Court Opinion

ID: 9889296
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-08 23:11:22.97395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:50:01.957052
License: Public Domain

In the Court of Criminal
           Appeals of Texas
                           ══════════
                          No. WR-28,073-02
                           ══════════

               EX PARTE JAMES HARRY REYOS,
                              Applicant

   ═══════════════════════════════════════
         On Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus
                 In Cause No. A-14,583-B
                In the 70th District Court
                      Ector County
   ═══════════════════════════════════════

      YEARY, J., filed a concurring opinion.

      Applicant was convicted of murder and sentenced to thirty-eight
years’ imprisonment in 1983. His conviction was affirmed by the Eighth
Court of Appeals the following year. Reyos v. State, No. 08-83-0026-CR
(Tex. App.—El Paso, Nov. 21, 1984). Applicant made this application
this year, in 2023, on the grounds that new evidence proves he is
                                                              REYOS – 2

actually innocent.
      Today the Court grants Applicant post-conviction habeas relief
based on his claim of actual innocence. In my view, Applicant has
satisfied the burden established in Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The new fingerprint evidence alone is enough to
reach that conclusion. Where my thinking differs is that the Court
declares Applicant to be “actually innocent” by virtue of meeting this
standard alone. For reasons that I have expressed before, I disagree with
the Court’s use of the term “actually innocent” when granting relief
under Elizondo; simply satisfying the Elizondo burden is not enough to
prove literal “actual innocence.” See Ex parte Cacy, 543 S.W.3d 802, 803
(Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (Yeary, J., concurring) (“The Elizondo standard,
on its face, does not really focus on innocence per se. It is, instead, an
exceedingly high burden by which an applicant must show that, if newly
available evidence were added to the evidentiary mix, no reasonable jury
would have found the State’s case to have been compelling enough to
defeat the systemic presumption of innocence.”).
      Because I am persuaded Applicant has met his burden under
Elizondo, I respectfully concur.

FILED:                                         October 4, 2023
DO NOT PUBLISH