Court Opinion

ID: 9703654
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:03:31.831535+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:12.323409
License: Public Domain

*466CASTILLE,
Dissenting.
I agree with the majority that subsections 1408(c)(4)(A)-(C) of the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (“the Act”) pertain to in personam jurisdiction rather than subject matter jurisdiction. I agree further that the consent requirement of subsection 1408(c)(4)(C), like the rest of the Act, specifically relates to the military spouse’s retirement pension. I disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that appellant did not consent to the Commonwealth’s jurisdiction over his military retirement pension. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
The pertinent part of the Act provides that a court may not equitably distribute a serviceperson’s military retirement pension unless the court has jurisdiction over the person by reason of: 1) his residence, other than as a result of military assignment, in the territorial jurisdiction of the court; 2) his domicile in the territorial jurisdiction of the court; or 3) his consent to the jurisdiction of the court. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(4)(C).
As noted by the majority, the Act does not specifically define the type of jurisdiction a state court must acquire before it can distribute a military member’s retirement pension; however, since subsection (A) (concerning residency) and subsection (B) (concerning domicile) are traditional tests of personal jurisdiction, it logically follows that subsection (C) (concerning consent) also pertains to in personam jurisdiction. Thus, a state court may equitably distribute a serviceperson’s military retirement pension only if it has personal jurisdiction over the serviceperson either through his residency, domicile, or consent.
The parties here agree that appellant is neither a resident nor domiciliary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; therefore, jurisdiction required appellant’s consent. There are a variety of ways a litigant may give express or implied consent to the court’s personal jurisdiction. One such method of implied consent is through minimum contacts. See International Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment *467Compensation and Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945); see also, Allen v. Allen, 484 So.2d 269 (La.Ct.App.1986) (the Act does not require express consent).
The purpose of the minimum contacts test is to protect a defendant from having to litigate a matter in some distant forum, unless the defendant’s contacts with the forum make it appropriate to force him to defend there. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 105 S.Ct. 2965, 86 L.Ed.2d 628 (1985). The defendant’s contacts should be such that “he should reasonably anticipate being haled” into the forum. World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980); Kachur v. Yugo America, Inc., 534 Pa. 316, 632 A.2d 1297 (1993). In this case, I believe that appellant’s minimum contacts with Butler County were sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.
As reflected in the record, appellant accepted personal service of the reinstated divorce complaint, while stationed in Alabama. The divorce complaint did not specifically mention appellant’s military retirement pension; however, it did serve to place him on notice that his wife planned to seek equitable distribution of all their martial assets. See Allen, supra (military spouse, by answering divorce petition filed by wife in Louisiana, waived all objections to jurisdiction of Louisiana courts, and such waiver was sufficient to give court jurisdiction over wife’s subsequent petition to partition community property, including share of husband’s military retirement pay). Appellant then obtained counsel, who entered an appearance on his behalf in Butler County. While the entry of a written appearance alone does not constitute a waiver of the right to challenge the court’s jurisdiction, such activity is inconsistent with the intent to object to jurisdiction over the military retirement pension. See Pa.R.C.P. 1012(a); see also In re Booker, 833 P.2d 734, 740 (Colo.1992).
Moreover, appellant, through his attorney, participated in numerous hearings regarding discovery disputes, complied with discovery orders setting sanctions of counsel fees and answered his wife’s first set of interrogatories. Appellant *468even made a personal appearance at an ancillary support modification conference in Butler County.
For almost three years, appellant participated, without objection, while the Butler County courts adjudicated the dissolution of the parties’ marriage. It was not 'until four days prior to the bifurcation hearing that appellant objected to the court’s jurisdiction over his military retirement pension. As the Superior Court noted, if appellant had wanted to object to Pennsylvania jurisdiction over his military retirement pension, he could have immediately filed a preliminary objection raising the question of personal jurisdiction concerning his pension. See, e.g. Seeley v. Seeley, 690 S.W.2d 626 (Tex.App.1985) (husband, who was professional soldier stationed in Germany, waived his special appearance and made general appearance in divorce proceeding by allowing trial to proceed without first obtaining ruling on his special appearance motion; thus, husband consented to jurisdiction and satisfied requirements of § 1408(c)(4), allowing the trial court to award wife a percentage of husband’s military retirement pension).
Instead, appellant argued that, although he generally consented to the divorce proceeding, the court lacked the specific jurisdiction to divide his military retirement pension because he did not specifically agree to it. Contrary to the majority’s finding, I find that argument not supported by the clear language of the statute. Subsection 1408(c)(4)(C) only requires consent to the jurisdiction of the court, not consent to the court’s authority to divide the pension. Had Congress intended specific consent for the military retirement pension to become subject to a court proceeding, it would have drafted the statute to do so. As it is, the statute curtails “forum shopping” by the nonmilitary spouse but does not confer absolute “veto power” to the military spouse. If it did, the military member could always invoke the jurisdiction of a court on matters ancillary to the divorce, such as visitation, custody, etc., but then refuse to give consent as to division of the military retirement pension. That surely was not the intent of Congress. Furthermore, there was no evidence of forum shopping here by the military member’s spouse.
*469Appellant’s contacts with Butler County lead inescapably to the conclusion that he submitted himself to the jurisdiction of Butler County to adjudicate his divorce, notwithstanding that he later objected to the state’s jurisdiction to handle the narrow question of in personam jurisdiction over his military retirement pension. As such, I would find that appellant had sufficient minimum contacts with the Commonwealth to establish his consent to the court’s jurisdiction, thereby allowing the trial court to equitably distribute his military retirement pension pursuant to the Act. It would defy logic to have this appelleeAvife go through support proceedings and divorce proceedings in Pennsylvania but have to invoke the jurisdiction of a court located wherever appellant’s residence or domicile happens to be. assuming that it would even be in the United States, in order to reach the military retirement pension. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.