Court Opinion

ID: 9691796
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 14:09:37.688901+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:19:13.809804
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-848

                           MARIO MARIANI & others1

                                       vs.

                   PLANNING BOARD OF DENNIS & another.2

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       Mario Mariani and Priscilla Mariani (plaintiffs)3 appeal

 from summary judgment dismissing both their challenge under

 G. L. c. 40A, § 17, to a decision of the planning board of

 Dennis (board)(first count), and their claim for declaratory

 judgment (second count).        See G. L. c. 231A.       Because we agree

 with the judge that the plaintiffs failed to sustain their

 burden as to their standing under either G. L. c. 40A (zoning

 act) or G. L. c. 231A, we affirm.

       Background.     At issue is the plaintiffs' challenge to the

 board's decision to grant a special permit pursuant to § 8.5.3

 of the Dennis Zoning Bylaw, allowing defendant, Upper County

 1 Priscilla Mariani and Andrew Murray.
 2 Upper County Residences, LLC.
 3 Andrew Murray did not file a notice of appeal and has not

 otherwise participated in this appeal.
Residences (UCR), to build eight two-bedroom housing units at

232 Upper County Road (property), in Dennis Port, within the

Dennis Port Village Center District.   Two units were planned to

be low-income housing.   The lot size was less than 35,000 square

feet.   The plaintiffs are homeowner abutters of the property to

the north.

    On February 1, 2021, after a public hearing, the board

granted the special permit subject to fifteen specific

conditions.

    The plaintiffs appealed the special permit in the

Barnstable Superior Court under G. L. c. 40A, § 17, on February

18, 2021.

    The plaintiffs and defendants both moved for summary

judgment on the first (and at that time, the only) count of the

plaintiffs' complaint.   After the motions for summary judgment

were filed, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, which

added a new claim for declaratory judgment pursuant to G. L.

c. 231A.

    On March 31, 2022, the judge denied the plaintiffs' motion

for summary judgment and granted the defendants' cross-motion as

to all counts of the amended complaint.    This appeal followed.

    Analysis.   1.   Standard of review.   We review a grant of

summary judgment de novo.   See Marhefka v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals

of Sutton, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 515, 517 (2011).   Summary judgment

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is appropriate where no material facts are in dispute and the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.        See

81 Spooner Rd., LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Brookline, 461

Mass. 692, 699 (2012).     "[W]here both parties have moved for

summary judgment, [we view] the evidence . . . in the light most

favorable to the party against whom judgment [was entered]."

Id., quoting Albahari v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Brewster, 76

Mass. App. Ct. 245, 248 n.4 (2010).      See also Mass. R. Civ. P.

56 (c), as amended, 436 Mass. 1404 (2002).

     2.     Standing for G. L. c. 40A.   a.   Presumption of

standing.    As abutters to the property, the plaintiffs here are

"parties in interest" entitled to a rebuttable presumption of

standing.    Murray v. Board of Appeals of Barnstable, 22 Mass.

App. Ct. 473, 476 (1986).     See G. L. c. 40A, § 17.   The

defendants may rebut an abutter's presumption of standing at

summary judgment by, as relevant here, producing an expert

affidavit or other credible affirmative evidence that refutes

the presumption.4    See 81 Spooner Rd., LLC, 461 Mass. at 702-703.

4 Alternatively, the defendants can show that the plaintiffs'
interest is not one that the zoning act was meant to protect.
81 Spooner Rd., LLC, 461 Mass. at 702-703. In their motion, the
defendants do not attempt to challenge the plaintiffs' arguments
about traffic, noise, or wastewater disposal as beyond the scope
of the zoning act's protections, see Picard v. Zoning Bd. of
Appeals of Westminster, 474 Mass. 570, 574 (noting "typical
zoning concerns," including "density, traffic, parking
availability, [and] noise"); Bylaws §§ 1.4.2.1 (noise), 1.2

                                   3
If the defendants rebut the presumption, the burden shifts back

to the plaintiffs to present credible evidence to substantiate

their allegations.    Id. at 701.       To do so, they must show they

do or will suffer a unique, special, cognizable injury that is

"not merely reflective of the concerns of the community."

Denneny v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Seekonk, 59 Mass. App. Ct.

208, 212 (2003).     See, e.g., Standerwick v. Zoning Bd. of

Appeals of Andover, 447 Mass. 20, 33 (2006); Barvenik v.

Aldermen of Newton, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 129, 132 (1992); Harvard

Sq. Defense Fund, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Cambridge, 27 Mass.

App. Ct. 491, 493 (1989).

    b.   Noise, traffic, and sewage and flooding.         We are

satisfied that the defendants' expert affidavits provided the

credible evidence necessary to rebut the plaintiffs' claims of

aggrievement related to noise, traffic, and sewage and flooding.

The affidavits from acoustical engineer, Christopher Menge;

traffic engineer, Robert Michaud; and designer of the septic

system, John O'Reilly, averred that ambient noise on the

plaintiffs' property would be diminished, traffic would remain

unaffected, and the septic system was up to code and would

adequately protect against sewage and water overflow.        We

(traffic and wastewater); rather, they argue that the
plaintiffs' claims are unfounded or de minimis.

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conclude that each of these affidavits rebutted the plaintiffs'

presumption of standing.

       In response, the plaintiffs attempt to discredit these

affidavits, but do not offer any affirmative evidence of their

own.    This approach is unavailing, see Barbetti v. Stempniewicz,

490 Mass. 98, 116 (2022), quoting Bulwer v. Mount Auburn Hosp.,

473 Mass. 672, 689 (2016) ("on a motion for summary judgment, 'a

court does not . . . assess credibility'"), where the plaintiffs

failed to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material

fact as to the increase in noise, traffic, and potential for

flooding created by UCR's proposed development of the property.5

See Barbetti, 490 Mass. at 116.   Such "speculative personal

opinion," Standerwick, 447 Mass. at 33, was inadequate to create

a question of material fact and thereby failed to confer

standing.   Barvenik, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 132 n.9 & 133 ("Even

when positing legitimate zoning-related concerns, including

possible vehicular traffic increases, . . . a plaintiff must

nonetheless offer more than conjecture and hypothesis").

5 While we view the evidence presented in the light most
favorable to the plaintiffs, the fact that O'Reilly's affidavit
did not attach all the documentation on which the affiant relied
(specifically, a HydroCAD Modeling report illustrating
anticipated improvements in stormwater runoff amounts resulting
from implementation of O'Reilly's system) did not rob the
affidavit of its evidentiary value.

                                  5
    c.   Neighborhood character.    The potential inconsistency in

aesthetics or neighborhood appearance is not ordinarily

considered an interest intended to be protected by G. L. c. 40A,

Harvard Sq. Defense Fund, Inc., 27 Mass. App. Ct. at 493

("[M]atters, essentially involving the expression of aesthetic

views and speculative opinions, do not establish a plausible

claim of a definite violation of a private right, property

interest, or legal interest sufficient to bring . . . plaintiffs

within the zone of standing"), and while we acknowledge that the

town bylaws call for the board to consider the "[c]ompatibility

of the proposed use with surrounding land uses, so as to

minimize harmful impact or conflict with existing desirable

neighborhood character, including . . . aesthetic values" when

acting on requests for special permits, see Dennis Bylaws

§ 1.4.2.1 (d), as amended May 2, 2017, we are not persuaded that

this case presents an exception to the usual rule.

    The plaintiffs' claimed aggreivement about incompatible

architectural styles is not the kind of infringement on an

individual property or private right necessary to survive

summary judgment in the circumstances here, at least absent a

more specific allegation of harm caused by the project's design.

See Murchison v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Sherborn, 485 Mass.

209, 214 (2020) ("The language of a bylaw cannot be sufficient

in itself to confer standing:   the creation of a protected

                                6
interest [by statute, ordinance, bylaw, or otherwise] cannot be

conflated with the additional, individualized requirements that

establish standing" [citation omitted]); Sweenie v. A.L. Prime

Energy Consultants, 451 Mass. 539, 544-545 (2008) (even if bylaw

created protected interest, plaintiffs must "establish[] the

link between the bylaw and themselves" and their property).

Contrast Monks v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Plymouth, 37 Mass.

App. Ct. 685, 688 (1994).

       d.   Violation of density requirements.   Because under

§ 8.5.3, the board had discretion to grant UCR a variance from

the density requirements set forth in that section, and acted

within that discretion, its approval of UCR's request for the

special permit needed to develop the property did not violate

the density provisions of the bylaws as written.6     See Dennis

Bylaws § 8.5.3.    See also G. L. c. 40A, § 9.

       Even if that were not the case, we are not persuaded that

the plaintiffs demonstrated standing based on its density

argument.    To establishing standing, a plaintiff must do more

than merely allege a zoning violation.     Murchison, 485 Mass. at

214.    Here, as we have discussed, the plaintiffs have failed to

provide the evidence necessary to demonstrate their claimed

6 We acknowledge the plaintiffs' challenge to the legality of
§ 8.5.3. Based on our conclusion, infra, that the plaintiffs
lacked standing to seek declaratory relief here, however, we do
not address that challenge further.

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aggrievement based on the potential harms of overcrowding --

specifically, noise, traffic, and sewage.   This case is

distinguishable on that basis from Dwyer v. Gallo, 73 Mass. App.

Ct. 292, 297 (2008), on which the plaintiffs rely for the

proposition that "violation of the density provisions of the

zoning by-law will generally constitute harm sufficiently

perceptible and personal to . . . confer standing to maintain a

zoning appeal."   In Dwyer, the challenged permit increased the

density in a neighborhoood where construction was already more

dense than the bylaws permitted, and "the direct impacts on the

[plaintiffs'] property from construction in violation of the

density requirements of the by-law [were] evident."   Id.    See

Sheppard v. Zoning Bd. of Appeal of Boston, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 8,

12 (2009) (holding plaintiff had standing where variances

granted would exacerbate Boston's existing density problems).

Cf. Marotta v. Board of Appeals of Revere, 336 Mass. 199, 203-

204 (1957) ("status of the property or of the plaintiffs may be

such that the plaintiffs are not aggrieved even though the

property is very near").

    e.   Privacy and overcrowding.   Although we acknowledge that

protection from overcrowding, generally, is an interest

protected by the bylaws, see Dennis bylaw § 1.2 (objectives of

bylaws include "prevent[ion of] the overcrowding of land"), we

are not persuaded that the bylaws' density requirements are

                                 8
intended to insulate the plaintiffs from any loss of privacy

occasioned by the development of the property.   See, e.g.,

Murchison, 485 Mass. at 214 (finding dimensional lot width

zoning requirement had no demonstrated purpose to control

density or to protect particular abutter's interest); 81 Spooner

Rd., LLC, 461 Mass. at 700.

    Even if we were to find a protected privacy interest within

the density bylaws, the plaintiffs' claims that their privacy

would be impacted by, for example, occupants of the new

development peering into their yard, were too speculative and

intangible to meet the standing requirement under c. 40A.     See

81 Spooner Rd., LLC, 461 Mass. at 702-703; Marashlian v. Zoning

Bd. of Appeals of Newburyport, 421 Mass. 719, 723 n.5 (1996)

(contrasting "tangible loss of parking spaces" with

"uncorroborated speculations" about possibility that headlights

would shine into window); Tsagronis v. Board of Appeals of

Wareham, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 55, 58-59 (1992), rev'd other

grounds, 415 Mass. 329 (1993) (plaintiff aggrieved by variance

allowing construction that would partially block plaintiff's

water view).   Moreover, such claims are not direct consequences

of the density concerns on which much of their argument relies.

    Bertrand v. Board of Appeals of Bourne is not to the

contrary; there, the plaintiffs' privacy concerns were

compounded by affirmative evidence of the negative impacts

                                 9
caused by artificial light and sewage issues.    Bertrand v. Board

of Appeals of Bourne, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 912 (2003).    Likewise,

the plaintiffs have also failed to present more than speculation

to support ther claims that UCR's development will impact their

use of their yard to make audition tapes.     With no tangible

harm, and relying solely on an alleged violation of a bylaw, the

plaintiffs again are unable to establish a private right

sufficient to presume aggrivement and standing as abutters.

    3.   Revision without a public hearing.    Our conclusion that

the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the board's decision

also disposes of their challenge to the board's procedure.       Even

if it did not do so, however, the board's failure to hold an

additional public hearing before approving the amendment to

UCR's permit would not have entitled them to summary judgment

nor defeated the defendants' motion because the alteration at

issue in the amendment was neither an actual change nor a

"substantive" one.   See Tenneco Oil Co. v. City Council of

Springfield, 406 Mass. 658, 659-660 (1990).    The change to

Condition 14 was limited to landscaping on one portion of the

property and was affirmatively requested as a condition of the

original special permit following a public hearing attended by

the plaintiffs.

    4.   Declaratory judgment.   We likewise conclude that

summary judgment in favor of the defendants was proper on the

                                 10
question of the plaintiffs' standing to seek a judgment

declaring invalid §§ 4.9.2.2.2 and 8.5.3 of the Dennis bylaws.

Those sections address, inter alia, the board's authority to

grant special permits allowing successful petitioners to create

housing that exceeds the town's base residential density.       See

Dennis bylaw §§ 4.9.2.2.2, 8.5.3.    They do not, however, "state

. . . the maximum increases in density of population . . . which

may be authorized by such special permits," notwithstanding the

requirement in the enabling statute under which these bylaws

were promulgated that they do so.    G. L. c. 40A, § 9.   The

plaintiffs argue that because the bylaws do not conform to the

requirements of § 9, they are invalid.    The question is again

one of the plaintiffs' standing to raise the argument.

    For a court to entertain an action for declaratory judgment

under G. L. c. 231A, § 1, the plaintiff must allege "an 'actual

controversy' [and] . . . demonstrate the requisite legal

standing to secure its resolution."    Massachusetts Ass'n of

Indep. Ins. Agents & Brokers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Ins., 373

Mass. 290, 292 (1977).   Where, as here, the plaintiff's claim

"involves a dispute over an official interpretation of a statute

and the validity of a regulation promulgated pursuant to that

interpretation, a justiciable controversy exists."    Id. at 293.

Standing, however, only exists where a party can allege

individualized harm, Sudbury v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth.,

                                11
485 Mass. 774, 780 (2020), "within the area of concern of the

statute or regulatory scheme under which the injurious action

has occurred."   Massachusetts Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents &

Brokers, Inc., supra at 293.   In contrast to their claims under

G. L. c. 40A, the plaintiffs do not enjoy a presumption of

standing as abutters to the property.    See Enos v. Secretary of

Envtl. Affairs, 432 Mass. 132, 135 (2000).    For the reasons we

have already discussed, the plaintiffs have failed to do more

than speculate about what harm, if any, they are likely to

suffer as a result of the increased density occasioned by the

board's issuance of a special permit for UCR's development of

the property.7   Because they have failed to demonstrate standing

to pursue their declaratory judgment claim, summary judgment in

favor of the defendants on that claim was proper.

                                     Judgment affirmed.

                                     By the Court (Wolohojian,
                                       Singh & Hand, JJ.8),

                                     Clerk

Entered:   August 25, 2023.

7 Nothing in this decision should be read to conflate the
standards applicable to the plaintiffs' various claims in this
case.
8 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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