Court Opinion

ID: 9830689
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:23:51.273007+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:25.719961
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
The members of the court concur in the view that the motions for rehearing, filed herein by appellants and appellees, respectively, should be overruled, and it is so ordered.
The writer desires to collate the authorities and briefly state the grounds of his conclusion that this cause should be remanded for trial on the issue of limitation only.
Article 1048, R. S. 1879, discussed in Wells v. Littlefield, post, reads: “Where the judgment or decree of the court below shall be reversed the Supreme Court, or Court of Appeals, shall proceed to render such judgment or decree as the court below should have rendered, except when it is necessary that some matter of fact be ascertained, or the damages to be assessed or the matter to be decreed is uncertain, in either of which cases the cause shall be remanded for a new trial in the court below.” This statute was carried forward into the Revised Statutes of 1895 as article 1027, and into Revised Statutes of 1911 as article 1626, in the same language, except, only, that in the statutes of 1S95 and 1911 it is made applicable to Courts of Civil Appeals, instead of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals.
In Wells v. Littlefield, 59 Tex. 556, upon trial of right of property, the cause was remanded with directions' to the .court below to enter such judgment in favor of Wells as, under the law announced in the opinion, he was entitled to on the former trial, and to allow him such recovery as he had a right to in the state of the record below had the decision there been in his favor upon the trial of the right to the property in controversy. The trial court, upon a showing by Little-field of newly discovered evidence, was about to reopen and retry the whole case, and, in issuing a mandamus to compel observance of its instructions, the Supreme Court, in Wells v. Littlefield, 62 Tex. 28, says: “But it is urged that the writ cannot be used in this instance, because the Supreme Court cannot reverse and remand a cause except for a new trial upon all the issues in the case, both those which were and those which were not determined by the court in passing upon the appeal. This view seems to be based upon the language of our Revised Statutes, art. 1048, which provides that, ‘where it is necessary that some matter of fact be ascertained, or the damages to be assessed or the matter to be decreed is uncertain, in either of which cases the cause shall be remanded for a new trial in the court below.’ *69This article is the same as that contained in the act in force at the time the Revised Statutes were adopted, with the exception that the words ‘new trial in the court below’ are used in the Revised Statutes, instead of the words, ‘definite decision,’ which occur in the former act. There is but little material variance between these two expressions; and in the case of Chambers v. Hodges, 3 Tex. 517, they were treated by Chief Justice Hemphill as having a similar meaning. We do not consider that by the use of the words ‘new trial’ it was meant that, no matter what might be the decision of this court, or how far it had settled the rights of the parties, in every case where a cause was remanded it should be reopened upon all the issues which could possibly arise in it, both those which were determined and those which were not by the decision of the Supreme Court. Examples readily occur in which .this court may close investigation as to points passed upon in its opinion, but permit it as to others which it is necessary to ascertain, before a proper judgment dispos-, ing of the rights of the parties can be pronounced ; for instance, in a suit for land where judgment has gone for a defendant who had pleaded improvements made in good faith. If that judgment is reversed, the court might well render its judgment decreeing the land to the plaintiff, but remanding the cause for the purpose of ascertaining the value which should be allowed the defendant for his improvements. For other instances, see Wood v. Wheeler, 7 Tex. 25, and Anderson v. Powers, 59 Tex. 213. The language of the statute itself seems to imply that the very facts which are wanting so as to prevent this court from fully disposing of the case are those which the. new trial may be given to ascertain. At least that it would not be out of the power of the court to remand the cause for a definite finding of these facts alone. It has been the practice of this court from its earliest days down to the present time to reverse and remand causes to the district court, and to" enter judgments in accordance with their decisions. Chambers v. Hodges, 3 Tex. 517; Peters v. Caton, 6 Tex. 554; Wood v. Wheeler, 7 Tex. 13; Id., 9 Tex. 127; Anderson v. Powers, 59 Tex. 213; Cowan v. Nixon, 28 Tex. 240. This having been the uniform practical construction given to the act in force before the Revised Statutes were adopted, and the latter having adopted substantially the language of that act, it must have been the intention of the Legislature that the same interpretation should be applied to the new statutes. Hillebrand v. McMahan, 59 Tex. 450; State v. Smith, 55 Tex. 447. We think this court had authority to remand the cause to be disposed of as required in the opinion of the court”
Wall v. McConnell, 65 Tex. 397, was a suit against a county treasurer for recovery of money belonging to the county improperly retained by that officer as commissions. The, rights of the treasurer depended upon the. date certain drafts were collected. This order was entered: “The judgment of the. court below will be reversed and the cause remanded, in order that inquiry may be made as to the time at which the money collected on the drafts given to cover amounts , to which the county was entitled on insur- ; anee was received, and that judgment may be there entered in accordance with this,opinion.” The court below followed these instructions, refused to reopen the entire, case, and, upon subsequent appeal (67 Tex. 352, 5 S. W. 681) from the judgment so en- . tered upon the instructions, it was said: “This cause, having been tried without a jury, was before this court at the last term, and is reported in 65 Texas, 397. The rights. of the parties were then determined, except as to one item, in reference to which the evidence was not sufficiently full to enable this court to render the proper judgment. The: judgment was reversed, and the cause remanded, with instructions to the court-below to ascertain when Houston county received certain money on an insurance policy which: it held, and then to render a judgment in accordance with the opinion. It became necessary to ascertain when the insurance money was received, in order that the commissions to which the appellant was entitled, as county treasurer, might be known; he being entitled, to a certain date, to 2% per cent, on moneys received, and only to one-half of-that sum after that date. When the cause was called for trial, after being remanded, it was admitted that the insurance money was received at such time as to entitle the appellant to the higher commissions, but He insisted on opening the whole ease and hav--ing a trial by a jury, which was refused.This is assigned as error. The court below did not misunderstand the former judgment-of this court, and correctly refused to reopen the entire case. If the appellant was of the opinion, when the judgment of this court was entered at the last term, that on another' trial he could make proof that would show-his right to be other than by the record it then appeared, he should have asked this court so to reform its judgment as to give-him an opportunity to do so. This he did not do. To have given him a jury trial would' have been useless; for every fact affecting his right which could be inquired into was admitted to be as he claimed it to the utmost extent. There is no error in the judgment, and it will be affirmed.”
The rule of practice established by these two cases has been many times observed and enforced.
In Hanrick v. Gurley, 93 Tex. 458, 54 S. W. 347, 55 S. W. 119, 56 S. W. 330, the rights of the parties were finally determined and-adjudicated, except those arising upon the issues presented by the claim of E. G. Hanrick for contribution, and the cause was re*70versed and remanded for the sole purpose of a further accounting between the parties in accordance with the opinion. See, also, opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals upon subsequent appeal in 81 S. W. 795.
In Schuster v. Bauman Jewelry Co., 79 Tex. 179, 15 S. W. 259, 23 Am. St. Rep. 327, it was said: “A separate suit could have been brought for each of the three parcels of land for which this action was brought. The controversies as to the several titles grew out of the transactions wholly distinct from each other. Such was the case of Cooper v. Lee, 75 Tex. 114 [12 S. W. 483], in which this court found error in the proceedings as to one tract of land, but no error as to another tract which had been recovered in the same judgment in the court below. In 'the first instance the judgment as a whole was reversed, and the cause remanded, but, upon a motion for rehearing and to reform the judgment, the court affirmed the decree below as to the one tract, and reversed and remanded the cause as to the other. [It is to be noted that the action upon the motion does not appear in the report of the case.] In the present case we find reversible error as to the tract of land first conveyed to Mrs. Schuster, but no error as to the last. She recovered the city lot bought January 9, 1882. The judgment of the court below will accordingly be reversed as to the tract of 20 acres of land conveyed to Mrs. Schus-ter February 17, 1881, and the cause remanded for a new trial as to that. It will, in all other respects, be affirmed.”
In Shirley v. Ry. Co., 78 Tex. 131, 10 S. W. 543, the cause was remanded “with instructions to the court below to try the issue whether the sale of the Waco & Northwestern Railway made to the Houston & Texas Central Railway Company through and under the terms and provisions of the deed of trust executed by John T. Flint for and as president of the Waco & Northwestern Railway Company to Gray and Botts, the trustees therein mentioned for the Houston & Texas Central Railway Company, was fraudulent as to appellant’s rights as a creditor of said Waco & Northwestern Railway Company, and to try no other issue now made or presented by the pleadings in this cause. And, if, upon a trial of the issue above instructed to be tried, it shall be found that said sale so made under said deed of trust was not fraudulent, then and in that event judgment shall be entered against the trustees for the stockholders and creditors of said Waco & Northwestern Railway Company in their representative capacity only for the sum of $16,453.90, with interest on said sum from the date of the judgment from which this appeal was taken, together with a foreclosure of appellant’s lien upon the railway and appurtenances thereto belonging from Bremond, in Robertson county, to the city of Waco, in McLennan county, against said trustees and the said Houston & Texas Central Railway Company to enforce its payment. And that judgment be rendered against said trustees for the sum of $96,602 with interest thereon also from the date of the judgment from which this appeal was taken, to be paid out of any assets in their hands as such trustees. And, if, upon a. trial of the issue above directed to be tried, it should be found that the sale of said Waco & Northwestern Railway and its appurtenances under the terms of said deed of trust was made with intent to defraud the creditors of said Waco & Northwestern Railway Company, then and in that event the said Waco & Northwestern Railway Company shall be adjudged subject to sale for the satisfaction of the judgment to be rendered in favor of appellant against said trustees.”
In Benjamin v. Ry. Co. (Dallas) 49 Tex. Civ. App. 473, 108 S. W. 408, the plaintiffs sued the railway company for damages resulting from the maintenance by the railway company at its shops of certain oil on its premises, and allowing the same to escape so as to pollute the water of a creek upon which the plaintiff’s land was situated, which pollution caused damage to plaintiff’s crops, the destruction of fish, and injury of his cattle. The trial resulted in a verdict for the railway company, and the plaintiff appealed. Upon appeal the court determined that the case had been correctly tried as to the issue affecting damage to crops, fish, etc., but that error had been committed with reference to, the issue of damage to plaintiff’s cattle, and reversed and remanded the case on. account of such error. On rehearing the court limited the remand of the case to-the issues relating to the damages to the cattle, assigning reason for limitation upon issues to be retried as follows: “The court in its general charge presented each of these items separately and distinctly, so that the jury, in considering them,' could not have possibly gotten them confused with the other items of damage presented, or with each other, and their verdict was, in effect, that plaintiff did not suffer damage as to either of them, which finding is supported by the evidence. The error in the court’s charge on which a reversal was based related alone to damages to cattle, and which in no way was calculated to affect the finding as to the crops of oats and grass and fish. Such being the condition 'of the record showing that plaintiff has had a fair and impartial trial as to these items, he should not be allowed to have another chance to recover as to them. Therefore the judgment heretofore rendered will be changed, affirming as to said items, and reversing as to the remainder of said items.”
So, in the case at bar, the error of the court in withdrawing the issue of limitation in no wise relates to and in no possible way can it affect the boundary question. Whatever the facts may be with respect to limitation, they cannot affect the location of *71the Rio Viejo, which alone controls the determination of the boundary issue.
In Marshall v. City of San Antonio (San Antonio) 63 S. W. 138, the plaintiff sued the city for breach,by it of a contract for the construction of a certain sewer system. Under the contract, he was to perform certain specific services and to be paid according to certain classifications. When the work was about a third completed, a dispute arose between him and the city as to the construction of a contract, and the city relet' the contract to another company. Plaintiff sued for the work done by him, and for profits he alleged he would have made but for such alleged breach by the city. The city answered, seeking affirmative relief by reason of the alleged cost of having the contract completed after plaintiff’s default. It admitted that it held certain funds due the plaintiff, but that it had a right to credit the same upon its claim and to recover a balance over against the plaintiff. The case was .tried before a jury, which found in favor of the city. On appeal, the Court .of Civil Appeals, by Judge Neill, held that the error was committed in reference to the issue of the city’s right to a recovery against plaintiff, and reversed and remanded the ease. On motion for rehearing, however, they limited the remand to the issues in which error had been found, saying: “The issue of the amount of damages, if any, sustained by the city, which involves its right to withhold said sum of money, is the only one which, in our opinion (save the claim of the intervener as assignee of said fund), was not properly disposed of in the trial court. Therefore, under authority of Shirley v. Ry. Co., 78 Tex. 150, 10 S. W. 543, our former reversal of the entire judgment is set aside, and to this extent only the motion for rehearing is granted, and the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the cause remanded, with instructions to the court below to try the issue above stated, and to try no other issue now made or presented by the pleadings in this case; and if, upon the trial of the issue instructed to he tried, it shall be determined that the city is entitled to withhold said sum of money by reason of the damages it claims to have sustained, to enter final judgment in favor of the city; but, if, upon the trial of said issue, it shall be determined that the city is not entitled to withhold said sum of money, or any part of it, then to enter final judgment in favor of plaintiffs in error (plaintiffs below) against the city for said sum, or such part of it as may be determined it is not entitled to withhold from plaintiffs in error. With this .modification of our former judgment, the motion for rehearing is overruled.”
Nona Mills Company v. Jackson (Galveston) 159 S. W. 932, was a suit in trespass to try title for certain lands, and for damages for timber taken from the land. The plaintiffs, as tenants in common, recovered the land, and also recovered damages for the timber taken from the land. An opinion by Judge Pleasants held that the plaintiffs, who were tenants in common, were entitled to recover the land, etc., as against defendants who had no title, but that they could only recover that portion of the damages for timber cut and taken from the land to which their interest in the land entitled them, and the evidence failed to show what their particular interest in the land was, and therefore failed to show what portion of the damages they were entitled to recover. The court, therefore, by reason of such error, reversed the case as to the recovery of damages for the removal of the timber, and remanded the cause, with instructions to the trial court to hear evidence upon- the question of what interest the plaintiff had in the sum found to be the amount of the damages, and to give them judgment accordingly. The court cited rule 62a for its action in so remanding the case. It may be suggested that this practice violates the provisions of article 1997, Revised Statutes 1911, which reads: “Only one final judgment shall be rendered in any cause, except where it is otherwise specially provided by law.” This statute, however, relates to judgments of the district and county courts. Judgments of the Courts of Civil Appeals are governed by article 1626, R. S. 1911. Wells v. Littlefield and Wall v. McConnell, supra.
The reasons for the -rule that in some instances permits the Supreme Court and Courts of Civil Appeals to reverse a case in part and affirm in part, or to remand on certain issues, are not altogether applicable to trial courts. Schintz v. Morris, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 580, 603, 35 S. W. 516, 36 S. W. 292. And it would seem that article 1626, as construed by the Supreme Court in the two cases mentioned, furnishes the exception permitted by article 1997. At any rate, the rule and practice is well established of affirming as to certain parties and reversing as to others, when a proper decision of the case as to one is not dependent upon the judgment as to the other. Hamilton v. Prescott, 73 Tex. 565, 11 S. W. 548; Ry. Co. v. Emos, 92 Tex. 577, 50 S. W. 928; Wimple v. Patterson, 117 S. W. 1034; Tel. Co. v. Hoffman, 80 Tex. 420, 15 S. W. 1048, 26 Am. St. Rep. 759; State v. Dayton Lumber Co., 164 S. W. 48. So it would seem that article 1997 has never been considered by the Supreme Court as standing in the way of limited reversals or remanding with instructions, and to the writer it seems that these authorities indubitably establish the right of this court to foreclose further investigation and retrial of an issue, which has been once correctly tried and decided, and which is entirely severable from, and in no wise dependent upon, other issues in the cause improperly tried or erroneously decided. But the Courts of Civil Appeals seem to have enforced it in but few instances, and on *72November 22, 1911, tbe Supreme Court promulgated for tbe observance of said courts a rule with reference to reversals as follows: “If it appear to tbe court that tbe error affects a part only of tbe matter in controversy, and 'tbe issues are severable, tbe judgment sbal'1 only be reversed and a new trial ordered as to that part affected by sucb error.” Rule 62a (149 S. W. x).
We must certainly assume that tbe Supreme Court acted advisedly in promulgating this rule, and bad a definite purpose in mind which it desired to accomplish. Its language alone, to the mind of tbe writer, bears obvious and unmistakable proof that it was intended to cover and enjoin upon tbe Courts of Civil Appeals tbe observance of tbe rule of practice' recognized and declared in tbe various cases to which reference is made above. And I am further firmly convinced that tbe rule is most salutary, and should be enforced in all instances where applicable. Its manifest tendency is to a quicker and surer administration of justice without tbe sacrifice of any substantial right. Now in tbe case at bar there are two issues: Eirst, of boundary; second, of limitation. Tbe boundary issue is wholly severable, and in no wise dependent upon limitation, and to assume otherwise is an evasion of tbe question controlling tbe proper remanding order to be entered. Tbe boundary question depends upon tbe location of tbe Rio Viejo. Whatever tbe facts may be with respect to payment of taxes, adverse possession and claim by defendants would not change its location. Tbe issue as to its location has been tried without error, and decided in plaintiff’s favor. Why try it again? Why should not further inquiry as to its location be foreclosed, since it has been investigated and determined in a trial free from error? Tbe issue having been once fairly and impartially decided against appellants, they should not be permitted to again try the same. It is neither just, right, nor proper. Benjamin v. Ry. Co., supra.
Under tbe general order of reversal entered herein, tbe issue as to tbe Rio Viejo’s location will be retried, as well as limitation. Suppose tbe cause be submitted upon special issues, that a finding against defendants be returned upon tbe issue of limitation, but in their favor upon tbe question of boundary, that this trial was without error; upon appeal to this court tbe judgment would be affirmed. This court would thus finally affirm a judgment in defendant’s favor upon tbe issue of boundary, which issue upon this appeal, it is said, was correctly decided in plaintiff’s favor.
I am of tbe opinion that tbe finding of tbe jury as to tbe location of tbe Rio Viejo should not be disturbed, and that, upon retrial, tbe inquiry should be confined to tbe issue of limitation.