Court Opinion

ID: 9891950
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-19 21:04:05.835298+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:59:40.067850
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

PAIN SPECIALIST GROUP, LTD.                 )
                                            )
             Plaintiff,                     )
                                            )
       v.                                   )      C.A. No. 2022-0814-NAC
                                            )
MICRON MEDICAL CORPORATION,                 )
MINISTIM, LLC, URO MEDICAL                  )
CORPORATION, MICRON MEDICAL                 )
LLC, MICHAEL PERRYMAN, and                  )
LAURA PERRYMAN                              )
                                            )
             Defendants.                    )

                ORDER DENYING APPLICATION FOR
            CERTIFICATION OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

      WHEREAS:

      1.    This is Defendant Laura Perryman’s third effort since mid-2022 at

interlocutory appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court from decisions of this Court.

See Perryman v. Stimwave Techs. Inc., 284 A.3d 77 (Del. 2022) (TABLE) (appeal

dismissed); Perryman v. Stimwave Techs. Inc., No. 302, 2023 (Del.) (application for

interlocutory appeal pending).

      2.    Ms. Perryman and her son, Defendant Michael Perryman, seek

interlocutory appeal of my September 19, 2023, oral ruling and September 20, 2023,

implementing order denying Ms. Perryman’s motion for a stay pending her criminal

trial in federal court. For the same reasons that Vice Chancellor Glasscock denied
Ms. Perryman’s application for certification of interlocutory appeal in Stimwave

Technologies Inc. v. Perryman, I conclude that the application for certification of

interlocutory appeal in this matter (the “Application”) must be denied. 2023 WL

5748753 (Del. Ch. Sept. 6, 2023).

      3.     The Application sets forth a torrent of conclusory statements regarding

why interlocutory appeal is purportedly appropriate. These include assertions that

my ruling:

             a.    “declines to give the Defendant the right to due process in

      accordance with the Fourteenth Amendment” (App. at 3);

             b.    “assumes the denial of the stay determination [sic] can be made

      without a hearing or any evidence whatsoever, in violation of the

      Constitutional 6th Amendment” (id.);

             c.    “expressly conflicts with previously been considered [sic] by the

      Delaware Supreme Court, including the right to a jury trial under the

      Constitutional 7th Amendment and cruel and unusual punishment under the

      8th Amendment” (id.);

             d.    “implicate[s]    constitutional   principles   of   federal/state

      sovereignty and comity, as protected and reinforced by the Commerce Clause,

      the Due Process Clauses, and the Freedom of Speech and Right to a Trial

      Clauses of the U.S. Constitution” (App. at 11); and

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             e.    raises “a question of first impression whether Delaware may

      constitutionally regulate the economic incentives of out-of-state actors”

      because “[r]egulating out-of-state individual personal conduct[] violates the

      Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause.” Id.

The Application is largely an indecipherable jumble of untethered concepts and

inflammatory statements. See, e.g., App. at 11 (“Thus, the Order is candid in seeking

to change the fundamental concept of law that accused [sic] are innocent till proven

guilty, that civil claims must be validated by evidence and testimony, and that a

Corporation cannot just make fraudulent claims based on hearsay—rendering the

Chancery Court not an equity based court[,] but a place for fake claims to be

accepted without question, evidence, testimony or proof.”).

      4.     Given this, I focus my analysis below on what I understand to be the

substantial issue of material importance meriting interlocutory appeal identified in

the Application.

      NOW, THEREFORE, the Court, having carefully considered the Application,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, this 19th day of October, 2023, as follows:

                                         3
      1.     Supreme Court Rule 42 governs certification of interlocutory appeals.

“The purpose of Rule 42 is to prevent wasteful piecemeal litigation from

overwhelming the docket of the Supreme Court.”1

      2.     Interlocutory appeals are “generally not favored.” Supr. Ct. R. 42

cmt. They “disrupt the normal procession of litigation, cause delay, and can threaten

to exhaust scarce party and judicial resources.” Supr. Ct. R. 42(b)(ii). So, a Rule 42

application cannot be certified unless it clears two “rigorous” hurdles. 2 First, the

order must have “decide[d] a substantial issue of material importance that merits

appellate review before a final judgment.” Supr. Ct. R. 42(b)(i). Second, there must

be “substantial benefits” to granting the application that “will outweigh the certain

costs that accompany an interlocutory appeal.” Supr. Ct. R. 42(b)(ii).

      3.     Here, the Application fails to meet the requirements for certification.

As Vice Chancellor Glasscock reasoned in denying Ms. Perryman’s application for

certification of interlocutory appeal in Stimwave Technologies Inc.:

      My denial of a stay does not determine an issue of material importance.
      It does not prejudice Ms. Perryman, who is free to request a stay in the
      future if the criminal litigation makes such appropriate. The question
      of whether to grant a stay is in the discretion of the Court, as a function
      of its necessary control of its docket. The burden to the litigants and to
      the Supreme Court of interlocutory appeal, therefore, is in no way

1
 In re Del. Pub. Schs. Litig., 2022 WL 1220075, at *9 (Del. Ch. Apr. 26, 2022) (alteration
and internal quotation marks omitted), appeal refused, 277 A.3d 296 (Del. 2022) (TABLE).
2
 TowerHill Wealth Mgmt., LLC v. Bander Fam. P’ship, L.P., 2008 WL 4615865, at *2
(Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 2008), appeal refused, 962 A.2d 256 (Del. 2008) (TABLE).

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       justified. None of the factors of Supreme Court Rule 42(b)(iii) support
       interlocutory appeal.

2023 WL 5748753, at *1 (citations and footnote omitted).3

       4.     Boiled down, the Application asserts that I improperly denied Ms.

Perryman’s motion to stay without first holding an evidentiary hearing.                    Ms.

Perryman cites no case law in support of her assertion and, indeed, acknowledges in

the Application that “[t]he decision whether to grant or deny a motion for a stay is

within the discretion of the trial court.” App. at 6 (citations omitted).

       5.     I further question how holding an evidentiary hearing on her stay

motion would be consistent with the contention she makes in her stay motion that

she cannot testify in light of her criminal proceeding.4 In any event, Ms. Perryman

3
  Like Vice Chancellor Glasscock in Stimwave Technologies, I have considered the Rule
42(b)(iii) factors here, which include whether: (A) The interlocutory order involves a
question of law resolved for the first time in this State; (B) The decisions of the trial courts
are conflicting upon the question of law; (C) The question of law relates to the
constitutionality, construction, or application of a statute of this State, which has not been,
but should be, settled by this Court in advance of an appeal from a final order; (D) The
interlocutory order has sustained the controverted jurisdiction of the trial court; (E) The
interlocutory order has reversed or set aside a prior decision of the trial court, a jury, or an
administrative agency from which an appeal was taken to the trial court which had decided
a significant issue and a review of the interlocutory order may terminate the litigation,
substantially reduce further litigation, or otherwise serve considerations of justice; (F) The
interlocutory order has vacated or opened a judgment of the trial court; (G) Review of the
interlocutory order may terminate the litigation; or (H) Review of the interlocutory order
may serve considerations of justice. Id. at *1 n.2.
4
  See D.I. 24 (Motion for Stay), ¶¶ 2-3 (“Based on the allegations and representations made
to the United States Department of Justice . . ., Ms. Perryman has been indictment [sic] and
arraigned on March 31, 2023[,] and must defend this action and cannot testify in any other
matters . . . . Ms. Perryman must now focus her attention of dispelling the lies told to the
government for the foreseeable future.”).

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chose to devote extensive time to making representations of fact to the Court during

the September 18, 2023, oral argument in this matter.5 She also chose to email

evidentiary materials to the Court following oral argument.6

       6.     Having carefully considered the Application, I conclude that it is best

understood as a “dilatory tactic, devoid of merit, that already has wasted trial court

resources, would waste appellate resources . . . and would open the door to piecemeal

appeals that would undermine the normal process of litigation.”7 Accordingly, and

for all the foregoing reasons, I DENY the Application.

       IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                               /s/ Nathan A. Cook
                                          Vice Chancellor Nathan A. Cook

5
  Ms. Perryman and her son also recently commenced a separate action in this Court against
the alleged controller of the Plaintiff-entity in this matter. Perryman v. Gupta, C.A. No.
2023-0962-NAC, D.I. 1 (pro se Petition for Advancement and Indemnification).
6
  D.I. 70-71. I note that, although the Application also takes issue at times with my denial
of Ms. Perryman and Mr. Perryman’s motion to dismiss, this does not actually appear to
comprise the Application’s articulation of a substantial issue of material importance. On
the other hand, the Application is hardly a model of clarity. Thus, I note that the
Application asserts that Plaintiff’s amended complaint attaches one or more fraudulent
documents as exhibits. Ms. Perryman made this claim during oral argument too. But that
is a factual dispute not amenable to resolution on a motion to dismiss. Mr. Perryman may
also continue to object to the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him based on arguments
concerning the constitutionality of 10 Del. C. § 3114. If so, the Application, like Mr.
Perryman’s motion to dismiss, ignores the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Hazout
v. Tsang Mun Ting, 134 A.3d 274 (Del. 2016).
7
 Deutsche Bank AG v. Devon Park Bioventures, L.P., 2019 WL 3227633, at *3 (Del. Ch.
July 15, 2019), appeal refused, 214 A.3d 449 (Del. 2019) (TABLE).

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