Court Opinion

ID: 9487175
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:10:26.470878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:08.377509
License: Public Domain

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge,
concurring specially:
While I join in the court’s opinion, I write separately to emphasize the great degree of care that must be taken by trial courts when admitting evidence of a defendant’s prior felony conviction in a § 922(g) prosecution.
Usually, and for good reason, a defendant is willing to stipulate to the fact of his prior felony conviction. The nature and underlying circumstances of a defendant’s prior felony conviction are obviously immaterial to the defendant’s status as a convicted felon — it does not make the fact that a defendant is a convicted felon more or less probable. Rather, in most eases, the nature and underlying circumstances of the prior felony offense serve only to prejudice the defendant in that it will likely influence even the most conscientious juror’s perception of the defendant. Stated differently, common sense teaches us that jurors are more inclined to convict defendants when they are aware that a defendant has committed prior felonies.1 The prejudicial impact of such evidence is further exacerbated when the predicate felony in a *875§ 922(g) prosecution involves violence, especially firearms, see United States v. Poore, 594 F.2d 39, 41—42 (4th Cir.1979), and drugs. Accordingly, because it is in his or her best interest to do so, a defendant ordinarily should stipulate to the fact of the prior felony conviction.
Poore held that when a defendant offers to stipulate the fact of his prior felony conviction, evidence of the nature of the conviction is irrelevant and must be excluded.2 The defendant, Poore, was charged with, among other things, possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. The indictment charging Poore with this offense revealed the nature of his prior felony, carrying a handgun. Poore contended that the indictment improperly contained the nature of the prior felony conviction and offered to, among other things, stipulate to the fact. In holding that the nature of Poore’s prior felony should be stricken, we noted:
The prejudice against appellant in permitting the jury to be apprised of the nature of Poore’s prior felony conviction by the use of unnecessary language descriptive of that felony conviction contained in Count II is clear. The prior felony conviction was for “carrying a handgun,” the same type of firearm offense with which appellant is being charged in this case. Despite the district court’s precautionary instructions, we recognize that “to the layman’s mind the defendant’s criminal disposition is logically relevant to his guilt or his innocence of a specific crime.” Therefore, we must conclude that it was not unlikely that the jury, being apprised of the fact that appellant had previously been convicted of a like firearms offense, considered that fact in passing on his guilt or innocence of the offenses charged in this case. Any sueh consideration, of course, would be improper.
Id. at 41-42 (citation and footnote omitted). However, Poore left unanswered a very important question: whether, in the absence of a stipulation, the nature and underlying circumstances of a defendant’s prior felony conviction are nevertheless admissible. Id. at 42 (“ ‘A different question would be presented if there was no offer to stipulate to the prior felony conviction, and the government was therefore forced to prove such conviction by reliance upon a prior judgment containing a statement of conviction inextricably interwoven with descriptive details of the offense. Indeed, if the defendant should not be willing to stipulate to the prior felony conviction, he could require the prosecution to prove such conviction by the prior record or judgment of conviction.’ ” (quoting United States v. Kemper, 503 F.2d 327, 329 and n. 3 (6th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1124, 95 S.Ct. 810, 42 L.Ed.2d 824 (1975) (emphasis in original)).
In my view, Fed.R.Evid. 403 provides the guide to resolve the question left open in Poore. Rule 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Under a proper application of Rule 403, it appears, even in the absence of a stipulation, the nature and underlying circumstances of the prior felony conviction should not be admitted, unless employed for proper impeachment purposes. See, e.g., Tavares, 21 F.3d at 4-6 (nature and underlying circumstances of prior felony conviction irrelevant); United States v. Barker, 1 F.3d 957, 959 n. 3 (9th Cir.1993) (underlying facts of prior conviction irrelevant); United States v. Gilliam, 994 F.2d 97, 103 (2d Cir.) (nature and underlying facts of prior felony conviction inadmissible), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 335, 126 L.Ed.2d 280 (1993); but see Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d at 691 n. 4 (“[Wjhile the underlying facts of the felony may not be *876relevant, the conviction judgment or other proof — which may state the nature of the conviction — most certainly is.”). This approach appears to be eminently reasonable for it keeps extremely prejudicial evidence away from the jury, while, at the same time, it allows the government to meet its eviden-tiary burden through reliance on a properly redacted prior judgment or record, or circumscribed testimony, if necessary. In short, the prior judgment should not contain the nature or the underlying circumstances of the prior felony conviction under Rule 403 because it is unduly prejudicial and unrelated to the crimes for which the defendant is being tried.3
In summary, Rule 403 mandates that the government is not at liberty to engage in a free ranging exploration of a defendant’s pri- or criminal history to satisfy its evidentiary burden in a § 922(g) prosecution and provides the proper guide in resolving issues that arise when the government is put to the task of proving the prior felony conviction in a § 922(g) prosecution.4

. The Federal Rules of Evidence recognize this point by strongly disfavoring the introduction of prior crimes when they are not probative of the crimes charged. See Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.”); Fed.R.Evid. 609 (impeachment by prior crime only in certain instances); Fed.R.Evid. 403 ("evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice” or where the evidence is unnecessarily cumulative).

. Poore is at odds with several circuit decisions which have held that the government is not required to accept the stipulation. See, e.g., United States v. Tavares, 21 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1994) (en banc); United States v. Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d 688, 692 (9th Cir.1993) (noting that prosecution has right to refuse stipulation).

. Also of note, proof of more than one conviction in a § 922(g) prosecution is generally viewed as unnecessary, cumulative, and prejudicial. See, e.g., Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d at 692; United States v. Collamore, 868 F.2d 24, 30 (1st Cir.1989) (18 U.S.C.App. § 1202(a) case); United States v. Romero, 603 F.2d 640, 641-42 (7th Cir.1979) (same). But see, United States v. Bruton, 647 F.2d 818, 824-25 (8th Cir.) (18 U.S.C.App. § 1202(a) case), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 868, 102 S.Ct. 333, 70 L.Ed.2d 170 (1981); United States v. Burkhart, 545 F.2d 14, 15 (6th Cir.1976) (same).

. In my view, the admission of the indictments describing in detail Rhodes' prior felonies (most significantly, that Rhodes’ prior felonies involved firearms and the shooting of two victims), as well as a litany of offenses for which Rhodes had been charged but not convicted, the depositions summarizing the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crimes, Rhodes' sentencing transcript, and the testimony of Agent Swann — ■ all extremely prejudicial — was error. A one page Certificate of Disposition (properly redacted) was all that the government needed to establish that Rhodes had a prior felony conviction. The Certificates of Disposition were each one page in length and completely severable from the remaining materials in Government’s Exhibits 6 and 7.