Court Opinion

ID: 9954371
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 23:02:09.256198+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:06.124044
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/25/24 Zeng v. Wang CA1/5
                NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

        IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                 FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                            DIVISION FIVE

    YING MAGGIE ZENG,
        Petitioner and Respondent,                            A165473
    v.
                                                              (Sonoma County
    ALBERT HUAI-EN WANG,                                      Super. Ct. No.
        Defendant and Appellant.                              SFL089529)

        Pro per defendant Albert Huai-En Wang (Father) appeals from orders
imposing a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against him pursuant
to Family Code section 6320,1 granting petitioner and respondent Ying
Maggie Zeng (Mother) sole legal and physical custody of their minor child,
and awarding Mother attorney fees and costs. Father contends the trial court
erred, arguing primarily that the court should have deferred to provisions in
an earlier parenting plan, the custody order is unconstitutional and barred by
the doctrines of res judicata and unclean hands, the court misapplied section
6320, he should have been awarded attorney fees, and the award of attorney

1     Except where otherwise indicated, all statutory references in this
opinion are to the Family Code.

                                                        1
fees to Mother was inconsistent with the earlier parenting plan. Having fully
considered all of Father’s arguments, we will affirm the orders.2
                   I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
        Father and Mother were married in 2005 and have a minor daughter
(Daughter). Their marriage was dissolved in 2013 in a proceeding in Orange
County Superior Court. In that proceeding, they entered into a 2014
Stipulation and Order, which included a parenting plan that called for
Mother and Father to have joint legal and physical custody and equal
parenting time until Daughter could decide for herself where she wanted to
live.
        In August 2021, Mother requested a change of venue to Sonoma
County, where she was living with Daughter. After a hearing, the Orange
County Superior Court transferred the case by a written order entered on
October 12, 2021, which stated that “[a]ll matters before the Court are
transferred to Sonoma County.” The case was not actually transferred to
Sonoma County, however, until December 2021.
        A. Mother’s Request for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), DVRO,
and Change of Custody
        On October 20, 2021, Mother filed this separate proceeding against
Father in Sonoma County Superior Court, because the dissolution case had
not yet been transferred and Mother could wait no longer for relief. Mother
sought a TRO and DVRO against Father under the Domestic Violence
Prevention Act (§ 6200 et seq.; DVPA), a change of custody and visitation on

2    Father has filed other appeals arising out of his family law issues with
Mother. Case No. A166681 (appealing a November 9, 2022 order) and Case
No. A168238 (appealing a December 12, 2022 order) are pending. Case No.
A168859 (appealing a July 24, 2023 order) was dismissed as an appeal from a
non-appealable order.

                                       2
the ground that the current order placed Daughter at risk of emotional harm,
and attorney fees and costs. In an accompanying declaration, Mother
described Father’s emotionally abusive conduct toward Daughter and his
near-daily harassment of Mother, Daughter, and the administration at
Daughter’s school, which had become so severe that the school principal
recommended that Mother obtain a restraining order.
      The trial court issued a TRO in favor of Mother and Daughter on
October 26, 2021, and set the matter for trial. Pending the trial, the court
also granted Mother sole legal and physical custody of Daughter, with no
visitation for Father.
              1. Trial
      On the first day of the four-day trial, Father requested an advance of
attorney fees so he could hire counsel. The trial court denied the request
without prejudice. Mother then testified to the following.
      After the parties separated in 2011, Father started harassing Mother
by convincing police to conduct welfare checks for Daughter, claiming that
Mother was planning to abduct her. He further humiliated Mother by
emailing physicians and staff at UC Irvine, where Mother was doing a
fellowship.
      In 2013, Mother moved to Pennsylvania to take a job as an oncologist.
Father did not allow Daughter to go to Pennsylvania for a year. After
allowing Daughter to go to Pennsylvania with Mother, Father contacted
Mother “very constant[ly]” and emailed Daughter’s pre-school, questioning
Daughter’s safety and accusing Mother of withholding contact. He also called
the school, and Mother in the middle of the night, to be sure that Daughter
was there.

                                       3
      In 2017, Mother moved with Daughter to Sonoma County to work as an
oncologist at Kaiser Hospital. Father agreed to the move. But Father
emailed Daughter’s teachers in Santa Rosa, claiming he feared for her safety,
asking if he should report Mother to Child Protective Services (CPS), and
threatening to pick up Daughter at school and take her away from Mother.
These emails worried and embarrassed Mother. Father also complained to
Daughter’s school about Mother’s parenting style and falsely claimed that
Mother was an officer in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, causing her
further embarrassment.
      At some point, Father found out that Mother had purchased a firearm.
He told Daughter, “Your mom is going to kill you and kill herself,” prompting
Daughter to speak with a school counselor, which led to Mother being
contacted by CPS.
      During the summer of 2021, Daughter was staying with Father in San
Diego and was to return to Mother in Sonoma County on July 31. Father
pressured Mother to agree that Daughter would live with him in San Diego
every other year and could decide where to attend school. When Mother
refused, Father unilaterally enrolled Daughter in a San Diego school, told
Mother he found Daughter a new primary doctor, dentist, and optometrist in
San Diego, and threatened to keep Daughter in San Diego.
      In July 2021, Mother applied to the Orange County Superior Court for
an order returning Daughter to Sonoma County. The day before the August
2021 hearing, Daughter told Mother “ ‘I want to die’ ” and “ ‘I would have
used a knife, but it’s too painful.’ ” After the hearing, the trial court ordered
Father to return Daughter to Mother. The court thereafter ordered that
Daughter go to school in Santa Rosa to maintain the status quo, that Father
would have parenting time on Daughter’s school breaks and holidays, that

                                        4
Mother would store her firearm with a licensed gun dealer pending further
order, that Father would have access to Daughter’s “Kaiser portal,” and that
all other orders not in conflict were to remain in effect. Mother and Daughter
returned to Sonoma County together.
      Father thereafter embarked on a near-daily campaign of harassment of
Mother, Daughter, and the administration at Daughter’s school. From
August 2021 to October 2021, he sent Mother at least 53 emails. Mother’s
attorney emailed Father, asking him to “cease and desist,” but he refused.
He also telephoned Mother “many times,” including calling her 16 times one
day and 8 times another day. Mother testified, “I feel so harassed in the way
that I cannot have a moment of peace in my life, and I have to remind myself
to be calm. And this is [a] huge impact on my daily life.”
      Father cross-examined Mother, called his sister as a witness, and gave
narrative testimony.
            2. Trial Court’s Findings and Order
      At the hearing, the trial court observed that Mother had presented
compelling evidence that Father sent mass emails to Mother’s colleagues and
supervisors at UC Irvine in 2012, expressing concern that Mother had
kidnapped Daughter, and that Father provided no credible reason for doing
so. The court found that this began Father’s “disturbing pattern” and
“practice of humiliating, embarrassing, and possibly tampering with
[Mother’s] medical career.” In particular, the court found compelling
evidence that Father (1) contacted police and CPS multiple times, claiming
without basis that Mother had kidnapped Daughter or that he feared for her
health and safety; (2) continued to complain to CPS about Mother even after
the first CPS visit produced no evidence of abuse or neglect; (3) threatened to
take Daughter away from Mother in 2020–2021 for violations of the

                                       5
Parenting Plan, even though Father and Mother had verbally modified the
plan, causing Mother great emotional pain; (4) refused to return Daughter to
Mother in July 2021 unless Mother agreed to certain terms and conditions,
forcing Mother to hire attorneys to get Daughter back to Sonoma County; and
(5) sent Mother 53 emails despite her attorney requesting that he stop. The
court concluded that, although Father had not physically abused Mother or
Daughter, he abused Mother emotionally and disturbed her peace within the
meaning of section 6320.
      Based on these findings, the trial court granted Mother a two-year
DVRO. It also granted Mother “temporary” sole legal and physical custody of
Daughter, allowing Father visitation by video conference twice per week.
Father was ordered to attend individual counseling with a licensed
professional. Father filed a timely notice of appeal.
      B. Mother’s Request for Attorney’s Fees and Costs
      Mother filed a request to recover her attorney fees and costs. The trial
court found that Mother was the prevailing party in the domestic violence
trial and, in a written order entered on July 13, 2022, awarded Mother
$21,175 in attorney fees and $417.14 in costs, finding that Father had assets
from which those amounts could be paid. Father filed an amended notice of
appeal to include a challenge to the July 13, 2022 order.
                              II. DISCUSSION
            A. DVRO and Custody Order
      Father raises a number of challenges to the DVRO and custody order
issued by the trial court. We review the court’s factual findings for
substantial evidence and the grant of a DVRO or child custody order for
abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Evilsizor & Sweeney (2015) 237
Cal.App.4th 1416, 1424 (Evilsizor); Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249,

                                       6
255 [court’s ruling is upheld “if it is correct on any basis, regardless of
whether such basis was actually invoked”].) We do not reweigh the evidence.
(M.S. v. A.S. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1139, 1145; Phillips v. Campbell (2016) 2
Cal.App.5th 844, 850–851 [reviewing court “resolve[s] all factual conflicts and
questions of credibility in favor of the prevailing party and indulge[s] all
reasonable inferences to support the trial court’s order”].) Applying this
standard of review, we reject Father’s challenges.
            1. DVRO
      Under section 6320, the trial court “may issue an ex parte order
enjoining a party from molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening,
sexually assaulting, battering, credibly impersonating as described in Section
528.5 of the Penal Code, falsely personating as described in Section 529 of the
Penal Code, harassing, telephoning, including, but not limited to, making
annoying telephone calls as described in Section 653m of the Penal Code,
destroying personal property, contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail
or otherwise, coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of
the other party, and, in the discretion of the court, on a showing of good cause,
of other named family or household members.” (§ 6320, subd. (a), italics
added.)
      “[D]isturbing the peace of the other party” in this context means
conduct that “destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party.”
(§ 6320, subd. (c).) It “may be committed . . . by any method or through any
means including, but not limited to, telephone, online accounts, text
messages, internet-connected devices, or other electronic technologies.”
(Ibid.) The issue is whether the conduct of the party to be restrained
destroyed the calm of the party seeking the restraining order, not whether
the conduct would have destroyed the calm of a reasonable person. (Parris J.

                                         7
v. Christopher U. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 108, 121; see In re Marriage of
Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1497–1499 (Nadkarni) [“disturbing
the peace” in section 6320 may be based on the former husband accessing,
reading, and publicly disclosing his former wife’s confidential emails];
Evilsizor, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1419–1420 [DVPA restraining order
upheld where the husband downloaded tens of thousands of text messages
and other information from his wife's cell phones]; Burquet v. Brumbaugh
(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1144 [the defendant disturbed the peace of the
plaintiff through a “course of conduct of contacting plaintiff by phone, e-mail,
and text, . . . and arriving at her residence unannounced and uninvited, and
then refusing to leave”].)
      Here, the trial court granted the DVRO on the ground that Father
emotionally abused Mother and disturbed her peace. Ample evidence, set
forth in our summary of the facts and the court’s order, supported the court’s
factual findings. While Father views the evidence differently, he does not
demonstrate the absence of substantial evidence or an abuse of discretion in
issuing the DVRO.3
            2. Custody
      Under the DVPA, the trial court may issue orders pertaining to custody
in cases of domestic violence. (§ 6323, subd. (a); § 6340, subd. (a); see also

3     Father distinguishes Nadkarni on the ground that the “proper code of
conduct expected of Mother and Father in their co-parenting relationship is
memorialized” in the 2013 Parenting Plan Guidelines, 2013 Co-Parenting
Plan, 2014 Parenting Agreement, and Orange County “[s]tatus [q]uo” order of
August 13, 2021. But Father does not demonstrate that this “code” allowed
him to do the things the Sonoma County court found he did. Father also
points out that, unlike Nadkarni, no physical violence is involved here.
Section 6320 is clear, however, that physical violence is not required for a
DVRO. (Nadkarni, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1496.)

                                        8
§ 3040 [court may modify existing custody order ex parte where parent
committed recent or ongoing acts of domestic violence].) In addition, other
provisions in the Family Code generally authorize the court to modify a prior
custody order to promote the best interest of the child. (§ 3087 [“An order
for joint custody may be modified or terminated upon the petition of one or
both parents or on the court’s own motion if it is shown that the best interest
of the child requires modification or termination of the order.”]; § 3022 [“The
court may, during the pendency of a proceeding or at any time thereafter,
make an order for the custody of a child during minority that seems
necessary or proper.”].)
      Here, the trial court’s order modifying custody was supported by
evidence of Father’s domestic violence and evidence that Daughter’s best
interest required the modification. Father threatened to keep Daughter in
San Diego and unilaterally enrolled her in a San Diego school, forcing Mother
to obtain a court order to secure Daughter’s return. From this evidence of
Father’s refusal to honor the terms of joint custody, along with the
overwhelming evidence of continuing domestic violence (in the form of
emotional abuse and disturbing Mother’s peace), it was reasonable to
conclude that circumstances had changed substantially, and that joint
physical and legal custody was no longer a viable arrangement. (§§ 6323,
subd. (a); 6340, subd. (a); see §§ 3040, 3087, 3022; see also § 3044, subd. (a)
[rebuttable presumption that an award of sole or joint custody to a parent
who perpetrated domestic violence within the previous five years against the
other parent is detrimental to the best interest of the child].)4 Although the

4     Father argues in his reply brief that the presumption in section 3044
does not apply because he was not seeking custody, citing In re Marriage of
Willis & Costa-Willis (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 595. That case is inapposite
because it merely held that section 3044 has no application when neither

                                        9
court did not make an express finding regarding Daughter’s best interest, the
finding was implied from the court’s ruling, particularly given the
presumption that the court knows and follows the law. (Heidi S. v. David H.
(2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1175.) And while Father questions the sufficiency
of the evidence, he fails to demonstrate a lack of substantial evidence.
            3. Deference to 2014 Orange County Parenting Plan
      Father argues that “Sonoma, as transferee court, should give some
deference (give a little respect) to court orders, post-divorce parenting
agreements, outstanding motions and other court filings transferred from the
transferor court, instead of reaching contradictory findings of fact and rulings
of law when the two litigations are just two months apart involving the same
parties and same set of 10-year long co-parenting disputes (plus 2 more
months of conflicts started by Mother).” His argument is unavailing.
      The Sonoma County Superior Court was not obligated to follow the
Stipulation and Order (and attached parenting plan) issued by the Orange
County Superior Court in 2014. By statute, the Sonoma County Superior
Court had authority to issue a TRO and DVRO. (§ 6320.) By statute, the
trial court also had authority to modify the earlier custody and visitation
orders. (§§ 3022, 3087, 6323, 6340.) The court mentioned the 2014 parenting
plan, noted that the court had not been asked to invalidate it, and stated it
was therefore “not addressing [the] issue.” (Italics added.) Then, based on
the evidence—largely concerning events occurring after the parenting plan—
it made findings of fact that justified the DVRO and custody order. A
superior court is not powerless to fulfill the purpose of the DVPA and custody

party is seeking a change of custody. (Id. at pp. 599–602.) Here, Mother did
seek a change of custody, Father opposed her request, and custody was
plainly at issue. Even without the presumption, however, there is more than
enough evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion.

                                       10
laws merely because the parties signed a parenting plan years earlier,
especially where, as here, the parties’ divorce proceeding (including custody
orders) had been transferred to that court.5
      In a similar vein, Father contends that, when a superior court transfers
“venue jurisdiction” to another superior court, the transferee court has a duty
to “coordinate and communicate with the transferor court to ensure [a]
smooth transition and resolution of the case” and is bound by the court
orders, findings of fact, and rulings of the transferor court. However, there
were no prior orders, findings, or rulings concerning Mother’s contention that
she needed a DVRO based on the facts presented in her October 2021
application. And contrary to Father’s argument, the Sonoma County
Superior Court did not “reverse” the Orange County Superior Court’s August
2021 “Status Quo Order without explanation.” The August 2021 order did
not rule on the DVRO application Mother later presented in October 2021.
            4. Due Process
      Father contends the trial court violated his due process rights. He
argues: “Because of Sonoma [County’s] conflicting sole custody order,
without any child’s best interest determination, without any child custody
evaluation, without appointment of minor’s counsel, without in camera
interview of Daughter, Father has been deprived of more than 98% of his
parental rights, has not been able to spend quality family time with Daughter
for two years. Such deprivation of more than 98% [footnote omitted] of

5      There is no dispute that the Sonoma County Superior Court had
jurisdiction in this case. In addition, the venue transfer order gave the
Sonoma County Superior Court full authority over the custody and visitation
initially addressed in the Orange County proceeding. (Cf. Thompson v.
Thames (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1303–1308.)

                                      11
Father’s parental rights/liberty interest raises constitutional issues under the
Due Process Clause.”
      Father’s argument is unpersuasive. Father received notice and a
meaningful opportunity to be heard in Sonoma County Superior Court.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s orders. While Father cites
cases indicating that parents have due process interests in the parent-child
relationship, he does not cite any legal authority demonstrating a deprivation
of due process in this case.6
            5. Res Judicata
      Father argues that “Mother’s second ‘domestic violence/sole custody’
lawsuit in October 2021 in Sonoma Court should be barred under the
Doctrine of Res Judicata, in light of [the] prior sole custody lawsuit in Orange
County in August 2021 (just 2 months earlier).” He is incorrect.
      The August 2021 order required the return of Daughter to Mother in
Sonoma County and Daughter’s attendance at school in Sonoma County to
uphold the “status quo,” with all prior orders remaining in effect to the extent
not inconsistent. Father does not establish that the August 2021 order is a
final judgment with res judicata effect. (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 823, 825.)
      Furthermore, as Father acknowledges in his opening brief, Mother’s
filing in Sonoma County Superior Court included “additional co-parenting
conflicts during the venue transfer period (August to October 2021).” (Italics

6      Father contends that “a California family court judge [should] borrow
procedural safeguards used in juvenile dependency court proceedings.” But
Father did not support this contention with legal argument in his opening
brief. He has therefore forfeited it. (See In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke
(2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 1004 [court of appeal “ ‘can treat as waived or
meritless any issue that, although raised in the briefs, is not supported by
pertinent or cognizable legal argument or proper citation of authority,’ ”.)

                                      12
added.) Those acts were obviously not at issue in the Orange County
Superior Court when the 2014 Stipulation and Order was issued, and most
were not considered in the August 2021 Orange County proceeding.
      Father presents no legal authority that a DVRO cannot be issued based
on events occurring after a parenting plan is established. Moreover, new or
modified child custody and visitation orders are authorized under the DVPA
(§§ 6340, subd. (a) & 6323, subd. (a)), and prior orders are generally
modifiable throughout a child’s minority if the trial court finds a modification
“necessary or proper” in the child's best interests (§ 3022; see §§ 3087, 3088).
As discussed above, there was ample evidence that the custody and visitation
order was necessary, proper, and in Daughter’s best interest.
            6. Unclean Hands
      Father contends the doctrine of unclean hands precluded Mother’s
litigation in Sonoma County. He asserts that Mother’s hands were unclean
because she violated the August 2021 “Status Quo” order by confiscating the
iPhone he gave Daughter and shutting down their communications from
August 2021 to October 2021, by filing an allegedly false report with San
Diego CPS, by misrepresenting to the Orange County Superior Court that
she had Sonoma County witnesses in seeking the venue transfer to Sonoma
County, by obtaining a firearm, and by applying for a passport for Daughter
with a man pretending to be Father.
      However, Father fails to cite to the record to support many of these
allegations, and we therefore disregard them. (WFG National Title Ins. Co. v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881, 894; Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.204(a)(2)(C).) He also provides no legal authority for the proposition
that the unclean hands doctrine applies to a custody decision or the issuance
of a DVRO. To the extent that he contends Mother’s conduct either excuses

                                       13
or eclipses his own, our role is not to reweigh the evidence but only to
determine if there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of
fact could reach the conclusions of the trial court. (M.S. v. A.S., supra, 76
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1143–1145.) That standard is met here.7
            7. Application of Section 6320
      Father contends the trial court improperly applied section 6320 (which
authorizes a trial court to issue a DVRO) by considering his actions that
occurred before the statute was amended effective January 1, 2021. He
argues that the court thereby created “an ex post facto law” prohibited by the
United States Constitution. We disagree.
      As Father points out, in the course of stating its ruling, the trial court
read language from section 6320, subdivision (c), which became effective
January 1, 2021. Father argues that subdivision (c) expanded the definition
of disturbing the peace of the other party, and that while the court could
apply that language to his acts after January 1, 2021, it could not apply it to
his acts occurring before that date. Father’s argument is unavailing.
      First, an ex post facto law is one that makes an act a crime after it took
place, even though the act was lawful when it was committed. The doctrine
does not apply in civil cases like this one. (Watson v. Mercer (1834) 33 U.S.
88, 110.)

7     Father argues that “Mother is not a ‘victim of domestic violence’
because she does not have clean hands.” He provides no authority for this
proposition. (See Dabney v. Dabney (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 379, 384 [“We
need not consider an argument for which no authority is furnished.”]; In re
Marriage of Falcone & Fyke, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 1004.) Father also
argues that the trial court should have found that Mother committed
domestic violence against him. But that issue was not before the court,
because Father did not seek a DVRO against Mother.

                                       14
      Second, while Senate Bill No. 1141 added subdivision (c) to section
6320 effective January 1, 2021, the amendment has no effect on this case,
because the applicable law was the same before and after the amendment.
Long before 2021, case law interpreted “ ‘disturbing the peace’ ” under the
DVPA to mean conduct that destroys the mental or emotional calm of the
other party. (E.g., Nadkarni, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1497.) Indeed,
the trial court referred to Nadkarni—a 2009 case—in rendering its decision.
This concept was incorporated into section 6320, subdivision (c), so the
statute both before and after 2021 authorized the issuance of a DVRO upon a
showing that the mental or emotional calm of the other party had been
disturbed. (§ 6320, subd. (c).) And while the latest version of section 6320
goes further and broadens the definition of “disturbing the peace” to include
“coercive control”—behavior that “in purpose or effect unreasonably
interferes with a person’s free will and personal liberty” (§ 6320, subd. (c))—
that portion was not critical to the court’s findings here.
      In the end, the trial court applied the version of section 6320 in effect at
the time of its ruling. The statute does not preclude the court from
considering acts perpetrated before its amendment as part of a course of
conduct establishing that, at the time of the ruling, the threat of abuse or
disturbing the peace of another is sufficient to justify the issuance of a DVRO.
And even if we looked no further than Father’s acts after January 1, 2021,
there was ample evidence justifying the issuance of the DVRO. Father fails
to establish error.
            8. Denial of Request for Funds to Hire Attorney
      On the first day of trial, Father requested an advance of attorney fees
so he could hire counsel. He told the trial court: “I am here from San Diego
County. I don’t have a lawyer in Sonoma. [¶] And in my responsive

                                       15
declaration I made a request for attorney’s fees so that I can hire a lawyer in
Sonoma. I spoke with—I interviewed a few lawyers, and it seems that the
retainer fee is $10,000, and that there is a parenting agreement where
plaintiff is contractually obligated to pay my attorney’s fees.” The court
responded: “All right, Mr. Wang. I just want to start out with, first of all,
thank you for being patient here. . . . The request for attorney’s fees at this
point is denied without prejudice.” Father contends the court erred in not
granting his request, and he would have fared better at trial if he had
counsel. His argument is meritless.
      In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage (§ 2030) or for custody
pursuant to section 3120 (§ 3121), or in any proceeding following entry of a
related judgment, the trial court may award attorney fees and costs based on
the parties’ relative circumstances to “ensure that each party has access to
legal representation” in the case. (§§ 2030, subd. (a)(1); 3121, subd. (a).) “A
party who lacks the financial ability to hire an attorney may request, as an in
pro per litigant, that the court order the other party, if that other party has
the financial ability, to pay a reasonable amount to allow the unrepresented
party to retain an attorney in a timely manner before proceedings in the
matter go forward.” (§§ 2030, subd. (a)(2); 3121, subd. (b).)
      We question whether section 2030 or section 3121 apply to DVPA
proceedings. But even if they do, Father did not provide the requisite
information to the trial court. As stated in the Judicial Council form Father
used to respond to Mother’s DVRO request, Father was required to file and
serve an Income and Expense Declaration (Form FL-150). (See §§ 2030,
subd. (e); 3121, subd. (g).) The record does not show that he accompanied his
fee request with Form FL-150, provided the information it required, or
specified the amount of fees he sought. Although Father states that he

                                       16
requested attorney fees in his response to Mother’s request for a DVRO,
attaching his FL-300 requests for legal fees in Orange County, he does not
provide a citation to the record or demonstrate that he provided financial
information that would have entitled him to fees and costs in this DVPA
proceeding. The court’s denial of his request, without a further hearing, was
therefore not error.
      Moreover, the trial court denied Father’s request without prejudice,
allowing him to renew the request with proper evidentiary support. He
declined to do so. And while Father claims he submitted financial
information later, that was in the context of the court determining whether
he had assets to pay for Mother’s attorney fees after the DVRO had issued.
Because the court found his assets were sufficient to pay Mother’s fees, there
is no indication that the court would have granted Father fees to litigate the
case if he had provided his financial information when seeking fees at the
start of the trial.
      In his reply brief, Father protests that “nothing in the statutory
language imposes an affirmative obligation on an unrepresented parent to
become an expert in civil procedure, court rules, family law and financial
accounting.” But parties who litigate without counsel are still required to
know and follow proper procedure (Barton v. New United Motor
Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1210), and it should not
take much to realize the need to provide financial information when
requesting an award of attorney fees.
      Father also claims he is entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to
an attorney fees provision in the parenting plan, which was incorporated into
the 2014 Stipulation and Order entered in Orange County. He argues that

                                        17
the Sonoma County trial court should have enforced those provisions under
contract law.
      Father’s argument is meritless. First, he does not provide a record
citation to the attorney fees provision in the parenting plan. Second, we
question whether the parenting plan can still be enforced as a contract, since
it was attached to and incorporated into the Stipulation and Order. (See
Marriage of Umphrey (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 647, 656 [property settlement
agreement ceased to operate as an independent legal instrument].) Third,
even if the provisions entitling Father to attorney fees could be enforced as
part of a court order (or a contract), Father’s failure to file the requisite
financial information and specify an amount warranted the denial of his
request. And finally, contrary to Father’s argument, there is no indication
that an attorney’s assistance would have changed the outcome of the
proceeding.
              9. Limiting Father’s Cross-Examination of Mother
      Father claims that, if he had been allowed to further cross-examine
Mother, he would have impugned her credibility. His claim fails.
      It is the trial court’s duty to control the trial, including the questioning
of witnesses, “so as to make interrogation as rapid, as distinct, and as
effective for the ascertainment of the truth, as may be, and to protect the
witness from undue harassment or embarrassment.” (Evid. Code, § 765,
subd. (a).) Among other things, the court has broad discretion to keep cross-
examination within reasonable bounds, and it is the court’s duty to protect
witnesses from intimidation. (People v. Jones (1962) 207 Cal.App.2d 415,
421–422, 426.)
      Here, after Mother’s direct examination had taken only three hours,
Father was permitted to cross-examine Mother for two and one-half hours on

                                        18
March 1, 2022, the second day of trial. Father resumed and completed his
cross-examination of Mother on March 3, 2022, telling the trial court: “I have
no further question[s] for [Mother] . . . . But I’d like to reserve—I’d like to
reserve the right to call [Mother] again as my witness, as a hostile witness.”
Father thereafter called his sister as a witness and testified on his own
behalf. When the court asked Father if he had any other witnesses, Father
said “No.”
      Father had a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine Mother. He
cannot complain that the trial court denied him further cross-examination,
because he was the one who ended the cross-examination and elected not to
recall Mother as a witness. Nor has Father shown any reasonable probability
that further cross-examination would have yielded a better outcome for him
at the trial.
      In sum, Father fails to establish that the court erred in issuing the
DVRO and custody order.
      B. Award of Attorney Fees to Mother
      Father argues that the trial court should not have awarded attorney
fees to Mother because the “2014 Parenting Agreement governs rights to
attorney’s fees.” Asserting that section 8(a) of the agreement requires Mother
to pay Father’s legal fees “if Mother initiates any court action,” Father
contends the provision applies even if Mother is the prevailing party.
      Father misrepresents the record (which perhaps explains his lack of
record citation). Section 8(a) of the Stipulation and Order on Parenting Plan
actually states: “If Mother initiates any court action relating to Daughter’s
living arrangement or the Co-Parenting Plan in Pennsylvania, Mother shall
be financially responsible for paying all reasonable legal fees” of Father and

                                        19
his travel expenses. (Italics added.) Mother did not commence this case in
Pennsylvania.
       Moreover, this case was brought under the DVPA. In a DVPA
proceeding, upon request and after notice and hearing, the trial court “shall”
award attorney fees and costs to the prevailing petitioner, provided the party
ordered to pay has, or is reasonably likely to have, the ability to pay. (§ 6344,
subds. (a), (c).)
       Here, the trial court found that Mother was the prevailing party in the
DVPA proceeding. The court considered Mother’s request for approximately
$30,000 in attorney fees and costs, awarded a lower amount of $21,592.14,
and found that Father had assets to cover it. Father has not shown that the
amount awarded by the court was improper or excessive.
                              III. DISPOSITION
       The orders are affirmed.

                                       20
                              CHOU, J.
We concur.

JACKSON, P. J.
BURNS, J.

Zeng v. Wang / A165473

                         21