Court Opinion

ID: 9732058
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:06:22.29193+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:22.830283
License: Public Domain

HARTNETT, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent and agree with Justice Berger that we should affirm. I would affirm because, in my opinion, the totality of the circumstances support a finding that there was sufficient probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant and therefore there was no violation of 11 Del.C. § 2306 or the Delaware or-federal Constitutions. If there was any question whether the search warrant was properly issued, the record shows that the police acted in good faith in reliance on the warrant in accordance with the rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon.108
I find no Delaware Constitutional impediment to the adoption by us of the good faith exception to the evidentiary exclusionary rule as set forth in Leon and I agree with Justice Berger that, as a matter of public policy, it should be adopted in Delaware. In my opinion, in a murder investigation, the good faith exception rule represents a reasonable balance between the right of an owner of a motor vehicle that might contain a weapon to be free from an unreasonable search and the right of an individual to be safe from harm. There is, therefore, in my opinion, no legal bar to the introduction into evidence of the weapon that was found in Dorsey’s motor vehicle.
I.
The majority relies, in part, on Jones v. State,109 a case in which I concurred in the result but where I thought it was undesirable for this Court to reach the constitutional issues in view of the provisions of 11 Del.C. § 1902.110 In applying that statute to the facts in Jones, I believed that the totality of the circumstances there did not adequately support a finding of probable cause justifying the seizure and searching of Jones without a warrant. I, therefore, concurred in the result without considering the Constitutional arguments. In the present case, however, although the affidavit supporting the warrant could have been better drafted, I find that the totality of the circumstances reasonably showed a sufficient basis for the Superior Court judge to have issued the warrant authoriz*824ing a search of the motor vehicle and therefore there was no statutory or constitutional violation.111
II.
I also find nothing in our case law nor in the Delaware Constitution of 1897 (or in its predecessors) that precludes our adopting the good faith exception rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Leon.
In 1914 in Weeks v. United States,112 the United States Supreme Court held that evidence obtained by means of an unlawful search and seizure by federal officers is not admissible against an accused in a federal criminal trial. The exclusionary rule thus established was based on the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures in the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and did not affect the admissibility of evidence in state courts. In 1961 in Mapp v. Ohio,113 the United States Supreme Court extended the exclusionary rule to state courts. Delaware had earlier reached the same conclusion in Rickards v. State.114
In 1984 in Leon, the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, itself, does not expressly preclude the use of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant, that is later found to be defective. This is now known as “the good faith exception rule .” Since then, some states have not considered the rule, while others have either adopted it or rejected it. 19 ALR 5th 470, 487. In State v. Bolt,115 the Arizona Supreme Court, after reviewing the pros and cons of alternative means of deterring illegal searches by the police, adopted the good faith exception rule as a matter of state public policy. I agree with that reasoning.
III.
Because the good.faith exception to the exclusionary rule is not precluded by the Delaware Constitution, or any statute or precedent, the issue before us is whether, as a matter of public policy, the good faith exception rule should be adopted in Delaware. I believe it should be.
The first Delaware Constitution, in 1776, incorporated a Declaration of Rights and Fundamental Rules of the Delaware State. Section 17 stated:
That all warrants without oath to search suspected places, or to seize any person or his property, are grievous and oppressive; and all general warrants to search suspected places, or to apprehend all persons suspected, without naming or describing the place or an person in special, are illegal and ought not to be granted.116
I find nothing in that language that precludes a good faith exception to any later judicially-created exclusionary rule and there is no evidence that the delegates to that Convention considered an exclusionary rule or any good faith exception thereto.
In any case, the 1776 Constitution with its Declaration of Rights ceased to be the Constitution of Delaware or to have any force when it was replaced (not amended) by the Delaware Constitution of 1792 that was promulgated by the delegates on June 12, 1792. The Delaware Constitutional Convention of 1792 was convened, in large part, because of the adoption of the United States Constitution in 1789 and its Bill of Rights (the first ten amendments) in 1791.117 The Bill of Rights had been ratified by Delaware on January 28, 1790.
*825The Delaware Constitution of 1792 provided in Section 6: “The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or things, shall issue without describing them as particularly as may be; nor then; unless there be probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.” That language was readopted (with only stylistic changes) in the Delaware Constitution of 1881 that replaced the 1792 Constitution. Our current Constitution, which replaced the 1831 Constitution, also adopted the same language in Art. I § 6.
In Rickards v. State,118 this Court stated: “Article I, Section 6, of the [1897] Constitution of Delaware is substantially identical with the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution preventing unreasonable searches and seizures. Article I, Section 7, of the Constitution of Delaware prohibits compulsory self-incrimination and is substantially the same as the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.” 119 I agree. As the Supreme Court of the United States held in Leon, there is nothing in that Constitutional language that addresses a good faith exception to the judicially created exclusionary rule that was created long after 1897. In Rick-ards this Court adopted the exclusionary rule for Delaware because it was persuaded by the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Weeks and its progeny.120
In my opinion, the cases relied on by the majority are not persuasive. In Mason v. State121 the challenged search of the defendant’s apartment took place during the nighttime without a warrant. Subsequent to the search, a warrant was obtained that this Court held did not meet the exigent circumstances mandate of 11 Del.C. § 2808, the Delaware nighttime search statute.122 In Rickards and Sanders v. State,123 this Court did not discuss good faith reliance. A court, in construing a constitution, should begin by using the same principles of law used to construe an Act of the General Assembly.124 In construing a statute a court must attempt to ascertain the intent of the enacting body. In the case of a state Constitution, a court should consider the intent of its framers and the initial focus is always on the text.125 In Commonwealth v. Edmunds,126 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowledged that it went beyond the text and history of the Pennsylvania Constitution. It also relied on certain criminal rules of Pennsylvania. In State v. Hunt,127 the New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged that State policy reasons justified its departure from federal precedents construing the Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution.
Because no stenographic record of the debates of the Delaware Constitutional Conventions prior to the 1897 Convention exists, it is virtually impossible to find any valid aid to construction other than the primary one: the text itself. In 1897, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention *826agreed to adopt without change the bill of rights as contained in the Delaware Constitutions of 1792 and 1831.128 In Rickards the Delaware Supreme Court found that Article I § 6 of the Delaware Constitution is substantially identical to the text of the Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution. As the United States Supreme Court found in Leon, there is no language in the Fourth Amendment that addresses the issue of a good faith exception to the judicially created exclusionary rule. I am also convinced it was the United States Constitution of 1789 that was the primary impetus for the Delaware Constitution of 1792 that replaced the Delaware Constitution of 1776.129 In my opinion, we are free to adopt the good faith exception rule as adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Leon and should do so as a matter of good state policy.
IV.
In summary, I agree with Justice Berger that the judgment of the Superior Court be affirmed. There is, in my opinion, no binding Delaware Constitutional provision or precedent that either adopts the Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule or precludes its adoption by us. If the Leon good faith exception is to be rejected, it must- be done so on the basis of public policy, not dicta, statutes or historical speculation.130 In my opinion, the good faith exception rule (as adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Leon), as a matter of state policy, constitutes a proper balance between the rights of an owner of a motor vehicle that contains a weapon to protection against an unreasonable search and the rights of individuals to life. It should, therefore, be adopted in Delaware.

. 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984).

. DeLSupr., 745 A.2d 856 (1999).

.Id. at 874 (Hartnett, J., concurring).

. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).

. 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914).

. 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961).

. Del.Supr., 77 A.2d 199 (1950).

. 142 Ariz. 260, 689 P.2d 519 (1984).

. Declaration of Rights and Fundamental Rules of the Delaware State § 17 (1776).

. See Jeannete Eckman, Constitutional Development 1776-1897 in Delaware: A History of the First State, 284-85 (H. Clay Reed, ed., 1947).

. Del.Supr., 77 A.2d 199 (1950).

. Id. at 204 (emphasis added).

. See also Cook v. State, Del.Supr., 374 A.2d 264 (1977); Gamer v. State, Del.Supr., 314 A.2d 908 (1973).

. Del.Supr., 534 A.2d 242 (1987).

. The Court stated "We find that Leon is not applicable to the questions presented in this appeal.” 534 A.2d at 254.

. Sanders v. State, Del.Supr., 585 A.2d 117 (1990). Sanders involved the issue of the effect of a jury verdict of "guilty but mentally ill” and not search and seizure.

. Turnbull v. Fink, Del.Supr., 668 A.2d 1370, 1378 n. 7 (1995).

. Alfieri v. Martelli, Del.Supr., 647 A.2d 52, 54 n. 1 (1994).

. 526 Pa. 374, 586 A.2d 887, 901 (1991).

. 91 NJ. 338, 450 A.2d 952, 955 (1982).

. Rodman Ward, Jr. and Paul J. Lockwood, in The Delaware Constitution of 1897, 78-79 (Randy J. Holland, ed., 1997).

. Jeannete Eckman, Constitutional Development 1776-1786 in Delaware: A History of the First State, 284-85 (H. Clay Reed, ed., 1947).

. "History never embraces more than a small part of reality.” La Rochefoucauld.