Court Opinion

ID: 9726175
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:35:41.226188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:23.827993
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion
Cook, J.
— I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion.
This proceeding commenced with the filing of a “juvenile complaint form” on January 17, 1966, charging Appellant with being a delinquent, the acts of delinquency being unlawful entry, theft, and consumption of alcohol. The proof related only to the consumption of some alcoholic beverage. An examination of the record discloses that Appellant, age 16, and two other boys, ages 15 and 16, attended a Chesterton High School dance on Friday night, January 7, 1966; that a teacher detected alcohol on Appellant and the other two boys and requested that they leave the dance. These circumstances were reported to the high school principal, who, in turn, called the P’orter Circuit Court juvenile probation officer to investigate. The probation officer’s investigation began on January 10, 1966, and presumably extended to January 17, 1966, when the formal “juvenile complaint form” was filed.
On January 17, 1966, the Honorable Alfred J. Pivarnik, Judge of the Porter Circuit Court, in the exercise of the court’s juvenile jurisdiction, entered an order to the effect that the juvenile probation officer orally reported to the court that Appellant had been in illegal possession of intoxicating liquor. The trial court’s order then found that Appellant be *579placed in juvenile dentention in the custody of the Sheriff of Porter County from 4:00 P.M. Friday, January 21,1966, until 11:00 A.M. Sunday, January 23, 1966.
Up to this point there had not been a hearing, as provided by Burns’ Indiana Statutes, 1966 Supplement, § 9-3215. I cannot condone detention and the resulting deprivation of a minor’s liberty, however limited, without a hearing. However, Appellant’s parents would not permit their child to be placed in juvenile detention pursuant to the trial court’s order of January 17, 1966, and the attorney who appears for Appellant on this appeal was employed and requested a hearing.
A hearing was set for January 24, 1966, at which time Appellant appeared before Judge Pivarnik in person and by counsel.
On the day of hearing, but before the commencement of the hearing, Appellant, by his father and guardian, presented a verified “Petition for Change of Judge.” The trial court denied the petition, stating “I don’t believe there is a provision in juvenile law for a change from the Juvenile Court.” This action of the trial court was clearly erroneous. In the case of State ex rel. Duffy v. Lake Juvenile Court (1958) 238 Ind. 404, 151 N. E. 2d 293, Judge Bobbitt stated:
“A petition for delinquency such as that filed in said Cause No. 14014 in the Lake Juvenile Court is an adversary proceeding of a statutory nature not triable by a jury. Acts 1945, ch. 356, §§1-15, p. 1724, being §§9-3201 — 9-3215, inclusive, Burns’ 1946 Replacement; State ex rel. Fritz et al. v. Del. C. Ct., etc. (1957), 236 Ind. 229, 139 N. E. 2d 442. This being true, then the petition for delinquency herein comes clearly within the provisions of § 2-1402, supra, and relator is, therefore, entitled to a change of Judge.”
The majority hold that Appellant’s petition for change of judge was waived because of the provisions of Supreme Court Rule 1-12 (B) sub. (2) and 1-12 (B) sub. (7). Rule 1-12 (B) sub. (2) could not possibly apply in this case because the *580period was less than ten days between the filing of the formal “juvenile complaint form” and the trial date. Rule 1-12 (B) sub. (7) does not apply, as the trial court did not make an order book entry fixing the date of trial on January 24, 1966. I believe that Appellant’s motion for change of judge was timely filed under the circumstances of this case, and should have been granted.
However, I do not perceive that the error of the trial court has been preserved because of Appellant’s failure to assign such error in his motion for a new trial. Appellant, for the first time, in his assignment of errors filed in this Court for his second ground, states “That the Juvenile Court improperly refused to grant the petition for a change of judge.” The error of the court in denying a proper application for change of venue from the judge must be assigned in the motion for a new trial and not by a separate assignment of error. Goodrich v. Stangland (1900) 155 Ind. 279, 58 N. E. 148; Goodwin v. Bentley (1903) 30 Ind. App. 477, 66 N. E. 496. Appellant’s brief is defective in failing to include assignment of errors and motion for a new trial. Supreme Court Rule 2-17; Michaels v. Johnson (Feb. 24, 1967), Appellate Court, Ind., 223 N. E. 2d 585.
The order of the trial court of January 17, 1966, about which Appellant complains, is a nullity. It was superceded by the order and judgment of the trial court following a hearing as requested by Appellant, entered January 24, 1966. It is from this judgment, which restated the terms of the detention contained in the court’s order of January 17, 1966, that Appellant appeals to this Court.
The limitations and restrictions placed upon this Court are aptly stated in the case, In Re Pierson (1943) 114 Ind. App. 195, 51 N. E. 2d 91. Judge Crumpacker, speaking for this Court, said:
“In the instant case the fact that any one of several other judgments, less drastic than the one pronounced, would *581have been proper on the facts found can be no concern of ours. What corrective remedy the trial court chose out of the several the law provides was within its exclusive province and its judgment in that regard is beyond our reach by both statutory restriction and the dictates of reason and common sense. It is apparent, therefore, that the facts found by the court support the judgment rendered and that such facts are sustained by the evidence.”
It is just as apparent in this case that the judgment rendered by the trial court is sustained by the evidence.
I agree with the majority that the judgment should be affirmed.
Note. — Reported in 224 N. E. 2d 516.