Court Opinion

ID: 4210970
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2017-10-12 03:16:18.245636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:41:01.261172
License: Public Domain

PD-0734-17
                                                                                                  COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
                                                                                                                 AUSTIN, TEXAS
                                                                                                   Transmitted 10/6/2017 1:38 PM
                                                                                                    Accepted 10/9/2017 10:00 AM
                                                                                                           DEANA WILLIAMSON
                                              NO.	
  PD-­‐0734-­‐17	
                                                     CLERK
                                                              	
  
                                                        IN	
  THE	
                                  FILED
                                                                                            COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
                                                              	
                                   10/9/2017
                                                                                             DEANA WILLIAMSON, CLERK
                        COURT	
  OF	
  CRIMINAL	
  APPEALS	
  
                                                         	
  
                                                  OF	
  TEXAS	
  
                                                AUSTIN,	
  TEXAS	
  
	
  
                        EX	
  PARTE	
  RUSSELL	
  BOYD	
  RAE,	
  
                                                   APPELLANT	
  
                                                        	
  
                                                       V.	
  
                                                        	
  
                                            THE	
  STATE	
  OF	
  TEXAS,	
  
                                                    APPELLEE	
  
	
  
                   BRIEF	
  FOR	
  APPELLANT	
  
       ___________________________________________	
  
                                            NO.	
  06-­‐17-­‐00063-­‐CR	
  
                                            COURT	
  OF	
  APPEALS	
  
                                 FOR	
  THE	
  SIXTH	
  DISTRICT	
  OF	
  TEXAS	
  
                                               AT	
  TEXARKANA	
  
                           On	
  appeal	
  from	
  Cause	
  Number	
  F14-­‐689-­‐A	
  
                   In	
  the	
  276TH	
  District	
  Court	
  of	
  Marion	
  County,	
  Texas	
  
                           Honorable	
  Robert	
  Rolston,	
  Judge	
  Presiding	
  
	
  
	
        	
     	
         	
       	
          	
          Hough-­‐Lewis	
  (“Lew”)	
  Dunn	
  
	
        	
     	
         	
       	
          	
          P.O.	
  Box	
  2226	
  
	
        	
     	
         	
       	
          	
          Longview,	
  TX	
  75606	
  
	
        	
     	
         	
       	
          	
          Tel.	
  903-­‐757-­‐6711	
  
	
        	
     	
         	
       	
          	
          Fax	
  903-­‐757-­‐6712	
  
	
        	
     	
         	
       	
          	
          Email:	
  dunn@texramp.net	
  
	
        	
     	
         	
       	
          	
          Texas	
  State	
  Bar	
  No.	
  06244600	
  
	
        	
     	
         	
       	
          	
          Attorney	
  for	
  Appellant	
  
                                 IDENTITY	
  OF	
  PARTIES	
  AND	
  COUNSEL	
  
                                                                 	
  
In	
  compliance	
  with	
  Rule	
  68.4,	
  TEX.	
  R.	
  APP.	
  PROC.,	
  following	
  are	
  the	
  identities	
  
of	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  judge,	
  all	
  parties	
  to	
  the	
  judgment	
  appealed	
  from,	
  and	
  the	
  
names	
  and	
  addresses	
  of	
  all	
  trial	
  and	
  appellate	
  counsel:	
  
	
  
Parties	
  
	
  
Russell	
  Boyd	
  Rae,	
  Appellant	
  
	
  
The	
  State	
  of	
  Texas,	
  Appellee	
  
	
  
Trial	
  Court	
  Judge	
  
	
  
Hon.	
  Robert	
  Rolston	
  	
  
Presiding	
  Judge,	
  276th	
  District	
  Court	
  
Marion	
  County,	
  Texas	
  
	
  
Trial	
  and	
  Appellate	
  Counsel	
  
	
  
William	
  K.	
  Gleason,	
  Attorney	
  at	
  Law	
  
P.O.	
  Box	
  888	
  
Jefferson,	
  TX	
  75657	
  
Counsel	
  for	
  Appellant	
  at	
  trial	
  
	
  
James	
  R.	
  (“Rick”)	
  Hagan,	
  Attorney	
  at	
  Law	
  
P.	
  O.	
  Box	
  3347	
  
Longview,	
  TX	
  75606	
  
Counsel	
  for	
  Appellant	
  in	
  Probation	
  Revocation	
  and	
  Habeas	
  at	
  Trial	
  Court	
  	
  
	
  
Angela	
  Smoak	
  
County	
  &	
  District	
  Attorney	
  of	
  Marion	
  County	
  
102	
  West	
  Austin,	
  Room	
  201	
  
Jefferson,	
  TX	
  75657	
  
Trial	
  Counsel	
  for	
  the	
  State	
  of	
  Texas,	
  Appellee	
  
	
  
                                                                ii	
  
              IDENTITY	
  OF	
  JUDGE,	
  PARTIES,	
  AND	
  COUNSEL	
  (CONT’D)	
  
	
  
	
  
Hough-­‐Lewis	
  (“Lew”)	
  Dunn	
  
Attorney	
  at	
  Law	
  
P.O.	
  Box	
  2226	
  
Longview,	
  TX75606	
  
Counsel	
  for	
  Appellant	
  on	
  Appeal	
  
	
  
Ricky	
  Shelton	
  
Assistant	
  County	
  Attorney	
  	
  
102	
  West	
  Austin,	
  Room	
  201	
  
Jefferson,	
  TX	
  75657	
  
Counsel	
  for	
  State	
  on	
  Appeal	
  
	
  
Stacey	
  M.	
  Soule	
  
State	
  Prosecuting	
  Attorney	
  
P.O.	
  Box	
  13046	
  
Austin,	
  TX	
  78711-­‐3046	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
                                                    	
  
                                                    	
  
                                                    	
  
                                                    	
  
                                                    	
  
                                                    	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
                                                    	
  
                                                    	
  
                                                    	
  
                                                  iii	
  
                                                TABLE	
  OF	
  CONTENTS	
  
                                                               	
  
                                                                                           	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  PAGE	
  
                                                                                           	
  
IDENTITY	
  OF	
  PARTIES	
  AND	
  COUNSEL	
  …………………………………………	
                                                        ii	
  
	
  
TABLE	
  OF	
  CONTENTS	
  ………………………………………………………………..	
                                                                  iv	
  
                                                        	
  
INDEX	
  OF	
  AUTHORITIES	
  …………………………………………………………….	
                                                                 vi	
  
	
  
STATEMENT	
  OF	
  THE	
  CASE	
  …………………………………………………………	
                                                               viii	
  
	
  
STATEMENT	
  REGARDING	
  ORAL	
  ARGUMENT	
  ……………………………….	
                                                            viii	
  
	
  
SOLE	
  ISSUE	
  PRESENTED	
  ……………………………………………………………..	
                                                                ix	
  
	
  
STATEMENT	
  OF	
  FACTS	
  …..…………………………………………………………….	
   1	
  
	
  
	
       Guilty	
  Plea	
  ………………………………………………...........................	
                                               1	
  
	
  
	
       State’s	
  Petition	
  to	
  Revoke	
  Probated	
  Judgment	
  ………………..	
                                       2	
  
	
  
	
       Hearing	
  on	
  Application	
  for	
  Writ	
  of	
  Habeas	
  Corpus	
  and	
  ……	
                            2	
  
	
       Motion	
  to	
  Quash	
  
	
  
	
       Appeal	
  …………………………………………………………………………….	
                                                                      3	
  
	
  
SUMMARY	
  OF	
  THE	
  ARGUMENT	
  	
  ………………………………………………….	
                                                           4	
  
	
  
ARGUMENT	
  ………………………………………………………………………………	
                                                                             5	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
                                                    iv	
  
	
  
                                                                                                               PAGE	
  
	
  
SOLE	
  ISSUE,	
  RESTATED:	
  ………………………………………………………….	
   	
                                                  5	
        	
  
	
  
DID	
  THE	
  COURT	
  OF	
  APPEALS	
  ERR	
  IN	
  FINDING	
  THAT	
  THE	
  	
  
PRIOR	
  CONVICTION	
  FOR	
  OPERATING	
  A	
  WATERCRAFT	
  	
  
WHILE	
  INTOXICATED	
  WAS	
  A	
  FINAL	
  CONVICTION?	
  
	
  
	
       Part	
  I.	
  The	
  Texas	
  Parks	
  &	
  Wildlife	
  Code	
  is	
  Different…………	
                 5	
  
	
  
         Part	
  II.	
  Analysis	
  of	
  the	
  Differences	
  Between	
  ………………………	
                         8	
  
                      Texas	
  Parks	
  &	
  Wildlife	
  and	
  Texas	
  Penal	
  Code	
  
	
  
         Part	
  III.	
  The	
  Court	
  of	
  Appeals	
  Did	
  Not	
  Grasp	
  the	
  Distinction	
          10	
  

         Part	
  IV.	
  	
  Application	
  of	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Case	
  or	
  Stare	
  Decisis	
   	
     11	
  

         Part	
  V.	
  	
  Conclusion	
  ……………………………………………………………	
                                             13	
  

PRAYER	
  FOR	
  RELIEF	
  …………………………………………………………………..	
                                                       14	
  
	
  
CERTIFICATE	
  OF	
  SERVICE	
  ……………………………………………………………..	
                                                    15	
  
	
  
CERTIFICATE	
  OF	
  COMPLIANCE	
  …………………………………………………….	
                                                     16	
  
	
  
APPENDICES	
  
	
    APPENDIX	
  A:	
  Information	
  and	
  Judgment	
  in	
  Cause	
  No.	
  6513	
  
      	
  
      APPENDIX	
  B:	
  TEX.	
  PARKS	
  &	
  WILD.	
  CODE	
  §31.097	
  
      	
  
      APPENDIX	
  C:	
  TEX.	
  PARKS	
  &	
  WILD.	
  CODE	
  §31.097	
  
      	
       as	
  amended,	
  effective	
  9-­‐1-­‐91	
  
      	
  
      APPENDIX	
  D:	
  TEX.	
  PARKS	
  &	
  WILD.	
  CODE	
  §31.097	
  
      	
       Repealing	
  Legislation,	
  1993	
  	
  	
  
                                                   	
  
                                                  v	
  
                                              INDEX	
  OF	
  AUTHORITIES	
  
	
  
CASES	
  	
         	
          	
       	
       	
        	
          	
     	
        	
         	
                 PAGE	
  
	
  
Ex	
  parte	
  Langley,	
  833	
  S.W.2d	
  141	
  (Tex.	
  Crim.	
  App.	
  1992)	
  ………….	
                          10	
  
	
  
Ex	
  parte	
  Murchison,	
  560	
  S.W.2d	
  654	
  (Tex.	
  Crim.	
  App.	
  1978)	
  ……..	
                         6,	
  9	
  
	
  
Ex	
  parte	
  Russell	
  Boyd	
  Rae,	
  No.	
  74,840	
  	
  …………………………………	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  11,	
  12,	
  13	
  	
  
          (Tex.	
  Crim.	
  App.	
  2003)	
   	
  
	
  
Ex	
  parte	
  Russell	
  Boyd	
  Rae,	
  2017	
  Tex.	
  App.	
  LEXIS	
  5325	
  ………………	
                            3,	
  10	
  
          (Tex.	
  App.	
  –	
  Texarkana,	
  June	
  13,	
  2017)	
  	
  
	
  
Ex	
  parte	
  Serrato,	
  3	
  S.W.3d	
  41	
  (Tex.	
  Crim.	
  App.	
  1999)	
  ………………..	
                          7	
  
	
  
Nixon	
  v.	
  State,	
  153	
  S.W.3d	
  550	
  …………………………………………………	
                                                 10	
  
          (Tex.	
  App.	
  –	
  Amarillo	
  2004,	
  pet.	
  ref’d)	
  
	
  
Rizo	
  v.	
  State,	
  963	
  S.W.2d	
  137	
  (Tex.	
  App.	
  –	
  Eastland	
  1997,	
  no	
  pet.)	
               11	
  
	
  
State	
  v.	
  Swearingen,	
  478	
  S.W.3d	
  718	
  (Tex.	
  Crim.	
  App.	
  2015)	
  ……..	
                        13	
  

Swearingen	
  v.	
  State,	
  424	
  S.W.3d	
  32	
  (Tex.	
  Crim.	
  App.	
  2014)	
  ………..	
                            13	
  

STATUTES	
  AND	
  RULES	
  
	
  
ACTS	
  OF	
  TEXAS	
  LEGISLATURE	
  
	
  
	
       Chapter	
  900,	
  	
  §1.18(b),	
  1993	
  …………………………………………..	
                                                  9,	
  11	
  
	
  
TEX.	
  CODE	
  CRIM.	
  PROC.	
  
	
  
	
       11.072	
  ……………………………………………………….......................	
                                                          2	
            	
  
	
  
	
  
                                                      vi	
  
	
       	
        	
         	
   	
   	
    	
     	
   	
   	
   	
                       PAGE	
  
	
  
TEX.	
  PENAL	
  CODE	
  	
  
	
  
	
       §49.06	
  ……………………………………………………………………………..	
                                         9	
  
	
  
	
       §49.09(a)	
  ………………………………………………………………………..	
                                        6	
  	
  	
  
	
  
         §49.09(b)(2)	
  	
  ………………………………………………………………….	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  4,	
  7,	
  10	
  
         	
  
         §49.09(c)(3)(C)	
  	
  ……………………………………………………………………	
   4,	
  8	
  
         	
  
         §49.09(d)	
  ………………………………………………………………………..	
                                        10	
  	
  	
  
         	
  
TEX.	
  PARKS	
  &	
  WILD.	
  CODE	
  
	
  
	
       §31.097	
  …………………………………………………………………………..	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  5,	
  8,	
  9	
  
	
  
	
       §31.097(b)	
  ………………………………………………………………………	
                                         4,	
  5	
  
	
  
	
       §31.097(c)	
  ……………………………………………………………………….	
                                        5	
  
	
  
VERNON’S	
  ANNOTATED	
  CIVIL	
  STATUTES	
  
	
  
	
       Art.	
  6701l-­‐1	
  …………………………………………………………………….	
                                  7,	
  10	
  	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
                                             vii	
  
                                 STATEMENT	
  OF	
  THE	
  CASE	
  
                                                    	
  
          Appellant	
  pleaded	
  guilty	
  to	
  DWI,	
  third	
  offense	
  and	
  was	
  sentenced	
  to	
  

ten	
   (10)	
   years,	
   probated	
   for	
   ten	
   years.	
   The	
   State	
   moved	
   to	
   revoke,	
   and	
  

Appellant	
   filed	
   an	
   Application	
   for	
   Writ	
   of	
   Habeas	
   Corpus,	
   which,	
   after	
  

hearing,	
   was	
   denied.	
   That	
   Application	
   contested	
   the	
   use	
   of	
   a	
   prior	
  

conviction	
   to	
   enhance	
   the	
   DWI	
   to	
   a	
   felony.	
   Appeal	
   was	
   made	
   to	
   the	
   Sixth	
  

Court	
   of	
   Appeals	
   in	
   Texarkana,	
   which	
   affirmed	
   the	
   trial	
   court	
   in	
   a	
  

Memorandum	
   Opinion	
   on	
   or	
   about	
   June	
   13,	
   2017.	
   A	
   Petition	
   for	
  

Discretionary	
   Review	
   was	
   then	
   filed	
   on	
   	
   July	
   12,	
   2017.	
   This	
   Court	
   granted	
  

discretionary	
  review	
  on	
  September	
  13,	
  2017.	
  

	
  
                                              	
  
                          STATEMENT	
  REGARDING	
  ORAL	
  ARGUMENT	
  
	
  
	
        This	
  Court	
  has	
  stated	
  that	
  the	
  case	
  will	
  be	
  submitted	
  on	
  briefs	
  without	
  

oral	
  argument.	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

                                                            viii	
  
                                                              	
  
                                                              	
  
                                  SOLE	
  ISSUE	
  PRESENTED	
  

DID	
  THE	
  COURT	
  OF	
  APPEALS	
  ERR	
  IN	
  FINDING	
  THAT	
  THE	
  PRIOR	
  CONVICTION	
  

FOR	
   OPERATING	
   A	
   WATERCRAFT	
   WHILE	
   INTOXICATED	
   WAS	
   A	
   FINAL	
  

CONVICTION?	
  

                                                   	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
                                                 ix	
  
                                             NO.	
  PD-­‐0734-­‐17	
  
                                                               	
  
                                                         IN	
  THE	
  
                                                               	
  
                          COURT	
  OF	
  CRIMINAL	
  APPEALS	
  
                                                           	
  
                                                    OF	
  TEXAS	
  
                                                  AUSTIN,	
  TEXAS	
  
	
  
                          EX	
  PARTE	
  RUSSELL	
  BOYD	
  RAE,	
  
                                                   APPELLANT	
  
                                                        	
  
                                                       V.	
  
                                                        	
  
                                            THE	
  STATE	
  OF	
  TEXAS,	
  
                                                    APPELLEE	
  
	
  
                                      BRIEF	
  FOR	
  APPELLANT	
  
_____________________________________________________________	
  
	
  
TO	
  THE	
  HONORABLE	
  JUDGES	
  OF	
  THE	
  COURT	
  OF	
  CRIMINAL	
  APPEALS:	
  
	
  
	
      COMES	
  NOW	
  RUSSELL	
  BOYD	
  RAE,	
  and	
  files	
  this,	
  his	
  Brief	
  in	
  support	
  of	
  

review	
  of	
  his	
  conviction	
  in	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  for	
  felony	
  DWI	
  and	
  subsequent	
  

affirmance	
  by	
  the	
  Sixth	
  Court	
  of	
  Appeals,	
  and	
  would	
  show:	
  

                                   STATEMENT	
  OF	
  FACTS	
  

Guilty	
  Plea	
  

	
        Appellant	
   was	
   indicted	
   for	
   felony	
   DWI,	
   with	
   two	
   prior	
   intoxication	
  

offenses	
   alleged	
   (CR	
   6).	
   At	
   his	
   guilty	
   plea	
   (August	
   3,	
   2016)	
   Appellant	
   was	
  

	
                                                                                                                         1	
  
admonished	
  by	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  (1	
  RR	
  4-­‐7),	
  then	
  entered	
  his	
  guilty	
  plea	
  (1	
  RR	
  

7)	
   to	
   the	
   charge	
   of	
   DWI,	
   pleading	
   guilty	
   or	
   “true”	
   to	
   the	
   enhancement	
  

paragraphs	
   (1	
   RR	
   8).	
   The	
   trial	
   court	
   accepted	
   the	
   pleas	
   as	
   voluntarily	
   made,	
  

and	
   asked	
   the	
   State	
   for	
   its	
   evidence,	
   consisting	
   of	
   a	
   signed	
   stipulation	
   of	
  

evidence	
   (1	
   RR	
   9).	
   The	
   State	
   recommended	
   ten	
   years	
   probated	
   for	
   ten	
  

years,	
  fine	
  of	
  $3,500,	
  and	
  other	
  conditions	
  of	
  probation,	
  including	
  10	
  days	
  

in	
   county	
   jail	
   (1	
   RR	
   9).	
   Appellant	
   agreed	
   (1	
   RR	
   9).	
   Trial	
   court	
   followed	
   the	
  

agreement	
  of	
  the	
  parties	
  and	
  entered	
  judgment	
  accordingly	
  (1	
  RR	
  10;	
  CR	
  8).	
  

State’s	
  Petition	
  to	
  Revoke	
  Probated	
  Judgment	
  

	
         On	
  or	
  about	
  November	
  10,	
  2016,	
  there	
  was	
  filed	
  the	
  “State’s	
  Petition	
  

to	
   Revoke	
   Probated	
   Judgment”	
   (CR	
   11).	
   Capias	
   issued;	
   Appellant	
   was	
  

arrested	
   and	
   jailed.	
   Thereafter,	
   on	
   his	
   behalf	
   a	
   “Defendant’s	
   Motion	
   to	
  

Quash	
  Application	
  for	
  Revocation	
  of	
  Probation”	
  was	
  filed	
  on	
  December	
  27,	
  

2016,	
  with	
  several	
  exhibits	
  attached	
  (CR	
  13).	
  	
  

Hearing	
  on	
  Application	
  for	
  Writ	
  of	
  Habeas	
  Corpus	
  and	
  Motion	
  to	
  Quash	
  
	
  
	
    On	
   	
   December	
   27,	
   2017,	
   Appellant	
   filed	
   his	
   Application	
   for	
   Writ	
   of	
  

Habeas	
   Corpus,	
   pursuant	
   to	
   Art.	
   11.072,	
   TEX.	
   CODE	
   CRIM.	
   PROC.	
   (CR	
   30).	
  	
  

The	
  State	
  filed	
  the	
  “State’s	
  Response	
  to	
  Applicant’s	
  Application	
  for	
  Writ	
  of	
  

Habeas	
  Corpus	
  and	
  Motion	
  to	
  Quash”	
  (CR	
  50).	
  

	
                                                                                                                                  2	
  
	
             At	
   the	
   hearing	
   on	
   February	
   23,	
   2017,	
   Counsel	
   for	
   Appellant	
   offered	
  

arguments	
   and	
   authorities	
   on	
   why	
   the	
   second	
   conviction	
   used	
   for	
  

enhancement	
   (boating	
   while	
   intoxicated,	
   Cause	
   No.	
   6513	
   from	
   Marion	
  

County	
   in	
   1993)	
   was	
   not	
   a	
   proper	
   case	
   to	
   use	
   for	
   enhancement,	
   requesting	
  

the	
   trial	
   court	
   to	
   declare	
   the	
   judgment	
   in	
   the	
   case	
   at	
   bar	
   void	
   because	
   of	
  

that	
   infirmity	
   (2	
   RR	
   3,	
   5).	
   State’s	
   counsel	
   countered	
   by	
   arguing	
   that	
   there	
   is	
  

a	
   distinction	
   to	
   be	
   made	
   between	
   using	
   a	
   prior	
   DWI	
   for	
   purposes	
   of	
  

jurisdictional	
   enhancement	
   as	
   opposed	
   to	
   using	
   it	
   for	
   purposes	
   of	
  

punishment	
  (2	
  RR	
  6),	
  urging	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  to	
  review	
  her	
  arguments	
  in	
  her	
  	
  

“Response”	
   (CR	
   50).	
   During	
   the	
   hearing	
   both	
   parties	
   agreed	
   that	
   the	
  

exhibits	
  to	
  their	
  respective	
  pleadings	
  be	
  admitted	
  into	
  evidence	
  as	
  exhibits,	
  

and	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  approved	
  (2	
  RR	
  6,7).	
                	
  

	
             Thereafter,	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  entered	
  its	
  “Order	
  Denying	
  Application	
  for	
  

Writ	
   of	
   Habeas	
   Corpus	
   with	
   Findings	
   of	
   Fact	
   and	
   Conclusions	
   of	
   Law”	
   (CR	
  

74).	
  	
  

Appeal	
  

	
             The	
   Court	
   of	
   Appeals	
   upheld	
   the	
   denial	
   of	
   habeas	
   relief	
   in	
   Ex	
   parte	
  

Russell	
  Boyd	
  Rae,	
  2017	
  Tex.	
  App.	
  LEXIS	
  5325	
  (Tex.	
  App.	
  –	
  Texarkana,	
  June	
  

13,	
  2017).	
  

	
                                                                                                                                 3	
  
                                     SUMMARY	
  OF	
  THE	
  ARGUMENT	
  

	
        The	
  Court	
  of	
  Appeals	
  failed	
  to	
  grasp	
  the	
  distinction	
  between,	
  on	
  the	
  

one	
   hand,	
   the	
   old	
   law	
   that	
   pertained	
   to	
   “boating	
   while	
   intoxicated”	
   as	
  

enacted	
  in	
  1989	
  in	
  TEXAS	
  PARKS	
  &	
  WILDLIFE	
  CODE	
  §31.097(b),	
  	
  and,	
  on	
  the	
  

other	
   hand,	
   later	
   law	
   under	
   the	
   Texas	
   Penal	
   Code	
   describing	
   intoxication-­‐

related	
  offenses	
  and	
  use	
  of	
  prior	
  convictions.	
  The	
  law	
  governing	
  the	
  use	
  of	
  

prior	
  conviction	
  for	
  “boating	
  while	
  intoxicated”	
  on	
  June	
  22,	
  1992	
  –	
  the	
  date	
  

of	
   Appellant’s	
   prior	
   offense	
   -­‐-­‐	
   provided	
   that,	
   if	
   one	
   successfully	
   worked	
  

community	
   supervision	
   and	
   was	
   not	
   revoked,	
   then	
   that	
   “conviction”	
   was	
  

never	
   legally	
   a	
   “final	
   conviction”	
   for	
   purposes	
   of	
   enhancement.	
   TEX.	
   PENAL	
  

CODE	
   §49.09(c)(3)(C)	
   and	
   the	
   repealing	
   legislation	
   in	
   1994	
   stated	
   that	
   an	
  

offense	
   committed	
   before	
   its	
   effective	
   date,	
   was	
   covered	
   by	
   the	
   law	
   in	
  

effect	
   when	
   the	
   offense	
   was	
   committed,	
   and	
   that	
   the	
   former	
   law	
   was	
  

continued	
   in	
   effect	
   for	
   that	
   purpose.	
   	
  Therefore,	
   the	
   later	
   law	
   found	
  in	
  TEX.	
  

PENAL	
   CODE	
   §49.09(b)(2),	
   concerning	
   what	
   priors	
   could	
   be	
   used	
   to	
  

enhance	
   a	
   DWI	
   to	
   a	
   felony,	
   did	
   not	
   apply	
   to	
   Appellant.	
   The	
   same	
   issue	
   in	
  

2003	
  was	
  resolved	
  in	
  favor	
  of	
  Appellant	
  by	
  this	
  Court;	
  the	
  law	
  of	
  the	
  case	
  or	
  

stare	
  decisis	
  should	
  yield	
  the	
  same	
  outcome.	
  

	
  

	
                                                                                                                               4	
  
                                                      ARGUMENT	
  

                                            SOLE	
  ISSUE,	
  RESTATED	
  

              DID	
  THE	
  COURT	
  OF	
  APPEALS	
  ERR	
  IN	
  FINDING	
  THAT	
  THE	
  	
  
              PRIOR	
  CONVICTION	
  FOR	
  OPERATING	
  A	
  WATERCRAFT	
  	
  
              WHILE	
  INTOXICATED	
  WAS	
  A	
  FINAL	
  CONVICTION?	
  

          To	
   elevate	
   the	
   DWI	
   of	
   June	
   21,	
   2015,	
   to	
   a	
   third	
   degree	
   felony,	
   the	
  

State	
   relied	
   upon	
   two	
   prior	
   intoxication	
   offenses:	
   a	
   conviction	
   for	
   DWI	
   on	
  

January	
   28,	
   1987,	
   in	
   Cause	
   No.	
   87-­‐16	
   from	
   Cass	
   County,	
   and	
   a	
   conviction	
  

for	
   operating	
   a	
   boat	
   while	
   intoxicated	
   on	
   July	
   6,	
   1993,	
   in	
   Cause	
   No.	
   6513	
  

from	
  Marion	
  County.	
  (See,	
  Indictment,	
  CR	
  6).	
  That	
  offense	
  was	
  committed	
  

on	
  June	
  22,	
  1992	
  (See,	
  Information,	
  CR	
  17).	
  

          Part	
  I.	
  The	
  Texas	
  Parks	
  &	
  Wildlife	
  Code	
  is	
  Different	
  

          In	
  1992	
  the	
  offense	
  of	
  “boating	
  while	
  intoxicated”	
  was	
  found	
  in	
  TEX.	
  

PARKS	
   &	
   WILD.	
   CODE,	
   §31.097,	
   in	
   particular	
   §31.097(b),	
   TEX.	
   PARKS	
   &	
  

WILD.	
   CODE,	
   which	
   stated,	
   in	
   relevant	
   part:	
   “No	
   person	
   may	
   operate	
   a	
  

moving	
   vessel…while	
   the	
   person	
   is	
   intoxicated…”	
   Punishment	
   was	
   also	
  

found	
  in	
  the	
  same	
  code,	
  in	
  §31.097(c),	
  TEX.	
  PARKS	
  &	
  WILD.	
  CODE,	
  giving	
  a	
  

range	
   of	
   punishment	
   to	
   include	
   a	
   fine,	
   jail,	
   or	
   a	
   combination	
   of	
   both;	
  

subsequent	
   subsections	
   allowed	
   for	
   more	
   severe	
   punishment	
   for	
   repeat	
  

offenders.	
  It	
  was	
  this	
  law	
  under	
  which	
  the	
  State	
  brought	
  its	
  complaint	
  and	
  

	
                                                                                                                              5	
  
information	
   in	
   1993	
   and	
   for	
   which	
   Appellant	
   was	
   convicted	
   in	
   Cause	
   No.	
  

6513	
  in	
  Marion	
  County.	
  	
  

                  Exhibit	
  A	
  of	
  Appellant’s	
  Application	
  in	
  Habeas	
  Corpus	
  (CR	
  36	
  ff)	
  offers	
  

a	
   copy	
   of	
   the	
   “Information,”	
   showing	
   Applicant’s	
   offense	
   was	
   alleged	
   to	
  

have	
   occurred	
   on	
   June	
   22,	
   1992.	
   The	
   Judgment	
   and	
   Order	
   Granting	
  

Probation	
   was	
   entered	
   on	
   July	
   6,	
   1993.	
   (Both	
   the	
   Information	
   and	
  

Judgment	
  are	
  attached	
  to	
  this	
  Brief	
  as	
  “Appendix	
  A.”)	
  Though	
  at	
  one	
  point	
  

the	
   State	
   moved	
   to	
   revoke	
   that	
   probation,	
   the	
   motion	
   was	
   eventually	
  

dismissed	
   (CR	
   41-­‐42).	
   	
   Thus,	
   Appellant	
   served	
   out	
   his	
   probation	
   without	
  

ever	
  being	
  revoked.	
  	
  

                  Appellant	
   contends	
   that	
   the	
   prior	
   boating	
   while	
   intoxicated	
   case	
  

could	
   not	
   be	
   used	
   to	
   enhance	
   his	
   current	
   offense	
   to	
   a	
   third	
   degree	
   felony.1	
  	
  

See,	
   Ex	
   parte	
   Murchison,	
   560	
   S.W.2d	
   654,	
   656	
   (Tex.	
   Crim.	
   App.	
   1978).	
  

There,	
  in	
  an	
  appeal	
  of	
  a	
  conviction	
  with	
  assault	
  with	
  intent	
  to	
  commit	
  rape,	
  

enhanced	
   by	
   two	
   prior	
   felony	
   convictions	
   to	
   yield	
   a	
   life	
   sentence,	
  the	
   Court	
  

of	
   Criminal	
   Appeals	
   held	
   that,	
   absent	
   an	
   order	
   revoking	
   probation,	
   a	
  

conviction	
  is	
  not	
  “final”	
  and	
  may	
  not	
  be	
  used	
  for	
  enhancement	
  purposes;	
  to	
  

do	
   otherwise	
   was	
   a	
   violation	
   of	
   due	
   process	
   of	
   law.	
   Similarly,	
   because	
   of	
   its	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1 	
  In	
   that	
   event,	
   the	
   highest	
   level	
   of	
   offense	
   in	
   this	
   matter	
   would	
   be	
   a	
   Class	
   A	
  

misdemeanor.	
   Appellant	
   does	
   not	
   contest	
   the	
   use	
   of	
   the	
   other	
   misdemeanor	
   conviction	
  
in	
  Cause	
  No.	
  87-­‐16	
  from	
  Cass	
  County.	
  See,	
  TEX.	
  PENAL	
  CODE,	
  §49.09(a).	
  	
  

	
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         6	
  
own	
  particular	
  statute,	
  the	
  operation	
  of	
  a	
  moving	
  vessel	
  while	
  intoxicated	
  

or	
   “boating	
   while	
   intoxicated”	
   –	
   when	
   probated	
   and	
   not	
   revoked	
   –	
   does	
  

NOT	
  operate	
  as	
  an	
  enhancing	
  offense.	
  

          Because	
  the	
  1992	
  case	
  arose	
  under	
  a	
  different	
  statute,	
  it	
  differs	
  from	
  

other	
  intoxication	
  offenses	
  that	
  involve	
  a	
  probated	
  sentence	
  linked	
  to	
  the	
  

operation	
  of	
  a	
  motor	
  vehicle.	
  In	
  the	
  event	
  of	
  the	
  latter,	
  the	
  case	
  of	
  Ex	
  parte	
  

Serrato,	
  3	
  S.W.3d	
  41,	
  43	
  (Tex.	
  Crim.	
  App.	
  1999)	
  held	
  that	
  “a	
  probated	
  DWI	
  

which	
  occurred	
  after	
  January	
  1,	
  1984,	
  but	
  prior	
  to	
  September	
  1,	
  1994,	
  may	
  

properly	
  be	
  used	
  to	
  enhance	
  a	
  sentence.”	
  That	
  was	
  the	
  case,	
  because	
  the	
  

DWI	
   statute	
   then	
   in	
   effect,	
   Article	
   6701l-­‐1,	
   V.A.C.S.,	
   specifically	
   stated:	
   “For	
  

purposes	
  of	
  this	
  article,	
  a	
  conviction	
  for	
  an	
  offense	
  that	
  occurs	
  on	
  or	
  after	
  

January	
  1,	
  1984,	
  is	
  a	
  final	
  conviction,	
  whether	
  or	
  not	
  the	
  sentence	
  for	
  the	
  

conviction	
  is	
  probated.”	
  	
  Ex	
  parte	
  Serrato,	
  at	
  43.	
  

          It	
   might	
   seem	
   at	
   first	
   glance	
   as	
   if	
   the	
   prior	
   watercraft/boating	
   DWI	
  

would	
   be	
   available	
   as	
   an	
   enhancement.	
   TEX.	
   PENAL	
   CODE	
   §49.09(b)(2)	
  

states	
   that	
   a	
   DWI	
   may	
   be	
   enhanced	
   by	
   any	
   combination	
   of	
   prior	
  

intoxication	
  convictions:	
  driving,	
  boating,	
  or	
  flying,	
  and	
  two	
  of	
  them	
  will	
  	
  

	
                                                                                                                          7	
  
serve	
   to	
   enhance	
   to	
   a	
   third	
   degree	
   felony.	
   However,	
   TEX.	
   PENAL	
   CODE	
  

§49.09(c)(3),	
   “Operating	
   a	
   watercraft	
   while	
   intoxicated,”	
   defines	
   the	
  

offense,	
  in	
  relevant	
  part:	
  

          “Offense	
  of	
  operating	
  a	
  watercraft	
  while	
  intoxicated	
  means:	
  

          ….	
  

          (C)	
   an	
   offense	
   under	
   Section	
   31.097,	
   Parks	
   and	
   Wildlife	
   Code,	
   as	
  that	
  

law	
  existed	
  before	
  September	
  1,	
  1994.”	
  

          (emphasis	
  supplied)	
  

          That	
  latter	
  statute,	
  TEX.	
  PARKS	
  &	
  WILD.	
  CODE	
  §31.097,	
  was	
  the	
  law	
  

in	
  effect	
  when	
  Appellant	
  was	
  charged	
  and	
  received	
  his	
  probated	
  sentence	
  

on	
   July	
   6,	
   1993,	
   the	
   offense	
   occurring	
   on	
   June	
   22,	
   1992.	
   Consequently,	
  

Subsection	
  	
  (C)	
  of	
  TEX.	
  PENAL	
  CODE	
  §49.09(c)(3)	
  applies	
  in	
  the	
  case	
  at	
  bar.	
  	
  

          Part	
   II.	
   Analysis	
   of	
   the	
   Differences	
   Between	
   Texas	
   Parks	
   &	
   Wildlife	
  
          and	
  Texas	
  Penal	
  Code	
  
          	
  
          That	
  being	
  the	
  case,	
  the	
  next	
  question	
  is	
  this:	
  	
  

          Did	
   Section	
   TEX.	
   PARKS	
   &	
   WILD.	
   CODE	
   §31.097	
   specify	
   whether	
   or	
  

not	
  a	
  	
  probated	
  conviction	
  under	
  that	
  statute	
  was	
  final?	
  

          To	
   answer	
   that,	
   one	
   must	
   review	
   its	
   legislative	
   history.	
   The	
   entire	
  

statute,	
   TEX.	
   PARKS	
   &	
   WILD.	
   CODE	
   §31.097,	
   as	
   enacted	
   into	
   law	
   by	
   the	
   71st	
  

Legislature	
   (effective,	
   July	
   1,	
   1989)	
   	
   is	
   attached	
   as	
   “Appendix	
   B.”	
   The	
   law	
  

	
                                                                                                                            8	
  
was	
   amended	
   by	
   the	
   72nd	
   Legislature,	
   effective	
   September	
   1,	
   1991,	
   as	
   seen	
  

in	
   attached	
   “Appendix	
   C.”	
   Finally,	
   the	
   law	
   was	
   repealed	
   by	
   the	
   73rd	
  

Legislature,	
   providing	
   that	
   “boating	
   while	
   intoxicated”	
   offenses	
   occurring	
  

on	
  or	
  after	
  September	
  1,	
  1994,	
  were	
  to	
  be	
  prosecuted	
  under	
  §49.06,	
  TEX.	
  

PENAL	
   CODE,	
   attached	
   as	
   “Appendix	
   D.”	
   	
   So	
   the	
   answer	
   to	
   the	
   question	
  

above	
   is	
   this:	
   Neither	
   version	
   of	
   that	
   statute,	
   seen	
   in	
   Appendix	
   B	
   or	
   C,	
  

stated	
  that	
  a	
  probated	
  sentence	
  under	
  TEX.	
  PARKS	
  &	
  WILD.	
  CODE	
  §31.097	
  

was	
  available	
  for	
  enhancement.	
  In	
  fact,	
  Chapter	
  900,	
  	
  §1.18(b)	
  of	
  the	
  1993	
  

repealing	
  legislation	
  stated	
  as	
  follows,	
  in	
  relevant	
  part:	
  

          …	
  

          “(b)	
  An	
  offense	
  committed	
  before	
  the	
  effective	
  date	
  of	
  this	
  article	
  is	
  

covered	
   by	
   the	
   law	
   in	
   effect	
   when	
   the	
   offense	
   was	
   committed,	
   and	
   the	
  

former	
  law	
  is	
  continued	
  in	
  effect	
  for	
  that	
  purpose.”	
  	
  

          (Appendix	
  D).	
  

          Therefore,	
  the	
  law	
  in	
  effect	
  on	
  June	
  22,	
  1992,	
  applied	
  to	
  Appellant’s	
  

“boating	
  while	
  intoxicated”	
  offense,	
  not	
  some	
  law	
  enacted	
  at	
  a	
  later	
  date.	
  

That	
   means	
   the	
   pronouncement	
   in	
   Ex	
   parte	
   Murchison	
   controls:	
   only	
   a	
  

conviction	
  in	
  a	
  revoked	
  probation	
  -­‐-­‐	
  	
  only	
  that	
  sort	
  of	
  	
  “final”	
  conviction	
  –	
  

can	
   be	
   used	
   to	
   enhance,	
   not	
   something	
   less.	
   	
   	
   Absent	
   a	
   specific	
   statutory	
  

	
                                                                                                                            9	
  
directive	
   such	
   as	
   found	
   in	
   Art.	
   6701l-­‐1,	
   V.A.C.S.,	
   or	
   in	
   TEX.	
   PENAL	
   CODE	
  

§49.09(d),	
  a	
  probated	
  sentence	
  from	
  1993	
  for	
  boating	
  while	
  intoxicated	
  is	
  

NOT	
   a	
   final	
   conviction	
   for	
   purposes	
   of	
   enhancement,	
   unless	
   it	
   is	
   revoked	
  

and	
   a	
   final	
   conviction	
   entered.	
   A	
   successfully	
   served	
   probation	
   –	
   which	
  

happened	
  in	
  Cause	
  No.	
  6513	
  –	
  is	
  not	
  available	
  for	
  enhancement.	
  See	
  also,	
  

Ex	
   parte	
   Langley,	
   833	
   S.W.2d	
   141,	
   143	
   (Tex.	
   Crim.	
   App.	
   1992).	
   There	
   the	
  

defendant	
   was	
   convicted	
   and	
   given	
   probation,	
   then	
   revoked	
   and	
  

sentenced,	
   but	
   then	
   given	
   shock	
   probation,	
   setting	
   the	
   case	
   back	
   to	
   the	
  

status	
  of	
  probation,	
  which	
  was	
  unrevoked.	
  It	
  was	
  error	
  to	
  use	
  that	
  case	
  for	
  

enhancement.	
   	
   See	
   also,	
   Nixon	
   v.	
   State,	
   153	
   S.W.3d	
   550,	
   551	
   (Tex.	
   App.	
   –	
  

Amarillo	
  2004,	
  pet.	
  ref’d).	
  

            Part	
  III.	
  The	
  Court	
  of	
  Appeals	
  Did	
  Not	
  Grasp	
  the	
  Distinction	
  

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  The	
   Court	
   of	
   Appeals	
   failed	
   to	
   grasp	
   the	
   distinction	
   just	
   made.	
  

Instead,	
   it	
   relied	
   upon	
   TEX.	
   PENAL	
   CODE	
   §49.09(b)(2)	
   which	
   pertains	
   to	
  

enhancing	
   the	
   DWI	
   to	
   a	
   felony	
   of	
   the	
   third	
   degree	
   if	
   it	
   is	
   shown	
   that	
   the	
  

person	
   has	
   been	
   convicted	
   two	
   times	
   of	
   any	
   intoxication	
   offense.	
   See,	
   Ex	
  

parte	
  Rae,	
  2017	
  Tex.	
  App.	
  LEXIS	
  5325,	
  *3	
  and	
  n.	
  4,	
  citing	
  to	
  TEX.	
  REV.	
  CIV.	
  

STAT.	
  art.	
  6701l-­‐1.	
  Furthermore,	
  the	
  Court	
  of	
  Appeals	
  cited	
  to	
  

	
                                                                                                                                                   10	
  
Rizo	
  v.	
  State,	
  963	
  S.W.2d	
  137,	
  139	
  (Tex.	
  App.	
  –	
  Eastland	
  1997,	
  no	
  pet.)	
  to	
  

support	
  its	
  reasoning	
  (id.).	
  	
  

	
        However,	
   Rizo	
   is	
   inapposite	
   since	
   it	
   involved	
   a	
   conviction	
   under	
   an	
  

older	
   driving	
   while	
   intoxicated	
   statute,	
   not	
   a	
   conviction	
   for	
   the	
   operation	
  

of	
  a	
  watercraft	
  while	
  intoxicated	
  under	
  the	
  TEX.	
  PARKS	
  &	
  WILD.	
  CODE.	
  The	
  

Court	
   of	
   Appeals	
   ignored	
   the	
   distinction	
   about	
   how	
   the	
   law	
   concerning	
   a	
  

conviction	
   under	
   the	
   TEXAS	
   PARKS	
   &	
   WILD.	
   CODE	
   applied	
   to	
   the	
   prior	
  

Marion	
   County	
   case.	
   The	
   point	
   is	
   that,	
   as	
   such,	
   that	
   conviction	
   was	
   never	
  

final.	
  It	
  was	
  an	
  offense	
  	
  “covered	
  by	
  the	
  law	
  in	
  effect	
  when	
  the	
  offense	
  was	
  

committed,	
   and	
   the	
   former	
   law	
   is	
   continued	
   in	
   effect	
   for	
   that	
   purpose.”	
  

(See,	
  Chapter	
  900,	
  §1.18(b),	
  Appendix	
  D,	
  post).	
  	
  

	
        Part	
  IV.	
  	
  Application	
  of	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Case	
  or	
  Stare	
  Decisis	
  

          This	
   Court	
   so	
   held	
   in	
   2003	
   in	
   Cause	
   No.	
   74,840,	
   Ex	
   parte	
   Russell	
   Boyd	
  

Rae	
   (per	
   curiam	
   decision,	
   December	
   3,	
   2003).	
   In	
   that	
   case	
   precisely	
   the	
  

same	
   issue	
   arose	
   over	
   using	
   the	
   same	
   Marion	
   County	
   operation	
   of	
  

watercraft	
   case,	
   Cause	
   No.	
   6513,	
   to	
   enhance	
   a	
   DWI	
   in	
   Gregg	
   County	
   to	
   a	
  

felony	
   in	
   Cause	
   No.	
   28,841-­‐B.	
   Part	
   of	
   the	
   reasoning	
   behind	
   this	
   Court’s	
  

granting	
   the	
   writ	
   was	
   ineffectiveness	
   of	
   counsel	
   “for	
   failing	
   to	
   investigate	
  

one	
  of	
  the	
  prior	
  convictions	
  used	
  to	
  elevate	
  this	
  offense	
  to	
  a	
  felony.”	
  The	
  

	
                                                                                                                               11	
  
trial	
  court	
  found	
  that	
  the	
  prior	
  offense	
  (i.e.,	
  Cause	
  No.	
  6513)	
  was	
  not	
  a	
  final	
  

conviction	
   available	
   for	
   enhancement	
   purposes	
   and	
   that	
   there	
   was	
  

ineffectiveness	
  of	
  counsel	
  in	
  failing	
  to	
  investigate	
  that	
  prior	
  conviction;	
  the	
  

trial	
   court	
   recommended	
   granting	
   relief.	
   This	
   Court	
   agreed	
   with	
   that	
  

recommendation	
  and	
  granted	
  habeas	
  corpus	
  relief.	
  	
  

          Although	
   no	
   ineffectiveness	
   of	
   counsel	
   issue	
   was	
   raised	
   in	
   the	
  

current	
   habeas	
   application,	
   the	
   underlying	
   determining	
   consideration	
   in	
  

Cause	
   No.	
   74,840,	
   Ex	
   parte	
   Russell	
   Boyd	
   Rae	
   was	
   the	
   use	
   of	
   a	
   prior	
  

conviction	
  that	
  was	
  not	
  final	
  to	
  enhance	
  a	
  misdemeanor	
  DWI	
  offense	
  to	
  a	
  

felony;	
  this	
  Court	
  agreed	
  with	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  in	
  2003	
  that	
  the	
  “boating	
  while	
  

intoxicated”	
   conviction	
   was	
   not	
   a	
   final	
   conviction;	
   otherwise,	
   there	
   would	
  

have	
   been	
   no	
   predicate	
   for	
   finding	
   ineffectiveness.	
   It	
   was	
   the	
   same	
   prior	
  

case	
  that	
  was	
  used	
  here:	
  Cause	
  No.	
  6513	
  from	
  Marion	
  County.	
  	
  

          The	
  principle	
  of	
  the	
  “law	
  of	
  the	
  case”	
  or	
  stare	
  decisis	
  applies	
  to	
  the	
  

instant	
  case.	
  This	
  Court	
  has	
  written	
  that	
  “	
  ‘an	
  appellate	
  court’s	
  resolution	
  of	
  

questions	
   of	
   law	
   in	
   a	
   previous	
   appeal	
   are	
   binding	
   in	
   subsequent	
   appeals	
  

concerning	
  the	
  same	
  issue.’	
  Therefore,	
  ’when	
  the	
  facts	
  and	
  legal	
  issues	
  are	
  

virtually	
   identical,	
   they	
   should	
   be	
   controlled	
   by	
   an	
   appellate	
   court’s	
  

previous	
   resolution.’	
   	
   Such	
   a	
   rule	
   promotes	
   ‘judicial	
   consistency	
   and	
  

	
                                                                                                                      12	
  
efficiency.’	
   “	
   State	
   v.	
   Swearingen,	
   478	
   S.W.3d	
   718,	
   720	
   (Tex.	
   Crim.	
   App.	
  

2015)	
   (citing	
   to	
   Swearingen	
   v.	
   State,	
   424	
   S.W.3d	
   32,	
   36	
   (Tex.	
   Crim.	
   App.	
  

2014).	
  	
  

           What	
   is	
   that	
   same	
   issue?	
   It	
   is	
   this:	
   can	
   the	
   prior	
   “conviction”	
   of	
  

Appellant	
  under	
  the	
  Texas	
  Parks	
  &	
  Wildlife	
  Code	
  in	
  Cause	
  No.	
  6513	
  be	
  used	
  

to	
   enhance	
   a	
   subsequent	
   DWI	
   to	
   a	
   felony?	
   The	
   answer	
   in	
   2003	
   was	
   “no”	
  

and	
  should	
  still	
  be	
  “no”	
  under	
  the	
  law	
  of	
  the	
  case	
  or	
  stare	
  decisis.	
  It	
  is	
  the	
  

same	
  defendant	
  and	
  the	
  same	
  prior	
  and	
  now	
  an	
  attempt	
   –	
  again	
  –	
  to	
  use	
  it	
  

to	
  enhance.	
  	
  

           Part	
  V.	
  	
  Conclusion	
  

           Appellant	
  would	
  urge	
  this	
  Court	
  in	
  the	
  case	
  at	
  bar	
  to	
  follow	
  its	
  own	
  

precedent,	
  and	
  apply	
  the	
  same	
  reasoning	
  it	
  applied	
  in	
  reviewing	
  that	
  prior	
  

habeas	
   application	
   in	
   Cause	
   No.	
   74,840,	
   Ex	
   parte	
   Russell	
   Boyd	
   Rae	
   from	
  

2003.	
  Appellant	
  contends	
  that,	
  in	
  light	
  of	
  the	
  foregoing,	
  it	
  is	
  clear	
  that	
  the	
  

Court	
   of	
   Appeals	
   erred	
   in	
   failing	
   to	
   find	
   that	
   the	
   prior	
   conviction	
   in	
   Cause	
  

No.	
   6513	
   was	
   not	
   a	
   final	
   conviction	
   and	
   could	
   not	
   be	
   used	
   for	
  

enhancement.	
  	
  	
  

           Appellant	
   urges	
   reversal	
   of	
   the	
   Judgment	
   of	
   the	
   Court	
   of	
   Appeal,	
  

finding	
  that	
  the	
  prior	
  conviction	
  for	
  boating	
  while	
  intoxicated	
  in	
  Cause	
  No.	
  

	
                                                                                                                             13	
  
6513	
  from	
  Marion	
  County	
  was	
  never	
  a	
  final	
  conviction	
  for	
  the	
  purposes	
  of	
  

enhancement,	
   and	
   remanding	
   to	
   the	
   lower	
   courts	
   for	
   appropriate	
   relief,	
  

including	
   a	
   re-­‐sentencing	
   as	
   a	
   Class	
   A	
   misdemeanor,	
   or,	
   alternatively,	
   a	
  

reformation	
   of	
   the	
   sentence	
   to	
   show	
   a	
   conviction	
   for	
   a	
   Class	
   A	
  

Misdemeanor,	
  and	
  remand	
  for	
  a	
  new	
  hearing	
  on	
  punishment.	
  	
  	
  

                                              PRAYER	
  FOR	
  RELIEF	
  

	
       WHEREFORE,	
   PREMISES	
   CONSIDERED,	
   Appellant	
   respectfully	
   prays	
  

that	
   this	
   Court,	
   in	
   consideration	
   of	
   the	
   foregoing	
   arguments	
   and	
  

authorities,	
   issue	
   an	
   opinion	
   reversing	
   the	
   Court	
   of	
   Appeals’	
   Judgment,	
  

remanding	
   this	
   cause	
   to	
   the	
   trial	
   court,	
   vacating	
   and	
   setting	
   aside	
   the	
  

conviction	
  as	
  a	
  felony,	
  and,	
  instead,	
  reflecting	
  a	
  judgment	
  of	
  conviction	
  as	
  

a	
  Class	
  A	
  misdemeanor,	
  and	
  remand	
  for	
  a	
  hearing	
  on	
  sentencing.	
  	
  

                                                   Respectfully	
  submitted,	
  

	
       	
        	
        	
        	
          Hough-­‐Lewis	
  Dunn	
  
	
       	
        	
        	
        	
          Hough-­‐Lewis	
  (“Lew”)	
  Dunn	
  
                                                   P.O.	
  Box	
  2226	
  
	
       	
        	
        	
        	
          Longview,	
  TX	
  75606	
  
	
       	
        	
        	
        	
          Tel.	
  903-­‐757-­‐6711	
  
	
       	
        	
        	
        	
          Fax	
  903-­‐757-­‐6712	
  
	
       	
        	
        	
        	
          Email:	
  dunn@texramp.net	
  
	
       	
        	
        	
        	
          Texas	
  State	
  Bar	
  No.	
  06244600	
  
	
       	
        	
        	
        	
          Attorney	
  for	
  Appellant	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

	
                                                                                                                 14	
  
                                            CERTIFICATE	
  OF	
  SERVICE	
  
	
  
	
        I	
   hereby	
   certify,	
   by	
   affixing	
   my	
   signature	
   above,	
   that	
   a	
   true	
   and	
  

correct	
  copy	
  of	
  the	
  foregoing	
  Brief	
  for	
  Appellant,	
  was	
  sent	
  to	
  the	
  following	
  

person	
   by	
   certified	
   mail,	
   return	
   receipt	
   requested,	
   on	
   the	
   	
   6th	
   day	
   of	
  	
  

October,	
   2017,	
   to	
   Ms.	
   Stacy	
   M.	
   Soule,	
   State	
   Prosecuting	
   Attorney,	
   at	
   P.O.	
  

Box	
  13046,	
  Austin,	
  TX	
  78711-­‐3046	
  and	
  also	
  sent	
  by	
  electronic	
  means,	
  and	
  

also	
   a	
   true	
   and	
   correct	
   copy	
   was	
   sent	
   by	
   first	
   class	
   mail	
   to	
   Ms.	
   Angela	
  

Smoak,	
   Marion	
   County	
   &	
   District	
   Attorney,	
   102	
   W.	
   Austin	
   Street,	
   Jefferson,	
  

TX	
  75657	
  and	
  also	
  sent	
  by	
  electronic	
  means	
  on	
  the	
  same	
  date.	
  	
  

	
        	
         	
         	
         	
         	
         Hough-­‐Lewis	
  Dunn	
  
	
        	
         	
         	
         	
         	
         Hough-­‐Lewis	
  Dunn	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

	
                                                                                                                            15	
  
                                              CERTIFICATE	
  OF	
  COMPLIANCE	
  
	
  
	
  
                      I	
   certify	
   that	
   the	
   foregoing	
   document	
   complies	
   with	
   Rule	
   9,	
   TEX.	
  

       R.	
  APP.	
  PROC.,	
  regarding	
  length	
  of	
  documents,	
  in	
  that,	
  exclusive	
  of	
  caption,	
  

       identity	
  of	
  parties	
  and	
  counsel,	
  statement	
  regarding	
  oral	
  argument,	
  table	
  of	
  

       contents,	
   index	
  of	
   authorities,	
  statement	
   of	
   the	
   case,	
   issues	
   presented,	
  

       statement	
   of	
   jurisdiction,	
   statement	
   of	
   procedural	
   history,	
   signature,	
  

       proof	
  of	
  service,	
  certification,	
  certificate	
  of	
  compliance,	
   and	
   appendix,	
   it	
  

       consists	
  of	
  2,703	
  words.	
  

                                                                      Hough-­‐Lewis	
  Dunn	
  
                                                                      Hough-­‐Lewis	
  Dunn	
  
	
  

               	
  

	
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