Court Opinion

ID: 9584984
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:54:42.967784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:25:18.690002
License: Public Domain

*546Justice KIDWELL,
specially concurring.
While I agree with the result of the majority opinion, I specially concur because I believe Officer Dawson had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Hudson.
Reasonable articulable suspicion is intended as “a less demanding standard than the probable cause standard.” State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641, 644 (1998). When determining whether the facts rise to the level of reasonable articulable suspicion, this Court looks at the totality of the circumstances. State v. Benefiel, 131 Idaho 226, 229, 953 P.2d 976, 979 (1998). Furthermore, the circumstances may be considered in light of the training of the law enforcement officer. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 629 (1980) (“[T]he evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.”).
Officer Dawson testified that: 1) he observed Hudson parked in an area known to be used by individuals to consume alcohol, 2) Hudson’s vehicle changed positions in the parking lot, and 3) Hudson’s vehicle swerved slightly within its lane when it left the parking lot. Obviously, each of these facts, standing alone, means little; but, when taken as a whole, it is reasonable for a trained law enforcement officer to suspect that a crime like driving under the influence wa.s occurring. Thus, the stopping of Hudson’s vehicle was based on a reasonable suspicion which Officer Dawson was able to articulate for the court.
During trial, the district court had the opportunity to make an evaluation of Officer Dawson’s reasonable suspicion. I am unable to find error in this evaluation. Therefore, I join the majority in affirming the district court.