Court Opinion

ID: 9767650
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:23:03.458002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:32.181624
License: Public Domain

SEARS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
Appellee testified that she learned about the reformed deed in 1979. Appellant’s lease with Brightwell was not executed or recorded until 1981. Mr. Jennings testified that he took no action to correct the reformed deed because he thought it was proper. He was assured by the title company that he and the Appellee owned one-half of the minerals and he was assured by his attorneys that the Brightwells retained no mineral interest in the property. Therefore, only the Appellant was unaware of any problems that existed with the reformed deed and unaware that there was no intent between the Brightwells and the Jennings to reserve any mineral interest in the land conveyed. If the doctrine of latches or estoppel would apply to a cause of action by Mr. Jennings against the Appellant, then Mrs. Jennings cannot avoid those defenses by claiming blindness and ignorance.
Mr. Jennings had a copy of the reformed deed and he advised his wife of the existence of the reformed deed as early as 1979. Therefore, Appellee had actual knowledge of the existence of the reformed deed prior to Appellant executing a lease on the land. Further, Appellant’s lease with Brightwell was recorded on May 29, 1981. Subsequently, the deed conveying Mr. Jennings’ interest in the land to Mrs. Jennings was executed on June 5, 1981, and it was recorded on June 19, 1981. There was a specific recitation in that deed which conveyed property to Appellee, “Subject to ... oil and gas leases ...” Also, at the time Appellant’s lease was executed and recorded, the character of the property was community property owned jointly by Mr. and Mrs. Jennings. The majority opinion imputes to Clayton Williams knowledge of the acts of the leasing agent, yet the majority opinion contends that the wife is not to be held accountable for the knowledge of her husband with regard to the community property. This is illogical and is not a correct statement of the law of this state.
There is no doubt that Mr. Jennings was dealing with the attorneys and the title company, with regard to the property in question, with the full knowledge and consent of Mrs. Jennings. It is well settled in Texas that when spouses are living together, and acting in the best interest of both, one spouse may act as the agent of the other and knowledge of the acts of the agent spouse are imputed to the principal spouse. Walling v. Hannig, 73 Tex. 580, 11 S.W. 547, 548 (Tex.1889). Further, agency between spouses can be imputed by their acts and conduct. Walling v. Hannig, 11 S.W. at 548.
This appeal is similar to Outlaw v. Bowen, 285 S.W.2d 280 (Tex.Civ.App. Amarillo 1955, writ ref’d n.r.e.). In Outlaw, the issues also involved a mineral interest in the land, and the court held that the wife cannot disassociate herself from the agreement, acts, conversations and negotiations of the husband as her agent, and at the same time receive and enjoy benefits therefrom. Outlaw v. Bowen, 285 S.W.2d at 286. Further, a wife is bound by the acts *888of her husband when he is acting in her behalf, and she cannot accept that which is to her advantage and reject that which imposes a burden on her. Outlaw v. Bowen, 285 S.W.2d at 286; Smith v. Olivarri, 127 S.W. 235, 238 (Tex.Civ.App.1910, writ dism’d). Finally, when the husband is acting for the wife, she cannot benefit by claimed ignorance. Allen v. Garrison, 92 Tex. 546, 50 S.W. 335, 336 (Tex.1899).
The jury found that the Appellant was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the fact that Appellee was claiming title and ownership to a full one-fourth interest in the minerals. Yet, the majority opinion contends that the issue failed to include an instruction on agency and was therefore to be disregarded as it was not a controlling issue. The majority fails to cite any authority for that conclusion.
The majority opinion holds that malice is recoverable where the acts are shown to have been deliberate and without reasonable cause. The majority opinion then states that the “Appellants had constructive notice through their agents that the reformed deed created an ambiguity and passed no title.” Again, the majority fails to cite authority to support the contention that because a deed contains an ambiguity it passes no title. Although the majority opinion discusses the conversations of the leasing agent, Frierson, with Brightwell, to the effect that Brightwell may not own any mineral interest, the opinion fails to show any testimony or evidence that the information learned in any of these conversations was transmitted by Frierson to the Appellant. In the absence of any proof that the Appellant had any actual knowledge of these defects, there is no proof that Appellant acted in a malicious manner. Therefore, Appellant should not be liable for punitive damages. The majority opinion goes to great lengths to establish the control that Appellant had over Frierson in an effort to establish the agency relationship, in an effort to impute implied knowledge, and in an effort to establish malice; however, the evidence is weaker than secondhand tea.
As to special damages, the majority opinion relies solely on the testimony of the Appellee that she received a verbal offer from a “Mr. Berry” to pay a lease bonus of four hundred and fifty dollars an acre plus a one-fourth overriding royalty. However, the majority opinion goes on to show that no lease was executed because Mr. Berry was out of this country on other business. There is no showing that Mr. Berry ever returned to this country or that he renewed his offer if he did return to this country. Appellee testified that subsequent to the discovery of the Appellant’s lease she unilaterally determined that she could not enter into a lease on her own. Therefore, based on the testimony of the Appellee it is clear that there was no lost sale. The alleged verbal offer to lease was never consummated. No subsequent sale was offered or lost because the Appellee made the decision that she could not execute a lease. Clearly, Appellee fails in her burden of proof of a specific sale and of special damages; therefore, exemplary damages cannot be found.1 The majority opinion totally ignores that evidence which establishes that the Appellant, upon discovery of the problems existing in the reformed deed upon which the lease was executed with Brightwell, offered to work things out with Appellee, and, that Appellee refused because she thought she could get more money by way of her lawsuit.
In dealing with special damages, even though the only proof of any offer to lease Appellee’s property was for a price of four hundred and fifty dollars an acre, the majority opinion nonetheless justified the twenty-three thousand and seventy-five dollars awarded by the jury on the basis that five hundred dollars an acre was reasonable at that point in time. The special damages assessed as a result of the loss of a sale cannot be measured by what is reasonable in the industry, but must be measured by the actual loss incurred by the Appellee. Therefore, I would hold that there is no evidence to support a finding of a specific loss of sale or special damages sustained by the Appellee.
*889The majority opinion cites Yellow Freight System, Inc. 2 for the proposition that Appellee’s testimony concerning the verbal offer to lease the land was not hearsay. However, the Yellow Freight System, Inc. case dealt solely with oral negotiations between the parties to the lawsuit and/or agents of parties to the lawsuit. Yellow Freight contended there was no valid oral agreement because the parties had failed to agree upon a value, and, that the testimony of North American’s official regarding the agreement was hearsay. The case is significantly different from the facts of this appeal. In Yellow Freight System, Inc., the parties to the lawsuit agreed that they had entered into oral negotiations, but one side contended it was not a contract solely on the grounds that they had not agreed upon a price. That court held: “Since there was evidence of an oral agreement, and since a reasonable price could be presumed, the trial court’s findings of a contract ... are supported by the evidence.” Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. North American Cabinet Corp., 670 S.W.2d at 390. The Yellow Freight System, Inc. court even noted that because one party to the lawsuit testified about conversations with the other party’s agent or representative, it would be admissible even if the hearsay testimony was admitted for its truth. The majority opinion overlooks the fact that the Yellow Freight System, Inc. reasoning is inapplicable because Appellee was not talking to an agent or representative of the Appellant. The majority opinion also overlooks the fact that the Appellee’s hearsay testimony was offered not for the purpose of proving up a missing element of the contract, but for the purpose of proving the contract itself.
The majority opinion also cites Irving Lumber Company. 3 The Irving Lumber Company case involved statutory liens on the construction of residential homes. Irving Lumber contended that they entered into oral contracts with Alltex Mortgage Company to furnish the materials necessary to complete residential homes to be built on vacant lots. Irving Lumber also contended that although construction of the homes was to be completed in three different stages, the oral contract obligated the parties only as to the first two of the three stages. That court concluded that the testimony of the agent of Irving Lumber was not hearsay as to Alltex Mortgage Company because the testimony “together with exhibits numbers 8, 9, and 12, showed the oral contracts _” Irving Lumber Company v. Alltex Mortgage Company, 446 S.W.2d at 71. The exhibits alluded to by the court listed four lots, separate plans for each lot, the date the plans were ordered, the contract price for each lot and the date the labor and materials were furnished to each lot. Obviously, the court found that the testimony, together with the evidence in exhibits 8, 9, and 12, showed that the parties had entered into an oral contract. Also, that court expressly held “evidence of an out of court statement is not hearsay unless it is offered as proof of the fact asserted.” Irving Lumber Company v. Alltex Mortgage Company, 446 S.W.2d at 71. (Emphasis added.) Clearly, the authority relied upon in the majority opinion does not support the conclusion that the testimony of Appellee regarding the oral contract of sale was not hearsay. In fact, the law as shown above is to the contrary.
At best, the evidence shows that Appel-lee may have had conversations concerning a mineral lease on her land. There is no competent evidence of any contract for a lease; therefore, there is no competent evidence of any loss of a specific sale. As mentioned earlier in this dissenting opinion, even if we took the hearsay testimony as admissible and as true, Appellee has still failed to establish the existence of a contract or the loss of a specific sale. Therefore, damages for slander of title cannot be assessed against Appellee. A.H. Belo Corporation v. Sanders, 632 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Tex.1982).
*890Appellant testified that following his unsuccessful attempts to negotiate with Ap-pellee, he executed a release of his lease on the property and sent the release to the attorney for Appellee in August of 1983. However, to this date there is no evidence that the release was ever recorded by the Appellee, nor is there any evidence of any attempt by Appellee to lease her land after receiving the release from the Appellant. Appellee’s expert witness testified that the oil boom reached its peak in 1983 and that owners of mineral estates were then receiving seven hundred dollars per acre as a leasing bonus. Therefore, according to Ap-pellee’s own witness, she could have received sixty-four thousand, six hundred and ten dollars ($64,610.00) had she leased her land after Appellee executed a release. Obviously, as Appellee testified, she felt she could get more money by pursuing her lawsuit. Yet, the facts show that if she had leased her land in an attempt to mitigate damages, she would have received more money than she alleged she lost.
I would hold that Appellee has failed in her burden to establish the loss of a specific sale, that there is no evidence of malice on the part of Appellant, and I would reverse and render the judgment to the trial court with instructions that a judgment be entered that Appellee take nothing.

. Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. North American Cabinet Corp., 670 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1984, no writ). .

. Irving Lumber Company v. Alltex Mortgage Company, 446 S.W.2d 64 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1969), aff’d 468 S.W.2d 341 (Tex.1971).