Court Opinion

ID: 9898719
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-15 00:03:13.496701+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:12.642111
License: Public Domain

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            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

MATTHEW ALLEN TAYLOR,
                                                         Court of Appeals No. A-13686
                             Appellant,                Trial Court No. 4FA-17-01399 CR

                     v.
                                                                  OPINION
STATE OF ALASKA,

                             Appellee.                    No. 2756 — August 25, 2023

             Appeal from the Superior Court, Fourth Judicial District,
             Fairbanks, Thomas I. Temple, Judge.

             Appearances: Renee McFarland, Assistant Public Defender,
             and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the
             Appellant. Nancy R. Simel, Assistant Attorney General, Office
             of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney
             General, Juneau, for the Appellee.

             Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Terrell,
             Judges.

             Judge ALLARD.

             Matthew Allen Taylor pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to
first-degree failure to stop at the direction of a peace officer (felony eluding).1 Taylor

   1
       AS 28.35.182(a)(1).
received 2 years to serve on this conviction. The plea agreement also required Taylor
to plead guilty, in a separate case, to first-degree offering a false instrument for
recording, for which he received an additional 2 years to serve.2
                Taylor now appeals his conviction for felony eluding, arguing that his plea
was involuntary because the trial court erroneously deprived him of his right to
represent himself. For the reasons explained here, we conclude that the involuntariness
of Taylor’s plea cannot be litigated in this direct appeal and must instead be litigated
through an application for post-conviction relief, where Taylor can move to withdraw
his plea and the record can be properly supplemented.3

       Factual background
                In 2017, Taylor was arrested and charged with felony eluding and driving
with a revoked license after he engaged in reckless driving during a high-speed chase
with the police.4 Taylor was appointed an attorney to represent him in this case.
                At the time of his arrest, Taylor was on probation in multiple different
felony cases. Following Taylor’s arrest, the State filed petitions to revoke his probation
in each of those cases. (Taylor was appointed a different attorney to represent him in
those cases.)
                On January 9, 2019, the parties convened for a change-of-plea hearing in
the felony eluding case. However, the change-of-plea hearing was continued because
Taylor had received new criminal charges in a separate case, including charges for
forgery and offering a false instrument for recording. (Taylor was appointed yet another
attorney in this new case.)

   2
       AS 11.46.550.
   3
       See Alaska R. Crim. P. 11(h), 35.1(a)(8).
   4
       AS 28.35.182(a)(1) and AS 28.15.291(a)(1), respectively.

                                            –2–                                       2756
              At the January hearing, Taylor requested a hearing because he wanted to
represent himself. The court refused to schedule a representation hearing because the
court apparently believed that the request for a representation hearing needed to come
from the attorney. The court told Taylor to “talk to [his] attorney” and have the attorney
file a written motion requesting a representation hearing. Taylor responded “no
problem” and indicated he would file something. However, no request for a
representation hearing was filed.
              At the next hearing, on February 21, there was no mention of self-
representation and no request for a representation hearing.
              The following hearing took place on March 18. At that hearing, Taylor’s
attorney moved to withdraw, and Taylor told the court that he wanted to hire a new
attorney but could not afford one. Taylor again requested a representation hearing. The
court took the motion to withdraw under advisement and scheduled a subsequent
hearing for March 28.
              On March 28, the court held a representation and a pretrial hearing, but
Taylor told the court at that hearing that he did not want to represent himself; instead,
he told the court that he was hoping to hire another attorney to represent him. The court
continued the case and explained that Taylor’s attorney would remain appointed until a
substitution of counsel was filed.
              On July 9, the court held another representation hearing. At that hearing,
Taylor initially told the court that he wanted to dismiss all of his attorneys in all of his
cases and to represent himself. However, after the court advised Taylor of the
advantages of having counsel and the disadvantages of self-representation, Taylor told
the court that he did not want to represent himself. Taylor also said that he was ready
to resolve his cases and accept the State’s proposed plea agreement with “a minor
adjustment.” The court found that Taylor did not actually want to represent himself, and
the court set Taylor’s cases for a change-of-plea hearing.

                                           –3–                                         2756
              At the change-of-plea hearing, however, it became clear that, although
there was a resolution for Taylor’s petitions to revoke probation, there was not an
agreement on the 2017 felony eluding case or the 2019 forgery case. The court therefore
set those two cases for a continued pretrial hearing, and it scheduled another
representation hearing at Taylor’s request.
              On August 14, the court held the representation hearing, and Taylor told
the court that he wanted to represent himself in the felony eluding case but he wanted
to keep his lawyer in the forgery case. The court questioned Taylor about his charges
and the underlying law. Taylor was able to tell the court about the charges and the
sentencing ranges, but he was unable to identify the elements of felony eluding. Taylor
explained that he had been in “the hole” while incarcerated and unable to do legal
research. Taylor was clear that he did not want the lawyer in the felony eluding case to
continue to represent him. The court subsequently denied Taylor’s request to represent
himself.
              Approximately three weeks later, Taylor entered into a plea agreement on
the felony eluding case and the forgery case. Under the terms of the plea agreement,
Taylor pleaded guilty to felony eluding and offering a false instrument and received a
composite sentence of 4 years to serve (2 years to serve, consecutively, on each
conviction). The remaining charges were dismissed.
              This appeal followed.

       Why we conclude that Taylor cannot litigate on direct appeal from his
       guilty plea his claim that the superior court erroneously denied him the
       right to represent himself
              Taylor raises a single issue on appeal: he argues that the trial court erred
when it denied his requests to represent himself. As we are about to explain, Taylor
cannot raise this issue for the first time in a direct appeal from his conviction. Instead,
under Alaska Criminal Rule 11(h), he must first seek to withdraw his plea.

                                           –4–                                        2756
               It is generally said that “a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is a waiver of
all non-jurisdictional defects and forecloses appellate review.”5 This rule bars
defendants who have pleaded guilty from arguing on appeal that the trial court made an
erroneous legal ruling prior to their guilty plea, as Taylor seeks to do here. Taylor
provides two arguments for why this rule should not apply to his case.
               First, Taylor argues that the erroneous denial of the right to self-
representation is a jurisdictional defect that can be raised anytime. Taylor, however,
provides no support for this argument. Although this Court has acknowledged that the
complete deprivation of the right to counsel is a jurisdictional defect, 6 Taylor does not
cite any cases — from this jurisdiction or any other — holding that the erroneous denial
of the right to self-representation is a jurisdictional defect. Nor is there anything about
the nature of a self-representation claim that would make it jurisdictional.7 We therefore
reject this argument.

   5
        Gordon v. State, 577 P.2d 701, 703 (Alaska 1978) (citing Cooksey v. State, 524 P.2d
1251, 1255 (Alaska 1974)); see also Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) ( “[A]
guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal
process. When a criminal defendant has [pleaded guilty] he may not thereafter raise
independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior
to the entry of the guilty plea.”).
   6
        Crane v. State, 118 P.3d 1084, 1085 (Alaska App. 2005); see also Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 467-68 (1938) (holding that an erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel
is a jurisdictional defect).
   7
        Hinshaw v. State, 515 P.3d 129, 138 (Alaska App. 2022) (explaining that the right
to self-representation is grounded in the right to individual autonomy, not the right to a fair
trial); Knix v. State, 922 P.2d 913, 918 n.6 (Alaska App. 1996) (explaining that the right to
counsel is dominant and the right to self-representation is clearly subordinate and “while
forfeiture of the right to counsel is not tolerated, forfeiture of the right of self-representation
is the established norm”); see also United States v. Williams, 29 F.4th 1306, 1314 (11th
Cir. 2022) (“[A] defendant’s voluntary guilty plea may waive a claim even of structural
error.”).

                                              –5–                                            2756
              Second, Taylor argues that the court’s denial of his request to represent
himself rendered his plea involuntary. Taylor is correct that a claim that one’s plea was
involuntary is not barred by the forfeiture rule because that rule “has no application to
defects which go directly to the guilty plea itself.”8 It would clearly be unfair and
illogical to prohibit a defendant from challenging the voluntariness of their guilty plea
on the grounds that they waived any such challenge by pleading guilty.
              But although a defendant can challenge the voluntariness of their guilty
plea, they usually cannot do so for the first time in a direct appeal. Rather, because
evaluating whether the defendant’s plea was voluntary typically requires further
development of the record — specifically, of the circumstances surrounding the
defendant’s plea — a defendant claiming that their plea was involuntary must first file
a motion to withdraw their plea under Criminal Rule 11(h).9
              This concept was spelled out in two cases from the Alaska Supreme Court.
In the first, McKinnon v. State, the supreme court considered whether a defendant who
had been denied the right to be represented by his counsel of choice could subsequently
challenge the validity of his guilty plea.10 The court ruled that the defendant could

   8
        5 Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 21.6(a), at 232 (4th ed. 2022).
   9
        A defendant can move to withdraw their plea prior to sentencing by filing a motion
in the underlying criminal case. Under Criminal Rule 11(h)(2), the court must grant a
presentencing motion to withdraw a plea if “withdrawal is necessary to correct manifest
injustice,” but the court may, in its discretion, grant a presentencing motion to withdraw a
plea for “any fair and just reason unless the prosecution has been substantially prejudiced.”
Under Criminal Rule 11(h)(3), by contrast, a defendant seeking to withdraw their plea after
sentencing must file an application for post-conviction relief under AS 12.72. Such
applications should be granted only when “withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest
injustice.” See Nelson v. State, 440 P.3d 240, 247 (Alaska 2019).
   10
        McKinnon v. State, 526 P.2d 18, 21-24 (Alaska 1974).

                                            –6–                                         2756
challenge his plea on appeal because “the voluntariness and reliability of such a plea is
inherently suspect.”11
               But McKinnon was later clarified in a second case, Gordon v. State.12 In
Gordon, the defendant argued on direct appeal that his plea was involuntary and
asserted that this argument was permitted by McKinnon. But as our supreme court wrote
in Gordon, “[a]lthough the McKinnon language sanctions appellate review of the
voluntariness of a plea, it does not authorize bringing such claims by direct appeal.”13
Rather, “McKinnon merely stands for the proposition that a guilty or nolo plea will not
insulate the conviction from subsequent appellate review, if the issue is properly
raised.”14 As the court explained in a footnote, the defendant in McKinnon “was
appealing from the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea,” not raising the issue in a
direct appeal from his judgment of conviction.15
               Taylor points to a Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Hernandez, holding
that defendants can challenge their guilty plea on direct appeal when they were
erroneously denied their request for self-representation.16 In Hernandez, the Ninth
Circuit reasoned that the wrongful refusal of a request for self-representation
automatically renders a defendant’s guilty plea involuntary because it forces the
defendant “to choose between pleading guilty and submitting to a trial the very structure

   11
        Id. at 24.
   12
        Gordon v. State, 577 P.2d 701, 703-04 (Alaska 1978).
   13
        Id.
   14
        Id. at 704.
   15
        Id. at 704 n.3.
   16
        United States v. Hernandez, 203 F.3d 614, 626-27 (9th Cir. 2000).

                                           –7–                                      2756
of which would be unconstitutional.”17 In other words, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
the erroneous denial of a request for self-representation automatically renders any
subsequent plea involuntary, and thus “there is no need for any further factual
information.”18
               The rest of the federal circuit courts to consider this issue, however, have
rejected this reasoning in the context of self-representation.19 In United States v.
Dewberry, for example, the Eighth Circuit criticized the Ninth Circuit’s rationale as
being “based on the false premise that the defendant who is denied his right to represent
himself is forced to either plead guilty or submit to an unconstitutional trial.” 20 This
premise is faulty because, as Dewberry explained, “if the defendant proceeded to trial
and was convicted, he could seek an appellate remedy for the constitutional violations
he alleged.”21 We agree with this reasoning and further note that a defendant who
believes they have been erroneously denied their right to self-representation has the

   17
        Id. at 626 (emphasis in original).
   18
        Id. at 619.
   19
       See, e.g., Jackson v. Bartow, 930 F.3d 930, 934-35 (7th Cir. 2019); United States v.
Dewberry, 936 F.3d 803, 806 (8th Cir. 2019); United States v. Montgomery, 529 F.2d 1404,
1406-07 (10th Cir. 1976); see also United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 279-80 (4th
Cir. 2010) (holding that a guilty plea waives the right to assert the erroneous deprivation
of counsel of choice); United States v. Glover, 8 F.4th 239, 245-46 (4th Cir. 2021)
(declining to revisit Moussaoui in context of self-representation claim because parties did
not raise, discuss, or even cite to Moussaoui in the briefs); Werth v. Bell, 692 F.3d 486,
495-96 (6th Cir. 2012) (discussing how state and federal courts are divided regarding
whether the denial of a motion for self-representation necessarily renders a guilty plea
involuntary and holding that, under a deferential standard of review, it was not a violation
of clearly established law for Michigan courts to hold that the defendant waived his claim
that he was deprived of his right of self-representation by pleading guilty).
   20
        Dewberry, 936 F.3d at 806 (citing Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at 280).
   21
        Id. at 806-07 (quoting Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at 280).

                                             –8–                                       2756
additional option of filing an interlocutory petition for review with this Court prior to
going to trial or entering a guilty plea.22
              We also note that there are significant differences, in the context of a
guilty plea, between a defendant who has been denied their right to self-representation
and a defendant who has been denied their right to counsel altogether. A defendant who
has been denied the right to counsel has been denied their right to the assistance of a
trained attorney in deciding whether to plead guilty. By contrast, a defendant who has
been denied the right to self-representation has been denied the right to be their own
counsel and make decisions that would usually have been entrusted to an attorney. This
distinction is important in the context of a guilty plea because, unlike most decisions
about a defendant’s representation, the decision to plead guilty is entrusted to the
defendant rather than the attorney.23 Thus, for purposes of determining whether to plead
guilty, a defendant who has erroneously been denied the right to represent themself
stands in approximately the same position as they would have been if their request had
been granted: they have the benefit of their own counsel and full autonomy to decide
whether to plead guilty.
              To be clear, we do not doubt that the denial of a defendant’s request for
self-representation could affect the defendant’s decision to plead guilty and render that
decision involuntary. Rather, like the majority of federal courts to consider this issue,
we conclude that the erroneous denial of a request for self-representation does not
automatically render a defendant’s decision to plead guilty involuntary. Because we
conclude that a guilty plea made after the erroneous denial of the right to self-
representation will not always render a plea involuntary, and therefore further factual

   22
        Alaska R. App. P. 402, 403.
   23
        See, e.g., Murray v. State, 344 P.3d 835, 840 (Alaska App. 2015); Alaska R. Prof.
Conduct 1.2(a) (“In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision . . . as
to a plea to be entered.”).

                                              –9–                                       2756
development would be needed to prevail on such a claim, we hold that Taylor’s claim
cannot be raised for the first time on direct appeal from his guilty plea.24

        Conclusion
              The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.

   24
      See Alaska R. Crim. P. 11(h) (explaining procedures for defendant seeking to
withdraw their plea).

                                          – 10 –                               2756