Court Opinion

ID: 9397852
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-26 18:03:32.21601+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:28.178284
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/26/23 Today’s Fresh Start v. Inglewood Unified etc. CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

TODAY’S FRESH START, INC.,                                          B314405

         Plaintiff and Appellant,                                   (Los Angeles County
                                                                    Super. Ct. No.
         v.                                                         20STCP02646)

INGLEWOOD UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT et al.,

         Defendants and Respondents.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mary H. Strobel, Judge. Affirmed.

      Young, Minney & Corr, Paul C. Minney and Kevin M. Troy
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Dannis Woliver Kelley, Sue Ann Salmon Evans and Keith
A. Yeomans for Defendants and Respondents Inglewood Unified
School District and Erika Torres.
      Vibiana M. Andrade and Patrick Saldana for Defendants
and Respondents Los Angeles County Office of Education and
Debra Duardo.

               _________________________________________

       This appeal addresses a county official’s authority to deny
renewal of a charter school in an insolvent public school district.
Charter schools are “public schools funded with public money but
run by private individuals or entities rather than traditional
public school districts.” (Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles
County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 205 (TFS I).)
Schools are approved, supervised, revoked, and renewed under
the Charter Schools Act of 1992. (Ed. Code, § 47600 et seq.) 1 If a
petition to renew a charter school is not decided within 60 days
after receipt, it is deemed approved.
       Insolvent school districts are overseen by an administrator
appointed by and serving under the supervision of the county
superintendent of schools. (§ 41326, subd. (b)(1).) We conclude
that when, as here, a petition to renew a charter school is
submitted to an insolvent school district while the administrator
position is vacant, the county superintendent’s duty to act
expeditiously on the renewal petition may be delegated to a
deputy superintendent. (§ 7.) We affirm the judgment.

        1   Undesignated statutory references are to the Education
Code.

                                   2
            FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       Appellant Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. has operated a charter
school in respondent Inglewood Unified School District (IUSD)
since 2009. Its charter was renewed in 2012 and 2016. The 2016
renewal occurred when authorities failed to take timely action on
appellant’s petition for renewal, and it was deemed approved by
operation of law. (Today’s Fresh Start Charter School v.
Inglewood Unified School Dist. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 276, 280–
281, 285 (TFS II).)
       Appellant operated other schools in the County of Los
Angeles (County). County revoked appellant’s charter in 2007.
(TFS I, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pp. 207–211, 230–231 [upholding the
revocation].) In 2015, the Los Angeles Unified School District
denied appellant’s petition for a charter school, describing its
history as “unsuccessful.”
       IUSD has been insolvent since 2012 and is in receivership.
The state administered IUSD from 2012 to 2018. In 2017 and
2018, IUSD’s state administrator warned appellant about the
likely impact of the “severe underperformance of your students”
on the renewal of its IUSD charter.
       In 2018, respondent Debra Duardo, superintendent of
respondent County Office of Education, assumed control of IUSD
after the Legislature shifted responsibility for insolvent schools
from the state to counties. Superintendent Duardo delegated
oversight of IUSD to a deputy superintendent, respondent Erika
Torres. After a vetting process, Dr. Duardo appointed Dr. Torres
as County Administrator of IUSD (Administrator) effective
November 8, 2019.
       On August 9, 2019, appellant petitioned to renew its IUSD
charter. Acting as deputy superintendent and designee for

                                3
Superintendent Duardo, Dr. Torres denied the petition for
renewal at an IUSD school board meeting on October 9, 2019.2
She adopted written findings that cite conflicts of interest; poor
academic performance; governance issues; failure to serve special
education pupils; and lack of transparency because appellant
refused to provide recent academic performance data to evaluate
student progress. The record does not show any written or oral
objection that Dr. Torres lacked authority to decide the petition.
       Appellant sought relief from the County Board of
Education, which conducted a de novo assessment of the petition
and denied renewal. Next, appellant asked the State Board of
Education (SBE) to grant renewal. The Advisory Commission on
Charter Schools, which makes recommendations to the SBE,
advocated for denial of appellant’s petition. On July 9, 2020, the
SBE unanimously denied renewal because appellant’s County
charter was revoked in 2007; appellant engaged in “related party
transactions”; and its operational history “exhibits ambiguity,
self-dealings, and a lack of transparency.” Neither of the
administrative decisions state that renewal was automatic
because Deputy Superintendent Torres lacked authority to act.
       Appellant petitioned for a writ of mandate in August 2020,
asking the trial court to set aside the denial of its renewal and
deem it approved. The writ petition, as amended, alleges that
appellant’s charter was automatically renewed because Dr.
Torres lacked authority to act before she was appointed

      2 Appellant notes that IUSD’s counsel referred to Dr.
Torres, incorrectly, as “County Administrator.” However,
appellant’s site administrator, Dr. Raul Roman, addressed Dr.
Torres as “superintendent,” indicating his awareness of the basis
for her authority when she denied the petition.

                                4
Administrator. Respondents admitted some of the petition’s
allegations but denied that Dr. Torres lacked authority to act on
the renewal application. Appellant requested judgment on the
pleadings. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 438, 1094.)
                     The Trial Court’s Ruling
       The court denied appellant’s petition for a writ of mandate.
It rejected appellant’s argument that Dr. Torres lacked authority
to deny appellant’s renewal request. Interpreting the Education
Code, the court concluded that Dr. Torres exercised the powers
and duties of the superintendent, as Dr. Duardo’s deputy. The
statutes do not show a legislative intent to prohibit the
superintendent from delegating powers to a deputy to decide
charter school renewal applications. Dr. Duardo’s appointment of
Dr. Torres as Administrator, a month later, belies any claim that
they sought to subvert the statutory scheme. The court entered
judgment for respondents.
                            DISCUSSION
       1. Standard of Review
       Courts presume that public officials performed the duties
required by law. (Cosgrove v. County of Sacramento (1967) 252
Cal.App.2d 45, 50–51.) Appellant does not discuss the merits of
the denial of its charter school renewal petition. Instead, it
argues that Dr. Torres lacked jurisdiction or authority to deny
renewal; therefore, renewal was automatic. “ ‘[W]e apply the
substantial evidence test to the trial court’s findings of fact and
exercise our independent judgment on legal issues, such as the
interpretation of statutory or regulatory requirements.’ ” (TFS
II, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 281.)

                                5
        2. Charter School Act Overview
        The Legislature has a constitutional duty to provide state
citizens with schooling. (TFS I, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 205.) In
1992, it authorized charter schools “to improve public education
by promoting innovation, choice, accountability, and
competition.” (Id. at p. 206; § 47601.) Charter schools operate
independently but are subject to public control and oversight,
which “ ‘legitimize[s]’ ” them “and arguably is constitutionally
necessary.” (TFS I, at p. 206; Mendoza v. State of California
(2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1034, 1060–1061.)
        A charter school applicant submits a petition to the
governing board of a school district. (TFS I, supra, 57 Cal.4th at
p. 206; § 47605; United Teachers of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles
Unified School Dist. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 504, 521–522.) Charters
are granted “consistent with sound educational practice and with
the interests of the community.” (§§ 47605, subd. (c), 47605.6,
subd. (b); TFS I, at p. 206; United Teachers, at pp. 522–523.)
Charter schools are eligible for state and local funding. (TFS I, at
p. 206; Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation (2006) 39 Cal.4th
1164, 1186.) “Chartering authorities must monitor schools’ fiscal
condition and academic performance and are authorized to
investigate whenever grounds for concern arise.” (TFS I, at
p. 206.)
        Charters are renewable. (§ 47607.) A chartering district
may deny renewal if performance is inadequate, with written
findings listing facts showing that the school has not provided a
benefit and closure is in the pupils’ best interest. (Id., subd.
(c)(7); TFS II, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 283 [district considers
academics, finances, and operations to evaluate future success].)
If a governing board fails to act within 60 days on a petition for

                                 6
renewal, the renewal is deemed approved. (Cal. Code Regs.,
tit. 5, § 11966.4, subd. (c).)
        3. Governance of Insolvent School Districts
        Before 2018, when an insolvent school district sought state
funding, the state superintendent of schools would assume control
of the district. Effective September 17, 2018, the law changed.
Now, the county superintendent of schools, under supervision of
the state superintendent, “assumes control of the school district
in order to ensure the school district’s return to fiscal solvency.”
(§ 41325, subd. (a), amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 426, § 9.) Once
the county superintendent “assume[s] control” of an insolvent
district under section 41325, he or she “shall assume all the legal
rights, duties, and powers of the governing board of a qualifying
school district.” (§ 41326, subd. (b).)
        Appellant focuses on the following language in the 2018
amendments to the Education Code: “The county superintendent
of schools, with concurrence from both the [State] Superintendent
and the president of the state board . . . shall appoint an
administrator from a pool of candidates identified and vetted by
the County Office Fiscal Crisis and Management Assistance
Team . . . to exercise the authority described in this subdivision.”
(§ 41326, subd. (b).) The administrator serves “under the
direction and supervision of the county superintendent,” who may
terminate the administrator. (Id., subd. (b)(1).)3
        An administrator appointed pursuant to section 41326 is
charged with specified responsibilities: To implement substantial
changes in a school district’s fiscal policies and practices,

      3 Alternatively, the county and state superintendents, and
president of the SBE may appoint “a trustee with the powers and
responsibilities of an administrator.” (§ 41325, subd. (c).)

                                 7
including filing for bankruptcy; revise educational programs to
reflect income projections; encourage community members to
accept a fair share of the district’s fiscal recovery; consult with
the district’s governing board, employees, and community;
consult with and seek recommendations from the county and
state superintendents and the county fiscal crisis and
management team; and (with approval from the county
superintendent) enter agreements to change school district rules,
regulations, policies, or practices to implement a recovery plan.
(§§ 41325, subd. (b)(1)–(5), 41326, subd. (b)(10)(A)–(F).)
       We asked the parties to brief whether the responsibilities
listed in sections 41325 and 41326 authorize an administrator to
grant or deny charter school renewals. These statutes do not
mention charter schools; they focus on fiscal matters aimed at
returning a district to solvency.
       Appellant and respondents reply that an administrator has
power to decide charter school renewals. They agree that
uncertainty and confusion will result if an administrator is
precluded from making decisions about charter schools. They
point out that approving or renewing a charter school has fiscal
effects on a school district, which obtains state and local funding
based on the number of students the charter school recruits.
(TFS I, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 206.)4
       Appellant observes that the county superintendent “shall
assume all the legal rights, duties, and powers” of an insolvent
school district’s governing board, then appoint an administrator

      4 The Legislature recognized the monetary impact of
charter schools when it amended the Education Code in 2019 to
state that a district under state receivership may deny a charter
school petition for fiscal reasons. (§ 47605, subd. (c)(8).)

                                 8
to carry out those rights, duties, and powers. (§ 41326, subd. (b).)
Respondents add that the broad statutory language delegating
all power over insolvent schools gives the administrator “implied
authority to grant or deny a charter school petition.”
       Appellant suggests that the county superintendent retains
little authority once an administrator is appointed. However, as
respondents note, “the county superintendent is the ultimate
authority charged with control over an insolvent school district
and is not divested of any authority when a county administrator
is appointed.”
       The Education Code supports respondents’ reading that the
county superintendent retains ultimate power over insolvent
districts. “The appointment of an Administrator pursuant to
Section 41326 does not remove any statutory rights, duties, or
obligations from the county superintendent of schools. The
county superintendent of schools retains the responsibility to
superintend school districts under his or her jurisdiction.”
(§ 41327.2, subd. (a).) Moreover, the authority of the county
superintendent, the state superintendent, the president of the
SBE and the administrator “shall continue” until the insolvent
school district has fully recovered from insolvency and satisfied
all plans and reporting requirements. (§ 41326, subd. (f).)
       As we shall see, the continuing responsibility of the county
superintendent to manage school districts, including insolvent
ones, gave Dr. Torres authority to act—in her role as deputy
superintendent—before becoming administrator.

                                 9
       4. Forfeiture and Exhaustion of Remedies
              a. Dr. Torres Did Not Act as Administrator
                 Before Being Appointed
       Respondents assert that appellant forfeited its claim that
Dr. Torres purported to act as administrator when she denied the
renewal petition. Appellant denies making such a claim. The
trial court wrote in its order, “Respondents contend, and
Petitioner has not disputed, that Dr. Torres decided the petition
purportedly as a deputy or designee of Dr. Duardo.” It is not in
dispute that Dr. Torres acted as deputy superintendent, not as
administrator.
              b. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
       Appellant did not object at the IUSD school board meeting
that Deputy Superintendent Torres lacked authority to conduct
the meeting or decide its renewal petition. Nor did appellant
argue that Dr. Torres lacked authority in administrative
proceedings with the County Board of Education and SBE.
Respondent asserts that appellant cannot challenge Dr. Torres’s
authority now after failing to do so in administrative proceedings.
       “ ‘[A] party must exhaust administrative remedies before
resorting to the courts.’ ” (Williams & Fickett v. County of Fresno
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1258, 1267.) The exhaustion doctrine is a
fundamental rule of procedure and “not a matter of judicial
discretion.” (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d
280, 293.) “[A]bsent an exhaustion rule, a litigant might have an
incentive to ‘sandbag.’ ” (Hill RHF Housing Partners, L.P. v. City
of Los Angeles (2021) 12 Cal.5th 458, 478–479.) The doctrine
applies to charter school decisions. (American Indian Model
Schools v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th

                                10
258, 264, 291 [charter revoked for conflicts of interest, fiscal
mismanagement, and improper use of public funds].)
       Exhaustion of remedies may be excused if a party claims
that an agency had no authority to resolve a dispute. (Coachella
Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. v. California Public
Employment Relations Bd. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1072, 1081–1082.)
Exhaustion is not required if an administrative officer lacked
jurisdiction to issue a challenged order. (City of Lodi v. Randtron
(2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 337, 360.)
       The merits of appellant’s renewal petition were resolved by
three administrative bodies and are not contested on appeal. The
sole issue is a legal one requiring statutory interpretation to
determine a deputy superintendent’s authority to act for the
superintendent in an insolvent school district. Under the
circumstances, the exhaustion doctrine does not prevent the
courts from addressing the challenge to Dr. Torres’s authority.
       5. Dr. Torres Had Authority to Deny Renewal While
          Serving as Deputy Superintendent
       As an insolvent school district, IUSD’s rights, duties, and
powers were assumed in 2018 by Superintendent Duardo, under
amended section 41326. In answer to appellant’s petition,
respondents admit that (1) Dr. Torres was deputy superintendent
of schools when she denied appellant’s renewal application on
October 9, 2019, and (2) Dr. Torres was appointed administrator
one month later, on November 8, 2019. The issue is whether
Deputy Superintendent Torres had authority to act on appellant’s
renewal request before she was appointed administrator.
       When appellant filed for renewal, Superintendent Duardo
was in the process of selecting an administrator; she observed
that the vetting process takes “months.” Dr. Duardo is

                                11
responsible for 1.5 million students in the County. She has many
duties to perform. (See, e.g., § 1240.) The superintendent is
authorized to appoint a deputy to assist in carrying out these
duties. (§ 1290.)
      After section 41325 was amended in September 2018, Dr.
Duardo assumed control over IUSD and designated Deputy
Superintendent Torres to carry out the transfer of responsibility
over IUSD from the state to County. In July 2019, the state and
County formalized an agreement for Dr. Torres to work under the
guidance of the state administrator while control of IUSD was
transferred to County. During the transition period, County
began searching for an administrator. Interviews for the
administrator position began in October 2019.
      An administrator must be vetted by a fiscal crisis
management team and cannot be appointed by Dr. Duardo
without concurrence from the state superintendent of schools and
the president of the SBE. (§ 41326, subd. (b).) After the vetting
and interview process was completed, Dr. Duardo secured the
concurrence of the state officials in November 2019 and
appointed Dr. Torres as administrator.
      The Education Code did not bar Dr. Torres from acting on
behalf of Dr. Duardo while control of IUSD was transferring from
the state to County and candidates for administrator were being
vetted and interviewed. Dr. Duardo was not required to review
the petition herself and could rely on a deputy to carry out her
duty: “Whenever a power is granted to, or a duty is imposed
upon, a public officer, the power may be exercised or the duty
may be performed by a deputy of the officer or by a person
authorized, pursuant to law, by the officer, unless this code
expressly provides otherwise.” (§ 7.)

                               12
        Appellant argues that only an appointed administrator can
oversee an insolvent school district or act on a petition for charter
school renewal in an insolvent district. In the absence of an
administrator, appellant reasons, a county superintendent must
personally oversee the insolvent district, regardless of how long it
takes to locate, evaluate, and approve a qualified person for the
administrator position.
        Appellant’s position is untenable.
        A petition to renew a charter school must be acted upon
within 60 days; otherwise, it is approved by operation of law.5
The Legislature has made clear that renewal should be denied if
it is in the best interests of a district’s pupils. (§ 47607, subd.
(c)(7).) The well-being of children cannot be sacrificed if an
unmeritorious petition to renew a charter school is approved by
operation of law merely because an administrator is not in place
to review it.
        An administrator might retire, resign, die in office or, as
here, not yet be appointed when a renewal petition is filed. Given
the brevity of the 60-day limit for acting on a renewal petition
and the complexity of vetting and appointing a new
administrator, we decline to interpret the Education Code to
mean that a charter school renewal application can escape review
in the absence of an administrator. Similarly, a superintendent

      5 The regulation reads: “If within 60 days of its receipt of a
petition for renewal, a district governing board has not made a
written factual finding as mandated by Education Code section
47605[, subdivision] (b), the absence of written factual findings
shall be deemed an approval of the petition for renewal.” (Cal.
Code Regs., tit. 5, § 11966.4, subd. (c).) Respondents question the
validity of this regulation, a point we need not reach to resolve
the appeal.

                                 13
may be incapacitated before appointing an administrator, yet
under appellant’s reading of the law, an insolvent school district
would be paralyzed from taking any formal action through a
deputy superintendent.
      Even after an administrator is appointed, a superintendent
retains “statutory rights, duties, [and] obligations” and “the
responsibility to superintend school districts under his or her
jurisdiction.” (§ 41327.2, subd. (a); see also § 41326, subd. (f)
[superintendent and administrator have continuing authority
until an insolvent district recovers].) The county superintendent
can, contrary to appellant’s belief, act through a deputy.
      State law has long recognized a deputy’s authority. “The
deputy of a public officer, when exercising the functions or
performing the duties cast by law upon such officer, is acting for
his principal or the officer himself. The deputy’s official acts are
always those of the officer. He merely takes the place of the
principal in the discharge of duties appertaining to the office.
When, therefore, the law provides that it shall be the duty of a
certain public officer to do or perform certain public official acts,
the deputy of such officer, if there be one, is necessarily included
within the terms of the provision. . . . In brief, a deputy under a
public officer and the officer or person holding the office are, in
contemplation of law and in an official sense, one and the same
person . . . and his (the deputy’s) acts are, therefore, not his, but
those of the holder or incumbent of the office.” (Sarter v. Siskiyou
County (1919) 42 Cal.App. 530, 536.)
      Superintendent Duardo’s duty to appoint an administrator
did not divest her of the ability to have a deputy supervise an
insolvent school district before an appointment is made.
Appellant suggests that because school district board members

                                 14
cannot delegate “decision-making authority” to a deputy, a
superintendent cannot do so. Appellant is making a false
equivalence. Public officers may delegate powers when “a statute
expressly allows them to do so.” (City of Los Angeles v. Superior
Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1086, 1094–1095.) The Education Code
expressly allows a superintendent to appoint a deputy (§ 1290)
and exercise power through a deputy (§ 7).
       Appellant cites section 41326, subdivision (a) for the
proposition that a superintendent cannot delegate authority.
That provision has nothing to do with a superintendent’s ability
to delegate authority.6 It only states that a school district’s
acceptance of money constitutes its agreement to statutory
conditions on emergency apportionments. It is not a specific
statute purporting to override the general rule stated in
section 7.

      6  It reads: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this
code, the acceptance by a school district of an apportionment
made pursuant to Section 41320 that exceeds an amount equal to
200 percent of the amount of the reserve recommended for that
school district under the standards and criteria adopted pursuant
to Section 33127 constitutes the agreement by the school district
to the conditions set forth in this article. Before applying for an
emergency apportionment in the amount identified in this
subdivision, the governing board of a school district shall discuss
the need for that apportionment at a regular or special meeting of
the governing board of the school district and, at that meeting,
shall receive testimony regarding the apportionment from
parents, exclusive representatives of employees of the school
district, and other members of the community. For purposes of
this article, ‘qualifying school district’ means a school district
that accepts a loan as described in this subdivision.”

                                15
       The Education Code does not require a superintendent—
especially one responsible for overseeing a million students—to
tend to the operations of an insolvent district during the months
needed to evaluate candidates for administrator. As the
appointed deputy of the superintendent, Dr. Torres was
responsible for overseeing the insolvent IUSD.
       Appellant argues that use of a deputy superintendent
during the search for an administrator creates a conflict because
it means the superintendent will be holding incompatible offices.
(Gov. Code, § 1099.) We are not persuaded. Even after an
administrator is named, the superintendent still exercises
statutory rights, duties, and obligations (Ed. Code, § 41327.2,
subd. (a)) and may terminate the administrator (Ed. Code,
§ 41326, subd. (b)(1)). The Legislature did not perceive a conflict
between a superintendent’s duty to review all school districts
while also overseeing an insolvent district. Delegating authority
to a deputy changes nothing because the deputy is acting as the
superintendent. There are not two incompatible offices.
       Appellant describes “what if” hypotheticals involving rogue
officials. However, courts presume that public officials perform
their duties. (Cosgrove v. County of Sacramento, supra, 252
Cal.App.2d at pp. 50–51.) The parade of horribles envisioned by
appellant did not occur. What happened was that the Legislature
amended the law in 2018 to shift responsibility for insolvent
school districts from the state to counties. Unsurprisingly, this
shift did not occur overnight. During the transition phase, the
state and County formally agreed that Dr. Torres would work
under the guidance of the state administrator. Soon after, she
was appointed County administrator after a vetting process to

                                16
satisfy section 41326. There is nothing nefarious about the
process.7
       Nothing in the Education Code expressly provides that a
county superintendent must personally attend to the operations
of an insolvent school district, nor does it expressly state that a
deputy cannot act for the superintendent under Education Code
section 7. Education Code section 41326 discusses the
superintendent’s authority and the process for appointing an
administrator; it does not contain express language limiting the
power of a superintendent to delegate powers to a deputy.
Education Code section 7 does not limit the deputy’s powers to
nondiscretionary decisions. The powers and duties of a deputy
are the same as the superintendent’s powers and duties. (Gov.
Code, § 1194 [“each deputy possesses the powers and may
perform the duties attached by law to the office of his principal”].)
       We conclude that in the absence of an administrator, the
deputy superintendent appointed by the superintendent
exercised authority to deny appellant’s petition to renew its IUSD
charter. Appellant’s renewal petition was thoroughly reviewed.
Appellant writes that after Dr. Torres denied the petition, full
assessments of the petition—not mere substantial evidence
reviews—were done by the County and the State Boards of
Education, as if the petition had been submitted to them in the
first instance; appellant had, in its words, “a second and third
‘bite of the apple.’ ” Appellant enjoyed the full panoply of rights
afforded by the Education Code.

      7 Appellant relies on a case in which an agency failed “to
comply with its regularly adopted ‘Personnel Policy’ rules.” (Civil
Service Assn. v. Redevelopment Agency (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d
1222, 1225.) The case is inapposite.

                                 17
       6. Automatic Renewal
       A petition for renewal must be resolved expeditiously. “The
strict timeline for denial of a renewal petition is justified by the
need for certainty during the school year. Parents, students, and
teachers need ample notice whether the charter school will be
authorized to continue operation for the following year.
Sufficient time must be available for the charter school to pursue
all necessary review processes if the renewal petition is denied.”
(TFS II, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 285.)
       Charter school renewals are governed by the same
standards as original applications to form a charter school. A
petition must be promptly decided and cannot be denied unless
the governing board “makes written factual findings” about the
charter school’s educational program. (§§ 47605, subd. (c),
47607, subd. (c)(7).) IUSD staff wrote a 19-page report detailing
reasons to deny appellant’s renewal petition. Deputy
Superintendent Torres adopted this report “as the district’s
written findings to support the denial of the petition.”8
       Appellant asserts in the last two pages of its opening brief
that only Superintendent Duardo or an administrator could deny
the petition; because Dr. Duardo did not do so, and could not
delegate her duty, the charter automatically renewed. This
reflects the claim made in appellant’s writ petition. As discussed
in part 5, ante, Deputy Superintendent Torres had authority to

      8  We do not address the parties’ discussion of the timing or
sufficiency of the written findings, a topic that exceeds the scope
of the writ petition and the trial court’s ruling. We do not
address Dr. Torres’s qualifications for the administrator position
for the same reason.

                                18
deny appellant’s renewal petition and did so within 60 days. The
petition was not approved by operation of law.
                             DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed. Appellant to bear all costs on
appeal.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                          KWAN, J.*
We concur:

      ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J.

      CHAVEZ, J.

       * Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County under
appointment by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6
of the California Constitution.

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