Court Opinion

ID: 9961264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-18 15:10:39.491862+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:30.944528
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                                                      RENDERED: APRIL 18, 2024
                                                         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Supreme Court of Kentucky
                                    2023-SC-0098-MR

ANTONIO TYREE GASKIN                                                APPELLANT

                   ON APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
V.                  HONORABLE THOMAS L. TRAVIS, JUDGE
                              NO. 20-CR-00180

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                             APPELLEE

                     MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                      AFFIRMING

      Antonio Gaskin was convicted following a jury trial in Fayette Circuit

Court of two counts of murder and two counts of failure of a person to report a

death. Upon receiving a sentence of life imprisonment, he now appeals as a

matter of right. 1 Following a careful review, we affirm.

                   I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      Just before 11 a.m. on the morning of October 16, 2019, an anonymous

caller informed the Lexington Police Department (“LPD”) that a person or

persons may have been shot inside an apartment on Alexandria Drive in

Lexington, Kentucky. Responding officers made entry into the apartment

where they located the bodies of Marquis Harris and Sharmaine Carter in the

      1   KY. CONST. § 110(2)(b).
kitchen. Both had been shot multiple times in the head and chest. Harris was

wearing a backpack and had a travel pillow around his neck.

      Further investigation revealed the apartment was rented to Harris and

was likely used as a location to traffic narcotics. The front door had been fitted

with a mechanism by which a 2x4 wood plank could be installed and locked

into place as a barricade. Officers located a security camera in a back

bedroom, and it appeared another had been removed from the kitchen above

where the bodies were found. Several items were collected from the scene

which were sent for fingerprint analysis and DNA testing. Gaskin’s fingerprints

were found on a Sprite can and Solo cup while his DNA was present on the

same Sprite can and a cigarette butt.

      In the first few hours of the investigation, LPD officers obtained cellphone

records revealing Gaskin’s phone was at the apartment on the night of October

15. Officers discovered Harris called Gaskin at 9:05 p.m. and 9:09 p.m. that

night. The latter call was the last activity on Harris’s phone. Carter’s final call

was to Harris at 7:46 p.m. Video surveillance from a neighboring business

showed a white passenger car pulling up in front of the apartment at

approximately 9:10 p.m. that evening and two figures moving around it. No

positive identification could be made of either of the individuals based on the

distance of the vehicle from the camera’s location.

      The day after the bodies were discovered, police were contacted by

George Heard who had seen news coverage of the murders. Heard told officers

he was a Lyft driver who also provided his driving services outside the

                                         2
parameters of his usual work as a “side gig.” He had given Harris rides on

several previous occasions. Heard said he had picked Harris up in Detroit,

Michigan, and driven him back to the Alexandria drive apartment on October

15. He recalled Harris was traveling with a backpack and routinely wore a

neck pillow on long car rides. Upon arriving at the apartment, Harris was

short on the fare, so he called someone to bring him the remaining $50. A man

came to the car and handed Heard the cash before walking with Harris back to

the apartment. Heard would later identify Gaskin as the man who paid him

after being shown a single photograph by the investigating officer.

      Around this same time, LPD received an anonymous tip that Gaskin was

responsible for the murders, prompting a search for connections between

Gaskin and the victims. Detectives obtained search warrants for cellphone

records and were able to locate an individual who occasionally gave Gaskin

rides in exchange for favors, commonly in the form of drugs. He indicated he

knew Gaskin and Harris and that he had dropped Gaskin off at the Alexandria

Drive apartments on October 15 between 8:50 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. Gaskin

called him back at around 9:20 p.m. but he did not answer. Additional

searches of Gaskin’s cellphone records and more in-depth investigation

revealed he had contacted a taxicab service on October 16 seeking a ride from

the Greyhound bus station in Cincinnati back to Lexington. The driver took

Gaskin to the apartment where Harris and Carter were found later that

morning. Gaskin went into and out of the apartment several times and

appeared to be putting things in his pockets.

                                       3
      Sometime in the morning hours of October 16, Gaskin contacted Harris’s

mother and told her she should get the family together and travel to Lexington.

Shortly thereafter, Harris’s sister called Gaskin and he informed her Harris and

Carter were dead. Gaskin was asked to contact police to report the deaths, but

he refused. Another family member made the anonymous call to LPD which

was received at 10:55 a.m. At some later time, Gaskin told Harris’s family

members he had entered the apartment and found the dead bodies.

      Gaskin was subsequently indicted for two counts of murder, two counts

of failure of a person to report a death, and being a persistent felony offender in

the second degree (PFO II). A five-day jury trial commenced on July 18, 2021.

During the guilt phase, the Commonwealth called eighteen witnesses and

Gaskin called six; almost seventy exhibits were entered into the record. The

jury convicted Gaskin on the charges of murder and failure to report a death

and recommended a sentence of life imprisonment. 2 This appeal followed.

                                   II. ANALYSIS

      Gaskin raises several assignments of error in seeking reversal. First, he

contends the trial court erroneously denied his pretrial motion to suppress the

out-of-court identification by Heard as unduly suggestive and lacking in

reliability. Second, Gaskin contends the Commonwealth was improperly

permitted to present rebuttal testimony from a witness who had not been

separated and had been in the courtroom during testimony by other witnesses

      2 Prior to sentencing, the Commonwealth moved to dismiss the PFO II charge.

The jury was not charged to consider sentencing on the misdemeanor offenses.

                                        4
in violation of KRE 3 615. Third, he alleges the Commonwealth engaged in

prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments by violating multiple

pretrial rulings. Finally, Gaskin seeks reversal under the cumulative error

doctrine.

     A. Suppression of the out-of court identification was unwarranted.

      The day after the murders, Heard contacted police and provided

information about occurrences close in time to the murder, specifically that he

had dropped Harris off at the apartment and an African American man whom

he had seen before had come out of the apartment to pay a portion of the fare

for Harris’s trip to Lexington from Detroit because Harris was short on cash.

Approximately twenty-eight days later, Heard gave a video-recorded interview

with investigators in which he reiterated the information he had previously

provided. During the interview, Heard was shown a single photograph and

asked if it looked like the man who had paid him the $50 on the night of the

murders. Heard indicated the photograph “looked like him” and he had seen

the person who paid him “once or twice” before.

      Prior to trial, Gaskin moved to suppress Heard’s out-of-court

identification of him, asserting the procedure used by police was unduly

suggestive and the identification was otherwise unreliable. He argued the

encounter on the night of the murders was brief and nothing about the

circumstances of a simple money exchange would trigger a heightened need for

      3   Kentucky Rules of Evidence.

                                        5
attention to detail. Gaskin highlighted the fact that Heard’s initial description

of the man he saw was generic and vague, and he expressed no level of

certainty at the time he was shown the single photograph. He also contended

the nearly-month-long delay before the identification, when coupled with the

inherently suggestive nature of the police procedure used, made his out-of-

court identification unreliable. Following a suppression hearing, the trial court

issued a six-page order wherein it determined the single-photo procedure “may

have been unnecessarily suggestive” but concluded the totality of the

circumstances rendered the identification reliable and suppression was not

required. Gaskin disagrees with that holding and now urges reversal.

      A trial court’s findings of fact on motions to suppress evidence are

subject to the “clearly erroneous” standard of review. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S.

188, 199 (1972). Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are reviewed for an

abuse of discretion. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575,

576 (Ky. 2000). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “trial judge’s decision

was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”

Id. at 581 (citing Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. 1999)).

      We employ a two-pronged test to determine whether identification

testimony violates a defendant’s due process rights. Commonwealth v. Parker,

409 S.W.3d 350, 352 (Ky. 2013) (stating “[t]he determination of whether

identification testimony violates a defendant’s due process rights involves a

two-step process.” (citations omitted)). The Court must first determine whether

the procedure used for the identification was unnecessarily suggestive. Perry v.

                                        6
New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 238-39 (2012) (“[D]ue process concerns arise

only when law enforcement officers use an identification procedure that is both

suggestive and unnecessary.”). “If so, ‘the identification may still be admissible

if under the totality of the circumstances the identification was reliable even

though the [identification] procedure was suggestive.’” Dillingham v.

Commonwealth, 995 S.W.2d 377, 383 (Ky. 1999) (quoting Stewart v.

Duckworth, 93 F.3d 262, 265 (7th Cir. 1996)).

      Heard’s in-person identification was based on a single photograph, rather

than the preferred methods of using photo arrays or “mug books” containing

multiple photographs.

            This procedure is similar to a showup and is similarly
            received by the courts. . . . The most circumspect
            identification is where a single photo is presented.
            Where this occurs, courts assume suggestiveness and
            then inquire as to the totality of circumstances to see
            if the identification was otherwise reliable.

Leslie W. Abramson, 8 Ky. Prac., Crim. Prac. & Proc. § 20:24 (6th ed.).

Although showup identifications are inherently suggestive, they may be

necessary to “aid the police in either establishing probable cause or clearing a

possible suspect.” Savage v. Commonwealth, 920 S.W.2d 512, 513 (Ky. 1995).

Here, because a showup procedure was utilized which is inherently

circumspect, we conclude it was both suggestive and unnecessary. See Sweatt

v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Ky. 1977) (a showup is not a generally

approved method of securing an identification).

                                        7
       Having concluded the identification procedure was suggestive, we turn to

the second prong of the analysis to determine if Heard’s identification was

otherwise reliable. In Neil, the United States Supreme Court stated an out-of-

court identification would not be held to violate due process if under the

“‘totality of the circumstances’ the identification was reliable even though the

confrontation procedure was suggestive.” 409 U.S. at 199. Assessing the

totality of the circumstances requires consideration of the five factors

enumerated in Neil. Those factors are: 1) the opportunity of the witness to

view the criminal; 2) the witness’ degree of attention; 3) the accuracy of prior

descriptions of the criminal; 4) the level of certainty demonstrated at the

confrontation; and 5) the time between the crime and confrontation. Id. at

199-200. Therefore, the emphasis in Neil was on the reliability of the

identification itself.

              It is, first of all, apparent that the primary evil to be
              avoided is ‘a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
              misidentification.’ Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S.
              [377, 384 (1968)]. While the phrase was coined as a
              standard for determining whether an in-court
              identification would be admissible in the wake of a
              suggestive out-of-court identification, with the deletion
              of ‘irreparable’ it serves equally well as a standard for
              the admissibility of testimony concerning the out-of-
              court identification itself. It is the likelihood of
              misidentification which violates a defendant’s right to
              due process, and it is this which was the basis of the
              exclusion of evidence in [Foster v. California, 394 U.S.
              440 (1969)]. Suggestive confrontations are
              disapproved because they increase the likelihood of
              misidentification, and unnecessarily suggestive ones
              are condemned for the further reason that the
              increased chance of misidentification is gratuitous.
              But as [Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967)] makes

                                          8
              clear, the admission of evidence of a showup without
              more does not violate due process.

Id. at 198 (footnote omitted). Furthermore, even if a suggestive and

unnecessary procedure is utilized, “suppression of the resulting identification

is not the inevitable consequence.” Perry, 565 U.S. at 239 (citing Manson v.

Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112-13 (1977)). Thus, an identification will be

excluded on due process grounds only when “improper police conduct created

a ‘substantial likelihood of misidentification.’” Id. (quoting Neil, 409 U.S. at

201).

        Turning to the five totality of the circumstances factors, we conclude they

weigh in favor of the reliability, and thus the admissibility, of Heard’s

identification. The trial court found all five factors weighed in favor of

reliability and we agree. First, it is undisputed Heard had an opportunity to

view an individual at the Alexandria Drive apartment complex. He engaged in

a hand-to-hand cash transaction at a distance of less than two feet under the

illumination of streetlights. Second, Heard was able to give a detailed account

of the events of the evening and his attention would have been drawn to the

person paying the remainder of the fare for which his passenger was short.

Third, although his initial description was somewhat vague, it was accurate,

and he stated he had seen the individual on previous occasions. Fourth, while

he was not asked to give a precise level of confidence or certainty in his

identification, Heard did not equivocate when stating the photograph looked

like the man he saw the night of the murders. Finally, the delay of thirty days

                                         9
between the crime and the identification does not taint its overall reliability. 4

In Neil, the victim did not identify the perpetrator for seven months. 409 U.S.

at 194-95. In Beecham v. Commonwealth, 594 S.W.2d 898, 899 (Ky. App.

1979), the Court of Appeals noted the five years between the offense and

photographic identification was a “weak point” in the case, yet ultimately

concluded the identification evidence was properly admitted. And in

Kordenbrock v. Scroggy, 919 F.2d 1091, 1103 (6th Cir. 1990), a delay of

approximately one month was deemed “relatively short” and was not a negative

factor in the reliability calculus.

      Although the showup procedure was unduly suggestive, we hold that,

under the five factors set out in Neil, the identification was nonetheless reliable.

There is always a possibility of mistaken identity. But “[t]he accuracy of an

identification, though it is based on memory and the senses alone, still lies

within the inherent province of the jury to assess.” Stephens v.

Commonwealth, 489 S.W.2d 249, 252 (Ky. 1972) (quoting Burton v.

Commonwealth, 442 S.W.2d 583, 585 (Ky. 1969)). Gaskin would only be

denied due process if the “photographic identification procedure was so

      4   As Gaskin correctly notes, the trial court’s suppression order erroneously
found the delay to be less than forty-eight hours. However, the error was not brought
to the trial court’s attention for correction or modification. Almost all issues are
subject to waiver from inaction or consent, even in a criminal case, and “[a] new theory
of error cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Springer v. Commonwealth, 998
S.W.2d 439, 446 (Ky. 1999). Furthermore, in spite of the trial court’s erroneous
finding, this Court “may affirm a correct result upon any ground supported by the
record” even if the lower court “reaches its judgment for the wrong reason.” Wells v.
Commonwealth, 512 S.W.3d 720, 721-22 (Ky. 2017) (citing Jarvis v. Commonwealth,
960 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Ky. 1998)).

                                          10
impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to the very substantial likelihood of

irreparable misidentification.” Simmons, 390 U.S. at 385. No such likelihood

was shown in this case. Thus, under the circumstances presented, we discern

no abuse of discretion in the trial court admitting Heard’s out-of-court

identification of Gaskin and the evidence was properly allowed to go to the jury.

      B. No abuse of discretion occurred in allowing rebuttal testimony.

      Second, Gaskin asserts the trial court erroneously permitted the

Commonwealth to present rebuttal testimony from Lance Collins who was in

the gallery during testimony from other witnesses after a motion had been

made under KRE 615 for separation of witnesses. 5 He contends the

Commonwealth concealed knowledge of Collins to ambush the defense and

resulted in undue prejudice.

      On the third day of trial, a detective was cross-examined extensively by

the defense about a death threat sent via text message to Carter approximately

fourteen days prior to her murder. The detective did not recall ever seeing the

message and admitted he was unaware of the identity of the sender, nor had he

      5   KRE 615 states:
      At the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they
      cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses and it may make the order on its
      own motion. This rule does not authorize exclusion of:
              (1) A party who is a natural person;
            (2) An officer or employee of a party which is not a natural person
      designated as its representative by its attorney; or
            (3) A person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to the
      presentation of the party’s cause.

                                           11
investigated the threat. The following morning, the Commonwealth informed

the trial court and Gaskin that Collins had approached during the previous

day’s lunch recess and claimed to be the author of the threatening message.

Collins was directed not to reenter the courtroom or have any contact with the

victims’ families. He was placed in an anteroom for the remainder of the day

until the Commonwealth could interview him to determine whether he should

be called in rebuttal. Gaskin raised no objection to the disclosure.

      After Gaskin closed his case, the Commonwealth called Collins in

rebuttal. He testified he was Carter’s boyfriend in 2019 and had been present

in the courtroom when the detective was asked about the threatening text

message. Gaskin immediately objected to Collins testifying as his presence in

the courtroom the previous day during the testimony of other witnesses

constituted a violation of KRE 615. He argued that even an inadvertent

violation of the rule requires exclusion of the offending witness’s testimony.

After hearing the parties’ positions, the trial court concluded whether to allow

Collins to testify was discretionary. Because he was previously unknown to all

parties, his testimony would be limited to factual rebuttal, and neither party

would gain an undue advantage or prejudice from his testimony, the trial court

ruled Collins could testify.

      Collins confirmed he had sent the threatening messages and stated he

and Carter were merely “bickering” rather than actually fighting. He stated he

was in Detroit, Michigan, at the time and was not in Lexington on the date of

the murders. Collins stated he and Carter were back on good terms before her

                                       12
death and denied any role in the killings. Gaskin asserts the violation of KRE

615 required all of Collins’ testimony to be excluded. Alternatively, he

contends the testimony should have been disallowed because Commonwealth

acted in bad faith by concealing Collins’ presence. We discern no error.

      The purpose of separating witnesses is “to insure (sic) the integrity of the

trial by denying a witness the opportunity to alter his testimony.” Reams v.

Stutler, 642 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Ky. 1982). “We have uniformly interpreted the

separation rule as providing a trial judge broad discretion to permit or refuse to

permit a witness to testify who has violated the rule and have refused to

intervene in such matters except in cases where that discretion has been

abused.” Jones v. Commonwealth, 623 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Ky. 1981). “The test

for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary,

unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”

Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). Further, an

appellant must show he was prejudiced when a rebuttal witness was called

after hearing other witnesses testify. As we have previously held, “a violation

without prejudice would not entitle a party to any relief.” Smith v. Miller, 127

S.W.3d 644, 647 (Ky. 2004).

      Gaskin’s defense relied in large part on attempting to show the

investigation into the murders was superficial and incomplete, and in pointing

the finger at an unknown alternate perpetrator. To further the defense, Gaskin

introduced the threatening texts when cross-examining the investigating

detective and keyed in on the fact that the sender was unknown to police

                                        13
because of a failure to investigate. Unbeknownst to anyone, Collins was in the

gallery and recognized the texts as being his own. As the trial court noted,

until that point Collins “wasn’t on anyone’s radar” nor was there any indication

he would be a potential witness. Thus, the trial court concluded there was no

“mischief” afoot and that permitting Collins to testify in rebuttal was

appropriate under the specific circumstances presented.

      Rebuttal testimony responds to something brought up in a defendant's

case that the Commonwealth could not reasonably anticipate. However,

“[r]ebuttal does not offer a protective umbrella, under which prosecutors may

lay in wait.” Chestnut v. Commonwealth, 250 S.W.3d 288, 297 (Ky. 2008).

Such was simply not the case here. Nothing in the record supports a finding

the Commonwealth acted in bad faith or willingly or knowingly concealed

Collins’ presence or potential testimony. We discern no strategic violation of

any rules by the Commonwealth or any attempt to surprise Gaskin with an

undisclosed witness. Collins was previously unknown to law enforcement or

the Commonwealth, potentially due to the incomplete investigation as argued

by Gaskin in his defense. He was present in the courtroom of his own volition

to watch the trial of the person accused of killing his former girlfriend. It was

not until the detective spoke of the threatening messages that he recognized

them as his own and approached the Commonwealth to claim ownership.

      To borrow an analogy used by our predecessor Court, “the appellants,

having opened the book on the subject, were not in a position to complain

when their adversaries sought to read other verses from the same chapter and

                                        14
page.” Harris v. Thompson, 497 S.W.2d 422, 430 (Ky. 1973). It was within the

sound discretion of the trial court to allow Collins to testify in rebuttal. Gaskin

attempted to cast blame on an unidentified person who had threatened Carter’s

life shortly before she was killed. Collins came forward to identify himself and

explain the context of the threats. The threatening messages were clearly

unflattering to him and placed his own credibility and potential culpability into

question. There is nothing in the record to indicate Collins tailored his

testimony after listening to other witnesses. Although there had been a

technical violation of KRE 615 by Collins being present in the courtroom while

other witnesses were testifying, we cannot say the trial court abused its

substantial discretion in allowing his limited rebuttal testimony. See Pilon v.

Commonwealth, 544 S.W.2d 228, 231 (Ky. 1976). Gaskin has shown no

prejudice and is therefore entitled to no relief. Smith, 127 S.W.3d at 647.

    C. Commonwealth’s closing argument did not constitute misconduct.

      Next, Gaskin contends the Commonwealth engaged in prosecutorial

misconduct during closing argument. Specifically, he complains the

Commonwealth, in violation of the trial court’s explicit pretrial rulings, made

improper inferences regarding his exact location based on cell tower data

adduced at trial. He concedes this argument is unpreserved for appellate

review and requests palpable error review pursuant to RCr 6 10.26.

      6   Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

                                         15
      Although not properly preserved, a palpable error “affects the substantial

rights of a party” and “relief may be granted upon a determination that

manifest injustice has resulted” from the error. RCr 10.26. A palpable error

must be “easily perceptible, plain, obvious and readily noticeable.” Brewer v.

Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006). To obtain a reversal based

on an alleged palpable error, a defendant must show the error was “shocking or

jurisprudentially intolerable.” Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Ky.

2006). “When an appellate court engages in a palpable error review, its focus is

on what happened and whether the defect is so manifest, fundamental and

unambiguous that it threatens the integrity of the judicial process.” Id. at 5.

      Prosecutorial misconduct has been defined as an “improper or illegal act

. . . involving an attempt to . . . persuade the jury to wrongly convict a

defendant or assess an unjustified punishment.” Noakes v. Commonwealth,

354 S.W.3d 116, 121 (Ky. 2011) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009)).

The misconduct can occur in a variety of forms, including improper closing

argument. Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 485 S.W.3d 310, 329 (Ky. 2016) (citing

Duncan v. Commonwealth, 322 S.W.3d 81, 87 (Ky. 2010)). Any allegation of

misconduct must be viewed in the context of the overall fairness of the trial.

Commonwealth v. McGorman, 489 S.W.3d 731, 742 (Ky. 2016). For reversal to

be justified, the prosecutorial misconduct must be “so serious as to render the

entire trial unfair.” Soto v. Commonwealth, 139 S.W.3d 827, 873 (Ky. 2004)

(quoting Stopher v. Commonwealth, 57 S.W.3d 787, 805 (Ky. 2001)).

                                        16
      “If the misconduct is objected to, we will reverse on that ground if proof

of the defendant’s guilt was not such as to render the misconduct harmless,

and if the trial court failed to cure the misconduct with a sufficient admonition

to the jury.” Duncan v. Commonwealth, 322 S.W.3d 81, 87 (Ky. 2010).

However, as occurred here, where the defendant raised no objection this Court

“will reverse only where the misconduct was flagrant and was such as to render

the trial fundamentally unfair.” Id. (citing Barnes v. Commonwealth, 91 S.W.3d

564 (Ky. 2002); Partin v. Commonwealth, 918 S.W.2d 219 (Ky. 1996)).

      At a pretrial hearing, Gaskin raised concerns about his historical

cellphone location evidence and its use at trial. He asserted the recent decision

in Torrence v. Commonwealth, 603 S.W.3d 214 (Ky. 2020), operated to prohibit

a police officer from testifying about a cellphone’s specific location based solely

on historical cell tower data. Gaskin argued officers could plot the locations of

cell towers with which a phone was communicating but go no further. The trial

court agreed and stated its expectation the Commonwealth would stay within

the bounds of binding caselaw. In its ruling, the trial court noted it was the

province of the jury to draw inferences from any testimony regarding the

generalized and approximate location of Gaskin’s phone based on a ping to a

cell tower site. Officers could testify only to which tower his phone was

communicating at a particular time and the general location of the tower itself.

At trial, the trial court reminded the Commonwealth of its earlier ruling when

the historical cell tower data testimony began. The Commonwealth ensured

the testimony conformed to the trial court’s rulings. Exhibits provided to the

                                        17
jury showed the dates and times Gaskin’s phone was communicating with a

tower and where the particular tower was located.

      During closing arguments, the Commonwealth referenced the historical

cell tower location data testimony to show Gaskin’s movements before and after

the murders. Gaskin’s phone primarily connected with two towers during that

time period, one near a hotel where he had rented a room and the other near

the Alexandria Drive apartment complex. The Commonwealth referenced other

corroborating testimony and evidence to argue Gaskin was at the apartment

when the two murders occurred. In urging reversal, Gaskin now contends

these arguments went beyond the scope of the trial court’s explicit limitations

and the Commonwealth made improper inferences exceeding the bounds of

witness testimony and argued facts not in evidence as to his exact location. He

asserts this equated to prosecutorial misconduct. We disagree.

      “[P]rosecutors are allowed wide latitude during closing arguments and

may comment upon the evidence presented.” Maxie v. Commonwealth, 82

S.W.3d 860, 866 (Ky. 2002) (citing Derossett v. Commonwealth, 867 S.W.2d

195 (Ky. 1993); Houston v. Commonwealth, 641 S.W.2d 42 (Ky. App. 1982)).

Such latitude is allowed during closing arguments because argument is not

evidence. Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 744 S.W.2d 407, 412 (Ky. 1987). As

previously stated, in the absence of a contemporaneous objection, we will only

reverse if flagrant misconduct rendered the entire trial fundamentally unfair.

Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 485 S.W.3d 310, 329 (Ky. 2016). To determine

whether improper comments amount to flagrant prosecutorial misconduct, we

                                       18
must examine: “(1) whether the remarks tended to mislead the jury or to

prejudice the accused; (2) whether they were isolated or extensive; (3) whether

they were deliberately or accidentally placed before the jury; and (4) the

strength of the evidence against the accused.” Id. (quoting Mayo v.

Commonwealth, 322 S.W.3d 41, 56 (Ky. 2010)).

      Upon review of the Commonwealth’s argument in full, we cannot

conclude it mischaracterized the evidence or otherwise misled the jury. The

Commonwealth reviewed the testimony regarding the cell tower location

testimony and the maps produced from the raw data. It further referenced

witness testimony which placed Gaskin at the apartment complex close in time

to the murders to show that each corroborated the other. The Commonwealth

then drew fair and reasonable inferences from all of the evidence to argue

Gaskin was present when Harris and Carter were killed. During the

Commonwealth’s nearly forty-minute-long summation, less than four minutes

was devoted to the cell tower location data and testimony. The three instances

Gaskin references which he asserts crossed the line were fleeting at best and

were certainly not extensive. Nor did the prosecutor specifically state the cell

tower location information alone placed Gaskin in the apartment as he claims.

The Commonwealth’s argument tracked the evidence and fell within the

bounds of reasonable inferences and comments on the evidence. No

prosecutorial misconduct occurred.

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                        D. There was no cumulative error.

      Finally, Gaskin urges this Court to reverse his convictions under the

cumulative error doctrine. We decline his invitation to do so.

      The cumulative error doctrine provides that “multiple errors, although

harmless individually, may be deemed reversible if their cumulative effect is to

render the trial fundamentally unfair.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d

577, 631 (Ky. 2010). “We have found cumulative error only where the

individual errors were themselves substantial, bordering, at least, on the

prejudicial.” Id. (citation omitted). In addition, “[w]here . . . none of the errors

individually raised any real question of prejudice, we have declined to hold that

the absence of prejudice plus the absence of prejudice somehow adds up to

prejudice.” Id. (citation omitted). A criminal defendant “is guaranteed a fair

trial[,]” but “[t]his does not mean, however, a perfect trial, free of any and all

errors.” McDonald v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 84, 86 (Ky. 1977). Having

concluded a singular error occurred related to one finding by the trial court in

its order denying Gaskin’s suppression motion, we are confident such error

lacked any prejudicial effect. “Although errors crept into this trial, as they

inevitably do in a trial . . . they did not, either individually or cumulatively,

render the trial unfair.” Brown, 313 S.W.3d at 631. Gaskin is not entitled to

the relief he seeks.

                                 III.   CONCLUSION

      For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of conviction and sentence of the

Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.

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      All sitting. All concur. Thompson, J., concurs with separate opinion in

which Conley, J., joins.

      THOMPSON, J., CONCURRING: I write separately to emphasize that the

presentation of a single photograph to Heard to identify Gaskin as the man

who paid part of Harris’s fare on the night of the murders was unduly

suggestive, highly inappropriate, and violated police procedure. For more than

forty years, it has been established that presenting a witness with a single

photograph of a suspect for identification purposes is unduly prejudicial and

suggestive. Moore v. Commonwealth, 569 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Ky. 1978). Standard

police procedure dictates that a six-pack of similar photos be presented to the

witness. See Oakes v. Commonwealth, 320 S.W.3d 50, 57-58 (Ky. 2010)

(reviewing proper photo arrays). There is no reason that this standard

procedure could not have been followed in this case, where Heard was

interviewed by the police nearly a month after his initial report to police. The

Commonwealth is very fortunate that in this particular case there was

sufficient independent indicia of reliability to save Heard’s later in-court

identification of Gaskin and that, therefore, reversal of Gaskin’s criminal

conviction is not required based on this substantive misstep by the police.

      Conley, J., joins.

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COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Jennifer Wade
Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Russell M. Coleman
Attorney General of Kentucky

Thomas A. Van De Rostyne
Assistant Attorney General

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