Court Opinion

ID: 9832892
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:16:55.091542+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:55.006930
License: Public Domain

Opinion on Motion for Rehearing.
Counsel for appellees have presented a motion for rehearing, accompanied by an able printed argument, all of which have been carefully considered by this court. However, we have reached the conclusion tha-t we made the proper disposition of the case, and that the motion must be overruled. We deem it proper, however, to file an additional opinion relating to what seems to be the main points relied upon by appellees’ counsel.
[5] It is urgently insisted that because appellant requested the court to give several instructions relating to the question of discovered peril it is estopped by what has been denominated “invited error,” and should not be heard to complain because the court submitted to the jury the issue of discovered peril, and instructed them that contributory negligence was no defense against liability predicated upon the law of discovered peril.
Appellant requested the trial court to give six special charges, numbered 1 to 6, inclusive. No. 1 was a peremptory instruction, stating that the evidence was insufficient to warrant a .verdict for the plaintiffs, and directing the jury to return a verdict for the defendant. All of the other charges requested by the defendant show upon their faces that they were subject to the action of the court in refusing to give the defendant’s special charge No. 1. In other words, the record makes it clear that appellant did not intend to concede that there was testimony sufficient to authorize the court to submit to the jury any theory upon which a verdict against appellant could be predicated, and that all of the charges requested were based upon the theory that the court did not agree with appellant upon that subject, and appellant, in the event the question of discovered peril should he submitted to the jury, merely sought to have the views of its counsel upon the law of that question presented'to them. The facts referred to do not disclose invited error. Patton v. Dallas Gas Co., 108 Tex. 321, 192 S. W. 1060.
We also overrule appellees’ contention that appellant did not in the trial court object to the submission of the issue of discovered peril. Appellant filed written objections to the court’s charge, in which the paragraph submitting that issue was objected to, among other reasons, as follows:
“And because all of the evidence in the record conclusively shows that the employes in charge of said engine did all that they could do to preventi the accident after discovering the peril. Therefore the issue as to whether Brakeman Jack Cantrell was negligent in failing to warn deceased, Ben F. Gooch, is clearly not raised, for the simple reason that the said Jack Cantrell gave a warning immediately upon discovering deceased, which fact is not disputed, and cannot in the very nature of things be disputed.”
The document referred to assigned other reasons for objecting to that paragraph of the court’s charge, predicated upon the idea that the evidence did not authorize the submission of that issue. ‘ That, in connection with appellant’s request for an instructed verdict, was sufficient to preserve appellant’s right to present the question in this court.'
The third ground of the motion, which is urged with much force and confidence, embodies the contention that this court not only committed error when it held that the testimony did not raise the issue of discovered peril, but that in so holding it, in effect, overruled several appellate decisions in this state. That feature of the case has been carefully reconsidered, with the result that no sufficient reason has been shown or *789found for changing the conclusion we reached upon that subject at the former hearing.
In support of their contention counsel have cited a number of Texas cases, three of which it is claimed are directly in point in appellees’ favor.
The first case is I. & G. N. R. R. Co. v. Ploeger, 93 S. W. 226, and same volume (Sup.) 722. In that case the engineer in charge of the engine that injured Ploeger testified that when he first saw him he was going toward the track and stooped over in what the witness called a trot; that he was about 12 or 15 feet from the traqk, coming as though he was going across the track; and that he, the witness, thought Ploeger was going to try to cross the track, and hardly had time to do it, and that he'applied the brake in the emergency with one hand and grabbed the whistle and blew it with the other. There was other testimony which justified the jury in finding that the engineer did not blow the whistle, or give any other signal, and doubtless it was upon that theory that the jury found for the plaintiff. At any rate, it was quite clear from the testimony given by the engineer himself that he realized the fact that Ploeger was about to go upon the track, where he would probably be injured, at a time when he was 12 or 15 feet from the track; and therefore the engineer’s knowledge of Ploeger’s perilous situation brought the case clearly within the doctrine of discovered peril.
The second case is H. & T. C. R. R. Co. v. Finn, 107 S. W. 94. In that case the plaintiff, Finn, was traveling in a space 10 feet in width between two railroad tracks in the city of Houston. He was not a trespasser, because the space referred to had been used so long by the public that it was known as “Railroad street”; and we quote, as follows, some, of the facts disclosed by Mr. Justice Hodges, who wrote the opinion of the court:
“While the appellee was walking along in this space between the two tracks, a passenger train operated by the employés of the San Antonio & Aransas Pass Railroad Company was moving westward from the Central Depot towards Houston avenue, meeting the appellee. At the samo time a switch engine with two loaded stock cars attached to its rear was backing up and approaching the appellee from his rear, going in the same direction that he was traveling. At or about the time the passenger train and the switch engine with the stock cars were passing each other, and at some point between Hickory and Oak streets, the appellee, having approached in close proximity to the southern track on which the switch engine was pushing the stock cars, and having his back toward the direction from which the switch engine was approaching, was struck on the shoulder by some portion of the forward car near its corner, and received the injuries for -which he sued. The result of the collision was that he fell forward and outward from the 'cars to the ground on his face, so that no portion of his limbs or person was actually run over by the cars. He had not advanced sufficiently far to get on the track, but was merely within range of that part of the backing ears which extended over the rails. * *
“While walking east between the two tracks he observed a passenger train on his left approaching him from the opposite direction, coming from the Central Depot; and when it got near him steam was being emitted from the cylinder cocks on the sides, and in order to avoid this steam as the engine approached he moved to the right, that is, to-wards the track on the south side, and about that time became unconscious. He learned afterwards that he had at that instant been struck by ears approaching him from behind on the southern track; that the passenger train while approaching and emitting steam made considerable noise, and this prevented him from hearing the noise of the cars that struck him. He also stated that after he passed between the tracks at about Hickory street he again looked backward to see if any cars were coming in his direction, and saw none. At the point where the accident occurred the two tracks were parallel and about 10 feet apart. He had walked beyond Hickory street when the collision occurred. He had walked all the way down to the point where he bore to the right to avoid the steam in the center, of the space between the two tracks, and aid this in order to avoid coming in contact with any moving train. At tho time he diverged from this position to go around the steam coming from the passenger engine he did not halt, but kept moving on, and had no idea that any other train was coming in his rear. He hoard no one halloo or give him any warning of the approach of a train, and his hearing- at that time was good. His recollection as to whether he had gotten beyond the steam of the passenger engine when struck was not clear, but he thought the accident must have occurred immediately as he bore to the right to get out of the way, and while the steam was still upon him. A man on an engine or car could see him at the time he was struck a distance of three or four blocks in both directions. It was also admitted by attorneys for appellee that had he looked back he could have seen the approaching engine and cars that caused his injuries. The fact is undisputed that the train that struck the appellee was operated by the em-ployés of the appellant, and consisted of two loaded stock cars and • a switch engine, which were being backed down towards the Central Depot. Will Hellegeist, a witness for the ap-pellee, testified: That at the time of the accident he was on the railroad track about 35 or 40 yards behind the appellee and west of Mm, and witnessed the collision. That appel-lee was walking in the space between the two tracks as the passenger train approached, emitting steam. That appellee moved to the right around the steam, and just as he did so the cars on the other track struck him and knocked Mm down. Both trains were then stopped. After both had stopped the forward end of the stock car that struck Finn and the passenger engine were between two and. three cars apart; the latter having passed ' the stock car. That there was no obstruction to hinder the men on the car from seeing Finn, nor was there any to prevent Finn from seeing the approaching *790car had he looked hack. Jim Scott, a switch-man and witness for the appellant, testified: That he was on the top of one of the stock cars of the train that injured the appellee, and was on the end next to the switch engine as they were being backed down towards the Central Depot. That Butler Nance, a brakeman, and Mr. Crawford, the foreman, were standing on the top of the other car, which was in the lead toward the depot. While in this position, and just after passing Hickory street, he heard Nance halloo, ‘Look out! look out!’ and at the same time give a stop signal. Witness looked over the edge of the car to see the cause of this stop signal at this time, and discovered the appellee within 4 or 5 feet of the front end of the forward car, and immediately signaled the engineer to stop. The latter applied the air, and the cars were stopped within 25 or 30 feet, which was as short a distance as a stop could have been made, considering the rate of speed at which they were traveling. At that time they were going at about 5 or 6 miles per hour. Pie also stated that at the time he saw Einn and received the signals to stop the engine the passenger train on the other track had passed Finn and was about opposite the witness, and that no steam was then being emitted by the engine of the passenger train. He further admitted that a man walking down between those tracks, meeting an engine emitting steam, would be expected to bear away from the steam, and that he (witness) seeing one under those conditions - would govern himself accordingly, and if he thought the man was unconscious of the approach of any cars in his rear, would take care to see that the man was advised in time to avoid injury, but that he would not expect the man to step over on the other track to avoid the steam.”
As pointed out in that case, the jury had the right to find from testimony given by the plaintiff and one of his witnesses that the engine approaching him from the front was emitting steam, and that to escape from supposed injury by the steam he diverged so near the track on the other side that he was struck and injured by the train which was approaching from the rear; that the defendant’s. switchman, who was assisting in handling the train which caused the injury, saw the train in front, saw that it was emitting steam, and if he did so, then, according to his own testimony, he realized the fact that the plaintiff Finn would be expected to bear away from the steam, which would place him in proximity of the train approaching from the rear, and that he might be struck and injured by that train, unless something was done by those operating it to prevent that result. This shows that the brakeman Scott realized that Finn was in a perilous situation, and would probably do exactly what the testimony shows he did— diverge so far to the opposite side as caused him to be struck and injured by the train approaching him from the rear. Those facts brought that case clearly within the doctrine of discovered peril.
The third case is I. & G. N. R. R. Co. v. Tinon, 117 S W. 936. The following is quoted from that case:
“That appellant’s line of railroad at the point where it crossed a public road ran north and south; that a public road running from west to east, at a point about identical with the west line of the right of way of the railroad, divided into two prongs, one of which extended east across the track of the railroad, and the other of which extended north along and parallel with the west boundary line of said right of way; that from the point where the public road crossed the railroad to a point south about 250 to 300 yards, where it curved to the west, the track of the railroad was straight and slightly upgrade; that for some distance west the public road as it approached the crossing over the railroad was also straight; and that between said public road as'it so approached said crossing from the west and the right of way for the railroad south of the crossing was a field inclosed in part by a fence along the south line of the road and west line of the right of way. It further appeared from the evidence: That at about 9 o’clock on the morning of November 28, 1904, deceased and her sister Rose, then about 30 years of age, started to go afoot from a point on the public road west of the crossing to a point east of the crossing; that at the time the wind was blowing strongly from the south; that deceased was wearing a sunbonnet, which extended down and out, covering the sides of her head and face, and which was tied on to her head because of the wind; thkt her sister was wearing an ordinary hat pinned onto her head; that as they approached the crossing deceased and her sister, who had been jumping and skipping along the roa'd,. raced towards the crossing, the former being a short distance ahead of her sister; that at the same time appellant’s north-bound passenger train was approaching the crossing at a speed of between 40 and 50 miles an hour, and making very little noise; and that deceased, as she reached the crossing, and while running across the same, was struck by the locomotive pulling the train and thereby instantly killed.”
The deceased’s sister testified that there was a man in the engine on the side next to her, and in discussing the question of discovered peril Chief Justice Willson said:
“We are of the opinion that the testimony referred to made it proper to submit to the jury as' an issue in the case whether deceased’s perilous position was discovered, by the fireman or not, and if it was, whether or not it was discovered in time to have enabled him by the means at hand to have averted the injury resulting in her death. Had deceased known that the train was approaching, and that it was so close to the crossing, her position would not have been one of peril, for by stopping before she reached the crossing she could have effectually prevented injury to herself from the train. Her peril was due to her ignorance of the fact that the train was approaching and so close to the crossing. Railway Co. v. Finn (Tex. Civ. App.) 107 S. W. 99; Railway Co. v. Munn [46] Tex. Civ. App. [276], 102 8. W. 445; Railway Co. v. Ball, 96 Tex. 624, 75 S. W. 4. Is the evidence sufficient to support a finding that the *791fireman discovered that she was so ignorant? The jury had a right to disbelieve the testimony of the fireman and the engineer that the former was engaged in firing the engine as they approached the crossing, and a right to believe the testimony of deceased’s sister that a man was in the window on the fireman’s side of the cab, and from her testimony infer that that man was the fireman. Railway Co. v. Craig, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 548, 80 S. W. 866; Brown v. Griffin, 71 Tex. 659, 9 S. W. 546; Railway Co. v. Ball, 96 Tex. 624, 75 S. W. 4; Railway Co. v. Finn (Tex. Civ. App.) 107 S. W. 94. They had a right to further infer, if the fireman was in a position to see deceased as she approached the crossing, that, in the discharge of his duty to keep a lookout for persons on the public road at or near the crossing, he did see her, and that, seeing her, he knew she was approaching the crossing from the west, on a run, at a time when a high wind then blowing was calculated to distract her senses of sight and hearing, already more or less impeded by a bonnet she was wearing, and apparently was oblivious to the fact that a swiftly and almost silently moving train, running behind its schedule time, was approaching the same crossing. If the jury might have found that the fireman knew so much, what deductions, if any, were they authorized to draw from such knowledge on Ms part? We believe they were authorized to infer that he knew that her intention might be to continue running and so pass over the crossing, that she at the time might be ignorant of the fact that the train was approaching and so near to the crossing, and that because of the bonnet she was wearing, the strongly blowing wind, the absence of noise in the movement of the train, and its 'rapid speed, she might not discover its approach in time to save herself from injury by it. If the jury might have inferred the fireman knew so much, then we think they might have concluded that he discovered before the train reached the crossing that deceased was in a position of peril from it.”
The case at bar .is not, in our opinion, analogous to either of the three cases referred to. The case was submitted to the jury upon the alleged negligence of the brakeman Cantrell, and it is not claimed that he knew anything about the unfortunate men who lost their lives on that occasion until they had crossed one track in front of an approaching engine, and were seen by two other witnesses walking between that track and the one upon which an engine was approaching from their rear. There is no satisfactory evidence showing that Gooch and Mills were not aware of the fact that the engine was approaching. They may have seen it as soon as they crossed the other track, and may have supposed that they could cross the track upon which it was traveling before it reached them,, and may have attempted to do so without looking again. But be that as it may, if Cantrell discovered that they were about to attempt, or probably would attempt, to cross the track in front of the engine, and so near thereto as to endanger their lives, then it became his duty to exercise great care and diligence to prevent such injury, and his failure to do so would render appellant liable, although Mills and Gooch may have been guilty of contributory negligence in going upon the track. The doctrine of liability for discovered peril, notwithstanding the, contributory negligence of the injured party, is founded upon principles of humanity and public policy, “to prevent,” as said by Mr. Justice Denman in T. & P. Ry. Co. v. Breadow, 90 Tex. 31, 36 S. W. 412, “what would otherwise be, as far as civil liability is concerned, the licensed destruction of persons negligently exposing themselves to peril.” However, in that case, and as a part of the doctrine of discovered peril, the court said:
“If defendant, through the parties in eharge of the engine, knew of Breadow’s peril in time to have avoided same, such knowledge imposed upon it the new duty of using every means then within its power, consistent with the safety of the engine, to avoid running him down, and a failure so to do would render it liable, notwithstanding he may have been guilty of contributory negligence in being exposed to the peril. This new duty and liability for its breach is imposed, upon principles of humanity and public policy, to prevent what would otherwise be, as far as civil liability is concerned, the licensed destruction of persons negligently exposing themselves to peril. The same principle of law which, on grounds of public policy, will not permit a person to recover when his own negligence has proximately contributed to the injury, will not permit the party who has inflicted the injury in violation of such new duty to defend upon the ground of such negligence.
“The principle, however, has no application in the absence of actual knowledge, on the part of the person inflicting the injury, of the peril of the party injured, in time to avoid the injury by the use of the means and agencies then at hand. If he had no such knowledge the new duty was not imposed, though it be clear that by the exercise of reasonable care he might have acquired same. The burden of proof was upon plaintiff in this case, in order to recover for a breach of such new duty, to establish, not that the employés might by the exercise of reasonable care have acquired such knowledge, but that they actually possessed it.”
In this case, where is the testimony that shows that Cantrell discovered that Mills and Gooch were in a perilous situation because of the approach of the engine upon which he was riding in time to have prevented or mitigated the catastrophe that resulted? Did the fact that they were walking diagonally along a space 15 feet in width between two railroad tracks necessarily indicate that they intended to cross the one toward which they were diverging without taking any steps to ascertain whether it would be safe to do so? A train was passing on the track they had just crossed, and even if they had intended to continue their journey down the 15-foot space without crossing the other track, it is but natural that in crossing the first track in *792front of an approaching train they would diverge toward the other side of the 15-foot space. The railroad yard in Question, like other railroad yards, had many different tracks, and persons who enter upon such yards are charged with knowledge that trains and engines may be moving on one or more of the tracks at any time, and such persons are supposed to have knowledge of such facts, and govern themselves accordingly.
Therefore it would seem unreasonable to hold that merely because' persons are seen walking in a space between railroad tracks in a switch yard the employes engaged in moving cars and engines should assume that such persons will probably attempt to cross one of the trades without first ascertaining whether it is safe to do so. So in this case it may be conceded that the testimony justified the jury in finding that Cantrell did not tell the truth when he said that he did not see Mills and Gooch, although, he was looking in the direction where othpr, witnesses saw them walking in the space between the two tracks; and while knowledge of that fact might show that Cantrell was guilty of negligence in failing to give such warnings as are usually sufficient to cause persons so situated to remain a safe distance from the track, still that fact did not bring home to him knowledge of the additional fact that they were about to attempt to cross the track in front of his engine. But appellees’ counsel point to the fact that appellant’s witness Trantham testified that he saw Mills and Gooch walking close to the track upon which appellant’s engine was approaching; but he further stated that when he last saw them they were about 5 or 6 feet from that track. That statement explains what he meant' by the use of the term “close to the track,” or else it shows that while they may have “angled” some, a*s the witness said, toward that track, they had changed their eoúrse and gone back near the center of the space between the two tracks; and if Cantrell saw them all the time, as appellees’ counsel claim he must have, then when they turned away from the track upon which his engine was traveling he would naturally suppose that they were not going to attempt to cross that track in front of the approaching engine. And while they were 5 or 6 feet from the track they may have suddenly turned and attempted to cross in front of and so near the approaching engine that it was impossible for Cantrell to do anything which would have averted the disaster,, though he may have seen them turn and attempt to make such crossing.
The doctrine of discovered peril by which the defense of .contributory negligence is nullified and rendered unavailing is predicated upon that principle of humanity and public policy which denies to any one protection from civil liability when he has intentionally or recklessly run down and injured a human being; and one may be guilty of ordinary negligence, as to which contributory negligence is a valid defense, without manifesting such intentional or reckless disregard of human life as would bring the transaction within the rule of discovered peril, and, in our judgment, this case comes within the rule of ordinary negligence and not that of discovered peril.
Motion overruled.