Court Opinion

ID: 9657157
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:16:16.09195+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:41.570150
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Justice LANG.
I join Justice James’s dissent, which suggests that principles of statutory construction require the conclusion that the trial court erred in granting Sanchez’s oral motion to quash. However, I write separately to suggest that a defendant’s objection to the charging instrument should be in writing, filed “before the date on which the trial on the merits commences,” and considered in a hearing before the trial court in order to preserve the objection on appeal.
The MajoRity’s Holding
I join Justice James in respectfully dissenting from the holding of the majority. My concern is founded upon the fact that article 45.019(f), by its clear language, requires a defendant to “object” to any defect “in a charging instrument before the date on which the trial on the merits commences.” The majority’s holding upon which I focus concludes that an “objection” need not be heard before the date the trial is scheduled. It appears to me that the reasoning of the majority on this point turns, in part, on the fact that this case comes to us from a corporation court, where the procedure is intended to be more relaxed. For instance, pleadings and motions in justice and corporation courts need not be in writing unless directed by the court. See Tex.Code CRiM. PROC. Ann. art. 45.021 (Vernon Supp.2003). Accordingly, motions or objections are typically presented orally on the day a case is scheduled for trial.
The State argues that this last minute objection by Sanchez violated the code and gave it insufficient notice such that no time was available before trial to amend and thereby correct the complaint. I believe that the State’s position has merit. However, I also believe that, without intending to do so, the majority’s holding has adversely affected the rights of defendants.
I respectfully suggest that the majority leaves the process of when and how to “object” in a state of some uncertainty. Certainly, the majority’s holding creates negative ramifications for the State by allowing this last minute, informal objection. However, the effect on a defendant is that he is left to “gamble” as to whether he will risk waiver by waiting until the date a case is scheduled for trial to make his “objection.” The risk and uncertainty which a defendant faces as a result of the majority’s interpretation of the code section cannot be one which was envisioned by the legislature. Therefore, I cannot agree with the majority’s statement that “[w]e cannot conclude that these consequences could not possibly have been intended by the legislature.” To the contrary, I respectfully contend that the majority’s interpretation paves the way for potential consequences which are so unfair to defendants that the legislature could not have intended them. Such a result flies in the face of the presumption that the legislature intended to enact a just and reasonable statute. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.021(3) (Vernon Supp.2003) (“In enacting a statute, it is presumed that ... a just and reasonable result is intended.”); see also Cole v. Tex. Employment Comm’n, 563 S.W.2d 363, 367 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ dism’d) (presumption that legislature intended a just and reasonable result in enacting legislation).
The risk or “gamble” to which I refer above is created by the majority’s interpretation of the phrase in article 45.019(f): “the date on which the trial on the merits *702commences.” The meaning of “commences” is pivotal. The majority holds that since trial might not “commence” (i.e., “begin”) on the date the case is scheduled for trial, a defendant may make an oral objection on that date. If the trial court sustains the objection, it is timely and preserved, even though the State will have had no notice of it until the parties are called to the bench for trial announcements. On the other hand, if the trial court overrules the objection and then proceeds to trial that day, the objection is untimely and any error is waived.
Under the rule found by the majority, the defendant is put to an election of whether to risk the possibility that the judge will overrule his objection and continue to trial. If the defendant guesses wrong and the court overrules what might be a meritorious objection on appeal, the defendant is foreclosed from raising the issue in an appellate argument. Thus, a defendant who proceeds according to the “informal,” oral, and last-minute process cultivated and used in justice and corporation courts exposes himself to the risk that he may fail to preserve his objection. In my mind, such a system is no better than a spin of the wheel of chance. Such an uncertain process does not conform with the basic fairness and predictability requirements of procedural due process. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125-127, 110 S.Ct. 975, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990) (due process encompasses a guarantee of fair procedure); see also Long v. State, 742 S.W.2d 302, 320 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), overruled in part on other grounds by Briggs v. State, 789 S.W.2d 918, 923 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (due process is in itself essentially fairness or at the very least is the vehicle used to arrive at fairness).
Expanding On Justice James’s Dissenting Opinion
Although I concur with the reasoning of Justice James’s dissent, I go further. Justice James specifically says that he would require that the defendant make his objection before the scheduled trial date, but he would not require that a pretrial hearing be scheduled. While I agree that a defendant should make his objection before the scheduled trial date, I suggest that a “better practice” is to require the motion to be in writing and filed before the date on which trial on the merits commences in order to preserve the objection. Additionally, I suggest the defendant must request that his objection be considered in a hearing prior to the commencement of trial. Such a hearing may be conducted by the trial court on the same date it has set the case for trial, but before any other part of the case is pursued.
I am certainly mindful that pleadings and motions in justice and corporation courts need not be in writing unless directed by the court. However, the procedure I suggest would give adequate notice of the defendant’s objections to the State and rid the process of the “gamble” of waiver. While I also believe such a procedure would not offend the majority’s concerns as to judicial economy, I think it would unequivocally comply with the express requirements of article 45.019(f). If a defendant follows these steps, the parties and appeals courts would be left with no question as to whether error has been preserved. Finally, I believe this procedure is supported by the case law respecting article 1.14(b), which interprets the requirements for the preservation of one’s objection to an indictment or information and governs the determination of the point at which that objection must be presented to the trial court. See, e.g., Whitsey v. State, 853 S.W.2d 769 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd) (appellant preserved error on motion to quash indictment where he filed written motion two days before trial and obtained hearing on *703morning of trial); cf. Prudhome v. State, 989 S.W.2d 852 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (appellant did not preserve error with general or “form” motion but would have satisfied Whitsey with pretrial motion and hearing).
Conclusion
I agree with Justice James that the majority’s interpretation leads to results the legislature could not possibly have intended. However, I write separately to suggest what I believe is a straight-forward, reliable, and safe procedure for the State, defendants, and courts to employ in order to comply with the current version of the code. Finally, I suggest that, due to the majority’s holding, the gamble of waiver remains. This matter can best be resolved by the legislature through revision of the statute to tell us precisely when timely objections must be made. Defendants in justice and corporation courts are entitled to a predictable and clear process for the preservation of their objections to charging instruments.
Dissenting Opinion by Justice JAMES.