Court Opinion

ID: 9557600
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 16:53:13.182832+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:04.377122
License: Public Domain

Green, C.J.
(dissenting) — I dissent. In my judgment, the majority opinion nullifies RCW 7.36.120; further, it prohibits the use of affidavits in reaching decisions on writs of habeas corpus contrary to Somday v. Rhay, 67 Wn.2d 180, 406 P.2d 931 (1965) and Little v. Rhay, 68 Wn.2d 353, 413 P.2d 15, cert. denied, 385 U. S. 96, 17 L. Ed. 2d 196, 87 S. Ct. 331 (1966). Further, the decision will require a full evidentiary hearing every time a petitioner makes a bare, uncorroborated allegation that he has been denied a constitutional right, even though the allegation is conclusively controverted by substantial affidavit and petitioner testifies in person when the writ is heard. Frivolous allegations, under the majority holding would be presumed true and require a full evidentiary hearing to determine their frivolity. I do not believe this result is compelled by the cited decisional or constitutional law.
The scope of the hearing upon application for writ of habeas corpus is set forth in RCW 7.36.120: *733habeas corpus, it is proper to make a determination based upon affidavits. Somday v. Rhay, supra; Little v. Rhay, supra. Evidentiary hearings may be required where a petitioner raises a “serious question of fact” regarding an alleged denial of a constitutional right. Scruggs v. Rhay, 70 Wn.2d 755, 425 P.2d 364 (1967).2 I am unable to find in this record that a “serious question of fact” is presented.
*732The court or judge shall thereupon proceed in a summary way to hear and determine the cause, and if no legal cause be shown for the restraint or for the continuation thereof, shall discharge the party.
(Italics mine.) In disposing of an application for writ of
*733The petition on file alleges essentially that petitioner did not waive his right of trial by jury, at all times told his court-appointed counsel that he wanted a jury trial and that he never realized that he was on trial when the matter was heard; rather, he thought the hearing at which he was convicted was for the sole purpose of deciding what convictions could be used against him on the habitual charge. Petitioner testified at the time his petition was heard. Since no statement of facts was filed on appeal, we do not know what petitioner said but presume his testimony reaffirmed his allegations.
In addition to petitioner’s testimony, the court considered the affidavit of court-appointed counsel:
That he [appointed counsel] met with the Honorable Judge Utter in chambers immediately prior to the commencement of said proceedings on said date and in the company of the counsel for the State; that said Judge then inquired as to whether the question of petitioner’s status as an habitual criminal was to be tried to the court or to a jury. That your affiant responded that he would inquire of the petitioner.
That your affiant left the Judge’s chambers and conferred with petitioner. That your affiant then advised petitioner that petitioner had a right to trial of the question to a jury. That your affiant further advised petitioner that, in your affiant’s opinion as an attorney, no useful purpose would be served by trial of the question to a jury. That petitioner informed your affiant that he would waive his right to trial of the question to a jury. *734That whereupon your affiant returned to the Judge’s chambers and informed the Honorable Judge Utter of the petitioner’s desire to waive trial of the question to a jury. That immediately thereafter the proceedings commenced in open court.
and the affidavit of the deputy prosecuting attorney:
That he has examined portions of the affidavit of Roger I. Lewis, attorney at the trial for Harry Little, defendant; that he has not had the opportunity to examine personal trial notes or the file in the office of the King County Prosecuting Attorney, but do not believe they would reveal whether or not the defendant was advised of his right to a trial by jury in open court;
That to the best of his knowledge, when the matter came on for trial, he and Mr. Lewis conferred with Judge Utter in chambers prior to actual commencement of the trial; that the matter of whether the defendant desired a trial by jury was discussed; that Mr. Lewis then conferred with the defendant and that no jury was called; that he does not specifically have any recollection of the defendant being advised or questioned in open court concerning waiver of the jury, but that it would have been possible, based on recollection of the practice at the time, and the knowledge and experience that court reporters do not always record (or did not at that time) preliminary proceedings.
(Italics mine.) Also considered were affidavits of two sheriff’s deputies, as stated in the majority opinion. In addition, the findings entéred in the habitual proceedings recited that petitioner waived his right to trial by jury. Finally, the trial court had before it the fact that petitioner was just convicted by a jury of one count of indecent liberties and one count of sodomy. Further, he had four prior felony convictions; larceny, assault with a deadly weapon, second-degree burglary, murder in the second degree. Also, there were two other convictions on pleas of guilty for grand larceny and larceny.
With this record before it, the trial court found that petitioner failed to sustain his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not waive his right to trial by jury on the habitual charge. I agree. The trial *735court was in a position to entirely disbelieve petitioner’s oral testimony in light of all of the facts disclosed in the record before it. In essence this is what it did.
It is implicit in the trial court’s decision that petitioner failed to establish either by his testimony or by affidavit that a serious factual constitutional issue existed; thus, a full evidentiary hearing was unnecessary. Scruggs v. Rhay, supra. The controverting affidavit by petitioner’s court-appointed counsel was clear and unmistakable and not inconclusive as was the affidavit in Scruggs v. Rhay, supra. The sheriff’s deputies did not corroborate petitioner’s contentions nor contradict the affidavit of court-appointed counsel. In these circumstances, I do not believe the trial judge was required to presume the truthfulness of the petitioner’s testimony, as stated in the majority opinion, because he had the opportunity to observe petitioner’s demeanor and weigh his credibility. The affidavit of his court-appointed counsel was properly considered along with the other evidence, Somday v. Rhay, supra; Little v. Rhay, supra.
Whether a full evidentiary hearing is required should depend upon the facts of each case. To require such a hearing on the facts of the instant case would necessitate a full evidentiary hearing for every petitioner who makes a bare, uncorroborated allegation, frivolous or not, that his constitutional rights have been violated even where those allegations are conclusively controverted by affidavit, and petitioner is present and testifies in support of his allegations. This I do not believe we are required to do. To do so renders the instruction in RCW 7.36.120 for courts to proceed in a “summary way” to hear and determine applications for habeas corpus meaningless.
No case cited by the majority parallels the facts of this case. As a consequence, I do not believe those cases mandate that the broad general principles recited therein must be applied in every case at the expense of a commonsense approach to the particular facts presented.3 That a case *736may be disposed of on affidavits and answers to interrogatories by petitioner without a full evidentiary hearing is recognized in Schiebelhut v. United States, 357 F.2d 743 (6th Cir. 1966) cited in the majority opinion. Here the trial court had the benefit of petitioner’s oral testimony.
I would affirm the denial of the application for the writ.

In Scruggs the affidavit of court-appointed counsel for petitioner was inconclusive on the constitutional question raised by petitioner’s allegations; and therefore, a “serious question of fact” was presented requiring an evidentiary hearing.

In Sehiebelhut v. United States, 357 F.2d 743 (6th Cir. 1966), at 747, the court observed:
*736“In Orlando [United States v. Orlando, 327 F.2d 185 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 825, 13 L. Ed. 2d 35, 85 S. Ct. 50], Judge Miller construed Machibroda [Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 7 L. Ed. 2d 473, 82 S. Ct. 510 (1962)] as holding that a petitioner is not automatically entitled to a full hearing no matter how ‘palpably incredible his allegations may be’ and that ‘the statute does not strip the district courts of all discretion to exercise their common sense.’ We recognize that the relevant language of Machibroda had literal reference to the necessity of bringing the petitioner into court but we think it had broader implications which have application here.”