Court Opinion

ID: 9408031
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-11 14:11:11.404252+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:41.304803
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
PUBLISHED

            Present: Judges AtLee, Causey and Friedman
            Argued at Norfolk, Virginia

            BLUE PEARL VETERINARY PARTNERS, LLC,
             BLUE PEARL OPERATIONS, LLC AND
             MARS, INC.
                                                                                 OPINION BY
            v.     Record No. 1180-22-1                                   JUDGE RICHARD Y. ATLEE, JR.
                                                                                 JULY 11, 2023
            KRISTINE ANDERSON

                           FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH
                                            Kevin M. Duffan, Judge

                             Matthew A. Roberson (McGavin, Boyce, Bardot, Thorsen & Katz,
                             P.C., on briefs), for appellants.

                             Elliott M. Harding (Harding Counsel, PLLC, on brief), for appellee.

                   In this action to recover for damages negligently inflicted upon a dog, appellants

            (collectively “Blue Pearl”) challenge the trial court’s denial of its motion in limine to exclude

            evidence of veterinary expenses exceeding the dog’s fair market value. The trial court certified

            its ruling on the motion for an interlocutory appeal under Code § 8.01-675.5(A), and we granted

            Blue Pearl’s subsequent petition for appeal. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s ruling.

                                                       I. BACKGROUND

                   In March 2019, Kristine Anderson filed a complaint against Blue Pearl for breach of

            bailment, breach of contract, and negligence,1 alleging that her dog, a golden retriever, sustained

            fractures to two of its legs while receiving veterinary care at Blue Pearl’s facility. Anderson

            averred that a veterinarian technician recklessly, carelessly, and negligently failed to secure the

                   1
                       The trial court dismissed with prejudice a fourth count alleging false advertising.
dog’s legs during a CT scan, leaving them “hanging off of the CT table.” Two of its legs were

subsequently “crushed” as the table moved into “the cylinder tube for the CT scan.” Anderson

sought $6,782 for “necessary treatment and evaluations.” She also sought between $108,855 and

$119,055 per year for the remainder of the dog’s life for “adequate and necessary rehabilitative

care,” including electronic stimulation, shockwave therapy, ultrasound therapy, laser therapy,

underwater treadmill, platelet rich plasma therapy, and stem cell therapy.

       Blue Pearl filed a motion in limine to exclude “any evidence or suggestion of veterinary

expenses in excess of $350.00,” the amount Anderson paid for the dog. It argued that because

dogs are personal property under Code § 3.2-6585, a claim for “necessary and reasonable

expenses incurred” for an injury to a dog cannot include recovery of repair expenses that exceed

the diminution in value of the dog. Anderson responded that unlike other types of personal

property, her dog was a living creature, and she was obligated to provide “adequate, lasting care,

including veterinary care,” in part to avoid criminal liability. Thus, she argued that veterinary

expenses were recoverable as “‘reasonable and necessary’ costs.”

       After a hearing, the trial court denied Blue Pearl’s motion in limine. The court

acknowledged that damages for injury to personal property typically are “confined to the

diminution of the value of the property” and any “reasonable and necessary expenses incurred.”

Nevertheless, the court ruled that certain veterinary treatments exceeding the dog’s value could

be “reasonable and necessary expenses.” The court further found that determining which

expenses were in fact reasonable and necessary was a question for the fact finder.

       On July 25, 2022, the trial court certified under Code § 8.01-675.5(A) that resolving Blue

Pearl’s motion in limine presented a question of law on which there was substantial ground for

disagreement and no clear or controlling precedent. The trial court also certified that resolving

the issue “could be dispositive of the entire civil action” between the parties and that an

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interlocutory appeal was in the parties’ best interests. Thus, the trial court stayed the

proceedings and “certifie[d] for an interlocutory appeal the issue of the admissibility . . . of

veterinary expenses in excess of the market value of plaintiff’s dog, as an element of recoverable

reasonable and necessary expenses.”

        On August 18, 2022, we granted Blue Pearl’s petition for appeal under Code

§ 8.01-675.5(A).2 On appeal, Blue Pearl argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion in

limine because dogs are personal property and veterinary expenses to treat the dog’s injuries

were repair costs. Applying the well-established measure for damages for injury to personal

property, Blue Pearl contends that Anderson cannot recover for repair costs that exceed the

diminution in market value of the damaged property. Moreover, Blue Pearl maintains that

money “poured into” fixing “the very object of damaged personal property” is necessarily the

“cost of repair” and not recoverable as “necessary and reasonable expenses.”

                                             II. ANALYSIS

        “[T]he law in Virginia, as in most states that have decided the question, regards animals,

however beloved, as personal property.” Kondaurov v. Kerdasha, 271 Va. 646, 657 (2006); Code

§ 3.2-6585 (“All dogs and cats shall be deemed personal property . . . .”). Accordingly, a dog owner

“may maintain any action for the killing of any such animals, or injury thereto, . . . as in the case of

other personal property.” Code § 3.2-6585. The Supreme Court has held that because a dog is

personal property, recovery cannot include “damages for emotional distress resulting from

        2
          Our order instructed the parties to brief whether this Court had jurisdiction to consider
this appeal given the General Assembly’s July 1, 2022 amendment to Code § 17.1-405, the
statute that outlines the scope of our civil jurisdiction, which struck the reference to Code
§ 8.01-675.5. 2022 Va. Acts ch. 307. Effective April 12, 2023, however, the General Assembly
again amended Code § 17.1-405 to unequivocally declare our jurisdiction to review certified
interlocutory appeals under Code § 8.01-675.5. 2023 Va. Acts ch. 741. The 2023 amendment
did not effect a substantive change in our jurisdiction but was instead “declarative of existing
law”; it also contained an emergency clause providing that it was “in force from its passage.” Id.
Consequently, we have jurisdiction to consider this appeal.
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negligently inflicted injury to” the dog. Kondaurov, 271 Va. at 657. Neither this Court nor the

Supreme Court, however, has addressed whether in an action to recover for injuries negligently

inflicted to a dog, recoverable damages include veterinary expenses that exceed the diminution in

the dog’s fair market value.

       Blue Pearl correctly notes that “the general rule for determining . . . damages for injury to

personal property is to subtract the fair market value of the property immediately after the loss from

the fair market value thereof immediately before the injury, the remainder, plus necessary

reasonable expenses incurred, being the damages.” White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Swiney, 237 Va.

23, 30 (1989) (citing Averett v. Shircliff, 218 Va. 202, 206-07 (1977)). That rule applies “[w]hen

diminution in market value can be reasonably ascertained.” Younger v. Appalachian Power Co.,

214 Va. 662, 664 (1974). Moreover, a general exception to the rule exists when repair costs are less

than the diminution in market value. Averett, 218 Va. at 207.

       Nevertheless, “the sundry rules for measuring damages are subordinate to the ultimate aim

of making good the injury done or loss suffered and hence ‘[t]he answer rests in good sense rather

than in a mechanical application of a single formula.’” Younger, 214 Va. at 664 (quoting New

Jersey Power & Light Co. v. Mabee, 197 A.2d 194, 195 (N.J. 1964)). In other words, the general

damages rules are “a standard, not a shackle.” Charles T. McCormick, Handbook on the Law of

Damages § 45 (1935). Often, items of personal property have “no exchange value but may be

valuable to the owner; other things may have a comparatively small exchange value but have a

special and greater value to the owner.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 911 (1979). When, in

such cases, application of the “ordinary methods” for calculating damages “will produce a

miscarriage of justice,” courts do not hesitate to employ other methods that more fairly accomplish

the goal of making good the injury done or loss suffered. See, e.g., Irwin v. Degtiarov, 8 N.E.3d

296, 300 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014).

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        Consistent with those principles, the Supreme Court has held that “when the damaged

property has no ascertainable market value or when market value would be a manifestly inadequate

measure, then some other measure must be applied.” Younger, 214 Va. at 664 (emphasis added)

(citing Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Richmond Cedar Works, 160 Va. 790, 806-07 (1933)). Potential

“exception[s] to the general market value rule” include when a family portrait with little to no

market value is lost, or when an architect’s plans with little to no market value are destroyed.

Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 160 Va. at 806 (citing Green v. Boston & Lowell R.R. Co., 128 Mass. 221

(1880); and then citing Mather v. Am. Express Co., 138 Mass. 55 (1884)). Indeed, the Restatement

(Second) of Torts provides that when a “chattel has peculiar value to the owner, as when a family

portrait having substantially no exchange value has been harmed . . . , it may be reasonable to make

repairs at an expense greater than the cost of another chattel.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 928

cmt. a (1979) (emphasis added).

        To that end, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has held that “if an animal is injured

in such a way that proper care and attention reasonably may be expected to effect a cure,” the

“expense properly incurred for this purpose is a part of the damage to the owner, for which he is

entitled to compensation” even if that expense exceeds the diminution in the animal’s market value.

Atwood v. Boston Forwarding & Transfer Co., 71 N.E. 72, 72 (Mass. 1904). That enunciation of

the rule governing damages when an animal is negligently injured is consistent with Younger and

the common law. See Shearman & Redfield, Negligence § 603, at 680-81 (2d ed. 1870) (“[I]n cases

of injury to animals . . . the plaintiff ought to recover for expenses reasonably incurred in efforts to

cure them, in addition to the depreciation in their value, or to their whole value where they are

finally lost.”); McCormick, supra, § 124 (“[W]here repairs have been prudently undertaken, under

circumstances where repair seems the reasonable course, then, if in fact the cost of repair, including

loss or use, exceeds the value of the chattel, there should be no hard and fast rules fixing that value

                                                  -5-
as the maximum recovery.”). Nevertheless, that rule plainly does not permit an owner to recover

expenses for any and all treatments that may be available to treat an animal’s injuries. Rather, the

owner “is bound to act in good faith, and to exercise a sound discretion, so as not to make an

unreasonable expenditure.” Atwood, 71 N.E. at 72. To be sure, “reasonableness is the touchstone

for determining whether, and to what extent, veterinary costs can be recovered.” Irwin, 8 N.E.3d at

301 (applying Atwood). “[B]ut if money is prudently expended in the hope of mitigating the injury,

. . . there is no good reason why this expense, as well as the value of the animal, should not be

included as a part of the damages,” even if the animal ultimately “is lost.” Atwood, 71 N.E. at 72.

       Whether veterinary care and treatment is reasonable and necessary is a question of fact to be

decided by the jury after a showing of the relevant facts and circumstances. Cf. Damages–Property

of No Market Value, 12 A.L.R.2d 902, § 2 (1950) (“[I]n the absence of a market value for personal

property converted, lost, or injured, the amount of damages should be left to the discretion of the

jury.”). Relevant factors to be considered include the type of animal; its age, purchase price, and

any special traits or skills; the likelihood of the medical procedure’s success; and whether the

medical procedures are typical and customary to treat the injuries at issue. Irwin, 8 N.E.3d at 301.

But in no case may the owner of an animal recover for her emotional or mental anguish resulting

from the animal’s injuries or from a concern for the animal’s physical or emotional condition.

Kondaurov, 271 Va. at 657-58.

       Applying the above principles, we conclude that the trial court appropriately denied Blue

Pearl’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of veterinary expenses to the extent they exceeded the

price Anderson paid for the dog. Blue Pearl’s motion employed an overly mechanistic approach to

measuring damages that disregarded the “ultimate aim of making good the injury done or loss

suffered.” Younger, 214 Va. at 664. Indeed, it is a matter of “good sense” that Blue Pearl must

“mak[e] good the injury” caused by its negligence. Id. Thus, Anderson may recover for all

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veterinary expenses that she can prove were or will be reasonably and necessarily incurred because

of Blue Pearl’s negligence.

                                           III. CONCLUSION

        Blue Pearl has demonstrated no error in the trial court’s ruling. Therefore, the trial court’s

ruling is affirmed.

                                                                                              Affirmed.

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