Court Opinion

ID: 9515038
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:53:19.179533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:24.243674
License: Public Domain

GILBERTSON, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
[¶ 34.] I respectfully dissent. I would hold that, as no more than a factor to be considered in the totality of the circumstances, the lack of notification of parents, guardians or custodians in this case does not tip the balance in favor of suppressing Robert’s statements. Nor would I hold that it creates a bright line rule that law enforcement must overcome to gain admission of a juvenile’s statement, which was otherwise voluntary.
[¶ 35.] At one point, this Court apparently concludes that SDCL 26-7A-157 does not impose a per se rule of inadmissibility in the absence of parental notification. Yet, in later declaring “immediate notification is mandatory,” it also appears to contradict itself and draw a bright line rule from a procedural statute that provides none. Neither the statute, nor our constitutional standard for determining voluntariness, is compatible with such a rule. See Fare, 442 U.S. at 725, 99 S.Ct. at 2572, 61 L.Ed.2d at 212; Gallegos, 370 *227U.S. at 55, 82 S.Ct. at 1213, 8 L.Ed.2d at 328.8
[¶ 36.] The Legislature required that notification of parents, guardians or custodians be made “without unnecessary delay in keeping with the circumstances.” SDCL 26-7A-15 (emphasis added). In doing so, it recognized that there are circumstances that may render it unnecessary or even impossible for a juvenile’s parents, guardians or custodians to be notified before questioning begins. See, e.g., Ther-iault v. State, 66 Wis.2d 33, 223 N.W.2d 850 (1974) (holding failure to notify parents in accordance with statute did not affect voluntariness as juvenile asked police not to contact semi-invalid grandmother because it might adversely affect her health); State v. Paille, 601 So.2d 1321 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1992) (holding defendant’s confession was voluntary, notwithstanding age and mother’s absence, because juvenile had requested parent not be notified); Gkrogg v. Com., 6 Va.App. 598, 371 S.E.2d 549 (1988) (holding absence of parent weighed less heavily against voluntariness because mother did not have a telephone, father could not be reached and no adult family member was available). Even if law enforcement had contacted the Pennington County State’s Attorney, who in turn contacted the Pine Ridge police, who in turn searched out the mother’s or aunt’s residence, there is no factual basis to conclude that they could have been found at all, or if so, when.9
[¶ 37.] Moreover, we determine a statement’s voluntariness, including that of a juvenile, under a “totality of the circumstances” standard, which is consistent with the literal wording of SDCL 26-7A-15. The statements of a juvenile are not rendered inadmissible because they were given before notification of the parents, guardians or custodians. See Doerr v. State, 383 So.2d 905, 907 (Fla.1980); People v. Zepeda, 47 Ill.2d 23, 265 N.E.2d 647, 649 (1970); Commonwealth v. Wallace, 346 Mass. 9, 190 N.E.2d 224, 229 (1963). While at one point, this Court correctly acknowledges that lack of notice is merely a factor to be considered in the totality of the circumstances, it does not convincingly demonstrate that the absence of Robert’s parents somehow dominates totality analysis in this case.
[¶ 38.] Here, law enforcement got permission to question Robert from Jerry Horse, the half-brother with whom Robert was living. This discussion took place, and permission was obtained, in Robert’s presence. Before the interview, Robert was advised of his Miranda ’ rights, and that what he said could be used against him in adult court. During one interview, Robert *228was so oriented towards the subject matter that he corrected the officers no less than sixteen times regarding their inaccurate summary of information. A subsequent mental health professional examination of Robert determined him to be within the low average range of intelligence. He received primarily Bs and Cs, with the occasional D, in school. His teachers characterized him as a “quiet” and “nice young man” who “can do better if he tries.” Robert attributed his lower grades (he received all As and Bs before moving to South Dakota) to missing too many school days while spending time with his girlfriend. In addition, the trial court entered the following relevant findings of fact:
[Robert] spoke English, appeared to understand West’s questions, and answered West’s questions in an appropriate fashion. West did not believe there was any ethnic barrier to their communication. [Robert] was cocky, arrogant, stand-offish, and seemingly unconcerned about discussing the murder.
Robert was not deprived of food, drink, or sleep. He gave every indication that he understood and willingly participated in the conversational exchange. Thus, by allowing the lack of notification to outweigh the multitude of other factors favoring vol-untariness, this Court’s decision essentially establishes a bright line rule in which notification of parents, guardians or custodians is determinative in every juvenile case.
[¶ 39.] Furthermore, this Court’s decision presents a practical nightmare for law enforcement. Unfortunately, the grizzly facts of this case are not unique to this State.10 This case involves a 15-year-old juvenile who has not been cared for by either of his parents in at least three years. In fact, there is evidence in the record that suggests Robert’s mother has had very little role in his life since his birth. Immediately prior to the murder, Robert had been living with his half-brother, who acted as his custodian in reality if not legality, for the past month.11 Before that, Robert lived with his aunt on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation, not either of his parents. Robert’s half-brother informed police that Robert’s “parents didn’t have a telephone; that we wouldn’t be able to contact them.” While this fact alone would have made contact difficult, the added jurisdictional problems associated with Indian country, as well as the uncertainty of whether one parent resides in another state, made location and notification of *229Robert’s parents, guardians or custodians (other than Jerry) nearly impossible.
[¶40.] South Dakota law enforcement has no legal authority in its official capacity to enter Indian country to seek out Robert’s mother or aunt. State v. Lufkins, 381 N.W.2d 263, 266 (S.D.1986). The aunt, and possibly the mother, were residents of the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation and members of the Oglala Sioux Tribe. “It is common ground here that Indian conduct occurring on the trust allotments is beyond the State’s jurisdiction .... ” DeCoteau v. Disk County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 428, 95 S.Ct. 1082, 1085, 43 L.Ed.2d 300, 305 (1975).12 The jurisdiction of the State law enforcement ends at this state’s borders. Its officers have no more authority to seek out Robert’s mother or aunt on the Pine Ridge Reservation than they do to seek out his father in Sacramento, California.
[¶ 41.] In cases like this one, not only would the police be required to find and notify parents, guardians or custodians, but prior thereto they would also be required to act as fact finding judicial entities to determine who is legally responsible for the child. The alternative would be to risk notifying the wrong individuals and thus render all statements by the juvenile involuntary.
The case at hand did not involve the traditional “Leave It To Beaver” family where mom, dad and the kids all ate supper together under the same roof each evening. In this case, the biological father was not living with his biological son. Importantly, the traditional “Cleaver” family is becoming less and less common in contemporary society.
Meldrwm v. Novotny, 2002 SD 15, ¶66, 640 N.W.2d 460, 473 (Amundson, J., concurring).
[¶ 42.] Robert argues that either parents or guardians (but not custodians) must be successfully notified or no interview with the juvenile is constitutionally acceptable. This Court’s decision today appears to conclude at one point that this bright line “either/or” rule is not correct, but nevertheless unconvincingly attempts to rescue Robert’s legal position by advancing a third option even he did not advance. With no foundation in the record, this Court declares that “the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation has a police force that can be contacted by telephone and could have been requested to locate defendant’s parents.” Even if this new thesis is correct, it does not translate into successful timely notification of either of the child’s parents or his aunt. Specula*230tion that the Pine Ridge police might have been able to locate any of them is nothing more than that just speculation. The only other option raised by this Court (and again never raised by Robert) is that: “[n]o doubt, other means of attempting to contact them were available as well.” These “other means,” however, were never identified by the State, Robert, the trial court, or this Court. The trial court made no findings to factually support the nebulous theories that this Court now advances. Before setting aside this conviction on an evidentiary record such as this, we would be well advised to specify the exact nature of the realistic and reasonable legal13 options the officers supposedly had, but never exercised, particularly when these unex-ercised options mandate a reversal.
[¶ 43.] SDCL 26-7A-15 is a procedural statute providing only for parental notification that the child is in custody and that a dispositional hearing will be held. Contrary to this Court’s assertion, the statute does not give a child the right to confer with a parent, guardian or custodian before questioning. It does not give a child the right to be accompanied by a parent, guardian or custodian during questioning. It does not require a parent, guardian or custodian to give permission before the child is questioned.14 Indeed, the statute specifically states that “failure to notify the child’s parents ... is not cause for delay of the hearing.” SDCL 26-7A-5 (emphasis added). Therefore, it is illogical to import legislative intent to delay questioning absent notification. In doing so, this Court imposes a burden of impossible performance, holding that until parents, guardians or custodians are notified, even those that are unavailable, absent, or outside the jurisdiction of the State of South Dakota, almost any questioning of a juvenile would be illegal.
[¶ 44.] The more dysfunctional the family, the more likely that parental, guardian or custodian notification will advance from the difficult to the impossible. Lohnes, 324 N.W.2d at 418. The officers are faced with the difficult task of identifying these parties and then the even more difficult task of effectuating their timely notification. Id. Thus, under this Court’s ruling, the more likely it is that law enforcement will be helpless to solve crimes committed by juvenile members of dysfunctional families. I am not persuaded by this Court’s opinion that such was the intent of the Legislature when it enacted SDCL 26-7A-15.15
*231Society must be protected from violent crime and the agony of its effects. It is of little or no comfort to a victim of violent crime and the victim’s family that the victim’s life was damaged or destroyed by a youth rather than an adult. Protection of society must be sought whether accomplished through rehabilitation or incarceration.
In re Y.C., 1998 SD 76 at ¶ 43, 581 N.W.2d at 490.
[¶ 45.] I would affirm this conviction and accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

. SDCL 26-7A-15 provides:
The officer or party who takes a child into temporary custody, with or without a court order, except under a court order issued during a noticed hearing after an action has been commenced, shall immediately, without unnecessary delay in keeping with the circumstances, inform the child’s parents, guardian, or custodian of the temporary custody and of the right to a prompt hearing by the court to determine whether temporary custody should be continued. If the child's parents, guardian, or custodian cannot be located after reasonable inquiry, the officer or party taking temporary custody of the child shall report that fact and the circumstances immediately to the state's attorney. The state's attorney shall notify the child’s parents, guardian, or custodian, without unnecessary delay, of the time, date, and place of the temporary custody hearing. The hearing shall be held within forty-eight hours if it concerns any apparent abused or neglected child or within twenty-four hours if it concerns any apparent delinquent child pursuant to § 26-8C-3 or any apparent child in need of supervision pursuant to § 26-8B-3, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and court holidays, after taking the child into temporary custody, unless extended by order of the court. Failure to notify the child’s parents, guardian, or custodian of the temporary custody hearing is not cause for delay of the hearing if the child is represented by an attorney at the hearing, (emphasis added).

. Today, this Court declares that "[a] crucial statutory safeguard to assure the due process rights of juveniles taken into custody is the requirement that the juvenile's parents guardian or custodian be 'immediately notified.' ” Beyond its misinterpretation of the explicit language of SDCL 26-7A-l 5, the only authority cited by the Court for this new due process constitutional mandate is an intermediate court of appeals case from Illinois, People v. Montanez, 273 Ill.App.3d 844, 210 Ill.Dec. 295, 652 N.E.2d 1271, 1272 (1995). Montanez, however, actually supports the thesis of this dissent, as it advances parental notification only “where possible.” Id.

. The family history relayed by Robert in his psychiatric evaluation by Doctor Stephen Manlove indicated that Robert was raised primarily by his father until the age of twelve, when Robert moved from Sacramento, CA, to Porcupine, SD, and began living with his aunt. But Robert would only "occasionally see his mother on the street and at her workplace,” and there is no indication of whether his father is still in Sacramento or now lives here in South Dakota. Robert has a seventeen-year old sister living with another aunt in Montana and several half siblings, some living on their own and some living with his mother.

. In State v. Lohnes, 324 N.W.2d 409 (S.D. 1982), a 16-year-old boy was convicted of second degree murder, burglary and grand theft when he shot and killed a motel owner with a high powered rifle at point blank range. When police attempted unsuccessfully to locate his parents, Lohnes’ mother was living "somewhere in Minnesota and his father had been killed in Viet Nam.” Id. at 418. See also In re S.K., 1999 SD 7, 587 N.W.2d 740 (involving 16-year-old convicted of first degree robbery and escape); In re Y.C., 1998 SD 76, 581 N.W.2d 483 (involving 16-year-old who committed first degree robbery of bank with loaded .357 magnum and declared, once released, he would get even with bank teller); State V. Jensen, 1998 SD 52, 579 N.W.2d 613 (involving 14-year-old convicted of first degree murder for executing an unarmed cab driver by shooting him in the head at point blank range); State v. Rios, 499 N.W.2d 906 (S.D.1993) (16-year-old convicted of second degree manslaughter and aggravated assault with a knife).

. This Court dismisses the permission granted by Jerry Horse concluding that "he has a conflict of interest with the child or has no real parental relationship with the child.” Robert, himself, sees his relationship with his brother Jerry in a vastly different light. In his brief, Robert argues that law enforcement’s refusal to allow him to confer with his brother, rather than being meaningless, is so significant that it rises to a violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Robert cannot have it both ways.

. Claims of legality for previous forays into Indian country by state law enforcement have not been well received by the courts in this State. See U.S. v. Anderson, 857 F.Supp. 52 (D.S.D.1994) (holding state parole officers lack authority to conduct on-reservation war-rantless search of tribal member’s home); Annis v. Dewey County Bank, 335 F.Supp. 133 (D.S.D.1971) (holding service of process invalid on tribal members in Indian country); State v. Spotted Horse, 462 N.W.2d 463 (S.D.1990) (holding no hot pursuit of Indian into Indian country for crime committed in State jurisdiction); Lufkins, 381 N.W.2d 263 (holding no state authority for law enforcement to serve a subpoena on tribal members in Indian country).
This Court's declaration that recognition of tribal sovereignty, which has been upheld in an unbroken line of cases dating back to Worcester v. Georgia, somehow denies Native American children equal protection under SDCL 26-7A-15, is without legal support. See 31 U.S. 515, 6 Pet. 515, 8 L.Ed. 483 (1832). To the contrary, the Supreme Court has specifically recognized that in state-tribal jurisdictional relationships, Native Americans may possess jurisdictional rights to access state courts while the corresponding right of the state to exert its jurisdiction in Indian country is denied. Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877, 893, 106 S.Ct. 2305, 2314, 90 L.Ed.2d 881, 895 (1986).

. No claim is advanced that there existed a cross-deputization agreement between the State and this tribe. See generally 25 USC 2804(a).

. Notwithstanding the conflict of this Court’s interpretation with the literal language of SDCL 26-7A-l 5, one might ask exactly how the appearance of Robert's parents or aunt would have affected the outcome of these interrogations. See Brookins v. State, 704 So.2d 576, 578 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997) (holding 16-year-old murder suspect's statements admissible, despite failure to contact parents, as there was "nothing in the record to suggest that [mother’s] absence affected the voluntariness of the defendant’s statement.”). Robert had been fully Mirandized and advised that any statements he made could be used against him in adult court. See In re Watson, 47 Ohio St.3d 86, 548 N.E.2d 210 (1989) (stating no requirement in Miranda that parents be read child’s constitutional rights along with him to effectuate valid waiver). He repeatedly had to correct the police on their inaccurate summaries of what he had told them. Neither Robert nor this Court advance any convincing claim as to what might have been different had the parents been notified, let alone if they had actually appeared at the interrogation.

.Although unintentional, this Court inadvertently identifies the result which it mandates in this case when it says, "[t]he record indicates that although defendant’s most recent residence was Jerry's home, he spent little time with Jerry and much with Chaske and *231Dawn.” As has been previously set forth, Robert’s father, mother and aunt were at unknown locations outside the jurisdiction of the State of South Dakota. The Court declares Jerry to be unacceptable for the purpose of custodian notification in compliance with SDCL 26-7A-l 5 because Robert had spent little time with Jerry. Presumably, this would leave law enforcement with the dubious alternative of notifying Chaske White, Robert’s gang leader and the instigator of Morning Star’s murder.