Court Opinion

ID: 9447946
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:18:16.062159+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:14.422942
License: Public Domain

POPE, Circuit Judge.
I concur.
The court’s opinion, as I understand it, in invalidating the clause of the bill of lading relating to lighterage holds that the carrier remains responsible for the safe arrival of the goods under the general law of maritime carriage. That law, to start with, provided that all the shipper had to do to make his case was to prove receipt of goods in good order and non-delivery, or delivery in bad order. In this connection the opinion states: “The Act invalidates * * * any clause inserted in a bill of lading by a ship owner, relieving the owner from liability for failure to make a ‘proper delivery’ either by agreement with shippers or by delegation to others.” It would follow that the opinion proceeds upon the theory that the duty of safe and proper delivery is a nondelegable duty. If that be so, then in the absence of proof by the carrier that the circumstances were such that this absolute duty did not apply, such for instance as perils of the sea, act of God, act of war or public enemies, etc., the carrier is liable if safe delivery be not made. If the case be shown to be under one of the recognized exceptions mentioned, even then he becomes liable if he has been negligent.
The obligations of this carrier were governed not merely by the Harter Act but by the provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act as well. The bill of lading expressly recited: “This bill of lading shall have effect subject to the provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of the United States, approved April 16, 1936, which shall be deemed to be incorporated herein. * * * The provisions stated in said Act * * * shall govern before the goods are loaded on and after they are discharged from the ship and throughout the entire time the goods are in the custody of the carrier.”
The only provision of that Act which might conceivably operate to relieve the carrier is § 4(2) (q) which provides: “Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising or resulting from * * * any other cause arising without the actual fault and privity of the carrier and without the fault or neglect of the agents or servants of the carrier, but the burden of proof shall be on the person claiming the benefit of this exception to show that neither the actual fault or privity of the carrier nor the fault or neglect of the agents or servants of the carrier contributed to the loss or damage.” It is possible that the argument might be made that since the lighterage company which owned and handled the lighter was an independent contractor, the loss which occurred while the goods were in its hands could be deemed due to a cause “arising without the actual fault and privity of the carrier and without the fault or neglect of the agents or servants of the carrier” within the meaning of the clause just quoted. I think it unnecessary to resolve that question. If the paragraph just quoted has no application here, then since the cause of the loss was neither an act of God nor a peril of the sea, nor due to a fault in the navigation and management of the ship, or any other excepted cause, the absolute nondelegable duty to make safe delivery renders the carrier liable here without regard to negligence; and negligence is immaterial. On the other hand, if the carrier may find an exception from his absolute responsibility within the provisions of § 4(2) (q), supra, he cannot claim it in this case for a condition precedent to his utilization of that provision is that he must prove want of negligence and he has the burden thereof as that section provides.
In discussing the question of proof of negligence, the opinion states that “evidence of negligence lies in the inference which may be drawn from the unex*494plained sinking of the lighter in smooth water.” This is the same sort of inference which may be drawn in ordinary cases where the rule of res ipsa loquitur is applied. If it were necessary here to prove that the carrier itself was guilty of negligence I might have some difficulty in drawing an inference of that kind as to negligence on the part of the carrier in view of the fact that the lighter was not at the time of sinking in the possession of the carrier or its agents; but for the reasons I have stated above that too is a problem which I think need not be met here.
In short, what I am saying here is that either § 4(2) (q) has application here to furnish what Gilmore and Black call a “catch-all exception” or it does not. If it does not, then the non-delegable duty of respondent carrier makes it liable. If it does apply that section’s requirement of proof of want of negligence has not been complied with.