Court Opinion

ID: 9718000
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:14:40.904453+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:56.711900
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Justice,
dissenting (Assigned).
Believing the majority’s harm analysis does not meet the requirements of Rule 44.2(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, I dissent.
I. FACTUAL SUMMARY
This case involves the dissolution of a domestic relationship between the complainant and appellant. Their relationship ended in September of 1998. The complainant testified that on March 26, 1999, appellant initiated several conversations attempting to reconcile. The last conversation occurred outside the complainant’s home. This was a heated exchange that ended with the complainant driving from her home. After the complainant departed, appellant followed and rammed her vehicle four times. The complainant wrote down appellant’s license plate number and gained the attention of a police officer to whom she reported this incident. The complainant testified appellant’s conduct caused just over $700.00 in damages.
Jonathan Evans, the complainant’s neighbor, testified to seeing appellant and the complainant in her driveway and hearing raised voices. After this conversation, Evans saw appellant closely follow the complainant as she drove from her home. Evans, however, did not see an impact between the two vehicles.
Houston Police Officer M.R. Janson testified the complainant drove next to the patrol car and motioned for Janson to stop. Janson followed the complainant to her home and examined the bumper of her vehicle and observed an area on the rear bumper that was damaged. The damage was similar to a large paint chip in the center of the bumper two to three inches in diameter. Neither Janson nor the complainant photographed the alleged damage to the bumper.
Appellant testified he was at work on March 26, 1999, when he received a telephone call from the complainant requesting $540.00 to pay her car note. When appellant refused to lend the money, the complainant became upset and abruptly ended the conversation. Appellant testified he had no other direct contact with the complainant that day. Subsequently, appellant received a telephone call regarding the complainant’s allegations. Appellant took several photographs of his vehicle, which showed no damage to the bumper. These photographs were admitted into evidence. Appellant denied being at the complainant’s home or ramming her vehicle.
II. JURY ARGUMENT
The second and third points of error contend the trial court erred in overruling appellant’s objection to the prosecutor’s closing argument, which mentioned matters outside the record. Specifically, the second point centers around the prosecutor injecting new and harmful facts to bolster the credibility of the complainant and Evans by stating that neither had criminal records. The majority agrees this argument was “technically” improper. See supra at 796. The characterization of this clearly improper argument as a technicality is unfortunate. Rule 608(a)(2) of the Texas Rules of Evidence specifically prohibits one from offering proof, in the first instance, of the truthfulness of a witness. If such evidence is not admissible, then argument designed solely to circumvent the rules of evidence to place such matters before the jury is more than merely technically improper. Despite this regrettable characterization, the majority ultimately holds the argument was improper. Of course, it would be difficult for the majority to hold otherwise in light of the State’s confession of error, and the controlling and direct authority from this very court. See Hill v. State, 659 S.W.2d 94 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no pet.).
The third point contends the prosecutor injected new and harmful facts when she *799argued the details of appellant’s prior misdemeanor conviction. The majority correctly concludes the argument was not a reasonable deduction from the evidence. See supra at 797. Assertions of fact within a question are not established as fact unless the witness admits or agrees to those assertions. Stated another way, inquiry does not establish the existence of the fact(s) within the question. In the instant case, appellant did not admit that he assaulted a woman. Therefore, that fact was not proven. Because it was not proven, a reasonable deduction could not be drawn. As this court has noted, “Logical deductions from evidence do not permit within the rule logical deductions from non-evidence.” Ortiz v. State, 999 S.W.2d 600, 605 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] no pet). Therefore, the trial court erred in overruling appellant’s objection.
III. HARM ANALYSES
My disagreement on these points of error comes from the majority’s harm analysis. While the majority correctly recognizes the instant question of harm is governed by Rule 44.2(b) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure and Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 259 (Tex.Crim.App.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1070, 119 S.Ct. 1466, 143 L.Ed.2d 550 (1999), what follows is not the considered, meaningful, and thorough analysis contemplated by either Rule 44.2(b) or Mosley. Rule 44 .2(b) requires us to examine error in relation to the entire proceeding to determine whether it had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” See King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Ortiz, 999 S.W.2d at 606. To that end, the Mosley Court recognized three factors to employ when assessing the harm associated with improper jury argument. See Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 259.
A. Severity of the Misconduct
When considering the first factor, it is important to note that neither Evans, nor Officer Janson, saw appellant ram the complainant’s vehicle. Therefore, this case boiled down to a swearing match between appellant and the complainant. Therefore, it was advantageous to the State to bolster the credibility of the complainant and to destroy the credibility of appellant. Both of the complained of arguments were designed to have this desired affect.
In Hill, this court condemned this type of argument:
The Court of Criminal Appeals has on many occasions condemned any effort on the part of the State to bolster the credibility of its witnesses by unsworn testimony. [citations omitted] Where the bolstered witness was the only witness who could identify appellant as the person who committed the offense, and the credibility of this witness was critical to the trial of this case, it is not harmless error, [citations omitted] This expression of the prosecutor’s opinion was not a deduction from the evidence, but was instead an effort to bolster [the witness’s] credibility by unsworn testimony. Accordingly, appellant’s third ground of error is sustained.
659 S.W.2d at 96. (emphasis added)
The misconduct is even more severe when one recognizes the argument was derived from questions that were improperly phrased in the first instance. When a party seeks to impeach a witness with a prior conviction, the proper inquiry is to ask the witness whether s/he has been convicted of the offense in question. If the witness answers in the affirmative, the impeachment is complete. If the witness denies the prior conviction, the same may be proven by public record. See Tex.R.Evid. 609; Aleman v. State, 795 S.W.2d 332, 334 (Tex.App.-Amarillo, 1990, no pet). It is highly improper to permit the proponent to elicit the details which resulted in the conviction. See Tex.R.Evid. 608(b); Mays v. State, 726 S.W.2d 937, 953 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); Lape v. State, 893 *800S.W.2d 949, 958 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, pet. refd). This improper conduct was attempted by the State in the instant case.
Despite this direct and controlling authority condemning such conduct, the majority finds the State’s misconduct was not severe. But in doing so, the majority fails to cite even a single case to support either finding. This is not the analysis required by Rule 44.2(b) and Mosley.
Additionally, the State’s improper arguments were not limited to these two instances; at other times, the State argued-outside the record. For instance, the State argued:
THE STATE: Now the niece is out there in the courtroom, Monica, and if we wanted to we could have called her. She would have said the same thing.
APPELLANT: Well, Judge, she’s testifying—
THE COURT: Sustained as to form.
At another point, the prosecutor argued:
THE STATE: [Y]ou know, I live over by Rice University, my parents do and I went down Shepherd a couple of years ago when they were re-doing it. I hit a pot hole and it costs me sixteen hundred dollars—
APPELLANT: Judge, she’s testifying.
THE COURT: Sustained.
These two additional arguments portray a prosecutor bent on doing anything necessary to bolster the credibility of her witnesses. By arguing outside the record, the prosecutor willfully ignored the rules of law governing jury argument. Such misconduct was severe and has never been sanctioned by this court. See Ortiz, 999 S.W.2d at 606. (“[W]e find the prosecutor’s argument not to be mildly inappropriate, but rather approaching the opprobrious.”). For all of these reasons, the first factor of Mosley militates toward a finding of harm.
The majority fails to mention these latter arguments within its harm analysis, and criticizes me for doing so. See supra at 797 n. 1. That portrayal of this opinion is incorrect in three major respects. First, the majority states that I do not believe the arguments complained of in these points of error are sufficient on their own to warrant reversal. Ibid. That statement is inaccurate; had the State not made these latter arguments, I would nevertheless find the first Mosley factor militates toward a finding of harm. Second, and more importantly, the majority fails to recognize that this species of harm analysis was spawned by federal precedent. See Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 259 (“[F]ederal caselaw ... provide[s] especially useful guidance.”) (citing United States v. Millar, 79 F.3d 338, 343 (2nd Cir.1996); United States v. Palmer, 37 F.3d 1080, 1085 (5th Cir.1994)). An examination of that precedent demonstrates that the cumulative effect of improper argument is part and parcel of assessing the severity of the prosecutorial misconduct. See U.S. v. Friedman, 909 F.2d 705, 709 (2nd Cir.1990); Floyd v. Meachum, 907 F.2d 347, 355 (2nd Cir.1990). Third, by ignoring these latter arguments and taking a myopic view of the complained of arguments, the majority fails to properly apply Rule 44.2(b) which requires an examination of the error(s) in relation to the entire proceeding to determine whether the error(s) had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” See King, 953 S.W.2d at 271 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Ortiz, 999 S.W.2d at 606. Therefore, the majority errs in failing to consider these latter two arguments in assessing the severity of the misconduct in the instant case.
B. Measures Adopted to Cure the Misconduct
Our law is clear that sustaining an objection to improper argument and instructing the jury to disregard the argument is normally sufficient to cure error arising from the improper argument. See Gardner v. State, 730 S.W.2d 675, 696 (Tex.Crim. *801App.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 905, 108 S.Ct. 248, 98 L.Ed.2d 206 (1987).1 However, the converse is equally true-the overruling of a proper objection places “the stamp of judicial approval” on the improper argument and magnifies the possibility of harm. See Good v. State, 723 S.W.2d 734, 738 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). In other words, rather than curing the error, by overruling the objection the trial court compounds the error. As the majority acknowledges the trial court overruled both of appellant’s objections to the complained of arguments. Since the trial court undertook no measures to cure the improper jury arguments, the second factor of Mosley necessarily militates toward a finding of harm.
However, the majority fails to recognize the trial court has the duty to “cure the misconduct.” This failure leads the majority to erroneously view the second Mosley factor in light of the prosecutor’s conduct after making the improper argument. In relation to the first improper argument, the majority finds that the prosecutor “corrected herself.” See swpra at 797.However, the majority cites no authority for the proposition that corrective action taken by the offending party is a proper substitute for actions which are the responsibility of the trial court. Indeed, in the context of closing arguments, there is United States Supreme Court authority directly contrary to the majority’s position. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 488-489, 98 S.Ct. 1930, 1936, 56 L.Ed.2d 468 (1978) (“arguments of counsel cannot substitute for instructions by the court.”).
In relation to the second improper argument, the majority states that the argument was not emphasized by the prosecutor. See supra at 797. Again there is no citation of authority of how the failure of the offending party to emphasize the error it created alleviates the need for the trial court to take corrective action. Moreover, the reasoning employed by the majority begs the question: why would a lawyer feel the need to emphasize an argument anointed with “the stamp of judicial approval.” See Good, 723 S.W.2d at 738. One is hard pressed to see how such an argument could receive a more emphatic endorsement which is precisely why, under these circumstances, the possibility of harm is magnified. See Good, 723 S.W.2d at 738; Davis v. State, 964 S.W.2d 14, 18 (Tex.App.-Tyler, 1997, pet.ref'd).
In sum, the majority’s harm analysis does nothing more than recite the second Mosley factor. What follows is a distortion of that factor in finding the offending party took corrective action when the trial court, who bore the responsibility, took none. The majority’s reasoning permits the fox to guard the hen house. This is not the analysis required by Rule 44.2(b) and Mosley.
C. Certainty of Conviction Absent the Misconduct
When considering the third factor, we assess the strength of the evidence supporting the conviction. See Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 259. But the majority does not set forth the facts of this case or in any way discuss the evidence presented at trial. Instead, in assessing the third Mosley factor, the majority states the obvious: that the case “boiled down to a swearing match between the State’s witnesses and appellant.” See supra at 797. The majority then describes the complained of jury arguments, on one hand, as a “weak attempt to bolster” the credibility of the State’s witnesses, and, on the other hand, *802as having “little effect” on appellant’s credibility. See ibid. Surely Rule 44.2(b) and Mosley require more than merely stating conclusions that are not shown to be supported by the record. Moreover, it is self evident in a case which is nothing more than a swearing match that any attempt(s) to bolster one side and to undermine the other is necessarily injurious.
When the trial evidence is considered, we learn that.neither Evans, nor Officer Janson, could testify as to the cause of damage to the complainant’s vehicle. Only the complainant could supply that testimony. On the other hand, appellant testified he was at work when the alleged offense occurred, and produced photographs of his vehicle showing it was not damaged as one would expect from ramming another vehicle four times. When the record evidence is carefully examined, clearly absent is the certainty of conviction.
IV. Conclusion
When the three factors of Mosley are subjected to the meaningful and thorough analysis required by Rule 44.2(b) one finds: the prosecutor engaged in severe misconduct by making the complained of arguments which were a part of a studied pattern of improper remarks throughout her summation; the trial court instead of taking corrective measures to cure the misconduct, placed his stamp of judicial approval on it; and, the evidence does not establish appellant’s conviction was certain absent the misconduct. Consequently, these errors should not be disregarded. Accordingly, I would sustain the second and third points of error and reverse the judgment of the trial court. Because the majority does not, I dissent.

. The continued viability of this body of law has been drawn into question with the Court of Criminal Appeals’ adoption of federal precedent in this area. See Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 259. Under such precedent, the curative measure adopted by the trial court may be inadequate. See and compare Friedman, 909 F.2d at 709-10 (citing U.S. v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1182 (2nd Cir.1981), with U.S. v. Tutino, 883 F.2d 1125, 1136 (2d Cir.1989); U.S. v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504, 514 (2nd Cir.1986)).