Court Opinion

ID: 9491272
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:08:55.634876+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:37.536313
License: Public Domain

McKAY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I concur with everything that the court has said with one reservation. I cannot accept the court’s disregard for clear and unmodified Supreme Court precedent that once a jury is empaneled and sworn, double jeopardy attaches and the defendant has a “ ‘valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.’ ” See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978) (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689, 69 S.Ct. 834, 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949)); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 736, 83 S.Ct. 1033, 10 L.Ed.2d 100 (1963); see also United States v. Rich, 589 F.2d 1025, 1030-31 (10th Cir.1978). A defendant’s right to have his trial completed by the original jury is an independent and integral aspect of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35-36, 38, 98 S.Ct. 2156, 57 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978) (recognizing that a defendant’s right to a particular jury is integral to the guarantee against double jeopardy because it “lies at the foundation of the federal rule that jeopardy attaches when the jury is empaneled and sworn”).
The cases which articulate a defendant’s right to a particular tribunal are easily harmonized with the line of eases requiring some event to terminate the original jeopardy. See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 325, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984); Justices of Boston Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 309, 104 S.Ct. 1805, 80 L.Ed.2d 311 (1984). The harmony is simple: Once jeopardy attaches, the defendant’s right to a particular tribunal may be overcome if there is manifest necessity for a mistrial or the defendant requests or consents to a mistrial. In other words, where manifest necessity is found or a defendant requests or consents to a mistrial, the-loss of the right does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Arizona, 434 U.S. at 505, 98 S.Ct. 824; United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 606-07, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976); Wade, 336 U.S. at 689, 69 S.Ct. 834; Watkins v. Kassulke, 90 F.3d 138, 141 (6th Cir.1996); Rich, 589 F.2d at 1031-32; see also Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 463, 468-71, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 35 L.Ed.2d 425 (1973) (holding that despite weighty interest of defendant in having his fate determined by the jury first empaneled, defendant’s double jeopardy rights were not violated by court’s declaration of mistrial which was required by “manifest necessity” or the “ends of public justice”) (quoting United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824)). More importantly, the Supreme Court has found no conflict between the continuing jeopardy cases which require a terminating event and the cases which affirm a defendant’s right to a particular tribunal.
Although Defendant does not appear to have objected initially to the replacement of the juror after the original jury was empaneled and sworn, I agree with the majority’s footnote .that “neither the court nor counsel made [Defendant aware of the constitutional right that he was1 forgoing so that he could make an informed, conscious waiver.” Ante, at - n. 1; see Rich, 589 F.2d at 1032-33. Thus because Defendant does not appear to *1280have consented or requested a mistrial, and because the trial court made no finding of manifest necessity for a mistrial, I believe that the replacement of the juror and the subsequent trial with a jury different from the original sworn jury violated Defendant’s right to a particular tribunal and his double jeopardy rights. See Rich, 589 F.2d at 1031-32. Had the trial court taken the simple measure of having an alternate juror sworn in the first place, we would not be confronted with this problem. Under these circumstances, however, I would reverse the judgment.