Court Opinion

ID: 9516440
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:42:31.798326+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:15.216860
License: Public Domain

REILLY, Chief Judge, Retired,
concurring:
In joining in Judge Terry’s opinion, I should like to make an additional comment on the legal fee issue. The authority of a court to require one party in a divorce action to pay counsel fees incurred by the other spouse derives entirely from statute, as such awards are at odds with the so-called American rule, which makes each litigant in a civil action, irrespective of the outcome of the case, shoulder the burden of paying his own lawyer. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975); see also In re Antioch University, 482 A.2d 133 (D.C.1984), (summarizing the authorities in this jurisdiction). Hence the controlling statute, like any legislative enactment in derogation of common law, should be strictly construed.
Insofar as relevant, such statute, D.C. Code § 16-911(a)(l) provides:
During the pendency of an action for divorce, or an action by the husband or wife to declare the marriage null and void, where the nullity is denied by the other spouse, the court may:
(1) require the husband or wife to pay alimony to the other spouse for the maintenance of himself or herself and their minor children committed to such other spouse’s care, and suit money, including counsel fees, to enable such other spouse to conduct the case, whether as the plaintiff or the defendant_ [Emphasis supplied.]
The award before us, as well as similar awards by some trial judges, reveal a misconception of that statute. Prior to recent revision, this subsection of the code authorized the courts to require a husband to provide temporary alimony and “suit money, including counsel fees to enable [a wife] to conduct her case.” 1 At the time of its enactment, Congress undoubtedly felt that wives without independent income or other resources were at a disadvantage in divorce proceedings unless provided enough financial assistance to enable them to retain a lawyer. This did not mean of course that judges were free tó charge the wife’s entire legal bill to the husband in situations where the wife could afford a lawyer, either because she had money of her own when the suit began or had become somewhat self-sufficient by reason of securing alimony or a favorable division of property. In short, the words “to enable her to conduct her case” clearly implied that a husband should be charged only with such portion of the fee incurred by the wife *481as was needed to provide her with legal representation.
Recognition of such statutory intent caused this court, in awarding counsel fees for appellate services furnished by the financially disadvantaged spouse, to fix relatively small amounts.2 Our premise was that it was not our function to pass on the reasonableness of the claimed fee, but to charge only such portion thereof to the husband as was necessary to enable the wife to present her position.
The recent revision of this subsection of the code by the City Council, placing the sexes on an even footing, did not change this basic concept, as the critical words “to enable ... to conduct the case” were retained. Thus, in the case before us, the fact that the husband’s income was almost twice that of the wife was no reason for holding him liable for all the fees claimed by wife’s counsel. We note that when the case was heard in the trial court, the wife was earning a substantial salary, and that when it was over, she had won a generous division of the husband’s real estate equity.
So far as the award of a fee is concerned, covering in whole or in part appellate services performed in this court by the same lawyer, we are not aware of any decision construing § 16-911 which contemplates the exercise of such authority by a trial court. In Gullo v. Hirst, 207 A.2d 662 (D.C.1965), where we regarded multiple litigation pursued by a husband as an abuse of process, we ordered him to pay a combined fee of $1,000 for legal services in appellate and trial courts, but expressly stated, id. at 264, that ordinarily “we would leave the question of counsel fees for services in the trial court to that court for determination.” There is nothing in that opinion which even remotely suggests that the award of counsel fees for services on appeal is something upon which a trial court should pass.

. See D.C.Code § 16-911 (1973).

. See Thunberg v. Thunberg, 283 A.2d 444 (D.C.1971); Majette v. Majette, 261 A.2d 824 (D.C.1970); Payton v. Payton, 187 A.2d 899 (D.C.1963).