Court Opinion

ID: 9758035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:08:25.015954+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:46.629852
License: Public Domain

Ray Thornton, Justice, dissenting. Because I believe that stice, laws of this state vest in the Supreme Court the duty and authority to regulate the practice of law and to prohibit the unauthorized practice of law,” and because the court adopted a rule creating a Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law delegating to that committee authority over “all complaints of and matters or inquiries dealing with the unauthorized practice of law,”11 respectfully dissent. While the duty and authority to regulate the practice of law is inherent in our 1874 Constitution, it is specifically set out in Amendment 28 to the Constitution. The full text of that amendment reads: The Supreme Court shall make rules regulating the practice of law and the professional conduct of attorneys at law. Id. In addition, prior to the adoption of Amendment 28, the General Assembly had passed a number of legislative enactments including, among many subjects, legislation to establish standards for admission to the practice of law, calling for the appointment of a Board of Law Examiners, prohibiting individual judges from conferring admission to the bar, and legislation prescribing rules for disbarment, suspension, and discipline of attorneys. For examples, see Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-201 through 206 (Repl. 1999) and § 16-22-401 through 414 (Repl. 1999). Amendment 28 clearly vested exclusive power to regulate the practice of law in the supreme court, but those statutory provisions that did not conflict with the court’s exclusive duty and authority were allowed to continue to exist. In McKenzie v. Burris, 255 Ark. 330, 500 S.W.2d 357 (1973), this court stated that its power under Amendment 28 to regulate the practice of law is “supreme and exclusive.” Id. The grant of authority to the Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law is similar to that exercised by the Committee on Professional Conduct. This court has held that the Committee on Professional Conduct, in exercising its authority, has clearly pre-empted litigation in trial courts aimed at regulating professional conduct. See Myers v. Mauss, 281 Ark. 188, 662 S.W.2d 805 (1984); Davis v. Merritt, 252 Ark. 659, 480 S.W.2d 924 (1972) (holding that the chancery court did not have jurisdiction to form a committee of local attorneys to act on charges of professional conduct). Before the Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law (“the Committee”) was created in 1978, I note that a number of efforts to define and regulate the unlawful practice of law had been announced and then modified or abandoned. ' In 1959, our court ruled in Ark. Bar. Ass’n v. Block, 230 Ark. 430, 323 S.W.2d 912 (1959), that the use, without the services of an attorney, of twenty-five printed forms having to do with property transactions, including such forms as agreements for the sale of real estate, warranty deeds, declarations of forfeiture, promissory notes, bills of sale, assignments of leases and rentals, and pledges of personal property, by means of printed forms was prohibited as an unauthorized practice of law. The use of one such instrument was considered to not be an unauthorized practice of law in Block, supra, namely, offers and acceptances. The holding in Block, supra, did not last long. In Block v. Ark. Bar Ass’n, 233 Ark. 516, 345 S.W.2d 471 (1961), this court allowed the trial court to modify an injunction with respect to preparations of the forms for loan applications, and Creekmore v. Izard, 236 Ark. 558, 367 S.W.2d 416 (1963), emasculated Block. The court in Creekmore pointed out that many towns in Arkansas did not have a resident lawyer and held that a real estate broker may, where his customer declines to employ a lawyer, be permitted to fill in the blanks in printed standardized real estate forms, arising in the usual course of the broker’s business where the printed form had been approved by a lawyer. Id. The dissent in Creekmore called for the court to exercise the exclusive authority granted by Amendment 28 to “make rules regulating the practice of law . . . [.]” Id. However, as this court pointed out in Pope County Bar Ass’n v. Suggs, 274 Ark. 250, 624 S.W.2d 828 (1981), public policy considerations raise issues of the best interest of the public that should not be resolved simply on the basis of whether the filling out of these simple forms constitutes the unauthorized practice of law, but rather upon consideration of whether it is in the best interest of the public to allow the practice to continue. We stated in Pope County Bar Ass’n, supra, The ultimate issue ... is not so much whether realtors are practicing law when filling out these routine forms, but whether it is in the best interest of the public to allow them to do so ... we feel that to grant the injunctive relief requested, thereby denying the public the right to conduct real estate transactions in the manner in which they have been transacted for over half a century, with apparent satisfaction, and requiring all such transactions to be conducted through lawyers, would not be in the public interest. Id. (Emphasis added). The determination of this question called for exercise of the supreme court’s exclusive authority to define and regulate the unauthorized practice of law, and the Committee was created by the court for the purpose of exercising that jurisdiction over issues relating to the unauthorized practice of law. In order to address public policy considerations, the Committee was composed of four lawyers and three public members who are not lawyers. On December 18, 1978, this court delegated and conferred all its jurisdiction and authority to the Committee as follows: III. All inquiries and complaints relating to the unauthorized practice of law shall be directed to the committee, in writing, through the Clerk of the Arkansas Supreme Court. Rules of Court Creating a Committee on the Unauthorized Practice ofLaw, 264 Ark. Appendix 960 (1978). In my view, nothing couldbe more clearly expressed. The Committee was granted exclusive jurisdiction to define the unauthorized practice of law, to conduct hearings, issue subpoenas, render decisions, and to enforce its decisions. More specifically, our case law supports my view. This court has repeatedly stated that Amendment 28 vested exclusive authority to regulate the profession and practice of law in this court. In re Anderson, 312 Ark. 447, 851 S.W.2d 408 (1993); Ark. Bar Ass’n v. Union Nat’l Bank, 230 Ark. 430, 323 S.W.2d 912 (1954); see also McKenzie, supra. Rule III of the Rules of Court Creating a Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law has been revised to now read as follows: All inquiries and complaints relating to the unauthorized practice of law shall be directed to the Committee, in writing, through the Administrative Office of the Courts. R. Com. Un. Prac. L. Ill (2004) (emphasis added). The plain language of the rule is mandatory. Every complaint relating to the unauthorized practice oflaw “shall be directed” to the Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law. Id. That Committee may then determine whether an unauthorized practice oflaw has occurred and take what action is appropriate to advance the public interest in accordance with our holding in Pope County Bar Ass’n, supra. For example, the Committee may issue an advisory opinion on the matter and, if needed, pursue injunctive relief against parties engaging in the unauthorized practice oflaw. Id. The Committee is an administrative body with investigatory and evidence gathering powers similar to the Committee on Professional Conduct, see Sexton v. Ark. Sup. Ct. Comm. On Prof. Cond., 299 Ark. 439, 774 S.W.2d 114 (1989), and the Client Security Fund, see Nosal v. Neal, 318 Ark. 727, 888 S.W.2d 634 (1994). It can subpoena individuals and documents, and a violation of such a subpoena is treated as contempt of our court. R. Com. Un. Prac. L. II. The unauthorized practice of law may also constitute contempt of court under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-209 (Supp. 2004) and can be prosecuted as any other contempt of court offense. I think it is untenable to reach any conclusion other than the following: The trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to define and regulate the unauthorized practice oflaw or to proceed with a class action based upon a complaint relating to the unauthorized practice of law. This court has ordered that all issues relating to the unauthorized practice oflaw must be directed to the Committee. For all of these reasons, I respectfully dissent.   Both quotations are promulgated in the first paragraph of this court’s per curiam 78-11 of December 18,1978, establishing the Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law.