Court Opinion

ID: 9711110
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:24:36.612179+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:02.352287
License: Public Domain

Holbrook, J.
Defendant was charged in an information on two counts of breaking and entering a dwelling in the nighttime with intent to commit a larceny therein,1 and possession of burglary tools.2 Defendant pleaded guilty in the recorder’s court for the city of Detroit, October 15, 1963, to the charge of possession of burglary tools and such plea was accepted. On October 29, 1963, defendant was sentenced to prison to a term of 7 to 10 years. Upon petition of defendant, the court appointed present counsel for appellate review. A delayed motion was presented to the trial court to set aside the plea and for a new trial which was denied May 21, 1965. Application for leave to file a delayed appeal from the denial of the said motion in the trial court was granted by this Court, December 16, 1965.
Pursuant to said order, defendant has appealed and raises the several claims of error for review, one of which was that the trial judge did not meet the statutory and court rule requirements in accepting the defendant’s plea of guilty.
More specifically, the error asserted by defendant involves the sufficiency of the arraignment prior to acceptance of his plea of guilty in order to comply with the applicable court rule G-CR 1963, 785.3(2) which is as follows:
“If the accused pleads guilty, after such plea and before sentence the court shall inform the accused of the nature of the accusation and the consequence *11of his plea; and regardless of whether'he is represented by counsel, the court shall examine the accused, not necessarily under oath, and as a condition of accepting the plea of guilty and imposing sentence shall ascertain that the plea was freely, understanding^, and voluntarily made, without undue influence, compulsion, or duress, and without promise of leniency. Unless the court determines ■that the plea of guilty was so made, it shall not be accepted.”
The defendant and another were charged with -the crime contained in the information; both pleaded guilty as to count 2, the possession of burglary tools. The record received from the trial court discloses the following proceedings on arraignment:
“The Court. Irving Charles Goldfarb?
“Defendant.' Yes, sir.
“The Court. Your counsel Mr. Parzen advises the court that you wish to plead guilty to possession of burglary tools, is that correct?
“Defendant. Yes.
“The Court. You plead guilty freely and voluntarily?
“Defendant. Yes.
“The Court. No one forced you to plead guilty?
“Defendant. No.
“The Court. No one threatened you in any way or made you any promises?
“Defendant. No, sir.
“The Court. You plead guilty after having talked .the matter over with Mr. Parzen and after receiving his advice, is that right?
“Defendant. Yes, sir.
“The Court. He’s told you the maximum penalty .for the crime is 10 years?
“Defendant. Yes, sir.
“The Court. He’s also told you that you have a ■constitutional right to trial by jury, you wish to *12waive tbe right and plead guilty before me, is that correct ?
“Defendant. Yes, sir.
“The Court. You plead guilty because you are guilty?
“Defendant. Yes, sir.
“The Court. Very well. * * * The court will accept both pleas, refer you to the psychiatric — ■ wait, to the probation department only, 2 weeks from today for sentence and remanded to the custody of the sheriff as to each.”
The foregoing clearly shows that the court adequately ascertained that the plea was freely and voluntarily made without any undue influence, compulsion, duress, or promise of leniency. He was advised that the maximum penalty was 10 years and also advised of his right to a jury trial. At the time, his attorney was present and representing him.
It now clearly appears that the only issue of substance is whether the trial court substantially complied with the requirement that “the court shall inform the accused of the nature of the accusation.”
The only references to the nature of the accusation contained in the record are the following two questions by the court: “Your counsel, Mr. Parzen, advises the court that you wish to plead guilty to possession of burglary tools, is that correct?” and “You plead guilty after having talked the matter over with Mr. Parzen after receiving .his advice, is that right ?”
The offense to which defendant offered a plea of guilty is CL 1948, § 750.116 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 28.311) which is as follows:
“Any person who shall knowingly have in his possession any nitroglycerine, or other explosive, thermite, engine, machine, tool or implement, device, chemical or substance, adapted and designed for *13cutting or burning through, forcing or breaking open any building, room, vault, safe or other depository, in order to steal therefrom any money or other property, knowing the same to be adapted and designed for the purpose aforesaid, with intent to use or employ the same for the purpose aforesaid, shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the State prison not more than 10 years.”
The charge is a complicated one. Its elements involve both knowledge of possession and potential utility of certain tools and items and intent to use such for a specific purpose as defined by the statute. It is true that the defendant was represented by capable counsel and that defendant had considerable previous experience in the criminal courts- of our State. However, the court rule is mandatory as we have previously ruled in People v. Winegar (1966), 4 Mich App 547, wherein Judge McGregor stated on pp 552, 553:
“If the arraignment proceedings which culminate in a plea of guilty fail to comply with the appropriate rule, there is no standard by which they could be- said to be valid. The standard to be followed for validity of a plea of guilty is clearly the court rule. Perhaps the requirements of the court rule go beyond the minimum Federal constitutional requirements, but it is beyond the authority of the Court of Appeals to emasculate the statute or the court rule. Once the procedure is set forth by statute or court rule, it would be a denial of equal protection of the laws not to apply said rule in a consistent manner to all defendants. The rule is more than a matter of mere procedure. It sets up a means of providing and guaranteeing fair treatment to defendants who are pleading guilty.”
The people cite People v. Bumpus (1959), 355 Mich 374, as authority for holding the present arraignment sufficient. In Bumpus, supra, the Su*14preme Court affirmed the conviction but noted that the defendant had twice stated he understood the nature of the charge made against him. The Court stated at p 380: “It is clear that the trial judge made such investigation, particularly with reference to the accuracy of the charge made and was satisfied, as required.” In our case the defendant was never asked whether he understood the charge and the court made no investigation as to the accuracy.
In People v. Barrows (1959), 358 Mich 267, Mr. Justice Edwards stated on p 272 as follows:
“The direct questioning of a defendant by the trial judge on plea of guilty is required by the rule for the purpose of establishing the crime and the participation therein of the person pleading guilty. This is a precaution against involuntary or induced false pleas of guilty, and against subsequent false claims of innocence.”
■ Since the plea in Barrows, supra, was set aside even though he was represented by counsel, it does not appear that the trial court may rely on the defendant’s attorney to fulfill the requirements that the accused be informed of the nature of the accusation.
Both the people and defendant rely on the case of People v. Reed (1965), 1 Mich App 60, This Court found in that case no reversible error in accepting a plea of guilty made with the advice of counsel. However, from the facts given in the opinion it appears that the trial court “informed him of the, charge” and “examined” the defendant respecting the homicide. It would appear, therefore, that the trial court made an investigation as to the accuracy of the charge and the participation therein by the defendant as was done in Bumpus, supra.
*15The case of People v. Steele (1966), 4 Mich App 352, is not applicable to the case at hand because in the Steele Case, the defendant stated the surrounding circumstances of the crime in open court, indicating he was well aware of the accusation and admitting the essential elements of the crime.
Under the court rule and the cases herein cited, it is mandatory on arraignment on the information, that the court inform the accused of the nature of the accusation and investigate by direct questioning the accuracy of the charge for the purpose of establishing the crime and the defendant’s participation therein. In referring to the offense to which the defendant offered a plea of guilty, the court in questioning the defendant on arraignment only used the words “possession of burglary tools.” This alone was not sufficient to establish the crime and the defendant’s participation therein.
The fact that defendant was not a stranger to the criminal courts of our State or that he was represented by competent counsel does not relieve the trial court of fulfilling the mandatory requirements of the court rule. People v. Barrows, supra; People v. Winegar, supra.
Common sense compels recognition of the fact that certain offenses involve more elements and are of greater complexity than others. The instant case is an example of the former, and Steele, supra, of the latter. The language of the court rule dealing with acceptance of pleas implicitly recognizes this fact, and we have recognized this self-evident principle in applying the rule to the offenses charged and the fact situations presented by the cases cited above. Although the requirement does not change, the extent of explanation it demands of . the trial court prior to acceptance of a plea cannot be set by predetermined, mechanical rules and must nec*16essarily vary to cover the offense charged and the facts of each case.
In view of the action we order herein, we find it unnecessary to comment upon the other assignments of error made by the defendant except to say we find them to be without merit.
The conviction of the defendant is reversed and remanded for trial.
Lesinski, C. J., concurred with Holbrook, J.

 CL 1948, § 750.110 (Stat Ann 1962 Eev § 28.305), since amended by PA 1964, No 133 (Stat Ann 1965 Cum Supp § 28.305).

 CL 1948, § 750.116 (Stat Ann 1962 Eev § 28.311).