Court Opinion

ID: 9906816
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-05 14:25:13.191763+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:48:39.579986
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                        Washington State
                                                                                        Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Division Two

                                                                                        December 5, 2023

    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                          DIVISION II
 In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of                          No. 57376-8-II

 MELVIN CARLOS EDWARDS,

                                 Petitioner.
                                                              UNPUBLISHED OPINION

        CRUSER, J. — In this Personal Restraint Petition (PRP), Melvin Edwards challenges the

sentence he received in 2014 as a juvenile in adult court for second degree rape and first degree

kidnapping. He was also convicted of first degree attempted murder in juvenile court. Edwards

pleaded guilty to these crimes and is currently serving an indeterminate sentence of 158 months to

life. He completed the six-and-a-half-year sentence he received for the attempted murder

conviction in a juvenile facility.

        Edwards filed a CrR 7.8 motion for relief which was transferred to this court as a PRP after

a hearing in September 2022. Edwards, who was 14 at the time of his crimes, argues that he is

entitled to a resentencing hearing due to the sentencing court’s failure to meaningfully consider

the mitigating factors of his youth as required by Houston-Sconiers. However, under the recent

supreme court cases of In re Personal Restraint of Carrasco and In re Personal Restraint of

Hinton, Edwards’ petition is time barred because he relies solely on the procedural violation of

Houston-Sconiers for his claim for relief.
No. 57376-8-II

        Second, even if this court were to consider the merits of his petition, he fails to demonstrate

actual and substantial prejudice because he has not shown that the sentencing court, when faced

with additional evidence of the mitigating factors of youth, would have imposed a sentence lower

than what he received, particularly in light of the fact that the sentence he received is precisely

what he agreed to and advocated for in his plea agreement. Accordingly, we deny Edwards’

petition.

                                               FACTS

                                  I. CRIME AND PLEA AGREEMENT

        In July 2013, Melvin Edwards “abducted a seven-year-old child, took her into a secluded

forested area, raped her, and attempted to kill her via strangulation.” Br. of Resp’t at 3. The State

charged Edwards with first degree attempted murder with sexual motivation, first degree rape, first

degree child rape, and first degree kidnapping with sexual motivation. Had Edwards not entered

into a plea agreement, he faced the following consecutive standard sentencing ranges: 187.5 to

249.75 months for first degree attempted murder plus 24 months for the sexual motivation

sentencing enhancement; 93 to 123 months to life for first degree rape; and 51-68 months for first

degree kidnapping plus 24 months for the sexual motivation sentencing enhancement. In total,

before the plea agreement, Edwards faced 31.625 to 40.73 years to life.

        Edwards ultimately pleaded guilty to attempted murder in the first degree, rape in the

second degree,1 and kidnapping in the first degree. Edwards stipulated to decline to adult court for

the rape and kidnapping charges. In remanding the rape and kidnapping charges to adult court, the

1
  Had Edwards not entered into a plea agreement with the State, he faced a charge of rape in the
first degree rather than second degree.

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No. 57376-8-II

trial court considered the Kent factors. The parties stipulated that the Kent criteria supported

declination to adult court.

       Pursuant to the plea agreement, the attempted murder charge remained in juvenile court

and he agreed to a manifest injustice sentence until his 21st birthday, making his sentence in

juvenile court just over six and a half years. He served his juvenile sentence and is now serving a

sentence of 158 months to life (running consecutively to his juvenile sentence). Edwards was 14

years old at the time of the crime. He is now 24 years old.

                                    II. SENTENCING HEARING

       During Edwards’ sentencing hearing, his defense counsel explained to the court that

Edwards “is a child” who was “raised in some very difficult circumstances, . . . some of which

were quite appalling.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 38. He went on to explain that Edwards “is a special

needs child,” and was at a second-grade reading level at the time of the crime, even though he was

14, and had a somewhat “childlike understanding of things.” Id.

       The sentencing court also received a pre-sentence investigation report. The report

discussed his age, history of abuse, special needs, mental health diagnoses, and some of the

difficulties he experienced in childhood. Edwards was diagnosed with ADHD and bipolar disorder.

He endured years of physical abuse from his stepdad and attempted suicide in 2012 during an

episode in which he lashed out at his mother and brother and jeopardized their safety to the point

that police were called to restrain Edwards.

                               III. POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURE

       The judgment and sentence in Edwards’ case became final on October 31, 2014. In March

2022, Edwards filed a CrR 7.8 motion requesting resentencing under State v. Houston-Sconiers.

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No. 57376-8-II

The State requested that the CrR 7.8 motion be transferred to this court as a PRP. The trial court

transferred Edwards’ motion to this court in September 2022.

                                            DISCUSSION

I. EDWARDS FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE IS ENTITLED TO RESENTENCING BASED ON THE
SENTENCING COURT’S PROCEDURAL ERROR IN FAILING TO MEANINGFULLY CONSIDER MITIGATING
FACTORS OF YOUTH

        Edwards argues that he is entitled to a resentencing hearing because the sentencing court

failed to meaningfully consider the mitigating qualities of youthfulness when it sentenced him to

an indeterminate sentence of 158 months to life. He argues that, as such, prejudice should be

presumed under Domingo-Cornelio. The State responds that the sentencing court did, in fact,

consider Edwards’ youth, and that Edwards cannot demonstrate actual and substantial prejudice

because he received the precise sentence he requested.

        We deny Edwards’ petition because a sentencing court’s procedural error alone in not

considering the Houston-Sconiers factors is not retroactive and does not constitute per se prejudice

in a personal restraint petition. Edwards must demonstrate actual and substantial prejudice by

showing that he would have received a shorter sentence had the sentencing court meaningfully

considered the mitigating qualities of youthfulness at the time of his original sentencing. Even if

Edwards’ petition were not time barred based on the non-retroactivity of a procedural Houston-

Sconiers violation—the only error he asserts—Edwards fails to show actual and substantial

prejudice and is therefore not entitled to relief.

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No. 57376-8-II

A. Legal Principles

       1. Meaningful consideration of the mitigating factors of youth

       In 2017, our supreme court held that “trial courts have full discretion to impose sentences

below [the Sentencing Reform Act] SRA guidelines and/or statutory enhancements based on

youth.” State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 18, 391 P.3d 409 (2017) (capitalization omitted).

The court explained that according to Miller v. Alabama, sentencing courts must consider a

defendant’s age and mitigating factors of youth such as a defendant’s “ ‘immaturity, impetuosity,

and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.’ ” Id. at 23 (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.

460, 477, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012)). Additional mitigating factors that courts

must consider include familial and peer pressure, family circumstances, the defendant’s

surrounding environment, and “how youth impacted any legal defense, along with any factors

suggesting that the child might be successfully rehabilitated.” Id. In 2020, the supreme court held

that Houston-Sconiers “requires retroactive application on collateral review.” In re Pers. Restraint

of Domingo-Cornelio, 196 Wn.2d 255, 259, 474 P.3d 524 (2020), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 141

S. Ct. 1753, 209 L. Ed. 2d 515 (2021).

       2. Actual and substantial prejudice

       Generally, a petitioner seeking relief on collateral review must, by a preponderance of the

evidence, demonstrate actual and substantial prejudice when alleging a constitutional error. In re

Pers. Restraint of Forcha-Williams, 200 Wn.2d 581, 599, 520 P.3d 939 (2022). In the context of

sentencing juveniles under the SRA, a petitioner does not demonstrate per se prejudice by showing

merely that the sentencing court committed a procedural error under Houston-Sconiers. Id.

“Rather, a petitioner must show by a preponderance of the evidence that his sentence would have

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No. 57376-8-II

been shorter if the sentencing judge complied with Houston-Sconiers. This requires something

more than merely showing the judge did not comply with Houston-Sconiers’ dual mandates.” Id.

If the sentencing court imposed the lowest sentence in the sentencing range, then that “is evidence

that the judge was willing to consider mitigating factors that justify a lower sentence,” in cases

where a petitioner is alleging that the sentencing court failed to consider the mitigating qualities

of his youth prior to imposing the sentence. Domingo-Cornelio, 196 Wn.2d at 268.

       3. Retroactivity of Houston-Sconiers

       In 2020, the supreme court held that Houston-Sconiers “requires retroactive application on

collateral review.” Id. However, Houston-Sconiers has a procedural component and a substantive

component. Forcha-Williams, 200 Wn.2d at 594. The supreme court recently clarified that only

the substantive component of Houston-Sconiers is retroactive. See In re Pers. Restraint of

Carrasco, 1 Wn.3d 224, 233, 525 P.3d 196 (2023) (“[T]his court has since confirmed that

Houston-Sconiers’ procedural ‘dual mandates’ are not retroactive and therefore do not apply on

collateral review to a sentence that is long final.”); In re Pers. Restraint of Hinton, 1 Wn.3d 317,

331, 525 P.3d 156 (2023) (“Therefore, the rule announced by Houston-Sconiers that applies

retroactively to Hinton’s case is the substantive rule that courts may not impose ‘certain adult

sentences . . . on juveniles who possess such diminished culpability that the adult standard SRA

ranges and enhancements would be disproportionate punishment.’ ” (alteration in original)

(quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Ali, 196 Wn.2d 220, 239, 474 P.3d 507.)) Thus, a claim of error

brought more than one year after a judgment becomes final that is predicated solely on a

procedural violation of Houston-Sconiers is not retroactive under RCW 10.73.100(6).

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No. 57376-8-II

B. Application

       Assuming without deciding that the trial court did not meaningfully consider any

mitigating circumstances relating to Edwards’ youth2, this court should deny Edwards’ petition for

three reasons. First, Edwards relies solely on the procedural violation of Houston-Sconiers to

argue that he has suffered actual and substantial prejudice. Edwards claims that “[o]nce a petitioner

shows that a Houston-Sconiers sentencing did not occur, he has shown actual and substantial

prejudice.” Pet’r Br. at 6. As support for this statement, Edwards cites to this court’s decision in

In re Personal Restraint of Miller, 21 Wn. App. 2d 257, 264, 505 P.3d 585 (2022). He argues that

“[a] sentencing court’s failure to weigh and consider the mitigating qualities of youth as mandated

by Houston-Sconiers is an error of constitutional magnitude that creates a presumption of prejudice

under Domingo-Cornelio and mandates a new sentencing hearing.” Pet’r Br. at 6. 3

       This understanding of Domingo-Cornelio is inaccurate. In Forcha-Williams, the supreme

court stated explicitly that “Domingo-Cornelio did not establish a per se prejudice rule based solely

2
   Edwards claims that the sentencing court “never meaningfully considered any mitigating
circumstances relating to his youth.” Pet’r Br. at 4. This argument ignores the fact that the
sentencing court did in fact grapple to some extent with the mitigating factors of his youth. While
it was not discussed at length during the sentencing hearing, the court was presented with the pre-
sentence investigation which outlined his childhood abuse, learning difficulties, and family
environment, among other factors. Additionally, the court considered the Kent factors before
declining the rape and kidnapping charges to adult court. The sentencing court did not ignore
mitigating factors of Edwards’ youth entirely, as was the case in Domingo-Cornelio. That said, the
examination of the mitigating qualities of Edwards’ youth by the sentencing court arguably fell
short of that contemplated by Houston-Sconiers.
3
  While we could have been more precise in our wording on this point in Miller, Edwards omits
the passage in Miller that says “[a]nd it is more likely than not that Miller would have received a
lesser sentence had the sentencing court complied with Houston-Sconiers.” Miller, 21 Wn. App.2d
at 264. Thus, we did not rely on the procedural violation of Houston-Sconiers alone to reach our
conclusion that Miller demonstrated prejudice.

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No. 57376-8-II

on a Houston-Sconiers error.” Forcha-Williams, 200 Wn.2d at 599. The court explained that a

petitioner must do more than merely show that the sentencing court did not comply with Houston-

Sconiers’ dual mandates. Id. Rather, the petitioner must demonstrate that had the court complied

with Houston-Sconiers, he would have received a shorter sentence. Id. Edwards’ argument ignores

this holding. Edwards does not, at any point in his brief, argue that he suffered a substantive

violation of the 8th Amendment because his sentence more likely than not would have been shorter

if the sentencing judge complied with Houston-Sconiers at his original sentencing hearing. Id.

       Second, Edwards’ argument also overlooks that our supreme court recently clarified that a

procedural Houston-Sconiers violation is not, by itself, retroactive. Carrasco, 1 Wn.3d at 233;

Hinton, 1 Wn.3d at 330-31. As Edwards relies on the procedural Houston-Sconiers violation alone,

and does not argue that he suffered a substantive violation of the 8th Amendment because his

sentence would have been shorter if the trial court had complied with the procedural mandate of

Houston-Sconiers at his original sentencing, his petition is time barred under Carrasco and

Hinton.4

       Third, even if this petition were not time barred and Edwards had argued a substantive

violation of the 8th Amendment, Edwards fails to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence

that his sentence would have been shorter had the sentencing court complied with the procedural

mandate of Houston-Sconiers. The reason he cannot make this showing is because the sentence he

received is the precise sentence he asked for and agreed to as part of his carefully negotiated plea

agreement.

4
 We note that neither party discusses or cites Carrasco or Hinton. Both of these supreme court
decisions were issued prior to the briefing in this case and were available to the parties.

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No. 57376-8-II

       Although Edwards relies on Domingo-Cornelio as support for his prejudice claim, the facts

of his case bear almost no factual similarity to the facts in that case. Domingo-Cornelio was

convicted after a jury trial, and at sentencing both he and the State were free to argue for any

sentence that each felt appropriate. Domingo-Cornelio, 196 Wn.2d at 259-60. The State

recommended a sentence at the top of the standard range while Domingo-Cornelio recommended

a sentence at the bottom. Id. at 260. The trial court sided with Domingo-Cornelio in the face of

these competing recommendations and imposed a sentence at the bottom of the range. Id. at 261.

       Here, the parties entered into an intricate plea settlement in which the parties agreed that

the attempted murder charge would be adjudicated in juvenile court and the rape second degree

and kidnapping first degree charges adjudicated in adult court, with joint sentencing

recommendations as to each count. In the State’s offer of settlement, it noted that if Edwards

rejected the State’s plea offer and did not prevail at the decline hearing, Edwards would be

proceeding to trial on attempted murder in the first degree with sexual motivation, first degree

rape, first degree rape of a child, and first degree kidnapping with sexual motivation.

       Had Edwards been convicted of all of his crimes in adult court, his maximum exposure on

the attempted murder count alone was 270 months in prison. The plea agreement provided that

Edwards would remain in Juvenile Rehabilitation Administration until his 21st birthday on the

attempted first degree murder count and then serve an agreed sentence of 158 months thereafter in

the Department of Corrections on the other two counts.

       Not only did Edwards not receive a sentence at the bottom of the standard range as in

Domingo-Cornelio, but he received the exact sentence he bargained for and requested. Edwards

points to no evidence in the record suggesting that the trial court would have given him a lower

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No. 57376-8-II

sentence than the one he specifically bargained for had it complied with the procedural mandate

of Houston-Sconiers at his original sentencing hearing.5 As such, Edwards fails to demonstrate

actual and substantial prejudice.

                                        CONCLUSION

         Edwards’ PRP is barred, and it would fail on its merits even if it were not. We deny

Edwards’ PRP.

         A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,

it is so ordered.

                                                    CRUSER, J.
    We concur:

    GLASGOW, C.J.

    PRICE, J.

5
 We also note the futility of remanding Edwards’ case for resentencing when he is bound by his
plea agreement to request the precise sentence he already received.

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