Court Opinion

ID: 6323975
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-03-16 20:09:52.654123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:47.655256
License: Public Domain

People v Cooper (2022 NY Slip Op 01821)

People v Cooper

2022 NY Slip Op 01821

Decided on March 16, 2022

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on March 16, 2022
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

MARK C. DILLON, J.P.
FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY
VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON
LARA J. GENOVESI, JJ.

2018-14088

[*1]The People of the State of New York, respondent,
vGrayson Cooper, appellant.

Janet E. Sabel, New York, NY (Kerry Elgarten of counsel), for appellant.
Michael E. McMahon, District Attorney, Staten Island, NY (Morrie I. Kleinbart of counsel; Nicole Kaye on the brief), for respondent.

DECISION & ORDER
Appeal by the defendant from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Mario F. Mattei, J.), dated October 26, 2018, which, after a hearing, designated him a level three sex offender pursuant to Correction Law article 6-C.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The defendant was convicted, upon a plea of guilty, of criminal sexual act in the first degree. After a hearing pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (Correction Law art 6-C; hereinafter SORA), at which the defendant sought a downward departure from his presumptive level three risk designation, the Supreme Court designated the defendant a level three sex offender.
"An offender seeking a downward departure from the presumptive risk level has the initial burden of (1) identifying, as a matter of law, an appropriate mitigating factor, namely, a factor which tends to establish a lower likelihood of reoffense or danger to the community and is of a kind, or to a degree, that is not otherwise taken into account by [SORA] Guidelines, and (2) establishing the facts in support of its existence by a preponderance of the evidence" (People v Curry, 158 AD3d 52, 58; see People v Gillotti, 23 NY3d 841, 861; People v Wyatt, 89 AD3d 112, 128; see also SORA: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 4 [2006]). If the offender makes that twofold showing, the court must exercise its discretion by weighing the mitigating factor to determine whether the totality of the circumstances warrants a departure to avoid an overassessment of the offender's dangerousness and risk of sexual recidivism (see People v Gillotti, 23 NY3d at 861; People v Bigelow, 175 AD3d 1443, 1444).
Here, the defendant failed to identify, as a matter of law, an appropriate mitigating factor and failed to establish the facts in support of the existence of any purported mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence (see People v Bright, 195 AD3d 868, 869; People v Price, 164 AD3d 1282, 1283; People v McCurdy, 121 AD3d 875, 875-876).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant's request for a downward departure.
DILLON, J.P., CONNOLLY, BRATHWAITE NELSON and GENOVESI, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Maria T. Fasulo
Clerk of the Court