Court Opinion

ID: 9570782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:26:13.828881+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:13:28.955117
License: Public Domain

WILKINS, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
A reading of this record demonstrates that the District Court, after an evidentiary hearing, acted properly and according to law in granting the defendant’s motion to quash the information against him on the basis that the prosecution had granted the defendant immunity.
The immunity statute, Utah Code Ann. 1953, Sec. 77-45-21, on which this case focuses, is set out in relevant part as follows:
In any investigation or prosecution of a criminal case, the attorney general and any district attorney or county attorney shall have the power to grant immunity from prosecution to any person who is called or who is intended to be called as a witness in behalf of the state of Utah whenever the attorney general, district attorney or county attorney deems that the testimony of such person is necessary to the investigation or prosecution of such a case. No prosecution shall be instituted against the person for any crime disclosed by his testimony which is privileged under this action, provided that should the person testify falsely, nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent prosecution for perjury. [Emphasis added.]
Transactional immunity is that type of immunity which precludes prosecution for any “transaction, matter or thing” about which the witness is compelled to testify. By contrast, use immunity prohibits the use of immunized testimony or other immunized information and also prohibits the use of any information directly or indirectly derived from such immunized testimony or other immunized information, but does not prohibit a subsequent prosecution based on independent evidence.
It would seem that the language of the statute, “no prosecution shall be instituted against the person for any crime disclosed by his testimony which is privileged under this action,” although not the traditional language of “transaction, matter or thing,” conveys a meaning more similar to that of transactional immunity. Furthermore, it is specifically set out that this statute confers the “power to grant immunity from prosecution.” Were the statute intended to be the use type, more precise wording would have been used, not precluding prosecution, but precluding the use of immunized testimony in a prosecution.
The State contends that a liberal reading of the statute, along with consideration of *1348public policy, permits the statute to be interpreted as providing for use immunity. The assertion is made that the language found in an Ohio use immunity statute, Ohio Revised Code 2945.44, which grants immunity to a person “from any prosecution based on his testimony . . .’’is similar to the language found in the statute in question, which declares that “no prosecution shall be instituted against the person for any crime disciosed by his testimony.” (Emphasis added.) The distinction seems obvious. For example, suppose that a witness, while under a grant of immunity, confesses to a crime. In Ohio, a prosecution may be brought, but it may not be based on the confession nor can the confession be used as evidence. However, in Utah, the witness cannot be prosecuted “for any crime disclosed by his testimony.” Since the confession discloses the crime, no prosecution for that crime may be brought.
The majority opinion would in effect extend use immunity to the defendant for reasons stated therein even though that opinion holds that there was an invalid grant of immunity. But I believe transactional immunity must be given to the defendant under our immunity statute and the circumstances of this case.
I do not agree that a deputy county attorney should be denied the power to grant immunity under the present statute, Sec. 77-45-21, supra, because it is couched in terms of “county attorney” and not “deputy.” A more reasonable and sensible interpretation of this statute and Utah Code Ann., Sec. 68-3-12(17), cited in the majority opinion, which allows the deputy to perform the duties of county attorney, would be one which upholds the right of the deputy to act in matters of immunity. And, I submit, this conclusion is reinforced by the practice and need of deputies in the attorney general’s and county attorney’s offices to assume the most awesome responsibilities in and out of court in performance of their responsibilities. They are members of the Utah State Bar and officers of the Courts of this State. And I therefore do not sense the “potential for disorder or for confusion, or even collusion” mentioned in the majority opinion if deputies exercise powers of granting immunity. I do believe a mistake was made in this case, but that should not become a basis for deprivation of the powers of deputies to act in these matters.
I turn now to the matter of alleged fraudulent inducement by the defendant, and in this matter, the facts are very important. Many are enumerated in the majority opinion. But it should be emphasized that defendant did not request immunity from anyone, and he did not bargain for immunity. He was quizzed by the sheriff’s detectives, his parole officer, and the deputies for several hours on three occasions without an attorney. Further he was granted unconditional immunity by the deputies without their inquiring of him about his being the “trigger man” or their placing any other conditions of his involvement in the crime upon the grant of immunity.
The District Court, after an evidentiary hearing, as noted earlier, made careful findings of fact and conclusions of law, which I believe this Court should sustain. The Court concluded in writing:
It is possible for the immunity granted pursuant to the aforementioned statute to be fraudulently induced by subterfuge or deceit, but such fraudulent inducement must be established by clear and convincing evidence.
Plaintiff in this action, the State of Utah, failed to establish that the immunity was fraudulently induced by the defendant.
And the District Judge made some very perceptive comments from the bench when he ruled in this difficult and emotionally charged matter, which are worthy of inclusion in this dissent. They are:
. immunity is not granted to people who are thought by the police or prosecutor to be innocent, or who believe that they are innocent; . . . immunity [in that instance] would be unnecessary . . . . Rather, it is a grant to persuade the culpable to speak . [and it therefore aids] in the investigative process.
*1349Immunity is granted in exchange for information needed. But . . . immunity ought not to supplant and take the place of the investigative process; that is, it may be the easy way out in many instances, it may be the easier way to get to the ultimate goal. But one vested with the power of granting immunity . . . [has] pretty absolute power [and] ought to proceed with considerable caution; and if the Government, having granted immunity, obtains an answer contrary to that which it hopes to get and which it expects, one ought not to say that that is a basis for again revoking an immunity granted . . . that is a risk that one takes in relying on the grant of immunity and in lieu of extensive investigations.
I believe the District Court should be affirmed.
MAUGHAN, J., concurs in dissenting opinion of WILKINS, J.