Court Opinion

ID: 9784450
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:45:23.318319+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:54.783505
License: Public Domain

RICHARD B. TEITELMAN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The principal opinion recognizes that the state constitutional right to a trial by jury applies to the Overbeys’ claim for punitive damages under the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act. However, the principal opinion then holds the statutory cap on punitive damages does not violate the Ov-erbeys’ right to a jury trial because the legislature could have precluded recovery of punitive damages altogether. The “inviolate” state constitutional right to a trial by jury is not contingent on hypothetical legislative prerogative. Instead, the constitutional right to a trial by jury attaches to claims that actually are prosecuted under existing law. Having given the Over-beys the option to exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial, the legislature cannot limit that right statutorily. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the principal opinion to the extent it holds that statutory limits on a jury’s award of punitive damages do not violate the “inviolate” state constitutional right to a trial by jury.
Article I, section 22(a) is one of the fundamental guarantees of the Missouri Constitution, providing “the right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate....” The word “inviolate” has a simple definition. It means “free from change or blemish, pure or unbroken.” Webster’s third new international dictionary 1190 (1993). This simple definition frames the issue. Does the right to a trial by jury “remain inviolate” when a statuto*382ry limit requires courts to reduce the jury’s verdict?
The special constitutional significance of the jury’s role in determining damages is reflected in the analytical basis for determining whether the right to trial by jury attaches. If the action is a civil action for damages, then the right to a jury trial attaches and must “remain inviolate.” State ex rel. Diehl v. O’Malley, 95 S.W.3d 82, 84 (Mo. banc 2003). Because the constitutional right to a civil jury trial is contingent on there being an action for damages, statutory limits on those damages directly curtails one of the most significant constitutional roles performed by the jury. Under these circumstances, the right to trial by jury does not “remain inviolate.” It plainly and clearly is violated.
As the principal opinion acknowledges, this Court held that plaintiffs have a constitutional right to have a jury determine both punitive and actual damages in a statutory cause of action such as the Missouri Human Rights Act or the MMPA. See Scott v. Blue Springs Ford Sales, Inc., 176 S.W.3d 140, 142 (Mo. banc 2005). Whether an action is based on the common law or a statutory cause of action, the jury’s role in a civil case is to determine the facts relating to both liability and damages and to enter a verdict accordingly. These functions are what must “remain inviolate” under article I, section 22(a). Once the right to a trial by jury attaches, as it does in this case, the plaintiff has the full benefit of that right free from the reach of hostile legislation. While it is true that the legislature could decline to provide for punitive damages under the MMPA, the legislature instead chose to allow punitive damages. Having provided the right to pursue punitive damages, the legislature also invoked the attendant constitutional guarantee of a trial by jury. That right cannot be curtailed by statute.
The analytical framework established by the principal opinion leaves the legislature free to limit punitive damages at $1 in even the most egregious cases. Although the plaintiff still would receive the benefit of the jury’s factual findings regarding actual damages and the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, the benefit would be hollow from both a practical and constitutional perspective.
Practically, the purpose of punitive damages is to punish civil wrongdoing and to serve as a deterrent to others who may be tempted to engage in similar conduct. Arbitrarily limiting punitive damages without reference to the facts found by the jury or the limits of due process is inconsistent with the intended purpose of punitive damages.
Constitutionally, the “inviolate” right to trial by jury preserves the role of citizens in resolving disputes and provides the people with a voice in the application of the law to problems of the day. By setting substantive limits on recovery regardless of the evidence, statutes such as section 510.265, RSMo, unavoidably limit the constitutional role of the jury. As with any other fundamental constitutional right guaranteed in the bill of rights, the right to trial by jury applies “regardless of any statutory provision” and is “beyond the reach of hostile legislation.” Diehl, 95 S.W.3d. at 92 (citations omitted). If legislative limits on this constitutional right are permitted in statutory causes of action, the right to trial by jury is defined not by the text and history of our constitution but instead by the whim of legislative prerogative.
Similarly, the scope of the state constitutional guarantee of a right to trial by jury is not informed by the federal courts’ interpretation of the Seventh Amendment. The Seventh Amendment provides that “the right of trial by jury shall be pre*383served.” Article I, section 22(a) does more than simply “preserve” the right to a trial by jury; it requires that the right “remain inviolate.” The phrase “remain inviolate” is a “more emphatic statement of the right” than that provided by the Seventh Amendment. Diehl, 95 S.W.3d at 84. The textual differences require a different analysis. The fact that the federal constitution authorizes limits on the jury’s constitutional role in awarding damages has limited relevance to the interpretation of Missouri’s “more emphatic statement” of the right to trial by jury.
Section 510.265 directly limits the jury’s constitutional role in determining and awarding damages. Consequently, I would hold that the limits on punitive damages imposed by section 510.265 violate article I, section 22(a) of the Missouri Constitution.