Court Opinion

ID: 9631221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:32:08.465625+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:50.623864
License: Public Domain

ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Today, a panel majority overturns an Ohio judgment, which sentenced petitioner Reginald Jells to death, by re-characterizing a defaulted Brady claim, reviewing it de novo, and finding that the State’s withholding of evidence unconstitutionally prejudiced Jells; and also by finding that Jells’s counsel were unconstitutionally inadequate because they failed to discover— and present to the trial court during the sentencing phase — mitigation evidence that would have provided a more “nuanced” and sympathetic picture of Jells. Because the record does not support either the majority’s re-characterization of the Brady claim or the majority’s finding of prejudice resulting from that claim; because the law does not permit us to overturn the state court’s Strickland judgment *514on the basis of subjective interpretations of the facts, no matter how nuanced; and because the facts of this ease do not permit a finding of prejudice on either the Brady claim or the Strickland claim, I must respectfully dissent.
I.
When Devon Stapleton was four years old, he watched helplessly as a man beat his mother senseless with a transmission jack. So close was Devon to the onslaught that his mother’s blood splattered onto him. His last image of his mother was of her lifeless body being dragged by this savage man into a cold, dark junkyard in the middle of the night. When he was found by Clyde Smith, alone outside a different junkyard in the wee hours of the morning, “Devon kept telling Smith that his mother was over a fence and that he could not get to her because of the wire.” Ohio v. Jells, 1989 WL 43401, *2 (Ohio App.1989). A police report from a few days after the crime recounts:
Conversed with victim, Devon Stapleton. Devon was shown several photos of black males, and three photos of the suspect’s van. Devon pointed immediately to the second photo which was the arrested male [Reginald Jells] and said, ‘This is the man that hit my mommy,’ ‘Ask that man where is my mommy.’ Devon also stated that [the picture of Jells’s van] was the [assailant’s] van. The child was adamant in positively identifying the photos of the suspect Reginald Jells and the [v]an, with the license plates 149MJV. Devon requested of me to take [him] to see the man [Reginald Jells] so he could ask him where is his mother. (Emphasis added.)
More to the point, Devon testified against Jells at trial. See Jells, 1989 WL 43401 at *2.
The Ohio Eighth District Court of Appeals’ opinion from Jells’s direct appeal of his conviction provides a reasonably vivid account of four-year-old Devon’s testimony:
Devon Stapleton took the stand and testified that on the night in question he and his mother were en route from his father’s bar.[1] Devon stated that as he and his mother were trying to go to Coventry Road, [Jells] asked his mother if they wanted a ride. Devon’s testimony indicated that he and his mother were either forced into [Jells]’s van by [Jells] or that they entered it voluntarily. At about 10:30 p.m.[,] Ruby Staple-ton escaped from the van causing [Jells] to stop and physically force her and Devon back in. This is the abduction witnessed by Owen and Camilla Banks and Edward Wright. Devon testified that they drove around for a long time. Devon stated that he saw [Jells] hit his mother twice with a ‘silver thing.’. After his mother was hit, Devon stated she ‘got knocked out.’ Blood was splattered on Devon’s clothes.
Devon testified that at some point [Jells] carried his mother from the van. Devon recalled seeing a junkyard and that [Jells] opened a big fence. Devon could not see where [Jells] took his mother. [Jells] returned to the van, drove around some more, and eventually stopped at a gas station. Devon testified that he was later abandoned near a junkyard. Devon stated that he just stood there until some man [Clyde Smith] picked him up.
Clyde Smith testified that in the early morning hours of April 19, 1987[,] he came upon a child who had been aban*515doned on the street. Smith testified that the child was crying. Smith picked up the child and took him to his (Smith’s) home. Devon kept telling Smith that his mother was over a fence and that he could not get to her because of the wire. Smith called the police. Smith’s wife, Anita, noticed a shiny substance on Devon’s coat which she thought to be blood. Devon stated that the blood was his mother’s and that a man had thrown him out of a van.
Jells, 1989 WL 48401 at *2; see also Ohio v. Jells, 53 Ohio St.3d 22, 559 N.E.2d 464, 466-67 (1990). Elsewhere in the court of appeals’ opinion, the court elaborated on its appraisal of Devon’s testimony:
It is clear that Devon got a good view of the assailant. Devon was in [Jells]’s van and able to observe [Jells] for an extended period. He saw [Jells] hit his mother with a silver object and saw her blood splatter. He saw [Jells] knock his mother unconscious, carry her into a junkyard and return to the van. Devon stated he was eventually dropped off by [Jells]. Devon’s ability to relay accurately these events indicated he paid a good deal of attention the night his mother and h[e] were kidnapped and his mother murdered. Further, the information relayed by Devon was substantiated by scientific and physical evidence. Devon described [Jells] as ‘real Mg’ and ‘black black.’ Given the child’s age and that he was able to recall the night’s events in detail, we conclude that his description of [Jells] was not indetermi-natively vague. Further, Devon identified [Jells] with great certainty the day after [Jells]’s arrest. We find nothing unreliable in Devon’s out of court identification.
Id. at *6; see also Jells, 559 N.E.2d at 470. The court acknowledged the corroborating evidence:
In this case four witnesses, Camilla Banks, Owen Banks, Edward Wright[,] and Devon Stapleton testified that the kidnapping was intentional and forceful. All four identified [Jells] as the perpetrator. Patricia Green’s testimony also indicates that the abduction was deliberate and forceful. Camilla and Owen Banks, Edward Wright[,] and Devon Stapleton all identified [Jells]’s van as the one used the night of the abduction. Owen and Camilla Banks, Devon[,] and Wright identified the victim, Ruby Sta-pleton, as the woman [Jells] picked up and threw into the van. It is clear from the evidence presented by the State that Ruby Stapleton was forced, against her will, into the van and that Devon was also placed into the van.
As discussed in the facts, the evidence showed that Ruby Stapleton while in the van was beaten with some sort of silver object and that she was ‘knocked out’ as a result and dragged into a junk yard. The evidence further showed that Ruby Stapleton’s blood was found in the van along with a shoe print which matched the left tennis shoe recovered on her body. A transmission jack was also found in [Jells]’s van which matched the marks found on the victim’s body. [Jells] unequivocally stated that the van, which four witnesses had identified as belonging to the perpetrator of the kidnapping, belonged to him.
Id. at *8-9; see also id. at *18 (“This evidence overwhelmingly supported the trial court’s finding that [Jells] was guilty of the aggravated circumstance of kidnapping.”). A coroner testified that Ruby Stapleton was beaten to death with a blunt instrument, and the wounds — evidencing over 90 blows — matched a transmission jack recovered from Jells’s van. Id. at *12; Jells, 559 N.E.2d at 467.
*516On appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, that court affirmed the court of appeals decision, and concluded its opinion with an independent assessment of the death sentence, stating:
[Jells] killed Ruby Stapleton after first kidnapping her and her child off the streets of Cleveland, Ohio. We find that the aggravating circumstance is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. [Jells] introduced in mitigation that [1] he had no significant history of prior criminal conduct, [2] he could possibly adapt well to imprisonment, [3] his youth (21 years old), and [4] his low intelligence. Weighing the mitigating factors against the aggravating circumstance, we conclude that the aggravating circumstance outweighs the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jells, 559 N.E.2d at 477 (paragraph breaks omitted).
Based on the forgoing recitation of incontrovertible facts — which the majority has also expressly adopted as its own, Maj. Op. § 1(A) — I cannot conclude that Reginald Jells suffered any undue prejudice from either the alleged Brady violation or the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. Indeed, I find it remarkable that anyone could. Simply put, Devon’s testimony is so powerful that, even standing alone, it proves that Jells kidnapped and murdered Ruby Stapleton:
It is clear that Devon got a good view of the assailant. Devon was in [Jells]’s van and able to observe [Jells] for an extended period. He saw [Jells] hit his mother with a silver object and saw her blood splatter. He saw [Jells] knock his mother unconscious, carry her into a junkyard and return to the van.... Devon’s ability to relay[ ] these events [accurately] indicated [that] he paid a good deal of attention the night his mother and h[e] were kidnapped and his mother murdered. Further, the information relayed by Devon was substantiated by scientific and physical evidence.
Jells, 1989 WL 43401 at *2; see also Jells, 559 N.E.2d at 470.
The [physical] evidence [] showed that Ruby Stapleton’s blood was found in the van along with a shoe print which matched the left tennis shoe recovered on her body. A transmission jack was also found in [Jells]’s van which matched the marks found on the victim’s body. [Jells] unequivocally stated that the van ... belonged to him.
Id. at *8-9. Jells was fully aware of Devon’s testimony and this physical evidence before trial and yet he pursued a defense of misidentification — he argued that he was not the perpetrator, that he did not abduct Ruby and Devon Stapleton, and that he and his van had been misidentified. At sentencing, Jells argued “residual doubt” — i.e., the court should spare his life if it found (that is, because it should find) some residual doubt as to whether he actually committed the crime.
Even if the alleged Brady materials would have aided Jells’s defense — which they would not, as they fit only an entirely different theory of defense; i.e., that Ruby was with Jells voluntarily2 — Jells is still *517left with Devon’s testimony, which is overwhelming. And the currently alleged Brady materials do not diminish Devon’s testimony in any way. Furthermore, the after-acquired mitigation evidence (i.e., that Jells is learning disabled and socially maladjusted, and that, as a child, he was the victim of and witness to extensive physical abuse) does little to lessen Jells’s culpability for this particular act, considering the totality of the evidence — i.e., Jells was sufficiently intelligent to become a successful auto mechanic, had no prior criminal history other than one purse snatching, and this was an especially gruesome murder, committed over the course of an entire evening, for purposes of sexual gratification, and in the presence of the victim’s four-year-old son.
Therefore, even if the withheld evidence had been provided as the majority says it should have been and even if Jells’s counsel had performed exactly as the majority says they should have, there is no legitimate possibility that the trial, the conviction, or the sentence would have been any different. Jells kidnapped, assaulted, and brutally murdered Ruby Stapleton in front of her four-year-old son, and no rational finder of fact could reasonably consider the total evidence and conclude otherwise. Consequently, I cannot join the majority’s opinion and must respectfully dissent.
I also disagree with the majority’s legal analysis of both the Brady claim and the sentencing-phase ineffective-assistance claim, and feel compelled to explain my disagreement, albeit briefly. Even though I also disagree with the majority’s analysis of Jells’s other claims, I am not compelled to comment specifically on the majority’s treatment of those claims because the majority ultimately reaches the correct conclusion — finding no merit to any of those other claims.
II.
In analyzing Jells’s Brady claim, the majority — conducting a de novo review— contends that if the State had properly provided the withheld evidence to Jells’s counsel, then that counsel might reasonably have prevented the State from convincing all three members of the three-judge panel that Jells kidnapped Ruby Stapleton. The majority says that, taken together, this evidence is sufficient to undermine confidence in the trial court’s finding that a kidnapping occurred. See Maj. Op. § V(C)(3). The four pieces of evidence at issue are: (1) a statement by one Willie Smith relating his impression of Ruby on the night of the murder; (2) a statement from Cynthia Yawn, Ruby’s sister, relating her impressions of Ruby on the night of the murder; (3) a statement from Anthony Massingill, Devon’s father, relating his impressions of Ruby on the night of the murder; and (4) a Crimestop-pers intake sheet, attributable to Camilla *518Banks, stating that she had not gotten a good look at the perpetrator. The majority surmises that if Jells’s counsel had been armed with this evidence, then that counsel would have: (1) been more persuasive in showing that Ruby was with Jells voluntarily “after the time of the altercation at the street intersection”; (2) been more effective in impeaching Camilla Banks’s identification of Jells; (3) bolstered Edward Wright’s testimony that Ruby appeared to be with Jells voluntarily and correspondingly impugned the contradictory testimony that Ruby appeared to have been abducted; and (4) nullified suspicion that Jells had been lying when he told Owen Banks that Ruby was drunk. Maj. Op. § V(C)(3).
As I have indicated, I am confident— particularly in light of Devon’s testimony — that the absence of this allegedly withheld Brady evidence had so little effect on the determination that Jells kidnapped Ruby that Jells cannot show any prejudice, even if there was error. Thus, I disagree with the majority’s contention that the allegedly withheld evidence undermines confidence in the trial court’s finding that a kidnapping occurred. In fact, I find this contention inconceivable. But, the Brady issue itself — and the majority’s treatment of it — warrants some further discussion.
Jells first filed a petition for post-conviction relief with the state trial court on November 8, 1991. He filed an amended petition on April 26, 1995. During the intervening four years, Jells had obtained copies of the witness statements to the police that comprise his Brady claim. Thus, Jells did not raise a Brady claim in his original (Nov. 8, 1991) petition, but added it as the 27th cause of action in his amended (Apr. 26, 1995) petition, claiming that his “right to due process was violated because the State withheld material impeachment and exculpatory evidence from him during his 1987 capital trial.” Specifically, Jells complained that: (1) witness Edward Wright had mistakenly described Jells as having a light skin complexion and a chubby face; and (2) Devon Stapleton had mistakenly described Jells’s van as white, Jells’s murder weapon as brown, and Jells’s jacket as light blue. Jells did not identify or describe any other Brady materials in that petition, and notably, those are not the Brady materials (or arguments) to which either Jells or the majority now points.3
The state trial court eventually ruled on (and dismissed) Jells’s petition on April 9, 1997. In its opinion, the state trial court addressed Jells’s Brady claim succinctly, stating: “Cause of Action 27: No exculpatory evidence was withheld from [Jells]. All witness statements were subject to in-camera inspection and disclosure to defense. Conflicting or disagreeing statements are matters for the trier of fact to resolve.” The court concluded: “The evidence in the record established ... that no exculpatory evidence was withheld from [Jells]. This court overrules Cause[] of Action ... 27.” The court denied his petition and Jells appealed the denial to the state appellate court.
On appeal, Jells asserted that his Brady claim was based on the two aforemen*519tioned pieces of evidence — (1) the police reports suggesting that Edward Wright had mistakenly described Jells as having light skin and a chubby face, and (2) the report suggesting that Devon had mistakenly described the van as white, the murder weapon as brown, and Jells’s jacket as light blue. Jells did not discuss, or even refer to, any other withheld materials. Furthermore, he framed the trial court’s error as a misapplication of Brady, not as a misstatement of what had occurred at trial: “[The State] asserted, and the trial court agreed, that because the statements of these witnesses were all available for in-camera inspection by defense counsel, then no exculpatory evidence was withheld from [Jells]. This analysis is incorrect.” So, Jells did not argue that the factual premise was incorrect — he did not argue that the witness statements had not been available for in-camera inspection by his defense counsel. Jells argued that “[t]his analysis is incorrect,” and, specifically, that the court’s in-camera inspection during trial was not enough, but that “[t]he prosecutor had a duty to disclose all material exculpatory and impeachment evidence in accordance with [Jells]’s request for discovery.” That is, Jells argued that the State was obligated to disclose the witness statements before trial.4
In resolving his appeal, the Ohio court of appeals framed Jells’s Brady claim as follows: “[Jells] claim[s] that evidence for impeachment of the state’s witnesses had to be provided prior to trial, pursuant to Brady[], and not [in camera] following the testimony of the witness on direct examination.” Ohio v. Jells, 1998 WL 213175, *10 (Ohio App.1998). The court then rejected this claim, finding that: (1) the government’s disclosure was sufficient under Ohio’s discovery laws (i.e., “while [Jells] complains that the statements should have been provided prior to trial, we are satisfied that compliance with the procedure outlined in [Ohio] Crim. R. 16(B)(1)(g) is sufficient to meet the requirements of Brady ”); and (2) there was no prejudice anyway (i.e., “Moreover, no evidence has been offered to indicate that there is a reasonable probability that an earlier disclosure of this information would have resulted in a different outcome of the proceedings.”).
The majority rejects both the Ohio trial court’s findings of fact and the Ohio appellate court’s findings of law, and instead conducts a de novo review based on its assertion that the Ohio courts “misconstrued Jells’s Brady claim,” so “there is no state court decision regarding the merits of th[at] claim.” Maj. Op. § V(C)(2). The majority contends: “Jells’s petition for post-conviction relief properly stated the Brady claim [and] included a clear statement that Jells was not able to receive the complained of information until post-conviction.” Maj. Op. § V(C)(2). But, this “complained of information” — i.e., the information described in Jells’s post-conviction-relief motion and subsequent appellate brief — is not the information presently at issue. The only information for which there is “a clear statement” in either Jells’s post-conviction-relief motion or ensuing appellate brief are the two witness statements (of Edward Wright and Devon Stapleton) suggesting that Wright had mistakenly described Jells as having light *520skin and a chubby face and Devon had mistakenly described the van as white, the murder weapon as brown, and Jells’s jacket as light blue. The Ohio trial court decided this case on a purely factual basis and flatly rejected Jells’s assertion that these documents had been withheld, stating unequivocally: “All witness statements were subject to in-camera inspection and disclosure to defense.” (emphasis added).
Furthermore, when Jells appealed the denial of his post-conviction petition, he did not argue that the statements were not available to his defense counsel for in-camera inspection. He conceded that they were and argued (incorrectly) that Brady required pre-trial discovery. More importantly, Jells did not complain at all about the four documents now at issue. Those were not in dispute.
For all of these reasons, I disagree with the majority’s contention that Jells preserved his Brady claim as to these four documents, and I disagree with the majority’s statement that the Ohio court did not render a decision on the merits. But, even if Jells properly preserved his claim (by appending the documents), it is beyond dispute that prejudice is a substantive component of a Brady claim, see Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194), and the Ohio court of appeals clearly rendered a finding that Jells suffered no prejudice. Therefore, I must also disagree that this decision does not warrant deference under AED-PA. Inasmuch as the Ohio court of appeals considered the question of prejudice, decided it, and relied upon its determination that Jells had shown none, I cannot conclude that it unreasonably applied Brady in this case.
Moreover, the district court reconsidered this evidence in light of Jells’s habeas petition and reached a similar conclusion, finding no violation and no prejudice. See Jells v. Mitchell, No. 98-CV-2453, *14-20 (N.D.Ohio Mar. 18, 2002). Specifically, the district court explained:
The evidence that the victim [Ruby Sta-pleton] and her son [Devon] were with [Jells] willingly earlier in the evening is not relevant. Indeed, [Jells’s] defense counsel was aware of this fact and argued in his closing argument [in the state trial court] that the victim’s conduct earlier in the evening refuted the kidnapping charges. Specifically, counsel argued that there could be no kidnapping insofar as the parties had been riding around together for an hour to an hour and a half. The circumstances, however, became a kidnapping when, at the intersection of Lakeview and Euclid, the victim and her son were forced into [Jells]’s van. As described in the Ohio Supreme Court’s opinion, several witnesses (including the victim’s son) described what happened at the intersection. This testimony is sufficient to establish a kidnapping at that time regardless of what had occurred earlier in the evening.
Id. at *16 (citation omitted; emphasis added). The district court also addressed the other materials:
The Crimestoppers intake statement is only a paragraph. Its vague statement of what Camilla [Banks] told Crimestop-pers, regarding what the victim supposedly told her [Camilla’s] father [Owen Banks], has virtually no impeachment value. If anything, the statement is highly incriminating [to Jells] because it contains that license plate number that subsequently was traced to [Jells].
Camilla’s statement to the police that she could not see the male well is more significant. Such a statement arguably could have been used to impeach her description and identification of [Jells]. *521Its non-disclosure, however, does not warrant relief because the statement is not ‘material’ as that term is used in a Brady claim. It does not undermine the confidence in the result of the trial. The statement specifically indicates that although Camilla could not see the man well, her father could. Thus, even assuming Camilla’s testimony could be impeached, Owen’s testimony is bolstered by the statement. In addition, other witnesses were able to identify [Jells]. The statement, therefore, does not undermine confidence in the trial.
Id. at *18-19. Thus, the district court concluded its Brady analysis:
[This court] must view all the allegedly withheld evidence collectively to determine whether such evidence is ‘material’ in that it undermines the confidence in the outcome. Here, none of the evidence allegedly withheld can be characterized as exculpatory. In addition, only Camilla’s pretrial statement that she could not see the male perpetrator clearly, even arguably would have been usable for impeachment. In view of the testimony of other eyewitnesses to the kidnapping, that statement lacks sufficient significance to be material as the term is defined in the Brady context.
Id. at *20. The district court, therefore, rejected Jells’s Brady claim. Id.
Based on the foregoing, I cannot agree with the majority’s rendition of the facts or application of the law in regard to this Brady issue. Consequently, I respectfully dissent.
III.
In analyzing Jells’s sentencing-phase ineffective-assistance claim, the majority acknowledges that “[t]he Ohio Court of Appeals correctly identified the Strickland standard as the governing federal rule,” but asserts “that the Ohio court applied this standard to the facts of Jells’s case in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Maj. Op. § IV(C). But, what the majority goes on to describe is not a misapplication of Strickland — let alone “an objectively unreasonable” misapplication — but rather, a perfect application of Strickland, albeit one in which the Ohio courts simply came to a subjective conclusion different from that of the majority regarding the persuasiveness, forcefulness, or weight of the after-acquired mitigating evidence. This is not a proper basis for habeas relief.
A.
Jells raised his ineffective-assistance claim in his Ohio state petitions for post-conviction relief, “assert[ing] that his trial counsel were ineffective in failing to introduce evidence regarding his troubled family and early life and in failing to utilize expert assistance.” Ohio v. Jells, 1998 WL 213175, *5-6 (Ohio.App.1998). Following the trial court’s denial of his petition, the Ohio court of appeals analyzed the claim under Strickland, id. at *2, and found no prejudice:
In this matter, the mitigation presented at trial tended to focus upon [Jells]’s loving behavior to his family, his good behavior at school, his obedience to authority and his teachers, his strong work ethic, and his tendency to walk away from an argument. In addition, trial counsel indicated that [Jells]’s family had moved many times, and also presented expert opinion evidence that [Jells] was of borderline intelligence and over-controlled his hostility. Finally, [Jells] presented an unsworn statement in which he emphasized his work ethic, his empathy for Devon, his sadness at the tragic manner in which [Ruby] Sta-pleton must have met her death, and his disagreement with the verdict reached by the panel. Further, in its written *522opinion, the three judge panel observed that [Jells] had presented evidence of, inter alia, character, family relationships, employment history, and emotional stability.
Examining the evidence now offered dehors the record, we find that a certain measure of the evidence which [Jells] now claims should have been admitted to be cumulative of what was presented at trial, i.e., the frequent moves, change of care givers, borderline intelligence, superficial, personality style. We are therefore unable to conclude that there is a reasonable probability that, but for this alleged omission of counsel, the result of his trial would have been different, and [JellsJ’s challenge to the effectiveness of counsel in this respect fails.
As to the remaining items concerning the other more tragic circumstances which [Jells] now claims should have been admitted, i.e., his mother’s alcoholism and the abuse which he often witnessed, this information would appear to be completely inconsistent with the favorable portrait of [Jells] which counsel presented at trial. That is, trial counsel emphasized the favorable aspects of [Jells]’s life and chose to present him as someone who over controlled his negative feelings and had no pathological difference or condition requiring treatment or thought disorder. Considered in light of the nature of [Jells]’s defense at trial, we are compelled to conclude that the more negative information produced in connection with the amended petition for post-conviction relief is inconsistent with the essential trial strategy of working to establish reasonable doubt and in turn residual doubt that [Jells] committed these offenses. We are therefore unable to conclude that counsel was ineffective in failing to present this information.
Indeed, social worker Linda Pudvan’s averment that even negative family history is relevant to provide an explanation of Mr. Jells life and behavior during his offense and attorney Ken Murray’s averment that unfavorable information further serves to explain the stresses and traumatic events that culminated the night of the offense seem odd in light of the complete- denial presented at trial.
Id. at *5-6 (citations, quotation marks, and editorial marks omitted; emphasis added). So, based on the foregoing, it appears that the Ohio court of appeals largely accepted Jells’s assertion that his counsel’s investigation was deficient and decided the case instead on the question of prejudice.
B.
The majority “conclude[s] that the Ohio court applied [Strickland] to the facts of Jells’s case in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Maj. Op. § IV(C). According to the majority, Jells’s counsels’ performance (i.e., their search for mitigating evidence) was deficient and prejudicial (i.e., there is a “reasonable probability” that the mitigating evidence that would have been found during a sufficient search would have persuaded the three-judge panel that Jells was not deserving of the death penalty). Thus, the majority reaches a different conclusion than the Ohio court reached, even though they both applied the same law (i.e., Strickland) and considered the same evidence.
But, more than that, the majority contends that the reason they reached different conclusions is not merely a disagreement on the weight or effect to be given to the evidence — that would be entirely unacceptable under AEDPA; it is because the Ohio court applied Strickland in a manner that was objectively unreasonable. Be*523cause the majority disagrees with the two different parts of the Strickland analysis in two different ways, the two disagreements require separate examinations.
1.
It is, at this point in time, beyond dispute that defense counsel in a capital case must perform a complete mitigation investigation. See, e.g., Hamblin v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 482, 496 (6th Cir.2003) (Batchelder, J., dissenting). Nor is there any dispute that this requirement was “clearly established” as of Jells’s sentencing in 1987. Id. Jells’s counsel was deficient in this regard.
After ten pages of analysis, the majority concludes similarly, stating: “Jells has demonstrated that his counsel [performed deficiently] when they: (1) failed to timely prepare for the mitigation phase of Jells’s trial; and (2) failed to use a mitigation specialist to gather information about Jells’s background in preparation for mitigation.” Maj. Op. § IV(C)(l)(e). This unremarkable proposition, however, leads immediately into the unsupported— and, indeed, unexpected — assertion that: “The Ohio Court of Appeal’s refusal to recognize that these omissions by Jells’s counsel fell outside the bounds of professionally competent assistance constituted an unreasonable application of federal law as determined by the Supreme Court in Strickland.” Maj. Op. § IV(C)(1)(e) (emphasis added).
But, far from “refusing]” to find the performance deficient, the Ohio court of appeals tendered no finding whatsoever on the sufficiency/deficiency of counsel’s performance and, in fact, appears to have assumed or accepted that the above-described performance was deficient. Because Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052, expressly provides for disposition solely on the prejudice prong, the Ohio court’s application of Strickland in this manner cannot be deemed objectively unreasonable. In fact, it is not even incorrect. Nor is it even in disagreement with the majority’s assessment.
2.
The Ohio court’s opinion does disagree with the majority on the question of prejudice, however, and the majority begins by saying: “the Ohio Court of Appeals unreasonably determined that the alleged errors of Jells’s trial counsel did not prejudice Jells’s case.” Maj. Op. § IV(C)(2). The Ohio court did indeed determine that Jells’s counsel’s alleged errors did not prejudice Jells’s case, but I cannot agree that this determination was unreasonable. More to the point, I cannot agree that the manner by which the Ohio court made this determination was unreasonable.
The Ohio court — just like the majority, see Maj. Op. § IV(C)(2) — “evaluated] the totality of the available mitigation evidence — both that adduced at trial[] and the evidence adduced in the [post-conviction-relief] proceeding [and] re-weigh[ed] it against the evidence in aggravation,” see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397-398, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), to determine whether there was “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different,” see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The Ohio court did not exclude, omit, or fail to consider any evidence — it fully considered all the same evidence as the majority did. The Ohio court did not consider itself bound by an unreasonable or improper standard of review — it fully and fairly considered all of the evidence, and reweighed it against the aggravating evidence. In fact, there was nothing improp*524er about the Ohio court’s application of Strickland.
The majority’s disagreement with the Ohio court is not in its application, but in its conclusion, and even that disagreement is not pronounced. The majority says that “this [after-acquired] evidence provides a more nuanced understanding of Jells’s psychological background and thus presents a more sympathetic picture of Jells,” Maj. Op. § IV(C)(2)(c), thereby leading to “a reasonable probability that at least one of the judges may have reached a different conclusion regarding the imposition of the death penalty,” id. Even if this assessment were correct — which, in my view, it is not — these findings of “a more nuanced understanding” and “a more sympathetic picture” are purely (necessarily) subjective determinations. Our disagreement with a state court’s subjective determination of the effect of the evidence is not a proper basis for habeas relief. See, e.g., Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) (“The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court’s determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable — a substantially higher threshold.”); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 665, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004) (“We cannot grant relief under AEDPA by conducting our own independent inquiry into whether the state court was correct as a de novo matter.”); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003) (“It is not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of the legal question, is left with a firm conviction that the state court was erroneous.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25, 123 S.Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002) (“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the state-court decision applied [the law] incorrectly.”); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (“unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law”).
The majority relies on Morales v. Mitchell, 507 F.3d 916 (6th Cir.2007), and Dickerson v. Bagley, 453 F.3d 690 (6th Cir.2006), to support its position, but in both of those cases the state court had rendered no opinion on the prejudice prong, so our review was de novo. In the present case, the Ohio court did render an opinion on the prejudice prong — finding no prejudice — and our review is (supposed to be) the deferential review dictated by AEDPA. The majority also cites Hamblin v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 482 (6th Cir.2003), but that case was pre-AEDPA. Thus, the majority’s proffered legal support for its approach to this case actually provides no support at all.
IV.
For all of the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion in the present case. I would affirm the district court’s decision to deny habeas relief.

. Devon's father is Anthony Massingill. See Maj. Op. § V(C).

. Jells's theory of defense was "misidentification” (i.e., someone else abducted and murdered Ruby Stapleton), and though he produced only one witness for his defense, that witness testified to Jells’s alibi (that Jells was at home), which was consistent with the mis-identification theory. Of the Brady materials at issue, only the anonymous statement to Crimestoppers (which was later determined to have been Camilla Banks) would have furthered this defense, in that it would have cast doubt on Camilla Banks’s ability to identify Jells, but even that would have had little force against her in-court identification. The remaining evidence would actually have bolstered the identification of Jells.
*517Presumably, if Jells's counsel had received the withheld evidence before trial, counsel would have pursued a different theory of defense, namely, the one now endorsed by the majority: that it was Jells, but that Ruby was with him voluntarily, and hence, had not been kidnapped. But, even assuming that counsel could have discredited Camilla’s testimony, diminished her father’s testimony, and bolstered the favorable portions of Edward Wright’s testimony, the prosecution still produced overwhelming evidence of Jells’s guilt, most notably, Devon’s testimony and the presence of Ruby’s blood in Jells’s van. Furthermore, Patricia Green’s testimony also indicated that the abduction was deliberate and forceful, and there was a stipulation at the beginning of trial, from which the prosecution agreed not to call all of the witnesses to the incident. In a subsequent deposition, the prosecutor testified that "we had a ton of people that watched that kidnapping and I believe I told the defense that either they stipulate to it or I was going to call every one.”

. Recall that the four Brady materials at issue here are statements from (1) Willie Smith, (2) Cynthia Yawn, and (3) Anthony Massingill; and (4) a Crimestoppers intake sheet, containing a statement attributable to Camilla Banks. The majority contends that Jells has preserved his Brady claims with respect to these four withheld items of information, see Maj. Op. § V(B)(1), based on Jells’s attachment of these materials as exhibits to his state post-conviction petition, even though he did not argue about them, discuss them, or even mention them in the text of the petition.

. Which is — as the state court found — an inaccurate portrayal of the Brady doctrine. See United States v. Presser, 844 F.2d 1275, 1284 (6th Cir.1988) ("The Brady doctrine did not create a constitutional right of pre-trial discovery in a criminal proceeding.” (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977))); O’Hara v. Brigano, 499 F.3d 492, 502 (6th Cir.2007) ("Brady generally does not apply to delayed disclosure of exculpatory information, but only to complete failure to disclose. Delay violates Brady only when the delay itself causes prejudice.”).