Court Opinion

ID: 9403899
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 20:04:10.765137+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:17.894007
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE,                     )
                                       )
      v.                               )    I.D. No. 2112011764
                                       )
WILLIAM J. BILLINGS,                   )
                                       )
      Defendant.                       )

     ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

                            Submitted: May 22, 2023
                             Decided: June 21, 2023

             Upon Consideration of Motion for Postconviction Relief,
                                  DENIED.

           Upon Consideration of Motion for Appointment of Counsel,
                                  DENIED.

Rebecca E. Anderson, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice,
Georgetown, Delaware, Attorney for the State of Delaware.

William J. Billings, Sussex Correctional Institution, Georgetown, Delaware,
Pro Se.

CONNER, J.
                              INTRODUCTION
      This is the Court’s decision on a pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief

filed pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”) by William Billings

(“Defendant”). Defendant seeks relief for two ineffective assistance of counsel

claims. Defendant also seeks appointment of counsel.

             FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      On November 9, 2022, Defendant entered pleas of guilty to Continuous

Sexual Abuse of a Child and to six counts of Sexual Abuse of a Child by a Person

in a Position of Trust, Authority, or Supervision First Degree. This Court

conducted a guilty plea colloquy with Defendant. During the plea colloquy,

Defendant confirmed he understood that by pleading guilty he waived his

constitutional rights, including the right to appeal with the assistance of an

attorney.

      Defendant was sentenced that same day to 25 years of incarceration at Level

V, suspended after 12 years of incarceration at Level V, followed by 6 months of

home confinement, followed by 5 years of probation with GPS monitoring.

      The charges stem from conduct that occurred approximately between

January 1, 2013, and November 1, 2018. The victim, a minor child, disclosed via a

school assignment that she had been sexually abused by Defendant. The victim’s

                                        1
teacher reported the disclosure to the DFS Hotline and the victim was subsequently

interviewed at the Child Advocacy Center. During the interview, the victim made

statements that formed the basis for Defendant’s charges.

       Defendant filed this instant Motion for Postconviction Relief on February

24, 2023. The State responded on April 11, 2023. Defendant then had until May

22, 2023, to file his reply. Defendant failed to file a reply leaving the Court to

review the Motion based upon the current record.

                                  PROCEDURAL BARS

       Before the Court can address the merits of a Rule 61 Motion, the Court must

address the four procedural bars of Rule 61(i).1 If a procedural bar is applicable,

the merits of the Motion need not be addressed.2 Pursuant to Rule 61(i), a motion

for postconviction relief can be barred due to time limitations, successive motions,

failure to raise procedural claims earlier in the proceedings, or former

adjudication.3

       First, a motion for postconviction relief cannot be filed more than one year

after the judgment of conviction is final or more than one year after a retroactively

1
  Ayers v. State, 802 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 2002).
2
  Id.
3
  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i).
                                                   2
applicable right is recognized by the Supreme Court.4 Here, Defendant’s

conviction became final after he entered guilty pleas and was sentenced on

November 9, 2022. Defendant filed this Motion on February 24, 2023. Defendant’s

Motion is considered timely and not barred by the one-year limitation of Rule

61(i)(1).

       Next, subsequent motions for postconviction relief are barred unless certain

requirements are met.5 This is Defendant’s first Rule 61 Motion, therefore it is not

barred.

       Third, grounds for relief that were not asserted during the proceedings that

led to Defendant’s conviction are barred unless Defendant can show procedural

default or prejudice from a violation of his rights.6 Here, Defendant does not assert

new procedural grounds for relief. Additionally, ineffective assistance of counsel

claims, the type of claim Defendant is raising, are not subject to this procedural bar

because the claims cannot be asserted in proceedings leading to the judgment of

conviction.7 This bar is not applicable to Defendant’s Motion.

4
  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
5
  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2).
6
  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
7
  Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160, 175 (Del. 2020).
                                               3
         Lastly, grounds for relief that were already formally adjudicated are barred. 8

Again, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are properly raised for the first

time in a postconviction motion for relief, thus this bar is also inapplicable.

         None of the Rule 61(i) procedural bars apply to Defendant’s Motion. The

Court will now consider Defendant’s claims on the merits.

                   INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

         Strickland v. Washington established the well-known standard for ineffective

assistance of counsel claims.9 Here, because Defendant pled guilty, he must show

that “but for his counsel’s unprofessional errors, he would not have pleaded guilty

but instead would have insisted on proceeding to trial.”10

    I.      Defense Counsel Failed to Compile a Mitigation Report

         Defendant’s first ineffective assistance of counsel claim is that his attorney,

Angela Huffman, failed to compile a mitigation report, which in Defendant’s view

would have addressed his mental health issues and lack of criminal history.11

However, in an affidavit from Ms. Huffman, she states she used the services of

Mary Fishel, a Forensic Social Specialist, to investigate Defendant’s mental health

8
  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
9
  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See also Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53 (Del.
1988).
10
   Miller v. State, 840 A.2d 1229, 1231 (Del. 2003).
11
   Def. Mot. for Postconviction Relief at 3.
                                               4
history.12 A report was prepared that detailed Defendant’s mental health history as

well as his biographical information.13 The report was not used to support

Defendant’s case as Ms. Huffman deemed it not helpful.14

       When determining if Defendant’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel

is viable, the Court must not use hindsight but instead evaluate defense counsel’s

conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.15 Here, Ms. Huffman utilized a

specialist in order to compile a mitigation report for Defendant. After reviewing

the report, Ms. Huffman made the decision not to use the report because it did not

support Defendant’s case. When analyzing Ms. Huffman’s actions from her

perspective at the time, it is clear to the Court that she did not commit any

unprofessional errors or prejudice Defendant.

       Furthermore, this Court conducted a detailed plea colloquy with Defendant.

During the plea colloquy Defendant indicated he had plenty of time to speak with

Ms. Huffman and was satisfied with her representation of him. The statements

Defendant made to the Court during the guilty plea colloquy are presumed

truthful.16

12
   Huffman Aff. ¶ 6.
13
   Id.
14
   Id.
15
   Shelton v. State, 744 A.2d 465, 504 (Del. 2000).
16
   Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997).
                                                5
           Finally, when Defendant’s sentence was imposed, this Court was already

aware of and in possession of the Immediate Sentencing Form that contained

Defendant’s criminal history and mental health diagnosis of depression. Defendant

has not shown that Ms. Huffman made unprofessional errors that would have

caused Defendant to plead not guilty and instead proceed to trial. This claim is

without merit.

     II.      Defense Counsel Failed to Investigate an “Investigative Note” in DFS
              Report
           Defendant’s next claim is that Ms. Huffman was ineffective for failing to

investigate an “investigative note” in the DFS report.17 In Ms. Huffman’s affidavit

she explains that the DFS report was opened on November 17, 2021, at 3:48 p.m.

and closed less than an hour later.18 Ms. Huffman additionally explains that the

report was preliminary in nature, only described statements the victim made in her

school project and did not contain any actual professional or medical opinions of

the DFS worker.19

           Ms. Huffman did her due diligence for Defendant. No information contained

in the report required any further investigation. There is no obligation nor

requirement to investigate every avenue of potentially mitigating evidence.20 Ms.

17
   Def. Mot. for Postconviction Relief at 3.
18
   Huffman Aff. ¶ 8.
19
   Id.
20
   Shelton, 744 A.2d at 504.
                                               6
Huffman is afforded the benefit of making reasonable choices and focusing her

investigation on what best suited Defendant.21

       Again, Defendant’s statements to this Court during the guilty plea colloquy

are presumed truthful.22 At no point did Defendant state he was dissatisfied with

Ms. Huffman’s representation of him because of a failure to investigate this note

from the DFS report. Defendant has not established Ms. Huffman made

unprofessional errors that would have caused him to plead not guilty and instead

proceed to trial. This claim is also without merit.

                            APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

       Rule 61(e) dictates appointment of counsel for postconviction motions for

relief.23 When a defendant pleads guilty, the Court has discretion to appoint

counsel pursuant to Rule 61(e)(3) if:

               (i) the conviction has been affirmed by final order upon direct
               appellate review or direct appellate review is unavailable; (ii) the
               motion sets forth a substantial claim that the movant received
               ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to the plea of guilty or
               nolo contendere; (iii) granting the motion would result in vacatur of
               the judgment of conviction for which the movant is in custody; and
               (iv) specific exceptional circumstances warrant the appointment of
               counsel.24

21
   Id.
22
   Somerville, 703 A.2d at 632.
23
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e).
24
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(3).
                                           7
As discussed above, Defendant has not raised any substantial claims that he

received ineffective assistance of counsel in regard to his guilty pleas.

Additionally, no other specific exceptional circumstances require this Court to

exercise its discretion to appoint counsel for Defendant.25

                                       CONCLUSION

       Defendant has failed to demonstrate his counsel was ineffective. There has

been no showing of unprofessional errors that would have caused him to plead not

guilty and instead proceed to trial. Additionally, Defendant did not satisfy the

requirements pursuant to Rule 61(e)(3) for appointment of counsel. Accordingly,

Defendant’s Motions for Postconviction Relief and Appointment of Counsel are

DENIED.

       IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                                     /s/ Mark H. Conner
                                                     Mark H. Conner, Judge

25
   The Court also notes in Defendant’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel he marked the box
stating “[t]he judge shall appoint counsel because the requirements set forth under Rule 61(e)(2)
are met.” 61(e)(2) does not apply to Defendant because he chose to plead guilty instead of
proceeding to trial.
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