Court Opinion

ID: 9737626
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:30:49.09608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:00.320275
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE STEIGMANN, dissenting: Although I agree with much of the majority’s analysis, I disagree with the result it reaches. In my judgment, what occurred in this case was a Terry stop that the circumstances fully justified. Clearly, an innocent person might simply walk back and forth along a two-block span for two or three days, four to five hours per day, as defendant did here. However, in making a determination of reasonable suspicion, the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is “innocent” or “guilty,” but the degree of suspicion that attaches to the noncriminal act in light of existing circumstances, including an officer’s knowledge of the neighborhood where the conduct occurred and particular patterns of criminal behavior. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 12, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1587 (1989). In this case, (1) Huckstep had observed defendant’s behavior for two to three days; (2) he observed defendant pacing the same two-block area for four to “five hours each day; and (3) Huckstep knew the area to be a high drug-trafficking area. Viewing Huckstep’s observations in light of his knowledge of the neighborhood and the modes of behavior of drug dealers, an inference is clearly reasonable that defendant had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime — specifically, trafficking in unlawful drugs. Accordingly, this court should hold that the trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion to suppress. The majority seems to place great weight not only on Huckstep’s observations of the situation he confronted, but also his conclusions concerning it. However, Huckstep’s testimony regarding his suspicions and intent seemed to change depending upon who was questioning him. For instance, he agreed with the prosecutor that he stopped defendant merely to ascertain his identity, not for some other investigative function. Yet, later on re-cross-examination, he testified about those aspects of defendant’s conduct that struck him as suspicious. The majority is correct that this case requires us to determine whether the circumstances here (1) were sufficient to warrant an investigative Terry stop initially or (2) became sufficient after Huck-step’s initial inquiry. 331 Ill. App. 3d at 150. The majority is also correct that a police officer may conduct a brief investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot without violating the fourth amendment. 331 Ill. App. 3d at 151. However, an analysis of these factors requires a focus on the nature of the circumstances confronting Huckstep, not on what conclusions Huckstep drew from those circumstances. Despite the seeming inconsistences in Huckstep’s testimony concerning why he did what he did, there was no inconsistency or uncertainty about what he saw, and, in my judgment, what he saw was sufficient to justify a Terry stop. The need to focus a court’s analysis on the factual circumstances rather than the subjective conclusions drawn by police officers has been discussed in search and seizure cases addressing whether probable cause to arrest existed in those cases. For instance, in Buss, 187 Ill. 2d at 203, 718 N.E.2d at 34, the supreme court reviewed a trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence that the police seized from him after searching his car allegedly with his consent. The defendant argued on appeal that his consent was the product of an illegal arrest and, therefore, involuntary. The supreme court affirmed the denial of defendant’s motion to suppress and wrote the following: “We begin by addressing the legality of defendant’s arrest. The circuit court found that defendant was not arrested until 12:30 p.m. on August 10, at which time the police‘had probable cause to arrest him. We may affirm the circuit court’s ruling on defendant’s motion to suppress for any reason in the record, regardless of whether the circuit court expressed this reason as a basis for its conclusion. [Citation.] While we agree that the police had probable cause to arrest defendant, we find that probable cause existed before 12:30 p.m. on August 10. Our review of the record convinces us that police had probable cause to arrest defendant when they met with him at the Wilmington Dam at approximately 9 a.m. on August 10.” Buss, 187 Ill. 2d at 205, 718 N.E.2d at 35. Interestingly, the two police officers (Sims and Mitchell) primarily involved in the murder investigation of the defendant in Buss did not believe they possessed sufficient evidence to arrest him at the Wilmington Dam at approximately 9 a.m. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d at 209, 718 N.E.2d at 37. However, the officers’ legal conclusions did not trouble the supreme court: “We also reject defendant’s suggestion that the State did not establish probable cause to arrest him because Sims and Mitchell testified that they believed they did not have sufficient evidence to arrest defendant at the Wilmington Dam. Probable cause is an objective standard, and an officer’s subjective belief as to the existence of probable cause is not determinative. [Citation.] As we have explained, the facts demonstrate that police had probable cause to arrest defendant at the Wilmington Dam, and their subjective beliefs to the contrary do not alter that conclusion.” Buss, 187 Ill. 2d at 209, 718 N.E.2d at 37. The supreme court reaffirmed this point in People v. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 218-19, 743 N.E.2d 48, 68-69 (2000), where the court wrote the following: “As a final matter, we reject defendant’s suggestion that the State did not establish probable cause to arrest him because a police officer testified at the hearing that the police would not have been able to obtain an arrest warrant before going to defendant’s apartment. ‘Probable cause is an objective standard, and an officer’s subjective belief as to the existence of probable cause is not determinative.’ Buss, 187 Ill. 2d at 209[, 718 N.E.2d at 37] (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the determination of probable cause was affected by police officers’ testimony that they did not believe that they had probable cause to arrest the defendant). As we have discussed, the facts demonstrate that the police had probable cause to arrest defendant, and a subjective belief to the contrary does not change that conclusion.” Just as probable cause is an objective standard, so is the standard governing when a reasonable, articulable suspicion exists to warrant a Terry stop. See People v. Chavez, 327 Ill. App. 3d 18, 31-32, 762 N.E.2d 553, 566 (2001) (An objective standard is used in determining whether the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of the stop would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe a Terry stop was necessary). Indeed, it could hardly be otherwise, given that the existence of probable cause to arrest authorizes much more intrusive police conduct, including a full custodial arrest, as well as a thorough search incident to arrest. Huckstep’s uncontradicted testimony regarding his observations of defendant’s conduct provided more than enough evidence, when judged by an objective standard, to warrant Huckstep’s making a Terry stop of defendant. That Huckstep (and the trial court) may not have thought so does not matter, and the majority errs by placing weight on Huckstep’s legal conclusions. The majority’s doing so violates the supreme court’s holdings on point in both Buss and Chapman. For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent.