Court Opinion

ID: 8636426
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-24 19:46:01.427119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:55:56.620656
License: Public Domain

LOWELL, District Judge.
The question presented is, whether the title to this chattel is in the petitionérs or the respondents. The assignees of McKay & Aldus have the same rights, and no more, as the bankrupts had. They take subject to all liens, incumbrances, and equities, in the same manner as executors, excepting that, by the terms of the statute, liens by attachment are dissolved unless they have been standing for four months, and that assignees may set aside all conveyances made in fraud of the general body of the creditors. The question, therefore, is whether, as between the bankrupts and the petitioners, the title had passed on the 15th of December. The property in a chattel passes whenever, by a valid contract, the owner undertakes that it shall pass; but the chattel must be in existence, and must be capable of being distinguished from other like chattels, before the title will change, because until that time there is no definite subject upon which the contract can operate. In the case of a contract to manufacture a chattel, the general rule is, that the property does not pass until it has been finished, and until the maker has in some manner appropriated it or set it apart for the particular customer, and the latter has accepted it. It is said that until this is done, the manufacturer, on the one hand, may deliver the article to any' other customer, and the purchaser, on the other hand, may reject it if it do not conform to the order. The question in the late cases has therefore been of a definite appropriation on the one side, assented to on the other: Carruthers v. Payne, 5 Bing. 270; Wilkins v. Bromhead, 6 Man. & G. 963; Elliott v. Pybus, 10 Bing. 512; Rhode v. Thwaites, 6 Barn. & C. 388; Benj. Sales, pp. 260, 268, 270. Every thing Hepends, however, on the contract, and if the parties choose to agree that the property shall pass before the work is complete, they can do so; and this may be implied as well as expressed. Thus in those cases of ships paid for by instalments, of which Woods v. Russell, 5 Barn. & Ald. 942, was the first, such an inference has been derived from the mode of payment and other circumstances; and however any of those cases may have been criticised, they are not open to any just remark in matter of principle, but only upon the propriety of its application in the particular case. The agreement to pass the title may have been inferred too hastily, but the competency of the parties to make such an agreement cannot be questioned. There may be cases, of course, in which the manufacturer would have no right to appropriate the goods to another customer, as In the instance of a portrait painted to order; and there may be others where the purchaser may have waived his right to reject the article, and have left it to the judgment and honesty of the maker to comply with the terms of the bargain. If both these elements concur, there is no reason why the property should not vest in the purchaser on the completion of the work. It is not denied, that if this engine had been made on the 4th of November, the title would have passed; but it is said the minds of the parties never met in relation to this identical engine. It may be maintained with some force, that the petitioners having been induced by the misrepresentation of the bankrupts to accept the chattel before it was finished, that when it was finished, and the petitioners were notified that it would be sent away, the title was complete by relation to the former acceptance.
But there is another view which seems to me to establish a title in the petitioners by estoppel. The bankrupts and their assignees cannot deny that there was an engine finished and set apart for these petitioners, and paid for by them early in November. Here is such an engine. If this is not the engine referred to in the correspondence, it is for them to show the other which was. ' Suppose the bankrupts had never built any other engine like this, would they not be estopped by their acts and correspondence to deny that this chattel was complete on the 4th of November? The fact that there were two chattels precisely alike does not embarrass the case at all. If, when both were in the bankrupts' machine shop, the petitioners had demanded one in particular, the bankrupts could not have been permitted to say that neither had been appropriated to this contract, because i1 was on the distinct statement that one had been appropriated, by being pointed out and delivered in some way to the transportation company, that they had obtained payment of the price; and so, to defeat an action for the one, they must have been able to show that it was the other that was so appropriated. This they cannot do here, for the contrary is the truth. The argument was, that the estoppel could not apply to a chattel not in esse when the misrepresentation was made. But the foregoing consideration appears to be a sufficient answer, namely, that the assignees are estopped to say that it was not in esse unless they show some other engine to which the representation applied.
Petition granted.