Court Opinion

ID: 9371478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-16 16:02:58.039089+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:27.761202
License: Public Domain

Supreme Court of Florida
                            ____________

                            No. SC22-72
                            ____________

                         FRANK A. WALLS,
                            Appellant,

                                  vs.

                       STATE OF FLORIDA,
                            Appellee.

                         February 16, 2023

PER CURIAM.

     Frank A. Walls, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals

an order denying his latest successive postconviction motion, which

sought relief under Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014).1 For the

reasons given below, we affirm.

                            Background

     Early one morning in 1987, Walls broke into a mobile home

then occupied by Edward Alger and Ann Peterson. Using curtain

cords, Walls tied them up. Alger managed to get loose, and a

     1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
struggle ensued. Ultimately, Walls tackled Alger, slashed his

throat, and then shot him in the head several times—killing him.

     Walls then turned his attention to Peterson, who was at that

time helpless and in tears. Though Peterson posed no threat to

him, Walls shot her in the head from close range. Peterson began

screaming. In response, Walls forced Peterson’s face into a pillow

and again shot her in the head from close range. She died as a

result of these gunshot wounds.

     Based on these events, the State charged Walls with two

counts of first-degree murder and other crimes. A jury found Walls

guilty as charged on both murder counts and recommended a

sentence of death for the murder of Peterson. Following the

sentencing hearing, the circuit court sentenced Walls to death. On

appeal, we reversed his convictions and death sentence, holding

that a correctional officer committed a Massiah 2 violation during

Walls’s pretrial detention. Walls v. State, 580 So. 2d 131, 132-35

(Fla. 1991) (plurality opinion); id. at 135 (Grimes, J., concurring).

     2. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).

                                 -2-
     On remand, a jury found Walls guilty of both first-degree

murder counts and again recommended a death sentence for the

murder of Peterson. Accepting that recommendation, the circuit

count imposed the death sentence. This time, we affirmed in all

respects. Walls v. State, 641 So. 2d 381, 391 (Fla. 1994). Walls

then filed a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court, which was

denied. Walls v. Florida, 513 U.S. 1130 (1995).

     Since then, Walls has challenged his death sentence

numerous times, including on the basis that he is intellectually

disabled. He first raised an intellectual-disability claim shortly after

the Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, which held that the

Eighth Amendment forbids execution of the intellectually disabled.

536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). Following a lengthy evidentiary hearing,

the circuit court denied Walls’s Atkins claim. We affirmed, noting

that Walls had never scored 70 or below on an IQ test. Walls v.

State, 3 So. 3d 1248 (Fla. 2008) (table decision) (citing Cherry v.

State, 959 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 2007)).

     Seven years later, Walls raised his second intellectual-

disability claim—this time relying on Hall v. Florida. That decision

held that Cherry’s bright-line test created “an unacceptable risk

                                 -3-
that persons with intellectual disability will be executed.” Hall, 572

U.S. at 704. Reasoning in part that Hall did not apply to cases on

collateral review, the circuit court summarily denied Walls’s claim.

We disagreed, determining that Hall was retroactive under our state

law. Walls v. State, 213 So. 3d 340, 346 (Fla. 2016) (applying

retroactivity test set forth in Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla.

1980)). In light of that determination, we reversed the summary

denial and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 341, 347.

     Over four years later, the evidentiary hearing took place.

Ultimately, the circuit court denied Walls’s motion, giving two

reasons for its ruling. First, relying on intervening case law from

this Court, see Phillips v. State, 299 So. 3d 1013 (Fla. 2020); Nixon

v. State, 327 So. 3d 780 (Fla. 2021), the circuit court concluded

that Hall was not retroactive and, thus, Hall could not provide a

basis for relief. Second, on the merits, the court found that Walls

failed to prove that he was intellectually disabled under section

921.137, Florida Statutes (2021). Walls now appeals.

                                Analysis

     Walls argues that the circuit court erred in multiple respects

in denying his intellectual-disability claim. We decline to reach his

                                  -4-
merits-based argument and instead affirm on the basis that Hall is

not retroactive. 3

     Walls’s death sentence became final in 1995. Thus, to benefit

from Hall—a decision that issued almost 20 years later—Walls must

show that Hall is retroactive. Our decision in Phillips, however,

forecloses that argument. In that decision, we held that Hall is not

retroactive under federal or state law, receding from prior case law

to the contrary. Phillips, 299 So. 3d at 1018-24.

     Recognizing the hurdle Phillips poses, Walls contends that

Phillips was wrongly decided. And in the alternative, he argues that

our decision in State v. Okafor, 306 So. 3d 930, 933-35 (Fla. 2020)

(applying finality-of-judgment principles in concluding that we

lacked authority to simply reinstate death sentence when time

period for recalling our mandate vacating death sentence had

expired), and the law-of-the-case doctrine preclude application of

Phillips in this particular case. But we have already rejected

arguments to recede from Phillips and have instead consistently

applied its holding in the postconviction context, see, e.g.,

     3. Our review in this case is de novo. See Rogers v. State, 327
So. 3d 784, 787 n.5 (Fla. 2021).

                                 -5-
Thompson v. State, 341 So. 3d 303, 304 (Fla. 2022) (death sentence

final in 1993); Pittman v. State, 337 So. 3d 776, 777 (Fla. 2022)

(death sentence final in 1995); Nixon, 327 So. 3d at 781 (death

sentence final in 1991); Freeman v. State, 300 So. 3d 591, 593 (Fla.

2020) (death sentence final in 1991); Cave v. State, 299 So. 3d 352,

353 (Fla. 2020) (death sentence final in 1999), even in cases where

we had remanded for additional proceedings in light of Hall,

see, e.g., Thompson, 341 So. 3d at 306; Nixon, 327 So. 3d at 782.

     For instance, in Nixon, we affirmed the denial of a Hall-based

intellectual-disability claim. 327 So. 3d at 784. In so doing, we

stated that Phillips was the controlling law that governed on appeal,

concluding: “It would be inconsistent with that controlling law for

us to entertain Nixon’s successive, Hall-based challenge to the trial

court’s order here.” Id. at 783. We further stressed that the law-of-

the-case doctrine did not compel a different analysis. Id. Again,

noting that Phillips had issued after our mandate in Nixon’s prior

appeal, we applied an exception to the law-of-the-case doctrine for

intervening changes in controlling law. Id.

     We reached a similar conclusion in Thompson, a case that

involved a remand instruction requiring the circuit court to hold a

                                -6-
new evidentiary hearing on Thompson’s Hall-based intellectual-

disability claim. Thompson, 341 So. 3d at 305. On remand, the

circuit court declined to hold an evidentiary hearing and summarily

denied the claim on the authority of Phillips. Id. Thompson argued

on appeal that Okafor required the circuit court to hold an

evidentiary hearing in compliance with the remand instruction. Id.

Disagreeing with that argument, we distinguished Okafor based on

the fact that Thompson’s death sentence remained intact. Id. at

305-06. Additionally, consistent with Nixon, we concluded that

Phillips constituted an intervening change in law for purposes of an

exception to the law-of-the-case doctrine. Id. at 306. Accordingly,

we followed Phillips and held that Hall did not apply in Thompson’s

case. Id. Based on this analysis, we affirmed the summary denial

of Thompson’s intellectual-disability claim. Id.

     Accordingly, consistent with Nixon and Thompson,4 we

conclude that Walls does not get the benefit of Hall. As a

    4. We reject Walls’s argument to recede from Nixon and
Thompson.

                                -7-
consequence, his Hall-based intellectual-disability claim fails

regardless of the evidence presented at his evidentiary hearing. 5

                             Conclusion

     Based on the above analysis, we affirm the circuit court’s

ruling.

     It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, POLSTON, COURIEL, GROSSHANS,
and FRANCIS, JJ., concur.
LABARGA, J., dissents with an opinion.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

LABARGA, J., dissenting.

     Because I continue to adhere to my dissent in Phillips v. State,

299 So. 3d 1013 (Fla. 2020) (receding from Walls v. State, 213 So.

      5. Walls also argues that application of Phillips would result
in a due-process violation, claiming that the decision was both
“unexpected and indefensible.” We reject this argument. Of
significance, federal and state courts alike have concluded that Hall
is not retroactive. See State v. Lotter, 976 N.W.2d 721, 741
(Neb. 2022) (relying on Phillips in holding that Hall is not
retroactive); State v. Jackson, 157 N.E.3d 240, 253 (Ohio Ct. App.
2020) (refusing to apply Hall retroactively; listing Phillips as
example of “substantial and growing body of case law” declining “to
apply Hall and Moore [v. Texas, 581 U.S. 1 (2017),] retroactively”); In
re Payne, 722 Fed. Appx. 534, 538 (6th Cir. 2018) (noting body of
federal case law finding Hall not retroactive).

                                 -8-
3d 340 (Fla. 2016), and holding that Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701

(2014), does not apply retroactively), I dissent to the majority’s

decision affirming the denial of Walls’s successive motion for

postconviction relief.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Okaloosa County,
    William Francis Stone, Judge
    Case No. 461987CF000856XXXAXX

Eric Pinkard, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Julissa R.
Fontán, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle
Region, Temple Terrace, Florida; and Kara R. Ottervanger, Office of
the Federal Public Defender, Tallahassee, Florida,

     for Appellant

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,

     for Appellee

                                 -9-