Court Opinion

ID: 9384606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-04 14:11:47.513481+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:54.952537
License: Public Domain

2023 WI 26

                  SUPREME COURT             OF    WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:              2020AP1362-CR

COMPLETE TITLE:        State of Wisconsin,
                                 Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,
                            v.
                       Jovan T. Mull,
                                 Defendant-Appellant.

                             REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
                             Reported at 401 Wis. 2d 195, 973 N.W.2d 14
                                        (2022 – unpublished)

OPINION FILED:         April 4, 2023
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:         November 29, 2022

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
   COURT:              Circuit
   COUNTY:             Milwaukee
   JUDGE:              Joseph R. Wall & Jonathan D. Watts

JUSTICES:
ROGGENSACK, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY,
HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.      DALLET, J., filed a
dissenting opinion.

NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:

       For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs
filed       by   Christine    A.   Remington,   assistant   attorney   general,
with whom on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general.
There was an oral argument by Christine A. Remington, assistant
attorney general.

       For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by
Christopher P. August, assistant state public defender. There
was an oral argument by Christopher P. August, assistant state
public defender.

                              2
                                                                         2023 WI 26
                                                                 NOTICE
                                                   This opinion is subject to further
                                                   editing and modification.   The final
                                                   version will appear in the bound
                                                   volume of the official reports.
No.       2020AP1362-CR
(L.C. No.    2015CF2419)

STATE OF WISCONSIN                             :             IN SUPREME COURT

State of Wisconsin,

             Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,                         FILED
      v.                                                          APR 4, 2023
Jovan T. Mull,                                                      Sheila T. Reiff
                                                                 Clerk of Supreme Court
             Defendant-Appellant.

ROGGENSACK, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY,
HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.      DALLET, J., filed a
dissenting opinion.

      REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.                 Reversed.

      ¶1     PATIENCE      DRAKE    ROGGENSACK,         J.     We      review        an

unpublished, per curiam decision from the court of appeals.1                       The

court of appeals granted defendant Jovan T. Mull a new trial

because     it   concluded   Mull   received   ineffective          assistance       of

      1State v. Mull (Mull II), No. 2020AP1362-CR, unpublished
slip op., (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2022) (per curiam).
                                                                         No.     2020AP1362-CR

counsel         at    his    trial,    which    resulted      in   his    conviction        for

first-degree reckless homicide.2

      ¶2         We conclude that Mull's trial counsel did not perform

deficiently.             Because we make this determination, we need not

assess         whether      counsel's       performance      prejudiced        the   defense.

Lastly, we decline Mull's request to grant him a new trial in

the interest of justice because the controversy was fully tried,

and       it     is      not    probable        that     justice       has      miscarried.

Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals.

                                       I.     BACKGROUND

                                       A.    The Incident

      ¶3         Ms. Ericka Walker was shot and killed in her bedroom

during a crowded house party in the early morning hours of March

7, 2015, when a fight bordering on a brawl erupted.                              Eyewitness

accounts are consistent so far as the general details of the

evening, but differ significantly regarding the specifics.

      ¶4         Most       accounts    describe       the   initial      outbreak     of    a

small,         personal      fight,    which    subsided      only   to      swell    into   a
larger clash almost immediately.                       The fight escalated quickly

from grabbing, to pushing, to throwing dishes, to the use of one

or multiple tasers.               A few people and Ms. Walker, who by most

accounts was not involved in the fight, sheltered in a bedroom

off of the main living area where the fight was taking place.

Seeing a roommate engaged in the fight, Ms. Walker pulled him

      2The Honorable Jonathan D. Watts of Milwaukee                                    County
presided and entered the judgment of conviction.

                                                2
                                                              No.    2020AP1362-CR

and his friend into the bedroom with her.                 However, the pair

continued to fight, throwing objects at people standing outside

the bedroom's main door from a second door to the bedroom.                       The

fight   culminated   when    someone   fired       multiple   shots       into   the

bedroom   through    the     closed        door,    striking        and    killing

Ms. Walker.    Ms. Walker's autopsy confirmed she was struck by

six bullets.

                        B.    The Investigation

    ¶5     Police arrived on scene and began investigating the

shooting immediately.       Witness accounts suggest that 40 to 100

people attended the party, and police obtained statements from

more than 25 individuals.         Eyewitness descriptions identified

the person who shot through the door as a black male who fired

the gun with his right hand, but descriptions were otherwise

very inconsistent.

    ¶6     The array of witness statements described the shooter

as 16-24 years old, 5'2"-5'11" tall, slim, medium or stocky

build, with a medium or dark complexion.                 Investigators were
told the shooter had short dreads, a short "afro," a four-inch

"afro," and "short, curly hair."            Numerous people described the

shooter as wearing a red sweatshirt, although some reported the

sweatshirt was "Adidas" brand, while others told investigators

it was a Wisconsin Badgers sweatshirt.               Two people told police

the shooter wore a blue sweatshirt.            Three individuals reported

seeing the shooter in a black or dark sweatshirt, while another

person reported the shooter was in a white t-shirt.                  The shooter

                                       3
                                                                      No.    2020AP1362-CR

was described as wearing red Rock Revival pants while others

reported the shooter wore black pants or blue jeans.

       ¶7      Accounts varied as to how many people were outside the

bedroom.           One   witness     placed         two    individuals      outside    the

bedroom, both with guns and one in an orange shirt.                          Others told

police three to eight men were looking for the two individuals

Ms. Walker pulled into the bedroom.                       Reports also varied as to

whether the lights were on or off in the living room during the

fight.       Nearly all accounts, however, suggested Vashawn Smyth3

and his friend Menjuan Bankhead were involved in the initial

stages of the fight.

       ¶8      Shortly after the party, rumors began circulating on

Facebook accusing Smyth of firing his gun into the door.                                  A

mysterious           Facebook      user      contacted         Ms. Walker's       former

girlfriend Cheyenne Pugh to convey that Smyth was the person who

shot       through    the   door.         Pugh      reported   this    information      to

police.        Witness Keshawna Wright                told officers she had seen

Smyth      shoot     into   the   door     at       the   party.   Police      initially
investigated and arrested Smyth for Ms. Walker's death.                               Smyth

remained adamant that he did not have a gun while at the party.

Smyth first told officers he was already leaving the house when

       The record reflects numerous alternate first and last name
       3

spellings for many subjects involved. We use the spelling used
at trial for those who testified or the most common spelling
that appears in the record.      Further, many individuals have
nicknames, but as the record connects an individual's name and
nickname, and neither party disputes this, we proceed using what
appeared to be each person's legal name.

                                                4
                                                                         No.      2020AP1362-CR

the       shooting    began,         but   in      later          interviews          he     told

investigators he was in the house when someone shot through the

door.       One individual involved in the fight did not identify

Smyth in a lineup in which he was the target.                               Smyth is right-

handed.

      ¶9      Witness Jalyn Lynch reported that he saw two people

holding      guns    at    the   party     and     identified           one      of   them    as

Bankhead.      Lynch told officers that Bankhead did not shoot into

the door, but rather he shouted to the other person with a gun

to shoot through the door.                 Witness Wright did not identify

Bankhead in a lineup for which he was the target.                                     Officers

arrested      Bankhead      as   a    felon       in    possession          of    a   firearm.

Bankhead      told    officers        he   wore         a       red    Wisconsin       Badgers

sweatshirt on the night of the party.                             The record does not

reflect why investigators turned their attention from Bankhead.

      ¶10     During one interview, Smyth told officers Tyler Harris4

displayed a handgun to Smyth from across the room at the party

minutes before someone shot through the door.                           Smyth reported to
investigators that Tyler Harris later told him he "emptied [his]

clip" at the party.              Shortly after, Tyler Harris changed his

Facebook status to indicate he needed to "stay low."                                   Witness

Channel Howard identified Tyler Harris in a photo array as the

"person      [she]   saw    in   possession            of   a    gun   at     [the]    party."

Officers arrested Tyler Harris as a felon in possession of a

      4There are four individuals with the last name Harris in
the record: Tyler, Sanchez, Demon, and Dejuan. For clarity, we
refer to each individual by his full name.

                                              5
                                                                       No.     2020AP1362-CR

firearm.       The record does not reflect why investigators turned

their attention from Tyler Harris.

       ¶11     A few days after the incident, Pugh began hearing new

rumors       that    Jovan    Mull    was     the     person    who    shot     Ms. Walker

through the door.             Pugh received photos of Mull from unknown

senders who said the person in the photo was the shooter.                                Pugh

brought that information to investigators' attention, too.

       ¶12     The investigation then focused on Mull.                       Witness Lynch

stated he did not remember seeing Mull at the party, although

others recalled seeing him there.                       Three individuals——Sanchez

Harris,        Alphonso        Carter,        and     Desmond      Butler——separately

identified Mull in a photo array as the person who shot through

the    door.         Four    people——Demon         Harris,     Tyler   Harris,      Charles

Cantrell, and Elicia Burrows——did not recognize or identify Mull

as     the     shooter       in     separate        photo    arrays.          Smyth      told

investigators         Mull    was    "the   person      that    had    the    gun   in   the

kitchen," although he did not identify Mull as the shooter.

Smyth also told investigators that he and Mull did not have an
amicable history.

       ¶13     Additional accounts implicated Mull.                      Sanchez Harris

told investigators that Mull said he had a gun on him while they

rode    to     the    party       together.         Sanchez     Harris       further     told

officers Mull "did the shooting," but also that, Mull "had to

be" the shooter.            Vachune Hubbard told investigators that he had

spoken with Mull shortly after the party and Mull said that at

the party, "[T]hey got to fighting, so I got to shooting," and
"I shot through the door."               Mull is right-handed.
                                               6
                                                             No.    2020AP1362-CR

     ¶14    The State   ultimately charged Mull with first-degree

reckless homicide for Ms. Walker's death.

                           C.   Mull's Trial

     ¶15    A four-day jury trial took place in April 2016.                  The

State    presented   multiple   witnesses,      including      witnesses     who

attended the party, witnesses who did not attend the party, and

investigators.       The   defense       did   not    call    any     witnesses

independently.5

     ¶16    The State called Ms. Walker's former girlfriend, Pugh,

who did not attend the party.        On direct examination, the State

questioned Pugh regarding Facebook messages and a photo of Smyth

that Pugh received and brought to police regarding the shooter's

identity.    Counsel objected on foundation and hearsay grounds

multiple times during Pugh's testimony.              In one instance, Pugh

read a message on the stand to which defense counsel made a

     5 The defense submitted a witness list that identified nine
individuals. Of those nine individuals, eight were cross-listed
on the State's witness list. The ninth, and the only name that
was not cross-listed, was "Donika Payton," which may be an
alternate spelling of "Donieka Payton." Review of the record is
inconclusive as to whether Donika and Donieka are actually the
same person.

     Assuming they are the same person, all individuals
identified on the defense's witness list were also identified on
the State's witness list.     Of the eight individuals on the
defense's witness list, the record supports that neither the
State nor the defense subpoenaed five of those witnesses.    The
State subpoenaed the remaining three individuals on the
defense's list——Sanchez Harris, Elicia Burrows and Keshawna
Wright. Sanchez Harris appeared and testified at trial, but the
record reflects Burrows and Wright could not be located after
multiple attempts.

                                     7
                                                                 No.    2020AP1362-CR

hearsay objection.           The State explained the message was offered

"to    explain       further    [officers']       investigation."       The   court

overruled all of the defense's objections.                   Pugh then testified

that others told her Mull was the shooter.                   Pugh received a text

with a photo of Smyth, and another person sent her a photo of

Mull on Facebook.            Pugh testified she brought this information

to investigators.

       ¶17        On cross-examination, Pugh confirmed she did not know

the person who sent her a Facebook message and photo of Smyth,

nor the person who sent her a photo of Mull.                    Pugh's responses

included references to "they" or "them," which Mull's counsel

sought       to    clarify   for   the    court     reporter.     His   subsequent

questions resulted in the following exchange and statement from

Pugh:

       [Trial counsel]: And then you talked about, "They."
       Is there another person the message is going to?

       [Pugh]: It's not actually on my messenger.      It was
       just other people coming up to me about the situation
       and sending [their] love out I guess about talking to
       me and say they apologize for her death and stuff like
       that.

            And also another lady was telling me about him
       going -- being in the hood bragging about it saying
       that he hit a lick over there on 35th and he killed
       the stud bitch.

       [Trial counsel]:          I guess.       Just could you define what
       that means?

       [Pugh]:       Stud.     It's a female who dresses like a guy.
Trial counsel did not move to strike Pugh's testimony, nor did
he    move    for    a   mistrial.       Instead,    trial   counsel    pivoted   to

                                            8
                                                       No.    2020AP1362-CR

explore   Pugh's   relationship   to   the   investigation.     The   jury

heard additional testimony from Smyth, Sanchez Harris, Carter,

Butler, and Hubbard.

    ¶18    Smyth testified that he attended the party, and he

described the events culminating in the "big brawl."           Smyth also

testified that he saw two people with guns in the living room——

Mull and Tyler Harris.     Smyth told the jury he heard the shots

fired, but that he did not actually see Mull fire a gun.

    ¶19    Sanchez Harris testified that Mull rode to the party

with Sanchez Harris and his brothers, and that Mull announced he

had a gun on him.      Sanchez Harris stated he was in the living

room when Ms. Walker was shot, and he saw one person wearing a

red sweatshirt pointing a gun at the bedroom door.                Sanchez

Harris testified Mull was also in the vehicle when they left the

party and Mull said, "You better not say anything.            I know your

faces."    He testified that Mull wore a red Wisconsin Badgers

sweatshirt the night of the party, and the State entered Sanchez

Harris's prior identification of Mull in a photo array from the
investigation into evidence.6      He testified that Mull was "the

person who probably did it."

    6  Sanchez Harris testified he was shown only two photos in
the photo array, and that he identified Mull's photo as the
person who shot through the door.   Whether there was a problem
with the photo array is not before us for review.           The
prosecutor walked Sanchez Harris through the photo array
identification form that he signed, where his circled responses
indicate he viewed six photos.

                                   9
                                                                No.    2020AP1362-CR

      ¶20   Carter testified he was at the party and that he saw

two men outside the bedroom door with guns.                  One man told the

other to "[s]hoot in there," and the other person shot through

the   door.       The     State     admitted    Carter's        prior       positive

identification of Mull as the shooter in a photo array.

      ¶21   Butler     testified    he   was   at   the   party       and   that   he

recalled the shooter wearing a red sweatshirt.                    The prosecution

admitted    Butler's    prior     identification     of    Mull    from     a   photo

array.      However, after seeing Mull in the courtroom, Butler

recanted    his   identification      because   he   did    not       believe   Mull

looked like the person he identified in the photo array.                           "As

I'm looking at [Mull], the height even different like.                      The body

language.     I'm looking.        I don't want to convict nobody that's

innocent."

      ¶22   Hubbard did not attend the party, but he testified in

accordance with the statements he made to officers during the

investigation.       Namely, Hubbard affirmed that he previously told

investigators that Mull told him "I got to shooting" at the
party and "I shot through the door."

      ¶23   The jury found Mull guilty of first-degree reckless

homicide.     Mull subsequently received a bifurcated sentence of

twenty-five    years    initial    confinement      and   ten     years     extended

supervision.

                                         10
                                                                  No.     2020AP1362-CR

                               D.   Procedural History

       ¶24   Mull timely filed for postconviction relief seeking a

new trial based on grounds that included ineffective assistance

of    counsel     and    the   interest   of   justice.      The    circuit     court

denied the postconviction motion without a hearing,7 which Mull

appealed.       The court of appeals reversed8 and ordered the circuit

court to conduct a Machner9 hearing.                    Specifically, the court

concluded Mull was entitled to a Machner hearing regarding his

allegations       that    trial     counsel    was    ineffective       for   the   two

claims we review today.

       ¶25   First, Mull asserted his trial counsel was ineffective

for "failing to file a third-party perpetrator motion regarding

any    one   of    the    viable     alternate       suspects."         (Emphasis    in

original.)        Mull identified Smyth, Tyler Harris, and/or Bankhead

as potential third-party perpetrators that Mull could have named

consistent with a Denny10 defense.

       The Honorable Jeffrey A. Conen entered the order denying
       7

Mull's postconviction motion.

       State v. Mull (Mull I), No. 2018AP1349-CR, unpublished
       8

slip op., ¶1 (Wis. Ct. App. July 23, 2019).

       State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App.
       9

1979).     "The   evidentiary  hearing   to   evaluate  counsel's
effectiveness, which includes counsel's testimony to explain his
or her handling of the case, is . . . called a Machner hearing."
State v. Balliette, 2011 WI 79, ¶31, 336 Wis. 2d 358, 805 N.W.2d
334.

       State v. Denny, 120 Wis. 2d 614, 357 N.W.2d 12 (Ct. App.
       10

1984).   A Denny defense permits a defendant to raise a third-
party perpetrator defense if the defendant can show "a
'legitimate tendency' that the third person could have committed
the crime."    Id. at 623.    A third-party perpetrator defense
                                          11
                                                                              No.     2020AP1362-CR

       ¶26       At the Machner hearing,11 trial counsel testified he

thought pursuing a reasonable doubt defense was preferable to

pursuing         a    third-party          perpetrator         defense       because        it       was

difficult to locate witnesses to interview them.                                    Trial counsel

testified        to        an    "inability      to     contact      certain        witnesses        to

prepare      a       Denny       motion   pretrial,"         even    with    the     help       of    an

investigator.                   Trial    counsel      said     "a    lot    of      these       people

wouldn't return phone calls, went by nicknames, [and Mull] did

not have phone numbers . . . or addresses."                                 Trial counsel was

aware the State also had difficulty locating witnesses.                                          Based

on this information, trial counsel determined there were a lot

of     credibility              issues     and     inconsistent            accounts        of     what

happened, which he strategically thought presented a reasonable

doubt       defense.             Trial    counsel       also    testified           that    he       had

prepared two Denny motions for clients in other cases, both of

which were denied.

       ¶27       Secondly, Mull argued trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to object or move to strike Pugh's testimony.                                         Mull
found his attorney's failure to strike Pugh's hearsay testimony

that    "he"         was    "saying       that . . . he        killed       the     stud    bitch,"

particularly deficient and prejudicial.                             At the Machner hearing,

trial       counsel         testified      that       he   "objected        to      the    line       of

questioning,"              relative        to     the      out-of-court           messages           the

requires motive, opportunity, and a direct connection to the
crime. Id. at 625.

       The Honorable Joseph R. Wall presided at the hearing and
       11

issued the subsequent order.

                                                   12
                                                                  No.    2020AP1362-CR

prosecution presented through Pugh.                 "The judge had overruled,"

both on foundation and hearsay grounds.                   Relative to the hearsay

objection,    the    court     allowed     Pugh's      testimony    as    course-of-

investigation testimony.             Having been overruled, trial counsel

explained    he    attempted    to    discredit        Pugh's   testimony      through

cross-examination by attacking her credibility and questioning

Pugh's motive in testifying.              Trial counsel testified he did not

object, as the statement came out on his own cross-examination

of Pugh, and he did not move to strike the statement because he

did   not   want    to    "[bring]       too    much   attention    to    the    jury"

regarding Pugh's testimony.

      ¶28   The circuit court made a number of relevant factual

findings, which we discuss below.                The court found trial counsel

credible, and it accepted his testimony.                        The circuit court

concluded "the errors asserted by the defense" did not rise to

the established standard of prejudice for ineffective assistance

of    counsel.      The    circuit        court    accordingly      denied      Mull's

postconviction      motion     for   a    new     trial   following      the   Machner
hearing.

      ¶29   Mull appealed the circuit court's denial to the court

of appeals.       Mull renewed his ineffective assistance of counsel

claims and his argument seeking a new trial in the interest of

justice.     The court of appeals reversed and granted Mull a new

trial after it concluded Mull received ineffective assistance.

State v. Mull (Mull II), No. 2020AP1362-CR, unpublished slip

op., ¶1 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2022).                      The court of appeals
determined trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present
                                           13
                                                                     No.    2020AP1362-CR

a third-party perpetrator defense, and for "failing to move to

strike or move for a mistrial following hearsay testimony" from

Pugh.        Id.    The court of appeals remanded for a new trial

without addressing Mull's interest of justice claim.

       ¶30    The State petitioned us for review on two questions

that    largely     reflect     the       claims     Mull   raised   below.         First,

whether the court of appeals impermissibly failed to defer to

trial counsel's strategic decisions; and second, whether this

court should grant Mull a new trial in the interest of justice.

                                    II.    DISCUSSION

                               A.   Standard of Review

       ¶31    "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim presents a

mixed question of fact and law."                      State v. Pico, 2018 WI 66,

¶13, 382 Wis. 2d         273, 914 N.W.2d              95.    We do not reverse a

circuit court's finding of fact unless it is clearly erroneous.

Id.     "Findings of fact include 'the circumstances of the case

and the counsel's conduct and strategy.'"                     Id. (quoting State v.

Thiel,   2003      WI   111,    ¶21,      264    Wis. 2d    571,   665     N.W.2d    305).
Whether those facts demonstrate that counsel's performance fell

below the constitutional standard is a matter of law subject to

our independent review.             State v. Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d 628, 634,

369 N.W.2d 711 (1985).

       ¶32    We may exercise our discretion to grant a new trial in

the interest of justice "[u]nder both our inherent powers and

our statutory authority."                  State v. Armstrong, 2005 WI 119,

¶114, 283 Wis. 2d 639, 700 N.W.2d 98; see also State v. Avery,
2013 WI 13, ¶23, 345 Wis. 2d 407, 826 N.W.2d 60; Wis. Stat.
                                                14
                                                                        No.    2020AP1362-CR

§ 751.06 (2021-22).12             We recognize that "a circuit court is in

a better position than an appellate court to determine whether

confidence in the correctness of the outcome at the original

trial or hearing has been undermined."                          Morden v. Cont'l AG,

2000 WI 51, ¶87, 235 Wis. 2d 325, 611 N.W.2d 659.                              Because of

that,      we   approach      a    request    for        a    new    trial    "with   great

caution."       Armstrong, 283 Wis. 2d 639, ¶114.

                   B.   Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

      ¶33       The court of appeals reviewed Mull's two arguments,

which are renewed before us.                 Mull asks us to affirm the court

of appeals' conclusion that his trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to present a third-party perpetrator defense and for

failing to move to strike or move for a mistrial in light of

Pugh's testimony.

      ¶34       The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution

guarantees the effective assistance of counsel to every criminal

defendant.        U.S. Const. amend. VI; Pico, 382 Wis. 2d 273, ¶18.

The   purpose      of   the       guarantee       is    "to    ensure     that    criminal
defendants receive a fair trial," and "to justify reliance on

the outcome of the proceeding."                    Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 689, 692, (1984).              A defendant is denied the right to

effective       assistance        of   counsel         when   "his    counsel     performs

deficiently" and "the deficiency prejudices his trial."                               Pico,

382 Wis. 2d 273, ¶18.

       All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are
      12

to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise indicated.

                                             15
                                                                      No.   2020AP1362-CR

       ¶35     Counsel     performs     deficiently       if    his     "conduct   falls

outside [an] objectively reasonable range," which we recognize

is "wide."          Id., ¶19.      We apply a "strong presumption" that

counsel acts "reasonably within professional norms."                          State v.

Coleman, 2015 WI App 38, ¶20, 362 Wis. 2d 447, 865 N.W.2d 190.

We   are     "highly      deferential"    to      counsel's    decisions,      provided

they     are      objectively     reasonable        and   strategic.          State      v.

Breitzman, 2017 WI 100, ¶65, 378 Wis. 2d 431, 904 N.W.2d 93.

However, we do not review the reasonableness of trial counsel's

decisions with "the benefit of hindsight."                         Pico, 382 Wis. 2d

273,     ¶22.        We    will   not    "second-guess         a   reasonable      trial

strategy, [unless] it was based on an irrational trial tactic or

based upon caprice rather than upon judgment."                          Breitzman, 378

Wis. 2d      431,    ¶65    (brackets    in       original).       We    cannot    decide

after-the-fact that "a more appropriate decision could have been

made."       State v. Felton, 110 Wis. 2d 485, 502-03, 329 N.W.2d 161

(1983).

       ¶36     On the other hand, it is not enough to merely "label"
counsel's challenged decisions "a matter of choice and of trial

strategy."          Id. at 502.         Rather, we examine trial counsel's

choices "in the context of the circumstances as they existed at

the time he made his decisions."                    Pico, 382 Wis. 2d 273, ¶22.

See also Felton, 110 Wis. 2d at 502-03.

       ¶37     Counsel's deficient performance prejudices a criminal

defendant when "there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would      have    been    different.         A    reasonable      probability      is   a
                                          16
                                                                No.          2020AP1362-CR

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."

Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d at 642 (quoting                    Strickland,       466 U.S.         at

669).

                  1.   Third-Party Perpetrator Defense

    ¶38    We     begin    by    reviewing       whether    trial        counsel       was

deficient in choosing a "reasonable doubt" trial strategy over a

"third-party perpetrator" defense strategy.                    Before we proceed

to the merits of Mull's argument, we first review the boundaries

and requirements of a third-party perpetrator defense.

    ¶39    Due process requires the government to bear the burden

of proving an accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in order

to convict.     In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).                        While an

accused is not obligated to present a defense, the United States

and Wisconsin Constitutions provide a criminal defendant the due

process right to "present a theory of defense to the jury."

State v. Wilson, 2015 WI 48, ¶3, 362 Wis. 2d 193, 864 N.W.2d 52.

An accused may present a theory of defense that another party

committed the crime for which an accused stands trial.                              Such a
defense,   however,       must    be    grounded    in     admissible          evidence.

Accordingly, an accused's right to present a defense does not

encompass the right to present irrelevant evidence.                            State v.

Scheidell, 227 Wis. 2d 285, 294, 595 N.W.2d 661 (1999).

    ¶40    When    dealing       with   stakes    as    high   as    a       defendant's

liberty,   third-party      perpetrator       evidence      walks        a    bit    of   a

tightrope.      On the one hand, evidence of another's guilt is

                                         17
                                                                        No.        2020AP1362-CR

always relevant to an accused's innocence;13 on the other hand, a

trial     should     avoid        "undue       diversion . . . by             injecting         a

collateral issue, and in avoiding unsupported jury speculation

regarding the guilt of other suspects."14                       Id. at 303.               "It is

this tension between the defendant's rights and the relevancy

requirement       that    the     court    of       appeals    addressed           in    Denny."

Wilson, 362 Wis. 2d 193, ¶48 (referencing State v. Denny, 120

Wis. 2d    614,    622,     357    N.W.2d       12   (Ct.     App.    1984));           see   also

Wilson, 362 Wis. 2d 193, ¶102 (Ziegler, J., concurring).                                  There,

the court adopted the "legitimate tendency" test to guide the

admissibility of third-party perpetrator evidence in Wisconsin.

Denny, 120 Wis. 2d at 623-24.15

     ¶41    Denny        established       a    three-prong          test     to     ensure     a

defendant's proffered evidence does not change the proceedings

"into a trial of collateral issues."                    Denny, 120 Wis. 2d at 624.

     13Wisconsin Stat. § 904.01 defines "[r]elevant evidence" as
"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence."
     14See also Wis. Stat. § 904.03, which states in pertinent
part, "[R]elevant evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice,   confusion of  the   issues,  or   misleading  the
jury . . . ."
     15Although we ratified the Denny "legitimate tendency" test
in State v. Knapp, and reaffirmed it in State v. Wilson, third-
party   perpetrator  evidence   is  commonly  known   as  "Denny
evidence," used to present a "Denny defense."    State v. Knapp,
2003 WI 121, ¶¶175-183, 265 Wis. 2d 278, 666 N.W.2d 881 vacated
on other grounds, 542 U.S. 952 (2004); State v. Wilson, 2015 WI
48, ¶52, 362 Wis. 2d 193, 864 N.W.2d 52.

                                               18
                                                         No.    2020AP1362-CR

To be admissible, the proponent of the evidence must demonstrate

that there is "a 'legitimate tendency' that the third person

could have committed the crime" by establishing the third person

had the motive, opportunity, and a direct connection to the

crime charged.       Id. at 623, 624.16

      ¶42   We have never addressed whether a criminal defendant

may   present    a     Denny   defense     implicating   more     than     one

alternative     suspect.       Assuming,    without   deciding,     that    a

criminal defendant may present a third-party perpetrator defense

that implicates multiple alternative suspects, we turn to Mull's

argument before us.17      Mull's postconviction counsel argues trial

       See generally id, ¶¶62-72, for a detailed discussion of
      16

each   requirement   necessary  to   establishing  "legitimate
tendency."

       We have reviewed decisions from other jurisdictions where
      17

arguments   regarding   multiple   alternative   suspects   were
permitted.

     Often, a defendant was unable to present evidence regarding
multiple alternative perpetrators merely because his proffered
third-person perpetrator evidence did not pass the respective
jurisdictional test for admissibility, not because of a per se
rule prohibiting as much.      See generally Andrews v. United
States, 179 A.3d 279, 294-95, 296 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (defendant
argued counsel was ineffective for not presenting third-party
perpetrator   defense   regarding   two  alternative   suspects;
appellate court reviewed admissibility as to both and ultimately
determined the evidence did not survive the jurisdiction's test
for either person); United States v. Moore, 590 F. Supp. 3d 177,
181-82 (D.D.C. 2022) (same); People v. Elmarr, 351 P.3d 431,
¶¶5, 13 (Colo. 2015) (defendant proffered evidence of six
alternative suspects in wife's homicide, which the circuit court
held inadmissible; the court of appeals concluded that evidence
of   alternative  suspects   one   and  six   were  admissible);
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 174 A.3d 1130, 1146 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2017) (accused's attempts to proffer evidence of two known
alternative suspects deemed inadmissible because it did not meet
                                     19
                                                                          No.       2020AP1362-CR

counsel was deficient for failing to present a Denny defense

that implicated one or more alternative suspects.                                     While we

appreciate that is counsel's argument, what we review, however,

is    whether       trial    counsel's         strategy      to   present       a   reasonable

doubt defense was objectively reasonable.

       ¶43     We    begin    with       the    circuit      court's      factual      findings

regarding Mull's trial counsel.                       The circuit court found trial

counsel       credible       and    accepted         his   testimony      at    the     Machner

hearing.        The court also found that Mull was involved in the

decision       to    pursue        the   reasonable        doubt     defense,         and   that

preparing       a    Denny    motion        would     have    been     difficult        due   to

challenges in locating or interviewing individuals.

       ¶44     Regarding a Denny defense that Smyth was the shooter,

the circuit court found "it was difficult to locate witnesses

who would have supported the defense."                            The court found that

Keshawna Wright, who identified Smyth as the shooter, had become

uncooperative with authorities a few weeks after the shooting,

and    that    the    State        showed      numerous      unsuccessful       attempts      to
subpoena her.

       ¶45     Mull's postconviction counsel argued a Denny defense

implicating         Bankhead        could       be     premised      on     Jalyn       Lynch's

statement      to    police.         Lynch      identified        Bankhead      as     standing

outside the door telling another individual to shoot through it.

jurisdictional test of admissibility); State v. Grega, 721 A.2d
445, 456 (Vt. 1998) (same, for two alternative suspects); Grady
v. State, 197 P.3d 722 (Wyo. 2008) (same, for three of four
alternative suspects).

                                                20
                                                                   No.    2020AP1362-CR

The circuit court found "the only inference to be drawn from

that is [Bankhead] is yelling that to somebody else," and was

not the shooter.

      ¶46    Regarding a Denny defense that Tyler Harris was the

shooter, the circuit court made two findings.                  First, that Smyth

did not testify during Mull's trial that Tyler Harris told Smyth

he   "emptied    his    clip"   because         the   State    objected       to   the

statement as hearsay, which objection was sustained.18                      Secondly,

the court noted Channel Howard                 identified Tyler Harris in a

photo array as "in possession of a gun at [the] party."                       Despite

Howard's     identification     of    Tyler       Harris      by    his     nickname,

demonstrating she knew him, she did not identify him as the

shooter.

      ¶47    Our review of the record supports the circuit court's

findings related to a Denny defense implicating Smyth, Bankhead,

and/or Tyler Harris.        Accordingly, because the circuit court's

findings are not clearly erroneous, we accept them.                         State v.

Tourville, 2016 WI 17, ¶16, 367 Wis. 2d 285, 876 N.W.2d 735.
      ¶48    After accepting the circuit court's factual findings

as   not    clearly   erroneous,     we    independently      determine       whether

trial counsel's decision to present a reasonable doubt defense

       Mull's postconviction counsel contends trial counsel
      18

could have used Tyler Harris's statements at trial as admissible
statements of an unavailable declarant pursuant to Wis. Stat.
§ 908.045.   We do not address this argument because we review
whether counsel's defense strategy was objectively reasonable,
not whether it was legally possible to present a different
defense.

                                          21
                                                            No.     2020AP1362-CR

was objectively reasonable and therefore, not deficient.                      We

accordingly examine the record to assess whether trial counsel's

decision    falls   within   the   "objectively        reasonable    range"   we

discussed in Pico, 382 Wis. 2d 273, ¶19.                We do so "as if we

were encountering [the circumstances] just as trial counsel did,

making every effort to ensure our knowledge of the present does

not affect how we assess what was known to him at the time."

Id., ¶22.       We agree with Mull's counsel's statement at oral

argument that we "have to look at counsel's reasoning process.

It   is   not   sufficient   to   just    take   his   explanations    at   face

value."     In determining whether trial counsel's performance was

objectively reasonable, we do not rely on a "blanket policy of

deference."     E.g., Coleman, 362 Wis. 2d 447, ¶20.

      ¶49   After reviewing the investigatory materials available

to trial counsel at the time he decided on Mull's defense, we

agree with trial counsel's summary at the Machner hearing:

      [T]here was a lot of other people          []    giving
      conflicting   statements   as   to who   the    shooter
      was . . . other     people    with  guns     in     the
      party . . . other people who were shooting outside
      after the incident.

           Different people had identified other shooters,
      [] there were different descriptions of outfits given
      by various people.

      . . . .

           When you got multiple people with guns, multiple
      people giving bad descriptions especially considering
      a lot of them had been smoking marijuana or drinking,
      it   goes   to   their   ability  to   perceive   and
      recall . . . .

                                         22
                                                           No.    2020AP1362-CR

The record demonstrates Mull's representation was reassigned to

new trial counsel seven months after the shooting.                  Combining

all of those facts with the lapse of time since witnesses gave

strikingly      inconsistent       statements,     we      recognize       the

circumstances trial counsel faced.          Pico, 382 Wis. 2d 273, ¶19.

We conclude that trial counsel's trial strategy to cast doubt on

the State's case against Mull was not outside an objectively

reasonable range of performance.           State v. Kimbrough, 2001 WI

App 138, ¶31, 246 Wis. 2d 648, 630 N.W.2d 752.             That a different

trial strategy may look better in hindsight does not render a

reasonable strategy deficient performance.              Felton, 110 Wis. 2d

at 502.

    ¶50   The    court   of    appeals    (Mull   II)    failed   to   review

whether trial counsel's decision to pursue a reasonable doubt

defense was objectively reasonable.           Instead, it determined a

third-party perpetrator defense was preferable to the defense

trial counsel presented.       The court of appeals stated:

    [I]n pursuing the reasonable doubt defense, trial
    counsel merely highlighted the discrepancies and
    inconsistences   in   the  witness   accounts  without
    providing an alternative theory to explain those
    discrepancies.   A decision to present a third-party
    perpetrator defense would have turned an argument that
    the witnesses gave conflicting descriptions of what
    Mull was wearing and what Mull was doing into a
    defense that it was someone other than Mull who was
    firing shots at the bedroom door.
Mull II, No. 2020AP1362-CR, ¶38.          However, the court of appeals

did not "make 'every effort . . . to eliminate the distorting
effects   of    hindsight,    to   reconstruct    the     circumstances     of

                                     23
                                                                          No.   2020AP1362-CR

counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from

counsel's perspective at the time.'"                            Breitzman, 378 Wis. 2d

431, ¶65 (quoting State v. Domke, 2011 WI 95, ¶36, 337 Wis. 2d

268, 805 N.W.2d 364).                Trial counsel was not obligated to make

sense of the State's case or to "explain the discrepancies" in

the State's evidence against Mull.19

         ¶51     Rather, we review whether trial counsel's reasonable

doubt defense strategy was objectively reasonable based on the

totality of circumstances at the time counsel made the defense

decision.             Brietzman, 378 Wis. 2d 431, ¶65.                    We conclude that

drawing attention to discrepancies in the State's case through

vigorous         cross-examination        of      witnesses       who     appeared     was   an

objectively reasonable trial strategy                        under the circumstances

trial counsel faced.

         ¶52     Mull also argues           trial counsel's investigation into

witness statements was insufficient, and therefore deficient.

"In assessing the reasonableness of an attorney's investigation

[]   a        court    must    consider     not     only    the    quantum      of    evidence
already known to counsel, but also whether the known evidence

would         lead     a   reasonable     attorney         to     investigate        further."

Wiggins         v.    Smith,   539   U.S.    510,     527       (2003).      Trial     counsel

reviewed more than 140 pages of witness statements provided to

       See Wis. JI——Criminal 140 ("Defendants are not required
         19

to prove their innocence . . . .     The burden of establishing
every   fact  necessary   to  constitute   guilt   is  upon   the
State . . . . If [the jury] can reconcile the evidence upon any
reasonable hypothesis consistent with the defendant's innocence,
[the jury] should do so and return a verdict of not guilty.").

                                               24
                                                                       No.     2020AP1362-CR

investigators,      and     the       statements      varied       significantly.          An

attorney's decision to refrain from investigating inconsistent

witness statements further may be reasonable if he believed the

statements      differed       enough       to     cast    reasonable      doubt     on    the

State's case against his client.                    Given the facts of this case,

trial counsel's decision to refrain from expending resources on

further investigation compared to preparing a reasonable doubt

defense was objectively reasonable.

      ¶53   Because       Mull's           trial     attorney        did     not     perform

deficiently,      we    need         not    address        whether     trial       counsel's

performance prejudiced Mull at his trial.                            Pico, 382 Wis. 2d

273, ¶20 ("The court need not address [the prejudice] prong if

the   petitioner       fails     to    satisfy       the    [deficient       performance]

prong.").

                                2.    Pugh's Testimony

      ¶54   The    State       appeals      the     court    of    appeals'     (Mull      II)

determination      that    trial       counsel       was    ineffective      in     handling

Pugh's testimony.          Specifically, the court of appeals (Mull I)
stated Mull was entitled to a Machner hearing on the allegation

"that   trial     counsel      was     ineffective         for    failing     to    move   to

strike or for a mistrial following Cheyenne Pugh's statement on

cross-examination         to    the    effect       that    Mull     had   bragged    about

shooting [Ms. Walker]."               Mull I, No. 2018AP1349-CR, ¶49.                     That

is what the Machner hearing addressed, what the circuit court

reviewed in determining that Mull received effective assistance,

and what we must review on appeal.

                                              25
                                                                    No.    2020AP1362-CR

    ¶55     Mull asks us to conclude that his attorney's failure

to address Pugh's statement that she received a message stating

Mull bragged about killing the "stud bitch" was "objectively

unreasonable" as a matter of law.                  Mull argues it casts him as

confessing, boasting about killing, and using a disparaging term

to describe the victim.

    ¶56     We begin our review with the circuit court's order on

Mull's    postconviction       motion;       we    accept    the   court's     factual

findings as true, unless clearly erroneous, and we independently

decide whether the facts amount to ineffective assistance of

counsel.    Kimbrough, 246 Wis. 2d 648, ¶27.                     We do so because a

trial court is "free to accept or reject all or any portion of

defense counsel's testimony as it deemed credible."                          Id., ¶29.

Factual findings include "the circumstances of the case and the

counsel's conduct and strategy."                  State v. Jenkins, 2014 WI 59,

¶38, 355 Wis. 2d 180, 848 N.W.2d 786.

    ¶57     The circuit court found trial counsel to be credible

based on his testimony and the record as a whole.                          The circuit
court also made two factual findings regarding trial counsel's

strategy:    (1) that his strategy was to discredit Pugh and to

attack the foundation of the electronic messages; and (2) that

trial    counsel   did   not    want    to    draw    the    jury's       attention   to

Pugh's statement.        See id., ¶38 (stating "counsel's conduct and

strategy"    are   findings     of     fact).        We     do   not   reverse   these

findings because they are not clearly erroneous after our review

of the record.     Kimbrough, 246 Wis. 2d 648, ¶27.

                                         26
                                                                        No.     2020AP1362-CR

       ¶58    In light of those findings, we independently review

whether      counsel's        decision        to     discredit       Pugh     via    cross-

examination and whether electing not to object or move to strike

were    outside        the     "wide     range       of    reasonable         professional

assistance."          Pico, 382 Wis. 2d 273, ¶19 (quoting Strickland,

466 U.S. at 689).            We recognize:

       There are [] 'countless ways to provide effective
       assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal
       defense attorneys would not defend a particular client
       in the same way.'    Rare are the situations in which
       the 'wide latitude counsel must have in making
       tactical decisions' will be limited to any one
       technique or approach.
Harrington       v.     Richter,       562    U.S.       86,   106     (2011)     (internal

citations omitted).            We must make "every effort to reconstruct

the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, to evaluate

the    conduct        from    counsel's       perspective        and    at    the    time."

Jenkins, 355 Wis. 2d 180, ¶36.                     We next turn to the record to

determine the circumstances trial counsel faced.

       ¶59    On direct examination,                the prosecution attempted to

introduce screenshots of messages between witness Cheyenne Pugh

and a person she knew only online by the name of Sack Casher.

Defense      counsel     objected       for       lack    of    foundation.         He   was

overruled.        Pugh testified she did not really know who Sack

Casher was.       Shortly after, Pugh read a message from that same

unknown sender while testifying.                    Trial counsel objected to the

statement as hearsay and was overruled.                        The prosecutor asserted

the    statement        was    offered       to    "explain       further       [officers']
investigation," and the court instructed the jury the statement

                                              27
                                                                     No.     2020AP1362-CR

was offered to demonstrate "merely that there's a statement that

this    witness       received."       The       court    further        explored    trial

counsel's initial objection based on foundation, and overruled

it again.        In overruling trial counsel's objection, the court

told    trial        counsel   he     could      "cross-examine          regarding     the

source."       Not long after, trial counsel maintained his objection

based    on     foundation      to     admitting         documentation       of     Pugh's

conversation         with   Casher.         He    was    overruled        again.      Pugh

testified Kia Wade sent her a photo, "[a]nd after [Wade] sent me

the picture, she told – she wrote comments that he was in the

hood bragging about it."              The prosecutor clarified whether that

was "all just rumor," to which Pugh replied "yes."

       ¶60     While cross-examining Pugh, trial counsel asked Pugh a

series of questions about the origin of the photos she received

implicating Smyth and Mull.                 Trial counsel elicited that Pugh

did    not    know    the   person    who     sent      her    Smyth's    photo.      Pugh

testified about the likely meaning of one of Casher's messages,

"I     guess     [Smyth]       and    the        young        gentlemen . . . had       an
altercation.         And I guess [Casher] was trying to say after that

fight that's when I guess he shot through the door but he didn't

know that it was Erika."

       ¶61     These are the circumstances trial counsel faced, and

what we must review relevant to his decisions regarding cross-

examination of Pugh.             Pico, 382 Wis. 2d 273, ¶22.                   The jury

already heard the statement that "he was in the hood bragging

about it" was a rumor.               Pugh's statement came out while trial
counsel probed why a mysterious sender she knew only online
                                            28
                                                                            No.     2020AP1362-CR

blocked her immediately after providing accusatory information.

This    is   consistent       with      his      trial       strategy       to     attack       the

foundation of Pugh's information.                        Trial counsel had already

objected      and     been        overruled        three          times      during         Pugh's

testimony——four        if    we    consider        the       court's      return       to     trial

counsel's initial objection.

       ¶62    We    recognize      this     is     a    close       call.         Applying      the

"strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide

range of reasonable professional assistance," we cannot say that

counsel's strategy not to move to strike or move for a mistrial

was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances he faced.

Id., ¶19 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).                                    Accordingly,

trial   counsel's      performance          was        not    deficient.            Even      those

decisions that appear "unwise in hindsight, will not constitute

ineffective        assistance          of   counsel          so     long      as       they     are

'reasonably founded on the facts and law under the circumstances

existing at the time the decision was made.'"                               State v. Smith,

2016 WI App 8, ¶14, 366 Wis. 2d 613, 874 N.W.2d 610.
       ¶63    Although      Mull accurately argues that discrediting a

witness      and    moving        to    strike         "otherwise         inflammatory          and

prejudicial material" are not "mutually exclusive" strategies,

that is not what we review.                 Rather, we review whether counsel's

defense      strategies      were      deficient         as     a    matter       of    law     and

prejudicial to the defendant.                      Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693.

Mull must demonstrate that trial counsel's decision to refrain

from moving to strike or for a mistrial was either irrational or
based on caprice in order to overcome the strong presumption
                                              29
                                                                  No.     2020AP1362-CR

that his trial counsel's strategy was reasonable.                          Breitzman,

378 Wis. 2d 431, ¶65.        Mull has not done so.

    ¶64     Because    we    conclude       trial     counsel     did    not    perform

deficiently, we do not review prejudice to Mull.                          We conclude

Mull had the necessary assistance to justify reliance on the

jury's verdict.       Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.

                       C.    The Interest of Justice

    ¶65     In postconviction motions, Mull raised the interest of

justice as a basis for a new trial.                   The court of appeals did

not consider this issue, but both the State and Mull ask us to

review his request.

    ¶66     An appellate court grants a new trial "(1) whenever

the real controversy has not been fully tried; or (2) whenever

it is probable that justice has for any reason miscarried."

State v. Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d 150, 159-60, 549 N.W.2d 435 (1996).

    ¶67     Under   the     first    scenario,        we   have    said     the      real

controversy has not been fully tried in two situations.                         First,

when "the jury was erroneously not given the opportunity to hear
important   testimony       that    bore    on   an    important        issue   of    the

case."    State v. Henley, 2010 WI 97, ¶81, 328 Wis. 2d 544, 787

N.W.2d 350.    Second, when "the jury had before it evidence not

properly admitted which so clouded a crucial issue that it may

be fairly said that the real controversy was not fully tried."20

State v. Cameron, 2016 WI App 54, ¶31, 370 Wis. 2d 661, 885

    20 Mull does not argue that the circuit court had improperly
admitted evidence that clouded a crucial issue.

                                           30
                                                                   No.        2020AP1362-CR

N.W.2d 611.        Under this first category of cases, an appellate

court need not make a determination that the "outcome would be

different on retrial."           Vollmer v. Luety, 156 Wis. 2d 1, 19, 456

N.W.2d 797 (1990).

     ¶68      By contrast, when a claim is made of "a miscarriage of

justice,"     an     appellate    court        must   conclude    that    there       is   a

"substantial       probability        of   a    different      result    on     retrial,"

before granting a new trial.               Id.; Henley, 328 Wis. 2d 544, ¶81;

State v. Zdzieblowski, 2014 WI App 130, ¶24, 359 Wis. 2d 102,

857 N.W.2d 622.        We address each issue in turn.

     ¶69      Mull argues the real controversy was not fully tried

because "[i]mportant evidence was left out of the trial."                             Mull

identifies four categories of evidence that the jury was not

given   the    opportunity       to    weigh.         First,   evidence       connecting

Smyth and his friends to the shooting, and second, evidence

directly implicating Smyth or one of his friends.                              These two

categories      of     evidence       amount        to   third-party      perpetrator

evidence, which merely repackage Mull's ineffective assistance
of counsel claims.           We will not address these points further, as

we addressed them above.              See State v. Goetsch, 186 Wis. 2d 1,

23, 519 N.W.2d 634 (1994) (Arguments for a new trial in the

interest of justice may fail if they simply rehash rejected

arguments regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel.).

     ¶70      Mull next asserts the jury erroneously was not given

the opportunity to hear "other evidence tending to exonerate

Mr. Mull,"     but     the    evidence         he   identifies    focuses        on   four
witnesses discussed earlier.               Keshawna Wright and Elicia Burrows
                                            31
                                                                No.    2020AP1362-CR

could not be located.           While it is true that Charles Cantrell

did     not     identify   Mull   in     a    photo    array,    he    also     told

investigators he "only heard the gun shots but didn't see the

shooter."        Lastly, Jalyn Lynch's statement to officers that he

"didn't remember seeing [Mull] at the party," was based on a

"single [Facebook] photo," that police had obtained from Pugh

and showed Lynch.

      ¶71     Finally, Mull argues the jury erroneously was denied

the opportunity to hear "evidence tending to call into question

Smyth's credibility and believability."                We disagree.       The jury

heard    that    Smyth's   answers     were    often   noncommittal      and    that

Smyth     became    "agitated     with       this   shit"   referring      to    the

prosecutor's and defense counsel's questioning.                    The jury also

heard that Smyth and his friends had been involved in the fight,

Smyth was inside the house at the time shots were fired, Smyth

"[thought]" he had seen Tyler Harris with a gun in the living

room, Smyth had a prior criminal record, had been on probation,

was right-handed, and was originally arrested for Ms. Walker's
homicide.        The jury heard other witnesses discuss the initial

stages of the investigation, which focused on Smyth.                    While Mull

now identifies other ways Smyth's credibility could have been

attacked while testifying, the jury had ample opportunity to

weigh Smyth's credibility and believability.                    Lastly, we note

that whether Smyth was a credible or believable witness was not

the     "real    controversy"     of   the     trial   we   must      review    when

considering whether to grant a new trial.                   Avery, 345 Wis. 2d
407, ¶39.
                                         32
                                                           No.     2020AP1362-CR

       ¶72    Rather, the real controversy of the trial was whether

Mull    was   the   person   who   shot    through   the   door    and   killed

Ms. Walker.      During closing argument the prosecutor stated, "The

big question is identity. . . .            Is Mr. Mull the shooter or is

the wrong person on trial?"           Mull's attorney reiterated "the

State is right, this is an issue of identification."

       ¶73    The jury had the opportunity to hear and consider a

plethora of expected and unanticipated evidence over the course

of the four-day trial.         Butler recanted his identification of

Mull as the shooter while on the stand.              Hubbard, the person to

whom Mull reportedly said, "I shot through the door," stated

that a detective "basically like bribed me here" to testify.

Witnesses testified about the shooter's clothing, which was not

consistent with what witnesses claimed Mull wore that evening.

Detectives testified regarding the photo array process and that

they did not attempt to "conduct a photo array of the people who

had guns" as identified by Smyth.

       ¶74    The jury was given the opportunity to hear evidence
that bore on the central issue of the case before the jury——

whether Mull was the shooter or an innocent man.                  Henley, 328

Wis. 2d 544, ¶81.      That was the real controversy.21           Based on the

        Contrary to what may have seemed desirable to Mull, the
       21

prosecutor could not charge four people with Ms. Walker's death
and put them on trial together for the jury to determine who was
the shooter.     Other jurisdictions have rightfully failed to
condone "[t]his gladiator-style trial."    People v. Gutierrez,
499 P.3d 367, ¶40 (Colo. App. 2021). "Under our system society
carries   the   burden  of  proving   its  charge   against  the
accused . . . .    It must establish its case . . . by evidence
independently secured through skillful investigation . . . ."
                                      33
                                                                                No.     2020AP1362-CR

evidence presented at trial, we conclude that Mull has "not

demonstrated         this       is         an     exceptional           case      requiring         our

discretionary grant of a new trial because we are satisfied that

the    real     controversy           has        been   fully       tried."           Cameron,       370

Wis. 2d 661, ¶32.

       ¶75    Mull asks for a new trial on the grounds that his

first trial resulted in a miscarriage of justice.                                            However,

Mull's lone paragraph in his brief does little to convince us

that a substantial probability of a different outcome awaits him

in a new trial.             Henley, 328 Wis. 2d 544, ¶81.                             Instead, Mull

rehashes      his    prior          arguments:          that      the    jury     did        not    hear

"important evidence to the determination of [Mull's] guilt," and

that     Mull      lacked       a     meaningful         defense.            We       have    already

addressed these arguments.                      Mull also argues that Pugh's hearsay

testimony was improperly admitted.                            Without deciding the issue,

we note that even if we assume Pugh's testimony were improperly

admitted, it would not warrant the extraordinary remedy Mull

seeks.        Accordingly,           we     decline          to   exercise      our     exceptional
power    to     grant       a       new    trial        in    the    interest          of    justice.

Armstrong, 283 Wis. 2d 639, ¶114.

                                          III.    CONCLUSION

       ¶76    We    conclude          that        Mull's      counsel     at      trial       did   not

perform deficiently.                  Because we make this determination, we

need    not     assess   whether            counsel's         performance         prejudiced         the

Watts v. State of Ind., 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949).  Our system
demands "[t]he requirement of specific charges, their proof
beyond a reasonable doubt . . . ." Id.

                                                   34
                                                                  No.   2020AP1362-CR

defense.    Lastly, we decline Mull's request to grant him a new

trial in the interest of justice because the controversy was

fully   tried    below   and   it   is    not      probable   that      justice    has

miscarried for any reason.          Accordingly, we reverse the court of

appeals.

    By     the   Court.—The    decision       of    the   court    of    appeals    is

reversed.

                                         35
                                                                   No.    2020AP1362-CR.rfd

       ¶77    REBECCA      FRANK    DALLET,       J.        (dissenting).          When     we

evaluate whether an attorney's performance was constitutionally

ineffective,        we     must    defer   to      trial      counsel's         objectively

reasonable strategic decisions.                  See State v. Breitzman, 2017 WI

100,       ¶65,    378   Wis. 2d 431,      904      N.W.2d 93.            But    for      that

deference to apply, counsel's decisions must be the result of

reasoned            strategic          judgment               rather            than         a

mere "post hoc rationalization" for counsel's conduct.                              Wiggins

v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 526 (2003).

       ¶78    In    this    case,    Jovan       Mull       alleges    two      "strategic"

decisions made by counsel at his first-degree reckless homicide

trial      were    ineffective:        (1)       Relying      on   a     run-of-the-mill

reasonable doubt defense when a far more compelling third-party

perpetrator (Denny1) defense was possible based on the ample

evidence that someone other than Mull committed the crime; and

(2)    not    challenging     the    admission         of    Mull's      alleged    hearsay

confession and then eliciting further details about it.

       ¶79    I reluctantly agree with the majority that, in light
of the circuit court's factual findings, counsel's decision to

pursue a reasonable doubt defense was objectively reasonable.

See majority op., ¶51.              The same cannot be said, however, of

counsel's decisions regarding Mull's alleged hearsay confession.

Because I conclude that counsel's performance on that score was

deficient and prejudicial, I respectfully dissent.

       See State v. Denny, 120 Wis. 2d 614, 357 N.W.2d 12 (Ct.
       1

App. 1984) (setting forth various requirements for defendants
who assert that a third party is responsible for the alleged
crime).

                                             1
                                                                   No.    2020AP1362-CR.rfd

                                             I

      ¶80    Mull,     Vashawn       Smyth,2      Menjuan    Bankhead,          and     Tyler

Harris all attended a party at Ericka Walker's house.                                 A huge

brawl erupted after Smyth and another partygoer, Davion Crumble

bumped     into   each   other.        Walker        attempted      to    intervene       and

pulled Crumble into a bedroom adjacent to the main living room.

Someone then fired through the bedroom door, killing Walker.

      ¶81    More    than      twenty-five         partygoers       gave       the     police

conflicting       statements     about       what    happened.           They    described

anywhere between two and eight people standing near the bedroom

door at the time of the shooting.                   And their descriptions of the

shooter     varied   widely.          Witnesses       described          the   shooter    as

wearing a red sweatshirt, a blue sweatshirt, a red and black

hoodie, or a white t-shirt with blue jeans. Various eyewitness

accounts place Smyth, Bankhead, and Harris in front of the door

to   the    bedroom,     two    of    them       armed,    with    Bankhead          shouting

"[s]hoot     through     that    motherfucker."              The    police       initially

focused their attention on Smyth, who one witness identified as

the shooter with "absolute[] certain[ty]."                         But after Walker's
former      girlfriend,        Cheyenne      Pugh,        showed     police          Facebook

messages which said that Mull was the shooter, they turned their

attention to him.        The State eventually charged Mull with first-

degree reckless homicide.

      2The record contains numerous alternate spellings for the
names of those involved.     Both the majority and I use the
spellings used at trial for those who testified and the
spellings that appear most commonly in the record for those that
did not. See majority op., ¶7 n.3.

                                             2
                                                              No.    2020AP1362-CR.rfd

    ¶82    Given the inconsistent eyewitness accounts and strong

evidence   pointing    to    multiple       other     possible       shooters,3     any

reasonable     trial   counsel      should       have    at     least      considered

mounting   a   third-party    perpetrator        defense.           See   Denny,    120

Wis. 2d at 624 (requiring evidence demonstrating a third party's

motive, opportunity, and direct connection to the crime in order

to assert such a defense).           After all, when it's available, a

third-party    perpetrator    defense       is   much    more       compelling     than

attacking the sufficiency of the State's evidence through a mere

reasonable     doubt   defense.       That       is     because      a    third-party

perpetrator     defense     seeks     affirmatively           to      disprove      the

defendant's guilt, and therefore answers the question left open

by any reasonable doubt defense:            if not the defendant, then who

committed the crime?        Indeed, research shows that "jurors tend

to base decisions on the presentation of a persuasive story, the

strength of which is judged in part on the completeness of key

story elements."4      Thus, all else being equal, it's better to

point to a third-party who had the motive, opportunity and a
direct connection to the crime than simply to poke holes in the

State's case.

    3  The majority assumes without deciding that a third-party
perpetrator   defense   can  point  to   "multiple  alternative
suspects," rather than just one. Majority op., ¶42. I see no
reason why Mull or any other defendant asserting a third-party
perpetrator defense should be limited to just one alternative
suspect if, as here, multiple people are directly connected to
the crime and had both the motive and opportunity to commit it.
See Denny, 120 Wis. 2d at 624.
    4  David S. Schwartz and Chelsey B. Metcalf, Disfavored
Treatment of Third-Party Guilt Evidence, 2016 Wis. L. Rev. 337,
341 (2016).

                                        3
                                                                       No.    2020AP1362-CR.rfd

       ¶83        Yet Mull's attorney mounted a reasonable doubt defense

at trial anyway.              He did not call any witnesses, and instead

relied       on    cross-examination           of    the     State's    witnesses       in    an

attempt to establish reasonable doubt that Mull was the shooter.

That effort failed, and Mull was convicted.

       ¶84        Mull filed a post-conviction motion alleging that his

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to assert a third-

party perpetrator defense.                     At the        Machner5 hearing, counsel

testified that although he considered it, he did not pursue a

third-party            perpetrator     defense       "because    it     was    difficult      to

locate witnesses who would support that defense."                                  There are

good       reasons,        however,      to    doubt       whether      counsel       or     his

investigator made any effort whatsoever to reach key witnesses

who    would       have    supported      a    third-party       perpetrator         defense.

When pressed for specifics, counsel's refrain was that he didn't

remember          or    didn't    have   his        files.      For     example,      counsel

couldn't remember whether he tried to locate Keshawna Wright,

who identified Smyth——not Mull——as the shooter in a police photo
array       with        "absolute[]      certain[ty]."             Similarly,         counsel

couldn't recall any specific efforts he made to locate Jalyn

Lynch, who saw Bankhead holding a handgun while trying to get

into       the    bedroom,       and   heard    him    yell     "shoot,       shoot."        And

despite his suggestion that his investigator might know more, as

it turns out, she didn't have a file or notes either.                                 Nor did

she remember anything about any witnesses in the case or even if

she tried to contact or interview anyone.

       5   State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App.
1979).
                                                4
                                                                    No.   2020AP1362-CR.rfd

      ¶85   Despite    counsel's         inability           to    remember      much,   if

anything, about the efforts made to identify or locate witnesses

to support a third-party perpetrator defense, the circuit court

nevertheless     "found   him       to   be       credible    as    to    what   he   could

remember and the things that he said."                      Thus, the circuit court

"accept[ed] his testimony as it was stated at the [Machner]

hearing" that he decided to forego a third-party perpetrator

defense "in consultation with Mr. Mull and . . . based upon the

difficulty in locating and identifying witnesses."6                           Accordingly,

the circuit court concluded that counsel's decision to pursue a

reasonable doubt defense was an objectively reasonable strategic

decision and denied Mull's post-conviction motion.

      ¶86   In    reviewing     a    claim        of    ineffective       assistance     of

counsel we must accept the circuit court's findings of fact

unless they are clearly erroneous.                     State v. Pico, 2018 WI 66,

¶13, 382 Wis. 2d 273, 914 N.W.2d 95.                        And as credulous as the

circuit court's findings are, I                    cannot say they are clearly

erroneous.       Because the circuit court found that counsel tried
and   failed     to   locate        witnesses          to   support       a   third-party

      6Even if we accept trial counsel's assertion that his
decision to forego a third-party perpetrator defense was based
on the difficulty locating witnesses, it nevertheless appears
that counsel might have been able to assert such a defense with
respect to Smyth, who testified at trial.     In order for that
defense to have been compelling, however, counsel would have
needed admissible evidence of Wright's statement to the police
that she was "absolutely certain" that Smyth was the shooter.
But as the circuit court concluded, counsel was unable to locate
Wright, and without her appearing at trial, the police report
containing her statement identifying Smyth would have been
inadmissible.

                                              5
                                                                    No.   2020AP1362-CR.rfd

perpetrator defense, counsel's decision to pursue a reasonable

doubt defense was objectively reasonable, and his performance in

that regard was therefore not deficient.                      See id., ¶19.

                                           II

      ¶87    Counsel's        decision     to        pursue     a    reasonable        doubt

defense may have been within the bounds of reasonableness, but

the   same    cannot     be    said   of   his        decisions      regarding       Mull's

alleged      hearsay    confession.7            In    concluding          otherwise,     the

majority     relies     on    an   incomplete         picture       of    the   facts   and

overemphasizes         the    presumption       that     counsel's         actions      were

reasonable.

      ¶88    The majority's analysis gets off on the wrong foot

with an attempt to "reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's

challenged conduct."           Majority op., ¶58.              It tries to show that

counsel's failure to object to Pugh's testimony about Mull's

      7Mull's postconviction motion alleged that counsel was
ineffective because he "fail[ed] to object to impermissible and
unreliable hearsay testimony . . . that Mr. Mull was the shooter
[and] . . . continu[ed] to elicit hearsay testimony of this
nature    during   his    cross-examination . . . without   ever
moving . . . to have the offending answer stricken."

     The circuit court denied that motion without a hearing.
Mull appealed and the court of appeals reversed in part,
concluding that Mull was entitled to a Machner hearing only on
his claims that counsel was ineffective for "failing to move to
strike or for a mistrial following hearsay testimony elicited on
cross-examination."      State  v.   Mull,  No.   2018AP1349-CR,
unpublished slip op., ¶1 (Wis. Ct. App. July 23, 2019).      The
problem with the court of appeals' narrow framing is that the
failure to move to strike or for a mistrial is inseparable from
the rest of counsel's decisions regarding Mull's alleged hearsay
confession.    Accordingly, I analyze all of those decisions
together.

                                           6
                                                                    No.   2020AP1362-CR.rfd

alleged      hearsay      confession        was       reasonable       because    "[t]rial

counsel      had   already       objected       and    been     overruled    three    times

during Pugh's testimony."                Id., ¶61.       The implication is that it

would have been futile for counsel to object again when Pugh

testified about an alleged hearsay confession by Mull.                           See id.,

¶59.      Based     on    this    retelling,          the   majority      concludes    that

counsel's      strategy        was       objectively          reasonable     "under     the

circumstances he faced."             Id., ¶62.

       ¶89    But the "circumstances he faced" demonstrate just the

opposite.          Read   in     full,    the       transcript    instead     shows    that

counsel's      prior      objections        were       on     substantially      different

grounds to a different line of questioning about a different

exhibit that identified a different person as the shooter.                               At

trial, the State called Pugh, who did not attend the party, to

testify about Facebook messages she received from a person named

Sack Casher, regarding the identity of the shooter.                           Screenshots

of   these     messages        appeared     in        exhibit    44.      Counsel     first

objected to exhibit 44 based on foundation, but the circuit
court did not rule immediately.                       When later given a chance to

elaborate, counsel questioned the screenshot's authenticity and

asked for the "http address" of the original message thread.

The circuit court then overruled this objection to exhibit 44's

foundation, noting that counsel could "cross-examine regarding

the source."        Bizarrely, counsel's only hearsay objection was to

one of the screenshots in exhibit 44 in which Casher said that

Smyth——not Mull——was the shooter.                      That objection was overruled
on the grounds that the screenshot was not offered for the truth

                                                7
                                                                  No.   2020AP1362-CR.rfd

of the matter asserted but instead to show why the investigation

initially focused         on Smyth.       When exhibit 44 was                 eventually

offered into evidence, counsel reiterated his earlier objection

to    the    foundation    and     authenticity        of   the    exhibit      and    was

overruled.

       ¶90      None of these objections related to exhibit 40, the

photo of Mull that Kia Wade——not Sack Casher——sent to Pugh.                             It

was in an exchange about that exhibit that Pugh first described

an    alleged    hearsay    confession        by    Mull,     stating     that   "after

[Wade] sent me the picture, she told –- she wrote comments that

[Mull] was in the hood bragging about [the shooting]."                           Counsel

made no objection to that testimony.                   In fact, counsel made no

objections at all to any of Pugh's testimony about Mull.                              Given

the full context, there is no reason to assume, as the majority

does, that it would have been futile for counsel to object to

Pugh's      testimony     about    exhibit     40      because     he    "had    already

objected and been overruled."            Majority op., ¶61.

       ¶91    To establish deficient performance, a petitioner "must
show   that     'counsel's      representation         fell    below     an   objective

standard of reasonableness.'"             Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.

86, 104 (2011) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

688    (1984)).         Once      we   take     into     account        the   important

distinction      between     counsel's        objections      to    exhibit      44    and

Pugh's       hearsay    testimony      regarding        exhibit         40,   counsel's

deficiencies become clear.             Most obviously, counsel should have

objected to Pugh's inflammatory testimony about Mull's alleged
hearsay confession.            And such an objection, had it been made,

                                          8
                                                               No.   2020AP1362-CR.rfd

should have been sustained.             That is because Pugh's statements

that       Mull     bragged    about     committing         the      homicide     were

quintessential        hearsay:        Pugh    was    relaying      an   out-of-court

statement by Kia Wade for the truth of the matter asserted,

namely that Mull was bragging about killing Walker.8                          See Wis.

Stat. § 908.01(3).         Counsel then compounded that error by asking

Pugh       during   cross-examination        for    details   about     the    alleged

confession.          That led Pugh to reiterate and expand upon the

hearsay testimony, stating that "another lady was telling me

about [Mull] . . . being in the hood bragging about it saying

that he hit a lick over there on 35th and he killed the stud

bitch."       Finally, rather than move to strike the alleged hearsay

confession, counsel appeared to give credence to it by asking

the witness what Mull would have meant by the term "stud bitch,"

which Pugh said was a reference to "a female who dresses like a

guy."       For these reasons, counsel's actions in this regard did

not simply "deviate[] from best practices."                       Richter, 562 U.S.

at     105.         Instead,   they    "amounted       to     incompetence       under
'prevailing professional norms.'"                  Id. (quoting Strickland, 466

U.S. at 690).

       The circuit court ruled that the Facebook messages in
       8

exhibit 44 pointing to Smyth as the shooter could not be used
for their truth but could be used to explain how the police
investigation unfolded. Whatever the merits of that ruling, the
same exception to the hearsay rule couldn't apply to Mull's
alleged confession as "the dangers of prejudice" clearly
outweigh its probative value. Jones v. Basinger, 635 F.3d 1030,
1046 (7th Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Benitez-Avila,
570 F.3d 364, 369 (1st Cir. 2009)("A prosecutor cannot justify
the receipt of prejudicial, inadmissible evidence simply by
calling it 'background' or 'context' evidence.").
                                9
                                                                   No.   2020AP1362-CR.rfd

    ¶92     In    reaching        its   contrary       conclusion,        the    majority

treats   the     "strong      presumption"         that    counsel's       conduct        was

reasonable     as    conclusive         of   the     question      before    us.           See

majority    op.,     ¶62.         But    the      strong   presumption          that      "the

challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy'" is

not definitive.        Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v.

Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).                        We must still analyze

counsel's      actions      and    decide      whether      they     were,      in     fact,

reasonable.         See State v. Hicks, 195 Wis. 2d 620, 629, 536

N.W.2d 487 (Ct. App. 1995), aff'd, 202 Wis. 2d 150, 549 N.W.2d

435 (1996).      The majority sets forth a lengthy account of what

happened at trial but engages in virtually no analysis of why

counsel's actions were not deficient.

    ¶93     At best, the majority falls back on counsel's supposed

strategic reasons for his actions:                   that he chose to discredit

Pugh's testimony through cross-examination and wanted to avoid

drawing attention to it by objecting.                      But these reasons don't

excuse his deficient performance either.                     For starters, defense
counsel's goal is always to discredit the State's witnesses.

But that cannot mean that an attorney can ignore obvious, highly

inflammatory        hearsay       because      his    "trial       strategy"         is    to

discredit the witness later.                 In any event, objecting to Pugh's

testimony would have furthered, not undermined, his purported

strategy of discrediting her.                  And besides, counsel undermined

his own alleged strategic goal of diverting the jury's attention

away from these statements when he asked Pugh to elaborate on
the alleged confession during cross-examination and to define

                                             10
                                                                   No.    2020AP1362-CR.rfd

"stud bitch."      Indeed, by doing so, counsel gave credence to the

alleged hearsay confession by treating it as if it actually

occurred.          Accordingly,            counsel's            purported        "strategic

decisions"     appear      to      be     nothing        more     than    a      "post    hoc

rationalization"      for       his     clearly     deficient       performance,         thus

satisfying the first prong of Strickland.                       See Wiggins, 539 U.S.

at 526.

       ¶94   As for the second prong, I conclude that counsel's

deficient    performance        prejudiced        Mull.         Confessions       are    "the

most    compelling    possible           evidence        of   guilt,"         Miranda     v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966), and have such a "profound

impact on the jury, . . . that we may justifiably doubt its

ability to put them out of mind even if told to do so."                             Arizona

v.   Fulminante,     499    U.S.      279,    296    (1991).        And     as    explained

previously, the admissible evidence of Mull's guilt was far from

overwhelming.         There        were      numerous         conflicting        eyewitness

accounts, many of which pointed to other perpetrators.                              In that

context, inflammatory testimony that the defendant was bragging
about killing the "stud bitch" could easily have tipped the

balance.     See Wiggins 539 U.S. at 534 ("In assessing prejudice,

we reweigh the evidence."); English v. Romanowski, 602 F.3d 714,

730 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that "the lack of overwhelming

evidence of guilt, combined with the negative consequences of

defense counsel's [deficient performance], sufficiently creates

a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have

struck a different balance.").                    Accordingly, I conclude that
counsel's     actions       with        regard      to    Mull's     alleged        hearsay

                                             11
                                                      No.   2020AP1362-CR.rfd

confession   "undermine   confidence      in   the   outcome,"    and   were

therefore prejudicial.    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

    ¶95   Because Mull received ineffective assistance when his

counsel failed to challenge the admission of an alleged hearsay

confession   and   then   elicited    further    details     about   it,   I

respectfully dissent.

                                     12
    No.   2020AP1362-CR.rfd

1