Court Opinion

ID: 9498890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:30:37.737974+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:07.952577
License: Public Domain

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I write separately to underscore that federal law, not Arizona law, is determinative of the admissibility of evidence in this case. The majority dedicates substantial time explaining why the traffic stop was permissible under Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-3883(B), and why retroactive application of the Arizona Court of Appeals decision in State v. Box, 205 Ariz. 492, 73 P.3d 623 (2003), does not offend due process. Maj. Op. at 1235-1237. Neither question bears on our Fourth Amendment analysis.
Although Miranda-Guerena’s argument focuses on state law, the issue before us is not whether the stop violated Arizona law. We have long held that “evidence seized in compliance with federal law is admissible without regard to state law.” United States v. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d 1368, 1374 (9th Cir.1987). This principle holds true even where the evidence was obtained in violation of state law. United States v. Cornier, 220 F.3d 1103, 1111 (9th Cir.2000) (“The general rule, therefore, is that evidence will only be excluded in federal court when it violates federal protections, such as those contained in the Fourth Amendment, and not in cases where it is tainted solely under state law.”).
Exceptions to this general rule are limited. The admissibility of evidence in federal court depends on state law only when the “[federal] constitutional test for determining the legality of a search” necessarily implicates state law. Cormier, 220 F.3d at 1112. Thus, the Fourth Amendment requires exclusion of evidence seized in a search incident to an arrest or an inventory search that is illegal under state law, see id. at 1111-12, or pursuant to a traffic stop based on a mistake of substantive state criminal law, see United States v. King, 244 F.3d 736, 741-42 (9th Cir.2001) (“Because an officer’s mistake of [state] law cannot form the basis for reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop, we reverse the district court’s denial of King’s motion to suppress.”). Here, no exception applies. Absent a specific exception, the general rule remains that the federal constitutional test for reasonable suspicion is not affected by state law. Cf. United States v. Becerra-Garcia, 397 F.3d 1167, 1173-74 (9th Cir.2005) (treating tribal law as equivalent to state law under the Fourth Amendment and holding that “the legality of the seizure does not depend on the rangers’ authority under tribal law”; “the reasonableness of a seizure depends exclusively on federal law”).
With these principles in mind, resolution of Miranda-Guerena’s appeal turns on the question whether, under the Fourth Amendment, Officer Hammarstrom had reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation and Deputy Davila properly relied on instructions from Officer Hammarstrom in making the investigatory stop. Because I agree with the majority’s resolution of this question, I concur in the result. See Maj. Op. at 1237.