Court Opinion

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Date Created: 2024-01-18 16:06:31.352355+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:22.651740
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                                                RENDERED: JANUARY 18, 2024
                                                     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

               Supreme Court of Kentucky
                               2022-SC-0324-MR

BRUCE WAYNE EMBRY                                                     APPELLANT

              ON APPEAL FROM MUHLENBERG CIRCUIT COURT
V.                 HONORABLE BRIAN WIGGINS, JUDGE
                           NO. 21-CR-00192

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                               APPELLEE

                  MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                    AFFIRMING

      A Muhlenberg County jury convicted Bruce Wayne Embry of one count

each of trafficking in a controlled substance, heroin, while in possession of a

firearm; trafficking in a controlled substance, methamphetamine, while in

possession of a firearm; possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; and being

a persistent felony offender (PFO) in the first degree. Embry received a total

enhanced sentence of seventy years in prison. This appeal followed as a matter

of right. See KY. CONST. § 110(2)(b). Having reviewed the record and the

arguments of the parties, we affirm the Muhlenberg Circuit Court.

                               I.     BACKGROUND

      Embry drove from his home in Muhlenberg County to Louisville the night

of May 26, 2021, accompanied by Chrystal Johnson. At trial, Johnson testified

that she had known Embry for roughly one year. Johnson further testified that
when the two arrived in Louisville, Embry drove to the home of his family

members, went inside, and returned carrying six or eight ounces of

methamphetamine. After obtaining the methamphetamine, Embry was said to

have driven back to Muhlenberg County with Johnson where they went to

Embry’s garage at 89 Spring Street in Central City. Johnson had visited the

garage with Embry on multiple occasions and testified the two were engaged in

a sexual relationship. She also testified she had often seen Embry in

possession of drugs and that he stored drugs in the garage. Johnson testified

that, upon arriving at the garage in the early morning hours of May 27, 2021,

Embry went inside while she stayed in the car. Johnson testified Embry took

the methamphetamine into the garage and did not have the methamphetamine

when he returned to the car. Embry’s friend James “Ponch” Jones resided in a

camper on the same property as the garage.

      Prior to Embry’s trip to Louisville in May 2021, Detective Troy Gibson of

the Pennyrile Narcotics Task Force was investigating Embry for involvement in

drug trafficking. Detective Gibson was also familiar with Johnson because she

had served as a confidential informant to local authorities on past occasions.

On May 28, 2021, Detective Gibson and officers from the Division of Probation

and Parole took Johnson into custody at a local Dollar General store. At the

time, Johnson was a convicted felon in violation of her parole conditions.

Detective Gibson told Johnson that he was investigating Embry for drug

trafficking, solicited Johnson’s help, and offered to put in a good word for her

with the corrections system. Johnson subsequently gave Detective Gibson a

                                        2
recorded statement detailing her trip to Louisville with Embry and stated that

she had been buying “dope” from Embry for roughly one year and that Embry

often kept drugs in his garage.

      Detective Gibson applied for a warrant to search Embry’s garage at 89

Spring Street the same day he spoke with Chrystal Johnson. A warrant was

quickly issued, and officers arrived at Embry’s garage the same evening. Upon

gaining entry to the garage, officers observed Embry sitting on a couch joined

by his daughter. Officers searched the garage and found a bag containing a

white crystalline substance in a filing cabinet, two handguns stuffed between

the couch cushions where Embry had been sitting, and $3,255 in Embry’s

wallet. Embry was then transported to the local jail.

      At the jail, Embry was instructed to remove his clothes while the jail

employees searched his clothing for contraband. At trial, Deputy Matthew

Marshall testified a pill fell out of Embry’s shoe during the procedure. He

further testified two bags were discovered in Embry’s pants. The bags were

later determined to contain a mixture of heroin, methamphetamine, fentanyl,

tramadol, and gabapentin. One bag weighed 0.549 grams and the other 2.3

grams. Deputy Marshall testified that Embry accused him of planting the bags

in Embry’s pants. Deputy Marshall testified that he then asked Embry to

engage in a “squat and cough,” so he could determine whether Embry was

concealing any items in his buttocks. Deputy Marshall testified he eventually

recovered another bag wrapped in a paper towel from in between Embry’s

                                        3
buttocks. The bag was later determined to contain 27.76 grams of

methamphetamine.

      At trial Embry testified that shortly before he was arrested at his garage,

his friend Ponch gave him the bags to hold and Embry stuffed them down his

pants. He testified it was his intent to give the bags back to Ponch. Embry also

testified that Ponch often occupied the garage, and Embry was not aware of the

guns concealed in the couch. Detective Gibson testified that the composition of

the bags found on Embry’s person, as well as the large amount of cash in his

wallet, indicated that Embry had intended to traffic the drugs in his

possession.

      At the close of the Commonwealth’s case, Embry moved for a directed

verdict on the trafficking charges. The motion was denied. The jury later

convicted Embry of both counts of trafficking and possession of a handgun by

a convicted felon. However, the trial court declared a mistrial during the

penalty phase, and a second jury trial was held in June 2022 to recommend

Embry’s sentence. The jury found that Embry was a PFO and recommended 50

years’ imprisonment on each trafficking charge and 20 years on the possession

of a handgun by a convicted felon charge, to run consecutively and capped at a

total of 70 years.

      We will set out additional facts as relevant.

                                  II. ANALYSIS

      Embry alleges numerous errors by the trial court and urges this Court to

reverse his convictions. First, he alleges that the trial court erred in denying his

                                         4
motion for a directed verdict on the charge of trafficking in heroin. Second, he

alleges the jury instructions on the trafficking charges violated his right to a

unanimous verdict. Third, he alleges the trial court erroneously admitted a

host of other bad act evidence in violation of Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE)

404(b). Fourth, he alleges the trial court erroneously failed to suppress the

fruits of a search which was conducted based on an allegedly insufficient

search warrant affidavit. Fifth, he alleges the trial court erroneously admitted

evidence which improperly bolstered the credibility of one of the

Commonwealth’s witnesses. Sixth, he alleges the Commonwealth failed to

prove by competent evidence that he was a convicted felon in order to sustain

the conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Finally, he urges

this Court to reverse his convictions due to cumulative error. We address each

of Embry’s arguments in turn.

A. Directed Verdict

      Embry first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a

directed verdict on the charge of trafficking in heroin. He asserts that no

reasonable juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed

heroin with the intent to sell it. Specifically, he contests an intent to sell heroin

because the bags of drugs at issue contained a mixture of five different drugs,

only one of which was heroin. This issue was properly preserved.

      Our directed verdict standard has been firmly established in

Commonwealth v. Benham:

      On a motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair
      and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the
                                          5
       Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable
       juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
       guilty, a directed verdict should not be given. For the purposes of
       ruling on the motion, the trial court must assume that the
       evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury
       questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to such
       testimony.

816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991). “So long as the Commonwealth produces

more than a mere scintilla of evidence to support the charges, a defendant’s

motion for directed verdict should be denied.” Taylor v. Commonwealth, 617

S.W.3d 321, 324 (Ky. 2020). “On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict

is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury

to find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of

acquittal.” Benham, 816 S.W.3d at 187.

       Pursuant to KRS 218A.1412(1)(d), “[a] person is guilty of trafficking in a

controlled substance in the first degree when he or she knowingly and

unlawfully traffics in . . . [a]ny quantity of heroin . . . .” “‘Traffic’ . . . means to .

. . possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or sell a controlled

substance[.]” KRS 218A.010(56). “‘Heroin’ means a substance containing any

quantity of heroin, or any of its salts, isomers, or salts of isomers[.]” KRS

218A.010(20).

       In this case, the jury heard that Embry was arrested and brought to the

jail. He was searched at the jail, and a bag, containing two smaller bags, fell

out of his pants. One of those smaller bags weighed 0.549 grams and the other

weighed 2.3 grams. Both smaller bags contained a mixture of heroin, fentanyl,

methamphetamine, tramadol, and gabapentin. The specific quantity of each

                                            6
drug in the mixture was unknown. Embry himself testified that he was

“holding” the bags for his friend and suspected that they contained drugs.

      The jury also heard Detective Troy Gibson from the Pennyrile Drug Task

Force testify that possession by a person of more than one bag of the same

drug is indicative of trafficking as opposed to personal use. He testified this is

especially true if the weights of the bags are consistent with an amount of the

drug that is typically purchased on the street. Here, one of the bags contained

just over a half gram of heroin, and Detective Gibson testified that heroin is

sometimes trafficked in half gram bags. Detective Gibson also testified that the

combination of Embry’s possession of close to three (3) grams of heroin, the

multiple bags, and the large amount of cash found in Embry’s wallet all

indicated trafficking.

      Additionally, Deputy Beatty testified that Embry’s possession of two bags

containing different amounts of the same drugs was indicative of trafficking.

Finally, the jury heard from Johnson that just a couple of days before his

arrest, Embry was in possession of several hundreds of dollars’ worth of

heroin.

      Taking all of this evidence into consideration, it would not be clearly

unreasonable for a jury to find Embry guilty of trafficking in heroin. Embry

points this Court to other pieces of evidence that might mitigate against his

guilt, such as Detective Gibson’s testimony, contrary to Deputy Beatty’s, that

multiple bags containing similar amounts of the same drugs is indicative of

trafficking. Embry also emphasizes the fact that the bags contained a mixture

                                         7
of five different drugs. He notes that none of the Commonwealth’s witnesses

testified about the significance of that fact in their analyses of whether the

items Embry possessed were indicative of trafficking. He further argues that

the very fact that the bags contained a mixture of drugs creates reasonable

doubt that Embry intended to sell heroin, specifically.

      Although Embry points out evidence that was, perhaps, favorable to him,

the trial court was required to draw all inferences in favor of the

Commonwealth in making its decision on a motion for a directed verdict.

Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187. We are also mindful that “[i]ntent can be inferred

from the actions of an accused and the surrounding circumstances. The jury

has wide latitude in inferring intent from the evidence.” Anastasi v.

Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Ky. 1988) (citing Rayburn v.

Commonwealth, 476 S.W.2d 187 (Ky. 1972)). Reviewing the evidence as a

whole, we conclude that it would not be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find

guilt. Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in

denying Embry’s motion for a directed verdict.

B. Unanimous Verdict

      Embry next argues that the jury instructions on the trafficking charges

violated his right to a unanimous verdict. He concedes this argument is not

preserved and requests palpable error review pursuant to Kentucky Rule of

Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10.26. (“A palpable error which affects the

substantial rights of a party may be considered . . . by an appellate court on

appeal, even though insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and

                                         8
appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination that manifest injustice

has resulted from the error.”)

      As discussed above, Embry was found in actual or constructive

possession of four (4) bags containing drugs. The first bag was found in the

filing cabinet in the residence, weighed 2.737 grams, and contained

methamphetamine. The second bag was found by jail staff hidden in his

buttocks, weighed 27.76 grams, and contained methamphetamine. The third

bag was found at the jail when it fell out of his pants, weighed 2.3 grams, and

contained a mixture of heroin, methamphetamine, fentanyl, tramadol, and

gabapentin. The fourth bag was also found at the jail when it fell out of his

pants, weighed .549 grams, and contained a mixture of heroin,

methamphetamine, fentanyl, tramadol, and gabapentin.

      Embry asserts that the jury could have found him guilty of trafficking in

methamphetamine for any of the four bags and of trafficking in heroin for

either of the two bags that fell out of his pants at the jail. He further asserts

that because the jury instructions did not specify which bag he possessed with

intent to sell, the jury may not have unanimously agreed on which bag he

possessed with this intent. He argues that because of this potential

disagreement, his right to a unanimous verdict was violated. We disagree.

      The trial court instructed the jury that in order to find Embry guilty of

trafficking in methamphetamine, they had to believe beyond a reasonable

doubt all of the following:

                                         9
      A. That, in this county on or about May 28, 2021, and before the
      finding of the Indictment herein, he had in his possession a
      quantity of two (2) or more grams of methamphetamine;
      AND
      B. That he knew the substance so possessed by him was
      methamphetamine;
      AND
      C. That he had the methamphetamine in his possession with the
      intent of selling it to another person. . . .

The trial court further instructed the jury that in order to find Embry guilty of

trafficking in heroin, they had to believe beyond a reasonable doubt all of the

following:

      A. That, in this county on or about May 28, 2021, and before the
      finding of the Indictment herein, he had in his possession a
      quantity of heroin;
      AND
      B. That he knew the substance so possessed by him was heroin;
      AND
      C. That he had the heroin in his possession with the intention of
      selling it to another person. . . .

As Embry notes, the instructions did not specify which bag of drugs the jury

had to believe Embry possessed with the intent to sell. However, the

constitution does not require this.

      Specifically, Embry argues that the instructions given to the jury in his

case created a “multiple acts” violation of the unanimity requirement. This type

of violation occurs when “a general jury verdict is based on an instruction

including two or more separate instances of a criminal offense, whether

explicitly stated in the instructions or based on the proof.” Martin v.

Commonwealth, 456 S.W.3d 1, 6-7 (Ky. 2015), overruled on other grounds by

Johnson v. Commonwealth, 676 S.W.3d 405 (Ky. 2023) (emphasis added)

(alteration and citation omitted). In Martin, we explained that when
                                        10
      the instruction does not specify which specific act it is meant to
      cover, we cannot be sure that the jurors were unanimous in
      concluding the defendant committed a single act satisfying the
      instruction. Instead, the jury’s verdict only reflects their
      unanimous view that the defendant committed the crime, without
      necessarily resulting in a unanimous conclusion that the
      defendant committed a single criminal act beyond a reasonable
      doubt.

Id. at 7 (emphasis added).

      Our multiple acts jurisprudence has focused on situations in which the

defendant was alleged to have committed two distinct instances of conduct,

often on two different dates, either of which could have qualified for a

conviction of the charged offense. See Kingrey v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.3d

824 (Ky. 2013), overruled on other grounds by Johnson, 676 S.W.3d 405;

Johnson v. Commonwealth, 405 S.W.3d 439 (Ky. 2013), overruled on other

grounds by Johnson, 676 S.W.3d 405; Martin, 456 S.W.3d 1; King v.

Commonwealth, 554 S.W.3d 343 (Ky. 2018), overruled on other grounds by

Johnson, 676 S.W.3d 405. Such is not the case here.

      Here, there was only one alleged instance of criminal conduct for each

count that occurred on one date. Embry was alleged to have possessed

methamphetamine with the intent to sell it on May 28, 2021. He was also

alleged to have possessed heroin with the intent to sell it on that same date.

The facts that Embry was in possession of more than one bag of drugs and that

those bags were found in different locations do not change this analysis. The

drugs found on Embry at the jail were only found there rather than at the

residence because the search of Embry at the jail was presumably more

                                        11
thorough than the one conducted when he was placed under arrest at the

residence. In short, our constitution’s unanimity requirement does not require

the level of specificity for which Embry advocates. Accordingly, Embry’s right to

a unanimous verdict was not violated.

C. Other Acts Evidence

      Embry alleges the trial court committed reversible error in that it

erroneously admitted the following pieces of “prior bad acts” evidence under

KRE 404(b): (1) general testimony from Chrystal Johnson about Embry’s prior

drug activity, (2) testimony from Detective Gibson that he was investigating

Embry for drug trafficking, (3) evidence that Embry had made a trip to

Louisville on May 26 to obtain methamphetamine, (4) evidence regarding a pill

that fell out of Embry’s shoe at the jail, (5) evidence that Embry had threatened

a deputy jailer at the jail, and finally (6) evidence of other drugs and

paraphernalia found at his garage.

      Embry failed to preserve his objection to the admission of some of this

evidence, and we review those pieces of evidence for palpable error under RCr

10.26. “A palpable error is one resulting in ‘manifest injustice,’ i.e. a

‘probability of a different result or error so fundamental as to threaten a

defendant’s entitlement to due process of law.’” Hunt v. Commonwealth, 326

S.W.3d 437, 440 (Ky. 2010) (quoting Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 3

(Ky. 2006)).

      Embry did, however, file a motion in limine seeking to prohibit the

admission of some prior bad acts evidence the Commonwealth provided pre-

                                         12
trial notice of under KRE 404(c). Those pieces of evidence include testimony

from Chrystal Johnson that Embry often kept drugs on his person, evidence

regarding a pill that fell out of Embry’s shoe during his change-out procedure

at the jail, evidence of other drugs and paraphernalia found at his garage, and

evidence that Embry made a trip to Louisville on May 26 to obtain

methamphetamine. In his motion in limine, Embry challenged these pieces of

evidence arguing that the Commonwealth “failed to articulate [its] grounds for

introduction” and any “probative value would be seriously outweighed by the

prejudicial impact on the Defendant.” Defense counsel also advocated to

prohibit the admission of these four pieces of evidence at a pre-trial hearing

and disputed their relevancy. We observe the defense’s objections to these

pieces of evidence were properly preserved, and we review the trial court’s

subsequent evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. Goodyear Tire &

Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 577 (Ky. 2000). “The test for abuse of

discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable,

unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v. English,

993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). The Commonwealth further concedes that

defense counsel’s contemporaneous objection to Deputy Jailer Matthew

Marshall’s testimony that Embry had threatened him at the jail appropriately

preserved that issue. We also review the trial court’s admission of that evidence

for an abuse of discretion.

                                       13
      Under KRE 404(b), “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts” is

inadmissible to prove propensity and may only be admissible under two sets of

circumstances:

      (1) If offered for some other purpose, such as proof of motive,
      opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
      absence of mistake or accident; or
      (2) If so inextricably intertwined with other evidence essential to
      the case that separation of the two (2) could not be accomplished
      without serious adverse effect on the offering party.

In assessing evidence admitted under KRE 404(b), this Court has maintained a

three-part examination of the evidence’s relevance, probativeness, and

prejudice. Bell v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 882, 889 (Ky. 1994). First, we

ask ourselves is the evidence “relevant for some purpose other than to prove

the criminal disposition of the accused?” Id. Second, is the evidence

“sufficiently probative of its commission by the accused to warrant its

introduction into evidence?” Id. at 890. And finally, does the evidence’s

potential for prejudice “substantially outweigh its probative value?” Id.

      In analyzing whether evidence of prior bad acts is relevant for “some

other purpose” than propensity, this Court has upheld the admission of such

evidence when relevant to prove a defendant’s “intent” to commit the charged

offense—that is when intent is an element of the charged offense, or when

intent is genuinely in dispute. Walker v. Commonwealth, 52 S.W.3d 533, 535-

36 (Ky. 2001) (citing Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook,

§ 2.25, 98 (3d ed. 1993)).

                                        14
      Evidence of prior bad acts can also be relevant to prove a defendant’s

“knowledge” when necessary to refute a defendant’s claim of lack of knowledge.

Muncy v. Commonwealth, 132 S.W.3d 845, 847–48 (Ky. 2004). Defendants

often “open the door” to the admission of this category of evidence by claiming

a lack of knowledge at trial. Id. at 848.

      KRE 404(b)(1) also allows for the admission of prior bad acts evidence

relevant to prove the defendant engaged in “preparation” or employed a “plan”

to accomplish the charged offense. Under this exception, the prior bad acts and

the charged offenses are said to be “part and parcel of a greater endeavor.”

English, 993 S.W.2d at 945.

      KRE 404(b)(1)’s list of “other purposes” for which evidence of prior bad

acts may be admissible is “illustrative rather than exhaustive.” Rodriguez v.

Commonwealth, 107 S.W.3d 215, 219 (Ky. 2003) (quoting Colwell v.

Commonwealth, 37 S.W.3d 721, 725 (Ky. 2000)). Accordingly, this Court has

previously upheld the admission of prior bad acts evidence when such evidence

is relevant to prove the defendant’s “consciousness of guilt.” Elam v.

Commonwealth, 500 S.W.3d 818, 824 (Ky. 2016).

      Under KRE 404(b)(2), evidence of prior bad acts that are “inextricably

intertwined” with other evidence in the case may also be admissible when

evidence of those prior bad acts

      “furnishes part of the context of the crime” or is necessary to a “full
      presentation” of the case, or is so intimately connected with and
      explanatory of the crime charged against the defendant and is so
      much a part of the setting of the case and its environment that its

                                            15
        proof is appropriate in order “to complete the story of the crime on
        trial by proving its immediate context[].”

Ordway v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d 762, 790 (Ky. 2013) (quoting Norton v.

Commonwealth, 890 S.W.2d 632, 638 (Ky. App. 1994)).

   i.      Testimony from Chrystal Johnson about Embry’s Prior Drug

           Activities

        Embry challenges statements made by Chrystal Johnson at trial alleging

that she often saw Embry in possession of methamphetamine, that Embry

sometimes talked to her about selling methamphetamine, that Embry

previously told her that he was looking for hundreds of dollars’ worth of drugs

that he had lost, that she had been buying drugs from Embry for over a year,

and that Embry was known to carry drugs on his person. We begin by noting

that the only one of these issues that Embry has sufficiently preserved for this

Court’s appellate review is Johnson’s testimony that he was known to keep

drugs on his person. However, because we discern no error in the admission of

any of these statements, we need not scrutinize them differently.

        Embry was charged with two counts of trafficking in a controlled

substance, KRS 218A.1412, charges that required the jury to decide whether

Embry had the intent to sell those controlled substances to others. Throughout

trial, Embry relied heavily on the defense theories that he lacked the intent to

sell any drugs found in his possession at the time he was arrested, that the

drugs were given to him by his friend James “Ponch” Jones, and that he

intended to return them. As such, it is clear that Embry’s intent was “in

genuine dispute.” Walker, 52 S.W.3d at 536.
                                        16
      As to the evidence’s relevancy, we hold that the above-described

testimony from Chrystal Johnson that tended to show Embry had previously

harbored the intent to sell drugs like methamphetamine was relevant to prove

his intent as to the charges he faced at trial.

      [T]he relevancy of the extrinsic offense derives from the defendant’s
      indulging himself in the same state of mind in the perpetration of
      both the extrinsic and charged offenses. The reasoning is that
      because the defendant had unlawful intent in the extrinsic offense,
      it is less likely that he had lawful intent in the present offense.

Walker, 52 S.W.3d at 537 (quoting United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898,

911 (5th Cir. 1978)).

      We further observe that, prior to trial, Embry allegedly made several

statements that put his knowledge of the drugs in his possession in genuine

dispute. Kentucky State Police Trooper Broadbent testified that at the scene of

arrest, Embry accused Trooper Broadbent of planting the methamphetamine

officers found in the garage. Deputy Marshall also testified that, during

Embry’s change-out at the jail, Embry accused him of planting two bags of

drugs on his person. Deputy Marshall also testified that when he asked Embry

about the bag of methamphetamine located between his buttocks, Embry said

he did not know what the bag was and accused Deputy Marshall of planting it.

      It is clear to this Court that Chrystal Johnson’s testimony alleging that

Embry had committed the above-described bad acts was relevant to disprove

Embry’s pre-trial statements that he had no knowledge of the drugs found on

his person or in the garage. Chrystal Johnson’s testimony about Embry’s prior

general drug activity tended to make it more likely that he had an intimate

                                        17
knowledge of drugs like methamphetamine and heroin, that he would recognize

them in his presence, and that he did, in fact, have knowledge they were on his

person. Embry’s pre-trial accusations and statements of lack of knowledge

“open[ed] the door” to the admission of this evidence. Muncy, 132 S.W.3d at

847. We note that Embry did not acknowledge that he had suspicions of what

was in the bags in his pants until he himself took the stand after Chrystal

Johnson’s sworn testimony.

      This Court further concludes that each of Johnson’s statements were

sufficiently probative to warrant their admission into evidence. The burden of

probativeness “is met by a showing that the ‘jury could reasonably infer that

the prior bad acts occurred and that [the defendant] committed such acts.’”

Kelly v. Commonwealth, 655 S.W.3d 154, 165 (Ky. 2022) (quoting Parker v.

Commonwealth, 952 S.W.2d 209, 214 (Ky. 1997)). Here, Johnson testified that

she had been buying drugs from Embry for more than a year. The only

contradictory evidence regarding Johnson’s knowledge of Embry’s prior actions

came from Embry himself, which placed the jury in the best position to

determine which witness it would believe. As such, we conclude that the jury

could reasonably conclude that Johnson would have sufficient knowledge

about Embry’s trafficking activity to render her sworn statements sufficiently

probative of Embry’s prior bad acts.

      We finally ask whether the probative value of Johnson’s testimony as to

the commission of the charged offenses is “substantially outweighed by the

danger of undue prejudice”—that prejudice being the “forbidden character

                                       18
inference” that KRE 404(b) is intended to prohibit. Jenkins v. Commonwealth,

496 S.W.3d 435, 459 (Ky. 2016). Here, it is the rebutting force of Johnson’s

testimony that gives it substantial probative value. Each piece of testimony in

this category was probative to disprove the defense theories that Embry lacked

the intent to traffic in a controlled substance and that he had no knowledge of

the drugs found in his possession. In a trial focused largely on Embry’s intent

and knowledge, this testimony from Johnson was highly probative.

         As such, we cannot find any error in the admission of Johnson’s

testimony in these respects.

   ii.      Testimony from Detective Gibson that he was investigating

            Embry for drug trafficking

         Embry alleges that the trial court erred when it admitted testimony from

Detective Gibson that he had been investigating Embry for drug trafficking

even before Chrystal Johnson gave her recorded statement to Detective Gibson.

As Embry failed to preserve this issue, we review admission of this evidence

using the palpable error standard.

         First, we take this opportunity to recognize that Detective Gibson’s

statements concerning his ongoing investigation do not particularly reference a

specific bad act allegedly committed by Embry. Detective Gibson merely

responded in the affirmative when asked whether he had “been investigating

the defendant, Bruce Embry, for drug trafficking.” At first blush, it might not

be apparent that evidence of a mere “investigation” warrants exclusion under

KRE 404(b), which only operates to exclude evidence of “[o]ther crimes, wrongs,

                                          19
or acts.” However, such a statement carries a necessary implication that Embry

had previously committed crimes, wrongs, or bad acts of some sort as to

warrant Detective Gibson’s investigation. Even “thinly-veiled reference[s]” to a

defendant’s relationship with law enforcement can trigger KRE 404(b)’s

exclusionary rule. Wiley v. Commonwealth, 348 S.W.3d 570, 581 (Ky. 2010).

Here, it is apparent that Detective Gibson’s statement, while not exceedingly

particular, carried the same potential for prejudice as other evidence also

rightfully excluded under KRE 404(b): an inference that Embry had a criminal

character. For these reasons, we analyze Detective Gibson’s testimony under

KRE 404(b).

      We conclude that Detective Gibson’s testimony affirming the existence of

his investigation into Embry’s drug trafficking activities was “inextricably

intertwined” with other evidence in the case and admissible to furnish the

context for the eventual discovery of the charged offenses. KRE 404(b)(2).

Immediately before Detective Gibson testified that he had been investigating

Embry for drug trafficking, he testified that he had driven to a local Dollar

General store on May 28 to speak with Chrystal Johnson, who would later give

him a statement attesting to Embry’s prior drug trafficking activities. Detective

Gibson’s confirmation that he had been investigating Embry for drug

trafficking necessarily furnishes the context for why Detective Gibson desired

to meet with Johnson, as well as her eventual statement to Detective Gibson.

And that statement ultimately led the authorities to search Embry’s garage at

89 Spring Street in Muhlenberg County, where he was arrested. Detective

                                        20
Gibson’s acknowledgement of his investigation “provided the setting and

context of the discovery of the crime.” Kerr v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.3d 250,

263 (Ky. 2013). Excluding this evidence would have left a reasonable jury to

wonder why Detective Gibson had desired to meet with Johnson at Dollar

General and why he asked her whether she had been involved with Embry.

Limitation of this testimony would have eliminated a material link in the logical

progression of the Commonwealth’s case. KRE 404(b)(2), while exclusionary in

nature, does permit the Commonwealth “‘to present a complete, unfragmented

picture of the crime and investigation[,]’ including a ‘picture of the

circumstances surrounding how the crime was discovered.’” Kerr, 400 S.W.3d

at 261. Accordingly, we hold that Detective Gibson’s statements regarding his

investigation into Embry’s alleged drug trafficking activities were relevant for

some purpose other than to prove a criminal propensity.

      It is also readily apparent that this evidence, coming from Detective

Gibson himself—the proponent of this investigation into Embry—was

sufficiently probative to lead a jury to believe that Embry was, in fact, being

investigated for drug trafficking. Further, Embry offered no evidence to refute

Detective Gibson’s statement that Embry was being investigated.

      We are also convinced Detective Gibson’s mere affirmation of the

existence of his investigation was not prohibitively prejudicial as to warrant

exclusion of this evidence. Detective Gibson did not elaborate on any alleged

prior bad acts that might have sparked his investigation into Embry. We also

observe that any reasonable jury might logically conclude for itself that any

                                        21
criminal defendant facing charges of drug trafficking was likely, at one point,

under investigation for drug trafficking.

          Accordingly, we discern no error, and certainly no palpable error, in the

admission of Detective Gibson’s brief reference to his investigation into Embry’s

alleged drug trafficking activities.

   iii.      Evidence that Embry traveled to Louisville on May 26 to obtain

             methamphetamine

          Embry next challenges the admission of testimony from Chrystal

Johnson that Embry had traveled to Louisville on May 26, 2021, bought

several ounces of methamphetamine, and returned to Muhlenberg County with

that methamphetamine. We find this issue properly preserved by Embry’s

motion in limine and review its admission for an abuse of discretion.

          We hold that Johnson’s testimony as to Embry’s alleged trip to Louisville

was relevant to prove that Embry had engaged in “preparation” or employed a

“plan” to accomplish the charged offense of trafficking in a controlled

substance. KRE 404(b)(1). Here, Johnson testified that she had accompanied

Embry to Louisville where he visited the home of family members, went inside

that home, and returned carrying about six or eight ounces of

methamphetamine. Johnson further testified that the two drove back to

Muhlenberg County and stopped at Embry’s garage at 89 Spring Street where

Embry took the methamphetamine inside. Johnson testified that when Embry

returned to the car he no longer had any methamphetamine with him. When

asked whether she knew what Embry planned to do with the

                                           22
methamphetamine he had obtained in Louisville, Johnson replied “probably

use it, sell it.”

       It is clear to this Court that each detail of Embry’s trip to Louisville that

Johnson testified to can logically be viewed as a step taken in preparation for

Embry’s trafficking offense. To accomplish the offense of trafficking, one must

necessarily gather, obtain, or produce the illicit materials he intends to traffic—

precisely the sequential picture painted by Johnson’s testimony. According to

Johnson, Embry drove to Louisville with an intent to obtain

methamphetamine, obtained that methamphetamine, drove back to

Muhlenberg County with that methamphetamine, and deposited that

methamphetamine in his garage while harboring an intent to later use or sell

it. Each step alleged in this sequence is “part and parcel” of a greater endeavor

charged by the Commonwealth—the offense of trafficking in a controlled

substance. English, 993 S.W.2d at 945. Accordingly, Johnson’s testimony is

certainly relevant to prove preparation or plan under KRE 404(b)(1).

       As to the probative value of this evidence to support a conclusion by the

jury that Embry did, in fact, go to Louisville to obtain methamphetamine, we

conclude that Johnson’s first-hand testimony describing the alleged prior bad

act was sufficient to support its admission. Johnson testified that she

personally accompanied Embry to Louisville and that she saw him in

possession of a large amount of methamphetamine. Even if not corroborated,

such first-hand observations alleged by the witness were sufficient to create a

                                         23
reasonable inference on the part of the jury that Embry did go to Louisville and

returned to Muhlenberg County with methamphetamine.

         We further conclude that any prejudice occasioned by Johnson’s

testimony concerning Embry’s trip to Louisville did not substantially outweigh

its probative value in proving the charged offenses. Johnson’s testimony gave

the jury a plausible depiction of exactly how Embry set out to accomplish the

charged offense of trafficking, beginning first with obtaining the necessary

materials to accomplish the crime. The existence of such a plan, and Embry’s

execution of that plan, certainly made it much more likely to be true that

Embry accomplished the charged offense of trafficking in a controlled

substance. This evidence was highly relevant to prove the commission of the

charged offense.

         Accordingly, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in

admitting this evidence.

   iv.      Evidence regarding the pill in Embry’s shoe discovered at

            the jail

         Embry next challenges the admission of testimony from Deputy Marshall

and Captain Horton concerning a pill discovered in Embry’s shoe during his

change-out procedure at the jail. As Embry’s motion in limine preserved this

issue for review, we review for an abuse of discretion.

         At trial, Deputy Marshall testified that, while being changed out, Embry

removed his shoe, and a loose pill fell to the floor. Deputy Marshall also

testified that Embry explained the presence of the pill by stating that it was

                                          24
“his medication.” Deputy Marshall testified that multiple bags of drugs were

later found within Embry’s clothes, as well as one bag located between his

buttocks, discovered during a “squat and cough” procedure. Deputy Marshall

testified that inmates are asked to squat and cough if they are “considered to

have anything on them.” He also testified that the purpose of the squat and

cough is “to make sure they do not have anything hidden . . . .” The bag

discovered between Embry’s buttocks later formed part of the basis for the

Commonwealth’s trafficking in a controlled substance, methamphetamine

charge.

      Captain Horton testified that he assumed custody of each of the items

found on Embry’s person during his change-out procedure before transferring

them to another deputy, including the pill found in Embry’s shoe, the bags in

his pants, and the bag discovered during the squat and cough procedure.

      We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting

the brief testimony regarding the pill that fell from Embry’s shoe, because this

evidence was inextricably intertwined with other evidence relevant to Embry’s

trafficking charges and furnished the necessary context for how that evidence

was discovered. The testimony in question established that the pill that fell

from Embry’s shoe invited a reasonable inference from Deputy Marshall that

Embry might have other items of interest on his person. Deputy Marshall’s

testimony reveals this suspicion induced him to require Embry to squat and

cough, which led to the discovery of the bag located between his buttocks. As

previously stated, the Commonwealth is entitled to admit evidence which

                                       25
“provide[s] the setting and context of the discovery of the crime.” Kerr, 400

S.W.3d at 263.

        This evidence, consisting of alleged first-hand observations of the

testifying witnesses, was certainly probative enough to create a reasonable

inference on the part of the jury that Embry was in possession of the pill in

question. Even Embry himself did not dispute the existence of the pill, only its

substance.

        We also cannot say that any prejudice occasioned by this evidence

substantially outweighed its probative value as to the charged offenses. Again,

this evidence established a logical link in the discovery of other evidence that

formed part of the basis for one of the Commonwealth’s trafficking charges.

Deputy Marshall and Captain Horton also did not testify as to the chemical

identity of the pill, nor did they dispute Embry’s claim that it was “medication.”

This evidence simply acted to furnish the context for how other evidence highly

relevant to the charged trafficking offenses was obtained.

        Accordingly, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in

admitting this evidence.

   v.      Evidence that Embry threatened Deputy Marshall at the jail

        Embry next challenges admission of testimony from Deputy Marshall

that Embry threatened him during the change-out procedure by stating: “I

know who you are, and I know where you live.” Embry properly preserved this

issue via contemporaneous objection at trial, and we review for an abuse of

discretion.

                                         26
      As previously stated, this Court has held that evidence of a defendant’s

prior bad acts may be relevant and admissible where that evidence tends to

prove the defendant’s “consciousness of guilt.” Elam, 500 S.W.3d at 824. “Any

attempt to suppress a witness’ testimony by the accused, whether by

persuasion, bribery, or threat, or to induce a witness not to appear at the trial

or to swear falsely, or to interfere with the processes of the court is evidence

tending to show guilt.” Foley v. Commonwealth, 942 S.W.2d 876, 887 (Ky.

1997) (emphasis added) (citing Collier v. Commonwealth, 339 S.W. 2d 167 (Ky.

1960)).

      Here, we conclude that Embry’s alleged statement to Deputy Marshall

can properly be characterized as a threat or intimidation and is certainly

evidence of consciousness of guilt. Such a statement is plainly “inconsistent

with [defendant’s] innocence” and relevant for some other purpose than

propensity. Id.

      We also conclude that Deputy Marshall’s descriptions of a conversation

he personally had with Embry were sufficiently probative to prove that such an

occasion did occur.

      We finally conclude that any prejudice occasioned by the admission of

this evidence was not sufficiently prejudicial to outweigh its probative value as

to the charged offenses. This statement was but a small piece of evidence

offered against Embry in a trial largely focused on his intent and knowledge.

Embry’s alleged threat was highly relevant to prove his consciousness of guilt.

                                        27
         Accordingly, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in

admitting this evidence.

   vi.      Evidence of drugs and paraphernalia found at Embry’s

            garage

         Embry finally challenges the admission of evidence regarding drugs and

paraphernalia found in his garage during his arrest, namely an item containing

THC discovered in a filing cabinet, a tin can with “white residue,” and baggies.

Objection to this evidence was properly preserved by Embry’s motion in limine,

and we review for an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.

         During cross-examination of Detective Gibson, the following exchange

occurred involving defense counsel:

         Defense Counsel: You’ve indicated that there weren’t any
         scales that were found. Were there any separate baggies?

         Detective Gibson: I believe there were baggies found in the
         residence.

Minutes later, this exchange followed:

         Defense Counsel: Were there any items there, like pipes, or
         anything that would be used to ingest drugs?

         Detective Gibson: I do remember sitting in the same room
         there was a tin can that had white residue on top of it. How
         many other paraphernalia items were there, I don’t
         remember. But I do remember a can with white residue on it.

Defense counsel then embarked on a line of questioning concerning a

paraphernalia charge that had initially been brought against Embry but

subsequently dropped. We cannot say with certainty why defense counsel

thought it prudent to elicit such testimony from Detective Gibson, but after

                                          28
review of the record we presume defense counsel sought to use the evidence of

paraphernalia and the dismissed charge to his advantage to bolster the defense

theory that Embry lacked an intent to traffic.

       Following his question about the presence of “baggies” in Embry’s

garage, defense counsel asked Detective Gibson whether those baggies were

“corner bags.” When Detective Gibson replied that he did not remember seeing

any corner bags, defense counsel asked whether the presence of corner bags

was indicative of trafficking. Presumably defense counsel was attempting to

highlight that the baggies found at Embry’s garage were not of the kind usually

associated with trafficking activity.

      We also note that defense counsel specifically asked Detective Gibson

whether Embry’s garage contained any paraphernalia items “used to ingest

drugs.” Defense counsel then asked Detective Gibson to clarify which items

served as the basis for Embry’s dismissed paraphernalia charge. Detective

Gibson stated that it was probably the tin can with white residue. We can only

assume these questions were designed to invoke an inference that Embry

lacked an intent to traffic the methamphetamine in his garage, and instead

only use it.

      “Generally, ‘[o]ne who asks questions which call for an answer has

waived any objection to the answer if it is responsive.’” Shemwell v.

Commonwealth, 294 S.W.3d 430, 436 (Ky. 2009) (quoting Estep v.

Commonwealth, 663 S.W.2d 213, 216 (Ky. 1984)). Here, Detective Gibson’s

remarks regarding paraphernalia and other evidence discovered in Embry’s

                                        29
garage were clearly responsive to defense counsel’s invitations for such

testimony.

      Accordingly, we conclude Embry is precluded from raising a successful

challenge to the admission of this testimony.

      Embry also challenges the admission of a portion of Exhibit 2, a report

from the Commonwealth’s lab analyst, Wendy Williams. Embry challenges the

portion of the report that shows that item 1.2, which was discovered in his

garage, contained 0.298 grams of THC, a chemical constituent of marijuana.

We agree that this evidence had no relevant purpose other than propensity,

and, as such, was inadmissible at trial.

      The THC present in item 1.2 did not serve as a basis for any of the

Commonwealth’s charged offenses, and this evidence was not so inextricably

intertwined with other relevant evidence as to warrant admission. We observe

that this portion of Exhibit 2 could have been easily redacted before its

introduction into evidence without “serious adverse effect” on the

Commonwealth. KRE 404(b)(2). Nor did this evidence furnish appropriate

context for any other evidence relevant to the offenses charged against Embry.

Admission of this portion of the report was certainly error. However, when

viewed against all other admissible evidence offered against Embry, we can say

with fair assurance that this lone piece of evidence could not have

“substantially swayed” the jury. Ordway v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d 762,

774 (Ky. 2013). Accordingly, the erroneous admission of this evidence was

harmless, and we do not reverse Embry’s convictions because of it.

                                       30
D. Search Warrant

      Embry next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to

suppress the fruits of the search of the building located at 89 Spring Street in

Central City, Kentucky. He argues that the affidavit included in the application

for the search warrant failed to provide probable cause to justify the issuance

of the warrant. Specifically, he argues that the information in the affidavit was

stale, irrelevant, uncorroborated, and unreliable. Embry preserved this issue

through his pretrial motion to suppress.

      In reviewing the issuance of a search warrant, we “look at the ‘totality of

the circumstances’ surrounding the warrant request.” Commonwealth v. Pride,

302 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Ky. 2010). We have previously explained that

      [t]he task of the [warrant-issuing judge] is simply to make a
      practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the
      circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the
      “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay
      information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence
      of a crime will be found in a particular place.

Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). “[T]he trial court judge

faced with a motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search

warrant should . . . determine whether under the ‘totality of the circumstances’

presented within the four corners of the affidavit, a warrant-issuing judge had

a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” Id. at 49. On

appellate review, we must “determine first if the facts found by the trial judge

are supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). Then, we must

“determine whether the trial judge correctly determined that the issuing judge

did or did not have a ‘substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]’ that probable
                                         31
cause existed.” Id. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 236). In doing so, we “review the

four corners of the affidavit and not extrinsic evidence in analyzing the

warrant-issuing judge’s conclusion.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Hubble, 730

S.W.2d 532 (Ky. App. 1987)). Finally, “all reviewing courts must give great

deference to the warrant-issuing judge’s decision.” Id. (footnote omitted) (citing

Gates, 462 U.S. at 236).

      After reviewing the search warrant affidavit, the suppression hearing,

and the trial court’s order, we conclude that the trial court’s factual findings

were supported by substantial evidence. In doing so, we note that “[o]rdinarily .

. . there is no reason for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the facts

alleged in the affidavit are actually true” unless there is an allegation that

police officers “included intentionally or recklessly false statements or

purposefully or recklessly omitted material facts.” Id. at 49 n.1. No such

allegation was made in this case.

      We also conclude that the trial court correctly determined that the

warrant-issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding there was

probable cause. Under the totality of the circumstances, while giving great

deference to the warrant-issuing judge’s decision, there was sufficient

information in the affidavit to establish probable cause to support the issuance

of the search warrant. The search warrant affidavit stated as follows:

      Affiant has been an officer in the [Pennyrile Narcotics Task Force]
      for a period of 8 years and 11 months. The information and
      observations contained herein were received and made in his/her
      capacity as an officer thereof. On May 28, 2021, at approximately
      2:00 p.m., Affiant received information from/observed:

                                        32
      That the Affiant states that he has been investigating illegal drug
      activities in Muhlenberg County, Kentucky, in the performance of
      his duties as a Detective with the Pennyrile Narcotics Task Force.
      On the above-said date, the Affiant was given an audio statement
      by a Confidential Informant that she and Bruce Embry AKA
      “Batman” had traveled to Louisville on the evening of May 26, 2021
      and returned to Muhlenberg County early on the morning of May
      27, 2021 with approximately 8 ounces of methamphetamine. The
      CI advised when she and Bruce Embry arrived back to Muhlenberg
      County that he went inside a building/residence located at 89
      Spring Street, Central City, Kentucky (which is the residence to be
      searched). The CI stated to the Affiant that Bruce Embry stated to
      her that he had approximately $700-$800 worth of heroin. The CI
      further stated that she had been buying dope from Bruce Embry
      for approximately a year and knew that the said Bruce Embry kept
      his dope in the safe and filing cabinet and money in a safe located
      inside the building/residence. The CI has provided the Affiant with
      a copy of text messages between her and Bruce Embry in which
      they discuss drugs and that he is in his garage (picture attached
      herewith as Exhibit A and incorporated herein). On April 3, 2021,
      Lisa Baker was arrested for Possession of Controlled Substance In
      the First Degree and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia with Bruce
      Embry being the driver of the vehicle. The Affiant has also received
      information from another CI that Bruce Embry was staying at the
      above-said building/residence and was known to be selling heroin
      and kept dope in a safe and filing cabinet located inside.

      Acting on the information received, Affiant conducted the following
      independent investigation:

      The Affiant is also aware that the said Bruce Embry has a history
      of numerous past drug charges. The Affiant also received a
      statement from Chasity Warner in December 2020 in which she
      states that she was also purchasing and selling dope for the said
      Bruce Embry. Based on the Affiant’s prior experience, knowledge,
      training, expertise, surveillance and the foregoing, it is the Affiant’s
      belief that methamphetamine, heroin and/or any controlled
      substances, any instrumentalities, paraphernalia, or other
      contraband associated therewith are now located at the above
      described property located at 89 Spring Street, Central City,
      Kentucky.

The text messages described in the affidavit were dated May 12 and stated:

                                        33
      Bat I need you bae
      I’ve got u 3 so far but I want to get me some ts whenever ol girl
      messages me bck .. I just need
      To talk to u forreal I’m in dboro atm can u call me right quick
      please

      Hey I’m at your garage now I’ll be out there soon where you

The first message appears to be from the possessor of the phone (presumably

the CI), and the second message appears to have been received by the CI in

response to the first message.

      This affidavit explains that Detective Gibson received information from a

confidential informant (CI) that less than 48 hours earlier, the CI had gone to

Louisville from Muhlenberg County with Embry. The pair had returned only the

day prior with approximately eight (8) ounces of methamphetamine and went to

the residence for which Detective Gibson was requesting the search warrant.

Embry had also told the CI that he had between $700 and $800 worth of

heroin. This information was all very recent. The CI also stated that she had

been buying drugs from Embry for over a year and that she knew he stored his

drugs and money in a safe and a filing cabinet located inside the residence that

Detective Gibson sought to search. This information provided context for the

relationship between the CI and Embry which added to the reliability of the

information. Finally, the CI provided text messages which she alleged were

between she and Embry. She stated, and Detective Gibson apparently believed,

that the messages were about drugs.

      Aside from information from the primary CI, the affidavit also contained

information from, or about, three other individuals—two of whom were named

                                       34
and one of whom was also a confidential informant—which served to

corroborate portions of the primary CI’s statement. First, the affidavit stated

that Embry was driving a car in which Lisa Baker was a passenger when Baker

was arrested for drug charges. This occurred on April 3, 2021. While this

information does little on its own to inculpate Embry, it occurred relatively

close in time to the application for the search warrant and placed Embry at

least in the vicinity of drugs.

      The affidavit also included information from Chasity Warner dating back

to December 2020. At that time, Warner stated that she had been purchasing

and selling drugs for Embry. While this information was from several months

prior to the warrant affidavit, it corroborated the primary CI’s statement which

indicated that Embry had been selling drugs for at least a year prior.

      Perhaps the most probative corroborating information contained in the

warrant affidavit came from another CI. That CI stated that Embry was staying

at the residence at issue, was known to be selling heroin, and kept his drugs in

a safe and filing cabinet located inside of the residence. Although this

information included neither a time frame nor additional information about the

CI, it was very similar to that provided by the primary CI.

      All of this information, taken together and with the fact that Embry had a

history of prior drug charges, was more than sufficient to support the warrant-

issuing judge’s decision that there was probable cause to issue the search

warrant. The information provided was not perfect and omitted statements

regarding the historical reliability of the CIs and the basis of some of their

                                        35
knowledge. However, perfect information is not required. We view the warrant-

issuing judge’s decision under the totality of the circumstance and give great

deference to that judge. Under this standard, the warrant-issuing judge

certainly had a substantial basis for his decision. Accordingly, the trial court

did not err in refusing to suppress the fruits of the search of the residence

conducted pursuant to the search warrant.

E. Bolstering

   i.      Admission of Chrystal Johnson’s prior recorded statement

           to Detective Gibson

        Embry now argues the trial court committed reversible error when it

admitted video evidence of a prior recorded statement that Chrystal Johnson

gave to Detective Gibson. Prior to trial, Chrystal Johnson gave a recorded

statement to Detective Gibson detailing her trip to Louisville with Embry on

May 26. In that recorded statement, when asked by Detective Gibson whether

Embry had obtained eight ounces of methamphetamine in Louisville, Johnson

replied affirmatively. At trial, the Commonwealth questioned Johnson about

her trip to Louisville with Embry, and she stated on direct examination that

she thought Embry obtained “about six ounces” of methamphetamine in

Louisville. This statement was obviously inconsistent with her prior statement

to Detective Gibson. When asked by the Commonwealth if she had previously

told Detective Gibson that Embry had obtained eight ounces of

methamphetamine, Johnson replied: “I think so. I know it was like six or eight.

I couldn’t be for sure.” Later on cross-examination when asked again about her

                                        36
earlier statement to Detective Gibson, Johnson replied she thought “it was

either six or eight” ounces of methamphetamine. Accordingly, on re-direct, the

Commonwealth sought to introduce Johnson’s prior recorded statement to

Detective Gibson into evidence. At the corresponding bench conference, defense

counsel argued that introduction of Johnson’s prior recorded statement would

amount to impermissible “bolstering” of Johnson’s trial testimony. The

Commonwealth argued that the prior recorded statement was admissible under

KRE 801A(a)(2), which excepts from the rule barring hearsay prior statements

that are: “[c]onsistent with the declarant’s testimony and [are] offered to rebut

an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or

improper influence or motive[.]” The trial court permitted the Commonwealth to

play the entirety of Johnson’s six-minute recorded statement to Detective

Gibson, presumably in agreement with the Commonwealth’s assertion that

admission was proper under KRE 801A(a)(2). We note that defense counsel

advocated that if any portion of Johnson’s recorded statement was admitted,

the Commonwealth should admit the entire video recording.

      On appeal, Embry argues to this Court that Johnson’s prior recorded

statement was inadmissible hearsay and that its admission was improper

under KRE 801A(a)(2) because defense counsel never lodged an express or

implied charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive against

Johnson. On appeal, the Commonwealth makes an alternative argument to the

one it offered to the trial court. The Commonwealth now asserts Johnson’s

prior recorded statement was admissible as non-hearsay offered only for

                                        37
rehabilitative purposes. In short, we do not wholly agree with either of the

parties’ arguments. Instead, we conclude the statement is more appropriately

labeled as hearsay, but, nevertheless, admissible under KRE 801A(a)(1) as a

statement “inconsistent” with Johnson’s trial testimony.

      “‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while

testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the

matter asserted.” KRE 801(c). Under KRE 801A(a)(2), a statement that would

otherwise be inadmissible hearsay can be admissible if it is “[c]onsistent with

the declarant’s testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge

against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive[.]”

“The hearsay exception in KRE 801A(a)(2) is only available if the prior

consistent statement was made ‘before the alleged motive to fabricate came into

existence.’” Hoff v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.3d 368, 380 (Ky. 2011) (quoting

Slaven v. Commonwealth, 962 S.W.2d 845, 858 (Ky. 1997)). A prior statement

can also be admissible when such a statement does not fall under the hearsay

rule—that is when it is not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted.

Such an occasion arises when prior consistent statements are “offered

primarily for rehabilitative, not substantive, purposes.” Noel v. Commonwealth,

76 S.W.3d 923, 929 (Ky. 2002). However, neither of these rules applies sensibly

to the facts at hand.

      Here, we discern no express or implied charge of recent fabrication or

improper influence or motive from defense counsel aimed at Johnson. On

                                         38
cross-examination, the following exchange occurred between defense counsel

and Johnson.

            Defense Counsel: You stated earlier you believe he had
            about eight ounces, correct?

            Chrystal Johnson: Yes.

            Defense Counsel: Today, you’re saying maybe six ounces?

            Chrystal Johnson: It was either six or eight.

One theory of defense was that Johnson had a motive to fabricate her initial

statement to Detective Gibson in exchange for his help in resolving a probation

violation. At no point did defense counsel assert that Johnson had developed a

new motive to fabricate her trial testimony, meaning that Johnson’s statement

to Detective Gibson did not pre-date her supposed motive to lie. If we were to

accept the defense’s theory as true, it would mean only that Johnson had

maintained the same motive to lie since her May 28 statement to Detective

Gibson. Accordingly, Johnson’s prior recorded statement was not admissible

under KRE 801A(a)(2), because it could not have been offered “to rebut an

express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or

improper influence or motive[.]” KRE 801A(a)(2) (emphasis added). We also take

this opportunity to note that Johnson’s prior recorded statement also cannot

be excepted under KRE 801A(a)(2)’s plain language, because her statement was

plainly inconsistent with her trial testimony. We will discuss that inconsistency

at greater length below.

      We next turn to the Commonwealth’s assertion on appeal that Johnson’s

prior recorded statement was admissible to “rehabilitate” her credibility and
                                       39
therefore, not barred by the hearsay rule. The nature of rehabilitation assumes

that the prior consistent statement being offered for rehabilitative purposes will

tend to combat the inference that the testifying witness is a liar. Here, we

observe that introduction of Johnson’s prior recorded statement did just the

opposite—highlighting the inconsistency between the statement she gave before

trial and the multiple statements she gave at trial. We find it puzzling why the

Commonwealth would seek to offer evidence impeaching the credibility of its

own witness, if not to offer that evidence for its substantive purpose, the truth

of the matter asserted. Accordingly, the facts before us today do not fit neatly

within the non-hearsay classification.

      Finally, however, it is clear to this Court that Johnson’s prior recorded

statement was admissible under the hearsay exception for “inconsistent”

statements, and as such was admissible for substantive purposes. KRE

801A(a)(1). Johnson previously told Detective Gibson in her recorded statement

that Embry had obtained eight ounces of methamphetamine while in Louisville.

At trial, however, she characterized the amount of methamphetamine in

Embry’s possession as “about six ounces,” “like six or eight,” and “either six or

eight.” We observe that the number “eight” is literally inconsistent with “about

six,” “like six or eight,” and “either six or eight.” We also note that the degree of

certainty with which Johnson testified to the amount of methamphetamine she

had seen was inconsistent between her statement to Detective Gibson and her

trial testimony. “[I]nconsistency is not limited to diametrically opposed answers

but may be found in evasive answers, inability to recall, silence, or changes of

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position.” Meece v. Commonwealth, 348 S.W.3d 627, 672 (Ky. 2011) (quoting

United States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782, 795 (8th Cir. 1980)). In her prior

recorded statement, when asked whether Embry obtained eight ounces of

methamphetamine, Johnson responded soundly in the affirmative. However, at

trial, Johnson could not state definitively how much methamphetamine she

had seen, going as far as to say herself: “I couldn’t be for sure.” As such, we

conclude once more that Johnson’s prior recorded statement was inconsistent

with her testimony at trial and admissible.

      While we assume the trial court erroneously admitted Johnson’s prior

recorded statement in reliance on KRE 801A(a)(2), this Court “may affirm a

correct result upon any ground supported by the record” even if the lower court

“reaches its judgment for the wrong reason.” Wells v. Commonwealth, 512

S.W.3d 720, 721-22 (Ky. 2017) (citing Jarvis v. Commonwealth, 960 S.W.2d

466, 469 (Ky. 1998)).

      We also observe that it was undoubtedly error for the trial court to admit

the entirety of Johnson’s six-minute prior recorded statement, when the only

portion at issue was Johnson’s brief affirmation to Detective Gibson that she

saw Embry obtain eight ounces of methamphetamine. However, we find that

any error occasioned by the trial court’s decision was invited by defense

counsel. During the bench conference immediately preceding admission of

Johnson’s prior recorded statement, defense counsel advocated that if the trial

court admitted any portion of the video, it should admit the entirety of the

video. “Generally, a party is estopped from asserting an invited error on

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appeal.” Quisenberry v. Commonwealth, 336 S.W.3d 19, 37 (Ky. 2011).

Accordingly, Embry has waived any objection to the admission of the

extraneous footage of Johnson’s recorded statement.

   ii.      Detective Gibson’s statement that Chrystal Johnson provided

            “reliable” information as a confidential informant

         Embry next argues that Detective Gibson’s testimony that Chrystal

Johnson had produced “reliable” information as an informant amounted to

improper “bolstering” of Johnson’s credibility as a witness. We find this issue

was properly preserved for our review by defense counsel’s contemporaneous

objection preceding Detective Gibson’s statement. Accordingly, we review the

trial court’s decision to admit Detective Gibson’s testimony for an abuse of

discretion.

         Our rules of evidence mandate that evidence of a witness’s truthful

character “is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness

has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.” KRE 608(a).

We must first determine whether Johnson’s character for truthfulness had

been attacked, and then whether Detective Gibson’s subsequent statement was

actually rehabilitative evidence bearing on Johnson’s truthfulness or merely

the kind of character evidence prohibited by KRE 404.

         We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in determining

that Johnson’s character for truthfulness had previously been attacked. During

cross-examination of Chrystal Johnson, the following exchange occurred

between Johnson and defense counsel:

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      Defense Counsel: “As a user [of drugs] you’ve lied before, right?

      Chrystal Johnson: “Yes.”

      Defense Counsel: “Have you lied before to stay out of jail?”

      Chrystal Johnson: “No.”

      Defense Counsel: “So you’ve never said ‘Hey, that isn’t mine
      officer.’ Or anything like that?”

      Chrystal Johnson: “No.”

      We observe that while defense counsel did not make a prolonged

inquiry into Johnson’s character for truthfulness, he did inquire into

“specific instances” of lying, presumably to conjure an inference that

Johnson had an untruthful character. An inquiry into specific instances

of the witness’s prior conduct that is “probative of truthfulness” is

permissible under KRE 608(b), at the discretion of the trial court,

provided “the cross-examiner has a factual basis for the subject matter of

his inquiry.” KRE 608(b). This brief foray into Johnson’s credibility likely

did not arouse any explosive conclusions as to Johnson’s credibility on

the part of the jury, but we cannot say it was not an “attack” on

Johnson’s credibility for purposes of KRE 608(a). As Professor Lawson

notes, “[T]he most common methods of attacking the character of a

witness will be by use of evidence of opinion or reputation; however . . .

[KRE 608] leaves no doubt that character of a witness may come under

attack in other ways.” Robert G. Lawson, Kentucky Evidence Law

Handbook § 4.25[2][a] (2022 ed.)

                                        43
      We must now determine whether Detective Gibson’s subsequent

rehabilitating testimony was evidence of Johnson’s character for

truthfulness, and thus admissible under KRE 608.

      In his brief to this Court, Embry relies heavily on our prior

holdings in Fairrow v. Commonwealth, to argue that Detective Gibson’s

statements did not bear on Johnson’s character for truthfulness. 175

S.W.3d 601 (Ky. 2005). In Fairrow, we held that a police officer’s

testimony that a witness was a “reliable” informant was not probative of

the witness’s character for credibility and truthfulness, and thus not

admissible under KRE 608. Id. at 606. This Court characterized the

officer’s statements as opining on the witness’s “dependab[ility]” not

credibility or truthfulness. Id. We observed that within the context of the

officer’s testimony, the Commonwealth had specifically inquired as to the

witness’s previous cooperation with police which included successfully

buying drugs from the defendant while acting as an undercover

informant. Id. Here, we find Detective Gibson’s testimony distinguishable

in that he opined as to the reliability of the “information” Johnson had

provided to him, something we observe bears directly on Johnson’s

character for truthfulness.

      Here, when asked by the Commonwealth whether the information

Johnson had previously provided to him had proven “reliable,” Detective

Gibson responded affirmatively. We conclude this testimony was certainly

evidence of Johnson’s character for truthfulness.

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      Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting

Detective Gibson’s testimony.

F. Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon

      Embry next argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove by competent

evidence that he was a convicted felon to sustain the conviction for possession

of a firearm by a convicted felon. He acknowledges that this alleged error is

unpreserved and requests palpable error review.

      In order to be found guilty of the crime of possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant does, in

fact, have a prior felony conviction. KRS 527.040(1). In this case, to prove this

essential element of the crime, the Commonwealth offered into evidence a

certified copy of Embry’s prior felony conviction from the United States Federal

District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, Owensboro Division. This

document included a square box in the top left corner which stated, in

typewritten words, “Certified[,] James J. Vilt Jr., Clerk[,] U.S. District Court[,]

W/D of Kentucky[.] Date: Jan 18, 2022[.]” The document did not include a

signature of the clerk. This document was admitted through the testimony of

the Muhlenberg Circuit Court Clerk who merely testified that the document

was a certified copy of a felony conviction from the named federal court and

testified to the date it was certified.

      Embry argues that the copy of his federal conviction does not comply

with KRE 902 or 1005 which govern the admissibility and authentication of

certain documents and other records. Specifically, he notes that the document

                                          45
does not contain a signature of the clerk and does not contain a certificate

stating that the clerk has the authority to attest to the accuracy of the copy. He

further notes that the only seal appears over the name of the judge and

appears to be the seal of the court as opposed to the seal of the clerk’s office.

Review of the relevant rules, however, reveals that these are not requirements

for admissibility and authentication when the document is an official record

that is kept inside the Commonwealth of Kentucky.

      KRE 1005 addresses authentication of public records generally. It states,

in relevant part,

      The contents of an official record, or of a document authorized to
      be recorded or filed and actually recorded or filed with a
      governmental agency, either federal, state, county, or municipal, in
      a place where official records or documents are ordinarily filed, . . .
      if otherwise admissible, may be proved by copy, certified as correct
      in accordance with KRE 902 or testified to be correct by a witness
      who has compared it with the original. . . .

KRE 1005. KRE 902, in turn, allows for an “official record” to “be evidenced by

an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by an official having the

legal custody of the record.” KRE 902(4). Only for records “kept outside of the

Commonwealth,” is “a certificate that the official attesting to the accuracy of

the copy has the authority to do so” required. Id. If that certificate is needed, it

“may be made by any public officer . . . authenticated by the seal of office.” Id.

However, because the document at issue in this case is not “kept . . . outside of

the Commonwealth,” those additional requirements do not apply. Id. Thus, the

copy only needed to be “attested by an official having the legal custody of the

record.” That requirement was met.

                                         46
      As stated, the copy of Embry’s federal conviction had a notation in the

corner that it was “certified” by the clerk of the United States District Court for

the Western District of Kentucky. We acknowledge that the word “attested”

does not appear on the document. However, in the past, we have held that “[a]

certified copy of the Transportation Cabinet’s driving history satisfies the

authentication requirement of KRE 902.” Commonwealth v. Duncan, 939

S.W.2d 336, 337 (Ky. 1997) (emphasis added). This interpretation of the

attestation requirement in KRE 902(4) is further buttressed by Black’s Law

Dictionary. Black’s definition of “attested copy” merely says, “See certified

copy.” Copy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). The definition of “certified

copy,” in turn, states, “A duplicate of an original (usu. official) document,

certified as an exact reproduction usu. by the officer responsible for issuing or

keeping the original. — Also termed attested copy; exemplified copy; verified

copy.” Id. (emphasis added). It is clear to us that a copy of a document that has

been “certified” meets the requirement of KRE 902(4) that it be “attested.”

      Accordingly, the copy of Embry’s prior federal conviction was properly

authenticated and admitted as proof of his prior felony conviction. The trial

court did not err in admitting it.

G. Cumulative Error

      Embry finally argues that this Court should reverse his convictions on

account of cumulative error. We decline to do so.

      Under the cumulative error doctrine, “multiple errors, although harmless

individually, may be deemed reversible if their cumulative effect is to render the

                                        47
trial fundamentally unfair. We have found cumulative error only where the

individual errors were themselves substantial, bordering, at least, on the

prejudicial.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 577, 631 (Ky. 2010). There

is no doubt that error occurred throughout Embry’s trial. However, the error

we have discerned has lacked any real prejudicial effect. “Although errors crept

into this trial, as they inevitably do in a trial . . . they did not, either

individually or cumulatively, render the trial unfair.” Id.

                                  III. CONCLUSION

      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Muhlenberg

Circuit Court.

      All sitting. VanMeter, C.J.; Bisig, Conley, Keller, Lambert and Nickell,

JJ., concur. Thompson, J., concurs in result only.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Kathleen Kallaher Schmidt
Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Russell M. Coleman
Attorney General of Kentucky

Bryan Darwin Morrow
Assistant Attorney General

Elizabeth Themins Hedges
Assistant Attorney General

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