Court Opinion

ID: 9548513
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:04:42.91669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:04.405963
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE WEBER,
dissenting:
I concur with the majority opinion and its abolition of the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity. I dissent from its conclusion with regard to the pre-release form.
I disagree with the majority conclusion that a negligent violation of law by PreFab, Davis or Miller constitutes a violation of Section 28-2-702, MCA, so that the waiver may not be relied on.
The majority opinion points out that this Court has never had occasion to interpret Section 28-2-702, MCA, and further points out that the statute was adopted verbatim from California in 1895. The majority then concludes that the interpretation of the statute by the California Supreme Court in Tunkl is persuasive. Unfortunately the rationale of the majority opinion actually is strikingly different from the rationale in Tunkl. The majority concludes that under Section 28-2-702, MCA, an entity cannot contractually exculpate itself from liability for negligent violations of legal duties whether they are rooted in statutes or case law. Tunkl approached the same code section with an entirely different rationale.
Tunkl emphasized that the code section had been interpreted in *223various ways by California cases, some strictly, some very liberally so that the authority for Tunkl under California cases was limited. Tunkl did emphasize that all of the California cases consistently held that the exculpatory provision of the code section would stand only if the public interest was involved. Tunkl then set forth a number of factors to be considered in determining whether or not the public interest was effected by the release agreement. Included are such factors as whether it is a business which is suitable for public regulation; whether a party is performing a service of great importance to the public which is practically necessary to the public; whether a party is willing to perform this for any member of the public; whether there is an essential nature of services being performed and a decisive advantage in bargaining strength; whether there is superior bargaining power and a standardized adhesion contract; and whether a party is placed under the control of the party to be exculpated. Clearly the present case does not set forth facts justifying the application of the public interest rule under Tunkl. In other words, if the rationale of Tunkl were applied in the present case, the holding would be contrary to the majority opinion here.
In Tunkl the California court distinguished private voluntary transactions from public interest cases and stated:
“While obviously no public policy opposes private, voluntary transactions in which one party, for a consideration, agrees to shoulder a risk which the law would otherwise have placed upon the other party, the above circumstances pose a different situation.”
Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 446, 32 Cal.Rptr. at 38. This Court applied the rationale of Tunkl in Haynes v. County of Missoula (1973), 163 Mont. 270, 517 P.2d 370. Even though this Court was interpreting Section 28-2-702, MCA, it followed the public interest rationale of Tunkl and quoted extensively from Tunkl. In addition, this Court in Haynes referred to the provision in Restatement, Contracts, Section 575 making an exemption from liability illegal if a party is charged with the duty of public service, and the bargain relates to negligence in the performance of any part of its duty to the public, for which it has received or been promised compensation. Without going into Haynes in any more detail, it is clear that this Court adopted the public interest rationale of Tunkl. I therefore conclude that neither Tunkl nor Haynes is authority for the position taken in the present majority opinion.
I dissent from the primary conclusion of the majority opinion that an entity cannot contractually exculpate itself from liability for ei*224ther willful or negligent violations of legal duties whether they are rooted in statutes or in case law, under the provision of Section 28-2-702, MCA. As I look at this statute which was enacted by our Montana Legislature in 1895, I note that it addresses contracts which are against the policy of the law of this state. Section 28-2-702, MCA, states that all of the following contracts are against the policy of Montana: contracts which exempt anyone from responsibility for fraud, willful injury to person or property, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent. It is clear that in order to discourage anyone exempting himself for his own fraud, such a provision is appropriate. In a similar manner, it is appropriate to eliminate an exemption for willful injury to person or property. This leaves the last portion which is the violation of law, whether willful or negligent. Again there is a clear policy apparent in a prohibition which applies to willful violation of law. That element is not present in this case. This leaves only the question of the negligent violation of law. I conclude that negligent torts were not contemplated by this section.
I invite the attention of our Montana Legislature to the majority opinion in order that it may determine if it approves of the interpretation of Section 28-2-702, MCA.
MR. JUSTICE GULBRANDSON joins in the foregoing dissent of MR. JUSTICE WEBER.