Court Opinion

ID: 9599454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:18:48.832108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:08:30.824984
License: Public Domain

CLARK, J.
I concur with the majority that, despite notification, extenuating circumstances may exist, making it inequitable or unconscionable to require repayment of funds for which the recipient was ineligible. However, because of the increased frequency of recoupment proceedings, I am compelled to clarify the procedural result of the majority’s decision.
It is implicit that notification, while not establishing conclusive proof, does constitute a prima facie showing that extenuating circumstances precluding repayment do not exist. Thus, after the department has shown proper notice of possible liability for repayment, the burden of proof is to be borne by the recipient who must show it would be unconscionable for him to have to repay the state following an unsuccessful appeal. This is fair. Because extenuating circumstances—where they exist—are of an individual and personal nature, the recipient, rather than the department, is in the better position to know of them.
By adopting the above procedure, several desirable ends are realized: The procedure best calculated to fairly reveal relevant circumstances in each case is promoted; both judicial and quasi-judicial efficiency are fostered—at no sacrifice in fairness—by alleviating significantly the hardships incident to requiring proof of a negative fact; finally, the limited resources available for payment of benefits are conserved by minimizing the amount diverted to the department’s investigative functions. In short, *330a procedure is provided satisfying the requirements of section 1375 of the Unemployment Insurance Code, while permitting that section’s fair and efficient enforcement.
McComb, J., concurred.
On May 22, 1974, the opinion was modified to read as printed above.