Court Opinion

ID: 9855935
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:34:33.45013+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:17.972442
License: Public Domain

Miller, Justice,
dissenting:
The majority ignores both the facts and the law in its result-oriented holding that liens may be enforced against Zapata Coal Corporation [Zapata] for liquidated damages and attorney fees because Zapata’s general contractor, M & T Corporation [M & T], failed to pay wages to its (M & T’s) employees as required under law. I take no issue with that portion of the opinion which concludes that Zapata is liable to M & T’s employees under our mechanic lien statute, W. Va. Code, 38-2-31, for the four weeks’ wages due as well as all accrued vacation and other fringe benefits contracted for between M & T and its employees. However, I am in deep disagreement with the majority’s holding that our wage payment statute, W. Va. Code, 21-5-4(e) (imposing penalties for nonpayment of wages), can be read into the mechanic lien statute, W. Va. Code, 38-2-31 (enforcement of liens by unpaid workmen).
The majority manages this absurd result by holding that both statutes relate to “employee liens to secure compensation,” (Slip Opinion, p. 10), and thus should be read inpari *641materia. This holding completely mischaracterizes the fundamental purposes of each of the statutes. W. Va. Code, 38-2-31, permits workmen who are employed either by a general contractor or subcontractor to have a lien for the amount of their accrued wages against the real and personal property of the corporation who has hired their employer.1 We have historically held that this statute is remedial and, therefore, should be liberally construed. Charter v. Doddridge County Bank, 117 W. Va. 742, 188 S.E. 486 (1936); Shore v. United Auto Supply, 107 W. Va. 66, 146 S.E. 890 (1929).
On the other hand, W. Va. Code, 21-5-4(e), which provides for liquidated damages where an employer fails to pay wages due his employees, is strictly limited to the employer-employee relationship.2 Furthermore, W. Va. *642Code, 21-5-4(e), is a penal statute, and we have traditionally held that statutes involving penalties should be strictly construed. Dials v. Blair, 144 W. Va. 764, 111 S.E.2d 17 (1959); Clear Fork Coal Co. v. Anchor Coal Co., 105 W. Va. 570,144 S.E. 409 (1928). The language of this section is too plain and unambiguous in its reference to the employer-employee relationship to enable me to torture it into a situation where a non-employer becomes liable for the penalty of liquidated damages. The majority does just this, relying on the sheerest casuistry in holding that the word “lien” in the last sentence of W. Va. Code, 21-5-4(e), “is to be treated as a lien for unpaid wages for work actually performed [and] may be enforced in a proceeding brought pursuant to W. Va. Code, 38-2-31.” (Slip opinion, p. 9) This quoted language is a complete misreading of the sentence, which merely preserves the lien right and remedies that an employee has for the protection of his “salary or wages.” It has nothing to do with broadening the right of the penalty of liquidated damages against third parties who are non-employers.
The purpose of W. Va. Code, 21-5-4(e), is to punish an employer who fails to pay wages to his employees. There is some rationality to this punishment since it will encourage employers to pay their employees in a timely fashion. Moreover, the employer is in direct control of the condition that may give rise to the penalty. Such is not the case with a third party such as Zapata, which has no control over the prompt payment by M & T of its employees who are the plaintiffs in this suit. It is simply incredible to me that Zapata, who is not the employer, can be made responsible.3
Other courts have strictly limited the application of penalty provisions of wage collection statutes similar to our own. In Johnson v. Banner Corporation, 308 So.2d 534 (La. App. 1975), the Louisiana court refused to allow *643penalties for wage nonpayment against Banner Corporation which had contracted with Andrews Construction Corporation for work in a housing subdivision. Andrews was the employer, as was M & T here, and left with employees unpaid. The court strictly construed the word “employer” to apply only to Andrews:
“The jurisprudence has interpreted these statutes as being penal in nature and therefore they must be strictly construed, [citations omitted]. Because these statutes are strictly construed the definition ‘anyone employing laborers ...’ cannot be interpreted to apply to Banner.” 308 So.2d at 536.
See also Fern v. Latour Creek R. Co., 29 Idaho 521, 160 P. 941 (1916); Milner v. Sheely, 57 Nev. 174, 69 P.2d 771 (1937), modifying, 57 Nev. 159, 60 P.2d 604 (1936); Eldorado-Rand Mining Co. v. Thompson, 57 Nev. 407, 65 P.2d 878 (1937).
As a final flourish, the majority seizes upon W. Va. Code, 21-5-12(b), of our Wage Payment and Collection Statute, which provides that “[t]he court in any action brought under this article may, [if] judgment is awarded to the plaintiff... assess. . .reasonable attorney fees against the defendant,” (emphasis added), and holds Zapata liable for attorney fees. The majority ignores the fact that proceedings under Chapter 21, Article 5, are confined to the employer-employee relationship and Zapata was not in that relationship with the plaintiffs. Moreover, the majority, in the early portions of its opinion, held that the plaintiffs’ case was brough under the mechanic lien statute, W. Va. Code, 38-2-31; now, it concludes “that the action brough by the appellants is an action under Chapter 21, article 5 ....” (Slip Opinion, p. 11)
The Legislature may be slightly astounded by the way in which the majority has legislated new meaning into W. Va. Code, 25-5-1, et seq. Despite the plain language of this statute confining its ambit to the employer-employee relationship, the maj ority has now opened it so wide that anyone may be sued if he has any connection with the wage earner’s employer. One might expect the Legislature to correct the majority’s mistake but I suspect that no matter *644what the Legislature does, the majority would twist the result back again.

 W. Va. Code, 38-2-31, provides:
“Every workman, laborer or other person who shall do or perform any work or labor, for an incorporated company doing business in this State, by virtue of a contract either directly with such incorporated company or with its general contractor, or with any subcontractor, shall have a lien for the value of such work or labor upon all real estate and personal property of such company; and, to the extent and value of one month’s such work or labor, said lien shall have priority over any lien created by deed or otherwise on such real estate or personal property subsequent to the time when such work or labor was performed: Provided, however, that there shall be no priority of lien as against conditional sales of, or reservation of title to, machinery sold to such company; nor shall there be priority of lien as between the parties claiming under the provisions of this section.”

 W. Va. Code, 21-5-4(e), provides:
“If a person, firm or corporation fails to pay an employee wages as required under this section, such person, firm or corporation shall, in addition to the amount due, be liable to the employee for liquidated damages in the amount of wages at his regular rate for each day the employer is in default until he is paid in full, without rendering any service therefor: Provided, however, that he shall cease to draw such wages thirty days after such default. Every employee shall have such lien and all other rights and remedies for the protection and enforcement of such salary or wages, as he would have been entitled to had he rendered service therefor in the manner as last employed; except that, for the purpose of such liquidated damages, such failures shall not be deemed to continue *642after the date of the filing of a petition in bankruptcy with respect to the employer if he is adjudicated bankrupt upon such petition.”

 Of course, if it could be shown that Zapata actually controlled M & T, or that M & T was a subsidiary of Zapata, then liability might be found based on the fact that Zapata was the “real” employer. However, no such contention is made here.