Court Opinion

ID: 9568820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:07:49.231395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:09:01.277808
License: Public Domain

Justice Meyer
concurring in result.
I concur only in the result reached by the majority. I continue, primarily for the reasons stated in my dissent and that of Justice Webb in Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics, 327 N.C. 283, 307, 318, 395 S.E.2d 85, 99, 106 (1990), to believe that this Court should place some limitations on the nebulous “foreseeability” rule adopted by the majority. Those restrictions should, in accord with those adopted by the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, be based on the relationship of the claimant to the injured or deceased person and the proximity of perception as well as the severity of the claimant’s mental or emotional injury. For limitations on foreseeability based on plaintiff’s relationship to the victim, see, e.g., Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 667-68, 771 P.2d 814, 829-30, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865, 880 (1989) (mother of victim is “closely related”); Elden v. Sheldon, 46 Cal. 3d 267, 273, 758 P.2d 582, 587, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254, 258 (1988) (unmarried cohabitant denied recovery); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 741, 441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80 (1968) (mother of victim is “closely related”); Quesada v. Oak Hill Improvement Co., 213 Cal. App. 3d 596, 610, 261 Cal. Rptr. 769, 778, reh’g denied & op. modified, rev. denied (1989) (niece given opportunity to prove sufficiently close relationship). For limitations on foreseeability based on the proximity of perception, see, e.g., Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d at 669, 771 P.2d at 830, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 881 (recovery denied to mother who was neither present at scene of accident nor aware that son was being injured); Wright v. City of Los Angeles, 219 Cal. App. 3d 318, 350, 268 Cal. Rptr. 309, 329, rev. denied (1990) (plaintiffs must be on the scene and “then aware [that decedent] was being injured by [the tort-feasor’s] negligent conduct”); Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., 56 Haw. 204, 209, 532 P.2d 673, 676 (1975) (physical proximity to scene of tort is determining factor); Wilder v. City of Keene, 131 N.H. 599, 604, 557 A.2d 636, 639 (1989) (recovery denied to parents who neither *676saw nor heard collision); Burris v. Grange Mutual Cos., 46 Ohio St. 3d 84, 93, 545 N.E.2d 83, 91 (1989) (recovery denied to parent who had “no sensory perception of the events surrounding the accident”); Gain v. Carroll Mill Co., 114 Wash. 2d 254, 261, 787 P.2d 553, 557 (1990) (plaintiff required to be “present at the scene of the accident and/or arrive shortly thereafter”).
I also believe that this Court should require the joinder of any negligent infliction of emotional distress claim with the suit on the underlying wrongful death or personal injury claim. The jury would thereby be able to view the claims in their proper context and fashion its remedies accordingly. To allow the parents or other loved ones to bring a wrongful death claim separate and apart from their negligent infliction of emotional distress claim raises the possibility of inconsistent verdicts based on the same act of negligence and, in many cases, double recoveries by the same parties for the same loss.
This approach is not without precedent in North Carolina law. In Nicholson v. Hospital, 300 N.C. 295, 266 S.E.2d 818 (1980), this Court held that
a spouse may maintain a cause of action for loss of consortium due to the negligent actions of third parties so long as that action for loss of consortium is joined with any suit the other spouse may have instituted to recover for his or her personal injuries.
Id. at 304, 266 S.E.2d at 823. A claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress flowing from an injury to a third party bears sufficient resemblance in all pertinent respects to a claim for loss of consortium to merit requiring the two claims to be joined in the same action. See Ruark, 327 N.C. at 314-15, 395 S.E.2d at 103 (Meyer, J., dissenting).