Court Opinion

ID: 9690930
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:52:40.212558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:07.697635
License: Public Domain

RICHARD H. EDELMAN, Justice,
concurring on second motion for rehearing.
The circumstances in which a possessor of land can be liable for injury resulting from a dangerous condition on the land vary according to whether liability is asserted against the possessor in its capacity as possessor or, if applicable, as lessor. Compare Restatement (Second) of ToRts §§ 342 and 343 (1965) (liability of possessor to licensees and invitees, respectively), with id. § 360 (liability of possessor, who leases part but retains control over part which the lessee is entitled to use, to lessee and others lawfully on the land with the consent of the lessee). In this case, the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law contain liability findings and conclusions against American Industries based on its capacity as owner, ie., possessor of the office building. It does not contain any findings or conclusions against American Industries in its capacity as a lessor apart from those that are common to liability in its capacity as a possessor.
The judges on this panel are in agreement that the trial court’s judgment cannot be affirmed based on liability against American Industries in its capacity as a mere possessor, ie., non-lessor, of the property because the evidence did not show that Johnathan was an invitee or that American Industries had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition, as required to impose liability in favor of a licensee. The disagreement arises among us concerning whether liability can be imposed against American Industries in its capacity as a lessor. In this regard, the former majority (now plurality) and dissenting opinions differ as to whether: (1) lessor liability applies to office buildings, as contrasted from other commercial properties, such as apartments and retail stores; and (2) whether the elements of lessor liability that were not included in the trial court’s findings and conclusions were nevertheless supported by the evidence. Although I agree with the dissent’s affirmative determinations on these two issues, I do not agree with it that lessor liability can be imposed on American Industries in this case based on a presumed finding of omitted elements.
A judgment may not be supported upon appeal by a presumed finding upon any ground of recovery or defense, no element of which has been included in the findings of fact; but when one or more elements thereof have been found by the trial court, omitted unrequested elements, when supported by evidence, will be supplied by presumption in support of the judgment. Tex.R. Civ. P. 299. Importantly, however, “[t]he rule that supplemental findings necessary to support the judgment are presumed, has no application when the findings and conclusions disclose the basis therefor, and that the court did not find such necessary supplemental facts,”1 ie., the findings and conclusions show that no other findings were needed.2 In other words, where “the trial-court judgment rests upon the specific grounds set out in the findings of fact and conclusions of law that accompany the judgment, we are not *148permitted to assume omitted findings or conclusions necessary to any other grounds for the judgment.” Leonard v. Eskew, 731 S.W.2d 124, 132 (Tex.App.Austin 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).3
In this case, the trial court’s findings and conclusions clearly disclose that liability was sought and found against American Industries solely on the basis of its capacity as possessor of the property, not its capacity as lessor (or otherwise). Therefore, the fact that the evidence might have also supported the remaining elements of lessor liability if it had been asserted or that the findings made on possessor liability happen to overlap with some of those needed for lessor liability does not authorize us to impose liability based on presumed omitted elements of lessor liability where the findings and conclusions disclose that the trial court instead imposed liability exclusively on possessor liability and thus neither needed, found, nor omitted any additional findings on the remaining elements of lessor liability. Accordingly, I concur in the overruling of appellees’ second motion for rehearing.

. Burford v. Pounders, 145 Tex. 460, 199 S.W.2d 141, 145 (1947).

. See generally Frank W. Elliott, Nonjury Trial, in 4 Texas Civil Practice § 20.13 n. 95 (1992 ed.).

. See E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Fox, 518 S.W.2d 849, 856 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("no additional finding can be presumed because, as the court’s conclusions of law show, the judgment is based on the findings recited.”). Thus, rule 299 supplies omitted findings on the theory of recovery submitted, it does not supply additional findings on other, unsubmitted theories in order to overcome a lack of evidence to support the theory submitted.