Court Opinion

ID: 9387018
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-14 15:01:31.069537+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:10.690020
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-2257    Document: 36     Page: 1   Filed: 04/14/2023

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

    ZHEJIANG MACHINERY IMPORT & EXPORT
                    CORP.,
               Plaintiff-Appellant

                             v.

                    UNITED STATES,
                    Defendant-Appellee
                  ______________________

                        2021-2257
                  ______________________

    Appeal from the United States Court of International
 Trade in No. 1:19-cv-00039-GSK, Judge Gary S.
 Katzmann.
                ______________________

                  Decided: April 14, 2023
                  ______________________

     ADAMS LEE, Harris Bricken McVay Sliwoski, LLP, Se-
 attle, WA, argued for plaintiff-appellant.

     KELLY A. KRYSTYNIAK, Commercial Litigation Branch,
 Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
 ington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also repre-
 sented by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY,
 LOREN MISHA PREHEIM; NIKKI KALBING, JESUS NIEVES
 SAENZ, Office of the Chief Counsel for Trade Enforcement
 and Compliance, United States Department of Commerce,
 Washington, DC.
Case: 21-2257    Document: 36      Page: 2   Filed: 04/14/2023

 2          ZHEJIANG MACHINERY IMPORT & EXPORT CORP.    v. US

                  ______________________

     Before PROST, REYNA, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.
 REYNA, Circuit Judge.
      Appellant Zhejiang Machinery Import & Export Corp.
 appeals the judgment of the U.S. Court of International
 Trade that affirms the U.S. Department of Commerce’s fi-
 nal determination in the 2016–2017 administrative review
 of tapered roller bearings from China. Zhejiang challenges
 Commerce’s decision that Zhejiang did not qualify for a
 separate antidumping duty rate because it failed to suc-
 cessfully rebut the presumption of de facto control by the
 government of China. Commerce’s determination that
 Zhejiang was not entitled to a separate rate was reasonable
 and supported by substantial evidence because a labor un-
 ion is the majority shareholder with significant rights over
 Zhejiang and has overlapping membership with the em-
 ployee stock-ownership committee. Accordingly, we affirm.
                              I.
     In June 2017, the U.S. Department of Commerce
 (“Commerce”) initiated an antidumping duty investigation
 on certain tapered roller bearings (“TRBs”) from the Peo-
 ple’s Republic of China (“PRC”). See 82 Fed. Reg. 26,443
 (Dep’t of Commerce June 1, 2017); 82 Fed. Reg. 35,749–51
 (Dep’t of Commerce Aug. 1, 2017). Antidumping duties
 may be imposed on U.S. imports of goods that have been
 determined are sold in the United States at less than fair
 value, i.e., dumped or dumping, and that a domestic indus-
 try is “materially injured” or “threatened with material in-
 jury,” by virtue of the dumped imports. 19 U.S.C. § 1673;
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 ZHEJIANG MACHINERY IMPORT & EXPORT CORP.    v. US          3

 see, e.g., Diamond Sawblades Mfrs. Coal. v. United States,
 866 F.3d 1304, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 1
     An antidumping duty investigation may involve a non-
 market economy (“NME”). A non-market economy country,
 such as the PRC, is “any country that the administering
 authority determines does not operate on market princi-
 ples of cost or pricing structures, so that sales of merchan-
 dise in such country do not reflect the fair value of the
 merchandise.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A); see, e.g., J.A. 526–
 722.
     Investigated goods from a non-market economy coun-
 try are subject to a single country-wide antidumping duty
 rate. Sigma Corp. v. United States, 117 F.3d 1401, 1405
 (Fed. Cir. 1997). An individual producer from that country
 can seek to receive an individual rate (as opposed to the
 country-wide rate) if it demonstrates that the NME coun-
 try’s government lacks both de jure and de facto control
 over its activities. Id. at 1405. Only de facto control is at
 issue in this appeal. Oral Arg. at 4:55–5:04.
     To show an absence of de facto government control, the
 foreign producer can demonstrate that it sets its prices in-
 dependently, negotiates its own contracts, selects its man-
 agement autonomously, and keeps its sales proceeds.
 Silicon Carbide from the People’s Republic of China, 59
 Fed. Reg. 22,585 (Dep’t of Commerce May 2, 1994); see also
 Sigma Corp., 117 F.3d at 1405–06. If the exporter fails to
 meet its burden in demonstrating the absence of govern-
 ment control, Commerce can decline to issue a separate

     1   Generally, in an antidumping investigation, Com-
 merce determines the extent of dumping, and the U.S. In-
 ternational Trade Commission investigates whether a
 domestic industry that produces a like product (here,
 TRBs) under investigation is materially injured or threat-
 ened with material injury by virtue of dumped imports. 19
 U.S.C. § 1673(2).
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 4          ZHEJIANG MACHINERY IMPORT & EXPORT CORP.      v. US

 company-specific rate and instead apply to that exporter
 the country-wide antidumping duty rate. Ad Hoc Shrimp
 Trade Action Comm. v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 2d
 1315, 1320 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2013).
      On October 26, 2017, Commerce published a memoran-
 dum, “China’s Status as a Non-Market Economy” (the
 “NME Status Memorandum”), which discussed various fac-
 tors that the agency examines in making its determination
 on de facto government control, including the Chinese
 economy as a whole. J.A. 526. A key factor is the legal and
 institutional framework of trade unions of the Government
 of China (“GOC”). J.A. 545–548. The NME Status Memo-
 randum explains that Chinese labor laws permit employ-
 ees to join and organize trade unions and negotiate
 contracts, but the unions must be approved by the state.
 J.A. 545. In actuality, labor and management do not “carry
 out real bargaining” and “management does not even meet
 with the trade unions, and “just sends them a collective
 contract for ‘approval.’” J.A. 551 (internal citations omit-
 ted). In other words, “[f]ormal indicia of trade union mem-
 bership in China do not necessarily support a conclusion
 [of] free bargaining.” Id.
      The NME Status Memorandum outlines that the All-
 China Federation of Trade Unions (“ACTFU”) has been
 China’s official trade union since the founding of the PRC
 in 1949. J.A. 546. The ACTFU has a “legal monopoly on
 all trade union activities” and the ACTFU is subject to the
 control of the Chinese Communist Party (the “CCP”) such
 that trade or labor union leaders concurrently hold office
 at a corresponding rank of the CCP or government. Id. In-
 deed, “[t]rade union officials are officially employees of the
 Chinese government” and are considered, by Commerce, to
 be “government actors under CCP control.” Id. Addition-
 ally, State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration
 Commission of the State Council (“SASAC”) is the manag-
 ing entity of state-owned assets that has the power to
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 ZHEJIANG MACHINERY IMPORT & EXPORT CORP.     v. US         5

 appoint managers and board members of state-owned en-
 terprises but is influenced by the CCP. J.A. 608–09.
                              II.
      In 1987, in the underlying antidumping duty investi-
 gation, Commerce established a country-wide anti-dump-
 ing duty for TRBs from the PRC. Tapered Roller Bearings
 and Parts Thereof, Finished or Unfinished, from the Peo-
 ple’s Republic of China, 52 Fed. Reg. 22,667, 22,667 (Dep’t
 of Commerce June 15, 1987). In 2009, Commerce revised
 the rate to 92.84%. Zhejiang Machinery Import & Export
 Corp. v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 3d 1313, 1326 (Ct. Int’l
 Trade 2020) (Decision I) (citing 74 Fed. Reg. 3,987, 3,989
 (Dep’t of Commerce Jan. 22, 2009)). Since 2017, Zhejiang
 Machinery Import & Export Corp. (“ZMC”) had previously
 been granted separate rate status in prior reviews of TRBs
 from China. Appellant’s Br. 4, 32. An interested domestic
 party requested review of ZMC’s entries for a period of re-
 view of June 1, 2016, to May 31, 2017, and submitted data
 indicating de facto control of ZMC by the GOC. Decision I,
 at 1326–27; see also Initiation of Antidumping and Coun-
 tervailing Duty Administrative Reviews, 82 Fed. Reg.
 35,749, 35,749 (Dep’t of Commerce Aug. 1, 2017).
     At the request of an interested party, Commerce can
 conduct an administrative review of an outstanding anti-
 dumping duty order and, to the extent necessary, recalcu-
 late antidumping duties for the period of review. 19 U.S.C.
 § 1675(a)(1)–(2). In 2017, Commerce published a notice of
 opportunity to request review of the 2009 rate (“the 2009
 Administrative Review”). ZMC filed an application seeking
 a separate review.
                   CORPORATE STRUCTURE
   In its response to a questionnaire issued by Commerce,
 ZMC provided details about its corporate structure.
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 6          ZHEJIANG MACHINERY IMPORT & EXPORT CORP.    v. US

 Appellant’s Br. 6. According to that data, ZMC (or
 “Zhejiang Machinery” in the chart above) is wholly owned
 by Zhejiang Sunny I/E Corporation (“Sunny”) which is, in
 turn, owned in minority part by Zhejiang Province Metal &
 Minerals Import and Export Co., Ltd. (“Zhejiang MMI&E”).
 Appellant’s Br. 5. Zhejiang MMI&E is ultimately owned
 by the Zhejiang Provincial SASAC. Id. at 7. Sunny’s ma-
 jority shareholder, a labor union, was registered in accord-
 ance with the Labor Union Law of the PRC and Civil Law
 of the PRC and is registered before the Zhejiang Federation
 of Trade Unions, a provincial level branch of the ACTFU.
 Id. at 9–10. ZMC characterized Sunny’s labor union as the
 “nominal owner” of the majority shares because the ulti-
 mate owners were the members of Sunny’s employee stock
 ownership company (“ESOC”), which cannot have legal
 personhood under Chinese law or be assigned shares. De-
 cision I, at 1327.
                        CIT ACTIONS
     In July 2018, Commerce issued its preliminary deter-
 mination in the 2009 Administrative Review. Decision I,
 at 1326–27. After assessing ZMC’s corporate structure pro-
 vided in ZMC’s separate rate application, Commerce pre-
 liminarily found that ZMC failed to rebut the presumption
 of de facto government control over its export activities.
 Appellee’s Br. 5; Decision I, at 1327. In particular,
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 ZHEJIANG MACHINERY IMPORT & EXPORT CORP.    v. US          7

 Commerce found that Sunny’s labor union and the GOC-
 controlled SASAC together own 100% of Sunny and that
 Sunny, in turn, owns 100% of ZMC. Decision I, at 1327.
 According to Commerce, all labor unions are under the con-
 trol and direction of the ACTFU, which is a government
 affiliated “organ” of the CCP, and therefore, the GOC has
 actual or potential control over ZMC’s export activities. Id.
 at 1327–28.
      ZMC submitted its case brief that included a revision
 of the original translation of the ESOC’s Articles of Associ-
 ation, but Commerce rejected consideration of the new
 translation as untimely, and, instead, it considered ZMC’s
 revised brief without the translation of the ESOC’s Articles
 of Association. Id. at 1328.
     In February 2019, Commerce published its final deter-
 mination, which maintained the preliminary results that
 ZMC failed to rebut the presumption of de facto control.
 Decision I, at 1328–29. Commerce reasoned that Sunny’s
 labor union (the majority shareholder) was ultimately con-
 trolled by the ACTFU—an extension of the CCP—and that
 Zhejiang MMI&E (the minority shareholder) was wholly
 owned by the Zhejiang SASAC. Appellee’s Br. 9. Addition-
 ally, the ESOC and labor union are intertwined because all
 members of the ESOC are labor union members. Id. at 10.
      ZMC appealed to the Court of International Trade
 (“CIT”), challenging Commerce’s final determination, in-
 cluding the refusal to consider the revised translation of
 the ESOC Articles. Decision I, at 1329. The CIT held that
 Commerce erred in rejecting the revised translation of
 Sunny’s Articles and remanded the case, directing Com-
 merce to consider the translation and explain how Sunny’s
 labor union had the potential to exercise majority share-
 holder rights in light of the presence of the ESOC. Appel-
 lee’s Br. at 11–12; Decision I, at 1330.
     On remand, Commerce reviewed the revised transla-
 tion but maintained its determination that ZMC failed to
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 8          ZHEJIANG MACHINERY IMPORT & EXPORT CORP.      v. US

 rebut the presumption of de facto government control for
 several reasons. First, Commerce pointed to Article 20 of
 the ESOC Articles of Association, which states that “[t]he
 labor union members of [Sunny] may become members of
 the ESOC after approval of the ESOC, and may purchase
 and hold shares of the company according to their positions
 or achievements in the company.” Appellee’s Br. 12. Sec-
 ond, Commerce observed that ZMC’s separate rate ques-
 tionnaire response states that members of the ESOC are
 also members of the labor union:
     Sunny is majoritively (sic) owned by its labor un-
     ion, which consists of [] private individuals. In Ex-
     hibit 1, please see the Articles of Association of
     Sunny and the list of labor union members who own
     the shares of Sunny. Based upon the Articles of As-
     sociation, the majority shareholder, i.e., Sunny’s la-
     bor union, takes majority members of the board of
     directors and majority voting rights over all im-
     portant decisions of Sunny within the board of di-
     rectors. The board of directors, which is controlled
     by the majority shareholder, also appointed the
     general manager who is in return responsible for
     all daily activities of Sunny.
 Id. at 13 (citing J.A. 803) (emphases in original). Third,
 Commerce did not distinguish labor union membership
 from leadership, noting that the GOC “has the ability to
 control labor union members to the same extent as labor
 union leaders” and that collectively, these individuals, who
 are members of the labor union, direct the equity owner-
 ship of Sunny through the ESOC by selecting management
 and the directors. Id. at 9, 13–15, 48–49 (citing J.A. 782,
 804–05).
     ZMC challenged Commerce’s determination, asserting
 that Commerce had changed its position to rely entirely on
 the premise that the CCP controlled Sunny because some
 owners of Sunny were also members of the labor union.
 Zhejiang Machinery Import & Export Corp. v. United
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 ZHEJIANG MACHINERY IMPORT & EXPORT CORP.    v. US          9

 States, 521 F. Supp. 3d 1345, 1350 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2021)
 (Decision II). The CIT reviewed Commerce’s remand de-
 termination and affirmed Commerce’s determination that
 ZMC had failed to rebut the presumption of government de
 facto control. Id. at 1351. ZMC appealed. We have juris-
 diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5).
                         DISCUSSION
     We review a judgment of the Court of International
 Trade de novo, reapplying the same standard of review ap-
 plied by that court in its review of Commerce’s antidump-
 ing duty determinations. See NEXTEEL Co. v. United
 States, 28 F.4th 1226, 1233 (Fed. Cir. 2022). As such, we
 review Commerce’s findings for substantial evidence. Id.
 Substantial evidence is “evidence that a reasonable mind
 might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” SeAH
 Steel VINA Corp. v. United States, 950 F.3d 833, 840 (Fed.
 Cir. 2020) (citation omitted); see also Nippon Steel Corp. v.
 United States, 337 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
      On appeal, ZMC contends that the corporate structure
 here differs from other cases where Commerce has denied
 separate rate status to an exporter that was either directly
 or indirectly owned by a company with majority sharehold-
 ing held by a SASAC entity. Appellant’s Br. 19. ZMC as-
 serts that the SASAC entity in this case only held an
 “indirect minority shareholding.” Id. (emphasis in origi-
 nal). The record evidence, ZMC believes, shows that the
 union could not exercise any control—actual or potential—
 over the corporation because the union could not make cap-
 ital contributions and, consequently, had no voting rights.
 Oral Arg. at 3:43–4:03. ZMC argues that Commerce should
 have focused on the majority of the corporation’s shares be-
 ing held by the twenty individual employees who formed
 the ESOC because they had true voting rights while the
 labor union’s possession of those shares were nominal. Ap-
 pellant’s Br. 20; Oral Arg. at 3:56–4:11. ZMC claims that
 mere passive membership of the ESOC in a labor union
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 10         ZHEJIANG MACHINERY IMPORT & EXPORT CORP.      v. US

 where they participate only in non-union activities is not
 enough to establish the GOC’s control. Appellant’s Br. 20.
      The government argues that the NME Status Memo-
 randum explains how the Chinese union structure shows
 government involvement and is evidence of a “top-down,
 state-led approach to collective bargaining in China [that]
 essentially produces government-managed outcomes.” Ap-
 pellee’s Br. 26–27 (citing J.A. 551). While ZMC’s question-
 naire response and case brief assert that the union is a
 nominal majority shareholder, the government contends
 that the Articles of Association do not limit the labor un-
 ion’s power—let alone “carve out any rights for the ESOC.”
 Id. at 37–38. The government explains that the union can
 still appoint board members who control operations and
 price setting, can still vote on shareholder resolutions, and
 can still determine the disposition of profits. Id. at 39. Ad-
 ditionally, the government asserts that Zhejiang MMI&E,
 the state-owned minority owner of ZMC, has significant
 control over Sunny because it can elect two out of five board
 members. Id. at 39–40. So, not only are Sunny’s employees
 members of the union, but the union itself is the majority
 shareholder. Id. at 41. Therefore, the government argues,
 the GOC could exert influence over Sunny and ZMC if it
 wanted to. Id.
     As the CIT has noted, “[w]here a majority shareholder
 has potential control[,] that control is, for all intents and
 purposes, actual control.” An Giang Fisheries Imp. & Exp.
 Joint Stock Co. v. United States, 284 F. Supp. 3d 1350, 1359
 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2018). The mere presence of a government-
 owned minority shareholder may not be sufficient to estab-
 lish de facto government control. Id. at 1359, 61–62. But
 where evidence of additional indicia of control shows that
 the minority shareholder could exercise its right to con-
 trol—such as Articles of Association without restrictions on
 the minority shareholder’s rights, or evidence that the mi-
 nority shareholder stifled other shareholders’ opportunity
 to put competing nominations to the board or indirectly
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 ZHEJIANG MACHINERY IMPORT & EXPORT CORP.    v. US         11

 appointed board members—a determination of de facto
 government control is reasonable. Id. at 1361–64.
      There is no dispute that the labor union is the legal
 majority shareholder of ZMC. Oral Arg. at 8:42–8:48. The
 record demonstrates that the labor union is a majority
 shareholder of and has influence over Sunny, which owns
 100% of ZMC. Corporate documents show that the labor
 union is the majority shareholder; the union voted to ap-
 point the corporation’s general manager and board mem-
 bers; one of the twenty ESOC members is both a union
 member and a union official; and the remaining ESOC
 members are also union members. J.A. 785; Appellee’s Br.
 13, 24; Oral Arg. at 18:29–35. Commerce’s NME Status
 Memorandum explains that (1) workers in China have
 “limited collective bargaining power because they lack the
 freedom to associate and assemble and the right to strike,”
 J.A. 551, and (2) all labor unions are ultimately under the
 control of the ACTFU and—by extension—the CCP, J.A.
 785. Even if ZMC were correct that the ESOC exercises
 majority shareholder rights, the common membership of
 the ESOC members with the labor union (and one union
 official) shows that the GOC has the potential to exercise
 control over the ESOC through its labor union members
 and, consequently, over Sunny and ZMC. J.A. 805–06;
 Oral Arg. at 15:49–16:34, 17:17. Even ZMC’s minority
 shareholder, which is owned by a SASAC entity, has the
 power to appoint two board members, thereby having at
 least the potential to control ZMC—if not actual control
 over the corporation.
      ZMC’s corporate documents do not support its argu-
 ment that the labor union cannot exercise any voting rights
 as the legal majority shareholder. Article 11 of Sunny’s Ar-
 ticles of Association lists “Zhejiang Province Metals and
 Minerals Import and Export Co., Ltd.” as Shareholder A
 and “Labor Union of Zhejiang Sunny I/E Co., Ltd.” as
 Shareholder B. J.A. 149. Article 12(1) gives the sharehold-
 ers the right to participate in meetings and “exercise voting
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 12         ZHEJIANG MACHINERY IMPORT & EXPORT CORP.      v. US

 rights . . . in proportion to their capital contribution.” Id.
 at 149. While ZMC argues that this proportionality of
 rights hinges on capital contributions, and the union can-
 not legally make any capital contributions, ZMC has not
 shown whether all shareholder rights are tethered to capi-
 tal contributions. For example, Article 12(3) gives “share-
 holders of the Company” the right to “elect and be elected
 as director or supervisor of the Company,” and Article 12(5)
 permits shareholders to “exercise the priority purchase
 right.” Id. Article 14 provides that the “board of share-
 holders of the Company shall be composed by both of its
 shareholders” as the “organ of authority of the Company.”
 Id. Article 21 explains that the Board is accountable to the
 shareholders (including the labor union) and “shall” “de-
 cide on business plans and investment plans,” formulate
 the annual budget, formulate the “profit distribution plans
 and plans for making up losses,” and decide on the “inter-
 nal management organization.” Id. at 150; see Tapered
 Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished and Unfin-
 ished from the People’s Republic of China: Factual Infor-
 mation Regarding Zhejiang Machinery (Oct. 2, 2017), P.R.
 109 (“ZMC October Submission”); Appellee’s Br. 10. Article
 27 provides that the company “shall have a board of super-
 visors, which shall have three members,” and that board is
 to be “appointed by the board of shareholders.” J.A. 151.
 These shareholder rights do not appear to be expressly tied
 to a shareholder’s capital contributions from the Articles.
     The record does not disclose an instance where Sunny
 was unable to exercise its rights as a majority shareholder
 due to GOC influence through the labor union. Appellant’s
 Br. 22, 36–37; Appellee’s Br. 16–17; Arg. at 15:25–50. The
 absence of such evidence, however, does not necessarily ne-
 gate the potential for GOC control, particularly as the bur-
 den lies with ZMC to develop a full record and affirmatively
 rebut the presumption. Sigma, 117 F.3d at 1405–06; see
 also Decision II, at 1351–52.
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 ZHEJIANG MACHINERY IMPORT & EXPORT CORP.     v. US         13

      Commerce found that Sunny’s labor union had the in-
 herent ability to appoint board members who “in turn con-
 trol Zhejiang Machinery, including company operations
 and price setting,” vote on shareholder resolutions, and
 “determine the disposition of profits.” Appellee’s Br. 10
 (citing J.A. 783); ZMC October Submission. Sunny’s “Res-
 olution of Shareholders’ Meeting” suggests that sharehold-
 ers approve board appointments. Appellee’s Br. 6. Board
 meeting minutes also suggest that only the board elected
 by the labor union voted on matters. Appellee’s Br. 48. Ar-
 ticle 20 of the ESOC’s Articles of Association states that the
 labor union members can purchase shares of the company.
 Appellee’s Br. 12. And yet, neither Sunny’s Articles of As-
 sociation nor its board meeting minutes mention the em-
 ployees or “ESOC.” J.A. 148–53; Appellee’s Br. 37–38.
 Accordingly, ZMC’s argument that the corporation is actu-
 ally governed by the ESOC is unreasonable and unsup-
 ported by substantial evidence. Contra Appellant’s Br. 50–
 51.
     Commerce has previously found an exporter’s labor un-
 ion membership relevant to the de facto analysis. See Ap-
 pellee’s Br. 42 n. 3 (citing Multilayered Wood Flooring from
 the People’s Republic of China: Final Results of Antidump-
 ing Duty Administrative Review and Final Determination
 of No Shipments; 84 Fed. Reg. 38,002 (Dep’t of Commerce
 Aug. 5, 2019), and accompanying IDM at 50 (“Thus, we con-
 tinue to conclude that [the company’s] government-owned
 entity, the Labor Union, which is under control of the
 ACTFU, exercises, or has the potential to exercise, control
 over [the company’s] export operations.”)). When “Com-
 merce has a routine practice for addressing like situations,
 it must either apply that practice or provide a reasonable
 explanation” as to why it departs from it. Save Domestic
 Oil, Inc. v. United States, 357 F.3d 1278, 1283–84 (Fed. Cir.
 2004). Thus, Commerce’s consideration of the labor union’s
 role in ZMC’s corporate structure was not error.
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 14          ZHEJIANG MACHINERY IMPORT & EXPORT CORP.   v. US

      Together, ZMC’s submissions demonstrate that the
 shareholders, including the labor union, have the power to
 select managers and keep the profit distribution—factors
 that Commerce has considered in establishing the pre-
 sumption of de facto control. See, e.g., Sigma, 117 F.3d at
 1405–06 (considering independent pricing, contract negoti-
 ation, management selection, and profit management).
 Given the legal framework of unions in China, there is no
 absence of control over ZMC from the labor union or
 ACTFU because the ESOC cannot negotiate its own con-
 tracts or organize as a legal person, nor is there any meas-
 urement by the GOC to decentralize control of unions or
 the union in this case as majority shareholder. Even if this
 is the first case where an exporter is arguing that the vot-
 ing shareholder is an employee stock ownership committee,
 Commerce’s determination of de facto government control,
 based on ZMC’s corporate structure comprising union
 membership and overlapping ownership with a union offi-
 cial, paired with an absence of support for ZMC’s argument
 of restricted GOC control over the ESOC, is reasonable and
 supported by substantial evidence. The CIT properly af-
 firmed Commerce’s remand determination denying ZMC a
 separate rate due to de facto government control.
                        CONCLUSION
     We hold that Commerce’s determination of the pre-
 sumption of de facto government control over ZMC was
 supported by substantial evidence and otherwise not con-
 trary to law. We therefore affirm the CIT’s decision sus-
 taining Commerce’s final results of redetermination
 pursuant to court remand that denied ZMC a separate an-
 tidumping rate. We have considered ZMC’s remaining ar-
 guments and find them unpersuasive.
                        AFFIRMED
                           COSTS
 No costs.