Court Opinion

ID: 9387081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-14 17:03:08.32574+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:11.214178
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/14/23 In re B.G. CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
           SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                  DIVISION TWO

 In re B.G., a Person Coming                              B323467
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.                            (Los Angeles County
                                                          Super. Ct. No.
                                                          17CCJP01670C)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF
 CHILDREN AND FAMILY
 SERVICES,

          Plaintiff and Respondent,

          v.

 MANUEL G.,

          Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Debra R. Archuleta, Judge. Affirmed.
      John L. Dodd, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Melania Vartanian, Deputy County
Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.

            ______________________________________

      Manuel G. (Manuel) appeals from the juvenile court’s order
terminating parental rights. This case comes before us a second
time following our conditional reversal and remand for further
inquiry into Manuel’s Indian ancestry pursuant to the Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) and
Welfare and Institutions Code sections 224.2 and 224.3.1 (In re
B.G. (Aug. 20, 2021, B309291) [nonpub. opn.].) This time,
Manuel contends the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to adequately
investigate his affiliation with the Chumash Tribe. We disagree
and affirm.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.    The Underlying Facts
      Manuel is the biological father and nonoffending parent of
B.G., who was born in 2018 to mother Kimberly. Manuel was
arrested and incarcerated in March 2020 for murder. Prior to
this arrest, Manuel had been in and out of custody.

     1  Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

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B.     The Proceedings Prior to the First Appeal
       A juvenile dependency petition was sustained against
Kimberly as a result of her substance abuse and mental health
issues, and B.G. was declared a dependent of the juvenile court.
At the disposition hearing, B.G. was ordered removed from the
parents’ custody and to remain placed with maternal
grandmother.2 Manuel was still incarcerated at the time of the
disposition hearing.
       The juvenile court rejected Manuel’s request for presumed
father status and denied him reunification services. Additionally,
the court found ICWA and related state statutes did not apply.
There was “[no] reason to know” B.G. was an Indian Child.
Manuel timely appealed from the disposition order.
C.     The First Appeal
       Manuel appealed on grounds the juvenile court erroneously
denied him presumed father status and found ICWA did not
apply. (In re B.G., supra, B309291.)
       We rejected Manuel’s claim of presumed father status. As
for his ICWA claim, an amendment to section 224.2 defining the
criteria for “reason to believe,” as opposed to “reason to know,”
that a child is an Indian child became effective shortly before the
jurisdiction and disposition hearing in this case. We concluded
specific references by Manuel and his relatives to Apache and
Yaqui heritage triggered the statutory duty of further inquiry
into Manuel’s Indian heritage. As a result, we conditionally
reversed the juvenile court’s order removing B.G. from parental

      2 B.G.’s half sibling was also ordered placed with maternal
grandmother. Kimberly and the half sibling were not parties to
either appeal in this case.

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custody and remanded with directions for DCFS to conduct an
adequate inquiry under sections 224.2 and 224.3. If the juvenile
court found ICWA applied, it was then to comply with ICWA and
related state statutes. If the court found ICWA did not apply, it
was to reinstate the removal order. (In re B.G., supra, B309291.)
D.      The Proceedings on Remand: DCFS’s Further
        Inquiry Into Manuel’s Indian Heritage3
        On remand, the court ordered DCFS to correct prior
deficiencies in its original inquiry into Manuel’s Indian heritage
by questioning parental relatives and other extended family
members.
        Manuel informed DCFS that only Patricia, B.G.’s paternal
grandmother, would know more about the paternal relatives’
Apache and Yaqui ancestry. In an October 2021 interview,
Patricia told the social worker that paternal great-grandmother
“had some Indian ancestry,” but Patricia was unsure which tribe.
Patricia also stated paternal great-grandfather “ha[s] some . . .
kind of Yaqui blood line and Apache.” Patricia added, “ ‘[M]y
uncle also has ancestry . . . . [M]y father’s brother unfortunately
. . . died about two months ago.’ ” Patricia indicated her cousin Al
(the uncle’s son) “ ‘[was] very involved with the tribe and would
know more.’ ”
        On October 22, 2021, Al told a DCFS social worker that
when “ ‘we were small, we use[d] to participate in [tribal] rituals

      3 Because the sole issue on appeal is whether DCFS met its
statutory duty of making further inquiry on remand, we discuss
only the facts and law pertinent to that issue.

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and gathering[s]’ ” until their father was incarcerated.4 Al said,
“ ‘My mother was part of Chumash in San Inez[;] my father[’s]
side[,] which is how Patricia is related to us[,] he [is] Pasqual [sic]
Yaqui.” Al explained because the tribe had refused to
acknowledge them, family members were unable to become
registered members. Al then went on to say his paternal
grandfather was a Spaniard and paternal grandmother “was
Yaqui”—referring to B.G.’s paternal great-great-grandfather and
great-great-grandmother, respectively.
       On November 16, 2021, Manuel’s father (B.G.’s paternal
grandfather) informed a DCFS social worker that he had no
Indian ancestry. The same day, B.G.’s paternal great-
grandfather declined to discuss his Indian heritage with DCFS.
       The bottom line: According to Manuel’s paternal relatives,
their affiliation with the Pasqua Yaqui Tribe could be traced from
B.G.’s paternal great-great-grandmother to B.G.’s paternal great-
grandfather to B.G.’s paternal grandmother and to B.G.’s father
Manuel. However, DCFS later confirmed that, in response to an
earlier inquiry, the Pascua Yaqui Tribe sent a letter on July 31,
2020, stating that neither Manuel nor B.G. was a member of the
tribe or had a membership application pending. All other
relatives contacted by DCFS stated there was no Indian ancestry.
       As for the Chumash Tribe, the only family member
supposedly affiliated with that tribe was the wife of Patricia’s
uncle. She is not in a lineal relationship through Manuel’s
paternal relatives.

      4 Although DCFS refers to Al as B.G.’s paternal great-
uncle, as the cousin of B.G.’s paternal grandmother Patricia, Al
appears to be B.G.’s cousin twice removed.

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       Presented with the preceding evidence, the juvenile court
ruled this was not “a case governed by the Indian Child Welfare
Act.” The court later terminated parental rights of Manuel and
Kimberly. Manuel timely appealed.
E.     The Instant Appeal
       In this appeal, Manuel argues DCFS again failed to comply
with sections 224.2 and 224.3. Specifically, Manuel contends the
Chumash Tribe was not asked whether his relatives were
members or eligible for membership.
                            DISCUSSION
1.     Standard of Review
       When the facts are undisputed, we review independently
whether the requirements of ICWA have been satisfied. (In re
J.L. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 913, 918.) However, where the facts
are disputed, we review the juvenile court’s ICWA findings under
the substantial evidence test, which requires us to determine if
reasonable, credible evidence of solid value supports the court’s
order. (In re Hunter W. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1467.) We
must uphold the court’s orders and findings if any substantial
evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them, and we
resolve all conflicts in favor of affirmance. (In re Natalie A.
(2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 178, 184.)
       Although the parties disagree on the applicable standard of
review, we affirm the juvenile court’s ICWA finding that DCFS
met its statutory duty of further inquiry under either standard.
2.     Applicable Law
       An “ ‘Indian child’ ” is any unmarried person under 18 who
“is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for
membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a
member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); accord, Welf. &

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Inst. Code, § 224.1, subd. (b) [adopting ICWA’s definition of
“ ‘Indian Child’ ”].)
       There are two separate ICWA obligations which are
sometimes conflated: the duty to give notice to a tribe, and the
duty to conduct further inquiry to determine whether notice is
necessary. Notice to a tribe is required, under federal and state
law, when the court knows or has reason to know the child is an
Indian child. (In re Elizabeth M. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 768, 784.)
The court and DCFS have a “continuing duty to inquire whether
a child [in a dependency proceeding] is or may be an Indian
child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) If the court or DCFS has “reason to
believe” that the child might be an Indian child, it must “make
further inquiry” into the child’s status. (§ 224.2, subd. (e).)
Under section 224.2, subdivision (e), further inquiry includes
“[i]nterviewing the . . . extended family members” to gather
additional information as well as “[c]ontacting . . . any other
person that may reasonably be expected to have information
regarding the child’s membership, citizenship status, or
eligibility.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A), (C).)
3.     DCFS Satisfied Its Duty of Further Inquiry
       Manuel does not challenge the juvenile court’s findings to
the extent they pertain to his Apache and Yaqui ancestry.
Instead, he maintains DCFS was required to ask the Chumash
Tribe whether Manuel’s paternal relatives were members, rather
than rely on cousin Al’s “ambiguous” statements.
       To be sure, an Indian child’s tribe has the exclusive right to
determine whether a child is an Indian child. (Isaiah W. (2016) 1
Cal.5th 1, 8.) But the tribe’s need to intervene arises only when
the juvenile court knows or has a reason to know the child is an
Indian child and notice must be given to the tribe. Here, because

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there was a reason to believe B.G. might be an Indian child,
DCFS was obligated to inquire further, which it did by
interviewing immediate and extended paternal family members.
The inquiry yielded a potential member of the Chumash Tribe—
the wife of a paternal great-uncle, who is related by marriage, not
by blood, to Manuel’s paternal relatives. We discern no
ambiguity in Al’s identification of his mother as Chumash. Thus,
there was no reason to know that B.G. was biologically related to
a member of the Chumash Tribe, so DCFS had no duty to notify
the tribe. Manuel’s argument to the contrary mistakes the facts
in this case and the law triggering notice to the tribes.
                          DISPOSITION
       The juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights is
affirmed.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                          LUI, P. J.
We concur:

      CHAVEZ, J.

      HOFFSTADT, J.

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