Court Opinion

ID: 9897591
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:18:24.866339+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:34.992121
License: Public Domain

09/29/2023
                 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
                            AT NASHVILLE
                                 May 24, 2023 Session

                STATE OF TENNESSEE v. EBONY ROBINSON

              Appeal by Permission from the Court of Criminal Appeals
                        Criminal Court for Davidson County
                    No. 2020-D-1886 Mark J. Fishburn, Judge
                      ___________________________________

                            No. M2021-01539-SC-R11-CD
                       ___________________________________

In 2020, Ebony Robinson (“Defendant”) pleaded guilty to vehicular homicide by
intoxication, aggravated assault, resisting arrest, and driving without a license. The trial
court imposed a ten-year sentence largely suspended to probation with periodic weeks of
confinement for the first three years. The State appealed the sentence, arguing that a 2017
amendment to the probation eligibility statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-
303, prohibits defendants who are convicted of vehicular homicide by intoxication from
receiving any form of probation. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the State and
reversed the trial court, ordering Defendant to serve the full sentence in confinement. The
intermediate court concluded that the amended probation statute expressly prohibits
probation of any kind, including periodic or split confinement, for criminal defendants
convicted of vehicular homicide by intoxication. After reviewing the relevant statutes, this
Court affirms the Court of Criminal Appeals and holds that the clear and precise language
of the 2017 amendment to the probation eligibility statute prohibits all forms of probation
for a defendant convicted of vehicular homicide by intoxication. Accordingly, we affirm
the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

   Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Criminal
                                Appeals Affirmed.

ROGER A. PAGE, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which SHARON G. LEE, JEFFREY
S. BIVINS, HOLLY KIRBY, and SARAH K. CAMPBELL, JJ., joined.

Emma Rae Tennent, Assistant District Public Defender (on appeal); Mary Ruth Pate and
Randi Hess, Assistant District Public Defenders (at hearing), for the appellant, Ebony
Robinson.
Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée Sophia Blumstein, Solicitor
General; Benjamin A. Ball, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Garrett D. Ward, Assistant
Attorney General; Glenn R. Funk, District Attorney General; and Elaine Heard, Assistant
District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

                                                  OPINION

                            I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       On the evening of August 9, 2020, police responded to a call reporting that two
minors were struck by a car in a Nashville neighborhood. The crash was captured on video.
The video revealed Ebony Robinson (“Defendant”) reversing her vehicle at a high rate of
speed while on her cell phone. She struck two children who were riding their bikes in the
apartment roadway. The children, referred to as C.M. and C.D., were both under the age of
ten.1 C.M. passed away that evening at Vanderbilt Children’s Hospital. C.D. survived after
sustaining injuries.

        When officers arrived, Defendant admitted that she was driving the car. The
investigating officer immediately noticed the smell of alcohol and asked if she had been
drinking. Defendant replied that she “had a few” but later stated she “only had a sip.”
Defendant gave officers consent to search her car where a cup of “what smelled like
tequila” was recovered in the center console. Defendant initially complied with sobriety
testing but ultimately refused, became enraged, and resisted attempts to handcuff her. After
officers detained her, they discovered that Defendant did not have a driver’s license or
insurance. Officers obtained a search warrant that revealed Defendant’s blood alcohol
percentage to be .08. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-401(a)(2) (“It is unlawful for any person
to drive or to be in physical control of any automobile or other motor driven vehicle on any
of the public roads and highways of the state . . . while . . . [t]he alcohol concentration in
the person’s blood or breath is eight-hundredths of one percent (0.08%) or more.”). The
toxicology report also revealed that the Defendant tested positive for a psychoactive
amount of marijuana.

        On November 4, 2020, a Davidson County Grand Jury indicted Defendant. She was
charged with four separate counts: vehicular homicide by intoxication, aggravated assault,
resisting arrest, and driving without a license. Defendant pleaded guilty to all charges
without an agreement as to the sentence. Before a sentencing hearing was held, the State
submitted a memorandum stating that Defendant was not eligible for probation pursuant to
the probation eligibility statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-303(a), because
she had pleaded guilty to vehicular homicide by intoxication.

       1
           It is the custom of this Court to use initials in place of the minors’ full names.
                                                        -2-
       At the sentencing hearing, the trial court heard testimony from Monique Archibald,
a family friend of one of the victims, and Valerie Robinson, Defendant’s mother. Ms.
Robinson testified that she fostered Defendant then adopted her when she was three years
old. Ms. Robinson explained that Defendant was quiet and never had any disciplinary
issues growing up; however, she was aware that Defendant drank alcohol and used
marijuana on occasion. She testified that, at the time of the hearing, Defendant was the
mother of two children who were ten and six years old. Finally, Defendant gave a brief
statement expressing her regret and lack of intent with respect to the crimes.

        The trial court sentenced Defendant to ten years for vehicular homicide, four years
for aggravated assault, six months for resisting arrest, and six months for driving without
a license. The court found that while the probation eligibility statute states that criminal
defendants convicted of vehicular homicide by intoxication are ineligible for probation,
Defendant was eligible for split and periodic confinement. Defendant had been
incarcerated while awaiting trial and sentencing. After the sentencing hearing, the trial
court placed Defendant on probation for the vehicular homicide and aggravated assault
offenses and ordered the sentences to run concurrently. The six-month sentences for
resisting arrest and driving without a license were also ordered to run concurrently with the
felony counts. The trial court further required Defendant to immediately enter the Hope
Center for one year, during which time she was required to comply with all conditions of
probation including drug and alcohol screens.2 Thereafter, Defendant was required, for
three years, to serve one week in jail during each child’s birthday week as well as the week
of Christmas. The trial court further ordered Defendant to attend and complete two Mothers
Against Drunk Driving (“MADD”) Victim Impact Panels per year.3 She also lost her
driving privileges for eight years.

        The State timely filed a notice of appeal challenging Defendant’s sentence for
vehicular homicide by intoxication. It primarily argued that the trial court erred by placing
Defendant on probation with periodic confinement when Defendant was not statutorily
eligible for probation. Defendant responded that she was eligible for a sentence of split

        2
           According its website, the Nashville Rescue Mission Hope Center is a “Christian Life Recovery
Program that helps men and women . . . develop tools to make realistic, achievable changes that lead to a
better quality of life.” Life Recovery Program, Nashville Rescue Mission, https://perma.cc/2FG8-U3YK
(last visited August 19, 2023).
        3
           MADD is a multi-faceted organization that seeks to end drunk and drugged driving, and it
provides resources to victims, survivors, and schools. See generally, MADD, https://perma.cc/5AM4-
VVTE (last visited August 19, 2023). MADD also conducts research studies and publishes Court
Monitoring Reports for several states, including Tennessee. Id. The organization advocates for victims’
rights, helps victims find attorneys, and hosts victim impact panels to educate the community about the
dangers of drunk and drugged driving. Victim Impact Panels, MADD, https://perma.cc/CHS4-SK4S (last
visited August 19, 2022).
                                                    -3-
confinement, arguing that section 39-13-213(b)(2)(B) read together with section 40-35-
303(a) merely disallows “full” probation.4 The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the
State and reversed the trial court’s grant of probation and ordered execution of Defendant’s
sentence. State v. Robinson, No. M2021-01539-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 4004153, at *6
(Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 2, 2022) perm. app. granted, (Jan. 30, 2023). The intermediate
court held that “a defendant convicted of vehicular homicide by intoxication is not eligible
for release on any form of probation, whether it be periodic confinement or split
confinement.” Id. at *5.

       This Court granted Defendant’s ensuing application for permission to appeal to
interpret and consider the interplay between Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-13-
213 and 40-35-303 and to determine whether the trial court erred in allowing a part of
Defendant’s sentence to be suspended to probation after a conviction of vehicular homicide
by intoxication.

                                    II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

       The issue presented for review concerns statutory construction. Statutory
construction presents a question of law, and we review such questions de novo with no
presumption of correctness. Kampmeyer v. State, 639 S.W.3d 21, 23 (Tenn. 2022) (citing
In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d 533, 552 (Tenn. 2015)); State v. Dycus, 456 S.W.3d 918, 924
(Tenn. 2015) (citing State v. Springer, 406 S.W.3d 526, 532˗33 (Tenn. 2013)).

        When engaging in statutory interpretation, “well-defined precepts” apply. State v.
Frazier, 558 S.W.3d 145, 152 (Tenn. 2018) (quoting Tenn. Dep’t of Corr. v. Pressley, 528
S.W.3d 506, 512 (Tenn. 2017)); State v. Howard, 504 S.W.3d 260, 269 (Tenn. 2016)
(quoting State v. McNack, 356 S.W.3d 906, 908 (Tenn. 2011)). “The most basic principle
of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent without
unduly restricting or expanding a statute’s coverage beyond its intended scope.” Howard,
504 S.W.3d at 269 (quoting Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995)); see Carter
v. Bell, 279 S.W.3d 560, 564 (Tenn. 2009) (citing State v. Sherman, 266 S.W.3d 395, 401
(Tenn. 2008)). In construing statutes, Tennessee law provides that courts are to avoid a
construction that leads to absurd results. Tennessean v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 485
S.W.3d 857, 872 (Tenn. 2016) (citing Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 527
(Tenn. 2010)).

        We look to “the language of the statute, its subject matter, the object and reach of
the statute, the wrong or evil which it seeks to remedy or prevent, and the purpose sought

        4
         Defendant reasoned that the trial court’s allowing her to be placed on probation after trial and
sentencing resulted in a sentence of split confinement because Defendant had been in custody since her
arrest.
                                                   -4-
to be accomplished in its enactment.” Spires v. Simpson, 539 S.W.3d 134, 143 (Tenn. 2017)
(quoting State v. Collins, 166 S.W.3d 721, 726 (Tenn. 2005)). Courts seek a reasonable
interpretation “in light of the purposes, objectives, and spirit of the statute based on good
sound reasoning.” Beard v. Branson, 528 S.W.3d 487, 496 (Tenn. 2017) (quoting Scott v.
Ashland Healthcare Ctr., Inc., 49 S.W.3d 281, 286 (Tenn. 2001)). The words in a statute
“must be given their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they appear and
in light of the statute’s general purpose.” Coffee Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. City of Tullahoma,
574 S.W.3d 832, 839 (Tenn. 2019) (quoting Mills v. Fulmarque, Inc., 360 S.W.3d 362, 368
(Tenn. 2012)).

       If two statutes appear to be in conflict with one another, the more specific statute
will govern over the more general statute. State v. Welch, 595 S.W.3d 615, 622 (Tenn.
2020). Additionally, when a newer statute’s relationship with an older provision is
analyzed, “we presume that the legislature has knowledge of its prior enactments and is
fully aware of any judicial constructions of those enactments.” Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d
751, 762 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting Hicks v. State, 945 S.W.2d 706, 707 (Tenn. 1997)).

                                       III. ANALYSIS

        With this standard of review and these principles of statutory interpretation in mind,
we turn to the central issue of this appeal: whether the 2017 amendment to the probation
eligibility statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-303, prohibits defendants who
are convicted of vehicular homicide by intoxication from receiving any form of probation
despite Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-213 outlining a mandatory-minimum
sentence for the same offense.

     Defendant pleaded guilty to vehicular homicide by intoxication, a Class B felony,
among other charges. As to sentencing for this offense, the vehicular homicide statute, as
amended in 2015, provides in pertinent part:

       Any sentence imposed for a first violation of subdivision (a)(2) shall include
       a mandatory minimum sentence of forty-eight (48) consecutive hours of
       incarceration. The person shall not be eligible for release from confinement
       on probation pursuant to § 40-35-303 until the person has served the entire
       forty-eight-hour minimum mandatory sentence.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-213(b)(2)(B) (Supp. 2015).

        Notably, as discussed above, the probation statute was amended in 2017 to provide
as follows:

                                             -5-
        A defendant shall be eligible for probation under this chapter if the sentence
        actually imposed upon the defendant is ten (10) years or less; however, no
        defendant shall be eligible for probation under this chapter if convicted of a
        violation of § 39-13-213(a)(2) [vehicular homicide by intoxication]. . . .

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-303(a) (Supp. 2017).

       The intermediate court concluded that a defendant who is convicted of vehicular
homicide by intoxication is not eligible for release on any form of probation. In its opinion,
the court addressed two prior opinions discussing the same issue: State v. McKinney, in
which one panel of the Court of Criminal Appeals denied the defendant any form of
probation when analyzing the two statutes at issue, No. E2020-01730-CCA-R3-CD, 2022
WL 122867, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 13, 2022), as well as State v. Key, in which a
separate panel of the Court of Criminal Appeals stated that the subject statutes made such
defendants ineligible for full probation but allowed a sentence of split confinement. State
v. Key, No. M2019-00411-CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 7209603, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec.
27, 2019).

        The McKinney court considered the sentence of a first-time offender who was
convicted of vehicular homicide by intoxication and ordered to serve his full sentence in
incarceration. McKinney, 2022 WL 122867, at *1. The defendant argued on appeal that the
trial court erred, reasoning that the subject statutes were not in conflict because the “release
from confinement” language of the vehicular homicide statute should be interpreted as
release on parole after the mandatory minimum sentence is served. Id. Thus, according to
the defendant “a clear and plain reading of both statutes taken together clearly and
unequivocally satisfies both statutes because a mandatory jail sentence under [the vehicular
homicide by intoxication statute] of 48 hours before release ‘from confinement’ is required
and [thus] the sentence is not one that is probation only.” Id. The intermediate court rejected
this reasoning stating that “the Legislature’s intent to make a defendant convicted of
vehicular homicide by intoxication ineligible for probation is clearly and unambiguously
expressed in the language of the amendment to the probation statute.” Id. at *3.

      In Key, the defendant pleaded guilty to vehicular homicide by intoxication and
vehicular assault and was also ordered to serve his eight-year sentence in confinement.
Key, 2019 WL 7209603, at *1. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred
in denying him alternative sentencing.5 Id. at *3. The Court of Criminal Appeals panel

        5
          The trial court and intermediate court in the case before us, as well as the courts in the cases
referenced herein, appear to use the term “alternative sentence” loosely and seemingly interchangeably with
“split confinement” and “periodic confinement.” We recognize, however, that “alternative sentence” can
technically be used to describe any type of criminal punishment other than confinement. Given the specific
question before us, it is important to clarify that we are today specifically addressing sentences suspended
to probation, including split and periodic confinement. We expressly stop short of addressing whether the
                                                      -6-
ultimately disagreed, concluding that based on the record the trial court did not err in
denying alternative sentencing. Id. at *6. In doing so, the intermediate court noted that
defendants are not eligible for “full probation due to statutorily imposed minimum jail
terms which must be served before any potential release on probation . . . [t]hus, the
Defendant could receive, at best, a sentence of split confinement.” Id.

       The State mentions, and we agree, that the preceding quoted language of the Court
of Criminal Appeals panel in Key is mere dictum. In Key, the Court of Criminal Appeals
determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the defendant an
alternative sentence. Key, 2019 WL 7209603, at *6. Therefore, the court was not required
to decide what form of alternative sentencing was potentially available to the defendant,
and the panel’s statements concerning “full” probation and split confinement were not
necessary to the decision of the case before it. See Bellar v. Nat’l Motor Fleets, Inc., 450
S.W.2d 312, 313-14 (Tenn. 1970) (This Court has defined dictum as “an opinion expressed
by a court upon some question of law which is not necessary to the decision of the case
before it.”).

       Thus, the McKinney view is that the legislature clearly and unambiguously
expressed in the 2017 amendment to the probation statute that a defendant convicted of
vehicular homicide by intoxication is ineligible for probation. See McKinney, 2022 WL
122867, at *3. The McKinney panel reasoned that the language therein does not conflict
with the probation reference contained in the mandatory minimum sentence provisions of
section 39-13-213(b)(2)(B) because the vehicular homicide statute indicates that any
release on probation (after service of the mandatory minimum) is to be pursuant to section
40-35-303(a), which now precludes probation for such offenders. See id. Conversely, under
the Key view, the 2017 amendment to the probation statute is interpreted to mean
ineligibility for “full” probation because of the mandatory minimum sentence provision
contained in section 39-13-213(b)(2)(B). See Key, 2019 WL 7209603, at *6.

     In the present case, the Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Key and adopted the
McKinney holding, quoting the following excerpt from the McKinney opinion:

                [T]he Legislature’s intent to make a defendant convicted of vehicular
        homicide by intoxication ineligible for probation is clearly and
        unambiguously expressed in the language of the amendment to the probation
        statute, which was enacted after the amendment to the vehicular homicide
        statute setting forth the mandatory minimum sentences for defendants
        convicted of vehicular homicide by intoxication. . . . [T]he language in
        Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-213(b)(2) concerning the

2017 amendment to the probation eligibility statute prohibits all forms of alternative sentencing in cases of
a vehicular homicide by intoxication conviction.
                                                   -7-
       mandatory minimum sentences required before release to probation does not
       directly conflict with the probation statute because of its provision that any
       release on probation is to be pursuant to the probation statute.

              The practical effect of the amendment to the probation statute,
       however, is that a defendant convicted of vehicular homicide by intoxication
       will never be eligible for release on probation. Thus, to the extent that the
       two statutes cannot be reconciled, we conclude that the amendment to the
       probation statute repeals by implication the conflicting provisions of the
       vehicular homicide statute concerning probation eligibility for a defendant
       convicted of vehicular homicide by intoxication.

Robinson, 2022 WL 4004153, at *5 (quoting McKinney, 2022 WL 122867, at *3). The
Robinson panel concluded that “a defendant convicted of vehicular homicide by
intoxication will never be eligible for release on probation.” Robinson, 2022 WL 4004153,
at *8 (quoting McKinney, 2022 WL 122867, at *3). It determined that the plain meaning
of the statute does not allow for any type of probation, including split confinement or
periodic confinement. Id. While the instant panel concluded that the statutes are not in
conflict with each other due to the fact that the vehicular homicide statute is to be construed
“pursuant to § 40-35-303,” the court stated that wherever the two statutes are not
reconcilable, the doctrine of repeal by implication would take effect. Id.

        On appeal before this Court, Defendant argues that a sentence including periodic
confinement was still available to her despite the 2017 amendment to the probation statute.
In support of her argument, Defendant cites to the Key panel’s statement that the defendant
was statutorily ineligible for a sentence of full probation due to the mandatory minimum
jail terms but could receive, at best, a sentence of split confinement. Key, 2019 WL
7209603, at *6. Using Key, Defendant argues that the amendment to the probation statute
merely precludes “full” probation as a consideration when sentencing a defendant
convicted of vehicular homicide by intoxication but that other forms of alternative
sentencing are still available. She asserts that we must choose between the doctrine of
repeal by implication or Defendant’s interpretation of the statute.

        The State, on the other hand, argues that the language of the vehicular homicide
statute, section 39-13-213, requires the reader to refer to the probation statute, section 40-
35-303, to analyze all conditions and exclusions of probation for the crime. With section
40-35-303 indicating that a person convicted of this offense is not eligible for probation,
the State submits that Defendant is simply not eligible for any form of probation. The State
also reasons that the Court of Criminal Appeals did not actually rely on the doctrine of
repeal by implication, but simply made mention of it. The State argues that while the Court
of Criminal Appeals could use the doctrine wherever the two statutes could not be

                                             -8-
reconciled, the court’s holding was not that the entire subsection of the vehicular homicide
statute was repealed by implication.

        This Court must conduct our own statutory interpretation analysis to determine the
appropriate application of and interplay between the vehicular homicide by intoxication
statute and the probation eligibility statute. As stated above, the first precept of statutory
interpretation is to establish and effectuate legislative intent. Howard, 504 S.W.3d at 269.
Of course, we begin with the plain text of the statute, “read in context of the entire statute,
without any forced or subtle construction which would extend or limit its meaning.” State
v. Cauthern, 967 S.W.2d 726, 735 (Tenn. 1998).

       As we see it, the interpretation of the probation eligibility statute is straightforward.
Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-303 outlines all conditions of probation for
criminal defendants in the state. Subsection (a) specifically states that “no defendant shall
be eligible for probation under this chapter if convicted of a violation of § 39-13-213,” the
statute criminalizing vehicular homicide by intoxication. Defendant contends that the
probation statute can be read to merely prohibit “full” probation. She arrives at this
conclusion by reasoning that the statute sought only to limit “full” probation but still allow
for sentences of split and periodic confinement, which are entirely different types of
sentences. However, such an interpretation does not comport with this Court’s long-
established rule of statutory interpretation. The addition of the word “full” to section 40-
35-303(a) alters the plain meaning of the statute.

        The General Assembly, when amending the probation statute in 2017, did not
include the word “full,” and we must assume that this was not an oversight. Davis v. State,
313 S.W.3d 751, 762 (Tenn. 2010) (“When construing a more recent statute in conjunction
with pre-existing legislation, ‘we presume that the legislature has knowledge of its prior
enactments and is fully aware of any judicial constructions of those enactments.’” (quoting
Hicks, 945 S.W.2d at 707)). In our view, reading the word “full” into the statute’s wording,
amounts to a forced construction that effectively limits the statute’s reach. The probation
statute, in its natural reading, states that defendants who are convicted of vehicular
homicide by intoxication are prohibited from receiving any form of probation, which we
conclude is intended to include probationary sentences of split or periodic confinement.
This conclusion finds support in that the statutes that authorize sentences such as split or
periodic confinement regard them as probationary sentences. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-
35-306(a), -307(a) (referring to a defendant receiving probation). In other words, the
language of the split and periodic confinement statutes indicates that probation is a
foundational requirement for these sentences.6 We agree, therefore, with the State that these

        6
         We note that neither of the statutes discussed in this opinion specifically addresses a sentence to
community corrections. This opinion addresses only probation and does not reach the distinct question of
whether a person convicted of vehicular homicide by intoxication may receive community corrections.
                                                   -9-
alternative sentences are probationary sentences and, as a result, are disallowed under
section 40-35-303(a).

        We next address the probation statute’s impact on section 39-13-213. The State
reasons that, because the vehicular homicide statute cross-references the probation statute,
the vehicular homicide statute is subject to all conditions and exclusions of the probation
statute. We agree. Subsection 39-13-213(b)(2)(B), in part, states that “[t]he person shall
not be eligible for release from confinement on probation pursuant to § 40-35-303 until the
person has served the entire forty-eight-hour minimum mandatory sentence.” Tenn. Code
Ann. § 39-13-213(b)(2)(B) (emphasis added). This language demonstrates the legislature’s
clear intent for the vehicular homicide statute to be subject to all limitations and conditions
set forth in the probation statute. As a result, the two statutes can be reasonably read
together without conflict.

        Because we conclude that Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-213 and section
40-35-303 are not in conflict, we do not rely on the doctrine of repeal by implication. We
reject Defendant’s contention that we must choose between the doctrine of repeal by
implication or Defendant’s interpretation of the statute. Again, the vehicular homicide
statute was written such that it is subject to the probation eligibility statute by the words
“pursuant to § 40-35-303.” It is certainly possible that the legislature kept the mandatory
minimum language within the vehicular homicide statute while also making it subject to
the terms of the probation statute to maintain an element of flexibility if, for example, the
probation statute was to be further amended in the future to again allow probation to those
convicted of vehicular homicide by intoxication. As such, we conclude that Defendant’s
argument is without merit.

                                     IV. CONCLUSION

        For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the plain language of the probation
eligibility statute, section 40-35-303, prohibits defendants convicted of vehicular homicide
by intoxication from receiving any form of probation, including periodic and split
confinement sentences. We therefore affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
It appearing that Defendant, Ebony Robinson, is indigent, costs of this appeal are taxed to
the State of Tennessee.

                                                      ______________________________
                                                      ROGER A. PAGE, CHIEF JUSTICE

                                             - 10 -