Court Opinion

ID: 9418612
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:34:04.396453+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:49:46.062606
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Brandéis,
concurring in part.
I agree that the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals, directing a dismissal of the Railroad’s bill, should be reversed. But I think that the decree of the District Court requires serious modification. That decree ordered among other things, “ that the Town of Morristown, do desist and refrain, and is hereby forever restrained and enjoined bjr the attempted enforcement of said ordinance or other'wise, from in any manner interfering with or hindering or obstructing the complainant, the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company, in the occupation, use or control of its said station grounds, or in regulating the place, manner or time in which public or private vehicles going to and from said station grounds shall enter, stand or wait thereon or depart from the same.” This part of the decree is, in my opinion, inconsistent with the terms of the contract between the Railroad and the town, with the decision of the highest court of the State construing the same, Welsh v. Morristown, 98 N. J. L. 630, affirmed sub *196nom. Welsh v. Potts, 99 N. J. L. 528, and with the general law of New Jersey. It seems to me inconsistent, also, with the law concerning the obligations of railroads as heretofore declared by this Court.
The situation which confronted the town authorities was this: About 3,000 passengers are handled in and out of the .station each day. Continuously, for nearly ten years after the elimination of the grade crossings, cabs had, under the direction of the town authorities and with the acquiescence, of the Railroad, parked at the place later assigned by the ordinance here in question. Then, in 1922, arose the controversy which gave rise to the Welsh case and to the case at bar. The bulk of the traffic passing through the station is composed of persons commuting to Newark and New York. Accordingly, the demand for taxicabs at the station is largely concentrated in the late afternoon hours. There are forty-two licensed cabs in Morristown. About twenty-five of them were accustomed to park at the station, at various times of the day. Presumably most of them were available for service at the rush hour in the late afternoon. Welsh, for whom the Railroad asserts the exclusive privilege of using the driveway as a hack stand, has only three licensed cabs. Obviously, these are insufficient to give an adequate service. It is true that Welsh made application for additional licenses, and that these have been denied by the town authorities. But the testimony shows that the authorities were of the opinion that there were already more taxicabs in the town than could be operated profitably. No new license had been granted to any one since a date preceding Welsh’s application; and no cabman had a license to operate more than three cabs.
The Railroad presented this alternative to the town: “Either grant to Welsh licenses sufficient in number to enable him to supply the needs of all passengers arriving at the station, or submit to a denial to such passengers of *197the facilities customary on leaving the station.” To escape from that dilemma the town first resorted to the means upheld by the New Jersey courts in the Welsh case. It prohibited all parking on the driveway, and located a public taxi-stand on a public street adjacent thereto. While this provided a service adequate so far as the number of vehicles was concerned, it proved unsatisfactory in other respects. The taxi-stand was several hundred feet distant from the shelter house; was not easily visible therefrom; and was difficult of access in inclement weather. The town then passed the ordinance which gave rise to the present suit. It undertook to establish near the station door a public taxi-stand on the Railroad’s land. That it clearly had no right to do; for the contract between it and the Railroad had not made the driveway a public street. Obviously a railroad’s property cannot be taken without compensation for a purpose unconnected with its rail transportation. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 238 U. S. 340, 346; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Cahill, 253 U. S. 71. A public taxi-stand is such an unconnected purpose. It would be open to use by cabs which do not serve the patrons of the Railroad, as well as those which do. In establishing this public taxi-stand, the town exceeded its powers. Enforcement of this ordinance was properly enjoined. And since the individual defendants must base their claims on the ordinance, the injunction against them also was proper. Compare Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U. S. 279; Thompson’s Express & Storage Co. v. Mount, 91 N. J. Eq. 497.
But the injunction granted by the District Court was so broad as to prevent the town from making, by future ordinance, provisions which it may deem necessary to assure to its inhabitants adequate cab facilities. While the contract between the town and the Railroad did not make the driveway a public highway, it did not restrict *198rights which the town would otherwise have had under the New Jersey Law and under decisions of this Court. Under the New Jersey law the Railroad was bound to keep the driveway open to all persons seeking access to' and from the station on legitimate business. It could not obstruct the driveway by physical enclosure. Public Service Ry. Co. v. Weehawken, 94 N. J. Eq. 88, 92. It could not, by its private contract with Welsh, interfere with the power of the municipality to make appropriate regulations as to traffic there. Welsh v. Morristown, supra. For as the New Jersey court said, “ the driveway in question was and is devoted to public use, although the fee thereof remained in the railroad company.” Like all property of a carrier by railroad, the driveway was subject to the power of the State to compel the provision of adequate facilities incident to the rail transportation.
In these days, the ability of the traveller to obtain conveniently, upon reaching the street door of the station, a taxicab to convey him and his hand-baggage to his ultimate destination, is an essential of adequate rail transportation. The duties of a rail carrier are not necessarily limited to transporting freight and passengers to. and from its stations. It must, in connection with its stations, provide adequately for ingress and for egress. And if it does not itself provide the facilities essential for the convenient removal of freight and passengers from the station, it may be required to let others provide them. That a railroad's obligations may be extended beyond its rails, is settled by numerous decisions of this Court. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Corporation Commission, 206 U. S. 1, 21-22; Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Iowa, 233 U. S. 334; Michigan Central R. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 236 U. S. 615; Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Ochs, 249 U. S. 416; Lake Erie & Western R. R. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 249 *199U. S. 422. A State may require a railroad to construct stations. Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 193 U. S. 53. It may compel the building of a crossing for the convenience of shippers in removing freight. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 265 U. S. 70, 74. Its power to require adequate provision for carrying passengers to their ultimate destination rests on the same basis. Compare Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Knight, 192 U. S. 21, 26.
The Lackawanna Railroad recognized the importance of proper cab service. It undertook to provide it by the contract with Welsh. But Welsh was in no position to furnish adequate service. He had only three licensed cabs. The Railroad answers that Welsh agreed by his contract with it to supply as many cabs as were needed and that, but for the refusal of the town to grant him more licenses, he would have supplied the requisite number. The town was not obliged to issue additional licenses to Welsh. Its refusal to do so was not arbitrary or unreasonable. The ground of its refusal was that the granting of additional licenses would ruin the business of the established cabmen who had long been engaged in serving its inhabitants, and thus would impair the cab service of the general public throughout the town. The principle on which the town acted is one that is general in motor vehicle regulation today.1 It is one that has been ap*200proved by this Court. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 270 U. S. 266, 277; Interstate Busses Corp. v. Holyoke Street Ry. Co., 273 U. S. 45, 52. Compare Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140, 145; Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Bailroad Commission, 271 U. S. 583, 599-600.
The record shows that the service which Welsh can furnish is inadequate, that to grant him sufficient licenses to enable him to furnish such service would impair taxi service throughout the town, and that a taxi-stand located elsewhere than on the driveway does not satisfy the needs of travellers leaving the station. If, under these circumstances, the town should pass an ordinance establishing, *201on the driveway, a taxi-stand available only to incoming passengers, I see no reason why, under the contract between it and the Railroad or under the general laws of New Jersey, it may not do so. Certainly Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U. S. 279, .presents no obstacle. For in that case, the Court expressly left open the question whether the State, to secure adequate service, might require what the cabmen there asserted of their own right. P. 298. Compare Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Public Service Commission, supra.
Moreover, the decree is subject to another infirmity. By its broad language, it restrains the town from making and enforcing reasonable traffic regulations applicable to the driveway. In so doing it conflicts with both the terms of the contract and the decision of the New Jersey courts in the Welsh case. The contract between the Railroad and the town expressly declares that the driveway “ shall be kept open at all times for passengers, pedestrians, carriages, wagons, automobiles and general vehicular traffic to and from the station grounds ”; and that “the Town may and shall exercise all necessary police powers in and upon the station, station grounds, approaches and driveways, for the purpose of regulating foot and vehicular traffic.” It was decided in Welsh v. Morristown, 98 N. J. L. 630, affirmed sub nom. Welsh v. Potts, 99 N. J. L. 528, that under this contract the town had power to prohibit all parking on the driveway. That construction, being a ruling on a matter of law, is binding upon us. St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. St. Paul Water Commissioners, 168 U. S. 349, 358; Guffey v. Smith, 237 U. S. 101, 112-113. Compare Detroit v. Osborne, 135 U. S. 492, 497-500; Hartford Insurance Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 175 U. S. 91, 100.
Mr. Justice Holmes concurs in this opinion.

 In at least nine states the commission charged with the duty of licensing bus operators is specifically directed to consider the transportation service already furnished and the effect which the proposed service would have upon it, Colorado, Compiled Laws, 1921, § 2946; Kansas, Laws, 1925, c. 206, § 4; Kentucky, Acts, 1926, e. 112, § 4; Montana, Laws, 1923, c. 154, § 4; North Dakota, Laws, 1925, c. 91, §§ 4, 5, 8; Ohio, Page’s Code' 1926, § 614-87; South Dakota, Laws, 1925, c. 224, § 3; West Virginia, Barnes’ Code, 1925, c. 43, § 82; Wyoming, Compiled Statutes, 1920, § 5497. The principle of safeguarding established, adequate facilities, is applied by commissions in *200passing upon applications for certificates of convenience and necessity, and by courts in reviewing their orders, although there is not a specific direction in the statute. In the following cases the orders of commissions granting certificates of convenience and necessity were set aside on the ground that it did not sufficiently appear that existing facilities were inadequate: West Suburban Transportation Co. v. Chicago & West Towns Ry. Co., 309 Ill. 87; Choate v. Commerce Commission, 309 Ill. 248; Superior Motor Bus Co. v. Community Motor Bus Co., 320 Ill. 175; Cooper v. McWilliams & Robinson, 298 S. W. 961 (Ky.); Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 112 Ohio St. 699; East End Traction Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 115 Ohio St. 119; Columbus Ry., Power & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 116 Ohio St. 36; Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. State, 123 Okla. 190. In Red Star Transportation Co. v. Red Dot Coach Lines, 220 Ky. 424; McClain v. Public Utilities Commission, 110 Ohio St. 1; and Abbott v. Public Utilities Commission, 136 Atl. 490 (R. I.), orders denying certificates were sustained, on the ground that the proposed operation would have impaired adequate transportation facilities already established. The same principles apply with regard to municipal regulation of jitney busses. Cloe v. State, 209 Ala. 544, 545-546; Birmingham Interurban Taxicab Service Corp. v. McLendon, 210 Ala. 525; State v. City of Spokane, 109 Wash. 360. That a railroad has no preferred claim to the grant of a certificate, see Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Department of Public Works, 256 Pac. 333 (Wash.). Compare Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. State Road Commission, 139 S. E. 744 (W. Va.).