Court Opinion

ID: 9581443
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:15:00.693423+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:57.378738
License: Public Domain

Pannell, Judge,
concurring specially. I agree with the result reached by the majority opinion, but cannot agree that this result can properly be reached based solely on construction of the quoted provisions of Section 15(a) of the Civil Practice Act of 1966 (Ga. L 1966, pp. 609, 627; Code Ann. § 81A-115). Section 15(a) makes no drastic change in the right of amendment which existed prior thereto except that now it is not generally necessary to secure the approval of the trial judge in order for the filing of the amendment to become valid. Section (c) also comports with the prior law. Section (b) restricts the right of amendment. The decision in Hooper v. City of Atlanta, 26 Ga. App. 221 (105 SE 723) held that because of the failure of the petition in a suit against a municipality to allege compliance with the notice required by Code Ann. § 69-308 it did not contain sufficient allegations in the original pleadings “to amend by” as no valid cause of action was set forth in the original declaration. In my opinion Section 8 of the Civil Practice Act of 1966 (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 619; Code Ann. § 81A-108 (a)) is controlling here because under that section it is no longer necessary that a petition contain such a sufficient framework of a cause of action before it is amendable; in other words, the rule that there must be enough in the pleadings “to amend by” is no longer applicable by reason of the language of Section 8.
I also must disagree with the statement and the ruling which *566reads as follows: “Here the notice was given to the corporation, the City of Atlanta, and was mailed to it at the address of its legal department, which constitutes a substantial compliance with the law.” There is no allegation in the petition that the notice was mailed to the City of Atlanta at such an address. If it had so alleged, I would be constrained to dissent on the ground that notice to the legal department of a municipality is not notice to the governing authorities of the municipality, which latter is required by the statute. Code Ann. § 69-308. See also Davis v. City of Rome, 37 Ga. App. 762 (4) (142 SE 171); City of Lafayette v. Rosser, 53 Ga. App. 228 (185 SE 377); Peek v. City of Albany, 101 Ga. App. 564 (114 SE2d 451); City of Tallapoosa v. Brock, 138 Ga. 622 (75 SE 644). However, the petition here alleges unequivocally that the “plaintiff notified the City of Atlanta” of her claim in writing and that a copy of this notice was attached. It is true that the notice attached was headed as follows: the first line “City of Atlanta,” the second line “Department of Law,” the third line “Atlanta 3, Georgia,” and the fourth line “Attention: Mr. R. A. Harris, Attorney.”
Nothing in the petition or exhibit contradicts the allegations that the City of Atlanta was properly given this notice so headed. The conclusion in the opinion that this notice was mailed to the address of the Law Department of the City of Atlanta, rather than to the governing authorities of the municipality, is unauthorized. I, therefore, concur in the judgment only.