Court Opinion

ID: 9569018
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:09:45.658468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:19:36.090983
License: Public Domain

Sears, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join fully in the Chief Justice’s partial concurrence and dissent. I write separately in order to call special attention to two serious concerns raised by the majority’s affirmance of Greene’s death sentence. First, in Division 2, the majority relies entirely upon the standard enunciated in Wainwright v. Witt4 in dismissing Greene’s argument that the trial court committed reversible error by dismissing five prospective jurors because they expressed varying degrees of opposition to the death penalty, without considering this Court’s treatment of Wainwright. Our cases interpreting the Wainwright standard establish that a prospective juror may not be disqualified merely for stating on voir dire that they would have difficulty imposing the death penalty, that they have misgivings about the death penalty, or that they would tend to lean toward a life sentence.5 The record of voir dire in this case, explained at length in the Chief Justice’s opinion, makes it clear that under our case law interpreting Wainwright, each of the five prospective jurors was qualified to serve, and that the trial court committed reversible error in ruling otherwise.
Second, in Division 26 the majority opinion sanctions the State’s use of certain religious teachings in arguing for the imposition of the death penalty, contrary to our law. In Georgia, it is improper to urge that the teachings of a particular religion command the imposition of the death penalty.6 Rather, jurors must be charged with sentencing on the death penalty, as in all cases, in accordance with the laws of the *463State.7 The prosecutor’s direct references during closing argument to the Baptist faith, biblical commandments concerning retribution and mercy, and the Sermon on the Mount, all of which are quoted in the Chief Justice’s opinion, constituted inflammatory appeals to the private religious beliefs of the jurors, and therefore were improper.8 Such comments are especially unjustifiable coming from a State’s attorney, “whose duty is as much to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.”9
Decided March 15, 1996 —
Reconsideration denied March 28, 1996.
William L. Kirby II, Charlotta Norby, Stephen B. Bright, Herbert L. Wells, for appellant.
Douglas C. Pullen, District Attorney, J. Gray Conger, Lori L. Canfield, Assistant District Attorneys, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

 See Jones v. Kemp, 706 FSupp. 1534, 1559 (N.D. Ga. 1989).

 Id.

 Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78, 88 (55 SC 629, 79 LE 1314) (1935).

 469 U. S. 412 (105 SC 844, 83 LE2d 841) (1985).

 See Jarrell v. State, 261 Ga. 880, 881 (413 SE2d 710) (1992); Isaacs v. State, 259 Ga. 717, 731 (386 SE2d 316) (1989); Alderman v. State, 254 Ga. 206, 207 (327 SE2d 168) (1985). See also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510, 522 (88 SC 1770, 20 LE2d 776) (1968) (quoted at p. 453 of the Chief Justice’s opinion).

 Hill v. State, 263 Ga. 37, 45 (427 SE2d 770) (1993); Evans v. Thigpen, 809 F2d 239 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 483 U. S. 1033 (107 SC 3278, 97 LE2d 782) (1987).