Court Opinion

ID: 9635944
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:10:47.608316+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:39.172654
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Hoffman, J.:
Appellant contends that his contempt conviction for refusal to testify before an investigating grand jury should be reversed because the lower court did not comply with the statutory requirements prior to granting him immunity from prosecution and ordering bim to testify. The instant matter is not within our jurisdiction and should be certified to the Supreme Court which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction in cases of direct criminal contempt.1 Although Judge Harry A. Takiff *485held appellant in civil contempt following his refusal to testify with immunity before the grand jury, the statute provides: “Any person who shall refuse or decline to testify . . . after being granted immunity and ordered by the court shall be guilty of criminal contempt. . . ” (emphasis added).2 Thus, this must be considered an appeal from a conviction for direct criminal contempt which is not within our jurisdiction.
The Act of November 22, 1968, P. L. 1080, No. 383, §1 et seq. (19 P.S. §640.1 et seq.) empowers the judge presiding over a grand jury investigating organized crime to grant immunity to a witness where the attorney general has established such a need.3 In a dissenting opinion in Riccobene Appeal, 439 Pa. 404, 426-427, 268 A. 2d 104, 119 (1970), Justice Cohen examined a judge’s power to grant immunity in an organized crime investigation:
“There is no question that if the Act of 1968 had not been passed and it is determined that a witness is rightfully asserting his privilege (as here) no sanctions for contempt, either civil or criminal could be imposed. The problem is to determine the effect of the immunity statute. Section 5 of the Act in unmistakable language states that Any person who shall refuse or decline to testify . . . after being granted immunity and ordered by the court, shall be guilty of criminal contempt. . . .’ Without that statute, the court has no power, inherent *486or otherwise, to impose any penalties. Therefore, when the legislature enters this field in which courts had no power previously, courts can only be deemed to have the specific power granted to them in the statute. Courts may not exercise their normal inherent powers in this situation because they could not exercise them in the absence of the statute and the legislation does not give them what they otherwise did not possess. The legislature has occupied the field and has prescribed criminal contempt as the only permissible sanction. Certainly the statute might be more effective if civil contempt were a permissible sanction, but we cannot supply what the draftsmen have omitted.”
Although a witness’ refusal to testify following the grant of immunity is criminal contempt under this statute, the legislation does not indicate whether such a refusal is direct or indirect criminal contempt. Direct criminal contempt is misconduct taking place in the court’s presence “or so near thereto as to interfere with its immediate business”; indirect criminal contempt is the violation of a court order occurring outside the court’s presence. Knaus v. Knaus, 387 Pa. 370, 375, 127 A. 2d 669, 671 (1956); Commonwealth v. Patterson et al., 452 Pa. 457, 308 A. 2d 90 (1973). Appellant’s refusal to testify before the grand jury constitutes direct criminal contempt, for it occurred in the court’s presence and interfered with the grand jury’s immediate business.
Superior Court cases decided under the former state constitution and appellate jurisdiction acts support this conclusion: “Thus, when a witness refuses to testify before a grand jury, notwithstanding statutory immunity or constitutional protection, is brought before the court, is directed to answer on proper notice and refuses in open court to answer proper questions, a criminal contempt is committed in the presence of the court which may be punished summarily.” Common*487wealth v. Butler, 171 Pa. Superior Ct. 350, 356, 90 A. 2d 838, 841 (1952) (emphasis added). Such a contempt is direct because “contempts occurring in the presence of the grand jury are considered as taking place in the presence of the court or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice or interfere with its immediate business.” Rosenberg Appeal, 186 Pa. Superior Ct. 509, 515, 142 A. 2d 449, 452-3 (1958). These rules with respect to the imposition of contempt are founded upon the common law. If refusing to testify before the grand jury is direct criminal contempt under the common law, it must be direct criminal contempt under a statute defining such action as criminal contempt. In light of the plain wording of the statute and these prior cases, the lower court erred in holding appellant in civil contempt. Once the appellant refused to testify, the presiding judge’s only alternative was to hold him in direct criminal contempt.
This conclusion is in apparent conflict with Chief Justice Bell’s affirming opinion in Riccobene Appeal, supra, which found that civil contempt may be imposed upon a witness who refuses to testify after being granted immunity before a grand jury investigating organized crime.4 The Chief Justice interpreted Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966) as holding that every court has the inherent power to hold an uncooperative grand jury witness in civil contempt. Shillitani, however, does not require that a court hold a grand jury witness in civil contempt prior to imposing *488criminal contempt; it only requires that a Federal Court “consider the feasibility of civil contempt” before finding a witness in criminal contempt. This requirement has never been specifically applied to state courts. Baker v. Eisenstadt, 456 F. 2d 382, 387 (1972); United States v. DiMauro, 441 F. 2d 428 (8th Cir. 1971). Furthermore, under the present facts the court would have had no power to hold the witness in contempt prior to the enactment of the statute in November 1968. Since that act which empowers the court to grant immunity also prescribes the penalty for failure to testify, the court is limited to holding the appellant in criminal contempt. These circumstances are distinguishable from Shillitam which was decided under a Federal Statute empowering the court to grant immunity and providing: “No witness shall be exempt under this section from prosecution for perjury or contempt committed while giving testimony or producing evidence under compulsion as provided in this section.” Act of July 18,1956, c. 629, Title II, §201, 70 Stat. 574 (18 U.S.O.A. §1406). By using the word “contempt”, the Congress of the United States empowered the Federal Courts to hold recalcitrant grand jury witnesses in either criminal or civil contempt. The Pennsylvania Statute limits this Commonwealth’s courts to imposing criminal contempt.
Appellant’s refusal to testify before the grand jury following a grant of immunity constitutes direct criminal contempt. The Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act places exclusive jurisdiction over such appeal in the hands of the Supreme Court. Thus, this case should be certified to the Supreme Court.

 “The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from final orders of the courts of common pleas in any of the following classes of cases:
(5) Direct criminal contempt in the courts of common pleas and other contempt proceedings in the courts of common pleas relating to orders which are appealable directly to the Supreme *485Court;” Act of July 31, 1970, P. L. 673, No. 223, art. II, §202 (17 P.S. §211.202).

 Act of November 22, 1968, P. D. 1080, No. 333, §5 (19 P.S. §640.5).

 Prior to this enactment, the judiciary had no power to grant immunity to a witness appearing before a grand jury investigating organised crime. There were, however, other provisions permitting a court to grant immunity to witnesses in grand jury investigations. See, Commonwealth v. Butler, 171 Pa. Superior Ct. 350, 357, 90 A. 2d 838 (1952) ; Rosenberg Appeal, 186 Pa. Superior Ct. 509, 515, 142 A. 2d 449 (1958).

 Chief Justice Bell’s opinion was not adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court. Three Supreme Court Justices — Cohen, O’Brien, Basen — took the view adopted herein that a witness’ refusal to testify before the grand jury with immunity is direct criminal contempt. Two Justices — Roberts and Pomerot — joined Chief Justice Bell. The seventh, Justice Jones — now Chief Justice —concurred in the result reached by the Chief Justice, but expresses no opinion on the issue raised herein.