Court Opinion

ID: 9766367
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:43:38.145586+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:21.898394
License: Public Domain

CADENA, Justice
(dissenting).
I cannot agree that a plaintiff who is attempting to rescue a third person from imminent danger and who is injured by the negligent conduct of defendant should be denied recovery because, in the rescue attempt, he failed to show that concern for his own safety which, presumably, would have characterized the conduct of that mythical creature, the man of ordinary prudence.
The rescue doctrine came to fine flower in the leaping language of Judge Cardozo in Wagner v. International Ry. Co., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437, 19 A.L.R. 1 (1921). That brilliant opinion rejects that dark and dismal view of human nature which insists that a bystander has no legitimate interest in attempting the rescue of those imminently imperiled.
One of the earliest Texas cases involving a rescue situation is San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v. Gray, 95 Tex. 424, 67 S.W. 763 (1902). The opinion sheds little light on the problem, since the jury’s verdict in favor of plaintiff was based on a general charge which made the absence of contributory negligence a prerequisite to recovery. But the Supreme Court pointed out that a plaintiff’s act of exposing himself to danger for the purpose of saving the life of another does not “lay him liable to the charge of contributory negligence.” 67 S.W. at 764. Much stronger language is found in Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Goss, 31 Tex.Civ.App. 300, 72 S.W. 94, 96 (Tex.Civ.App., Dallas 1903, writ ref’d) : “ ‘For a person engaged in his ordinary affairs, * * * knowingly and voluntarily to place himself in a position where he is liable to receive serious injury, is negligence which will preclude a recovery for an injury so received; but when the exposure is for the purpose of saving life it is not wrongful, and therefore not negligent, unless such as to be regarded *720either rash or reckless.’ * * * So, even if Goss knew that the engine was approaching, — and it is not clear that he did, — the question as to whether his going on the track was necessary, and was not rash or reckless, considering the reason for his action, was properly left to the jury, * * (Emphases added)
Similar dicta are found in Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Scarborough, 104 S.W. 408 (Tex.Civ.App., San Antonio 1907, affirmed, 101 Tex. 436, 108 S.W. 804)1; Panhandle & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Haywood, 227 S.W. 347 (Tex.Civ.App., Amarillo 1921, writ ref’d)2; Shultz v. Dallas Power & Light Co., 147 S.W.2d 914, 916 (Tex.Civ.App., Dallas 1941, writ dism’d); and Keystone-Fleming Transport, Inc. v. City of Tahoka, 315 S.W.2d 656, 663 (Tex.Civ.App., Amarillo 1958, writ ref’d n. r. e.).
There is language in the Texas cases to the effect that a rescuer’s right to relief is barred if he is guilty of what is sometimes called “ordinary negligence”; that is, he may not recover if, in his rescue attempt, he failed to adhere to the letter to that course of conduct which would have been followed by the man of ordinary prudence. See Kelley v. Alexander, 392 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tex.Civ.App., San Antonio 1965, writ ref’d n. r. e.), which is not a rescue case, since, as pointed out in the opinion, no one was in a position of peril at the time that plaintiff acted; Reddick v. Longacre, 228 S.W.2d 264, 270 (Tex.Civ.App., Fort Worth 1950, writ ref’d n. r. e.), in which no Texas authority was cited in support of the statement that recovery was precluded if the rescuer acted in a “negligent manner”; Southwestern Hydrocarbon Co. v. Thompson, 355 S. W.2d 823, 826 (Tex.Civ.App., Waco 1962, writ ref’d n. r. e.) where the Court referred with approval to the position taken by the American Law Institute 3; and Swift & Co. v. Baldwin, 299 S.W.2d 157, 161 (Tex.Civ.App., Texarkana 1957, no writ), where defendant did not rely on contributory negligence as a defense but contended, instead, that plaintiff had assumed the risk because he acted rashly and recklessly as a matter of law. Goolsbee v. Texas & N. O. R. Co., 150 Tex. 528, 243 S.W.2d 386 (1951), referred to in the Baldwin opinion, in no way supports the statement by the Texarkana Court of Civil Appeals to the effect that when a person acts to save another from imminent danger the relevant question is one of determining whether a person of ordinary prudence would have attempted the rescue. Goolsbee is not a rescue case and, understandably, the Supreme Court there used no language referring to the rescue doctrine. Goolsbee merely applies the elementary rule which allows a non-negligent plaintiff to recover from a negligent defendant.
Apparently, the only two Texas cases where the Court specifically considered, in order to dispose of the case, whether a rescuer’s recovery is barred by contributory negligence are International & G. N. R. Co. v. McVey, 81 S.W. 991, on rehearing, 83 S.W. 34 (Tex.Civ.App., Austin 1904, rev’d, other grounds, 99 Tex. 28, 87 S.W. 328), and Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Hoyle, 421 S.W.2d 442 (Tex.Civ.App., El Paso 1967, writ ref’d n. r. e.).
There can be no doubt that in McVey the Austin Court of Civil Appeals squarely held that a rescuer’s contributory negligence would not bar recovery. There the trial court instructed the jury that if plaintiff was attempting to rescue lives when he was injured as a result of defendant’s negligence, *721he was entitled to recover unless he was rash or reckless. The defendant objected to this portion of the charge, contending that the correct test is what a person of ordinary prudence would have done under similar circumstances. This theory was rejected as “not correct.” 81 S.W. 998.
The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals in McVey was reversed by the Supreme Court on the ground that the trial court gave an incorrect charge relating to the measure of damages. However, the Supreme Court said: “We are of opinion that the judgment should be reversed, and the cause remanded for error in the charge of the court as to the measure of damages; and, since the other questions were correctly disposed of in the able and elaborate opinion of Chief Justice Fisher, it would be a profitless task to state the case in full, or to discuss the questions of which a correct disposition has been made by the Court of Civil Appeals.” 87 S.W. at 328.4
In Hoyle, although the jury found that plaintiff was guilty of some five acts of contributory negligence, it also found that he was injured while attemping to rescue imminently imperiled persons and that, in attempting such rescue, he did not act in a rash or reckless manner. A judgment in favor of the rescuer was affirmed, the El Paso Court of Civil Appeals saying that, since plaintiff had not acted rashly or recklessly, the findings of contributory negligence would bar recovery. 421 S.W.2d at 447. Hoyle is apparently the only Texas case in which a defendant entered the appelate battleground armed with a jury finding to the effect that the rescuer failed to act as would have a person of ordinary prudence under similar circumstances.
It is true that in Hoyle we find an alternative ground for the decision, since the opinion also relies on the doctrine of imminent peril. 421 S.W.2d 447-448. No particular significance can be attached to the action of the Supreme Court in refusing the application for writ of error with the docket notation, “no reversible error,” since defendant’s assault on the action of the Court of Civils Appeals, insofar as relevant here, was limited to the complaint that the verdict contained no finding that the perilous position of the third party was caused by defendant’s negligence and that, therefore, the verdict did not establish the facts calling for an application of the rescue doctrine.
This Court’s attention has been called to no Texas case in which a rescuer was denied recovery because a jury found that he failed to exercise that degree of care which would have been exhibited by the man of ordinary prudence. Even if the preceden-tal value of McVey and Hoyle be discounted, all that can be said is that the question *722presented by this case has not been answered by the Texas Courts.
I believe that sound policy considerations support the conclusion that the standard of the man of ordinary prudence should not be applied to bar recovery in a rescue situation. The very nature of the standard itself militates against its use against a rescuer.
Traditionally, the legal literature discussing the man of ordinary prudence emphasizes his many commendable qualities.5 Nevertheless, this lifeless creature falls somewhat short of being an ideal person. He is subject to those human frailties which, while not commendable are not considered sufficient cause for judicial condemnation. His concern for the safety of trespassers is almost minimal. He shows but little more interest in the welfare of his social guests. Although he arranges the display of his goods and merchandise in a manner which he hopes will induce his business guest not to walk through the shop with eyes riveted on the floor, when the customer slips and falls the man of ordinary prudence will whisper into a receptive judicial ear that the dangerous condition of the floor was so open and obvious that any fool could plainly see it. The common law, recognizing his detachment and reluctance to involve himself in matters which do not affect him, does not expect him to come to the aid of his injured neighbor, even when he can do so without exposing himself to danger. Of course, these attributes of the man of ordinary prudence are seldom listed as character defects. In those situations where his conduct is not quite praiseworthy, the judicial mind comes to his defense with the rhetoric of the “no duty” doctrine.
But no amount of verbal camouflage can hide the fact that our man of ordinary prudence will bestir himself only when inaction will be penalized. Since our standard of conduct is not too high, it is not unreasonable to penalize those who fall short of the standard. Our tolerance of conduct which does no more than conform to this minimum standard is but a recognition of human frailty. But to treat as a transgressor the person who, on occasion, rises above this standard is indefensible.
Heroism is not one of the attributes of the man of ordinary prudence, since prudence, his cardinal virtue dictates that he not embark on a journey down the road to heroism. This is as it should be. To adopt the hero as our standard would make tort-feasors of us all. The hero necessarily displays more concern for the safety of others and, correspondingly, attaches less value to his own safety, than does the man of ordinary prudence. Society places the hero on a pedestal. It is incongruous for the law, which should, at least to some degree, reflect the social conscience, to cast him into exterior darkness. To inquire whether one who risks his life to save another acted as would a person whose prudent nature would frown on such unselfish conduct is to ask a meaningless question.
The pronouncements of the legislative and judicial branches of this State clearly indicate a preference for a policy which demands that, when the purpose of conduct is *723the avoidance of death or serious bodily injury, the standard of the man of ordinary prudence be brushed aside. Thus, where plaintiff is rendering assistance to a person in distress, our legislature abrogated the common law rule which requires that the Good Samaritan, if he is to avoid civil liability to the person whom he attempts to aid, exercise ordinary care. In this State, as in several others,6 a person who undertakes to administer emergency aid in good faith is not liable for “acts performed during the emergency unless such acts are wilfully or wantonly negligent.” Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. Art. la.
Again, the Supreme Court of Texas, in developing the doctrine of “imminent peril,” has held that, even where the sole threat is to the life or limb of the actor, so that his conduct lacks that spirit of altruism which prompts the civilizing impulse to rescue others, the standard of the man of ordinary prudence is not applicable. In an imminent peril situation, whether plaintiff acts prudently or imprudently in his attempt to save himself is irrelevant. International & G. N. R. Co. v. Neff, 87 Tex. 303, 28 S.W. 283 (1894); Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Watkins, 88 Tex. 20, 29 S.W. 232 (1895); Jackson v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co., 90 Tex. 372, 38 S.W. 745 (1897); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Rogers, 91 Tex. 52, 40 S.W. 956 (1897); Beck v. Browning, 129 Tex. 7, 101 S.W.2d 545 (1937); Thode, Imminent Peril and Emergency in Texas, 40 Tex.L. Rev. 441 (1962).
To hold that only reckless or rash conduct will preclude recovery by a rescuer from the person whose negligence created a dangerous situation should not shock the judicial conscience. While a rescue attempt has as its purpose the shielding of another from injury, it should be remembered that the rescuer, if successful, will also have effectively shielded the negligent defendant from liability or, as in Hoyle, will have decreased defendant’s liability by reducing the number of persons killed or injured.

. This Court pointed out in Scarborough that a rescuer may recover “if he were not so reckless” in his rescue attempt “as to defeat recovery,” and added that whether the conduct of the rescuer is to be deemed reckless is for the jury to decide. 104 S.W. at 410.

. “Where one acts to save another from imminent peril brought about by the negligence of the defendant, the rule of ordinary care is not applied to Ms act, but he is only precluded from recovery if he acted rashly under the circumstances.” 227 S.W. at 350-361 (emphasis added).

.Restatement of Torts, § 466 (1938). See also Restatement 2d, Torts, § 472 (1965).

. However, the Supreme Court did say that, at the time the writ of error was granted, the Court was inclined to believe that “the third special instruction” requested by defendant should have been given, and that if, as claimed by defendant, “it appeared by the uncontroverted evidence that Edward McVey ⅞ * * knew of the approach of defendant’s train to the place of collision with the push car,” the charge should have been given. 87 S.W. 329-830. A reading of the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals contains nothing indicating the substance of “the third special instruction,” nor does the Supreme Court cast any light on this question. The language of the Supreme Court to the effect that the charge should have been given if the uncontro-verted evidence established that plaintiff knew of the approach of the train would indicate that the instruction in question was to the effect that the failure of the engineer to give a warning signal should not be regarded as negligence because McVey knew of the approach of the train. See the discussion by the Court of Civil Appeals of defendant’s twenty-fourth assignment of error. 81 S.W. at 1001. The Court of Civil Appeals held, as did the Supreme Court, that this charge was properly refused because it assumed the fact that McVey knew the train was approaching. If this conjecture as to the nature of the defendant’s requested special instruction No. 3 is correct, there is nothing in the Supreme Court opinion to weaken the comments of the Court of Civil Appeals concerning the proper standard to he applied in rescue cases.

. “He is one who invariably looks where he is going, and is careful to examine the immediate foreground before he executes a leap or a bound; who neither star-gazes nor is lost in meditation when approaching trapdoors or the margin of a dock; * * * who never mounts a moving omnibus and does not alight from any car while the train is in motion * * * and will inform himself of the history and habits of a dog before administering a caress; * * * who never drives his ball until those in front of him have definitely vacated the putting-green which is his own objective; who never from one year’s end to another makes an excessive demand upon his wife, his neighbors, his servants, his ox, or his ass; * * * who never swears, gambles or loses his temper; who uses nothing except in moderation, and even while he flogs his child is meditating only on the golden mean. * * * In all that mass of authorities which bears upon this branch of the law there is no single mention of a reasonable woman.” Herbert, Misleading Cases in the Common Law, 12-16 (1930), quoted in Prosser, Law of Torts, 3rd Ed., 154 n. 18 (1964).

. See Note, 51 Col.Law Rieview 816 (1963).