Court Opinion

ID: 9643444
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:29:17.686033+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:00.544576
License: Public Domain

LEBDY, J.
(concurring). — I concur in the principal opinion, but in view of the division among us on the question of the state’s argument, I desire to make these additional observations in amplification of my views in relation to that matter.
In my opinion, the construction given (both by the trial court and by the principal opinion) the first of the challenged bits of argument (“What evidence do you have of the condition of his mind?”) as referring to the testimony of defendant’s witness Cheeks, and not to the failure of the defendant to testify, is further supported and made abundantly clear by the very next utterances of the assistant 'prosecutor as he resumed his argument, thus:
“MR. HOUGH (continuing) : Did Cheeks tell you immediately he [defendant] was indignant, abused, hurt, he grabbed the'pistol and *845shot Pelham Scott? No, he did not. * * * Was Pelham Scott shot at that moment? Even if we believe Cheeks? Whom 1 tell you is an unqualified perjurer ? Even if you believe, did he tell you Scott was shot at that moment?”
In the light of such a record, I cannot believe that the remark complained of would be taken and understood by the jury as a reference to defendant’s failure to testify, in -violation of § 546.270, RSMo 1949.
Proceeding to a consideration of the second portion of the challenged argument (“Did they make any defense of it?”), it is not amiss to note that the record fails to show it was objected to at the trial as being a reference to defendant’s failure to testify. The first appearance of that objection came in the motion for. new trial, which was too late. But apart from this (which is not raised by the state), I put my concurrence upon the broader proposition involved in the merits of the question presented.
Counsel for defendant appears to have consumed about an hour in argument (24 pages of the transcript), during the coarse of which he never at any time made reference to the facts and circumstances immediately surrounding the killing. Nor did he point out or attempt to argue any distinction between the different degrees of the crime of murder, as submitted by the instructions. The prime, if not entire, object and purpose of the argument appears to have been an adroit effort to induce a verdict in a grossly aggravated case whereby defendant would' escape infliction of the extreme penalty. It was in that setting, and obviously in answer to such argument, that the •prosecutor, in his closing argument, made the statements which form the second of appellant’s complaints. In addition to what is shown by the principal opinion concerning this particular matter, I think there is significance and clarification in these statements which immediately follow the ruling complained of:
“MR. GRANT: Can it be made clear that he is referring to the fact that I did not argue to the defense of his having shot him during my argument?
“MR. WALLACH: That is what I meant, Mr. Grant. T am sorry I gave the wrong impression.”
While, of course, it is not to be expected that identical language will ever be found in any of the cases, nevertheless there is striking similarity between that now questioned and some this court has had occasion to construe. The following is the offending argument: “Now, what is there to this case? Pelham Scott has been killed. Shot to death. There sits the man that shot him. Is there any doubt about that in anybody’s mind? Did they make any defense of it?” Now, let this be contrasted with that involved in prior cases where the substance and effect seems to have been much the same. State v. Ruck, 194 Mo. 416, 440-442, 92 S. W. 706, 713-714, is a typical example. It *846was there contended that the prosecutor’s argument that the facts had not been denied had reference to no one but the defendant, and hence was a comment on his failure to testify. The argument was this, in part: ‘ ‘ Here is a case that seems to me calls for the punishment that should be made to fit the crime. Here we have testimony undenied, undisputed by no living or unliving witness.” (Emphasis mine.) It was held that the statement could not reasonably be construed as such a reference, the court saying: “A reading of the whole context shows that he was not discussing one specific piece of testimony as was the case in State v. Snyder, 182 Mo. 523, but was discussing the general result of the trial, as the evidence had taken a wide range, including many facts and circumstances testified to by many witnesses, and argued that this evidence was undenied and undisputed, but another way of stating that which had been shown beyond contradiction; that the facts were as he insisted they were. We think it is not fair to charge the counsel with having thus purposely and indirectly commented upon the failure of the defendant to testify, nor do we think it will do to give section 2638, Revised Statutes 1899, such a construction that counsel for the State may not in the course of an argument, if evidence of the State is uncontradicted, allude to it as undenied and undisputed. * * * Judge Harvey had not said that any witness had failed to testify, or that the defendant failed to testify, nor had he, as in the Snyder case, stated that only two parties were present, one of whom was the defendant, and that the other party had testified and his statement had not been denied. There the issue was narrowed down, and but one inference could have been drawn from the statement of the prosecuting attorney, that the defendant had not denied the statement of the other witnesses when he might have done so. Whereas in this case the assertion of the counsel for the State amounted to no more than an expression of his views as to the strength of the evidence in behalf of the State in a general way, and that it had not been rebutted, or there was nothing to the. contrary. We do not think that the remark attributed to Judge Harvey was a violation of section 2638, and we would not be justified in reversing the cause on that ground alone.”
In State v. Fields, 234 Mo. 615, 625-626, 138 S. W. 518, 520-521, it was held that the following, argument was not open to the construction that it was a comment on the failure of the defendant to testify: “The state has proved certain facts; has brought a large number of witnesses before you whose testimony has not been controverted by the defendant’s witnesses.” It was there said: “The words 'the defendant’s witnesses’ are not fairly susceptible of such an interpretation, nor is there anything in the record to indicate that they were so intended. We hold that the prosecuting attorney was within the bounds of legitimate argument and that his comment was not *847open to the objection made [that the defendant was not obliged to take the stand] or deserving of admonition from the court.”
In State v. Gordon, 253 Mo. 510, 518, 161 S. W. 721, 723, the testimony of a witness (Bisehoff) on a former trial was rea'd to the jury.In arguing the case the prosecutor said that such witness “was not able to be here and we had to introduce his testimony and that testimony is conclusive and not contradicted by any evidence.” Upon a consideration of such argument, this court said: “Appellant insists that this remark was a direct reference to defendant’s failure to testify in his own behalf. We cannot agree with appellant’s contention. This was in the nature of a general comment as to the weight and effect of the evidence of the witness Bisehoff and it would be a forced construction that would interpret it as a reference to defendant’s failure to testify. V The Ruck and Field cases were cited with approval. See also State v. Hughes, 258 Mo. 264, 270, 167 S. W, 529, 531; State v. Myer, 259 Mo. 306, 318, 168 S. W. 717, 720; State v. DePriest, 283 Mo. 459, 468, 232 S. W. 83, 86; State v. McKeever, 339 Mo. 1066, 1085, 101 S. W. 2d 22, 30.
I think there was neither violation of the statute in question, nor error in the other matters complained of, and hence the judgment should be affirmed.
Hyde, Hollingsworth and Dalton, JJ., and ISllison, C. J., concur.