Court Opinion

ID: 9917442
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 15:03:11.053832+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:03.368858
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                       Case No. 5D23-2930
                   LT Case No. 2021-CF-025108
                  _____________________________

KENNETH WAYNE BOWERS,

    Petitioner,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Respondent.
                  _____________________________

Petition for Writ of Prohibition.
Aaron Peacock, Respondent Judge.

Robert Blaise Trettis, Public Defender, and Timothy Seiler,
Assistant Public Defender, Melbourne, for Petitioner.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kaylee D.
Tatman, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for
Respondent.

                         January 12, 2024

EISNAUGLE, J.

     Kenneth Wayne Bowers (“Bowers”) petitions this court for a
writ of prohibition arguing that his prosecution for burglary of a
dwelling is barred by the statute of limitations, and that all three
of the charges against him are barred because the State violated
his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Bowers raised these
arguments in a motion to dismiss below, and the trial court denied
the motion after an evidentiary hearing.

     We deny the writ based on the constitutional speedy trial
claim without further discussion, but we grant the petition as to
the burglary of a dwelling charge because that count is barred by
the statute of limitations. § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2022); cf.
Collazo v. State, 42 So. 3d 339, 340 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (granting
writ of prohibition based upon the expiration of the statute of
limitations on a second-degree felony charge).

     In this case, the State argues that, while the statute of
limitations on the burglary of a dwelling charge would have
otherwise expired, prosecution is not barred based on section
775.15(16)(a)5., Florida Statutes (2022), because Bowers was
identified with DNA. Section 775.15(16)(a)5. provides:

    [A] prosecution for [a burglary offense under s. 810.02]
    may be commenced at any time after the date on which
    the identity of the accused is established, or should have
    been established by the exercise of due diligence, through
    the analysis of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence, if a
    sufficient portion of the evidence collected at the time of
    the original investigation and tested for DNA is preserved
    and available for testing by the accused[.]

(emphasis added).

     While there is no dispute that Bowers was identified “through
the analysis of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence,” the State
failed to present any competent substantial evidence at the
evidentiary hearing that a sufficient portion of the DNA “is
preserved and available for testing by the accused.”

     At the hearing, the State primarily relied on the testimony of
a detective and a lab report to establish that “a sufficient portion
of the evidence” is available for testing. But the detective only
testified that he had not authorized destruction of the DNA
evidence and that the evidence was available “as far as [he]

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kn[ew].” This testimony, standing alone, falls short of establishing
that a sufficient portion of the DNA evidence is actually available
for testing by the accused.

     The State further argues the lab report itself establishes that
the DNA evidence is available, but the report, which is dated more
than two years before the evidentiary hearing took place, merely
states that “submitted evidence and DNA extracts are available
for retrieval or return at the earliest opportunity.” We agree with
Bowers that this language does not establish that a sufficient
portion of the DNA evidence remains available for testing,
especially given that the report was published more than two years
before the hearing.

     In sum, the State failed to present any competent substantial
evidence that a sufficient portion of the DNA evidence is available
for testing. We therefore grant the petition as to the burglary of a
dwelling charge. The petition is otherwise denied.

    WRIT OF PROHIBITION GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part.

JAY and HARRIS, JJ., concur.

                 _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

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