Court Opinion

ID: 9810934
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:04:53.28595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:40:21.869650
License: Public Domain

*160Eurciies, J.,
dissentipg. I can not concur in tbe opinion and judgment of the Court in this case. Tbe first question discussed in tbe opinion of tbe Court, as to a discharge by parol evidence, seems to me to have no application. I can not see that any question of discharge is involved in tbe case.
Tbe whole case, in my opinion, depends on tbe second question discussed in tbe opinion — tbe statute of limitations. It is clear to my mind that the' plaintiff can not recover upon the contract contained in the deed of trust, which authorized the trustee to retain for bis services 4 per cent on receipts and 4 per cent on disbursements; and it is admitted that he has retained no more than this per cent amounts to. Tbe defendant owes tbe plaintiff nothing, according to tbe terms of tire deed, which is admitted to contain the terms of the original contract between the parties. This being so- — ■ admitted to be so — -the plaintiff has no cause of action against the defendant, unless it be upon tbe verbal contract alleged to have been made between Pace and tire plaintiff some time after the date of the deed of assignment — the original contract. And as it is admitted in the opinion that if the plaintiff’s cause of action has to rest on the verbal contract, it is barred by the statute of limitations, it seems to me that this admission closes tire discussion, and I am of the opinion that there is error, for which a new trial should be awarded.