Court Opinion

ID: 9767550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:21:18.37961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:31.733568
License: Public Domain

MORRISON, Judge
(dissenting).
The majority holds that Vandall, supra, is not controlling. They say:
“The facts in that case (Vandall) are close to those here, but that case is distinguished from this case in that it appears that the checks there had been identified by a witness as having been passed and presented for payment at about the time the check specified in the indictment had been passed.”
In Vandall, we said:
“Dorothy Hill testified that during the week following (defendant’s) departure, she was notified by the bank that some of the checks in the amount of $1200.00 or $1300.00 had been presented for payment. Three other company checks, numbered 10464, 10468 and 10469 were introduced.”
The opinion in Vandall does not say what the majority says it does. It says simply:
“Appellant had possession of and passed one of the checks taken from the company, and it may be inferred that he took all twenty-one checks.”
In the case at bar, the State proved that all of the checks on this particular account were stolen in the burglary. Every major *119department store in the city called in to the injured party concerning forgeries on this account. Although it is true that no witness specifically identified this particular check as being one of those which was passed or attempted to be passed, it would appear that as much showing was made to identify the check in the case at bar as was made in the Vandall case. Martin Mor-achnick, President of the injured party corporation, identified State’s Exhibit No. 3 by necessarily including it when he testified that all checks on this particular account were stolen. Appellant had possession of two of the checks shortly after the burglary, and it may be inferred that he took and had possession of all of the stolen checks, including State’s Exhibit No. 3. Vandall, supra.
The three checks in question reflect the following common characteristics:
1. Appellant attempted to cash No. 2 at a Sears store, and No. 1 and No. 3 were cashed at Sears stores.
2. All three checks were made payable to appellant and signed by Dan E. Butler.
3. The evidence reflects that neither appellant nor Butler worked for Carpet Mart.
4. The same social security number (455-44-9536) appears on both No. 1 and No. 3.
5. The same driver’s license number and physical characteristics are noted on the backs of No. 1 and No. 3.
6. Exhibits No. 1 and No. 3 were both passed the same day.
7. All three exhibits were drawn on Carpet Mart through Lakewood Bank.
The majority admits that Vandall is close. I would hold it to be controlling. I am unable to perceive the distinction the majority is making, and, as I view it, it is a distinction without a difference.
Since State’s Exhibit No. 3 was almost identical to the other exhibits which were properly admitted, I am persuaded that its admission, if erroneous, was nothing more than harmless error.
I do not agree that Tomlinson v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 422 S.W.2d 474, is authority for reversal either. That case was reversed on the laxity and possible bad faith of the prosecutor as is apparent from the opinion.
I dissent to the reversal of this conviction.
DOUGLAS, J., joins in this dissent.