Court Opinion

ID: 9546928
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:38:04.34225+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:02.233950
License: Public Domain

KENNARD, J., Concurring.
I agree with the majority that the trial court did not err when it instructed the jury in the language of CALJIC No. 10.60.1 This instruction correctly states that in a rape case the testimony of the complaining witness need not be corroborated. But as Justice Mosk’s concurring opinion points out, this instruction is unnecessary because its essence appears in another instruction, CALJIC No. 2.27, that expresses the general rule that testimony of a single witness is sufficient to establish the truth of *706any fact. I write separately because unlike Justice Mosk, who suggests that use of CALJIC 10.60 be prohibited, I would not bar trial courts from giving the instruction, as it accurately states legal principles pertinent to witness corroboration; but unlike the majority, I would not encourage use of this instruction, because it is redundant and thus of little value.
Before our decision in People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864 [123 Cal.Rptr. 119, 538 P.2d 247, 92 A.L.R.3d 845], CALJIC No. 10.60 served to minimize the impact of former CALJIC No. 10.22 (3d ed. 1970 bound vol.), which told jurors that rape is a charge “which is easily made and . . . difficult to defend against. . . .” This instruction, if unaccompanied by CALJIC No. 10.60, might have left jurors with the erroneous impression that a complaining witness in a rape case should not be believed in the absence of corroborating testimony. Our disapproval of former CALJIC No. 10.22 in Rincon-Pineda eliminated the need to give CALJIC No. 10.60 in rape trials.
In the majority’s view, however, CALJIC No. 10.60 “continues to perform an important role.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 701.) The majority offers two justifications: it reminds the jury in a rape trial that there is no requirement for corroboration of the complaining witness’s testimony, and that it (in combination with other, unspecified instructions) strikes a “balance” that protects the rights of the defendant and the complaining witness, in view of the “heavy burden of persuasion” placed on the prosecution by the requirement that it prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
But the majority is incorrect in suggesting that juries need to be instructed in the terms of CALJIC No. 10.60 in order to make clear that there is no requirement for corroboration of the testimony of a complaining witness. CALJIC No. 2.27, a standard instruction that must be given in every criminal trial, already tells the jury of the general rule that the testimony of any single witness, complaining or otherwise, need not be corroborated.
The majority’s alternate claim, that CALJiC No. 10.60 is necessary to strike some sort of “balance” that will protect the rights of all concerned, reflects a misperception of the purpose of jury instructions. Trial courts should give jury instructions to inform jurors of the law, not to create a proper “mix” of “pro-prosecution” and “pro-defense” instructions. Unnecessary instructions, such as CALJIC No. 10.60, should not be given simply to provide greater “weight” to one side or another. In any event, the majority fails to explain how CALJIC No. 10.60 provides this “balance.”
In summary, CALJIC No. 10.60 is accurate but superfluous. Because it is accurate, the trial court did not err in giving it in this case, and the judgment *707of the Court of Appeal should therefore be affirmed. Because it is superfluous, I do not join the majority opinion, which encourages its continued use.

CALJIC No. 10.60 (5th ed. 1988 bound vol.) is substantially similar to former CALJIC No. 10.21 (1970 rev.) (4th ed. pocket pt), the instruction given in this case. Like the majority, for ease of discussion, I use CALJIC No. 10.60 to refer also to former CALJIC No. 10.21.