Court Opinion

ID: 9699337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:19:54.787768+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:48.861997
License: Public Domain

*599Pashman, J.,
concurring. I concur in the Court’s holding that in order for a plaintiff to establish a cause of action based upon an alleged malicious use of civil process (or its counterpart in the criminal context, malicious prosecution) he must demonstrate a “special grievance.” This seemingly harsh rule is necessary to avoid having prospective plaintiffs discouraged from seeking vindication of their rights by the threat of such a retaliatory suit. I agree with the statement in the recent case of Pantone v. Demos, 375 N. E. 2d 480 (Ill. App. 1978), a suit by former medical malpractice defendants against the plaintiff in the prior suit and his counsel, that
* ® * public policy requires a safeguarding of a suitor’s access to the courts without fear of easily maintained countersuits for bringing such actions.
[375 N. E. 2d at 484]
However, this particular plaintiff obviously acted in bad faith and improperly used the courts to prey upon its innocent tenant. I am loathe to see it escape without some sanction for its misdeed. Nevertheless, despite the unfairness in permitting this plaintiff to escape a judgment for malicious use of civil process, the overall administration of justice requires that this remedy be approved sparingly. Thus, I am constrained to join with the Court in relieving this plaintiff of the otherwise richly-deserved consequences of its wrongful conduct.
Eor similar reasons I join in the Court’s ruling that an action for malicious use of process may not be maintained as a counterclaim in the action alleged to have been maliciously brought. The societal cost resulting from the deterrence of just claims by reason of the powerful leverage such a practice would afford defendants far outweighs the utility of any judicial economies it might produce.
Moreover, I am concerned at some of the ramifications of today’s upholding of the “special grievance” rule. All *600too frequently improperly motivated litigants, such as plaintiff herein, will be able to drain the financial resources of their opponents through burdensome and costly litigation having no legal or factual basis. Permitting such plaintiffs to escape any penalty so long as they are successful in carefully avoiding any action which would create a “special grievance” may be a necessary evil. Plowever, some avenue of relief must be available to defendants so victimized.
Although presently precluded by R. 4:42 — 9, I believe that our courts should have the discretionary power to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant in certain defined classes of litigation upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was instituted vexatiously and in bad faith. This is generally the case in those jurisdictions which adhere to the so-called “American rule” of the common law. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412, 415-417, 98 S. Ct. 694, 697-698, 54 L. Ed. 2d 648, 653-654 and n. 9 (1978); Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240, 95 S. Ct. 1612, 44 L. Ed. 2d 141 (1975). Any danger that an undesirable chilling effect as described above would result from the fact that such a rule would be applied with the benefit of hindsight, see Christiansburg, supra, 434 U. S. at 422, 98 S. Ct. at 700, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 657, could be minimized by a requirement that in such case, the losing party’s improper purpose be clearly and convincingly established. Such a rule would simultaneously prevent abuse of plaintiffs with arguably meritorious but unsuccessful claims, while ensuring that those who act in capricious disregard of the interests of justice by using the courts as a tool for harassment will not be able to indirectly accomplish their goal. Such persons should not be permitted to visit the potentially ruinous costs of litigation on an innocent party. I commend the issue to our Civil Practice Committee for appropriate consideration.
Pashman, J., concurring with result.
*601For affirmance — Chief Justice Hughes, Justices Sullivan, Pashman, Clifford, Schreiber and Handler and Judge Conford — 7.
For reversal — None.