Court Opinion

ID: 9892006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-20 05:07:54.848393+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:16:45.175610
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                             COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                       UNPUBLISHED
In re P. D. HOWE, Minor.                                               October 19, 2023

                                                                       No. 366425
                                                                       Wayne Circuit Court
                                                                       Family Division
                                                                       LC No. 2022-001968-NA

Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and RIORDAN and PATEL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Respondent-father appeals as of right the order terminating his parental rights to his minor
child, PH. On appeal, respondent challenges only the trial court’s best interest findings. Because
the court failed to explicitly address PH’s relative placement, we vacate the court’s best-interest
analysis and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                        I. BACKGROUND

        In September 2022, Child Protective Services (“CPS”) received a complaint alleging
respondent sexually abused PH’s cousin, KH. In November 2022, CPS received a second
complaint, alleging threatened harm of sexual abuse of PH. CPS Specialist, Jennifer Allred, spoke
with respondent regarding the allegations. Respondent disclosed he had previously been accused
of sexually abusing another minor. Allred also was able to determine respondent did not have
stable or suitable housing.

        In December 2022, petitioner filed a petition requesting the trial court take jurisdiction over
PH under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2) and terminate respondent’s parental rights under MCL
712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care or custody), (i) (parental rights to one or more
siblings of the child have been terminated and parent failed to rectify conditions that lead to prior
termination), and (j) (reasonable likelihood child will be harmed if returned to the parent).
Petitioner claimed it was contrary to PH’s welfare to remain with respondent because of threatened
harm of sexual abuse, prior CPS investigations, and prior termination of respondent’s parental

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rights to two of his other children.1 The petition alleged respondent had five prior contacts with
CPS between 1999 and 2004 for issues related to physical neglect, physical abuse, sexual abuse,
mental injury, and failure to protect. One of the claims, made in September 1999, involved
allegations that respondent sexually abused a minor child. But the allegations were
unsubstantiated because the child was too young to be forensically interviewed.

         During the preliminary hearing, Allred affirmed PH was living with her mother, who was
able to provide adequate housing, care, and protection for PH. Allred stated it was contrary to
PH’s welfare to remain with respondent “because he has been substantiated for sexual abuse of a
minor and also he had his rights terminated to two prior children.” Allred indicated criminal
charges were pending against respondent in three jurisdictions for his sexual abuse of KH. On
cross-examination, Allred affirmed respondent was previously able to provide an adequate home
for himself, PH’s mother, and PH. Allred did not witness any interaction between PH and
respondent during her investigation. Regarding her recommendation of no visitation, Allred noted
there were issues between respondent and PH’s mother. Based on respondent’s conduct, Allred
indicated that supervised Facetime visits between respondent and PH would be appropriate. The
trial court authorized the petition, finding it was contrary to PH’s welfare to be placed with
respondent. The court ordered that PH was to remain in the care of her mother, and suspended
visitation between PH and respondent.

        At the adjudication and dispositional hearing, respondent pleaded no contest as to
jurisdiction and the grounds for termination. The court entered the order of adjudication, accepting
respondent’s no contest plea and finding grounds for termination exist under MCL
712A.19b(3)(g), (i), and (j). The order restates the dispositional narrative admitted during the
adjudication hearing and indicates the trial court “took judicial notice of its order terminating
[respondent-]father’s rights to two children on 1/29/2007,” during a posthearing meeting between
the parties and the trial court. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to support
termination because respondent failed to properly care for PH by sexually abusing other children,
had prior terminations, and there was a reasonable likelihood PH would be harmed if returned to
respondent. The order also referred respondent to the Clinic for Child Study for a best-interest
evaluation.

         During the best-interest hearing, Sharon Hamilton-Martin, a forensic family clinician,
testified that she interviewed respondent and observed him interacting with PH virtually.
Hamilton-Martin stated there “did not seem to be a strong relationship” between respondent and
PH. Respondent expressed wanting to see PH, and during his interactions with PH, he made
several attempts to engage with her. However, “[m]any times it was [PH’s mother] that was
helping to narrate or suggest ideas to [respondent] as to how to keep [PH] engaged[.]” On cross-
examination, Hamilton-Martin admitted PH’s reaction to respondent could have been attributed,
in part, to her age, the virtual setting, that respondent had not seen PH in about six months, or the
overall relationship. Notably, respondent denied the allegations of sexual abuse. Hamilton-Martin

1
  After failing to complete services to rectify issues involving unsuitable housing, physical abuse,
physical neglect, substance abuse, and untreated mental health issues, respondent’s parental
rights to his two children, LP and AP, were terminated in January 2007.

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believed termination would be in the best interests of PH because of the substantiated allegations
against respondent for his sexual abuse of KH and his history of CPS investigations involving
sexual abuse.

         Allred also testified that it was in PH’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental
rights based on the substantiation of his sexual abuse of KH and his prior terminations. Allred
admitted respondent was able to provide suitable housing for PH and maintain employment before
the sexual abuse allegations surfaced. The final witness was CPS worker, Ashley Griffin. Before
visitation was suspended, Griffin supervised and facilitated parenting time between respondent
and PH, but was unable to assess whether there was a bond between PH and respondent. Griffin
believed termination was in PH’s best interests because respondent sexually abused KH, and “what
happened to one child can happen to another as far as the sexual abuse or any abuse or neglect.”

       The trial court entered an order finding termination was in PH’s best interests because: (1)
respondent sexually abused KH; (2) respondent had a history of CPS investigations involving
sexual abuse of minors, prior terminations, domestic violation, substance abuse, and criminal
convictions; and (3) Hamilton-Martin found respondent controlling, manipulative, “defensive,”
evasive, had poor insight, denied, minimized and rationalized his actions. This appeal followed.

                                       II. BEST INTERESTS

       In his sole issue raised on appeal, respondent argues the trial court erred by finding that
termination of his parental rights was in PH’s best interests. In light of the trial court’s failure to
address the issue of relative placement, we vacate the trial court’s best-interest determination and
remand.

                                  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        We review a trial court’s decision that termination is in a child’s best interests for clear
error. In re Atchley, 341 Mich App 332, 346; 990 NW2d 685 (2022). “A finding of fact is clearly
erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In
re Sanborn, 337 Mich App 252, 276; 976 NW2d 44 (2021) (cleaned up). “To be clearly erroneous,
a decision must be more than maybe or probably wrong.” In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 33; 817
NW2d 111 (2011).

                                           B. ANALYSIS

        “If a trial court finds that a statutory basis for terminating parental rights exists by clear
and convincing evidence, it is required to terminate parental rights if it finds from a preponderance
of evidence on the whole record that termination is in the children’s best interests.” In re
Brown/Kindle/Muhammad Minors, 305 Mich App 623, 637; 853 NW2d 459 (2014) (cleaned up);
see also MCL 712A.19b(5). The focus of the best-interest determination is on the child, not the
parent. In re Schadler, 315 Mich App 406, 411; 890 NW2d 676 (2016). Factors to be considered
for purposes of the best-interest analysis include “the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s
parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a
foster home over the parent’s home.” In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823
NW2d 144 (2012) (cleaned up). A court may also consider whether it is likely that a child could

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be returned to a parent’s home “within the foreseeable future, if at all.” In re Frey, 297 Mich App
242, 249; 824 NW2d 569 (2012). Other relevant factors include “a parent’s history of domestic
violence, the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s visitation history
with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption.” In re
White, 303 Mich App 701, 714; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). If a child is in the care of a relative at the
time of the termination hearing, the trial court must also explicitly address that factor. In re Mason,
486 Mich 142, 164; 782 NW2d 747 (2010). A “relative” is defined as any “individual who is at
least 18 years of age and is . . . [r]elated to the child within the fifth degree by blood, marriage, or
adoption[.]” MCL 712A.13a(1)(j)(i).2

       In this case, the trial court’s best-interest analysis failed to expressly consider PH’s
placement with her mother, who is clearly a “relative” as defined by MCL 712A.13a(1)(j)(i).
Because PH’s placement with a relative was a factor that weighed against termination, MCL
712A.19a(8)(a), the trial court was required to explicitly address that factor in its analysis,
Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 43. “A trial court’s failure to explicitly address whether termination
is appropriate in light of the children’s placement with relatives renders the factual record
inadequate to make a best-interest determination and requires reversal.” Id. See also In re Mays,
490 Mich 993, 994; 807 NW2d 304 (2012).

        We conclude that the trial court clearly erred by finding that termination of respondent’s
parental rights was in PH’s best interests without considering her relative placement. Accordingly,
we vacate the trial court’s best-interest analysis, and remand this case to the trial court for further
proceedings to promptly consider the issue of PH’s placement with a relative in the context of its
best-interest analysis as required by our discussion in In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 43-44.

        Vacated in part and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We retain
jurisdiction.

                                                               /s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
                                                               /s/ Michael J. Riordan
                                                               /s/ Sima G. Patel

2
  We note effective October 7, 2022, MCL 712A.13a was amended to include biological parents
in the definition of “relative.” See 2022 PA 200. Before this amendment, biological parents
were not included in the definition of relatives and thus trial courts were not required to consider
relative placement when children were placed with a nonrespondent parent. See In re Schadler,
315 Mich App 406, 412-413; 890 NW2d 676 (2016); 2016 PA 191. During the best-interest
hearing, petitioner argued the trial court did not need to consider relative placement because PH
was placed with her mother. However, the new definition of “relative” under MCL
712A.13a(1)(j)(i) was already in effect when the petition was filed.

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                              Court of Appeals, State of Michigan

                                                ORDER
                                                                               Mark J. Cavanagh
 In re P D Howe Minor                                                            Presiding Judge

 Docket No.     366425                                                         Michael J. Riordan

 LC No.         2022-001968-NA                                                 Sima G. Patel
                                                                                 Judges

               Pursuant to the opinion issued concurrently with this order, this case is REMANDED for
further proceedings consistent with the opinion of this Court.

                Proceedings on remand in this matter shall commence within 56 days of the Clerk’s
certification of this order, and they shall be given priority on remand until they are concluded. As stated
in the accompanying opinion, the court is to make findings with respect to the relative placement in the
context of its overall best-interest analysis. The proceedings on remand are limited to the best-interest
analysis, as explained in more detail in the accompanying opinion.

                The parties shall promptly file with this Court a copy of all papers filed on remand. The
trial court shall complete the proceedings within 63 days after the issuance of the order. Within seven
days after entry, respondent shall file with this Court copies of all orders entered on remand.

               The transcript of all proceedings on remand shall be prepared and filed within 21 days after
completion of the proceedings.

               We retain jurisdiction.

                                                           _______________________________
                                                            Presiding Judge

                                 October 19, 2023