Court Opinion

ID: 9949954
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-12 21:00:36.505646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:34:43.591362
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 21-4601

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        JOE LINDSEY TAYLOR, III, a/k/a Yosef Hakiem Bey,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
        Asheville. Max O. Cogburn, Jr., District Judge. (1:20-cr-00076-MOC-WCM-1)

        Submitted: January 4, 2024                                        Decided: March 11, 2024

        Before GREGORY, THACKER, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: John G. Baker, Federal Public Defender, Ann L. Hester, Assistant Federal
        Public Defender, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC.,
        Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Dena J. King, United States Attorney, Amy E.
        Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, OFFICE OF THE
        UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Joe Lindsey Taylor, III (“Appellant”), also known as Yosef Hakiem Bey, appeals

        his criminal conviction for possession of a firearm as a felon. He contends that his Sixth

        Amendment rights were violated when the district court allowed him to proceed at trial pro

        se. Specifically, he contends the district court erred when it determined that his waiver of

        counsel was knowing and voluntary.

               We hold that Appellant’s waiver was knowing and voluntary, and we affirm the

        district court.

                                                     I.

               Appellant was arrested in June 2020 when officers executing a warrant on a separate

        matter found him with a firearm. He had previously been convicted of state drug-

        trafficking offenses for which he was sentenced to 8 to 19 months of imprisonment and a

        state robbery offense for which he was sentenced to 29 to 44 months of imprisonment. In

        August 2020, a grand jury indicted Appellant on a single count of possessing a firearm as

        a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

               At his initial appearance, Appellant stated he wished to represent himself. A federal

        public defender was present during the initial appearance, but she remained in the gallery,

        informing the magistrate judge that Appellant did not wish her to represent him. The

        magistrate judge advised Appellant of his right to an attorney and impressed upon him the

        charge he faced as well as the maximum penalties for that charge. Appellant stated he

        understood the charges against him, understood his right to an attorney, and understood

        that several rules with which he was not familiar would govern the proceedings, including

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        the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. J.A. 21 1

        (“You’re not familiar with the rules that would be in effect here, that is, the court

        procedures, Federal Rules of Evidence, or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.”). The

        court further admonished Appellant that it would be unwise to represent himself and that a

        trained lawyer could represent Appellant far better than he could represent himself.

        Specifically, the court “strongly urge[d] [Appellant] not to try to represent [him]self in this

        case.” Id.

               Nonetheless, Appellant insisted he represent himself. The magistrate judge inquired

        if that decision was “entirely voluntary,” and Appellant relied, “Yes.” J.A. 22. The

        Government and the public defender who was present for the hearing each testified that

        they had no reason to doubt that Appellant was knowingly and voluntarily waiving his right

        to counsel. The court finally determined that, notwithstanding its admonition, Appellant

        had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. The court then appointed the

        federal public defender as standby counsel. Appellant objected to that decision.

               Thereafter, at Appellant’s arraignment, the magistrate judge again discussed

        Appellant’s right to counsel with him. The magistrate judge asked a litany of questions

        designed to ensure that Appellant’s waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily. These

        questions included whether Appellant understood that he had a right to counsel at every

        stage of proceedings, including appointed counsel if he could not afford to hire an attorney;

        that Appellant understood the nature of the charge against him, including the specific

               1
                   Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.

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        penalties he faced for that charge; and that Appellant was aware that the Sentencing

        Guidelines, Federal Rules of Evidence, and Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure would

        govern the proceedings. The magistrate judge reminded Appellant, “[I]n representing

        yourself, you must abide by those very technical rules and . . . they will not be relaxed for

        your benefit.” J.A. 33. Last, the magistrate judge once again admonished Appellant that

        he was not familiar with the applicable law or procedures and that a trained lawyer would

        represent him far better than he would represent himself. At this juncture, Appellant stated

        that he would accept the public defender as his counsel. The arraignment went forward

        with the assistance of counsel. Appellant pled not guilty and requested a jury trial.

               But before trial, Appellant’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw. The magistrate

        judge held a hearing on the motion. At the hearing, the public defender informed the court

        that Appellant had decided to proceed pro se and had asked her to withdraw. Appellant

        affirmed that he wanted to represent himself because he felt like he could “handle [his]

        own situation,” because he had obtained representation “on the outside,” 2 and because he

        felt “like he [could] handle [his] situation better than [the public defender].” J.A. 558. He

        argued that he had “a right to represent [him]self,” and he felt “confident in doing that pro

        se.” Id. He further testified that he had discussed his decision with counsel. And the

        public defender stated, “I think that he has an understanding of the potential pitfalls of

               2
                 Appellant was relying on materials from an organization sometimes referred to as
        the Moorish Nation. Some members of this group argue that they are not subject to the
        jurisdiction of the United States. Moorish Sovereign Citizens, Southern Poverty Law
        Center (last visited December 11, 2023), https://perma.cc/UQZ5-SEZH.

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        representing himself so I’m not sure that further discussions will assist him in making this

        decision.” Id. at 560. She likewise stated, in response to the judge’s question whether she

        “ha[d] any concerns about his competency,” “No, Your Honor, not mental competency.”

        Id. at 561. 3

                Even after this exchange, the magistrate judge called a recess to give Appellant and

        the public defender an opportunity to confer. Appellant spoke to his counsel during the

        recess but remained adamant that he wanted to represent himself. After this conferral, the

        public defender emphasized to the court, “He -- not only does he not request my advice, I

        think that he is taking a position that he actively will not cooperate with me to give it and

        so I -- again, at this point I think that he is fairly firm in his decision that he does want to

        represent himself.” J.A. 564. After the public defender’s statement, the court once more

        asked Appellant a series of questions to ensure he willingly chose to represent himself.

        Appellant responded, “Yeah, I’m doing it voluntarily.” Id. at 565.

                The court then gave Appellant the following admonishment:

                               THE COURT: I must advise you, sir, that in my opinion
                        a trained lawyer would defend you far better than you can
                        defend yourself. I think it is unwise of you to try to represent
                        yourself in this case. It does not appear to me that you are
                        familiar with the law or that you are familiar with court
                        procedures or that you are familiar with the rules of evidence.
                        Therefore, I strongly urge you not to try to represent yourself
                        and instead allow yourself to be represented by an attorney.
                               Do you understand the Court’s recommendation in this
                        regard?
                               [APPELLANT]: Yeah, I understand.

                3
                 This discussion took place outside of the prosecutor’s hearing because this portion
        of the hearing was sealed.

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                            THE COURT: In light of the Court’s recommendation,
                     do you still wish to represent yourself in this case?
                            [APPELLANT]: Yes, I strongly do.
                            THE COURT: You’re telling the Court that you
                     understand fully the penalties that you might suffer if you’re
                     found guilty as well as the difficulties with representing
                     yourself and that you still desire to represent yourself and to
                     give up your right to be represented by a lawyer?
                            [APPELLANT]: Yes.
                            THE COURT: Is your decision to represent yourself
                     entirely voluntary?
                            [APPELLANT]: Yes.
                            THE COURT: Has anyone forced you, threatened you,
                     or applied any pressure whatsoever in this regard?
                            [APPELLANT]: No.
                            THE COURT: Is your decision to represent yourself
                     made by you and you alone freely and willingly in all respects?
                            [APPELLANT]: Yes.
                            THE COURT: Is this really what you would like to do?
                            [APPELLANT]: Yes.

        J.A. 569–70. The magistrate judge asked the prosecutor if the prosecutor had any concerns

        about Appellant’s waiver of counsel. The prosecutor expressed concern that some of

        Appellant’s answers made it difficult to determine Appellant’s level of familiarity with

        legal proceedings.

               Nevertheless, the magistrate judge concluded that Appellant’s waiver of his right to

        counsel was knowing and voluntary. Having had the opportunity to observe Appellant, the

        magistrate judge concluded in a written order that Appellant “underst[ood] the proceedings

        and [wa]s choosing to represent himself, notwithstanding the potential dangers of doing so

        and notwithstanding the Court’s recommendation that he not attempt this course of action.”

        J.A. 82.

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                A grand jury returned a superseding indictment against Appellant in December 2020

        for a single charge of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. The district court arraigned

        Appellant, and he pled not guilty and requested a jury trial.

                After several continuances, Appellant’s trial commenced in June 2021. At the

        beginning of trial, Appellant made several jurisdictional arguments tied to his Moorish

        Nation defense and indicated that he did not consent to moving forward. The court

        removed Appellant from the courtroom during voir dire because Appellant was being

        disruptive, but he was allowed to watch proceedings from his holding cell. He returned to

        the courtroom for the Government’s opening statement and remained throughout the rest

        of the trial.

                In its case in chief, the Government presented testimony from the arresting officers

        who found Appellant with the firearm on his person. The Government also called a North

        Carolina probation officer who testified about Appellant’s prior convictions. Appellant

        cross-examined the Government’s witnesses.

                Appellant then offered his own testimony and the testimony of his girlfriend.

        Appellant’s primary defense was that his identity had changed from Joe Lindsey Taylor to

        Yosef Hakiem Bey, so he was not the same person charged with the conduct at issue in the

        case. Appellant also introduced documents purporting to support this defense, and he

        accepted the assistance of standby counsel for the limited purpose of introducing those

        documents. Appellant admitted on cross-examination and in closing argument that he

        possessed the firearm police found on his person in June 2020, but he argued the law did

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        not apply to him because he was a member of the Moorish Nation, and the Second

        Amendment gave him a right to keep and bear arms.

               The jury found Appellant guilty. At sentencing, the district court determined that

        the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) advised a sentence of between 77

        and 96 months. Ultimately, Appellant accepted “full responsibility” for his conduct, J.A.

        526, but claimed he was “under the influence that [he] had lawfully proclaimed [a new]

        nationality” and “was told and encouraged to carry a firearm.” J.A. 526–27. The court

        sentenced Appellant to a below Guidelines sentence of 65 months of imprisonment because

        Appellant had children and the court worried about the consequences of depriving them of

        a father figure for longer than necessary.

               Appellant noted a timely appeal.

                                                     II.

               The parties dispute the standard of review. The Government argues that the

        standard of review is plain error when a defendant seeks to represent himself and is

        represented by counsel “advocating for the defendant’s ability to represent himself.” See

        Response Br. at 29 (citing United States v. Ductan, 800 F.3d 642, 648 (4th Cir. 2015);

        United States v. Bernard, 708 F.3d 583, 588 (4th Cir. 2013)). Appellant counters that this

        case is not the typical self-representation case, and de novo review is proper, because the

        Government objected to the magistrate judge’s waiver determination below, so the error

        was “preserved.” Response Br. at 16 (citing Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 52(b); Holguin-Hernandez

        v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 762, 766 (2020); United States v. Robinson, 460 F.3d 550, 557

        (4th Cir. 2006)). The Government responds that (1) it did not object to the waiver

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        determination, and (2) regardless, Appellant did not object to the waiver determination as

        he was required to do in order to avoid plain error review.

               We agree with the Government. During the hearing regarding Appellant’s motion

        to discharge his counsel and proceed pro se, the magistrate judge discussed with Appellant

        his desire to waive his right to counsel. The prosecutor was present during that discussion,

        and the magistrate judge asked the prosecutor if he had any concerns about Appellant’s

        desire to waive his right to counsel. The prosecutor stated concerns regarding Appellant’s

        decisions to “plead[] the Fifth” in response to basic questions about his familiarity with

        legal proceedings. Opening Br. at 7. This, the prosecutor argued, left the court unable to

        determine what Appellant knew and did not know about the legal process. Nevertheless,

        the magistrate judge issued an order allowing Appellant to represent himself. That finding

        was based both on the public colloquy to which the government was privy and also upon a

        status of counsel hearing that was closed to the prosecutor. The Government did not object

        to the court’s order.

               The Government is correct that the Government’s voicing concerns regarding

        Appellant’s colloquy with the magistrate judge is not the same as objecting to the court’s

        determination that Appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. It

        would have been clear to everyone in the room that it was not advisable for Appellant to

        represent himself, but that is a different matter from whether he was able to knowingly and

        voluntarily do so.

               The Government is correct that the standard of review is plain error when a

        represented defendant, whose counsel is advocating for their client’s right to self

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        representation, is allowed to proceed pro se. In Bernard, the defendant sought to fire his

        counsel and proceed pro se. 708 F.3d at 586. The district court in Bernard debated whether

        to grant the defendant’s request because the defendant had a history of mental illness and

        had previously been held incompetent to stand trial. Id. Defense counsel advocated for

        the defendant to represent himself, and the court ultimately allowed the defendant to

        proceed pro se, but with standby counsel. Id. Under these circumstances, we held that the

        defendant had not preserved an objection to the district court’s finding that he had validly

        waived his right to counsel, and plain error review applied. See id. at 588 (“Because

        Appellant presents these arguments for the first time on appeal, we review for plain

        error.”); see also Ductan, 800 F.3d at 648 (“Because counsel bore substantial responsibility

        for allowing the alleged error to pass without objection, we concluded that his failure to

        preserve the claim of invalid waiver warrants plain error review.”) (cleaned up).

               This case is controlled by Bernard and Ductan. Appellant insisted on representing

        himself, and his public defender unequivocally supported his right to do so in multiple

        hearings. The public defender was also appointed as standby counsel to assist Appellant -

        - a decision Appellant actually objected to. The Government expressed some concerns

        about Appellant’s self representation, but when the court issued a written order, based in

        part upon a sealed portion of the hearing during which the prosecutor was absent, the

        Government made no objection.

               Therefore, we review for plain error.

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                                                     III.

               The question on appeal is whether Appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his

        Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Appellant argues he did not because he (1) did not

        understand the value of an attorney’s assistance; (2) lacked an educational background and

        experience with legal proceedings; and (3) had no understanding of the judicial process at

        trial. The Government points out that the magistrate judge questioned Appellant at length

        three times about his awareness of the value of counsel and the intricacies of the legal

        process; that Appellant stated he understood the charge against him and its penalties and

        understood that the rules of evidence, with which he was unfamiliar, would govern

        proceedings; and that the magistrate judge strongly advised Appellant against self

        representation.

               The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant’s right to assistance of

        counsel before conviction and imprisonment, but it also guarantees the defendant’s

        affirmative right to self representation. United States v. Ziegler, 1 F.4th 219, 226 (4th Cir.

        2021) (citing United States v. Ductan, 800 F.3d 642, 648 (4th Cir. 2015)). A defendant

        may waive the right to counsel and proceed pro se at trial only if the waiver is (1) clear and

        unequivocal; (2) knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; and (3) timely. Id. (citing United

        States v. Bernard, 708 F.3d 583, 588 (4th Cir. 2013)). Here, Appellant disputes only that

        his waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

               This court has declined the “invitation to define a precise procedure or litany for

        [the] evaluation” of whether such waiver was knowing and voluntary and instead has

        instructed district courts “to determine the sufficiency of the waiver from the record as a

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        whole.” United States v. Singleton, 107 F.3d 1091, 1098–99 (4th Cir. 1997). We “review

        the sufficiency of a waiver of the right to counsel by evaluating the complete profile of the

        defendant and the circumstances of his decision as known to the trial court at the time, by

        examining the record as a whole.” United States v. Bush, 404 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir.

        2005). We have affirmed a district court’s determination that a defendant was competent

        to represent himself when the defendant “knew the charges against him, understood the

        process, knew his rights, had some experience in the law, was warned that proceeding pro

        se was a bad idea, and understood the consequences of waiving his right to counsel and

        proceeding on his own.” Ziegler, 1 F.4th at 229; see also Ductan, 800 F.3d at 649 (holding

        the “district court must find that the defendant’s background, appreciation of the charges

        against him and their potential penalties, and understanding of the advantages and

        disadvantages of self-representation support the conclusion that his waiver of counsel is

        knowing and intelligent”).

               The record here reflects that the magistrate judge had ample basis to determine

        Appellant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel and decided to represent

        himself. The magistrate judge questioned Appellant in three separate hearings to confirm

        Appellant wished to waive his right to counsel. Appellant repeatedly insisted, in his initial

        appearance and in the hearing on his public defender’s motion to withdraw, that he wished

        to represent himself. The magistrate judge repeatedly impressed upon him the dangers of

        this decision, flatly told him the decision was unadvisable, and even forced standby counsel

        upon him over his own objection. The court also emphasized more than once that

        Appellant did not understand the rules that would govern the trial, such as the Federal Rules

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        of Evidence, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Sentencing Guidelines. The

        magistrate judge explained the crime of which Appellant was accused as well as the

        maximum penalties to which he was exposed. The magistrate judge did everything

        possible to ensure this decision was knowing and voluntary, short of forcing Appellant to

        accept counsel. That was more than enough. See Bernard, 708 F.3d at 591 (holding waiver

        was knowing and voluntary when the court advised the defendant that he would be far

        better defended by a trained lawyer and advised the defendant of the difficulties and the

        penalties).

               Appellant’s argument that he had no understanding of the value of the assistance of

        counsel is without merit. The magistrate judge expressly impressed upon Appellant the

        value of counsel and repeatedly stated that Appellant would be better off being represented

        by counsel than he would be pro se. J.A. 21 (“[A] trained lawyer would defend you far

        better than you could defend yourself. I think it is unwise of you to try and represent

        yourself in this case. You’re not familiar with the rules that would be in effect here, . . .

        and I would strongly urge you not to try to represent yourself.”); id. at 34 (same); id. at 569

        (same). Further, as the Government notes, Appellant had previously been convicted of

        crimes, and so he had some familiarity with the court system.

               Appellant also argues that the magistrate judge lacked an opportunity to evaluate

        his intelligence and failed to inquire into his educational background. This argument also

        cannot succeed. The magistrate judge had numerous discussions with Appellant, which

        were sufficient to assure the magistrate judge that Appellant did not understand the Rules

        of Evidence or the Rules of Criminal Procedure. And in fact, the magistrate judge

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        specifically asked if Appellant had any “formal legal education.” J.A. 31. Appellant

        responded, “No, sir.” J.A. 31. This inquiry satisfies what is required of judges in such

        situations, where even someone who is mentally ill may be determined by a district court

        competent to waive the right to counsel. See Bernard, 708 F.3d at 590 (“It is therefore

        permissible for a trial court, having found a mentally ill defendant competent to stand trial,

        to determine him to be competent to waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”); id. at

        591 (“[T]he district court was in the best position to observe [a defendant’s] demeanor and

        make judgments about his mental abilities.”).

               Finally, Appellant’s argument that he did not understand the judicial process does

        not equate to error on the part of the magistrate judge. The magistrate judge made clear to

        Appellant several times that rules would govern the proceedings of which Appellant had

        no knowledge and that accepting representation would give him the benefit of counsel that

        understood the rules. Appellant’s conduct during the trial, setting aside his interruptions

        during voir dire, further indicates that he was at least able to follow the proceedings with

        admonitions from the district court. See Bernard, 708 F.3d at 591–92 (“The district court’s

        satisfaction as to Appellant’s competence to waive counsel and represent himself was

        justified throughout the trial because Appellant was able to make opening and closing

        statements, testify, and have his case reopened to conduct an examination . . . .”).

               Thus, none of Appellant’s arguments undermine the district court’s determination

        of a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver.

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                                                   IV.

              In sum, we conclude that the district court did not plainly err in determining that

        Appellant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.

                                                                                      AFFIRMED

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