Court Opinion

ID: 9674838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:36:19.969379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:29.927409
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of conviction on January 11, 1984. On rehearing, Appellant in part challenges our application of the doctrine of equitable adoption or adoption by estoppel to find that the presence of Placida Tenorio at his juvenile certification hearing satisfied Tex.Fam.Code Ann. sec. 51.11 (Vernon 1975).
Appellant in no way contests our finding that the prerequisites of such a form of adoption, in terms of the intent or conduct of the parties, were adequately demonstrated. His sole complaint is that:
... there has never been a decision of a Texas court which permitted a finding of equitable adoption or adoption by estop-pel in a situation which would not be directly beneficial to the child or someone claiming under the child. The doctrine of estoppel is an equitable device to protect the child and has never been used to *240work a liability or detriment to the child or one claiming under the child.
(Motion for Rehearing p. 6).
Appellant’s conclusion that our application of the doctrine stands alone in working a detriment upon the child is founded upon a faulty analytical approach. The only way in which this could be construed as a detriment is the net result arising out of the affirmance of the adverse decision of the certification judge. In determining whether the application of the doctrine in this case is consistent with the traditional beneficial purpose of the doctrine, one must take a prospective rather than retrospective view and isolate the analysis from the certification court’s decision on the merits of the case. From a pre-hearing viewpoint, application of the doctrine to the relationship between Appellant and Placida Tenorio was not only justified by their past conduct towards each other but was beneficial to the child. The court and prosecuting authority recognized Mrs. Tenorio as the mother of the child. This was a status desired by both Appellant and Mrs. Tenorio and invoked all of the attendant notice and presence rights arising under Family Code chapters 53 and 54. Consequently, before and during the hearing, Appellant had the supportive presence of a caring, nurturing adoptive parent rather than that of a natural mother who was totally unknown to the Appellant or an appointed guardian ad li-tem whose relationship would have been even less intimate.
Viewed from the standpoint of whether the Family Code requirements were being met as Appellant entered the certification process, we find that the application of the equitable adoption doctrine was beneficial to the Appellant and accurately characterized his relationship to Mrs. Tenorio.
The other issues raised in the Motion for Rehearing are adequately addressed in our original opinion. The Motion for Rehearing is denied.