Court Opinion

ID: 9520923
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:53:16.273964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:14.529809
License: Public Domain

Black, J.
(dissenting). We have already committed one grievous error against Catherine Demkiw, that of denying — on presently undermined legal ground (Pilgrim v. Menthen, 327 Mich 714)* — her timely application for review of the compensation commission’s order, entered May 28, 1952, by which order the presently mentioned claim for workmen’s compensation was rejected. On motion of-Mr-.-Jus*500tice Carr, bottomed of corresponding legal quicksand, our dwindling majority proceeds now to compound that error by dismissing her instant declaration. This lady is thus beaten, going and coming in all known legal fora, out of determination on the merits of whatever claim she may have possessed against the defendant on January 30, 1950.
The chronology of events before us starts with due filing of a claim for compensation, by Catherine Demkiw against Briggs Manufacturing Company, in October of 1950. Briggs thereupon insisted with signal success that the claim be denied because Mrs. Demkiw’s presently considered injury did not arise in the course and out of employment. It said, and we must not forget, that “she was merely on her way to work.” The compensation commission, compelled by Pilgrim to agree with this matter-of-law defense, held:
“The main issue is whether or not the injury which plaintiff sustained arose out of and in the course of her employment. The accident occurred from one-half to three-quarters of an hour before her work commenced. She was not performing any duty for her employer at his request at the time of the accident. She was merely on the employer’s premises on her way to work. The fact that the accident happened on the employer’s premises is not sufficient to establish that it arose out of and in the course of her employment. The decision in the Pilgrim Case is controlling here.”
The nest event was Mrs. Demkiw’s mentioned application for leave to review the commission’s quoted determination. Briggs, successfully opposing the application here, insisted:
“As was pointed out by the commission in its opinion, the accident in question occurred from one half to three quarters of an hour prior to the time when plaintiff’s work actually commenced. At the time *501the accident was sustained, plaintiff owed no duty or obligation to the employer. She could have, if she had seen fit, returned to her home and defendant had no control over her. She was not doing anything at the time the accident was sustained which furthered the interest of her employer. She was merely on her way to work, and this in and of itself is not sufficient to warrant or justify the conclusion that the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment.”*
Mrs. Demkiw’s next effort to obtain redress is shown by the declaration before us. Briggs, named as defendant therein, moved to dismiss for and on account of specifications detailed in the motion as follows:
“1. At the time of the accident set forth in plaintiff’s declaration, plaintiff and defendant were subject to the workmen’s compensation act of Michigan. (PA 1912 [1st Ex Sess], No 10, as amended.)
“2. The department of labor and industry of the State of Michigan has exclusive jurisdiction over matters stated in plaintiff’s declaration and, consequently, this court is without jurisdiction.
“3. Plaintiff’s rights- have been fully adjudicated before the department of labor and industry of the State of Michigan and this matter is res judicata.
“4. Plaintiff has selected her forum, thus barring recourse to this court.
“5. Plaintiff’s arbitration of the matters set forth in plaintiff’s declaration before the department of labor and industry of the State of Michigan, constitutes a full release of the defendant, her employer, by reason of the provisions of CL 1948, § 416.1 (Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17.212). >
> “6. Plaintiff’s declaration fails to state a cause of action against the defendant.
*502“7. In plaintiff’s action before the department of labor and industry, she alleged that the accident resulting in her injuries arose out of and during the course of her employment, whereas in the action in this coiirt, plaintiff alleges that the accident did not arise out of and during the course of employment.” (Italics supplied by present writer.)
Judge Brennan, by formal opinion and order, denied the motion to dismiss. He said:
“It is my holding that the plaintiff is not deprived of her remedy to sue at law, under the provisions of section 1 of the workmen’s compensation act quoted above,  for the reason that she is not, in this action, suing the Briggs Manufacturing Company as an ‘employer.’ It is my opinion that the language of the statute, of course, has the effect of preventing plaintiff from obtaining any other relief against her ‘employer,’ as such, after she has once filed a claim under the workmen’s compensation act; but in the instant case, she is suing the defendant, not as an ‘employer’ but. as a tort-feasor.”
Briggs duly- applied for leave to appeal from the order denying..dismissal. This time we did not deny ■the application. By order dated June 16, 1954, we granted-’ leave to review said order. . . .
TBd- record on appeal in this case was filed here February 19, 1955. The first of 4 printed briefs in the case did not arrive until May 15, 1956. The cause, complicated by 1956 motion of Mrs. Demkiw that we reconsider orir 1952 denial of her mentioned application for leave to appeal, was submitted here June 8, 1956.’ October 4, 1956, Mr. Justice Smith and the writer dissenting, our majority denied Mrs. Demkiw’s application for reconsideration. So muclj for. the record seriation of this case.
*503I turn now to the corresponding chronology of events in Totten v. Detroit Aluminum & Brass Corp., 344 Mich 414. Totten, as we shall see, is a quasi companion of this case and is said to disclose error of Judge Brennan in refusing to dismiss the present declaration.
Totten’s injury occurred more than a year after Mrs. Demkiw’s injury was sustained. He did not apply for compensation. Instead, Totten filed a declaration at law for damages, characterized here in separate opinions as follows:
“Plaintiff recognizes that the relationship of the parties here presented is of an employee acting outside of the jurisdiction of his employment but claims it to be within the outside limits of the employer-employee relationship.” (Quotation from opinion of Mr. Justice Reid, p 417 of report.)
“The record here does establish, as shown by Mr. Justice Reid, that the plaintiff relies, for recovery of ‘damages,’ on his relationship of employer and employee. This brings him within the purview of the workmen’s compensation act.
“For that reason I agree that plaintiff’s remedy, if any, lies under the act. It may be, as has been sometimes shown in our opinions, that for some' valid reason an employee cannot recover damages from his employer, namely, compensation under the workmen’s compensation act, for an injury. It is also conceivable that there are circumstances under which an employee may recover damages based on the negligence of his employer, or his workmen, entirely unrelated to the relationship of employee which the claimant bears to the defendant employer. But that is not the case here.” (Quotation from opinion of Mr. Justice Boyles, p 419 of report.)
The defendant in Totten’s Case moved for judgment on the pleadings April 30, 1954. The lower court denied such motion May 26, 1954. The defend*504ant duly applied for leave to appeal and, on September 8, 1954, we granted the application. Totten’s record was filed here February 12, 1955. The case was submitted October 5, 1955, and decided December 28, 1955. From this point I pass to legal questions posed before us in this appeal of Briggs. Tot-ten’s distinguishing features will unfold.
First: The compensation commission’s determination, quoted above, is an adjudication as much binding on defendant Briggs as on plaintiff DemIdw. For the parties before us, it decided with finality that Mrs. Demkiw’s injury was sustained for stated reason outside the protective pale of the workmen’s compensation act. We cannot question the decision now. It leaves us, as we contemplate this declaration and motion to dismiss, with issue whether Mrs. Demkiw was left possessed of a right of action for personal injury against defendant Briggs on theory that the requisite employment relationship had not started — in fact never started— on the event-date we are considering. Remember, Mrs, Demkiw “was merely on her way to work” when she was injured. That much, at least, is settled. It is our duty, then, to judge this declaration and motion to dismiss exactly as if Briggs had negligently caused Mrs. Demkiw’s injury anywhere on the route of her trip that morning between home and time clock.
Here we have a case where plaintiff and others similarly situated were permitted to enter upon the plant premises an hour ahead of time, the start of the work day being 7 a. m. Whether ahead of time or not, they customarily walked — -from the plant gate on Vernor highway — across a driveway and yard on the plant premises to the outdoor flight of steps where Mrs. Demkiw, solely on account of negligence of Briggs as alleged, slipped and was in-: *505jured. From such steps, and after entering the plant building, they were required to ascend 3 flights of stairs to the work room in which the time clock and sewing machines were located.*
What was the legal position of these ahead-of-time workers, walking- their way to actual place of work? Were they employees, enjoying protection of the employment relation? The adjudicatory finding previously quoted says “no.” Were they trespassers on the premises of Briggs, after having passed through the plant gates? Hardly. Were they invitees? Undoubtedly, considering such finding. Were they subject to disabling or other injury, negligently inflicted by Briggs, absent all redress against Briggs? My elder Brothers say “yes.” I say “no,” and start with previously announced premise that final denial to Mrs. Demkiw of compensation is a judgment of status both parties should cheerfully accept. Ah, yes, Mrs. Demkiw “was merely on her way to work.”
Second: If, while a servant is on his way to hut has not arrived at the actual place of work, an injury is inflicted upon him by negligence of the one for whom he is about to start work, it being conceded that the injury was sustained not in the course of employment and that both parties are subject when applicable to provisions of a compensation act like ours, is the injury not actionable?† The answer is given by Professor Larsonf with authoritative as well as sensible support. He rightly separates an injury, which does not come within the fundamental coverage provisions of the given compensation act (that is what we have here in this case *506of Demkiw), from an injury which in itself is covered but presents particular elements of noncompensable damage only, and goes on to say (2 Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 65.10, p 136):
“In the former class are, of course, all the cases in which the relation of employment did not exist, or in which plaintiff or his employer was within an excluded category, or in which there was no ‘injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment.’ As has ' been observed at Several points above, a considerable amount of law, usually bad law, has been made in damage suits in which the positions of the parties have been reversed, with the employee denying coverage in order to escape the exclusive remedy rule, and the employer with equal earnestness pleading for a broad construction of compensation coverage.”
Schneider puts it this way (1 Schneider, Workmen’s Compensation Text (Perm ed), § 89, p 229):
“If both the employer and employee are engaged in' a type of business or employment specifically exempted from the act, or if the employment is covered exclusively by some Federal act, or if the employee’s injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment, then the acts generally have no effect on employee damage actions against their employers.”
It is readily apparent, from continuous reading of the texts penned by these nationally recognized writers upon workmen’s compensation, that our State — Twork,* to Totten — stands pretty much alone and out of step in present regard. And it will not do to say, as some glibly chant, that our act is peculiar or substantially different. It is not, at least so far as present inquiry is concerned, and the diaphanous distinctions so uttered are rarely de*507fined. Time is thus nigh that we re-examine for due case-light the opinion of dissent appearing in Totten and that our studied doctrine of disability of self-eorrection be scanned anew.
Aside from the above, Totten’s majority opinion is patently distinguishable from- this case for 2 reasons. The first is that Totten did not seek compensation and did not obtain, as Mrs. Demkiw did, an adjudication that he was injured beyond and outside the scope of employment. The second is that Tot-ten’s declaration was founded on allegation that his injuries were sustained during and caused by an existing employment relationship, whereas Mrs. Demkiw’s declaration was in the court below,- and still is so far as I am concerned, planted on the common-law right of redress for negligent injury sustained while she was on way- to work and had not as yet entered scope of the mutually protective relation of employer and employee.
Turning for the moment to Totten’s novelty that an employee can be “acting outside of the jurisdiction of his employment” and yet “be within the outside limits of the employer-employee relationship” (p 417 of report) :* Does any authority of respect support notion that an ethereal never-never zone of absolute exemption from liability, defined by events occurring while a servant.is on. his wav to or from work — a happy land where premiums need be paid neither for liability nor compensation insurance and the quasi-employee bears all risks — , exists in favor of the one for whom the work is to be or has been *508done?* We have seen none as yet in onr reports unless Totten’s ineogitant edictum he regarded as such. The question, fortunately, is not before us because it was not raised or suggested in the court below.
It is significant that plaintiff’s declaration was filed in January of 1953; that defendant’s motion to dismiss was filed in the month following; that the motion, having been duly submitted, was decided by written opinion of Judge Brennan filed Jauary 18, 1954; that no one in the court below construed the declaration as having been worded or planted upon the relation of employer and employee or as having alleged an injury occurring “within the outside limits” of such relationship; that no amendment, either of the declaration or motion to dismiss, was sought below; that the construction of said declaration, as presently urged, was not mentioned in Briggs’ brief supporting application for leave to appeal,† and that the real reason advanced for dismissal before Judge Brennan was that plaintiff, by filing and pursuing her claim for compensation, had yielded to Briggs an unconditional release of the cause declared upon.
*509The inference I draw from this summary of the record is that Totten’s intervening case, submitted here while Demkiw’s case waited, suggested for the first time that Mrs. Demkiw’s declaration be construed as planted on the relation of employer and employee.
Relying, then, on Larson’s quoted reasoning in conjunction with that which was settled by the compensation commission’s determination that Mrs. Demkiw’s injuries were not compensable, I find no difficulty in holding that this declaration states a cause of action at common law for negligently inflicted injury; that it contains proper averment of freedom from contributory negligence; that it is framed on theory as found by the circuit court, and that the defense of election of remedy and resultant release is governed by an altogether intelligent rule once known in this State (Hansen v. Pere Marquette R. Co., 267 Mich 224, 227), vis., that an election of a remedy which proves to be nonexistent is no election at all. With respect to that rule Larson says:
“Unquestionably this is the only view which effectuates the purposes of the legislation, whatever arguments may be raised against it based on literal wording of statutes or on the technical application of the election doctrine at some stages of the common law. Workmen’s compensation is above all a security system; a strict election doctrine transforms it into a grandiose sort of double-or-nothing gamble. Such gambles are appealing to those who still think of the judicial process as a glorious game in which formal moves and choices are made at peril, and in which the ultimate result is spectacular victory for one side and utter defeat for the other. The stricken workman is in no mood for this kind of play, and should not be maneuvered into the necessity for gambling with his rights, under the guise of enforcing a supposed penalty against the employer.” (2 *510Larson’s "Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 67.22, pp 150, 151.)
Third: It is said, in the opinion of Mr. Justice Carr, that Twork v. Munising Paper Co., supra; and Morris v. Ford Motor Co., 320 Mich 372, are factually analogous to the case at bar. I disagree. In each instance — Twork and Morris — the common-law plaintiff previously sought compensation and, being unsuccessful in the department below, failed to review or attempt review.* In the present instance Mrs. Demkiw sought timely review without success and, later on, abortively applied to this Court for reconsideration of its refusal to review, citing Ditch v. General Motors Corp., supra. The real import of Twork, of interest here, is seen in the following portion of the prevailing opinion (p 180 of report):
“Appellant contends, for the applicability of the doctrine of estoppel and says that the employer may not deny the accidental nature of the injury before the department of labor and industry and having succeeded thereby, now assert before the circuit court that jurisdiction is lacking in that forum because plaintiff’s action is bottomed upon an . accidental injury. The reasonableness of this argument is apparent, but its corollary is also sound; neither may the plaintiff ride 2 horses. His remedy was to seek an appeal to the full department from the finding of the deputy and then, if necessary, to review by .certiorari.”
To recapitúlate: Since Mrs. Demkiw “was merely on her way to work” at the time of injury, her declaration states an .appropriate cause of action for negligence against a defendant for whom she was not working at the time. By adjudicated construction, the contract of employment between the parties *511made them legal strangers to the compensation act each morning until Mrs. Demkiw punched the time clock and started her sewing machine. The vital relationship of employer and employee did not exist until such time and defendant did not claim otherwise in the court below. This means that an injury negligently inflicted on Mrs. Demkiw by any wrongdoer, while she was “on her way to work,” was and is actionable provided there be no contributory negligence. It means, too, that her assiduous, if unsuccessful, pursuit of remedy under the compensation act does not bar this action.
I vote to affirm, noting by way of conclusion that our majority has not even accorded plaintiff the usual 15 days for amendment to meet that which it has read into her declaration.
Smith, J., concurred with Black, J.
Edwards, J., did not sit.

 Pilgrim, it is plain, was quietly overruled in. Ditch v. General Motors Corp., 345 Mich 178.

 Quotation from page 4 of brief filed here July 5, 1952, in opposition to plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal from order denying compensation.

 Mrs. Demkiw had worked for the defendant some 20 years, mostly as a sewing-machine operator.

 Former professor of law, Cornell Law School; dean, Pittsburgh Law School, now on leave as under-seeretary of labor; author, “A Republican Looks At His Party” (Harpers, 1956),

 Twork v. Munising Paper Co., 275 Mich 174.

 This idea apparently eame from Totten’s, first brief,, filed- here August 16, 1955,.in which the following appears (p 5) : . .
“None of these considerations enter into the relationship here presented of an employee acting outside of the boundaries. of -his employment, but within the outside limits of the employer-employee relationship.”

 The 1954 amendment, PA 1954, No 175 (CLS 1954, § 412.1 [Stat Ann 1955 Cum Supp §17.151]), may aid relevant decision as to claims postdating its effective date but it extends no help with respeet to cases of earlier origin like the one at bar, where adjudication and other factors have intervened.

 In brief supporting such application, filed here March 30, 1954, Briggs summarized the proposed reviewable questions as follows:
“First: The submission of any question under the Michigan workmen’s compensation act to arbitration constitutes a release to such employer of all claims or demands at law arising from such injury.
“Second: The mere subjectivity of the employer and the employee to the Michigan workmen’s compensation law constitutes the workmen’s compensation commission as the exclusive tribunal to hear questions of liability of employers for injuries or death sustained by their employees.
“Third: The Michigan workmen’s compensation act relieves the employer of any liability other than that provided for personal injury to employees under the workmen’s compensation act.
“Fourth: The error of the commission in denying compensation may only be rectified by application for certiorari to the Michigan Supreme Court and not by suit at common law.”

 The same is true of Sotonyi v. Detroit City Gas Co., 251 Mich 393 cited to iis by defendant.