Court Opinion

ID: 9570226
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:21:16.685311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:05:10.578043
License: Public Domain

MACY, Justice.
Appellants Ted and Ada Jan Harmon brought an action against Julie Hunting and appellee Town of Afton following an automobile accident in which Ted Harmon suffered injuries to his back and legs. In the course of the proceedings, Hunting was discharged in bankruptcy from any liability arising from the accident, and appellants proceeded to trial against appellee. At the close of the evidence, the jury found that appellee was negligent but that its negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident. In accordance with the jury’s findings, the district court entered judgment in favor of appellee.
We affirm.
Appellants set forth three issues on appeal:
1. Whether the jury’s finding that ap-pellee's negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident is supported by substantial evidence;
2. Whether the district court erred in instructing the jury and allowing counsel for appellee to comment on the effect of joint and several liability; and
3.Whether the district court erred in denying admission of the accident report into evidence.
On February 15, 1984, at approximately four in the afternoon, Ted Harmon was driving west on Sixth Avenue in Afton, Wyoming. As he entered the intersection of Sixth Avenue and Madison Street, another vehicle traveling north on Madison Street also entered the intersection. Harmon attempted to brake and swerve to the right, but the left front of his vehicle struck the right front side of the second vehicle.
Both Madison Street and Sixth Avenue are two-lane streets. Traffic is controlled at the intersection by yield signs facing the northbound and southbound lanes of Madison Street. There are no traffic lights or signs at the intersection controlling eastbound and westbound traffic on Sixth Avenue. At the time of the accident, the streets were snow packed and icy. Snowbanks left by plows lined the edges of both streets.
Upon impact, the passenger side of the northbound vehicle driven by Hunting slid into the driver’s side of Harmon’s car. As the cars collided, Harmon felt a sharp pain in his back and legs. When his car came to a stop and he attempted to get out, he realized he could not move his legs. Hunting went to a nearby house and called the police. A short time later, an officer of the Afton police department arrived, followed by an ambulance. Harmon was extracted from his car and taken to the hospital.
On February 27, 1985, appellants filed a negligence action against Hunting and ap-pellee. In their complaint, appellants alleged that Hunting was negligent in failing to keep a proper lookout, control her vehicle, yield to oncoming traffic, and exercise care for her safety and that of others. In their claim against appellee, appellants alleged generally that appellee violated its duty to exercise reasonable care in maintaining the streets by creating a dangerous condition along Sixth Avenue and Madison Street. Appellants set forth a variety of dangerous conditions including snowbanks; inadequate traffic signals; insufficient *891equipment, manpower, and supervision; lack of sanding; and improper design of the intersection. Appellant’s complaint further stated that, as a direct and proximate cause of the negligence of Hunting and appellee, Ted Harmon sustained injuries to his back and legs, and his wife, Ada Jan Harmon, was denied the care and companionship of her husband. After Hunting was discharged in bankruptcy from any liability, appellants filed an amended complaint naming appellee as the sole defendant.
I
Appellants contend that the jury’s finding that appellee’s negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident is not supported by substantial evidence.
We previously have held:
“ ‘As a reviewing court, we assume the evidence of the successful party is true, leave out of consideration entirely evidence of the unsuccessful party in conflict therewith, and give the evidence of the successful party every favorable inference which may reasonably be drawn from it.’ ” Huang International, Inc. v. Foose Construction Company, Wyo., 734 P.2d 975, 979 (1987), quoting DeJulio v. Foster, Wyo., 715 P.2d 182,185 (1986). “[W]hen dealing with questions of fact, this court will not ordinarily substitute its judgment for that of the jury. * * * So long as there is sufficient evidence upon which the jury could rationally base its findings, such findings will not be adjusted in any way by this court.” DeJulio v. Foster, 715 P.2d at 185.
“ ‘In addition, when reviewing a jury verdict, we leave to the jury the duty of ascertaining the facts, reconciling conflicts therein and drawing its own inferences if more than one inference is permissible. Also, when the facts permit the drawing of more than one inference, then it is for the jury to choose which one will be utilized and, if supported by substantial evidence, the jury’s choice will be held by us to be conclusive.’ ” Reese v. Dow Chemical Company, Wyo., 728 P.2d 1118, 1120 (1986), quoting Crown Cork & Seal Company, Inc. v. Admiral Beverage Corporation, Wyo., 638 P.2d 1272, 1274-75 (1982).
While recognizing the existence of these standards of review, appellants argue that, in the present case, the jury’s finding that appellee’s negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident is not supported by even a scintilla of evidence and that, even upon viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to appellee, the evidence supports the conclusion that appellee’s negligence was a proximate cause of the accident. More specifically, appellants claim that, because the jury found that Ted Harmon was not negligent, we must assume he acted with due care and would have seen and avoided Hunting had it not been for the negligence of appellee in failing to properly remove the snowbanks.
“Proximate cause means that the accident or injury must be the natural and probable consequence of the act of negligence. The law does not charge a person with all the consequences of a wrongful act, but ignores remote causes and looks only to the proximate cause.” DeWald v. State, Wyo., 719 P.2d 643, 651 (1986) (citation omitted).
“Proximate cause is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of facts unless only one conclusion can be drawn from the evidence.” Ely v. Kirk, Wyo., 707 P.2d 706, 711 (1985).
In the present case, the evidence presented was susceptible to more than one conclusion; more than one reasonable inference could be drawn from it. The testimony as to the height of the snowbanks and whether the snowbanks actually obscured visibility was contradictory. On the one hand, there was testimony that the snowbanks were eight feet high; on the other hand, there was testimony that they were only three feet high. Similarly, while there was testimony that the snowbanks obstructed visibility, Hunting testified at one point that she could see down Sixth Avenue and that she decided to proceed through the intersection only after she had full clear visibility. In addition, Ted Harmon testified that Hunting proceeded through the *892intersection without looking in his direction. On the basis of this testimony, we are not prepared to say that the jury’s finding that appellee’s negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident is unsupported by substantial evidence. That we might have reached a different result is not grounds for overturning a jury verdict. DeJulio v. Foster, supra.
II
Appellants also contend that the district court erred in instructing the jury and allowing counsel for appellee to comment on the effect of joint and several liability. The district court gave the following instruction:
“INSTRUCTION NO. 16a
“This case must be determined on the basis of comparative negligence of the parties involved in the occurrence. In deciding the case, you will need to know the meaning of the term ‘negligence’. “Negligence has been defined for you in earlier instructions.
“It will be necessary for you to determine the percentage of negligence, if any, of each of the parties involved in the occurrence. It also will be necessary for you to determine the amount of damages sustained by any party claiming damages.
“The law of Wyoming applicable to this case requires the Court to reduce the amount of damages you have awarded to any party by the percentage of negligence, if any, that you find is attributable to that party.
“The percentage of negligence of Ted Harmon, if any, will be compared to the negligence, if any, of the Town and Julia Hunting. If the negligence of the Town is equal to or less than the negligence of Harmon, the plaintiff will not recover damages from the Town. However, if the negligence of the Town is greater than the negligence of Harmon, the Plaintiffs will recover all of the damages to which they are entitled solely from the Town. The Court will reduce the amount of such damages which you have awarded by the percentage of negligence that you find attributable to Ted Harmon. In no event will the Plaintiffs be entitled to recover if Harmon’s negligence is 50% or more.”
Appellants do not contend that the instruction misstates the law; they contend that the instruction should not have been given at all. They claim that, in giving the instruction, the district court relied on the following statutory provision:
Section 1-1-109, W.S.1977.1
“(a) Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if the contributory negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought. Any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the person recovering.
“(b) The court may, and when requested by any party shall:
* * * * * *
“(iii) Inform the jury of the consequences of its determination of the percentage of negligence.” (Emphasis added.)
Appellants argue that the court’s reliance on this provision is misplaced for the reason that § 1-1-109 deals exclusively with comparative negligence, which is separate and distinct from joint and several liability. Specifically, appellants argue that § 1-1-109 only authorizes the district court to inform the jury that, if the plaintiff is found more negligent than the defendant, the plaintiff will not recover and that the plaintiff’s recovery will be reduced by the amount of his own negligence.
Appellants’ argument overlooks § 1-1-114, W.S.1977, which provides in pertinent part:
“In all cases the court shall inform the jury of the consequences of its verdict.”
*893In Coryell v. Town of Pinedale, Wyo., 745 P.2d 883 (1987), in response to a claim identical to that raised in the present case, we held that § 1-1-114 authorizes the court to inform the jury of the consequences of its verdict in all cases, including those in which comparative negligence is not an issue. Thus, it was not error for the district court to instruct the jury on the effect of joint and several liability.
As in Coryell v. Town of Pinedale, appellants also assert that the district court erred in allowing counsel for appellee to comment on the effect of joint and several liability during closing argument. It is well established in this state that, during closing argument, counsel may comment on the instructions given by the court. Spriggs v. Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc., 63 Wyo. 416, 182 P.2d 801 (1947); Annot., 66 A.L.R.2d 9 (1959). Thus, absent a showing that counsel for appellee in some way misstated the law, we hold that the district court did not err in allowing him to comment on the effect of joint and several liability during his closing argument.
Ill
Appellants’ final contention is that the district court erred in denying admission of the accident report into evidence.
Following his investigation of the accident scene, Officer Val K. Clement of the Afton police department filed a report which stated in part that, due to the conditions of high snowbanks and very icy roads, no citations were issued at that time. Prior to trial, appellee filed a motion in limine to exclude
“[a]ny and all evidence, testimony, or argument concerning any matters contained in [the accident report] including, but not limited to, the accident report itself, any conclusions rendered by the Officers concerning the cause of the [accident] in question, and any reference to these Officers’ decision not to render a citation * *
The district court apparently granted the motion to the extent that it held the report could not be introduced as evidence at trial but denied the motion to the extent that it allowed appellants to use the report to impeach or refresh the recollection of Officer Clement. There was no error in the district court’s ruling.
“The fact of citation or non-citation of a driver by the investigating law enforcement officer is inadmissible in an action for negligence.” Ingrum v. Tucson Yellow Cab Co., 131 Ariz. 523, 642 P.2d 868, 872 (1982).
The rationale for this rule is that a citation evidences the opinion of the traffic officer as to negligence and the cause of the accident.
“ ‘It is not proper to permit a witness to give his opinion on questions of fact requiring no expert knowledge, when the opinion involves the very matter to be determined by the jury, and the facts on which the witness founds his opinion are capable of being presented to the jury.’ ” Id. 642 P.2d at 872, quoting Billington v. Schaal, 42 Wash.2d 878, 259 P.2d 634, 637 (1953).
This rule has been adopted by a number of courts. See Frias v. Valle, 101 Nev. 219, 698 P.2d 875 (1985); Brownell v. Brown, 114 Mich.App. 760, 319 N.W.2d 664 (1982); Napolitan v. Happe, 288 Pa.Super. 468, 432 A.2d 608 (1981). It is also consistent with our prior holding that
“an opinion or evaluation of the ultimate issue to be decided by the jury is inadmissible, whether it be presented in an official report or in any other fashion.” Meyer v. Kendig, Wyo., 641 P.2d 1235, 1243 (1982).
Thus, the district court properly excluded the accident report and any testimony as to the issuance or nonissuance of a citation. Appellants thereafter were entitled to, and in fact did, use the report to present to the jury the facts upon which the officer based his opinion. On direct examination, appellants elicited the following testimony from Officer Clement:
“Q. Well, did you observe any visual obstructions at the scene of the collision?
“A. Not that I could see at the time.
“Q. Okay. Well, I’m going to direct your attention to — could you identify *894that as an accurate copy of your investigation report? * * *
“A. Yes.
“Q. And could you look at all the pages to make sure that that’s the complete report?
“A. It is.
* * * * * sjt
“Q. Now, do you recall observing any visual obstructions at the scene of the accident?
“A. Yes, I did.
* H« * * * ¡fc
“Q. Now, in fact, you had observed high snowbanks at the scene of the collision, correct?
“A. Correct.
* * * * * *
“Q. Did you observe and experience very icy road conditions at the intersection?
“A. It had been clear that day and the roads, usually in the wintertime, get icy on the top because of the warmness and water appears and people drive over it and it gets icy, yes?
“Q. So you did observe and experience very icy conditions at the intersection, isn’t that true?
“A. That’s true.
“Q. And the streets appeared snow packed to you, correct?
“A. Correct.
“Q. And the streets were iced over, correct?
“A. Correct.”
Thereafter, on redirect, appellants elicited the following additional testimony from the officer:
“Q. Did I understand you to say that these eight foot snow embankments constituted a visual obstruction at that particular intersection on that day?
“A. Yes.”
On the basis of this testimony and the other evidence presented at trial, it was the jury’s responsibility to decide whether snow conditions were a proximate cause of the accident.
Having concluded that the jury’s finding is supported by substantial evidence and that the district court did not err in instructing the jury on the effects of joint and several liability or in denying admission of the accident report, we affirm.
URBIGKIT, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

. Amended effective June 11, 1986.