Court Opinion

ID: 9399569
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-05 19:01:57.411412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:34.758478
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 20-13954    Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 06/05/2023   Page: 1 of 23

                                                            [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 20-13954
                           ____________________

        AM GRAND COURT LAKES LLC,
        AM 280 SIERRA DRIVE LLC,
                                Plaintiﬀs-Counter Defendants-Appellees,
        versus
        ROCKHILL INSURANCE COMPANY,

                                Defendant-Counter Claimant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cv-23576-KMW
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                20-13954

        Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
        JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge:
                AM Grand Court Lakes LLC and AM 280 Sierra Drive LLC
        (collectively “AM Grand”) owned a group of buildings that were
        operated as an assisted living facility. AM Grand submitted a claim
        to its insurer, Rockhill Insurance Company, for damage caused by
        Hurricane Irma. Rockhill denied the claim because it determined
        that the hurricane caused only minor damage to the property and
        the cost of any repairs was less than the insurance policy’s deducti-
        ble.
               AM Grand sued Rockhill for breach of the policy. The case
        went to trial, where a jury found that Rockhill had breached the
        terms of the insurance policy and that AM Grand’s covered losses
        amounted to $9,280,000. Based on the jury’s findings, the district
        court entered judgment in AM Grand’s favor. After the district
        court entered judgment, Rockhill filed a motion for a new trial ar-
        guing that the jury’s damages award was excessive. The district
        court denied the motion.
                Rockhill argues on appeal that the district court erred in
        denying its motion for a new trial because there was no evidence
        in the record to support the jury’s finding that AM Grand sustained
        a loss of $9,280,000. After careful consideration, and with the ben-
        efit of oral argument, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient
        to sustain the verdict. Thus, we affirm.
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        20-13954                   Opinion of the Court                        3

                                              I.
                                              A.
                AM Grand owned property in Miami Gardens, Florida,
        which it operated as an assisted living facility. The facility com-
        prised five buildings, each of which was five stories tall. The build-
        ings were connected by a series of catwalks. There were about 200
        residential units at the facility. The facility also included a dining
        room, an activity center, and nursing stations. All together, the fa-
        cility totaled approximately 165,000 square feet.
              AM Grand insured the property against certain losses, in-
        cluding losses due to hurricanes. Under the insurance policy’s
        terms, Rockhill was required to “pay for direct physical loss of or
        damage to” the property. Doc. 203-2 at 30. 1 The maximum cover-
        age under the policy was $15,112,500. For claims arising out of
        damage caused by a hurricane, the policy had a deductible of
        $330,250, which represented two percent of the total insured value.
               On September 10, 2017, Hurricane Irma made landfall. In
        the area near the facility, the storm produced heavy rain and wind
        gusts of over 100 miles per hour. According to Jonathan Kirschner,
        who was responsible for overseeing the property for AM Grand,
        the five buildings were in good condition before the hurricane. Alt-
        hough parts of some of the buildings previously had sustained

        1 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.
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        4                         Opinion of the Court                     20-13954

        water damage, Kirschner reported that AM Grand had repaired this
        damage before the hurricane.
               After the storm, Kirschner visited the property and saw that
        it had suffered substantial damage. He observed that portions of
        the roofs on two of the buildings (Buildings B and D) “had been
        pulled up” in the storm and were missing. Doc. 270-3 at 25–26. To
        keep additional water from permeating these buildings due to the
        roof damage, AM Grand hired a contractor who performed tem-
        porary repairs to the roof of Building D and potentially also Build-
        ing B.2
               AM Grand notified Rockhill that the property had sustained
        damage in Hurricane Irma and submitted a claim for the damage.
        AM Grand hired a public insurance adjuster, Five Star Claims Ad-
        justing, to assist with its claim. After inspecting the property, Five
        Star concluded that the roofs of all five buildings had been damaged
        in the hurricane and needed to be replaced. It estimated a cost of
        approximately $1,200,000 to replace all the roofs. Because AM
        Grand could not afford to replace the roofs, it waited for Rockhill
        to approve its claim.
              Rockhill hired an independent adjusting firm, Engle Martin,
        to review AM Grand’s claim. Colby Chavers, an Engle Martin

        2 There is conflicting evidence in the record about whether temporary repairs
        were made to the roof of Building B. Several witnesses testified at trial that
        temporary repairs were made to the roof of Building D only. But at least one
        witness reported that temporary repairs were made to the roof of Building B
        as well.
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        20-13954                  Opinion of the Court                              5

        employee, was assigned the claim. Chavers’s role was to determine
        the extent of the damage caused by the hurricane and estimate how
        much it would cost to repair the damage. Shortly after the storm,
        he visited the property and conducted a physical inspection. From
        his inspection, Chavers determined that the only damage from the
        storm was to a portion of the roof of Building D. When he in-
        spected the buildings, Chavers saw some evidence of water dam-
        age inside the buildings. But he concluded that this water damage
        had occurred over time before Hurricane Irma.
               In addition, Rockhill hired third-party experts to evaluate
        the scope of the damage caused by the hurricane.3 Engle Martin
        engaged Timothy Philmon from Donan Engineering and Mason
        Mitchell from the Tines Group. About three months after the hur-
        ricane, Philmon and Mitchell inspected the property, including the
        roofs and some interior areas of the buildings.
               After this physical inspection, Philmon determined that the
        damage from Hurricane Irma was confined to Building D and that
        only a portion of Building D’s roof needed to be repaired. Philmon
        found “no interior or structural damage” to Building D from the
        hurricane. Doc. 270-3 at 162. Philmon admitted that he saw “severe
        deterioration” of parts of Building B’s roof, id. at 180, but he con-
        cluded that this deterioration was the result of regular “wear and
        tear” that occurred before Hurricane Irma. Doc. 270-4 at 34–35.

        3 AM Grand does not dispute that the policy permitted Rockhill to retain these
        additional experts.
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        6                         Opinion of the Court                     20-13954

              Mitchell prepared an estimate of the cost of these repairs. He
        estimated that it would cost approximately $149,000 to repair the
        portions of Building D’s roof that Philmon determined had been
        damaged in the hurricane. 4
                Based on this estimate and the cost of the temporary repairs
        that AM Grand had already completed for Building D, Rockhill de-
        termined that AM Grand sustained a loss of $235,556.80 due to the
        hurricane. Because this amount was less than the policy’s hurricane
        deductible, Rockhill concluded that it owed nothing under the pol-
        icy. In May 2018, approximately eight months after the hurricane,
        Rockhill notified AM Grand of its decision.
               AM Grand maintains that while it was awaiting Rockhill’s
        decision, the condition of the buildings deteriorated. According to
        Kirschner, moisture damage began to appear inside the buildings.
        AM Grand’s maintenance department tried to make repairs. But
        the moisture damage kept recurring, requiring additional repairs.
        As a result, the maintenance department had to repair some of the
        buildings’ interior walls multiple times.
               After Rockhill denied the claim, with the buildings’ condi-
        tions worsening, AM Grand hired Sergio Arce, an independent in-
        surance adjuster, to assess the scope of damage the property

        4 Because AM Grand’s public adjuster had determined that all the roofs
        needed to be replaced, Engle Martin prepared its own estimate about the cost
        to replace all the roofs. It estimated that replacing all the roofs would cost
        $1,110,714.
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        20-13954               Opinion of the Court                        7

        sustained from the hurricane. In July 2018, approximately 10
        months after the hurricane, Arce inspected the property and per-
        formed diagnostic testing on the roofs and interior walls of each
        building. Based on his inspection, Arce determined that the roofs
        of all five buildings suffered “catastrophic failure due to Hurricane
        Irma” and needed to be replaced. Doc. 203-59 at 5.
               Arce also determined that water had permeated the walls of
        the buildings due to the roof damage. He took readings of the mois-
        ture levels on the floors, ceilings, and walls and found high mois-
        ture levels throughout the buildings. He saw “a lot of water stain-
        ing, spalling, [and] blistering of walls particularly around the col-
        umns in the hallways of all the buildings.” Doc. 270-2 at 30.
               Al Brizuela, a structural engineer and building contractor,
        worked alongside Arce. Brizuela agreed with Arce’s opinions that
        the roofs of all the buildings were damaged and that the moisture
        permeated the interior walls of the buildings. Brizuela concluded
        that this damage resulted from Hurricane Irma.
               Brizuela explained how the damage to the buildings’ roofs
        caused the moisture problems in the walls. He said that the roof of
        each building was saturated with water. The water then migrated
        down the walls of each building. He explained that the concrete
        walls were constructed with hollow core planks. Water was
        trapped and accumulated in these hollow areas. The water then
        corroded the rebar in the walls, which led to expansion and crack-
        ing of the concrete walls in every building.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 20-13954

               Brizuela assessed what was needed to repair this damage to
        the buildings’ interiors. To repair the damage to the concrete walls,
        he opined, contractors would have to open up the damaged areas
        and remove the water from the hollow areas. They would then
        have to chip away the damaged concrete, brush the rebar to re-
        move the rust, and cover the rebar with rust inhibitor. Lastly, they
        would need to apply concrete patches. According to Brizuela, it
        would be less expensive to knock down and rebuild the buildings
        than to try to repair the concrete because the labor costs associated
        with the repairs would be “astronomical.” Id. at 99.
                AM Grand relied on Alain Gonzalez, a construction man-
        ager with experience constructing assisted living facilities, to esti-
        mate the cost of rebuilding. According to Gonzalez, it would gen-
        erally cost between $315 and $400 per square foot to build an as-
        sisted living facility. But Gonzalez had never seen a successful bid
        of less than $200 per square foot. Given Gonzalez’s estimates of the
        cost per square foot to rebuild and that the existing buildings cov-
        ered approximately 165,000 square feet, it would cost AM Grand
        between $33,000,000 and $66,000,000 to rebuild all the buildings.
                                         B.
              After Rockhill failed to pay the claim, AM Grand sued the
        insurer in Florida state court for breach of contract. Rockhill re-
        moved the action to federal district court and filed a counterclaim
        seeking a declaratory judgment that it owed AM Grand nothing
        under the policy.
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        20-13954                    Opinion of the Court                                 9

                 The district court held a jury trial, which lasted five days. At
        trial, the jury heard testimony from witnesses including Kirschner,
        Chavers, Philmon, Mitchell, Arce, Brizuela, and Gonzalez.
               The primary dispute at trial was the extent to which the
        property sustained damage from Hurricane Irma. AM Grand con-
        tended that the storm damaged the roofs and interiors of each of
        the five buildings. Based on Brizuela’s opinion that it would be less
        expensive to rebuild rather than repair the buildings and Gonza-
        lez’s opinion about the cost of rebuilding, AM Grand asked the jury
        to award $15,112,500, an amount equal to the policy limits. If the
        jury concluded that only the roofs were damaged by the storm,
        however, AM Grand asked alternatively for the jury to find that it
        sustained a loss of approximately $1,200,000, representing the cost
        to replace all the roofs based on the estimate from Five Star, its
        public adjuster. 5
               In contrast, Rockhill took the position that the property sus-
        tained minimal damage from Hurricane Irma. It maintained that
        only a portion of the roof of one building, Building D, was damaged
        by the hurricane. It presented evidence showing that the loss AM
        Grand sustained for this damage was $235,556.80, which was less
        than the policy’s deductible. Rockhill offered no evidence about the
        cost to repair or rebuild if the hurricane damaged the interior of
        any of the buildings.

        5 Although the public adjuster from Five Star did not testify at trial, Five Star’s
        estimate was admitted into evidence.
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        10                         Opinion of the Court                       20-13954

                The jury found that Rockhill breached the insurance policy.
        It determined that AM Grand’s “covered damages resulting from
        Hurricane Irma” were $9,280,000. Doc. 202 at 1–2. After subtract-
        ing for the policy’s deductible and making other adjustments, the
        district court entered a judgment in AM Grand’s favor in the
        amount of $8,753,594.61 plus pre-judgment and post-judgment in-
        terest. 6
                Rockhill filed a motion for a new trial. 7 It argued that the
        jury’s finding that AM Grand sustained damages in the amount of
        $9,280,000 was “excessive.” Doc. 252 at 18. Because there was “no
        reasonable relation” between the “amount of damages sought” and
        the amount of the jury’s award, Rockhill argued, the jury’s award
        must have been based on “speculation and conjecture.” Id. at 20.

        6 AM Grand also has sought to recover its attorney’s fees and costs. After the
        disposition of this appeal, the district court will rule on AM Grand’s request.
        7 Rockhill also filed a motion for judgment as matter of law, arguing, con-
        sistent with its strategy at trial, that there was no evidence that AM Grand
        sustained a loss “in excess of the [p]olicy’s deductible,” and therefore the rec-
        ord did not support any amount of damages. Doc. 186 at 4. The district court
        denied the motion.
        On appeal, Rockhill argues that the district court erred in denying its motion
        for judgment as a matter of law. But Rockhill conceded in its reply brief that
        based on the estimated $1,200,000 to replace all the roofs, the evidence sup-
        ported a jury finding that AM Grand sustained a loss up to that amount. We
        agree with Rockhill’s concession that this evidence was sufficient to allow the
        jury to award AM Grand some damages. The district court thus did not err in
        denying Rockhill’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.
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        20-13954                   Opinion of the Court                              11

               The district court denied the motion. Addressing Rockhill’s
        argument that the damages award was excessive, the court ex-
        plained that the relevant question was whether the jury’s award
        was “so inordinately large” that it “obviously . . . exceed[ed] the
        maximum limit of a reasonable range.” Doc. 279 at 19 (internal
        quotation marks omitted). The court concluded that Rockhill failed
        to show the verdict was excessive. The court observed that at trial
        each party made a strategic decision to take an all-or-nothing ap-
        proach to the case. First “all”: AM Grand sought the policy limits
        of $15,112,500, maintaining that Hurricane Irma had damaged the
        roofs and interior of all five buildings and the buildings needed to
        be rebuilt rather than repaired. Then “nothing”: Rockhill urged
        that AM Grand could recover nothing because the hurricane had
        damaged only a portion of one building’s roof, and it would cost
        less than the policy’s deductible to repair this damage. The court
        concluded that the jury “rejected both sides’ ultimate positions”
        when it found that AM Grand suffered damage from the hurricane
        in an amount above the deductible but below the policy limits. Id.
        at 21. Because the jury’s verdict was “within the range shown by
        the evidence at trial,” the court ruled that the verdict was not ex-
        cessive. Id. at 21 n.12 (internal quotation marks omitted). 8

        8 Rockhill also filed a motion for relief from the judgment under Rule 60. In
        the Rule 60 motion, it argued, in relevant part, that the verdict should be set
        aside because the jury’s award was excessive. The court denied the Rule 60
        motion explaining that it had “already determined,” in denying the motion for
        a new trial, “that there [was] evidence on the record sufficient” to support the
        award. Doc. 279 at 24.
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        12                         Opinion of the Court                       20-13954

                This is Rockhill’s appeal.
                                              II.
               We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of
        a motion for a new trial. See Kerrivan v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
        953 F.3d 1196, 1204 (11th Cir. 2020). In reviewing a compensatory
        damages award on a state-law claim, we evaluate the propriety of
        the award under state law. See Myers v. Cent. Fla. Invs., Inc., 592 F.3d
        1201, 1211 (11th Cir. 2010); see Kerrivan, 953 F.3d at 1204 n.6 (look-
        ing to state law to determine whether a compensatory damages
        award was excessive).
                                              III.
                The issue before us on appeal is whether the district court
        abused its discretion when it denied Rockhill’s motion for a new
        trial. Rockhill argues that the district court should have ordered a
        new trial because the damages the jury awarded were excessive.
               Under Florida law, 9 it is the responsibility of “the court,
        upon proper motion, to review the amount of” a damages award
        to determine whether the amount is “excessive . . . in light of the
        facts and circumstances which were presented to the trier of fact.”

        9 Here, there is no dispute that Florida supplies the relevant state law.
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        20-13954                 Opinion of the Court                            13

        Fla. Stat. § 768.74(1). 10 To determine whether an award is exces-
        sive, the court must consider the following criteria:
               (a) Whether the amount awarded is indicative of prej-
               udice, passion, or corruption on the part of the trier
               of fact;

               (b) Whether it appears that the trier of fact ignored
               the evidence in reaching a verdict or misconceived the
               merits of the case relating to the amounts of damages
               recoverable;

               (c) Whether the trier of fact took improper elements
               of damages into account or arrived at the amount of
               damages by speculation and conjecture;

               (d) Whether the amount awarded bears a reasonable
               relation to the amount of damages proved and the in-
               jury suﬀered; and

               (e) Whether the amount awarded is supported by the
               evidence and is such that it could be adduced in a log-
               ical manner by reasonable persons.

        Id. § 768.74(5).
              When reviewing a jury’s damages award under § 786.74, we
        must bear in mind that “assessing the amount of damages is within

        10 Florida law requires a court to review whether a damages award is exces-
        sive in “any action for damages, whether in tort or in contract.” Fla. Stat.
        § 768.71(1).
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        14                      Opinion of the Court                 20-13954

        the province of the jury.” Odom v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 254 So.
        3d 268, 277 (Fla. 2018). “[A] court should never declare a verdict
        excessive merely because it is above the amount which the court
        itself considers the jury should have allowed.” Id. (internal quota-
        tion marks omitted).
               In addition, when a trial court refuses to grant a new trial or
        reduce a damages award, “the correctness of a jury’s verdict is
        strengthened.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Absent un-
        usual circumstances, the trial court judge who denied the motion
        for a new trial had “the opportunity to observe the witnesses and
        to consider the evidence in the context of a living trial rather than
        upon a cold record.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation
        marks omitted). Given the deference afforded a trial court’s deci-
        sion, an appellate court generally “should not disturb” a verdict as
        excessive “unless the verdict is inordinately large as obviously to
        exceed the maximum limit of a reasonable range within which the
        jury may properly operate.” Id. (quoting Lassiter v. Int’l Union of Op-
        erating Eng’rs, 349 So. 2d 622, 627 (Fla. 1976)). Under this standard,
        our review of the district court’s order denying Rockhill’s motion
        for new trial is “very restricted.” Lassiter, 349 So. 2d at 627.
              Rockhill argues that the jury’s damages award was excessive
        because it “bore no relationship to the evidence of damages ad-
        duced at trial.” Appellant’s Br. at 36. According to Rockhill, the ev-
        idence allowed the jury only three options with respect to the
        amount of AM Grand’s damages:
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        20-13954               Opinion of the Court                        15

              (1) to ﬁnd that all the buildings were damaged in the
              hurricane, on the interior and the exterior, and
              needed to be rebuilt, at a cost between $51,000,000
              and $66,000,000, and thus AM Grand could recover
              the policy limits of $15,112,500;

              (2) to ﬁnd that all the buildings’ roofs were damaged
              in the hurricane and needed to be replaced at a cost
              of approximately $1,200,000, and thus AM Grand
              could recover $869,750 after subtracting the policy’s
              deductible; or

              (3) to ﬁnd that only a portion of Building D’s roof was
              damaged in the hurricane and needed to be repaired,
              leaving AM Grand with a loss of $235,556, which was
              below the policy’s deductible, and thus AM Grand
              could recover nothing.

        Because the jury’s verdict fell outside these three options, Rockhill
        says, the verdict was excessive.
               Rockhill is correct that the amount of damages depended on
        the extent to which AM Grand’s buildings were damaged in Hurri-
        cane Irma. But we disagree that the jury’s options were as limited
        as Rockhill describes. Instead, we conclude—based on the evidence
        presented at trial—that the verdict was within the range of dam-
        ages that a jury reasonably could have awarded.
               At trial, the parties presented conflicting evidence on the ex-
        tent of the damage AM Grand sustained due to Hurricane Irma.
        The jury could have found that the damage fell somewhere be-
        tween damage to a part of the roof of Building D (as Rockhill
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        16                      Opinion of the Court                  20-13954

        claimed) and damage to the roofs and interiors of every building
        (as AM Grand claimed). For example, the jury could have found
        that the hurricane damaged both the roof and interior of Building
        B, damaged part of the roof of Building D, and caused no damage
        to the other three buildings. If the jury so found, then based on AM
        Grand’s damages model presented at trial, the jury could have con-
        cluded that AM Grand’s total loss from the hurricane was
        $9,200,000. Let us explain how the jury could have gotten there.
               For Building B, the jury could have found, based largely on
        the testimony from AM Grand’s witnesses, that the hurricane
        caused substantial damage to both the roof and interior of the
        building. The jury heard from Kirschner that he saw damage to the
        roof of Building B after the hurricane. He observed, among other
        things, that Styrofoam was missing from portions of Building B’s
        roof. Indeed, witnesses from both sides, Philmon and Arce, con-
        firmed that there was damage to Building B’s roof. Philmon testi-
        fied that he saw “severe deterioration” of Building B’s roof, Doc.
        270-3 at 180, and Arce testified that the integrity of Building B’s roof
        was “gone.” Doc. 270-2 at 26.
               It is true that the jury heard conflicting evidence about the
        cause of the damage to Building B’s roof. Philmon opined that the
        roof’s severe deterioration occurred before the storm. But the jury
        could have disbelieved his testimony and instead credited Bri-
        zuela’s testimony that Hurricane Irma damaged the roof of Build-
        ing B.
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        20-13954                   Opinion of the Court                                17

               The jury also heard evidence that the hurricane damaged
        not only Building B’s roof, but also its interior walls. Arce described
        to the jury how his inspection and testing showed high moisture
        levels in Building B’s walls. And Brizuela opined that this water
        damage was a result of the storm and the roof’s failure, rather than
        any other cause.
               After finding that Hurricane Irma damaged Building B’s roof
        and its interior walls, the jury also could have found based on Bri-
        zuela’s testimony that it would be more cost effective to tear down
        and rebuild Building B than to engage in the more labor-intensive
        and expensive process of trying to repair the water damage inside
        the walls. 11 It then could have used Gonzalez’s damages model in-
        dicating that it would cost between $200 and $400 per square foot
        to rebuild the building. Because the evidence at trial showed that
        Building B was approximately 39,000 square feet, the jury could

        11 Rockhill argues that the jury could not find that any of the buildings needed
        to be demolished and rebuilt because under Florida law AM Grand could re-
        cover the costs of rebuilding only if a “governmental authority issue[d] an or-
        der requiring the demolition of the structure or prohibiting repair of the struc-
        ture.” Appellant’s Br. at 25. Because there was no evidence of a government
        order requiring demolition or prohibiting repair of the buildings, Rockhill
        says, AM Grand could not recover damages for the cost of rebuilding. But
        Rockhill never took this position in the district court and instead raises it for
        the first time on appeal. Therefore, we will not consider it. See Access Now, Inc.
        v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[A]n issue not raised
        in the district court and raised for the first time on appeal will not be consid-
        ered by this [C]ourt.”).
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        18                         Opinion of the Court                      20-13954

        have found that it would cost between $7,800,000 and $15,600,000
        to rebuild Building B.12
               For Building D, the jury could have found that the building
        sustained limited damage to its roof from Hurricane Irma and
        awarded AM Grand the cost to repair the roof only. There was am-
        ple evidence before the jury that Building D’s roof sustained dam-
        age in the hurricane. Kirschner testified to seeing damage to the
        roof after the hurricane. Rockhill’s witnesses admitted that Build-
        ing D’s roof sustained some damage from the hurricane and
        needed at least some repairs: Chavers testified that he saw “physical
        damage” to the roof of Building D and Philmon agreed that he saw
        that “the roof over Building D was damaged by wind.” Doc. 270-3
        at 129, 162.
               The evidence also supported a finding that the limited dam-
        age to Building D’s roof could be repaired without replacing the
        entire roof. The jury could have reached this conclusion based on
        Philmon’s testimony that the damage to Building D was limited “to
        the roof covering, downspouts[,] and gutters” and there was “no

        12 Rockhill has not challenged on appeal the admission of Brizuela’s expert
        testimony that rebuilding would be less expensive than repairing or Gonza-
        lez’s expert testimony about the cost per square foot to rebuild.
        We note, too, that at trial Rockhill made a strategic decision to focus on chal-
        lenging AM Grand’s evidence about the extent of the damage caused by the
        hurricane. It could have, but did not, introduce its own evidence about what
        it would cost to repair water damage in the interior of any of the buildings,
        the cost per square foot to rebuild buildings in an assisted living facility, or
        whether rebuilding would be less expensive than making repairs.
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        20-13954                Opinion of the Court                        19

        interior or structural damage” to the building. Id. at 162, 170. And
        based on Rockhill’s estimate, the jury could have found that it
        would cost $235,556 to repair this damage.
               Finally, as to the three remaining buildings, the jury could
        have found that AM Grand failed to prove that they sustained any
        damage from Hurricane Irma. Although Arce and Brizuela opined
        that these buildings’ roofs and interiors were damaged in the
        storm, there was evidence going the other way. The jury heard
        Chavers’s and Philmon’s opinions that these buildings sustained no
        damage from Hurricane Irma and that the water damage inside
        them occurred before the storm. Even Kirschner, AM Grand’s cor-
        porate representative, did not report seeing any damage to the
        roofs of these buildings after the storm. As a result, the jury reason-
        ably could have awarded AM Grand no damages for the three re-
        maining buildings.
               If the jury made the findings described above about the ex-
        tent of the damage to each building, then based on the evidence
        about the cost of rebuilding Building B and repairing Building D’s
        roof, the jury could have calculated AM Grand’s loss from the hur-
        ricane to be between $8,035,556 and $15,835,556. The jury’s finding
        that AM Grand’s loss was $9,280,000 was well within this range. See
        United States v. Sullivan, 1 F.3d 1191, 1196 (11th Cir. 1993) (explain-
        ing that a “jury enjoys substantial discretion in awarding damages
        within the range shown by the evidence” and is entitled to “reject
        the figures offered by the parties”).
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        20                         Opinion of the Court                       20-13954

               In arguing that the jury’s verdict was excessive, Rockhill says
        that because AM Grand tried the case as a total-loss case, maintain-
        ing that all the buildings sustained both roof and interior damage
        from the hurricane, the jury had no basis for finding that some, but
        not all, of the buildings needed to be rebuilt. 13 Not so. Given the
        conflicting evidence at trial about the extent of the damage to each
        building individually and whether Hurricane Irma was the cause of
        the damage, the jury, as factfinder, was free to find that some, but
        not all, of the buildings sustained damage from the hurricane and
        to determine the extent of the damage to each building.
                We acknowledge that in arriving at a loss amount of
        $9,280,000, the jury likely had to have credited some parts of a wit-
        ness’s testimony while rejecting other parts of that same witness’s
        testimony. For example, the jury may have credited Brizuela’s
        opinion that it would be more cost effective to rebuild than replace
        buildings with interior water damage but not credited his opinion
        that all the buildings sustained damage in the hurricane. But it was
        well within the jury’s role of fact finder to make such credibility

        13 Rockhill raised for the first time at oral argument another reason why the
        jury could not find that some, but not all, the buildings needed to be rebuilt.
        It argued that because of the way the buildings were connected, if any building
        needed to be demolished, all would need to be demolished. Rockhill thus con-
        tended that it was impossible for the jury to conclude that only some of the
        buildings needed to be rebuilt. Assuming it is not too late for Rockhill to raise
        this argument, it has identified no evidence in the record to support its asser-
        tion that it would be impossible to demolish and rebuild some, but not all, of
        the buildings. And after carefully reviewing the record, we have found no such
        evidence.
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        20-13954                   Opinion of the Court                               21

        determinations. See Moore v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 340 U.S. 573,
        576 (1951) (recognizing that a jury may “credit or discredit all or
        part of” a witness’s testimony); Seymour v. Oceanic Navigating Co.,
        453 F.2d 1185, 1190 (5th Cir. 1972) (recognizing that a factfinder
        “may, of course, choose to reject certain portions of a witness’s tes-
        timony while accepting other portions”).14
                What is more, there are other ways that the jury reasonably
        could have arrived at its $9,280,000 damages verdict. As AM
        Grand’s counsel explained at oral argument, the jury could have
        found that Building A1, which covered approximately 27,000
        square feet, suffered both roof and interior damage from the hurri-
        cane and that AM Grand would need to rebuild this building. Using
        Gonzalez’s damages model, the jury could have found that it
        would cost between $5,400,000 and $10,800,000 to rebuild. Or the
        jury could have found that Buildings A1 and A2, which together
        totaled approximately 44,000 square feet, both needed to be rebuilt
        due to roof and interior damage from the storm. Applying Gonza-
        lez’s damages model to this scenario, the jury could have found
        that it would cost between $8,800,000 and $17,600,000 to rebuild
        Buildings A1 and A2. Under either of these additional scenarios, the

        14 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),
        we adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit
        handed down prior to October 1, 1981.
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        22                         Opinion of the Court                       20-13954

        trial evidence would have supported the jury’s $9,280,000 ver-
        dict. 15
               The jury’s damages award in this case was not “so inordi-
        nately large as obviously to exceed the maximum limit of a reason-
        able range within which the jury may properly operate.” Odom, 254
        So. 3d at 277 (internal quotation marks omitted). We reach this
        conclusion after considering the evidence in the record as well as
        the “deference properly given to the jury’s determination of such
        matters of fact as the weight of the evidence and the quantum of
        damages” and the deference due the district court, which denied
        Rockhill’s motion for a new trial after “observ[ing] the witnesses”
        and “consider[ing] the evidence in the context of a living trial rather
        than upon a cold record.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (internal quota-
        tion marks omitted). 16

        15 Rockhill speculates that the jury reached its $9,280,000 verdict based on
        evidence showing that AM Grand’s parent company lost approximately
        $9,000,000 in its investment when it sold the property. Rockhill argues that it
        would have been improper for the jury to consider the ultimate value of AM
        Grand’s investment to calculate its loss from the hurricane under the insur-
        ance policy. Because, as we explain above, the jury’s award was reasonable
        and supported by evidence about the loss that AM Grand sustained in the hur-
        ricane, we need not address Rockhill’s argument.
        16 Rockhill also argues that the district court erred in denying its motion for
        relief from judgment under Federal of Civil Procedure 60. It says that because
        the jury’s “verdict was excessive,” the district court erred in denying its Rule
        60 motion and refusing to set aside or reduce the verdict. Appellant’s Br. at 35.
        We affirm the district court’s denial of the Rule 60 motion for the same reasons
        that we affirm the denial of the Rule 59 motion for a new trial.
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        20-13954            Opinion of the Court                   23

              AFFIRMED.