Court Opinion

ID: 9945080
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 23:27:08.739401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:21.707347
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 THE HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE
 COUNTY OF KING, a Washington                           DIVISION ONE
 municipal corporation,
                                                        No. 85031-8-I
                         Appellant,
                                                        PUBLISHED OPINION
                v.

 ANGELA KNIGHT, and all occupants,
 including ANDRE KNIGHT and
 DELANEY KNIGHT,

                         Respondents.

      DWYER, J. — Does the federal Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic

Security Act1 (CARES Act) require 30 days’ notice for any eviction from dwellings

covered by the Act? With all due respect to our colleagues at Division II, we

conclude that the answer is no.2 The CARES Act requires such notice only for

evictions stemming from a tenant’s nonpayment of rent.

                                              I

      In January 2023, the King County Housing Authority served a notice to

vacate on a rental unit, alleging that its occupants had engaged in nuisance and

criminal activity on the premises. The unit was occupied by Angela Knight,

Andre Knight, and Delaney Knight. The notice provided them with three days to

vacate the unit. Three days later, they had not done so. The Housing Authority

      1 Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020) (codified at 15 U.S.C. ch. 116).
      2 See infra Section III. E.
No. 85031-8-I/2

subsequently filed an unlawful detainer petition and a motion to show cause in

King County Superior Court.

        A superior court commissioner denied the Housing Authority’s petition and

dismissed its eviction action without prejudice. The commissioner stated that he

had relied on our opinion in Sherwood Auburn LLC v. Pinzon, 24 Wn. App. 2d

664, 521 P.3d 212 (2022), review denied, 1 Wn.3d 1005 (2023), to conclude that

the CARES Act requires 30 days’ notice for all evictions from dwellings covered

by the Act, and that, regardless of the Housing Authority’s asserted basis for

evicting the Knights, it had only given them three days’ notice.3

        The Housing Authority now appeals.4

                                                  II

        The superior court commissioner herein dismissed the Housing Authority’s

unlawful detainer action in reliance on our opinion in Pinzon. However, because

that opinion did not resolve the matter presented herein, such reliance was

misplaced.

        In the Pinzon opinion, we summarized that,

        [t]he federal CARES Act, enacted by Congress in response to the
        economic disruption resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic,
        provides protections for tenants living in housing units owned by
        landlords that have received the financial benefits of certain federal

        3 The Housing Authority did not dispute that the Knights’ rental unit was a dwelling

covered by the CARES Act.
         4 The King County Bar Association’s Housing Justice Project requested to participate in

this appeal as an amicus curiae. A commissioner of this court approved its request. The
Housing Justice Project’s suggestions discussed herein are not treated as assertions by a party
to this appeal but, rather, as thoughtful contributions intended to aid us in our deliberations.
         The Housing Justice Project also requests to intervene in this matter. Because its
interest is insufficient to justify intervention, we deny its request. Sutton v. Hirvonen, 113 Wn.2d
1, 8, 775 P.2d 448 (1989) (citing CR 24(a); RAP 1.2(a); RAP 18.8(a)).

                                                  2
No. 85031-8-I/3

       programs. 15 U.S.C. § 9058. The statute applies to tenants living
       in any “covered dwelling,” which includes housing units on
       properties with “[f]ederally backed mortgage loan[s].” 15 U.S.C. §
       9058(a)(1), (2)(B)(i). In addition to imposing a 120-day moratorium
       on eviction actions for nonpayment of rent or other charges, 15
       U.S.C. § 9058(b), the CARES Act established a 30-day notice
       requirement, which provides that “[t]he lessor of a covered dwelling
       unit . . . may not require the tenant to vacate the covered dwelling
       unit before the date that is 30 days after the date on which the
       lessor provides the tenant with a notice to vacate.” 15 U.S.C. §
       9058(c)(1).

Pinzon, 24 Wn. App. 2d at 671-72 (alterations in original). We stated that,

       [i]n the federal CARES Act, Congress mandated that landlords who
       have accepted certain federal financial benefits must provide to
       tenants living in covered housing units a 30-day notice to cure the
       rental payment deficiency or vacate the premises before the
       landlord may commence an eviction action.

Pinzon, 24 Wn. App. 2d at 667 (footnote omitted) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 9058).

       The tenants therein had fallen behind on their rent as a result of the

economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic. Pinzon, 24 Wn. App. 2d at 668.

Their landlord had issued them two notices to vacate, a 14-day notice stemming

from their failure to pay rent and a 30-day notice stating that such notice period

would begin upon a superior court’s order to vacate. Pinzon, 24 Wn. App. 2d at

668-69. On appeal, and as pertinent here, the parties disputed whether “lessor”

as set forth in the 30-day notice to vacate provision of the CARES Act meant a

lessor or a superior court. Pinzon, 24 Wn. App. 2d at 672-73. We concluded

that “lessor” meant lessor and reversed and remanded the matter. Pinzon, 24

Wn. App. 2d at 672-76, 681-82 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 9058(c)(1)).

       Pinzon does not resolve the matter before us. Nowhere in that opinion did

we set forth a holding that the CARES Act requires 30 days’ notice to vacate in

                                         3
No. 85031-8-I/4

all eviction actions in dwellings covered by the Act. Moreover, the tenants

therein had received the notices to vacate arising from their nonpayment of rent,

and the extent of our interpretation of the CARES Act was whether a “lessor” was

a lessor under the Act.

        In contrast, the notice to vacate herein stemmed from the Knights’ alleged

nuisance and criminal conduct on the premises, and we are tasked with

interpreting whether the Act requires 30 days’ notice for all eviction actions

regarding a dwelling covered by the Act. Thus, we plainly did not decide in

Pinzon the matter now before us. Accordingly, by so relying on that opinion to

dismiss the Housing Authority’s unlawful detainer action herein, the superior

court commissioner erred. 5 However, because Pinzon does not resolve the

matter before us, we next look for guidance from the text of the CARES Act itself.

                                               III

        The Housing Authority asserts that the CARES Act requires 30 days’

notice only for evictions stemming from nonpayment of rent. The Housing

Authority is correct.

         5 We note that we repeatedly stated in Pinzon that the Act’s 30-day notice provision

applied to evictions stemming from a tenant’s nonpayment of rent. 24 Wn. App. 2d at 667, 672,
679-80 (“cure the rental payment deficiency or vacate,” “pay or vacate notice”). However, we did
not analyze whether that provision only applied to such circumstances. In the analysis that
follows, we do so now.

                                               4
No. 85031-8-I/5

                                                A

        The CARES Act is a federal enactment. In interpreting such an

enactment, our objective is to ascertain Congress’s intent. Kitsap County

Consol. Hous. Auth. v. Henry-Levingston, 196 Wn. App. 688, 701, 385 P.3d 188

(2016).6 “‘[I]f the statute’s meaning is plain on its face, then [we] must give effect

to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent.’” Pinzon, 24 Wn.

App. 2d at 670 (alterations in original) (quoting Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell &

Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9-10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002)). A statute’s plain meaning is

derived from inquiring into “all that the Legislature has said in the statute and

related statutes which disclose legislative intent about the provision in question.”

Dep’t of Ecology, 146 Wn.2d at 11.

        In determining the plain meaning of a statute, we consider “the
        ordinary meaning of words, the basic rules of grammar, and the
        statutory context to conclude what the legislature has provided for
        in the statute and related statutes.” In re Forfeiture of One 1970
        Chevrolet Chevelle, 166 Wn.2d 834, 839, 215 P.3d 166 (2009).
        In so doing, we “construe a statute ‘so that all the language used is
        given effect, with no portion rendered meaningless or
        superfluous.’” Seattle City Light v. Swanson, 193 Wn. App. 795,
        810, 373 P.3d 342 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted)
        (quoting Rapid Settlements, Ltd. v. Symetra Life Ins. Co., 134 Wn.
        App. 329, 332, 139 P.3d 411 (2006)). “Common sense informs our
        analysis, as we avoid absurd results in statutory interpretation.”
        State v. Alvarado, 164 Wn.2d 556, 562, 192 P.3d 345 (2008).

Linville v. Dep’t of Ret. Sys., 11 Wn. App. 2d 316, 321, 452 P.3d 1269 (2019).

        6 A superior court commissioner’s interpretation of a statute involves a question of law

which we review de novo. See Faciszewski v. Brown, 187 Wn.2d 308, 313-14, 386 P.3d 711
(2016) (citing King County v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hr’gs Bd., 142 Wn.2d 543, 555,
14 P.3d 133 (2000)); Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4
(2002) (citing State v. Breazeale, 144 Wn.2d 829, 837, 31 P.3d 1155 (2001); State v. J.M., 144
Wn.2d 472, 480, 28 P.3d 720 (2001)).

                                                5
No. 85031-8-I/6

        “[I]f, after this inquiry, the statute remains susceptible to more than one

reasonable meaning, the statute is ambiguous and it is appropriate to resort to

aids to construction, including legislative history.” Dep’t of Ecology, 146 Wn.2d at

12 (citing Cockle v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 142 Wn.2d 801, 808, 16 P.3d 583

(2001); Timberline Air Serv., Inc. v. Bell Helicopter-Textron, Inc., 125 Wn.2d 305,

312, 884 P.2d 920 (1994)). “‘However, a statute is not ambiguous merely

because of different conceivable interpretations.’” Smith v. Dep’t of Lab. &

Indus., 22 Wn. App. 2d 500, 507, 512 P.3d 566 (quoting Bennett v. Seattle

Mental Health, 166 Wn. App. 477, 483-84, 269 P.3d 1079 (2012)), review denied,

200 Wn.2d 1013 (2022).

                                                 B

        The United States Congress enacted the CARES Act on March 27, 2020

“in response to the economic disruption resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic.”

Pinzon, 24 Wn. App. 2d at 671-72.

        At issue herein is a 30-day notice to vacate provision set forth in the

CARES Act bill, located within Section 4024, “Temporary Moratorium on Eviction

Filings.” That section reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

        SEC. 4024 TEMPORARY MORATORIUM ON EVICTION FILINGS
               (a) DEFINITIONS[7]. . .
               ....
               (b) MORATORIUM.—During the 120-day period beginning on
        the date of enactment of this Act, the lessor of a covered dwelling
        may not—

         7 Section 9058(a) sets forth the definition of “covered dwelling” to identify the manner and

type of housing to be affected by the provisions of subsections (b) and (c). See Pinzon, 24 Wn.
App. 2d at 672 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 9058(a)(1), (2)(B)(i)). As applicable here, section (a) does
not define “notice” or “nonpayment of rent.” See 15 U.S.C. § 9058(a).

                                                  6
No. 85031-8-I/7

                       (1) make, or cause to be made, any filing with the
                court of jurisdiction to initiate a legal action to recover
                possession of the covered dwelling from the tenant for
                nonpayment of rent or other fees or charges; or
                       (2) charge fees, penalties, or other charges to the
                tenant related to such nonpayment of rent.
                (c) NOTICE.—The lessor of a covered dwelling unit—
                       (1) may not require the tenant to vacate the covered
                dwelling unit before the date that is 30 days after the date on
                which the lessor provides the tenant with a notice to vacate;
                and
                       (2) may not issue a notice to vacate under paragraph
                (1) until after the expiration of the period described in
                subsection (b).

Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136,

§ 4024, 134 Stat. 281, 492-94 (2020) (emphasis added).

                                                1

        The plain meaning of Section 4024’s 30-day notice to vacate provision—

paragraph (c)(1)—is that it applies only to evictions stemming from nonpayment

of rent.8 Section 4024 sets forth a temporary moratorium on evictions from

covered dwellings in which the basis provided for such eviction is nonpayment of

rent. Indeed, Section 4024 is titled “Temporary Moratorium on Eviction Filings,”

and subsection (b) thereof explicitly sets forth a 120-day moratorium on evictions

(and penalties) in covered dwellings in which the basis for initiating such an

eviction (or imposing such penalties) stems from a tenant’s nonpayment of rent.

134 Stat. at 493.

        Subsection (c) of Section 4024, by contrast, does not explicitly set forth

such a basis. Nevertheless, by looking to “all that the Legislature has said in the

        8 We use the nomenclature set forth in the text of the bill which Congress enacted to

describe the organizational structure of the CARES Act.

                                                7
No. 85031-8-I/8

statute and related statutes which disclose legislative intent about the provision in

question,” we can determine whether Congress intended to supply such a basis

to subsection (c) elsewhere in Section 4024. See Dep’t of Ecology, 146 Wn.2d

at 11. Based on the connections and cross-references placed in section 4024, it

is clear that Congress intended that the basis provided in subsection (b)—

nonpayment of rent—also apply to subsection (c).

       Indeed, Congress plainly intended the provisions of Section 4024 to be

read together. Subsection (a) sets forth the definition of the phrase “covered

dwelling” and that phrase is used twice in subsection (b) and twice in subsection

(c), thereby connecting these three sections. Furthermore, in subsection (c),

Congress placed an “and” conjunction between paragraph (c)(1) and paragraph

(c)(2), thereby connecting together the paragraphs of subsection (c). Lastly—

and significantly—in paragraph (c)(2), Congress expressly referenced not only

paragraph (c)(1), but also subsection (b), thereby connecting subsection (c) with

subsection (b). Congress thus intertwined these three sections with not only a

shared vocabulary, but also a conjunction linking together the paragraphs of

subsection (c) and an express reference in subsection (c) to subsection (b). We

do not consider these connections to be superfluous or meaningless. Linville, 11

Wn. App. 2d at 321 (quoting Swanson, 193 Wn. App. at 810). Therefore, it is

clear that Congress intended for subsection (b), paragraph (c)(1), and paragraph

(c)(2) to be connected to and read in conjunction with one another.

       It follows that Congress, by implication, intended that the nonpayment of

rent basis provided in subsection (b) apply to both paragraph (c)(1) and

                                         8
No. 85031-8-I/9

paragraph (c)(2).9 Indeed, by extending the protections set forth in subsection

(b) only to evictions stemming from nonpayment of rent, and by clearly intending

that subsection (b) and (c) be read as one, Congress demonstrated its intent to

extend the protections in subsection (c) only to evictions stemming from

nonpayment of rent. Thus, the plain meaning of Section 4024’s 30-day notice to

vacate provision is that it applies only to evictions stemming from nonpayment of

rent.

                                                2

        The statutory context underlying the CARES Act also guides our

interpretation of the notice to vacate provision here at issue.

        As set forth above, a statute’s plain meaning is derived from inquiring into

“all that the Legislature has said in the statute and related statutes which disclose

legislative intent about the provision in question.” Dep’t of Ecology, 146 Wn.2d at

11. “The title of a legislative act also may be referred to as a source of legislative

intent.” Covell v. City of Seattle, 127 Wn.2d 874, 887-88, 905 P.2d 324 (1995)

(citing Wash. Optometric Ass’n v. County of Pierce, 73 Wn.2d 445, 449, 438 P.2d

861 (1968); In re Kurtzman’s Estate, 65 Wn.2d 260, 265, 396 P.2d 786 (1964)),

modified on other grounds by Yim v. City of Seattle, 194 Wn.2d 682, 702, 451

P.3d 694 (2019). In that sense, the statutory context can guide our interpretation

         9 Amicus King County Bar Association Housing Justice Project suggests that the

interpretation provided herein would constitute an improper addition of language to Section 4024
that Congress did not intend. We disagree. By connecting the provisions of Section 4024 to one
another, it was plainly Congress’s intent to set forth the nonpayment of rent basis in subsection
(b) also in subsection (c) by implication. Acknowledging implication is not addition.

                                                9
No. 85031-8-I/10

of a provision set forth within that context. Linville, 11 Wn. App. 2d at 321

(quoting One 1970 Chevrolet Chevelle, 166 Wn.2d at 839).

       The short title of the CARES Act bill was the “Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and

Economic Security Act.” § 1, 134 Stat. 281 (emphasis added) (capitalization

omitted). The Act was broken down into two divisions, Division A, “Keeping

Workers Paid And Employed, Health Care System Enhancements, and

Economic Stabilization,” and Division B, “Emergency Appropriations for

Coronavirus Health Response and Agency Operations.” 134 Stat. at 285

(emphasis added) (capitalization omitted). Division A set forth six titles, “Title I—

Keeping American Workers Paid and Employed Act,” “Title II—Assistance for

American Workers, Families, and Businesses,” “Title III—Supporting America’s

Health Care System in the Fight Against the Coronavirus,” “Title IV—Economic

Stabilization and Assistance to Severely Distressed Sectors of the United States

Economy,” “Title V—Coronavirus Relief Funds,” and “Title VI—Miscellaneous

Provisions.” 134 Stat. at 281-85 (emphasis added) (capitalization omitted).

       Congress located the pertinent notice provision of Section 4024 in Division

A, Title IV, Subtitle A—“Coronavirus Economic Stabilization Act of 2020,”

adjacent to 28 other sections.

       TITLE IV—ECONOMIC STABILIZATION AND ASSISTANCE TO
          SEVERELY DISTRESSED SECTORS OF THE UNITED
          STATES ECONOMY
                     Subtitle A—Coronavirus Economic
                             Stabilization Act of 2020
       Sec. 4001. Short title. . . .
       Sec. 4002. Definitions. . . .
       Sec. 4003. Emergency relief and taxpayer protections. . . .

                                         10
No. 85031-8-I/11

       Sec. 4004. Limitation on certain employee compensation. . . .
       Sec. 4005. Continuation of certain air service. . . .
       Sec. 4006. Coordination with Secretary of Transportation. . . .
       Sec. 4007. Suspension of certain aviation excise taxes. . . .
       Sec. 4008. Debt guarantee authority. . . .
       Sec. 4009. Temporary Government in the Sunshine Act relief. . . .
       Sec. 4010. Temporary hiring flexibility. . . .
       Sec. 4011. Temporary lending limit waiver. . . .
       Sec. 4012. Temporary relief for community banks. . . .
       Sec. 4013. Temporary relief from troubled debt restructurings. . . .
       Sec. 4014. Optional temporary relief from current expected credit
                   losses. . . .
       Sec. 4015. Non-applicability of restrictions on ESF during national
                   emergency. . . .
       Sec. 4016. Temporary credit union provisions. . . .
       Sec. 4017. Increasing access to materials necessary for national
                   security and pandemic recovery. . . .
       Sec. 4018. Special Inspector General for Pandemic Recovery. . . .
       Sec. 4019. Conflicts of interest. . . .
       Sec. 4020. Congressional Oversight Commission. . . .
       Sec. 4021. Credit protection during COVID–19. . . .
       Sec. 4022. Foreclosure moratorium and consumer right to request
                   forbearance. . . .
       Sec. 4023. Forbearance of residential mortgage loan payments for
                   multifamily properties with federally backed loans. . . .
       Sec. 4024. Temporary moratorium on eviction filings. . . .
       Sec. 4025. Protection of collective bargaining agreement. . . .
       Sec. 4026. Reports. . . .
       Sec. 4027. Direct appropriation. . . .
       Sec. 4028. Rule of construction. . . .
       Sec. 4029. Termination of authority. . . .

134 Stat. at 469-97 (emphasis added) (bold face and capitalization omitted).

       The statutory context of the CARES Act reflects Congress’s intent to, in

large part, provide economic relief and economic stabilization in response to the

COVID-19 pandemic. With the exception of Title III and its emphasis on

supporting the health care system, the short title of the Act, its two divisions, and

the five other titles within Division A each set forth as their intended target

economic stabilization, financial assistance, or relief funding. Therefore, in

                                          11
No. 85031-8-I/12

addition to supporting the United States health care system, Congress plainly

intended that the Act provide economic relief and stabilization to major sectors of

the United States economy.

       Turning to Title IV, within which Section 4024 is contained, Congress’s

economic relief and stabilization-driven purpose comes into sharper focus.

Indeed, it is telling of Congress’s economic intent that Section 4024 was located

within Title IV, titled “Economic Stabilization and Assistance to Severely

Distressed Sectors of the United States Economy,” and Subtitle A, “Coronavirus

Economic Stabilization Act of 2020.” The same is so of those sections

neighboring the temporary eviction moratorium within Subtitle A, setting forth

emergency relief to taxpayers, continuing air travel service, guaranteeing certain

debts, providing relief to certain banking entities, authorizing foreclosure

forbearance, providing federally-backed loan mortgage payment forbearance,

and protecting collective bargaining agreements. These provisions expressly

regard stabilization of distressed sectors of the United States economy disrupted

by the pandemic. Thus, the statutory context of not only the Act in general, but

also Title IV specifically was to provide economic stabilization in response to the

pandemic.

       Therefore, by placing Section 4024 within Title IV, Congress plainly

intended that section to be interpreted in a manner that would lead to greater

economic stabilization in the relevant economic sector. The economic sector to

be stabilized by Section 4024 was rental housing and the potential for the

economic disruption of the pandemic to interfere with a tenant’s ability to make

                                         12
No. 85031-8-I/13

rental payments. This reinforces the interpretation that, in enacting Section

4024, Congress was concerned only with the instability created in the rental

housing sector by a tenant’s nonpayment of rent due to the pandemic.

                                         3

       The Amicus suggests a much broader interpretation of Section 4024,

offering that, because Congress did not specify an eviction basis in the notice to

vacate protections set forth in subsection (c), Congress purportedly intended that

those protections be interpreted as applying to any and all notices to vacate in

covered dwellings. The argument for this broad interpretation, however, is

unpersuasive.

       As set forth above, “we ‘construe a statute so that all the language used is

given effect, with no portion rendered meaningless or superfluous.’” Linville, 11

Wn. App. 2d at 321 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Swanson, 193

Wn. App. at 810). Indeed, “‘[c]ommon sense informs our analysis, as we avoid

absurd results in statutory interpretation.’” Linville, 11 Wn. App. 2d at 321

(quoting Alvarado, 164 Wn.2d at 562). “We avoid an interpretation that results in

unlikely or strained consequences.” Swanson, 193 Wn. App. at 811 (citing

Broughton Lumber Co. v. BNSF Ry., 174 Wn.2d 619, 635, 278 P.3d 173 (2012)).

       Here, the Amicus suggests that, because subsection (c)(2) set forth a

prohibition on notices to vacate during the 120-day eviction moratorium but did

not expressly set forth therein a basis for eviction from which such notice could

issue, Congress intended that no notices to vacate could have been provided

during that moratorium. Furthermore, according to the Amicus, because

                                         13
No. 85031-8-I/14

subsection (c)(1) required 30 days’ notice for evictions but also did not expressly

set forth a basis for eviction from which such notice could issue, Congress

intended that, after the moratorium ended, 30 days’ notice must be provided for

any eviction action.

       The Amicus’s proposed interpretation is unpersuasive. As an initial

matter, such an interpretation would render subsection (b)—the 120-day

moratorium on evictions stemming from nonpayment of rent—entirely

superfluous. Pursuant to such an interpretation, if no notices to vacate could

issue during that moratorium, no unlawful detainer actions could be initiated.

This would have the effect of entirely precluding evictions from covered dwelling

units over a four-month period. If such was Congress’s intent, then it would not

have included subsection (b), nor limited the temporary eviction moratorium

therein to evictions stemming from nonpayment of rent. To read such a broad

intent into subsection (c) would thus render subsection (b) superfluous.

       In addition, unlikely circumstances would result from the eviction actions

prohibited by such a broad interpretation. Starting with paragraph (c)(2)—

prohibiting the issuance of notices to vacate during the 120-day moratorium—the

Amicus’s interpretation would result in a far-reaching ban on a range of evictions

that Congress likely would not have intended. Indeed, applying such an

interpretation to eviction actions in Washington State, landlords would not have

been permitted to issue a notice to vacate in response to circumstances such as

a tenant’s substantial breach of a rental agreement or a landlord’s desire to sell

the unit or, in more extraordinary circumstances, a tenant’s criminal conduct or

                                        14
No. 85031-8-I/15

nuisance behavior on the premises, a unit having become uninhabitable or

condemned, or a tenant having engaged in unwanted sexual advances or other

acts of sexual harassment toward the property owner or another tenant based on

such individual’s race, gender, or other protected status. See, e.g., RCW

59.18.650(2)(a)-(p). It appears to us unlikely that Congress would have intended

to leave landlords helpless to evict those living in uninhabitable covered

dwellings for a period of four months or to condemn tenants to live for such a

period of time alongside those who engage in the listed antisocial activity. Thus,

the unlikely circumstances that might result from the Amicus’s broad

interpretation suggest that such an interpretation was not intended by Congress.

       Similarly, such an interpretation cannot plausibly be extended to a

permanent 30-day notice requirement for all covered dwelling evictions from

subsection (c)(1). Indeed, it is difficult to imagine Congress requiring a

landlord—or neighboring tenants—to wait 30 days for the eviction of a tenant

engaging in criminal activity or nuisance on the premises. Thus, a broad

interpretation that Congress intended that the notice protections of subsection (c)

apply to notices to vacate for any eviction would cause subsection (b) to be

superfluous and would lead to absurd and unlikely circumstances. Accordingly,

the Amicus’s alternate interpretation cannot reflect the intention of Congress.

                                         C

       The Housing Authority asserts that the decisional authority from

jurisdictions outside of Washington that have addressed this issue have uniformly

adopted the interpretation presented herein. The Housing Authority is correct.

                                         15
No. 85031-8-I/16

        In a Connecticut superior court case, W. Haven Hous. Auth. v. Armstrong,

Superior Court, Judicial District of New Haven, 2021 WL 2775095, the judge

therein concluded that the CARES Act did not require a housing authority to

provide 30 days’ notice to vacate to evict Armstrong when the eviction action

stemmed from her serious nuisance on the premises.10 Armstrong, at *3. The

judge reasoned that

        the language of the Act is clear. Section 4024(b) expressly provides
        a moratorium related to residential summary process actions
        commenced on the basis of nonpayment of rent. Subsection (c) of
        the same section, 4024 describes the requirements for the notice to
        vacate and expressly refers back to subsection (b). Specifically,
        this subsection (c), upon which the defendant relies; expressly
        states that the lessor of the covered dwelling unit must provide 30
        days’ notice “and” may not issue said notice “until after the
        expiration of the period described in subsection (b).”
                The plain language of the Act provides that the two
        subsections are integrally related, and the notice at issue is one for
        nonpayment of rent. The word “and” is conjunctive. “The word ‘or’
        can never be substituted for ‘and’ in a statute when the meaning of
        the language used in the statute is plain and there is nothing in it to
        call for the substitution. Courts will construe ‘or’ as ‘and,’ and vice
        versa, only where from the context of other provisions of the
        statute, or from former laws relating to the same subject and
        indicating the policy of the State thereon, such clearly appears to
        have been the legislative intent. 25 R.C.L., Statutes, § 226, p. 977;
        Sutherland, Statutory Construction (1943, 3rd ed.), § 4923, p. 450.”
        Macri v. Liquor Control Commission, 113 Conn. Sup. 206, 208
        (1945).
                In reading the language of the Act as a whole, the plain and
        unambiguous language supports that the 30-day notice
        requirement is applicable to nonpayment of rent cases only and not
        to cases such as this one brought for serious nuisance. . . . While
        the defendant notes that there are no Connecticut state or federal
        cases that have addressed this issue in other than nonpayment of
        rent cases, there is good reason for that; specifically because those
        are indeed the cases to which these sections apply.

        10 We cite to this decision pursuant to GR 14.1(b), in light of Connecticut’s repeal of

Connecticut Superior Court Rule 5-9, which had previously prohibited citation to opinions not
officially published in Connecticut.

                                                 16
No. 85031-8-I/17

Armstrong, at *3.

        Similarly, in Watson v. Vici Community Development Corp., No. 20-1011,

2022 WL 910155 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 28, 2022) (unpublished), the federal district

court judge therein implicitly concluded that Section 4024’s 30-day notice to

vacate paragraph applied only to notices to vacate for nonpayment of rent.11

Watson, at *10. There, the parties did not dispute that the development

corporation landlord had not provided 30 days’ notice to Watson prior to initiating

the eviction action. However, they did dispute whether the corporation’s basis for

eviction was the absence of a valid lease agreement or Watson’s nonpayment of

rent. Watson, at *10. The federal district court judge denied summary judgment

to the corporation, finding that a genuine issue of material fact existed for trial as

to the basis of the eviction therein. Watson, at *10. By so finding, the district

court judge implicitly determined that the CARES Act required 30 days’ notice

only for evictions stemming from nonpayment of rent.

        Lastly, in CP Commercial Properties, LLC v. Sherman, 318 So.3d 445 (La.

Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2021), Sherman asserted that, contrary to Section 4024 of the

CARES Act, she was not provided with 30 days’ notice of the corporation’s

eviction action, notwithstanding that the action was predicated on her lease term

having ended. 318 So.3d at 446-47. The appellate court therein rejected her

argument, stating that

        [p]aragraph (c) sets forth when notice to vacate may be sent
        following the moratorium stated in paragraph (b). However, that

        11 We cite to Watson pursuant to GR 14.1(b), in reliance on 10th Cir. R. 32.1, for its

persuasive value only.

                                                17
No. 85031-8-I/18

       moratorium is not even applicable in this matter as it applies to
       “legal action to recover possession of the covered dwelling from the
       tenant for nonpayment of rent or other fees or charges[.]” The
       eviction at issue is premised upon the ending of the lease period.

Sherman, 318 So.3d at 449 (alterations in original).

       Each of these cases, in analyzing the plain text of the CARES Act, either

explicitly or implicitly adopted the interpretation presented herein. Thus, the

sparse decisional authority in jurisdictions outside Washington further reinforce

that the CARES Act only requires 30 days’ notice for evictions stemming from

nonpayment of rent.

                                          D

       The Amicus suggests that a report by the federal Congressional Research

Service (CRS), created after Congress passed the CARES Act, is a persuasive

resource that supports a broad reading of the Act’s 30-day notice to vacate

provision. We disagree.

       We need not resort to other aids of statutory interpretation if the plain

meaning of the statute in question is clear. As discussed above, the plain

meaning of Section 4024 of the CARES Act is clear: the 30-day notice paragraph

therein applies only to notices for evictions stemming from nonpayment of rent.

Nevertheless, even assuming that Section 4024 was ambiguous, the CRS report

offered by the Amicus is unpersuasive.

       The CRS report in question was issued the month following the enactment

of the CARES Act. It reads in pertinent part as follows:

               CARES Act Section 4024(b) prohibits landlords of certain
       rental “covered dwellings” from initiating eviction proceedings or
       “charg[ing] fees, penalties, or other charges” against a tenant for

                                         18
No. 85031-8-I/19

       the nonpayment of rent. These protections extend for 120 days
       from enactment (March 27, 2020).
              Section 4024(c) requires landlords of the same properties to
       provide tenants at least 30 days-notice before they must vacate the
       property. It also bars those landlords from issuing a notice to
       vacate during the 120-day period. In contrast to the eviction and
       late fee protections of Section 4024(b), which are expressly limited
       to nonpayment, Section 4024(c) does not expressly tie the notice to
       vacate requirement to a particular cause. Thus, Section 4024(c)
       arguably prohibits landlords from being able to force a tenant to
       vacate a covered dwelling for nonpayment or any other reason until
       after August 24, 2020 (i.e., 120 days after enactment, plus 30 days
       after notice is provided).
              Section 4024(b)’s and (c)’s protections, however, do not
       absolve tenants of their legal responsibilities to pay rent. Tenants
       who do not pay rent during the eviction grace period may still face
       financial and legal liabilities, including eviction, after the moratorium
       ends.

MAGGIE MCCARTY & DAVID H. CARPENTER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., CARES ACT

EVICTION MORATORIUM (Apr. 7, 2020),

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11320 [https://perma.cc/YRK4-

4BE9] (some emphasis added and some alterations in original).

       As an initial matter, the CRS report cannot be said to form part of

Congress’s intent in enacting the CARES Act. It bears repeating that such a

report was created not before Congress voted on the Act but, rather, after the

votes had been cast. Thus, no member of Congress voted in reliance on or in

confirmation of the assertion of arguable intent contained within the report.

       Furthermore, the CRS report does not express the proposition that the

CARES Act requires 30 days’ notice for all covered dwelling evictions. Indeed, it

does not state or present argument or analysis that such is the correct—and

only—interpretation of section 4024. Rather, it merely declares that it is arguable

whether the CARES Act does as much. That an interpretation of a statute is

                                          19
No. 85031-8-I/20

arguable does not signify that it is correct, accurate, or even creates ambiguity.

Smith, 22 Wn. App. 2d at 507 (a statute is not ambiguous merely because of

different conceivable interpretations (quoting Bennett, 166 Wn. App. at 483-84)).

In the end, the report merely sets forth a postenactment interpretation of Section

4024 that an argument that could be made for a broader interpretation thereof.

As analyzed herein, such an interpretation does not withstand closer scrutiny.

Thus, the CRS report does not reflect Congress’s intent, expressly endorse a

broader interpretation of Section 4024, or align with text and statutory context of

the CARES Act. Accordingly, the CRS report is unpersuasive.

       Furthermore, if we were to consider the CRS report, we would also

consider Congress’s enactments in the months following the passage of the

CARES Act. As discussed below, we find those enactments to be a more

reliable basis for legislative intent than the CRS report.

       As set forth above, in March 2020, the 116th Congress passed the

CARES Act. Nine months later, in December 2020, that same Congress also

passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021. Pub. L. No. 116-260, § 501,

134 Stat. 1182, 2069-79 (2020). Within that bill, Congress included a provision

titled “Emergency Rental Assistance,” which was contained within Title V—

Banking, set forth a rental payment assistance program and, notably, expressly

indicated that it was to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 9058a. 134 Stat. at 2069.

       The 116th Congress’s enactment of the Emergency Rental Assistance

provision would be a much better source of legislative intent than the CRS report

in interpreting Section 4024 of the CARES Act. The 116th Congress indicated

                                         20
No. 85031-8-I/21

that such provision was to be located at 15 U.S.C. § 9058a, immediately adjacent

to 15 U.S.C. § 9058, where, in the CARES Act, that same Congress had

indicated that Section 4024 was to be codified. This is significant not only

because the Emergency Rental Assistance provision set forth provisions

explicitly oriented toward economic relief and stabilization—appropriating and

allocating funds to be put toward rental payment assistance—but also because

the members of Congress were almost all the same as those who, earlier that

year, had voted on the CARES Act and Section 4024 herein. Given that, such

enactment and placement of such a provision is much more likely to reflect the

116th Congress’s earlier intent with regard to Section 4024 than an equivocal

writing drafted by staff members who were not elected to Congress and who did

not vote on such enactments.

       In January 2021, one month after the Consolidated Appropriations Act

was passed, the 117th Congress commenced after an intervening general

election. This Congress passed the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021. Pub. L.

No. 117-2, § 2912, 135 Stat. 6, 51-52; § 3201, 135 Stat. at 54-58; § 3201(h), 135

Stat. at 58; § 3206, 135 Stat. at 63-67 (2021). In that bill, Congress amended a

portion of the Emergency Rental Assistance provision and set forth three

additional provisions, one underneath the subtitle of “Ratepayer Protection,” titled

“Funding for Water Assistance Program,” and the other two, underneath the

subtitle of “Housing Provisions,” titled “Emergency Rental Assistance,” and

“Homeowner Assistance Fund.” 135 Stat. at 51-52, 54-58, 63-67. The 117th

                                        21
No. 85031-8-I/22

Congress indicated that those provisions were to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§

9058b, 9058c, 9058d. 135 Stat. at 51, 54, 63.

       The enactment of the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 by the 117th

Congress is a better source of legislative intent than the CRS report. A

significantly similar number of congressional members of the 117 Congress

voted on both the CARES Act and the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021.

Furthermore, the 117th Congress’s enactment similarly indicated that those

provision were to be located at 15 U.S.C. §§ 9058b, 9058c, and 9058d,

immediately adjacent to 15 U.S.C. § 9058. Those provisions, like the Emergency

Rental Assistance provision above, also focused on economic relief and

stabilization in utilities, rental housing (again), and homeownership. Therefore,

even though the 117th Congress’s enactment and placement of the listed

provisions are not necessarily a reliable indication of the 116th Congress’s intent,

such are nonetheless superior to an equivocal writing drafted by staff members

who were not elected and who did not cast any votes in the enactment of the

CARES Act.

       Thus, these later additions support the view that not only the 116th

Congress but also the 117th Congress saw the CARES Act as an economic

recovery and stabilization act and not as a means to make a general change to

all eviction actions nationwide. If we were to rely on either the CRS report or

subsequent enactments for an indicia of legislative intent, we would rely on those

congressional enactments, and not the equivocal staff report. In deciding this

matter, however, we should not consider the equivocal CRS report nor the

                                        22
No. 85031-8-I/23

subsequent legislative enactments of the 116th Congress or the 117th

Congress.12 None of those actions took place prior to the actual vote on the

CARES Act. Thus, they could not have influenced that vote. Moreover, as

discussed herein, the plain meaning of Section 4024 is clear, and we need not

resort to additional aids in statutory interpretation.

                                               E

        On January 9, 2024, Division II of this court published its opinion in

Pendleton Place, LLC, v. Asentista, No. 58118-3-II, (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 9,

2024), http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/581183.pdf, which concluded that

the CARES Act requires 30 days’ notice for all eviction actions in dwellings

covered by the Act. There, a housing authority had issued Asentista a series of

10-day notices to vacate stemming from three instances that, the housing

authority determined, constituted a substantial breach of a material term in his

rental agreement. Asentista, slip op. at 2-3. In reversing and remanding the

matter, the Division II panel concluded that the housing authority had only

provided 10 days’ notice to Asentista and that, pursuant to Section 4024 of the

CARES Act, he was entitled to 30 days’ notice. In so concluding, the panel relied

        12 The Housing Authority urges us to rely on an informal question and answer document

drafted by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and
discussing certain provisions of the CARES Act. HUD, CDBG EVICTION MORATORIUM Q&AS 2-3
(2020),
https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/CPD/documents/CDBG_Eviction_Moratorium_QAs_2020_05_18
_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/AL3V-N6GN] That document was created after the CARES Act was
enacted.
         We do not give this informal document substantial deference. There is no indication that
such document was created through a formal process. Furthermore, other than being consistent
with the plain meaning analysis above and drafted by an entity with a special expertise in the
matter herein, it is not significantly persuasive.

                                               23
No. 85031-8-I/24

on our decision in Pinzon and the CRS report, discussed supra. Asentista, slip

op. at 6-10.

       For the reasons previously stated herein, we respectfully disagree with

Division II’s reasoning and decision in Asentista.

                                          F

       Section 4024 of the CARES Act requires 30 days’ notice only for evictions

stemming from nonpayment of rent. Congress clearly intended that the

subsections of Section 4024 be interpreted as one, and when read as such, such

is the unambiguous plain meaning that follows. The economic context of the

CARES Act’s other provisions and persuasive decisional authority from other

jurisdictions reinforce that interpretation. Adopting the alternative interpretation

offered by the Amicus—that in the throes of the onset of a pandemic Congress

initiated an expansive and permanent nationwide program of landlord and tenant

eviction reform—would lead to unlikely and absurd results in rental housing.

       Thus, the plain meaning of the CARES Act is that it requires 30 days’

notice to vacate only for evictions stemming from nonpayment of rent.

Accordingly, the superior court commissioner erred by denying the Housing

Authority’s petition and dismissing its unlawful detainer action against the

Knights.

                                          IV

       As a final matter, we recognize that the Knights, to our knowledge, have

not received actual notice of this appeal. They did not submit any filings to the

                                         24
No. 85031-8-I/25

superior court, appear in the proceedings therein, submit any filings to this court,

or otherwise participate at any stage in this matter.

        It is undisputed that both the Housing Authority and this court sent notices

to the Knights at their last known address, the rental unit from which the Housing

Authority was seeking to evict them. However, it is unclear if the Knights actually

received such notice.13

        Nevertheless, it is well-established that the test for due process is not

whether actual notice is received, but whether the notice was sent in a manner

“reasonably calculated to reach the intended parties.” In re Saltis, 25 Wn. App.

214, 219, 607 P.2d 316 (1980) (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust

Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318, 70 S. Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950) (“within the limits of

practicability notice must be such as is reasonably calculated to reach interested

parties”); State v. Wenof, 102 N.J. Super. 370, 246 A.2d 59 (1968)), aff’d, 94

Wn.2d 889, 621 P.2d 716 (1980). Our Rules of Appellate Procedure set forth

that sending notice by mail to a party’s last known address may, in certain

situations, satisfy this requirement. See RAP 18.5(a) (citing CR 5(b), (f), (g)); see

also In re Saltis, 25 Wn. App. at 219.

        The record supports that the notice herein was sent in a manner

reasonably calculated to reach the Knights. The Knights’ last known address

        13 The record contains a declaration from a representative of the Housing Authority

stating that she affixed a copy of the notice to vacate on the door of that rental unit and later,
while at that unit, she personally delivered to Angela Knight a packet of legal documents
pertaining to the superior court proceedings. The record also contains a declaration from an
employee of the Housing Authority’s legal counsel stating that he mailed a copy of the notice of
appeal addressed to the rental unit in question. Our court staff also mailed letters, orders, and
rulings pertaining to this appeal to that address, but they were returned as undelivered.

                                                25
No. 85031-8-I/26

was the rental unit in question, and notice by the Housing Authority and by this

court was mailed to that address. Thus, although the absence of actual notice

gives us concern about the Knights’ due process rights, the notice provided

herein appears to have satisfied due process.

        The Knights may yet have rights or remedies available to them, including

the vacation of a mandate or vacation of judgment entered upon a vacated

mandate.14 Nonetheless, with the understanding that we do not have clear

answers to those questions, we reverse and remand this matter to the superior

court for the reasons discussed herein.15, 16

        Reversed and remanded.

        14 No evidence in the record suggests that the Housing Authority’s representations

regarding service of process are inaccurate. However, if the Knights can sustain an assertion of
prejudice arising therefrom, then the Knights “may move in the appellate court for appropriate
relief.” RAP 5.4(b). In such a scenario, it is unclear what rights the Knights might retain, whether
our appellate mandate would be effective, how much time they might have to challenge such a
mandate, and whether a superior court could enter effective monetary judgment against them.
          15 We do not award sanctions or appellate costs. In reversing and remanding this matter,

we leave it to the serenity of the superior court as to whether it wishes to do so on remand,
should any such request be made.
          16 We recognize that our decision today conflicts with the earlier Division II opinion

discussed herein. We also recognize that, as the prevailing party, the Housing Authority has no
motivation to seek review by our Supreme Court. Similarly, as the Knights have not appeared,
they will most assuredly not be the source of a petition for review. And, finally, Amicus is not a
party and thus is not an “aggrieved party.” This issue may escape further review, notwithstanding
its eligibility for such review. See RAP 13.3(a)(1), 13.4(a), (b)(2).

                                                26
No. 85031-8-I/27

WE CONCUR:

                   27