Court Opinion

ID: 9957437
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 15:12:39.819262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:19.855003
License: Public Domain

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2024 S.D. 17

                            IN THE SUPREME COURT
                                    OF THE
                           STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA

                                   ****

STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA,                      Plaintiff and Appellee,

      v.

PAUL HAROLD TRUEBLOOD,                      Defendant and Appellant.

                                   ****

                  APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
                    THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
                  PENNINGTON COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA

                                   ****

               THE HONORABLE JOSHUA K. HENDRICKSON
                              Judge

                                   ****

TIMOTHY J. RENSCH of
Rensch Law Office
Rapid City, South Dakota                    Attorneys for defendant
                                            and appellant.

MARTY J. JACKLEY
Attorney General

JACOB R. DEMPSEY
Assistant Attorney General
Pierre, South Dakota                        Attorneys for plaintiff
                                            and appellee.

                                   ****

                                            CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS
                                            AUGUST 29, 2023
                                            OPINION FILED 04/03/24
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MYREN, Justice

[¶1.]        Under a plea agreement, Paul Trueblood pled guilty to second-degree

rape. He subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The circuit court

denied the motion, and Trueblood appealed. We affirm.

                        Factual and Procedural History

[¶2.]        On May 27, 2021, Paul Trueblood and D.B.L. had a sexual encounter.

As a result of this incident, the State filed a Complaint on May 28, 2021, charging

Trueblood with aggravated assault (SDCL 22-18-1.1(8)), alternative counts of

simple assault on a law enforcement officer (SDCL 22-18-1(1) and (4), and SDCL 22-

18-1.05)), false personation (SDCL 22-40-1), and obstructing a public officer (SDCL

22-11-6).

[¶3.]        On June 9, 2021, a Pennington County grand jury indicted Trueblood

for the same charges in the Complaint. The State filed a part II information

alleging Trueblood had two prior felony convictions. In a superseding indictment, a

grand jury, after considering the testimony of D.B.L., added a count of second-

degree rape (SDCL 22-22-1(2)). The State filed an amended part II information to

reflect its intention to seek enhancement of the additional rape count.

[¶4.]        The case proceeded to trial on January 18 and 19, 2022. D.B.L. was

scheduled to testify, but she contracted COVID-19. As a result, the circuit court

declared a mistrial.

[¶5.]        Before retrying the case, the State presented additional evidence to a

grand jury, which delivered a second superseding indictment adding charges

against Trueblood for alternative counts of aiding and abetting witness tampering

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(SDCL 22-11-19 (1) and (4)), and solicitation of witness tampering (SDCL 22-4A-1

and SDCL 22-11-19). These charges were based on allegations that Trueblood

arranged to have D.B.L. attacked to prevent her from testifying. The State filed a

third amended part II information to reflect the new charges and its intention to

seek enhancements to them.

[¶6.]        On the morning of the scheduled second trial, Trueblood pled guilty to

second-degree rape under a plea agreement with the State. In return, the State

dismissed all other charges and agreed not to pursue the allegations in the part II

information. Trueblood signed and submitted a factual basis statement to support

the guilty plea which provided:

             On or about May 27, 2021, I did commit the public offense of 2nd
             Degree Rape, in that I did accomplish an act of sexual
             penetration against [D.B.L.] through the use of force or coercion
             against her, accompanied by apparent power of execution. On
             this date in question, I met [D.B.L.] in downtown Rapid City,
             where we conversed and ultimately walked up to her father’s
             motel room at the Dakota Rose. At some point we were left
             alone in the room, and started to have what I believed to have
             been, consensual sex. However, at some point in time, it became
             apparent that [D.B.L.] was no longer consenting to the sexual act,
             and I did not immediately stop. For a brief period of time, but
             for more than a fleeting moment, I continued to force myself on
             her before I did ultimately withdraw and attempt to console
             [D.B.L.]. [D.B.L.] became enraged and quite vocal at this time,
             at which time law enforcement arrived on scene.

(Emphasis added.) In an extended exchange with Trueblood, the circuit court

ensured that Trueblood’s plea was knowing and voluntary. The circuit court relied

on Trueblood’s signed factual basis statement and the grand jury transcript to find

a factual basis for Trueblood’s guilty plea.

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[¶7.]        On June 1 and 23, 2022, Trueblood wrote letters to the circuit court

requesting a change in counsel. On June 27, 2022, at the start of the hearing set for

Trueblood’s sentencing, the court addressed Trueblood’s written requests for a

change of counsel. Trueblood’s trial counsel told the court that “two or three weeks”

earlier, Trueblood had expressed “an interest in withdrawing his plea.” Still,

counsel believed Trueblood had decided against pursuing the motion. Trueblood

told the circuit court he would like new counsel and wanted to move to withdraw his

guilty plea. The court denied Trueblood’s request for new counsel but continued the

matter so that he and his counsel could submit a motion to withdraw his plea.

[¶8.]        In his motion to withdraw his plea, Trueblood asserted his innocence.

However, he continued to acknowledge that when D.B.L. “was no longer consenting

to the sexual act, . . . [he] accordingly withdrew from the act, but did not

immediately do so.” The circuit court denied the motion to withdraw the plea in a

written order that included a detailed reasoning based on the factors set out in

State v. Kvasnicka, 2016 S.D. 2, 873 N.W.2d 705. The circuit court noted that

Trueblood did “not argue that his plea was not made knowingly and voluntarily.”

The circuit court also noted that after filing his motion to withdraw his plea,

Trueblood submitted an additional letter stating, “I am ashamed to say that I did

not stop right away when [D.B.L.] did ask me to stop.” The circuit court observed

that Trueblood’s position regarding his conduct had not changed from the time of

his plea, and “[t]here has been no new information brought to light between the

time of the plea and the motion to withdraw the plea.” The circuit court also

addressed Trueblood’s argument that he only entered the plea agreement out of fear

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that the new witness tampering charges would prejudice him before the jury. The

circuit court found that any fear Trueblood felt “hardly appears to be the only

factor” considered when he entered the guilty plea. The circuit court found that

Trueblood’s plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily and denied his motion to

withdraw the plea because Trueblood had not established any “fair and just reason”

for the withdrawal. Trueblood contends the circuit court abused its discretion by

denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

                                      Analysis

[¶9.]        SDCL 23A-27-11* allows a defendant to move to withdraw a guilty

plea. The factors the trial court should consider are also well settled:

             When a defendant moves to withdraw a guilty plea prior to
             imposition of sentence, the trial judge’s discretion in the matter
             should be exercised liberally in favor of withdrawal, unless it
             appears that the state has detrimentally relied upon the plea
             and the prosecution of the defendant has been thereby
             prejudiced. “When deciding whether to allow a criminal
             defendant to withdraw his plea, the trial court must look at the
             reasons why the plea is sought to be withdrawn and if the
             request to withdraw is obviously frivolous, the trial court need
             not grant it.”

State v. Bailey, 1996 S.D. 45, ¶ 12, 546 N.W.2d 387, 391 (citation omitted) (quoting

State v. Wahle, 521 N.W.2d 134, 137 (S.D. 1994)). A defendant’s “reason [to

*       SDCL 23A-27-11 provides:

             A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere may be
             made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence
             is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice a court after
             sentence may set aside a judgment of conviction and permit the
             defendant to withdraw his plea.
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withdraw a guilty plea] must show more than the mere desire to have a trial.” Id.,

¶ 13, 546 N.W.2d at 391 (citing State v. Grosh, 387 N.W.2d 503, 506 (S.D. 1986)).

[¶10.]       “After a defendant pleads guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, she

‘may not withdraw [her] plea unless [she] shows a “fair and just reason”’ for doing

so.” State v. Kvasnicka, ¶ 8, 873 N.W2d 705, 708 (alterations in original) (quoting

United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 671, 117 S. Ct. 1630, 1631, 137 L. Ed. 935

(1997)). Whether a defendant’s reasons are “fair and just” is determined by several

considerations:

             whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily pleaded
             guilty; whether the defendant asserts [he] is innocent; delay
             between the defendant’s plea and request for withdrawal of the
             plea; whether the defendant received competent assistance of
             counsel in making the decision to plead guilty; whether
             withdrawing the plea will prejudice the prosecution of the
             defendant; and whether withdrawing the plea will waste judicial
             resources[.]

             As we stated in Kvasnicka, “this is hardly a checklist.” Indeed,
             because a defendant no longer enjoys the presumption of
             innocence after pleading guilty, the defendant bears the burden
             of production and persuasion. Moreover, “[t]he ultimate
             determination of whether a defendant has presented a fair and
             just reason to withdraw a guilty plea is left to the sound
             discretion of the trial court; we will set aside such a
             determination only when it constitutes an abuse of discretion.”

State v. Ceplecha, 2020 S.D. 11, ¶¶ 40–41, 940 N.W.2d 682, 694 (alterations in

original) (citations omitted) (quoting Kvasnicka, ¶ 9, 873 N.W2d at 709).

[¶11.]       Trueblood contends the circuit court abused its discretion by denying

his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because of his “lack of communication with

his [trial] lawyer[.]” When he requested his change of counsel, Trueblood told the

court that he had no contact with his counsel since the entry of his guilty plea.

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However, Trueblood did not raise any concerns about the adequacy of his counsel’s

representation during the plea hearing. The court denied the request for

replacement counsel, and Trueblood does not challenge that decision on appeal.

[¶12.]       Trueblood asserts that he “received advice to forsake his constitutional

rights in favor of taking the plea agreement.” That is the nature of a plea

agreement; a defendant forgoes his right to trial in return for the benefits offered in

return for that plea. Counsel provides the defendant with advice about a plea

agreement. However, the final decision to plead guilty is the defendant’s choice

alone. Trueblood acknowledged receiving advice from his counsel regarding the

plea agreement. He did not contend that the advice was erroneous.

[¶13.]       Trueblood also asserts the denial of the motion to withdraw his plea

was an abuse of discretion because he took the plea deal for reasons “other than

being guilty.” “Courts have permitted the withdrawal of a defendant’s guilty plea

where there is no factual basis in the record to support it. However, self-serving

testimony concerning a defendant’s innocence by the defendant has not been found

to provide a basis for permitting the withdrawal of a guilty plea.” Bailey, 1996 S.D.

45, ¶ 25, 546 N.W.2d at 393 (citation omitted) (citing United States v. Smith, 818 F.

Supp. 123, 127 (W.D. Pa. 1993), aff’d, 14 F.3d 50 (3d Cir. 1993)). Trueblood’s

written factual basis acknowledged the facts that support the guilty plea—i.e., he

did not immediately stop sexual intercourse with D.B.L. after she withdrew her

consent. His submissions to the circuit court continued to acknowledge the same

fact. Given Trueblood’s continued admission to facts sufficient for second-degree

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rape, the circuit court correctly noted that Trueblood’s motion was not premised on

a claim of actual innocence.

[¶14.]       Trueblood also contends that the circuit court abused its discretion by

denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because he entered the plea due “to

feelings of fear and concern that the new Tampering charges severely prejudiced the

strength of his defense concerning the underlying Rape and Assault charges.” Fear

of the possible ramifications of a trial is not a sufficient reason to withdraw a guilty

plea. See Ceplecha, 2020 S.D. 11, ¶ 51, 940 N.W.2d at 696 (“the fear of receiving a

life sentence is not a ‘fair and just’ reason for withdrawing a plea”). Trueblood was

concerned that the new witness tampering charges might make him look bad before

a jury. This is a reasonable assessment that supports the logic of his decision to

accept the plea-bargain rather than providing a “fair and just reason” to allow him

to withdraw his guilty plea.

[¶15.]       In his appellate briefing, Trueblood appears to argue that he did not

voluntarily stipulate to the factual basis: “In Trueblood’s statement of factual basis

that he was compelled to set forth as part of the plea deal, he was required to admit

having continued the sexual act after DBL had withdrawn her consent.” To ensure

that Trueblood’s plea was not the result of impermissible compulsion, the circuit

court canvassed Trueblood about his understanding of the plea agreement and

whether he was entering the agreement voluntarily. Trueblood raised no concerns

about being inappropriately compelled to enter his plea or to acknowledge a

sufficient factual basis. The circuit court accepted the plea after finding it was

given knowingly and voluntarily. “When assessing voluntariness, we do not

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consider a defendant’s after-the-fact regret about his decision to plead guilty.

Rather, we review the defendant’s competency to waive his constitutional rights and

his appreciation of the consequences of pleading guilty at the time of the plea.”

Ceplecha, 2020 S.D. 11, ¶ 51, 940 N.W.2d at 696.

             “A plea is intelligent and voluntary when the accused has a full
             understanding of his constitutional rights and, having that
             understanding, waives those rights by a plea of guilty.” In order
             for a plea to be voluntary, a defendant must “be advised of his
             rights relating to self-incrimination, trial by jury, and
             confrontation[.]” After this advisement, the defendant must
             “intentionally relinquish or abandon [those] known rights.” If
             the record demonstrates “that the defendant understood his
             rights” and the consequences of his guilty plea, we will find that
             the defendant’s plea was “entered intelligently and voluntarily.”
             Because the record “must affirmatively show the plea was
             voluntary[,]” we review the circumstances of each plea in its
             entirety to determine whether they each “understood the
             consequences of pleading guilty[.]”

Id. ¶ 45, 940 N.W.2d at 695 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting

Monette v. Weber, 2009 S.D. 77, ¶ 10, 771 N.W.2d 920, 925). The record here

demonstrates that at the change of plea hearing, Trueblood affirmed to the circuit

court that he voluntarily and knowingly entered the plea agreement without

coercion and with a complete understanding of its ramifications and the rights he

would be waiving. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying

Trueblood’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm.

[¶16.]       JENSEN, Chief Justice, and KERN, SALTER and DEVANEY,

Justices, concur.

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