Court Opinion

ID: 9473297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:25:28.363807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:26.234676
License: Public Domain

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I find myself in substantial agreement with nearly all that the court concludes today, but I am deeply concerned with its holding that the district court’s exclusion of the testimony of Dr. Gaydos and Dr. Seeskin was harmless error. I therefore respectfully dissent.
This court has long followed the rule that in bench trials evidence should be admitted and then sifted when the district court makes its findings of fact and conclusions of law. In Builders Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 179 F.2d 377, 379 (8th Cir. 1950), Judge Sanborn, writing for the court, stated:
In the trial of a nonjury case, it is virtually impossible for a trial judge to commit reversible error by receiving incompetent evidence, whether objected to or not. * * On the other hand, a trial judge who, in the trial of a nonjury case, attempts to make strict rulings on the admissibility of evidence, can easily get his decision reversed by excluding evidence which is objected to, but which, on review, the appellant court believes should have been admitted. * * * [E]ven if the trier of facts, by making close rulings upon the admissibility of evidence, does save himself some time, that saving will be more than offset by the time consumed by the reviewing court in considering the propriety of his rulings and by the consequent delay in the final determination of the controversy. One who is capable of ruling accurately upon the admissibility of evidence is equally capable of sifting it accurately after it has been received, and, since he will base his findings upon *266the evidence which he regards as competent, material and convincing, he cannot be injured by the presence in the record of testimony which he does not consider competent or material.
See also Fields Engineering & Equipment, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 651 F.2d 589, 594 (8th Cir.1981).
I realize that when, as here, technical personnel employed by a corporation testify, the line between expert testimony and fact testimony may easily become blurred and indistinct. I am also mindful that under Rule 61 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rulings excluding evidence are to be the subject of reversal only when inconsistent with substantial justice. Nonetheless, had the testimony, of these industrial psychologists- regarding Anheuser-Busch’s testing program been admitted, the district court could have differentiated between expert and fact testimony, distinguishing that stemming out of the psychologists’ general expertise from that relating to their actual work and their positions as actors in or viewers of specific events. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee note. For example, Anheuser-Busch made an offer of proof that Dr. Gaydos was prepared to testify as to:
when he got involved with the test, the contact he had with the outside consultant who had developed the test, the purpose of the test, the methodology of the test, compliance with the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (1978), the effect of the test on the selection process, attempts to validate the test, alternative selection methods, adverse impact of the test and proposed solutions, experimental use of the test, and ways to validate the test.
Brief for Appellant at 17. As AnheuserBusch argues, since Dr. Gaydos’s job required him to become involved in these matters as an “actor or viewer,” it may very well be that such relevant, material testimony was not expert and should have been admitted. I am not satisfied that it is sufficient to review such questions on the basis of an offer of proof or the testimony in earlier arbitration proceedings of one of the witnesses. It is far preferable to have the testimony taken and for the analysis of the district court to be contained in its findings of fact and conclusions of law so that it may be carefully reviewed by this court.
Depriving Anheuser-Busch of the procedures that we have followed for many years severely limited its opportunity to present a defense. It may well be that in the end Anheuser-Busch would have lost the case even with the admission of this testimony. We simply do not know. I think not only that the district court erred in excluding the testimony but also that the error was prejudicial. On this ground alone I would reverse and remand for further consideration.