Court Opinion

ID: 9906815
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-05 14:25:12.767361+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:48:09.344230
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                         Washington State
                                                                                         Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Division Two

                                                                                         December 5, 2023

    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                         DIVISION II
 STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                                No. 57025-4-II

                                Respondent,

        v.

 BRITTNEY L. SCHUMATE,                                        UNPUBLISHED OPINION

                                Appellant.

       VELJACIC, J. — Brittney Shumate appeals her conviction for 10 counts of animal cruelty in

the first degree. She asserts the warrantless entry of her apartment should result in suppression of

all evidence obtained. She also argues that there is insufficient evidence supporting her conviction

of animal cruelty under RCW 16.52.205. Further, she argues that the superior court’s failure to

enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law for its trial decision requires remand. Lastly,

Shumate argues the superior court’s order requiring her to pay community custody supervision

fees is unauthorized and must be stricken from the judgment and sentence.

       We conclude that the search was lawful. Because the State concedes that the superior court

failed to enter written findings after trial in accordance with CrR 6.1(d), and the record as

comprised does not allow appellate review, we accept the State’s concession and remand for entry

of written findings and conclusions. Accordingly, we do not reach the merits of Shumate’s

sufficiency argument. Finally, we accept the State’s concession and additionally remand for the

trial court to strike the imposition of community custody supervision fees and to reconsider the
57025-4-II

deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) collection and victim penalty assessment legal financial obligations

(LFOs).

                                              FACTS

I.     BACKGROUND

       Brittney Shumate signed a lease with a termination date of February 29, 2020, for an

apartment in Longview, where she lived with her boyfriend and children. When signing the lease,

Shumate did not identify any animals living in her apartment.

       Come fall 2019, apartment general manager Brandi Bate commenced eviction due to

nonpayment of rent and lack of communication. Despite Bate reporting having seen Shumate at

the apartment in December 2019, she stated she received constant complaints from other tenants

regarding barking coming from Shumate’s apartment. But there was no answer when she reached

out to Shumate to tell her of the complaints in December.

       In January 2020, Bate filed a complaint for restitution of property and damages in superior

court. In the complaint, Bate noted Shumate received both a 14-day notice to pay or vacate in

November 2019 and a 20-day notice to terminate tenancy and vacate in December 2019 via posting

at the residence and through first-class mail.1

       Bate attempted to reach Shumate but was unsuccessful. On January 24, 2020, still unable

to reach Shumate, Bate called the Cowlitz County Humane Society Animal Control, unlocked the

door, and let them enter Shumate’s apartment. A total of 10 deceased animals were removed from

the apartment. In the process of removing the deceased animals, animal control took photos of the

animals and conditions within the apartment.

1
  Because Bate was unable to have Shumate served with the complaint, and Shumate was
apparently not present at the apartment, a show cause hearing on the unlawful detainer action was
not held. The matter was later dismissed in June 2020.

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II.    PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       On December 8, 2021, the State charged Shumate with 10 counts of animal cruelty in the

first degree. Before the scheduled April 27, 2022 trial, Shumate filed a motion to suppress all the

evidence discovered by the humane society. The superior court denied her motion finding she had

abandoned her apartment and, therefore, no longer had a reasonable expectation of privacy and no

ability to prevent Bate from consenting to the search.

       The trial court entered written findings and conclusions supporting its decision denying the

motion to suppress. First, the court found Bate had attempted to contact Shumate since January

of 2020 in order to serve her with eviction documents and inform her of animal noise complaints

but was unsuccessful. It further found that after animal noises suddenly stopped, Bate again tried

to contact Shumate and knocked on the apartment door without avail. Afterwards, Bate contacted

the Cowlitz Public Utilities District who informed her that services had been terminated since

December 2019. Consequently, Bate along with one of her employees, opened the door to the

apartment and saw unsanitary conditions, including animal feces, urine, and a deceased cat in the

doorway. Next, Bates called animal control and allowed them entry into the apartment where they

found trash and a number of decaying and deceased animals. Animal control removed the animals

and Bate had her employees clean and repair the apartment. The superior court concluded that

Shumate’s lack of response to Bate’s multiple attempts at contact and the inability of a process

server to contact her showed Shumate had abandoned the apartment prior to January 11, 2022. It

concluded that Bate’s entry on January 24 was lawful. Shumate waived her right to a jury trial

and the parties proceeded to a bench trial.

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III.   TRIAL

       Shumate’s bench trial for all 10 counts of animal cruelty in the first degree was held on

April 27, 2022. The court heard testimony from Bate, officers Nathan Stanyer and Tina Melton

of the humane society animal control, and Shumate.

       A.      Bate’s Testimony

       At trial, Bate recounted the events of January 24, 2020. Bate noted that on the day of the

search, the animal noises coming from Shumate’s apartment had suddenly stopped, so she tried to

contact Shumate. However, she had no luck. Bate then called the public utilities department to

check if there was electricity and heat but was told services had been shut off in December 2019.

After learning the power was off, coupled with a terrible smell emitting from the apartment, Bate

decided to conduct a welfare check. But before entering the apartment, she called the Longview

Police, noting there might be animals inside, and they advised her to call the humane society animal

control. She did.

       While waiting for the humane society to arrive, Bate and one of her employees opened the

apartment door. Bate could not enter the apartment because of how bad it smelled. But upon

opening the door, they saw a deceased cat lying in the entryway and “[a] whole lot of feces,”

“toys,” “clothes,” and other “stuff piled everywhere.” Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 57. Once animal

control arrived, she permitted them to enter the apartment while she went to her office to wait.

       After animal control departed with nine deceased animals, Bate sent some of her employees

into the apartment to clean. They found a tenth deceased animal.

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       B.       Animal Control Officers

                1.     Nathan Stanyer

       Next, the court heard testimony from humane society animal control officer Nathan

Stanyer. Stanyer stated that upon first arriving, he observed Bate standing outside the apartment

with the door open. Stanyer added that “[f]rom the outside, [he] could see . . . unsanitary

condition[s]: feces, urine . . .garbage.” RP at 64. And once Bate permitted him to enter the

apartment, all the clutter “made it difficult to even walk through the apartment. . . [and] [that] the

smell was so overwhelming [he] had to put [on] a . . .face mask respirator . . . to even proceed far

into the apartment.” RP at 64-65.

       Ultimately, Stanyer found a total of nine deceased animals in the apartment. He also stated

that he took photographs of where he found each.2 He testified that all the animals found were in

poor condition, emaciated, and covered in fleas, with two being just “bones and a little bit of fur.”

RP at 73. The animals were then taken to the human society animal clinic for examination by a

veterinarian.

       Three days later, Stanyer located Shumate at a hotel in Kelso. Shumate provided the

animals’ names and that she was the owner, but did not show remorse. Shumate also said she went

to a party in December and left the animals in her boyfriend’s care, but had yet to return to the

apartment since then. Lastly, Stanyer noted Shumate did not discuss a plan for subsequent care of

the animals after she left them in December.

2
  One animal was found “barely alive” by Shumate’s sister after Bate called her in an attempt to
reach Shumate. RP at 7. The dog was taken by the sister after she and Bate dug “feces and stuff
out of the [animal’s] nose so that it could breathe.” RP at 58. Bate informed the humane society
of the dog after it was taken.

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57025-4-II

               2.     Tina Melton’s Testimony

       The court also heard from Officer Melton. She noted that she was working dispatch on the

day of the incident and had dispatched Stanyer to the apartment following Bate’s call. She added

that she became involved once the animals were removed and brought to the humane society for

documentation and examination.

       Melton assisted Stanyer in taking photographs of the animals, noting some were just

skeleton and fur and others were intact but appeared severely emaciated. She testified that when

positioning the animals for photos, flesh and fur was “sloughing off.” RP at 86. She also testified

that all the animals were infested with fleas that were still alive and feeding on the deceased

animals.

       Melton also accompanied Stanyer when interviewing Shumate at the hotel. She noted

Shumate said she had asked her boyfriend for help with the animals for the first few days she was

gone but did not have a set plan after that, nor did she ever reach out for help from the humane

society, shelters, or animal control. Lastly, Melton noted Shumate did not express concern about

the animals when questioned.

       C.      Shumate’s Testimony

       Next, the court heard from Shumate. She stated that she went away for a week or two

around Thanksgiving in 2019, leaving the animals in the care of her boyfriend, Kenzie Lian. After

returning, she stated the animals appeared cared for. In December, she visited her parents and left

her boyfriend in charge of the animals again. She testified that she provided him with money to

buy the animals food while she was gone.

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57025-4-II

          Shumate added that Lian said he would take care of the animals after she went to the Kelso

motel upon learning she was being evicted. She said that originally, in early January, she had

brought one of the dogs with her to the motel but was later told she could not have any animals

there, so she returned them to the apartment. She continued, testifying that when she entered the

apartment in January to return the dog, there was power and heat, and all had food and water.

          Shumate stated she learned of the animal’s deaths when Stanyer questioned her at the end

of January. And upon hearing the news, she was very upset to learn they were deceased.

IV.       COURT’S ORAL RULING

          The court issued an oral ruling. In its ruling, the court stated that it was looking to see if

Shumate’s actions were a “gross deviation” from the reasonable person standard. It highlighted

that Shumate did not inquire about the well-being of the animals, along with the photographs taken

by Stanyer showing “disorganization within the apartment; clutter . . . ; [and] filth,” stating that a

person could not have taken many steps in the apartment “without having to step on or over

something.” RP at 130. The court further stated that one could infer from the testimony and

evidence that the last time Shumate did go to the apartment, it “probably looked relatively similar

to the pictures . . . arguably minus the animals in the positions that that the animal were in.” RP

at 130.

          Next, the court called attention to Shumate’s testimony that she was there in January and

indicated that everything was good and the animals were cared for by Lian, whereas a few weeks

later, the animals were deceased. The court then stated, “I don’t know how one can overlook the

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57025-4-II

status of the apartment with the number of animals that were in that apartment, and think that was

an acceptable way to leave those animals.” RP at 132. Ultimately, the court found Shumate

criminally negligent and guilty of all 10 counts. The court did not enter written findings and

conclusions.

V.         JUDGMENT AND SENTENCING

           Shumate appeared for sentencing on May 9, 2022. Shumate’s attorney argued she was

indigent and requested the court strike all non-mandatory fees. The court appeared to agree, saying

it would impose only the standard fees, which were the victim crime fee and the DNA collection

fee.3 A judgment and sentence order was entered. The order assessed supervision fees.

           Shumate appeals.

                                                ANALYSIS

I.         THE ENTRY INTO THE APARTMENT BY ANIMAL CONTROL WAS LAWFUL BECAUSE
           BATE, DUE TO SHUMATE’S ABANDONMENT, HAD PERMISSION TO ALLOW ENTRY

           Article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution provides that: “No person shall be

disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.” When considering

an alleged violation of a privacy interest, Washington courts ask whether the State has

unreasonably intruded into a person’s private affairs. State v. Sweeney, 125 Wn. App. 881, 885,

107 P.3d 110 (2005).

           [I]nterpretation and application of article I, section 7 requires a two-part analysis.
           The first step requires us to determine whether the action complained of constitutes
           a disturbance of one’s private affairs. If there is no private affair being disturbed,
           the analysis ends and there is no article I, section 7 violation. If, however, a private
           affair has been disturbed, the second step is to determine whether authority of law
           justifies the intrusion. Authority of law may be satisfied by a valid warrant.

State v. Puapuaga, 164 Wn.2d 515, 522, 192 P.3d 360 (2008).

3
     Shumate requests, and the State concedes, that the supervision fee should be stricken.

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57025-4-II

        Private affairs are not determined according to a person’s subjective expectation of privacy

but, in part, are determined by examining the historical treatment of the interest asserted. Id. But

if history does not show whether the interest is one entitled to protection under article I, section 7,

the court asks whether the expectation is one that a citizen of this state is entitled to hold. Id.; State

v. Hartman, ___ Wn. App.____, 534 P.3d 423, 432 (2023).

        A warrantless search violates article I, section 7 unless it falls under one of “‘a few

jealously guarded exceptions.’” State v. MacDicken, 179 Wn.2d 936, 940, 319 P.3d 31 (2014)

(quoting State v. Afana, 169 Wn.2d 169, 176-77, 233 P.3d 879 (2010)). Voluntarily abandoned

property is such an exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Samalia, 186 Wn. App. 224,

228, 344 P.3d 722 (2015); State v. Kealey, 80 Wn. App. 162, 907 P.2d 319 (1995) (police may

search misplaced purse to determine its owner even though they know it contains contraband;

expectation of privacy is diminished). Because Shumate does not challenge specific findings of

fact, we review only the trial court’s order under article 1, section 7 de novo.4 State v. Dugas, 109

Wn. App. 592, 595, 36 P.3d 577 (2001).

        Abandonment is primarily a question of intent which may be inferred from words, acts,

and other objective standards. State v. Evans, 159 Wn.2d 402, 408, 150 P.3d 105 (2007).

Therefore, the question is whether Shumate so relinquished her interest in the property that she no

longer had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

4
 To be clear, the only factual issue Shumate assigns error to and briefs relates to the trial court’s
use of the wrong year in its findings; that error appears to be a scrivener’s error. The court
generally does not consider an issue that has not been briefed or argued in a meaningful way.
Ameriquest Mortg. Co. v. State Att’y Gen., 148 Wn. App. 145, 166, 199 P.3d 468 (2009), aff’d on
other grounds by Ameriquest Mortg. Co. v. Wash. State Office of Att’y. Gen., 170 Wn.2d 418, 241
P.3d 1245 (2010). Accordingly, we do not address this further.

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       Shumate primarily relies on State v. Birdsong, 66 Wn. App. 534, 832 P.2d 533 (1992), for

the proposition that she did not abandon the property, so she maintained the sole undisputed

possession of the leased premises and therefore animal control’s entry into the apartment was

unlawful. Specifically, Shumate argues there was no evidence showing she planned to terminate

the lease, as she still had the keys and did not notify anyone that she planned to move out.

       Contrary to Shumate’s assertions, Birdsong is distinguishable. Birdsong moved out of his

rental home weeks before the end of the lease but left furniture in the garage. Id. at 534. More

significantly, after the police were called by the landlord, but before the police had entered,

Birdsong arrived to clean the home and remove his possessions. Id. The court held that the

evidence was insufficient to show Birdsong had abandoned the property and the search and seizure

without his consent was unreasonable violation of his private affairs. Id. at 538. It explained that

Birdsong himself retained the key, kept his possessions there, and was present at the time of search

because he was going to clean the house and remove his possessions. Id. at 539.

       Turning to the case before us, assuming Shumate retained her key and kept her property at

the apartment, the similarities to Birdsong end there. Unlike Birdsong, here, the facts show that

Shumate abandoned her apartment before animal control entered the premises. Despite Bate

seeing Shumate in December 2019, Bate received constant complaints from tenants regarding

animal noises in the apartment, and Bate reached out to Shumate but never received a response.

Bate also provided Shumate notice to pay or vacate twice via posting and first-class mail, but again

Shumate never responded or paid as she never received the notice. Then, after animal noises

stopped suddenly, Bate tried to reach Shumate but was unable to. Finally, when performing a

welfare check, observed obvious evidence of abandonment in the form of deceased animals, trash,

feces, and scattered debris. This evidence is a far cry from Birdsong’s active involvement in the

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subject home. The trial court did not err in concluding Shumate abandoned the apartment.

Shumate did not maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment. Accordingly, entry

was lawful and her argument fails.

II.    FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AFTER TRIAL

       Next, Shumate argues, and the State concedes, that the superior court failed to enter written

findings of fact and conclusions of law after trial pursuant to CrR 6.1(d). We accept the State’s

concession. We also conclude that, though we may in our discretion review issues even absent

findings and conclusions, the record on appeal here is insufficient to allow review. We may decline

to address an issue because the appellate record is inadequate. State v. Riley, 121 Wn.2d 22, 31,

846 P.2d 1365 (1993).

       CrR 6.1(d) provides that “[i]n a case tried without a jury, the court shall enter findings of

fact and conclusions of law.” The purpose of the rule is to facilitate appellate review. State v.

Head, 136 Wn.2d 619, 622, 964 P.2d 1187 (1998). Therefore, courts have frequently “refused to

address issues raised on appeal in the absence of such findings and conclusions.” Id. at 624. Oral

rulings by the trial court do not cure the absence of formal written findings of fact and conclusions

of law. Id. at 622. Nevertheless, failure to enter written findings and conclusions is harmless

where the trial court’s oral findings sufficiently explain how the facts met the elements of the

charge as they are “‘so clear and comprehensive that written findings would be a mere formality.’”

State v. Smith, 76 Wn. App. 9, 16, 882 P.2d 190 (1994) (quoting State v. Smith, 68 Wn. App. 201,

                                                 11
57025-4-II

208, 842 P.2d 494 (1992)); Head, 136 Wn.2d at 621-23. Here, the superior court’s oral ruling is

as follows: “I don’t know how one can overlook the status of the apartment with the number of

animals that were in that apartment, and think that was an acceptable way to leave those animals.”

RP at 132.

       The oral ruling is insufficient to permit review of Shumate’s assignment of error regarding

sufficiency of the evidence. Accordingly, we remand for entry of written findings and conclusions.

III.   FEES

       Next, Shumate argues, and the State concedes, that the superior court’s order requiring her

to pay community custody supervision fees is unauthorized under RCW 9.94A.703 and must be

stricken from the judgment and sentence. We accept the State’s concession.

       RCW 9.94A.703 governs community custody conditions and outlines which fees the trial

court must impose and which it may waive. Former RCW 9.94A.703(2)(d) (2018) provided that

“[u]nless waived by the court, as part of any term of community custody, the court shall order an

offender to: . . . [p]ay supervision fees as determined by the department.” However, the statute

was recently amended. The amendment removed the waivable community custody supervision

fee condition. See RCW 9.94A.703; SECOND SUBSTITUTE H.B. 1818, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.

2022). Although the amendment was not effective until July 1, 2022, after Shumate filed her

appeal, Division Three of this court recently held that the amendment to RCW 9.94A.703 applies

to cases pending on appeal. State v. Wemhoff, 24 Wn. App. 2d 198, 202, 519 P.3d 297 (2022).

We agree with the reasoning in Wemhoff and adopt it here.

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       Although Shumate argues that only the community custody fees should be stricken under

RAP 2.5(a), we exercise our discretion to address the DNA collection fee and victim penalty

assessment fee.    Recent legislative changes eliminated the DNA collection fee unless the

defendant’s DNA was previously collected as a result of a prior conviction. LAWS OF 2023, ch.

449, § 4.

       Similarly, RCW 7.68.035(1)(a), which imposes a victim penalty assessment fee “for each

case or cause of action that includes one or more convictions of a felony or gross misdemeanor,”

was also amended, allowing waiver of the fee if the superior court finds that “the defendant, at the

time of sentencing” was indigent. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 449, §1. Accordingly, the court should

reconsider the DNA collection fee and victim penalty assessment upon remand.                  RCW

43.43.7541(2); RCW 7.68.035(4)-(5)(b).

       Accordingly, we remand with instructions to strike the supervision fees, and for the

superior court to reconsider the DNA collection fee and victim penalty assessment fee in light of

the recent statutory changes.

                                         CONCLUSION

       We conclude that the search of the apartment was lawful. We do not reach the merits of

Shumate’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying her conviction, but instead remand

for the trial court to enter written findings and conclusions regarding the bench trial. Finally, we

remand to the trial court to (1) strike the requirement that Shumate pay community custody

supervision fees and (2) for the court to reconsider the DNA collection and victim penalty

assessment LFOs.

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57025-4-II

        A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,

it is so ordered.

                                                            Veljacic, J.

We concur:

        Glasgow, C.J.

        Price, J.

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