Court Opinion

ID: 9604687
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:25:30.003119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:05:33.405947
License: Public Domain

I’ANSON, C.J.,
dissenting.
*727Because I do not agree with the reasoning or the conclusion of the majority, I dissent.
In Roderick Cecil Jones v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 757, 240 S.E.2d 658, cert. denied, 435 U.S. 909 (1978) (No. 77-5728) and 439 U.S. 892 (1978) (No. 77-6543), we analyzed the relationship between larceny and robbery in considerable detail. We concluded that, for purposes of the double jeopardy clauses of the Virginia and United States Constitutions, grand larceny is a lesser-included offense of robbery only if the theft charged in the larceny indictment is the same theft charged in the robbery indictment. 218 Va. at 729, 240 S.E.2d at 660. Because Jones’ conviction for grand larceny rested upon the theft of an item not specified in the robbery indictment, we affirmed both convictions.1
The principles announced in Jones for grand larceny are applicable in this case involving petit larceny. The majority opinion appears to recognize this fact when it notes Jones’ language that “a robbery indictment includes ... all elements of whatever larceny offense is charged, whether grand or petit.” 221 Va. at 723, 273 S.E.2d at 780-81. Under the standard set forth in Jones, petit larceny is a lesser-included offense of robbery if the theft in the larceny indictment is the same theft charged in the robbery indictment.
The resolution of this appeal thus turns upon whether the theft charged in Martin’s larceny indictment is the same theft charged in Martin’s robbery indictment. The majority opinion concludes that it is not, and I disagree with that conclusion. Jones sets forth a clear guide for determining this issue: One must examine the items specified in the indictments.2 If the items specified in the indictments are the *728same, then double jeopardy protections provided by the state and federal constitutions would preclude multiple prosecutions or multiple punishments not intended by the legislature. The Jones requirement that the indictments be examined was not arbitrarily selected, but instead rested upon language in decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States: “The precise manner in which an indictment is drawn cannot be ignored, because an important function of the indictment is to ensure that, ‘in case any other proceedings are taken against [the defendant] for a similar offense, . . . the record [will] sho[w] with accuracy to what extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction.’ ” Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 65-66 (1978), quoting in part Cochran v. United States, 157 U.S. 286, 290 (1895).
The grand larceny indictment charged that Martin “unlawfully and feloniously did steal United States monies and currencies having a value of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) belonging to Melvin Davis . . . [and] in the possession of Earl Randolph Griffin.” The robbery indictment charged that Martin “unlawfully and feloniously did rob one Earl Randolph Griffin of United States currency and monies having a value of about Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00).” The robbery indictment does not allege ownership of the money taken, but claims instead that money in the possession of Griffin (not necessarily his money) was taken from him by force or intimidation. The larceny indictment specifies the theft of money belonging to Davis but in the possession of Griffin. This allegation in the larceny indictment is entirely consistent with the robbery indictment and does not indicate that monies owned by different persons formed the basis for the two indictments. The evidence abundantly indicated that, at the very most, only $250.00 was taken.3 The majority recognizes this fact by noting that Griffin, the only person to testify concerning the amount taken, testified the total amount taken was about $250. 221 Va. at 722, 273. S.E.2d at 780.
Perhaps the most novel feature of the majority opinion is the manner in which it discusses the indictments’ similarity of the amounts alleged to have been taken. The majority concludes that “[wjithout a listing of the serial numbers of the bills making up the two amounts, it is impossible to determine from a mere statement of the amounts whether they involve the same or different ‘dollars.’ ” 221 Va. at 725, 273 S.E.2d at 782. The majority thus impliedly renounces an examination of the evidence as a means for determining the duplicity of thefts in *729the indictments and confines itself to an examination of the indictments only.4 I fear that two consequences of this language will return to haunt this court at a later date. First, such a holding allows the Commonwealth to obtain convictions for both larceny and robbery, even though the evidence clearly reveals the same money is at issue in both indictments,5 so long as the indictments themselves do not reveal the duplicity. Second, where the indictments do not specify the serial numbers or provide a description unique to the item stolen, defendants can successfully argue the indictments do not “show with accuracy to what extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction.” Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 764 (1962).
For the reasons stated, I would vacate the defendant’s conviction for petit larceny and affirm his robbery conviction.

 In addition, we noted that the value of the stolen item is an essential element of a grand larceny conviction, whereas it is not an essential element of a robbery charge. 218 Va. at 760, 240 S.E.2d at 661. A strict application of the test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), would thus lead to the conclusion that grand larceny and robbery can never be the “same offense” because both grand larceny and robbery require proof of a fact which the other does not. Since Martin was convicted of petit larceny, not grand larceny, this language in Jones is not dispositive of this appeal.

 The majority opinion, rather than limiting itself to an examination of the indictments, chooses to discuss whether the items were taken in the same act, as that term is used in Code § 19.2-294, even though the statutory issue was not raised by the appellant. In so doing, the opinion blurs the distinction that we have previously drawn between the “same act” and the “same offense.” As the majority notes, “[i]t is the identity of the offense, and not the act, which is referred to in the constitutional guaranty against double jeopardy.” 221 Va. at 723, 273 S.E.2d at 780, quoting Epps v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 150, 153-54, 216 S.E.2d 64, 67 (1975) (Emphasis added in majority opinion).

 The jury rejected even this claim and convicted the defendant of petit larceny, not grand larceny, as charged in the indictment.

 This renunciation is not absolute, however. The majority examines the evidence in detail in determining that the theft involved different acts, one of the grounds for its determination that the indictments did not involve the same theft. 221 Va. at 726, 273 S.E.2d at 782.

 For example, if both indictments charged the theft of $251.14, it would nevertheless be possible to conjecture two thefts of this amount if serial numbers of the bills are not provided in both indictments. Without resort to the evidence produced at trial, it will not be possible for a defendant to prove that the same theft is at issue in both indictments where serial numbers are not provided in the indictments. Even more problematic are those instances where the stolen items do not bear serial numbers.