Court Opinion

ID: 9722774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:49:51.518269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:39.974324
License: Public Domain

HANSON (P. D.), Acting P. J.
I respectfully dissent.
I disagree with the majority’s explanation of the terms of Penal Code section 667.6, subdivision (c), and find the explanation neither simple nor reasonable.
*832Section 667.6, subdivision (c), is not mandatory, but is discretionary. (People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335, 345 [193 Cal.Rptr. 882, 667 P.2d 686].) In light of the other subdivisions of the section, (a), (b) and (d), which are mandatory and punish only those persons who have committed one of the enumerated sex crimes more than once, subdivision (c) is ambiguous as to whether it applies to multiple sex offenses or only a single sex offense coupled with a nonsex offense.
When interpreting a particular subdivision of a statute, one must look at the statute as a whole to try to glean from it the true legislative intent. (People v. Moroney (1944) 24 Cal.2d 638, 642 [150 P.2d 888].)
When subdivision (c) is read in combination with subdivision (d), the phrase in subdivision (c) “whether or not the crimes were committed during a single transaction” takes on a special meaning. Subdivision (d) requires a harsher sentencing if there were separate victims or the same victim on separate occasions. Subdivision (c) seems to contemplate the situation where one person has been victimized by several sex crimes during one transaction or occasion. If this is not what the Legislature intended, then subdivisions (c) and (d) overlap, and the language in subdivision (c) becomes surplusage. When interpreting a statute, the court should avoid a construction which renders any part of the statute “surplusage.” (People v. Gilbert (1969) 1 Cal.3d 475, 480 [82 Cal.Rptr. 724, 462 P.2d 580].)
Since subdivision (c) is discretionary, it seems that the Legislature must have viewed multiple violations of one victim at one time to be not as serious as violations upon more than one victim or multiple violations on the same victim on separate occasions.
We note the language of subdivision (c) in the sentence, “If such term is imposed consecutively pursuant to this subdivision, it shall be served consecutively to any other term of imprisonment, and shall commence from the time such person would otherwise have been released from imprisonment.” (Italics added.) When read independently from the rest of subdivision (c) and the rest of section 667.6, this sentence seems to indicate the Legislature spoke in the singular and allowed the imposition of a full term for a single sex offense consecutive to a nonsex crime.
On the contrary, subdivision (d) uses almost the same language: “Such term shall be served consecutively to any other term of imprisonment, and shall commence from the time such person would otherwise have been released from imprisonment.” (Italics added.) While subdivision (d) speaks only to multiple sex crimes, again the language is singular. It therefore *833seems that the sentence in subdivision (c) is merely clarifying the nature of the term’s length.
An argument can be made that section 667.6, subdivision (c), does not apply to multiple offenses when only one of the offenses is a sex crime enumerated in section 667.6. (See dicta in People v. Waite (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 585, 590-591 [194 Cal.Rptr. 245]; People v. Masten (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 579, 592 [187 Cal.Rptr. 515].) However, it seems undeniable that the language of the subdivision at best is ambiguous. Settled rules of statutory construction require that we resolve the ambiguity in favor of appellant. (People v. Belmontes, supra, 34 Cal.3d 335, 345.) I would not apply section 667.6, subdivision (c).
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied May 17, 1984. Reynoso, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.