Court Opinion

ID: 9656705
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:56:56.31811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:34.495939
License: Public Domain

LAMBERT, Chief Justice,
Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent and would reverse the Court of Appeals on the view that KRS 452.210(2)(a)(1) affords an adequate basis for exercising jurisdiction over Appellee in this matter.
Appellant asserts that the Court has personal jurisdiction over Appellee pursuant to Kentucky’s Long-Arm Statute. KRS 454.210(2)(a)(1) states, “A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim arising from the person’s.... transacting any business in this Commonwealth.” This statute “permits the courts to reach the full constitutional limits of due *598process in entertaining jurisdiction over non-resident defendants.”1
To exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant pursuant to KRS 454.210(2)(a)(1), three questions must be addressed. The first is whether the Ap-pellee’s conduct constituted transacting “any business” in this Commonwealth. The second question is whether the cause of action for negligence arises from Ap-pellee transacting business within the Commonwealth. The third question is whether entertaining jurisdiction would be permitted by the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Upon an affirmative answer to these three questions, jurisdiction over Appellee should be established.
Appellee’s conduct constituted transacting business within the meaning of KRS 454.210(2)(a)(1). Appellee agreed to take possession of an airplane in Kentucky and deliver it to Maryland on behalf of Multi-Air, Ltd. Whatever the formal relationship between Multi-Air and Appellee, Appellee undoubtedly acted as an agent for Multi-Air. Appellee’s business purpose was to acquire possession of the Piper Seneca II airplane at Bowman Field in Louisville and take the plane to Clinton, Maryland, but before possession could be gained, Appel-lee had to deliver a check to Appellant for the purchase price. The check was delivered in Louisville.
The plain meaning of KRS 454.210(2)(a)(1) is to authorize the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a person conducting any business in Kentucky. The plain meaning of the term “any business” encompasses Appellee’s tender of payment for the airplane. The tender of payment for goods or services is logically and traditionally a business activity. Appellee’s action clearly falls within the purview of the language of KRS 454.210(2)(a)(1) granting jurisdiction over a person who transacts any business within the Commonwealth.
Appellee’s transaction of business within the Commonwealth gave rise to Appellant’s negligence cause of action. It is proper to exercise jurisdiction over a tort claim occurring in another jurisdiction that arises out of business transacted in Kentucky.2 In Mohler v. Dorado Wings, Inc., the business agreement for plane tickets was entered into in Kentucky, but gave rise to a tort cause of action for compensatory and punitive damages from the loss of jewelry between Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.3 In Mohler, the Court of Appeals stated, “If a defendant is transacting business within the Commonwealth, it is not necessary that a tort be committed herein.”4
In the present case, Appellee tendered a check for payment for an airplane in Kentucky and proceeded to fly the plane to Maryland where he negligently crashed it. The business transacted in Kentucky, delivering the check and taking possession of the plane, was a condition precedent and sine qua non to the negligent plane crash in Maryland.
Due process of law permits the exercise of jurisdiction when a party establishes minimum contacts with the Commonwealth so that the exercise of jurisdiction would not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”5 Appellee’s trip *599to Kentucky was sufficient contact to render the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable. Although the duration of Appellee’s stay was short, his conduct was such that requiring him to defend litigation in Kentucky would not offend due process.
For the forgoing reasons I dissent.
STUMBO, J., joins this dissenting opinion.

. Davis-Johnson v. Pannelee, Ky.App., 18 S.W.3d 347, 352 (1999).

. Mohler v. Dorado Wings, Inc., Ky. Ct.App., 675 S.W.2d 404, 407 (1984).

. Id.

. Id.

. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (citations omitted).