Court Opinion

ID: 9906096
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 23:00:16.342369+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:06.030365
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                      For the First Circuit

No. 22-1521

                  TOWN OF MILTON, MASSACHUSETTS,

                           Petitioner,

                                v.

     FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION and BILLY NOLEN, Acting
      Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration,

                           Respondents.

               PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF
               THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

                              Before

                  Montecalvo, Selya, and Lynch,
                         Circuit Judges.

     Karis L. North, with whom Murphy, Hesse, Toomey & Lehane, LLP
was on brief, for petitioner.
     Thomas J. Dougherty on brief for Congressman Stephen F. Lynch,
State Senator Walter F. Timilty, and State Representative William
J. Driscoll, Jr., amici curiae.
     David S. Frankel, Attorney, Appellate Section, Environment
and Natural Resources Division, U.S. Department of Justice, with
whom Todd Kim, Assistant Attorney General, Justin D. Heminger,
Attorney, Appellate Section, Environment and Natural Resources
Division, Scott E. Mitchell, Assistant Chief Counsel, Federal
Aviation Administration, Laura Price, Acting Manager, Airports and
Environmental Law, Office of the Chief Counsel, and Evan Baylor,
Attorney Advisor, Airports and Environmental Law, Office of the
Chief Counsel, were on brief, for respondent.
     Cindy L. Christiansen, PhD and John Rowe, pro se, on brief
for themselves as amici curiae.
November 30, 2023
              SELYA,     Circuit      Judge.       The     Federal     Aviation

Administration        (FAA)   initiated   the    process   of   shifting     from

ground-based navigation to satellite-based navigation at Boston's

Logan International Airport (Logan).             This shift, which was aimed

at increasing the safety and efficiency of flight procedures,

relegated certain approaches and departures at Logan to a narrower

swath of airspace that covers the Town of Milton, Massachusetts

(the Town).      Dismayed by the possibility of heavier air traffic

over its terrain, the Town objected to the FAA's proposed course

of   action     and    mounted   an   extensive    campaign     to   block   the

implementation of the new flight procedure.

              The campaign came to naught: the FAA rejected the Town's

entreaties and entered a final order authorizing the new flight

procedure.      The Town, a mostly residential community which is

located about ten miles southwest of Logan, now petitions for

judicial review of the FAA's final order.            Its location, the Town

says, subjects it to heavy air traffic, and many residents decry

the resulting noise.

              In its petition for review, the Town contends that the

FAA's environmental analysis of the noise impacts failed to comply

with the agency's obligations under the National Environmental

Policy Act (NEPA), see 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 - 4370m-11, and that the

noise   from     this    challenged     flight    procedure     disturbs     Town

residents.      We do not reach the merits of these contentions.

                                       - 3 -
            The FAA responds that the Town does not have standing to

challenge its final order because it failed to satisfy the first

prong of the standing test:       injury in fact to its own interests.

See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2203-04 (2021).

We agree with the FAA.       The harms that the Town asserts are not

legally cognizable harms to the Town itself.                   Consequently, we

dismiss the Town's petition for want of Article III standing.                     In

reaching this result, we agree with other courts of appeals that

have dismissed municipal NEPA challenges to FAA orders for want of

Article III standing because those challenges failed to show

cognizable injury to the municipalities themselves.                    See, e.g.,

City of N. Miami v. F.A.A., 47 F.4th 1257, 1277 (11th Cir. 2022);

Arapahoe Cnty. Pub. Airport Auth. v. F.A.A., 850 F. App'x 9, 11

(D.C. Cir. 2021) (per curiam); cf. City of Olmsted Falls v. F.A.A.,

292 F.3d 261, 267-68 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (explaining that municipality

had standing only because it showed injury to itself based on Clean

Air Act requirements with which it had to comply).

                                        I

            Before turning to the parties' arguments, we briefly

rehearse the law on standing. Federal courts are courts of limited

jurisdiction that may entertain only "Cases" or "Controversies."

U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.                 "For there to be a case or

controversy   under   Article    III,       the      [petitioner]   must   have   a

'personal   stake'    in   the   case       —   in    other   words,   standing."

                                   - 4 -
TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2203 (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S.

811, 819 (1997)).      "As the party invoking federal jurisdiction,

the [petitioner] bear[s] the burden of demonstrating that [it has]

standing."    Id. at 2207-08 (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504

U.S. 555, 561 (1992)).        The petitioner "must show (i) that [it]

suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and

actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the

[respondent]; and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed

by judicial relief."        Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61).

          Concreteness and particularization are independent and

necessary prerequisites of the injury in fact requirement.                See

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 334 (2016).          To be concrete,

"the asserted harm [must have] a 'close relationship' to a harm

traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in

American courts — such as physical harm, monetary harm, or various

intangible harms including . . . reputational harm."           TransUnion,

141 S. Ct. at 2200 (quoting Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 340-41).                To be

particularized, the harm "must go beyond a generalized grievance[]

to manifestly affect the [petitioner] in a personal and individual

way."   Lyman v. Baker, 954 F.3d 351, 361 (1st Cir. 2020) (first

alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted); see Save

Our Heritage, Inc. v. F.A.A., 269 F.3d 49, 55 (1st Cir. 2001)

(explaining    that,   in    order   to   satisfy   the   injury   in    fact

                                     - 5 -
requirement, "the petitioner [must be] someone who has suffered or

is threatened by injury in fact to a cognizable interest").

           In order to satisfy the traceability (causation) and

redressability requirements, a petitioner must "allege personal

injury [that is] fairly traceable to the [respondent]'s allegedly

unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested

relief."    California v. Texas, 141 S. Ct. 2104, 2113 (2021)

(quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006)).

If the petitioner fails to show any of these three elements, we

cannot review the proffered matter on its merits.             See Katz v.

Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 75-76 (1st Cir. 2012).

                                  II

           Against   this   backdrop,    we   proceed   to   appraise   the

particulars of the case at hand.          The parties' dispute about

standing focuses on whether the Town has shown injury in fact.          In

its opening brief, the Town argues that it has suffered injury

because of:    "the impact of noise on its residents, including

increased annoyance and complaints about noise made both to Town

officials and to . . . the FAA"; and the "considerable time and

money" that it spent "addressing these issues."          We examine each

of these arguments but find them wanting.

                                   A

           The Town first argues that it has suffered injury in

fact in the form of "the impact of noise on its residents."        Black-

                                 - 6 -
letter law dictates that harm to others, such as the Town's

residents, is insufficient to show an injury that is particularized

to the petitioner itself.          See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1 (noting

that "the injury must affect the [petitioner] in a personal and

individual way" to be "particularized"); Sierra Club v. Morton,

405    U.S.   727,   734-35      (1972)   ("[T]he    'injury      in   fact'   test

requires . . . . that the party seeking review be [it]self among

the injured.").         We first explore the injury in fact requirement

in the context of municipal standing, and then we turn to the

specifics of some of our prior cases that the Town cites in its

defense.

                                          1

              Several    cases    from    other     courts   of    appeals     have

established that municipalities cannot assert that they have been

injured because of an alleged injury to their residents.                        For

example, in City of Olmsted Falls v. FAA, the D.C. Circuit examined

whether the City of Olmsted Falls, Ohio, had standing to sue the

FAA for its approval of a runway improvement project at Cleveland

Hopkins International Airport.            See 292 F.3d 261, 265, 267 (D.C.

Cir. 2002).      Relying in part on harm to its residents, the City

contended that the FAA's approval violated, inter alia, NEPA and

the Clean Air Act (CAA), see 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q.                  See id. at

267.

                                      - 7 -
               The D.C. Circuit rejected the City's argument that "it

may represent its citizens, much as a private association could

represent its members' interests."                 Id.     The court held that this

argument       "misconceive[d]          the   very     concept      of   associational

standing"       as   "[t]he      City    does   not      have     'members'   who   have

voluntarily associated, nor are the interests it seeks to assert

here       germane   to   its    purpose."         Id.     at   267-68   (emphasis    in

original). Instead, as the court held, "the City [was] effectively

attempting to assert the alleged interests of its citizens under

the doctrine of parens patriae."                  Id. at 268.       It reasoned that,

because "a state may not sue the federal government on behalf of

its citizens as parens patriae,"1 municipalities, which "derive

their       existence     from    the     state      and    function     as   political

subdivisions of the state," also "presumably" cannot sue the

federal government under this doctrine.2                    Id.

               In City of North Miami v. FAA, the Eleventh Circuit

endorsed this reasoning and held that the municipal petitioners

       A state cannot sue the federal government, asserting the
       1

interests of its citizens as parens patriae, because "it is the
United States, and not the state, which represents [a state's
citizens] as parens patriae." Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S.
447, 485-86 (1923).

      In Arapahoe County Public Airport Authority v. FAA, the D.C.
       2

Circuit recently reaffirmed its reasoning in Olmsted Falls and
rejected the municipal petitioners' NEPA challenge to an FAA order,
which claimed standing based on harms, such as noise impacts, to
residents. See 850 F. App'x 9, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (per curiam).

                                          - 8 -
did not have standing to challenge the FAA's alleged failure to

comply with NEPA based on impacts, such as increased noise, to

their residents.      See 47 F.4th 1257, 1277 (11th Cir. 2022).            The

court   concluded    that,    "[b]y   invoking   the    interests   of   their

residents, the municipalities are attempting to sue the FAA under

a parens patriae theory."       Id.

           The Town attempts an end-run around this body of case

law by disclaiming any intent to represent its residents as parens

patriae.   Relatedly, it denies that it "bas[es] its claims of harm

on   individual     impacts   to   citizens."      In    defense    of   these

contentions, the Town mistakenly relies on language in Olmsted

Falls, in which the court, "[t]aking a generous reading of the

petitioner's materials," held that the City had "alleged harm to

its own economic interests based on the environmental impacts of

the [FAA-]approved project."          292 F.3d at 268.     Unlike the Town,

the City in Olmsted Falls showed injury to itself because the CAA

imposed a requirement on the City to comply with air quality

standards.   See id.

           In reaching this conclusion, the D.C. Circuit cited a

prior opinion in which it had blessed a showing of injury in fact

by municipal petitioners on the theory that new federal automobile

fuel economy standard would "adversely affect[] air quality in

their urban areas, making it more difficult for them to comply, as

they must, with the air quality standards imposed upon them by the

                                      - 9 -
[CAA]."      Id. (emphasis supplied) (citing City of Los Angeles v.

Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 912 F.2d 478, 484-85 (D.C.

Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Florida Audubon Soc'y v.

Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).                   This alleged increase in

difficulty      complying         with      CAA          standards     inflicted      a

"constitutionally cognizable injury."                    City of Los Angeles, 912

F.2d at 485.        Here, however, the Town sued only under NEPA, which

—   unlike    the    CAA   —   does   not       impose    standards   with    which   a

municipality must comply.3

                                            2

             In further defense of its position, the Town cites a

line of cases in which we reviewed municipal challenges to FAA

actions based on harms such as increased traffic congestion.                       See,

e.g., Town of Marshfield v. F.A.A., 552 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008);

Town of Winthrop v. F.A.A., 535 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2008); Save

Our Heritage, Inc. v. F.A.A., 269 F.3d 49, 55 (1st Cir. 2001).

These cases are inapposite, and our decision in Save Our Heritage

illustrates the point.          There, we declined to decide whether the

municipal     petitioners      themselves         had    standing    based   on   their

      3The determination of the Olmsted Falls court that the
municipal petitioner had standing to advance all its statutory
grievances, predicated on injury under only one of those statutes,
predated TransUnion.    This timing bears mention because the
TransUnion court stated that "standing is not dispensed in gross;
rather, [petitioners] must demonstrate standing for each claim
that they press." 141 S. Ct. at 2208; see Webb v. Injured Workers
Pharmacy, LLC, 72 F.4th 365, 372 (1st Cir. 2023).

                                       - 10 -
"direct interest" (that is, injury from the FAA's ruling).                  Save

Our Heritage, 269 F.3d at 55.            We recognized that deciding the

issue was unnecessary because two joint petitioners (non-profit

landowners) "would be affected by both noise and air pollution,"

and "[i]t is sufficient for the case to proceed if at least one

petitioner has standing."         Id.    Any statements about the likely

standing of the municipal petitioners were merely dictum.

               Nor is the Town's argument supported by our decision in

Winthrop, which also featured two local residents as individual

petitioners (both of whom had standing).             See 535 F.3d at 3.          In

contrast, the Town is the sole petitioner seeking standing here —

and there are no individual resident petitioners.

               So, too, our decision in Marshfield does not bear the

weight that the Town piles upon it.            See 552 F.3d 1.     The municipal

petitioner there brought a claim under the National Historic

Preservation Act, see 16 U.S.C. §§ 470 - 470x-6 (2000) (current

version at 54 U.S.C. §§ 300101 - 320303), which clearly imposes

some       obligations   concerning    historic    sites    in    and   around   a

municipality.       See Marshfield, 552 F.3d at 5.           For that reason,

there was no need for a discussion of standing.                  Here, unlike in

Marshfield, the Town has not identified any concrete harm to a

municipally owned site within its borders.4                The case before us

       Although the Town makes a passing reference to "pollution
       4

impacts" on the Town itself, it neither elaborates on the nature

                                      - 11 -
remains factually and legally distinct from the cases to which the

Town alludes.

           The Town, in a footnote in its reply brief, points to

one more case that it says found that a municipality may sue to

recover damages on behalf of itself and "other similarly injured

and situated persons," at least under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A,

§ 11.    Town of Randolph v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 19-10813, 2019

WL 2394253, at *5 (D. Mass. June 6, 2019).           That decision is not

binding authority and — in any event — fails to advance the Town's

cause.   First, because Randolph already required a remand to state

court on other jurisdictional grounds, see id. at *5, a standing

discussion would have been superfluous.             Second, the complaint

there sought damages for "decreased tax revenue and diminished

property values" as well as "'municipal expenditures' resulting

from the opioid epidemic," id. at *1, which are substantially

different than the injuries that the Town has alleged here.            Thus,

Randolph furnishes no comfort for the Town's standing argument.

                                      B

           The Town next argues that it has suffered concrete

economic   injury   as   a   result   of   the   expenses   it   incurred   in

challenging the new flight procedure.            The Town describes these

costs, which derive from assorted activities:               Town officials

of these impacts nor identifies any facts that we could construe
as supporting such a theory of harm.

                                  - 12 -
devoted "considerable time and money [to] addressing" residents'

noise complaints; Town officials attempted to coordinate with

Logan personnel, the FAA, and state and federal elected officials;

the Town formed an advisory committee on airplane noise composed

of Town residents; the Town purchased noise monitors, which Town

residents staffed as volunteers; and the Town retained lawyers to

represent        it     both   at   the    administrative       level    and    in   this

proceeding.5          These activities, the Town complains, constituted

injury to the Town because they diverted "precious municipal

resources" from other core functions that the Town must perform.

                We reject this theory of standing, which again fails to

pass muster upon consideration of the first element of the standing

inquiry:        injury in fact.           Inasmuch as the municipal government

exists to support its citizens, any action that it takes inherently

serves that purpose and cannot be an injury to it.                        Put another

way,       a   municipality     cannot     claim     that    reallocating      municipal

resources to address one of its residents' concerns is an injury

because this decision simply represents a policy preference to

prioritize        one    government       function    over    another.         Cf.   Conn.

Citizens Def. League, Inc. v. Lamont, 6 F.4th 439, 447 (2d Cir.

       We summarily disregard this final assertion of harm because
       5

attorneys' fees cannot constitute injury in fact. See Thole v.
U.S. Bank N.A., 140 S. Ct. 1615, 1619 (2020) (explaining that
attorneys' fees did not give petitioners a "concrete stake in the
lawsuit").

                                           - 13 -
2021) (holding that a non-profit organization's allocation of

resources to effectuate responsibilities in furtherance of its

mission cannot constitute injury in fact because this action does

not divert resources from its "current activities").

                  The   Town   asseverates    that   it   has    been    injured   by

allocating its "limited funds" to advocate against the imposition

of the new flight procedure over the Town rather than to carry out

other "statutory responsibilities and obligations."                     Yet, the Town

also denies that this asseveration relies on an associational

standing theory.           It concedes that "a municipality is not like an

advocacy organization" and "engagement with the FAA is not its

mission."          To the Town's credit, a municipality in many ways is

unlike organizations to which the associational standing cases

refer.       It is not a voluntary association of members with common

interests.          Nor is the Town an association whose purpose is to

represent and advance a common interest of its members.                        After

all, the Town was not formed under Massachusetts law to pursue an

ideological mission.

                  These differences, though, mean that a municipality will

have       more    difficulty    running     the   standing     gauntlet    than   an

organization.           A resource-diversion argument is available only to

petitioners who allege associational standing6 — and only to those

       Here, we use the term "associational standing" to include
       6

"organizational standing."

                                       - 14 -
who have shown that "the challenged conduct frustrated their

organizational missions and that they diverted resources to combat

that conduct."   Friends of the Earth v. Sanderson Farms, Inc., 992

F.3d 939, 942 (9th Cir. 2021); see Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,

455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982) (holding that an organization suffers

injury in fact when its key activities are "perceptibly impaired"

and its resources "consequent[ly] drain[ed]"); Equal Means Equal

v.   Ferriero,   3   F.4th   24,     29-30    (1st   Cir.    2021)   (rejecting

associational standing predicated on organizations' expenditure of

"additional resources to ensure that the law [benefitting their

members] will be treated as having legal effect").                   As we have

discussed, the Town is not an association that can represent its

members'   interests.        Thus,    its    reliance   on    principles    from

associational standing case law is misplaced.

           The Town acknowledges the force of this comparison but

counters that these differences suggest that a municipality has a

stronger justification for a resource-diversion theory of harm.

It maintains that its efforts exceed "mere advocacy," pointing to

"the cost of purchasing and deploying its own field noise monitors,

attended by Town volunteers."          We fail to see how this example

materially   differs    from    the    type    of    work   that   an   advocacy

organization might perform.

                                     - 15 -
                                 III

          In its reply brief, the Town for the first time argues

a new form of alleged injury:    that it was "harmed when residents

s[old] their homes and move[d] away from Milton because of noise

impacts, which" caused fiscal and reputational harm.    Because the

Town did not raise this argument in a timely and complete manner,

we deem it waived.   See Sandstrom v. ChemLawn Corp., 904 F.2d 83,

86 (1st Cir. 1990) (explaining that argument not raised until

appellant's reply brief is deemed waived); see also United States

v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (explaining that

argument made "in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some

effort at developed argumentation, [is] deemed waived").

          The newly asserted injury assumes that an exodus of

residents hurts the Town's financial interests and reputation in

a legally cognizable manner, but introducing these assumptions

extends the argument well beyond that which the Town advanced in

its opening brief. Moreover, that the Town's coffers are shrinking

(the financial injury that the new theory seems to assert) is a

wholly different harm than the Town having to reallocate existing

funds from core functions to challenge the new flight procedure

(the only theory of financial injury set forth in the Town's

opening brief).   Introducing this asserted harm, coupled with the

new assertion of reputational harm, plainly extends the argument

beyond that which the Town advanced in its opening brief.        It

                                - 16 -
follows that the Town's new standing argument is both legally and

factually distinct from the arguments advanced in its opening

brief.   Given these facts, we deem this argument waived.

                                IV

          We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,

we dismiss the Town's petition for want of Article III standing.

Each party shall bear its own costs.

Dismissed.

                              - 17 -