Court Opinion

ID: 9838858
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-08 15:00:53.632209+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:18.443173
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13000   Document: 13-1    Date Filed: 09/08/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 22-13000
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       TRISTAN MICHAEL HYDE,
                                                   Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       SHERIFF, WALTON COUNTY,
       JOHN MORING,
       Captain,
       J. BROWN,
       Captain,
       GABRIELLE CUTCHENS,
       Legal Access Staﬀ Mailroom,

                                                Defendants-Appellees.
USCA11 Case: 22-13000      Document: 13-1       Date Filed: 09/08/2023     Page: 2 of 6

       2                       Opinion of the Court                  22-13000

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 3:22-cv-04904-LC-HTC
                           ____________________

       Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Tristan Hyde, proceeding pro se, appeals an order
       dismissing his § 1983 claim without prejudice for failure to
       prosecute, failure to comply with a court order, and failure to
       disclose. Hyde failed to pay the initial partial filing fee in his case,
       despite the fact that he had access to the requisite funds and had
       been given repeated warnings that failure to pay could result in the
       dismissal of his case. Because the district court did not abuse its
       discretion when it dismissed Hyde’s case for failure to comply with
       a court order, we affirm.
                                          I.
               When Hyde filed a complaint alleging a variety of
       constitutional violations on the part of several local officials in
       Walton County, Florida, the district court granted his motion to
       proceed in forma pauperis. But the court denied his motion to waive
       the initial partial filing fee because Hyde regularly received deposits
       of over $300 in his inmate trust account. The court explained that
       the “fact that Plaintiff spends these funds on telephone calls,
       purchases, or other litigation, does not excuse him from paying a
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       22-13000                Opinion of the Court                          3

       partial filing fee in this case.” Accordingly, it ordered Hyde to pay
       an initial partial filing fee of $68.06, as calculated under 28 U.S.C. §
       1915(b)(1), within twenty-one days. The April 29, 2022 order
       explicitly warned that failure to pay the initial partial filing fee may
       result in dismissal of the action for failure to comply with a court
       order.
               Twenty-one days came and went without payment from
       Hyde. This failure prompted the court to issue an order requiring
       him to show cause why his case should not be dismissed for failure
       to prosecute or comply with an order of the court. Hyde
       responded with a motion requesting a thirty-day extension of time
       to pay the initial filing fee. He claimed to have spent the entirety
       of his funds on improving the infrastructure and operations of his
       business, and said that he would soon be receiving new revenues
       to satisfy the filing fee. The court granted Hyde an additional
       fourteen days to make the payment, and once again warned that
       failure to comply may result in dismissal.
               Hyde again failed to make the payment. Instead, he
       requested yet another extension, this time claiming that he could
       not pay because he had been detained after failing to appear for a
       court date and had retained counsel at a cost of $800 for his defense
       in that case. Perhaps sensing a pattern, the court denied the motion
       and ordered Hyde to pay the fee or else have his case dismissed
       without prejudice. The district court made it plain that Hyde had
       access to the necessary funds but was “choosing to spend his
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-13000

       money on things that he apparently deem[ed] to be more
       important than this litigation.”
              Even so, the court considered one last volley of similar
       motions from Hyde to extend time and to request new payment
       guidelines, both of which it rejected. After Hyde missed the final
       deadline of August 4, 2022, the district court adopted the
       magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation, dismissing the
       case without prejudice for failure to prosecute, failure to comply
       with a court order, and failure to disclose.
                                        II.
               We review the district court’s decision to dismiss Hyde’s
       case for failure to comply with a court order for abuse of discretion.
       Zocaras v. Castro, 465 F.3d 479, 483 (11th Cir. 2006). This means
       that “we must affirm unless we find that the district court has made
       a clear error of judgment, or has applied the wrong legal standard.”
       United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004).
       Although pro se litigants are generally subject to less stringent
       standards than represented parties, Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760
       F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014), they are nevertheless required to
       conform to procedural rules. Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1304
       (11th Cir. 2002).
                                        III.
              Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 permits dismissal of an
       action if a plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with a court
       order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Dismissal for failure to comply with a
       court order is appropriate “where there is a clear record of ‘willful’
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       22-13000               Opinion of the Court                         5

       contempt and an implicit or explicit finding that lesser sanctions
       would not suffice.” Gratton v. Great Am. Commc’ns, 178 F.3d 1373,
       1374 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535
       (11th Cir. 1985)). Although dismissal has been described as an
       “extraordinary” remedy, “dismissal upon disregard of an order,
       especially where the litigant has been forewarned, generally is not
       an abuse of discretion.” Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th
       Cir. 1989).
               The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
       Hyde’s case for failure to comply with a court order. Hyde was
       repeatedly warned that failure to pay the initial partial filing fee
       could result in dismissal of his case. Moreover, the district court
       unsuccessfully employed lesser sanctions—a show cause order and
       an extension of time to pay the initial filing fee. The district court
       entertained a series of duplicative motions from Hyde, effectively
       giving him nearly four months to make a payment that was initially
       due within twenty-one days. There was plenty of evidence for the
       district court to conclude that Hyde was willfully defying court
       orders and that lesser sanctions would not be sufficient to induce
       compliance.
               Hyde argues that dismissal was inappropriate because his
       failure to comply was the result of simple negligence. McKelvey v.
       AT & T Techs., Inc., 789 F.2d 1518, 1519 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding
       that dismissal was too harsh a sanction where simple negligence
       was the reason underlying inaction). But McKelvey is not enough.
       First, the court’s discussion there was limited to cases where
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-13000

       dismissal without prejudice would be the equivalent of dismissal
       with prejudice because of temporal proximity to the statute of
       limitations. Id. at 1520. Second, the district court’s ruling here was
       based on evidence of “willful delay,” not “simple negligence.” Id.
       The district court found that Hyde had made multiple $250
       payments in his state criminal case, an $800 payment for an
       attorney, and hired a firm to handle a contract dispute related to
       his business. In short, Hyde “had sufficient funds to pay the initial
       partial filing fee and, instead, chose to spend those funds on other
       matters.”
               Hyde also argues that the district court violated the Equal
       Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to
       provide him with a full record on appeal for free. This argument
       also fails. To state an equal protection claim, Hyde must show that
       he “was discriminated against by establishing that other similarly-
       situated individuals outside of his protected class were treated
       more favorably.” Amnesty Int’l, USA v. Battle, 559 F.3d 1170, 1180
       (11th Cir. 2009). Hyde neither claims to belong to a protected class,
       nor does he identify any comparators whom the district court
       treated more favorably than him.
                                  *      *      *
               In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
       dismissing Hyde’s complaint without prejudice for failure to
       comply with a court order. As the district court noted, Hyde “can
       refile the suit when he is ready to do so.” Accordingly, the district
       court order is AFFIRMED.