Court Opinion

ID: 9530720
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:02:57.243309+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:14.089298
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the Court. I would reverse the conviction on the ground that there was insufficient evidence of the reliability of the HGN test to permit Officer Fost to testify to the results of the test.
Prior to the adoption of the Idaho Rules of Evidence in 1985, this Court had required that the reliability of a new scientific method of proof be established as a foundation to the admissibility of evidence based on the new method. State v. Iwakiri, 106 Idaho 618, 621-27, 682 P.2d 571, 574-80 (1984); see also State v. Crea, 119 Idaho 352, 806 P.2d 445 (1991). The question in Iwakiri was the competency of a *884witness whose testimony had been hypnotically refreshed. In fashioning a rule for the admissibility of this type of evidence, the Court rejected the per se rule of general acceptability of reliability established in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923). 106 Idaho at 623-25, 682 P.2d at 576-78. Instead, the Court left the determination of the reliability of the evidence to the trial court, specifying certain safeguards for the guidance of the trial courts. Id. at 625, 682 P.2d at 578. The essence of the Court’s holding in Iwakiri was that in considering the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony, trial judges should “make a determination whether, in view of all of the circumstances, the proposed testimony is sufficiently reliable to merit admission.” Id.
The committee that presented Rule 702 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence to this Court for adoption commented on the requirement of reliability as a necessary foundation for the admissibility of expert opinion evidence based on a new scientific method of proof:
If the proffered opinion evidence would be a novel form of expertise which has not yet received judicial sanction, the court must make an initial inquiry to determine whether the new technique or principle is sufficiently reliable so that it will aid the jury in reaching accurate results.
The requirement of general scientific acceptance is in effect a requirement that the probative value of the evidence not be significantly outweighed by the risks of jury confusion, time wasting, or undue prejudice. Since that balancing is required under Rule 403, and since literal application of the general processes, even in contexts where they would pose no significant risks to the adjudicatory process, this rule requires only evidence of reliability for the foundation.
Report of the Idaho State Bar Evidence Committee, C 702, p. 2 (1985).
In State v. Fain, 116 Idaho 82, 87, 774 P.2d 252, 257 (1989), this Court also referred to the requirement of reliability in discussing the admissibility of the results of a polygraph examination.
Applying this foundational requirement of reliability to the admission of Officer Fost’s testimony based on the HGN test he administered to Garrett, I find the record to be lacking sufficient evidence in support admissibility. The following is the only evidence of reliability that I am able to locate in the record:
Q. [to Officer Fost] In addition to your training, has it been your experience that the [HGN] test is indicative of the presence of alcohol?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. And you base that on the number of times when you’ve used the test?
A. From my experience, when I do score a person four points on the test, there is a very good likelihood that they are under the influence in the state of Idaho, which is .10.
Q. And, as I understand, what you’re relying on when you give the Gaze Nystagmus Test, is you’re relying on what you perceive as your knowledge of how the human eye reacts when attempting to follow, be it the source of light or be it the end of a pen, as coupled with the presence or nonpresence of alcohol in the body?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And that’s based upon what you’ve been told by these other folks, by Corporal Sterling or Sergeant LePier, and their training, and things like that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. But as far as the formal study or personal knowledge of why its is the body makes the eye — assuming it does — why the eye would react, given the presence of alcohol, given a lot of other factors. You don’t have formal training in those areas?
A. Well, in all the classes that we have attended and the ones that we have given, we do bring the subjects in before they have been dosed or given any alcoholic beverages to drink. We do give them the eye tests. We look at the eyes.
Then we have them go in. And it is a controlled environment. We know *885exactly how much alcohol they are being given. Then we do our training according to that. And we bring them back in after they’ve had so much to drink, recheck the eyes. And we’ve done this on numerous occasions.
Based on this foundation, the trial court allowed Officer Fost to testify that Garrett failed the HGN test, indicating it was likely that Garrett’s blood alcohol concentration was above .10, which Officer Fost described as “the legal limit in the state of Idaho.”
I am unable to accept that the testimony of Officer Fost was sufficient to establish the reliability of the HGN test required by I.R.E. 702. If this establishes the reliability for the admissibility of expert opinion based on new scientific methods, then we must be prepared to accept the admissibility of the result of polygraph examinations based on the testimony of polygraph operators, the admissibility of DNA tests based on the testimony of laboratory technicians who conduct the tests, and the results of other forms of “scientific” testing based on the testimony of those who conduct the tests. In my view, this is not the type of reliability that we should require before allowing testimony of the results of tests conducted based on new scientific methods. The foundation should be laid by experts who have researched the tests and are able to testify as to the scientific basis for the tests.
Having concluded that the testimony of Officer Fost based on the HGN test should not have been admitted, I am unable to conclude that the error was harmless. Although this was a prosecution for driving under the influence and not a prosecution for driving with a blood alcohol concentration of .10 or more, Officer Fost’s testimony that Garrett’s BAC level was likely .10 or more inevitably affected the jury’s consideration. I cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found Garrett guilty without this evidence.