Court Opinion

ID: 9792579
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:31:04.55992+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:43.693667
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (Specially concurring). I concur in the result. The majority opinion has taken the wrong course to a correct result. It states: We hold that the absence of traffic controls is a condition of a highway and is, therefore, the subject of maintenance. I disagree. Section 41-4-ll(A) deprives the State of immunity for negligence “in the maintenance of ... any ... highway .... ” The word “highway” means a way over land open to the use of the general public, the part of a road over which vehicle traffic travels. Moore v. State, 95 N.M. 300, 621 P.2d 517 (Ct.App.1980). Mainte- • nance of a highway means the upkeep of the surface of the highway. In Moore, guardrails were not “a condition” of a highway subject to maintenance. The omission of guardrails is related to negligence not maintenance. In the instant case, the omission of traffic controls, uncertain in meaning, equates with guardrails. “Maintenance” of a highway is not an issue. Thus far, the State is immune to liability for failure to maintain the highway. Under § 41-4-ll(A), an alternative to maintenance exists. Immunity does not apply when injury is caused by negligence “for the existence of any .. . highway . . . . ” Immunity is waived for a highway actually built. If plaintiff’s injuries occurred on the highway but did not have traffic controls, a genuine issue of material fact exists with reference to negligence and proximate cause. Moore, supra. The opinion further states: This was not design work. There is no question as to design. The sole issue raised by the .State is that the State was immune from liability in that the negligence alleged by plaintiff involves the plan or design of a highway. The State’s claim should be answered. The majority refusing to do so, I decline. At this juncture, it is important to correlate Moore v. State, supra, Rickerson v. State of N.M. and City of Roswell, 94 N.M. 473, 612 P.2d 703 (Ct.App.1980) and O’Brien v. Middle Rio Grande, Etc., 94 N.M. 562, 613 P.2d 432 (Ct.App.1980). Principle? of law can be established to govern the meaning of § 41^4-11 of the Tort Claims Act. Once we set a direct course in the meaning of the statute, these problems may not arise again. Concurring opinions are denied publication. The majority refusing to correlate these cases, I decline.