Court Opinion

ID: 6739682
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-20 23:20:58.732497+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:01:55.226081
License: Public Domain

Christianson, J.
(concurring). All the errors assigned and argued on this appeal relate to the defense interposed by the defendant. It is contended:
(1) That there is no evidence justifying the application of subdivision I, § 15, c. 202, Laws 1917, which provides:
“Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that the buyer relies upon the seller’s skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for that purpose.”
(2) That the evidence in this case does not show a breach of such warranty (if one exists) for the reason that it does not appear that the musical instrument was not reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was purchased, but on the contrary that the evidence shows that it was fit for such purpose.
(3) That the contract of sale was for a specified article, under its . patent or trade name, and, hence, that (under subd. 4, § 15, c. 202, Laws 1917) there was no implied warranty as to its fitness for any particular purpose.
(4) That there is no evidence from which the jury could compute the amount of damages to which the defendant is entitled, in event a warranty and breach thereof were shown.
1 and 2. So far as the first two contentions are concerned. I am of the opinion that the evidence, considered as a whole, justified the submission to the jury both as to whether an implied warranty existed, and also whether there was a breach of such warranty. In other words, the evidence was such that it could not be said, as a matter of law, either that there was or was not an implied warranty; neither could it be said, as a matter of law, that the warranty (if one existed) had not been broken. Inasmuch as the findings of the jury upon these two questions have substantial support in the evidence, they are, of course, not subject to interference by this court.
3. The contention that the contract involved in this case was for the sale of a specified article, under its patent or trade name, has in my opinion no real basis in the evidence. The evidence shows that the defendant was solicited by the plaintiff to purchase an instrument of the character involved in this controversy. When the defendant called upon *401the plaintiffs with respect to the matter,, he was not at all interested in the purchase of- an instrument of any particular make. He did not come to the plaintiff saying that he desired to purchase a fotoplayer manufactured by some particular firm. What he wanted and finally agreed to buy was an instrument which could be utilized for a particular purpose; and he relied upon plaintiff’s representations and superior skill or judgment as to what that instrument should be. In any event, the record ■discloses that the contention that the contract of sale was for a specified .article under its patent or trade name was not advanced in the trial court, and it cannot be urged for the first time on appeal.
4. I am also of the opinion that the contention that the evidence furnished no proper basis for a computation of damages may not be raised at this time. It is true that the questions propounded to the witnesses as to the value of the instrument were couched in the' present tense; that is, the witnesses were not asked as to the value of the instrument at the time of the purchase, but were asked as to the then value. The defendant testified that the instrument could be used as a piano, but that the attachments were of no value, and that, used as a piano, it was worth .'$500. Another witness for the defendant testified that the instrument in its then condition was valueless. These witnesses were both present at the time of the installation of the instrument, and had more or less to do with its operation and repair during the entire period it was in the hands of the defendant. Their testimony was not objected to on the ground now urged. The only objection urged to the testimony of either witness in the trial court was that the witness had not been shown to be qualified to testify as to value. No objection was made on the ground that the evidence related to the value of the instrument at the time of the trial, and that it should relate to the value of the instrument at the time of the purchase. The objection now made could readily have been obviated, if it had been presented at the time of the trial, and manifestly the plaintiff cannot at this time object to the evidence on grounds different from those raised in the trial court. It would also seem that no particular harm could result from the questions as propounded. Whether a particular article is fit for a specified purpose can generally be determined only after trial or an attempt to apply it to the intended use. While the questions propounded to the witnesses as to the value of the instrument in controversy were in the present tense, and the answers related to the then value of the instrument, it would seem that this testimony, if true, also *402tended to prove that the instrument, at the time of its installation, was fit only for the same purpose which the testimony showed it to be fit for at the time of the trial.
Upon the record as a whole, I find no.reason for disturbing the verdict or the judgment entered thereon. Hence I agree that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed.
Bronson, J., concurs.