Court Opinion

ID: 9684911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:18:43.826652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:01.127358
License: Public Domain

BISSETT, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s broad application of the doctrine of “de minimis non curat lex.” I would hold that the $2.00 inspection fee and the $.50 notary fee for the transfer of title, charged as “official fees” are not governed by the doctrine of “de minimis,” since their inclusion as “official fees” constituted a misrepresentation in the “Retail Installment Contract,” and, as such, is not subject to the doctrine.
With respect to the pertinent charges to Molina, the contract here involved, permitted Wayne Strand to charge:
Official Fees $ 2.50 Taxes Not Included in Cash Price $N.A. License and/or Registration Fees (itemize) $33.47 Certificate of Title Fee $ .75 Other (Describe) $N.A.” ►-* ¡¾
As illustrated, on the face of the retail installment contract initiated, a $2.50 charge was made for official fees. At the trial, testimony was presented which established that $2.00 of this charge was made to pay for the state inspection of the vehicle purchased. The remaining $.50 was to cover a notary charge in connection with the transfer of the title to Molina.
Article 5069-7.01(g), at the time of the contract, provided:
“ ‘Official Fees’ means the amount of the fees prescribed by law for filing, recording or otherwise perfecting and, in addition for releasing or satisfying a retained title, lien or other security interest created in connection with a retail installment transaction.” TEX.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 5069-7.01(g) (1971) — now amended.
While the transfer of a title for a motor vehicle must be notarized when the vehicle is being disposed of at a subsequent sale, Tex.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6687-1, § 33 (1977), no such requirement is made when the transfer is in connection with a new vehicle.1
Under the current law, a certificate of inspection is required prior to the registration of a motor vehicle under the Certificate of Title Act, Tex.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6701d, § 142A (Supp.1981). However, such was not the case at the time the parties entered into the contract in the instant case.
Neither the $2.00 charge made for the certificate of title nor the $.50 charge for notarization of the transfer of title constituted an official fee under the definition applicable at the time of the formation of *49the contract in question.2
As a retail installment contract was required to set forth the aggregate amount of official fees, Tex.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5069-7.-02(6)(e) (now amended), I believe that the unauthorized charges reflected as official fees amounted to a violation of the Texas Consumer Credit Act as it then read. Since the $2.50 for “official fees” reflect charges misrepresented on the face of the contract rather than merely miscalculated yet properly represented charges, it is distinguishable from the $5.53 overcharge addressed by the majority. The purpose of both the Texas Consumer Credit Code and the Federal Truth in Lending Act is to educate and inform the consumer through proper disclosures. See: Declaration of Legislative Intent, Texas Laws 1967, Chapter 274, Section 1, at 608. Tex.Civ.Stat.Ann., volume 15, pp. 1-2 (1971) and 15 U.S.C.S. § 1601(a) (1982). This purpose is frustrated if the doctrine of “de minimis” is extended to misrepresentations in consumer contracts.
“It is the duty of the Legislature to decide what should be contained in a retail installment contract and for the court to decide that such a plain requirement as contained in the Code is very small or a trifling matter would be to encroach into the exclusive domain of the Legislature, and this is not the proper function of the court.” Anguiano v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 561 S.W.2d 249, at 255 (Tex.Civ.App.— San, Antonio 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
Admittedly, the $2.50, charged as “official fees,” of itself, is trivial in amount. However, that is not the issue presented in this appeal. The issue to be resolved is whether misrepresentation, regardless of the amount of money involved, will be excused by application of the “de minimis” doctrine. The majority would broaden the application of the “de minimis” doctrine to cover any situation in which merely the amount criteria was satisfied. Such a result would not only frustrate, but would, in fact, defeat the very purpose of legislation akin to the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and the Texas Consumer Credit Code.
Under the majority holding, a seller who is subject to the provisions of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act or the Consumer Credit Code could uniformly overcharge all its customers some as yet “undetermined amount,” provided it was careful to ensure that this amount was small in proportion to the total amount involved, and have complete impunity from prosecution under either the Deceptive Trade Practices Act or the Consumer Credit Code. If such had been the intent of the legislature, they would have so provided in these acts.
The majority relies on several cases where the courts have ruled on the “de minimis” issue. However, all of these cases are clearly factually distinguishable from the case before us. Further, none of them address a situation in which an actual misrepresentation was made.
Under Thornhill and Zapata, relied upon by the majority, miscalculations in amounts were found to be de minimis in nature. In Long, also relied upon by the majority, an acquisition fee which was neither provided for nor prohibited was found to be de min-imis. In all of these eases, the doctrine of “de minimis” was applied to charges which were clearly reflected and properly disclosed on the contracts in question and not *50to a situation in which improper disclosures were made. These cases are authority for holding that the overcharge of $5.53, because of a miscalculation of authorized charges, is controlled by the doctrine of “de minimis”; but they are not authority for holding that such doctrine immunizes Wayne Strand against the penalties provided by the Texas Consumer Credit Code where the charge was made because of a misrepresentation.
The majority also relies on two cases in which a proposition rather than an amount was found to be “de minimis.” In Hight v. Jim Bass Ford, Inc., the Austin Court of Appeals addressed a violation of Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. art. 5069-7.02(4) which requires that any acknowledgement by the buyer of delivery of a copy of the contract be printed in a size equal to at least ten-point bold type. The acknowledgment before the court had been printed in ten-point type. The court found the violation to be de min-imis. The court also suggested, however, that a different result might have occurred had the appellant been either deceived or injured. A misrepresentation was not involved.
Finally, the majority relies on one of our own opinions, in which we found that the failure to include sales tax as part of the “cash sale price” in an automobile retail installment contract was “de minimis.” Grant v. Friendly Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 612 S.W.2d 667. This is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar, as it is an omission rather than an inclusion. This distinction is also illustrated by examining Smith v. Chapman, 436 F.Supp. 58 (W.D.Texas 1977); and Chapman v. Miller, 575 S.W.2d 581 (Tex.Civ.App.- — Beaumont 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.) where the inclusion of sales tax as an “official fee” was found to be a violation of the Texas Consumer Credit Code.
For the reason stated above, I believe that the inclusion of the $2.50 charges as “official fees” is a violation of the Texas Consumer Credit Code and would affirm the trial court’s finding of a violation of the same. Since the majority did not reach appellants’ remaining points of error or ap-pellee’s cross-points, I do not address these points either.

. Through the analysis of four different Texas Code sections it becomes apparent that more stringent registration requirements are applicable to the purchase and sale of a “used vehicle” than are applicable to the purchase and sale of a “new vehicle.”
Article 6687-1, § 33 requires the notarization of a title transfer at a subsequent sale (emphasis added). There is, however, no such requirement at a first sale. In differentiating between the two types of sales, the code, at art. 6687-1, § 8, defines “subsequent sale” as “[t]he bargain, sale, transfer, or delivery, with intent to pass an interest therein, other than a lien, of a motor vehicle which has been registered or licensed within this state ...(Emphasis added.) Correspondingly, the code, at art. 6687-1, § 7, defines “first sale” as “the bargain, sale, transfer, or delivery with intent to pass an interest therein, other than a lien, of a motor vehicle which has not been previously registered or licensed in this state or elsewhere, ...” (Emphasis added.) In art. 6687-1, § 9, a “new car” is defined as “a motor vehicle which has never been the subject of a first sale either within this state or elsewhere.” (Emphasis added.) Since the evidence adduced at trial shows that the vehicle purchased by Mr. Molina was a new 1977 truck which would necessarily fall within the category of a first sale, it is clear that the transfer of the title before a notary and the payment of a notary fee was not required by state law.

. In 1979, § 5069-7.01(g) was amended to provide that:
“ ‘Itemized Charges’ however denominated or expressed means those amounts, if any, included in the contract but not included in the cash price for charges made to the buyer for:
(i) any registration, certificate of title, and license fees;
(ii) any taxes;
(iii) any other fees or charges that are set or prescribed by law, that are not more than the amounts allowed by law, and are connected with the sale or inspection of a motor vehicle; ...” (Emphasis added.)
While this revision would expressly allow the imposition of a charge for a certificate of inspection under the newly designated heading of “itemized charges” it would still not provide for a notary charge in connection with the title transfer of a new vehicle as “itemized charges” since such a charge is not one “prescribed by law.” NOTE: The term “itemized charges” has now replaced the term “official fees” in the Deceptive Trade Practices Act.