Court Opinion

ID: 9902406
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 08:09:22.910283+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:50.058394
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________
          No. 02-23-00273-CV
     ___________________________

  IN THE INTEREST OF D.O., A CHILD

  On Appeal from the 233rd District Court
          Tarrant County, Texas
      Trial Court No. 233-714643-22

  Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Wallach, JJ.
  Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant D.B. (Mother) appealed from the trial court’s final order naming her

possessory conservator of her child, D.O., and naming the Department of Family and

Protective Services as permanent managing conservator. However, her appointed

attorney has filed an Anders brief asserting that Mother’s appeal is frivolous. See Anders

v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967); see also In re K.M.,

98 S.W.3d 774, 776–77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, order) (holding that Anders

procedures apply in parental-rights-termination cases), disp. on merits, No. 2-01-349-

CV, 2003 WL 2006583, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 1, 2003, no pet.) (per

curiam) (mem. op.). The Anders brief meets Anders’s requirements by professionally

evaluating the record and demonstrating why no arguable appellate grounds could be

advanced.

      Mother’s counsel has certified that he provided Mother with a copy of the

Anders brief and informed her of her rights to request and review the appellate record

and to file a pro se response in this court. Mother’s counsel also certified to us that he

had explained to Mother the process of obtaining the appellate record; furnished her

with a motion for pro se access to the record, which lacked only Mother’s signature

and the date; and provided her with our mailing address and the motion’s filing

deadline. We also informed Mother that her appointed appellate counsel had filed an

Anders brief, and we gave her an opportunity to examine the appellate record and to

file a pro se response to the Anders brief. Mother did not file a response. The

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Department’s attorney filed a letter stating that she agreed with Mother’s attorney that

there are no meritorious grounds for appeal and that, accordingly, the Department

would not file a reply to the Anders brief.

       We have carefully reviewed the Anders brief and the appellate record. We have

determined that no jurisdictional issues exist. The trial court complied with Texas

Family Code Section 263.401 in retaining the suit on its docket past the original

dismissal date, and the trial court held the trial and signed the order before the

extended dismissal date. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.401. We also found no

concerns regarding the application of the Indian Child Welfare Act; the record shows

that Mother denied Native American heritage and denied being affiliated with or

registered with any Native American tribe. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 1912.

       Mother’s parental rights were not terminated, so there is no concern regarding

the evidentiary sufficiency to support one of the predicate termination grounds

required under the Texas Family Code. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1).

Further, sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding that it was in D.O.’s best

interest to name the Department as managing conservator. See id. § 263.404 (allowing

trial court to appoint the Department as managing conservator without terminating a

parent’s parental rights); In re R.M., No. 02-18-00004-CV, 2018 WL 2293285, at

*5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 21, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (discussing evidence

relevant to best-interest determination). At trial, the caseworker testified about both

D.O.’s meconium and Mother’s urine testing positive for drugs at D.O.’s birth, and

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the Department produced the relevant medical records. The caseworker further

testified that Mother had completed only one service under her service plan, a copy of

which was admitted at trial; that Mother had been asked to leave both her

psychological evaluation and her individual counseling; that Mother had not

responded the last time that the caseworker asked her to take a drug test; that Mother

had recently had another baby and had stopped showing interest in D.O., keeping

only four of her scheduled weekly visits in the last three months before trial; and that

Mother had stopped responding to the caseworker’s phone calls.

      The caseworker testified that D.O. had been placed with Mother’s aunt, and

the Department’s plan was for the aunt to obtain the licensing required to eventually

be named D.O.’s permanent managing conservator. Both the caseworker and the aunt

testified about how well D.O. was doing in the aunt’s care, and the aunt stated that

she was willing to continue supervising Mother’s visits and was committed to keeping

D.O. The trial evidence supports the trial court’s best-interest finding. See In re

D.L.W.W., 617 S.W.3d 64, 93–95 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.)

(reviewing and upholding trial court’s conservatorship decision).

      Finally, Mother had appointed counsel at trial, and we have found no grounds

to support an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.

      Finding nothing in the record that could arguably support an appeal, we agree

with counsel that Mother’s appeal is without merit. See In re D.D., 279 S.W.3d 849,

850 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied). We thus affirm the trial court’s final order.

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                                   /s/ Mike Wallach
                                   Mike Wallach
                                   Justice

Delivered: November 22, 2023

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