Court Opinion

ID: 9656500
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:49:28.386067+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:32.769803
License: Public Domain

*214Carr, J.
(dissenting in part). While in the employ of the defendant, the plaintiff, under date of August 27, 1949, sustained an accidental injury to his right knee, said injury arising out of and in the course of the employment. Defendant filed its basic report of the injury on September 9th following. On September 13th of the same year plaintiff left defendant’s employ and later, in April, 1952, requested medical treatment for the knee. In accordance with such request an operation was performed, following which compensation was paid voluntarily by defendant for some weeks.
Subsequently plaintiff filed application for the payment of compensation in accordance with the statute.* A hearing, beginning November 6, 1952, was had before a deputy commissioner, resulting in an award of compensation for a portion of the period of time following the injury, and a finding that plaintiff’s disability had terminated as of August 18, 1952. On appeal to the workmen’s compensation commission the award made by the deputy was modified on the basis of a holding that the employee was still disabled at the time of the hearing before the deputy, and that he was entitled to compensation from August 18, 1952, until the further order of the commission.
On leave granted, the award of the workmen’s compensation commission was appealed to this Court, where the case was decided March 9, 1955. White v. Michigan Consolidated Gas Company, 342 Mich 160. On the record in the cause it was determined that there was no testimony on which to base a finding that plaintiff’s disability continued from and after November 6,1952, and that the award could not be sustained insofar as it provided for the payment of compensation thereafter until the further order of *215the commission. Accordingly the proceeding was remanded with directions to modify the award in accordance with the holding of this Court. It will be noted from the opinion of the Court in the case that the decision was based wholly on a lack of testimony to support that portion of the award from which the appeal was taken. The question at issue was whether there was such testimony. In deciding the matter the Court could not, and did not, go beyond the determination of that issue. The remanding order may not be construed as an affirmative finding that plaintiff did not suffer a compensable disability during the period in question. It follows that the prior decision (342 Mich 160) is not res judicata as to such question.
The conclusion indicated is not at variance with the holding in Webber v. Steiger Lumber Company, 322 Mich 675. Involved in that case was an award of the workmen’s compensation commission made on July 15, 1946, based, in part, on the finding specifically set forth that compensable disability had ceased 4 months previously. In other words, there was an affirmative finding, made by the trier of the facts, that disability did not exist following a specified date. From the award so made no appeal was taken. Citing the holding in Gulec v. Chrysler Corp., 292 Mich 711, it was held that an award in a subsequent proceeding for additional compensation could not be made for the 4 months period preceding July 15,1946. In the case at bar a wholly different situation is involved. The Webber Case may not be regarded as overruled by the decision in this proceeding.
The record before us in the present case contains testimony supporting the conclusion of the appeal board that plaintiff was in fact suffering compensable disability during the period from November 7, 195.2, to the date of hearing before the referee, with *216the exception of certain brief periods when he was employed and for which no compensation ivas awarded. There is also testimony in support of the claim that the disability found by the board to exist at the time of the hearing was continuing in nature. Such being the situation this Court is bound by the factual findings of the board. Hooks v. Wayne County Road Commissioners, 345 Mich 384; CL 1948, § 413.12 (Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17.186).
Plaintiff’s petition for further compensation, involved in the instant proceeding, was filed June 28, 1955. Compensation was allowed beginning November 7, 1952. On behalf of appellant it is claimed that under part 3, § 14, of the workmen’s compensation act, as amended by PA 1943, No 245,* an award for the period antedating more than 1 year the filing of said application -was unauthorized. The section in question reads as follows:
“If payment of compensation is made (other than medical expenses) and an application for further compensation is later filed with the commission, no compensation shall be awarded by the commission for any period which is more than 1 year prior to the date of the filing of such application.”
The proceeding now before the Court was initiated by plaintiff’s application for further compensation, filed as above stated. He cannot rely on the application filed May 21, 1952. As before noted, on the hearing of said application he failed to offer proof on which to base a finding that he did continue to suffer compensable disability after November 6,1952. We are now concerned with his later application which is the basis of the present proceeding. The wording of the statute, as amended in 1943, clearly indicates an intention on the part of the legislature to limit an award, on an application for further com*217pensation under the statute, to a period beginning not more than 1 year preceding the filing of such application.
In Tarnow v. Railway Express Agency, 331 Mich 558, an employee who, as he claimed, had sustained a compensable injury prior to the amendment of 1943 sought further compensation. On November 21, 1950, an award was granted by the workmen’s compensation commission allowing compensation for a period of 500 weeks beginning March 10,1944. The application was filed on October 14,1949. On behalf of defendant it was claimed that the statutory provision, above quoted, applied, although enacted in its amended form after the plaintiff had sustained his injury, and that, in consequence, the award as made Avas unauthorized. It was held that the amendment Avas not retroactive and did not apply to plaintiff, it not being in effect at the time of the accidental injury sustained by him. It was recognized, however, that if applicable it would bar recovery of compensation for the disability existing prior to October 14, 1948. The following language indicates the vieAv of the Court as to the purpose of the amendment and the interpretation thereof (p 566):
“It seems obvious that the purpose of the amendment Avas to limit the amount of recovery in certain cases. Such result must follow in any instance wdiere the statute in its present form is invoked to defeat recovery, partially or wholly, and is applicable. The amendment may not be regarded as relating merely to procedure, nor may it be classed as remedial legislation.”
In certain respects the facts in Lynch v. Briggs Manfg. Co., 329 Mich 168, are analogous to those in the case at bar. There plaintiff Lynch sustained a compensable injury on March 26, 1946, his knee being fractured. He was paid compensation until September 7th following wdien he returned to Avork *218at bis former rate of pay. On October 3, 1946, he filed an application for bearing and adjustment of bis claim for compensation. Tbe matter was set for bearing but tbe application was withdrawn under date of February 11, 1947. A second application, filed May 6,1947, was dismissed, for lack of prosecution, on September 2d of tbe same year. A third application for the payment of additional compensation was made April 23, 1948. This resulted in a bearing. and denial of compensation by tbe deputy commissioner. Tbe commission reversed tbe deputy, allowing compensation for total disability “from March 27,1946 to September 7,1946, from November 13, 1946 to April 16, 1947 and from May 22, 1947, until tbe further order of tbe commission.” As in tbe case at bar, tbe award as made sought to allow compensation for a period antedating by more than 1 year the filing of tbe application on which tbe proceeding was based. After quoting tbe section of the statute in question and declaring that “Tbe power of tbe commission to award compensation is expressly limited” by said section, it was said (p 173):
“Under this statutory provision tbe period for which compensation could be awarded in the instant ease could not extend retroactively beyond 1 year prior to April 23, 1948, tbe date upon which plaintiff’s present petition was filed. It follows that tbe award of tbe commission for March 27, 1946, to September 7, 1946, and for November 13, 1946, to April 16, 1947, must be vacated; but the award ‘from May 22, 1947, until tbe further order of tbe commission’ should be and is affirmed.”
While reference was made in tbe Lynch Case to tbe fact that 2 prior applications bad been made, one being withdrawn and tbe other dismissed for lack of prosecution, it was obviously considered that tbe proceeding under tbe third application was not thereby affected in any way. In tbe case at bar the *219award under consideration by this Court in the prior case (342 Mich 160) failed as to the provision for compensation from and after the date of hearing before the deputy because of lack of proof necessary to support it. From the practical standpoint the situation would have been essentially the same had plaintiff withdrawn any claim for continuing compensation from and after the date of hearing. Failure to offer requisite proof amounted to a lack of prosecution as to such portion of his claim.
The limitation imposed by the legislature on the power of the appeal board to award compensation is expressed in language that can leave no doubt as to the intention. The bar. to such compensation beginning more than 1 year prior to the filing of application therefor is absolute in terms and has reference to the power of the commission in the premises. It relates to the relief that may be granted 'in a purely statutory proceeding and is not analogous to statutes relating to the bringing of an action at law within a specified period after the accrual of the right of action.
The case should be remanded to the appeal board with directions to set aside that part of the award covering the period of time antedating by more than 1 year the filing of the application involved therein.. Neither party having prevailed in full, no costs should be allowed.
Dethmers, O. J., and Kelly, J., concurred with Carr, J.
Kavanagh, J., took no part in the decision of this case.

 PA 1912 (1st Ex Sess), No 10, as amended (CL 1948, §411.1 et seq. [Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17.141 et sag.]).

 CL 1948, § 413.14 (Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17.188).