Court Opinion

ID: 9606998
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:54:44.316242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:36.769569
License: Public Domain

Nichols, Presiding Justice,
dissenting.
While I agree that the 1973 Charter of the City of Atlanta is not subject to any of the constitutional attacks made in this case, I can not agree that the 1973 charter deprives Inman of any rights, responsibilities or duties to control the Police Department during his term of office.
"A public office is a public trust and is not the property of the incumbent. A public officer has no vested *574right in the compensation of his office. Moseley v. Garrett, 182 Ga. 810, 815 (187 SE 20); Walton v. Davis, 188 Ga. 56, 58 (2 SE2d 603), and citations.” Burpee v. Logan, 216 Ga. 434, 436 (117 SE2d 339). Yet, the holder of public office can not in all cases be summarily removed.
The earlier decision of this court in Walton v. Davis, 188 Ga. 56, 62 (2 SE2d 603), relied upon as authority in Burpee v. Logan, held: "To accept an office created by legislative authority with knowledge of the fact that the holder may be ousted without cause by the appointing power, or at the will of some one to whom that power has been delegated, is one thing. To be inducted into an office for a fixed term, with the right to have the office declared vacant only for certain specified causes which concern the holder, is a far different thing. In the former, the holder is granted his commission with the proviso that he may be at any time ousted at the will of another; and he takes the office with that understanding and its tenure limited by the possibility that it may be shortened without cause. Gray v. McLendon, [134 Ga. 224 (67 SE 859)]; Felton v. Huiet, [178 Ga. 311 (173 SE 660)]. In the latter, the right to deprive the holder of his office, its honor, and its perquisites and emoluments, is dependent upon the determination of certain facts; and before such facts are determined, he is, according to the law of the land, entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard. In such a case, to oust him without notice and without a hearing is to deny him due process of law, and to withhold from him rights which have been vouchsafed to freemen and which they have enjoyed almost for 'time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary.’ ”
In McDuffie v. Perkerson, 178 Ga. 230, 234 (173 SE 151, 91 ALR 1002) what constitutes public office was discussed in detail as follows: " 'An individual who has been appointed or elected in a manner prescribed by law, who has a designation or title given him by law, and who exercises functions concerning the public, assigned to him by law, is a public officer.’ Bradford v. Justices, 33 Ga. 332; Polk v. James, 68 Ga. 128 (2); Wiley v. Sparta, 154 Ga. 1, 14 (114 SE 45, 25 ALR 1342); 46 CJ 928, § 19. In 22 RCL 372, § 2, it is said: 'Since one who holds an office *575is an "officer,” it becomes necessary to ascertain what, properly considered, is an "office.” The definitions of this word, as given by the text-writers and courts, are not in entire harmony. Blackstone (2 Com. 36) defines an office as the right to exercise a public or private employment, and to take the fees or emoluments thereunto belonging. Thus it has been said that everyone who is appointed to discharge a public duty, and who receives a compensation in whatever shape, whether from the crown or otherwise, is a public officer. A distinction is drawn between public and private officers, the former being those whose functions and duties concern the public. The term "public officer” involves the idea of tenure, duration, fees or emoluments, and powers, as well as that of duty. [Emphasis supplied.] These ideas or elements can not properly be separated and each considered abstractly. All, taken together, constitute an office. But it is not necessary that an office should have all of the above-named characteristics, although it must possess more than one of them, and the mere fact that it concerns the public will not constitute it an office.’ In 46 CJ 929, § 21 c, it is said: 'The term "public office” embraces the ideas of tenure and of duration or continuance; hence an important distinguishing characteristic of an officer is that the duties to be performed by him are of a permanent character as opposed to duties which are occasional, transient, and incidental. But it is held that this element is not essential where the other qualifications of officers are present. Public employments are public offices, notwithstanding the instability of the tenure by which the incumbent holds.’ So we find that even that test is not conclusive. The decision in State ex rel. Barney v. Hawkins, 79 Mont. 506 (257 P 411, 53 ALR 583), dealt with the question of what are the essential elements to constitute public office. The court discussed the question elaborately and assembled a great number of cases throughout the country dealing with that question. Also, the case has been thoroughly annotated in ALR and reference is made thereto rather than to collect all of the same authorities in this opinion. In Wyman’s Administrative Law, 163, § 44, it is said: 'A public office, then, is the right, authority, and duty *576conferred by law by which for a given period, either fixed by law or through the pleasure of the creating power of government, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The warrant to exercise powers is conferred, not by a contract, but by the law. It finds its source and limitation in some act of expression of governmental power. Oath, salary, operation, scope of duties, are signs of the official status; but no one is essential. The essential thing is that in some way or other the officer is identified with the government.’ ”
In 1943 the Charter of the City of Atlanta was amended so as to define the powers etc. of the Chief of Police. This amendment read in part as follows: " '9-102(a). Chief of Police. The Chief of Police shall be the chief executive officer of the Department of Police, shall have full power and authority over the management and conduct thereof, and shall be charged with full and complete responsibility for its successful and efficient operation. He shall faithfully execute all laws of the State of Georgia and ordinances of the City of Atlanta. He shall have power and authority to give such orders to the officers and members of the Department of Police as he may deem proper; and it shall be their duty to render to him and his orders implicit obedience.
" '9-102 (b). Vacancy in office of Chief of Police. Whenever there shall be a vacancy in the office of the Chief of Police, such vacancy shall be filled by election by the Mayor and General Council, such election to be conducted as are other elections by the Mayor and General Council and under the same rules.’
" '9-102 (c). The Chief of Police shall have the exclusive power, and it shall be his duty to assign all officers and employees of the Police Department to their respective duties and to make such changes from time to time as he may deem proper and to the best interest of the Police Department of the City. The power herein conferred shall include the power to assign such members of the Police Department, in such numbers as he may choose to the various and sundry activities of the Department, such as traffic duty, plain clothes, detective *577bureau, the various watches and the various territories where such members of the Police Department shall work.’
" '9-102 (d). The Chief of Police shall be subject to removal, suspension, or demotion by the Mayor and General Council after trial in the manner prescribed by the other provisions of this Charter. Any decision of the Mayor and General Council suspending, demoting or discharging such Chief shall be subject to review by the Superior Court of Fulton County on a writ of certiorari.’ ”
In Yarn v. City of Atlanta, 203 Ga. 543, 545 (47 SE2d 556), referring to the above provisions of the Charter of the City of Atlanta it was said, "It is thus made the duty of the Chief of Police to assign policemen to the performance of any duty within the department and confine them to any territory within the city limits which he may think advisable in the exercise of his judgment and discretion.” Thus, at the time the Act "To Reincorporate the City of Atlanta. . .,” supra, was enacted, the Chief of Police ran the Police Department subject only to the then mayor and general council after trial, subject to review by the superior court by writ of certiorari.
The 1973 Charter of the City of Atlanta stated in part as follows: "Section 7-101. The current terms of office of all elected and appointed officials and officers of the City and its agencies, serving on the effective date of this Charter, shall not be diminished and shall continue in full force and effect. Section 7-105. (a) Any rights or interest, public or private, vested in whole or in part on the effective date of this Charter, whose validity might be sustained or preserved by reference to any provisions of law repealed by this Charter, shall not be affected by this Charter. This Section shall not apply to any right or interest in any elective public office not conferred by this Charter.”
The real question is did the new charter permit the dilution of the functions and powers of the Chief of Police by the creation of a new agency which would exercise the powers and duties previously granted the Chief of Police by legislative enactment? The initial administrative *578organization provision of the 1973 Charter (Section 7-104) must be read in the light of Sections 7-101 and 7-105 of such charter. The current term of office of all elected and appointed officials and officers of the City referred to in Section 7-101 must be construed to refer to all elements of his term of office including tenure, duration, terms, emoluments, and powers, as well as that of duty and not merely salary and retirement benefits. When read together Sections 7-101, 7-104 and 7-105 do not authorize sweeping away of the total city government but rather an orderly transition which protects the tenure of previously elected and appointed officials for definite terms and assures the City that experienced and qualified personnel continue in office during such transition period. The ordinance provides that the mayor recommend for the council’s consideration a proposal which shall specify the number of departments and the duties and the functions thereof and when adopted shall have the force of statutory law under the Home Rule Provisions of Code Ann. § 69-1017 (b) (1). Such ordinance shall become effective according to its terms for administrative and other purposes so long as it does not interfere with the tenure of the incumbents protected by Sections 7-101 and 7-105. As to these offices and these officers the law in effect must continue until the end of their term of office and their duties and responsibilities can not be diminished during such period of time.
Until the expiration of the term to which Chief Inman was elected he can be removed only as provided by the charter at the time of his election.
The net effect of the majority opinion is to repeal those Sections which preserve Chief Inman’s status until the end of his current term of office.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Undercofler concurs in this dissent.