Court Opinion

ID: 9791661
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:15:42.311117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:37.797267
License: Public Domain

*96Pearson, J.
(concurring) — I concur with the majority opinion, but feel constrained to comment on a decision of Division 3 of this court, with which our decision may, by implication at least, be in conflict. In Hurst v. Struthers, 1 Wn. App. 935, 465 P.2d 416 (1970) this court reversed a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff (a left-turning car which was struck by a passing vehicle) and did so on the basis that RCW 46.61.305(1) and its construction by Niven v. MacDonald, 72 Wn.2d 93, 431 P.2d 724 (1967) compelled such a result.
Our decision, insofar as it affirms the trial court’s factual determination of negligence on the part of the plaintiff, is inconsistent with Hurst.
I do not believe the Supreme Court, in Niven intended to hold that in every circumstance where a passing driver collides with a left-turning driver, the latter is negligent as a matter of law. Such a construction renders meaningless the word reasonable, which appears in the statute.
I think that where the evidence ■ of time or distance is conflicting or where there are conflicting inferences as to whether or not a last-minute glance by the lead driver would disclose the presence of the passing driver, or where as in Hurst, there is testimony that the passing car intends to wait until the left turn is completed, such circumstances should render the leading driver’s negligence a fact question for the jury. I think Hurst takes Niven as too broad a rule, and that we should limit Niven to a situation, as the court had before it in Niven, where the evidence (and we add parenthetically the inferences from the evidence) is uncontroverted, and leaves room for no other conclusion than that had plaintiff looked immediately prior to commencing the left turn, he would have observed the overtaking vehicle.
Experienced drivers know of the speed with which a vehicle may overtake one that is slowing. They also are aware that there is in most vehicles a built-in blind spot where the silent approach of an overtaking vehicle will not be observed. The better visibility, of course, is with the *97overtaking vehicle, and we do not perceive that Niven or the statute places any higher duty upon the driver making the left turn than it does on the overtaking vehicle. Both have statutory duties which, in my view, should be equal. It seems to me that Hurst creates an absolute in a situation where an absolute is unwarranted.
I agree with the majority in holding that the trial court had substantial evidence to support its factual findings and conclusion of plaintiffs liability to defendant.