Court Opinion

ID: 9369375
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-08 17:02:17.523229+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:14.513368
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 56
                     ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                          DIVISION I
                                         No. CV-22-507

 LEONARD FULMER                                  Opinion Delivered   February 8, 2023

                                           APPEAL FROM THE LOGAN
                                           COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
                                 APPELLANT NORTHERN DISTRICT
                                           [NO. 42PJV-18-30]
 V.
                                                 HONORABLE TERRY M. SULLIVAN,
 ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF                          JUDGE
 HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR
 CHILD
                     APPELLEES AFFIRMED

                              WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge

       Appellant Leonard Fulmer appeals the Logan County Circuit Court’s order

terminating his parental rights to his daughter, Minor Child 1 (MC1).1 He argues on appeal

that the evidence is insufficient to support the termination or the finding that termination

was in the best interest of MC1. We affirm.2

       The Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) had been involved with the

family on and off since 2018. In the summer of 2020, DHS had a true finding regarding

       1
           MC1’s date of birth is October 26, 2009.
       2
       The parental rights of MC1’s mother, Elizabeth Elliot, was terminated in a separate
proceeding, and she is not a party to this appeal.
Minor Child 2 (MC2),3 MC1’s biological sibling and whom appellant had guardianship over

due to appellant’s stepson, Bruce McGahey, sexually assaulting MC2. Appellant’s wife, Lori

Fulmer, refused to believe that her son had committed any sexual act against MC2 and

verbally abused her. MC2 contacted the case worker, Brandy Ezell, on February 25, 2021,

threatening to run away if she was not removed from the home. On February 26, when

interviewed by Ezell, MC2 stated that she did not feel safe in the home and that she feared

Lori. She also stated that appellant and Lori were on drugs and were selling drugs out of the

house. She showed bruising on her butt that she attributed to appellant spanking her. MC1

stated that MC2 would bring a lot of trouble on herself by not doing what she was told. As

a result of the interview, a hotline call was made, and a report was accepted for abuse and

neglect against both appellant and Lori. On March 8, a call was made by a relative stating

that MC2 was in fear for her life and needed to be removed from the home. Both children

were interviewed at school, and although MC2 reiterated what she had said in February,

MC1 denied any kind of abuse or neglect. Appellant was subsequently contacted, and he

admitted spanking MC2 due to bad grades and her allegedly posting a naked video of herself

on TikTok. Another report was made on March 9 alleging that appellant and Lori were

grooming MC1 for the “real world” by having her undress in front of appellant and touch

his penis. The girls were taken to the Hamilton Center for Child Advocacy in Fort Smith,

and during the interview, they both admitted drug use in the home and that Lori yells a lot.

       3
           MC2’s date of birth is June 4, 2008.

                                                  2
MC2 also stated that Lori “grabs” MC2’s vagina, talks about how big MC2’s “boobs” are,

and discusses appellant’s penis size in front of her. MC2 said that appellant tries to make

Lori stop, but he cannot. This resulted in a pending investigation for sexual abuse against

appellant and Lori. While at the Hamilton Center, appellant was drug screened and was

positive for amphetamines, methamphetamine, buprenorphine, oxycodone, and THC.

Appellant admitted having a medical marijuana card and prescriptions for Suboxone,

gabapentin, and Celebrex. He also admitted taking Adderall while fishing and taking

methamphetamine a week earlier. The girls were removed for suspected sexual abuse and

failure to protect.

       DHS filed a petition for emergency custody and dependency-neglect, outlining the

above fact in an accompanying affidavit.       The petition indicated that the girls were

dependent-neglected due to neglect and parental unfitness. The circuit court issued an ex

parte order for emergency custody that same day. A probable-cause hearing took place on

March 17, and in the order filed on April 20, the circuit court found probable cause for

granting DHS emergency custody of MC1. At a subsequent adjudication hearing, appellant

stipulated that MC1 was dependent-neglected based on substance abuse in the home. The

circuit court found that appellant should no longer be MC2’s guardian. In the order filed

on May 3, the circuit court ordered appellant not to allow any visitation or any other contact

between Lori and MC1. Appellant was also ordered to attend a case-plan staffing and comply

with the services—specifically, obtain and maintain safe, stable and appropriate housing;

obtain and maintain income sufficient to support the family; obtain and maintain safe and

                                              3
reliable transportation; comply with random drug screens, hair-follicle tests, and alcohol

swabs; attend and complete a drug-and-alcohol treatment and comply with resulting

recommendations; attend and complete parenting class and demonstrate the skills learned

at visitations; obtain and maintain sobriety; keep DHS apprised of his current contact

information and any changes; keep the DHS apprised of any significant life events, and visit

MC1 as recommended. The goal of the case was reunification.

       A review hearing took place on August 18. In the order entered on September 20,

the circuit court found that appellant had partially complied with the case plan. The order

stated in pertinent part:

               12. The parent, Leonard Fulmer, has partially complied with the case plan
       and the orders of the Court. Specifically, the father has a clean and appropriate
       home; has transportation; completed his drug and alcohol assessment; completed his
       psychological evaluation; has been attending weekly group counseling and individual
       counseling sessions; has been attending parenting classes without violence; and has
       somewhat complied wit the case plan. He has missed four group sessions and three
       individual sessions in the past three months. The parent, Leonard Fulmer, has
       demonstrated progress towards the goal of the case plan as he has partially complied
       with the services, but those services have not fully benefitted the parent in remedying
       the issues that prevent the safe return of the juvenile, [MC1]. The father continues
       to not understand or acknowledge the abuse that the children experienced while in
       his home, thus [making him] unable to meet the emotional needs of his child. The
       father continues to have issues with substance abuse and/or mismanagement of his
       prescription medication. During a home visit, Mr. Fulmer was missing a significant
       amount of his prescription suboxone when 22 of his trips were missing. Further, Mr.
       Fulmer continues to maintain the relationship with Lori Fulmer and continues to be
       married to her when she was an offending caregiver resulting in his child being placed
       in the Department’s care. He continues to have inappropriate people in and out of
       the home. The Court finds that the child cannot be placed with Leonard Fulmer at
       this time, no can there be unsupervised visits.

                                              4
Appellant was ordered by the circuit court to complete a second psychological evaluation.

The case’s goal remained reunification.

       Another review hearing took place on December 15. In the order entered on January

7, 2022,4 the circuit court found that appellant had minimally complied with the case plan

and goals of the case, and that his progress was “backwards from the last hearing.” The

circuit court found that Lori was still an issue and that she had been present at appellant’s

home the day after the last hearing. It found that appellant’s and Lori’s relationship

negatively affected MC1 and reiterated that MC1 was not to be around Lori “in any fashion.”

The circuit court further stated that it “will not consider placement with Leonard until his

wife comes for services and the toxic relationship ends.” It noted that although appellant’s

medical marijuana card had expired, appellant continued to test positive for the drug. The

order also stated that appellant “tested positive for meth, and claims it is because his wife

spiked his tea and creamer.” Visitation with appellant was ordered to remain supervised,

and reunification continued to be the goal of the case.

       A permanency-planning hearing took place on March 2. In the resulting order filed

on March 10, the circuit court found that appellant was not making much progress and that

he had admitted in court that “he did use meth previously despite adamantly insisting his

wife spiked his drink. Leonard Fulmer testified he did not know why [MC1] was in DHS

       4
        An amended review order was filed on March 3, but there is no notable change in
that order.

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custody or why the case was opened.” The order also noted that appellant had threatened

to kill the caseworker. The case’s goal was changed to termination and adoption.

       DHS filed a petition to terminate appellant’s parental rights on March 4. The

petition alleged four separate grounds for termination: (1) failure-to-remedy ground,5 (2)

failure-to-support ground,6 (3) subsequent-other-factors ground,7 and (4) aggravated-

circumstances ground.8 The termination hearing took place on May 4. The circuit court

entered an order on May 17, grating DHS’s petition to terminate appellant’s parental rights

on all grounds except the failure-to-support ground. Appellant’s timely appeal followed.

       Appellant argues on appeal that the evidence is not sufficient to support the

termination of his parental rights based on any ground relied on by the circuit court.

Termination-of-parental-rights cases are reviewed de novo on appeal.9 Termination of

parental rights is an extreme remedy and in derogation of the natural rights of parents. 10

DHS must prove by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the juvenile’s best interest to

terminate parental rights as well as the existence of at least one statutory ground for

       5
           Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a) (Supp. 2021).

       6
           Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ii)(a).
       7
           Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(vii).
       8
           Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(3)(A).

       9
           Lancaster v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 557, 566 S.W.3d 484.

       10
            Id.

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termination.11 Clear and convincing evidence is that degree of proof that will produce a

firm conviction in the finder of fact regarding the allegation sought to be established; the

question that must be answered on appeal, when the burden of proving a disputed fact in

equity is by clear and convincing evidence, is whether the circuit court’s finding that the

disputed fact was proved by clear and convincing evidence is clearly erroneous. 12 A finding

is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court, on

the entire evidence, is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. 13

However, a high degree of deference is given to the circuit court because it is in a far superior

position to observe the parties before it and judge the credibility of the witnesses.14

       The goal of Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341 is to provide permanency in

a minor child’s life in circumstances in which returning the child to the family home is

contrary to the minor’s health, safety, or welfare, and the evidence demonstrates that a return

to the home cannot be accomplished in a reasonable period of time as viewed from the

minor child’s perspective.15 Termination of parental rights is a two-step process requiring a

determination that the parent is unfit and that termination is in the best interest of the

       11
            Id.

       12
            Id.

       13
            Id.

       14
            Id.

       15
            Sutton v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 459, 503 S.W.3d 842.

                                                7
child.16 The first step requires proof of one or more statutory grounds for termination; the

second step, the best-interest analysis, includes consideration of the likelihood that the

juvenile will be adopted and of the potential harm caused by returning custody of the child

to the parent.17 Each of these requires proof by clear and convincing evidence, which is the

degree of proof that will produce in the finder of fact a firm conviction regarding the

allegation sought to be established.18

        One ground relied on by the circuit court when terminating appellant’s parental

rights to MC1 was the aggravated-circumstances ground, meaning that there is little

likelihood that continued services will result in reunification. The order stated in pertinent

part:

                         1) As shown above, the parent, Leonard Fulmer has failed to comply
                         with the services or orders of the Court and is not making progress in
                         reunification. Without completion and utilization of services, services
                         cannot, nor will not, benefit the family enough to result in a successful
                         reunification. The Court has found the parent, Leonard Fulmer, is not
                         making progress in the case and is minimally compliant with the case
                         plan and orders of the Court. He tested positive for illegal substances
                         and blamed his wife for spiking his tea and creamer. After adamantly
                         making this claim, he did finally admit that he used meth and the
                         statement that his wife spiked his drink was false. He has failed to take
                         any responsibility for his actions, and claims he does not know why the
                         case was opened or why the juvenile is in DHS custody. His actions
                         clearly demonstrate a little likelihood that services to the family would
                         result in a successful reunification.

        16
             Watson v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 484, 529 S.W.3d 259.

        17
             Id.

        18
             Id.

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                 7.     Leonard Fulmer has checked the boxes on services, but has shown he
                 has not benefited from the services.

                 8.     The Court has found Leonard Fulmer’s wife, Lori, a danger for the
                 juvenile to be around, there has been a true finding regarding her child and
                 Lori did not believe that. She wrote hateful stuff on the juveniles[’] room and
                 has refused to come forward for services. Leonard Fulmer has not severed the
                 relationship with Lori, though he has said he cannot afford a divorce at this
                 time. Regardless if Leonard Fulmer gets a divorce or not, the juvenile cannot
                 be placed with [him] with his wife being around the juvenile.

                 9.      Leonard Fulmer has failed to take responsibility in this case and cannot
                 tell the court today why the case was open[ed]. He has never been able to have
                 unsupervised visits, and this case has now been open for fourteen months and
                 there is no indication of when [he] would be able to receive unsupervised
                 visitations.

The circuit court found that termination was in MC1’s best interest, having found that she

is adoptable and there is a risk for potential harm if she was returned to appellant’s custody.

       Appellant argues that the circuit court’s order terminating his parental rights to MC1

is based on nothing more than speculation and conjecture. He contends that he completed

all services required and that the circuit court erred in finding that he minimally complied

with the case plan and orders. We agree that the evidence seems to suggest that appellant

completed all services required of him. However, completion of case-plan services is

irrelevant when the parent continues to make decisions that are contrary to the best interest

of the child.19 Throughout the case, the circuit court found that although appellant was

complying with the case plan, he failed to show that he had benefited from the services. At

       19
            Black v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 518, 565 S.W.3d 518.

                                                 9
the hearing, Pamela Feemster, supervisor for Logan County DHS, testified that every time

DHS tried to loosen the reins, an issue came up with Lori being around. She stated that the

case had not even progressed past supervised visits. She further stated there were no other

services that could be offered that would lead to reunification. This testimony alone is

enough to support a finding of aggravated circumstances. 20 Additionally, appellant was

unable to verbalize why the case was opened or why Lori posed any harm to MC1. Even

when it seemed as if he understood the answers to those questions at the termination

hearing, he qualified them with “I guess.” Unfortunately for appellant, the circuit court was

not convinced that his completion of the case plan achieved the intended result of making

him capable of caring for MC1. The evidence supports the circuit court’s finding that

appellant’s parental rights should be terminated due to aggravated circumstances. To the

extent that appellant’s appeal is a request for us to reweigh the evidence, it is well settled that

we will not reweigh the evidence on appeal, and credibility determinations are left to the

circuit court.21 According, we affirm.

       Appellant also argues that the evidence does not support the circuit court’s finding

that termination is in MC1’s best interest. He does not contest that MC1 is adoptable.

However, he challenges the circuit court’s potential-harm finding if returned to him. In

considering the potential harm caused by returning MC1 to appellant, the circuit court is

       20
            Debiasse v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2022 Ark. App. 331, 651 S.W.3d 736.

       21
            Newman v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 207, 489 S.W.3d 186.

                                                10
not required to find that actual harm would result or affirmatively identify a potential

harm.22         Potential-harm evidence must be viewed in a forward-looking manner and

considered in broad terms.23 A parent’s past behavior is often a good indicator of future

behavior.24 We conclude that the same evidence that supports the aggravated-circumstances

ground of little likelihood of successful reunification is sufficient to support the circuit

court’s potential-harm finding. Although appellant went though the motions of completing

the case plan, he did little more than just check off the boxes. He never got to a point where

he benefited enough from the services to even have unsupervised visitation with MC1

because he did not appreciate the cause of MC1’s removal from the home or why Lori posed

a threat to her.

       Affirmed.

       ABRAMSON and GLADWIN, JJ., agree.

       Leah Lanford, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant.

       Kaylee Wedgeworth, Ark. Dep’t of Human Services, Office of Chief Counsel, for

appellee.

       Dana McClain, attorney ad litem for minor child.

       22
            Kloss v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 389, 585 S.W.3d 725.

       23
            Tillman v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 119.

       24
            Shaffer v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 208, 489 S.W.3d 182.

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