Court Opinion

ID: 9383393
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-30 16:00:41.785656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:45.234482
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-9503    Document: 010110835474        Date Filed: 03/30/2023     Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                           Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                           March 30, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  MOREES MURQUS HARMEZ,

        Petitioner,

  v.                                                           No. 22-9503
                                                           (Petition for Review)
  MERRICK B. GARLAND,
  United States Attorney General,

        Respondent.
                          _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before HARTZ, KELLY, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

       Morees Murqus Harmez petitions for review of the Board of Immigration

 Appeals (Board) order denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings.

 Exercising jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), we deny his petition for review.1

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
 argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
 except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
 may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
       1
        Our jurisdiction to review “final order[s] of removal,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1),
 encompasses appeals from the Board’s denial of a motion to reopen a removal
 proceeding. See Mata v. Lynch, 576 U.S. 143, 147 (2015); Infanzon v. Ashcroft,
 386 F.3d 1359, 1361 (10th Cir. 2004).
Appellate Case: 22-9503     Document: 010110835474        Date Filed: 03/30/2023    Page: 2

                                     I. Background

       Petitioner is a native and citizen of Iraq. He was admitted to the United States

 as a Chaldean Christian refugee in 2008 and was granted lawful permanent resident

 status. In 2016, the government charged him as removable based on his 2015

 conviction of a drug offense in Utah state court. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)

 (providing that aliens convicted of an aggravated felony are deportable).

       Petitioner appeared at the October 2016 hearing pro se and admitted the factual

 allegations against him. The Immigration Judge (IJ) advised him that he could seek

 protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and avoid removal if he

 showed it was more likely than not that he would be tortured based on his religion

 with the instigation, consent, or acquiescence of an Iraqi official. He told the IJ he

 feared being tortured if returned to Iraq but said he did not have any evidence or

 witnesses. The IJ explained the types of evidence he could submit to support a CAT

 claim and offered to continue the hearing so he could prepare an application, but he

 said “he did not want to apply.” R. at 280. The IJ then found him removable as

 charged and ordered him removed to Iraq. He waived his right to appeal.

       Between 2017 and 2021, Petitioner filed four motions to reopen, which were

 all denied.2 The second and third motions, which were based on an alleged change in

       2
         Petitioner filed the first motion to reopen before the IJ. See 8 C.F.R.
 § 1003.23(b)(1) (providing that an IJ may reopen a case in which he or she has
 rendered a decision unless jurisdiction is vested with the Board). After the Board
 dismissed his appeal of the IJ’s denial of the first motion, he filed the other three
 motions to reopen with the Board. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (governing motions to
 reopen in cases in which the Board has rendered a decision).
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 the law concerning whether his state drug conviction was a removable offense, are

 not relevant to the issues before us. The first and fourth motions sought reopening to

 apply for relief from removal based on changed country conditions in Iraq. The

 fourth motion is the one at issue here, but the factual and procedural background of

 the first motion is also relevant, and is described more fully below.

        The Board denied the fourth motion as untimely and successive, concluding

 that Petitioner’s evidence was not new and did not prove that country conditions in

 Iraq had materially worsened since he filed the first motion to reopen, so did not

 support excusing the time and numeric limitations. The Board also denied reopening

 on the ground that Petitioner had not made a prima facie showing that he was eligible

 for CAT protection. He now seeks review of that order.

                                   II. Legal Standards

        We review the Board’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.

 Infanzon v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1359, 1362 (10th Cir. 2004). The Board “abuses its

 discretion when its decision provides no rational explanation, inexplicably departs from

 established policies, is devoid of any reasoning, or contains only summary or conclusory

 statements.” Id. The Board also abuses its discretion by committing a legal error or

 relying on a factual finding that is not supported by substantial evidence. See Qiu v.

 Sessions, 870 F.3d 1200, 1202 (10th Cir. 2017).

        Motions to reopen removal proceedings are disfavored because they threaten

 the strong public interest in finality of removal orders. Maatougui v. Holder,

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 738 F.3d 1230, 1239 (10th Cir. 2013). Thus, the movant “bears a heavy burden to

 show the [Board] abused its discretion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

        Ordinarily, a noncitizen may file only one motion to reopen and must do so within

 90 days of the date of the final removal order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) (number

 limit); id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (deadline); § 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motions before the

 Board); id. § 1003.23(b)(1) (motions before the IJ). But the 90-day deadline does not

 apply to motions to reopen proceedings to apply for CAT protection

        based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or the
        country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material
        and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at
        the previous hearing.
 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (motions before the Board); see also 8 U.S.C.

 § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(i) (motions before the IJ). The

 regulations, but not the statute, allow for the same exception to the numeric

 limitation. See Wei v. Mukasey, 545 F.3d 1248, 1254 n.2 (10th Cir. 2008). “Change

 that is incremental or incidental does not meet the regulatory requirements . . . .”

 In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 257 (B.I.A. 2007).

        A motion to reopen must “state the new facts that will be proven” and provide

 supporting evidence. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B). The Board may not grant reopening

 unless the “evidence sought to be offered [upon reopening] is material and was not

 available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”

 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). “The new facts . . . must demonstrate that if proceedings before

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 the IJ were reopened . . . the new evidence offered would likely change the result in the

 case.” Maatougui, 738 F.3d at 1240 (internal quotation marks omitted).

        An applicant for CAT relief must show that “it is more likely than not that he

 or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R.

 § 1208.16(c)(2). Although evidence of gross, flagrant or mass human rights

 violations is relevant, see § 1208.16(c)(3)(iii), such evidence “does not . . . constitute

 sufficient grounds for determining that a particular person would be in danger of

 being subjected to torture upon his return to that country,” In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec.

 291, 303 (B.I.A. 2002) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Azanor v. Ashcroft,

 364 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2004). “Specific grounds must exist that indicate the

 individual would be personally at risk.” Id.

                                     III. Application

        A. Additional Factual and Procedural Background

        In his 2017 motion to reopen Petitioner claimed he had evidence that was

 unavailable at the time of his hearing that showed changed country conditions in Iraq,

 and he sought reopening to apply for CAT protection and other relief.3 In support, he

 submitted news articles and the U.S. Department of State 2016 Country Report,

 which indicated that ISIS had occupied northern Iraq—the part of the country he was

        3
        Petitioner also sought reopening to apply for asylum and withholding of
 removal, but the IJ concluded he was ineligible for such relief because of his
 aggravated felony conviction.

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 from—and was persecuting and committing crimes against minority groups in its

 control, including Chaldean Christians.

        The IJ denied the motion as untimely. The IJ concluded Petitioner did not

 satisfy the requirements for excusing the filing deadline because although the

 documents he presented were published after the October 2016 hearing, they

 described conditions that existed before the hearing, so did not establish that country

 conditions had materially changed since then. In particular, the IJ noted that the

 2016 Country Report described adverse conditions that had been causing Christians

 to flee Iraq for many years, and especially since 2014, when ISIS occupied northern

 Iraq. The IJ also noted that the news articles described violence against Iraqi

 Christians since November 2015. Finally, because Petitioner had rejected the

 opportunity to apply for CAT protection in his original proceedings, the IJ found he

 did not show exceptional circumstances warranting a discretionary decision to reopen

 sua sponte despite the untimeliness of his motion. The Board agreed and dismissed

 Petitioner’s appeal of the IJ’s order.

        Petitioner filed the motion at issue here in 2021, claiming country conditions

 in Iraq had changed since he filed the 2017 motion, making it more likely that he

 would be tortured if returned to Iraq. He claimed he would be tortured because he is

 Christian, has become Americanized, has a criminal conviction, and might be

 suspected of being an ISIS sympathizer because he has no Iraqi security documents.

        In support, he filed the U.S. Department of State 2019 Country Report, written

 statements from three witnesses he proffered as experts, and letters from family

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 members. The 2019 Country Report and witness statements detailed ISIS’s take-over

 of northern Iraq in 2014, its treatment of Christians since then, the resulting Christian

 exodus, the Iraqi government’s response, the defeat of ISIS in 2017, and ISIS’s

 continued persecution of Christians despite its defeat. One witness said the situation

 for Christians had worsened since the defeat of ISIS because the Iraqi government is

 weak so cannot protect them and corrupt so has not returned property appropriated

 from them. Another said the government’s “long track record of failing to protect its

 minority citizens,” including Christians, had “not changed dramatically” since the

 defeat of ISIS in 2017, but minority populations continued to “dwindle,” making

 those who remained more vulnerable. R. at 84. A third witness said Christians had

 been persecuted for years before the ISIS occupation and many fled Iraq. He said the

 situation for those who remained got worse after the occupation and that even after

 the area was liberated in 2017, Christians “still suffer” segregation and persecution,

 and those who were displaced “have nothing to return to.” R. at 90. The witnesses’

 reports also discussed anti-American sentiment in Iraq and the detention and

 mistreatment of people suspected of supporting ISIS. The letters of family support

 said Petitioner was at risk of harm by ISIS, which was responsible for killing his

 father sometime before the family left Iraq in 2005.

       The Board held the evidence did not support excusing the time and numeric

 limitations because it did not “establish changed country conditions in Iraq material

 to [his] eligibility for CAT protection.” R. at 4. In so holding, the Board compared

 Petitioner’s new evidence with the evidence he presented in 2017 and found his new

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 evidence did not show that being either Christian or Americanized made him more

 vulnerable to persecution or torture in 2021 than in 2017. With respect to the degree

 of change in country conditions, the Board explained that the evidence established

 “that violence against Christians in Iraq has existed since 2014” and “reflects . . .

 a continuance of the ongoing circumstances that gave rise to [Petitioner’s] first

 motion to reopen,” not a dramatic change. R. at 5. Likewise, the Board found the

 evidence showed nothing “more than an incremental difference from October 2016

 with respect to Iraqi views of those with United States or Western affiliations.” Id.

 With respect to the materiality of the alleged change in country conditions, the Board

 held the evidence showed ongoing discrimination against Christians, but nothing

 rising to the level of torture, noting, for example, that the government’s failure to

 return misappropriated property does not constitute torture. And it found the

 evidence did not show a correlation between anti-American sentiment and the

 likelihood of torture for having tattoos and other signs of Americanization.

       The Board also denied the motion on the ground that Petitioner failed to make

 a prima facie showing that he is eligible for CAT protection. The Board explained

 that while his evidence showed that “Christians remain at high risk of persecution in

 Iraq,” it did “not reflect a reasonable likelihood that [he] can show that anyone would

 specifically intend to inflict severe pain or suffering on him” based on his

 Christianity or Americanization. R. at 5. With respect to his fear of being tortured

 because of his drug conviction or based on suspicion that he is an ISIS sympathizer,

 the Board similarly held that while the evidence “indicates that detainees in Iraq

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 suffer human rights abuses and may be tortured, [Petitioner] has not established a

 reasonable likelihood that he would be detained upon removal to Iraq and tortured by

 or with the acquiescence of a public official” there. R. at 6. The Board thus

 concluded that he did not meet “his heavy burden to show that the evidence

 submitted with the instant motion would likely change the outcome of his case.” Id.

 (internal quotation marks omitted).

       B. Analysis of Petitioner’s Claims

       1. Changed Country Conditions

       Petitioner claims the Board failed to properly consider his evidence and erred

 in concluding that the evidence did not show a material change in country conditions

 in Iraq that warranted excusing him from the filing deadline. The record belies the

 first claim, and we find no abuse of discretion in the Board’s ruling.

       We reject his contention that the Board “did not compare the evidence of

 country conditions submitted with his last motion to those that existed at the time of

 his hearing and with his first motion.” Aplt. Br. at 6. The Board “abuses its

 discretion when it fails to assess and consider a petitioner’s evidence that the

 persecution of others in his protected category has substantially worsened since the

 initial application.” Qiu, 870 F.3d at 1204-05. Ordinarily, the Board compares

 country-conditions evidence presented with a motion to reopen to evidence presented

 at the time of the merits hearing. See In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 253. Here,

 however, despite the IJ’s offer to continue the 2016 hearing so Petitioner could gather

 evidence to support a CAT claim, he declined the offer and did not present any

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  country-conditions evidence. Accordingly, he cannot complain now that the Board

  did not compare his current evidence to evidence available at the time of the hearing.

         And contrary to his assertion, the Board did compare his current evidence to

  the evidence he presented with his 2017 motion. The Board identified and addressed

  the key exhibits supporting the 2021 motion, discussed some of it in depth, and

  explained why it did not show a material worsening in conditions since 2017.

  Petitioner’s disagreement with that conclusion does not mean the Board failed to

  consider his evidence. Neither does the fact that the Board did not explicitly discuss

  every aspect of his evidence. See Hadjimehdigholi v. INS, 49 F.3d 642, 648 n.2

  (10th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he BIA is not required to discuss every piece of evidence when

  it renders a decision. . . . [A]ll that is necessary is a decision that sets out terms

  sufficient to enable us as a reviewing court to see that the Board has heard,

  considered, and decided.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

         Petitioner’s disagreement with the Board’s ruling also does not establish that

  the Board abused its discretion. He insists that conditions in Iraq are worse now for

  Christians and Americanized Iraqis than they were at the time of the hearing in 2016

  and when he first applied for reopening in 2017, and he points to evidence describing

  mistreatment of both groups since then. But evidence that Christian and

  Americanized Iraqis continue to be mistreated does not establish that their plight is

  significantly worse now than during the ISIS occupation. The Board gave a rational

  explanation for its ruling and substantial evidence supports its finding that the

  evidence did not show the kind of change needed to excuse the deadline for seeking

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  reopening. Petitioner’s argument ultimately amounts to a request to reweigh the

  evidence, which we cannot do. See Yuk v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1222, 1236 (10th Cir.

  2004) (“[I]t is not our prerogative to reweigh the evidence.”). Accordingly, we find

  no abuse of discretion in its denial of the motion as time barred.4

        2. Eligibility for CAT Protection

        The Board also acted within its discretion in concluding that the same

  evidence did not show a prima facie case of eligibility for CAT protection. It found

  the evidence established that “Christians remain at high risk of persecution in Iraq”

  and there is still significant anti-American sentiment there, but did now show that

  Petitioner was likely to be tortured if returned to Iraq based on his Christianity,

  Americanization, or for any other reason. R. at 5. Because it found he did not

  demonstrate that he is personally at risk of torture, the Board held that he failed to

  make a prima facie case of his eligibility for relief under the CAT. See In re J-E-,

  23 I. & N. Dec. at 303. Again, substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding, and

  it gave a reasonable explanation for its ruling.

        3. Due Process Claim

        In both the statement of the issues presented and summary of argument

  sections of his appellate brief, Petitioner suggested he intended to argue that the IJ

  violated his right to due process by “proceeding with [the] hearing, knowing that [he]

        4
          Because we find no abuse of discretion in the Board’s conclusion that
  the exception to the time limit did not apply, we need not decide whether the
  regulatory exception could have applied to the numeric limitation. See Wei, 545 F.3d
  at 1254 n.2.
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  was afraid to return to Iraq and believed that he would not be returned to Iraq.” Aplt.

  Br. at 2; see also id. at 6 (“The IJ erred in ordering the Petitioner deported when [he]

  had expressed his fear of torture by government officials or those acting on their

  behalf. . . . . Based on what had previously taken place, the [Board] should have

  granted [his] motion to reopen and allowed him to apply for CAT.”). But he did not

  pursue the due process issue in the substance of his brief and cited no legal authority

  to support it. He thus waived the argument, and we do not address it. See Bronson v.

  Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e routinely have declined to

  consider arguments that are not raised, or are inadequately presented, in an

  appellant’s opening brief.”); Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 679

  (10th Cir. 1998) (“Arguments inadequately briefed in the opening brief are

  waived.”). And, having concluded that he waived the argument, we need not address

  the government’s exhaustion arguments.

                                    IV.      Conclusion

        The petition for review is denied.

                                               Entered for the Court

                                               Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
                                               Circuit Judge

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