Court Opinion

ID: 9950966
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 14:02:45.665191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:35:35.895295
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                        SECOND DISTRICT

                                   N.D.,

                                Appellant,

                                     v.

                                    J.B.,

                                  Appellee.

                              No. 2D23-686

                             March 15, 2024

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Sarasota County; Maria Ruhl, Judge.

Scott T. Orsini of Orsini Law Group, LLC, St. Petersburg, for Appellant.

Jesse R. Butler of Dickinson & Gibbons, P.A., Sarasota, for Appellee.

KELLY, Judge.
     N.D. appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his petition to
establish paternity. Because the trial court misapplied section 742.12(4),
Florida Statutes (2020), to disestablish N.D.'s paternity, we reverse and
remand for further proceedings.
     N.D. and J.B. (the mother) were in a relationship for several years
but never married. R.R.D. was born during the time they were together,
and N.D. was named as the father on the child's birth certificate. N.D.
continued to be involved in the child's life after the parties' relationship
ended until the mother discontinued his visitation in 2020.
Consequently, N.D. filed a petition to establish paternity, a parenting
plan, and a timesharing schedule. In response to the petition, the
mother requested DNA testing and the appointment of a guardian ad
litem to determine whether testing was in the best interest of the child.
At first N.D. objected to the appointment of the guardian, but eventually
stipulated to the appointment. Based on the guardian ad litem's
recommendation, the trial court ordered the testing. The test results
showed that there was no chance N.D. was R.R.D.'s biological father.
The mother moved to dismiss N.D.'s paternity action pursuant to section
742.12(4), which provides that, in a proceeding to establish paternity,
"[i]f the test results show the alleged father cannot be the biological
father, the case shall be dismissed with prejudice." After a hearing on
the motion to dismiss, the trial court voiced its reluctance to dismiss the
petition, but ultimately stated, "My hands are tied. You know, 742.12
tells me I have to dismiss the case with prejudice based on the test
results." The court granted the mother's motion and dismissed the
petition.
      N.D. argues that the trial court erred in applying section 742.12(4)
to remove his rights as R.R.D.'s legal father based "solely on biology."
See Van Weelde v. Van Weelde, 110 So. 3d 918, 921 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)
("[D]espite the Husband's status as [the child's] legal father, the trial
court granted the Wife's motion [to disestablish the Husband's paternity]
based solely on biology . . . ."). He correctly contends that even though
the DNA test results revealed that he is not the biological father, he is
entitled to the presumption that he is the legal father because he was
named as the child's father on the birth certificate. See § 742.10(1).

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Section 742.10(1) provides that if an affidavit acknowledging paternity is
executed by both parties, witnessed, and signed under penalty of perjury,
a rebuttable presumption of paternity is created. Either party has the
right to rescind the acknowledgment within sixty days. Id. If not
rescinded within the sixty-day period, the voluntary acknowledgment of
paternity "shall constitute an establishment of paternity and may be
challenged in court only on the basis of fraud, duress, or material
mistake of fact, with the burden of proof upon the challenger." § 742.10(4)
(emphasis added). Because the parties did not rescind the
acknowledgement within sixty days, N.D.'s paternity was established by
operation of law. Thereafter, N.D. "was neither required nor permitted to
take action under chapter 742 to further establish his paternity." Van
Weelde, 110 So. 3d at 921; see also § 742.10(5) ("Judicial or
administrative proceedings are not required or permitted to ratify an
unchallenged acknowledgment of paternity."). The trial court erred in
failing to recognize N.D.'s status as R.D.D.'s legal father.
      The mother argues that N.D. failed to establish a presumption of
paternity because he did not produce any documents showing that the
statutory birth registration requirements were properly followed before
his name was placed on the birth certificate. This argument has no
merit. Section 382.013(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2015), states that "[i]f the
mother is not married at the time of the birth, the name of the father
may not be entered on the birth certificate without the execution of an
affidavit signed by both the mother and the person to be named as the
father." (Emphasis added.) Because N.D. is named on the child's birth
certificate, he was not required to prove that the underlying documents
were executed correctly. See Flores v. Sanchez, 137 So. 3d 1104, 1108-
09 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) ("As Mr. Flores' name appears on the Child's birth

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certificate as the Child's father, we must assume that the hospital
complied with section 382.013(2)(c) by obtaining an affidavit or a
voluntary acknowledgment of paternity from Mr. Flores and the
Mother."); see also Van Weelde, 110 So. 3d at 921 ("[O]nce the Voluntary
Acknowledgement of Paternity was signed and the Husband's name was
placed on [the child's] birth certificate, the Husband became [the child's]
legal father for all purposes."). The statute does not require that the
"person to be named as the father" on the birth certificate be the
biological father. Id.; see also § 382.013(2)(c).
      As the challenger of the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, the
mother had the burden of proof to rebut the presumption of paternity.
See § 742.10(4). The mother contends that there was "some testimony"
during one of the evidentiary hearings about coercion or fraud at the
time the acknowledgement of paternity was signed. However, the mother
did not plead fraud, coercion, or mistake of fact, and the trial court did
not dismiss the petition to establish paternity on those grounds. Rather,
the trial court dismissed the petition solely because the DNA tests
revealed that N.D. was not the biological father.
      Thus, because N.D.'s paternity has already been established, the
trial court should have treated his petition to establish paternity as a
petition to determine timesharing. Accordingly, we reverse and remand
for the trial court to determine whether timesharing with N.D. is in the
best interest of the child.
      Reversed and remanded.

CASANUEVA and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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