Court Opinion

ID: 9835151
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 02:08:40.901695+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:58.452788
License: Public Domain

Andrias and Richter JJ.,
dissent in part in a memorandum by Andrias, J., as follows: I agree with the majority that the motion court properly denied petitioners’ motion for leave to amend their notice of claim under General Municipal Law § 50-e (6). I also agree with the majority that petitioners should have been granted leave to file a late notice of claim pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e (6) to assert a claim based on the City’s alleged negligence and professional negligence in the design of the infrastructure of the Citi Bike program and the incident site (the design claim). However, because I believe that petitioners should not be granted leave to file a late notice of claim to assert a claim based on the City’s alleged negligent failure to provide helmets on a system-wide basis, through vending machines or otherwise (the helmet claim), I respectfully dissent in part.
On October 25, 2013, petitioner Ronald Corwin was injured when the front wheel of the Citi Bike he was riding allegedly struck an unpainted concrete wheel stop placed at a Citi Bike station, causing the bike to flip over. Petitioners served a notice of claim, dated December 23, 2013, alleging in part, that the City improperly installed the wheel stop at the accident location, where it was not necessary; forced Mr. Corwin into a position of danger; failed to make timely inspections; failed to highlight the existence of the wheel stop with proper warnings; caused and allowed hazards to exist which brought about the accident; and created a trap and nuisance on the roadway.
More than 30 days later, petitioners commenced a federal action based on the same allegations as those in the notice of claim. In its answer dated April 16, 2014, the City asserted a boilerplate affirmative defense seeking to bar or diminish plaintiffs’ claims based on Mr. Corwin’s culpable conduct. On July 16, 2014, Mr. Corwin was deposed and stated that he was not wearing a helmet at the time of the accident, even though *492he is an avid cyclist who owned two helmets and had previously worn one of them while riding a Citi Bike.
Subsequently, petitioners amended the complaint in the federal action to assert, among other things, the design claim and the helmet claim. In its amended answer, the City raised an affirmative defense that Mr. Corwin’s claims should be barred or diminished by his culpable conduct, including his failure to wear a helmet. Thereafter, petitioners commenced this proceeding seeking leave to amend their notice of claim to conform to the amended complaint in the federal action, thereby allowing them to assert the design claim and the helmet claim against the City.
As the majority finds, the motion court properly denied petitioners leave to amend the notice of claim under General Municipal Law § 50-e (6). Section 50-e (6) authorizes the amendment of a notice of claim for the correction of good faith, nonprejudicial, technical defects or omissions, not substantive changes in the theory of liability (see Scott v City of New York, 40 AD3d 408, 410 [1st Dept 2007]). Contrary to petitioners’ contention that they are merely expounding on the initial allegations of common law negligence based on placement and maintenance of the wheel stop, the new allegations of negligent design, “professional negligence or malpractice,” “gross negligence,” and negligent failure to provide helmets all raise new theories of liability (see Rodriguez v Board of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 107 AD3d 651 [1st Dept 2013]; Van Buren v New York City Tr. Auth., 95 AD3d 604 [1st Dept 2012]). Indeed, at the status conference in the federal action referenced by the majority, petitioners’ counsel acknowledged “the City’s failure to provide helmets was not something that was included in the original notice of claim.”
General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) confers upon a court, under certain statutorily permitted circumstances, the discretion to determine whether to permit the filing of a late notice of claim to include new theories of liability (see Pierson v City of New York, 56 NY2d 950, 954 [1982]; Thomas v New York City Hous. Auth., 132 AD3d 432 [1st Dept 2015]). In determining whether leave should be granted pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e (5), “the key factors considered are ‘whether the movant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve the notice of claim within the statutory time frame, whether the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense.’ ” (Velazquez v City of N.Y. *493Health & Hosps. Corp. [Jacobi Med. Ctr.], 69 AD3d 441, 442 [1st Dept 2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 711 [2010], quoting Matter of Dubowy v City of New York, 305 AD2d 320, 321 [1st Dept 2003]). While the presence or absence of any one factor is not determinative (Velazquez, 69 AD3d at 442), this Court has stated that “[t]he most important factor that a court must consider ... is whether [the City] . . . ‘acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within the time specified’ ” (Padilla v Department of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 90 AD3d 458, 459 [1st Dept 2011], quoting General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; see also Matter of Whittaker v New York City Bd. of Educ., 71 AD3d 776, 778 [2d Dept 2010]).
Here, the request for leave was made 1 year and 87 days after the accident and petitioners did not establish a reasonable excuse for the delay. Accordingly, to prevail on their motion, it was incumbent on petitioners to demonstrate that there exists “some prior actual notice and the absence of prejudice— which would be relevant in condoning the lack of reasonable excuse” (Harris v City of New York, 297 AD2d 473, 474 [1st Dept 2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 503 [2002]).
Whether the municipal defendant received knowledge of the facts constituting the claim means “whether the public corporation or its attorney or its insurance carrier acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within [90 days of its occurrence] or within a reasonable time thereafter” (General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]). Knowledge that an accident occurred is not, in and of itself, enough (see Chattergoon v New York City Hous. Auth., 161 AD2d 141, 142 [1st Dept 1990], appeal dismissed 76 NY2d 875 [1990]). Rather, the municipal defendant must have knowledge of the essential facts that underlie the legal theory or theories upon which liability is predicated (see Evans v New York City Hous. Auth., 176 AD2d 221, 221-222 [1st Dept 1991], appeal dismissed 79 NY2d 886 [1992], lv denied 79 NY2d 754 [1992]; Bullard v City of New York, 118 AD2d 447, 450-451 [1st Dept 1986]).
While the original notice of claim provided the City with timely actual notice or knowledge of the essential facts connecting the accident to the City’s alleged negligence with respect to placement of the wheel stop, which is the basis for the design claim, it did not provide the City with actual notice or knowledge of the facts that underlie the legal theory that the City was negligent in failing to provide helmets on a system-wide basis, through vending machines or otherwise, which is the basis for the helmet claim. Significantly, the notice of claim did not inform the City that Mr. Corwin was not wear*494ing a helmet at the time of the accident and there is no indication that the City was on notice, prior to the expiration of the time to file a notice of claim, or within a reasonable time thereafter, that its failure to provide a helmet would result in a distinct theory of liability (see Matter of Gonzalez v City of New York, 127 AD3d 632, 633-634 [1st Dept 2015] [no actual knowledge where workers’ compensation form, among other things, made no mention of petitioners’ present claim that the railroad car had a bent edge and was not equipped with proper safety devices]; Kim v City of New York, 256 AD2d 83, 84 [1st Dept 1998] [knowledge that the petitioner was injured when instructed by a teacher to move a large piece of plywood, was not tantamount to notice of the petitioner’s claim that the respondents “were negligent in not providing petitioner with the mechanical means to move the plywood and otherwise in their supervision of petitioner’s activities”], Iv dismissed in part, denied in part 93 NY2d 896 [1999]). Since petitioners did not show an excuse for their delay and the City did not have actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the helmet claim, the motion court properly denied petitioners leave to serve a late notice of claim with regard to that claim.
Although the majority concedes that petitioners have not shown a reasonable excuse for their one-year-and-87-day delay in bringing the motion, and that the original notice of claim did not provide the City with actual notice, it nevertheless grants petitioners leave to file a late notice of claim pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) with respect to the helmet claim. The majority bases its determination on its belief that the City has not been substantially prejudiced because petitioners had no reason to make a claim concerning the lack of helmets until the City injected its mitigation defense into the federal action, and petitioners are merely trying to ensure that their notice of claim supports their effort to rebut that defense. Thus, the majority finds that “it would be patently unfair if petitioners are unable to contest the City’s affirmative defense that [Mr. Corwin] should have worn a helmet.”
However, despite what the majority perceives as unfairness, this Court is constrained to follow the General Municipal Law and case law. Because petitioners have not demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the delay and the City did not have actual notice of the facts constituting the helmet claim, “which heavily militate against granting the petition,” the motion court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying petitioners leave to file a late notice of claim asserting a new tort claim based on the City’s alleged negligent failure to *495provide helmets on a system-wide basis (Matter of Gonzalez v City of New York, 127 AD3d at 634; see also Matter of Peterson v New York City Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 66 AD3d 1027, 1030 [2d Dept 2009] [“While the remaining respondents failed to demonstrate how the passage of time hampered their ability to investigate the alleged roadway defect, or interview witnesses or employees, and did not show substantial prejudice in their ability to defend this proceeding, the Supreme Court nonetheless properly, in effect, denied the petition insofar as asserted against them due to the lack of timely actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim and the petitioner’s lack of a reasonable excuse for the delay in bringing the proceeding”]). Indeed, in Gonzalez, this Court held that where the petitioner does not establish a reasonable excuse for the delay and the City does not have actual knowledge of the essential facts underlying the claim, “we need not address the final criterion to be considered in assessing a late notice of claim — whether respondents have been substantially prejudiced by the delay” (127 AD3d at 634; see also Hebbard v Carpenter, 37 AD3d 538, 541 [2d Dept 2007]).
Nor does the fact that the City asserted an affirmative defense based on Mr. Corwin’s failure to wear a helmet constitute a “unique” circumstance that warrants granting petitioners leave to assert the helmet claim. To succeed on its mitigation defense, the City bears the burden of proving that Mr. Corwin’s conduct in failing to wear a helmet was culpable because he acted unreasonably under the circumstances. Even without the granting of leave to allow plaintiff to assert the helmet claim as a new theory of liability, petitioners will be free to argue that Mr. Corwin’s conduct was not unreasonable under the circumstances and that he did not breach a duty of care because adults are not required to wear helmets while riding bicycles in New York City and the Citi Bike program does not provide helmets.
However, with respect to the design claim, the City had actual notice or knowledge of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter and no substantial prejudice has been shown. Consequently, the majority is correct that it was an improvident exercise of discretion to deny the City’s motion for leave to serve a late notice to raise the design claim.
Accordingly, I would modify the judgment on appeal to the extent of granting the petition for leave to serve a late notice of claim asserting the design claim but not the helmet claim.