Court Opinion

ID: 9363547
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-16 00:13:29.631628+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:32.452084
License: Public Domain

2023 WI 1

                  SUPREME COURT              OF    WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:                2020AP226-CR

COMPLETE TITLE:          State of Wisconsin,
                                   Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,
                              v.
                         Jeffrey L. Hineman,
                                   Defendant-Appellant.

                            REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
                            Reported at 400 Wis. 2d 274,968 N.W.2d 867
                                       (2021 – unpublished)

OPINION FILED:           January 10, 2023
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:           November 8, 2022

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
   COURT:                Circuit
   COUNTY:               Racine
   JUDGE:                Mark F. Nielsen

JUSTICES:
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous
Court. KAROFSKY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined.
NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:

       For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs
filed by Sarah L. Burgundy, assistant attorney general, with
whom on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There
was an oral argument by Sarah L. Burgundy, assistant attorney
general.

       For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by
Frances Reynolds Colbert, assistant state public defender. There
was   an     oral      argument   by   Frances   Reynolds   Colbert,   assistant
state public defender.
    An amicus curiae brief was filed by Robert R. Henak, Ellen
Henak, and Henak Law Office, S.C., for the Wisconsin Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
                                                                               2023 WI 1
                                                                      NOTICE
                                                      This opinion is subject to further
                                                      editing and modification.   The final
                                                      version will appear in the bound
                                                      volume of the official reports.
No.        2020AP226-CR
(L.C. No.     2015CF1159)

STATE OF WISCONSIN                                :             IN SUPREME COURT

State of Wisconsin,

              Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,
                                                                           FILED
       v.                                                             JAN 10, 2023

Jeffrey L. Hineman,                                                      Sheila T. Reiff
                                                                      Clerk of Supreme Court

              Defendant-Appellant.

ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous
Court.    KAROFSKY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined.

       REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.                     Reversed.

       ¶1     ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.                  This is a review of
an    unpublished     decision       of   the   court     of    appeals,       State      v.

Hineman, No. 2020AP226-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App.

Nov. 24, 2021) (per curiam), reversing the Racine County circuit

court's1      judgment      of   conviction     against     Jeffrey        Hineman      for

first-degree       child    sexual    assault,    S.J.S.,       and     order     denying

Hineman's motion for postconviction relief.                    We reverse.

       ¶2     Hineman argues that he is entitled to a new trial
because the State suppressed evidence favorable to his defense

       1   The Honorable Mark F. Nielsen presided.
                                                                        No.   2020AP226-CR

in violation of his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland,

373 U.S. 83 (1963).              According to Hineman, the State failed to

disclose a report from Child Protective Services ("CPS") which

contained "material exculpatory impeachment evidence that went

to an issue at the heart of the case."                         He argues the circuit

court erred in denying his motion for postconviction relief and

that the court of appeals was correct to reverse that decision.

Hineman also argues two alternative grounds for affirming the

court       of    appeals:      "he    was   denied      effective       assistance    of

counsel," and he "is entitled to a new trial[] and an in camera

review of [S.J.S.'s] treatment records[] in the interests of

justice."

       ¶3        We    conclude       that    Hineman      is     not     entitled     to

postconviction relief.                The State did not violate Hineman's due

process rights by failing to disclose the CPS report because the

report was not material.                There is no reasonable probability of

a different result if the State had disclosed the CPS report

because Hineman had access to a police report containing the
same    information.            Hineman's     four      ineffective      assistance    of

counsel      claims      also    fail.       He   was    not    prejudiced     by   trial

counsel's failure to request the subject report, and the other

claims      fail      because   counsel's     performance        was    not   deficient.

Finally, we decline to exercise our discretion to grant Hineman

a new trial in the interest of justice because there were no

errors at trial that prevented the real controversy from being

tried.       The circuit court was correct to deny Hineman's motion

                                              4
                                                                             No.        2020AP226-CR

for postconviction relief.                    We therefore reverse the court of

appeals.

                 I.    FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE
       ¶4        Hineman was in a romantic relationship with S.J.S.'s

mother, S.S., since shortly before S.J.S. was born in 2008 and

until June 2009.                   Though Hineman is not S.J.S.'s biological

father, he continued to remain in contact with S.J.S. until S.S.

and S.J.S. moved away in September 2009.                            S.S. eventually lost

custody         of    S.J.S.,      and    S.J.S.      moved    in   with     his        biological

father,         F.S.          In     2013,    Hineman      contacted        M.S.,         S.J.S.'s

grandmother and F.S.'s mother, requesting to reestablish contact

with S.J.S. because Hineman "cared for [S.J.S.] and wanted to be

a part of [his] life and family."                         M.S. and F.S. both agreed,

after which Hineman had regular contact with S.J.S.                                        Hineman

would       spend      time    with      S.J.S.     at   F.S.'s     home,    buy        gifts    for

S.J.S, and take him out for activities such as shopping or going

to the park.

       ¶5        On March 12, 2015, CPS received a mandatory report
from a therapist S.J.S. was seeing at the time.2                                   According to

the report, S.J.S.                 had been       seeing the therapist to address

behavioral issues such as "pulling his pants down in class and

also       at   home    in     his    room    and     acting   as    if     he     is    going   to

defecate on the floor."                      The therapist reported that "during

school . . . [S.J.S.] was observed sucking on his pen cap" and

       See Wis. Stat. § 48.981 (2019-20). All references to the
       2

Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise
indicated.

                                                  5
                                                             No.   2020AP226-CR

that S.J.S. "told a classmate [it] 'feels good when someone

sucks on your privates.'"         S.J.S. initially told the therapist

that he learned this from a Garfield book or movie but later

"indicated that [Hineman] had told him."            The CPS report also

states, "Reporter indicated that no information was given by

[S.J.S.] that [Hineman] had touched him or forced [S.J.S.] to

touch [Hineman]."      The therapist reported that she told F.S. and

M.S. about her concerns, and that they were no longer permitting

Hineman to have contact with S.J.S.

       ¶6   CPS received a second report on April 20, 2015, from a

nurse at Aurora Healthcare.         The nurse reported that S.J.S.'s

behavioral issues persisted.        She spoke with F.S. and M.S. and

reported they "feel that someone must be abusing [S.J.S.] since

his behavior is getting worse."          The nurse also reported that

F.S. and M.S. believed either Hineman or "an autistic son, whose

name is not known," abused S.J.S.

       ¶7   CPS received a third report on May 29, 2015, from both

a teacher and a counselor at S.J.S.'s school.                The CPS report
states, "Both reporters feel the concerns today for [S.J.S.] are

his continuation of defiant behaviors at school resulting from

what   is   believed   to   be   sexual[]   abuse   by   a    former   family

friend."    The teacher and counselor reported their concerns are

based on observations of S.J.S.'s behavior at school as well as

conversations with S.J.S.'s family.

       ¶8   On June 5, 2015, the Racine County Sheriff's Office

received a copy of the March 12 CPS report.              It is undisputed

                                     6
                                                                 No.    2020AP226-CR

that the sheriff's office never received either the April 20 or

May 29 CPS reports.

     ¶9     Investigator Tracy Hintz was assigned to the case and

began her investigation by reviewing the March 12 CPS report.

She summarized the CPS report's contents in a police report:

     The report indicates that [S.J.S.] was sucking on a
     pen at school and told a classmate that it feels good
     to have your privates sucked on.    He said he learned
     it in a Garfield book but then stated it was from the
     Garfield 2 movie. The reporter spoke to [F.S.] about
     it and [S.J.S.] indicated that [Hineman] had told him.
     No specific information was given on if [Hineman]
     touched   [S.J.S.]  or   forced   [S.J.S.]  to   touch
     [Hineman].
Investigator    Hintz     interviewed        F.S.     and     M.S.       She    also

coordinated a forensic interview of S.J.S., which took place at

the Child Advocacy Center ("CAC") on August 4, 2015.                   During the

forensic interview, S.J.S. disclosed that Hineman had touched

him inappropriately.         Investigator Hintz interviewed Hineman the

next day.

     ¶10    On August 6, 2015, based on this investigation, the

State filed a criminal complaint charging Hineman with first-
degree child sexual assault, sexual contact with a person under

the age 13, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(e).

     ¶11    Hineman    filed    a    pretrial     discovery     demand    for   the

State to disclose "[a]ll evidence and/or other information which

would   tend   to   negate     the   guilt   of     the   defendant,     including

laboratory reports, hospital records or reports, police reports,

or   any    other     information      within       the     state's    possession,
knowledge, or control."         The State did not provide the March 12

                                        7
                                                               No.    2020AP226-CR

CPS    report,   but    it    did   provide    Investigator    Hintz's    police

report summarizing the CPS report.

       ¶12   At trial,       defense counsel waived opening statement.

The State called four witnesses:              the forensic interviewer from

the CAC, S.J.S., M.S., and Investigator Hintz.                      The forensic

interviewer,     Heather      Jensen,    testified   that     she    interviewed

S.J.S. and described how a forensic interview is conducted.                   She

also    described      the    concepts   of    "piecemeal     disclosure"     and

"delayed disclosure":

       Piecemeal disclosure is where kids tell bits and
       pieces of their disclosure at a time. So it's typical
       for kids to tell a little bit over extended periods of
       time so they might tell the initial reporter just one
       detail.    Then they might tell more later on to
       different people.   So some time kids will disclose a
       little bit to just gauge you as an adult, the reaction
       to see how the adult will react. . . .

       [D]elayed disclosure is when a victim reports abuse
       after it[']s happened.   Research shows that typically
       about a third of kids delay disclosing what happened.
       About a third of kids will tell what happened right
       after it happened.     About a third of kids do not
       disclose at all.    So it's common that kids delay in
       their reporting.   There is different reasons for it.
       Some is that kids are fearful.    Some kids have been
       told that they could be hurt if they disclose so they
       don't disclose initially. Some kids have been hurt by
       the maltreater.   They are afraid of the maltreater.
       They don't disclose immediately or if they don't have
       trusted adults to disclose to.

            There is lots of different reasons that kids
       don't talk right away. A difficult thing for kids to
       talk about something that's shameful or embarrassing.
       Or even young kids some times don't know at the time
       that it's happening; that it's wrong.   So they some
       times don't disclose until they realize that that's
       what happened to them is not right.

                                         8
                                                         No.   2020AP226-CR

The State did not notice Jensen as an expert witness.             Defense

counsel did not object to this testimony, but she did challenge

its relevance on cross-examination:         "Ms. Jensen, this is not a

case of delayed disclosure, correct?"

    ¶13   After Jensen's testimony, the State next played the

video recording of S.J.S.'s forensic interview.         It included the

following exchanges:

         [Interviewer]: Did [Hineman] ever do anything
    else that you didn’t like? Tell me about that.

          [S.J.S.]:    He touched my private parts.

         [Interviewer]: Okay.       Tell   me          all     about
    [Hineman] touching your private parts.

         [S.J.S.]: Ugh, my mom and dad were sleeping, and
    me and him were on the couch and he just touched my
    private parts.

          [Interviewer]:    Uh-hmm.      And then what happened?

          [S.J.S.]:    He laughed at me.

         [Interviewer]:     He laughed at you? Okay.            Then
    what happened?

         [S.J.S]:      I woke my mom and dad up and I told
    them.

          [Interviewer]:    Okay.       And then what happened?

         [S.J.S.]: Um, he kicked [Hineman] out again, and
    he told him that -- to never come back.

          . . . .

         [Interviewer]: Okay.           And did [Hineman] touch on
    your clothes or your skin?

          [S.J.S.]:    My clothes.

          . . . .

                                    9
                                                                         No.    2020AP226-CR

            [Interviewer]: . . . Did [Hineman] ever want you
       to do something to his privates?

              [S.J.S.]:       Yeah, but I didn't do it.

              [Interviewer]:          What    did    [Hineman]      want       you   to
       do?

              [S.J.S.]:       Touch his privates, but I didn't do
       it.
S.J.S. said in the interview that this incident occurred during

the "wintertime."             He first told the interviewer that Hineman

touched him four times but later said it was six.

       ¶14    After the State played the video, S.J.S. testified.

S.J.S. initially responded "No" or "I can't remember" to most of

the State's questions regarding whether Hineman had touched him,

but S.J.S. became more responsive after saying that he felt

nervous.      S.J.S. testified, "I think [Hineman] touched me on my

private      part."      He    said    this    happened      "the    day       right   after

trick-or-treating," nobody else was in the house at the time,

and he told M.S. and F.S. about it the same day.                                 On cross-

examination, S.J.S. said he told M.S. and F.S. "[a] few weeks

after it happened" and at different times.                        M.S. later testified

that no such disclosure took place:                       "[S.J.S.] claims that he

told   his    daddy     but    he     didn't       come   right    out    and    say      what

anything was.          He just didn't want to be around [Hineman] any

more. . . . I knew something was wrong.                     I kept saying [S.J.S.]

what's wrong.         Tell grandma.      He kept saying nothing."

       ¶15    The State's final witness was Investigator Hintz.                            She

testified that Hineman's behavior toward S.J.S. "in the totality
of everything that he was doing is often described as what we

                                              10
                                                       No.     2020AP226-CR

would refer to as grooming."      Defense counsel objected to this

statement as unnoticed expert testimony, and the court sustained

that objection.

    ¶16   On   cross-examination,       defense   counsel      questioned

Investigator Hintz regarding when S.J.S. first disclosed that

Hineman had touched him:

         [Defense Counsel:]      You first met with [F.S.] and
    [M.S.] in July of 2015?

          [Hintz:]   Correct.

          . . . .

         [Defense Counsel:] . . . There was no mention
    that [Hineman] had inappropriately touched [S.J.S.]?

          [Hintz:]   From [F.S.] no.     There was not.

         [Defense Counsel:] And there is no mention from
    [M.S.] that there was a[n] allegation that [Hineman]
    had touched [S.J.S.]?

          [Hintz:]   No.

         [Defense Counsel:] So the forensic interview of
    [S.J.S.] in August of 2015?

          [Hintz:]   In the beginning, correct.

         [Defense    Counsel:]    And   you   were   present     for
    that?

          [Hintz:]   I was.

         [Defense Counsel:] And is that the first               time
    that   [S.J.S.]  says  that [Hineman]  touched               his
    privates?

         [Hintz:] I don't know if that's the first time
    [S.J.S.] had said that.   I know that was the first
    time that I had seen that. But I believe in the CPS
    report, that there was a statement in there that he

                                  11
                                                           No.     2020AP226-CR

    said [Hineman] had done that.     But I would have to
    look at the original report that came from CPS.

         [Defense Counsel:] Would that have been anywhere
    in your report if you -- if there was a mention that
    [Hineman] had inappropriately touched [S.J.S.]?

         [Hintz:] I don't know if I documented that.
    Whether or not I would have to look at my report
    again, in my original narrative to see if I did indeed
    write that in there.

         [Defense Counsel:] But if you were told that,
    you would have then put it in your report?

         [Hintz:] I would think I would have but it's
    not -- I might have not put it in there but that's why
    I would have to look at the report and look at the
    original CPS.   I believe it does state that he later
    says that.
    ¶17   The defense called no witnesses except for Hineman.

Hineman described his relationship with S.J.S. and his family,

how his communication with them changed after March 2015, and he

denied sexually assaulting S.J.S.

    ¶18   The jury found Hineman guilty of first-degree child

sexual assault, sexual contact with a person under the age 13.

The court sentenced Hineman to 17 years of initial confinement
and 8 years of extended supervision.

    ¶19   On March 1, 2019, Hineman filed a motion requesting

postconviction   relief    and   an   order   compelling    postconviction

discovery of the March 12 CPS report.              He claimed the State

suppressed   material     evidence     favorable   to   his      defense    in

violation of his due process rights under Brady.                 Hineman also

claimed he received ineffective assistance of counsel because of
his attorney's "failing to obtain the CPS report before trial,"

                                      12
                                                                     No.    2020AP226-CR

"failing to make an opening statement," "failing to object to

improper expert testimony," and "conceding Mr. Hineman's guilt

at closing."3           Hineman further requested a new trial in the

interest of justice and in camera review of S.J.S.'s treatment

records.

      ¶20       The    circuit      court     granted      Hineman's       motion   for

postconviction          discovery    and     recommended       the   release   of   all

three CPS reports.4           After briefing and oral argument, the court

issued      a    decision        denying    each     of    Hineman's       claims   for

postconviction relief.              The court first held that the March 12

CPS   report          was   not    material        under   Brady     because    "[t]he

information in Investigator Hintz's report corresponded to the

information in the March [12] report."

      ¶21       The    circuit    court     also    rejected    each   of    Hineman's

ineffective assistance claims.                The court did not address trial

counsel's failure to obtain the CPS reports because the March 12

report was "the only report of consequence."                     It held that trial

counsel's decision to waive opening statement was not deficient

      3Hineman also claimed he received ineffective assistance of
counsel because of his attorney's "failing to obtain a defense
expert," "failing to file a Shiffra/Green motion," and "failing
to move for a mistrial." See State v. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d 600,
499 N.W.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Green, 2002 WI 68, 253
Wis. 2d 356, 646 N.W.2d 298. The circuit court rejected each of
these claims, and Hineman did not raise them either before the
court of appeals or this court.
      4The circuit court recommended to the juvenile court that
it release the CPS reports.    The Honorable David W. Paulson of
the juvenile court ordered the release.

                                            13
                                                                    No.     2020AP226-CR

performance       based      on    counsel's       explanation    at   the    Machner5

hearing:       "I had some concerns about what [Hineman] would say

when he took the stand.                 I didn't want to make an opening

statement and commit him to something that he wouldn't then say

in his direct."         The circuit court also credited trial counsel's

explanation       for    not      objecting       to   Jensen's   unnoticed     expert

testimony.       Counsel explained, "I just thought that I would on

my   cross     cover    [the      delayed    disclosure     testimony]      because   I

didn't think that this was a case of delayed disclosure, if I

remember correctly."              The circuit court rejected Hineman's last

claim     of   ineffective        assistance——that        trial   counsel     conceded

guilt in closing argument by stating, "but I believe the sexual

assault happened."             The court found the statement was not a

concession       of    guilt      because     "[c]learly     defense      counsel   was

speaking ironically. . . . Counsel's point was to criticize the

version of events that had been testified to."

      ¶22      Finally, the circuit court denied Hineman's request

for an in camera review of S.J.S.'s treatment records.                              The
court concluded Hineman did not satisfy the standard under State

v. Green, 2002 WI 68, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 646 N.W.2d 298, because

"no one has shown in this record a 'fact specific evidentiary

showing'       that    the   records    of    [S.J.S.'s]     therapy      support   any

defense to this charge."

      5   State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App.
1979).

                                             14
                                                                       No.     2020AP226-CR

       ¶23   Hineman appealed the circuit court's order, and the

court of appeals reversed.              The court of appeals concluded that

suppression of the March 12 CPS report violated Hineman's due

process rights under Brady.              The court reasoned that the report

was material under Brady because Investigator Hintz "could not

be   impeached . . . without            the       report   itself,     and     thus,      the

undermining of the investigator's recall of events related to

the investigation and her credibility more generally could not

occur without the report itself."                     Hineman, No. 2020AP226-CR,

¶47.    The court of appeals also concluded Hineman was entitled

to an in camera review of S.J.S.'s therapy records based on the

information the therapist reported to CPS.                     Id., ¶52.

       ¶24   The State petitioned this court for review, which we

granted.

                            II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW

       ¶25   When assessing a Brady claim, "we independently review

whether a due process violation has occurred, but we accept the

trial     court's      findings    of        historical        fact    unless       clearly
erroneous."         State     v.    Wayerski,           2019      WI   11,     ¶35,       385

Wis. 2d 344, 922 N.W.2d 468.                  We apply this same standard of

review to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the

Sixth   Amendment.        State     v.       Dillard,      2014   WI   123,        ¶86,   358

Wis. 2d 543,     859    N.W.2d     44    ("An       appellate     court      upholds      the

circuit      court's    findings        of    fact     unless      they      are    clearly

erroneous . . . [and]         independently           determines          whether     those

historical facts demonstrate that defense counsel's performance

                                             15
                                                                                No.        2020AP226-CR

met the constitutional standard for ineffective assistance of

counsel . . . .").

       ¶26    Regarding Hineman's request for an in camera review of

therapy records, we review such claims de novo.                                         Green, 253

Wis. 2d 356, ¶20.            Finally, because neither the circuit court

nor the court of appeals addressed whether to grant a new trial

in the interest of justice, we consider this issue de novo.                                         See

Bosco v. LIRC, 2004 WI 77, ¶22, 272 Wis. 2d 586, 681 N.W.2d 157

(analyzing de novo an issue raised below but not addressed).

                                        III.        ANALYSIS

       ¶27    We    begin       our     review       by       addressing        Hineman's          Brady

claim   and       concluding       that       the    State       did    not     commit       a     Brady

violation because the subject evidence was not material.                                             We

then    turn       to    each     of         Hineman's         claims     that        he     received

ineffective assistance of counsel.                             In analyzing those claims,

we   determine          Hineman    was        not    prejudiced          by     trial       counsel's

failure      to    request        the    March           12    CPS     report    and        that    the

remaining         ineffective         assistance              claims     fail     for        lack    of
deficient performance.                  Finally, we deny Hineman's request to

order a new trial in the interest of justice.

                                        A.    Brady Claim

       ¶28    The United States Supreme Court in Brady, 373 U.S. 83,

imposed on prosecutors a duty under the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment to disclose evidence favorable to the

defense.          Brady involved a defendant on trial for murder who

testified he was involved in the murder but that his co-actor
directly committed it.                Id. at 84.              The jury found the defendant
                                                    16
                                                                   No.     2020AP226-CR

guilty and sentenced him to death.                Id.    After the defendant was

convicted and sentenced, he learned the prosecution failed to

comply    with    a    pretrial      discovery     request    by    withholding      a

statement by the defendant's co-actor admitting to the murder.

Id.    The Court held that such "suppression by the prosecution of

evidence     favorable     to   an      accused   upon    request    violates      due

process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to

punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the

prosecution."         Id. at 87.

       ¶29   The Supreme Court has since explained, "[t]here are

three components of a true Brady violation:                     The evidence at

issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is

exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must

have     been    suppressed        by   the     State,    either    willfully       or

inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued."                          Strickler v.

Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999).                The parties do not dispute

that the March 12 CPS report is favorable to Hineman's defense

and that the State suppressed the report.                    We therefore assume
without deciding that the first two requirements of Hineman's

Brady claim are satisfied.               The parties do however disagree as

to whether Hineman was prejudiced by the State's suppressing the

report——that is, whether the report is "'material' either to

guilt or to punishment."           Wayerski, 385 Wis. 2d 344, ¶35.

       ¶30   "While previously the standard for materiality varied

depending upon the type of Brady violation, the Supreme Court

has since adopted a uniform standard for materiality . . . ."
State v. Harris, 2004 WI 64, ¶14, 272 Wis. 2d 80, 680 N.W.2d 737
                                           17
                                                                     No.     2020AP226-CR

(citation omitted).             The Court explained that standard in United

States v. Bagley:              "The evidence is material only if there is a

reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to

the   defense,        the      result   of    the     proceeding    would    have   been

different.            A     'reasonable        probability'    is      a    probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."                           473 U.S.

667, 682 (1985).            In conducting this analysis,6

      [t]he reviewing court should assess the possibility
      that such effect might have occurred in light of the
      totality of the circumstances and with an awareness of
      the difficulty of reconstructing in a post-trial
      proceeding the course that the defense and the trial
      would have taken had the defense not been misled by
      the prosecutor's incomplete [discovery] response.
Id. at 683.

      ¶31      Hineman argues the March 12 CPS report "was material

exculpatory impeachment evidence that went to an issue at the

heart     of    the       case——when       and     how   [S.J.S.]    disclosed      that

Mr. Hineman       had          sexually       assaulted     him,     and     what    the

circumstances             of     the      disclosure       indicated        about    its

reliability."          "Generally, where impeachment evidence is merely

cumulative       and        thereby     has      no   reasonable     probability      of

affecting the result of trial, it does not violate the Brady

      6The State criticizes the court of appeals' analysis for
"reweighing the witnesses' credibility based on a paper record,
displacing the role of the factfinder."    The State asks us to
clarify that, "on review, deference to the factfinder's unique
function is warranted in determining whether but for the
complained-of errors, there is a substantial likelihood of a
different result." We see no need to rework the formulation for
assessing Brady materiality that the Supreme Court announced in
Bagley.

                                              18
                                                                      No.     2020AP226-CR

requirement."          United States v. Dweck, 913 F.2d 365, 371 (7th

Cir. 1990).        Impeachment evidence is cumulative and therefore

not material when "the witness was already [or could have been]

impeached at trial by the same kind of evidence."7                            Conley v.

United States, 415 F.3d 183, 192 (1st Cir. 2005) (alteration in

original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Cuffie,

80 F.3d 514, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1996)); see also Ferrara v. United

States, 456 F.3d 278, 294 (1st Cir. 2006) (considering "whether

the   sequestered        evidence      was        cumulative    of    other       evidence

already     in    the    defendant's         possession");       United       States   v.

Marashi, 913 F.2d 724, 733 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding officer's

police report contradicting officer's testimony was cumulative

where officer also made a similar inconsistent statement in a

deposition).

      ¶32     According to Hineman, the March 12 CPS report was not

merely cumulative in two respects:                   "the CPS report is the only

document that contains the clear exculpatory statement that as

of    March      12,    [S.J.S.]      had     not     made     any    disclosures       of
maltreatment,"          and   "even    more         important,       the    CPS     report

      7Impeachment evidence may also be cumulative, and therefore
not   material,   "when   the  testimony   of   the  witness   is
'corroborated by other testimony,' or when the suppressed
impeachment evidence merely furnishes an additional basis on
which to impeach a witness whose credibility has already been
shown to be questionable."        United States v. Payne, 63
F.3d 1200, 1210 (2d Cir. 1995)(citation omitted) (quoting United
States v. Petrillo, 821 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1987)); see also
State v. Rockette, 2006 WI App 103, ¶41, 294 Wis. 2d 611, 718
N.W.2d 269.

                                             19
                                                                      No.     2020AP226-CR

clarifies           who    the     mandatory       reporter         was:      [S.J.S.'s]

therapist."         We disagree on both counts.

      ¶33     The March 12 CPS report's use as impeachment evidence

was   not     material      because   it    fails       to   create     a     reasonable

probability of a different result.                 The CPS report contains the

same information as Investigator Hintz's police report except

for the identity of the reporter, which is not material.                                 The

CPS report states, "Reporter indicated that no information was

given    by    [S.J.S.]     that   [Hineman]      had    touched      him     or    forced

[S.J.S.] to touch [Hineman]."                   The police report states, "No

specific information was given on if [Hineman] touched [S.J.S.]

or forced [S.J.S.] to touch [Hineman]."                      The only difference

between the two is that the CPS report includes, "by S.J.S."

Regardless of this difference, both statements make the same

point:        At the time Investigator Hintz completed her report,

she     had    no    knowledge     from    any    source     that     there        was   an

allegation of touching.            The CPS report provided defense counsel

everything she needed to impeach Investigator Hintz's testimony
that there was a prior allegation of touching.

      ¶34     The report also is not material as evidence that a

therapist was the mandatory reporter.                    Hineman argues S.J.S.'s

therapist      is     "a   material   fact       witness,"    that      the     patient-

provider privilege does not apply because there is no privilege

"when the therapist makes a mandatory report . . . under Wis.

Stat. § 48.981," and that "[l]ogically, any person trying to

ascertain Mr. Hineman's guilt or innocence would want to know

                                           20
                                                                           No.       2020AP226-CR

more about how, when, and why the reporter suspected Mr. Hineman

of this crime."          These arguments are unpersuasive.

    ¶35        First,    Hineman     is    mistaken       that      filing       a    mandatory

report waives any privilege from testifying.                               He cites Wis.

Stat. § 905.04 as support.                However, the only relevant exception

to the provider-patient privilege is far narrower than Hineman

claims:    "There is no privilege for information contained in a

report    of    child      abuse    or    neglect       that   is    provided         under   s.

48.981(3)."       § 905.04(4)(e)2m. (emphasis added).                        The only way

Hineman could have accessed information about S.J.S.'s treatment

beyond the CPS reports' contents was to file a Shiffra-Green

motion, which, as we discuss below, would fail.

    ¶36        Second,     and     more    importantly,         nowhere      in       Hineman's

argument       does   he    explain       how     the    fact       that    the       mandatory

reporter was a therapist creates a reasonable probability of a

different result.            He fails to identify any way the mandatory

reporter's identity is relevant to the determination of guilt or

innocence beyond the vague assertion that the jury might "want
to know more."           This does not undermine our confidence in the

outcome.       Accordingly, such evidence of the mandatory reporter's

identity is not material.

    ¶37        Because the March 12 CPS report contained no evidence

that creates a reasonable probability of a different result, it

is not material.             Its suppression therefore did not violate

Hineman's due process rights under Brady.

                                             21
                                                                             No.     2020AP226-CR

             B.    Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims

       ¶38   For a criminal defendant to succeed on an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim, "[f]irst, the defendant must show

that    counsel's       performance          was    deficient."               Strickland        v.

Washington,       466   U.S.     668,    687       (1984).            "To    establish        that

counsel's     performance        was    deficient,         the    defendant          must     show

that it fell below 'an objective standard of reasonableness.'"

State   v.   Breitzman,        2017     WI    100,       ¶38,    378        Wis. 2d 431,       904

N.W.2d 93     (quoting      State       v.    Thiel,       2003       WI     111,     ¶19,     264

Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305).                 "This court will not second-guess

a   reasonable      trial      strategy,          [unless]       it    was     based     on     an

irrational trial tactic or based upon caprice rather than upon

judgment."        Id., ¶65 (quoting State v. Domke, 2011 WI 95, ¶49,

337 Wis. 2d 268, 805 N.W.2d 364) (alteration in original).

       ¶39   "Second, the defendant must show that the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense.                      This requires showing that

counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of

a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable."                                    Strickland,
466 U.S. at 687.            This is the same test used to determine

materiality under Brady.               See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 ("We find

the    Strickland       formulation . . . for              materiality             sufficiently

flexible     to     cover . . . cases              of    prosecutorial              failure     to

disclose     evidence      favorable         to    the   accused[.]");              Harris,    272

Wis. 2d 80, ¶14 (stating that Brady materiality "is the same

test for ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland");

Wayerski, 385 Wis. 2d 344, ¶36 ("The materiality requirement of
Brady   is   the    same    as    the    prejudice         prong       of     the    Strickland
                                              22
                                                                       No.   2020AP226-CR

analysis.").        A criminal defendant "must prevail on both parts

of the test to be afforded relief."                       State v. Allen, 2004 WI

106, ¶26, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433.

      ¶40    Hineman argues he received ineffective assistance of

counsel in four ways:            trial counsel failed to request the March

12 CPS report, waived opening statement, failed to object to

improper expert testimony, and conceded Hineman's guilt during

closing argument.          We address each of these claims in turn.

                1.    Failure to request the CPS report.

      ¶41    Hineman's      first    claim     of     ineffective         assistance       is

based   on   trial    counsel's       failure       to    request      the   CPS    report

before trial.        This claim fails for lack of prejudice.                       Because

the test for prejudice under Strickland is here the same as the

test for materiality under Brady, trial counsel's failure to

request the March 12 CPS report was not prejudicial for the same

reasons that it was not material.

      ¶42    Hineman also asserts he was prejudiced because, "had

counsel filed motions pre-trial to obtain the CPS report, she
likely would have obtained the related April 20 and May 29 CPS

reports."      However,       neither    one     of      these     reports       creates    a

reasonable probability of a different result.

      ¶43    According      to    Hineman,     the       April    20   CPS   report    was

"exculpatory" because it "states that [M.S.] and [F.S.] took

[S.J.S.] to be examined by a physician for signs of sexual abuse

and   that   'there    [was]       nothing     from      his     doctor    who    examined

[S.J.S.]     that    any    type    of   sexual       abuse      has   taken      place.'"
However, the nature of the sexual contact the State alleged
                                          23
                                                                   No.     2020AP226-CR

likely would not produce the kind of evidence that would appear

in a physician's examination.                 Hineman also argues the April 20

CPS report "underscores that it was [S.J.S.'s] behaviors, not

Mr. Hineman's, that led to the concern that [S.J.S.] was being

abused."    Evidence of S.J.S.'s behavioral issues was presented

at trial.       Trial counsel did not need the April 20 CPS report to

support this line of argument.

      ¶44   The May 29 CPS report's absence also did not prejudice

Hineman.        He   argues       the     report    impeaches   S.J.S.    because   it

"suggest[s]       that         [S.J.S.]      was   repeatedly    questioned      about

Mr. Hineman and inappropriate sexual touching."                        But this too

came out at trial.               M.S. testified that she repeatedly asked

S.J.S. to tell her what was wrong, and he was nonresponsive.

      ¶45   Overall, Hineman was not prejudiced by trial counsel's

failure to request the March 12 CPS report because any evidence

derived from that request would have been cumulative.8                         Because

we    resolve    this      claim        on   prejudice,    we   need     not   address

deficient performance.
                          2.    Waiving opening statement.

      ¶46   Hineman next argues that trial counsel was ineffective

for   choosing       to    waive    opening        statement.    He    argues   trial

      8Hineman makes the additional argument that "[h]ad counsel
obtained these CPS reports before trial, a defense expert could
have rebutted the therapist's assumption that [S.J.S.'s] unusual
behaviors meant that he was being sexually abused."      Hineman
could have called a defense expert even without first reviewing
the CPS reports.     Officer Hintz's report contains the same
information about S.J.S.'s behavior that Hineman alleges raised
suspicion that S.J.S. had been sexually assaulted.

                                              24
                                                                                     No.    2020AP226-CR

counsel performed deficiently because "[f]oregoing an opening

statement because you are not sure what your client is going to

say——when he has a constitutional right to say nothing at all——

is not a reasonable strategy."

       ¶47    In this case a Machner hearing was conducted.                                            As a

result,       we        benefit          from        the       testimony       and    circuit       court

findings.           We        conclude             that    this      claim    fails    for     lack      of

deficient performance.                         Trial counsel explained, "I had some

concerns about what he would say when he took the stand.                                                  I

didn't    want          to       make    an        opening     statement       and    commit      him    to

something that he wouldn't then say in his direct."                                        The circuit

court concluded, "The failure to give an opening statement, when

supported          by        a     strategic          reason,         is     largely       within       the

discretion of the trial attorney.                                   I see no reason to disturb

this     judgement."                    As     a     result,        trial     counsel's      strategic

decision was reasonable.                           Courts that have addressed this issue

consistently             hold           that        waiving         opening     statement         is     an

acceptable trial strategy.                          See, e.g., United States v. Haddock,
12    F.3d    950,           955    (10th          Cir.    1993)      (holding       that    counsel's

uncertainty about what his client might say justified waiving

opening statement); United States v. Salovitz, 701 F.2d 17, 20-

21 (2d Cir. 1983) ("It is common knowledge that defense counsel

quite     often          waive          openings          as    a     simple     matter      of     trial

strategy.") (collecting cases); Moss v. Hofbauer, 286 F.3d 851,

863    (6th    Cir.           2002)          (holding      that       counsel's      desire       not    to

disclose trial strategy was a reasonable strategic reason for
waiving opening statement).
                                                          25
                                                                 No.      2020AP226-CR

      ¶48    Trial counsel did not know how or even whether Hineman

would testify.     It was perfectly reasonable for her to waive her

opening statement and avoid making promises to the jury she

could not keep.     This decision did not fall below "an objective

standard of reasonableness."             Breitzman, 378 Wis. 2d 431, ¶38.

Because we resolve this claim on deficient performance, we need

not address prejudice.

        3.   Failure to object to improper expert testimony.

      ¶49    Hineman's    third     ineffective        assistance       claim     also

fails for lack of deficient performance.                He claims that Jensen

presented     unnoticed        expert    testimony      on    the      concepts    of

"piecemeal disclosure" and "delayed disclosure" and that trial

counsel's    failure     to    object    to   this   testimony      was    deficient

performance.     Hineman argues this was deficient because trial

counsel's    proffered        strategy   of   "attacking      Jensen's      improper

expert testimony by trying to establish that this case involved

an   immediate   disclosure——when         that   testimony     could      have    been

kept out altogether——would have undermined the defense strategy
and bolstered [S.J.S.'s] incriminating statements."

      ¶50    However,     the     testimony      and    the    circuit       court's

findings at the Machner hearing revealed that trial counsel did

not object because she had a reasonable alternative strategy of

showing Jensen's testimony did not match the State's theory of

immediate disclosure.           Trial counsel testified at the Machner

hearing, "I just thought that I would on my cross cover [the

delayed disclosure testimony] because I didn't think that this
was a case of delayed disclosure, if I remember correctly."                        The
                                         26
                                                                      No.    2020AP226-CR

circuit      court    concluded,      "The     attorney     could       rely       on    her

experience in examining such experts to have a moment in front

of the jury of wrenching an admission out of the witness.                               That

is what the attorney decided to risk and it paid off."

      ¶51    The record supports that trial counsel pursued this

strategy.          During    cross-examination,       she      asked    Jensen,         "And

let's say the abuse happens and the child goes and tells the

parent immediately.           Is that a delayed disclosure?"                By pointing

out that Jensen discussed delayed disclosure despite the State

arguing      there     was    an    immediate     disclosure,          trial       counsel

highlighted an inconsistency in the State's case.                              This was

consistent with trial counsel's overall strategy.                           During her

closing     argument,       trial   counsel     argued    the    State's       witnesses

presented varying accounts of when the assault happened, how

many times it happened, and when S.J.S. disclosed.                           We cannot

say   that    trial     counsel     was   deficient      for    attempting         to    use

otherwise     objectionable         testimony    to   her      client's      advantage.

Because we resolve this claim on deficient performance, we need
not address prejudice.

              4.     Conceding guilt during closing argument.

      ¶52    Hineman's final ineffective assistance claim is that

trial counsel conceded Hineman's guilt during closing argument

by saying, "But I believe the sexual assault happened."                            At the

Machner      hearing,       trial   counsel     explained,       "I     don't       recall

conceding     Mr.    Hineman's      guilt[]. . . . [M]y         notes       say,    if    it

happened, what version do you believe.                   Then I would go into --
the different things."              Though the circuit court found trial
                                          27
                                                                          No.     2020AP226-CR

counsel         was    "speaking      ironically"    to     explain        the     competing

versions of events, Hineman argues, "conceding guilt——even in

jest——is        not    a    reasonable    strategy    in     a    first-degree        sexual

assault of a child trial."

       ¶53       Hineman misconstrues the circuit court's finding.                         The

circuit court, who heard the trial and also heard the testimony

at the Machner hearing, concluded that counsel's performance was

not deficient.              Contrary to Hineman's argument, the court did

not find that trial counsel conceded guilt "in jest"; it found

she did not concede guilt at all.                     The court explained, "The

structure of the closing was designed to contrast the version

told       in    the       forensic   interview      with     that        coming     out    at

trial. . . . By             attempting    to     force      the    jury         between    two

different theories, the defense obviously played to doubt."                                 The

court found that, in this context, trial counsel's statement was

meant only "to criticize the [State's] version of events that

had been testified to."                Accordingly, the statement was ironic

and not a concession of guilt.                  This is a factual determination
to which we owe deference, and it is not clearly erroneous.                                 See

Dillard,        358    Wis. 2d 543,      ¶86.      Because        trial    counsel        never

conceded Hineman's guilt, this last claim fails for lack of

deficient         performance.9          Because    we     resolve        this     claim    on

deficient performance, we need not address prejudice.

       The
       9    parties  disagree   as  to   whether  there   was  a
transcription error and the trial transcript should actually
say, "But to believe the sexual assault happened." We need not
resolve this issue because the circuit court found there was no
concession of guilt under the assumption that the transcript was
correct.
                                            28
                                                                              No.    2020AP226-CR

                          C.    The Interest Of Justice

       ¶54    Hineman's        final    claim          is     that     this      court     should

exercise its discretion to order a new trial in the interest of

justice.       Absent other grounds for doing so, this court may

order a new trial "if it appears from the record that the real

controversy has not been fully tried, or that it is probable

that    justice    has    for     any    reason             miscarried."            Wis.   Stat.

§ 751.06.

       ¶55    Hineman asserts the real controversy in this case has

not    been    fully   tried     because         the        State    improperly       presented

unnoticed expert testimony and "in camera review of [S.J.S.'s]

treatment records is necessary to fully try this controversy."

There are two situations where the real controversy has not been

fully tried such that the interest of justice may require a new

trial:

       (1) when   the   jury  was   erroneously denied  the
       opportunity to hear important evidence bearing on an
       important issue in the case or (2) when the jury had
       before it evidence not properly admitted that "so
       clouded" a crucial issue that it may be fairly said
       that the real controversy was not tried.
State    v.   Avery,     2013    WI    13,       ¶38    n.18,        345   Wis. 2d 407,        826

N.W.2d 60.        "However,       such       discretionary             reversal       power    is

exercised only in 'exceptional cases.'"                         Id., ¶38 (quoting State

v. Henley, 2010 WI 97, ¶98, 328 Wis. 2d 544, 787 N.W.2d 350).

"We    are    reluctant    to    grant       a    new       trial     in   the      interest   of

justice, and thus we exercise our discretion only in exceptional

cases."       Morden v. Cont'l AG, 2000 WI 51, ¶87, 235 Wis. 2d 235,
611 N.W.2d 659.

                                             29
                                                                               No.     2020AP226-CR

       ¶56     Hineman's         first    argument         regarding       unnoticed           expert

testimony fails.             His assertion that Jensen's testimony on the

concepts       of    "piecemeal          disclosure"         and    "delayed          disclosure"

requires       a      new       trial     merely          repackages       his        ineffective

assistance claim, which we already rejected, as an interest-of-

justice claim.              As for Investigator Hintz's testimony on the

concept of "grooming," it consisted entirely of the following

statement:          "Those things, in the totality of everything that he

was    doing    is       often     described        as    what     we    would       refer     to    as

grooming."               Trial     counsel          immediately          objected         to      this

testimony,         and    the    court    sustained          that       objection.           Neither

Jensen's nor Investigator Hintz's testimony on these topics was

so inflammatory or pervasive that it clouded the real issue at

trial:    whether Hineman had sexual contact with S.J.S.

       ¶57     Hineman's second argument also fails because he has

not made the requisite evidentiary showing necessary to obtain

in camera review of S.J.S.'s treatment records.                                      In order to

gain in camera review of treatment records, a defendant must
"make a sufficient evidentiary showing that is not based on mere

speculation         or    conjecture          as    to    what   information           is    in     the

records."       Green, 253 Wis. 2d 356, ¶33.                       "[T]he evidence sought

from    the    records       must       not    be       merely   cumulative          to     evidence

already available to the defendant.                         A defendant must show more

than a mere possibility that the records will contain evidence

that may be helpful or useful to the defense."                                 Id.     Because we

conclude       the       absence    of    the       CPS    reports       did     not      prejudice
Hineman, it follows that the reports do not form an adequate
                                                   30
                                                                    No.        2020AP226-CR

evidentiary         basis       supporting      in   camera    review     of     S.J.S.'s

treatment records, and the jury was not "erroneously denied the

opportunity         to      hear       important     evidence."10         Avery,       345

Wis. 2d 407, ¶38 n.18.

    ¶58       The        real      issue      was    fully     tried.           Hineman's

disagreements on whether the jury should or should not have

heard certain evidence does not change that fact.                         We therefore

deny Hineman's plea for a new trial in the interest of justice.

                                       IV.    CONCLUSION

    ¶59       Hineman argues that he is entitled to a new trial

because the State suppressed evidence favorable to his defense

in violation of his due process rights under Brady.                             According

to Hineman, the State failed to disclose a report from CPS which

contained "material exculpatory impeachment evidence that went

to an issue at the heart of the case."                        He argues the circuit

court erred in denying his motion for postconviction relief and

that the court of appeals was correct to reverse that decision.

Hineman also argues two alternative grounds for affirming the
court    of    appeals:          "he    was    denied   effective       assistance      of

counsel," and he "is entitled to a new trial[] and an in camera

    10 We heard argument earlier this term in State v. Johnson,
No. 2019AP664-CR, regarding whether "the court [should] overrule
State v. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d 600, 499 N.W.2d 719 (Ct. App.
1993)." State v. Johnson, No. 2019AP664-CR, unpublished order,
at 2 (Wis. Oct. 14, 2021).         That case remains pending.
Regardless of how we resolve the issue in Johnson, we conclude
that Hineman cannot make the evidentiary showing necessary for
review under the Green standard.

                                               31
                                                                       No.     2020AP226-CR

review of [S.J.S.'s] treatment records[] in the interests of

justice."

       ¶60     We     conclude       that      Hineman    is     not     entitled        to

postconviction relief.               The State did not violate Hineman's due

process rights by failing to disclose the CPS report because the

report was not material.               There is no reasonable probability of

a different result if the State did disclose the CPS report

because Hineman had access to a police report containing the

same     relevant           information.          Hineman's      four         ineffective

assistance of counsel claims also fail.                       He was not prejudiced

by trial counsel's failure to request the subject report, and

the    other       claims    fail    because     counsel's     performance       was    not

deficient.          Finally, we decline to exercise our discretion to

grant Hineman a new trial in the interest of justice because

there       were     no     errors    at    trial      that    prevented       the     real

controversy from being tried.                The circuit court was correct to

deny Hineman's motion for postconviction relief.                             We therefore

reverse the court of appeals.
       By    the     Court.—The      decision     of   the    court    of     appeals    is

reversed.

                                            32
                                                                 No.   2020AP226-CR.jjk

       ¶61    JILL      J.     KAROFSKY,    J.    (concurring).             I    write

separately to push back against a pernicious myth about child

sexual assault victims found in the court of appeals opinion.

The court of appeals determined that the child victim in this

case presented credibility issues, in part because he did not

disclose to his therapist that he was a victim of Hineman's

sexual       abuse.          See   State   v.    Hineman,        No.   2020AP226-CR,

unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2021) (per curiam).

Such reasoning ignores the barriers child sexual assault victims

face in reporting sexual abuse and perpetuates the misguided

notion that delayed disclosures in these cases are the exception

rather than the norm.

       ¶62    To bolster its conclusion that "[t]he state's case was

not particularly strong," the court of appeals faulted S.J.S.

for not disclosing his abuse to his therapist.                     The court wrote,

"[S.J.S.] meeting with his therapist around this time would have

provided an obvious opportunity for S.J.S. to reveal if he had

been inappropriately touched by Hineman, yet S.J.S. made no such
revelations."         Id. at ¶41 (emphasis added).               Assertions such as

this   ignore     the    victim's     herculean    task     of    reporting     sexual

abuse.

       ¶63    There are myriad reasons children do not report sexual

abuse——to anyone.            These include: an inability to recognize or

articulate sexual abuse, an uncertainty about which adults are

safe, a lack of opportunities to disclose, fear of not being

believed,       trauma        that    results     from      the        abuse,    power
differentials between the child victim and adult perpetrator,

                                           1
                                                                 No.   2020AP226-CR.jjk

and   institutional            power     dynamics.           CHILD     USA,   Delayed

Disclosure: A Factsheet Based on Cutting-Edge Research on Child

Sex   Abuse,      2    (Mar.    2020).        Additionally,     recounting       abuse,

particularly          for    child   sexual       abuse   survivors,   "creates    new

painful     and        traumatic     memories        that   compound     older    pain

associated with the abuse.                Recounting the abuse experience,

especially more than once, 'triggers' survivors and can leave

them feeling exhausted, fatigued, and defeated."                       James Marsh &

Margaret Mabie, Trauma-Informed Advocacy, Trial, Aug. 2022, at

38 (footnotes omitted).

      ¶64   Importantly, when disclosure does occur, it does not

usually happen in one sitting.                    Rather, disclosure is a process

that can take decades and may involve "telling through direct

and indirect hints and signs, decisions to tell, re-decisions

and delaying, or withholding until adulthood, and the dependency

on trusted confidants who ask and listen for final disclosure to

occur."     CHILD USA at 2 (quoting Maria Larsen Brattfjell & Anna

Margrete Flam, "They Were the Ones That Saw Me and Listened."
From Child Sexual Abuse to Disclosure: Adults' Recalls of the

Process Towards Final Disclosure, 89 Child Abuse Neglect 225

(2019)).

      ¶65   The truth——as opposed to the myth——is that when it

comes to child sexual assault cases, disclosure is the departure

from the norm.              According to data from the U.S. Department of

Justice as much as 86 percent of child sexual abuse may go

unreported altogether.               Dean G. Kilpatrick et al., U.S. Dep't
Just., Youth Victimization: Prevalence and Implications, 6 (Apr.

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                                                       No.   2020AP226-CR.jjk

2003).      And when disclosure of child sexual abuse does occur, it

is   almost    always   delayed.   Strikingly,   the     average    age   of

disclosing childhood sexual abuse is 52.     CHILD USA at 3.

      ¶66     In short, there was never an "obvious opportunity" for

S.J.S. to disclose to his therapist or anyone else.             There were

only barriers and trauma and uncertainty.        In the face of these

obstacles, what should cause us to pause is not that S.J.S.

failed to disclose to his therapist but that he had the courage

to disclose at all.

      ¶67     I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL

BRADLEY joins this concurrence.

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