Court Opinion

ID: 9862967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 02:36:37.137968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:45:27.482426
License: Public Domain

*18Opinion on Petition to Rehear
The plaintiff in error through counsel has filed herein a petition to rehear, which in essence raises one or two of the propositions heretofore considered by the Court. We will attempt to reply to these contentions in this opinion on petition to rehear, after having’ read the petition and the brief that accompanies it as well as reading and rechecking the record.
It is very seriously contended and argued again, as it was in the original brief, that a statement made by the robbery victim should have been furnished the plaintiff in error for the purpose of impeachment. We considered this question at length in our original opinion and for reasons therein stated see no reason now to change our opinion. We determined that this was not error for reasons therein stated, and then arguendo said that this so-called evidence, which was being argued about and which plaintiff in error contends he should have been allowed to introduce, amounted simply to notations which the officers had made in the course of their investigation. It is true there is no statement in this record that this is a fact but when you read the whole record there is simply no other inference that can be drawn from it when the record does not show what this evidence is. It does show that whatever was done was done in this way. In other words, there is a clear inference that this was merely a part of the arrest report which the police had. This assignment on the petition to rehear is basically nothing but a reargument of the proposition which was argued originally.
It is next argued very forcibly that the trial judge committed error when he failed to instruct the jury as to the lesser included offense of assault and battery. We, to *19our satisfaction, and the present argument has not varied it in the least, answered this question fully. In answering the question we referred to a rather recent case, Patterson v. State, 218 Tenn. 80, 400 S.W.2d 743, which we considered was authority for the position which we felt we were bound to assume in such cases. It is now argued that a previous case of this Court, James v. State, 215 Tenn. 221, 385 S.W.2d 86, holds, or as counsel says it is at least the inference of this opinion, that it is the duty of the trial judge to charge all grades of the offense. The James case does not so hold and that is not the law. We have repeatedly written on this subject and a number of these cases are referred to in the Patterson case, supra. The fact is in the James case there is one statement therefrom which negatives this argument. This statement is:
“This does not mean, however, that the trial judge must instruct the jury on the said lesser offense in every indictment for robbery. The holding of this Court is that the trial judge shall so instruct the jury if there is factual evidence which would support a conviction for the lesser included offense.”
We are satisfied in the present case that under this record there is no dispute as to whether or not a robbery occurred, and thus the charge was correct. This assignment herein, too, is a reargument of what has been heretofore argued.
It is now argued for the first time, and a long quotation is contained in the petition to rehear regarding a statement that the trial judge made to the jury in the process of the trial, and before the case had been finally concluded and argument heard thereon. This proposition concerns a matter which, as we have said, was not heretofore raised. After the defense was closed the State apparently offered a witness in rebuttal as to certain *20statements made by a witness for the defense in an effort to attack the credibility of this defense witness. It was after this that the conrt told the jury in effect that they should consider prior inconsistent statements as merely going to the weight and credibility of the witness’ testimony. The argument as to this statement, which is quoted in the petition to rehear, is that it should be included in writing to the jury so that they could take it to the jury room with them, and consider it just like they do the written charge of the court to the jury, as is required by T.C.A. sec. 40-2516.
The statement that the trial judge made here when he ruled on this question is certainly not such a statement as is required to be'given in writing to the jury. This Court more than a hundred years ago held that as a general proposition the requirement that the judge’s instruction be in writing does not prevent the judge from making oral statements concerning the testimony to the jury during the course of the trial. State v. Becton, 66 Tenn. 138. It seems to us that this holding is so absolutely logical and reasonable that it cannot be questioned. Suppose that every time an objection is made to evidence, or a question arises, the ruling of the judge in each instance, and the words he says, would have to be in writing and submitted to the jury thus according to the Code Section last above referred to. To make such a statement is to answer it because of the absurdity of such a proposition. It was never intended that such be done and no holdings anywhere can be found making such a requirement.
After having fully considered the petition to rehear and again re-checking the record, we are satisfied that there is no reversible error herein and the judgment below must be affirmed.