Court Opinion

ID: 9795929
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:42:53.968731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:42:02.088881
License: Public Domain

TAYLOR, V.C.J.,
concurring:
¶ 1 Today’s per curiam, opinion holds that our district courts are courts of competent jurisdiction in the state Model Tribal Gaming Compact (model compact), 3A O.S.Supp.2004, § 281. Our holding is rested upon the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2722, the state statutory model compact, and basic rules of statutory construction. I join fully in our holding, and I concur fully in today’s per curiam opinion. I write separately to direct attention to the compact language requiring compliance with state law in the operation of Indian gambling casinos and to emphasize the conformity of today’s opinion and our recent opinion in Cossey v. Cherokee Nation Enterprises, LLC, 2009 OK 6, 212 P.3d 447 (mandate issued June 11, 2009).
¶ 2 The model compact, at Part 8, provides that the operation of a class III gaming casino in Indian country must comply with state law. Part 8 delineates the oversight and monitoring duties of the Office of State Finance as the state compliance agent (SCA), requiring the SCA to give written notice of any suspected “violation of this Compact or *499of law” to the tribal compliance officer (TCA), model compact at Part 8(A), and to report any violations of “federal, state, or tribal laws, the rules and regulations, or this Compact” to the TCA. Id. at Part 8(C)(bold added). Part 8 limits the state’s oversight by withholding authority from the state “to regulate the tribe’s government, including the TCA, or to interfere with the tribe’s selection of its governmental officers.” Id. at Part 8(D). The importance of Part 8 here is that it plainly requires Indian tribes to comply with state law in operating their gambling casinos, except when state law interferes with tribal self-government. In my view, Part 8 is strong support for including state district courts within the meaning of “courts of competent jurisdiction.”
¶ 3 Also, our opinion in Cossey v. Cherokee Nation Enterprises, LLC compels today’s holding. Notwithstanding the many factors that distinguish Cossey from the instant ease, the primary issue in Cossey was the same as the issue here-whether the state district court is a court of competent jurisdiction to entertain an Indian casino patron’s tort claim against an Indian tribe under the model compact. Cossey analyzed federal and state jurisprudence in assigning meaning to “court of competent jurisprudence” in the model compact1 and reached the same conclusion that today’s per curiam opinion reached through its statutory construction analysis.
OPAL A, J., concurring
¶ 1 I write in concurrence to support the court’s construction of the key phrase “the court of competent jurisdiction.”
¶ 2 The claim we deal with in this cause — a common law tort — was created by the cooperative effort of three separate levels of governmental power: (1) the federal sovereign’s authorization of the compact1 that created the claim before us and by (2) the State of Oklahoma entering into a federally-authorized compact2 with (3) the Choctaw Nation. It is in light of the tripartite joinder of sovereign powers that we must interpret the key phrase “a court of competent jurisdiction.”.3 We do so here by not excluding any one of the three birth-giving participants. Instead, we acknowledge that each of them, in its own court, may assume original jurisdiction over the casino patron’s tort claim. The Nation has agreed to share jurisdiction with the other two sovereigns, the State and the federal government. The casino patron’s tort claim is not, and cannot be, denominated as Indian law.4 Our interpretation opens the door and keeps it widely open until one or more of the participating sovereigns should decline the opportunity to extend its adjudicative power over a casino patron’s cause of action. Inasmuch as the casino patron’s tort claim is a product created by a legal cooperation among the three sovereigns, the construction to be placed on the key phrase “the court of competent juris*500diction” must extend equal treatment to each of these participating governments. The compact’s textual impact plainly contemplates that jurisdiction over a casino patron’s tort claim is to be shared. See Parts 6 and 9.5 Over time, if all three sovereigns will continue to participate in the adjudicative process by entertaining the claims in their courts, a harmonizing jurisprudence will doubtless evolve for the three forensic systems to remain consistent and parallel.
¶ 3 A casino patron’s tort claim for injury sustained on tribal casino’s premises is governed neither by tribal law nor by Oklahoma state law. Rather, it is the product of compact-agreed terms of liability that may be imposed. A compact is defined as “an interstate [intergovernmental] agreement entered into to handle a particular problem or task.”6 A claim crafted pursuant to compact law — -the law agreed upon by the parties to the compact-authorized negotiations— should be enforceable by the signatory parties, the state and the tribe as well as by the federal courts. In the absence of a definition different from that which stands crafted by the text for the key term “the court of competent jurisdiction”, the phrase used by the compact should include a proper court of all three powers which participated in creating the compact.

.Cossey followed 1) state jurisprudence for the meaning of "court of competent jurisdiction," relying on Ex Parte Plaistridge, 1918 OK 352, 173 P. 646, and Ex Parte Justus, 1909 OK CR 132, 3 Okla.Crim. Ill, 104 P. 933; 2) federal jurisprudence for the notion of "dual sovereignty," relying on Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 110 S.Ct. 792, 107 L.Ed.2d 887 (1990), and Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 121 S.Ct. 2304, 150 L.Ed.2d 398 (2001) ("Dual sovereignty” recognizes that state courts have inherent authority and concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts to adjudicate claims arising under federal law in the absence of specific congressional enactment to the contrary.); and 3) federal Indian jurisprudence for the prohibition against state interference with tribal self-governance and internal affairs, including such cases as Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981), Strate v. A-l Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 117 S.Ct. 1404, 137 L.Ed.2d 661 (1997), Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 121 S.Ct. 2304, 150 L.Ed.2d 398(2001), and Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Company, -U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2709, 171 L.Ed.2d 457 (2008).

. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d).

. 3A O.S. Supp.2004, § 381.

. "This Compact shall not alter tribal, federal or state civil and criminal jurisdiction". We are not concerned here about pre-existing federal law of Indian country but about the new laws created by Choctaw Nation/Oklahoma compact.

. U.S. v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1030, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (holding that absent an ambiguity or a result that is at odds with a statute's purposes, statutory provisions must be interpreted according to their plain meaning).

. Part 6 sets forth the casino patron's tort claims. Part 9 provides that tribal, federal and state governments retain their respective spheres of civil adjudicative jurisdiction over gaming in Indian country.

. Webster's New International Dictionary 461 (3rd ed.1961).