Court Opinion

ID: 9811777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:28:12.764117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:22.024387
License: Public Domain

Eaieci.oth, O. J.,
dissenting: On this petition to rehear T am unable to agree with the opinion of a majority of the Court.
The facts: The plaintiff in 1888 instituted several actions before a Justice of the Peace against defendant Board of County Commissioners. The only matter filed in the nature of a complaint was “Claim,” and stating the amount of each. No denial of the claim, nor any defence, was made by the defendant, and judgments were entered in each case for the amount of the claim and costs. These judgments were not *211paid and they were docketed in the Superior Court on September 29, 1893. In 1894, the plaintiff obtained judgments upon these former judgments, and it does not appear that defendants then made or offered any defence.
In the present action, by consent of parties, his Honor found the facts in these words: “That the judgments sued on in the complaint were obtained in the year 1894 in certain actions brought on former judgments obtained in 1888; that the cause of action on which said judgments of 1888 were obtained were school claims, as alleged in the answer; that there was nothing in the record of judgments of 1894 to show what the causes of action were, except that they were brought on-former judgments.”
This action for mandamus, to compel defendants to levy a tax and pay said judgments, was before us at last term by appeal from the Superior Court, refusing to grant the writ, and this Court held that was error, and reversed the judgment below. In this proceeding, the defendants answer and deny the validity of the judgments, and plead section 7, Article VII of the ■ Constitution, • and aver that said school claims are not a necessary expense of the county.
I shall not further remark on the effect and force of the judgments, as I did so for the Court in this case, supra. The case of Young v. Henderson, 76 N. C., 420, is decisive. The Court now admits the integrity of the judgments — that they can notbe impeached, and that the matters therein in issue are res■ adjudícala — and puts its opinion on the ground that the consideration is a debt, not for a necessary county expensé. Passing over the competency of evidence, in the executionary stage of the cause;, to go behind the judgments to set up a de-fence which was open to the defendants before the judgments were entered, we must consider whether the expense of the public common county school system is a necessary expense. What is a necessary expense is a question for the Court, *212whenever the question arises. It is necessary for the good, safety and happiness of the whole people that certain benefits and improvements shall be recognized as necessary expenses. The public school system tends to improve the manners, morals, and material condition of the people in the march of civilization. This Court has often said that the building of court-houses, public roads and bridges are necessary expenses. Vaughan v. Commissioners, 117 N. C., 434. We have said that water-works is not a necessary expense of a corporation (Charlotte v. Sheppard, 120 N. C., 411), and that electric lights are not a necessary corporate expense. Mayo v. Washington, 122 N. C., 5.
In Lutterloh v. Commissioners, 65 N. C., 403, it was held, “Where a party has established his debt against a county by judgment, and payment can not be enforced by an execution, he is entitled to a writ of mandamus against the Board of Commissioners of said county, to compel them to levy a sufficient tax to pay off and discharge his said judgment.” It does not appear that it then occurred to any layman or lawyer that executionary process was inhibited by Article VII, section 7 of the Constitution, which was then in force. The opinion of the Court refers briefly to that case, but fails to distinguish it from the present case. Every necessary expense in the whole list is such by force of the law, written or unwritten. Public education is a cherished object of our Constitution and of our Legislature and people. It is of vital importance to society and to the State. Is it less so than a public bridge across a stream which can be crossed by a common ferry boat?
The Constitution, Article I, section 27, declares that “The people have the right to the privileges of education, and it is the duty of the State to guard and maintain that right.” Article IXj section 4, makes a most liberal provision for funds *213for the purposes of education, and commands that they “shall be faithfully appropriated for establishing and maintaining in this State a system of free public schools, and for no other uses or purposes whatsoever.” Article IX, section 15, empowers the Legislature to require every child within the prescribed age to attend the public school, unless educated by other means.
Finally, Article IX, section 2, declares “that the General Assembly .... shall provide by taxation, and otherwise, for a general and uniform system of public schools, wherein tuition shall be free of charge to all the children of the State.”
I have thus quoted to show how important and necessary the Constitution considers the subject of public; education. Every one knows that much machinery is necessary to perform this command of the organic law. Are not teachers necessary ? And who will teach if his undisputed “school claim” can not be collected, as this plaintiff’s can not be, if the remedy he prays for is withheld by this Court? The Court cites no authority whatever in support of its position, except the case of Rodman v. Town of Washington, 122 N. C., 39. Let us examine that ease: The defendants were proceeding to levy and collect a tax under a special Act (Laws 1897, chapter 343) to meet the expenses of a corporation graded school, and the plaintiff obtained an injunction on the ground that the Act was not passed according to the Constitution, Article VII, section 7, as construed by a majority of this Court. This was admitted by the defendants, but they insisted that the expense was a “necessary expense” in the spirit of that Article. It was also admitted that the tax, if levied, would largely exceed the constitutional limit of taxation. The Court held that, while it favored public education, it could not hold that a tax over and beyond the *214constitutional limit is a necessary corporation tax, that tbe Act in that respect was void, and affirmed the judgment. I am unable to see how that case supports the defendant’s contention as to a necessary county expense to support the public school system, when neither the record nor the opinion refers to that question.
My conclusion is that the opinion ought to be dismissed, and that the writ of mandamus should issue.
Fubches, J., concurring in the dissenting opinion.