Court Opinion

ID: 9778323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:00:39.297705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:06.928146
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-4626

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        JASMINE BARNES,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
        Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (5:21-cr-00193-FL-1)

        Submitted: August 24, 2023                                        Decided: August 28, 2023

        Before QUATTLEBAUM and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and MOTZ, Senior Circuit
        Judge.

        Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Bradley M. Kirkland, BRADLEY M. KIRKLAND, LLC, Columbia, South
        Carolina, for Appellant. David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, Lucy Partain
        Brown, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
        ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Jasmine Barnes pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to distribution of

        a quantity of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); distribution of a

        quantity of cocaine base (crack) and a quantity of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

        § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of

        18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). The district court sentenced him to a total term of 144

        months’ imprisonment. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.

        California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal

        but questioning whether Barnes was properly classified as a career offender. Barnes was

        informed of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but he has not done so. The

        Government moves to dismiss Barnes’ appeal pursuant to the appellate waiver in his plea

        agreement. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the convictions, vacate Barnes’ sentence

        and remand for resentencing, and deny as moot the Government’s motion to dismiss.

               Upon review of the record, we conclude that Barnes’ guilty plea was knowing,

        voluntary, and supported by a sufficient factual basis and that he knowingly and voluntarily

        waived his right to appeal. However, in accordance with our review under Anders, we

        have found a meritorious issue that falls outside the scope of Barnes’ appeal waiver and

        requires us to vacate and remand for resentencing. * Specifically, some of the non-

               *
                 Because we vacate Barnes’ sentence, we do not consider any other issues related
        to the sentence, including his claim that he was improperly classified as a career offender.
        See United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341, 346-47 (4th Cir. 2021) (declining to consider
        additional challenges to original sentence).

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        mandatory conditions of supervised release included in the written criminal judgment were

        not orally pronounced at sentencing.

               We review de novo whether the sentence imposed in the written judgment is

        consistent with the district court’s oral pronouncement of the sentence. United States v.

        Rogers, 961 F.3d 291, 296 (4th Cir. 2020). While a district court need not orally pronounce

        all mandatory conditions at the sentencing hearing, “all non-mandatory conditions of

        supervised release must be announced at a defendant’s sentencing hearing,” either by

        separately announcing each discretionary condition or by “expressly incorporating a

        written list of proposed conditions.” Id. at 296, 299.

               In pronouncing the terms of Barnes’ supervised release at sentencing, the district

        court did not orally impose all of the standard conditions of supervised release. In United

        States v. Singletary, we explained that a challenge to discretionary supervised release terms

        that were not orally pronounced at sentencing falls outside the scope of an appeal waiver

        because “the heart of a Rogers claim is that discretionary conditions appearing for the first

        time in a written judgment . . . have not been ‘imposed’ on the defendant.” 984 F.3d at 345

        (emphasis omitted). Where, as here, the court fails to announce non-mandatory conditions

        of supervised release that are later included in the written judgment, the remedy is to vacate

        the sentence and remand for a full resentencing hearing. Id. at 346 & n.4.

               In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case, and we

        have found no other meritorious issues for appeal outside the scope of the waiver.

        Accordingly, we affirm Barnes’ convictions, vacate his sentence, and remand for

        resentencing. We deny as moot the Government’s motion to dismiss.

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               This court requires that counsel inform Barnes, in writing, of the right to petition

        the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Barnes requests that a petition

        be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may

        move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state

        that a copy thereof was served on Barnes. We dispense with oral argument because the

        facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and

        argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                               AFFIRMED IN PART,
                                                                                VACATED IN PART,
                                                                                 AND REMANDED

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