Court Opinion

ID: 9475345
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:24:24.74616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:39.566924
License: Public Domain

J. BLAINE ANDERSON, Circuit Judge:
The United States (government) appeals from a district court order quashing part of a grand jury subpoena. At issue is whether certain records belonging to intervenor John B. Lacoste (Lacoste) are protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled incrimination or by the attorney-client privilege.
I. BACKGROUND
Lacoste was the Chief of Police in Emer-yville, California. On the evening of November 15,1983, the Emeryville City Council suspended Lacoste from this position. Lacoste went to police headquarters and began removing boxes and papers. Although Lacoste claimed he was removing only personal records, Police Department officials were concerned about the possible removal of department property. In response to this situation, representatives of the Alameda County District Attorney’s office were summoned. A sorting process was begun and continued throughout the night and early morning hours, through which the ownership of each document could be verified by the District Attorney representatives. Lacoste was allowed to remove those items determined to be his personal property. The procedure was tedious and shortly after 7:00 a.m. on November 16, the parties agreed to temporarily suspend the sorting due to fatigue. The remaining unsorted materials were placed under seal at police headquarters.
Before the sorting process could be resumed, a federal grand jury that had been investigating matters involving Lacoste issued and served a subpoena on the new Acting Chief of Police, one Maltby. The subpoena called for production of all documents on Police Department premises relating to various aspects of the investigation. Lacoste filed a motion to intervene and to quash the subpoena. The district court ordered that the unsorted materials continue to be impounded, and appointed a special master to determine the ownership of each document, whether each was subpoena responsive, and whether each was privileged.
The master returned a large number of items belonging to the Police Department and a large number of nonresponsive items belonging to Lacoste. Then, the master, Lacoste, and his counsel reviewed the remaining subpoena-responsive material for possible objections. No objection was asserted as to some documents, and they are not at issue here. As to all the remaining items, Lacoste claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Further, as to a few of the items, Lacoste invoked the attorney-client privilege.
The master ruled that because the documents were of a “personal” nature, the contents of those documents were privileged by the Fifth Amendment according to the rule in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886). The master also held that Lacoste was personally compelled by the subpoena, despite the *983fact that it was directed at Acting Chief Maltby. Finally, the master upheld La-coste’s attorney-client privilege claim as to five specific documents.1
The district court agreed with the master and affirmed the findings that the document contents were privileged and that Lacoste was personally compelled by the subpoena. Because these findings encompassed all the challenged documents, however, the district court expressly declined to decide the attorney-client privilege issue. The district court, therefore, quashed part of the subpoena, and ordered the documents released to Lacoste.2 The government appeals to this court.
II. DISCUSSION
The government argues that the Fifth Amendment does not privilege the subpoena-responsive documents because the subpoena is directed to Acting Chief Maltby and, therefore, it does not compel any act of production from Lacoste. The district court acknowledged that Lacoste was not in actual physical possession of the documents. Nevertheless, the court found that Lacoste was in constructive possession because his “involuntary relinquishment of actual possession was so insignificant as to leave the personal compulsion on him essentially unaltered.” (ER at 89). Thus, the court found that Lacoste was subject to actual compulsion because he was compelled to stop removing the records from the police department “as he was doing and as, except for the subpoena, he had the right to do.” (ER at 82). We agree with the government and reverse the district court.
In addressing this issue, the Supreme Court has clearly stated that “a person inculpated by materials sought by a subpoena issued to a third party cannot seek shelter in the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” S.E.C. v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 742-43, 104 S.Ct. 2720, 2725-26, 81 L.Ed.2d 615, 621-22 (1984). The rationale behind this principle was elucidated in the seminal Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 93 S.Ct. 611, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973), and in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 48 L.Ed.2d 39 (1976). The facts in Couch and Fisher were similar: subpoenas seeking taxpayers’ records were directed at the taxpayers’ accountant and attorney, respectively, in whose possession the records were kept. In holding that the taxpayers could not use the Fifth Amendment to protect the records, the Court emphasized that the privilege is personal to the accused and the taxpayers were not personally compelled by the subpoenas to do anything. Since the records were sought from the third-party accountant and the third-party attorney, “the ingredient of personal compulsion against an accused is lacking.” Couch, 409 U.S. at 329, 93 S.Ct. at 616, 334 L.Ed.2d at 554; Fisher, 425 U.S. at 397, 96 S.Ct. at 1574, 48 L.Ed.2d at 48.
The same ingredient is lacking at bar. The subpoena directed at Maltby does not compel anything from Lacoste personally. The sought-after records are in the custody and possession of the Emeryville Police Department, and only that department can comply with the subpoena. That being the case, Lacoste is not compelled to bear witness against himself. It makes no difference that Lacoste does not want the Police Department to possess the records. Likewise, it is irrelevant that Lacoste does not want the records produced. “ ‘A party is privileged from producing the evidence but not from its production.’ ” Couch, 409 U.S. at 328, 93 S.Ct. at 616, 34 L.Ed.2d at *984554, and Fisher, 425 U.S. at 399, 96 S.Ct. at 1575; 48 L.Ed.2d at 49 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458, 33 S.Ct. 572, 57 L.Ed. 919 (1913)).
We reject Lacoste’s argument, and the district court’s reasoning, that the instant facts give rise to the exception contemplated in Couch and Fisher. There the Court noted that “situations may well arise where constructive possession is so clear or the relinquishment of possession is so temporary and insignificant as to leave the personal compulsions upon the accused substantially intact.” Couch, 409 U.S. at 333, 93 S.Ct. at 618, 34 L.Ed.2d at 557 (footnote omitted); Fisher, 425 U.S. at 398, 96 S.Ct. at 1574, 48 L.Ed.2d at 48. The Court has provided no further guidance as to what circumstances would trigger this reserved exception. We are convinced, however, that they are not presented at bar.
This is not a case where, as in Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833, 77 S.Ct. 48, 1 L.Ed.2d 52 (1956), and United States v. Guterma, 272 F.2d 344 (2d Cir.1959), the accused maintained control of the documents while merely storing them on the premises of a third party. Nor is this a case, as suggested by Lacoste, concerning the sanctity of private, personal office space. The records being sought are not secured in Lacoste’s former personal office.3
It may seem mere happenstance that this question arises at all. Had the parties not grown weary on the morning of November 16, 1983, the sorting process may have been completed before the subpoena issued. In that event, nothing would remain for Maltby to produce and, more importantly, Lacoste could properly assert the privilege as to any subpoena directed at him personally. Unfortunately for Lacoste, however, those events did not occur, and like the petitioners in Couch and Fisher whose records happened to be in the possession of a subpoenaed third party, La-coste is not personally compelled and the Fifth Amendment provides him with no protection.
Consequently, we reverse the district court’s application of the Fifth Amendment without reaching the issue of whether the contents of the “personal” documents were privileged.4 It is still possible that a limited number of the documents may be protected under the attorney client-privilege. Because the district court expressly refused to review the master’s findings on the attorney-client privilege, however, we must remand for that purpose.
Accordingly, the order of the district court is VACATED IN PART and this case is REMANDED for further proceedings.

. The master listed the following as confidential communications between Lacoste and an attorney concerning legal advice:
(1) Letter from Carniato’s office to Lacoste, November 15, 1982, re litigation.
(2) Letter from Carniato’s office to Lacoste, December 27, 1982, re litigation.
(3) Copies of unsigned, unfiled drafts of court documents in litigation.
(4) Letter to Lacoste from attorney Heafey.
(5) Undated note to “Billy.”
(ER at 84).

. The district court stayed its order for release pending appeal. All subpoena-responsive documents remain impounded.

. By this we do not hold or imply that the private, personal office situation or the facts in Schwimmer or Guterma are sufficient to invoke the exception envisioned in Couch. We need not decide those issues today. We merely note that they are distinguishable from the circumstances at bar.

. Although we do not reach the Boyd issue, for edification purposes we direct the interested reader to In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Terry), 759 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir.1985), which was filed after the judgment of the district court in this case.