Court Opinion

ID: 9493631
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:13:42.505841+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:56.443473
License: Public Domain

EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring:
A Louisiana jury found Robert Wilkerson guilty of murdering fellow inmate August Kelly during a prison melee in 1973. The prosecution’s key witness, inmate William Riley, testified that he saw Wilkerson stab Kelly, but he has since altered his testimony. I agree with the majority that we cannot hear Wilkerson’s abusive and repetitive federal habeas corpus petition until an evidentiary hearing has shown him “actually innocent.” I, however, do not join the majority’s Sixth Amendment analysis because I believe it is premature.
The majority correctly notes that Wilkerson must show that he is, more likely than not, “actually innocent” to be able to present his third habeas petition. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995). The claim of actual innocence does not itself provide a basis for relief. It merely serves as “a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.” Id. at 315, 115 S.Ct. 851 (citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404, 113 S.Ct. 853, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993)).
The district court must hold an eviden-tiary hearing to assess the newly introduced affidavits because there are reasons to doubt their reliability. First, as a general matter, an affidavit, which is usually prepared by an attorney, states only what an affiant will purportedly testify about. It cannot replace a live hearing where a court can judge an affiant’s reliability. As Schlup warned, “new statements may, of course, be unreliable.” Id. at 331. Second, Riley submitted his affidavit fifteen years after the murder had occurred. Courts treat last-minute affidavits with “a degree of skepticism” because “[i]t seems that, when a prisoner’s life is at stake, he often can find someone new to vouch for him.” Herrera, 506 U.S. at 423, 113 S.Ct. 853. Third, we should question Riley’s credibility, given that he now admits to perjuring himself at trial. “[R]ecanting affidavits and witnesses are viewed with extreme suspicion by the courts.” United States v. Adi, 759 F.2d 404, 408 (5th Cir. 1985). Thus, by holding an evidentiary *894hearing into “actual innocence,” we ensure that Wilkerson does not receive a free pass through the Schlup v. Délo “gateway.”
While I agree with the majority on the importance of an evidentiary hearing, I do not join its Sixth Amendment analysis. If the district court finds that Wilkerson has failed to meet the “actually innocent” standard, then it will render the Sixth Amendment problem moot. I believe the court should not prematurely and unnecessarily address this very difficult issue.
The majority writes that the state violated Wilkerson’s right to confrontation by limiting the cross-examination into Riley’s prison transfer. I question, but do not decide, whether the state indeed violated Wilkersoris Sixth Amendment right. I bring up the following critique only to show that we should not try to resolve this thorny (and potentially moot) issue at this point.
First, it is not at all clear from the record if Riley’s letters to the prison administration shed much light on his alleged bias.1 Wilkerson argues that Riley had an incentive to fabricate testimony to curry favor with prison officials and receive a transfer from a maximum to a medium security prison. A few facts put a different gloss on Riley’s transfer request. The Louisiana Supreme Court has emphasized that Riley, “fearing for his life [from Wilkerson], requested to be moved.” Louisiana v. Wilkerson, 326 So.2d 358, 357 (La.1976). As the district attorney told the state trial judge in a colloquy, the state of Louisiana, as a safety measure, usually transfers an inmate who will testify against a fellow inmate. Furthermore, it is not obvious from the record if Riley requested to be transferred only to medium security prisons. He might have requested a transfer to a different, but similarly inhospitable, maximum security prison — just so that he could stay away from Wilkerson.2
Second, the trial court’s interest in preventing mistrial possibly outweighed Wilk-ersoris competing interest in cross-examining Riley about the letter. See Davis, 415 U.S. at 319, 94 S.Ct. 1105 (recognizing that an important state interest can sometimes trump the right to an unfettered cross-examination). The state trial judge limited the cross-examination into Riley’s transfer because he worried that this line of questioning would broach Wilkerson’s first trial, where Riley had also testified. He warned Wilkersoris attorney during a colloquy about the transfer: “[Y]ou are bordering [] very close to a mistrial by asking him about the previous trial. The man [Riley] was careful enough in his testimony not to disclose anything about it but I want to caution you.” Apparently, the state trial judge feared that Wilkerson’s attorney would elicit testimony about the previous trial, and lay the seeds of a mistrial should Wilkerson be found guilty. The judge’s fear of a manufactured mistrial may not have been misplaced: after his conviction, Wilkerson moved for a mistrial because a prospective juror during voir dire had mentioned that he knew this case was “back for retrial.”3 See Louisiana v. *895Wilkerson, 326 So.2d at 355 (rejecting the motion for mistrial).
Third, despite limiting testimony regarding the prison transfer, the state court nevertheless might have allowed constitutionally sufficient probing into Riley’s potential bias. See United States v. Mizell, 88 F.3d 288, 293 (5th Cir.1996) (holding that limits on cross-examination did not violate the Sixth Amendment because the “jury was given adequate information to appraise the bias and motives of the witness.”) The court allowed Wilkerson’s attorney, Leslie Ligón, to cross-examine Riley about potential deals with the state. Ligón, for instance, asked Riley whether he received anything in exchange for his testimony. Ligón also cross-examined Riley about receiving preferential treatment:
Q: Were you charged with this murder?
A: No, sir.
Q: How many other people were charged with this murder?
A: Six or seven I guess, I’m not sure.
Q: Is it or is it not true that you were the only person that was out of his cell that was not charged with this murder?
A: I wouldn’t know ...
Q: But you were not charged?
A: No, sir.
The court also allowed Ligón to attack other aspects of Riley’s credibility: he pointed out that Ligón was a convicted armed robber, was dishonorably discharged by the Marines, took medication for psychological problems, and visited a psychiatrist at the penitentiary.
Finally, while res judicata does not attach to the denial of habeas relief, see Schlup, 513 U.S. at 317, 115 S.Ct. 851, I note that a Fifth Circuit panel rejected Wilkerson’s prior habeas petition, which raised this same Sixth Amendment claim. See Wilkerson v. Whitley, 16 F.3d 64 (5th Cir.1994). The Fifth Circuit en banc then affirmed the panel’s decision. See Wilkerson v. Whitley, 28 F.3d 498 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc opinion).

. Riley’s letters are not in the record, so we must rely on the characterizations of them described in the trial transcript and the judicial opinions.

. Wilkersoris attorney noted in a sidebar conversation that Riley, in his letters, "asked in one place to be transferred to DeQuincy and in another place that he be transferred to Camp H just a medium security area.” It is unclear from the record if DeQuincy is a maximum or medium security prison, but the attorney’s contrast between DeQuincy and Camp H suggests that DeQuincy is a maximum security penitentiary. If that is the case, it undermines Wilkerson’s argument that Riley had an incentive to lie in hopes of being transferred to a medium security prison.

.The majority argues that this fear of a mistrial was unwarranted because a prospective juror had already informed the jury of the prior trial. But the Louisiana Supreme Court dismissed the significance of the prospective juror's statement, saying "it is extremely unlikely that the comment drew the attention” of the jurors. Louisiana v. Wilkerson, 326 So.2d at 355.