Court Opinion

ID: 9581001
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:10:56.982227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:38.975752
License: Public Domain

Shanahan, J.,
dissenting.
This court correctly affirms the judgment concerning liability for the death of Dan L. Crewdson, but incorrectly sets aside the verdict for damages.
In rationalization for vacating the damages verdict, the majority, envisioning a predetermined relationship between Dan Crewdson and his parents after Dan’s marriage to Jody Jones, foretells: “Inferentially, the couple [Jody and Dan], when married, would establish their own home and any work the decedent did around his parents’ home would be considerably diminished,” and “[t]he services he provided his parents would be reduced since he would be marrying in the near future and, by inference, establishing his own residence.”
However, nothing in Dan’s conduct remotely indicates that after his prospective marriage, Dan’s relationship with his parents would have been any different regarding the services he was rendering for his parents and the help he was providing. Eventual diminution of the relationship between the Crewdsons, which the majority characterizes as an inference, but which is more properly classified as prognostication or indulgence in an unwarranted assumption, is assuredly disregard for “Honor thy father and thy mother,” a mandate which contains no exemptive contingency “until thou art married.” As the majority perceives the situation, wedding bells for Dan Crewdson would have been the death knell for his filial assistance to Dorothy and Marvin Crewdson, his parents.
The evidence clearly establishes that Dan and Marvin worked closely in a part-time auto repair business, which produced approximately $3,600 annually before Dan’s death. *648That repair business was cut in half by Dan’s death. Dan was also helpful around his parents’ home — removing snow, taking care of the yárd, maintaining a 200-tree windbreak, making household repairs, and doing any other task his father was unable to perform. According to Dorothy Crewdson, undoubtedly Dan would have supplied a helping hand in any of his parents’ needs. More simply expressed by Marvin Crewdson, if there was any household chore to be done, Dan “would be there, ” while Dorothy Crewdson observed that if she had any problem, Dan would be “[r]ight by my side.” Without question, the past was a sign of the future between Dan and his parents.
In Garvin v. Coover, 202 Neb. 582, 586, 276 N.W.2d 225, 227 (1979), referring to the question of damages in a wrongful death action, this court noted, “It is virtually impossible to ‘color match’ cases in attempting to decide a given issue,” and then stated:
[D]amages in any wrongful death case are incapable of computation and are largely a matter for the jury. In Selders v. Armentrout [192 Neb. 291, 220 N.W.2d 222 (1974)], this court said: “The amount which should be awarded in any wrongful death case is incapable of computation and is largely a matter for the jury. As stated in Dorsey v. Yost, 151 Neb. 66, 36 N. W. 2d 574, 14 A. L. R. 2d 544: ‘The amount to which a parent is entitled cannot be accurately determined because of the numerous contingencies involved. The amount being very problematical, it is peculiarly for the jury to determine, after hearing all the evidence bearing upon the situation, including the parent’s position in life, the physical and mental condition of the child, his surroundings and prospects, and any other matter that sheds light upon the subject. Members of juries generally have children of their own and have information as to the pecuniary value of children’s services and the expense involved in their care and education. A jury is peculiarly fitted to determine the loss sustained by a parent in such a case. At best, the verdict can only be an approximation as no yardstick exists by which the correct answer can be found with *649exactness.’...”
Garvin at 586-87, 276 N.W.2d at 227.
As one commentator has observed:
The action for wrongful death is sui generis. Because of the difficulty in placing a monetary value on the human life, and the speculative or, more accurately, the nonmathematically calculable — nature of damages, where recoverable, for mental anguish or loss of love and affection, the measurement of such damages is left to the jury. The jury is not bound by any fixed or precise mathematical rules in estimating the amount of damages. It possesses discretion, and it is given wide latitude to exercise its sound judgment and good sense, aided by proper instructions from the court.
2 S. Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful Death § 9:2 at 3-4 (2d ed. 1975).
As a consequence of Dan Crewdson’s death and the evidence of his relationship with his parents, the loss to Dorothy and Marvin Crewdson was a matter for measure by the jury, not by this court. Since there is no objective justification for setting aside the verdict for damages, the district court’s judgment should have been affirmed in all respects.
Grant, J., joins in this dissent.