Court Opinion

ID: 9836811
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:08.117943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:18.951912
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion under prong one of the Strickland test that the performance of Capt S was deficient. I think it is appropriate to quote the affidavit of Capt S:
8. That between 25 November 1996, the day I met Cpl Alves, and his trial date of 12 February 1997,1 met with Cpl Alves *291approximately 12 times to discuss his case and prepare him for trial.
9. That during our discussions, Cpl Alves and I discussed pleading not guilty, but came to a mutual agreement that the evidence against Cpl Alves was overwhelming.
10. That during our discussion, Cpl Alves and I discussed pleading not guilty because he could not recollect pointing the weapon at anyone. However, when asked about the victims’ statements, Cpl Alves could not foresee any reason for the victims to lie in their sworn statements.
11. That based on our discussions, Cpl Alves and I agreed that it would be in his best interest to plead guilty because it appeared very likely he would be convicted of all charges. We agreed that a plea of guilty was Cpl Alves best chance for leniency in sentencing.
12. That I explained to Cpl Alves that he could only plead guilty if he was willing to rely on the victims’ statements because he could not remember pointing the weapon at them. Cpl Alves indicated to me that he understood and had no reason not to believe what was in the victims’ statements.
16. That in preparing for his trial, I concentrated on getting Cpl Alves through providency and on his sentencing case. Based on Cpl Alves’ numerous representations that he had no reason to disbelieve the victims’ statements, and based on his account of the incidents just prior to and just after the alleged incident, and the fact that the trial counsel had indicated no intentions of calling the victims to testify on sentencing, I saw no reason to personally interview the victims.
17. That in preparation for sentencing, I asked Cpl Alves to provide me with names of Marines he would like to have called on his behalf. He provided me Enclosure 4.
18. That I made a tactical decision not to call any witness on Enclosure 4 who is of equal or lesser rank than that of Cpl Alves.
19. That based on Cpl Alves’ prior page ll’s (Enclosure 5) and the fact that he worked in the armory, I made a tactical decision not to call SSgt Cole. The Government would have been able to cross-examine SSgt Cole on everything Cpl Alves did that went against what he had been taught while working in the armory. Additionally, Marines are taught proper weapons handling continuously and there simply is no way for any Marine witness to say anything positive about the way Cpl Alves handled his weapon that evening (which is worsened by the fact that he was illegally storing his personal weapon in his barracks room).
20. That I specifically addressed the issue of intoxication as a defense to his actions. I went over Enclosure 6 with Cpl Alves in detail. He indicated that he understood that his voluntary intoxication could not be used in his defense.
(Emphasis added.) It was not deficient performance for Capt S to rely on his conversations with appellant in deciding not to interview any of the victims or witnesses to the event. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); United States v. Scott, 24 MJ 186, 192 (CMA 1987); Turner v. Williams, 35 F.3d 872, 898 (4th Cir.1994), overruled on other grounds by O’Dell v. Netherlands 95 F.3d 1214 (4th Cir.1996); State v. Thomas, 285 Mont. 112, 946 P.2d 140, 143-4 (1997).
As the Supreme Court noted in Strickland, “[A] particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Furthermore, “when a defendant has given counsel reason to believe that pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel’s failure to pursue those investigations may not later be challenged as unreasonable.” Id. It was reasonable for Capt S not to have interviewed the witnesses who had already given statements because appellant told Capt S that there was no reason they would be lying. *292See State v. Thomas, supra; cf. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 385, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (finding counsel’s performance deficient where “Respondent’s lawyer neither investigated, nor made a reasonable decision not to investigate, the State’s case through discovery”) (emphasis added).
I also do not believe that Capt S’s performance during sentencing was deficient. Most ineffective assistance of counsel claims at the sentencing phase arise in situations where counsel fails either to call any witnesses at sentencing or fails to respond to character attacks by the Government. See United States v. Boone, 49 MJ 187,196, n. 10 (1998). Capt S presented a case in mitigation at sentencing; it may not have been what appellant now asserts should have been presented, but it was not deficient, and Capt S’s tactical decisions cannot now be second-guessed.
I agree with the majority’s conclusions on the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. I would add, however, that as to prejudice, appellant is merely asserting that the prejudice to him is inherent because he was forced to rely on statements from unreliable witnesses. Aside from being a legally inadequate argument, see United States v. Ginn, 47 MJ 236, 247 (1997)(“conclusory argument that ‘prejudice is clear’ from his counsel’s defective performance is legally inadequate”), appellant is now trying to refute what he specifically stated to the contrary at trial: that there was no reason for him to believe that the witnesses were lying. The record does not indicate “there was a reasonable probability” that had Capt S interviewed the witnesses, appellant would have changed his plea. Id. Appellant himself stated to the military judge that he knew Capt S had not interviewed the witnesses and that if he had, the witnesses would just reiterate what was in their statements.
For the above reasons, I join the majority’s affirmance of appellant’s case.