Court Opinion

ID: 9929895
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-05 18:01:03.111126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:52:51.363815
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC,                    No. 23-55123

             Petitioner-Appellee,            D.C. No.
                                          2:21-cv-04751-
 v.                                         FLA-RAO

GUSSI, S.A. DE C.V.,
                                            OPINION
             Respondent-Appellant.

      Appeal from the United States District Court
          for the Central District of California
   Fernando L. Aenlle-Rocha, District Judge, Presiding

        Argued and Submitted December 6, 2023
                 Pasadena, California

                 Filed February 5, 2024

Before: MILAN D. SMITH, JR., KENNETH K. LEE, and
       LAWRENCE VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

          Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.
2          VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC V. GUSSI S.A. DE C.V.

                          SUMMARY *

                     Arbitration / Service

    The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment
confirming an arbitral award in favor of Voltage Pictures,
LLC (Voltage), and against Gussi S.A. de C.V. (Gussi SA),
in a case arising from a dispute concerning the parties’
respective rights and obligations under their Distribution and
License Agreement (DLA).
    The panel held that the district court had jurisdiction to
hear the motion to confirm the arbitral award but not for the
reasons it articulated. The district court ruled that it had
diversity jurisdiction, but the panel was not satisfied that it
did where the record below did not indicate the citizenship
of Voltage’s members. The panel nevertheless held that
Section 203 of Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 gave the district court an
independent basis for exercising jurisdiction.
    The panel held that the district court erred in ruling that
California law governed service of Voltage’s notice of
motion to confirm the arbitral award. Federal procedural law
generally governs service when a party files an action in
federal district court unless the party-to-be-served waives
this protection. The panel looked to the DLA, which was
governed by California law, and held that the parties agreed
to accept service of a confirmation motion pursuant to the
law that applied to such motions in the prevailing party’s
chosen confirmation forum. Because Voltage filed its

*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
          VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC V. GUSSI S.A. DE C.V.          3

confirmation motion in a federal court, the panel analyzed
whether service of the motion on Gussi SA complied with
federal law.
     Applying federal law, the panel held that Voltage
sufficiently served notice to confirm the arbitral award by
mailing its motion papers to Gussi SA’s counsel. Gussi SA
does not reside in the district where the award was made, and
Voltage did not serve Gussi SA by a U.S. marshal. Gussi
SA contended that service of Voltage’s notice of motion was
insufficient pursuant to § 9 of the FAA, which requires
service by a U.S. marshal. The panel held that later
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not
implicitly repeal § 9’s marshal requirement, and thus it is
still valid where it applies. However, § 9’s nonresident
service provision does not apply to the service of notice of
an application to confirm a foreign arbitral award governed
by the New York convention if the adverse party is not
available for service in any judicial district of the United
States at the time of service. When § 9 does not apply,
section 6 of the FAA and Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)—the federal
procedural law governing how service of a motion is made—
fill the gap. Therefore, Voltage properly effected service by
mailing its motion papers to Gussi SA’s attorney pursuant to
Rule 5(b). Service of notice was sufficient under federal
law, and the district court was empowered to enter judgment
against Gussi SA in confirming the award.
    Finally, the panel held that the district court did not abuse
its discretion when it declined to extend comity to a
purported Mexican court order enjoining Voltage from
seeking to confirm the award in the United States because
Gussi SA did not certify the genuineness of the purported
Mexican court order or the accompanying translation.
4             VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC V. GUSSI S.A. DE C.V.

                              COUNSEL

Charles M. Coate (argued), Hamrick & Evans LLP,
Burbank, California, for Respondent-Appellant.
Elaine Li (argued) and Jeremiah Reynolds, Eisner LLP,
Beverly Hills, California, for Petitioner-Appellee.

                               OPINION

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

    On June 10, 2021, Voltage Pictures, LLC (Voltage) filed
a motion in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California to confirm an arbitral award that was
issued against Gussi S.A. de C.V. (Gussi SA) earlier that
year. After hearing from both parties, the district court
confirmed the award and entered judgment in favor of
Voltage. On appeal, Gussi SA maintains that service of the
motion to confirm the award was insufficient under federal
law and that parallel proceedings in Mexico required the
district court to abstain from confirming the arbitral award.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 9
U.S.C. § 16(a), and we affirm.
                   FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    Voltage is a film production and distribution limited
liability company based in Los Angeles. 1 Gussi SA is a
Mexican corporation with its principal place of business in
Mexico City. On November 7, 2018, Voltage, on behalf of
non-party EVE Nevada, LLC, entered into a Distribution and

1
    The record does not indicate the citizenship of Voltage’s members.
           VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC V. GUSSI S.A. DE C.V.             5

License Agreement (the DLA) with Gussi SA to license the
distribution rights of the film Ava in Latin America on an
exclusive basis, and for pan-regional television services in
Spanish in additional foreign countries on a non-exclusive
basis.
    Exhibit A to the DLA contains an arbitration provision,
which states that “[a]ny dispute arising out of or relating to
this Agreement will be resolved by final binding arbitration
under the [Independent Film & Television Alliance (IFTA)]
Rules [for International Arbitration] . . . in effect at the time
of the notice of arbitration is filed . . . .” It further states that
Gussi SA “consents and submits to the jurisdiction of the
state and federal courts located in Los Angeles County,
California with respect to any action arising out of or relating
to this Agreement or the Picture,” and that the DLA “shall
be covered by and interpreted in accordance with the laws of
the State of California (without regard to the conflict of laws
provisions thereof).” It also provides that “[t]he Parties
hereby submit to the jurisdiction of the courts in [Los
Angeles County, California] to compel arbitration or to
confirm an arbitration award.” Most significantly to this
appeal, the arbitration provision declares that “[t]he Parties
agree to accept service of process in accordance with the
IFTA Rules.”
   IFTA Rule 12 is titled “The Award.” IFTA Rule 12.5
provides, in part, that:

        Service of any petition, summons or other
        process necessary to obtain confirmation of
        the Arbitrator’s award may be accomplished
        by any procedure authorized by applicable
        law, Treaty or Convention, except that the
        parties waive application of the Hague
6        VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC V. GUSSI S.A. DE C.V.

       Convention for Service Abroad of Judicial
       and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or
       Commercial Matters with respect to service
       of process.

Immediately below IFTA Rule 12.5 is IFTA Rule 13, titled
“Applicable Law.” IFTA Rule 13.1 provides, in full, that:

       The Arbitrator shall apply the laws of the
       State of California to all arbitrations
       conducted under these Rules unless the
       parties by mutual agreement or by the
       contract to be enforced provide that the
       Arbitrator shall apply the law of one other
       jurisdiction, or the Arbitrator for good cause
       designates another location to be the situs of
       the arbitration in which case the Arbitrator
       shall have the discretion to apply for good
       cause the law of the situs of the arbitration.

              PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    On July 22, 2020, Voltage filed and served its demand
for arbitration against Gussi SA after a dispute arose
between Voltage and Gussi SA regarding their respective
rights and obligations under the DLA. Eventually, both
parties participated in an arbitration over Zoom on
December 3 and 4, 2020, with the proceedings based in Los
Angeles. On June 7, 2021, the Arbitrator issued a final
arbitral award in Voltage’s favor. Shortly thereafter,
Voltage mailed a notice of motion to confirm the arbitral
award and the accompanying motion papers to the attorneys
who had represented Gussi SA in the underlying arbitration.
On June 10, 2021, Voltage filed its motion to confirm the
         VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC V. GUSSI S.A. DE C.V.       7

award in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California. In the motion, Voltage alleged that
the district court had diversity jurisdiction over the matter
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2).
    On June 21, 2021, Gussi SA filed its first motion to
quash service of and to dismiss Voltage’s motion to confirm
the arbitral award. On March 28, 2022, after the district
court held that it had diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) to adjudicate the motion, the district
court ruled that “the parties agreed to service as allowed
under California law” by incorporating IFTA Rule 12.5 into
the DLA. However, the court also held that Voltage “fail[ed]
to demonstrate it completed service of process on” Gussi SA
in accordance with California law. Accordingly, the court
granted in part the motion to quash service and ordered
Voltage to complete service of the motion to confirm the
arbitral award “within 60 days of th[e] order.”
    The next day, Voltage mailed its notice of motion and
accompanying motion papers to Gussi SA’s address in
Mexico via Federal Express and requested the return of a
signed receipt upon delivery. A few days later, Voltage
received a return receipt, signed by Silvia Torres, who had
been designated by Gussi SA as its representative for service
of process during the underlying arbitration proceedings.
Then, on May 3, 2022, Voltage delivered the same papers
through personal service on the registered service agent for
Gussi, Inc., a Delaware corporation registered to do business
in California and with its executive offices located in Los
Angeles, California. Gussi SA and Gussi, Inc. are owned by
the same Mexican holding company. Gussi, Inc. has only
three employees, two of whom negotiated the DLA on behalf
of Gussi SA.
8         VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC V. GUSSI S.A. DE C.V.

    On June 3, 2022, Gussi SA filed a further motion to
quash service of process. Despite the district court already
having ruled that California law governed service of process,
Gussi SA reargued that federal procedural law—
specifically, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(h)(2) &
4(f)—and not California law, applied to service of process.
Gussi SA also contended that, even if California law applied,
Voltage’s service was invalid. On December 6, 2022, the
court reaffirmed its holding that California law governed
service of the motion and also ruled that Voltage sufficiently
served Gussi SA on May 3, 2022, through personal service
on the registered service agent for Gussi, Inc., which the
district court deemed to be Gussi SA’s “general manager”
pursuant to § 416.10(d) of the California Code of Civil
Procedure and § 2110 of the California Corporations Code.
    Within two days of the district court’s order denying
Gussi SA’s further motion to quash service, Gussi SA
notified Voltage of an action that Gussi SA supposedly
brought against Voltage in Mexico earlier that year.
According to Gussi SA, a Mexican court issued an order
enjoining Voltage from enforcing the arbitral award on
February 2, 2022. Therefore, Gussi SA requested that the
district court dismiss or stay Voltage’s motion to confirm the
arbitral award based on the Mexican court order. The district
court ultimately denied this motion, finding that Gussi SA
failed to certify the genuineness of the document purporting
to be a Mexican court order and the accompanying
translation. Accordingly, the district court found that there
was no judicially noticeable court order to which the district
court could extend comity. On January 23, 2023, the district
court entered judgment confirming the arbitral award in all
respects. Gussi SA timely appealed.
          VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC V. GUSSI S.A. DE C.V.        9

   JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 9
U.S.C. § 16(a). Johnson v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc.,
635 F.3d 401, 409 (9th Cir. 2011). We review de novo a
district court’s determination that it had subject matter
jurisdiction over an action and its determination that service
of process was sufficient. United States v. Peninsula
Commc’ns, Inc., 287 F.3d 832, 836 (9th Cir. 2002) (subject
matter jurisdiction); In re Focus Media Inc., 387 F.3d 1077,
1081 (9th Cir. 2004) (sufficiency of service). We review for
abuse of discretion a district court’s evidentiary rulings and
its decisions regarding international comity. Wagner v.
Cnty. of Maricopa, 747 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2013)
(evidentiary rulings); Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580,
589 (9th Cir. 2014) (international comity). We may affirm
a district court’s decision “on any ground supported by the
record even if not explicitly relied upon by the district
court.” Johnson v. Barr, 79 F.4th 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 2023).
                        ANALYSIS
I. The District Court Had Jurisdiction to Hear the
   Motion to Confirm the Arbitral Award but Not for
   the Reasons It Articulated.
    The district court correctly recognized that “[t]he
provisions of 9 U.S.C. § 9,” which govern motions to
confirm an arbitral award, “do not in themselves confer
subject matter jurisdiction on a federal district court.” See
Gen. Atomic Co. v. United Nuclear Corp., 655 F.2d 968, 969
(9th Cir. 1981); see also United States v. Park Place Assocs.,
Ltd., 563 F.3d 907, 918–19 (9th Cir. 2009). Therefore, the
district court had to identify an independent source of subject
matter jurisdiction to hear Voltage’s motion. The district
court ultimately ruled that it had diversity jurisdiction
10        VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC V. GUSSI S.A. DE C.V.

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2), but we are not satisfied
that it did. See generally Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch.
Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) (“[E]very federal appellate
court has a special obligation to satisfy itself not only of its
own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause
under review, even though the parties are prepared to
concede it.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
     Section 1332(a)(2) vests federal district courts with
subject matter jurisdiction over suits involving “citizens of a
State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state,” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a)(2), but not over suits in which “aliens [are] on both
sides of the case,” Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp., L.P.,
541 U.S. 567, 569 (2004). Section 1332(a)(3), by contrast,
does confer jurisdiction over suits in which aliens are on both
sides of the case, but only if there are also diverse U.S.
citizens on both sides. See Transure, Inc. v. Marsh and
McLennan, Inc., 766 F.2d 1297, 1298–99 (9th Cir. 1985)
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3)). “A limited liability
company is a citizen of every state of which its
owners/members are citizens, not the state in which it was
formed or does business.” NewGen, LLC v. Safe Cig, LLC,
840 F.3d 606, 612 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
     The record below does not indicate the citizenship of
Voltage’s members. The record merely indicates that
Voltage has its principal place of business in California. If
Voltage were a corporation, the fact that its principal place
of business is in California would be sufficient to render it a
citizen there. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). However, Voltage
is not a corporation—it is a limited liability company. The
citizenship of a limited liability company is determined by
the citizenship of its members. NewGen, 840 F.3d at 612. If
one of Voltage’s members is a citizen or subject of a foreign
          VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC V. GUSSI S.A. DE C.V.       11

state, then diversity of citizenship pursuant to § 1332(a)(2)
would be lacking. Cf. Grupo Dataflux, 541 U.S. at 569
(“Because [the limited partnership] had two partners who
were Mexican citizens at the time of filing, the partnership
was a Mexican citizen . . . . And because the defendant . . .
was a Mexican corporation, aliens were on both sides of the
case, and the requisite diversity was therefore absent.”).
     In advance of oral argument, we ordered the parties “to
be prepared to address . . . [w]hether the district court erred
in concluding it had 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) diversity
jurisdiction over the case despite not inquiring into the
citizenship of the members of Voltage . . . .” At oral
argument, we asked Voltage’s counsel to clarify whether any
of Voltage’s members are citizens or subjects of a foreign
state.     Voltage’s counsel declined this opportunity.
Accordingly, on appeal, we still do not have enough
information to determine whether the district court had
§ 1332(a) diversity jurisdiction over the matter.
    Nevertheless, we hold that 9 U.S.C. § 203 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 provided the district court with an independent basis
for exercising jurisdiction over the matter. See generally
Johnson, 79 F.4th at 1003 (stating that we may affirm a
district court’s decision “on any ground supported by the
record even if not explicitly relied upon by the district
court”). As we have stated previously, Section 203 of
Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) vests federal
district courts with subject matter jurisdiction over motions
seeking to confirm non-domestic arbitral awards. See
HayDay Farms, Inc. v. FeeDx Holdings, Inc., 55 F.4th 1232,
1239 (9th Cir. 2022) (“[The parties’ confirmation] petition
stated that it was an action to confirm an arbitration award,
and stated that the award was between at least one foreign
party. Those facts trigger § 203.”). Here, it is undisputed
12         VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC V. GUSSI S.A. DE C.V.

that the arbitral award at issue is “between at least one
foreign party” because Gussi SA is a citizen of Mexico. Id.
Accordingly, we are satisfied that Section 203 provided the
district court with an independent basis for exercising
subject matter jurisdiction over the motion. 2
II. The District Court Erred in Ruling that California
    Law Governed Service of Voltage’s Notice of Motion
    to Confirm the Arbitral Award.
    Whereas subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s
power to hear a certain type of case, Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v.
HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009), personal
jurisdiction refers to a court’s power over a particular
defendant, Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Off. of
Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945). On appeal, Gussi SA objects to the district court’s
exercise of the latter. However, it is undisputed that Gussi
SA, by entering into the DLA, “consent[ed] and submit[ted]
to the” district court exercising personal jurisdiction over it

2
  The fact that Voltage failed to expressly invoke Section 203 in its
motion to confirm the arbitral award does not change our conclusion.
See HayDay, 55 F.4th at 1239 (holding that a confirmation petition’s
“state[ment] that the award was between at least one foreign party” is
sufficient to “trigger § 203[]” even if the petition itself does not
“explicitly invoke[]” § 203). While it is true that the Supreme Court has
ruled that courts may not “look through” an application to confirm an
arbitral award to the underlying substantive controversy to search for an
independent source of federal subject matter jurisdiction that does not
appear on the face of the application, Badgerow v. Walters, 596 U.S. 1,
5 (2022), that is not what we are doing here. Here, we are looking to the
face of Voltage’s motion itself, which clearly states Gussi SA’s Mexican
citizenship. Cf. id. at 9 (acknowledging that if “the face of the
application itself[]” provides the requisite jurisdictional facts
establishing § 1332(a) diversity jurisdiction, “then § 1332(a) gives the
court diversity jurisdiction[]” over the application).
          VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC V. GUSSI S.A. DE C.V.       13

because the district court is a “federal court[] located in Los
Angeles County, California . . . .” See Nat’l Equip. Rental,
Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964) (observing that
“parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the
jurisdiction of a given court”). Accordingly, the only basis
for Gussi SA to contest the district court’s exercise of
personal jurisdiction over it would be insufficient service of
Voltage’s notice of motion to confirm the arbitral award.
See generally S.E.C. v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130, 1138–39 (9th
Cir. 2007) (explaining that “in the absence of proper service
of process, the district court has no power to render any
judgment against the defendant’s person or property”).
    Gussi SA maintains that it was never properly served
with notice of Voltage’s motion to confirm the arbitral
award, and therefore, the district court lacked personal
jurisdiction over Gussi SA to confirm the award. For us to
evaluate whether service of Voltage’s motion on Gussi SA
was sufficient, we must first determine what law governs
service of a confirmation motion. The district court ruled
that California law governs service, but Gussi SA argues that
federal procedural law governs. We agree with Gussi SA.
    When a party files an action in federal district court,
federal procedural law generally governs service, see, e.g.,
Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 799–800 (9th Cir. 2004)
(ruling that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 governs
service of a summons and complaint in federal district
court), unless the party-to-be-served waived its protections,
see Nat’l Equip. Rental, 375 U.S. at 316 (“[P]arties to a
contract may agree in advance . . . to permit notice to be
served by the opposing party, or even to waive notice
altogether.”); see also Rockefeller Tech. Invs. (Asia) VII v.
Changzhou SinoType Tech. Co., 9 Cal. 5th 125, 140–41 (Cal.
2020). We must therefore look to the DLA, which is
14        VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC V. GUSSI S.A. DE C.V.

governed by California law, to determine whether such
waiver occurred.
    By entering into the DLA, Voltage and Gussi SA clearly
“agree[d] to accept service of process in accordance with the
IFTA Rules.” Therefore, whether Gussi SA consented to
accept service of the motion pursuant to California law (even
if the motion is filed in federal court) hinges on our
interpretation of the IFTA Rules governing service. The
IFTA Rule governing service of a subsequent motion to
confirm an arbitral award is IFTA Rule 12.5, which
provides, in relevant part, that:

       Service of any petition, summons or other
       process necessary to obtain confirmation of
       the Arbitrator’s award may be accomplished
       by any procedure authorized by applicable
       law, Treaty or Convention, except that the
       parties waive application of the Hague
       Convention for Service Abroad of Judicial
       and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or
       Commercial Matters with respect to service
       of process.

    To date, at least two district courts in the Ninth Circuit,
including the court below, have concluded that the
“applicable law” referenced in IFTA Rule 12.5, which
governs the service of a motion to confirm an arbitral award,
is necessarily California law. See Voltage Pictures, LLC v.
Gussi, S.A. De C.V., 2022 WL 18397529, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 28, 2022); Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Gulf Film, LLC,
2018 WL 2110937, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2018). Those
courts’ justification is simple: because “IFTA Rule 12.5
provides [for service of confirmation motion to] ‘be
         VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC V. GUSSI S.A. DE C.V.      15

accomplished by any procedure authorized by applicable
law,’” and “IFTA Rule 13.1 defines ‘applicable law’ as ‘the
laws of the State of California,’” California law necessarily
governs service of a confirmation motion, no matter the
forum in which the prevailing party chooses to file its
motion. Gussi, 2022 WL 18397529, at *3; see Gulf Film,
2018 WL 2110937, at *3.
    If only it were that simple. IFTA Rule 13.1 does not
actually “define ‘applicable law’” in the way that Voltage or
the district court suggests that it does. In fact, the words
“applicable law” do not appear anywhere in IFTA Rule 13.1.
The words “applicable law” only appear in the header of
IFTA Rule 13. IFTA Rule 13.1 itself only provides that
“[t]he Arbitrator shall apply the laws of the State of
California to all arbitrations conducted under the[] [IFTA]
Rules . . . .” The rule says nothing about the procedural law
a court must apply when adjudicating a subsequent petition
to confirm an arbitration award issued pursuant to the IFTA
Rules. Nor does any other IFTA Rule.
    Moreover, IFTA Rule 12.5 does not merely state that
service must be accomplished by applicable law. Rather, it
provides that service “may be accomplished by any
procedure authorized by applicable law, Treaty or
Convention, except that the parties waive application of the
Hague Convention . . . with respect to service of process.”
This language indicates that any law, treaty, or convention
(except for the Hague Convention) that applies in the
prevailing party’s chosen confirmation forum may govern
service. The drafters of the IFTA Rules could have easily
provided that service of a confirmation motion must be
accomplished by California law, regardless of the prevailing
party’s chosen confirmation forum, but they did not.
16        VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC V. GUSSI S.A. DE C.V.

    We therefore reject the district court’s ruling that by
agreeing to abide by IFTA Rule 12.5, Gussi SA voluntarily
waived its right to be served with notice of Voltage’s motion
in compliance with federal law in federal court. Instead, we
hold that, by incorporating IFTA Rule 12.5 into the DLA,
Voltage and Gussi SA both agreed to accept service of a
confirmation motion pursuant to any law, treaty, or
convention (except for the Hague Convention) that applies
to such motions in the prevailing party’s chosen
confirmation forum. Because Voltage filed its confirmation
motion in a federal court, we must analyze whether service
of the motion on Gussi SA complied with whatever federal
law applies to such motions.
III. Voltage Sufficiently Served Notice of Its Motion to
     Confirm the Arbitral Award by Mailing Its Motion
     Papers to Gussi SA’s Counsel.
    Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs
service of summons and a complaint in federal district court.
Brockmeyer, 383 F.3d at 800. However, this case does not
concern the service of summons and a complaint. Rather, it
concerns the service of a prevailing party’s notice of motion
to confirm an arbitral award. Rule 81(a)(6)(B) provides that
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “govern proceedings
under the [FAA] . . . relating to arbitration,” except as the
FAA “provide[s] other procedures.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
81(a)(6), (B).
    Section 6 of the FAA provides that “[a]ny application to
the court hereunder shall be made and heard in the manner
provided by law for the making and hearing of motions,
except as otherwise herein expressly provided.” 9 U.S.C.
§ 6. In federal district court, Rule 5 generally governs the
service of “written motion[s]” and “notice[s] . . . .” Fed. R.
         VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC V. GUSSI S.A. DE C.V.     17

Civ. P. 5(a)(1)(D), (E). Section 9 of the FAA, however,
provides that:

       Notice of the application [to confirm an
       arbitral award] shall be served upon the
       adverse party, and thereupon the court shall
       have jurisdiction of such party as though he
       had appeared generally in the proceeding. If
       the adverse party is a resident of the district
       within which the award was made, such
       service shall be made upon the adverse party
       or his attorney as prescribed by law for
       service of notice of motion in an action in the
       same court. If the adverse party shall be a
       nonresident, then the notice of the application
       shall be served by the marshal of any district
       within which the adverse party may be found
       in like manner as other process of the court.

9 U.S.C. § 9.
    It is undisputed that Gussi SA does not reside in the
district where the award was made—i.e., the Central District
of California—and that Voltage did not attempt to serve
Gussi SA by a U.S. marshal. Because of these undisputed
facts, Gussi SA contends that service of Voltage’s notice of
motion was insufficient pursuant to § 9. Voltage, on the
other hand, argues that later amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure implicitly repealed § 9’s marshal
requirement, and even if the requirement is still valid, it
cannot apply to service on Gussi SA because Gussi SA
insisted it could not be served within the United States and
service by a U.S. marshal outside of the United States is
impossible.
18        VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC V. GUSSI S.A. DE C.V.

    These arguments present several questions of first
impression for us, including (1) whether later amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure implicitly repealed
the marshal requirement in § 9’s nonresident service
provision, and (2) whether that nonresident provision may
apply to adverse parties who insist that they are not available
for service within the United States. To resolve these
questions, we must examine the statutory text of the FAA
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as later
amendments to both.
     A. When Congress Enacted § 9 of the FAA, Service
        by a U.S. Marshal Was the Prevailing “Manner of
        Other Process of the Court.”
    “The FAA was enacted in 1925 in response to
widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.”
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339
(2011). The Supreme Court has stated that “it [is] beyond
dispute that the FAA was designed to promote arbitration.”
Id. at 345. The Ninth Circuit has “gone [even] further,
stating that ‘the FAA’s purpose is to give preference (instead
of mere equality) to arbitration provisions.’” Chamber of
Com. of the United States of Am. v. Bonta, 62 F.4th 473, 483
(9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Mortensen v. Bresnan Commc’ns,
LLC, 722 F.3d 1151, 1160 (9th Cir. 2013)). However, the
Supreme Court has tempered “the FAA’s ‘policy favoring
arbitration’” by clarifying that it “does not authorize federal
courts to invent special, arbitration-preferring procedural
rules.” Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 596 U.S. 411, 418 (2022).
    The FAA’s provisions governing applications to confirm
arbitral awards manifest Congress’ intent to promote
arbitration. One provision is § 6, which provides that “[a]ny
application to the court hereunder shall be made and heard
         VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC V. GUSSI S.A. DE C.V.        19

in the manner provided by law for the making and hearing
of motions, except as otherwise herein expressly provided.”
9 U.S.C. § 6. Section 9 similarly provides, in relevant part,
that:

       If the adverse party is a resident of the district
       within which the [arbitral] award was made,
       such service [of the application to confirm the
       award] shall be made upon the adverse party
       or his attorney as prescribed by law for
       service of notice of motion in an action in the
       same court.

9 U.S.C. § 9 (emphasis added). Serving a notice of motion
in an already commenced action is less cumbersome than
serving process to initiate a new action, which generally
requires the service of summons and a pleading, most
commonly a complaint. Accordingly, these two provisions
conform with Congress’ stated desire to promote arbitration,
as they make the adjudication of a confirmation application
more efficient.
    However, Congress provided a different rule for serving
confirmation applications on adverse parties that do not
reside in the district where the award was made:

       If the adverse party shall be a nonresident [of
       the district within which the arbitral award
       was made], then the notice of the application
       [to confirm the arbitral award] shall be served
       by the marshal of any district within which
20        VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC V. GUSSI S.A. DE C.V.

        the adverse party may be found in like
        manner as other process of the court.

9 U.S.C. § 9 (emphasis added). In 1925, when Congress
enacted the FAA, service of process—including service of
summons and a complaint—was routinely enacted by the
U.S. marshal. See Changes in Federal Summons Service
Under Amended Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 96 F.R.D. 81, 94 (1983) (“[P]rior to 1980, the
marshal was the stated summons server unless there was a
person ‘specially appointed’ by the court to make service.”).
Accordingly, in 1925, this additional provision in § 9
required prevailing parties to serve a confirmation
application according to the normal rules governing service
of other process of the court if the adverse party did not
reside in the district within which the arbitral award was
made.
     B. Later Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
        Procedure Did Not Implicitly Repeal § 9’s
        Marshal Requirement.
      In 1983, Congress amended Rule 4 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, newly providing for service of summons
by any nonparty over the age of eighteen. See Changes in
Federal Summons Service, 96 F.R.D. at 88, 94. The
“ostensibly principal purpose” of this change was to “tak[e]
the marshals out of summons service almost entirely.” Id. at
94. However, “[p]rocess other than a summons (or subpoena
. . .) continue[d] to be servable only by a marshal or person
specially appointed by the court.” Id.
   Numerous courts, including lower courts in our circuit,
have relied on the 1983 amendment regarding the service of
summons to conclude that the marshal requirement in § 9’s
          VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC V. GUSSI S.A. DE C.V.      21

nonresident service provision is an anachronism under the
current Federal Rules. See, e.g., In re Arbitration Between
InterCarbon Berm., Ltd. & Caltex Trading & Transp. Corp.,
146 F.R.D. 64, 67 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating that identical
service language in 9 U.S.C. § 12 “is an anachronism”);
Hancor, Inc. v. R & R Eng’g Prod., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 12,
15 (D.P.R. 2005) (noting that “[s]ome courts have
questioned the continued validity of § 9’s service
requirement”); Technologists, Inc. v. MIR’s Ltd., 725 F.
Supp. 2d 120, 126 (D.D.C. 2010) (observing that the FAA’s
marshal requirement “is an artifact of the era in which United
States marshals were the default servers of process in federal
courts”); LG Elecs. MobileComm U.S.A., Inc. v. Reliance
Commc’ns, LLC, 2018 WL 2059559, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May
3, 2018) (collecting cases).
    Some of those courts have even gone as far to suggest
that the 1983 amendment implicitly repealed the marshal
requirement in § 9’s nonresident service provision and is
thus no longer valid. See, e.g., Hancor, 381 F. Supp. 2d at
15–16 (jettisoning the marshal requirement because of the
“later amendments to the Federal Rules”); Technologists,
725 F. Supp. 2d at 127 (concluding that the FAA’s marshal
requirement has been displaced by contemporary Rule 4);
LG Elecs., 2018 WL 2059559, at *3 (ruling that “service
under Rule 4 satisfies [§] 9’s notice requirement”); see also,
e.g., Elevation Franchise Ventures, LLC v. Rosario, 2013
WL 5962984, at *3 n.1 (E.D. Va. Nov. 6, 2013) (declining
to apply § “9’s requirement of service by U.S. Marshal”
because some courts have found that it “need not be
followed”); Dobco, Inc. v. Mery Gates, Inc., 2006 WL
2056799, at *2 (D.N.J. July 21, 2006) (implicitly ruling
service by marshal pursuant to § 9 is no longer a requirement
and is instead an “alternative” to Rule 4).
22        VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC V. GUSSI S.A. DE C.V.

    Those courts erred. First, while it is true that the
“principal purpose” of the 1983 amendment was to “tak[e]
the marshals out of summons service almost entirely,”
“[p]rocess other than a summons (or subpoena . . .)
continue[d] to be servable only by a marshal or person
specially appointed by the court.” Changes in Federal
Summons Service, 96 F.R.D. at 94. That remains true today.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.1; see, e.g., Hilao v. Est. of Marcos, 95
F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying Rule 4.1’s marshal
requirement to a class of plaintiffs’ service of a notice of levy
against a defendant’s deposit account). Therefore, at the
very least, § 9’s requirement that “the notice of [an]
application [to confirm an arbitral award] shall be served by
the marshal . . . in like manner as other process of the court”
is not wholly anachronistic as some courts have suggested.
Rather, the marshal requirement mirrors contemporary Rule
4.1, which provides that “[p]rocess—other than a summons
under Rule 4 or a subpoena under Rule 45—must be served
by a United States marshal or deputy marshal or by a person
specially appointed for that purpose.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.1(a).
    Second, even assuming arguendo that the phrase “in like
manner as other process of the court” in § 9’s nonresident
service provision necessarily refers to the method for serving
summons pursuant to Rule 4, see, e.g., Reed & Martin, Inc.
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 439 F.2d 1268, 1277 (2d Cir.
1971) (holding that that the phrase “in like manner as other
process of the court” refers to Rule 4 governing service of
summons), that assumption would still fail to do away with
the marshal requirement. The plain text of the statute clearly
states that “the notice of the application shall be served by
the marshal . . . .” 9 U.S.C. § 9. Congress’ use of the term
“shall” indicates that service by a U.S. marshal is mandatory.
See Firebaugh Canal Co. v. United States, 203 F.3d 568, 573
            VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC V. GUSSI S.A. DE C.V.                  23

(9th Cir. 2000). To jettison the marshal requirement in its
entirety because of the latter phrase “in like manner as other
process of the court,” 9 U.S.C. § 9, would “violate an
important rule of statutory construction—that every word
and clause in a statute be given effect.” United States v.
Zhou, 678 F.3d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation marks removed). We can give meaning to both the
marshal requirement and the phrase “in like manner as other
process of the court” by reading the marshal requirement as
governing who can complete service and the latter phrase as
governing the method the marshal may employ to complete
it.
     Section 9’s marshal requirement does not expressly
contradict or irreconcilably conflict with the current Federal
Rules, which still allow for service by a U.S. marshal if the
court so orders, and still mandates service by a U.S. marshal
where Rule 4.1 applies. Accord Logan & Kanawha Coal
Co., LLC v. Detherage Coal Sales, LLC, 789 F. Supp. 2d
716, 720–22 (S.D.W. Va. 2011) (holding that Rule 4 did not
implicitly repeal § 9’s marshal requirement and listing
several contemporary instances where courts can still order
marshal service).       Accordingly, we hold that later
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not
implicitly repeal the marshal requirement in § 9’s
nonresident service provision and that it is still valid where
it applies. 3

3
 We avoided answering this question more than a decade ago. See Kirby
Morgan Dive Sys., Inc. v. Hydrospace, Ltd., 478 Fed. App’x 382, 383
(9th Cir. 2012) (declining to “address whether . . . service of [a] petition
for confirmation . . . complied with . . . § 9”). But district courts within
our circuit have continued to struggle with it. See, e.g., LG Elecs., 2018
WL 2059559, at *3.
24        VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC V. GUSSI S.A. DE C.V.

     C. Section 9’s Nonresident Service Provision Does
        Not Provide a Viable Method of Service on
        Adverse Parties Who Are Not Available for
        Service in the United States.
    Despite lower court disagreement over whether § 9’s
marshal requirement has survived into the present day, there
is an emerging consensus among district courts that § 9’s
nonresident service provision does not apply to adverse
parties located outside the United States because service by
a U.S. marshal outside of the territorial United States is
impossible. See, e.g., InterCarbon, 146 F.R.D. at 67 (“The
problem [with the marshal requirement] is that foreign
parties will not necessarily be found in any district.
Requiring parties to satisfy [it] might amount to requiring
them to do the impossible.”); Technologists, Inc. v. MIR’s
Ltd., 725 F. Supp. 2d at 126 (observing the same); PTA-FLA,
Inc. v. ZTE USA, Inc., 2015 WL 12819186, at *7 (M.D. Fla.
Aug. 5, 2015) (noting that § 9’s nonresident service
provision “arguably does not include any method for service
on foreign parties at all since [such parties] will not
necessarily be found in any district” (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted)), aff’d, 844 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir.
2016).
    This emerging consensus among lower courts is well-
founded. By ratifying the 1958 Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(the New York Convention) and enacting Chapter 2 of the
FAA, Congress clearly intended for international arbitral
awards to be confirmable in the courts of the United States.
See Jones Day v. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP, 42
F.4th 1131, 1133 (9th Cir. 2022).           However, § 9’s
nonresident service provision requires service of a notice of
application to confirm an arbitral award to be made by the
          VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC V. GUSSI S.A. DE C.V.       25

marshal of the district within which the adverse party may
be found. See U.S.C. § 9. This requirement, in effect,
requires prevailing parties to do the impossible when a
nonresident adverse party cannot be found for service of
process in any judicial district of the United States. In that
circumstance, requiring service by the marshal of the district
within which the adverse party may be found would disallow
a federal court from ever exercising personal jurisdiction
over an adverse party and prevent it from confirming an
arbitral award governed by the New York Convention. That
result would necessarily conflict with 9 U.S.C. § 207, which
requires a federal court to confirm an award governed by the
Convention “unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or
deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award specified
in the said Convention.” 9 U.S.C. § 207. Applying § 9’s
nonresident service provision to adverse parties located
outside of the United States would also be repugnant to the
entire purpose of Chapter 2, which Congress “enacted . . . to
provide for the effective and efficient resolution of
international arbitral disputes after the United States entered
into the [New York] Convention . . . .” Jones Day, 42 F.4th
at 1133.
    How do we resolve this irreconcilable conflict? Section
208 of Chapter 2 instructs that Chapter 2 only incorporates
§ 9 “to the extent that [§ 9] is not in conflict with [Chapter
2] or the Convention as ratified by the United States.” 9
U.S.C. § 208. Therefore, we conclude that Congress did not
intend to incorporate § 9’s nonresident service provision into
Chapter 2 of the FAA in circumstances where nonresident
adverse parties cannot be found for service within the United
States. Accordingly, we hold that § 9’s nonresident service
provision does not apply to the service of notice of an
application to confirm a foreign arbitral award governed by
26        VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC V. GUSSI S.A. DE C.V.

the New York Convention if the adverse party is not
available for service in any judicial district of the United
States at the time of service.
     D. Section 6 of the FAA and Federal Rule of Civil
        Procedure 5(b) Fill the Gap Left by § 9, Not Rule
        4.
    When § 9 does not apply, what stands in its place? Many
courts, including the Second Circuit, have concluded that
Rule 4 necessarily fills the gap. See, e.g., InterCarbon, 146
F.R.D. at 67 (ruling that Rule 4, and not Rule 5, is “the
proper fallback provision” where the FAA provides “no
method of service for foreign parties not resident in any
district of the United States”); Technologists, Inc. v. MIR’s
Ltd., 725 F. Supp. 2d at 127 (same); Commodities & Mins.
Enter. Ltd. v. CVG Ferrominera Orinoco, C.A., 49 F.4th
802, 812 (2d Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 786 (2023)
(noting that “[i]t is well established” in the Second Circuit
that “Rule 4 sets forth the basic procedures for serving
process in connection with arbitral awards”).
    However, those courts discount § 6 of the FAA, which
states that “[a]ny application to the court hereunder shall be
made and heard in the manner provided by law for the
making and hearing of motions, except as otherwise herein
expressly provided.” 9 U.S.C. § 6. Those courts also ignore
other applicable language from § 9, which requires only that
“[n]otice of [an] application” to confirm an arbitral award
“be served upon the adverse party” before “the court shall
have jurisdiction of such party as though he had appeared
generally in the proceeding.” 9 U.S.C. § 9. A prevailing
party need not serve an adverse party with summons for the
forum court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the
           VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC V. GUSSI S.A. DE C.V.             27

adverse party. All that needs to be served is “[n]otice of the
application . . . .” Id.
    Because § 9’s nonresident service provision does not
provide a viable method of service of notice on adverse
parties who are not available for service within the United
States, we must rely on § 6’s statutory mandate that “[a]ny
application to the court hereunder shall be made and heard
in the manner provided by law for the making and hearing
of motions . . . .” 9 U.S.C. § 6. That language plainly refers
to the reigning rules governing service of written motions
and notices in federal court, which today is found in Rule 5.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a)(1)(D), (E). Accordingly, we hold
that Rule 5(b)—the federal procedural law governing how
service of a motion is made, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)—is the
default rule for serving notice of an application to confirm
an award when § 9 conflicts with Chapter 2.
    Gussi SA’s reliance on Technologists, 725 F. Supp. 2d,
and other district court cases finding that Rule 4 governs
service of such applications is unavailing. In Technologists,
the District Court for the District of Columbia rejected the
view that Rule 5 governs the service of notice of applications
to vacate 4 arbitral awards on adverse parties unavailable for
service within the United States because if Rule 5 governed,
“foreign parties could be served by mail, whereas domestic
parties who reside in another judicial district would” benefit
from the heightened protections of §§ 9 and 12’s nonresident
service provisions 5 “which generally do[] not permit service

4
  9 U.S.C. § 12 governs service of notice of an application to vacate,
correct, or modify an arbitral award and contains identical provisions
regarding service on resident and nonresident adverse parties.
5
 The Technologists court also concluded that Rule 4 displaced the
marshal requirement in § 12’s nonresident service provision, such that
28         VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC V. GUSSI S.A. DE C.V.

by mail[].” Id. at 127. The court stated that such an outcome
“is not a logical reading of the FAA’s service provisions”
and held that Rule 4 governs service of notice on a foreign
adverse party. Id.
    The court did so despite the plain language of § 6, which
instructs that “[a]ny application to the court hereunder shall
be made and heard in the manner provided by law for the
making and hearing of motions . . . .” 9 U.S.C. § 6. To
justify its approach, the court asserted that § 6 “merely
ensures that motions to vacate or confirm arbitral awards are
not subject to the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and enables judges to decide arbitration
issues on an expedited basis,” and has nothing to do with
how notice of such motions are served. Technologists, 725
F. Supp. 2d at 127. But the court’s narrowing construction
does not withstand scrutiny. By referring to the “law for the
making . . . of motions” in § 6, Congress clearly invoked the
procedural law governing the making of motions in federal
court. It is axiomatic that making a motion in federal court
requires giving notice to the nonmovant. To facilitate such
notice, the moving party must generally serve it on the other
parties to the litigation in accordance with Rule 5. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 5(a)(1). Pursuant to the plain language of the
FAA, that default rule applies unless the FAA “provides
otherwise.” 9 U.S.C. § 6.
    A court’s discomfort, as a matter of policy, that the
default rule under the FAA allows for service of notice of
applications to confirm an arbitral award pursuant to the
“law for the making . . . of motions” does not authorize that
court to narrow the commands of the FAA to the effect of

§ 12’s nonresident service provision mandates the application of Rule 4.
See 725 F. Supp. 2d at 127.
            VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC V. GUSSI S.A. DE C.V.                29

ignoring them. As the Supreme Court has instructed,
“[e]ven the most formidable policy arguments cannot
overcome a clear statutory directive[]” in the FAA.
Badgerow, 596 U.S. at 16. As a court, we “have no warrant
to redline the FAA,” id. at 11, importing Rule 4’s procedural
protections, which generally apply to the service of
summons into § 9 of the FAA, which does not require the
service of summons, cf. id. (criticizing lower courts for
“importing . . . consequential language” from § 4 of the FAA
“into [other] provisions containing nothing like it”). 6
Accordingly, we reject Gussi SA’s argument that Rule 4 is
the proper fallback provision where § 9’s nonresident service
provision does not apply.
    E. Gussi SA Insisted It Was Not Available for
       Service in the United States. Voltage Could
       Therefore Effect Service by Mailing its Motion
       Papers to Gussi SA’s Attorney Pursuant to Rule
       5(b).
   In its first motion to quash service of the confirmation
application, Gussi SA insisted that it had to be served in
compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)
because it is “a non-resident and foreign adversary” not
available “for service . . . at any location . . . within a judicial

6
  Even if we could privilege policy-based arguments in construing the
FAA, we would still reject importing the protections of Rule 4 into the
FAA. “The overarching purpose of the FAA . . . is to ensure the
enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to
facilitate streamlined proceedings.” Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344.
Importing Rule 4 into the FAA as the default rule for serving notice of
applications to confirm arbitral awards does not streamline the
confirmation of them. Doing so hinders their confirmation, as is evident
through Gussi SA’s litigation conduct after it lost an arbitration that it
fully participated in.
30         VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC V. GUSSI S.A. DE C.V.

district of the United States.” In its second motion to quash
service, Gussi SA maintained that it could not be served in
the United States and further represented to the district court
that it is not registered to do business in California, thereby
relieving it of the obligation under California law to have a
registered agent for service of process in the state. See Cal.
Corp. Code § 2105(a)(6). Gussi SA’s past representations
about its inability to be served in the United States alone are
sufficient for us to conclude that Gussi SA could not be
found for service of process in the United States, and thus
§ 9’s nonresident service provision does not apply.
    Accordingly, Voltage only needed to serve the motion
“in the manner provided by the law for the making . . . of
motions,” 9 U.S.C. § 6, which in federal district court is Rule
5. Rule 5 provides that “[i]f a party is represented by an
attorney, service under this rule must be made on the
attorney . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(1). It further provides
that “[a] paper is served under this rule by . . . mailing it to
the person’s last known address—in which event service is
complete upon mailing.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2), (C). In this
case, it is undisputed that Voltage mailed its motion papers
to the attorneys who represented Gussi SA in the underlying
arbitration shortly before filing the motion in federal court.
Accordingly, the application to confirm the award was
sufficiently served in accordance with § 6 and Rule 5.
Service of notice was thus sufficient under federal law, and
the district court “ha[d] jurisdiction [over Gussi SA] as
though [it] had appeared generally in the proceeding.” 9
U.S.C. § 9. The district court was thus empowered to enter
judgment against Gussi SA in confirming the award. 7

7
 Gussi SA’s argument that Voltage’s service of notice violates the Inter-
American Convention on Letters Rogatory is without merit. That
           VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC V. GUSSI S.A. DE C.V.               31

IV. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
    When It Declined to Extend Comity to a Purported
    Mexican Court Order.
    On appeal, Gussi SA also challenges the district court’s
decision not to take judicial notice of a document that Gussi
SA claimed was a court order from Mexico enjoining
Voltage from seeking to confirm the award in the United
States. However, as the district court correctly noted, Gussi
SA did not certify the genuineness of the document
purporting to be a Mexican court order or the accompanying
translation.
    In its opening brief on appeal, Gussi SA fails to
challenge either of those reasons stated by the district court
for refusing to notice the order. Gussi SA only argues in
general that the district court erroneously interpreted Federal
Rule of Evidence 201 and fails to make any mention of the
procedural and evidentiary rules upon which the district
court relied, such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
44(a)(2)(A)(ii) or Federal Rules of Evidence 604 and 902(3).
Therefore, Gussi SA fails to carry its heavy burden to show
that the district court abused its discretion when it decided
not to take judicial notice of the purported court order from
Mexico. There was no judicially noticeable court order to
which the district court could have extended comity.

convention only regulates the transmittal of judicial documents abroad.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1781. Voltage’s motion papers were not issued by a
court and were not transmitted abroad when they were mailed to Gussi
SA’s attorneys, who received the papers in the United States. Gussi SA’s
related argument that such service is inconsistent with the Hague
Convention is immaterial, because on the same page in its opening brief,
Gussi SA plainly acknowledges that in signing the DLA, it waived
application of the Hague Convention.
32        VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC V. GUSSI S.A. DE C.V.

    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of
Gussi SA’s request to stay or dismiss the case. Because
Gussi SA’s failure to certify the genuineness of the court
order and its accompanying translation is sufficient to affirm
the district court’s denial, we need not reach the substantive
question of international comity raised by Gussi SA on
appeal.
                      CONCLUSION
   For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district
court’s judgment confirming the arbitral award in favor of
Voltage. Gussi SA shall bear Voltage’s costs on appeal. See
Fed. R. App. P. 39(a)(2).