Court Opinion

ID: 9744034
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:52:25.895833+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:46.318734
License: Public Domain

RATLIFF, Chief Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in that portion of the majority opinion finding the trial court erred in amending Canfield’s tendered instruction deleting therefrom language defining excuse or justification for violation of a statute and what a person claiming excuse or justification must show to excuse such violation. This is particularly applicable to the alleged statutory violations by Canfield and his attempted explanation or justification for such violation. However, I dissent from the majority holding that the trial court’s damage instruction was faulty.
The trial court instructed the jury that among the elements of damages to Mr. Sandock which they could consider was “[t]he effect of his injury upon the quality and enjoyment of his life.” In Dunn v. Cadiente (1987), Ind.App., 503 N.E.2d 915, 918 (reversed on other grounds, Ind., 516 N.E.2d 52) the instruction given referred to “the nature, extent and permanency of the injury as it affects the quality and enjoyment of life.” The court’s instruction here in language prior to the disputed wording told the jury they should consider the nature and extent of Mr. Sandock’s injuries and whether such injuries were temporary or permanent. Any difference in the language used in the instruction here and that employed in Dunn is purely semantic. Further, in Grubbs v. United States (N.D.Ind.1984), 581 F.Supp. 536, 541, the court, applying Indiana law, observed:
“The law recognizes that an individual is entitled to be compensated for the loss of the use or the loss of function of a part of the body irrespective of the relationship of that loss to other elements of damages. The individual is entitled to the full function of his body, and any loss of function or disability is in itself com-pensable because of the effect upon the quality and enjoyment of life which would not have been impaired but for the injury.”
Adverse effect from injuries upon the enjoyment of life long has been recognized as a factor to consider in awarding damages in this state. Kings Indiana Billiard Co. v. Winters (1952), 123 Ind.App. 110, 106 N.E.2d 713, trans. denied; Samuel E. Pentecost Const. Co. v. O'Donnell (1942), 112 Ind.App. 47, 39 N.E.2d 812, trans. denied. In Winters, the Appellate . Court stated the jury was entitled to consider the plaintiff’s personal suffering and the fact that he had been deprived of enjoyments common to men of his class. The Winters case held the jury was required to consider *1242the loss of privileges and enjoyment common to men of his class.
In most jurisdictions, impairment of the capacity to enjoy life as a result of a personal injury is a proper and separate element of damages. 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages, § 272. See also Annot. 34 ALR 4th 293, § 4. This is not to say there need not be an injury. Obviously, without an injury, no impairment of the ability to enjoy life would result. But, given injury, the effect of that injury upon the quality and enjoyment of life properly may be considered by the jury as a separate element of damages.
The instruction complained of advised the jury they could consider the effect of his injury upon the quality and enjoyment of his life. No new principle was enunciated. Rather, the instruction followed well established law.1 Believing the damage instruction to be correct, I must dissent.

. It is interesting to note that although no issue was raised concerning the propriety of the instructions relating thereto, in both Dayton Walther Corp. v. Caldwell (1980), Ind., 402 N.E.2d 1252, and Antcliff v. Detzman (1982), Ind.App., 436 N.E.2d 114, trans. denied, instructions were given that the jury could consider "the plaintiff’s ability or inability to have and enjoy the pleasures of life.” (Caldwell) or [l]oss of enjoyment of life’s activities.” (Antcliff).