Court Opinion

ID: 9595838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:43:37.488206+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:05.860572
License: Public Domain

Sears, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
1. The majority opinion in Division 2 makes this the first State Supreme Court in the nation that has failed to acknowledge the established principle that the mid-trial substitution of a judge prejudices a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Despite the existence of an enormous body of instructive case and statutory law which establishes this principle, the majority opinion merely “as*14sumes, for purposes of this appeal only” that the mid-trial substitution of the judge in this case “implicated” McIntyre’s right to a fair trial. Moreover, in its perfunctory analysis of the impact of the substitution of the judge in this case upon McIntyre’s right to a fair trial, the majority has both relied upon authority that is not applicable to this case, and omitted crucial facts from its analysis. Although I recognize that the crime McIntyre was convicted of was heinous, depraved, and revolting, I cannot countenance this sort of legal analysis or its unconstitutional conclusion. I therefore strongly dissent to Division 2 of the majority opinion.
2. First, Division 2 of the majority opinion lacks any authority to support its conclusion. People v. Espinoza,3 for example, is cited to support the inference that the mid-trial substitution of a trial judge may not “implicate” the right to a fair trial. Op. at 9.4 However, Espinoza does not discuss the established principle that the right to a fair trial is prejudiced by the mid-trial substitution of a judge. That particular principle has been acknowledged by every State Supreme Court, save this one, to consider this question.5 Further amplifying its misunderstanding of the basic constitutional principle of a fair trial, the majority opinion does not even address the impact of the mid-trial substitution of the judge in this case upon McIntyre’s right to a fair trial, nor does it recognize the vast volume of authority that is contrary to its ruling.
Moreover, the majority fails to note that the substitution of the trial judge in Espinoza was made pursuant to California Penal Code § 1053, which legislatively provides for the substitution of a trial judge who becomes incapacitated and cannot complete the trial.6 Similarly, the majority’s citations to annotated legal compilations is misplaced, as they all concern Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 25 (a), which prescribes constitutional safeguards to ensure that the right to a fair trial is not compromised when it becomes imperative that a *15judge in a criminal trial be substituted.7 In contrast, Georgia has no statutory provision that provides such safeguards to criminal defendants in this State. Finally, the trial judge in Espinoza was incapacitated and incapable of completing the trial due to chemotherapy treatments he was undergoing.8 The judge presiding over McIntyre’s trial faced a family emergency that required his temporary absence, but he was not incapacitated, inasmuch as he indicated on the record that he was capable of completing the trial after a continuance.
The majority’s reliance at p. 9 upon Koza v. State9 as support for its overbroad edict that “in Georgia, the temporary absence of a trial judge without suspension of the trial is not a basis for reversal unless the complaining party shows prejudice resulting from the absence” is also woefully misplaced. First, Koza dealt with the temporary absence of a judge during voir dire of the jury pool.10 Virtually every court to have considered this issue, including authority relied upon by the majority, has agreed that the substitution of the trial judge does not impact upon the right to a fair trial until the first introduction of evidence, a position that is entirely consistent with Koza.11 Second, the facts of this case do not involve the “temporary absence” of a judge during voir dire, but rather the wholesale substitution of the judge mid-way through the evidentiary portion of a criminal trial.12
Nor does United States v. Boswell support the majority’s conclusion that the mid-trial substitution of a judge is generally subject to harmless error analysis. Op. at 9. The defendant in Boswell consented to the substitution of the judge during closing arguments, after the close of evidence,13 and thus Boswell’s finding of harmless error is entirely consistent with the law in Georgia and other jurisdictions.14 Fi*16nally, it should be noted that while the Texas Court of Appeals ruling in Jimenez v. State15 appears to be an anomaly, this Court now enjoys the distinction of issuing the only majority opinion in the nation to cite that case. When considered against the volume of authority that is contrary to the majority opinion, which I discuss in Division 3 below, the vacuous authority cited by the majority thoroughly discredits the ruling that it purports to support.
3. While the question of whether different judges may preside over a criminal trial despite the objection of counsel is one of first impression for this Court, it has been addressed by other federal and state courts.16 The opinions of these courts establish that the substitution of a judge during a trial must (1) be rigorously governed, (2) only be permitted when absolutely necessary and imperative to the due administration of justice, and (3) only be allowed after stringent safeguards are put in place to ensure that the accused’s right to a fair trial suffers no prejudice as a result of the substitution.17
Until quite recently, virtually all jurisdictions have subscribed to a general rule that prohibits entirely the substitution of a judge in a criminal trial after the introduction of evidence and before the verdict is rendered.18 The theory behind this general rule is that the only judge competent to instruct the jury and otherwise exercise his discretion is the judge who hears all of the testimony, observes the demeanor and forms opinions as to the credibility of all of the witnesses, and “knows something of the ‘atmosphere’ of the case.”19 It is, of course, axiomatic that jury instructions given by a judge must be tailored to the facts in evidence, and therefore necessarily require an application of the law to the particular facts of a case.20 The general rule absolutely prohibiting judicial substitution reasons that a judge *17who assumes the bench after the first introduction of evidence does not have first-hand knowledge of what took place at the trial before the substitution, and therefore is not qualified to charge the jury properly.21
Some courts also have recognized that the right to a criminal trial by jury means a
trial by a tribunal consisting of at least one judge and twelve jurors, all of whom must remain identical from the beginning to the end. . . . The continuous presence of the same judge and jury is equally essential throughout the whole of the trial.22
Under the general rule, a criminal defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial is prejudiced, and a reversal of any conviction is mandated, when he is denied adjudication of his guilt or innocence before a presiding judge with first-hand knowledge of all of the trial’s proceedings.23
I agree with the general rule against substitution of a judge over a party’s objection insofar as it recognizes that the due process right to a fair and impartial trial requires that the judge who charges the jury, exercises judicial discretion, and presides over the adjudication of innocence or guilt must be thoroughly knowledgeable of what has transpired during the trial. However, I disagree with the general rule insofar as it reasons that these necessary components of a fair trial can only be provided by a judge who gained his knowledge of a trial’s proceedings due to his actual presence in the courtroom.
As explained below, I believe that there may be some rare instances when it is absolutely imperative to the due administration of justice to allow the substitution of a judge, so long as procedural and substantive safeguards are put in place to protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial. For example, it may be necessary to substitute a presiding judge who becomes completely incapacitated, and incapable of fulfilling his duty to preside over an entire trial, at a late stage of *18proceedings in a lengthy and complex criminal trial which has consumed an inordinate amount of the parties’ and court’s time and resources. In that type of situation, the only alternative to substituting the incapacitated judge would be to declare a mistrial. However, depending upon the circumstances of the trial, the detrimental effect of a mistrial upon the court and the State may override the defendant’s right to have the trial presided over by a single judge.
In those types of circumstances, with the aid of advanced techniques for recording trial proceedings, the procedures which are explained below would safeguard the right to a fair trial while simultaneously allowing the trial to continue before a substitute judge. Because the general rule’s inflexibility does not provide for these types of rare instances, and cannot accommodate the few situations when judicial substitution should be allowed, I would reject the general rule’s blanket prohibition against the substitution of a judge, and advocate the adoption of these procedural safeguards.
4. A number of States, as well as the federal government, have modified the general rule by establishing procedures to govern the exceptional instances when the substitution of a judge should be allowed over a party’s objection.24 These procedures, together with the cases noted in Division 3, provide guidance, ignored by the majority, for determining when and under what circumstances a judge may substitute for another judge during the course of a criminal trial after the first introduction of evidence and before the rendering of the verdict.
First, it should be unequivocal that the substitution of a judge should never be permitted except in the most extraordinary circumstances.25 The exigency which necessitates the substitution should involve only the incapacitation of the presiding judge by either death or debilitating physical, psychological or emotional illness or trauma.26 In short, the presiding judge must be incapable of performing her duty to preside over the trial. It should not be sufficient that the presiding judge has other engagements, duties or personal obligations.27 *19Absent debilitating or incapacitating illness or trauma, substitution of a judge in a criminal trial should not be considered as an option.
Second, the substitution of a judge should be absolutely necessary.28 By this I mean that no alternatives less drastic than substitution can be available. Whenever less drastic alternatives are available, and can be reasonably implemented, they should be opted for in lieu of substituting a judge. The overriding preference whenever possible should be for the presiding judge to order a continuance of the trial for a reasonable time. It should never be sufficient to forego such a continuance in favor of substituting a judge merely because it will be difficult for the trial court, the parties, counsel, or witnesses to reschedule their affairs in order to accommodate the continuance. The presiding judge also should consider all other possible alternatives to substitution, including reordering the witnesses, changing the order of the trial, and ordering a recess. Only when all practical alternatives to substitution have been considered and rejected for legitimate reasons on the record should the presiding judge consider whether the circumstances of the particular trial warrant allowing substitution.
Third, substitution of a judge should be imperative to the due administration of justice.29 By this I mean that, on balance, the circumstances of the particular trial at the time of substitution should weigh in favor of allowing substitution rather than declaring a mistrial. Circumstances which should be weighed in making this determination include, but are not limited to, the number of witnesses who already have testified,30 the length of the trial transcript, the amount of time consumed by prior proceedings, the expected amount of time necessary to complete the trial, the expense of retrial, the anticipated amount of time required for a substitute judge to familiarize himself with the record, the complexity of the facts and evidentiary issues of the case, the functions that a substitute judge likely will be called upon to perform,31 and where the parties stand in their presentations of their cases.32 Substitution of a judge should only be allowed after the presiding judge has balanced on the record all relevant characteristics of the particular trial and determined that they weigh in favor of substitution rather than declaring a mistrial.
Finally, in those rare instances when, after complying with the rules discussed above, it is determined that substitution of a judge should be allowed, before a substitute judge presides over the trial, *20she should be required to certify on the record that she has reviewed the trial transcript and thoroughly familiarized herself with the prior proceedings, and is prepared to proceed with and finish the trial.33 In order to accomplish this, a substitute judge ordinarily should read, or have read to her, a written transcript, listen to an audio recording, and/or listen to and watch a visual recording of the prior proceedings.34 Regardless of the method used, the end result should give a substitute judge a sufficient grasp of the prior testimony and proceedings to enable her fairly and effectively to exercise her discretion in issuing rulings, and properly to instruct the jury.35 A substitute judge’s certification should specify the method used to gain familiarity with the record, and any objections to the method specified must be entered at the time of certification, as must be all other objections to the substitution of a judge.36
Absent compliance with the rules discussed above, it should be presumed that the substitution of a judge has prejudiced a criminal defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial, and a new trial should be awarded unless the presumption of prejudice is rebutted.37 However, when properly followed, these rules would adequately safeguard a criminal defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial, by ensuring that the judge who charges the jury, otherwise exercises his discretion, and presides over the adjudication of innocence or guilt is thoroughly knowledgeable of what has transpired during the trial.
5. In this case, Judge Noland’s relinquishment of the bench to Judge James was not done in a manner which safeguarded McIntyre’s right to a fair trial. First, the record fails to support a finding that Judge Noland was debilitated and incapable of presiding over McIntyre’s trial. The loss of Judge Noland’s grandchild was tragic and traumatic, and would have justified an extended temporary absence from the bench. However, nothing in the record supports a finding that his unfortunate loss constituted an incapacitating trauma. Contrary to the concurring opinion, I do not in any way mean to imply that the death of a family member cannot be an incapacitating or debilitating event; common sense and decency dictate otherwise.38 I *21merely note that the record in this case fails to support such a finding.
Second, it was not necessary to substitute the judge in this case because a continuance could and should have been ordered. Judge Noland left the bench on June 8, 1988, in order to attend a funeral held on the following morning. Allowing time to spend with his family, surely a priority under the circumstances, it would have been reasonable to expect Judge Noland to resume his position on the bench within seven days. Hence, a continuance of no more than one week, while slightly inconvenient, would have been eminently possible and certainly preferable to the drastic step of substituting the judge. The State’s claim that a continuance would have been problematic because of its busy trial calendar and the scheduling of its witnesses was insufficient to preclude ordering a continuance. Under these circumstances, where a continuance was the most reasonable and efficient means available, I believe that it was error not to order that the trial be continued until Judge Noland could resume his place on the bench and fulfill his duty to preside over the trial.
Third, the trial court erred in failing to balance the circumstances of McIntyre’s trial at the time of substitution and determine whether the due administration of justice favored allowing substitution rather than declaring a mistrial. Because the trial court failed to make this determination by balancing factors such as, inter alia, how much time McIntyre’s trial had already consumed, the anticipated amount of time necessary to complete McIntyre’s trial, the expense of retrial, whether rulings on any evidentiary issues were pending, and whether the State had nearly completed the presentation of its case against McIntyre, there is no record from which to determine whether the due administration of justice warranted permitting the substitution of Judge Noland.
Finally, despite defense counsel’s request that he do so, Judge James expressed reluctance to review the transcript of prior proceedings, and before assuming the bench failed to certify for the record that he had reviewed the trial record and was prepared to preside over and complete the trial. Indeed, contrary to the concurring opinion, the only logical conclusion to be drawn is that Judge James did not review the record before taking the bench, as he became the presiding judge only 15 minutes after Judge Noland stepped down. I believe that Judge Noland’s failure to comply with these rules governing the substitution of a judge, along with Judge James’ failure to familiarize himself with the prior proceedings before taking the bench, deprived McIntyre of a fair trial by (1) allowing the substitution of a judge when it was not absolutely necessary, and without first determining whether it was imperative to the due administration of justice; and (2) permitting a judge who was not knowledgeable of the entire *22trial’s proceedings to preside over the adjudication of guilt or innocence, charge the jury, and otherwise exercise judicial discretion.
6. The majority opinion incorrectly states that the “general rule” is that the substitution of judges is subject to harmless error analysis. Not only do the cases cited by the majority fail to support this ruling, recent United States Supreme Court rulings lead me to conclude that the erroneous substitution of a judge and resulting denial of the right to a fair trial is one of the very limited class of errors that is not susceptible to harmless error analysis.
The current test for determining which errors are subject to harmless error analysis was established in Arizona v. Fulminante,39 In Fulminante, the Supreme Court divided errors into two types: trial errors and structural defects.40 Harmless error analysis applies to trial errors, while structural defects remain subject to automatic reversal.41 The plurality in Fulminante defined “trial errors” as errors in the trial process that occur in a party’s presentation of its case, and can therefore be quantitatively assessed.42 On the other hand, “structural defects” are errors that affect the framework or the conduct of the tried.43 While there are few “structural defects,” the Supreme Court noted that they include, inter alia, the right to an impartial judge, the right to counsel, and the right to a public trial.44 Structural defects, it should be noted, cannot be harmless because they create a “serious risk of injustice which infects the trial itself.”45 Unlike the vast majority of errors, a structural error cannot be quantitatively assessed “in the context of other evidence presented” in order to determine whether “its admission” was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.46
The error of substituting a judge without the imposition of constitutional safeguards to ensure the preservation of the right to a fair trial is not capable of being qualitatively assessed with “other evidence” to determine whether “its admission” was harmless beyond a *23reasonable doubt.47 Rather, the error that occurred in this case when Judge Noland relinquished the bench effected a structural defect in the constitution of the trial mechanism itself, created a serious risk of injustice, and infected the integrity of McIntyre’s criminal adjudication.48 Hence, it is not susceptible to harmless error analysis. I therefore would order that this matter be remanded to the trial court for a new trial.
Decided November 6, 1995 —
Reconsideration denied December 4, 1995.
J. M. Raffauf, for appellant.
David McDade, District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paige R. Whitaker, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
7. I agree with Division 4 of the majority opinion that the trial court erred in failing to give McIntyre’s requested jury charge regarding witness impeachment. I write separately in order to highlight the change in our precedent that this ruling represents.
The majority’s ruling recognizes that, for purposes of a requested charge on witness impeachment, there is no basis for distinguishing between the State’s failure to object to a line of testimony sought on cross-examination, and the State’s elicitation of that same line of testimony on direct examination. If the former constitutes a waiver of the best evidence rule, then so must the latter. In this case, the State waived its best evidence objection for purposes of the witness impeachment charge sought by the defense when it elicited on direct examination its own witness’s admission to a prior criminal conviction. Having elicited such an admission from its own witness, the State cannot complain that the conviction is not established for purposes of a jury charge on impeachment without a certified copy of the conviction.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Fletcher joins in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.

 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 682 (1992).

 In Espinoza, the California Supreme Court rejected certain reasoning discussed in Freeman v. United States, 227 F 732 (2nd Cir. 1915) that the right to a trial by jury means the right to a tribunal consisting of 12 jurors and a single judge, all of whom must remain constant throughout the trial. Id. at 759-760. Freeman reasoned in part that because the right to a trial by jury could not be waived, the right to a single judge was inviolate. Id. In light of the United States Supreme Court’s subsequent ruling that the right to a jury trial can be waived, see Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276 (50 SC 253, 74 LE 854) (1930), it is hardly surprising that this particular line of reasoning from Freeman would be questioned. However, this only means that after Patton, a criminal defendant may consent to the substitution of the presiding judge. 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 392 (1982). Virtually all state and federal courts continue to adhere to Freeman’s ruling that a judge in a criminal case may not be substituted after evidence has been adduced before the original judge. See 46 AmJur2d 332, § 249; notes 15-21, infra, and accompanying text.

 See notes 15-21, infra, and accompanying text.

 Espinoza, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 695.

 See 73 ALR Fed. 833, 839, § 4; 75 AmJur2d 444, § 222. The majority has overlooked the fact that, even with the added safeguard of Federal Rule 25 (a), at least one noted commentator maintains that, absent the defendant’s consent, the substitution of a judge after the evidentiary portion of a criminal trial has begun is unconstitutional. See C. Wright, 2 Federal Practice & Procedure, § 392 (1982).

 Espinoza, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 694, n. 1.

 158 Ga. App. 709 (282 SE2d 131) (1981).

 Id., 158 Ga. App. at 710.

 See, e.g., n. 5, supra; Jones v. State, 57 Ala. App. 275 (327 S2d 913) (1975), cert. denied, 295 Ala. 409 (1976); State v. Amarillas, 141 Ariz. 620 (688 P2d 628) (1984); People v. Rodriguez, 786 P2d 472 (Colo. 1989); People v. McCline, 442 Mich. 127 (499 NW2d 341) (1993); Bellah v. State, 415 SW2d 418 (Tex. 1967); 46 AmJur2d 332, Judges, § 249; 83 ALR2d 1032, § 2 (b).

 Notably, the substitution in this case occurred almost exactly at the half-way point of the evidentiary period of the five-day trial — after two and one-half days of testimony, and at a point where the State had introduced forty-four of its eighty-eight pieces of evidence.

 565 F2d 1338,1341 (5th Cir. 1978). Contra Randel v. Beto, 354 F2d 496, 501 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 387 U. S. 935 (87 SC 2058, 18 LE2d 996) (1967).

 See Griner v. State, 162 Ga. App. 207, 211 (291 SE2d 76) (1982) (failure to object to substitution); Strickland v. State, 156 Ga. App. 475, 476-477 (274 SE2d 823) (1980) (defendant consented to substitution); Throgmorton v. Trammell, 90 Ga. App. 433, 435 (83 SE2d *16256) (1954) (same); C. Wright, 2 Federal Practice & Procedure, § 392 (1982).

 838 SW2d 661, 666 (Tex. App. 1992).

 Any intimation by the majority that this issue has previously been considered by Georgia courts is misguided. As noted, the majority’s reference to Koza is misplaced, as the substitution at issue in that case took place during voir dire. See notes 8, 10, supra.

 See, e.g., Randel v. Beto, 354 F2d at 501; Hood v. State, 334 Md. 52, 57 (637 A2d 1208) (1994); Commonwealth v. Thompson, 328 Pa. 27, 29 (195 A 115) (1937); State v. McKinley, 7 Ohio App. 3d 255, 257 (455 NE2d 503) (1982).

 See Thompson, 328 Pa. at 29; Freeman v. United States, 227 F at 759-760; People v. McCline, 442 Mich, at 128; Bailey v. State, 397 NE2d 1024, 1026-1027 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); State v. Davis, 564 SW2d 876, 878 (Mo. 1978); State v. Johnson, 55 Wash. 2d 594, 596 (349 P2d 227) (1960); State v. McClain, 194 La. 605, 612 (194 S 563) (1940); Durden v. People, 192 Ill. 493, 498 (61 NE 317) (1901); Blend v. People, 41 NY 604 (1870); Commonwealth v. Zeger, 200 Pa. Super. 92, 99 (186 A2d 922) (1962); see also 83 ALR2d 1032, Substitution of Judge in Criminal Case, § 2 (1962 and Supp. 1991); 46 AmJur2d 331, Special, Substitute, or Pro Tern Judges, § 249 (1994).

 Thompson, 328 Pa. at 29; see McCline, 442 Mich, at 131; Johnson, 55 Wash, at 596.

 Durden, 192 Ill. at 498; see Nelson v. State, 262 Ga. 763, 766 (426 SE2d 357) (1993); Joiner v. State, 163 Ga. App. 521, 523 (295 SE2d 219) (1982).

 McCline, 442 Mich, at 133 (“As a rule, a judge cannot finish the performance of a duty already entered upon by his predecessor where that duty involves the exercise of judgment and the application of legal knowledge to, and judicial deliberation of, facts known only to the predecessor.”); Thompson, 328 Pa. at 29; Durden, 192 Ill. at 498; see Johnson, 55 Wash, at 596; McClain, 194 La. at 613; 83 ALR2d at 1033.

 Freeman, 227 P at 759-760. Accord Davis, 564 SW2d at 878; Durden, 192 Ill. at 500; see Bailey, 397 NE2d at 1026.

 See Randel, 354 F2d at 500; McClain, 194 La. at 605; Durden, 192 Ill. at 493; 83 ALR2d at 1033; cf. Turney v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 532 (47 SC 437, 71 LE 749) (1927) (affirming criminal defendant’s right to an impartial judge; “[ejvery procedure .. . which might lead [a judge] not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused denies the latter due process of law.”).

 See, e.g., Alaska Rules of Crim. Pro., Rule 25; Arizona Rules of Crim. Pro., Rule 19.5; California Penal Code at 1053; Delaware Court of Common Pleas Rules of Crim. Pro., Rule 25; Florida Rules of Crim. Pro., Rule 3.321; Iowa Rules of Crim. Pro., Rule 18 (7) (b); Maryland Rules of Crim. Pro., Rule 750; Massachusetts Rules of Crim. Pro., Rule 38; Minnesota Rules of Crim. Pro., Rule 26.03 (13); Nevada Revised Statutes at 175.091; North Dakota Rules of Crim. Pro., Rule 25; Ohio Rules of Crim. Pro., Rule 25; Puerto Rico Rules of Crim. Pro., Rule 186; Virgin Islands Rules of Crim. Pro., Rule 25; Virginia Code at 19.2-154; Wyoming Rules of Crim. Pro., Rule 26; Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 25 (a).

 Randel, 354 F2d at 501; Hood, 334 Md. at 57; Thompson, 328 Pa. at 28; McKinley, 7 Ohio App. 3d at 258.

 See Randel, 354 F2d at 501; Hood, 334 Md. at 56; People v. Gonzalez, 51 Cal. 3d 1179, 1210 (800 P2d 1159) (1990), cert. denied, 502 U. S. 835 (112 SC 117, 116 LE2d 85) (1991).

 See Randel, 354 F2d at 500-501.

 Randel, 354 F2d at 501; Hood, 334 Md. at 57; Thompson, 328 Pa. at 29.

 Randel, supra; Hood, supra; Thompson, supra.

 See McKinley, 7 Ohio App. 3d at 256-257.

 Cf. Hood, 334 Md. at 57; Gonzalez, 51 Cal. 3d at 1211.

 See McKinley, 7 Ohio App. 3d at 256-257.

 Hood, 334 Md. at 56, 59; McKinley, 7 Ohio App. 3d at 257.

 Hood, 334 Md. at 57-58.

 See Hood, 334 Md. at 58-59.

 See Hood, 334 Md. at 58. In this regard, Georgia case law concurs with the majority of jurisdictions that a criminal defendant may consent to judicial substitution or waive any objection thereto on appeal by failing to object at the time of substitution. See Griner v. State, 162 Ga. App. 207, 211 (291 SE2d 76) (1982) (failure to object to substitution); Strickland v. State, 156 Ga. App. 475, 476-477 (274 SE2d 823) (1980) (defendant consented to substitution); Throgmorton v. Trammell, 90 Ga. App. at 435 (same).

 See Hood, 334 Md. at 62; McKinley, 7 Ohio App. 3d at 257-258; see 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 392 (1982).

 See Randel, 354 F2d at 501.

 499 U. S. 279, 307-308 (111 SC 1246, 113 LE2d 302) (Rehnquist, J., plurality op.) (1991). Notably, the majority and the cases that it relies upon do not concern themselves with Fulminante.

 499 U. S. at 307-308.

 Id.

 Id.

 Id.

 Id.

 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335, 343 (100 SC 1708, 64 LE2d 333) (1980). See also Project, Twenty-Fourth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Court of Appeals 1993-1994, 83 Geo. L.J. 1, 1363 (1995); Note, Ake v. Oklahoma and Harmless Error: The Case for a Per Se Rule of Reversal, 81 Va. L. Rev. 521, 538 (1995); Carter, Harmless Error in the Penalty Phase of a Capital Case: A Doctrine Misunderstood and Misapplied, 28 Ga. L. Rev. 125, 130 (1993); Note, Harmless Error Analysis in Louisiana After Fulminante, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 1086, 1088 (1992).

 Fulminante, 499 U. S. at 307-308.

 Id.

 See id.; Cuyler, 446 U. S. at 343.