Court Opinion

ID: 9593044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:19:09.074382+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:18.463774
License: Public Domain

Pope, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the opinion in Case No. A90A1669 but respectfully dissent to the opinion in Case No. A90A1668.
Defendant Goodgame argues that as a radiological physicist he is a professional and that for plaintiff to bring an action against him for negligent practice of that profession she. is required by OCGA § 9-11-9.1 to file with her complaint an affidavit supporting her claim against him. The issue presented by this case is whether the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 should be extended to a complaint for negligence *418against a radiological physicist. I conclude the statute was not intended to apply in such a case as this.
“[OCGA § 9-11-9.1] applies to any action for professional malpractice by negligent act or omission, sounding in tort or by breach of contract for failure to perform professional services in accordance with the professional obligation of care.” Barr v. Johnson, 189 Ga. App. 136, 137 (375 SE2d 51) (1988). The only Georgia statute in which “profession” is defined is OCGA § 14-7-2 (2), which lists only 16 occupations including “medicine and surgery” but not the occupation of defendant Goodgame. The term “professional service” is defined at OCGA § 14-10-2 (2) as “any type of professional service which may be legally performed only pursuant to a license from a state examining board pursuant to Title 43. . . .” The majority opinion rejects any analysis of the term “professional malpractice” which refers to these two sections of the Georgia Code. The majority opinion acknowledges, however, that the Georgia Supreme Court in Housing Auth. of Savannah v. Greene, 259 Ga. 435 (383 SE2d 867) (1989), referred to these other, unrelated, statutes in reaching the conclusion that architecture is a profession which is therefore included within the expert affidavit requirement. Justice Weltner has also recently suggested “that the term ‘professional’ should be limited for purposes of the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1” by the definitions found at OCGA §§ 14-7-2; 14-10-2 and 43-1-24. See Creel v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 260 Ga. 499, 500 (397 SE2d 294) (1990) (Weltner, J., concurring specially).
Defendant Goodgame testified at his deposition that he was not required to be licensed or certified to practice his occupation by any state authority. The practice of radiological physics is certainly a learned skill but it is neither a “profession” as that term is defined by statute nor a service requiring a state license or certificate to practice. “The foregoing limitations suggest that [Goodgame] is not a ‘professional’ within the meaning of OCGA § 9-11-9.1.” Id.
Even though the expert affidavit statute has been interpreted by the appellate courts as applying to complaints against architects and engineers (see Housing Auth. of Savannah v. Greene, supra) and attorneys at law (see Padgett v. Crawford, 189 Ga. App. 568 (376 SE2d 724) (1988) and Barr v. Johnson, supra), the Georgia Supreme Court has recently acknowledged the courts may have interpreted the statute more broadly than the legislature intended when it enacted the statute as part of the Medical Malpractice Act of 1987. See Kneip v. Southern Engineering Co., 260 Ga. 409 (4) (395 SE2d 809) (1990). Therefore, I do not believe the requirements of the expert affidavit statute should be extended to this action alleging negligence in the performance of the services of a radiological physicist.
According to the majority opinion, in any case in which a plaintiff *419would be required to call an expert witness to prove the allegation of negligent performance of a skilled service, the plaintiff would be required to file the affidavit of an expert witness with the complaint. In my opinion, OCGA § 9-11-9.1 should not be extended this far. A complaint is not brought within the purview of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 simply because it alleges negligent performance of a skilled service and will require the testimony of an expert witness to establish the defendant did not meet the reasonable degree of care and skill ordinarily employed in the service.
Decided March 15, 1991
Rehearing denied March 29, 1991
Berrien L. Sutton, Ronald W. Hallman, for appellant.
Beckmann & Pinson, William H. Pinson, Jr., for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Sognier, Judge Mc-Murray and Judge Banke join in this opinion.