Court Opinion

ID: 9927697
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-29 20:08:29.61887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:28.333953
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Sessom, 2024-Ohio-130.]

                       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               DEFIANCE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,
                                                          CASE NO. 4-23-10
         PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

    v.

ARNOLD W. SESSOM,                                         OPINION

         DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

                Appeal from Defiance County Common Pleas Court
                          Trial Court No. 22 CR 14882

                                      Judgment Affirmed

                            Date of Decision: January 16, 2024

APPEARANCES:

         Henry Schaefer for Appellant

         Russell R. Herman for Appellee
Case No. 4-23-10

WILLAMOWSKI, P.J.

       {¶1} Defendant-appellant Arnold W. Sessom (“Sessom”) appeals the

judgment of the Defiance County Court of Common Pleas, alleging that his right to

speedy trial was violated; that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of

counsel; and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. For the

reasons set forth below, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                           Facts and Procedural History

       {¶2} On October 28, 2022, Sessom was indicted on one count of engaging in

a pattern of corrupt activity in violation of R.C. 2923.32(A)(1), a second-degree

felony; one count of theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(3), a fifth-degree felony;

one count of possessing criminal tools in violation of R.C. 2923.24(A), a fifth-

degree felony; and one count of receiving stolen property in violation of R.C.

2913.51(A), a fifth-degree felony.

       {¶3} On February 26, 2023, Sessom filed a motion to dismiss on speedy trial

grounds. In response, the State argued that Sessom’s calculations failed to account

for numerous tolling events. On February 21, 2023, the trial court denied Sessom’s

motion to dismiss. On April 13, 2023, Sessom entered pleas of guilty to the four

counts charged in the indictment. On July 14, 2023, the trial court issued is

judgment entry of sentencing.

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Case No. 4-23-10

       {¶4} Sessom filed his notice of appeal on July 28, 2023. On appeal, he raises

the following assignments of error:

                            First Assignment of Error

       The Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Sessom’s Motion to Dismiss
       for Speedy Trial.

                           Second Assignment of Error

       Mr. Sessom’s Counsel Was Ineffective.

                            Third Assignment of Error

       Mr. Sessom’s Plea Was Not Knowing and Voluntary.

                             First Assignment of Error

       {¶5} Sessom argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss

the charges on the grounds that the speedy trial time had run in this case.

                                 Standard of Review

       {¶6} “Appellate review of a trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss for

a speedy-trial violation involves a mixed question of law and fact.” State v.

Westerfield, 3d Dist. Crawford No. 3-17-15, 2018-Ohio-2139, ¶ 17. “Accordingly,

a reviewing court must give due deference to the trial court’s findings of fact if they

are supported by competent, credible evidence but will independently review

whether the trial court correctly applied the law to the facts of the case.” State v.

Shaffer, 3d Dist. Paulding No. 11-21-05, 2022-Ohio-421, ¶ 10, quoting State v.

Hansen, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-12-42, 2013-Ohio-1735, ¶ 20.

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Case No. 4-23-10

                                   Legal Standard

       {¶7} Under Ohio’s speedy trial statute, a person with a pending felony charge

“[s]hall be brought to trial within two hundred seventy days after the person’s

arrest.” R.C. 2945.71(C)(2). In calculating the amount of speedy trial time that has

accrued, the triple-count provision in R.C. 2945.71(E) requires that “each day

during which the accused is held in jail in lieu of bail on the pending charge shall

be counted as three days.” Further, R.C. 2945.72 contains a list of tolling events

that stop the accrual of speedy trial time that includes the following:

       (C) Any period of delay necessitated by the accused’s lack of counsel,
       provided that such delay is not occasioned by any lack of diligence in
       providing counsel to an indigent accused upon the accused’s request
       as required by law;

       ***

       (E) Any period of delay necessitated by reason of a plea in bar or
       abatement, motion, proceeding, or action made or instituted by the
       accused;

       ***

       (H) The period of any continuance granted on the accused’s own
       motion, and the period of any reasonable continuance granted other
       than upon the accused’s own motion;

R.C. 2945.72. The occurrence of a tolling event does “not unconditionally extend

the time limit in which an accused must be brought to trial” but only extends the

time limit for the length of the delay occasioned by tolling event. State v. Flynn, 3d

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Case No. 4-23-10

Dist. Paulding No. 11-16-06, 2017-Ohio-1484, ¶ 8, quoting State v. Arrizola, 79

Ohio App.3d 72, 75, 606 N.E.2d 1020 (3d Dist. 1992).

       {¶8} “Upon review of a speedy-trial issue, a court is required to count the

days of delay chargeable to either side and determine whether the case was tried

within applicable time limits.” State v. Sanchez, 110 Ohio St.3d 274, 2006-Ohio-

4478, 853 N.E.2d 283, ¶ 8.

       The computation of time for criminal statutes is governed by Crim.R.
       45, which provides, ‘[i]n computing any period of time prescribed *
       * * by any applicable statute, the date of the act or event from which
       the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The
       last day of the period so computed shall be included * * *.’

State v. Shafer, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-14-28, 2015-Ohio-2469, ¶ 12, quoting Crim.R.

45. “If any ambiguity exists,” the reviewing court is to “construe the record in favor

of the accused.” Shafer at ¶ 12.

                                   Legal Analysis

       {¶9} On appeal, Sessom raises speedy trial arguments based upon R.C.

2945.71, et seq. As a general matter, “a defendant [who] enters a plea of guilty as

a part of a plea bargain * * * waives all appealable errors which may have occurred,

unless such errors are shown to have precluded the defendant from entering a

knowing and voluntary plea.” State v. Kitzler, 3d Dist. Wyandot No. 16-02-06,

2002-Ohio-5253, ¶ 12. For this reason, “a guilty plea waives the defendant’s right

to challenge his or her conviction on statutory speedy trial grounds.” State v.

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Case No. 4-23-10

Watson, 2018-Ohio-4971, 126 N.E.3d 289, ¶ 4 (1st Dist.).1 See State v. Kelley, 57

Ohio St.3d 127, 130, 566 N.E.2d 658 (1990).

         {¶10} However, even if he had not waived his speedy trial rights, the record

contains no indication that Sessom’s statutory speedy trial rights were violated. See

State v. Mize, 2022-Ohio-3163, 195 N.E.3d 574, ¶ 37 (2d Dist.); State v. Jones,

2019-Ohio-783, 132 N.E.3d 1254, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.); State v. Luttrell, 12th Dist.

Warren No. CA2021-07-062, 2022-Ohio-1148, ¶ 11. In this case, Sessom was

charged with four felonies, giving the State two hundred seventy (270) days of

speedy trial time under R.C. 2945.71(C)(2). Further, Ohio’s triple count provision

in R.C. 2945.72(E) is applicable because Sessom was held in jail for the entire

period in which this case was pending.

         {¶11} On September 14, 2022, Sessom was arrested. He was then arraigned

on September 16, 2022. At his arraignment, Sessom requested a continuance until

September 19, 2022. Under R.C. 2945.72(H), the accrual of speedy trial time is

tolled when the accused requests a continuance. See Flynn, supra, at ¶ 12. In

between September 14, 2022 and September 16, 2022, six (6) days of speedy trial

time accrued.

1
  While a general agreement exists as to whether a guilty plea waives statutory speedy trial challenges on
appeal, the appellate districts in our state have reached different conclusions about the extent to which a guilty
plea waives constitutional speedy trial challenges on appeal. Watson, supra, at ¶ 6; State v. Mize, 2022-Ohio-
3163, 195 N.E.3d 574, ¶ 34-35 (2d Dist.); State v. Glanton, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-18-091, 2020-Ohio-
834, ¶ 21-23. However, Sessom does not base any of his arguments on the constitutional standard governing
speedy trial challenges. For this reason, we need not—and do not—reach a conclusion as to whether a guilty
plea waives a constitutional speedy trial challenge on appeal.

                                                      -6-
Case No. 4-23-10

       {¶12} On September 19, 2022, Sessom appeared before the trial court with

his counsel.   He then filed a discovery request on November 21, 2022.              A

defendant’s “demand for discovery or a bill of particulars is a tolling event pursuant

to R.C. 2945.72(E).” State v. Brown, 98 Ohio St.3d 121, 2002-Ohio-7040, 781

N.E.2d 159, ¶ 26. In between September 19, 2022 and November 21, 2022, one

hundred eighty-nine days (189) of speedy trial time accrued, bringing the total

amount of speedy trial time to one hundred ninety-five (195) days.

       {¶13} On November 23, 2022, the State filed a response to Sessom’s

discovery request.    At a pretrial conference on November 29, 2022, Sessom

requested a continuance. The trial court granted this request, continuing the pretrial

conference until January 11, 2023. See also State v. Brown, 10th Dist. Franklin No.

19AP-40, 2019-Ohio-4753, ¶ 34. In between November 23, 2022 and November

29, 2022, eighteen (18) days of speedy trial time accrued, bringing the total amount

of speedy trial time to two hundred thirteen (213) days as of January 11, 2023.

       {¶14} On January 11, 2023, the parties appeared at the final pretrial

conference. At this hearing, defense counsel indicated that Sessom believed she

was being “unethical and violating his rights.” (Tr. 13). Since the attorney-client

relationship had broken down, the trial court appointed a new attorney for Sessom.

As the trial was set to occur on January 30, 2023, the trial court decided to have

another pretrial conference on January 20, 2023 to determine if Sessom’s new

attorney could proceed to trial as scheduled. Since Sessom’s lack of counsel caused

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Case No. 4-23-10

delay, no speedy trial time accrued in between January 11, 2023 and January 20,

2023, leaving the total amount of speedy trial time at two hundred thirteen (213)

days.

         {¶15} On January 20, 2023, Sessom appeared with his new attorney at the

continued final pretrial hearing. On February 6, 2023, Sessom filed a motion to

vacate the trial date.2 In this motion, defense counsel noted that he had “just been

appointed on January 11, 2023.” (Doc. 23). He further stated that “[d]iscovery in

this case is voluminous” and that “additional time is needed to prepare for trial.”

(Doc. 23). The trial court then granted this motion. In between January 20, 2023

and February 6, 2023, fifty-one (51) days of speedy trial time accrued, bringing the

total amount of speedy trial time to two hundred sixty-four (264) days.

         {¶16} The trial court then scheduled a trial for April 13, 2023. However, on

March 28, 2023, Sessom filed a motion to vacate the trial date and sought to hold a

change of plea of hearing instead. The trial court then granted this motion. Since

the trial date was moved to April 13, 2023 to accommodate Sessom’s change of

attorneys, we conclude that no speedy trial time accrued after Sessom filed his

February 6, 2023 motion to vacate the trial date. State v. Watkins, 3d Dist. Allen

2
 The trial was scheduled to occur on January 30, 2023, but for some reason, the motion to vacate this trial
date was not filed until February 6, 2023. We suspect that the motion to vacate was filed pursuant to an
understanding that was reached at the January 20, 2023 pretrial conference. See State v. Christian, 7th Dist.
Mahoning No. 12 MA 164, 2014-Ohio-2590, ¶ 11. However, since we do not have a transcript of the January
20, 2023 pretrial conference, we cannot confirm this suspicion. Accordingly, for the sake of this analysis,
we will simply count the time between the pretrial conference on January 20, 2023 and the motion to vacate
on February 6, 2023 as accruing against the State for speedy trial purposes.

                                                    -8-
Case No. 4-23-10

No. 1-18-32, 2018-Ohio-5055, ¶ 16; State v. Smith, 4th Dist. Lawrence No.

16CA10, 2017-Ohio-7864, ¶ 29. This leaves the total amount of speedy trial time

that accrued in the case at two hundred sixty-four (264) days.3

         {¶17} In conclusion, April 13, 2023—the date on which his trial was

scheduled and on which he ultimately pled guilty—fell within the speedy trial

timeframe allotted for felonies. Thus, even if Sessom had not waived his right to

raise a statutory speedy trial challenge on appeal by pleading guilty, we have

considered this issue and conclude that his arguments fail to demonstrate that the

trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds or that his

statutory speedy trial rights were violated. Accordingly, the first assignment of error

is overruled.

                                     Second Assignment of Error

         {¶18} Sessom argues that he was denied his right to the effective assistance

of counsel because defense counsel did not renew the previously-denied motion to

dismiss on speedy trial grounds.

3
  In opposing Sessom’s motion to dismiss, the State also argued that Sessom failed to respond to discovery
requests and argues that this failure constituted yet another tolling event in this case. Doc. 26, citing State v.
Palmer, 112 Ohio St.3d 457, 2007-Ohio-374, 860 N.E.2d 1011, paragraph one of the syllabus. Among other
things, this issue is complicated by the fact that Sessom had three separate attorneys appointed for him during
the course of this case. Accordingly, we have decided not to address this issue as this case was resolved
within the required timeframe regardless of whether Sessom’s failure to respond to discovery requests would
operate to further reduce the amount of speedy trial time that had accrued against the State.

                                                      -9-
Case No. 4-23-10

                                   Legal Standard

       {¶19} Ohio law presumes that the representation provided by a licensed

attorney is competent. State v. Passmore, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-22-39, 2023-

Ohio-3209, ¶ 53.      For this reason, the burden of establishing an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim rests on the appellant. State v. Cartlidge, 3d Dist. Seneca

No. 13-19-44, 2020-Ohio-3615, ¶ 39. The appellant must establish (1) that trial

counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that such performance prejudiced the

Defense. State v. Dendinger, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-23-11, 2023-Ohio-4255, ¶ 24.

       {¶20} To establish deficient performance, the appellant must demonstrate

that trial counsel’s representation was not objectively reasonable and made errors

of such seriousness that he or she was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by

the Constitution. State v. Lloyd, 171 Ohio St.3d 353, 2022-Ohio-4259, 218 N.E.3d

737, ¶ 16. The failure of trial counsel to file a meritless motion does not constitute

deficient performance. State v. Corchado, 2017-Ohio-4390, 93 N.E.3d 150, ¶ 21

(7th Dist.). To establish prejudice, the appellant must demonstrate that, in the

absence of counsel’s ineffectiveness, a reasonable probability exists that the

outcome of the proceeding would have been different. State v. Berry, 3d Dist. Union

No. 14-20-05, 2021-Ohio-1132, ¶ 122.

                                   Legal Analysis

       {¶21} In general, a guilty plea “waives a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, except to the extent the defects complained of caused the plea to be less

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Case No. 4-23-10

than knowingly and voluntary.” State v. Green, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-20-30, 2021-

Ohio-4249, ¶ 29, quoting State v. Street, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-98-09, 1998 WL

682284, *2 (Sept. 30, 1998). Following this logic, courts have held that a guilty

plea usually waives ineffective assistance of counsel claims that are rooted in

statutory speedy trial issues. State v. Bateman, 4th Dist. Jackson No. 19CA13,

2021-Ohio-57, ¶ 9-10; State v. McCauley, 5th Dist. Licking No. 16-CA-93, 2017-

Ohio-4373, ¶ 23; Jones, supra, at ¶ 11-12; Luttrell, supra, at ¶ 9. See also State v.

Johnson, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2013-CA-1, 2013-Ohio-4077, ¶ 5; State v. Matland,

7th Dist. Mahoning No. 09-MA-115, 2010-Ohio-6585, ¶ 17.

       {¶22} On appeal, Sessom argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to renew his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. Even if his guilty

plea did not waive this ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we have already

concluded under the first assignment of error that his speedy trial rights were not

violated. For this reason, he cannot establish that trial counsel performed deficiently

by failing to make a meritless motion to dismiss. State v. Brown, 12th Dist.

Clermont No. CA2018-05-027, 2018-Ohio-4939, ¶ 11. He also cannot establish

that the outcome of this proceeding would have been different if trial counsel had

raised statutory speedy trial arguments before the trial court that have since failed

on appeal. Jones, supra, at ¶ 47. Since he has not carried the burden of establishing

that his trial counsel was ineffective, his second assignment of error is overruled.

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Case No. 4-23-10

                             Third Assignment of Error

       {¶23} Sessom asserts that the Crim.R. 11 colloquy was deficient because he

was not informed that a guilty plea waived his right to a speedy trial or his right to

raise a speedy trial challenge on appeal.

                                   Legal Standard

       {¶24} “When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be

made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525,

527, 1996-Ohio-179, 660 N.E.2d 450, 451 (1996). “Failure on any of those points

renders enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States

Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.” Id. “Crim.R. 11(C)(2) directs trial courts

to engage in a colloquy with a defendant before accepting a guilty or no contest plea

in a felony case.” State v. Wallace, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-23-04, 2023-Ohio-3014,

¶ 6. This colloquy is designed to ensure that a plea is knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily made. State v. Phipps, 2021-Ohio-258, 167 N.E.3d 576, ¶ 6 (3d Dist.).

       {¶25} In general, “a defendant is not entitled to have his plea vacated unless

he demonstrates he was prejudiced by a failure of the trial court to comply with the

provisions of Crim.R. 11(C).” State v. Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765,

164 N.E.3d 286, ¶ 16. “The test for prejudice is ‘whether the plea would have

otherwise been made.’” Id., quoting State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564

N.E.2d 474, 476 (1990). However, the Ohio Supreme Court has delineated two

exceptions to this general rule. Dangler at ¶ 16.

                                        -12-
Case No. 4-23-10

       First, ‘a trial court’s complete failure to comply with a portion of
       Crim.R. 11(C) eliminates the defendant’s burden to show prejudice.’
       Dangler at ¶ 15. Second, ‘[w]hen a trial court fails to explain the
       constitutional rights that a defendant waives by pleading guilty or no
       contest’ as required by Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), the defendant’s plea is
       presumed to have been ‘entered involuntarily and unknowingly, and
       no showing of prejudice is required.’ Id. at ¶ 14.

State v. Caudill, 3d Dist. Wyandot No. 16-23-03, 2023-Ohio-3843, ¶ 7. The Ohio

Supreme Court has explained the analysis of an appellate challenge based upon

Crim.R. 11(C)(2) as involving three main questions: “(1) has the trial court

complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court has not complied

fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that excuses a defendant from

the burden of demonstrating prejudice? and (3) if a showing of prejudice is required,

has the defendant met that burden?” Dangler at ¶ 17.

                                    Legal Analysis

       {¶26} Sessom argues that the Crim.R. 11 colloquy was deficient since the

trial court did not mention his right to a speedy trial while listing the constitutional

rights that he would waive by entering a plea of guilty. The Ohio Supreme Court

has held that a trial court must “advis[e] a defendant of all five constitutional rights

listed” in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) during a plea colloquy. State v. Veney, 120 Ohio

St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 22. These five constitutional rights

are:

       (1) the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, (2) the
       right to a jury trial, (3) the right to confront accusers, (4) the right to

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Case No. 4-23-10

       the compulsory process of witness, and (5) the right to be proven
       guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Howard, 3d Dist. Logan Nos. 8-17-01, 8-17-09, 2017-Ohio-8020, ¶ 20.

“[T]he language of * * * Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) “supports the conclusion that the list

of cited rights was intended to be exclusive” and does not “indicat[e] that the trial

court is obligated to inform the defendant of other constitutional rights.” State v.

Phillips, 2020-Ohio-2785, 154 N.E.3d 484, ¶ 12 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Stewart,

11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2010-A-0026, 2011-Ohio-2582, ¶ 20.

       {¶27} The constitutional right to a speedy trial is not listed in Crim.R.

11(C)(2)(c). Thus, courts have indicated that a trial court is not obligated by Crim.R.

11(C)(2)(c) to include an advisement on a defendant’s right to a speedy trial in a

plea colloquy. State v. White, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-10-061, 2011-Ohio-5946, ¶ 13;

State v. Cruz-Ramos, 2019-Ohio-779, 132 N.E.3d 170, ¶ 14-15 (7th Dist.); State v.

Ulatowski, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2019-G-0021, 2020-Ohio-862, ¶ 23. See also

State v. Goddard, 3d Dist. Wyandot No. 16-06-05, 2007-Ohio-1229, ¶ 14.

       {¶28} On appeal, Sessom does not identify any legal authority that would

suggest Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) requires a trial court to inform a defendant that a guilty

plea waives the right to a speedy trial. Further, he concedes in his brief that the trial

court advised him of the five constitutional rights listed in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c).

Appellant’s Brief, 16. For these reasons, we conclude that Sessom has failed to

                                          -14-
Case No. 4-23-10

establish that the trial court did not fully comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c). Thus,

his first argument is without merit.

       {¶29} Next, Sessom argues that he was not made aware that a guilty plea

would waive his right to raise a statutory speedy trial challenge on appeal. Again,

he has failed to cite any legal authority that would suggest that trial courts are

required to provide such a notification before accepting a guilty plea. “Ohio courts

have specifically held that a court’s failure to inform a defendant that his guilty plea

would waive a speedy trial violation issue on appeal did not render the plea

involuntary.” State v. Turski, 6th Dist. Lucas No. WD-18-091, 2019-Ohio-3604, ¶

10. State v. Snyder, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 03 MA 152, 2004-Ohio-3366, ¶ 15-17;

State v. Chiles, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103719, 2016-Ohio-1225, ¶ 13; State v.

Wilson, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2015-T-0082, 2017-Ohio-502, ¶ 54; State v.

Childs, 12th Dist. Butler No. 2009-03-076, 2010-Ohio-1814, ¶ 9.

       {¶30} Sessom also concedes that, during the change of plea hearing, the trial

court indicated that a guilty plea would limit the grounds on which he could

challenge his conviction on appeal. Further, under the first assignment of error, we

did consider Sessom’s statutory speedy trial arguments and concluded that the

record contained no indication that his speedy trial rights were violated. For these

reasons, we conclude that Sessom has failed to establish that the trial court erred by

not informing him that a guilty plea would waive his right to raise a statutory speedy

trial challenge on appeal. Thus, his second argument is without merit.

                                         -15-
Case No. 4-23-10

       {¶31} In conclusion, the record establishes that the trial court complied with

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c). Sessom has not identified a deficiency in the Crim.R. 11

colloquy or raised an argument that could otherwise establish that his guilty plea

was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The third assignment of

error is overruled.

                                    Conclusion

       {¶32} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars

assigned and argued, the judgment of Defiance County Court of Common Pleas is

affirmed.

                                                                Judgment Affirmed

WALDICK and ZIMMERMAN, J.J., concur.

/hls

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