Court Opinion

ID: 9760025
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:38:58.805961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:07.616594
License: Public Domain

FERREN, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
This case presents the question whether the accused, in remaining silent after Miranda warnings, should be understood to have asserted — or waived — his Fifth Amendment right to silence. My colleagues affirm the trial court’s implied finding that appellant either did not assert his right or did but eventually waived it before making an incriminating statement. I respectfully dissent because the trial court’s ruling is too ambiguous to be reviewable; the record should be remanded for clarification.
After receiving the proper warnings under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), at 2:30 p.m., appellant remained silent for approximately 30 minutes. Pressed to respond, he then told Detective Shuler that “he knew what his rights were and that he understood them.” Ante at 1349. Appellant said nothing more. After a hiatus of 1V4 hours while a mobile crime technician took photographs, seized appellant’s clothing, and swabbed his hands, Detective Shuler returned to question appellant for another 45 minutes. Appellant still said nothing. At about 5:00 p.m. Detective Donald, whom appellant knew from a previous investigation, entered the room at Shuler’s request and began to ask questions. Soon thereafter, without expressly waiving his right to remain silent, appellant made an incriminating statement.
Accordingly, we confront the complexity of evaluating an alleged waiver of the right to silence by an accused who had received Miranda warnings, was interrogated three times for V-k hours during a 2lh hour period, remained silent the entire time (except to say he knew and understood his rights), and then made an incriminating statement.
I.
Cases concerning Fifth Amendment Miranda rights come in so many species that an appellate court cannot review them un*1352less the trial court carefully determines what is at issue. First, there is the question whether the case concerns an alleged waiver of the right to silence or to counsel — or a waiver of both. Second, as to either category, there is the question whether the case concerns a “first-level” waiver (in response to the initial Miranda warnings) or a “second-level” waiver (a change of mind after an initial assertion of rights). See generally In re C.P., D.C.App., 411 A.2d 643, 649 (Ferren, J., dissenting), vacated, 449 U.S. 945, 101 S.Ct. 345, 66 L.Ed.2d 210 (1980), remanded, 439 A.2d 460 (1981).
“A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). This means, first, that whatever category or level of waiver is at issue, the “relinquishment of the privilege” must be “voluntary.” Miranda, supra 384 U.S. at 476, 86 S.Ct. at 1629.1 Second, “a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege.” Id. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628.2
The government’s burden is eased, however, by the Supreme Court’s ruling that a waiver need not be express; it can be found in “ ‘the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’ ” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (Fifth Amendment right to counsel) (quoting Johnson, supra 304 U.S. at 464, 58 S.Ct. at 1023 (Sixth Amendment right to counsel)); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-75, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757-58, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979) (Fifth Amendment right to counsel); Bliss v. United States, D.C.App., 445 A.2d 625, 630-31 (1982) (right to silence). As elaborated below, this “facts and circumstances” test inevitably imposes a responsibility on the trial court to be explicit about the type of waiver at issue (silence and/or counsel), the level of the alleged waiver (first or second),3 and the record evidence supporting the court’s findings.
Any waiver analysis must begin with a trial court finding as to whether the accused has asserted any right after receiving the Miranda warnings and options. As to the first level, the right to counsel cannot be asserted effectively unless asserted expressly: the accused has to ask for counsel. Thus, after Miranda warnings, failure to ask for counsel amounts to waiver. As to the second level, the right to counsel, once asserted, cannot be waived effectively unless waived affirmatively, and only if “the accused himself initiates further communication,” Edwards, supra 451 U.S. at 485, 101 S.Ct. at 1885, after the police have “scrupulously honored” the asserted right. United States v. Alexander, D.C.App., 428 A.2d 42, 49 (1981).4
Assertion of the right to silence is a more complex proposition, for unlike the right to counsel it is not necessarily dependent on an express invocation. An accused’s simply re*1353maining silent — after a Miranda warning that he or she has a right to do so — may reflect an assertion of the right.5 Or it may not. The trial court must make a finding as to assertion or waiver based on all the facts and circumstances. Bliss, supra at 630-31. Once an accused has asserted the right, the question of a second-level waiver is also a matter of the circumstances, beginning with a threshold inquiry into whether the police have “scrupulously honored” the initially-asserted right. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104, 96 S.Ct. 321, 326, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975); see Wilson v. United States, D.C.App., 444 A.2d 25, 27-30 (1982). The trial court’s inquiry is especially sensitive, moreover, for as I read Mosley, supra, the Supreme Court has not foreclosed the possibility that, under certain circumstances, the police themselves may initiate the resumption of questioning (after renewal of the Miranda warnings), without violating the requirement that they scrupulously hon- or an asserted right to silence.
In sum, right-to-silence eases reflect two significant differences from right-to-counsel cases: (1) the question of assertion or waiver of the right to silence, both at the first and second levels, may be a much more difficult question of fact; and (2) a second-level waiver of the right to silence may be possible under some circumstances when the police have taken the initiative to resume questioning, whereas, for a second-level waiver of the right to counsel, the accused alone must take the initiative.
It follows that, when an accused eventually talks after hearing his Miranda rights and saying nothing whatsoever for a long time (or, as in this case, merely saying that he understands his rights), the trial court faces a very difficult question of fact: (1) whether the accused, by eventually talking, has manifested a decision not to assert the right to silence and thus has given a first-level waiver — in which case the pattern of police questioning (unless coercive) is not legally significant; or (2) whether, instead, the accused has asserted the right to silence — in which case there can be no second-level waiver unless the trial court finds the police have scrupulously honored that assertion during the period before waiver.
II.
In the present case, the trial court made the following findings and ruling:
Based on the total situation before the Court, the divergent testimony, even the testimony of Mr. McClinnahan, the court would have to rule that the statement must be let in because, according to [Michigan] v. Mosley, a Supreme Court case. Counsel argues the point that Mr. McClinnahan did not, as the Court recalls, ever say to anybody I wish an attorney or I do not want to talk. The courts have ruled that even if he had said that he didn’t want to talk and then he talked later, the courts have ruled that that’s permissible. It would not have been permissible if he had said I want an attorney and then the police kept talking to him. That would be illegal and the statements would not be admissible. But based on the total situation, the statements will come in.
I have two problems: First, we cannot tell whether the trial court found a first- or second-level waiver. By citing Mosley, supra, a second-level right-to-silence case, the court may be suggesting the latter. On this record of police questioning, however, there is no sure basis for finding that the police *1354“scrupulously honored” an asserted right to silence. If the court meant to find a second-level waiver here, I would be hard pressed not to hold it clearly erroneous.
Second, even if the court had in mind a first-level waiver, it appears from the ruling quoted above that the court may have assumed, erroneously, that “silence alone,” Butler, supra 441 U.S. at 373, 99 S.Ct. at 1757; note 5 supra, followed by an eventual statement, implied non-assertion and thus waiver of the right. To the contrary, circumstances in addition to mere silence followed by a statement are necessary for a finding of first-level waiver. See Bliss, supra at 630 (appellant communicated “his understanding and responses through nonverbal means” and thus cannot be said to have asserted his right to silence).
The trial court’s ambiguous ruling illustrates why, in right-to-silence eases, it is important for the trial court to analyze, step-by-step, until the issue is resolved: (1) whether there has been an assertion of the right or a first-level waiver; (2) whether the police have scrupulously honored an asserted right; and (3) whether there has been a second-level waiver.6 Otherwise, the appellate court cannot review. The trial court’s ruling here failed to sort out whether appellant’s silence itself reflected an assertion, or was evidence of a first-level waiver, of the right to silence. If it was the former, the court failed to address whether the police “scrupulously honored” the asserted right before appellant gave a second-level waiver. Mosley, supra 423 U.S. at 104, 96 S.Ct. at 326. Thus, the trial court gave us an unreviewable ruling.
I would remand the record for the trial court to clarify the level of waiver it found and its reasoning. It is not for this court to make that fact-oriented ruling.

. For a related line of cases on voluntariness of confessions see Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964); Bliss v. United States, D.C.App., 445 A.2d 625, 631 (1982).

. Recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that Miranda waivers not only must be “voluntary” but also must conform to the rigid constitutional standard in Johnson, supra, of “a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (right to counsel); see Wilson v. United States, D.C.App., 444 A.2d 25 (1982) (right to silence).

. While not always using “first” or “second” level terminology, this court does make clear, conceptually, what level is at issue. See, e.g., Bliss, supra (first-level waiver of right to silence); Wilson, supra (second-level waiver of right to silence); United States v. Alexander, D.C.App., 428 A.2d 42 (1981) (second-level waiver of right to counsel); In re C.P., supra (same); Jackson v. United States, D.C.App., 404 A.2d 911 (1979) (same).

. The Supreme Court has indicated that if an accused who has invoked the Fifth Amendment right to counsel initiates further communication with the police, the question of a second-level waiver of that right is resolved by the “facts and circumstances” test. See Edwards, supra 451 U.S. at 486 n. 9, 101 S.Ct. at 1885-86.

. The possibility that silence itself may reflect an assertion of the right follows from the Supreme Court’s view that “silence alone” after Miranda warnings, followed eventually by a statement, provides an insufficient basis for finding waiver. Butler, supra 441 U.S. at 373, 99 S.Ct. at 1757.
As was unequivocally said in Miranda, mere silence is not enough [to establish waiver]. That does not mean that the defendant’s silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver, may never support a conclusion that a defendant has waived his rights. The courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights; the prosecution’s burden is great; but in at least some cases waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated. [Id. (footnote omitted).]

. Commonly, related questions arise as to whether there has been police “interrogation,” see Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980); Wilson, supra, of a suspect in “custody.” See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976); Ford v. United States, 376 A.2d 439 (1977). Neither question is presented in this case.