Court Opinion

ID: 2963956
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:17:57.925498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:49.100726
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USCA1 Opinion

	

          March 8, 1996     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 95-1556

                                     KATHY SMITH,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                               F.W. MORSE & CO., INC.,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                              _________________________

                                     ERRATA SHEET
                                     ERRATA SHEET

               The  opinion of this court  issued on February  12, 1996, is
          corrected as follows:

          On  page 21,  line 15,  change "(1st  Cir. 1995)"  to  "(1st Cir.
          1996)"

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 95-1556

                                     KATHY SMITH,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                               F.W. MORSE & CO., INC.,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                              _________________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

                     [Hon. Norman H. Stahl, U.S. District Judge]
                                            ___________________
                   [Hon. Steven J. McAuliffe, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                              _________________________

                                        Before

                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________

                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                              and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
                                          _____________

                              _________________________

               Debra  Weiss  Ford,  with whom  Edmond  J.  Ford, Eileen  L.
               __________________              ________________  __________
          Koehler,  and  Ford,  Ford &  Weaver,  P.A.  were  on brief,  for
          _______        ____________________________
          appellant.
               Raymond P.  Blanchard, with whom Taylor,  Keane & Blanchard,
               _____________________            ___________________________
          P.A. was on brief, for appellee.
          ____

                              _________________________

                                  February 12, 1996
                              _________________________

                    SELYA,  Circuit Judge.  In this  appeal, the  plaintiff
                    SELYA,  Circuit Judge.
                            _____________

          invites  us to  overrule  the district  court's adverse  decision

          under Title  VII of the  Civil Rights Act  of 1964, 42  U.S.C.   

          2000e-2000e-17 (1988)  (Title VII),  and to reinstate  her common

          law  causes  of  action  for  breach  of  contract  and  wrongful

          discharge.  We decline the invitation in all its aspects.

          I.  BACKGROUND
          I.  BACKGROUND

                    We  chronicle the  events that  preceded the  filing of

          suit and then recount what transpired thereafter.

                              A.  Chronology of Events.
                              A.  Chronology of Events.
                                  ____________________

                    Damar  Plastics  &  Metal  Fabricators,   Inc.  (Damar)

          operated  a job  shop  in Somersworth,  New  Hampshire, where  it

          crafted  custom  components  for   high-technology  applications.

          Plaintiff-appellant Kathy Smith joined Damar in 1976 and advanced

          steadily through  the ranks  until she  reached  the position  of

          production  manager  almost a  decade later.   In  that capacity,

          Smith scheduled production  runs and coordinated delivery  dates.

          In late  1987, after an  imbroglio with Darrol  Robinson (Damar's

          owner   and  general   manager),   she  requested   and  obtained

          reassignment  to a  different post  having no  responsibility for

          production scheduling.

                    On December  23, 1988, defendant-appellee F.W.  Morse &

          Co., Inc. (Morse), a  firm owned by Chris Bond,  acquired Damar's

          business  and assets.  Damar then had fewer than forty employees,

          including seven managers reporting directly to Robinson:  Michael

          Hickman  (production  control);  Robert  Lane  (shipping); Ronald

                                          3

          Paradis (production/machining);  Marc Shevenell (production/sheet

          metal); Gary Bickford (engineering);  Michael Seeger (sales); and

          Smith.    Though  not  titled,  Smith  testified  that   she  was

          considered  to  be a  de facto  manager  who, largely  because of

          Hickman's  inadequacies,  performed many  of  the  duties of  the

          production control manager.

                    Bond promptly concluded that  Damar had too many chiefs

          and  too few  Indians.   Within  days of  the  closing, he  fired

          Hickman.   Then, in concert with Maryann Guimond, the new general

          manager  (who  had  authority   to  hire,  fire,  and  discipline

          personnel),  he  interviewed  a  number  of employees,  including

          Smith.   In the aftermath  of this review,  the company cashiered

          Lane.   To  fill  the void  created  by the  two  executive-level

          departures, Morse promoted Smith to the newly created position of

          materials manager, consolidating responsibilities for scheduling,

          production  control, inventory control, purchasing, shipping, and

          receiving that had previously been spread among three managers.

                    All  told,  Morse's   initial  reorganization   efforts

          substituted  Guimond  for   Robinson  and  pared   second-echelon

          management  from  seven to  five.   In  addition to  Guimond, the

          reconfigured  management  team  comprised   Paradis  (machining);

          Shevenell  (sheet metal); Bickford (engineering); Seeger (sales);

          and  Smith  (materials).   In  recognition  of Smith's  increased

          responsibilities, Morse  twice hiked her pay (once in January and

          again in March),  thus increasing her  weekly stipend by  roughly

          twenty-five percent.

                                          4

                    At about the time of the takeover, Smith informed  Bond

          that  she had become pregnant  and would need  a maternity leave.

          Morse,  a tiny  company,  had no  formal maternity  leave policy.

          Bond nonetheless honored Smith's request and assured her that her

          position  was "secure."  In preparation for her leave, Smith held

          several  meetings  with Guimond,  Shevenell,  and  Paradis.   The

          company temporarily distributed her managerial duties among other

          supervisors  and  arranged  for a  newly-hired  secretary,  Kelly

          Gilday,  to  perform her  clerical  functions.   Along  the  way,

          Guimond informed  Smith that  either Paradis or  Shevenell likely

          would  be discharged,  and told  her that  she would  be promoted

          again  upon  her  return  from  maternity  leave.   Guimond  also

          indicated that,  in all  probability, Bickford would  be demoted,

          and Smith  would  be asked  to assume  a portion  of his  duties.

          While   these   changes   presumably  would   warrant   increased

          remuneration, Guimond did not mention an amount.

                    On  April 7,  1989,  Smith began  her maternity  leave,

          planning to  return to work in approximately six weeks.  She gave

          birth two weeks later.  Meanwhile, Guimond, expecting the "sky to

          fall," held  regular "reality check" meetings  with Shevenell and

          Paradis.   To  her  surprise, the  plant  functioned very  well.1

          Guimond reported the good news to Bond.

                    Smith visited the plant on  May 1 and informed  Guimond

          that  she  wished  to  return  to  work  one  week  earlier  than
                              
          ____________________

               1During  this same  time frame,  the company  eliminated the
          engineering manager's position.  However, Bickford remained  with
          Morse in a lesser capacity.

                                          5

          originally  anticipated.   Guimond inquired  about whether  Smith

          desired  more children,  and  Smith replied  affirmatively.   The

          following day, Guimond queried  Karen Vendasi, Smith's sister and

          co-worker,  about Smith's plans to have a larger family.  Vendasi

          relayed this conversation to Smith and told her of nascent rumors

          to the effect that she might not return to work.  Smith contacted

          Guimond  and  demanded  an   explanation.    Guimond  denied  any

          knowledge  of the rumors, dismissed them as idle buzznacking, and

          again  assured Smith that her  job was secure.   Guimond repeated

          these assurances during a chance meeting on May 4.

                    A few days later,  Guimond concluded that the materials

          manager's position  was superfluous and decided  to eliminate it.

          She told Smith of her decision on May 11.   During this telephone

          conversation, Guimond asked Smith if  she preferred people to  be

          told that she  had decided to stay at home  with her infant child

          rather than that  she had  been discharged.   Smith rejected  the

          suggestion.  Nevertheless, a  Morse employee repeated this canard

          to several customers.2

                    Following Smith's  severance, Guimond gave  most of her

          duties  to Paradis  in his  new capacity  as operations  manager.

          Shevenell assumed the role of manufacturing manager (in charge of

          both  machining and sheet metal work).  Guimond also promoted two

          lower-ranking  employees, Peter  Lapanne  and  Brian Hoffman,  to

          assistant  manager  positions (though  evidence adduced  at trial

                              
          ____________________

               2The company  reprimanded the employee  and trial  testimony
          tended to establish that Morse had not authorized the comments.

                                          6

          demonstrated that Lapanne  had been an  assistant manager as  far

          back   as  1984,   and   that  neither   man   assumed  any   new

          responsibilities or received  any salary  increase in  connection

          with  his new title).   Gilday continued to  perform the clerical

          functions  associated with  Smith's  former position.   When  the

          second round  of the  reorganization wound  down,  the plant  had

          three second-echelon managers    Paradis (operations);  Shevenell

          (manufacturing); and  Seeger (sales)    in lieu  of the  original

          seven.

                               B.  Procedural History.
                               B.  Procedural History.
                                   __________________

                    Smith  sued  Morse  in  a  New  Hampshire  state  court

          alleging,  inter   alia,  wrongful  discharge   based  on  gender
                     _____   ____

          discrimination, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and

          breach of contract.   Morse removed the case to  federal district

          court on the ground  that Smith's claim "arose under"  Title VII,

          thus prompting federal question  jurisdiction.  See 28  U.S.C.   
                                                          ___

          1331,   1343(c)(3),  1441,  1446;  see  also  28  U.S.C.     1367
                                             ___  ____

          (conferring  ancillary  jurisdiction  over   appended  nonfederal

          claims).   Smith thereafter filed an amended  complaint that made

          her Title VII claim explicit.

                    Early  in the  proceedings,  Morse  moved  for  partial

          summary judgment.   The  district court  (Stahl, J.) granted  the

          motion  on  the  common  law  wrongful  discharge  and  emotional

          distress claims.  See  Smith v. F.W. Morse  & Co., No.  90-361-S,
                            ___  _____    _________________

          slip op. at 12 (D.N.H. Sept. 26, 1991) (unpublished) (Smith I).
                                                                _______

                    Several  years later, the  parties simultaneously tried

                                          7

          the Title VII  claim to the bench (McAuliffe,  J.) and the breach

          of contract  claim to a jury.3   At the close  of the plaintiff's

          case, the district court entered  judgment as a matter of law  in

          the  defendant's  favor on  the  breach  of  contract  claim  and

          disbanded  the jury.   The  Title VII  case proceeded  before the

          district judge.   Morse asserted  that it scrapped  the materials

          manager's  position  and laid  off the  appellant  as part  of an

          overarching   strategy  to  streamline   a  top-heavy  managerial

          structure, and that even if Smith had not been on maternity leave

          she would have been flattened by the downsizing steamroller.  The

          district  court agreed  and  entered judgment  accordingly.   See
                                                                        ___

          Smith v.  F.W. Morse  & Co.,  901 F. Supp.  40, 45  (D.N.H. 1995)
          _____     _________________

          (Smith II).  This appeal ensued.
           ________

          II.  THE TITLE VII CLAIM
          II.  THE TITLE VII CLAIM

                    The crown jewel of the appellant's asseverational array

          is her contention that  the district court erred in  finding that

          Morse  did not discriminate against her  on the basis of her sex.

          Our appraisal of this contention is in three parts.

                               A.  Standard of Review.
                               A.  Standard of Review.
                                   __________________

                    Following a  bench trial, the court  of appeals reviews
                              
          ____________________

               3The Civil Rights  Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166,    102, 105
          Stat. 1071, 1073  (1991) (codified at  42 U.S.C.    1981a(c)(1)),
          authorizes trial  by jury in  Title VII cases.   Since the events
          that  form the basis of  the appellant's claim  occurred prior to
          the effective date of  the 1991 Act, she  had no right to  a jury
          trial on her  Title VII claim.  See Landgraf  v. USI Film Prods.,
                                          ___ ________     ________________
          Inc., 114  S. Ct. 1483, 1487 (1994) (holding that the 1991 Act is
          ____
          not retroactive).  By like token,  the Price Waterhouse framework
                                                 ________________
          for proof  of "mixed-motive"  discrimination that we  describe in
          Part II(B), infra, is  somewhat changed under the 1991  Act.  See
                      _____                                             ___
          Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1142 (4th Cir. 1995).
          ______    ______

                                          8

          the trier's factual determinations  for clear error, see Cumpiano
                                                               ___ ________

          v. Banco Santander P.R.,  902 F.2d 148, 152 (1st Cir. 1990); Fed.
             ____________________

          R.  Civ.  P. 52(a),  but affords  plenary  review to  the trier's

          formulation  of  applicable legal  rules,  see  Johnson v.  Watts
                                                     ___  _______     _____

          Regulator  Co.,  63  F.3d  1129,  1132  (1st  Cir.  1995).    The
          ______________

          jurisprudence of clear error  constrains us from deciding factual

          issues anew.   See, e.g., Jackson v. Harvard Univ., 900 F.2d 464,
                         ___  ____  _______    _____________

          466  (1st  Cir.), cert.  denied, 498  U.S.  848 (1990);  Keyes v.
                            _____  ______                          _____

          Secretary  of  the Navy,  853 F.2d  1016,  1019 (1st  Cir. 1988).
          _______________________

          Indeed,  we may  not disturb  the district  court's record-rooted

          findings of fact unless on the whole of the evidence we reach the

          irresistible conclusion  that  a  mistake  has been  made.    See
                                                                        ___

          Cumpiano,  902 F.2d at 152;  RCI Northeast Servs.  Div. v. Boston
          ________                     __________________________    ______

          Edison Co., 822 F.2d 199, 203 (1st Cir. 1987).
          __________

                    This deferential  standard extends not only  to factual

          findings  simpliciter  but  also  to inferences  drawn  from  the

          underlying facts.   See Cumpiano,  902 F.2d at  152.   Similarly,
                              ___ ________

          findings regarding an actor's  motivation fall within the shelter

          of  Rule 52(a), and, therefore,  if the trial  court's reading of

          the record on such an issue is plausible, appellate review  is at

          an end.  See Foster v.  Dalton,71 F.3d 52, 56-57 (1st Cir. 1995);
                   ___ ______     ______

          Anthony v. Sundlun, 952 F.2d 603, 606 (1st Cir. 1991).
          _______    _______

                         B.  The Jurisprudence of Title VII.
                         B.  The Jurisprudence of Title VII.
                             ______________________________

                    Title VII  provides, inter alia, that it is an unlawful
                                         _____ ____

          employment practice  for an  employer to discharge  an individual

          because of  her sex.  See  42 U.S.C.   2000e-2(a)(1).   After the
                                ___

                                          9

          Supreme  Court  held  that  this phraseology  did  not  proscribe

          discrimination on the  basis of pregnancy, see  General Elec. Co.
                                                     ___  _________________

          v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1976), Congress augmented Title
             _______

          VII  by enacting the Pregnancy  Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA),

          Pub. L. 95-555,   1,  92 Stat. 2076, 2076 (1978) (codified  at 42

          U.S.C.   2000e(k)).  The PDA made clear that:

                    The terms  "because of sex" or  "on the basis
                    of sex"  include,  but are  not  limited  to,
                    because  of or  on  the  basis of  pregnancy,
                    childbirth,  or  related medical  conditions;
                    and women affected by  pregnancy, childbirth,
                    or  related  medical   conditions  shall   be
                    treated the same  for all  employment-related
                    purposes, including receipt of benefits under
                    fringe benefit programs, as other persons not
                    so affected  but similar in their  ability or
                    inability to work.

          42  U.S.C.   2000e(k).  Thus, at  the time Smith and Morse parted

          company,  Title VII's  ban on  gender  discrimination encompassed

          pregnancy-based discrimination.

                    Like other  Title VII plaintiffs, an  employee claiming

          discrimination on the basis of pregnancy may proceed under either

          a  disparate  treatment  or  a  disparate  impact  theory.    See
                                                                        ___

          generally Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575, 579-
          _________ ____________________    ______

          80  (1978)  (explaining  the  dichotomy).   Here,  the  appellant

          alleged disparate treatment.  Consequently, she had the burden of

          proving that the defendant purposefully terminated her employment

          because of her pregnancy.

                    In cases  predating the Civil  Rights Act of  1991, see
                                                                        ___

          supra   note   3,   the   framework   for   proving   intentional
          _____

          discrimination  varies depending  on  the availability  of direct

                                          10

          evidence.   See Fields  v. Clark Univ.,  966 F.2d 49,  51-52 (1st
                      ___ ______     ___________

          Cir.  1992), cert. denied, 113  S. Ct. 976  (1993); Cumpiano, 902
                       _____ ______                           ________

          F.2d at 153.   Absent  the evidentiary equivalent  of a  "smoking

          gun," the plaintiff must attempt to prove her case by resort to a

          burden-shifting framework.  See  Texas Dep't of Community Affairs
                                      ___  ________________________________

          v. Burdine,  450 U.S. 248, 254-56 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp.
             _______                                _______________________

          v. Green,  411 U.S.  792, 802  (1973).  Under  this framework,  a
             _____

          plaintiff  can   establish  a  prima  facie   case  of  pregnancy

          discrimination  by  showing that  (1)  she  is pregnant  (or  has

          indicated  an   intention  to  become  pregnant),   (2)  her  job

          performance   has  been  satisfactory,   but  (3)   the  employer

          nonetheless  dismissed her from her position  (or took some other

          adverse employment  action against  her) while (4)  continuing to

          have her duties performed by a comparably qualified person.  See,
                                                                       ___

          e.g., Cumpiano, 902 F.2d  at 153; Lipsett v. University  of P.R.,
          ____  ________                    _______    ___________________

          864 F.2d 881, 899 (1st Cir.  1988).  Establishing the prima facie

          case raises a rebuttable presumption  that discrimination sparked

          the adverse employment action, see Cumpiano, 902 F.2d at 153, and
                                         ___ ________

          imposes upon the employer  a burden to put forward  a legitimate,

          nondiscriminatory motive for  the action.  See  Burdine, 450 U.S.
                                                     ___  _______

          at 254-55;  Lipsett, 864  F.2d at 899.   If the  defendant clears
                      _______

          this modest hurdle, the  presumption of discrimination vaporizes,

          see  Mesnick v. General  Elec. Co., 950  F.2d 816, 823  (1st Cir.
          ___  _______    __________________

          1991), cert.  denied, 504  U.S. 985  (1992),4  and the  plaintiff
                 _____  ______
                              
          ____________________

               4Mesnick  is a case brought under  the Age Discrimination in
          Employment  Act (ADEA), 29  U.S.C.    621-634,  rather than under
          Title VII.   The same burden-shifting  framework applies in  both

                                          11

          (who  retains the ultimate burden  of persuasion on  the issue of

          discriminatory  motive  throughout)  must  then  prove  that  the

          employer's   proffered    justification   is   a    pretext   for

          discrimination,  see St. Mary's Honor  Ctr. v. Hicks,  113 S. Ct.
                           ___ ______________________    _____

          2742, 2749 (1993); Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 823-24.
                             _______

                    On the  relatively rare occasions when a smoking gun is

          discernible   that is, when a  plaintiff produces direct evidence

          that  the protected characteristic was a motivating factor in the

          employment   action      the  McDonnell   Douglas  framework   is
                                        ___________________

          inapposite.  See Fields, 966 F.2d at 52.  In  those cases, direct
                       ___ ______

          evidence  of discriminatory  motive    say, an  admission by  the

          employer that it explicitly  took actual or anticipated pregnancy

          into account in reaching an employment decision   serves to shift

          the burden of persuasion  from employee to employer.   The latter

          must  then affirmatively prove that  it would have  made the same

          decision even if  it had not  taken the protected  characteristic

          into account.  See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258
                         ___ ________________    _______

          (1989) (plurality op.); id. at 265-67 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
                                  ___

                    The seeming  neatness of this dichotomy  is illusory in

          certain  respects,   for   evidence   rarely   comes   in   tidy,

          geometrically precise packages.  In many cases, the  line between

          McDonnell Douglas, on  one hand,  and  Price  Waterhouse, on  the
          _________________                      _________________

          other  hand, is  blurred.   In  those situations,  classification

                              
          ____________________

          instances; therefore, ADEA cases have solid precedential value in
          Title  VII litigation.  Hence, we  cite herein interchangeably to
          Title VII  and ADEA  cases, often without  distinguishing between
          them.

                                          12

          depends on  both the  quantity and quality  of the  proof that  a

          court  deems   sufficient  to   constitute  direct   evidence  of

          discriminatory animus.

                    Discretion is  sometimes the better part  of valor, and

          courts  often wisely  decide  to sidestep  difficult  theoretical

          questions  if answers  to them  are not  essential to  the proper

          resolution of a given case.  We have here a good example  of such

          a  prudential approach.   The  trial  court largely  bypassed any

          differential  direct  evidence/circumstantial evidence  tamisage,

          preferring to go directly to a  finding that, on the totality  of

          the   evidence   presented,   Morse   had   proven  that   gender

          discrimination did not trigger the firing.  See Smith II, 901  F.
                                                      ___ ________

          Supp. at 44-45.  This approach negates any need for  us to pursue

          the question of an analytic  framework to a definite  conclusion.

          While we  agree with our concurring colleague that the decisional

          process  is  important,  there comes  a  point  at which  slavish

          insistence upon process for its own sake serves only to exalt the

          trappings  of justice  over its  substance.   Here, the  district

          court's finding on causation,  if sustainable, resolves the Title

          VII claim whether  the appellant's prima facie  case arises under

          the  McDonnell Douglas or Price  Waterhouse paradigm.   And as we
               _________________    _________________

          illustrate  below, see  infra  Part III(C),  that finding  passes
                             ___  _____

          muster.

                                   C.  The Merits.
                                   C.  The Merits.
                                       __________

                    Consistent  with the  district court's  approach, Morse

          must be assumed to have  had the burden of proving that  it would

                                          13

          have taken the  same action    the elimination  of the  materials

          manager's  position     whether   or  not  the  appellant  became

          pregnant,  took  a  maternity  leave,  or  planned  to bear  more

          children.    The court  found that  Morse  carried the  devoir of

          persuasion on  this  pivotal issue.   It  concluded that  Morse's

          decision was  "motivated by business judgment  and represented an

          effort to economize  by placing the  most qualified personnel  in

          the fewest number  of managerial positions possible, and  was not

          based on  plaintiff's gender, pregnancy, or  her expressed desire

          to have more children."  Smith II, 901 F. Supp. at 44.  The court
                                   ________

          also  concluded  "that  even  if   Guimond  is  assumed  to  have

          considered impermissible gender-based  factors, the same decision

          to  eliminate plaintiff's position would  still have been made at

          the same  time" for reasons of business necessity.  Id.  The crux
                                                              ___

          of our inquiry is whether these findings are clearly erroneous.

                    There is little doubt that an employer, consistent with

          its business judgment, may  eliminate positions during the course

          of a  downsizing without  violating Title  VII even  though those

          positions are held by members of protected groups (pregnant women

          included).  See, e.g., LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836,
                      ___  ____  _______    __________________

          844-45 (1st Cir.  1993), cert.  denied, 114 S.  Ct. 1398  (1994);
                                   _____  ______

          Goldman v. First  Nat'l Bank,  985 F.2d 1113,  1118-19 (1st  Cir.
          _______    _________________

          1993);  Montana v. First  Fed. Sav. &  Loan Ass'n, 869  F.2d 100,
                  _______    ______________________________

          105, 107 (2d Cir.  1989); Dister v. Continental Group,  Inc., 859
                                    ______    ________________________

          F.2d  1108, 1115 (2d Cir. 1988); Pearlstein v Staten Island Univ.
                                           __________   ___________________

          Hosp.,  886 F. Supp. 260, 268-69 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).  This is merely
          _____

                                          14

          a  reflection  of a  central  theme that  permeates  the relevant

          jurisprudence:   insofar as Title  VII is concerned,  an employer

          can hire or fire one employee instead of  another for any reason,

          fair or unfair, provided that the employer's choice is not driven

          by   race,   gender,   pregnancy,   or   some   other   protected

          characteristic.   See Foster, 71  F.3d at 56; Keyes,  853 F.2d at
                            ___ ______                  _____

          1026; see  also Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1341
                ___  ____ _______    _________________

          (1st Cir.  1988) (elucidating similar proposition  in ADEA case).

          The flip  side of  the  coin, however,  is that  an employer  who

          selectively cleans house cannot hide behind convenient euphemisms

          such as "downsizing" or "streamlining."   Whether or not trimming

          the fat  from  a  company's  organizational chart  is  a  prudent

          practice in  a particular  business  environment, the  employer's

          decision to eliminate specific positions must not be tainted by a

          discriminatory  animus.    See Goldman,  985  F.2d  at  1118 n.4;
                                     ___ _______

          Maresco v. Evans  Chemetics, 964  F.2d 106, 111  (2d Cir.  1992);
          _______    ________________

          Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 825; Pearlstein, 886 F. Supp. at 268-69.
          _______                   __________

                    Against this  backdrop,  we believe  that the  evidence

          adequately supports the trial court's findings.  When Morse  took

          over, Damar had an inordinately high ratio of managers to workers

          and the  managers' responsibilities  overlapped.5  Both  Bond and

          Guimond testified  that from  the very  start they believed  that

          Damar's  sprawling  organizational  structure  defied   rhyme  or

          reason.   Accordingly,  they  set out  to  compress some  of  the
                              
          ____________________

               5To  cite an  example,  Damar split  the responsibility  for
          manufacturing  between two  managers  (Shevenell and  Paradis), a
          situation that, in appellant's own phrase, caused daily "chaos."

                                          15

          sprawl.  The district court credited their intention, noting that

          the witnesses' actions  matched their stated objective.   More to

          the point,  Guimond testified  that she terminated  the appellant

          "because  I had  a position that  I no  longer felt  needed to be

          filled."   Bond testified in  the same vein,  indicating that he,

          too, had  become convinced that Smith's  position was expendable.

          The court  accepted this evidence, concluding  that the materials

          manager's  position would  have been  eliminated within  the same

          time frame whether or not Smith had taken a maternity leave.

                    In our view, this determination,  while not inevitable,

          is supportable.  In the first place, the record strongly suggests

          that, in fact, the position was expendable.  In the second place,

          any other  choice  would  have entailed  a  loss  of  engineering

          expertise that Damar could ill afford.6  In  the third place, the

          court's  view is  bolstered by  the reception that  the appellant

          originally received from  the new  ownership.   Bond and  Guimond

          apprised  her   of  the  planned  downsizing   and  assigned  her

          significant  new   responsibilities  when  other   managers  were

          dismissed.     They   also   promoted  her   and  increased   her

          compensation.  These actions, undertaken with full knowledge that

          the  appellant  was  pregnant  and  would  be  taking a  six-week

          maternity leave,  are inconsistent  with a bias  against pregnant

                              
          ____________________

               6Bond  testified  that he  purchased  Damar  to acquire  its
          engineering talents.   Paradis and Shevenell  were highly trained
          and experienced  engineers, while Smith had  no such credentials.
          When Morse  discovered  that  it  could function  with  one  less
          manager,  the  decision  to  retain Paradis  and  Shevenell,  and
          dismiss Smith, seems quite plausible.

                                          16

          employees.  In the  fourth place, the district judge,  sitting as

          the trier of fact,  had the right to credit Bond's testimony that

          the "maternity leave never  played a role in itself"  because the

          same  decision "would have been made in a very close time frame,"

          and Guimond's testimony  to like effect.  In a  bench trial, such

          credibility judgments are the  judge's prerogative.  See Anthony,
                                                               ___ _______

          952 F.2d at 606.

                    To be sure,  the record could support a  less innocuous

          conclusion.   The chronal proximity of  Guimond's questions anent

          Smith's plans to have more children and her dismissal,  Guimond's

          ill-advised suggestion that customers  and employees be told that

          Smith  decided to  stay at  home  to care  for her  daughter, and

          Smith's  termination while on maternity  leave are troubling   so

          much so  that  we, if  free  to write  a palimpsest,  might  have

          characterized   the  impetus   behind   the  appellant's   ouster

          differently.  But  whether the  trial court could  have drawn  an

          inference  of discriminatory intent is not the test.  See Foster,
                                                                ___ ______

          71 F.3d at 55; Keyes,  853 F.2d at 1027.   As long as a  contrary
                         _____

          inference is also supportable   and  that is the situation here  

          then it is for the trial court, not the court of appeals, to call

          the tune.   After all, "when there  are two permissible  views of

          the  evidence, the  factfinder's  choice between  them cannot  be

          clearly erroneous."  Johnson, 63 F.3d at 1138 (citing Anderson v.
                               _______                          ________

          City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)).
          _____________________

                    In  an effort to evade the force of this principle, the

          appellant hauls two further  arguments from her bag.   First, she

                                          17

          asseverates that Morse  did not in  fact eliminate her  position,

          and that the district court's contrary finding, see Smith II, 901
                                                          ___ ________

          F. Supp. at 43,  is itself clearly erroneous.   This asseveration

          leads down a blind alley.

                    When  an employer defends  an employment discrimination

          case on the ground of position elimination, the position may not,

          like a Dali painting, fade from one image to another only for the

          first  image to reemerge  at the blink  of an eye.   See Gallo v.
                                                               ___ _____

          Prudential Residential  Servs., Ltd.  Partnership, 22  F.3d 1219,
          _________________________________________________

          1226-28 (2d Cir. 1994); LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 846; Barnes v. GenCorp
                                  _______                 ______    _______

          Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1465 (6th Cir.),  cert. denied, 498 U.S. 878
          ____                                   _____ ______

          (1990).   Yet,  a  position elimination  defense is  not defeated

          merely  because  another employee,  already  on  the payroll,  is

          designated  to  carry out  some or  all  of the  fired employee's

          duties  in addition  to  his own,  or  because those  duties  are

          otherwise  reallocated  within  the  existing work  force.    See
                                                                        ___

          LeBlanc,  6  F.3d  at  846;  Barnes,  896  F.2d  at  1465.    The
          _______                      ______

          elimination of a position signifies the employer's belief that it

          can get by with one less helper; it does not necessarily convey a

          belief  that the work the employee had been doing was superfluous

          and need not be performed at all.

                    Here, the undisputed evidence before the district court

          indicates that  after Guimond dismissed Smith,  the position that

          Smith  had occupied    materials  manager   fell  into desuetude.

          There is no basis in the record for a suggestion  that Lapanne or

          Hoffman  assumed  any of  the  appellant's  former duties;  those

                                          18

          duties, which Paradis, Shevenell, and Gilday had performed during

          Smith's leave, continued to  be performed by them (or,  at least,

          by Paradis  and  Gilday).   In  short, the  second round  of  the

          reorganization  (which  cost  Smith  her  job)  bore  a  striking

          resemblance to the first round (which gave Smith her promotion to

          materials  manager).   Given  these facts,  the district  judge's

          determination that Morse eliminated  the appellant's position  is

          unimpugnable.

                    The  appellant next  endeavors  to  surmount the  sharp

          escarpment of the clearly erroneous rule by casting a hook at the

          legal  standard  applied  by   the  trial  court.    This   is  a

          theoretically  sound  way  to  climb  the  mountain,  see,  e.g.,
                                                                ___   ____

          Reliance Steel Prods.  Co. v.  National Fire Ins.  Co., 880  F.2d
          __________________________     _______________________

          575, 577 (1st Cir. 1989) (explaining that appellate courts review

          questions of law de novo, even  after a bench trial), but in this

          case  the hook  does  not hold.   The  appellant's  thesis is  as

          follows.   She  says that  Title VII  prohibits an  employer from

          dismissing  an employee while she  is on maternity  leave even if

          the  employer, in  the process of  rationalizing its  work force,

          discovers that  her position is  redundant and eliminates  it for

          that reason.

                    Refined  to bare  essence, this  thesis suggests  that,

          since Morse would not have discovered the redundancy at that time

          (if ever) but for the fact that Smith took a maternity leave, the

                                          19

          leave brought about the  firing.7  And the appellant  attempts to

          drive this point  home by citing Bond's  testimony that "because"

          Smith was out on maternity leave, Morse was able to discover that

          her  position  was expendable     testimony  which the  appellant

          optimistically equates with an admission that Morse dismissed her

          "because" of her pregnancy.   With respect, we believe  that this

          argument, which seeks to apply a  black-letter legal principle in

          a  totally   mechanical  fashion,  plays  mischievously   on  the

          mendacity of language by substituting sound for sense.

                    It  is settled under Title VII that an employer may not

          discharge  an  employee based  on  the  categorical fact  of  her

          pregnancy.  See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC,
                      ___ ________________________________________    ____

          462 U.S. 669, 684 (1983); Cumpiano, 902 F.2d at 153.  By the same
                                    ________

          token, since a short-term inability to work is  bound up with the

          very  nature of  pregnancy and  childbirth, that disability  is a

          pregnancy-related  condition within  the meaning  of 42  U.S.C.  

          2000e(k),  and   Title  VII  thus  prohibits   an  employer  from

          dismissing an  employee in  retaliation for taking  an authorized

          maternity leave.  Nevertheless, under the PDA, pregnancy does not

          confer total  immunity.8  An  employer may discharge  an employee
                              
          ____________________

               7We  note  in  passing  that the  appellant's  reasoning  is
          hopelessly  circular.   Morse demonstrated  a firm  commitment to
          downsizing and actively sought ways to streamline its operations.
          Consequently,  there is no  basis for surmising  that Morse would
          have failed to realize that the materials manager's position  was
          superfluous whether or not Smith took a maternity leave.

               8We stress that  this case  is brought pursuant  to, and  is
          governed  by,  Title VII.   If  the  recently enacted  Family and
          Medical  Leave  Act  of 1993,  P.L.  103-3,  107  Stat. 6  (1993)
          (codified at 29 U.S.C.    2601-2654) were applicable, a different

                                          20

          while  she is  pregnant  if it  does  so for  legitimate  reasons

          unrelated  to  her pregnancy.   See,  e.g.,  Troupe v.  May Dept.
                                          ___   ____   ______     _________

          Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir.  1994); Pearlstein, 886 F.
          __________                                     __________

          Supp.  at 268-69; see also Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 899 (holding that
                            ___ ____ _______

          an employer may  dismiss an employee who is in  a protected class

          for a  nondiscriminatory reason); Johnson v. Allyn & Bacon, Inc.,
                                            _______    ___________________

          731  F.2d 64,  70 (1st Cir.  1984) (similar).   It follows, then,

          that an  employer may  discharge an  employee while  she is  on a

          pregnancy-induced  leave so  long as  it does  so for  legitimate

          reasons unrelated to her gravidity.

                    Harmonizing these  principles  leads to  the  following

          conclusions.  Title  VII mandates  that an employer  must put  an

          employee's pregnancy (including her departure on maternity leave)

          to one side in making its employment decisions    but the statute

          does not command  that an employer bury its head  in the sand and

          struthiously  refrain from implementing business judgments simply

          because they affect a  parturient employee.  See Troupe,  20 F.3d
                                                       ___ ______

          at 738  (holding that the PDA "requires the employer to ignore an

          employee's  pregnancy, but  . .  . not  her absence  from work");

          Crnokrak v. Evangelical  Health Systems Corp., 819  F. Supp. 737,
          ________    _________________________________

          743  (N.D. Ill.  1993)  (stating that  "the  PDA does  not  force

          employers to  pretend that absent employees  are present whenever

          their absences are caused  by pregnancy").  At bottom,  Title VII

          requires  a causal nexus between the employer's state of mind and

          the  protected trait  (here,  pregnancy).   The mere  coincidence
                              
          ____________________

          set of rules would obtain.

                                          21

          between that trait and  the employment decision may give  rise to

          an inference of discriminatory animus, see St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct.
             _________                           ___ __________

          at 2747, but it is not enough to establish a per  se violation of

          the statute (at least when, as now, the justification advanced by

          the employer in support of the employment decision is on its face

          legitimate and nondiscriminatory).9

                    To sum up, an employee (pregnant or not) runs a risk of

          suffering  the  ordinary  slings  and  arrows  that  suffuse  the

          workplace  every day  she goes to  work and  every day  she stays

          away.  Title  VII is neither a shield against this broad spectrum

          of employer actions nor a  statutory guaranty of full employment,

          come what  may.   Applying the PDA  as the  appellant asks  would

          eliminate   an  employer's  business  necessity  defense     long

          recognized  under Title VII    and cripple  industry's ability to

          manage workers in  keeping with nondiscriminatory considerations.

          That is not the law.  See Bowen v. Valley Camp of Utah, Inc., 639
                                ___ _____    _________________________

          F. Supp. 1199, 1204 (D. Utah 1986) (explaining that Title VII, as

          amended  by  the  PDA,  does   not  "preclude  an  employer  from

          articulating legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating

          a woman while she was on maternity leave"); see generally Blackie
                                                      ___ _________ _______
                              
          ____________________

               9Say,  for   example,  a  Jewish  employee,   in  charge  of
          maintaining  corporate records, stays home  for a week to observe
          Passover.  In her absence, her employer rummages through the file
          drawers that she maintains in search of  a particular memorandum.
          The employer  finds a packet of  heroin.  The  employer would not
          have had the occasion  to look through the  file drawers but  for
          the  fact  that the  employee was  on  religious leave;  he would
          simply  have  asked  the   employee  for  the  memo.     In  such
          circumstances,  we think it is  clear that the  employer can fire
          the  employee for  introducing drugs  into the  workplace without
          violating Title VII's ban on religious discrimination.

                                          22

          v. Maine, ___ F.3d  ___, ___ (1st  Cir. 1996) [No. 95-1777,  slip
             _____

          op. at 13]  (suggesting, in retaliation case,  that "[a] contrary

          rule would mummify the status quo").

                    Here, the  district  court found  the  requisite  nexus

          lacking  between  the  employer's  mindset  and  the   employee's

          gravidity.    In the  court's  estimation,  Morse discharged  the

          appellant for nondiscriminatory reasons.  The record permits that

          view  of the  facts.   That the  discharge took  place while  the

          appellant   was  on   maternity   leave  possessed   considerable

          evidentiary   significance      but  that   circumstance  neither

          transformed the  character of the employer's  action nor rendered

          it per se unlawful under Title VII.  The district court therefore

          did not apply an erroneous legal standard.

          III.  THE BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM
          III.  THE BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM

                    We turn  now to the appellant's  partially tried breach

          of contract claim.   At the  close of her  case, the trial  court

          took  this claim from the jury  and directed a verdict in Morse's

          favor.  The appellant assigns error.

                               A.  Standard of Review.
                               A.  Standard of Review.
                                   __________________

                    The  court of appeals reviews the grant of a motion for

          judgment  as a  matter of  law de  novo, applying the  same legal

          principles  that inform  the trial  court's ruling.    See Rolon-
                                                                 ___ ______

          Alvarado  v. Municipality of  San Juan, 1  F.3d 74, 77  (1st Cir.
          ________     _________________________

          1993).   Accordingly, we "examine the evidence and the inferences

          reasonably extractable therefrom in  the light most hospitable to

          the  nonmovant."  Fashion House,  Inc. v. K  Mart Corp., 892 F.2d
                            ____________________    _____________

                                          23

          1076,  1088  (1st  Cir. 1989).    If the  proof,  eyed  from this

          standpoint,  permits  a reasonable  factfinder  to  reach only  a

          conclusion favorable  to the movant,  then the court  must remove

          the issue from the jury's consideration.  See id.
                                                    ___ ___

                    While  this  approach  does  not  allow  the  court  to

          "consider  the  credibility of  witnesses,  resolve conflicts  in

          testimony, or evaluate the weight of  the evidence," Wagenmann v.
                                                               _________

          Adams, 829  F.2d 196, 200 (1st  Cir. 1987), neither does  it pave
          _____

          the way for every case, no matter how sketchy, to reach the jury.

          Thus, "a mere  scintilla of evidence is not enough to forestall a

          directed verdict, especially on a claim or  issue as to which the

          burden  of proof belongs to the objecting party."  Fashion House,
                                                             _____________

          892 F.2d at 1088.

                                   B.  The Merits.
                                   B.  The Merits.
                                       __________

                    The  parties   who concur  on very little  else   agree

          that  New  Hampshire law  governs the  breach of  contract claim.

          Under  that law, the at-will status of an employment relationship

          is  "one of prima facie  construction."  Panto  v. Moore Business
                                                   _____     ______________

          Forms,  Inc., 547  A.2d 260, 267  (N.H. 1988).   That  is to say,
          ____________

          unless an  employment  relationship  explicitly  provides  for  a

          definite duration, it is presumed to  be at-will.  See Butler  v.
                                                             ___ ______

          Walker  Power, Inc., 629 A.2d 91, 93 (N.H. 1993) (explaining that
          ___________________

          the at-will presumption "is a gap filler for determining duration

          when  the parties'  contract of  employment is  silent as  to its

          expiration").   This  is  critically important  when an  employee

          challenges her ouster; an employer can give an at-will employee  

                                          24

          even one who has been a stellar performer   her walking papers at

          any  time,  for any  reason or  no  reason, unless  a  statute, a

          collective bargaining agreement, or  some aspect of public policy

          proscribes firing the employee on a particular basis.  See Panto,
                                                                 ___ _____

          547 A.2d at 267.

                    Of course,  an employer and  an employee may  alter the

          at-will status of the  employment relationship.  See  Butler, 629
                                                           ___  ______

          A.2d  at  93; Panto,  547  A.2d  at  267.   Such  a  modification
                        _____

          sometimes may  be accomplished  if the  employer makes  a binding

          offer that the employee can accept by remaining on the  job.  See
                                                                        ___

          Panto, 547 A.2d  at 265.  Standard  contract formation principles
          _____

          govern  the creation and construction of such contracts.  See id.
                                                                    ___ ___

          at 264.  Thus, the "offer must  be so definite as to its material

          terms or require such  definite terms in the acceptance  that the

          promises  and  performances  to be  rendered  by  each  party are

          reasonably certain."   Chasan v.  Village Dist.  of Eastman,  523
                                 ______     _________________________

          A.2d16, 21 (1986) (quoting Restatement of Contracts   32 (1932)).

                    Definiteness, like beauty, is  frequently in the eye of

          the beholder.   At best, it  involves matters of degree.   In the

          last  analysis,  the   standard  is  reasonable   certainty,  not

          mathematical precision.   See Sawin  v. Carr, 323  A.2d 924,  926
                                    ___ _____     ____

          (N.H.  1974).    The  provisions  of  a  contract  need  only  be

          "sufficiently  certain to allow  claims of breach  to be resolved

          readily,  and  to  enable  a reasonably  certain  computation  of

          damages."  Panto, 547  A.2d at 264 (internal  citations omitted);
                     _____

          accord  Phillips v. Verax Corp.,  637 A.2d 906,  910 (N.H. 1994);
          ______  ________    ___________

                                          25

          Sawin, 323 A.2d at 926.
          _____

                    In this  instance, the appellant takes  bits and pieces

          of  various conversations  that  she had  with Guimond  and Bond,

          pastes them together,  and argues that  a rational jury,  mulling

          the  ensuing  patchwork, could  conclude  that  Morse offered  to

          reinstate and  promote her  following her  maternity  leave.   By

          continuing  her  employment in  the  wake of  such  promises, her

          thesis runs, she accepted the offer.   The district court did not

          buy  the patchwork, remarking in  its ore tenus  ruling that "the
                                                ___ _____

          promises   described   by  the   evidence  are   of  insufficient

          definiteness  to  be  enforceable,  do  not  modify  the  at-will

          employment relationship,  [and are such] that  any calculation of

          damages or any identification of breach would be impracticable if

          not impossible."  We agree with the lower court that the terms of

          the alleged contract are too indefinite to raise a jury question.

                    We start by attempting  to decipher the true  nature of

          the appellant's claim.   Her lawyers tell us that  the disjointed

          statements  made to her (e.g., "don't worry, we will manage while

          you are on maternity leave, your job is secure," "you will assume

          more  responsibilities on  your return,"  you are  "wanted back")

          created  a contract to reinstate her  following the completion of

          her maternity leave.  Yet, the appellant concedes that Bond's and

          Guimond's statements  did not  alter the durational  component of

          the at-will  employment relationship.  A contract to reinstate an

          at-will employee to  an at-will  position (from  which she  could

          immediately be removed without cause) is no contract at all.  See
                                                                        ___

                                          26

          Light v. Centel Cellular Co., 883 S.W.2d 642, 645 n.5 (Tex. 1994)
          _____    ___________________

          (holding that, as long as the at-will character of the employment

          relationship  remains  unchanged,  any  "promise made  by  either

          employer  or employee  that depends  on an  additional  period of

          employment is  illusory because it is  conditioned upon something

          that is  exclusively within  the control  of  the promisor");  E.

          Allan  Farnsworth,   Contracts      2.13,  2.14   (2d  ed.  1990)
                               _________

          (explaining that promises to maintain an at-will relationship are

          illusory); cf.  Butler, 629 A.2d  at 94 (terming  an analytically
                     ___  ______

          equivalent argument "a thin reed").

                    Nor  is  this  the  only shortcoming  in  the  supposed

          contract for reinstatement.  The evidence also fails to establish

          either the  nature of  the position  Smith was  to assume or  her

          proposed  rate  of  pay.    These  gaps   seemingly  foreclose  a

          reasonably certain computation of damages.

                    Concluding,  as we  do, that  the alleged  contract for

          reinstatement is  too indefinite  to be actionable  does not  end

          this   phase  of  our  inquiry.     In  stark   contrast  to  the

          reinstatement theory  proffered by her  counsel, the  appellant's

          own testimony  indicates that she understood  the statements made

          to  her   as  promises  of  employment   "indefinitely,"  and  as

          constituting an abiding "commitment  to a permanent position with

          F.W. Morse  that would never  end."   If, by this,  she means  to

          suggest  a  contract  for  lifetime employment,  her  claim  also

          founders.

                    Although tangentially related New  Hampshire precedents

                                          27

          exist, the  state supreme court has not  explicitly addressed the

          contours  of   contracts  for   lifetime  employment.     We  are

          nonetheless confident  that the court would  adopt the prevailing

          view  of such matters.   See generally Kathios  v. General Motors
                                   ___ _________ _______     ______________

          Corp.,  862  F.2d 944,  949 (1st  Cir.  1988) (explaining  that a
          _____

          federal  court, called upon to determine state law in the absence

          of direct in-state precedent,  may look, inter alia, to  cases in
                                                   _____ ____

          other jurisdictions);  Moores v.  Greenberg, 834 F.2d  1105, 1107
                                 ______     _________

          (1st Cir. 1987) (similar).   That view regards such  contracts as

          out  of  the ordinary,  and insists  that  an offer  for lifetime

          employment must be expressed in clear and unequivocal terms to be

          enforceable.   See, e.g., Williamson  v. Sharvest Mgmt.  Co., 415
                         ___  ____  __________     ___________________

          S.E.2d 271, 274 (W. Va. 1992); Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 473
                                         ____    _____________________

          N.W.2d 268, 273 (Mich. 1991);  Vance v. Huff, 568 So. 2d 745,  749
                                         _____    ____

          (Ala.  1990); Shebar v. Sanyo Bus. Sys. Corp., 544 A.2d 377, 381-
                        ______    _____________________

          82 (N.J. 1988); Degen v. Investors  Diversified Servs., Inc., 110
                          _____    ___________________________________

          N.W.2d  863, 866 (Minn. 1961).   Measured by  this yardstick, the

          representations made by  Morse do not stand  sufficiently tall to

          confer lifetime employment.  See, e.g., Williamson, 415 S.E.2d at
                                       ___  ____  __________

          275-76 (finding employer's statement that it would "take care of"

          employee  insufficiently definite  to alter  at-will employment);

          Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper  Co., 266 N.W. 872, 874  (Minn. 1936)
          __________    __________________

          (finding   that   the   terms   "permanent   employment,"   "life

          employment," and  "as long  as the employee  chooses" established

          only an at-will contract); Aberman v.  Malden Mills Indus., Inc.,
                                     _______     _________________________

          414 N.W.2d 769, 771-72 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (concluding that the

                                          28

          statement "we are  offering you security"  only indicated an  at-

          will employment relationship).

          IV.  THE WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIM
          IV.  THE WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIM

                    The  district court terminated the appellant's wrongful

          discharge claim  in advance of trial  under the aegis of  Fed. R.

          Civ. P. 56.  The appellant presses her objection.

                          A.  The Summary Judgment Standard.
                          A.  The Summary Judgment Standard.
                              _____________________________

                    The  Civil  Rules  empower  a court  to  grant  summary

          judgment   "if    the   pleadings,   depositions,    answers   to

          interrogatories,  and  admissions  on  file,  together  with  the

          affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

          material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

          as a  matter of law."  Fed.  R. Civ. P. 56(c).   We have explored

          the  nooks and crannies  of this rule  in a  compendium of cases,

          see, e.g. McCarthy v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 314-
          ___  ____ ________    ________________________

          15  (1st Cir. 1995); National Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham,
                               _________________________    ______________

          43  F.3d 731,  735  (1st Cir.),  cert.  denied, 115  S. Ct.  2247
                                           _____  ______

          (1995); Pagano v. Frank, 983 F.2d 343, 347 (1st Cir. 1993); Wynne
                  ______    _____                                     _____

          v.  Tufts Univ.  Sch. of  Med., 976  F.2d 791,  793-94 (1st  Cir.
              __________________________

          1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1845 (1993); United States v. One
                 _____ ______                          _____________    ___

          Parcel of Real Property (Great Harbor Neck, New  Shoreham, R.I.),
          ________________________________________________________________

          960 F.2d 200, 204 (1st Cir. 1992); Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d
                                             ___________    _____

          112,  115-16  (1st  Cir.  1990); Medina-Munoz  v.  R.J.  Reynolds
                                           ____________      ______________

          Tobacco Co., 896  F.2d 5,  7-8 (1st Cir.  1990); Garside v.  Osco
          ___________                                      _______     ____

          Drug,  Inc., 895 F.2d  46, 48-49  (1st Cir.  1990), and  it would
          ___________

          serve no useful purpose to rehearse that jurisprudence here.

                                          29

                    For the nonce, we think it is sufficient to repeat that

          "summary  judgment's role  is to  pierce the  boilerplate of  the

          pleadings  and assay  the  parties' proof  in order  to determine

          whether trial is  actually required."   Wynne, 976  F.2d at  794.
                                                  _____

          Thus, a Rule 56 motion may end the case unless the party opposing

          it can identify a genuine  issue as to a material fact.   In this

          regard,  "genuine" means that the  evidence on the  point is such

          that  a  reasonable  jury, drawing  favorable  inferences,  could

          resolve the fact in the manner urged by the nonmoving party.  See
                                                                        ___

          One Parcel,  960 F.2d  at 204.   By like token,  "material" means
          __________

          that a contested fact  has the potential to alter the  outcome of

          the suit  under  the governing  law  if the  dispute  over it  is

          resolved favorably to the nonmovant.  See id.
                                                ___ ___

                    When the summary judgment  record is compiled the trial

          court must scrutinize  it "in  the light most  hospitable to  the

          party  opposing  summary   judgment,  indulging  all   reasonable

          inferences  in that party's favor," Griggs-Ryan, 904 F.2d at 115,
                                              ___________

          but disregarding "conclusory allegations,  improbable inferences,

          and unsupported speculation," Medina-Munoz, 896 F.2d at 8.  If no
                                        ____________

          genuine  issue  of  material  fact is  discernible,  then  brevis
                                                                     ______

          disposition ordinarily follows.

                    Because  the summary  judgment standard  requires legal

          reasoning  as  opposed  to  differential  factfinding,  appellate

          review  of summary judgment orders  is plenary.   See Pagano, 983
                                                            ___ ______

          F.2d at 347; Garside, 895 F.2d at 48.
                       _______

                                   B.  The Merits.
                                   B.  The Merits.
                                       __________

                                          30

                    New  Hampshire  law controls  Smith's  pendent wrongful

          discharge claim.  Under that law, even an at-will employee cannot

          be cashiered for a reason that offends public policy because such

          an  employment decision  "is  not in  the  best interest  of  the

          economic system or the pubic good and constitutes a breach of the

          employment contract,"  Monge v. Beebe  Rubber Co., 316  A.2d 549,
                                 _____    _________________

          551 (N.H. 1974).  The appellant urges that her severance offended

          the state's  policy against gender-based discrimination.   In the

          court below,   Judge Stahl ruled that  when a statutory remedy is

          available, New  Hampshire courts would not  entertain a complaint

          that  an  at-will  employee  had been  wrongfully  discharged  in

          violation of  public policy.   Therefore, the  appellant's common

          law   claim  for  wrongful  discharge  failed  because  pregnancy

          discrimination is redressable under Title VII.  See Smith I, slip
                                                          ___ _______

          op. at 9-10.

                     In reaching  this conclusion, the district  court drew

          heavily upon the teachings of Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 414 A.2d
                                        ______    _______________

          1273 (N.H.  1980).  The appellant  strives to convince  us that a

          later New Hampshire  case, Cloutier v.  Great Atlantic &  Pacific
                                     ________     _________________________

          Tea Co.,  436 A.2d 1140  (N.H. 1981), defenestrates  the district
          _______

          court's reading of Howard.  We are not persuaded.
                             ______

                    In  Howard,  the plaintiff  alleged  that  he had  been
                        ______

          discharged because  of  age.   The  New Hampshire  Supreme  Court

          construed  its seminal decision in Monge, 316 A.2d 549, "to apply
                                             _____

          only  to a situation where  an employee is  discharged because he

          performed an act  that public policy would encourage,  or refused

                                          31

          to do that which public policy would condemn."  Howard, 414  A.2d
                                                          ______

          at  1274.   A  discharge due  to  age fell  outside  this "narrow

          category" inasmuch  as  the  "proper  remedy for  an  action  for

          unlawful age  discrimination is  provided for  by statute."   Id.
                                                                        ___

          (listing state and federal statutory remedies).  In Cloutier, the
                                                              ________

          court synthesized  these cases, holding  that to come  within the

          judicially created public policy exception a plaintiff "must show

          that the  defendant  was  motivated  by  bad  faith,  malice,  or

          retaliation in  terminating [her] employment," 436  A.2d at 1143,

          and  must also  "demonstrate  that [s]he  was discharged  because

          [s]he performed  an act  that public  policy would  encourage, or

          refused to do something that public policy would condemn," id. at
                                                                     ___

          1144.   Cloutier did not answer, however, the question of whether
                  ________

          such a  cause of action lies where, as here, the public policy at

          stake is codified  in a  statute that itself  provides a  private

          right of action to remedy transgressions.10

                    A recently decided  case makes the import of  the state

          supreme court's earlier decisions pellucid and speaks directly to

                              
          ____________________

               10In Cloutier,  the defendant  argued that  there must  be a
                    ________
          statutory expression of a  public policy, and that  a generalized
          assertion of a public policy (loosely based on a federal statute)
          is insufficient  as a  matter of  law to  meet the  public policy
          prong of a wrongful  discharge claim.  See Cloutier, 436  A.2d at
                                                 ___ ________
          1144-45.    The  court  disagreed, observing  that  it  had  "not
          restrict[ed  the] holding  in  Howard to  situations involving  a
                                         ______
          public policy enunciated in a statute.  Public policy  exceptions
          giving  rise to wrongful discharge  actions may also  be based on
          non-statutory  policies."  Id. at  1144.  This  language means no
                                     ___
          more than that a  plaintiff can utilize a statutory  provision to
          prove the  existence of a public policy;  it does not address the
          more sophisticated issue  of whether  a plaintiff may  rely on  a
          statute that provides a remedy for its violation.

                                          32

          the question that  confronts us here.  In  Wenners v. Great State
                                                     _______    ___________

          Beverages, Inc., 663  A.2d 623 (N.H. 1995),  the plaintiff relied
          _______________

          on a section of the Bankruptcy Code to  establish a public policy

          against the termination of his employment.  See id. at  625.  The
                                                      ___ ___

          court held that "[w]hile a plaintiff  may not pursue a common law

          remedy  where  the  legislature intended  to  replace  it  with a

          statutory  cause of  action," a  wrongful discharge  action could

          proceed if  the relevant  statutory provision did  not provide  a

          private  cause  of  action  for its  violation.    Id.  (internal
                                                             ___

          citations  omitted).  We deem  this holding to  be dispositive of

          Smith's contention.11

                    Title VII  not only codifies the  public policy against

          gender-based  discrimination  (including,  but  not  limited  to,

          pregnancy  discrimination) but  also creates  a private  right of

          action to remedy  violations of  that policy and  limns a  mature

          procedure  for  pursuing  such an  action.    Under Wenners,  the
                                                              _______

          existence  of  such a  remedy  precludes  the  appellant, in  the

          circumstances of this case, from asserting a common law claim for

          wrongful  discharge.   It follows that  the district  court acted

          impeccably in granting summary judgment on this claim.12
                              
          ____________________

               11To  the   extent  that  either  Kopf   v.  Chloride  Power
                                                 ____       _______________
          Electronics,  Inc., 882 F. Supp.  1183, 1189-90 (D.N.H. 1995), or
          __________________
          Godfrey v.  Perkin-Elmer Corp., 794  F. Supp. 1179,  1187 (D.N.H.
          _______     __________________
          1992), hold otherwise, Wenners consigns them to the scrap heap.
                                 _______

               12We acknowledge some  apparent tension between this  ruling
          and  our earlier opinion in  Chamberlin v. 101  Realty, Inc., 915
                                       __________    _________________
          F.2d 777, 786-87 (1st Cir. 1990).  We set Chamberlin  to one side
                                                    __________
          for a  pair of reasons.   First, the parties there  did not raise
          the  issue of statutory preclusion, and the panel did not address
          that  issue.   Second,  Wenners makes  a dispositive  difference.
                                  _______

                                          33

          V.  CONCLUSION
          V.  CONCLUSION

                    We  need go  no further.   On  the factbound  Title VII

          claim, this case presents a close question.  In the end, however,

          we must uphold the district court's judgment because the standard

          of review is generous and there  is enough evidence in the record

          to  support the trier's findings.   On the two common law claims,

          our task is  appreciably easier; both  claims raise questions  of

          law, not of fact, and  the district court   albeit in  the person

          of two different district judges   correctly resolved them.

          Affirmed.
          Affirmed.
          ________

                              Concurring opinion follows  
                              Concurring opinion follows  

                              
          ____________________

          When  the highest court of a state  disposes of an issue of state
          law contrary to the resolution of the issue theretofore suggested
          by  a federal  court,  the  latter ruling  must  give  way.   See
                                                                        ___
          Williams  v. Ashland  Eng'g  Co., 45  F.3d  588, 592  (1st  Cir.)
          ________     ___________________
          (permitting   relaxation  of   stare   decisis  principles   when
          "controlling  authority,  subsequently announced,"  undermines an
          earlier decision), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 51 (1995).
                             _____ ______

                                          34

                      BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring.  Although
                      BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring.
                              ________________________________

            I  am  compelled by  the  deference  due  a district  court's

            findings  of  fact to  concur in  the  final result,  I write

            separately because  I am  troubled  by the  analysis used  in

            deciding  the Title  VII claim.   The  majority applauds  the

            district court's  failure to fully analyze  Smith's claims as

            "prudential."   I, however, am convinced  that Smith produced

            direct evidence of  intentional discrimination  and that  the

            district court  was  obligated to  fully analyze  plaintiff's

            case under the framework of Price  Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
                                        ____________________________

            U.S. 228  (1989).   Additionally, I think  that the  majority

            mischaracterizes   the   law   relevant  to   the   causation

            requirement  under Title VII and Morse's position-elimination

            defense.   Its  opinion  could erroneously  be  viewed as  an

            invitation to use that defense as a cover  for discrimination

            against women who take or plan to take maternity leave. 

            I.  The District Court's Analytical Process  
            I.  The District Court's Analytical Process 

                      The basic  facts are undisputed.   My first concern

            arises  from the  district  court's  abbreviated analysis  of

            plaintiff's  claim.   The Supreme  Court has  established two

            analytical frameworks that courts  reviewing Title VII claims

            must  follow.    Where  the evidence  produced  at  trial  is

                                         -35-
                                          35

            "direct,"  the  Price Waterhouse  framework  applies.13   See
                            ________________                          ___

            Fields v. Clark Univ.,  966 F.2d 49, 51-52 (1st.  Cir. 1992),
            _____________________

            cert.  denied,  113  S. Ct.  976  (1993);  Cumpiano  v.  Banco
            _____  ______                             ___________________

            Santander P.R., 902 F.2d 148, 152 (1st Cir. 1990); Jackson v.
            ______________                                     __________

            Harvard Univ.,  900 F.2d 464,  467 (1st Cir.),  cert. denied,
            _____________                                   ____  ______

            498 U.S. 848 (1990).  

                      If the  evidence of  discrimination is  indirect or

            circumstantial,  the  burden-shifting framework  of McDonnell
                                                                _________

            Douglas  Corp. v. Green, 411  U.S. 792 (1973),  governs.  See
            _______________________                                   ___

            McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411  U.S. 792 (1973); Texas
            ________________________________                        _____

            Dep't of Community  Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.  248 (1981);
            ______________________________________

            St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).  These
            ______________________________

            basic  rules  have  been  followed,  as  they  must,  by this

            Circuit.  See, e.g.,  Cumpiano, 902 F.2d at 152; Jackson, 900
                      ___  ____   ________                   _______

            F.2d at   467; Chamberlin v.  101 Realty, 915  F.2d 777,  782
                           _________________________

            n.7. (1st Cir. 1990).  

                      Yet,  the   district   court  found   that   gender

            discrimination played  no part  in the decision  to terminate

            the  plaintiff's employment without determining whether there

            was direct evidence under Price Waterhouse or even mentioning
                                      ________________

                                
            ____________________

            13.  The  plurality  opinion  in Price  Waterhouse  does  not
                                             _________________
            itself  require  direct  evidence  of  discrimination.    The
            reference to direct  evidence appears  in Justice  O'Connor's
            concurrence in that  case.   See, e.g., 490  U.S. at  270-74.
                                         ___  ____
            This  court first adopted  Justice O'Connor's conclusion that
            direct evidence is required in mixed-motives cases in Jackson
                                                                  _______
            v. Harvard Univ., 900 F.2d 464 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
            ________________                                _____ ______
            498 U.S. 848 (1990).

                                         -36-
                                          36

            McDonnell Douglas.   See Jackson,  900 F.2d  at 467  (holding
            _________________    ___ _______

            that  a  finding of  direct  evidence  renders the  McDonnell
                                                                _________

            Douglas framework inapplicable).  The majority compounds this
            _______

            analytical omission  by praising  the district court  for its

            "directness"   and   for   having   "largely   bypassed   any

            differential    direct    evidence/circumstantial    evidence

            tamisage."   A  district court's  decision to  circumvent the

            analytical  processes  Supreme  Court  and  circuit precedent

            require should be criticized, not praised.  

                      This is particularly true where Title VII cases are

            concerned.   The discrimination  that  plaintiffs like  Kathy

            Smith face in the workplace is frequently as subtle  as it is

            invidious.   It is in recognition of this hard truth that the

            Supreme   Court  established  an   analytical  process  which

            district courts, in my opinion, are required to follow.  See,
                                                                     ___

            e.g.,  McDonnell   Douglas,  411  U.S.  at   801  ("[I]n  the
            ____   ___________________

            implementation  of [employment]  decisions, it  is abundantly

            clear  that Title  VII  tolerates no  .  . .  discrimination,

            subtle or  otherwise."); see also Price  Waterhouse, 490 U.S.
                                     ___ ____ _________________

            at 271.   The Court's jurisprudence stands for  the principle

            that  the unlawfulness  of the  employment actions  typically

            challenged  in  Title VII  cases  is best  exposed  through a

            process of inquiry.  See, e.g., Burdine, 450 U.S.  at 255 n.8
            _______              ___  ____  _______

            ("In a Title VII case, the  allocation of burdens and the . .

            . prima facie case [requirement] [are] intended progressively

                                         -37-
                                          37

            to sharpen the inquiry  into the elusive factual  question of

            intentional  discrimination.").    Because  I  stand by  that

            principle, I would ordinarily suggest a remand in a case such

            as this.

                      I have come to the conclusion, however, that remand

            would not be  meaningful in this  case.   This does not  mean

            that  I  agree with  the  district court's  finding  that the

            evidence produced by Smith  was not compelling.  I  concur in

            the  result because I am  bound by Supreme  Court and circuit

            precedent.   And in this area, that precedent, unfairly in my

            opinion, imposes too  heavy a burden on plaintiffs  trying to

            prove the  ultimate issue  in discrimination cases:  that the

            employer intentionally discriminated against her on the basis

            of a Title  VII-protected trait.   I believe  that Smith  has

            produced  enough evidence  to meet  her initial  burden under

            Price  Waterhouse or  McDonnell  Douglas, but  agree that  it
            _________________     __________________

            would have been plausible for  a factfinder to conclude  that

            Morse   proved   its   position-elimination  defense   by   a

            preponderance  of the  evidence or,  alternatively,  that the

            facts   established  were   insufficient  to   show  pretext.

            Although  it did so without adhering to the process Title VII

            requires, the  district court  decided the ultimate  issue in

            the case and, although I disagree with it, I  cannot say that

            decision was clearly erroneous.  

                                         -38-
                                          38

            II.  Direct Evidence Under Price Waterhouse
            II.  Direct Evidence Under Price Waterhouse
                                       ________________

                      In  light  of  my  concurrence  in  the  majority's

            ultimate  holding   on  Smith's  Title   VII  claim,   issues

            pertaining to the  nature of the  evidence Smith produced  at

            trial are, admittedly, moot.  Nevertheless, I want to explain

            my belief that Smith produced direct evidence and  that Price
                                                                    _____

            Waterhouse controls  this case.   This  is important for  two
            __________

            reasons.    First,   the  availability  of  direct   evidence

            determines  whether a  case  should be  analyzed under  Price
                                                                    _____

            Waterhouse or McDonnell Douglas.  Direct evidence renders the
            __________    _________________

            McDonnell  Douglas framework inapposite and imposes a heavier
            __________________

            burden  of proof on the employer.   Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d
                                                ________________

            1137, 1141 (4th Cir. 1995).

                      Second,  the determination of  whether the evidence

            produced at trial is direct, though cast in procedural terms,

            affects  the substantive  outcome in  Title VII  cases.   See
                                                                      ___

            Deborah  C. Malamud,  The  Last Minuet:  Disparate  Treatment
                                  _______________________________________

            After Hicks,  93 Mich. L.  Rev. 2229, 2229  (1995)("Title VII
            ___________

            jurisprudence  cloaks substance  in  the  'curious  garb'  of

            procedure.").   This observation is of less import in Smith's

            case because, at the  time the events giving rise  to Smith's

            suit  occurred, the  law provided that  an employer  shown to

            have unlawfully discriminated could avoid Title VII liability

            by  demonstrating by  a  preponderance of  evidence that  the

            adverse employment decision  would have been the same even if

                                         -39-
                                          39

            discrimination  had played no role.  Lam v. Univ. of Hawai'i,
                                                 _______________________

            40  F.3d  1551, 1564-65  (9th Cir.  1994).   In  other words,

            direct  evidence of  discrimination,  without more,  was  not

            enough to impose liability on Morse.  Id.  
                                                  ___

                      Under today's applicable law, however,  a plaintiff

            producing  direct  evidence  of  discrimination  under  Price
                                                                    _____

            Waterhouse  may have a Title VII remedy.   Id. at 1565 n. 24.
            __________                                 ___

            The Civil Rights Act of  1991 "modified the Price  Waterhouse
                                                        _________________

            scheme"  and made "mixed-motives  treatment more favorable to

            plaintiffs."  Fuller, 67  F.3d at 1142; see Civil  Rights Act
                          ______                    ___

            of  1991,  Pub.  L. 102-166,     107,  105  Stat. 1071,  1073

            (1991)(codified  at 42 U.S.C.   2000e-2).  Section 107 of the

            Act provides that Title VII is violated whenever an  employer

            takes sex  or pregnancy  into account, regardless  of whether

            other  considerations  independently   explain  the   adverse

            employment decision.   Id.; see 42  U.S.C.   2000e-2(m)("[A]n
                                   ___  ___

            unlawful   employment  practice   is  established   when  the

            complaining  party demonstrates  that race,  color, religion,

            sex,  or  national origin  was  a motivating  factor  for any

            employment practice, even though other factors also motivated

            the practice.").  Prevailing mixed-motives plaintiffs, at the

            very least,  are now  entitled to declaratory  and injunctive

            relief and attorney's fees.  See Kerr-Selgas v. Am. Airlines,
                                         ___ ___________________________

            69  F.3d 1205, 1210 (1st Cir. 1995)(citing 42 U.S.C.   2000e-

            5(g)(2)(B))(where  an employer in a mixed-motives case proves

                                         -40-
                                          40

            that it would  have made  the same  decision, the  prevailing

            plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees, and declaratory and

            injunctive relief, but not  damages or reinstatement).  Thus,

            what  constitutes direct  evidence  is a  critical issue  for

            Title VII plaintiffs.

                      The majority makes  repeated references to "smoking

            gun" evidence.  Using  this term only obscures the  fact that

            this  Circuit  has yet  to  clearly  define what  constitutes

            direct evidence of gender discrimination.  On prior occasions

            we have held  that "[d]irect evidence  is evidence which,  in

            and  of itself, shows  a discriminatory animus."   See, e.g.,
                                                               ___  ____

            Jackson,  900 F.2d at 467.   But, this  reasoning is circular
            _______

            and does  not further  understanding  of the  term.   Justice

            O'Connor,  in her  concurring  opinion  in Price  Waterhouse,
                                                       _________________

            defined  the term  in  the negative,  explaining that  direct

            evidence   "exclude[s]  'stray  remarks  in  the  workplace,'

            'statements   by   nondecisionmakers',   or  'statements   by

            decisionmakers unrelated to  the decisional process itself.'"

            Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277 (O'Connor concurring).  
            ________________

                      I contend that the evidence Smith produced at trial

            was direct and, therefore,  warranted full application of the

            Price Waterhouse  framework.   The evidence shows  that Smith
            ________________

            was pregnant,  and   requested and received  unpaid maternity

            leave.   After being on  leave several weeks,  Smith notified

            Morse's general  manager, Guimond, that she  wanted to return

                                         -41-
                                          41

            to  work  on  May 15,  1989,  a  week  earlier than  planned.

            Guimond  approved  the  earlier start time  and assured Smith

            that her  job was secure.   She also asked Smith  whether she

            intended  to have  additional children; Smith  indicated that

            she did. 

                      On  May 2,  1989, the  day after  this conversation

            occurred,  Guimond also  questioned Vendasi,  Smith's sister,

            about Smith's future  childbearing plans.   Smith  confronted

            Guimond  about this behavior and the rumor that she would not

            be returning to  work because  she had decided  to stay  home

            with her child.  Guimond denied any knowledge about the rumor

            and reiterated that Smith's job was secure; she repeated this

            guarantee two days later.   Despite these assurances, Guimond

            terminated Smith on May  11, 1989, one week after  their last

            conversation and four days before Smith was slated  to return

            to work.   Guimond requested permission  to tell people  that

            Smith  failed to return to  work because she  decided to stay

            home to care for her child, but Smith refused to give it.  

                      There  is  precedent holding  that  statements like

            those  Guimond made  to Smith  and Vendasi  constitute direct

            evidence.   For  example, in  the Eighth  Circuit, statements

            made by an employer can be direct evidence of discrimination,

            if  made during  a key  decisional process.   In  Beshears v.
                                                              ___________

            Asbill, 930 F.2d 1348,  1354 (8th Cir. 1991), the  court held
            ______

            that  an  employer's oral  statement,  "older employees  have

                                         -42-
                                          42

            problems adapting  to changed  and new policies,"  was direct

            evidence of age discrimination.  930 F.2d at 1354.  Two years

            later,  the court  expanded its  Beshears holding  to include
                                             ________

            written statements.   Radabaugh v. Zip Feed  Mills, Inc., 997
                                  __________________________________

            F.2d  444,   449-50  (8th  Cir.  1993),   held  that  written

            statements included in corporate planning documents were also

            direct evidence of discrimination.   

                      Other  circuits  have   included  statements   made

            outside of the decisional process in the definition of direct

            evidence.    In 1994,  the  Seventh Circuit  held  that post-

            discharge   statements  made  by  a  supervisor  were  direct

            evidence of age bias, even though they were not reflective of

            an  express  intent to  discriminate.   See  Robinson  v. PPG
                                                    ___  ________________

            Indus., Inc., 23 F.3d 1159, 1165 (7th Cir. 1994).  Similarly,
            ____________

            the  Eleventh Circuit  has  held that  statements made  by an

            employer   to   third   parties   are   direct  evidence   of

            discriminatory animus.   In  EEOC v. Beverage  Canners, Inc.,
                                         _______________________________

            897  F.2d 1067, 1070 (11th  Cir. 1990), the  court found that

            racially biased statements made by a supervisor to workers in

            his plant were direct evidence of racial animus and a hostile

            environment under Title VII.  

                      Guimond's statements to both Smith and Vendasi fall

            well within the definition  of direct evidence established by

            cases such  as Beshears and  Beverage Canners.   Guimond  was
                           ________      ________________

            solely  responsible  for Morse's  personnel  decisions.   Her

                                         -43-
                                          43

            questions about Smith's childbearing plans were neither stray

            nor  random and  evinced  a concern  about future  pregnancy.

            Additionally,  Guimond began  asking questions  about Smith's

            childbearing  plans   during  what  she  admits   was  a  key

            decisional period.   Finally, the facts show  that the timing

            of  the decision  to  terminate Smith  was  suspicious.   Cf.
                                                                      ___

            Troupe v. May Dep't Stores, 20 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir. 1994);
            __________________________

            Josey v.  Hollingsworth  Corp., 996  F.2d 632,  639 (3d  Cir.
            ______________________________

            1993).  Within two  weeks of learning about Smith's  plans to

            have more children, Guimond  decided to terminate Smith, even

            though  she had  repeatedly assured  Smith  that her  job was

            secure.

                      This evidence of discrimination is direct and clear

            even if it does not reach the status of a  smoking gun.  That

            some inferences must be drawn from what was said and  done to

            reach   this  conclusion  does   not  make  Smith's  evidence

            indirect.   As  the Seventh  Circuit recognized  in its  1991

            decision, Visser  v. Packer Eng'g Assoc., Inc., 924 F.2d 655,
                      ____________________________________

            659 (7th Cir. 1991), "all knowledge is inferential."  Because

            judges are not mind-readers and cannot reach into the mind of

            a Title VII defendant,  a certain amount of inference-drawing

            is necessary in any  case, whether the evidence is  direct or

            indirect.  The ultimate issue in disparate treatment cases  -

            - whether the employer intended to discriminate --  cannot be

            established  by  purely  direct  evidence.   See  Charles  A.
                                                         ___

                                         -44-
                                          44

            Sullivan,  Accounting For Price Waterhouse: Proving Disparate
                       __________________________________________________

            Treatment Under  Title  VII, 56  Brook.  L. Rev.  1107,  1138
            ___________________________

            (1991)("'[D]irect evidence' of intent cannot exist, at  least

            in the sense of evidence which, if believed, would  establish

            the  ultimate issue  of intent  to discriminate.");  Tyler v.
                                                                 ________

            Bethlehem  Steel Corp.,  958  F.2d 1176,  1183-84 (2d  Cir.),
            ______________________

            cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 82 (1992).
            _____ ______

                      Rather   than   adhering   to   the   colorful  but

            meaningless requirement of a  smoking gun, I think we  should

            adopt  a  definition of  direct evidence  in Title  VII cases

            which satisfies  the  minimum negative  requirements  Justice

            O'Connor  set out  in Price  Waterhouse:   "exclude[s] 'stray
                                  _________________

            remarks in the workplace,' 'statements by nondecisionmakers',

            or 'statements by decisionmakers  unrelated to the decisional

            process  itself.'"    Price   Waterhouse,  490  U.S.  at  277
                                  __________________

            (O'Connor  concurring).  In accord  with the Civil Rights Act

            of 1991, this definition  preserves the mixed-motives case as

            a  viable  option  in  Title  VII  suits.    Cf.  Michael  A.
                                                         ___

            Zubrensky,  Despite  The  Smoke,  There  Is  No  Gun:  Direct
                        _________________________________________________

            Evidence  Requirements In Mixed-Motives  Employment Law After
            _____________________________________________________________

            Price  Waterhouse  v. Hopkins,  46  Stan.  L. Rev.  959,  969
            _____________________________

            (1994).   It lowers the high hurdle of "smoking gun" evidence

            to  reasonable  limits  so  that  plaintiffs   in  employment

            discrimination cases  can receive all  the protections  Title

            VII was intended to give.   

                                         -45-
                                          45

                      Even if my  definition of  Price Waterhouse  direct
                                                 ________________

            evidence  is rejected, however, it is irrefutable that  Smith

            made out a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell
                                                                _________

            Douglas: that after being directly so asked, she expressed an
            _______

            intention  to  become  pregnant   in  the  future;  that  her

            performance at work was more than satisfactory; that  she was

            terminated  after  repeated  assurances   that  her  job  was

            "secure;"  and that her  duties continued to  be performed by

            comparably qualified individuals.   See Cumpiano, 902 F.2d at
                                                ___ ________

            153;  Lipsett v. Univ. of  P.R., 864 F.2d  881, 899 (1st Cir.
                  _________________________

            1988).  

                      Smith's  reiteration  of   these  facts  on  appeal

            complied  with Supreme  Court and  circuit precedent.   Smith

            proved  that she was fired  even though she  was an excellent

            manager  and that  her  duties continued  to be  performed by

            other  employees.  In my view, this is all McDonnell Douglas'
                                                       _________________

            prima  facie  case  burden  requires.    See, e.g.,  Byrd  v.
                                                     ___  ____   ________

            Ronayne, 61  F.3d 1026, 1031 (1st  Cir. 1995)("[T]he required
            _______

            prima  facie showing  is not  especially burdensome.")(citing

            Woodman  v. Haemonetics Corp.,  51 F.3d 1087,  1091 (1st Cir.
            _____________________________

            1995)).    The district  court  should  have shifted  to  the

            McDonnell Douglas framework  before finding Smith's  evidence
            _________________

            deficient.

            III.  Causation Under Title VII
            III.  Causation Under Title VII

                                         -46-
                                          46

                      In   addressing  the   question  of   causation  in

            disparate  treatment  cases,  the  majority  stresses that  a

            "coincidence"  between  pregnancy  leave  and  an  employment

            decision does  not prove intentional discrimination.   It may

            not in  all cases, but  it arguably  did in this  case.   The

            majority's discussion of causation completely disregards this

            possibility.  Its blanket  contention that pregnancy does not

            give  plaintiffs  "total  immunity"  from  adverse employment

            actions  ignores the  extent to  which maternity  leave gives

            employers  an   opportunity  to  discharge   women  who  take

            maternity  leave or who express  an intention to  have one or

            more children.

                      The evidence arguably shows that the position Smith

            held  would  have  been  eliminated even  if  Morse  had  not

            considered her  pregnancy or intention to  become pregnant in

            the future.    It  does not  necessarily  follow  from  this,

            however, that  Smith  would have  been  fired had  Morse  not

            considered  her  maternity  leave  or  desire  to  have  more

            children.  In their conversations before Smith took maternity

            leave,   Bond,  Morse's  president,   and  Guimond  discussed

            eliminating the  materials manager  position, but  not Smith.

            The record shows both that Bond initially intended to  retain

            Smith because  of her excellent  skills and that  he admitted

            that Smith would still be employed at Morse had she not taken

            maternity leave.

                                         -47-
                                          47

                      Had Smith  refused to  disclose or even  lied about

            her intention to have more children, she would probably still

            have a  job at Morse.   The facts show that  Guimond was very

            concerned  about the  disruption Smith's absence  would cause

            and suggest that  she would  have taken steps  to avoid  such

            disruption in  the future.   The majority  completely ignores

            the probability  that Smith's  expressed desire to  have more

            children was the motivating factor in her  discharge and that

            her temporary absence on maternity leave gave her employer an

            opportunity to find  a reason  to discharge her.   I  contend

            that the evidence Smith  produced was sufficient to establish

            intent and causation.

                      The two  examples the majority gives  to illustrate

            the need  for a causal  connection between pregnancy  and the

            adverse employment  action challenged in  disparate treatment

            cases  are both  inapposite and  unfair.   Footnote 9  of the

            court's opinion analogizes Smith's dismissal during maternity

            leave  to an  employee who  is discharged while  on religious

            leave  because heroin is discovered in her  desk.  It is true

            that  in  both  cases  the  employee's  absence  enabled  the

            employer to make  the discovery resulting in  discharge.  But

            here the analogy breaks down.  

                      The  possession of heroin  is illegal; its presence

            in the employee's desk was  a fact that could not  be refuted

            (although an explanation  might be made).   The employer  did

                                         -48-
                                          48

            not  have to make any determination  as to the quality of the

            employee's  work or her capabilities.   She had  to be fired.

            In the  case of maternity  leave, however, an  employer would

            have  to  make  a  judgment  as  to  whether  eliminating the

            position made  good business  sense.  Considerations  such as

            the  employee's  prior  performance and  future  childbearing

            plans would  be part  of the  employer's position-elimination

            decision.   At least in part, that decision would be "because

            of" pregnancy, present and future.   It could not be made  in

            the vacuum the majority's hypothetical presupposes.

                      Similarly,  the cases the majority cites to support

            its  view obscure  the causation  issue and  unfairly compare

            Smith  to employees  who are placed  on probation  because of

            poor  attitudes or  who are  discharged because  of unexcused

            absences.  Cases such as Troupe  v. May Dep't  Stores Co., 20
                                     ________________________________

            F.3d  734 (7th  Cir.  1994), Crnokrak  v. Evangelical  Health
                                         ________________________________

            Systems Corp., 819 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Ill. 1993), and Johnson
            _____________                                         _______

            v. Allyn & Bacon, Inc., 731 F.2d 64 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
            ______________________                          _____ ______

            469  U.S.  1018  (1984),  involved  discharge,  not  position

            elimination.   In Troupe, the employee's  pre-maternity leave
                              ______

            dismissal  was  motivated  by   her  tardiness  and  frequent

            absences.   Crnokrak involved a plaintiff  who was terminated
                        ________

            after  returning from maternity  leave later  than originally

            expected, whereas  Johnson dealt with an  employee who lacked
                               _______

            supervisory skills and  who was fired  after being placed  on

                                         -49-
                                          49

            probation because of a poor work attitude.  The one position-

            elimination case  the  majority cites,  Pearlstein v.  Staten
                                                    _____________________

            Island  Univ. Hosp.,  886 F.  Supp. 260  (E.D.N.Y. 1995),  is
            ___________________

            similarly  inapposite; it  involved adoption,  not pregnancy,

            and  an  employee  who gave  short  notice  of  her need  for

            maternity  leave.  And in that case, the evidence showed that

            the plaintiff  was accidentally  overpaid, that  her employer

            was  experiencing  financial difficulties,  and that  she had

            received no assurances about the security of her job.     

                      These cases  do not directly  address the causation

            issues  presented  here.    In contrast  to  Pearlstein,  the
                                                         __________

            evidence  in this  case  shows that  Smith received  repeated

            assurances about her job, that the raise she received  before

            taking  maternity leave  was  intentional,  and that  Smith's

            termination was not due  to economic hardship.  Additionally,

            the evidence does  not show that Smith  was fired for  a poor

            attitude,  that she had ever  been on probation,  or that she

            lacked  supervisory skills.    The fact  that Smith  received

            regular promotions and  that few  people at  the Morse  plant

            exceeded  her level  of  education or  experience belies  any

            suggestion  that Smith's  performance and  skills were  below

            par.  

                      Finally,     Smith  received   permission  for  her

            maternity leave,  shortened the  duration of that  leave, and

            was fired before  she could  return to work,  not before  she

                                         -50-
                                          50

            left.   Smith's maternity leave, thus, did not pose a problem

            for  Morse  in  the  same  way  that  the  Troupe  employee's
                                                       ______

            unexpected illness or the Crnokrak plaintiff's extended leave
                                      ________

            did  for their employers.  The crux of Morse's defense, after

            all,  is  that Smith  was fired  because  her absence  had no

            effect whatsoever on Morse's operations. 

                      My point  is simple:   just  as pregnancy does  not

            fully  shield  plaintiffs  from  adverse  employment actions,

            business judgment  or  necessity does  not  totally  immunize

            employers  from  Title  VII's  sanctions.    The   majority's

            discussion of causation understates  this important point.  I

            believe  that, more  often  than not,  a correlation  between

            pregnancy  and  position elimination  during  maternity leave

            will exist.   It is naive to think that an employer would not

            take an employee's pregnancy  or intention to become pregnant

            in  the  future  into  consideration during  the  process  of

            determining   whether  the  employee's   position  should  be

            eliminated.14

            IV.  The Position-Elimination Defense
            IV.  The Position-Elimination Defense

                                
            ____________________

            14.  I am, of course, aware that the Family and Medical Leave
            Act  of 1993, P.L. 103-3,  107 Stat. 6  (1993)(codified at 29
            U.S.C.     2601-2654) addresses  a number  of the  concerns I
            raise.  That Act,  however, does not apply in  pre-1993 cases
            and does  not, moreover, correct  the problems I  perceive in
            the majority  opinion's analysis and  posture towards Smith's
            discrimination claim.  

                                         -51-
                                          51

                      The majority upholds  the district court's  finding

            that  Morse made  out a  position-elimination defense  on two

            grounds: that  Morse reduced its  management-level staff  and

            that  Smith's  duties  were  shifted to  employees  who  were

            already on the Morse payroll.  Though I concur in the holding

            that  Morse  arguably proved  the  facts  necessary to  rebut

            Smith's gender discrimination claim, I think the scope of the

            position-elimination defense is considerably more narrow than

            the majority's  interpretation of the facts suggests.  That a

            company is  able to manage in  the absence of one  of its key

            employees  will not  always be  proof of  a nondiscriminatory

            purpose, contrary to what the  court's opinion implies.  Were

            that so,  every woman who took maternity leave would do so at

            risk of losing her job.

                      Moreover,  the conclusion  that  Morse reduced  its
                                                             _______

            management staff is not supported by the evidence.  Morse did

            not, as the court's exposition of the  facts suggests, reduce

            its  management  team  from seven  to  three.    The majority

            reached this conclusion by  eliminating Bond and Guimond from

            its final count, even though they each donned  one of the two

            hats formerly  worn by  Darryl Robinson, Damar's  founder and

            chief officer.  It also erroneously included Smith in Damar's

            original  management team,  even though  she did  not have  a

            management title  at that time.  And it failed to include the

            two  assistant manager  positions  in its  final count,  even

                                         -52-
                                          52

            though  the  individuals   holding  those   slots  did   have

            management  titles.   If  the individuals  excluded from  the

            majority's  calculations  are  added,  the  size  of  Morse's

            management  team was  the same at  the end  as it  was in the

            beginning -- seven.15

                      The facts demonstrate that Morse mainly reorganized
                                                              ___________

            its  management   team.     It  consolidated   positions  and

            eliminated titles,  but  did not  decrease  the size  of  its

            management.   Because  it would  have been plausible  for the

            district court  to interpret this  reorganization as position

            elimination,  I  concur in  the court's  holding.   I  do not

            agree,  however,  that  reorganizations  of  the  sort  Morse

            carried  out will  be enough to  rebut claims  of intentional

            discrimination in every  case.  For me,  whether the district

            court was clearly erroneous in its findings on this issue was

            a very close call.

                      The court's  holding that Smith  was not  replaced,

            that  her  duties  were  merely transferred  to  other  Morse

                                
            ____________________

            15.  Post-acquisition    of   Damar,    Morse's   upper-level
            management team  included the  following seven people:   Bond
            (president); Guimond (general manager);  Paradis (machining);
            Shevenell  (sheet  metal);  Bickford   (engineering);  Seeger
            (sales);  and Smith (materials).   I do not  include Lane and
            Hickman  in  this  number  because  they  were  fired  almost
            immediately after Damar's acquisition, partially due to their
            poor performance.  After Smith was fired, Morse's upper-level
            management  team  still  included  seven  individuals:   Bond
            (president); Guimond (general manager); Paradis (operations);
            Shevenell (manufacturing); Seeger (sales); Lapanne (assistant
            manager); and Hoffman (assistant manager).

                                         -53-
                                          53

            employees,  is based on our  holding in LeBlanc  v. Great Am.
                                                    _____________________

            Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct.
            ________                              _____ ______

            1398  (1994).    LeBlanc  holds  that  a position-elimination
                             _______

            defense is not  defeated by  the claim that  an employee  was

            only "replaced"  because  "another employee [was] assigned to

            perform the  plaintiff's duties in addition  to other duties,

            or  [because]  the  work   [was]  redistributed  among  other

            existing employees already performing  related work."  6 F.3d

            at 846; see  also Barnes  v. GenCorp., Inc.,  896 F.2d  1457,
                    ___  ____ _________________________

            1465 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 878 (1990).  
                             _____ ______

                      To  the extent  that Morse's defense  comports with

            Leblanc at all,  it does so on the basis  of the first prong,
            _______

            not the second.   In analogizing Morse's first reorganization

            to the  reorganization which  occurred after  Smith's firing,

            the  majority  opinion gives  the  impression  that LeBlanc's
                                                                _______

            second   prong,  the  "related   work"  requirement,  can  be

            satisfied  by demonstrating  that  a plaintiff's  duties were

            simply transferred to someone working in the same company.  I

            disagree.   I contend that LeBlanc's related-work requirement
                                       _______

            cannot  be met unless the employer proves that it shifted the

            plaintiff's duties  to employees who were  already performing

            some of the plaintiff's duties or, at least, duties that were

            very similar.  This did not occur in this case.  

                      In the first reorganization, Smith was promoted  to

            materials manager and  asked to officially assume some of the

                                         -54-
                                          54

            duties  she  had  already  been  performing  because  of  the

            inadequacies of other  managers.  Smith at that  time assumed

            duties which,  in my opinion, constituted  related work under

            LeBlanc.   In  contrast,  the second  reorganization did  not
            _______

            shift Smith's  responsibilities to  managers who had  already

            been performing  her  job.    After Smith  was  fired,  those

            managers  took  on  what  were essentially  new  duties;  the

            majority's own contention that Paradis and Shevenell were far

            more experienced than Smith and responsible for the technical

            aspects  of  Morse's  business bears  this  out.   That  they

            performed those duties for some period before Smith was fired

            was  only   because  Smith  was  on  maternity  leave.    The

            nonpregnancy-based    explanation   for    their   additional

            responsibilities did not kick in until after Smith's firing.

                      If Title VII's protections  against pregnancy-based

            discrimination are to  have any force, the relevant period of

            inquiry for determining whether the duties formerly performed

            by  a plaintiff  were assumed  by someone  already performing

            related work under LeBlanc  should not be during  a maternity
                               _______

            leave.   The relevant period  of inquiry must  be before that

            leave  began.   Using the  time period when  the woman  is on

            maternity leave creates a perverse  incentive to discriminate

            against  pregnant women by firing  them when they  are not at

            their  jobs and  when  it will  almost  always be  true  that

            someone  else is performing their  duties.  In  this case, if

                                         -55-
                                          55

            Smith had not become pregnant and  taken maternity leave, she

            would still be a valued Morse employee.

            V.  Conclusion
            V.  Conclusion

                      William James once said that an idea's "validity is

            the process  of its valid-ation."   Accordingly, I  concur in

            the  outcome  reached in  this  case,  but  not  the  process

            employed,  because  I disagree  with  the  view of  pregnancy

            discrimination  cases taken by the majority.  I think it only

            plausible that gender was not the  motivation for the adverse

            employment action  taken against  Smith, not "true."   And  I

            agree  only that  position elimination  can be  a defense  in

            Title VII cases, not that it will be a defense in every case.

            For  me, the  process employed  in reaching  a result,  which

            includes the hypotheticals drawn and examples given, matters.

                                         -56-
                                          56