Court Opinion

ID: 9959317
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-11 15:09:22.388863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:07.626465
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Parma v. Perotti, 2024-Ohio-1359.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

CITY OF PARMA,                                      :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                :
                                                                 No. 112089
                 v.                                 :

DEREK PEROTTI,                                      :

                 Defendant-Appellant.               :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: APPLICATION DENIED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 9, 2024

                                      Parma Municipal Court
                                      Case No. 21-TRC-15946
                                     Application for Reopening
                                        Motion No. 570762

                                              Appearances:

                 Scott Tuma, City of Parma Law Director/Chief Prosecutor,
                 and Gregory A. Gentile, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney,
                 for appellee.

                 Robert A. Dixon, for appellant.

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.:

                   Derek Perotti has filed a timely App.R. 26(B) application for

reopening. Perotti is attempting to reopen the appellate judgment, rendered in

Parma v. Perotti, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112089, 2023-Ohio-3472, that affirmed
the denial of his motion to suppress evidence that was used for the conviction of

operating a vehicle under the influence (“OVI”) following a jury trial in Parma v.

Perotti, Parma M.C. N0. 21-TRC-15946. We decline to reopen Perotti’s appeal.

      I.     Standard of Review Applicable to App.R. 26(B)
                       Application for Reopening

               An application for reopening shall be granted if there exists a genuine

issue as to whether an applicant was deprived of the effective assistance of appellate

counsel on appeal.     See App.R. 26(B)(5).     To establish a claim of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel, Perotti is required to establish that the performance

of his appellate counsel was deficient and the deficiency resulted in prejudice.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984);

State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989).

               In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court held that a court’s

scrutiny of an attorney’s work must be highly deferential. The court further stated

that it is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess his attorney after

conviction and that it would be too easy for a court to conclude that a specific act or

omission was deficient, especially when examining the matter in hindsight. Thus, a

court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the

wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must

overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action

might be considered sound trial strategy. Strickland.
                  Moreover, even if Perotti establishes that an error by his appellate

counsel was professionally unreasonable, Perotti must further establish that he was

prejudiced; but for the unreasonable error there exists a reasonable probability that

the results of his appeal would have been different.           Reasonable probability,

regarding an application for reopening, is defined as a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome of the appeal. State v. May, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 97354, 2012-Ohio-5504.

          II.   First Proposed Assignment of Error — Speculation by
                Arresting Police Officer as to Other Offenses Possibly
                Committed

                  First assignment of error, in support of his application for reopening,

is that

          [t]he trial court erred in permitting [arresting police officer] to
          speculate as to other offenses which he believed Mr. Perotti might have
          committed.

Perotti, through his first proposed assignment of error, argues that his appellate

counsel failed to argue on appeal the issue of the arresting police officer testifying at

trial regarding offenses that might have been committed, besides the charged

offense of OVI. Specifically, Perotti argues that he was prejudiced by the testimony

of the arresting police officer upon his arrival at the scene of a young female’s

complaint about suspicious behavior by Perrotti: 1) police officer responded to

complaint by young female, 2) young female pointed to vehicle Perotti was

operating, 3) police officer began to follow vehicle operated by Perotti, and 4)

thought process of police officer during investigation of complaint. Perotti argues
that the testimony of the arresting police office was prejudicial and should have been

excluded under Evid.R. 403(A).

               We find that the testimony of the arresting police officer regarding the

basis for his response to a complaint from a young female about suspicious behavior

by Perotti was admissible at trial and its probative value was not substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading

to the jury. There was no violation of Evid.R. 403(A) that required the exclusion of

the testimony of the arresting officer regarding his thought process during the

investigation, because the testimony of the arresting officer was relevant, equivocal,

and contemporaneous. State v. Ricks, 136 Ohio St.3d 356, 2013-Ohio-3712, 995

N.E.2d 1181; State v. Richcreek, 196 Ohio App.3d 505, 2011-Ohio-4686, 964 N.E.2d

442 (6th Dist.); State v. Blevins, 36 Ohio App.3d 147, 521 N.E.2d 1105 (10th

Dist.1987).

      III.    Second Proposed Assignment of Error — Prosecutor’s
              Comment to Jury to “Protect the Community”

               Perotti’s second proposed assignment of error is that

      [t]he prosecutor committed misconduct by speculating as to other
      offenses Mr. Perotti might have committed and by urging the jury to
      “protect the community.”

Perotti, through his second proposed assignment of error, argues that he was

prejudiced by the prosecutor’s misconduct during closing arguments. Specifically,

Perotti argues that that remarks of the prosecutor during closing arguments

regarding Perotti’s presence on the young female’s porch and the need to protect the
community, were prejudicial and resulted in a conviction for OVI based upon

“something he was not arrested nor charged with.”

               A prosecutor must avoid any declarations, claims, or averments that

are deliberately calculated to mislead a jury. State v. Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d 239,

473 N.E.2d 768 (1984); State v. Smith, 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 470 N.E.2d 883 (1984).

An allegation of prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument must be reviewed to

determine whether any remarks were improper and, if so, whether they prejudicially

affected substantial rights of Perotti. A conviction can only be reversed on the

grounds of prosecutorial misconduct if the effect of the misconduct permeated the

entire trial and Perotti has demonstrated that but for the prosecutor’s improper

statements, he would have prevailed at trial. Broadview Hts. v. Thomas, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 112312, 2023-Ohio-4645. The key to a determination of prosecutorial

misconduct is the fairness of the trial not the culpability of the prosecutor. State v.

Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111739, 2023-Ohio-1748.

               A review of the trial transcript, as provided by Perotti and made a part

of the App.R. 26(B) application for reopening, clearly fails to demonstrate that he

would have been found not guilty of OVI, but for the claimed errors of prosecutorial

misconduct. It is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found

Perotti guilty of OVI regardless of the alleged misconduct of the prosecutor. Thus,

we find that Perotti was not prejudiced by any of the remarks made by the prosecutor

during closing arguments. State v. Hanna, 95 Ohio St.3d 285, 2002-Ohio-2221, 767
N.E.2d 687; State v. Stevens, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-21-1219, 2023-Ohio-4683; State

v. Erker, 2019-Ohio-3185, 141 N.E.3d 543 (8th Dist.).

              Accordingly, we decline to grant Perotti’s App.R. 26(B) application for

reopening.

              The application for reopening is denied.

___________________________
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, A.J., and
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., CONCUR