Court Opinion

ID: 9649790
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:09:33.86415+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:22:27.637668
License: Public Domain

Bogdanski, J.
(dissenting). The defendant should have been permitted to withdraw his pleas of guilty. The facts of this case are almost identical to those of State v. Brown, 157 Conn. 492, 255 A.2d 612. The pleas of guilty were entered just before trial; the court questioned the defendant about the “voluntariness” of the pleas before accepting them ; and shortly thereafter, but prior to sentencing, the defendant changed his mind, claiming that the pleas were not voluntary because he did not understand the proceeding and because counsel was overly persuasive. The motion to withdraw the pleas was not unseasonably made and there was no indication that it was motivated by an attempt to delay or that the state had been prejudiced. “Under all these circumstances, in exercising its judicial discretion, the court should have left the decision as to a plea to the defendant and followed The universal practice in this State . . . for the court to exercise that discretion in favor of the accused, and to permit him to change his plea and have a jury decide the question of his guilt.’ State v. Carta, . . . [90 Conn. 79, 82, 96 A. 411].” State v. Brown, supra, 497.
By rejecting the guidelines set forth in State v. Brown, supra, and by falling back on the naked proposition that the decision “lies within the sound discretion of the trial court,” the majority opinion leaves the judges of. this state without any standards or guidelines on plea withdrawal. This can only lead to arbitrary and inconsistent rulings which *49may cause some defendants to feel that they have been dealt with unfairly. “There are obvious reasons, from a correctional standpoint, why a defendant should be satisfied that he was treated fairly when he arrives at the penitentiary.” A.B.A. Standards Delating to Pleas of Guilty (Approved Draft, 1968) §3.3 (b), commentary at Sup. p. 2.
A guilty plea is “perhaps the most devastating waiver possible under our Constitution.” Dukes v. Warden, 406 U.S. 250, 258, 92 S. Ct. 1551, 32 L. Ed. 2d 45 (concurring opinion of Stewart, J.). It involves a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274; State v. Bugbee, 161 Conn. 531, 533, 290 A.2d 332. When an accused changes his mind shortly after waiving those constitutional rights, claiming that he was confused and under pressure and that he didn’t understand what he was doing, the court should show solicitude for the defendant and allow him to undo the waiver, especially when there is no prejudice to the state and no attempt to delay the proceeding. State v. Brown, supra. “ ‘Any requirement that a defendant prove the “merit” of his reason for undoing this waiver would confuse the obvious difference between the withdrawal of a guilty plea before the government has relied on the plea to its disadvantage, and a later challenge to such a plea, on appeal or collaterally, when the judgment is final and the government clearly has relied on the plea.’ ” Szarwak v. Warden, 167 Conn. 10, 49, 355 A.2d 49 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part by Bogdanski, J.), citing Dukes v. Warden, supra (concurring opinion of Stewart, J.).
*50I would find error, set aside the judgment and remand the case with direction to grant the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas.