Court Opinion

ID: 9939527
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-10 06:29:15.702234+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:22.351387
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed February 8, 2024

                                       In The

        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                    __________

                                 No. 11-23-00027-CV
                                     __________

     ABILENE REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER AND BRIAN
                GANESH, M.D., Appellants
                                        V.
  EUGENIA FAE PIERCE, INDIVIDUALLY, ON BEHALF OF
    ALL WRONGFUL DEATH BENEFICIARIES, AND AS
 PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF ELTON
                  PIERCE, Appellee

                     On Appeal from the 42nd District Court
                            Taylor County, Texas
                        Trial Court Cause No. 51319-A

                                    OPINION
      In this interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of the motions to
dismiss filed by Appellants, Abilene Regional Medical Center and Brian Ganesh,
M.D., 1 we must decide, among other things, whether a healthcare liability claimant
complies with the Texas Medical Liability Act’s (TMLA) expert report service
requirements if the claimant only files her expert report and curriculum vitae (CV)
with the trial court clerk but fails to serve a copy of her report and CV upon the
affected healthcare providers for which claims have been asserted, even if the
healthcare providers are purportedly aware, or could have been aware, that said
report and CV exist.2
        In this case, Appellants alleged in their motions to dismiss that Appellee failed
to timely serve them with an expert report and CV as required by Section 74.351(a)
of the TMLA. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(a) (West Supp.
2023). After a hearing, the trial court denied Appellants’ motions. On appeal,
Appellants argue that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied their
motions because the record conclusively shows that Appellee did not comply with
the TMLA’s expert report service requirements. We reverse and render.
                          I. Factual and Procedural Background
        Elton Pierce was admitted to Abilene Regional Medical Center on May 3,
2020, for the treatment of acute abdominal pain; after his admission he was
diagnosed with acute pancreatitis. 3 On May 6, 2020, during his hospitalization,
Elton suffered a cardiac arrest and died. On May 3, 2022, Appellee, Eugenia Fae
Pierce, in her individual and representative capacities, electronically filed the
underlying medical malpractice suit against Appellants with the Taylor County

        1
         See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(9) (West Supp. 2023).
        2
         Section 74.351(a) mandates that an expert report and a curriculum vitae of each expert identified
in the report must be served on each affected healthcare provider. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 74.351(a). For
simplicity in this opinion, we may, at times, refer to this dual requirement as “the expert report(s).”

        In addition to these maladies, Elton had a history of other ailments for which he had sought
        3

treatment: pancreatitis, daily alcohol abuse, acute kidney injury, hypertriglyceridemia, and hypertension.

                                                    2
District Clerk, via the district clerk’s electronic filing manager, alleging that
Appellants’ combined negligence caused Elton’s death.4 Attached to her original
petition were four exhibits—the expert reports and CV of Terrence Shaneyfelt, M.D.
and Claudia Estrada, R.N. Eugenia’s petition also states: “[P]ursuant to Chapter 74
of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, [Eugenia] hereby serves on
[Appellants] the [attached] expert report[s] and curriculum vitae.”
        An automated/e-filed certificate of service, which in sequence followed the
electronically filed original petition, only listed the contact information for
Eugenia’s counsel of record. However, there is no such automated/e-filed certificate
of service for the four exhibits that were attached to her petition. On May 5, 2022,
returns of service were filed in this case with the Taylor County District Clerk
indicating that only Eugenia’s original petition, and not the expert reports and CV,
had been personally delivered to Appellants the day before via a process server.
        Dr. Ganesh answered Eugenia’s suit and filed a plea in abatement on May 27,
2022; Abilene Regional filed its answer and a plea in abatement on May 31, 2022.
Thus, Eugenia had 120 days from these respective dates in which to serve each
Appellant with her expert reports and CV. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 74.351(a). On
September 30, 2022, after Eugenia’s 120-day deadline to serve her expert reports
and CV on either Appellant had expired, Dr. Ganesh filed his motion to dismiss
Eugenia’s suit with prejudice. See id. § 74.351(b). In his motion, Dr. Ganesh
asserted that, as of the date his motion was filed, he had not been served, consistent
with the service requirements of Rule 21a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure,
with Eugenia’s expert reports and CV. On November 7, 2022, Abilene Regional
filed a similar motion and raised the same arguments.

        4
          Eugenia filed suit in her individual and representative capacities and alleged that (1) Abilene
Regional Medical Center was liable for the actions of its physicians and nurses and (2) Dr. Ganesh was
liable for his actions.

                                                   3
         Eugenia responded to Appellants’ motions and contended that (1) Rule 21a
should be liberally construed and (2) even if her expert reports and CV had not been
served on Appellants in compliance with Rule 21a, the reports and CV were
contained in the Taylor County District Clerk’s file (because they were filed with
and referred to in her original petition) and were thus accessible and available to
Appellants. As such, Eugenia averred that Appellants had, at least, constructive
notice or possession of her expert reports and CV and their filing. After a hearing,
the trial court denied Appellants’ motions. This appeal followed.
                                        II. Analysis
         In their sole issue on appeal, Appellants contend that the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied their motions to dismiss because (1) the record
conclusively shows that Eugenia did not timely serve her expert reports and CV on
Appellants within the TMLA’s 120-day statutory deadline and (2) in the absence of
serving her reports and CV on Appellants, merely filing the expert reports and CV
with the Taylor County District Clerk does not constitute either notice to them of the
reports’ service or existence, or Eugenia’s compliance with the TMLA’s expert
report service requirements.
         A. Standard of Review
         We review the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss a healthcare liability
claim for an abuse of discretion. Jelinek v. Casas, 328 S.W.3d 526, 539 (Tex.
2010)). It is axiomatic that the trial court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily or
unreasonably, without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Downer v.
Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985). As we have
noted:
         When reviewing matters committed to a trial court’s discretion, an
         appellate court may not substitute its own judgment for the trial court’s
         judgment. Nor may a reviewing court set aside the trial court’s
         determination unless it is clear from the record that the trial court could
                                             4
      only reach one decision. On the other hand, our review of a trial court’s
      determination of the legal principles controlling its ruling is much less
      deferential. A trial court has no “discretion” in determining what the
      law is or applying the law to the facts. Thus, a clear failure by the trial
      court to analyze or apply the law correctly will constitute an abuse of
      discretion.
Kendrick v. Garcia, 171 S.W.3d 698, 703 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2005, pet. denied)
(internal citations omitted) (citing Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839–40 (Tex.
1992)). Thus, we defer to the trial court’s factual determinations, if any, if they find
support in the record, and we review de novo questions of law that involve statutory
interpretation. Stockton v. Offenbach, 336 S.W.3d 610, 615 (Tex. 2011).
      In the matter before us, the trial court’s ruling and the resolution of this appeal
concerns the application of a question of law—whether filing an expert report and
CV with the trial court clerk, without more, comports with and satisfies the expert
report service requirements of the TMLA.
      B. The Expert Report Service Requirements of the TMLA
      To proceed with a healthcare liability claim, the TMLA requires that a
healthcare liability claimant, such as Eugenia, comply with the Act’s expert report
service requirements—the claimant must serve an expert report, along with the
expert’s CV, upon each healthcare liability defendant named in the underlying suit
within 120 days after each defendant files its answer.            CIV. PRAC. & REM.
§ 74.351(a); see Loaisiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248, 252 (Tex. 2012). The TMLA’s
expert report service requirements, of which there are no ambiguities, serve a dual
purpose: (1) to inform the served healthcare provider of the specific conduct that the
claimant has questioned; and (2) to provide a basis for the trial court to determine
whether the claims asserted by the claimant have merit. Hebner v. Reddy, 498
S.W.3d 37, 41 (Tex. 2016).

                                           5
      Section 74.351(a) does not provide for either an “accident or mistake” or a
“good faith” exception to the TMLA’s mandatory 120-day service requirement.
Kendrick, 171 S.W.3d at 704–05. In fact, and despite the perceived harshness
of certain results that may flow from the implementation of this deadline, strict
compliance with Section 74.351(a)’s mandatory service provision is required.
Zanchi v. Lane, 408 S.W.3d 373, 376 (Tex. 2013); Rinkle v. Graf, 658 S.W.3d 821,
825 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.) (collecting cases); Kendrick,
171 S.W.3d at 704. Consequently, the trial court, if requested by an affected
physician or other healthcare provider, must dismiss the claimant’s suit with
prejudice if the claimant fails to serve her expert report(s) upon them within the
prescribed 120-day deadline. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 74.351(b); see Zanchi, 408
S.W.3d at 376.
      Although the term “serve” is not defined in the TMLA, the context in which
the term is used in Section 74.351(a) is synonymous and consistent with the methods
of service that are required by and enumerated in Rule 21a of the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure. See Stockton, 336 S.W.3d at 615–16; Rinkle, 658 S.W.3d at 825;
Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at Houston v. Gutierrez, 237 S.W.3d 869, 872 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied); Herrera v. Seton Nw. Hosp., 212
S.W.3d 452, 459 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.); Kendrick, 171 S.W.3d at 703–
04; see also Quint v. Alexander, No. 03-04-00819-CV, 2005 WL 2805576, at *2–3
(Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 28, 2005, pet. denied) (mem. op.). As such, a method of
service designated by Rule 21a must be utilized and occur in order for one to comply
with and effectuate the purpose of Section 74.351(a). See Stockton, 336 S.W.3d at
615–16; Rinkle, 658 S.W.3d at 825; Gutierrez, 237 S.W.3d at 872, Herrera, 212
S.W.3d at 459; Kendrick, 171 S.W.3d at 703–04; see also Quint, 2005 WL 2805576
at *2–3. In that regard, Rule 21a provides that service may be accomplished by the
following methods: (1) through an electronic filing manager if the e-mail address of
                                         6
the party or the party’s duly authorized agent or attorney of record to be served is on
file with the electronic filing manager; (2) in person; (3) by mail; (4) by commercial
delivery service; (5) by facsimile; (6) by e-mail; or (7) by any other means that the
trial court, in its discretion, may direct. TEX. R. CIV. P. 21a(a).
             1. Service by Eugenia was Insufficient
      Unique methods of service have evolved from the advent of electronic filing.
Pursuant to Rule 21a(a)(1), a document that is filed electronically pursuant to
Rule 21 must also be served electronically via the electronic filing manager;
however, electronic service of a document may only be accomplished if the party to
be served, or the party’s authorized agent or attorney of record, is included
and designated on the electronic filing manager’s service list.          See TEX. R.
CIV. P. 21a(a)(1). If electronic service cannot be used or accomplished because the
e-mail address of the party to be served, or the party’s authorized agent or attorney
of record, is not on file, the document may then be served by using any of the means
listed in Rule 21a(a)(2). See TEX. R. CIV. P. 21a(a)(2). Appellants assert that neither
they nor their attorneys of record or other authorized agent were included on the
Taylor County District Clerk’s electronic filing manager’s service list for this case
when Eugenia’s expert reports and CV were electronically filed with her original
petition, thus, electronic service of the reports and CV was not effectuated. As such,
to show that her reports and CV were properly served on Appellants, Eugenia must
have complied with any of the “non-electronic” methods of service designated in
Rule 21a(a)(2).
      In response to Appellants’ assertion that they were not timely served with her
expert reports and CV, Eugenia contends that a presumption of timely and proper
service exists because her original petition’s certificate of service states that “these
exhibits—the expert reports and the CVs are incorporated therein and attached as
exhibits” to her petition, therefore, Appellants effectively received and had notice of
                                            7
her expert reports and CV when they were served with her petition. If a question
exists as to whether proper service occurred, “[a] certificate by a party or [the
party’s] attorney of record, or the return of the officer, or the affidavit of any other
person showing service of a notice shall be prima facie evidence of the fact of
service.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 21a(e); see also Mathis v. Lockwood, 166 S.W.3d 743, 745
(Tex. 2005). Such prima facie evidence creates a presumption of service. Mathis,
166 S.W.3d at 745; see also In re E.A., 287 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. 2009). Nevertheless,
“[t]he presumption of service under Rule 21a ‘is not evidence and it vanishes when
. . . evidence [to the contrary] is introduced that [a document] was not received.’”
In re E.A., 287 S.W.3d at 5 (quoting Cliff v. Huggins, 724 S.W.2d 788, 780 (Tex.
1987)).
      Here, there is no presumption of proper service of the expert reports because
(1) Eugenia’s original petition does not include a certificate of service, and (2) the
process server’s affidavit and returns of service—the contents of which alone should
have alerted Eugenia to the service deficiencies—state that only Eugenia’s original
petition was served on and delivered to Appellants, not her expert reports or their
CVs. Thus, there is no evidence that her expert reports were served on Appellants
or Appellants’ counsel of record in a manner prescribed by Rule 21a. See Kendrick,
171 S.W.3d at 704 (only the methods of service authorized by Rule 21a will suffice
for purposes of service under Section 74.351(a)).         Nor can Eugenia create a
presumption of valid service because the evidence she presents only shows that her
expert reports were filed with the Taylor County District Clerk and not served on
Appellants. Nevertheless, even if the presumption was in play, Appellants’ verified
denials and the undisputed evidence that they presented in support of their motions
to dismiss—Dr. Ganesh’s affidavit that Appellants were only served with and
received copies of Eugenia’s original petition, and not the expert reports or CVs—
rebuts the presumption.
                                           8
      Eugenia’s efforts to serve her expert reports and CV upon Appellants via
electronic means were deficient and not compliant with Rule 21a(a)(1) because
neither Appellants nor their attorneys were included on the Taylor County District
Clerk’s electronic management system’s service list for this case at the time the
expert reports and CV were electronically filed. Further, Eugenia’s service efforts
under Rule 21a(a)(2) were equally deficient because only her original petition, and
not the expert reports or CVs, was served on and delivered to Appellants. Therefore,
because Eugenia’s expert reports were not timely served on Appellants in a manner
consistent with Rule 21a, by electronic means or otherwise, we conclude, on that
basis, that Eugenia failed to comply with the expert report service requirements
mandated by Section 74.351(a).
             2. What Constitutes Service and Notice of the Expert Reports
      Despite Eugenia’s failure to timely and properly serve Appellants with her
expert reports and their CVs, she nonetheless argues that her reports were effectively
served on Appellants and that she provided adequate “notice” to them of the reports’
filings because (1) they were aware, or should have been aware, that her reports
existed in that she “referred” to the reports and CVs in the body of her original
petition that they were served with, or (2) they had constructive knowledge or
possession of her reports because they had access to the Taylor County District
Clerk’s portal and thus could have accessed and retrieved the reports. We disagree.
      Eugenia’s alternative “notice” argument is two-fold. First, she contends that
by filing the experts reports and CVs with and “referring” to them in her original
petition, alone—even though the reports were not included with the copies of the
petition that were delivered to Appellants—constitutes sufficient notice to
Appellants of the reports’ existence and therefore qualifies as “service” under
Rule 21a. In support, Eugenia relies on the dissenting opinion in Poland v. Ott,
278 S.W.3d 39, 60 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied)—an opinion
                                          9
in which the majority upheld the dismissal of the plaintiff’s healthcare liability claim
for failure to timely serve an expert report—and cases that pre-date the current
version of the TMLA. However, the dissenting opinion in Poland and the other
cases cited by Eugenia on this point are inapposite and unpersuasive.
      Eugenia’s second contention—that Appellants’ ability to access her expert
reports and CVs via the Taylor County District Clerk’s portal constitutes sufficient
service under Rule 21a—is equally unavailing. There is no dispute that Eugenia’s
expert reports were electronically filed with the Taylor County District Clerk
simultaneously upon the filing of her original petition. However, and contrary to
Eugenia’s assertion, her expert reports and CVs were not served on Appellants as
the TMLA requires. Indeed, and importantly, while a healthcare liability claimant
need not file her expert reports with the trial court clerk, the claimant’s expert reports
and CVs must nonetheless be served upon the affected healthcare providers in
accordance with Rule 21a and Section 74.351(a).              See CIV. PRAC. & REM.
§ 74.351(a).
      Despite Eugenia’s contentions, we and some of our sister courts have held that
filing an expert report with the trial court clerk, without more, neither constitutes
service of the report nor does it satisfy the necessary service requirements under
Rule 21a and Section 74.351(a). As such, an expert report is not timely and properly
served on a party simply because the report is filed contemporaneously with the
claimant’s original petition—strict compliance with the service provision in
Section 74.351(a) is mandatory, which expressly requires that the claimant must,
irrespective of any filing with the trial court clerk, “serve” the expert report and CV
“on each party or the party’s designated attorney of record” within the prescribed
120-day period. Hogue v. Steward, No. 11-21-00124-CV, 2022 WL 16640834, at
*3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Nov. 3, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.); Kendrick, 171 S.W.3d
at 704; see also Daneshvar v. Jaladanki, No. 01-22-00455-CV, 2023 WL 4356189,
                                           10
at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 6, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.); Rinkle, 658
S.W.3d at 826; Breiten v. Shatery, 365 S.W.3d 829, 832 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012,
no pet.); Acosta v. Chheda, No. 01-07-00398-CV, 2007 WL 3227650, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 1, 2007, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Gutierrez, 237
S.W.3d at 871; Herrera, 212 S.W.3d at 455–56; Thoyakulathu v. Brennan, 192
S.W.3d 849, 851 n.3, 853–54 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, no pet.); Quint, 2005
WL 2805576, at *2–3. Thus, merely filing the report does not result in its service.
We reaffirm that principle today. Nevertheless, our analysis does not end here.
      Instead, we address these questions: Did Appellants have actual or
constructive knowledge or possession of Eugenia’s expert reports simply because
they could have accessed the reports via the Taylor County District Clerk’s portal?
If so, was such knowledge sufficient to comply with and overcome the TMLA’s
expert report service requirements? The courts in Daneshvar and Rinkle addressed
this argument and held that, in the absence of proper service, a healthcare provider’s
actual or constructive knowledge of an expert report’s filing or its ability to locate
the report on a district clerk’s website is insufficient to establish service under
Rule 21a or Section 74.351(a). Daneshvar, 2023 WL 4356189, at *3; Rinkle, 658
S.W.3d at 827 (citing Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at Houston v. Joplin, 525 S.W.3d
772, 781 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied); Gutierrez, 237
S.W.3d at 873–74. We agree with this rationale and conclude that a healthcare
provider’s alleged actual or constructive knowledge or possession of an expert report
that has been filed with a trial court clerk, irrespective of whether the healthcare
provider could have retrieved a copy, does not establish service of a healthcare
liability claimant’s expert report upon an affected healthcare provider or absolve the
claimant of her responsibility to strictly comply with the TMLA’s expert report
service requirements. In this instance, neither Appellants’ access to the Taylor

                                         11
County District Clerk’s portal nor the isolated reference to the expert reports in
Eugenia’s original petition constitute proper service of the reports under the TMLA.
        The duty, which she cannot ignore, rested with Eugenia to timely and properly
serve Appellants with her expert reports and CVs; Appellants had no obligation to
either seek out or locate the reports and any purported efforts by them to do so is not
tantamount to service of the reports under the TMLA.5 See Rinkle, 658 S.W.3d at
827. Indeed, service and notice are distinct legal terms which have different
meanings. Section 74.351(a) specifically refers to the service of or “serving” the
claimant’s expert reports on the affected parties, not to merely providing “notice” to
them of the reports filing. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 74.351(a) (“[A] claimant shall
. . . serve . . . one or more expert reports. . . . The date for serving the report may be
extended.”) (emphasis added). Therefore, providing notice of the filing of an expert
report or that such a report exists, without more, is not sufficient to accomplish
service under the TMLA.
        As we have said, there must be strict compliance with Section 74.351(a)’s
service requirements. See Hogue, 2022 WL 16640834, at *3; Kendrick, 171 S.W.3d
at 704. Here, Eugenia failed to do so. Unfortunately, her good faith or mistaken
belief that service of her reports had been properly effectuated on Appellants in this
case cannot save her. See Kendrick, 171 S.W.3d at 704–05. Further, Eugenia cannot
blame the actions, or alleged inactions, of the process server or the Taylor County
District Clerk for her own failure to comply with Section 74.351(a)’s well-settled
service requirements. Contrary to Eugenia’s contention, what Appellants could have
accessed or acquired is of no consequence. Nevertheless, even if they in some

        5
         Although it could be argued that Appellants and/or their counsel engaged in gamesmanship by not
advising Eugenia that they had not been properly served with her expert reports, such conduct is immaterial
to our analysis because, in the context of service, the TMLA provides no exception for alleged
“unprofessional conduct of opposing counsel or the alleged failure of opposing counsel to point out a service
mistake.” See Joplin, 525 S.W.3d at 782.
                                                     12
manner had accessed the reports, proper service was still not effectuated. Rinkle,
658 S.W.3d at 827–28.
             3. Harm Need Not be Shown if Proper Service has not been Effectuated
      Finally, Eugenia argues that Appellants must show that they were harmed by
her failure to comply with Section 74.351(a). We disagree. If a healthcare liability
claimant fails to comply with the TMLA’s expert report service requirements, as
Eugenia did here, the trial court must dismiss the claimant’s suit with prejudice; the
trial court has no discretion to act otherwise. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 74.351(b);
Zanchi, 408 S.W.3d at 376. Such is the case here. Therefore, contrary to her
suggestion, Eugenia cannot avoid dismissal, regardless of the harm, or the lack
thereof, to Appellants.
                              III. This Court’s Ruling
      In the healthcare liability context, unless the parties agree to extend the service
deadline, Section 74.351(a) mandates that an expert report and CV must be served
on the affected physician or healthcare provider no later than 120 days after their
answer is filed. Id. § 74.351(a). The failure to timely and properly serve the report
and CV in compliance with Section 74.351(a) within this 120-day window results in
the dismissal of the claimant’s suit with prejudice. Id. § 74.351(b)(2). Here, Eugenia
failed to timely effectuate service of her expert reports and their CVs upon
Appellants by any manner or method that is consistent with the service requirements
of the TMLA and Rule 21a. Because the parties to this appeal did not agree to extend
the deadline for service and because the only evidence in the record conclusively
shows Eugenia’s lack of compliance with the mandatory service requirements, there
is no support for the trial court’s implied finding—by its denial of Appellants’
motions to dismiss—that Eugenia served Appellants with her experts reports and
their CVs within the statutory deadline. Therefore, the trial court abused its

                                          13
discretion when it denied Appellants’ motions to dismiss, and Eugenia’s suit must
be dismissed with prejudice. See id.
        We sustain Appellants’ sole issue on appeal.6 Accordingly, we reverse the
trial court’s order denying Appellants’ motions to dismiss and we render judgment
dismissing Eugenia’s suit against Appellants with prejudice. See id.

                                                           W. STACY TROTTER
                                                           JUSTICE

February 8, 2024
Panel consists of: Trotter, J.,
Williams, J., and Wright, S.C.J.7
Bailey, C.J., not participating

        6
         We note that Appellants do not challenge the sufficiency of Eugenia’s expert reports.
        7
          Jim R. Wright, Senior Chief Justice (Retired), Court of Appeals, 11th District of Texas at Eastland,
sitting by assignment.
                                                     14