Court Opinion

ID: 9902612
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:20:43.549199+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:55.456283
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                   _____________________________

                        Case No. 5D23-0780
                    LT Case No. 2019-CA-000231
                   _____________________________

ADVENTIST HEALTH
SYSTEM/SUNBELT, INC., D/B/A
FLORIDA HOSPITAL ALTAMONTE
AND WILLIAM HUETHER, III, M.D.,

    Petitioners,

    v.

SALLY MACHALEK AND MATTHEW
APTER, M.D.,

    Respondents.
               _____________________________

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, A Case of Original Jurisdiction.

Christian P. Trowbridge, Craig S. Foels, and Dinelia A.
Concepcion, of Estes, Ingram, Foels & Gibbs, P.A., Maitland, for
Petitioners.

Andres I. Beregovich, of The Beregovich Law Firm, P.A.,
Orlando, for Respondent, Sally Machalek.

No appearance for Respondent, Matthew Apter, M.D.

                          October 6, 2023
SOUD, J.

     Respondent Sally Machalek (“Ms. Machalek”) brought suit
against Petitioners Adventist Health System/Sunbelt, Inc., d/b/a
Florida Hospital Altamonte (“Florida Hospital”), and William
Huether, III, M.D. (“Dr. Huether”) for alleged medical malpractice.
Petitioners filed motions to dismiss in the trial court alleging
Respondent failed to timely comply with presuit requirements.
The motions were denied. Thereafter, Petitioners filed their
Petition for Writ of Certiorari sub judice, asking that we quash the
trial court’s amended orders denying Petitioners’ motions to
dismiss and dismiss the case with prejudice.

     We dismiss the petition because the trial court’s denial of
Petitioners’ motions to dismiss is not reviewable by certiorari.

                                 I.

    Ms. Machalek was hospitalized at Florida Hospital in August
2015 when Dr. Huether, as a consulting general surgeon,
examined her and ordered diagnostic testing. The next day
Respondent Dr. Matthew Apter (“Dr. Apter”), as a consulting
gastroenterologist, diagnosed Ms. Machalek and advised Dr.
Huether of his findings. Based thereon, Dr. Huether performed
surgery on Ms. Machalek the next morning.

     Thereafter, and as part of the presuit process required by the
Medical Malpractice Act (chapter 766, Florida Statutes (2018)),
Ms. Machalek served her notices of intent to initiate litigation,
including the corroborating expert affidavit of Dr. Ira Shafran, a
gastroenterologist. His qualification as one in the same specialty
as Dr. Huether was disputed. After filing this medical malpractice
lawsuit, 1 Ms. Machalek later served a September 2019

    1 Ms. Machalek amended her complaint, which was deemed

filed on February 22, 2022, adding Dr. Apter as a defendant below
and claiming fraudulent concealment against him.

                                 2
corroborating affidavit from Stephen Cohen, M.D., a general
surgeon. 2

     Petitioners ultimately moved to dismiss this case with
prejudice pursuant to section 766.206, Florida Statutes.
Specifically, Petitioners asserted that Ms. Machalek discovered
the basis of her claim during her December 19, 2016 medical
appointment with Dr. Apter and a conversation that was a part
thereof. Importantly, Petitioners dispute that this conversation—
as recorded by Ms. Machalek—ever took place. Nonetheless, they
claim the statute began to run on this date. As a result, Petitioners
argue Dr. Cohen’s affidavit was served outside the two-year
statute of limitations, which expired by Petitioners’ reckoning no
later than June 17, 2019 (as tolled ninety days pursuant to section
766.106(4) and extended an additional ninety days by Ms.
Machalek pursuant to section 766.104(2)). Ms. Machalek disagrees
and claims she learned of the basis of her medical malpractice
action at a later time.

    Following a hearing, the trial court denied Petitioners’
motions to dismiss. 3 This petition for writ of certiorari followed.

                                 II.

     “The common law writ of certiorari is an ‘extraordinary
remedy.’” Univ. of Fla. Bd. of Trs. v. Carmody, 48 Fla. L. Weekly
S150 (Fla. July 6, 2023). It provides this Court “the prerogative to
reach down and halt a miscarriage of justice where no other
remedy exists.” Id. Certiorari review, which is entirely
discretionary, has never been a substitute for a postjudgment

    2 The trial court ultimately entered a stipulated order finding

Dr. Shafran’s affidavit insufficient as a matter of law.
    3  This Court quashed the trial court’s orders denying
dismissal and remanded the case for the trial court to make the
requisite findings as to whether Plaintiff/Respondent complied
with the Chapter 766 presuit requirements. Thereafter, the trial
court entered its Amended Order Denying Motion to Dismiss as to
each Petitioner’s motion.

                                 3
appeal and is “available only in very limited circumstances.” Id.
“[T]he scope of certiorari review is more constrained than that of
direct appellate review, for ‘[t]he writ never was intended to
redress mere legal error ....’” Id.; see also Abbey v. Patrick, 16 So.
3d 1051, 1053–54 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (“[Certiorari] is not a remedy
that can be used simply because the order in question is not
appealable. . . .”). 4

     To be entitled to certiorari relief from the denial of their
motions to dismiss, Petitioners must establish (1) a departure from
the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material
injury for the remainder of the case, (3) that cannot be corrected
on post-judgment appeal. See Carmody, 48 Fla. L. Weekly S150.
The last two requirements are often combined into the concept of
“irreparable harm.” Id. We must first consider the final two
elements because irreparable harm is jurisdictional and must be
found before we may decide whether there has been a departure
from the essential requirements of the law. See id.; see also Holmes
Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Dumigan, 151 So. 3d 1282, 1284 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2014); Allan & Conrad, Inc. v. Univ. of Cent. Fla., 961 So. 2d
1083, 1087 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).

     Generally, certiorari review is not available to seek review of
a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss. See Carmody, 48 Fla.
L. Weekly S150. Nonfinal orders subject to interlocutory review
are limited to those set forth in Rule 9.130 of the Florida Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Id. This “reduces the need for common law
certiorari.” Abbey, 16 So. 3d at 1053. In this case, the trial court’s
denial of Petitioners’ motions to dismiss does not fall within any of
the classes of orders enumerated in Florida Rule of Appellate

    4 “Florida judicial policy limits common law certiorari review

so as to avoid ‘piecemeal review of nonfinal trial court orders [that]
will impede the orderly administration of justice.’” DeSantis v. Fla.
Educ. Ass’n, 313 So. 3d 151, 153 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (quoting Jaye
v. Royal Saxon, Inc., 720 So. 2d 214, 215 (Fla. 1998)).

                                  4
Procedure 9.130. 5 Thus, the Florida Supreme Court has cautioned,
“[I]t is generally inappropriate for district courts to review an order
denying a motion to dismiss, aside from those specified under rule
9.130 . . . .” Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. San Perdido Ass’n, Inc., 104
So. 3d 344, 352 (Fla. 2012).

     However, “Florida courts have created an ‘exception . . . when
the presuit requirements of a medical malpractice statute are at
issue’ since the ‘purpose’ of the Medical Malpractice Act is ‘to avoid
meritless claims and to encourage settlement for meritorious
claims.’” Carmody, 48 Fla. L. Weekly S150 (quoting Williams v.
Oken, 62 So. 3d 1129, 1133–34 (Fla. 2011)). As the Florida
Supreme Court reiterated in Carmody, “Florida courts have
permitted certiorari review solely to ensure that the procedural
aspects of the presuit requirements are met.” Id. (emphasis added).
For example, certiorari review is permitted to review “whether a
plaintiff—before the filing of the medical malpractice lawsuit—
gave the defendant ‘advance notice’ and provided an ‘opportunity
[for the defendant] to examine [the] claim.’ Thus, a district court
can grant certiorari review to verify that the plaintiff
submitted the corroborating affidavit of an expert witness.”

      5 We are aware that contemporaneously with the issuance of

its decision in Carmody, the Florida Supreme Court issued its
opinion in In re Amendment to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.130, 367 So. 3d 1204 (Fla. 2023), by which the Court amended
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3) to provide for
interlocutory review of nonfinal orders that “deny a motion to
dismiss on the basis of the qualifications of a corroborating
expert witness under subsections 766.102(5)–(9), Florida
Statutes.” Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(H) (emphasis added).
However, the issue before us is not the qualification of Dr. Cohen
as one in the same specialty as Dr. Huether, but rather whether
his corroborating affidavit was provided to Petitioners before the
expiration of the statute of limitations. Further, Petitioners here
have traveled under a Petition for Writ of Certiorari. They have
not filed any notice of supplemental authority following Carmody
and have made no reference to the amended Rule.

                                   5
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 6 Accordingly, “[c]ertiorari
may be an appropriate remedy if the error is one that resulted in
the deprivation of the right to the process itself.” Abbey, 16
So. 3d at 1054 (emphasis added).

     Importantly, Carmody does not dictate that every decision a
trial court makes involving the execution of the presuit process is
reviewable by certiorari. Certiorari will not lie when a trial judge
has afforded a defendant the statutory presuit process required by
the Medical Malpractice Act but has merely made a mistake of law
or fact in the course of carrying it out. See Abbey, 16 So. 3d at 1055.

     Petitioners sub judice do not argue that Dr. Cohen is
unqualified to submit the corroborating expert affidavit (as in
Carmody). Rather, they contend that Ms. Machalek failed to
provide the affidavit—and thus comply with the presuit
requirements—within the two-year statute of limitations. As such,
the issue before us simply is whether the statute of limitations bars
Ms. Machalek’s cause of action.

      Certiorari is unavailable to permit our review of the trial
court’s denial of Petitioners’ motions to dismiss sounding in the
statute of limitations. See Stemerman, Lazarus, Simovitch,
Billings, Finer & Ginsburg, M.D.’s P.A. v. Fuerst, 4 So. 3d 55, 57
(Fla. 3d DCA 2009). Just because this affirmative defense is
asserted within the context of a medical malpractice case does not
render this case as one falling within the exceptions carved out by
Florida courts allowing certiorari review with respect to presuit
requirements in medical malpractice actions. See id. (“[T]he issue
before this Court is whether the statute of limitations barred the
respondents’ cause of action, not the failure to comply with the pre-
suit notice requirements.”). An error—if any—regarding the
timeliness of the corroborating affidavit did not deprive Petitioners
of their rights under the medical malpractice presuit screening
statutes. See Abbey, 16 So. 3d at 1051.

    6 As discussed at n.5, supra, Rule 9.130 now expressly permits

interlocutory appeal of a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss
based on the qualifications of a corroborating expert witness. See
Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(H).

                                  6
                                III.

      As did the Third District in Fuerst, we conclude the trial
court’s denial of Petitioners’ motions to dismiss “is . . . not one
suitable for certiorari review.” Fuerst, 4 So. 3d at 57. Accordingly,
the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is DISMISSED.

      It is so ordered.

MACIVER, J., concurs.
KILBANE, J., concurs specially, with opinion.

                  _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

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                                              Case No. 5D23-0780
                                      LT Case No. 2019-CA-000231

KILBANE, J., concurring specially.

     I concur in the dismissal of Adventist’s petition for writ of
certiorari. All that remained for the trial court to determine was
whether the substituted affidavit, filed approximately nine months
after filing suit, was provided before the statute of limitations ran.
Such a determination is not subject to certiorari review. 1 Based
on current precedent, it was appropriate for the trial court to make
such a determination in spite of the mandatory language of section
766.206(2), Florida Statutes (2018). I write to address that
precedent and its disregard of the plain text of Florida’s Medical
Malpractice Act’s (“MMA”) presuit requirements.

    The Florida Supreme Court’s express adoption of the
“supremacy-of-text” principles in statutory construction, Ham v.
Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 308 So. 3d 942, 946–47 (Fla. 2020),
coupled with its recent decision in University of Florida Board of
Trustees v. Carmody, 48 Fla. L. Weekly S150 (Fla. July 6, 2023),
make clear that the text of the presuit requirements of the MMA
mean what they say: failure to comply equals dismissal. When
provisions of the MMA are read in pari materia, there is little

    1   In July 2023, the Florida Supreme Court, sua sponte,
amended “Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3) to
provide for interlocutory review of nonfinal orders that deny a
motion to dismiss on the basis of the qualifications of a
corroborating witness under subsections 766.102(5)-(9), Florida
Statutes.” Univ. of Fla. Bd. of Trs. v. Carmody, No. SC2022-0068,
48 Fla. L. Weekly S150 (Fla. July 6, 2023); In re Amend. to Fla.
Rule of App. Proc. 9.130, 367 So. 3d 1204 (Fla. 2023). Section
766.102(5)-(9) specifically outlines the requirements for who may
qualify to give standard of care testimony dependent upon who
allegedly committed the negligence, i.e., the sufficiency of the
presuit affidavit. The new rule does not purport to cover the full
range of statutes [§§ 766.201-.212, .1065] under which a motion to
dismiss may be filed pursuant to section 766.206(2), Florida
Statutes. The instant case was heard before the decision in
Carmody and enactment of the new rule.

                                  8
doubt as to the mandatory nature of the text and the process by
which medical negligence claims must be brought in this state.
However, years of precedent which ignore this same text in the
name of access to courts—a valid and important right, but one
properly subject to reasonable restrictions—has eroded the
judiciary’s ability to enforce the will of the people as explicitly
expressed by the Legislature.

    To interpret the meaning of statutory texts, Ham
counsels:

    [W]e follow the “supremacy-of-text principle”—namely,
    the principle that “[t]he words of a governing text are of
    paramount concern, and what they convey, in their
    context, is what the text means.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan
    A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal
    Texts 56 (2012). We also adhere to Justice Joseph Story’s
    view that “every word employed in [a legal text] is to be
    expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense,
    unless the context furnishes some ground to control,
    qualify, or enlarge it.” Advisory Op. to Governor re
    Implementation of Amendment 4, the Voting Restoration
    Amendment, 288 So. 3d 1070, 1078 (Fla. 2020) (quoting
    Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the
    United States 157-58 (1833), quoted in Scalia & Garner,
    Reading Law at 69).

308 So. 3d at 946–47 (alterations in original).

     The Legislature specifically stated and codified its intent in
creating the MMA, which is the “public policy” of the State of
Florida. 2  Section 766.201(1)(a)-(b) details the Legislature’s

    2   The Florida Supreme Court has expressly recognized the
MMA as a legislative statement of public policy. See Franks v.
Bowers, 116 So. 3d 1240, 1241 (Fla. 2013). “Public policy is
determined by the legislature through its statutory enactments.”
Saunders v. Saunders, 796 So. 2d 1253, 1254 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)
(citing Univ. of Miami v. Echarte, 618 So. 2d 189, 196 (Fla. 1993)).
Express provisions of legislative intent codified in a statute
                                 9
findings that increased medical malpractice insurance premiums
were primarily caused by increased loss payments to claimants,
the functional unavailability of medical malpractice insurance for
some physicians, and increased care costs to patients. Noting “the
public need for quality medical services” and that “[t]he high cost
of medical negligence claims in the state can be substantially
alleviated by requiring early determination of the merit of claims,”
§ 766.201(1)(c)-(d), Fla. Stat., the Legislature explicitly stated its
intention to create a process to extinguish unviable claims early:

    (2) It is the intent of the Legislature to provide a plan for
    prompt resolution of medical negligence claims. Such
    plan shall consist of two separate components, presuit
    investigation and arbitration. Presuit investigation
    shall be mandatory and shall apply to all medical
    negligence claims and defenses. Arbitration shall be
    voluntary and shall be available except as specified.

    (a) Presuit investigation shall include:

    1. Verifiable requirements that reasonable investigation
    precede both malpractice claims and defenses in order to
    eliminate frivolous claims and defenses.

    2. Medical corroboration procedures.

§ 766.201(2), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).

     Various sections of chapter 766 spell out the specific presuit
requirements and duties both parties must fulfill throughout the
presuit process. At the conclusion of that process, either before or
after suit is filed, section 766.206 provides a process by which that
participation may be challenged. A finding that either party did
not comply with the reasonable investigation requirements of
sections 766.201-.212 has mandatory consequences and potential
sanctions. Section 766.206, Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent
part:

constitute “public policy” of the state. See Dinkins v. Dinkins, 120
So. 3d 601, 603 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013).

                                 10
    (1) After the completion of presuit investigation by the
    parties pursuant to s. 766.203 and any discovery
    pursuant to s. 766.106, any party may file a motion in the
    circuit court requesting the court to determine whether
    the opposing party’s claim or denial rests on a reasonable
    basis.

    (2) If the court finds that the notice of intent to
    initiate litigation mailed by the claimant does not
    comply with the reasonable investigation
    requirements of ss. 766.201-766.212, including a
    review of the claim and a verified written medical
    expert opinion by an expert witness as defined in
    s. 766.202, or that the authorization accompanying
    the notice of intent required under s. 766.1065 is
    not completed in good faith by the claimant, the
    court shall dismiss the claim, and the person who
    mailed such notice of intent, whether the claimant or the
    claimant’s attorney, is personally liable for all attorney’s
    fees and costs of the defendant or the defendant’s insurer.

(Emphasis added). The word “shall” as used in section 766.206(2)
is mandatory and not permissive, particularly because “it refers to
an action preceding the denial of a substantive right.” State v.
Goode, 830 So. 2d 817, 824 (Fla. 2002). When viewed in its context,
the legislature made itself clear: the two-step presuit investigation
process is mandatory to bring a medical negligence lawsuit in this
state, and failure to participate in that process requires dismissal.
See §§ 766.201, .206, Fla. Stat.; see also Goode, 830 So. 2d at 823
(noting that the proper “interpretation ‘depends upon the context
in which [“shall”] is found and upon the intent of the legislature as
expressed in the statute’ ” (quoting S.R. v. State, 346 So. 2d 1018,
1019 (Fla. 1977))).

     In spite of this clear statutory language and Florida courts’
adherence to the supremacy-of-text principle, much of the case law
stands in stark contrast due to what seems to be a perceived
conflict between the clear Legislative directive and Florida’s
constitutional protection for access to courts. See Art. I, § 21, Fla.
Const. Seemingly raised for the first time in the medical
negligence context in Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 805 (Fla.

                                 11
1976), and notwithstanding the supreme court in that case
pronouncing that the medical negligence statutes did not place
unreasonable restrictions on citizens’ access to the courts, later
courts have regularly departed from the plain text in the name of
such access. See, e.g., Morris v. Muniz, 252 So. 3d 1143 (Fla. 2018)
(citing access to courts no less than three times in requiring trial
court to make a finding of prejudice to defendant before dismissing
case based on failure to comply with presuit requirements);
Williams v. Oken, 62 So. 3d 1129 (Fla. 2011) (certiorari not
available to challenge plaintiff’s presuit expert for not being in
same specialty as defendant physician, as required by statute);
Kukral v. Mekras, 679 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1996) (under “liberal
interpretation” of MMA, plaintiff’s failure to comply with presuit
requirements and timeframes, including plaintiff’s failure to
provide mandatory expert opinion until a month prior to trial
(instead of statutory ninety-day period), was excusable as long as
requirements were met prior to expiry of statute of limitations);
Ingersoll v. Hoffman, 589 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1991) (defendant’s
assertion on first day of trial that plaintiff’s failure to comply with
presuit requirements was “waived” as “prejudicial” to plaintiff); N.
Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Kalitan, 219 So. 3d 49, 56 (Fla. 2017)
(extending the reasoning in McCall to find the statutory caps
applicable in personal injury cases were also unconstitutional as
violative of the equal protection clause as they did “not bear a
rational relationship to the Legislature’s stated interest in
addressing the medical malpractice crisis.” (emphasis added)); Est.
of McCall v. U.S., 134 So. 3d 894 (Fla. 2014) (disregarding the
stated factual findings of the legislature in ruling the statutory cap
on wrongful death noneconomic damages recoverable in a medical
malpractice action violated the equal protection clause of the
Florida Constitution).

     In essence, Florida courts have determined that because the
presuit process restricts a plaintiff’s ability to bring medical
malpractice claims, we “must construe the medical malpractice
presuit screening requirements ‘in a manner that favors access to
courts.’” Morris, 252 So. 3d. at 1146 (quoting Patry v. Capps, 632
So. 2d 9, 13 (Fla. 1994)). While this precept cannot be ignored, the
act of construing statutory text still requires “analyz[ing] and
explain[ing] the meaning of (a sentence or passage).” Construe,
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Courts have instead relied

                                  12
on access to courts to right perceived wrongs thereby evading the
statutory text altogether. While well intentioned, such decisions
cannot stand.

     Returning to the text, the Florida Supreme Court in Carmody
states that the presuit requirements have a jurisdictional purpose.
48 Fla. L. Weekly S150 at *7. If a non-compliant case is filed
pursuant to the MMA, the Carmody court observed that “no action
shall be filed” and “the court shall dismiss the claim.” Id. (quoting
§§ 766.104(1), .206(2), Fla. Stat.). In light of our directive to follow
the supremacy-of-text principle and Carmody’s clear statement
that the presuit requirements “have served a jurisdictional
purpose” both before and after the 2013 amendments, id., there no
longer should be any doubt about their jurisdictional import and
the legislative mandate to dismiss claims that fail to comply with
the reasonable investigation requirements of section 766.206(2).

     Nonetheless, the Carmody court stopped short of overruling
any precedent on this issue. See id. (cautioning that “the
Legislature may generally limit what tort claims can be brought at
state law, and how they are brought, as long as it does not run
afoul of article 1, section 21 of Florida’s Constitution”). However,
as Justice Canady wrote in his dissent in Morris, a court’s
determination of whether a plaintiff filed a statutorily compliant
claim “has nothing to do with roadblocks to court access.” Morris,
252 So. 3d at 1167 (Canady, J., dissenting). This is supported in
the plain language of section 766.206(2), which states that the
court “shall dismiss.” It does not say “shall dismiss with prejudice.”
Nothing prohibits plaintiffs from refiling their claims so long as
the limitations period has not expired.            See Williams v.
Campagnulo, 588 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1991) (holding that
corrective action regarding presuit requirements is only prohibited
outside the limitations period); Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. Lindberg, 571
So. 2d 446, 449 (Fla. 1990) (explaining that where presuit notice
filed same time as complaint, complaint subject to dismissal;
plaintiff may subsequently file amended complaint asserting
compliance with presuit notice and investigation requirements).

    Reading into the statute an opportunity to “cure” or requiring
defendants to prove prejudice goes beyond our constitutional
authority. As then-Justice Polston explained:

                                  13
    [U]nder our constitutional system, it is the Legislature,
    not this Court, that is entitled to make laws as a matter
    of policy based upon the facts it finds. See art. II, § 3, Fla.
    Const.; art. III, § 1, Fla. Const. It is the Legislature’s task
    to decide whether a medical malpractice crisis exists,
    whether a medical malpractice crisis has abated, and
    whether the Florida Statutes should be amended
    accordingly.

Kalitan, 219 So. 3d 63 (Polston, J., dissenting). Over time, it
appears the courts have not focused on the statutory text and have
instead rewritten it, a clear violation of the separation of powers.
See Westpark Preserve Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Pulte Home
Corp., 365 So. 3d 391, 394–95 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023) (“It is not within
the power of the judicial branch to change the statute’s language.
Instead, ‘[t]he legislature is the proper branch of government to
alter the statutory text.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Freeman
as Tr. of Fiddlesticks Land Tr. U/A/D Sept. 25, 1984 v. Berrin,
352 So. 3d 452, 455 (Fla 2d DCA 2022))).

     In sum, I perceive no jurisprudentially sound means of
reconciling these past decisions with the supremacy-of-text
principle or Carmody. As a result, their continued vitality
deserves a close reexamination. “In a case where we are bound by
a higher legal authority—whether it be a constitutional provision,
a statute, or a decision of the Supreme Court—our job is to apply
that law correctly to the case before us. When we are convinced
that a precedent clearly conflicts with the law we are sworn to
uphold, precedent normally must yield.” State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d
487, 507 (Fla. 2020); accord Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544, 550–
51 (Fla. 2020).

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