Court Opinion

ID: 9490410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:42:55.235609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:05.197033
License: Public Domain

KAREN LeCRAFT HENDERSON,
Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I disagree with the majority’s view of what a sentencing judge may consider when evaluating “criminal history” under section 5K2.13. I agree that “criminal history” is not simply the defendant’s numerical score as calculated in accordance with Chapter 4, Part A of the Guidelines. I fail to see, however, how the defendant’s circumstances upon release have anything to do with his. “criminal history.” Similarly, psychiatric or other medical treatment the defendant is receiving or will receive and the treatment’s chance of success ordinarily have no connection to criminal history.1 Although United States v. Cantu, 12 F.3d 1506, 1516 (9th Cir.1993), identifies these factors as relevant to whether a defendant’s criminal history indicates a need for incarceration, they are inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit’s own reasoning. Cantu describes section 5K2.13 as being motivated by the fact that, “[w]hen defendants with reduced mental capacity do not exhibit violent conduct, ... incapacitation is not such an important goal.” Id. But Cantu’s criminal record contained “four convictions for differing degrees of assault.” Id. at 1515-16. Far from “presum[ing] that a defendant with reduced mental capacity is more dangerous than other offenders,” id. at 1516, the sentencing court (and the circuit court, for that matter) had unequivocal proof that Cantu had exhibited violent conduct and thus that incapacitation was an important goal in his case. Regardless of treatment he might receive or his circumstances upon release, Cantu’s record demonstrated a need for incarceration to protect the public — a conclusion the Ninth Circuit itself would have reached had it heeded its own words.
“Criminal history” comprises the defendant’s record of offenses — no more, no less. When a term defined in one section is used identically in another, we cannot simply ignore the overlap. Section 5K2.13 uses “criminal history” — the same term used in Chapter 4, Part A to determine the defendant’s location on the horizontal axis of the Guidelines’ sentencing table. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1. If the Commission did not intend Chapter 4, Part A’s definition of “criminal history” to apply to the sentencing court’s determination whether the defendant’s incarceration is, based on his “criminal history,” necessary to protect the public, it could easily have chosen a different term. See, e.g., id. § 5D1.3 (court is to evaluate defendant’s “history and characteristics” in considering supervised release); cf. United States v. Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446, 1451 (D.C.Cir.1993) (“crime of violence” in section 4B1.2 is “distinctively crafted ‘term of art’” and does not guide interpretation of “non-violent offense” in section 5K2.13).
Accordingly, a sentencing judge evaluating whether the defendant’s “criminal history” indicates a need for incarceration to protect the public should look to how the defendant’s past crimes are classified under Chapter 4, Part A — the Guidelines provisions covering “criminal history.” Section 4A1.2(p) adopts section 4B1.2(l)’s definition of “crime of violence” for the purpose of determining the defendant’s criminal history under section 4A1.1. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(p). Section 4B1.2(1) in turn defines “crime of violence” as a felony having “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another” or burglary, arson or extortion involving explosives or “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Id. § 4B1.2(1). The Guidelines emphasize that the “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” means only “the conduct set forth (ie., expressly charged) in the count of which the defendant was convicted.” Id. § 4B1.2 application n.2 (emphasis added). Application note 2 repeats: “[T]he conduct of which the defendant *1573was convicted is the focus of the inquiry.”2 Id. (emphasis added). Ignoring the directive, the majority today sanctions the examination of facts underlying the defendant’s criminal record without regard to — indeed without knowing — whether the facts were part of the charged conduct.3 This is in addition to its examination of facts unrelated even to “criminal history.” The record, namely the presentence investigation report, does not reflect what conduct was “expressly charged” in Atkins’s past crimes. Nevertheless Atkins’s criminal history does include at least one offense — assault on a law enforcement officer — that, based on its elements alone, is indisputably violent.4 Presentence Investigation Report at 7. In my view, a departure under section 5K2.13 is unauthorized.
In addition, I believe that Guidelines section 5H1.1 bars the district court from considering Atkins’s age upon release under any theory. That section provides that age “is not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range” but may become relevant “when the defendant is elderly and infirm.” U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1. There is nothing so extraordinary about his being in his 50’s when released that makes Atkins’s age relevant to a departure decision. As the majority observes, neither Atkins’s repeat offense — possession of a firearm by a felon— nor the use of a firearm requires “youthful vigor.” Maj. op. at 1570. Moreover, Atkins cannot reasonably claim that he either is or at the time of his release will be elderly and infirm.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent — I would remand with instructions to sentence Atkins within the applicable Guidelines range.5

. Medical treatment might have some bearing on how the defendant's criminal history reflects on his dangerousness in an exceptional case. For example, treatment might be relevant in the case of a defendant whose past crimes occurred before treatment began and whose offense of conviction occurred during a temporary and singular lapse in that treatment.

. “Expressly charged” conduct is plainly a narrower category of conduct than "relevant conduct,” i.e., "all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant ... that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(l); see generally United States v. Valdez-Torres, 108 F.3d 385, 387-88 (D.C.Cir.1997).

. We have held that, in determining whether a past crime is a "crime of violence,” the sentencing court may consider “the facts of the case.” United States v. Baskin, 886 F.2d 383, 390 (D.C.Cir.1989); see also United States v. Bradshaw, 935 F.2d 295, 303 (D.C.Cir.1991). Baskin, however, was decided before the Commission amended the commentary by expressly limiting the sentencing court’s review of the facts to "the conduct set forth {i.e., expressly charged) in the count of which the defendant was convicted” and by emphasizing that "the conduct of which the defendant was convicted is the focus of inquiry.” U.S.S.G.App. C, amend. 433 (amending U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 application n.2). Curiously, although Chatman observes that section 4B1.2 and its commentary had been amended twice in the prior two years, Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1450, the opinion overlooks the effect of the amendments which seriously erode Baskins authority. Id. at 1453 n. 7. The majority in Chatman expressly disavows reliance on Baskin, id., but Judge Ginsburg's concurrence explains that "the result in [Chatman] would not obtain if [Baskin] were not the law of this circuit.” Id. at 1454 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Accordingly, I question Baskin’s continuing vitality. Cf. id. at 1455 (questioning Buskin on different ground).

. Atkins’s arrest in England also resulted in his conviction of, inter alia, common assault and using a firearm with the intent to resist arrest. Presentence Investigation Report at 8.

. Atkins did not receive a two-level decrease in the base offense level for acceptance of responsibility even though he pleaded guilty in accordance with the plea bargain and "indicated through his attorney [that] he accepted responsibility for the offense of conviction.” Presentence Investigation Report at 3. Although the probation officer did not recommend a downward adjustment on the ground that Atkins “declined to discuss the issue with the probation office,” id., it remains within the district court's discretion to grant the adjustment. See U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(a); id. § 3E1.1 application n.5 ("The sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant's acceptance of responsibility.”).