Court Opinion

ID: 9686730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:04:00.829135+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:19.094280
License: Public Domain

Edwards, J.
(concurring in affirmance). In many recent cases .this Court has reiterated-its opposition to interference with the right of jury trial through directed .verdicts or judgments notwithstanding the. verdict. Ohman v. Vandawater, 347 Mich 112; Kaminski v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., 347 Mich 417 ; Bishop v. New York Central R. Co., 348 Mich 345; *685Ware v. Nelson, 351 Mich 390. Frequently these cases have quoted or cited Mr. Justice Cooley’s opinion in Van Steinhurg where, discussing judicial abuse of the power to take a case from the jury, he said:
“The case, however, must be a very clear one.which would justify the court in taking upon itself this responsibility.” Detroit & Milwaukee R. Co. v. Van Steinburg, 17 Mich 99, 120.
The trial judge in the instant case apparently felt this case was “a very clear one” for, after jury disagreement, he entered judgment of no cause for action notwithstanding.
The sole evidence pertaining to the allegation of negligence on the part of defendant is that of the plaintiff contained in his direct- and cross-examination. Giving every favorable inference to his testimony, I cannot read that testimony other than as establishing the point of impact of this collision as on his (plaintiff’s) west side of this 4-lane highway in accordance with his own declaration.
The trial judge in entering judgment said, however :
“All of the debris caused by the collision was located on the east side of the outer northbound lane of traffic and on the shoulder to the east of the highway. The collision could not possibly have occurred at any other place.”
• The rule upon which he relied is stated and perhaps best qualified by Harper and James:
“The court determines the sufficiency of the evidence to show the existence of a fact. When there is direct evidence of the existence of a fact in issue, a jury will in most cases be authorized to find the existence of that fact. * * * But even here the court has retained some control. In all cases it may find a direct testimonial assertion of a fact insuf*686ficient evidence of that fact’s existence where under-all the circumstances the testimony is not reasonably credible. A witness’s story may be so inherently fantastic as to be incredible. Or it may fly in the face of "incontrovertible physical facts.1 * * * Of course it is the court which decides whether evidence-■is reasonably credible and the concept under discussion here could theoretically be extended so that the-court’s judgment was in effect substituted for the jury’s. In fact, however, the courts have exercised restraint in using this notion, and.if there is any trend it is probably towards even greater restraint.’’ 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts, pp 876, 877.
Although this rule pertaining to physical facts has, to my mind, been abused in past legal history in this State (particularly in relation to observation problems concerning contributory negligence, see DePotty v. City of Detroit, 258 Mich 657), I do not think it should be completely abandoned. See Cofran v. Swanman, 225 Minn 40 (29 NW2d 448); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Chambers, 165 Ky 703 (178 SW 1041, Ann Cas 1917B, 471); Scott v. Hansen, 228 Iowa 37, 289 NW 710); 20 Am Jur, Evidence, § 1183.
A review of all the undisputed testimony concerning physical facts in this record convinces me that the trial judge did not abuse it in this case.
I concur in affirmance.
Kavanagh, J., concurred with Edwards, J.

 Emphasis supplied.