Court Opinion

ID: 9914913
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-03 18:00:42.508183+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:15:22.819990
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JAN 3 2024
                                                                          MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                           U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

    D.B. and D.C.B., by and through their          No. 22-56065
    Guardian ad Litem, Terri Thomas, and as
    successors in interest to the Estate of Darren D.C. No.
    Burley,                                        22-cv-04207-PA-JPR

                    Plaintiffs-Appellants,

     v.                                             MEMORANDUM*

    COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, et al.,
               Defendants-Appellees.

                       Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Central District of California
                        Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding

                        Argued and Submitted December 14, 2023
                                 Pasadena, California

Before: TASHIMA, WALLACH,** and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

          Plaintiffs D.B. and D.C.B. appeal the district court’s order dismissing their

First Amended Complaint (FAC) on the basis of claim preclusion. Because the

*
 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
  The Honorable Evan J. Wallach, United States Senior Circuit Judge for the
Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.
parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Alston v. Nat’l

Collegiate Athletic Ass’n (In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-

Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.), 958 F.3d 1239, 1252 (9th Cir. 2020), aff’d, 141 S. Ct.

2141 (2021), and we affirm.

      1. Plaintiffs’ claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 could have been

raised in the prior state court action (Burley I), including their claim asserting

municipal liability pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S.

658 (1978). See Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 731 (2009). Although the

Monell claim against the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD) would

have likely been dismissed on the merits based on the California Supreme Court’s

ruling classifying sheriffs as state officers, the state court would have had

jurisdiction over this claim. See Pierce v. San Mateo Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 232

Cal. App. 4th 995, 1014–15 (2014). Accordingly, the exception to claim

preclusion based on “limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts”

does not apply here. Feminist Women’s Health Ctr. v. Codispoti, 63 F.3d 863, 869

(9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26(1)(c)).

      The district court correctly concluded that Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims are part

of the same cause of action as the claims asserted in Burley I. Federal courts are

required to give preclusive effect to state-court judgments by applying the state’s

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preclusion doctrine. See Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 759 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir.

1985) (citing Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481-82

(1982)). Under California’s primary rights theory, a “claim arises from the harm

suffered, as opposed to the particular theory of the litigant,” so “[e]ven when

multiple legal theories for recovery exist, one injury gives rise to only one claim

for relief.” Id. In Burley I, Plaintiffs brought claims in both their individual

capacities for Darren Burley’s wrongful death, and in their representative

capacities on behalf of Burley’s estate for, inter alia, negligence and battery

suffered by Burley prior to his death. Plaintiffs’ Monell claim against the County

pleads a different theory of liability—the County’s “custom, policy, and practice”

that allegedly permitted the deputies’ unlawful conduct—but is based on these

same injuries. Because the harms suffered by Plaintiffs are the same as those

asserted in Burley I, the Monell claim is asserted under the same primary right and

is part of the same cause of action, and is therefore precluded.

      2. The district court did not err in concluding that equitable factors did not

warrant an exception to claim preclusion here. The FAC does not plausibly allege

that Plaintiffs were unable to discover the existence of LASD gangs. To the

contrary, the record demonstrates that Plaintiffs had access to these facts at the

time of Burley I, as evidenced by Plaintiffs’ depositions of Deputy Aviles.

Similarly, Plaintiffs’ difficulty in recovering pre-death pain and suffering damages

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in Burley I does not prevent the application of claim preclusion. Following this

court’s decision in Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2014),

Plaintiffs could have amended their complaint in Burley I to argue their entitlement

to such damages.

      3. Finally, we deny as moot Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice of the

Proposed Judgment on Jury Verdict. The Proposed Judgment is not necessary to

identify the claims raised in Burley I, which the district court summarized in the

order appealed, and which appear in the Burley I complaint included in the

supplemental excerpts of records.

      AFFIRMED.

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