Court Opinion

ID: 9809296
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:07:26.432247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:52.842833
License: Public Domain

Clark, C. J.,
dissenting: The judge below granted a new trial without saying whether he did so as a matter of discretion, or because he found he had committed an error of law in the trial, and he was not asked to state upon what ground he granted a new trial.
The presumption always is in favor of the correctness of the trial below and he who alleges error must assign and show error. This is elementary. If this new trial was granted as a matter of discretion, there could be no error. If it was granted for error 'in law which the judge thought he had committed, it would be a reviewable question to decide whether or not there was error committed by him. As it does not appear upon which ground the court put its action, and ap-' pellant’s counsel did not ask that it should be stated, it will be presumed that there was no error and that the judge did, what he had a right to do, and granted the new trial in-his ’ discretion. " ,
Besides if the new,trial was granted for error in law committed by the judge it is absolutely necessary that the judge find the facts otherwise, it' cannot be seen whether he did or *347did not in fact commit an error of law. To reverse tbe judgment, without such finding, is to order a final judgment below against the appellee when not appealing, he had no chance to file exceptions. He has had no showing on this appeal, no day in court. When the judge puts his ruling upon the ground that he committed an error of law, he finds the facts and the alleged error of law is presented. This has been the case in every instance where an appeal has been taken because the judge below granted a new trial upon a matter of law. Wood v. Railroad, 131 N. C., 48; Thomas v. Myers, 87 N. C., 31; Gay v. Nash, 84 N. C., 333; Bryan v. Heck, 67 N. C., 322.
Two cases (and two cases only) have presented the precise point herein, as 'to the effect of an appeal from an order granting a new trial without stating whether it was granted in the discretion of the court or for error of law, and in both by a unanimous court, it was held that the new trial must be taken to have been granted in the discretion of the court and in both the appeal was dismissed. In Braid v. Lukins, 95 N. C., 125, Merrimon, C. J. says that when the court below “grants a new trial, without specifying the matters that induced it to make the order, and these do not appear with sufficient certainty in the record, it must be taken that the court granted the new trial in the exercise of its discretionary power. The presumption is that the order was properly made for gx>d and sufficient cause, nothing to the contrary appearing * * * The defendant, it is true moved to set the verdict aside because fit is irregular’ but it does not appear that the court placed its decision upon that ground. The judge was familiar with the law, and if he had intended to decide upon the ground that the verdict was irregular and void, thus raising a question of law, he would most probably have stated the grounds of his decision, so as to give the appellant the benefit of an appeal. In that case, as we have seen, he ought to have stated what induced his *348decision. The burden rests upon the appellant to show sufficient grounds for the appeal and to show error.” It is not sufficient ground, as in this case, to show merely that the new trial was granted, without showing that it was not granted in the discretion of the court.
In Braid v. Lukins, Merrimon, C. J. further says that when the new trial is granted below for an error of law “the court should state upon the record the facts and considerations that induced it to make the order granting or refusing a new-trial. This is necessary to enable this court to see and determine whether or not the order or judgment presents questions of law, the subject of review, or whether it was .made in the exercise of discretionary power and therefore not reviewable.” In the last decision of this court, and a very recent one, Bird v. Bradburn, 131 N. C., 488, the same ruling is made dismissing the appeal. The court said “The power of the court to set aside the verdict as a matter of discretion has always'been inherent and is necessary to the proper administration of justice. The judge is not a mere moderator but is an integral part of the trial, and when he perceives that justice has not been done, it is his duty to set aside, the verdict * * * It is only when a new trial is granted as a matter of law that such action is reviewable, and then the facts should be found. When the verdict is set aside as a matter of discretion, it is not necessary to find the facts, Allison v. Whittier, 101 N. C., bottom of page 494; and no appeal lies, Braid v. Lukins, 95 N. C., 123; Jones v. Parker, 97 N. C., 33; and if no reason is given, it is presumed that the new trial was granted as a matter of discretion, and the appeal will be dismissed. Braid v. Lukins supra; State v. Braddy, 104 N. C., 737.” The court further says that if the grant of a new trial “was not in the exercise of the judge’s discretion it is reviewable, and therefore his reason should be given, if asked.”
Here, the judge’s reasons were neither asked nor given, *349and the above cases settle that it must be presumed that he acted iu his discretion. This court will not presume error below. It must affirmatively appear. The court below refused to grant a new trial “because against the- weight of evidence” and then granted it without giving any reason. It does not follow that it must have been for some error of law which the judge had made. There might be a hundred reasons (some of which are suggested in Bird v. Bradburn, supra,) why the judge in his discretion thought that in the interest of justice there should be a new trial. None of these was he required to set out in the record, and in most cases they ought not to go upon the record, to prejudice persons or another trial (as where the judge has a suspicion but not legal proof that the jury was tampered with, and many other cases.) To summarily order a judgment, here, upon a verdict which the court below has set aside without giving its reasons ■ (and therefore presumably- in its dis-pretion) would be unjust to the defendant. It was incumbent upon the appellant, the plaintiff, to ask the judge to give his reasons.
If, contrary to above precedents, the failure of the judge, unasked to state his grounds for granting a new trial does not raise a presumption that he acted in his discretion and committed no error, certainly it could not raise the opposite presumption that he acted not in his discretion but for reason of error in law committed in the trial, still less can there arise the further presumption that he erred in finding that he had committed error. There may have been an error in his charge or in a remark to the jury or in the remarks of counsel, or in the composition of the jury, or other legal errors which do not appear in the record because no facts are found. The defendant appellee is not to be punished by a judgment without a hearing because the judge did not ex mero motu find the facts and state his reason for granting a new trial. If it was error to fail to do this, at most the *350case should be remanded that the judge may state bis, grounds and find the facts.
If, however it could be presumed that the judge granted the new trial for error of law committed by him, the presumption is that he ruled properly, that there was such error, alid it was incumbent on the appellant, the plaintiff to have the facts found. But what ruling of law is presented when no facts are found? The verdict against the defendant being set aside he is not appealing. He 'could not, on this record, with no facts found, allege errors in the judge’s ruling. It is the plaintiff who is appealing, and he assigns no error save that the new trial was granted. To order judgment against the defendant is not only to presume that the judge granted the new trial, not in his discretion, but is to deprive the defendant of opportunity to show that in fact error of law was committed on the trial, for no facts were found, as should be done when the new trial below is granted by the judge for his own error.
If the judgment below stands, there is no harm done, for on the new trial which was granted by the judge, the costs will follow the final verdict. But it will be depriving the defendant of his day in court to direct judgment against ap-pellee if the judge granted the new trial in the exercise of his discretion in the interest of justice — as is the presumption ■ — -or to hold (if the new trial is presumed to have been granted for error of law committed) that the judge granted a new trial when no error had been committed, when the facts are not found, upon which alone the errors of law would be presented, and the appellant upon whom it devolved did not ask the facts to be found.
But if the judge ex mero motu and unasked by the appellant should have stated whether the new trial was granted in his discretion or for error of law, the defendant appellee should not be punished for the judge’s error by our putting in *351force a judgment as to wbicb tbe appellee bas bad no opportunity to file bis exceptions or have them passed upon.
Upon reason and tbe precedents tbe appeal should be dismissed and tbe truth of tbe matters determined by tbe new trial below.
HoKE, J., concurs in tbe dissenting opinion.