Court Opinion

ID: 9469934
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:52:20.459425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:38.167730
License: Public Domain

JAMES M. BURNS, District Judge,
concurring.
I concur with the opinion, and its result. I add some comments on the “special parole term” issue.
Faherty received a typical “split” sentence on the importation count. Five years in prison, the first 120 days in jail and the balance suspended, with three years probation. All of this is a routine kind of sentence, authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3651. (She also received a “straight” probation sentence of 3 years on the possession count, the probation to run concurrently with that on the importation count.) But the sentencing judge provided, also, on the importation count, that there should be a special parole term (SPT) of three years. Presumably, the sentencing judge believed that he was required to impose a SPT in view of the provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 960, which provides that “If a sentence under this paragraph provides for imprisonment, the sentence shall indicate a special parole term.” (Emphasis supplied).
Ironically, however, unless Faherty violates her split sentence probation, is revoked for such violation, and the original five year sentence (or some portion of it at least one year and a day in length), comes into play, she will never serve the “special parole term.” That is because of Section 2.57-01 of the Notes and Procedures Manual of the Parole Commission. Paragraph (d) of that section provides as follows:
“In a ‘split sentence’ situation, the special parole term is considered to be part of the sentence that was suspended and this will not take effect unless probation is revoked.”
*1262As a practical matter, Faherty would never come to the attention of the Parole Commission if the split sentence were served and probation were not revoked. While Faherty would become a “file” for the U.S. Probation Office — because of the probation sentence and would be a “file” for the U.S. Bureau of Prisons — because of the 4 months sentence in a jail type institution, she never became a “file” for the Parole Commission. That is because the Parole Commission, under 18 U.S.C. § 4205, assumes jurisdiction only for the persons sentenced to a term of imprisonment of “more than one year.”
Indeed at the time of oral argument, counsel for Faherty was questioned as to whether this issue was properly before us. One might argue with some fervor — and validity, perhaps — that we are being asked to render an advisory opinion. However, the panel has concluded that the question is properly before us, and I join, though reluctantly.
Nor is this the only anomaly in the special parole term field. Another, which we need not reach here, deals with the interplay between the provisions relating to early termination of “regular” parole and that of “special” parole. Section 4211 of Title 18 provides that the Commission is to evaluate and “determine the need for continued supervision[.]” annually, commencing two years after the parolee is released. At the end of five years, “ordinary” parole terminates unless, after a full blown hearing, the Commission determines that “there is a likelihood that the parolee will engage in conduct violating any criminal law.” § 4211(c) (Emphasis supplied.) 28 C.F.R. 2.43.
Under C.F.R. 2.57(e) these early termination provisions purport to apply to special parole terms as well as ordinary parole terms. Thus, a defendant sentenced, for example, to 10 years in prison and 10 years special parole, if released on “ordinary” parole after say, 3 years, it is likely that he will serve no more than 5 years of ordinary parole, plus, perhaps a minimum amount of special parole time thereafter. Almost certainly, the SPT will not run beyond 5 years; in all likelihood it will run for perhaps a year or less. Indeed, there is some question whether special parole actually ever comes into play in most cases where ordinary parole is terminated early. The regulations, 28 C.F.R. 2.57(e), specify that this is not permitted, but the reality may well not be the same as the regulation. Whether the application of early termination provision of § 4211 should apply to special parole — and whether the Congressional intent is being furthered or frustrated is a question that need not be answered here.