Court Opinion

ID: 9655968
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:28:29.721652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:25.024466
License: Public Domain

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.
¶ 63. (concurring). I join the majority opinion in its entirety. I write separately to address the dissenting opinion.
¶ 64. In a spirited writing, the dissent continues in its attempt to ride the Makos1 train. The dissent is either unable, or unwilling, to acknowledge that Makos has no precedential value. Indeed, the Makos train never left the station.
¶ 65. What the dissent fails to acknowledge is what this court readily admitted only seven days after the Makos opinion was released: Makos has no prece-dential value. In Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 211 Wis. 2d 312, 334 n.ll, 565 N.W.2d 94 (1997), this court explained: "[T]he only 'majority' holding in [Makos] is the mandate. Of the four 'majority'justices, three separate opinions give three distinct reasons for the result. *32Therefore, none of the opinions in that case has any precedential value." (Emphasis added).
¶ 66. The dissent continued to try to ride the Makos train last term in Aicher. See Aicher v. Wisconsin Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶¶ 86 — 92, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849 (Crooks, J., dissenting). Now, in the present case the dissent again attempts to stoke the Makos fires. In footnote 13 the dissent laments that Aicher overruled Makos "just three years after that decision." It erroneously suggests that Makos was precedent to overrule in the first instance. Again, in footnote 16, the dissent refuses to acknowledge that there was no majority opinion of precedential value in Makos. See Aicher, 2000 WI 98, ¶¶ 35 — 40 (explaining split decision in Makos and indicating that Makos "carries no precedential weight"); see also Tomczak v. Bailey, 218 Wis. 2d 245, 280, 578 N.W.2d 166 (1998) (Geske, J., concurring).
¶ 67. The dissent's unwillingness to acknowledge the fate of Makos is symptomatic of its flawed approach in this case. The dissent is unwilling to acknowledge that the term "statute of repose" is not part of the legislature's lexicon, but rather is a judicially created label used to describe a particular type of limitation on actions. Instead, the dissent derides the majority, while all the time ignoring this critical distinction.
¶ 68. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON joins this concurrence.