Court Opinion

ID: 9471923
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:44:21.169042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:38.831128
License: Public Domain

BOYCE F. MARTIN, Jr., Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
While I recognize that this Court’s role in considering a habeas corpus petition to deny a writ of extradition is limited, see Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 99 S.Ct. 530, 58 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978), it is not quite so limited as the majority seems to believe. One of the four factors we are authorized by Doran to consider is “whether the petitioner is a fugitive.” Id. at 289, 99 S.Ct. at 535. In deciding this question of fugitivity, we should consider all relevant information, including, in this case, the plea agreement between Chamberlain and the State of Arizona. Moreover, my own examination of that plea agreement convinces me that Chamberlain is not a fugitive from Arizona and is not, therefore, extradictable.
As the majority points out, under Ohio law, “an individual ‘charged with a crime’ who has not satisfied the judgment against him is a fugitive from justice where he is unable to rebut by proof beyond a reasonable doubt the presumption of fugitivity attached to the governor’s warrant.” However, Chamberlain does not meet this definition of fugitivity because he has satisfied the judgment against him. The plea agreement between Chamberlain and Arizona states: “After sentence is imposed herein [5 years imprisonment] the defendant shall be returned to the Ohio Department of Corrections to serve the entire sentence imposed herein.” Subsequently, Chamberlain served his five-year term in Ohio. Part of that term, the last three years, was served while on parole in accordance with Ohio law. See State ex rel. McKee v. Cooper, 40 Ohio St.2d 65, 73, 320 N.E.2d 286 (1974). Because Chamberlain has successfully completed his five-year term of imprisonment, he is not a fugitive and cannot be extradicted. The fact that Arizona disagrees with the manner in which the sentence was served is immaterial. Whatever right Arizona had to require Chamberlain to serve his sentence in accordance with Arizona sentencing principles was waived when it signed *1078the plea agreement entrusting Chamberlain to the custody of Ohio authorities.
Moreover, even assuming that Chamberlain has not satisfied the judgment against him in Arizona, he has, nevertheless, succeeded in overcoming “the presumption of fugitivity attached to the governor’s warrant.” Because Chamberlain is in Ohio by agreement with Arizona, Arizona cannot claim that he is a fugitive from its borders. At most, Arizona can demand that Ohio continue to keep Chamberlain incarcerated for a full five years as would be required under Arizona law. But it cannot demand that he be returned to Arizona. Plea agreements are contracts that the parties are entitled to have enforced according to their terms. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 498, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision.