Court Opinion

ID: 9547077
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:41:27.367006+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:17.300124
License: Public Domain

Gunderson, C. J., and Steffen, J.,
concurring and dissenting:
We agree that any improprieties which may have occurred during the guilt phase of the trial were not prejudicial. However, we respectfully dissent from the majority opinion insofar as it requires a new penalty hearing.
The United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1984), declared that “a criminal conviction is not to be lightly overturned on the basis of a prosecutor’s comments standing alone, for the statements or conduct must be viewed in context; only by so doing can it be determined whether the prosecutor’s conduct affected the fairness of the trial.” Id. at 11. Although prosecutorial misconduct did occur in this case, the remarks did not deprive Flanagan of a fair trial. Anything the prosecutor said about Flanagan paled in comparison to the portrait painted by Flanagan himself as he terrorized and murdered his grandparents. See Wainwright v. Darden, 106 S.Ct. 2464 (1986); Darden v. State, 329 So.2d 287 (Fla. 1976). We are persuaded that the prosecutor said nothing that influenced the jury to deal more harshly with Flanagan than it would have absent the prosecutor’s comments.
Moreover, this court said in Moser v. State, 91 Nev. 809, 544 P.2d 424 (1975):
In State v. Hunter, 48 Nev. 358, 367, 232 P. 778, 781 (1925), this court held that “to entitle a defendant to have *113improper remarks of counsel considered on appeal, objections must be made to them at the time, and the court must be required to rule upon the objection, to admonish counsel, and instruct the jury.” This requirement was reiterated in State v. Fitch, 65 Nev. 668, 200 P.2d 991 (1948), and more recently in Mears v. State, 83 Nev. 3, 442 P.2d 230 (1967). No such request was made in the instant case.
Id. at 814, 544 P.2d at 427 (emphasis added).
The rule just mentioned has since been relied upon in cases even more recent than Moser. See, e.g., Kelso v. State, 95 Nev. 37, 44, 588 P.2d 1035, 1040 (1979); Mercado v. State, 100 Nev. 535, 538, 688 P.2d 305, 307 (1984). Therefore, as stated in Point v. State, 102 Nev. 143, 717 P.2d 38 (1986), we need not consider the issues of misconduct which defendant’s counsel belatedly seeks to raise, “since there was no objection at trial that would have alerted the district court to the necessity of avoiding the possibility of error,” 102 Nev. at 147, 717 P.2d at 42. This rule may not be nullified by any agreement, express or implied, between counsel even when promoted or endorsed by the trial judge.