Court Opinion

ID: 9674637
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:32:22.96636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:28.741491
License: Public Domain

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE SMITH,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority assumes that the injunction granted in the case of Russell Arnold v. E. K. Buford, restraining Upton County, Texas, from using road machinery or other equipment belonging to the county for the benefit of private persons, etc., is based upon a judgment against Buford and Conger. The terms of the judgment convince me that this assumption is unfounded. The judgment provides:
“It further appearing to the Court that the attorneys for all parties have conferred and have reached an amicable agreement in settlement of said cause, to the effect that Upton County should itself be enjoined but that none of the said Commissioners should be personally enjoined, and it appearing to the Court that such a provision is right, just and equitable, it is accordingly ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the above entitled and numbered cause be, and the same is hereby, dismissed as to E. K. Buford, Joe Conger, H. Wheeler, and Tommy D. Workman, the said Commissioners of Upton County, Texas; * * *.”
Following the above paragraph dismissing Buford and Conger from the case appears the decretal portion of the judgment *512wherein Upton County was restrained from using the road machinery for the benefit of private persons, but no such order is made relative to Buford and Conger in the decretal portion of the judgment.
It is true that the writ of injunction signed by the Clerk recites that “* * * Upton County, its agents, servants, officers and employees” are commanded to desist and refrain from using the road machinery for the benefit of private persons. This, however, is no part of the judgment of the Court and cannot be read into the judgment by implication or otherwise, especially in view of the fact that the judgment shows on its face that the controversy between the plaintiff, Arnold, and the defendants, Buford and Conger, was settled and compromised and these particular defendants were dismissed from the suit.
Under the circumstances, the judgment of contempt was void, as the court was without jurisdiction to enter the order of contempt against the Relators. I am not unmindful of the fact that a proceeding of this nature constitutes a collateral attack upon the judgment of the trial court and that in order for the contempt judgment to be subject to collateral attack it must be absolutely void. Ex Parte La Rocca, 154 Texas 618, 282 S.W. 2d 700. I insist, however, that contempt proceedings in this case will never be in order until there exists a valid judgment restraining these Relators from using road machinery for the benefit of private persons.
The settlement, compromise, and dismissal by judgment is forever a bar to any proceedings, contempt or otherwise, against Buford and Conger growing out of that particular suit. The judgment in that case cannot be used as a basis for the contempt action here. This does not mean, however, that proceedings can never be instituted against Buford and Conger. The judgment in the case of Arnold v. Buford is not a bar to the institution of a new suit under new facts. Buford and Conger may be proceeded against under a state of facts giving rise to a new cause of action just as though the judgment in Arnold v. Buford had never been written. See Bute v. Brainerd, 93 Texas 137, 53 S.W. 1017. Buford and Conger can be proceeded against as if the former suit of Arnold v. Buford had never been brought. The new facts pertaining to Buford and Conger can be tried in the new suit. The majority of this Court has rendered a judgment against both Buford and Conger without a hearing on these facts in the trial court. In other words, it has never been judicially determined in the trial court that an injunction was in order. *513Buford and Conger have not had their day in court. They are being deprived of their liberty under a void order.
Since the majority has passed upon the facts, I will say that in my opinion Relators are not guilty of contempt. Each had the authority to do and perform their duties. It is true no suit was brought by the county to remove the hazardous condition of the lot, but Buford removed the brush, etc., which created the hazard for the protection and safety of the general public.
Conger is not guilty, because the record clearly shows that Conger instructed the employees not to use road machinery and equipment for private purposes.
Buford and Conger should be held not guilty of contempt and they and their sureties should be discharged from further liability on the bonds filed therein.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE HAMILTON joins in the dissent.
Opinion delivered June 6, 1962.