Court Opinion

ID: 1079668
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-10-09 20:34:26.427183+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:55:53.284639
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE         
                                                          FILED                     
                                    AT KNOXVILLE                                 
                                                           March 25, 1998           
                                                         Cecil Crowson, Jr.         
          IN THE MATTER OF )THHEA MAIDLOTPOTNI OCNOUNTY              
                                                          Appellate Court Clerk     
          OF SUMMER SIERRA )MA0S3SAE0N1G-A9L7E08-CV-00373            
                                          )                                         
          CRAIG MARCEL BULL) and                                     
          DEBRA FAYE BULL )                                         
                                          )                                         
               Petitioners-App)ellants                                              
                                          )                                         
          KAREN DENISE MASS)ENHGOANLS.EAMUEL H. PAYNE,         
                                          ) J U D G E                              
               Co-Petitioner)                                                       
                                          )                                         
               v. )                                         
                                          )                                         
          CHRISTOPHER WAYNE) R A N D O L P H                         
                                            )                                       
               Respondent-Appe)lAlFeFeIRMED AND REMANDED       
          MICHAEL S. PINEDA OF CHATTANOOGA FOR APPELLANTS
          CHARLES G. WRIGHT, JR., OF CHATTANOOGA FOR APPELLEE
                                   O P I N I O N                          
                                                          Goddard, P.J.     
                    In this adoption proceeding, Craig Marcel Bull and his
          wife, Debra Faye Bull, appeal a determination of the Circuit
          Court for Hamilton County that they had not shown by clear and
          convincing evidence that Christopher Wayne Randolph, father of
          Summer Sierra Massengale, was guilty of any acts which would
          entitle them to have his parental rights terminated. This
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
          determination, of course, precluded the Bulls from adopting the
          child.                                                                    
                    The Bulls contend that the Trial Court failed to use
          the proper standard in determining whether an abandonment had
          occurred, and that the record supports a finding of abandonment
          under the proper standard. They also insist that Mr. Randolph's
          parental rights should be terminated under certain provisions of
          T.C.A. 36-1-113(g), hereinafter set out.  
                    The Trial Judge entered the following memorandum
          opinion which embraced his findings of fact and conclusions of
          law:                                                                      
                    This cause came on to be heard on April 8, 1997,
               upon a petition to terminate the parental rights of
               Christopher Randolph. The petition was filed by Craig
               and Debra Faye Bull, who have present custody of this
               minor child by virtue of an order from the Juvenile
               Court. This Court heard testimony from Craig Bull,
               Debra Faye Bull, Christopher Randolph, Shirley
               Massengale, paternal grandmother, Tammy Lane, and Scott
               Giles and the deposition for proof of the natural
               mother, Karen Massengale. This petition was filed and
               accompanied with an adoption petition. The natural
               mother, Karen Massengale, consented to the adoption and
               Mr. Christopher Randolph, the natural father of the
               child, has filed an answer seeking to deny the adoption
               and gain custody of his minor child. This matter was
               filed pursuant to T.C.A. 36-1-102 and 36-1-113. Mr. &
               Mrs. Bull obtained the child, who was born in May 1996,
               approximately six weeks after her birth. The Bulls
               picked the child up from the natural mother's
               grandmother, Shirley Massengale, and have resided since
               that time at 610 Bivins Road. Mr. & Mrs. Bull have
               three other children. The Bulls obtained custody of
               this minor child from the Juvenile Court by virtue of
               filing a petition along with an affidavit from the
               natural mother, Karen Massengale, who is presently
               incarcerated in the penitentiary. In their petition
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               they alleged in Juvenile Court they did not know the
               address or whereabouts of the natural father,
               Christopher Randolph. Christopher Randolph avers he
               was never notified, was never served, and had no idea
               where the child was so that he could pay support, or so
               he could visit. This Court finds that the natural
               mother, Karen Massengale, knew how to get in touch with
               Christopher Randolph and they intentionally did not
               notify him to be at the hearing in Juvenile Court. The
               testimony revealed that neither Mr. or Mrs. Bull or
               Karen Massengale even made any attempt to contact or
               serve the natural father, Christopher Randolph. It is
               in evidence that Christopher Randolph filed a petition
               to legitimate this child and even visited the child
               while it was in the hospital after its birth. He
               alleges that he paid $50 on several occasions to the
               mother before the birth and even after the birth. The
               natural mother denies this and says he only paid $25.
               The evidence shows that Christopher Randolph has
               visited with the child at the hospital, has had the
               child on overnight visitation on two other occasions.
               Christopher Randolph says he then lost awareness of
               where the child was and since the natural mother was in
               the penitentiary he could not find the child until he
               was served with the Petition for Adoption. Mr.
               Randolph called the grandmother, Shirley Massengale,
               and the natural mother, Karen Massengale, and they
               would not reveal the child's location. Christopher
               Randolph, the natural father of this child, has served
               seven years in the penitentiary for rape and the
               natural mother is now in the penitentiary. When this
               child was born, the mother was on cocaine and the child
               even had a cocaine habit, according to their testimony.
               It is also in evidence that the natural father,
               Christopher Randolph, supplied clothes and diapers for
               the child when he knew where she was. The testimony of
               all the parties in this case was highly conflicting and
               this Court could not say that the burden of proof to
               terminate the natural father's rights has been carried.
               This Court finds that there is not clear and convincing
               evidence for the grounds of termination of the father's
               rights as set forth in T.C.A. 36-1-113(c)(1), which
               requires a finding by the Court of clear and convincing
               evidence that the grounds for termination of parental
               rights have been established---or T.C.A. 36-1-113(5)(g)
               or any of the grounds that are stated in this section.
               The Court further finds that there is no clear and
               convincing evidence that the parent has abandoned the
               child or violated any of the provisions set forth in
               T.C.A. 36-1-113(7)(B) or (8)(A).               
                    This Court finds that the father is now presently
               working at Aladdin Industries in Dalton, Georgia and
               makes approximately $518.40 per week. Although the
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               natural father, Christopher Randolph, has admitted to
               having alcohol and drug problems, he says he is now
               presently clean and has been through a recovery program
               with AA. At the trial he was clean, well dressed and
               had complete control of himself and has maintained his
               job for some period of time. It is in evidence here
               that the natural father grasped at every opportunity to
               develop some relationship with his child, and he
               constantly called the mother, even when she was in the
               penitentiary, and the grandmother trying to locate the
               child. Neither natural parent in the case before the
               Court qualifies as what this Court would call totally
               responsible parents. Therefore, this child should be
               left in the custody of Mr. & Mrs. Bull and child
               support be fixed at $85.00 per week by the natural
               father, Christopher Randolph, and the case returned to
               Juvenile Court for the fixing of visitation rights
               and/or further determination of their temporary custody
               decree. This Court recommends counseling for all
               parties and, if necessary, the help of the Department
               of Human Services in establishing a reasonable
               visitation schedule. The Tennessee Supreme Court in
               1994 stated that a father whose child has been
               legitimated can defeat adoption by withholding consent
               to adoptionN al-e -v.- R obSeretseo n, 871 S.W.2d 674     
               (1994). The Court also O'hDaenileld v .in the case of
               Messier, 905 S.W.2d 182 (1995), that a party seeking
               declaration of abandonment in adoption case must prove
               his or her case by heightened "clear and convincing
               evidence" standard to safeguard against wrongful
               determination of biological parent's parental rights.
               The Court also heldKo iivun v . tIrhwien, c7a2s1e of  
               S.W.2d 803 (1986) that a finding of possible
               abandonment in adoption proceeding, or the lack of such
               finding, on the part of one parent is not to be
               interpreted as conclusive to the other parent or the
               ultimate issue.                                              
                    In considering whether there has been abandonment
               in this case, the Court has considered such factors as
               the parent's ability to support the child, the amount
               of support the parent has provided to the child - or
               tried to provide, extent and nature of contact between
               the parent and the child - or his attempts to visit,
               frequency of gifts on any special occasions - such as
               gifts of clothes and diapers, and whether the parent
               voluntarily relinquished custody of the child. This
               Court finds the natural father did not voluntarily
               relinquish custody. The length of time the child has
               been separated from the parent is approximately one
               year. The home environment and conduct of the parents
               prior to removal of the child are suspect. The natural
               father or natural mother, Karen Massengale, had no home
               environment with this child after its birth, but only
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               periodic visitation as other people cared for the
               child. This Court, although not approving of the
               natural father's or natural mother's conduct in any
               manner, cannot say that the father under this proof has
               evidenced any conduct which evidences a settled purpose
               to forego all parental duties and relinquish all
               parental rights to this child by clear and convincing
               evidence.                                                            
                    T.C.A. 36-1-113, which addresses abandonment as a
          ground for termination of parental rights, provides as pertinent
          to this appeal the following:                            
                    36-1-113. Termination of parental rights.                      
                    . . . .                                                    
                    (g) Termination of parental or guardianship rights
               may be based upon any of the following grounds:
                    (1) Abandonment by the parent or guardian, as
               defined in § 36-1-102, has occurred.         
                    T.C.A. 36-1-102 defines abandonment as follows:
                    36-1-102. Definitions.-- As used in this part,  
               unless the context otherwise requires:     
                    (1)(A) "Abandonment" means, for purposes of
               terminating the parental or guardian rights of
               parent(s) or guardian(s) of a child to that child in
               order to make that child available for adoption, that:
                    (I) For a period of four (4) consecutive months
               immediately preceding the filing of a proceeding or
               pleading to terminate the parental rights of the
               parent(s) or guardian(s) of the child who is the
               subject of the petition for termination of parental
               rights or adoption, that the parent(s) or guardian(s)
               either have willfully failed to visit or have willfully
               failed to support or make reasonable payments toward
               the support of the child;                           
                    . . . .                                                    
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                    (iii) A biological or legal father has either
               willfully failed to visit or willfully failed to make
               reasonable payments toward the support of the child's
               mother during the four (4) months immediately preceding
               the birth of the child; provided, that in no instance
               shall a final order terminating the parental rights of
               a parent as determined pursuant to subdivision
               (1)(A)(iii) be entered until at least thirty (30) days
               have elapsed since the date of the child's birth.
                    Koivu v., E7r2w1i nS.W.2d 803 (Tenn.App.1986), was
          relied upon by the Trial Court, which defined abandonment under
          the statute then in effect, and quoted with approval from earlier
          cases and American Jurisprudence, as follows (at page 808):
               In addressing this question Mr. Justice Brock, speaking
               for the CAoduoprtiton oif nBo wling v. Bowling, 631           
               S.W.2d 386 (Tenn.1982)W,ol feandnend, quoting from
               which in turn quotes from American Jurisprudence, said
               the following (at page 389):                     
                "So, the issue of abandonment should be resolved by
                the Circuit Court under the following statement of
                law:                                                                
                 'Abandonment imports any conduct on the part of the
                 parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego
                 all parental duties and relinquish all parental
                 claims to the child. It does not follow that the
                 purpose may not be repented of, and, in proper
                 cases all parental rights again acquired.... But
                 when abandonment is shown to have existed, it
                 becomes a judicial question whether it really has
                 been terminated, or can be, consistently with the
                 welfare of the child.' 1 Am.Jur., Adoption of
                 Children, § 42." 349 S.W.2d at 714.   
                    By a 1996 amendment to T.C.A. 36-1-102(1)(G), the
          Legislature specifically overruled the definition of abandonment
          containKeodi vibuny providing the following:            
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                    (G) "Abandonment" does not have any other
               definition except that which is set forth herein, it
               being the intent of the general assembly to establish
               the only grounds for abandonment by statutory
               definition. Specifically, it shall not be required
               that a parent be shown to have evinced a settled
               purpose to forego all parental rights and
               responsibilities in order for a determination of
               abandonment to be made. Decisions of any court to the
               contrary are hereby legislatively overruled.
                    While it is true the Trial Judge's opinion relied upon
          case law repealed by the Legislature, it is clear that it he
          accredited the testimony of Mr. Randolph and his witnesses rather
          than those of the mother and her witnesses on the question of
          whether his conduct was wilful.                      
                    As already noted, the Bulls also contend that they are
          entitled to termination of Mr. Randolph's parental rights under
          the following Sections of T.C.A. 36-1-113(g):
               (8)(A) The parental rights of any person who is not the
               legal parent or guardian of a child or who is described
               in § 36-1-117(b) or (c) may also be terminated based
               upon any one (1) or more of the following additional
               grounds:                                                             
                    (i) The person has failed, without good cause or
               excuse, to pay a reasonable share of prenatal, natal,
               and postnatal expenses involving the birth of the child
               in accordance with the person's financial means
               promptly upon the person's receipt of notice of the
               child's impending birth;                             
                    . . . .                                                    
                    (vi) The person has failed to file a petition to
               establish paternity of the child within thirty (30)
               days after notice of alleged paternity by the child's
               mother.                                                              
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                    With regard to Sub-section (i), the record supports the
          finding of the Trial Court that Mr. Randolph gave certain monies
          to the mother and offered to pay medical bills, but this offer
          was refused because these bills were being paid through TennCare.
                    As to Subsection (vi), there is nothing in the record
          to show that the mother ever gave "notice of the alleged
          paternity." Additionally, we note that Mr. Randolph, of his own
          volition, legitimated the child, as shown by a recommendation of
          the Referee of the Juvenile Court (which was presumably approved
          by the Juvenile Judge) dated December 9, 1996, which was after
          the petition was filed in this Court, but long before the hearing
          in the Trial Court on April 8, 1997.           
                    It should also be noted that these provisions only
          apply to one who is not a legal parent, which is defined in
          T.C.A. 36-1-102(26) to be:                            
                    (26) "Legal parent" means:                    
                    . . . .                                                    
                    (D) A man who has been adjudicated to be the legal
               father of the child by any court or administrative body
               of this state or any other state or territory or
               foreign country or who has signed, pursuant to §§ 24-7-
               118, 68-3-203(g), 68-3-302 and 68-3-305(b), an
               unrevoked and sworn acknowledgment of paternity under
               the provisions of Tennessee law, or who has signed such
               a sworn acknowledgment pursuant to the law of any other
               state, territory, or foreign country.      
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                    Finally, we observe that Sub-section (8) uses the
          precatory word "may," rather than the mandatory one "shall."
                    We accordingly conclude that--upon deferring to the
          Trial Judge's judgment as to credibility and upon using the
          correct standard--the evidence failed to show by clear and
          convincing evidence that Mr. Randolph was guilty of any acts
          justifying termination of his parental rights.
                    For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Trial
          Court is affirmed and the cause remanded for such further
          proceedings as may be necessary and collection of costs below.
          Costs of appeal are adjudged against the Bulls and their surety.
                                        _______________________________             
                                        Houston M. Goddard, P.J.   
          CONCUR:                                                                   
          ________________________________                                          
          Don T. McMurray, J.                                        
          ________________________________                                          
          Charles D. Susano, Jr., J.                           
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