Court Opinion

ID: 9794636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:08:49.873593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:05.889946
License: Public Domain

SIMMS, Vice Chief Justice, concurring in part, dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority that the application by Kenneth and Debra for injunctive relief to prevent Eugenia and Michael from adopting these children should be denied. I must dissent however, to the other major points of the opinion.
I do not agree that the Department of Human Services (DHS) has standing to prosecute this appeal. It was only the court named custodian of these children and as such is not a party.
*1219I am not persuaded by the majority’s “aggrieved party” reasoning. The public interest involved in this matter as well as the authority to prosecute the action below and on appeal is reposed in the district attorney by 10 O.S.1981 § 1109.
In keeping with that position, DHS has spent much time and effort in this court seeking declarations of non-party status in juvenile appeals; asking that its name be removed from the style of pleadings, and that it be relieved of briefing. It claimed that in such cases it was not a party and had no standing because it was merely the court named custodian of children, and the respective district attorneys were the only proper parties.
I assume from this case then, that the Department’s claim of standing which was sustained by the majority, will be DHS’s consistent position in every case where it is the custodian.
I do not agree that the trial judge lacked the “power and authority” to order these children removed from their DHS placement. In fact, I do not even agree that the power and authority of the trial judge is a question properly presented in this action. The only question here is whether, in exercising the power and authority he clearly had, the trial judge abused his discretion. It is my opinion that he did not.
Prior to this opinion there was no question raised about the power of the trial court to enter the orders it did. DHS, now the declared appellant, has explicitly conceded at every step of the way in this litigation that the trial court had the power and authority to do what it did. DHS challenged only the court’s exercise of discretion in using that power.
It is not surprising that DHS conceded the court’s power to make the orders it did, for the Department had lost that battle in at least two recent opinions of this court. Unlike the Department, the majority of this court seems to have forgotten State ex rel Dept. of Inst, Soc & R. Serv. v. Griffis, 545 P.2d 763 (Okla.1976), 83 ALR 3d 363, and Carder v. Court, of Criminal Appeals, 595 P.2d 416 (Okla.1979).
Both these decisions involved the issue of whether the trial court or DHS has the ultimate power over children who are wards of the court placed in the custody of DHS. In each case this court held that the constitution, statutes and good sense required finding that the trial court has the jurisdiction and power over its children although they may be in the custody of DHS. Now the court holds to the opposite result.
In Griffis, the Department claimed that its refusal to consent to an adoption (where it had been imbued with the power to consent), deprived the trial court of jurisdiction over the adoption matter.
The following from Griffis applies with equal force here:
“Respondent submits that adoption is a function which requires the exercise of the judicial power, which by the Oklahoma Constitution, Article VII, Sections 1, 5, and 7, is vested in the Courts, and further, that Title 10, O.S.1971, § 60.04 places original and exclusive jurisdiction over adoption proceedings in our district courts. Respondent contends that if the Department’s position is upheld the Department, not the court, would become the final arbiter in an adoption proceeding. Respondent further argues that guarantees of due process of law are vio- • lated if the Department may prevent an adoption by simply refusing to consent to it where the reasonableness of that refusal is not subject to judicial review.
The primary issue in an adoption proceeding is whether the adoption will promote the best interests of the child. See, generally, In Re: Adoption of Greer, Okl., 463 P.2d 677 (1969). As Respondent correctly urges, the trial judge must make that determination. The adoption statutes clearly do not permit any interpretation which would derogate the constitutionally vested jurisdiction of the trial judge and allow a delegation of this *1220decision making power to the Department or to any other third party....
While we are not concerned here with the question of parental consent, we cannot help but observe that the legislature has provided that in certain compelling situations a child may be adopted without the consent of his natural parents. 10 O.S.Supp. 1974, § 60.06. If the Department’s position were upheld, it would lead to the ultimate conclusion that the Department can always deprive a court of jurisdiction in an adoption proceeding involving a child judicially placed in the Department’s custody while the natural parent cannot. We do not believe that the legislature intended to place the relationship of the Department and children entrusted to its custody on a higher plane than the law accords the relationship existing between natural parents and their children.
The Department may not operate beyond the scrutiny of judicial review.” Id. at 766-768.
In Carder, while the child in question had been adjudicated delinquent rather than deprived, the underlying question of power was the same. There we stated:
“Simply put, the Department’s contention is that delinquent children, such as Howard Carder, Jr., upon commitment to its custody, are its children, not the court’s; and are thereafter beyond the reach of the court.
This is not the intention of the statutes. If it were, we would have no alternative but to strike" them down as unconstitutional.
We decline the obvious temptation to engage in a lengthy and well documented legal discussion of the doctrine of separation of powers and the requirements of due process of law. It should, we believe, be sufficient to remember that the power to disrupt a family relationship and interfere with a child’s personal liberty is placed with the courts. The assumption and exercise of that power are limited by law. Persons subject to it receive substantive and procedural protections from arbitrary and capricious action; they must be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law and given fair treatment. A judgment against them is subject to review by higher courts.
Placement of Howard’s custody with the Department was but one of many options available to the court after adjudicating Howard a delinquent child and ordering him a ward of the court (§ 1116). There is no basis for the Department’s argument that Judge Maley “lost” jurisdiction over Howard by reason of the custody order. That order did not impair or in any way affect the court’s jurisdiction over Howard. Howard remained a ward of the court placed only in the custody of the Department by court order and the court retained its jurisdiction over his person and J-77-14.
Once a child has been made a ward of the court, even the natural parent’s consent to the child’s adoption by third parties and the filing of adoption petition will not terminate the court’s jurisdiction over the child. West v. State, Dept. of Public Welfare, Okl., 536 P.2d 901 (1973).” Id. at 421-422.
Now, however, this court is willing to gratuitously declare that the Department, not the judiciary, has the ultimate power over these children who are wards of the court. The holding that the court had no power or authority to order its wards removed from the DHS “placement” or modify its previous custody order by placing the children with others, must result from one of two things. Either the majority views a DHS placement as something of greater sanctity and validity than a trial court’s continuing jurisdiction over its wards, or the majority perceives DHS as more trustworthy and benevolent than the judiciary.
In either case, by its deferential attitude toward this DHS arrangement, the majority has created an upside down situation. Everyone involved with this placement has *1221the power to terminate it — except the trial judge whose wards are involved.
Surely no one imagines that the Department would have felt compelled to seek this majority imposed “prior judicial determination” if it had decided that Kenneth and Debra weren’t working out. So too, Kenneth and Debra could unilaterally end this placement.
The contract creating the arrangement stipulates that the placement “may be terminated by either party at any time.”
Additionally, I must dissent to the majority’s decision, also gratuitous, to “strongly urge” the entire District Court Bench of Oklahoma County to disqualify itself because of the employment relationship between judges and public defenders. There has not been a demand for the disqualification of one judge in this matter, let alone the entire bench and there is no showing that the disqualification is warranted. I do agree with the majority’s statement that the issue is not before us.
It should be observed that we are only creating problems for the future. If this employment “relationship” disqualifies every judge in this case then every judge should be likewise disqualified whenever one with whom this relationship exists. In addition to public defenders, this would include among others, court reporters, bailiffs, etc.
Finally, I disagree with the court’s refusal to address the related “challenge” to Eugenia as a person eligible to petition for adoption because of her previous representation by court appointment at the termination hearing.
It seems clear to me that failing to answer this constant refrain of Intervenors substantially increases the chance of prolonging the litigation by future appeals. This was the evil sought to be avoided by the majority in'disqualifying every judge in Oklahoma County on its own initiative. Having taken that drastic step it would seem a small thing to state that Interve-nors’ position is not persuasive and we reject it.
Under the particular facts of this case, Eugenia’s representation of these children at the non-adversarial termination proceeding and her subsequent decision to seek their adoption did not present even a suggestion of a conflict of interest.
I believe the court’s opinion goes further than necessary. I am certain this opinion will spawn many other appeals.
I am authorized to state that Justice DOÓLIN joins with the views expressed herein.