Court Opinion

ID: 9853953
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:58:14.902519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:20.338849
License: Public Domain

URBIGKIT, Justice,
dissenting, with whom MACY, Justice, joins.
I would require an evidentiary hearing when a motion for new trial is accompanied by an affidavit alleging a principal prosecution witness committed perjury. When we keep in mind the human pain occasioned by perjury1 and the fact that someone’s interest in liberty or life is at stake, it is not a lot to ask that a neutral judge listen to “live testimony, where the facts will be established before the decision on a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence is made.” Story v. State, 755 P.2d 228, 232 (Wyo.1988), Urbigkit, J., specially concurring.
The majority ignores Best v. State, 769 P.2d 385, 389 (Wyo.1989). There we said “[a] court may deny a motion for new trial without a hearing when all that is necessary for disposition is already on the record."- Id. at 389 (emphasis added). A hearing becomes necessary under Best when disposition of a motion for new trial cannot be made from the record. So it remains unexplained by the majority how an allegation of perjury can be examined simply by reference to a record.
In this case, the trial judge seemed quite reassured that a principal prosecution witness had not perjured herself after both the prosecutor2 and the prosecution witness, Wanda Hammond, simply reassured him that there had been no perjury. The trial judge then thought it unnecessary to hear live testimony from Wanda Hammond’s sister-in-law who had signed an affidavit claiming Wanda Hammond lied at trial. This is adjudication in the face of ignorance. “A standard should be established for the circumstance ⅜ ⅞ *, that a court is not required to grant a new trial on affidavit evidence, but when there is reasonable evidence of material perjury, the trial court should hold an evidentiary hearing.” Keser v. State, 737 P.2d 756, 762 (Wyo.1987). I would require an evidentiary hearing be held when there is an allegation made that a principal prosecution witness lied at trial. “Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.” Brady v. State of *626Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 89, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1197, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Asking a prosecution witness if she lied, feeling reassured when she said she did not lie and failing to hear any testimony to the contrary is not treating the accused fairly.
Wanda Hammond testified at trial that Dr. John Story had sexually assaulted her. Dr. Story claimed he had not sexually assaulted her but had inserted an IUD into Wanda Hammond. Wanda Hammond claimed she never had an IUD. The jury convicted Dr. Story, obviously believing Wanda Hammond’s version of events. After that conviction, Dr. Story’s attorneys moved for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence when Wanda Hammond’s sister-in-law came forward with an affidavit that Wanda Hammond had indeed had an IUD and had perjured herself at trial. That affidavit stated in pertinent part:
3. That Affiant [Parthena Thompson] knows of her own knowledge that Wanda Hammond was allergic to birth control pills and because of the allergy did in fact have an IUD placed in her by Dr. John H. Story.
⅜ sj: # ⅜ # #
5. That Affiant and Wanda Hammond discussed more than once Wanda Hammond’s IUD and the fact that Affiant did not need an IUD because Affiant had a hysterectomy performed on her and Wanda Hammond told Affiant that Dr. Story inserted the IUD in her.
6. That Affiant knows of her own knowledge that after Wanda Hammond quit going to Dr. Story, she went to Dr. Ray Christensen of Powell, Wyoming, as her physician and that Dr. Christensen performed a hysterectomy on Wanda Hammond after Dr. Story had placed the IUD in her * * *.
Had the jury been presented testimony from Wanda Hammond’s sister-in-law that Wanda Hammond had worn an IUD and her testimony to the contrary was perjured, it is reasonable to suspect Dr. Story may have been found not guilty of sexually assaulting her. The trial judge, however, thought it unnecessary to have an eviden-tiary hearing on the motion for new trial before disposing of the motion. After reassurance from the prosecutor and the prosecution witness that there had been no perjury, and after refusing to hear any testimony to the contrary, the trial judge could see no need for an evidentiary hearing. In his decision letter denying the motion for new trial with no evidentiary hearing, the trial judge stated “[t]hose words ‘to hyst — or reinsert IUD’ [3] is the basis for the Defendant’s contention that Wanda Hammond committed perjury.” The first mistake by the trial judge occurred when he failed to understand it was the affidavit from Parthena Thompson which accompanied the motion for new trial and which formed the basis for the contention that Wanda Hammond committed perjury. The trial judge made no mention of the affidavit. He reasoned that those few words, “to hyst — or reinsert IUD,” “when balanced against the affidavits of and present testimony of Wanda Hammond that she reaffirmed her original statement and that she never had an IUD falls short of convincing [the judge] of evidence so material that [the evidence] would produce a different verdict upon retrial.” This second mistake made by the trial judge is even more basic. He confused the standard for granting a motion for a new trial with the standard for granting an evidentiary hearing before deciding whether to grant a new trial. Under Best, 769 P.2d 385, an eviden-tiary hearing need not occur when all that is necessary for disposition is in the record. The corollary is that an evidentiary hearing needs to occur when all that is necessary for disposition is not in the record. An allegation of perjury is precisely the kind of issue which cannot be decided on the record.
Having examined the particular structure of the argument advanced by the majority to support the notion that an eviden-tiary hearing is not required in this instance, I remain completely unconvinced. I *627do not find federal case law, nor the rationale which underpins it, to be compelling authority for Wyoming state law. The federal circuit cases cited by the majority deal more with suspicious recantations than any allegations of perjury. Beyond that, federal cases are controlled by F.R.Cr.P. 33— rules which cannot govern Wyoming criminal procedure. If we cite federal law to persuade, we should explain why the federal approach should prevail when the Supremacy Clause to the United States Constitution is not in operation.
Story, 755 P.2d at 231, the Wyoming case cited in support of the holding, relies on Hopkinson v. State, 679 P.2d 1008, 1022 (Wyo.), cert. denied 469 U.S. 873, 105 S.Ct. 228, 83 L.Ed.2d 157 (1984). Hopkinson, in what appears but a strictly result-oriented approach, relies on United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106, 66 S.Ct. 464, 90 L.Ed. 562, reh’g denied 327 U.S. 817, 66 S.Ct. 699, 90 L.Ed. 1040 (1946), which simply addresses the standard of review for federal appellate courts reviewing the disposition by a trial court of a motion for new trial. Johnson has nothing to do with the need for an evidentiary hearing. I would not continue the effect of the faulty application of federal law in Hopkinson by reviving it through Story II and now Story III
The solution adopted by other states seems better and concerns the necessity of an evidentiary hearing either when substantial issues are raised or when the allegations cannot be determined from the trial record. The Massachusetts and Minnesota courts appear to use the “substantially significant issue” approach,4 while courts in Texas require an evidentiary hearing when the credibility of the allegations cannot be determined by the record. “[A] hearing on a motion for new trial is mandated when an affidavit attacking the verdict on any matter outside the record itself is sufficient to give the trial court notice that reasonable grounds exist for disturbing its verdict.” Fielding v. State, 719 S.W.2d 361, 364 (Tex.App.1986) (emphasis added). The Texas courts reason:
Without doubt, the hearing on a motion for new trial is a critical stage of the proceedings. It is the only opportunity to present to the trial court certain matters that may warrant a new trial, and to make a record on those matters for appellate review.
Owens v. State, 763 S.W.2d 489, 492 (Tex.App.1988).5
This need for an evidentiary hearing, when an attack on the verdict comes to matters outside the record, is essentially the same approach we adopted in Best, 769 P.2d 385, where we indicated a hearing should be held when all that is necessary for disposition is not on the record. Because we ignore the precedent of Best and set the stage for unbridled discretion of a trial judge to dispense with an evidentiary hearing in the face of alleged perjury, I dissent.

. Perjury is a wrong done to the judicial system and the administration of justice for which punishment should be provided.
"Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration may well affect the dearest concerns of the parties before a tribunal.” United States v. Norris, 1937, 300 U.S. 564, 574, 57 S.Ct. 535, 539, 81 L.Ed. 808. Without truthful testimony, the court system cannot function. For that reason, a court cannot accept the threats as a compulsion to lie under oath and a court will use all its force to protect the one threatened.
Edwards v. State, 577 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Wyo.1978).
“In one-third of the cases [in the conviction of innocent people], the erroneous witness testimony was in fact perjured.” Bedau & Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 Stan.L.Rev. 21, 60 (1987) (emphasis added).

. Earlier in the year, that trial judge wrote a letter which stated:
I have on this date received some communication from Terry Tharp [the prosecutor] concerning my request. The essence of his letter is that he interviewed Wanda Hammond after John Story filed his Motion for New Trial. At the interview, Mr. Tharp reports that Wanda Hammond reiterated her trial testimony and that she stood by it and that she had never used an IUD nor had anyone ever inserted such a device in her.
It certainly appears to me that Mr. Tharp has looked into the allegation and therefore, since he has acted, I cannot and will not act to call a special prosecutor to look into these so-called allegations. I hope this lays this matter to rest.

. These words were attributed to Wanda Hammond's medical records in the office of Dr. Christensen, a physician who had attended Wanda Hammond after Dr. Story.

. See Com. v. Boutwell, 21 Mass.App. 201, 486 N.E.2d 77, 81 (1985) and State v. King, 414 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn.App.1987).

. "When a motion for new trial and supporting affidavits attack a verdict on a matter outside the record, if the matters alleged give notice that reasonable grounds exist for disturbing the verdict, a hearing is mandatory.” Webb v. State, 757 S.W.2d 830, 831 (Tex.App.1988) (emphasis added). "Having presented to the trial court a timely verified motion for a new trial raising matters extrinsic to the record, appellant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing.” Haight v. State, 772 S.W.2d 159, 161 (Tex.App.1989) (emphasis added). “When a party presents to the trial court a timely, verified motion for new trial which raises matters extrinsic to the record, the trial court abuses its discretion in denying a hearing on the motion.” McMillan v. State, 769 S.W.2d 675, 676 (Tex.App.1989) (emphasis added).