Court Opinion

ID: 9408188
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-11 19:05:27.586568+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:42.619601
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/11/23
                CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                          DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,                         B321031

        Plaintiff and Respondent,   (Los Angeles County
                                    Super. Ct. No. BA037726)
        v.

ANTHONY ARNOLD,

        Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Laura F. Priver, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.

      Sally Patrone, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Christopher G.
Sanchez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                     _________________________
       This is defendant and appellant Anthony Arnold’s third
appeal arising from his 1992 conviction for second degree murder
(Pen. Code, § 187) in the stabbing death of a man during a street
brawl.1 The jury in defendant’s case also found a sentencing
enhancement alleging that he personally used a knife to be not
true. (§ 12022, subd. (b).)
       Defendant appealed his conviction, and we affirmed the
judgment. (People v. Arnold (Oct. 29, 1993), B065831 [nonpub.
opn.], at p. 13 (Arnold I).) In 2019, defendant filed a petition for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6.2 We reversed the trial
court’s summary denial of that petition and remanded the matter
for an evidentiary hearing per section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(1).
(People v. Arnold (Dec. 15, 2020), B303619 [nonpub. opn.], at
p. 10 (Arnold II).)
       Following that evidentiary hearing, the trial court again
denied defendant’s petition, finding that defendant could still be
convicted of murder as the actual killer because “it is clear
beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant] stabbed the victim.”
       Defendant now appeals for a third time, arguing, among
other things, that substantial evidence did not support the trial
court’s ruling he could still be convicted of murder as the actual
killer. We agree that the court erred in finding that defendant
stabbed the victim to death after the jury found not true an

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise noted.

2     When defendant filed his petition, the relevant
resentencing statute was numbered section 1170.95. Effective
June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered section 1172.6,
with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For simplicity,
we refer to the section by its new numbering.

                                 2
allegation that defendant personally used a knife. Therefore, we
reverse the order denying defendant’s petition and direct the trial
court to conduct a new hearing to determine, without
contradicting the prior knife use finding, whether the prosecution
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant is guilty under
a permissible theory of murder.
         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.     The 1992 Conviction and First Appeal
       “At 3 a.m. on July 8, 1990, Kathryn Cox was awakened by
yelling outside her apartment on Adams and Magnolia Avenues
in Los Angeles. Unable to see anything from her bedroom
window, she went to the front door and stepped out to the porch.
Later, she went to the end of the walkway. She saw a group of
about 12 young men and women chasing Leonides Marroquin
Carranza. They caught the victim in a vacant parking lot
directly across from her apartment. About five men had the
victim by a tree and were hitting him. He got free and ran, but
he was chased and caught by [defendant]. [Defendant] hit the
victim in the stomach several times. Ms. Cox demonstrated how
[defendant] struck the victim, and the prosecutor described her
movement as ‘a closed fist with a horizontal motion, parallel to
the ground in a[n] inward-type motion, with the thumb side of
the fist moving towards the body.’ The victim fell, and while he
was lying on his back, [defendant] again hit him two or three
times. The witness’ demonstration of the way in which
[defendant] struck the victim at that point was described as ‘the
same type of motion . . . only in a downward direction.’ She also
stated that she saw [defendant] hit the victim in a punching
motion, with the ‘fist in a forward direction.’ Ms. Cox, who by
this time was standing on the sidewalk outside her apartment

                                3
house about 45 feet from the crime scene, did not see anything in
[defendant’s] hand. She heard sirens and then she heard
someone say, ‘Vamanos, Spider,’ at which point [defendant] ran
away.
      “Ms. Cox walked across the street and saw that the victim
had been stabbed several times in the abdomen. She testified
that there was a lot of blood. . . . [¶] . . . The victim died of
multiple stab wounds. In addition to 13 stab wounds, the victim
had abrasions on his face and forehead as well as defensive
wounds on his hands.
      “Bianca Alvarez, a friend of [defendant’s], testified that his
nickname was Spider and that he belonged to a gang named
‘Harpies.’ She also testified that on the night of the murder, the
victim, who was drunk, walked up Magnolia and passed remarks
to the group. One of the group suggested that they take the
victim’s wallet. About five of the males in the group, including
[defendant], started following the victim; and after they caught
up with him, they started pushing him as they stood in a circle
around him. However, Alvarez left at that point and returned
only after everyone was running from the area and the victim
had been stabbed.
      “[Defendant] told Los Angeles Police Department Detective
Eric Browne that his nickname was Spider. [Defendant] had a
spider tattoo on his right upper arm, which he showed to the
members of the jury.” (Arnold I, supra, B065831, at pp. 2–4.)
      At trial, the “jury convicted [defendant] of second degree
murder [(§ 187)] and found the allegation that he personally used
a knife in the commission of the offense to be not true [§ 12022,
subd. (b)]. Defendant was sentenced to 15 years to life.”

                                 4
(Arnold I, supra, B065831, at p. 2.) We affirmed the conviction.
(Id. at p. 13.)
II.    The Resentencing Petition and Second Appeal
       “On January 28, 2019, defendant, in propria persona, filed
a petition to be resentenced pursuant to section [1172.6]. He
averred that an information was filed against him that allowed
the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder or
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine;
he was convicted of second degree murder pursuant to the felony
murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine;
and he could not now be convicted of murder because of changes
made to sections 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019.”
(Arnold II, supra, B303619, at p. 4.)
       “After entertaining oral argument, the trial court denied
defendant’s petition. The minute order provides: ‘The petition is
denied because the petitioner is not entitled to relief as a matter
of law. [¶] The petitioner was convicted of 2nd degree murder.
However, a review of the portions of the court file and appellate
record available to this court reveal that the petitioner was the
actual killer.’” (Arnold II, supra, B303619, at p. 5.)
       The defendant appealed, and the People conceded that
“defendant made a prima facie showing of eligibility.” (Arnold II,
supra, B303619, at p. 8.) We agreed, reversing and remanding
“[b]ecause defendant satisfied the prima facie stages of section
[1172.6], subdivision (c), [requiring] the trial court . . . to set the
matter for an order to show cause, with an evidentiary hearing.”
(Ibid.)
III. The Resentencing Hearing and Third Appeal
       The matter proceeded to an evidentiary hearing, held over
two sessions in October 2021 and April 2022. Neither defendant

                                   5
nor the prosecution presented additional admissible evidence, so
the matter was “submitted on the evidence elicited at trial, the
record of conviction, and the extensive briefing.”
       On April 15, 2022, the trial court issued a written order
denying the petition. The court held that “[t]he only logical
conclusion from the facts found in the record of conviction in this
matter is that [defendant] was the actual killer.” The court also
found that defendant acted with express or implied malice.
       In reaching these conclusions, the trial court acknowledged
that “[t]he knife allegation was found not true by the jury.”
However, the trial court found that, given the totality of the
evidence adduced at trial, including “the description of the motion
[defendant made towards the victim], the witnesses’ observation
of blood and stab wounds following the incident, the coroner’s
testimony regarding the cause and manner of death; it is clear
beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant] stabbed the victim.”
       Defendant timely appealed.
                            DISCUSSION
I.     Background Legal Principles
       Section 1172.6 provides a mechanism whereby people “who
believe they were convicted of murder for an act that no longer
qualifies as murder following the crime’s redefinition in 2019[ ]
may seek vacatur of their murder conviction and resentencing by
filing a petition in the trial court.” (People v. Drayton (2020)
47 Cal.App.5th 965, 973 (Drayton), overruled in part on other
grounds in People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis).)
       As is relevant here, in order to obtain resentencing relief,
the petitioner must allege that (1) an information had been filed
against him allowing the prosecution to proceed under a theory of
murder under the felony murder rule, the natural and probable

                                6
consequences doctrine, or any “other theory under which malice
is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation
in a crime” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)); (2) the petitioner was
convicted of murder (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(2)); and (3) he could not
now be convicted of murder as presently defined. (§ 1172.6, subd.
(a)(3)).
       If the trial court determines that the petitioner has made a
prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, it must issue an
order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c).) At the evidentiary hearing, the parties may rely upon
evidence in the record of conviction or new evidence to
demonstrate whether the petitioner is eligible for resentencing.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The prosecution bears the burden of
proving, “beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is
ineligible for resentencing.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) If the
prosecution cannot meet its burden, and the petitioner prevails,
he is entitled to vacatur of the murder conviction and
resentencing as set forth in section 1172.6, subdivision (e).
II.    Standard of Review
       In determining whether a trial court correctly denied a
section 1172.6 petition following an evidentiary hearing, “‘“we
review the factual findings for substantial evidence and the
application of those facts to the statute de novo.”’” (People v.
Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 652, 663.) However, “[t]he
primary issue here is the preclusive effect of [defendant’s]
acquittal” on the allegation that he personally used a knife,
which is “an issue of law that we independently review.” (People
v. Cooper (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 393, 412 (Cooper).)

                                 7
III.   Analysis
       Defendant raises three arguments against the order
denying his section 1172.6 petition. He argues that (1) the trial
court’s determination that defendant was the actual killer is
precluded by the jury’s prior not true finding on the personal use
of a knife allegation; (2) the trial court improperly relied on
evidence in the preliminary hearing transcript; and (3) the trial
court erroneously relied on the factual summaries from our prior
opinions in this matter.
       A.     Preclusive Effect of Prior Jury Findings
              1.    Relevant law
       Since defendant’s second appeal, there have been
substantial developments in the law regarding the preclusive
effect of prior jury findings at a section 1172.6 resentencing
hearing.
                    i.     Cooper, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th 393
       In April 2022, our colleagues in the First District held that
“a trial court cannot deny relief in a section [1172.6] proceeding
based on findings that are inconsistent with a previous acquittal
when no evidence other than that introduced at trial is
presented.” (Cooper, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 398.)
       The defendant in Cooper was charged with kidnapping and
murdering a man who died of a gunshot wound to the head.
(Cooper, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at pp. 399–400.) The jury
convicted him on the kidnapping and murder charges and found
true the allegation that a principal had been armed with a gun
during both offenses. (Id. at p. 399.) However, although the
defendant stipulated to being a convicted felon, the jury acquitted
him of the charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm.
(Ibid.) At the defendant’s section 1172.6 hearing, the trial court

                                 8
found that the defendant was ineligible for relief, “based in part
on [the court’s] belief that [the defendant] possessed and fired a
gun.” (Cooper, supra, at p. 398.)
       The Cooper court reversed, holding that a trial court may
not find that a defendant is ineligible for resentencing under
section 1172.6 “by relying on factual determinations about the
defendant’s gun use that ‘turn[ed] acquittals and not-true
enhancement findings [at trial] into their opposites.’” (Cooper,
supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 413.)
       In arriving at this conclusion, the Cooper court observed
that “it is not clear whether collateral estoppel principles apply in
section [1172.6] proceedings.” (Cooper, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at
p. 413.) The court noted that “[w]hen applicable in criminal
cases, the [collateral estoppel] doctrine ‘is a component of the
double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment’ and article I,
section 15, of the California Constitution, which both ‘provide
that no person may be tried more than once for the same offense.’
[Citations.] Thus, in the criminal context, ‘[c]ollateral estoppel is
traditionally applied to successive prosecutions, and there is
some question whether [the doctrine] applies to further
proceedings in the same litigation.’ [Citation.] Indeed, we have
previously indicated that ‘double jeopardy principles are not at
stake” in a section [1172.6] proceeding.’ [Citations.]” (Cooper,
supra, at pp. 412–413.)
       Instead of applying the collateral estoppel doctrine, the
court turned to “established case law in the analogous context of
petitions for resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act of
2012” (Proposition 36). (Cooper, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 413.)
It held that, like Proposition 36, the law that enacted section
1172.6 “created a ‘parallel structure’ [citation] between its

                                 9
amendments to existing law (§§ 188 and 189 governing liability
for murder) and its resentencing provisions (section [1172.6])[,]”
which “‘reflects an intent that sentences imposed on individuals
with the same criminal history be the same, regardless of
whether they are being sentenced or resentenced.’” (Cooper,
supra, at p. 415.)
       At least one appellate court has applied Cooper to a jury’s
not true finding on a personal weapons use allegation. (People v.
Henley (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1003, 1020 (Henley) [trial court
erred by finding that the defendant used a firearm to commit the
charged offense, despite relying on “the same evidence the jury
found did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt the allegation that
[the defendant] personally used a firearm”].)
                   ii.    People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698
                          (Strong)
       In August 2022, four months after Cooper was published
and four months before the Henley court adopted its reasoning,
our Supreme Court addressed whether a prior jury finding would
have preclusive effect on a section 1172.6 proceeding.
       The prior jury finding in Strong found true that the
defendant had been a major participant in the charged offense,
rather than finding not true that he personally used a weapon.
(Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 704.) But we find it instructive
that the court resolved the question of the finding’s preclusive
effect by applying the collateral estoppel doctrine. (Id. at p. 715
[“Because the text of section 1172.6 does not speak in any direct
way to the issue before us, we turn to background principles for
guidance. In general, whether a prior finding will be given
conclusive effect in a later proceeding is governed by the doctrine
of issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel.”]) The

                                10
court’s analysis suggests that the collateral estoppel doctrine
does apply to section 1172.6 proceedings, the Cooper court’s
constitutional concerns notwithstanding.
             2.    Analysis
       The parties disagree on what law applies in this appeal.
Defendant urges us to apply Cooper; the People argue that
Cooper was wrongly decided and encourage us to use the
collateral estoppel doctrine, as our Supreme Court did in Strong.3
       We need not decide between these two approaches to
resolve this appeal; assuming arguendo that either Cooper or the
collateral estoppel doctrine apply, both compel the same result.
                   i.     Cooper
       As in Cooper, no new evidence was adduced at defendant’s
section 1172.6 hearing. Therefore, we must determine whether
the trial court denied defendant’s petition on grounds that
contradicted the jury’s prior finding that defendant did not
personally use a knife. (Cooper, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 398.)
       The trial court’s order undoubtedly contradicted the jury’s
prior finding. The court found that “[t]he only logical conclusion
from the facts found in the record of conviction in this matter is
that [defendant] was the actual killer.” In arriving at this
conclusion, the court rejected the argument that the jury’s not
true finding on the knife allegation prevented it from finding
“beyond a reasonable doubt that the [defendant] stabbed the
victim.”

3     Although the People extensively argued that the collateral
estoppel doctrine applies and warrants affirmance, defendant did
not brief the collateral estoppel issue.

                                11
       The finding that defendant was the actual killer, premised
on the trial court’s conclusion that defendant stabbed the victim,
effectively “‘turned [the jury’s] . . . not-true enhancement finding[]
[at trial] into [its] opposite[].’” (Cooper, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at
p. 413.) Under Cooper, this was error.
                      ii.  Collateral estoppel
       Collateral estoppel is “‘grounded on the premise that “once
an issue has been resolved in a prior proceeding, there is no
further factfinding function to be performed.”’ [Citation.]”
(Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 715–716.) “It applies in criminal
as well as civil proceedings.” (Id. at p. 716.) The doctrine “bars
relitigation of issues earlier decided ‘only if several threshold
requirements are fulfilled. First, the issue sought to be precluded
from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former
proceeding. Second, this issue must have been actually litigated
in the former proceeding. Third, it must have been necessarily
decided in the former proceeding. Fourth, the decision in the
former proceeding must be final and on the merits. Finally, the
party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or
in privity with, the party to the former proceeding.’” (Ibid.)
       However, “‘[e]ven if the[ ] threshold requirements are
satisfied, the doctrine will not be applied if such application
would not serve its underlying fundamental principles’ of
promoting efficiency while ensuring fairness to the parties.
[Citations.]” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 715–716.)
       Here, each of the five threshold requirements are met. At
the 1992 trial, one issue the jury had to decide was whether
defendant personally used a knife in the commission of the
murder. The trial court instructed the jury as follows: “It is
alleged . . . that in the commission of the crime charged, the

                                 12
defendant personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon. If you
find such defendant guilty of [murder] . . . you must determine
whether or not such defendant personally used a deadly or
dangerous weapon in the commission of such crime. [¶] . . . [¶]
The term ‘used a dangerous or deadly weapon,’ as used in this
instruction, means to display such a weapon in an intentionally
menacing manner or intentionally to strike a person with it. [¶]
The People have the burden of proving the truth of this
allegation. If you have a reasonable doubt that it is true, you
must find it to be not true.”4
         The jury found the knife use allegation not true. Per the
instructions given, it had to assess whether the prosecution
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant “intentionally
. . . str[uck]” the victim with a knife. The trial court considered
the exact same issue at the section 1172.6 hearing, where it
determined “beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant] stabbed
the victim.”
         It is undisputed that the remaining four threshold
requirements are satisfied. The issue of whether defendant
stabbed the victim was actually litigated at the original trial. As
described above, the jury necessarily decided the issue in
rendering its not true finding on the knife use allegation. The
jury’s decision was final and was made on the merits, and both
the jury trial and the resentencing involved identical parties.
         Moreover, invoking the collateral estoppel doctrine in this
appeal would not contravene the doctrine’s fundamental

4     The jury’s verdict found “the allegation that in the
commission . . . of the above offense, [defendant] personally used
a deadly and dangerous weapon, to wit, knife, . . . to be not true.”

                                 13
principles. (Contra, e.g., Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 716
[collateral estoppel “does not apply when there has been a
significant change in the law since the [prior] findings were
rendered that warrants reexamination of the issue”].)
       Therefore, under the collateral estoppel doctrine, the trial
court erred in finding that the defendant stabbed the victim.
                    iii.  The People’s counterarguments
       The People raise five arguments against our conclusion.5
       First, the People contend that the trial and the section
1172.6 hearing cannot have involved identical issues because, at
the latter, “the parties are permitted . . . to present ‘new or
additional evidence’ [§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3)] (or simply raise new
arguments based on the cold record) to an independent factfinder
whose decision is not based on what the original jury found.”6
But in this case, neither party presented new evidence at the
section 1172.6 hearing. The trial court thus relied on the exact
same evidence the jury heard at the 1992 trial.
       Alternatively, the People try to analogize this case to People
v. Santamaria (1994) 8 Cal.4th 903 (Santamaria). The People
construe Santamaria as holding that the issue of whether a

5    Because we assume arguendo that Cooper applies to this
appeal, we need not reach the People’s claims that the case was
wrongly decided.

6      The People also claim that the structure of section 1172.6’s
resentencing mechanism implicitly conveys the Legislature’s
“intention that in these evidentiary hearings, prior acquittals and
findings of insufficient evidence generally do not have preclusive
effect.” This interpretation reads more into the statute than is
there.

                                 14
defendant used a knife to commit murder is not identical to any
issue necessarily decided by a not true finding as to a knife use
allegation.
       Santamaria does not stretch that far. In that case, the
defendant’s felony murder conviction was reversed and remanded
for retrial. (Santamaria, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 909.) The
defendant argued that the original jury’s not true finding on a
personal knife use allegation required the retrying prosecution to
“prove some basis for liability, such as that [the] defendant aided
and abetted the actual perpetrator, that did not involve personal
knife use,” and required “the trial court [to] . . . instruct the
[second] jury that [the defendant] did not use [a] knife.” (Id. at
p. 910.)
       Our Supreme Court disagreed; applying the collateral
estoppel doctrine, it held that the prior not true finding “show[ed]
only that there was a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors
that defendant specifically used a knife. It d[id] not show the
reverse, that the jury specifically found defendant was an aider
and abettor,” or establish conclusively that the defendant did not
use a knife. (Santamaria, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 919.) The Court
concluded that the jury’s doubt “as to knife use did not preclude a
murder conviction here . . . although it did mandate a not true
enhancement finding.” (Id. at p. 922.)
       As the court’s holding shows, the issue sought to be
precluded in Santamaria differs significantly from the issue
defendant seeks to preclude here. In this appeal, defendant
argues that the prior not true finding on the knife use allegation
precludes the trial court from finding, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that he stabbed the victim. Conversely, the Santamaria
defendant tried to preclude the prosecution from retrying him on

                                15
any theory involving his potential use of a knife. (Santamaria,
supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 920 [“Although defendant claims he merely
seeks to preclude the theory that he used the knife, he
necessarily is claiming more; he seeks to preclude the theory, and
evidence to support the theory, that he either used the knife or
aided and abetted the one who did. This, however, is not the
issue decided regarding the enhancement allegation”].) In the
former scenario, the issue sought to be precluded is identical to
the issue the jury decided in its not true finding. In the latter, it
is not.
        Second, the People contend that, under the collateral
estoppel doctrine, a prior not true finding does not preclude
subsequent contradictory findings. The People stress that a not
true finding does not constitute a factual finding of defendant’s
innocence as to the alleged knife use, but rather shows that the
jury was “not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of [the] theory
or fact[s] advanced by the prosecution.” (People v. Harrison
(2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 429, 440.) They argue that because the not
true finding is not a finding of fact, it should not carry preclusive
effect.
        We agree that the jury did not make a factual finding as to
whether defendant used a knife. But the question of defendant’s
factual innocence on the knife allegation is irrelevant to our
inquiry. The pertinent question for collateral estoppel purposes
is not whether the jury and the trial court reached identical
factual findings, but whether they decided identical factual
allegations. (See Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335,
342 [“The ‘identical issue’ requirement addresses whether
‘identical factual allegations’ are at stake in the two proceedings,
not whether the ultimate issues or dispositions are the same”].)

                                 16
And in this case, the issues were identical: Both the jury and the
trial court decided whether the prosecution proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant stabbed the victim to death.
       Third, the People argue that because section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(2) expressly gives preclusive effect to one type of
prior acquittal—namely, a finding that the defendant did not act
with reckless disregard for human life or was not a major
participant in a felony—the statute presumably does not give
preclusive effect to any other acquittals. We disagree that, when
read as a whole, the subdivision has such a dramatic effect.
(People v. Ramirez (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 923, 932 (Ramirez)
[“Each section of a statute must be construed in context, keeping
in mind the statutory purpose, and harmonizing related sections
to the extent possible”].)
       Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(2), reads as follows: “The
parties may waive a resentencing hearing and stipulate that the
petitioner is eligible to have the murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter conviction vacated and to be resentenced. If there
was a prior finding by a court or jury that the petitioner did not
act with reckless indifference to human life or was not a major
participant in the felony, the court shall vacate the petitioner’s
conviction and resentence the petitioner.” Read together, the
subdivision suggests the Legislature’s intention “to streamline
the process” by grouping together “‘a waiver . . . with a
presumption.’” (Ramirez, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 932; see
also Harrison, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 439.) The inclusion of
a mechanism providing expedited relief for certain defendants
does not imply a legislative intent to stop other defendants from
receiving the benefit of favorable prior jury findings.

                                17
      Fourth, the People cite to our analysis in Arnold I,
characterizing our opinion as suggesting that the jury’s prior
finding on the knife use allegation need not preclude a later
finding that defendant stabbed the victim.7 In Arnold I, we
determined that the jury’s not true finding on the knife use
allegation did not invalidate its simultaneous guilty verdict on
the second degree murder charge, “reject[ing] the argument that
we cannot consider that [defendant] had a knife because the jury
found the personal knife use enhancement not true.” (Arnold I,
supra, B065831, at p. 8.)
      However, our analysis was premised on statutory and case
law designed to reconcile jury verdicts that are facially
inconsistent with simultaneously rendered verdicts or findings.
(People v. Lopez (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 565, 571 [apparent
inconsistencies between the verdict and special findings “‘“‘may
be caused not by the confusion but the mercy of the jury, of which
[an] appellant can neither complain nor gain further advantage.
[Citations.]’”’”]; § 954 [“‘An acquittal of one or more counts shall
not be deemed an acquittal of any other count.’”]) We question
whether these authorities allow a trial court presiding over a
postconviction resentencing hearing to contradict a jury’s prior
finding, particularly when no new evidence was presented.
      Lastly, the People claim that the trial court’s alternate
finding that defendant acted with implied malice, “standing

7      Under the California Rules of Court, a party ordinarily may
not cite to an unpublished opinion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.1115(a).) However, an unpublished opinion may be cited or
relied on “[w]hen the opinion is relevant under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.” (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.1115(b)(1).)

                                 18
alone, was sufficient for the trial court to deny [defendant] relief.”
We disagree. The trial court’s order denying defendant’s petition
contains one sentence finding defendant “acted with express or
implied malice,” unaccompanied by further explanation. The
bulk of the order is dedicated to a detailed analysis of the
determination that defendant was the actual killer because he
stabbed the victim. When the court briefly returns to the
question of implied malice, it suggests that the malice finding
was substantially based on the assumption that defendant
stabbed the victim.
      Therefore, it appears that the trial court’s implied malice
finding is just as impaired as its finding that defendant was the
actual killer. Both findings rely on the trial court’s erroneous
conclusion that defendant stabbed the victim.
                    iv.  Disposition
      Having concluded that the trial court erred, we turn to the
question of disposition. Defendant urges us to grant his petition,
arguing that he cannot presently be found guilty of murder.
However, we note that the record contains evidence that could
support a finding that, despite not stabbing the victim, defendant
acted with express or implied malice.8 (§ 189, subd. (e)(3).) For
example, a key eyewitness testified that once the victim broke
away from the mob that had cornered him, defendant alone
pursued him and appeared to hit him six or seven times with a

8      In so holding, “[w]e express no opinion about [defendant’s]
ultimate entitlement to relief following the hearing.” (Drayton,
supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 983 [abrogated on other grounds by
Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 963].) That determination is left to
the trial court.

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closed fist. Defendant delivered two or three additional blows
after the victim had fallen to the ground.
       The trial court could reasonably conclude from this
evidence that the defendant acted with implied malice, especially
if combined with direct or circumstantial evidence showing that
the victim had been stabbed by a third party before defendant hit
him.
       Accordingly, we conclude that it is appropriate to remand
the matter for a new hearing to determine whether the
prosecution proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant is
guilty under a permissible theory of murder. (§ 1172.6, subd.
(d)(3).) In doing so, the court shall not make any finding or rely
on any evidence which contradicts the jury’s finding that the
personal use of a knife sentencing enhancement was not true.
       For the sake of completeness, we will now turn to
defendant’s remaining arguments.
       B.     Reliance on Preliminary Hearing Transcripts
       Defendant argues that the trial court improperly
considered evidence contained in the preliminary hearing
transcripts.
       At the evidentiary hearings, defendant did not object to the
trial court’s consideration of the preliminary hearing transcripts.
(See People v. Myles (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 688, 696 [the
defendant forfeited challenge to admissibility of evidence by
failing to object at section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) hearing].)
On the contrary, defendant’s counsel referred the trial court to
the preliminary hearing transcript during the October 2021
hearing.
       Defendant is also wrong on the merits. Section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3) explicitly provides that the trial court “may

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consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing.”
However, “hearsay evidence that was admitted in a preliminary
hearing pursuant to subdivision (b) of [s]ection 872 shall be
excluded from the hearing as hearsay, unless the evidence is
admissible pursuant to another exception to the hearsay rule.”9
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) Defendant alleges that the trial court
violated this provision, but fails to identify any preliminary
hearing evidence admitted under section 872 on which the trial
court relied. In fact, the trial court’s order only references
preliminary hearing testimony twice; in both mentions, the court
merely confirms that an eyewitness’ preliminary hearing
testimony was consistent with her trial testimony. This does not
constitute error under section 1172.6.

9      Section 872, subdivision (b) reads as follows:
“Notwithstanding Section 1200 of the Evidence Code, the finding
of probable cause may be based in whole or in part upon the
sworn testimony of a law enforcement officer or honorably retired
law enforcement officer relating the statements of declarants
made out of court offered for the truth of the matter asserted. An
honorably retired law enforcement officer may only relate
statements of declarants made out of court and offered for the
truth of the matter asserted that were made when the honorably
retired officer was an active law enforcement officer. Any law
enforcement officer or honorably retired law enforcement officer
testifying as to hearsay statements shall either have five years of
law enforcement experience or have completed a training course
certified by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and
Training that includes training in the investigation and reporting
of cases and testifying at preliminary hearings.”

                                21
       C.    Factual History
       Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred by
relying on factual summaries from our prior appellate opinions in
this case.
       Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) provides that the trial
court may “consider the procedural history of the case recited in
any prior appellate opinion.” The specificity of this provision
“indicates the Legislature has decided trial judges should not rely
on the factual summaries contained in prior appellate decisions
when a section [1172.6] petition reaches the stage of a full-
fledged evidentiary hearing.” (People v. Clements (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 276, 292, as mod. on den. of rehg, Mar. 16, 2022
(Clements).)
       In summarizing the factual history of the case, the trial
court did quote extensively from the statement of facts we wrote
in Arnold I, supra, and quoted in Arnold II, supra. But at the
October 2021 evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted a
continuance to allow time to receive and review the complete
preliminary hearing and trial transcripts. Moreover, in its
analysis, the court explicitly cited portions of the original trial
record.
       Overall, the record demonstrates that the trial court
probably relied on its independent review of the trial record, but
quoted from our prior opinions to quickly summarize the broader
factual history of defendant’s case. In the interest of avoiding
future confusion on this issue, we note that when issuing orders
from a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing, the trial court should
make clear that it is relying on facts taken from the evidence
before it and not from prior appellate opinions. (Clements, supra,
75 Cal.App.5th at p. 292.)

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                          DISPOSITION
       The order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition is
reversed. The matter is remanded for the trial court to hold a
new hearing to determine whether the prosecution proved,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant is guilty under a
permissible theory of murder. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) In doing
so, the court shall not make any finding or rely on any evidence
which contradicts the jury’s finding that the personal use of a
knife sentencing enhancement was not true.
       CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

                              _____________________, Acting P. J.
                              ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

_________________________, J.
CHAVEZ

_________________________, J.*
KWAN

*     Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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