Court Opinion

ID: 9759496
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:18:23.389439+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:02.292116
License: Public Domain

STEPHENSON, Justice,
dissenting.
As I read the majority opinion, it is based on infringing a defendant’s right to exercise peremptory challenges. I do not think we should reverse a case on that basis.
The discussion apparently assumes legal bias on the part of jurors not excused for cause. There is reliance upon Ward v. Commonwealth. In my dissent in Ward, I predicted that enlarging automatic strikes to relationships to lawyers, witnesses, etc., would be a real troublemaker. It is here. Excusing a prospective juror for cause constitutes a legal inference of bias or prejudice in the case.
This case is enlarging this presumption of bias beyond Ward and effectively takes away from the trial courts the formerly recognized discretion in seating a juror after being satisfied that a prospective juror’s answers under oath qualified a juror to sit and render a fair and impartial verdict.
The Criminal Code of Practice No. 210 contemplated implied bias as to relationship to the accused or the victim, etc. Traditionally, we have, aside from relationship, knowledge of the case, or expressed opinion as to guilt, left the question of excusing for cause to the discretion of the trial court.
We have required that questions of familiarity with the case, witnesses, attorneys, etc., be answered truthfully in order that a defendant may exercise his peremp-tories.
If we are to engage in selecting jurors, we should set out all of the categories which we regard as inferring bias and prejudice and not do this piecemeal.
In Caldwell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 634 S.W.2d 405 (1982), we stated that the determination of whether to exclude a juror for cause lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. I wonder about the efficacy of Caldwell in view of the majority opinion.
Accordingly, I dissent.
WINTERSHEIMER, J., joins in this dissent.