Court Opinion

ID: 9352456
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-06 16:00:53.372037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:02:57.367735
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-2372    Document: 47    Page: 1    Filed: 01/06/2023

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

                DIONEX SOFTRON GMBH,
                       Appellant

                            v.

          AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
                      Appellee
               ______________________

                        2021-2372
                  ______________________

     Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
 Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. 106,109.
                   ______________________

                 Decided: January 6, 2023
                  ______________________

     ANDREW JAMES ISBESTER, Kilpatrick Townsend &
 Stockton LLP, San Francisco, CA, argued for appellant.
 Also represented by BYRON ROBERT CHIN; KRISTOPHER L.
 REED, Dallas, TX.

    JOHN B. SGANGA, JR., Knobbe, Martens, Olson & Bear,
 LLP, Irvine, CA, argued for appellee. Also represented by
 EDWARD M. CANNON, PHILIP MARK NELSON.
                  ______________________

     Before REYNA, CHEN, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
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 2       DIONEX SOFTRON GMBH   v. AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

 STARK, Circuit Judge.
     Dionex Softron GmbH (“Dionex”) appeals the Patent
 Trial and Appeal Board’s (“Board”) judgment in an inter-
 ference proceeding, awarding priority to Agilent Technolo-
 gies, Inc. (“Agilent”). The parties dispute priority, claim
 construction, written description support, conception, and
 reduction to practice. We affirm.
                               I
     This case involves an unusual history, in which the
 parties copied one another’s claims in separate attempts to
 provoke an interference. First, Agilent substantially cop-
 ied Dionex’s claims but, nonetheless, failed to provoke an
 interference. 1 Agilent then amended its claims, and Di-
 onex subsequently copied those amended claims verbatim,
 resulting in the interference at issue. The instituted inter-
 ference was between Agilent’s U.S. Patent Application No.
 15/965,402 and Dionex’s U.S. Patent Application No.
 16/016,866.
     In the interference, the Board identified Dionex as the
 senior party and Agilent as the junior party, thereby re-
 quiring that Agilent prove priority by a preponderance of
 the evidence. The Board defined a single count as claim 1
 of Agilent’s patent application, reproduced below:
     A method of operating a liquid chromatography
     system, the liquid chromatography system com-
     prising a liquid chromatography column and an in-
     jection valve, the method comprising:
     isolating a sample loop of the liquid chromatog-
     raphy system from a high-pressure fluidic path in

     1   Specifically, Agilent substantially copied the
 claims of Dionex’s U.S. Patent Application No. 15/596,738,
 which eventually became Dionex’s U.S. Patent No.
 10,031,112 (“’112 patent”).
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 DIONEX SOFTRON GMBH   v. AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.       3

    fluid communication with the liquid chromatog-
    raphy column, wherein the high-pressure fluidic
    path is at a pump pressure, wherein the sample
    loop is in fluid communication with the injection
    valve and the sample loop comprises a metering de-
    vice for loading a sample on the sample loop, and
    isolating the sample loop comprises placing the in-
    jection valve in a PRESSURE COMPENSATION
    position, wherein a volume of the metering device
    is defined by a chamber in which a piston is recip-
    rocatingly mounted;
    determining a movement amount of the piston
    within the chamber from a first position to a second
    position to increase a pressure in the sample loop
    from an essentially atmospheric pressure to the
    pump pressure, based on the pump pressure; and
    while the sample loop is isolated from the high-
    pressure fluidic path, decreasing the volume of the
    metering device to increase the pressure in the
    sample loop from the essentially atmospheric pres-
    sure to essentially correspond to the pump pres-
    sure of the high-pressure fluidic path;
    wherein decreasing the volume includes forward-
    ing the piston within the chamber by the determined
    movement amount from the first position to the sec-
    ond position;
    wherein the metering device and the sample loop
    are in fluid communication in each position of the
    injection valve.
 J.A. 15 (italicized emphasis added by Board).
      In the interference, Dionex moved for judgment that
 Agilent’s claims were invalid based on a lack of written de-
 scription support for the following limitation: “determining
 a movement amount of the piston within the chamber from
 a first position to a second position to increase a pressure
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 4       DIONEX SOFTRON GMBH   v. AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

 in the sample loop from an essentially atmospheric pres-
 sure to the pump pressure, based on the pump pressure.”
 J.A. 16. Dionex argued that “determining a movement
 amount” had to occur prior to “forwarding the piston” but
 the relevant specification did not provide adequate written
 description support for this order of operations. Dionex
 contended that the relevant specification from which to
 measure the adequacy of the written description support
 was generally its ’112 patent, but Dionex stated that some
 terms, such as “determining,” had to be construed in light
 of Agilent’s ’402 application. Agilent maintained that the
 limitation had to be viewed solely in light of its own speci-
 fication.
     The Board concluded that Agilent’s specification con-
 trolled, construed the disputed claim language in light of
 that specification, and found that the specification pro-
 vided adequate written description support. Under the ap-
 plicable broadest reasonable construction standard, the
 Board rejected Dionex’s proposal to limit claim scope to re-
 quire a determination of a movement amount before for-
 warding the piston. Instead, the Board construed the claim
 language as permitting real-time, empirical determination
 of a movement amount while forwarding the piston to
 achieve pressure equalization between the sample loop and
 the pump pressure. The Board found adequate written de-
 scription support for the thus-construed determining limi-
 tation based on paragraphs 81-84 of Agilent’s specification,
 as attested to by Agilent’s expert.
      Later in the proceeding, Agilent and Dionex separately
 moved for judgment on the basis of priority due to their re-
 spective alleged dates of conception and reduction to prac-
 tice. The Board granted Agilent’s motion and denied
 Dionex’s motion, finding that Agilent proved conception as
 of May 1, 2007 and actual reduction to practice as of June
 1, 2007, all before Dionex’s earliest alleged conception date
 of December 4, 2007.
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 DIONEX SOFTRON GMBH   v. AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.        5

     In its analysis, the Board applied the rule of reason and
 found that the testimony of Wolfgang Kretz, one of Ag-
 ilent’s two co-inventors, was sufficiently corroborated by
 two of his co-workers, Manfred Berndt and Martin Bäuerle,
 who had worked near Kretz during the relevant time.
 Berndt and Bäuerle testified that Kretz successfully tested
 a prototype encompassing all limitations of the count by
 June 1, 2007.
     The Board discussed Bäuerle’s testimony in detail. It
 noted that Bäuerle testified he had witnessed, in the rele-
 vant time frame, the successful prototype as well as a doc-
 ument depicting the prototype. Although the document,
 which was admitted as Exhibit 2152, had a creation date of
 April 4, 2006 and a last modified date of November 11,
 2008, the Board credited Bäuerle’s testimony that the doc-
 ument had existed and shown the prototype’s configuration
 during the relevant time frame; i.e., by June 1, 2007. The
 Board further noted that Agilent’s expert testified that the
 configuration in Exhibit 2152 was for an apparatus that
 would achieve the count’s pressure equalization require-
 ment. The Board rejected Dionex’s contention that Exhibit
 2152 lacked a pressure sensor necessary for the claimed
 pressure equalization, instead crediting Bäuerle’s corrobo-
 rating testimony that Kretz used a high-pressure pump
 with a built-in pressure sensor to achieve pressure equali-
 zation. The Board also denied Dionex’s requests to draw
 negative inferences from the lack of testimony from Kretz’s
 co-inventor, Bernd Glatz, 2 and the lack of contemporane-
 ous documentary evidence (such as photographs, technical
 drawings, schematics, firmware specifications, laboratory
 notebooks, and research and development reports).

     2  Agilent explained to the Board that Glatz, like
 Kretz, was retired and argued that his testimony would
 have been cumulative of Kretz’s.
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 6       DIONEX SOFTRON GMBH    v. AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

     Although the Board noted that it need not evaluate
 conception, because Agilent proved actual reduction to
 practice prior to Dionex’s earliest alleged conception date,
 the Board determined that Agilent proved conception as of
 May 1, 2007.
     Based on the foregoing, the Board entered judgment on
 priority for Agilent and against Dionex and refused Di-
 onex’s claims. Dionex timely appealed.
     We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A)
 (2012) and 35 U.S.C. § 141 (2012). See Technical Correc-
 tions–Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-
 274, 126 Stat. 2456, 2458 (2013). 3
                               II
     We review the Board’s claim construction based on in-
 trinsic evidence de novo and subsidiary factual findings
 based on extrinsic evidence for substantial evidence. See
 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 331-
 32 (2015). In an interference proceeding, claims are given
 their broadest reasonable construction in light of their orig-
 inating specification. See ULF Bamberg v. Dalvey, 815
 F.3d 793, 796 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Determining which specifi-
 cation to consult as the “originating specification” in con-
 nection with claim construction is a legal question we
 review de novo. See Agilent Techs., Inc. v. Affymetrix, Inc.,
 567 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
     Satisfaction of the written description requirement
 presents a question of fact we review for substantial evi-
 dence. See ULF Bamberg, 815 F.3d at 797. We review de
 novo the Board’s legal conclusions concerning priority, con-
 ception, and reduction to practice; the factual findings

     3   We apply pre-AIA law. See, e.g., Regents of Univ.
 of Cal. v. Broad Institute, Inc., 903 F.3d 1286, 1291 n.2
 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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 DIONEX SOFTRON GMBH    v. AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.        7

 underpinning these conclusions, including findings relat-
 ing to corroboration, we review for substantial evidence.
 See Taskett v. Dentlinger, 344 F.3d 1337, 1339-40 (Fed. Cir.
 2003); Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1171
 (Fed. Cir. 2006). We review the Board’s evidentiary deter-
 minations, including whether to draw an adverse infer-
 ence, for abuse of discretion. See Chen v. Bouchard, 347
 F.3d 1299, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Overnite Transp.
 Co. v. N.L.R.B., 140 F.3d 259, 266 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (find-
 ing, in context of NLRB, that “the decision of whether to
 draw an adverse inference has generally been held to be
 within the discretion of the fact finder”).
                              III
     On appeal, the parties dispute whether the Board erred
 by evaluating claim construction and written description
 support in light of Agilent’s specification instead of Di-
 onex’s. They further disagree as to whether the Board
 erred in the construction it adopted and its findings of ad-
 equate written description support, priority, and reduction
 to practice. 4 We address these issues in turn.
                               A
     The Board properly treated Agilent’s specification as
 the “originating specification” for purposes of construing
 the disputed claim terms and evaluating the sufficiency of
 written description support for the claims. “[W]hen a party
 challenges written description support for an interference
 count or the copied claim in an interference, the originating
 disclosure provides the meaning of the pertinent claim

     4   The parties also dispute conception, but because we
 agree with the Board that Agilent reduced the invention to
 practice before Dionex’s earliest possible date of concep-
 tion, Agilent did not have to prove conception. See Fox
 Grp., Inc. v. Cree, Inc., 700 F.3d 1300, 1304-05 (Fed. Cir.
 2012). We need not and do not address conception.
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 8       DIONEX SOFTRON GMBH   v. AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

 language.” Agilent Techs., 567 F.3d at 1375. This rule was
 created “to ensure that the PTO would only declare an in-
 terference if both parties had a right to claim the same sub-
 ject matter.” Id. (quoting Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 479
 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
     Here, it was Dionex’s copying of Agilent’s claims that
 provoked the interference. That renders the Agilent appli-
 cation the originating disclosure. Therefore, we evaluate
 the patent claims based on the Agilent specification. See
 Agilent Techs., 567 F.3d at 1375; see also In re Spina, 975
 F.2d 854, 858 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“A claim is not interpreted
 one way in light of the specification in which it originally
 was granted, and another way in light of the specification
 into which it is copied as a proposed interference count.”).
 Although we have not had occasion to apply this rule in
 circumstances in which there was a prior unsuccessful ef-
 fort between the same parties to provoke an interference,
 we neither see nor have been provided any persuasive rea-
 son not to apply our rule in this context.
                              B
     The Board did not err in construing the claim language
 to permit “determining a movement amount” while “for-
 warding the piston . . . by the determined movement
 amount.” Dionex wrongly contends that “determining” has
 to occur before “forwarding” because of the “logical struc-
 ture” of the claim language and because the Board’s con-
 struction renders “the determined movement amount”
 language superfluous. See Opening Br. 37-39.
     Although the language of a method claim does not gen-
 erally require that its steps be undertaken in the listed or-
 der, sometimes either logic or grammar mandates a
 particular order of steps. See Mformation Techs., Inc. v.
 Rsch. in Motion Ltd., 764 F.3d 1392, 1398-1400 (Fed. Cir.
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 DIONEX SOFTRON GMBH    v. AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.         9

 2014). 5 Here, neither the logic nor grammar of the claim
 compel such a result under the applicable broadest reason-
 able construction approach. Instead, as the Board con-
 cluded, “determining” could occur during the forwarding of
 the piston, much like a fuel pump determines the amount
 of fuel necessary to fill a vehicle’s fuel tank during filling,
 a comparison described by Agilent’s expert and credited by
 the Board.
     Our conclusion does not render any claim language su-
 perfluous. Instead, as the Board concluded, “the deter-
 mined movement amount” portion of the claim is necessary
 in order for the method to accurately move the piston in a
 manner that achieves the claimed pressure equalization.
                               C
      The Board did not err in concluding that Agilent’s spec-
 ification provided adequate written description support.
 Dionex’s arguments on this point depend entirely on our
 adopting Dionex’s proposed claim construction. In other
 words, Dionex contends there is not adequate written de-
 scription support for its ordered steps construction of the
 claim, but we have rejected this proposed construction.
 Since we affirm the Board’s claim construction, Dionex’s
 written description arguments necessarily fail.
                               D
     The Board did not err in awarding priority to Agilent.
 Substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings that
 Agilent’s actual reduction to practice was sufficiently cor-
 roborated and occurred prior to Dionex’s earliest concep-
 tion date.

     5   A specification, and not just the claim itself, may
 also directly or implicitly require an order of steps, see
 Mformation, 764 F.3d at 1398, but Dionex does not argue
 such is the case here.
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 10       DIONEX SOFTRON GMBH    v. AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

      Priority depends on conception and reduction to prac-
 tice. See, e.g., Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1327
 (Fed. Cir. 1998). “[T]o establish an actual reduction to
 practice, the inventor must prove that: (1) [the inventor]
 constructed an embodiment or performed a process that
 met all the limitations of the interference count; and (2)
 [the inventor] determined that the invention would work
 for its intended purpose.” Id. Additionally,
      an inventor’s testimony must be corroborated by
      independent evidence. However, a “rule of reason”
      analysis is applied to determine whether an inven-
      tor’s testimony regarding reduction to practice has
      been sufficiently corroborated. The rule requires
      an evaluation of all pertinent evidence when deter-
      mining the credibility of an inventor’s testimony.
      In order to corroborate a reduction to practice, it is
      not necessary to produce an actual over-the-shoul-
      der observer. Rather, sufficient circumstantial ev-
      idence of an independent nature can satisfy the
      corroboration requirement. Furthermore, an ac-
      tual reduction to practice does not require corrobo-
      ration for every factual issue contested by the
      parties. . . . [T]he law does not impose an impossi-
      ble standard of “independence” on corroborative ev-
      idence by requiring that every point of a reduction
      to practice be corroborated by evidence having a
      source totally independent of the inventor; indeed,
      such a standard is the antithesis of the rule of rea-
      son. In the final analysis, each corroboration case
      must be decided on its own facts with a view to de-
      ciding whether the evidence as a whole is persua-
      sive.
 Id. at 1330-31 (internal quotation marks and citations
 omitted).
     Dionex argues that the Board’s finding of corrobora-
 tion, particularly with respect to the claimed pressure
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 DIONEX SOFTRON GMBH   v. AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.       11

 equalization functionality, is not supported by substantial
 evidence. In this regard, Dionex attacks various portions
 of Berndt’s and Bäuerle’s testimony, and emphasizes the
 last modified date and contents of Exhibit 2152. Dionex
 further argues that the Board erred by failing to draw neg-
 ative inferences based on a lack of co-inventor testimony
 and a lack of certain documentary evidence. On each of
 these points, Dionex is mistaken.
                              1
     The Board’s finding of corroboration, under the rule of
 reason, is supported by substantial evidence. Kretz’s testi-
 mony was corroborated by Bäuerle, Berndt, and Exhibit
 2152. As the Board recounted, Bäuerle and Berndt both
 worked near Kretz and witnessed a successful working pro-
 totype containing all of the functionality and limitations of
 the count during the relevant time. While Exhibit 2152
 was last modified after reduction to practice, there was ev-
 idence it was created before then, including Bäuerle’s tes-
 timony that the successful prototype had the configuration
 generally depicted in Exhibit 2152.
     The Board also credited Agilent’s expert’s opinion that
 the Exhibit (whatever the timing of its creation) disclosed
 a configuration that was designed to achieve the claimed
 pressure equalization. Similarly, the Board credited
 Bäuerle’s testimony that Kretz had used a high-pressure
 pump with a built-in pressure sensor to achieve pressure
 equalization. Taken as a whole, there was substantial ev-
 idence under the rule of reason for finding corroboration
 here.
     Dionex’s efforts to demonstrate a lack of substantial ev-
 idence of corroboration are unpersuasive. Dionex argues
 that Bäuerle’s testimony was not independent because
 (1) he did not know the prototype’s hydraulic configuration;
 (2) his knowledge of Kretz’s work to create the prototype’s
 specialized grooves did not demonstrate his knowledge of
 the grooves’ purpose; (3) his knowledge of a high-pressure
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 12      DIONEX SOFTRON GMBH    v. AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

 pump as a metering device conflicted with his admission
 that he did not know the prototype’s specific hydraulic con-
 figuration; and (4) his knowledge of pressure equalization
 was based on documentary evidence produced by Kretz.
 Under the flexible rule of reason approach, there was noth-
 ing inappropriate about the Board accepting Bäuerle’s tes-
 timony. Bäuerle may not have known every detail, but
 such omniscience is unnecessary under the rule of reason.
 See, e.g., Goldfarb, 154 F.3d at 1330-31. He testified that
 he witnessed a successful prototype and, the Board found,
 “understood enough to know that the prototype performed
 all steps of the count and that the prototype had the con-
 figuration generally depicted in Exhibit 2152.” J.A. 55.
 The Board’s findings are supported by substantial evi-
 dence.
     Dionex similarly argues that Berndt’s testimony was
 not independent because he could only state that others
 considered the prototype a success. The Board did not rely
 on Berndt’s testimony in great depth. In any event, his tes-
 timony was, at least in part, independent of Kretz and the
 Board was free to find it had some corroborative value. See
 Goldfarb, 154 F.3d at 1331 (rule of reason does not require
 impossible standard of total independence from inventor).
 Nothing about the Board’s consideration of Berndt’s testi-
 mony detracts from the substantial evidence supporting
 the Board’s conclusions.
     Dionex also argues that Exhibit 2152 could not corrob-
 orate Kretz’s testimony because it was modified after Ag-
 ilent’s purported June 1, 2007 actual reduction to practice,
 even allowing that the document may have been created
 before that date. This contention lacks merit. The Board
 found that the Exhibit as it existed at the relevant date gen-
 erally depicted a prototype that met the limitation of the
 claim. As a corollary, the Board was unpersuaded by Di-
 onex’s effort to prove that the Exhibit only came to include
 this depiction at a later date. As we have already ex-
 plained, the record contains substantial evidence,
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 DIONEX SOFTRON GMBH    v. AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.        13

 particularly Bäuerle’s testimony, to corroborate Kretz’s
 testimony that Exhibit 2152 depicted such an embodiment
 at the pertinent date. See, e.g., In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d
 1279, 1291-92 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see also Kolcraft Enters.,
 Inc. v. Graco Children’s Prods., Inc., 927 F.3d 1320, 1324
 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Apator Miitors ApS v. Kamstrup A/S, 887
 F.3d 1293, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
                               2
      Finally, Dionex argues that the Board erred by failing
 to draw negative inferences against Agilent based on a lack
 of co-inventor testimony and a lack of certain documentary
 evidence. We again disagree with Dionex.
     There is no per se requirement to infer that the testi-
 mony of an inventor who fails to testify would be harmful
 to the position of his co-inventor. See Borror v. Herz, 666
 F.2d 569, 574-75 (C.C.P.A. 1981); see also id. at 574 (“[T]he
 absence of the inventor’s testimony does not require an in-
 ference that his testimony would have been inconsistent
 with other evidence.”). Instead, the Board has discretion
 to determine whether to apply a negative inference based
 on what “is reasonable under the totality of evidence in the
 case.” Id. at 574. While “the unexplained failure to call
 any known non-hostile person who has direct knowledge of
 facts being developed” may raise an inference that the tes-
 timony would be unfavorable, such an inference is not man-
 datory, and we have found it unwarranted where “the
 testimony of such a witness would be cumulative or inferior
 to what is utilized.” Id. at 573-74. Here, the Board did not
 abuse its discretion in deciding not to draw negative infer-
 ences, particularly given Agilent’s representations that the
 testimony of the co-inventor, Glatz, would have been cumu-
 lative of Kretz’s testimony and inferior to it, for reasons in-
 cluding that Kretz testified about materials on his own
 hard drive.
    Dionex contends that “a ‘strong negative inference’ is
 appropriate ‘[w]here ambiguities exist in the record or
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 14      DIONEX SOFTRON GMBH    v. AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

 there is conflicting testimony as to events which an inven-
 tor’s testimony could clear up.’” Opening Br. 47-48 (quot-
 ing Borror, 666 F.2d at 574). This is not a correct
 statement of the law. In Borror, we explained that, under
 the circumstances described by Dionex, “a strong negative
 inference may be reasonable.” 666 F.2d at 574 (emphasis
 added). Further, “[i]f an explanation is given for failure to
 call a witness which in ordinary logic or experience is sat-
 isfactory, no negative inference at all may be appropriate.”
 Id. The Board found this is such a case, and we have no
 basis on which to disagree.
     There is similarly no mandate that the Board draw a
 negative inference whenever a party fails to present some
 types of documentary evidence an opposing party insists
 must exist. Dionex asserts that “industry norms” should
 have caused Agilent to have created documents other than
 those produced in the interference, see Opening Br. 50-52,
 but the Board was not required to accept this contention.
 Nor was it required to reach the additional conclusion that
 the absence of such documents implies that the purport-
 edly “missing” documents would harm Agilent’s case. In
 short, again, the Board did not abuse its discretion.
                              IV
      We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments
 and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we
 affirm the judgment of the Board.
                        AFFIRMED
                            COSTS
 No costs.