Court Opinion

ID: 9584414
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:47:54.448384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:44.913587
License: Public Domain

Judge MARTIN (Harry C.)
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the majority opinion finding no error in the trial of the common law robbery and false imprisonment charges. For the reasons set forth below, I dissent from the portion of the opinion with respect to the charge of assault with a deadly weapon with the intent to kill.
The majority holds that the state failed to present sufficient evidence of defendant’s intent to kill to allow the felonious assault charge to be submitted to the jury. They argue that any intent on the part of defendant to kill Ellen Sampson was conditional and, relying upon a 1923 Mississippi case, hold that the evidence is insufficient on the element of intent to carry the case to the jury on this charge. I cannot agree.
From the majority’s holding comes the inescapable conclusion that evidence of intent to kill is insufficient as a matter of law in any hostage-taking situation where a deadly weapon is used as a coercive device to force compliance with the defendant’s demand. Moreover, by logical extension of this reasoning, it would be possible for any defendant to negate the intent element as a matter of law by simply informing his victim that he does not intend to kill or promising not to kill as long as the victim submits. To be sure, the law does not contemplate that the accused can control the degree of his culpability in this fashion.
Intent is a condition of the mind, seldom, if ever, capable of direct or positive proof, but is arrived at by such just and reasonable deductions from the acts and facts proven as the guarded judgment of a reasonably cautious and prudent person *312would ordinarily draw therefrom. It is usually shown by facts and circumstances known to the party charged with the intent and may be evidenced by the acts and declarations of the party.
Intent to kill is a mental attitude and ordinarily must be proved by circumstantial evidence, that is, by proving facts from which the intent may be reasonably inferred. Intent to kill may be inferred from the act in question, the nature of the assault, the manner in which it was made, the purpose of the assault, the conduct of the parties, and other relevant circumstances. State v. Cauley, 244 N.C. 701, 94 S.E. 2d 915 (1956); State v. Revels, 227 N.C. 34, 40 S.E. 2d 474 (1946); State v. Smith, 211 N.C. 93, 189 S.E. 175 (1937). Ordinarily, it must be left to the jury to decide, from all the facts and circumstances, whether the ulterior criminal intent existed. State v. Allen, 186 N.C. 302, 119 S.E. 504 (1923).
In determining whether a charge should be submitted to the jury, the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the state, and the state is entitled to every reasonable intendment thereon and every reasonable inference therefrom. Discrepancies and contradictions in the evidence are disregarded, as they are matters for the jury and do not warrant nonsuit. State v. Witherspoon, 293 N.C. 321, 237 S.E. 2d 822 (1977); State v. Smith, 291 N.C. 505, 231 S.E. 2d 663 (1977); State v. McNeil, 280 N.C. 159, 185 S.E. 2d 156 (1971). If there is any evidence tending to prove the fact of guilt or which reasonably leads to that conclusion as a logical and legitimate deduction, the issue is one to be decided by the jury. Smith, 291 N.C., supra.
Applying the above rules to the facts of this case, I find ample evidence to take the case to the jury on the issue of intent to kill. Defendant was a prisoner in the Wayne County jail. In escaping from the jail, he grabbed Ellen Sampson, a female employee in the jail, from behind, holding her around the body with one arm and putting and holding a knife to her throat with his other arm. He kept the knife at her throat at all times until he left the jail, a period of some five to seven minutes. He held her up with such force that she lost her shoes. When he first assaulted her, he had the knife at her face, causing a small abrasion on her cheek. Then he lowered the knife to her throat. I find no evidence that the small cut or abrasion to her face was “inadvertent,” as it is described by the majority. The statements of defendant, when *313placed upon this background of a desperate prisoner escaping from jail by threatening the life of Ellen Sampson, do not negate as a matter of law the inferences as to defendant’s intent arising from the circumstances of the assault. His statement, “don’t any of [you] be no damn hero, I will kill this woman,” is in no way conditional.
The jury had no difficulty in considering all the evidence and resolving the issue of defendant’s intent when he assaulted Ellen Sampson. It was the jury’s province to do so. Allen, supra.
I find no error in the trial of the felonious assault charge.