Court Opinion

ID: 9895366
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-06 21:03:36.184151+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:26.749853
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/6/23 P. v. Lawson CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                         (Butte)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C094760

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     (Super. Ct. No. 19CF03236)

           v.

 WILLIAM DAVID LAWSON, JR.,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant William David Lawson, Jr., repeatedly sexually abused his
stepdaughter, J.L., when she was between the ages of 12 and 18. A jury found him guilty
of numerous sex offenses, including two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child
under the age of 14 years--rape (Pen. Code, §§ 269, subd. (a)(1), 261, subd. (a)(2)),1 two

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child under the age of 14 years--oral copulation
(§§ 269, subd. (a)(4), 287, subd. (c)(2)(B)), one count of aggravated sexual assault of a
child under the age of 14 years--sexual penetration (§§ 269, subd. (a)(5), 289, subd.
(a)(1)(B)), three counts of forcible oral copulation of a minor over the age of 14 years
(§ 287, subd. (c)(2)(C)), and seven counts of forcible rape of a minor over the age of 14
years (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)). The jury also found true the special allegation that J.L. was a
minor under the age of 18 years when the forcible rape counts were committed, and
defendant knew or reasonably should have known she was under 18. In a bifurcated
proceeding, the trial court found that defendant had a prior serious felony conviction
(§§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (d); 1170.12, subd. (b)) that qualified as a strike under the three
strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12, subd. (b)). The court sentenced defendant to
an aggregate term of 244 years to life in prison, with a minimum parole eligibility of 150
years.
         Defendant appeals, arguing reversal is required due to instructional errors and
sentencing error. He also argues the matter must be remanded for resentencing in light of
Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 567). We will vacate
defendant’s sentence and remand the matter for a full resentencing given the change in
law effected by Senate Bill No. 567. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.

                               FACTUAL BACKGROUND
         We summarize the pertinent facts adduced at trial. Additional information related
to the contentions raised on appeal is set forth in the Discussion section, post.
         The Family
         J.L. was born in March 2001 and at the time of the trial was 20 years old. She has
three younger sisters and an older brother. At all relevant times, J.L.’s family lived in
Chico.

                                               2
       In 2004, defendant became J.L.’s stepfather; she was three years old and he was
28 or 29 years old. Defendant was the only father figure J.L. ever knew. J.L.’s mother
was not a “very present mom”; she took pills and slept “a lot,” including during the day.
From a young age, J.L. took care of her sisters and was like a mother to them.
       Defendant set the family rules and was the disciplinarian. He helped pay the bills
and bought food and clothes for the children. He also took J.L. to school, gave her
permission to do social things with her friends, and gave her money. J.L. did not obtain a
driver’s license at any point during the relevant period and depended on defendant to take
her places she needed to go.
       The Sexual Abuse
       Defendant repeatedly sexually abused J.L. when she was between the ages of 12
and 18.
       The abuse began during the summer before J.L. entered sixth grade. On a frequent
basis, defendant went into J.L.’s room at night when she was in bed and rubbed her “butt
and vagina area.” He also inserted his finger into her vagina and/or put his mouth on her
vagina. During these incidents, J.L. pretended to be asleep. Her mother was either
sleeping or working.
       When J.L was in sixth grade and 11 or 12 years old, defendant had sexual
intercourse with her “[b]asically every day.” Initially, J.L. pretended to be asleep when
defendant came into her bedroom at night to engage in intercourse. However, because
that did not deter defendant, she stopped. Instead, she would just “lay there” and not
“really fight it,” even though she did not want to have intercourse with defendant. At
trial, J.L. recalled that she was worried about becoming pregnant when she was in the
sixth grade. To accomplish the sexual acts that occurred in J.L.’s bedroom at night,
defendant undressed J.L. and moved her around the bed and/or onto the floor.

                                             3
       When J.L. was in seventh or eighth grade, her family moved to a different home.
Thereafter, the “frequency of [the] sexual intercourse picked up.” When J.L. was
between the ages of 13 and 15, defendant orally copulated and had sexual intercourse
with her “[o]ften”; he “didn’t go longer than two or three days without having
intercourse” with J.L.
       After J.L. turned 15 years old, defendant took her on “rides” to Little Chico Creek
or empty parking lots to engage in sexual acts in the car. In exchange for doing things for
J.L. (e.g., paying her phone bill), he would demand that she “go on a ride” with him and
have sex in the car.
       When J.L. was between the ages of 15 and 17, defendant took her to motels to
have sexual intercourse. Defendant also orally copulated J.L. during this time period.
       At trial, J.L. testified that she did not consent or willingly participate in sexual acts
with defendant. J.L. explained that she “submit[ted]” to the acts because she felt like she
had no choice and it was a “normal” part of her life; she felt frustrated, helpless, and
trapped. J.L. further explained that if she refused defendant’s sexual demands, he would
be on edge and irritated the entire day; he would create a “whole bunch of chaos and
havoc” in the house and yell at everyone. This made J.L. feel like it was her fault that
defendant was yelling at her mother and/or sisters.
       When asked, J.L. recalled an incident where defendant forced himself onto her
after she refused to engage in sexual acts with him. During this incident, defendant
ignored J.L.’s pleas to stop, even though she was crying. On another occasion, defendant
got really mad and yelled and swore at J.L. when she told him “no.” This made J.L. feel
“pretty terrified.” Both of these incidents occurred at some point after J.L.’s family
moved in seventh or eighth grade.
       J.L.’s Boyfriends
       When J.L. was 15 years old and a freshman in high school, defendant put a
“tracker” on her cell phone and would show up at her location on a regular basis.

                                               4
Defendant told J.L. that the tracker allowed him to access her photographs, text
messages, and call history.
       At age 15 or 16, J.L. began dating her first boyfriend, A. Defendant, who was
jealous of A., read the couple’s text messages, would not allow them to get together, and
followed them around town. On one occasion, he grabbed A.’s neck while J.L. was
sitting on his lap at the farmer’s market and told them they “shouldn’t be doing that kind
of stuff.” On another occasion, defendant rented a room at a motel for J.L. and A.
However, defendant told J.L. she could not use the room unless she agreed to engage in
sexual intercourse with him.2 Defendant set up a camera inside the hotel room, which
captured J.L. having sexual intercourse with A, and later showed the video recording to
J.L.
       Shortly after J.L. turned 18 years old, she began dating J. Defendant, who was
jealous of J., harassed and threatened him. He called J. from blocked phone numbers,
followed his car, threatened to beat him up, and threatened to go to his house and speak
with his family. Defendant called J. a racial slur, accused J.L. of using “random beds” to
“fuck” J., and told J.L. she needed to get her “ass kicked” because she was “acting foul,
doing nasty shit like [a] street girl.” Defendant would regularly show up at J.L.’s location
when she was with J., including when she and J. were alone together in J.’s car.
       On two separate occasions, defendant pulled out a knife and “put it up to [J.’s]
chest.” During one of those incidents, defendant threatened to kill J. if he did not leave
J.L. alone. On another occasion, defendant threatened J. while he was in the backseat of
his car with J.L. Defendant opened the door and told J. that he was “going to grab his

2 At trial, J.L. explained that defendant would often try to “make deals” with her to “get
sexual intercourse.” For example, he would pay her phone bill or give her permission to
go to a friend’s house if she had sex with him.

                                             5
nine” (i.e., 9 mm handgun), and that J. was a “dead mother F’er.” Before leaving the area
with J.L., defendant punched J. in the chest.
       J. broke up with J.L. two or three times during a six-week period because of
defendant’s behavior. At trial, J. explained that “there were multiple times where [he]
felt like [his] life was put on the line and [he] couldn’t do it anymore.”
       Disclosure of the Sexual Abuse
       When J.L. was 12 or 13 years old, she told her cousin and best friend (A.B.) that
defendant had shaved her “private parts.”3 Around the same time, J.L. told her mother
that defendant was “peeping” on her (i.e., looking at her through the window or while she
was in the bathroom), touching her, and had “put” a vibrator on her. In response, J.L.’s
mother became “really mad” at defendant and they argued. J.L., however, recanted;
because she was afraid of the confrontation, she told her mother she had lied.
When J.L. was 15 years old, she sent her mother a text message saying that she wanted
defendant “gone” because he had “peep[ed]” on her in the bathtub, was trying to “make
another deal with [her],” and had slapped her in the face two times. J.L. indicated that
she wanted her grandmother to be her guardian if mother stayed together with defendant.
J.L. also threatened to “tell[] on [defendant]” (i.e., disclose the abuse).
       Around the same time, J.L. told A.B. that she had lost her virginity, but not to her
boyfriend. Instead, J.L. pointed at defendant. Thereafter, A.B. told her mother (i.e.,
defendant’s sister) that J.L. had lost her virginity to defendant.4 Although A.B.’s mother

3 A.B. is approximately a year-and-a-half younger than J.L. A.B. was 18 years old when
she testified at trial. A.B.’s mother is defendant’s sister. Thus, defendant is A.B.’s uncle.
4 When A.B. was asked about J.L.’s relationship with defendant, she explained that they
argued “a lot,” and that, at a “certain point,” it appeared that they “were in a relationship”
and “it was like husband and wife fighting constantly.” A.B. further explained that J.L.
“always got what she wanted,” and that defendant was always doing “favors” for her,

                                                6
called Child Protective Services (CPS), A.B. never spoke with anyone from CPS about
J.L.’s accusation against defendant.
       Upon questioning “about the situation,” J.L. told the police that A.B.’s mother had
lied, explaining that defendant had not “done anything” to her or her siblings. At trial,
J.L. noted that she did not disclose the sexual abuse at that time because she was scared
of how it would affect her family.
       When J.L. was 18 years old, her boyfriend (J.) took her to the police station after
she disclosed that defendant had been raping her. The disclosure occurred after J. saw a
Snapchat message on J.L.’s account while she was in the shower.5 In that message,
defendant said, “Let me see you,” with an eyeball emoji, i.e., a picture of two eyes.
When J. (posing as J.L.) asked defendant what he wanted to see, defendant indicated that
he would “show” her if she let him take her away for an hour or two. J. responded by
asking defendant whether it was “going to be naughty,” to which defendant replied, “You
know it.”
       At some point prior to the shower incident when J.L. was 18 or about to turn 18,
she told her brother’s girlfriend that defendant had done “[a] lot” of “inappropriate
things” to her. While crying, J.L. explained that, in order to spend time with her
boyfriend (J.), she had to do “inappropriate things” she did not “want to do,” some of
which occurred in hotel rooms.
       At trial, J.L. explained that she would not have gone to the police station if J. had
not found out about the sexual abuse.

which made her sisters jealous. A.B. also noted that J.L. and defendant would frequently
“go places alone.”
5 At trial, J.L. explained that she would communicate with defendant using Snapchat, a
social media application that allows users to send pictures and messages that disappear
after a short period of time. J.L. further explained that J. had access to her Snapchat
account.

                                              7
         Defendant’s Police Interview
         In May 2019, less than a week after J.L. went to the police station, defendant was
interviewed by the police. Prior to his interview, defendant told his niece (A.B.) that he
had been having an “inappropriate relationship with [J.L.] for the past few years,” and
that he was “going to get in trouble for it.” Defendant explained that he had made a
mistake “he wasn’t going to be able to come back from.” Defendant also told other
family members that he had an “inappropriate relationship” with J.L.
         During the police interview, defendant initially denied engaging in any sexual
contact with J.L. However, after the detective indicated that the police had evidence
demonstrating otherwise, defendant acknowledged that something had been going on
between him and J.L. “for a year or two.” When defendant was asked how it started, he
responded, “I honestly don’t even remember.” Defendant gave the same answer when he
was asked how many times he had sexual intercourse with J.L. When defendant was
asked who initiated the intercourse, he said that he did not remember.
         At one point during the interview, defendant admitted he had taught J.L. how to
use a vibrator. Defendant also admitted to renting a hotel room for J.L. and A., but
denied that he put a recording device in the room. He also denied that he saw a video of
J.L. and A. engaging in sexual intercourse.
         J.L.’s Police Interview
         Five months later, in October 2019, J.L. was interviewed by the police. During
the portion of her interview that was played for the jury, J.L. described how defendant
pressured her into having sexual intercourse in exchange for renting a hotel room for her
and A.
         Police Investigation
         A search of defendant’s cell phone revealed that he had viewed teenage
pornography and had searched the Internet for a “spy listening device.” The search also
revealed that, in September 2014 (when J.L. was 13 years old), defendant accessed a

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document titled, “Unlawful Sexual Intercourse with a Minor, Criminal Statutes.”
Additionally, in May 2019, shortly after J.L.’s disclosure of the sexual abuse to the
police, defendant searched the Internet for information as to whether an attorney can
subpoena phone records, whether a criminal case can be settled out of court, and what
happens if an accuser does not show up to court. Finally, in addition to various
photographs of unidentified teenage girls, defendant’s phone also contained photographs
of J.L. when she was 12, 13, and 14 years old, including a photograph of her while she
was getting dressed (which was taken from outside her bedroom window), a photograph
of her in a swimsuit on a diving board, and a close-up of the swimsuit photograph, which
was cropped and zoomed in on her body.
       During a search of the family home, the police found condoms, lubricant,
and photographs of J.L. in a drawer in the garage.
       Records from the relevant motels showed that defendant rented a room for one
night on five separate occasions in 2016 and 2017 when J.L. was 15 and 16 years old, as
well as a one-night stay in 2019 when J.L. was 17 years old.
       Expert Testimony on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS)
       Anthony Urquiza, a licensed psychologist with a Ph.D. in clinical psychology,
qualified as an expert on the subject of sexually abused children and testified about
CSAAS--a pattern of behaviors exhibited by children who have been sexually abused.
Dr. Urquiza explained that CSAAS is not a diagnostic tool to determine whether sexual
abuse has occurred, but rather an educational tool used to understand why children who
have been sexually abused behave in a manner that appears to be inconsistent with being
a victim of such abuse. For example, most children who are sexually abused by a family
member significantly delay in reporting the abuse, and when they eventually disclose the
abuse, they tend to give few details. If the response to the initial disclosure of the abuse
is supportive, children tend to disclose more details because they feel safe. Relatedly,
secrecy is also a component of CSAAS. Dr. Urquiza explained that most children are

                                              9
sexually abused by someone with whom they have an ongoing relationship (e.g., a family
member who is older, stronger, and in a position of control and authority), and that
perpetrators of sexual abuse use intimidation and/or coercion to keep the abuse a secret.
For example, children can be coerced by a threat of physical harm or a threat that
something bad will happen if the abuse is disclosed. Children may also be coerced into
keeping the abuse a secret because they receive special attention and/or gifts from the
abuser.
       Another component of CSAAS is that sexually abused children tend to feel
helpless due to the inherent power differential between themselves and their adult
abusers, especially if the abuser lives in the family home. And many sexually abused
children feel trapped, ashamed, disgusted, and embarrassed, which causes them to
suppress their feelings as a means of coping with the abuse. Finally, although not
common, Dr. Urquiza noted that there are instances where children retract allegations of
sexual abuse. He explained the best predictor of retraction is a situation where the child
does not feel supported by their family (e.g., non-offending parent).
       Dr. Urquiza made clear that he did not know the facts of this case and had never
spoken with J.L. He explained that his testimony was about sexually abused children “as
a class generally” and “not about this case particularly.”
       Defendant’s Trial Testimony
       Defendant testified on his own behalf at trial. His theory was that J.L. fabricated
her claims of abuse because she was upset at him for the way he had treated her and her
boyfriends.
       Defendant repeatedly denied that he had sexual intercourse with J.L. or otherwise
touched her in an inappropriate way. However, he admitted that, before he left the family
home for his police interview in May 2019, he told J.L.’s mother and sisters that he had
an “inappropriate relationship” with J.L., and that he had to “go to jail for a little while.”

                                              10
Shortly thereafter, he told his sister and niece (A.B.) that he had an “inappropriate
relationship” with J.L. and was crying and upset.
       Upon questioning at trial, defendant explained that he admitted to having an
inappropriate relationship with J.L. during his police interview because J.L. refused to
return home until he was arrested, and because J.L.’s mother was “freaking out” and
threatened to take J.L.’s sisters and leave him if he did not make such an admission.
When asked what he meant by inappropriate relationship, defendant explained that he let
J.L. do inappropriate things and he talked to J.L. about “inappropriate stuff” and “racy
topics,” including “stuff about . . . intimate relationships.” Defendant also claimed that
he “just went with the question” when he indicated during his police interview that he
had been having sex with J.L. for the past year or two. According to defendant, the only
time he “didn’t tell the truth” during his police interview was when he “admitted to
having sex with [J.L.].” When asked, defendant explained that he did not deny having
intercourse with J.L. because he “didn’t know what was being said” by the interviewer,
and that, “whatever it was, [he] was obviously going to take the blunt (sic) of [it] so
[J.L.’s mother] could have nothing wrong, so nothing happened to [his] wife and kids.”
Defendant explained that he was worried that his wife would be arrested and his kids
placed in foster care.
       Defendant admitted that he threatened to stab J. on two separate occasions, he
slapped J., he called J. a racial slur, and he harassed J. Defendant also admitted that he
grabbed A.’s neck and that he rented a hotel room for J.L. and A.
       When asked, defendant explained why he had certain photographs of J.L. in his
phone and the Snapchat conversation that occurred while J.L. was in the shower. As to
the latter, defendant claimed that he sent J.L. a message saying he wanted to “see” the
house clean.
       As for the motel records, defendant claimed he sold marijuana to people who
would meet him at motels. He also claimed that he rented one room for his anniversary

                                             11
with his wife, and that he set up a motion-sensitive camera in the motel rooms because a
motel employee had stolen marijuana from him. However, he acknowledged that he
never went to the relevant motel with his wife, and that the only images captured by the
camera were of J.L., including J.L. having sex with A. Defendant claimed that he was
truthful in his police interview when he denied ever seeing a video of J.L. and A. having
sex because the camera only captured still images.
                                       DISCUSSION
                                              I
                                Alleged Instructional Errors
       Defendant raises several claims of instructional error, which we review de novo.
(People v. Parker (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1, 66; People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 326.)
As we next explain, we see no basis for reversal.
       A. Lesser Included Offenses
       Defendant initially argues the trial court erred by failing to sua sponte instruct the
jury on lesser included offenses as to the forcible sex offenses charged in counts 1
through 6, 8, and 10. He claims substantial evidence supported instructions on
nonforcible sex offenses.
              1. Additional Background
       In counts 1 and 4, defendant was charged with aggravated (forcible) sexual assault
of a child--rape of J.L. In counts 2 and 5, defendant was charged with aggravated
(forcible) sexual assault of a child--oral copulation of J.L. In count 3, defendant was
charged with aggravated (forcible) sexual assault of a child--sexual penetration of J.L. In
counts 6, 8, and 10, defendant was charged with forcible oral copulation with a minor 14
years of age or older.
       We refer to the foregoing offenses as “forcible” sex offenses, as a shorthand way
of referring to the force element, which requires that the offenses be “accomplished
against a person’s will by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate

                                             12
and unlawful bodily injury on the person or another.” (See §§ 261, subd. (a)(2) [rape],
287, subd. (c)(2) [oral copulation], 289, subd. (a)(1) [sexual penetration].) During
closing argument, the prosecutor focused on the element of duress with respect to the
aggravated/forcible component of the charged sex offenses.
         The accusatory pleading alleged that J.L. was 12 years old with respect to counts
1, 2, and 3, 13 years old with respect to counts 4 and 5, 14 years old with respect to count
6, 15 years old with respect to count 8, and 16 years old with respect to count 10. The
accusatory pleading also alleged that, with respect to counts 1 through 5, J.L. was under
the age of 14 years and defendant was more than seven years older than her.

               2. Applicable Legal Principles
                      a. Aggravated/Forcible Component
         As relevant here, an act is accomplished by “force” if a person uses enough
physical force to overcome the other person’s will. (See People v. Griffin (2004) 33
Cal.4th 1015, 1023-1024, 1027 [explaining that “ ‘ “ ‘[t]he kind of physical force [used]
is immaterial,’ ” ’ ” and “conduct which might normally attend sexual intercourse . . . can
support a forcible rape conviction”]; CALCRIM No. 1000 (Rape by Force, Fear, or
Threats); CALCRIM No. 1015 (Oral Copulation by Force, Fear, or Threats); CALCRIM
No. 1045 (Sexual Penetration by Force, Fear, or Threats).) “ ‘Force’ includes
circumstances where the victim did not want to engage in the act and the evidence does
not otherwise establish the victim’s positive cooperation in act or attitude. [Citation.] It
also includes the force used to accomplish ‘the penetration and the physical movement
and positioning of [the victim’s] body in accomplishing the act.’ ” (People v. Thomas
(2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1063, 1071.) The question for the jury is whether the defendant
used force to accomplish the sexual acts against the victim’s will, “not whether the force
he used overcame [the victim’s] physical strength or ability to resist him.” (Griffin, at p.
1028.)

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       Further, for purposes of the relevant charged sex offenses, “duress” means “ ‘a
direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, . . . or retribution sufficient to coerce a
reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities to (1) perform an act which otherwise
would not have been performed or, (2) acquiesce in an act to which one otherwise would
not have submitted.’ ” (People v. Leal (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1004; see CALCRIM Nos.
1000, 1015, and 1045.)6 The jury determines duress by considering the totality of the
circumstances. (People v. Veale (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 40, 46; § 261, subd. (b)(1);
CALCRIM Nos. 1000, 1015, 1045.) Relevant factors include the age of the victim, their
relationship to the defendant, relative size and age disparities, location of the sexual
abuse, the position of dominance and authority of the defendant, and past and present
conduct of the defendant toward the victim, including defendant’s continuous
exploitations of the victim and whether the defendant made threats of harm to the victim
or physically controlled the victim when the victim attempted to resist. (People v.
Cochran (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 8, 13-14, disapproved on other grounds in People v.
Soto (2011) 51 Cal.4th 229, 248, fn. 12; People v. Cardenas (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 927,
940; People v. Senior (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 765, 775; People v. Superior Court (Kneip)
(1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 235, 238-239; People v. Pitmon (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 51,
disapproved on other grounds in Soto, at p. 248, fn. 12.) “The very nature of duress is
psychological coercion.” (Cochran, at p. 15.)
       “The fact that the victim testifies the defendant did not use force or threats does
not preclude a finding of duress. [Citation.] When the victim is young and is molested

6 We recognize that, in contrast to forcible rape, duress for purposes of forcible oral
copulation and forcible sexual penetration also includes a direct or implied threat of
hardship. (Compare CALCRIM No. 1000 with CALCRIM Nos. 1015 and 1045; see
People v. Leal, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1007 [the deletion of the term “hardship” from the
definition of “duress” applies only to the rape and spousal rape statutes].) This
distinction is immaterial to the resolution of the issues raised on appeal.

                                               14
by her father in the family home, duress will be present in all but the rarest cases.”
(People v. Thomas, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1072-1073.)
                      b. Lesser Included Offenses
       “ ‘ “ ‘[I]t is settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, the trial
court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the
evidence. [Citations.] The general principles of law governing the case are those
principles closely and openly connected with the facts before the court, and which are
necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case.’ [Citation.] That obligation has been
held to include giving instructions on lesser included offenses when the evidence raises a
question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense were present [citation],
but not when there is no evidence that the offense was less than that charged.” ’ ”
(People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 115.) “[T]he existence of ‘any evidence, no
matter how weak’ will not justify instructions on a lesser included offense, but such
instructions are required whenever evidence that the defendant is guilty only of the lesser
offense is ‘substantial enough to merit consideration’ by the jury. [Citations.]
‘Substantial evidence’ in this context is ‘ “evidence from which a jury composed of
reasonable [persons] could . . . conclude[ ]” ’ that the lesser offense, but not the greater,
was committed.” ’ ” (People v. Sattiewhite (2014) 59 Cal.4th 446, 477.)
       An offense is necessarily included in another if the greater crime cannot be
committed without also committing the lesser crime. (People v. Hughes (2002) 27
Cal.4th 287, 365-366.) Courts have “applied two tests in determining whether an
uncharged offense is necessarily included within a charged offense: the ‘elements’ test
and the ‘accusatory pleading’ test. Under the elements test, if the statutory elements of
the greater offense include all of the statutory elements of the lesser offense, the latter is
necessarily included in the former. Under the accusatory pleading test, if the facts
actually alleged in the accusatory pleading include all of the elements of the lesser

                                               15
offense, the latter is necessarily included in the former.” (People v. Reed (2006) 38
Cal.4th 1224, 1227-1228.)
       In determining whether the trial court improperly failed to instruct on a lesser
included offense, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant.
(People v. Millbrook (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1137.)
              3. Analysis

       We conclude the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on
lesser included nonforcible sex offenses (e.g., nonforcible oral copulation). As we shall
explain, even assuming (without deciding) the nonforcible sex offenses identified by
defendant are lesser included offenses of the charged offenses (see People v. Woods
(2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 461, 475 [accepting the People’s concession that nonforcible oral
copulation of a person under 18 years of age is a lesser included offense of forcible oral
copulation of a minor 14 years of age or older]), we agree with the People that there was
no substantial evidence to warrant instructions on these offenses.
       In support of his position, defendant argues J.L. did not testify that he used force
or duress to accomplish the charged sexual acts that occurred when she was 12 and 13
years old. Defendant further argues J.L. did not specifically describe the use of force or
duress as to the oral copulation that occurred after she turned 14 years old. Instead, J.L.
discussed two specific incidents involving force or duress but neither involved oral
copulation, and she gave general testimony that, if she refused to engage in sexual acts,
defendant would yell at her mother and siblings. According to defendant, the lack of
evidence as to the aggravated/forcible component was a sufficient basis to warrant
instructions on lesser included nonforcible sex offenses. We disagree, because the record
does not contain substantial evidence showing that the charged sex offenses were not
accomplished by force and/or duress.
       As we have described, J.L. unequivocally testified that she neither consented to
nor willingly engaged in any sexual act with defendant, and that the acts began in the

                                             16
family home when she was 11 or 12 years old and continued regularly until she turned
18. J.L. explained that, beginning in the summer before she started sixth grade,
defendant came into her room at night on a regular basis while she was in bed, undressed
her, and moved her around so he could orally copulate her and/or touch her vagina,
including the inside, with his finger. J.L. further testified that defendant had sexual
intercourse with her frequently when she was between the ages of 12 and 14. She
explained that, beginning in sixth grade when she was 12 years old, defendant came into
her room at night, pulled her pants down, and moved her body (including to the floor) so
he could have sexual intercourse with her, and that there was never a year from when she
was 12 years old until she was 18 years old that defendant did not orally copulate her.
J.L. noted that she submitted to the sexual acts because she felt like she had no choice
and it was a normal part of her life; she felt frustrated, helpless, and trapped. She further
noted that defendant made the family rules and was the disciplinarian, and that if she
refused his sexual demands, he would be on edge and irritated the entire day; he would
create a “whole bunch of chaos and havoc” in the house and yell at everyone.
Defendant’s conduct made J.L. feel like it was her fault that defendant yelled at her
mother and/or sisters. When asked, J.L. described an incident where defendant forced
himself onto her when she refused to engage in sexual acts with him, and a separate
incident where he got really mad and swore at her when she told him, “no,” which made
her “pretty terrified.” There was also evidence that defendant would refuse to do things
for J.L. (e.g., pay her phone bill, give her permission to do things, drive her places) if she
did not engage in sexual acts with him (e.g., go for a car ride to an empty parking lot to
have sexual intercourse). Defendant, for his part, denied that he had ever touched J.L.
inappropriately, including all sexual abuse allegations. During closing argument, defense
counsel argued as much. The defense theory was that J.L. fabricated the allegations of
abuse because she was upset at defendant because of the way he had treated her and her
boyfriends.

                                              17
       On this record, we see no instructional error. There was no evidence establishing
J.L.’s positive cooperation in act or attitude that would have allowed a reasonable jury to
conclude that defendant committed nonforcible but not forcible sex offenses. (Cf.
People v. Woods, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 476 [finding sufficient evidence to warrant
an instruction on nonforcible oral copulation where, among other things, there was
evidence that the female victim regarded the defendant as her boyfriend, she did not say
“no” to him or ask him to stop, she initiated some of the sexual conduct and found the sex
to be fun, and told others she loved him and was in a consensual sexual relationship with
him].) Here, the evidence was such that if defendant did commit the charged acts, he
accomplished them by force and/or duress.
       Finally, even if we assume instructional error, we see no prejudice. In a
noncapital case, when a trial court fails to instruct on a lesser included offense, reversal is
not required unless there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would have
obtained a more favorable outcome had the instruction been given. (People v. Rogers
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 867-868; People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 195-196, 198-
199.) In short, because there was overwhelming evidence (as detailed ante) that
defendant committed the charged offenses against J.L. by force and/or duress and no
evidence supporting a contrary conclusion, we are convinced that it is not reasonably
probable defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome absent the asserted
instructional error.
       B. CALCRIM No. 362 (Consciousness of Guilt: False Statements)
       Next, defendant argues the trial court erred in instructing the jury with the
following pattern instruction on false statements:
       “If the defendant made a false or misleading statement before this trial relating to
the charged crime, knowing the statement was false or intending to mislead, that conduct
may show he was aware of his guilt of the crime and you may consider it in determining
his guilt. If you conclude that the defendant made the statement, it is up to you to decide

                                              18
its meaning and importance. However, evidence that the defendant made such a
statement cannot prove guilt by itself.”
       Defendant does not argue the instruction lacked evidentiary support.7 Rather, he
claims the instruction was erroneously given because it is argumentative in favor of the
prosecution, it allowed the jury to make an irrational inference of guilt, and its language
presumed defendant’s guilt, thereby reducing the prosecution’s burden of proof in
violation of his constitutional rights. We are unpersuaded.
       Our Supreme Court has repeatedly approved consciousness of guilt instructions.
(See, e.g., People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, 413-414 [approving CALJIC No.
2.03, the predecessor to CALCRIM No. 362]; People v. Howard (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1000,
1020-1021.) And a panel from this court recently rejected a claim that CALCRIM No.
362 is “infirm.” (See People v. Burton (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 917, 923-926.) In so
doing, the Burton court explained: “CALCRIM No. 362 limits the reach of any adverse
inference both by telling the jury that it decides the ‘meaning and importance’ of the
evidence and by telling the jury the making of a willfully false statement ‘cannot prove
guilt by itself.’ [Citation.] CALCRIM No. 362, like CALJIC No. 2.03 before it, is
designed to benefit the defense, ‘ “admonishing the jury to circumspection regarding
evidence that might otherwise be considered decisively inculpatory.” [Citation.]’
[Citation.] And because the evidence cannot prove guilt by itself, a jury would
understand that the consciousness of guilt—however deep it ran—was not the equivalent
of a confession. [Citation.] Thus, a jury would understand both that false statements
were not the equivalent of a confession and that they were not themselves sufficient to
prove guilt of the charged crimes. ‘The trial court properly left it for the jury to

7 In his opening brief, defendant concedes he made a false statement during his police
interview about his relationship with J.L.

                                              19
determine whether defendant’s statement to police was false or deliberately misleading,
and if so, what weight should be given to that evidence.’ ” (Burton, at p. 925.)
        We find no merit in defendant’s contention that CALCRIM No. 362 improperly
presumes guilt because it asks the jury to determine whether the defendant was “aware”
of his guilt, and a defendant cannot be “aware of his guilt unless he was in fact guilty.” A
similar argument concerning CALCRIM No. 372 (Flight) was rejected in People v.
Hernández Ríos (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1158-1159.8 (See also People v.
Pettigrew (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 477, 500-502 [adopting the reasoning of Hernández
Ríos (and other cases) in rejecting due process claim asserting that CALCRIM No. 372
“ ‘reliev[ed] the state of proving every element of the charged crime[s] beyond a
reasonable doubt’ ”].) We find the reasoning in Hernández Ríos persuasive and follow it
here.
        C. CALCRIM No. 1193 (Testimony on CSAAS)
        Finally, defendant argues the trial court erred by instructing the jury with the
following pattern instruction on CSAAS: “You have heard testimony from Dr. Urquiza
regarding child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. Dr. Urquiza’s testimony about
child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome is not evidence that the defendant
committed any of the crimes charged against him. You may consider this evidence only
in deciding whether or not [J.]L.’s conduct was not inconsistent with the conduct of
someone who has been molested, and in evaluating the believability of her testimony.”

8 The challenged flight instruction in Hernández Ríos stated as follows: “If the
defendant fled immediately after the crime was committed, that conduct may show that
he was aware of his guilt. If you conclude that the defendant fled, it is up to you to
decide the meaning and importance of that conduct. However, evidence that the
defendant fled cannot prove guilt by itself.” (People v. Hernández Ríos, supra, 151
Cal.App.4th at p. 1158.)

                                              20
       Defendant claims the instruction was erroneous because it violated his due process
rights by allowing the jury to consider CSAAS testimony for the improper purpose of
determining whether J.L. “was telling the truth and hence whether [he] was guilty.”9
Although defendant recognizes that appellate courts have held that CALCRIM No. 1193
is a “correct instruction,” he insists that those cases were wrongly decided. We are
unpersuaded. We agree with the reasoning of the cases upholding the instruction and
adopt it here. (See People v. Lapenias (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 162, 175, People v. Munch
(2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 464, 473-474; People v. Gonzales (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 494,
504.) Accordingly, we find no instructional error.10

                                            II
                                Alleged Sentencing Errors
       Defendant raises two claims of sentencing error, which we address in turn below.
       A. Senate Bill No. 567
       Defendant initially argues reversal is required because the trial court imposed
upper term sentences on counts 6 through 15 without the benefit of Senate Bill No. 567.
He claims Senate Bill No. 567 applies retroactively, and the proper remedy is to vacate
sentence and remand for resentencing. The People agree with the first claim but argue
remand is unnecessary because any sentencing error was harmless. We agree that Senate
Bill No. 567 applies retroactively to defendant’s nonfinal judgment (People v. Zabelle

9 CSAAS expert testimony is not admissible to prove the complaining witness has in fact
been sexually abused. (People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1300.) It is admissible
to rehabilitate such witness’s credibility when the defendant suggests that the child’s
conduct after the incident (e.g., delay in reporting) is inconsistent with her testimony
claiming molestation. (Ibid.) Such testimony is needed to disabuse jurors of commonly
held misconceptions of child sexual abuse and the abused child’s seemingly self-
impeaching behavior. (Id. at p. 1301.)
10 Because we have addressed defendant’s claims of instructional error on the merits, we
need not and do not consider the People’s forfeiture arguments.

                                            21
(2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1098, 1109 (Zabelle)) and will remand for a full resentencing.
       When defendant was originally sentenced in August 2021, section 1170,
subdivision (b) provided that when a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the
statute authorizes three potential terms, “the choice of the appropriate term shall rest
within the sound discretion of the court.” (§ 1170, former subd. (b); Stats. 2020, ch. 29, §
14.) Thus, at the time of sentencing, the trial court had broad discretion to select the
term--lower, middle, or upper--from the applicable triad. (People v. Lopez (2022) 78
Cal.App.5th 459, 464.) Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 567 changed the
requirements for proving aggravating circumstances and altered sentencing discretion
under section 1170. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.)
       Under the newly amended version of section 1170, when a judgment of
imprisonment is to be imposed and a statute specifies three possible terms, “the court
shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle
term, except as otherwise provided in [section 1170, subdivision (b)(2)].” (§ 1170, subd.
(b)(1).) Section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) provides that the trial court may impose a
sentence exceeding the middle term “only when there are circumstances in aggravation of
the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle
term, and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the
defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by
the judge in a court trial.” One exception is that the court may rely on a certified record
of conviction to find a prior conviction proven. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3).)
       Here, in imposing upper term sentences on counts 6 through 15, which involved
forcible oral copulation and forcible rape when J.L. was between the ages of 14 and 17,
the trial court did not find any factors in mitigation and cited multiple aggravating
factors: (1) “the crimes involved acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness,
and callousness”; (2) the victim was “particularly vulnerable”; (3) “[t]he manner in which
the crimes were committed indicated planning, sophistication, or professionalism”; (4)

                                             22
defendant had served a prior prison term; and (5) defendant’s performance on probation
was unsatisfactory. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a), (b).)11 None of these factors
were proven as now required under the amended statute, and the court provided no
explanation as to the respective weight it was according any of the aggravating factors.
Nor did the court elaborate on its decision to impose upper term sentences. Nothing in
the appellate record discloses that the records of conviction were certified and the People
do not argue as much on appeal. Further, none of the other aggravating factors were
proven in the manner required under the new sentencing law, as amended by Senate Bill
No. 567. (See § 1170, subd. (b).) Prior to imposing sentence, the court stated that it
intended to follow the recommendation set forth in the probation report, which it
ultimately did. The court did not address defendant’s objection to the probation report on
the ground it contained “a bunch of hearsay” that did not include anything “factual from
trial.”
          It is undisputed that the trial court did not have the benefit of the amendments to
section 1170 when it sentenced defendant. However, “before finding remand
appropriate, [we] must first subject the trial court’s error to harmless error review.”
(Zabelle, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 1110.) On the record before us, we conclude
remand for resentencing is required. Even assuming the denial of defendant’s right to a
jury trial on the aggravating circumstances was harmless under the Sixth Amendment
analysis articulated in Zabelle because it was undisputed defendant had served a prior
prison term (rule 4.421(b)(3)), we cannot reach the same conclusion with respect to the
remaining aggravating circumstances articulated by the court. Where, as here, an
aggravating circumstance rests on a somewhat vague or subjective standard (e.g., the
crimes involved acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, and callousness

11 Further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.

                                                23
(rule 4.421(a)(1)), the victim was particularly vulnerable (rule 4.421(a)(3)), the manner in
which the crimes were carried out indicates planning, sophistication, or professionalism
(rule 4.421(a)(8)), “it may be difficult for a reviewing court to conclude with confidence
that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in
the same manner as did the trial court.” (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 840;
see People v. Lincoln (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 196, 204 [“making assessments of what a
jury would have decided with respect to ‘somewhat vague or subjective standard[s]’ is a
thorny task”].) As we have noted, defendant’s objections to the contents of the probation
report went unaddressed. Further, the record reflects that the court relied on the unproven
allegations in the probation report for its finding concerning defendant’s unsatisfactory
performance on probation. As the Zabelle court explained, “If the record is insufficient
to support a trial court’s findings about a defendant’s criminal history, we will not
presume the existence of extrarecord materials, however likely they are to exist, to
address this insufficiency.” (Zabelle, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 1115, fn. 6.)
       Under the circumstances presented, where none of the aggravating circumstances
were proven as is now required by the amended statute, we will vacate the sentence and
remand for the trial court to resentence defendant in a manner consistent with the
amended version of section 1170, subdivision (b). (See People v. Avalos, supra, 37
Cal.3d at p. 233 [reviewing court “must . . . reverse where it cannot determine whether
the improper factor was determinative for the sentencing court”].) The court is directed
to conduct a full resentencing, including all applicable retroactive changes in the law.
(See People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424-425; People v. Buycks (2018) 5
Cal.5th 857, 893.)
       B. Victim Restitution
       Because we are vacating sentence and remanding for a full resentencing, we need
not and do not consider defendant’s contention that the trial court erred in awarding J.L.

                                             24
$300,000 in victim restitution for noneconomic losses under section 1202.4, subdivision
(f)(3)(F).
                                      DISPOSITION
       The sentence is vacated and the matter is remanded for a full resentencing,
applying section 1170 as amended by Senate Bill No. 567 and all other applicable
retroactive changes in the law. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

                                                       /s/
                                                  Duarte, J.

We concur:

      /s/
Hull, Acting P. J.

      /s/
Keithley, J.*

*Judge of the Butte County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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