Court Opinion

ID: 9368353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-03 21:00:57.437017+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:07.204684
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 21-4129      Doc: 53         Filed: 02/02/2023    Pg: 1 of 6

                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 21-4129

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        MONTA OLANDER JORDAN, a/k/a Ghost,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at
        Roanoke. Michael F. Urbanski, Chief District Judge. (7:17-cv-00056-MFU-1)

        Submitted: November 9, 2022                                       Decided: February 2, 2023

        Before HARRIS and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Paul G. Beers, GLENN, FELDMANN, DARBY & GOODLATTE, Roanoke,
        Virginia, for Appellant. Christopher R. Kavanaugh, United States Attorney, Roanoke,
        Virginia, Jennifer R. Bockhorst, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
        UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
USCA4 Appeal: 21-4129      Doc: 53         Filed: 02/02/2023      Pg: 2 of 6

        PER CURIAM:

               A federal jury convicted Monta Olander Jordan of conspiracy to possess with intent

        to distribute and distribute heroin, Fentanyl, methamphetamine, and cocaine, in violation

        of 21 U.S.C. § 846; possession with intent to distribute Fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

        § 841(a); attempt to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of § 841(a);

        attempt to possess with intent to distribute heroin, in violation of § 841(a); and possession

        of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

        Prior to the sentencing, the district court granted in part Jordan’s Fed. R. Crim. P. 29, 33

        motion for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial based on the Government’s failure to

        tender exculpatory and impeachment evidence to the defense; the court thus vacated the

        firearm conviction. The court sentenced Jordan to 240 months of imprisonment, and he

        now appeals. We affirm.

               On appeal, Jordan first argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to

        suppress all evidence obtained through the tracking of two of his vehicles, asserting that

        the affidavits in support of the warrants lacked probable cause and the court incorrectly

        found that the good faith exception applied. In reviewing a district court’s ruling on a

        motion to suppress, we review legal conclusions de novo and the underlying factual

        findings for clear error, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government.

        United States v. Cloud, 994 F.3d 233, 241 (4th Cir. 2021). The Fourth Amendment requires

        that the police obtain a warrant before installing a tracking device on a target’s vehicle.

        United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012). In an effort to deter police misconduct,

        courts apply the exclusionary rule to “evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s

                                                     2
USCA4 Appeal: 21-4129       Doc: 53         Filed: 02/02/2023      Pg: 3 of 6

        Fourth Amendment rights.” United States v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327, 335 (4th Cir. 2014).

        But “exclusion of evidence has always been the last resort, not the first impulse,” because

        it “exacts a heavy toll on both the judicial system and society at large.” Id. (cleaned up).

        The exclusionary rule, therefore, is not applied “when the police act with an objectively

        reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful.” Id.

               In determining whether officers acted in good faith, we “begin with the assumption

        that there was not a substantial basis for finding probable cause” and question only whether

        “reliance on” the warrant at issue “was nevertheless reasonable.” United States v. Andrews,

        577 F.3d 231, 236 n.1 (4th Cir. 2009). “Usually, searches conducted pursuant to a warrant

        will rarely require any deep inquiry into reasonableness, for a warrant issued by a

        magistrate normally suffices to establish that a law enforcement officer has acted in good

        faith in conducting the search.” United States v. Perez, 393 F.3d 457, 461 (4th Cir. 2004)

        (internal quotation marks omitted). However, good faith does not apply when the warrant’s

        supporting affidavit is “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief

        in its existence entirely unreasonable. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984)

        (internal quotation marks omitted).

               In assessing whether official belief in probable cause was “entirely unreasonable,”

        our “inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well

        trained officer would have known that the search was illegal,” under all the circumstances.

        Id. at 922 n.23 (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. McKenzie-Gude, 671

        F.3d 452, 458-59 (4th Cir. 2011) (“Leon requires that [this Court] assess whether the

        officers harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of this factual predicate.”

                                                      3
USCA4 Appeal: 21-4129      Doc: 53          Filed: 02/02/2023     Pg: 4 of 6

        (internal quotation marks omitted)).        “[A]n assessment of an officer’s objective

        reasonableness . . . cannot turn on the subjective good faith of individual officers,” but we

        may “consider[] the uncontroverted facts known to the officer, which he has inadvertently

        failed to disclose to the magistrate.” McKenzie-Gude, 671 F.3d at 460 (internal quotation

        marks omitted); see also United States v. Thomas, 908 F.3d 68, 74 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting

        that we can look beyond the four corners of the affidavit because the omission was

        inadvertent and not in bad faith). We “look to all the facts and circumstances of the case,

        including the nature of the unlawful activity alleged, the length of the activity, and the

        nature of the property to be seized.”      United States v. Farmer, 370 F.3d 435, 439

        (4th Cir. 2004).

               Here, the Government conceded that the contested warrant applications failed to

        establish probable cause. However, based on the officer’s testimony regarding information

        known to him at the time of the applications, and the facts that a neutral magistrate granted

        the applications and two state court judges later renewed them, the district court determined

        that the officer had a reasonable belief that the resulting searches and gathering of evidence

        were lawful. We agree. The officer testified that he had recent information from several

        cooperating witnesses who provided information on Jordan’s drug dealing activities and

        also made statements against their own penal interest, information that he inadvertently left

        out of the warrant applications. Therefore, the officer’s belief that he possessed probable

        cause was not unreasonable.

               Jordan also challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for a judgment of

        acquittal or a new trial on the drug counts based on the Government’s violation of Brady v.

                                                      4
USCA4 Appeal: 21-4129       Doc: 53         Filed: 02/02/2023      Pg: 5 of 6

        Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). We review a district court’s denial of a Rule 33 motion for

        a new trial for abuse of discretion.       United States v. Wilson, 624 F.3d 640, 660

        (4th Cir. 2010). To receive a new trial based on a Brady violation, Jordan must “show that

        the undisclosed evidence was (1) favorable to him either because it is exculpatory, or

        because it is impeaching; (2) material to the defense, i.e., prejudice must have ensued; and

        (3) that the prosecution had [the] materials and failed to disclose them.” Id. at 661 (internal

        quotation marks omitted). To establish that such favorable evidence is material, the

        defendant must show that, had the evidence been disclosed, there is a reasonable

        probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. United States v.

        Caro, 597 F.3d 608, 619 (4th Cir. 2010).

               Here, the Government failed to produce the recording of the interview of a

        cooperating witness who provided information to the Government about Jordan’s

        activities. During the course of that interview, the witness took sole responsibility for the

        firearms Jordan was charged with possessing in the § 924(c) count. The district court found

        that this information, while material to the firearm charge, was not material to the drug

        charges. Given the extensive evidence of Jordan’s involvement in narcotics trafficking,

        we agree. As the district court noted, the Government presented substantial evidence,

        unrelated to the firearm charge, that Jordan distributed controlled substances over the

        course of more than a year. Therefore, the court did not err in denying Jordan’s request to

        vacate his drug convictions based on the Brady violation.

                                                      5
USCA4 Appeal: 21-4129      Doc: 53        Filed: 02/02/2023     Pg: 6 of 6

              Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral

        argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

        before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                     AFFIRMED

                                                    6