Court Opinion

ID: 9459411
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:19:48.961801+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:08.813814
License: Public Domain

GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge
(specially concurring):
I concur in the result for the following reasons. Plaintiffs have neither alleged nor proven that available state procedures were inadequate to vindicate their federal constitutional rights and to prevent those rights from suffering irreparable harm. Instead of seeking state court review of the state court’s injunction,1 and without alleging that *254state review would have been inadequate to prevent irreparable harm, plaintiffs did, in fact, as the majority points out, obtain in the federal district court what amounts to appellate review of the state court’s action. I do not read the majority’s opinion here, nor the opinion in Palaio v. McAuliffe,2 nor even the opinions in the Younger v. Harris cases,3 as prohibiting federal injunctive relief against state judicial proceedings where there is a showing that use of state procedures will be inadequate to protect federal rights, i.e., where irreparable harm would otherwise occur.4 Indeed, Mitchum v. Foster, decided after Younger v. Harris, expressly recognized the existence of such a remedy.5
Had these plaintiffs shown that the state procedures for review were inadequate to safeguard their rights, because of delay or for any other reason,6 I believe federal relief would clearly have been warranted on the facts of this case, and I do not read the majority as saying otherwise. The Younger v. Harris sextet requires at least some showing that if available state procedures are fol*255lowed, irreparable harm will not be prevented. No such showing was made here.7
I have no doubt that the state injunction went far beyond the “chilling effect” present in Dombrowski v. Pfister8 and that First Amendment expressional freedoms were unquestionably frozen here. See Note, 50 Texas L.Rev. 170 (1971). I also have no doubt that a federal remedy would have been appropriate had plaintiffs shown that a thaw could not have been obtained in state court that would have adequately prevented irreparable First Amendment harm from occurring. If that result is not to obtain, the February sextet will have become an orchestra of oppressive proportions.9 The federal forum continues, as it must, to play a rightful role in the vindication of federal constitutional rights. The First Amendment is still audible,10 but before the extraordinary remedy of federal intervention in state court proceedings may be invoked, there must be a showing that the federal action is necessary to safeguard those rights. Because such a showing is totally lacking here, I concur in this reversal.

. The briefs filed on behalf of the State of Texas state the problem as follows:
“No effort was ever made by the complainants to seek any modification or review within the state court system. No appeal was taken. No application was made to the Texas Court of Civil Appeals or to the Texas Supreme Court to seek extraordinary relief. No application was made in the state trial court to try to obtain any alteration, clarification or expanded definitive ruling.
" . . . .
“It is significant to note again at this point that counsel for complainants made no effort to continue anything in *254Texas courts. Many further remedies, both legal and equitable, were still available in the trial court, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals (an intermediate appellate court with substantial equitable powers), and in the Texas Supreme Court (the court of last resort within the state and having broad equitable powers).”

. 5 Cir. 1972, 466 F.2d 1230. The Palaio decision distinguished and did not question Hobbs v. Thompson, 5 Cir. 1971, 448 F.2d 456, where we stated that “exhaustion of state judicial remedies is not a prerequisite to the invocation of federal relief under section 1983 . . .” 448 F.2d at 461. The question in the instant case is not whether state remedies should have been exhausted as much as it is whether a federal injunction against state proceedings was necessary to protect federal rights.

. The six companion cases were Younger v. Harris, 1971, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669; Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688; Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77, 91 S.Ct. 758, 27 L.Ed.2d 696; Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 91 S.Ct. 674, 27 L.Ed.2d 701; Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200, 91 S.Ct. 769, 27 L.Ed.2d 781; and Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216, 91 S.Ct. 777, 27 L.Ed.2d 792.

. See generally Fiss, Injunctions at 27-74.

. 1972, 407 U.S. 225, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 32 L.Ed.2d 705. Holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is an “expressly authorized exception” to the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U. S.C. § 2283, the Court stated:
“The very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people’s federal rights — to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law ‘whether that action be executive, legislative or judicial.’ Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346, 25 L.Ed. 676, 679. In carrying out that purpose, Congress plainly authorized the federal courts to issue injunctions in § 1983 actions, by expressly authorizing a ‘suit in equity’ as one of the means of redress. And this Court long ago recognized that federal injunctive relief against a state court proceeding can in some circumstances be essential to prevent great, immediate, and irreparable loss of a person’s constitutional rights. . . . ”
407 U.S. at 242, 92 S.Ct. at 2162, 32 L. Ed.2d at 717.

. The Court in Younger v. Harris, supra note 3, reproduced the language in Dombrowski v. Pfister, infra note 8, that suggests that delay in obtaining appellate disposition may be a sufficient “extraordinary circumstance” justifying federal intervention to prevent irreparable harm:
“But the allegations in this complaint depict a situation in which defense of the State’s criminal prosecution will not assure adequate vindication of constitutional rights. They suggest that a substantial loss of or impairment of freedoms of expression will occur if appellants must await the state court’s disposition and ultimate review in this Court of any adverse determination. These allegations, if true, clearly show irreparable injury.”
401 U.S. at 48-49, 91 S.Ct. at 753, quoting from Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. at 485-486, 85 S.Ct. 1116. See also Sedler, infra note 9, at 40-42, 46-56.

. Plaintiffs have not alleged or shown that they would encounter any delay whatsoever in obtaining state review of the state court’s injunction.

. 1965, 380 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 14 L.Ed.2d 22.

. Much has already been written regarding the potential impact of the Younger v. Harris cases. See, e. g., Sedler, Dombrowski in the Wake of Younger: The View from Without and Within, 1972 Wisc.L.Rev. 1; Note, 40 Cincinnati L.Rev. 613 (1971); Comment, Federal Injunctive Relief: What Remains after Younger v. Harris?, 60 Ky.L.J. 216 (1971); Comment, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: From Young to Younger, 32 La.L.Rev. 601 (1972); Note, 25 U.Miami L.Rev. 506 (1971); Comment, 17 N.Y.L.F. 652 (1971); Note, 1972 Wisc.L.Rev. 257. Compare Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The Significance of Dombrowski, 48 Texas L.Rev. 535 (1970), with Maraist, Federal Intervention in State Criminal Proceedings: Dombrowski, Younger, and Beyond, 50 Texas L.Rev. 1324 (1972). Compare Shevin, Federal Intrusion in State Court Proceedings, 1972 Utah L.Rev. 3, with Gilbert, Questions Unanswered by the February Sextet, 1972 Utah L.Rev. 14. See also Comment, Exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Statute, 21 Am.U.L.Rev. 395 (1972); Comment, Federal Courts: New Limitations on Injunctive Relief, 23 U.Fla.L.Rev. 416 (1971); Note, 18 Loyola L.Rev. 207 (1971); Comment, The Federal Anti-Injunction Statute, 8 Wake Forest L.Rev. 107 (1971); Comment, The Civil Rights Act of 1871 versus The Anti-Injunction Statute: The Need for a Federal Forum, 1971 Wash.U.L.Q. 625.

. See generally Kennedy & Schoonover, Federal Declaratory & Injunctive Relief Under the Burger Court, 26 SW.L.J. 282 (1972); Note, Equity on the Campus: The Limits of Injunctive Regulation of University Protest, 80 Yale L.J. 987, 993-1027 (1971). See, also Note, Collateral Attack of Injunctions Restraining First Amendment Activity, 45 So.Cal.L.Rev. 1083 (1972).