Court Opinion

ID: 9532168
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:18:45.943595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:41.622580
License: Public Domain

DUNN, Justice
(dissenting).
I would quash the extraordinary writ of mandamus in its entirety.
The majority opinion would dissolve the writ as to the Pennington County Board of Equalization (County Board) in one breath and in the next breath order the County Auditor to spread a mill levy based upon the legislative limitation of a taxable value of no more than 60% of true and full value in place of the 30% valuation set by the County Board. This has the exact effect of mandating the County Board to increase the valuation for tax purposes from the 30% set to 60%. The majority opinion is based upon the incorrect theory that the County Board’s action in setting taxable value at 30% was ultra vires and void.
The County Board was acting pursuant to SDCL 10 — 11—25 as amended on March 11, 1977. It reads as follows:
The county commissioners, or a majority of them, with the county auditor shall constitute a board for the equalization of the assessment of property. Before entering upon the discharge of his duties each member of the board shall take an oath fairly and impartially to perform his duties, as a member thereof. Such board shall meet for the purpose of hearing appeals, determining the percentage of true and full value to be used as taxable value and equalizing the assessments of property, annually, on the third Tuesday in June, at the office of the auditor and may continue in session and adjourn from time to time until all properly filed appeals have been determined and equalization completed and shall adjourn in any event, no later than the first Tuesday in July, (emphasis added)
True, this statute is an equalization statute wherein a County Board of Equalization acts on cases of inequities between taxpayers of a certain class, but also for the first time since the enactment of the true and full value statute (SDCL 10-6-33) it provides that a County Board of Equalization is to determine “the percentage of true and full value to be used as taxable value.” SDCL 10-11-25.
Contrary to the majority opinion’s deduction that this had something to do with equalization among classes, I believe the Legislature meant exactly what it set out in the statute, and a County Board of Equalization was given the duty to equalize this taxable value when the actual value of the land was increased from 60% of true and full value for tax purposes to true and full value. We must read the two statutes together because they were both amended by the Legislature on the same day, and by doing so, there is no other logical conclusion to be reached.
If the majority opinion is correct and school boards have unbridled authority to levy taxes to raise funds sufficient to cover their budgets, I would like to ask this question: What if a school board levied taxes in excess of 60% of the assessed value of land? If a school board can ignore the legislative authority delegated to the County Board of Equalization to set taxable value, it would follow that school boards could also ignore the 60% limit set directly by the Legislature. In this regard, I have another question: If the Legislature had desired to give school districts power carte blanche to meet whatever budget they determined necessary, why was the mill levy limitation im*314posed in the first instance? I am convinced that the majority decision effectively circumvents this statutory limitation in that now a school district has power to dictate the percentage of true and full value. It takes no mathematical genius to figure out that a levy of 40 mills on 600 million dollars (60%) would produce the same tax dollars as 80 mills on 300 million dollars (30%). Who cares about lower levies if the percentage of true and full value is high enough?
The mill levy limitation has been considered so sacred that it takes a three-fourths vote of the people at a special election to raise a mill levy under SDCL 10-12-36, but with control of the taxable value of property up to 60%, a school board can avoid the mill levy limitation with impunity-
In this regard, the legislative history of the amendment of SDCL 10-6-33 in 1977 is most enlightening. This began as House Bill 508, which read in pertinent part:
All property shall be assessed at its true and full value in money but only thirty per cent of such assessed value shall be taken and considered as the taxable value of such property upon which the levy shall be made and applied to the taxes computed, (emphasis added)
Thus, the clear legislative intent was to put some limitation on taxable value when the assessment went to “true and full value.” After several sessions of the House Taxation Committee, which were attended by the President of the Rapid City School Board and attorneys and representatives of South Dakota school boards wherein they voiced objections to this flat limitation applying to all counties, a compromise was reached wherein the limitation was “up to 60%” and the authority was given to County Boards of Equalization to set the taxable value in each county. The school people still objected to any limitation, but the bill passed out of committee on February 9, 1977, by an 8-5 vote, and the final product was the amendment of SDCL 10-11-25 and SDCL 10-6-33. The majority opinion speaks of legislative intent, but I fail to find any evidence that actions of the Legislature were studied or discussed as a basis for its conclusion.1
There can be no question of the legislative intent to put some brake on the unbridled spending of school boards and other units of government, and as long as that brake is applied reasonably and not arbitrarily or fraudulently, the court should not interfere and order the county boards to expand their original percentage of taxable value.
The County Board was aware that the assessors had already assessed all property in Pennington County “at its true and full value” as provided in SDCL 10-6-33, as amended on March 11, 1977, and that such true and full value had not been reduced by 40% as provided by SDCL 10-6-33 prior to the amendment.
The County Board concluded most reasonably that when total taxable property values increased, a lower percentage of true and full value for tax purposes was necessary. Pursuant to the power specifically granted it in SDCL 10-11-25, the County Board determined that the percentage of true and full value to be used as taxable value would be. 30%. This was lower than the 40% used the previous year when the Board only had 60% of true and full value with which to work. This procedure by the County Board was not illegal, fraudulent or arbitrary. The County Board was simply following the directions given it by the Legislature.
*315As a result of this action, the nearly 19 million dollar budget of the Rapid City Area School District (School District) was short approximately $50,000. After the County Board had acted pursuant to its statutory authority, the School District amended its budget request (as it had a right to do) so that the total shortage would be some $293,117. After the County Auditor’s computation, which included an increase in taxable value in Pennington County in 1979 as compared to 1978, the shortfall in the school budget was reduced to $241,511. In the final school budget request is a line item contingency fund of $509,167 that is over and above all operating expenses. This contingency fund would offset the short-fall and still leave a contingency fund of $257,655. Contrary to the contentions of the School District, this contingency fund is not earmarked for certain purposes. The statute governing contingency funds is SDCL 13-11-2.1, which states:
In preparing the school district budget, the school board may include a line item for contingencies. The line item shall be included in the annual budget and shall not exceed five per cent of the total school district budget. The school board may by resolution transfer contingency funds to any budget category except capital outlay, (emphasis added)
In this regard, the concurring opinion entirely misconstrues Salem Independent School District v. Circuit Court, 60 S.D. 341, 244 N.W. 373 (1932). It is true that the actions of a county auditor are ministerial in nature; however, I am convinced that when the Salem case and SDCL 13-11-3 are read together, the School District’s argument that the county auditor must spread a levy to meet whatever budget is submitted by the school is incorrect. Rather, the clear import of both the Salem decision and the statute is merely to restrain a county auditor from changing, at his whim, the budget figure or the percentage of true and full value as submitted to him by the taxing authorities. Simply, the auditor is being informed to “do what you have been told to do and do not make any changes.” To read the statute as commanding an auditor to meet whatever the school board desires in the way of funds is, I submit, an incorrect reading. A proper reading is that a school district’s proposed budget, the mill levy limitations and the percentage of true and full value as determined by the County Board of Equalization must be considered together in determining the final amount of the school district’s budget. The only import of the statute is that the county auditor has no discretion to change any of the above specified figures after the taxing procedure is completed.
The School District has failed to meet its burden of showing that the action of the County Board in setting taxing value at 30% was fraudulent, arbitrary or without “logical relationship to some tax purposes.” The tax valuation originally came within $50,000 of meeting the School District’s requested budget. It is only $241,511 short after the amendment to the budget which has a $509,167 contingency fund upon which to draw. The School District has not met its burden of showing that 30% true and full value makes it impossible to perform its statutory function of providing a “thorough and efficient system of common schools.” The School District has made no attempt to pare its budget or to indicate what programs might be terminated by a smaller budget. In short, the School District has made no showing that would justify the extraordinary writ of mandamus. The School District is simply asking this court to move into the legislative process and substitute its judgment for that of the County Board.
The majority opinion in expanding taxable values in Pennington County up to 60% has given relief that was never requested, and it goes on to state that the 30% valuation set by the County Board is legal for all units of county government except school boards! Now the court is not only setting taxable value for the counties but is discriminating as to one unit of county government over another. This does not demon*316strate any expertise in the field of taxation or any awareness of the body politic.2
This court has business enough without venturing into the field of setting tax valuations lacking any showing of fraudulent or arbitrary action of the County Board.
I would quash the writ of mandamus in its entirety.

. The majority decision throws out a threat of unconstitutionality of a statute delegating authority to County Boards of Equalization to set tax valuation, but goes off on an interpretation of the statute as to what the Legislature “must have intended.” In the face of the clear language of the statute and the equally clear legislative history that the Legislature did intend to delegate this authority, the opinion now resorts to a footnote again threatening the unconstitutionality of the statute. If the majority feels that the statute is unconstitutional, I suggest it say as much and permit the Legislature to set a definite limitation as was its original intention in 1977. I also suggest that the opinion discuss the constitutionality of the statute wherein, according to this opinion, the Legislature has delegated authority to school boards to levy taxes to cover their budgets without regard to tax valuation or mill levy limitation.

. The majority opinion takes solace in the fact that no other units of government have complained of this double standard of taxable values in Pennington County. Of course, it should be noted that these units of government have not as yet seen this opinion and could hardly anticipate that the court was going to set two taxable valuations for Pennington County! Further, if the Legislature cannot constitutionally delegate authority to another body to set tax valuations, how come County Boards of Equalization can set tax valuations for other units of county government but not school boards?