Court Opinion

ID: 9862160
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 01:02:48.231754+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:30:29.706050
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SCARIANO, dissenting: The majority reverse and remand this case for the reason that the trial judge ruled that "as a matter of law what [Sergeant Rhodes] observed ten minutes beforehand is not probative as being too remote as to what occurred at the time of this impact.” (264 Ill. App. 3d at 617.) Federal Rule of Evidence 401, adopted by the Supreme Court and cited by the majority (Fed. R. Evid. 401), does not in any way change the long-established and well-defined rule of law that the determination as to whether evidence is relevant is within the sound discretion of the trial court and its decision is not to be overturned by a reviewing court absent an abuse thereof. O’Brien v. Hertl (1992), 238 Ill. App. 3d 217, 223, 606 N.E.2d 225, 230 ("The determination of relevancy of evidence is largely within the discretion of the trial court, and reversal of its decision is not warranted absent abuse of that discretion!]”); Bullard v. Barnes (1983), 112 Ill. App. 3d 384, 392, 445 N.E.2d 485, 491 ("It is so fundamental as to need no citation of authority that admission of evidence is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial judge and reversal is not warranted in the absence of an abuse of that discretion! ]”), rev’d in part on other grounds (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 505, 468 N.E.2d 1228; accord Galowich v. Beech Aircraft Corp. (1991), 209 Ill. App. 3d 128, 135, 568 N.E.2d 46, 50; Eleopoulos v. Dzakovich (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 595, 600, 418 N.E.2d 980, 985; Brown v. Nale (1969), 106 Ill. App. 2d 238, 245, 245 N.E.2d 9, 13; cf. City of Chicago v. Anthony (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 169, 554 N.E.2d 1381 (holding that it is within the discretion of the trial court to determine whether an expert’s opinion is admissible which may not be interfered with unless the court abused its discretion). Yet, despite acknowledging their awareness that the circuit judge’s ruling on this evidentiary issue was within the sound discretion of the court to make and could therefore not be set aside unless that discretion was abused, the majority, it turns out, pay only lip service to that hoary rule of law, for they overlook the well-established definition of the term "abuse of discretion:” "In determining whether the circuit court abused its discretion, [the appellate] court should not decide whether it agrees with the circuit court’s decision; but rather, should determine whether the circuit court 'acted arbitrarily without the employment of conscientious judgment or, in view of all the circumstances, exceeded the bounds of reason and ignored recognized principles of law so that substantial prejudice resulted.’ ” Zurich Insurance Co. v. Raymark Industries, Inc. (1991), 213 Ill. App. 3d 591, 594-95, 572 N.E.2d 1119, 1122, quoting In re Marriage of Aud (1986), 142 Ill. App. 3d 320, 326, 491 N.E.2d 894, 898. A slightly different but equally well-recognized explanation of the "abuse of discretion” standard of review was offered by this court as well in Schoon v. Hill (1990), 207 Ill. App. 3d 601, 609, 566 N.E.2d 718, 724, where we said: "The role of [the appellate] court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the circuit court, or even to determine whether the circuit court exercised it discretion 'wisely.’ [Citations.] Rather, our task is to determine if the circuit court abused its discretion; in the absence of an abuse of discretion, the decision of the circuit court in granting or denying a *** motion will not be disturbed on review.” Accord Whitney v. Madden (1948), 400 Ill. 185, 190, 78 N.E.2d 593, 596 ("[B]ut where the trial court has the power of judicial discretion and exercises it without abuse, and within the scope of the law, such actions will not be disturbed by the reviewing courts[ ]”); In re Marriage of Pearson (1992), 236 Ill. App. 3d 337, 349, 603 N.E.2d 720, 729 ("An abuse of discretion occurs when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court[ ]”); Progress Printing Corp. v. Jane Byrne Political Committee (1992), 235 Ill. App. 3d 292, 304, 601 N.E.2d 1055, 1064 ("[A] circuit court’s decision on [a] question [concerning the relevancy of evidence] will be overruled [on appeal] only if it represents an obvious abuse of discretion); Kirk v. Rosewell (1992), 225 Ill. App. 3d 326, 329-30, 587 N.E.2d 1214, 1216 ("[Discretion is abused only where no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court[; i]f reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion! ]”); In re Application of Kane County Collector (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 796, 805, 482 N.E.2d 161, 167 (describing abuse of discretion as being judicial action which is "arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable”). I fail to apprehend, and the majority fail to apprise us, how their overruling the trial judge on this issue conforms to the formulae we are mandated to follow by the case law quoted above, which represents only a sample of the legion of authority on the subject. One can very well wonder also if the majority recognize that all of the cases they cite in support of their holding except one uphold the trial court’s exercise of discretion. For instance, in Eleopoulos, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant finding that he did not negligently cause an automobile accident wherein the plaintiff was injured. (Eleopoulos, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 596, 418 N.E.2d at 982.) On appeal, the plaintiff urged, inter alia, that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of the passenger in the defendant’s automobile who would have stated that a short time before the accident, the defendant took his eye off the road in order to help her look for an item in the glove compartment. (Eleopoulos, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 599-600, 418 N.E.2d at 984.) The appellate court disagreed, holding that the trial court properly excluded this testimony as the witness could not "connect this testimony to the relevant time frame.” Eleopoulos, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 600, 418 N.E.2d at 985. In Hanck v. Ruan Transport Corp. (1954), 3 Ill. App. 2d 372, 122 N.E.2d 445, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant and its employee for negligently operating a gasoline tractor-trailer transport. After the jury found for the defendants, the plaintiff argued on appeal, inter alia, that the trial court improperly excluded the testimony of a witness for plaintiff who would have testified that he saw the defendants’ truck cross the centerline just prior to the accident approximately 800 feet from the scene. (Hanck, 3 Ill. App. 2d at 381, 122 N.E.2d at 449.) The court rejected the plaintiff’s contention, holding that "[t]here is nothing in the testimony of the witness *** as offered which indicates that such testimony would show any observation of the manner in which the transport was being driven from the time the witness observed the same until the collision occurred.” Hanck, 3 Ill. App. 2d at 381, 184 N.E.2d at 449-50. Additionally, in all of the other cases mentioned by the majority, this court affirmed the trial court’s exercise of its discretion with respect to evidence of a driver’s conduct prior to an accident. (See, e.g., Wassman v. Ritchason (1978), 63 Ill. App. 3d 770, 778, 380 N.E.2d 1022, 1028; Brown, 106 Ill. App. 2d at 245-46, 245 N.E.2d at 13; Cooper v. Cox (1961), 31 Ill. App. 2d 51, 58, 175 N.E.2d 651, 654.) Moreover, in the lone case the majority cite wherein the judge’s determination was set aside, Klavine, the issue of remoteness involves a witness’ determination that he was only approximately 600 yards from the scene of the accident, that he was able to see the plaintiff’s vehicle for a distance of 300 yards, and that the vehicle was traveling at a speed of 20 to 25 miles per hour — all clearly amounting to a temporal span that could not even remotely approach the 10-minute difference we encounter in this case. The majority’s statement that the record does not support the trial judge’s finding "that 10 minutes elapsed between the time of Rhodes’ observations and the accident” (264 Ill. App. 3d at 620) is to be contrasted with the record itself: "THE COURT[, after being asked to reconsider its exclusion of Rhodes’s testimony as to plaintiff’s earlier shoulder-riding, stated]: I have read your motion over the noon hour and the materials. What’s not in there and what I’ve been informed of is that her observations were made 10 minutes before the time of the occurrence. MR. VAC ALA [counsel for defendants]: Judge, and the reason her observations were made 10 minutes before the time of the occurrence was because it was bumper to bumper traffic from a stationary observation point where her unmarked police vehicle was stopped, and she will lay a foundation for that. THE COURT: That is a matter of dispute. The testimony so far has been that the traffic was moving at a minimum, 30 miles per hour. * * * What occurred 10 minutes before is too remote a time. MR. VACALA: Judge, I would once again respectfully submit that the 10 minutes in time is quite distorted here in light of the traffic circumstances. *** * * * THE COURT: *** I’m, just saying that I’m ruling as a matter of law that what [Sergeant Rhodes] observed 10 minutes beforehand is not probative as being too remote as to what occurred at the time of this impact.” (Emphasis added.) Consequently, Klavine is inapposite. Since the testimony offered by defendants in this case was considerably more remote than that proffered in Klavine, it cannot be said that under that decision the trial judge here abused his discretion in excluding it. The majority, by focusing on what they characterize as my glossing over the "correctness of the circuit court’s ruling” (264 Ill. App. 3d at 621 n.5), and chiding me for the deference I accord the judge, obviously turn the universally acknowledged meaning of abuse of discretion on its head and redefine it: if the appellate court disagrees with the result of the trial court’s exercise of what is indisputably its discretion (never mind what the reasonable person might think), it must necessarily follow that the court was incorrect and therefore abused its discretion. Shades of bootstrapping! Our United States Court of Appeals views "correctness” a bit more pragmatically, even if less elegantly: "To be clearly erroneous, a decision must strike us as more than just maybe or probably wrong; it must, as one member of this court recently stated during oral argument, strike us as wrong with the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish.” (Parts & Electric Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Electric, Inc. (7th Cir. 1988), 866 F.2d 228, 233.) If the majority’s ruling displaces existing case authority that requires a finding that there be at least a clear appearance of an abuse of discretion (see, e.g., Progress Printing Corp., 235 Ill. App. 3d at 304, 601 N.E.2d at 1064), whatever its effect might be on one’s olfactory receptors, before the exercise of that discretion may be set aside, we may very well ask why we need trial court judges at all. I therefore dissent.