Court Opinion

ID: 9824691
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 11:09:11.120785+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:39:58.745171
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
We are not disposed to charge our omissions or oversights to the fault of *271others, but an explanation here is appropriate.
When this appeal was first reviewed we observed that the appellant made only one claim as a defense in the court below. This is evinced by the following statement of his counsel: “Of course, Mr. Satterwhite’s objection goes to the merits of this case. Our defense in this case, as the court probably has gathered, this man was discharged pursuant to order of the Fourth Regional War Labor Board sitting in Atlanta who issued instructions to the company on the request of the Union that this man be suspended five days a week for four weeks and then discharged if he didn't pay his dues, that instruction being based on the order of the War Labor Board extending the contract between the company and the union which governed the terms of employment of Mr. Jenkins. I submit, unless that is a defense, as Mr. Satterwhite says, we have no defense.”
On appeal appellant’s attorney apparently abandoned this contention. In brief he Insisted only that the sections in the act In question are unconstitutional. We responded to this position. In deference to the fact that the record indicated the other insistence, we deemed it appropriate to make response to it also.
After the original opinion was published it came to our attention that our conclusions occasioned some confusion and uncertainty. Of our own motion, we ordered the cause placed on the rehearing docket. The views we now express will be taken as an extension of our original opinion.
The cause below was submitted on an agreed statement of facts, which statement ■consists of oral testimony of Mr. Jenkins, the employee in question, and that of the appellant; also exhibits, among which are interim directive orders of the Regional War Labor Board, opinions of the Board, .and some correspondence; all of which was tendered in the trial where the prosecution had its original inception.
On April 12, 1943, the Ingalls Iron Works Company (which we will herein denote as the Company) and the International Association of Bridge, Structural .and Ornamental Iron Workers, Shopmen’s
Local Number 539, A. F. of L. (which we herein denote as the Union) entered into a collective bargaining agreement. A copy of the contract is not included in the agreed statement of facts. It fairly appears from the evidence, however, that the agreement was to extend for a period of one year from the date of its execution. It is apparent also that the Company and the Union became involved in a controversy over the terms of a proposed renewal contract. This dispute was certified to the National War Labor Board.
On April 21, 1944, the Regional War Labor Board for the Fourth Region, acting as the duly authorized agent of the National War Labor Board, issued an interim directive order which in part contained the following: “The contract between the parties dated April 12, 1943, shall remain in full force and effect until such time as the Regional War Labor Board shall be able to determine finally the issues in this case, or until such time as the parties may mutually agree. If any wage increases are ordered by the Board the increases shall be retroactive to April 12, 1944, the date this case was certified by the. Secretary of Labor.”
The defendant was a superintendent of one of the Company’s plants. Mr. Jenkins entered the employment of the Company on June 19, 1943. At the time he was a member of the Union. He paid his dues incident to his membership up to April 12, 1944. On July 25, 1944, he received a letter, dated the day prior, from the appellant. The letter contained the following paragraph: “Therefore, in compliance with the above stated demand of the Union and pursuant to the aforementioned Orders of the Board, you are hereby suspended from employment for a period of five (5) consecutive days beginning Wednesday, July 26, 1944. You will be at liberty to return to work on Monday, July 31, 1944, but if then you still have not paid up your dues you will be subject to further suspension as required by the Board’s Orders aforementioned.”
Mr. Jenkins left the employment of the Company on July 27, 1944.
*272A maintenance of membership clause in a contract is understood to mean that all employees who are members of the union at a specified time after the contract is executed and all who later join the union must, as a condition of employment, remain as members in good standing for the duration of the agreement between the ■employer and the union.
We entertain the view and hold .that Mr. Jenkins was bound by the terms of the agreement between the Union and the Company. If the contract contained a maintenance of membership clause, Mr: Jenkins was obligated to retain his Union membership standing by the payment of the required dues.
The Company, of course, was also bound by ‘the - terms of the contract.
It appears reasonably certain that Mr. Jenkins was discharged solely because his membership in. the Union had terminated. If the contract contained the indicated cla.use. and if Mr. Jenkins’ discharge occurred during the effective life thereof, the .appellant could not be charged with a violation of the law in question.
This conclusion follows logically from ‘the holding in the Greenwood case, supra.
In. the case at bar the evidence does not make it certain that the contract between the Company and the Union had in -every respect terminated at the time Mr. Jenkins was -discharged. -In fact, there are evincing indications that by mutual consent it .had not.
In any' 'event, in consonance with the extent of proof whi-ch • is. required in all criminal prosecutions, we hold that -the evidence in thefinstant case is not -sufficient tó meet, the§e '1'egá.l demands-.
It is therefore ordered that the application for -rehearing be and 'the same is hereby granted, pur judgment of affirmance set aside, and -the judgment of the court below be reversed and the cause remanded.
Application for rehearing granted.
Reversed and remanded.