Court Opinion

ID: 9687755
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:46:36.919429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:31.243132
License: Public Domain

ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.
¶ 85. (<concurring). I write separately to address the "Bill Gates Rule" and also to clarify that the majority's cite to State v. Floyd, 2000 WI 14, 232 Wis. 2d 767, 606 N.W.2d 155, is not to be construed as authority for the proposition that a read-in offense entitles one to sentence credit for that read-in offense as a matter of law under all circumstances.
*57I
¶ 86. In the defense counsel's oral argument and in Justice Prosser's concurrence, references are made to the "Bill Gates Rule." Counsel defines that "rule" as one which should ensure that no defendant spend more time in custody than billionaire Bill Gates would spend in custody for the same conduct.
¶ 87. This argument assumes that Bill Gates would always be able to post bail at the earliest opportunity. This argument also assumes that the other defendant would be unable to post bail. We also must assume for the sake of this argument that Bill Gates and any other defendant received the exact same sentence. Even assuming these factors to he the case, however, the "Bill Gates Rule" does not, in reality, forward the defense counsel's argument.
¶ 88. In reality, some defendants, here Bill Gates, are able to post bail and thus, would not spend time in custody pre-sentencing. Other defendants, who cannot post bail, would indeed spend time in custody presentencing. Thus, Bill Gates may spend zero days in custody pre-conviction and the other defendant may spend, for example, 50 days in custody pre-conviction. However, assuming that both defendants receive the same period of incarceration at sentencing, Mr. Gates would actually serve 50 days more time in custody post-sentencing than the other defendant because of sentence credit. Under Wis. Stat. § 973.155, sentence credit is awarded for pre-sentence incarceration. In this example, Bill Gates is not entitled to receive credit post-sentencing and the other defendant then would receive credit relief post-sentencing of 50 days. The credit given is the great equalizer.
*58¶ 89. I write this concurrence to outline the fatal flaw of the defense counsel’s argument. That is, credit is due for those who deserve credit for pre-sentence incarceration. Such credit is not due for those who do not spend time in custody pre-sentencing. As a result, because of sentence credit, each defendant will ultimately serve the exact same amount of time in custody.
II
¶ 90. I write separately to clarify that the majority's use of Floyd is as an example but not as authority for the proposition that time served for a read-in offense will always be given as sentence credit. Wisconsin Stat. § 973.155(l)(a) entitles an offender to credit "for all days spent in custody in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed." However, whether credit is due for the same course of conduct may depend on the facts of the case and whether State v. Straszkowski, 2008 WI 65, ¶ 95, 310 Wis. 2d 259, 750 N.W.2d 835, changed the analysis in Floyd. When Floyd was decided, a read-in offense was deemed admitted for the purposes of sentencing. Now, under Straszkowski, a read-in offense is no longer deemed admitted. This new analysis now leaves open the question of whether the defendant is being sentenced for the same "course of conduct" because under Straszkowski, read-in offenses are not admitted. As a result, I write to clarify that this issue was not briefed or argued by the parties in this case and we do not decide that question today. This court then appropriately waits to decide these questions raised by this concurrence until we have the full benefit of the adversarial process to guide our decision.
¶ 91. For the foregoing reasons I concur.
*59¶ 92. I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this concurrence.