Court Opinion

ID: 9808791
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:50:55.835999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:18:40.227232
License: Public Domain

*212Merrimon, C. J.,
(dissenting): The policy sued upon in this action contains this clause of agreement: “It is expressly covenanted by the parties hereto that no suit or action against this company for recovery of any claim by virtue of this policy shall be sustainable in any Court of law or chancery, unless commenced within twelve months next after the loss shall have occurred ; and should any suit or action be commenced against this company after the expiration of the aforesaid twelve months, the lapse of time shall be taken and admitted as conclusive evidence against the validity of such claim, any statute of limitation .to the contrary notwithstanding.” The Court has held that such agreement is valid and binding on the parties to it. Muse v. Assurance Co., 103 N. C., 240; Manufacturing Co. v. Assurance Co , 106 N. C., 28. The alleged loss of the plaintiff occurred on July 31, 1888, and more than twelve months next thereafter, to-wit, on the 4th of June, 1890, this action began. Hence, by the express agreement above set forth of the parties, the alleged cause of action is without any force or validity, and not actionable.
The plaintiffs allege, however, that their delay in bringing their action was induced by the defendant. “ And they further say that defendant ought not to be allowed to set up said limitation of forfeiture as a defence to this action, since the delay in bringing this suit was caused by the actions and promises of the defendant, which induced plaintiffs to believe that the said limitation would not be pleaded or relied on.”
But the policy contains this further clause of agreement: “And it is further expressly covenanted by the parties hereto that no officer, agent or representative of this company shall be held to have waived any of the terms and conditions of this policy, unless such waiver shall be endorsed hereon in writing.” This agreement does not conti’avene any principle or policy of the law. It is reasonable, and there is no legal reason why it is not valid. The parties might make it, *213as they did, a material part of the contract of insurance. It is not pretended that the defendant or its agent waived the agreement that the plaintiff in case of loss should bring his action within twelve months next after it accrued by writing or endorsement on the policy, or in writing at all. The plaintiffs knew of this agreement; it is presumed, and must be taken, that they had knowledge of it; it is not contended that they did not. It was, therefore, their laches if they allowed more than twelve months to elapse after their loss before they brought their action without having a waiver as to the lapse of time endorsed on the policy. In the face of the express stipulation above recited, and the absence of an endorsement of such waiver on the policy, and in the absence of all agreement of such waiver, I cannotsee any just or valid reason, legal or other, why the agreement of the parties shall not be enforced according to its plain terms and purpose.
It is not alleged that the defendant or its agent fraudulently induced the plaintiffs to delay the bringing of their action, but simply that they were induced to do so by the defendant’s “ actions and promises.” It appears that the plaintiffs furnished their proof of loss. The defendant’s agent (the adjuster) insisted that they should furnish certain other evidence of the extent of their loss. But the plaintiffs did not ask the agent of the defendant to waive the lapse of time in writing on the policy or otherwise as they might have done; they said nothing on that subject, nor did the defendant or its agent intimate that he had any authority to do so, nor did he promise to do so. There was no evidence sufficient to go to the jury to prove such a waiver by act or promise in writing or otherwise. The evidence relied upon fairly interpreted gives rise to no more than conjecture or the merest inference, that ought not to be allowed to prevail to destroy a plain and express stipulation. If evidence of the waiver, other than a waiver in writing endorsed on the policy, could be competent at all, it should have been clear and distinct, *214not such as gave rise lo mere inference or possible implication. Moreover, it was in evidence, without contradiction, that the adjuster had “ no authority to waive any stipulation of the policy.”
This case is'very different from Joyner v. Massey, 97 N. C., 148, and other like cases cited for the plaintiffs. In these cases the defendants expressly asked and induced the plaintiffs not to sue, and promised directly that they would hot plead the statute of limitations. The Court properly held that it would be unconscionable and a fraud upon the plaintiffs to allow the defendárits to avail themselves of that plea. But here .the defendant did riot request the plaintiffs not to sue, nor did it promise not to avail itself of the express agreement under consideration. In view of this agreement the waiver should have been clear and distinct, hot left to mere inference.
The Court instructed the jury that if the defendant’s agent on the 1st of June, 1889, required the plaintiffs to produ'ce certain duplicate warehouse' bills, the plaintiffs would be entitled to a reasonable time within which to procure and produce the same, and left it to them to determine what was such' reasonable' time. The view I have taken above renders it unnecessary for me to point out the error in this instruction. I deem it worth while, however, to say that what is reasonable time is not a question' of fact for the jury to determine, but is a question of law to be determined by the Court when the facts are found or admitted, and when the facts do not appear the Court should submit the evidence to the jury, instructing them that there would or would not be reasonable time accordingly as they might find the facts in view of varying aspects of the evidence. See Emry v. Railroad, 109 N. C., 589, and cases there cited. In my judgment there is error, and. there ought to be a new trial.
Per curiam. Affirmed.