Court Opinion

ID: 9731706
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:55:19.087755+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:20.571598
License: Public Domain

TERRY, Associate Judge,
dissenting in part: I agree that the motion to suppress identification was properly denied; on that point this court is unanimous. I part company with my colleagues, however, on the Monroe-Farrell issue. In my view, the trial judge did not conduct a sufficient inquiry when the prosecutor, just before the trial began, reminded him of the pending letter from appellant complaining about defense counsel. I would therefore remand the record for further proceedings on the Monroe-Farrell claim, including such factual findings as may be appropriate.
*578My colleagues correctly state that when a defendant presents a pre-trial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “the trial court has a constitutional duty to conduct an inquiry sufficient to determine the truth and scope of the defendant’s allegations.” Monroe v. United States, 389 A.2d 811, 820 (D.C.1978) (citations omitted); accord, Farrell v. United States, 391 A.2d 755, 760-761 (D.C.1978). Although “the exact nature of the inquiry is within the trial court’s discretion,” Nelson v. United States, 601 A.2d 582, 592 (D.C.1991), “the trial court, must put to defense counsel (and to the defendant, if necessary) — on the record — specific questions designed to elicit whether or not the ... criteria of professional competence have been met.” Monroe, 389 A.2d at 821 (emphasis in original). The judge in this case did not do that; indeed, he admitted on the record that he “didn’t make the standard Monroe-Farrell inquiry.” I would hold that, on the present record, this admitted failure to comply with the requirements of Monroe and Farrell was error which now requires a remand.
I reach this conclusion for two reasons. First, the court did not properly question appellant. When the court asked appellant if he was satisfied with counsel, appellant did not answer the court’s question; instead, he responded by asking for a five-minute recess to speak with his counsel. After the recess, the court failed to ask appellant for an answer to its earlier question, as the case law required it to do. See Monroe, 389 A.2d at 821 (“the trial court must put ... to the defendant, if necessary ... specific questions”). Although there is no “formularized series of questions which trial judges must mechanically recite,” id., I believe that the trial court in this case had a duty to follow up with appellant in order to determine whether he was satisfied with his counsel’s performance. Compare Wingate v. United States, 669 A.2d 1275, 1284-1285 (D.C.1995) (trial court properly addressed appellant’s complaints because it' “followed up on each of appellant’s assertions” and gave him opportunities to state his complaints). Nor did the court give appellant a chance to state that he no longer wanted a new attorney. Had that been done, this might well be a different case. See McKenzie v. United States, 659 A.2d 838, 840 (D.C.1995) (“When a defendant ... later tells the court that he is now satisfied with his counsel or no longer desires new counsel, the court need not continue further into the matter” (citations omitted)).
Second, the court did not question defense counsel about the specific complaints set forth in appellant’s letter. See Nelson, 601 A.2d at 592 (trial court has a duty “to elicit from counsel any information necessary to rebut or confirm” a defendant’s complaint). The only question that the court posed to counsel was whether he had a copy of the letter.1 In response to that question, counsel said, “I had received a copy of the letter. I saw my client. I also wrote him a letter addressing some of his concerns. We had a long conversation. I believe at that time that my client was satisfied with my representation.” Counsel further stated that appellant’s complaints were related to the plea offers that he had relayed to appellant. But these remarks had nothing to do with the matters raised in appellant’s letter. That letter stated that counsel had faded to meet *579with him and provide him with information about his case for nearly four months while he was in jail. Counsel’s remarks were simply not responsive to appellant’s complaints, and the court did not follow through to make sure that appellant’s concerns were addressed. Also, contrary to counsel’s statement, appellant’s letter did not indicate that plea offers were an issue. On this record I would hold that the trial court did not meet its “obligation to question defense counsel directly, on the record, about the specifics of [appellant’s] complaint.” Nelson, 601 A.2d at 592; see Monroe, 389 A.2d at 821.
“[W]hen a defendant requests new counsel, based on pretrial ineffectiveness ... and the trial court conducts no inquiry”— or an inadequate inquiry, as in this case— “this court will remand for findings on the issue.” McFadden v. United States, 614 A.2d 11, 17 (D.C.1992) (citations omitted); accord, Matthews v. United States, 629 A.2d 1185, 1193 (D.C.1993) (“In the absence ... of a statement on the record by [counsel] about his pretrial preparation, neither reversal nor affirmance is warranted.... Rather, a remand is required .... ” (citations omitted)). I would therefore remand the record to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with Monroe and Farrell and the later cases interpreting those two decisions.2

. At the end of the pre-trial proceeding, the court did ask counsel if he had hired an investigator. Counsel responded that he had and that appellant had a copy of the file. The court's question, however, was not “tailored to carefully explore the specifics of appellant's [letter]”; indeed, the letter did not even mention an investigator. See Wingate, 669 A.2d at 1284.

. For this reason, I would not consider at this stage of the proceedings whether the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion under D.C.Code § 23-110 (2001), and thus I do not join in part IV of the court’s opinion. Controlling case law requires us to resolve the Monroe-Farrell issue first. See McFadden, 614 A.2d at 13.