Court Opinion

ID: 9629062
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:36:27.942782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:15.078858
License: Public Domain

BYE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I would affirm the district court’s order reducing Delano Maxwell’s and Hassan Majied’s sentences to 240 months’ imprisonment because such reductions are authorized by section 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) of the Sentencing Guidelines. I therefore respectfully dissent.
As noted by the majority, the Guidelines permit a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) — beyond the two-level reduction authorized by Amendment 706 — if “the original term of imprisonment imposed was less than the term of imprisonment provided by the guideline range applicable to the defendant at the time of sentencing.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) § lB1.10(b)(2)(B). When Maxwell and Majied were first sentenced in July 1993, the district court originally imposed sentences of 240 months, less than the guideline range applicable to each defendant at the time (i.e., life imprisonment for Maxwell and 360 months-to-life for Majied). As a consequence, when the two men filed motions for sentence reductions under § 3582(c), the district court was authorized to grant a reduction comparable to the original reduction. See id. (indicating a “reduction comparably less than the amended guideline range ... may be appropriate” when the original term of imprisonment is below the guideline range applicable at the time of sentencing).
The majority concludes the 360-month sentences the two men received upon re-sentencing in November 1995 constituted their “original” terms of imprisonment, rather than the 240-month sentences the district court first imposed in July 1993. I disagree for several reasons. First, the sole rationale provided for this otherwise unsupported conclusion is flawed. The majority concludes the November 1995 resentencings were the original terms of imprisonment because the original sentences imposed in July 1993 were subsequently vacated by our court. See United States v. Maxwell, 25 F.3d 1389, 1401 (8th Cir.1994) (vacating the original 240-month terms of imprisonment and remanding for resentencing). The fact that the 240-month *590sentences were vacated did not change them into something other than the “original” terms of imprisonment, or more aptly, nothing at all: it simply meant the original terms of imprisonment had been vacated. “Original” means “[preceding all others in time: FIRST.” Webster’s New College Dictionary 792 (3d ed.2008). Whether subsequently vacated or not, the “original” sentences were still the first sentences imposed; they necessarily preceded the resentencings. It is axiomatic that there could not be resentencings without the vacation of the “original” terms of imprisonment.
Second, the manner in which courts routinely refer to an original sentence, even when subsequently vacated on appeal, supports my conclusion the “original” terms of imprisonment were the 240-month sentences imposed by the district court in July 1993, not the 360-month terms imposed upon resentencing in November 1995. For example, in United States v. Sanders, 452 F.3d 572 (6th Cir.2006), the defendant was originally sentenced to thirty-seven months. The sentence was vacated on appeal and the defendant resentenced to 188 months. The 188-month sentence was also vacated on appeal and the defendant resentenced to 180 months. The defendant thereafter filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the district court found meritorious, thereby sentencing the defendant for a fourth time, imposing the original term of thirty-seven months. The government appealed. In describing the sequence of events which occurred, the Sixth Circuit described the thirty-seven month sentence as the “original term of imprisonment.” Id. at 584 (“The court then resentenced Sanders to the original term of imprisonment of thirty-seven months and ordered him released from custody[.]”) (emphasis added).
Similarly, in United States v. Singletary, 458 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.2006), a case involving an original sentence subsequently reversed on appeal, the court referred to the vacated sentence as the “original sentence,” rather than the sentence the defendant received upon resentencing. Id. at 77. See also Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334, 336, 83 S.Ct. 1236, 10 L.Ed.2d 383 (1963) (referring to a sentence reversed on appeal as the “original sentence.”); Yates v. United States, 356 U.S. 363, 366, 78 S.Ct. 766, 2 L.Ed.2d 837 (1958) (same); United States v. Quintieri, 306 F.3d 1217, 1230 (2d Cir.2002) (discussing sentences vacated on appeal and stating “even when a remand is limited, an issue may be raised if it arises as a result of events that occur after the original sentence.”); United States v. Regalado, 518 F.3d 143, 149 (2d Cir.2008) (“[T]the court should vacate the original sentence and resentence the defendant.”).
Our court regularly refers to a sentence reversed on appeal as the “original sentence,” and in doing so distinguishes the “original sentence” from the “resentencing].” United States v. Collier, 581 F.3d 755, 757-58 (8th Cir.2009); see also United States v. Spudich, 510 F.3d 834, 835-36 (8th Cir.2008) (“[W]e vacated Spudich’s original sentence”); United States v. House, 501 F.3d 928, 930 (8th Cir.2007) (“When Vallejo’s conviction was reversed on appeal, both the prison term and the supervised release term of his original sentence were set aside.”); United States v. Lalley, 317 F.3d 875, 876 (8th Cir.2003) (“[W]e reversed Lalley’s original sentence”); United States v. Allery, 175 F.3d 610, 615 (8th Cir.1999) (vacating a sentence and remanding for resentencing, stating “[n]one of the other considerations that the trial court used in arriving at its original sentence may properly be brought to bear in the resentencing.”).
*591Indeed, the other two members of this panel have each authored opinions referring to sentences vacated on appeal as the “original sentence.” United States v. Bueno, 549 F.3d 1176, 1180 (8th Cir.2008) (authored by Judge Wollman); United States v. Aguilar, 512 F.3d 485, 487 n. 2 (8th Cir.2008) (authored by Judge Murphy).
Furthermore, certain rights enjoyed by a criminal defendant (and concomitant obligations of the district court) apply only to the “original” sentencing proceeding, not to any subsequent resentencings triggered by a reversed sentence. E.g., United States v. Jeross, 521 F.3d 562, 585 (6th Cir.2008) (involving a sentence reversed on appeal and remanded for resentencing, and holding the defendant’s right of allocution only “applies to the original sentence and not to the subsequent resentencing.” (quoting Pasquarille v. United States, 130 F.3d 1220, 1223 (6th Cir.1997))) (emphasis added).
Third, the majority ignores the context in which “original term of imprisonment” is used in § 1B1.10. See, e.g., United States v. Archambault, 767 F.2d 402, 404 (8th Cir.1985) (indicating the meaning of a term must be determined from the context in which it is used). The manner in which “original term of imprisonment” is used elsewhere in § 1B1.10 supports my view. One of the guideline’s Application Notes provides:
The court may consider post-sentencing conduct of the defendant that occurred after imposition of the original term of imprisonment in determining: (I) Whether a reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment is warranted; and (II) the extent of such reduction, but only within the limits described in subsection (b).
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n. l(B)(iii) (emphasis added). Let us assume for the sake of argument that one of the two men here (Maxwell) did not appeal his original sentence while the other (Majied) did. Thus, only Majied’s sentence would have been vacated on appeal. Under the majority’s interpretation of the term “original term of imprisonment,” Maxwell’s original sentence would have been imposed in July 1993, while Majied’s original sentence would have been imposed over two years later in November 1995. Further assume both men were exemplary prisoners entitled to have their post-sentencing rehabilitative conduct considered as the grounds for a sentence reduction.
According to the majority, the district court could consider all of Maxwell’s post-sentencing conduct because it occurred after imposition of his original term of imprisonment in July 1993, but could not consider any of Majied’s exemplary conduct which occurred between July 1993 and November 1995 because his “original term of imprisonment” would not have been imposed until November 1995. Defendants whose sentences were never appealed, or appealed but upheld, would be eligible to have their entire time of incarceration examined to determine eligibility for a sentence reduction. On the other hand, defendants whose sentences were appealed and reversed (even in their favor) would have lengthy periods of incarceration time which could not be considered as the basis for a sentence reduction, with the ineligible period determined entirely by happenstance (i.e., the length of time the appeal was pending, plus the length of time for a district court to schedule a resentencing). This would be a perverse result, where consideration of post-sentencing rehabilitative conduct would turn on whether a particular defendant’s original term of imprisonment was appealed by either party, and the length of time it took to resolve the appeal and schedule a resentencing.
Section 1B1.10 plainly and unambiguously refers to an “original term of impris*592onment” as the first imposed upon a defendant at the time of original sentencing, irrespective of whether such a sentence is later vacated on appeal. Even assuming, however, there is some support for the majority’s interpretation, at best this renders the term “original term of imprisonment” ambiguous and triggers the rule of lenity, which requires us to construe the term in favor of the defendants and against the government. See United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 54, 114 S.Ct. 1259, 127 L.Ed.2d 611 (1994) (finding the phrase “original sentence” ambiguous and applying the rule of lenity in favor of the defendant); United States v. Rodriguez-Arreola, 313 F.3d 1064, 1067 (8th Cir.2002) (indicating the rule of lenity applies to the Sentencing Guidelines).
The majority’s holding is contrary to the meaning of the term “original,” contrary to the manner in which courts (including ours) routinely refer to an original term of imprisonment even when vacated on appeal, contrary to the context in which the phrase “original term of imprisonment” is used in § 1B1.10, and inconsistent with the application of the rule of lenity.
I respectfully dissent.