Court Opinion

ID: 9366367
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-26 17:07:38.146601+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:51.673342
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Wilson, 2023-Ohio-218.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                    :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,              :
                                                           No. 111543
                 v.                               :

DAVID WILSON,                                     :

                 Defendant-Appellant.             :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED; REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 26, 2023

          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                              Case No. CR-20-651076-A

                                            Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Carla B. Neuhauser, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 P. Andrew Baker, for appellant.

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:

                   Defendant-appellant, David Wilson, appeals from the trial court’s

judgment finding him guilty of aggravated assault and domestic violence. We affirm

Wilson’s convictions but remand for resentencing to merge the convictions as allied

offenses.
I.       Background

               Wilson was charged in a two-count indictment. Count 1 charged

felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1); Count 2 charged domestic

violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A). Wilson pleaded not guilty and waived his

right to a jury trial, and the matter proceeded to trial before the bench.

               Karima McCree-Wilson testified at trial that she is Wilson’s daughter.

She said that pursuant to a judicially ordered protective order, Wilson is not allowed

to be at her house. Nevertheless, on June 7, 2020, Wilson and his friend, Fred

Mobley, drove to her house, in a car that belonged to her, to retrieve a lawnmower.

Karima said that as Wilson and Mobley were putting the lawnmower in the trunk of

the car, she came out of the house and told Wilson he was not allowed to be there,

at which point he grabbed her. She testified that, in an effort to get away from

Wilson, she got in the car. She said that Mobley entered the car from the passenger

side and used his feet to prevent her from driving away, while Wilson tried to pull

her out of the car from the driver’s side. Karima testified that she bit Wilson in an

effort to defend herself and in response, Wilson punched her twice in her face.

               Karima testified that she recorded parts of the encounter on her cell

phone; those recordings were played at trial. In addition, two 911 calls from

neighbors reporting that a man was assaulting a woman in the face were played at

trial.

               Wilson testified that he knew he was not supposed to be at Karima’s

house when he went there on June 7, 2020. He testified further that he punched
Karima twice in her face after she bit him as he was trying to get her out of the car,

causing her lips to become, as he described it, “all fat and swollen.” (Tr. 112.) He

also testified that prior to this incident, he had sought a protective order against

Karima due to various incidents between them. (Tr. 109-110.)

               Despite Wilson and Mobley’s interference, Karima managed to drive

the car to the middle of the street where she, Wilson, and Mobley waited for the

police to arrive. Karima testified that the police arrested Wilson, and she was

transported by ambulance to the hospital, where she was diagnosed with a nearly

one-quarter inch laceration to her upper lip, a small abrasion on her lower lip, two

small abrasions on her forehead, and a facial contusion. She underwent a CT scan,

which indicated there were no broken bones in her face or jaw, and received three

stitches for the upper lip laceration. Karima’s medical records were admitted into

evidence at trial.

               The court denied Wilson’s Crim.R. 29 motions at the close of the

state’s case and the end of the trial. The court took the matter under advisement

and subsequently rendered a verdict finding Wilson guilty on Count 1 of the inferior

offense of aggravated assault and guilty on Count 2 as charged and sentenced him

to two years of community control on each count, to be served concurrently. This

appeal followed.
II. Law and Analysis

      A. Aggravated Assault

               When rendering its verdict, the court first found Wilson guilty of

Count 2, domestic violence, stating, “[t]he evidence supports the allegation the

Defendant did knowingly cause physical harm to the victim.” (Tr. 135.) Then, with

respect to Count 1, the court stated:

      Given the totality of the circumstances, the Court rejects the allegations
      contained in Count 1.

      The Court does, however, find that the relationship between the two,
      coupled with the fact the Defendant was bitten by the victim and then
      punched by the Defendant, the Court is satisfied the elements of
      aggravated assault have been met. And, therefore, finds the Defendant
      guilty of the inferior offense of agg[ravated] assault.

(Tr. 136.)

               In his first assignment of error, Wilson contends that, in light of the

trial court’s statement that it “rejects the allegations in Count 1,” the trial court erred

in convicting him of aggravated assault after finding him not guilty of felonious

assault.

               Wilson was charged in Count 1 with felonious assault in violation of

R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), which provides that “no person shall knowingly cause serious

physical harm to another.” The offenses of aggravated assault and felonious assault

are comprised of the same elements, except aggravated assault contains the

mitigating element of “serious provocation.” Accordingly, aggravated assault is an

inferior offense of felonious assault. See State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

98210, 2013-Ohio-573, ¶ 21.
               As this court stated in State v. Martin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

106125, 2018-Ohio-1098,

       To be found guilty of aggravated assault as an inferior offense of
       felonious assault, the trier of fact must first find that the state proved
       the elements of felonious assault beyond a reasonable doubt. Only then
       does the trier of fact consider whether the defendant proved the
       mitigating factor of serious provocation by a preponderance of the
       evidence. If the trier of fact finds that the defendant proved the
       mitigating circumstance, then the trier of fact can find a defendant
       guilty of aggravated assault. See State v. Ruppart, 187 Ohio App.3d
       192, 2010-Ohio-1574, 931 N.E.2d 627, ¶ 33-38 (8th Dist.), citing 2 Ohio
       Jury Instructions, Section 503.11(A)(14) (2009).

Id. at ¶ 13.

               In Martin, which involved a bench trial, the trial court expressly

stated when rendering its verdict regarding two counts of felonious assault that the

state had not presented evidence that rose to the level of guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt as to the felonious assault charges. Id. at ¶ 12. The court went on to find,

however, that the state had presented evidence that rose to the legal standard of

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as to aggravated assault and, accordingly, the trial

court found the defendant guilty of two counts of aggravated assault. Id. This court

reversed the convictions on appeal, finding that the trial court at no point considered

the mitigating factor of provocation and further, that the trial court had effectively

found Martin not guilty of both felonious assault charges when it determined that

the state had not satisfied its burden of proof with respect to those charges. Id.

               Wilson contends that this case is like Martin because the trial court’s

statement that it “rejects the allegations contained in Count 1” was “tantamount to
an acquittal,” and therefore, because the trial court found him not guilty of felonious

assault, it could not then find him guilty of the inferior degree offense of aggravated

assault. (Appellant’s Brief, p. 7).

               We disagree with Wilson’s assertion that the court’s statement that it

rejected the allegations in Count 1 meant that it found him not guilty of felonious

assault. Rather, when considered in light of the court’s statement immediately prior

that Wilson was guilty of domestic violence because he knowingly caused physical

harm to Karima (tr. 135), and its statement immediately following that Wilson

punched Karima only after she bit him (tr. 136), we find the court’s statement that

it rejected the allegations in Count 1 to be merely an imprecise way of saying that

although Wilson knowingly caused serious physical harm to Karima (the elements

of felonious assault), he was provoked into doing so. Accordingly, despite its inartful

statement, we conclude that the trial court found Wilson guilty of felonious assault

beyond a reasonable doubt but then found that he had proved the mitigating factor

of provocation sufficient to find him guilty of the inferior offense of aggravated

assault.1 The first assignment of error is overruled.

       B. Allied Offenses

               In his second assignment of error, Wilson contends that the trial court

erred in not merging his convictions for aggravated assault and domestic violence as

allied offenses.

       1Although the trial court stated that Wilson was guilty of “the inferior offense of
agg[ravated] assault,” the journal entries of conviction and sentencing incorrectly refer to
aggravated assault as a “lesser-included offense” of felonious assault.
               The allied offenses statute, R.C. 2941.25, codifies Ohio’s double

jeopardy protections regarding when multiple punishments may be imposed. State

v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, 34 N.E.3d 892, ¶ 12. Under the statute,

where the same conduct by a defendant can be construed to constitute two or more

allied offenses of similar import, the indictment may contain counts for all such

offenses, but the defendant may be convicted of only one offense. A defendant

charged with multiple offenses may be convicted of all the offenses, however, if (1)

the defendant’s conduct constitutes offenses of dissimilar import; i.e., each offense

caused separate, identifiable harm; (2) the offenses were committed separately; or

(3) the offenses were committed with separate animus or motivations.                R.C.

2941.25(B); Ruff at ¶ 14. Thus, to determine whether offenses are allied, courts must

consider the defendant’s conduct, the animus, and the import. Id. at paragraph one

of the syllabus.

               Where a defendant fails to raise the issue of allied offenses in the trial

court, he forfeits all but plain error on appeal. State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385,

2015-Ohio-2459, 38 N.E.3d 860, ¶ 3. Applying the plain error standard to an allied

offenses argument, the “accused has the burden to demonstrate a reasonable

probability that the convictions are allied offenses of similar import committed with

the same conduct and without a separate animus” or import. Id.

               Wilson concedes that he did not raise the issue of allied offenses in

the trial court, and our review is therefore for plain error. He contends, and we

agree, that his convictions were allied offenses because his offenses involved the
same victim, were committed with a single animus, and the injuries caused by each

offense were the same. The state concedes the error. Accordingly, we sustain the

second assignment of error and remand for resentencing to merge the offenses with

the state electing the count upon which Wilson should be sentenced.

       C. Sufficiency of the Evidence

               In his third assignment of error, Wilson contends there was

insufficient evidence to support his conviction for aggravated assault because the

state failed to present evidence of “serious physical harm,” an element of the offense.

               The test for sufficiency requires a determination of whether the

prosecution met its burden of production at trial. State v. Williams, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 98210, 2013-Ohio-573, ¶ 16. The relevant inquiry is whether, after

viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a

reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991),

paragraph two of the syllabus.

               As relevant to this appeal, R.C. 2901.01(A)(5)(d) defines serious

physical harm to persons as any physical harm that involves some temporary,

serious disfigurement.

               This court has recognized that although serious physical harm is

defined in the statute, “[t]he degree of harm that rises to the level of ‘serious’ physical

harm is not an exact science” given that the definition includes such terms as

“substantial,” “temporary,” “acute,” and “prolonged.” State v. Miller, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 98574, 2013-Ohio-1651, ¶ 18.              Nevertheless, “this court has

‘historically applie[d] a liberal interpretation of “serious physical harm” to persons.’”

State v. Henry, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102634, 2016-Ohio-692, ¶ 41, quoting State

v. Davis, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 81170, 2002-Ohio-7068, ¶ 20.

               In support of his argument that Karima’s injuries did not amount to

serious physical harm, Wilson directs us to State v. Enovitch, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 72827, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 3833 (Aug. 20, 1998), wherein this court found

that the victim’s injuries did not constitute serious physical harm because even

though the cut over the victim’s eye required 11 stitches, there was no evidence that

the scar from the laceration was permanent and the hospital records characterized

the injury as “minor.” Id. at 6. Wilson contends that Karima’s injuries were only

superficial and less severe than those in Enovitch and accordingly, any finding of

serious physical harm was not supported by sufficient evidence.

               As this court noted in State v. Finley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108062,

2019-Ohio-3891, however, this court has distinguished Enovitch several times since

it was decided. In State v. Whittsette, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 85478, 2005-Ohio-

4824, for example, this court upheld the defendant’s conviction for felonious

assault, even though the victim did not seek any medical attention, where the

defendant struck the victim in the head with a gun, causing gashes on the victim’s

head. Finley at ¶ 26, citing Whittsette at ¶ 20. This court also distinguished

Enovitch in State v. Norman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 85938, 2005-Ohio-6018,

concluding that even if the victim’s facial and neck lacerations did not leave a
permanent scar, they constituted serious physical harm because they were a

temporary, serious disfigurement under R.C. 2901.01(A)(5)(d). In Finley, this court

likewise declined to follow Evonitch, concluding that because the state presented

evidence of the victim’s loss of blood and that she sought medical treatment and

received butterfly stitches for the wounds on her neck and ear lobe, there was

sufficient evidence of serious physical harm. Id. at ¶ 30.

              As in Finley, Whittsette, and Norman, we find Enovitch

distinguishable from this case. As noted in Finley, “‘[t]his court has consistently

held that the need for stitches constitutes serious physical harm for purposes of a

felonious assault conviction.’” Finley at ¶ 28, quoting State v. Studgions, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 94153, 2010-Ohio-5480, ¶ 10, citing State v. Churchwell, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 88171, 2007-Ohio-1600, ¶ 28. This court has also “‘repeatedly held

that the element of serious physical harm is satisfied when the evidence shows that

the victim sustained injuries requiring medical treatment, including stitches.’”

Finley at id., quoting State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98210, 2013-Ohio-

573, ¶ 19. Furthermore, this court has found serious physical harm even where no

stitches were required but the victim sustained a bloody cut and significant swelling

to the eye. See State v. Payne, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 76539, 2000 Ohio App.

LEXIS 3274, 9 (July 20, 2000) (even where no stitches were required, a bloody cut

and swollen eye was sufficient to establish serious physical harm under R.C.

2901.01(A)(5) because the injury was a temporary, serious disfigurement).
              Accordingly, in light of the foregoing precedent and the facts of this

case — the contusion on Karima’s face, the abrasions to her forehead, her “fat and

swollen” lips, the lacerations on her upper and lower lips, and her transport to the

hospital by ambulance, where she underwent a CT scan to determine whether any

bones in her jaw were broken and received three stitches to close the laceration on

her upper lip — we find that the state presented sufficient evidence to establish that

Karima sustained a serious physical injury that involved some temporary, serious

disfigurement pursuant to R.C. 2901.01(A)(5)(d). After reviewing the evidence in a

light most favorable to the prosecution, as we are required to do, we find that the

state produced sufficient evidence to prove the element of serious physical harm

beyond a reasonable doubt. The third assignment of error is overruled.

      D. Manifest Weight of the Evidence

              In his fourth assignment of error, Wilson contends that his

convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence because the evidence

demonstrated that he acted in self-defense.

              In contrast to a sufficiency argument, a manifest weight challenge

questions whether the state met its burden of persuasion. State v. Armstrong, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109709, 2021-Ohio-1087, ¶ 24. A reviewing court examines the

entire record, “weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the

credibility of witnesses, and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the

evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest

miscarriage of justice that the convictions must be reversed and a new trial ordered.”
State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 388, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). A conviction

should be reversed as against the manifest weight of the evidence only in the most

“exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” Id.

               Wilson testified that he knew he was not allowed to be at Karima’s

home but went there anyway on June 7, 2021. He testified further that Karima

owned the car that he was driving that day and that when Karima bit him as he was

trying to pull her out of her car as she was trying to drive away, he punched her twice

in the face.

               “Ohio courts have long recognized that a person may not provoke an

assault or voluntarily enter an encounter and then claim the right of self-defense.”

State v. Vines, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 33871, 1975 Ohio App. LEXIS 6280, *8

(May 29, 1975); see also State v. Gaston, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98904, 2013-Ohio-

2331, ¶ 16, quoting State v. Nichols, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 01CA2775, 2002-Ohio-415

(same); State v. Sekic, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95633, 2011-Ohio-3987, ¶ 15

(defendant could not claim self-defense where he created the situation and failed to

avoid the danger that led to the altercation). Because Wilson’s own testimony

demonstrates that he was at fault in creating the situation that gave rise to the

altercation by going to Karima’s house and then trying to prevent her from leaving

the scene in the car she owned, he cannot claim self-defense.

               After reviewing the record, weighing the evidence, and considering

the credibility of the witnesses, we find no indication that the trier of fact lost its way

and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that Wilson’s convictions for
aggravated assault and domestic violence should be reversed and a new trial

ordered. The fourth assignment of error is therefore overruled.

              Judgment affirmed; remanded for resentencing.

      It is ordered that the parties share equally the costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.            The defendant’s

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for resentencing and execution of sentence.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE

ANITA LASTER MAYS, A.J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR