Court Opinion

ID: 9737541
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:28:11.226847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:59.661323
License: Public Domain

On Petition for Rehearing
Lowdermilk, J.
Appellants, in their petition for rehearing, attach a copy of the affidavit on which they were tried, which was duly authenticated by the Clerk and the Judge.
Under Rule AP. 15 (C), Certiorari, the affidavit should have been made a part of the record by having been brought into the transcript by certiorari.
Although the affidavit should have been made a part of the transcript, we shall not be technical on this point for the reason that this is a criminal case and it is our desire in this, as well as in all cases, that the correct result be reached.
Appellants state that the original opinion herein contravenes a decision of this court, decided August 4, 1973, namely, Allison v. State (1973), 157 Ind. App. 277, 299 N.E.2d 618, in which the court held that aggravated assault was not necessarily an included offense in the charge of assault and battery with intent to kill; that only assault and battery should be included.
*81We agree with Judge Sullivan’s opinion in Allison, supra, but will call appellants’ attention to the fact that the case of Thomas v. State (1970), 254 Ind. 600, 261 N.E.2d 588, discussed the matter of aggravated assault and battery being an included offense in assault or assault and battery with intent to kill. In Thomas, the court said:
“. . . This Court has previously stated that aggravated assault is an included offense in assault and battery with intent to kill. ...”
The pertinent parts of the affidavit in that case charged the defendant as follows:
“. . . did then and there unlawfully and feloniously and in a rude, insolent and angry manner, shoot and wound, with a certain 38 caliber revolver then and there loaded with gunpowder and a slug, DOROTHY THOMAS in the back, with felonious intent then and thereby to kill and murder the said DOROTHY THOMAS, a human being.”
In discussing the affidavit as it applied to the two separate statutes, Justice Givan said:
“It is inconceivable that a person could commit an assault and battery with intent to kill another person as charged in this case without also intentionally and knowingly inflicting great bodily harm or disfiguring the assaulted person. We hold that if the facts are present to warrant a conviction on assault and battery with intent to kill in this case they would certainly be present to warrant a conviction on aggravated assault.
We, therefore, hold that aggravated assault and battery is an included lesser offense of the crime of assault and battery with intent to kill as charged in this case. It would not, of course, be an included offense if the charging affidavit merely alleged an assault with intent to kill without alleging bodily injury.”
The Allison case supra, had this to say concerning the affidavit:
“However, it is possible for aggravated assault and battery to be a lesser included offense if the element of ‘great bodily harm’ or ‘disfigurement’ is properly alleged in the charging affidavit. . . .”
*82The pertinent part of the affidavit in the case at bar is that the defendants:
. . did then and there unlawfully and feloniously, and with intent to kill another human being, to wit: one Bernard Fogle, did then and there and thereby perpetrate an assault and battery upon the said Bernard Fogle by attacking him with a machette or corn knife and a shotgun then and there severly injurying [sic] the said Bernard Fogle, . . (Emphasis supplied.)
Comparing the affidavit in the case at bar with that in Thomas v. State, supra, we necessarily hold that said affidavit sufficiently alleges great bodily harm and would, therefore, include aggravated assault and battery and no error was committed by finding the defendants guilty of the offense of aggravated assault and battery.
Specifications 2 and 3 of the petition for rehearing have, we think, been sufficiently covered and properly ruled on in the original opinion and therefore require nothing further. Petition for rehearing denied.
Robertson, P.J. and Lybrook, J., concur.
Note.—Reported at 303 N.E.2d 287.