Court Opinion

ID: 9373647
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:06:28.134195+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:42.614101
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     ANDRE WATSON,                                   DOCKET NUMBER
                 Appellant,                          DC-0752-16-0549-I-1

                  v.

     GENERAL SERVICES                                DATE: June 13, 2022
       ADMINISTRATION,
                  Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Victoria Williamson, Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the appellant.

           Daniel D’Isidoro, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed his removal appeal as untimely filed by 1 day without good cause
     shown. For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                          2

     review, REVERSE the initial decision, and REMAND the case to the regional
     office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                       BACKGROUND
¶2         As described in the initial decision, the appellant was removed from his
     Building Manager position for medical inability to perform the duties of his
     position, effective March 29, 2016.       Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 4 at 26,
     Tab 12, Initial Decision (ID) at 2, 5. 2 On March 25, 2016, the agency delivered a
     copy of its decision letter to the rehabilitation facility where the appellant was
     living. ID at 3-4. 3 The appellant filed a Board appeal of his removal on April 29,
     2016. ID at 3, 5.
¶3         The agency moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely filed.           IAF, Tab 4
     at 4‑6.      The administrative judge issued a timeliness order informing the
     appellant that his appeal may be untimely filed, apprising him of his burden
     regarding timeliness, and ordering him to file evidence and argument on the
     timeliness issue. IAF, Tab 6. The appellant, through his attorney, responded that
     his appeal was timely filed because he did not receive notice of his removal until
     March 30, 2016, when his attorney informed him of the agency’s decision. IAF,
     Tab 8 at 5‑6.     The appellant explained that, although the decision letter was
     delivered on March 25, 2016, he did not “actually receive” it because he is blind
     and delivery was made only to the reception desk of the rehabilitation facility
     where he was living. Id. He further argued that his limited ability to receive,
     open, and read mailings due to his blindness constitutes good cause for any delay
     in filing.    Id. at 6-7.   To support his arguments, the appellant submitted an

     2
       The administrative judge made a typographical error in stating that the appellant’s
     removal was effective March 24, 2016. ID at 1.
     3
       The agency also attempted to deliver copies of its decision letter to the appellant’s
     address of record and his attorney’s address on March 25, 2016. ID at 2, 4. However,
     the appellant’s attorney did not receive the decision letter until March 30, 2016, when
     the agency emailed her a copy. IAF, Tab 8 at 10, 15, Tab 9 at 6.
                                                                                       3

     affidavit of his attorney, copies of a billing form and receipt for a mailing, the
     agency’s email message to his attorney, and an unopened envelope that was
     mailed to the appellant by the agency. Id. at 10-18.
¶4        Without holding the requested hearing, the administrative judge issued an
     initial decision dismissing the appeal as untimely filed without good cause shown.
     ID at 1 n.1, 2, 5-6.     Specifically, the administrative judge found that the
     appellant’s appeal was filed 1-day late because he received the agency’s decision
     on March 25, 2016, his removal was effective March 29, 2016, and he filed his
     appeal on April 29, 2016. ID at 5-6. The administrative judge further found that
     the appellant did not establish good cause to waive the filing time limit because
     his refusal to collect and open his mail failed to demonstrate ordinary prudence or
     due diligence. Id.
¶5        The appellant has filed a petition for review arguing that, due to the
     minimal length of delay and circumstances beyond his control that impaired his
     receipt of the agency’s decision, such as his living situation at the rehabilitation
     facility and his blindness, there is good cause to waive the filing time limit.
     Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has filed a response , PFR
     File, Tab 3, to which the appellant has replied, PFR File, Tab 4.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     The appellant has established good cause to waive the time limit for filing his
     Board appeal.
¶6        The appellant bears the burden of proof regarding the timeliness of his
     appeal, which must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. Smith v.
     Office of Personnel Management, 117 M.S.P.R. 527, ¶ 5 (2012); 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(B). With exceptions not applicable here, an appeal must be
     filed with the Board no later than 30 days after the effective date, if any, of the
     action being appealed, or 30 days after the date of the appellant’s receipt of the
     agency’s decision, whichever is later.    Smith, 117 M.S.P.R. 527, ¶ 5; 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.22(b)(1).
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¶7         As discussed above, the administrative judge found that the appellant’s
     appeal was filed 1-day late. ID at 5-6. For the following reasons, we find that,
     even assuming that the appellant’s appeal was untimely filed, the preponderance
     of the evidence shows that there is good cause to waive the filing time limit under
     the particular circumstances of the case.
¶8         The Board may waive the time limit for filing an appeal if the appellant has
     shown good cause for the delay.         Smith, 117 M.S.P.R. 527, ¶ 6; 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.22(c). To establish good cause for the untimely filing of an appeal, a
     party must show that he exercised due diligence or ordinary prudence under the
     particular circumstances of the case.       Alonzo v. Department of the Air Force,
     4 M.S.P.R. 180, 184 (1980). To determine whether an appellant has shown good
     cause, the Board will consider the length of the delay, the reasonableness of his
     excuse and his showing of due diligence, whether he is proceeding pro se, and
     whether he has presented evidence of the existence of circumstances beyond his
     control that affected his ability to comply with the time limits or of unavoidable
     casualty or misfortune which similarly shows a causal relationship to his inability
     to timely file his appeal. Moorman v. Department of the Army, 68 M.S.P.R. 60,
     62-63 (1995), aff’d, 79 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Table).
¶9         Here, we find that the fact that the appellant is represented by an attorney is
     outweighed by the other Moorman factors. In particular, the length of the 1-day
     delay is minimal; the appellant reasonably claimed as a blind individual that the
     reception desk received, but did not promptly forward to him, the agency’s
     decision letter; and the record contains medical evidence of his permanent
     blindness, which impaired his ability to collect, open, and read the agency’s
     decision letter.   PFR File, Tab 1 at 6; IAF, Tab 4 at 61-62, Tab 8 at 7; see
     Adams v. Office of Personnel Management, 98 M.S.P.R. 541, ¶ 12 (2005) (finding
     that the appellant’s submission of medical evidence showing that she suffered
     from depression and anxiety, and the minimal length of the 1-day delay in filing
     her petition for review, were factors in favor of finding good cause for the delay);
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      Coleman v. Department of the Treasury, 88 M.S.P.R. 266, ¶¶ 7-8 (2001) (finding
      that the appellant’s claim of stress-related depression, substantiated in part by
      medical evidence, and the minimal length of the 1-day delay in filing her appeal,
      were factors in favor of finding good cause for the delay); see also Lacy v.
      Department of the Navy, 78 M.S.P.R. 434, 437 (1998) (establishing that the Board
      will find good cause to waive its filing time limits when a party demonstrates that
      he suffered from an illness that affected his ability to file on time by identifying
      the time period during which he suffered from the illness, submitting medical
      evidence showing that he suffered from the alleged illness during that time
      period, and explaining how the illness prevented him from timely filing his
      appeal or a request for an extension of time).      Thus, we find that, under the
      particular circumstances of this case, the appellant exercised due diligence in
      filing his appeal and the principles of justice and good conscience weigh in favor
      of finding good cause for waiving the filing time limit. See Alonzo, 4 M.S.P.R.
      at 183-84 (explaining that “good cause” is an elastic concept that entitles an
      employee to the application of broad equitable principles).
¶10         Moreover, the agency has presented no evidence or argument suggesting
      that it would be prejudiced by a waiver of the filing time limit. See Moorman,
      68 M.S.P.R. at 63 (explaining that, once good cause has been demonstrated, the
      Board must determine whether the agency has shown that it would be prejudiced
      by a waiver of the time limit).
¶11         Accordingly, we reverse the initial decision and waive the filing time limit
      for good cause shown.
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                                          ORDER
¶12        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the regional office
      for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                          /s/ for
                                              Jennifer Everling
                                              Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.