Court Opinion

ID: 9718817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:34:43.766602+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:20.726522
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SIMON, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the defendant was proved guilty of voluntary manslaughter, although not with all of the analysis in the majority opinion. I dissent only from affirmance of the defendant’s sentence to a term of four years’ imprisonment. Although in the appellate court the defendant attacked his sentence, he failed to raise the issue in this court, and normally that would conclude the matter. After having reviewed the record here, however, it appears to me that the failure of the trial judge properly to assess the factors in mitigation and aggravation in imposing sentence was so pronounced that the interests of justice require our sua sponte consideration of the sentence. This court has previously held that a reviewing court cannot reduce a sentence of imprisonment to one of probation (People v. Rege (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 473, 482), a principle with which I do not necessarily agree. At a minimum, however, it is an abuse of discretion for a judge to impose a prison sentence instead of granting probation when this appears to be the result of an improper evaluation of the factors which should be considered. In that event it is the responsibility of the reviewing court to intervene. I would therefore vacate the sentence imposed and remand with directions to reconsider the appropriateness of probation under the proper statutory standards. According to the uncontroverted evidence elicited in mitigation at the sentencing hearing, Terrance Sawyer has a background and record the like of which is not often seen in a criminal courtroom. He graduated from a Chicago high school where he was captain of the basketball team, homecoming king, and most popular senior. He attended Lewis University and then Western Illinois University, from which he graduated in May 1983. At the time of sentencing he worked as a full-time substitute teacher in the Chicago public schools and was also a graduate student at the University of Illinois, Chicago Circle campus. He has been active in his church and in volunteer community activities. He has no prior record of criminal or delinquent behavior. At sentencing, eight witnesses testified in his behalf, including two faculty members from Lewis University, Belinda Stevens’ mother, and the associate minister of his church. He was described as a “very fine young man,” a “positive, helpful, friendly, serious man,” and a good father. In addition, more than 20 letters — from the assistant principal of his high school, the minister of his church, a college professor and others — attesting to Mr. Sawyer’s good character were admitted into evidence. Despite this evidence, and despite the evidence at trial concerning the circumstances of the offense, the trial judge found only one factor in mitigation, the absence of any prior record of criminal activity or delinquency. In so holding, the judge rejected a number of other mitigating factors which should have been considered. Most importantly, the judge refused to consider in mitigation that “there were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the defendant’s criminal conduct, though failing to establish a defense.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005—5—3.1(a)(4).) Although Sawyer’s belief in the necessity of using deadly force was objectively unreasonable, the circumstances certainly tended to justify his conduct. The deceased, who was intoxicated, had twice slapped Belinda Stevens (once hard enough to knock her down), had directed profanities at her, and had reentered the house against her will. Neither Stevens nor her roommate, Cheryl Sherman, contradicted the account the defendant gave to the police— which two police officers repeated at trial — that the deceased was the aggressor in the “scuffle” which ended in his death. Belinda Stevens also testified that their small child was clinging to Sawyer’s leg when the deceased reentered the house moments before the scuffle. While this evidence did not establish an acceptable defense, it certainly furnished substantial grounds tending to explain and excuse the defendant’s reaction. It is also relevant to two other statutory mitigating factors: that the defendant acted under a strong provocation and that his conduct was induced by someone else, namely, the deceased. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 1005—5— 3.1(a)(3), (a)(5). The legislature has also provided that a trial judge shall consider in mitigation the fact that “the defendant’s criminal conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005—5—3.1(a)(8).) If this factor is to have any meaning, it must mitigate an offense precipitated by a rival suitor who is intoxicated, who has struck an occupant of the house twice, who enters the house without authorization, and who poses at least an indirect threat to everyone in the house, including the defendant’s 18-month-old child. The strong evidence of the defendant’s otherwise stainless background also tends to show that his “character and attitudes *** indicate that he is unlikely to commit another crime.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005—5— 3.1(a)(9).) Finally, each of the witnesses who testified in mitigation expressed certainty that the defendant would be able to comply with the terms of probation. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005—5—3.1(a)(10). The appellate court stated that while the trial judge may not have “recited” each mitigating factor (139 Ill. App. 3d 383, 387), it is presumed that he considered all the evidence before him. The mere fact that the trial judge heard the evidence, however, does not mean that he properly applied the law to that evidence and actually considered it as mitigating. It is quite clear from the record here that the trial judge thought the only factor properly counted in mitigation was the defendant’s lack of a prior criminal record. Although defense counsel argued a number of other factors as well, the judge specifically found only that factor in mitigation. On the sentencing order signed by the trial judge, each of the statutory factors in mitigation is crossed out with the exception of the absence of a criminal record. The only factor the trial judge found weighing on the other side of the balance was the necessity of deterring others from committing the same crime. The defendant was convicted, though, of making an unreasonable judgment as to whether the use of deadly force was justified; this appears to me to be the type of offense for which punishment can have very little, if any, deterrent effect on other potential offenders. When called upon to respond to an imminent threat of physical violence, it is unlikely that the average person will have the time or ability to figure out the implications of this court’s decisions. Whatever the criminal law can do, improving the split-second judgment of citizens faced with stressful and rapidly developing circumstances is not one of them. By ignoring a significant number of factors in mitigation, and improperly considering a supposed factor in aggravation, the trial judge abused his sentencing discretion. That abuse has resulted here in a miscarriage of justice. I therefore dissent.