Court Opinion

ID: 9929900
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-05 18:01:14.153037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:52:51.934116
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11069    Document: 51-1      Date Filed: 02/05/2024   Page: 1 of 12

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-11069
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        ANGELO VICTOR FERNANDES,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 2:22-cr-14046-AMC-1
                           ____________________
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        2                     Opinion of the Court                23-11069

        Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Angelo Victor Fernandes appeals his sentence of 188
        months’ imprisonment following his guilty plea to the distribution
        of child pornography. On appeal, Fernandes argues that the district
        court miscalculated his guideline range by applying a 5-level
        enhancement based on the guidelines commentary, Section 2G2.2,
        n.6(B)(ii), which defines one child pornography video as 75 images.
        After careful review, we affirm.
                               I.     Background
                Fernandes was charged in an indictment with distribution of
        child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(2) and
        (b)(1). Fernandes pleaded guilty.
              The presentence investigation report (“PSI”) described the
        following offense conduct. On April 30, 2022, Fernandes’ former
        coworker, Daniel Crow, had his phone searched and seized by
        Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”) pursuant to a border
        search at the Philadelphia airport. A search of Crow’s phone
        showed chats with Fernandes in which “Crow promised to send
        Fernandes videos of himself masturbating if Fernandes sent him”
        child pornography in exchange. Crow and Fernandes also
        “discussed Fernandes’ ability to obtain children for sex.”
              The videos Fernandes sent to Crow included, for example,
        “depictions of prepubescent females engaged in lascivious
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        23-11069              Opinion of the Court                        3

        exhibition”; “prepubescent boys engaged in vaginal intercourse
        with possible older sibling females and adult females”; and videos
        “depict[ing] an adult male . . . anally penetrating a prepubescent
        female who is exhibiting signs” of pain. All of the child
        pornography videos Fernandes sent to Crow were shorter than
        two minutes.
               In July 2022, Fernandes was subjected to a secondary
        inspection by HSI at the San Francisco Airport. Agents located the
        messages between Fernandes and Crow, as well as a conversation
        Fernandes had with another individual “where Fernandes said that
        he performed oral sexual acts with a 14-year-old boy.” Agents also
        located many other chats “between Fernandes and other
        individuals in which [Fernandes] offered to procure children for
        sex.” “Based on a forensic examination of Fernandes’[s] phone as
        well as Crow’s phone, Fernandes is responsible for 16 still images
        and 13 videos that depict child sexual abuse . . . , which
        included . . . prepubescent minors under the age of 12” and
        toddlers.
               The PSI also referenced a statement Fernandes made. Per
        the PSI, in that statement, Fernandes said that he “was attracted to
        Crow[] and wanted to see sexually explicit material featuring
        Crow.” “When [Fernandes] found out that Crow liked child
        pornography, [Fernandes] obtained child pornography . . . and
        sent it to Crow in hopes that Crow would” send him videos of
        Crow masturbating. He also said that he only told Crow that he
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        4                     Opinion of the Court                 23-11069

        could arrange encounters with underage children to arouse Crow,
        but he did not intend to follow through.
               Fernandes received a total offense level of 34, including a
        five-level increase because “the offense involved 600 or more
        images.” While Fernandes was not responsible for 600 individual
        pictures and videos, under § 2G2.2, n.6(B)(ii), each video was
        considered to include 75 images. Thus, Fernandes was responsible
        for 991 images. “Based upon a total offense level of 34 and a
        criminal history category of I,” Fernandes’s guideline range was
        151 to 188 months’ imprisonment. The statutory term of
        imprisonment was 60 to 240 months.
               Fernandes moved for a downward variance. He argued that
        he “ha[d] no interest in child pornography” and that his “sole
        purpose . . . was to induce [] Crow to send [him] sexual videos of
        himself,” and that he was a first-time offender with no criminal
        history who was unlikely to reoffend. Fernandes then submitted a
        forensic evaluation, which indicated a six-percent chance of
        reoffending. He also submitted a polygraph examination, which
        suggested that Fernandes had never had a sexual interaction with
        someone under the age of 18.
               The government opposed the motion, arguing that the
        nature and severity of the offense conduct justified a guideline
        sentence. The government pointed out that Fernandes “used child
        pornography as a type of currency” to trade for sexual videos of the
        adults with whom he chatted. The government also provided logs
        of Fernandes’s texts to the district court. In the texts, Fernandes
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        23-11069              Opinion of the Court                        5

        talked about different underage boys with whom he had sex, said
        that he liked hearing young girls cry in pain during sex with adult
        men, and told Crow that he would hold down a young girl so that
        Crow could have sex with her.
               During his sentencing hearing, Fernandes objected to the
        PSI’s guideline calculation, arguing that the term “image” was
        unambiguous, so the court could not look to § 2G2.2, n.6(B)(ii),
        which defines a video as 75 images. Thus, Fernandes argued that
        he had fewer than 600 images, and so his guideline range should
        have been 108 to 135 months. The district court overruled
        Fernandes’s objection, holding that “there is a strong case to be
        made . . . that the guideline is genuinely ambiguous and that” the
        guideline’s commentary provides “a reasonable ratio that warrants
        deference[.]”
               After hearing arguments from both sides regarding the
        appropriate sentence, the district court sentenced Fernandes to 188
        months’ imprisonment. The court stated it had considered the
        parties’ statements, the advisory sentencing guidelines, the 18
        U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the record, and the expert testimony
        offered on behalf of Fernandes. The court said that it viewed
        Fernandes’s conduct as “horrific and vile and beyond the pale” and
        saw “no basis whatsoever for a downward variance.” The court
        then stated that a sentence “at the high end of the guidelines [was]
        more than appropriate” and that “frankly a higher sentence than
        that would also be appropriate[.]”
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                    23-11069

               In support of the sentence, the court said that, based on the
        messages, “it is clear . . . that [Fernandes] has a real interest in child
        abuse and in taking pleasure from child abuse.” The court
        highlighted that Fernandes offered to hold children down “so that
        someone else c[ould] molest them,” and that he would enjoy
        seeing them suffer. The court also highlighted that Fernandes
        offered to arrange for several individuals to meet in person with
        underage children. And the court referenced that Fernandes
        “discusse[d] his own sexual conduct with at least one minor boy[.]”
               While the court said it considered the expert testimony and
        the polygraph examination, it said “the reliability of [polygraphs
        are] very debatable,” and Fernandes’s polygraph did not change its
        analysis of the § 3553(a) factors. The court said that it “considered
        the characteristics of [Fernandes], along with the need to protect
        the community, the danger [it saw] in [Fernandes’s] conduct, as
        well as the need for specific and general deterrence[.]” The court
        also said that “to the extent a future Court were to determine that
        the 75:1 ratio is somehow invalid, [it] would impose the same
        sentence of 188 months’ imprisonment regardless of that issue[.]”
               Fernandes renewed his objection to the district court’s
        reliance on the guideline commentary’s 75:1 ratio for videos and
        argued that the sentence was substantively unreasonable.
                                  II.     Discussion
               On appeal, Fernandes argues that the district court erred by
        treating the guideline commentary’s 75:1 ratio for videos as valid
        and relying on it to calculate Fernandes’s guideline range. After
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        23-11069                Opinion of the Court                          7

        careful review, any potential error in calculating the guideline
        range was harmless. Accordingly, we affirm.
                We review the district court’s interpretation and application
        of the sentencing guidelines de novo. United States v. Dupree, 57
        F.4th 1269, 1272 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc). If we decide that the
        district court misapplied the sentencing guidelines, “a remand is
        appropriate unless [we] conclude[], on the record as a whole, that
        the error was harmless, i.e., that the error did not affect the district
        court’s selection of the sentence imposed.” Williams v. United
        States, 503 U.S. 193, 203 (1992); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a).
                The district court can render a proposed guidelines error
        harmless by stating that it would have imposed the same sentence
        even if the defendant prevailed on that issue. United States v. Keene,
        470 F.3d 1347, 1349–50 (11th Cir. 2006). In other words, we will
        not “set aside [a] reasonable sentence and send the case back to the
        district court [where] it has already [said] that it would impose
        exactly the same sentence, a sentence we would be compelled to
        affirm.” Id. at 1350. That said, “[the] sentence imposed through
        the alternative or fallback reasoning of § 3553(a) must be
        reasonable.” Id. at 1349. The appellant has the burden of showing
        that his sentence would be unreasonable under this alternative
        range. Id. at 1350.
               When reviewing for substantive reasonableness, we review
        the sentence imposed by the district court under an abuse-of-
        discretion standard. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1180 (11th
        Cir. 2010) (en banc). The appellant bears the burden of showing
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                   23-11069

        that his sentence is unreasonable considering the totality of the
        record and the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d
        1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). As a result of the “substantial deference
        district courts are due in sentencing,” we will give the district
        court’s “decisions about what is reasonable [a] wide berth and
        almost always let them pass.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1225.
                In evaluating substantive reasonableness, the relevant
        § 3553(a) factors include: (1) “the nature and circumstances of the
        offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant”; (2) the
        need for the sentence “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to
        promote respect for the law, . . . to provide just punishment for the
        offense,” “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,” and
        “to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant”; (3)
        “the kinds of sentences available”; (4) the sentencing range; and (5)
        “the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among
        defendants with similar records” convicted of similar conduct. 18
        U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(4), (a)(6); see
        Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 n.6 (2007). The district court
        must “state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the
        particular sentence” that it selects. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c).
               We have emphasized that “we must give due deference to
        the district court” to consider and weigh the proper § 3553(a)
        sentencing factors. United States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204, 1224
        (11th Cir. 2018) (quotations omitted). The district court does not
        have to give all the factors equal weight and is given discretion “to
        attach great weight to one factor over others.” United States v.
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        23-11069               Opinion of the Court                         9

        Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation
        omitted). Though the district court must consider all the § 3553(a)
        factors, “[a]n acknowledgement the district court has considered
        the defendant’s arguments and the § 3553(a) factors will suffice.”
        Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 1324. Along with the § 3553(a) factors, the
        district court should also consider the relevant conduct and
        particularized facts of the defendant’s case and the sentencing
        guidelines. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1259-60. The district court
        maintains discretion to give heavier weight to any of the § 3553(a)
        factors or a combination of factors than to the sentencing
        guidelines. Id. at 1259.
                The district court also has wide discretion to decide whether
        the § 3553(a) factors justify a variance. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. In
        imposing a variance, the district court can contemplate conduct
        already considered when calculating the guideline range. United
        States v. Johnson, 803 F.3d 610, 619 (11th Cir. 2015). Though a major
        variance should be supported by a more significant justification
        than a minor variance, the district court need not account for every
        § 3553(a) factor, nor must it discuss each factor and the role that it
        played in sentencing. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50–54. “[A]n indicator of a
        reasonable sentence[]” is one that is “well below the statutory
        maximum” for the crime. United States v. Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353,
        1362 (11th Cir. 2014).
               We need not reach the merits of Fernandes’s argument
        related to the district court applying a 5-level enhancement based
        on § 2G2.2, n.6(B)(ii), because any error in calculating his guideline
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                  23-11069

        range was harmless. During sentencing, the district court said that
        the disputed guidelines issue did not affect its ultimate sentence,
        explaining, “to the extent a future Court were to determine that
        the 75:1 ratio is somehow invalid, [it] would impose the same
        sentence of 188 months’ imprisonment regardless of that issue[.]”
        See Keene, 470 F.3d at 1349–50. Thus, for purposes of this opinion,
        we will assume there was a guidelines error and “then ask whether
        the final sentence . . . would still be reasonable” under the § 3553(a)
        factors considering that alternative guideline range, which would
        be 108 to 135 months. Id. at 1349.
               Considering the relevant § 3553(a) factors, Fernandes’s 188-
        month sentence would still be substantively reasonable under the
        alternative range of 108 to 135 months. The district court began
        by stating that it had considered the parties’ statements, the
        advisory sentencing guidelines, the § 3553(a) factors, the expert
        testimony, and the record. See Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1259–60.
        The court then undertook an extensive explanation of how it
        arrived at the sentence on the record, focusing on the nature of the
        offense conduct. Johnson, 803 F.3d at 619.
               The court described Fernandes’s conduct as “horrific and
        vile and beyond the pale.” It stated that a sentence at the high end
        of the guideline range was “more than appropriate” and that
        “frankly a higher sentence than that would also be appropriate[.]”
        The court highlighted that, based on the messages, “it is clear . . .
        that [Fernandes] has a real interest in child abuse and in taking
        pleasure from child abuse.” For example, the court referenced
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        23-11069               Opinion of the Court                       11

        messages where Fernandes (1) offered to hold children down “so
        that someone else c[ould] molest them”; (2) said he would enjoy
        seeing them suffer; (3) offered to arrange for several individuals to
        meet in person with underage children; and (4) “discusse[d] his
        own sexual conduct with at least one minor boy[.]”
               The district court did not find the mitigating evidence
        compelling enough to warrant a lower sentence. For example, it
        said Fernandes’s polygraph did not change its analysis of the §
        3553(a) factors because it believed “the reliability of [polygraphs
        are] very debatable[.]” The court said that it “considered the
        characteristics of [Fernandes], along with the need to protect the
        community, the danger [it saw] in [Fernandes’s] conduct, as well as
        the need for specific and general deterrence[.]” The court
        maintained its discretion to give heavier weight to these factors
        rather than the mitigating factors. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254,
        1259. Furthermore, Fernandes’s sentence of 188 months’
        imprisonment is well below the statutory maximum of 240
        months’ imprisonment, which is “an indicator of a reasonable
        sentence.” Dougherty, 754 F.3d at 1364. Thus, it cannot be said that
        the court “committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the §
        3553(a) factors[.]” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190.
               Ultimately, because the district court stated it would have
        given him the same sentence regardless of the outcome of the
        guidelines commentary issue, and because an upward-variance
        sentence of 188 months from an alternative guideline range of 108
        to 135 months would still be reasonable, any potential error in
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        12                   Opinion of the Court               23-11069

        calculating the guideline range based on § 2G2.2, n.6(B)(ii) was
        harmless. See Keene, 470 F.3d at 1349–50. Accordingly, we affirm.
              AFFIRMED.