Court Opinion

ID: 9780988
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 15:05:42.731575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:51.705311
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 350
                   ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                       DIVISION IV
                                       No. CV-22-252

 GINA BETTIS                                    Opinion Delivered August 30, 2023
                               APPELLANT
                                                APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
                                                COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FOURTH
 V.                                             DIVISION
                                                [NO. 60CV-20-4516]
 AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL SERVICES,
 INC., AKA AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL    HONORABLE HERB WRIGHT, JR.,
 SERVICES, LLC; AND EVAN           JUDGE
 CONNOLLY BETTIS AND MEGAN
 MARIE BETTIS, TRUSTEES OF THE
 VICTOR L. BETTIS LIVING TRUST
                         APPELLEES REVERSED AND REMANDED

                          RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge

       Appellant Gina Bettis (“Gina”) brings this interlocutory appeal from the January 13,

2022 order of the Pulaski County Circuit Court denying her motion to compel arbitration

and her motion to dismiss the third-party complaint against her. On appeal, Gina argues

that this court should reverse the circuit court’s denial of her motion to compel arbitration

because a valid agreement to arbitrate exists. We agree, and we reverse and remand for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

       Before his death on July 8, 2020, Gina’s husband, Victor L. Bettis (“Victor”), owned

an Ameriprise IRA account (“Victor’s IRA”). Gina was the beneficiary named in Victor’s

IRA. Following his death, Gina, through the advice of Ameriprise Financial acting through
its representative, Doug Wilson, her financial advisor, exercised her right to roll over Victor’s

IRA into an IRA of her own, thereby designating herself as the account owner (hereafter

referred to as “Gina’s IRA”). This IRA was established, fully funded, and vested on July 24,

2020––sixteen days after Victor’s death.

       On August 17, Evan Connolly Bettis and Megan Marie Bettis (“Trustees”), Victor’s

two children from a prior marriage, filed suit as the Trustees of the Victor L. Bettis Living

Trust against Ameriprise Financial Services, Inc., d/b/a Ameriprise Financial Services, LLC

(“Ameriprise”), and Doug Wilson. In their complaint, they allege that during his lifetime,

Victor established the Victor L. Bettis Living Trust on March 18, 2020; pursuant to the terms

of the trust, Victor’s IRA was to become an asset of the trust. They further allege that they

are the successor Trustees of the Victor L. Bettis Living Trust, which became irrevocable

upon Victor’s death.

       They also allege that a “Tax-Qualified Accounts Designation” was executed that

changed the beneficiary of Victor’s IRA from Gina to the Victor L. Bettis Living Trust and

was forwarded by Victor’s estate-planning attorney to Doug Wilson, the Ameriprise

representative. The Trustees allege that Ameriprise negligently failed to timely process the

beneficiary-change request prior to Victor’s death on July 8, 2020. As a result of such

negligence, Gina–rather than Victor’s trust–remained the beneficiary when Victor died.

       The Trustees assert a claim against Ameriprise and Doug Wilson for their negligence

in not timely processing the change-of-beneficiary form. The Trustees do not assert a claim

against Gina, nor do they assert any claim to Gina’s IRA.

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       On October 29, 2020, Ameriprise filed its third-party complaint and counterclaim

for interpleader against Gina. After Victor’s death on July 8, the proceeds of Victor’s IRA

were used to fund Gina’s IRA. Ameriprise acknowledges that at an undetermined time, it

froze or otherwise restricted the funds in Gina’s IRA.

       Ameriprise alleged that Gina’s IRA ownership conflicts with the Trustees’ contention

that Ameriprise and its representative were negligent. Even though the Trustees assert

neither a claim against Gina nor a claim to Gina’s IRA, Ameriprise contends that the

Trustees and Gina have conflicting claims to the funds in Gina’s IRA, and Ameriprise should

therefore be permitted to interplead Gina’s IRA and be absolved from further liability to

Gina for her IRA.

       On November 19, Gina filed a motion to dismiss the third-party complaint against

her. She pled that the third-party plaintiff, Ameriprise, did not attach to its complaint copies

of Victor’s IRA, the Tax-Qualified Accounts Designation, or Gina’s IRA, all of which are

written documents upon which the third-party plaintiff bases its claims and are required

attachments pursuant to Rule 10(d) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.

       The same day, Gina filed a separate motion to compel arbitration. After reciting some

of the procedural history of the controversy, she alleges that in their complaint, the Trustees

do not claim ownership of Gina’s IRA, or even mention it.

       Gina argues, and we agree, that Gina’s IRA is a written contract between her and

Ameriprise. It is dated July 24, 2020, and it clearly contains the parties’ agreement to

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arbitrate. On page 6 of Gina’s IRA, immediately above the signatures of Gina and Doug

Wilson, the following appears in bold type:

        You understand that your IRA is governed by a predispute arbitration clause,
        found in the custodial agreement in Article III, Number 14, Page 9 of ‘Your Guide
        to IRAs,’ Article III, Number 14, Page 8 of ‘Your Guide to SIMPLE IRAs,’ and
        Article IX, Number 14, Page 8 of ‘Your Guide to Roth IRAs.’ You acknowledge
        receipt of the predispute arbitration clause.

        On December 3, Ameriprise and Doug Wilson filed their response to Gina’s motion

to compel arbitration and filed their own countermotion to compel arbitration as to all

parties or dismiss the complaint for failure to join a necessary party. In it, Ameriprise and

Doug Wilson do not specifically deny the allegations in the motion to compel, nor do they

deny that Gina’s IRA contains a specific agreement to arbitrate any controversy or claim with

Gina.

        Instead, they argue their reasons for contending that either the Trustees be required

to join in any arbitration or that the lawsuit be dismissed. The circuit court did not rule on

their countermotion to compel arbitration as to all parties or dismiss the complaint for

failure to join a necessary party. Consequently, their countermotion is not ripe for appellate

review. “Ripeness is a jurisdictional requirement, and we lack jurisdiction to consider issues

that are not ripe for appellate review.” Howard v. Jenkins, 2019 Ark. App. 15, at 6, 568 S.W.3d

771, 776 (denying appellate review of motion not yet ruled on by circuit court in

interlocutory appeal).

        On May 4, 2021, the circuit court held a hearing on Gina’s motion to compel. In its

January 13, 2022 order, the circuit court denied the motion to compel arbitration and

                                              4
denied the motion to dismiss the third-party complaint without stating its reasons. Gina has

brought this interlocutory appeal from the court’s January 13 order.1

       We review a circuit court’s order denying a motion to compel arbitration de novo on

the record. Courtyard Gardens Health & Rehab., LLC v. Quarles, 2013 Ark. 228, 428 S.W.3d

437. Arbitration is simply a matter of contract between parties. Id. We decide the issues on

appeal using the record developed in the circuit court without deference to the circuit court’s

ruling. Pine Hills Health & Rehab., LLC v. Talley, 2018 Ark. App. 131, 546 S.W.3d 492. This

court is not bound by the circuit court’s decision; however, in the absence of a showing that

the circuit court erred in its interpretation of the law, we will accept its decision as correct

on appeal. Diamante v. Dye, 2013 Ark. App. 630, 430 S.W.3d 196.

       On appeal, Gina argues that the circuit court erred in denying her motion to compel

arbitration. When asked to compel arbitration, a circuit court is limited to deciding two

threshold questions. The court must first consider whether there is a valid agreement to

arbitrate between the parties. On appeal, we look to state contract law to determine if the

parties’ agreement is valid, even though an arbitration agreement is subject to the Federal

Arbitration Act. GGNSC Holdings, LLC v. Chappel, 2014 Ark. 545, 453 S.W.3d 645.

       The circuit court must affirmatively find the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate

between the parties before conducting any further analysis. If the court does find a valid

agreement to arbitrate, then the court must consider whether the dispute falls within its

       1
        This court’s jurisdiction is pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure–Civil
2(a)(12).

                                               5
scope. Asset Acceptance, LLC v. Newby, 2014 Ark. 280, 437 S.W.3d 119. In answering these

questions, doubts about arbitrability must be resolved in favor of arbitration. GGNSC

Holdings, LLC v. Lamb ex rel. Williams, 2016 Ark. 101, 487 S.W.3d 348. Only when the court

finds affirmatively that a valid agreement to arbitrate exists between the parties and that the

dispute falls within its scope will the court consider any defenses to the enforcement of the

agreement. See Bank of the Ozarks, Inc. v. Walker, 2014 Ark. 223, 434 S.W.3d 357.

       Here, the circuit court’s order states only that the motion to compel arbitration was

denied. The circuit court did not address either of the two threshold questions. Moreover,

Ameriprise does not deny that there is an arbitration clause in its contract with Gina. On

appeal, it simply contends that the circuit court properly denied the motion to compel

arbitration because granting it would force Ameriprise to litigate “two sides of a family

dispute” in two separate forums. We hold that Gina’s motion to compel arbitration with

Ameriprise should have been granted. Therefore, we reverse and remand for entry of an

order consistent with this opinion.2

       Reversed and remanded.

       HARRISON, C.J., and VIRDEN, J., agree.

       William L. Owen, P.A., by: William L. Owen; and Hale & Young, P.L.L.C., by: Virgil W.

Young, for appellant.

       2
        We decline to address the circuit court’s denial of Gina’s motion to dismiss the third-
party complaint against her at this time.

                                              6
       Kutak Rock LLP, by: Andrew King and McKenzie L. Raub, for separate appellee

Ameriprise Financial Services, Inc.

       The Jiles Firm, P.A., by: Matthew K. Brown and Thomas V. Vinson, for separate appellees

Evan Connolly Bettis and Megan Marie Bettis, trustees of the Victor L. Bettis Living Trust.

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