Court Opinion

ID: 9411857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-28 07:00:26.841159+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:15.618557
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     ERNEST C. GRAHAM,                               DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        DC-0752-16-0889-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,                         DATE: July 27, 2023
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Brian C. Plitt, Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the appellant.

           Nikki Greenberg, Washington Naval Yard, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     affirmed his indefinite suspension. For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT
     the appellant’s petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND
     this appeal to the regional office for adjudication of whether the agency

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

     improperly continued the appellant’s indefinite suspension in accordance with
     this Remand Order.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2          The appellant was employed by the agency as a Utility Systems Repair
     Operator at the Washington Navy Yard in Washington, D.C. Initial Appeal File
     (IAF), Tab 1 at 6, Tab 4 at 51. On April 18, 2016, a coworker of the appellant’s
     and his supervisor reported to the agency that in March and April 2016,
     the appellant threatened to kill them and others.         IAF, Tab 4 at 55-56,
     Tab 19 at 2. The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia pressed
     charges against the appellant in D.C. Superior Court based on the comments he
     made on April 18, 2016. IAF, Tab 4 at 42, 58-59.
¶3          On June 28, 2016, the agency proposed the appellant’s indefinite suspension
     based on reasonable cause to believe he committed a crime for which
     imprisonment might be imposed.         Id. at 51-53.    The agency informed the
     appellant that the suspension would continue until “(1) completion of any
     criminal proceeding against [him] or a final determination of the investigation
     into   [his]   alleged   wrongdoing   and   (2)   completion   of   any   subsequent
     administrative action taken against [him].” Id. at 52. The agency enclosed a
     copy of the materials upon which it relied in deciding to propose the appellant’s
     indefinite suspension. Id. at 51. Those materials included the criminal complaint
     and warrant for the appellant’s arrest, two affidavits in support of the arrest
     warrant, and an email from an Assistant United States Attorney indicating the
     appellant was being prosecuted for attempted threats which carried a maximum
     penalty of 180 days in jail and $1,000 in fines. Id. at 51, 54-56, 59. After the
     appellant responded to the notice of proposed in definite suspension on
     July 12, 2016, the agency issued its decision on August 15, 2016, informing him
     that he would be suspended indefinitely, effective the close of business on
     August 12, 2016. Id. at 17-30.
                                                                                          3

¶4          The    appellant     was    acquitted    of    all    criminal    charges    on
     November 21, 2016. IAF, Tab 16 at 22-37. On December 8, 2016, the agency
     proposed his removal for sleeping on duty, falsification of log sheets, and
     inappropriate comments based on comments with which he had been criminally
     charged. IAF, Tab 4 at 27-28, Tab 19. It provided the appellant with 25 days to
     respond to the proposed removal. IAF, Tab 19 at 4. Due to a request for an
     extension from the appellant’s representative, the appellant did not provide his
     oral and written reply until February 2, 2017. IAF, Tab 16 at 73-78; Tab 18,
     Hearing Recording Audio 2 of 3 at 1:36:10-1:39:10 (testimony of the appellant).
     On   May     4,   2017,    the    agency    issued   its    decision    removing    the
     appellant from service. Graham v. Department of the Navy, MSPB Docket No.
     DC-0752-17-0577-I-1, Initial Appeal File (0577 IAF), Tab 3 at 19-33.
¶5         The appellant filed the instant appeal, in which he challenged his indefinite
     suspension of more than 14 days. 2 IAF, Tab 1 at 6-9. Specifically, he alleged
     that the agency lacked reasonable cause to believe he had committed a crime, the
     penalty of a suspension was excessive, and he had been subject to unlawful
     discrimination and reprisal for prior Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO)
     activity. IAF, Tab 1 at 8-9, Tab 17 at 2-3. The administrative judge conducted a
     hearing.   IAF, Tab 18.    In an initial decision, he found that the agency had
     reasonable cause to believe the appellant had committed a crime for which
     imprisonment may be imposed, the indefinite suspension had an ascertai nable
     end, the agency had established nexus, and the indefinite suspension was a
     reasonable penalty. IAF, Tab 21, Initial Decision (ID) at 4-7. The administrative
     judge also found that the appellant did not prove that his indefinite suspension
     was based on race or age discrimination, or in retaliation for EEO activity.
     ID at 8-11. The administrative judge therefore affirmed the agency’s indefinite
     suspension decision. ID at 11.
     2
       The removal is the subject of a separate appeal currently pending before the Board on
     review. 0577 IAF, Tab 1 at 2, Tab 22, Initial Decision at 1, 8.
                                                                                        4

¶6        The appellant has filed a timely petition for review. Petition for Review
     (PFR) File, Tab 1. On review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge
     erred in finding the agency was justified in issuing the indefinite suspension as
     the ruling was based on the erroneous belief that the appellant was criminally
     charged with “Threatening to Injure and Kidnap a Person.” Id. at 10. He disputes
     that the agency had reasonable cause to believe he committed a crime punishable
     by imprisonment. Id. at 7-8, 10. Finally, he reiterates his claim from below that
     the indefinite suspension should have ended when he was acquitted on all
     charges.     Id. at 11-14.   The agency has filed a response in opposition to the
     petition for review. PFR File, Tab 3.

                       DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     The administrative judge properly sustained the imposition of the indefinite
     suspension.
¶7        To establish that an indefinite suspension is valid, the agency must show the
     following:     (1) it imposed the suspension for an authorized reason; (2) the
     suspension has an ascertainable end, i.e., a determinable condition subsequent
     that will bring the suspension to a conclusion; (3) the suspension bears a nexus to
     the efficiency of the service; and (4) the penalty is reasonable.       Henderson v.
     Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 536, ¶ 5 (2016), aff’d, 878 F.3d
     1044 (Fed. Cir. 2017).        One of the authorized circumstances for imposing
     an indefinite suspension is when the agency has reasonable cause to believe
     an employee has committed a crime for which a sentence of imprison ment could
     be imposed. Id. Here, the parties do not challenge the administrative judge’s
     findings as to the nexus or penalty, and we discern no basis to disturb them.

           The administrative       judge   made   a   proper   reasonable    cause
           determination.
¶8        As noted above, an agency may indefinitely suspend an employee if it has
     reasonable cause to believe that he has committed a crime for which a sentence of
     imprisonment could be imposed.          Henderson, 123 M.S.P.R. 536, ¶ 5.        The
                                                                                         5

     administrative judge determined that the appellant’s arrest , followed by the
     criminal information, established reasonable cause.       ID at 5.    The appellant
     appears to dispute this finding, arguing on review that the arrest alone was
     insufficient. PFR File, Tab 1 at 8. His argument misconstrues the administrative
     judge’s reasoning and is not persuasive.
¶9        The Board has held that “reasonable cause” in the context of an indef inite
     suspension based on possible criminal misconduct is virtually synonymous with
     “probable cause,” which is necessary to support a grand jury indictment, i.e.,
     probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused
     has probably committed it. Henderson, 123 M.S.P.R. 536, ¶ 7. In Dunnington v.
     Department of Justice, 956 F.2d 1151 (Fed. Cir. 1992), the U.S. Court of Appeals
     for the Federal Circuit addressed the issue of what constitutes “reasonable cause”
     in the context of an indefinite suspension. The court stated that neither an arrest
     warrant alone, nor an actual arrest, is sufficient. Dunnington, 956 F.2d at 1157.
     On the other hand, “a formal judicial determination made following a preliminary
     hearing, or an indictment following an investigation and grand jury proceedings”
     is more than sufficient. Id. “[T]he best evidence of reasonable cause will be that
     determined by the agency after an appropriate investigation of the facts and
     circumstances of the alleged misconduct.” Id. An arrest warrant combined with a
     criminal complaint supported by witness statements may support a determination
     of reasonable cause if the documents provide sufficient information from which
     the agency can “assure itself that the surrounding facts are suf ficient to justify”
     indefinitely suspending the appellant without conducting its own investigation. 3
     Id. at 1156-58.

     3
      To the extent the appellant suggests that the agency’s reasonable cause determination
     was “proven to be false” by his acquittal, we are not persuaded. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6.
     Because indefinite suspensions are taken for the purpose of allowing examination of
     misconduct, and not as a punishment for misconduct, the fact that the appellant was
     acquitted does not prove that the suspension itself was improper. Novak v. Department
                                                                                          6

¶10        In this case, the agency indefinitely suspended the appellant after it learned
      that he had been charged by criminal information with two counts of attempted
      threats and that the case had been assigned to an Assistant U.S. Attorney for
      prosecution. 4 IAF, Tab 4 at 42, 50. Under District of Columbia law, an offense
      of attempted threats is punishable by a fine and incarceration of up to 180 d ays.
      D.C. Code §§ 22-407, 22-1803, 22-3571.01. Because the maximum sentence is
      less than 1 year, an attempted threat may be prosecuted either by indictment or by
      criminal information. See D.C. Code § 23-301. The administrative judge was
      correct that, under the circumstances, the agency had reasonable cause to believe
      that the appellant had committed a crime for which a sentence of imprisonment
      might be imposed. ID at 4-5.
¶11        This case is similar to Hernandez v. Department of the Navy, 120 M.S.P.R.
      14, ¶ 2 (2013), in which an agency indefinitely suspended an appellant after he
      had been charged with various misdemeanors under California law. The appellant
      in Hernandez had not been indicted.       Id., ¶ 13.   The Board observed that in
      California, where the appellant had been charged, only felony cases are presented
      to a grand jury for indictment. Id., ¶¶ 7, 13. In misdemeanor prosecutions, the
      complaint was the only formal accusatory pleading filed with the court, and
      therefore, under California law, the misdemeanor complaint filed against the
      appellant was comparable to an indictment. Id., ¶ 13. For the reasons explained
      above, the law of the District of Columbia is similar to the extent that a criminal
      offense carrying a sentence of less than 1 year can be prosecuted by criminal

      of the Treasury, 11 M.S.P.B. 94, 458-59 (1982), aff’d, 723 F.2d 97 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
      (Table).
      4
         The appellant argues that the administrative judge failed to state whether the
      “attempted threats” with which the appellant was charged constituted a misdemeanor,
      versus a felony, charge. PFR File, Tab 1 at 10. However, the administrative judge was
      not required to determine whether the crime was a misdemeanor or felony charge but, as
      the administrative judge correctly found, whether the agency had reasonable cause to
      believe that a crime was committed for which imprisonment may be imposed. ID
      at 4-5.
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      information without a grand jury indictment. Therefore, the criminal information
      in this case is comparable to an indictment.
¶12           The remaining issue to be resolved, then, is if the agency had sufficient
      information before it at the time it proposed to suspend the appellant that
      provided reasonable cause to believe that the appellant had commit ted a crime for
      which he could be imprisoned. Id., ¶ 16. The evidence presented to the agency at
      the time it imposed the appellant’s indefinite suspension included the criminal
      complaint and warrant for the appellant’s arrest, two affidavits in support o f the
      arrest warrant, and an email from the Assistant U.S. Attorney indicating the
      appellant was being prosecuted for attempted threats which carried a maximum
      penalty of 180 days in jail and $1,000 in fines. IAF, Tab 4 at 51, 54-56, 59. One
      of the affidavits contained specific information regarding the appellant’s alleged
      threats. IAF, Tab 4 at 55. For example, the affidavit indicated that the appellant
      told his coworker “on multiple occasions . . . that he was going to come in and
      kill all these motherfuckers,” referring to his supervisor and others.        Id.   The
      affiant went on to state that the appellant had reportedly advised this same
      coworker that he had added him to “the list” of people the appellant was going to
      kill.   Id. We find that these facts provided the agency with reasonable cause to
      believe that the appellant threatened “to injure . . . a person,” a misdemeanor for
      which a term of imprisonment could be imposed. 5 See Rampado v. U.S. Customs

      5
         On review, the appellant asserts that the administrative judge “repeatedly and
      mistakenly state[s] that [the appellant] had been issued an arrest warrant based on
      ‘threatening to injure and kidnap a person.’” PFR File, Tab 1 at 10. A reading of the
      arrest warrant shows that it was issued for exactly that, “Threatening to Injure and
      Kidnap a person, in violation of 22 D.C. Code, Section 1810 (2001 ed.))” IAF, Tab 4
      at 54. The relevant statute provides threatening “to kidnap any person or to injure the
      person” as alternative bases for the criminal offense. D.C. Code § 22-1810. The
      appellant is correct that the affidavits in support of the arrest warrant do not include
      kidnapping in the narrative description. IAF, Tab 4 at 54 -55. It appears that the basis
      of his arrest was threatening to injure other agency employees. Id. at 55. The
      administrative judge did not make a finding that the appellant threatened to kidnap
      anyone. Instead, to the extent he mentioned kidnapping, he was merely reciting what
      was stated in the warrant. ID at 1-2, 4. Therefore, we discern no error.
                                                                                        8

      Service, 28 M.S.P.R. 189, 190-191 & n.1 (1985) (finding that the appellant’s
      admission to unauthorized disclosure of information, a crime for which
      imprisonment could be imposed, provided the agency with reasonable cause for
      his indefinite suspension).

            The administrative judge correctly determined that the suspension
            had an ascertainable end.
¶13        The administrative judge found that the indefinite suspension had
      an ascertainable end.    ID at 5-6.    We agree. The appellant challenges this
      determination. But his arguments concern the continuation of the indefinite
      suspension after he was acquitted, which is a separate matter that we will address
      below. PFR File, Tab 1 at 11; Rhodes v. Merit Systems Protection Board,
      487 F.3d 1377, 1380-32 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
¶14        In determining whether the indefinite suspension was proper, we look at the
      facts known by the agency at the time it was imposed. See Rhodes, 487 F.3d
      at 1380 (“An inquiry into the propriety of an agency’s imposition of an indefinite
      suspension looks only to facts relating to events prior to suspension t hat are
      proffered to support such an imposition.”). To be valid, an indefinite suspension
      must have an ascertainable end, that is, a determinable condition subsequent that
      will bring the suspension to a conclusion. Arrieta v. Department of Homeland
      Security, 108 M.S.P.R. 372, ¶ 8 (2008). An indefinite suspension may extend
      through the completion of both a pending investigation and any subsequent
      administrative action, provided the agency notifies the appellant of this
      possibility. Engdahl v. Department of the Navy, 900 F.2d 1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir.
      1990); Camaj v. Department of Homeland Security, 119 M.S.P.R. 95, ¶ 11 (2012);
      Arrieta, 108 M.S.P.R. 372, ¶ 8; 5 C.F.R. § 752.402.          Here, the appellant’s
      indefinite suspension had an ascertainable end because the agency stated in the
      suspension proposal and decision notices that the suspension would end following
      the disposition of the criminal charges against the appellant and the completion o f
                                                                                        9

      any administrative action. IAF, Tab 4 at 17, 52. Therefore, we decline to disturb
      the administrative judge’s determination to affirm the indefinite suspension.

      The appeal must be remanded to determine if the agency impermissibly continued
      the suspension after the appellant responded to his proposed removal.
¶15        The appellant argued below, and reargues on review, that the agency
      improperly continued his indefinite suspension beyond the date of his
      acquittal. IAF, Tab 16 at 14-15; PFR File, Tab 1 at 11-14. The administrative
      judge analyzed this argument as a challenge to whether the indefinite suspension
      had an ascertainable end. ID at 5-6. When a suspension continues after the
      condition subsequent that would terminate it, the continuation of the suspensi on
      is a reviewable agency action separate from the imposition of the suspension
      itself. Sikes v. Department of the Navy, 2022 MSPB 12, ¶ 7 (citing Rhodes,
      487 F.3d at 1381 (recognizing that “the agency’s failure to terminate an indefinite
      suspension after a condition subsequent is a separately reviewable agency
      action”)). Here, the administrative judge erred in considering the inde finite
      suspension and its continuation as one action.
¶16        In analyzing the question as to whether the suspension had an ascertainable
      end, the administrative judge concluded that it did. ID at 5-6. He reasoned that
      the delay of 3 weeks between the appellant’s November 21, 2016 acquittal and his
      December 8, 2016 proposed removal was reasonable. ID at 5-6. The appellant
      does not directly challenge this finding. Nonetheless, for the reasons set forth
      below, we find that the time it took the agency to issue the removal decision itself
      should have been part of the calculus in deciding if the agency’s delay was
      reasonable. We remand for further proceedings to resolve this issue.
¶17        Whether the continuation of an indefinite suspension is proper depends on
      events occurring after the agency imposed the suspension. Rhodes, 487 F.3d
      at 1380-81. An agency must act within a reasonable amount of time to end the
      suspension once the identified condition subsequent is satisfied.        Id.; Sikes,
      2022 MSPB 12, ¶ 8. When, as here, the suspension is conditioned on the
                                                                                       10

      resolution of criminal charges and any subsequent agency act ion, the agency must
      implement its subsequent action within a reasonable time after criminal
      proceedings are concluded. Camaj, 119 M.S.P.R. 95, ¶ 11. In determining the
      reasonableness of any delay, the Board has traditionally looked at the amount of
      time it took the agency to propose an adverse action. Id., ¶ 12 (concluding that a
      delay of nearly 3 months between the resolution of the criminal charges against
      an appellant and his proposed removal was unreasonable); Jarvis v. Department
      of Justice, 45 M.S.P.R. 104, 107, 111-12 (1990) (finding that a period of
      2 1/2 months between the dismissal of an indictment against an appellant and his
      proposed suspension was unreasonable). Given this case law, it is not surprising
      that the administrative judge examined the period between the appellant’s
      acquittal and his proposed removal. ID at 5-6.
¶18        Here, although the agency acted relatively quickly to propose the
      appellant’s removal on December 8, 2016, it did not issue its removal decision
      until May 4, 2017, five months later. While Board cases appear to look at this
      issue more narrowly, as discussed above, an indefinite suspension may only
      continue   through     the   “completion    of   any   subsequent     administrative
      action.” 5 C.F.R. § 752.402 (emphasis added). “The cornerstone of the [Civil
      Service Reform Act of 1978’s] protections is the aggrieved employee’s right to
      seek review of adverse agency action in the . . . Board.” LeBlanc v. United
      States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1029 (Fed Cir. 1995). That right is triggered by the
      agency’s decision on its proposed action, not the proposal. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(d);
      Emerald    v.   U.S.   Postal   Service,   49    M.S.P.R.   586,    587-88   &   n.1
      (1991). Therefore, to determine if an indefinite suspension continued for an
      unreasonable time, the relevant ending date is the one on which the agency issues
      its decision on any proposed action arising out of the same conduct that led to the
      criminal charges. See Engdahl, 900 F.2d at 1578-79 (finding that an agency did
      not unreasonably delay the appellant’s “actual removal” following resolution of
      the criminal charges against him). Permitting the agency to take an unlimited
                                                                                             11

      amount of time to make a decision on a proposed adverse action while keeping
      the appellant on an indefinite suspension would run contrary to the requirement
      that an indefinite suspension have an ascertainable end.                     See Arrieta,
      108 M.S.P.R. 372, ¶ 8.
¶19        Based on the decision letter indefinitely suspending the appellant, the
      condition subsequent triggering the cessation of the appellant’s suspension was
      the “(1) completion of any criminal proceedings . . . and (2) completion of any
      subsequent administrative action taken against [the appellant].” IAF, Tab 4 at 17,
      52 (emphasis added).        As discussed above, the agency timely proposed the
      appellant’s removal on December 8, 2016, based in part on the conduct
      underlying the criminal charges. IAF, Tab 19. Due to a request for extension
      from the appellant’s representative, the appellant provided an oral and written
      reply on February 2, 2017. IAF, Tab 16 at 73-78; Tab 18, Hearing Recording
      Audio 2 of 3 at 1:36:10-1:39:10 (testimony of the appellant). This portion of the
      delay in the agency’s removal decision appears to be the fault of the appellant’s
      representative.
¶20        If this were the entirety of the delay, the appellant would be unable to
      prevail on a claim that the agency improperly continued his indefinite
      suspension.   See Engdahl, 900 F.2d at 1578-79 (declining to find that the
      continuation of an appellant’s indefinite suspension was improper when the delay
      was due to his attorney’s requests for extensions to reply to the appellant’s
      proposed removal).        However, there is no explanation in the record for the
      3-month delay between the appellant’s reply and the agency’s May 4, 2017
      removal decision. 0577 IAF, Tab 3 at 19-33. In fact, the deciding official signed
      and dated his Douglas factor checklist on March 28, 2017, thus indicating that
      he had already considered the appellant’s penalty on or before that date .
      Id. at 25, 33; see Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06
      (1981)   (providing   a     nonexhaustive   list   of   factors   relevant    to   penalty
      determinations). It does not appear from the record that there were any unusual
                                                                                     12

      circumstances that would explain why it took the agency until May 4, 2017, to
      issue its removal decision.
¶21         Neither the parties nor the administrative judge addressed th is 3-month
      delay, and the record is not developed on this issue. Therefore, we cannot resolve
      this issue on the current record.   Thus, we must remand the case to the regional
      office for further development of the record and adjudication of this issue. See
      Montgomery v. Department of Health and Human Services, 123 M.S.P.R. 216,
      ¶ 13 (2016) (remanding an appeal for the administrative judge to hold the
      appellant’s requested hearing and develop the record). Even if the record were
      fully developed, remand would be necessary here. The administrative judge who
      oversaw the proceedings below and issued the initial decision is no longer
      employed by the Board. When there is conflicting testimony on a material issue,
      and a new administrative judge will decide the case, the testimony shou ld be
      heard again to permit him to make credibility determinations based on witness
      demeanor. Lin v. Department of the Air Force, 2023 MSPB 2, ¶ 24. On remand,
      the administrative judge may incorporate into the remand initial decision the
      findings from the initial decision, as modified by this Remand Order above,
      affirming the appellant’s indefinite suspension. Id., ¶ 9. If the administrative
      judge finds that the agency failed to issue its removal decision within a
      reasonable time, the administrative judge should order the agency to reinstate the
      appellant to the date of the resolution of criminal charges. Camaj, 119 M.S.P.R.
      95, ¶ 11.
¶22         Finally, we briefly dispose of the appellant’s remaining arguments on
      review. He argues that the continuation of his indefinite suspension was not
      justified because the agency failed to charge him with the same “offense” as the
      one set forth in the criminal charges. PFR File, Tab 1 at 13. Generally, once the
      underlying criminal case against an appellant is resolved, an agency must
      immediately terminate the indefinite suspension unless it contemplates effecting
      further disciplinary action within the foreseeable future. Welch v. Department of
                                                                                      13

      Justice, 106 M.S.P.R. 107, ¶¶ 3, 5 (2007). To the extent the appellant suggests
      that the conduct underlying his arrest is not the same as that which led to his
      indefinite suspension and removal, we are not persuaded.         The “inappropriate
      comments” charge consists of the underlying miscondu ct for which the appellant
      was criminally charged. Compare IAF, Tab 19 at 2, with IAF, Tab 4 at 27-28, 51,
      55. Furthermore, the fact that the appellant was ultimately acquitted does not
      prevent the agency from proposing his removal based on the same misc onduct
      underlying the charge. See Pflanz v. Department of Transportation, 21 M.S.P.R.
      71, 73 (1984), aff’d, 776 F.2d 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Table). The appellant’s
      acquittal on criminal charges is not relevant in the administrative proceedings
      when the agency action is based upon the misconduct which led to the criminal
      charge not on the fact of arrest or indictment, which is the case here. Id.
¶23         For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the regional office
      for further adjudication of the appellant’s claim that the agency improperly
      continued his indefinite suspension beyond February 2, 2017, in accordance with
      this Remand Order.      The new administrative judge may incorporate into the
      remand initial decision the findings, discussed above, tha t the agency properly
      imposed the indefinite suspension in the first place.

                                            ORDER
¶24         For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the regional office
      for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                                Jennifer Everling
                                                Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.