Court Opinion

ID: 9737547
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:28:21.883102+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:59.687793
License: Public Domain

*26Robert W. Hansen, J.
(concurring in fart; dissenting in part). Not so long ago, a Waukesha county court conviction on a charge of forcible rape was reversed by the circuit court on appeal. On the appeal to this court,1 the state contended that the circuit court had “. . . improperly assumed a fact-finding function and improperly substituted its discretion for that of the trial court.” This court found that the “. . . circuit court reviewed the record and concluded, de novo, that ‘the facts are not as a matter of law sufficient to constitute the crime of rape/ ” and that the circuit judge “. . . did not have the authority to review the record and come to an independent conclusion, . . .” The facts in the Waukesha case and legal issues raised differ, but the decision is relevant here because it spells out the limits of the scope of review as to sufficiency of evidence in criminal cases:
“ ‘This limitation upon the scope of review must rest, in part at least, upon a recognition that the trier of the fact who saw and heard the witnesses is in a better position to determine credibility and weight of evidence than a court which merely reads the transcript of the testimony.’ ” 2
In the case before us, the jury found the defendant guilty. The trial court found that “. . . there is without any question certainly credible evidence to support and sustain the verdict . . .” He denied motions after verdict and imposed a substantial prison sentence. Thus, both jury and judge found credible the testimony of the prosecutrix that the act of intercourse was against her will.
The majority of this court is not impressed by the testimony of the prosecutrix. The majority opinion acknowledges her testimony that she “kicked, struggled and yelled,” that she was “threatened and choked,” that she *27was “crying and afraid,” but these statements are referred to only as “claims” although it would appear that the jury and trial judge accepted them as more than that.
As to the testimony of the prosecutrix, the majority opinion concluded: “In our opinion, certain parts of complainant’s testimony are incredible.” One example: “She stated that she was threatened with a brandy bottle (none was seen by any other witness, none was produced) . . . .” Since this was not a drama acted out before an audience, it is difficult to imagine who such corroborating witnesses might be. This court finds “incredible” testimony that both jury and trial judge found credible. This comes close to taking over the fact-finding function. I cannot join in finding the evidence insufficient to sustain conviction on the basis of its incredibility. The jury and trial judge who saw and heard the witnesses are in a better position to determine credibility and weight of evidence than the court which has merely read the transcript of the trial.
Appellant on this appeal sought in the alternative a reversal and dismissal or an exercise of the discretionary power granted under sec. 251.09, Stats., and the ordering of a new trial in the interest of justice. The writer would reverse and order a new trial in the interest of justice.
At the trial the doctor, an osteopath, appearing for the prosecution, was asked whether a tear to the introitus that he had found “. . . would that be consistent with a history given to you by the patient that she was raped?” Defense counsel objected on the grounds that (1) the question was not proper in form; (2) that it did not incorporate the records; and (3) that it did not meet the test of requiring an opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. The majority opinion finds the question to have been “inadequately phrased.” We would apply the cases cited in the majority opinion to find it improperly phrased. The trial court erred in overruling *28the objection. It was properly objected to. Because of the significance of the doctor’s testimony in the case, this error should entitle the defendant to a reversal and new trial in the interest of justice. No error is claimed or found in the trial court’s permitting the medical witness to give an opinion in a field outside the area of his primary specialization and experience. However, such circumstance gives special reason to require the proper phrasing of an expert opinion question and the incorporation into it of the proper standard of certainty. This is particularly true where heavy reliance for qualifying the witness as an expert appears to have been placed on training received in medical school, rather than on experience as a treating or examining physician.3
Under the circumstances here present, we find special reason for holding that the defendant was entitled to have the expert opinion questions properly phrased.
Ordering a new trial in the interest of justice would remove a perhaps unavoidable but certainly unfortunate factor that may well have adversely affected the entire credibility of defendant’s testimony. Here the defendant was charged and tried, not only with the crime of rape, but with illegal possession of marijuana. There is dispute as to where the marijuana came from, but it is not disputed that both the prosecutrix and defendant smoked or “took a drag” of the illegal cigarette. Only the defendant was criminally charged in connection with the marijuana aspect of this case. Midway in the trial, the defendant changed his plea on the marijuana charge from not guilty to guilty. Asked on oral argument whether this development might not have eroded the credibility of defendant’s testimony (denying the forcible rape) with *29the jury, counsel for the state frankly conceded that it probably impelled the jury to disbelieve the defendant’s denial of guilt on the rape charge. It is obvious that this may have happened. The basic issue in this entire case is one of credibility. As the trial court summarized the evidence, “There was definitely evidence of force in the testimony of the complaining witness and very definite evidence of no force in the testimony of the defendant.” The jury had to decide who was to be believed. In retrospect, probably only in retrospect, it appears at least possible that the trial of defendant on both the rape and marijuana charges developed here to affect the fairness of the trial. Although both prosecutrix and defendant puffed the illegal cigarette, in the jury’s mind, the marijuana smoke likely clouded or blurred only the defendant’s account of what happened. Regardless of whether this alone would warrant directing a new trial, the possibility that the jury found the defendant guilty of rape in part because of his midtrial plea of guilty to the marijuana charge would be eliminated on a new trial.
I would reverse in the interest of justice and order a new trial.

 State v. Waters (1965), 28 Wis. 2d 148, 135 N. W. 2d 768.

 State v. Waters, id. at page 152.

 From decision of trial court on motions after verdict: “. . . certainly every doctor who graduates from medical school is somewhat of an expert of many things which, he hasn’t actually seen or treated ... or had extensive experience with . . . Accordingly, I believe generally speaking he is entitled to give an opinion on a broad background of medical experience, I mean medical training.”