Court Opinion

ID: 9965075
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-01 17:01:47.675182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:41.441673
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-6203     Document: 010111041413       Date Filed: 05/01/2024    Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                            May 1, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                          No. 23-6203
                                                   (D.C. No. 5:21-CR-00256-PRW-1)
  MAURICE TUDOR BOWENS,                                      (W.D. Okla.)

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before McHUGH, BRISCOE, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

       Maurice Tudor Bowens pleaded guilty to two federal crimes: possession of

 methamphetamine with intent to distribute, and possession of a firearm as a convicted

 felon. He received a 115-month prison sentence, and he has now appealed from his

 conviction and sentence. His plea agreement contains an appeal waiver, however,

 and the government moves to enforce that waiver under United States v. Hahn,

 359 F.3d 1315, 1328 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc).

       Bowens’s counsel responds that she is aware of no non-frivolous argument for

 overcoming the waiver and she has moved to withdraw. See Anders v. California,

       *
          This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
 of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
 its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-6203      Document: 010111041413      Date Filed: 05/01/2024       Page: 2

 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). On February 28, 2024, we gave Bowens an opportunity to

 file a pro se response by March 20. See id. (requiring the court to give the defendant

 a chance to file something on his own behalf when his attorney seeks to withdraw in

 these circumstances). When the court received nothing by March 20, it sua sponte

 extended the deadline to April 4. One day after that order, the court received from

 Bowens a pro se motion for an extension of time. We granted that motion, setting a

 new deadline of April 19.

       The court did not receive a response from Bowens by April 19, and it has

 received nothing since. We will therefore decide the motion on the current record.

       Our first question when faced with a motion to enforce an appeal waiver is

 “whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at

 1325. Here, the waiver embraces every aspect of pretrial proceedings and

 sentencing, with one exception: “If the sentence is above the advisory Guidelines

 range determined by the Court to apply to Defendant’s case, this waiver does not

 include Defendant’s right to appeal specifically the substantive reasonableness of

 Defendant’s sentence[.]” R. vol. I at 83. This exception does not apply. The district

 court determined that the advisory guidelines range was 92 to 115 months, and the

 district court sentenced Bowens to 115 months. Thus, this appeal falls within the

 waiver’s scope.

       We next ask “whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his

 appellate rights.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325. “When determining whether a waiver of

 appellate rights is knowing and voluntary, we especially look to . . . whether the

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Appellate Case: 23-6203    Document: 010111041413        Date Filed: 05/01/2024     Page: 3

 language of the plea agreement states that the defendant entered the agreement

 knowingly and voluntarily[, and whether the district court conducted] an adequate

 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 colloquy.” Id. Both are true here. First, the

 plea agreement states that Bowens was knowingly and voluntarily giving up his

 appellate rights. See R. vol. I at 82. Second, the district court confirmed Bowens’s

 understanding at the change-of-plea hearing:

              THE COURT: Your plea agreement also contains a waiver
              of your right to appeal or collaterally attack the sentence
              that I impose except in some limited circumstances.

              So by entering into the plea agreement and entering a plea
              of guilty, you will have waived or given up your right to
              appeal or collaterally attack all or part of the sentence that
              I impose unless I impose a sentence that's above the
              guideline range, in which case you would have the right to
              appeal the substantive reasonableness of the sentence that I
              impose.

              Do you understand that you are waiving most of your
              appeal rights by entering into the plea agreement?

              THE DEFENDANT: Sir, yes, sir.

 Mot. to Enforce Appellate Waiver, Attach. 2 at 15. Thus, we find that Bowens agreed

 to the waiver knowingly and voluntarily.

       Finally, we ask “whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of

 justice.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325. This means Bowens must show that (1) the district

 court relied on an impermissible factor such as race, (2) there was ineffective

 assistance of counsel specifically as to the negotiation of the appeal waiver, (3) the

 sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, or (4) the waiver is otherwise unlawful. Id.

 at 1327. “[This] list is exclusive.” United States v. Shockey, 538 F.3d 1355, 1357
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 (10th Cir. 2008). We have reviewed the record and can locate no potential argument

 that might satisfy this high standard.

       Counsel for Bowens states that she also considered the Hahn factors and can

 locate no potential argument that might excuse the appeal waiver. Counsel further

 states that she considered whether the government may have breached the plea

 agreement. See United States v. Rodriguez-Rivera, 518 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir.

 2008) (“[A]n appellate waiver is not enforceable if the Government breaches its

 obligations under the plea agreement . . . .”). Counsel theorizes a potential argument

 based on the plea agreement’s discussion of acceptance of responsibility, but counsel

 believes the argument lacks merit. Specifically, the plea agreement states:

              The parties agree Defendant should receive a two-level
              downward adjustment for Defendant’s acceptance of
              responsibility . . . if Defendant commits no further crimes,
              does not falsely deny or frivolously contest relevant
              conduct, and fully complies with all other terms of
              this Plea Agreement. Further, if the Court applies that
              two-level downward adjustment, the United States will
              move for an additional one-level downward adjustment . . .
              if it determines that Defendant qualifies for the additional
              adjustment based on the timeliness of Defendant’s
              acceptance of this Plea Agreement and other appropriate
              considerations . . . .

 R. vol. I at 81. At sentencing, the government did not move for an additional

 one-level downward adjustment. However, counsel believes there is no meritorious

 argument that this amounted to a breach of the plea agreement because, at sentencing,

 the district court found Bowens was falsely denying or frivolously contesting many

 facts relevant to his case, and the court therefore never adjusted Bowens’s offense

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 level based on acceptance of responsibility. Thus, the government’s obligation to

 move for an additional one-level adjustment never arose.

       We agree with counsel that there is no nonfrivolous basis to assert that the

 government breached a duty to move for a one-level downward adjustment. We also

 see no other basis to conclude that the government breached the plea agreement.

       In sum, we conclude this appeal falls within Bowens’s appeal waiver, no other

 Hahn factor counsels against enforcement of the waiver, and there is no basis to

 claim the government breached the plea agreement. We therefore grant counsel’s

 motion to withdraw, grant the government’s motion to enforce the appeal waiver, and

 dismiss this appeal.

                                            Entered for the Court

                                            Per Curiam

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