Court Opinion

ID: 9577207
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:32:55.83317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:08.186073
License: Public Domain

Neill, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part)—I concur in the granting of a new trial and most of the rationale of the majority opinion,1 but dissent from that part of the *373majority opinion which confers a claim for damages under RCW 4.24.010 extending beyond the decedent’s age of majority.
The portion of the statute which extends recovery in these cases to include damages for “loss of love and companionship of the child and for injury to or destruction of the parent-child relationship” is unequivocally tied to the preexisting portion wherein the cause of action is established, having express reference back to “such an action.” Under that section, the term for which ongoing losses could be recovered was uniformly limited to the term of minority. Lockhart v. Besel, 71 Wn.2d 112, 426 P.2d 605 (1967); Skeels v. Davidson, 18 Wn.2d 358, 139 P.2d 301, 149 A.L.R. 225 (1943); Skidmore v. Seattle, 138 Wash. 340, 244 P. 545 (1926). Our prior construction of the statute requires some affirmative action by the legislature to extend the time for which such losses are recoverable. Pringle v. State, 77 Wn.2d 569, 464 P.2d 425 (1970); Nyland v. Department of Labor & Indus., 41 Wn.2d 511, 250 P.2d 551 (1952). The majority opinion perceives a lack of period limitation in the express language of the statute, and on that premise concludes that no such limitation exists. The conclusion is contrary to this court’s own precedent, both as to the existence of a period limitation and as to the effect of legislative acquiescence in this court’s prior judicial constructions.
Assuming the majority opinion will be controlling precedent for future cases, I see this portion of that opinion as having harmful impact. Now, loss of services damages are open-ended, as are all other wrongful death damages of continuing nature. In my view, that is an invitation to conjecture that exceeds the ability of legal rules to control. The majority states no reasons, and I perceive none, to support such radical departure from existing law.
Stafford, J., and Ott, J. Pro Tern., concur with Neill, J.

Although not applicable to this 1969 accident, attention should be called to the enactment by the legislature of Laws of 1971, ch. 77, § 3 (RCW 46.37.425) relating to standards of tire tread and condition.