Court Opinion

ID: 9820850
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 07:37:34.161195+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:12:27.249380
License: Public Domain

JUDGE J. JONES
specially concurring.
¶ 56 I concur in the majority opinion. I write separately, however, to address a question the majority leaves unanswered: did the district court err in failing to rule that, because defendant was prosecuted in Utah for unauthorized control over a motor vehicle, prosecuting him in Colorado for first degree criminal trespass is barred by section 18 — 1— 303, C.R.S.2015? The majority concludes that there was no plain error because any error — that is, any failure to construe the Utah and Colorado statutes at issue in the manner defendant suggests — was not obvious. I agree with that conclusion. See People v. Lacallo, 2014 COA 78, ¶¶ 25-32, 338 P.3d 442 (explaining that the lack of precedent construing a statute may mean an error of construction was not obvious for purposes of plain error review); see also People v. Heywood, 2014 COA 99, ¶ 36, 357 P.3d 201 (same); People v. Mendoza, 313 P.3d 637, 641 n. 4 (Colo.App.2011). But I also conclude that there was no error. In my view, prosecuting defendant for first degree criminal trespass was allowed by section 18-1-303.
¶ 57 As the majority correctly points out, the bar of section 18-1-303 presumptively applies because the Utah prosecution resulted in a conviction, the same conduct forms the basis for the Utah and Colorado prosecutions, and defendant’s conduct constitutes offenses within the concurrent jurisdiction of both Utah and Colorado. § 18 — 1—303(l)(a); see People v. Morgan, 785 P.2d 1294, 1299 (Colo.1990). The issue, then, is whether the first exception to the bar, set forth in section 18 — 1—303(1)(a)(I), applies. That exception applies if the offense for which defendant was prosecuted in Utah requires proof of a fact not required in a prosecution in Colorado for first degree criminal trespass and “the law defining each of the offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil.” § 18 — 1—303(l)(a)(I); see Morgan, 785 P.2d at 1299.
¶ 58 Defendant does not argue that the Utah statute and Colorado’s first degree criminal trespass statute require proof of precisely the same facts. They plainly do not. The Utah statute requires proof, for example, that the defendant actually exercised unauthorized control over the motor vehicle, intended to temporarily deprive the vehicle’s owner of possession, and did not return the vehicle to the owner within twenty-four hours of the unauthorized exercise of control. Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1314(1), (3) (West 2015). Section 18-4-502, C.R.S. 2015, which defines the offense of first degree criminal trespass, requires proof of none of those things. Instead, as relevant to trespass of a motor vehicle, it only requires proof that (1) the defendant entered a motor vehicle (2) with intent to commit a crime therein.
¶ 59 But defendant does argue that the two statutes are intended to prevent substantially the same harm or evil. More specifically, he argues that both laws “seek to prevent an *423individual from entering a motor vehicle to take the motor vehicle, even briefly.” His argument, however, fails for two reasons: it erroneously focuses on the evidence relevant to the charges in his particular case rather than on “the law defining each of the offenses,” and it misperceives the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the first degree criminal trespass statute.
¶ 60 Section 18-l-303(l)(a)(I) directs the court to determiné whether the statutes at issue are intended to prevent substantially different harms or evils by looking at “the law defining each of the offenses.” To me, this plainly requires examination of how each offense is defined, not charged or proved. Elsewhere, the statute requires examination of whether the offenses are “based on the same conduct.” § 18-l-303(l)(a). But the subsection setting forth the requirements of the first exception to the bar does not. § 18-l-303(l)(a)(I). Rather, it requires a more holistic and generalized comparison of the statutes at issue.
¶ 61 As defined, the offenses at issue are intended to prevent different .harms or evils. The Utah statute is akin to a theft statute. It is plainly intended to prevent the taking of a motor vehicle for an extended period of time. But, as discussed more fully below, Colorado’s first degree criminal trespass statute — as it relates to the entry of a motor vehicle — seeks to prevent the unlawful entry into the vehicle. And this is so regardless of the ciime the offender intends to commit within the vehicle.
¶ 62 In People v. Martinez, 640 P.2d 255 (Colo.App.1981), a division of this court, in addressing a double jeopardy challenge to prosecution for both theft of a motor vehicle and first degree criminal trespass' of the same vehicle, noted the “distinct interests” protected by the theft and first degree criminal trespass statutes: “the theft statute protects the rightful possessor from loss, while the trespass statute protects the Owner of a dwelling or motor vehicle from wrongful entry.” Id. at 256. The fact the division said this in the context of a double jeopardy analysis is significant because section 18-1-303 was intended to “codif[y] the federal and state prohibitions against double jeopardy.” Morgan, 785 P.2d at 1296.1
¶ 63 The Martinez division’s articulation of the purpose of the first degree criminal trespass statute is correct. Numerous other courts have recognized that modem trespass statutes protect a landowner’s interest in excluding others from the landowner’s property. See, e.g., State v. Willis, 218 Ariz. 8, 178 P.3d 480, 483 (Ariz.Ct.App.2008); State v. Tullo, 366 A.2d 843, 848 (Me.1976) (“The law making an attempt to enter a dwelling house without permission was enacted to better protect the owner or occupant thereof in the enjoyment of his property ....”);2 see also 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Laiv § 21.2, at 224 (2d ed. 2003). Thus, as implicitly recognized, by the Martinez division, the General Assembly’s placement of the prohibition against unlawful entry of a motor vehicle in a trespass- statute otherwise applicable, to trespass of dwellings indicates that it is the unlawful entry into the. motor vehicle which is the harm or evil the statute seeks to prevent.
¶ 64 I also note that because section 18-4-502 criminalizes unlawful entry into a motor vehicle with the intent to commit á crime therein, it is structured like a burglary statute. Colorado’s first and second degree burglary statutes, for example, proscribe unlawful entry into or remaining in buildings or occupied structures “with intent to commit therein a crime.” §§ 18-⅛-202(1), 18-4-203(1), C.R.S.2015. As with first degree criminal trespass of a motor vehicle,, the offense of burglary bars unauthorized entry *424regardless of the crime the burglar intends to commit inside the building or occupied structure. Modern burglary statutes thus are intended to protect the security and integrity of particular enclosures. See, e.g., People v. Nible, 200 Cal.App.3d 838, 247 Cal. Rptr. 396, 399 (1988); People v. Beauchamp, 241 mad 1, 348 Ill.Dec. 366, 944 N.E.2d 319, 323 (2011); State v. Pace, 602 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Iowa 1999); State v. Haines, 621 A.2d 858, 859 (Me.1993); State v. Office of the Pub. Def. ex rel. Muqqddin, 285 P.3d 622, 632 (N.M.2012) (also noting that such laws are intended to protect “the right to exclude”); Richardson v. State, 888 S.W.2d 822, 823 (Tex.Crim.App.1994); State v. Wilson, 136 Wash.App. 696, 160 P.3d 144, 149 (2007). And courts have held that this purpose animates burglary laws prohibiting unlawful entry into a motor vehicle. Beauchamp, 348 Ill.Dec. 366, 944 N.E.2d at 323 (citing People v. Steppan, 106 Ill.2d 310, 85 Ill.Dec. 495, 473 N.E.2d 1300, 1304 (1985)); Richardson, 888 S.W.2d6 at 823. By analogy, therefore, the harm or evil sought .to. be prevented by section 18-4-502 is, again, the unlawful entry itself.
165 A final point: whatever the crime one intends to commit when trespassing or committing burglary, the intended crime is penalized by other laws, having their own purposes. The trespass and burglary laws must then have some purpose independent of any purpose served by the law criminalizing the intended crime. See Nible, 247 Cal.Rptr. at 399 (the prohibition against burglary is intended to address the danger to personal safety, “not to deter the trespass and the intended crime, which are prohibited by other laws”); Office of the Pub. Def. ex rel. Muqqddin, 285 P.3d at 632; Wilson, 150 P.3d at 149,3. And therefore it makes sense, at least to me, to 'assess the harm or evil prevented by Colorado’s first degree criminal trespass statute by looking at the purpose of that statute generally, rather than the purpose of the statute addressing the crime the defendant intended to commit within the vehicle. Cf. People v. Esch, 786 P.2d 462, 466 (Colo.App.1989) (determining, for purposes of section 18-1-303(1)(a)(1), that a state statute criminalizing sexual exploitation of a child and a federal, statute criminalizing sexual exploitation of a child by use of the mails address substantially different evils).4 Doing so here leads to the conclusion that the purpose of section 18-4-502 is different from the purpose of Utah Code Ann. § 41-1a-1314. Cf. People v. Lanahan, 276 A.D.2d 906, 714 N.Y.S.2d 605, 606-08 (2000) (applying a statute similar to section 18 — 1—303(1)(a)(1), and concluding that prosecution for burglary was not precluded by prior prosecution in another jurisdiction for possession of property stolen during the burglary because the offenses prevent “very different kinds of harm or evil” (quoting People v. Skinner, 200 A.D.2d 782, 606 N.Y.S.2d 792, 793 (1994))).
¶ 66 In sum, because both requirements of the first exception to section 18-1-303’s bar are met in this case, the People could prosecute defendant for violating section 18-4-602, and the district court did not err in entering a judgment of conviction on that charge.5

. Section 18-1-303, C.R.S.2015, "extends the double jeopardy prohibition to situations where' the dual sovereignty doctrine otherwise would operate to permit state prosecution after a separate sovereign has prosecuted the defendant for the same offense.” People v. Morgan, 785 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Colo. 1990).

. Other courts have held that the original purpose (and perhaps a continuing purpose) ot trespass statutes is to protect against violence and threats of violence. See, e.g., Murphy v. Okeke, 951 A.2d 783, 788-89 (D.C.2008); People v. Goduto, 21 Ill.2d 605, 174 N.E.2d 385, 387 (Ill. 1961). That harm or evil is, too, substantially different from that primarily sought to be prevented by Utah's temporary deprivation statute.

. Indeed, the crime of burglary is complete upon entry, so long as the defendant had the requisite intent. See People- v. Gonyea, 195 P.3d 1171, 1175 (Colo.App.2008). The defendant need not actually commit a crime in the building or occupied structure to be guilty of burglary, further indicating that the purpose served by prohibiting ■ the underlying crime is not the purpose served by burglary statutes. This holds true with respect to the first degree criminal trespass statute as well, which requires only the intent to commit a crime within the vehicle. See People v. Rhodus, 2012 COA 127, ¶¶ 17-20, 303 P.3d 109 (analogizing first degree criminal trespass of a motor vehicle to burglary).

. Such an approach is also consistent with the strict elements test we apply in the double jeopardy context, whereby we compare the elements of the offenses, not evidence, to determine whether one crime is a lesser included offense of another. Armintrout v. People, 864 P.2d 576, 579 (Colo. 1993). As noted, section 18-1-303 is essentially a double jeopardy provision.

. Morgan, on which defendant relies, does not compel the contrary, conclusion. In that case, the court held that the statutes at issue did not require proof of different facts within the meaning of section 18 — 1—303(l)(a)(I). Therefore, the court did not address whether the second re*425quirement of the exception — prevention of different harms or evils — was satisfied. Morgan, 785 P.2d-at 1301-02.