Court Opinion

ID: 9450652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:54:11.046683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:24.445136
License: Public Domain

FAHY, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
All parties to the case are agreed that the will was prepared for the testator by an experienced draftsman. And though Paragraph 3 is nevertheless not altogether clear, it seems to me well nigh incredible that an experienced draftsman would have composed this provision as she did if the intention she sought to express were the wholly unnecessary one that the widow should have her statutory rights of quarantine, family allowance and renunciation, which were hers without any provision for them in the will.1 Moreover, if the intention were to protect such rights Paragraph 3 would not have been worded as a gift, devise and bequest. The language of Paragraph 3 is as follows:
“I give, devise and bequeath to my wife * * * all her statutory rights in my real and personal property wheresoever the same may be situated or located * *
I think this should be given meaning as a devise and bequest; and so I consider the content or measure of the gift. This is sufficiently clear even though not entirely so. The measure of the devise and bequest, adhering to its language, is found in those statutory provisions describing a widow’s share in the real and personal property of a deceased husband, wheresoever the same is situated; that is, the provisions of the statute are by reference made the measure of the gift.2
Thus I think the District Court reached essentially the correct conclusion. The court described the bequest as a “pecuniary” one of the value of the widow’s share measured as I have indicated. Perhaps it could better be described as the bequest of the share itself, rather than as a “pecuniary” one; but this difference is not significant.
It is true, as the opinion of the court states, the will, including of course Paragraph 3, speaks of the time of the testator’s death, and at that time one of the rights of the widow was the right to renounce the will and take the share she would take had testator died intestate. But the assumption made by the court that Paragraph 3 may have been included to protect this as well as the widow’s other statutory rights does not seem to me to support the court’s construction of that paragraph. The right of renunciation is the only statutory right left unprotected at the time of death, for it depends upon affirmative action by the widow within six months after administration of the estate. Under the trial court’s construction Paragraph 3 gives the widow as a devise and bequest the share she would take in the event of intestacy even though she should fail to exercise the right of renunciation within the time required by statute. This court’s construction of Paragraph *5073 gives no protection to the right of renunciation.
The question in the final analysis is whether the contested provision is a gift, devise and bequest of a share in the testator’s estate measured by his widow’s statutory share had he died intestate, or is merely a declaration by him that his widow shall have the incidental statutory rights she would have had in any event. I think the language used by testator shows he intended more than the latter. He explicitly made a gift, devise and bequest. This is not language he would have used, with the assistance of an experienced draftsman to accomplish nothing for his wife except, by indirection, the possible tax benefits referred to in note 1, supra.
I respectfully dissent.

. The majority suggests that Paragraph 3 might have been included in order to bring these statutory benefits within the scope of the estate tax marital deduction. The trial court in reaching its decision in the remand proceedings specifically dealt with this issue and rejected the position now taken by the majority. Even assuming that Paragraph 3 has some tax value this does not explain its general and all-inclusive language, which goes far beyond what is necessary to provide the relatively small tax savings suggested by the majority.

. These statutory rights are set out at 18 D.C.Code § 101 and 18 E.C.Code § 703; they are those to which a widow is entitled upon the death of her spouse intestate.