Court Opinion

ID: 9394506
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-15 17:07:22.196391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:00.545192
License: Public Domain

J-S10005-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    KHALIL SIMMS                               :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1156 EDA 2021

                Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 5, 2021
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
              Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003794-2014

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and STABILE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                              FILED MAY 15, 2023

       Khalil Simms appeals, pro se, from the order dismissing his first petition

for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). See 42

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.1 Simms raises ineffective assistance of trial and

PCRA counsel claims. We affirm.

____________________________________________

1  On July 30, 2021, this Court issued a rule to show cause “why the appeal
should not be quashed as having been taken from a purported order which is
not entered upon the appropriate docket of the lower court.” Order, 7/30/21.
Simms did not file a response. On November 29, 2021, this Court discharged
the rule to show cause and referred the matter to this panel. Here, Simms
filed his notice of appeal after the entry of the order dismissing his PCRA
petition and generally raises claims from his PCRA petition. However, Simms’s
notice of appeal failed to include a statement that the order appealed from
had been entered on the docket or a copy of the docket confirming entry of
the challenged order. See Pa.R.A.P. 904(d) (“The notice of appeal shall include
a statement that the order appealed from has been entered on the docket. A
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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       This Court previously set forth the underlying facts:

       [Simms] often sold marijuana out of Ananh (“Gak”) Ketphahn’s
       house at 44 South 44th Street, Philadelphia. On June 17, 2013,
       [Lajuan] Watkins [(Decedent)] and his cousin went to the 44th
       Street house to acquire marijuana from [Simms]. The sale went
       sour and following a fistfight between [Decedent] and [Simms],
       [Simms] shot and killed [Decedent]. …

       Gak testified that he lived at 44 South 44th Street, and that
       [Simms] was in his house selling marijuana to [Decedent] when
       those two men engaged in what Gak described as “wrestling” or a
       “fistfight” in the hallway of the house. The fight moved into a back
       room and Gak heard shots coming from the room and saw a
       muzzle flash. One of the bullets hit Gak. Gak testified that
       [Simms] was carrying a “funny colored” gun, and after the gunfire
       he saw “Decedent” with a red spot on his chest. At some point not
       long after, [Simms] fled, carrying a blue bag containing
       marijuana.

       After the shooting, Gak tried to flee[,] but [Decedent’s] cousin,
       Brahim Marshall, was standing in the doorway. Marshall had a
       black object in his hand, and Gak ran in the other direction, during
       which time he heard more shots. As he was running, Gak grabbed
       [Decedent], who had already been shot, in attempt to shield
       himself from the gunfire. Gak then disposed of his marijuana to
       avoid getting arrested. Another witness, Christopher Goodbread,
       testified that Marshall also fled the scene at that point, and that
____________________________________________

copy of the docket entry showing the entry of the order appealed from shall
be attached to the notice of appeal.”). Nevertheless, reviewing Simms’s pro
se appeal in conjunction with the lower court’s docket, it is obvious that Simms
is appealing from the order dismissing his PCRA petition. See
Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 766 (Pa. 2014) (acknowledging
that “courts may liberally construe materials filed by a pro se litigant”).
Therefore, we decline to quash the appeal. See Commonwealth v. Martin,
462 A.2d 859, 860 (Pa. Super. 1983), disapproved on other grounds,
Commonwealth v. Graves, 508 A.2d 1198, 1198 (Pa. 1986) (noting that
this Court may disregard an appellant’s failure to satisfy Pa.R.A.P. 904(d));
see also Pa.R.A.P. 105 (“These rules shall be liberally construed to secure the
just … determination of every matter”).

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     he saw [Simms] wiping blood off himself in the sink. Goodbread
     further testified that Gak told him that “the stupid fools tried to
     rob him.” Gak also described the “wrestling match” to Goodbread,
     as well as the fact that either Marshall or [Decedent] was carrying
     a gun. Goodbread then called 911 and informed them there had
     been a shooting.

     Officer Marc Peterson was the first officer on the scene. He first
     spoke with Gak and Gak’s mother, and Gak presented a story of
     how he got shot. Gak’s initial story was that Marshall had shot
     both [Decedent] and Gak himself. After Officer Peterson
     discovered the body of [Decedent], Gak told Office Peterson that
     [Decedent] was not involved in the shooting but fled as it
     occurred. …

     Dr. Albert Chu, Chief Deputy Medical Examiner[,] was qualified as
     an expert witness in forensic pathology. Dr. Chu testified that
     [Decedent] suffered two gunshot wounds, one of which entered
     the right side of his chest and exited the left side of his neck, and
     the other which entered the back of his right arm and exited on
     the inner right arm. Dr. Chu testified that there was no evidence
     of close-range gunfire. Dr. Chu concluded, to a reasonable degree
     of medical certainty, that the cause of death was gunshot wound
     to the chest, and the manner of death was homicide.

     Officer Robert Stott, of the Philadelphia Police Department[,] was
     qualified as an expert witness in the area of firearms identification.
     Officer Stott testified that the two recovered cartridge cases at the
     scene were from different caliber guns. Officer Stott further
     testified that [] one bullet can strike two different people, and that
     gunpowder residue can be removed by handwashing. Further, he
     stated that his conclusions were to a reasonable degree of
     professional certainty.

Commonwealth v. Simms, 891 EDA 2017 (Pa. Super. filed Jul. 18, 2018)

(unpublished memorandum at 2-3) (citation and footnote omitted).

     The police arrested Simms and charged him with numerous crimes.

Relevantly, a preliminary hearing was held, at which Gak testified and

identified Simms as the shooter. Counsel represented Simms during the

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preliminary hearing and extensively cross-examined Gak. The charges were

held over for trial. However, prior to the trial, Gak suffered a brain aneurysm.

Subsequently, the trial court held a hearing with respect to Gak’s competency

as a witness. Following the hearing, the trial court found Gak to be

incompetent.

       The matter proceeded to a jury trial. At trial, the Commonwealth sought

to introduce Gak’s preliminary hearing testimony. Simms did not object to the

admission. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Simms of third-

degree murder, possessing an instrument of crime, and firearms not to be

carried without a license, carrying firearms on public streets or public property

in Philadelphia, and persons not to possess. The trial court imposed an

aggregate sentence of 20 to 40 years in prison. This Court affirmed the

judgment of sentence, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance

of appeal on December 31, 2018. See id., appeal denied, 199 A.3d 888 (Pa.

2018).

       Simms filed, pro se, a timely PCRA petition. The PCRA court appointed

Simms counsel, who subsequently filed a Turner/Finley2 letter and a petition

to withdraw as counsel. Thereafter, the PCRA court entered a Pa.R.Crim.P.

907 notice. The PCRA court then dismissed Simms’s PCRA petition and granted

PCRA counsel leave to withdraw. This appeal followed.

____________________________________________

2 See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988);
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).

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       On appeal, Simms raises the following question for our review:

       Was [Simms’s] constitutional, rights of due process and equal
       protect of the law were violated when trial and PCRA counsels
       denied him of the effective assistance of counsel when they and
       the Commonwealth unlawfully deprived [Simms] of his rights to
       confront all witnesses against him on cross-examination to prove
       his actual innocence of the homicide of [Decedent][?]

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (some capitalization omitted).

       Our standard of review regarding a PCRA court’s order “is whether the

determination of the PCRA court is supported by the evidence of record and is

free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Rizvi, 166 A.3d 344, 347 (Pa. Super.

2017). “The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no

support for the findings in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Garcia,

23 A.3d 1059, 1061 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted).

       In a rambling and somewhat incoherent argument, Simms argues that

a second robber, “Shotie,” was the shooter, and that the evidence did not

establish that Simms shot anyone. See Appellant’s Brief at 8-9, 10, 14.3 To

that end, Simms alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly

present his arguments and cross-examine witnesses at trial such that the jury

was deprived of necessary evidence to determine his guilt. See id. at 8, 14.

Specifically, Simms alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for erroneously

indicating that Simms was in possession of a gun; failing to present and cross-

____________________________________________

3According to Simms, “Shotie” died in an unrelated incident prior to trial. See
Appellant’s Brief at 9.

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examine eight witnesses who were in the house during the robbery; failing to

cross-examine Gak, including to show the police coerced Gak into testifying

falsely against Simms; allowing redacted preliminary hearing testimony by

Gak to be read into the record at trial; failing to effectively cross-examine

Officer Peterson about moving Decedent’s body from the bedroom to the

hallway; stating during closing argument that Simms was in the hallway

during the shooting and that he washed blood off his hands; failing to cross-

examine Dr. Chu regarding the caliber of bullet that struck Decedent, the

drugs found in Decedent’s system, and whether a gunshot residue test had

been conducted; failing to present Dr. Marlin Osbourne, who conducted an

incomplete autopsy, and failing to object to Dr. Chu’s testimony about the

autopsy; failing to effectively cross-examine Officer Stott about the caliber of

bullet used in the shooting; failing to argue that Decedent was shot from

behind; and failing to properly cross-examine Goodbread about the shooting.

See id. at 8-13. Simms also alleges that PCRA counsel was ineffective. See

id. at 8, 14. Simms seeks an evidentiary hearing or a new trial. See id. at 14.

      To succeed on an ineffectiveness claim, Simms must demonstrate by a

preponderance of evidence that “(1) the underlying claim has arguable merit;

(2) counsel had no reasonable basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3)

the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s action or inaction.”

Commonwealth v. Brown, 196 A.3d 130, 150 (Pa. 2018) (citation omitted).

Counsel is presumed to be effective, and the burden is on Simms to prove

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otherwise. See Commonwealth v. Simpson, 66 A.3d 253, 260 (Pa. 2013).

A failure to satisfy any prong of the test for ineffectiveness will require

rejection of the claim. See Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 244 A.3d 359, 368

(Pa. 2021).

      To be eligible for relief on a claim that PCRA counsel was ineffective, the

petitioner “must meet all three prongs of the . . . test for ineffectiveness” for

each counsel. Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 30 A.3d 1111, 1128 (Pa. 2011)

(citation omitted). “A failure to satisfy any of the three prongs of the

[ineffectiveness] test requires rejection of a claim of ineffective assistance of

trial counsel, which, in turn, requires rejection of a layered claim of ineffective

assistance of” PCRA counsel. Id. (citation omitted).

      Here, while recognizing that this Court can liberally construe a pro se

brief, we conclude that Simms’s argument is woefully inadequate. See

Commonwealth v. Ray, 134 A.3d 1109, 1114-15 (Pa. Super. 2016) (stating

that “status as a pro se litigant does not entitle [appellant] to any advantage

due to his lack of legal training[,] and “a pro se litigant must still comply with

the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.”) (citation omitted)); see also

Commonwealth v. Martz, 232 A.3d 801, 811 (Pa. Super. 2020) (stating that

this Court will not act as counsel or develop arguments for appellant). Simms

merely provides conclusory statements that counsel was ineffective without

setting forth the three prongs of the ineffectiveness test or discussing them.

See Commonwealth v. Spotz, 896                 A.2d 1191, 1250        (Pa.   2006)

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(“[B]oilerplate, undeveloped” arguments regarding ineffective assistance of

counsel are “insufficient to establish an entitlement to post-conviction relief.”

(citation omitted)). In fact, Simms does not establish that he was prejudiced

by counsel’s alleged failures, nor does he support his claim that “Shotie” was

the shooter in this case or establish that any of the purported testimony would

have established this fact.4 Furthermore, Simms’s argument is unsupported

by citation to and discussion of relevant case law. “When an appellant cites no

authority supporting an argument, this Court is inclined to believe there is

none.” Commonwealth v. Reyes-Rodriguez, 111 A.3d 775, 781 (Pa.

Super. 2015) (citing Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), which requires the appellant to

discuss and cite to pertinent authorities). Therefore, Simms waived these

claims. See Commonwealth v. Paddy, 15 A.3d 431, 444 (Pa. 2011) (stating

that when an appellant fails “to set forth all three prongs of the ineffectiveness

test and [to] meaningfully discuss them, he is not entitled to relief, and we

____________________________________________

4 We additionally note that in his argument that trial counsel failed to cross-
examine Gak, Simms appears to ignore that Gak was found to be incompetent
to testify at trial and that Gak’s testimony from the preliminary hearing was
introduced at trial, as defense counsel had a full and fair opportunity to
examine Gak for a “fairly lengthy period of time” during the preliminary
hearing, N.T., 11/9/15, at 13. Further, with regard to Simms’s claim that
counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine Officer Peterson about the
location of the body, Officer Peterson specifically testified that the body was
found in the bedroom. See N.T., 11/10/15, at 171. Moreover, Simms has not
established that any of the purported eight witnesses were available to testify
or that they would have testified on his behalf.

                                           -8-
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are constrained to find such claims waived for lack of development”) (citation

omitted)).

      Regarding Simms’s claim that PCRA counsel was ineffective, our

Supreme Court recently held that the proper procedure for enforcing the right

to effective PCRA counsel is by “allowing a petitioner to raise claims of

ineffective PCRA counsel at the first opportunity [(after obtaining new counsel

or acting pro se)], even if on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d

381, 405 (Pa. 2021).

      In some instances, the record before the appellate court will be
      sufficient to allow for disposition of any newly-raised
      ineffectiveness claims. However, in other cases, the appellate
      court may need to remand to the PCRA court for further
      development of the record and for the PCRA court to consider such
      claims as an initial matter. Consistent with our prior case law, to
      advance a request for remand, a petition would be required to
      provide more than mere boilerplate assertions of PCRA counsel’s
      ineffectiveness; however, where there are material facts at issue
      concerning claims challenging counsel’s stewardship and relief is
      not plainly unavailable as a matter of law, the remand should be
      afforded.

Id. at 402 (citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted). In other words,

“appellate courts will have the ability to grant or deny relief on straightforward

claims, as well as the power to remand to the PCRA court for the development

of the record.” Id. at 403.

      We acknowledge that Simms timely raised his PCRA counsel’s

ineffectiveness claims on appeal. However, Simms is not entitled to relief on

these claims or further remand to develop the record. Simms merely raises

bald allegations of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness and failed to satisfy any of

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the three prongs of the ineffectiveness test for each counsel, which requires a

rejection of his claims. See Chmiel, 30 A.3d at 1128; Spotz, 896 A.2d at

1250. Accordingly, based upon this argument and record, we conclude that

Simms’ PCRA counsel ineffectiveness claims are without merit. See Bradley,

261 A.3d at 402 (noting that boilerplate allegations of ineffectiveness do not

entitle a petitioner to relief); see also Martz, 232 A.3d at 811.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/15/2023

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