Court Opinion

ID: 9448897
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:48:25.18879+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:35.731208
License: Public Domain

KAUFMAN, Circuit Judge
(concurring and dissenting).
I agree with my brothers in affirming the conviction of Gregory, but for the reasons I shall set forth I find it necessary to dissent from the affirmance of Sumpter’s conviction.
I shall accept the evidence offered by the Government which may be summed up in this fashion. At approximately 2:30 of the morning in question, both defendants were in a car which pulled up opposite the Kimberly Hotel, at which Gregory had been living. Gregory was driving and Sumpter was seated next to him. Gregory entered the hotel and emerged approximately ten minutes later carrying a brown paper bag. Agents Ward and Ripa approached the car from the front. Sumpter knew Ward. He rolled down the right window and surreptitiously lowered a paper bag, apparently handed him by Gregory, and caused it to fall to the ground. It was agreed that Sumpter’s participation lasted “only a matter of seconds.”
Sumpter’s case presents a difficult problem for me. Since there was no independent proof of his knowledge of the contents of the paper bag or of any conscious implication in a narcotics conspiracy, the problem we have to decide is whether the statutory presumption of 21 U.S.C. § 1741 may be invoked merely upon proof of the momentary grasp of the bag and its lowering out of the car window. I do not challenge Judge Cashin’s finding that such did in fact occur; my difficulty is with the legal conclusions he drew therefrom. Judge Gashin believed that Sumpter had possession of the narcotics long enough to invoke the statutory presumption.
That notorious irritant Mr. Narducci of United States v. Santore, 290 F.2d 51 (2d Cir., 1960), cert. denied 365 U.S. 834, 81 S.Ct. 745, 5 L.Ed.2d 743 (1961), seems naturally to provide the focus of our analysis. This Court, speaking of defendant Narducci, stated:
“In order to make the statutory presumption contained in that section meet the test of validity we *539must define ‘possession’ as used therein so as to include only that type of control from which it could not unreasonably be inferred that the possessor was going to commit one or more of the specified acts which have been declared criminal.” (290 F.2d p. 64)
The statutory presumption is merely a rule of evidence which shifts the burden to the defendant of explaining his possession of the narcotics. It is usually reasonable to assume that one having possession of narcotics — in the sense of ability to control — knows that he has narcotics and knows that they were procured illegally. Since it is reasonable to deduce the presumed fact from the proven fact of ability to control, the shift of the burden to the defendant is appropriate. It is reinforced by the policy reason that it is easier for the defendant to prove what was going on in his mind, by way of excuse, than it is for the Government to prove that the defendant indeed did have knowledge of illegal importation. Where the possession is so fleeting and where the ability to control is so tenuous that it is unreasonable to deduce knowledge therefrom, then the shifting of the burden of proof to the 'defendant is improper. In Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178, 45 S.Ct. 470, 69 L.Ed. 904 (1925), the Supreme Court held that a statutory presumption is valid only where there is a rational and not unreasonable connection between the ultimate fact to be presumed and the fact proved.
The majority has summarily distinguished the Narducci episode, but I am convinced that the case before us is an even stronger one for reversal of the conviction than was Narducci’s, and the attempted distinction does not stand up. Narducci opened a car trunk and was allegedly in the process of removing a package of narcotics when, manifestly in fear of federal narcotic agents nearby, he returned it to the trunk after having it in his possession for “less than half a minute.” His furtive actions revealed a sense of guilt and of knowledge of the contents of the package. By replacing it in the car trunk, he concealed or secreted the package just about as securely as anyone can. Sumpter, in our case, might well have been told on the spot by Gregory to dispose of the bag, although Sumpter had no knowledge of its contents. He was sitting in someone else’s car, which, unlike the Narducci situation, is hardly probative of his knowledge of the contents of the package. He tried to dispose of the bag, but did a pretty poor job of “concealing” or “secreting” it, since he dropped it right outside the car in view of the agents. It is true that there was evidence that he knew agent Ward and that his conduct might thus have reflected a sense of guilt and knowledge of the contents of the bag. But this alone, especially in view of Nar-ducci’s case, should be inadequate evidence upon which to found a conviction.
If “ability to control” is the crucial factor, Narducci had a greater ability to control' the narcotics than did Sumpter— federal agents were not closing in, he could have thrown the narcotics on the ground, hidden them carefully in the trunk, put them in his pocket and driven away, etc. Sumpter had few of these choices — his receipt of the package from Gregory was much more reflexive, the disposal might have been done pursuant to Gregory’s order, and it did not result in anywhere near as effective a “concealment” as in the case of Narducci.
It has been urged, in an attempt to distinguish the circumstances relating to Narducci, that Narducci performed the negative act of returning the package of narcotics to its original hiding place whereas here, Sumpter committed a more “positive, affirmative” act when he lowered the brown paper bag out of the car window. I must admit that I am at somewhat of a loss to see the relevance to “ability to control” of the physical dichotomy of “putting back” and “throwing out.” What would the result have been in Narducci’s ease had he put the narcotics in a different section of the *540automobile trunk? Or left the narcotics on the rear bumper? Or under the car, or in its back seat? Was his ability to control any the less merely because he chose to return the package to the trunk where he found it?
The majority opinion cites United States v. Barrington, 291 F.2d 481 (2d Cir., 1960). There, the defendant took two packages out of a locker in an airlines terminal, and took only four steps before he was intercepted by narcotics agents. Despite his short period of possession, the statutory presumption was held properly invoked. But, would Bar-rington’s ability to control the narcotics have been absent if he took one or two steps away from the locker in which the narcotics were hidden and then turned around and replaced the package in his locker? I cannot comprehend how the precise physical placement of the narcotics bears upon the ability to control. If, indeed, it has no bearing, then I believe that it is unreasonable to presume that the fleeting possession of the paper bag in the case before us, for but a few seconds, without any evidence that Sump-ter knew what was in it, or that he knew that Gregory was engaged in a transaction involving narcotics, warrants an inference of facts requisite to conviction —knowledge of the illegal contents of the package and of their illegal importation, and specific intent to violate the statute.
It is a source of concern to me that my brothers are willing to distinguish so summarily the precedent offered us by the Narducci episode, which this Court sitting in banc — my brothers among that number — so clearly thought warranted reversal of the conviction. The in banc Court in Santore was overwhelmingly influenced by the fact that Narducci’s grasp was but "momentary.” Surely Sumpter’s grasp of “only a matter of seconds” ranks as “momentary”, if Narducci’s grasp of roughly half a minute does. My brothers’ use of such phrases as “effective” possession and “complete” possession, in an effort to distinguish Narducci, somewhat mystifies me. Our only concern is whether the application of the statutory presumption is a reasonable one, and to hold that it is here would, in the words of my brother Friendly, “give the act of touching an unwarranted talismanic effect.” United States v. Santore, supra, at 82 of 290 F. 2d.2 It is likewise a source of concern to me that the Government is content to rest its case upon such flimsy evidence, especially when the consequence can only be the imposition of a severe minimum sentence of five years’ imprisonment. There is no doubt in my mind that such penalties are necessary to stamp out the invidious traffic in narcotics; but they should also serve as a reminder that the Government’s zeal should not overcome good sense. “Our concern for efficiency must not outweigh our concern for individual rights * * * . Once we embark upon shortcuts by creating a category of the ‘obviously guilty’ whose rights are denied, we run the risk that the circle *541of the unprotected will grow.” United States v. Tribote, 297 F.2d 598, 603-4 (2d Cir., 1961).
I would reverse Sumpter’s conviction and dismiss the indictment.

. “Whenever on trial for a violation of this section the defendant is shown to have or to have had possession of the narcotic drug, such possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant explains the possession to the satisfaction of the jury.”

. I am also troubled by the extraordinary manner in which my brothers have read the trial transcript and drawn their inferences therefrom. From the fact that Sumpter knew agent Ward, my brothers conclude that it was Sumpter who warned Gregory and suggested that he hand over the bag so that he, Sumpter, could dispose of jt; from this, they are drawn to the conclusion that Sumpter must have known that narcotics were in the bag. There is not a single iota of evidence in the record that Sumpter communicated the fact of Ward’s presence to Gregory. If there is any inference which the record supports it is not that “the attempt to dispose of the narcotics originated with Sumpter,” but that it must have originated with Gregory. The evidence disclosed that it was Gregory who, in the middle of the night, was carrying narcotics across a quiet street; four unknown individuals (the agents) approached the car under such circumstances as most likely to have been observed by Gregory, who was no doubt wary of any strangers in the vicinity. It is therefore almost incredible to assert that it was Sumpter who initiated the disposal operation, a point not even raised by the Government.