Court Opinion

ID: 9602542
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:56:40.823162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:04.518993
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur even though Officer Rountree was not explicitly tendered as an expert.
Normally a witness cannot state an opinion or conclusion because this would be an invasion of the province of the jury, which is to make its own calculations and conclusions. Maxwell v. State, 262 Ga. 73, 76-77 (5) (414 SE2d 470) (1992). But where the matter at issue is one of which a jury would not have knowledge from common experience and requires expertise, an expert can give an opinion if it is necessary or helpful in order for a jury to determine the facts. OCGA § 24-9-67; Maxwell, supra. “[Kjnowledge of the amount of crack cocaine one would generally possess for personal use or the amount which might evidence distribution is not necessarily within the scope of the ordinary layman’s knowledge and experience,” so expert opinion testimony is admissible on this issue. Davis v. State, 200 Ga. App. 44, 46 (406 SE2d 555) (1991).
Before such an opinion can be admitted, a foundation must be laid which establishes the witness’ credentials for giving an opinion, credentials such as training or experience. Opinion must be based on a proper foundation. See OCGA § 24-9-65. It is by this foundation that the trial judge decides whether the opinion is admissible or not, as a legal matter. The tender of the witness is made to the trial judge when the proponent believes the foundation has been laid, and the tender describes the area of expertise the proponent wishes the witness to testify to. It thus serves an important function, because a witness may be qualified in one area of expertise but be asked for an opinion on another. That was one of the problems which the majority in Davis v. State, 209 Ga. App. 572, 574 (434 SE2d 132) (1993), considered an impediment to affirmance. In Stephens v. State, 219 Ga. App. 881, 883 (1) (467 SE2d 201) (1996) (physical precedent only), the witness was neither qualified as an expert nor tendered as one. *331Whether or not there is other evidence of intent to distribute is irrelevant to the issue of whether the expert opinion is properly admitted.
Decided March 10,1997.
Hal T. Peel, for appellant.
Dupont K. Cheney, District Attorney, Carole E. Wall, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Here there was no explicit tender, but the foundational requirement was met in that the qualifications of the officer to testify as an expert in the use of cocaine were set out on the record. The trial court accepted the witness in this regard, and the officer testified about the meaning of the amount of cocaine possessed by. Bacon. Since the officer’s stated qualifications in terms of training and experience gave him adequate credentials to explain the significance of the amount of cocaine with respect to likelihood of personal use or sale (indicative of intent of possessor), no harm resulted from the absence of a proper tender of the witness to the trial judge to make a legal ruling on admissibility of the witness’ opinion.
The real problem here is the lack of a jury charge that cautions the jury it is not required to accept the opinion of the officer regarding the meaning of the quantity. See Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases (2nd ed.), p. 12, K. But as the majority points out, this was not enumerated as error.