Court Opinion

ID: 9929426
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 17:01:09.006919+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:23:12.042158
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KATHERINE BLUMENKRON;                        No. 21-35987
DAVID BLUMENKRON;
SPRINGVILLE INVESTORS, LLC,                 D.C. No.3:20-cv-
a limited liability company,                   00422-HZ

           Plaintiffs-Appellants,
 and                                           OPINION

ROBERT ZAHLER,

           Plaintiff,
 v.

MULTNOMAH COUNTY;
ANYELEY HALLOVA, ROBIN
MCARTHUR, CATHERINE
MORROW, KATIE PEARMINE,
GERARDO SANDOVAL, STUART
WARREN, all in their official
capacities as members of the Land
Conservation and Development
Commission; SAM CHASE,
SHIRLEY CRADDICK, CRAIG
DIRKSEN, JUAN CARLOS
GONZALEZ, CHRISTINE LEWIS,
LYNN PETERSON, BOB STACEY,
all in their official capacities as Metro
2                 BLUMENKRON V. MULTNOMAH COUNTY

    councilors,

              Defendants-Appellees.

         Appeal from the United States District Court
                  for the District of Oregon
        Marco A. Hernandez, Chief District Judge, Presiding

            Argued and Submitted February 8, 2023
                      Portland, Oregon

                      Filed February 2, 2024

     Before: Mary H. Murguia, Chief Judge, and Danielle J.
           Forrest and Jennifer Sung, Circuit Judges.

                      Opinion by Judge Sung

                          SUMMARY *

                       Burford Abstention

    The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of
plaintiffs’ facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to
the designation of certain land in Multnomah County,
Oregon, as “rural reserves” under the Oregon Land Reserves
Statute.

*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
             BLUMENKRON V. MULTNOMAH COUNTY                  3

    Plaintiffs alleged, in part, that the Land Reserves Statute
and regulations facially violate the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the federal constitution and that
defendants’ rural reserve designations violated plaintiffs’
federal procedural due process, substantive due process, and
equal protection rights (the “as-applied claims”). The
district court dismissed plaintiffs’ facial constitutional
claims for failure to state a claim and abstained from
exercising jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ as-applied
constitutional claims under Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S.
315 (1943), because exercising federal jurisdiction would
interfere with Oregon’s authority to manage its own land use
scheme.
    Burford abstention is designed to protect complex state
administrative       processes     from      undue      federal
interference. Application of Burford abstention requires:
(1) that the state has chosen to concentrate suits challenging
the involved agency’s actions in a particular court; (2) that
the federal issues cannot be separated easily from
complicated state law issues over which the state courts
might have special competence; and (3) that federal review
might disrupt state efforts to establish a coherent policy.
    The panel held that the Burford abstention requirements
were met for each of the as-applied claims. First, the Oregon
legislature concentrated review of reserve designation orders
by the Oregon Land Conservation and Development
Commission in a state court forum, and the state court
review was, in all material respects, identical to the state
court review of administrative orders deemed adequate in
Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern Railway
Co., 341 U.S. 341 (1951). Second, plaintiffs’ constitutional
claims were inextricably intertwined with complex state law
issues regarding the proper interpretation and application of
4             BLUMENKRON V. MULTNOMAH COUNTY

the Land Reserves Statute’s urban and rural designation
factors, as well as the statutorily prescribed,
intergovernmental       process     for     making       such
designations. Third, a change in the rural designation for
plaintiffs’ land would disrupt the State’s attempt to ensure
uniformity in the treatment of an essentially local problem.
     Having determined that the requirements for Burford
abstention were met for each of plaintiffs’ as-applied claims,
the panel next concluded that the district court did not abuse
its discretion by abstaining from exercising jurisdiction over
the claims in their entirety, including plaintiffs’ claims for
damages, which were incidental to the equitable claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief.
    Finally, the panel concluded that plaintiffs had
abandoned their facial constitutional claims on appeal and
therefore affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’
facial constitutional claims for failure to state a claim as a
matter of law.

                         COUNSEL

Christopher James (argued), The James Law Group LLC,
Portland, Oregon, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Roger A. Alfred (argued), Office of Metro Attorney,
Portland, Oregon; Christopher A. Gilmore (argued),
Multnomah County Attorney’s Office, Portland, Oregon;
Nathan A.S. Sykes, Deputy Assistant Chief Counsel, Metro
Office of General Counsel; Patrick M. Ebbett, Assistant
Attorney General, Oregon Attorney General’s Office,
Salem, Oregon; for Defendants-Appellees.
             BLUMENKRON V. MULTNOMAH COUNTY                  5

                         OPINION

SUNG, Circuit Judge:

    Plaintiffs Katherine Blumenkron, David Blumenkron,
and Springville Investors, LLC, filed this action to challenge
the designation of certain land in Multnomah County,
Oregon, as “rural reserves” under the Oregon Land Reserves
Statute. Defendants are Multnomah County, councilors of
the Metro Regional Government, and members of the
Oregon Land Conservation and Development Commission.
Plaintiffs brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging federal and state constitutional claims and seeking
a variety of injunctive and declaratory relief and damages.
    The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ facial
constitutional claims for failure to state a claim; abstained
from exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ as-applied
constitutional claims under Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S.
315 (1943), because exercising federal jurisdiction “would
interfere with Oregon’s authority to manage its own land use
scheme”; and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the remaining state-law claims.
    We affirm the dismissal of all claims. We agree with the
district court that the requirements for Burford abstention are
met for each of Plaintiffs’ as-applied claims. We also
conclude that the district court appropriately dismissed
Plaintiffs’ damages claims under Burford. Although the
comity principles that underlie abstention doctrines
generally permit dismissal only of claims for equitable relief,
when the requirements for abstention are met, a federal court
may dismiss damages claims that are only incidental to
equitable claims.
6            BLUMENKRON V. MULTNOMAH COUNTY

           The Oregon Land Reserves Statute
     Since 1973, Oregon law has required local governments
to make land use plans that comply with statewide policy
goals, which include preserving farm and forest land and
preventing the uncontrolled urbanization of rural areas. See,
e.g., 1000 Friends of Or. v. Land Conservation & Dev.
Comm’n, 724 P.2d 268, 273–76 (Or. 1986). In 2007, the state
legislature enacted the Land Reserves Statute, Or. Rev. Stat.
§§ 195.137–145, to “facilitate long-range planning” by local
governments and provide “greater certainty” to commerce,
industry, private landowners, and providers of public
services. Or. Rev. Stat. § 195.139. See also Barkers Five,
LLC v. Land Conservation & Dev. Comm’n (“Barkers Five
I”), 323 P.3d 368 (Or. Ct. App. 2014).
    Under the Land Reserves Statute, Metro, a regional
government, is responsible for establishing the “urban
growth boundary” in the Portland metropolitan area. Or.
Rev. Stat. §§ 197.015(14), 197.299. The statute also
authorizes local governments in the Portland metropolitan
area, including Multnomah County and Metro, to evaluate
land that is currently outside the urban growth boundary and
designate it as either “urban reserve” or “rural reserve.” Or.
Rev. Stat. §§ 195.141, 195.143, 195.145; Or. Admin. R.
660-027-0030, -0040, -0080. Urban reserves are prioritized
for development and eventual inclusion in the urban growth
boundary. Or. Rev. Stat. § 195.137(2). Rural reserves are
protected “to provide long-term protection for agriculture,
forestry or important natural landscape features.” Or. Rev.
Stat. § 195.137(1). Local governments may not designate
urban reserves in a county without also designating rural
reserves in that county. Or. Rev. Stat. § 195.143(3).
             BLUMENKRON V. MULTNOMAH COUNTY                 7

    To protect rural reserve land, the statute bars local
governments from including land designated as rural reserve
within the urban growth boundary for a decades-long
planning period. See Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 195.141(2);
195.145(4); Or. Admin. R. 660-027-0040(4); Barkers Five,
LLC v. Land Conservation & Dev. Comm’n (“Barkers Five
II”), 451 P.3d 627, 630 n.1 (2019). Additionally, local
governments may not “amend comprehensive plan
provisions or land use regulations to allow uses that were not
allowed, or smaller lots or parcels than were allowed, at the
time” the land was designated “as rural reserves unless and
until the reserves are re-designated, consistent with [the
applicable regulations], as land other than rural reserves.”
Or. Admin. R. 660-027-0070(3)–(4).
    When making urban or rural reserve designations, local
governments must consider the factors set forth in the Land
Reserves Statute and administrative rules. Or. Rev. Stat.
§§ 195.145(6), 195.141(3); Or. Admin. R. 660-027-0050, -
0060. For rural reserves, local governments must consider,
for example, whether the area can sustain long-term
agricultural operations—taking into account land use
patterns and the sufficiency of agricultural infrastructure—
and whether the land “[h]as suitable soils and available water
where needed.” Or. Rev. Stat. §195.141(3). Additionally,
they must consider whether the land has “suitable soils
where needed to sustain long-term agricultural or forestry
operations”; has sufficient “agricultural or forestry
infrastructure in the area”; or is “necessary to protect water
quality or water quantity, such as streams, wetlands and
riparian areas.” Or. Admin. R. 660-027-0060.
   For urban reserves, local governments must consider, for
example, whether the land “[c]an be developed at urban
densities in a way that makes efficient use of existing and
8            BLUMENKRON V. MULTNOMAH COUNTY

future public infrastructure investments”; “[c]an be served
by public schools and other urban-level public facilities and
services efficiently and cost-effectively by appropriate and
financially capable service providers”; “[c]an be designed to
be walkable and served by a well-connected system of
streets by appropriate service providers”; and “[i]ncludes
sufficient land suitable for a range of housing types.” Or.
Rev. Stat. § 195.145(6). See also Or. Admin. R. 660-027-
0050.
    To designate land as rural or urban reserve, the local
governments must engage in a multi-step, cooperative
process prescribed by the Land Reserves Statute and
administrative rules. Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 195.141, 195.143,
195.145; Or. Admin. R. 660-027-0030. Under this process,
Metro designates urban reserves and the three Portland-area
counties (Multnomah, Washington, and Clackamas)
designate rural reserves. Or. Admin. R. 660-027-0020.
However, Metro and each affected county must consider the
urban and rural reserve factors “concurrently and in
coordination with one another.” Or. Admin. R. 660-027-
0040(10). Further, Metro and the counties cannot make
urban or rural designations without an intergovernmental
agreement between Metro and the county. Or. Admin. R.
660-027-0030, -0040. After finalizing intergovernmental
agreements and maps of reserve areas, Metro and each
affected county must “adopt a single, joint set of findings of
fact, statements of reasons and conclusions explaining why
areas were chosen as urban or rural reserves.” Or. Admin. R.
660-027-0040(10).
    The Oregon Land Conservation and Development
Commission (“Commission”) oversees various land-use
decisions. The Commission has two roles in the reserve
designation process. First, the Commission has authority to
                BLUMENKRON V. MULTNOMAH COUNTY                         9

enact rules regarding the process and criteria for designating
reserves. Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 195.141(5), 195.145(8). Second,
the Commission reviews reserve designations submitted by
local governments. Or. Rev. Stat § 197.626(1)(c), (f); Or.
Admin. R. 660-027-0080(2). When reviewing submitted
reserve designations, the Commission determines whether
the designations (1) comply with statewide planning goals,
(2) comply with reserve designation standards, and (3) are
supported by substantial evidence. Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 197.633(3); Or. Admin. R. 660-027-0080(4). The
Commission must issue a final order regarding its decision
whether to approve a designation. Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 197.626(2); Barkers Five I, 323 P.3d at 374.
    The Commission’s final order regarding a reserve
designation is subject to judicial review by the Oregon Court
of Appeals. Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.651. The Court of Appeals
must limit judicial review to the administrative record and
“[m]ay not substitute its judgment for that of the Land
Conservation and Development Commission as to an issue
of fact.” Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.651(9). The Court of Appeals
may affirm, reverse, or remand the Commission’s final
order. Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.651(10).
        Factual Background and Prior Proceedings
    Plaintiffs own properties that, together, comprise 76
acres of land located in Multnomah County.1 Plaintiffs’
properties are within a large study area referred to as Area 7.
In December 2009, the Multnomah County Board of
Commissioners unanimously adopted a resolution

1
 “Because this is an appeal from an order [granting] a motion to dismiss,
we assume the truth of the well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint.”
See Pettibone v. Russell, 59 F.4th 449, 450–51 (9th Cir. 2023).
10           BLUMENKRON V. MULTNOMAH COUNTY

recommending that all land within Area 7 remain
undesignated—that is, not designated as either urban reserve
or rural reserve. Thereafter, an intergovernmental steering
committee established a regional numbering system that
divided Area 7 into three areas, 9A, 9B, and 9C. Plaintiffs’
property is within Area 9B.
    In the following months, Metro and Multnomah County
prepared a proposed intergovernmental agreement that
would leave Areas 9A and 9B undesignated. Various
individuals, including some Portland officials, sent Metro or
the County letters advocating for a different outcome—some
favoring an urban reserve designation, and others favoring a
rural reserve designation. Metro and Multnomah County
held public hearings regarding the proposed agreement.
Various interested parties, including Plaintiffs, testified at
the Multnomah County public hearing. Plaintiffs testified
and submitted evidence in favor of designating Area 9B as
an urban reserve. A Portland planning officer testified in
favor of designating Areas 9A and 9B as rural reserves.
    After the public hearing, Multnomah County
Commissioner Judy Shiprack moved to amend the proposed
intergovernmental agreement to designate Areas 9A and 9B
as rural reserves. Two commissioners opposed the
amendment, contending that the factors did not strongly
support a rural reserve designation. One commissioner
explained that she favored the amendment in part because
she received hundreds of communications from constituents
that overwhelmingly favored designating those areas as rural
reserves. Ultimately, the county commissioners, by a vote of
3 to 2, adopted an intergovernmental agreement with Metro
that designated Areas 9A and 9B as rural reserves. Soon
after, Metro also voted to amend the proposed
intergovernmental agreement to make it consistent with the
              BLUMENKRON V. MULTNOMAH COUNTY                     11

amended agreement adopted by the County, by a vote of 5
to 2. In May 2010, the County adopted Ordinance 1161
designating Areas 9A and 9B as rural reserves and setting
forth the County’s reasons for adopting the designations.
Metro conducted another public hearing on the designations
and then adopted Ordinance No. 10-1238A, approving and
adopting the same designations.
    Metro and the three Portland-area counties provided the
Land Conservation and Development Commission with a
“consolidated submittal” of proposed designations, which
included the designations of Areas 9A and 9B as rural
reserves. In October 2010, the Commission held a hearing
on the consolidated submittal. At the hearing, the
Commission heard extensively from Metro and the three
counties. Other individuals, including Plaintiffs, were given
brief opportunities to explain their objections and offer
evidence. The Commission generally approved the proposed
designations, except it remanded two areas (not at issue here)
to Metro and Washington County for further consideration.
In May 2011, Metro and the counties resubmitted their
proposed designations to the Commission, and the
Commission held another hearing to consider objections to
those designations. The Commission eventually issued a
156-page order of compliance acknowledgment for the
entire submittal (“First Compliance Acknowledgement
Order”). 2
    Plaintiffs and multiple other parties filed a petition for
review of the First Compliance Acknowledgment Order in

2
  Under Oregon law, the Commission may, at the request of a local
government, issue an order granting, denying, or continuing
“acknowledgement” that “comprehensive plan and land use regulations”
comply with approved goals. Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.251.
12            BLUMENKRON V. MULTNOMAH COUNTY

the Oregon Court of Appeals, raising 25 assignments of
error. See Barkers Five I, 323 P.3d at 374–75. The Oregon
Court of Appeals rejected most of the petitioners’
contentions, including their “overarching contention” that
the Commission “erroneously understood the designation of
urban and rural reserves to be a ‘political’ decision
materially unconstrained by legal requirements.” Id. at 404.
The court also affirmed the Commission’s conclusion that,
under the Land Reserves Statute, “if Metro and the counties
properly consider and apply the [reserve] factors, the
decision whether to designate particular land as urban
reserves or rural reserves or to leave it undesignated is left to
the local government.” Id. at 391. The court did find that the
Commission erred in four respects, but none of those errors
concerned Plaintiffs’ challenges to the rural reserve
designation of Area 9B. Id. at 375.
    After the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded the First Acknowledgement Order, Multnomah
County held more public hearings regarding the reserve
designations. Plaintiffs submitted testimony and new
evidence of changed circumstances affecting Area 9B. Both
Multnomah County and Metro eventually adopted
ordinances that reaffirmed and adopted all of Multnomah
County’s previous reserves designations.
    Metro filed another joint submittal with the Commission.
Plaintiffs objected to their properties’ rural reserve
designation on multiple grounds, including assertions of
bias, political interferences, failure to apply the required
factors and criteria, failure to follow the applicable rules, and
violation of Plaintiffs’ federal due process and equal
protection rights. The Commission held another public
hearing at which testimony from objecting parties, including
Plaintiffs, was limited to ten minutes. On May 16, 2018, the
              BLUMENKRON V. MULTNOMAH COUNTY                 13

Commission issued a second compliance acknowledgement
order (“Second Compliance Acknowledgment Order”)
rejecting every objection (including Plaintiffs’) and
approving the submittal.
    On October 9, 2019, the Oregon Court of Appeals
affirmed the Second Compliance Acknowledgment Order.
See Barkers Five II, 451 P.3d at 627. The court noted that
the assignments of errors raised “general contentions that
much of the decision-making involved in the reserves-
designation process was impermissibly political,” but
rejected them without discussion. Id. at 630. The court also
discussed and rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that Multnomah
County should have reconsidered, on remand, its designation
of Area 9B. Id. at 636-37. The court then noted that it had
“considered each of the additional arguments that petitioners
make on judicial review” and rejected them “without
discussion.” Id. at 637.
    In 2012, while Barkers Five I was pending in the Oregon
Court of Appeals, Plaintiffs filed a federal lawsuit
challenging the rural reserve designation for Area 9B. After
the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the
Commission’s First Compliance Acknowledgment Order in
Barkers Five I, the federal district court dismissed Plaintiffs’
claims as unripe but granted Plaintiffs leave to renew their
claims after a second final decision regarding the reserve
designations was issued.
    After the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the
Commission’s Second Compliance Acknowledgment Order,
Plaintiffs filed the complaint in this case. Plaintiffs asserted
that the Land Reserves Statute and regulations facially
violate the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the
federal constitution, and that Defendants’ designation of
14           BLUMENKRON V. MULTNOMAH COUNTY

Area 9B as rural reserve violated their federal procedural due
process, substantive due process, and equal protection rights
(the “as-applied claims”). Plaintiffs’ complaint also includes
related state law claims against Metro and Multnomah
County.
    The district court abstained from exercising jurisdiction
over Plaintiffs’ as-applied claims under Burford. The court
dismissed Plaintiffs’ federal facial constitutional claims for
failure to state claim. And, having dismissed all claims over
which it had original jurisdiction, the court declined to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state
law claims. Plaintiffs timely appealed.
                         Discussion
I. Burford Abstention
    Abstention is well recognized as an “extraordinary and
narrow exception” to the general rule that a federal court
should adjudicate cases otherwise properly before it. Colo.
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800, 813 (1976) (citation omitted).
    Burford abstention is designed to “protect[] complex
state administrative processes from undue federal
interference.” Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654,
671 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Tucker v. First Md. Sav. &
Loan, Inc., 942 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1991)).

       Where timely and adequate state-court
       review is available, a federal court sitting in
       equity must decline to interfere with the
       proceedings or orders of state administrative
       agencies: (1) when there are “difficult
       questions of state law bearing on policy
             BLUMENKRON V. MULTNOMAH COUNTY                15

       problems of substantial public import whose
       importance transcends the result in the case at
       bar”; or (2) where the “exercise of federal
       review . . . would be disruptive of state efforts
       to establish a coherent policy with respect to
       a matter of substantial public concern.”

New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans
(“NOPSI”), 491 U.S. 350, 360 (1989) (quoting Colo. River
Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 814).
    In the Ninth Circuit, application of Burford abstention
requires: (1) “that the state has chosen to concentrate suits
challenging the actions of the agency involved in a particular
court;” (2) “that federal issues could not be separated easily
from complicated state law issues with respect to which the
state courts might have special competence;” and (3) “that
federal review might disrupt state efforts to establish a
coherent policy.” United States v. Morros, 268 F.3d 695, 705
(9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Knudsen Corp. v. Nev. State Dairy
Comm’n, 676 F.2d 374, 377 (9th Cir. 1982)).
    We review de novo whether the requirements for
Burford abstention have been met. City of Tucson v. U.S. W.
Commc’ns, Inc., 284 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002). When
those requirements have been met, we review the district
court’s decision to abstain for abuse of discretion. Id.
   A. Burford Abstention Requirements
    For the reasons explained below, we agree with the
district court that the Burford abstention requirements have
been met for each of Plaintiffs’ as-applied claims.
16           BLUMENKRON V. MULTNOMAH COUNTY

     1. State Court Review
    Under the Land Reserves Statute, reserve designations
made by Metro and a county are first subject to review by
the Commission. Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.626(1). Then, the
Commission’s orders are subject to review by the Oregon
Court of Appeals. Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.651.

            The Court of Appeals may affirm, reverse
        or remand an order [of the Commission]. The
        Court of Appeals shall reverse or remand the
        order only if the court finds the order is:
            (a) Unlawful in substance or procedure.
        However, error in procedure is not cause for
        reversal or remand unless the Court of
        Appeals determines that substantial rights of
        the petitioner were prejudiced.
            (b) Unconstitutional.
            (c) Not supported by substantial evidence
        in the whole record as to facts found by the
        [C]ommission.

Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.651(10). The Court of Appeals must
“issue a final order on the petition for judicial review with
the greatest possible expediency.” Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 197.651(11). The Court of Appeals’ decision is also
subject to review by the Oregon Supreme Court. See Or.
Rev. Stat. 197.651(12).
    It is undisputed that the Oregon legislature has
concentrated review of Commission orders in a state court
forum, and that the state court’s review is timely. Plaintiffs
contend only that the state court’s review is inadequate. We
disagree.
              BLUMENKRON V. MULTNOMAH COUNTY                  17

    The Supreme Court considered whether comparable
state court review was “adequate” for Burford abstention in
Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern Railway
Co. (“Alabama PSC”), 341 U.S. 341 (1951). In that case, the
Alabama Public Service Commission denied a railway’s
application for a permit to discontinue passenger rail service,
and the railway brought an action in federal district court
seeking to enjoin enforcement of the commission’s
administrative order. Id. at 343. The district court granted the
injunction, id., but the Supreme Court reversed, instructing
that the federal district court should have abstained from
exercising jurisdiction because “adequate state court review
of an administrative order based upon predominantly local
factors” was available. Id. at 349–50 (citing Burford). In so
holding, the Court noted that Alabama had “[n]ot only”
created the Public Service Commission to review a proposed
discontinuation of rail service, “but it ha[d] also provided for
appeal from any final order” of the commission to a state
circuit court “as a matter of right.” Id. at 348. Additionally,
the state circuit court, “after a hearing on the record certified
by the [c]ommission,” could “set aside any [c]ommission
order found to be contrary to the substantial weight of the
evidence or erroneous as a matter of law,” and the circuit
court’s decision could be appealed to the Alabama Supreme
Court. Id. (citations omitted).
    Oregon has provided for state court review of the
Commission’s orders that is, in all material respects,
identical to the state court review of the commission orders
deemed adequate in Alabama PSC. In this case, Plaintiffs
argue that the state court review is inadequate because it is
limited to the administrative record. The Supreme Court,
however, rejected that argument in Alabama PSC. Id. at 348.
As the Court explained then, the fact that review in the state
18            BLUMENKRON V. MULTNOMAH COUNTY

courts is limited to the record taken before the commission
“presents no constitutional infirmity.” Id. “[W]hatever the
scope of review of [c]omission findings when an alleged
denial of constitutional rights is in issue,” there is “no right
to relitigate factual questions on the ground that
constitutional rights are involved.” Id. (citations omitted).
    Plaintiffs also generally argue that the state court review
of Commission orders is inadequate because it is not equal
to the review approved in Burford, because that regulatory
scheme at issue there allowed the state court to, at least on
occasion, exercise “as much power” as the Texas Railroad
Commission “to determine particular cases” after a “trial de
novo.” 319 U.S. at 326. But, while the Supreme Court in
Burford held that de novo review by a state court is adequate
for abstention, it did not hold that such review is required for
abstention. See id. And, as discussed above, the Court made
clear in Alabama PSC that state court review that is limited
to the administrative record is also adequate.
     2. Separability of federal and state law issues
    Plaintiffs do not meaningfully dispute that the
underlying state law issues are complicated and within the
special competence of the Oregon Court of Appeals. Rather,
Plaintiffs argue that Burford abstention does not apply
because their federal claims can be easily separated from
those state law issues. Burford abstention is inappropriate
where “the federal questions . . . can readily be identified and
reserved without colliding with what are essentially state
claims.” Santa Fe Land Improvement Co. v. City of Chula
Vista, 596 F.2d 838, 842 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting Rancho
Palos Verdes Corp. v. City of Laguna Beach, 547 F.2d 1092,
1096 (9th Cir. 1976)). Accordingly, we consider whether
Plaintiffs’ federal claims can be easily separated from the
              BLUMENKRON V. MULTNOMAH COUNTY                 19

state law issues on a claim-specific basis. But, because
Plaintiffs’ arguments conflate their as-applied equal
protection and substantive due process claims, we also
consider those claims together.
   a. As-applied equal protection and substantive due
      process claims
    According to Plaintiffs, “[a]t the heart of [their] as-
applied federal substantive due process and equal protection
claims [are] Plaintiffs’ allegations that Multnomah County
and Metro, notwithstanding their consideration of the results
of their own application and analysis of the reserves factors
with respect to the designation of Area 9B, arbitrarily and
irrationally chose to designate Area 9B and Plaintiffs’
property as a rural reserve for reasons of bias, caprice, and
political considerations . . . .” Further, Plaintiffs claim that
Defendants treated Area 9B “differently than other similarly
situated properties . . . without a rational basis for that
different treatment.”
    These as-applied claims are inextricably intertwined
with complex state law issues regarding the proper
interpretation and application of the Land Reserves Statute’s
urban and rural designation factors, as well as the statutorily
prescribed, intergovernmental process for making such
designations. For example, to resolve Plaintiffs’ claim that
Defendants treated Plaintiffs’ properties differently from
similarly situated properties, the court would first need to
determine whether Area 9B was in fact similarly situated to
other areas designated as urban reserves. And, to make that
threshold determination, the court would need to interpret
and apply the reserve factors prescribed by state law.
    Similarly, to resolve Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendants
designated Area 9B because of improper motives instead of
20           BLUMENKRON V. MULTNOMAH COUNTY

the applicable factors and record evidence, the court would
first need to determine whether the Defendants’ stated
reasons for the rural reserve designation are consistent with
state law and supported by the record. Plaintiffs assert that
the court could determine whether Defendants’ stated
reasons for designating Area 9B as rural reserve are pretext
for improper motives without evaluating whether
Defendants “failed to take into consideration or properly
weigh relevant state law factors.” Plaintiffs, however, ignore
that a court determines whether a stated reason is pretext by
evaluating its legal and factual validity.
     b. As-applied procedural due process claims
    To prevail on the as-applied procedural due process
claims, Plaintiffs “must establish the existence of ‘(1) a
liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution;
(2) a deprivation of that interest by the government, [and]
(3) a lack of process.’” Shanks v. Dressel, 540 F.3d 1082,
1090 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Portman v. County of Santa
Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993)).
    We agree with Plaintiffs that, typically, federal courts do
not need to resolve complex state law issues to determine
whether a particular process was constitutionally deficient.
In this case, however, Plaintiffs’ allegations in support of
their procedural due process claims are intertwined with
issues regarding the proper interpretation and application of
the Land Reserves Statute and the accompanying
regulations. For example, in the context of their procedural
due process claims against Multnomah County and the
Commission, Plaintiffs allege that these Defendants failed to
give Plaintiffs “fair consideration of the factors under SB
1011” or “fair consideration of the applicable statutory and
regulatory factors.” And, in the context of their procedural
             BLUMENKRON V. MULTNOMAH COUNTY                 21

due process claim against Metro, Plaintiffs allege that
“Metro failed to (1) obtain timely reports regarding the
availability of services to Area 9B and failed to consider that
information once it was available; (2) properly investigate
the location and nature of landscape features and failed to
consider such information as applied to Area 9B when
presented with it; and (3) consider such evidence and others
in part because it would upset political bargaining.”
Similarly, Plaintiffs allege the Commission “did not provide
an impartial review” and “did not objectively or
substantively consider or weigh evidence.” Because
Plaintiffs’ claims regarding “procedural” deficiencies are
essentially substantive challenges to the Defendants’
decision to designate Area 9B as a rural reserve, we conclude
that the Burford abstention inseparability requirement has
also been met for the as-applied procedural due process
claims.
   3. Disruption of state efforts to establish a coherent
      policy
    The Oregon legislature expressly found that
“[u]ncoordinated use of lands within this state threatens the
orderly development, the environment of this state and the
health, safety, order, convenience, prosperity and welfare of
the people of this state.” Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.005(1). The
legislature further declared that the “[i]mplementation and
enforcement of acknowledged comprehensive plans and
land use regulations are matters of statewide concern.” Or.
Rev. Stat. § 197.013. “To promote coordinated
administration of land uses consistent with comprehensive
plans adopted throughout the state,” the legislature
“establish[ed] a process for the review of state agency, city,
county and special district land conservation and
development plans for compliance with [state] goals.” Or.
22            BLUMENKRON V. MULTNOMAH COUNTY

Rev. Stat. § 197.005(2). The Oregon Land Reserves Statute
is part of this statutory scheme.
    Plaintiffs concede that the heart of their as-applied
claims is the contention that the Defendants, two local
governments and a state agency, misapplied their lawful
authority or failed to take into consideration or properly
weigh the relevant state-law factors under the Land Reserves
Statute. Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief specifically asks a federal
court to reverse the rural reserve designation of Area 9B—a
designation authorized by state law, made by
intergovernmental agreement, approved by a state agency,
and subject to judicial review by the Oregon Court of
Appeals. Plaintiffs’ property is only one portion of Area 9B,
which includes 2,500 acres of property belonging to multiple
Oregonians. And, because “the designation of urban and
rural reserves are interrelated” under state law, a change to
the rural reserve designation for Area 9B would likely
require reconsideration of urban and rural reserve
designations in Multnomah County or the Metro region “as
a whole.” Barkers Five I, 323 P.3d at 411–12 (requiring
Commission to remand entire submittal to Metro and
counties because of error in Washington County’s
application of rural reserve factors). Under these
circumstances, we have no doubt that Plaintiffs’ claims
would “disrupt the State’s attempt to ensure uniformity in
the treatment of an ‘essentially local problem.’” NOPSI, 491
U.S. at 362 (quoting Alabama PSC, 341 U.S. at 347).
     B. Abuse of discretion review
    Because we conclude that the requirements for Burford
abstention have been met for Plaintiffs’ as-applied claims,
we review for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision
to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction over those claims.
              BLUMENKRON V. MULTNOMAH COUNTY                   23

“A district court may abuse its discretion if it does not apply
the correct law or if it rests its decision on a clearly erroneous
finding of material fact.” United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d
797, 799 (9th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (quoting United States
v. Dunn, 728 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2013)). Plaintiffs
argue that the district court made a legal error by applying
Burford abstention to their damages claims. For the reasons
explained below, we conclude that the district court did not
err.
    In Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co., the Supreme
Court clarified that, as a general rule, federal courts may
dismiss or remand an action under Burford only when the
relief sought is “equitable or otherwise discretionary.” 517
U.S. 706, 730–31 (1996). However, the Court declined to
hold “that abstention principles are completely inapplicable
in damages actions,” or to “resolve what additional authority
to abstain might be provided under Fair Assessment [in Real
Estate Ass’n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981)].” Id.
    In Fair Assessment, the Court affirmed the dismissal of
a § 1983 damages action under the principles of comity that
undergird abstention, including Burford abstention. 454 U.S.
at 101–02. The Court concluded that dismissal of the
petitioners’ damages action was consistent with limited
application of the comity principle because petitioners
would “not recover damages under § 1983 unless a district
court first determine[d] that [local and state officers’]
administration of the County tax system violated petitioners’
constitutional rights” and “that such a determination would
be fully as intrusive as the equitable actions that are barred
by principles of comity.” Id. at 113. “In effect,” the damages
action would require the district court to “first enter a
declaratory judgment like that barred in Great Lakes
[Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943)],” id.
24           BLUMENKRON V. MULTNOMAH COUNTY

at 113, where the petitioners sought “a declaratory judgment
that the state tax law as applied to them was unconstitutional
and void,” id. at 110.
    In Martinez v. Newport Beach City, we considered the
application of Younger abstention to a § 1983 claim that
included a claim for money damages. 125 F.3d 777, 782 (9th
Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Green v. City of
Tucson, 255 F.3d 1086, 1093 (9th Cir. 2001). While Burford
prevents undue federal interference with complex state
administrative processes, Younger prevents such
interference with state judicial proceedings. Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 40–41 (1971). We noted that the Eighth
Circuit “has interpreted Quackenbush and Fair Assessment
to mean that ‘a plaintiff’s incidental insertion of a general
claim for damages will not suffice to prevent the dismissal
of a § 1983 case [under Younger] where the damages sought
cannot be awarded without first declaring unconstitutional a
state court judgment on a matter committed to the states.’”
Martinez, 125 F.3d at 783 (quoting Amerson v. Iowa, 94 F.3d
510, 513 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 1061 (1997)).
However, we concluded that Younger abstention was not
appropriate in Martinez’s case because “granting [his]
requested relief would not necessarily involve the
invalidation of a state statute or judgment.” Id.
    We conclude that the reasoning of Amerson and
Martinez, which considered Quackenbush and Fair
Assessment in the Younger abstention context, is equally
applicable to Burford abstention. Accordingly, we also
conclude that Quackenbush and Fair Assessment, in the
Burford abstention context, mean the following: A
plaintiff’s incidental insertion of a general claim for damages
will not prevent the dismissal of a § 1983 case under Burford
where the damages sought cannot be awarded without, in
              BLUMENKRON V. MULTNOMAH COUNTY                 25

effect, first declaring unconstitutional either (1) a state
statute establishing an administrative process for resolving a
matter committed to the states, or (2) the proceedings or
orders of a state administrative agency on a matter
committed to the states.
    Here, Plaintiffs allege, on information and belief, that the
“designation of their property as rural reserve, rather than
urban reserve, reduces the present value of [their] property,”
and they seek alleged “damages arising from that wrongful
designation.” A district court could not award damages
without first declaring unconstitutional the administrative
proceedings and orders of the Commission affirming the
local governments’ designation of Area 9B as rural reserve.
There is no dispute that land use is a matter committed to the
states.
    Further, Plaintiffs primarily seek declaratory and
injunctive relief, and their request for damages is incidental.
Compare Amerson, 94 F.3d at 512 (plaintiff’s damages
claims were incidental because “most all of her claims for
relief [were] equitable in nature”), with Warmus v. Melahn,
110 F.3d 566, 568 (8th Cir. 1997) (plaintiff’s damages
claims were not incidental because they were “his only
claims”). For example, Plaintiffs seek a “judicial declaration
that Defendants’ policy, practice, designations, and
agreements in connection with the reserve designation
system violate Plaintiffs’ rights under the Equal Protection
Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment”; “[a] judicial declaration that the reserves
designation review process fails to provide adequate judicial
and quasi-judicial constitutional due process protections in
their agency administrative reviews and in the truncated and
limited judicial review in the Oregon Court of Appeals, and
that such failures violate the Fifth and Fourteenth
26            BLUMENKRON V. MULTNOMAH COUNTY

Amendments”; and “[a] judicial declaration stating that the
urban and rural reserves regulations violate the Due Process
and Equal Protection clauses.” Plaintiffs also seek injunctive
relief, including permanent injunctions enjoining
Defendants from acting on their reserve designations and
requiring Defendants “to designate Area 9B or Plaintiffs’
property as Urban Reserve.” Indeed, Plaintiffs’ complaint
alleges that their “injuries will be redressed only if this Court
declares Multnomah County, Metro, and [the
Commission]’s actions and the rural reserve designation of
Plaintiffs’ property unconstitutional, and enjoins
Multnomah County, Metro, and [the Commission] from its
application and enforcement.”
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in
abstaining from exercising its jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ as-
applied claims in their entirety.
II. Facial Claims
    We review de novo the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ facial
constitutional claims for failure to state a claim. Telesaurus
VPC, LLC v. Power, 623 F.3d 998, 1003 (9th Cir. 2010).
Although Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred by
dismissing their facial claims, this argument is vague,
unsupported by any citations to case authority, and
untethered to the applicable legal standards. Even after
Defendants argued in their answering briefs that Plaintiffs
waived their facial claims, Plaintiffs failed to address these
deficiencies in the reply brief. Consequently, we conclude
that Plaintiffs have abandoned their facial constitutional
claims on appeal by failing to sufficiently develop their
argument. See United States v. Graf, 610 F.3d 1148, 1166
(9th Cir. 2010) (“Arguments made in passing and not
supported by citations to the record or to case authority are
              BLUMENKRON V. MULTNOMAH COUNTY                   27

generally deemed waived.”); United States v. Williamson,
439 F.3d 1125, 1138 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Fed. R. App. P.
28(a)(9)(A)).
                            *****
    The district court appropriately abstained from
exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ as-applied claims
under Burford. We also affirm the district court’s dismissal
of Plaintiffs’ facial constitutional claims for failure to state a
claim as a matter of law.
    AFFIRMED.