Court Opinion

ID: 9953839
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 20:11:51.869668+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:33.666408
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Leib, 2024-Ohio-1081.]

                               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                  FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                         MEIGS COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                :

        Plaintiff-Appellee,                   : CASE NO. 23CA4

        v.                                    :

WAYNE LEIB,                                   : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

        Defendant-Appellant.                  :

___________________________________________________________________
                            APPEARANCES:

James K. Stanley, Meigs County Prosecuting Attorney, Pomeroy, Ohio,
for appellee.

Christopher Bazeley, Cincinnati, Ohio, for appellant.1
___________________________________________________________________
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT
DATE JOURNALIZED:3-18-24
ABELE, J.

        {¶1}     This is an appeal from a Meigs County Common Pleas Court

judgment of conviction and sentence for aggravated murder.

        {¶2}     Wayne Leib, defendant below and appellant herein, assigns

two errors for review:

                 FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

                 “BECAUSE LIEB HAD TO SPECULATE AS TO WHETHER HE
                 HAD THE INTENT TO COMMIT AGGRAVATED MURDER, HIS
                 GUILTY PLEA WAS NOT KNOWINGLY, VOLUNTARILY, OR

        1
      Different counsel represented appellant during the trial
court proceedings.
                                                                      2
MEIGS, 23CA4

           INTELLIGENTLY GIVEN.”

           SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

           “THE TRIAL COURT’S SENTENCE IS CONTRARY TO LAW
           BECAUSE IT CONSIDERED LIEB’S SILENCE AS A LACK
           OF REMORSE.”

    {¶3}   On September 30, 2022, appellant, who was homeless, rode

his bicycle to the victim’s residence and killed the victim with a

firearm.   Eyewitnesses heard a gunshot and observed appellant

hurriedly leave the residence on his bicycle.   When law enforcement

found appellant, another eyewitness stated that appellant admitted

that he killed the victim and hid the firearm at that location.

Appellant later said that he killed the victim because he

believed the victim molested children.

    {¶4}   In November 2022, a Meigs County Grand Jury returned an

indictment that charged appellant with one count of aggravated

murder in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A) and one count of murder in

violation of R.C. 2903.02(A), both with firearm specifications and

both unclassified felonies.   Appellant pleaded not guilty by reason

of insanity (NGRI), and the trial court ordered an assessment.

    {¶5}   Appellant’s psychological evaluation revealed that he had

been hospitalized for 12 days in 2019 and has a history of bipolar

disorder, schizophrenia and “self-injurious behavior consisting of

punching himself and using heroin to cope with hallucinations.”
                                                                     3
MEIGS, 23CA4

Appellant has “been homeless and * * * using substances,” reported

hearing voices telling him to hurt himself, reported feeling that

he is “being watched, targeted, and followed for the last three

years,” and believed “smoke-like figures” that were “demon[s] in

the Bible hundreds of years ago” put “thoughts in his head for

years.”

     {¶6}   The evaluation further provided that appellant “spoke

coherently and relevantly and had no indication of a formal thought

disorder at the time of the interview.”     In addition to daily

illicit drug use, clinical impressions included that appellant “has

a severe mental illness, schizoaffective disorder, which in his

case involves hallucinations, delusions, and magical thinking, as

well as mood symptoms, including unstable mood, periods of mania,

depression, and anxiety.”     The evaluation also revealed that

appellant stated that he killed the victim to avenge the victim’s

alleged victimization of children.     The report specified that

appellant fled the scene, hid incriminating evidence, and refused

to speak when interrogated.     The evaluation concluded that

appellant “had a severe mental disease, but not a mental defect, at

the time of the offense, but that a severe mental disease or defect

did not cause the defendant to fail to know the wrongfulness of his

actions at the time of the offense charged.”
                                                                      4
MEIGS, 23CA4

     {¶7}   At the change of plea hearing, appellant indicated that

he consulted with his attorney, who read the plea agreement to him,

and expressed satisfaction with his representation.     Appellant also

acknowledged that he understood the plea agreement, the allegations

contained in the indictment, the rights he waived with his guilty

plea, and possible penalties.    The trial court specified that the

sentence is mandatory, that appellant is ineligible for community

control and judicial release, must pay costs, and, if released,

will be on parole for the remainder of his life.

     {¶8}   When the trial court questioned appellant about the

underlying facts, appellant stated, “Uh, just basically like what

it said.    I, you know, I shot Dwayne Qualls.   Took his life on that

day.”   When the trial court asked, “So, [you] shot him with the

intent of killing him,” appellant replied, “I suppose so, yea.”

Consequently, appellant withdrew his not guilty plea and pleaded

guilty to one count of aggravated murder in violation of R.C.

2903.01(A).

     {¶9}   After the plea hearing, the trial court immediately

proceeded to sentencing.    After the state and the defense spoke,

the court asked, “Mr. Leib, do you have anything to say on your own

behalf or to present any information in mitigation of punishment?”
                                                                     5
MEIGS, 23CA4

Appellant replied, “no.”   The court asked, “[d]on’t want to say

anything at all?”   Appellant replied, “No, ma’am.”

    {¶10} In reviewing the sentencing factors, the trial court

noted, “Um, the Court has not had the opportunity to look at

whether or not there’s remorse because there’s no * * * no

statement from the defendant, although he has readily admitted the

offense, uh, it sounds like and taken responsibility here today,

has not tried to blame others or anything like that.”

    {¶11} After consideration, the trial court (1) sentenced

appellant to serve life in prison without the possibility of

parole, (2) dismissed count two and the gun specifications without

prejudice, and (3) ordered appellant to pay all costs.   This appeal

followed.

                                 I.

    {¶12} In his first assignment of error, appellant asserts that

he did not enter a knowing, intelligent and voluntary guilty plea

because he had “to speculate as to whether he had the intent to

commit the offense.”   In particular, appellant refers to his

response to the trial court’s questioning about his intent to kill

the victim “I suppose so, yea,” at sentencing as speculative.

    {¶13} “Because a no-contest or guilty plea involves a waiver of

constitutional rights, a defendant’s decision to enter a plea must
                                                                       6
MEIGS, 23CA4

be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.”    Crim.R. 11, State v.

Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, 164 N.E.3d 286, ¶ 10,

citing Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28-29, 113 S.Ct. 517, 121

L.Ed.2d 391 (1992).    Thus, if the defendant did not enter the plea

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, enforcement of that plea

is unconstitutional.    Id.

    {¶14} Appellate courts apply a de novo standard of review when

evaluating a plea’s compliance with Crim.R. 11(C).    State v. Nero,

56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108-109, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990).    Moreover,

evidence of a written waiver form signed by the accused constitutes

strong proof of a valid waiver.    State v. Clark, 38 Ohio St.3d 252,

261, 527 N.E.2d 844 (1988).    In the present case, appellant does

not challenge the trial court’s compliance with Crim.R. 11, but

rather argues that due to his “speculative” response, he did not

enter a knowing, intelligent, or voluntary guilty plea.

    {¶15} In the case sub judice, appellant’s signed written plea

of guilty form is included in the record.    Also, during the plea

colloquy the trial court reviewed the elements of the charge, the

possible sentence and asked appellant if he understood that his

guilty plea waived his right to a jury trial, right not to testify

against himself, right to confront witnesses, right to compulsory

process, and right to require the state to prove his guilt beyond a
                                                                        7
MEIGS, 23CA4

reasonable doubt.   Appellant responded that he did understand.       The

court further reviewed appellant’s mental health and medication

history and asked appellant if he entered his plea intelligently,

knowingly, and voluntarily.   Appellant characterized the offense as

“just basically like what it said.      I, you know, I shot Dwayne

Qualls.   Took his life on that day.”    The court then asked, “So,

shot him with the intent of killing him?”     Appellant replied, “I

suppose so, yea.”   After that, appellant withdrew his not guilty

plea and entered a plea of guilty to the aggravated murder charge.

     {¶16} Appellant asserts that he did not enter a knowing,

voluntary, or intelligent plea because his response to the trial

court’s inquiry indicated speculation regarding intent to commit

the offense.   Appellant argues that, when asked if he intended to

kill the victim, he responded, “I suppose so.”     The record,

however, indicates that appellant replied, “I suppose so, yea.”

The latter part of the phrase shows an affirmative response.

Turning to the words, “I suppose so,” the Supreme Court of Ohio has

held that “[t]o determine the common, everyday meaning of a word,

we have consistently used dictionary definitions.”     State v. Wells,

91 Ohio St.3d 32, 34, 740 N.E.2d 1097 (2001); Campus Bus Serv. v.

Zaino, 98 Ohio St.3d 463, 2003-Ohio-1915, 786 N.E.2d 889, ¶ 21.

Thus, a court may take judicial notice of definitions in standard
                                                                       8
MEIGS, 23CA4

dictionaries.   Andrews v. Tax Comm. of Ohio, 135 Ohio St. 374, 21

N.E.2d 106 (1939).    In addition to dictionary definitions, courts

may also look to the “meaning that the word [] ha[s] acquired when

* * * used in case law.”     Rancho Cincinnati Rivers, L.L.C. v.

Warren Cty. Bd. of Revision, 165 Ohio St.3d 227, 2021-Ohio-2798,

177 N.E.3d 256, ¶ 21.

     {¶17} The Online Oxford English Dictionary defines “suppose,”

inter alia, as “to hold as a belief or opinion; to believe in the

truth of; to think, be of the opinion” and “[t]o assume (without

reference to truth or falsehood) as a basis of argument, or for the

purpose of tracing consequences; to frame as a hypothesis; to put

as an imaginary case; to posit,” and “[t]o believe as a certainty,

know, understand.”    Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “suppose, v.”,

September 2023. <https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/9741133745> (accessed

December 11, 2023). The online edition of Merriam-Webster’s

Dictionary defines “suppose” as a transitive verb meaning “a. to

lay down tentatively as a hypothesis, assumption, or proposal, b.

to hold as an opinion, or to think probable or in keeping with the

facts.”   Merriam-Webster.com. Dictionary, “suppose, v.”

<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/suppose>     (accessed

December 11, 2023).     Webster’s New World Dictionary defines

“suppose” as “to suppose, assume * * * to assume to be true, as for
                                                                         9
MEIGS, 23CA4

the sake of argument, or to illustrate a proof.”    Third College

Edition Webster’s New World Dictionary of American English 1346

(1991).   Finally, the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on

Historical Principles defines “suppose” as “[h]old as an opinion;

believe as a fact; think as if certain that.”   And the same

dictionary defines “suppose so” as “expressing hesitant agreement.”

Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles 316-317

(Sixth Ed.2007).   Thus, the dictionary definitions collectively

lead us to conclude that appellant’s response “I suppose so”

indicates a belief or opinion held as fact.

     {¶18} In State v. Williams, 6 Ohio St.3d 281, 452 N.E.2d 1323

(1983), the Supreme Court of Ohio considered the meaning of the

phrase “I suppose so,” uttered during voir dire.   The court

observed that the expression is a colloquialism.    Id. at 288.    The

court pointed out: “[D]epending on the facial movements or physical

gesture that accompany [it], [the colloquialism] can be as

unequivocal as [a] ‘yes’ answer.”   Id.   Moreover, the court noted

that because a trial court is best positioned to observe a juror’s

demeanor during voir dire, the court refrained from challenging the

“propriety of its determination.”   Id.   See also State v. Anthony,

2019-Ohio-5410, 151 N.E.3d 13, ¶ 15 (11th Dist.)(trial court best

position to determine defendant’s genuineness); State v. Moore, 6th
                                                                    10
MEIGS, 23CA4

Dist. Lucas No. L-17-1291, 2019-Ohio-1032, ¶ 35 (trial court best

position to judge credibility).   We believe that appellant’s

statement acknowledged his commission of the offense and his desire

to enter a guilty plea.

    {¶19} Consequently, after our review we conclude that appellant

entered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea.

Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s first assignment of error.

                                  II.

    {¶20} In his second assignment of error, appellant asserts that

the trial court’s sentence is contrary to law because the court

considered appellant’s silence at sentencing as a lack of remorse.

This argument involves the trial court’s consideration of the

sentencing factor in R.C. 2929.12(D)(5).    State v. Brunson, 171

Ohio St.3d 384, 2022-Ohio-4299, 218 N.E.3d 765.

    {¶21} As Brunson points out, an appellate court’s review of the

R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 sentencing factors is limited under R.C.

2953.08(G)(2)(b).   Id.   R.C. 2953.08(G) provides, in relevant part,

that after an appellate court reviews the record, it “may increase,

reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence that is appealed under this

section or may vacate the sentence and remand * * * if it clearly

and convincingly finds * * * [t]hat the sentence is * * * contrary
                                                                      11
MEIGS, 23CA4

to law.”   R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b).   Moreover, whether a trial court

improperly considered an offender’s silence at sentencing as

demonstrating a lack of remorse falls within the parameters of

whether a sentence is “otherwise contrary to law,” and is therefore

proper for appellate review under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b).     See

Brunson at ¶ 70.

     {¶22} In the case sub judice, in light of no objection to the

trial court's alleged inference of lack of remorse from appellant’s

decision not to speak at sentencing, this court is limited to a

plain error review.   Brunson at ¶ 65-67 (applying plain-error

review when defendant did not object to “the trial court's

consideration of his decision to remain silent and waive allocution

in finding that he lacked remorse”).

     {¶23} For the plain error doctrine to apply, the party claiming

error must establish (1) that “‘an error, i.e., a deviation from a

legal rule’” occurred, (2) that the error was “‘an “obvious” defect

in the trial proceedings,’” and (3) that this obvious error

affected substantial rights, i.e., the error “‘must have affected

the outcome of the trial.’”   State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385,

2015-Ohio-2459, 38 N.E.3d 860, ¶ 22, quoting State v. Barnes, 94

Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002); accord State v.

Obermiller, 147 Ohio St.3d 175, 2016-Ohio-1594, 63 N.E.3d 93, ¶ 62;
                                                                      12
MEIGS, 23CA4

State v. Young, 2018-Ohio-4990, 125 N.E.3d 177, ¶ 4 (4th Dist.).

For an error to be “plain” or “obvious,” the error must be plain

“under current law” “at the time of appellate consideration.”

Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467, 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544,

137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997); accord Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d at 27, 759

N.E.2d 1240; State v. G.C., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-536, 2016-

Ohio-717, ¶ 14.   “We take ‘[n]otice of plain error * * * with the

utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent

a manifest miscarriage of justice.’”    Obermiller at ¶ 62, quoting

State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 97, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978).

“Reversal is warranted only if the outcome of the [proceeding]

clearly would have been different absent the error.”    State v.

Hill, 92 Ohio St.3d 191, 203, 749 N.E.2d 274 (2001).

     {¶24} Crim.R. 32(A) requires trial courts to allow defendants

to speak during sentencing hearings.    “‘The purpose of allocution

is to permit the defendant to speak on his own behalf or present

any information in mitigation of punishment.’” (Citations omitted.)

State v. Short, 129 Ohio St.3d 360, 2011-Ohio-3641, 952 N.E.2d

1121, ¶ 85.    The Crim.R. 32 inquiry “is much more than an empty

ritual: it represents a defendant’s last opportunity to plead his

case or express remorse.”    State v. Green, 90 Ohio St.3d 352, 359-

360, 738 N.E.2d 1208 (2000).    However, the opportunity for a
                                                                      13
MEIGS, 23CA4

defendant to speak during a sentencing hearing does not require

that a defendant speak.    “‘Any effort by the State to compel [the

defendant] to testify against his will at the sentencing hearing

clearly would contravene the Fifth Amendment.’”     Mitchell v. United

States, 526 U.S. 314, 326, 119 S.Ct. 1307, 143 L.Ed.2d 424 (1999),

quoting Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 463, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68

L.Ed.2d 359 (1981).    Thus, a sentencing court cannot use silence at

sentencing against a defendant because the right against self-

incrimination follows the defendant to sentencing.     Mitchell at

321.    Mitchell also held that it is inappropriate to infer facts of

the crime from a defendant’s silence at sentencing.    However,

Mitchell “did not address whether a defendant’s ‘silence bears upon

the determination of a lack of remorse, or upon the acceptance of

responsibility for the purposes of the downward adjustment provided

[in the federal sentencing guidelines].’”     Brunson at ¶ 76, quoting

Mitchell at 330.

       {¶25} Although the United States Supreme Court did not address

whether lack of remorse could be inferred from a defendant’s

silence at sentencing, the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed the

issue in Brunson.     The court cited White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415,

134 S.Ct. 1697, 188 L.Ed.2d 698 (2014), to point out that Mitchell

may permit some negative inferences regarding a defendant’s silence
                                                                      14
MEIGS, 23CA4

at sentencing.   Brunson at ¶ 77, citing Woodall at 422, 134 S.Ct.

1697.   Brunson held that “a trial court errs in its evaluation of a

defendant’s lack of remorse when it considers that defendant’s

decision to waive allocution and remain silent at sentencing if the

defendant pleaded not guilty and exercised his or her right to a

jury trial.”   (Emphasis added.)   Brunson at ¶ 4.     The court stated

that the “focus in determining whether a negative inference from a

defendant’s silence may be considered as a demonstration of that

defendant’s lack of remorse is on whether the inference affects the

factual determinations in the case.”    Id. at ¶ 78.    The court wrote

at ¶ 81:

    Because ‘remorse’ is a loaded term and showing remorse
    requires a person to acknowledge that he or she committed
    an offense, a finding of a lack of remorse necessarily goes
    ‘to factual determinations respecting the circumstances
    and details of the crime’ (emphasis sic), Mitchell, 526
    U.S. at 328, 119 S.Ct. 1307, 143 L.Ed.2d 424, because it
    implicates the defendant’s role in the crime.        For a
    criminal defendant who pleaded not guilty and took the case
    to trial, thus maintaining his or her innocence, a finding
    of a lack of remorse based on the defendant’s silence is
    to use that silence to infer the defendant’s involvement
    in the crime. If the trial court is permitted to use the
    defendant’s silence to infer his or her involvement in the
    crime, the defendant ‘might reasonably feel compelled to
    trade the certainty of incrimination by silence for the
    possibility of incrimination by statement.’       State v.
    Leach, 102 Ohio St.3d 135, 2004-Ohio-2147, 807 N.E.2d 335,
    ¶ 40 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Such an inference would
    violate the Fifth Amendment. See Mitchell at 326-327, 119
    S.Ct. 1307 (any effort by the state to compel a defendant
    to testify at sentencing would clearly contravene the Fifth
    Amendment).   And such an inference would go against the
[Cite as State v. Leib, 2024-Ohio-1081.]

        essential purpose of the right to remain silent - ‘to
        protect a defendant from being the unwilling instrument of
        his or her own condemnation,’ id. at 329, 119 S.Ct. 1307.

        {¶26} Other Ohio courts have held that a defendant’s silence at

sentencing may not be used against the defendant in fashioning a

sentence.          State v. Betts, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88607, 2007-Ohio-

5533, ¶ 29.           However, lack of remorse is a sentencing factor under

R.C. 2929.12(D)(5).                 Therefore, even when a defendant does not

speak at sentencing, “the court’s statement that the defendant

demonstrated a lack of remorse and an unwillingness to take

responsibility, does not demonstrate that a court’s sentencing

decision is based upon the silence but shows only that the court

was considering the statutory sentencing factors.”                 State v.

Clunen, 7th Dist. Columbiana No. 12 CO 30, 2013-Ohio-5525, ¶ 21;

State v. Moore, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2011-G-3027, 2012-Ohio-3885,

¶ 47; Hodges, supra, at ¶ 11.

        {¶27} The Eleventh District recently considered facts similar

to the facts present in the case at bar.                 After the defendant

pleaded guilty, the appellate court pointed out that the Brunson

holding “that a court may not infer a lack of remorse from a

defendant’s silence at sentencing [is] limited to where a defendant

has pleaded not guilty and gone to trial, which is not the case

here.”        State v. Gurto, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2022-A-0045, 2023-
[Cite as State v. Leib, 2024-Ohio-1081.]

Ohio-2351, ¶ 19.               Thus, the court held that because the defendant

pleaded guilty, “we cannot discern how an inference of lack of

remorse pertains to facts of the case, as Gurto already

acknowledges wrongdoing through his guilty plea.”               Id. at ¶ 20.

        {¶28} In State v. Lowery, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2023-CA-4, 2023-

Ohio-4444, the Second District considered a case similar to the

instant case.             In Lowery, the defendant pleaded guilty, but later

alleged that the prosecutor’s argument that Lowery’s failure to

identify his codefendant constitutes an aggravating sentencing

factor that violated his Fifth Amendment rights.               In rejecting this

contention, the Second District held at ¶ 19:

        We note too that Ohio case law preceding Brunson permitted
        a trial court to infer a lack of remorse from silence
        following a guilty plea without running afoul of the Fifth
        Amendment. See State v. Duhl, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2016-
        CA-30, 2017-Ohio-5492, ¶ 31 (“Duhl pled guilty to the
        crimes. Furthermore, * * * the court here was not trying
        to draw adverse inferences about the circumstances of the
        crime in order to punish Duhl more severely. Instead, the
        transcript clearly indicates that the trial court's focus
        was on whether Duhl was remorseful for the crimes he had
        committed.”); State v. Taft, 6th Dist. Huron No. H-18-003,
        2019-Ohio-1565, ¶ 33, quoting Duhl at ¶ 31 (“[A] trial
        court does not violate a defendant's right against self-
        incrimination when it notes that the defendant's silence
        shows a lack of remorse or an unwillingness to take
        responsibility for the crime because it is not using the
        silence ‘to draw adverse inferences about the circumstances
        of the crime in order to punish [the defendant] more
        severely.’ ”). In light of the foregoing authority, we see
        no obvious Fifth Amendment violation arising from the trial
        court's inference of a lack of remorse based on Lowery's
        refusal to identify his accomplice at sentencing.
[Cite as State v. Leib, 2024-Ohio-1081.]

Id. at ¶ 19.

        {¶29} In the case sub judice, after our review we do not

believe that the trial court penalized appellant for his silence at

sentencing.           After appellant’s guilty plea, the trial court

analyzed the sentencing factors and stated, “Uh, the Court has not

had the opportunity to look at whether or not there’s remorse

because there’s no * * * no statement from the defendant, although

he has readily admitted the offense, uh, it sounds like and taken

responsibility here today, has not tried to blame others or

anything like that.”                  We believe that the trial court’s comments

represent the court’s review of the R.C. 2929.12 factors, rather

than drawing any adverse inference and penalizing appellant for his

silence.         Moreover, as in Gurto and Lower, we conclude that when

appellant pleaded guilty, he already had acknowledged wrongdoing.

Therefore, we find no error, plain or otherwise, and overrule

appellant’s second assignment of error.

        {¶30} Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm

the trial court’s judgment.

                                                        JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
[Cite as State v. Leib, 2024-Ohio-1081.]
MEIGS, 23CA4                                                        19

                          JUDGMENT ENTRY

     It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed and appellee
recover from appellant the costs herein taxed.

    The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

     It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court
directing the Meigs County Common Pleas Court to carry this
judgment into execution.

     A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

    Hess, J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion

                                   For the Court

    BY:_____________________________
                                       Peter B. Abele, Judge

                         NOTICE TO COUNSEL

     Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a
final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal
commences from the date of filing with the clerk.