Court Opinion

ID: 9755155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:28:20.405684+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:03.765267
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Nix:
I am constrained to respond to the dissent of Mr. Justice Roberts which suggests that the result reached by the majority today “effectively renders inoperative a mandatory constitutional provision.” In view of the prior decisions of this Court on this subject, this criticism is completely unfounded and unwarranted.
To argue that today’s result vests within the Governor “the power to whimsically and continually circumvent the constitutional requirement of Senate advice and consent” is to ignore that this Court as early as 1918 allowed the recess appointive power to be used to fill a vacancy first happening while the Senate was in session. Commonwealth ex rel. Lafean v. Snyder, 261 Pa. 57, 104 A. 494 (1918). The circumvention of Senate approval of which the dissent now complains was fully accomplished when the Lafean Court rendered the Senate’s power of dissent impotent. I fail to comprehend the distinction the dissent now urges that we accept. In Lafean this Court held that Senate rejection of a nominee would not preclude the appointment under the recess power to the very office for which he had been re*186jected. That opinion clearly expressed its refusal to find an intention in the language of the 1874 section of the dominance of appointment by advice and consent tbat would justify a restriction upon tbe recess appointment by implication. More recently this Court in an alternative holding in Ritenour v. Peirce, 442 Pa. 1, 272 A. 2d 900 (1971), reviewing tbe present Art. IV, Sec. 8 found tbat Lafean was still applicable and held tbat tbe failure of tbe Senate to act would not restrict in any way tbe power to make recess appointments.
I find it now difficult to understand bow we can be urged to find an implied limitation upon tbe exercise of recess appointments where there has been a failure to submit a nominee because of tbe need to preserve Senate confirmation. What are we being now asked to preserve? How is tbe quality of government being served by requiring tbe charade of seeking Senate approval and yet concluding tbat unless there is concurrence tbe Senate’s deliberations may not diminish tbe recess appointive power an iota. The eulogy has been offered at tbe wrong funeral; tbe virtues of Senate confirmation should have been expounded for tbe benefit of tbe Lafean Court.
If we were faced with only a reconsideration of tbe earlier judicial interpretation of this constitutional provision, I would have grave difficulty in reaching tbe result of tbe Lafean Court and those cases which followed. But it must be remembered tbat our task is not tbe reassessment of prior judicial interpretations but rather an interpretation of tbe will of tbe people of this Commonwealth as expressed in tbe 1967 Amendment to tbe Constitution of this State. In searching for tbe true intent of tbe document tbe Court’s theory of government must be subservient to tbe expressed will of tbe people. Tbe prior interpretation of tbe former 1874 section and tbe adoption of the present section without significant change, forces tbe conclusion tbat *187the intention was to construe the section in accordance with the principles announced by Lafean* To attempt now to ignore this public mandate would be judicial over-reaching of the most offensive nature.
In light of the history of Art. IV, Sec. 8, the intention to create two separate and distinct powers in my judgment is beyond question. That one of these powers imposes a mandatory duty does not necessitate the conclusion that non-compliance must result in a withdrawal of the discretionary power. This was not an action to challenge the Governor for failure to perform a mandated duty but rather to test the title to office. For the reasons I have stated the alleged failure to perforin the mandated duty, even if established, would not affect the power of recess appointment.**

 As pointed out in the majority opinion the only changes in the language from the former provision strengthen the Lafean view.

 I am in complete accord with the result and reasoning of the majority opinion on the question of standing to maintain an action in quo warranto and the length of the term of the appointment.