Court Opinion

ID: 9426166
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:17:00.824789+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:59.383973
License: Public Domain

Mr. Chief Justice Burger,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the Court’s opinion insofar as it holds that the availability of backpay is a matter which Title VII commits to the sound equitable discretion of the trial court. I cannot agree with the Court’s application of that principle in this case, or with its method of reviewing the District Court’s findings regarding Albemarle’s testing policy.
*450With respect to the backpay issue, it must be emphasized that Albemarle was not held liable for practicing overt racial discrimination. It is undisputed that it voluntarily discontinued such practices prior to the effective date of Title VII and that the statute does not— and could not — apply to acts occurring before its passage. The basis of Albemarle’s liability was that its seniority system perpetuated the effects of past discrimination and, as the District Court pointed out, the law regarding an employer’s obligation to cure such effects was unclear for a considerable period of time. Moreover, the District Court’s finding that Albemarle did not act in bad faith was not simply a determination that it thought its seniority system was legal but, rather, a finding that both prior to and after the filing of this lawsuit it took steps to integrate minorities into its labor force and to promptly fulfill its obligations under the law as it developed.1
In light of this background, the Court’s suggestion that the District Court “conditioned” awards of backpay upon a showing of bad faith, ante, at 423, is incorrect. Moreover, the District Court’s findings on this point cannot be disregarded as irrelevant. As the Court’s opinion notes, one of Congress’ major purposes in giving district courts discretion to award backpay in Title VII *451actions was to encourage employers and unions “ 'to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country’s history.’ ” Ante, at 418. By the same token, if employers are to be assessed backpay even where they have attempted in good faith to conform to the law, they will have little incentive to eliminate marginal practices until bound by a court judgment. Plainly, then, the District Court’s findings relate to “reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory purposes ....” Ante, at 421. Because respondents waited five years before changing their original position disclaiming backpay and belatedly seeking it, thus suggesting that a desire to be “made whole” was not a major reason for their pursuit of this litigation, I cannot say that the District Court abused its discretion by denying that remedy.2
The Court’s treatment of the testing issue is equally troubling. Its entire analysis is based upon a wooden application of EEOC Guidelines which, it says, are entitled to “great deference” as an administrative interpretation of Title VII under' Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 (1971). The Court’s reliance upon Griggs is misplaced. There we were dealing with Guidelines which state that a test must be demonstrated to be job related before it can qualify for the exemption contained in § 703 (h) of Title VII, 78 Stat. 257, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (h), as a device not “designed, intended or used to discriminate . . . .” Because this interpretation *452of specific statutory language was supported by both the Act and its legislative history, we observed that there was “good reason to treat the -guidelines as expressing the will of Congress.” 401 U. S., at 434. See also Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U. S. 86, 93-95 (1973).
In contrast, the Guidelines upon which the Court now relies relate to methods for proving job relatedness; they interpret no section of Title VII and are nowhere referred to in its legislative history. Moreover, they are not federal regulations which have been submitted to public comment and scrutiny as required by the Administrative Procedure Act.3 Thus, slavish adherence to the EEOC Guidelines regarding test validation should not be required; those provisions are, as their title suggests, guides entitled to the same weight as other well-founded testimony by experts in the field of employment testing.
The District Court so considered the Guidelines in this case and resolved any conflicts in favor of Albemarle’s experts. For example, with respect to the question whether validating tests for persons at or near the top of a line of progression “is a permissible measure of the minimal qualifications of new workers,” ante, at 434, the District Court found:
“The group tested was typical of employees in the skilled lines of progression. They were selected from the top and middle of various lines. Professional studies have shown that when tests are vali*453dated in such a narrow range of competence, there is a greater chance that the test will validate even a broader range, that is, if job candidates as well as present employees are tested.” 2 App. 490-491.
Unless this Court is prepared to hold that this and similar factual findings are clearly erroneous, the District Court’s conclusion that Albemarle had sustained its burden of showing that its tests were job related is entitled to affirmance, if we follow traditional standards of review. At the very least, the case should be remanded to the Court of Appeals with instructions that it reconsider the testing issue, giving the District Court’s findings of fact the deference to which they are entitled.

The District Court concluded that Albemarle was entirely justified in maintaining some type of seniority system which insured that its employees would have “a certain degree of training and experience.” Its findings regarding the absence of bad faith were as follows:
“It appears that the company as early as 1964 began active recruitment of blacks for its Maintenance Apprentice Program. Certain lines of progression were merged on its own initiative, and as judicial decisions expanded the then existing interpretations of the Act, the defendants took steps to correct the abuses without delay.” 2 App. 498.

 As the Court points out, ante, at 424 n. 20, the District Court’s reasons for denying backpay were cumulative. It did not favor one policy of Title YII to the exclusion of all others, as I fear this Court is now doing.

 Such comment would not be a mere formality in light of the fact that many of the EEOC Guidelines are not universally accepted. For example, the Guideline relating to “differential validation-,” upon which the Court relies in this case, ante, at 435, has been questioned by the American Psychological Association. See United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F. 2d 906, 914 n. 8 (CA5 1973).