Court Opinion

ID: 9465395
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:44:59.045509+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:09.317898
License: Public Domain

BAUER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In dismissing the complaint herein, Judge Will entered a well-reasoned and, to me, persuasive opinion in which he discusses both § 744(e)(2) and § 744(a)(1). He then states:
Given this unambiguous statutory language, it is clear that Congress, with respect to passenger rail service, altered the distinction made in § 304(a) of the 3-R Act between final system plan and non-final system plan lines. This specific statutory directive takes precedence over the inconsistent language in the earlier written Final System Plan notwithstanding the fact that Congress “approved” the Final System Plan in the 4-R Act. See 4-R Act § 601(e), 45 U.S.C. § 718(d)(1). Such general approval cannot be construed to override or condition the specific statutory framework of § 744(e). See, e. g., Monte Vista Lodge v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 384 F.2d 126, 129 (9th Cir. 1967).
Later, Judge Will concludes:
In sum, we hold that ConRail was entitled to use the notice procedures of § 744(a)(1) by virtue of the direct statutory mandate in § 744(e)(2) and (4). No question has been raised with respect to ConRail’s compliance with the § 744(a)(1) procedures. More importantly, since August 1, 1978, no transportation authority has offered to make the continued subsidy payments required under § 744(e). Accordingly, ConRail may discontinue the service.
In an argument over statutory construction of an enactment that I conceive to be poorly drawn, I believe that the opinion of the trial court is sounder than the majority opinion of this court. I would affirm.