Court Opinion

ID: 9928808
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 22:10:52.562913+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:54:51.159012
License: Public Domain

J-S29028-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :         PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
  JOHN ALEXANDER BURGOS-NUNEZ                  :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :       No. 616 MDA 2023

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 29, 2023
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
           Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0001314-2021

BEFORE:      MURRAY, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                              FILED: JANUARY 29, 2024

       Appellant, John Alexander Burgos-Nunez, appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered in the Berks County Court of Common Pleas, following the

revocation of his probation. We affirm.

       The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On

October 5, 2022, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to statutory sexual

assault.1 On December 21, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to five

years of probation and payment of restitution. The court further ordered that

Appellant be placed on probation with electronic monitoring for nine months

and required Appellant to have the electronic monitoring equipment installed

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3122.1(a)(2).
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no later than 30 days following the date of sentence.

      Appellant failed to report to the probation office immediately after his

sentencing, resulting in a bench warrant being issued on December 28, 2022.

After two and a half weeks, Appellant reported to the probation office, at which

point the warrant was stayed. Appellant tested positive for cocaine when he

reported. Appellant was asked to come back in a week so that the electronic

monitoring equipment could be installed. Appellant reported to the probation

office the next week but did not have the money to pay for the monitoring

equipment. Appellant again tested positive for cocaine and admitted to the

probation officer that he did not have the money because he used it on

cocaine. The probation officer told Appellant that if he went to drug treatment,

the officer would speak to the judge about Appellant’s delay in starting

electronic monitoring. Appellant underwent the initial evaluation but failed to

show up for inpatient treatment. Appellant also did not report to the probation

office thereafter to begin electronic monitoring.

      On February 6, 2023, a bench warrant was issued against Appellant for

violating the terms of his probation. The court conducted a hearing on March

29, 2023, during which the Commonwealth alleged that Appellant committed

the following violations: failure to abstain from the use, possession or sale of

illegal drugs; failure to participate in treatment as directed by the court and

probation; and failure to submit to electronic monitoring.     At the hearing,

Appellant admitted to violating the terms of his probation and the court

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revoked his probation.        The court then resentenced Appellant to 16 to 32

months of incarceration at a state correctional facility, followed by 5 years of

probation.

       On April 4, 2023, Appellant timely filed a motion for reconsideration and

modification of sentence, which the court denied on April 13, 2023. Appellant

filed a timely notice of appeal on April 21, 2023. On April 28, 2023, the court

ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On May 8, 2023, Appellant’s counsel filed a

statement of intent to file an Anders2 brief.

       As a preliminary matter, counsel seeks to withdraw his representation

pursuant to Anders and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 602 Pa. 159, 978

A.2d 349 (2009). Anders and Santiago require counsel to: (1) petition the

Court for leave to withdraw, certifying that after a thorough review of the

record, counsel has concluded the issues to be raised are wholly frivolous; (2)

file a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the

appeal; and (3) furnish a copy of the brief to the appellant and advise him of

his right to obtain new counsel or file a pro se brief to raise any additional

points the appellant deems worthy of review. Santiago, supra at 173-79,

978 A.2d at 358-61.          Substantial compliance with these requirements is

sufficient.   Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 934 A.2d 1287, 1290 (Pa.Super.

____________________________________________

2 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967).

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2007). After establishing that counsel has met the antecedent requirements

to withdraw, this Court makes an independent review of the record to confirm

that the appeal is wholly frivolous. Commonwealth v. Palm, 903 A.2d 1244,

1246 (Pa.Super. 2006).

     In Santiago, supra, our Supreme Court addressed the briefing

requirements where court-appointed appellate counsel seeks to withdraw

representation:

        Neither Anders nor [Commonwealth v. McClendon, 495
        Pa. 467, 434 A.2d 1185 (1981)] requires that counsel’s brief
        provide an argument of any sort, let alone the type of
        argument that counsel develops in a merits brief. To repeat,
        what the brief must provide under Anders are references
        to anything in the record that might arguably support the
        appeal.

                                  *    *    *

        Under Anders, the right to counsel is vindicated by
        counsel’s examination and assessment of the record and
        counsel’s references to anything in the record that arguably
        supports the appeal.

Santiago, supra at 176, 177, 978 A.2d at 359, 360. Thus, the Court held:

        [I]n the Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed
        counsel’s petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a
        summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations
        to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that
        counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth
        counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4)
        state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
        frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of
        record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that
        have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Id. at 178-79, 978 A.2d at 361.

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        Instantly, appellate counsel has filed a petition to withdraw. The petition

states that counsel has conducted a conscientious review of the record and

determined that the appeal is wholly frivolous.             Counsel also supplied

Appellant with a copy of the brief and a letter explaining Appellant’s right to

retain new counsel or to proceed pro se to raise any additional issues Appellant

deems worthy of this Court’s attention. In the Anders brief, counsel provides

a summary of the facts and procedural history of the case.                Counsel’s

argument refers to relevant law that might arguably support Appellant’s

issues. Counsel further states the reasons for his conclusion that the appeal

is wholly frivolous.   Therefore, counsel has substantially complied with the

technical requirements of Anders and Santiago. Accordingly, we proceed to

an independent evaluation of the issues raised in the Anders brief.            See

Palm, supra.

        Counsel raises the following issue on Appellant’s behalf:

           Whether the [trial] court abused its discretion by imposing
           a state sentence instead of the county sentence on technical
           violations of probation.

(Anders Brief at 4).

        Appellant argues that the court abused its discretion in imposing a state

sentence where his probation violation was technical and did not involve a

new criminal conviction.      Appellant complains the sentence was manifestly

excessive under the circumstances of this case.         As presented, Appellant’s

claim    challenges    the   discretionary   aspects   of   his   sentence.    See

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Commonwealth v. Lutes, 793 A.2d 949 (Pa.Super. 2002) (stating claim that

sentence     is   manifestly   excessive   challenges   discretionary   aspects   of

sentencing).

         Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an

appellant to an appeal as of right. Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 910

(Pa.Super. 2000). Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary sentencing

issue:

           [W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
           appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P.
           902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved
           at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
           sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [708(E)]; (3) whether
           appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and
           (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence
           appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing
           Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal

denied, 589 Pa. 727, 909 A.2d 303 (2006) (internal citations omitted).

         When appealing the discretionary aspects of a sentence, an appellant

must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by including in his brief a separate concise

statement demonstrating a substantial question as to the appropriateness of

the sentence under the Sentencing Code. Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 571

Pa. 419, 812 A.2d 617 (2002); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). “The requirement that an

appellant separately set forth the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal

furthers the purpose evident in the Sentencing Code as a whole of limiting any

challenges to the trial court’s evaluation of the multitude of factors impinging

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on the sentencing decision to exceptional cases.”          Commonwealth v.

Phillips, 946 A.2d 103, 112 (Pa.Super. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1264,

129 S.Ct. 2450, 174 L.Ed.2d 240 (2009) (quoting Commonwealth v.

Williams, 562 A.2d 1385, 1387 (Pa.Super. 1989) (en banc)) (emphasis in

original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

      “The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be

evaluated on a case-by-case basis.”      Commonwealth v. Anderson, 830

A.2d 1013, 1018 (Pa.Super. 2003). A substantial question exists “only when

the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s

actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing

Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing

process.” Sierra, supra at 912-13. A claim of excessiveness can raise a

substantial question as to the appropriateness of a sentence under the

Sentencing Code, even if the sentence is within the statutory limits. Mouzon,

supra at 430, 812 A.2d at 624. Bald allegations of excessiveness, however,

do not raise a substantial question to warrant appellate review. Id. at 435,

812 A.2d at 627.

      Additionally, “[i]n general, the imposition of sentence following the

revocation of probation is vested within the sound discretion of the trial court,

which, absent an abuse of that discretion, will not be disturbed on appeal.”

Commonwealth v. Hoover, 909 A.2d 321, 322 (Pa.Super. 2006).                    A

sentence should not be disturbed where it is evident the court was aware of

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the appropriate sentencing considerations and weighed them in a meaningful

fashion.    Commonwealth v. Fish, 752 A.2d 921, 923 (Pa.Super. 2000).

“[U]pon sentencing following a revocation of probation, the trial court is

limited only by the maximum sentence that it could have imposed originally

at the time of the probationary sentence.” Commonwealth v. Coolbaugh,

770 A.2d 788, 792 (Pa.Super. 2001).

      A court can sentence a defendant to total confinement after revoking

probation if the defendant was convicted of another crime, the defendant’s

conduct indicates it is likely that he will commit another crime if he is not

imprisoned, or such a sentence is essential to vindicate the court’s authority.

Commonwealth v. Crump, 995 A.2d 1280 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied,

608 Pa. 661, 13 A.3d 475 (2010). Further:

           We note that a sentencing court must state on the record
           its reasons for imposing sentence. [Commonwealth v.
           McAfee, 849 A.2d 270, 274-275 (Pa.Super. 2004)]; 42
           Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). “Nevertheless, a lengthy discourse on
           the trial court’s sentencing philosophy is not required.”
           McAfee, 849 A.2d at 275. Rather, the record as a whole
           must reflect the court’s reasons and its meaningful
           consideration of the facts of the crime and the character of
           the offender. [Anderson, supra at 1018-19].

Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 1253 (Pa.Super. 2006).

      Instantly, Appellant raised his sentencing claim in his timely filed motion

to modify sentence and he filed a timely notice of appeal.       Appellant also

included the requisite Rule 2119(f) statement.       (See Anders Brief at 7).

Additionally, Appellant’s claim arguably presents a substantial question for our

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review. See Malovich, supra (stating: “A claim that a particular probation

revocation sentence is excessive in light of its underlying technical violations

can present a question that we should review”).

      Here, the trial court explained the rationale for its sentence on the

record as follows:

         [T]he reason for my sentence is, sir, I know you asked this
         court for a second opportunity but the testimony of your
         probation officer [is that] you were provided with multiple
         opportunities to cooperate with her. You were given a
         mitigated sentence of nine months of [electronic
         monitoring]. You failed to get that equipment installed. You
         then acknowledged and had two positive tests for cocaine,
         that you were using the money for the [electronic
         monitoring] on cocaine. The probation officer then made
         arrangements for you to go to inpatient treatment and you
         did not even show up for the inpatient treatment[.] [P]art
         of the original agreement … is that [the victim] wanted you
         out of jail so that you [could make] child support payments
         for this child, which you have not cooperated …at all with
         domestic relations.

(Probation Violation Hearing, 3/29/23, at 6-7).

      The court’s statements at sentencing demonstrate that it adequately

considered the general principles of sentencing as well as the factors

delineated in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(c). See Malovich, supra; Fish, supra.

Specifically, the Commonwealth reported that Appellant was initially given a

lenient sentence, allowing him the opportunity to provide monetary support

for his child with Victim but Appellant failed to participate in the child support

enforcement hearings. The probation officer’s testimony further established

that Appellant was afforded multiple opportunities to comply with the terms

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of his probation and seek drug treatment but failed to do so. Additionally, the

probation officer’s testimony confirmed that Appellant tested positive for

cocaine on two occasions and Appellant admitted that he had used the money

he needed to pay for electronic monitoring equipment to purchase cocaine.

Under these circumstances, we cannot say the court abused its sentencing

discretion upon revocation of Appellant’s probation.     See Hoover, supra.

Following our independent review of the record, we confirm the appeal is

wholly frivolous.   See Palm, supra.         Accordingly, we affirm and grant

counsel’s petition to withdraw.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed; petition to withdraw is granted.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/29/2024

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