Court Opinion

ID: 9889290
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-08 07:10:52.72698+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:22.697111
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed October 3, 2023

                                             In The

                         Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                                    NO. 14-22-00204-CV

                      JOHN-HENRY AYANBADEJO, Appellant
                                                V.
KRISTIN M. SETTLES, PILAR COYLE, FDC MANAGEMENT INC., THE
                     LEXINGTON, Appellees

                        On Appeal from the 189th District Court
                                Harris County, Texas
                          Trial Court Cause No. 2019-89809

                              MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant John-Henry Ayanbadejo (“Ayanbadejo”) appeals pro se1 a
summary judgment granted to the leasing agent, apartment assistant manager, and
management company of the apartment in which he lived, after he sued them for
misrepresentation, Deceptive Trade Practices (“DTPA”), and premises liability. 2 In

      1
          Ayanbadejo is an attorney but not licensed in Texas.
      2
          The Lexington, the apartment owner, was named but not served with citation and did
what we construe as two issues, Ayanbadejo argues that appellees fraudulently
deceived him to sign the lease, violated his privacy, failed to warn of or place anti-
skid materials on ice, and hindered discovery. He also argues that his former
attorney-of-record assaulted him and failed to return his files after withdrawing.
We affirm.

                                   I. BACKGROUND

       Ayanbadejo signed a fourteen-month lease at The Lexington apartments
starting on December 16, 2016, and ending February 16, 2018. On November 1,
2017, Ayanbadejo gave sixty days’ notice of his termination of the lease and
intended move-out: “This letter serves as my sixty (60) day notice to vacate. I will
be vacating my apartment at the end of my current lease.” Ayanbadejo states in his
second amended petition that at the time he had forgotten his was a fourteen-month
lease, not a twelve-month lease. He alleges that after The Lexington received his
notice letter, Pilar Coyle (“Coyle”), the leasing agent, erroneously told him that his
lease lasted until the end of February 2018. Ayanbadejo pleads that he was then
surprised when appellees told him on February 16, 2018, that he was expected to
vacate the property by midnight. He contends that he tendered a check for rent for
the entire month of February on February 16, 2018, to Coyle and the assistant
manager, Kristen M. Settles (“Settles”), and stayed in his apartment through the
end of February. Ayanbadeyo avers that Coyle and Settles improperly deducted
money from his security deposit for cleaning and painting, which he disputes
surpassed normal wear and tear. Ayanbadeyo’s misrepresentation, DTPA, and
contract claims against appellees in the trial court are based on these allegations.

       Ayanbadeyo also brought premises liability claims against the appellees
based on a slip and fall in the common area of The Lexington. On January 16,

not appear.

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2018, Ayanbadeyo slipped on ice at the top of an exterior stairwell after Houston
experienced unusually cold weather and an ice storm. Ayanbadeyo contends that
appellees had a duty to warn him about the ice and to place non-skid “substances”
on the stairway.

       Appellees filed a motion for traditional summary judgment, contending that
the landlord was the proper defendant for Ayanbadeo’s claims, not them; the lease
included a release of liability for managers and agents; and the lease terms
addressed security deposits, modifications of the lease’s duration, and contractual
non-liability for injuries or loss from ice. Appellees also moved for summary
judgment averring that Ayanbadejo was not a consumer under the DTPA in any
transaction with appellees because appellees were only agents who facilitated the
contract between Ayanbadeo and the Landlord, and that case law precluded his
claims for justifiable reliance and slipping on naturally-occurring ice. Appellees’
evidence included the lease and Ayanbadejo’s notice letter that he would be
moving at the end of his lease.

       On February 21, 2022, the trial court granted appellees’ motion for
traditional summary judgment after an oral hearing.3 This appeal ensued.

                                 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

       We review a trial court’s grant of a traditional summary judgment de novo.
Provident Life & Accident Ins. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). In a
traditional motion for summary judgment, the movant has the burden of
establishing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); KPMG

       3
        Ayanbadejo states in his brief that the trial court decided cross-motions for summary
judgment. At the hearing, the trial court stated that “[W]e’re here on Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment,” and the trial court’s order reflects that only appellees’ motion was heard.

                                              3
Peat Marwick v. Harrison Cnty. Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex.
1999). A defendant moving for summary judgment must either (1) disprove at least
one of the essential elements of each of the plaintiff’s causes of action or (2)
conclusively establish all the elements of an affirmative defense. Cathey v. Booth,
900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995). In deciding whether there is a disputed material
fact precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the non-movant will be
taken as true, every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the non-
movant, and any doubts will be resolved in its favor. Knott, 128 S.W.3d at 215.
The movant must conclusively establish its right to judgment as a matter of law.
See MMP, Ltd. v. Jones, 710 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Tex. 1986). A matter is conclusively
established if reasonable people could not differ as to the conclusion to be drawn
from the evidence. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 816 (Tex. 2005).

                                  III.   DISCUSSION

A.    THE LEASING AGENT, ASSISTANT MANAGER & MANAGEMENT COMPANY

      In Ayanbadejo’s first issue, he contends the trial court erred in granting
appellees’ motion for summary judgment because (1) appellees “fraudulently
deceived [him] to enter a leasing contract” for an apartment that had previously
suffered water damage from broken water pipes and (2) appellees violated his
privacy rights under the United States Constitution by entering his apartment
without permission. In sub-issues, Ayanbadejo also argues that appellees did not
prove that the ice he slipped on was naturally occurring; appellees knew about the
ice the day before he slipped but did not place warning signs or anti-slip materials
on the stairwell; and appellees hindered the discovery process.

      When a party moves for summary judgment on multiple grounds, and the
trial court’s order granting summary judgment does not specify the ground or
grounds on which it was based, a party who appeals the order must negate all
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possible grounds upon which the order could have been based. Miner Dederick
Constr., LLP v. Gulf Chem. & Metallurgical Corp., 403 S.W.3d 451, 463 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), pet. denied, 455 S.W.3d 164 (Tex. 2015) (per
curiam). If an appellant does not challenge each possible ground for summary
judgment, then we must uphold the summary judgment on the unchallenged
ground. Id. Appellees’ grounds for summary judgment were: (1) appellees are not
the proper parties to Ayanbadeyo’s claims; (2) the terms of Ayanbadeyo’s lease (a)
release claims against managers and agents of the apartment complex,4 (b) prohibit
verbal modification of the lease, (c) preclude liability for ice and snow, and (d)
govern disposition of security deposits; (3) Supreme Court precedent disallows
Ayanbadeyo’s claims for premises liability for naturally-occurring ice and for
justifiable reliance; and (4) Ayanbadeyo was not a consumer under the DTPA as to
appellees. Ayanbadeyo has not assigned error to each of these grounds on appeal,
including that his lease terms release claims against the apartment’s managers and
agents. Because Ayanbadeyo has not assigned error to appellees’ affirmative
defense of release, we affirm the summary judgment on that ground. See id.

       As to Ayanbadejo’s sub-issue concerning discovery, an appellant must
obtain a ruling from the trial court to preserve error regarding a discovery dispute.
See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1 (stating that to preserve error a party must obtain either an
express or implicit ruling or, if the court refuses to rule, must object to the failure
to rule); U. Lawrence Boze’ & Assocs., P.C. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 368
S.W.3d 17, 32 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.). Although the record
includes Ayanbadejo’s motion to compel appellees’ responses to interrogatories,
and Ayanbadejo complained about inadequate discovery responses in his late-filed

       4
         Release is expressly designated as an affirmative defense. Tex. R. Civ. P. 94. A release
extinguishes a claim or cause of action and is an absolute bar to any right of action on the
released matter. Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. 1993).

                                               5
response 5 to appellees’ motion for summary judgment, the record does not contain
a ruling by the trial court on his discovery complaints. Thus, Ayanbadejo has not
preserved error for review of his complaint alleging appellees’ hindrance of
discovery. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).

       Regarding Ayanbadejo’s issues that appellees fraudulently induced him to
lease a water-damaged apartment and invaded his privacy, Ayanbadejo’s second
amended petition is devoid of these claims. Ayanbadejo cannot raise new causes of
action for the first time on appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a) (requiring
presentation of complaint to trial court to preserve issue for consideration on
appeal); Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) (“Issues not expressly presented to the trial court
. . . shall not be considered on appeal as grounds for reversal”); see also Baxter v.
Gardere Wynne Sewell LLP, 182 S.W.3d 460, 465 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet.
denied) (concluding appellants could not assert claim for first time on appeal to
avoid summary judgment). Accordingly, we cannot address this sub-issue.

       We overrule Ayanbadejo’s first issue, including its sub-issues.

B.     AYANBADEJO’S FORMER COUNSEL OF RECORD

       In his second issue, Ayanbadejo appeals that his former counsel of record
breached a fiduciary duty and violated Ayanbadejo’s constitutional rights under the
First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In his
appellate brief and in some of his pleadings before the trial court, Ayanbadejo
explains that he was originally represented by counsel, Olu Otubusin. Ayanbadejo
complains that his former attorney failed to cooperate in transferring the case files
to another attorney or directly to Ayanbadejo. Ayanbadejo contends that his former

       5
          Under Rule 166a(c), the non-movant’s response must be filed “not later than seven days
prior to the day of hearing.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). The summary judgment hearing occurred
February 21, 2022. Ayanbadejo filed his response three days before the hearing.

                                               6
attorney argued and slapped him on one occasion and coerced him into signing a
motion to withdraw on a second occasion. Ayanbadejo states that his former
attorney utilized an armed guard, who allegedly drew a gun, prevented Ayanbadejo
from taking his files, and physically assaulted him. In August 2021, the trial court
granted Otubusin’s motion to withdraw as attorney of record. Ayanbadejo states
that the trial court erred in awarding fees to his former attorney, but the trial court’s
order does not address attorney’s fees. On appeal, Ayanbadejo also seeks
$1,500,000 in damages from his former attorney, including unpaid wages while
appellant worked at Otubusin’s law office.

      Ayanbadejo’s former attorney is not a party to this lawsuit. See generally
Tex. R. Civ. P. 39(a), 41, 51(a) (setting forth requisites for joinder of persons,
misjoinder, and joinder of claims and remedies). There were no live claims against
the former attorney in the proceedings before the trial court. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 47
(addressing pleadings for claims of relief). There was no motion for sanctions filed
against the attorney in connection with his motion to withdraw. See Tex. R. Civ. P.
13; see also Brewer v. Lennox Hearth Prods., LLC, 601 S.W.3d 704, 718–23 (Tex.
2020) (explaining that a trial court’s inherent authority includes the power to
discipline an attorney’s behavior and discussing limits to this authority). This court
cannot consider Ayanbadejo’s claims against his former attorney for the first time
on appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a) (requiring presentation of complaint to trial
court to preserve issue for consideration on appeal); see also Baxter, 182 S.W.3d at
465 (concluding appellants could not assert claim for first time on appeal).

                                           7
         We thus overrule Ayanbadejo’s second issue.

                                  III.   CONCLUSION

         Having overruled Ayanbadejo’s issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court.

                                          /s/ Justice Margaret “Meg” Poissant

Panel consists of Justices Wise, Zimmerer, and Poissant.

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