Court Opinion

ID: 9778418
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:03:52.137721+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:18:27.637976
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent.
I would hold that the pistol used to kill the deceased and the television set which was taken in the course of the robbery-murder were obtained as the result of the unlawful custodial interrogation of Wilder and Armour and that due to this constitutional violation, reversible error was committed when these items were admitted into evidence. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
Some of the more salient facts surrounding the recovery of the two aforementioned items which were omitted from the majority’s otherwise comprehensive summary of the evidence are as follows: In the course of his investigation of the offense, Texas Ranger R. M. Arnold determined that the weapon which fired the fatal shots was an Arminius .38 caliber pistol. After reviewing gun dealers’ sales records in Bowie and surrounding counties, Arnold comprised a list of “suspects” which included all recent purchasers of this type of firearm. As a result, he learned that Wilder purchased such a pistol from Gibson’s Discount Center in Mt. Pleasant approximately two weeks prior to the offense. Arnold then contacted B. C. Sustaire, Mt. Pleasant’s Chief of Police, and the two men discussed various methods of obtaining the pistol for ballistics analysis without the necessity of first obtaining a search warrant.
Sustaire testified that when he arrived at his office on the morning of February 14, 1976, approximately seven weeks subsequent to the offense, he found Wilder there waiting to talk to him about the possibility of being released on a public intoxication charge for which he had been jailed the previous night. After arrangements were made for Wilder’s release on this charge, Sustaire began questioning him about the pistol without first giving him the benefit of Miranda warnings or warnings pursuant to Article 38.22, Vernon’s Ann. C.C.P. Wilder admitted owning the pistol and, at Sus-taire’s request, agreed to surrender it for inspection. Accompanied by another officer, Sustaire drove Wilder in a patrol car to Armour’s house where Wilder said he kept the pistol. On cross-examination, Sustaire testified:
“Q [W]hy then did you go with him and get the pistol, rather than letting him just bring the pistol in later on?
“A Well, I felt at the time it was the thing for me to do. I needed the pistol, and I didn’t want to take any chances on him changing his mind.”
Sustaire and the accompanying officer went with Wilder to Armour’s doorstep where *366Armour, without first being advised of his Miranda rights, gave the pistol to Wilder who then surrendered it to the officers. Sustaire testified that he permitted Wilder to leave when they returned to the police station and that he never considered Wilder to be in his custody.
Ranger Arnold testified on cross-examination that he obtained the pistol from Sus-taire and then submitted it for ballistics analysis. He further testified:
* * * * * *
“Q When . . what did Chief Sus-taire tell you when he brought you the pistol?
“A There was little discussion about what we were going to do with it . . we already knew what we were going to do with it. I’d been looking for this . we’d been looking for this particular pistol right here for sometime.
* * * * * *
“Q Did . . is it my understanding then that before he ever obtained the pistol, it was your plan to take this pistol and send it to the Lab for a ballistics test?
“A Take it to the Lab, yes, sir.
* * * * * *
“Q Alright, at that point in time, had you in your investigation of the killings in Hooks, and killing in Bowie County, had you focused your investigation on John Lewis Wilder and Artie Armour?
“A Yes, sir, I had.
“Q That was because of information you had received prior to that date?
“A Yes, sir.
* * * * * *
“Q So at the time you took Wilder’s pistol, he was the focus of your investigation and there wasn’t any other suspect you knew of?
“A No, sir, didn’t have any other suspect at the time.”
The results of the ballistics test on Wilder’s pistol confirmed the fact that it was the murder weapon; based on the results of that test, arrest warrants were issued for Wilder and Armour. In executing the arrest warrant on Armour, officers recovered from inside Armour’s house the television set in question.1
In Ancira v. State, 516 S.W.2d 924 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), an appeal from a conviction for possession of heroin, we held to be reversible error the trial court’s failure to suppress the heroin in question acquired as the result of the custodial interrogation of Ancira when he had not been given the Miranda warnings. We stated:
“In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, the United States Supreme Court held that evidence obtained as the result of a custodial interrogation was inadmissible unless the State proved that proper warnings were given to the defendant and an affirmative waiver of rights was shown. See Art. 38.22, V.A.C.C.P. Custodial interrogation was defined in Miranda as ‘questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.’
******
“While questioning does not have to occur at the police station for Miranda warnings to be required, Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 89 S.Ct. 1095, 22 L.Ed.2d 311 (1969), Miranda stated, ‘[Compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of the police station may weii be greater than in courts or other official investigations, where there are often impartial observers to guard against intimidation.’
“It is not necessary that an accused be under formal arrest prior to the interrogation for Miranda rights to arise. Windsor v. United States, 389 F.2d 530 (5th Cir., 1968). In Windsor, it was held that Miranda rights had arisen, and the *367Court said, ‘The Government agents’ testimony that Windsor was not a suspect and not under arrest when questioned in his motel room is belied by the facts of the case. . . . Windsor was definitely the central figure in their investigation . . .
“In Brown v. State, supra, [475 S.W.2d 938 (Tex.Cr.App. 1972)] and Jones v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 442 S.W.2d 698, where this Court held that Miranda rights had not arisen, it was noted that the investigation had not begun to focus on the accused.
“. . . In Miranda itself the Supreme Court explained that ‘in custody’ was a short-hand phrase for what Escobedo v. Illinois, 1964, 378 U.S. 478, 490, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977, described as an investigation which has focused on an accused.” (Emphasis supplied.)
See also Newberry v. State, 552 S.W.2d 457 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).
In the present case, Wilder, while “in the isolated setting of the police station,” Miranda, supra, in response to interrogation initiated by Sustaire, confessed to his ownership and the location of the pistol; Sus-taire found it necessary to accompany Wilder to Armour’s house where, in the presence of Sustaire and another officer, Armour surrendered the pistol.2 The evidence also showed that prior to Sustaire’s interrogation of Wilder concerning the pistol he and Arnold had discussed various plans for obtaining Wilder’s pistol without the necessity of first obtaining a search warrant; Arnold testified unequivocally that prior to the questioning of Wilder the investigation of the offense had focused on Wilder and Armour.
Under these circumstances, I conclude that at the time the pistol was surrendered by Wilder and Armour they were significantly deprived of their freedom of action in such a manner as to place them in the type of constructive custody which fosters involuntary self-incrimination; this was precisely the situation contemplated by Miranda. I would hold, therefore, that the fruits of this unlawful police activity should have been suppressed at the appellants’ trial.3 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
The majority holds, that due to the overwhelming untainted evidence of appellants’ guilt, i. e. their voluntary confessions, the *368error in admitting the items in question cannot be accorded reversible weight. With this conclusion, I cannot agree. In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), the Court admonished against giving too much emphasis to “overwhelming evidence” of guilt, stating that constitutional errors affecting the substantial rights of the aggrieved party could not be considered to be harmless. See also Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969). Also, the Court in Chapman, supra, recognized that “harmless-error rules can work very unfair and mischievous results” in some instances, and emphasized that “error in admitting plainly relevant evidence which possibly influenced the jury adversely to a litigant cannot ... be conceived of as harmless.” Id., 386 U.S. at 22-24, 87 S.Ct. at 827, 17 L.Ed.2d at 710. Finally, the Court in Chapman, supra, stated:
“. . . We prefer the approach of this Court in deciding what was harmless error in . Fahy v. State of Connecticut, [375 U.S. 85, 84 S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963)].4 There we said: ‘The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.’ Id., at 86-87, 11 L.Ed.2d at 173.”
Thus, the Court in Chapman left no doubt that for an error to be harmless it must have made no contribution to the defendant’s conviction. Harrington v. California, (dissenting opinion), supra. See also Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 92 S.Ct. 2174, 33 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972).
It is a settled principle that an extrajudicial confession standing alone is insufficient to support a verdict of guilt; such a confession must be corroborated by other independent evidence of guilt, either circumstantial or direct. Wong Sun, supra, 371 U.S. at 491, 83 S.Ct. at 419, 9 L.Ed.2d at 459. Martinez v. State, 387 S.W.2d 673 (Tex.Cr.App.1965). Moreover, the extrajudicial eonfession of a co-defendant may not be used to corroborate a like confession of the defendant. Wong Sun, supra, 371 U.S. at 491, 83 S.Ct. at 419, 9 L.Ed.2d at 457. The items in question which were erroneously admitted during the appellants’ joint trial tended to provide in part, if not exclusively, the required corroboration of appellants’ extrajudicial confessions. Thus, I would hold that the admission of these two items of relevant evidence contributed to appellants’ convictions for capital murder, and therefore reversible error was committed. Chapman v. California, supra; Fahy v. Connecticut, supra.
Nor can I agree with the majority’s conclusions with respect to appellants’ lack of standing in the present case to challenge the admissibility of the items in question. As previously indicated, the record reflects that Wilder confessed to his ownership and location of the pistol while he was under interrogation at the police station awaiting his release on a charge for public intoxication; Wilder was then placed in a patrol car and taken to Armour’s house by Sustaire, who was accompanied by another officer; in the presence of the two officers, Armour confessed to his possession of the pistol and surrendered it to them. It is uncontrovert-ed that the foregoing events occurred at a time when the investigation had clearly focused upon appellants and before each had been apprised of their constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
The majority seeks to deny appellants’ standing on the principle that only victims of a search whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated have standing to object to the admissibility of the unlawfully seized evidence; they cite Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1961); Wong Sun v. United States, supra; Alderman v. U. S., 394 U.S. 165, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1967), and Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 24 Crim.L.Rptr. 3009 (1978), as authority for their holding.
*369With the soundness of this generally accepted principle, I have no quarrel; however, its applicability to the facts of the present case escapes me. At issue in the present case is the admissibility of evidence obtained as the result of the unlawful custodial interrogation of Wilder and Armour, not the admissibility of evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful search and seizure.
In Wong Sun, supra, one of the very cases the majority purport to apply, Toy and Wong Sun were tried for federal narcotics laws violations. Toy, who the Court held was unlawfully arrested, gave information leading federal agents to Yee and Wong Sun. In Yee’s possession was found an ounce of heroin which was used as evidence against Toy and Wong Sun. As to Toy, it was held that the heroin recovered from Yee should have been excluded as the fruit of the officers’ unlawful action. The Court stated: “The exclusion of the narcotics as to Toy was required solely by their tainted relationship to information unlawfully obtained from Toy.” Id., 371 U.S. at 492, 83 S.Ct. at 419, 9 L.Ed.2d at 458. However, the heroin seized from Yee was held admissible against Wong Sun because “The seizure of this heroin invaded no right of [his] privacy of person or premises . . .” Id., at 492, 83 S.Ct. at 419, 9 L.Ed.2d at 458.
Under the governing principles of Wong Sun, supra, the continuing vitality of which stand unchallenged, I would hold that Wilder and Armour have standing to challenge the admissibility of the pistol and television set because each had his Miranda rights violated; the items in question were recovered as a result of their custodial interrogation at a time when the investigation had clearly focused upon them and when neither had been apprised of his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
This writer is not insensitive to the enormous, albeit necessary, expenditures of time, money and human resources which accompany most criminal prosecutions; however, no such expenditure can justify a denial of the fundamental rights of an accused accorded him as a citizen of this state and nation; for the rights of an accused come not from judicial generosity but from prescribed rules of law to be applied evenhandedly despite the consequences.
“To follow the dictates of justice when in harmony with the law, must be a pleasure; but to follow the rules of law, in their true spirit, to whatever consequences they may lead, is a duty.” Duncan v. Magette, 25 Tex. 245 (1860).
To this ideal we have always been committed; the preservation and maintenance of its integrity should be our unswerving objective.
For the reasons stated, I would reverse and remand the judgments of conviction.
I respectfully dissent.
ODOM, J., joins in this dissent.

. Contrary to what the majority says, this writer’s review of the record reveals that the television set was not recovered as a result of a consent search of Armour’s house; rather it was recovered during the execution of the arrest warrant for Armour.

. We attach no significance to the fact that Wilder may have asked Armour for the pistol rather than the officers because at this time Wilder was assisting the officers in their investigation of the offense, and therefore acting as their agent in this matter.

. I would likewise hold that the television set recovered by the officers when executing the arrest warrant on Armour should have been excluded because the warrant was issued as the direct result of the ballistics analysis confirmation of the illegally obtained pistol as the murder weapon. Wong Sun, supra.
The admissibility of appellants’ written confessions on the other hand presents a different question.
The record shows that on February 19, 1976, the day that they were arrested, appellants duly received the magistrate’s warning prescribed by Art. 15.17, Vernon’s Ann. C.C.P. On February 20, 1976, each appellant gave a full written confession describing the manner in which they committed the offense. No complaint is made in this appeal concerning the adequacy of these warnings or the voluntariness of the confessions. Coercion has not been urged or established.
Prior to the trial, the court conducted a hearing to determine the voluntariness of the confessions. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). The testimony established that appellants were properly advised of their rights in compliance with Article 38.22, Vernon’s Ann. C.C.P. and Miranda v. Arizona, supra, and that they waived those rights before they gave the confessions.
Consequently, 1 conclude that the connection between the unlawful interrogation of Wilder and Armour and their subsequent confessions “had become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint,” and therefore rendered the confessions admissible. Wong Sun, supra. See also Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 89 S.Ct. 1095, 22 L.Ed.2d 311 (1969). The degree of appellants’ free will to make the complained of statements is a relevant factor in determining “the extent to which the basic purpose of the exclusionary rule will be advanced by its application.” United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 276, 98 S.Ct. 1054, 1060, 55 L.Ed.2d 268, 277 (1978). Cf. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975).

. In Fahy v. Connecticut, supra, the admission of illegally seized evidence was held to be reversible despite the overwhelming evidence of the accused’s guilt which included extrajudicial as well as judicial confessions.