Court Opinion

ID: 9849479
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:40:43.474219+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:02.601437
License: Public Domain

Deen, Chief Judge,
dissenting..
While I fully concur with Division 1 of the majority opinion, I must dissent from Division 2 wherein the majority holds that there was no evidence warranting a charge on the provisions of Code Ann. § 26-1103 (b) although the defendant made a timely written request for such a charge.
Simpson testified that he had been assaulted several times in the past by the victim and that on the day of the shooting Williams demanded money from him. After this meeting, appellant went home, changed his clothing, got his mother’s handgun and put it in his pants because he wanted to protect himself and scare off Williams if he tried to bother him again. He further testified that when he left his home on his way to his cousin’s house, the victim was sitting inside an automobile which was parked beside the sidewalk in front of his house. The defendant claims that Williams called him over to the car and reached out of the window to grab him when he was about a foot from the car. He maintains that he pulled out the gun intending to scare the victim, and it went off.
The record shows that the trial court charged the jury on self-defense, but refused to give appellant’s requested *823charge on Code Ann. § 26-1103 (b). However, when the jury returned for a requested recharge the judge gave Code Ann. § 26-1103 (a) and (b) Apparently realizing that he had charged (b) the judge said: "Now, now. A person — belay that, the last. Let me charge you this” and repeated § 26-1103 (a). He then proceeded to instruct them that they could find the defendant guilty of murder, voluntary manslaughter or involuntary manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act, but he did not instruct them that they could find the defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of a lawful act in an unlawful manner. At no point did the judge instruct the jury to disregard his instruction on § 26-1103 (b).
I believe that the evidence presented by the defendant, if believed by the jury, would be sufficient for them to find that he was doing a lawful act (defending himself) in an unlawful manner (using excessive force). The refusal to grant such a request is clearly error in view of the charge on self-defense and the case law on this issue. The Supreme Court, in Jackson v. State, 234 Ga. 549, 551 (216 SE2d 834) (1975) (a full bench decision with two justices concurring in the judgment only), addressed this issue and held: "[w]hen a defendant on trial for murder admits the act but denies the intention to kill, Code Ann. § 26-1103 deserves special scrutiny... Code Ann. § 26-1103 (b) provides: 'A person commits involuntary manslaughter in the commission of a lawful act in an unlawful manner when he causes the death of another human being, without any intention to do so, by the commission of a lawful act in an unlawful manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm.’
"The defendant here urges that the 'lawful act’ was self-defense and that the 'unlawful manner’ was the use of unnecessary (excessive) force. Defendant cites Warnack v. State, 3 Ga. App. 590 (60 SE 288), in support of this contention. . .
"The defendant’s trial counsel requested and the court gave instructions as to self-defense, which requested instructions left open (the use of more force than necessary) the possible application of Code Ann. § 26-1103 (b). Now the defendant’s counsel appointed for *824appeal complains that the court did not fill the gap in the instructions given at defendant’s request.
"We feel certain that if the defendant had requested a charge pursuant to Code Ann. § 26-1103 (b), the trial judge would have given it. The defendant did not do so,... [and] will not be heard to complain that the trial court failed to give a complete charge.”
In Jackson v. State, 143 Ga. App. 734 (240 SE2d 180) (1977), the same issue appeared before this court, but the defendant had made a timely written request for a charge on § 26-1103 (b). In a full bench decision (two judges dissenting and one not participating), this court, closely tracking the Supreme Court decision and expressly overruling a line of cases to the contrary, held that it was reversible error for the trial court to deny the defendant’s request to charge when it was timely submitted.
In view of the confusing recharge, the fact that there was evidence to justify a charge on Code Ann. § 26-1103 (b) and the charge on self-defense (see also Stonaker v. State, 236 Ga. 1 (222 SE2d 354) (1976)), and the instruction to the jury limiting it as to the type of verdict it could return, I believe that this case should have been reversed and remanded for retrial.
I am authorized to state that Judge Smith, Judge Shulman and Judge Birdsong join in this dissent.