Court Opinion

ID: 9896762
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 16:05:23.870604+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:06.481248
License: Public Domain

IN THE
            ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                            DIVISION ONE

                         In re the Marriage of:

             JUSTIN GREGORY MEEK, Petitioner/Appellant,

                                   v.

               JENNA LYNN MEEK, Respondent/Appellee.

                        No. 1 CA-CV 23-0010 FC
                             FILED 11-14-2023

          Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                         No. FN2019-005275
               The Honorable Suzanne Nicholls, Judge

                              AFFIRMED

                              COUNSEL

Dickinson Wright PLLC, Phoenix
By Vail C. Cloar (argued), Dana M. Levy, Alexandra Crandall, & James T.
Lawson
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

The Cavanagh Law Firm, P.A., Phoenix
By Philip C. Gerard (argued) & Nicholas J. Brown
Counsel for Respondent/Appellee
                            MEEK v. MEEK
                          Opinion of the Court

                                OPINION

Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s opinion, in which Presiding
Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1            Justin Meek (“Husband”) appeals from the decree dissolving
his marriage to Jenna Meek (“Wife”). He argues the marital separation
agreement terms became unfair because of economic changes in the months
between its execution and the superior court’s approval. He also argues the
court erred by excluding the evidence at the evidentiary hearing that would
show that the agreement became inequitable after its execution.

¶2            We hold that a court need not divide the community assets
equitably when the parties reach their own agreement. See A.R.S.
§ 25-317(A). We also hold that the time to review for unfairness under
A.R.S. § 25-317(B) is at the time of the agreement’s formation. Thus, we
affirm because Husband makes no argument that the contract was unfair
when the spouses mutually assented to it. See Alulddin v. Alfartousi, 255
Ariz. 436, 442, ¶ 20 (App. 2023) (Defenses to contract formation such as
coercion and unconscionability are subject to waiver unless raised in the
superior court.).

             FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶3           Husband and Wife were married in 2016. Husband works in
the mortgage industry, and in 2017, he became a member of a mortgage
company, JFQ Lending, Inc. (“Company”). The marital community
contributed around $180,000 to purchase a 30 percent interest in the
Company.

¶4            In 2019, Husband petitioned to dissolve his marriage. During
the divorce proceedings, both spouses retained experts to determine the
Company’s value. After receiving the valuation reports and consulting
legal counsel, Husband and Wife attended a private mediation to discuss
the division of the community assets. In September 2021, they signed a
separation agreement under Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure
(“Rule”) 69.

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¶5            The relevant part of the Rule 69 agreement awarded Husband
the community interest in the Company and Wife an equalization payment
of $5 million, secured by a promissory note. The promissory note dictated
the terms of the equalization payment and required Husband to pledge
7,500 shares of the Company as collateral to secure the note.

¶6             Once the parties reached their Rule 69 agreement, the
superior court granted a joint request to vacate the scheduled trial. The
parties stipulated to continue the matter on the inactive calendar “to finalize
their complex settlement documents.” The parties also deferred submitting
the agreement to the court for approval. See Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 69(b) (“An
agreement under this rule is not binding on the court until it is submitted
to and approved by the court as provided by law.”); see also A.R.S.
§ 25-317(B) (“[T]he terms of the separation agreement, except those
providing for the support, legal decision-making and parenting time of
children, are binding on the court unless it finds . . . that the separation
agreement is unfair.”).

¶7             By December 2021, the Company learned of the stock pledge
component of the Rule 69 agreement and notified Husband he was
prohibited from making such a pledge without the Company’s
supermajority consent. Husband then requested a status conference to
determine whether the Company could participate in setting the terms of
the stock pledge. The court held the conference in February 2022 and ruled
in April 2022.

       The Court was never presented with the parties[‘] Rule 69
       Agreement to review and approve pursuant to Rule 69(b). As
       such, to date, it has not been approved and adopted by this
       Court and, therefore, is not binding on this Court. In fact, this
       Court was unaware of the contents of the parties’ Rule 69
       Agreement until it was attached to [Wife]’s Memo. However,
       neither party is asserting that the Rule 69 Agreement is not a
       valid and binding agreement between them.

As the agreement outlined, the court referred the parties to arbitration to
resolve disputed language in the pledge and continued the matter on the
inactive calendar until August 2022.

¶8            In May 2022, Husband requested an evidentiary hearing in a
“Motion to Determine Fairness of Rule 69 Agreement Pursuant to A.R.S.
§ 25-317(B).” He claimed that “in the eight (8) months since the parties’
entered the Agreement (and one (1) year since the last valuation report for

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                            Opinion of the Court

[the Company] was prepared) material subsequent events have occurred
that have resulted in a significant devaluation of the community’s interest
in [the Company].” Citing “rising interest rates and general economic
changes,” Husband alleged that the Company had lost substantial value, so
the Rule 69 agreement was now “unfair and inequitable” and must “be
deemed unenforceable.” Husband also identified that the Rule 69
agreement “only contains specific values for four (4) assets” and therefore
the agreement does not “contain enough information to enable the Court to
make [a] fairness determination.” Husband concurrently requested a stay
of the arbitration because “[i]t would be improper and a waste of resources
to conduct an arbitration hearing until the enforceability of the parties’
agreement is resolved.”

¶9            Wife responded by arguing that the court did not have the
authority to stay the arbitration and did not have to hold an evidentiary
hearing to determine the agreement’s fairness because the parties already
agreed it was fair. Wife also moved to enforce the Rule 69 agreement.

¶10           Based on the dispute, the court stayed the arbitration referral
and scheduled an evidentiary hearing about the fairness of the agreement
and Wife’s motion to enforce it. See A.R.S. § 25-317(B). Husband asked the
court “to clarify . . . with regard to the date the Court will evaluate the
parties’ Rule 69 Agreement.” He elaborated:

       Husband argues that the Court . . . must consider all evidence
       that exists at the time of the Court’s review, including events
       subsequent to the entry of the Agreement. Wife argues that
       the Court must evaluate the fairness of the Agreement as of
       the date it was entered in September [2021] and that it may
       not consider any subsequent events.

[footnote omitted.]. Husband also requested an extended disclosure period,
to continue the hearing for at least 60 days, and to extend the duration of
the hearing. Wife opposed the requests and argued that, under Buckholtz v.
Buckholtz, the superior court could only consider the evidence available
around the execution date of the Rule 69 agreement. 246 Ariz. 126, 133, ¶ 24,
n.5 (App. 2019) (“We note that on remand, when determining whether the
Agreement is unfair, the superior court must look at the time the
Agreement was entered.”).

¶11          Citing Buckholtz and Ertl v. Ertl, 252 Ariz. 308, 315, ¶ 22 (App.
2021), the superior court ruled that the proper standard was to “look to
whether the Rule 69 Agreement was fair as of the date the parties entered

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                            Opinion of the Court

into the agreement.” The court denied Husband’s requests for a
continuance, extended disclosure, and more hearing time.

¶12           After the August 2022 evidentiary hearing, the court found
that the parties agreed on all issues when they entered into the Rule 69
agreement:

       In light of the Court’s [ruling] . . . rejecting Husband’s
       position that the Court should evaluate the fairness of the
       parties’ Rule 69 Agreement as of the date of attempted
       enforcement, Husband concedes that the dispute regarding
       fairness of the parties’ Rule 69 Agreement[] is no longer a
       justiciable issue before this Court.

The court also noted that “by conceding the foregoing points, Husband is
not in any way waiving, but expressly reserves, his right to contest the
Court’s ruling in its [order] . . . including his right to an appeal of the
Court’s ruling.” The court found that the parties had entered into a fair and
valid Rule 69 agreement, approved it, and ordered Wife’s counsel to draft
a formal decree incorporating it.

¶13           The court entered the decree, and Husband appealed. We
have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 12-2101(A)(1), and Rule
78.

                               DISCUSSION

¶14           Husband appeals from a consent decree. With limited
exceptions, such as mistake or fraud, a party cannot appeal from a
judgment to which it consented. ARCAP 1(d) (“Any party aggrieved by a
judgment may appeal.”) (Emphasis added.); Duwyenie v. Moran, 220 Ariz.
501, 506, ¶¶ 16-18 (App. 2009) (A party consenting to a judgment waives
arguments on appeal challenging it or incorporated interlocutory orders.);
Cofield v. Sanders, 9 Ariz. App. 240, 242 (1969) (A party that consents to a
judgment is not aggrieved and thus may not appeal from it.).

¶15            It is clear from Husband’s motions and the August 2022
minute entry that Husband disagreed with the superior court’s ruling about
when to determine whether the agreement was unfair, and the parties have
thoroughly briefed the issues on appeal. As a result, we decline to apply the
waiver doctrine and instead address the merits of the arguments. See Reid
v. Reid, 222 Ariz. 204, 208, ¶ 16 (App. 2009) (Waiver is discretionary, not “an
unalterable rule.”); see also City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 209

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Ariz. 544, 552, ¶ 33, n.9 (2005) (Waiver is a “rule of prudence, not of
jurisdiction.”).

¶16           We review the superior court’s approval of a separation
agreement for an abuse of discretion. See Hutki v. Hutki, 244 Ariz. 39, 42,
¶¶ 13-14 (App. 2018). But we review the superior court’s interpretation of
statutes and rules de novo. Id. at ¶ 14; Hornbeck v. Lusk, 217 Ariz. 581, 582,
¶ 4 (App. 2008).

¶17           Husband argues that the superior court erred by (1) failing to
determine whether the community assets’ division was equitable and
(2) declining to consider evidence of unfairness arising after the Rule 69
agreement’s execution date.

A.     The Equitable Division Requirement in A.R.S. § 25-318(A) Only
Applies When the Superior Court Divides Community Assets, Not When
the Parties’ Agreement Divides the Assets.

¶18           Husband begins his argument by stating that by statute, a
court must divide community property equitably between spouses. See
A.R.S. § 25-318(A) (“[T]he court shall . . . divide the community, joint
tenancy and other property held in common equitably, though not
necessarily in kind.”). Noting that A.R.S. § 25-317, which governs
separation agreements, does not provide an express exception to A.R.S.
§ 25-318’s equity directive, Husband contends the equitable division
requirement “controls even when parties enter into settlement agreements
regarding [the] division of property.” Husband argues that A.R.S.
§ 25-317(B)’s unfairness assessment must be read with A.R.S. § 25-318,
requiring a court to approve a separation agreement only if it is equitable.

¶19           Proceeding under this theory, Husband points out that the
parties executed the Rule 69 agreement eight months before the court
approved it. Because of the claimed change in the Company’s value during
that time, Husband argues the superior court erred by relying on older
valuations and refusing to consider the evidence around the unfairness
hearing date. Husband alleges that in doing so, “the court abdicated its duty
to divide property equitably, and, in essence, chose to enforce the
requirements of A.R.S. § 25-317 over those imposed by A.R.S. § 25-318.”

¶20          Wife counters that the economic changes over the eight
months after the parties’ agreement are irrelevant because the Rule 69
agreement precedes and forecloses A.R.S. § 25-318’s equity assessment. She
contends that the settlement process would be ineffective if divorce
settlements had to meet A.R.S. § 25-318’s standard. She maintains that

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                            Opinion of the Court

otherwise, parties would have to settle their dispute like a court would
decide the issues.

¶21           Wife’s argument has merit. Consistent with our holding in
Buckholtz, we conclude that nothing in A.R.S. § 25-318(A) requires the court
to review whether a Rule 69 agreement is equitable. See Buckholtz, 246 Ariz.
at 131, ¶ 18. Instead, A.R.S. § 25-317(B) mandates that a court review a
separation agreement and determine whether it is “unfair.”

¶22           Two spouses enter a contract when they execute a Rule 69
separation agreement. See Buckholtz, 246 Ariz. at 129, ¶ 10 (citing Muchesko
v. Muchesko, 191 Ariz. 265, 268 (App. 1997)). Of course, the contract “is not
binding on the court until it is submitted to and approved by the court,” see
Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 69(b) (emphasis added), but the agreement may still
be “valid and binding on the parties” even before court approval, see Ariz. R.
Fam. Law P. 69(a) (emphasis added). Cf. Wheeler v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
999 S.W.2d 279, 287 (Mo. App. 1999) (“Parties may bind themselves to
obligations which the dissolution court lacks authority to impose.”). Thus,
although the court must review the agreement to determine whether it is
“unfair” under A.R.S. § 25-317(B), the parties remain bound at its execution.

¶23           Under A.R.S. § 25-317(D), the superior court may adopt the
agreement in one of two ways. The Rule 69 agreement may “merge” into
the court’s decree, superseding the agreement’s terms. See In re Marriage of
Rojas, 255 Ariz. 277, 282, ¶ 14 (App. 2023). Or the decree may incorporate
the agreement by reference, in which “the agreement retains its
independent contractual status and is subject to the rights and limitations
of contract law.” Id. at ¶ 16 (quoting LaPrade v. LaPrade, 189 Ariz. 243, 247
(1997)). Whether a separation agreement’s terms merge into the decree
“depends on the intent of the parties and the dissolution court.” Id. at ¶ 19.
Once the court enters a decree, its property terms are non-modifiable. See
A.R.S. § 25-317(F).

¶24            To determine which alternative applies, “we look initially to
the language of the agreement and the decree.” LaPrade, 189 Ariz. at 248.
Here, the decree stated that the Rule 69 agreement “is approved and
incorporated herein . . . but is specifically not merged herein.” Because the
decree explicitly incorporated the parties’ agreement, contract law governs
its terms, including the division of assets. See Buckholtz, 246 Ariz. at 129,
¶ 10 (citing MacMillan v. Schwartz, 226 Ariz. 584, 588, ¶ 12 (App. 2011)).

¶25          Thus, here, A.R.S. § 25-318(A) cannot require the court to
“divide the community . . . equitably” because it is not the court that is

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dividing the assets in its order—it is the parties in their contract. We decline
to expand the scope of the superior court’s review such that it may override
the terms of a valid and enforceable contract. See Ertl, 252 Ariz. at 312, ¶ 12
(“Arizona has long recognized that parties can enter a separation
agreement disposing of rights to property as they desire.”); accord Unif.
Marriage and Divorce Act § 306 cmt. (as amended 1973) (“Subsection (b)
undergirds the freedom allowed the parties by making clear that the terms
of the agreement respecting maintenance and property disposition are
binding upon the court unless those terms are found to be
unconscionable.”); Wheeler, 999 S.W.2d at 287.

¶26           We conclude that the superior court did not err by declining
to determine whether the Rule 69 agreement divided the property equitably
before accepting it.

B.    Courts Must Evaluate a Rule 69 Agreement’s Unfairness Based on
Circumstances Existing at the Agreement’s Formation.

¶27           Husband argues that the proper time to evaluate a Rule 69
agreement’s unfairness is at its incorporation date, not its formation. He
argues that “[i]t defies logic that an agreement can be ineffective until the
time of approval, but must be evaluated for fairness at some earlier date.”
He, therefore, requests that we remand to the superior court and “order the
court to assess the fairness of the agreement as of the date of dissolution
and division of the property.”

¶28            First, we reject his premise that the agreement is “ineffective
until the time of approval.” As explained above, the parties are bound by
the agreement at its formation, even if the formal division of assets does not
occur until the court incorporates the agreement into the dissolution decree.
The mere fact that an agreement is not enforced immediately does not make
it any less binding on the parties.

¶29            Second, as the superior court identified, Buckholtz already
addressed this question: “[W]hen determining whether the Agreement is
unfair, the superior court must look at the time the Agreement was
entered.” 246 Ariz. at 133, ¶ 24, n.5; see also Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc.,
184 Ariz. 82, 84 (1995) (“[T]he question of unconscionability is determined
as of the time the contract was made.”); A.R.S. § 47-2302(A) (The court may
refuse to enforce a contract if it finds “the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made.”) (Emphasis
added.).

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                               MEEK v. MEEK
                             Opinion of the Court

¶30           Husband cites Ertl for the proposition that a “separation
agreement’s unfairness review” takes place “at dissolution.” 252 Ariz. at
315, ¶ 22. Husband points out that Buckholtz addressed the timing of the
superior court’s fairness review only in a footnote that “relies upon
principles governing unconscionability, not the statutory fairness analysis,”
suggesting that, between the two cases, Ertl is the legal standard that
“makes sense.”

¶31              But Husband misreads Ertl. As Wife points out, Ertl resolved
a premarital versus separation agreement dispute. See 252 Ariz. at 311-12,
¶¶ 3, 6. In Ertl, this court was comparing two contracts against one another.
By identifying that a separation agreement is properly reviewed for
unfairness “at dissolution,” Ertl did not dispute the holding about the
timing of the A.R.S. § 25-317(B) review identified in Buckholtz. See Ertl, 252
Ariz. at 315, ¶ 22; see also Buckholtz, 246 Ariz. at 133, ¶ 24, n.5. The Ertl court
was not distinguishing between the date of the separation agreement
formation and its acceptance by the court. Instead, we clarified that it was
proper to review the fairness of the separation agreement “at dissolution”
as distinct from the appropriate time for reviewing the premarital agreement
(i.e., at its formation before the marriage). See Ertl, 252 Ariz. at 315, ¶ 22.

¶32            Still, Husband argues Buckholtz is not dispositive because it
referenced unconscionability principles while A.R.S. § 25-317(B) requires a
review for unfairness. Husband notes that the Arizona legislature modeled
A.R.S. § 25-317 on the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act but specifically
replaced the word “unconscionable” with “unfair.” Compare A.R.S.
§ 25-317(B) with Unif. Marriage and Divorce Act § 306(b). Husband asks us
to “hew close to the interpretation[s] applied by sister jurisdictions that
share similar statutory guidelines[.]” See, e.g., Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 7.006(b) (“If the court finds that the terms of the written agreement in a
divorce or an annulment are just and right, those terms are binding on the
court.”).1

¶33         Buckholtz indeed relied on authorities addressing
unconscionability, not unfairness, when holding that “when determining

1      We disagree with Husband that the Texas code is a close analog to
A.R.S. § 25-317(B) because the Texas law expressly provides: “The
agreement may be revised or repudiated before rendition of the divorce or
annulment.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 7.006(a). As explained supra ¶ 22, this
differs from Arizona, where the parties are bound once they form the
agreement.

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                               MEEK v. MEEK
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whether the Agreement is unfair, the superior court must look at the time
the Agreement was entered.” 246 Ariz. at 133, ¶ 24, n.5 (citing Nelson v. Rice,
198 Ariz. 563 (App. 2000); A.R.S. § 25-202(C)(2)). Even so, we disagree with
Husband that the superior court’s reliance on Buckholtz was misplaced.

¶34           In Maxwell v. Fidelity Financial Services, Inc., our supreme court
provided a framework for courts to use when analyzing the “amorphous
equitable doctrine” of unconscionability. See 184 Ariz. at 88-90. An
agreement may be procedurally or substantively unconscionable. Id. at 90
(The court rejected the requirement that both aspects be present for a court
to find unconscionability.). Procedural unconscionability, the
“common-law cousin[] of fraud and duress,” may be found by considering
“the real and voluntary meeting of the minds of the contracting party: age,
education, intelligence, business acumen and experience, relative
bargaining power, who drafted the contract, whether the terms were
explained to the weaker party, whether alterations in the printed terms
were possible.” Id. at 89 (citation omitted). Some substantive
unconscionability indicators are “contract terms so one-sided as to oppress
or unfairly surprise an innocent party” or “an overall imbalance in the
obligations and rights imposed by the bargain.” Id. The listed factors are
not exhaustive. Id.

¶35             Maxwell acknowledged that unconscionability arises based on
“the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract.” See
184 Ariz. at 88 (quoting Seekings v. Jimmy GMC of Tucson, Inc., 130 Ariz. 596,
602 (1981)); see also A.R.S. § 47-2302(A). The review’s timing is because
unconscionability concerns the bargaining process. See Maxwell, 184 Ariz.
at 89 (Procedural unconscionability “mean[s] bargaining did not proceed as
it should.”); id. at 90 (“[S]ubstantive unconscionability really seems to be . . .
[evidence] . . . confirming the conclusion that the process of bargaining was
itself defective.”). Moreover, this court has long reviewed premarital
agreements for unconscionability when they are entered. See, e.g., In re
Marriage of Pownall, 197 Ariz. 577, 581, ¶ 11 (App. 2000) (A premarital
agreement was not unconscionable partly because Wife received disclosure
of property at issue.); see also A.R.S. § 25-202(C)(2).

¶36            Maxwell did not define “unfairness,” but it did use the term
“unfair” to describe both types of unconscionability. See 184 Ariz. at 88
(“Procedural or process unconscionability is concerned with ‘unfair
surprise.’”); see id. at 89 (“Indicative of substantive unconscionability are
contract terms so one-sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise an innocent
party.”). And though the Maxwell court did not conclude that the contract
was unconscionable, the court acknowledged that remand was necessary

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                              MEEK v. MEEK
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because there was “evidence of unconscionability” and it “may be possible”
that the respondent “intend[ed] ‘to extract’ unfair profits” using the
contract. Id. at 93 (emphasis added).

¶37            Thus,      Buckholtz’s      reference   to    caselaw   citing
unconscionability is unsurprising because, although unconscionability
requires a “more stringent” test than mere unfairness, 246 Ariz. at 131, ¶ 18,
n.4, the two tests address the same concerns, see Nelson, 198 Ariz. at 567,
¶ 14 (Unconscionability “concerns the actual terms of the contract and the
relative fairness of the parties’ obligations.”) (Emphasis added.).2 Husband
provides no caselaw to distinguish between unconscionability and
unfairness—other than the citation to Buckholtz for the proposition that
“fairness is a less stringent standard.” At oral argument, Husband
acknowledged that the distinction between unconscionability and
unfairness is a matter of degree.3

2      Cases in which Arizona courts have disapproved separation
agreements on unfairness grounds exhibited substantive and procedural
unconscionability. See, e.g., Hutki, 244 Ariz. at 43-44, ¶ 23 (Husband
controlled all business accounts and financial information before and
during divorce litigation, made misrepresentations of value during
negotiations, and stood to receive more than two times the value of
community assets under the agreement.); Sharp v. Sharp, 179 Ariz. 205, 208
(App. 1994) (Wife alleged “undue influence and overbearing tactics,”
“extreme emotional distress,” financial manipulation during the
negotiations, and that husband would not communicate with her through
counsel.) (superseded on other grounds).

3      Other jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Wille
v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 549 P.2d 903, 907 (Kan. 1976) (Unconscionability “is
directed against one-sided, oppressive and unfairly surprising contracts,
and not against the consequences per se of uneven bargaining power or even
a simple old-fashioned bad bargain.”); Marin Storage & Trucking, Inc. v.
Benco Contracting & Eng’g, Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 657 (App. 2001) (“[A]
greater degree of substantive unfairness than has been shown here was
required before the contract could be found substantively
unconscionable.”); Rivera v. Rivera, 243 P.3d 1148, 1154 (N.M. App. 2010)
(“Substantive unconscionability relates to the content of the contract terms
and whether they are illegal, contrary to public policy, or grossly unfair.”)
(Emphasis added.).

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                              MEEK v. MEEK
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¶38            While the difference between unconscionability and
unfairness may be relevant to apply A.R.S. § 25-317(B), we decline to
explore the distinction’s contours because it is not at issue in this appeal.
Instead, we need only decide whether A.R.S. § 25-317(B) requires the court
to consider the terms of a Rule 69 agreement around the date it conducts
the unfairness review. And Husband fails to explain adequately why an
unfairness review should be conducted at a different time simply because
it requires a lesser showing than unconscionability.

¶39           As this case reflects, the decision to assess a separation
agreement’s fairness at its formation is also partly a matter of practicality.
During negotiations, Husband’s expert assessed the fair market value of the
community’s interest in the Company at around $6.7 million in 2019 and
$13.7 million in 2021. Wife’s expert reported around a $5 million change in
the fair market value between 2019 and 2020. Given the demonstrable
variance in the Company’s value during a short period, the Company may
one day return to its 2021 value—or be worth even more than anticipated
at the Rule 69 agreement’s formation.

¶40          A line must be drawn to prevent endless litigation over the
“unfairness” of the agreement’s terms based on when that review occurs.
Here, the parties consulted experts with counsel and reached an informed
compromise that accounted for the assessment and predictions of the
Company’s future value at the time of the Rule 69 agreement’s formation
in 2021. We see no good reason to deviate from reviewing for unfairness at
the time when the parties agreed.

¶41           We thus hold that, like a test for unconscionability, courts
must review for unfairness under A.R.S. § 25-317(B), considering only the
circumstances that existed around the time of the separation agreement’s
formation. As Husband only claims to have evidence of the Company’s
value change after the agreement’s formation, the court did not err by
refusing to consider his evidence at the evidentiary hearing.

                           ATTORNEY’S FEES

¶42           Wife requests her costs on appeal and fees under A.R.S.
§ 25-324. Per our discretion, we decline to award fees. Wife is entitled to
costs upon compliance with ARCAP 21 as the prevailing party.

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                     MEEK v. MEEK
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                      CONCLUSION

¶43   We affirm.

                   AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                   FILED: AA

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