Court Opinion

ID: 9390849
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 19:02:37.365575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:37.518560
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/28/23 P. v. Martinez CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,                                                    B322154

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                             Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No.
         v.                                                    VA066428-02

JONATHAN PETER MARTINEZ,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Lee W. Tsao, Judge. Affirmed.

      Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.

         No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                     _________________________
       This is Jonathan Peter Martinez’s third appeal in this case.
The first was a direct appeal from his convictions for the first
degree murders of two victims. We affirmed the convictions.
(People v. Martinez (Mar. 29, 2004, B164263) [nonpub. opn.]
(Martinez I).) The second was Martinez’s appeal from the
superior court’s 2019 order denying his petition for resentencing
under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 We affirmed that order in
2021. (People v. Martinez (Sept. 22, 2021, B301347) [nonpub.
opn.] (Martinez II).) This third and current appeal is from the
superior court’s 2022 order denying Martinez’s second petition
for resentencing under section 1172.6. Again, we affirm.
                             BACKGROUND
       As the facts of Martinez’s crimes are largely irrelevant
to our analysis, we summarize them only briefly.2
       On the evening of July 22, 2001, a woman who was in
her backyard in Downey heard two gunshots. She peered into
the alley behind her yard and saw two men “ ‘casually’ ” walking

1     References to statutes are to the Penal Code. Effective
June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered former section
1170.95 to section 1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10.)
2      We previously granted Martinez’s “motion to incorporate
the record” in Martinez II, including “the prior pleadings and jury
instructions.” In Martinez II, we granted Martinez’s request that
we take judicial notice of “the entire record[ ]” in his direct appeal
and the related habeas proceeding. As the truth of the facts
of the crimes recited in Martinez I are not necessary for our
resolution of this appeal, we summarize them only for the basis
of Martinez’s convictions. (See People v. Woodell (1998) 17
Cal.4th 448, 459-460.)

                                  2
away from a two-door car stopped in the alley. She called the
police. A responding officer found the bodies of Rudy Estrada
and his wife or girlfriend Gabrielle Almaraz in the driver’s and
front passenger seats of the car. Each victim had been shot once
in the head at the left ear. Estrada had been shot at point blank
range, with the gun’s muzzle touching his skin, and Almaraz had
been shot from a distance of less than three feet. (Martinez I.)
       Martinez’s palm print and fingerprint were found on
the outside of the car. Police also found a fingerprint belonging
to Jacob Crespin. After speaking with Crespin, authorities
identified Martinez as a suspect. Police arrested Martinez,
who at first “denied knowing anything about the killings.”
Eventually, Martinez told detectives he, Crespin, and Estrada
“were friends and ‘home boys.’ ” Martinez claimed Crespin
shot the victims without warning. Martinez admitted having
“handled the gun earlier in the day,” but he denied having
“provided” it to Crespin. Martinez told the detectives he and
Crespin were both in the back seat and he “pushed the seat
in front of him forward,” got out, and ran. Forensic evidence
presented at trial contradicted Martinez’s account. (Martinez I.)
       The People charged Martinez and Crespin with two counts
of murder. The information alleged Crespin personally used and
discharged a firearm. Martinez’s motion to sever his trial from
Crespin’s was granted. Crespin was tried first and acquitted
of both murders. In Martinez’s trial the jury convicted him of
two counts of first degree murder. The trial court sentenced
Martinez to 50 years to life in prison. (Martinez I.)
       The trial court instructed Martinez’s jury on direct aiding
and abetting (CALJIC Nos. 3.00 and 3.01) and first and second
degree murder (CALJIC Nos. 8.00, 8.10, 8.20, and 8.30). The

                                3
court’s murder instructions also included the definition of
“malice aforethought” (CALJIC No. 8.11). The court did not
instruct the jury on the felony-murder rule or the natural
and probable consequences doctrine. (Martinez II.)
       In March 2004, another panel of this court affirmed
Martinez’s convictions and denied his related petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. (Martinez I.)
       Some 15 years later, on June 17, 2019, Martinez filed
a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6, using a
preprinted form. The court appointed counsel for Martinez
(Deputy Alternate Public Defender Jeffrey C. Kelley), the
prosecution filed a response to the petition, and Martinez filed
a reply. In his reply and at the hearing, Martinez’s counsel
argued that, by checking “ ‘all of the appropriate boxes’ ” on the
form, Martinez had made “ ‘a sufficient showing of a prima facie
case in order for the court to issue an order to show cause.’ ”
(Martinez II.)
       The superior court denied Martinez’s petition. The court
noted Martinez’s jury had not been instructed on either felony
murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
nor did the People “ ‘proceed on those theories.’ ” In a later-
issued minute order, the court stated it had relied on Martinez’s
petition and reply, the prosecution’s response and exhibits,
the jury instructions, the verdict forms, the preliminary hearing
transcript, and the court of appeal opinion on direct appeal
in ruling on the petition. As we noted, we affirmed the court’s
order. (Martinez II.)
       On April 6, 2022, Martinez filed a second petition for
resentencing. On a preprinted form, Martinez checked boxes
stating the prosecution had filed an information against him that

                                4
allowed it “to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other
theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on
[his] participation in a crime”; he had been convicted of murder
“following a trial”; and he “could not presently be convicted of
murder . . . because of changes made to Penal Code §§ 188 and
189.”3 Martinez requested the appointment of counsel.
       The court reappointed the same attorney who had
represented Martinez in the 2019 proceedings. On July 12, 2022,
the prosecution filed an opposition to Martinez’s petition. The
prosecution argued, “[W]ithout getting into the factual content
supporting the conviction, a review of the jury instructions and
verdicts establishes that the jury found beyond a reasonable
doubt that petitioner Martinez acted with express malice for
purposes of both first-degree murder convictions. The jury
was instructed that the crime of first-degree murder required
a joint operation of act and intent, and that ‘the crime of murder
in the first degree requires the specific intent to kill.’ ” The
prosecutor submitted a disk labeled, “Reporter’s Transcript
on Appeal; COA opinions; Clerk’s Transcript.”4 Martinez’s
counsel did not file a reply to the opposition.
       Counsel appeared before the court on July 12, 2022.
Martinez was not present. His attorney stated, “He is in state
custody.” The court noted it “did issue a tentative.”5 Martinez’s

3    The “I ____ declare” line on the petition was left blank but
Martinez signed the petition on the second page.
4     The record on appeal does not include the disk.
5     The record on appeal does not include the tentative.

                                5
counsel replied, “Yes, Your Honor. I will submit on the reply
as filed, as it related to the original petition, because the issues
are identical as to why I believe a prima facie case has been
established.”6
       The court said, “I would be inclined to adopt the court’s
tentative, which indicates that Mr. Martinez remains ineligible
for relief, notwithstanding the amendments under SB 775.”
The court asked, “Anything else by either side?” Both attorneys
replied, “No, Your Honor.” The court then stated, “So over the
defense objection, the petition under 117[2.6] is summarily
denied. The court does not find a prima facie case; does not order
an order to show cause or an evidentiary hearing for the reasons
stated in the tentative.” The court asked Martinez’s counsel
if he would notify his client; counsel said he would and noted
he would file a notice of appeal on his behalf.
       Martinez appealed and we appointed counsel to represent
him. After examining “the entire record on appeal,” counsel filed
an opening brief stating she had “not found any arguable issues
to raise on appeal” and asking this court to “follow the procedures
set forth in People v. Serrano (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 496.”
Counsel stated she had written to Martinez “and explained [her]
evaluation of the record on appeal and [her] intention to file this
pleading.” Counsel said she had sent Martinez “the transcripts of
the record on appeal,” as well as a copy of her brief, and informed

6      As appellate counsel notes, Martinez’s attorney was
referring to the reply brief he had filed in the 2019 proceedings.
He told the court, “I did review [the prosecutor’s] supplemental
opposition today, and again, I will still submit on the original
reply I filed as to the original petition.”

                                 6
Martinez of his right to file a supplemental brief. We have not
received a supplemental brief from Martinez.
                                 DISCUSSION
        Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
1437) took effect on January 1, 2019. (See Stats. 2018, ch. 1015,
§ 4.) The legislation substantially modified the law governing
accomplice liability for murder. It eliminated the natural and
probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant
guilty of murder (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843
(Gentile)) and significantly narrowed the felony-murder exception
to the malice requirement for murder (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189,
subd. (e); see People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708;
People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).)
        Senate Bill 1437 also authorized—through new section
1172.6—an individual convicted of felony murder or murder
based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine to
petition the sentencing court to vacate the conviction if he could
not have been convicted of murder because of the legislation’s
changes to the definition of the crime. (See Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 959-960; Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843.)
Senate Bill No. 775, effective January 1, 2022, expanded the
group of eligible petitioners to those convicted of murder “under
any theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” (Stats. 2021,
ch. 551.)
        If the petitioner files a “facially sufficient” petition, he
is entitled to the appointment of counsel, if requested. (Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 970.) The court must direct the prosecutor
to file a response to the petition, permit the petitioner to file a
reply, and determine if the petitioner has made a prima facie case

                                 7
showing he is entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); see Lewis,
at pp. 959-960.)
       In determining whether the petitioner has carried his
burden of making the requisite prima facie showing, the superior
court properly examines the record of conviction, “allowing the
court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those
that are clearly meritless.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)
However, “the prima facie inquiry under [section 1172.6,]
subdivision (c) is limited. Like the analogous prima facie inquiry
in habeas corpus proceedings, ‘ “the court takes petitioner’s
factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment
regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if
his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court must
issue an order to show cause.” ’[7] . . . ‘However, if the record,
including the court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting
the allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is
justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the
petitioner.” ’ ” (Ibid.; see People v. Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th
666, 675.)
       We independently review a trial court’s determination of
whether a petitioner has made a prima facie showing. (People v.
Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)
       While this appeal was pending, our Supreme Court decided
People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo). The
high court held that, because an appeal from the denial of a
section 1172.6 petition does not implicate a constitutional right

7     The court then holds an evidentiary hearing at which
the prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (d)(3).)

                                 8
to counsel, the protections afforded by People v. Wende (1979)
25 Cal.3d 436, 441 (Wende)—including an independent review
of the record by courts of appeal—do not apply. (Delgadillo,
at pp. 230-231.) The court, however, invoked its inherent
supervisory powers to prescribe a basic procedural framework
for use in section 1172.6 no-issues appeals, leaving it to the
appellate courts to develop and tailor additional procedures
as they see fit. (Delgadillo, at pp. 231-232.)
       Under the Delgadillo framework, once appointed appellate
counsel files a brief stating she has been unable to find any
arguable issue, the appellate court should send a copy of it to
the defendant along with a notice informing him of the right to
file a supplemental brief or letter, and that if he does not do so,
the court may dismiss the appeal. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at pp. 231-232.)
       Here, after we received counsel’s Serrano brief, we issued
an order directing counsel to send the record and a copy of her
brief to Martinez. Our order stated, “Within 30 days of the
date of this notice, appellant may submit a supplemental brief
or letter stating any grounds for an appeal, or contentions,
or arguments that appellant wishes this court to consider.”
However, our letter did not tell Martinez that, if he did not file
a supplemental brief, we could deem his appeal abandoned and
dismiss it. Accordingly, we exercise our discretion to undertake
a review of the entire record under Wende.
       The court in Martinez’s trial instructed the jury on
first and second degree murder and direct aiding and abetting.
The court told the jury, “The crime of murder in the first degree
requires the specific intent to kill.” (CALJIC No. 3.31.) The court
instructed the jurors that murder requires malice aforethought,

                                 9
and it defined express and implied malice. (CALJIC Nos. 8.10,
8.11.) The court told the jury, “[A]ny kind of willful, deliberate
and premeditated killing with express malice aforethought is
murder of the first degree.” (CALJIC No. 8.20.) “If you find that
the killing was preceded and accompanied by a clear, deliberate
intent on the part of the defendant to kill, which was the result
of deliberation and premeditation, so that it must have been
formed upon pre-existing reflection and not under a sudden heat
of passion or other condition precluding the idea of deliberation,
it is murder of the first degree.” (Ibid.) The court did not
instruct the jury on felony murder or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. Nor did the court instruct the jury with
any instruction that could have permitted jurors to convict
Martinez on a theory under which malice could have been
imputed to him based solely on his participation in the crimes.
       In convicting Martinez of the first degree murders of both
Estrada and Almaraz, the jury necessarily found Martinez was
either the actual killer or an aider and abettor who acted with
intent to kill. (People v. Estrada (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941,
945-946.) Accordingly, he is ineligible for resentencing. (Id. at
pp. 943-946 [affirming summary denial of petition]; see Gentile,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 848 [Senate Bill 1437 does not eliminate
direct aiding and abetting liability for murder because a direct
aider and abettor must possess malice aforethought]; cf. People
v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947, 952 [jury’s verdict
and finding on special circumstance means it necessarily found
defendant acted with intent to kill, and therefore was ineligible
for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law]; People v. Lopez (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 566, 570, 575-578, 580 [same; summary denial
of petition affirmed].)

                                 10
       We have independently reviewed the record and find no
arguable issues.8 We are satisfied that Martinez’s counsel has
fully complied with her responsibilities and that no arguable
issues exist. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 109-110;
Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 441.)

8      Less than two months before the July 2022 hearing in
this case, a court of appeal held a petitioner has a constitutional
right to be present at a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing
(or competently waive his presence). (People v. Basler (2022)
80 Cal.App.5th 46, 51, 57-58.) As noted, here, Martinez was
not present at the hearing on whether he had established a
prima facie case. Nothing in the record indicates his counsel
asked the court to order him out from state prison or objected
to the court proceeding in his absence. Basler involved an
evidentiary hearing, not a hearing on whether a petitioner
had made out a prima facie case. In any event, any error in
the conduct of the hearing in Martinez’s absence was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California (1967)
386 U.S. 18.) Nothing Martinez could have contributed to
the hearing could change the instructions given at his trial
or the jury’s verdicts finding him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of two first degree murders.

                                 11
                         DISPOSITION
     We affirm the trial court’s order denying Jonathan Peter
Martinez’s second petition for resentencing.

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                     EGERTON, J.

We concur:

             LAVIN, Acting P. J.

             NGUYEN (KIM), J.


      Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

                                12