Court Opinion

ID: 9481996
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:37:19.169598+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:42.098271
License: Public Domain

BRUNETTI, Circuit Judge,
dissenting as to part II of the Opinion:
In United States v. Hashimoto, 878 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir.1989), this court stated that the presumption of prejudice that arises when the government fails to comply with section 6103(h)(5) “might be overcome if the examination of jurors during voir dire is such that the inference of risk of prejudice is negated.” Id. at 1134. The majority in Hashimoto held that merely questioning the jurors whether they had “any reason why you may be prejudiced for or against the Government or this Defendant because of the nature of the charges,” id. at 1136 (Wiggins, J., dissenting), “was not such as to negate that inference.” Id. at 1135. Hashimoto, however, clearly contemplates that voir dire could, if the proper questions were asked, overcome the presumption.
In this case, the district court asked the jurors (1) if they had “ever been audited by the Internal Revenue Service?”; (2) if they had “any disputes other than just a formal or informal audit, that someone talked to you about your return or wrote to you about your returns, any connection with the IRS?”; and (3) whether “either you or your husband or wife, whatever the situation, your mothers and fathers, your children, your brothers and sisters, ever have any connection other than just filing your income tax with the IRS? Anything at all?” The court also explained why the questions were being asked:
The reason we ask the question, we don’t ask it to embarrass you or anything else, we ask it to see if maybe you not only— you have an audit problem or problem with the IRS, but maybe your parents, or your husband and wife, or your children, or someone else, that might talk to you about it, and we try to find out if you have formed any preconceived ideas that might be considered by some people as biases or prejudices, either for the IRS or against the IRS, or for the defendant or *585against the defendant, because of that experience with the IRS.
Now, any of you feel that way that have either you or members of your family have had a problem, as people call them, or experience with the IRS that was unpleasant, unsatisfactory, that you have, because of that experience, formed some conclusions or biases or prejudices or preconceived ideas because of that experience that might affect your fairness and impartiality in this case, either for or against the government, or for or against the defendant, because of that experience?
The majority states that although these questions “did elicit additional information, [they] did not negate the significant risk of prejudice caused by the government’s incomplete disclosure.” If the questions asked of the Sinigaglio veniremen were insufficient, however, district courts will be hard pressed to develop questions that will meet with this court’s satisfaction. Though the majority states that it does not apply a per se rule of reversal, its practical effect is just that. District courts will undoubtedly feel compelled to dismiss charges or require unnecessary and costly, if not impossible, discovery rather than attempt to discern what possible questions this court would find acceptable. I do not believe Congress in passing this statute intended to effectively eliminate the court’s power to discover bias during voir dire when this statute applies. See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1026, 1038, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2892, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (voir dire has long been relied upon for identifying bias among veniremen), United States v. Johnson, 762 F.Supp. 275 (C.D.Cal.1991) (proper voir dire can negate any potential risk of prejudice Congress intended in section 6103(h)(5)).
The opinion also conflicts with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Masat, 896 F.2d 88 (5th Cir.1990). In Masat, the jurors were asked “whether or not they had been the subject of an audit or controversy with the IRS.” Id. at 95. The court found that the government’s failure to comply with the statute was harmless error because “the jurors were asked the relevant questions by the trial judge.” In our case, the court’s questioning was even more extensive than in Masat. I find no basis for distinguishing or rejecting the Fifth Circuit’s analysis. See also United States v. Lussier, 929 F.2d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 1991) (district courts are encouraged to take reasonable and feasible steps to enable defendants to obtain 6103(h)(5) information, but “we do not lay down a hard and fast rule”).
I respectfully dissent as to part II.