Court Opinion

ID: 9832669
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:05:40.154449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:49.992057
License: Public Domain

Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing.
For the first time, appellant in his motion for rehearing raises the question that tfie district court of the. Seventy-Eighth judicial *772district was abolished by the Legislature in the adoption of the Civil Code of 1925. Wichita county has three district courts, the Thirtieth, Seventy-Eighth and Eighty-Ninth. Under the title “Apportionment,” and under article 199, Rev. St. 1925, the present statute reads:
“30. The Thirtieth judicial district shall be composed of the counties of Wichita, Archer and Young; and the terms of the district court shall be held therein each year as follows :
“ ‘In the county of Wichita, on the first Monday in January, April, July and October, and may continue in session four weeks.
“ ‘In the co'unty of Archer, on the first Monday in February, May, August and November, and may continue four weeks.
“ ‘In the county of Young, on the first Monday in March, June, September and December, and may continue four weeks.
“ ‘All suits now pending in the Ninety-Second district court for Young county shall be and tlie same are hereby transferred to the Thirtieth district court.
“ ‘All process issued, bonds and recognizances made, and all grand and petit juries drawn before this act takes effect shall be valid for and returnable to the next succeeding terms of the district courts of the several counties, as herein fixed as though issued and served for such terms and returnable to and drawn for the same.’ ”
Under “78” and “89,” the statute says, “See 30th District.” We have noticed this omission in the article on previous occasions, and in this case on original hearing, but the question not having been raised, we did not discuss it. But it being a jurisdictional question, we will have to consider it, though raised at this late hour.
Under the head “Final Title” (Rev. St. 1925, p. 2419), and section 2 thereof, it is provided:
“Repealing clause. — That all civil statutes of a general nature, in'force when the revised statutes take effect, and which are not included herein, or which are not hereby expressly continued in force, are hereby repealed.”
In section 8 of this title, it is said:
“Gotorts. — That the laws now in force organizing the several district and other courts, or increasing, diminishing, restoring or defining the jurisdiction of said courts, and prescribing the times of holding said courts, except as herein otherwise provided, are continued in force.”
Under the law prevailing before the adoption of the 1925 Civil Code, the Seventy-Eighth district court was created, and the statutes provide that the term shall begin—
“on the first Mondays in March and September and shall continue in session until the Saturday night next preceding the beginning of the following term unless the business of the terms shall be sooner disposed of: Provided, that nothing in this act shall be construed to in any way affect the time and terms of the court of the Thirtieth judicial district in said county as the same is now constituted.”
See Acts 1915, c. 6, § 1; Complete Texas Statutes 1920, art. 30, subd. 78.
 Since section 8 of the “Final Title,” supra, especially provides that the laws organizing the several district and other courts, except as herein otherwise provided, are continued in force, it follows that the Seventy-Eighth judicial district court was continued in force as it existed prior to the adoption of the 1925 Code. See Republic Oil & Gas Co. v. Owen (by this court) 210 S. W. 319, writ of error refused. See the discussion of the effect of a revision, codification, and consolidation of previous laws in section 175, p. 924, 25 Ruling Case Law. But where the revision or codification especially exempts from repeal certain designated laws, such laws are not repealed by the revision or the codification.
We have considered other matters raised in appellant’s motion for rehearing, but believe we have sufficiently and properly disposed of them on original hearing.
The motion for rehearing is therefore overruled.