Court Opinion

ID: 9948761
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 21:10:23.169095+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:49.752238
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Quinones-Torres, 2024-Ohio-844.]

                              COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                       :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                 :
                                                           No. 112339
                 v.                                  :

FRANCISCO QUINONES-TORRES,                           :

                 Defendant-Appellant.                :

                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 7, 2024

         Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                             Case No. CR-22-669141-B

                                            Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Jordan Mason, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 John E. Jackson, for appellant.

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J.:

                Defendant-appellant Francisco Quinones-Torres (“Quinones-Torres”)

appeals his convictions for felonious assault and other charges. For the reasons that

follow, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural History

             On April 5, 2022, a grand jury convened and indicted Quinones-Torres

for kidnapping, a felony of the first degree (Count 1); abduction, a felony of the third

degree (Count 2); two counts of felonious assault, felonies of the second degree

(Counts 3 and 4); and two counts of having weapons while under disability, felonies

of the third degree (Counts 5 and 6).1 Counts 1-4 contained one-year and three-year

firearm specifications. Counts 1, 3, and 4, also contained repeat violent offender

(“RVO”) and notice of prior conviction (“NPC”) specifications.

             Prior to trial, Quinones-Torres signed a jury waiver for the RVO and

NPC specifications. His counsel did not waive the jury for the weapons while under

disability charges. Counsel expressed on the record that because his client’s prior

convictions were elements of the offenses, the charges could not be bifurcated, and

therefore had to be tried by the jury. The parties subsequently stipulated to the

authenticity and admission of Quinones-Torres’ prior convictions for drug

possession and felonious assault. State’s exhibits Nos. 52 and 53.

             The jury trial commenced on November 28, 2022. The testimony

revealed that in the early morning hours of February 28, 2022, Cleveland police

officers were called to the area of Bradwell Avenue on the report of a shooting. They

were informed that a female was shot and possibly in the basement of a home;

      1 In the original indictment, Wanda Cruz was indicted in Counts 1 and 2 with

kidnapping and abduction, respectively, and appellant’s charges were Counts 3 through
8. The trial court later renumbered the charges after Cruz pleaded to a reduced charge.
For ease of reference, we have numbered the counts as reflected in the judgment of
conviction.
however, they only had the street not the number of the home. By way of knocking

on doors, Officer Hector Vazquez made contact with Wanda Cruz (“Cruz”) who

informed him that the female K.W. had gone to the hospital. Officer Vazquez speaks

Spanish fluently and spoke to Cruz in that language. Officer Vazquez obtained

permission to search the home. He found a shell casing in the basement as well as

what appeared to be blood. Officer Vazquez spoke to Quinones-Torres over the

phone, also in Spanish. Quinones-Torres first told Officer Vazquez that he was in

Lorain, then spontaneously told him he was going to turn himself in the following

morning. Quinones-Torres claimed that he was dropped off in Lorain and that his

mother’s Jeep should be parked at her home.

            K.W. met Quinones-Torres a month prior to the incident at a gas station

at West 25th Street and Bradwell Avenue. They became close rather quickly and saw

each other almost every day. They usually met at the home Quinones-Torres shared

with his mother, Cruz, on Bradwell Avenue. On the day before the incident, K.W.

and Quinones-Torres met at 6:00 p.m. They ran errands, while Cruz did laundry,

and later the two smoked some marijuana.

            Around 2:30 a.m., K.W. asked Quinones-Torres to take her home. He

became angry and accused her of stealing from him. Quinones-Torres called

someone on the phone but spoke in Spanish, which K.W. did not understand.

Nevertheless, she felt like something bad was going to happen. Quinones-Torres

took K.W.’s bookbag and emptied its contents onto the floor. At that point, K.W.

decided to go upstairs and get Cruz. She turned around when she heard Quinones-
Torres come up behind her and saw that he had his gun pointed at her. She smacked

it away from her and Quinones-Torres pulled the trigger. She heard the bullet hit

the wall but did not realize initially that it had hit her first. The bullet entered near

her belly button and exited her right side.

             K.W. turned and went upstairs. Quinones-Torres followed her and got

her a cup of water. K.W. remembered seeing him with the gun upstairs, though she

could not recall if he had it the whole time or if he had gone downstairs to get it at

some point. (Tr. 168-169.) K.W. attempted to leave but either Quinones-Torres or

Cruz stopped her. When she tried to call her stepfather, Quinones-Torres took her

phone. Eventually, Quinones-Torres obtained the keys to Cruz’s Jeep and drove

K.W. to the hospital. Quinones-Torres also gave K.W. her phone back. She secretly

called 911 and placed the phone in her pocket. Video from MetroHealth Hospital

shows Quinones-Torres dropping off K.W. in the Jeep.

             After deliberations, the jury found Quinones-Torres guilty of abduction

and the associated gun specifications (Count 2); guilty of two counts of felonious

assault and the associated gun specifications (Counts 3 and 4); and guilty of two

counts of weapons while under disability (Counts 5 and 6).             The jury found

Quinones-Torres not guilty of the kidnapping charge (Count 1). The trial court

found Quinones-Torres guilty of the RVO and NPC specifications associated with

Counts 3 and 4.

             The trial court sentenced Quinones-Torres to an aggregate term of 9 to

10 ½ years. Quinones-Torres appeals assigning the following errors for our review.
                           Assignment of Error No. 1

      The trial court violated appellant’s right to due process of law by finding
      him guilty of abduction without sufficient evidence.

                           Assignment of Error No. 2

      Appellant’s convictions were against the manifest weight of the
      evidence.

                          Assignment of Error No. 3

      Appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel
      failed to bifurcate and try the having weapons while under disability
      charges to the trial court.

Law and Argument

              For ease of analysis, we will address the assignments of error out of

order, beginning with the third assignment of error. Quinones-Torres argues that

he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his lawyer failed to bifurcate the

weapons while under disability charges effectively placing his prior bad acts in the

form of prior convictions before the jury.

             Ineffective assistance of counsel is established when a defendant

demonstrates that (1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonable representation and (2) he was prejudiced by that performance.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

Courts considering whether an attorney’s performance fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness, “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s

conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”

Strickland at 689. A defendant establishes prejudice by showing that “there exists
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” State v. Davis, 159 Ohio St.3d 31, 2020-Ohio-309, 146

N.E.3d 560, ¶ 10. A party must establish both prongs of the test. Failure to prove

one prong makes consideration of the other prong unnecessary. State v. Morgan,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105682, 2018-Ohio-1834, ¶ 11.

                Quinones-Torres’ trial counsel indicated that the weapons while under

disability charge could not be bifurcated and that was the reason that it had to be

tried before the jury. On appeal, Quinones-Torres has not cited any case law to

establish that this decision was in error. Additionally, because there are no citations

to case law it is unclear whether Quinones-Torres is claiming that the error was, as

the state argues in its response, a failure to waive the jury on the weapons while

under disability charges, or whether the error was arguing that the prior convictions

could not be “bifurcated” from the weapons while under disability charge and tried

to the court.

                The discussion between the trial court and defense counsel leads this

court to believe they were discussing whether an element of the offense, i.e., the prior

conviction, could be bifurcated and tried to the court, while the remainder of the

offense was tried to the jury.

      Court: Let me just indicate for the record, there’s no way to bifurcate
      the weapons disability thing, correct? In other words, there is a
      reference to a prior conviction in that count.

      Defense: Correct, your honor.

      ***
       Court: There’s no way to bifurcate that or try that to the Court? It’s an
       element of the offense, right?

       Defense: Correct?

       Court: So the jury will be made aware that he has a prior conviction.

       Defense: Correct.

(Tr. 15.)

              Regardless, because Quinones-Torres has not cited case law to

support his argument that his trial counsel’s decision was in error, we are unable to

review the argument. A court of appeals may disregard any assigned error that is

unsupported by citation to caselaw or statutes. State v. Tye, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

111174, 2022-Ohio-2869, ¶ 25, citing App.R. 12(A)(2) and 16(A)(7).

              Therefore, the third assignment of error is overruled.

              In the first assignment of error, Quinones-Torres argues that there

was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for abduction. He argues that

there was insufficient evidence that he forced or threatened K.W., preventing her

from leaving the residence.

              “A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction

requires a determination of whether the state met its burden of production.” State

v. Hunter, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86048, 2006-Ohio-20, ¶ 41, citing State v.

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). It involves a review of the

evidence admitted at trial and a determination of “‘whether such evidence, if

believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.’” State v. Goins, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109497, 2021-Ohio-

1299, ¶ 13, quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991),

paragraph two of the syllabus. We must look at the evidence in a light most favorable

to the prosecution and determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

The question is not “ ‘whether the state’s evidence is to be believed, but whether, if

believed, the evidence against a defendant would support a conviction.’” Id., quoting

Thompkins at 390.

              Abduction requires a showing that the accused, without privilege to do

so, knowingly, by force or threat, restrained the liberty of the victim under

circumstances that created a risk of physical harm to her or placed her in fear.

R.C. 2905.02(A)(2). “Force” is defined as “any violence, compulsion, or constraint

physically exerted by any means upon or against a person or thing.

R.C. 2901.01(A)(1). A “threat” is not defined in the code, but Black’s Law Dictionary

defines it as “a communicated intent to inflict harm or loss on another or on

another’s property, especially one that might diminish a person’s freedom to act

voluntarily or with lawful consent; a declaration, express or implied of an intent to

inflict loss or pain on another.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th Ed. 2019).

              After she was shot, K.W. went upstairs and tried to leave. Quinones-

Torres moved in front of her, blocked her access to the door, and told her not to go.

He then went downstairs but told his mother to watch K.W. When he left, K.W. tried

to leave again, managed to unlock and open the side door, but his mother pushed it
closed. Although K.W. was unclear whether Quinones-Torres had the gun the entire

time, he had it when he came back upstairs. When K.W. tried to call her stepfather,

Quinones-Torres took her phone. While this was happening, K.W. testified that the

blood from her wound was “flowing heavily.” K.W. estimated that 20-30 minutes

passed before Quinones-Torres drove her to the hospital.

              Looking at the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a

jury could reasonably conclude that Quinones-Torres actions after he shot K.W.

established both force and threat. Quinones-Torres shot K.W. over an alleged theft.

Consequently, any action he took to prevent her from leaving would seem

threatening. Blocking the door and taking her phone, while carrying the gun for all

or most of the incident would signal to K.W. that she was not free to leave.

Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence as to the elements of force or threat.

Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled.

              Finally, in the second assignment of error, Quinones-Torres argues

that his convictions were not supported by the manifest weight of the evidence.

              “‘[W]eight of the evidence involves the inclination of the greater

amount of credible evidence.’” State v. Harris, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109060,

2021-Ohio-856, ¶ 32, quoting Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541.

Weight of the evidence relates to “‘the evidence’s effect of inducing belief.’” Id.,

quoting State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264,

¶ 25, citing Thompkins at 386-387. As the reviewing court, a decision to reverse a

conviction based on the weight of the evidence stems from this court sitting as the
“thirteenth juror” who “disagrees with the factfinder’s resolution of the conflicting

testimony.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), citing

Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982). The reviewing

court must consider all of the evidence in the record, the reasonable inferences to

make from it, and the credibility of the witnesses to determine “‘whether in resolving

conflicts in the evidence, the factfinder clearly lost its way and created such a

manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial

ordered.’” Id., citing Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d

172, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).

              Quinones-Torres points to several contradictions and inconsistencies

in K.W.’s testimony and suggests that they establish a lack of credibility. Notably,

none of these inconsistencies or contradictions are regarding the shooting itself.

      K.W. mistook the date of the offense.

      K.W. testified that she told the police the gun was a Smith and Wesson,
      but the detective testified she did not identify the type of gun.

      K.W. stated at one point that Quinones-Torres gave her a hoodie before
      they left the house, then later testified that he gave it to her in the car.

      K.W. testified that the Jeep was gold while officers testified it was gray.

      Det. Krakowski testified K.W. told her mother she was hit by a stray
      bullet, but K.W. did not remember making that statement.

              None of these contradictions is so egregious as to call into question

K.W.’s veracity. She testified about an incident that happened almost nine months

prior to trial. The jury could have noted all these contradictions and still found K.W.
was credible when she testified that Quinones-Torres shot her in his basement. Her

testimony regarding the shooting was simple and straightforward. The other

testimony does not lead this court to doubt the veracity of that testimony.

              Quinones-Torres also questions whether K.W. had drugs in her

possession. A black cosmetics bag was found in K.W.’s backpack at the scene. K.W.

admitted ownership of the backpack but denied owning the black cosmetic bag. The

cosmetics bag contained makeup items that K.W. admitted were hers. It also

contained a spoon, a vial, and a shell casing, which K.W. denied were hers. The

spoon, vial, and shell casing were never tested. Quinones-Torres suggests K.W. was

using drugs. The suggestion that K.W. was using drugs is speculative. The jury

could have assigned the cosmetic bag and its contents no probative value because

the evidence presented gave it no value.

              Quinones-Torres also takes issue with K.W.’s testimony that she

heard a bullet hit the wall, yet no impact strike was found nor was a bullet found.

The state’s witnesses countered that testimony with testimony stating that an impact

strike is not always found and neither is a bullet. The jury could have found that

testimony credible.

              Finally, Quinones-Torres argues that the police failed to properly

investigate the case because they did not follow up on text messages between K.W.

and Quinones-Torres’ niece and mother; canvas the neighborhood to determine if

anyone heard a gunshot; never tested the blood that was found for DNA; and failed

to recognize there was not enough blood at the scene given how K.W. said she was
shot. Again, the evidentiary value of this evidence is speculative. Quinones-Torres

could have obtained the text messages from his family members if they were truly

relevant. The relevance of whether a neighbor heard a gunshot would depend on

whether they were awake at 2:30 a.m., and whether a gunshot could have been heard

outside of the home. It is speculative to suggest that a canvas would have yielded

results. The defense could have requested that the state test the blood. Whether the

blood would have splattered is also speculative.

              Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that the jury lost its way or

created a manifest injustice when it found Quinones-Torres guilty. The convictions

were supported by the greater weight of credible evidence. Accordingly, the second

assignment of error is overruled.

              Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

      The defendant’s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending is

terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, JUDGE

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR