Court Opinion

ID: 9406331
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-30 17:05:32.916344+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:29.127094
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 180864-U
                                            No. 1-18-0864
                                      Order filed June 30, 2023

                                                                                        Sixth Division
 NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
 limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
 ______________________________________________________________________________
                                               IN THE
                                 APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                         FIRST DISTRICT
 ______________________________________________________________________________
 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                           )
                                                                )   Appeal from the Circuit Court
          Plaintiff-Appellee,                                   )   of Cook County, Illinois.
                                                                )
     v.                                                         )   No. 10 CR 9052
                                                                )
 TERRENCE COULTER,                                              )   The Honorable
                                                                )   Brian Flaherty,
          Defendant-Appellant.                                  )   Judge, Presiding.
                                                                )
                                                                )

          JUSTICE C.A. WALKER delivered the judgment of the court.
          Justices Oden Johnson and Tailor concurred in the judgment.

                                             ORDER

Held: We affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence where: (1) the circuit court did not abuse
      its discretion in admitting other crimes evidence; (2) the circuit court’s finding that hearsay
      statements were admissible under the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine was not against
      the manifest weight of the evidence; and (3) the prosecutor’s improper comments during
      closing argument were not so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial.
No. 1-18-0864

¶1      Following a jury trial, Terrence Coulter was found guilty of first degree murder of Dana

Haynes and sentenced to 52 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, Coulter argues: (1) the admission of

the State’s extensive other crimes evidence at trial was highly prejudicial; (2) Dana’s hearsay

statements were inadmissible under the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine; and (3) the prosecutor

made improper comments during closing argument. For the following reasons, we affirm Coulter’s

conviction and sentence.

¶2                                     I. BACKGROUND

¶3      Terrence Coulter was charged with counts I through VI of first degree murder of Dana

Haynes and count VII of concealing a homicidal death. The State nolle prosequi counts III, VI,

and VII and proceeded on counts I, II, IV, and V. Before trial, the State filed a motion to allow

proof of Coulter’s other crimes, including a prior charge of attempted murder against Dana. The

court allowed the admission of the other crimes evidence to show Coulter’s motive, intent, absence

of mistake, and propensity to commit domestic violence. The State also filed a motion to admit

Dana’s hearsay statements regarding the attempted murder charge under the doctrine of forfeiture

by wrongdoing. The circuit court granted the motion. A fitness hearing was held on May 20, 2016,

and September 7, 2017. At the conclusion of both hearings, the circuit court found Coulter fit to

stand trial.

¶4      The case proceeded to trial on January 23, 2018. The evidence at trial revealed the

following story of events. Derrick Hayes, Dana’s son, was 16 years old at the time of Dana’s death.

Coulter was Dana’s long-time boyfriend and, in November 2007, Derrick, Dana, and Coulter lived

together. Derrick spent a lot of time with Coulter and Dana and never noticed Coulter mumble,

talk to himself, or act mentally unstable. On November 18, 2007, Derrick went to his cousin’s

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No. 1-18-0864

house. Around 5 p.m., Derrick received a phone call from Dana stating “call the ambulance. T just

stabbed me.” Derrick stated “T” was Dana’s nickname for Coulter. Derrick’s cousin, Andrea Lenn,

left to help Dana and instructed Derrick to call the police. Derrick did not see Dana until the

following week because Dana was in the hospital. Derrick later learned that Coulter had been

charged with attempted murder. On the morning of January 25, 2010, Dana told Derrick that she

was going to work. The next morning, Derrick noticed that Dana was not home and reported her

missing. Patricia Hajden worked for a company called Help at Home with Dana. On January 25,

2010, Dana called Hajden at work and told Hajden that she was not going to work that day. Hajden

never saw or spoke to Dana again.

¶5     On November 18, 2007, around 5 p.m., paramedic Tracy Van Dyke was dispatched to a

stabbing. When she arrived at the scene, Van Dyke found Dana sitting on a swing soaking in blood.

Van Dyke noticed stab wounds near Dana’s throat, and Dana said she was short of breath. In the

ambulance, Van Dyke removed Dana’s clothing and discovered more stab wounds. Dana told Van

Dyke that her boyfriend pulled her out of a car, threw her to the ground, and stabbed her.

¶6     On December 26, 2007, Dana gave Assistant State’s Attorney (ASA) Michael Sorich a

statement regarding the stabbing incident. In the statement, Dana said she was with Coulter on

November 18, 2007. Dana and Coulter had been dating for 12 years, and they had recently got

back together. Dana and Coulter went to K-Mart, stopped to get cigarettes and chips, and drove

around. Dana’s phone rang, and Coulter noticed it was Dana’s son calling. Coulter got mad and

pushed Dana out of the car. Coulter then grabbed a knife from his trunk and stabbed Dana while

she was on the ground in an alley. Dana played dead so Coulter would stop stabbing her, and

Coulter eventually got back in his car and drove away. Dana believed she was stabbed 19 times in

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No. 1-18-0864

the back, arms, neck, and legs. Dana stated that she gave her statement to Sorich freely and

voluntarily and had not been forced or threatened by anyone nor was she under the influence of

drugs or alcohol.

¶7     ASA Torrie Corbin was assigned to the courtroom where Coulter was arraigned on the

attempted murder charge. Torrie received a letter dated February 18, 2008, from Dana stating she

“made a terrible mistake and that Coulter “was not the person who stabbed me November 17,

2007.” The letter also stated that Dana was in shock and scared at the time of the incident, that

“everybody was yelling at me” at the scene, and that when she said she wanted to call Coulter, the

responding officers assumed Coulter was the offender. On August 25, 2008, Corbin received

another recantation letter from Dana and, in early 2009, received a video statement of Dana

recanting her initial statements that Coulter was her assailant. On December 9, 2009, Coulter’s

attempted murder trial was scheduled for February 9, 2010. Coulter was present in court and

advised of the February 2010 trial date. Later that day, Corbin had a conversation with Dana

outside of the courtroom about the trial date. Dana told Corbin that her recantations were not true

and that Coulter was her assailant, but she was afraid.

¶8     Ray Ditzler was the owner of the Star Lite Motel. Upon check-in, Ray requests that guests

provide a photo identification (ID), and he records the guest’s name and address on the motel

registration card. Ray also documents the make and model of each guest’s vehicle in the parking

lot. In late January, police asked Ray for records for Room 28 dated January 24, 2010. Ray testified

that the name of the requested registration card was Terrence Coulter with an address of 14800

Kenwood Avenue in Dolton, Illinois. The vehicle recorded on the registration card was a green

Chevy van. Ray also testified about a registration card dated January 25, 2010, that listed the same

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No. 1-18-0864

address and vehicle information and included a credit card receipt time stamped 11:12:12. Ray

stated Room 28 was not rented again until after the police finished their search of the room.

¶9     On January 25, 2010, Younlaunda Burgess was working at the Star Lite Motel. Around

11:12 a.m., a male came into her office and asked to rent Room 28 for another night. The man

filled out a registration card, signed the card “Terrence Coulter,” provided an ID and credit card,

and told Younlaundra that his car was a green van. Younlaunda noticed a Black female drive a

silver car into the parking lot, and she saw the male and female go into Room 28. Five minutes

later, the female exited Room 28, got back into the silver car, and drove off. Younlaunda later

identified Coulter as the male who rented Room 28 at the Park Forest Police Department.

¶ 10   On January 25, 2010, around 11:30 a.m., South Holland police officer Harold Coleman

was running license plates of parked vehicles in the Star Lite Motel parking lot. Coleman saw a

male and female walking to a silver Kia vehicle. The license plate of that vehicle came back

“clean” with no issues. Two days later, Coleman met with Park Forest Police Department officers

and the South Suburban Major Crimes Task Force to discuss the individuals he saw at the Star Lite

Motel. During the meeting, Coleman was shown a photograph of Dana and identified Dana as the

woman he saw getting into the driver’s seat of the Kia. Coleman was unable to make an

identification of the male he saw on January 25 although he noticed the male was African

American.

¶ 11   On January 26, 2010, Park Forest deputy chief Bryan Ryski was assigned to a missing

person case in which he learned Dana was reported missing by her son. Ryski contacted Dana’s

employer, Help at Home, and discovered Dana had not gone into work that day. Ryski spoke with

Dana’s relatives, attempted to locate Dana’s silver Kia, and placed Dana’s information into the

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No. 1-18-0864

national LEADS database. Ryski later learned about Coulter’s attempted murder case and went to

Coulter’s home at 14800 Kenwood Avenue. Coulter’s mother, Rosie Coulter, answered the door

and informed Ryski that Coulter was not home. As Ryski left the residence, he noticed a green van

parked in front of the house. He ran the van’s license plate and learned it was registered at the

Kenwood address. Ryski later met with police officer Harold Coleman to get more information

about running Dana’s vehicle license plate on January 25. Ryski met with Ray, the owner of Star

Lite Motel, and received registration cards for January 24 and January 25. Ryski learned that Room

28 was the room that defendant had rented out on those dates.

¶ 12   On January 27, Rosie informed police that Coulter was at Ingalls Hospital. Ryski went to

the hospital and learned that Coulter had been admitted into the psychiatric unit around 2 a.m. that

day. Coulter told Ryski that he was feeling “fine” and was not medicated. Coulter also stated that,

on January 24, he had gone to his brother’s house to watch football and then returned home. On

January 25, Coulter went to a motel on 87th Street and Halsted Street. Dana called him that

morning and told him she was going to work. Although Coulter spoke to Dana at that time, he had

not seen her in a long time. Ryski stated Coulter was not laughing, mumbling, or disoriented but

responsive and spoke clearly and intelligently. During their conversation, Bryan noticed some

inconsistencies between Coulter’s statements and the motel information he collected earlier.

¶ 13   Coulter was later released from Ingalls Hospital and agreed to speak with Ryski again.

Coulter stated that he went to his brother’s house to watch football on January 24. He later went

to the Star Lite Motel to be alone because he was hearing voices. When he woke up the next day,

he was no longer hearing voices. Dana did not visit him at the motel, and he had last seen Dana

two weeks earlier at his house. Coulter stayed another night at the Star Lite Motel on January 25

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No. 1-18-0864

because he had been drinking. He woke up the next day hearing voices and went to a different

hotel. On Wednesday morning, his mother took him to the hospital. Coulter was not on any

medications and was not hearing voices at the time of the interview with Ryski. Although Ryski

believed Coulter’s statements conflicted with his prior interview statements, Ryski observed

Coulter was coherent, logical, and not disoriented.

¶ 14   On January 28, 2010, police located Dana’s vehicle in Harvey, Illinois, and transported the

vehicle to the Park Forest Police Department. On March 23, 2010, Dana’s body was found in

Thornton, Illinois. Crime scene investigator William Wujek took photos of Dana’s body and

recovered a knife, shoes, basket, and a bed sheet lying next to Dana’s body. Chief medical

examiner Ponni Arunkumar reviewed Dana’s autopsy report. X-ray results revealed skull fractures

in Dana’s head, and an internal examination revealed hemorrhaging to various areas of her skull,

neck, and shoulders and bruising in the back of the skull. Dana’s skull fractures were consistent

with blunt force trauma, and her hemorrhages in the neck may have been due to strangulation. Dr.

Arunkumar opined Dana’s cause of death was multiple injuries due to an assault and the manner

of death was a homicide.

¶ 15   Sergeant Sean Grosvenor assisted in processing and searching Room 28 of the Star Lite

Motel. During his search, he noticed a red stain that looked like blood on a pillow which he sealed

in a bag and transported to the crime lab for testing. Officer Patrick Phillips executed a search

warrant at Coulter’s address and recovered mail addressed to Coulter, a pair of jeans, two white t-

shirts containing a red substance, and a sweatshirt. A green Chevy van was towed to the Park

Forest Police Department. Investigator Peter Watson processed a silver Kia Spectra and a green

Chevy Gladiator. Watson recovered a brown strand of hair from the trunk of the Kia that he sent

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No. 1-18-0864

to the crime lab for testing. In the van, Watson recovered an envelope with documents containing

Dana’s name, a Walgreens receipt dated January 23, 2010, with credit card number 7769, a credit

card receipts for the Star Lite Motel dated January 25, 2010, with credit card number 7769, and

cigarette butts. Investigator Rober Deel collected carpet standards from the van floorboard. Park

Forest Police Chief Pete Green went to Dana’s house. Green collected a used feminine napkin in

the bathroom garbage can and sent it to the crime lab for testing.

¶ 16   Forensic testing was conducted on the recovered items. The presence of blood was found

on the pillow standard recovered from Room 28, Coulter’s white t-shirt and jeans, and the feminine

napkin. A human female DNA profile identified on the pillow standard matched the DNA profile

on the feminine napkin blood sample. The DNA profile found on the pillow standard and feminine

napkin matched Dana’s DNA profile extracted from a dried blood standard. The blood stain on the

white t-shirts matched the profile extracted from Coulter’s buccal swab. A male DNA profile

identified on the cigarette butt matched Coulter’s DNA profile. Three stains found on Coulter’s

jeans revealed a male profile matching Coulter and a female profile matching Dana.

¶ 17   Sprint Nextel phone records showed Rosie Coulter was a registered subscriber for 708-

646-7561 in January 2010 and her mailing address was 14800 South Kenwood, Dolton, Illinois.

T-Mobile phone records showed Dana Hayes was a registered subscriber for 708-668-3422 in

January 2010. The phone records showed five outgoing calls from 708-668-3422 to 708-646-7561

on January 25, 2010. Chase Bank records showed Terrence Coulter was a Chase Visa credit card

holder in January 2010 with number ending in 7769. Coulter’s Visa showed a $35 transaction at

Star Lite Motel on January 25, 2010, and a $20 transaction at Roseland Marathon gas station in

Chicago on January 26, 2010.

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No. 1-18-0864

¶ 18   Coulter testified he dated Dana and was not responsible for Dana’s stabbing in November

2007. In January 2010, Coulter was at the Star Lite Motel by himself. Dana called him, showed up

to the motel, stayed for a minute, and then left. Coulter believed the attempted murder case would

be dismissed because Dana recanted but learned it was not dismissed when he went to court on

December 9, 2009.

¶ 19   Several witnesses testified regarding Coulter’s mental condition. Rosie lived with Coulter

in Dolton, Illinois. Rosie knew Dana because Dana and Coulter had been dating a long time. In

2007, she noticed that Coulter had become distant and was hearing voices. Rosie took Coulter to

Tinley Park Hospital where he was prescribed psychotropic medication. Rosie did not believe

Coulter was taking his medication in January 2010 and that his mental state was poor.

¶ 20   Shortly after the stabbing incident, Coulter went to Tinley Park hospital because he was

having “issues” and “hearing voices.” Coulter described the voices as “threatening” but not telling

him to hurt anyone. Coulter went to Ingalls hospital in 2008 because he wasn’t taking his

medication. Before his arrest in 2010, Coulter went to Ingalls hospital because he was experiencing

visual hallucinations and thought he had a chip in his head. Coulter stated that he was not hearing

voices at trial, he was testifying as himself, and he alone decided when to listen to the voices. He

acknowledged killing someone is wrong and that his delusions did not tell him to hurt anyone.

Coulter admitted that he had never been to the hospital prior to Dana’s stabbing. In January 2010,

Coulter was “having a hard time,” was not taking his medication, and was drinking alcohol.

¶ 21   Kanyaran Gerring was dating Coulter at the end of 2009 and 2010. Coulter never told her

that he was hearing voices or seeing paranormal visions. Tamika Rice testified she and Coulter

began a romantic relationship at the end of January 2010. Coulter never exhibited any strange

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No. 1-18-0864

behavior, and Tamika never suspected Coulter had any mental health issues. Lenn Thomas, Dana’s

nephew, stated Dana told him Coulter heard voices and the voices were telling him to kill Dana at

the time of the stabbing incident. Lenn had spent a significant amount of time over the years with

Coulter and never heard Coulter mumble or act strangely and Coulter never told Lenn that he heard

voices. Both Dr. Christopher Cooper and Dr. Alexis Mergias conducted a psychiatric evaluation

of Coulter. Dr. Cooper and Dr. Merigas concluded that Coulter was malingering and sane at the

time of the offense.

¶ 22   During closing arguments, the State argued that it proved beyond a reasonable doubt that

Coulter murdered Dana based on the testimony surrounding the Star Lite Motel and physical

evidence. The defense asserted the State failed to meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable

doubt that Coulter murdered Dana given the fact that Dana’s whereabouts were unknown after she

left Coulter’s motel room and the lack of evidence connecting Coulter to the murder.

¶ 23   Before jury deliberations, the court gave the jury several instructions including instructions

on finding Coulter not guilty by reason of insanity and guilty but mentally ill. The jury returned a

verdict of guilty on all counts. Coulter filed a motion for a new trial arguing, inter alia, that the

circuit court erred in allowing proof of other crimes evidence and Dana’s statements under the

doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing and that the prosecutor made improper remarks during

closing arguments. The court denied the motion. The circuit court sentenced Coulter to 52 years’

imprisonment. Coulter filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which the court denied. This appeal

follows.

¶ 24                                    II. JURISDICTION

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No. 1-18-0864

¶ 25   Coulter was sentenced on his first degree murder conviction on April 25, 2018. The same

day, Coulter filed a notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to article VI,

section 6 of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6) and Illinois Supreme Court

Rules 603 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013) and 606 (eff. Mar. 12, 2021).

¶ 26                                      III. ANALYSIS

¶ 27   On appeal, Coulter argues: (1) he was denied a fair trial when the State was allowed to

introduce extensive other crimes evidence; (2) his constitutional right to confrontation was violated

when the court admitted Dana’s hearsay statements under the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine;

and (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct when the prosecutor commented Coulter

would “walk free” if he was found guilty but mentally ill or not guilty by reason of insanity. We

review each issue respectively.

¶ 28                                A. Other Crimes Evidence

¶ 29   First, Coulter argues the volume and detail of other crimes evidence about Coulter’s

attempted murder charge constituted an impermissible mini-trial. Consequently, the prejudicial

effect of the other crimes evidence outweighed any probative value. The State argues the other

crimes evidence was properly admitted at trial and necessary to prove the specific charges in count

II of the indictment—that Coulter intended to prevent Dana from testifying against him. Moreover,

any error was cured by several limiting instructions on other crimes evidence advising the jury to

consider it for the limited purpose of Coulter’s intent and motive.

¶ 30   Generally, evidence of other crimes is inadmissible if relevant to establish the defendant’s

propensity to commit crime. People v. McKibbins, 96 Ill. 3d 176, 182 (1983). However, evidence

of the commission of other crimes is admissible to show modus operandi, intent, identity, motive,

                                               - 11 -
No. 1-18-0864

or absence of mistake. Id. Section 115-7.4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that

evidence of a defendant’s commission of other acts of domestic violence may be admitted in a

prosecution for first degree murder when the commission of the offense involves domestic

violence. See 725 ILCS 5/115-7.4 (West 2018); People v. Dabbs, 239 Ill. 2d 277, 291 (2010).

¶ 31    The evidence must be relevant and its probative value must not be substantially outweighed

by the risk of undue prejudice. People v. Torres, 2015 IL App (1st) 120807, ¶ 40 (citing Dabbs,

239 Ill. 2d at 291). “In weighing the probative value of the evidence against undue prejudice to the

defendant, the court may consider: (1) the proximity in time to the charged or predicated offense;

(2) the degree of factual similarity to the charged or predicated offense; or (3) other relevant facts

and circumstances.” 725 ILCS 5/115-7.4 (West 2018). “ ‘[U]ndue prejudice’ within the meaning

of section 115-7.4(b) necessarily is prejudice other than that resulting from proof of the defendant’s

propensity to commit domestic violence, because the very purpose of section 115-7.4 is to lift the

common-law ban on that particular kind of propensity evidence.” People v. Kelley, 2019 IL App

(4th) 160598, ¶ 77. When admitting other crimes evidence pursuant to section 115-7.4, the trial

court “must admit only so much evidence as is reasonably necessary to establish propensity.”

People v. Smith, 406 Ill. App. 3d 747, 756 (2010). We will not reverse the trial court’s decision to

admit other crimes evidence unless we find that the court abused its discretion. People v. Donoho,

204 Ill. 2d 159, 182 (2003). We will find an abuse of discretion if the trial court’s evaluation is

arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by

the trial court. Id.

¶ 32    Our supreme court has held, if other crimes evidence is admitted, it should not lead to a

mini-trial of the collateral offense; the court should carefully limit the details to what is necessary

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No. 1-18-0864

to illuminate the issue for which the other crime was introduced. People v. Bartall, 98 Ill. 2d 294,

315 (1983); People v. McKibbins, 96 Ill. 2d 176 (1983). This court has found other crimes evidence

constituted a mini-trial of the collateral offense where the evidence was unrelated to the offense at

issue, excessively detailed, and repetitive. People v. Nunley, 271 Ill. App. 3d 427 (1995) (finding

that other crimes evidence was excessively detailed and repetitive, unrelated to the crime at issue,

and “far more grotesque than that for which he was on trial”); People v. Brown, 319 Ill. App. 3d

89 (2001) (finding that other crimes evidence presented by 6 out of the 12 state witnesses was

repetitive and switched the focus of the trial to the prior crime).

¶ 33   By contrast, this court has found other crimes evidence did not result in a mini-trial of the

collateral offense where the evidence was brief, noncumulative, and relevant to the offense at issue.

See People v. Davis, 2019 IL App (1st) 160408, ¶ 67 (finding gun testimony did not result in a

mini-trial where the first witness’s testimony about the recovery was brief and basic, the second

witness’s testimony “merely established” chain of custody, and gun evidence was necessary to

prove an element of the offense); People v. Torres, 2015 IL App (1st) 120807, ¶ 47 (finding

victim’s testimony did not amount to a mini-trial where it was relevant to reveal the development

of the relationship between defendant and victim and mirrored the circumstances surrounding the

charged offenses).

¶ 34   Coulter argues that Dana’s hearsay statements that Coulter stabbed her, the testimony of

four witnesses detailing the events surrounding the stabbing—namely, ASA Sorich, Derrick, Van

Dyke, and Rice—and the State’s opening and closing arguments focused on the attempted murder

charge and constituted an impermissible mini-trial. However, considering the totality of the trial

evidence, the admission of the other crimes evidence did not constitute a mini-trial of the attempted

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No. 1-18-0864

murder charge. The other crimes evidence was relevant to show the relationship between Dana

and Coulter and Coulter’s motive and intent for committing the instant murder offense.

Furthermore, the other crimes evidence was not excessive. Derrick and Van Dyke’s testimony

regarding the stabbing were brief, and all four witnesses provided sufficient detail to give context

to the stabbing incident. Despite the other crimes evidence, the State presented testimony from

over 13 witnesses, numerous exhibits, and physical evidence solely related to the instant murder

offense. While witness testimony surrounding the attempted murder charge may appear repetitive

on the surface, such testimony was warranted where each witness gave different prospectives of

the same event to give context to the stabbing incident.

¶ 35   Furthermore, the other crimes evidence was not the focus of the State’s opening and closing

arguments. Most of the prosecutor’s argument pertained to the evidence surrounding the murder.

The prosecutor only referenced the other crimes evidence when addressing Coulter’s motive or

intent. During closing argument, the prosecutor stated to the jury, “ladies and gentlemen, you are

not here to decide whether or not this defendant stabbed Dana in 2007. You’re only to consider

that evidence to show that, that was his motive and his intent to kill her in 2010.”

¶ 36   We also note that the trial court provided limiting instruction on other crimes evidence and

on the fact that closing statements are not evidence and any statement or argument made by the

attorneys which is not based on the evidence should be disregarded. See People v. Illgen, 145 Ill.

2d 353, 376 (1991) (finding that a trial court’s instruction on other crimes evidence “limited and

substantially reduced any prejudicial effect created by the admission of the prior-offense

evidence”). Therefore, we find that the probative value of the other crimes evidence outweighed

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No. 1-18-0864

any prejudicial effect. Accordingly, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting

other crimes evidence at trial.

¶ 37                              B. Forfeiture By Wrongdoing Doctrine

¶ 38   Next, Coulter argues the circuit court erroneously admitted Dana’s hearsay statement under

the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine in violation of his constitutional right to confrontation.

Specifically, the State presented no evidence that Coulter intended to prevent Dana from testifying

by engaging in “witness tampering, or some type of conduct designed to prevent the witness from

testifying, thwart the judicial process, or procure the witness’s absence from trial.” The State

argues that it showed, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Coulter caused Dana’s absence by

murdering her to prevent her from testifying against him in the attempted murder case.

¶ 39   The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, in all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall have the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”

U.S. Const., amend. VI. However, under the common law doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing,

“one who obtains the absence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to

confrontation.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006). The doctrine was codified in the

Illinois Rules of Evidence in 2011. Ill. R. Evid. 804(b)(5). Rule 804(b)(5) provides an exception

to the hearsay rule for “[a] statement offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in

wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.”

Id.

¶ 40   The State’s burden of proof at a forfeiture by wrongdoing hearing is a preponderance of

the evidence. People v. Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 37. The preponderance standard is a less

stringent standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even the intermediate standard of clear

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No. 1-18-0864

and convincing evidence. Id. “Under the preponderance standard, the State need only present

evidence that renders a fact more likely than not.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. “Thus,

in a forfeiture hearing, the State must establish that defendant, more likely than not, ‘engaged or

acquiesced in wrongdoing’ and that such wrongdoing was ‘intended to, and did, procure the

unavailability of the declarant as a witness.” Id. Intent may be shown from conduct and the

surrounding circumstances. Id. ¶ 43. For forfeiture by wrongdoing to apply, the evidence must

show that the defendant engaged in witness tampering or some type of conduct designed to prevent

the witness from testifying, thwart the judicial process, or procure the witness’s absence from trial.

In re Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d 13, 40 (2008). We review a trial court’s decision to admit trial

evidence pursuant to the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine under the manifest weight of the

evidence standard. Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 39. “A finding is against the manifest weight of

the evidence where ‘the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding itself is

unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.’ ” Id.

¶ 41   The parties dispute whether the State proved Coulter’s intent by a preponderance of the

evidence. Our supreme court’s Peterson decision provides guidance. There, the defendant argued

that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce hearsay statements of the victim,

Kathleen, and defendant’s wife, Stacy, under the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine. Id. ¶¶ 11, 36.

At the forfeiture hearing, the State theorized defendant murdered Kathleen to prevent her from

testifying at a divorce hearing. Id. ¶ 45. The evidence revealed that defendant and Kathleen were

involved in a tumultuous divorce; two weeks before her death, Kathleen informed her sister to take

care of her children if anything happened to her; Kathleen would have testified at an upcoming

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No. 1-18-0864

divorce hearing; and defendant asked a friend if he knew anyone that could have defendant’s “third

wife taken care of.” Id. ¶¶ 45-48.

¶ 42   Moreover, the State theorized the defendant murdered Stacy to prevent her from reporting

defendant’s involvement in Kathleen’s murder or testifying at the divorce hearing. Id. ¶ 52. The

evidence revealed Stacy was planning to file for divorce; the defendant acknowledged their marital

difficulties and was concerned about the financial impact of a divorce; and Stacy was suspicious

of the defendant’s involvement in Kathleen’s death. Id. ¶¶ 70-75. The court found that the trial

court’s finding that the evidence was admissible under the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine was

not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. ¶¶ 51, 75. The court found that, although there

was no evidence of a specific intent to avoid testimony, the State was only required to prove that

the reason for procuring a witness’s unavailability was motivated “at least in part” by an intent to

prevent the witness from testifying. Id. ¶ 50. Thus, the Peterson court relied on evidence

surrounding the witnesses’ unavailability—the tumultuous divorce proceeding and the defendant’s

tumultuous relationships—in finding that the State established defendant’s intent.

¶ 43   Similarly, here, the State showed by a preponderance of the evidence that Coulter intended

to, and did, procure the unavailability of Dana as a witness based on the surrounding

circumstances. The facts presented at the forfeiture hearing revealed that, at the time of the

stabbing, Dana informed several people that Coulter was the person who stabbed her. Coulter was

later charged with attempted murder related to the stabbing incident. During the pendency of the

attempted murder case, Dana recanted her admission that Coulter was her assailant three times.

Two months before the case was set for trial, Dana stated that her recantations were not true and

that Coulter was her assailant but she was afraid. Dana ultimately agreed to testify against Coulter

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at trial. A few days before the commencement of the trial, Dana and Coulter were seen at the Star

Lite Motel. Dana and Coulter met in the motel’s parking lot and went into Coulter’s motel room.

Dana left Coulter’s room five minutes later and was not seen again until her death. Dana’s presence

at the motel was corroborated by physical evidence. Given Dana’s multiple admissions that

Coulter stabbed her in a prior incident, her statement to Corbin that she recanted her admission

because she was afraid, the pending attempted murder case, and Coulter and Dana’s meeting

shortly before her death, we find that the State proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

Coulter murdered Dana, at least in part, with the intent to prevent her from testifying at the

attempted murder trial. Accordingly, the circuit court’s finding that the hearsay statements were

admissible under the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine was not against the manifest weight of the

evidence.

¶ 44                            C. Improper Prosecutor Comments

¶ 45   Lastly, Coulter argues the prosecutor misstated the law and impermissibly discussed

punishment when he stated Coulter was “begging” the jury to “let me go” and “let me walk free

from this crime” during closing argument. The statement incorrectly implies that a guilty but

mentally ill (GBMI) verdict would be equivalent to an acquittal by allowing Coulter to “walk free”

or that Coulter would “walk free” if he was found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGBRI). The

State argues any error was cured by the circuit court sustaining defense’s objection and by the

additional instructions given to the jury.

¶ 46   Generally, the prosecution has wide latitude in making its closing argument. People v.

Nicholas, 218 Ill. 2d 104, 121 (2005). The prosecutor may comment on the evidence and any fair,

reasonable inferences from it, even if those inferences reflect negatively on the defendant. Id.

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However, a closing argument must serve a purpose beyond inflaming the emotions of the jury. Id.

“A closing argument must be viewed in its entirety, and the challenged remarks must be viewed

in their context.” Id. “A prosecutor’s comments in closing argument will result in reversible error

only when they engender ‘substantial prejudice’ against the defendant to the extent that it is

impossible to determine whether the verdict of the jury was caused by the comments or the

evidence.” People v. Macri, 185 Ill. 2d 1, 62 (1998). If the jury could have reached a contrary

verdict had the improper remarks not been made, or if this court cannot say that the State’s

improper remarks did not contribute to the defendant’s conviction, a new trial should be granted.

People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 123 (2007).

¶ 47   Illinois courts have acknowledged an apparent conflict between two Illinois Supreme Court

decisions on the appropriate standard of review to apply in this case. Compare People v. Blue, 189

Ill. 2d 99, 128 (2000) (applying an abuse of discretion standard), with People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill.

2d 92 (2007) (applying a de novo standard). More recently, this court held that no conflict existed

between Blue and Wheeler. People v. Cook, 2018 IL App (1st) 142134, ¶¶ 61-62. Rather, the

holdings in both cases establish that we apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the trial

court’s ruling on the propriety of the challenged remarks, and a de novo standard in reviewing

whether any misconduct was egregious enough to warrant a new trial. Id. However, regardless of

the applicable standard of review, we find the prosecutor’s comments do not warrant a new trial.

¶ 48   This court “prohibits prosecutorial comments which convey, implicitly or explicitly, that a

not guilty verdict by reason of insanity may result in a defendant’s release.” People v. Stacks, 244

Ill. App. 3d 166, 172 (citing People v. Wilson, 120 Ill. App. 3d 950 (1983)); People v. Singer, 256

Ill. App. 3d 258, 270 (1993) (“arguments that a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity

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will be released is a misstatement of the law”); People v. Alerte, 120 Ill. App. 3d 962, 972 (1983);

People v. Brown, 104 Ill. App. 3d 1110 (1982).

¶ 49    For instance, in Stacks, the defendant was on trial for murder. 244 Ill. App. 3d at 168.

During closing arguments, the prosecutor repeatedly stated that society would “have to live with”

the defendant if the jury allowed him to escape responsibility. Id. at 171. The court found the

prosecutor improperly commented on the consequences of a not guilty by reason of insanity

verdict. Id. The court reasoned the prosecutor’s comment “hammer[ed] home the idea that only

the jury’s guilty verdict stood between defendant being free to kill again and being incarcerated.

These types of comments could only play on an insanity jury’s inherent fear that their verdict might

set a dangerous man free.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 171-72.

¶ 50    Furthermore, our supreme court found a prosecutor’s comments about a verdict of GBMI

were improper given the particular circumstances. People v. Seuffer, 144 Ill. 2d 482, 516 (1991).

In Seuffer, the defendant was on trial for murder. Id. During closing arguments, the prosecutor

stated, “Let’s at least say he’s mentally ill so he can avoid some of the responsibility of his actions”

and “Guilty but mentally ill. That, ladies and gentlemen, is a compromise verdict to permit him to

escape his responsibility.” Id. The court found the remarks were improper because they “misstated

the legal significance of guilty but mentally ill.” Id.

¶ 51    In this case, the following dialogue took place during closing arguments:

                “[MR. LAGERWALL (ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY):] I want to address

        an issue right up-front, that there may be some of you sitting in this jury right now, sitting

        there wondering to yourself, are we supposed to figure out something, is there some issue

        we’re supposed to address or solve? And it may be natural to think that you just sat through

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No. 1-18-0864

       over a week and a couple of days of trial, and as you sat through that trial, you may be

       sitting there wondering, hmm, there’s got to be something we’re supposed to be figuring

       out, this cannot be as clear-cut as possible. It cannot be that obvious that, that guy sitting

       over there is guilty of first-degree murder and that, that guy sitting over there is faking it.

       Don’t worry, it’s clear as possible. It’s as clear as can be. His guilt could not be clearer.

       This defendant, the only issue with this defendant is, he’s faking that he’s mentally ill. He

       is begging you please, please, please, please let me go and let me walk free from this crime.

                MR. GRACE [(DEFENSE ATTORNEY)]: Objection, Judge.

                THE COURT: Sustained.

                Please disregard that.

                MR. LAGERWALL: He’s begging you to let him go from the first-degree murder

       charge. That’s what he’s begging you.”

¶ 52   By stating Coulter is “faking that he’s mentally ill” and begging the jury to “let [him] go

and let [him] walk free from this crime,” the prosecutor misstated the law on NGBRI and GBMI

verdicts. A defendant does not “walk free” if the jury renders either verdict. Section 5-2-4 of the

United Code of Corrections provides, if a defendant is found NGBRI, the court must order the

defendant to the Department of Human Services for an evaluation as to whether he needs mental

health services. 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4 (West 2022). The court must hold a hearing on the Department’s

evaluation report before any finding that the defendant does not need mental health services and

may be discharged from custody. Id. Furthermore, section 5-2-6(b) provides, “If the court imposes

a sentence of imprisonment upon a defendant who has been found guilty but mentally ill, the

defendant shall be committed to the Department of Corrections.” See also People v. Crews, 122

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Ill. 2d 266, 278 (1988) (“[a] GBMI offender is no less guilty than one who is guilty and not

mentally ill; unlike insanity, a GBMI finding or plea does not relieve an offender of criminal

responsibility for his conduct”). As in Stacks, the prosecutor’s comment emphasized the idea in

the jury’s mind that only a guilty verdict stood between defendant being free to commit another

crime and being incarcerated and placed an “inherent fear that their verdict might set a dangerous

man free.” See Stack, 244 Ill. App. 3d at 168. The effect of this misstatement of law is further

compounded by the fact that it negatively impacts the jury’s perception of two different verdicts

and was repeated after the trial court sustained the first objection.

¶ 53   Here, we find that the jury would not have reached a contrary verdict had the improper

comments not been made because the evidence overwhelmingly supports a finding that Coulter

did not suffer from a mental disease, defect, or illness. See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions,

Criminal, No. 24-25.01 (approved Jan. 27, 2023) (definition of insanity); Illinois Pattern Jury

Instructions, Criminal, No. 24-25.01(b) (approved Jan. 27, 2023) (guilty but mentally ill). Both

Kanyaran and Tamika, Coulter’s paramours, testified they were dating Coulter around the time of

the murder. Kanyaran testified Coulter never stated that he was hearing voices or seeing

paranormal visions. Tamika testified Coulter never exhibited strange behavior and Tamika never

suspected Coulter had any mental health issues. Lenn, Dana’s Nephew, testified he had spent a

significant amount of time over the years with Coulter and never heard Coulter mumble or act

strangely and Coulter never told Lenn that he heard voices. Derrick testified that he spent a lot of

time with Coulter and never noticed Coulter mumble, talk to himself, or act mentally unstable. Dr.

Cooper and Dr. Merigas testified they conducted a psychiatric evaluation of Coulter and concluded

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No. 1-18-0864

that he was malingering and sane at the time of the offense. Thus, the prosecutor’s comments are

not so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial.

¶ 54    Indeed, this court previously held error was not so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial in

cases where the prosecutor’s improper comments were similar to or more inflammatory than in

this case. Alerte, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 972-73 (finding that prosecutor’s improper comment the

defendant would “skate,” “get a slap on the wrist,” or “walk out of this courtroom and *** scoff

at all of us” if found NGBRI did not warrant a new trial); People v. Brown, 104 Ill. App. 3d 1110,

1120-21 (1982) (finding prosecutor’s improper comments that after the defendant had one “break

with reality,” “he is not responsible for what he did, and let’s send him back out in the community”

was not reversible error); Seuffer, 144 Ill. 2d at 516 (finding prosecutor’s remarks about GBMI

verdict were cured when judge sustained the defense objection).

¶ 55    We also note that the nature of the prosecutor’s comment was not a direct attack on the

NGBRI and GBMI verdicts, but at most, an inference that Coulter would “go free” if any other

verdict was rendered. See Alerte, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 972 (“Since the prosecutors did not directly

call upon the jury to convict defendant even though it might believe defendant insane, we do not

believe that the comments here constituted the type of violation which requires a new trial.”).

Therefore, we find that the prosecutor’s improper comments were not so prejudicial as to warrant

a new trial.

¶ 56                                    IV. CONCLUSION

¶ 57    We find the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the other crimes evidence

at trial, and the court’s finding that the Dana’s hearsay statements were admissible under the

forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We also

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find the prosecutor’s improper comments were not so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial.

Accordingly, we affirm Coulter’s conviction and sentence.

¶ 58   Affirmed.

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