Court Opinion

ID: 9775851
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:11:06.147704+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:31.329016
License: Public Domain

OPINION
TODD, Presiding Judge.
This suit is brought under the authority of Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code which provides for proceedings for redress for deprivation of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws”.
*462The plaintiffs are parents who desire to teach their children at home rather than to send them to a public or private school for instruction. T.C.A. § 49-6-3050(b) provides that a parent-teacher conducting a home school must comply with certain requirements, including:
Notice to the local superintendent by August 1 before the commencement of each school year of his intent to conduct a “home school” and, for the purpose of reporting only, submit the name, number, age and grade level of children involved, the location of the school, the curriculum to be offered and the proposed hours of instruction and the qualifications of the parent-teacher relative to subdivision (b)(4) or (b)(7). Information contained in such reports may be used only for record keeping and other purposes for which similar information on public school students may be used in accordance with guidelines, rules and regulations of the state board of education;
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Possession of at least a baccalaureate degree awarded by a college or university accredited by an accrediting agency or association recognized by the state board of education, by a parent-teacher conducting classes in grades nine (9) through twelve (12). A parent-teacher may request an exemption from this requirement from the department of education on a year-to-year basis;
Four of the plaintiffs lack the required degree, and each was denied an exemption from the degree requirement. Two were denied a variation of the August 1 deadline for reporting.
The complaint seeks designation as a class action, a declaration that the “practices and policies” of the “defendants” are unconstitutional and in violation of civil rights, and injunctive relief.
After a hearing on the merits, the Trial Judge, sitting without a jury, dismissed the suit. Plaintiffs have appealed and presented the following issues for review:
1.Whether the Trial Court erred in its finding that the Commissioner’s blanket denial of all requests for statutory waivers of the baccalaureate degree requirement is not arbitrary and capricious and unconstitutional.
2. Whether the Trial Court erred in its finding that the Commissioner’s rigid enforcement of the August 1 deadline does not result in a denial of the right to travel and violates the standards of equal protection.
3. Whether the Trial Court erred in refusing to certify as two classes of plaintiffs those requesting waivers from the Bachelor’s degree requirement, and those seeking relief from the August 1 notification requirement.
4. Whether the Court erred in failing to issue a preliminary and permanent injunction against the arbitrary, capricious and unconstitutional practices of the Commissioner.
Appellants assert that the defendant-Commissioner has a practice and policy of denying all requests for exemption from the degree requirement of the statute and that this practice and policy is arbitrary, capricious and unconstitutional.
The factual background is found in the testimony of Mrs. Betty Long, Administrator of Home Schooling, and the Commissioner. Mrs. Long testified:
Q. Mrs. Long, is there a uniform policy established by the Department of Education on how you treat requests for waivers?
A. No, not established by the Department of Education, no.
Q. Established by the Commission (sic)? A. I have been directed by the Commissioner to read the letters, yes; and to look at the materials, yes; and to draft a response for him. That is the uniform policy.
Q. Has he told you, given you any kind of uniform direction as to what substance should be put into the response? A. I recommend to him and then he decides when he reads the letter whether to sign it.
*463Q. Has he told you how to treat such cases or — strike that. How has he told you to treat such cases?
A. Well, when he first came he was not familiar with the law, and so I met with him and I explained to him the law. And I told him the way that we had handled the waivers under Commissioner McEl-rath.
Q. What did you tell him?
A. I told him we had so far not granted any up to that point in time.
Q. Was his curiosity piqued and did he ask you why?
A. He asked why, and I said, “Well, we have up to this point — we have not found anyone that we felt really met the requirements equivalent to a baccalaureate degree.”
Q. And what did he tell you to do then? A. He told me to continue the way that I had been doing it, and he would review each one of them, which he has done.
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Q. Is there a uniform policy to deny them all because there are no standards or guidelines, or are you subjectively reviewing each one? Which one is the truth?
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A. The policy is they are reviewed and since there are no standards, in the absence of anything equivalent to any experience or educational experience or other experience equivalent to a baccalaureate degree, they have been denied.
Q. You have no standards for judging what an equivalent is, do you?
A. There are no standards by which to either grant them or deny them. They have not been set in writing.
Q. Are there any standards of assessing what is an equivalent?
A. There are no standards that have been set, that is true, but I can only review them and recommend to the Commissioner—
Q. All right, so you’re telling us today that there's a — that each piece of paper gets looked at and is reviewed in that sense, but the outcome is always the same because you have no standards?
A. The outcome has been the same because we have not found any that we feel to this point are equivalent to a baccalaureate degree.
The Commissioner testified:
Q. The manner of practice, as you testified, is that when a letter comes in it is routed by you to Ms. Long, as the designated person to handle these requests. ...
A. Yes.
Q. And then would you agree — this is her statement — “As far as the Commissioner has advised me, he is not granting any exemptions from this requirement”; is that accurate?
A. We have not granted any exemptions, right.
Q. My question is, Commissioner, whether you ever advised Ms. Long to that effect?
A. I would say that would be yes.
Q. It’s been the policy, in fact, of the office — of the Department, rather, to use a letter that is somewhat a standard letter — we’ll get into those in a moment— but the letter used to deny these requests is from a standard letter; is that not true?
A. I wouldn’t say the language was identical, but the essence of the message would be essentially the same.
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A. Well, let me state it another way to maybe make it clear. My position would be, I think, very similar to that of Commissioner McElrath; that is, that we do not feel that it’s unreasonable to require a baccalaureate degree, number one, for someone who is going to be teaching at the high school level; and number two, that to our minds there is not an alternative that we know of to the baccalaureate that would be equivalent to it in the context of the law.
Q. So no matter what degree of educational attainment or experience that a person might obtain informally, that, in your opinion, would not be a suitable substitute to a formal baccalaureate?
*464A. We have not seen any presentation of anything we would consider to be the equivalent. Let me say I have not, and I would assume he had not; I can't speak for him.
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Q. What has been now marked as Exhibit 2, Commissioner Smith, specifically I’m referring to the language, and I quote, “Since Tennessee’s Home School statute requires a baccalaureate degree for parents conducting home schools for their children in grades nine through twelve and does not provide any standards for granting an exemption to this requirement, I am declining your request.” Are you familiar with that language?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Is it fair to say that language or paraphrasing of that language appears in virtually all the letters declining?
A. They would be language very similar to that if not identical.
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Q. And what in your mind would be equivalent to a baccalaureate degree?
A. Once again, I’m not sure about that because we haven’t seen anything at this point.
Q. No, ma’am. I’m not asking have you seen one yet that measures up to that standard. I’m asking you what the standard is and how you would measure against it.
A. You’re asking me to set standards. I do not set the standards. I can’t answer that. I don’t set the standards. Q. Who does set the standards?
A. We don’t have any standards. We look for something that we feel might be equivalent education-wise, experience-wise that possibly might be the equivalent. I cannot say to you that it would be X, Y or Z because I haven’t seen it yet. We haven’t determined that yet. Q. Would you know it if you saw it? A. I can’t answer that either because I haven’t done it yet.
The evidence does not support the assertion that the Commissioner has a policy of denying all requests for exemption from the degree requirement. However, it does appear that no exemption has been granted, and the policy of the Commissioner is to consider each application separately but to reject each application which does not demonstrate preparation for teaching equivalent to a baccalaureate degree. The Commissioner did not admit that it would be impossible to satisfy him as to equivalency, but he declined to theorize the elements which would, in his opinion, establish equivalency.
It is clear that the action of the General Assembly, in legislating that “a parent-teacher may request an exemption from the Department of Education” without providing any express direction or standards for responding to such requests, has placed both the applicants and the Commissioner in a difficult position.
Appellants assert that the Legislature has delegated to the Commissioner clear authority to adopt regulations necessary for the implementation of the Home School Law, citing T.C.A. § 49-l-201(a) which states:
Powers and duties of commissioner.—(a) The commissioner shall be responsible for the implementation of law or policies established by the general assembly or the state board of education.
The Commissioner has interpreted the statute to express a legislative policy of requiring a baccalaureate degree or its equivalent, and is following that policy by granting no exception unless equivalency is shown. He has complied with the quoted statute, and the courts are not empowered to require him to do more in the way of defining equivalency. The equivalence of the qualification of applicants must be decided on a case-by-case basis. Any review of the decisions of the Commissioner must be on a case-by-case basis, rather than by judicial dictation of the manner in which the Commissioner sees fit to implement the statute.
No authority is cited to support a holding that a bare statutory provision that an exception may be requested is a mandate to the administering authority to *465adopt and publish conditions which would require the request to be granted.
The Commissioner has recognized and applied one general standard, that is equivalency. Although general, it is reasonable, and has been uniformly applied.
Appellants’ real complaint is that the Commissioner has not defined the word, equivalent, whereby appellants might have a set of directions for preparing a successful request for exemption. As desirable as this might be, this Court finds no legal justification for compelling the Commissioner to do so.
By omitting to establish or mandate guidelines, the Legislature has left non-degreed parents the task of presenting to the Commissioner a set of qualifications so compelling that the refusal of an exemption would be so unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious as to be unlawful and judicially correctable by common law certiorari.
This Court does hold that the statutory provision, “may request” does mandate a reasonable and responsible administrative consideration of the request and a response thereto in such a manner as to be judicially reviewed by certiorari. By this means, the inherent power of the courts to restrain unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious administrative actions may be exercised in appropriate cases.
Such review must by its nature be sought in individual cases and not in a group or class action. The only appropriate relief in the present case is a direction to the Commissioner to give appropriate attention to the details of each application, including the evidence of qualifications submitted therewith, to preserve for review all that is considered in reaching a decision, and a reasonably comprehensive and intelligible decision.
Appellants assert that, the Commissioner has arbitrarily erected an insurmountable obstacle to those who request exemption by applying an “imaginary equivalency standard”. This Court does not agree. The General Assembly established a general standard of a baccalaureate degree. There is no requirement that anything less than its equivalent be accepted. If the General Assembly desires to permit teaching by one having less than a baccalaureate degree or its equivalent, the law should be amended to so state. If the General Assembly intends to delegate to an administrative official the authority to permit teaching by anyone not qualified by a baccalaureate degree or equivalent, the law should be amended to so state.
Appellants next insist that the qualification of a teacher should be judged by pupil progress rather than teacher preparation. This is a reasonable statement, but it overlooks the “lag-time” in assessment of pupil progress. That is, by the time pupil progress can be measured at the end of the year, it is too late to recover the lost year under an unqualified teacher. Qualification of teachers renders a prospective evaluation, whereas pupil progress renders a more meaningful, but retrospective evaluation.
Moreover, the principle urged by appellants is not mandated by the statute as grounds for exception to the required degree rule.
Appellants assert that the statutory words, “on a year to year basis” imply that the annual progress of the pupil, rather than the qualification of the parent is the sole criterion for granting exception. This Court does not agree. If, prior to applying for exemption, the applicant has conducted a home school, the results of prior instruction could be a meaningful but not the sole consideration in granting or refusing exemption to permit higher instruction. If, however, the applicant has no prior history of home instruction, the application can be considered only on the basis of the qualification of the applicant. Upon the second annual application, the progress of the pupil during the first year would be a proper, but not the sole consideration in granting or refusing exemption for the second year.
Appellants insist that the courts should require the Commissioner to adopt “an appropriate and reasonable basis for evaluating requests for exemptions, as recommended by appellants’ expert”.
*466Where an administrative action is reasonable, it is not for the courts to dictate to the administrative authority a different action which an expert or the courts might deem more reasonable.
Appellants next insist that the policy of “blanket denial of all requests” violates due process. Although denials have been consistent, there is no evidence that each request has not been considered separately or that there is no possibility of the granting of such a request. This aspect of the problem has already been discussed and does not require further discussion.
Appellants insist that it was the duty of the Commissioner to search for, find and consider evidence to support each decision to deny exemption. This Court does not agree. The burden of establishing entitlement to exemption is upon the applicant, and failure to carry that burden is ample justification for denial of exemption.
Appellants cite In Re: Billing and Tariffs of South Central Bell, Tenn.App.1989, 779 S.W.2d 375. In that case the administrative agency, on its own motion and without a hearing, directed certain utilities to amend their billing procedures and scheduled a hearing at a later date to permit the utilities to show cause why they should not make the amendment. This Court said:
Whatever arguments may be made in favor of the Commission’s Final Order, it cannot be denied that in making it, the Commission is regulating rates, albeit under limited circumstances.... To the extent that the order amending the billing procedures constitutes rate regulation, it must be evaluated as such. When that evaluation is made, the order fails under T.C.A. § 4-5-322(h)(4) and (5) in that no evidence was taken as to costs, capital investments, relative rates of return and other factors which must be considered in order to establish rates.
In the cited case, the agency took affirmative action sua sponte without supporting evidence. In the preset case, the Commissioner declined to take affirmative action requested by applicants for lack of sufficient evidence to support the applications. The cited authority is not applicable.
Appellants cite Brooks v. Fisher, Tenn. App.1985, 705 S.W.2d 135, which was a common law certiorari review of the zoning board’s denial of a permit to use property as a fraternity house. This Court found that the zoning ordinance granted the absolute right to use the property upon compliance with reasonable conditions imposed by the board, and that the zoning board unreasonably denied the permit. In the present case, the statute does not grant the plaintiffs the absolute right to exemption, but only the privilege of requesting exemption and, by implication, a fair consideration of the request. The Commissioner has determined that the sole condition of granting exemption is qualification equivalent to a baccalaureate degree. None of the plaintiffs have shown equivalence to the satisfaction of the Commissioner. If a decision of the Commissioner should be so arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable as to justify judicial relief, each applicant has the remedy of common law certiorari, but not by group action.
Appellants next insist that the Commissioner has violated their rights to instruct their children and teach them religion as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Authorities cited by appellants are not found applicable to the present case.
The State has a compelling interest in the proper schooling of all children. Pursuant to this interest, the State has the power to compel attendance upon duly established public schools or their equivalent. 79 C.J.S. Schools and School District § 363-pp. 390 et seq. No violation of constitutional rights by the Commissioner is shown in this case.
Plaintiffs assert that their constitutional right to the free exercise of religion and to educate their children requires that the Commissioner grant their application for exemption.
The government has the power to see that the children of its citizens receive an education according to reasonable mini*467mum standards from instructors having minimum qualifications. The free exercise of religion or of right to control education cannot be used to defeat this power of government.
The power in the government to prescribe educational standards and the right of parents to exercise religion and educate their children are not necessarily inconsistent, and neither should be used as a weapon to impair or destroy the other. Both the power and the right are fully capable of coexisting, and they should be permitted to do so.
The complaint does not request that the statute or any part of it be declared unconstitutional.
The foregoing disposes of the first issue tendered by appellants.
By their second issue, appellants urge that the strict enforcement of the statutory requirement for notice to local school boards by August 1 of each year violates a constitutional right to free travel and equal protection.
The complaint about travel restriction has been rendered moot by two memo-randa issued to all superintendents of education in the state indicating that:
[T]he August 1 deadline will no longer apply to parents who were conducting home schools in another state and who move into Tennessee after August 1 in which to conduct a home school in Tennessee.
The Commissioner has effectively granted the relief which recent arrivals request in this case.
Nevertheless appellants insist that the strict enforcement of the August 1 deadline unconstitutionally discriminates against those whose children are attending public school but who, during the school year (after August 1) desire to remove their children from public school and teach them religion in the home.
While absolute freedom and flexibility to attend or not attend public school or home school at will may be desirable to some, it does not comport with the orderly conduct of a school system provided for all the children of the state.
The exception for continuing home instruction after arriving in the state is not calculated to place an undue and unexpected burden upon a school system, because the new arrivals have not been planned for and their absence will not upset the planning for the school year. Resident students will be expected to attend unless notice is received by August 1 (before the beginning of the school year), and their absence will affect adversely the operation of the school system for the year.
With the exception for new arrivals, the August 1 deadline for requests for exemption is reasonable and valid; and its enforcement does not infringe upon any constitutional right.
Appellants complain of the refusal of class certification. As has already been discussed, the consideration of requests for exemption should be on a case-by-case basis. In this light, a class action would not be appropriate. As stated by the Trial Judge, the defendant is a State official, and any relief granted to the present plaintiffs would undoubtedly be extended voluntarily to others similarly affected.
The situation as viewed by this Court is not appropriate for a class action.
Finally, appellants complain of the refusal of injunctive relief. There is no showing of any injury being presently inflicted upon plaintiffs which would be removed or reduced by injunction. If any plaintiff desires to file a further request for exemption with supporting evidence of equivalency, there is no reason to doubt that it will be considered and decided in conformity with this opinion, subject to such judicial review as may be appropriate.
The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are taxed against appellants. The cause is remanded to the Trial Court for such further proceedings, if any, as may be necessary.
Affirmed and remanded.
*468WILLIAM H. INMAN, Special Judge, concurs.
KOCH, J., files separate opinion concurs in part and dissents in part.