Court Opinion

ID: 9629967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:54:44.81664+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:31:06.310253
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Justice
(dissenting).
This is another case1 in which the Philadelphia police have deliberately refused to comply with Rule 130 of the *67Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure by failing to take an arrested person “without unnecessary delay” to preliminary arraignment.2 The plurality’s acquiescence *68in such police conduct compels dissent. By reversing the order of the trial court3 suppressing statements made during unnecessary delay, the plurality: (1) does not fairly characterize the facts of the case; (2) misapprehends the constitutional foundations of Rule 130; (3) overlooks the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule this Court announced in Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972); 4 (4) incorrectly describes the analysis used by the Court in Futch and subsequent cases; and (5) reaches the wrong result.
I
Though there is no dispute concerning the facts of this case, the plurality does not accurately characterize what transpired. Appellee Charles Coley was taken into custody by city police at noon on November 30, 1973. At 2:45 p. m. he was brought to the police administration building,5 the same building in which he was arraigned the following morning. Although an interrogating offi*69cer testified that pre-arraignment administrative processing could have been completed in less than one hour,6 appellee was detained for more than 13 hours and not arraigned until some time after 1:00 a. m., on December 1, 1973.7 Despite the custodial detention of more than 13 hours, the plurality states, “the instant case involves a delay of three hours and thirty-five minutes.” 8 To the person repeatedly questioned in the inherently coercive atmosphere of the police station,9 not knowing when he will get the preliminary arraignment to which he is constitutionally entitled,10 a 13 hour delay is not made one minute shorter by a gloss 11 on the facts in the record.
*70The plurality states:
“Coley was given his Miranda warnings and affirmatively indicated he understood his rights. He expressed a willingness to answer questions
Review of the record reveals that the basis for the plurality’s conclusion is nothing more than appellee’s “yes” and “no” answers to the police questions read from a card when he was first taken into custody.
Even assuming that one word answers in those circumstances might constitute a waiver12 of the right to remain silent, appellee’s assent to answer questions cannot be construed as giving the police an unlimited privilege to interrogate until a confession is obtained. Moreover, the plurality’s statement that appellee’s “agreeing to questioning by the police necessitated the delay” is completely untenable. Appellee repeatedly denied involvement in the crime during the first two interrogation sessions which lasted for more than two hours. Denying involvement does not necessitate delay for further questioning — unless the plurality is suggesting that the police have a right to interrogate until they produce a confession.
Rule 130 is clear. As the cases show, the only delay to be tolerated is that necessary for administrative processing.13 Delay for interrogating the arrested person does not constitute a necessary delay. American Law Institute, Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, § 130.2. Some police, however, continue to read the rule as though it allows custodial detention and interrogation until a confession is obtained. The “Standard *71procedure” is described by Detective Cleary in his testimony in this case:
Q. Now after you took the first statement from the defendant, which began at 2:55 p. m. and ended at 4:25 p. m., why did you detain him further?
A. Why did I detain him further ?
Q. Yes, Sir.
A. Because it’s customary to spend some time with the defendant.
Q. Well, you already interviewed him at that time, and he gave a statement denying any involvement in the Caldwell shooting, didn’t he?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. All right. Now, after he denied that, why did you keep him in your homicide division?
A. To further interview him concerning the same case.
Q. For what purpose ?
A. To gain an admission to the incident.
This colloquy indicates two things which the plurality fails to recognize: (1) the 13 hour delay between arrest and preliminary arraignment was unnecessary and the evidence obtained was indeed a product of the delay:14 *72and, (2) unless the courts of the Commonwealth are diligent in excluding such improperly obtained evidence, some police will feel free to continue to ignore Rule 130, the sound policies upon which it is based, and the prior decisions of this Court.
II
Rule 130 protects rights guaranteed by both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution.15 A federal rule,16 similar to Rule 130, was described by Justice Frankfurter in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343-44, 63 S.Ct. 608, 614, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1943):
“Legislation such as this, requiring that the police must with reasonable promptness show legal cause for *73detaining arrested persons, constitutes an important safeguard — not only in assuring protection for the innocent but also in securing conviction of the guilty by methods that commend themselves to a progressive and self-confident society. For this procedural requirement checks resort to those reprehensible practices known as the ‘third degree’ which, though universally rejected as indefensible, still find their way into use. It aims to avoid all the evil implications of secret interrogation of persons accused of crime.” 17
A rule of procedure requiring that persons arrested without a warrant be taken “without unnecessary delay” to preliminary arraignment protects the Fourth Amendment right to a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to detention. As recently explained by Mr. Justice Powell in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113-114, 95 S.Ct. 854, 862-63, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975):
“Maximum protection of individual rights could be assured by requiring a magistrate’s review of the factual justification prior to any arrest, but such a requirement would constitute an intolerable handicap for legitimate law enforcement. Thus while the Court has expressed a preference for the use of arrest warrants when feasible, (citations omitted) it has never invalidated an arrest supported by probable cause solely because the officers failed to secure a warrant, (citations omitted)
“Under this practical compromise, a policeman’s on-the-scene assessment of probable cause provides legal justification for arresting a person suspected of crime, and for a brief period of detention to take the administrative steps incident to arrest. Once the suspect is in custody, however, the reasons that justify dispensing with the magistrate’s neutral judgment evaporate.”
*74Our procedural rules are designed to protect these constitutional rights. In Commonwealth v. Dixon, 454 Pa. 444, 446-47, 311 A.2d 613, 614 (1973), Mr. Justice Manderino articulated for the Court the interrelationship of two Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure which protect the constitutional right to this magisterial determination :
“The significance of Rule 118 [now Rule 130], requiring arraignment without unnecessary delay, becomes fully apparent when that rule is read together with the requirements of rule 119 [now Rule 140]. The fundamental purpose of the preliminary arraignment is, therefore, to guarantee a citizen substantially the same rights to which he is entitled under the Pennsylvania Constitution . . . . The prohibition in rule 118 against any unnecessary delay between an arrest by an accusatorial authority and a preliminary arraignment minimizes the possibility of any unnecessary abridgement of a citizen’s liberty. Such an abridgement would, of course, be unconstitutional. The danger of any such unnecessary and unconstitutional restriction of liberty diminishes significantly when a citizen is brought swiftly before a neutral authority . . . .”
The plurality fails to recognize that Rule 130 is designed, in part, to ensure that individuals will not be detained without this constitutionally guaranteed determination of probable cause.18
The plurality implies that some delay for questioning is to be tolerated. Provisions of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions refute this contention.19 They mandate that the delay be no more than “a brief *75period of detention to take the administrative steps incident to arrest.” Gerstein v. Pugh, supra.
Any notion that police have some absolute right to detain and interrogate an arrested person until a confession is obtained is unfounded. Ours is not an inquisitorial system.20 Justice Frankfurter stated for the United States Supreme Court in Watts v. Indiana, 388 U.S. 49, 54, 69 S.Ct. 1347, 1350, 93 L.Ed. 1801 (1949):
“Under our system society carries the burden of proving its charge against the accused not out of his own mouth. It must establish its case, not by interrogation of the accused, even under judicial safeguards, but by evidence independently secured through skillful investigation.”
Those who dispute a holding that police must take an arrested person without delay21 to preliminary arraignment dispute the tenets of our adversary system, and the fifth amendment protection against compulsory self-incrimination. The wisdom of our long established rule prohibiting unnecessary delay is beyond question. In *761931 the Wickersham Commission22 investigated the problems of custodial interrogation by police. The Commission’s much heralded report concluded that the best remedy for the “third degree” would be “enforcement of the rule that every person arrested charged with crime should be forthwith taken before a magistrate. ” 23
It is patently inconsistent for courts to speak of the fifth amendment’s protection against self-incrimination while at the same time straining to justify deliberate police disregard for constitutional, decisional and procedural mandates prohibiting unnecessary delay in order to obtain what are characterized as “voluntary confessions.” Former Chief Justice Roger J. Traynor of the California Supreme Court was also troubled by this judicial ambivalence:
“The Fifth Amendment has long been the life of the party in judicial or legislative proceedings, but it has had no life it could call its own in the pre-arraignment stage. Prosecutors seemed disposed to live happily ever after this double standard. . . . Did we or did we not believe in the privilege against self incrimination? There was never a real confrontation of the question so long as there was a double standard of the privilege.” 24
*77Courts should be unwilling — when the record shows, as it does here, a clear pattern of police conduct in violation of our Rule, our cases and our constitutional provisions —to operate under this “double standard.” It is regrettable that the plurality today does otherwise.
Ill
The plurality has completely overlooked the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule this Court announced in Commonwealth v. Futch. In his dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Saunders, 459 Pa. 677, 686, 331 A.2d 193, 195, 196, 197 (1975), in which I joined, Mr. Justice Nix stated:
“This rule of exclusion was not developed primarily because of the unreliability of such evidence but rather because of our determination to require police conduct to comply with our procedural rules.”
This deterrent effect was further emphasized by Mr. Justice O’Brien in the opinion of the Court in Commonwealth v. Cherry, 457 Pa. 201, 205, 321 A.2d 611, 613 (1974):
“Rule 118 [now Rule 130] . . . and our decision in Futch, supra, are specifically designed to put a stop to the practice of arresting an individual and holding him during a lengthy period while continuing the investigation before arraigning him.”
*78In Mallory v. United States, Justice Frankfurter writing for a unanimous Court also noted this deterrent effect:
“In order adequately to enforce the congressional requirement of prompt arraignment, it was deemed necessary to render inadmissible incriminating statements elicited from defendants during a period of unlawful detention.” 25
354 U.S. at 453, 77 S.Ct. at 1359.
The plurality errs in stating, “the Futch rule has as its purpose the elimination of circumstances which are coercive in nature . . . .” Admittedly, one of the bases of Rule 130 is the elimination of coercive questioning, but Futch is a rule of exclusion. It provides a means of ensuring compliance with Rule 130 by removing the incentive to violate the rule. Just as the plurality’s failure to consider the fourth amendment basis for Rule 130 makes its analysis incomplete, its lack of recognition of the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule of Futch makes the opinion even more unacceptable.
IV
Although purporting to follow the principles set forth by this Court in Commonwealth v. Futch and its progeny, the plurality’s analysis is inconsistent with the rationale of Futch and renders Rule 130 nugatory. The plurality states “[0]ur [Futch] inquiry is merely a method of analysis to examine the totality of the circumstances to determine if coercion in a sufficient degree exists to warrant rejection of the confession.” This is inaccurate.
The plurality’s statement says nothing more than “we will exclude confessions found to be coerced.” Such a *79proposition dates from the 18th century 26 and is the law of this Commonwealth independent of Rule 130 or Futch?27 The plurality’s statement is little more than the realization that coerced confessions are to be excluded as unreliable, just as other unreliable evidence may not be admitted.28 The plurality ignores the Rule’s prohibition against unnecessary delay and inaccurately treats it as if only coercion is prohibited.
Rule 130 does more. It mandates a procedure to protect constitutional rights. The mandated procedure is arraignment without unnecessary delay. Futch provides a method of ensuring compliance with that mandate. The method is an exclusionary rule to be applied in certain circumstances.29 Futch was much more than a reiteration of an ancient “coercion” principle to which this Court has long adhered.
*80Thus, the Futch analysis is: (1) “Has Eule 130 been violated?” i. e., “Has there been unnecessary delay between arrest and preliminary arraignment?” and (2) “Is evidence obtained from the violation sought to be admitted?” If both answers are in the affirmative then the evidence is to be excluded. The exclusion is determined independent of a “voluntariness” inquiry. The voluntariness, or coercion, analysis is separate, i. e., whether Eule 130 was, or was not, violated, a statement determined to be involuntary will be excluded. These are independent inquiries designed to serve different functions. The Futch analysis is not, as the plurality suggests, merely a method of making the voluntariness inquiry.
V
Application of the Futch analysis to the facts of this case results in the conclusion that the trial court properly suppressed the statements.
In determining whether there was unnecessary delay here, the record establishes: (1) more than 13 hours elapsed between arrest and preliminary arraignment; and (2) the delay was unnecessary since, as a detective testified, necessary administrative processing could have been completed within one hour of appellee’s arrival at the police administration building. Appellant should have been arraigned early that afternoon instead of the following morning. Thus Eule 130 has been violated. Appellee was not “taken without unnecessary delay before the proper issuing authority.”
Next we must consider whether the evidence was obtained as a result of the unnecessary delay. Here there is clear evidence that the only reason appellee was not taken to preliminary arraignment was because police detained and interrogated him “to gain an admission.” During two periods of questioning totaling more than two hours, appellee denied involvement in the crime. *81After further delay, and further interrogation, appellee made the inculpatory statements sought to be admitted.
The record forcefully establishes as the trial court found, that “the statement procured from Coley was . the product of unnecessary delay” and must be suppressed.30
The order of the trial court should be affirmed.
MANDERINO, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. In just the last two years this Court has seen numerous cases where the Philadelphia police have intentionally delayed taking the arrested person to preliminary arraignment. See, e. g., Commonwealth v. Eiland, 450 Pa. 566, 301 A.2d 651 (1973), (25 hour delay); Commonwealth v. Tingle, 451 Pa. 241, 301 A.2d 701 (1973), (21 hour delay); Commonwealth v. Riggins, 451 Pa. 519, 304 A.2d 473 (1973), (17 hour delay); Commonwealth v. Dutton, 453 Pa. 547, 307 A.2d 238 (1973), (26 hour delay); In re Geiger, *67454 Pa. 51, 309 A.2d 559 (1973), (24 hour delay); Commonwealth v. Dixon, 454 Pa. 444, 311 A.2d 613 (1973), (15 hour delay); Commonwealth v. Simms, 455 Pa. 599, 317 A.2d 265 (1974), (22 hour delay); Commonwealth v. Hancock, 455 Pa. 583, 317 A.2d 588 (1974), (19 hour delay); Commonwealth v. Williams, 455 Pa. 569, 319 A.2d 419 (1974), (27 hour delay); Commonwealth v. Cherry, 457 Pa. 201, 321 A.2d 611 (1974), (15 hour delay); Commonwealth v. Dreuitt, 457 Pa. 345, 321 A.2d 614 (1974), (24 hour delay); Commonwealth v. Sanders, 458 Pa. 281, 327 A.2d 43 (1974), (17 hour delay); Commonwealth v. Parker, 458 Pa. 381, 327 A.2d 128 (1974) , (31 hour delay); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 459 Pa. 171, 327 A.2d 618 (1974), (10 hour delay); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 458 Pa. 285, 327 A.2d 621 (1974), (14 hour delay); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 463 Pa. 1, 329 A.2d 881 (1974), (9 hour delay); Commonwealth v. Ashburn, 459 Pa. 677, 331 A.2d 167 (1975), (18 hour delay); Commonwealth v. Saunders, 459 Pa. 677, 331 A.2d 193 (1975) , (9 hour delay); Commonwealth v. Smalls, 460 Pa. 436, 333 A.2d 853 (1975), (9 hour delay); Commonwealth v. Barilak, 460 Pa. 449, 333 A.2d 859 (1975), (22 hour delay); Commonwealth v. Bryant, 461 Pa. 3, 334 A.2d 603 (1975), (18 hour delay); Commonwealth v. Tucker, 461 Pa. 191, 335 A.2d 704 (1975), (12 hour delay); Commonwealth v. Cullison, 461 Pa. 301, 336 A.2d 296 (1975), (23 hour delay); Commonwealth v. Doamaral, 461 Pa. 517, 337 A.2d 273 (1975), (12 hour delay); Commonwealth v. Bey, 462 Pa. 533, 341 A.2d 907 (1975), (17 hour delay); Commonwealth v. Palmer, 463 Pa. 26, 342 A.2d 387 (1975), (18 hour delay); Commonwealth v. Smith, 463 Pa. 393, 344 A.2d 889 (1975), (14 hour delay).
Periods of delay are calculated from time of arrest until preliminary arraignment. Because the exact time of arraignment is usually not in the record the delay in the cases listed above may have been longer than shown.

. Pa.R.Crim.P. 130 provides:
“When a defendant has been arrested without a warrant in a court case, he shall be taken without unnecessary delay before the proper issuing authority where a complaint shall be filed against him and he shall be given an immediate preliminary arraignment.”
Formerly Rule 118, renumbered Sept. 18, 1973, effective Jan. 1, 1974. Originally enacted as part of Rule 118 in June 1964, effective January 1, 1965.
Rule 130 imposed no change in the required criminal procedure, in fact, it was a mere codification of a common law rule at least 200 years old: “In point of fact it has long been the rule that an officer is under a duty to bring an arrested person before a magistrate immediately. Such was the common-law rule in regard to criminal procedure, and is the rule today.” Kauper, Judicial Ex*68amination of the Accused — A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 Mich.L.Rev. 1224,- (1932).
See also 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries * 296 (1765): “Immediately after the arrest, the delinquent should be taken before a justice of the peace, who shall examine the circumstances of the alleged crime . . . .”

. After a suppression hearing, the trial court denied “defendant’s petition for suppression of his statements.” An oral motion for reconsideration was denied. After a jury trial in which the statements were admitted, appellee was convicted. Motion for new trial was filed. The trial court granted the motion for new trial concluding that the statements should have been suppressed.

. The arrest in this case took place more than a year and a half after the decision of this Court in Futch.

. Appellee was taken into custody at the federal building at 9th and Chestnut St., in Philadelphia. As the police log shows, he was taken to the police administration building at 8th and Race St., — four blocks away — at 2:45 p. m. The log fails to explain why it took the police 2 hours and 45 minutes to transport appellee four blocks. The plurality ignores this discrepancy stating, without any support in the record: “the period of time used in the transportation of Coley . . . was obviously necessary and free from coerciveness . . . .”

. Suppression hearing transcript at 55.

. In this case, as with many others which have been before this Court, the police log indicates with great detail even the least important event during the period following arrest. The final entry, however, the actual time of arraignment remains unspecified. Thus we rarely can determine the total length of the delay. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 463 Pa. 393, 398, 344 A.2d 889, 891 (1975) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Manderino, J.).

. Because of its failure to recognize that there is a fourth amendment basis to Rule 130, see Part II infra, the plurality measures delay only until the time of the statement not to the time of preliminary arraignment. Even using its standard, however, the calculation is suspect. Appellee was arrested at noon and made the inculpatory statements sought to be admitted some time after 6 p. m.

. See, Driver, Confessions and The Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 Harv.L.Rev. 42; O’Hara, Fundamentals of Criminal Investigation at 99, as quoted in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 449-50, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1615, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948); cf. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961).

. Repeated interrogations are not made any more acceptable by calling them “interviews”; periods of isolation handcuffed to a metal chair are not made any more tolerable by calling them “rest.” Even engaging in such a rationalizing process does not avoid the conclusion that the police are ignoring the requirements of Rule 130.

. A waiver must be “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). See also Note, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 Yale L.J. 1519 (1967); Note, 5 Stan.L.Rev. 459, 477 (1953) (“if the privilege is easily waived, there is really no privilege at all”).

. See cases cited in note 14, infra.

. As such, the statements must be suppressed. Commonwealth v. Flitch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972); Commonwealth v. Bey, 462 Pa. 533, 341 A.2d 907 (1975); Commonwealth v. Cullison, 461 Pa. 301, 336 A.2d 296 (1975); Commonwealth v. Barilak, 460 Pa. 449, 333 A.2d 859 (1975); Commonwealth v. Showalter, 458 Pa. 659, 328 A.2d 841 (1974); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 458 Pa. 285, 327 A.2d 621 (1974); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 459 Pa. 171, 327 A.2d 618 (1974); Commonwealth v. Parker, 458 Pa. 381, 327 A.2d 128 (1974); Commonwealth v. Saunders, 458 Pa. 281, 327 A.2d 43 (1974); Commonwealth v. Cherry, 457 Pa. 201, 321 A.2d 611 (1974); Commonwealth v. Williams, 455 Pa. 569, 319 A.2d 419 (1974); Commonwealth v. Dixon, 454 Pa. 444, 311 A.2d 613 (1973); Commonwealth v. Wayman, 454 Pa. 79, 309 A.2d 784 (1973); In re Geiger, 454 Pa. 51, 309 A.2d 559 (1973); Commonwealth v. Dutton, 453 Pa. 547, 307 A.2d 238 (1973); Commonwealth v. Peters, 453 Pa. 615, 306 A.2d 901 (1973); Commonwealth v. Tingle, 451 Pa. 241, 301 A.2d 701 (1973).

. U.S.Const. amend. IV provides:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing . the person or things to be seized.”
U.S.Const. amend. V provides in relevant part:
“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . .”
The fourth amendment is applicable to state proceedings per the fourteenth amendment. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963). The fifth amendment’s protection against compulsory self-incrimination is also applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964).
See also, Pa.Const., art. I, § 8 which provides:
“The people shall be secure in their persons . . . from unreasonable . . seizures, and no warrant to seize any person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath of affirmation subscribed to by the affiant;”
and Pa.Const., art. I, i 9 which provides in relevant part:
“In all criminal prosecutions the accused . . . cannot be compelled to give evidence against himself.”

. Fed.R.Crim.P. 5(a).
“Rule 118 [now Rule 130] of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure parallels Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that ‘[a]n officer making an arrest . . . shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available commissioner.’ ”
Commonwealth v. Futch, supra, 447 Pa., at 393, 290 A.2d at 419.

. See also Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 369, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948).

. By viewing Rule 130 as only relating to coercion, the plurality has overlooked a crucial basis for this Rule. See part IV, infra; U.S.Const., amend. II; Pa.Const., art. I, § 8; Gerstein v. Pugh, supra note 17; Johnson v. United States, supra note 17.

. See note 15, supra.

. As Professor Bickel states:
“Ours is an adversary, accusatory system, as opposed to the European inquisitorial system. Police and prosecutors, with us, are supposed to seek justice, of course, but we channel their zeal to the pursuit of evidence of guilt, and train them to rely on the defense to find and present to an impartial third party evidence of innocence. We rely on the collision between prosecution and defense to produce the just result. This adversary system may not be the best, the most efficient, or ultimately the most just. But the worst and most unjust system is assuredly a mixed one, an adversary system which weighs the scales, contrary to its fundamental premises, in favor of the prosecution.”
A. Bickel, The Morality of Consent, at 82 (1975).

. Questions asked incident to administrative processing are, of course, necessary. Interrogation designed to elicit admissions to the crime, such as took place here constitutes unnecessary delay. See American Law Institute, Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, § 130. 2: “Delay for the purpose of facilitating investigation regarding the arrested person shall not constitute a necessary delay.”

. National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement (1931).

. Id., at 5.

. Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention and Trial, 33 U.Chi.L.Rev. 657, 674 (1966). See Y. Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, in Kamisar, Inbau & Arnold, Criminal Justice in Our Time, at 19-36 (1965); Note, An Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation, 73 Yale L.J. 1000 (1964); Sutherland, Crime and Confession, 79 Harv.L.Rev. 21 (1965).
In Heimstra, Abolition of the Right Not to be Questioned, 80 S.African L.J. 187, 194-95 (1963), a Judge of the Supreme Court of South Africa noted our doctrinal inconsistency, saying:
' “But in none of the [U.S.] jurisdictions [where there is the privilege against self-incrimination] does it apply to what hap*77pens in the police station. The police interrogate freely, sometimes for seven to eight hours on end. The statements thus extracted are given in evidence. There is the provision that only statements made voluntarily may be given in evidence, but that seems to be interpreted rather liberally, judged by our standards.”
See also, Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused — A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 Mich.L.Rev. 1224, - (1932); Kamisar, Kauper’s “Judicial Examination of the Accused” Forty Years Later — Some Comments on a Remarkable Article, 73 Mich. L.Rev. 15, 18 (1974).

. See also McNabb v. United States, supra. Cf. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961).

. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 546, 18 S.Ct. 183, 188, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897);
“Gilbert, in his treatise on Evidence, (2d ed. published in 1760,) says, at page 139:
‘ * * * But, then, this confession must be voluntary and without compulsion; for our law . will not force any man to accuse himself; and in this we do certainly follow the law of nature, which commands every man to endeavor his own preservation; and therefore pain and force may compel men to confess what is not the truth of facts, and consequently such extorted confessions are not to be depended on.’ ”
See III Wigmore on Evidence § 821 at 324: “Involuntary confessions are excluded because they are untrustworthy, because it offends” the community’s sense of fair play and decency “to convict a defendant by evidence extorted from him, and because exclusion serves to discourage the use of physical brutality and other undue pressures in questioning those suspected of crimes.”

. See, e. g., Commonwealth v. Mosler, 4 Pa. 264 (1846); Commonwealth v. Harman, 4 Pa. 269 (1846); Commonwealth v. Wyman, 3 Brewst. 338 (Quarter Sessions 1869); Commonwealth v. Graham, 408 Pa. 155, 182 A.2d 727 (1962); Commonwealth ex rel. Gaito v. Maroney, 422 Pa. 171, 220 A.2d 628 (1966).

. See, e. g., Burton v. Pacific Mutual Ins. Co., 368 Pa. 613, 84 A. 2d 310 (1951); Stape v. Civil Service Commission, 404 Pa. 364, 172 A.2d 161 (1961).

. I. e., when the evidence is obtained during an unnecessary delay between arrest and preliminary arraignment.

. See note 14, supra.