Court Opinion

ID: 995559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 00:39:06.89951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:21.478670
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

CHARLES J. MITCHELL,
Petitioner,

v.

CLARK MARYLAND TERMINALS;
                                                                     No. 97-1887
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS'
COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
Respondents.

On Petition for Review of an Order
of the Benefits Review Board.
(94-713)

Argued: April 7, 1998

Decided: July 15, 1998

Before ERVIN and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and
G. ROSS ANDERSON, JR., United States District Judge for the
District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.

_________________________________________________________________

Reversed by unpublished opinion. Judge Ervin wrote the opinion, in
which Judge Wilkins and Judge Anderson joined.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Bernard Jerome Sevel, SEVEL & SEVEL, P.A., Balti-
more, Maryland, for Petitioner. Andrew Martin Battista, Towson,
Maryland, for Respondents.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

ERVIN, Circuit Judge:

This case arises out of the Benefits Review Board's ("BRB")
reduction of the hourly rate requested by an attorney in a fee petition
submitted for work on a successful claim under the Longshore and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ("LHWCA"), 33 U.S.C. § 901 et
seq. (1994). Claimant Charles J. Mitchell prevailed on his LHWCA
claim against his employer, Clark Maryland Terminals, before an
administrative law judge, and the employer appealed to the BRB. In
response, the claimant's attorney submitted a 27-page brief to the
BRB. After the appeal was summarily affirmed,* the claimant's attor-
ney filed a fee petition with the BRB, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 802.203
(1997), requesting payment for 8.05 hours of work preparing the
brief, at the rate of $195.00 per hour. The employer responded to this
fee petition, arguing that the charges were excessive and should be
reduced. The BRB then entered an order stating:"After review of the
fee petition and employer's response, the Board considers the
requested hourly rate to be excessive in view of the nature and com-
plexity of the case, and therefore reduces the allowable hourly rate to
$150.00. In all other respects, the fee is awarded as requested." Joint
Appendix at 86. The claimant then filed a motion for reconsideration,
which the BRB denied. This appeal followed.

Our review of the BRB's decision is limited. An agency's interpre-
tation of its own regulations is entitled to substantial deference from
the courts. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993);
_________________________________________________________________
*The BRB never addressed the merits of the appeal. On September 12,
1996, the BRB sent the parties a notice stating that pursuant to the provi-
sions of the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 101(d), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-29 (1996),
all appeals to the BRB relating to claims under the Act were deemed to
have been affirmed if the case had been pending before the BRB for
more than one year.

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United States v. Boynton, 63 F.3d 337, 342 (4th Cir. 1995). Nonethe-
less, "the interpretation will not be enforced if it is plainly erroneous
or inconsistent with the regulation's language or the intent of the reg-
ulation...." Boynton, 63 F.3d at 342. In this case, the issue before us
is whether the BRB's decision to reduce the attorney's hourly rate due
to the complexity of the case is inconsistent with the regulation's lan-
guage. We find that it is.

The BRB is authorized to award a successful claimant attorney's
fees under 33 U.S.C. § 928, but that section does not explain how the
BRB should assess the proper amount of the fee. Regulatory guid-
ance, however, is provided by 20 C.F.R. § 802.203. Subsection (d)(4)
of that regulation instructs the attorney for a successful claimant to
submit a fee application including: "The normal billing rate for each
person who performed services on behalf of the claimant. The rate
awarded by the Board shall be based on what is reasonable and cus-
tomary in the area where services were rendered for a person of that
particular professional status." Because the plain language of the reg-
ulation allows the BRB to adjust an attorney's normal billing rate
only if it is out of line with what is "reasonable and customary" for
a similarly-qualified professional in the same area, we find that the
BRB applied the wrong standard when it lowered the attorney's fees
in this case in light of its "nature and complexity." While the BRB
may adjust the number of hours or overall fee awarded pursuant to a
case's complexity, see 20 C.F.R. § 802.203(e), the language and
structure of the regulation compels us to conclude that the BRB must
accept the attorney's normal billing rate, unless it finds that the
requested rate is not reasonable or customary for an attorney of that
professional status in the area where services were rendered, see 20
C.F.R. § 802.203(d)(4).

Because there is no evidence to suggest, and the BRB did not find,
that the hourly rate of $195.00 requested by the attorney here was
excessive in light of his professional status and experience in the area
in which he practices, we reverse the BRB's decision and award a fee
of $1,569.75 for 8.05 hours of legal services at the hourly rate of
$195.00, to be paid directly to claimant's counsel by the employer.

REVERSED

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