Court Opinion

ID: 9848921
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:29:56.932699+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:53.866851
License: Public Domain

*603Weaver, J.
(concurring specially) — The crux of my disagreement with the majority opinion is that its interpretation of RCW 47.52.072 through 47.52.075 establishes a “town meeting,” or a series of town meetings, at which anyone may appear no matter what his interest. My interpretation of these statutes supports the conclusion that the procedures provided are only for the protection of abutting property owners.
The four sections must be read and interpreted as a unit for they are interdependent.
RCW 47.52.072 provides:
“No existing . . . street . . . may be established as a limited access facility until the owners ... of the abutting property ... be given notice of such proposal and an opportunity to be heard ...” (Italics mine.)
At the conclusion of the hearing, RCW 47.52.074 provides that
“ . . . the authority shall consider the evidence . . . and shall make specific findings in the case of each abutting ownership as to whether such proposal to establish . . . a limited access facility is required by the public convenience and necessity. . . . ” (Italics mine.)
The purpose of the hearing, and its results (as discussed in State ex rel. Dawes v. State Highway Comm., 63 Wn. (2d) 34, 385 P. (2d) 376 (1963)) are confined to abutting property owners. RCW 47.52.073 is sandwiched between the statutory purpose and result. Considered alone, it might be interpreted as authorizing a “town meeting.” Considered in the light of the statutes preceding and following it, I believe it is simply directory of the manner of conducting and recording the hearing. The city misinterpreted the purpose and effect of these statutes when it gave notice to “the owners of all the property that would be affected;” only the abutting property owners were entitled to notice.
I do not reach the city’s contention “that the only time the route of the proposed limited access facility will- be an issue is upon the condemnor’s application for an adjudi*604cation of public use and necessity in condemnation proceedings under RCW 8.12.090; ...”
Paraphrasing what was said in Dawes, supra, the city has simply fulfilled the statutory condition precedent (see State ex rel. Sternoff v. Superior Court, 52 Wn. (2d) 282, 325 P. (2d) 300 (1958)) to maintain an action of eminent domain to deprive the abutting property owners of right of access. It has gained no advantage over relators, whether they be abutting property owners or not, by reason of the hearing held pursuant to RCW 47.52.072-075. The city must prove its right to a certificate of public use and necessity, not by reliance upon findings of the city council, but as provided by law. Property owners, whether abutting or not, have the right to defend and protest the issuance of a certificate of public use and necessity, if their property is sought by condemnation, in all manners previously available to them. Whether the contemplated use be really public is still a judicial question and must be determined “ . . . without regard to any legislative assertion that the use is public ...” Art. 1, §16 (amendment 9), Washington Constitution.
I agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the majority opinion that the findings made by the city council are insufficient. Whether the city’s action was arbitrary and capricious cannot be tested by the present record. See King Cy. v. Theilman, 59 Wn. (2d) 586, 369 P. (2d) 503 (1962).
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and the cause returned to the superior court and by it referred to the city council with directions that the council make specific findings in the case of each abutting ownership in accordance with RCW 47.52.074, either upon the record as made or after further hearing as the council may determine.
Ott, C. J., Donworth and Hamilton, JJ., concur with Weaver, J.
July 24, 1964. Petition for rehearing denied.