Court Opinion

ID: 9581376
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:14:17.694037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:53.906263
License: Public Domain

Littlejohn, Justice
(dissenting) :
I respectfully dissent and would reverse the order wherein the judge refused to vacate the default judgment.
*443The issue before this court is whether the lower court abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion is an error of law. The defendant asserts that his failure to respond was due to inadvertence, excusable neglect, or surprise, and that he is entitled to have the judgment vacated under § 15-27-130, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976). I agree. Under the facts of this case, I would rule that there has been an abuse of discretion amounting to an error of law.
This court has said:
“In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion all of the facts and circumstances must be evaluated. If the requirements to vacate a judgment are met the judgment should be opened and the defendant permitted to answer.” Edwards v. Ferguson, 254 S. C. 278, 175 S. E. (2d) 224, 226 (1970).
An examination of all of the facts and circumstances of this case leads me to the conclusion that defendant’s failure to respond was due to excusable neglect, initiated by error on the part of plaintiff’s counsel in designating the wrong court. Except for this error, the dilemma we nurse could not have occurred.
Counsel for the insurance carrier is not to be faulted for refusing to agree to the requested amendment to the summons and complaint, the effect of which would be to transfer jurisdiction. Such consent might conceivably have deprived his client, the insurance company, of some defense under the terms of the insuring contract.
The ex parte order, having been sought without notice to interested parties appearing, was improperly procured. This court has frowned upon such orders in several opinions heretofore. Failure to notify counsel of the application and failure to provide the defendant’s personal attorney with a copy of the order, set the stage for the misunderstanding which has resulted. Even if it be conceded that plaintiff’s counsel was as a matter of right entitled to have the action dismissed, *444the fact remains that opposing counsel were entitled to be notified so that they might keep abreast of that which was taking place. The majority opinion submits that . we are unable to discern any prejudice resulting to appellant [defendant] by its [ex parte order] use in this case.” I am not at all sure that this is true. Defendant avers that he . . never received notice nor a copy of .the order of the dismissal . . ..” At the time of service of the second summons and complaint, he had reason to believe the first action was still active. We can only speculate as to what might have occurred had the matter been handled in the usual fashion. It is understandable that a layperson, unfamiliar with the technicalities of the law and the court and unaware of the dismissal of the first action, might have conceived the second set of papers to be duplicates. He had properly delivered copies of the first papers to both his own counsel and to counsel for the insurance carrier.
This court has held that § 15-27-130 should be liberally construed to see that justice is promoted and to strive for disposition of cases on their merits. Edwards v. Ferguson, supra, 175 S. E. (2d) at 226.
In furtherance of justice, this court has made efforts to protect laymen from default judgments caused by confusing pleadings. We have also attempted to eliminate injustices caused by confusion arising out of the use of summons (complaint not served), a confusing legal document.
Under the majority opinion, plaintiff benefits from his initial error of bringing an action in a court without jurisdiction. Such was a cause of the confusion, without which the case would have been disposed of in the normal fashion on its merits.
The facts here are akin to those in Thompson v. Wilder, S. C., 253 S. E. (2d) 108 (1979), where we said:
“In our view respondent’s prosecution of these two identical actions against essentially the same defendants, coupled *445with the use of identical Summons Complaint Not Served was sufficiently irregular to confuse the appellants.” (Emphasis added.)
Here, as there, the resulting confusion led to excusable neglect by the defendant and warrants vacation of the judgment.
In Howard v. Holiday Inns, 271 S. C. 238, 246 S. E. (2d) 880 (1978), we attempted to soften the harsh impact of default judgments by holding that when there has been an appearance but no answer or demurrer filed, the defendant is entitled to participate in the ascertainment of damages by cross-examining plaintiff’s witnesses and objecting to evidence. We held that one in default concedes liability but does not concede the amount of liability in a tort action. Here, both defendant’s counsel and his insurance carrier’s counsel had made an appearance as relates to the first summons and complaint. Counsel for the plaintiff was well aware that both personal counsel and insurance counsel had been employed to defend the claim. The ruling of the lower court may have the effect of relieving the insurance carrier of liability. While it is true that the defending attorneys had not, technically speaking, made an appearance as relates to the second summons and complaint, I think that the facts bring the case within the spirit, if not the letter, of our ruling in Howard. A strong argument can be made for the proposition that defendants should be notified of the default hearing in every instance, such that the court would have the benefit of an adversary proceeding as relates to the assessment of damages. Howard did not go that far in its ruling. Such an expansion of the rule would tend to eliminate many of the injustices arising out of default judgments with which both the lower court and this court are regularly plagued. Even if the defendant is not permitted .to answer, he should be allowed to defend and/or mitigate the damages as permitted by Howard.
While the majority does not reach the issue of whether a meritorious defense exists, the record abundantly shows that *446the defendant has made out a case on the “meritorious defense” issue. The order of the lower court should be reversed, the defendant permitted to answer, and the case should be tried on its merits in the conventional fashion.
Gregory, J., concurs.