Court Opinion

ID: 9774932
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:38:34.719665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:17.949818
License: Public Domain

McCORMICK, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
Because the majority misconstrues what has happened in this case, I must dissent.
Appellant was convicted of engaging in organized criminal activity and sentenced to fifty years’ incarceration. On appeal, the San Antonio Court of Appeals reformed the judgment to correctly reflect that the sentence was enhanced, and affirmed. Fee v. State, 722 S.W.2d 234 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1986). We granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review in order to examine the Court of Appeals’ holding that the evidence was sufficient to support appellant’s conviction.
The indictment alleged that
“... on or about the 11TH day of AUGUST, A.D., 1983, JOSE L. ARAUJO, THOMAS SCOTT BATES, STEVEN FEE, BENJAMIN A. MORGAN, JERRY LEE PIERCE, JOSE JORGE TREVINO, JR., and JAMES HENRY WOERNER, JR., hereinafter called defendants, together with others unknown to this Grand Jury, with intent to establish, maintain and participate in a combination and in the profits of a combination, did then and there conspire and agree to commit and did commit the criminal offense of Theft over $20,000.00, and in pursuance of such agreement the said defendants performed overt acts as follows, to-wit:
“On or about the 11TH day of AUGUST, A.D., 1983, in Bexar County, Texas, STEVEN FEE, JERRY LEE PIERCE, BENJAMIN A. MORGAN, JOSE L. ARAUJO, THOMAS SCOTT BATES, and JAMES HENRY WOER-NER, JR., with the intent to deprive the owner, MICHAEL POLANSKY, of property, namely: A 1979 International truck tractor and a 1981 Budd flatbed trailer, did unlawfully appropriate said property by acquiring and otherwise exercising control over said property, said property being other than real property which had an aggregate value of $10,000.00 or more, without the effective consent of the owner; and
“On or about the 7TH day of SEPTEMBER, A.D., 1983, in Bexar County, Texas, STEVEN FEE, JERRY LEE PIERCE, BENJAMIN A. MORGAN, JOE JORGE TREVINO, JR., and THOMAS SCOTT BATES, with the intent to deprive the owner, MICHAEL BRASH-EAR, of property, namely: A 1983 White truck tractor and a 1983 Aztec platform trailer, did unlawfully appropriate said property by acquiring and otherwise exercising control over said property, said property being other than real property which had an aggregate value of $20,-000.00 or more, without the effective consent of the owner; ...”
The charge to the jury tracked the wording of the indictment and was submitted in the conjunctive. Appellant argued that the evidence was insufficient to show the participation of Woerner, Araujo and Bates in the combination and that therefore the State had failed in its burden. More specifically, appellant argued that since the charge was submitted in the conjunctive as to all seven co-defendants the State was required to prove the participation of all seven, citing Benson v. State, 661 S.W.2d 708 (Tex.Cr.App.1982). The Court of Appeals found the evidence to be insufficient as to co-defendants Araujo and Bates but concluded that “[t]he State has satisfied the requirements of the organized crime statute by proving Fee and at least four *398other persons collaborated in carrying on the criminal activity.” Fee v. State, supra.
In his petition for discretionary review, appellant acknowledges the Court of Appeals considered the evidence in light of statutory sufficiency, but argues the court failed appropriately to apply the standard of review required by Benson.
After granting appellant’s petition, this Court decided Barber v. State, 764 S.W.2d 232 (Tex.Cr.App.1989). In Barber, the Court of Appeals found the evidence sufficient to connect three defendants to the theft, but there was insufficient evidence to establish that the three participated in a combination with two other named defendants. Barber v. State, 668 S.W.2d 424 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1984). On review, this Court noted:
“In other words, the Court of Appeals found the evidence insufficient to establish the existence of the underlying combination due to the acquittal of Cunningham and Navarre [the two other named defendants]. Therefore, the question that must be answered is: When a jury is charged that only five actors formed a criminal combination, and those five are tried jointly, can the convictions of any of the defendants stand if one or more is acquitted? We answer the question in the affirmative.” Barber v. State, 764 S.W.2d at 234.
The contention which appellant here presents is that, since the jury was charged in the conjunctive, and since the evidence was insufficient as to two of the defendants, the State failed in its burden as placed upon it by the Court’s instruction. In Barber, the charge required the jury to find that all five named defendants were members of the combination. Here, the charge required the jury to find that the appellant and six other named defendants “conspired and agreed to commit” the offense of theft. In Barber, we determined that the evidence was sufficient where the charge was in the conjunctive and even though two of the defendants were acquitted. The insufficiency in Barber was in the proof of the membership of the combination. The insufficiency here is in the proof of those who “conspired to commit” theft. Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that appellant violated the statute — only that the evidence is insufficient when measured against the jury charge.
In Benson, supra, we held the evidence insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for retaliation where the State’s theory of the case was that the victim was a “prospective witness” and the jury charge authorized a verdict of guilty based solely on a finding that the victim was a “witness” — a theory of retaliation never advanced nor argued by the State. As has often been stated since:
“We hold that when a charge is correct for the theory of the case presented we review the sufficiency of the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict by comparing the evidence to the indictment as incorporated into the charge.” Benson, supra, at 715.
Later, in Boozer v. State, 717 S.W.2d 608 (Tex.Cr.App.1984), the Court elaborated:
“Because a verdict of ‘guilty’ necessarily means the jury found evidence of that on which it was authorized to convict, the sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the charge that was given. It follows that if evidence does not conform to the instruction given, it is insufficient as a matter of law to support the only verdict of ‘guilty’ which was authorized, (emphasis in original; footnotes and citations omitted.)
“Under the trial court’s charge in the instant case, the only verdict authorized in view of the evidence was ‘not guilty;’ restated, had the jury followed the trial court’s instructions, appellant would have been acquitted.” Boozer, supra, at 610-611.
In the instant case, and as noted previously, the court’s charge in applying the law to the facts tracked exactly the wording of the indictment. The charge correctly presented to the jury the State’s theory of the ease as demonstrated by the indictment, the evidence, and the argument. Furthermore, the court correctly instructed the jury on the definition of the offense, on *399the terms “combination” and “conspire to commit” and on the provisions of V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 71.03 (Defenses Excluded).
Under the evidence and the charge, I cannot say that had the jury followed the trial court’s instructions this appellant would have been acquitted. Appellant was on trial alone, and it was only his conduct which the jury was to scrutinize. Even though the Court of Appeals found the evidence insufficient to show the participation of Araujo and Bates, the evidence was still sufficient as to appellant Fee for the jury to find both the combination and appellant’s conduct in committing the overt theft.
For these reasons, I dissent.
CAMPBELL and WHITE, JJ., join this dissent.