Court Opinion

ID: 9956016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-30 09:15:54.64788+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:03.147552
License: Public Domain

NO. 12-23-00261-CR

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

                 TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

                                         TYLER, TEXAS

 D'ERIC JOVAN BRANFORD,                                §       APPEAL FROM THE 349TH
 APPELLANT

 V.                                                    §       JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

 THE STATE OF TEXAS,
 APPELLEE                                              §       HOUSTON COUNTY, TEXAS

                                      MEMORANDUM OPINION
       D’Eric Jovan Branford appeals his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a
felon. In his sole issue, Appellant argues that the sentence imposed by the trial court amounts to
cruel and unusual punishment because it is disproportionate to (1) other sentences for the same
offense and (2) the facts and circumstances constituting his offense. We affirm.

                                              BACKGROUND

       Appellant was charged by indictment with unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon.1
The matter proceeded to trial, and the jury found Appellant “guilty.” The trial court assessed
punishment at seven years of confinement. This appeal followed.

                                  CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
       In his sole issue, Appellant argues that the seven-year sentence imposed by the trial court
amounts to cruel and unusual punishment because it is disproportionate to other sentences for the
same offense and the facts and circumstances of the crime committed. However, Appellant did
not raise a timely objection in the trial court regarding the issue of cruel and unusual punishment,

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           See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.04(a) (West Supp. 2023).
and he therefore failed to preserve any such error. See Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 120
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (waiver of rights under Texas Constitution); Curry v. State, 910 S.W.2d
490, 497 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (waiver of rights under United States Constitution); see also
TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Mays v. State, 285 S.W.3d 884, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)
(“Preservation of error is a systemic requirement that a first-level appellate court should
ordinarily review on its own motion[;] [and] . . . it [is] incumbent upon the Court itself to take up
error preservation as a threshold issue.”). For the reasons explained herein, despite Appellant’s
failure to preserve error, we conclude that his sentence does not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment.
       “The legislature is vested with the power to define crimes and prescribe penalties.” Davis
v. State, 905 S.W.2d 655, 664 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1995, pet. ref’d); see also Simmons v.
State, 944 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1996, pet. ref’d). Courts have repeatedly held that
punishment which falls within the limits prescribed by a valid statute is not excessive, cruel, or
unusual. See Harris v. State, 656 S.W.2d 481, 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Jordan v. State, 495
S.W.2d 949, 952 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Davis, 905 S.W.2d at 664. In this case, Appellant was
convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.04(e)
(West Supp. 2023) (providing that offense of unlawful possession of firearm by felon under
Subsection (a) is a third-degree felony); see also id. § 12.34 (West 2019) (setting range of
punishment for third-degree felony at confinement for not more than ten years or less than two
years). The seven-year sentence imposed by the trial court falls within the range set by the
legislature. Therefore, the punishment is not prohibited as cruel, unusual, or excessive per se. See
Harris, 656 S.W.2d at 486; Jordan, 495 S.W.2d at 952; Davis, 905 S.W2d at 664.
       Nonetheless, Appellant urges this Court to perform the three-part test originally set forth
in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983). Under this test, the
proportionality of a sentence is evaluated by considering (1) the gravity of the offense and the
harshness of the penalty, (2) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction,
and (3) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. Solem,
463 U.S. at 292, 103 S. Ct. at 3011. Texas courts and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals have
modified the application of the Solem test in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision
in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991) to require a
threshold determination that the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime before

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addressing the remaining elements. See, e.g., McGruder v. Puckett, 954 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 849, 113 S. Ct. 146, 121 L. Ed. 2d 98 (1992); see also Jackson v.
State, 989 S.W.2d 842, 845-46 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, no pet.).
       We are guided by the holding in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S. Ct. 1133, 63 L.
Ed. 2d 382 (1980), in making a threshold determination of whether Appellant’s sentence is
grossly disproportionate to his crime. In Rummel, the United States Supreme Court addressed
the proportionality claim of an appellant who received a mandatory life sentence under a prior
version of the Texas habitual offender statute for a conviction of obtaining $120.75 by false
pretenses. See id., 445 U.S. at 266, 100 S. Ct. at 1135. The appellant in Rummel received a life
sentence because he had two prior felony convictions – one for fraudulent use of a credit card to
obtain goods worth $80.00 and the other for passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36. Id.,
445 U.S. at 266, 100 S. Ct. at 1134-35. After recognizing the legislative prerogative to classify
offenses as felonies and considering the purpose of the habitual offender statute, the Court
determined that the appellant’s mandatory life sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. Id., 445 U.S. at 284-85, 100 S. Ct. at 1145.
       In the instant case, Appellant’s third-degree felony offense – unlawful possession of a
firearm by a felon – is no less serious than the combination of offenses committed by the
appellant in Rummel, and Appellant’s seven-year sentence is significantly less severe than the
life sentence upheld in Rummel. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that if the sentence in
Rummel is not constitutionally disproportionate, neither is the sentence imposed upon Appellant.
Because we do not conclude that Appellant’s sentence is disproportionate to his crime, we need
not apply the remaining elements of the Solem test. See McGruder, 954 F.2d at 316; Jackson,
989 S.W.2d at 845-46. We overrule issue one.

                                CLERICAL ERROR IN JUDGMENT
       On the record before us, we observe that a clerical error not raised by Appellant exists in
the trial court’s judgment. The trial court’s judgment states that punishment was assessed by the
jury, but the reporter’s record clearly indicates that the trial judge assessed punishment. We have
the authority to correct a trial court’s judgment to make the record speak the truth when we have
the necessary data and information to do so. Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1993); Patterson v. State, 525 S.W.3d 896, 898 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017, no pet.); Asberry

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v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d). Our authority to reform an
incorrect judgment is not dependent on the request of any party. Rhoten v. State, 299 S.W.3d 349,
356 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, no pet.). Because we have the necessary data and information
to correct the “punishment assessed by” portion of the judgment, we conclude that the judgment
should be modified to reflect that the trial judge assessed Appellant’s punishment. See Bigley, 865
S.W.2d at 27-28; Patterson, 525 S.W.3d at 898; Asberry, 813 S.W.2d at 529;        see also TEX. R.
APP. P. 43.2(b). Accordingly, we modify the “punishment assessed by” portion of the trial court’s
judgment by replacing the word “jury” with the word “court” to correctly       reflect that the trial
court assessed punishment.

                                                  DISPOSITION
         Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue but having concluded that a clerical error exists
in the trial court’s judgment, we modify the trial court’s judgment and affirm the trial court’s
judgment as modified.

                                                                GREG NEELEY
                                                                   Justice

Opinion delivered March 28, 2024.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

                                             (DO NOT PUBLISH)

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                                   COURT OF APPEALS

      TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                                           JUDGMENT

                                           MARCH 28, 2024

                                         NO. 12-23-00261-CR

                                   D'ERIC JOVAN BRANFORD,
                                            Appellant
                                               V.
                                     THE STATE OF TEXAS,
                                            Appellee

                                Appeal from the 349th District Court
                         of Houston County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 22CR-022)

                    THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed herein,
and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this Court that the judgment should be modified
and as modified, affirmed.
                    It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment of
the court below be modified to indicate that punishment was assessed by the trial court; in all other
respects the judgment of the trial court is affirmed; and that this decision be certified to the court
below for observance.

                    Greg Neeley, Justice.
                    Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.