Court Opinion

ID: 9553414
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:29:11.789996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:31:03.838736
License: Public Domain

MICHAEL DALY HAWKINS, Circuit Judge,
with whom PREGERSON and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges, join, concurring as to Part III,
and concurring in the judgment:
We face two closely related issues, both dealing with the ability of district judges to manage complex criminal trials. One is whether a district judge may order the government to provide a final witness list prior to the beginning of trial. This one the Opinion gets absolutely right, holding that the interests of trial continuity outweigh any interest in withholding those names and disclosing them only when the prosecution deems it appropriate. The other is whether the prosecution can delay a trial and require an interlocutory appeal on an evidentiary ruling on nothing more than its say so. By my lights, the Opinion not only gets this one wrong, but also creates along the way what our colleague Judge Goodwin describes as a “hazard to navigation” to the efficient and evenhanded administration of justice in our trial courts.
*517For the following reasons, I respectfully part from the portion of the Opinion dealing with 18 U.S.C. § 3731.
I. Statutory Text
According to the majority, the plain language of § 3731 precludes this court from exercising any independent judgment over its own jurisdiction. I disagree.
The second paragraph of § 3731 provides:
An appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision or order of a district court suppressing or excluding evidence or requiring the return of seized property in a criminal proceeding, not made after the defendant has been put in jeopardy and before the verdict or finding on an indictment or information, if the United States attorney certifies to the district court that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding.
Reading this, the majority believes that it is evident from the statute’s phrasing that the courts of appeals are forbidden from applying even the most modest scrutiny to the United States Attorney’s certification. On my reading, the statute is ambiguous and nothing in the text compels the majority’s interpretation.
We begin with a straightforward proposition: Congress not only knows how to tell courts of appeals to defer completely to the United States Attorney, it has done just that in the confines of a remarkably similar certification statute. Under the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679, when a federal employee is sued for a wrongful or negligent act, the United States is to be substituted as the party defendant “[u]pon certification by the Attorney General that the defendant employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose.” Id. § 2679(d)(1). A separate subsection of the same Act provides that a suit commenced in state court shall be removed to federal court upon the Attorney General’s scope-of-employment certification, and that “[t]his certification of the Attorney General shall conclusively establish scope of office or employment for purposes of removal.” Id. § 2679(d)(2) (emphasis added). Importantly, there is no similar provision in § 2679(d)(1); Congress never stated that the Attorney General’s certification would be conclusive for the substitution inquiry.
The Supreme Court has considered both the removal and substitution subsections of the Westfall Act. Interpreting the removal provision, the Court explained that “Congress gave district courts no authority to return cases to state courts on the ground that the Attorney General’s certification was unwarranted.... For purposes of establishing a forum to adjudicate the case ... § 2679(d)(2) renders the Attorney General’s certification dispositive.” Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 127 S.Ct. 881, 894, 166 L.Ed.2d 819 (2007). This reading makes perfect textual sense, for if it were “open to a district court to remand a removed action on the ground that the Attorney General’s certification was erroneous, the final instruction in § 2679(d)(2) would be weightless. The Attorney General’s certification would not ‘conclusively establish scope of office or employment’ for either trial or removal.” Id. at 895.
By contrast, the Supreme Court has held that the scope-of-employment certification under § 2679(d)(1) — the substitution provision — is reviewable. Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 434, 115 S.Ct. 2227, 132 L.Ed.2d 375 (1995). As a matter of syntax, § 2679(d)(1) cannot be meaningfully distinguished from *518§ 3731. That section of the Westfall Act provides, in full:
Upon certification by the Attorney General that the defendant employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose, any civil action or proceeding commenced upon such claim in a United States district court shall be deemed an action against the United States under the provisions of this title and all references thereto, and the United States shall be substituted as the party defendant.
28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) (emphasis added).
In Gutierrez de Martinez, the Supreme Court framed “[t]he sole question ... [as] who decides on which side of the [scope-of-employment] line the case falls: the local United States Attorney, unreviewably or, when that official’s decision is contested, the court.”1 515 U.S. at 423-24, 115 S.Ct. 2227. Unlike the majority in the present case, the Court did not hold that the phrase “[u]pon certification by the Attorney General,” or the word “shall,”2 made evident Congress’s intent to preclude courts from looking beyond the Attorney General’s naked certification. Instead, the Court believed that “Congress did not address this precise issue unambiguously, if at all____ [T]he Westfall Act is, on the ‘who decides’ question we confront, open to divergent interpretation.”3 Id. at 424, 115 S.Ct. 2227.
Where the Supreme Court perceived “statutory fog,” id. at 425, 115 S.Ct. 2227, the majority finds congressional intent that “has been expressed in reasonably plain terms.” We are told that “[njothing in the statute requires the government to go further and prove that the evidence suppressed or excluded by the district court is actually material to the proceeding before our jurisdiction can attach.” A fair point, but not one that establishes the statute is unambiguous. Using the same reasoning, it seems clear that nothing in *519the statute prohibits the court from examining the United States Attorney’s certification.
The majority finds guidance in the portion of § 3731 that reads, “The provisions of [§ 3731] shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.” Congress did not explicitly state its purposes, so this provision invites some question-begging.4 The majority posits that “[t]he purpose of § 3731 is to give the government a window of opportunity to challenge a district court’s exclusion of allegedly material evidence before jeopardy attaches; we should not, therefore, read into the statute an unwritten additional hurdle, even if well intentioned.”
This reading distorts Congress’s intent. The majority’s description would be accurate if there were no certification requirement in the statute. But that requirement exists, and it undoubtedly reflects Congress’s concern that the government might abuse its appellate rights. Indeed, the majority recognizes that “[b]y specifying that the United States Attorney must certify the appeal, Congress plainly intended that the decision to take an interlocutory appeal be a serious, considered judgment, not simply an administrative formality.”
Deterring frivolous appeals is as much of a statutory purpose as enabling worthy ones, and the Loud Hawk rule liberally construes the certification requirement to effectuate both purposes. Far from being unwritten hurdles, the jurisdictional conditions identified by Loud Hawk are drawn straight from § 3731’s text. The majority, however, appears content to liberally construe the first half of the paragraph, while strictly construing the second half.
Interestingly, of the three jurisdiction-conferring provisions of § 3731, only the one at issue in this case requires the government to certify facts to the district court.5 This suggests Congress was especially concerned that federal prosecutors might abuse the ability to interlocutorily appeal suppression orders,6 thereby unnec*520essarily disrupting proceedings, and that certification was supposed to act as a meaningful check. While it is possible that Congress decided to counter potential prosecutorial abuse by requiring an unreviewable, boilerplate certification by the prosecution alone, the text of § 3731 does not unambiguously express this intent.
II. Legislative History
Where the statutory language is ambiguous, we “turn to the legislative history for evidence of congressional intent.” Dent v. Cox Commc’ns Las Vegas, Inc., 502 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir.2007). Although the legislative history fails to directly resolve the question presented here, it does shed some light on Congress’s purpose in adopting § 3731’s second paragraph.
The second paragraph was adopted, with slightly different language,7 as part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub.L. No. 90-351, tit. VIII, § 1301(a), 82 Stat. 197, 237-38. The original Senate and House bills did not contain the provision; it was proposed as an amendment to the Senate bill by Senator Allott of Colorado. United States v. Greely, 413 F.2d 1103, 1104 n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1969) (per curiam); 114 Cong. Rec. 14787, 14787-89 (1968). The amendment was identical to a previously-passed House bill, H.R. 8654, 90th Cong. (1967). Senator Allott’s remarks and the report accompanying H.R. 8654 reveal three concerns addressed by the provision.
First, the legislation was designed to facilitate successful prosecutions by granting the government an opportunity to challenge the suppression of important evidence. Senator Allott hoped that “our law-enforcement agencies will be given the tools with which to launch a meaningful attack on the critical problem of crime in this country,” and he explained that “[i]t is obviously much better to prove a case with tangible and concrete evidence than upon oral testimony and observation of witnesses.” 114 Cong. Rec. at 14788 (statement of Sen. Allott). The House report noted that an order granting a motion to suppress evidence is often “in effect, a final order bringing the prosecution to an end, for the Government is unable to proceed without the suppressed evidence.” H.R.Rep. No. 90-603, at 2 (1967).
Second, the provision was intended to lead to “the development of a complete body of law regarding the legality of searches and seizures presently hampered by the inability of the Government to bring to the appellate courts significant cases” arising out of suppression orders. Id. at 3. “[T]he law of search and seizure and confessions [was] highly uncertain,” and the amendment would ameliorate that uncer*521tainty. 114 Cong. Rec. at 14788 (statement of Sen. Allott) (internal quotation marks omitted). In United States v. Dior, we recognized this concern, noting that the “the overriding purpose of the provision permitting immediate government appeals from suppression orders was to deal with the harm which the lack of government appeals worked on the development of the law of suppression.” 671 F.2d 351, 356 (9th Cir.1982).
These two goals were not to come at the expense of a criminal defendant’s rights. A report authored by the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, cited favorably by Senator Allott, stated that “[w]here the prosecution is permitted to appeal from pretrial orders, rules should be established to protect the defendant’s interest in obtaining a speedy trial.” 114 Cong. Rec. at 14789. The Commission admonished the government that “appeals should not be taken routinely from every adverse pretrial ruling. They should be reserved for cases in which there is a substantial law enforcement interest.” Id. The House Committee on the Judiciary stressed that the “rights of the defendants, of course, have been taken into consideration and are in no way impinged upon” by the bill. H.R.Rep. No. 90-603, at 3. The provision required the prosecution to pursue appeals within thirty days of the district court’s decision and to prosecute them “diligently.” 8 The courts of appeals were expected to dispose of these appeals “with despatch so that the interest of justice, both on the part of the defendant and the Government, will be met as quickly as possible.” Id.
There is nothing in the legislative history that speaks directly to the propriety of courts reviewing the United States Attorney’s certification. By revealing Congress’s concerns, however, the history guides us in our efforts to liberally construe the statute in order to effectuate all of its purposes.
III. Proper Interpretation of § 3731
The legislative history confirms that Congress was not concerned exclusively with facilitating successful prosecutions; rather, Congress was also eager to see the courts develop a coherent body of search and seizure law, and was solicitous of defendants’ rights. It is these latter goals that inform our understanding of the certification requirement.
There is no dispute that the government is forbidden from appealing for the purpose of delay or from an order suppressing evidence that is insubstantial or immaterial, and Loud Hawk does not modify those substantive conditions. The precise question before us concerns the procedure by which Congress chose to enforce these restrictions: How, in other words, does the certification requirement impact our ability to ensure that the government is complying with the jurisdictional conditions?
If the same conditions were present without a certification requirement, we would presumably have the authority and duty to ensure that they were satisfied. See Arbaugh v.Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006) (stating that courts “have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party”). If, for example, the government violated the fourth paragraph of § 3731 by filing its notice of appeal more than thirty days after the pertinent order, this court *522would consider dismissing the appeal, even though the statute does not expressly grant us the right to independently review the timeliness of the filing. See, e.g., United States v. Belgarde, 300 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir.2002) (considering timeliness of § 3731 filing); United States v. Shaffer, 789 F.2d 682, 686 n. 3 (9th Cir.1986) (same).
Given this presumptive ability to determine our own jurisdiction, the majority must have concluded that the second paragraph of § 3731 not only expressly imposes an obligation on the United States Attorney, but also silently strips this court of its authority to review jurisdictional facts. We are not, however, told why Congress would wish to take the highly unusual step of precluding us from independently reviewing our jurisdiction.
Section 3731 serves a gatekeeping function by balancing the prosecution’s desire to appeal suppression orders with the defense’s and court’s interest in a prompt and orderly trial. Congress may have tasked prosecutors with reviewing potential interlocutory appeals in the first instance, but experience with certification provisions in two other significant contexts suggests that Congress did not intend to wholly outsource our jurisdictional inquiry.
In civil actions, courts of appeals may entertain an interlocutory appeal from a non-final district court order if the district judge certifies that he is “of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The certification “serves the dual purpose of ensuring that [appellate] review will be confined to appropriate cases and avoiding time-consuming jurisdictional determinations in the court of appeals.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 474-75, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978). Importantly, though, once the district judge opens the gate to this court, we exercise complete, undeferential review to determine whether the court properly found that § 1292(b)’s certification requirements were satisfied. James v. Price Stern Sloan, Inc., 283 F.3d 1064, 1068 n. 6 (9th Cir.2002); In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir.1982). Only the district judge’s decision to deny certification escapes our scrutiny. Executive Software N. Am., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 24 F.3d 1545, 1550 (9th Cir.1994); Oppenheimer v. L.A. County Flood Control Dist., 453 F.2d 895 (9th Cir.1972) (per curiam).
Our review of a district court’s decision to grant or deny a habeas corpus petitioner’s request for a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) is even broader. “In federal habeas corpus proceedings, ... the exercise of appellate jurisdiction is dependent entirely upon the issuance of a COA.” Phelps v. Alameda, 366 F.3d 722, 726 (9th Cir.2004); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). When a district judge or motions panel grants one, a court of appeals merits panel is not irrevocably vested with jurisdiction over the appeal. In Phelps v. Alameda, we held that “COAs are not beyond merits panel scrutiny”; after one is granted, we retain the “power to vacate or to contract it.” 366 F.3d at 727, 728. In fashioning this rule, the Phelps court acknowledged that “we must be ever mindful of the gatekeeping and efficiency functions of the certificate of appealability.” Id. at 728 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, the court explained, “the pursuit of efficiency alone does not support an absolute bar against examining the validity of a COA.” Id. And, in contrast to § 1292(b) certification denials, when a district court denies a COA, we review its *523determination upon the petitioner’s request. See, e.g., Stokes v. Schriro, 465 F.3d 397, 401 (9th Cir.2006).
These two examples show the remarkable nature of the majority’s ruling. In two core areas of our jurisdiction, Congress has employed the device of certification to assist us in — without eliminating — our determination of jurisdictional conditions. Without explanation as to why Congress would desire such a result, the majority tells us that a prosecutor deserves much greater deference than district judges tasked with analogous gatekeeper-like responsibilities. This simply does not square with the notion that the decision to exercise jurisdiction, is, at bottom, a judicial, not a prosecutorial, function.
This paradox is puzzling when one conceives of the § 3731 certification requirement as a gatekeeping device, but it becomes troubling when the certification is viewed as admonitory in nature.
Certifications are formalities, and in some contexts they may “perform a cautionary or deterrent function by acting as a check against inconsiderate action.” Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 Colum. L.Rev. 799, 800 (1941). Parties in the federal courts are familiar with certification requirements that serve a cautionary function. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, attorneys must sign the filings they submit to the district court, and, upon filing, the attorneys certify that the papers are not being filed for an improper purpose, such as to harass or cause delay; that legal contentions are supported by existing law or by nonfrivolous arguments to alter existing law; that factual contentions have or are likely to have evidentiary support; and that denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence, belief, or lack of information. Fed. R.Civ.P. 11(a), (b). At the appellate level, attorneys’ briefs are subject to specific type-volume limitations, Fed. R.App. P. 28.1(e)(2), 32(a)(7)(B), and they must contain a Certificate of Compliance that attests that the brief adheres to the applicable limitations, Fed. R.App. P. 32(a)(7)(C).
These certifications do not serve a gatekeeper function, and they are not a means of presenting the courts with useful information. They serve a much more basic purpose: reminding the parties of their obligation to comply with the courts’ rules. See, e.g., Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 advisory committee’s note (“The rule continues to require litigants to ‘stop-and-think’ before initially making legal or factual contentions.”). It goes without saying that we give no weight to such certifications when determining whether the attorneys have committed any sanctionable violations; the attorneys’ self-interest makes the certification inherently untrustworthy.
The certification requirement in § 3731 serves a purpose similar to these rules. It provides a forceful reminder to federal prosecutors that “Congress recognized the importance of minimizing appellate interference in the trial process,” United States v. Dior, 671 F.2d 351, 356 (9th Cir.1982), and that the government is to take seriously its obligation to respect defendants’ rights. By doing so, it implicitly recognizes that United States Attorneys are biased participants in criminal prosecutions. In the same way that most private attorneys would realize, in the absence of Rule ll’s signing and certification requirement, that it is improper to pursue legal claims in order to harass an opponent, few prosecutors needed § 3731 to inform them that it is improper to file an appeal for the purpose of delay or to disrupt proceedings over an unimportant piece of evidence. The certification requirements exist in both instances not simply to describe the regulations, but to put the parties on no*524tice that Congress and the courts take seriously the choices attorneys make.
Given Congress’s clearly expressed concern over the potential for prosecutors to abuse their appellate rights, it is hard to believe that the statute requires us to blindly trust United States Attorneys or those who supervise them.9 The men and women of the Department of Justice are fíne public servants, dedicated to advancing the public interest. Nevertheless, Congress’s recognition of prosecutors’ self-interest is inherent in § 3731, and we would be unfaithful to congressional intent if we repudiated that recognition when construing the statute.
By my lights, the Loud Hawk rule more effectively advances the statutory goals than the majority’s approach. For starters, the Loud Hawk rule is modest. Section 3731 provides that the government may only appeal the suppression of evidence that “is a substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding.” In United States v. Adrian, we held that “we will find the government to have satisfied this additional jurisdictional requirement if, assuming that the evidence would be admissible, a reasonable trier of fact could find the evidence persuasive in establishing the proposition for which the government seeks to admit it.” 978 F.2d 486, 491 (9th Cir.1992) (emphasis added). Adrian explicitly rejected an interpretation that would “require the government to demonstrate that the evidence is highly probative.” Id.
The burden on the prosecution is thus slight, and this should allay any fear that Loud Hawk might undermine the first identifiable purpose of the statute, the facilitation of successful prosecutions. Prosecutors pursuing worthy appeals have little to fear from our precedents. Certifying the § 3731 requirements presents little administrative inconvenience, and a prosecutor actively involved in the case should have no difficulty making the necessary showing to the court. In fact, the majority’s rule and the Loud Hawk rule would lead to divergent results only in those cases in which the government is appealing for the purpose of delay, or challenging the suppression of immaterial or insubstantial evidence. The approach the majority adopts today will allow such appeals to proceed, although this appears to contravene Congress’s clear intent.
Congress also hoped that § 3731 would yield a well-developed body of search-and-seizure jurisprudence. The Loud Hawk rule furthers this goal in two ways. First, it keeps the government honest by ensuring that prosecutors do not take appeals from the suppression of immaterial or insubstantial evidence in order to establish favorable law. As repeat players in the federal courts, prosecutors have an incentive to take the long-term view. When an opportunity to make seemingly “good law” comes along, there will be a temptation to pursue it even if it will have little impact on the case in which a prosecutor is currently involved. For example, if the district court suppresses some trivial evidence that the prosecutor feels is unnecessary in that particular prosecution, she may appeal anyway if the facts are such that she has the chance to have the courts of appeals announce a government-friendly rule of law.10
*525Additionally, the Loud Hawk rule favors the development of the law by enabling the courts of appeals to gain a better understanding of the facts of appealed cases. Interlocutory appeals from suppression orders are typically taken before trial, and the record is therefore necessarily limited. This means that a panel could be tasked with making new law in a near factual vacuum. The law develops most properly when judges can evaluate all facts relevant to a case, and not just those that pertain to some discrete issue. Under Loud Hawk, this court gains familiarity with the case by assessing whether the excluded evidence is a substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding. The government will explain why the evidence is meaningful in light of the larger evidentiary picture, and the defense has the opportunity to contest that explanation. By the time jurisdiction is established, the judges will have a greater sense of what the case is about and the consequences of their potential rulings.
The Loud Hawk rule also accommodates the statute’s final purpose, protecting defendants’ rights. The majority finds comfort in its aspirational rhetoric; my colleagues “expect the concerns about frivolous or disruptive attempts to involve us prematurely in ongoing trial proceedings ... will be addressed by the government’s wise and careful invocation of § 3731 appeals.” Our experience belies this optimism. We have noted that, “[ujnfortunately, some government attorneys from time to time treat the § 3731 certification requirement as a mere formality and even neglect to file the certification in a timely manner.” United States v. Gantt, 194 F.3d 987, 997 (9th Cir.1999); see id. at 997 & n. 4 (citing cases from this and other circuits); cf. United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1324 (9th Cir.1993) (stating that “[t]he overwhelming majority of prosecutors are decent, ethical, honorable lawyers who understand the awesome power they wield, and the responsibility that goes with it. But the temptation is always there: It’s the easiest thing in the world for people trained in the adversarial ethic to think a prosecutor’s job is simply to win”; citing cases in support).
If Congress had explicitly made the United States Attorneys’ certifications conclusive, as it did for the scope-of-employment certifications under the Westfall Act when removal was at issue, I would concede that the court would be left with no choice but to place our faith in the executive branch. As it currently reads, however, § 3731 places no such restrictions on our jurisdictional review. Loud Hawk correctly demands that we respect our jurisdictional limits, and in doing so, shield defendants and their speedy trial rights from the occasional misguided prosecutor.
Recognizing our concern about improper appeals, the majority attempts to minimize the impact of its holding. It insists that we will not blindly trust the government, nor allow it to disrupt proceedings on a whim. This is because “[i]f the merits of the appeal independently require us to question whether the evidence truly is material, the government’s certification is not conclusive.”
This non sequitur completely mischaracterizes my position. I do not assert that the Loud Hawk rule affects our merits analysis; I recognize that under either the Loud Hawk rule or the majority’s rule, a § 3731 certification has no bearing on any substantive assessment of the materiality *526of suppressed evidence.11 The point remains, however, that the prosecution will have unchecked authority to pursue interlocutory appeals from all suppression orders. Even if this court were certain in a given case that the certification was inaccurate and that the jurisdictional conditions of § 3731 were violated, we would be powerless to dismiss, and we would be forced to adjudicate the appeal on the merits. See e.g., United States v. Laville, 480 F.3d 187, 196-98 (3d Cir.2007) (McKee, J., concurring) (expressing “concern[ ] that the certification the Government filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731 may be disingenuous,” noting that “it appears to have been reflexively filed,” and “doubt[ing] that the § 3731 certification was afforded the consideration Congress intended,” but acknowledging that circuit precedent foreclosed the possibility of review). The majority’s dogged attack on this straw man suggests that it recognizes this problematic result and that it is uncomfortable with the breadth of its own ruling.
By raising our power to expedite review, the majority also discounts the disruptive value of § 3731 appeals. It currently takes nine to ten months from the filing of an interlocutory appeal in a criminal case to its placement on an argument calendar.12 Even if we were able to somehow reduce that time by half, it would still amount to an inordinate delay in trial proceedings. Under the naked power the majority gives the government, appeals taken for the purpose of delay will achieve that purpose regardless of our alacrity.
Indeed, this very appeal demonstrates the Loud Hawk rule’s necessity. The government filed its notice of appeal in this case on March 16, 2006. It filed another interlocutory appeal regarding a separate issue on August 23, 2006, and yet another on September 27, 2006. In this appeal, the government initially refused to provide the three-judge panel with any evidence to support its bare certification that the suppressed evidence was material, further delaying proceedings. The government’s litigation strategy has effectively derailed the criminal trial, while it no doubt continues its search for more witnesses and victims. The trial date remains in limbo, and the defendants’ right to a speedy trial has been completely frustrated.
Further, the majority fails to apprehend the design of the Loud Hawk rule, pointing out that our precedent “does nothing to get the appeal on an argument calendar any faster than the prevailing certification-only rule,” and that “because we must first determine the jurisdictional issue and then determine the merits separately, a final determination under the Loud Hawk rule may well take longer.” This misses the point. Even if it were true that the majority’s rule will lead to a slightly faster disposition of individual § 3731 appeals, that hardly warrants the conclusion that Loud Hawk is not “efficient.” Loud Hawk provides a deterrent to frivolous appeals. As with most deterrents, the benefit is not *527realized in the process that follows a breach of the underlying rule, but in the cases in which the rule is scrupulously observed for fear of that process.13 To eliminate any confusion, it may be helpful to review the way in which Loud Hawk operates as a deterrent.
Under the rule we adopt today, the only thing standing between a prosecutor and an interlocutory appeal is a piece of paper. A prosecutor faced with an unfavorable suppression order must decide within thirty days whether to appeal, and must leave enough time to obtain the approval of the Solicitor General.14 If the suppressed evidence is of questionable value, will she take the time to fully consider its materiality? If there is even the slightest chance that the evidence might bolster the prosecution’s case or buy time to further prepare its case, the temptation will be there to forgo any serious consideration of the certification requirements, secure in the knowledge that we will not question the justification for the decision to appeal.
The Loud Hawk rule, by contrast, is conducive to a thoughtful certification process. Knowing a modest showing in support of the certification will be required, the prosecutor has incentive to seriously consider whether to seek an interlocutory appeal. Even a hasty decision to challenge the suppression of insubstantial or immaterial evidence might be reconsidered when actually facing the task of Loud Hawk compliance. Similarly, a written showing provides the prosecutor’s superiors with something they can truly evaluate; they need not rely on the trial prosecutor’s vague assurances that the suppressed evidence is important.
Like the majority, my hope and expectation is that the government will act wisely and carefully when deciding whether to pursue an interlocutory appeal, and that its unchecked ability to do so will not diminish the independent judgment of district judges in the making of important evidentiary rulings. Unlike the majority, though, I would measure that confidence with caution. To paraphrase a former President, I would “trust, but verify.”15 Only this way can we provide the congressionally desired review necessary to safeguard defendants’ rights.
The Loud Hawk rule secures the continuity of proceedings by ensuring that the appeal is not taken for purposes of delay *528and involves evidence that is both substantial and material. The rule the majority embraces today permits a prosecutor to disrupt proceedings with the stroke of a pen. Congress did not require us to permit that when it enacted § 3731, and we should not do so now.

. The local United States Attorney was acting on behalf of the Attorney General. 515 U.S. at 421, 115 S.Ct. 2227.

. The majority emphasizes the word "shall” in § 3731, suggesting, I take it, that we must exercise jurisdiction if the United States Attorney certifies the necessary facts. As a textual matter, the word provides very little guidance, even aside from the reality that "legal writers sometimes use, or misuse, 'shall' to mean 'should,' 'will,' or even 'may.' ” Gutieirez de Martinez, 515 U.S. at 432 n. 9, 115 S.Ct. 2227; see also id. at 433 n. 9, 115 S.Ct. 2227 (noting that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(e) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b) "use the word 'shall' to authorize, but not to require, judicial action”). I agree that we have no discretion to decline jurisdiction if the United States Attorney's certification obligation is satisfied. I dispute only the nature of that obligation, which is a question upon which the word "shall” has no bearing.

. I rely on Gutieirez de Martinez only for my textual analysis. Although the case resulted in the outcome I argue for here, the contrast between the Westfall Act and § 3731 precludes me from suggesting that the Supreme Court resolved our ultimate inquiry. For example, in Gutieirez de Martinez, the Attorney General’s certification would have led to an automatic dismissal of the case on sovereign immunity grounds, and "when a Government official's determination of a fact or circumstance — for example, 'scope of employment'— is dispositive of a court controversy, federal courts generally do not hold the determination unreviewable.” Gutieirez de Martinez, 515 U.S. at 424, 115 S.Ct. 2227. And, as discussed, the inclusion of the word "conclusively” with respect to removal, and its absence with respect to the substitution issue, provided strong textual evidence that the latter was reviewable. See id. at 432, 115 S.Ct. 2227; see also Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 127 S.Ct. 881, 895, 166 L.Ed.2d 819 (2007). Additionally, the court looked to the particular and unique impetus that led to adoption of the Westfall Act. 515 U.S. at 425-26, 115 S.Ct. 2227. That legislative backdrop does not apply here.

. The majority wisely ignores the government's invocation of United States v. Wilson, which held that § 3731 was "intended to remove all statutory barriers to Government appeals and to allow appeals whenever the Constitution would permit.” 420 U.S. 332, 337, 95 S.Ct. 1013, 43 L.Ed.2d 232 (1975). The government fails to appreciate that Wilson dealt with an entirely separate and independent portion of § 3731 that enables the prosecution to appeal, in a criminal case, “a decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an indictment or information or granting a new trial after verdict or judgment.” The Wilson Court’s conclusion that Congress intended to "allow appeals whenever the Constitution would permit” rested on legislative history that applied exclusively to this paragraph of § 3731. See id. at 337-39, 95 S.Ct. 1013.

. The provision that concerns us in this case is found in the second paragraph of § 3731. The first and third paragraphs of this section read in full:
In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an indictment or information or granting a new trial after verdict or judgment, as to any one or more counts, or any part thereof, except that no appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecution.
An appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision or order, entered by a district court of the United States, granting the release of a person charged with or convicted of an offense, or denying a motion for revocation of, or modification of the conditions of, a decision or order granting release.

.For stylistic purposes, I will rely on "suppression orders,” “suppressing evidence,” and like phrases as shorthand for an "order of a district court suppressing or excluding evidence or requiring the return of seized property in a criminal proceeding.”

. The original language of the certification requirement provided that the United Stales Attorney was to certify " 'to the judge who granted such motion that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial proof of the charge pending against the defendant.’ ” See United States v. Greely, 413 F.2d 1103, 1104 (D.C.Cir.1969) (per curiam). The requirement was amended to its current form in 1971 as part of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub.L. No. 91-644, tit. III, 84 Stat. 1880, 1890 (1971). Although the 1971 amendment slightly altered the language of tire certification requirement, the primary purpose of amending the suppression order paragraph was to make "the Government’s, including probation revocation hearings, not merely to pretrial suppressions." S.Rep. No. 91-1296, at 2 (1970); see also United States v. Hines, 419 F.2d 173, 174-5 (10th Cir.1969) (holding that the government's right to appeal under the 1968 statute did not apply to probation revocation hearings). One final amendment to the now-second paragraph corrected a grammatical error. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub.L. No. 103-322, tit. XXXIII, § 330008(4), 108 Stat. 1796, 2142.

. The fourth paragraph of § 3731 provides: "The appeal in all such cases shall be taken within thirty days after the decision, judgment or order has been rendered and shall be diligently prosecuted.”

. While I have great respect for the author of the Opinion and his distinguished prior service as a senior Department of Justice official, I wonder if recent experience might suggest that the comfort he finds in the supervision of Main Justice officials over the activities of United States Attorneys might not always be well placed. See John McKay, Train Wreck At the Justice Department: An Eyewitness Account, 31 Seattle U.L.Rev. 265 (2008).

. That the government chooses its appeals with care is not mere speculation. Rather, it *525is the raison d’etre of the policy that requires federal government lawyers to obtain approval from the Office of the United States Solicitor General before appealing. See FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 96, 115 S.Ct. 537, 130 L.Ed.2d 439 (1994).

. The majority somehow finds consolation in the notion that the certification will have no bearing on the substantive analysis. The materiality vd non of the suppressed evidence will not be relevant in many, if not most, § 3731 interlocutory appeals. Thus, the Loud Hawk inquiry will typically be the only opportunity this court has for reviewing the government's claim that the evidence suppressed is in fact material.

. As noted above, § 3731 requires the government to file an appeal of a suppression order within thirty days of the ruling. Although this provision is salutary, defendants and district courts (which also have an interest in speedy proceedings) still must endure the substantial lag between the government's notice of appeal and our decision.

.An example: Traffic regulations are designed to keep drivers and pedestrians safe, and law enforcement vehicle patrols further that goal by providing a monitoring and enforcement mechanism. When a violator is detected and pursued, the momentary danger may be elevated if a high-speed chase ensues. Are we to conclude that patrols do not keep drivers and pedestrians safe, then? Do they undermine the very goal they seek to advance? Hardly. Countless drivers obey the traffic laws because of the threat of being punished, and that is how the safety gains are achieved in the aggregate. All other things being equal, so long as the safety gain from the violations deterred outweighs the elevated levels of danger during police chases, law enforcement will provide a positive benefit. I concede that beyond my own intuition, I “have no evidence that the certification-plus rule of Loud Hawk is more efficient than simply accepting certification as sufficient to establish our jurisdiction.” I am not the one seeking to overturn a three-decades-old precedent however. If the majority seeks to impugn my reasoning because it is not empirically substantiated, I would think it would offer some evidence of its own.

. Nothing in § 3731 requires the local United States Attorney to seek the approval of the Solicitor General and nothing in the rule the majority fashions today gives the courts of appeals the authority to question whether it has occurred.

. See, e.g., Remarks on Signing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, II Pub. Papers 1455 (Dec. 18, 1987) (Ronald Reagan).