Court Opinion

ID: 9534558
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:40:58.202012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:31:29.339155
License: Public Domain

WARREN, P. J.,
dissenting.
Because I disagree that the state is precluded from requiring compliance with its procedural statutes in this case, I dissent.
The majority is correct that ICWA grants Indian tribes a substantive right to intervene in a child custody proceeding involving an Indian child and that ICWA preempts the state from enforcing any law that would deny that substantive right. It is also correct that federal law preempts any conflicting state law that affects its substantive rights under ICWA. However, when the state law is solely procedural in nature and does not affect or limit the substance of a federal right, then no preemption occurs. Nutbrown v. Munn, 311 Or 328, 811 P2d 131 (1991), cert den US_ (112 S Ct 867) (1992); Marr v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham *192& Co., Inc., 116 Or App 517, 842 P2d 801 (1992), rev den 315 Or 442 (1993).
ORS 9.160 provides that “no person shall practice law * * * unless that person is an active member of the Oregon State Bar.” ORS 9.320 provides:
“Any action, suit, or proceeding may be prosecuted or defended by a party in person, or by attorney, except that the state or a corporation appears by attorney in all cases * * *.”
In general, the forum state applies its own conflicts of law rules to determine whether the question is one of substance or procedure. Hust v. Moore-McCormick Lines, Inc., 180 Or 409, 424, 177 P2d 429 (1947). However, a state cannot apply its own law to limit the rights that a party has under a federal claim, even when that claim is asserted in a state court. Rogers v. Saylor, 306 Or 267, 284, 760 P2d 232 (1988). Because the ICWA gives an Indian tribe a right to intervene in state court proceedings, we must decide whether applying ORS 9.160 and ORS 9.320 would deny the tribe a right granted it by federal law.
25 USC § 1911(c) provides:
“In any State court proceeding for foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child, the Indian custodian of the child and the Indian child’s tribe shall have a right to intervene at any point in the proceeding.”
ORS 9.160 and ORS 9.320 do not deny the tribe’s right to intervene in this proceeding, but affect only how the intervention shall occur.
We decided a similar issue in Cooley v. Fredinburg, 114 Or App 532, 836 P2d 162 (1992), rev den 315 Or 311 (1993). In that case, we held that the failure of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to assert and establish its lien in a foreclosure proceeding precluded it from redeeming the property under ORS 23.530(2). 28 USC § 2410(c) provides for an absolute right on the part of the United States to have one year from the date of sale within which to redeem. We said:
“Although 28 USC § 2410(c) requires Oregon to permit redemption by the government within 1 year from the date of sale, nothing entitles the government, or anybody else, to *193redeem when it has failed to follow the state procedures that would have permitted it to protect itself.” 114 Or App at 538.
Similarly, the tribe retains its substantive right to intervene so long as it complies with the state’s procedures for intervention. I would hold that the trial court did not err when it ruled that the tribe’s motion to intervene was defective because it did not comply with the requirements of ORS 9.160 and ORS 9.320.
I dissent.