Court Opinion

ID: 9839939
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-14 18:01:11.384331+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:43.878653
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JEREMY DEAN KITCHEN,                            No. 22-35581

                 Plaintiff-Appellant,             D.C. No.
     v.                                       2:21-cv-00602-SI

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,                  OPINION

                 Defendant-Appellee.

          Appeal from the United States District Court
                   for the District of Oregon
          Michael H. Simon, District Judge, Presiding

                   Submitted June 16, 2023*
                      Portland, Oregon

                   Filed September 14, 2023

     Before: Richard C. Tallman and Johnnie B. Rawlinson,
       Circuit Judges, and Jed S. Rakoff,** District Judge.

                 Opinion by Judge Rawlinson

*
 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
**
  The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
2                       KITCHEN V. KIJAKAZI

                          SUMMARY***

                          Social Security

    The panel affirmed the district court’s order affirming
the denial of claimant’s application for disability insurance
benefits under the Social Security Act.
    On appeal, claimant challenged only the administrative
law judge (ALJ)’s finding that his mental impairments were
not disabling.
    The panel held that the ALJ did not err in excluding
claimant’s VA disability rating from her analysis. McCartey
v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding
that an ALJ is required to address the Veterans
Administration disability rating), is no longer good law for
claims filed after March 27, 2017, the effective date of the
Social Security Administration’s revised regulations
regarding the evaluation of medical evidence. The 2017
regulations removed any requirement for an ALJ to discuss
another agency’s rating.
    The panel held that the ALJ gave specific, clear, and
convincing reasons for rejecting claimant’s testimony about
the severity of his symptoms by enumerating the objective
evidence that undermined claimant’s testimony.
    The panel rejected claimant’s contention that the ALJ
erred by rejecting the opinions of Drs. Condon and Adams.
First, claimant’s contention that the ALJ’s residual
functional capacity (RFC) finding was inconsistent with Dr.

***
   This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                    KITCHEN V. KIJAKAZI                   3

Condon’s opinion lacked merit. Second, under the revised
regulations, the ALJ need only provide an explanation
supported by substantial evidence, and substantial evidence
supported the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Adams’ opinion
regarding claimant’s mental impairments was not
persuasive.
    The panel held that substantial evidence supported the
ALJ’s conclusion that claimant’s mental impairments did
not meet all of the specified medical criteria or equal the
severity of a listed impairment because substantial evidence
supported the ALJ’s determination that Dr. Adams’ opinion
was unpersuasive.
    Finally, because the panel concluded that the ALJ
properly weighed Dr. Adams’ opinion and included Dr.
Condon’s limitations in the RFC, claimant did not show that
the ALJ’s resulting hypothetical posed to the vocational
expert was incomplete.
4                   KITCHEN V. KIJAKAZI

                       COUNSEL

Chad Hatfield, Hatfield Law PLLC,              Kennewick,
Washington, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Joseph J. Langkamer, Assistant Regional Counsel, Office of
the General Counsel, Office of Program Litigation, Social
Security Administration, Baltimore, Maryland; Matthew W.
Pile, Associate General Counsel, Office of Program
Litigation; Social Security Administration, Office of the
General Counsel, Seattle, Washington; Renata Gowie, Civil
Division Chief; Natalie K. Wight, United States Attorney;
United States Department of Justice, Seattle, Washington;
Kevin C. Danielson, Assistant United States Attorney,
United States Department of Justice, United States
Attorney’s Office, Portland, Oregon; for Defendant-
Appellee.

                        OPINION

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge:

    Jeremy Dean Kitchen (Kitchen) appeals the district
court’s order affirming the denial of Kitchen’s application
for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security
Act. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Because substantial evidence supports the Administrative
Law Judge’s (ALJ) decision that Kitchen was not disabled,
we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
   Kitchen enlisted in the Oregon Army National Guard in
1999. A few years later, he was deployed to Iraq as a medic
                          KITCHEN V. KIJAKAZI                            5

and sustained an injury to his right knee from an Improvised
Explosive Device (IED). He also experienced emotional
distress following this incident.
    Upon returning to civilian life, Kitchen held several jobs
in the medical field, and sought treatment for his injuries
through the United States Department of Veterans Affairs
(VA).     At that time, the VA found no significant
abnormalities relating to Kitchen’s knee, but noted that
Kitchen continued to struggle with Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD), nightmares, irritability, depression,
avoidance of crowds, panic attacks, and insomnia. However,
in 2015, the VA concluded that Kitchen was 70 percent
disabled from PTSD, 10 percent disabled from synovitis,1
and 10 percent disabled from limited knee flexion, for an
overall disability rating of 80 percent.
    In 2018, Kitchen underwent a consultative examination
from Dr. Michael Anderson, an independent medical
examiner, who recorded that Kitchen had regained full
“[r]ange of motion” in his knee and that his knee was
“completely normal.” Kitchen was also referred to Dr.
Stephen Condon for a psychological evaluation. Dr. Condon
observed that Kitchen had issues with concentration and
memory, noting that “his cognitive functioning might be
mildly impaired” and his inability to interact with others
“appears to be mildly or markedly impaired.” Less than a
year later, Dr. Condon reexamined Kitchen and reached
similar conclusions.

1
 “Synovitis” is “[i]nflammation of a synovial membrane, especially that
of a joint; in general, when unqualified, the same as arthritis.” Stedman’s
Medical Dictionary, 891270 (Online ed. 2014).
6                        KITCHEN V. KIJAKAZI

     Kitchen sought further treatment from the VA and
reported some improvement, including that his pain was zero
on a scale of zero to ten, and that his mood, sleep, and
irritability had improved with medication. But on a
subsequent Mental Residual Function Capacity Form, Dr.
Stephen Adams rated Kitchen as “markedly,” “severely,” or
“extremely” limited in the ability to: “remember locations
and work-like procedures;” “understand and remember very
short and simple instructions;” “understand and remember
detailed instructions;” “carry out very short simple
instruction[s];” “carry out detailed instructions;” “maintain
attention and concentration for extended periods;” “perform
activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance and
be punctual within customary tolerances;” “sustain an
ordinary routine without special supervision;” “work in
coordination with or proximity to others without being
distracted by them;” “make simple work-related decisions;”
“complete a normal work-day and workweek;” “interact
appropriately with the general public;” “accept instructions
and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors;”
“respond appropriately to changes in the work setting;”
“travel in unfamiliar places or use public transportation;”
“set realistic goals or make plans independently of others;”
“understand, remember, or apply information;” interact with
others;” “concentrate, persist, or maintain pace;” and “adapt
or manage oneself.”
   Kitchen applied for disability insurance benefits on
January 30, 2020, alleging disability since March 1, 2017,2
due to PTSD, depression, anxiety, insomnia, headaches, and

2
  Kitchen previously filed applications for disability insurance benefits
in 2017, 2018, and 2019. All three applications were denied.
                          KITCHEN V. KIJAKAZI                             7

a right knee injury. His application was denied initially and
upon reconsideration.
     At his hearing before the ALJ, Kitchen testified that
trauma-based therapy was causing his mental health to
decline, specifically causing “nightmares, flashbacks, [and]
anxiety.” He related that his symptoms affected his marital
relationship and that he was fired from his most recent job
due to his volatile personality and memory lapses. Kitchen
also submitted function reports he prepared, reflecting that
he neglects his personal hygiene, has severe knee pain, is
irritable, has a hard time concentrating, and isolates himself
socially.
    A medical expert confirmed Dr. Condon’s assessment
that Kitchen would be markedly limited when interacting
with others. The medical expert suggested that Kitchen’s
Residual Function Capacity (RFC) include “some
limitations in terms of his work situation.” He observed that
Kitchen “should not have any contact with the public,” “[h]e
should not be required to work in a close teamwork setting
with other people,” and that “he would need a [] normal
range of supervision.” On cross-examination, the medical
expert noted that Kitchen was “doing very well” or “above
average” “in terms of memory, concentration, persistence
and pace.”
    Finally, a vocational expert (VE) testified that a
hypothetical person with Kitchen’s mental RFC 3 would not
be able to perform Kitchen’s past work because his past jobs

3
 The ALJ stated Kitchen’s RFC as the “ability to understand, remember,
or apply. . . simple and routine” information, no close interaction with
others, “ability to concentrate, persist, and maintain pace at the [Specific
Vocational Preparation] 2 level,” and “an environment that is routine and
predictable.”
8                    KITCHEN V. KIJAKAZI

were skilled and he was now limited to unskilled work. The
VE stated that the hypothetical person would be able to work
as a small product assembler, marker, or an electronics
worker.
     After considering and weighing the evidence, the ALJ
applied the five-step sequential evaluation for determining
disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). At the first step,
the ALJ found that Kitchen had not engaged in substantial,
gainful activity. At the second step, the ALJ determined that
Kitchen had severe impairments of PTSD; depression;
anxiety disorder; insomnia; Baker cyst, right knee;
occasional headaches; and obesity. At the third step, the ALJ
concluded that these impairments did not meet or equal a
listed impairment.
    At the fourth step, the ALJ concluded that Kitchen had
the mental RFC to perform light work, with the limitations
of remembering or applying information that is simple and
routine, and working in an environment with no close
cooperation (i.e., teamwork), with co-workers and
supervisors, or the public.
    In reaching this decision, the ALJ rejected the opinion of
Dr. Adams, reasoning that his assessment of the existence of
“disabling mental work-related limitations” was inconsistent
with the medical record and with Dr. Adams’ “own
unremarkable mental status examinations.” The ALJ also
noted that Dr. Adams used a “check box form” that
contained “very little meaningful information.”
    At the fifth step, the ALJ considered the response of the
VE to the hypothetical posed by the ALJ based on Kitchen’s
RFC. The VE opined that there were a significant number
of jobs in the national economy that a person with Kitchen’s
RFC could perform.
                      KITCHEN V. KIJAKAZI                    9

    Once the Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s
decision, Kitchen sought judicial review. The district court
affirmed the agency’s denial of benefits.
    On appeal, Kitchen only challenges the ALJ’s finding
that Kitchen’s mental impairments were not disabling.
Kitchen specifically contends that the ALJ improperly (1)
failed to consider the VA’s disability rating; (2) discounted
Kitchen’s testimony; (3) rejected Drs. Condon’s and Adams’
opinions; (4) decided that Kitchen’s mental impairments did
not meet or medically equal a listing; and (5) relied on the
VE’s response to an incomplete hypothetical.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    “We review the district court’s order affirming the ALJ’s
denial of social security benefits de novo and will disturb the
denial of benefits only if the decision contains legal error or
is not supported by substantial evidence.” Lambert v. Saul,
980 F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). “Substantial evidence is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, and must be more than a
mere scintilla, but may be less than a preponderance. . . .”
Rounds v. Comm’r, 807 F.3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 2015), as
amended (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
“Overall, the standard of review is highly deferential.” Id.
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
   A. VA Disability Rating
    Kitchen filed his application on January 30, 2020, after
the March 27, 2017, effective date of the Social Security
Administration’s revised regulations regarding the
evaluation of medical evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c
10                   KITCHEN V. KIJAKAZI

(2017). The 2017 regulations provide that “[d]ecisions by
other governmental agencies,” including the VA, are
“inherently neither valuable or persuasive,” and thus, an ALJ
is not required to include any analysis about “a decision
made by any other governmental agency.” §§ 404.1504,
404.1520b(c)(1).
    Kitchen relies on McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d
1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002), to support his contention that the
ALJ was required to address the VA disability rating. But
Kitchen fails to explain why we should not give effect to the
new regulations, beyond saying (1) we have the power to
“determine the law” under Article III and (2) McCartey has
not been overruled. Kitchen does not argue that the new
regulations are inconsistent with the Social Security Act.
   The Commissioner counters that McCartey is no longer
good law for claims filed after March 27, 2017. We agree.
    McCartey is binding unless its “‘reasoning or theory is
clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning or theory of
intervening higher authority,’ which in this case is the
agency’s updated regulations.” Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th
785, 790 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d
1266, 1274 (9th Cir. 2020) (alteration omitted). McCartey
gave several reasons for requiring that the ALJ give “great
weight” to a VA disability determination: (1) nine other
circuit courts to consider the issue had required that the VA
rating be given at least some weight; (2) the regulations said
only that another agency’s determination was not binding on
Social Security; and (3) there was a “marked similarity”
between the VA’s disability program and Social Security’s
disability program. McCartey, 298 F.3d at 1075–76.
    McCartey’s theory and reasoning is clearly
irreconcilable with the revised regulations. First, as
                      KITCHEN V. KIJAKAZI                     11

discussed, the regulations now explicitly state that Social
Security “will not provide any analysis in [its] determination
or decision about a decision made by any other
governmental agency,” § 404.1504, and that such decisions
are “inherently neither valuable nor persuasive.”
§ 404.1520b(c)(1). Second, when revising the regulations,
the Commissioner cited research which undermines
McCartey’s logic about the “similarities” between the two
disability programs. See Revisions to Rules Regarding the
Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, 5849
(Jan. 18, 2017) (“While individuals with a VA rating of
100% or [Individual Unemployability] have a slightly higher
allowance rate under our programs than members of the
general population, nearly one-third are denied benefits
based on our rules . . .”). Finally, the only other circuit court
to have considered the 2017 rules concluded they supersede
that circuit’s precedent requiring deference to VA
determinations. See Rogers v. Kijakazi, 62 F.4th 872, 879–
80 (4th Cir. 2023).
    “The Social Security Act provides no guidance as to how
the agency should evaluate medical evidence. . . .” Woods,
32 F.4th at 790. Rather, the Act gives the Commissioner
“wide latitude” to promulgate “regulations governing ‘the
nature and extent of the proofs and evidence to establish the
right to benefits.’” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(a)
(alteration omitted)). Kitchen does not contend that the
Commissioner has exceeded that latitude. Put simply, the
2017 regulations removed any requirement for an ALJ to
discuss another agency’s rating. Thus, it was not error for
the ALJ to exclude Kitchen’s VA disability rating from her
analysis. See id.
12                    KITCHEN V. KIJAKAZI

     B. Kitchen’s Testimony
    “When objective medical evidence is inconsistent with a
claimant’s subjective testimony, an ALJ can reject the
claimant’s testimony about the severity of [his] symptoms
only by offering specific, clear, and convincing reasons for
doing so. . . .” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 494 (9th Cir.
2022) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here,
the ALJ summarized Kitchen’s symptom testimony, which
included Kitchen’s reports of anxiety, irritability, anger, and
panic attacks. But the ALJ concluded that Kitchen’s
“statements concerning the intensity, persistence and
limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent
with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.”
    The ALJ reasoned that most of Kitchen’s physicians
opined that his mental impairments were “mild[]” or
“moderate,” rather than disabling. See Carmickle v.
Comm’r, 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008)
(“Contradiction with the medical record is a sufficient basis
for rejecting the claimant’s subjective testimony. . . .”)
(citation omitted). The ALJ also noted that Kitchen
e
  xperienced “a gradual improvement in his functioning with
prescribed medication and psychotherapy sessions.” See
Warre v. Comm’r, 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006)
(“Impairments that can be controlled effectively with
medication are not disabling for the purposes of determining
eligibility for SSI benefits.”). Thus, the ALJ’s explanation
was “specific, clear and convincing,” as it enumerated the
objective evidence that “undermine[d] [Kitchen’s]
testimony.” Treichler v. Comm’r, 775 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th
Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
                        KITCHEN V. KIJAKAZI                       13

    C. Medical Opinion Evidence
    “[U]nder the new regulations, an ALJ cannot reject an
examining or treating doctor’s opinion as unsupported or
inconsistent without providing an explanation supported by
substantial evidence.” Woods, 32 F.4th at 792. “The agency
must articulate how persuasive it finds all of the medical
opinions from each doctor or other source, and explain how
it considered the supportability and consistency factors in
reaching these findings.” Id. (citations, alterations, and
internal quotation marks omitted). Supportability concerns
how “a medical source supports a medical opinion” with
relevant evidence, while consistency concerns how “a
medical opinion is consistent with the evidence from other
medical and nonmedical sources.” Id. at 791–92 (citations,
alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted). There is
no longer a hierarchy of medical opinions that determines
how the opinions are weighed. See id. at 792.
   Kitchen argues that the ALJ committed reversible error
by rejecting the opinions of Drs. Condon and Adams that
support a finding of disability. Kitchen also asserts that the
ALJ failed to assess the consistency and supportability of
each medical opinion.4
        1. Dr. Condon’s Opinion
    Kitchen contends that the ALJ issued an RFC assessment
in conflict with Dr. Condon’s findings without adequate
explanation. Dr. Condon determined that “[i]t is likely that
[Kitchen] would have. . . marked interpersonal problems in

4
  This argument is belied by the record. The ALJ explicitly discussed
the supportability and consistency of the opinions of Drs. Condon and
Adams by identifying medical sources and records relevant to her
analysis. See Woods, 32 F.4th at 791–92.
14                  KITCHEN V. KIJAKAZI

an employment situation.” And the RFC limitations found
by the ALJ were consistent with Dr. Condon’s assessments.
    Specifically, the ALJ limited Kitchen to working in an
environment that does not require “close cooperation . . .
with co-workers and supervisors.” The ALJ also found that
Kitchen “must work away from the public.” These
limitations restrict Kitchen to minimal interaction with
others and track Dr. Condon’s opinion that Kitchen was
“mildly or markedly impaired” in terms of “[i]nteracting
appropriately with others.” See Turner v. Comm’r, 613 F.3d
1217, 1223 (9th Cir. 2010) (approving the ALJ’s
incorporation of the physician’s assessment into the RFC).
Kitchen’s contention that the RFC finding was inconsistent
with Dr. Condon’s opinion lacks merit.
       2. Dr. Adams’ Opinion
    Contrary to Kitchen’s assertion, the ALJ’s weighing of
Dr. Adams’ opinion was sufficiently articulated. Our prior
standard, that an ALJ “provide specific and legitimate
reasons for rejecting a treating or examining doctor’s
opinion,” is “incompatible with the revised regulations”
addressing the weighing of medical opinions without
“special deference to the opinions of treating and examining
physicians.” Woods, 32 F.4th at 792; see also § 404.1520c
(2017). Under the revised regulations, an ALJ need only
provide “an explanation supported by substantial evidence.”
Woods, 32 F.4th at 792.
    Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Dr.
Adams’ opinion regarding Kitchen’s mental impairments
was not persuasive. The ALJ reasoned that Dr. Adams’
assessment of severe limitations was inconsistent with the
medical record and with Dr. Adams’ “own unremarkable
mental status examinations.” See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533
                      KITCHEN V. KIJAKAZI                    15

F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that an ALJ may
discount a doctor’s opinions that are inconsistent with or
unsupported by the doctor’s own clinical findings). The ALJ
pointed to Dr. Adams’ observation that Kitchen was
engaged, alert and oriented, and only “slightly anxious.”
The ALJ also noted the medical expert’s testimony that Dr.
Adams’ “objective observations during office visits counter
the extremeness of Dr. Adams’ evaluation.” Finally, we
have accepted the discounting of a medical opinion set forth
in a checkbox form with little to no explanation. See Ford
v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1155 (9th Cir. 2020) (explaining that
an ALJ “may permissibly reject check-off reports that do not
contain any explanation of the bases of their conclusions”)
(citation omitted).
   D. Listed Impairments
     “The listings describe impairments that are considered to
be severe enough to prevent an individual from doing any
gainful activity.” Id. at 1148 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). “For a claimant to show that his impairment
matches a listing, it must meet all of the specified medical
criteria.” Id. “If an impairment does not meet a listing, it
may nevertheless be medically equivalent to a listed
impairment if the claimant’s symptoms, signs, and
laboratory findings are at least equal in severity to those of a
listed impairment. Id. (citation, footnote reference, and
internal quotation marks omitted).          “If a claimant’s
impairments meet or equal the criteria of a listing, the
claimant is considered disabled.” Id. at 1149.
16                        KITCHEN V. KIJAKAZI

    Kitchen argues that the ALJ failed to properly consider
the “paragraph C” 5 criteria by reporting findings that were
inconsistent with Dr. Adams’ opinion. But his challenge
fails because substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
determination that Dr. Adams’ opinion was unpersuasive.
    “To satisfy the paragraph C criteria, [a claimant’s]
mental disorder must be ‘serious and persistent’; that is,
there must be a medically documented history of the
existence of the disorder over a period of at least 2 years.”
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00A(2)(c).
Additionally, the criteria “is satisfied when the evidence
shows that [the claimant] rel[ies], on an ongoing basis, upon
medical treatment, mental health therapy, psychosocial
support(s), or a highly structured setting(s), to diminish the
symptoms and signs of [his] mental disorder.”
§ 12.00G(2)(b). Finally, the criteria is satisfied when “the
evidence shows that, despite [the claimant’s] diminished
symptoms and signs, [he] has achieved only marginal
adjustment.” 6 § 12.00G(2)(c).
    The ALJ determined that Kitchen failed to satisfy the
paragraph C criteria sufficiently to meet or equal listings

5
  Kitchen’s reference is to 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1
§ 12.00A(2)(c), (paragraph C), which describes the criteria used to
evaluate “serious and persistent mental disorders.”
6
  “Marginal adjustment” means that [the claimant’s] adaptation to the
requirements of daily life is fragile; that is, [the claimant] ha[s] minimal
capacity to adapt to changes in [the claimant’s] environment or to
demands that are not already part of [the claimant’s] daily life.”
§ 12.00G(2)(c).
                           KITCHEN V. KIJAKAZI                     17

12.04,7 12.06,8 or 12.15.9 The ALJ explained that the “record
d[id] not establish that [Kitchen] ha[d] only marginal
adjustment.” The ALJ also reasoned that Kitchen “has
intermittently received psychotherapy, and he has responded
well to medication.” The ALJ referenced VA records
indicating that on February 3, 2020, Kitchen had returned to
psychotherapy “for the first time” since December 13, 2017,
besides “two additional [follow-ups].” Additionally, the ALJ
pointed out that Kitchen’s reports of “deterioration in his
self-care, hygiene, and grooming” were contradicted by
objective evidence. Thus, substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s conclusion that Kitchen’s mental impairments did not
“meet all of the specified medical criteria” or “equal [the]
severity” of a listed impairment. Ford, 950 F.3d at 1148.
       E. VE Testimony
    Finally, Kitchen contends that the ALJ erred at step five
by relying on the VE’s response to an incomplete
hypothetical. Kitchen faults the ALJ for not including
further limitations in the RFC based on “the disabling
opinions” from Kitchen’s “examining psychologist and
treating physician.”
    “If an ALJ’s hypothetical does not reflect all of the
claimant’s limitations, then the [VE’s] testimony has no
evidentiary value to support a finding that the claimant can
perform jobs in the national economy.” Bray v. Comm’r,
554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). But, an ALJ “is free to accept or
reject restrictions in a hypothetical question that are not

7
    Depressive, bipolar and related disorders. See § 12.00B(3).
8
    Anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders. See § 12.00B(5).
9
    Trauma- and stressor-related disorders. See § 12.00B(11).
18                  KITCHEN V. KIJAKAZI

supported by substantial evidence.” Greger v. Barnhart, 464
F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
    Kitchen’s argument is a restatement of his contention
that the ALJ should have credited Dr. Adams’ opinion and
completely adopted Dr. Condon’s assessment. Because we
have already concluded that the ALJ properly weighed Dr.
Adams’ opinion and included Dr. Condon’s limitations in
the RFC, Kitchen has not shown that the ALJ’s resulting
hypothetical was incomplete. See Stubbs-Danielson v.
Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2008) (rejecting a
similar argument by the claimant in that case).
     AFFIRMED.