Court Opinion

ID: 9719040
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:41:16.679229+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:26.772097
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Chief Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur fully with respect to Divisions 2 and 3 of the majority opinion. I also concur in the judgment of the Court that the motion to suppress was properly denied since the limited search of the electronic data stored on Hawkins’s cell phone was reasonable. In reaching this result, however, I apply a different analysis than the majority opinion. For this reason, I concur specially in Division 1.
The search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement “derives from interests in officer safety and evidence preservation that are typically implicated in arrest situations.” Arizona v. Gant, 556 U. S. 332 (129 SC 1710, 1716 (II), 173 LE2d 485) (2009). Because officer safety is not at issue in this case, I believe that this case must be analyzed in the context of whether the search of Hawkins’s cell phone was for purposes of evidence preservation.
Generally, the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest has been extended to closed containers located on an arrestee’s person. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 233-234 (III) (94 SC 467, 38 LE2d 427) (1973) (discussing broad authority granted *261to police officers when conducting a search incident to arrest to look for destructible evidence of the arrestee’s crime on his person in order to preserve it for use at trial); In the Interest of T. M., 303 Ga. App. 322 (693 SE2d 574) (2010) (incident to the defendant’s arrest for marijuana possession, the officer lawfully searched a cell phone located in the defendant’s pants pocket where a razor blade was found); Bagwell v. State, 214 Ga. App. 15, 16 (446 SE2d 739) (1994) (the officer was authorized to remove and open a closed metal container found in the defendant’s pocket incident to his arrest).
As stated in the majority opinion, the question of whether or not a cell phone is analogous to a closed container falling within the scope of the search incident to arrest exception is an issue of first impression before this Court. Although other jurisdictions have addressed this issue, those decisions present a split in the authorities.7 As stated in the majority opinion, I am persuaded that a cell phone should be treated as a closed container for purposes of our Fourth Amendment analysis.
Hawkins nevertheless argues that State v. Smith, 920 NE2d 949, 954-955 (4) (Ohio 2009), supports her argument that a cell phone is not analogous to a closed container because it is not capable of holding another physical object. See New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 460, n. 4 (101 SC 2680, 69 LE2d 768) (1981). As such, she argues that the police were required to obtain a search warrant to search its contents.8 The dissent finds Hawkins’s argument persuasive and concludes that a cell phone is more akin to a laptop computer, which *262is capable of storing large amounts of electronic data.
Certainly the members of this Court are well suited to decide issues of Fourth Amendment challenges regarding technological changes when the evidence of record is established. The dissent’s claims to the contrary notwithstanding, however, there is no evidence in our record indicating that Hawkins’s cell phone was similar to or possessed a capacity comparable to that of a computer. The evidence does, however, support a conclusion that a cell phone is akin to a closed container that stores files and electronic data.
Having concluded that Hawkins’s cell phone was analogous to a closed container, I believe that the warrantless search of the cell phone’s data was properly allowed for the purpose of evidence preservation. See Gant, supra; United States v. Ortiz, 84 F3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996). The majority opinion analyzes this case based upon its interpretation of Gant. The dissent relies upon a different interpretation of Gant in reaching its conclusion that the scope of the warrantless search should be more restrictive.
In Gant, the Supreme Court ruled that “circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Gant, supra, 129 SC at 1719 (III). Gant does not change the black letter law establishing that police officers are authorized to conduct a search of a defendant or any instrument which may have been used to commit the crime that is found within the defendant’s immediate presence or within the passenger compartment of a vehicle when the search is incident to arrest. See id. at 1718-1721 (III)-(IV). See also Lopez v. State, 267 Ga. App. 532, 538 (6) (601 SE2d 116) (2004).
Here, the evidence established that Hawkins had used the cell phone to exchange text messages with Investigator Denmark in furtherance of the drug activity. Indeed, Investigator Denmark had observed Hawkins using the cell phone to send text messages in coordination of the drug transaction while he was conducting surveillance of Hawkins immediately prior to the arrest. During the search incident to Hawkins’s arrest, Investigator Denmark found Hawkins’s cell phone in her purse and searched the text messages for evidence of the drug offense. Accordingly, these circumstances clearly establish that Hawkins was using her cell phone as an instrumentality of the crime. Further, it is unmistakable that the officer was not exercising unbridled discretion to rummage through the personal information contained in Hawkins’s cell phone, but rather was preserving evidence of the crime for which Hawkins was *263arrested.9 See United States v. Finley, All F3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007); Ortiz, supra, 84 F3d at 984; Lopez, supra, 267 Ga. App. at 538 (6) (cell phone was instrumentality of crime of cocaine trafficking). Thus, having lawfully arrested Hawkins, Investigator Denmark was authorized to search the contents of her cell phone for evidence of a crime, and a search warrant was not required. OCGA § 17-5-1 (a) (4); Belton, supra, 453 U. S. at 458 (general requirement for a search warrant prior to search of container does not apply when container is seized incident to arrest); Ortiz, supra, 84 F3d at 984; Lopez, supra, 267 Ga. App. at 538 (6).
While I strongly believe in the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures, I must conclude that the search of Hawkins’s cell phone was not precluded in this instance. And as the majority correctly observes, the arresting officer had personally observed Hawkins use her cell phone to send text messages in the commission of the crime for which she was arrested. Accordingly, the arresting officer reasonably conducted a search for such messages in order to preserve the evidence. Consequently, the search of the contents of the cell phone for evidence of the crime was proper, and the trial court did not err in denying Hawkins’s motion to suppress.

 Numerous jurisdictions have reached the conclusion that a cell phone or pager is analogous to a closed container for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis. See Silvan W. v. Briggs, 309 Fed. Appx. 216, 225 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Finley, 477 F3d 250, 259-260 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Ortiz, 84 F3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Cole, No. 1:09-CR-0412-ODE-RGy 2010 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 82822, at *60-68 (7) (N.D. Ga. 2010); United States v. Salgado, No. 1:09-CR-454-CAP-ECS-5, 2010 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 77266, at *9-12 (N.D. Ga. 2010); United States v. Garcia-Aleman, No. 1:10-CR-29, 2010 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 65333, at *29-37 (E.D. Tex. 2010); United States v. Monson-Perez, No. 4:09CR623DJS(MLM), 2010 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 20575, at *21-23 (E.D. Mo. 2010); Newhard v. Borders, 649 FSupp.2d 440, 448 (W.D. Va. 2009); Brady v. Gonzalez, No. 08 C 5916, 2009 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 57836, at *8-10 (N.D. Ill. 2009); United States v. McCray, No. CR408-231, 2008 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 116044, at *9-14 (S.D. Ga. 2008); United States v. Santillan, 571 FSupp.2d 1093, 1102 (D. Ariz. 2008); United States v. James, No. 1:06CR134 CDB 2008 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 34864, at *9-11 (E.D. Mo. 2008); United States v. De Jesus Fierros-Alvaraez, 547 FSupp.2d 1206, 1214 (D. Kan. 2008); United States v. Chan, 830 FSupp. 531, 535-536 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
Other jurisdictions, however, have distinguished cell phones from closed containers, pagers, and address books. See United States v. Wall, No. 08-60016-CR-ZLOCH, 2008 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 103058, at *9-13 (S.D. Fla. 2008); United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 40596, at *21-22 (N.D. Cal. 2007).

 In light of technological advances in electronic storage devices since Belton and evolving federal precedent on this issue, the fact that text messages are not a physical object is not a dispositive consequence.

 Although the issue was not argued or decided in the trial court below, the text messages exchanged between Hawkins and Investigator Denmark ultimately may have been admissible under the inevitable discovery rule, to the extent that the same messages were also located on the cell phone that Investigator Denmark used during the exchange. See Cunningham v. State, 284 Ga. App. 739, 741 (644 SE2d 878) (2007) (“Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, if the State shows by a preponderance of the evidence that illegally obtained evidence would have been discovered inevitably by lawful means, the evidence is admissible.”).