Court Opinion

ID: 9793359
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:46:26.813243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:35.204610
License: Public Domain

McFADDEN, Justice, Retired,
dissenting.

Community Property

Under long established principles of community property law the property in this case cannot by any stretch of the imagination be characterized as the separate property of Edgar.
In order to reach the conclusion it does, the majority makes assumptions not present in the record and relies on the findings of fact of the trial court which are unsupported by any evidence. The majority states that any profit from the farm itself had been spent by the parties and none of the farm income remained at the time of Edgar’s death. This statement comes from the testimony of Lucille:
“Q. All right. During the period . .. that you were married, did you and Edgar spend as much money as you were making or you took in?
A. I assume we did. We don’t have any of it left.”
Contrary to the majority’s assumption that this related to the farm income alone, it appears that the statement referred to the *246income of both parties. Accepting as true the statement that none of the money was left at Edgar’s death, the crucial question is, where did it go? Some of it was used to live on and some of it was used to purchase real and personal property. How much money and where it came from, i.e., separate assets or community assets, is unknown and the evidence and testimony adduced at trial sheds no light on the subject.
There is a rebuttable presumption that all property acquired during marriage is community property. Stanger v. Stanger, 98 Idaho 725, 571 P.2d 1126 (1977); Guy v. Guy, 98 Idaho 205, 560 P.2d 876 (1977); Suter v. Suter, 97 Idaho 461, 546 P.2d 1169 (1976).
A special application of the general presumption is the commingling doctrine. When separate and community funds are so commingled that it is impossible to trace the source of funds used to purchase any given asset, all assets purchased with commingled funds are community property. Houska v. Houska, 95 Idaho 568, 512 P.2d 1317 (1973). The trial court and the majority opinion correctly conclude that so long as the separate property of either spouse is identifiable and traceable, commingling of such separate property with community does not convert the separate property into community. Stahl v. Stahl, 91 Idaho 794, 430 P.2d 685 (1967); Evans v. Evans, 92 Idaho 911, 453 P.2d 560 (1969); Ripatti v. Ripatti, 94 Idaho 581, 494 P.2d 1025 (1972).
The presumption of community property places the burden of proof on the party asserting the separate character of the assets. Speer v. Quinlan, 96 Idaho 119, 525 P.2d 314 (1974); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96 Idaho 672, 535 P.2d 53 (1975); Guy v. Guy, supra.
The majority concludes that Edgar’s estate sustained its burden of proof by tracing the assets. The majority fails to point to any evidence to support its conclusion, and blindly quotes the trial court’s findings of fact. With the exception of the Marsh Valley ranch and some of the equipment, all of the property was acquired during coverture. Consequently, the presumption applies and the burden is on the personal representative to prove the separate property character of the property. This court in Stahl v. Stahl, 91 Idaho 794, 797, 430 P.2d 685, 688 (1967), stated
“When the source of the property can be established with reasonable certainty and particularity as the separate property of one or the other, the effect of such presumption [that of being community] is overcome, and the property so traced retains its character as separate property.”
When direct tracing is impossible, the party may employ indirect evidence in the form of an accounting. Speer v. Quinlan, supra, Houska v. Houska, 95 Idaho 568, 512 P.2d 1317 (1973); Evans v. Evans, 92 Idaho 911, 453 P.2d 560 (1969).
Separate and community property were commingled so as to make tracing impossible. The funds used to purchase the Marsh Creek ranch came from commingled funds.
While the principal from the sale of the ranch in Rockland would have been decedent’s separate property because it was acquired before marriage, I.C. § 32-903, the interest on the balance due on the contract would have been community property, I.C. § 32-906. Contrary to the majority’s attempt to liken it to an increase in stock, clearly this interest was a “rent or profit” to the community. There was no evidence as to how much of the $12,000 annual payments required by the contract was interest and how much was principal. Nor does the record indicate how much of the $12,000 annual payments went to Edgar and how much went to the others. It appears that the monies received from the contract on the sale of the Rockland ranch, both interest and principal, were deposited in decedent’s checking account.
The sale of cattle also provided some of the funds used to make payments on the Marsh Creek ranch. Edgar testified in his deposition that he had 125 head of cattle when he bought the ranch. Lucille testified at trial that he had around 100 head of cattle. She also testified that the main source of income was the sale and purchase of the cattle; that every year Edgar sold *247the calves and replaced some of the other cows. Edgar testified in his deposition that the money from the sale of the cows was placed in his bank account. The interest and principal on the sale of the Rockland ranch were commingled as was the money received from the sale of cattle acquired both before and after marriage. Although decedent owned cattle prior to marriage, no evidence was introduced regarding the sale price or the date of sale. Because the respective interests of the community and the separate estate are unknown, and because the estate failed to introduce evidence to segregate these interests, the general presumption of community property should prevail. Indicative of the lack of tracing is decedent’s own testimony. In his deposition he stated that he had no records, and no way of dividing the money in his bank accounts between the sale of cattle owned before marriage and those cattle which represented the increase after marriage.
Specifically in Gapsch v. Gapsch, 76 Idaho 44, 277 P.2d 278 (1954) we held: “Where the parties have not only commingled, blended and confused, but treated, regarded and handled their separate funds and community funds in their bank accounts as one fund, it all becomes community.” (Citations omitted.)
In Gapsch v. Gapsch, supra, and the cases cited therein, the parties maintained a joint bank account. The rule should be equally applicable when the parties maintain separate accounts and deposit both separate and community property in the accounts.
Further, in support of applying the general presumption, there is the fact that the Acequia ranch, the two trailers, and the cars were taken in the names of both Edgar Eliasen and Lucille Eliasen, husband and wife. Also, the cattle brand was in both names.
Since direct tracing is impossible, the estate seeks to avail itself of the Houska-Evans accounting method. This method involves proving that throughout the marriage community living expenses consumed or exceeded community income. Although the trial court made a finding of fact that value of decedent’s property was less at the date of his death than at the date of his marriage there is no evidence to support this finding. In Evans v. Evans, the court based its conclusions on the report of an accountant. In the recent case of Martsch v. Martsch, 103 Idaho 142, 645 P.2d 882 (1982), income tax records were introduced into evidence to show the community income. In Houska we held that the method of accounting involves proving that throughout the marriage community living expenses consumed or exceeded community income. Here, there was no evidence regarding either the community expenses or the community income or what funds were used to support the community. Consequently, the accounting method is inapplicable.
The trial court also found that decedent had less money at the time of his death than he had at the time of marriage, and in effect thus concluded that no community property came into existence and all the property was decedent’s separate property. The trial court, however, failed to make findings as to decedent’s value prior to marriage and his value at the date of his death. The record does not indicate the property value prior to marriage, although it does show its value at the date of death. Hence, the finding that decedent was worth less at the date of death than at the date of marriage is not supported by the record.
Regarding the majority’s initial conclusion that the parties entered the marriage with separate property and they intended to retain the separate nature of the property, it ignores the rule that rents and profits of separate property are community property when acquired during coverture. I.C. § 32-906. Regardless of how the name appears on the account in which the funds were deposited, in the absence of proof of their separate character those accounts were community in nature. When separate funds were commingled with community funds, all funds presumably became community. As in any other type of property, a party asserting the separate character of the property has the burden of proof to *248trace it. The estate has failed in its burden. If the parties intended to retain the separate character of the property (an assumption not based on the record), they should have kept the separate property separate, and not commingled it with community property. At a minimum, a person should keep records in order to overcome the presumption by tracing. None of these steps were taken in the instant case; consequently, the general presumption must apply.
As to the cattle, this court held, in Ripatti v. Ripatti, supra, that when the offspring of a cattle herd is periodically sold, the proceeds from the sale commingled with other revenue and the cattle pastured on the homestead, the cattle presumably are community property. The majority cites Evans v. Evans, supra, for the proposition that when the herd is merely maintained and not increased, the herd is separate in character. At the threshold, it is important to note that cattle do not just maintain themselves. They must be cared for, even minimally. The amount of labor and industry expended in their maintenance is community property. There was testimony that both Edgar and Lucille, as well as Lucille’s children by a previous marriage, cared for the cattle.
Additionally, the herd was not merely “maintained,” it increased and decreased over the years. Edgar sold and made replacement purchases every year. Applying community property law, the cows acquired after marriage are presumed community, the cows acquired before marriage presumably were Edgar’s separate property. No records were kept of the cows, making it impossible to determine which cows were Edgar’s and which were Edgar’s and Lucille’s. Consequently, all the cattle (here, the proceeds from sale of the cattle) must be considered community in nature.
Based on the foregoing, the record fails to support the trial court’s finding that all property was the separate property of decedent. I would reverse this characterization of the property by the trial court.

Slayer’s Statute

The argument of the estate regarding the applicability of the slayer’s statute, I.C. § 15-2-803, relates only to the family allowance, exempt property, and the homestead.
I.C. § 15-2-803 provides in pertinent part:
“Effect of homicide on distribution at death. — (a)(1) ‘Slayer’ shall mean any person who participates, either as principal or as an accessory before the fact, in the wilful and unlawful killing of any other person.
(3) ... (b) No slayer shall in any way acquire any property or receive any benefit as a result of the death of the decedent, but such property shall pass as provided in the sections following.
(c) The slayer shall be deemed to have predeceased the decedent as to property which would have passed from the decedent or his estate to the slayer under the statutes of descent and distribution or have been acquired by statutory right as surviving spouse or under any agreement made with the decedent.....”
For the slayer’s statute to apply, the estate must prove that the widow acted in the wilful and unlawful killing of the decedent. It is undisputed that the widow shot the decedent on September 22, 1974, in the stomach; that decedent died November 28, 1974; that at the time of the shooting the decedent was suffering from stomach cancer and was undergoing chemotherapy. The only issue left to be resolved is whether the shooting by the widow was the proximate cause of decedent’s death. The magistrate court answered this question in the negative which the district court affirmed.
Proximate cause is generally an issue for the jury unless the proof is so clear that reasonable minds cannot draw different conclusions or where all reasonable minds will construe the facts and circumstances one way. Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho, 357, 659 P.2d 111 (1983); Schaefer v. Elswood Trailer Sales, 95 Idaho 654, 656, 516 P.2d 1168, 1170 (1973). Consequently, if the finding is supported by substantial and *249competent evidence, it must be affirmed on appeal.
Decedent’s death certificate was properly admitted into evidence. Under cause of death, disease or condition directly leading to death is written, “Tumor cachexia.” Under antecedent causes is written, “Metatastic Ca of stomach adenocarcinoma of stomach” and under “other significant conditions” is written, “bullet wound of stomach.”
I.C. § 39-263 is a portion of the vital statistics act of 1949 which establishes the duty to file certificates of death, birth, etc. I.C. § 39-263 provides:
“Evidentiary character of records and copies of records. —Any certificate filed in accordance with the provisions of this act and the regulations prescribed by the board, or any copy of such records or part thereof, duly certified by the state registrar, shall be prima facie evidence of the facts recited therein.”
The death certificate being admitted into evidence, Corey v. Wilson, 93 Idaho 54, 454 P.2d 951 (1969), the burden was on the estate to prove that decedent did not die of the condition listed on the certificate but rather from the gunshot wound. The evidence supports the conclusion of the trial court, and the district court. The gunshot would had healed before decedent’s demise. Two depositions were taken of medical doctors and introduced as evidence in this case. Dr. Venzon is a pathologist and made his conclusions from the medical records. Dr. Marrow was decedent’s treating physician at the time of death and was treating decedent for the cancerous condition. Dr. Venzon testified:
“Q I am asking for your understanding of cause of death. I guess I could rephrase my question, Doctor. Of what did Edgar Eliasen die?
A In my opinion, the cause of his death was the adenocarcinoma of the stomach. Q Again, you are aware of this gunshot wound in September?
A Yes.
Q Did that have any effect on the spread of cancer, as far as you could tell from the medical records?
A I believe that, from reviewing the records, that he would have died of the adenocarcinoma of the stomach, in any event. I don’t believe that the gunshot wound was either necessary or sufficient to explain his death. I do believe that it was a contributing factor, in the sense that it may have hastened his death by weeks because of its effect on his stomach and because of the fact that it necessitated a 2-week discontinuance of his chemotherapy.”
And Dr. Marrow testified:
“Q Do you have an opinion as to the cause or causes of his death? .... And if so, what is that opinion within the realm of reasonable, medical probability (certainty)?
A Tumor cachexia, metastatic carcinoma of the stomach, secondary to adenocarcinoma of the stomach and with bullet wound of the abdomen being ... a factor in his death.”
Proximate cause has been defined as the “cause without which the result would not have occurred,” People v. Sam, 71 Cal.2d 194, 77 Cal.Rptr. 804, 454 P.2d 700 (Cal.1969); and in Armstrong v. State, 502 P.2d 440, 446 (Alaska 1972), “[b]y proximate cause is meant a direct cause, that is, a cause which, by direct and natural sequence, produced the death in question. To say it differently, the proximate cause of a thing is that cause which produces it and without which it would not have happened.” Decedent was dying of cancer at the time of the gunshot and while it may have hastened his death by a matter of weeks, the testimony supports the lower courts’ conclusion that the gunshot wound was not the proximate cause of his death. Because the gunshot wound was not the proximate cause of decedent’s death, the slayer’s statute is inapplicable. Findings of fact supported by substantial and competent evidence, though conflicting, will not be disturbed on appeal. Foremost Ins. v. Putzier, 627 P.2d 317, 102 Idaho 138 (1981).
*250I would affirm this portion of the trial court’s decision.
BISTLINE, J., concurs.