Court Opinion

ID: 9482560
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:54:07.765717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:04.179433
License: Public Domain

BRUNETTI, Circuit Judge,
with whom Judges ALARCON and BEEZER join, dissenting:
The unique procedural history of this case deprived the state from fully challenging the correctness of our prior en banc decision. Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir.1988). I continue to believe that that decision is incorrect and clearly inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s direction. Therefore, I believe there are exceptional circumstances in this case that justify recalling our mandate to allow the full court to review our approach to this case. Thus, I respectfully dissent.
I.

Case History

I agree with the majority that an understanding of the procedural posture of this matter is necessary to consider the question before us. This is the third time our en banc court has heard an issue stemming from John Adamson’s conviction for the 1976 murder of Donald Bolles, an investigative reporter. The first en banc decision reversed a three-judge panel and would have vacated Adamson’s murder conviction on double jeopardy grounds. Adamson v. Ricketts, 789 F.2d 722, 780 (9th Cir.1986) (en banc). I dissented because of my belief that the en banc court misapplied constitutional law and Supreme Court precedent. See id. 735-47 (Brunetti, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court squarely reversed the Ninth Circuit and reinstated Adamson’s sentence. Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987).
When the en banc court resumed control of the case on remand it again reversed Adamson’s death sentence and remanded for resentencing. Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir.1988) (en banc). Once again I dissented from the opinion because of difficulties with the majority’s legal analysis. 865 F.2d at 1045-69 (Brunetti, J., dissenting). Undeterred by clear Supreme Court precedent, the majority relied on four theories to vacate Adamson’s death sentence and on one theory remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing. 865 F.2d at 1045. Three of the majority’s reasons for vacating the death sentence involved the alleged unconstitutionality of Arizona’s death sentence statutes. The majority’s reasoning on these three issues was firmly rejected by the Supreme Court in Lewis v. Jeffers, — U.S. —, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990), and Walton v. Arizona, — U.S. —, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990). The other two underpinnings of the en banc panel’s decision, judicial arbitrariness and prosecutorial vindictiveness, were undercut by a third Supreme Court case, Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989).
After our en banc decision, Arizona was faced with a choice: challenge our decision (in particular, our ruling on the constitutionality of the Arizona statutory scheme) through a request for a rehearing before the full court of the Ninth Circuit or petition the Supreme Court for a writ of certio-rari. Arizona made the reasonable determination that our cases might be contrary to Supreme Court precedent and that the Court would grant certiorari to consider these important issues. This is exactly what happened in Lewis and Walton.
But something unexpected happened in Adamson. Two Justices, O’Connor and Kennedy, did not take part in the consideration of the petition for writ of certiorari. Lewis v. Adamson, — U.S. —, 110 S.Ct. 3287, 111 L.Ed.2d 795 (1990). Although three of the Justices considering the petition specifically stated that they “would *622grant the petition for a writ of certiorari, vacate the judgment and remand[ ] the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for further consideration in light of” Lewis, Walton, and Smith, Arizona failed to garner the four votes necessary for the petition to be granted. Id. Considering the Court’s posture in Lewis, Walton, and Smith, the failure to grant the petition appears to have resulted solely from the absence of the participation of Justices O’Connor and Kennedy in the process. Consequently, there is an unfortunate and irreconcilable conflict between Adamson and Lewis, Walton, and Smith, which would not-exist if the analysis in my dissent prevailed.
II.

Exceptional Circumstances

This unusual circumstance justifies recalling our mandate and reconsidering our decision. The judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court first and we are an inferior court bound to follow its dictates. U.S. Const., art. III, § 1. The actions of the Court following our Adamson en banc decisions should cause us to question whether we correctly applied the law. We have an opportunity to do so, and at least three of the Justices believe it is necessary. The rare posture of this case is exceptional enough for us to take the severe step of recalling our mandate.
In conclusion, I will also note that our holding relating to judicial arbitrariness, while currently the law of our circuit, must be read in light of the Supreme Court’s subsequent cases.
I would order a recall of our mandate to reconsider our second en banc decision.