Court Opinion

ID: 9899416
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-16 18:04:34.137288+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:25.101369
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/15/23 In re A.M. CA2/4
            NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

     IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                       DIVISION FOUR

In re A.M., a Person Coming                                    B325354
Under the Juvenile Court Law.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                             Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN                                         Super. Ct. No.
AND FAMILY SERVICES,                                           17CCJP01728
       Plaintiff and Respondent,
       v.
I.M.,
       Defendant and Appellant.
In C.M. et al., Persons Coming                                 B325364
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                             Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN                                         Super. Ct. No. DK19774
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
       Plaintiff and Respondent,
       v.
I.M.,
       Defendant and Appellant.
      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Kristen Byrdsong, Judge Pro Tempore.
Affirmed.
      Ernesto Paz Rey, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
             _________________________________________

                       INTRODUCTION

      This appeal arises out of the dependency proceedings
relating to 13-year-old C.M., 10-year-old Ja.F., 9-year-old Jo.F.,
and 6-year-old A.M., the children of I.M. (mother).1 Mother
challenges the order denying her petition filed under Welfare and
Institutions Code2 section 388, by which she sought to terminate
the legal guardianship established over the children and have
them returned to her care.
      The parties are familiar with the facts and procedural
history of the case, so we do not fully restate those details here.
Instead, in the Discussion, post, we discuss the facts as needed to
provide context for and resolve the issues presented on appeal.
For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

1     Mother has two other children, 12-year-old A.F. and 5-year-
old J.M., both of whom are in her care and are not at issue in this
appeal. C.M.’s father is L.M. and his whereabouts are unknown.
M.F. is the father of mother’s other children. L.M. and M.F. are
not parties to this appeal.
2     All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code.

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                         DISCUSSION

I.    Relevant Background
      C.M., Ja.F., and Jo.F. have been dependents of the court
since December 2016. Subsequently, in February 2018, A.M. was
also declared a dependent of the court, and the children were
removed from their parents. The children have resided with their
current caregivers since 2018 and have had unmonitored
overnight visits with their parents on weekends since November
2018.
      Near the end of their 18-month reunification period, in July
2019, the parents told the Department of Children and Family
Services (Department) that, although they had been participating
in services and had secured stable housing, “they did not feel
ready to reunify with the children” due to the children’s special
needs and necessary services. Specifically, the parents noted: (1)
they needed more time to learn how to manage/address the
behavioral issues of their older son, A.F., who was in their care
and receiving wraparound services; (2) Jo.F. was also receiving
wraparound services and having behavioral issues in their home
during visits; and (3) C.M., Ja.F., and A.M. were clients of the
Regional Center at the time and each received different services
several times per week. Consequently, in September 2019, the
juvenile court terminated the parents’ reunification services.
      At the section 366.26 hearing held in February 2021, the
juvenile court granted legal guardianship of the children to their
caregivers. It also ordered the parents’ unmonitored visits to
continue.
      In September 2022, mother filed a petition under section
388 seeking to modify the order establishing the caregivers’ legal
guardianship over the children. She asked the juvenile court to

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return the children to her care or, alternatively, reinstate her
reunification services and extend her weekend overnight visits by
one day. Following a hearing, the court denied mother’s petition,
finding she failed to demonstrate a change in circumstances, or
that the requested modification to its order was in the children’s
best interests.

II.    Governing Principles and Standard of Review
       “Section 388 accords a parent the right to petition the
juvenile court for modification of any of its orders based upon
changed circumstances or new evidence.” (In re Alayah J. (2017)
9 Cal.App.5th 469, 478, fn. omitted.) “The [parent] has the
burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that
there is new evidence or a change of circumstances and (2) that
the proposed modification would be in the best interests of the
child.” (In re Mickel O. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 615, original
italics.) “In considering whether the [parent] has made the
requisite showing, the juvenile court may consider the entire
factual and procedural history of the case.” (Id. at p. 616.)
       “We review the juvenile court’s denial of a section 388
petition for an abuse of discretion.” (In re Mickel O., supra, 197
Cal.App.4th at p. 616.) “‘[“]The appropriate test for abuse of
discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of
reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced
from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute
its decision for that of the trial court.[”]’” (Ibid.)

III.   Analysis
       Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by
denying her section 388 petition because she satisfied both
prongs of the two-pronged test discussed above. With respect to
the first prong, mother asserts she “proved that her

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circumstances had changed substantially” because the record
shows she completed all the classes/programs set forth in her
court-ordered case plan, has secured “a stable home for the
children,” and “was able to work with [the children’s] service
providers.” For the reasons discussed below, we do not agree with
mother’s argument.
         As noted above, mother seeks to modify the February 2021
order placing the children with their caregivers under a
permanent plan of legal guardianship. Although mother correctly
observes she has completed all of the classes/programs required
of her and secured adequate housing, the record—including the
evidence offered in support of her section 388 petition—shows she
reached those milestones before her reunification services were
terminated in September 2019. Indeed, when it terminated her
reunification services, the juvenile court acknowledged mother’s
substantial compliance with her case plan. Consequently, while
commendable, mother’s compliance with her court-ordered case
plan and her stable housing situation do not establish her
circumstances have changed since entry of the order she seeks to
modify.
         Next, mother’s evidence in support of her section 388
petition does not—as she appears to suggest—demonstrate she
has addressed the barriers precluding reunification in 2019.
Attached to the petition was a declaration by mother, in which
she acknowledged she previously “did not feel mentally prepared
to have [all the children] together” in her care because she “was
working with [her] son [A.F.] . . . who has anger problems.”
Mother then states she has made “progress i[n] situating [A.F.]
at . . . [her] home,” that she “ha[s] been preparing day by day to
be able to deal with the tantrums of each child,” and that she has

                                5
been “practicing what [she] learn[ed] from [Jo.F.’s wraparound
services providers] . . . and will put everything into practice with
all [her] children.” These vague statements, however, do not
illustrate what progress, if any, mother has made in managing
A.F.’s behavioral challenges. Nor does mother clearly explain how
or why she is now prepared to address all of her children’s
behavioral issues and/or other special needs. Although mother
suggests she has learned certain skills or techniques while
participating in wraparound services with Jo.F., she does not
describe what they are or explain how they will assist her in
managing the children’s behaviors or meeting their needs.
Moreover, contrary to mother’s statements in her declaration, the
children’s caregivers told the Department that the parents “‘have
not worked with [A.F.] and his [problematic] behaviors continue.’”
       Finally, as discussed below, the record shows mother has
consistently struggled to manage the children’s behaviors during
her unmonitored visits, and that those challenges persisted up
until she filed her section 388 petition in September 2022.
       Throughout the reunification period and beyond, up
through 2021, the children’s caregivers reported that, during
weekend visits, mother regularly, and frequently, called them for
assistance in calming the children over the phone. The caregivers
also related the children often misbehaved in their parents’ home
and that, on multiple occasions, the caregivers had to pick up one
or all of the children early from visits when the parents were
unable to control them or manage their tantrums. Further, the
caregivers stated the children behaved differently with their
parents, as they followed the rules and were calm in the
caregivers’ home.

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       In 2022, the parents continued to communicate with the
caregivers about the children’s behaviors and sought their
support as needed during visits. At some point that year, Jo.F.
had two tantrums in one month at his parents’ home. During one
of those tantrums, Jo.F. hit mother with a belt, leading her to call
the police. Upon learning of the incident, the children’s caregiver
went to mother’s home, helped Jo.F. calm down by using
breathing exercises and discussing the potential consequences of
his actions, and took him home.
       Another incident occurred in August 2022, a month before
mother filed her section 388 petition. C.M. reported that, during
J.M.’s birthday party, A.F. became upset for unknown reasons
and began yelling, cursing, and hitting mother. C.M. then
intervened and tried to stop A.F. from hitting mother. At that
point, A.F. “punched [C.M.] on the right side of her head by her
ear, dropping her to the floor.” Soon thereafter, father returned
home from work and separated A.F. from his siblings. Mother
called the children’s caregiver and asked her to pick them up.
Thereafter, the caregiver took C.M. to the hospital because she
reported having pain to her head. While C.M. did not have any
bruises or serious injuries, she was given medication to help her
relax.
       For the reasons discussed above, we conclude the juvenile
court did not “exceed[ ] the bounds of reason” (In re Mickel O.,
supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 616) by finding mother failed to
demonstrate a change in circumstances of “‘such significant
nature that it requires a setting aside or modification of the
challenged prior order.’” (Ibid.) The juvenile court therefore did
not abuse its discretion by denying mother’s section 388 petition.
Having reached this conclusion, we need not address whether the

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court erred by finding the requested modification to its February
2021 order was not in the children’s best interests. (See ibid.
[“The petitioner has the burden of showing by a preponderance of
the evidence (1) that there is new evidence or a change of
circumstances and (2) that the proposed modification would be in
the best interests of the child.” (Original italics.)].)

                        DISPOSITION

     The order denying mother’s section 388 petition is affirmed.

  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                  CURREY, P. J.
We concur:

MORI, J.

ZUKIN, J.

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