Court Opinion

ID: 9634743
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:22:10.397365+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:09.236162
License: Public Domain

DON BURGESS, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur with opinion of the Court on motion for rehearing. Because I disagree with the majority’s opinion on the substantive issue originally presented in the relator’s petition, I respectfully dissent. While this is a sparse record, this much we do know:
1 — Jemece Richard was appointed temporary guardian of Jimmy Mays.
2 — Rose Mays deposited a check from Louisiana-Pacific to Jimmy Mays into the Texaco Credit Union and then withdrew the cash.
3 — There was a prior hearing where the Judge verbally ordered Rose to pay the money into the registry of the court.
4 — Rose gave Johnson the money after she was told to “bring [the money] to court.”
5 — The hearing conducted on July 21, 2004 was not a contempt hearing, “because there was not a prior written order.”
6 — At the conclusion of the July 21, 2004 hearing, the court verbally ordered Rose and Johnson to deposit $24,150 into the registry of the court by 9:30 a.m., July 22, 2004.
7 — A written order reciting the verbal order and setting a hearing for 10:30 am on July 22, 2004. The order was signed July 22, 2004.
8 — The order committing Johnson to jail recites the verbal order of July 21 and finds Johnson is able to deposit the funds but has refused to do so and finds Johnson in contempt, but does not recite that a hearing was held.
Therefore, based solely on the record, Mr. Johnson is, at best, a gratuitous bail-*274ee1 of the money from Ms. Mays or, at worst, a thief of the money from Ms. Mays or Ms. Richard. As I view the record, Mr. Johnson had no knowledge of the dispute between Ms. Mays or Ms. Richard nor any knowledge of the verbal order that Ms. Mays deposit the proceeds of the check into the registry of the court. All Mr. Johnson knew was Ms. Mays asked him to keep the money until she could take it to court. Under these facts, Mr. Johnson clearly had no fiduciary relationship with Ms. Richard, the court or Ms. Mays, for “[a] bailment generally does not create a formal, fiduciary relationship between bail-ee and bailor.” Prime Products, Inc. v. S.S.I. Plastics, Inc., 97 S.W.3d 631, 637 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (citing Bank One, Texas, N.A. v. Stewart, 967 S.W.2d 419, 442 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied)). Johnson’s only relationship (bailor/bailee) was with Ms. Mays and either he negligently (failed to take proper care of the money) or intentionally (stole the money) breached that relationship.
If the trial court and the majority believes Johnson negligently breached his duty,2 then this is a pre-suit, pre-judgment civil commitment under the guise of contempt. If the trial court and the majority believes Johnson intentionally breached his duty,3 then this is either a pre-suit, prejudgment civil commitment under the guise of contempt or a pre-trial, pre-sen-tence criminal commitment under the guise of contempt.4 Neither of these three rationales are constitutional.
A similar case, not mentioned by the majority, is Currie v. Drake, 550 S.W.2d 736, 741 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref d n.r.e.). The court stated:
At the conclusion of the hearing the court entered an order directing that actions be taken. A portion of that order directed that Holt and Currie return moneys which were owed to the estate. The order does not direct appellants to deliver to the executor a specific identified fund in being, but only to repay the amount of money previously received. Consequently, this portion of the order is a direction for payment of a debt, and if the parties do not comply, it would not be enforceable by contempt. Tex. Const, art. I, s 18. The proper remedy would have been a judgment on which execution might be levied. Northwestern Fuel Co. v. Brock, [139 U.S. 216, 220, 11 S.Ct. 523, 35 L.Ed. 151 (1891) ], and Salgo v. Hoffman, 521 S.W.2d 922, 925 (Tex.Civ.App.Dallas 1975, no writ). Accordingly, we reverse the order and remand the cause to the probate court with instructions to conduct a hearing *275wherein testimony may be taken concerning the payment of the claim and offsets, if any, and render a judgment accordingly.
Here, too, the proper remedy is not an order of contempt, but a suit for conversion. I would grant the writ, release Mr. Johnson and not subject him to further contempt proceedings.

. Cash may be the subject of a bailment. See Tellez v. Tellez, 531 S.W.2d 368, 369 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1975, no writ); Bloom v. Bloom, 767 S.W.2d 463, 469 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1989, writ denied).

. "A bailee has the duty to exercise ordinary care over the goods and is therefore 'responsible’ for the bailor’s goods.” Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word, Houston, Texas v. Meaux, 122 S.W.3d 428, 431 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2003, pet. denied).

. "Theft as defined in Section 31.03 constitutes a single offense superseding the separate offenses previously known as theft, theft by false pretext, conversion by a bailee, theft from the person, shoplifting, acquisition of property by threat, swindling, swindling by worthless check, embezzlement, extortion, receiving or concealing embezzled property, and receiving or concealing stolen property.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.02 (Vernon 2003).

.The majority has certainly made it easier to retrieve stolen money; one may simply order the bank robber to return the money and if there is no compliance, hold the robber in contempt and civilly commit the robber until the money is returned. A novel approach but with definite constitutional infirmities.