Court Opinion

ID: 9586968
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:16:58.848579+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:57.900197
License: Public Domain

HALL, Chief Justice
(dissenting):
I do not join the Court in departing from the traditional rational basis standard of review in assessing the constitutionality of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
The issues presented which are disposi-tive of this appeal are (1) whether the equal protection guarantees of the Utah and United States Constitutions are violated by provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act which place a limitation upon the amount that can be recovered from a governmental entity; and (2) whether the equal protection guarantees of the Utah and United States Constitutions aré violated by provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act which restrict individual suits against governmental employees.
Relevant sections of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act provide:
Section 63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit. — Except as may be otherwise provided in this act, all governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise of a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or other governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program conducted in either public or private facilities.
Section 63-30-4_ Limitations on personal liability....
The remedy against a governmental entity or its employee for an injury caused by an act or omission which occurs during the performance of such employee’s duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority is, after the effective date of this act, exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding by reason of the same subject matter against the employee or the estate of the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, unless the employee acted or failed to act through gross negligence, fraud or malice.
An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity in a representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for which the governmental entity may be liable, but no employee may be held personally liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance of the employee’s duties, within the scope of employment or under color of authority, unless it is established that the employee acted or failed to act due to gross negligence, fraud or malice.
Section 63-30-34. Liability Insurance-Judgment or award over limits of insurance policy reduced-limitation of judgment or award against self-insurers. —If any judgment or award against a governmental entity under sections 63-30-7, 63-30-8, 63-30-9, and 63-30-10, or against a governmental employee for which a governmental entity may have a statutory duty to indemnify the employee, exceeds the minimum amounts for bodily injury and property damage liability specified in section 63-30-29, the court shall reduce the amount of the judgment or award to a sum equal to the minimum requirements unless the governmental entity has secured insurance coverage in excess of said minimum requirements in which event the court shall reduce the amount of the judgment or award to a sum equal to the applicable limits provided in the insurance policy.
*376Any governmental entity that acts as a self-insurer under section 63-30-28 is liable for any judgment or award entered against it or its employee under sections 63-30-7, 63-30-8, 63-30-9, and 63-30-10, and is liable to indemnify its employees against personal liability in accordance with sections 63-48-1 through 63-48-7, but only to the extent of the minimum amounts for bodily injury and property damage liability specified in section 63-30-29, arid no judgment or award shall be entered in such action in excess of such minimum amounts.1
Plaintiffs argue that these provisions, as they apply to this action, violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection by classifying similarly situated people differently. As to the damage limitation issue, plaintiffs essentially contend that the Governmental Immunity Act violates the equal protection clauses because of the following four types of alleged discrimination.
(1) The statutes discriminate between malpractice victims of public versus private hospitals by limiting the former to judgments not exceeding a statutory amount, while allowing the latter full recovery for negligently inflicted damages.
(2) Individuals injured by governmental entities performing “nonessential” governmental functions are entitled to unlimited recovery, whereas individuals injured by governmental health care providers are subject to the statutory limit.
(3) Victims of governmentally owned hospitals are classified by whether the hospital purchased insurance or is self-insured. Judgment against self-insured governmental hospitals is limited to the statutory amount, while judgment against insured governmental hospitals is only limited by the amount of the purchased insurance policy.
(4)Finally, victims of governmental tort-feasors are classified according to the severity of their injuries. Victims may recover only up to the statutory limit; this allows victims with less serious injuries to possibly recover in full, while seriously injured victims are discriminately denied recovery for injuries exceeding the statutory limit.
As to the statutory proscription against suing governmental employees performing governmental functions, plaintiffs contend that the Act violates equal protection guarantees because patients who are treated by employees at private hospitals may bring an action against those employees for injuries incurred as a result of their negligence. A patient who is injured by the negligence of employees of the University Hospital, however, may not recover anything from those employees personally unless gross negligence, fraud, or malice is found.
The foregoing contentions need to be addressed in light of the legal principle that legislative acts are presumed constitutional2 and that a heavy burden necessarily rests on the party challenging the legislative action on constitutional grounds.3 Therefore, if any doubt exists, it must be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the statute(s).4
*377In this regard, it is not the prerogative of the Court to nullify a legislative enactment unless there is a clear, complete, and unmistakable violation of some specific provision of the constitution.5 Indeed, it is the Court’s duty to investigate and, insofar as possible, construe the challenged legislation so as to discover any reasonable avenues by which the statute(s) can be upheld,6 allowing every reasonable presumption in favor of constitutionality.7 Furthermore, it is not our prerogative to question the wisdom, social desirability, or public policy underlying a given statute. Those are matters left exclusively to the legislature’s judgment and determination.8 And when a challenger asserts that a statutory classification violates the equal protection clause, he or she must prove abuse of legislative discretion beyond a reasonable doubt.9
Regarding the principle of prudent judicial restraint, the United States Supreme Court has stated:
[I]t has always been a matter of fundamental principle with this Court, a principle dictated by our very institutional nature and constitutional obligations, that we exercise our powers of judicial review only as a matter of necessity. As said in United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 5 [67 S.Ct. 1538, 1540, 91 L.Ed. 1877] (1947), “We have consistently refrained from passing on the constitutionality of a statute until a case involving it has reached a stage where the decision of a precise constitutional issue is a necessity.” 10
This principle, that we necessarily avoid addressing and striking down statutes pursuant to constitutional grounds, especially those not urged by the parties, honors the doctrine of separation of powers of our three branches of government and exists notwithstanding the conviction of mind or the personal desires of this Court or its justices to determine policy or rectify perceived wrong.11
*378Acknowledging these established concepts, I am not convinced that the “performance of ... [a] balancing function under the due process framework” 12 is appropriate or required as “a matter of necessity” in this case.13 Indeed, the question presented for our determination, as conceded in the main opinion, is whether the legislation in question impermissibly affected plaintiffs’ rights to equal protection of the law. Notwithstanding any “overlap” between the analyses of claims brought pursuant to equal protection and due process rights, (1) plaintiffs have not challenged the validity of the subject statutes under the open courts provision or the due process clause;14 (2) the parties have neither urged nor addressed the applicability and appropriateness of discarding established principles of equal protection review in favor of the main opinion’s “due process balancing test”;15 (3) consideration pursuant to a “due process balancing” analysis has not been likewise “forced” into other applicable cases addressing similar issues and constitutional provisions; (4) significant distinctions between the relevant constitutional principles and analyses pursuant thereto have not been acknowledged or addressed by the main opinion; and (5) broad application of the “due process balancing test” has not been explained, tempered, or distinguished by the main opinion from other claims and cases involving noneconomic legislation, equal protection, and the right to recover for personal injuries. Instead, convinced that “[cjharacterizing plaintiffs’ rights here as ‘nonfundamental’ would virtually insure that the legislative action will be found constitutional under the [equal protection] rational basis standard,” 16 the main, opinion fashions and imposes a due process analysis in order to challenge the subject legislation. In doing so, it ignores established principles of judicial review17 to reach a desired result.
Further, the use of a rational basis standard in measuring statutes limiting or barring governmental liability does not, as the main opinion implies, inevitably result in a finding that the legislation is constitutional. Indeed, in Ryszkiewicz v. City of New Britain,18 the Connecticut Supreme Court, in reviewing an action against the state to recover damages for injuries sustained in a fall, applied the test followed by “the vast majority of courts” considering governmental immunity statutes 19 and concluded that there was no rational basis behind imposing a liability limit in damages for all torts *379that occur in New Britain.20 In holding such, that court cited decisions by the Alabama and Kansas Supreme Courts supporting the conclusion that immunity legislation, when measured by the rational basis test, nonetheless denied the plaintiffs their constitutional rights to equal protection of the law.21
Regardless, the concern expressed in the main opinion that the legislation before us is constitutional under a rational basis approach does not justify its claim “[t]hat balancing should be accomplished by means of a due process, rather than an equal protection, analysis.”22 Accordingly, recognizing that we are compelled by the specific issue raised here, relevant case law, and the fundamentals of judicial review to consider and analyze the legislation’s constitutionality only in regard to the following established equal protection principles, I dissent from the views expressed in the main opinion.23
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act sets forth the type of losses for which it permits recovery and places a limitation on the amount of recovery allowed.24 Plaintiffs contend, therefore, that some victims have greater rights than others. The mere exclusion of persons situated as plaintiffs from the classes of victims entitled to recovery, however, does not alone render the legislative scheme invalid.25 Rather, article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution states; “All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.” The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution similarly prohibits states from enacting laws that deny “any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws.”26 Although the language of these two provisions is dissimilar, both embody the general principle that “persons similarly situated should be treated similarly, and persons in different circumstances should not be treated as if their circumstances were the same.”27
As we stated in Malan v. Lewis, although article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution embodies the same general principles incorporated in the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution, construction and application of our state constitutional provision is not controlled by the federal court’s construction and application of the federal equal protection clause. While case law developed under the fourteenth amendment may be persuasive in applying article I, section 24, such law is not binding on the state as long as we do not reach a result that violates the federal equal protection clause.28 Notwithstanding comments of my colleagues to the contrary, for purposes of this analysis, no conflict exists between the standard of review utilized by this Court and that used by federal courts.29 Therefore, both state and federal cases will be cited as to *380each test, and no attempt will be made to differentiate between state and federal equal protection arguments.
In analyzing a statute’s constitutionality under article I, section 24, we consider whether the law meets the criteria of applying equally to all persons within a class.30 In order for a classification (or different treatment within a class) to be valid under Utah’s equal protection standard, such classification must be reasonable and not arbitrary31 and must be based upon differences that further the statutory objective.32 Depending upon the importance of the interest involved, the state will have a greater or lesser burden to show this relationship.33 This, then, establishes the framework for the necessary analysis. With respect to the specific provisions before this Court, it is necessary to determine at the outset the proper standard of review, namely, whether the challenged provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act operate to the disadvantage of a suspect class or impinge upon a fundamental right protected by the constitution such that the state would need to demonstrate a compelling interest in the subject matter of the statute in order to justify the resulting discrimination or, in the alternative, whether the provisions merit intermediate review or, lastly, rationally further some legitimate state purpose, therefore not constituting an invidious discrimination in violation of the equal protection guarantees of the Utah and United States Constitutions.34 Although the Utah Governmental Immunity Act establishes several classifications, none of the statutory demarcations plaintiffs focus upon involve the type of suspect classification, such as race, nationality, or alienage, determined by the United States Supreme Court to require strict scrutiny analysis.35 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has firmly reiterated the principle that “equal protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of a legislative classification only when the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class.”36
In regard to rights classified as “fundamental,” this Court has stated the standard as follows:
The catalog of fundamental interests is relatively small to date, and includes such things as the right to vote, to pro*381create and to travel interstate.... A right or interest does not invoke strict scrutiny just because it is important to the aggrieved party. Only those rights which form an implicit part of the life of a free citizen in a free society can be called fundamental.4
Plaintiffs essentially assert that the right to bring a civil action for personal injuries and the right to full legal redress are fundamental rights guaranteed under article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution. Therefore, plaintiffs contend that the constitutionality of the Governmental Immunity Act’s provisions allegedly abrogating or constricting those rights must be judged by the more burdensome strict scrutiny test. Article I, section 11 provides:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
In support of their proposition, plaintiffs cite the Montana case of White v. State.38 Therein, the plaintiffs challenged a Montana statute barring recovery of noneco-nomic damages and limiting recovery of economic damages in a suit against the state. The Montana Supreme Court declared that the right to bring a cause of action for personal injuries was fundamental and that the statutory classification scheme had to thus satisfy a compelling state interest.39
I disagree with the Montana court’s premise that there is a fundamental right to recover unlimited damages from governmental entities performing governmental functions. The vast majority of other jurisdictions considering the issue have reached a conclusion supportive of my own, that the right to bring an action for the recovery of damages (and the right to sue a particular party) is not fundamental for purposes of equal protection analysis, but instead, subject to a rational basis review.40
*382In this regard, courts have taken several different approaches in upholding the constitutionality of governmental immunity statutes as they specifically shield an employee’s liability. Some courts holding that government employees are immune from liability have done so without significant reference to equal protection rights.41 Others have held that those persons who seek recovery against private tórt-feasors are a different classification of persons than those who seek recovery against the state or its employees, thus justifying the fact that the latter group may be treated differently.42
In contrast, while applying an equal protection analysis in comparable and somewhat different contexts, many courts have summarily and/or implicitly upheld an employee’s immunity from liability.43 In doing so, several courts seemingly recognize the wisdom of the legislature in protecting governmental employees from liability.in many instances since “no [governmental] entity ... can act otherwise than through individuals, i.e., officials, officers, or employees.” 44
Finally, Garcia v. Albuquerque Public Schools Board of Education,45 Yotvat v. Roth,46 and Martinez v. California47 are representative of those decisions which have explicitly found constitutional the granting of immunity to governmental employees. In Garcia, the court reviewed what it considered to be essentially an equal protection challenge to the statutory immunity of public employees. In concluding that the legislature was merely being consistent in waiving immunity for public employees on the same basis as for public entities, the court noted a rational basis:
[I]f public employees were not immune from liability, the government would be responsible for all claims against the public employees and there would be no governmental immunity. Immunity for public employees is also essential to insure the unhampered performance of their governmental duties. If every action taken by a public employee is subject to judicial review, he will be reluctant to take actions which are necessary for the good of the general public.48
In comparison, the Court in Yotvat enumerated five considerations underlying the immunity of public employees which constituted a rational basis for distinguishing between the victims of private and public employee tort-feasors.49 And in Martinez, *383the United States Supreme Court accepted California’s conclusion that a rational relationship existed between the state’s purpose and the statute giving immunity to governmental employees making parole decisions:
In fashioning state policy in a “practical and troublesome area” like this, the California Legislature could reasonably conclude that judicial review of a parole officer’s decisions “would inevitably inhibit the exercise of discretion”. That inhibiting effect could impair the State’s ability to implement a parole program designed to promote rehabilitation of inmates as well as security within prison walls by holding out a promise of potential rewards. Whether one agrees or disagrees with California’s decision to provide absolute immunity for parole officials in a case of this kind, one cannot deny that it rationally furthers a policy that reasonable lawmakers may favor.50
Such rationale is persuasive.
In construing the language of article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution, we view the common law as it existed at the time the constitution was adopted. Since the principle of sovereign immunity was a well-settled principle at that time, the challenged provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act do not deprive plaintiffs of any remedies or property rights. Therefore, article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution cannot be extended in support of a right to full and unlimited tort recovery.51 And allowing suits against governmental employees contrary to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(3) and (4) would impair the state’s ability to perform its duties and effectively result in indirect suits against governmental entities which are required to indemnify such employees pursuant to the Indemnification of Public Officers & Employees Act.52 Such result would thwart the objectives of the Governmental Immunity Act. Additionally, we have previously held that section 63-30-4, granting immunity to state employees, does not contravene article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution, inasmuch as the plaintiffs in such situations have the opportunity to seek redress in the courts.53
Accordingly, under the facts of this case, the right to full legal redress from a state governmental entity and its employees performing governmental functions is not an independent fundamental right entitled to strict scrutiny in every instance.54 Similar*384ly, any intermediate review is also inappropriate in this case, as it has no application in dealing with the constitutionality of the well-settled principles of sovereign immunity.55
Thus, since the rights to full redress for injury asserted by plaintiffs are not fundamental and do not involve a suspect class or merit intermediate scrutiny, the appropriate equal protection analysis is the “rational basis standard” whereby the pertinent classifications must be sustained unless they are arbitrary and bear no relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.56
The principles of such analysis are as follows:
1. The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not take from the state the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary.
2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality.
3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed.
4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.57
Those provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act which plaintiffs assert deny them equal protection of the law need be examined in light of the foregoing analytical framework. The issue to be addressed is whether the statutes have a reasonable and rational relationship to a legitimate legislative objective.58 Notwithstanding statements to the contrary, we have heretofore held the operation of a “governmentally-owned health care facility such as the University Medical Center to be a ‘governmental function’ as contemplated by the statute prior to amendment.”59 Thus, plaintiffs’ rationale and those espoused by my colleagues for overruling *385and/or mischaracterizing this determination are unpersuasive and inaccurate. Nevertheless, the legislature has not specifically set forth its rationale for immunizing governmental employees or imposing a monetary limitation on recovery in the Governmental Immunity Act. It is our obligation to locate, if possible, a rationale that might have influenced the legislature and that reasonably upholds a legislative determination.60 Certainly, the rationale which the Court locates might be disputable. However, it is not our task to judge the wisdom of the rationale or the legislation. The legislature gathers applicable data and chooses the course to follow.61
As in other cases, defendants herein essentially assert that the Governmental Immunity Act limits the state’s liability and thus serves the legitimate public purpose of protecting the state’s treasury, thereby safeguarding public funds and the government’s ability to discharge public responsibility while affording some recovery to those injured by governmental tort-fea-sors.62 Further, defendants contend that unlimited liability makes it increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to purchase sufficient insurance coverage. They emphasize the high risk involved in activities such as the operation of a hospital which must be performed by governmental entities. And they point out that all such functions and services entail a potential for civil liability far beyond the potential liability of nonessential governmental entities or other corporations or persons in the private sector.
Government engages in activities of a scope and variety far beyond those of any private business, and governmental operations affect a large number of people.63 A governmental unit limited in fiscal resources may lack the capability to withstand the results of substantial unanticipated liability.64 Moreover, unlimited re*386covery to all victims of governmental tort-feasors may seriously impair the ability of government to govern efficiently and effectively.65 Therefore, it is the legislature’s duty and prerogative to evaluate and balance the risks, the possible exposure to liability, the need to compensate citizens for injury, the availability and cost of insurance, and the financial condition of governmental units. It is the legislature’s function to structure statutory provisions capable of protecting the public interest by fairly and reasonably reimbursing victims while maintaining governmental services by realistically evaluating the financial burden to be placed on the taxpayers.66
In contrast, plaintiffs maintain the claim raised in similar cases that permitting unlimited recovery of tort claims from the governmental entity and the individual governmental employee tort-feasor would not create a fiscal nightmare as both the government and the individual, without significant impact on the state treasury, can obtain liability insurance adequate to protect themselves in such actions. Hence, the argument continues, there is no need to limit the liability amount or restrict the waiver to those entities enumerated in the Act.67 While this contention may be true, it misses the point. The rational basis test for equal protection does not require that the legislative objective be compelling or that the legislature utilize the best or wisest means to achieve its goals.68 Rather, there need only be a rational relationship between the statutory classifications of governmental tort victims and the object of the legislation to enhance recovery in most cases while limiting the financial burden the exercise of such remedies would impose on taxpayers.69
Given the realities of modern government and the litigiousness of our society, the legislature, in enacting the Governmental Immunity Act, had a rational basis on which to fear that unrestricted liability involves the risk of insolvency or grave financial burdens. Fiscal resources must be available and preserved to pay for essential governmental services; public financial burdens must be kept at reasonable levels; it is for the legislature to decide how limited public funds will be spent. It is also within the legislature’s power to preserve sufficient public funds to insure that government will be able to continue providing those services it believes will benefit its citizenry.70
*387Further, concerning the “cap” on damages in its governmental immunity statute, the Nevada Supreme Court stated:
It seems to us quite impossible to devise a scheme of equality in the awards of damages. The “total damages sustained” by a claimant is an uncertain amount in any case. That amount is what negotiation or trial declares it to be, and the variation in result for substantially similar injuries is remarkable. A percentage of the “total damages sustained” is equally uncertain. In the nature of things, equality of treatment as to the amount of damages cannot be achieved, and in our view, the equal protection clause has no bearing upon the subject. It was within the legislative power to limit recovery.71
In view of such, the views espoused in the main opinion that the monetary limitations imposed by the subject statutes are “drastic,” “arbitrary,” and “absurdly low,” thus egregiously infringing upon plaintiffs’ right to a jury trial on the question of damages,72 are unwarranted. As noted by other courts, while the value of the recovery limitation levels prescribed by governmental immunity statutes may have, through inflation or otherwise, substantially decreased to seemingly insufficient amounts,
[s]o long as the statute is constitutional, we have no intrinsic ability to review its inherent wisdom or, if it seems unwise, the power to change it. Whenever lines are drawn by legislation, some may seem unwise, but the responsibility for drawing these lines rests with the legislature and judicial review is limited. We [can but] agree with the sentiments expressed by other courts which have urged their legislatures to periodically review their statutory provisions which limit tort recoveries.73
This Court errs in assuming without empirical evidence that it is in a better position than the legislature to consider the financial integrity of the state and the reasonableness of monetary limitations available to strike the necessary balance between “sufficient” and “insufficient” recovery in future cases.
When a legal distinction is determined, as no one doubts that it may be, between night and day, childhood and maturity, or any other extremes, a point has to be fixed or a line has to be drawn, or gradually picked out by successive decisions, to mark where the change takes place. Looked at by itself without regard to the necessity behind it the line or point seems arbitrary. It might as well or nearly as well be a little more to one side or the other. But when it is seen that a line or point there must be, and that there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the Legislature must be accepted unless we can say that it is very wide of any reasonable mark.74
Such is not the case here.
Accordingly, I conclude that the challenged provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act clearly relate to a permissible legislative objective and are neither discriminatory, arbitrary, nor oppressive in their application. The Act does not violate plaintiffs’ equal protection rights or their access to the courts. It provides a fair means of recovery against governmental entities for the negligent acts of their employees and officials.75
*388I would affirm the trial court’s order and uphold the constitutional validity of the challenged provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
HOWE, Associate C.J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of HALL, C.J.

. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-3 (Interim Supp.1981) (amended 1984 & 1985), -4 (Supp.1979) (amended 1983), -34 (Supp.1979) (repealed and reenacted 1983; amended 1987).

. Timpanogos Planning & Water Management Agency v. Central Utah Water Conservancy Dist., 690 P.2d 562, 564 (Utah 1984); State v. Murphy, 674 P.2d 1220, 1222 (Utah 1983); Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 275 Ind. 520, 530, 418 N.E.2d 207, 213-14 (1981); Sambs v. City of Brookfield, 97 Wis.2d 356, 370, 293 N.W.2d 504, 511, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1035, 101 S.Ct. 611, 66 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980).

. Salt Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 1035, 1037 (Utah 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 915, 96 S.Ct. 1514, 47 L.Ed.2d 766 (1976); Trade Comm'n v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 21 Utah 2d 431, 438, 446 P.2d 958, 962 (1968). Courts in other jurisdictions have similarly held. See, e.g., Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 381, 404 N.E.2d 585, 591 (1980); Winston v. Reorganized School Dist., 636 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Mo.1982) (en banc); Sambs, 97 Wis.2d at 370, 293 N.W.2d at 511; Stephenson v. Mitchell ex rel. Workmen’s Compensation Dep't, 569 P.2d 95, 97 (Wyo.1977).

.Dague, 275 Ind. at 530, 418 N.E.2d at 213; Winston, 636 S.W.2d at 327; Americans United v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711, 716, 721 (Mo.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029, 97 S.Ct. 653, 50 L.Ed.2d 632 (1976); Sambs, 97 Wis.2d at 370, 293 N.W.2d at 511; Stanhope v. Brown County, 90 Wis.2d 823, 837, 280 N.W.2d 711, 716 (1979).

. Sims v. Smith, 571 P.2d 586, 587 (Utah 1977) (quoting Pride Club Inc. v. State, 25 Utah 2d 333, 481 P.2d 669 (1971)); Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Utah Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 564 P.2d 751, 753 (Utah 1977).

. See State v. Lindquist, 674 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Utah 1983); State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Utah 1982); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 82 (Utah), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988, 103 S.Ct. 341, 74 L.Ed.2d 383 (1982); In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1981).

. Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78, 80 (Utah 1981); Trade Comm'n, 21 Utah 2d at 437-38, 446 P.2d at 962; Winston, 636 S.W.2d at 327-28. Indeed, where persons are treated differently under legislation which is basically economic in nature, we have held that such legislation is entitled to a presumption of constitutionality and such presumption may justify discriminations, even without actual evidence demonstrating a rational basis for the distinctions made. See Baker v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 233, 236, 244 (Utah 1979).

. Winston, 636 S.W.2d at 327; Masich v. United States Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co., 113 Utah 101, 126-27, 191 P.2d 612, 625, appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 866, 69 S.Ct. 138, 93 L.Ed. 411 (1948), reh'g denied, 325 U.S. 905, 69 S.Ct. 405, 93 L.Ed. 439 (1949); see also City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2516-17, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976), quoted in Short v. Texaco, Inc., 273 Ind. 518, 528-29, 406 N.E.2d 625, 632 (1980), aff’d, 454 U.S. 516, 102 S.Ct. 781, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982); Sidle v. Majors, 264 Ind. 206, 209, 341 N.E.2d 763, 766 (1976); Brown v. Wichita State Univ., 219 Kan. 2, 13, 547 P.2d 1015, 1025 (quoting Tri-State Hotel Co. v. Londerholm, 195 Kan. 748, 760, 408 P.2d 877, 887 (1965), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 806, 97 S.Ct. 41, 50 L.Ed.2d 67 (1976).

. Utah Pub. Employees’ Ass'n v. State, 610 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Utah 1980) (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 31 S.Ct. 337, 55 L.Ed. 369 (1911)); Sambs, 97 Wis.2d at 370, 293 N.W.2d at 511.

. Sanks v. Georgia, 401 U.S. 144, 151, 91 S.Ct. 593, 597, 27 L.Ed.2d 741 (1971), quoted in Gray v. Dep't of Employment Sec., 681 P.2d 807, 824 (Utah 1984) (Durham, L, concurring and dissenting).

. Stone v. Dep’t of Registration, 567 P.2d 1115, 1117 (Utah 1977); cf. Wood, 648 P.2d at 82 ("It is a fundamental rule that we should avoid addressing a constitutional issue unless required to do so.”) (citations omitted); Peck v. Dunn, 574 P.2d 367, 369 (Utah) ("[I]f there is a choice as to the matter of ... [a statute’s] interpretation and application, that should be done in a manner which will make it constitutional, as opposed to one which would make it invalid."), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 927, 98 S.Ct. 2822, 56 L.Ed.2d 770 (1978); Brown, 219 Kan. at 21-22, 547 P.2d at 1023, 1030-31 (“As judges our desire to achieve what may seem fair to us as individuals cannot overcome the laws enacted by our duly elected legislators.” "There was a time when the courts used the Fourteenth Amend*378ment due process clause to strike down laws thought to be unwise. Since then courts have returned to the original concept of constitutional interpretation, that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies whose function it is to pass the laws. The court has been cited to no case where constitutional due process has been used as a basis for the abrogation of legislatively imposed governmental immunity." (Citations omitted.)).

. Main opinion at 357; see abo id. at 356.

. See Sanks, 401 U.S. at 151, 91 S.Ct. at 597.

. See Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft, Til P.2d 670, 674-86 (Utah 1985); cf. Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 629 (Utah 1983) ("Article I, § 11 of the Utah Constitution ... was not meant to create a new legal remedy or a new right of action. Consequently, Article I, § 11 worked no change in the principle of sovereign immunity, and sovereign immunity is not unconstitutional under that section.”) (citing Brown v. Wightman, 47 Utah 31, 34, 151 P. 366, 366-67 (1915) (“[Wjhere no right of action is given, however, or no remedy exists, under either the common law or statute, ... [Article I, § 11] create[s] none.” Courts protect and enforce existing rights only in accordance with established and known remedies.)); Robson v. Penn Hills School Dist., 63 Pa.Cmwlth. 250, 256, 437 A.2d 1273, 1276 (1981) (nothing in open courts clause of constitution prevents legislature from extinguishing cause of action).

. See Yotvat v. Roth, 95 Wis.2d 357, 372, 290 N.W.2d 524, 532 (Wis.Ct.App.1980) (“The question of the rights of governmental tort victims is a difficult one, and legislation in that area should not be overturned without complete briefing by the parties.”), superseded by statute as stated in Daily v. Univ. of Wis., Whitewater, 145 Wis.2d 756, 429 N.W.2d 83 (Wis.Ct.App.), review denied, 436 N.W.2d 30 (Wis.1988).

. Main opinion at 357, 358.

. See supra notes 2-11 and accompanying text.

. 193 Conn. 589, 479 A.2d 793 (1984).

. Id. 193 Conn, at 598, 479 A.2d at 799, and cases cited therein.

. Id. 193 Conn, at 598-600, 479 A.2d at 799-801.

. Id. 193 Conn, at 599, 479 A.2d at 800 (citing Peddycoart v. City of Birmingham, 354 So.2d 808 (Ala.1978); Flax v. Kansas Turnpike Auth., 226 Kan. 1, 596 P.2d 446 (1979) (apparent use of rational basis test)).

. Main opinion at 356 (footnote omitted).

. Even if I were to ignore the principles noted above and agree with the main opinion that a due process “balancing analysis” is acceptable in this case, I would not concur with the determinations that such analysis favors liability or that the damage limitation provisions are unconstitutional.

. While the amount of recovery under the challenged statutes was limited to $100,000 per person and $300,000 for two or more persons, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-29, -34 (Supp.1979), Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-29 and -34 were repealed and the latter section reenacted in 1983. That section now limits recovery resulting from personal injury to $250,000 per person and $500,000 for two or more persons. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34 (Supp.1988).

. Child v. City of Spanish Fork, 538 P.2d 184, 187 (Utah 1975); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351, 99 S.Ct. 1742, 1745, 60 L.Ed.2d 269 (1979); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1104, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); Winston, 636 S.W.2d at 327-28.

. Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984).

. Id. (footnote & citations omitted).

. Id. at 670 (citations omitted).

. See supra notes 2-11 and accompanying text; see also infra note 57.

- The United States Supreme Court has referred to such rights as "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”37

. State Tax Comm'n v. Department of Fin., 576 P.2d 1297, 1298 (Utah 1978); Dodge Town v. Romney, 25 Utah 2d 267, 269, 480 P.2d 461, 462 (1971).

. Hart Health Studio v. Salt Lake County, 577 P.2d 116, 118-19 (Utah 1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967); Wilson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 669 P.2d 569, 572 (Alaska 1983).

. Thompson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 724 P.2d 958, 959 (Utah 1986); State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 266 (Utah 1986).

. See, e.g., Wilson, 669 P.2d at 572.

. See generally J.J.N.P. Co. v. State ex rel. Div. of Wildlife Resources, 655 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Utah 1982).

. See, e.g.. Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 n. 4, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2566 n. 4, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976) (per curiam); Loving, 388 U.S. at 8-9, 87 S.Ct. at 1821-1822; Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 938, 424 A.2d 825, 830 (1980) (medical malpractice legislation), and cases cited therein, limited by Appeal of Bosselait, 130 N.H. 604, 547 A.2d 682 (1988). As was the case in Troyer v. Wyoming Department of Health and Social Services, 722 P.2d 158 (Wyo.1986), plaintiffs herein have not alleged that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act discriminates against a suspect class. However, as noted in Troyer, there are no classifications in this Act based upon plaintiffs' characteristics. The provisions of the Act apply equally to every person suffering injury by the state, and there is no suspect classification triggering compelling state interest analysis. Troyer, 722 P.2d at 165 n. 3; see abo infra note 42 and accompanying text.

.Murgia, 427 U.S. at 312, 96 S.Ct. at 2566 (footnotes omitted) (citing San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1287, 36 L.Ed.2d 16, reh’g denied, 411 U.S. 959, 93 S.Ct. 1919, 36 L.Ed.2d 418 (1973)). Moreover, the rights classified as "fundamental" by the Supreme Court have been few in number. While the Supreme Court has offered little guidance as to the characteristics of a fundamental right, rights such as privacy, marriage, procreation, travel and voting and first amendment rights have been classified as “fundamental” and extended to a strict scrutiny review. Mur-gia, 427 U.S. at 312 n. 3, 96 S.Ct. at 2566 n. 3, and cases cited therein; 16A Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 750, at 819-20 and cases cited therein.

. Utah Public Employees’ Ass'n, 610 P.2d at 1273 (quoting in footnote Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937), overruled on other grounds, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-94, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 2061-62, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969)).

. 203 Mont. 363, 661 P.2d 1272 (1983).

. Id. 203 Mont, at 365, 661 P.2d at 1275. White v. State and the subsequent case of Pfost v. State, 219 Mont. 206, 713 P.2d 495 (Mont.1985), are easily distinguished. During the reformation and readoption of a new Montana constitution in 1972, the constitutional framers "swept aside all notions of governmental immunity." Pfost, 219 Mont, at 209, 713 P.2d at 499. Therefore, later statutory attempts to reinstate limited governmental immunity in Montana were apparently considered an unconstitutional invasion upon the right to sue governmental entities for full legal redress. Id. 219 Mont, at 211-218, 713 P.2d at 505-06. In contrast, the adoption of the Utah Constitution, including the open courts provision of article I, section 11, worked no change in the already existing principle of sovereign immunity. See Madsen, 658 P.2d at 629; see also Ryszkiewicz, 193 Conn. at 598, 479 A.2d at 799; Troyer, 722 P.2d at 165 (right to sue particular individual is not fundamental).

.The majority of cases discovered upon review have applied the rational basis test and have upheld governmental immunity and other relevant legislation. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 93-94, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2640-2641, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (standard implicitly applied); Wilson, 669 P.2d at 572 (lesser standard implicitly applied); Fritz v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 196 Colo. 335, 338-39, 586 P.2d 23, 25 (1978) (en banc); Ryszkiewicz, 193 Conn. at 598-599, 479 A.2d at 799-800, and cases cited therein (vast majority of courts apply rational basis test); Jetton v. Jacksonville Elec. Auth., 399 So.2d 396, 399 (Fla.App.), review denied, 411 So.2d 383 (1981); Packard v. Joint School Dist. No. 171, 104 Idaho 604, 608-09, 661 P.2d 770, 774-75 (Idaho Ct.App.1983) (citing Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 659 P.2d 111 (1983)); Winston, 636 S.W.2d at 327-30; Estate of Cargill v. City of Rochester, 119 N.H. 661, 666, 406 A.2d 704, 707-08 (1979), appeal dismissed, 445 U.S. 921, 100 S.Ct. 1304, 63 L.Ed.2d 754 (1980); Robson, 63 Pa.Cmwlth. at 255-56, 437 A.2d at 1276; Sambs, 97 Wis.2d at 370, 377-78, 293 N.W.2d at 511, 514; Stanhope, 90 Wis.2d at 837-45, 280 N.W.2d at 716-20; Yotvat, 95 Wis.2d at 363-65, 290 N.W.2d at 528-29; Troyer, 722 P.2d at 165, and cases cited therein.

. See, e.g., Begay v. State, 104 N.M. 483, 486, 723 P.2d 252, 256-57 (N.M.Ct.App.1985), rev'd on other grounds, Smialek v. Begay, 104 N.M. 375, 721 P.2d 1306 (N.M.), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1020, 107 S.Ct. 677, 93 L.Ed.2d 727 (1986).

. See, e.g., O’Dell v. School Dist. of Independence, 521 S.W.2d 403, 409 (Mo.1975) (en banc), superseded by statute as stated in Bartley v. Special School Dist. of St. Louis County, 649 S.W.2d 864 (1983); Troyer, 722 P.2d at 165.

. See, e.g., Bell v. Chisom, 421 So.2d 1239, 1242 (Ala.1982); Bonds v. Calif. ex rel. Highway Patrol, 138 Cal.App.3d 314, 322, 187 CaI.Rptr. 792, 797 (1982); Seifert v. Standard Paving Co., 64 I11.2d 109, 116, 355 N.E.2d 537, 539-41 (1976), overruled on other grounds, Rossetti Contracting Co. v. Court of Claims, 109 Ill.2d 72, 92 Ill.Dec. 521, 485 N.E.2d 332 (1985); Anderson v. City of Detroit, 54 Mich.App. 496, 499, 221 N.W.2d 168, 169-70 (1974); Green-Glo Turf Farms, Inc. v. State, 347 N.W.2d 491, 494-95 (Minn.1984); Sena School Bus Co. v. Board of Education of Sante Fe Public Schools, 101 N.M. 26, 29, 677 P.2d 639, 642 (N.M.Ct.App.1984); Lumpkin v. Albany Truck Rental Services, Inc., 70 A.D.2d 441, 442, 421 N.Y.S.2d 714, 716 (N.Y.App.Div.1979).

. Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 P.2d 925, 938 (Utah 1977) (Crockett, J., concurring); see, e.g., Troyer, 722 P.2d at 160-62; infra note 52 and accompanying text; cf. Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517, 520 (Utah 1980) (contrary to reason to deny governmental immunity to a public employer and then grant it to the very employee allegedly causing injury).

. 95 N.M. 391, 622 P.2d 699 (N.M.Ct.App.1980).

. 95 Wis.2d 357, 290 N.W.2d 524.

. 444 U.S. 277, 100 S.Ct. 553, 62 L.Ed.2d 481, reh’g denied, 445 U.S. 920, 100 S.Ct. 1285, 63 L.Ed.2d 606 (1980).

. 95 N.M. at 394-95, 622 P.2d at 702-03.

. 95 Wis.2d at 365, 290 N.W.2d at 529. The factors identified included;
"(1) The danger of influencing public officers in the performance of their functions by the threat of lawsuit; (2) the deterrent effect which the threat of personal liability might have on those who are considering entering public service; (3) the drain on valuable time *383caused by such actions; (4) the unfairness of subjecting officials to personal liability for the acts of their subordinates; and (5) the feeling that the ballot and removal procedures are more appropriate methods of dealing with misconduct in public office.”
(Quoting Lister v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. System, 72 Wis.2d 282, 299, 240 N.W.2d 610, 621 (1976)); cf. DuBree v. Pennsylvania, 481 Pa. 540, 542-543, 393 A.2d 293, 295-96 (1978) (noting considerations for determining whether an official should be immune from liability), cited and applied in Pine v. Synkonis, 79 Pa.Cmwlth. 479, 482-88, 470 A.2d 1074, 1076-78 (1984) (non-equa¡ protection case)..

. 444 U.S. at 282-83, 100 S.Ct. at 557-58 (presented as due process challenge) (quoting McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270, 93 S.Ct. 1055, 1059, 35 L.Ed.2d 282 (1973); United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 721 (7th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146, 94 S.Ct. 900, 39 L.Ed.2d 102 (1974)), cited in Garcia, 95 N.M. at 395, 622 P.2d at 703.

. See Ryszkiewicz, 193 Conn, at 598, 479 A.2d at 799. Although plaintiffs do not specifically challenge the constitutionality of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act under Utah’s open courts provision in article I, section 11, I reiterate our conclusion in Madsen v. Borthick:
Sovereign immunity — the principle that the state cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent — was a well-settled principle of American common law at the time Utah became a state. Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution, which prescribes that all courts shall be open and persons shall not be barred from using them to redress injuries, was not meant to create a new remedy or a new right of action. Consequently, Article I, Section 11 worked no change in the principle of sovereign immunity, and sovereign, immunity is not unconstitutional under'that section.
658 P.2d at 629 (citations omitted).

. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-48-1 to -7 (repealed in 1983 & replaced by Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-36, -37, -38 (1986 & Supp.1988)); see also Garcia, 95 N.M. at 394, 622 P.2d at 702; supra notes 40-51.

. Payne ex rel. Payne v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1987).

. Holding otherwise improperly invalidates the power of the legislature to promote the public *384health, safety, morals, and welfare. See Berry, 717 P.2d at 677, wherein we discuss the legislature’s abolition of certain common law remedies for personal injuries and substitution of other remedies pursuant to the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the Occupational Disease Act, and the No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act; see also supra notes 40-50.

. See supra notes 10-21 & 40-53 and accompanying text. The United States Supreme Court has used intermediate scrutiny haltingly. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217-18, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2395, 72 L.Ed.2d 786, reh’g denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982); Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 101 S.Ct. 1200, 67 L.Ed.2d 437 (1981) (gender); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 99 S.Ct. 518, 58 L.Ed.2d 503 (1978) (illegitimacy).

. Robson, 63 Pa.Cmwlth. at 255, 437 A.2d at 1276.

. Utah Pub. Employees' Ass'n, 610 P.2d at 1273-74 (quoting Lindsley, 220 U.S. 61, 31 S.Ct. 337). This Court has applied the rational basis test in other cases involving equal protection attacks on various statutory schemes. Recently, in Ma-tan, 693 P.2d at 670-75, we applied the rational basis test in evaluating the constitutionality of the Utah guest statute. Therein, we held that a statute may treat individuals differently and yet meet constitutional equal protection and access to the court requirements if (1) the law applies equally to all persons within a class, and (2) the statutory classification and different treatment given the class are based upon differences that have a reasonable tendency to further the statutory objectives. Furthermore, a classification may be reasonable even though some inequality results, Crowder v. Salt Lake County, 552 P.2d 646, 657 (Utah 1976) (upholding notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act); differing treatment of individuals does not necessarily deny equal protection as long as the classification has a reasonable relationship to a proper and lawful purpose, Child, 538 P.2d at 187; and the presumption of constitutionality may justify discrimination even without actual evidence demonstrating a rational basis for the distinctions made, cf. Baker, 607 P.2d at 235-36 (court will not strike down enactment unless party attacking it clearly establishes that a constitutional provision has been violated).

. See Hart Health Studio, 577 P.2d at 118.

. Frank, 613 P.2d at 519.

. See Sambs, 97 Wis.2d at 371, 293 N.W.2d at 512; Winston, 636 S.W.2d at 328; State v. Hart, 89 Wis.2d 58, 66, 277 N.W.2d 843, 847 (1979). As noted by one annotator, to balance the public’s right of action pursuant to a waiver of immunity with the government's need to protect fiscal resources from potentially devastating claims, several jurisdictions have adopted statutes limiting the amounts or kinds of damages recoverable against a governmental tortfeasor. Most of these courts uniformly recognize that legislative bodies have the power to prescribe such limits and that the limits are constitutionally valid. Though they may abridge the remedies of victims of government as opposed to private tort-feasors, damage limitation statutes are almost unanimously viewed as having a rational relationship to the government’s need to provide for effective risk management. Annotation, Validity and Construction of Statute or Ordinance Limiting the Kinds or Amount of Actual Damages Recoverable in Tort Action Against Governmental Unit, 43 A.L.R.4th 19 (1986), and cases cited therein, including Cauley v. City of Jacksonville, 403 So.2d 379, 387 (Fla.1981) (citing Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620); see also supra note 40; infra notes 62-74 and accompanying text.

. Sambs, 97 Wis.2d at 371, 293 N.W.2d at 512; Masich, 113 Utah at 126-27, 191 P.2d at 625.

. Winston, 636 S.W.2d at 328; Sambs, 97 Wis.2d at 372-74, 293 N.W.2d at 512-13; Stanhope, 90 Wis.2d at 840-42, 280 N.W.2d at 718-19 (citing Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U.Ill.L.Forum 919 [hereinafter Van Alstyne]). It has been noted that governmental immunity was historically believed necessary and important in order to protect governmental funds from depletion by payment of damage claims resulting from a state’s own liability or the indemnification of torts committed by its agents or employees in the performance of state-imposed duties. Therefore, it was reasoned that the individual victim's need to be made whole must give way to the public welfare. Although some may regard governmental tort immunity as mistaken and unjust, limitations on public tort responsibility continue to exist. Sambs, 97 Wis.2d at 372-74, 293 N.W.2d at 512-13; Van Alstyne, 1966 U.Ill.L.Forum at 975, 979-80; Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, 1232-37 (Utah 1980) (proprietary-governmental distinction) (citing Van Alstyne); Crowe v. John W. Harton Memorial Hosp., 579 S.W.2d 888, 891-93 (Tenn.Ct.App.1979); supra note 40 and accompanying text.

. Sambs, 97 Wis.2d at 376, 293 N.W.2d at 514.

. As the Wisconsin Supreme Court has noted, the rationale that limited liability against governmental entities is necessary to protect governmental functions is not entirely without pragmatic support. If public entities with substantial fiscal resources were involved, the financial problem may be minimal. On the other hand, for smaller governmental entities or those with more limited financial powers, liability judgments could have serious consequences. Stanhope, 90 Wis.2d at 842, 280 N.W.2d at 719. In enacting the Governmental Immunity Act, the legislature could have foreseen the need to *386limit the potential financial distress certain to be imposed on governmental units (including individual cities and towns) by large judgments or high insurance premiums. Indeed, the legislature could have reasonably determined that imposing liability upon governmental entities for justifiable participation in areas such as medical services may discourage many communities (particularly the smaller ones in this state) from providing medical aid, as the financial commitment necessary to insure all claims resulting from that aid could be disabling in its effect. See Stanhope, 90 Wis.2d at 842-43, 280 N.W.2d at 719; Van Alstyne, supra note 62, at 971 n. 365.

. Sambs, 97 Wis.2d at 376-77, 293 N.W.2d at 514.

. See Winston, 636 S.W.2d at 328-29; Sambs, 97 Wis.2d at 377, 293 N.W.2d at 509, 514-15; Stanhope, 90 Wis.2d at 843, 280 N.W.2d at 719.

. Winston, 636 S.W.2d at 328.

. Id.; Stanhope, 90 Wis.2d at 843, 280 N.W.2d at 719.

. Winston, 636 S.W.2d at 328; Sambs, 97 Wis.2d at 366-68, 375-77, 293 N.W.2d at 509-10, 514; Stanhope, 90 Wis.2d at 841-43, 280 N.W.2d at 718-19. Since the Act's immunity waiver provisions afford a remedy to all without qualification and since it is impossible to achieve complete equality in damage awards given the state’s right to limit the amount thereof, the equal protection clauses of the Utah Constitution and the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution are not offended by the Act’s damage limitation provisions. See supra notes 35, 40 & 60 and accompanying text; infra notes 70 & 71 and accompanying text.

.Stanhope, 90 Wis.2d at 842-43, 280 N.W.2d at 719. It is also to be observed that since the state could choose to claim absolute sovereign immunity for torts committed by a governmental entity, it is therefore entitled to waive such immunity and to impose reasonable monetary limits thereon. Since the legislature provided for the right and the remedy when it enacted the Governmental Immunity Act, it is within its judgment to limit the maximum recoverable amount. See Madsen, 658 P.2d at 629-30; Winston, 636 S.W.2d at 328; Sambs, 97 Wis.2d at 372, 293 N.W.2d at 512 (quoting Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 40, 115 N.W.2d 618, 625 (1962)); Stanhope, 90 Wis.2d at 839, 280 N.W.2d at 717.

. State v. Silva, 86 Nev. 911, 916, 478 P.2d 591, 594 (1970) (citation omitted).

. See main opinion at 363, 365 & 366.

. Leliefeld, 104 Idaho at 375, 659 P.2d at 129 (footnote and citations omitted), cited in part in Packard, 104 Idaho at 609, 661 P.2d at 775 (value of recovery limitation has decreased); see also Estate of Cargill, 119 N.H. at 669-670, 406 A.2d at 708-09; Sambs, 97 Wis.2d at 368, 293 N.W.2d at 510; cf. Johnson, 273 Ind. at 400-01, 404 N.E.2d at 602 (right to have jury assess damages is not offended by statutory limitations in medical malpractice legislation).

. Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 41, 48 S.Ct. 423, 426, 72 L.Ed. 770 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting), quoted in Leliefeld, 104 Idaho at 375 n. 17, 659 P.2d at 129 n. 17.

. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text; see also Berry, 717 P.2d 670, 677 ("[LJegal causes of action which provide remedies that protect section 11 interests may, in some cases, *388have to yield to the power of the Legislature to promote the public health, safety, morals, and welfare” (footnote omitted).).