Court Opinion

ID: 9753817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:31:00.8717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:42.954658
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mb. Chief Justice Bell:
According to plaintiff’s evidence, plaintiff, with a group of friends, went (on May 8, 1959) to a picnic area in an open field on the banks of the Delaware in South Philadelphia. About midnight, the group departed in two automobiles, one of which was owned by plaintiff. Plaintiff’s car was occupied by himself and four of his friends. They intended to go to Chinatown for something to eat. As plaintiff’s car was proceeding north on Delaware Avenue at Pier 98 South, it collided with defendant’s switching engine, which had entered Delaware Avenue from a lead extending from Pier 98 to the defendant’s tracks on the west side of Delaware Avenue. Plaintiff did not prove why he did not see defendant’s engine and testified that he had no recollection of the occurrence of the accident. It is to be noted that following the accident plaintiff told the accident investigation officer that he had been driving his car. However, at the trial he claimed that he could not remember whether he was driving his car or was simply a passenger therein.
As a result of the collision, two occupants of the car were killed and plaintiff suffered severe personal injuries for which he brought this present trespass action. One of the plaintiff’s witnesses testified that *603during the party there were two, and only two, bottles of beer for the entire group. It is this testimony that gives rise to the sole question on this appeal.
Defendant’s evidence was as follows: About 1 a.m. on May 9, 1959, an automobile operated by plaintiff ran into a switching engine on Delaware Avenue. The engine was visible from at least 400 feet, and plaintiff’s automobile (1) was operated in excess of 60 miles per hour and (2) was neither braked nor (3) did it swerve prior to the collision. The jury believed defendant’s witnesses and brought in a verdict for defendant.
The sole assignment of error raised by plaintiff on this appeal was the ruling of the trial Judge permitting defendant’s medical witness to testify as to his findings of laboratory tests performed on the contents of the stomach of one of the passengers in plaintiff’s car which showed he had been drinking heavily within an hour or two of his death. This evidence was admitted for the sole and restricted purpose of rebutting the testimony of one of plaintiffs witnesses who had testified in direct examination that he did not see any whisky at the picnic but saw about two bottles of beer, and did not see plaintiff drink any beer. Plaintiff himself testified on cross-examination that he had consumed about one-third of a bottle of beer at this picnic.
The majority hold that the admission of this rebutting testimony constituted prejudicial error, since it was collateral to the issues involved and since there was no evidence on behalf of defendant to show that plaintiff was intoxicated at the time of the accident. It is obvious that plaintiff ran into defendant’s train either because he did not look or because he was intoxicated. While a witness may not be impeached through cross-examination on matters not germane to the issues involved, Zubrod v. Kuhn, 357 Pa. 200, 53 A. 2d 604, and Commonwealth v. Petrillo, 341 Pa. 209, *60419 A. 2d 288, this rule is inapplicable where matters upon which impeachment is sought were first introduced during direct examination: Bruno v. Brown, 414 Pa. 361, 200 A. 2d 405.
One of the crucial issues in this case was whether plaintiff had been drinking—if he had not, it would have been almost impossible for him to fail to see the defendant’s engine. In Zubrod and in Petrillo, supra, which are relied upon by the majority Opinion, the Court relevantly said (page 203) : “In Commonwealth v. Petrillo, 341 Pa. 209, 19 A. 2d 288, we held: ‘No witness can be contradicted on everything he testifies to in order to “test his credibility.” The pivotal issues in a trial cannot be “side-tracked” for the determination of whether or not a witness lied in making a statement about something which had no relationship to the case on trial.’”*
It is clear that the question of drinking had a relationship to the case on trial and whether the material testimony on behalf of the plaintiff on the question of drinking was true or false. Furthermore, Mr. Justice Eagen, joined in by five Justices, wrote in Bruno v. Brown, 414 Pa., supra, which is directly in point (page 364) : “A witness may not be impeached through cross-examination on matters not germane to the issue involved, unless such matters were first introduced during din-eci examination.”** The contrary rule which is now adopted by the majority will open wide the door to fraud.
Furthermore, the cases hold that even if this were a collateral matter, the question of admission should be left to the discretion of the trial Court. Moreover, plaintiff could not have been unreasonably prejudiced in the light of the Court’s charge to the jury. The *605trial Judge in his charge to the jury pertinently said: “In connection with this testimony, I charge you that this was offered for a restricted purpose only. This certainly is not to be considered by you in any way as evidence that the plaintiff himself had any alcohol in him nor that it in any way affected the plaintiff’s operation of the car. This testimony was offered because there had been testimony by the plaintiff and his witness that there had been only two bottles of beer at this Eight Rocks, and that they had been drinking chiefly soda. It is only as to whether or not this had any effect on the testimony of the plaintiff and his witness that you will consider the testimony of the Medical Examiner, and only for the purpose of the credibility* of the witness Anastasi and the plaintiff in this connection. It is not to be considered in any way concerning the operation of the plaintiff’s car or the actions of the plaintiff at the time of the collision.”
For these reasons, I strongly dissent and would affirm the Judgment of the lower Court, which had sustained a verdict for the defendant.

 Italics in original Opinion.

 Italics, ours.

 Italics, ours.