Court Opinion

ID: 9725309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:40:14.892465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:13.720342
License: Public Domain

Messmore, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion for the following reasons.
The defendant predicates error on the part of the trial court in failing to instruct the jury on his theory of the case, and in failing to submit to the jury as a question of fact whether the alleged defects could be corrected and whether the correction of such defects would result in material injury to or substantial reconstruction of the premises.
The defendant tendered an instruction on his theory *644of the measure of damages he deemed applicable to this case under the evidence adduced.
The following are pertinent, relating to the measure of damages, whether it be a building contract or an agreement to purchase.
The measure of damages proper in a case of this nature is twofold, as pointed out in the case of Jones v. Elliott, 172 Neb. 96, 108 N. W. 2d 742, wherein this court said, quoting from Graham v. Anderson, 121 Neb. 733, 238 N. W. 362: “ ‘There is a generally accepted rule .applicable to building contracts that, where defects in materials, construction or workmanship are remediable without materially injuring or reconstructing any substantial portion of the building, the damage which the owner is entitled to recover is the expense of making the work conform to contractual requirements. See 23 A. L. R. 1436; 65 A. L. R. 1298. This rule has been recognized in Library Board v. Ohlsen, 110 Neb. 146. * * *
“ ‘There is, however, another generally accepted rule to the effect that, where a contractor’s violations of a building contract result in defects which cannot be remedied without reconstruction of, or material injury to, a substantial portion of the building, the measure of the owner’s damages is the difference between its value when constructed and what its value would have been if built according to contract.’ ”
The trial court, contrary to defendant’s requested instruction No. 6, refused to submit to the jury the question of whether or not the defects, if any, could be remedied with or without substantial reconstruction or material injury to the building. This was a question for the jury to determine. If the jury determined as a matter of fact that the defects could be remedied without substantial injury to or material reconstruction of a substantial portion of the building, then' the rule of damages first set forth in Jones v. Elliott, supra, would apply. If, on the other hand, the jury determined as a matter of fact that the defects alleged and proved were of such *645nature that correction of them would result in material injury to or reconstruction of a subsantial portion of the building, then the second rule set forth in Jones v. Elliott, supra, would apply.
It is error for the court to give an instruction which assumes as established a disputed question of fact. It is for the jury alone to pass upon conflicting evidence. Willman v. Sandman, 101 Neb. 92, 162 N. W. 419. See, also, Howe v. Provident Loan & Investment Co., 130 Neb. 469, 265 N. W. 255.
In Springer v. Henthorn, 169 Neb. 578, 100 N. W. 2d 521, this court said: “A jury should be fully and fairly informed as to the various items of damages which it should take into consideration in arriving at its verdict. In this respect it is the duty of the trial court to instruct as to the proper basis upon which damages are to be assessed for each such item.”
The failure of the trial court to permit the jury to make a determination as to which measure of damages should be invoked deprived the defendant of a fair trial and constituted reversible error. I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause for a new trial.
I am authorized to state that Judge Yeager and Judge Brower concur in this dissent.