Court Opinion

ID: 9367840
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-01 22:03:43.158951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:03.669460
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

VADIM M. SHULMAN, BRACHA         )
FOUNDATION; HORNBEAM             )
CORPORATION,                     )
                                 )
              Plaintiffs,        )
                                 )
       v.                        ) C.A. No. 2019-0678-NAC
                                 )
IGOR VALERYEVICH                 )
KOLOMOISKY; GENNADIY             )
BORISOVICH; MORDECHAI KORF;      )
PANIKOS SYMEOU; JOINT STOCK      )
COMPANY COMMERCIAL BANK          )
PRIVATBANK; WARREN STEEL         )
HOLDINGS, LLC; OPTIMA            )
ACQUISITIONS, LLC; OPTIMA        )
GROUP, LLC; CC METALS AND        )
ALLOYS, LLC; FELMAN TRADING,     )
INC.; FELMAN PRODUCTION, LLC;    )
OPTIMA FIXED INCOME, LLC;        )
OPTIMAVENTURES, LLC;             )
QUERELLA HOLDINGS, LTD.;         )
OPTIMA INTERNATIONAL OF          )
MIAMI, INC.; 5251 36TH STREET,   )
LLC; GEORGIAN AMERICAN           )
ALLOYS, INC.; HALLIWEL ASSETS,   )
INC.,                            )
                                 )
              Defendants.        )

             ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
      DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO AMEND
      WHEREAS:

     1.      Plaintiffs Vadim M. Shulman and Bracha Foundation (the “Initial

Plaintiffs”) commenced this action on August 23, 2019. Docket Index (“D.I.”) 1.

     2.      In the months following the commencement of the action, various

defendants filed short-form motions to dismiss.         During this time, the Initial

Plaintiffs also sought to serve various foreign defendants via the Hague Convention.

     3.      The Initial Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint on November

27, 2019 (the “First Amended Complaint”). The First Amended Complaint added

Hornbeam Corporation as a plaintiff (together with the Initial Plaintiffs, “Plaintiffs”)

and, according to Plaintiffs, deleted one defendant and added another with “no other

substantive amendments.” D.I. 103 (“Motion to Amend”) ¶2.

     4.      Various defendants again filed short-form motions to dismiss, and

Plaintiffs continued efforts to effectuate service.       This included briefing on

Defendant Gennadiy Bogolyubov’s motion for reargument of an order granting

Plaintiffs permission to employ an alternative method of service. D.I. 51.

     5.      Following oral argument, the Court denied the motion for reargument

on July 28, 2020. D.I. 76. The Court entered an implementing order on August 11,

2020. D.I. 75.

     6.      On March 3, 2021, the Court issued a letter staying briefing on

Defendants’ motions to dismiss pending motions to dismiss on forum non

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conveniens grounds in a related matter, PrivatBank v. Kolomoisky, C.A. No. 2019-

0377-JRS. D.I. 86.

       7.    On August 23, 2021, the Court issued its decision in the PrivatBank v.

Kolomoisky matter. The parties in this action filed a stipulated schedule for briefing

on Defendants’ motions to dismiss in mid-September 2021. D.I. 91; D.I. 92.

       8.    On October 20, 2021, various defendants filed their respective opening

briefs in support of their motions to dismiss the November 2019 First Amended

Complaint. D.I. 93; D.I. 94; D.I. 95; D.I. 96; D.I. 97.

       9.    On November 19, 2021, the parties agreed to a stipulated briefing

schedule, which contemplated the submission of any opposition to Defendants’

motions to dismiss briefing by December 17, 2021. D.I. 101; D.I. 102.

       10.   On December 17, 2021, Plaintiffs filed the Motion to Amend.

       11.   The Defendants in this matter filed four separate sets of opposition

papers in response, plus a short-form joinder. D.I. 107; D.I. 109; D.I. 110; D.I. 111;

D.I. 112. Plaintiffs filed an omnibus reply in support of their Motion to Amend. D.I.

116.

       12.   Contemporaneously with these various filings, the Court issued a letter

notifying the parties of Vice Chancellor Slights’s retirement and that all applications

for judicial decision would not be scheduled for a hearing until a new judge was

sworn in. D.I. 106.

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     13.     Having heard oral argument , I am now prepared to rule on Plaintiffs’

Motion to Amend.

      NOW, THEREFORE, the Court having carefully considered the Motion to

Amend papers, oral argument on the motion, and the supplemental filings of the

parties, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, this 1st day of February 2023, as follows:

      1.     Court of Chancery Rule 15(a) provides that leave to amend should be

“freely given when justice so requires.” Ct. Ch. R. 15(a). This Court interprets Rule

15(a) to “allow for liberal amendment in the interest of resolving cases on the

merits.” Gould v. Gould, 2011 WL 141168, at *7 (Del. Ch. Jan. 7, 2011). Leave to

amend is typically granted unless the non-moving party can establish “undue

prejudice, undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive or futility of amendment[.]” In re

TGM Enters., L.L.C., 2008 WL 4261035, at *2 (Del. Ch. Sept. 12, 2008) (citation

omitted). The most important factor in this context is consideration of undue

prejudice. Indeed, in interpreting Superior Court Rule 15(a), which is substantially

the same as Court of Chancery Rule 15(a), the Delaware Supreme Court has held

that, “[i]n the absence of prejudice to another party, the trial court is required to

exercise its discretion in favor of granting leave to amend.” Mullen v. Alarmguard

of Delmarva, Inc., 625 A.2d 258, 263 (Del. 1993) (citation omitted).1

1
   I also note that “[t]his court rarely declines amendments under Rule 15(a) based
on futility.” Twitter, Inc. v. Musk, 2022 WL 4087797, at *1 (Del. Ch. Sept. 7, 2022)
(rejecting argument that amendment would be futile given the “exceedingly movant-
                                         4
       2.     Although Plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint would constitute

their second amendment, they argue that the First Amended Complaint did not make

any substantive changes to the original complaint’s fact allegations. 2 Based on my

review of the redline that accompanied the filing of the First Amended Complaint,

Plaintiffs’ characterization appears to be correct.

       3.     Given this, Plaintiffs say that their proposed amendment should be

viewed as essentially a routine response to Defendants’ first set of opening dismissal

briefs—indeed, a response specifically contemplated by the terms of Rule 15(aaa).

Plaintiffs further argue that the proposed amendment reflects new facts that the

Plaintiffs had learned since the filing of the First Amended Complaint.

       4.     For their part, Defendants have raised a host of arguments in opposition

to what Plaintiffs characterize as a routine motion to amend.3

       5.     First, Defendant Joint Stock Company Commercial Bank PrivatBank

(“PrivatBank”) filed papers opposing the Motion to Amend on the grounds that

Plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint sought to bring a claim for alleged violation

friendly standard of Rule 15(a)”). “Such arguments require the court to assess the merits
of a claim on a highly truncated posture and before such claim has been pled; such
arguments are therefore antithetical to the policy of resolving cases on the merits.” Id.
2
 Plaintiffs point out that the First Amended Complaint simply added a plaintiff, dropped a
defendant, and added a defendant.
3
  Although I address the various bases for opposition according to the defendant who
specifically made the argument, I note that various arguments have been reciprocally joined
by co-defendants.

                                            5
of the Delaware Organized Crime and Racketeering Act (“Delaware RICO”) against

PrivatBank. D.I. 109 (“PrivatBank Opp.”) at 2–3. PrivatBank argued that Plaintiffs’

Delaware RICO claim would be futile and, indeed, during the course of oral

argument, Plaintiffs withdrew their request to add the claim. D.I. 130 (“Hr’g Tr.”)

at 26:5–27:2; see also id. at 30:3–9 (“[PrivatBank] agree[s] that [the Delaware RICO

claims] would be futile[.]”). Accordingly, this portion of the Motion to Amend is

denied as moot.

      6.     PrivatBank also asks that I parse Plaintiffs’ proposed new factual

allegations and make a determination that those allegations do not apply to

PrivatBank. PrivatBank Opp. at 5–6. PrivatBank argues that the allegations are

taken from PrivatBank’s pleadings in the related action before this Court and that

they, “in fact, actually strengthen PrivatBank’s defenses in this case” and, “at least

as to PrivatBank, should be denied.” PrivatBank Opp. at 6. That may be, but

PrivatBank does not cite any authority for its request that I decide now the

applicability of various allegations as to PrivatBank versus other defendants.

Accordingly, at least for purposes of ruling on the Motion to Amend, I decline

PrivatBank’s invitation to slice and dice Plaintiffs’ complaint in that way.

      7.     Next, Defendant Gennadiy Bogolyubov (“Bogolyubov”) argues that

Plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint must be denied on bad faith grounds. D.I.

107 “(Bogolyubov Opp.”) at 1–2.          Bogolyubov asserts that, in response to

                                          6
Defendants’ briefing arguing for dismissal on laches grounds, Plaintiffs deleted, in

bad faith, various allegations concerning dates and when Plaintiffs would have had

notice of claims. See Bogolyubov Opp. at 9-10. Plaintiffs strongly object to

Bogolyubov’s argument, contending that the objection is essentially a meaningless

critique of “Plaintiffs’ drafting style.” D.I. 116 (“Plaintiffs’ Reply”) at 5–8. In any

event, this issue was resolved during oral argument. See Hr’g Tr. at 16:5–17:16,

35:3–40:15, 51:1–6, 65:1–11.       Based on the parties’ presentations—and as I

discussed with the parties—during oral argument, to the extent Plaintiffs’ First

Amended Complaint references dates or notice matters, Defendants may continue to

cite to those prior allegations in support of their dismissal arguments even if

Plaintiffs’ proposed amendment would delete such allegations. Id. I will consider

any such citations in context, including based on Plaintiffs’ assurances that their

changes are ultimately immaterial.

      8.     The next argument concerns the objection of the “Loans Defendants”

to the addition of Chaim Schochet and Uri Tzvi Laber as new defendant-parties to

this action. D.I. 110 (“Loans Defs.’ Opp.”) at 2–4. The Loans Defendants assert

that the proposed amended complaint is nearly devoid of specific factual allegations

concerning Schochet and Laber. Id. 4–12. The Loans Defendants further argue that

the addition of Schochet and Laber via amendment should be denied on Rule 15(c)

grounds. Id. 8–12.

                                          7
      9.     “Notwithstanding the general liberal policy toward amendments

imparted by Rule 15, a motion to add or substitute a party after the statute of

limitations has run must be denied if it fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule

15(c).” Mullen, 625 A.2d at 263 (citation omitted). “Rule 15(c)(3) establishes the

‘relation back’ doctrine” applicable here. Allmaras v. Bd. Of Adj. of Sussex Cnty.,

238 A.3d 142 (Del. 2020) (TABLE). In Allmaras, the Delaware Supreme Court

affirmed the conclusion of the Superior Court that “a party seeking relief under Rule

15(c) must still show that it was mistaken as to the identity of the proper defendant.”

Id.

      10.    Here, the Loans Defendants’ papers persuasively argue that Plaintiffs

have adequately known of the identity of Schochet and Laber for many years.

Plaintiffs do not engage with this argument in their papers and instead focus on

whether Schochet and Laber “should have known that, but for Plaintiffs’ mistake,

they would have been named in” Plaintiffs’ original complaint. Plaintiffs’ Reply at

13–15. The problem for Plaintiffs is that they fail to make any showing that their

decision not to name Schochet and Laber was an actual “mistake concerning the

proper defendant[s’] identity” as that concept is understood under our law, as

opposed to being simply a “fully informed decision” resulting from the sort of

choices that parties and their counsel routinely make in the course of litigation.

Allmaras, 238 A.3d 142. Based on the arguments presented to me, this is a case of

                                          8
the latter. Plaintiffs’ request to add Schochet and Laber as new party-defendants is

“not entitled to relief under the relation back doctrine” and is accordingly denied.

Id.

      11.    Defendants also raise, at various points, arguments that Plaintiffs’

Motion to Amend reflects undue delay. E.g., D.I. 111 (“Halliwel Defs.’ Opp.”) at

11–13. “Delay alone” is generally not a sufficient basis to deny a motion to amend.

Mullen, 625 A.2d at 263 (citations omitted). This is Plaintiffs’ first motion to amend,

and their prior amendment as of right did not contain substantive changes to

Plaintiffs’ fact allegations. To the extent there was significant time between the

commencement of the action and the filing of the Motion to Amend, a significant

portion of that time involved efforts to effectuate service of foreign defendants and

the stay of briefing on the motions to dismiss ordered by this Court. In any event,

Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Amend within their stipulated time for briefing

Defendants’ motions to dismiss. I therefore do not find delay warranting denial of

the Motion to Amend, particularly given this Court’s liberal policy towards

amendment.

      12.    Next, I turn to what I consider to be the most important factor in this

context:    whether the Motion to Amend would result in undue prejudice.

Defendants’ prejudice arguments are largely bound up in the arguments that I

addressed above. Otherwise, Defendants complain that they expended resources in

                                          9
preparing opening briefs in support of their original motions to dismiss. E.g.,

Bogolyubov Opp. At 11–12; Halliwel Defs.’ Opp. at 12–13. Defendants’ cost

arguments, however, do not provide a basis to deny the Motion to Amend here. See

NACCO Indus., Inc. v. Applica Inc., 2008 WL 2082145, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 7, 2008)

(“The court is cognizant of the significant costs briefing such motions can incur.

Even considering the expenses the defendants have already incurred, however, such

costs do not rise to the level of ‘undue prejudice.’ Given the court’s preference for

resolving matters on the merits and the absence of material prejudice to the

defendants, as well as the fact that leave to amend is freely given, the motion for

leave to amend will be granted.”).4

       13.    Finally, I turn to the Halliwel Defendants’ argument that allegations in

Plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint materially contradict Plaintiffs’ positions,

including positions taken under oath, both in other litigation and in this action.

Halliwel Defs.’ Opp. at 8–9.         The Halliwel Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’

proposed amendment is a bad faith attempt to duck a ruling that various claims

4
  The Halliwel Defendants also demand that, if Plaintiffs’ motion is granted, the Court
direct that Plaintiffs pay defense counsel’s fees incurred in preparing the original opening
briefs in support of dismissal. Halliwel Defs.’ Opp. at 12–13. The Halliwell Defendants
cite Lillis v. AT&T Corp., 896 A.2d 871, 878–79 (Del. Ch. 2005) in support. I deny the
request for the same reasons the Court did in NACCO: “[T]he defendants’ request that the
plaintiffs’ pay the defendants’ costs and legal fees incurred in [ ] drafting the defendants’
prior motion to dismiss will be denied. This is not a case, such as Franklin
Balance or Lillis, in which the plaintiffs sought leave to amend only after defending their
pleading with full briefing and oral argument.” 2008 WL 2082145, at *3.

                                             10
asserted by Plaintiffs are subject to jurisdiction in the British Virgin Islands. Id. at

6–9.

       14.   For their part, Plaintiffs respond that the Halliwel Defendants take prior

statements out of context and that Plaintiffs’ positions have necessarily changed over

time as Plaintiffs have engaged in a decade of litigation in numerous venues and

learned more about alleged fraudulent activities that occurred many years ago. Id.

at 7–8.

       15.   At bottom, the Halliwel Defendants’ argument relies on the charge that

Plaintiff Shulman has previously acknowledged that he executed a unanimous

consent, dated April 3, 2008 (the “2008 Consent”), transferring his direct

membership interests in Warren Steel Holdings, LLC (“Warren Steel”) to Halliwel

Assets Inc., a BVI entity (“Halliwel”). Id. at 6–9. Per the Halliwel Defendants, the

result of this transfer is that Shulman did not, and does not, own a direct interest in

Warren Steel. Id. Pointing to the proposed amended complaint’s allegations that

the 2008 Consent is a forgery, the Halliwel Defendants argue that any allegation, or

change in allegations, suggesting that Shulman has a direct ownership interest in

Warren Steel is made in bad faith and must be rejected. Id.

       16.   During oral argument, based on the statements of counsel, that

argument seemed to have significant force. I therefore asked the parties to file

supplemental briefing on the issue.

                                          11
       17.      In their supplemental briefing, Plaintiffs point out that, during oral

argument, the Halliwel Defendants failed to note that Shulman made functionally

the same assertions of forgery in a proceeding before England’s High Court of

Justice in May 2017.5 D.I. 129 (“Plaintiffs’ Suppl. Br.”). More importantly, I also

reviewed the original complaint and the First Amended Complaint and found the

following allegation:

       A “unanimous written consent” dated April 3, 2008 and purportedly bearing
       the signatures of Plaintiff Shulman and Defendants Kolomoisky and
       Bogolyubov, states that the three Principals resigned as a shareholder of
       Warren Steel and approved Halliwel as the sole shareholder of Warren Steel.

5
  The Particulars of Claim that Mr. Shulman filed with England’s High Court of Justice
states as follows:
       [U]p until an investigation into Warren Steel was commenced by Mr. Shulman’s
       adviser . . . in or around April or May 2012, it was Mr. Shulman’s belief that . . .
       Mr. Shulman, Mr. Kolomoisky and Mr. Bogolyubov each held an equal direct
       shareholding in [Warren Steel]. . . . [T]hat investigation revealed that Mr.
       Shulman’s shareholding had been transferred to an intermediary company
       incorporated in the British Virgin Islands, called Halliwel Assets Inc. . . . Pending
       disclosure and further investigation, Mr. Shulman’s current understanding as to the
       ownership structure of [Warren Steel] derived from his ongoing investigations is as
       follows:
             1. Halliwel was incorporated in the British Virgin Islands on 5 January 2006.
             2. In around 2006, Mr. Shulman provided examples of his signature to Mr.
                Novikov to be used solely for the day-to-day running of the parties’ joint
                investments, including WSH, but not for executing any substantive
                documents unless expressly approved by Mr. Shulman.
             3. By a unanimous written consent purportedly signed on 3 April 2008, each of
                Mr. Shulman, Mr. Kolomoisky and Mr. Bogolyubov resigned as a
                shareholder of WSH and approved Halliwel as the sole shareholder of WSH.
                Mr. Shulman has no recollection of having signed or approved the resolution,
                and the Defendants are put to proof as to its validity and legal effectiveness.
Plaintiffs’ Supp. Br., Ex. A, ¶ 74.

                                               12
       Shulman had no knowledge of this occurrence and did not approve it. Any
       documents that bear his signature in this regard are false.

D.I. 1, ¶73; D.I. 30, ¶74.

       18.    Given these facts, I find the premise from which the Halliwel

Defendants’ argument flows is flawed. The forgery theory has been present in the

pleadings since Plaintiffs commenced this action in August 2019.6 In addition, I

consider these issues in light of the circumstances of this litigation, which involves

matters that have been the subject of proceedings for a decade in one form or another,

in multiple domestic and foreign jurisdictions, involving numerous foreign parties

and allegations of complex financial activities.

       19.    To be clear, I have concerns about Plaintiffs’ prior statements, and I

anticipate that this is not the last that I will hear of them in this action. But, at least

for purposes of the Motion to Amend, I decline to find those concerns warrant

denying the motion, particularly in light of this Court’s policy in favor of resolving

claims on the merits.

6
  I acknowledge that this theory seems difficult to square with other allegations that
Plaintiffs made in their prior pleadings at various points. Plaintiffs seem to say that, at least
as to some of their allegations suggesting that Hornbeam or Shulman owns interests in
Halliwel and that Halliwel is in turn the sole owner of Warren Steel, those allegations
simply reflect the ownership positions on the various entities’ (allegedly fraudulent)
records. This “all-of-the-above” approach may not be a model of pleading, but it is not, in
these peculiar circumstances, a basis to foreclose Plaintiffs’ opportunity to amend.

                                               13
      20.   For these reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend is GRANTED IN

PART as set forth above, on the condition that Defendants may reference allegations

in Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint in making any timeliness arguments.

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend (i) to add the Delaware RICO claim has been

withdrawn and is therefore DENIED AS MOOT and (ii) to add Mr. Schochet and

Mr. Laber as new defendants is DENIED.

                                                  /s/ Nathan A. Cook
                                             Vice Chancellor Nathan A. Cook

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