Court Opinion

ID: 9948224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-06 18:01:48.381276+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:20.329075
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                Mar 06, 2024
                                                                                11:52 AM(CT)
                                                                                 TENNESSEE
                                                                            WORKERS' COMPENSATION
                                                                               APPEALS BOARD

            TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
               WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

John F. Oldham                               )   Docket No.     2022-03-0420
                                             )
v.                                           )   State File No. 66575-2020
                                             )
Freeman Webb Company Realtors                )
d/b/a Sunnybrook, et al.                     )
                                             )
                                             )
Appeal from the Court of Workers’            )   Heard February 7, 2024
Compensation Claims                          )   at Knoxville
Pamela B. Johnson, Judge                     )

                  Affirmed in Part, Vacated in Part, and Remanded

The employee sustained injuries to his right foot and leg while working for the employer
in October 2020. Thereafter, in April 2022, the parties presented a proposed settlement
to the trial court resolving the employee’s claim for an original award of permanent
partial disability benefits. When the employee’s initial benefit period ended, the
employee filed a petition for increased benefits, extraordinary relief, or permanent total
disability. The employer denied the employee’s claim for additional benefits, asserting in
part that the employee’s permanent work restrictions were unrelated to the work accident.
Following a period of discovery, the employer filed a motion for partial summary
judgment, arguing that the employee’s court-approved settlement for permanent partial
disability benefits precluded, as a matter of law, any award of permanent total disability
benefits. The employer further argued that the medical evidence did not support an
award of extraordinary relief under the express terms of that statute. In addition, the
employer filed a motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum the employee had served on
the employer’s vocational expert seeking the production of certain documents. In two
separate orders, the trial court declined to rule on the employer’s motion for partial
summary judgment prior to the compensation hearing, and it declined to quash the
subpoena duces tecum. The employer has appealed both orders, which we consolidated
for purposes of this appeal. Upon careful consideration of the record and arguments of
counsel, we affirm in part and vacate in part the trial court’s orders and remand the case.

Presiding Judge Timothy W. Conner delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which
Judge Pele I. Godkin and Judge Meredith B. Weaver joined.

                                            1
A. Allen Grant and Benjamin T. Norris, Nashville, Tennessee, for the employer-
appellant, Freeman Webb Company Realtors d/b/a Sunnybrook

Andrew J. Roberto, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the employee-appellant, John F. Oldham

                         Factual and Procedural Background

       John Oldham (“Employee”) worked for Freeman Webb Company Realtors
(“Employer”) as a maintenance technician. On October 6, 2020, Employee sustained a
work-related injury when his foot became caught in the seat arm of a golf cart he was
working on, and he fell. The fall caused a displaced femoral fracture in his right leg.
After a period of authorized medical treatment, the parties reached a tentative settlement
of Employee’s “original award” based on a medical impairment rating of 8%. On April
28, 2022, the trial court approved the settlement, which included the following language:

      If, at the end of the initial compensation period, Employee has not returned
      to work with any employer or has returned to work at a lower rate of pay
      than Employee received on the date of the injury, Employee may file a
      Petition for Benefit Determination to determine whether Employee is
      entitled to increased benefits under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-
      6-207(3)(B) or extraordinary relief under Tennessee Code Annotated
      section 50-6-242(a) . . . . If the judge determines Employee is entitled to an
      increased award or extraordinary relief, Employer will be credited for
      payment of the original award under this agreement.

(Emphasis added.) After the initial compensation period expired, Employee filed a new
petition in November 2022 seeking “increased benefits, extraordinary relief and/or
Permanent Total Disability.” Following the issuance of a dispute certification notice, the
trial court entered a scheduling order setting various deadlines and scheduling the
compensation hearing for October 18, 2023. In September 2023, due to a conflict in the
trial court’s schedule, an Amended Scheduling Order was entered resetting the
compensation hearing for December 20, 2023. This order also set an October 4, 2023
deadline for the filing of dispositive motions.

        Employer filed a motion for partial summary judgment on October 4 arguing that,
as a matter of law, Employee was disqualified from seeking either extraordinary relief or
permanent total disability. Employer asserted, in part, that “[b]ecause Employee entered
into a binding settlement agreement for permanent partial disability benefits that was
approved by [the] Court, he is not eligible for permanent total disability benefits.” It
further argued that Employee cannot qualify for extraordinary relief under Tennessee
Code Annotated section 50-6-242 because his medical impairment rating was less than
10%, and a rating of 10% or more is a statutory prerequisite for seeking extraordinary
relief. On the face of its motion for partial summary judgment, Employer included a

                                            2
notice setting an in-person hearing to address its motion for November 15, 2023, as
required by Tenn. Comp. R. and Regs. 0800-02-21-.18(1)(c). Thereafter, a separate
notice of hearing was filed confirming that the motion hearing was set for November 15,
which was five weeks before trial. On November 9, 2023, a new Notice of Hearing was
filed reflecting the court’s decision to reset the hearing on Employer’s motion for
summary judgment for December 20, the same day as the trial.

       In addition, Employer filed a motion on October 24 asking the court to compel
Employee to attend an in-person evaluation with Employer’s vocational expert.
Employee had declined to attend the evaluation voluntarily, arguing that Employer’s
request was too late because the deadline for taking expert proof depositions had passed. 1
On November 9, the trial court granted Employer’s motion to compel Employee’s
attendance at an evaluation by Employer’s vocational expert, which was set for the
following week.

       On November 14, 2023, counsel for Employee asked the trial court clerk to issue a
subpoena duces tecum, which was personally served by Employee’s counsel on
Employer’s vocational expert on the date of the vocational evaluation. 2 The subpoena
indicated Employer’s vocational expert was to appear at the offices of Employee’s
counsel on November 28, 2023, and bring with her the following:

        1. All correspondence related to this claim between your office and the
           Employer or any representative of the Employer;
        2. Any notes generated in conversations regarding job surveys; and
        3. The full results and data collected by your office related to
           [Employee’s] history and performance in your vocational assessment.

      On November 9, Employer filed a “Motion Requesting Ruling on Employer’s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Prior to Compensation Hearing or, in the
Alternative, Continuance of Compensation Hearing.” On November 20, Employer filed a
“Motion to Quash Subpoena” that had been served on its vocational expert.

       Thereafter, the trial court entered two orders. In the first, it denied Employer’s
motion seeking a pre-trial ruling on its motion for partial summary judgment. The trial
court reasoned that Employer’s request was akin to a request for a bifurcated hearing,

1
  In its original Scheduling Order filed on March 3, 2023, the court set a deadline of August 31, 2023 to
“complete proof depositions of all medical and/or expert witnesses.” That deadline was not altered in the
Amended Scheduling Order. However, as later noted by the trial court, the scheduling order did not
include, and the parties did not request, a deadline for the disclosure of the identity of vocational experts
who may testify in person at trial and/or any written reports produced by such experts.
2
  The line on the subpoena form on which the server is to record the “Date of Service” is blank, but the
signature of Employee’s counsel appears below that line, and the signature of Employee’s counsel was
notarized on November 14.
                                                     3
which the court noted was disfavored in workers’ compensation cases, and any order
addressing a motion for partial summary judgment would be interlocutory in nature,
which would not assist the parties in preparing for trial. In its second order, the trial court
denied Employer’s motion to quash the subpoena that had been served on its vocational
expert, reasoning that Rule 26.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure “allows
parties to obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending litigation, whether it is related to the claim or
defense.” The court then concluded, “Given the limited time available before the
compensation hearing, the Court finds a subpoena duces tecum appropriate in this
instance.” Employer has appealed both orders.

                                    Standard of Review

       The standard we apply in reviewing the trial court’s decision presumes that the
court’s factual findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.
See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (2023). However, the interpretation and
application of statutes and regulations are questions of law that are reviewed de novo
with no presumption of correctness afforded the trial court’s conclusions. See Mansell v.
Bridgestone Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 417 S.W.3d 393, 399 (Tenn. 2013). We are
also mindful of our obligation to construe the workers’ compensation statutes “fairly,
impartially, and in accordance with basic principles of statutory construction” and in a
way that does not favor either the employee or the employer. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-
116 (2023).

        A trial court’s decisions regarding pretrial discovery are discretionary and are
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Doe 1 ex rel. Doe 1 v. Roman Catholic Diocese of
Nashville, 154 S.W.3d 22, 42 (Tenn. 2005). An abuse of discretion is found if the trial
court “applied incorrect legal standards, reached an illogical conclusion, based its
decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or employ[ed] reasoning that
causes an injustice to the complaining party.” Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton
Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 249 S.W.3d 346, 358 (Tenn. 2008). “Whether a court applied an
incorrect legal standard is a question of law that is reviewed de novo.” Funk v. Scripps
Media, Inc., 570 S.W.3d 205, 210 (Tenn. 2019). We are required to “review a [trial]
court’s discretionary decision to determine (1) whether the factual basis for the decision
is properly supported by the evidence in the record, (2) whether the [trial] court properly
identified and applied the most appropriate legal principles applicable to the decision, and
(3) whether the [trial] court’s decision was within the range of acceptable alternative
dispositions.” Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524-25 (Tenn. 2010) (internal
citations omitted). This standard does not permit us to substitute our judgment for that of
the trial court. See Discover Bank v. Morgan, 363 S.W.3d 479, 487 (Tenn. 2012).

                                              4
                                        Analysis

      On appeal, Employer raises two broad issues, which we have restated as follows:
(1) whether the trial court erred in declining to rule on Employer’s motion for partial
summary judgment prior to the compensation hearing; (2) whether the trial court erred in
determining Employer’s vocational expert was subject to a subpoena duces tecum under
Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 26.02(4).

                         Motions for Partial Summary Judgment

       The Tennessee Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims conducts hearings in
accordance with the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and the Tennessee Rules of
Evidence “unless an alternate procedural or evidentiary rule has been adopted by the
[Bureau’s] administrator.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(1). In circumstances where a
Rule of Civil Procedure conflicts with the Bureau’s rules or regulations, the rule adopted
by the Bureau will prevail. Id.; see also Syph v. Choice Food Group, Inc., No. 2015-06-
0288, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 18, at *8 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd.
Apr. 21, 2016).

      In Syph, we addressed the circumstances in which an employer could seek to
dismiss an employee’s claim for benefits prior to the final compensation hearing. In
addressing motions for summary judgment filed pursuant to Rule 56 of the Tennessee
Rules of Civil Procedure, we reviewed the Tennessee Supreme Court’s opinion in Rye v.
Women’s Care Center of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235 (Tenn. 2015) and noted the
Court’s discussion of the relative burdens of proof:

      We reiterate that a moving party seeking summary judgment by attacking
      the nonmoving party’s evidence must do more than make a conclusory
      assertion that summary judgment is appropriate on this basis . . . . When a
      motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in
      Tennessee Rule 56, to survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party
      may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading, but must
      respond, and by affidavits or one of the other means provided in Tennessee
      Rule 56, set forth specific facts at the summary judgment stage showing
      that there is a genuine issue for trial.

Syph, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 18, at *20-21 (quoting Rye, 477 S.W.3d at
264-65) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

       Following the passage of the 2013 Workers’ Compensation Reform Act, several
cases have arisen in which the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims was asked to
address a motion for partial summary judgment. For example, in Rye v. Calsonic Kansei
North America, Inc., No. 2017-06-0627, 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 64

                                            5
(Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Nov. 29, 2018), the employee filed a motion for partial
summary judgment asking the court to deem his claim for benefits based on carpal tunnel
syndrome compensable. Id. at *5. In denying the employee’s motion, the trial court
noted that addressing the merits of the employee’s motion would require it to “make
factual determinations,” which was inappropriate at the summary judgment stage. Id. at
*6. On appeal, we affirmed, stating, “Any determination of causation on this record
requires comparing testimony and assessing credibility, which the trial court must not do
at the summary judgment phase.” Id. at *13.

       In Linsey v. Acadia Healthcare Co., No. 2017-08-1276, 2019 TN Wrk. Comp.
App. Bd. LEXIS 17 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. May 13, 2019), an employee was
attacked by a patient at the medical facility where she worked. Id. at *2. The employee
alleged back and shoulder injuries, and subsequently asserted a mental injury. Id. at *3.
After selecting a mental health provider from a panel, that provider declined to treat the
employee. Id. More than one year passed before the employee filed a petition seeking
benefits for her alleged mental injury. Id. Thereafter, the employer filed a motion for
summary judgment as to the mental injury claim only, which we noted was a motion for
partial summary judgment. Id. at *9. On appeal, we determined the trial court had erred
in not granting partial summary judgment as to the mental injury claim. Id. at *21.

        Finally, in Warren v. The Pictsweet Co., No. 2017-07-0811, 2019 TN Wrk. Comp.
App. Bd. LEXIS 60 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Oct. 17, 2019), an employee
settled his claim for his original award of permanent partial disability benefits, then later
filed a petition seeing increased benefits or extraordinary relief. Id. at *3. The employer
filed a motion for partial summary judgment, alleging the employee had failed to show
that limiting his relief to the original award “would be inequitable” given that the
employee admittedly had not sought any other employment after separating from the
employer. Id. Because the trial court’s resolution of this issue would require a
“determination of fact,” we concluded the trial court did not err in denying the
employer’s motion for partial summary judgment. Id. at *6-7.

        In conjunction with the decisions noted above, we have also been presented with
numerous cases in which a party asked a trial court to resolve an issue of compensability
at an interlocutory stage of the case, typically through the use of a bifurcated trial. We
have consistently concluded that it is generally improper for a trial court to use
bifurcation to determine the compensability of a claim at an interlocutory stage of the
case. See, e.g., Foriest v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. 2017-06-0413, 2018 TN Wrk.
Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 39 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Aug. 10, 2018) (“[T]he
issue of compensability was not ripe for adjudication at an interlocutory stage of the
case . . . . [O]ur Supreme Court’s Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel has
observed that bifurcated trials serve little purpose in workers’ compensation cases.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).

                                             6
        We also addressed the intersection between premature compensability
determinations and motions for partial summary judgment in Love v. Love Management,
Inc., No. 2020-06-0102, 2022 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 9 (Tenn. Workers’
Comp. App. Bd. Feb. 23, 2022). In Love, the employee filed a motion for partial
summary judgment seeking a determination that her alleged accident occurred in the
course and scope of her employment with the employer. Id. at *6. 3 Following a period
of discovery, the trial court set a hearing on the employee’s motion for partial summary
judgment, and the insurer filed a motion to continue the hearing. Id. at *7. The trial
court denied the insurer’s request for a continuance and, after the hearing, entered an
order granting partial summary judgment in favor of the employee as to the issue of
compensability. Id. at *13. On appeal, we reversed, concluding the trial court had
applied an incorrect legal standard in denying the insurer’s motion for a continuance and
in granting partial summary judgment on the issue of compensability. Id. at *19-20. A
concurring opinion emphasized that an interlocutory order purportedly resolving the issue
of compensability “has resolved nothing because the interlocutory nature of the order
makes it subject to revision at any time prior to the issuance of a final compensation
order.” Id. at *28 (Conner, J., concurring). The concurrence further noted that “nothing
prevents the party who lost at the bifurcated hearing from seeking additional discovery on
the very issue the parties sought to resolve at the bifurcated hearing.” Id. at *28. Finally,
the concurrence concluded that the trial court’s interlocutory order purportedly resolving
the issue of compensability is “essentially a non-binding advisory opinion.” Id. at *32.

        In the context of the present case, we are asked to address whether motions for
partial summary judgment are, per se, prohibited by the statutes and rules applicable to
the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims. We conclude they are not. Motions for
partial summary judgment can be appropriately addressed in circumstances where
resolving the motion does not require the trial court to consider the credibility of
witnesses or make compensability determinations based on its weighing of the evidence
presented to date. What we have stated in previous cases, as highlighted in Love, is that
determining the compensability of an employee’s claim for benefits is almost always
inappropriate at an interlocutory stage of the case, including in the context of motions for
partial summary judgment. As we explained in Foriest:

       [F]uture developments in the case can impact the ultimate determination of
       compensability. . . . [W]e conclude that, as Employee has not yet completed
       his medical treatment . . . further developments over the course of the
       litigation may well alter the rights and obligations of the parties. As such, a
       final determination of the compensability of the claim has not matured to
       the point that it warrants a judicial decision.

3
 The Love case was complicated by the fact that the employer took a position adverse to its workers’
compensation insurer as to the issue of compensability, which necessitated that the employer and insurer
be represented by separate counsel.
                                                   7
Foriest, 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 39, at *8 (internal quotations marks and
citations omitted).

       Here, Employer asked the trial court to address two questions of law in its motion
for partial summary judgment: (1) whether an employee who previously entered into a
settlement agreement for permanent disability based on a medical impairment rating less
than 10% can later seek an award of extraordinary relief as described in Tennessee Code
Annotated section 50-6-242; and (2) whether an employee who previously settled his
claim for permanent partial disability benefits can later seek an award of permanent total
disability. Neither of those questions requires the court to consider the credibility of
witnesses or make preliminary compensability determinations.                  Indeed, the
compensability of Employee’s claim was acknowledged by Employer in the original
settlement agreement. Thus, we conclude the trial court could have elected to address the
questions of law raised by Employer in the context of a motion for partial summary
judgment.

                  Trial Court’s Discretion to Address Pre-Trial Motions

       The conclusion we have reached above does not end the inquiry. Although we
agree with Employer that a trial court can address questions of law at an interlocutory
hearing in circumstances such as arose in this case, we must also address whether a trial
court must entertain such issues at an interlocutory stage of the case if requested to do so
by a party. We conclude a trial court’s decision regarding whether to resolve any
particular issues at an interlocutory stage of the case is within its sound discretion, and we
will disturb such determinations only upon a showing that the trial court abused its
discretion. See, e.g., Ellison v. Alley, 902 S.W.2d 415 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (“[a] trial
court will not be placed in error for failing or refusing to rule on a motion unless the
record clearly reflects that it was asked to do so and thereafter, without just cause, refused
to act”).

        We previously addressed a similar issue in Hollis v. Komyo America, No. 2016-
03-0298, 2017 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 25 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd.
Mar. 7, 2017). In Hollis, the employer filed a motion for summary judgment in which it
asserted that the employee could not come forward with expert medical proof supporting
her claim. Id. at *4. Although the employer set a hearing and notified the employee’s
counsel of that hearing date, the trial court sua sponte delayed the hearing on the
employer’s motion for summary judgment and instead used that hearing date to consider
the employee’s motion for a “stay” or continuance. Id. at *4-5. On appeal, we concluded
the trial court had not abused its discretion and explained, “[T]he text of Rule 56 does not
specify a time within which a trial court must conduct a hearing on a previously filed
motion for summary judgment . . . . It gives a trial court significant discretion to
determine the appropriate time in the course of litigation to conduct a hearing on a party’s
motion for summary judgment.” Id. at *7. In response to the employer’s argument that

                                              8
a trial court cannot, in its discretion, refuse to address the merits of a properly-filed
dispositive motion, we stated as follows:

       Contrary to Employer’s argument, the trial court has not refused to address
       the merits of Employer’s motion but has merely delayed its consideration
       of the merits of the motion to give Employee the opportunity to take a
       medical deposition. Such an action does not constitute a refusal to address
       the merits, as Employer contends, but is instead an action that controls the
       pace of litigation. Employer does not describe in any detail the nature of
       the alleged prejudice it has suffered as a result of the trial court’s order. In
       essence, Employer’s argument implies that once an employer elects to file a
       motion for summary judgment, a trial court is obligated to act on the
       motion without regard to the circumstances of the case, the course of
       discovery, the employee’s medical status, or the occurrence of expert
       depositions. A litigant does not control the pace of litigation; it is the trial
       court’s duty to monitor the course of discovery and schedule hearings as it
       deems appropriate and fair to all parties.

               On the other hand, a non-moving party cannot be given an unfettered
       ability to delay a hearing on a dispositive motion until he or she believes
       the proof is sufficient to withstand the motion. Allowing a non-moving
       party to delay a hearing on a dispositive motion indefinitely would
       eviscerate the summary judgment process and render such motions
       meaningless. Thus, in setting hearings on pending motions, a trial court
       must balance the interests of both parties, give each side a reasonable and
       meaningful opportunity to prepare for the motion hearing, and set the
       hearing as expeditiously as it deems appropriate under the circumstances
       of the case.

Id. at *9-10 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

        Here, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in resetting the
hearing on Employer’s motion for partial summary judgment. Employer filed its motion
on October 4, the last possible day as mandated by the court’s scheduling order.
Employer set a hearing on its motion for November 15, and trial was set for December
20. Both parties were actively preparing for trial and both parties had retained vocational
experts who were expected to testify at trial. Employer would not have been spared any
significant time or expense by having its motion heard on the original hearing date given
that its vocational expert completed her evaluation before the original hearing date, and
the trial court would have needed time to evaluate the motion, decide the issues, and
prepare an order on Employer’s motion. By the time any such order was issued, both
parties would have completed most trial preparation activities. On the other hand, we
acknowledge that, in some circumstances, a pre-trial decision addressing such a motion

                                              9
can result in savings of time and expense and/or changes in trial strategy. We conclude,
however, that the trial court did not apply an incorrect legal standard, reach an illogical
conclusion, or employ reasoning that caused an injustice to the complaining party. We
further conclude the trial court’s decision to reset the hearing on Employer’s motion for
partial summary judgment was within the range of acceptable alternative dispositions.
See Lee Med., Inc., 312 S.W.3d at 525.

                      Use of Subpoena Duces Tecum in Expert Discovery

       Next, Employer asserts the trial court erred in compelling its vocational expert to
respond to a subpoena duces tecum served on her by Employee’s counsel. Several rules
must be considered to address this issue. First, Tenn. Comp. R. and Regs. 0800-02-21-
.17(6) authorizes the Clerk of the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims to “issue
signed subpoenas in blank in accordance with the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.”
That rule also requires the party who requested issuance of the subpoena to “complete
and serve their own subpoenas.” Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-21-.17(6)(a). The
use of subpoenas is governed generally by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 45, and the
use of a subpoena duces tecum, or a subpoena for the production of documents, is
authorized in Rule 45.02. That rules states:

        A subpoena may command a person to produce and permit inspection,
        copying, testing, or sampling of designated books, papers, documents,
        electronically stored information, or tangible things . . . with or without
        commanding the person to appear in person at the place of production or
        inspection . . . . An order of the court requiring compliance with a subpoena
        issued under this rule must provide protection to a person that is neither a
        party nor a party’s officer from undue burden or expense resulting from
        compliance.

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 45.02. Moreover, Rule 45.07 provides certain protections for non-
parties served with a subpoena duces tecum. As cited by Employer, a non-party witness
served with a subpoena for the production of documents can serve a written objection to
the subpoena “within twenty-one days after the subpoena is served.” Tenn. R. Riv. P.
45.07(2). The subpoena in the present case was issued and purportedly served on
November 14, 2023, and it listed November 28, 2023 as the date for production of the
documents requested, which was less than twenty-one days later. Thus, Employer’s
position is that the court erred in compelling its vocational expert to respond to a
subpoena duces tecum prior to the 21-day deadline for serving objections to such a
subpoena as allowed in Rule 45.07. 4

4
 The trial court’s order addressing Employer’s motion to quash the subpoena noted the November 28
deadline as stated on the face of the subpoena, but the court gave Employer’s expert the full 21 days, or
until December 5, to produce the requested documents or assert “[a]ny claims of privilege or protection.”

                                                   10
        To address this issue, we must also consider Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure
26.02, which defines the scope of pre-trial discovery. In its motion to quash the
subpoena, Employer cited Rule 26.02(3) in support of its argument that opposing counsel
cannot seek the work product of Employer’s counsel “prepared in anticipation of
litigation” absent a showing of “undue hardship” in obtaining “the substantial equivalent
of the materials by other means.” During oral argument, Employer also cited Rule
26.02(4), which appears to limit the methods by which a party can discover “facts known
and opinions held by experts” who are expected to testify at trial to interrogatories and
depositions, with no mention of subpoenas. However, the record on appeal does not
include a transcript of the November 29, 2023 hearing, and it is unclear whether
Employer presented this particular argument concerning the limitations on expert
discovery as stated in Rule 26.02(4) to the trial court. Although the court’s order
addressing Employer’s motion to quash discusses other provisions in Rule 26.02, it does
not specifically mention Rule 26.02(4). 5 Thus, based on our review of the record on
appeal, it is unclear whether the trial court was given an opportunity to address the
language in Rule 26.02(4) and whether this rule limits the methods by which a party may
discover “facts known and opinions held by experts” to interrogatories and depositions
only, thereby excluding subpoenas as a discovery method under these circumstances. As
a result, we conclude it is necessary to vacate the trial court’s order denying Employer’s
motion to quash the subpoena served on Employer’s vocational expert and remand the
case for the trial court to address whether a party may use a subpoena to obtain “facts
known and opinions held by experts” in light of the language of Tennessee Rule of Civil
Procedure 26.02(4).

                                            Conclusion

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order to the extent the court
reasonably exercised its discretion in declining to rule on Employer’s motion for partial
summary judgment at a particular point in the litigation. Further, we vacate the trial
court’s order to the extent it suggests a court is prohibited from considering an
employer’s motion for partial summary judgment at a preliminary stage of the case.
Finally, we vacate the trial court’s order declining to quash the subpoena duces tecum
served on Employer’s vocational expert, and we remand the case for the court to address
the language in Rule 26.02(4) as it pertains to the discovery of “facts known and opinions
held by expert” by use of a subpoena. Costs on appeal are taxed to Employer.

5
  The trial court’s order reflects that Employer did not object to providing certain of the materials
described in the subpoena but objected to the demand that its vocational expert drive to Knoxville on a
date and time certain to deliver such records as described in the subpoena.
                                                  11
                  TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
                    WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

John F. Oldham                                        )      Docket No. 2022-03-0420
                                                      )
v.                                                    )      State File No. 66575-2020
                                                      )
Freeman Webb Company Realtors                         )
d/b/a Sunnybrook, et al.                              )
                                                      )
                                                      )
Appeal from the Court of Workers’                     )      Heard February 7, 2024
Compensation Claims                                   )      at Knoxville
Pamela B. Johnson, Judge                              )

                                   CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Appeals Board’s decision in the referenced
case was sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service on this the 6th day
of March, 2024.

 Name                              Certified   First Class   Via   Via     Sent to:
                                   Mail        Mail          Fax   Email
 A. Allen Grant                                                      X     agrant@eraclides.com
 Ben Norris                                                                bnorris@eraclides.com
 Andrew Roberto                                                      X     aroberto@brownandroberto.com
                                                                           bseay@brownandroberto.com
 Pamela B. Johnson, Judge                                            X     Via Electronic Mail
 Kenneth M. Switzer, Chief Judge                                     X     Via Electronic Mail
 Penny Shrum, Clerk, Court of                                        X     penny.patterson-shrum@tn.gov
 Workers’ Compensation Claims

Olivia Yearwood
Clerk, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board
220 French Landing Dr., Ste. 1-B
Nashville, TN 37243
Telephone: 615-253-1606
Electronic Mail: WCAppeals.Clerk@tn.gov