Court Opinion

ID: 9887029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 17:00:45.818828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:59:20.089468
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                No. 22-10044

             Plaintiff-Appellee,            D.C. No.
                                         4:19-cr-02615-
 v.                                       CKJ-DTF-1

JOSHUA WILLIAM SCHEU,                    ORDER AND
                                          AMENDED
             Defendant-Appellant.          OPINION

      Appeal from the United States District Court
               for the District of Arizona
      Cindy K. Jorgenson, District Judge, Presiding

        Argued and Submitted February 7, 2023
                  Phoenix, Arizona

                Filed August 2, 2023
               Amended October 6, 2023

  Before: Michael Daly Hawkins, Susan P. Graber, and
           Morgan Christen, Circuit Judges.

                        Order;
               Opinion by Judge Hawkins
2                          USA V. SCHEU

                          SUMMARY *

                         Criminal Law

    The panel denied a petition for panel rehearing and filed
an amended opinion affirming a sentence for two counts of
aggravated sexual abuse of a child in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2241(c), 2246(2), & 1152, in a case in which the district
court applied a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. §
2A3.1(b)(5) because “the victim was abducted.”
    The panel noted that the weight which must be accorded
to Sentencing Guidelines commentary, or whether the
commentary may be considered at all after Kisor v. Wilkie,
139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019), has become a contentious issue
across the circuits. But the panel did not need to delve into
the issue in this case, having concluded that the Guideline
provision itself is unambiguous and was properly applied by
the district court. Interpreting the plain language of the text
of § 2A3.1(b)(5), the panel had no difficulty concluding that
the victim was “abducted” when the defendant forced her
from the roadside where he encountered her into a nearby
cornfield to perpetrate the sexual assault.

*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                       USA V. SCHEU                      3

                       COUNSEL

J. Ryan Moore (argued), Assistant Federal Public Defender;
Jon M. Sands, Federal Public Defender; Federal Public
Defender’s Office, Tucson, Arizona; for Defendant-
Appellant.
Shelley K.G. Clemens (argued) and Corey J. Mantei,
Assistant United States Attorneys; Christina M. Cabanillas,
Deputy Appellate Chief; Gary M. Restaino, United States
Attorney; United States Attorney’s Office, Tucson, Arizona;
for Plaintiff-Appellee.

                         ORDER

    The Opinion filed on August 2, 2023, is replaced by the
attached Amended Opinion.
    The petition for panel rehearing is denied. No further
petitions for rehearing will be accepted.
4                       USA V. SCHEU

                         OPINION

HAWKINS, Circuit Judge:
    Defendant Joshua William Scheu appeals his sentence
following a guilty plea to two counts of aggravated sexual
abuse of a child in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c),
2246(2) & 1152. He contends that the district court
misapplied a sentencing enhancement for abduction and thus
improperly added four levels to his sentencing range. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
affirm.
       FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
   In October 2019, Scheu was indicted on two counts of
aggravated sexual abuse of a child for sexual acts of violence
committed against a fourteen-year-old Native American girl
on the Gila River Indian Community outside of Phoenix,
Arizona, in November 2004. Scheu pled guilty without the
benefit of a plea agreement.
    The Presentence Investigation Report calculated the
sentence using the 2004 version of the Guidelines, applied a
downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, and
added a four-level enhancement because “the victim was
abducted.” U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.”)
§ 2A3.1(b)(5). This enhancement increased both ends of the
advisory sentencing range by more than six years. Scheu
objected, arguing that the abduction enhancement should not
be applied because there was no significant change in
location during or prior to the assault.
    At the sentencing hearing, the government presented the
testimony of a former Gila River Police Department
                          USA V. SCHEU                            5

detective who had investigated the case in 2004. 1 The
detective testified that the victim and victim’s mother said
that the victim had been waiting by a dirt berm and water
pumping station along 83rd Avenue when the defendant
drove by, made a U-turn, parked, and got out of his vehicle.
As he approached the victim, she began walking backwards,
but Scheu caught up to her, grabbed her arms, and put his
hand over her mouth. He then pushed, pulled, dragged
and/or moved her approximately 35 to 40 feet into the corner
of a nearby cornfield where the sexual assault occurred, and
ordered her to lie down and not to scream or cry. The field
was adjacent to the road, and the corn was approximately
two-and-a-half feet high at the time. Several photographs
and a hand-drawn diagram of the crime scene were admitted
in evidence.
     Overruling Scheu’s objection to the enhancement, the
district court concluded that the forced movement of the
victim from the roadside into the cornfield was sufficient to
support the abduction enhancement and noted that the
defendant had “physically forced the victim into a cornfield
to conceal the assault from public view or detection.” The
court sentenced Scheu to 210 months of imprisonment and
lifetime supervised release.
                 STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review de novo the district court’s legal
interpretation of the Guidelines. United States v. Gasca-
Ruiz, 852 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc). A
court’s application of the Guidelines to the facts of a case is

1
  The victim died of natural causes in 2020 and was not available to
testify at Scheu’s sentencing hearing.
6                      USA V. SCHEU

reviewed for an abuse of discretion and its factual findings
for clear error. Id. at 1170.
                      DISCUSSION
   The Sentencing Guideline           at   issue,   U.S.S.G.
§ 2A3.1(b)(5) (2004), provides:

       Criminal Sexual Abuse; Attempt to Commit
       Criminal Sexual Abuse:
       a. Base Offense Level:      30
       b. Specific Offense Characteristics
          ....
          (5) If the victim was abducted, increase
              by 4 levels.

The application note to this Guideline further provides that
the term “abducted” in subsection (b)(5) shall “have the
meaning given those terms in Application Note 1 of the
Commentary to § 1B1.1.” In turn, the commentary to
§ 1B1.1 explains:

       “Abducted” means that a victim was forced
       to accompany an offender to a different
       location. For example, a bank robber’s
       forcing a bank teller from the bank into a
       getaway car would constitute an abduction.

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, cmt. n.1(A) (2004).
    Applying the definition in the commentary, the district
court found the defendant had forcibly moved the victim
from the shoulder of the road into an adjoining cornfield,
where he shoved her onto the ground, approximately 35 to
40 feet from the spot where he had initially grabbed her by
                         USA V. SCHEU                         7

the open road. The district court ruled that this movement
was sufficient to demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that Scheu had forced the victim to accompany him
to a different location and applied the four-level
enhancement.
                               I.
    For many years, the leading case on how courts should
treat definitions, examples, and other information in the
Guideline commentary has been Stinson v. United States,
508 U.S. 36 (1993). Stinson concluded that the Sentencing
Commission’s commentary in the Guidelines manual that
interprets or explains a Guideline is binding and that courts
must follow it unless it is plainly erroneous, inconsistent
with the Guideline provision itself, or violates the
Constitution. Id. at 47. In reaching this conclusion, the
Court considered various analogies to other legal areas and
ultimately concluded that, although “not precise,” the
Guideline commentary was much like an agency’s
interpretation of its own legislative rule (and not like an
agency’s construction of a federal statute that it administers).
Id. at 43‒45.
    Twenty-six years after Stinson, the Supreme Court
decided Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019), which
addressed the proper deference to an agency’s interpretation
of its regulations (in that case, the Board of Veterans’
Appeals interpretation of an agency rule in a particular
decision). Kisor reaffirmed the existence of, but limited the
scope of, “Auer / Seminole Rock deference”; the Court
explained that “the possibility of deference can arise only if
a regulation is genuinely ambiguous” and a court has
exhausted all the “traditional tools of construction.” Id. at
2414‒15 (citation omitted); see Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S.
8                        USA V. SCHEU

452 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S.
410 (1945).
    Since Kisor was decided, a circuit split has arisen over
whether this more limited deference should apply to the
Sentencing Guidelines commentary and application notes.
Compare United States v. Moses, 23 F.4th 347, 351‒58 (4th
Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 640 (Jan. 9, 2023) (setting
forth reasons why Kisor did not apply to the Guidelines, and
continuing to apply Stinson), with United States v. Riccardi,
989 F.3d 476, 484‒85 (6th Cir. 2021) (applying Kisor to the
Guidelines and concluding that a court may defer to
commentary only if the Guidelines are ambiguous).
    Our court recently weighed in on the debate and agreed
that the “more demanding deference standard articulated in
Kisor applies to the Guidelines’ commentary.” United
States v. Castillo, 69 F.4th 648, 655 (9th Cir. 2023). As we
explained:

       Kisor directly examined and narrowed
       Seminole Rock and Auer deference in the
       context of an administrative agency’s
       interpretation of its own regulation, noting that
       such deference is not permitted without first
       finding the regulation ambiguous. Stinson
       deference is directly grounded in Seminole
       Rock and Auer deference. . . . Therefore, to
       follow Stinson’s instruction to treat the
       commentary like an agency’s interpretation of
       its own rule, we must apply Kisor’s
       clarification of Auer deference to Stinson.

       Id. at 655‒56 (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
                        USA V. SCHEU                        9

    In any event, as discussed below, we conclude the result
in this case is unaffected by this change in analysis.
                             II.
    We apply “the traditional rules of statutory construction
when interpreting the sentencing guidelines.” United States
v. Flores, 729 F.3d 910, 914 n.2 (9th Cir. 2013). “Our
interpretation will most often begin and end with the text and
structure of the guidelines’ provisions themselves.” United
States v. Cuevas-Lopez, 934 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2019)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “In
determining the ‘plain meaning’ of a word, we may consult
dictionary definitions, which we trust to capture the common
contemporary understandings of the word.” Flores, 729
F.3d at 914.
    Here, the Guideline itself simply provides that “[i]f the
victim was abducted, increase by 4 levels.” U.S.S.G.
§ 2A3.1(b)(5). The word “abduct” derives from the Latin
“‘abduco’ to lead away.” Humphrey v. Pope, 54 P. 847, 848
(Cal 1898). Contemporary dictionary definitions define
“abduct” as “to seize and take away (a person) by force,”
Merriam Webster Online (2023), https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/abduct       [https://perma.cc/32EU-
LC8Y], “to carry off by force,” The American Heritage
Dictionary (2d Coll. Ed. 1991), and “[t]o take (a person)
away by force or deception,” The Oxford English Dictionary
Online (2023),          https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/212
[https://perma.cc/KJ3L-Z3KX]. Black’s Law Dictionary
similarly defines abduct(ion) as “[t]he act of leading
someone away by force or fraudulent persuasion.” (9th Ed.
2009). Scheu argues that “abducted” requires a “substantial
leading away” and is “akin to protracted custody, captivity,
or significant isolation.”
10                       USA V. SCHEU

    The plain meaning of “abducted” is not difficult to
discern, and the facts of this case would constitute an
abduction under any of these definitions. The defendant
encountered, chased, and caught the victim by the side of the
open road, and then forced her to accompany him 35 to 40
feet into a nearby cornfield, where the corn was
approximately two-and-a-half feet high; he then pushed her
down onto the ground so they could not be seen by passing
vehicles, ordered her not to scream or cry so no one would
come to her aid, and raped her. It can easily be said that the
defendant seized the victim and led her away by force,
significantly isolating her and holding her in his custody and
captivity while he perpetrated the crime.
     We note that this interpretation is also consistent with the
structure and use of “abducted” as an enhancement in other
Guidelines provisions, such as U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1 (robbery)
and § 2B3.2 (extortion by force or threat). FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)
(noting the “fundamental canon of statutory construction
that the words of a statute must be read in their context and
with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). In these
Guidelines, there is a lesser, two-level enhancement if the
victim was “physically restrained” and a separate, four-level
enhancement if the victim was abducted. Unlike abduction,
physical restraint does not require any movement of the
victim and applies if the victim is simply restrained in place.
See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 109 F.3d 639, 641 (9th
Cir. 1997) (noting examples such as being tied, bound, or
locked up). Applying the abduction enhancement in this case
is also completely consistent with the underlying purpose of
the enhancement in the sexual assault guideline. As the
Eighth Circuit has noted: “Abduction increases the gravity
                            USA V. SCHEU                             11

of sexual assault or other crimes because the perpetrator’s
ability to isolate the victim increases the likelihood that the
victim will be harmed.” United States v. Saknikent, 30 F.3d
1012, 1013 (8th Cir. 1994).
    Employing these “traditional tools of construction,”
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted), we conclude that the text of § 2A3.1(b)(5)
is not ambiguous and that the district court correctly applied
the abduction enhancement in this case.
                                 III.
    As we noted above, the weight which may be accorded
to the Guidelines’ commentary, or whether the commentary
may be considered at all post-Kisor, has become a
contentious issue across the circuits. See, e.g., Castillo, 69
F.4th at 660–62 (discussing post-Kisor circuit split); see also
United States v. Vargas, 74 F.4th 673, 690 (5th Cir. 2023)
(en banc); United States v. Rivera, 76 F.4th 1085, 1089–90
(8th Cir. 2023). We need not delve into this issue in this
case, having concluded that the Guideline provision itself is
unambiguous and was properly applied by the district court
in this case. We do note, however, that our interpretation is
entirely consistent with the way in which this Guideline has
been applied for many years in numerous other circuits when
they were applying the commentary definition pre-Kisor. 2
See e.g., United States v. Whooten, 279 F.3d 58, 61 (1st Cir.
2002) (abduction enhancement upheld where defendant
forced bank employee approximately 65 feet from building
into parking lot, but not all the way to getaway vehicle);
United States v. Davis, 48 F.3d 277, 278‒79 (7th Cir. 1993)

2
  The commentary defines “abducted” as “forced to accompany an
offender to a different location.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, cmt. n.1(A) (2004).
12                      USA V. SCHEU

(abduction enhancement upheld where defendant forced
employee from parking lot into credit union); United States
v. Kills in Water, 293 F.3d 432, 434 (8th Cir. 2002)
(abduction enhancement upheld where defendant picked up,
“dragged,” and “lifted” victim inside an abandoned trailer
after she willingly accompanied him to the trailer’s
vicinity), United States v. Hawkins, 87 F.3d 722, 728 (5th
Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (movement at gunpoint 40 to 50 feet
between vehicles in the same parking lot sufficient to
support the enhancement); United States v. Hefferon, 314
F.3d 211, 215 (5th Cir. 2002) (movement of victim from
near some trees by a playground to an area behind garbage
dumpsters constituted abduction).
                      CONCLUSION
    Interpreting the plain language of the text of
§ 2A3.1(b)(5), we have no difficulty concluding that the
victim in this case was indeed “abducted” when the
defendant forced her from the roadside where he
encountered her into a nearby cornfield to perpetrate the
sexual assault. The district court did not abuse its discretion
by applying the four-level enhancement.
     AFFIRMED.