Court Opinion

ID: 9684672
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:07:59.902733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:58.728330
License: Public Domain

Conley Byrd, Justice, dissenting. The majority has ignored the provisions of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Ark. Stat. Ann. Sec. 34-1002 (Repl. 1962), which denies a joint tortfeasor contribution until “he has discharged the COMMON LIABILITY or has paid more than his pro rata share thereof.” The exact language of the statute is as follows: “(2) A joint tortfeasor is not entitled to a money judgment for contribution until he has by payment discharged the COMMON LIABILITY or has paid more than his pro rata share thereof.” (Emphasis mine). In this case there is no adjudicated “common liability” because in International Harvester Company v. Pike, 249 Ark. 1026 (1971) we reversed the joint or common liability of International. In doing so we held that International had the right to have the comparative negligence of Pike submitted to the jury. We also told International that because of the reversal it was unnecessary for us to discuss its asserted error whereby the trial court permitted the jury to raise its first findings of damages of Pike’s personal injuries from $19,000 to $70,000. The majority’s reliance upon Wymer v. Dedman, 233 Ark. 854, 350 S.W. 2d 169 (1961) is not well founded —in that case there was an adjudicated “common liability.” Here the adjudicated “common liability” of International has been reversed and set aside for a new trial. When the majority speaks of the law of the case, I’m at a loss to understand why- the opinion styled International Harvester Company v. Pike, 249 Ark. 1026, is not a part of the law of this case also, for by order of this court it was consolidated with Burks Motors Inc. v. International Harvester Company, 250 Ark. 29, 466 S.W. 2d 907 (1971) before submission. At the time the so-called clarification opinion was written on rehearing, 250 Ark. 641, Burks had not paid more than its pro rata share of the COMMON LIABILITY and of course any decision at that time with reference to whether it was entitled to contribution from International was not a justiciable controversy before this court. Thus the so-called clarification was nothing more than obiter dictum on that issue and for that reason, I’m at a loss to understand why we should declare it to be the law of the case. For the reasons stated here and in 250 Ark. 641, I respectfully dissent.