Court Opinion

ID: 9855822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:31:37.696217+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:11.682213
License: Public Domain

BLATZ, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the denial of postconviction relief and remand to the district court for further proceedings on the narrow issue of Clemons’ communication of the second plea offer to respondent. The postconviction court found that the second plea offer was conveyed to Clemons at counsel table and in the presence of respondent during a recess in the jury selection process. Affidavits from the two prosecuting attorneys state that they heard Clemons communicate the offer to the respondent and that the offer was rejected. If this was the extent of the communication, I would hold that respondent did not receive effective assistance of counsel.
The duty to advise a client of a plea offer goes beyond mere communication that an offer exists. To secure the effective representation guaranteed to criminal defendants under the Sixth Amendment, an attorney is obliged to explain to the defendant the possible ramifications of accepting or declining a plea offer in such a manner so as to ensure the defendant has a clear understanding to make an informed decision. Particularly troubling here is respondent’s age, intelligence level, and the severity of the offense.
A 16-year-old with limited comprehension skills, being tried as an adult for second-degree felony murder, can hardly be expected to make an informed decision concerning a plea offer if, as the record currently reflects, the offer is briefly communicated in an open courtroom, in the presence of opposing counsel.
In order to grant a defendant postconviction relief on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must affirmatively prove that his counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard , of reasonableness” and “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Gates v. State, 398 N.W.2d 558, 561 (Minn.1987) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). The majority’s analysis focuses in on the singular act of communication of the plea offer. I do not disagree with its conclusion, or the finding of the postconviction court that a 64 month plea offer was, in fact, communicated to the respondent. Of concern, however, is that the record presented on appeal indicates that nothing more than a “communication” of an offer occurred. While the majority takes issue with the court of appeals statement that the communication took place in a matter of seconds, the record does not support a conclusion that anything more than a verbal statement of a 64-month-offer was given to the respondent. If the only plea offer discussion that occurred between Clemons and respondent was at the counsel table in the presence of the prosecuting attorneys, I would conclude that Clemons’ assistance fell below the standard of objective reasonableness. A reasonably prudent attorney would have taken additional measures to ensure that a 16-year-old client with borderline intellectual functioning truly understood the legal implications of declining the plea offer. At the very least, a reasonably prudent attorney would have discussed the plea offer with the defendant in private. Moreover, if in fact the record accurately reflects the extent of Clemons’ representation on this issue, I. would conclude that respondent was prejudiced by the ineffective assistance of counsel he received because respondent was therefore deprived of the right to elect a shorter term of incarceration.
*734Accordingly, I would remand to the post-conviction court for evidentiary hearings to determine whether Clemons discussed the plea offer with respondent outside the hearing of the prosecuting attorneys and others. I do not believe that such an inquiry would depart from this court’s longstanding recognition of the flexibility and discretion inherent in attorney client representation. See King v. State, 562 N.W.2d 791, 795 (Minn. 1997). What is disturbing about this case is not what we do not know — but what we do. The trial court needs to make the necessary findings that defense counsel did more than simply tell the respondent that the state was offering him 64 months upon a plea of guilty. If no further discussion took place between Clemons and respondent other than that which is documented, respondent should be granted postconviction relief by receiving the benefit of the second plea offer.