Court Opinion

ID: 9699426
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:23:26.377974+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:39:40.713604
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
FITZGERALD, J.:
¶ 1 In reversing the trial court’s well-reasoned order and opinion, the learned majority conducts a plenary review of the facts, rather than reviewing the decision for abuse of discretion as our standard of review requires. There is substantial support for the trial court’s finding that the relevant crimes were not sufficiently similar to warrant their admission as evidence in the instant trial. Hence, I dissent.
¶ 2 I re-emphasize that this Court may reverse the trial court’s rulings on the admissibility of evidence only if the trial court abused its discretion. See Commonwealth v. Phillips, 700 A.2d 1281, 1284 (Pa.Super.1997). Even if a court finds the evidence in question relevant, we must also review, under the abuse-of-discretion standard, whether its prejudicial impact renders the evidence inadmissible. Commonwealth v. Reid, 571 Pa. 1, 34, 811 A.2d 530, 550 (2002). It is well-settled that a mere error of judgment does not constitute abuse of discretion; rather, the court’s judgment must be manifestly unreasonable or the result of bias, prejudice, ill will, or partiality. Commonwealth v. Carroll, 936 A.2d 1148, 1152-53 (Pa.Super.2007), appeal denied, 596 Pa. 752, 947 A.2d 735 (2008). The trial court’s reasoning displays none of these characteristics.
¶ 3 The majority describes the crimes as “so distinctive” and “so similar” that the similarities between them are “striking.” See Majority Op. at 1188-89. The twelve purported similarities, as posited by the Commonwealth, therefore bear repeating:
(1) Both crimes were allegedly committed by Selenski and co-defendant Weakley;
(2) Flex ties found on the bodies of the homicide victims were visually, instrumentally, and steromicroscopieally similar to those removed from Samuel Goosay, the victim of the subsequent robbery;
(3) Flex ties were used to bind the hands of Kerkowski and Fassett in the homicides, and used to bind the hands of Goosay in the robbery.
(4) Duct tape found on the body of the homicide victim Kerkowski was visually, instrumentally and stereomicro-scopically similar to the tape removed from Goosay, the robbery victim;
(5) Duct tape was used to cover the eyes of Kerkowski and Goosay;
(6) Flex ties were used in conjunction with duct tape as a distinct method of restraint of the victims in the two incidents;
(7) The two crimes or incidents occurred in or involved the victims’ residences, as opposed to their businesses;
(8) Kerkowski and Goosay were both small business owners;
(9) Goosay’s jewelry store and Ker-kowski’s pharmacy both dealt in large sums of cash;
(10) Jewelry and prescription drugs have independent street value;
(11) The victims of the two matters were left bound as the assailants fled;
(12) Flex ties and duct tape were found or seen at both defendant’s properties and/or in their vehicles.
See id. at 1188.
¶ 4 We may obviously disregard the first reason proffered by the Commonwealth, since the purpose in admitting the Goosay evidence is precisely to establish that Ap-pellees committed the instant crimes. Ad*1193ditionally, the remaining “similarities” are, as the majority accurately describes them, “conclusory and repetitive entries.” Majority Op. at 1188. The only way the trial court could have erred in its decision, therefore, is if the following evidence proves a common plan or scheme: (1) similar-but-common duct tape used; (2) similar-but-common flex ties used; (3) the victims were business owners who dealt with items that had independent street value; and (4) the victims were targeted at home, rather than at their place of business.
¶ 5 The common plan or preparation exceptions, or modus operandi, require “such a high correlation in the details of the crimes that proof that the defendant committed one makes it very unlikely that anyone else but the defendant committed the others.” Commonwealth v. Morris, 493 Pa. 164, 176, 425 A.2d 715, 721 (1981) (emphases added). The existence- of a common scheme is relevant to establish any element of a crime, including identity, “so long as it does not merely indicate the defendant’s propensity to commit similar crimes.” Commonwealth v. Bronshtein, 547 Pa. 460, 478, 691 A.2d 907, 915-16 (1997). A comparison of the crimes must establish a logical connection between them. Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423, 459, 555 A.2d 1264, 1283 (1989). Where it is contended that a distinctive modus operandi exists between the two crimes, it must be shown that the crimes are “so nearly identical in method as to earmark them as the handiwork of the accused.” Commonwealth v. Rush, 538 Pa. 104, 113, 646 A.2d 557, 561 (1994) (quoting McCormick, Evidence, § 190 (2d ed. 1972)). A sufficient modus operandi may exist “where crimes of the accused [are] so nearly identical in method as to earmark them as the handiwork of the accused.... More is demanded [than] the mere repeated commission of crimes of the same class, such as repeated burglaries or thefts. The device used must be so unusual or distinctive ■ as to be like a signature.” Commonwealth v. Blady, 298 Pa.Super. 82, 444 A.2d 670, 671-72 (1982) (emphasis added) (quoting McCormick, Evidence, § 190 at 449 (2d ed. 1972)).
¶ 6 The trial court accurately noted, “There is nothing in the facts of either the Goosay robbery or the Kerkowski/Fassett homicides that involves any distinctive skill or ability. The Goosay break-in was a garden variety forced entry and it appears that the perpetrators(s) of the Kerkow-ski/Fassett disappearance and murder were invited in.... The Goosay robbery is not admissible to show that [Appellees] had an unusual or distinctive opportunity to murder Michael J. Kerkowski and Tammy Fassett.” Trial Ct. Op. at 25 (emphasis omitted). The trial court’s evaluation of the separate, proffered similarities and its comments on each proffered similarity mirrored this Court’s analysis of purported similarities in Commonwealth v. Robinson, 361 Pa.Super. 87, 521 A.2d 940 (1987), and reflected its commitment to determining whether there was a “high correlation in the details” of the two crimes. See id. at 941-42. In discussing the purported similarities, the,trial court commented on the relative strength of that particular similarity.
¶ 7 Instead of analyzing whether the trial court’s judgment was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, ill will or partiality, the majority instead offers its own evaluation of the crimes: .
Select as a victim a small business owner who possesses a large stock of small, easily confiscated, and highly valuable goods that can be readily trafficked in an illicit market; engage the victim not at his place of work but at his residence, located in rural Northeastern Pennsylvania; overtake him and bind him with a combination of duct tape over his eyes and mouth, and plastic flex ties around *1194the wrists; and gain uncontested access to valuable goods and a store of cash. These similarities are striking. They reveal a highly identifiable method of selecting, overtaking, restraining, and robbing a victim that, when viewed in its entirety, places the same signature on the two crimes at issue.
Majority Op. at 1189-90. In my view, the majority’s description offers no such signature; rather, the majority’s description would accurately assess many robberies that occur, even in rural Northeastern Pennsylvania. I am unable to conclude that only a select few robbers would target a small business owner who sells readily trafficked items, invade that owner’s home in a remote area, use duct tape and flex ties to bind and gag the victim, and gain easy access to the goods and cash. Such a finding seems to constitute a refusal to acknowledge that many robbers develop a plan before performing their crime.1 What the majority describes is a robbery with a careful plan; it does not describe a signature. Though the majority hastily adds that Goosay had also been threatened with murder and a security alarm caused the perpetrators to flee, I again do not find it unusual that a robber threatened a victim with murder and fled upon hearing an alarm.2
¶ 8 I also disagree with the majority’s analysis of the eight-month lapse between the crimes. While I agree that the lapse is not dispositive, such a conclusion goes both ways. The éight-month lapse is but a factor, and the trial court appeared to consider it a rather minor factor. Rather, the trial court focused on the lack of similarities between the--victims, the location of the crimes, and Appellees’ relationships with the respective victims. Thus, its mere consideration of the time period, as a single factor among many factors, was appropriate. Just as the majority concludes that the eight-month lapse may indicate a careful and prudent approach to the robberies, the trial court was also permitted to find that the eight-month lapse was not helpful to proving the crimes’ similarities.
¶ 9 The trial court quoted our Supreme Court in stating, “The similarities here do not show a common thread or signature. They are merely coincidentally and not logically connected. What was not shown here was a common modus operandi.... ” Trial Ct. Op. at 27 (quoting Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 534 Pa. 123, 129, 626 A.2d 550, 553 (1993)). The trial court evaluated the evidence proffered regarding the flex ties and duct tape used in the two crimes and found that, at most, the similarities were generic. The expert lab report submitted by the Commonwealth indicated that some of the samples submitted “ ‘could [have originated,]’ not did,” from the same manufacturers, while other samples did not share a common source or origin. Trial Ct. Op. at 28 n. 18. ' The trial court also observed that “[b]oth duct tape and plastic flex ties are ubiquitous.” Trial Ct. Op. at 28. The court further found that merely because “two samples of duct tape look alike ... and [ ] two plastic flex ties look alike is not unusual.” Id. Finally, the court noted that the use of duct *1195tape to cover the victims’ eyes and mouth, and flex ties to restrain the victims, is also not unusual. Id. at 29. After considering all of the evidence and circumstances as they related to the proffered “similarities,” the trial court found that the similarities presented by the Commonwealth did not “demonstrate uniquely similar common features.” Id. at 29 (emphasis omitted). As the trial court accurately notes, both duct tape and flex ties are items commonly found at hardware stores, and both are commonly used to restrain or muzzle victims. This is a point not contested by the majority, other than to opine that the forensic tests did not disprove identity. Majority Op. at 1190 n. 7. As such, the majority seems to flip the burden of proof, requiring Appellees to prove why easily available and commonly used duct tape and flex ties are not signature items, rather than requiring the Commonwealth to prove why using these items could only have meant that Appellees were involved.3
¶ 10 I must note that this is not a case where the evidence would be used to impeach a witness or to rebut inferences favorable to the defendant. See Commonwealth v. Saxton, 516 Pa. 196, 207, 532 A.2d 352, 357 (1987) (admitting evidence of a prior firearm conviction where a defendant testified that he “never owned a gun”). Perhaps more pertinently, this is not a case where the same gun was used in two crimes. Compare with Commonwealth v. Terrell, 234 Pa.Super. 325, 339 A.2d 112, 114 (1975) (finding admissible the defendant’s subsequent arrest with a particular firearm in prosecution for committing a crime with a firearm); Commonwealth v. Nolen, 390 Pa.Super. 346, 568 A.2d 686, 689 (1989) (finding admissible the defendant’s burglary in which he stole a gun during the prosecution of a subsequent homicide with the same gun). Thus, in the instant case, identity cannot be proven by the use of a unique instrument, as flex ties and duct tape are simply too generic to render such a finding.
¶ 11 Finally, in performing the balancing test required by Pa.R.E. 404(b)(3), I find that the trial court properly concluded admission of the Goosay-robbery evidence would unfairly divert the jury’s attention to a remote and wholly collateral incident and raise the likelihood that Appellees would be deprived of an “unclouded determination” of the instant charges. Trial Ct. Op. at 33, (citing [Commonwealth v.] Hude, 256 Pa.Super. 439, 390 A.2d [183,] 186 (1978)). The Commonwealth offers little argument to counter the trial court’s thorough analysis, particularly concerning the ease by which anyone may obtain similar flex ties and duct tape, and the common usage of each. Accordingly, the trial court properly employed the balancing test as set forth in Pa.R.E. 404(b)(3), and did not abuse its discretion in applying the test to the facts and circumstances of the within case.4
¶ 12 In conclusion, the trial court filed a comprehensive opinion in which its reasoning is supported amply by the record. It properly concluded that the Common*1196wealth failed to prove the Goosay robbery was unlike many other robberies that turn violent. It also weighed the probative value of the evidence, which it found to be minimal, with the overwhelming prejudicial value of the evidence.5 Instead of conducting a plenary analysis of the facts with an eye toward reversing the trial court, I would review the trial court’s decision to determine if there is any basis for affirming it. Because I find the trial court’s decision easily supported by the record, I respectfully dissent.6

. Indeed, while the majority could argue that these factors "permit [] the contrary conclusion that they are so logically connected they share a perpetrator," Majority Op. at 1189 (emphasis added), they do not, in my view, require such a conclusion, which is necessary in order to find the trial court’s decision manifestly unreasonable and therefore an abuse of discretion.

. Importantly, the majority does not consider that while Appellees apparently befriended one of the murder victims, Kerkowski, Jr., there was no evidence that they had any kind of relationship with the robbery victim, Goo-say.

. Such a finding would therefore require trial courts always to admit evidence that, e.g.: (1) red Sherwin-Williams paint was used to vandalize homes in two different vandalism cases; or (2) regular-unleaded Sunoco gasoline was used to set fire to a house in two different arson cases.

. The learned majority cites as compelling evidence the fact that Goosay and Weakley identified Appellees as the perpetrators of the Goosay robbery. Majority Op. at 1191. It is precisely this direct identification evidence, easily apparent in the Goosay robbery but absent from the Kerkowski and Fassett murders, that provides much of the prejudicial impact of admitting evidence of the Goosay robbery.

. I emphasize our Rules of Evidence make it clear that evidence of other crimes is presumptively prejudicial unless a listed exception applies. It matters not, in my opinion, whether “the focal point of the evidence is the precise criminal method used,” as the majority states. See Majority Op. at 1191. Instead, the trial court has the discretion to exclude evidence if it finds that the probative value is outweighed at all by “the danger of unfair prejudice.” Pa.R.E. 403; see also Pa.R.E. 403, Comment (observing that Pennsylvania Rule 403 differs from Federal Rule of Evidence 403 in that the federal rule requires the probative value to be "substantially outweighed,” while the Pennsylvania rule requires that the probative value be "outweighed,” in conformity with Pennsylvania law).

. Moreover, I have substantial doubts that excluding evidence of the Goosay robbery substantially handicaps the Commonwealth's prosecution of Appellees, as it appears to have plenty of other evidence by which to prosecute them. However, I acknowledge that we may be unable to review the Commonwealth’s good-faith certification. See Commonwealth v. White, 589 Pa. 642, 653-54, 910 A.2d 648, 654-55 (2006); Commonwealth v. Cosnek, 575 Pa. 411, 420-21, 836 A.2d 871, 877 (2003).