Court Opinion

ID: 9929347
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 15:07:40.781337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:07:13.567238
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JANUARY 26, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2022-CA-1312-MR

RACHELLE WEIS                                                         APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.               HONORABLE DENISE D. BROWN, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 16-CI-501354

DAVID WEIS                                                              APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, KAREM, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

KAREM, JUDGE:

              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

             Rachelle and David Weis married on February 23, 2002, and David

filed a petition for dissolution on April 29, 2016. The parties shared two children –

M.W., born in 2003, and J.W., born in 2006. Rachelle and David entered an

executed Marital Settlement Agreement (the “Agreement”) with the circuit court
on May 29, 2018. The circuit court entered a dissolution decree on June 4, 2018,

which incorporated the terms of the Agreement.

             In the Agreement, the parties agreed to share joint custody of their

children, with Rachelle maintaining physical custody, care, and control subject to

David’s visitation rights. Due to his higher income, David agreed to pay Rachelle

$2,175.00 per month as child support and to provide ninety percent of their

extraordinary medical expenses and agreed-upon extracurricular activities. The

parties also agreed that David would provide maintenance to Rachelle of

$32,000.00 per year for three (3) years. Except for a motion to prohibit corporal

punishment of the children and competing motions to hold each other in contempt,

the matter sat inactive for approximately two (2) years.

             On January 18, 2022, Rachelle filed a motion for temporary sole

custody of the children because David had pointed a loaded gun at Rachelle’s head

in the presence of J.W. and shot at and hit the car’s tire on the side where J.W. was

sitting. After negotiations between counsel, the court entered an uncontested order

of protection prohibiting David from having any contact with Rachelle and J.W.

             In the same motion, Rachelle sought child support modification and

sole control of the children’s educational savings accounts. In addition to her

requests concerning the custody, care, and support of their minor children,

Rachelle requested that David pay one hundred percent of the reasonable

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attorney’s fees “incurred in this action, including but not limited to the domestic

violence incident[.]”

             While Rachelle’s requests were pending, the Cabinet for Health and

Family Services intervened and initiated a dependency, neglect, and abuse

(“DNA”) action against David under Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) Chapter

620. David stipulated to abuse in the DNA action.

             After he stipulated to abusing J.W., David also consented to

Rachelle’s request for sole custody but not to her other requests concerning child

support, exclusive control of the children’s education funds, and an award of

attorney’s fees.

             Rachelle filed another motion for attorneys’ fees on June 21, 2022,

requesting that David reimburse and advance Rachelle $20,000.00 for her

attorney’s fees, citing the disparity between the parties’ incomes. On September 6,

2022, the circuit court entered an order declining to award Rachelle any of her

attorney fees. Further, the circuit court denied Rachelle’s motion to alter, amend,

or vacate. This appeal followed.

             We will discuss further facts as they become relevant.

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                                     ANALYSIS

             a. Standard of Review

             We review the circuit court’s denial of Rachelle’s request for

attorney’s fees for an abuse of discretion. Sexton v. Sexton, 125 S.W.3d 258, 272

(Ky. 2004). “A [] court abuses its discretion when it relies on clearly erroneous

findings of fact, or when it improperly applies the law[.]” Overstreet v. Overstreet,

144 S.W.3d 834, 838 (Ky. App. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Otherwise, an abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is “arbitrary,

unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Sexton, 125

S.W.3d at 272 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

             Discussion

             Kentucky courts regularly apply the “American Rule” regarding

attorney’s fees, which requires parties to pay their own attorney’s fees and does not

allow for shifting the prevailing party’s fees to the loser. Bell v. Com., Cabinet for

Health and Family Services, Dep’t for Community Based Services, 423 S.W.3d

742, 748 (Ky. 2014) (Attorney’s fees in Kentucky are not awarded as costs to the

prevailing party unless there is a statute permitting it or as a term of a contractual

agreement between the parties.). Exceptions to the rule exist, however, and this

case involves one of them, KRS 403.220.

             KRS 403.220 states the following in applicable part:

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             The court from time to time after considering the
             financial resources of both parties may order a party to
             pay a reasonable amount for the cost to the other party of
             maintaining or defending any proceeding under this
             chapter and for attorney’s fees, including sums for legal
             services rendered and costs incurred prior to the
             commencement of the proceeding or after entry of
             judgment.

             In Sexton, the Supreme Court of Kentucky discussed the statutory

language of KRS 403.220.

             Under this statute, a trial court may order one party to a
             divorce action to pay a “reasonable amount” for the
             attorney’s fees of the other party, but only if there exists
             a disparity in the relative financial resources of the
             parties in favor of the payor. But even if a disparity
             exists, whether to make such an assignment and, if so, the
             amount to be assigned is within the discretion of the trial
             judge. There is nothing mandatory about it. Thus, a trial
             court’s ruling on attorney fees is subject to review only
             for an abuse of discretion.

125 S.W.3d at 272 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

              In Smith v. McGill, 556 S.W.3d 552, 554 (Ky. 2018), however, the

Kentucky Supreme Court specifically removed financial disparity between the

parties as a threshold requirement for an award of fees under KRS 403.220.

Instead, “the trial court . . . must only consider the financial resources of the

parties.” Smith, 556 S.W.3d at 544. Nevertheless, financial disparity is still a

viable factor for the circuit court to consider in applying the statute. Id. at 556.

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             While the standard for awarding fees under KRS 403.220 requires the

court to consider the financial resources of both parties, there is no requirement for

specific findings of fact. Hollingsworth v. Hollingsworth, 798 S.W.2d 145, 148

(Ky. App. 1990). As stated in Hollingsworth:

             It is a well-known concept that the trial court has great
             discretionary power in its determination to award or deny
             attorney fees. Although the court does not mention the
             financial resources of the appellee in its orders awarding
             the appellee attorney fees, there is no requirement that it
             do so. . . . The obligation of the trial court is to consider
             the financial resources of the parties in ordering a party
             to pay a reasonable amount in attorney’s fees. The trial
             court need only “consider” the parties’ financial
             situation. The record is replete with circumstances in
             which the trial court was made aware of each party’s
             financial situation. Based on the record before this
             Court, it appears that the trial court’s award of attorney
             fees was reasonable and will not be disturbed.

Id. at 147-48 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

             Finally, we note that “the fee shifting authorized under KRS 403.220

is not intended primarily to be punitive or sanctioning. It is intended . . . to

ensure that dissolution and child-custody proceedings are fair and not skewed in

favor of the party in the financially superior position.” Rumpel v. Rumpel, 438

S.W.3d 354, 364 (Ky. 2014) (emphasis added).

             In this case, the circuit court followed KRS 402.220’s directives and

considered the parties’ financial resources throughout the lengthy proceedings. We

decline to impose the payment of Rachelle’s attorney’s fees on David to punish or

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sanction him for his actions, as this was not the legislature’s intent in enacting KRS

403.220. Id. Moreover, after the domestic violence incident, David did not

dispute any of the allegations or require extensive hearings or motion practice.

David did not contest the entry of the domestic violence order, he stipulated to

findings of abuse in the DNA action, and he agreed to give Rachelle sole custody

of the children and entered into an agreed order with regard to custody and other

issues. Rachelle has failed to identify anything in the record that sufficiently

indicates that the family court abused its discretion in denying her request for

attorney’s fees.

                                  CONCLUSION

             Based on the foregoing, we affirm the Jefferson Circuit Court’s orders

denying Rachelle’s request for attorney’s fees and motion to alter, amend, or

vacate.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 Laurel S. Doheny                          James K. Murphy
 Peter J. Catalano                         Louisville, Kentucky
 Louisville, Kentucky

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