Court Opinion

ID: 9609274
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:24:56.137721+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:50.039208
License: Public Domain

Green, J.
(dissenting) — I disagree with the majority's conclusion the stop was overly intrusive and therefore I respectfully dissent.
There are three factors the court considers in determining whether an intrusion is permissible under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), or must be supported by probable cause: (1) the purpose of the stop; (2) the amount of physical intrusion upon the suspect's liberties; and (3) the length of time the suspect is detained. State v. Wheeler, 108 Wn.2d 230, 235, 737 P.2d *8441005 (1987); State v. Williams, 102 Wn.2d 733, 740, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984). "The purpose of a stop must be related to an investigation focused on the defendant." Wheeler, at 235. The scope of an investigatory stop may be enlarged or prolonged as required by the circumstances if the stop confirms or arouses further suspicion. State v. Guzman-Cuellar, 47 Wn. App. 326, 332, 734 P.2d 966, review denied, 108 Wn.2d 1027 (1987). Also, if the results of the initial investigation do not dispel the officer's suspicion criminal activity is afoot, he may further detain the suspect and continue the investigation by doing what is reasonably necessary under the circumstances. State v. Mercer, 45 Wn. App. 769, 775-76, 727 P.2d 676 (1986). The stop must be temporary, however, and last no longer than is necessary to carry out the purpose of the stop, State v. Gonzales, 46 Wn. App. 388, 394, 731 P.2d 1101 (1986), and the investigative methods must be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion. Gonzales, at 394 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983)).
With respect to the first factor, the purpose of the stop here was to ask the four men in the car who they were and what they were doing in the vicinity. The officers were seeking to determine whether the four men were in fact "casing" houses to burglarize. They had been informed by radio of suspicious persons possibly casing houses and were given a description of one of the men. One of the four resembled the described person. It is clear the investigation focused on the four men detained.
As to the second factor, it is evident the amount of intrusion was significant. The question is whether it was reasonable. In certain circumstances, drawn guns, handcuffing, or seclusion of the suspect may be appropriate but only when the police have a legitimate fear of danger. Wheeler, at 236. Under extreme circumstances, the combination of all three responses, drawn gun, handcuffs and seclusion, may be warranted. Williams, at 740.
*845A determination of the reasonableness of an officer's intrusion depends to some degree on the seriousness of the apprehended criminal conduct. An officer may do far more if the suspected misconduct endangers life or personal safety than if it does not.
State v. Samsel, 39 Wn. App. 564, 573, 694 P.2d 670 (1985) (quoting State v. McCord, 19 Wn. App. 250, 253, 576 P.2d 892, review denied, 90 Wn.2d 1013 (1978)). The officer need not be absolutely certain the suspect is armed. Rather, the question is whether a reasonably prudent man in the same situation would be warranted in the belief his safety or that of others is in danger. State v. Sweet, 44 Wn. App. 226, 233-34, 721 P.2d 560 (quoting Terry, at 27), review denied, 107 Wn.2d 1001 (1986). The officer's belief is reasonable only if he or she can point to "particular facts" from which reasonable inferences of danger may be drawn. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917, 88 S. Ct. 1889 (1968). The questions raised regarding the validity of a frisk concern how much suspicion the officer must have that the suspect is possibly armed and dangerous, whether the test is objective or subjective, and also the extent to which the officer may search the suspect and the surrounding area. State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 11, 726 P.2d 445 (1986).
Mere placement in the patrol car to preserve the status quo does not necessarily exceed the scope of a Terry stop. Gonzales, at 395. Also, handcuffing and placing a suspect in the backseat of a patrol car are appropriate procedures when a suspect is being transported in the police car — such action is consistent with good police practice and common sense. Wheeler, at 236. Furthermore, an officer conducting a Terry investigatory stop may be in danger not only from the suspect but also the suspect's companions, and thus an officer may frisk the companions if the officer could lawfully frisk the driver, especially where the companion is in the suspect's car. State v. Kennedy, supra. However, the suspected crime of burglary by itself does not support an inference of dangerousness. Williams, at 740; Sweet, at 234.
*846Thus, the question presented here is whether, considering all the circumstances and the legitimate concern for police safety consistent with good police practice and common sense, Wheeler, at 236, the police acted reasonably in making the stop with drawn guns and then frisking, handcuffing and separating the occupants of the vehicle. In resolving this question, a police officer's expertise in identifying criminal behavior must be given consideration. State v. Fricks, 91 Wn.2d 391, 398, 588 P.2d 1328 (1979); State v. Cottrell, 86 Wn.2d 130, 542 P.2d 771 (1975); State v. Stebbins, 47 Wn. App. 482, 484, 735 P.2d 1353, review denied, 108 Wn.2d 1026 (1987); State v. Samsel, supra. In my view, they acted reasonably.
These facts were known to the officers. It was around 9:30 p.m. and it was dark. They knew there had been numerous burglaries in this particular area in which guns had been taken. Indeed, these officers were engaged in surveillance of another potential burglary in the same area at the time they received the call that Mr. Duffy had reported he thought his house was being "cased" for a possible burglary. The report indicated two men rang his doorbell, and when he answered, they stated their car was disabled and requested use of his telephone. On receiving the radio report, the officers went to the block where Mr. Duffy lived and found a white Ford Torino parked in the middle of the block. Two men were approaching the car as one of the officers driving an unmarked police car slowly pulled up behind the Torino. One of the men met the description given by Mr. Duffy. As the officer's car was parking behind the Torino, the two men walked past the car and looked back; the person sitting in the car "slouched down" in his seat and leaned slightly to the left. This officer was instructed by radio not to remain behind the car. As he was leaving, he observed the two men walk to the end of the block and turn right. Another officer observed the two men walking on the sidewalk. When they reappeared, they were "running hard" back to the Torino. They got into the car, which had apparently been reported disabled, started the *847engine and without lights began moving into the traffic lane. This information was radioed to the other officers. After moving for a short distance, the lights of the Torino were turned on. The police made a decision to stop the car. As one officer approached the car in his vehicle from the opposite direction, he observed the passenger in the front seat bend or slouch forward as if doing something in the front seat. This officer then blocked the path of the defendants' vehicle, while two other unmarked police cars pulled along the side and rear of the Torino. One of these vehicles had turned on the flashing police lights hidden behind the radiator grille.
The officers approached the car with guns drawn and ordered the occupants to get out of the car. As the driver exited the car, a knife was readily observed. As one of the passengers exited the rear of the car, a rifle with a shortened stock was observed in plain view. The occupants were frisked, handcuffed and separated.
In these circumstances, the officers were warranted in the belief their safety might be endangered by the stop. This belief rested on particular facts from which reasonably prudent persons could believe there was danger involved. A reasonable inference from the actions of defendants as observed by the police confirmed Mr. Duffy's report his house was being "cased" for potential burglary. Knowing that guns had been taken in previous burglaries in the neighborhood alerted the officers to the fact guns might be present in the defendants' vehicle. This concern was reinforced when the officer saw the passenger in the front seat bend forward as if doing something in the front seat — a reasonable inference he was obtaining or loading a gun. Thus, in my view, there were ample particular facts to support the use of guns in making the stop.
Further, the frisking, handcuffing and separating of the occupants was clearly justified by the unfolding events. As Mr. Blount, the driver, exited the car, a knife was readily observed on his person — in fact, he made movements suggesting the use of it. As the passengers in the backseat *848exited, a rifle with the stock sawed off was in plain view behind the front seat. Within 10 minutes, it was learned there was an outstanding warrant for Mr. Blount's arrest. Upon a search of the vehicle, a loaded pistol was found under the driver's seat and a second loaded pistol was found under the passenger's front seat. The rifle was also loaded. These unfolding events clearly justified the frisking, handcuffing and separating of the occupants.
For the foregoing reasons, I conclude the stop was justified and the officers' conduct was not overly intrusive in light of all the circumstances.
Mr. Blount contends there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of attempted second degree burglary. I find sufficient facts to support his conviction. The record establishes he took a substantial step toward the commission of a burglary when he rang the doorbell of Mr. Duffy's house to determine if anyone was home. One of the occupants of the vehicle with Mr. Blount stated he had accompanied Mr. Blount on several other burglaries and if Mr. Duffy had not been at home, they planned to burglarize his house. The evidence established that the Duffy house looked dark as the drapes were drawn and no outside lights were on. In contrast, Mr. Duffy stated the other homes in the area had their outside lights on and were "lit up like Christmas trees."
In my view, the defendants' convictions should be affirmed.
Review granted by Supreme Court July 5,1988.