Court Opinion

ID: 9647836
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:52:19.721059+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:53.852850
License: Public Domain

On Petition to Rehear.
Ms. Justice Chattin.
Petitioner has filed an earnest and forcible petition to rehear. The petition points out the writer of the majority opinion for the Court overlooked the case of Birdsong v. City of Chattanooga, 204 Tenn. 264, 319 S.W.2d 233 (1958), in which it was held by a. unanimous Court in order to make out a case under the playground theory it was necessary to show an owner or possessor of land had actual knowledge children had, in fact, been using the property for a playground; and that it was not sufficient to prove the owner or possessor should, in the exercise of ordinary care, have known that children were playingon the property.
The opinion further stated this was made clear in the case of Gatlinburg Const. Co. v. McKinney, 37 Tenn.App. *582343, 263 S.W.2d 765 (1953), certiorari denied by this Court.
Petitioner insists we were in error in approving' tbe following* charge of the trial court, which is in conflict with the rule announced in the Birdsong* case:
“Where, over a considerable time, a premises is frequently and regularly or habitually used as a playground by children and the owner and controller of the premises knows, or in the exercise of reasonable care could and should have known that children of immature years habitually trespassed upon the land as a playground, then the owner or controller is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid unreasonable risks of bodily injury from dangers which children, because of their youth, would fail to discover and prevent. ’ ’
Petitioner further1 insists there is no proof in the record defendant had actual knowledge children were using* the premises as a playground; and that the majority of the Court were in error1 in holding* the playground doctrine was applicable where defendant by the exercise of ordinary care could have ascertained children were playing on the premises after working hours.
Contrary to the statement in the Birdsong case that the G-atlinburg case made it clear in order to make out a case under the playground doctrine it was necessary to show the owner or possessor of land had actual knowledge children had, in fact, been using the property for a playground, it is clear the G-atlinburg case recognized the • following* rules:
“The words ‘actual notice’ do not always mean in law what in metaphysical strictness they import; they more often mean knowledge of facts and circumstances *583sufficiently pertinent in character to enable reasonably cautious and prudent persons to investigate and ascertain as to the ultimate facts.” 39 Am.Jur., Section 4, page 234; Texas Company v. Aycock, 190 Tenn. 16, 227 S.W.2d 41 (1953).
In the case of Woodfolk v. Blount, 4 Tenn. 147 (1816), the Court said:
“When anything appears which would put a man of ordinary prudence upon inquiry, the law presumes that such inquiry was actually made, and therefore fixes notice upon him as to all legal consequences.”
■ Again, in Covington v. Anderson, 84 Tenn. 310 (1886), the Court said:
“The rule upon the question of notice is, that whatever is sufficient to put a person upon inquiry, is notice of all the facts to which that inquiry would lead when prosecuted with reasonable diligence and in good faith. ’ ’
It was said in the G-atlinburg case:
“In the present case it is clear that defendant knew or had good reason to know that children were making a playground of its lot. As stated, its president admits that he knew there was a basketball court on the lot. This was at least sufficient to put defendant on inquiry and this is notice of all the facts to which inquiry prosecuted with reasonable diligence would have led.”
Consequently, we are unable to reconcile the statement in the Birdsong case that the Gatlinburg case makes it clear an owner or controller of property had to have actual knowledge children were, in fact, using the property as a playground for that theory to be applicable.
*584Since we think the Birdsong case is in conflict with the case of Gatlinburg Construction Company v. McKinney, supra, with respect to the playground doctrine and not sound, we overrule its holding in that respect. We approve the rule as announced in the Gatlinburg' case and will follow it.
The petition is denied and the costs adjudged against petitioner.