Court Opinion

ID: 9700890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:52:14.263402+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:15.729727
License: Public Domain

HUSPENI, Judge
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I agree with the majority that this appeal is timely. I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority’s determination that applying the psychopathic personality statute to a nonviolent exhibitionist is beyond the intent of the statute and beyond the sweep of State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 205 Minn. 545, 287 N.W. 297 (1939), aff'd 309 U.S. 270, 60 S.Ct. 523, 84 L.Ed. 744 (1940).
In In re Clements, 440 N.W.2d 133 (Minn.App.1989), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. June 21, 1989), this court addressed both Minn. Stat. § 526.09 and Pearson in affirming the psychopathic personality commitment of an individual who, similar to appellant here, had never actually inflicted injury. The Clements court observed that:
The trial court was not required to delay commitment until appellant or someone else was actually harmed, “so long as the danger of appellant’s condition had already become evident.”
Id. at 136 (quoting In re Terra, 412 N.W.2d 325, 328 (Minn.App.1987)).
The majority here rejects the holding of Clements in favor of indicating support for *664the Clements dissent. I cannot adopt my colleagues’ approach to Clements; neither am I able to distinguish that case factually from the one we are deciding here.
Review of the testimony presented in this case supports, I believe, the trial court’s determination that “the evidence * * * is clear and convincing that in [appellant] there exists a psychopathic personality.”
Appellant raises several other issues. He argues that the hearing was not timely because it was not held within the required 44-day period. See Minn.Stat. § 253B.08, subd. 1 (1992). That requirement was waived under the facts of this case. See In re Buckhalton, 503 N.W.2d 148, 151 (Minn.App.1993), pet. for rev. granted (Minn. Sept. 10, 1993). Appellant also contends his commitment violates due process. This court’s recent decision rejecting that argument is controlling at present. In re Blodgett, 490 N.W.2d 638 (Minn.App.1992), pet. for rev. granted (Minn. Nov. 3, 1992).
A final matter is troubling. During the commitment hearing appellant discharged his attorney and the trial court appointed standby counsel to assist him. The record is silent, however, as to any inquiry by the court to determine whether appellant knowingly and intelligently waived Ais right to counsel.
The majority, having determined as a matter of law that the psychopathic personality statute was inapplicable to the conduct exhibited by appellant, was not required to address the issue of waiver of counsel. Because I view the sweep of statute and case law as broad enough to cover appellant’s conduct, I would remand the issue of waiver of counsel to the trial court, with directions to determine whether appellant, in fact, had the capacity to waive his right to counsel and whether he did so knowingly and intelligently. See State v. Richards, 456 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Minn.1990); In re S.Y., 162 Wis.2d 320, 469 N.W.2d 836, 842 (1991).