Court Opinion

ID: 9402064
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-15 00:00:30.852239+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:57.220483
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-50869         Document: 00516786985             Page: 1      Date Filed: 06/14/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                               Fifth Circuit

                                      ____________                                           FILED
                                                                                         June 14, 2023
                                        No. 21-50869                                    Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________                                           Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                       Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Ernesto Ordunez,

                                               Defendant—Appellant.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the Western District of Texas
                               USDC No. 7:20-CR-129-1
                      ______________________________

   Before Ho, Oldham, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          Ernesto Ordunez was indicted in July of 2020 for one count of
   conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five or more grams of
   methamphetamine.           At sentencing, the district court determined that
   Ordunez qualified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Ordunez now
   challenges that determination, pointing to three prior convictions: (1) a 1998
   federal conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 21-50869      Document: 00516786985          Page: 2   Date Filed: 06/14/2023

                                    No. 21-50869

   violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841; (2) a 2008 conviction in state court of attempted
   child abuse resulting in great bodily harm in violation of New Mexico Statutes
   § 30-6-1(D); and (3) a 2008 conviction in state court for three counts of
   aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in violation of New Mexico Statutes
   § 30-3-2(A). He argues that none of these prior convictions qualify as crimes
   of violence or controlled substance offenses for purposes of § 4B1.1. We have
   jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. For the
   reasons provided herein, we AFFIRM the district court’s application of the
   career offender enhancement.
                           I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
          Though the parties dispute the applicable standard of review, plain
   error applies throughout. Ordunez failed to object to the district court’s
   categorization of his 1998 marijuana conviction as a controlled substance
   offense, instead arguing it was too old to qualify for an enhancement. See
   United States v. Huerra, 884 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e subject to
   plain-error review arguments that are raised for the first time on appeal.”).
          Regarding the two remaining qualifying offenses — aggravated assault
   with a deadly weapon and attempted child abuse resulting in great bodily
   harm — Ordunez argues this court should apply de novo review. In his
   written objections to the PSR, he stated in full that he “objects to the
   classification of the felonies in paragraph 19(B) [attempted child abuse] and
   19(C) [aggravated assault]” because “these felonies should not be classified
   as violent felonies.”
          “To preserve an issue for appeal, the objection below ‘must fully
   apprise the trial judge of the grounds for the objection so that evidence can
   be taken and argument received on the issue.’” Huerra, 884 F.3d at 519
   (quoting United States v. Musa, 45 F.3d 922, 924 n.5 (5th Cir. 1995)). “There
   is no bright-line rule for determining whether a matter was raised below.”

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   United States v. Soza, 874 F.3d 884, 889 (5th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). “If a
   party wishes to preserve an argument for appeal, the party must press and
   not merely intimate the arguments during the proceedings before the district
   court.” Id. (cleaned up). The objection must be “sufficiently specific to alert
   the district court to the nature of the alleged error and provide an opportunity
   for correction.” United States v. Neal, 578 F.3d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 2009).
           Although Ordunez objected to the characterization of his remaining
   qualifying offenses as crimes of violence, he provided no reasons for this
   objection. The probation officer responded to Ordunez’s objection by stating
   that he “did not provide any reasons as to why the convictions should not be
   considered crimes of violence.” At sentencing, Ordunez’s counsel appeared
   to argue that the objection related to whether the underlying offenses were
   aggravated, but that they were unable to obtain the documents to make their
   argument. 1 The district court stated that it agreed with the probation
   officer’s response and overruled Ordunez’s objections.
           Because the objection was not sufficiently clear to alert the district
   court to the alleged error, this court reviews for plain error. To demonstrate
   plain error, a defendant has the burden of showing (1) an error, (2) that is
   clear or obvious, and (3) that affects the defendant’s substantial rights.
   Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). If satisfied, this court has
   the discretion to remedy the error if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity,
   or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id.

           _____________________
           1
             Ordunez’s counsel indicated that “[t]he second objection I made was basically
   that how his felonies were classified, it makes him a career offender.” However, his counsel
   indicated he could not “go forward with objections saying that I found anything that says
   it’s not aggravated … So I would like to at least leave my objection in place in case
   something happens later on.”

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                              II. DISCUSSION
          The career offender enhancement is applied when “the defendant has
   at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a
   controlled substance offense.” § 4B1.1(a). Because the district court found
   that Ordunez had committed three such offenses, he must show that two of
   the three prior convictions were not either controlled substance offenses or
   crimes of violence to demonstrate that the career offender enhancement was
   improperly applied. See id.
          The term “controlled substance offense” is defined, in relevant part,
   as “an offense under federal … law, punishable by imprisonment for a term
   exceeding one year, that prohibits … the possession of a controlled substance
   (or a counterfeit substance) with intent to … distribute[.]” U.S.S.G.
   § 4B1.2(b). A crime of violence is a crime punishable by more than a year
   under federal or state law that has as an element the use, attempted use, or
   threatened use of physical force against the person of another (“elements
   clause”) or is otherwise included in an enumerated category. U.S.S.G.
   § 4B1.2(a).
          To determine whether a prior conviction constitutes such an offense,
   this court uses the categorical approach, “look[ing] only to the elements of
   the prior offense, not to the actual conduct of the defendant in committing
   the offense.” United States v. Hinkle, 832 F.3d 569, 572 (5th Cir. 2016).
   Under the categorical approach, courts “must presume that the conviction
   rested upon [nothing] more than the least of th[e] acts criminalized, and then
   determine whether even those acts are encompassed by the generic federal
   offense.” Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190-91 (2013) (cleaned up).
   Further, the defendant “must also show a realistic probability that [the
   Government] will prosecute the conduct that falls outside the generic
   definition of a crime.” Alexis v. Barr, 960 F.3d 722, 726 (5th Cir. 2020)
   (cleaned up).

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               A. 1998 Federal Marijuana Conviction
          Ordunez argues that his marijuana conviction should no longer be
   considered a controlled substance offense because the federal definition of
   “marihuana” was modified in 2018 to exclude hemp. When Ordunez was
   convicted of the crime, 21 U.S.C. § 802 defined “marihuana” to mean “all
   parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L., whether growing or not; the seeds
   thereof; the resin extracted from any part of such plant, its seeds or resin.” §
   802(16) (effective Oct. 11, 1996). In 2018, the statute was amended to
   exclude hemp from the definition of “marihuana.” § 802(16)(B)(i) (effective
   Dec. 21, 2018).
          This court has never held that a pre-2018 predicate conviction does
   not qualify as a controlled substance offense for purposes of the Sentencing
   Guidelines because hemp was subsequently removed from the CSA prior to
   the time of federal sentencing. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, No. 21-
   50680, 2022 WL 1615333 (5th Cir. May 23, 2022); United States v. Belducea-
   Mancinas, No. 20-50929, 2022 WL 1223800 (5th Cir. Apr. 26, 2022); United
   States v. Nava, No. 21-50165, 2021 WL 5095976 (5th Cir. Nov. 2, 2021).
   “An error is not plain unless the error is clear under current law.” United
   States v. Bishop, 603 F.3d 279, 281 (5th Cir. 2010). Because this question
   remains an open one in this circuit, Ordunez cannot show the district court
   committed plain error.
           B. 2008 New Mexico Attempted Child Abuse
                                  Conviction
          Ordunez raises two arguments to suggest his attempted child abuse
   conviction should not count as a crime of violence: (1) it does “not have as
   an element the purposeful or knowing use, attempted use, or threatened use
   of force against the person of another,” and (2) a defendant could be
   convicted of New Mexico child abuse with a mens rea of recklessness. He

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   pleaded guilty to “Attempt to Commit a Felony, to wit: Child Abuse –
   Intentional (Resulting in Great Bodily Harm)” on March 13, 2008.
          Regarding his force argument, Ordunez contends that the recent
   decision in United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022), in which the
   Supreme Court held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery did not qualify as a
   “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3) because a conviction under
   that statute does not “require the government to prove that the defendant
   used, attempted to use, or even threatened to use force against another
   person or his property[,]” 142 S.Ct. at 2020, applies to his conviction for
   New Mexico attempted child abuse. In Taylor, the Supreme Court reasoned
   that “attempted Hobbs Act robbery [requires] two things: (1) the defendant
   intended to unlawfully take or obtain personal property by means of actual or
   threatened force, and (2) he completed a ‘substantial step’ toward that end.”
   142 S. Ct. at 2020 (emphasis in original). The Taylor court cited United States
   v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 106 (2007), for the proposition that an
   attempt crime requires a “substantial step” towards completion. Id.
   Likewise, New Mexico law “requires the accused to take a substantial step”
   for attempt crimes. State v. Telles, 446 P.3d 1194, 1204 (N.M. 2019)
   (attempted tampering with evidence).
          The Supreme Court explained that a defendant could, hypothetically,
   take a substantial step towards completing a Hobbs Act robbery without
   using, attempting to use, or threatening to use force. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. at
   2021. Ordunez argues that Taylor applies here. He argues that, by using the
   same logic, a defendant could plan to commit child abuse and buy weapons
   intended for that abuse but be arrested as he walks back into his house before
   the actual abuse occurs. Further, this court has stated, in an unpublished
   opinion, that the New Mexico child abuse statute can be violated without the
   use of force, as “a child could be cruelly confined without the use of force
   against the child. Without using any force, a child could be kept locked in a
   room without access to food or water.” United States v. Torres-Reyes, 444 F.

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   App’x. 828, 828 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that the defendant’s previous child
   abuse conviction did not qualify as a crime of violence under § 2L1.2(b)(1)).
           The reasoning in Torres-Reyes, however, relied upon this court’s
   ruling in United States v. Calderon-Pena, 383 F.3d 254 (5th Cir. 2004), which
   analyzed an analogous Texas statute. 444 F. App’x. 828. Calderon-Pena, in
   turn, was overruled by United States v. Reyes-Contreras, 910 F.3d 169 (5th Cir.
   2018) (en banc). Reyes-Contreras specifically overruled Calderon-Pena’s
   requirement of bodily contact for a crime of violence, holding that physical
   force extends to applications of force that are subtle or indirect. Id.
   (“Calderon-Pena is overruled to the extent that it requires bodily contact for
   a COV and makes a distinction between creating a risk of injury and using or
   attempting to use physical force.”). Reyes-Contreras was then abrogated in
   part by Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021). See United States v.
   Lopez-Garcia, No. 21-51018, 2022 WL 2527667, at *1 (5th Cir. July 7, 2022)
   (unpublished). It is accordingly unclear if the reasoning is still applicable.
   Because the current state of the law is neither clear nor obvious, this
   argument fails to satisfy the plain error standard.
           As to his mens rea argument, this circuit has not ruled on the specific
   New Mexico statute at issue, but it does recognize that attempt crimes
   require specific intent. See, e.g., United States v. Howard, 766 F.3d 414, 419
   (5th Cir. 2014). Further, numerous other circuits have held that attempt
   crimes require specific intent even though the underlying crime could be
   committed recklessly. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 941 F.3d 1048, 1054
   (11th Cir. 2019) (holding that “under Alabama law, attempt requires the
   specific intent to commit an offense and one cannot intend to commit a
   reckless offense”); United States v. Gomez-Hernandez, 680 F.3d 1171, 1175
   (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that “it is well-settled that attempted aggravated
   assault under Arizona law covers only intentional conduct”); United States v.
   Castro-Gomez, 792 F.3d 1216, 1218 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding that “Illinois’
   definition of attempt … requires the specific intent to commit a substantive
   offense.”). Likewise, the Court of Appeals of New Mexico has held, in a case

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   involving attempted child abuse, “that the crime of attempt to commit a
   felony requires a specific intent to commit the underlying felony.” State v.
   Herrera, 33 P.3d 22, 27 (N.M. 2001); see also N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-28-1.
   Because Ordunez’s attempted child abuse conviction requires specific
   intent, this argument likewise fails to satisfy plain error review. 2
                                     III. CONCLUSION
         Accordingly, the district court’s application of the career offender
   enhancement is AFFIRMED.

           _____________________
           2
             Because we find that the marijuana and attempted child abuse convictions are
   qualifying offenses for the career offender enhancement, this court need not address
   whether the 2008 New Mexico aggravated assault conviction applies. With two qualifying
   career-offender predicates, the enhancement would apply regardless, and any third offense
   — qualifying or otherwise — affected neither his guidelines range nor sentence.

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