Court Opinion

ID: 9666450
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:15:40.315825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:28.897638
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
As in its original brief, the Appellant has filed an excellent Motion for Rehearing. It initially urges that this Court erred in failing to reverse and remand for trial its claim of conspiracy because Ford did not assert limitations as a ground to bar that claim. We do not reach that contention.
Our initial opinion noted that the appeal was based upon a single point of error which asserted that the trial court erred in granting Ford’s motions for summary judgment. That was a proper point of error under the holding in Malooly Brothers, Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119 (Tex.1970). Therefore, this Court considered the issues raised under that point of error. Under that point of error in the Table of Contents, as shown by the attachment to this Opinion, was a two page listing of the various issues to be raised in the brief for Appellant including fiduciary duty, express and implied covenants, Deceptive Trade Practice Act, duty of good and workmanlike performance and defenses of release and limitations. No mention is made of a conspiracy claim. The excellent brief of fifty pages cites no case dealing with a conspiracy claim. Under a heading dealing with a claim for breach of an implied warranty of good faith and workmanlike performance, the word conspiracy appears in one sentence. We conclude the issue has not been properly raised on appeal from the summary judgment.
This Court would urge the Supreme Court to reconsider its opinion in Malooly Brothers, Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119 (Tex.1970) and recognize that the time has come when attorneys should be able to direct an appellate court to the error of the trial court with such specificity that there is no question about the complaint on appeal. In this case, with a transcript of over 1700 pages, a deposition of more than 1200 pages and 28 exhibits, a single point of error saying the trial court erred is little help.
Each Court of Appeals in this state must pass upon hundreds of points of error each month. A very general point of error gives little help in disposing of that work load. The decision in O’Neil v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 542 S.W.2d 112 (Tex.1976) that the Court cannot decide the ease on the points presented but must decide the case on the argument raised does not help a busy court in the disposition of its case load. The more recent opinion in Inpetco, Inc. v. Texas American Bank/Houston, 729 S.W.2d 300 (Tex.1987) is even less help. In that case, the Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court on the basis of Inpetco’s briefing inadequacies without first ordering Inpetco to rebrief. Its application has not been uniform. D. Gunn, Unsupported Points of Error on Appeal, 32 S.Tex.L.Rev. 105 (1990) at 121 et. seq. When that right to rebrief was presented to the Supreme Court in Davis v. City of San Antonio, 752 S.W.2d 518 (Tex.1988), the Court said the request comes too late.
In San Jacinto River Authority v. Duke, 783 S.W.2d 209 (Tex.1990), the Court, in relying upon Rule 52(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, noted that in order to preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling. Is it too much to expect that same party to present specific grounds in points of error when the appeal is perfected?
Perhaps the Napier case was justified in 1970. At that time, the courts of appeals had no criminal jurisdiction and the volume of cases was substantially less than it is in 1991. Today when the State Bar of Texas has an outstanding appellate practice section with an excellent practice course each year, when attorneys are charging hun*761dreds of dollars on an hourly rate and when fees are in the thousands of dollars for appeals in most cases, are we to continue to act as if appeals were perfected by laymen and not professionals? See Texas Employers’ Insurance Association v. Stodghill, 570 S.W.2d 398, 402 (Tex.Civ.App. — El Paso 1978), reversed, 582 S.W.2d 102 (Tex.1979). We respectfully urge that the Napier holding be reconsidered.
We have considered the arguments presented in the Motion for Rehearing and the Motion is overruled.
APPENDIX
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