Court Opinion

ID: 9851032
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:06:14.559249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:47.552203
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
dissenting. I dissent from the judgment of reversal and the opinion of the majority. While I agree that our rules governing tort liability in regard to suits against municipal •corporations make a “curious patchwork of immunity and responsibility” and that no satisfactory test has been devised for •distinguishing between governmental and proprietary functions, I think that, in this instance, the evidence is insufficient to •establish as a matter of law, that maintenance of the golf course by the City of Atlanta is a governmental function. By affidavit, the General Manager of Parks swore that the golf courses of the City of Atlanta are a part of the Parks and Recreation administration of the City (including cemeteries); are not maintained for revenue purposes; the fees charged are regulatory in nature only and are only maintained to prevent overcrowding; and the “Bobby Jones Golf Course is a part of a larger park known as Atlanta Memorial Park.” Considering all of his statements as *572being true, this does not establish that a golf course, maintained by the City of Atlanta, becomes a governmental function, as distinguished from a cemetery, and therefore becomes a park. It is clear that the reasoning of counsel for the city was an attempt to show the maintenance of a municipal golf course is a governmental function as opposed to a ministerial function and therefore comes within the rule established in Cornelisen v. City of Atlanta, 146 Ga. 416 (91 SE 415). To this I cannot agree. I cannot see any real difference between the maintenance of a cemetery where the lot holders pay for their easements (thereby excluding the general public, or the public at large) and a golf course in which greens fees are charged, and only those members of the public who pay the fee may play, while other members of the public, who merely wish to walk around in the open area, enjoying the sunlight and other pleasures of a walk in a park, are excluded. A golf course is not a park, and I am certain that here the general public is excluded from its use. In fact, the affidavit of Mr. Delius shows clearly that greens fees are charged for the purpose of excluding the public generally, to prevent overcrowded conditions, and to allow only the playing of golf thereon. While his affidavit attempts to establish that this is a mere area of a park, nevertheless, I do not feel that the evidence submitted on summary judgment has been sufficient to pierce the allegations of the petition, and establish, as a matter of law, that a golf course becomes a governmental function rather than a ministerial one. Lacking any other evidence than that submitted on summary judgment here, I would be willing to decide that the City of Atlanta is acting in a proprietary capacity similar to that of the City of San Mateo (Plaza v. City of San Mateo, 123 Cal. App. 2d 103, cited in the majority opinion). While, for some other reason, the petitioner might not be able to maintain his action or prove his complaint as alleged, until other evidence is shown, under the new Civil Practice Act, the court below was correct in its ruling denying summary judgment in favor of the City. As to the rules of evidence applicable to motions for summary judgment, see Holland v. Sanfax Corp., 106 Ga. App. 1, 4 (126 SE2d 442).