Court Opinion

ID: 9697876
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:35:32.103499+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:36.531273
License: Public Domain

ROBERT M. BELL, Judge,
dissenting.
Among the disciplinary rules the hearing judge found that George J. Goldsborough, Jr., the respondent, violated was Rule 8.1, prohibiting a lawyer, in connection with a disciplinary action, from knowingly making a false statement of material fact. The bases for finding the violation were representations the respondent made in correspon*367dence with Bar Counsel and his testimony before the inquiry panel. In his correspondence the respondent denied that he spanked two of the complaining witnesses as they had alleged.1 Testifying before the Inquiry Panel, not only did he deny the petition’s allegations, but he specifically branded the testimony of the complaining witnesses as untrue. As he was permitted to do, the hearing judge accepted the testimony of the complaining witnesses and rejected the respondent’s. Thus, the hearing judge found that the respondent engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, see DR 1-102(A)(5); Rule 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, or which adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. See DR 1-102(A)(6). In addition, however, the hearing judge found that the respondent’s testimony and his representations in the correspondence with Bar Counsel were “deliberately untruthful.” The only evidence upon which the latter finding was based was the testimony of the complaining witnesses, which the hearing judge credited, and the respondent’s denials, which he rejected.
The respondent excepted to the hearing judge’s finding that there was “clear and convincing evidence” that he was deliberately untruthful.2 Overruling the exception, the ma*368jority acknowledges that, as a general rule, “only a conflict in testimony between [the respondent] and each of the three women who testified, and ... a court’s refusal to believe a respondent’s evidence does not, of itself, mean that a witness is being ‘deliberately untruthful.’ ” [Op. at 355]. It is persuaded, however, that the additional finding of “deliberate untruthfulness” was not clearly erroneous. Notwithstanding that it was based on the same evidence as proved the substantive offenses, the majority points out, it is up to the hearing judge to decide what to make of the evidence before him. Pointing then to “the substantial evidence presented at the hearing”, [Op. at 356], and giving appropriate deference to the hearing judge’s finding, the majority concludes that the respondent violated Rule 8.1. Id. We are never told just precisely why, or how, the evidence is either substantial on the Rule 8.1 issue or supports the additional “deliberate untruthfulness” finding.
I agree that a hearing judge is free to pick and choose, from among the evidence presented, that which he or she will credit, accepting some and discarding some, until the factual conflict has been resolved. See Attorney Grievance Commission v. Powell, 328 Md. 276, 292, 614 A.2d 102, 110 (1992). I also agree that judging the credibility of witnesses is a matter peculiarly within the province of the hearing judge and that his findings in that regard are entitled to appropriate deference. I, therefore, agree that the finding that the respondent committed the acts the witnesses alleged and testified to, is not clearly erroneous. Their testimony provides the substantial evidence of those acts.
I do not agree, on the other hand, that this record contains substantial evidence that the respondent was deliberately untruthful. As I indicated earlier, the only evidence *369bearing on the issue was the conflicting testimony of the witnesses and the respondent. No evidence bearing upon the respondent’s state of mind and, in particular, his motivation for denying the allegations was ever presented.
Permitting the joinder of substantive charges and perjury-like charges, premised only on the respondent’s denial of the substantive charges is highly prejudicial and creates a dangerous precedent. A person acts deliberately whenever that person elects, voluntarily, to testify at a hearing or to respond to a complaint made against him or her. It makes no difference whether that to which the person testifies is consistent with, or contradictory to, the complaint or other testimony or evidence in the case. When the evidence is in dispute, it is the fact finder’s call as to which side is being truthful. Its resolution of the credibility issue may lead, and, I suggest, most often does, in fact, lead,3 inexorably, to the conclusion that the side disbelieved was deliberately untruthful and, conversely, that the other side was deliberately truthful. Thus, when it believes the complaining witness, a trial court’s single act of resolving credibility may, and often does, perform double duty — it determines that the respondent or defendant committed the charged offenses and, necessarily, albeit sub silentio, affirmatively labels that party a perjurer.4 When only the substantive *370offense is charged, the latter conclusion often does not receive voice. In such a case, and in those, such as here, in which the hearing judge has no responsibility for sanctioning the respondent, the court will have no occasion to act on that conclusion.
Where, however, again, as in this case, in addition to the substantive offenses, the respondent is charged with knowingly making a false statement of material fact because he denied the complaint’s allegations, the court’s attention necessarily is directed to both the substantive charge and the corollary perjury-like charge. The latter charge likely may all but guarantee a like finding, whenever the respondent is found to have committed the charged substantive offense.5 And once it is held that it is permissible to charge and convict a respondent for a perjury-like offense on nothing but conflicting evidence, where the decisive factor is the credibility determination, such charges will be brought, not on the rare occasion, but in every case. Indeed, Bar Counsel might even feel obliged to file a corollary perjury-like charge every time a respondent denies committing the substantive charge. Of course, when it becomes generally known that such charges are permitted in attorney discipline cases, it won’t be long before they will be filed in criminal cases whenever the defendant makes an exculpatory statement or denies the charges after electing to testify before the grand jury. It may thus become common place that, whenever a respondent or defendant denies the allegations of a complaint or makes an exculpatory statement in response to allegations in a charging document, either two charges will be filed for each allegation, or *371an additional charge for either knowingly making a false statement of material fact or perjury will be brought.
There is another reason not to permit perjury-like charges to be tried in the same proceeding as the substantive charges. In Brown v. State, 225 Md. 610, 616, 171 A.2d 456, 458 (1961), quoting Wharton, Criminal Law, § 1511 (12th ed. 1932), we defined perjury as follows:
The offense consists in swearing falsely and corruptly, without probable cause of belief; not in swearing rationally or inconsiderately, according to belief. The false oath, if taken from inadvertence or mistake, cannot amount to voluntary or corrupt perjury____ That the oath is wilful and corrupt must not only be charged in the indictment, but must be supported on trial. An oath is wilful when taken with deliberation, and not through surprise or confusion, or a bona fide mistake as to the facts, in which latter cases perjury does not lie.
See also State v. Mercer, 101 Md. 535, 538, 61 A. 220, 221 (1905); State v. Floto, 81 Md. 600, 601, 32 A. 315 (1895); 4 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Law, § 601 (14th ed. 1981). As this definition of perjury reflects, the gravamen of the offense is intentional lying. The same is true of a Rule 8.1 violation, the respondent must have intentionally lied to be in violation of that rule. Where the evidence conflicts on the question, there is no basis for concluding that the respondent lied, intentionally or otherwise, until the trier of fact has first resolved the credibility issue. Certainly, the fact that more witnesses are lined up on one side or the other is not dispositive. Furthermore, until the substantive charges are resolved, the focus will be on determining whether the respondent committed them, not on whether he or she is falsely or corruptly lying. Certainly, the record in this case does not reflect any attempt by Bar Counsel to establish that the respondent knowingly made a false statement. All the record reflects is that one side sought to prove that the respondent committed the acts alleged and the other sought to prove that he did not. In this case, the hearing judge simply inferred from his acceptance of the *372complaining witnesses’ testimony that the respondent’s denials deliberately were untruthful. Once the substantive charges have been tried, it may then be appropriate to charge and, in a separate proceeding, prosecute the respondent for a Rule 8.1 violation. That would at least ensure that the proper focus is maintained.
To permit a respondent to be found guilty of a perjury-like charge, conviction of which necessarily presupposes, or, at least, exposes, the respondent to punishment for that offense, as well as for the substantive rule violation he or she denies committing, based only on conflicting evidence, and in the context of a hearing on the latter, places a significant cost on a respondent’s decision affirmatively to defend him or herself.6 Having been notified of a complaint lodged against him or her for alleged misconduct, a lawyer will have to consider, before answering it, whether to risk the consequences of doing so. Even when he or she believes the allegations are not well-founded, given this decision, he or she must seriously consider foregoing any option he or she may have to deny them, since the hearing judge’s decision on credibility could very well result in the multiplication of the charges; not only may the substantive charges be sustained but so too could perjury-like charges.
Using the fact of contradictory evidence as the predicate for a perjury-like charge and its resolution as the basis for a conviction on that charge also impermissibly results in double punishment and is fundamentally unfair. When the *373hearing judge resolved the credibility issue against the respondent, and in favor of the witnesses against him, he necessarily determined that the respondent engaged in conduct violative of the Rules of Professional Responsibility and, thereupon, may be sanctioned for that conduct to the fullest extent permitted by law. By using that same credibility determination to find a violation of another rule, the respondent was subjected to a separate, but potentially cumulative, sanction. Moreover, that violation is at least as serious, if not more so, than the charge which prompted the petition for disciplinary action, because it implicates a character trait, dishonesty, the existence of which undermines, if it is not inimical to, one’s ability to practice law. This is in no way analogous to the situation in which the respondent’s sentence is enhanced by reason of a defendant testifying falsely at trial. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 55, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2618, 57 L.Ed.2d 582, 592 (1978). See also United States v. Dunnigan, —— U.S. --, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993). In the latter case, the question is what sentence, the outer limits of which are already fixed, should be imposed in respect of the conviction. In the former, however, there are two separate offenses, each subject to separate, and cumulative, punishment. Thus, far from enhancing a sentence, what actually occurs is that offenses are multiplied, which, as a practical matter, makes it more likely that a more severe sanction will be imposed.
Fundamental fairness demands that only the substantive charge, i.e. the charge reflecting the conduct about which the complaint was concerned and, hence, which prompted the filing of the petition, should be considered. As indicated, that charge subjects the petitioner to a significant sanction. To allow the perjury-like charge to be considered smacks of “piling on.” Although not identical, the majority recognized the unfairness of “piling on” when it responded to the petitioner’s exceptions to the hearing judge’s refusal to find an 8.4 violation. In overruling Bar Counsel’s exceptions to the hearing judge’s refusal to find that Rule 8.4(c) *374had been violated, i.e., that the respondent engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, based on the same conduct as formed the basis for the 8.1 violation, the majority suggested that, while the conduct might support both violations, there was no need to find a violation of another rule when the violation already found sufficiently covered the offense. [Op. at 362.]. Similarly, here, having determined that the respondent violated the substantive offense, there really is no basis, or need, for a further finding that his denial that he did so i.e., his entering a defense, was deliberately untruthful. The hearing judge should have declined, as it did in the case of the charged Rule 8.4 violation, to find a Rule 8.1 violation.
Rather than order the respondent disbarred, the majority indefinitely suspends him with the right to apply for reinstatement in no sooner than two years, but then only when he is able to persuade the Court that the conduct it found that he committed will never be repeated. This disposition is curious given the majority’s acceptance of the hearing judge’s finding that the respondent deliberately chose to deny what he well knew to be a well-founded charge and when no mitigating circumstances, such as alcoholism, drug addiction, or a mental disorder beyond his control were found. Indeed, as to the latter, the respondent has not even contended that there were mitigating circumstances which would explain his conduct, adamantly maintaining, throughout these proceedings, that he simply did not do that with which he was accused. That being the case, it is difficult for me to understand how a finding that he is suffering from a serious, but treatable disorder (that appears to be the only possible predicate for the Court’s disposition) is possible.
Moreover, because the respondent does not admit the conduct, I am puzzled as to how the respondent can aggressively seek help when he has indicated, emphatically, that he not only does not need help, but that he did not commit the acts alleged. Furthermore, an indefinite suspension, especially on the condition proposed by the majority, holds *375out hope to the respondent that he may again practice law, but only if he is willing to engage in subterfuge and dishonesty, the latter of which was found by the hearing judge to be reprehensible enough to support an additional charge. By upholding that finding, I would have thought that the majority would have enhanced, rather than mitigate, the respondent’s sanction.
Because I find the respondent’s conduct reprehensible, the hearing judge’s findings of fact concerning the respondent’s commission of the substantive charges, unlike those pertaining to the Rule 8.1 violation, not being clearly erroneous, I would have suspended the respondent from the practice of law for two years. Assuming the Rule 8.1 violation finding was not clearly erroneous, disbarment, rather than indefinite suspension, would have been warranted.

. The respondent also denied the allegations that two partnership corporations of which he had been a member had been dissolved as a result of his unethical behavior. While the hearing judge said that his response was “anything but candid," he acknowledged that, since the dissolution involved professional associations, it was technically correct. It cannot be assumed that the violation was premised on that representation.
As to the Schisler allegations, Bar Counsel inquired whether the respondent had “subjected [her] to regular spankings that continued throughout the course of her employment." The respondent’s denial was that she had not been “subjected ‘to anything,’ including specifically, ‘regular spankings.’ ” Although he testified before the Inquiry Panel and the hearing judge that he spanked Schisler on one occasion, he consistently denied that there were regular spankings.

. The hearing judge’s findings of fact referred to the respondent’s testimony before both the Inquiry Panel and the hearing judge. In his conclusions of law, however, the hearing judge focused only on "[Respondent's misrepresentations as set forth in his letters of June *36822, 1990, and January 2, 1991, to Assistant Bar Counsel and his false testimony before the Inquiry Panel, on July 8, 1991.” Therefore, it is clear that the hearing judge’s finding of a violation of Rule 8.1 was not premised on the respondent’s testimony before him.

. It is by no means unusual for a trial judge to take account, in sentencing, of his or her conclusion that a defendant who testified that he or she did not commit the charges of which he or she was convicted, lied and/or refused to accept responsibility for his or her conduct. The only explanation for that conclusion in most of those cases is that the judge believed the State’s witnesses and accepted its evidence, while disbelieving and rejecting the defendant’s. To be sure, those cases are usually criminal cases in which the defendant elects to testify at trial, but, rather than refuting the point, that fact actually buttresses it.

. The prohibition against knowingly making a false statement of material fact is tantamount to committing perjury. See Brown v. State, 225 Md. 610, 616, 171 A.2d 456, 458 (1961) (quoting Wharton, Criminal Law, § 1511 (12th ed. 1932)); State v. Mercer, 101 Md. 535, 538, 61 A. 220, 221 (1905); State v. Floto, 81 Md. 600, 601, 32 A. 315 *370(1895). See also 4 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law, § 601 (14th ed. 1981).

. I am aware that that was not the case in Atty. Griev. Com. v. Protokowicz, 329 Md. 252, 260-62, 619 A.2d 100, 104-05 (1993). There, the hearing judge specifically rejected the invitation, offered by Bár Counsel, to find that Protokowicz knowingly lied about how the complaining witness’s cat was microwaved. Notwithstanding, the danger that such a finding will be made automatically still exists.

. It may be argued that, a lawyer does not have a right to commit perjury; thus, he or she is not harmed by permitting separate punishment for the substantive charge and perjury. The argument continues that he or she may, rather than deny the allegations, simply put Bar Counsel to its proof. There is a real question as to whether a respondent actually has any alternative but to answer a request from Bar Counsel for information about a complaint. See Rule 8.1(b) ("An applicant ... shall not ... knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admission or disciplinary authority____’’). That is, by no means, satisfactory. Moreover, it is mere fortuity under the circumstances where the credibility determination is dispositive of whether the lawyer’s denial is found to be perjury or the gospel truth.