Court Opinion

ID: 9890266
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-12 18:00:51.499804+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:11:13.428424
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10556    Document: 00516928788       Page: 1    Date Filed: 10/12/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                       United States Court of Appeals
                                                                     Fifth Circuit

                              ____________                         FILED
                                                             October 12, 2023
                                No. 22-10556
                                                                Lyle W. Cayce
                              ____________                           Clerk

   Association of Club Executives of Dallas,
   Incorporated, a Texas non-profit Corporation; Nick’s Mainstage
   Inc Dallas PT’s, doing business as PT’s Men’s Club; Fine
   Dining Club, Incorporated, a Texas Corporation, doing business as
   Silver City; TMCD Corporation, a Texas Corporation, doing business
   as The Men’s Club of Dallas; 11000 Reeder, L.L.C., a Texas
   Limited Liability Company, doing business as Bucks Wild; AVM-AUS,
   Limited, a Texas limited partnership, doing business as New Fine Arts
   Shiloh,

                                                        Plaintiffs—Appellees,

                                    versus

   City of Dallas, Texas,

                                          Defendant—Appellant.
                 ______________________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Texas
                           USDC No. 3:22-CV-177
                 ______________________________

   Before Wiener, Southwick, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
   Stuart Kyle Duncan, Circuit Judge:
         “[W]hile the material inside adult bookstores and movie theaters is
   speech, the consequent sordidness outside is not.” City of Los Angeles v.
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                                      No. 22-10556

   Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 445 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
   judgment). Communities can therefore regulate the so-called “secondary
   effects” of sexually oriented businesses (or “SOBs”), like crime and blight,
   without running afoul of the First Amendment. See generally City of Renton v.
   Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc.,
   427 U.S. 50 (1976).
            Acting on that authority, the City of Dallas passed Ordinance
   No. 32125 in 2022. The Ordinance requires licensed SOBs, such as cabarets,
   escort agencies, and adult video stores, to close between 2:00 a.m. and
   6:00 a.m. The Ordinance was backed by ample data—from the City’s own
   police task force, other comparable cities, and academic research—
   supporting a link between SOBs’ late-night operation and increased crime.
            Plaintiffs, a group of SOBs and their trade association, challenged the
   Ordinance under the First Amendment. After a hearing, the district court
   found that the City lacked reliable evidence to justify the Ordinance and that
   the Ordinance overly restricted Plaintiffs’ speech. It therefore preliminarily
   enjoined the Ordinance.
            The district court erred. Under longstanding Supreme Court
   precedent, the Ordinance is likely constitutional. The City’s evidence
   reasonably showed a link between SOBs’ late-night operations and an
   increase in “noxious side effects,” such as crime. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at
   446 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). The Ordinance also left the
   SOBs ample opportunity to purvey their speech at other times of the day and
   night.
            We therefore VACATE the preliminary injunction and REMAND
   for further proceedings.

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                                                 I.
           From late 2020 to early 2021, a rash of shootings in or around Dallas
   SOBs left multiple people dead.1 The police responded by forming a task
   force to patrol near SOBs on busy nights after midnight.2 Operating for about
   eight months during 2021, the task force made 123 felony arrests, responded
   to 134 calls for service, issued over 1,100 citations, and made more than 350
   drug and weapon seizures.
           The police also compiled and analyzed 2019–21 data on crime
   occurring within a 500-foot radius of licensed SOBs. They broke this data
   down based on the number of arrests, crimes reported, and 911 calls. The
   analysis focused on the nighttime hours, comparing the 10:00 p.m.-to-
   2:00 a.m. and the 2:00 a.m.-to-6:00 a.m. windows.
           During those timeframes, the data showed over 1,600 custodial
   arrests. And while most property crime occurred from 10:00 p.m. to 2:00
   a.m., the opposite was true for violent crime: roughly 67% of all aggravated
   assaults, rapes, robberies, and murders occurred from 2:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m.
   In 2021, that percentage jumped to 76%.
           The data told a similar story about 911 calls. The police received over
   4,500 calls between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., over half of which came
   between 2:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. Over half of the Priority 1 calls—those

           _____________________
           1
             The City defines an SOB as “an adult arcade, adult bookstore or adult video store,
   adult cabaret, adult motel, adult motion picture theater, escort agency, nude model studio,
   or other commercial enterprise the primary business of which is the offering of a service or
   the selling, renting, or exhibiting of devices or any other items intended to provide sexual
   stimulation or sexual gratification to the customer.” Dall. City Code § 41A-2(31).
           2
               Eight officers patrolled on Thursday, Friday, and Saturday nights.

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   requiring an immediate emergency response—also came during that
   window. The same was true with respect to calls to the fire department.
          After months of heightened patrols, the department began presenting
   its findings to the city council—twice to committees and once to the entire
   council. It also provided summaries of three academic studies linking SOBs
   to increased crime rates. And it noted that two other Texas cities, Beaumont
   and Amarillo, had issued reports finding a correlation between SOBs’ hours
   of operation and increased crime. Based on this evidence, the department
   recommended that the council close SOBs from 2:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m.
          The council unanimously passed the Ordinance in January 2022. The
   Ordinance stated it was restricting SOBs’ hours to “reduce crime and
   conserve police and fire-rescue resources” because “the operation of [SOBs]
   between 2:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. is detrimental to the public health, safety,
   and general welfare.” The Ordinance listed the evidence it relied on,
   including recent “multiple shootings,” the increase in violent crime and 911
   calls during those hours, the three academic studies, and the Beaumont and
   Amarillo reports.
          Plaintiffs immediately sued to enjoin the Ordinance, arguing it
   violated the First Amendment. Specifically, they claimed the Ordinance was
   a content-based restriction on their speech and that the City enacted it
   “without valid empirical information to support it.”
          The district court held a hearing and, largely agreeing with the
   Plaintiffs, granted a preliminary injunction. The court declined to decide
   whether intermediate or strict scrutiny applied, noting our court’s unsettled
   caselaw on the continuing validity of the secondary effects doctrine. But it
   held that the Ordinance likely failed under either standard.
          The district court then scrutinized the City’s evidence and concluded
   that it failed to support the “stated rationale for the Ordinance.” In

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   particular, the court found that the City’s crime data was unreliable and that,
   regardless, it did not adequately link SOBs to secondary effects such as crime
   and increased 911 calls. Finally, the court concluded the Ordinance failed to
   leave SOBs’ protected speech sufficiently accessible.
           The City now appeals.
                                               II.
           “We review a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion,
   reviewing findings of fact for clear error and conclusions of law de novo.” Tex.
   All. for Retired Ams. v. Scott, 28 F.4th 669, 671 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation
   omitted). To obtain a preliminary injunction, the Plaintiffs must show:
   (1) they are substantially likely to succeed on the merits; (2) a substantial
   threat of irreparable harm absent the injunction; (3) the threatened injury
   outweighs any harm caused by granting the injunction; and (4) the injunction
   is in the public interest. Clarke v. CFTC, 74 F.4th 627, 640–41 (5th Cir.
   2023). On appeal, the parties contest only the first factor, whether the
   Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claims.
                                              III.
           As a threshold matter, the parties dispute the First Amendment
   standard governing a municipality’s regulation of SOBs.
           For over three decades, the Supreme Court has analyzed such
   regulations under a two-step test adopted in City of Renton v. Playtime
   Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986).3 The first step asks whether the measure

           _____________________
           3
             See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 433–34 (2002)
   (plurality) (applying Renton); City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 295–96 (2000)
   (plurality) (same); Tex. Ent. Ass’n, Inc. v. Hegar, 10 F.4th 495, 509–10 (5th Cir. 2021)
   (same); LLEH, Inc. v. Wichita County, 289 F.3d 358, 365 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Our court has
   reviewed SOB licensing and location provisions under the Renton test.”).

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   “ban[s]” SOBs or regulates only the “time, place, and manner” of their
   operation. Id. at 46. If the latter, the second step asks whether the regulation
   is “designed to combat the undesirable secondary effects” of “businesses
   that purvey sexually explicit materials” rather than to restrict their “free
   expression.” Id. at 48–49. A regulation satisfying both steps is “reviewed
   under the standards applicable to ‘content-neutral’ time, place, and manner
   regulations,” namely intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 50. Accordingly, the
   regulation will be upheld if it “is designed to serve a substantial governmental
   interest and allows for reasonable alternative avenues of communication.”
   Ibid.
           Plaintiffs argue that Renton is no longer good law. And even if it is,
   they contend that the Ordinance is content-based under recent Supreme
   Court precedent and thus subject to strict scrutiny. We reject both
   arguments.
           Plaintiffs’ first argument depends on our now-overruled decision in
   Reagan National Adverting of Austin, Inc. v. City of Austin (Reagan I), 972 F.3d
   696 (5th Cir. 2020), rev’d and remanded sub nom. City of Austin v. Reagan
   Nat’l Advert. of Austin, LLC, 142 S. Ct. 1464 (2022). There, we applied strict
   scrutiny to a law distinguishing on-premises from off-premises signs. Ibid.4
   To reach that conclusion, we read Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155
   (2015), to require strict scrutiny whenever “a regulation of speech on its face
   draws distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys,” even if the law
   had a “benign motive” or “content-neutral justification.” Id. at 702 (quoting
   Reed, 576 U.S. at 163, 165) (internal quotation marks omitted). We further
   suggested that Reed abrogated many of our precedents—including cases

           _____________________
           4
             On-premises signs are those that advertise things located onsite, while off-
   premises signs advertise things elsewhere. Reagan I, 972 F.3d at 699–700.

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   applying Renton that we listed in a footnote See id. at 703 n.3.5 Plaintiffs’
   argument here relies heavily on that footnote.
           The problem for Plaintiffs—and it is a fatal one—is that the Supreme
   Court reversed Reagan I and rejected that decision’s understanding of Reed
   as “too extreme.” City of Austin, 142 S. Ct. at 1470–71. The Court clarified
   that its precedents “have consistently recognized that restrictions on speech
   may require some evaluation of the speech and nonetheless remain content
   neutral.” Id. at 1473; see also id. at 1474. Based on that principle, the Court
   held that the sign ordinance at issue was content neutral because it drew only
   location-based distinctions and had no illicit purpose. Id. at 1471.
   Importantly, the Court emphasized that an overly strict reading of Reed
   would “contravene numerous precedents” upon which “Reed did not
   purport to cast doubt.” Id. at 1474.
           The upshot for our case is obvious. Any shadow cast on the secondary
   effects doctrine by our Reagan I opinion has been dispelled by City of Austin.
   Specifically, Plaintiffs are mistaken that the Reagan I footnote somehow
   survived the decision’s reversal. To the contrary, that footnote depended on
   a view of Reed that City of Austin repudiated. The footnote, in other words,
   was not spared in the fall of Reagan I.6
           Alternatively, Plaintiffs argue that the Ordinance should now be
   analyzed as content-based under City of Austin’s clarification of Reed. We

           _____________________
           5
             These cases included Illusions–Dallas Private Club, Inc. v. Steen, 482 F.3d 299 (5th
   Cir. 2007); Fantasy Ranch Inc. v. City of Arlington, 459 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 2006); N.W.
   Enters. Inc. v. City of Houston, 352 F.3d 162 (5th Cir. 2003); and Encore Videos, Inc. v. City
   of San Antonio, 330 F.3d 288, 292 (5th Cir. 2003).
           6
            On remand in Reagan II, we had no occasion to address Reagan I’s footnote 3. See
   Reagan Nat’l Advert. of Austin, Inc. v. City of Austin (Reagan II), 64 F.4th 287 (5th Cir.
   2023). But nothing in Reagan II suggests the footnote remains viable after City of Austin.

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   disagree. Both Reed and City of Austin concerned physical signs and said
   nothing about SOBs or the secondary effects doctrine. The Court “does not
   normally overturn . . . earlier authority sub silentio.” Shalala v. Ill. Council on
   Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 18 (2000).7 So, it would be a mistake to
   interpret those decisions as silently spelling Renton’s demise. To the
   contrary, City of Austin cautioned inferior courts against doing exactly that.
   See City of Austin, 142 S. Ct. at 1474 (warning that overreading Reed would
   “contravene numerous precedents” upon which “Reed did not purport to
   cast doubt”).
           More to the point, whether to overrule or modify Renton is the High
   Court’s business, not ours. “Our job, as an inferior court, is to adhere strictly
   to Supreme Court precedent, whether or not we think a precedent’s best
   days are behind it.” United States v. Vargas, 74 F.4th 673, 683 (5th Cir. 2023)
   (en banc) (citing Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 143 S. Ct. 2028, 2038 (2023)).
   Renton and its longstanding secondary effects doctrine has “direct
   application in [this] case,” Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc., 490
   U.S. 477, 484 (1989), and so we are bound to apply it to the challenged
   Ordinance, Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Mack, 4 F.4th 306, 315 (5th
   Cir. 2021). To that we now turn.
                                                IV.
           Under Renton, the Ordinance must be upheld if it “is designed to
   serve a substantial governmental interest and allows for reasonable
   alternative avenues of communication.” Renton, 475 U.S. at 50.8 The district

           _____________________
           7
            Renton is cited only once across the two decisions—in a concurrence that implies
   it remains good law. See Reed, 576 U.S. at 184 (Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment).
           8
               We have sometimes observed that restrictions on SOBs must also be narrowly
   tailored. See Encore Videos, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 330 F.3d 288, 292 (5th Cir. 2003), as
   clarified, 352 F.3d 938 (5th Cir. 2003). But later precedents have explained that a restriction

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   court found the Ordinance likely failed both requirements. We address each
   in turn.
                                               A.
           The district court concluded that the Ordinance failed Renton’s first
   requirement because of flaws in the City’s supporting evidence. We disagree.
   The district court held the City’s evidence to a standard of exactitude not
   required by the Supreme Court’s precedents.
           The Supreme Court explicated Renton’s evidentiary standard in City
   of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 433 (2002) (plurality
   opinion); see also id. at 444–53 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).9
   An SOB regulation is “designed to serve a substantial government interest”
   when the municipality can “provid[e] evidence that supports a link” between
   the regulated business and the targeted secondary effects. Alameda Books, 535
   U.S. at 434, 437; see also id. at 449 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)
   (agreeing that the plurality “gives the correct answer” to the question of how

           _____________________
   that satisfies Renton’s formulation is necessarily narrowly tailored. See H and A Land Corp.
   v. City of Kennedale, 480 F.3d 336, 339 (5th Cir. 2007).
           9
              While Alameda Books generated no majority opinion, we join numerous other
   circuits in holding that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence controls. See generally Marks v.
   United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (the holding of a fragmented court is the position
   supporting the judgment “on the narrowest grounds”). See, e.g., Peek-A-Boo Lounge of
   Bradenton, Inc. v. Manatee County, 630 F.3d 1346, 1354 n.7 (11th Cir. 2011); Ben’s Bar, Inc.
   v. Village of Somerset, 316 F.3d 702, 718 n.24 (7th Cir. 2003); Ctr. For Fair Pub. Pol’y v.
   Maricopa County, 336 F.3d 1153, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003). Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is the
   narrowest opinion under Marks because it opposed the plurality’s “subtle expansion” of
   Renton. See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 445 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Our
   court’s decision in N.W. Enterprises implies that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence controls.
   See N.W. Enters., 352 F.3d at 181 & n.18 (citing Marks and suggesting Justice Kennedy’s
   rationale was “critical” because his vote was “necessary to the Court’s judgment”).

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   much evidence is needed to satisfy Renton).10 A municipality may rely on
   evidence “reasonably believed to be relevant,” id. at 438 (quoting Renton,
   475 U.S. at 51–52), but not on “shoddy data or reasoning” that does not
   “fairly support” the ordinance’s rationale. Ibid.; see also id. at 451 (Kennedy,
   J., concurring in the judgment). Plaintiffs may show evidence is “shoddy”
   either because it “does not support [the ordinance’s] rationale,” or because
   Plaintiffs’ own evidence counters the municipality’s findings. Id. at 438–39.
   Doing so shifts the burden back to the municipality to provide additional
   evidence. Id. at 439.
           The pertinent inquiry here, then, is whether the City could reasonably
   believe that its evidence linked SOBs’ operation between 2:00 a.m.–6:00 a.m.
   and the secondary effects targeted by the Ordinance. See Baby Dolls Topless
   Saloons, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 295 F.3d 471, 481 (5th Cir. 2002) (stressing that
   this is a “reasonable belief standard”) (emphasis omitted). The district court
   answered that question in the negative after closely scrutinizing the City’s
   evidence. “[W]e review a district court’s findings as to the existence of a
   city’s evidence for clear error, but we review de novo whether that evidence”
   is “shoddy” or unreliable within the meaning of Alameda Books. H and A
   Land Corp., 480 F.3d at 338.
           To begin with, the district court found the City’s data flawed in that
   it “artificially enhance[d]” the association of crime with SOBs. The court
   cited four main reasons. First, the data included crimes committed at
   locations that held an SOB license but were not operating as an SOB.11
   Second, the court found the data “inaccurately inflate[d]” the numbers by
           _____________________
           10
             See also N.W. Enters., 352 F.3d at 180 n.14 (“Justice Kennedy’s concurrence
   approves the Court’s treatment of the evidentiary questions.”).
           11
            The record reflects that non-operational SOBs accounted for 6% of violent crimes
   between 2:00 and 6:00 a.m., 2% of violent crime arrests, and 3% of Priority 1 calls for service.

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   counting all crime within a 500-foot radius around SOBs, thus bringing in
   crimes that might have occurred at a nearby restaurant or motel. Third, the
   court noted that, while the data analyzed crime occurring from 10:00 p.m.–
   6:00 a.m., not every SOB was always open during those hours (for instance,
   some closed before 6:00 a.m. on weekdays). Finally, the court believed the
   very existence of the police task force distorted the data—for instance, by
   generating stops that would not have otherwise occurred or that were
   unrelated to SOBs, like traffic stops. For these reasons, the court concluded
   that the crime data did not reasonably link SOBs to secondary effects.
          The court also criticized the three academic studies cited in the
   Ordinance. Its basic objection was that the studies were not sufficiently
   similar to the Ordinance to be relevant. The court noted that, while all three
   studies linked SOBs with increased crime rates, they either did not “show
   increasing crime rates associated with late-night hours” or did not “address[]
   any particular time of day.” Thus, in the court’s view, the City could not
   have reasonably relied upon such studies to curtail nightly hours of operation.
          The district court applied Renton’s reasonable belief standard too
   strictly. “[R]equiring proof to this degree of exactitude set the bar too high.”
   N.W. Enters., 352 F.3d at 181. The district court demanded the City link
   SOBs to secondary effects with a degree of certainty that outstrips what
   Renton envisioned. To the contrary, all Renton demands is evidence
   “reasonably believed to be relevant” to the problem. Renton, 475 U.S. at 51;
   see also N.W. Enters., 352 F.3d at 180 (under the “deference” demanded by
   Renton, “legislators cannot act, and cannot be required to act, only on judicial
   standards of proof”). Indeed, because “a city must have latitude to
   experiment” in addressing secondary effects, “very little evidence is
   required.” Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 451 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
   judgment); see also Doe I v. Landry, 909 F.3d 99, 109 (5th Cir. 2018) (“The
   evidentiary burden to support the governmental interest is light.”). The

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   standard does not require a city to forge an ironclad connection between
   SOBs and secondary effects or to produce studies examining precisely the
   same conditions at issue. See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 437 (explaining that
   the evidence must only “support[] a link” between SOBs and the asserted
   secondary effects); see also Ctr. For Fair Pub. Pol’y, 336 F.3d at 1168 (“The
   record here is hardly overwhelming, but it does not have to be.”).
           The City’s evidence here meets the Renton standard. Consider first
   the context of the Ordinance’s enactment: responding to multiple shootings
   at Dallas SOBs in the late hours of the night, the City formed a task force to
   increase police presence around SOBs. The task force operated for the better
   part of a year and devoted over 1,200 man-hours to patrols. It made over 100
   felony arrests, answered over 100 911 calls, and made over 350 weapons and
   drug seizures. To be sure, as the district court noted, not every arrest or
   seizure was related to an SOB. But the City was still entitled to rely on this
   type of boots-on-the-ground experience in crafting the Ordinance.
           “[C]ourts should not be in the business of second-guessing fact-bound
   empirical assessments of city planners” because they “know[] the streets”
   of their cities “better than we do.” Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 451–52
   (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); see also, e.g., N.W. Enters., 352
   F.3d at 180 (emphasizing that, under Renton and Alameda Books, courts must
   “respect[] local legislators’ superior understanding of local problems”). So
   long as a city’s “inferences appear reasonable, we should not say there is no
   basis for its conclusion.” Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 452 (Kennedy, J.,
   concurring in the judgment).12 The City could reasonably infer from the

           _____________________
           12
             This deference also supports the City’s reliance on the 2019–21 crime data even
   though that data is not perfectly tailored to SOBs. And that deference is particularly
   warranted here, where the City was viewing the data not in a vacuum but in light of the task
   force’s hands-on experience with the problem of secondary effects.

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   lengthy experiences of its police department—which was presented three
   times to the city council—that SOBs were responsible in significant part for
   the noxious secondary effects targeted by the Ordinance. As one officer
   testified during the preliminary injunction hearing, SOBs are “powder
   keg[s]” for violent crime in the late hours of the night, because they attract
   crowds of young men consuming alcohol and drugs.
          The City’s other evidence reinforces that conclusion. While
   considering the Ordinance, the city council had before it five other Texas
   cities’ hours-of-operation restrictions on SOBs, including those of Fort
   Worth, San Antonio, and El Paso. The Ordinance itself noted that Amarillo
   and Beaumont had issued reports showing “a positive correlation between
   the hours of operation of [SOBs] and higher crime rates.” And all this was in
   addition to the three studies that, in the district court’s words, “suggest that
   SOBs are associated with an increase in overall crime.” Thus, the City was
   hardly pushing the envelope. Both the Supreme Court and this court have
   found the reasonable belief standard satisfied on records much more tenuous
   than this one. See, e.g., Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 451–52 (Kennedy, J.,
   concurring in the judgment) (allowing an ordinance to survive summary
   judgment although supported only by “a single study and common
   experience”); H and A Land Corp., 480 F.3d at 339–40 (finding the standard
   satisfied based on two surveys, conducted in other cities, in which real estate
   appraisers “predicted that the presence of an adult bookstore would
   negatively affect real estate value in the surrounding area”).
          The district court also faulted the City for failing to include crime data
   associated with non-SOBs. Because crime could also occur at “other late-
   night establishments,” the court reasoned, a comparison was necessary to
   “conclude that the secondary effects are linked to the SOBs, as opposed to
   some other, unrelated factor.” We disagree. The City was entitled to make

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   reasonable inferences from the information it had without needing to rule out
   other possibilities.
          Alameda Books has already settled this point. The Supreme Court
   faulted the lower court for “implicitly requir[ing] the city to prove that its
   theory [was] the only one that can plausibly explain the data.” 535 U.S. at
   437. To the contrary, a city need not “rule[] out every theory for the link
   between [SOBs and secondary effects] that is inconsistent with its own.”
   Ibid. It can instead reasonably interpret the available information without
   courts “replac[ing] the city’s theory . . . with [their] own.” Id. at 437–38;
   Fantasy Ranch Inc. v. City of Arlington, 459 F.3d 546, 561 (5th Cir. 2006)
   (requiring deference to the “legislative process” even if the evidence allows
   a “different and equally reasonable conclusion” (citation omitted)). So, here,
   the City could plausibly infer that the best explanation for violent crime and
   911 calls near SOBs was the SOBs themselves rather than some other factor.
          One final word. At times, the district court appeared concerned with
   whether the Ordinance would be successful in reducing secondary effects. For
   instance, the court noted that, without data about 911 calls from non-SOBs,
   it was “impossible to know” whether closing SOBs from 2:00 a.m. to 6:00
   a.m. would really conserve City resources. This was the wrong focus,
   however. Cities’ latitude to experiment means, by definition, that they need
   not show that their “ordinance[s] will successfully lower crime,” at least “not
   without actual and convincing evidence from plaintiffs to the contrary.”
   Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 439 (emphasis added); see also Doe I, 909 F.3d at
   110 (“The State need not demonstrate through empirical data, though, that
   its regulation will reduce [secondary effects].”); Baby Dolls Topless Saloons,
   295 F.3d at 481 (rejecting the argument that there must be “specific evidence
   linking” the ordinance “to reducing secondary effects”) (emphasis
   removed). Once again, the district court demanded evidentiary precision
   from the City that Renton does not require.

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Case: 22-10556        Document: 00516928788                Page: 15     Date Filed: 10/12/2023

                                          No. 22-10556

           In sum, the City is substantially likely to show that the Ordinance was
   “designed to further a substantial government interest” under Renton.13
                                               B.
           The Ordinance must also “allow[] for reasonable alternative avenues
   of communication.” Renton, 475 U.S. at 50. It is mostly here that Justice
   Kennedy’s controlling opinion in Alameda Books differs from the plurality.
   See World Wide Video of Wash., Inc. v. City of Spokane, 368 F.3d 1186, 1195
   (9th Cir. 2004), as amended, (July 12, 2004) (noting that Justice Kennedy’s
   concurrence “dovetails with the requirement that an ordinance must leave
   open adequate alternative avenues of communication”). As he cautioned,
   restrictions on SOBs must “leave the quantity and accessibility of the speech
   substantially undiminished.” Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 445 (Kennedy, J.,
   concurring in the judgment). A city may not reduce secondary effects simply
   by reducing speech in the same proportion. Rather, “the necessary rationale
   for   applying      intermediate      scrutiny     is    the   promise      that    zoning
   ordinances . . . may reduce the costs of secondary effects without
   substantially reducing speech.” Id. at 450.

           _____________________
           13
              Plaintiffs suggest that, at a minimum, the City does not carry its burden with
   respect to adult bookstores, for which the district court found the “data [was] weakest.”
   But while Plaintiffs can continue to press this argument before the district court, we do not
   think a preliminary injunction is warranted as to adult bookstores. Although the overall
   incidence of violent crime at adult bookstores appears low, the data reflects that these
   locations still generated over 500 911 calls and over 150 arrests between 2:00 a.m. and
   6:00 a.m. Courts should not second-guess legislative judgments about the significance of
   these problems. See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 451–52 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
   judgment); G.M. Enters., Inc. v. Town of St. Joseph, 350 F.3d 631, 639–640 (7th Cir. 2003).
   Additionally, there is evidence that some of the adult bookstores provide the opportunity
   to view and use sexual materials on-site, which our precedents recognize as posing a greater
   threat of secondary effects than SOBs without such opportunities. See H and A Land Corp.,
   480 F.3d at 339; Encore Videos, 330 F.3d at 294–95.

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Case: 22-10556      Document: 00516928788               Page: 16    Date Filed: 10/12/2023

                                         No. 22-10556

          The district court found that the Ordinance failed this requirement
   because closure would cost the SOBs significant revenue while depriving
   many patrons and dancers of access to protected speech during those hours.
   We disagree. A regulation need not be costless to be valid. See Lakeland
   Lounge of Jackson, Inc. v. City of Jackson, 973 F.2d 1255, 1260 (5th Cir. 1992)
   (upholding a location-based regulation even though it required SOBs to
   relocate to places that “d[id] not seem particularly desirable for economic
   reasons”). And Plaintiffs do not argue that the Ordinance will be so costly as
   to drive them out of business. See Ent. Prods., Inc. v. Shelby County, 721 F.3d
   729, 741 (6th Cir. 2013) (rejecting a profitability argument where plaintiffs
   did   “not     allege   that   [the     ordinance] . . . makes    their   businesses
   unprofitable”). Thus, Plaintiffs still have a “reasonable opportunity to open
   and operate” their businesses. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 54; see also N.W.
   Enters., 352 F.3d at 181 (interpreting Justice Kennedy’s concurrence to mean
   that “the City may not use its regulation to eliminate businesses as a means
   to reduce their secondary effects” (emphasis added)).
          On this record, we cannot say that the Ordinance substantially or
   disproportionately restricts speech. It leaves SOBs free to open for twenty
   hours a day, seven days a week, while also, in the City’s reasonable view,
   curtailing the violent crime and 911 calls with which the City was concerned.
   Other circuits have found similar restrictions valid in the wake of Alameda
   Books. See, e.g., Ctr. For Fair Pub. Pol’y, 336 F.3d at 1162–63; Deja Vu of
   Cincinnati, L.L.C. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Trs., 411 F.3d 777, 791 (6th Cir. 2005).
   We see no reason to conclude otherwise.14

          _____________________
          14
              To the extent that Plaintiffs argue that an hours-of-operation restriction
   automatically violates Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, see Annex Books, Inc. v. City of
   Indianapolis, 740 F.3d 1136, 1138 (7th Cir. 2014), such an argument is misplaced. The
   concurrence recognizes that speech may be decreased if the loss is not “substantial.”
   Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 450 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Moreover, the

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Case: 22-10556        Document: 00516928788              Page: 17       Date Filed: 10/12/2023

                                          No. 22-10556

                                              ***
           To sum up, we hold that Renton remains good law and thus apply
   intermediate scrutiny to the Ordinance. We further conclude that, under
   Alameda Books, Plaintiffs have not shown a likelihood of success on the merits
   of their First Amendment claims. A preliminary injunction was therefore
   unwarranted.
                                               V.
           We VACATE the preliminary injunction and REMAND for further
   proceedings consistent with this opinion.

           _____________________
   concurrence must be read in context. Justice Kennedy addressed a “place” regulation that
   threatened to close businesses entirely, whereas we address a “time” regulation that poses
   no such threat. Those are starkly different contexts. See Ctr. For Fair Pub. Pol’y, 336 F.3d
   at 1162–63.

                                               17