Court Opinion

ID: 6946832
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-24 01:26:37.553004+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:07:56.635283
License: Public Domain

The Opinion of the Court was delivered by Treat, J.*  This was an action of debt commenced by Chapman against Shattuck. The declaration was on an appeal bond in the penalty of seventy one dollars. At the return term, Shattuck moved to dismiss the case and filed a stipulation signed by him and Chapman, stating that the suit had been settled, and agreeing that it should be dismissed at the costs of Shattuck. The motion was resisted by W. T. Burgess, Esq., the plaintiff’s attorney. He read an affidavit, .alleging in substance that it had been agreed between him and his client that a balance of seven dollars, due him for services as attorney in this and a former case, should be paid out of the proceeds of the judgment to be recovered in this suit. That before the date of the stipulation to dismiss, he notified Shattuck of the agreement between him and his client; and that the settlement was made without his knowledge or consent. The Circuit Court dismissed the case according to the terms of the stipulation. That decision is now assigned for error. It is insisted that Burgess had such an interest in the subject matter of the suit, as to preclude the parties from compromising it without providing for the payment of the amount due him. If this position can be sustained, it must be on the ground that he was the equitable assignee of the chose in action, on which the suit was instituted. The doctrine is now well settled, that Courts of law will recognize and protect the rights of the assignee of a chose in action, whether the assignment be good at law, or in equity only. If valid in equity only, the assignee is permitted to sue in the name of the person having the legal interest, and to control the proceedings. The former owner is not allowed to interfere with the prosecution, except so far as may be necessary to protect himself against the payment of costs. After the debtor has knowledge of the assignment, he is inhibited from doing any act which may prejudice the rights of the assignee. Payment by him to the nominal creditor, after notice of the assignment, will be no defence to an action brought for the benefit of the assignee. Any compromise or adjustment of the cause of action by the original parties, made after notice of the assignment, and without the consent of the assignee, will be void as against him. Andrews v. Becker, 1 Johns. Cases, 411; Littlefield v. Story, 3 Johns. 426; Raymond v. Squire, 11 do. 47; Anderson v. Van Allen, 12 do. 343; Jones v. Withe, 13 Mass. 304; Welch v. Mandeville, 1 Wheaton, 233; McCullom v. Coxe, 1 Dallas, 134. A partial assignment, however, of the chose in action, will not suffice to bring the case within the principle. The whole cause of action must be assigned. It was well remarked by Justice Story, in Mandeville v. Welch, 5 Wheaton, 277, that “a creditor shall not be permitted to split up a single cause of action into many actions, without the assent of his debtor, since it may subject him to many embarrassments aud responsibilities not contemplated in his original contract. He has a right to stand upon the singleness of his original contract, and to decline any legal or equitable assignments, by which it may be broken into payments. When he undertakes to pay an integral sum to his creditor, it is no part of his contract that he shall he obliged to pay in fractions to any other persons.” In the case before us, it is not pretended that there was an assignment of the entire cause of action. By the terms of the agreement, Burgess was only to receive a portion of the proceeds of the bond. This gave him no power over the suit. Chapman had not so parted with his interest in the bond as to lose his right to control it. Shattuck was not bound to notice the claim of Burgess. The parties to the record were at full liberty to compromise the case, and having done so, the Circuit Court did right in carrying their stipulation into effect. The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed with costs. Judgment affirmed.  Justice Young took no part in the decision of this case.