Court Opinion

ID: 9382375
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-27 16:00:30.064519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:38.937783
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                            For the Eighth Circuit
                        ___________________________

                                No. 22-2027
                        ___________________________

                            United States of America

                                      Plaintiff - Appellee

                                        v.

                             Mary Freida Fugerson

                                   Defendant - Appellant
                                 ____________

                     Appeal from United States District Court
                for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City
                                 ____________

                          Submitted: January 13, 2023
                            Filed: March 27, 2023
                                [Unpublished]
                                ____________

Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
                          ____________

PER CURIAM.

     Mary Freida Fugerson pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute 500
grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(A). The district court 1 sentenced her to 96 months in prison. She appeals her
sentence. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.

        Fugerson asserts her within-guidelines sentence is substantively
unreasonable. This court reviews for abuse of discretion. United States v. Doerr,
42 F.4th 914, 918 (8th Cir. 2022). “A district court abuses its discretion when it (1)
fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight; (2)
gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or (3) considers only the
appropriate factors but in weighing those factors commits a clear error of judgment.”
United States v. Palkowitsch, 36 F.4th 796, 802 (8th Cir. 2022). A within-guidelines
sentence is presumptively reasonable. United States v. Owens, 38 F.4th 1, 3 (8th
Cir. 2022). “It will be the unusual case when we reverse a district court sentence—
whether within, above, or below the applicable Guidelines range—as substantively
unreasonable.” United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 464 (8th Cir. 2009) (en
banc).

       First, Fugerson challenges the guidelines for drug possession offenses
generally, arguing they do not rely on empirical data but rather use a weight-driven
scheme and are unnecessarily punitive. Congress anticipated situations like
Fugerson’s with its safety valve provision. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (requiring the
court to impose a sentence “pursuant to guidelines . . . without regard to any statutory
minimum sentence” in certain situations). Because Fugerson possessed more than
500 grams of meth, she faced a mandatory minimum of 120 months in prison and a
potential for a life sentence. But she qualified for the safety valve relief, which
reduced her guidelines range to 87 to 108 months. The court did not abuse its
discretion in declining to further reduce her sentence based on policy arguments.
See United States v. Ultsch, 578 F.3d 827, 830-31 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding district
courts are “free to vary from the guideline based on policy concerns,” but are not
required to do so).

      1
      The Honorable Roseann Ketchmark, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri.
                                 -2-
       Second, she argues that because she was just a one-time drug courier, she
should not be punished based on the amount of drugs she was carrying. The district
court addressed this argument, expressing concern with couriers like Fugerson who
“are carrying large amounts of dangerous illegal drugs,” noting that they are “a
crucial aspect of the illegal meth supply chain success.” The court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that the amount of drugs she transported—almost 620
grams—indicated her culpability because she was “an integral part” of the
“community supply chain of illegal drugs.” See generally United States v. Bustos-
Torres, 396 F.3d 935, 943 (8th Cir. 2005) (observing that “weapons and violence
are frequently associated with drug transactions”).

       Third, she claims the court exaggerated the seriousness of her criminal history
because she received only probation for her two prior felonies (possession of
marijuana for sale and grand theft). But a court may consider that the leniency of
prior sentences has not effectively deterred future criminal conduct. See United
States v. Isler, 983 F.3d 335, 344 (8th Cir. 2020) (holding that even “minor crimes”
may show a likelihood of recidivism or “that leniency has not been effective”).

       Finally, she quibbles with the court’s statement that it would be required to
sentence someone with no criminal history more harshly than her because of her
safety-valve relief. But courts are required to fashion sentences to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities between defendants “guilty of similar conduct.”
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).

      The district court considered each of Fugerson’s arguments and made an
“individualized assessment based on the facts presented, addressing the defendant’s
proffered information in its consideration of the § 3553(a) factors.” Doerr, 42 F.4th
at 918. There was no abuse of discretion.

                                    *******
      The judgment is affirmed.
                      ______________________________
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