Court Opinion

ID: 9605687
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:40:47.991357+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:29.735600
License: Public Domain

Utter, J.
(dissenting) — I dissent. I believe the State of Washington has not properly assumed jurisdiction over the Indian reservations within this state, pursuant to Public Law 83-280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588.
The majority finds state jurisdiction over the Indian reservations on two rationales. It is argued that “[t]o now uproot the intergovernmental relationship that has developed over the years since 1957, by reversing our field and holding that state jurisdiction was ineffectively invoked is, in our view, legally unnecessary and would be not only unwise but manifestly unfair and unjust to those who have in good faith relied upon that jurisdiction or been affected by it.”
The majority also contends that the legislature’s enactment of RCW 37.12 is a sufficient compliance with Public Law 83-280 to vest jurisdiction in the State over Indian reservations. This conclusion is supported by two theories. First, the Enabling Act9 and Const, art. 2610 concern them*186selves with protecting Indian rights in land from the State’s interference but not other Indian rights. Second, the “where necessary”11 clause in Public Law 83-280 is a question of state law already resolved by this court in our earlier cases. Those cases held that it was not necessary to amend our state constitution prior to assuming Indian jurisdiction pursuant to Public Law 83-280.
Our Enabling Act is a federal statute. No better source *187may be found than the Congress itself for determining the meaning of a congressional act. If, as the majority states, our Enabling Act was not meant to restrict our state’s civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian activities on Indian reservations within the state, then Public Law 83-280 is mere surplusage. Under the majority’s reasoning, Public Law 83-280 conditionally vests power in the State to do that which the original Enabling Act never precluded the State from doing — exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction over the Indian tribes and reservations in this state. The colloquy in the committee hearing on H.R. 1063 contradicts such an expansive reading of state jurisdiction over Indian reservations. It indicates that Congress, the creator of Public Law 83-280, never intended such a result. The committee members stated:
Mr. Berry. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question. Would it not be better to word that to say that this “shall be applicable,” instead of saying “consent is hereby granted.” Why not say “The provisions of the law shall be applicable” to these states wherein they do these things. Mr. Westland. I believe the law would then be applicable to them, once they had taken this affirmative action. Mr. Rhodes. Will the gentleman yield. You cannot very well allow enabling legislation to be amended merely by giving consent. There has to be specific legislation. Mr. Dawson. That brings up another question: Whether your wording should refer to the Enabling Act. You say “We hereby give our consent for them to amend their state constitution.” Their state constitution was based upon the Enabling Act. In other words, they followed that. I wonder whether we should have something in there to say “Not withstanding any restrictions in the Enabling Act, consent is hereby given to amend their state constitution.” Mr. Abbott. (Counsel) I believe that clause “notwithstanding any provisions of the Enabling Act” for such states might well be included. It would make clear that Congress was repealing the Enabling Act. Mr. Dawson. To give permission to amend their constitution. Mr. Abbott. (Counsel) I think that would help clarify the intent of the committee at the present time and of Congress if they favorably acted on the legislation.
*188Hearings on H.R. 1063 before the House Comm, on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., at 8-9 (July 15, 1953).
There would have been no need for Congress to repeal our Enabling Act if it had not been an impediment to our state’s assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian reservations. I therefore cannot agree with the majority analysis insofar as it determines that the Enabling Act restrictions pertained only to ownership in and taxing power over Indian land.
The majority contends that the people of this state have spoken through the legislature in the form of a legislative act, RCW 37.12, and that the Enabling Act does not require a constitutional amendment in which each registered citizen has his own individual say on the issue. The legislature does not function in such a manner.
When the legislature speaks, it speaks on behalf of the people only. The Congress was well aware of this crucial distinction between the people speaking for themselves and representational speech where a few are authorized to bind the many when our Enabling Act was drafted. Section 4 of the Enabling Act states that “the delegates to the conventions . . . shall declare, on behalf of the people of said proposed States, that they adopt the Constitution of the United States . . (Italics mine.) In that same section of the Enabling Act the Congress expressed its will as to the participation of the people themselves, not their mere representatives, stating “[a]nd said conventions shall provide, by ordinances irrevocable without the consent of . . . the people of said States: . . . That the people . . . do agree and declare . . . [that] said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States; . . This clear distinction made by Congress in the Enabling Act between the people acting through their representatives and the people acting directly in their own capacity leaves no doubt in my mind as to the meaning which Congress *189intended when it used the phrase “the people of said States.”
It was under the express mandate of the congressional Enabling Act that the drafters of our constitution incorporated that Act’s identical language in Const, art. 26: “The following ordinance shall be irrevocable without the consent of the United States and the people of . this state:” This court stated in Boeing Aircraft Co. v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 25 Wn.2d 652, 171 P.2d 838, 168 A.L.R. 539 (1946), that the phrase in Const, art. 26 “without the consent of . . . the people of this state” meant the legislative representatives of the people rather than each citizen acting for himself in the form of a constitutional amendment.
In Boeing, King County sought to assess taxes against certain real property owned by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and used by Boeing Aircraft Company. The Boeing lease provided that Boeing should pay all property taxes lawfully assessed or imposed upon real property. Boeing refused to pay the taxes as not being lawfully assessed. In determining that the taxes so imposed were properly assessed against the property, we construed sections of our Enabling Act, constitution, federal and state statutes. The court concluded that our legislature could enact legislation and thereby consent for the people of Washington, as required by Const, art. 26, to the imposition of such taxes pursuant to the federal lawi However, other events contemporary with the Boeing decision indicate that the “consent of the . . . people of this state” to authorize the tax was achieved by a constitutional amendment voted by the people and not through legislative enactment. The Boeing decision was filed on August 12, 1946. The constitutional amendment allowing the tax was approved by the vote of the people on the November 1946 ballot. State v. Paul, 53 Wn.2d 789, 337 P.2d 33 (1959), and Makah Indian Tribe v. State, 76 Wn.2d 485, 457 P.2d 590 (1969), which the majority also cites, rely on the doubtful analysis found in Boeing.
Because of the way in which the Washington Territory *190became the State of Washington, this court as the highest appellate court of the state is not the ultimate arbiter of the meaning of our state constitution in its every particular. The Territory of Washington became the State of Washington only because representatives of the people of the Territory of Washington agreed to fulfill certain conditions imposed upon those representatives by the Congress. One of the conditions imposed was that the Washington State Constitutional Convention delegates would include in our state constitution a provision that the United States Congress should continue to have absolute jurisdiction and control over the Indian reservations. It specifically stated it could not be changed without the consent of the United States and the people of this state. This congressional condition precedent to the formation of our state was fulfilled by Const, art. 26. Thus, this court must look to federal law, the Enabling Act, and to the pronouncements of the members of that branch of government which created the conditions that had to be met before statehood was accorded Washington to determine the meaning of the phrase in Const, art. 26 “consent of the . . . people of this state,” engrafted from the congresssional Enabling Act. The meaning which Congress attaches to that phrase is made clear in the informed House Committee Hearing on Public Law 83-280. Mr. Abbott, counsel to the committee, first stated:
The bill does not as acted upon by the committee make provision for eight states which have constitutional organic impediments for accepting state jurisdiction. The enabling act for Arizona, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Oklahoma, Utah, and Washington provided that exclusive Federal jurisdiction would be retained.
The Indian Bureau in listing states pointed out that those eight states now have organic law impediments in their constitutions or other laws which would not enable them to take on, state jurisdiction. . . .
I have handed to Mr. Young a proposed amendment which would providé for the granting of consent to states having organic law impediments. At such time as they remove those impediments by action of the people in the *191state, they could then take over the exclusive civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indians and Indian matters.
In addition, Mr. Westland’s state [Washington], which is one state which has a constitutional impediment, the one section provides for removal by the state of constitutional impediments. The other section would apply to any other of the 15 Indian states, so that they by affirmative legislative action could assume either criminal or civil jurisdiction, or both, at such time as the matter were laid before the legislative bodies.
In short the legislation as acted upon by the committee would apply to only five states. The two additional section amendments would apply first to the eight states having constitutional or organic law impediments and would grant consent of the United States for them to remove such impediments and thus acquire jurisdiction.
The other amendment would apply to any other Indian states, some 15 or 18, who would acquire jurisdiction at such time as the legislative body affirmatively indicated their desire to so assume jurisdiction.
Hearings on H.R. 1063 before the House Comm, on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., at 2-4 (July 15, 1953).
In a subcommittee hearing on H.R. 1063, Harry A. Sellery, Chief Counsel for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and William R. Benge, Chief of the Branch of Law and Order of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, presented the final version of Public Law 83-280. There the language of section 6 of the Act authorizing “the people of any State to amend . . . their State constitution” was brought into sharp focus:
Mr. Abbott (Counsel to Committee). Mr. Benge informs me there are 26 states shown there as having Indian populations. You can correct it for the record, Mr. Benge, but I believe several of those states have constitutional prohibitions against jurisdiction. Mr. Benge. Yes, sir; that is right. Mr. Abbott. Which would mean that there would be apparently no jurisdiction. Mr. Benge. It would require amendment to a state constitution in most cases, on the ones that Mr. Abbott is speaking of. The Organic Act which admitted the state to the union and the state constitution would have to be amended. The state constitution in consequence of the Organic Act denied jurisdic*192tion over crimes committed by Indians on their reservations. To meet that the State Legislature would have to amend the constitution.
I take it that a general bill like this would be regarded as authority by the Congress for them to amend their constitutions. It would be regarded as an amendment to the Organic Act.
Mr. Aspinall. The State Legislature would not do it. The people of the state themselves would have to do it. Mr. Benge. Yes, sir.
Hearings on H.R. 1063 before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the House Comm, on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., at 23-24 (June 29,1953).
I believe these colloquies demonstrate Congress’ intent that section 6 of Public Law 83-280 authorizes Washington to assume Indian jurisdiction not by legislative action but only conditionally upon amendment of our state constitution. Accordingly, I do not believe this court has jurisdiction over the case. For the reasons stated, I dissent.
Stafford, J., concurs with Utter, J.
Petition for rehearing denied October 1, 1974.

“Sec. 4. That the delegates to the conventions elected as provided for in this act shall meet at the seat of government of each of said Territories . , . on the fourth day of July, eighteen hundred and eighty-nine, and, after organization, shall declare, on behalf of the people of said proposed States, that they adopt the Constitution of the *186United States; whereupon the said conventions shall be, and are hereby, authorized to form constitutions and States governments for said proposed states, respectively . . . And said conventions shall provide, by ordinances irrevocable without the consent of the United States and the people of said States:
“Second. That the people inhabiting said proposed States do agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries thereof, and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes; and that until the title thereto shall have been extinguished by the United States, the same shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the United States, and said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States; . . .” 25 Stat. 676 § 4 (1889).

“The following ordinance shall be irrevocable without the consent of the United States and the people of this state:
“Second. That the people inhabiting this state do agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries of this state, and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes; and that until the title thereto shall have been extinguished by the United States, the same shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the United States, and said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the congress of the United States . . .” Const, art. 26.

“Sec. 6. Notwithstanding the provisions of any Enabling Act for the admission of a State, the consent of the United States is hereby given to the people of any State to amend, where necessary, their State constitution or existing statutes, as the case may be, to remove any legal impediment to the assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this Act: Provided, That the provisions of this Act shall not become effective with respect to such assumption of jurisdiction by any such State until the people thereof have appropriately amended their State constitution or statutes as the case may be.” (First italics mine.) Act of August 15, 1953, ch. 505, § 6, 67 Stat. 588.