Court Opinion

ID: 9492962
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:54:10.836389+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:34.224642
License: Public Domain

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
In holding that Perez-Lastor was denied due process at his deportation hearing, the court hypothesizes that Perez-Lastor’s difficulty communicating with his interpreter “caused” the BIA to conclude that Perez-Lastor’s testimony was not credible. Because neither Perez-Lastor nor the record indicates how correct translations at the hearing would have refuted the BIA’s adverse credibility determination, I must respectfully dissent.
I
In order to succeed on a due process claim relating to the competence of the interpreter at his deportation hearing, Perez-Lastor must specifically demonstrate that the interpreter’s performance was prejudicial to his application for asylum and withholding of deportation. In short, he must show where the interpreter *784failed and how “a better translation would have made a difference in the outcome of the hearing.” Acewicz v. INS, 984 F.2d 1056, 1063 (9th Cir.1993).
Perez-Lastor has not carried this burden. He has neither indicated exactly which exchanges, if any, were mistranslated nor revealed what he otherwise would have said in the context of those exchanges that would have altered the outcome of his proceeding. In other words, Pere&-Lastor has not demonstrated that there were “instances in which an incorrect or incomplete translation prevented him from presenting relevant evidence.” Id1 Although we might be able to imagine such instances, that is not our role. If it were, there would be no point in requiring a showing of prejudice-any judge, after all, can concoct an ironclad case for asylum in the abstract. As it is, we do require a showing of prejudice, and Perez-Lastor must make that showing. See Kotasz v. INS, 31 F.3d 847, 850 (9th Cir.1994); Hartooni v. INS, 21 F.3d 336, 340 (9th Cir.1994) (“Because there is no evidence in this case of any specific instance where the interpreter is alleged to have erred, we cannot say that the interpretation influenced the outcome of the hearing.”).2
II
That Perez-Lastor’s showing of prejudice is supported not by his own assertions but by the groundless conjecture of the majority is readily apparent. The majority recites first that Perez-Lastor’s application was undermined because his “inability to understand the IJ’s questions prevented him from explaining to the IJ why he did not provide a Quiche or Spanish language version of the declaration.” Supra at 780. Perez-Lastor, however, has never proffered such an explanation-or even claimed that it would have been satisfactory.3 The majority simply takes as an article of faith that Perez-Lastor had some valid explanation that he would have given but for the faulty translation. Absent the majority’s baseless presumption, the record before us indicates that Perez-Lastor in fact had no idea what was in the English-language declaration (a state of affairs that is not unlikely, given that Perez-Lastor knows no English), and its exclusion was not the result of faulty translation at all.
From its pure speculation on the proba-tiveness of Perez-Lastor’s English-language declaration, the majority bootstraps another inference of prejudice that is inevi*785tably just as groundless. Specifically, the majority hypothesizes that the BIA imper-missibly “disbelieved Perez-Lastor’s testimony because he could not communicate effectively at the hearing.” Supra at 780. This hypothesis rests on the premise that “three of the reasons given by the BIA for sustaining the IJ’s adverse credibility finding ... would not have had a basis if the declaration had been admitted into the record.” Supra at 781. Absent the majority’s unfettered conjecture as to whether the declaration should havé been admitted, however, there is no reason not to conclude that the BIA’s adverse credibility determination rested squarely on the three inconsistencies that the BIA cited rather than on Perez-Lastor’s “inability to communicate effectively.” As to those inconsistencies, Perez-Lastor has never claimed, and the record does not indicate, that they are the result of any mistranslation.
The majority also attributes two other reasons given by the BIA for its adverse credibility finding to the incompetent translation. The first of these reasons was that the BIA doubted Perez-Lastor’s claim that his persecutors had threatened him by saying: “[Wjhenever we find you, we will kill you.” The BIA’s incredulity derived quite reasonably from the fact that the very claim that Perez-Lastor’s persecutors had delivered the threat established that they had inexplicably forgone the opportunity to carry it out. The majority rejects the possibility that Perez-Lastor was simply tripped up by his own embellishments,' hypothesizing instead that his claim was rendered incredible by the poor translation of a “figure of speech.” Supra at 781. This is a plausible hypothesis, but Perez-Lastor has never asserted that it has any basis in fact.4
The second basis for the BIA’s adverse credibility determination that the majority attributes to incompetent translation is Perez-Lastor’s inconsistent assertion at the hearing that he was not a member'of a civil defense unit in Guatemala. The majority posits that Perez-Lastor must have been referring only to civil defense units in Guatemala City rather than to' civil defense units anywhere in the country. This hypothesis rests on the majority’s observation that “Guatemalans refer to ‘Guatemala City’ simply as.‘Guatemala,’ just as ‘New York City’ is often referred to as ‘New York.’ ” Supra at 781. Although the majority’s observation may well be correct, there is no support for it in the record, and Perez-Lastor has never done anything more than indirectly suggest that it is true (and he did that for the first time in this court). Far more damaging to the majority’s divination of prejudice here, however, is the fact that even Perez-Lastor does not attribute his inconsistent testimony about his membership in a civil defense unit to inaccuracies in translation.5
The majority’s conclusion that incompetent translation prejudiced the outcome of Perez-Lastor’s deportation hearing is thus plainly founded on neither Perez-Lastor’s own. allegations nor the evidence in the record. The conclusion rests instead on the majority’s groundless conjecture about what Perez-Lastor would have said or actually did say. ■ If such conjecture were all *786it took to establish prejudice, Perez-La-stor would not be required to show prejudice, for the reviewing judge could just imagine it for him. Perez-Lastor is required to show prejudice, however, and he has not.
Ill
Because Perez-Lastor has not shown that the government-provided interpreter’s incompetence prejudiced the outcome of his hearing, his due process claim cannot provide a basis for reversing the BIA. I respectfully dissent.

.The court holds that the asylum-seeker can show prejudice without citing such instances. See supra at 780 n. 8. Hence, according to the majority, "evidence that the translation caused the BIA to disbelieve the petitioner’s testimony is sufficient” in Perez-Lastor's case. Id.
I fail to see any relevant difference between the majority’s articulation of the petitioner’s burden and the conventional one laid out in Acewicz. Where an incorrect translation "caused” an adverse credibility determination, the incorrect translation must either have added inconsistent elements to the petitioner’s otherwise accurately translated testimony or "prevented [the petitioner] from presenting relevant evidence” by altering the actual substance of the questions and answers. No one suggests in this case that the translator added any information, so the majority's reformulation of Perez-Lastor’s burden hardly lightens his load.

. I do not maintain, as the majority indicates, that the scope of our review is limited to the "facts identified by Perez-Lastor.” Supra at 777 n. 4. Our review is limited, however, to the actual record and allegations properly before us. Conjecture about what Perez-Lastor might have said falls under neither rubric.

. Before this court, Perez-Lastor does allege (for the first time) that his negative response to the IJ’s question of whether he understood the contents of his English-language declaration was really only meant to indicate that he did not understand English. This is too little too late. First, Perez-Lastor’s novel assertions of prejudice in his petition for review cannot be used to reverse the BIA’s decision. See Hartooni, 21 F.3d at 340 ("Our review is limited to the administrative record upon which the deportation order is based.”). Second, Perez-Lastor still has not asserted that he actually knew the contents of the declaration when he was asked about it at his deportation hearing.

. Indeed, the majority professes to base its hypothesis merely on a “reasonable interpretation” of the statement as it-was translated. Supra at 781. This fact alone suggests that there was no prejudice here. If the translation of Perez-Lastor's statement was not itself inaccurate, then the BIA’s adverse credibility determination rested not on "incompetent translation” but on a misinterpretation of the evidence-an error for which reversal could be obtained only if Perez-Lastor were to bear a much heavier burden than he is expected to shoulder here. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483-84, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992) (requiring the petitioner to "present evidence so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution”).

. Perez-Lastor's counsel hypothesizes in his opening brief to this court only that "[Perez-Lastor] probably thought the questions were specific to Guatemala City, given the context of when they were asked” (emphasis added).