Court Opinion

ID: 9893868
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-30 19:05:41.505135+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:45.885397
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/30/23
                 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                           DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,                               2d Crim. No. B324567
                                        (Super. Ct. No. CR28216)
     Plaintiff and Respondent,              (Ventura County)

v.

VINCENT MEDRANO,

     Defendant and Appellant.

       Vincent Medrano again appeals an order denying his Penal
Code section 1172.6 petition for resentencing. 1 The order was
made at the prima facie stage of the proceedings. This is his
second petition for resentencing.
       In 1991 appellant was convicted of two counts of first
degree murder with a multiple-death special-circumstances
finding (§§ 187, 189, 190.2, subd. (a)(3)), two counts of attempted
first degree murder (§§ 664/187, 189), and one count of conspiracy
to commit first degree murder (§ 182). The jury found true
allegations that a principal in the commission of the offenses had
been armed with a firearm. (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1).) Appellant

        1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
was sentenced to prison for 50 years to life plus one year for a
firearm enhancement. In 1994 we affirmed the judgment in an
unpublished opinion, People v. Medrano (Jul. 26, 1994, B065832).
        In 2019 appellant filed his first section 1172.6 petition.
After issuing an order to show cause, the trial court conducted an
evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d).
The trial court denied the petition, and we affirmed in People v.
Medrano (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 177, hereafter referred to as
“Medrano” or “our 2021 opinion.” We held “that section [1172.6]
relief is unavailable to a petitioner [such as appellant]
concurrently convicted of first degree murder and conspiracy to
commit first degree murder where both convictions involve the
same victim” because the “[c]onviction of conspiracy to commit
first degree murder shows, as a matter of law, that the ‘target
offense’ is murder . . . .” (Id. at p. 179.)
       In the present appeal we conclude that the above holding is
the law of the case and conclusively establishes at the prima facie
stage that appellant is not entitled to resentencing based on his
second 1172.6 petition. Accordingly, we again affirm.
       Our conclusion may be at variance with the holding of
People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 50 (Harden): “[P]rior
to [an evidentiary] hearing under section [1172.6], subdivision
(d)(3), the law-of-the-case doctrine cannot conclusively establish
disentitlement [to relief under section 1172.6].” We explain below
why the holding of Harden is inapplicable here.
                                   Facts
       The following facts are taken verbatim from Medrano,
supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 179: Appellant and Carlos Vargas
purchased a .22 caliber semi-automatic rifle. Appellant “scored”
the “tip” of the rifle’s bullets in the belief that “the scoring would

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make the bullets more explosive.” As overt act No. 7 underlying
the conspiracy charge, the jury found that appellant, Vargas,
Edward Throop, and Joseph Scholle “discussed among
themselves committing a drive-by shooting.” Vargas drove them
to Cabrillo Village in Ventura County. “Throop held the rifle and
sat in the back seat next to appellant.” Throop pointed the rifle
out the window and fired multiple shots at a group of people
attending a baptism party. As Vargas drove away, Scholle
shouted the names of rival gangs. Two men attending the
baptism party died of gunshot wounds. Two other men were shot
but survived.
                        Our 2021 Medrano Opinion
       In our 2021 opinion we concluded: “The prosecutor met his
burden [at the evidentiary hearing] of proving, ‘beyond a
reasonable doubt, that [appellant] is ineligible for resentencing.’
(§ [1172.6], subd. (d)(3).) Appellant’s conviction of conspiracy to
commit first degree murder rendered him ineligible as a matter
of law. The conviction established that he had not been
‘convicted of . . . [first degree] murder under a natural and
probable consequences theory.’ (§ [1172.6], subd. (a).) He was
convicted of first degree murder under a direct aiding and
abetting theory, i.e., he knew and shared the murderous intent of
the actual perpetrator, Throop.” (Medrano, supra, 68
Cal.App.5th at p. 186.)
              Section 1172.6 and Its Legislative History
       Section 1172.6 was added to the Penal Code by Senate Bill
No. 1437 and became effective on January 1, 2019. (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, § 4.) Section 1172.6, subdivision (a) originally provided,
“A person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural
and probable consequences theory may file a petition with the

                                 3
court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s
murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any
remaining counts when” certain conditions apply.
       Effective January 1, 2022, section 1172.6 was amended by
Senate Bill No. 775 (S.B. 775). (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.) S.B.
775 added the following ground for relief to section 1172.6,
subdivision (a): the petitioner’s murder conviction was pursuant
to a “theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” S.B. 775 also
amended section 1172.6, subdivision (a) to expand eligibility for
resentencing to persons convicted of “attempted murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine.”
       After a section 1172.6 petition is filed, “the court shall hold
a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima
facie case for relief. If the petitioner makes a prima facie
showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall
issue an order to show cause.” (Id., subd. (c).)
       If an order to show cause is issued, the court shall conduct
an evidentiary hearing to determine the petitioner’s eligibility for
relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).) At the evidentiary hearing, the
burden is on the People “to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder . . . .”
(Id., subd. (d)(3).)
         Guidelines for Conducting the Prima Facie Hearing
       “While the trial court may look at the record of
conviction . . . to determine whether a petitioner has made a
prima facie case for section [1172.6] relief, the prima facie inquiry
under subdivision (c) is limited. Like the analogous prima facie
inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings, ‘“the court takes
petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary

                                  4
assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to
relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court
must issue an order to show cause.”’” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11
Cal.5th 952, 971 (Lewis).)
       “Appellate opinions . . . are generally considered to be part
of the record of conviction. [Citation.] However, . . . the probative
value of an appellate opinion is case-specific, and ‘it is certainly
correct that an appellate opinion might not supply all answers.’”
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.)
       “In sum, the parties can, and should, use the record of
conviction to aid the trial court in reliably assessing whether a
petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief under [section
1172.6], subdivision (c).” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972, fn.
omitted.) “The record of conviction will necessarily inform the
trial court's prima facie inquiry under section [1172.6], allowing
the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those
that are clearly meritless.” (Id. at p. 971.)
                  The Second Section 1172.6 Petition
       Appellant filed this second section 1172.6 petition after the
effective date of the amendment of that section by S.B. 775. In
the trial court he asserted, “This petition is based on S.B. 775,
which amended section 1172.6, subdivision (a) to include [as
grounds for relief], in addition to felony-murder or murder under
the [natural and probable consequences] doctrine, any ‘other
theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on
that person’s participation in a crime.’” Appellant argued that he
had made a prima facie showing that he was convicted of murder
pursuant to a theory under which malice had been imputed to
him based solely on his participation in the drive-by shootings.
In addition, he argued that he had made a prima facie showing

                                  5
that he was convicted of both murder and attempted murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Relying
on Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th 45, appellant contended the
law of the case doctrine was inapplicable at the prima facie stage
of a section 1172.6 proceeding.
        The People’s Opposition and the Trial Court’s Ruling
       In opposition to appellant’s second section 1172.6 petition,
the People argued that our holding in Medrano, supra, 68
Cal.App.5th 177, is the law of the case. In denying the second
petition, the trial court explained, “[B]ased on the reasoning o[f]
the appellate opinion, specifically with regards to the conviction
for conspiracy, I will find that the petition is barred, as a matter
of law.”
                     The Law of the Case Doctrine
       “‘“The doctrine of the law of the case is this: That where,
upon an appeal, the [reviewing] court, in deciding the appeal,
states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the
decision, that principle or rule becomes the law of the case and
must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in
the lower court and upon subsequent appeal, and . . . in any
subsequent suit for the same cause of action . . . .”’ The principle
applies to criminal as well as civil matters [citations] . . . .”
(People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 786.) “We will apply the
law of the case doctrine where the point of law involved . . . was
 ‘“actually presented and determined by the court.”’” (People v.
Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 197.) But “the doctrine will not be
adhered to where its application will result in an unjust decision,
e.g., where there has been a ‘manifest misapplication of existing
principles resulting in substantial injustice’ [citation], or the
controlling rules of law have been altered or clarified by a

                                 6
decision or [statutory amendment] intervening between the first
and second appellate determinations [citation].’” (Stanley, supra,
at p. 787.)
           Applicability of the Law of the Case Doctrine at
       the Prima Facie Stage of a Section 1172.6 Proceeding
       Appellant claims the law of the case doctrine is inapplicable
at the prima facie stage of a section 1172.6 proceeding. He relies
on Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th 45. There, the Court of Appeal
held: “At the prima facie stage of an [1172.6] proceeding, it is of
course impossible to know what the evidence will ultimately be at
an evidentiary hearing that has not yet occurred. We thus agree
with Harden that prior to a hearing under section [1172.6],
subdivision (d)(3), the law-of-the-case doctrine cannot
conclusively establish disentitlement [to relief under section
1172.6].” (Id. at p. 50.
       The Court of Appeal credited Harden’s argument, which
was as follows: “[The] law of the case [doctrine] cannot be invoked
where there is a ‘“substantial difference in the evidence”’ on
retrial of the particular issue. [Citation.] . . . [I]f at [an
evidentiary] hearing under subdivision (d) of section [1172.6], the
evidence material to [Harden’s] role in the murder were
substantially the same [as the evidence in Harden’s 2001 trial],
then law-of-the-case principles would compel the same legal
conclusion to be drawn, i.e., that she was the actual killer. But if
the evidence were materially different on that issue, . . . [the] law
of the case [doctrine] would not apply. This is because law of the
case ‘controls the outcome on retrial only to the extent the
evidence is substantially the same.’ [Citation.] Where ‘“there is a
substantial difference in the evidence to which the [announced]
principle of law is applied, . . . the [doctrine] may not be

                                 7
invoked.”’” (Harden, supra, at p. 50; see People v. Boyer (2006) 38
Cal.4th 412, 442 [“the law-of-the-case doctrine governs only the
principles of law laid down by an appellate court, as applicable to
a retrial of fact, and it controls the outcome on retrial only to the
extent the evidence is substantially the same. [Citation.] The
doctrine does not limit the new evidence a party may introduce
on retrial”].)
       Appellant asserts, “Harden precludes the court from
invoking the law of the case doctrine at the prima facie stage
because it is unclear what the evidence will be at an evidentiary
hearing that has yet to occur. [Appellant] may present evidence
at the evidentiary hearing that contradicts [this court’s]
conclusion [in our 2021 opinion] that [he] harbored an intent to
kill.”
       The holding in Harden should be limited to prohibiting
application of the law of the case doctrine at a prima facie
hearing where the appellate court’s prior determination
concerned the sufficiency of the evidence at the petitioner’s trial.
The issue in Harden was whether the doctrine should apply to
the Court of Appeal’s determination in an earlier opinion (People
v. Harden (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 848) that “there was
insufficient evidence [at the trial] to sustain a finding that
Harden’s role was anything other than that of [the] actual killer.”
(Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 50.) At an evidentiary
hearing conducted pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d),
Harden would have had the opportunity to introduce new
evidence showing that she was not the actual killer. Therefore,
the sufficiency of the evidence determination in the earlier
opinion in Harden could not be the law of the case at the prima
facie stage of Harden’s section 1172.6 petition.

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       Unlike Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th 45, in Medrano,
supra, 68 Cal.App.5th 177, we were not concerned with an
appellate court’s prior determination of the sufficiency of the
evidence at appellant’s trial. Instead, we were concerned with
the effect of the jury’s finding that appellant was guilty of both
first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree
murder. We enunciated the following principle of law: “[S]ection
[1172.6] relief is unavailable to a petitioner concurrently
convicted of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first
degree murder where both convictions involve the same victim”
because the “[c]onviction of conspiracy to commit first degree
murder shows, as a matter of law, that the ‘target offense’ is
murder . . . .” (Id. at p. 179.) This principle of law necessarily
applies where, as here, the petitioner has also been concurrently
convicted of attempted first degree murder and conspiracy to
commit first degree murder and both convictions involve the
same victim.
       At a section 1172.6, subdivision (d) evidentiary hearing,
appellant could not introduce new evidence that would affect the
validity of the principle of law enunciated in our 2021 Medrano
opinion. This is the key distinction between Medrano and
Harden. Unlike appellant, the petitioner in Harden theoretically
could have introduced new evidence to controvert the appellate
court’s prior determination that, based on the evidence
introduced at trial, she must have been the actual killer. Thus,
in contrast to Harden, the principle of law enunciated in our 2021
opinion is the law of the case.
       This principle of law was not altered by S.B. 775’s
amendment of section 1172.6, subdivision (a) to expand eligibility
to persons convicted of murder pursuant to a “theory under which

                                9
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime.” (Ibid., italics added.) A person cannot
be convicted of conspiracy to commit first degree murder based on
such “imputed” malice. We noted in Medrano, supra, 68
Cal.App.5th at p. 184: “According to an instruction given before
the jury started its deliberations (CALJIC No. 6.10), it could
convict appellant of conspiracy to commit first degree murder
only if it found he had acted ‘with the specific intent to agree to
commit the public offense of first degree murder and with the
further specific intent to commit such offense.’ In view of this
instruction, the conspiracy conviction shows that the jury found
appellant had specifically intended to commit first degree
murder.” Appellant cannot relitigate this issue. “[A] section
[1172.6] petition is not a means by which a [petitioner] can
relitigate issues already decided.” (People v. Coley (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 539, 549.)
       As to the requisite intent for conspiracy to commit first
degree murder, the CALJIC instruction given to the jury at
appellant’s trial is consistent with current CALCRIM No. 563,
which requires the People to prove that the defendant,
personally, intended to kill the victim. Each charge and
conviction for a separate count stands or falls on its own. (People
v. Pahl (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1651, 1657.) Thus, even if there
were some instructional error as to the murder and attempted
murder counts, it could not be used to impeach the jury’s finding
of intent to kill as to the conspiracy count. This finding is as true
today as it was in 1991 when the jury returned its guilty verdicts.

                                 10
         Appellant’s Claim that Law of the Case Doctrine Does
             Not Apply Because Our 2021 Medrano Opinion
               Conflicts with Our Earlier Medrano Opinion
        Appellant argues, “[T]he law of the case doctrine should not
apply at all in this case [because we] rendered two irreconcilable
opinions on the issue of whether the jury found that [he had]
harbored the specific intent to kill.” The two opinions – our 2021
opinion and the earlier opinion – are not in conflict. In our 2021
opinion we rejected appellant’s similar contention. We noted that
in our earlier opinion “[w]e did not consider whether, by
convicting appellant of conspiracy to commit first degree murder,
the jury necessarily found that he had harbored the specific
intent to kill.” (Medrano, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 186.)
               Application of the Law of the Case Doctrine
                  Will Not Result in an Unjust Decision
        Appellant has not shown that, by applying the law of the
case doctrine, we would be shutting our eyes to a manifest
misapplication of existing principles resulting in substantial
injustice. As our Supreme Court observed: “‘[A]ll conspiracy to
commit murder is necessarily conspiracy to commit premeditated
and deliberated first degree murder.’” (People v. Beck & Cruz
(2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 641-642.) “[A] conviction of conspiracy to
commit murder requires a finding of intent to
kill . . . .” (People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 607.)
                               Disposition
        The order denying appellant’s second section 1172.6
petition for resentencing is affirmed.

                                11
     CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

                                   YEGAN, J.
We concur:

             GILBERT, P. J.

             BALTODANO, J.

                              12
                   Michele M. Castillo, Judge

               Superior Court County of Ventura

                ______________________________

      Claudia Y. Bautista, Public Defender, William Quest, Snr.
Deputy Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, Allison H. Chung, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.