Court Opinion

ID: 9608157
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:07:07.925042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:44.141307
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the judgments of reversal, as it is my view that no reversible error was committed by the trial court in its procedural or evidentiary rulings. As it is further my view that the trial court correctly charged to the jury on the substance of OCGA *265§ 51-12-5.1 (e) (2) and correctly denied the post-trial motions for new trial, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and for reduction in damages, I would affirm this product liability judgment in its entirety, large though it may be. Before addressing the evidence, properly viewed in the light most favorable to the party who secured the verdict, I pause only to register my disagreement with the majority that the trial court in the cases sub judice has misapplied Carney v. JDN Constr. Co., 206 Ga. App. 785, 790 (5) (426 SE2d 611), authored by then-Presiding Judge Carley, to retain venue in Fulton County and my further disagreement that the trial court misapplied General Motors Corp. v. Moseley, 213 Ga. App. 875, 880 (4), 882 (447 SE2d 302), authored by Judge Blackburn, regarding the admissibility of evidence of similar or subsequent acts which tend to show contemporary knowledge of a defect, causation, or to rebut a defense claim of physical impossibility. Such errors of application are made only in this Court.
“If there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue and the evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions therefrom, shall demand a particular verdict, such verdict shall be directed.” OCGA § 9-11-50 (a). A judgment n.o.v. “is properly granted only when there can be only one reasonable conclusion as to the proper judgment; if there is any evidentiary basis for the jury’s verdict, viewing the evidence most favorably to the party who secured the verdict, it is not error to deny the motion.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) First Union Nat. Bank of Ga. v. Davies-Elliott, Inc., 215 Ga. App. 498, 501 (1a), 502 (452 SE2d 132). With this standard in mind, my review of this enormous record reveals the following.
Plaintiffs Franklin E. Ford, Jr. (“Mr. Ford”) and his wife, Claudia Ford (“Mrs. Ford”), brought this product liability action against defendants The Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Company, a Delaware corporation, Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Company, a New York partnership (collectively “Uniroyal Goodrich”), and Automotive Corporation d/b/a NTW, alleging defective tire design, defective tire manufacture, and failure to warn. According to the complaint, the Fords’ van became stranded on an interstate highway when a 15-inch radial passenger tire designed and manufactured by Uniroyal Goodrich “exploded, separating between its steel belts[.]” One of the steel belts wrapped around the van’s axle and emergency brake cable, immobilizing the van in the second left-hand lane. The van was then struck with great force from the rear by an approaching station wagon, driven by Rebecca Parsons. The impact killed Mrs. Parsons and injured Mrs. Ford and her 22-year-old son, Franklin E. Ford III (“Franklin Ford”). Franklin Ford brought a separate but identical complaint, seeking to recover for permanent brain injuries sustained in this collision. By *266consent order in the Franklin Ford case, “The Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Company, a partnership, [was] substituted as the party defendants in lieu of the former entity known as The B. F. Goodrich Company, without need of] further service of the Complaint or Answer. ...” Uniroyal Goodrich admitted that it manufactured the “technical excellence SP7000 S tire, size P-235/70 SR15 model steel belted radial tire . . .” on the Fords’ van at the time of the collision but denied the tire was defective in any way. Before extensive discovery, Uniroyal Goodrich moved “to consolidate or, in the alternative, assign these companion cases to the same judge, pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-42 (a),” and the cases were assigned to a single judge. Plaintiffs settled with NTW before trial. Over objection by Uniroyal Goodrich, the cases were tried before two separate juries, simultaneously. One jury decided Mrs. Ford’s case (with Mr. Ford’s consortium claim) as against both the New York Uniroyal Goodrich partnership and the Delaware Uniroyal Goodrich corporation. The other jury decided Franklin Ford’s case against the same defendants.
The parties stipulated that “the subject tire . . . was manufactured by defendant [Uniroyal Goodrich], a New York partnership, at the Tuscaloosa plant“in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, in the thirty-fifth week of 1987.” The following circumstances and chronology are undisputed: Mr. Ford purchased two new tires from NTW on February 18, 1988. He noticed that the van vibrated after these tires were mounted. When Mrs. Ford returned the van to NTW, she was informed that one “tire was out of round” and received a substitute. At the time of the blowout on Saturday, August 26, 1989, the tire at issue had been driven 13,000 miles. That day, the Fords and their two sons were driving north on 1-85, returning to Norcross, Georgia, from a vacation in Florida. South of Hartsfield International Airport, Mr. Ford drew Mrs. Ford’s attention to a slight vibration, similar to those vibrations of the van observed while driving on the tire they had replaced. She “could feel it going uphill and . . . could not feel it at other times.” Although they discussed the possible source of the intermittent vibrations, the Fords never discussed “getting off the road and terminating the trip[.]” Between 5:00 and 5:30 p.m., as they approached the Clairmont Road exit, Mrs. Ford heard “a thump in the van[ . . . and saw that her husband] was just struggling with the [steering] wheel. ...” Within seconds, she heard “another thump and [Mr. Ford] said, that was the tire.” The van “skittered a while and came to a stop. And cars were just coming all around us.” In vain, Mr. Ford tried to move the van from the lane of traffic into the emergency lane. Mrs. Ford “could hear him pressing the accelerator and the van would not move.” Other cars were “squealing around [them]. They would come up on [the Fords] quickly and have to swerve ... to get around. ...” Some vehicles, including a tractor-trailer, had merged *267left and passed the stalled van by “going into the emergency lane.” The Fords “all agreed that we just did not dare try to get out.” They remained trapped in the van for “five or six minutes,” strapped into their seats with seatbelts, facing ahead. Franklin Ford turned on the four-way hazard lights while Mr. Ford tried to summon help on the C. B. radio. With the rearview mirror, Mr. Ford observed as Rebecca Parson’s station wagon speedily approached from the south, and he exclaimed, “this one’s not going to stop.” The impact of the ensuing crash pushed the van 200 feet. “It was just like we . . . got hit by a freight train.” When the van finally came to rest, Franklin Ford’s “seat had twisted and come back so that he was ... on his back. . . .” He was “trembling and convulsing [, while Mrs. Ford’s right] leg was broken.”
It is uncontradicted that neither Uniroyal Goodrich nor NTW ever gave the Fords any consumer warning not to drive the vehicle if vibrations were observed because such vibrations could be a symptom of imminent belt separation leading to loss of air and possible vehicle crash. The existence of a manufacturing defect, of the need to warn, and of the foreseeability of the type of catastrophic harm actually sustained were very much in dispute. The following evidence was adduced in support of the contentions that the tire at issue was defectively manufactured and Uniroyal Goodrich failed to warn the Fords of a foreseeable danger: Officer Steve Merrifield, a traffic specialist and accident reconstructionist with the DeKalb County Police, was called to the scene. From his analysis of the physical evidence, the jury was authorized to conclude the “tread had come loose [from the carcass of the tire] and had wrapped around the axle of the vehicle, while the vehicle was moving. The leading edge of the tread had wrapped around the axle; had wedged itself; . . . had locked the left-rear wheel. . . . The tire, with no tread left on the pavement, the cord wore through quickly; blew the tire out. It aired out. The wheel was locked up and . . . the vehicle, basically, became immobilized.” Photographs showing where the “rim was grinding on the pavement [indicated that] one of the wheels on the vehicle was . . . locked.” This grinding of the pavement started “probably [one] hundred feet . . .” from where the Fords’ van came to a halt. Three hundred feet back from that place, Officer Merrifield found “an offset mark that indicated that . . . [the belt] was flapping.” So tightly was the belt wrapped around the axle, it took the police “an hour and a half . . .” to remove the wheel without cutting the belt. Stephen P. Disch, M. D., the treating neurologist, thought that Franklin Ford’s brain injuries occurred when he “had a side-to-side action and that his head on the right side probably hit something on the right side[,. . . ] then went side-to-side [; . . .] sheared the blood vessels and caused the blood clot.” Dr. Disch affirmed that these injuries were compatible *268with the Fords’ van being propelled first to the right by the blow of the collision “and then, because of the locked wheel on the left, changing] direction to the left.” Franklin Ford’s permanent brain injuries are “the equivalent of having a stroke.” He is “hemiparetic on the left side of his body.”
William J. Campbell worked at the B. F. Goodrich plant in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, for over 27 years. Since 1981, he had been in the Quality Assurance Department. In that position he had so-called shut-down authority “in cases of either machine alignment or components or tolerances [.]” However, after the 1986 merger of B. F. Goodrich and Uniroyal Tire Company, he noticed a very definite change in his authority. “Oftentimes, [a machine he ordered shut down] wouldn’t stay down. The decision would be made to go ahead and run the machine. There was more of an emphasis put on keeping production going.” The post-merger company “relaxed [former] tolerances on components [and . . .] relaxed tolerances on machine alignment.”
During the summer of 1987, when this tire was manufactured, Mr. Campbell noticed a continuous emphasis on production, with each of the four plants in the Uniroyal Goodrich system being assigned daily, weekly, and monthly quota productions. While production was increasing, the size of the post-merger Quality Assurance Department was permitted to diminish through retirement and attrition. Mr. Campbell observed green (uncured) tires hanging from racks, where they would “sit there for a number of days before they were cured.” Such a delay can cause distortion in uniformity and even lead to “some separations.” If a “tread edge lifts and paint gets in there, ... it could cause a crack or a separation [of the steel belts] when it cured.” Because the Tuscaloosa plant had no air conditioning, during the hot and humid summer months, Mr. Campbell “would notice the tack[, i.e., stickiness of uncured tires,] in the different stock would change. [As a result, the manufacturer would] have to change the compounds to increase tack. That was an ongoing process. . . .” In the absence of “a proper amount of tack [the pressure of the stitching cycle] could cause the different components, whether it be belts or cone strip or whatever, it could cause them to shift around, move, literally move.” It was not uncommon in the tire room for the indoor temperature to reach 105 to 110 degrees Fahrenheit. When moisture or perspiration got “on the tire itself, especially if it got trapped between plys or between belts or under the tread, that would cause contamination and it probably wouldn’t cure out.” Workers were offered sweatbands, but some “refused to wear them.” John M. Swarts, a retired Manager of General Tire Compounding for Uniroyal Goodrich, confirmed that high temperatures and humidity affect the compounds used in tire building in that “it tends to degrade the tack.” Consequently, “it doesn’t have as much strength. It won’t stick to other *269things as good as it used to.” Mr. Campbell’s diminished Quality Assurance staff no longer could physically inspect the same number of finished tires. They “went from [physically] inspecting [one entire stack] of one group of tires [. . . down to just visually] inspecting the top three tires on the pallet.” Mr. Campbell related incidents where production employees would tinker with the preset speed at which the tire is rotated while steel belts were joined to the rubber. This applied the belt faster than it was being fed to the worker and “can stretch and distort the belt by doing that.” On one occasion, loose tires from the scrap heap were added to round out a load, and that load was then sent to the warehouse.
In late 1987 and early 1988, William H. Hudson, the Supervisor of Failed Tire Analysis for Uniroyal Goodrich, conducted an investigation of reported tire failures involving “belt separations or separations in the tread areas” for Uniroyal Goodrich management. He determined “that the B. F. G[oodrich] side of the family had more separations returning to the adjustment centers than the Uniroyal tires. . . . And the . . . Tuscaloosa plant . . . produced more separations per volume of built tires than the other plants.” He examined “every conceivable tire that was sent back to the adjustment centers [,] of all sizes and all brands [, . . . numbering] close to two to three thousand tires [,]” built between 1984 and 1988. These were tires that customers returned and the manufacturer agreed to take back. If there were no problem with excessive incidents of belt separation, Mr. Hudson expected to see that condition in “less than one percent. . .” of the tires returned for adjustment. When compared to the industry average as the normal rate of return for all defects, the percentage of total production returned for belt separations alone was eight times greater than that industry average. He further found that, of all the tires returned under warranty for belt separations, “more than ten percent ...” were manufactured at Tuscaloosa. Based on Uniroyal Goodrich criteria, this was “high enough that you would want to address the situation and to get it back to a normal area.” He affirmed that his report was “given to . . . management at Uniroyal Goodrich,” sometime in early 1988, i.e., near the time Mr. Ford purchased his tires and 18 months before this tragic collision.
Mr. Hudson also examined the Fords’ tire and concluded that “the tire separated because of lack of adhesion between the belt surfaces that are present in this tire.” This is evidenced by the “smooth appearance” of the separated belts. Ordinarily, wavy stock lines, called knotty tear lines or serrations, indicate resistance to separation. On the Fords’ tire, the “absence of these types of serrations lines indicate that is less adhesion.” He observed no “abrasion in the shoulder area to show that this tire was actually running underinflated or overloaded.” Rather, he affirmed that the lack of adhesion as the cause of *270this tire’s failure was a “manufacturing defect[.]”
Richard James Grogan, a pneumatic tire consultant, examined the Fords’ tire and found “chafing, that is movement, very small movements, but many, many hundreds of times over inside the tire.” Mr. Grogan’s X-rays of the Fords’ tire show that the stacked steel “belts have been sliding about or snaking as it’s known in the business.” He also found “shiny bits of brass in the failed tire, that tells us of incomplete adhesion, incomplete bonding,” because the brass plating should have been converted to black brass sulfide during the vulcanization process. He found “some bonding, but not enough, not enough to combine all that brass and fuse it to the rubber.” Further, Mr. Grogan discounted the likelihood that the Fords abused the tire because, in his opinion, “damage that arises from underinflating . . . , [and] to a certain extent overloading as well, will affect the tire uniformly around.” On the Fords’ tire, Mr. Grogan found “bits of the tire which are reasonably intact and bits which have come apart. So it can’t be underinflation, it can’t be overloading. It’s wrong in appearance and it’s wrong in position.” Mr. Grogan also explained that “rubber components have to be fresh and tacky to stay in place where the tire maker puts them. And if the factory is not air-conditioned, then the shelf life, the useful life of those components is very much reduced, and there’s a tendency for those sticky components to dry out quite rapidly and air conditioning helps this process enormously.”
Steven R. Syson, an accident reconstructionist and former engineer with the “Safety, Research and Development Laboratories at the General Motors Proving Grounds,” affirmed that, in his experience, “manufacturers of components [including tires] are [subject to] federal regulations that are . . . the same as . . . for auto makers [.]” The tire manufacturer must comply with “uniform tire quality grading requirements and then tires are also subject to the notification and recall procedures of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.” Mr. Syson explained that the notification and record-keeping procedures of the U. S. Department of Transportation include the “requirement that all defective products be reported to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.” In Mr. Syson’s opinion, the tire manufacturer had a duty to inspect the “out-of-round” tire that the Fords had returned under warranty. “[A]s a result, if they had inspected that tire, they would have found that that particular tire had a problem with tread separation. And I think, under those circumstances, they had a duty, at least, to notify the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration that they were having a problem with this particular size and date of manufacture of the tire and, then,. . . at that point, [had a further duty to] investigate how many other failures they were having and make a determin[ation] as to whether or not they needed to do a recall.” Mr. Syson also affirmed that, “in the *271automotive industry, including . . . tires, if a manufacturer knows or has reason to believe that there is a defect, they have a duty to warn the public[.]” Specifically, if the manufacturer knows that a “certain defect presents itself in a certain way, [it has] a duty to warn the public about what to anticipate when that defect shows up[.]” Mr. Syson recalled that General Motors maintained a policy manual for defect and recall procedures that “tells you what to do and how to deal with situations like that and, ... if you have a problem, then you have a duty to inform the consumer of it[.]”
Plaintiffs’ exhibit 93 is a September 2, 1987, document authorizing changes in the manufacturing specifications and indicates that Uniroyal Goodrich was operating under the assumption that certain radial passenger tires produced at Tuscaloosa could be “defective at plant[,]” due to inadequate tack. According to this technical authorization, the modification “will result in a dramatic increase in tack retention (aged up to 4 days). This is very critical during hot summer weather. . . .” However, two months later, on November 2, 1987, Uniroyal Goodrich approved another technical authorization. This technical change abandoned the recent modification, which had been projected to save more than $400,000 per year, and reverted to previous compound and bonding formulae. Although the defense offered alternative explanations for the Fords’ tire failure, even the expert tire engineer called by Uniroyal Goodrich conceded that underinflation alone “didn’t cause this tire to fail.” Redacted copies of service bulletins giving notice and instructions to dealers of the voluntary recall of other Uniroyal Goodrich tires were admitted for the limited purpose of showing the manufacturer’s knowledge that “[b]elt separation may also cause moderate to severe vehicle vibration. Continued operation could cause rapid air loss and vehicle crash.”
One jury found for Mrs. Ford but against Mr. Ford in his claim for loss of consortium. This jury further determined that Uniroyal Goodrich should not be liable to Mrs. Ford for punitive damages. The other jury found for Franklin Ford and further determined that Uniroyal Goodrich should be liable for punitive damages. After subsequent deliberations, Mrs. Ford was awarded $150,000 for her actual medical expenses and for her pain and suffering. The other jury awarded Franklin Ford more than $465,000 for past medical expenses; $3,022,000 for future medical expenses; $1,561,000 for reduced earning capacity; and $12 million for his pain and suffering. This jury also imposed punitive damages in the amount of $25 million. The four appeals in Case Nos. A95A0465, A95A0466, A95A0468, and A95A0469 follow the denial of post-trial motions by Uniroyal Goodrich for new trial, for judgment n.o.v., and for reduction in damages. The 26 enumerations of error urged are broadly classified as procedural objections, evidentiary objections, and exceptions to jury instructions. In *272Case Nos. A95A0467 and A95A0470, Franklin Ford and Mrs. Ford cross-appeal from the order of the trial court denying their motions to dismiss the post-trial motions of Uniroyal Goodrich.

Case Nos. A95A0465, A95A0466, A95A0468, and A95A0469

1. In the first enumeration, Uniroyal Goodrich contends the trial court committed procedural error by “conducting simultaneous trials of unconsolidated cases without the consent of the parties. . . .”
OCGA § 9-11-42 (a) provides: “When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, if the parties consent, the court may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs and delay.” In the cases sub judice, there was no consent by Uniroyal Goodrich to a joint trial before separate juries. Accordingly, the trial court did err in ordering the joint trials of unconsolidated actions without the consent of the parties. However, the State Court of Fulton County had jurisdiction over each Uniroyal Goodrich defendant separately by reason of their being properly named and served in the substantively identical suits as filed by Mr. and Mrs. Ford against the Delaware corporation and by Franklin Ford against the New York partnership, respectively. Furthermore, venue remained proper in Fulton County despite the plaintiffs’ settlement with NTW, the sole resident defendant. Carney v. JDN Constr. Co., 206 Ga. App. 785, 790 (5), supra. Consequently, the error in trying the separate cases jointly without the consent of the parties “does not require a reversal of the judgment^]” Herring v. McLemore, 248 Ga. 808, 809 (4) (286 SE2d 425).
2. Three days before trial, in response to plaintiffs’ motions to add a party, the trial court amended the pretrial order to add the New York partnership Uniroyal Goodrich as a defendant in Mrs. Ford’s case and to add the Delaware corporation Uniroyal Goodrich as a defendant in the “Franklin Ford, III case[.]” Although the trial court considered that it was merely correcting the style of the case, defendants objected, arguing that “new parties have an absolute right to be served, answer the complaint, and opportunity to raise any personal defenses or other defenses they may have to any claims.” In the fourth enumeration, Uniroyal Goodrich complains of this procedure.
Appellate courts are reluctant to control an exercise of the discretion reposed in the trial court by OCGA § 9-11-16 in formulating and amending the pretrial order. Ambler v. Archer, 230 Ga. 281, 285 (1), 287 (196 SE2d 858). Assuming without deciding that in the cases sub judice Uniroyal Goodrich did not invite this procedure by its previous motion for consolidation of the cases under OCGA § 9-11-42, and *273pretermitting whether each Uniroyal Goodrich defendant waived service of process in the opposite suit by making a general appearance, I note that substance and function prevail over nomenclature. Chan v. W-East Trading Corp., 199 Ga. App. 76, 77 (4) (403 SE2d 840). Strictly speaking, neither Uniroyal Goodrich defendant is a stranger or a “new” party to the substance of these product liability actions, since each had been properly served in one action or the other, and each filed responsive pleadings and engaged in extensive discovery over a period of many months. Compare Stone Mountain Aviation v. Rollins Leasing Corp., 174 Ga. App. 35, 36 (2) (329 SE2d 247). In the cases sub judice, the substance of the trial court’s action in amending the pretrial order was to make all allegations uniform against each existing defendant, rather than to make a complete stranger to the action a new defendant. See OCGA § 9-11-16 (a) (2). Here, neither the Delaware corporation nor the New York partnership has shown that it was unfairly surprised, that a valid defense was surrendered, that a valuable cross-claim was lost, or that the amendment created rather than prevented a “manifest injustice” under OCGA § 9-11-16 (b). Moreover, it appears that any risk of harm from additional exposure to liability may be addressed in a separate action for contribution or indemnification. It follows that any error in not requiring service of an amended complaint after the amendment of the pretrial order is not fatal to the judgment in this instance. This enumeration is without merit, and so I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding to the contrary.
3. Uniroyal Goodrich enumerates the denial of its motion for judgment n.o.v. as to the punitive damages awarded for Franklin Ford’s permanent partial paralysis and loss of mental capacity, arguing that a “mere ‘battle of the experts’ is not clear and convincing evidence of malice or wantonness.” I do not agree.
The evidence that Uniroyal Goodrich management knew, from its own internal investigation conducted by Mr. Hudson, that belt separation due to inadequate tack occurred with a markedly greater frequency among tires manufactured at Tuscaloosa during the hot and humid summer months was, in the opinion of Mr. Syson and others familiar with the applicable regulations, sufficient to trigger defect-reporting requirements imposed on the industry by federal law. Although Uniroyal Goodrich vigorously contested the applicability of the reporting requirements, the evidence on that issue was in conflict. See Windermere v. Bettes, 211 Ga. App. 177 (1), 178 (438 SE2d 406).
“ ‘A product is not in a defective condition when it is safe for normal handling and consumption. If the injury results from abnormal handling . . . the seller is not liable. Where, however, he has reason to anticipate that danger may result from a particular use ... he may be required to give adequate warning of the danger . . . and a *274product sold without such warning is in a defective condition.’ Restatement of the Law, Torts 2d, p. 351, § 402 A, comment h.” Center Chem. Co. v. Parzini, 234 Ga. 868, 869 (3) (218 SE2d 580). “In failure to warn cases, the duty to warn arises whenever the manufacturer knows or reasonably should know of the danger arising from the use of the product. [Cits.] An actual or constructive knowledge is consonant with Georgia tort law in general, [cits.]; ... see also Restatement (2d) of Torts, § 402A, Comment j (seller is required to give warning ‘if he has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have knowledge’ of the danger [cit.]; [cit.].” Chrysler Corp. v. Batten, 264 Ga. 723, 724 (1) (450 SE2d 208). In the cases sub judice, the Franklin Ford jury was authorized to find that the frequency of belt separations occurring in tires made during the summer at the Tuscaloosa plant, by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight, put Uniroyal Goodrich on notice of its duty to warn consumers not to continue driving on a vibrating tire. “However, negligence, even gross negligence, is inadequate to support a punitive damage award. Under OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (b), which is applicable in the instant case, it remains the rule that something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages. There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage. There is general agreement that, because it lacks this element, mere negligence is not enough.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Ivey v. Golden Key Realty, 200 Ga. App. 545 (1) (408 SE2d 811).
In my view of the cases sub judice, once the manufacturer was apprised of the results of Mr. Hudson’s internal investigation, it had a duty to act. The subsequent failure of Uniroyal Goodrich to warn of or otherwise remediate a latent hazard which was nevertheless obvious to the manufacturer is some evidence of scienter, i.e., reckless disregard of the known facts. This circumstance provides a clear and convincing evidentiary basis for the award of punitive damages in some amount against the manufacturer of the defective product under the standards established by OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (b) and (e) (1). In Georgia, the “purpose of punitive damages [generally] is to deter the repetition of reprehensible conduct.” Hosp. Auth. of Gwinnett County v. Jones, 261 Ga. 613, 614 (1) (409 SE2d 501). The purpose of subsection (e) (1) of OCGA § 51-12-5.1 specifically “is to authorize punishment of a defendant who has the potential to greatly damage society at large.” Mack Trucks v. Conkle, 263 Ga. 539, 541 (2a), 542 (436 SE2d 635). Compare Stone Man, Inc. v. Green, 263 Ga. 470, 471 (1) (435 SE2d 205) (Compliance with legal standards established by operating permits tends “to show there is no clear and convincing evidence of ‘willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of a con*275scious indifference to the consequences.’ [Cit.]”). In the cases sub judice, an award of punitive damages was authorized to deter in the future a dilatory response to a manufacturer’s own evidence reliably indicating a safety threat to the motoring public. Mack Trucks v. Conkle, 263 Ga. 539, 544 (4), supra. See also Windermere v. Bettes, 211 Ga. App. 177 (1), 178, supra, applying the whole court decision in J. B. Hunt Transport v. Bentley, 207 Ga. App. 250, 256 (3) (427 SE2d 499). As it is my view that the trial court did not err in denying the motion for directed verdict as to punitive damages, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding to the contrary.
4. Uniroyal Goodrich also contends the trial court erred charging the jury on the substance of OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (e) (2). This Code subsection provides that 75 percent of the punitive damages awarded in a product liability action, less a proportionate part of the costs of litigation, will be paid into the treasury of the State of Georgia. While it is argued that informing the jury of this fact will encourage an increase in the amount of the award, I do not agree that any such influence is beyond the scope of the present statutory scheme.
OCGA § 51-12-5.1, as enacted in 1987 and since amended, provides a comprehensive scheme governing the imposition of punitive damages in the courts of this state. In the case of product liability claims, there are two significant changes from previous law. First, repeated awards of punitive damages for the same conduct (no matter how egregious) were eliminated. Now, only one award of punitive damages may be recovered from a product liability defendant for any act or omission regardless of the number of causes of action which may arise from such act or omission. OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (e) (1). The second change is the division of any punitive damages award between the plaintiff and the public treasury as noted in the challenged charge. OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (e) (2). The issue presented is what is the jury’s role in this statutory scheme.
Either the jury is informed of the provisions of the statutory scheme and allowed to consider this information in reaching its verdict on punitive damages or charges detailing the statutory scheme are prohibited. The latter approach results in an attempt to reach a punitive damages award on the same theoretical basis as under prior law despite extensive legislative reform of OCGA § 51-12-5.1 as amended. However, since the statutory provisions are general law and have been widely publicized, a choice not to charge on this Code subsection must endure the fact that many jurors will have independent knowledge of the statutory scheme.
In Mack Trucks v. Conkle, 263 Ga. 539, 541 (2a), 543, supra, the Supreme Court of Georgia rejected an equal protection challenge to OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (e) (2), holding that under the statute similarly situated parties would be treated equally. In order for equal treat*276ment to be a reality, there must be consistency as to whether or not jurors are aware of the statutory provision. Apart from the presumption of knowledge of the law, this is a well-publicized general law. It must be anticipated that some portion of the jurors chosen to serve on product liability cases will be aware of the statute and bring this knowledge into the jury room. Thus, as a practical matter, the option of having product liability cases decided in every instance by a jury ignorant of this law is probably not available. If the parties in all such cases are to be treated equally, the instruction of the jurors as to such applicable statutes is necessary and proper.
There is no denial that the charge in question is a correct statement of the law. The general rule is that a requested charge which is a correct statement of the law and properly adjusted to the evidence may and should be included in the trial court’s instructions to the jury. This rule, like many others, is subject to a number of exceptions, and it is argued here that the charge is erroneous because it encourages the jury to increase its punitive damages award. This objection may have intuitive appeal but erroneously presupposes that such an increase of the one-time punitive award is unfair or prejudicial under the Georgia statutory scheme. If jury charges are to be rejected simply because they may influence the verdict, what instruction could possibly be proper for the jury’s consideration?
The underlying assumption of this enumeration of error is that an award of punitive damages in a product liability case under the present scheme should be no greater than that which would have been awarded in a similar case under prior law. In my view, this assumption is without support in the record and is contrary to the express provisions of OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (e). The present scheme for punitive damage awards in product liability cases presents a tradeoff in that there now may be only one award of punitive damages in product liability for a given act or omission (no matter how egregious) but that one verdict is “unlimited.” See Mack Trucks v. Conkle, 263 Ga. 539, 541 (2a), 543, supra. If that one unlimited award of punitive damages is to stand in the place of several awards which might have followed but for this statutory scheme, it seems reasonable to anticipate that this one award could be larger than amounts awarded in similar cases under prior law. The statutory tradeoff is facilitated by the provision diverting 75 percent of the proceeds to the public treasury which reduces any constraint on the jury arising from concern for unduly enriching a plaintiff who has already been awarded compensation for his claim. In order for this tradeoff to be realized, the jury must be instructed as to the statutory scheme. The charge on OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (e) (2) was not error.
5. In the twenty-third and twenty-fourth enumerations, Uniroyal Goodrich nevertheless contends the trial court erred in failing to set *277aside the $25 million punitive award as outrageous and excessive.
OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (e) (1) provides: “In a tort case in which the cause of action arises from product liability, there shall be no limitation regarding the amount which may be awarded as punitive damages.” In Georgia, the amount of punitive damages to be awarded (if any), like damages for pain and suffering, has long been determined according to the facts of the case as evaluated in the enlightened conscience of a fair and impartial jury. Hosp. Auth. of Gwinnett County v. Jones, 259 Ga. 759, 763 (5b), 764 (386 SE2d 120), judgment reinstated on remand, 261 Ga. 613, supra. “There is no other measure of damages for such a case.” Central R. & Banking Co. v. Roberts, 91 Ga. 513, 519 (6) (18 SE 315). Nevertheless, “each verdict must be scrutinized to see that it meets the parameters of due process.” Hosp. Auth. of Gwinnett County v. Jones, 259 Ga. 759, 763 (5b), 766, supra. “An inordinately large deterrence award may be set aside as reflecting undue passion and prejudice, rather than an enlightened conscience. Jones v. Spindel, [122 Ga. App. 390, 392 (6) (177 SE2d 187)].” Hosp. Auth. of Gwinnett County v. Jones, 259 Ga. 759, 762 (2), n. 9, supra. See also OCGA § 51-12-12.
“As [I] understand the law as to excessive verdicts, a verdict will not be set aside as excessive by this court unless it manifestly appears from the record that it was a result of prejudice, bias or gross mistake. [Cit.]” Colonial Stores v. Coker, 77 Ga. App. 227, 234 (9) (48 SE2d 150). “ ‘A verdict in one of that class of cases in which the amount of damages is left to the enlightened conscience of [a fair and impartial] jury is not to be declared by a reviewing court to be excessive, unless it is so large in amount as to justify the court in believing that it could not reasonably have resulted from any other cause than bias or gross mistake on the part of the jury.’ [Cit.] . . . ‘[The existence of such bias or gross mistake is usually] a matter of inference; and in that event the solution falls within the rule as to circumstantial evidence, — there must be no reasonable hypothesis other than that the bias or mistake did exist.’ . . . The presumption is that the jurors were impartial and understood their case. It is, therefore, a more ‘reasonable hypothesis’ that their finding was based on the evidence considered impartially.” Realty Bond & Mtg. Co. v. Harley, 19 Ga. App. 186, 187 (2), 189 (91 SE2d 254). “An excessive or inadequate verdict constitutes a mistake of fact rather than of law. It addresses itself to the discretion of the trial judge who saw the witnesses and heard the testimony. This court is a court for the correction of errors of law only, and this court’s jurisdiction is confined to the question of whether the trial court abused [its] discretion in overruling the motion for new trial [or for reduction of damages] on this ground. [Cits.]” St. Paul Fire &c. Ins. Co. v. Dillingham, 112 Ga. App. 422, 425 (145 SE2d 624). In the cases sub judice, the evidence authorized *278the conclusion that Uniroyal Goodrich failed to act diligently and warn consumers in the face of the reliable evidence of recurring manufacturing defects in tires manufactured during the summer at the Tuscaloosa plant. Applying the presumption that the jurors were impartial and understood their case, including the fact that OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (e) (1) permits only a single award of punitive damages in a product liability case, the $25 million actually awarded by this jury is reasonably explained as the permissible result of the jury’s proper application of the pertinent factors. See Hosp. Auth. of Gwinnett County v. Jones, 259 Ga. 759, 763 (5b), 764, fn. 13, supra. In the cases sub judice, the trial court correctly denied Uniroyal Goodrich’s motion to set aside the punitive damage award.
As I would affirm the judgments of the trial court in their entirety, I respectfully dissent from the judgments of reversal.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Pope joins in this dissent.