Court Opinion

ID: 9721428
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:59:03.445916+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:25.780397
License: Public Domain

T. M. Kavanagh, C. J.
I concur in the result reached by Justice Black “in order for the court to be able at this time to agree on an opinion in this important case based on the prevailing constitutional doctrine,” but without relinquishing our views hereafter expressed. See Time v Hill, 385 US 374, 398; 87 S Ct 534; 17 L Ed 2d 456 (1967); and Curtis Publishing Co v Butts, 388 US 130, 170; 87 S Ct 1975; 18 L Ed 2d 1094 (1967); quoted with approval in Wayne Circuit Judges v Wayne County, 383 Mich 10, 38-39 (1969).
Upon review of the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, and particularly the debates of the Constitutional Convention, I am of the opinion that the 15-mill limitation as applied to governmental units not coming under the designation of “city, village, charter county, charter township, charter authority or other authority” is a valid and binding constitutional limitation and that the “nonapplication” clause constitutes no exception to this constitutional limitation. In short, the unchartered defendants cannot tax or levy ad valorem property tax in excess of 15 mills without affirmative vote of qualified electors, where the general obligation bonds and/or debt service rests directly or indirectly upon ad valorem taxation. The reasons supporting these conclusions are as follows.
*68Although one may certainly find supportive comments, 1 I cannot ascribe to the position of Justice Black that the drafters of our 1963 Const, art 9, § 6, “yensed” the property taxpayers of Michigan, either intentionally or inadvertently. A review of the Con. Con debates discloses that the 3 alternatives presented to the Convention were: a) outright abolition of the 15-mill limitation under extant 1908 Const, art 10, § 21 (1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, pp 918, 921, 923. See also Citizen’s Advisory Committee Report, Taxation and Finance at 10-11); b) modification of the 1908 constitutional provision so that the limitation on millage would he fixed or “frozen” at the highest millage rate exacted under a base period of 5 years and to effectually eliminate the tax allocation boards (see debate on Committee and substitute Proposal 56,1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, pp 915-927); and e) retention of the 15-mill limitation provided in the 1908 Const (see debate on substitute Committee Proposal 56, 1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, pp 915-928). Expressly recognizing, to a man, the political infeasibility of the first alternative, i.e., abolition, the drafters compromised on a “package” composed of the latter two alternatives.
The “Brake” substitute to CP 56, which was finally adopted by the convention by vote of 100 yeas to 30 nays, was explained by its proponent as follows:
*69“In the ijrst part of this, it provides for the 15 mill limitation as we have had it in the past. Unless the county takes other action, as I shall talk about in a minute, the 15 mill provision will prevail. The allocation board will be as it has been in the past. The schools, townships and counties will need to come before the allocation board each year and get the best share of the 15 mills that they can wrangle out of the allocation board. We tried when we were before you before to, we thought, improve this, but you didn’t think so and rejected it.
“We now have this substitute and we think it’s better, much better than what we had submitted to you before, and it is on a pure county option basis. We provide here that any county which, by the vote of the people, so desires may adopt a fixed division of millage; so much for the schools, so much for the townships, so much for the county, which shall stand without any action on the part of any allocation board until such time as the people themselves change it. It would not be necessary for any negotiations or any hearing every year. Until it proves that the people are dissatisfied with the division, that is it year after year. Now we were convinced that in order to get such a thing adopted by the people of any county you would have to have pretty generally the agreement of the schools, the counties, and the townships. We were convinced that you would not generally be able to get that agreement and still stay within the 15 mills; that there would have to be a little leeway in order to come to such an agreement. We have therefore suggested to you a maximum of 18 mills.
“Remember, this is only by vote of the people of the county. If the schools agree that they shall have 9 and the county that it shall have 6 and the townships, for instance, that they shall have 2, you would have a total of 17 mills. That proposition would be submitted to the people, and if they approved it that *70would be tbe millage Until there would be another vote of the people changing it.
“Now if they can agree on 15 mills as a maximum, they would be at liberty to do so; no compulsion at going above 15 mills, or even going to 15 mills. But we think we have got to allow a little margin there in order to make the thing work, and the margin we are suggesting is 18 mills. Now this would in no way, in no way, interfere with the right of the people to raise more millage than that by a vote, with only the limit of 50 mills as the total, the same as it has been in the past. So even if they use 18 mills in their permanent millage, they still could vote by school districts, by townships, by the counties, to have more millage than that, as long as they stay under the 50. Now this up to this 18 could not be done by a vote of the school district or a vote of the township or county on its own millage. That would have to be the combination, and it would be on a countywide basis.” (2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 2628.)
For a thumbnail sketch of the major issues and decisions on this point, see also Sturm, Constitution Making in Michigan, 1961-1962 (University of Michigan Press, 1963), at 220-222.
The unassailably clear intent of the constitutional drafters was accurately and candidly presented in the Address to the People:
“This is a revision of Sec. 21, Article X, of the present constitution which continues in substance the 15-mill limit on property taxes. Statutory county tax allocation boards would be continued as the agencies charged with allocation of the 15 mills among the local units in the county. However, the section does permit the legislature to authorize initiative procedure within a county which would allow a majority of the qualified electors voting thereon to adopt a fixed division of millage among a county, *71its townships and school districts, the total of which shall not exceed 18 mills. This fixed division and limit voted by the electors would stand until such time as they change it in another vote. This is simply a ‘local option’ provision which can never be effective without authorization of a majority of the electors in the county affected.
“The section continues present provisions which permit the electors of any taxing district to vote additional millage, subject to the present 20-year limit and over-all 50-mill limit. Cities and villages are expected, as at present, from the 15-mill limit. The exception is also extended to charter townships, and charter counties organized under the terms of this new document. Such units would be subject only to limitations established in their charters or by law.” (2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 3399.)
In view of such unequivocal and unambiguous declarations, I must flatly reject the arguments made by counsel for defendants that the drafters intended to on the one hand provide, pro forma, a 15-mill limitation yet, on the other hand, by the nonapplication paragraph of art 9, § 6, to render it totally ineffectual in practice and not even subject to the governing vote of the affected taxpayers. Such argument not only violates fundamental canons of construction,2 but finds no support in the debates. Certainly, such a constitutional “Trojan horse” was not within the contemplation or common understanding of the people of our state who adopted the 1963 Constitution. The intent of the people, in end analysis, controls and I will not suppose “that they have looked for any dark or abstruse meaning in the words employed, but rather that they have accepted them *72in the sense most obvious to the common understanding, and ratified the instrument in the belief that that was the sense designed to be conveyed.” Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 81, quoted with approval in Traverse City School District v Attorney General, 384 Mich 390 (1971); Carman v Secretary of State, 384 Mich 443 (1971).
These fundamentals established, what then is the meaning and intent of the language in the “nonapplication” clause of art 9, § 6?
I must, of course, take at face value the statement addressed to the people that “All bond issues of local units of government will have unlimited tax support.” (2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 3399.) This, however, should not be misconstrued as a grant of power to tax. School District of City of Pontiac v City of Pontiac, 262 Mich 338, 344 (1933). If it had been intended as such, it was well within the ability and experience of the drafters to so provide as they had in Const 1963, art 9, § 16.3 I must, instead, recognize the prefatory remark in the Address that “local government bonds will have unlimited tax support, thus permitting lower cost borrowing.” (Address to the People, 2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 3361.)
How was this objective to be accomplished and yet not give local governments unbridled taxing power? To aid in analysis of this question, it is helpful to quote and examine the second clause of the nonapplication paragraph.
*73“ # # * or †0 taxes imposed for any other purpose by any city, village, charter county, charter township, charter authority or other authority, the tax limitations of which are provided by charter or by general law.”
The law is plain and uncontested that because of this provision the only tax limitations “for any other purpose” upon cities, villages, charter counties, charter townships, charter authorities or other authorities are the limitations voted by the people which are incorporated in the charter of the governmental unit or those limitations enacted into law by the legislature.4 In short, there is no constitutional limitation upon these governmental units to impose taxes “for any other purposes.” Three conclusions may and should be deduced from this initial construction of this second clause of this paragraph which, of necessity, affects and must be read in conjunction with the first clause of the nonapplication paragraph.
First, the specific enumeration of certain governmental units — cities, villages, charter counties, char*74ter townships, charter authorities or other authorities — specifically and intentionally5 omits unchartered counties, unchartered townships and school districts. There is, of course, no such enumeration of the various governmental units in the first clause the second paragraph. Consequently, it must he] concluded that the first clause of the second para-graph applies across the hoard to all forms of governmental units.
Second, the exclusionary provision of the second clause of the second paragraph states that the limitation shall not apply to taxes imposed “for any other purpose” by the cities, villages, etc. What are these “other purposes” ¶ I understand the term “other purposes” to mean operational, costs covered by operational millage. The immediate antecedent of the second clause is, of course, the first clause which specifies one of the purposes for which taxes may be imposed, i.e., capital outlay expenditures or bonded indebtedness or, in the words of the Constitution, “taxes imposed for the payment of principal *75and interest on bonds or other evidences of indebtedness or for the payment of assessments or contract obligations in anticipation of which bonds are issued # * * Applying well-recognized canons‘ of construction6 as well as the plain language of the provision, it is apparent that the purposes contem-. plated by the first clause are capital outlay or capital expenditures which are to be financed and debt serviced by bonds and contractual obligations of like nature.7 If the purposes specified in the first clause are excluded, the only “other purposes” remaining are those generally regarded as operational costs financed by operating millage.8
This construction has two necessary results. The only limitation upon the operational costs and, conversely, operational expenditures by cities, villages, chartered counties, etc., is the limitation fixed by vote of the people in the charter. The operational costs and expenditures of the unmentioned governmental units, vis., unchartered counties, unchartered *76townships and school districts, are by necessary implication, and in the absence of any negativing or “nonapplication” clause, subject to the limitations set out in the first paragraph of art 9, § 6.
Finally and most crucially, nothing in either the second clause of the second paragraph or the first paragraph read in its entirety negates the idea that, as in the past, the municipal power to tax remains limited and, in most instances, subject to referendum.
Initially, it is observed that unlike the state, the municipality has absolutely no inherent power to tax and any power of taxation must be delegated t<f. it, either by the constitution itself or by the legisla--' ture. 1 Cooley, Taxation, § 102 (4th ed). Our Court, cognizant of this fundamental principle, has of course held that the antecedent provision of the 1908 Const, art 10, § 21, is “not a grant of power, but instead a constitutional limitation upon the exercise of the general power of taxation.” School District of City of Pontiac v City of Pontiac, supra, at 344. Neither can I infer an enlargement of the delegated authority to tax from the language of the first clause, second paragraph, for as stated by Mr. Justice Cooley in his work on taxation, supra, at § 83:
“Constitutional provisions, or statute, claimed to delegate the power to tax will be strictly construed in favor of the taxpayer, in determining whether any power to tax has been delegated and also, where it is conceded that some power to tax has been delegated, in determining the scope of the delegated power.”
Thus, the hotly disputed and controverted language9 *78must be construed in favor of the taxpayer in the sense that, although the power to tax has been delegated, it has not been delegated unconditionally or without limitation. To rule otherwise would violate every rule and canon pertaining to delegation of taxing authority. See Cooley, supra, §§ 80,102,119-130a. As to any purported distinction between operational taxes being limited either by charter in the case of cities, etc., or by the 15-18-50-mill limitation in the instance of unchartered counties, etc., I would again refer to Cooley’s discussion concerning taxation by counties, § 119 at 266:
“In determining the existence or extent of an alleged delegated power to tax, the statute must be strictly construed against the power to tax, and a delegation of power to tax for certain purposes will not be extended so as to authorize taxation for other purposes.”
*79The application of such rule to the instant case avoids reading into onr constitutional provision a patent absurdity; that the delegated power as to operational expenses would be limited and subject to vote of the people beyond those limits, and yet capital outlay expenditures would be unlimited and not subject to referendum. Any attempt to utilize such categories or devices by a municipality would be suspiciously viewed as an indirect evasion of tax limits. In short, “a limitation on a municipal levy for current expenses cannot be exceeded by using a different designation for such an expense.” 1 Cooley, supra, §§ 169, 371.
A further consideration which addresses our attention is that in both clause two of the second paragraph and the entire first paragraph referendum is an integral element in increasing taxes within the limits established either by charter or fixed by the constitution. In fact, as relating to unchartered counties, etc., in the first paragraph it is notable that all of the alternatives proposed by the constitutional drafters — whether it be an increase in excess of the 15-mill limitation, in the form of the “frozen millage” proposal or the “county option” 18-mill proposal — provided for a vote of the involved taxpayers (1 and 2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, pp 913, 934, 917, 923, 924, 2628-2630). In fact, and consonant with the tenor of the debates, the present constitution specifies a distinction in eligibility:
“All electors may vote on millage increased up to and including 5 years for general purposes, but only property owners and their spouses may vote on property tax increase proposals which extend for more than 5 years.” (2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, Address to the People, p 3399.)
*80To accept defendants’ argument that the taxpayers have no voice at the ballot box on bond issues, which may be both long and short term obligations, even though it increases the general ad valorem tax, renders the clear language of the constitution and the created categories of interested voters utterly meaningless. Cities and chartered units are, of course, controlled by vote on the charter provisions.10 The necessity of voter ratification is consonantly reflected in current, controlling legislation.11
*81What is the net effect of onr construction of Const 1963, art 9, § 6, paragraph 2, clause 1? It means that all governmental units with power to tax, including those specified in paragraph 2, clause 2, vis., “city, village, charter county, charter township, charter authority or other authority,” as well as unchartered units, are not limited, either as to rate or amount, as to tax imposed for capital outlay expenditures or bonded indebtedness, which is approved by the voters. As to operational expenditures, the maximum millage which may be levied is limited either by the charter provisions for those units subject to paragraph 2, clause 2 or to those unchartered units and school districts subject to paragraph 1 of section 6, in 15-18-50 millage.
I concur fully in the reasoning and holding of Justice Black as to the second question, whether defendant township may require that property be connected to and available to a public sanitary sewer without a specific finding that an existing private sewer system is a health hazard.
Public questions being involved, no costs are allowed.

 Some of our Con Con delegates, who are best left unnamed, intimated that political palatability played a role in retaining the 15-mill limitation as in the Const 1908, art 10, § 21 (see, e.g., 1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 928).
Certainly, cogent arguments may be made against tax limitation itself. See Fundamentals of Municipal Bonds, p 107 (Investment Bankers Assn., 1959 ed). These arguments, however, are addressed to the people of our state. As to this policy decision, not a word in the debates suggests that the delegates, rather than accepting or rejecting the 15-mill limit, intended to resort to semantical subterfuge. See text, infra.

 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (7th ed), pp 91-94; 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law, §§ 58, 66-67.

 The pertinent constitutional provision reads:
“The power to tax for the payment of principal and interest on bonds hereafter issued which are the general obligations of any school district, including refunding bonds, and for repayment of any state loans made to school districts, shall be without limitation as to rate or amount.”
See also, 1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 916.

 E.g., general village act, 1895 PA 3 (MOLA 69.1; MSA 5.1371). As to the nonapplieability of the limitations, the question and answer between Delegate Bradley and Chairman Brake is enlightening:
“MR. BRADLEY: Mr. President, I regret that I have to ask this kind of a question, but if I am in good conscience to understand what is going on, I must. Having come recently to the convention, I am not sure of the meaning of the committee proposal. The language provides for limits imposed by the local units of government themselves. Do I understand this to mean that a county, if it adopts a home rule charter, of if any of these charter townships or the cities and villages desire, under their own authority, to set a higher limit than that imposed by the legislature that this limit will prevail?
“PRESIDENT NISBET: Mr. Brake.
“MR. BRAKE: Any unit of government which is authorized by law to set a charter limit on its millage is not under this 15 mill provision. That would apply to your cities, of course, your villages, and if we adopt the home rule for counties and they adopt the charters, it would apply to them, and it would apply to a charter township. They fix their own millage limits.” (2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 2629.)

 See 2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 3399. Address to the People quoted, supra, pp 70-71. We reject the suggestion that the addition of the phrase “or other authorities” encompasses any and all other governmental units not specifically enumerated by the preceding phrase. Such construction would not only grossly violate the canon of construction, “inclusio unis est exclusio alterms,” but also ignore the manifest intent of the constitutional drafters to not foreclose increase of millage by metropolitan authorities, whether actually chartered or merely law authorities. As the proponent of the amendatory language, Delegate Hanna stated, 2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 3162:
“I think it was the intent of taxation and finance to exempt from the limitations these charter authorities, and I think when they used the term they were talking about all forms of metropolitan authorities, whether they were actually charter authorities or merely law authorities. And some of them are authorities that may be incorporated by joint action of legislative bodies and do not have a charter, as such, to be adopted. My amendment would simply insert that these authorities, whether charter or otherwise, would be exempt from the millage limitation and, thus, would make the 18 mill and the 15 mill limitation work for counties, townships and school districts.” (Emphasis added.)

 The meaning of the words “other indebtedness” or “contract obligations,” etc., must be ascertained with reference to the context and by considering what types of obligations are referred to by the words with which they are associated. See Wood v The Michigan A L R Co, 81 Mich 358 (1890); Bennett v Carr, 134 Mich 243 (1903). The maximum noseitur a sociis is applicable here and excludes the idea that the first clause refers to anything else other than instruments usually considered to be in the nature of a bond.

 It is noted that the Citizens Beseareh Council of Michigan, in 2 Comparative Analysis of the Michigan Constitution, focused upon possible areas of revision and suggested to the delegates that if a tax limitation is to be included in the 1963 Constitution, then the delegates should consider, inter alia, the following questions:
“Should the limit cover all purposes for which property taxes might be levied — special assessments, operating millage, debt service, capital outlay millage, etc.? If not, which purposes should be included and which excluded?” (X-27b.)

 See, e.g., the analogy in the McCauley amendment which would have left to the legislature the fixing of millage rates of townships, counties and school districts to meet operating expenses “except where such limits are provided by charter or other applicable home rule provisions.” (1 Official Becord, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 927.)

 There would be much merit to the argument that the disputed language came about not so much by design, nefarious or otherwise, but rather by a metamorphosis brought on by style and drafting. Committee Proposal 56, when read to the Convention, provided as to the disputed language:
*77“This limitation shall not apply to taxes levied for the payment of interest and principal on obligations incurred prior to December 8, 1932, which sums shall be separately assessed in all cases. This limitation may be increased for not more than 20 years for taxes to be used for the payment of principal and interest on bonds or other evidences of indebtedness or for the purpose of capital outlay by a majority vote of the electors of the taxing district who are qualified to vote on the question of issuing bonds, voting thereon at any election. For any other purpose the limitation may be increased for not more than 20 years by a majority vote of the electors of the taxing district voting thereon at any election. This limitation may be increased when provided for by the charter of a municipal corporation.” (1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 913.)
The first change in the disputed language occurred with the submission of a substitute for Committee Proposal 56 by Chairman Brake:
“Where this limitation applies it may be increased for not more than. 20 years for taxes to be used for the payment of principal and interest on bonds or for the purpose of capital outlay by a majority vote of the electors of the taxing district who are qualified to vote on the question of issuing bonds, voting thereon at any election. For any other purpose the limitation, where it applies, may be increased for not more than 20 years by a majority vote of the electors of the taxing district voting thereon at any election. This limitation shall not apply to any city, village, charter township or other charter taxing authority to which a tax rate limitation applies pursuant to its charter.” (1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 915.)
No amendments were at that time made to this paragraph. (1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 917.)
Then, Committee members Turner, et al., who were apparently in the minority, offered the following amendment to the substitute Committee Proposal 56:
“The total amount of taxes assessed against property for all purposes in any one year shall not exceed 1-1/2 per cent of the assessed valuation of said property, except taxes levied for the payment of interest and principal on obligations heretofore incurred, which sums shall be separately assessed in all cases: Provided, That this limitation may be increased for a period of not to exceed 20 years at any one time, to not more than a total of 5 per cent of the assessed valuation, by a majority vote of the electors of any assessing district, or when provided for by the charter of a municipal corporation: Provided further, That this limitation shall not apply to taxes levied in the year 1932.”
The policy issue, as well stated by Chairman Brake, was “whether or not we wish to continue with the 15 mill limitation as we have had it [Turner amendment], or whether we wish to try the new plan submitted by the majority of the committee [frozen millage].” (1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 921.) The Turner amendment prevailed. (1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 926.)
The next amendment came from Delegate McCauley, who proposed that the legislature be entrusted with setting the millage limitation:
*78“The legislature shall by general law fix limits on the rates of ad valorem taxes which may be levied by counties, townships, school districts and other political subdivision * * * .” (1 Official Eecord, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 927.)
The amendment was initially adopted (1 Official Eecord, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 928), but in the end, Chairman Brake’s substitute to the McCauley amendment was eventually adopted:
“The limitations established herein or by county vote may be increased to an aggregate of not to exceed 50 mills on each dollar of such valuation, except as otherwise provided by law, for a period of not to exceed 20 years at any one time, by the vote of a majority of the qualified electors, as defined in Article II hereof, of any such taxing authority voting thereon.
“The foregoing limitations shall not apply to (a) taxes levied for the payment of principal and interest on bonds or other evidences of indebtedness, or for the payment of assessments or contract obligations in anticipation of which bonds are issued, which taxes may be levied without limitation as to rate or amount, or (b) taxes levied for any other purposes by any city, village, charter county, charter township or other charter authority the tax limitations of which are provided by charter or by general law.” (2 Official Eecord, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 2628.)
Nothing said or read in support of these amendments even hints, that the Con Con drafters intended to delegate to the municipalities all taxing power as to capital outlay expenditures or intended in any way to diminish the electoral check of referendum.

 Delegate Brake, chairman of the committee on finance and taxation stated as to increases over the 15-mill limitation carried over from the 1908 Const, art 10, § 21, that:
“As at present, the voters of any taxing district can vote additional millage, subject to the present 20 year limit and the overall 50 mill limit. Cities and villages are excepted, as at present, from the 15 mill limit, and the only limitation to which they will be subject is that established by charter or by vote of the people.
“All electors may vote on millage increases for general purposes, but only property owners may vote on taxes to retire bond issues or for capital outlay.” (1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 913.)
One of the critical factors which eventually produced the substitute Committee Proposal 56 is developed in the following colloquy on the convention floor:
“MR. KNIRK: * * * The majority report, Mr. Brake, absolutely gives the local units of government the power to increase our taxes automatically without our consent ?
“CHAIRMAN BENTLEY: Mr. Brake.
“MR. BRAKE: In some places, it makes available the highest millage you have had in those years 1957 to 1961. Now, that may in your particular instance — and it may not in some other instance— permit an increase. That is not a compulsory increase. You don’t have to go there if you don’t wish. * * *
“MR. KNIRK: We go in for the fight, and I mean it’s been a real tough battle. I would rather see the 15 mill limitation be retained, and then we will present our budget to the people, because we haven’t lost on a single millage increase in our community for quite a number of years, rather than having an increased tax in the county and the township, and then still have to go to the people to get our millage.
“That’s what I feel is going to happen. Therefore I would certainly object to the majority report.” (1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 924.)
In any event, and as finally adopted by the Convention, the voter participation and approval is an essential part of Const 1963, art 9, § 6 (see 2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 2628, supra, note 3).

 See re tax anticipation notes MCLA 134.2(b); MSA 5.3188(14) ; bonds MCLA 135.7(2); MSA 5.3188(27); floating indebtedness *81'MCLA 141.2; MSA 5.382. Compare with revenue bonds MCLA 141-.106; MSA 5.2736, but see referendum provision in MCLA 141.133; MSA 5.2763.