Court Opinion

ID: 9960539
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-16 15:19:46.506323+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:35.310888
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                         APRIL 16, 2024
                                                                  In the Office of the Clerk of Court
                                                                 WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                               DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,                           )
                                               )         No. 39141-8-III
                       Respondent,             )
                                               )
       v.                                      )
                                               )
MARC MACIAS,                                   )         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
                                               )
                       Appellant.              )

       STAAB, A.C.J. — Marc Macias appeals his conviction for second degree rape and

challenges the admission of statements he made to law enforcement when they showed

up at his place of employment, arguing the court erred in concluding he was not in

custody at the time he was interrogated at his workplace. Building on his first issue,

Macias contends the deputy engaged in an improper two-step interrogation by obtaining

his confession before advising him of his Miranda1 rights. Alternatively, Macias argues

his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admissibility of the statements.

       We conclude that Macias was not in custody at the time of questioning and in turn,

the deputy did not engage in a two-step interrogation. Because Macias cannot show

       1
           Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
No. 39141-8-III
State v. Macias

deficient performance, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails. Therefore, his

trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object.

                                      BACKGROUND

       Marc Macias was arrested and charged with second degree rape. Prior to trial, the

court held a CrR 3.5 hearing to determine if statements made by Macias were admissible.

We summarize the court’s findings from that hearing.

       The Klickitat County Sheriff’s Office received information that Marc Macias was

the suspect of a rape allegation. Upon receiving this information, a deputy went to

Macias’s worksite to speak with him. “At the worksite location, [the deputy] contacted

the project manager to see if he could speak with [Macias].” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 28.

“The project manager [requested] another employee inform [Macias] that [a deputy] was

there to speak with him.” CP at 28. Eventually, Macias approached the deputy.

       The deputy testified that during the initial interaction he was the only law

enforcement officer on scene and Macias was not ordered or required to speak with him.

Additionally, Macias was not handcuffed or placed in custody, and the deputy did not

draw his weapon.

       The conversation began with the deputy asking Macias general questions about the

night in question. At first, Macias explained there was normal partying going on but

“didn’t go into detail about the incident that was claimed.” Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 9. Once

Macias began making incriminating statements, the deputy decided to read him his

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State v. Macias

Miranda warnings. After reading Macias his Miranda rights, Macias stated that he

understood his rights, agreed to continue speaking with the deputy, and did not request an

attorney.

       After Macias made further incriminating statements, the deputy determined it was

appropriate to place him under arrest and had Macias escorted off the property. “Once

they were off the property, [the deputy] handcuffed and placed [Macias] in the back of

the patrol car.” CP at 28. While this was occurring, the deputy read Macias his Miranda

rights a second time. After they were read, Macias did not express confusion, ask for an

attorney, or unequivocally state he did not wish to speak with the deputy.

       The deputy transported Macias to the Klickitat County Jail. During the car ride

there was small talk but the deputy did not “ask him anything else about the incident.”

RP at 13. Once they arrived at the jail, the deputy read Macias his Miranda rights a third

time. After reading Macias his rights he did not request an attorney, and Macias did not

express confusion. At that point, the deputy continued to interrogate Macias regarding

the specific allegations.

       From these findings, the court concluded that up until the point he was arrested

and placed in the back of the patrol car, Macias was not in custody to a degree associated

with a formal arrest. After being arrested and while riding in the patrol car to the police

station, Macias was not interrogated. At the police station, Macias was subjected to

custodial interrogation after being read his Miranda rights. At that point, Macias made a

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No. 39141-8-III
State v. Macias

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his rights and agreed to answer questions

and make statements. The court concluded that all of the statements made by Macias

were admissible at trial.

       Following a bench trial, the court found Macias guilty of second degree rape.

Macias now appeals his conviction.

                                       ANALYSIS

       Macias challenges the trial court’s conclusion that he was not in custody when the

deputy first questioned him at his workplace. In reviewing the issue, we consider the trial

court’s unchallenged findings from the CrR 3.5 hearing as verities. State v. Homan, 181

Wn.2d 102, 106, 330 P.3d 182 (2014). Whether a person is in custody is a question of

law reviewed de novo. State v. Escalante, 195 Wn.2d 526, 531, 461 P.3d 1183 (2020).

       The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects a defendant

against self-incrimination. U.S. CONST. amend. V. “Miranda warnings were developed

to protect a defendant’s constitutional right not to make incriminating confessions or

admissions to police while in the coercive environment of police custody.” State v.

Heritage, 152 Wn.2d 210, 214, 95 P.3d 345 (2004). Without these warnings, a suspect’s

statements made during custodial interrogation will be presumed involuntary. Id. at 214.

Therefore, this court must first determine whether a defendant was in custody for the

purposes of Miranda. State v. Lorenz, 152 Wn.2d 22, 36-37, 93 P.3d 133 (2004).

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State v. Macias

       “Custodial” as it relates to an interrogation “refers to whether the defendant’s

movement was restricted at the time of questioning.” Id. at 36. “An objective test is used

to determine . . . whether a reasonable person in the individual’s position would believe

he or she was in police custody to a degree associated with formal arrest.” Id. at 36-37.

Under this standard, a detention does not necessarily amount to custody for purposes of

Miranda. Escalante, 195 Wn.2d at 533. Instead, the court considers whether, under the

circumstances, there was a serious danger of coercion. Id. “Relevant circumstances may

include the nature of the surroundings, the extent of police control over the surroundings,

the degree of physical restraint placed on the suspect, and the duration and character of

the questioning.” Id. at 534.

       In this case, the trial court’s conclusion that Macias was not in custody is

supported by the court’s findings. Macias was at his place of employment, there is no

indication that the conversation took place in an enclosed room or building, only one

officer was present, Macias was not ordered to do anything and the officer did not exert

any control over Macias’ movement. Finally, the questioning was brief before Miranda

warnings were given. These are not circumstances that create a serious danger of

coercion.

       In support of his argument that the circumstances demonstrated a custodial

interrogation, Macias cites to a Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Craighead, 539 F.3d

1073 (9th Cir. 2008). This case is factually distinguishable. In Craighead, eight officers

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No. 39141-8-III
State v. Macias

executed a search warrant on a suspect’s home and, although the defendant was informed

he was free to leave, he was directed into a closed-door room in the home and

interrogated for 20 to 30 minutes. Id. at 1078-79. The court found that the home was

police-dominated and that the defendant reasonably could have believed he was not free

to leave. Id. at 1079.

       Next, Macias argues that the court erred by admitting any statements made

following his first set of Miranda warnings because the officer deliberately engaged in a

two-step interrogation tactic. The two-step interrogation process involves a law

enforcement officer initially questioning a suspect during custodial interrogation without

providing Miranda warnings until the suspect confesses. See State v. Hickman, 157 Wn.

App. 767, 772, 238 P.3d 1240 (2010). Next, the officer “advised the suspect of [their]

Miranda rights, acquired a waiver . . . and then resumed interrogation while referring to

the suspect’s earlier pre-Miranda admissions to elicit a post-Miranda confession.” See

Id. Courts will look to whether an officer deliberately used a two-step interrogation

method to avoid giving proper Miranda warnings. State v. Rhoden, 189 Wn. App. 193,

200-01, 356 P.3d 242 (2015). Importantly, a two-step interrogation only occurs when

both sets of the interrogation take place when a person is in custody. United States v.

Barnes, 713 F.3d 1200, 1204-05 (9th Cir. 2013).

       Macias’s argument fails because the trial court concluded that Macias was not in

custody when he was first read his Miranda warnings, and thus, there could be no two-

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State v. Macias

step interrogation procedure at that point. Although Macias may have been interrogated

by the officer at his workplace, he was not subject to custodial interrogation, which

would have required Miranda warnings. Therefore, because he was not in custody when

the first interrogation took place, the deputy did not subject him to a two-step

interrogation procedure.

       Alternatively, Macias argues he was denied effective assistance of counsel when

his trial attorney failed to object to the statements at trial that were the result of a two-step

interrogation process. Based on our conclusion that Macias was not subject to a two-step

interrogation, we determine that Macias fails to show deficient performance.

       Both the Sixth Amendment and art. I, § 22 of the Washington State Constitution

guarantee effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-

85, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

are reviewed de novo. State v. Hamilton, 179 Wn. App. 870, 879, 320 P.3d 142 (2014).

A successful claim requires the defendant to demonstrate two components: that counsel’s

performance was deficient, and that deficient performance caused prejudice. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 687. Representation is deficient if after considering all circumstances, it falls

“‘below an objective standard of reasonableness.’” State v. Grier, 171 Wn.2d 17, 33, 246

P.3d 1260 (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). Further, prejudice exists if

“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the

outcome of the proceedings would have been different.” Id. at 34 (quoting State v. Kyllo,

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No. 39141-8-III
State v. Macias

166 Wn.2d 856, 862, 215 P.3d 177 (2009)). To prevail on an ineffective assistance

claim, a defendant must overcome a “strong presumption that counsel’s performance was

reasonable.” Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d at 862.

      Because the deputy did not employ an improper two-step interrogation process,

Macias cannot show his attorney’s performance was deficient.

      Affirmed.

      A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to

RCW 2.06.040.

                                             _________________________________
                                                     Staab, A.C.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________________
      Fearing, J.

_________________________________
      Cooney, J.

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