Court Opinion

ID: 9557770
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 16:57:06.022741+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:35.502140
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Justice
(dissenting).
In addition to the observations made in the dissent by Chief Justice Ellett, that the plaintiff’s name was not actually used to advertise or in connection with any product or service, I think the following observations are also pertinent.
It should be realized that living in an organized society imposes some obligations of consideration for others in the pursuit of their interests, so long as that does not unduly infringe upon our own. With each of the benefits to be enjoyed there are some disadvantages to be endured. With the telephone it is common knowledge that everyone expects to get some undesired calls: wrong numbers, solicitations, or calls which are for other reasons unwanted, and which are usually quickly and courteously dealt with.
By way of comparison, and in deference to the necessity for reciprocal consideration for the actions and interests of others, the law recognizes that, in the absence of ány warning to the contrary, there is an implied permission to enter one’s property and knock at his door. A person may refuse to answer it, or he may revoke the permission by advising the knocker that his presence is not desired and requesting him to leave, with which request he must comply.
By analogy, in allowing her name and phone number to be listed in the public phone book, plaintiff should be deemed to give an implied permission to those who desire to call her number. She has the options of not having a phone, or of having an unlisted number, or she can refuse to answer, or she can reject any call (as she proved herself quite capable of doing). But up to the point of calling her number, it is my judgment that there has been no trespass against her, nor any impermissible invasion of her right of privacy.
The foregoing should fully justify the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint. But if the filament of reason is strained to what I regard as beyond the breaking point, *1090and it be assumed that there was a technical violation of the plaintiff’s privacy, there is yet another obstacle to her recovery, which further justifies the trial court’s action.
In order to justify recovery two things must exist: first, a wrong committed by the defendant; second, and equally important, it must be shown to have been the cause of some damage to the plaintiff. Assume that there was some damage to the plaintiff (which this writer does not think reasonable minds would believe. Particularly so, because the plaintiff so ably demonstrated that she could summarily handle any unwanted calls.) Nevertheless, I can see no foundation upon which fair minded persons would conclude that any such damage was caused by the courteous inquiry and proffer of a favor by the defendant. On the contrary: the only reasonable conclusion is that if there was any such damage, it would have been caused solely by the plaintiff’s own intemperate outburst at the courteously offered favor.
In regard to the supposition stated above, if the defendant’s conduct constituted a mere technical violation of plaintiff’s right, but caused no actual damage, the established rule previously approved by this Court, is that it will not reverse for the purpose of awarding nominal damages only.1
It is my opinion that the trial court wisely, properly and judiciously ruled that the court and jury should not be required to devote the time, trouble and attention necessary to deal with such a tenuous and meritless claim.

. Commonwealth National Bank v. Kennedy Co., 29 Utah 2d 83, 505 P.2d 298; 66 C.J.S. New Trial § 75, 240.