Court Opinion

ID: 9684123
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:47:11.019791+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:52.965470
License: Public Domain

PAUL H. ANDERSON, Justice
(concurring specially).
I concur with the majority’s holding that, given the broad language of Minn. Stat. § 611A.04 (1998), the district court acted within its discretion in ordering appellant Anthony Tenerelli to pay restitution for the costs of Txawj Xiong’s Hu Plig. I also agree with the majority’s conclusion that Tenerelli did not' meet his burden of demonstrating that Txawj Xiong’s Hu Plig was a religious practice— we simply do not have in the record the information necessary to prudently conclude that Txawj Xiong’s Hu Plig was or was not a religious practice. I write separately, however, because it is important to set forth the legal principles on which I base this conclusion.
A. Religion and/or Religious Practice
The United States Constitution prohibits a state from directly promoting or endorsing religion or religious activity. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states that:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
U.S. Const, amend. I. This First Amendment provision on religion has been construed to have two guarantees, the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. While the amendment has two guarantees, the word religion only appears once and the definition of this one word governs both guarantees. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 32, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). As Justice Rutledge said in his dissent:
It [religion] does not have two meanings, one narrow to forbid “an establishment” and another, much broader, for securing “the free exercise thereof.” “Thereof’ brings down “religion” with its entire and exact content, no more and no less, from the first into the second guaranty, so that Congress and now the states are as broadly restricted concerning the one as they are regarding the other.
Id. Accordingly, what is religion or a religious practice is relevant regardless of which of the two guarantees, Free Exercise or Establishment, is being construed.
What is and what is not a religious practice is a difficult question to answer and the search for an answer has in many cases led to contradictory and arbitrary results when court-prescribed tests for religious practices have been applied. Such tests are indeterminate in nature and subject to variations in the general level of scrutiny employed. For example, when the three-pronged Lemon test, developed for interpreting the Establishment Clause, is “applied with particular rigor, the test yields one result, yet when applied in a less-exacting way to the same set of facts, the test can be made to yield an equally plausible, but contradictory result.” The Oxford Companion to The Supreme Court of the United States 719 (Kermit L. Hall, et al., eds., 1992) (referencing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971)).
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has articulated certain principles to be followed by courts when determining wheth*674er an activity is a religious practice. In United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 64 S.Ct. 882, 88 L.Ed. 1148 (1944), Justice Douglas stated that:
Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrine or beliefs. Religious experiences- which are as real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others.
Id. at 86, 64 S.Ct. 882. In United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 85 S.Ct. 850, 13 L.Ed.2d 733 (1965), the Court attempted to develop a test for granting exemption claims for conscientious objectors who did not belong to an orthodox religious sect. Before doing so, the Court stated:
Few would quarrel, we think, with the proposition that in no field of human endeavor has the tool of language proved so inadequate in the communication of ideas as it has in dealing with the fundamental questions of man’s predicament in life, in death or in final judgment and retribution. This fact makes the task of discerning the intent of Congress in using the phrase “Supreme Being” a complex one. Nor is it made the easier by the richness and variety of spiritual life in our country.
Id. at 174, 85 S.Ct. 850. The Court then went on to hold that a court must decide whether an objector’s beliefs are sincerely held and whether objectively
the claimed belief occupies] the same place in the life of the objector as an orthodox belief in God holds in the life of one clearly qualified for exemption.
Id. at 184, 85 S.Ct. 850. Courts were not to require proof of the religious doctrines nor were they to reject beliefs because the beliefs were not comprehensible. Id. at 184-85, 85 S.Ct. 850.
B. The Record Regarding Txawj Xiong’s Hu Plig
It is in the context of these holdings and principles that we must consider the record before us to determine whether the Hu Plig conducted for the benefit of Txawj Xiong constitutes a religious practice.
The record on the nature of the Hu Plig consists of two main parts: (1) the victim impact statement included with Tenerelli’s presentence investigation report and (2) the testimony of Neng Xiong at the restitution hearing.1 The relevant part of the victim impact statement reads as follows:
Mark Richardson of the Ramsey County Probation Department contacted William Yang from the Hmong American Partnership. Mr. Yang informed Mr. Richardson that the healing ceremony was known as “Hu Plig.” He reported that this was a ceremony to restore the soul of a victim, normally a person who has been physically or emotionally traumatized. Mr. Yang described a deeply held belief, particularly among elders of the Hmong community, that without the restoration ceremony the person will become sick and eventually die. Mr. Yang further stated that a shaman, a religious leader in the Hmong community, oversees this ceremony. Hu Plig typically involves the sacrifice of animals, in this case a cow, pig, and chickens. Upon sacrificing the animals the shaman is reported to inspect various aspects of the sacrificial animals, commonly the tongue and feet in an effort to determine whether the restoration has been successfully performed. Traditional belief is that the victim’s soul is replaced by that of the animals. Mr. Yang further reported that the ceremony is generally attended by family members and other members of the Hmong community who are close to the victim. The ceremony normally includes the provision of food and beverage to those in attendance, paid for by the person benefiting from the Hu Plig ceremony.
*675Tenerelli’s witness, Neng Xiong, testified that he was familiar with Hmong religious practices — his father was a shaman, a Hmong religious leader — and that on a “couple [of] occasions” he accompanied his father to places where he observed rituals in which his father took part. When asked if he accepted traditional Hmong religious teaching, Neng Xiong responded, “at .this time, not so much.” Neng Xiong stated that from time to time he has discussed, particularly with elders, traditional Hmong ceremonies, teachings, and healing activity. He testified that there is a traditional Hmong belief that, as the result of a traumatic event or injury, a person can lose his soul and thus need a shaman ceremony. He agreed that elders in the Hmong community are especially involved in traditional healing ceremonies. He stated that about 90 percent of Hmong elders living in the United States who have not converted to Christianity still accept the traditional Hmong shaman healing ceremony.
Neng Xiong then testified specifically about the Hu Plig ceremony. The number and kind of animals sacrificed depends upon how big or small the injury is. The beneficiary of the Hu Plig determines, after consultation with his own elders, the number and kind of animals to be sacrificed. A cow, two pigs, and a chicken would be appropriate for a major injury, but a cow and one egg also. would be appropriate for a “very serious injury.” There are different levels of Hu Plig. Some Hmong who have converted to Christianity participate in the Hu Plig, but then they do not “perform the real shamanism, but they do call spirit.” Neng Xiong went on to say the ceremony is “culturally evolving” and that “it is important for social, as well as the ritual calling purposes.” When asked if the Hu Plig is partially a religious ceremony, Neng Xiong stated:
It is difficult to say because in the tradition itself, my understanding is that, from my cultural anthropology studies, that a religion has to be a form of belief that is institutionalized. But at the same-time the Hmong also, this is a kind of a form of belief from thousands of years ago and the thing has never been institutionalized yet.
(Emphasis added.)
Neng Xiong also testified that he did not know Txawj Xiong and did not know if Txawj Xiong was an elder. When asked “the extent of what [Txawj Xiong] considered his injury or how much soul he feels he lost,” Neng Xiong responded that he did not know. There is no other information on the record that clarifies whether Txawj Xiong is a Hmong elder and the degree to which he accepts and practices traditional Hmong religious beliefs.2
C. Record Does Not Support Unequivocal Conclusion that Txawj Xiong’s Hu Plig Was or Was Not a Religious Practice
The key to our analysis of whether Txawj Xiong’s Hu Plig is or is not a religious ceremony turns on the fact that it appears there are different levels at which the Hu Plig ceremony is conducted. The record indicates that, depending upon the belief of the beneficiary, the Hu Plig in some circumstances may be a cultural and social ceremony and, in others, may be a religious practice. Thus, at least in part, the question of whether the Hu Plig is religious appears to depend on the nature of the beliefs of the individual for whom the ceremony is conducted. The victim impact statement indicates that Txawj Xiong “went through a'Hmong traditional healing ceremony,” but there is no evidence on the record of Txawj Xiong’s beliefs and no clarifying information on his beliefs or his purpose in having the Hu Plig. Neng Xiong conceded that it was *676difficult for him to say whether the Hu Plig was a religious practice, but according to his anthropological studies, he understood that a belief must be institutionalized to be religious and that the Hu Plig is not institutionalized.
While there is much on this record that leads me to believe that under certain circumstances a Hu Plig may be in whole or in part religious, it is unclear whether Txawj Xiong’s beliefs concerning his Hu Plig are religious, cultural, or some mix of both. Clearly there is insufficient evidence to conclude, as the dissent does, that there is no dispute in this case that the victim’s belief supports the position that this particular Hu Plig was a religious ceremony.
Ultimately, as the majority concludes, this case must be decided on the basis of who has the burden of proof and whether that party has carried his burden. Tener-elli, by challenging the constitutionality of the application of Minn.Stat. § 611A.04, has the burden of proving that paying restitution for Txawj Xiong’s Hu Plig is unconstitutional. This is a heavy burden. When making a constitutional challenge, a party must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a constitutional violation has occurred. In re Haggerty, 448 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn.1989). Tenerelli’s argument may contain some merit for, in certain circumstances and to certain individuals, the Hu Plig may well be a religious ceremony. Nevertheless, Tenerelli has failed to demonstrate that Txawj Xiong’s Hu Plig was conducted at a “level” such that it must be viewed as a religious practice rather than at a level that does not meet the constitutional standard for a religious practice. Accordingly, given the broad language of Minn.Stat. § 611A.04 and the broad discretion granted to the district court, the court did not err when it ordered Tenerelli to pay restitution for certain costs associated with the Hu Plig conducted for the benefit of Txawj Xiong.
Because Tenerelli has failed to carry his burden of showing that the Hu Plig at issue was a religious practice, there is no need to conduct an analysis of whether the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution and art. 1, § 16 of the Minnesota Constitution were implicated and violated. However, some further comment on this point is warranted. Courts must proceed in every case with considerable caution when exercising their broad discretion in making restitution under Minn.Stat. § 611A.04. They must do so to ensure that there is no excessive entanglement with religion. Here, the district court determined that based upon the nature and extent of the injury suffered by Txawj Xiong, a Hu Plig that includes the sacrifice of a cow, a pig, and two chickens is excessive because of the two chickens sacrificed. Had we had sufficient information to conclude that the Hu Plig was religious, the district court’s determination that the sacrifice of two chickens was excessive would come uncomfortably close to entangling the courts with religious authority. When courts exercise their broad discretion in granting restitution, they must be ever mindful of the dimly perceived “lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of the law.” Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613, 91 S.Ct. 2105.

. Neng Xiong is Hmong, was born in Laos, emigrated to the United States when he was 17, and was 30 years old at the time he testified. Neng Xiong holds a bachelor's degree in sociology, a master's degree in cultural anthropology, and was a law student at the time he testified.

. The dissent states that there is no dispute as to Txawj Xiong’s "deeply held belief.” Unlike the dissent, I am unable to find support for this statement in the record. In the victim impact statement, William Yang of the Hmong American Partnership described a "deeply held belief, particularly among elders of the Hmong community,” but there is nothing in the record to link this statement directly to the beliefs of the victim Txawj Xiong.