Court Opinion

ID: 9940291
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-13 21:00:50.330706+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:42.894202
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10732   Document: 30-1    Date Filed: 02/13/2024   Page: 1 of 9

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 23-10732
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       In re: SHIRLEY WHITE-LETT,
                                                              Debtor.
       ___________________________________________________
       ________________________________________
       SHIRLEY WHITE-LETT,
                                                   Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON,
       JORDAN E. LUBIN,
       Chapter 7 Trustee,
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                23-10732

                                                    Defendants-Appellees.

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-03992-WMR
                           ____________________

       Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Shirley White-Lett, proceeding pro se, appeals the denial of
       her motion for an injunction prohibiting the Bank of New York
       Mellon (“BONYM”) from foreclosing on her property pending the
       completion of her appeals from the bankruptcy court. She argues
       that, though she did not move the bankruptcy court for such an
       injunction first, impracticability excuses her from doing so, and she
       meets the traditional factors for an injunction to issue. After
       review, we affirm.
                               I.     Background
             White-Lett originally filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in
       January 2010. In February 2011, she was discharged, and the
       bankruptcy case was closed in July 2012. Then, in 2020, White-Lett
       moved to reopen the case to prosecute adversary proceedings
       against BONYM, its agents, and others to determine whether a
       mortgage debt that BONYM was attempting to pursue had been
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       23-10732                    Opinion of the Court                                   3

       discharged in the original bankruptcy case. White-Lett argued that
       the mortgage debt had been discharged in the resolution of the
       original bankruptcy proceeding, and that she had not made any
       agreement to reaffirm her debt. 1 The bankruptcy court granted
       the motion and reopened the case.
               BONYM then filed a motion for relief from the automatic
       bankruptcy stay, seeking to foreclose on White-Lett’s property. It
       argued that the automatic stay had terminated when the case was
       originally closed in 2012, that the later reopening in 2020 did not
       reinstate the stay, and that the stay would not apply to White-Lett’s
       property anyway because it was no longer property of the estate.
       But if the court determined that the stay did not terminate in 2012,
       BONYM asked the court to lift the stay now.
             White-Lett objected to BONYM’s request, arguing that an
       appeal in a separate adversarial proceeding against BONYM 2

       1 The instant appeal does not require us to resolve issues related to the

       discharge of the debt and the validity of BONYM’s interest in the property.
       2 White-Lett filed a complaint in a separate adversary proceeding in the

       bankruptcy court against BONYM and others, seeking to adjudicate the
       “validity of a lien,” to “obtain declaratory and injunctive relief as to the validity
       and enforceability of a debt and security,” to avoid an “unperfected lien,” to
       object to BONYM’s $900,000 proof of claim related to White-Lett’s mortgage,
       and to obtain sanctions for violating a discharge injunction. BONYM moved
       to dismiss, and the bankruptcy court granted the motion in part, dismissing
       (among other claims) White-Lett’s objections to BONYM’s proof of claim.
       The bankruptcy court reasoned that White-Lett lacked standing and her claim
       was precluded because these issues had previously been litigated
       unsuccessfully in a state court case. While White-Lett brought different claims
       in the state court case, the bankruptcy court held that ultimately “she pleads
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       4                         Opinion of the Court                      23-10732

       divested the bankruptcy court of jurisdiction to hear BONYM’s
       motion for relief from the automatic stay. She then requested to
       stay consideration of BONYM’s motion for relief from the
       automatic stay pending the resolution of the adversary
       proceeding.3
              The bankruptcy court gave an oral ruling, in which it
       granted BONYM’s motion for relief from the automatic stay. It
       held that (1) the appeal in the separate adversarial proceeding did
       not divest it of jurisdiction; (2) White-Lett received a discharge in
       2011 and her original bankruptcy action was closed in 2012; (3) any
       property held by White-Lett at the time of the closure that was not
       administered was considered abandoned to her and was no longer
       part of the bankruptcy estate; and (4) the automatic stay terminated
       when the proceeding closed in 2012. The bankruptcy court then
       entered a written order confirming that the automatic stay
       terminated in 2012 and granting BONYM’s motion for relief from
       the automatic stay “for the reasons stated on the record.” White-
       Lett appealed this order to the district court.

       the same facts arising out of the same situations and seeks the same relief: to
       invalidate an assignment she has no legal standing to challenge.” White-Lett
       obtained a certification that the bankruptcy court’s ruling was final and
       immediately appealable, and she appealed to the district court. That appeal
       remains pending in the district court.
       3 She also supplemented her response to add that BONYM’s motion should be

       denied because she had asserted setoff claims against BONYM that would
       reduce the amount she owed.
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       23-10732                  Opinion of the Court                              5

               In the district court, White-Lett moved to stay the
       bankruptcy court’s order and to enjoin BONYM from foreclosing
       on her house pending the resolution of her appeals. Following a
       hearing on the motion, the district court gave an oral ruling
       denying the requested injunction because: (1) in a separate state
       court proceeding, a preliminary injunction already prohibited
       foreclosure and so there was not a great likelihood of irreparable
       injury; and (2) White-Lett had a low likelihood of success on the
       merits because a state court had already ruled that BONYM owned
       the mortgage. The district court also expressed skepticism that any
       impracticability excused White-Lett from first asking for an
       injunction in the bankruptcy court, as required by the bankruptcy
       rules. 4 White-Lett appealed. 5

       4 While not the primary basis for denying White-Lett’s motion, the district

       court stated at the hearing that “there are a lot of other independent grounds
       for maybe why I shouldn’t grant an injunction, like, you didn’t go to the
       bankruptcy court to start with and you really have no argument why you
       didn’t . . . .”
       5 On appeal, White-Lett moved to expedite. She argued that because the state

       court had recently dissolved its injunction, it was necessary to expedite her
       appeal to prevent her case from being mooted by BONYM foreclosing on her
       property. BONYM did not object to an expedited decision. An appeal “may
       be expedited only by the court upon motion and for good cause shown.” 11th
       Cir. Rule 27-1 I.O.P. 3. Good cause exists to expedite the decision of White-
       Lett’s appeal. The dissolution of the state court injunction allows BONYM to
       foreclose within a short time. And because this appeal is about BONYM’s
       ability to foreclose on White-Lett’s property and BONYM’s foreclosure on
       that property would moot the appeal, the risk that the appeal would be
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       6                        Opinion of the Court                    23-10732

                                  II.     Discussion
               On appeal, White-Lett argues that the district court abused
       its discretion in denying her motion for a preliminary injunction
       staying the bankruptcy court’s order granting BONYM’s motion
       for relief from the automatic stay and enjoining BONYM from
       foreclosing on her house pending the resolution of her appeals. She
       argues that: (1) impracticability excused her from first asking for
       injunctive relief in the bankruptcy court, as required by the
       bankruptcy rules; (2) even if impracticability did not excuse her
       from first asking for injunctive relief in the bankruptcy court, the
       district court did not dismiss her motion on that ground; and (3) an
       injunction is warranted because she faces a substantial risk of
       foreclosure, and she is likely to succeed on the merits. After
       review, we find that impracticability did not excuse her from asking
       for injunctive relief in the bankruptcy court. Because this finding
       disposes of the case, we affirm.
              “We review the decision to deny a preliminary injunction
       for abuse of discretion.” Mata Chorwadi, Inc. v. City of Boynton Beach,
       66 F.4th 1259, 1263 (11th Cir. 2023) (quotations omitted). And “we
       may affirm on any ground supported by the record, regardless of
       whether that ground was relied upon or even considered below.”

       mooted establishes good cause to expedite it. See In re Kahihikolo, 807 F.2d
       1540, 1542 (11th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, we GRANT the motion to expedite.
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       23-10732                   Opinion of the Court                                 7

       Aaron Priv. Clinic Mgmt. LLC v. Berry, 912 F.3d 1330, 1335 (11th Cir.
       2019) (quotation omitted).
                “Ordinarily, a party must move first in the bankruptcy court
       for . . . a stay of a[n] . . . order . . . of the bankruptcy court pending
       appeal” and “an order suspending, modifying, restoring, or
       granting an injunction while an appeal is pending . . . .” Fed. R.
       Bankr. P. 8007(a)(1)(A)–(C). Relief may first be requested “in the
       court where the appeal is pending” only if the motion “show[s] that
       moving first in the bankruptcy court would be impracticable.” Id.
       8007(b)(2).
               White-Lett admits that she did not first move the
       bankruptcy court for an injunction pending her appeal in the
       district court. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8007(a)(1)(C). Nor did she
       adequately explain how it was impracticable for her to first move
       in the bankruptcy court. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8007(b)(2)(A). White-
       Lett’s primary explanation of impracticability is that the
       bankruptcy court did not address every argument she made in
       opposition to BONYM’s motion for relief from the automatic stay.
       She argues that the bankruptcy judge did not “make a ruling or any
       findings of fact or conclusions of law on her objections relating to
       her statutory right to a setoff nor made any ruling on her requests
       for stay of proceedings.” 6 Thus, she argues, it would have been

       6 To be clear, this “request for stay of proceedings” is distinct from the motion

       to stay that White-Lett first sought in the district court and that is at issue in
       this appeal. The “request for stay of proceedings” White-Lett made to the
       bankruptcy court—a request made only in passing in her opposition brief, not
       as a standalone motion—was a request for the bankruptcy court to stay a
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       8                          Opinion of the Court                        23-10732

       impracticable to argue for a stay to the bankruptcy judge because
       there were no findings to challenge.
              But at the hearing on BONYM’s motion for relief from the
       automatic stay, the bankruptcy judge provided extensive reasoning
       as to why it was granting the motion for relief from the automatic
       stay. That its oral ruling did not explicitly mention White-Lett’s
       request to stay ruling on BONYM’s motion or her setoff argument
       does not mean that the bankruptcy court did not consider those
       arguments. By explaining that it had jurisdiction to decide the
       motion for relief from the automatic stay, and then granting that
       motion, the bankruptcy court was implicitly rejecting White-Lett’s
       request to stay ruling on BONYM’s motion and her setoff
       argument. It is also unclear how the bankruptcy court’s failure to
       discuss those arguments made it impracticable for White-Lett to
       ask the bankruptcy court, rather than the district court, for a stay
       pending appeal or an injunction. Nor does White-Lett cite any
       authority for that proposition.
              As White-Lett did not comply with the requirement that she
       first move for an injunction in the bankruptcy court, we may affirm
       on that ground even though the district court did not rely on it
       when announcing its decision. Berry, 912 F.3d at 1335. Thus, the

       ruling on BONYM’s motion for relief from the automatic stay in the first
       instance. The motion to stay that White-Lett made to the district court, and
       that is at issue in this appeal, was a motion to stay the bankruptcy court’s order
       granting BONYM’s motion for relief and its consequences (e.g., potential
       foreclosure).
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       23-10732              Opinion of the Court                       9

       district court did not abuse its discretion in denying White-Lett’s
       motion for an injunction and stay pending appeal.
             AFFIRMED.