Court Opinion

ID: 9964656
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-30 16:03:51.491929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:38.632299
License: Public Domain

IN THE

            Court of Appeals of Indiana
                                         Lester L. Sumrall,                      FILED
                                                                             Apr 30 2024, 9:04 am
                           Appellant-Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff
                                                                                 CLERK
                                                                             Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                Court of Appeals
                                                     v.                           and Tax Court

                                            LeSEA, Inc.,
                            Appellee-Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant

                                             April 30, 2024
                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
                                           23A-PL-2214
                            Appeal from the St. Joseph Circuit Court
                              The Honorable John E. Broden, Judge
                                        Trial Court Cause No.
                                         71C01-1903-PL-84

                                   Opinion by Judge Crone
                                 Judges Bailey and Pyle concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2214 | April 30, 2024      Page 1 of 23
      Crone, Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   Lester L. Sumrall (Lester) appeals an order granting a motion for judgment lien

      on real estate in favor of LeSEA, Inc. (LeSEA). Lester also appeals the denial of

      his motion to continue a hearing. We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   In an unpublished decision, a different panel of our Court provided a detailed

      history of the events that ultimately led to the current appeal. See Sumrall v.

      LeSEA, Inc., No. 22A-PL-45, 2022 WL 17749955, at *1-5 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec.

      19, 2022) (Sumrall 1). We recite pertinent highlights. In March 2016, almost

      forty years after certain “bonds became due and well after the [six-year] statute

      of limitations had expired,” Lester filed a bond debt notice against LeSEA. Id.

      at *7. In the notice, which was filed with the St. Joseph County Recorder,

      Lester asserted that a $172,967.69 debt was “now due and owing.” Id.

[3]   In a warranty deed dated November 6, 2018, Ryan T. Marcott conveyed and

      warranted certain real property, 53646 Bridgewater Court, in Elkhart County

      (the Bridgewater Property) to Lester for ten dollars and other valuable

      consideration. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 119, 122-24. The warranty deed

      originally identified Lester “and Sarah Sumrall, Husband and Wife,” as

      grantee, but the quoted language was scratched out and initialed. Id. at 122.

      The identity of the person who initialed the change is unclear, as is the reason

      for the change. On November 15, 2018, “Lester Sumrall, A Married Man[,]”

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2214 | April 30, 2024         Page 2 of 23
      was identified as the sole borrower on a mortgage taken out on the Bridgewater

      Property. Id. at 109. On November 20, 2018, Lester executed and submitted to

      the Elkhart County Recorder a quitclaim deed. Lester was listed as the

      “Owner” who quitclaimed the Bridgewater Property to “Lester L. Sumrall and

      Sarah J. Sumrall, as Co-Trustees of The Lester and Sarah Sumrall Trust dated

      November 19, 2018 [hereafter, the Sumrall Trust], for no consideration[.]” Id. at

      101.

[4]   The Sumrall Trust, which is dated November 19, 2018, and was signed by

      Lester and Sarah, identifies Lester and Sarah as “both Settlors and Co-

      Trustees.” Id. at 130. The Sumrall Trust provides in pertinent part as follows:

              The Settlors reserve the right and power, jointly or individually,
              at any time and from time to time while living to revoke in whole
              or in part this Trust and to withdraw any … property …
              belonging to the trust estate or any part thereof; or to alter or
              amend any term or provision of the Trust, except that the Settlors
              shall have no power to change the duties of the Trustee without
              the Trustee’s written consent. During the lifetime of the Settlors,
              the Trustee shall distribute to the Settlors, or as either of the
              Settlors may otherwise direct in writing, the net income of the
              Trust, and the Trustee shall pay any or all of the principal of the
              Trust as either of the Settlors may direct in writing.

      Id. at 131. In addition, the document provides that upon the death of the

      surviving settlor, the Sumrall Trust “shall thereafter be irrevocable and not

      subject to alteration or amendment by any person.” Id. at 132. The Sumrall

      Trust further provides that after the death of both Lester and Sarah, their

      children shall be the residual beneficiaries. Id. at 135-36.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2214 | April 30, 2024        Page 3 of 23
[5]   Circling back to the $172,967.69 bond debt notice, in 2019, LeSEA filed a

      complaint against Lester in St. Joseph County. LeSEA sought a declaratory

      judgment and argued that Lester had slandered title to LeSEA’s real property

      by recording an invalid bond notice. Lester lodged counterclaims, which

      requested declaratory relief and specific performance and alleged that LeSEA

      had breached a contract by failing to redeem the bonds.

[6]   In 2020, the trial court granted summary judgment to LeSEA in its slander of

      title action. In October 2021, the trial court issued an “order granting

      [prevailing party] LeSEA $136,721.98 in attorney fees” (Original Attorney

      Fees). Sumrall 1, 2022 WL 17749955, at *1. As for Lester’s breach of contract

      counterclaim, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of LeSEA in

      December 2021. Lester appealed.

[7]   In its December 2022 decision, the Sumrall 1 panel reiterated evidence that

      Lester had recorded the false bond debt notice, that “a sale of certain property

      was unable to close until the Bond Debt Notice was released,” and that,

      consequently, LeSEA incurred substantial legal expenses to secure the release.

      Id. at *7. Concluding that summary judgment was appropriate in both instances

      and finding no abuse of discretion in the award of Original Attorney Fees, the

      Sumrall 1 panel affirmed.

[8]   On May 1, 2023, LeSEA filed with the trial court a motion for additional

      attorney fees (Appellate Attorney Fees) generated by the Sumrall 1 appeal. On

      or about June 12, 2023, Lester filed a motion arguing against Appellate

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2214 | April 30, 2024         Page 4 of 23
       Attorney Fees. On June 13, 2023, LeSEA filed its “Motion for Judgment Lien

       on Real Estate,” which referenced the judgment of Original Attorney Fees,

       requested that the trial court enter a lien on the Bridgewater Property, and

       included exhibits. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 99. On June 15, 2023, LeSEA

       filed a motion requesting leave to file a reply in support of its motion for

       Appellate Attorney Fees. On June 16, 2023, Lester filed a motion stating that

       he had no objection to LeSEA filing a reply. He also asked the trial court to set

       the matter for a hearing and require that all briefs be submitted “within ten (10)

       days of the hearing.” Id. at 151.

[9]    On June 20, 2023, the trial court granted leave to LeSEA to file a reply in

       support of its motion for Appellate Attorney Fees. Also on June 20, the trial

       court scheduled an August 1, 2023 hearing to be conducted via Zoom (Zoom

       hearing). On June 21, 2023, Lester filed both an objection to LeSEA’s motion

       for judgment lien against the Bridgewater Property and a motion requesting

       that the matter be set for hearing “no sooner than forty-five (45) days from the

       filing of this Motion, with briefs and arguments on the issues due ten (10) days

       before the hearing.” Id. at 154.

[10]   One week prior to the Zoom hearing, Lester filed a motion to continue it. In his

       motion, Lester asserted that time constraints prohibited him from presenting

       testimony at a July 2023 hearing 1 and that he would be unable to attend the

       1
           On appeal, no transcript of a July 2023 hearing has been included.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2214 | April 30, 2024         Page 5 of 23
       Zoom hearing because he would be out of the country “on a speaking

       engagement[.]” Id. at 170. On July 26, 2023, Lester filed a brief addressing

       Appellate Attorney Fees and a separate brief concerning the judgment lien on

       the Bridgewater Property. Also filed that same day was LeSEA’s objection to

       Lester’s motion to continue the Zoom hearing. LeSEA contended, inter alia,

       that time was of the essence because at the July hearing, Lester had “testified

       that he may be filing bankruptcy[.]” Id. at 177.

[11]   On July 28, 2023, the trial court entered an order denying Lester’s motion for

       continuance. Within its order, the trial court found that the hearing had been

       set more than a month ago and reiterated that it would be conducted via Zoom.

       The trial court further found that “no testamentary evidence will take place, but

       instead the Court will hear argument from counsel on the fully briefed

       Motions.” Id. at 50.

[12]   At the Zoom hearing, the trial court heard argument from counsel and took the

       matter under advisement. In an August 23, 2023 order, the trial court granted

       LeSEA’s motion for Appellate Attorney Fees, halved the requested amount,

       and explained its reasoning as follows:

               The Court believes it is of critical importance that [Lester] is not
               assessed any attorney fees for professional services unrelated to
               the slander of title issue. Therefore, in an abundance of caution
               to insure [Lester] is not assessed any attorney fees for work
               performed by [LeSEA’s] counsel unrelated to the slander of title
               issue, the Court reduces the global fee for the professional
               services proved by [LeSEA’s] counsel by Fifty Per Cent (50%).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2214 | April 30, 2024             Page 6 of 23
                 Thus, [LeSEA’s] Motion for Appellate Attorney Fees is
                 GRANTED but in the amount of $12,384.75.

       Appealed Order at 5. The trial court also granted LeSEA’s motion for judgment

       lien on the Bridgewater Property. Without “questioning [Lester’s] motives for

       placing [the Bridgewater] property in a trust,” the trial court concluded that

       “the legal impact of placing the real property in a revocable trust where the

       Trust instrument freely allows the property to be removed from the Trust at any

       time is much different than placing the real property in an irrevocable trust.” Id.

       at 6-7.

[13]   On September 20, 2023, Lester filed a notice of appeal that identified only the

       August 23 order. Lester filed his appellant’s brief, and LeSEA filed its appellee’s

       brief. Lester filed his reply brief. LeSEA filed a motion to strike the reply brief

       or, alternatively, for leave to file a surreply. Lester filed an answer to LeSEA’s

       motion. We denied the motion to strike and granted leave to file a surreply.

       Discussion and Decision

       Section 1 – Lester has not demonstrated that the entry of a
       judgment lien violated due process.
[14]   Lester intertwines due process concerns with the denial of his motion to

       continue the Zoom hearing. The standard of review for due process is well

       settled. “Whether a party was denied due process is a question of law that we

       review de novo.” Miller v. Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 878 N.E.2d 346, 351 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2007). “The fundamental requirement of due process is the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2214 | April 30, 2024          Page 7 of 23
       opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”

       NOW Courier, Inc. v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 871 N.E.2d 384, 387

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

[15]   Lester argues that the trial court “violated the Fourteenth Amendment due

       process rights of [him] and the [Sumrall] Trust by not allowing them their day

       in court to present evidence in opposition to LeSEA’s motion seeking a

       judgment lien against the” Bridgewater Property. Appellant’s Br. at 9. Though

       confusingly worded, Lester’s brief specifically states that the Sumrall Trust

       includes Sarah as a person “having an interest in the [Sumrall] Trust property,”

       and he consistently refers to her as co-settlor and co-trustee. Id. at 4 n.1. Lester

       contends that the Sumrall Trust “would be considered a person separate and

       distinct from [him] and therefore entitled to due process[.]” Id. at 10. He

       maintains that the judgment lien should be vacated because the record does not

       show that the Sumrall Trust was a party to the litigation, let alone “noticed of

       the lawsuit, or allowed to present evidence[.]” Id. at 11.

[16]   LeSEA maintains that any argument concerning Sarah’s rights is waived

       and/or cannot be raised by Lester. According to LeSEA, Lester did not argue

       Sarah’s interest before the trial court and did not develop an argument

       regarding her rights in his initial appellant’s brief. We disagree and point to

       Lester’s counsel’s argument at the August 23, 2023 hearing:

               I believe that this case is distinguishable [from Fulp v. Gilliland,
               998 N.E.2d 204 (Ind. 2013)] because who were the settlors? It
               was both–both Mr. Sumrall [Lester] and Mrs. Sumrall [Sarah].

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2214 | April 30, 2024             Page 8 of 23
               They’re co-settlors. The document which–even now if the Court
               saw a copy of it, it says that they’re co-settlors. And the reason
               they’re co-settl[or]s is the money to purchase the home, the down
               payment anyway, was from –was from Sarah Sumrall. So,
               they’re co-settlors.

               Then the next thing that we find out is that they’re co-trustees.
               And it goes to … it gives Lester the right to revoke the trust, take
               property out of the trust. I’m not disputing that. But it also gives
               his wife Sarah the same–the same thing. Same power.

               Also in the trust it’s clear from a reading of the trust that the
               house was put into the trust for a place for the family to live. That
               would include these children of the trust. The only reason they
               put in there the revocable nature of the trust, as far as to allow
               them to sell the house in case they … moved into another
               house[.] But the primary reason for the trust was to establish a
               succession of the trust to both of–if both of them died it would go
               to the children[.]

       Tr. Vol. 2 at 16-17. Lester’s counsel suggested that “the property that [LeSEA

       wants] to go after, which is in the Lester and Sarah Sumrall trust they’ve never

       been a party to this action. So their property rights are being decided by this

       Court without them even being a party to it.” Id. at 18. LeSEA’s more

       persuasive argument questions whether Lester can claim a violation of Sarah’s

       due process rights on her behalf.

[17]   Regardless of the packaging, the crux of this case concerns one complex

       question: whether a judgment holder may satisfy that judgment by securing a

       judgment lien upon real property within a revocable trust, when the judgment

       was against one co-trustee, co-settlor, and beneficiary of the trust, in his

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2214 | April 30, 2024         Page 9 of 23
       individual capacity, yet the judgment holder does not include the other co-

       settlor, co-trustee, or the trust itself as a party. Neither Lester nor LeSEA has

       presented any Indiana caselaw exactly on point, but each relies to some degree

       on Kesling v. Kesling, 967 N.E.2d 66 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.

[18]   Kesling involved a closely held corporation (TPO), questionable stock purchase

       agreements and transfers, and a debate about ownership status when stock is

       placed in a trust. In March 2001, family member and shareholder Andrew

       Kesling placed his TPO corporate voting stock into the “Andrew C. Kesling

       Trust,” a revocable trust of which he was the sole settlor, trustee, and

       beneficiary, with the right to amend, modify, or revoke the trust at any time. Id.

       at 70-71. In June 2004, Peter Kesling sold 5,410 TPO shares to Andrew, whom

       Peter believed to be a TPO shareholder. Yet, the documents memorializing the

       sale indicated that the stock was being transferred into Andrew’s trust. TPO

       shareholders brought an action against Andrew, his trust, and Peter Kesling,

       seeking a declaration that a transfer of stock from Peter to Andrew was a

       violation of the TPO shareholder agreement because Andrew was not a

       shareholder at the time of the transfer. Peter cross claimed against Andrew for

       rescission of the stock purchase agreement. After a bench trial, a judgment was

       entered providing for rescission of the stock purchase agreement. Andrew

       appealed.

[19]   In Kesling, we noted a prior case that had referred to an inter vivos, revocable

       trust as a tool for estate planning and a “unique legal entity.” Id. at 80 (citing In

       re Walz, 423 N.E.2d 729, 732 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981)). We also quoted extensively

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2214 | April 30, 2024          Page 10 of 23
       from the Restatements of Trusts, one of which described the creation of a trust

       as a “method of disposing of property.” Id. at 80-81 (citing Restatement

       (Second) of Trusts intro. note (1959)). The introductory note to Chapter 21 of

       the Restatement (Third) of Trusts (2007) had this to say on the subject:

               Technically, the trust is still not generally recognized as a legal
               “entity,” but it is generally for federal tax purposes, and in
               practice trustees act on behalf of their trusts and are sued as trust
               representatives. Indeed, in this Chapter and elsewhere in this
               country, the trust is treated as an entity to such an extent that it is
               no longer inappropriate to refer to claims against or liabilities of a
               “trust” (as in the title and content of this Chapter) and to the
               liability or debt of a beneficiary to a “trust” (as in Chapter 20), or
               to refer to and treat trusts, in law and in practice, as if they were
               entities in numerous other contexts.

[20]   In Kesling, we further observed that “the legal status of a trust is an evolving

       concept” and noted “Indiana case law in which a revocable trust itself has been

       listed as a party to a lawsuit, rather than listing the trustee acting on behalf of

       the trust as the party.” 967 N.E.2d at 82 (citing Breeden Revocable Tr. v.

       Hoffmeister-Repp, 941 N.E.2d 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), and Barkwill v. The

       Cornelia H. Barkwill Revocable Tr., 902 N.E.2d 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans.

       denied); see also Cain v. William J. Huff, II Revocable Tr. Declaration, Dated June 28,

       2011, 149 N.E.3d 645 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. However, we then

       clarified that “regardless of the legal position occupied by a revocable trust in

       Indiana,” we were addressing a different question. 967 N.E.2d at 82. That is,

       we examined “whether, under the circumstances … Andrew’s Trust

       Declaration establishing a revocable trust in which he is the settlor, trustee, and

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2214 | April 30, 2024           Page 11 of 23
       a beneficiary, constituted a transfer to a non-shareholder under TPO’s by-laws

       and the Shareholder Agreement and extinguished his ‘ownership’ over those

       assets, and thus whether Andrew ceased” being a shareholder of TPO after a

       certain date. Id. We held that Andrew’s trust declaration did not extinguish his

       rights as a TPO shareholder, that there was no mutual mistake of fact upon

       which to base an order of rescission in favor of Peter, and that the trial court

       abused its discretion when it ordered the shares returned to Peter. Id. at 86.

[21]   LeSEA reads Kesling as holding that Andrew was still the owner of the shares

       he placed in his trust “because he was the settlor, trustee, and beneficiary of the

       revocable trust and retained for himself the right to amend or revoke the trust at

       any time.” Appellee’s Br. at 16. LeSEA’s restatement of our Kesling holding is

       not wrong but does highlight a distinction between Kesling and the case we

       address today. Kesling did not involve a trust with co-settlors, co-trustees, and

       multiple beneficiaries but concerned just one person (Andrew) in multiple roles.

       And, although we commented that the assets held in Andrew’s trust were

       “reachable by Andrew’s potential creditors[,]” we were not squarely faced with

       a judgment holder seeking assets from Andrew’s trust. See 967 N.E.2d at 84

       (citing spendthrift provision, Ind. Code § 30-4-3-2(b), and various cases outside

       Indiana).

[22]   LeSEA also cites Fulp, 998 N.E.2d 204, for support. In that case, “Ruth Fulp

       placed her family farm in a revocable trust, reserving the right to revoke or

       amend the trust and to use its assets–with any remaining trust assets going to

       her three children upon her death.” Id. at 205. A few years later, Ruth decided

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2214 | April 30, 2024       Page 12 of 23
       to sell the farm to her son for a low price, use the proceeds to pay for her

       retirement-home care, and keep the farm in the family. Nancy, Ruth’s daughter,

       “argued that a bargain sale would breach Ruth’s fiduciary duty to her children

       and deprive Nancy of ‘her share’ of the trust.” Id. Fulp addressed this novel

       question: “[W]hile a revocable trust is revocable, whom does the trustee serve?”

       Id.

[23]   Fulp included the following explanation of revocable trusts:

               Revocable trusts have become popular estate planning tools and
               substitutes for wills because they allow settlors to avoid probate
               and guardianship, to have greater privacy, and to manage their
               assets. John J. Barnosky, The Incredible Revocable Living Trust, 10
               J. Suffolk Acad. L. 1, 1–15 (1995). Like other trusts, a revocable
               trust “is a fiduciary relationship between a person who, as
               trustee, holds title to property and another person for whom, as
               beneficiary, the title is held.” See Ind. Code § 30-4-1-1(a) (2004).
               A settlor creates a revocable trust by executing the trust
               agreement, at which time the trustee takes legal title to the
               property, and the beneficiary takes equitable title. Breeze v. Breeze,
               428 N.E.2d 286, 287 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); see I.C. § 30-4-1-1(a).
               But unlike other trusts, settlors of revocable trusts continue using
               the trust property during their lives and retain the power to
               revoke or amend the trust at any time. Kesling v. Kesling, 967
               N.E.2d 66, 80, 86 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. And unlike
               a will, upon the settlor’s death, the “trust property is not in the
               decedent-settlor’s estate.” In re Walz, 423 N.E.2d 729, 732 (Ind.
               Ct. App. 1981).

       Id. at 207. Our supreme court concluded that “while a trust is revocable, the

       trustee’s duty is only to the settlor[.]” Id. at 209 (citing then-newly amended

       Ind. Code § 30-4-3-1.3(a)). Thus, Ruth as trustee owed a duty to herself as the
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2214 | April 30, 2024          Page 13 of 23
       trust’s settlor and primary beneficiary but did not owe a duty to the remainder

       beneficiary children. Id. at 210. Accordingly, she “was free to sell her farm as

       trustee for whatever price she desired, without breaching a duty to her

       children.” Id. at 205.

[24]   We agree with Fulp’s holding as well as its general statements about revocable

       trusts. However, like Kesling, Fulp is not conclusive here. Ruth did not have a

       co-settlor or co-trustee, and no judgment holder was making a claim upon the

       farm asset within her revocable trust.

[25]   LeSEA points us to Marshall County Tax Awareness Committee v. Quivey, 780

       N.E.2d 380 (Ind. 2002). Marshall County addressed whether a settlor’s interest in

       real estate established residency sufficient to allow the settlor (Good) to sign a

       remonstrance petition to block a school building improvement plan. Our

       supreme court stated: “We think it was clear enough who Good was and that,

       as trustee of a revocable trust created by himself and his wife, he was an owner

       of property within the district.” Id. at 385. The Marshall County court had no

       trouble concluding that a co-trustee husband was an owner of real property

       within his and his wife’s revocable trust. Our supreme court was not faced with

       whether the holder of a judgment against Good could have enforced a

       judgment lien against real property within his and his wife’s trust, but the

       Marshall County language tends toward that conclusion.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2214 | April 30, 2024        Page 14 of 23
[26]   In addition, LeSEA cites several non-Indiana cases, 2 the most compelling of

       which is Pandy v. Independent Bank, 372 P.3d 1047 (Colo. 2016). Pandy reviewed

       whether “the court of appeals erred in holding that property titled in the name

       of a judgment debtor’s co-settled, revocable trust can also be the debtor’s

       property and is therefore subject to liens obtained by his judgment creditors

       pursuant to section 13-52-102(1), C.R.S. 2015.” Id. at 1048 n.1. Colorado’s

       supreme court summarized the case as follows:

                The petitioners, Joseph T. Pandy and Elizabeth Pandy, are co-
                settlors and co-trustees of a revocable trust that holds title to
                certain real property in Colorado. The respondent, Independent
                Bank (the “Bank”), obtained two judgments against Mr. Pandy
                in Michigan. After domesticating those judgments in the district

       2
         In re Est. of Nagel, 580 N.W.2d 810 (Iowa 1998) (allowing auto accident victim’s estate to reach corpus of
       trust belonging to deceased husband and deceased wife); In re Nielsen, 526 B.R. 351 (Bankr. D. Haw. 2015)
       (co-settlor and co-trustee husband and wife were both parties in bankruptcy); In re Tougas, 338 B.R. 164
       (Bankr. D. Mass. 2006) (holding that because debtor, as co-settlor and sole trustee of trust, retained broad
       power to alter and amend trust and retained incidents of ownership of trust res, the trust and trust res were
       property of debtor’s bankruptcy estate; debtor also ignored provisions of trust); In re Luedke, No. 20-20729,
       2020 WL 4342242 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. July 28, 2020) (citing Wisconsin statute that explicitly states that
       “[d]uring the lifetime of the settlor, the property of a revocable trust is subject to claims of the settlor’s
       creditors” and addressing whether husband and wife, who were settlors, beneficiaries, and trustees of
       revocable trust, could claim homestead exemption on real property in bankruptcy context); Boshernitsan v.
       Bach, 276 Cal. Rptr. 3d 109, 117 (Cal. App. 2021) (holding that trustees of revocable living trust who were
       also trust’s settlors and beneficiaries qualified as “landlord” under family move-in provision of city’s rent
       control ordinance); Soto v. First Gibraltar Bank, FSB San Antonio, 868 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. App. 1993) (holding
       that bank had right to offset revocable trust funds against debt of depositor, who was trust’s settlor; also
       noting bank’s right to apply depositor’s general deposit to an indebtedness that depositor owed bank on
       another account); Littell v. Law Firm of Trinkle, No. 8:03-cv-2539, 2009 WL 10706315 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 13,
       2009) (concluding that trust provision unambiguously expressed settlors’ intent to give surviving settlor
       power to amend trust, including changing beneficiary, thus law firm did not neglect professional duty by
       drafting and executing trust amendments), aff’d, 345 F. App’x 415 (11th Cir. 2009); Tseng v. Tseng, 352 P.3d
       74, 75 (Or. Ct. App. 2015) (addressing “whether and to what extent, after a settlor’s death, ORS 130.710(1)
       requires a trustee of a revocable trust to provide beneficiaries of the trust with information about the
       administration of the trust during the settlor’s lifetime”), rev. den.; Mickam v. Joseph Louis Palace Tr., 849 F.
       Supp. 516 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (citing Michigan statute for rule that revocable trust is not a separate legal entity
       regarding creditor); United States v. Peelle, 159 F. Supp. 45 (E.D.N.Y. 1958) (applying New York statute).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2214 | April 30, 2024                                 Page 15 of 23
               court for Grand County, Colorado and recording transcripts of
               the Colorado judgments with the Grand County Clerk and
               Recorder, the Bank filed the present action to quiet title and for a
               decree of foreclosure.

               The Pandys subsequently moved for judgment on the pleadings,
               arguing that the Bank’s complaint was barred by what they
               argued was the applicable statute of limitations, namely, the
               three-year statute set forth in section 13-80-101(1)(k), C.R.S.
               (2015). The district court denied the Pandys’ motion, and the
               Pandys brought an interlocutory appeal in the court of appeals. A
               division of that court affirmed the district court’s denial of the
               motion for judgment on the pleadings[.]

               We now affirm. We conclude that as a settlor of a revocable
               trust, Mr. Pandy held an ownership interest in the trust’s assets.
               Accordingly, the Bank could properly seek to enforce its
               judgment against Mr. Pandy in this case, and its action was not
               barred by the statute of limitations set forth in section 13-80-
               101(1)(k).

       Id. at 1048 (citation and footnote omitted). Thus, even though it was Mr. Pandy

       (and not Mrs. Pandy) who owed the debts to the Bank, the Bank was able to

       reach property within the co-settlors’ and co-trustees’ trust. The Bank did so by

       domesticating the judgments, recording the judgments, filing to quiet title, and

       then foreclosing. Pandy comes closest to the present situation, and, as such, we

       find it instructive.

[27]   LeSEA offers a related policy argument as well. LeSEA asserts that should we

       affirm, we would comport with policy that “a debtor may not tie up his or her

       property in a trust in such a way as to allow the debtor to enjoy the property

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2214 | April 30, 2024           Page 16 of 23
       while preventing his or her creditors from reaching it.” LeSEA’s Surreply at 8

       (citing Pandy, 372 P.3d at 1050). LeSEA goes further, stating that Lester’s

       transfer of the Bridgewater Property into the Sumrall Trust for no consideration

       “may well have been voidable as a fraudulent transfer to avoid his creditors’

       claims.” Id. LeSEA asserts that our Court “should not countenance Lester’s

       abuse of the trust system to avoid answering for the trial court’s judgment

       against him.” Id. at 9.

[28]   Lester and Sarah set up the Sumrall Trust on November 19, 2018. Lester

       quitclaimed the Bridgewater Property to the Sumrall Trust on November 20,

       2018. The quitclaim deed was duly recorded. These actions were completed

       almost three years before the six-figure judgment for Original Attorney Fees

       was entered against Lester in October 2021 and almost five years before the

       Appellate Attorney Fees award was entered in 2023. Absent clairvoyance by

       Lester and Sarah, their creation of a family trust and the placement of their

       family house within it would not seem to be an abuse of the trust system, a

       fraudulent transfer, or a nefarious way to tie up property to prevent a creditor

       from reaching it. Instead, it is entirely conceivable that it was garden variety

       estate planning.

[29]   Regardless of the original reason(s) for its creation, the revocable Sumrall Trust

       has two co-settlors and co-trustees, each of whom reserves “the right and

       power, jointly or individually, at any time and from time to time while living to

       revoke in whole or in part” the Sumrall Trust and “to withdraw any … property

       … belonging to the trust estate or any part thereof; or to alter or amend any

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2214 | April 30, 2024        Page 17 of 23
       term or provision of the Trust[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 131. Thus, per the

       Sumrall Trust’s terms to which Lester and Sarah agreed, Lester and Sarah each

       have ownership interests in the property within the Sumrall Trust. As of

       November 20, 2018, the Bridgewater Property became property of the revocable

       Sumrall Trust. Accordingly, Lester has the right and power to, at any time,

       revoke the Sumrall Trust or withdraw the Bridgewater Property. Sarah has the

       identical right and power. These powers of withdrawal of property may be

       exercised individually by either Lester or Sarah.

[30]   Such ownership rights within a revocable trust cannot exist in a vacuum. The

       flip side of an owner’s right to withdraw property must be that the property over

       which the owner has rights is also available to creditors. Because each of the

       settlors has ownership rights, the holder of a valid judgment against either

       owner may seek a judgment lien upon property within the revocable trust.

       Applied here, Lester, as an owner of this revocable trust, holds an ownership

       interest in the Sumrall Trust’s assets. Because the Sumrall Trust’s property

       includes the Bridgewater Property, LeSEA could seek to enforce its judgment

       against Lester via a lien on the Bridgewater Property without violating notions

       of due process. Our conclusion comports with Pandy and is consistent with

       Kesling, Fulp, and Marshall County.

[31]   As for Lester’s contention that LeSEA’s naming of only Lester as a party

       somehow violated Sumrall Trust’s or Sarah’s due process rights, we disagree

       with the idea that the due process rights of any person or entity besides Lester

       were implicated. No precedent has been cited that indicates that in a creditor’s

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2214 | April 30, 2024      Page 18 of 23
       action to collect on a judgment against one co-settlor or co-trustee of a

       revocable trust, the creditor must name each settlor/trustee as well as the trust

       itself. Had this been an action against only one of the Sumrall Trust’s trustees

       for breach of trust administration, a different conclusion might be warranted.

       Here, however, LeSEA’s judgment is against Lester for actions he took in his

       own individual, non-trustee capacity. As such, LeSEA’s choice to name only

       Lester does not involve due process rights of any person or entity besides

       Lester. 3 To the extent that Sarah’s ownership interests in the Sumrall Trust, and

       in the Bridgewater Property in particular, may be imperiled by LeSEA’s

       judgment lien, the language of the revocable Sumrall Trust and Lester’s actions

       set the stage for this predicament. And, any due process rights belonging to

       Sarah were not Lester’s to raise. See Richardson v. Richardson, 34 N.E.3d 696,

       702 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (“Constitutional rights are personal to an

       individual[.]”).

       Section 2 – Lester has not demonstrated that the trial court
       abused its discretion in denying his motion for continuance.
[32]   Lester contends that because he “may have had an interest in” the Bridgewater

       Property individually, his due process rights were violated when the trial court

       denied his motion to continue the Zoom hearing, at which he would like to

       3
         On appeal, Lester also challenges the St. Joseph County trial court’s jurisdiction over the Bridgewater
       Property, which is located in Elkhart County. Because Lester failed to raise the jurisdictional issue in the trial
       court, LeSEA argues waiver. Although waiver may be possible, our conclusion that LeSEA properly brought
       its action against Lester alone to reach property over which he has ownership makes any jurisdictional
       question concerning the Bridgewater Property moot.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2214 | April 30, 2024                                  Page 19 of 23
       have been “afforded an opportunity to present evidence on the issues[.]”

       Appellant’s Br. at 11. He claims that the exhibits and documents before the trial

       court “were no substitute for a hearing that would have allowed [Lester] to call

       witnesses, offer documents, and cross examine” witnesses. Id. at 12.

[33]   The decision to grant or deny a motion for a continuance rests within the sound

       discretion of the trial court, and we reverse only for an abuse of discretion.

       Rowlett v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 841 N.E.2d 615, 619 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2006), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion may be found in the denial of a

       motion for a continuance when the moving party has shown good cause for

       granting the motion. Id. To demonstrate an abuse of discretion, the “moving

       party must be free from fault and show that his rights are likely to be prejudiced

       by the denial” of the continuance. Scott v. Crussen, 741 N.E.2d 743, 746 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2000), trans. denied (2001).

[34]   LeSEA cites Indiana Appellate Rule 9(F)(3) and 9(F)(8)(a) and contends that

       Lester’s motion to continue is not properly before us. LeSEA points out that

       when Lester began his appeal, he neither identified the July 28, 2023 order

       denying his motion to continue nor attached it. Rather, he identified and

       attached only the August 23, 2023 order. “Even if the spirit of the rule would

       require (and the better practice might have been for) [Lester] to mention both

       orders in his notice of appeal and attach a copy of both orders,” LeSEA cites no

       persuasive authority for the proposition that Lester’s failure forfeited his right to

       appeal the continuance issue that he raised in his brief. In re Paternity of C.B.,

       112 N.E.3d 746, 750 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied (2019). Lester did

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2214 | April 30, 2024         Page 20 of 23
       include the July 28, 2023 order in his appellant’s appendix, and LeSEA

       addresses the substance of the issue on appeal.

[35]   To recap, in mid-June 2023, Lester asked the trial court to set a hearing

       regarding attorney fees. On June 20, 2023, the trial court did so, scheduling the

       Zoom hearing for August 1, 2023. On June 21, 2023, Lester filed both an

       objection to LeSEA’s motion for judgment lien against the Bridgewater

       Property and a motion requesting that the matter be set for hearing “no sooner

       than forty-five (45) days from the filing of this Motion, with briefs and arguments

       on the issues due ten (10) days before the hearing.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at

       154 (emphasis added). Approximately one week before the Zoom hearing,

       Lester moved for a continuance (claiming that he would be out of the country

       and unable to testify), and he filed briefs addressing the attorney fees and

       judgment lien issues. LeSEA filed its objection to Lester’s motion for

       continuance and contended that time was of the essence due to the prospect of

       Lester filing bankruptcy. In the July 28, 2023 order denying Lester’s motion for

       continuance, the trial court found that the hearing had been set more than a

       month previously, that it would be conducted via Zoom, and that it would

       consist of legal argument via counsel.

[36]   To demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion

       to continue the Zoom hearing, Lester had to show that he was free from fault

       and that his rights were likely to be prejudiced by the denial. When he made his

       original request for a hearing and when he reiterated the request, Lester did not

       ask for an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, his motion for continuance, filed

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2214 | April 30, 2024        Page 21 of 23
       one week before the Zoom hearing, was the first time he referenced possible

       testimony. Lester’s failure to request an evidentiary hearing makes it difficult to

       show that he was free from fault. Moreover, in making its decision regarding

       the judgment lien, the trial court considered the briefs and attached exhibits as

       well as the arguments presented by counsel at the hearing. Exhibits included the

       warranty deed with Sarah’s name scratched out,4 Lester’s mortgage application,

       and Lester’s quitclaim deed from himself to Sarah and him as co-trustees of the

       Sumrall Trust, and the Sumrall Trust document. At no point did Lester suggest

       what, if any, additional admissible evidence would be relevant to the legal

       question presented. Thus, he has not shown that his rights were likely to be

       prejudiced by a denial of the continuance motion. Because Lester has not

       shown good cause for granting the continuance motion, we find no abuse of

       discretion in the trial court’s denial of the motion.

[37]   Affirmed.

       Bailey, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

       4
        Regardless of who scratched out Sarah’s name, the warranty deed that was recorded had only Lester’s
       name.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2214 | April 30, 2024                          Page 22 of 23
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Philip E. Hesch
Hesch Law Office, LLC
Elkhart, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Louis T. Perry
Emily A. Kile-Maxwell
Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2214 | April 30, 2024   Page 23 of 23