Court Opinion

ID: 9654853
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:53:01.095779+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:14.172043
License: Public Domain

*248OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
HINOJOSA, Justice.
In our opinion we refused to completely overrule appellant’s sixth point of error because the point of error was not properly briefed. Inpetco, Inc. v. Texas American Bank/Houston, 729 S.W.2d 300 (Tex.1987) (per curiam denial of writ of error). In this point appellant argued that the punitive damage award in this case violated our state constitution. We provided appellant an opportunity to rebrief this issue with its motion for rehearing. It has. We now address the second half of appellant’s sixth point of error regarding whether the punitive damages awarded in the instant case violate appellant’s rights under the Texas Constitution.
Appellant argues that Texas procedure for assessing punitive damages applied in the instant case is unconstitutional under the Texas Constitution, Article I, § 19 because: 1) a higher standard of proof than a preponderance of the evidence should be required; 2) admission of evidence of defendant’s wealth should not be permitted; and 3) the gross negligence standard is impermissibly vague and does not provide a meaningful standard of review.
Texas law permits assessment of punitive damages to deter future misconduct, punish wrongdoers, and to reimburse the plaintiff for remote losses. Lunsford v. Morris, 746 S.W.2d 471, 471-72 (Tex.1988); Cavnar v. Quality Control, 696 S.W.2d 549, 555-56 (Tex.1985); Borden, Inc. v. De la Rosa, 825 S.W.2d 710, 720, (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1991, no writ hist.); Celotex Corp. v. Tate, 797 S.W.2d 197, 209 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1990, no writ). Such damages may only be awarded if the evidence establishes an entire want of care which would raise the belief that the act or omission complained of was the result of conscious indifference to the right or welfare of the plaintiff. Burk Royalty v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 920 (Tex.1981).
Whether an entire want of care exists in a particular case is not a fact so unique, specialized, or difficult to determine that a higher standard of proof is required. Moreover, unlike criminal cases or family law cases, the effects of most punitive damage awards are not different from ordinary damage awards. Cherished constitutional freedoms are not at issue in such cases, merely money. Like other damages, whether punitive damages are appropriate and the correct amount can readily be determined by a properly instructed jury. Prior decisions unanimously conclude that a higher standard is not required by the Texas Constitution. See e.g. Lawson-Avila Const. Inc. v. Stoutamire, 791 S.W.2d 584, 593 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1990, writ denied) (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Durrill, 714 S.W.2d 329 (Tex.App—Corpus Christi 1986)), writ granted on other grounds and vacated, 754 S.W.2d 646 (Tex.1988). The legislature has also concluded that punitive damages may be awarded if a preponderance of the evidence shows fraud, malice, or gross negligence. Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 41.003 (Vernon 1990).
The interests at stake when punitive damages are at issue are not significantly different than liability questions or other issues in civil cases. The preponderance of the evidence standard generally applies in civil cases, and we believe it should continue to apply to punitive damage awards. See International Armament Corp. v. King, 686 S.W.2d 595, 597 (Tex.1985). We therefore hold that the Texas Constitution does not require a clear and convincing standard of proof for assessment of punitive damages.
The next issue is whether admission of evidence regarding a defendant’s net worth violates appellant’s rights under the Texas Constitution. One of the purposes of punitive damage awards is to deter future misconduct; thus evidence of net worth is relevant to determine the amount of such an award. Lunsford, 746 S.W.2d at 471-73. Appellant has advanced no reason why admission of such evidence violates its rights under the Texas Constitution, and we find none. We hold that admission of relevant evidence of appellant’s net worth to prove the appropriate *249-251amount of punitive damages does not violate the Texas Constitution.
The final issue we address is whether the gross negligence standard is impermissibly vague. Gross negligence is a concept that has been clearly defined by the Supreme Court of Texas. Burk Royalty, 616 S.W.2d at 920. This standard is not intrinsically different or more difficult to understand than the concept of negligence or many other commonly accepted legal concepts. Review of punitive damage awards is guided by particularly detailed and specific guidelines. Alamo Nat’l Bank v. Kraus, 616 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tex.1981); Borden, at 720. We hold that this standard is not so vague that it violates the Texas Constitution.1 K-Mart Corp. v. Pearson, 818 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1991, no writ hist.); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. v. Zubiate, 808 S.W.2d 590, 603 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1991, writ denied).
Appellant’s arguments that Texas procedure for assessing punitive damages violates the Texas Constitution have no merit. We overrule point of error six.
We overrule appellant’s motion for rehearing. The trial court’s judgment remains AFFIRMED.

. Writ has been granted on this issue in Transportation Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 814 S.W.2d 144 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1991, writ granted). Moriel held this issue waived without ordering it re-briefed as we did. See Inpetco, 729 S.W.2d at 300. Other significant distinctions exist between this case and Moriel. We do not have the benefit of the Moriel court’s reasoning on this issue and we do not rely upon this decision.