Court Opinion

ID: 9950093
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-13 14:04:46.88558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:35:44.164926
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                        Opinion filed March 13, 2024.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D23-0150
                     Lower Tribunal No. 21-30463 CC
                           ________________

                               Henry Tien,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

                            Antonia F. Abad,
                                  Appellee.

    An Appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Jacqueline
Woodward, Judge.

     Henry Tien, in proper person.

      Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., and Scott A. Cole and Francesca M. Stein,
for appellee.

Before EMAS, SCALES and LINDSEY, JJ.

     PER CURIAM.
      Affirmed. See Kumar Corp. v. Nopal Lines, Ltd., 462 So. 2d 1178,

1183 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (observing that the “real party in interest” is “the

person in whom rests, by substantive law, the claim sought to be enforced”)

(quoting Author's Comment to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.210); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.210(a))

(providing in pertinent part: “Every action may be prosecuted in the name of

the real party in interest, but a personal representative, administrator,

guardian, trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a

contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party expressly

authorized by statute may sue in that person's own name without joining the

party for whose benefit the action is brought. All persons having an interest

in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded may join as

plaintiffs and any person may be made a defendant who has or claims an

interest adverse to the plaintiff.”); LaFrance v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, 141 So.

3d 754, 756 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (“A ‘plaintiff's lack of standing at the

inception of the case is not a defect that may be cured by the acquisition of

standing after the case is filed’ and cannot be established ‘retroactively by

acquiring standing to file a lawsuit after the fact.’”) (quoting McLean v. JP

Morgan Chase Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 79 So. 3d 170, 173 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012));

Dickson v. Roseville Props., LLC, 198 So. 3d 48, 50-51 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)

(“For better or for worse, it is settled that it is not enough for the plaintiff to

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prove that it has standing when the case it tried; it must also prove that it had

standing when the complaint was filed.”)

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