Court Opinion

ID: 9449209
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 00:00:58.796565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:45.443308
License: Public Domain

WRIGHT, Circuit Judge (dissenting).
As the court’s opinion indicates, appellants are 34 Chinese admittedly in this country illegally. Thirteen have been ordered deported to Nationalist China (Formosa) and 21 to Hong Kong. They are here resisting deportation to these countries on the ground that they are not subject nationals or citizens thereof' and that the proceedings which resulted in these deportation orders are lacking in due process.
Section 243(a)1 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 outlines the priorities as to countries to which aliens illegally in this country shall be deported. *189Under this section the alien is to be deported to the country designated by him, unless the Attorney General concludes that deportation to such country would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States or unless that country refuses to accept the alien. If this first priority is not satisfied, then the alien is to be deported “to any country of which such alien is a subject national, or citizen if such country is willing to accept him into its territory.” If the second priority cannot be satisfied, Section 243(a) provides seven alternative countries, culminating in “any country which is willing to accept such alien,” any one of which may be chosen by the Attorney General.
The aliens here did not exercise their right under the first priority to designate a country. After their deportation hearing, at which they admitted that they were natives of “China” and citizens of “China” and were so found to be, in those terms, by the Special Inquiry Officer of the Immigration Service, the Attorney General made inquiry of the Nationalist Chinese Government as to its willingness to accept appellants. The Attorney General’s action was predicated on the assumption that there is only one “China” since the United States does not recognize Communist China. When Nationalist China agreed to take only 13 of the appellants, the Attorney General obtained authority from Hong Kong to deport the balance there.
It is clear that aliens are entitled to due process of law which, in deportation proceedings, means a hearing with findings supported by evidence in the record.2 This requirement applies to the determination of the country to which an alien shall be deported under Section 243 of the Act.3 There is little evidence4 in *190these records beyond appellants’ admissions that they were born on the mainland of China and that they are citizens ■of “China.” These admissions are the basis for the Special Inquiry Officer’s finding that they are natives and citizens ■of “China.” But there is no proof as to the “China” the appellants or the Special Inquiry Officer had in mind. Moreover, there is in the record no evidence whatever as to the municipal law of Nationalist China.5 Consequently, we are uninformed as to whether, under the law of that country, these aliens, in particular, are subject nationals or citizens thereof, or whether, in general, Nationalist China claims as subject nationals or •citizens all persons born on the mainland. Under these circumstances, it appears to me that the conclusion that these appellants are subject nationals or citizens ■of Nationalist China is not only without support in the record, but is likewise without support in the findings them•selves.
Appellee seems to admit all this. He argues, however, that since this country •does not recognize Communist China, legally there is only one China, and therefore Nationalist China must have been in the minds of the appellants when they made their admissions and in the mind of the Special Inquiry Officer when he made his findings. This “legal postulate,” as appellee describes it, apparently is being advanced for the first time. Time and again, the Department of Justice has attempted to deport aliens born on the mainland to Communist China.6 The fact that some such aliens have frustrated the attempt by invoking Section 243(h)7 of the Act and alleging they will be subjected to physical persecution if sent to Communist China 8 cannot now justify the invocation of a “legal postulate.” Most of the appellants here have indeed indicated that if they are returned to the mainland of China, they too will be persecuted. And counsel for appellants, in argument, has frankly stated that he will invoke Section 243(h) on behalf of some, if not all, of the appellants if he is successful in showing that the “China” to which they referred in their admissions was the China on the mainland, and that, consequently, under the *191second priority of Section 243(a) they must be deported, if at all, to Communist China.
It is clear, therefore, that the real issue around which this case centers is whether these appellants, or most of them, have a right to invoke Section 243 (h). If appellee is successful in his suggestion that “China” means Nationalist China, then, of course, these appellants will be deported to the countries indicated above, since they would not be in a position to invoke Section 243(h) as to those countries. On the other hand, if it were held that these appellants are subject nationals or citizens of Communist China,9 Section 243(h) would become available to them.
Congress, in passing Section 243(a) of the Act, obviously intended to simplify the problem of deporting aliens, but it did not give the Executive an unrestricted hand. Under Section 243(a), since appellants indicated no preference under the first priority, in order to deport them it became necessary to determine their citizenship or nationality under the second. This has not been done, at least not in accordance with applicable standards of due process. The fact that these Chinese may be able to make a valid application under Section 243(h) to withhold deportation because of physical persecution cannot justify short-circuiting the second priority under Section 243(a). Nor, in my judgment, can their effort to assert whatever rights they may have under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 preclude consideration of their application to a court of equity for enforcement of due process of law.

. 66 Stat. 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a).

. For a collection of the cases, see Annotation, 94 L.Ed. 329, supplemented, 96 L.Ed. 576.

. Bellaskus v. Crossman, 335 U.S. 840, 69 S.Ct. 64, 93 L.Ed. 391 (1948), reversing 5 Cir., 164 F.2d 412 (1947); Lewis v. Frick, 233 U.S. 291, 304, 34 S.Ct. 488, 58 L.Ed. 967 (1914). See concurring opinion of Judge Lumbard in Leong Leun Do v. Esperdy, 2 Cir., 309 F.2d 467, 477 (1962).

. I cannot agree that the record in each of these cases will support a finding that the deportee is a “subject national, or citizen” of Nationalist China. The majority relies heavily upon the fact that many of these deportees express dislike for, and fear persecution by, the Communist government. To me, this is not an acknowledgment of allegiance to the Nationalist government. I summarize briefly the other evidence in the individual cases.
The group accepted by Formosa: Chung King Ming, Hui Lung Liu, Sho Feng Koo, Chen Chui Yuen and Liu Tze An apparently had Nationalist Chinese passports. The passports are not in the record so we do not know if these passports are based on citizenship. Wang Siang Ken and Lok Chi Wall have families on the mainland, but sailed aboard Nationalist flag vessels. Sung Ming Fa has a family on the mainland, but had worked on Formosa, had a Nationalist Chinese passport, and had worked on Nationalist flag vessels. Kwak Hou Chi referred to the mainland as “the country of my birth, nationality and last residence,” but had been a crewman on a Nationalist flag vessel. Hsin Pao Tsao has a family on the mainland, but may have had a Nationalist Chinese passport and was a crewman on a Nationalist flag vessel. Ma Tak Ding worked on Formosa for three years and had a Nationalist Chinese passport. Hsieh Chung Shan had a Hong Kong seaman’s identity card and seaman’s discharge book. There is no evidence as to Foo Mow Son. Only two of these deportees had ever lived on Formosa.
The group rejected by the Nationalist government and accepted by Hong Kong: There is no evidence connecting Liu Chung, Wong Ah Sing, Sze Chok Pan, Chang Kee Way, Leung Gar Kock, Wong Keung, Lam Cheong, or Ho Sing Chai with Nationalist China. As to Lee Wei Fang, Ip Chi Sum, Cheung Yu Cho, Au Sang, Cheun Shai Pai, Yeong Sing Loo, Lu Yip, Ho Kan, Kong Cheung Wah, and Ip For, not only is there no connection with the Nationalist government, but they have families presently living on the mainland. Yu Sai Tung testified, “My home is in the interior of China.” Chung Sai Ping, who has a family on the mainland, stated, “I am a citizen of the Republic of China, being born in Kwangtung Province.” This suggests that he equated citizenship with nativity. Chow Fat also stated, “I am a citizen of the Repub*190lie of China,” without further explanation. None of this group has ever been on Formosa.
The majority cites the fact that several of the deportees had Hong Kong identity cards or seamen’s discharge hooks. The nature of the discharge book does not appear in the record, but the Hong Kong identity card carries the printed statement: “[This card issued] without prejudice to and in no way affects the national status of the holder.”

. See Black Diamond S. S. Corp. v. Stewart & Sons, 336 U.S. 386, 396, 69 S.Ct. 622, 93 L.Ed. 754 (1949); United States ex rel. Zdunic v. Uhl, 2 Cir., 137 F.2d 858 (1943); United States ex rel. Jelic v. District Director of Immigration, etc., 2 Cir., 106 F.2d 14 (1939). Compare Dulles v. Katamoto, 9 Cir., 256 F.2d 545, 547 (1958). The omission is significant. As described supra, Note 4, and in Note 8 of the court’s opinion, the Nationalist Chinese government apparently applied its own municipal law in accepting some and rejecting others of these aliens. It accepted only those deportees who had lived on Formosa, who held Nationalist Chinese passports, or who worked on Nationalist Chinese vessels. Thus it appears that Nationalist China itself may not consider the Hong Kong group as its “subject national[s], or citizen[s].”

. See, e. g., United States ex rel. Tom Man v. Murff, 2 Cir., 264 F.2d 926 (1959) , noted, 28 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 790 (1960) ; Rogers v. Lu, 104 U.S.App. D.C. 374, 262 F.2d 471 (1958); United States ex rel. Fong Foo v. Shaughnessy, 2 Cir., 234 F.2d 715 (1955); United States ex rel. Leong Choy Moon v. Shaughnessy, 2 Cir., 218 F.2d 316 (1954).

. 66 Stat. 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h), which reads: “The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any alien within the United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien would be subject to physical persecution and for such period of time as he deems to be necessary for such reason.” See Note, 62 Yale L.J. 845 (1953).

. See, e. g., United States ex rel. Tom Man v. Murff, supra, Note 6; United States ex rel. Fong Foo v. Shaughnessy, supra, Note 6; United States ex rel. Leong Choy Moon v. Shaughnessy, supra, Note 6.

. The majority holds that one cannot be a “subject national, or citizen” of Communist China because this country does not recognize that government, relying on United States ex rel. Tom Man v. Murff, supra, Note 6, 264 F.2d at 928, where Judge Learned Hand, in obvious dictum, said: “We assume that [the deportee] cannot be regarded as a ‘subject national, or citizen’ of the Communist Government, because we do not recognize that as more than a de facto government.” See also Chu Lam v. Esperdy, S.D.N.Y., 209 F.Supp. 1 (1962); Ng Kam Fook v. Esperdy, S.D.N.Y., 209 F.Supp. 637 (1962).
It has been held that Communist China is a “country [which can be] designated by the alien” under the first priority, thereby compelling the Attorney General to approach Communist China as a condition to deportation. Hom Sin v. Esperdy, S.D.N.Y., 209 F.Supp. 3, 4 (1962), appeal pending. Also, Communist China may be “any country which is willing to accept such alien” under the third priority. United States ex rel. Tom Man v. Murff, supra, Note 6; United States ex rel. Leong Choy Moon v. Shaughnessy, supra, Note 6. Judge Lumbard, concurring in Leong Leun Do v. Esperdy, supra, Note 3, 309 F.2d at 477, argues that Communist China must be a “country” for all purposes.