Court Opinion

ID: 9573870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:00:00.563326+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:28.611640
License: Public Domain

BIEGELMEIER, Justice
(concurring by opinion).
The wording in Article XIV, § 3, of the South Dakota Constitution and general statements in the cited opinions, some of which are dicta or deal in generalities, point to no clear solution of the question presented on this appeal. Delving into the available Constitutional Debates and the Senate and House Journals of 1895 (S.J. 1895, p. 147) which spawned the now Article XIV, § 3, helps little in shedding light on the resolution of that problem. Grammar, arguably, may be reason to support the Regents’ contention that the 10-word restrictive clause applies *55only to the number of members of the board, their method of appointment and confirmation and not to their power of “control” feature first declared in § 3.
This court’s opinions, from State v. Sheldon, 1896, 8 S.D. 525, 67 N.W. 613 (considering the predecessor Article XIV), down to recent opinions reviewed in Justice Doyle’s opinion, give comfort to both views. While in agreement with much of that opinion on this question, it must be blended or reconciled with the verbiage and conclusions in the concurring opinion of Judge Campbell in State ex rel. Prchal v. Dailey, 1931, 57 S.D. 554, 234 N.W. 45, wherein it is stated that the “general scope of the powers of the board * * * are limited by the foundation purpose of the school as prescribed by the Legislature (and) [wjithin those limits the discretion of the board of regents is vast and subject to little, if any, control,” and the more sharply drawn verbiage and conclusions of Justice Hanson in Worzella v. Regents, 1958, 77 S.D. 447, 93 N.W.2d 411, wherein he stated, “[wjithout the right to employ, and the power to discharge, its employees the Board loses its constitutional right of control.” (emphasis supplied)
Conceding, as my colleagues Winans and Wollman agree, that there are some limits to the Regents’ powers, such as the inability to change the purpose of the school (Prchal) and the power over the purse (the legislative control of appropriations), I cannot agree with them that, as I measure it and Justice Doyle’s opinion limits it, SDCL 3-18 is an unconstitutional infringement on the Regents’ power of control. To be more specific of those limits, a part of that opinion which impels my concurrence is quoted:
“The ability of the Regents to unilaterally set salaries, discharge employees, or establish employment qualifications is left intact. The board’s basic right of control is left untouched, and SDCL 3-18 is, therefore, a permissible restriction on the exercise of that control.”
The legislature has fashioned a uniform procedure whereby state employees may organize and obtain recognition and good faith negotiations with the Board of their claimed grievances as *56provided by SDCL 3-18-1.1 through 3-18-2 and 3-18-4 and 3-18-5. Having recognized and heard the positions of the employees, the final decision rests with the Regents and their decision is not subject to further review, regulation or any other of the restrictions in SDCL 3-18, which of necessity include those mentioned in the dissent.
With those express limitations on SDCL 3-18, as applied to the classes of employees here involved, and the further caveat that nothing therein authorizes interference with any of the powers of the Board of Regents over the educational staff, I agree that SDCL 3-18 does not infringe on the constitutional control of the Board of Regents over the educational institutions. From these observations, it follows, as the opinion concludes, that the writ of prohibition issued against defendant Garter be reversed and the Board’s action dismissed.
I concur with that part of the opinion that affirms the dismissal of the Attorney General’s complaint in intervention.