Court Opinion

ID: 9744446
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:03:19.69384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:49.289600
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McMORROW, also specially concurring: I write separately because I do not agree that the defendant’s death sentence should be vacated for the reasons stated in the majority opinion. I agree with Justice Miller’s partial dissenting opinion to the extent that it rejects the majority’s characterization of the defendant’s actions in this case as an "explosive episode.” Nonetheless, I concur with the majority’s disposition insofar as it affirms the defendant’s conviction and vacates the death penalty because under the facts of this case I believe that the defendant’s death sentence is unreasonably disparate to the natural life sentence imposed on her codefendant, Eddie Williams. The majority opinion states that although jealousy and rage are no excuse for murder, the defendant led a relatively blameless life except for this one "explosive episode.” The majority then concludes that this case is analogous to a line of cases in which this court has vacated the death penalty where the defendant acted impulsively in response to mental or emotional disturbances or abnormally stressful circumstances. People v. Blackwell, 171 Ill. 2d 338 (1996); People v. Leger, 149 Ill. 2d 355 (1992); People v. Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d 253 (1989); People v. Buggs, 112 Ill. 2d 284 (1986); People v. Gleckler, 82 Ill. 2d 145 (1980); People v. Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d 564 (1980). Because I find that these cases are distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of the present case, I do not agree that they serve as the proper justification for vacating the trial court’s decision to sentence the defendant to death. I agree with the dissenting opinion’s statement that the murder in this case was the culmination of an escalating history of the defendant’s aggression and hostility toward the victim. I further agree that the defendant’s actions were not an immediate response to a stressful event. Rather, the defendant, over a lengthy period of time, planned to take the victim’s life in order to fulfill her own desire to continue an extramarital affair with the victim’s husband. Despite my disagreement with the majority’s rationale, I nonetheless concur in the judgment, based on my analysis of a related issue raised by the defendant in her supplemental brief, i.e., whether the defendant’s death sentence is unreasonably disparate to the life sentence imposed on her codefendant, Eddie Williams. In my view, this is the pivotal sentencing issue raised on appeal. Although the majority acknowledges the issue and offers some analysis, it declines to answer the question. Thus, I offer my reasons for concurring in the disposition reached in this case. Following a jury trial, codefendant Williams was convicted of the first degree murder of Valerie McDonald, conspiracy to commit murder and armed violence. The jury determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams fired the shot which resulted in the victim’s death. Following a separate hearing, the jury found Williams eligible for the death penalty and found no mitigating circumstances sufficient to preclude its imposition. Accordingly, the trial court sentenced Williams to death. On appeal to this court, we vacated Williams’ death sentence and remanded the cause for a new sentencing hearing based upon the cumulative errors which occurred during the sentencing phase of Williams’ trial. People v. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d 1 (1994). Following a new sentencing hearing in 1995, a jury found Williams death eligible. However, the jury was unable to reach a unanimous decision with respect to whether there existed mitigating factors sufficient to preclude a death sentence. Therefore, the trial court sentenced Williams to a term of natural life in prison without parole. On appeal in the present case, the defendant maintains that Williams’ culpability for the murder of Valerie McDonald was "measurably greater” than her culpability. See People v. St. Pierre, 146 Ill. 2d 494, 514 (1992) (death sentence upheld because the culpability of the defendant who delivered the fatal blows was "measurably greater” than that of the individuals who conceived the plan to murder); People v. Ashford, 121 Ill. 2d 55 (1988) (death sentence upheld where defendant was the triggerman, firing nearly all of the fatal shots which killed four victims). In the alternative, she argues that she and Williams were equally culpable. Notably, the State, in its supplemental brief, repeatedly concedes that defendant Smith was no more culpable than codefendant Williams. The defendant contends that because Williams’ character and background are more contemptible, his criminal record more extensive and his prospects for rehabilitation significantly poorer than the defendant’s, Williams’ life sentence for the murder of Valerie McDonald renders her death sentence unconstitutional (U.S. Const., amend. VIII; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). In sentencing the defendant to death, the trial court in this case characterized the defendant’s actions in orchestrating the murder as cold and callous. The court also found that the defendant acted with a malignant heart, and that she served as the moving force behind the victim’s murder. However, the trial court in the case at bar did not have the opportunity to consider Williams’ lesser sentence because Williams’ sentence was reduced to life imprisonment after the death penalty had been imposed on defendant Smith. This court gives great deference to the trial court in sentencing matters (Ashford, 121 Ill. 2d at 88). Deference to a trial court’s sentencing judgment is not warranted "where an arbitrary and unreasonable sentencing disparity exists between equally culpable codefendants” (Ashford, 121 Ill. 2d at 88). In People v. Page, 156 Ill. 2d 258 (1993), we considered the issue of whether the defendant’s death sentence should be vacated because his sentencing jury was precluded from hearing nonstatutory mitigation evidence that his codefendant had pied guilty and was sentenced to life imprisonment. We held that evidence of a codefendant’s lesser sentence is not a relevant mitigating factor for consideration at the "trial level” in a death penalty case because the safeguard to prevent unjustified disparity between equally culpable defendants exists at the "appellate level.” Page, 156 Ill. 2d at 272. Therefore, I believe it is appropriate to address the disparity between the defendant’s and Williams’ sentences at this juncture. Comparative proportionality review in death penalty cases is not required by the United States Constitution (Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 79 L. Ed. 2d 29, 104 S. Ct. 871 (1984)) and it is not a feature of the capital sentencing process under the Illinois Constitution (People v. Jimerson, 127 Ill. 2d 12 (1989)). However, the defendant is not asking this court to compare her case to other unrelated cases with similar facts. Rather, she requests that this court compare her death sentence with the life sentence imposed on her accomplice. This court previously has considered the issue of whether a sentence of death is disproportionately harsh in comparison with a less severe sanction imposed upon a codefendant convicted of the same crime. See People v. Towns, 174 Ill. 2d 453 (1996); People v. Byron, 164 Ill. 2d 279 (1995); People v. Burt, 168 Ill. 2d 49 (1995); People v. Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d 148 (1994); St. Pierre, 146 Ill. 2d 494; People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264 (1992); Ashford, 121 Ill. 2d 55; People v. Gleckler, 82 Ill. 2d 145 (1980). This court has consistently recognized that it has a duty to prevent arbitrary and capriciously imposed death sentences (Burt, 168 Ill. 2d at 80; People v. Bean, 137 Ill. 2d 65 (1990); Gleckler, 82 Ill. 2d 145), and a duty to ensure that cases in which a death sentence is imposed are rationally distinguished from those in which a death sentence is not imposed (St. Pierre, 146 Ill. 2d at 513). Judicial review of codefendants’ sentences in a capital case is appropriate in order to avoid a disparate imposition of the death penalty. Page, 156 Ill. 2d at 270-71. In reviewing whether a death sentence is proper or arbitrary, prior decisions of this court have focused on the nature of the offense and each individual’s relative involvement or culpability, the defendant’s character and background, including criminal records, and the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation. Burt, 168 Ill. 2d at 80; Flores, 153 Ill. 2d at 294. Similarly situated individuals should not be given arbitrary or unreasonably disparate sentences. Burt, 168 Ill. 2d at 80. The State argues that the record in the case at bar indicates that defendant is "as culpable” as Williams and that defendant’s culpability is "just as great” as Williams’ culpability. The State does not argue that defendant is more culpable than Williams. If she were more culpable, then she would be more deserving of the death penalty, but, again, the State does not and cannot argue that defendant was more culpable than Williams. As the majority opinion recognizes, Williams served as a ready and willing accomplice to the victim’s murder. He had several opportunities to abandon the conspiracy and prevent the victim’s death. It was Williams who had the final opportunity to spare the victim’s life, but instead chose to fire the fatal shot. See, e.g., Byron, 164 Ill. 2d at 303. Comparing the character and background of defendant and Williams does not provide a sufficient basis for the sentence disparity. I find no evidence that defendant had ever been arrested prior to her arrest in connection with this murder. The defendant has no prior criminal convictions. The record contains numerous letters from individuals who recounted the defendant’s positive life accomplishments prior to her involvement in this crime. In contrast, Williams’ criminal background is extensive and serious. At the time that Williams murdered the victim in the present case, he was on parole for voluntary manslaughter and had been released from prison just a few months earlier. The voluntary manslaughter conviction stemmed from an incident in which Williams and another individual beat and strangled a man to death in his bed. Williams also had convictions for felony theft and burglary, retail theft and criminal trespass to a vehicle. Other testimony in the record shows that in 1978 Williams beat a woman named Bridget Williams. In 1979, he stole a woman’s purse; and in 1981, Williams threatened to shoot a man with a loaded revolver. The record further shows that the defendant has greater rehabilitative potential than her codefendant. Several prison chaplains testified or submitted affidavits stating that the defendant’s attitude and behavior during her incarceration show that she has the capacity to be a productive member of prison society. The chaplains attested to the defendant’s leadership skills and her positive influence on the other inmates. The defendant was described as a cooperative prisoner who is concerned for others. In contrast, Williams’ rehabilitative prospects appear to be poor. While imprisoned for voluntary manslaughter from 1982 to 1987, Williams received approximately 25 disciplinary tickets for various offenses, including threatening correctional officers. A clinical psychologist testified that Williams suffers from two personality disorders, including an antisocial personality. Most notably, Williams committed the murder in the case at bar after being released from prison only a few months earlier and while he was on parole for voluntary manslaughter. It is the duty of this court to vacate a death sentence where an unreasonable disparity exists between equally culpable codefendants. Ashford, 121 Ill. 2d at 88. The overriding principle in death penalty cases is that each case is unique and sentences must be evaluated on their individual facts. Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d at 280. In my opinion, the facts of this case indicate that the defendant’s culpability is no greater than that of her codefendant, and, after comparing their character and background, criminal history and potential for rehabilitation, I find that the evidence shown in the record does not reasonably support the disparate sentences imposed on the defendant and Williams. Cf. People v. Jackson, 145 Ill. 2d 43, 124-25 (1991). This is not to say that a defendant who initiates a murder-for-hire plan cannot receive the death penalty where a codefendant who fires the fatal shot receives a lesser sentence. Rather, I believe that in the facts of the present case there is no rational basis on which to affirm the death sentence received by the defendant when her death sentence is compared to the life sentence imposed on Williams. Therefore, I conclude and would hold that the defendant’s death sentence should be vacated and she, like Williams, should be sentenced to life imprisonment. For the reasons stated, I concur only in the judgment of the majority opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN joins in this special concurrence.