Court Opinion

ID: 9384358
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-03 17:01:24.592571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:52.921293
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                           APR 3 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                        U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CECILIA M. FERREIRA,                            No.    22-15906

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 1:20-cv-00509-SAB

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security,

                Defendant-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Eastern District of California
                Stanley Albert Boone, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

                            Submitted March 30, 2023**
                             San Francisco, California

Before: McKEOWN, GOULD, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.

      Cecilia Ferreira (“Ferreira”) appeals the district court’s decision affirming

the final judgment of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her application

for disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. We have

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

      We review de novo the district court’s order. Cody v. Kijakazi, 48 F.4th 956,

960 (9th Cir. 2022). “We will affirm the decision of the administrative law judge

[(“ALJ”)] unless it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on a legal

error.” Wellington v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 867, 871 (9th Cir. 2017). “Our review of

an ALJ’s fact-finding for substantial evidence is deferential, and ‘[t]he threshold

for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.’” Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1159

(9th Cir. 2020) (internal citation omitted). We affirm.

      1. The ALJ’s handling of the testimony of Dr. Albert Ferrari, Ferreira’s

treating rheumatologist, is supported by substantial evidence. Under existing

precedent, a treating or examining physician’s opinion can be discounted if the

ALJ provides “specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial

evidence.” Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal citation

omitted).1 The ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for discounting Dr.

Ferrari’s medical opinion, such as the inconsistencies between Dr. Ferrari’s

opinion and the weight of the other medical professionals’ opinions, including the

opinion of examining physician Dr. Lauri Stenbeck. The evidence in the record

1
  Because Ferreira filed her claim before March 27, 2017, the new regulatory
framework for evaluating medical evidence is not applicable. See Woods v.
Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 789 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing Revisions to Rules Regarding
the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844 (Jan. 18, 2017)).

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does not compel a different result than the one that the ALJ reached. Ferreira’s

citation to Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587 (9th Cir. 2004), is unavailing, as the

ALJ in Ferreira’s case did not show a similar “[s]heer disbelief” in fibromyalgia as

a potentially debilitating condition. Id. at 594. The ALJ went through the entirety

of the record and identified inconsistencies not just between Dr. Ferrari’s medical

opinion and Ferreira’s daily activities, but also in various medical opinions

presented to the ALJ.

      2. The ALJ provided “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for

discounting Ferreira’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms, and

substantial evidence does not compel a different result. See Lingenfelter v. Astrue,

504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting the “specific, clear and convincing

reasons” standard) (citation omitted). The ALJ did not discount Ferreira’s

testimony regarding whether she had her claimed impairments, but rather

questioned the limiting effects those impairments had on her ability to perform

work. The ALJ cited to specific medical evidence showing that Ferreira retained

sufficient residual functioning to counter her subjective allegations of pain and

resulting disability. “Our cases do not require ALJs to perform a line-by-line

exegesis of the claimant’s testimony, nor do they require ALJs to draft

dissertations when denying benefits.” Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1277 (9th

Cir. 2020). Substantial evidence does not compel this court to uncritically credit

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Ferreira’s testimony when it is directly contravened by her statements in other

contexts or by the opinions of medical professionals.

      3. The ALJ gave germane reasons for discounting the opinions of Ferreira’s

mother, Helia Carvalho, to the extent she opined on her daughter’s functional

limitations. The ALJ properly discounted certain parts of Carvalho’s testimony

because Carvalho was not a doctor or other expert, as “medical diagnoses are

beyond the competence of lay witnesses.” Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1467

(9th Cir. 1996). Carvalho’s opinion that Ferreira could not work a regular job or

regular job hours due to her medical conditions is a medical determination that can

properly be discounted by the ALJ. The ALJ also stated that “the accumulated

medical evidence” was not outweighed by Carvalho’s observations of how

Ferreira’s limitations affected Ferreira’s ability to work. See Bayliss v. Barnhart,

427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that “[i]nconsistency with medical

evidence” is a germane reason that allows for discounting of a lay person’s

observations). Substantial evidence does not compel a different conclusion.

Finally, the ALJ was entitled to discount Carvalho’s testimony for the same

reasons it rejected Ferreira’s similar testimony. See Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec.

Admin. 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009); Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1121-

22 (9th Cir. 2012).

      4. The ALJ properly determined that Ferreira could perform jobs existing in

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substantial numbers in the economy. To the extent that Ferreira argues that the

ALJ’s determination of her residual ability is not supported by substantial

evidence, the argument is inherently derivative of Ferreira’s previous arguments

regarding the proper weighing of medical testimony. We hold that substantial

evidence does not compel a different finding. Additionally, though Ferreira

directly disputes the ALJ’s determination that Ferreira could not perform two out

of the three jobs identified by the vocational expert, Ferreira crucially does not

dispute the ALJ’s finding that she could perform the third job of housekeeper.

Substantial evidence does not compel a different result than that reached by the

Commissioner of Social Security.

      AFFIRMED.

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