Court Opinion

ID: 9731253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:40:28.777854+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:16.575998
License: Public Domain

T. G. Kavanagh, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur with the majority opinion, except for its treatment of plaintiff’s due process rights under the Michigan Constitution. Const 1963, art 1, § 17. While the majority opinion stops short of finding the Paternity Act unconstitutional, it expresses "some reservations about its effect upon plaintiff in this case.” Ante, at 190. The majority opinion labels these reservations as mere policy concerns; however, I would conclude that such concerns are of constitutional magnitude.
As aptly stated by the majority opinion, the leading case from this jurisdiction is Girard v Wagenmaker, 437 Mich 231; 470 NW2d 372 (1991). However, the majority in Girard expressly de*192dined to review "any constitutional questions.” Id. at 234-235, n 3. In dissent, Justice Cavanagh, joined by Justice Levin, found that the constitutional issues could not be ignored when interpreting the statute, and adopted the reasoning of the dissenting opinions of Justice White and Justice Brennan in the deeply divided cases of Michael H v Gerald D, 491 US 110; 109 S Ct 2333; 105 L Ed 2d 91 (1989), and Lehr v Robertson, 463 US 248; 103 S Ct 2985; 77 L Ed 2d 614 (1983). In this case, I also look to the dissenting opinions in Michael H and Lehr for guidance, and would conclude that the Paternity Act, as interpreted and applied by the Supreme Court in Girard, supra, denies Jamie Hauser his fundamental right to due process under the Michigan Constitution. However, I cannot wholeheartedly adopt the analytical framework of the dissenting opinions in Michael H and Lehr.
The majority opinion suggests that there are three approaches for determining whether a putative father has a protected liberty interest in a relationship with his biological child: Justice Sea-, lia’s approach in Michael H, supra, which denied the putative father standing in order to prevent an attack upon the traditional "family unit”; Justice Brennan’s dissent in Michael H, supra, which derived the putative father’s liberty interest from the father’s biological link with the child, combined with a substantial parent-child relationship; and Justice White’s dissent in Lehr, supra, which stated that a biological link establishes a protected relationship, and the development of that relationship is relevant to its weight, not its nature. The majority adopts the approach of Justice Brennan in Michael H. I would take a position between that of Justice Brennan and Justice White. That is, while I would not foreclose the possibility of a protected liberty interest in all cases where there *193has not been a previous parent-child relationship, I also conclude that a mere biological link is not sufficient in itself to establish a protected liberty interest.
Under the facts in Michael H, the biological father was permitted by the mother to develop a relationship with his child. Michael H, supra at 143-144. Indeed, it appears that in Michael H a new, functional, family unit was established while the mother, child, and biological father lived together — notwithstanding the mother’s continued legal marriage to Gerald D. Emphasizing the biological link and this new family relationship, Justice Brennan concluded that Michael H should prevail on his due process claim.
The facts of this case are distinct from those in Michael H in that the putative father here, Jamie Hauser, apparently was precluded by the mother from establishing a parent-child relationship, although he desired and attempted to do so. Thus, while the putative father here apparently was not able to establish a relationship with the child, this should not prejudice his constitutional rights under the facts of this case. This was precisely the situation in Lehr that prompted the following statement in Justice White’s dissenting opinion:
We cannot fairly make a judgment based on the quality or substance of a relationship without a complete and developed factual record. This case requires us to assume that Lehr’s allegations are true — that but for the actions of the child’s mother there would have been the kind of significant relationship that the majority concedes is entitled to the full panoply of procedural due process protections. [463 US 271.]
In such a case where the putative father would have had a significant relationship with the child *194but for the actions of the mother, the existence of a parent-child relationship cannot be the ultimate determiner of a protected liberty interest without effectively making the mother the arbiter of the putative father’s due process rights. Thus, the peculiar facts of this case demonstrate that while Justice Brennan’s approach may be sufficient for defining the liberty interest in some cases, it is potentially underinclusive.
On the other hand, I also find Justice White’s approach in Lehr, supra, which focuses on the biological link, somewhat unsatisfactory, as demonstrated by the obvious example of the rape case. No one could seriously argue that the perpetrator of a rape has any protected liberty interest in a relationship with the child. Thus, Justice White’s approach may be somewhat overinclusive.
While I would concur with many of the statements by Justices Brennan and White in their respective opinions in Michael H and Lehr, I would not wholeheartedly adopt their analytical framework. Rather, while I agree that a biological link is a necessary prerequisite, I believe that the protected liberty interest in a parent-child relationship derives from the agreement of the two consenting adults, whether explicit or implicit, to share the benefits and assume the responsibilities of entering into a new conjugal, and, ultimately, familial relationship. In this case, it is the agreement of the mother and biological father to establish a novel, independent relationship that has created the putative father’s protected liberty interest and concomitant due process rights. Indeed, aside from the blood test evidence, the existence of an agreement to enter into an independent relationship is supported in this case by plaintiff’s allegation that both he and defendant had filed for divorce from their respective spouses in further*195anee of the new relationship. I would hold that once the marriage covenant of fidelity is broken by an extramarital relationship, the state’s interest in preserving the "unitary family” that Justice Scalia spoke of is diminished, and the putative father should at least be afforded the minimal due process right of a hearing to determine paternity.
This is not to say that the new relationship would entitle the biological father to any parental rights; rather, the protected liberty interest would only entitle the putative father to the due process right of a hearing to determine paternity. Then, if and when paternity is established, the best interests of the child would control the extent of any actual relationship. Girard, supra at 272 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).
This approach, which focuses upon the disintegration of the legal marriage and the subsequent formation of an independent familial relationship between the biological parents, is not an entirely novel one, but is rather a recapitulation of many of the statements that have been made by the various justices in previous cases. For example, Justice White stated in Lehr:
The "nature of . the interest” at stake here is the interest that a natural parent has in his or her child, one that has long been recognized and accorded constitutional protection. We have frequently "stressed the importance of familial bonds, whether or not legitimized by marriage, and accorded them constitutional protection.” Little v Streater, 452 US 1, 13; 68 L Ed 2d 627; 101 S Ct 2202 (1981). [Lehr, supra at 270.]
Justice Brennan stated in Michael H:
We are not an assimilative, homogeneous society, but a facilitative, pluralistic one, in which we *196must be willing to abide someone else’s unfamiliar or even repellant practice because the same tolerant impulse protects our own idiosyncracies. Even if we can agree, therefore, that "family” and "parenthood” are part of the good life, it is absurd to assume that we can agree on the content of those terms and destructive to pretend that we do. In a community such as ours, "liberty” must include the freedom not to conform. The plurality today squashes this freedom by requiring specific approval from history before protecting anything in the name of liberty.
The evidence is undisputed that Michael, Victoria, and Carole did live together as a family; that is, they shared the same household, Victoria called Michael "Daddy,” Michael contributed to Victoria’s support, and he is eager to continue his relationship with her. Yet they are not, in the plurality’s view, a "unitary family,” whereas Gerald, Carole, and Victoria do compose such a family. The only difference between these two sets of relationships, however, is the fact of marriage.
The plurality’s exclusive rather than inclusive definition of the "unitary family” is out of step .... This pinched conception of "the family,” crucial as it is in rejecting Michael’s and Victoria’s claims of a liberty interest, is jarring in light of our many cases preventing the States from denying important interests or statuses to those whose situations do not fit the government’s narrow view of the family. [Michael H, supra at 141-145.]
Further, Justice White stated in Michael H:
It may be true that a child conceived in an extramarital relationship would be considered a "bastard” in the literal sense of the word, but whatever stigma remains in today’s society is far less compelling in the context of a child of a married mother, especially when there is a father *197asserting paternity and seeking a relationship with his child. It is hardly rare in this world of divorce and remarriage for a child to live with the "father” to whom her mother is married, and still have a relationship with her biological father.
The State’s professed interest in the preservation of the existing marital unit is a more significant concern. To be sure, the intrusion of an outsider asserting that he is the father of a child whom the husband believes to be his own would be disruptive to say the least. On the facts of this case, however, Gerald was well aware of the liaison between Carole and Michael. [Michael H, supra at 161-162.]
Additionally, Justice Cavanagh stated in Girard:
It is more than a little hypocritical to contend, as do the Wagenmakers, that denying standing to Girard is consistent with "the law’s repugnance to adulterers.” The biological mother in this kind of situation is certainly no less an "adulterer” than the biological father. It is surely a bit late to talk of preserving the "sanctity” of the marital family by the time a situation like the one alleged in this case has arisen. [Girard, supra at 270-271.]
While the various justices have not framed their due process analyses in terms of the erosion of the marital covenant and the inception of a mutual agreement to enter into a new familial relationship, their recitations of facts laden with details about the new family bonds or family dynamics reveal that a conscious intention or mutual consent to create a new familial relationship lies at the heart of the inquiry. In other words, the details of a new familial relationship are evidence of a mutual agreement to create such a relationship; but, it is the agreement itself that gives rise to the putative father’s liberty interest. Indeed, these are the same principles that protect parental *198rights within a traditional marriage. The distinction in this case is that the existing marital covenant has been breached, and a new and independent relationship has engendered certain basic rights in the biological father.
While the approach that I would take is consistent with the foregoing dissenting opinions, it is also consistent with our Supreme Court’s decision in Syrkowski v Appleyard, 420 Mich 367; 362 NW2d 211 (1985). In that case, our Supreme Court granted the biological father standing to bring a paternity claim despite the fact that the child was born to a married woman because the mother and biological father had entered into a surrogate-parenting agreement. While the majority in Girard maintained that the holding in Syrkowski was limited to the surrogate-parenting context, it nevertheless provides another example of a case where the marital relationship is superseded or modified by a subsequent agreement to create an independent, however nontraditional, familial relationship.
In sum, I would conclude that once the traditional marriage covenant is broken by an extramarital relationship, the state’s interest in preserving the unitary family is diminished, and the putative father should be afforded the minimal due process right of a hearing to determine paternity.1 I would reverse the decision of the trial court.

 It is noteworthy that the approach that I suggest also makes sense in the rape example. The rapist would have no protected liberty interest in a relationship with the child because there would be no mutual consent or agreement to enter into a new familial relationship.