Court Opinion

ID: 9664010
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:59:39.436085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:01.058096
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.
¶ 60. {concurring). I join the majority opinion. I agree that the written confession was involuntary and that the decision of the court of the appeals should be reversed. I wholeheartedly join the court in adopting a rule requiring police to record electronically all juvenile interrogations.
¶ 61. I write for two reasons. First, I write to discuss the court's state constitutional superintending authority over all courts. As I describe below, for more than 120 years of Wisconsin state constitutional history, from 1853 to 1977, the supreme court broadly construed its superintending authority as a power to control litigation in the courts. In 1977 the legislature and the people of the state of Wisconsin, presumably aware of this constitutional history, amended the judiciary article of the Wisconsin constitution, thereby giving their imprimatur to the court's broad constitutional superintending power to control litigation. Since the 1977 constitutional amendment the court has contin*174ued to take a broad view of its superintending authority. Accordingly, I conclude that the majority opinion fits well within the court's constitutional powers.1
¶ 62. Second, unlike the majority, I would adopt a per se rule excluding in-custody admissions from any child under the age of 16 who has not been given the opportunity to consult with a parent or interested adult.
¶ 63. The court of appeals,2 the defendant,3 the Children and Family Justice Center at Northwestern University School of Law's Bluhm Legal Clinic,4 the *175Juvenile Law Center,5 and University of Wisconsin Law School Professor Marygold S. Melli6 all agree that it is time to take appropriate action to protect the youth of our state from confessing to crimes they did not commit.
¶ 64. The State does not question the merits of a per se rule,7 but argues that the formulation of such a rule should he left to the legislature, as a matter of policy, just as it argues that formulation of a rule requiring electronic recording of juvenile interrogations should be left to the legislature. For the same reasons set forth in the majority opinion and in this concurring opinion for rejecting the State's argument about comparative judicial-legislative institutional competence relating to electronic recording,81 reject the State's leave-it-to-the-legislature approach on this parental issue.
I — I
¶ 65. The other concurrences' challenge to the court's exercise of its superintending powers in the instant case prompted me to reexamine the cases and impelled me to write. I disagree with their views of the court's powers. I view the exercise of superintending powers in the instant case as a means of controlling the course of litigation in the courts of this state by governing the admission of evidence;9 the court's exercising its superintending power here is a question of policy, not power.
*176¶ 66. The powers of the Wisconsin Supreme Court are defined in several ways and have diverse origins. Some are explicitly set forth in Article VII, Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution: appellate and original jurisdiction and superintending and administrative authority. Others are derived from the state constitutional separation of powers doctrine, as well as from the court's very existence, especially this court's being the highest court in the state, the court of last resort. Indeed, "it is well established that this court has express, inherent, implied and incidental powers"10 to *177manage the sound operation of the judicial system in our tripartite form of government.
¶ 67. Superintending, inherent, implied, and incidental powers should, as the court has often said, and as I strongly believe, be "invoked cautiously and with a minimum of rhetoric to reduce the risks of conflicts with the legislative and executive branches of government."11 Our superintending power is not lightly invoked.12
¶ 68. The other concurrences in the instant case set forth an erroneous and cramped view of the powers of this court based on their incomplete historical review of selectively chosen case law.
¶ 69. When all is said and done, Arneson v. Jezwinski, 206 Wis. 2d 217, 225-26, 556 N.W.2d 721 (1996), quoted with approval in State ex rel. Hass v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 2001 WI 128, 248 Wis. 2d 634, 640, 636 N.W.2d 707 (2001), summarizes the case law interpreting our superintending authority and sets forth the present and long-standing view that the court's superintending authority is a broad power to be exercised for controlling the course of litigation and is shaped by the continuing necessity that this court carry out its function as a supreme court.13 The Arneson court wrote as follows:
*178The Wisconsin Constitution grants three separate and distinct branches of jurisdiction to this Court: (1) appellate jurisdiction; (2) general superintending control over inferior courts; and (3) original jurisdiction at certain proceedings at law and in equity. Wis. Const, art VII, § 3; State ex rel. Reynolds v. County Court, 11 Wis. 2d 560, 564, 105 N.W.2d 876 (1960); In re Brand, 251 Wis. 531, 536, 30 N.W.2d 238 (1947), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 802, 69 S. Ct. 34, 93 L. Ed. 359 (1948); State ex rel. Fourth Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 103 Wis. 591, 611-12, 79 N.W 1081 (1899) (hereinafter "Johnson"). The constitutional grants of superintending authority endow this court with a power that is indefinite in character, unsupplied with means and instrumentalities, and limited only by the necessities of justice. In re Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 519-20, 235 N.W.2d 409, 238 N.W.2d 63, 239 N.W.2d 297 (1975); Reynolds, 11 Wis. 2d at 564-65, 105 N.W.2d 876; In re Phelan, 225 Wis. 314, 320-21, 274 N.W. 411 (1937); Johnson, 103 Wis. at 611, 79 N.W. 1081. In addition, this power enables the court to control the course of ordinary litigation in the lower courts of Wisconsin. Phelan, 225 Wis. at 320, 274 N.W. 411; Johnson, 103 Wis. at 613, 79 N.W. 1081. As we have stated, "The superintending power is as broad and as flexible as necessary to insure the due administration of justice in the courts of this state." Kading, 70 Wis. 2d at 520, 235 N.W.2d 409.
However, we do not use such power lightly. Phelan, 225 Wis. at 321, 274 N.W. 411. As we have indicated, "This court will not exercise its superintending power where there is another adequate remedy, by appeal or otherwise, for the conduct of the trial court, or where the conduct of the trial court does not threaten seriously to impose a significant hardship upon a citizen." McEwen v. Pierce County, 90 Wis. 2d 256, 269-70, 279 *179N.W.2d 469 (1979) (citing Newlander v. Riverview Realty Co., 238 Wis. 211, 225, 298 N.W. 603 (1941); State ex rel. Tewalt v. Pollard, 112 Wis. 232, 234, 87 N.W. 1107 (1901)).14
¶ 70. Let me explain the basis for the Arneson precis of superintending authority. A careful examination of Article VII, Section 3 and the case law shows the development of the court's views about superintending power, culminating in the 1977 constitutional amendment. The court has examined and reexamined the basis of the superintending power over the years and has defined and redefined the power. The court's conceptualization ends where it began: The court's superintending power is as broad as necessary to meet the needs of changing circumstances, and that power is to be exercised judiciously. The question of this court's exercising its superintending authority over the courts and litigation "is one of policy, not power."15
¶ 71. The analysis starts with the language of Article VII, Section 3 of the 1848 constitution, then considers the adoption of the 1977 constitutional amendment to Article VII, Section 3, and culminates with recent cases interpreting the constitutional grant of superintending authority.
¶ 72. Article VII, Section 3 of the 1848 constitution regarding superintending control read as follows:
The supreme court, except in cases otherwise provided in this constitution, shall have appellate jurisdiction only, which shall be coextensive with the state; but in no case removed to the supreme court shall a trial by a jury be allowed. The supreme court shall have a general *180superintending control over all inferior courts; it shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo warranto, certiorari, and other original and remedial writs, and to hear and determine the same (emphasis added).
After the 1977 constitutional amendment, the grant of superintending control in Article VII, Section 3(1), which governs the instant case, reads simply as follows:
The Supreme Court shall have superintending and administrative authority over all courts.16
¶ 73. The 1848 constitution's words "superintending control over all inferior courts" are broad and unlimited. The 1848 Wisconsin constitutional documents do not help us in understanding the meaning of "superintending control." We therefore turn to contemporaneous interpretations of the 1848 Constitution as a source of its meaning. Contemporaneous legislative or judicial interpretations of the state constitution have special value.17 The legislators or judges who were on hand when the constitution was adopted have a unique *181perspective. They ought to know what the constitution means. On the issue of the court's superintending power, we have a contemporaneous judicial interpretation and that interpretation should be given great weight.
¶ 74. In 1853, five years after the adoption of the Wisconsin Constitution, Justice Adam Smith, writing for the court in The Attorney General v. Blossom, 1 Wis. 277 [*317] (1853), addressed the meaning of "superintending control" in a case involving the court's power to issue a writ of quo warranto. Blossom, like cases to follow, was concerned with the relation of superintending control to the writs specified in the constitution.
¶ 75. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Smith interpreted the phrase "superintending control over all inferior courts" as a broad grant of power to the supreme court. The court's power would, he wrote, be interpreted over the years to enable the court to fulfill its role as the court of last resort in the state.18 *182Although Justice Smith viewed the constitutional "superintending" language as a grant of power, he asserted that the clause may have been unnecessary because this power might be arrived at by implication.19
¶ 76. To add weight to his persuasive reasoning, Justice Smith reminded his readers that a justice of the court joining his opinion had been a member of the judiciary committee that reported the judiciary article at the constitutional convention.20
¶ 77. Justice Smith's broad interpretation of the court's superintending power was echoed 21 years later by Chief Justice Edward Ryan, in The Attorney General v. Railroad Cos., 35 Wis. 425 (1874). Chief Justice Ryan was a prominent member of the 1846 constitutional *183convention.21 Chief Justice Ryan, writing for a unanimous supreme court, wrote that the constitutional grant is
to the supreme court of the state, in the full significance of that term given in Attorney General v. Blossom; designed to have a general judicial oversight of the state in all its interests, public and private. To this court, as such, are given general appellate jurisdiction and superintending control over all other courts throughout the state, because these are essential to the judicial supremacy of the court in all ordinary litigation ... 22
Chief Justice Ryan explained that the appellate, original, and superintending jurisdiction of the court all had one underlying policy: "to make this court indeed a supreme judicial tribunal over the whole state; a court of last resort on all judicial questions under the constitution and laws of the state .. . ,"23
¶ 78. Justice Smith's and Chief Justice Ryan's broad interpretation of superintending authority in the Blossom and the Railroad Cos. cases became the accepted view after judicial meanderings along other paths, one of which I discuss below.
*184¶ 79. One such meandering was Justice Winslow's unanimous opinion for the court in State ex rel. Fourth National Bank of Philadelphia v. Johnson, 103 Wis. 591, 79 N.W. 1081 (1899). Justice Winslow quoted Blossom's and Railroad Cos.' broad interpretations of superintending control but added a spin to these cases. Justice Winslow looked to English law (as had Justice Smith in Blossom)24 and seemed to take a narrower view of superintending control, emphasizing the use of writs specified in the exercise of superintending control to keep courts within their jurisdiction and compel action when courts failed to exercise jurisdiction.25 Justice Winslow's opinion seems to make a distinction between using the superintending power to correct jurisdictional errors of lower courts and using the superintending power to correct other judicial errors.
¶ 80. A second case following the Johnson path was Seiler v. State, 112 Wis. 293, 87 N.W. 1072 (1901), which Justice Roujet D. Marshall wrote for the court. Although the Seiler court stated that the nature of superintending control was decided by the Blossom, Railroad Cos., and Johnson cases, Justice Marshall's Seiler opinion seems to follow the theme of the Johnson case limiting superintending control to English practice.26
*185¶ 81. The Johnson and Seiler cases apparently-misinterpreted Justice Smith's discussion of the King's Bench in Blossom to suggest that the powers of the English King's Bench defined the superintending powers of the state supreme court. The justices returned, however, to the principles of Blossom, repudiating the narrower Johnson-Seiler King's Bench path, in State ex rel. Umbreit v. Helms, 136 Wis. 432, 118 N.W. 158 (1908). The views regarding the scope of the court's power set forth in the concurrences of Helms are essentially the way this court has viewed its superintending power since that case. In Helms, the supreme court was asked to exercise its superintending control by directing a circuit court judge to set aside his order quashing and dismissing a criminal complaint. Justice Kerwin, writing for the court, declared it unnecessary to write much on the meaning of superintending control. Justice Marshall and Chief Justice Winslow took the opportunity in concurring opinions to express their views on superintending control in an attempt to settle what they viewed as a festering interpretive issue.
¶ 82. In a concurring opinion with a lengthy historical synopsis, Justice Marshall, the author of Seiler, sought to put to rest the meaning of "superintending power."27 Justice Marshall endorsed the Blossom and Railroad Cos. cases, adopting their broad view of superintending power rather than the narrow view he appeared to express in Seiler.28 Justice Marshall did *186not, however, view the Johnson case as narrowing the scope of the Blossom and Railroad Cos. interpretations.
¶ 83. Chief Justice Winslow, the author of the Johnson case, also separately concurred in Helms. Although he interpreted Johnson as holding that superintending control meant the power exercised by the English court of King's Bench and not extending to all cases of judicial error, Chief Justice Winslow graciously backed away from this view in order to achieve, as he wrote, court unanimity. Chief Justice Winslow wrote as follows:
The majority of my brethren, however, hold that, even if my view of the English rule be correct (which they do not concede), still this court in the first Johnson Case took a much broader ground .... Upon mature reflection and with some hesitation I have yielded to this view, not because I have become convinced of error in my first conclusion, but chiefly because it has seemed to me eminently desirable that a troublesome question which has been frequently presented to us of late *187should be definitely and clearly settled with as great unanimity as possible.
It is not to be supposed that the constitution conferred the power of superintending control on this court to be used as a sort of an addition to the ordinary appellate jurisdiction in ordinary litigation, but rather as an extraordinary power to be wisely used only in cases where there has been a miscarriage of justice involving important public rights or great and widely extended private interests.29
¶ 84. Thus the court in Helms resolved the question of the interpretation of superintending control in favor of the broad view of the power expressed in Blossom.
¶ 85. The concurrences in the instant case tenaciously hang on to the limited view of superintending power expressed in Johnson and Seiler relying on English law, even though Justice Winslow, the author of the English King's Bench limited view of superintending control in Johnson, backed away from this narrow interpretation.
¶ 86. Justice John D. Wickhem summarized the case law in a law review article using the following words, words very similar to those used by the court recently in Arneson, quoted above:
The first and principal purpose of the constitutional grant is to insure protection of the rights of persons as litigants.
[T]he field of superintendence [is] not lightly entered ....
*188Many elements enter into the question whether the court in any given instance ought to exercise that power.
The merits of each case must be considered in light of the objectives of the grant and the necessary limitations upon its exercise.
The later cases hold that an exercise of the court's superintending control may be justified in spite of the fact that a determination of the duty of the inferior court and the scope of the petitioner's rights may present difficult and close questions of law.
[Tjhere were [in the cases] serious differences of opinion as to rationale, but that the tendency of the court was to liberalize the rule.30
¶ 87. Using inherent, implied, or superintending power, or a combination thereof, the court has in the latter part of the 20th century exercised its power over courts, judges, and attorneys to protect the state, the public, the litigants, and the due administration of justice. For example, the court adopted a unified bar and compelled payment of fees,31 and has promulgated32 and enforced a Code of Judicial Ethics.33
*189¶ 88. Against the contention that the court's inherent power is limited to regulation of attorneys and the physical operation of the courtroom and not the regulation of judges, Chief Justice Wilkie (and three of his colleagues) upheld the court's Code of Judicial Ethics in In re Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 235 N.W.2d 409 (1975), harkening back to the Blossom and Railroad Cos. cases by stating that the "inherent power of this court is shaped, not by prior usage, but by the continuing necessity that this court carry out its function as a supreme court."34 In using the court's superintending power as a justification for the adoption and enforcement of the Code of Judicial Ethics, Chief Justice Wilkie concluded that that the "superintending power is as broad and as flexible as necessary to insure the due administration of justice in the courts of this state." Chief Justice Wilkie wrote:
If this power were strictly limited to the situations in which it was previously applied [that is, as Judge Kading contended, to control courts in matters between parties to a litigation], it would cease to be superintending, since this word definitely contemplates ongoing, continuing supervision in response to changing needs and circumstances. The power of superintending control should not he ossified by an unduly restrictive interpretation of its extent.35
¶ 89. The Chief Justice asserted that the Code protects the rights of all litigants. "If the superintending power can be used to protect particular parties to a *190particular litigation, then surely it can be used to protect the rights of litigants in general."36
¶ 90. The dissenters in Kading disagreed with the court's view of its superintending power, relying on the discarded English King's Bench version of superintending control in Seiler and Johnson.37 A law student comment by Dennis Gallagher, relying on the repudiated Seiler case, erroneously gives credence to the dissenters' position.38 The dissent in Kading is better understood as an objection as a matter of policy to the use of the court's inherent and superintending powers to adopt a Code of Judicial Ethics rather than as a persuasive discussion of the court's power.
¶ 91. To summarize the cases pertaining to the court's superintending power through the 1970s: The 1853 Blossom court declared that the superintending power is as broad as necessary to control litigation and the rights of litigants; the writs named in the third grant of power in the constitutional article are not necessarily the only means for exercising superintending power. The Johnson and Seiler cases appear to have limited the court's superintending control to the power *191used by the English court of the King's Bench. The concurring opinions in Helms (including one by Justice Winslow, who authored Johnson) returned to the views expressed in Blossom and interpreted the Johnson case broadly. The majority of the court in the Kading case enforcing the Code of Judicial Ethics followed the broad interpretation of the court's superintending power as first enunciated in 1853 in the Blossom case.
¶ 92. The judiciary article of the Wisconsin Constitution was amended in 1977. The supreme court's superintending authority was placed in a one-sentence subsection separated from the other subsections granting appellate and original jurisdiction and separated from any reference to writs. Article VII, Section 3(1) of the 1977 amendment reads simply as follows regarding the court's superintending powers: "The supreme court shall have superintending and administrative authority over all courts."
¶ 93. Thus, in 1977, presumably aware of the historical case law interpreting the 1848 constitution and the court's exercise of superintending power to adopt and enforce the Code of Judicial Ethics, the legislature and the people of the state decoupled the court's superintending authority over all state courts from the writs specified in the 1848 constitution and thereby gave their imprimatur to the court's historical interpretation of the 1848 language attributing to the court broad constitutional superintending power to control litigation. Thus, the 1977 constitutional amendment implemented Justice Adam Smith's broad explication of the court's superintending power set forth in the Blossom case and in Chief Justice Wilkie's opinion in Kading.
¶ 94. Thereafter, this court has adhered to this understanding of its superintending power. Thus the *192recent Arneson and Hass cases follow the broad interpretation of the constitutional superintending authority enunciated in Blossom and subsequent cases and embodied in the 1977 constitutional amendment.
¶ 95. The present case fits within the historical understanding of the constitutional grant of superintending power to this court and the 1977 constitutional amendment and is, in my view on balancing all the equities, a prudent exercise of the court's power to control the course of litigation in the courts of this state.
HH 1 — 1
¶ 96. I also write separately to explain why the majority opinion's holding that an adult's presence is a significant factor under the totality of circumstances test does not go far enough. I would adopt a per se rule excluding in-custody admissions from any child under the age of 16 who has not been given the opportunity to consult with a parent or interested adult. Here are my top 8 (interrelated and overlapping) reasons for adopting a per se rule:
¶ 97. Reason No. 1. A per se rule should be adopted because Wisconsin law enforcement officers have not heeded the warning this court issued 30 years ago in Theriault v. State, 66 Wis. 2d 33, 223 N.W.2d 850 (1974), that law enforcement's failure to call a juvenile's parents would be viewed as "strong evidence that coercive tactics were used to elicit the incriminating statements."39 In addition to our admonishment in Theri-ault, in 1981 a Milwaukee County circuit court "berated *193the [Milwaukee] police department for not notifying the defendant's parents in order to give them an opportunity to be present during the police questioning."40 As the present case demonstrates, the long-time practice of Milwaukee police officers to exclude parents from the interrogation of juveniles has continued. Despite The-riault and the Milwaukee County circuit court's admonishment, the practice of excluding parents during juvenile interrogation is apparently widespread throughout the state.41
¶ 98. Theriault and the Milwaukee County Circuit Court's admonishment obviously have not changed police practices, and there is no reason to think a second clarion call by this court re-announcing Theriault's totality of the circumstances rule will change police practices, especially when a leading police interrogation manual recommends that police interrogate suspects in privacy whenever possible.42
¶ 99. Reason No. 2. A per se rule should be adopted because Wisconsin courts have not heeded this court's warning from Theriault that law enforcement's failure to call a juvenile's parents would be viewed as *194"strong evidence that coercive tactics were used to elicit incriminating statements."43 Courts have inconsistently applied the totality of circumstances test and have tended to haphazardly exclude only the most egregiously obtained confessions.44 A fair reading of the Wisconsin cases demonstrates that Wisconsin courts (including this court) do not consider law enforcement's failure to call a juvenile's parents or an interested adult as strong or even some evidence of coercive tactics.45
*195¶ 100. There is no reason to think a second clarion call by this court re-announcing Theriault's totality of the circumstances test will change court practices.
¶ 101. Reason No. 3. A per se rule should be adopted because juveniles do not have the decision-making capacity and understanding of adults. Emerging studies demonstrate that the area of the brain governing decision making and the weighing of risks and rewards continues to develop into the late teens and the early twenties.46 Further studies show that *196children under the age of 16 are less capable than adults of understanding their Miranda rights,47 have a propensity to confess to police,48 and are less capable than adults of making long range decisions.49 As the United States Supreme Court observed over 40 years ago, adult *197advice would put a juvenile "on a less unequal footing with his [or her] interrogators."50
¶ 102. Courts using the totality of circumstances test have not considered this evidence and have not weighed factors that make-children uniquely vulnerable during interrogation.51
¶ 103. Reason No. 4. A per se rule should be adopted to prevent false confessions. Although it is difficult for many of us to understand what leads an innocent person to confess to a crime, especially a serious felony, researchers have documented that false confessions are "a leading cause of the wrongful convictions of the innocent in America."52
¶ 104. When used against vulnerable suspects, standard police interrogation techniques are especially apt to lead to false confessions.53 Juveniles and the mentally retarded are the most vulnerable to modern psychological interrogation techniques.54 It follows that juveniles "appear with some regularity in false confession cases."55
*198¶ 105. Although it is difficult to quantify the exact number of false juvenile confessions, the court of appeals referred to one study in which over a two-year period almost a dozen juveniles in the United States who confessed to committing murder were subsequently proven innocent.56 The majority opinion acknowledges false confessions and notes the Central Park jogger rape case in which five youths ages 14 to 16 (interrogated in the absence of their parents) falsely confessed to rape.57
¶ 106. The U.S. Supreme Court has accepted that parental counsel and advice are crucial protections for juveniles against coercion and intimidation during police interrogation and are crucial to the voluntariness analysis. The Supreme Court has urged that the "greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary,"58 and that a juvenile needs someone to lean on "lest the overpowering presence of the law, as he knows it, may not crush him."59
¶ 107. At least two state courts have concluded that when a parent is deliberately excluded from interrogation of a juvenile, a confession almost invariably will be suppressed.60-
*199¶ 108. Given the limited mental abilities of juveniles and their heightened susceptibility to suggestion, a per se rule is needed to increase the likelihood that a guilty verdict will not be based on a false confession and be overturned on appeal. A per se rule thus fosters the fair administration of justice.
¶ 109. Reason No. 5. A per se rule should be adopted to protect parental and family values. One of the oldest fundamental liberty interests recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court is that of parents to direct the care, control, and upbringing of their children.61 This constitutional protection extends to parents' right to be consulted in decisions that have potentially traumatic and permanent consequences.62
¶ 110. This court's failure to mandate that a parent or interested adult be present during juvenile interrogation offends constitutionally protected — and societally accepted — concepts of parental rights.
¶ 111. Reason No. 6. A per se rule should be adopted because it comports with Wisconsin legislative policy evidenced in numerous statutes requiring parents or guardians to have a say in a variety of significant decisions affecting their children.63
*200¶ 112. This court's failure to mandate that a parent or interested adult be present during juvenile interrogation offends legislatively protected — and soci-etally accepted — parental rights.
¶ 113. Reason No. 7. A per se rule should be adopted because it has proven to function well in other states and in England. According to one commentator, thirteen states have adopted, by case law or legislative action, some form of a per se parental consultation rule.64 In 1998 the Kansas supreme court65 reviewed court-imposed rules from Massachusetts,66 Missouri,67 New York,68 Indiana,69 Vermont,70 and Florida71 and adopted a per se rule.
¶ 114. Great Britain's Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 details a Code of Practice for the Detention, Treatment, and Questioning of Persons by Police Officers, including those persons under 17 years of age. Juveniles must have an "appropriate adult" *201present during interrogation. An "appropriate adult" is defined as a parent or guardian, or, if the child is under a local authority, a representative of that authority. Once a child is taken into custody, authorities must inform this adult as soon as practicable. Police are required to inform the child that an adult is there to advise him or her, and that he or she has the right to consult with the adult privately at any time. During the interview, the police must advise the adult that the adult is not expected to function merely as an observer, but is present to advise the child, assure that the interview is properly and fairly conducted, and "facilitate communication" between the parties.
¶ 115. Reason No. 8. A per se rule should be adopted because such a rule is the right, just, and fair way to operate the Wisconsin judicial system.
¶ 116. Police and law television dramas may lead us to believe that interrogations using psychological tactics (including trickery) lead to sound and reliable confessions.72 Television is not reality. What may be compelling entertainment (as we cheer for the good guys and applaud the capture and successful prosecution of the bad guys) is far removed from the complications of the real world that sadly includes unreliable and false confessions.
¶ 117. Wisconsin must do more than apply the "totality of the circumstances" rule to protect children and families and tackle the problem of false confessions. Mandating electronic recording of juvenile interroga*202tions is a very important step, but it is only one step. I would have the court fashion a rule requiring the participation of an interested adult in the interrogation process of juveniles. Other jurisdictions provide good working models. Such a rule will provide desperately needed procedural safeguards to protect children and families and to ensure the validity of confessions and the sound administration of justice.
¶ 118. For the reasons set forth, I join the majority opinion but also separately concur.
¶ 119. I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH BRADLEY, N. PATRICK CROOKS, and LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. join only Part I of this concurrence.

 Justices Ann Walsh Bradley, N. Patrick Crooks, and Lotus B. Butler join only Part I of this concurrence relating to the court's superintending authority, making Part I the decision of the majority of the court regarding the nature of the court's superintending authority over all courts.

 State v. Jerrell C.J., 2004 WI App 9, ¶ 32, 269 Wis. 2d 442, 674 N.W.2d 607 (issuing a call for action).

 Brief and Appendix of Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner at 30-34. The defendant and the court of appeals suggest adoption of the rule set forth in In re E.T.C., 449 A.2d 937 (Vt. 1982). See Jerrell C.J., 269 Wis. 2d 442, ¶ 31.
The Vermont Supreme Court in E.T.C., 449 A.2d at 940, adopted the following criteria for a juvenile to voluntarily and intelligently waive his right against self-incrimination and right to counsel:
(1) [H]e must be given the opportunity to consult with an adult; (2) that adult must be one who is not only genuinely interested in the welfare of the juvenile but completely independent from and disassociated with the prosecution, e.g., a parent, legal guardian, or attorney representing the juvenile; and (3) the independent interested adult must be informed and be aware of the rights guaranteed to the juvenile.

 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Children & Family Justice Center, Professor Emérita Marygold S. Melli, & The Juvenile Law Center.

 See id.

 See id.

 Majority op., ¶ 39.

 Majority op., ¶¶ 47-49.

 See, e.g., State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 329 N.W.2d 386 (1983) (altering the rules regarding admissibility of hyp*176notically affected evidence); State v. Dean, 103 Wis. 2d 228, 307 N.W.2d 628 (1981) (polygraph evidence inadmissible).

 State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 45, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982).
I agree with Justice Prosser's concurrence that "[i]t is not completely clear how the court's 'superintending authority' differs from the court's inherent power, for the two powers sometimes overlap." Justice Prosser's concurrence/dissent, ¶ 136.
This court has grouped inherent power with implied and incidental powers and has defined them as those powers that are necessary "to enable the judiciary to accomplish its constitutionally or legislatively mandated functions." State ex rel. Friedrich v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 192 Wis. 2d 1, 16, 531 N.W.2d 32 (1995) (quoting State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 44, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982) (quoting State v. Cannon, 199 Wis. 401, 402, 226 N.W. 385 (1929))).
For a discussion of the supreme court's powers, see Comment, Inherent Power and Administrative Court Reform, 58 Marq. L. Rev. 133, 135-36 (1974); Dennis Gallagher, Comment, Superintending Power of the Wisconsin Supreme Court and Financial Disclosure Rules for Judges, 1977 Wis. L. Rev. 1111; Wis. Legislative Reference Bureau, The Powers of the Wisconsin Supreme Court (Res. Bull. 76-RB-l, 27-33). For a listing of Wisconsin cases and commentaries discussing court powers, see *177State ex rel. Friedrich v. Circuit Court for Dane County 192 Wis.2d 1, 16, 531 N.W.2d 32 (1995).

 Gallagher, supra note 10, at 1124 (citing John M. Connors, Inherent Power of the Courts — Management Tool or Rhe-. torical Weapon?, 1 Justice System J. 63, 65-68 (1973)).

 Arneson v. Jezwinski, 206 Wis. 2d 217, 226, 556 N.W.2d 721 (1996).

 See also State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶¶ 12-16, 99, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142 (The court unquestionably has the *178power to require the court of appeals to certify to this court any case presenting a conflict between our precedent and a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court.).

 Arneson, 206 Wis. 2d at 225-26.

 State ex rel. Hass v. Wis. Court of Appeals, 2001 WI 128, ¶ 12, 248 Wis. 2d 634, 636 N.W.2d 707.

 The 1977 amendment removed the reference to writs from the supreme court's superintending power. Writs are referred to in Article VII, Section 3(2) as follows: "The supreme court has appellate jurisdiction over all courts and may hear original actions and proceedings. The supreme court may issue all writs necessary in aid of its jurisdiction."

 The court in State v. Beno, 116 Wis. 2d 122, 136-37, 341 N.W.2d 668 (1984), and in other cases, has recognized that when-the plain meaning of words is not helpful in constitutional interpretation, contemporaneous authority is the next best interpretive tool. Constitutional interpretation involves
(1) The plain meaning of the words in the context used; (2) The historical analysis of the constitutional debates and of what practices were in existence in 1848, which the court may reasonably presume were also known to the framers of the 1848 consti*181tution; and (3) The earliest interpretation of this section by the legislature as manifested in the first law passed following the adoption of the constitution. (Citations omitted.)

 Justice Smith wrote as follows:
It is obvious, then, that when the framers of the constitution speak of a supreme court, they intended to convey the idea of the highest tribunal in the judicial department of the government.
. . . "The supreme court shall have a general superintending control over all inferior courts."
After the words "inferior courts," there is a period. The sentence is as complete and independent as is the first sentence which speaks of the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court.
*182This sentence contains a clear grant of power. We will not undertake to say that without this grant, the power would not be in the court. It is not necessary to discuss that question. We are endeavoring to arrive at the proper construction of the written law. It is a grant of power. It is unlimited in extent. It is undefined in character. It is unsupplied with means and instrumentalities. The constitution leaves us wholly in the dark as to the means of exercising this clear, unequivocal grant of power. It gives, indeed, the jurisdiction, but does not pretend to intimate its instruments or agencies....
The Attorney General v. Blossom, 1 Wis. 277 [*317], 281-83 [*322-25] (1853).

 Blossom, 1 Wis. at 284 [*326]:
The very force of the terms, supreme court; comprehending, naming, instituting the highest, the dernier judicial tribunal known to, and recognized by the common law, necessarily carries with it all the writs, instrumentalities, powers and agencies provided by the common law for the convenient and complete exercise of such superintending control. It is idle to say that the enumeration of such writs as are mentioned, were made to supply such means of superintending control.

 Blossom, 1 Wis. at 289 [*332].

 Wisconsin Supreme Court, Portraits of Justice: The Wisconsin Supreme Court's First 150 Years 16 (2d ed. 2003), available online at http://wicourts.gov/about/pubs/supreme/ docs/ portraitsofjustice.pdf.

 The Attorney General v. Railroad Cos., 35 Wis. 425, 518 (1874).

 Railroad Cos., 35 Wis. at 518.
Although State ex rel. Fourth Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 103 Wis. 591, 611-12, 79 N.W. 1081 (1899) limited the court's superintending power to correcting jurisdictional errors, later cases clarified that the power extended to judicial errors. State ex rel. Umbreit v. Helms, 136 Wis. 432, 450-52 (1908) (Marshall, J., concurring).

 Justice Smith discussed England's King's Bench in order to shed light on the history of writs specified in the original version of Article VII, Section 3. See Blossom, 1 Wis. at 277-280 [*318-21],

 See John D. Wickhem, The Power of Superintending Control of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1941 Wis. L. Rev. 153, 164-65.

 Seiler v. State, 112 Wis. 293, 299-301, 87 N.W. 1072 (1901).

 Helms, 136 Wis. at 442 (Marshall, J., concurring).

 Helms, 136 Wis. at 449 (Marshall, J., concurring):
Its broad and comprehensive character was emphasized at many points, the idea being made prominent that the instrumentalities for its exercise were to be discovered or invented, if need be, the power itself not to fail of efficiency in any given situation because of the ordinary restrictions upon the use of any particular writ or *186writs; that the constitutional grant was both "compact and congruous in itself," with its own "uniform group of analogous remedies" to be exercised in ways of its own "on many objects, in great variety of detail."... No suggestion is found up to this point that the concept of the constitution makers, as understood by this court, was based upon any model or any idea other than that to so round out supreme judicial authority as to afford a means in any given circumstances of preventing a denial of justice.
See also John D. Wickhem, The Power of Superintending Control of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1941 Wis. L. Rev. at 165-66 (J. Marshall expressly held that the power of superintending control extends into field of judicial error; C.J. Winslow deferred to the court's conclusion that the case is governed by Johnson, although as an original proposition he would not have extended the superintending power to cases of judicial review; J. Dodge took the view that superintending power, as it existed in the King's Bench, included the power to review all preliminary questions needing to be decided before an inferior court could consider the merits of the case).

 Helms, 136 Wis. at 464-65 (Winslow, C.J., concurring).

 John D. Wickhem, The Power of Superintending Control of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1941 Wis. L. Rev. at 162-66.

 In re Integration of the Bar, 249 Wis. 523, 25 N.W.2d 500 (1946).

 In the Matter of the Promulgation of a Code of Judicial Ethics, 36 Wis. 2d 252, 153 N.W.2d 873 (1967).

 In re Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 235 N.W.2d 409 (1975).

 Id. at 519.

 Id. at 520.

 Id.

 Id. at 537-40 (Hansen, J., dissenting).

 Gallagher, supra note 10, at 1120.
One problem with Gallagher's comment stems from his view that when it instituted a Code of Judicial Ethics, the supreme court had gone beyond its superintending powers to control "all members of the judiciary, not only as lawyers but also as 'judicial officers in a court system constituting the judicial branch of the state government... .'" Gallagher, supra note 10, at 1119 (citing Code of Judicial Ethics, 36 Wis. 2d 252, 254, 153 N.W.2d 873, 873 (1968)). The court's action should be seen instead as controlling the course of litigation in inferior courts, a power well within its superintending authority.

 Theriault v. State, 66 Wis. 2d 33, 48, 223 N.W.2d 850 (1974).

 In re C.W., No. 1980AP1844, unpublished slip op. at 2 (Wis. Ct. App. May 7, 1981).

 See, e.g., the present case (14r-year-old, Milwaukee County); In re C.W., No. 1980AP1844, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 7,1981) (12-year-old, Milwaukee County); State v. Campbell, No. 1980AP2136-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. March 16, 1982) (17-year-old, Forest County); State v. Glotz, No. 1983AP1792-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 1984) (17-year-old, LaCrosse County); R.E.W. v. State, No. 1986AP471, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 1986) (14r-year-old, Rock County).

 See Fred E. Inbau et al., Criminal Interrogation and Confessions 51-56, 521 (4th ed. 2001).

 Theriault, 66 Wis. 2d at 48.

 See Barry C. Feld, Bad Kids 118-19 (1999).
See In re 955 P.2d 1302 (Kan. 1998), in which the Kansas supreme court adopted a per se rule because the prosecution and trial court in that case gave only lip service to the factors in the totality of circumstances test.
For the haphazard pattern in Wisconsin cases, see cases at note 45, infra.

 For court of appeals cases giving short shrift to Theriault without even mentioning its "strong evidence" language, see, e.g., State v. Michael G., No. 2000AP1435, unpublished slip op. at 1 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2000) ("[P]arental presence is only one factor to consider and is not an absolute prerequisite."); State v. Rea, No. 1994AP2460-CR, unpublished slip op. at 4 (Wis. Ct. App. April 16, 1996) ("[P]resence of a parent or an attorney is not required to validate a juvenile's waiver."); State v. Glotz, 122 Wis. 2d 519, 523, 362 N.W.2d 179 (Ct. App. 1984) (noting that "reasonable expectation" language in Theriault does not apply and that circuit court's finding that juvenile confessed because police said witnesses could identify him was reasonable); State v. Campbell, No. 1980AP2136-CR, unpublished slip op. at 2 (Wis. Ct. App. March 16, 1982) ("The absence of a parent is but one of the factors making up the totality of the circumstances."); In re C.W., No. 1980AP1844, unpublished slip op. at 1 (Wis. Ct. App. May 7, 1981) ("[T]he presence of parents or an attorney is not an absolute requirement for the minor [a 12-year-old] to validly waive his right to remain silent.").
*195For a court of appeals case carefully analyzing all the facts and circumstances including the absence of a grandmother during interrogation and suppressing the confession of a 14-year-old, see R.E.W. v. State, No. 1986AP471, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 1986) (14-year-old, Rock County).
For a Wisconsin Supreme Court case in which the court failed to consider Theriault at all in determining whether a juvenile's (aged 16 years, 9 months) waivers of right to counsel and right to remain silent were, under the totality of the circumstances, knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, see State v. Woods, 117 Wis. 2d 701, 345 N.W.2d 457 (1984). In that case, Woods' mother went to the police station and asked to see Woods. The police denied permission because he was being interrogated. The case was overruled by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals under a different name, Woods v. Clusen, 794 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1986).
Compare State v. Bendlin, No. 1998AP426, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 1986), with Woods. In Bendlin, the court of appeals suppressed statements made by a 17-year-old as violative of Miranda, including a reference to Theriault's language requiring "greatest care" in assessing the validity of a juvenile's confession.

 See, e.g., Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., Mapping Continued Brain Growth and Gray Matter Density Reduction in Dorsal *196Frontal Cortex: Inverse Relationships during Postadolescent Brain Maturation, 21 J. Neurosci. 8819, 8828 (2001).
Information about juvenile brain development is available on the ABA's Juvenile Justice Center's website at http://www.abanet.Org/crimjust/juvjus/resources#brain.

 See, e.g., Barbara Kaban & Ann E. Tobey, When Police Question Children: Are Protections Adequate?, 1 J. Ctr. for Child. & Cts. 151 (1999); Barry C. Field, Competence, Culpability, and Punishment: Implications of Atkins for Executing and Sentencing Juveniles, 32 Hofstra L. Rev. 463, 530-535 (Winter 2003); David T. Huang, Less Unequal Footing: State Courts' Per Se Rules for Juvenile Waivers During Interrogations and the Case For Their Implementation, 86 Corn. L. Rev. 437, 449 (2001); Robert E. McGuire, A Proposal to Strengthen Juvenile Miranda Rights: Requiring Parental Presence in Custodial Interrogation, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1355, 1381-82 (2000); Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 Cal. L. Rev. 1134, 1160-61 (1980).

 See, e.g., Allison D. Redlich & Gail S. Goodman, Taking Responsibility for an Act Not Committed: The Influence of Age and Suggestibility, Law & Human Behavior 141, 152-53 (April 2003); Kaban & Tobey, supra note 47; Jennifer J. Walters, Comment, Illinois' Weakened Attempt to Prevent False Confessions by Juveniles: The Requirement of Counsel for the Interrogations of Some Juveniles, 33 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 487, 504-05 (2002); McGuire, supra note 47, at 1381-82; Maggie Brack & Stephen J. Ceci, The Suggestibility of Children's Memory, 50 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 419 (1999); Amy Bach, True Crime, False Confession, The Nation, Feb. 8, 1999, at 21.

 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Lawrence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 799, 814-15 (Feb. 2003). See Wis. Stat. § 48.375 (requiring parental consent for abortion, finding *197that "[i]mmature minors often lack the ability to make fully informed choices that take account of both immediate and long-range consequences").

 Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962).

 See Reason No. 2 and cases discussed at note 45, supra.

 Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 891, 906 (2004).

 See, e.g., Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitutional Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 105, 120 (1997).

 Drizin & Leo, supra note 52, at 919.

 John E. Reid and Associates, False Confession Cases— The Issues, available at http://www.reid.com/educational_info/ r_tips.html?serial=1080839438473936&print.

 Jerrell C.J., 269 Wis. 2d 442, ¶ 30, citing Walters, supra note 48, at 489.

 See majority op., ¶ 26 n.6. For discussions of the Central Park jogger case, see, e.g., Sydney H. Schanberg, When Justice is a Game: A Journey Through the Tangled Case of the Central Park Jogger, Village Voice, Nov. 20-26,2002, at 36; Rivka Gewirtz Little, Changed Lives Among Central Park Five Family Members Across 110th Street, Village Voice, Nov. 6-12, 2002, at 39; Dasun Alah, Guilty Until Proven Innocent, Village Voice, Sept. 11-17, 2002, at 24.

 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967).

 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 600 (1948).

 State v. Farrell, 766 A.2d 1057, 1062 (N.H. 2001); State v. Presha, 748 A.2d 1108, 1118 (N.J. 2000).

 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).

 H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 412 (1981).

 See Jerrell C.J., 269 Wis. 2d 442, ¶ 29 (citing state laws requiring parental consent for marriage, buying or leasing a car, purchasing alcohol or tobacco products, changing one's name, and having an abortion).

 Thomas J. Von Wald, Note, No Questions Asked! State v. Horse: A Proposition for a Per Se Rule When Interrogating Juveniles, 48 S.D. L. Rev. 143, 164 n.237 (2002-03).

 In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d 1302 (Kan. 1998). Counsel for B.M.B. argued that the following states have statutory restrictions on the admissibility of unadvised juvenile statements: Colorado, Connecticut, Iowa, Montana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and West Virginia. See id. at 1310.

 See Commonwealth v. MacNeill, 502 N.E.2d 938 (Mass. 1987).

 In re K.W.B., 500 S.W.2d 275 (Mo. App. 1973).

 See In re Aaron D., 290 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1968).

 Lewis v. State, 288 N.E.2d 138 (Ind. 1972); Sevion v. State, 620 N.E. 2d 736, 737 n.1 (Ind. App. 1993).

 See In re E.T.C., 449 A.2d 937 (Vt. 1982); State v. Piper, 468 A.2d 554 (Vt. 1983).

 J.E.S. v. State, 366 So. 2d 538 (Fla. App. 1979).

 The court has held that trickery, that is, misrepresentations during an interrogation of a juvenile, is considered on a case-by-case basis as part of the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the misrepresentation created pressure sufficient to overcome a suspect's free will. State v. Woods, 117 Wis. 2d 701, 726, 345 N.W.2d 457 (1984).