Court Opinion

ID: 9674525
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:30:16.396337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:27.951820
License: Public Domain

Robert H. Dudley, Justice. On November 4, 1986, the voters of Conway County were presented with the local option of whether to continue allowing the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages. After a recount of the votes, the election results were certified on November 10, with the “drys” winning by 33 votes. On November 26, which was 16 days after the certification, the “wets” filed a complaint contesting the election result. The complaint named as defendants the three election commissioners. Four “drys” petitioned to intervene in the contest and pleaded that the contest was not timely filed, since it was not filed within 10 days of the certification as required by Ark. Stat. Ann. § 48-820(2). On May 20, 1987, one of the election commissioners, Jimmy Garrett, filed a general denial. Process had been served on Garrett December 2, 1986. The trial court found the contest had been timely filed, and that the petitioners, the “wets,” were entitled to a default judgment setting aside the election. We reverse and dismiss. The first point of appeal raised by the appellants, or the “drys,” is that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the complaint due to its untimely filing. The argument has merit. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 48-820 (Repl. 1977), which is a part of the Arkansas Alcoholic Control Act provides in pertinent part: 48-820. Contest of election. — Any election held under this law may be contested as provided for in this section: 1. Hearing and determination. The contest shall be heard and determined by the same board which, by law, is authorized and empowered to hear and determine a contest of an election for county officers; and the same provisions of the statutes shall apply to the contest of any election held under this law as are provided for the contest of any election for county officers, except as hereinafter provided. 2. Petition. Any number of the citizens and legal voters, but not less than ten [10] of the county, city, town, district, or precinct in which the elections have been held, shall have the right to contest any election held under this law, and shall be designated the contestants. Such contestants shall, within ten (10) days after the final action of the examining board, file in the office of the clerk of the county court a written statement of the grounds of the contest, and shall cause a copy thereof, to be served on the county judge, and shall give notice thereof by written or printed notice to be posted at the courthouse door of the county, and in three or more public places in the county, city, town, district or precinct in which the election has been held, and shall cause the same to be published in some newspaper of the county, when possible, for two [2] consecutive issues, commencing not later than the first issue of the paper after filing the statement. When a notice of the contest shall be executed on the county judge, the certificate shall not be recorded. (Emphasis added.)  The first independent clause of subsection 1 above provides that a local option election contest is to be heard by the same “board” that is authorized by law to hear a contest of an election for county officers. “Board” now means circuit court. Henderson v. Anderson, 251 Ark. 724, 475 S.W.2d 508 (1972). The second independent clause of the subsection, the key clause, provides that statutes governing the contest of any election for county officers shall apply to local option election contests, “except as hereinafter provided.” Subsection 2 then contains the exceptions which apply to local option contests. One of the exceptions provided is the requirement that the contest be filed “within 10 days after the final action of the examining board.” This means within ten (10) days after the certification of the vote. Wurst v. Lowery, 286 Ark. 474, 695 S.W.2d 378 (1985). In Wurst, we said: We hold that, by analogy, Wurst’s time for intervening in the case expired with the lapse of the time allowed for filing a contest of a local option election, which is ten days after the certification of the vote. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 48-820 (Repl. 1977). The appellees argued, and the trial court ruled, that a different statute, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 3-1001 (Repl. 1976), was the governing statute. It allows twenty (20) days for the filing of an election contest. That statute is a part of the comprehensive election code of 1969 which contains thirteen (13) articles, all of which are directed toward elections involving candidates, and not toward local option elections. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 3-1001 provides: 3-1001. Procedure. — A right of action is hereby conferred on any candidate to contest the certification of nomination or the certificate of vote as made by the appropriate officials in any election. The action shall be brought in the Circuit Court of the county in which the certifications of nomination or certificate of vote is made when a county or city or township office, including the office of county delegate or county committeeman, is involved, and except as hereinafter provided, within any county in the Circuit or District wherein any of the wrongful acts occurred when any Circuit or District office is involved, and, except as hereinafter provided, in the Pulaski Circuit Court when the office of United States Senator or any State office is involved. If there are two (2) or more counties in the District where the action is brought and when fraud is alleged in the complaint, answer or cross complaint the Circuit Court may hear testimony in any county in the district. The complaint shall be verified by the affidavit of the contestant to the effect that he believes the statements thereof to be true, and shall be filed within twenty (20) days of the certification complained of. The complaint shall be answered within twenty (20) days. (Emphasis added.). The repealer section of the comprehensive act does not specifically repeal the local option act. Appellees argue that Ark. Stat. Ann. § 3-1004(c) repealed the local option election act. Section 3-1004(c) provides: (c) Except as hereinafter provided all laws pertaining to general and special elections or rules of political organizations holding primary elections providing for contest before political conventions or committees other than the proceedings herein provided shall be of no further force or effect. (Emphasis added.) However, “general and special elections” are defined as elections involving only candidates or officials. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 3-101 (c) provides: (c) “General or special election” shall mean the regular biennial or annual elections for election of United States, State, District, County, Township and Municipal officials, and the special elections to fill vacancies therein. Such term, as used in this Act, shall not apply to school elections for officials of school districts. (Emphasis added.)  Thus, the local option election statute, which does not involve candidates or officials, was not repealed by the comprehensive election code. Our interpretation of these statutes is consistent with the rule of statutory construction which provides that two statutes should be construed so as to give effect to both, if possible, and repeals by implication are not favored by the law. Faver v. Golden, Judge, 216 Ark. 792, 227 S.W.2d 453 (1950). The appellees argue that the interpretation we adopt is inconsistent with our holding in Henderson v. Anderson, 251 Ark. 724, 475 S.W.2d 508 (1972). Our holding in that case is that jurisdiction to try local option election contests is in circuit court. All else is dicta.  The appellees did not file this election contest within the ten (10) day period specified by § 48-820, the governing statute. As a result, the trial court should have dismissed the complaint. In Gower v. Johnson, 173 Ark. 120, 292 S.W. 382 (1927), we explained: The judgment of the circuit court was correct. Under our previous decisions construing our primary election statute, the right to contest a primary election is a statutory proceeding, the purpose of which is to furnish a summary remedy and to secure a speedy trial. The provision requiring the contest to be filed within ten days has been held to be mandatory and jurisdictional. If the contest is not filed within ten days after certification of the nomination complained of, the failure to institute the contest within that time is fatal to the right of the contestant. Hill v. Williams, 165 Ark. 421, 264 S.W. 964, and Storey v. Looney, 165 Ark. 455, 265 S.W. 51. As was said by the Supreme Court of the United States in Walsh v. Mayer, 111 U.S. 31: “The provisions requiring it to be asserted in a particular mode and within a fixed time are conditions and qualifications attached to the right itself, and do not form part of the law of the remedy. If it is not asserted within the limited period, it ceases to exist, and cannot be claimed or enforced in any form.” Accordingly, we must reverse and dismiss this cause. The only remaining issue is the appellees’, or “wets’,” argument that the appellants, or “drys,” had no standing to resist the election contest. Four appellants attempted to intervene in the suit against the election commissioners. The trial judge ruled that these four voters could not intervene, because the applicable statute, § 48-820(3), requires ten (10) voters to resist a local option contest. We need not determine whether that ruling was correct, because, in addition, one of the election commissioners, a named defendant, entered his appearance to resist the contest. If his appearance had been made within twenty (20) days after he was personally served, there would be no question about his standing. However, his appearance was made more than twenty (20) days after service. As a result, the appellees contend the appellants have no standing and they are entitled to a default judgment under ARCP Rule 55. The contention is without merit.  The local option election statutes do not set a specific number of days for the filing of an answer. Under such circumstances, in a local option election contest, a trial court may permit an answer at any time between the prompt filing and the expedited trial. See Cain v. McGregor, 182 Ark. 633, 32 S.W.2d 319 (1930). Since the trial court could permit the answer to be filed at any time before the trial commenced, the response filed in this case was sufficient to prevent a default, and the appellant election commissioner does have standing.  Further, even if the contestee were in default, a default judgment setting aside the election would not be mandated. The Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure apply to civil actions. ARCP Rule 2. A civil action is an ordinary proceeding by one party against another for the enforcement or protection of a private right or redress or prevention of a private wrong. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 27-106 (Repl. 1979).Every other remedy isaspecial proceeding. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 27-107 (Repl. 1979). Therefore a local option election contest is a special proceeding, and it is not necessary that all of the rules of civil procedure be applied. See Reed v. Baker, 254 Ark. 631, 495 S.W.2d 849 (1973). As we said in LaFargue v. Waggoner, 189 Ark. 757, 75 S.W.2d 235 (1934), judicial application of procedural rules in election contests “must not be so strict as to afford protection to fraud, by which the will of the people is set at naught, nor so loose as to permit the acts of sworn officers, chosen by the people, to be inquired into without an adequate and well-defined cause.”  Therefore, Rule 55 should not be applied to a special proceeding when the result would be to set aside a valid public election without any proof whatsoever. In fact, the local option election statute contemplates proof even where there are no contestees. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 48-820(4) provides in pertinent part: “In case the required number [10] shall fail to appear as contestees, ex parte testimony shall be competent . . . .” Reversed and dismissed. Hickman, J., concurs. Hays and Glaze, JJ., dissent.