Court Opinion

ID: 9747647
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:25:37.502055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:25.221702
License: Public Domain

Greene, J.,
concurring: I write separately to clarify the distinction between this case and the Watson case, where I also participated in the panel’s decision. In State v. Watson, 39 Kan. App. 2d 923, 186 P.3d 812, rev. denied 287 Kan. 769 (2008), there was no occasion to construe the UMDDA in circumstances where the State requests the continuance in open court with the inmate or counsel present, but the defendant objected and there was no showing of good cause. The panel in Watson held only that the period attributable to the State’s continuance must be counted toward the speedy trial deadline because the continuance was granted without the inmate or counsel present. In contrast, counsel was present here but there was no showing of good cause for the continuances.
K.S.A. 22-4303 requires the inmate to be brought to trial within 180 days unless that period is extended by one or more continuances that either (1) have been stipulated by the parties; or (2) have been granted in open court with the defendant or counsel present after notice to counsel and the opportunity to be heard, and upon “good cause shown.” In retrospect, the panel’s decision in Watson may have been overbroad in holding that “any trial continuance granted by the court extends the ... deadline ... provided that the defendant’s attorney received notice . . . and an opportunity to be heard.” 39 Kan. App. 2d at 928. Although the facts in Watson did not frame a good cause issue, the holding probably should have recognized the need for good cause to be shown, because it is a clear statutory mandate.
Here, there was no good cause shown for two of the continuances granted to the State. The first was due to some confusion in the prosecutor’s office and the second was due to an apparent wholesale failure to follow up on the need to procure a witness’ presence. The defense objected to both requests, and in neither instance was there a showing of good cause, nor did the court make any finding of good cause. See State v. McDonald, 250 Kan. 73, *296Syl. ¶ 2, 824 P.2d 941 (1992) (due diligence must be shown to support a continuance to procure a witness’ testimony). Obviously, after a UMDDA demand has been submitted, the better practice is for the court to make a record of all proceedings addressing continuance requests, and to make findings as to good cause.
Contrary to the State’s argument, we do not assume good cause for a continuance merely because it was granted by a magistrate. Indeed, our court has consistently examined the basis for any continuance granted after a UMDDA letter. See, e.g., State v. Rothwell, No. 92,493, unpublished opinion filed January 13,2006; State v. Flowers, No. 89,859, unpublished opinion filed April 2, 2004, rev. denied 278 Kan. 849 (2004); see also State v. Pickerill, No. 100,189, unpublished opinion filed April 3, 2009. Moreover, our focus on appeal must be on the action of the district court in its dismissal of the case; implicit in the district court’s conclusion and its dismissal is its belief that the continuances granted by the magistrate were not supported by good cause shown. We review the district court’s findings for an abuse of discretion, and we must conclude that there was no abuse of discretion in these findings. See State v. Kirkpatrick, 286 Kan. 329, 345-46, 184 P.3d 247 (2008).
I concur with the majority and the district court in concluding that Bums was entitled to a dismissal of the criminal charges based on a violation of his speedy trial rights under the UMDDA.
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