Court Opinion

ID: 9838362
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 06:10:19.392457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:57.320659
License: Public Domain

Affirm and Opinion Filed August 29, 2023

                                               In The
                                  Court of Appeals
                           Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                      No. 05-21-00965-CV

                 GALOVELHO LLC, Appellant
                            V.
GREG ABBOTT, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR OF THE
STATE OF TEXAS; COLLIN COUNTY, TEXAS; AND CITY OF FRISCO,
                      TEXAS, Appellees

                    On Appeal from the 219th Judicial District Court
                                 Collin County, Texas
                        Trial Court Cause No. 219-02595-2020

                            MEMORANDUM OPINION
                 Before Justices Pedersen, III, Goldstein, and Rosenberg1
                             Opinion by Justice Pedersen, III
         Galovelho, LLC appeals the trial court’s September 21, 2021 Order and Final

Judgment, which dismissed all of Galovelho’s claims with prejudice after granting

appellees’ original and supplemental pleas to the jurisdiction. In seven issues,

Galovelho challenges the trial court’s jurisdictional rulings on its claims for takings

and for equitable relief and the trial court’s earlier order requiring leave of court

   1
       The Hon. Barbara Rosenberg, Justice, Assigned.
before Galovelho further amended its pleadings. We affirm the trial court’s Order

and Final Judgment.

                                     BACKGROUND

      In the Spring of 2020, when the Covid-19 virus spread throughout the State

of Texas, appellant Galovelho was operating EG Steak, a dine-in full-service

restaurant in Frisco, Texas. On March 13, 2020, due to the imminent threat posed by

Covid-19, appellee Governor Greg Abbott declared a state of disaster pursuant to

the Texas Disaster Act. Days later, on March 19, Abbott issued executive order GA-

08, which in relevant part stated:

      In accordance with the Guidelines from the President and the CDC,
      people shall avoid eating or drinking at bars, restaurants, and food
      courts, . . . provided, however, that the use of drive-thru, pickup, or
      delivery options is allowed and highly encouraged throughout the
      limited duration of this executive order.

GA-08. During the course of the disaster declaration, Abbott issued a series of

additional executive orders that permitted indoor dining in varying percentages of a

restaurant’s capacity. None of these orders required restaurants to close; none

prohibited owners from using their property.

      In similar fashion, on March 16, 2020, Collin County Judge Chris Hill issued

a proclamation after the Commissioner’s Court declared a state of disaster in Collin

County. The county issued its own executive order, inter alia, incorporating

Abbott’s GA-08 and stating that “persons shall avoid eating or drinking at bars,

restaurants, and food courts . . . However, the use of drive-thru, pickup, or delivery

                                         –2–
options for bars, restaurants, and food courts is allowed and highly encouraged

throughout the limited duration of [Abbott’s] Executive Order.” Second Executive

Order.

      And in March 2020, the City of Frisco likewise issued its Declaration of Local

Disaster for Public Health Emergency. Frisco passed an ordinance stating, “In

accordance with the Guidelines from the President, the Governor and the CDC,

people shall avoid eating or drinking at bars [and] restaurants.” Ordinance No. 2020-

03-12. That provision was clarified to add: “Restaurants and beverage bars with or

without drive in or drive-through services . . . may only provide take out, delivery or

drive-through services as allowed by law.” Ordinance No. 2020-03-13.

      We will collectively describe these state, county, and municipal limitations on

restaurants, which began in March 2020 and extended to varying degrees for

approximately one year, as the Emergency Orders.

      On May 22, 2020, Galovelho filed suit against Abbott, Collin County, and

Frisco. He alleged that the Emergency Orders had effected a taking of its property,

and he sought $2 million in damages. In June 2020, all three defendants filed pleas

to the jurisdiction alleging that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the

takings claims. Galovelho filed an omnibus response, clarifying that its claims for

regulatory takings should be analyzed as categorical takings under Lucas v. S.C.

Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992), or alternatively, as traditional takings

pursuant to Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).

                                         –3–
Following a hearing, the trial court granted all three pleas to the jurisdiction.

Galovelho perfected an interlocutory appeal of those orders.

      However, the day after filing its omnibus response, Galovelho also filed its

Second Amended Petition, which added allegations that the Emergency Orders were

“invalid because they are unconstitutional and illegal under Texas Law.” The

pleading alleged equitable claims based on the Emergency Orders, including claims

for both injunctive and declaratory relief. Galovelho pleaded that he was denied due

process rights to notice and a hearing before the Emergency Orders took effect and

that restaurants were being denied equal protection of the law without a rational basis

for the deprivation. He prayed that appellees be permanently enjoined from

enforcing the provisions of the Emergency Orders and that the court enter judgment

declaring the various Emergency Orders unconstitutional and invalid.

      On August 14, 2020, the trial court issued an order purporting to support

resolution of jurisdictional issues in an efficient manner. The order required

Galovelho to seek leave of court before further amending its pleadings. Shortly after,

Galovelho’s interlocutory appeal was voluntarily dismissed and remanded to the trial

court. Galovelho, LLC v. Abbott, No. 05-20-00784-CV, 2020 WL 6156014 (Tex.

App.—Dallas Oct. 21, 2020, no pet.).

      On March 2, 2021, Abbott issued an order stating that “there are no Covid-

19-related operating limits for any business or other establishment [in Texas].” GA-

                                         –4–
34.2 Shortly after, appellees filed their joint Supplemental Plea to the Jurisdiction,

arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Galovelho’s equitable claims

because the claims had become moot following GA-34. Appellees also argued that

Galovelho lacked standing for a number of its claims and that some claims were

barred by sovereign immunity. Galovelho responded, and after hearing, the trial

court granted the supplemental plea and dismissed all of Galovelho’s claims with

prejudice.

        This appeal followed.3

                      THE TRIAL COURT’S JURISDICTIONAL RULINGS

        Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. Tex. Dep’t

of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). A court’s lack of

subject matter jurisdiction is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction. Id. at 225–

26. In this case, the trial court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to

decide Galovelho’s claims on a number of grounds. The court concluded broadly

that Galovelho’s claims were barred by sovereign or governmental immunity and

that it lacked standing to bring suit against appellees. The court concluded

specifically that Galovelho did not have a viable takings claim under the Texas

    2
       Collin County’s final order limiting occupancy expired on April 30th of 2020. Frisco continued
adopting ordinances that, in turn, adopted the Governor’s executive orders and expired by their own terms.
Thus, when GA-34 issued, no county or municipal orders continued to limit restaurant operations.
    3
       In response to Galovelho’s request, we briefly abated the appeal so the trial court could make findings
of fact and conclusions of law.
                                                    –5–
constitution. And finally, the court concluded that Galovelho’s due process and

equal protection claims for equitable relief were moot. We review the trial court’s

rulings on these pleas to the jurisdiction de novo. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226

(“Whether a pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate a trial court’s

subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo.”).4

                                      Galovelho’s Takings Claims

         In its Original and First Amended Petitions, Galovelho pleaded that the

Emergency Orders effected an unlawful taking of its property under the Texas

constitution. The fundamental rule of article I, section 17 prevents the government’s

taking, damaging, or destroying a person’s property for public use without either the

consent of the person or adequate compensation’s being made. TEX. CONST. art. I,

§ 17(a).5 This clause is self-executing and waives any claim of immunity by

governmental actors, whether sovereign or governmental, when a takings claim is

properly pled. See City of Dallas v. Stewart, 361 S.W.3d 562, 568 (Tex. 2012)

    4
      We recognize that some pleas to the jurisdiction raise issues of jurisdictional fact that must be decided
by a fact-finder. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. Galovelho’s briefing identifies no such fact issue that is
necessary to resolution of the pleas in this case on the grounds discussed below.
    5
        The provision makes exceptions, not at issue in this case, if the taking is for:
         (1) the ownership, use, and enjoyment of the property, notwithstanding an incidental use, by:
              (A) the State, a political subdivision of the State, or the public at large; or
              (B) an entity granted the power of eminent domain under law; or
         (2) the elimination of urban blight on a particular parcel of property.
Id. at § 17(a). Although Galovelho’s early pleadings included reference to section 19 in its takings pleading,
its arguments in this Court are limited to section 17 in support of the takings claims, while it relies on
section 19 in support of its equitable claims, discussed below.
                                                       –6–
(clause is self-executing); see also Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State, 381

S.W.3d 468, 476 (Tex. 2012) (“In the absence of a properly pled takings claim, the

state retains immunity.”). We review the trial court’s grant of a plea to the

jurisdiction to determine “whether the plaintiff’s pleadings, construed in favor of the

plaintiff, allege sufficient facts affirmatively demonstrating the court’s jurisdiction

to hear the case.” Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc., 381 S.W.3d at 476.

        Galovelho pled two types of regulatory takings claims against the appellees:

a categorical taking pursuant to Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 and a traditional taking

pursuant to Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.

                                    The Lucas Takings Claim

        Galovelho’s first claim alleged a categorical or per se taking, which occurs

“when the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically

beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property

economically idle.” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 (emphasis in original). The Supreme

Court identified this categorical taking claim in Lucas, but limited it to “the

extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial use of

land is permitted.” Id. at 1017 (emphasis in original). The Lucas Court’s use of

emphasis underscores that a categorical taking occurs only when the government’s

action destroys all economic value of the property at issue.6 That principle was

    6
     In a more recent discussion of the Lucas rule, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he emphasis on the
word “no” in the text of the [Lucas] opinion was, in effect, reiterated in a footnote explaining that the

                                                  –7–
subsequently confirmed, when the Court wrote that “[a]nything less than a ‘complete

elimination of value,’ or a ‘total loss’” would prevent such a taking claim. Tahoe-

Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 330.

        Galovelho pleaded: “The economic impact of the regulations was total and

failed to allow any economic or beneficial use of the property as a full-service

restaurant.” But the Lucas requirement of a “complete elimination of value” or a

“total loss” is not tied to an owner’s preferred economic use of the property.

Galovelho does not dispute that restaurants were always permitted to operate under

the Emergency Orders, albeit in a limited capacity. Customers could always take

food out or have it delivered. And for significant amounts of the affected time period,

restaurants were permitted to operate as “full-service dine-in restaurants”—to use

Galovelho’s description—with limited levels of occupancy on site. Moreover, all of

the regulations on the restaurant industry were temporary, which means an owner’s

economic loss could not be complete. See id. at 332 (“Logically, a fee simple estate

cannot be rendered valueless by a temporary prohibition on economic use, because

the property will recover value as soon as the prohibition is lifted.”). We conclude

that Galovelho’s complaints cannot meet the requirements of a categorical taking

because the Emergency Orders never completely destroyed all economic value of its

property.

categorical rule would not apply if the diminution in value were 95% instead of 100%.” Tahoe-Sierra Pres.
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 330 (2002) (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019,
n. 8).
                                                  –8–
                          The Penn Central Takings Claim

      Galovelho also pleaded a taking pursuant to the Supreme Court’s analysis in

Penn Central. There, the Supreme Court stated that whether a particular property

restriction is a taking depends largely “upon the particular circumstances [in that]

case.” Id. at 124. But the Court identified three guiding factors for our consideration

in this context: (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the

extent to which the regulation has interfered with the economic expectations of the

property owner; and (3) the character of the governmental action. Id. at 124.

      One of our sister courts has recently applied these Penn Central factors to a

group of bars complaining of emergency orders during the Covid-19 pandemic and

alleging a taking; we find that court’s analysis persuasive. See Stand for Something

Grp. Live, LLC v. Abbott, No. 13-21-00017-CV, 2022 WL 11485464 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi–Edinburg Oct. 20, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

      First, we agree that the economic impact of the Emergency Orders weighs

against finding a taking. See id. at *7. This factor “merely compares the value that

has been taken from the property with the value that remains in the property.”

Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 936 (Tex. 1998). We do not

ordinarily consider the loss of anticipated gains or potential profits in this

consideration. See id. Galovelho’s brief is replete with charges that the Emergency

Orders “damaged” its property, but it nowhere addresses a comparison of the value

of the restaurant before and after the pendency of the Emergency Orders. Galovelho

                                         –9–
did not plead facts indicating that the economic impact of the Emergency Orders so

interfered with its property rights that the appellees had appropriated the property

from him. See City of Baytown v. Schrock, 645 S.W.3d 174, 181 (Tex. 2022). We

cannot conclude that the value of Galovelho’s property was greatly diminished by

the temporary restrictions placed by those orders. See Stand for Something Grp. Live,

2022 WL 11485464 at *7.

      Although Galovelho’s property was never deprived completely of its

economic value, we conclude that the second Penn Central factor weighs in

Galovelho’s favor, i.e., in favor of finding a taking. See id. Galovelho’s primary

investment-backed expectation for the property was to operate a full-service dine-in

restaurant at its full capacity. According to Galovelho’s pleading, that expectation

complied with its lease, its certificate of occupancy, and its history of operation. We

do not question that the Emergency Orders interfered temporarily with Galovelho’s

expectations for its business. See id.

      However, we agree with our sister court that the third Penn Central factor

weighs heavily against finding a taking in this case. See id. at *8. The character of

the governmental action in this case is nothing like a physical invasion. See Penn

Central, 438 U.S. at 124. The Emergency Orders must be viewed in the context of

the existing national public health emergency, during which “restrictions were

issued to combat ‘the imminent threat of disaster’ posed by COVID–19, a contagious

and deadly virus.” See Stand for Something Grp. Live, 2022 WL 11485464 at *8.

                                         –10–
      Galovelho argues that the government’s motive for the regulation at issue is

irrelevant, relying on Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005). In

that opinion, the Supreme Court re-considered its suggestion in earlier cases that

whether a government regulation “substantially advanced” a valid public purpose

could serve as a stand-alone test for a takings claim. Id. at 540 (explaining that

“substantially advances” language has been read to announce stand-alone regulatory

takings test “wholly independent of Penn Central or any other test”). The Court

rejected this stand-alone test, saying:

      [T]he “substantially advances” inquiry probes the regulation’s
      underlying validity. But such an inquiry is logically prior to and distinct
      from the question whether a regulation effects a taking, for the Takings
      Clause presupposes that the government has acted in pursuit of a valid
      public purpose.

Id. at 543. Rather than the purpose of the regulation, then, we are to focus upon a

challenged regulation’s effect on private property. Id. Importantly, though, the

Lingle Court did not equate the government’s motive with the character of the

regulation. Instead, it reaffirmed use of that third Penn Central factor to determine

“whether [the regulation] amounts to a physical invasion or instead merely affects

property interests through ‘some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens

of economic life to promote the common good.’” Id. at 539.

                                          –11–
      When we look at the particular circumstances in this case, as Penn Central

directs us to do, we agree that the Emergency Orders “are hallmark examples of

regulations that ‘adjust[ ] the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the

common good.’” Stand for Something Grp. Live, 2022 WL 11485464 at *8 (quoting

Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124) (also citing United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining

Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168–69 (1958) (concluding that government orders temporarily

shutting down gold mines during war time were not a regulatory taking in light of

the “temporary restriction[ ],” wartime demands on resources, and the fact that the

shutdown was “essential to the war effort”); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668,

(1887) (“[P]rohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are

declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the

community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking.”)). We conclude that the

Penn Central factors do not support a conclusion that Galovelho pled a valid

regulatory taking in this case.

                 Galovelho’s Argument That the Law Has Changed

      Despite its initial reliance on Lucas and Penn Central, Galovelho now argues

that its takings claim is not dependent upon meeting those standards. It contends that

takings law has changed and it need only plead and prove some “damage” to its

property to obtain compensation from the government. Indeed, Galovelho argues

that the legal inquiry for the existence of a taking now amounts to a single question:

Was the property damaged by the actions of appellees? This argument is based on

                                        –12–
two legal theories: (1) the Texas constitution provides more protection for a

landowner than the U.S. Constitution, and (2) the United States Supreme Court has

recently ruled that protection for constitutional rights is much broader than our

earlier jurisprudence accorded. We address these theories briefly in turn.

(1) The Texas Constitution

      There is no dispute that the Texas constitution’s takings provision is different

from the United States Constitution’s provision. The Fifth Amendment provides:

“nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation,” while

the Texas counterpart provides: “[n]o person’s property shall be taken, damaged, or

destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation.” U.S. CONST.

amend. V; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17(a).

      Our supreme court recognized that distinction more than forty years ago. See

Steele v. City of Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1980). The Steele court stated that

the three bases for compensation in the Texas constitution, although “often treated,

more or less, as synonyms,” are actually “different and have different historical

origins.” Id. at 789. The court went on to state:

      It is not every damaging, however, that should be compensated. The
      Constitution limits compensation to damages “for or applied to public
      use,” and judicial restraints have narrowed that phrase to damages
      which arise out of or as an incident to some kind of public work.

Id. at 790. In Steele, the plaintiffs alleged a claim under article I, section 17 when

officers of the Houston Police Department caused the destruction of their home and

belongings while attempting to recapture three escaped convicts who had taken
                                     –13–
refuge in the house. Id. at 788. The court concluded that the plaintiffs could state

such a claim if they could prove that the City, acting through its authorized officers,

intentionally set the house on fire (or prevented the fire’s extinguishment after it was

set) and “that the destruction was done ‘for or applied to public use.’” Id. at 791–92.

The court went on to instruct that the City could defend against this claim “by proof

of a great public necessity. Mere convenience will not suffice. Uncompensated

destruction of property has been occasionally justified by reason of war, riot,

pestilence or other great public calamity.” Id. at 792.

      Galovelho does not attempt to fit its claim within the Steele understanding of

a compensable claim for damage of property short of an actual taking. Instead,

relying largely on two recent concurring opinions by supreme court justices, he

simply equates the damages he alleges from temporary restrictions to an actual

taking. We do not read either of the concurring opinions to make that same equation.

See Schrock, 645 S.W.3d 182–88 (J. Young concurring); Jim Olive Photography v.

Univ. of Houston Sys., 624 S.W.3d 764, 777–82 (Tex. 2021) (J. Busby concurring).

And each of the majority opinions in those cases addresses the taking alleged under

established federal jurisprudence. See Schrock, 645 S.W.3d at 181 (applying Penn

Central factors); Jim Olive Photography, 624 S.W.3d at 771-74 (applying Lucas

progeny to takings claim).

                                         –14–
      Neither of these cases—in majority or concurring opinions—supports

Galovelho’s argument that any damage to property is compensable under the Texas

constitution. Indeed, the majority in Jim Olive Photography states specifically:

      A compensable taking does not arise whenever state action adversely
      affects private property interests. Governments interfere with private
      property rights every day. Some of those intrusions are compensable;
      most are not.

624 S.W.3d at 771. That opinion continues to affirm that “Texas case law on takings

under the Texas Constitution is consistent with federal jurisprudence.” Id. Like the

Texas Supreme Court, we acknowledge that the language in the Texas and federal

takings provisions is different. But we await that court’s directive that the provisions

are to be analyzed differently when a takings claim is made for property temporarily

“damaged.”

(2)   New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022)

      Finally, Galovelho argues that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bruen has

markedly changed the test we must use to evaluate any government regulation of a

constitutional right. In that case, the Court addressed New York’s regulation of its

citizens’ Second Amendment rights and stated that “when the Second Amendment’s

plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects

that conduct.” Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2126. Therefore, according to the Court:

      To justify its regulation, the government may not simply posit that the
      regulation promotes an important interest. Rather, the government must
      demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s
      historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only if a firearm regulation is
      consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition may a court conclude
                                         –15–
        that the individual's conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s
        “unqualified command.”

Id. (citing Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 50, n. 10 (1961)).

        Galovelho argues that this Bruen test now applies to any government

regulation of a constitutional right. Because the Texas constitution purportedly

protects against the type of conduct he challenges, Galovelho contends that appellees

“must demonstrate there is a valid, constitutional, and historical basis for their

actions.” We reject Galovelho’s argument that the Bruen test is applicable in any

context other than the Second Amendment. But regardless, appellees have in fact

established that they had a valid constitutional and historical basis for the Emergency

Orders. See, e.g., Steele, 603 S.W.2d at 792 (“Uncompensated destruction of

property has been occasionally justified by reason of war, riot, pestilence or other

great public calamity.”).

                                                   ***

        The trial court correctly concluded that Galovelho failed to plead a

compensable claim for a taking. Accordingly, those claims for monetary relief

remain barred by appellees’ sovereign and governmental immunity. 7 We overrule

Galovelho’s second issue.

    7
        In its seventh issue, Galovelho argues dramatically that we must “[l]et sovereign immunity die; kill
it if you have to.” The United States Supreme Court has stated, “Although the sovereign immunity of the
States derives at least in part from the common-law tradition, the structure and history of the Constitution
make clear that the immunity exists today by constitutional design.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 733
(1999). We cannot disregard such settled law; we overrule the seventh issue without further discussion.
                                                  –16–
                           Galovelho’s Equitable Claims

      In its Second Amended Petition, Galovelho brought claims for injunctive and

declaratory relief based on constitutional challenges to the Emergency Orders. The

trial court concluded that these claims were moot and dismissed them. Texas courts

lack jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions, i.e., opinions that decide an abstract

question of law without binding the parties. Abbott v. Mexican Am. Legislative

Caucus, Tex. House of Representatives, 647 S.W.3d 681, 689 (Tex. 2022) (citing

Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993); TEX.

CONST. art. II § 1). “A case becomes moot if, since the time of filing, there has ceased

to exist a justiciable controversy between the parties—that is, if the issues presented

are no longer ‘live,’ or if the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the

outcome.” Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 162 (Tex. 2012). If a

court’s action on the merits of a case cannot affect the parties’ rights or interests,

then the case is moot, and courts are without jurisdiction to decide it. Id. We review

an application of the mootness doctrine de novo. Matthews, on behalf of M.M. v.

Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., 484 S.W.3d 416, 418 (Tex. 2016).

                                   Injunctive Relief

      Galovelho sought injunctive relief in the trial court based on its claims that

appellees’ actions violated its rights to equal protection and due process under the

Texas constitution. See TEX. CONST. art I, §§ 3, 19. In its third appellate issue,

                                         –17–
Galovelho argues that these equitable claims are ripe and are not barred by any

jurisdictional issues.

      Galovelho’s equal protection claim alleged that the Emergency Orders

“determin[ed] which people, businesses, services, and groups are permitted to

operate their business, and who must shut down their business on the whim of

Government,” and identified no “discernable, legitimate, criteria that has any

rational relationship to the governmental interest of stopping the spread of Covid-

19.” Its due process claim asserted that “[n]o local government or state government

has ever provided notice of deprivation, notice of hearing, a hearing, or any

meaningful review of the actions of the state and local government.” Galovelho

sought injunctive relief from the purportedly unconstitutional effects of the

Emergency Orders.

      Appellees argue that these equitable claims have been mooted by subsequent

government orders. GA-34 provided that “there are no Covid-19-related operating

limits for any business or other establishment.” Similarly, all Collin County

limitations on restaurants were rescinded, and all Frisco ordinances have expired.

There are no longer any limitations on indoor dining in Texas. Thus, the regulations

that were allegedly harming Galovelho no longer exist.

      Galovelho does not dispute the fact that the restrictions on restaurant

operations that he complained of no longer exist. However, he relies on exceptions

to the mootness doctrine for matters that are capable of repetition but evading review

                                        –18–
and for matters voluntarily abandoned by the defendant. We disagree that either

exception should apply in this case.

      The mootness exception for an issue “capable of repetition, yet evading

review” applies only in rare circumstances. Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184

(Tex. 2001). A plaintiff invoking this exception must establish that: (1) the

challenged action was too short in duration to be litigated fully before the action

ceased or expired; and (2) a reasonable expectation exists that the same complaining

party will be subjected to the same action again. Id. We acknowledge that no one

can predict with certainty that a world-wide pandemic will never again occur and

cause restrictions on the public like those that were in place temporarily in Texas.

But we have held that a mere theoretical possibility that a party may be subjected to

the same action again is insufficient to satisfy the test. City of Dallas v. Woodfield,

305 S.W.3d 412, 419 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.). Despite the fact that Covid-

19 has not disappeared completely, none of the appellees has ordered similar

restrictions for more than two years. Like our sister court, “[W]e see that as a

powerful signal that whatever course the Covid–19 pandemic takes, a return to

restrictions like those challenged here is highly unlikely.” Stand for Something

Group Live, LLC, 2022 WL 11485464, at *4 (citing Eden, LLC v. Justice, 36 F.4th

166, 171 (4th Cir. 2022)).

      Galovelho also relies on mootness cases that express a concern when charged

conduct is voluntarily ceased by the defendant without an admission that the action

                                        –19–
was wrongful. The concern is that “defendants could control the jurisdiction of

courts with protestations of repentance and reform, while remaining free to return to

their old ways.” Matthews, on behalf of M.M., 484 S.W.3d at 418. In a voluntary

cessation case, dismissal is appropriate only when subsequent events make clear that

the challenged conduct could not reasonably be expected to recur. Id. Again, no court

can predict the future. But we can conclude that, based on the passage of more than

two years without imposition of any further restrictions on restaurants, it is not

reasonable to expect appellees to issue restrictions comparable to those issued at the

height of the pandemic. Here, the complained-of conduct was voluntarily ceased as

the dangers of Covid-19 were mitigated through vaccination and immunity gained

after infection. Subsequent events do not support a concern that appellees will

“return to their old ways.” See id.

      We conclude that no live controversy exists based on Galovelho’s claims for

injunctive relief. It sought through these claims to be free of the limitations placed

by the Emergency Orders; it has been freed by the rescission and expiration of those

orders. We conclude the trial court correctly determined that Galovelho’s injunctive

claims were moot and should be dismissed. We overrule its third issue.

                                 Declaratory Relief

      Galovelho’s Second Amended Petition also sought a judgment declaring that

“the challenged Executive Orders and local orders violate the Texas Disaster Relief

Act and are unconstitutional.” In its fourth appellate issue, Galovelho argues that

                                        –20–
this claim is also ripe and that the trial court had jurisdiction over it. Again, we

disagree.

      Galovelho argues that “the only way a claim to the constitutionality of a statue,

or actions thereunder, could be rendered moot is by some other declaration

determining the statute or actions thereunder unconstitutional.” It cites cases dealing

largely with a plaintiff’s complaint about the defendant’s interpretation of a statute

or application of a policy. See, e.g., Lakey v. Taylor ex rel. Shearer, 278 S.W.3d 6,

9 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.) (dispute over Texas Department of State Health

Services’ policy and practice regarding providing competency-restoration treatment

to persons found incompetent to stand trial); Tex. Health Care Info. Council v. Seton

Health Plan, Inc., 94 S.W.3d 841, 844 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied)

(dispute over amount of civil penalty permitted for HMO’s failure to file annual

Health Plan Employer Data Information Set report). These cases address the

situation where a defendant abandons its position on the statutory interpretation or

application of a policy and then contends the plaintiff’s claim is moot; the reviewing

courts conclude that the parties’ same dispute could arise again if the government

reasserts its interpretation or policy. See Lakey, 278 S.W.3d at 12; Tex. Health Care

Info. Council, 94 S.W.3d at 847--48.

      Galovelho’s declaratory claim differs substantively from those cases on which

he relies. Its claim does not challenge a government department’s policy that can be

changed or reasserted based on changes in the department’s funding. See Lakey, 278

                                        –21–
S.W.3d at 9. Nor does it challenge a government administrative decision concerning

penalties available by statute for violation of a reporting obligation. See Tex. Health

Care Info. Council, 94 S.W.3d at 844. Those decisions were made by bureau-level

groups, and they affected a single entity (the non-reporting HMO) or a discrete group

with whose care the bureau was charged (persons found incompetent to stand trial).

The Emergency Orders were issued by the highest executive authorities of the State

of Texas, Collin County, and the City of Frisco. They were a response to the dangers

faced by our entire population in the midst of a worldwide pandemic. We concluded

above that the passage of time and the mitigation of those dangers indicated that we

can reasonably assume similar orders will not be issued again.

      Galovelho no longer faces the purportedly unconstitutional conduct about

which it complains; any prospective declaratory relief we might grant cannot help it.

See Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 184. Deciding Galovelho’s declaratory judgment claim

would yield no more than an advisory opinion. The claim is moot. We overrule

Galovelho’s fourth issue.

                            Relief Beyond That Requested

      In its fifth issue, Galovelho argues that the trial court granted relief to Collin

County and Frisco beyond what those parties requested and briefed. Specifically,

Galovelho contends that neither Collin County nor Frisco raised arguments below

concerning standing or immunity to Galovelho’s equitable claims. Galovelho

acknowledges that all appellees raised issues of immunity in their pleas challenging

                                        –22–
its takings claims. In addition, Galovelho concedes that all appellees asserted

mootness in regard to the equitable claims. We have affirmed the trial court’s takings

ruling based on Galovelho’s failure to plead a claim that effectively waives

appellees’ immunity. And we have affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that

Galovelho’s equitable claims are moot. Thus, both the trial court’s conclusions and

our own are based on jurisdictional arguments unquestionably raised and briefed by

all parties. We overrule Galovelho’s fifth issue.8

                      The Trial Court’s Pleading-Amendment Order

        In its sixth issue, Galovelho complains of the trial court’s “preemptive and

prophylactic ban” on its ability to amend its pleading. It argues that the trial court’s

August 14, 2020 order violates the open courts provision of the Texas constitution

and that it prevented Galovelho’s ability to update its responses to changes in the

Emergency Orders.

        The court’s order recited that Galovelho had filed three petitions between May

22, 2020 and August 12, 2000. It recited further that appellees had all asserted

immunity to Galovelho’s claims, filed Pleas to the Jurisdiction, and advised the court

    8
        Because Galovelho raises a standing question in this issue, we note here that the Texas Supreme
Court has recently confirmed that “[j]ust one valid jurisdictional obstacle is enough for the court to halt
further proceedings.” Rattray v. City of Brownsville, 662 S.W.3d 860, 868 (Tex. 2023) (“The fundamental
rule is that the court may not reach the merits if it finds a single valid basis to defeat jurisdiction. When one
such ground exists, it is not necessary that every other potential jurisdictional defect be raised, fleshed out,
or resolved at the outset.”). Because we have determined that the trial court lacked jurisdiction on other
bases, we need not address Galovelho’s first issue involving its standing to bring the claims it did.
                                                     –23–
that they would file supplemental briefing to address the new claims alleged in

Galovelho’s Second Amended Petition. The order continued:

      The Court is mindful that issues of jurisdiction and immunity should be
      determined as soon as practicable. Thus, in order to foster judicial
      economy, afford [appellees] their right to swift determination of
      jurisdictional immunity issues, and minimize costs and delays to all of
      the parties, the Court ORDERS that [Galovelho] shall not file any
      further amended pleadings without written leave of this Court. The
      Court will consider the Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition to be the
      live pleading for jurisdictional immunity challenges and will address
      same at a subsequent hearing based on further briefing and argument.
Contrary to Galovelho’s characterization, this order does not ban its ability to amend

its pleadings. Instead, it requires only that it seek leave of court before it amends

them. And while Galovelho contends that its complaints about this limitation “fell

on deaf ears and the trial court refused to rescind its unconstitutional order,” the

record contains no attempt by Galovelho to seek leave to amend, let alone any refusal

to grant that leave.

      The trial court was well within its discretion to order matters in the litigation

so that jurisdictional issues could be settled as soon as practicable. The Texas

Supreme Court has declared its “adher[ence] to the fundamental precept that a court

must not proceed on the merits of a case until legitimate challenges to its jurisdiction

have been decided.” Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228.

      The trial court’s order made the jurisdictional resolution a priority, while

allowing Galovelho to request leave to amend its pleadings if it wished to do so. By

                                         –24–
failing to seek leave to amend, Galovelho has failed to preserve error for our review.

We overrule Galovelho’s sixth issue.

                                   CONCLUSION

      We affirm the trial court’s September 21, 2021 Order and Final Judgment.

                                           /Bill Pedersen, III//
210965f.p05                                BILL PEDERSEN, III
                                           JUSTICE

                                        –25–
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

GALOVELHO LLC, Appellant                      On Appeal from the 219th Judicial
                                              District Court, Collin County, Texas
No. 05-21-00965-CV          V.                Trial Court Cause No. 219-02595-
                                              2020.
GREG ABBOTT, IN HIS OFFICIAL                  Opinion delivered by Justice
CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR OF                       Pedersen, III. Justices Goldstein and
THE STATE OF TEXAS; COLLIN                    Rosenberg participating.
COUNTY, TEXAS, AND CITY OF
FRISCO, TEXAS, Appellees

      In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the September 21, 2021
Order and Final Judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

      It is ORDERED that appellees Greg Abbott, in his official capacity as
Governor of the State of Texas; Collin County, Texas, and the City of Frisco,
Texas recover their costs of this appeal from appellant Galovelho LLC.

Judgment entered this 29th day of August, 2023.

                                       –26–