Court Opinion

ID: 9964530
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-30 14:07:28.280245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:34.464652
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2747-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ANDREW DAVIS, a/k/a
FLIPPA MAFIA, FLIPPA
MOGGELA, DJ and JOHN

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Submitted January 9, 2024 – Decided April 30, 2024

                   Before Judges Sumners and Smith.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 14-01-0003.

                   Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Steven M. Gilson, Designated Counsel, on
                   the brief).

                   Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
                   respondent (Regina M. Oberholzer, Deputy Attorney
                   General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Defendant Andrew Davis appeals the denial of his motion for post-

conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

      After a trial, defendant was convicted of:       first-degree conspiracy to

distribute cocaine and money laundering, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25(a)

and (c), and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1); first-degree possession with intent to

distribute cocaine, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1), (b)(1); and second-degree money

laundering as a lesser included offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-27(a).1 On June 3, 2016,

defendant was sentenced by the same judge who presided over the trial. The

court merged the two first-degree convictions and sentenced defendant to a term

of seventeen years in state prison, with an eight-year period of parole

ineligibility. The sentencing court then imposed a concurrent eight-year term

of imprisonment, with a four-year term of parole ineligibility. At defendant's

sentencing, trial counsel argued that his sentence should have been proportional

to the sentence received by his co-defendant at trial, Bernard, who was sentenced

in February 2016. The colloquy between trial counsel and the sentencing court

proceeded this way:

1
  Of the multiple defendants who were charged or indicted in this matter, only
co-defendant Marsha Bernard is relevant to this appeal. Bernard was tried with
defendant and convicted of identical counts. On February 5, 2016, Bernard was
sentenced to twenty-one years' incarceration in state prison with six years' parole
ineligibility.
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            THE COURT: Do you have any questions about your
            right to appeal, sir?

            [COUNSEL]: Your Honor . . . we'd just like to put on
            the record with respect to proportionality of [the
            sentence] . . . that the co-defendant [Bernard] received,
            I believe, 20 with a 6 aggregate if I'm correct.

                   ....

            THE COURT: It was 21 with a 6, and for
            proportionality.

            [COUNSEL]: And we would argue that at the very least
            [Bernard] should get the same. She was in the United
            States. She made all the deliveries. She actually was
            more involved. [Defendant] was in Jamaica, didn’t
            even leave the country.

            THE COURT: Well, I think the testimony would not
            indicate that, counsel. I think the testimony would
            indicate that from a proportionality perspective, this
            defendant’s role in the procedure was certainly much
            closer to that of Kemar Davis, which I think this
            sentence is in appropriate proportionality to . . . Kemar
            Davis'[s] sentence . . . . But . . . certainly, for the record,
            that should be noted.

      On direct appeal, we affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence in our

consolidated opinion, State v. Davis, Nos. A-3811-15, A-4893-15 (App. Div.

May 1, 2020), certif. denied 243 N.J. 524 (2020). We incorporate the facts and

procedural history from that opinion.

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      After his unsuccessful direct appeal, defendant filed his pro se PCR

petition in February 2021. Appointed PCR counsel filed an amended petition in

August 2021, and the PCR court heard argument in February 2022. Before the

PCR court, defendant argued trial counsel was ineffective by: failing to prevent

the State's introduction of certain evidence at trial; and failing to sufficiently

argue sentence disparity due to the differences between his and Bernard's

sentences.2 The PCR court found trial counsel "strongly argued" for a finding

of disparity during the sentencing hearing. The PCR court further found that

while trial counsel did not cite State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208 (1996) in making

the disparity application, the sentencing court understood the argument and

rejected it. The PCR court denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing,

concluding defendant failed to make a prima facie case for ineffective assistance

of counsel.

      On appeal, defendant seeks a remand for an evidentiary hearing, reprising

his argument below that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to sufficiently

make the disparity argument before the sentencing court. For the first time on

2
  During oral argument before the PCR court, defendant waived other arguments
he presented in his pro se petition. They included allegations that his trial
counsel was ineffective because she failed to: advise defendant of his maximum
sentencing exposure; hire an expert; object to the partial verdict; and seek
dismissal of the remaining counts.
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appeal, defendant argues that his sentence was unfairly disparate from Bernard's

because the sentencing court imposed a $250,000 penalty on him that was not

imposed on Bernard.

       We use a de novo standard of review when a PCR court does not conduct

an evidentiary hearing. State v. Blake, 444 N.J. Super. 285, 294 (App. Div.

2016) (citing State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 420-21 (2004)). When petitioning

for PCR, a defendant must establish he is entitled to "PCR by a preponderance

of the evidence." State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. 351, 370 (App. Div. 2014)

(citing State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992)).

       We analyze ineffective assistance of counsel claims using the two-prong

test established by the Supreme Court in Strickland.3 See Preciose, 129 N.J. at

459; see also State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). The first prong of the

Strickland test requires a petitioner to establish counsel's performance was

deficient. Preciose, 129 N.J. at 463. "The second, and far more difficult, prong

of the [Strickland] test is whether there exists 'a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.'" Id. at 463-64 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

3
    Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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      PCR proceedings are not a substitute for a direct appeal. R. 3:22-3; State

v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 50 (1997). "Ordinarily, PCR enables a defendant to

challenge the legality of a sentence or final judgment of conviction by presenting

contentions that could not have been raised on direct appeal." Afanador, 151

N.J. at 49. "PCR cannot be used to circumvent issues that could have, but were

not raised on appeal, unless the circumstances fall within one of three

exceptions." Id. at 50 (citing R. 3:22-4).

      Rule 3:22-4(a) provides that "[a]ny ground for relief not raised in the

proceedings resulting in the conviction, . . . or in any appeal taken in any such

proceedings is barred from assertion in a proceeding . . . ." The well-known

exceptions to this "procedural bar" include:

            (1) that the ground for relief not previously asserted
            could not reasonably have been raised in any prior
            proceeding; or

            (2) that enforcement of the bar to preclude claims,
            including one for ineffective assistance of counsel,
            would result in fundamental injustice; or

            (3) that denial of relief would be contrary to a new rule
            of constitutional law under either the Constitution of
            the United States or the State of New Jersey.

      On direct appeal, we carefully considered and rejected each of defendant's

seven arguments. The appeal contained defendant's challenge to trial court

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actions taken before, during, and after trial, including the court's: denial of

defendant's motions to dismiss count two of the indictment, and to suppress

certain cell phone records as well as all evidence obtained during a warrantless

search; jury instructions on language translation for intercepted phone calls;

refusal to declare a mistrial or voir dire the jury during deliberations; and finally,

imposition of what defendant argued was an excessive sentence. Defendant also

challenged the sufficiency of the State's proofs at trial on the money laundering

charges.

      Defendant did not challenge, on direct appeal, the disparity of his sentence

with respect to the sentence imposed on Bernard. The record shows none of the

three exceptions in Rule 3:22-4(a) apply. We are satisfied that defendant's

disparity argument is procedurally barred, and no evidentiary hearing was

warranted.

      For completeness, we comment briefly on the merits of defendant's

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Had there been no procedural bar, we

would find defendant failed to make a prima facie showing on prong one of

Strickland.   Defendant has not met his burden to show by a reasonable

probability that but for the unprofessional errors of trial counsel, the outcome at

sentencing would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Competent

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trial counsel raised the disparity argument before the sentencing court. While

counsel did not expressly raise State v. Roach, they placed the issue before the

sentencing court. In Roach, the Court held that differences in sentences among

co-defendants requires resentencing where "there is an obvious sense of

unfairness in having disparate punishments for equally culpable perpetrators."

146 N.J.at 232 (quoting State v. Hubbard, 176 N.J. Super. 174, 177 (1980)). The

court considered the argument in the context of Roach and found defendant's

sentence to be fair, not in relation to Bernard's sentence, but in relation to the

sentence of another co-defendant, Kemar Davis. The fact that counsel made their

argument after the court had imposed sentence is of no moment. Had the

sentencing court been persuaded by counsel's disparity argument, it had a full

and fair opportunity to reconsider its sentence in light of the principles of Roach.

      While the disparate penalty argument is also barred pursuant to Rule 3:22-

4(a), we decline to comment further, as it was not raised before the PCR court.

See State v. Galicia, 210 N.J. 364 (2012) ("Generally, an appellate court will not

consider issues, even constitutional ones, which were not raised below.").

      Affirmed.

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