Court Opinion

ID: 9861982
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:56:41.693805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:29:53.195396
License: Public Domain

ROTH, P. J.
I dissent. The facts outlined by the majority show that plaintiff Parr (real party in interest) filed a complaint for personal injuries and served it upon defendant Hill, an employee of Safeway Stores Incorporated, the other defendant. Safeway was not served but the insurance carrier for Safeway (Travelers) contacted Mr. Hoffman, attorney for plaintiff, and negotiations on behalf of both Hill and Safeway to settle plaintiff’s claim were commenced and continuously conducted (although abated by illness and specific requests for detailed information by the insurance adjuster) over a three-year period. As appears from the majority opinion: “In October 1964 Travelers’ adjuster had informed Parr’s attorneys that Travelers was not denying liability and that the only issue was the amount of Parr’s claim.” It thus appears that the sole issue was the amount of the settlement which should be made.
The two defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that the summons issued upon the filing of the action was not returned and filed within three years as required by section 581a of the Code of Civil Procedure. The motion was opposed by plaintiff. The trial judge after reviewing the conflicting affidavits in support of and opposing the motion said: “It seems to me from the showing made in this matter by the affidavits, and I say that I take the affidavits of Mr. Hoffman to he true, that the defendant in this matter is at this time estopped from asserting Section 581a. ” (Italics added.)
Thus the record shows that the trial judge on conflicting *757evidence found the facts to be true which have been cryptically summarized.
No citation of authority is needed for the thoroughly settled rule that the court must accept the facts found by the trial judge from conflicting affidavits. These found facts show that plaintiff was kept out of court because he as a reasonably prudent man had ample ground for believing that there was a good prospect of settlement, only the amount being an issue. They show further that the complaint which had been served on Hill was being treated by the insurance carrier as if plaintiff had served both Hill and Safeway since the carrier negotiated for both and that the overt indications from the settlement negotiations were that compliance with technical formalities, such as service on Safeway and return of summons, was unnecessary.
Conduct by a defendant which keeps a plaintiff out of court, conceding that the conduct was not fraudulently conceived by a defendant, has all the effect of extrinsic fraud when it ripens into a situation which causes a plaintiff, as a reasonably prudent man, to overlook compliance with a statutory rule which will enable him to stay in court. In a situation such as we have at bench, it seems to me that defendants had an obligation arising implicitly from the negotiations to announce on some date prior to the expiration of the three-year period, if they had the statute in mind, “serve Safeway and return the summons or we won’t deal with you. ’ ’ If there is such an implied obligation to speak, and I think there is, if a party privy to the situation plans to benefit from the omission, the failure to speak under the circumstances here detailed amounts to extrinsic fraud. Failure to speak at the very least, in my opinion, suggests a hope on the part of defendants that plaintiff would overlook the statutory requirement and forfeit the right to continue with an action which apparently had merit. If such a hope is created by prolonged negotiations (even though the delays were not generated by defendants), then realization of the hope by taking advantage of the security the negotiations spawned in the mind of plaintiff amounts to extrinsic fraud. (3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (1954) § 71, pp. 2124-2125.) If defendant didn’t have taking advantage of the. situation in mind, as seems quite probable, then the facts demonstrate that plaintiff was thoroughly justified in the assumption that defendants would continue to deal or advise, plaintiff that the negotia*758tians for settlement were hopeless and that he had best proceed with his action.
In the recent case of Morgan v. International Aviation Underwriters, Inc., 250 Cal.App.2d 176 [58 Cal.Rptr. 164], involving a contractual rather than a statutory period of limitations, decided by this court, we held on the precise question on substantially similar facts without the benefit of a finding by the trial court that a plaintiff who filed a complaint after the period set by an insurance contract was entitled to have tlie matter of estoppel determined before the action could be dismissed.
In Morgan, supra, this court said at pages 180-181: “ ‘The courts have recognized estoppels in circumstances comparable to these. Thus the District Court of Appeal in Gaglione v. Coolidge (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 518 [286 P.2d 568], expressed the opinion: “It is well settled that where delay in commencing an action is induced by the conduct of the defendant, he cannot avail himself of the defense of the statute. (Adams v. California Mut. Bldg. & Loan, Assn., 18 Cal.2d 487 [116 P.2d 75]; Langdon v. Langdon, 47 Cal.App.2d 28 [117 P.2d 371]; Berkey v. Halm, 101 Cal.App.2d 62 [224 P.2d 885]; Schaefer v. Kerber, 105 Cal.App.2d 645 [234 P.2d 109].) In Industrial Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 115 Cal.App.2d 684, 690 [252 P.2d 649], it is said that ‘Acts or conduct which wrongfully induce a party to believe an amicable adjustment of his claim will be made, may create an estoppel against pleading the statute. (Citations.) An insurer cannot hold out a hope of amicable adjustment of a claim and thus delay action against it, and then plead the delay caused by its own conduct as a defense to an action when brought. ’ ’ ’ (P. 527.) Bollinger v. National Fire Ins. Co. (1944) 25 Cal.2d 399 [154 P.2d 399], applies an estoppel to an insurance situation, saying the statute may be suspended by “fraudulent concealment by the defendant of the facts upon which a cause of action is based ... or mistake as to the facts constituting the cause of action . . . [Bjquitable considerations . . . are applicable whether defendant violated a legal duty in failing to disclose its intention to set up this technical defense, or whether it is now merely seeking the aid of a court in sustaining a plea that would enable it to obtain an unconscionable advantage and enforce a forfeiture.” (P. 411.)’”
The facts at bench judicially determined on the motion to dismiss are the equivalent of a finding of extrinsic fraud. If *759on the basis of extrinsic fraud a court can set aside a final judgment, irrespective of mandatory statutory provisions pursuant to which the judgment was obtained, it appears reasonable that the court has the power on the ground of equitable estoppel when the facts equate with extrinsic fraud to prevent a judgment from being entered.