Court Opinion

ID: 9385194
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-06 14:00:21.680819+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:59.648539
License: Public Domain

21-6067
     Singh v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                             Douchy, IJ
                                                                           A206 445 624

                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                    SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
 3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 4   New York, on the 6th day of April, two thousand twenty-
 5   three.
 6
 7   PRESENT:
 8            REENA RAGGI,
 9            WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
10            EUNICE C. LEE,
11                 Circuit Judges.
12   _____________________________________
13
14   JASPAL SINGH,
15                            Petitioner,
16
17                      v.                                       21-6067
18                                                               NAC
19
20   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
21   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
22                 Respondent.
23   _____________________________________
24
25
26   FOR PETITIONER:                        Suraj Raj Singh, Richmond Hill,
27                                          NY.
28
 1   FOR RESPONDENT:                   Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
 2                                     Attorney General; Sabatino F.
 3                                     Leo, Assistant Director; Colin J.
 4                                     Tucker, Trial Attorney, Office of
 5                                     Immigration Litigation, United
 6                                     States Department of Justice,
 7                                     Washington, DC.
 8
 9       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

10   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

11   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

12   is DENIED.

13       Petitioner Jaspal Singh, a native and citizen of India,

14   seeks review of a January 14, 2021 decision of the BIA

15   affirming a December 14, 2018 decision of an Immigration Judge

16   (“IJ”)   that        denied   Singh’s         application      for   asylum,

17   withholding     of    removal,    and       relief   under   the   Convention

18   Against Torture (“CAT”).           In re Singh, No. A206 445 624

19   (B.I.A. Jan. 14, 2021), aff’g No. A206 445 624 (Immigr. Ct.

20   N.Y.C. Dec. 14, 2018).           We assume the parties’ familiarity

21   with the underlying facts and procedural history.

22       We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as the final agency

23   determination.       See Li v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir.

24   2008).   We review an adverse credibility determination under

25   a substantial evidence standard, Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d

26   67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018), and “the administrative findings of

                                             2
 1   fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would

 2   be    compelled   to   conclude     to    the   contrary,”   8 U.S.C.

 3   § 1252(b)(4)(B).

 4         “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all

 5   relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility

 6   determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of

 7   the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the

 8   applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency between the

 9   applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements” and

10   inconsistencies within and between an applicant’s statements

11   and    other    evidence,     “without    regard    to   whether   an

12   inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of

13   the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.”              Id.

14   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).        “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility

15   determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances,

16   it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an

17   adverse credibility ruling.”        Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162,

18   167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. Singh alleged

19   that members of the Akali Dal Badal party (“Badal Party”)

20   attacked and threatened to kill him if he did not leave the

21   Shiromani      Akali   Dal     Amritsar    party   (“Mann    Party”).

                                        3
 1   Substantial        evidence      supports       the    agency’s       adverse

 2   credibility determination.

 3         The IJ permissibly relied on Singh’s demeanor, noting

 4   that his testimony was evasive, hesitant, frequently non-

 5   responsive, and that he took long pauses before answering

 6   questions.         See    § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).         The    IJ    was   not

 7   compelled     to    accept      Singh’s      explanation      that   he    had

 8   difficulty responding on account of his nerves rather than a

 9   lack of credibility, particularly as Singh confirmed that he

10   understood the questions.          See Zhang v. Holder, 585 F.3d 715,

11   725 (2d Cir. 2009) (“We again reject the notion that a

12   petitioner’s claim that she was nervous and distracted during

13   the   credible     fear     interview       automatically   undermines     or

14   negates its reliability as a source of her statements.”).

15         Further, the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was

16   supported by Singh’s inability to recall the name of the

17   hospital where he was admitted on three occasions.                   The IJ’s

18   conclusion    that       this   lack   of    recall   was   implausible    is

19   “tethered to record evidence” because Singh testified that he

20   was admitted to that hospital three times and confirmed that

21   he had reviewed his supporting documents, including medical

                                             4
 1   records containing the name of the hospital.           Yan v. Mukasey,

 2   509 F.3d 63, 67 (2d Cir. 2007).

 3        The agency also reasonably relied on inconsistencies in

 4   Singh’s testimony and between his statements and supporting

 5   documents.     See § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).           Singh alleged that

 6   members of the Badal Party and the police detained and beat

 7   him and that he was hospitalized multiple times from the

 8   resulting    injuries.       The    agency      reasonably    relied    on

 9   inconsistencies in Singh’s testimony and supporting documents

10   as to (1) whether his parents were beaten; (2) when the police

11   last searched for him after he left India; (3) the length of

12   his hospital stays; and (4) whether he was hospitalized on

13   December 26, 2013, how long the hospital stay was, and what

14   his injuries were.       The agency was not compelled to credit

15   Singh’s explanations that his family members did not tell him

16   everything    that    happened     after   he   left   India,   that    he

17   initially did not remember what had happened, and that his

18   testimony and application were consistent.               See Majidi v.

19   Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must

20   do   more    than    offer   a   plausible      explanation     for    his

21   inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate

22   that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit

                                         5
 1   his testimony.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).         Singh

 2   does not challenge the IJ’s reliance on the inconsistencies

 3   regarding his December 23 hospitalization or his injuries.

 4       The IJ also reasonably gave diminished weight to letters

 5   from Singh’s family members because the authors were not

 6   subject   to   cross-examination   and   the     documents   were

 7   inconsistent with Singh’s statements.    Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d

 8   137, 149 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding that “the IJ acted within

 9   her discretion in according [letters from a wife and friend]

10   little weight because the declarants (particularly [the]

11   wife) were interested parties and neither was available for

12   cross-examination”).

13       In sum, the IJ’s demeanor finding, the implausible and

14   inconsistent   statements,   and   the    lack     of   reliable

15   corroboration constitute substantial evidence for the adverse

16   credibility determination.    See § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Lin,

17   534 F.3d at 167.   The adverse credibility determination here

18   is dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT

19   relief because all three forms of relief were based on the

20   same factual predicate.   See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148,

21   156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).

                                   6
1       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

2   DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

3   stays VACATED.

4                               FOR THE COURT:
5                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
6                               Clerk of Court

                                  7