Court Opinion

ID: 9523173
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:36:45.421842+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:39.059486
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Judge,
dissenting.
The primary issue presented by this appeal is whether or not the notice described in IC 1971, 32-8-3-10 must include a statement that the lien shall be null and void if suit is not commenced within thirty days after receiving such notice. In the case before us, the trial court ruled that the owner’s notice was insufficient to void the mechanic’s lien and stated:
“. . . I.C. 32-8-3-10 (Burns 43-710) is a provision, under the Lien Statutes of the State of Indiana, providing for a shortened statute of limitations, at the option of the owner of property upon which a Mechanic’s Lien has been taken. “The Court FINDS that Statutory Liens are to be strictly construed. In order to comply with Lien Statutes, their exact provision must be followed. I.C. 32-8-3-10 provides that the owner, or a person having interest in the property in which the Mechanic’s Lien has been taken, must in the conjunctive notify the holder of the Lien to commence suit thereon, and if he fails to commence suit within 30 days after receiving such notice, the Lien shall be null and void.
“It has been argued that the owner of property is not required to state the law, as to the statutory period in which the lien holder must act, that everyone is presumed to know the law. The Court notices that the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure T.R. 4(C)(5) require that a summons state the time within which the person being served is to respond, and a statement that, in case of his failure to do so, Judgment by default may be rendered against him. Thus, it appears to this *1216Court that a summons would be defective if it failed to state the time to respond and the statement of the possible consequences of a failure to respond.
“The Court FINDS that I.C. 32-8-10 [sic], in the first paragraph thereof, is a provision in the nature of a summons and the requirements thereof must be literally complied with.
“The Court FINDS that the letter of November 19, 1975 [sic] to C. W. Ellison Builders, Inc. from Lafayette Tennis Club, Sidney Berger, President, is not a notice in compliance with said Indiana Code provision, for the reason that it fails to set forth said Indiana Code’s requirements of a statement of 30 days, in which to file suit and a statement of the consequences of failure to file suit.
“WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS said Motion to Strike Paragraph II of said Cross-Defendants’ Answer to Amended Cross-Claim of C. W. Ellison Builders, Inc. And now the Court ORDERS Paragraph II, of the Answer of Lafayette Tennis Club, Sidney L. Berger, Harriet [sic] Berger, Sandor Lippai, Carolyn Lip-pai, Indiana National Bank and Indiana Mortgage Corporation to the Amended Cross-Claim of C. W. Ellison Builders, Inc., be and hereby is stricken.” [Emphasis added]
The trial court has determined that IC 1971, 32-8-3-10 is “in the nature of a summons” and, therefore, it is necessary to review Ind.Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 4, which governs the form of a summons. That rule very specifically sets forth the exact requirements of a summons and must be strictly followed to properly commence litigation. The statute which is being reviewed here is readily distinguishable. The notice described in IC 1971, 32-8-3-10 does not serve to commence litigation, but merely informs the lienholder that he should file suit. The language of the statute does not clearly inform the owner of the property of the requirements which must be set forth in the notice. Because the statute is ambiguous, rules of statutory construction must be employed.
This approach requires that effect must be given to the intention of the Legislature which enacted the law. County Council, etc. v. Dept. of Pub. Wel., etc. (1980), Ind. App., 400 N.E.2d 1187. A statute must be applied in accordance with its plain meaning and a construction cannot be applied which violates the clear and express meaning of the statute. Gonser v. Bd. of Com’rs for Owen Cty. (1978), Ind.App., 378 N.E.2d 425. In reviewing the mechanic’s lien statutes, the Supreme Court has recently held that these statutes should be fairly construed with a view toward carrying out their purpose. Mid America Homes, Inc. v. Horn (1979), Ind., 396 N.E.2d 879.
The purpose of this statute is to provide a means by which owners of property may clear title to their land. Notice by the owners to commence suit effectively shortens the period of time (from one year to thirty days) in which suit may be brought. Thus, a property owner is not required to endure the passage of a full year before clear title to his property can be obtained. With this purpose underlying the actions of the Legislature, the statute must be construed to preserve the rights of property owners.
For further clarification of the notice requirements of IC 1971, 32-8-3—10, it is helpful to consider another provision of the mechanic’s lien statute, IC 1971, 32-8-3-3 (Burns Code Ed.). This provision involves the notice which is necessary for the creation of a mechanic’s lien and very specifically states:
“Any person who wishes to acquire a lien upon any property, whether his claim be due or not, shall file in the recorder’s office of the county, at any time within sixty [60] days after performing such labor or furnishing such materials, or machinery, described in section 1 [32-8-3-1] of this act, a sworn statement in duplicate of his intention to hold a lien upon such property for the amount of his claim, specifically setting forth the amount claimed, the name and address of the claimant and the name of the owner, and shall give legal description, street *1217and number, if any, of such lot or land on which the house, mill, manufactory or other buildings, bridge, reservoir, system of waterworks or other structure may stand or be connected with or to which it may be removed. . . . ” [Emphasis added]
It is apparent that when the Legislature intends to have a notice contain certain information, it clearly sets forth that information in unambiguous language. Such is not the case in the statute before us. IC 1971, 32-8-3—10 does not clearly and specifically require certain information to be contained in the notice and, therefore, the statute must be interpreted with a view toward upholding the underlying purpose which is the protection of the rights of the property owner.
Appellee’s counsel contends that his client, Mr. Ellison, is not an attorney and cannot be charged with knowledge of the intricacies of the mechanic’s lien statute. Since the notice failed to state either the 30-day time limit or the consequences established by the statute, his client viewed this letter as nothing more than another piece of correspondence in the process of negotiation. The law in Indiana does not support his position. In the case of Middleton Motors, Inc. v. Ind. Dept., etc. (1978), Ind., 380 N.E.2d 79, at 81, Justice Givan wrote:
“All persons are charged with the knowledge of the rights and remedies prescribed by statute.”
Similarly, the case of Searles v. Haynes (1955), 126 Ind.App. 626, at 635, 129 N.E.2d 362, at 366, rehearing denied 126 Ind.App. 626, 130 N.E.2d 482 held:
“Where a business, profession or acts have been made the subject of legislation and penalties have been fixed for failure to comply with the statute, the one who asserts a right based on the business, profession or acts is by law informed that his rights depend on the compliance with the statutes.” [Citation omitted]
Since the appellee is asserting a right based on a particular statute, he is, by law, charged with knowledge of the provisions of that statute.
A survey of case law in this jurisdiction does not reveal any judicial interpretation of IC 1971, 32-8-3-10. However, a similar statute has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of Iowa. Although the language of the Iowa statute differs from the language of the Indiana statute, the legislative intent is very similar. In the case of Woodruff & Son v. Rhoton (1960) 251 Iowa 550, 101 N.W.2d 720, at 721-723, the court stated:
“The sole issue raised in this appeal is the sufficiency of the demand notice served upon the cross-petitioners by the defendant owners .
“. . . [T]he trial court held the notices did constitute a sufficient and proper demand under the statute, and that the appellants forfeited their liens by their failure to commence foreclosure actions within thirty days after written demands were served upon them. We agree with the trial court.
“A notice required by law must contain information which in the wisdom of the legislature is necessary to fully advise the other party of the action necessary or of the claim advanced. However, the issue here is whether this non-jurisdictional notice is void for failure to comply with the specific requirements of the statute. It is not what we think the legislature should have required, but what it did require. “I. Appellants’ first proposition is that the demand notice is defective in that (1) it did not state the time within which appellants must commence their actions, and (2) it did not state that unless they did so their liens would be forfeited. The contention is without merit. The statute itself does not require that such information be set forth in the notice. . “Having filed their liens under Chapter 572 of the Code, I.C.A., the appellants could scarcely contend they were unfamiliar with the provisions of the mechanic’s lien law under which they claimed benefits. In any event it has been aptly stated that the enactments of the legislature are notification to all concerned as to
*1218what they contain. They are themselves notices of their terms to all affected.
* * * * * *
“Specific reference to the time of limitation or the forfeiture is not required in the ‘demand notice.’ We are not permitted to search further for some other requirement or meaning in the language of the statute.”
Similarly, this Court is not permitted to expand the meaning or application of the Indiana statute.
The letter to Ellison on November 19, 1973 was sufficient to fulfill the requirements of IC 1971, 32-8-3-10. Because suit was not filed on the mechanic’s lien within 30 days after receipt of the notice, the lien was rendered null and void.
The second issue presented for review challenges the award of attorney’s fees to Ellison which were incurred in the foreclosure of its mechanic’s lien. The general rule in Indiana is that attorney’s fees are not recoverable as damages in the absence of a statute or a contract stipulating the recovery of the same. Perry Co. Council v. State ex rel. Baertich (1973), 157 Ind.App. 586, 301 N.E.2d 219. Recovery in this case was based on IC 1971, 32-8-3-14, a provision of the mechanic’s lien statute. Since the mechanic’s lien is null and void, the recovery of attorney’s fees is improper.
Although the majority opinion states it is concerned with principles of basic fairness (basic fairness to whom?), it is improper for this Court to usurp the responsibility of the Legislature. Our role is to interpret the statute as created by the Legislature. New requirements in a statute should not be imposed by this Court.
I respectfully dissent and would reverse and remand this case to the trial court.