Court Opinion

ID: 9364352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-19 01:00:29.152456+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:37.601127
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-40849     Document: 00516615372         Page: 1     Date Filed: 01/18/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                               Fifth Circuit

                                                                             FILED
                                                                      January 18, 2023
                                  No. 21-40849                          Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                             Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                             Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                       versus

   Jacob Boone Wright,

                                                         Defendant—Appellant.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Texas
                          USDC No. 2:20-CR-1444-1

   Before Smith, Barksdale, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.
   Rhesa Hawkins Barksdale, Circuit Judge:
          At issue is whether Jacob Boone Wright was seized in violation of the
   Fourth Amendment when an officer, with emergency lights engaged, pulled
   behind Wright’s parked vehicle, and he did not attempt to flee or terminate
   the encounter, but failed to comply fully with the officer’s commands.
   Because the officer’s actions communicated clearly to Wright he was not free
   to leave, and because he submitted to the officer’s show of authority, we hold
   a Fourth Amendment seizure occurred at the time the officer activated her
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   emergency lights and almost simultaneously ordered him to stay in his car,
   which he continued exiting but stood beside.
          The district court at the end of an evidentiary hearing, however,
   denied Wright’s motion to suppress, concluding erroneously that the Terry
   stop was initiated instead at a later point in the encounter. As a result, its oral
   findings of fact and conclusions of law are inadequate for our reviewing
   whether reasonable suspicion existed at the earlier time we hold his seizure
   occurred.
          Therefore, while retaining jurisdiction over this appeal, we remand to
   district court for it, based on the record developed at the suppression hearing,
   to prepare expeditiously written findings of fact and conclusions of law on
   whether the seizure at the earlier point in time was in violation of the Fourth
   Amendment. The district court is to then return this case to this court for
   further     proceedings.    REMANDED              on    LIMITED          BASIS;
   JURISDICTION RETAINED.
                                           I.
                                           A.
          The suppression hearing was held on 24 June 2021. The following
   recitation of facts is, unless otherwise noted, based on the record developed
   at that hearing.
          The Corpus Christi, Texas, Police Department (CCPD) on 15 July
   2020 (at “about 4:30 in the afternoon”, as used in the Government’s
   question to the caller discussed infra) received an anonymous “suspicious
   vehicle call” regarding a vehicle in the Glen Arbor Park area near
   Tanglewood Drive and Bonner Drive in Corpus Christi. Glen Arbor Park

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   and the surrounding neighborhood are part of a corridor of problem areas
   where drugs are sold. Officers respond to a few calls in this area every shift.
            As a result of the call to CCPD, Officer Jakobsohn at 4:34 p.m. that
   day received an incident “call-out”. The Officer testified the dispatcher
   (dispatch) told her “there was a suspicious vehicle in the area of the Glen
   Arbor Park near Tanglewood [Drive] and Bonner [Drive]”, and directed her
   to respond. Dispatch also transmitted information regarding the call to the
   Officer’s in-vehicle computer (call summary or call-log report generated by
   CCPD dispatch). In addition to providing the address for Glen Arbor Park
   and the names of the surrounding intersecting streets signifying the vehicle’s
   location, the information communicated to the Officer included the
   following:

        •     SUSPICIOUS PEOPLE AT LOC/ RP ADV DRUG DEAL-
              ERS/NO DRIVING CARS AT LOC
        •     RP ADV NO DESC
        •     RP ADV PD NEEDS TO GET THESE DRUG DEALERS
              OUT OF HIS PARK
        •     DID THREATEN TO SHOOT SUBJS IF THEY DID
              SOMETHING THAT REQUIRED HIM TO DEFEND
              HIMSELF
        •     REF TO GIVE INFO ON HIMSELF
        •     ALSO ADV OF A GOLD COROLLA AT LOC/ IS ONE OF
              THE SUBJS CARS
            This call summary was introduced in evidence by Wright at the
   suppression hearing, with Officer Jakobsohn’s testifying about the summary.
   She explained it stated “suspicious people at the location, via drug dealers,
   driving cars at location”. She further confirmed the information specified
   police “need[ed] to get these drug dealers out of [the caller’s] park”, but that
   the caller “did not advise a description”. She did not testify about the

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   caller’s threats; but, based on the caller’s testimony, he threatened to shoot
   the subjects if they did something that required him to defend himself.
          The Officer presented conflicting testimony about “REF TO GIVE
   INFO ON HIMSELF”.            Despite testifying she received the summary
   written in “all caps”, she explained she did not “see any kind of refusal” by
   the caller to provide information; rather, the summary just stated the
   referring party (caller) did not want contact, nor did he provide information
   about himself. Finally, the Officer affirmed the caller provided information
   that a gold Toyota Corolla was one of the subjects’ vehicles.
          Minutes later, the Officer located a gold Toyota Corolla parked on
   Bonner Drive, across the street from the park; executed a three-point-turn;
   and pulled behind the vehicle, engaging her patrol vehicle’s red and blue
   emergency lights. As the Officer parked her vehicle, she saw the driver’s
   door open on the Corolla, and as she exited her vehicle, she commanded the
   driver—later identified as Wright—three times to “stay in [his] car”.
          Wright did not, however, remain in or re-enter his vehicle; but when
   the Officer told him to put his hands on his vehicle, he placed his keys on top
   of, and turned towards, it. The Officer then conducted a pat-down of Wright
   and attempted to move him next to her patrol vehicle, but he refused. He
   turned towards the Officer, keys in hand, and stated he wanted to talk to her.
          When the Officer again commanded Wright to walk towards the patrol
   vehicle, he instead began removing a key from the key chain. Wright then
   disregarded the Officer’s commands to put his keys on top of his vehicle.
   Once Wright separated one key and put the rest of them in his pocket, he
   turned and began moving towards the driver’s door; the Officer moved him
   to the front of his vehicle and ordered him to put his hands behind his back.
          Wright began knocking, and then banging, on his vehicle’s hood, while
   yelling repeatedly to the passenger in the vehicle to exit and lock it. Wright

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   was also motioning to the passenger to put something in his mouth. The
   Officer handcuffed Wright; she testified that, at this point, she was arresting
   him for “resisting detention”.
          The passenger exited the vehicle as a second officer arrived.
   (According to testimony by a special ATF agent at Wright’s subsequent 23
   December 2020 preliminary hearing, the passenger was not arrested during
   the stop in question.) A search of the vehicle produced a pistol and drugs.
                                         B.
          Wright on 22 December 2020 was indicted for possession of firearm
   by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2). After learning
   details of the anonymous tip, Wright on 17 May 2021 moved to suppress the
   firearm as evidence derived from an investigatory stop and seizure effected
   without reasonable suspicion, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
          In its response opposing the motion, the Government asserted:
   “based on the totality of the circumstances, including the information in the
   tip, the observance of activity consistent with that information, the
   defendant’s nervous reaction to the police, his unusual behavior, and his
   attempt to walk away, reasonable suspicion existed to justify a Terry stop”.
   See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (discussed infra).
          The 24 June 2021 suppression hearing, which lasted approximately 90
   minutes, was held approximately 11 months after the 15 July 2020 incident.
   In addition to a map of the area and the Officer’s dashboard and body-cam
   videos, the Government presented two witnesses: Officer Jakobsohn; and the
   anonymous caller, whom officers had identified only the week prior through
   knocking on doors in the area. Wright presented only the call summary.
          At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ruled from the bench. It
   denied the motion to suppress, based on concluding it did not “think that

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   Terry was implicated [when the Officer pulled up behind the vehicle]”;
   rather, the court “[thought] Terry was implicated afterwards based on the
   conduct which was further . . . spoken to by the officer [at the hearing]”,
   including the “chain of events that happened afterwards”. In that regard,
   the court concluded: Wright’s “taking the keys off the chain, not being
   willing to go back to the police officer’s car, [and] his communication with
   the passenger, . . . allowed [the Officer] to initiate the Terry stop”. (Because
   a “Terry stop” is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
   the term “stop” and “seizure” are used interchangeably in this opinion.
   E.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 674, 682 (1985)). (The point in time
   the court concluded the Terry stop permissibly occurred was, of course,
   subsequent to the time the Officer engaged her emergency lights and almost
   simultaneously ordered Wright to remain in his vehicle, which he instead
   stood beside.)
          Following the 24 June denial of his suppression motion, Wright on 4
   August 2021, a little over a year after the incident, pleaded guilty pursuant to
   a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2) conditional guilty plea,
   reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling. Our court granted
   Wright’s motion to expedite his appeal.
                                         II.
          When, as here, defendant shows he was seized absent a warrant, the
   Government bears the burden in showing reasonable suspicion existed
   justifying the seizure. E.g., United States v. Martinez, 486 F.3d 855, 859–60
   (5th Cir. 2007). Factual findings for the denial of a suppression motion are
   reviewed for clear error; conclusions of law, de novo. United States v. Smith,
   952 F.3d 642, 646 (5th Cir. 2020); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 564 F.3d
   735, 740 (5th Cir. 2009) (“The district court’s overall [ruling] that

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   reasonable suspicion existed for the stop is a conclusion of law that we review
   de novo.”).
          Viewing the evidence in the requisite light most favorable to the
   prevailing party (here, the Government), a district court’s ruling will be
   upheld “if there is any reasonable view of the evidence to support it”. United
   States v. Massi, 761 F.3d 512, 520 (5th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). In that
   regard, “[o]ne of the most important principles in our judicial system is the
   deference given to the finder of fact who hears the live testimony of witnesses
   because of his opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses”. United
   States v. Gibbs, 421 F.3d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
   Therefore, when, as in this instance, live testimony forms part of the basis for
   denial of a suppression motion, our clearly-erroneous standard is
   “particularly strong” because the “judge had the opportunity to observe the
   demeanor of the witnesses”. Id. (citation omitted).
          On the other hand, video recordings are given a presumption of
   reliability and significant evidentiary weight because “[a]n electronic
   recording will many times produce a more reliable rendition . . . than will the
   unaided memory of a police agent”. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753
   (1971). Accordingly, where testimony conflicts with video evidence, our
   court must view the “facts in the light depicted by the videotape”. Scott v.
   Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007); see also United States v. Vickers, 442 F.
   App’x 79, 86, 87 & n.7 (5th Cir. 2011).
                                         A.
          The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
   seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Terry, 392 U.S. at 9. A “Terry stop” is
   a “special category of Fourth Amendment ‘seizures’”, in which an officer
   may briefly detain an individual for further investigation, if the officer has

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   reasonable suspicion the individual is engaged in criminal activity. Terry, 392
   U.S. at 9; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979).
          “A temporary, warrantless detention of an individual constitutes a
   seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes and must be justified by reasonable
   suspicion that criminal activity has taken or is currently taking place;
   otherwise, evidence obtained through such a detention may be excluded.”
   United States v. Garza, 727 F.3d 436, 440 (5th Cir. 2013). The seizure must
   be “justified at its inception”; therefore, “our first task is ordinarily to
   determine when the seizure occurred”. United States v. Flowers, 6 F.4th 651,
   655 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
          A seizure occurs when an officer “objectively manifests an intent to
   restrain” the liberty of an individual through either use of physical force or a
   show of authority. Torres v. Madrid, 141 S. Ct. 989 (2021) (emphasis in
   original); Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16. “In the absence of physical force to
   restrain a suspect, ‘[a] police officer may make a seizure by a show of
   authority . . . , but there is no seizure without actual submission; otherwise,
   there is at most an attempted seizure, so far as the Fourth Amendment is
   concerned.’” Carroll v. Ellington, 800 F.3d 154, 170 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting
   Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007)). Accordingly, when, as
   presented in this appeal, a claimed seizure lacks physical force, we must
   analyze the encounter in two steps: whether the officer exerted a sufficient
   show of authority; and whether defendant submitted to it. E.g., id.
                                          1.
          In determining whether an officer makes a sufficient show of
   authority, the court considers whether, in the light of “all of the
   circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have
   believed that he was not free to leave”. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
   544, 554 (1980). When a person “has no desire to leave for reasons unrelated

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   to the police presence, the coercive effect of the encounter can be measured
   better by asking whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the
   officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter”. Flowers, 6 F.4th at
   655 (citation omitted).
          Wright contends the Terry stop was initiated when Officer Jakobsohn
   pulled up behind his vehicle. At the suppression hearing, the Government
   maintained the stop occurred when the Officer made physical contact almost
   immediately with Wright through the pat-down. In our court, however, the
   Government now predominantly asserts a position qualifying that the Terry
   stop may have occurred at some point earlier than the pat-down: when the
   Officer arrived with emergency lights engaged, or when she ordered Wright
   to remain in his vehicle.
          A Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j) letter concerning United
   States v. Morris, 40 F.4th 323, 327 (5th Cir. 2022) (holding stop occurred
   when officers “flagged down” defendant’s vehicle) was filed 3 November
   2022 by Wright, four days before oral argument in our court; the
   Government responded three days before argument. The Government’s
   response added to its position: “All agree that stopping one’s vehicle
   pursuant to a police command of a visual signal constitutes a seizure”; but,
   because Wright’s vehicle was already stopped, he was not seized when the
   Officer pulled behind him.
          Although our case law is sparse in considering whether emergency
   lights constitute a seizure, our court in Morris (again, the subject of the 28(j)
   letter) recently explained “[a]n officer’s visual signal for a motorist to stop—
   whether made by hand or lights and sirens—is such a show of authority”. Id.
   at 327–28. The use of emergency lights will not always exhibit a show of
   authority, of course.       For example, depending on the fact-specific

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   circumstances, emergency lights may be used instead by an officer to render
   aid or assistance.
          In Morris, defendant parked his vehicle behind a truck-stop casino and
   went to sleep; officers on foot later noticed the vehicle, but when they walked
   towards it, it began to drive away. Id. at 325. After flagging down the vehicle,
   it came to a stop. Id. Morris held defendant was stopped under the Fourth
   Amendment when officers “flagged down” his vehicle even though they did
   not physically block it. Id. at 327. Our court concluded the district court
   focused incorrectly on whether officers blocked defendant’s path, instead of
   assessing correctly whether the officers’ actions constituted a show of
   authority, obligating defendant to submit. Id.
          According to Wright’s counsel at the suppression hearing, the sound
   on the dashboard-camera video began when the Officer’s emergency lights
   were engaged; and the Officer turned her emergency lights on “maybe right
   before she stopped or right at the stop”. In any event, although Wright’s
   vehicle was already in the parked position, the use of emergency lights when
   Officer Jakobsohn arrived at his vehicle was a visual signal exhibiting her
   authority, as explained in Morris. Id; see also Malina v. Gonzalez, 994 F.2d
   1121, 1126 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding stopping individual “on the interstate by
   flashing a red light, . . . is a show of authority”).
          The principle underlying our court’s decision in Morris is not limited
   to actively moving vehicles. Accordingly, when the Officer quickly pulled up
   behind Wright’s vehicle, with emergency lights engaged, she was showing a
   sign of authority clearly communicating to Wright he was not free to leave.
   That Wright’s vehicle was parked at the time does not detract from the
   Officer’s show of authority. Moreover, the Officer almost simultaneously
   ordered Wright to remain in his vehicle; and “[u]nder the Fourth
   Amendment’s free to leave test, it is hard to conclude that a person ordered

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   to a certain location by police would feel free to leave”. Morris, 40 F.4th at
   328. (Therefore, on the facts presented by this case, it is not necessary to
   decide whether solely engaging the emergency lights constituted a seizure.)
                                         2.
          Officer Jakobsohn’s having asserted authority over Wright by
   engaging her emergency lights and visually and orally communicating to him
   that he was not free to leave, we next consider whether Wright submitted to
   that authority. Determining the time at which an individual submits to
   authority “depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority:
   a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting
   in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away”. Brendlin,
   551 U.S. at 262.
          It is undisputed that compliance with an officer’s commands
   constitutes submission to authority. E.g., United States v. Darrell, 945 F.3d
   929, 933 (5th Cir. 2019) (seizure occurred when defendant complied with
   officer’s second command to stop). The question at hand, however, turns on
   whether Wright submitted when, although he disregarded the Officer’s
   commands to remain in his vehicle, he did not attempt to flee or terminate
   the encounter.
          At the suppression hearing, Officer Jakobsohn testified: she found it
   unusual to see the driver’s door opening; and Wright’s exiting the vehicle
   was “kind of an aggressive approach”. The Officer’s dashboard-camera
   video shows Wright slowly exiting his vehicle. He turns to face the Officer
   with his arms extended at mid-chest level, with the palms of both of his hands
   facing her, and calmly states “Ma’am, I haven’t done anything”. He did not
   lunge towards the Officer, nor did he make any threatening or evasive
   movements. Wright did not attempt to flee, nor terminate the encounter.
   Contra California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991) (Seizure could not

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   “have occurred during the course of” a police chase because “that ‘show of
   authority’ did not produce [the individual’s] stop”. (citation omitted)).
          Wright’s not complying fully with some of Officer Jackobsohn’s
   commands was improper, to say the least, but his behavior does not show
   defiance to the Officer’s authority. Wright sufficiently submitted to the show
   of authority because he objectively appeared to believe he was not free to
   leave, and he did not attempt to flee, nor terminate the encounter.
                                           B.
          Wright’s having been seized when Officer Jakobsohn pulled behind
   his parked vehicle with the emergency lights engaged on her patrol vehicle
   and almost simultaneously ordered him to remain in his vehicle, which he
   instead stood beside, we turn to whether the requisite reasonable suspicion
   existed to justify the seizure at that point.
                                           1.
          An officer has reasonable suspicion if, based on the totality of the
   circumstances at the time of the stop, she has a “particularized and objective
   basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity”.
   United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981). The facts giving rise to
   reasonable suspicion must be “judged against an objective standard”. Terry,
   392 U.S. at 21. “The reasonable suspicion analysis is a fact-intensive test in
   which the court looks at all circumstances to weigh not the individual layers,
   but the laminated total.” United States v. Jacquinot, 258 F.3d 423, 427 (5th
   Cir. 2001).
          In claiming the stop was initiated pursuant to an unreliable anonymous
   tip, Wright maintains Officer Jakobsohn lacked reasonable suspicion to
   justify the stop. The Government, on the other hand, again presents an ever-
   shifting position.

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          In district court, as quoted supra, the Government asserted in its
   response in opposition to suppression: “the totality of the circumstances,
   including the information in the tip, the observance of activity consistent with
   that information, the defendant’s nervous reaction to the police, his unusual
   behavior, and his attempt to walk away” created reasonable suspicion
   justifying the stop.
          At the suppression hearing, the district judge had the Government
   clarify its position:
         [The Government]: . . . So, here, it is our position that this case
         does not hinge on the tip that was provided by the 9-1-1 caller to
         the dispatch center but, instead, hinges on what happened when
         the officer arrived on the scene and the Defendant got out of his
         vehicle and those events that occurred thereafter.
         ...
         The Court: When is it the Government’s assertion that Terry
         was implicated, at what point?
         [The Government]: Well, she does the [pat-down]; and he is
         still playing with his keys; and that was what started this—the trail
         of events that led to her reasonable suspicion ultimately.
         The Court: Okay. So, it wasn’t when she pulled up behind the
         car, it wasn’t when he exited the car, it was when she actually
         made physical contact with the Defendant is the Government’s
         position?
         [The Government]: Yes, your Honor.
   (Emphasis added.)
          At no point in the suppression hearing did the Government claim that
   the anonymous tip alone justified the seizure; instead, it repeatedly asserted
   the events that occurred after the pat-down cumulatively created reasonable
   suspicion. But, under its theory before this court, the Government contends

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   the anonymous tip regarding activity in a high-crime area established
   reasonable suspicion to justify the stop; in the alternative, the tip regarding
   activity in a high-crime area, plus Wright’s exiting his vehicle, gave rise to
   reasonable suspicion.
          “An investigative vehicle stop is permissible under Terry only when
   the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that
   criminal activity may be afoot.” Martinez, 486 F.3d at 861 (quoting United
   States v. Jaquez, 427 F.3d, 340–41 (5th Cir. 2005)). Reasonable suspicion “is
   dependent upon both the content of the information possessed by police and
   its degree of reliability”. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).
          This is especially true when claimed reasonable suspicion is primarily
   grounded in information from a tipster. It goes without saying that not all
   tips to police warrant the same reliance. “Unlike a tip from a known
   informant whose reputation can be assessed and who can be held responsible
   if her allegations turn out to be fabricated, an anonymous tip alone seldom
   demonstrates the informant’s basis of knowledge or veracity.” Florida v.
   J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000) (citations omitted). There are certain
   circumstances,    however,    where     an   anonymous      tip   is   “suitably
   corroborated”, exhibiting “sufficient indicia of reliability to provide
   reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop”. Id. (citation omitted).
          Although a tip need not necessarily contain predictive information to
   establish reasonable suspicion, certain factors may be considered in deciding
   whether the tip provided a sufficient basis. United States v. Gomez, 623 F.3d
   265, 269 (5th Cir. 2010). Those factors are:
          (1) the credibility and reliability of the informant; (2) the
          specificity of the information contained in the tip or report; (3)
          the extent to which the information in the tip or report can be

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          verified by officers in the field; and (4) whether the tip or report
          concerns active or recent activity or has instead gone stale.
   Id. (citing Martinez, 486 F.3d at 861).
          An anonymous tip may be found reliable when “the informant (1)
   asserts eyewitness knowledge of the reported event; (2) reports
   contemporaneously with the event; and (3) uses the 911 emergency system,
   which permits call tracing and voice recording”. United States v. Rose, 48
   F.4th 297, 303 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393,
   398–401 (2014)). (Although the Government claimed the call was through
   the 9-1-1 system, it had stated earlier for purposes of the indictment that the
   call was a suspicious-vehicle call. In any event, as discussed supra, even
   assuming it was a 9-1-1 call, the Government did not produce the recording
   or the dispatcher at the suppression hearing. As noted, the caller was found
   instead by knocking on doors the week prior to the hearing. And, as discussed
   supra, Officer Jakobsohn testified at the suppression hearing it was a
   suspicious-vehicle call.)
                                          2.
          As stated, and contrary to the district court, we hold Wright was
   seized when the Officer pulled behind his parked vehicle with the emergency
   lights engaged on her patrol vehicle and almost simultaneously ordered him
   to remain in his vehicle. That the Terry stop was initiated earlier than when
   the district court concluded obviously “changes the analysis”. Morris, 40
   F.4th at 329.
          All agree, as the district court noted at the hearing on the suppression
   motion, that the Government bears the burden of proving reasonable
   suspicion existed to justify the seizure. E.g., Martinez, 486 F.3d at 859. At
   the hearing, the Government, as discussed supra, did not base its position on

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   the anonymous tip; instead, it emphasized that the “trail of events [occurring
   after the pat-down] led to [the Officer’s] reasonable suspicion ultimately”.
          After hearing testimony from two witnesses, reviewing evidence, and
   hearing argument from the parties, the court made its findings of facts and
   conclusions of law from the bench. Prefacing its findings, the court stated: it
   was “not really sure that [the testifying] anonymous caller helped [the
   Government] out very much”; and, in ruling on the motion, it was “basing it
   on the totality of the circumstances articulated by the officer in this particular
   case”. (Emphasis added.) The court then made its findings of fact and
   conclusions of law:
          What I have before me is what [the Officer] saw on her screen
          which was report of suspicious people at a location, drug
          dealers. There’s an identification of a gold Corolla. And so,
          based on that and her experience that this was an area that had
          a high crime rate, vagrancy, and drug dealing, I find that it is
          reasonable for her to, at least, have pulled up behind the car. I
          don’t think that Terry was implicated at that point; and then, of
          course, all of the behavior that happened afterwards.
          ...
          So, based on the identifying information of the gold Corolla, I
          find that it was absolutely reasonable for her to have pulled
          behind a gold Corolla to, at least, investigate; and I think that
          Terry was implicated afterwards based on the conduct which was
          further, I think, spoken to by the officer.
          ...
          And then, the chain of events that happened afterwards with
          the conduct that we saw on the video. So, taking the keys off
          the chain, not being willing to go back to the police officer’s car,
          his communication with the passenger, all of those things I

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Case: 21-40849     Document: 00516615372            Page: 17   Date Filed: 01/18/2023

                                     No. 21-40849

          think allowed her to initiate the Terry stop; and then, the
          resisting is what happened afterwards with his conduct.
    (Emphasis added.)
          As reflected above, and consistent with, provided above, the court’s
   not relying on the tipster’s testimony in making its findings and conclusions,
   the court’s findings and conclusions are silent on the reliability of the
   anonymous tip and whether reasonable suspicion existed when, as held by
   this court, Wright was seized, as discussed supra. The court’s finding it was
   “reasonable” for the Officer to pull behind Wright’s vehicle cannot be read
   synonymously with a conclusion that she possessed “reasonable suspicion
   supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot”. Martinez,
   486 F.3d at 861 (citation omitted).
          “The Supreme Court has made clear that the initial reasonable
   suspicion determination should be made by the ‘resident judge,’ that is, the
   trial court of first instance, and the courts of appeal must give ‘due weight’
   to that court’s ‘factual inferences’.” Morris, 40 F.4th at 329 (quoting United
   States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273–74 (2002)). Accordingly, “it is not the
   place of our court to decide in the first instance the key issue of whether there
   was reasonable suspicion for the [Officer’s] stop”. Id.
          Based on the district court’s concluding the Terry stop was initiated
   later than our holding supra it occurred when the Officer pulled behind
   Wright’s parked vehicle with the emergency lights engaged on her patrol
   vehicle and almost simultaneously ordered him to remain in his vehicle, the
   record lacks adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law for whether
   reasonable suspicion existed at that point. In other words, because the
   court’s findings and conclusions turn instead on events occurring after the
   Terry stop, we are unable to deduce from them whether the court concluded

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                                   No. 21-40849

   the totality of the circumstances prior to the Officer’s pulling behind
   Wright’s vehicle provided reasonable suspicion justifying the stop.
          Accordingly, we remand for the limited purpose of the district court’s
   expeditiously providing written findings of fact and conclusions of law on
   whether reasonable suspicion existed when the Officer pulled behind Wright
   and ordered him to remain in his vehicle. Toward that end, because “the
   suppression hearing provided the [G]overnment the opportunity and
   obligation to present evidence establishing” reasonable suspicion, “[w]e will
   not afford the [G]overment a second opportunity to present evidence to the
   district court in attempt to meet their burden of proof”. United States v.
   Raney, 633 F.3d 385, 392 (5th Cir. 2011).           Instead, the findings and
   conclusions are to be based on the record developed at the suppression
   hearing.
                                       III.
         For the foregoing reasons, we retain jurisdiction over this appeal and
   remand to district court on a limited basis. As directed by this opinion, the
   court is to prepare expeditiously, based on the record developed at the
   suppression hearing, the above-described written findings of fact and
   conclusions of law. The court is to then return this case to this court for
   further    proceedings.   REMANDED             on     LIMITED         BASIS;
   JURISDICTION RETAINED.

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