Court Opinion

ID: 9630715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:18:17.393664+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:41.952713
License: Public Domain

TERRY JENNINGS, J„
dissenting.
Because the majority opinion errs in holding that the trial court’s submission of an unavoidable accident instruction in this case was harmful error and that this case *524is “controlled by Casteel,”1 I respectfully dissent.
I agree that the trial court erred in submitting an unavoidable accident instruction in this case. Such an instruction is proper only when there is evidence that the event was proximately caused by a non-human condition and not by the negligence of any party to the event. Hill v. Winn Dixie Texas, Inc., 849 S.W.2d 802, 803 (Tex.1992). When there is no evidence that the accident was caused by a nonhuman condition, submission of the instruction is generally improper. Id. Here, there is simply “no affirmative evidence of an extrinsic, unavoidable event” in the record to support the unavoidable accident instruction. See id.
However, we may not reverse a judgment on appeal on the ground that the trial court made an error of law unless we conclude that the complained-of error “probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment” or “probably prevented the appellant from properly presenting the case to the court of appeals.” TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a)(1) (emphasis added). Error in a civil jury charge is reversible “only if, in the light of the entire record,” it probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment. Reinhart v. Young, 906 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex.1995). Under the harmless error rule, it is an appellant’s responsibility to demonstrate that he has suffered harm from the submission of an improper jury charge. Nacol v. McNutt, 797 S.W.2d 153, 156 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
In his forth issue, Urista argues that the improper instruction “led the jury into returning an improper verdict” because (1) the case was “hotly contested”; (2) his wife testified that she saw merchandise fall off the shelf and hit Urista; (3) Bed, Bath & Beyond did not dispute that one of its employees was on a ladder on the other side of the shelf when Urista was hit by falling trash cans; (4) there was testimony that the shelf, from which the trash cans fell, was 12 feet high and accessible only to Bed, Bath & Beyond employees; (5) counsel for Bed, Bath & Beyond “referred to the ‘unavoidable accident’ instruction in his closing argument”; and (6) the fact that the verdict was not unanimous shows that the case was very close.
In regard to points one through four and six, we must be mindful that an improper jury instruction is especially likely to cause an unfair trial when the trial is hotly contested and the evidence is “sharply conflicting.” See Quantum Chem. Corp. v. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d 473, 480 (Tex.2001). Just because a case is contested and a verdict not unanimous, however, does not mean that the evidence was “sharply conflicting.”
As noted in the majority opinion, Bed, Bath & Beyond “did not introduce any evidence of its own and chose to rest at the conclusion of Urista’s case.” Here, the record reveals that Bed, Bath & Beyond, rather than presenting and relying on “sharply conflicting” evidence, chose to attack Urista’s credibility through cross-examination. The jury simply may not have believed Urista and his witnesses. The record also reveals that Urista presented no evidence on the issue of foreseeability— that Bed, Bath & Beyond had any actual or constructive knowledge that the trash cans in question posed an unreasonable risk of harm. Moreover, Urista admitted that he had suffered three back injuries before the incident in question and another after the incident. Thus, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the inci*525dent in question was not the cause of Urista’s injuries.
In regard to point five, although trial counsel for Bed, Bath and Beyond referred to the unavoidable accident instruction in his closing argument, the thrust of his argument, as reflected in 23 pages of the record, was that Urista had simply failed to meet his burden of proof, a failure upon which counsel kept “hammering.” Counsel focused on Urista’s failure to call Reginald Neal, a store employee, as a witness; the lack of Urista’s credibility as a witness; and the lack of credible evidence regarding Urista’s damages. In fact, Bed, Bath & Beyond’s counsel argued that Urista was a “walking lawsuit” and that Urista had manufactured his case and his damages. Counsel’s main argument was that Urista suffered from a pre-existing, degenerative disk disease and saw “an opportunity to become compensated for a condition, which he knows he had, which he knows he will have for the rest of his life.”
Rather than conducting a traditional harm analysis, the majority, in response to arguments made by Bed, Bath & Beyond, distinguishes ReinhaH and erroneously concludes that Urista was harmed by the submission of the unavoidable accident instruction. The majority notes that, “in contrast to the defendant in Reinhart,” Bed, Bath & Beyond did not introduce “ample” evidence to support the finding of no negligence, the jury verdict was not unanimous, and the charge contained an instruction on “new and independent cause,” to which Urista objected. It also concludes that Bed, Bath & Beyond “emphasized” the unavoidable accident instruction in closing arguments.
I agree that ReinhaH is factually distinguishable. However, simply because this case is factually distinguishable from Rein-haH, does not mean that Urista, under the totality of circumstances presented, was necessarily harmed. Nor can it be assumed that, because two members of the jury did not join in the verdict, they “would have found BBB negligent.” The majority’s analysis, with its focus on distinguishing ReinhaH, in effect improperly penalizes Bed, Bath & Beyond for not introducing “ample” evidence to support the finding of no negligence.
In ReinhaH, the Supreme Court found that “no evidence in this case even remotely suggests that the unavoidable accident instruction in any way caused the case to be decided differently than it would have been without it.” Id., 906 S.W.2d at 473. Here, none of the points made by Urista demonstrates that the improper instruction probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. There is no evidence in this case to suggest that the unavoidable accident instruction in any way caused the case to be decided differently from how it would have been decided without the instruction. To the contrary, the record reveals that Bed, Bath & Beyond called the testimony of Urista and his witnesses into serious question. Moreover, nothing suggests that the jury based its verdict in any way on the unavoidable accident instruction. Although trial counsel for Bed, Bath & Beyond, in the words of Urista, “referred to the ‘unavoidable accident’ instruction in his closing argument,” counsel in no way “emphasized” the instruction and instead focused on the failure of Uris-ta to meet his burden of proof. In light of the totality of these circumstances, the erroneous submission of the unavoidable accident instruction in this case did not amount to a denial of the rights of Urista such that the error “probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a)(1).
In regard to Casteel, the majority notes that “the single, broad-form liability question erroneously commingled a valid negli*526gence theory with an inferential rebuttal instruction that injected an invalid theory of ‘unavoidable accident.’ ” Therefore, the majority concludes, because we cannot determine “conclusively” whether the erroneous instruction formed the sole basis for the jury’s finding of no negligence, that Urista was “prevented” from presenting his case to this Court and that this case is “controlled by Casteel.”
However, the holding of Casteel is quite specific:
[W]e hold that when a trial court submits a single broad-form liability question incorporating multiple theories of liability, the error is harmful and a new trial is required when the appellate court cannot determine whether the jury based its verdict on an improperly submitted invalid theory.
Id., 22 S.W.3d at 388 (emphasis added).
Casteel’s holding in regard to broad-form submission of “multiple theories of liability” has not been extended to instructions on defensive theories. In fact, such an extension is logically precluded because inferential rebuttal issues may not be submitted to the jury. See TEX. R. CTV. P. 277. As noted by the Supreme Court, a “special issue inquiring about unavoidable accident should not be submitted because it [is] an inferential rebuttal issue that require[s] plaintiff[s] to prove the nonexistence of an affirmative defense.” Lemos v. Montez, 680 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tex.1984). Accordingly, “[s]ince 1971, the rule has been that an issue asking a jury about unavoidable accident is improper.” Id. Casteel’s holding in regard to broad-form versus granulated submission of liability theories is simply inapplicable in this case.
Because this case is not controlled by Casteel, and because, under a traditional harm analysis, Urista has not demonstrated, and the record does not support a finding, that the trial court’s erroneous submission of an unavoidable accident instruction in this case was harmful error, I would overrule Urista’s fourth issue and address his remaining issues.

. See Crown Life Ins. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378 (Tex.2000).