Court Opinion

ID: 9400783
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-09 14:07:28.202433+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:47.912526
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JUNE 2, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals

                              NO. 2022-CA-0910-MR

ADAM LLOYD GRUBB                                                      APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM KNOX CIRCUIT COURT
v.             HONORABLE MICHAEL O. CAPERTON, JUDGE
                      ACTION NO. 21-CR-00148

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                APPELLEE

                                OPINION
                 AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART,
                           AND REMANDING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; KAREM AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

KAREM, JUDGE: Adam Lloyd Grubb appeals from a Knox Circuit Court

judgment and sentence after a jury convicted him of trafficking in a controlled

substance, first degree, first offense; operating a motor vehicle under the influence

of intoxicants, first offense; possession of drug paraphernalia; failure to wear a

seatbelt; and being a persistent felony offender in the second degree. He was
sentenced to fifteen years in prison. After careful review, we affirm the judgment

in all respects but the sentence. We reverse the part of the judgment imposing

sentence and remand solely for a new sentencing hearing in accordance with the

framework set forth in Commonwealth v. Reneer, 734 S.W.2d 794, 798 (Ky. 1987).

              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

             Grubb testified at his trial that he was at home with his three sons

when his cousin, Tammy Sparks, accompanied by an unidentified man, arrived at

his house at approximately 1:00 o’clock in the morning. Sparks asked Grubb to

drive them home. On the way, she changed her mind and asked to be dropped off

at the T-Mart. After Grubb left Sparks and the man at the T-Mart, he noticed that a

makeup bag and small black zip-top pouch had been left behind in his car. Grubb

claimed to be worried about their contents because he knew his cousin once had

marijuana in the black container and he did not want to leave the items in his car

where his children might find them. He stuck the zip-top container under the

steering wheel and placed the other on the floor by the door. After driving out of

the T-Mart, he was pulled over by Officer Karl Middleton.

             Middleton testified that he observed a Ford Mustang leave the T-Mart

without signaling. When he checked its license plate number, the registration

indicated the vehicle should be a Toyota Camry. Middleton stopped the Mustang

and observed that Grubb was not wearing a seatbelt, had bloodshot eyes, and could

                                         -2-
not control the movements of his body. Middleton ordered Grubb out of the car

and conducted standard field sobriety tests. Middleton described Grubb as

displaying horizontal gaze nystagmus, a sign of stimulant usage, and testified that

he stumbled when performing the other tests.

             Grubb testified that his restless behavior was due to Graves’ Disease,

which causes him to be jittery due to a high heart rate. Middleton testified on

rebuttal that Grubb did not inform him that he suffers from Graves’ Disease.

Grubb also testified that he did not fail the field sobriety tests administered by

Middleton.

             Middleton asked if he could search the vehicle and Grubb initially

refused. Their accounts of what occurred afterwards differ. Middleton testified

that he had probable cause to perform a search after he spotted a glass smoking

pipe of the type used for methamphetamine, sticking out of a yellow box in the

driver’s side door panel of the car. Grubb testified Middleton told him he would

call in a police dog if he did not consent to a search. In any event, Grubb

consented to a search. Middleton found a black zip-top container attached under

the driver’s side of the dashboard with double-sided tape. It held five small

individual baggies containing a white crystal-like substance Middleton suspected

was methamphetamine. The baggies had individual stickers affixed to them, which

                                          -3-
Middleton testified was very unusual. A cut snorting straw with residue on it was

stored with the baggies.

             Middleton testified that the street value of a gram of

methamphetamine was $70. He thought each baggie contained a “teen” of

methamphetamine and that the stickers on the baggies indicated the weight of the

drugs inside. He explained that a “teen” or “teenager” of methamphetamine was

8/10ths of a gram. He testified that in his training and experience, the way in

which the methamphetamine was packaged was indicative of trafficking because

the baggies were “consistent with the same weight and they are each individually

bagged for distribution.” Middleton acknowledged that a straw such as the one

recovered can be used to ingest the drugs but also stated that a seller can use his

own product. He testified, based on his experience of dealers and addicts, that

addicts do not normally stockpile their drugs, but use them right away.

             On cross-examination he admitted that his search of the vehicle did

not yield any large sums of money, scales, ledgers of drug sales, or weapons. He

also admitted he had not received a tip regarding drug trafficking and did not

witness any activity which he believed to be a sale of drugs.

             The trial court asked Middleton if 0.8 grams was considered a dose,

and Middleton answered that it was not. He explained that most users would use a

tenth of a gram to pull up in a syringe or to smoke. Some people would use the

                                         -4-
drug multiple times throughout the day, to keep a consistent high. Middleton also

told the judge that a user would employ their own scales to weigh out a dose from

a “teen.”

             Jamie Hibbard, the state’s forensic science specialist, testified that the

contents of the five baggies weighed a total of 2.374 grams. Each baggie

contained a different quantity, with three baggies containing amounts greater than

half a gram and two containing less than half a gram.

             Grubb was charged with trafficking in a controlled substance in the

first degree, first offense, two grams or more of methamphetamine; operating a

motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants, first offense; possession of

drug paraphernalia; failure to wear a seat belt; and being a persistent felony

offender in the second degree.

             The jury found Grubb guilty of the first four charges. During the

penalty phase, the Commonwealth presented evidence that Grubb had one prior

felony conviction for possession of a controlled substance. The jury found that

Grubb was a persistent felony offender in the second degree and recommended an

enhanced total sentence of fifteen years. The trial court sentenced Grubb in

accordance with the jury’s recommendation. This appeal followed. Further facts

will be set forth below as necessary.

                                          -5-
                                    ANALYSIS

i. The trial court did not err in denying Grubb’s motion for a directed verdict
on the charge of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance

             Grubb argues that he was entitled to a directed verdict on the

trafficking charge because the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence of

intent to traffic. In moving for a directed verdict, defense counsel argued that in

most of the trafficking cases he had previously handled, the amount of drugs had

been greater and other indicia of trafficking had been present, such as cash, extra

baggies, scales, weapons, or ledgers. He further argued that the charge of driving

under the influence laid against Grubb supported the theory that he possessed the

drugs for his own use only.

             The trial court stated, with the Commonwealth’s support, that there

was a statutory presumption of trafficking if the contraband recovered was over a

certain amount. As to the absence of other indicia of trafficking, the trial court

stated that the jury could reasonably infer that Grubb was the distributor of the

methamphetamine and had not yet made a drop to pick up the cash from the sale of

his product. The trial court concluded that there was enough evidence to send the

charge to the jury and it denied the motion for a directed verdict.

             “On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the

evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only

then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.” Commonwealth v.

                                          -6-
Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991). “[T]he Commonwealth may prove its

case through either direct or circumstantial evidence, and a jury may make

reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence.” McGuire v. Commonwealth,

595 S.W.3d 90, 96-97 (Ky. 2019) (citations omitted).

             Grubb argues that the trial court’s denial of his motion for a directed

verdict on the trafficking charge must be reversed because it was premised on an

erroneous belief that there is a statutory presumption that an individual is guilty of

trafficking if he possesses more than a certain amount of methamphetamine.

             The trial court’s reason for denying the motion for a directed verdict is

not dispositive, however, because “an appellate court may affirm a lower court for

any reason supported by the record.” McCloud v. Commonwealth, 286 S.W.3d

780, 786 n.19 (Ky. 2009).

             Grubb argues that the only evidence that he possessed the

methamphetamine for the purposes of trafficking, as opposed to personal use, was

the fact it was packaged in five individual baggies with stickers on them. Grubb

contends that Middleton’s testimony that the presence of stickers on the baggies

was very unusual undermines the theory that his training or experience led him to

believe they were indicia of trafficking. Grubb contrasts the facts of his case with

those found in McGuire, supra. The evidence used to support McGuire’s

conviction for trafficking consisted of two baggies, one containing 2.623 grams of

                                          -7-
methamphetamine and the other marijuana, eight unused baggies, and cash in small

denominations. McGuire, 595 S.W.3d at 93. At trial, the arresting officer testified

that the amount of methamphetamine recovered was consistent with trafficking and

that persons who possess methamphetamine for personal use would also usually

have an item such as a needle or spoon with which to ingest it. Id. The Kentucky

Supreme Court held that the evidence was sufficient to support McGuire’s

conviction. Id. at 98.

             Grubb argues that, by contrast, he possessed a smaller amount of

methamphetamine than McGuire, had no small bills and possessed a cut straw with

residue which indicated the methamphetamine was for his own personal use.

Grubb’s contention that other specific indicia of trafficking, such as empty baggies,

cash, scales, weapons, or ledgers must be present to secure a conviction for

trafficking has no legal basis. The total weight of the methamphetamine recovered

from the baggies was 2.374 grams. Officer Middleton testified that the packaging

was indicative of distribution and that each baggie contained multiple doses. He

also testified that most addicts do not stockpile their drugs but consume them

almost immediately. The amount of methamphetamine and the way it was

packaged and hidden in the vehicle constituted evidence sufficient to sustain the

conviction for trafficking.

                                         -8-
             It was not unreasonable, based on the evidence presented, for the jury

to conclude that Grubb possessed the methamphetamine with the intent to sell it

and the trial court did not err in denying his motion for a directed verdict on this

charge.

ii. The trial court did not commit palpable error in permitting the jurors to
retain their cell phones during their deliberations

             As the judge prepared to send the jury to deliberate in the guilt phase

of the trial, the bailiff inquired about their cell phones. The judge asked the jurors

to turn off their cell phones and asked the bailiff whether they normally collected

the cell phones. The bailiff replied that they usually did. The judge again asked

the members of the jury to turn their phones off, stating, “Has anybody got their

phone left on? Okay, make sure your phone stays off please. We’d be retrying it.”

The jury members were allowed to retain their phones during their deliberations.

             Defense counsel did not raise a contemporaneous objection. Grubb

argues that the issue was nonetheless brought to the trial court’s attention by the

bailiff in time to prevent the alleged error from occurring. There was no

substantive objection, however, to alert the trial court to a potential legal error.

Grubb did raise the issue in his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,

which was too late to prevent the purported error from occurring.

             Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10.26 permits

unpreserved error to be reviewed if it affected “the substantial rights” of a

                                           -9-
defendant and resulted in “manifest injustice.” To rise to the level of palpable

error, there must be a “defect in the proceeding” which is “shocking or

jurisprudentially intolerable.” Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Ky.

2006). “[T]he required showing is probability of a different result or error so

fundamental as to threaten a defendant’s entitlement to due process of law.” Id. at

3.

             Grubb argues that the trial court’s decision to allow the jurors to retain

their cell phones was in direct contravention of the Kentucky Supreme Court’s

directive in Winstead, which states:

             [W]hen the jury retires to consider its verdict, the trial
             judge must direct a court official to collect and store all
             cell phones or other electronic communication devices
             until deliberations are complete. During deliberations, the
             court may release the cell phones or other electronic
             communication devices to allow appropriate
             communications by jurors (such as arranging for
             transportation, childcare, etc.) and may require such
             communication to be monitored by court officials.

Winstead v. Commonwealth, 327 S.W.3d 386, 401-02 (Ky. 2010).

             In Winstead, the members of the jury retained their cell phones, and

the trial court did not admonish them not to use their phones in deliberations.

Some jurors were subsequently observed by the court security officer using their

cell phones during the penalty phase deliberations. Id. at 401. After the defense

moved for a mistrial, the trial court questioned the jury as a group. Several jurors

                                         -10-
admitted using their phones but purely for personal and work-related calls. The

trial court denied the motion for a mistrial. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that

the trial court’s handling of the matter was appropriate and concluded that the

phone calls made by unmonitored jurors did not automatically entitle the defendant

to a mistrial. Id. at 402. Grubb contends that while the trial court in his case did

instruct the jurors to turn off their phones, it did not specifically admonish them not

to use their phones for investigative purposes, thereby leaving open the possibility

that improper communication or investigation by the jurors occurred.

             When evidence is improperly admitted, juries are presumed to heed

the admonition of the trial court to disregard it. Matthews v. Commonwealth, 163

S.W.3d 11, 17 (Ky. 2005) (citations omitted); Ross v. Commonwealth, 531 S.W.3d

471, 479 (Ky. 2017). There is absolutely no evidence or allegation that the

members of the jury in Grubb’s case disregarded the trial court’s admonition to

turn off their phones and improperly used their cell phones in a way that would

have affected the outcome of the trial. Grubb’s arguments are purely speculative,

and he has not succeeded in showing the probability of a different result or that he

was denied due process in any way. The trial court’s decision to allow the jurors to

retain their phones did not rise to the level of palpable error requiring reversal.

                                         -11-
iii. Officer Middleton’s testimony did not result in manifest injustice

             Grubb contends that he was deprived of the right to a fair trial because

Officer Middleton was allowed to testify as an expert about the “ultimate issue” in

the case. He concedes that the alleged error is unpreserved and requests palpable

error review.

             The prosecutor asked Middleton, “Based on your training and

experience, what does the way this meth was packaged indicate?” Middleton

replied, “It indicates trafficking to me, the way that it – all bags are consistent with

the same weight and they are each individually bagged for distribution.”

             “[E]xpert opinion testimony is admitted when the issue upon which

the evidence is offered is one of science and skill, . . . and when the subject matter

is outside the common knowledge of jurors.” Stringer v. Commonwealth, 956

S.W.2d 883, 889 (Ky. 1997) (citations omitted). “Presumably, jurors do not need

assistance in the form of an expert’s opinion that the defendant is guilty or not

guilty.” Id. at 889-90.

             Grubb argues that Middleton violated this rule when he testified that

Grubb was trafficking because the evidence of trafficking was circumstantial at

best. He contrasts the facts of his case with those in Sargent v. Commonwealth,

813 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Ky. 1991), which held that the trial judge did not err in

allowing police detectives to testify that in their expert opinion the defendants had

                                          -12-
the drugs in their possession for sale and not personal use. Grubb contends that the

expert opinion testimony was permissible in Sargent because the police in that case

recovered over fifteen pounds of marijuana, which far exceeded the personal use

amount, whereas in his case there was no other evidence associated with drug

trafficking. But the grounds for allowing the police testimony in Sargent had

nothing to do with the quantity of marijuana recovered but with the fact that the

detectives’ testimony about the marijuana trade was “specialized in character and

outside the scope of common knowledge and experience of most jurors.” Id.

Similarly, Middleton’s testimony about the way the methamphetamine was

packaged was outside the scope of knowledge of most jurors.

             Although Grubb also questions the authority of Sargent because three

justices dissented from the opinion, the Kentucky Supreme Court reaffirmed the

precedential value of Sargent in McGuire, supra. In McGuire, the Court directly

addressed the issue before us: whether a police expert witness may opine that the

evidence indicates trafficking. In McGuire, a police officer testified that, based on

his experience, the small plastic bags found on McGuire’s person were commonly

used to hold drugs, that the quantity of methamphetamine found on McGuire was

inconsistent with personal use, and that customarily people in possession of

methamphetamine for personal use are found with only one small plastic bag and

some tool for ingesting the drug, whereas McGuire was found with multiple bags

                                        -13-
and tools for ingesting the drug. McGuire argued that the police officer’s

testimony improperly invaded the province of the jury because it expressed an

opinion on the ultimate issue of whether McGuire was guilty of trafficking. As in

Grubb’s case, the argument was unpreserved.

             The Kentucky Supreme Court concluded that the officer’s testimony

did not result in manifest injustice, relying on a line of cases, including Sargent,

which have permitted expert witnesses to opine on relevant evidentiary facts which

tend to make the ultimate fact of guilt more or less probable. McGuire, 595

S.W.3d at 94. The Court concluded that the testimony was admissible because the

witness “offered his opinion based on his experience as a patrol officer that the

evidence was consistent with trafficking and not personal use, and he did not

testify that he believed McGuire to be guilty or not guilty. Id. at 95. The Court

observed that “[t]his type of expert opinion has been almost routinely admitted in

drug cases.” Id. (citations omitted).

             McGuire also relied on Stringer, which states that “[t]he real question

should not be whether the expert has rendered an opinion as to the ultimate issue,

but whether the opinion ‘will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to

determine a fact in issue.’ KRE 702.” Stringer, 956 S.W.2d at 889 (citing

Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE 702)).

                                         -14-
             Middleton’s testimony was based on his experience and training as a

police officer and was precisely the type of testimony approved in Sargent,

McGuire, and Stringer to assist the jury in understanding evidence beyond their

own experience and did not result in manifest injustice.

iv. The prosecutor’s closing argument was not palpable error

             Grubb requests palpable error review of the prosecutor’s closing

argument, which he argues constituted misconduct. He focuses on two particular

comments by the prosecutor, to the effect that Officer Middleton had no reason to

lie and, in regard to Grubb’s claim that the drugs were left in his car by his cousin

Tammy, that the prosecutor had never met a drug dealer who loses their drugs.

             Officer Middleton has no reason to tell you otherwise
             than what’s the truth. He doesn’t have a stake one way
             or the other. He, like me, and everyone in the courtroom
             except maybe the defendant goes home at the end of the
             day. So he has no reason to say anything but the truth in
             this matter.

In addressing defense counsel’s argument that the drugs belonged to Tammy

Sparks, he stated,

             I have yet to meet a drug dealer, in my many years of
             doing this since George W. Bush was in the White House
             . . . who loses his or her drugs. They don’t leave their
             sight. They don’t leave them in the car and walk off.

             Prosecutorial misconduct is defined as

             a prosecutor’s improper or illegal act involving an
             attempt to persuade the jury to wrongly convict a

                                         -15-
             defendant or assess an unjustified punishment. Any
             consideration on appeal of alleged prosecutorial
             misconduct must center on the overall fairness of the
             trial. In order to justify reversal, the misconduct of the
             prosecutor must be so serious as to render the entire trial
             fundamentally unfair.

Commonwealth v. McGorman, 489 S.W.3d 731, 741-42 (Ky. 2016) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted).

             We consider the following four factors in determining whether a

prosecutor’s remarks constitute flagrant misconduct:

             (1) whether the remarks tended to mislead the jury or to
             prejudice the accused; (2) whether they were isolated or
             extensive; (3) whether they were deliberately or
             accidentally placed before the jury; and (4) the strength
             of the evidence against the accused.

Murphy v. Commonwealth, 509 S.W.3d 34, 54 (Ky. 2017) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). “A prosecutor may comment on tactics, may

comment on evidence, and may comment as to the falsity of a defense position.”

Id. at 50. If the alleged error is unpreserved, “the Court will reverse only where the

misconduct was flagrant and was such as to render the trial fundamentally unfair.”

Id. at 49 (citation omitted).

             Grubb argues that the prosecutor improperly bolstered Officer

Middleton’s credibility by equating him with the prosecutor, rather than as a

witness whose credibility had to be assessed by the jurors. He concedes that

prosecutors are permitted to comment on the credibility of the evidence offered at

                                          -16-
trial but argues that the prosecutor in his case impermissibly presented his own

experience as a prosecutor as a basis on which the jury could disbelieve Grubb’s

testimony regarding the methamphetamine belonging to Tammy.

             The comments made by the prosecutor were neither misleading nor

unduly prejudicial. He compared Middleton to all the other individuals in the

courtroom, with the exception of the defendant, not solely with the prosecutor.

             The prosecutor’s other statement about drug dealers never leaving

their drugs, while based on his own experience, was also a common-sense

observation about Grubb’s excuse that the methamphetamine belonged to his

cousin.

             Neither of the prosecutor’s statements were misleading or extensive

and certainly did not rise to the level of palpable error.

v. The jury instructions did not comply with Reneer and consequently Grubb
is entitled to a new sentencing hearing

             Finally, Grubb claims that he was denied due process because the trial

court failed to follow the sentencing procedure set forth in Commonwealth v.

Reneer, 734 S.W.2d 794 (Ky. 1987), in imposing the persistent felony offender

enhancement on the trafficking charge. Under Reneer, a trial court is permitted to

combine the penalty phase of the trial with the persistent felony offender phase of

the trial, but the penalty on the underlying charge must be determined first, before

                                          -17-
the determination of guilt on the PFO charge and the imposition of the enhanced

sentence:

             If the accused is also charged as a persistent felony
             offender, the penalty phase and a persistent felony
             offender phase can be combined because the same
             evidence that is pertinent toward fixing the penalty is also
             pertinent for consideration in the enhancement of
             sentence, and the jury in the combined bifurcated hearing
             could be instructed to (1) fix a penalty on the basic
             charge in the indictment; (2) determine then whether the
             defendant is guilty as a persistent felony offender, and if
             so; (3) fix the enhanced penalty as a persistent felony
             offender.

Id. at 797-98.

             In Grubb’s case, the first step of fixing a penalty on the trafficking

charge was omitted. The alleged error was preserved by objection and by the

tendering of jury instructions by the defense. The tendered instructions complied

with Reneer and would have required the jury first to recommend a penalty on the

underlying offense of trafficking, then proceed to determine whether Grubb was

guilty of being a persistent felony offender in the second degree and if so,

thereafter recommend an enhanced penalty. The actual instructions, however,

combined the sentencing on the trafficking charge with the PFO charge:

             We, the jury, find the Defendant, Adam Grubb, GUILTY
             of being a Second-Degree Persistent Felony Offender and
             fix his punishment for Trafficking in a controlled

                                         -18-
             Substance in the First Degree, First Offense, Two Grams
             or More of Methamphetamine under Instruction No. 2 at

             (Not less than TEN (10) YEARS nor more than
             TWENTY (20) YEARS.)

             The Kentucky Supreme Court has expressed its disapproval of this

type of instruction. In Owens, for example, as in Grubb’s case,

             the trial court did not instruct the jury to fix a punishment
             for the underlying felonies before determining
             Appellant’s guilt as a PFO. Instead the jury found
             Appellant guilty of being a PFO, then set an enhanced
             sentence for the underlying felony convictions based on
             the PFO status. No sentence was fixed for the underlying
             offense, thus, Appellant correctly asserts that Reneer was
             not followed.

Owens v. Commonwealth, 329 S.W.3d 307, 319-20 (Ky. 2011).

             In Owens, the error was not preserved, and the Court held that it did

not rise to the level of palpable error, stating:

             While we continue to cite Reneer as the required practice
             for trial courts to follow for PFO sentencing, we have not
             yet held that the failure to do so is palpable error. See
             Miller v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 690, 704 (Ky.
             2009) (holding that the failure to instruct according to
             Reneer is a procedural issue which we need not review
             without a contemporaneous objection). We also note that
             in Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 819 S.W.2d 713 (Ky.
             1991), we stated that a jury’s failure to set a penalty for
             the underlying offense before finding PFO status does
             not violate the provisions of the PFO statute.
             Nonetheless we strongly encourage trial courts to follow
             the Reneer procedure, and while the failure to do so here
             is not palpable error, such may not always be the case.

                                           -19-
Id. at 520-21.

             In Anderson, the trial court required the jury to determine the

defendant’s PFO status before determining his sentence for underlying charge of

assault. The Kentucky Supreme Court did not fully address the error because the

conviction was being reversed on other grounds, but in a footnote, it stated:

             We need not address at length Anderson’s third
             argument, concerning the improper penalty phase
             instructions. However, the trial court did err by requiring
             the jury to determine Anderson’s PFO status before
             determining his sentence for the assault conviction and,
             thus, we are compelled to reiterate our directive for trial
             courts to follow the procedure prescribed in
             Commonwealth v. Reneer, 734 S.W.2d 794 (Ky. 1987).
             See also Owens v. Commonwealth, 329 S.W.3d 307 (Ky.
             2011).

Anderson v. Commonwealth, 352 S.W.3d 577, 584 n.7 (Ky. 2011).

      More recently, in Conrad, a similar error in the instructions was discovered

before the trial court accepted the verdict and discharged the jury. The jury was

sent back to deliberate with a full set of instructions. Conrad v. Commonwealth,

534 S.W.3d 779, 783 (Ky. 2017). The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the trial

court had thereby remedied any procedural error before accepting the final verdict.

Id.

             Although the Commonwealth has pointed out that the Anderson

footnote is dicta and that Reneer uses the permissive “could,” the directive from

                                        -20-
the Kentucky Supreme Court in Owens, Anderson, and Conrad is clear that the

jury must first determine the penalty for the underlying offense before proceeding

to determine whether the defendant is a persistent felony offender and thereafter

imposing an enhanced sentence on that basis.

             The case must be remanded for a new penalty phase to be conducted

in accordance with Reneer.

                                  CONCLUSION

             The case is remanded solely for a new sentencing hearing to be

conducted in accordance with Reneer. The judgment of the Knox Circuit Court is

affirmed in all other respects.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                    BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Molly Mattingly                          Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky                      Attorney General of Kentucky

                                         Christina L. Romano
                                         Assistant Attorney General
                                         Frankfort, Kentucky

                                        -21-