Court Opinion

ID: 9897526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:15:40.019441+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:33.191807
License: Public Domain

SYLLABUS

This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office
of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor
approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion.

                State v. Oscar R. Juracan-Juracan (A-32-22) (087849)

Argued June 1, 2023 -- Decided August 15, 2023

PIERRE-LOUIS, J., writing for the Court.

       The Court considers a question of first impression -- whether a criminal
defendant must be provided in-person interpreting services, rather than video remote
interpreting (VRI) services, at his jury trial.

      In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Court announced amendments to
the New Jersey Judiciary’s Language Access Plan (LAP) and expanded the
circumstances in which remote interpreting services may be used. Prior to the
update, VRI was allowed only for “emergent matters” or “short non-emergent
matters of 30 minutes or less.” The 2022 LAP now allows VRI for both “emergent
and routine proceedings,” subject to judicial discretion.

      In 2019, defendant Oscar R. Juracan-Juracan, a native speaker of Kaqchikel --
a language spoken by approximately 450,000 people worldwide -- was charged with
several offenses related to an alleged sexual assault. During pre-trial proceedings,
he requested a Kaqchikel interpreter and one was provided. The interpreter,
however, resided on the West Coast, so he appeared remotely. Additionally, the
Kaqchikel interpreter did not speak English, only Kaqchikel and Spanish, so a
second interpreter was required to translate to and from Spanish and English.

       After the court advised counsel that the Kaqchikel interpreter would continue
to participate virtually during the jury trial, defendant moved for in-person
interpretation services. During the motion hearing, the Kaqchikel interpreter
expressed concerns about his ability to provide interpretation services remotely
during the trial. The trial court denied defendant’s motion, advising the Kaqchikel
interpreter that the court would give him “as much time as you need, understanding
the complexities, not only of interpretations, interpreting through two individuals,
and also virtually.” The trial court reasoned that proceeding with VRI during the
trial was “what’s financially feasible, what’s fair, what’s just.”

       The Appellate Division denied defendant’s motion for leave to appeal in light
of the VRI policy change. The Court granted leave to appeal. 253 N.J. 283 (2023).

                                          1
HELD: In a criminal jury trial, there is a presumption that foreign language
interpretation services will be provided in person, which is consistent with the New
Jersey Judiciary’s longstanding practice. The Court sets forth guidelines and factors
to assist trial courts in deciding whether VRI should be used during criminal jury
trials, and it remands the matter for the trial court to reconsider whether VRI is
appropriate in the current case after assessing those factors.

1. The Sixth Amendment and its counterpart in the New Jersey Constitution afford
criminal defendants the right to a fair trial, the right of confrontation, and the right
to counsel. And due process protects a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial by
guaranteeing the defendant’s right to be present and to fully participate during trial.
The spoken word is unquestionably the principal method of communication during
in-court proceedings, so a participant’s ability to understand and communicate
through language is key to ensuring the fairness of the proceedings. A criminal
defendant in federal proceedings has a statutory right to such assistance, and federal
circuit courts have acknowledged a defendant’s right to an interpreter. New Jersey
courts have also noted a criminal defendant’s right to an interpreter and the
constitutional underpinnings of that right, which is tied to the defendant’s “rights
under the confrontation and assistance of counsel provisions of our federal and state
Constitutions.” See State v. Kounelis, 258 N.J. Super. 420, 422, 425-27 (App. Div.
1992). And other jurisdictions similarly recognize a criminal defendant’s right to an
interpreter. (pp. 12-17)

2. In 2017, the Judiciary implemented the LAP to ensure all people, including
persons with limited English proficiency, have equal access to court proceedings .
And the Court has consistently recognized the significance of access to interpreting
services. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, court proceedings and services
generally occurred and were available in-person within Judiciary facilities. Pursuant
to the 2017 LAP, the use of remote interpreting services was very limited. The
unprecedented circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in the widespread
use of virtual court proceedings. In 2020, in light of ongoing remote court
operations, the Court approved an addendum to the 2017 LAP that expanded the
standard for the use of remote interpreting by permitting remote interpreting services
to be used for emergent or non-emergent matters even if longer than 30 minutes
when an on-site interpreter is not available, including during an emergency that
prevents the courts from operating in person. The Addendum also listed several
factors for a court to consider in determining how to conduct a court event involving
remote interpreting services. In September 2022, the Court revised the LAP in part
to formalize judicial discretion to authorize remote interpreting services for
emergent and routine proceedings consistent with current and ongoing practices. In
contrast to the 2017 LAP, the 2022 LAP expanded the use of remote interpreting
from “emergent matters” and “short non-emergent matters” to “emergent or non-
emergent matters.” And for the first time, the 2022 LAP authorized judges to
                                           2
exercise their discretion to use remote interpreting “when appropriate”; it also
provides “Guidelines for Video Remote Interpreting.” Those guidelines and the
Code of Professional Conduct for Interpreters, Transliterators, and Translators
together direct that interpreters’ expert opinions -- including about the feasibility of
VRI -- be voiced and considered. (pp. 18-23)

3. Applying those principles to the newly revised LAP, the Court sets forth
guidelines and factors to assist trial courts in deciding whether VRI should be used
during criminal jury trials. Consistent with New Jersey’s jurisprudence to ensure all
court users have equal access to court proceedings, there should be a presumption of
in-person interpreting services for criminal jury trials. In considering whether to
proceed to a jury trial with in-person or remote interpreting, trial courts should
consider a nonexclusive list of factors: (1) the nature, length, and complexity of the
trial; (2) the number of parties and witnesses involved; (3) whether an interpreter is
available to interpret in person at trial; (4) the impact any substantial delay in
obtaining an in-person interpreter would have on the defendant and on third-parties
such as co-defendants or victims; (5) whether the defendant tentatively plans to
testify; (6) the financial costs associated with in-person interpreting as compared to
remote interpreting; and (7) the interpreters’ position as to whether they believe they
can adequately fulfill their duties to interpret accurately and meet professional
standards while interpreting virtually. In the rare cases in which VRI is used for a
criminal jury trial, guardrails should be put in place to ensure a fair trial for
defendants, and a trial court’s decision to use remote instead of in-person
interpreting services should be approved by the Assignment Judge or Presiding
Judge. To the extent that costs are a consideration, the vicinage should consult with
the Administrative Office of the Courts for further guidance. (pp. 23-25)

4. The Court remands this matter to the trial court for reconsideration of whether
VRI is appropriate here. The Court stresses the difference between pre-trial
proceedings governed by Rules 3:9 to :13 and criminal trials governed by Rules 3:14
to :19, as well as the obstacles that virtual interpreting may create for defendants to
communicate confidentially and spontaneously with defense counsel. In addition to
the Kaqchikel interpreter’s opinion and the costs involved, all other factors set forth
by the Court should be considered in assessing the propriety of virtual interpretation
during a criminal jury trial; no single factor is dispositive. (pp. 25-27)

      REVERSED and REMANDED to the trial court.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES PATTERSON, SOLOMON, and
WAINER APTER; and JUDGE SABATINO (temporarily assigned) join in
JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS’s opinion. JUSTICE FASCIALE did not participate.

                                            3
       SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
             A-32 September Term 2022
                       087849

                State of New Jersey,

                Plaintiff-Respondent,

                          v.

              Oscar R. Juracan-Juracan,

                Defendant-Appellant.

         On appeal from the Superior Court,
                Appellate Division.

       Argued                      Decided
     June 1, 2023               August 15, 2023

Christopher M. Godin, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public
Defender, attorney; Christopher M. Godin, of counsel and
on the briefs).

Stephanie Davis Elson, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
cause for respondent (Esther Suarez, Hudson County
Prosecutor, attorney; Stephanie Davis Elson and Barbara
Drasheff, Assistant Prosecutor, on the briefs).

Farrin R. Anello argued the cause for amici curiae
National Association of Judiciary Interpreters and
Translators and American Translators Association
(American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey
Foundation, attorneys; Farrin R. Anello, Alexander
Shalom, and Jeanne LoCicero, on the brief).

                          1
            Norma Esquivel of the New York bar, admitted pro hac
            vice, argued the cause for amicus curiae LatinoJustice
            PRLDEF (LatinoJustice PRLDEF, attorneys; Rafaela
            Uribe and Norma Esquivel, on the brief).

            Alan Silber submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae
            Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New
            Jersey (Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, attorneys; Alan
            Silber, on the brief).

        JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS delivered the opinion of the Court.

      In this matter, we consider a question of first impression -- whether a

criminal defendant must be provided in-person interpreting services, rather

than video remote interpreting (VRI) services, at his jury trial.

      In light of the proliferation of virtual court proceedings in response to

the COVID-19 pandemic, this Court issued Administrative Directive #10-22,

which announced updates to the New Jersey Judiciary’s Language Access Plan

(LAP) and expanded the circumstances in which remote interpreting services

may be used. See Administrative Directive #10-22: New Jersey Judiciary

Language Access Plan (Sept. 30, 2022) (Directive #10-22) (promulgating what

we refer to here as the “2022 LAP”). Prior to the update, VRI was allowed

only for “emergent matters” or “short non-emergent matters of 30 minutes or

less.” See Administrative Directive #01-17: New Jersey Judiciary Language

Access Plan” (Jan. 10, 2017) (Directive #01-17) (promulgating the “2017

                                        2
LAP”). The 2022 LAP now allows VRI for both “emergent and routine

proceedings,” subject to judicial discretion. Directive #10-22, at 2.

      On May 25, 2019, defendant Oscar R. Juracan-Juracan, a native

Kaqchikel speaker, was charged with several offenses related to an alleged

sexual assault. During pre-trial proceedings, defendant requested a Kaqchikel

interpreter and one was provided. The Kaqchikel interpreter, however, resided

on the West Coast, so he appeared remotely during pre-trial proceedings.

Additionally, the Kaqchikel interpreter did not speak English, only Kaqchikel

and Spanish, so a second interpreter was required to translate to and from

Spanish and English.

      After the trial court advised counsel that the Kaqchikel interpreter would

continue to provide interpreting services virtually during his criminal jury trial,

defendant filed a motion for in-person interpretation services. During the

motion hearing, the Kaqchikel interpreter expressed concerns about his ability

to properly provide interpretation services remotely during the trial. The trial

court denied defendant’s motion for in-person interpretation services. The

Appellate Division upheld the trial court’s decision based on the recent policy

change in Directive #10-22.

      We granted defendant’s motion for leave to appeal. Although the

COVID-19 pandemic has altered traditional courtroom dynamics, it remains

                                        3
crucial that the fundamental principles of fairness and a defendant’s right to

fully participate at trial are preserved. We therefore hold that in a criminal

jury trial, there is a presumption that foreign language interpretation services

will be provided in person, which is consistent with the New Jersey Judiciary’s

longstanding practice. We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Appellate

Division and remand the matter for the trial court to reconsider whether VRI is

appropriate in the current case after assessing the factors articulated in this

opinion.

                                         I.

       On August 28, 2019, a Hudson County grand jury returned a four-count

indictment charging defendant with two counts of first-degree aggravated

sexual assault, second-degree burglary, and third-degree terroristic threats.

       Defendant is a native speaker of Kaqchikel, one of many indigenous

Mayan languages spoken in central Guatemala by approximately 450,000

people worldwide. Kaqchikel Language, Encyc. Britannica, https://www.

britannica.com/topic/Kaqchikel-language (last visited July 27, 2023). Over the

course of approximately four pre-trial proceedings, including the detention

hearing and a case conference, a Spanish interpreter provided interpretation

services for defendant and the court. During a Miranda1 hearing on January

1
    Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
                                       4
28, 2020, defendant requested a Kaqchikel interpreter.2 Thereafter, the trial

court retained a court-certified Kaqchikel interpreter. The Kaqchikel

interpreter only speaks Kaqchikel and Spanish, so another interpreter who

speaks Spanish and English was also utilized to interpret from Spanish to

English and vice versa. The retained Kaqchikel interpreter resided on the

West Coast of the United States, so he participated remotely in the pre-trial

proceedings.

      Given the relatively small number of people who speak Kaqchikel,

court-certified interpreters for the language are not abundant. The Kaqchikel

interpreter in this matter indicated on the record that Kaqchikel interpreters are

very scarce, that he works throughout the United States, and that his schedule

was full for other matters two months out.

      According to defendant’s trial counsel, she was under the impression

that the Kaqchikel interpreter would provide in-person interpretation services

during the trial. After learning that the trial court intended to provide only

VRI services, defendant filed a motion for in-person interpretation services

during trial. The State did not submit any written opposition to the motion.

2
  Although defendant did not request a Kaqchikel interpreter until the January
28, 2020 Miranda hearing, after using only a Spanish interpreter in previous
proceedings, neither party has disputed defendant’s lack of proficiency in
Spanish or English in the appeal before this Court.

                                        5
      The motion hearing took place on January 24, 2023. Jury selection was

scheduled to begin on February 6, 2023. Defendant was present and the

Kaqchikel interpreter and the Spanish-English interpreters appeared virtually.

The State noted on the record that it “d[id] not take any position on the

motion.” The proceeding was interrupted at least three times when the Spanish

interpreter had to let a colleague take over, admitted to getting distracted, or

was disconnected due to technical issues. During the hearing, the Kaqchikel

interpreter expressed his concerns about providing virtual interpretation

services in a trial setting as follows:

             Your Honor, as I have said previously, that it is very
             complicated to do it in such a way to interpret at a
             distance. It would be the first case for me to do it this
             way because for me it is complicated, not just because
             of the nature of the case, but the nature of the language.
             And sometimes you don’t hear very well and it is
             simply not the same. And it is interpretation to be
             interpreted in this claim -- in this case to the client here.
             So that is the additional challenge that it presents. The
             complication that we have here would be the first case
             that I would -- that -- to work in such a fashion at the
             trial stage.

      The trial court dismissed the Kaqchikel interpreter’s concerns, stating

“[u]nderstood. Complications, though, can be overcome.” The trial court

further advised the Kaqchikel interpreter that the court would give him “as

much time as you need, understanding the complexities, not only of

                                          6
interpretations, interpreting through two individuals, and also virtually. We’ll

take as many breaks as you need, as you requested in the past.” The trial court

reasoned that proceeding with VRI during the trial was “what’s financially

feasible, what’s fair, what’s just.” Additionally, the trial court articulated how

it would ensure a fair trial:

             [Defendant] has access to an [i]Pad, a pad of some sort,
             so that he could view the proceedings and the
             Interpreters as they speak. He has a set of headphones.
             Any time there’s been an issue we’ve stopped
             proceedings to make adjustments . . . .

             ....

             As I said earlier, defendant has a right to a fair trial.
             Not every trial is perfect, nor can it be. And I deem it
             -- I deem that, at least through my experience in this
             case through the use of the Interpreters, as we have
             them set up through the use of IT, who is in this
             building and accessible at a moment’s notice,
             defendant’s rights are not infringed upon and shall not
             be infringed upon. And he shall have a fair trial.

After denying defendant’s motion for in-person interpretation services, the

trial court denied defendant’s request for a stay to make an application to the

assignment judge.

      On January 25, 2023, defendant filed an application with the Appellate

Division requesting emergent relief. The Appellate Division granted the

application and defendant filed a motion for leave to appeal with that court. In

                                        7
an order dated January 30, 2023, the Appellate Division denied defendant’s

motion for leave to appeal. Basing its decision on Directive #10-22, which

grants trial courts the discretion to decide whether remote interpreting should

be utilized, the Appellate Division concluded that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion and left it to the trial court “to ensure the interpreters are

provided with appropriate technology and the necessary time needed to ensure

appropriate services are provided to defendant.”

      On January 30, 2023, defendant filed an emergent application with this

Court, requesting relief from the Appellate Division’s order. We granted

defendant’s application to file an emergent motion and his motion for a stay of

the trial. Thereafter, we granted defendant’s motion for leave to appeal. 253

N.J. 283 (2023). We also granted the applications of the Association of

Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (ACDL), the National Association

of Judiciary Interpreters and Translators and the American Translators

Association (jointly, ATA), and LatinoJustice Puerto Rican Legal Defense and

Education Fund (LatinoJustice) to appear as amici curiae.

                                          II.

                                          A.

      Defendant argues that VRI is inferior to in-person interpretation, and

that forcing him to use a remote interpreter violates his right to a fair trial and

                                          8
equal access to the courts. Defendant emphasizes that the inevitable technical

and logistical difficulties would directly prejudice him, since judges and jurors

may “unconsciously misattribute” these technological frustrations to

defendant. Defendant further claims that VRI would interfere with his

understanding of the proceedings and ability to maintain eye contact with the

jury and would prevent him from observing how the jury receives his

testimony, which will deter defendant from exercising his constitutional right

to testify.

       Amici curiae all support defendant. The ACDL argues that the trial

court’s ruling risks depriving defendant of his right to an effective interpreter,

which is associated with his other constitutional rights. The ACDL

emphasizes that every challenge of remote interpreting would be magnified in

the current case in which two interpreters would be involved.

       LatinoJustice argues that adequate and competent interpretation,

including the right to in-person interpretation, is inherent in the right to an

interpreter. According to LatinoJustice, Kaqchikel is a complex language.

LatinoJustice contends that denying defendant’s in-person interpreting services

request essentially denies equal access rights to the growing population of all

Mayan-language speakers.

                                         9
      The ATA submits that VRI does not meet interpreters’ professional

standards, creates ethical risks for interpreters, and introduces unacceptable

risks of errors into a criminal jury trial. The ATA contends that the nature of

criminal trials, as well as the uniqueness of this case -- requiring a

Spanish/English interpreter to work with a Spanish/Kaqchikel interpreter --

will lead to an exceptional level of cognitive overload and fatigue-related

performance decline for the interpreter and urges this Court to accept the

professional judgment of the Kaqchikel interpreter.

                                        B.

      The State argues that the trial court’s order should be affirmed because

the trial court correctly exercised the discretion afforded under Directive #10 -

22 to use remote interpreting. The State contends that using VRI will not

interfere with defendant’s ability to fully understand and appropriately

participate in the trial. According to the State, any “technical glitches” will be

addressed as needed by stopping proceedings to make necessary adjustments,

and IT personnel are “accessible at a moment’s notice” to correct any issues.

The State acknowledges the Kaqchikel interpreter’s expressed concerns about

remote interpreting but asserts that he never told the court he was unwilling or

unable to interpret remotely. The State further notes that defendant did not

object to using VRI in pre-trial proceedings.

                                        10
                                       III.

                                        A.

      A trial judge has broad discretion in controlling the courtroom and court

proceedings. State v. Pinkston, 233 N.J. 495, 511 (2018); State v. Jones, 232

N.J. 308, 311 (2018). “The decision as to whether an interpreter is required

. . . will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is manifest.”

State in Int. of R.R., 79 N.J. 97, 117 (1979); see also State v. Rodriguez, 294

N.J. Super. 129, 137-38 (Law Div. 1996) (noting that the decision to grant a

non-English-speaking municipal court defendant an interpreter is subject to the

“sound discretion” of the court).

      The question of whether defendant was entitled to in-person as opposed

to remote interpreting services pursuant to Directive #10-22, however, is a

matter of first impression, and because there were no standards to guide the

trial court’s discretion, we review this matter de novo. See, e.g., New

Jerseyans for Death Penalty Moratorium v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 185 N.J. 137,

152 (2005) (reviewing a matter of first impression about an award of

reasonable attorney’s fees under the Open Public Records Act de novo because

“the trial court was without standards to guide its discretion”).

                                        11
                                         B.

                                         1.

      The Sixth Amendment and its counterpart in the New Jersey

Constitution afford criminal defendants the right to a fair trial, the right of

confrontation, and the right to counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; N.J. Const. art.

I, ¶ 10.

      The Due Process Clause further protects a criminal defendant’s right to a

fair trial by guaranteeing the defendant’s right to be present and to fully

participate during trial. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 1.

“The Due Process Clause also requires the States to afford certain civil

litigants a ‘meaningful opportunity to be heard’ by removing obstacles to their

full participation in judicial proceedings.” Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509,

523 (2004) (“[A] State must afford to all individuals a meaningful opportunity

to be heard if it is to fulfill the promise of the Due Process Clause.” (quoting

Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971))). Although we do not rest

our decision on constitutional grounds, these principles provide important

context for the discussion that follows.

                                        12
                                        2.

      The spoken word is unquestionably the principal method of

communication during in-court proceedings, so a participant’s ability to

understand and communicate through language is key to ensuring the fairness

of the proceedings. A criminal defendant’s right to an interpreter is widely

recognized in both federal and New Jersey courts. See United States ex rel.

Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 387-89 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v.

Carrion, 488 F.2d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1973); United States v. Gallegos-Torres, 841

F.2d 240, 242 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Lim, 794 F.2d 469, 470 (9th

Cir. 1986); see also State v. Linares, 192 N.J. Super. 391, 393-94 (Law Div.

1983); State v. Kounelis, 258 N.J. Super. 420, 422, 425-27 (App. Div. 1992);

Rodriguez, 294 N.J. Super. at 137, 142; State v. Guzman, 313 N.J. Super. 363,

379 (App. Div. 1998).

      There are “three different but essential roles” interpreters play in

criminal proceedings:

            (1) They make the questioning of a non-English-
            speaking witness possible; (2) they facilitate the non-
            English-speaking defendant’s understanding of the
            colloquy between the attorneys, the witness, and the
            judge; and (3) they enable the non-English speaking
            defendant and his English-speaking attorney to
            communicate . . . .

                                       13
            [People v. Aguilar, 677 P.2d 1198, 1201 (Cal. 1984)
            (quoting Williamson B. C. Chang & Manuel U. Araujo,
            Interpreters for the Defense: Due Process for the Non-
            English-Speaking Defendant, 63 Cal. L. Rev. 801, 802
            (1975)).]

      Although the United States Supreme Court has never addressed whether

there is a constitutional right to an interpreter, a criminal defendant in federal

proceedings has a statutory right to such assistance. See 28 U.S.C. § 1827.

Under the Court Interpreters Act of 1978, a “party (including a defendant in a

criminal case), or a witness who may present testimony” “in judicial

proceedings instituted by the United States” is entitled to the appointment of

an interpreter if the district court determines that the party “speaks only or

primarily a language other than the English language . . . so as to inhibit such

party’s comprehension of the proceedings or communication with counsel or

the presiding judicial officer, or so as to inhibit such witness’ comprehension

of questions and the presentation of such testimony.” 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1).

      The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recognized a criminal defendant’s

constitutional right to an interpreter decades ago in Negron, in which a

Spanish-speaking defendant was convicted of murder after a jury trial. 434

F.2d at 387-88. During the trial, an interpreter employed on behalf of the

prosecutor translated the court’s instructions and summarized the testimony of

                                        14
English-speaking witnesses for the defendant, but did not provide

contemporaneous interpretation while the trial was in progress. Id. at 388.

      The Second Circuit noted “that an indigent defendant who could speak

and understand no English would have a right to have his trial proceedings

translated so as to permit him to participate effectively in his own defense.”

Id. at 389. The court determined that such a right derived from “fundamental

fairness required by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” and

“the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a right to be confronted with adverse

witnesses, . . . includ[ing] the right to cross-examine those witnesses as ‘an

essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this

country’s constitutional goal.’” Ibid. (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,

405 (1965)). The court further concluded that the right to be present

necessitates that every criminal defendant “possess ‘sufficient present ability

to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational

understanding.’” Ibid. (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402

(1962)).

      Other federal circuits have also acknowledged a defendant’s right to an

interpreter. See, e.g., Carrion, 488 F.2d at 14 (“The necessity for an

interpreter . . . has been elevated to a right when the defendant is indigent and

has obvious difficulty with the language.”); Gallegos-Torres, 841 F.2d at 242

                                        15
(“A defendant who has difficulty with the language has a right to an

interpreter.”); Lim, 794 F.2d at 470 (noting that “[a] criminal defendant who

relies principally upon a language other than English has a statutory right to a

court-appointed interpreter” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1827 and that “several

circuits have held that a defendant whose fluency in English is so impaired that

it interferes with his right to confrontation or his capacity, as a witness, to

understand or respond to questions has a constitutional right to an

interpreter”).

      New Jersey courts have also noted a criminal defendant’s right to an

interpreter and the constitutional underpinnings of that right. In Linares, the

trial court expressly noted that “the constitutional right” of “a defendant in a

criminal case . . . to the assistance of an interpreter so that he can understand

the nature of the ongoing proceedings . . . has already been established.” 192

N.J. Super. at 393. The court linked the right to an interpreter to a defendant’s

“right to counsel, the right to confront adverse witnesses, the right to cross -

examine those witnesses, and the right to be present at one’s own trial.” Id. at

394 (quoting In re Application of Murga, 631 P.2d 735, 736 (Okla. 1981)).

      In Kounelis, a Greek immigrant who did not speak English was

convicted of robbery and weapons offenses after the trial court denied defense

counsel’s pre-trial request to have an interpreter sit next to and interpret for

                                         16
defendant. 258 N.J. Super. at 422, 425-26. The Appellate Division held that

“[t]he failure to afford defendant a Greek interpreter violated his rights under

the confrontation and assistance of counsel provisions of our federal and state

Constitutions.” Id. at 426 (citing U.S. Const. amend. VI; N.J. Const. art. I,

¶ 10). The Appellate Division further declared it “self-evident . . . that a

defendant who is unable to speak and understand English has a right to have

his trial proceedings translated so as to permit him to participate effectively in

his own defense.” Id. at 427; see also Guzman, 313 N.J. Super. at 379

(establishing the general standard for adequate translation and its relationship

to the right to a fair trial); Rodriguez, 294 N.J. Super. at 137, 142 (holding

that, at the public expense, “a non-English-speaking municipal court defendant

has the right to a court interpreter whenever that defendant is confronted with

imprisonment or any other ‘consequence of magnitude’ upon conviction”).

      Other jurisdictions similarly recognize a criminal defendant’s right to an

interpreter. See, e.g., People v. Cunningham, 546 N.W.2d 715, 716 (Mich. Ct.

App. 1996); Martinez Chavez v. State, 534 N.E.2d 731, 737 (Ind. 1989); State

v. Thien Duc Le, 743 S.W.2d 199, 202 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987); Suarez v.

State, 481 So. 2d 1201, 1203 (Fla. 1985); State v. Neave, 344 N.W.2d 181, 184

(Wis. 1984), abrogated in other part by State v. Koch, 499 N.W.2d 152 (Wis.

1993).

                                        17
                                       C.

      For decades, the New Jersey Judiciary has been committed to ensuring

that all court users, including people with limited English proficiency, have

equal access to all court proceedings. 2022 LAP, at app. 1 (“Historical

Highlights”). The Language Services Section of the Administrative Office of

the Courts (AOC) has “developed a comprehensive program through statutory

authority, Court Rules, [and] Administrative Directives” to ensure language

access for all members of the public who utilize our courts. Ibid. In 2017, the

Judiciary implemented the LAP to “ensure all people, including persons with

limited English proficiency . . . , have equal access to court proceedings.”

2017 LAP (cover page mission statement); see also 2022 LAP (cover page

mission statement reiterating substantially the same language). The LAP is

grounded in the following three basic tenets:

            (1) anyone who is limited in their ability to speak and/or
            understand English or is deaf or hard of hearing is
            entitled to the same access to, and meaningful
            participation in, the court process and services as those
            who are not; (2) only qualified interpreters may
            interpret; and (3) all costs for interpreting are to be
            borne by the Judiciary, except in very limited instances.

            [Directive #01-17, at 1; accord Directive #10-22, at 1.]

      This Court has consistently recognized the significance of access to

interpreting services. See, e.g., Report of the Supreme Court Task Force on
                                       18
the Improvement of Municipal Courts (June 28, 1985) (“The courts must be

equally accessible to all persons regardless of their ability to communicate

effectively in English.”); Task Force on Drugs and the Courts Final Report

(Apr. 1991) (“Defendants’ rights to understand the proceedings against them

are critical in the criminal justice process. Improvements need to be made in

the services provided defendants who do not speak English. Interpreter and

translation services should be routinely available in the courts . . . .”).

      “Remote interpreting (RI) is the provision of interpreting services using

technology in a situation where the interpreter is at a location physically

separate from court users of the interpreting service.” 2022 LAP, at 31

(comments to Standard 1.8) (emphasis omitted). Prior to the COVID-19

pandemic, court proceedings and services generally occurred and were

available in-person within Judiciary facilities. Pursuant to the 2017 LAP, the

use of remote interpreting services was very limited -- only “for emergent

matters when an on-site interpreter is not available or for short non-emergent

matters of 30 minutes or less.” 2017 LAP, at 20 (Standard 1.8) (emphases

added).

      The unprecedented circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic resulted

in the widespread use of virtual court proceedings. In 2020, in light of

ongoing remote court operations, this Court approved an addendum to the

                                         19
2017 LAP which “applie[d] to interpreting services for remote court events

during the COVID-19 crisis.” Addendum to Directive #01-17 (June 19, 2020).

The 2020 Addendum expanded Standard 1.8 of the 2017 LAP regarding the

use of remote interpreting by permitting “remote interpreting services [to] be

used for emergent or non-emergent matters even if longer than 30 minutes

when an on-site interpreter is not available, including during an emergency

that prevents the courts from operating in person.” Id. at 2 (emphasis added).

The Addendum also listed several factors for a court to consider in

determining how to conduct a court event involving remote interpreting

services:

            In determining how to conduct a court event using
            spoken or sign language remote interpreting services,
            the court shall make an informed decision considering
            the following factors:

               [1.] nature, length, and complexity of the court
               matter;

               [2.] language in which remote interpreting services
               is needed;

               [3.] virtual courtroom platforms (Zoom, Scopia,
               Teams, etc.);

               [4.] physical location of and technology available to
               the limited English proficient (LEP) and deaf or hard
               of hearing court users;

                                      20
               [5.] technology used by the interpreter(s), which
               varies even amongst staff interpreters;

               [6.] moderator’s    management        of   the   virtual
               courtroom, and

               [7.] court user’s position, if any.

            ....

            Remote interpreting (video or telephone) may not be
            appropriate for proceedings that are long (more than
            two hours) or complex or that involve constitutional
            rights, testimony, cross-examination, or production of
            evidence. If at any time before or during a remote
            proceeding, the court user is not satisfied with the
            quality and manner of the interpreting services, the
            court may determine to reschedule the proceeding. In
            using remote interpreting services, quality of
            interpretation will not be compromised.

            [Ibid. (emphasis added).]

      In September 2022, this Court revised the LAP via Directive #10-22.

Directive #10-22 explicitly states that it “supersedes and replaces Directive

#01-17,” the 2017 LAP, and its 2020 Addendum. Directive #10-22, at 1. The

2022 revisions to the LAP modified various sections, including Standard 1.8,

entitled “Use of Remote Interpreting.” The purpose of the Standard 1.8

revision was “to formalize judicial discretion to authorize remote interpreting

services for emergent and routine proceedings . . . consistent with current and

                                        21
ongoing practices.” Id. at 2. The revised Standard 1.8 in the 2022 LAP now

provides that

            [r]emote interpreting services are to be used for
            emergent or non-emergent matters for on-site, virtual
            or hybrid events, when appropriate. Judges shall have
            discretion to determine whether remote interpreting is
            to be used, in coordination with the vicinage
            interpreting unit and staff interpreters, to ensure the
            best remote interpreting option is provided when
            appropriate and to ensure efficient on-site, virtual, and
            hybrid court events; greater accessibility to AOC
            approved spoken and sign language court interpreters;
            and effective use of court interpreters and cost savings.

            [2022 LAP, at 31 (emphases added).]

      In contrast to the 2017 LAP, the 2022 LAP expanded the use of remote

interpreting from “emergent matters” and “short non-emergent matters” to

“emergent or non-emergent matters.” Also, for the first time, the 2022 LAP

authorized judges to exercise their discretion to use remote interpreting “when

appropriate.”

      The 2022 LAP Standard 1.8 revision also contains “Guidelines for Video

Remote Interpreting.” 2022 LAP, at 32-33. Guideline 1 directs that courts

should “[r]outinely consider use of VRI options for on-site, virtual or hybrid

court events, with interpreters giving their expert opinions when needed.” Id.

at 33 (emphasis added). Guideline 1 further notes that “[a]ppropriate use of

                                       22
VRI ensures efficient court events; increased access to AOC approved

interpreters; and effective use of court interpreters.” Ibid.

      In addition to the interpreting guidelines encompassed within the LAP,

this Court adopted in 1994 the Code of Professional Conduct for Interpreters,

Transliterators, and Translators (Code). See R. 1:14 (Appendix to Part I of the

Court Rules). Standard 3.1.1 of the 2022 LAP states that “[a]ll persons

employed by or under contract to the Judiciary who interpret, transliterate, or

translate shall be bound by” the Code. 2022 LAP, at 46.

      The Code consists of ten canons. Pursuant to Canon 2, an interpreter is

to “faithfully and accurately reproduce in the target language the closest

natural equivalent of the source-language message without embellishment,

omission, or explanation.” Canon 10, entitled “Impediments to Compliance

with Code,” states in part that “[w]hen an interpreter . . . has any reservation

about his or her ability to satisfy an assignment competently, he or she should

immediately convey that reservation to the court.”

                                        IV.

                                        A.

      Applying those principles to the newly revised LAP, we set forth

guidelines and factors to assist trial courts in deciding whether VRI should be

used during criminal jury trials. Consistent with New Jersey’s jurisprudence

                                        23
to ensure all court users have equal access to court proceedings, we hold that

there should be a presumption of in-person interpreting services for criminal

jury trials. We do not read the 2022 LAP to advance a contrary approach.

      In considering whether to proceed to a jury trial with in-person or remote

interpreting, trial courts, in exercising their discretion pursuant to the 2022

LAP, should take into consideration the following nonexclusive list of factors:

(1) the nature, length, and complexity of the trial; (2) the number of parties and

witnesses involved; (3) whether an interpreter is available to interpret in

person at trial; (4) the impact any substantial delay in obtaining an in-person

interpreter would have on the defendant and on third-parties such as co-

defendants or victims; (5) whether the defendant tentatively plans to testify;

(6) the financial costs associated with in-person interpreting as compared to

remote interpreting; and (7) the interpreters’ position as to whether they

believe they can adequately fulfill their duties to interpret accurately and meet

professional standards while interpreting virtually.

      In the rare cases in which VRI is used for a criminal jury trial, guardrails

should be put in place to ensure a fair trial for defendants, includin g built-in

breaks for the interpreter to rest and for the defendant to consult with counsel.

To ensure consistency in the use of remote interpreting throughout the state, a

trial court’s decision to use remote instead of in-person interpreting services at

                                        24
a criminal jury trial should be approved by the Assignment Judge or Presiding

Judge. To the extent that costs are a consideration, the vicinage should consult

with the Administrative Office of the Courts for further guidance.

                                         B.

      Because we have, for the first time, articulated in this opinion guidance

that trial courts should consider in determining whether to allow VRI during a

criminal jury trial, we remand this matter to the trial court for reconsideration

of whether VRI is appropriate.

      In the present case, the Kaqchikel interpreter participated virtually in

several pre-trial proceedings, as the State has argued. Pre-trial and trial

proceedings, however, are significantly different. Pre-trial proceedings

include arraignments, discovery hearings, plea negotiations, and pre-trial

motion hearings and are governed by Rules 3:9 to :13. A criminal jury trial,

by contrast, involves presenting evidence in various forms, questioning

witnesses, and making legal arguments to the jury and judge, among other

things, pursuant to Rules 3:14 to :19.

      Even the most involved pre-trial hearing is far less logistically complex

than a criminal jury trial because fewer parties are involved, it is easier to take

breaks, and there are more opportunities for parties to consult counsel without

causing an adjournment or delay in the proceedings. When an interpreter is

                                         25
physically present in the courtroom during a trial, defense counsel is able to

quickly and discreetly consult with clients through that interpreter while the

proceedings are taking place. But when an interpreter participates virtually in

a trial, the only way for confidential communication to occur between

defendant and defense counsel would seemingly be to halt the proceedings and

have the interpreter go to a virtual breakout room, which can be disruptive to

the proceedings and hinder a criminal defendant’s ability to have spontaneous

and continuous communications with counsel.

      Here, the Kaqchikel interpreter, in line with the Code, explicitly

expressed his concerns about his ability to accurately provide interpretation

services remotely during a jury trial, which would have been his first time

doing so. The trial court noted on the record that in-person interpreting was

not “financially feasible” but made no findings regarding the anticipated cost

of in-person interpreting services compared to remote interpreting services.

As we have articulated above, both the interpreter’s position as to the

possibility of adequately providing interpreting services remotely and the

fiscal feasibility of in-person as compared to virtual interpreting services are

factors for trial courts to consider in determining whether VRI is appropriate. 3

3
  At oral argument, defense counsel proposed conducting jury selection
virtually, which would streamline and reduce the costs of an in-person
                                      26
      It should be noted that no single factor is determinative and all factors

should be considered in assessing the propriety of virtual interpretation during

a criminal jury trial.

                                       V.

      For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Appellate Division’s judgment

and remand for the trial court to reconsider the matter consistent with this

opinion. We urge the trial court to expedite the proceedings.

     CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES PATTERSON, SOLOMON,
and WAINER APTER; and JUDGE SABATINO (temporarily assigned) join in
JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS’s opinion. JUSTICE FASCIALE did not participate.

interpreter. The parties can, of course, confer and agree to this procedure by
stipulation.
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