Court Opinion

ID: 9926871
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-25 20:06:03.875884+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:20.817390
License: Public Domain

Motor Vehicle Administration v. Rahq Deika Montana Usan, No. 6, September Term,
2023. Opinion by Hotten, J.

MARYLAND TRANSPORTATION ARTICLE – DRIVER’S LICENSES – TEST
REFUSAL – The Supreme Court held that the Administrative Law Judge did not err in
concluding that law enforcement had reasonable grounds to believe the detained individual
was driving a vehicle while impaired by alcohol, drugs, or both. The record as a whole
provided substantial evidence such that a reasoning mind could reasonably reach the same
conclusion. The Court also held that the Administrative Law Judge did not err in
concluding that law enforcement, having reasonable suspicion of a driver impaired by
alcohol, drugs, or both, may request testing pursuant to Transportation Article § 16-205.1.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the driver violated Transportation Article § 16-205.1 by
refusing to submit to the requested testing. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the
Circuit Court for Charles County.
Circuit Court for Charles County
Case No.: C-08-CV-22-000278
Argued: November 3, 2023

                                          IN THE SUPREME COURT

                                                OF MARYLAND

                                                       No. 6

                                              September Term, 2023

                                      MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION

                                                        v.

                                        RAHQ DEIKA MONTANA USAN

                                        Fader, C.J.,
                                        Watts,
                                        Hotten,
                                        Booth,
                                        Biran,
                                        Gould,
                                        Eaves,

                                                        JJ.

                                              Opinion by Hotten, J.
                                               Biran, J., concurs.

                                        Filed: January 25, 2024

             2024-01-25 14:32-05:00
       The Motor Vehicle Administration (“MVA”) seeks review of a decision by the

Circuit Court for Charles County, which overturned an Administrative Law Judge’s

(“ALJ”) suspension of Rahq Deika Montana Usan’s (“Mr. Usan”) driver’s license pursuant

to Maryland’s implied consent statute, Maryland Code Ann., Transportation Article

(“Transp.”) § 16-205.1. The MVA alleges the circuit court committed error in “[m]aking

[i]ts [o]wn [f]actual and [l]egal [f]indings,” thereby “improperly substitut[ing] its judgment

for the ALJ’s[.]” In response, Mr. Usan asserts that law enforcement had no grounds to

request an alcohol breath test as a component of drug testing, because he was arrested under

suspicion of driving under the influence of drugs, and there was no evidence that a Drug

Recognition Expert (“DRE”) was available to administer said drug testing.

       We granted certiorari to answer the following question:

       Did the administrative law judge correctly ﬁnd that reasonable grounds
       existed under Md. Code § 16-205.l of the Transportation Article for a law
       enforcement ofﬁcer to request a motorist to take a test for alcohol
       concentration, despite there being no odor of alcoholic beverage on his breath
       and a preliminary breath test [with a] result [of] 0.00 alcohol content, but
       where the motorist was driving erratically[,] with indicia of intoxication to
       include horizontal gaze nystagmus and lack of coordination and balance?

For the reasons discussed below, we answer the question in the affirmative and reverse the

circuit court.

                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Factual Background

       On December 17, 2021 at 12:06 a.m., State Trooper First Class Jonathan Greathouse

(“Trooper Greathouse”) “observed a [r]ed Jeep . . . driving in an erratic manner[,] cross[ing]

the solid white line” in Mechanicsville, St. Mary’s County, Maryland. Trooper Greathouse
made a traffic stop and identified Respondent, Mr. Usan, based on securing his

identification. At the time of the stop, Mr. Usan resided in Maryland and possessed a

Maryland-issued driver’s license. Trooper Greathouse “observed [that Mr. Usan] was very

disoriented[,] had glassy red eyes[, and] his movement was slow and sluggish.” Mr. Usan

denied drinking any alcohol.

       Trooper Greathouse requested that Mr. Usan submit to three Standardized Field

Sobriety Tests (“SFSTs”), including horizontal gaze nystagmus (“HGN”), walk and turn

(“WAT”), and one leg stand (“OLS”).1 Mr. Usan did not successfully perform the field

sobriety tests, as reflected in Trooper Greathouse’s report noting “6/6” indications of

impairment on HGN, “7/8” on WAT, and “3/4” on OLS. Although “at no point did

[Trooper Greathouse] detect the odor of an alcoholic beverage[,]” he suspected Mr. Usan

may be under the influence of alcohol. Mr. Usan “was offered a preliminary breath test”

(“PBT”) and blew “0.00” breath alcohol content (“BrAC”). “[Mr.] Usan was then arrested

for driving under the influence of drugs and transported to the Maryland State Police

Leonardtown Barrack for processing.” Before leaving the scene, Trooper Greathouse

asked a law enforcement officer from a different police department: “do you think you

guys will have a [DRE] available or no?” The other police officer appeared to say no.

Trooper Greathouse was not a DRE.

       1
         HGN has subjects follow a ballpoint pen with their eyes to test eye movement and
control. WAT has subjects walk a straight line in a heel-to-toe fashion to test coordination.
OLS has subjects stand on one leg to test balance.

                                             2
       With Mr. Usan sitting in the police car, Trooper Greathouse played an audio

recording of the DR 15.2 The recording was very clear. Trooper Greathouse paused the

recording to explain the DRE procedure that would take place if Mr. Usan consented to

taking a test. However, Mr. Usan interrupted him and stated “yeah . . . we’re not taking

any tests.” At this point, the recording resumed to play. At the end of the recording,

Trooper Greathouse clarified that Mr. Usan could go home regardless of whether he took

the test, but that a test would “take a little longer”, and asked Mr. Usan if he would consent

to a test. Mr. Usan replied, “not at this time.”

       Upon arrival at the barrack, Trooper Greathouse provided a DR 15 form to Mr.

Usan. Mr. Usan signed the DR 15, refusing alcohol testing. Mr. Usan also verbally

“refused to take the alcohol concentration test.” Thereafter, Trooper Greathouse suspended

Mr. Usan’s license pursuant to Transp. § 16-205.1 for refusing to submit to the requested

alcohol test.

       Mr. Usan was also charged with violating Transp. § 21-902(a)(1)(i): driving while

under the influence of alcohol; Transp. § 21-902(b)(1)(i): driving while impaired by

alcohol; Transp. § 21-902(c)(1)(i): driving while impaired by drugs; Transp. § 21-901.1(b):

negligent driving; Transp. § 21-901.1(a): reckless driving; and Transp. § 21-201(a)(1):

failure to obey properly placed traffic control device instructions. The alcohol-related

       2
         A “DR 15” is a standardized audio recording or form which advises motorists of
their rights regarding alcohol and drug testing pursuant to Transp. § 16-205.1. The
recording and form also provide relevant administrative penalties for refusing testing.

                                              3
charges were later dropped. However, Mr. Usan’s license suspension remained for

refusing a requested alcohol test pursuant to Transp. § 16-205.1.

Procedural Background

       On April 8, 2022, Mr. Usan appeared before ALJ Joy Phillips to contest his license

suspension. Mr. Usan testified that he drove for Uber for 12 hours on the day in question

and that he was driving under the speed limit and crossed over the solid white lines because

he was tired. Mr. Usan denied he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Mr. Usan

further claimed nervousness affected him during his SFSTs due to the arrival of additional

officers.

       Mr. Usan argued that there was no reason to request a test for alcohol in the absence

of evidence of alcohol impairment.       The ALJ explained her understanding that per

department procedure, law enforcement conducts certified alcohol testing before any drug

testing to “rule . . . out” alcohol as the cause for impairment. Mr. Usan confirmed his

understanding of law enforcement procedure. However, he argued that an officer who is

not certified as a DRE does not have the statutory authority to request drug testing. At no

point did Mr. Usan argue before the ALJ that he was induced to refuse testing or that a

DRE was completely unavailable.

       The ALJ found by a “preponderance of evidence” that: Trooper Greathouse had

reasonable grounds to believe Mr. Usan was driving while impaired by alcohol, drugs, or

both; there was evidence of the use of alcohol, drugs, or both due to Trooper Greathouse’s

report of Mr. Usan’s sluggishness, glassy eyes, and the SFSTs results; that “Trooper

[Greathouse] administered a PBT with results of 0.00 BrAC”; and that Trooper Greathouse

                                             4
arrested Mr. Usan for “driving under the influence of drugs, not alcohol.” The ALJ also

found that: “[Mr. Usan] said twice during the reading [of his rights] that he was not going

to take any test[; and Trooper Greathouse] asked [Mr. Usan] if he would take a test and

[Mr. Usan] responded, ‘[n]ot at this time.’” Further, “[a]t the station, [Mr. Usan] signed

the DR 15 that he was refusing the alcohol test [and he] was never offered a drug test or an

evaluation by a [DRE.]”

       Relying on Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shea, 415 Md. 1, 19, 997 A.2d 768, 778 (2010),

and Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Pollard, 466 Md. 531, 540, 222 A.3d 177, 182 (2019), the

ALJ articulated that the reasonable suspicion of an officer is a “common-sense,

nontechnical conception” based on the officer’s training and experience that is owed

deference by the courts. Since Trooper Greathouse “supported his belief [that Mr. Usan]

was under the influence of something with specific observations[,]” the ALJ concluded

that Trooper Greathouse’s suspicions provided reasonable grounds to request certified

testing at the barracks.

       The ALJ noted Mr. Usan’s “objections to being offered an alcohol test when he was

arrested for suspicion of drugs, but [observed that] the Transportation Article includes both

tests if an officer has an objectively reasonable belief the driver is under the influence or

impaired by something, whether it be alcohol or drugs.” The ALJ determined that Mr.

Usan’s test refusal violated Transp. § 16-205.1, resulting in the suspension of Mr. Usan’s

driver’s license for nine months with an alternative of twelve months of Ignition Interlock

restrictions.

                                             5
       Mr. Usan petitioned for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Charles County,3

where a hearing was held on November 29, 2022. Mr. Usan contended that the ALJ applied

an incorrect standard because Trooper Greathouse needed “reasonable grounds that [Mr.

Usan] was impaired by either alcohol and/or drugs . . . not just impaired by something.”

Additionally, Mr. Usan argued that the record did not provide “competent, material, and

substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that” Trooper Greathouse had reasonable

grounds to believe that Mr. Usan was under the influence or impaired by alcohol, drugs, or

both. Mr. Usan asserted that there was no direct evidence of the presence of alcohol, so

there was “no alcohol.” Further, Mr. Usan argued that, while law enforcement can request

both alcohol and drug testing depending on the context, “it was not proper to ask for or to

request a [certified] breath test [for alcohol] based off of the evidence in the record.” Mr.

Usan also contended that, despite a police manual requirement stating otherwise, an officer

could not request alcohol testing without any evidence of alcohol.

       MVA argued that the standard of review was not de novo, but instead was whether

there was “substantial evidence . . . to support the [ALJ’s] decision” and whether the

decision was legally correct. MVA pointed to the failed SFSTs and erratic driving as

substantial evidence of Mr. Usan’s impairment. MVA contended that the evidence sufficed

“to support the ALJ’s finding.”

       3
         Although the traffic stop at issue occurred in St. Mary’s County, Mr. Usan
petitioned for judicial review in Charles County. Mr. Usan resided at the time in Waldorf,
Charles County, Maryland. Maryland Code Ann., State Government Article § 10-222(c)
provides that, “[u]nless otherwise required by statute, a petition for judicial review [of a
final decision of an administrative agency] shall be filed with the circuit court for the
county where any party resides or has a principal place of business.” So, venue was proper.

                                             6
       The circuit court acknowledged that it did not watch the dashcam videos of the

incident. Instead, the court speculated on why Mr. Usan’s “eyes looked red[]” and

“bloodshot,” noting that “there’s a lot of reasons why somebody may be tired that is causing

them – maybe he’s falling asleep, I don’t know.” The circuit court then reiterated that

       if you’re pulling someone over and you’re suspecting that they’re under the
       influence of alcohol and they blow a [.]00 and you don’t have any other
       indication that he’s under the influence of alcohol such as a bottle, empty
       bottle of liquor, the smell of alcohol, any kind of admission that [Mr. Usan]
       drank at some point during the day, people do make admissions, if you go to
       the, the idea that maybe he’s on drugs, then, and there’s no expert that is able
       to even give any indication that they believed that he may be, then that’s just
       the officer guessing. And then you have people who may just be tired and
       driving, which is dangerous, but without indication. And then that blow of
       [.]00.

In short, the circuit court concluded that it did not “believe . . . that the decision was

sustained by the evidence” and reversed Mr. Usan’s suspension.

       MVA timely appealed and we granted certiorari. Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Usan,

483 Md. 572, 296 A.3d 415 (2023).

                               STANDARD OF REVIEW

       A court’s role in reviewing an administrative agency adjudicatory decision
       is narrow; it is limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the
       record as a whole to support the agency’s findings and conclusions, and to
       determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous
       conclusion of law.

       In applying the substantial evidence test, a reviewing court decides whether
       a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the
       agency reached. A reviewing court should defer to the agency’s fact-finding
       and drawing of inferences if they are supported by the record. A reviewing
       court must review the agency’s decision in the light most favorable to it; the
       agency’s decision is prima facie correct and presumed valid, and it is the

                                              7
      agency’s province to resolve conflicting evidence and to draw inferences
      from that evidence.

      Despite some unfortunate language that has crept into a few of our opinions,
      a court’s task on review is not to substitute its judgment for the expertise of
      those persons who constitute the administrative agency.

Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Carpenter, 424 Md. 401, 412–13, 36 A.3d 439, 446 (2012)

(cleaned up).

      “In applying this standard, we review the decision of the administrative agency,

rather than the determination of the lower court, and will defer to the [ALJ]’s findings of

fact and inferences drawn, insofar as supported by the record.” Id. at 413, 36 A.3d at 446

(citation omitted). “We review an agency’s decision that is premised upon the application

and analysis of caselaw without deference to the agency’s legal conclusions.” Pollard, 466

Md. at 537, 222 A.3d at 180 (quotation omitted).

                                     DISCUSSION

      The purpose of Maryland’s implied consent statute, Transp. § 16-205.1, is “to

reduce the incidence of [impaired] driving and to protect public safety by encouraging

drivers to take [requested] tests[.]” Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shepard, 399 Md. 241, 255,

923 A.2d 100, 108 (2007) (citation omitted). The statute provides that

      [a]ny person who drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle on a highway .
      . . in this State is deemed to have consented . . . to take a test if the person
      should be detained on suspicion of driving . . . while under the influence of
      alcohol, while impaired by alcohol, while so far impaired by any drug, any
      combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol
      that the person could not drive a vehicle safely, [or] while impaired by a
      controlled dangerous substance[.]

Transp. § 16-205.1(a)(2) (emphasis added).

                                             8
       “Test” means, unless the context requires otherwise:

       1. A test of a person’s breath or of 1 specimen of a person’s blood to
          determine alcohol concentration;

       2. A test or tests of 1 specimen of a person’s blood to determine the drug or
          controlled dangerous substance content of the person’s blood; or

       3. Both:
          A. A test of a person’s breath or a test of 1 specimen of a person’s blood,
             to determine alcohol concentration; and

          B. A test or tests of 1 specimen of a person’s blood to determine the drug
             or controlled dangerous substance content of the person’s blood.

Transp. § 16-205.1(a)(1)(iii).

       The statute, in relevant part, directs that a police officer that has “reasonable grounds

to believe” a person is driving a motor vehicle while under the influence or impairment of

alcohol, drugs, or any combination of both, is to detain the person, request that the person

permit a test to be taken, and advise the person of the administrative sanctions that shall be

imposed if testing is refused. Transp. § 16-205.1(b)(2)(i)–(iii).

       If the motorist refuses requested testing, the statute directs the police officer to,

among other things, confiscate and suspend the person’s driver’s license, inform the person

that they have a right to timely request administrative review, and advise the person of the

administrative sanctions that will be imposed upon an adverse finding upon review.

Transp. § 16-205.1(b)(3)(i)–(vi).

       At an administrative hearing in a test refusal case, the statute directs the ALJ to

assess whether: the law enforcement officer had “reasonable grounds to believe” the

motorist was driving under the influence or impairment of alcohol, drugs, or a combination

                                               9
of the two; there was evidence the motorist used alcohol, drugs, or a combination of the

two; the officer advised the motorist of their rights under the statute and possible

administrative sanctions before requesting testing; and the motorist refused to take the

requested test. Transp. § 16-205.1(f)(7)(i)(1)–(4). If each element is satisfied, the statute

requires that the MVA “suspend or revoke the person’s license[.]”             Transp. § 16-

205.1(f)(8)(i). In test refusal cases, for first-time offenders, the statute directs a 270-day

suspension. Transp. § 16-205.1(f)(8)(v)(5)(A).

       Transp. § 16-205.1(j) features specific provisions focused on drugs and controlled

dangerous substances (“CDS”). It provides that a “test for drug or [CDS] content” may

only be requested by a police officer if the “law enforcement agency of which the officer

is a member has the capacity to have such tests conducted[.]” Transp. § 16-205.1(j)(1).

Capacity to conduct these drug tests is limited to those types of officers designated within

the statute as DREs. See Transp. § 16-205.1(j)(2)–(3). Transp. § 16-205.1(j) makes no

provisions for alcohol testing.

I.     The Record Contains Substantial Evidence to Support the Administrative Law
       Judge’s Findings of Fact, and the ALJ’s Legal Conclusions Bore no Error of
       Law.

       A.     The ALJ had Substantial Evidence for finding Trooper Greathouse had
              Reasonable Grounds to Believe Mr. Usan was Driving under the Influence.

       At issue is whether the ALJ’s conclusion that Trooper Greathouse had reasonable

grounds to believe Mr. Usan was driving under the influence or impairment of alcohol,

drugs, or both, was supported by substantial evidence. In Shepard, we held that, as used

                                             10
in the implied consent statute, the phrase “reasonable grounds” means “reasonable

articulable suspicion[.]”4 399 Md at 254, 923 A.2d at 107.

       Here, the ALJ relied on Shea, 415 Md. at 19, 997 A.2d at 778, for the articulation

of an officer’s reasonable suspicion as a “common sense, nontechnical conception that

considers factual and practical aspects of daily life and how reasonable and prudent people

act.” The ALJ also followed our instruction in Pollard, 466 Md. at 540, 222 A.3d at 182,

to “consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the detaining officer

had ‘reasonable suspicion,’ and [] give deference to the detaining officer’s experience and

training and his or her ability to infer from his or her observations.” The ALJ’s articulation

of reasonable suspicion presents no error of law.

       Next, the evidence before the ALJ sufficiently supported the ALJ’s finding that

Trooper Greathouse had reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. Usan was driving under

the influence or impairment of alcohol, drugs, or both. The ALJ’s determination was based

on an examination of the totality of the record, including Trooper Greathouse’s report,

reflecting his credible, unopposed observations that Mr. Usan: was driving erratically,

crossing solid white lines, and driving under the speed limit; had red and glassy eyes;

exhibited slow and sluggish movement; and failed three SFSTs. Trooper Greathouse’s

report was further supported by dashcam footage documenting Mr. Usan’s failed SFSTs.

       4
         We have explained that “reasonable suspicion requires less in the way of quantity
and quality of evidence than is required for probable cause and it falls considerably short
of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Shea, 415 Md. at 19, 997 A.2d at
778 (cleaned up); see also Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Medvedeff, 466 Md. 455, 468, 221 A.3d
955, 963 (2019).

                                             11
We “defer to the [ALJ’s] fact-finding and drawing of inferences if they are supported by

the record.” Carpenter, 424 Md. at 412–13, 36 A.3d at 446.

       Although Trooper Greathouse did not detect an odor of alcohol and Mr. Usan’s

preliminary breath test result reflected an alcohol content of 0.00 on a PBT, such a result

may be negative indicia of alcohol but is not determinative of actual influence or

impairment and does not absolve drivers of complying with later-requested alcohol testing.

Transp. § 16-205.2 (c) (“The results of the [PBT] shall be used as a guide for the police

officer in deciding whether an arrest should be made[.]”), (d) (“[T]he taking of a [PBT]

shall not relieve the individual of the obligation to take the test required under [Transp.] §

16-205.1[.]”); Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Dove, 413 Md. 70, 94, 991 A.2d 65, 79 (2010)

(“The fact that the [PBT] . . . showed a reading of 0.00 is irrelevant to the analysis of

whether Dove refused the required blood test.”).

       Presuming the ALJ’s determination that Trooper Greathouse had reasonable

suspicion of Mr. Usan’s impairment by alcohol, drugs, or both as prima facie correct, a

reasoning mind could reasonably conclude as the ALJ did. In other words, given Trooper

Greathouse’s reported observations of Mr. Usan’s condition and the dashcam footage of

Mr. Usan’s failed SFSTs, the record contained substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s

conclusion that Trooper Greathouse had reasonable suspicion that Mr. Usan was driving

under the influence or impairment of alcohol, drugs, or both.

       B.     The ALJ Correctly Interpreted Transp. § 16-205.1 as Permitting Law
              Enforcement to Request Alcohol Testing, Drug Testing, or Both if an Officer
              has a Reasonable Suspicion that a Driver is Under the Influence or Impaired
              by Alcohol, Drugs, or Both.

                                             12
       The ALJ also correctly interpreted Transp. § 16-205.1 in determining that a law

enforcement officer has the ability to request alcohol testing, drug testing, or both if the

officer has a reasonable suspicion that a driver was under the influence or impairment of

alcohol, drugs, or both. “In interpreting a statute, a court first considers the statute’s

language, which the court applies where the statute’s language is unambiguous and clearly

consistent with the statute’s apparent purpose.” Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Gonce, 446 Md.

100, 110, 130 A.3d 436, 442 (2016) (cleaned up).

       The Transportation Article provides, in relevant part:

       Any person who drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle on a highway or
       on any private property that is used by the public in general in this State is
       deemed to have consented . . . to take a test if the person should be detained
       on suspicion of driving or attempting to drive while under the influence of
       alcohol, while impaired by alcohol, while so far impaired by any drug, any
       combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol
       that the person could not drive a vehicle safely, while impaired by a
       controlled dangerous substance, in violation of an alcohol restriction, or in
       violation of § 16-813 of this title.

Transp. § 16-205.1(a)(2) (emphasis added). The Transportation Article defines “test” as:

       1. A test of a person’s breath or of 1 specimen of a person’s blood to
          determine alcohol concentration;

       2. A test or tests of 1 specimen of a person’s blood to determine the drug or
          controlled dangerous substance content of the person’s blood; or

       3. Both:
          A. A test of a person’s breath or a test of 1 specimen of a person’s blood,
             to determine alcohol concentration; and

          B. A test or tests of 1 specimen of a person’s blood to determine the drug
             or controlled dangerous substance content of the person’s blood.

                                            13
Transp. § 16-205.1(a)(1)(iii).

       The ALJ concluded that law enforcement officers had access to both testing

procedures available in Transp. § 16-205.1, despite a lack of clarity as to whether Mr. Usan

was under the influence or impairment of alcohol, drugs, or both. Based on the plain

language of Transp. § 16-205.1, we agree with the ALJ. Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Deering,

438 Md. 611, 622, 92 A.3d 495, 502 (2014).

       Under the plain language of Transp. § 16-205.1(a), a law enforcement officer with

reasonable suspicion that a driver was under the influence or impairment of alcohol, drugs,

or both may request alcohol testing, drug testing, or both. Nowhere does Transp. § 16-

205.1(a) expressly or impliedly limit reasonable suspicion to either alcohol or drugs, or

limit testing to only alcohol or only drugs, respectively. Instead, Transp. § 16-205.1(a)

provides that drivers have consented to a test if suspected of driving under any of the varied

options of influence or impairment, and then defines “test” as alcohol testing, drug testing,

or both. In short, a person reasonably suspected of driving under only the influence or

impairment of drugs or CDS has impliedly consented to alcohol testing, drug testing, or

both. In reaching this conclusion, Gonce is helpful.

       In Gonce, the driver had submitted to alcohol testing pursuant to Transp. § 16-

205.1(a)(1)(iii) but refused to take subsequently requested drug testing, whereupon his

license was suspended. 446 Md. at 109, 130 A.3d at 442. Gonce argued that the word

“test” in Transp. § 16-205.1 indicated a singular testing requirement, which he had satisfied

by submitting to the alcohol test, and refusal to submit to further drug testing did not

                                             14
warrant his license suspension. Id. at 109, 130 A.3d at 442. We disagreed and explained

that,

        [b]y its plain language, [Transp.] § 16-205.1 gives law enforcement officers
        the authority to request that a person submit to a blood test for drugs or [CDS]
        and an alcohol concentration test, whether through breath or blood. [Transp.]
        § 16-205.1’s plain language does not expressly limit law enforcement
        officers to only one test; i.e., [Transp.] § 16-205.1 does not state that law
        enforcement officers must elect which test to request or that only one test is
        to be permitted. Stated otherwise, [Transp.] § 16-205.1 authorizes law
        enforcement officers to request an alcohol concentration test and a drug test,
        without any explicit language indicating that the tests are mutually exclusive.

Id. at 113, 130 A.3d at 444.

        Here, Mr. Usan argues that the use of the singular word “test” and option of “both”

in Transp. § 16-205.1(a)(1)(iii)(3) necessarily combines the separate alcohol and drug

testing into “a [s]ingle [t]est [c]onsisting of [t]wo [c]omponents[]” when an individual is

arrested for only suspicion of driving under the influence of drugs. Mr. Usan contends this

singular “drug” test would have required a DRE’s presence for the alcohol component

pursuant to Transp. § 16-205.1(j). We disagree. Even assuming a DRE was unavailable,

a fact which is not shown by the record, nothing in the statute combines both testing

procedures into one singular test. Instead, Transp. § 16-205.1 provides availability to law

enforcement to request testing for alcohol, or drugs, “or . . . [b]oth[]” testing options.

Transp. § 16-205.1(a)(1)(iii) (emphasis added). Indeed, “the word ‘test’ does not mean

only one test.” Gonce, 446 Md. at 113, 130 A.3d at 444.5

        5
         “The singular includes the plural and the plural includes the singular.” Md. Code
Ann., General Provisions Article § 1-202. In accord, Transp. § 16-205.1 grants access to
either or both tests “unless the context requires otherwise[.]” Transp. § 16-205.1(a)(iii)
                                                                       (continued . . .)

                                              15
       Mr. Usan’s argument that “test” and “both” in Transp. § 16-205.1(a)(1)(iii) reflects

“a single test” comprised of two components is incorrect because the statute plainly

indicates two separate testing procedures: a breathalyzer or blood test for alcohol, or a

blood test or tests for drugs and CDS. If officers are limited to a single “test” for alcohol

but can perform “[a] test or tests” for drugs and CDS, the testing procedures are

functionally delineated. Transp. § 16-205.1(a)(1)(iii). Further illustrating functional

separation is that alcohol can be tested by both breath or blood, where drugs and CDS can

only be tested via blood. Id. The testing procedures are also separated for the very reason

Mr. Usan notes: Transp. § 16-205.1(j) requires a DRE for any drug and CDS testing.

Alcohol testing has no such statutory requirement.

       Mr. Usan urges us to recognize that the requested alcohol testing here was a mere

component of drug testing, necessitating a DRE. Regardless of whether some current

police procedures may require that a DRE first examine the results of an earlier-in-time

alcohol test before requesting any testing for drugs, Transp. § 16-205.1 makes no such

statutory requirement. Police procedure may want or even require DREs to examine

alcohol testing results in their evaluation, but that procedure does not combine both tests

into a statutory singular one with two components.

(. . . continued)
(emphasis added). We have discussed the phrase “unless context requires otherwise” in
relation to Transp. § 16-205.1(c)’s requirement to test a driver when in an accident that
results in death or serious injury. See Gonce, 446 Md. at 123–25, 130 A.3d at 450–51. As
in Gonce, “‘unless the context requires otherwise’ . . . does not affect [the] conclusion that
the word ‘test’ may be taken to mean both an alcohol concentration test and a drug test[.]”
Id. at 125, 130 A.3d at 451 (emphasis added).

                                             16
       Requesting an alcohol test initially as part of a particular law enforcement entity’s

procedure has no bearing on the language of Transp. § 16-205.1. Law enforcement

procedure may vary in different areas of the State, among different types of organizations,

and may change in the future. The General Assembly has instead granted officers access

to separate testing procedures that neither statutorily rely on each other, nor functionally

tie together. If Mr. Usan seeks a change to Transp. § 16-205.1’s language, the correct

venue is the General Assembly.

       If we concluded that alcohol and drug testing were necessarily combined into a

singular, two-part process when performing “both” testing options, a DRE would be

required for even the preliminary alcohol test. However, alcohol testing does not require

a DRE. See Transp. § 16-205.1(e). Indeed, drug recognition experts are only required

pursuant to Transp. § 16-205.1(j) and testing requests for drugs or CDS. Irrespective of

whether a DRE may rely on the result of alcohol testing in making a determination of drug

or CDS influence or impairment, Transp. § 16-205.1(j) does not necessitate a DRE’s

presence for that alcohol test.6

       In the case at bar, the ALJ concluded as a matter of law and relying on Gonce, that

“the Transportation Article includes both tests if an officer has an objectively reasonable

belief the driver is under the influence or impaired by something, whether it be alcohol or

drugs.” We agree with the ALJ. The ALJ’s reliance on Gonce was well placed. Transp.

       6
         The concurrence would ask that in the instance of a driver suspected of only drug
impairment, before any alcohol test is requested, a DRE should be located. Slip Op. at 3
(Biran, J., concurring). Transp. § 16-205.1 makes no such requirement.

                                            17
§ 16-205.1’s plain language provides that a “test” can mean testing for alcohol, testing for

drugs and CDS, or both separate testing procedures, and our precedent confirms that

interpretation.

       In sum, the initial roadside suspicions of law enforcement are not conclusive of

whether a driver was guilty of driving under the influence or impairment of only one of

drugs or alcohol, or both. Instead, an officer’s reasonable suspicions are either confirmed

or denied by testing as designated by Transp. § 16-205.1 or other applicable statutes. See

Dove, 413 Md. at 95, 991 A.2d 79–80 (“[Transp. § 16-205.1(a)(2)] does not require

probable cause when an officer requests an alcohol concentration test . . . . Suspicion based

on reasonable grounds is a lower standard than a preponderance of the evidence or probable

cause.”) (citation omitted).

       We hold that the ALJ correctly concluded that Transp. § 16-205.1 allows for law

enforcement with reasonable suspicion of a driver driving under the influence or

impairment of alcohol, drugs, or both to request testing for alcohol, drugs, or both.

       C.     The ALJ had Substantial Evidence in the Record to Correctly Conclude that
              Mr. Usan Refused Alcohol Testing in Violation of Transp. § 16-205.1.

       In watching Trooper Greathouse’s dashcam videos, the ALJ noted that Mr. Usan

“said twice during the reading [of his rights] that he was not going to take any test.”

Further, “[a]fter the recording ended, [Trooper Greathouse] asked [Mr. Usan] if he would

take a test and [Mr. Usan] responded[] ‘[n]ot at this time.’” Then, “[Mr. Usan] signed the

DR 15 that he was refusing the alcohol test.” In reviewing the record, we discover the

same. Mr. Usan’s verbal refusals and signed DR 15 suffice as “substantial evidence” such

                                             18
that a reasoning mind could have reasonably concluded that Mr. Usan rejected the

requested testing.

       Next, in relevant part,

       a person may not be compelled to take a test. However, the detaining officer
       shall advise the person that, on receipt of a sworn statement from the officer
       that the person was so charged and refused to take a test, . . . the
       Administration shall: . . . [i]n the case of a person licensed under this title . .
       . [f]or a test refusal: . . . [f]or a first offense, suspend the driver’s license for
       270 days[.]

Transp. § 16-205.1(b)(1)(i)(5).

       The plain language shows that a person licensed under the Transportation Article

may refuse a requested test, but in that instance and upon first offense, their license shall

be suspended 270 days. Alternatively, pursuant to Transp. § 16-205.1(g), a driver may

request participation in the Ignition Interlock System. We agree with the ALJ’s reading of

Transp. § 16-205.1 as applied to Mr. Usan’s test refusal and the imposition of a nine-month

license suspension and take no issue with the alternative option of Mr. Usan using the

Ignition Interlock System. Both are correct applications of the statute, and we find no error.

We hold that Mr. Usan’s license suspension was warranted for his refusal to submit to

requested testing.7

       7
         In his brief, Mr. Usan argues that Trooper Greathouse improperly induced him into
refusing the alcohol concentration test, thereby negating his knowing refusal. Mr. Usan
did not make this argument before the ALJ, nor did he raise this issue in a cross-petition
for writ of certiorari. Accordingly, we shall not address it here. See Maryland Rule 8-
131(b)(1) (“Unless otherwise provided by the order granting the writ of certiorari, in
reviewing a decision rendered . . . by a circuit court acting in an appellate capacity, the
Supreme Court ordinarily will consider only an issue that has been raised in the petition
                                                                      (continued . . .)

                                                19
                                     CONCLUSION

       We hold that the ALJ’s determinations that Trooper Greathouse had reasonable

grounds to believe that Mr. Usan was driving under the influence or impairment of alcohol,

drugs, or both and that Mr. Usan refused requested testing were supported by substantial

evidence such that a reasoning mind could reasonably reach the same conclusions of fact.

We also agree with the ALJ’s interpretation and hold that Transp. § 16-205.1 affords law

enforcement the ability to request testing for alcohol, drugs, or both, when an officer has a

reasonable suspicion that a driver is under the influence or impairment of alcohol, drugs,

or both. Mr. Usan violated Transp. § 16-205.1 by refusing to submit to officer requested

testing when he was reasonably suspected of driving under the influence or impairment of

alcohol, drugs, or both. A nine-month suspension was warranted under the statute for that

refusal. We affirm the ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Accordingly, we

reverse the circuit court.

                                                  JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT
                                                  COURT FOR CHARLES COUNTY IS
                                                  REVERSED. COSTS TO BE PAID
                                                  BY RESPONDENT.

(. . . continued)
for certiorari or any cross-petition and that has been preserved for review by the Supreme
Court.”); Gonce, 446 Md. at 126, 130 A.3d at 452 (“a court will review an adjudicatory
agency decision solely on the grounds relied upon by the administrative agency.”) (cleaned
up); Brodie v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 367 Md. 1, 4, 785 A.2d 747, 749 (2001) (declining
to address a motorist’s claim because it was never raised during the administrative hearing).

                                             20
Circuit Court for Charles County
Case No. C-08-CV-22-000278
Argued: November 3, 2023
                                       IN THE SUPREME COURT

                                             OF MARYLAND

                                                   No. 6

                                           September Term, 2023

                                   MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION

                                                    v.

                                     RAHQ DEIKA MONTANA USAN

                                     Fader, C.J.
                                     Watts
                                     Hotten
                                     Booth
                                     Biran
                                     Gould
                                     Eaves,

                                                    JJ.

                                      Concurring Opinion by Biran, J.

                                          Filed: January 25, 2024
       Respectfully, I concur.

       In general, the implied consent statute, Md. Code Ann., Transp. (“TR”) § 16-205.1

(2020 Repl. Vol.), allows law enforcement to request alcohol testing, drug testing, or both

upon reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or both. I write

separately to express concern about the following potential scenario: (1) An officer stops a

motorist after observing the motorist driving erratically; (2) the motorist does not emit an

odor of alcohol, but nevertheless fails standard field sobriety tests; (3) the motorist takes a

preliminary breath test (“PBT”) while the traffic stop is still in progress, which results in a

0.00 breath alcohol content reading; (4) the officer is aware that their agency does not have

a drug recognition expert (“DRE”) available to request and conduct a drug test of the

motorist and, therefore, the officer knows that it will not be possible to administer a drug

test to the motorist under TR § 16-205.1(j)1; and (5) the officer, expecting that the motorist

would pass a test for alcohol if one were administered, makes comments to the motorist

that induce the motorist to refuse to take the alcohol test, resulting in the suspension of the

motorist’s driver’s license. Before this Court, Mr. Usan contends that this scenario

unfolded in his case. However, Mr. Usan did not argue at the administrative hearing that

       1
         Section 16-205.1(j)(1) provides that a drug test “[m]ay not be requested … by a
police officer unless the law enforcement agency of which the officer is a member has the
capacity to have such tests conducted[.]” (Emphasis added.) That “capacity” is fleshed out
in subsection (j)(2), which provides, among other things, that a drug test may only be
requested “by a police officer who is a trainee, has been trained, or is participating directly
or indirectly in a program of training that is …[d]esigned to train and certify police officers
as drug recognition experts[.]” Id. § 16-205.1(j)(2)(i). Thus, if a DRE or DRE trainee is not
available to request a drug test, no drug test may be requested.
Maryland State Police Trooper First Class (“TFC”) Jonathan Greathouse induced him to

refuse the alcohol test. For this reason, I concur in the Court’s judgment reversing the ruling

of the Circuit Court.

       Nevertheless, Mr. Usan’s arguments regarding inducement, and the interplay

between an alcohol test and a drug test in these circumstances, warrant comment here.2 In

my view, if an officer does not have reasonable grounds to believe that a motorist is

impaired by alcohol – because, for example, the officer does not detect any odor of alcohol

and the motorist’s PBT yields a 0.00 breath alcohol content – then the officer should only

ask the motorist to take an alcohol test if the officer’s agency has a DRE available to request

a drug test following the alcohol test.

       1. An Officer May Ask a Motorist to Take an Alcohol Test Even if the Officer
          Only Suspects Impairment by Drugs.

       As the Majority explains, subject to exceptions that do not apply here, a police

officer who stops a motorist must ask the motorist to take a “test” if the officer has

reasonable grounds to believe that the motorist has been driving or attempting to drive

while under the influence of or impaired by alcohol, or while impaired by a drug or some

combination of drugs and alcohol such that the motorist could not drive safely.

TR § 16-205.1(b)(2). A “test” includes a breath or blood test to determine alcohol content,

       2
        The attorneys who represented Mr. Usan in the administrative hearing and in the
Circuit Court moved to strike their appearances on behalf of Mr. Usan in this Court. The
Court granted counsel’s motion before it ruled on MVA’s petition for certiorari. After the
Court granted review in this case, Mr. Usan’s current attorneys agreed to represent him pro
bono before this Court. They have represented Mr. Usan well, and they are to be
commended for doing so free of charge.

                                             -2-
a blood test to determine drug content, or both. See id. § 16-205.1(a)(1)(iii). I agree with

the Majority that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s conclusion that there were

reasonable grounds here to suspect impairment.

       As I understand how these investigations proceed, an officer who suspects any kind

of impairment will always request an alcohol test initially, either: (1) because the officer

suspects the motorist’s impairment is due, at least in part, to consumption of alcohol; or

(2) because the officer suspects the impairment is due to drug use as opposed to alcohol,

and the officer needs to test for alcohol to provide a data point for the DRE to consider as

part of the DRE’s determination whether to request a drug test. Nothing in the implied

consent statute prohibits the second basis for requesting an alcohol test. The record reflects

that TFC Greathouse only suspected Mr. Usan of being impaired by drugs. Nevertheless,

TFC Greathouse was permitted to request that Mr. Usan take an alcohol test as a prelude

to a drug test.

       2. The Caveat: a DRE Must Be Available

       But there needs to be a caveat. In my view, officers who only suspect impairment

due to drugs should request an initial alcohol test only if their agencies have a DRE

available to request a drug test following an alcohol test. If no drug test can be requested

because no DRE is available, there is no need for the data point that an alcohol test would

provide. In other words, an alcohol test serves no legitimate purpose where there is no

reasonable suspicion that alcohol has contributed to impairment and there is no ability to

test for drugs due to the unavailability of a DRE. In such a circumstance, an officer who

suspects impairment by drugs but knows that cannot be proven might request an alcohol

                                            -3-
test in the hope that the motorist for some reason will refuse the test and have their license

suspended. An officer should not ask a motorist to take an alcohol test for this reason. Even

more troubling, an officer might be tempted to request an alcohol test and – believing that

the test will not return a positive result – try to induce the motorist to refuse the test. An

officer must resist that temptation. Taking such an approach would convert the alcohol test

from a tool to inform a future drug test into a tool for triggering automatic administrative

consequences for the motorist.

       The issues properly before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) in a test refusal case

include “[w]hether the police officer requested a test after the person was fully advised ...

of the administrative sanctions that shall be imposed[.]” TR § 16-205.1(f)(7)(i)(3). This

Court has held that an officer who “in any way” induces a motorist into refusing a test has

not “fully advised” the motorist. Forman v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 332 Md. 201, 217-18,

223-24 (1993). In my view, a motorist who refuses an alcohol test may, in an appropriate

case, raise the lack of capacity to conduct a drug test as part of a broader inducement

argument. For this reason, it behooves law enforcement agencies, in the first instance, to

document the availability of a DRE at the time an officer, who only suspects impairment

based on drugs, requests an alcohol test. And MVA would be well advised to present such

documentation at an administrative hearing in an alcohol test refusal case where a motorist

raises the lack of capacity to conduct a drug test as part of an inducement argument.

       Before this Court, Mr. Usan contends that TFC Greathouse induced his refusal to

take the alcohol test. First, Mr. Usan asserts that the record reflects there was no DRE

available at the State Police barracks to request that he take a drug test. He bases this

                                            -4-
contention on an exchange that occurred between TFC Greathouse and officers from the

local Sheriff’s Department who had arrived on the scene after TFC Greathouse made the

traffic stop:

                TFC Greathouse: Yeah. By any chance, would you guys – do
                you think you guys will have a DRE available or no?

                Sheriff’s Deputy: Do we have any DREs on the squad?[3]

                TFC Greathouse: I’m just curious.

After an aside with Mr. Usan, there was an inaudible response from the Sheriff’s Deputy

or Deputies to TFC Greathouse’s question concerning the DRE. TFC Greathouse then

replied, “Okay. I was just checking. Okay. All right. Thank you.”4

       Mr. Usan then argues that, because TFC Greathouse knew there was no DRE

available at the State Police barracks, TFC Greathouse made several statements to Mr.

Usan designed to lead Mr. Usan to refuse an alcohol test. In particular, Mr. Usan points to

       3
        It appears from the dashcam video footage that the Sheriff’s Deputy at this point
was asking other deputies present from his squad whether they had any DREs on the squad,
as opposed to the Deputy repeating TFC Greathouse’s question back to TFC Greathouse.
       4
         Mr. Usan characterizes the above exchange as establishing that the State Police
did not legally have capacity to conduct a drug test because a DRE was not available.
MVA, however, states that TFC Greathouse was never actually “put to the task of locating
a ... [DRE] from his, or any other law enforcement agency, because Mr. Usan refused the
alcohol test.” As discussed above, because TFC Greathouse only suspected impairment
due to drugs, he should not have asked Mr. Usan to take an alcohol test if no DRE was
available. I do not read the above-quoted exchange as establishing that a DRE was
unavailable to respond to the State Police barracks if requested, and the record contains no
other information on this point one way or another. Therefore, I cannot conclude that TFC
Greathouse should not have asked Mr. Usan to take the alcohol test.

                                           -5-
TFC Greathouse’s explanation that taking a test would mean it would take longer for Mr.

Usan to get home:

              TFC Greathouse: So I have to have your advice of rights read
              to you. You either have to say, yes, I’d like to take the test, or
              you don’t want to take the test. Remember ... whatever you do,
              we’ll still try to call you a ride afterwards.... [I]f you decide to
              take a test, it does take a little bit longer, okay? But that is
              something you have to make a decision for you alone, okay? I
              cannot tell you what you should or should not do. All I’m
              trying to tell you is that it just sometimes takes a little more
              extra time.

              ***

              TFC Greathouse: You don’t have to take any tests at all.

              Mr. Usan: Right.

              TFC Greathouse: You can say, heck, I ain’t taking anything.
              Or you [can] say, sure, I would like to take a test, but no matter
              what, I still have to read your [advice of5] rights. Okay?

              Mr. Usan: I understand.

After the recorded advice of rights was played for Mr. Usan, TFC Greathouse again stated

that taking a test would require more time and asked if Mr. Usan wanted to take a test:

              TFC Greathouse: [W]hether you decide you’d like to take the
              test at the barrack or whether you decide not to, no matter what,
              you can call a ride and you go home tonight. Okay? As long as
              you’re being cooperative .... The only thing is if you decide to
              take a test, of course it’s going to take a little longer. Okay. So
              I do have to ask you, would you like to consent to take the test
              or would you like not to?

              Mr. Usan: Not at this time.

       5
        The transcript of the dashcam video footage refers to “advisory” rights at this spot.
This appears to be a transcription error. TFC Greathouse clearly referred to giving Mr.
Usan his “advice of” rights.

                                             -6-
       At the administrative hearing, Mr. Usan did not argue that TFC Greathouse induced

his refusal to take the test. To the contrary, he volunteered in his testimony that he refused

the alcohol test for other reasons: he believed (correctly) that his PBT had returned a result

of 0.00, he did not understand why any further tests were necessary, and he was also

uncomfortable during his interaction with the officers:

              I remember [TFC Greathouse] said we’re doing more tests and
              I said I’m not doing more tests. Why – because I didn’t
              understand how we were there. I blew zeros [on the PBT]. I
              passed the sobriety. What are we doing? And I was just
              uncomfortable with the whole – the whole interaction.

As a result, an inducement issue was not generated, and “a reviewing court ordinarily may

not pass upon issues presented to it for the first time on judicial review and that are not

encompassed in the final decision of the administrative agency.” Schwartz v. Md. Dept. of

Nat. Res., 385 Md. 534, 555 (2005) (cleaned up).6 For this reason, I concur in the Majority’s

disposition of this case. However, if Mr. Usan had testified that TFC Greathouse’s

comments concerning a test taking longer to complete caused him to refuse the alcohol

       6
        Although Mr. Usan’s counsel at the administrative hearing brought up the
exchange between TFC Greathouse and the Sheriff’s Deputies in which TFC Greathouse
asked whether they had a DRE available, counsel did so to argue that “there couldn’t have
even been a blood test [for drugs] in this case because the observing officers were not
DREs.” Prior counsel’s argument was incorrect. The observing officers did not have to be
DREs themselves for a drug test to be requested. Rather, a DRE needed to be available to
respond to the State Police barrack that night to request that Mr. Usan take a drug test.

                                            -7-
test, the result might have been different, especially in light of the fact that MVA did not

establish a DRE was available to request a drug test.7

       7
          MVA asserts that “[w]hether law enforcement ‘had the capacity’ to conduct a test
is not an issue to be considered in an implied consent hearing” under
TR § 16-205.1(f)(7)(i). When a motorist raises the lack of an available DRE in the context
of a refusal to take an alcohol test, the motorist should not be understood to be arguing that
the agency did not have the “capacity” to conduct an alcohol test. Rather, the issue is
whether DRE unavailability supports an inference that the request for an alcohol test was
not made in a good faith effort to gather evidence, but rather was part of an effort to induce
a test refusal, given the lack of suspicion of alcohol consumption.

        However, to the extent MVA contends that a motorist who refuses a drug test cannot
raise an issue at an administrative hearing concerning an agency’s lack of capacity to
request a drug test, I disagree. An ALJ must consider whether the agency had the capacity
to conduct a drug test when the issue is generated in that context. See Motor Vehicle Admin.
v. Krafft, 452 Md. 589, 603-04 (2017) (“In a test refusal case, .... [u]sually, there is no
dispute that the individual refused to take the test. Instead, the validity of the suspension
often turns on whether the officer was authorized to ask the individual to take the test in
the first place.”). Of course, in Krafft, this Court was referring to reasonable grounds when
it stated that an officer must be “authorized” to request a test, but the capacity to conduct a
drug test is also a predicate for requesting one. See TR § 16-205.1(j)(1). So, if a motorist
raises the issue of capacity to request a drug test – for example, if the motorist contends
that the requesting officer was not a qualified DRE or DRE trainee, see id. § 16-205.1(j)(2)
– my view is that the ALJ must consider it as part of determining “[w]hether the police
officer requested a test[.]” Id. § 16-205.1(f)(7)(i)(3).

       MVA is correct that many potential issues concerning law enforcement’s handling
of a traffic stop and/or the testing process are excluded from consideration at an
administrative hearing in a test refusal case. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Aiken, 418
Md. 11, 31-33 (2011) (whether a qualified person administered a test using approved
equipment under Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. (“CJP”) § 10-304); Motor Vehicle
Admin. v. Jones, 380 Md. 164, 228 (2004) (whether a chemical breath test for alcohol was
taken within two hours of a motorist’s apprehension under CJP § 10-303). However, I view
law enforcement’s capacity to conduct a drug test like the issue of inducement – it must be
considered when properly generated. This is because, unlike the requirements at issue in
the cases cited above, which are set forth in the Courts Article, § 16-205.1 itself makes the
capacity to conduct a drug test an express predicate to requesting one, and
§§ 16-205.1(f)(7)(i)(3) and (f)(8)(i)(3) include whether an officer requested a test as one of

                                             -8-
the issues at a suspension hearing and one of the necessary findings to mandate suspension
of a driver’s license. For this reason, it is important that MVA make a record at an
administrative hearing in a drug test refusal case regarding the law enforcement agency’s
capacity to conduct a drug test if the issue of such capacity is generated.