Court Opinion

ID: 9367876
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-02 01:00:37.539176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:04.112330
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-20642         Document: 00516631301             Page: 1      Date Filed: 02/01/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                           for the Fifth Circuit                                  United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                           Fifth Circuit

                                                                                         FILED
                                                                                  February 1, 2023

                                         No. 21-20642                                 Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                           Clerk

   Gerry Monroe,
                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             Versus

   Houston Independent School District,

                                                                  Defendant—Appellant.

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Southern District of Texas
                                USDC No. 4:19-CV-1991

   Before Stewart, Willett, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          In this civil rights suit, the district court rendered a final judgment
   awarding attorney’s fees, court costs, and interest to a plaintiff that obtained
   some, but not all, of the relief he sought against a school district. The school

          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 21-20642      Document: 00516631301           Page: 2     Date Filed: 02/01/2023

                                     No. 21-20642

   district now appeals arguing that the district court erred in calculating the
   lodestar and abused its discretion when it failed to adjust the lodestar to
   account for the plaintiff’s limited success. Because we hold that the district
   court did not err in calculating the lodestar or abuse its discretion in declining
   to adjust the amount, we AFFIRM.
                I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
          Since approximately 2014, Gerry Monroe has served as a self-
   appointed educational activist and advocate within the Houston Independent
   School District (“HISD”) where he regularly attends monthly board
   meetings. The events that took place during two of the HISD meetings that
   Monroe attended in 2019 became the focus of the underlying proceedings in
   this appeal. First, on April 9, 2019, Monroe attended a reassignment hearing
   for an HISD employee. At that meeting, he shouted expletives, racial
   epithets, pounded on the table, insulted the administrators, and stated that
   he was going to turn the “m*****f***ing school upside down” and “knock
   out three of [HISD’s] principals.” Two days later, on April 11, 2019, Monroe
   attended an HISD board of trustees meeting wearing a grey cap, a bandana
   covering his entire face except his eyes, and a t-shirt that displayed a large
   photo of Fonville Middle School Principal Irma Sandate. The captions on the
   shirt stated that Principal Sandate “must go” because she did not “like black
   people.” When Monroe approached the podium, he spoke loudly and
   angrily, describing an alleged incident where a teacher at Fonville Middle
   School brought a gun to school in her purse. He then began shouting and
   criticizing Principal Sandate for failing to sufficiently address the incident,
   referring to her as an “idiot” and a “tyrant.” Towards the end of his speech,
   Monroe yelled “Do something with that idiot over there. This is the
   mandate: Either you take her out or I’m going to take her out.” He then made
   a gesture with his hand that resembled a pointing gun. HISD peace officers
   addressed Monroe as he was leaving the meeting pursuant to internal policy.

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          In response to the incident, HISD’s Business Operations Officer
   Eugene Salazar sent a letter to Monroe informing him that he was banned
   from entering all HISD facilities, meetings, and activities and that his entry
   onto HISD property would be considered trespass. The letter provided that
   the ban was a “direct result” of Monroe’s conduct at the April 11 meeting
   and also referenced his disruptive behavior at other HISD meetings.
          On April 14, 2019, Monroe wrote a letter to HISD appealing the ban
   and alleging that it violated his First Amendment rights. HISD did not
   respond and on June 3, 2019, Monroe filed suit in federal district court
   pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that HISD had violated his First and
   Fourteenth Amendment rights by imposing the facilities ban against him. A
   week later, Monroe moved for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin
   HISD’s enforcement of the ban.
          On June 12, 2019, HISD sent a second letter to Monroe reaffirming
   the facilities ban previously issued and informing him that he could view the
   HISD meetings online, allow a representative to speak on his behalf, and
   engage with board members off HISD property. On July 10, HISD sent
   Monroe a third letter that modified and reduced the term of the facilities ban.
   The preliminary injunction hearing was then held on July 11 and on July 15,
   HISD sent Monroe a fourth letter, overriding the third letter’s terms, that
   shortened the duration of the original ban from one year or longer to one that
   expired by its own terms on December 31, 2019. The letter further specified
   that during the modified ban’s existence, Monroe would be permitted to
   participate via telephone in any grievance or other administrative
   proceedings in which he was involved and that he could request permission
   to schedule an appointment for an in-person meeting. The letter ended by
   outlining the conduct that HISD considered “inappropriate” for Monroe’s
   future reference. Specifically, the letter provided in pertinent part:

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          With respect to your conduct at any of the above activities
          or at any other meetings or proceedings at HISD facilities or
          campuses, please be advised that HISD considers that the
          following conduct does not meet the standard for
          “appropriate” conduct and also that the following conduct
          disrupts and interferes with proceedings, as set out in
          existing HISD policy, including but not limited to HISD
          Policies BE(LOCAL) and GKA(LEGAL):
            • Use of profanity;
            • Personal verbal attacks on HISD personnel (e.g.,
            name-calling);
            • Making of threats (e.g., “take someone out” or
            “knock someone out” or “turn a school upside
            down”);
            • Use of material to cover or obscure any part of your
            face while addressing any HISD Board member or
            employee;
            • Wearing clothing containing offensive or derogatory
            remarks about any HISD Board member or employee;
            • Use of any signs, banners, posters, or similar visual
            aids containing offensive or derogatory remarks about
            any HISD Board member or employee;
            • Use or display of any object that could cause serious
            bodily injury (e.g., a noose);
            • Loud or violent physical gestures such as slamming
            hands on furniture;
            • Threatening physical gestures such as a “finger
            gun”; and
            • Yelling, shouting, or screaming.
          You are further advised that if you engage in conduct listed
          above on HISD property, HISD is fully authorized under
          existing policies, following a warning that is disregarded, to
          have you removed immediately from HISD property
          without further warning or advance notice. You are further
          advised that if you engage in the above conduct on HISD

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            property in the future, HISD may be required to issue
            additional Criminal Trespass Warnings.
   On July 19 the district court issued an order denying the preliminary
   injunction motion on grounds that the July 15 letter containing the modified
   ban struck an “appropriate balance between the right of schools to address
   security concerns and control their premises and [Monroe’s] First
   Amendment rights.”
          After the district court denied Monroe the preliminary injunctive
   relief he sought, he filed an interlocutory appeal with this court. See Monroe
   v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 794 F. App’x 381 (5th Cir. 2019). There, a panel
   of this court noted that the issue before the district court at the time of the
   preliminary injunction hearing was the facilities ban—not HISD’s policy. Id.
   at 384. Consequently, the panel remanded the case for the district court to
   determine in the first instance whether and to what extent Monroe had
   adequately alleged a violation of HISD’s policy, or HISD’s clarification
   thereof in the July 15 letter, and whether a preliminary injunction should
   issue. Id. at 386.
          After the proceedings were remanded to the district court, Monroe
   filed an amended motion for a preliminary injunction. In his motion, he
   sought to enjoin HISD from enforcing the facilities ban and the speech and
   expression restrictions listed in the July 15 letter. On December 10, 2019, the
   district court held a hearing and the following day, granted in part and denied
   in part the motion. The district court first determined by a preponderance of
   the evidence that Monroe “meant to communicate a serious expression of an
   intent to commit an act of unlawful violence against Principal Irma Sandate”
   during the April 11 HISD board meeting and that the limited facilities ban
   was a reasonable response to Monroe’s threat.
          The district court next addressed HISD’s speech policies for Monroe
   as outlined in the July 15 letter. It reasoned that the First Amendment’s

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   viewpoint neutrality principle protected Monroe’s right to express negative
   views at the HISD meetings because it was permissible for Monroe or other
   members of the public to express positive views at the meetings. Thus,
   because HISD’s July 15 letter mandated positivity from Monroe, as opposed
   to the negative speech and expression he desired to convey, it violated his
   First Amendment right to free speech. Additionally, because the same
   restrictions were not found in HISD’s policies, the July 15 letter improperly
   established independent restrictions on Monroe’s speech and not the speech
   of others. The district court then preliminarily enjoined HISD from
   punishing Monroe by removing him from HISD facilities or issuing criminal
   trespass warnings on the basis of his engaging in the prohibited speech and
   expression listed in the July 15 letter.
          On July 26, 2021, the district court held a bench trial on the sole
   remaining issue of whether Monroe was entitled to have the terms of the
   preliminary injunction issued as a permanent injunction. Shortly thereafter
   on August 4, 2021, the district court issued a memorandum decision and
   order vacating the preliminary injunction entered on December 11, 2019 and
   dismissing Monroe’s claims as moot. In doing so, it reasoned that Monroe
   had achieved his objective with HISD’s retraction of the unconstitutional
   restrictions in the July 15 letter, and thus there was no remaining case or
   controversy between the parties. The court then determined that the case
   was moot because it was clear from the testimony of various HISD personnel
   that “the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to
   recur.” The district court then opined that a reasonable attorney’s fee was
   likely available in the case and took the matter under advisement.
          On November 3, 2021, the district court rendered its order on the
   attorney’s fee issue. It first determined that Monroe was a “prevailing party”
   under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) because he had met the requirements under
   Dearmore v. City of Garland, 519 F.3d 517, 524 (5th Cir. 2008). The district

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   court then turned to its calculation of the fee award. After an extensive
   analysis of Monroe’s legal team’s itemized billing records using the Johnson1
   factors, the district court rendered a total award of $299,200.00, plus court
   costs and interest.2 The court declined to increase the lodestar amount by
   25% as Monroe’s counsel requested, reasoning that the fee award was
   sufficient as calculated without the enhancement. HISD then appealed the
   district court’s judgment issuing the attorney’s fee award.
                                II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
           “A district court’s award of attorney[’s] fees is reviewed for abuse of
   discretion.” Fessler v. Porcelana Corona De Mexico, S.A. DE C.V., 23 F.4th
   408, 415 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Torres v. SGE Mgmt., LLC, 945 F.3d 347, 352
   (5th Cir. 2019)). “A district court abuses its discretion if it: (1) relies on
   clearly erroneous factual findings; (2) relies on erroneous conclusions of law;
   or (3) misapplies the law to the facts.” Id. (citing Combs v. City of Huntington,
   829 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted)).
                                       III. DISCUSSION
           On appeal, HISD argues that the district court erred in calculating the
   lodestar because it awarded fees for all the time that Monroe’s attorneys
   spent on the litigation, rather than just the time they spent on pursuing
   successful claims. It also argues that the district court abused its discretion in
   failing to adjust the lodestar to account for Monroe’s limited success since he

           1
               Johnson v. Ga. Hwy. Exp., Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-20 (5th Cir. 1974).
           2
             The award included: (1) $262,875.00 for Monroe’s lead counsel at a rate of
   $500/hour for 525.75 hours; (2) $18,600.00 for Monroe’s second counsel at a rate of
   $400/hour for 46.5 hours; and (3) $17,725.00 for Newar’s paralegal at a rate of $100/hour
   for 177.25 hours.

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   did not recover damages or obtain injunctive relief. We address each of these
   arguments below.
           A. Calculation of the Lodestar
           “A prevailing litigant may not ordinarily collect an attorney’s fee from
   the loser absent some statutory exception.” Combs, 829 F.3d at 391 (citation
   omitted). A congressionally-created exception exists, however, in “Title VII
   of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which allows a district court to award
   reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party.” Id. (citing 42
   U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)). Courts apply a two-step method in this circuit for
   determining a reasonable attorney’s fee award. Id. at 391–92 (citing Jimenez
   v. Wood Cnty., 621 F.3d 372, 379 (5th Cir. 2010)). First, the court must
   calculate the lodestar, “which is equal to the number of hours reasonably
   expended multiplied by the prevailing hourly rate in the community for
   similar work.” Id. at 392. In doing so, “[t]he court should exclude all time
   that is excessive, duplicative, or inadequately documented.” Id. Second,
   although the lodestar is presumed reasonable, a court may enhance or
   decrease it based on the twelve Johnson factors.3 Id. “‘[T]he most critical
   factor’ in determining a reasonable fee ‘is the degree of success obtained.’”
   Fessler, 23 F.4th at 415 (citation omitted). “[T]he fee applicant bears the
   burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the
   appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.” Id. at 415–16 (citation

           3
             See Cruz v. Maverick Cnty., 957 F.3d 563, 574 n.3 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Johnson,
   488 F.2d at 717–19) (“The Johnson factors are: (1) ‘the time and labor required’; (2) ‘the
   novelty and difficulty of the questions’; (3) ‘the skill requisite to perform the legal service
   properly’; (4) ‘the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of
   the case’; (5) ‘the customary fee’; (6) ‘whether the fee is fixed or contingent’; (7) ‘time
   limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances’; (8) ‘the amount involved and the
   results obtained’; (9) ‘the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys’; (10) ‘the
   undesirability’ of the case’; (11) ‘the nature and length of the professional relationship with
   the client’; and (12) ‘awards in similar cases.’” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

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   omitted). However, once the fee is calculated, “the party seeking
   modification of the lodestar under the Johnson factors bears the burden.” Id.
   at 416 (citation omitted).
          This court has held that “[i]t is axiomatic that work on an
   unsuccessful claim cannot be deemed to have been expended in pursuit of the
   ultimate result achieved . . . and therefore no fee may be awarded for services
   on [an] unsuccessful claim.” Fessler, 23 F.4th at 416 (internal quotation
   marks and citation omitted). When unsuccessful claims in the lawsuit are
   unrelated to the successful claims, “the unsuccessful ones must be treated as
   if they had been raised in separate lawsuits and excluded from the fee award.”
   Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). On the other hand,
   “when claims . . . share a common core of facts or related legal theories, a fee
   applicant may claim all hours reasonably necessary to litigate those issues.”
   Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
          As the district court acknowledged, the parties’ primary dispute with
   respect to attorney’s fees arose over the application of two specific Johnson
   factors: (1) the time and labor required, and (2) the customary fee. See 488
   F.3d at 717–18. The district court stated that, consistent with the guidelines
   set forth in Johnson, id. at 717–19, it had “made a detailed line-by-line review
   of the contemporaneous time records” submitted by Monroe’s attorneys and
   determined that, with their proposed reduction in hours, the attorney time
   and labor spent on the case were reasonable and necessary to remedy HISD’s
   infringement of Monroe’s First Amendment rights. We agree. Although it is
   true that Monroe did not succeed at every turn in the lawsuit, he did
   ultimately prevail on obtaining a preliminary injunction and he was able to
   prove that HISD had violated his constitutional rights when it issued the July
   15 letter attempting to restrict his speech and expression at the HISD
   meetings. As the district court convincingly explained, the claims and steps
   in litigation leading up to Monroe’s ultimate success shared both a “common

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   core of facts” and “related legal” theories. Fessler, 23 F.4th at 416.
   Consequently, the record supports the district court’s conclusion that the
   time and labor Monroe’s attorneys spent on the case was reasonable. See Fox
   v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 834 (2011) (“[W]e have made clear that plaintiffs may
   receive fees under § 1988 even if they are not victorious on every claim. A
   civil rights plaintiff who obtains meaningful relief has corrected a violation of
   federal law and, in so doing, has vindicated Congress’s statutory
   purposes.”).
          The district court’s analysis of the Johnson customary fee factor is also
   supported by the record. This court has acknowledged that a district court’s
   selection of “an appropriate hourly rate” should be “based on prevailing
   community standards for attorneys of similar experience in similar cases.”
   Shipes v. Trinity Indus., 987 F.2d 311, 319 (5th Cir. 1993). The district court
   engaged in such an analysis in this case, noting that both of Monroe’s
   attorneys were well-credentialed Houston lawyers with decades of
   experience litigating civil rights cases. The court also took into account other
   Johnson factors that supported Monroe’s counsels’ proposed hourly rates
   such as “the difficulty of litigating constitutional issues that evolved as HISD
   shifted its position, the experience, reputation, and ability of [Monroe’s]
   counsel, and the undesirability of taking on the civil rights case of a
   community activist” like Monroe. This method of calculating the customary
   fee comports with our precedent. As we have explained, “a ‘reasonable’ fee
   is a fee that is sufficient to induce a capable attorney to undertake the
   representation of a meritorious civil rights case” and “the lodestar method
   yields a fee that is presumptively sufficient to achieve this objective.” Combs,
   829 F.3d at 392–93. Moreover, “trial courts need not, and indeed should not,
   become green-eyeshade accountants. The essential goal in shifting fees (to
   either party) is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection.” Fox,

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   563 U.S. at 838. The district court has achieved that goal in this case and thus
   did not err in calculating the lodestar. See Combs, 829 F.3d at 391.
          B. Adjustment of Lodestar
          HISD argued at the district court, and continues to argue on appeal,
   that the district court should have adjusted the lodestar to account for
   Monroe’s limited success. The district court determined, however, that an
   adjustment was unnecessary. We agree. Once the lodestar is calculated, the
   court may “determine whether any other considerations counsel in favor of .
   . . decreasing” it. Combs, 829 F.3d at 394–95. Here, the district court’s in-
   depth analysis of the time records submitted by Monroe’s attorneys in the
   context of the Johnson factors fully supports its lodestar calculation,
   including its decision not to adjust, i.e., decrease, the lodestar. Accordingly,
   we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to
   adjust the lodestar. Fessler, 23 F.4th at 415.
                                IV. CONCLUSION
          We AFFIRM the district court’s attorney’s fee award in favor of
   Monroe.

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