Court Opinion

ID: 9911623
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-20 16:03:42.336378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:30.900825
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                                 FOURTH DISTRICT

                    R.P.M, Adoptive Parent, and
    LAW OFFICE OF ELIZABETH R. BERKOWITZ, P.A., Adoption Entity,
                            Appellants,

                                         v.

                  PROPOSED ADOPTION OF I.R.M., a child,
                              Appellee.

                                 No. 4D2023-0558

                               [December 20, 2023]

  Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach
County; Karen M. Miller, Judge; L.T. Case No. 502021DR001591.

   Stephanie L. Serafin and Rebecca Mercier Vargas of Kreusler-Walsh, Vargas
& Serafin, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellants.

   No appearance for appellee.

FORST, J.

   Prospective adoptive parent R.P.M. (“Stepfather”) and the Law Office of
Elizabeth R. Berkowitz, P.A. (“Adoption Entity”) (collectively, “Appellants”) appeal
the trial court’s order dismissing their Amended Petition for Termination of
Parental Rights and Joint Petition for Adoption by Stepparent of minor child
I.R.M. (“the Amended Petition”). Because the trial court failed to hold an
evidentiary hearing on the Amended Petition and instead sua sponte invalidated
the biological father’s (“Father”) written consent to adoption (“the Consent”) on
an unsupported ground, we reverse and remand for the trial court to hold an
evidentiary hearing on the Amended Petition.

                                   Background

   With Adoption Entity’s assistance, Stepfather sought to adopt his twelve-year-
old stepdaughter, I.R.M. Father executed the Consent, which closely mirrors the
language of section 63.082(4)(e), Florida Statutes (2021), regarding the required
recitation of rights language. Specifically, the Consent indicated that it was
“valid, binding, and irrevocable” and “cannot be invalidated unless a court finds
that it was obtained by fraud or under duress.” The Consent further provided
Father with a revocation period of three business days, consistent with section

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63.082(4)(c), Florida Statutes (2021), governing adoptions of children older than
six months. Father did not revoke the Consent within the three-business-day
period, nor has he ever moved to revoke the Consent. Additionally, the Consent
states that “no action previously taken or previously signed by [Father], obligates
[Father] to sign this Consent for Adoption.”

   On the same date that Father executed the Consent, he also executed an
Adoption Settlement Agreement (“the Agreement”) with Stepfather and I.R.M.’s
mother. Therein, Father agreed to “affirm his Consent for Adoption,” which was
“part of and contemporaneous[] with th[e] Agreement.” The Agreement purports
to “settle all claims” between the parties regarding I.R.M. and provides for an
“open adoption” wherein I.R.M. and Father can establish a “natural and healthy
relationship.”     Additionally, the Agreement allows Father to visit and
communicate with I.R.M. if the latter consents to communication or visits.

   Appellants filed the Amended Petition, the Consent, and the Agreement in the
adoption case, and requested the trial court schedule a hearing. While the
Amended Petition was pending, the trial court issued two status orders directing
Appellants to correct various deficiencies; however, neither status order
pertained to the Consent or the Agreement. Appellants complied with the status
orders, corrected the deficiencies, and renewed their request for a hearing.

   Without holding a hearing on the Amended Petition, the trial court sua sponte
entered an order finding the Consent and Agreement invalid. The trial court
reasoned that the Consent was conditioned on the Agreement being incorporated
into a final judgment of adoption, and expressed concerns regarding the
Agreement’s above-noted “open adoption” language. As a result, the trial court
ordered Appellants to file Father’s nonconditional consent or it would dismiss
the Amended Petition for being “facially insufficient.”

    Appellants did not file an amended consent from Father, instead choosing to
rely on the Consent as filed, while persistently requesting a hearing. The trial
court never scheduled a hearing and ultimately dismissed the Amended Petition
for being “facially insufficient” based on its “prior findings invalidating [Father’s]
consent.” This appeal timely followed.

                                      Analysis

   We review the trial court’s ruling on a consent to adoption for an abuse of
discretion. See In re I.B., 142 So. 3d 919, 922 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014). We also
review the trial court’s decision to forego or deny an evidentiary hearing for an
abuse of discretion. See F.R. v. Adoption of Baby Boy Born Nov. 2, 2010, 135 So.
3d 301, 304 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012).

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Permissible Grounds to Revoke the Consent

   Section 63.082, Florida Statutes (2021), states in pertinent part:

      [(4)](c) If the minor to be adopted is older than 6 months of age at
      the time of the execution of the consent, the consent to adoption is
      valid upon execution; however, it is subject to a revocation period of
      3 business days.

         ....

      (7) If a person is seeking to revoke consent for a child older than 6
      months of age:

      (a) The person seeking to revoke consent must, in accordance with
      paragraph (4)(c), notify the adoption entity in writing by certified
      mail, return receipt requested, within 3 business days after
      execution of the consent. . . .

         ....

      (f) Following the revocation period described in paragraph (a),
      consent may be set aside only when the court finds that the consent
      was obtained by fraud or duress.

§ 63.082, Fla. Stat. (2021) (emphasis added).

   When Father executed the Consent, I.R.M. was older than six months; thus,
the Consent became valid upon execution and was then susceptible to a three-
business-day revocation period. § 63.082(4)(c), (7)(a), Fla. Stat. (2021); see I.B.,
142 So. 3d at 922. Father neither revoked the Consent within this revocation
period nor moved to revoke it for fraud, duress, or any other reason. See J.S. v.
S.A., 912 So. 2d 650, 656 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (discussing that the parent who
executed the consent has the burden of proving fraud or duress by clear and
convincing evidence). Nonetheless, both the trial court’s orders invalidating the
Consent and dismissing the Amended Petition are devoid of any discussion
related to fraud or duress, contrary to the above statutory language.

      Notwithstanding the requirements of this chapter, a failure to meet
      any of those requirements does not constitute grounds for
      invalidation of a consent to adoption . . . unless the extent and
      circumstances of such a failure result in a material failure of
      fundamental fairness in the administration of due process, or the
      failure constitutes or contributes to fraud or duress in obtaining a
      consent to adoption . . . .

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§ 63.2325, Fla. Stat. (2021).

    Notably, section 63.2325, which the trial court cited to justify invalidating the
Consent, actually limits the trial court’s ability to revoke a consent to adoption.
See M.J.G. v. Graves, 332 So. 3d 1008, 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022); see also C.G.
v. Guardian Ad Litem Program, 920 So. 2d 854, 856 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (consent
was valid because there was no suggestion of fraud or duress and no failure of
fundamental fairness).     None of the above-noted revocation grounds are
supported by this record nor alleged by Father.

   Thus, the trial court abused its discretion by invalidating the Consent without
making a finding as to either fraud or duress as required by section 63.082(7)(f),
Florida Statutes (2021), and relevant caselaw. See I.B., 142 So. 3d at 922–23;
see also M.J.G., 332 So. 3d at 1012. Moreover, a trial court cannot set aside a
birth parent’s consent “without notice to [the adoption entity] and an appropriate
evidentiary basis to establish the consent was obtained by fraud or duress.” In
re S.N.W., 912 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). Here, Appellants were
persistent in their efforts to obtain an evidentiary hearing before the trial court
invalidated the Consent on an unsupported ground and without an evidentiary
basis. See id.

Consent Language and Separate Agreement

    Father executed both the Consent and the Agreement on the same date.
While the Agreement specified that Father would “affirm his Consent for
Adoption,” the Agreement also included “open adoption” language which created
a concern with the trial court as to whether Father’s consent to termination of
parental rights was conditional. However, the existence of a separate adoption
agreement or a possibly conditional consent does not automatically mean a
consent to adoption is invalid. See In re Adoption of K.A.G., 152 So. 3d 1271,
1276 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (finding father’s consent to adoption can be valid even
though it was conditioned on the court granting grandmother’s petition for
adoption of father’s child); Hindman v. Bischoff, 534 So. 2d 743, 744 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1988) (birth mother’s consent to adoption was valid even though she signed
an agreement in contemplation of adoption that required her to pay adoption
expenses of intermediary if she failed to execute the consent to adoption); Quets
v. Needham, 682 S.E. 2d 214, 217–18 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (noting that a Florida
trial court entered a final judgment of adoption notwithstanding an “Open
Adoption Agreement” entered into by the parties that was not incorporated into
the final judgment).

   Here, the Consent, which does not specifically mention the Agreement, states
that “no action previously taken or previously signed by [Father], obligates
[Father] to sign this Consent for Adoption.” Nor has Father contended that he

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was defrauded into executing the Consent with an expectation of postadoption
contact with I.R.M. pursuant to the Agreement. Thus, the appropriate course of
action would have been for the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing with
prior notice to Appellants and Father before determining that the Consent was
invalid. See S.N.W., 912 So. 2d at 370. We express no opinion on whether
Father’s consent is or is not conditional; whether the trial court has either the
legal authority or discretion to include the Agreement in a final judgment of
adoption; or whether the Agreement itself is valid.

                                   Conclusion

   Because the trial court abused its discretion by failing to hold an evidentiary
hearing before invalidating the Consent on an unsupported basis, we reverse
and remand for the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the Amended
Petition with prior notice to Appellants and Father.

   Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

WARNER and MAY, JJ., concur.

                               *        *         *

      Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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