Court Opinion

ID: 9964548
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-30 14:12:00.002421+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:34.863706
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                      San Antonio, Texas
                                 MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                         No. 04-22-00295-CR

                                          Joshua CASAREZ,
                                               Appellant

                                                   v.

                                         The STATE of Texas,
                                               Appellee

                     From the 186th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
                                   Trial Court No. 2021CR4739
                            Honorable Jefferson Moore, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:       Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

Sitting:          Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
                  Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
                  Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: April 30, 2024

AFFIRMED

           After a jury trial, Joshua Casarez was found guilty of possession of four to two-hundred

grams of methamphetamine and was sentenced to eighteen years of imprisonment. On appeal, he

argues the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion to suppress and by refusing to include a

jury instruction pursuant to article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. We affirm.

                                            BACKGROUND

           In his motion to suppress, Casarez sought to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless

search and seizure, arguing that the police officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle
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in which he was a passenger and lacked probable cause to detain him or search his person or the

vehicle. Casarez argued the evidence was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the

Constitution, article I, section 9 of the Texas Constitution, and article 38.23 of the Texas Code of

Criminal Procedure. The two arresting officers testified and footage from the officers’ body

cameras were introduced in evidence.

       Officer Joseph Flores testified that on January 14, 2021, he was assigned to San Antonio

Police Department’s Street Crimes Unit, which patrols high crime areas in San Antonio, and was

working with his partner, Officer Ashley Gerken. They were on patrol in a stealth black police

vehicle with subdued lettering. At 1:00 a.m, Officer Flores noticed a four-door sedan did not have

a working license plate light and stopped the vehicle for the violation. Officer Flores approached

the driver’s side of the vehicle while Officer Gerken approached the passenger’s side. Officer

Flores saw that there was a passenger in the sedan sitting directly behind the driver. Officer Flores

told the driver the reason he had been stopped and asked to see a valid driver’s license. The driver

replied that he did not have a valid driver’s license. Officer Flores explained that driving without

a valid driver’s license is an offense for which one can be arrested. Thus, Officer Flores asked the

driver to step out of the vehicle, and the driver complied.

       Officer Flores testified that when the driver opened the door and stopped out, he could see

a “walkie-talkie and . . . the handle of what appeared to be a blade in between the console and the

seat—the front driver’s seat.” Officer Flores explained that when he said “blade” he meant a

knife—he just could not see the entire knife. When asked where the walkie-talkie was located,

Officer Flores replied, “Directly under his lap.” Officer Flores testified that based on his training

and experience, having a walkie-talkie in that manner at 1:00 in the morning is unusual and could

indicate the driver was “making narcotics deals,” was “stealing vehicles,” or “getting into vehicles

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and burglarizing vehicles.” Officer Flores then patted down the driver for weapons and took him

to the front of the vehicle.

        According to Officer Flores, while he was patting down the driver, Officer Gerken moved

from the passenger’s side of the vehicle to the driver’s side where Appellant Casarez was sitting

in the back seat. Officer Gerken told Casarez to get out of the vehicle because she saw in the

vehicle “baggies [and] a torch lighter, which are commonly used and known” tools for narcotics.

Officer Flores testified that Officer Gerken was trying to get Casarez out of the vehicle because “it

was a safety issue” and the knife in the vehicle was “still within reach” of Casarez. Casarez was

not compliant and “kept questioning the reason why.” Officer Flores testified he and Officer

Gerken “both took him out of the vehicle.” When Casarez got out of the sedan, Officer Flores saw

another walkie-talkie, the same kind as the driver. Officer Flores testified that when he saw Casarez

sitting in the back of the sedan with no other occupants, he was concerned “because if they [are]

both on one side, it makes it easily accessible for one to approach and for one to exit the vehicle

quickly.” Officer Flores testified both the driver and Casarez having the same type of walkie-talkie

indicated that “they were out doing illegal things.” Officer Flores explained, “Like I said, it could

be a number of things as far as what we call—or what is called—to rob somebody is called a ‘lick’

out on the streets. The slang name is to do a ‘lick.’ And that was what gave me that initial reason

that that’s what they were doing.”

        Officer Flores testified that after getting Casarez out of the vehicle, he patted down Casarez

for weapons. Officer Flores did not find any weapons, but he did feel the contour of a gun holster

on Casarez’s right thigh underneath his pants, which made Officer Flores think there was “possibly

a weapon somewhere.” Officer Flores asked Casarez if there was a gun, and Casarez replied that

there was not.

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       Officer Gerken testified similarly to Officer Flores. According to Officer Gerken, when

she first approached the passenger-side of the four-door sedan, she saw the driver and Casarez

sitting in the backseat behind the driver. Officer Gerken testified,

       Immediately upon approaching . . . the vehicle, I observed what appeared to be a
       torn-off baggie in the front seat. I also observed torch lighters. And those two items
       in my training and experience are commonly used with methamphetamine use.
       Also, I observed a walkie-talkie that the driver had and a scope that was sitting right
       next to [Casarez]. At that point I believed that those were tools to a crime in
       robberies.

Officer Gerken explained that she could see the baggie “protruding from another bag” and that

“[i]t appeared that the corner had been torn off.” The baggie was in the middle of the backseat near

Casarez. She testified, “In my experience with the narcotics cases, the appearance was that it was

bitten off, which is used—people do that to conceal illegal narcotics from officers.” The torch

lighters “are butane torch lighters” that make it “much easier to heat up drug paraphernalia.”

Officer Gerken testified that because of the scope she saw in the sedan, she moved to the driver’s

side of the sedan to make contact with Casarez. She explained that she did not know at that point

whether “there was a rifle attached to that rifle scope that [she] observed.” She wanted Casarez “to

be removed from the vehicle until [she] could retrieve the firearm.” Officer Gerken testified that

she was concerned about officer safety, and that she believed at that point the driver and Casarez

were “involved in robberies.” According to Officer Gerken, in her experience, robberies can be

associated with drug dealing: “People that use narcotics will tend to need that quick money, that

quick cash, so they’ll conduct a robbery for cash or assets and turn around and sell it so they can

have money for narcotics.”

       Officer Gerken testified that she made contact with Casarez and asked him to get out of the

vehicle, but he was not cooperative. When Casarez got out of the backseat, Officer Gerken saw

the second walkie-talkie, which was lying on the seat where Casarez had been sitting, and a pair

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of binoculars. Officer Gerken testified that both the walkie-talkie the driver had and the walkie-

talkie Casarez had were tuned to the same channel. According to Officer Gerken, Officer Flores

then searched Casarez and found an empty holster strapped to Casarez’s leg, which raised Officer

Gerken’s suspicion that a firearm was nearby. Thus, at this point, Officer Gerken and Officer

Flores had observed at 1:00 in the morning, two men sitting in an unusual formation in vehicle

(which would allow for quick ingress and egress), two walkie-talkies near each man (which were

turned on and tuned to the same channel), a rifle scope within reaching distance of Casarez,

binoculars, a knife in the front console, an empty holster strapped to Casarez’s thigh, torn-off

baggie in the backseat, and torch lighters in the front seat. Officer Gerken testified that all of these

circumstances formed her belief that some type of criminal activity was afoot. Officer Gerken

explained,

        In my experience and training, with robberies, people use walkie-talkies to
        communicate back and forth. They use scopes and binoculars to look from a
        distance for victims of opportunity. . . . Once they identify a victim, one person will
        get out of the vehicle, somebody other than the driver, they’ll go conduct the
        robbery and communicate back and forth on the walkie-talkies to coordinate a pick-
        up.

She also checked whether the driver and Casarez had any outstanding warrants and determined

that Casarez was a convicted felon. She then conducted a search of the vehicle.

        Officer Gerken started her search in the backseat where she had seen the torn-off baggie

and the rifle scope. She “quickly determined that there was no rifle attached to the scope and that

[the] baggie was, in fact, torn and empty.” She gathered the tools she believed were tools of

robbery, including “the binoculars, the scope, [and] the walkie-talkies.” She then searched a

“pillow case that [Casarez] [had been] sitting on and . . . pulled out rubber gloves.” She continued

her search and saw “a loaded revolver,” which was consistent with the holster that Casarez had

been wearing. She then went to the opposite side of the backseat and began to search where the

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baggie had been. “In a brown paper-like bag, [she] found several grams of a crystal-like substance,

which tested positive for methamphetamine.” She also found “marijuana roach joints,” “pills that

appeared to be Xanax, which were later confirmed as Alprazoiam,” a scale, and about $600 in

cash. In the same bag Officer Gerken found the drugs, she also found Casarez’s wallet and his

Texas ID card. In another bag in the backseat, Officer Gerken found the loaded revolver. Because

she knew Casarez was a felon, she knew he was not allowed to lawfully carry a firearm. There

“was one casing in the cylinder,” which indicated it had been fired. The methamphetamine found

had a field weight 37 grams.

        Officer Gerken testified that in the front seat of the sedan, she found a cell phone that the

driver had been using for directions. Officer Gerken testified the driver could have used that phone

if he needed to communicate with someone and did not need to use a walkie-talkie. The driver was

issued a citation for not having a driver’s license and for not having a license-plate light. Casarez

was arrested for possession of the firearm as a convicted felon and possession of methamphetamine

with intent to deliver.

        At the end of the hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. The case then

proceeded to trial. During the charge conference, Casarez requested a jury instruction pursuant to

article 38.23, which the trial court denied. Casarez now appeals.

                                        MOTION TO SUPPRESS

        A. Standard of Review

        We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress using a bifurcated standard of

review. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). First, we give almost

total deference to the trial court’s factual determinations. Id. The trial court “is the sole trier of fact

and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.” Id. The

trial court “is entitled to believe or disbelieve all or part of a witness’s testimony—even if that

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testimony is uncontroverted—because” it is the trial court that has the opportunity to observe a

witness’s demeanor and appearance. Id. Second, we review de novo a trial court’s application of

law to the facts, and we will affirm a ruling that is “reasonably supported by the record and is

correct on any theory of law applicable to the case.” Id. at 447-48. Thus, when reviewing a trial

court’s “decision to deny a motion to suppress where probable cause to search was challenged,”

we must “afford almost total deference to a trial court’s express or implied determination of

historical facts and review de novo the court’s application of the law of search and seizure to those

facts.” Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citations omitted) (emphasis in

original). When, as here, the trial court does not make explicit factual findings, we “view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and assume that the trial court made

implicit findings of fact that support its ruling as long as those findings are supported by the

record.” Id. (citations omitted).

       B. Initial Stop and Pat-Down

       The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S.

CONST. amend. IV; State v. Weaver, 349 S.W.3d 521, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). “Under the

Fourth Amendment, a brief investigatory detention must be justified by reasonable suspicion.”

Matthews v. State, 431 S.W.3d 596, 602-03 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citations omitted). “A police

officer has reasonable suspicion to detain if he has specific, articulable facts that, combined with

rational inferences from those facts, would lead him reasonably to conclude that the person

detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity.” Derichsweiler v. State, 348

S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968)) (other

citations omitted). “This standard is an objective one that disregards the actual subjective intent of

the arresting officer and looks, instead, to whether there was an objectively justifiable basis for the

detention.” Id. We also look to the totality of the circumstances; “those circumstances may all

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seem innocent enough in isolation, but if they combine to reasonably suggest the imminence of

criminal conduct, an investigative detention is justified.” Id. In other words, we focus on “whether

the totality of [the] reliable information provided specific, articulable facts that, combined with

reasonable inferences derived from those facts, would lead to the reasonable conclusion that the

appellant was committing, or soon would be engaged in, some type of criminal activity.” Id. at

915-16.

       Upon lawful arrest, the search of the person is justified by the need to assure officer safety

and the need to protect evidence from concealment or destruction without any need for a

particularized showing that weapons or evidence are likely to be found. See Price v. State, 662

S.W.3d 428, 433 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (“Searches of the person, or of property within the

immediate control of the person—property immediately associated with the person of the

arrestee—are always justified under the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant

requirement, upon no more justification than the arrest itself.”) (citation omitted).

       “In the context of a traffic stop, police officers are justified in stopping a vehicle when the

officers have reasonable suspicion to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” Lerma v. State,

543 S.W.3d 184, 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). “A traffic stop made for the purpose of investigating

a traffic violation must be reasonably related to that purpose and may not be prolonged beyond the

time to complete the tasks associated with the traffic stop.” Id. “During a traffic stop the officer

may request certain information from a driver, such as the driver’s license, vehicle registration,

and proof of insurance, and run a computer check on that information.” Id. “An officer is also

permitted to ask drivers and passengers about matters unrelated to the purpose of the stop, so long

as the questioning does not measurably extend the duration of the stop.” Id. “[I]f an officer

develops reasonable suspicion that the driver or an occupant of the vehicle is involved in criminal

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activity the officer may continue questioning the individual regardless of whether the official tasks

of a traffic stop have come to an end.” Id. at 191.

       Further, “[d]uring the course of a detention, an officer may, in certain circumstances,

conduct a pat-down search of an individual to determine whether the person is carrying a weapon.”

Id. “In order to justify a pat-down, the officer must reasonably believe that the suspect is armed

and dangerous, such that the officer can point to specific and articulable facts which reasonably

lead him to conclude that the suspect might possess a weapon.” Id. “Reasonable suspicion in this

context is based on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and

circumstances surrounding the detention.” Id. “The officer’s subjective level of fear is not

controlling.” Id. “The question is whether a reasonably prudent person would justifiably believe

that his safety or the safety of others was in danger.” Id.

       The record reflects that the officers stopped the vehicle in which Casarez was a passenger

because the vehicle’s license plate light was not working, which is a violation of section 547.322(f)

of the Texas Transportation Code. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 547.322(f) (requiring a “taillamp or

a separate lamp” to be “constructed and mounted to emit a white light that: (1) illuminates the rear

license plate; and (2) makes the plate clearly legible at a distance of 50 feet from the rear”). Thus,

the officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop. See Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 190.

       The record further reflects that when Officer Flores approached the vehicle, he saw Casarez

was sitting in the back seat behind the driver, which was an unusual seating pattern because no

one else was in the vehicle. The driver told Officer Flores that he did not have a valid driver’s

license, and Officer Flores asked the driver to step out of the vehicle. When the driver opened the

door and stepped out, Officer Flores saw a walkie-talkie, which had been underneath the driver’s

lap, and the handle of a knife in between the console and the front driver’s seat. Officer Flores

testified that in his experience and training, the walkie-talkies, the unusual seating pattern, the

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possible weapon, and the fact that it was 1:00 a.m. in the morning was suspicious and could

indicate the driver was “making narcotics deals,” “stealing vehicles,” or “getting into vehicles and

burglarizing vehicles.”

       The record further reflects that when Officer Gerken approached the vehicle, she saw a

torn-off baggie and torch lighters, which she testified are commonly used and known tools for

narcotics. Officer Gerken also saw a walkie-talkie next to Casarez in the back seat, which was the

same kind as the driver’s walkie-talkie, and a rifle scope, which she was not sure whether was

attached to a rifle. Both the rifle scope and the knife handle in the middle console of the vehicle

were within Casarez’s reach. Officer Gerken testified that she wanted Casarez removed from the

vehicle for her safety and that she believed at that point the driver and Casarez could possibly be

“involved in robberies.”

       Under our standard of review, the record supports an implicit finding by the trial court that

the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe their safety might be in danger and thus could

instruct Casarez to exit the vehicle and conduct a pat-down search. See Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 191-

92 (holding evidence supported implicit finding by trial court that officer had reasonable suspicion

to believe his safety or the safety of others was in danger and thus could conduct pat-down search

of passenger following traffic stop); see also Graham v. State, 893 S.W.2d 4, 7 (Tex. App.—Dallas

1994, no pet.) (“As part of [a] temporary detention, an officer may ask that an individual step out

of the automobile.”).

       C. Search of the Vehicle

       A passenger may challenge the search of a vehicle in which he was a passenger “if the

search resulted from an infringement (such as an illegal detention) of the passenger’s Fourth

Amendment rights.” State v. Crisp, 74 S.W.3d 474, 480 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.) (quoting

Lewis v. State, 664 S.W.2d 345, 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)) (emphasis in original). Thus, if a

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passenger’s “Fourth Amendment rights were violated because he was illegally detained or illegally

arrested, he would have standing to contest the search of the car.” Id. As noted above, we have

determined the vehicle’s detention and Casarez’s pat-down search was lawful.

        Moreover, even if Casarez had standing, the officers had probable cause to search the

vehicle. A warrantless search of a vehicle is reasonable if the officers have probable cause. See

Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “Probable cause requires an evaluation

of probabilities, and probabilities ‘are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on

which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’” Id. (quoting Brinegar v. United

States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)). “The United States Supreme Court has described probable cause

as a ‘fluid concept [ ]’; its ‘substantive content’ is derived from ‘the particular context[ ] in which’

it is assessed.” Id. (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)). “Probable cause

‘exist[s] where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable

prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.’” Id. (quoting Ornelas

v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)). “When determining probable cause, an appellate court

considers the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 25. “This means that a ‘divide-and-conquer’ or

piecemeal approach is prohibited.” Id. “The subjective intent or motivations of law enforcement

officials is not taken into account when considering the totality of the circumstances.” Id. “But the

training, knowledge, and experience of law enforcement officials is taken into consideration.” Id.

        When Officer Flores conducted the pat-down search of Casarez, he felt an empty gun

holster strapped to Casarez’s thigh underneath his pants. Thus, at the time Officer Gerken searched

the vehicle, the officers had stopped a vehicle at 1:00 a.m. in a high-crime area. They had observed

the driver and passenger sitting in an unusual formation—a formation that would make it easy “for

one to approach and for one to exit the vehicle quickly.” They saw walkie-talkies near both the

driver and Casarez, which were turned on and tuned to the same channel. Officer Flores testified

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that both the driver and Casarez having walkie-talkies and sitting in the formation they did,

indicated that “they were out doing illegal things.” The officers also saw a torn-off plastic baggie,

torch lighters, a knife sticking out in between the driver’s seat and the center console, and a rifle

scope in the backseat of the vehicle, which the officers testified were tools of narcotics and

robberies. A pat-down search of Casarez produced an empty gun holster attached to his thigh.

Officer Flores testified he was concerned where the gun that went in that holster was located.

Officer Gerken then ran a search and determined that Casarez was a convicted felon who was not

allowed to possess a firearm. Under the totality of these circumstances, the officers had probable

cause to search the vehicle. See Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 24 (explaining probable cause exists when

a person of reasonable prudence would believe that contraband or evidence of a crime will be

found). And, once Officer Gerken found in the back seat the loaded revolver (which was consistent

with the holster Casarez was wearing), the methamphetamine, and Casarez’s Texas identification

card (which was in the same bag as the methamphetamine), she had probable cause to arrest

Casarez for possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance and for being a felon in

possession of a firearm.

       Casarez would thus have no standing to challenge the officers’ search of the vehicle based

on an illegal detention or arrest. The only other way he could challenge the search of the vehicle

was if he asserted a possessory interest in the vehicle. See Morfin v. State, 34 S.W.3d 664, 666

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, no pet.) (explaining a passenger does not have a legitimate

expectation of privacy in a vehicle if he fails to assert a possessory interest in the vehicle).

However, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Casarez asserted any possessory interest in

the vehicle. Indeed, State’s Exhibit 4, which is video footage from Officer Gerken’s body camera,

reflects the opposite. The body cam footage shows Officer Gerken asking the driver of the vehicle

whether she would find anything illegal when she searched it. The driver replied that he had “no

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idea” and that he had “just picked [Casarez] up.” Therefore, Casarez has no basis to assert standing

to challenge the vehicle search based on a possessory interest in the vehicle. See Morfin, 34 S.W.3d

at 666.

          We therefore hold the trial court did not err in denying Casarez’s motion to suppress.

                                     ARTICLE 38.23 INSTRUCTION

          In his second issue, Casarez argues the trial court erred in refusing his request to give a

jury instruction pursuant to article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. We review a

claim of error in the jury charge under the standard enunciated in Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d

157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). We first determine whether the charge contains error. Ngo v.

State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). If error is present, we determine whether it is

harmless under the applicable standard. Id. at 743-44.

          “A defendant’s right to the submission of jury instructions under [a]rticle 38.23(a) is

limited to disputed issues of fact that are material to his claim of a constitutional or statutory

violation that would render evidence inadmissible.” Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504, 509-10

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “[W]hen an issue of fact is raised, a defendant has a statutory right to

have the jury charged accordingly.” Id. at 510 (citation omitted). “The only question is whether

under the facts of a particular case an issue has been raised by the evidence so as to require a jury

instruction.” Id. (citation omitted) “Where no issue is raised by the evidence, the trial court acts

properly in refusing a request to charge the jury.” Id. (citation omitted).

          Therefore, before a defendant is entitled to the submission of a jury instruction under article

38.23(a), a defendant must meet three requirements:

          (1) The evidence heard by the jury must raise an issue of fact;
          (2) The evidence on that fact must be affirmatively contested; and
          (3) That contested factual issue must be material to the lawfulness of the challenged
              conduct in obtaining the evidence.

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Id. “There must be a genuine dispute about a material fact.” Id. “If there is no disputed factual

issue, the legality of the conduct is determined by the trial judge alone, as a question of law.” Id.

“And if other facts, not in dispute, are sufficient to support the lawfulness of the challenged

conduct, then the disputed fact issue is not submitted to the jury because it is not material to the

ultimate admissibility of the evidence.” Id. “The disputed fact must be an essential one in deciding

the lawfulness of the challenged conduct.” Id.

        In support of his argument that the evidence raises an issue of fact, Casarez argues “the

instant record contains evidence from which a jury could find that, on January 14, 2021, [Casarez]

was both illegally arrested and improperly searched (and not merely detained and frisked).” He

argues that “[f]rom these facts, alone, a properly instructed jury could find the seizure and searches

that happened . . . were unreasonable.” As described above, we disagree that the record reflects

Casarez was illegally arrested and improperly searched.

        Additionally, Casarez points to Officer Gerken’s body cam footage where Officer Gerken,

about five minutes into her search of the vehicle and after she found the firearm in the backseat,

told Casarez that she was going to start a search because she has probable cause to believe that

narcotics were in the vehicle. Casarez argues that Officer Gerken’s statement in the body cam

footage was different than her testimony at trial, and thus a fact issue exists about the legality of

the search. In support of his argument, Casarez points to the “following colloquy” by her defense

counsel at trial:

        Your Honor, I’m requesting a[n] [article] 38.23 . . . [because] Officer Ashley
        Gerken’s testimony . . . [was that] she had probable cause to search before the
        search began. On the body worn camera video that was introduced into evidence
        by the State, she makes the statement after her search began, about five minutes
        into her search and after she finds a handgun, she makes a statement to the
        defendant that she is going to begin or is going to start a search because she has
        probable cause to believe that narcotics are in the vehicle. So those two statements
        are in dispute. One statement is, “I had probable cause before I started searching
        the car,” and the other statement is on the video, “I am now going to begin a

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       probable cause search,” which occurred about five minutes after the search began.
       That would violate the law because you cannot search something in order to gain
       probable cause for a search. That is an issue of fact for a jury to determine, Your
       Honor.

In response, the State points out that Casarez’s description of this moment on Officer Gerken’s

body cam footage is made “within the context of [Casarez]’s broader—and incorrect—argument

that the jury could answer the legal question of whether the vehicle search was reasonable.” We

agree with the State.

       The record reflects that Officer Gerken had probable cause to search the vehicle before she

began the search, and her body camera footage makes the sequence of events clear. Her body cam

footage reflects that she runs Casarez’s name on her computer before she conducts the search.

Before she conducted the search of the vehicle, she knew that Casarez was a convicted felon based

on running his name. The body cam footage further reflects that Officer Gerken begins to search

the vehicle, starting in the backseat, and after searching for a few minutes, she leaves the vehicle,

hands Officer Flores a handwritten note, and stands with Casarez while Officer Flores goes back

to the patrol vehicle. Officer Gerken tells Casarez that they are calling another unit. In response to

a comment made by Casarez, Officer Gerken states she is going to conduct a probable cause search

of the vehicle for illegal narcotics. Officer Gerken can then be heard a few minutes later telling

another officer that she had already found the firearm but had not informed Casarez of that fact.

Officer Gerken testified that she did not tell Casarez about finding the firearm because she did not

want to escalate the situation.

       Casarez argues that the evidence in this case raises a disputed issue of fact that is material

to his claim of a constitutional or statutory violation that would render evidence inadmissible,

because Officer Gerken testified at trial she had probable cause to search the vehicle before she

started the search and is heard on the body cam footage telling Casarez she has probable cause to

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search after she began the search. However, Officer Gerken’s statements about having probable

cause to search the vehicle are not material to Casarez’s claim of a constitutional or statutory

violation that would render evidence inadmissible. Officer Gerken’s statements about probable

cause to search are legal conclusions. Whether she, in fact, had probable cause to search is based

on the totality of the circumstances that would warrant a man of reasonable prudence to believe

that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found. See Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 24. Officer

Gerken’s “subjective intent or motivation[] . . . is not taken into account when considering the

totality of the circumstances.” Id. And, her opinion about whether the legal standard of probable

cause had been met does not create a material factual issue about the legality of the search. Thus,

her opinion statements about probable cause are simply not relevant to the probable cause inquiry.

See Garza v. State, 126 S.W.3d 79, 86 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (explaining that appellant

disagreeing “with the conclusion that probable cause was shown as a matter of law is not the same

as appellant controverting the facts” and that the “question of whether the search was legal is a

question of law, as none of the circumstances surrounding the search were controverted by

appellant”) (emphasis in original). Casarez has not pointed to a contested fact that relates to

whether the search was unlawful. See id. As noted above, we have described above the totality of

facts that gave Officer Gerken probable cause to search the vehicle, and Casarez has not pointed

to any of these facts as being in dispute. See id. Instead, Casarez points to Officer Gerken’s trial

testimony giving a legal conclusion about probable cause and to another statement made on her

body cam footage regarding a legal conclusion about probable cause. This “discrepancy” simply

does not create a fact issue with regard to whether the search, itself, was lawful. See id. Therefore,

we find no error by the trial court in denying Casarez’s request for a jury instruction pursuant to

article 38.23.

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                                                                                  04-22-00295-CR

                                        CONCLUSION

     For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                                                Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH

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