Court Opinion

ID: 9942138
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-20 16:02:38.361698+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:42.784215
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 24-4003     Document: 010111002489        Date Filed: 02/20/2024       Page: 1
                                                                                    FILED
                                                                        United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                           Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                          February 20, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                           Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                               Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                           No. 24-4003
                                                     (D.C. No. 2:23-CR-00403-DS-1)
  CHRISTOPHER THOMAS CAMPAS,                                    (D. Utah)

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before HARTZ, MORITZ, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

       Christopher Thomas Campas has been charged with one count of attempted

 coercion and enticement of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), and one

 count of travel with the intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct in violation of

 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). He appeals the district court’s detention order, which overruled

 a magistrate judge’s decision to release him pretrial with conditions. Exercising

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 24-4003    Document: 010111002489        Date Filed: 02/20/2024       Page: 2

 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c), we remand for further

 proceedings.

                                   I.     Background

       Mr. Campas is a resident of Arizona who was working on a marijuana farm in

 Oregon. He interacted online with an undercover agent who was representing

 himself to be a father offering his seven-year-old son for sexual activity with adults.

 Mr. Campas expressed interest in engaging in sexual acts with the young boy, and the

 parties arranged to meet up in Utah for that to happen. Mr. Campas was arrested at

 the meeting location.

       A magistrate judge conducted a detention hearing. The government focused

 on the nature and circumstances of the charges, as well as Mr. Campas’s statements

 after his arrest in which he expressed his belief that he wasn’t doing anything wrong

 and that minors could consent to sexual activity with adults. The government also

 noted that it had found through investigation that Mr. Campas was engaged in

 conversations with other undercover agents about his sexual interest in children. And

 the government expressed concern that when a person is released it is difficult to

 limit the ability to engage in this type of conduct online. For these reasons, the

 government argued there were no conditions that could protect the public if

 Mr. Campas was released pretrial.

       In response, Mr. Campas’s attorney emphasized that Mr. Campas had no

 criminal record, and so whatever his alleged beliefs were and whatever other

 discussions he had online, this was the first time he had acted out. Counsel also

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 noted that Mr. Campas has family support and could live with his brother. Counsel

 then identified a number of conditions that could be imposed on release, including

 requiring Mr. Campas to actively seek employment, limiting contact with minors, and

 installing software on Mr. Campas’s phone to monitor his communications.

       The magistrate judge emphasized the serious nature of the charges against

 Mr. Campas and the allegations about Mr. Campas’s belief system but noted there

 was no indication he had ever acted on his interest in sexual activity with children

 and further noted he had no criminal record. At the conclusion of the hearing, the

 magistrate judge determined Mr. Campas could be released pretrial because there was

 not enough to show that he posed an “unmanageable risk.” Aplt. App., vol. I at 51.

 The magistrate judge also imposed “very strict conditions,” id., on Mr. Campas,

 including:

           • Requiring him to maintain or actively seek employment or participate in
             an educational program.

           • Requiring him to live with his brother in Tucson.

           • Requiring him to turn in his passport.

           • Prohibiting him from viewing, accessing, or possessing any sexually
             explicit materials of any sort—even content related to adults.

           • Prohibiting him from contact with individuals under 18 years of age
             without supervision of an adult who is previously approved by the court.

           • Requiring him to participate in a location restriction program, which the
             magistrate judge described as being subject to “home detention,” id. at
             56.

           • Subjecting him to GPS monitoring.

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           • Requiring him to participate in a computer and internet monitoring
             program.

           • Restricting his computer access solely to what is approved for
             employment.

 See id. at 51-57.

        The government sought review of the magistrate judge’s release decision

 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a), and the district court held a hearing. The

 government did not present any new evidence at the hearing but instead continued to

 emphasize the seriousness of the allegations in the indictment and Mr. Campas’s

 statements after his arrest. The government also argued for the first time that

 Mr. Campas presented a flight risk. Mr. Campas submitted two letters from his

 brothers attesting to his character and their willingness to support and supervise him

 if he was released pretrial. Defense counsel argued Mr. Campas should not be judged

 solely on the allegations in the indictment, and further argued the court could impose

 conditions of release on him, as the magistrate judge had. Counsel restated the

 conditions the magistrate judge had previously imposed and asserted they were

 “conditions that are routinely imposed.” Aplt. App., vol. I at 75.

        At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court stated it was basing its

 decision on the conversations between Mr. Campas and the undercover agent, its

 “experience with these types of cases in the past,” and its “great respect . . . for [the

 magistrate judge].” Id. at 78. The court then found that Mr. Campas should be

 detained pending trial. After so finding, it also expressed the belief that the evidence

 against Mr. Campas was “very strong.” Id. The court then asked the government to
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 prepare an order for the court to sign. The court subsequently entered a short, written

 detention order that adopted the findings made on the record at the hearing.

       Mr. Campas now appeals the detention order.

                                    II.    Analysis

       The Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3142, sets out the framework for evaluating

 whether pretrial detention is appropriate. In general, persons charged with a crime

 are not detained pretrial. See id. § 3142(b). But for some charges, including the

 charges against Mr. Campas, there is a rebuttable presumption “that no condition or

 combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as

 required and the safety of the community.” § 3142(e)(3)(E). “Once the presumption

 is invoked, the burden of production shifts to the defendant.” United States v.

 Stricklin, 932 F.2d 1353, 1354 (10th Cir. 1991). But “the defendant’s burden of

 production is not heavy,” and only “some evidence must be produced.” Id. at 1355.

 “However, the burden of persuasion regarding risk-of-flight and danger to the

 community always remains with the government.” Id. at 1354-55. Even if a

 defendant rebuts the presumption, it remains a factor for consideration in the

 detention decision. Id. at 1355. The government bears the burden of proving risk of

 flight by a preponderance of the evidence and dangerousness to any other person or

 the community by clear and convincing evidence. United States v. Cisneros,

 328 F.3d 610, 616 (10th Cir. 2003).

       Under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g), the judicial officer must consider four factors in

 making the detention decision: “(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense

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 charged, including whether the offense . . . involves a minor victim”; “(2) the weight

 of the evidence against the person”; “(3) the history and characteristics of the

 person”; and “(4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the

 community that would be posed by the person’s release.” A detention order must

 include “written findings of fact and a written statement of the reasons for the

 detention,” § 3142(i), but a reviewing district court can state its reasons for detention

 “in writing, or orally on the record,” Fed. R. App. P. 9(a). When the government

 seeks review of a magistrate judge’s release order under § 3145(a), the district court

 conducts a de novo review of the magistrate judge’s release order. Cisneros,

 328 F.3d at 616 n.1.

        We review a district court’s pretrial detention decision de novo because it

 presents mixed questions of law and fact. Id. at 613. And we review the underlying

 findings of fact for clear error. Id.

        Mr. Campas raises four issues on appeal, but we need address only one—his

 broader argument the district court erred by failing to make findings required by the

 Bail Reform Act. He contends “the record below suggests that the district court

 ignored at least three of the four mandatory considerations under § 3142(g).” Aplt.

 Memo. Br. at 23-24. He argues “the district court failed to consider any conditions of

 release, and summarily concluded that detention was appropriate.” Id. at 24. And he

 further asserts that because “the record on appeal is devoid of any grounds for

 reviewing the adequacy of the court’s decisions below[,]” remand is necessary. Id. at

 25. We agree with Mr. Campas that the district court failed to make sufficient factual

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 findings regarding its detention decision at the hearing or in its written order.

 We therefore cannot conduct meaningful appellate review of that decision and must

 remand to the district court.

        The district court’s explanation at the hearing for overruling the magistrate

 judge and revoking the pretrial release order was brief. It stated:

        Based on my preview, counsel, of this very important case, based on my
        review of the conversation with the undercover contact, based on my
        review of the specificity of that conversation, based on my review of
        experience with these types of cases in the past, and the great respect I
        have for Judge Oberg, the Court is of the view that there is no fact or set
        of facts that can guarantee public safety or appearance in this important
        matter. And I’m accordingly going to find that Mr. Campas be held
        pending trial in this very important case. I believe the evidence is very
        strong, and we’ll just see how it unfolds as the case proceeds.
 Aplt. App., vol. I at 77-78.

        We conclude this explanation does not contain adequate factual findings to

 support the detention decision. The only § 3142(g) factor the district court addresses

 is § 3142(g)(2)—the weight of the evidence—as the court notes its belief that the

 evidence is “very strong.” Id. at 78. The court also mentions its review of the

 conversation between the agent and Mr. Campas and the “specificity” of that

 conversation, id., but it is not clear if that statement also speaks to the weight of the

 evidence or to another § 3142(g) factor. Next, the court references its “experience

 with these types of cases in the past,” id., but that is not one of the § 3142(g)

 considerations. The court then concludes its brief statement supporting its detention

 decision by seeming to rely on its “great respect” for Judge Oberg, the magistrate

 judge. Id. But the court’s statement is confusing because the magistrate judge

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 determined Mr. Campas could be released pretrial with conditions yet the district

 court reached the opposite conclusion. Finally, the district court misstates the

 standard for pretrial detention, stating its view that there is “no fact or set of facts

 that can guarantee public safety or appearance in this important matter.” Id.

 (emphasis added). But the standard requires the court to consider whether there are

 “no condition or combination of conditions” that can reasonably assure the

 appearance of the person as required and the safety of the community. § 3142(e)(1)

 (emphasis added).

        Except for § 3142(g)(2)—the weight of the evidence against the person—the

 district court failed to address the § 3142(g) factors. And, although the court was

 purportedly reviewing de novo the magistrate judge’s release decision, it failed to

 discuss that decision or the conditions of release the magistrate judge imposed.

        The written detention order does not fill in the necessary findings. Instead, it

 creates more confusion.

        The written order begins by stating “[u]pon the motion of the government

 attorney pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1), the court held a detention hearing and

 found that detention is warranted.” Aplt. App., vol. I at 30. But that is not an

 accurate description of the procedural background of the detention proceedings.

 The magistrate judge held the initial detention hearing, see id. at 3, and then after the

 magistrate judge granted pretrial release with conditions, the government sought

 review of that decision pursuant to § 3145(a), see id. at 16.

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       The next sentence states “[t]his order adopts herein the court’s findings of fact

 and conclusions of law articulated on the record at the hearing, as required by

 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i).” Aplt. App., vol. I at 30. But the only finding of fact that can

 be gleaned from the district court’s statements on the record at the hearing is that the

 weight of the evidence is strong (although even that is stated as a “belie[f],” id. at 78,

 as opposed to a factual finding).

       The written order next discusses the rebuttable presumption in

 § 3142(e)(3)(E). But other than the government noting this is a case where the

 statutory presumption applies, Aplt. App., vol. I at 65, the presumption was not

 addressed at the hearing before the district court and no findings were made

 regarding the presumption on the record at the hearing, see id. at 64-78. The written

 order concludes, however, that “[t]he defendant has not introduced sufficient

 evidence to rebut the presumption.” Aplt. App., vol. I at 30. This conclusion is not

 supported with sufficient factual findings.

       The order next states that “the government has proven by clear and convincing

 evidence that no condition or combination of conditions of release will reasonably

 assure the safety of any other person and the community.” Id. at 30-31. And “the

 government has proven by a preponderance of evidence that no condition or

 combination of conditions of release will reasonably assure the defendant’s

 appearance as required.” Id. at 31. The order concludes this paragraph by stating

 that “[t]he court made findings on the record at the hearing and those findings are

 adopted and incorporated herein.” Id. at 31. But the district court did not make

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  sufficient factual findings at the hearing regarding possible conditions of release or

  Mr. Campas’s danger to the community or risk of flight.

        Neither the district court’s statements at the hearing nor its written order

  adequately set out its factual findings and the reasons for its detention decision.

  When a district court is revoking a magistrate judge’s pretrial release order, as is the

  case here, it is especially important that the court provide adequate findings and an

  explanation for its detention decision.

                                     III.   Conclusion

        For the foregoing reasons, we remand for the district court to issue findings of

  fact and to explain the reasoning behind the detention decision or, alternatively, to

  order Mr. Campas’s pretrial release subject to appropriate conditions.

                                              Entered for the Court

                                              Per Curiam

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