Court Opinion

ID: 9675616
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:59:06.752585+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:35.871647
License: Public Domain

WOODLEY, Presiding Judge
(concurring).
The judges of this Court have been unable to agree upon an opinion but are in agreement that the petition for writ *405of habeas corpus should be granted and the relator discharged.
 The writer agrees that Art. 886, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P. is constitutional, as held by the Supreme Court and the Court of Civil Appeals, in McClelland v. Briscoe and Ex parte Jimenez, cited by Judge McDonald. He also agrees with Judge McDonald’s view that the matter before us is not moot, and the relator cannot be ordered discharged upon that ground.
The writer would grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus and order the petitioner discharged for the following reasons only
The proceedings before the Justice of the Peace being authorized by a valid statute, the controlling question is whether the relator was “an accused” who could not be called as a witness and required to testify, or was a witness who was bound to testify though he could plead his right against self-incrimination to any and all specific questions, the answer to which might tend to incriminate him. See McCormick on Evidence, Section 122.
If the relator occupied the status of “an accused” when called to testify at the Court of Inquiry, he was not required to testify and was not in contempt for refusing to do so. This is so without regard to whether or not he was denied the full assistance of counsel and whether or not the proceedings were conducted in an otherwise arbitrary and prejudicial manner.
The privilege of a witness to refuse to incriminate himself guaranteed by the Sth and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution furnished no excuse for his refusal to take the witness stand and testify. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653.
, The relator did not plead his privilege against self-incrimination to any question. He refused to testify or make any statement of facts.
Relator has since been indicted and the District Attorney concedes that he is an accused in the matter that was under investigation and cannot now be required to testify at the Court of Inquiry. He acted upon the advice of counsel and there is no reason to suppose that, had the relator purged himself, the contempt order, including the fine, would not have been set aside.
As to the fine imposed the contempt order is criminal in nature. The State alone is interested in enforcement in such cases. Beverly v. Roberts (Tex.Civ.App.) 215 S.W. 975; Ex parte Wolters, 64 Tex.Cr.R. 238, 144 S.W. 531. The District Attorney representing the State has joined in the prayer that the relator be discharged.