Court Opinion

ID: 9962911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-24 00:00:44.069677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:44.589044
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-40231            Document: 71-1          Page: 1       Date Filed: 04/23/2024

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit                                            United States Court of Appeals
                                   ____________                                          Fifth Circuit

                                                                                       FILED
                                     No. 23-40231                                  April 23, 2024
                                   ____________
                                                                                  Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                       Clerk
Vikramkumar J. Shah,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                           versus

Novelis,

                                             Defendant—Appellee.
                   ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Eastern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 4:22-CV-89
                  ______________________________

Before Elrod and Ramirez, Circuit Judges, and Ashe, District Judge. *
Per Curiam: †
      Plaintiff-appellant Vikramkumar Shah, appearing pro se, sued
defendant-appellee Novelis and others, alleging employment discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII). Because the defendants
had not been properly served with process more than a year after Shah filed
his complaint, the district court dismissed the lawsuit sua sponte under

      _____________________
      *
          District Judge of the Eastern District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.
      †
          This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-40231       Document: 71-1      Page: 2    Date Filed: 04/23/2024

                                No. 23-40231

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). Finding no reversible error, we
AFFIRM.
                                     I
       Sometime before 2013, Shah worked as a chemical engineer for
Novelis’s Indian subsidiary (Subsidiary). While he was employed there, his
supervisor informed him that Subsidiary would begin using a new software
program, which was sold by the supervisor’s friend. Believing the program to
be inadequate for Subsidiary’s needs, Shah suggested a different program. In
response, Shah’s supervisors asked him to illicitly copy data from that
program so that Subsidiary could use it. Shah objected on the grounds that
doing so would be unethical, and he raised various concerns regarding the
propriety of his supervisors’ conduct with officers of Subsidiary; he alleges
that, as a result, he was terminated in November 2013.
       Shah came to the United States in 2015. He avers that because of the
circumstances surrounding his discharge from Subsidiary, he and his family
have been the targets of cybercrime and hacking, identity theft, and other
criminal acts. At some point, he obtained a job with the Plano Independent
School District in Plano, Texas, but he was ultimately terminated, apparently
based on accusations that he abused a child. Shah maintains that his
termination was related to the cybercrimes perpetrated by Subsidiary. Shah
subsequently filed lawsuits in Plano, Texas, and in India, complaining of the
hacking. Both were dismissed. Shah alleges that the lawsuits were dismissed
due to fraud committed by members of the judiciary, collusion between his
attorney and opposing counsel, and bribery and extensive cybercrimes
committed by Subsidiary.

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                                       No. 23-40231

        On February 8, 2022, Shah filed his complaint asserting employment
discrimination claims under Title VII; 1 it listed a Plano, Texas home address.
He also moved to proceed in forma pauperis and for the appointment of
counsel. In March, he again moved for the appointment of counsel, and filed
a notice of change of address listing a home address in Tukwila, Washington.
The next day, he paid the filing fee, so his motion to proceed in forma pauperis
was denied as moot. The court also denied his first and second motions for
the appointment of counsel.
        On April 14, the district court sent Shah a notice of impending
dismissal, informing him that more than sixty days had passed since he filed
his complaint and, under Rule 4(m), he was responsible for serving the
defendants within ninety days from the commencement of the suit. The
notice ordered Shah to
        execute a verified petition regarding service of process,
        advising the Court:
        A. That the case should not be dismissed as to the unserved
        Defendant;
        B. That the failure to obtain service upon Defendants is not due
        to the fault of the party or counsel seeking to avoid dismissal;
        C. The reasons why the case against the unserved Defendants
        should not be dismissed, set forth in detail and demonstrating
        good cause; and

        _____________________
        1
         Shah now alleges that the defendants violated several other statutes, including the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030; the Electronic Communications
Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2702; “the federal identity theft statute,” 18 U.S.C. § 1028;
the federal wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343; the Americans with Disabilities Act; the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967; “numerous state laws”; and the laws of
India. These claims were not raised below.

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                                 No. 23-40231

       D. That service will be effected on Defendants within thirty
       (30) days of the date of the petition.
       This petition must be filed with the Court on or before
       Monday, May 9, 2022, at 5:00 p.m.
The notice was returned as undeliverable on May 16, 2022.
       The court ordered Shah to provide the correct address, citing to Local
Rule CV-11, which provides in relevant part:
       Notices will be sent only to an e-mail and/or mailing address
       on file. A pro se litigant must provide the court with a physical
       address (i.e., a post office box is not acceptable) and is
       responsible for keeping the clerk advised in writing of his or her
       current physical address.
The court received an acknowledgement of receipt signed by Shah in
response to that order, which had been mailed to the same address as the
notice of impending dismissal. Shah then sent a letter to the court providing
a very similar but corrected address in Tukwila, Washington. He also noted
that he did “receive [the court’s] letters even with” the prior similar address.
       Meanwhile, Shah filed a third motion for the appointment of counsel.
He later advised the court that he could not find an affordable attorney and
intended to represent himself, so the motion was denied. On September 1,
2022, Shah moved “to extend time for various investigations and
discovery[.]” For the first time, he also asked the district court to serve the
defendants and provided his credit card information to cover the cost.
Construing the first motion as one to extend time for discovery, the district
court denied the motion, noting that because “summons has not yet been
issued” and “Defendant remains unserved” the motion was “premature[.]”
The court also denied the request to serve the defendants. It emphasized that
“Plaintiff ha[d] paid the filing fee for his lawsuit; accordingly, he [wa]s
responsible for serving Defendants in this action. Plaintiff ha[d] failed to

                                       4
 Case: 23-40231          Document: 71-1          Page: 5      Date Filed: 04/23/2024

                                      No. 23-40231

complete the summons form as required by Local Rule CV-4.” The court
ordered the Clerk of Court to mail a summons form to Shah and reminded
him “that he must fully complete the form for the Clerk of Court to issue
summons.”
        The Clerk of Court issued summons on November 16, 2022. It was
returned as undeliverable on January 23, 2023. The Clerk of Court reissued
summons on February 3. In the meantime, Shah filed several letters
indicating that he was attempting to obtain waivers of service from the
defendants and that he intended to serve process via email. Ultimately, the
magistrate judge recommended dismissal under Rule 4(m). Shah filed
additional documents, which the district judge construed as objections to the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. Reviewing the record de
novo, the district judge adopted the recommendation and dismissed without
prejudice.
        Shah timely appealed. 2
                                            II
        Generally, we review a dismissal under Rule 4(m) for abuse of
discretion. See Fournier v. Textron, Inc., 776 F.2d 532, 534 (5th Cir. 1985)
(citing Porter v. Beaumont Enter. & J., 743 F.2d 269, 271 (5th Cir. 1984)). But
“where the applicable statute of limitations likely bars future litigation, a
district court’s dismissal of claims under Rule 4(m) should be reviewed under
the same heightened standard used to review a dismissal with prejudice.”

        _____________________
        2
           Shah filed his notice of appeal after he filed a motion to reinstate—which the
district court construed as a motion to alter the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59—but before the district court resolved his motion. The district court
ultimately denied that motion. The notice of appeal is effective as of the date the Rule 59
motion was denied. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b).

                                            5
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                                   No. 23-40231

Millan v. USAA Gen. Indem. Co., 546 F.3d 321, 326 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing
Boazman v. Econ. Lab’y, Inc., 537 F.2d 210, 213 (5th Cir. 1976)).
       Because “dismissal with prejudice ‘is an extreme sanction that
deprives a litigant of the opportunity to pursue his claim[,]’ . . . this Court has
limited district courts’ discretion to dismiss claims with prejudice.” Id. (first
citing Gonzalez v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 610 F.2d 241, 247 (5th Cir.
1980); and then citing Price v. McGlathery, 792 F.2d 472, 474 (5th Cir. 1986)).
“These dismissals . . . require ‘a clear record of delay or contumacious
conduct by the plaintiff.’” Lozano v. Bosdet, 693 F.3d 485, 490 (5th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Millan, 546 F.3d at 326). Affirming a dismissal with prejudice
typically requires one of the following: “(1) delay caused by plaintiff himself
and not his attorney; (2) actual prejudice to the defendant; or (3) delay caused
by intentional conduct.” Price, 792 F.2d at 474 (citing Callip v. Harris Cnty.
Child Welfare Dep’t, 757 F.2d 1513, 1519 (5th Cir. 1985)).
       We are obligated to construe the briefs of pro se litigants liberally. See
Brown v. Sudduth, 675 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 2012).
                                       III
       Shah argues that the district court’s dismissal under Rule 4(m) should
be reversed for three reasons: he did in fact serve the defendants as required
by Rule 4, the court dismissed the case prematurely, and Rule 4(m) does not
apply to international defendants.
                                        A
       Shah first argues that he properly served the defendants.
       Rule 4 governs service of process in federal court. See generally Fed.
R. Civ. P. 4. Rule 4(c) provides that, generally, “[t]he plaintiff is
responsible for having the summons and complaint served within the time
allowed by Rule 4(m)[.]” Id. 4(c)(1). Rule 4(c) also dictates that service may

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                                  No. 23-40231

be completed by “[a]ny person who is at least 18 years old and not a party”
to the case. Id. 4(c)(2). An individual located within a judicial district in the
United States may be served by:
       (1) following state law for serving a summons in an action
       brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the
       district court is located or where service is made; or
       (2) doing any of the following:
            (A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint
            to the individual personally;
            (B) leaving a copy of each at the individual’s dwelling or
            usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and
            discretion who resides there; or
            (C) delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized by
            appointment or by law to receive service of process.
Id. 4(e).
       A domestic or foreign corporation, on the other hand, must be served:
       (1) in a judicial district of the United States:
            (A) in the manner prescribed by Rule 4(e)(1) for serving an
            individual; or
            (B) by delivering a copy of the summons and of the
            complaint to an officer, a managing or general agent, or any
            other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive
            service of process and—if the agent is one authorized by
            statute and the statute so requires—by also mailing a copy
            of each to the defendant; or
       (2) at a place not within any judicial district of the United
       States, in any manner prescribed by Rule 4(f) for serving an
       individual [in a foreign country], except personal delivery
       under (f)(2)(C)(i).
Id. 4(h).

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                                  No. 23-40231

       Finally, should he so choose, a plaintiff may attempt to obtain waiver
of formal service of process from one or more defendants. See id. 4(d). To do
so, the plaintiff must send a written notice and request to the individual
defendant or, in the case of a corporation, to a particular agent of the
corporation. Id. 4(d)(1). The notice and request must contain all the
information listed in Rule 4(d)(1) to be effective. Id. For example, we have
previously held that a request for waiver of service was insufficient when it
was addressed to someone who was not a corporation’s “registered agent,
president, or vice president under Texas law, nor [was] she an officer, a
managing or general agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment or
by law to receive service of process.” Henderson v. Republic of Texas, 672 F.
App’x 383, 386 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (unpublished). And we affirmed
a district court’s denial of a plaintiff’s motion for costs on the ground that the
defendant had unreasonably declined to waive service because the plaintiff
had not shown that she had properly requested waiver. Flores v. Sch. Bd. of
DeSoto Par., 116 F. App’x 504, 508 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam)
(unpublished). The plaintiff had sent the request to the defendant’s attorney
rather than directly to the defendant and had not provided copies of the
request for the district court to evaluate. Id.
       Here, Shah maintains that he properly served the defendants. First,
he argues that he mailed and emailed the summons directly to the defendants.
A party to the suit is not permitted to effect service of process himself,
however. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2) (any person who is 18 years old and
not a party to the case may serve defendants). 3 And Rule 4 does not expressly
permit service of process via mail or email. Texas state law permits service

       _____________________
       3
            See also Pro Se Filing Procedures, U.S. Dist. Ct. E. Dist. of Tex.,
https://www.txed.uscourts.gov/?q=filing/non-lawyers [https://perma.cc/ZDM7-D5G3]
(last visited April 12, 2024).

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                                  No. 23-40231

by registered or certified mail and, upon plaintiff’s motion supported by a
sworn statement, permits courts to authorize service by email. Tex. R.
Civ. P. 106(b). But Texas law similarly does not permit parties to a case to
effect service, see Tex. R. Civ. P. 103, and Shah did not request permission
from the district court to serve the defendants by email. Additionally, it
appears Shah hired a process server to serve Novelis at its Georgia office. But
that summons was returned unexecuted, apparently because no one was
present at the address Shah provided to the process server.
       Shah’s attempts to obtain waiver of service were likewise insufficient.
He never received a waiver from the defendants or filed one with the court.
And the purported requests for waiver of service that he sent to the
defendants did not comply with the requirements of Rule 4(d). For instance,
the requests did not include information regarding “the consequences of
waiving and not waiving service,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1)(D), or provide
the defendants “a reasonable time of . . . at least 60 days . . . to return the
waiver,” id. 4(d)(1)(F). The requests also were not sent until November
2022—nine months after the complaint was filed and six months after the
court notified Shah of its intent to dismiss the case.
       Shah’s argument that he did in fact serve the defendants as required
by Rule 4 is unavailing.
                                       B
       Shah next argues that the district court did not afford him adequate
time to cure any defects in service or an opportunity to respond to the notice
of impending dismissal.
       Rule 4(m) permits a court to dismiss an action if the plaintiff does not
serve the defendants within ninety days of filing the complaint. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 4(m). Upon a showing of good cause by the plaintiff, “the court must
extend the time for service for an appropriate period.” Id.

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                                   No. 23-40231

       Shah contends that it was unfair for the district court to dismiss his
case “just 18 days [after] getting the notice to serve the summons[.]” But
Rule 4(m)’s time period does not begin to run when the summons is received
by the plaintiff; it begins to run when the complaint is filed. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 4(m). Moreover, it is the plaintiff’s responsibility to provide to the
clerk of court the information required to issue summons. See id. 4(b).
Indeed, the district court’s website provides the following instructions for pro
se litigants: “If the filing fee was paid, the Plaintiff is required to prepare the
summons(es) for the clerk’s issuance and to follow Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 to
accomplish service.” 4
       Shah further maintains that he was not given an opportunity to
respond to the court’s notice of impending dismissal because that notice was
sent to the incorrect address. But pro se plaintiffs are obligated to keep the
court apprised of their physical address. In the district court’s guidelines for
pro se parties—of which the record indicates he had knowledge—Shah was
admonished to “keep the Clerk of Court, and the other side, informed of [his]
current address and telephone number during the entire case.” And his
argument that he never received any mail at the Washington address as it was
first provided to the court—by Shah himself—is belied by the record. For
example, on June 21, 2022—the same day that Shah provided the court with
his corrected Washington address—the district court received an
acknowledgement of receipt from Shah in response to the orders denying his
third motion to appoint counsel and directing him to provide the court with
his current mailing address. And none of this explains why the first attempt

       _____________________
       4
              Pro Se Filing Procedures, U.S. Dist. Ct. E. Dist. of Tex.,
https://www.txed.uscourts.gov/?q=filing/non-lawyers [https://perma.cc/ZDM7-D5G3]
(last visited April 12, 2024).

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                                  No. 23-40231

to transmit the summons to Shah, which was sent using the corrected
address, was returned as undeliverable. Moreover, Shah acknowledges that
he received the court’s order denying his motion to extend time for
discovery; that order referred to Shah’s obligation to serve the defendants.
He also states in his brief that several of the court’s orders predating his June
21 letter providing a corrected address were “sent to the correct address[.]”
       The district court provided Shah, as it did all pro se litigants, with
guidance regarding his obligations to serve the defendants and keep the court
apprised of his mailing address; it mailed him a notice of impending dismissal
at the address that he provided; and it mailed an order to that same address
compelling Shah to update his mailing address. It did not dismiss until over a
year had elapsed, nine months after informing Shah that it intended to do so.
Shah was afforded ample time and opportunity to serve the defendants in
compliance with Rule 4. The district court did not abuse its discretion when
it dismissed for failure to timely serve the defendants.
                                       C
       Finally, construing his brief liberally, Shah contends that the district
court erroneously dismissed under Rule 4(m) because that rule does not
apply to defendants located in a foreign country.
       By its terms, Rule 4(m)’s time limit does not apply to service of
process abroad. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); see also Walker v. Transfrontera
CV de SA, 634 F. App’x 422, 430 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished).
But this does not mean that plaintiffs can serve these defendants at their
leisure. Lozano, 693 F.3d at 489; see also Walker, 634 F. App’x at 430 (“[T]his
does not mean that the time to serve process in a foreign country is
unlimited.”). We have held that Rule 4(f), which governs service of process
internationally, “authorizes a without-prejudice dismissal when the court
determines in its discretion that the plaintiff has not demonstrated reasonable

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                                  No. 23-40231

diligence in attempting service.” Lozano, 693 F.3d at 489 (citing Nylok Corp.
v. Fastener World Inc., 396 F.3d 805, 807 (7th Cir. 2005)). “Good faith and
reasonable dispatch are the proper yardsticks.” Id.
       Here, the record suggests that Shah did not attempt to serve the
international defendants until at least six months after he filed his complaint.
He did not provide the clerk of court with the necessary information for
summons to issue for several months. And he attempted to obtain a waiver
of service in November 2022—nine months after commencing suit—but, as
discussed, that attempt was insufficient for several reasons. Shah therefore
did not exercise “[g]ood faith and reasonable dispatch” in his attempts to
serve the foreign defendants. Id. To the extent Shah intended to sue
defendants located abroad, the district court’s reliance on Rule 4(m) was
erroneous as to those defendants, but its ultimate conclusion that the case
should be dismissed was not.
                                       D
       Shah’s claim would likely be time-barred should he attempt to assert
it again. He alleged in his complaint that he received a right to sue letter from
the EEOC on December 11, 2021. Shah was required to bring his Title VII
claims within ninety days of receiving that letter. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(f)(1); Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 379 (5th Cir. 2002). We
therefore review under the heightened standard used to evaluate dismissals
with prejudice. Millan, 546 F.3d at 326. Affirming a dismissal with prejudice
typically requires one of the following: “(1) delay caused by plaintiff himself
and not his attorney; (2) actual prejudice to the defendant; or (3) delay caused
by intentional conduct.” Price, 792 F.2d at 474.
       Under this standard, we have previously affirmed the dismissal of a
pro se litigant’s suit where he did not perfect service until ten months after he
filed his complaint. See Thrasher v. City of Amarillo, 709 F.3d 509, 513 (5th

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                                  No. 23-40231

Cir. 2013). In Thrasher, the plaintiff “made no effort to serve Defendants
until four months” after filing his complaint, when he “attempted to serve
Defendants but did so improperly.” Id. He was granted an extension of time
to serve the defendants, but he “missed his extended deadline.” Id. The
defendants then filed a motion to dismiss for insufficient process, and the
plaintiff still did nothing in response. Id. Finally, the defendants were
properly served almost one year after the suit began. Id. Holding that the
delays were caused by plaintiff himself rather than his attorney—since he was
not represented by an attorney for the majority of the proceedings—we
affirmed the district court’s dismissal under Rule 4(m). Id. at 514–15.
       This case is characterized by similar periods of inactivity by Shah. The
records indicates that Shah did not even begin to attempt serving the
defendants until several months had passed. Shah caused these delays
himself. And ultimately, unlike the defendants in Thrasher, these defendants
still have yet to be properly served. Id. at 513. For these reasons, we conclude
that the district court’s judgment dismissing this case should be affirmed
despite the fact that its practical effect is to preclude Shah from bringing suit
again in the future.
                                      IV
       Shah makes wholly unsubstantiated allegations that the magistrate
judge who adjudicated this case accepted bribes, abused her power,
discriminated against him, and engaged in a host of other improper acts. We
warn Shah that future filings making these types of unsupported accusations
could subject him to sanctions.
                                        V
       The judgment of the district court dismissing for failure to serve the
defendants is AFFIRMED.

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