Court Opinion

ID: 9858204
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:18:28.674379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:53:30.251969
License: Public Domain

SCHULTZ, Justice
(concurring specially).
Despite serious concerns regarding the $40-per-hour guideline, I concur. When used solely as a guideline, I am not convinced that the hourly rate violates Iowa Code section 815.7 as interpreted in Hulse v. Wifvat, 306 N.W.2d 707 (Iowa 1981). Because I am certain that in too many instances the guideline will be used to establish the fee by a simple multiplication method rather than the application of the correct factors for the allowance of fees that were set out in Hulse, I must express my concerns and suggestions.
Adherence to a fixed hourly rate, especially if it is low, is a step backwards and defeats the purpose of section 815.7. It will eventually increase the cost to the taxing body; more importantly, it will decrease the quality of legal services rendered to the indigent criminal defendant. Thus, it will destroy the very enlightened purpose behind the enactment of section 815.7.
The obvious purposes of section 815.7 are two-fold. First, it meets the constitutional standards requiring legal representation for indigent criminal defendants. Secondly, reasonable compensation is defined in a manner that should attract competent and effective counsel. Whether or not we are meeting this second purpose forms the central issue of this case.
I believe that it is self-evident that to attract able counsel to accept court appointments, the State must provide adequate remuneration. As in any other profession, the skills and abilities of attorneys that practice law vary. • The more able attorneys can command larger fees. Despite ethical considerations, it is obvious that modern day law offices have high overhead which must be paid from the fees that a lawyer can generate. The legislature wisely recognized the problem presented by the great number of indigent defendants that need competent representation and realized the bar no longer could be expected to greatly subsidize the public by performing pro-bono criminal work. The legislature not only may give, but it also may take away. Unless the bench and bar monitor court appointment fees carefully, the legislature that soon will assume responsibility for the payment of these fees may attempt to regulate the situation.
We indicated in Hulse that factors other than a fixed rate of compensation must be considered in setting fees. 306 N.W.2d at 712. Flat hourly rates do not take into account such factors as the difficulty of issues, the responsibility assumed, and the experience of the attorney. More importantly, flat hourly rates do not compensate an efficient lawyer who obtains a good result in a minimum of time. Rather than provide an incentive to reduce hours spent, flat rates benefit procrastination and unnecessary work. I believe that the vast majority of the lawyers place their clients’ *202interests before their own. When lawyers are privately retained on criminal cases, they must consider such matters as the cost to the client when they evaluate a course of action. We put blinders on if we fail to recognize that not all lawyers on indigent defense appointments recognize the factor of costs when a governmental unit is footing the bill. In some instances research is conducted, suppression hearings are held, depositions are taken, and cases are tried, not for the benefit of the client, but to increase the number of hours spent on the case. With our rotating system of judges, it is not unusual for two to four judges to sit on portions of a criminal proceeding. County attorneys who have to deal with defense lawyers seldom complain about fees, and when they do, they do it somewhat apologetically. The system is difficult at best to monitor. The result is higher fees, unhappy taxpayers and a greater time burden placed on the prosecutors and the judiciary.
I know that judges and lawyers are seeking better solutions; however, reliance upon a flat rate even for a guideline is questionable at best. I suggest that there must be more than one hourly guideline with the rates elevated according to the severity of the charge. Further, I believe that a limitation on billable hours should be set, depending on the type of case and the stage of the proceedings at which final disposition is achieved. Flexibility should be built in so additional chargeable hours would be available by securing a court order prior to incurring the additional hours. In addition to a maximum limitation, I believe that there should be a minimum fee available that would be large enough to encourage efficient and expeditious dispositions. If an experienced lawyer can obtain a good result in a minimum of time, the fees should not be confined by multiplying hours spent by an hourly rate.
In summary, I believe these suggestions would benefit the criminal defendant, the bar and the taxpayers. I believe that the adoption of a flat hourly rate as a guideline will in the end produce the opposite results.