Court Opinion

ID: 9831838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:24:21.821573+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:38.451167
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing
After carefully reviewing the entire record, we are of the opinion that we erred in holding that the trial court should have sustained appellants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Such holding was based upon the idea that the- evidence showed conclusively that the dangers incident to cleaning the machine were open and obvious to everyone, regardless of experience, and required no warning by appellants. The evidence is susceptible to the interpretation that Luttrell was not given any warning of the danger of having his hand crushed if he failed to hold the scraper with both hands flat on the table. It cannot be said that such danger was open and apparent to all. Appellee testified that Mr. Ashby showed him how to clean the roller one time; that he did not appear to be very careful;' that he merely ran the scraper back ’ and .forth across the roller. There is evidence that in demonstrating how the roller should be cleaned, Mr. Ashby held the scraper “this way” or “that way.” Of course, such testimony, although it may have been clear to the jury, is meaningless in a record. There is evidence from appellants to the effect that the accident could have happened only by reason of one of two things, (1) because Luttrell did not look where he was putting his hands, or (2) because Luttrell was not holding the scraper in a horizontal position with both hands flat on the table, but was holding it in a nearly perpendicular position with his right hand on the guard and his left hand holding the other end of the scraper higher, up in the air, and nearer the opening between the rollers.
It is readily conceivable that such an employee as Luttrell might not know that when the scraper struck a hard piece of dough on the roller while holding the scraper and his hands in such a position, that his left hand might be thrown between the rollers. This is quite a different thing from knowing and realizing merely that if he got his hand between the rollers is would be crushed. The same idea was expressed by Judge Strong in Hotel Dieu v. Armendarez, Tex.Com.App., 210 S.W. 518, 520, as follows:
“It does not appear from the testimony that plaintiff had, prior to her injury, been confronted with the duty of releasing entangled garments from the mangle, and the fact that she applied to Mrs. Sawyer for instruction indicates that she had not. She knew how to feed the mangle and knew if her hand came in contact with the revolving rollers that she would be injured, but it cannot be held, as a matter of law, that she understood and appreciated the danger of her hand being drawn between the rollers in an effort to release the entangled garments while the machine was in operation. Under the evidence, this was a question of fact which was properly left to the determination of the jury.”
In City of Waco v. Dool, Tex.Civ.App., 254 S.W. 353, Dool v. City of Waco, Tex.Civ.App., 231 S.W. 176, an employee, who knew that it was dangerous to handle dynamite, returned to the spot where he had lighted a fuse on a stick of dynamite after it had failed to explode within the usual time and was injured by a delayed explosion caused by a slow burning fuse. There was evidence that Dool did not know that some fuses burned more slowly than others; that the defendant failed to warn him; that if he had been so warned, he would have waited longer before going back *81to the ditch and would thereby have avoided the injury. The court held that the question whether defendant was negligent in failing to so warn said employee was for the determination of a jury and that the court erred in instructing a verdict for the defendant. See also Wikstrom v. Preston Mill Company, 48 Wash. 164, 93 P. 213.
Generally, it is a question for a jury to determine whether, under the circumstances of a particular case, it was incumbent upon the master to give the servant warning or instructions, not only regarding the dangers of the work, but also instructions as to how he could safely perform it and avoid injury. 39 C.J. 521.
“Comprehensively stated, the rulings of the cases are to the effect that if a person employs another to do work of a dangerous character or in a dangerous place, and the employee, because of youth, ignorance or inexperience, fails to appreciate the danger, it is a breach of duty and negligence on the part of the employer to expose him thereto, even with his consent, unless the employer first gives to him such instruction, caution, and warning as will enable him to comprehend the danger and to do his work safely with the exercise of proper care on his part.” 35 Am.Jur. 576. See also Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Watts, 64 Tex. 568; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Garrett, 73 Tex. 262, 13 S.W. 62; Chicago Anderson Pressed Brick Co. v. Reinneiger, 140 Ill. 334, 29 N.E. 1106, 33 Am.St.Rep. 249; Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Gardner, 29 Tex.Civ.App. 90, 69 S.W. 217.
We conclude that it was a question for the jury whether appellants were guilty of negligence in failing to warn appellee of the danger of getting his hand crushed unless he held the scraper with both hands flat on the table.
We do not think the failure of the court to sustain special exceptions to appellee’s pleadings because he did not specifically allege appellants had knowledge of his inexperience constitutes reversible error. Appellants’ evidence shows they were not surprised at the testimony as to appellee’s inexperience.. There is no substantial difference in the testimony as to the information relative to the employee’s ex-perience furnished by Luttrell to Ashby at the time he was employed and started his training. We cannot reverse the judgment because of the failure to submit special issues requested by appellants. They did not comply with the rules. No “specific grounds therefor” were stated in appellants’ motion for an instructed verdict, as required by Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 268. Steed v. State, 143 Tex. 82, 183 S.W.2d 458. All of appellants’ points have been considered and are overruled. Appellee’s motion for rehearing is granted, our former judgment is set aside and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.