Court Opinion

ID: 9769727
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:00:13.074386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:44:48.239512
License: Public Domain

*709ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
RICKHOFF, Justice.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is granted in part. Our opinion and judgment of September 25, 1996 are withdrawn, and this opinion and judgment are substituted. We granted the motion for rehearing in part to modify and clarify our holding regarding Helping Hands’ breach of contract claim and to correct our references to Helping Hands’ second claim as defamation, rather than business disparagement.
United Way of San Antonio and Bexar County, Inc. (“United Way”) appeals following a jury verdict awarding Helping Hands Lifeline Foundation, Inc. (“Helping Hands”) $116,885.00 for breach of a contract. As to Helping Hands’ breach of contract claim, we reverse and render; as to its business disparagement claim, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
Helping Hands became an affiliated United Way agency in May of 1989 and received funding for fiscal year 1990. In the process of applying for affiliation, Helping Hands was required to execute a contract with United Way consisting of two documents: a statement of agreement and a policies and procedures manual. The contract required Helping Hands to deliver effective human services programs to the community, advertise its relationship with United Way and assist United Way in its annual campaign for community funds. In return, United Way was required to allocate to Helping Hands a share of the approximately $25 million in proceeds raised from its annual campaign. The contract was to continue until either United Way terminated funding for good cause or Helping Hands voluntarily discontinued affiliation.
During the initial funding period, United Way expressed concerns about Helping Hands’ provision of services and internal operations and recommended that Helping Hands: (1) expand its governing board in terms of both number of directors and experience; (2) improve its tracking of clients; (3) develop a long range plan for expanding its operations as funding increased; and (4) develop a paid professional staff to work with its existing all-volunteer staff. United Way was concerned that the complete reliance on volunteers for staffing could lead to problems in continuity of services as a result of turnover and that the governing board was not sufficiently independent to provide objective supervision.
Following Helping Hands’ application for funds for fiscal year 1991, United Way once again reiterated its concerns and further advised that Helping Hands needed to: (1) improve its tracking of in-kind donations; (2) clearly define its mission; and (3) focus its energies rather than trying to serve all in need. United Way warned that the failure to develop a plan for the necessary transition from an all-volunteer agency to a professional organization could adversely affect future funding. Helping Hands responded that it intended to convert to a professional organization by paying staff, but that it considered its board and system of tracking donations sufficient for its needs.
In December of 1990, Helping Hands submitted its funding request for fiscal year 1992. United Way agreed to fund Helping Hands but placed it on probation with a warning that a failure to comply with the probationary conditions set forth in the funding notification would result in termination of funding. United Way’s review panel also recommended a meeting to review the progress on the panel’s recommendations and held $3,225.00 of Helping Hands’ funding in escrow pending such review.
Following a November 1991 meeting, United Way advised Helping Hands that its progress was unsatisfactory and the $3,225.00 in escrow would be forfeited pursuant to the contract. United Way also warned that future funding was in jeopardy for Helping Hands’ failure to respond to United Way’s concerns. After a January 14, 1992 meeting, United Way concluded Helping Hands failed to make adequate progress, and on January 21, 1992, United Way’s executive committee voted to defund and disaffiliate Helping Hands retroactive to January 1, 1992. United Way was then holding $11,885.00 in allocated but undistributed funds for fiscal year *7101992. These funds were retained by United Way.
Helping Hands sued United Way and one of its employees, Dick Brown (“Brown”), for breach of the contract and business disparagement based upon alleged statements made by Brown. The jury awarded Helpings Hands $116,885.00 in damages for breach of contract but refused to find in its favor as to the business disparagement claim. The trial court reduced the contractual damage award by $35,000.00 and entered judgment against United Way for $81,885.00.
United Way concedes that there is sufficient evidence of breach; however, United Way contends the damage award was erroneous.
United Way’s first two points of error assert that the trial court erred in rendering judgment that Helping Hands recover $81,-885.00 for damages resulting from United Way’s breach of the contract because: (1) $11,885.00 is the maximum amount recoverable under Texas law; and (2) there was no evidence or, alternatively, insufficient evidence to support any award in excess of $11,885.00. United Way’s third point of error asserts the trial court erred in admitting, over objection, the testimony of Helping Hands’ accountant, David Ludwig (Ludwig), because his testimony was speculative and at variance with his pretrial deposition testimony.
In two cross points, Helping Hands asserts that the trial court erred (1) in reducing the jury award of $116,885.00 by $35,000.00 and entering judgment for $81,885.00 because there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s answer of $116,885.00;2 and (2) in admitting expert testimony on a question of law relating to its business disparagement claim.
Because Helping Hands’ first cross point is interrelated with United Way’s points of error, we will address them jointly.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
In reviewing “no evidence” points, the reviewing court considers only the evidence and inferences that tend to support the finding and disregards all evidence and inferences to the contrary. If there is any evidence of probative force to support the finding, the point must be overruled and the finding upheld. Weirich v. Weirich, 833 S.W.2d 942, 945 (Tex.1992); Alm v. Aluminum Co. of America, 717 S.W.2d 588, 593 (Tex.1986).
In reviewing a “matter of law” challenge, the reviewing court employs a two-prong test. The court will first examine the record for evidence that supports the finding, while ignoring all evidence to the contrary. If there is no evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court will then examine the entire record to determine if the contrary proposition is established as a matter of law. If the contrary proposition is established conclusively by the evidence, the point of error will be sustained. Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex.1989).
In reviewing an insufficient evidence challenge, the reviewing court must first consider, weigh, and examine all of the evidence that supports and that is contrary to the jury finding. The reviewing court may set aside the verdict only if the evidence standing alone is so weak as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.1986) (per curiam).
Admitting and excluding evidence are matters within the discretion of the trial court. To obtain a reversal of a judgment based on the erroneous admission of evidence, an appellant must show that, in light of the entire record, the trial court’s ruling was in error and that the error was calculated to cause and probably did cause rendition of an improper judgment. Gee v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 765 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Tex.1989); McCraw v. Maris, 828 S.W.2d 756, 757 (Tex. 1992).
*711CONTRACTUAL DAMAGE AWARD
United Way argues that if it had not terminated the contract, Helping Hands would have received, at most, the $11,885.00 in funds that had been allocated to it for fiscal year 1992 but remained undisbursed at the time of the defunding. Moreover, United Way insists that Helping Hands could not show that it would have received funding beyond fiscal year 1992 because funding allocation occurred on an annual basis and nothing indicated that Helping Hands would be entitled to automatically receive funding each year.
Under the terms of the contract between United Way and Helping Hands, United Way agreed to provide financial support as determined by United Way through an annual allocations process. Although affiliated agencies generally were required to reapply each year for continued funding, an agency desiring allocation of funding for a period greater than one year could apply for multi-year funding provided it met additional requirements. Helping Hands never applied for multi-year funding. Furthermore, Helping Hands admitted that the United Way funding had to be renewed each year, that funding was entirely within United Way’s discretion, and that there were no guarantees it would receive funding each year. Therefore, the burden was on Helping Hands to establish that it would receive funding beyond fiscal year 1992 to support the jury finding for that period. The only evidence offered by Helping Hands to meet this burden was the testimony of Ludwig, its accountant.
Prior to Ludwig testifying, United Way’s attorney voir dired him regarding the bases for his opinions. Ludwig admitted giving deposition testimony on damages and lost future funding based upon possibility rather than upon reasonable probability. Ludwig admitted his testimony would now be based upon reasonable probability and further admitted that he had not supplemented his prior opinion. The trial court refused to exclude his testimony in the face of objections.
Ludwig was permitted to give his opinion on damages which he candidly admitted was based on pure speculation that Helping Hands would have received funding for the next 10 to 20 years. Ludwig further testified that he had no firsthand knowledge of any public funding lost by Helping Hands as a result of the defunding. His conclusion that such a loss would occur was solely based upon his belief that the general public would have heard bad things about Helping Hands following defunding and would be inclined not to donate. Ludwig admitted that he could not say with any degree of certainty that any lost funding was permanent.
Moreover, his calculations of lost funding were based upon the historical receipt of $35,000.00 for each previous year from United Way and an approximate loss of general public funds or donations in the amount of $14,000.00 for each year for a total loss of $49,000.00 annually. Therefore, Ludwig’s loss of funding calculations were based upon the simple fact that funding was not received for a period of three years, that is, from date of defunding up to the date of trial, and from the fact that it had received that amount in previous years. Ludwig admitted that the only funding that he could identify with any degree of certainty as lost due to defunding by United Way was the remainder of the 1992 fiscal year allocation in the amount of $11,885.00.
In order to recover lost fundings [an expectation], we have reviewed eases involving proof of lost profits by for-profit entities. In that context, a party must produce sufficient evidence to enable the fact finder to determine the net amount of the loss with reasonable certainty. See Southwestern Bell Media, Inc. v. Lyles, 825 S.W.2d 488, 496 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied)(lost profits). The evidence relative to the funds [expectation] must not be uncertain or speculative, Southwest Battery Corp. v. Owen, 131 Tex. 423, 426, 115 S.W.2d 1097, 1098 (1938)(lost profits); however, it is not necessary that the lost funds be subject to exact calculation. White v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 651 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Tex.1983).
Opinion testimony that is based on speculation or conjecture lacks probative value. Naegeli Transp. v. Gulf Electroquip, *712Inc., 853 S.W.2d 737, 741 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied); Ochs v. Martinez, 789 S.W.2d 949, 958 (Tex.App.— San Antonio 1990, writ denied); UMC, Inc. v. Coonrod Elec. Co., 667 S.W.2d 549, 559 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Golleher v. Herrera, 651 S.W.2d 329, 334 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1983, no writ); Flores v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 365 S.W.2d 379, 382-83 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Therefore, nonproba-tive testimony constitutes “no evidence.” See Schaefer v. Texas Emp. Ins. Ass’n, 612 S.W.2d 199, 204-05 (Tex.1980).
Just as the “mere hope for success of an untried enterprise” will not support recovery of lost profits, Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Teletron Energy Management, Inc., 877 S.W.2d 276, 280 (Tex.1994), the mere hope for funding renewable at the discretion of another party will not support recovery of any future funds the other party could withhold at its discretion. Helping Hands’ expectations of renewal of funding in light of United Way’s prior warnings were at best hopeful; “in reality, they were little more than wishful.” Id.
We agree that the only part of the jury’s findings on damages with support in the record is that part regarding the balance of $11,885.00, representing the remaining allocation for fiscal year 1992. Because $11,-885.00 is the maximum amount of damages recoverable as a matter of law in light of the discretion given United Way under the terms of the funding agreement, we sustain United Way’s first point of error and overrule Helping Hands’ cross point number one. We do not address United Way’s second point of error because it does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the $11,-885.00 damage award, and, therefore, is not necessary to the rendition of the judgment in this case.3 We also do not address United Way’s third point of error alleging error on the part of the trial court in failing to strike Ludwig’s testimony because even if its admission was erroneous, we have found the testimony complained of to be non-probative; .therefore, its admission would be harmless and not constitute error requiring reversal.4
OPINION TESTIMONY REGARDING DISPARAGING STATEMENT
Helping Hands’ cross point number two alleges trial court error in permitting a law professor to testify on whether certain language was disparaging because this question is exclusively one for the trial court and not a proper subject for expert testimony.
Prior to United Way calling Barbara Al-dave, Dean of St. Mary’s University School of Law, as its expert witness, counsel for Helping Hands asked to approach the bench outside the presence of the jury and objected to the Dean’s testimony. The trial court allowed the Dean to testify but only as a fact witness.
After giving the jury a brief background of her educational achievements, Aldave was permitted to explain, over Helping Hands’ objection, that in the previous twenty-nine years of her legal career, she had kept abreast of libel law in the course of her teaching, had been retained as expert witness in cases involving libel and slander, and was then a defendant in a libel action. Thereupon followed a discussion about the witness’ fee arrangement. An objection was lodged to this area of examination, and the trial court sustained the objection.
*713Aldave then acknowledged that she reviewed the fact sheet United Way prepared prior to defunding, and she expressed her opinion that the language of the fact sheet was not defamatory because “corporations are not potential subjects of defamation.” Helping Hands objected that Aldave was testifying regarding a matter of law. The trial court stated that the questioning could proceed on fact questions. Helping Hands requested an instruction that the jury disregard the witness’ response to the legal question. The trial court stated that it would give the jurors the legal instructions necessary when it came to the charge and told counsel for United Way to proceed.
Counsel for United Way then asked the following:
Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether or not the statements she attributes to Mr. Brown as a quote in the last paragraph on page one of that document [Defendant’s Exhibit 2j are defamatory?
A. My opinion is that they are not defamatory.
Q. And, again, Dean, I would ask you why you are of that opinion?
A. I think that any reasonable person would construe this simply to mean that putting people on the payroll would not change the basic character of the foundation, would not transform the foundation into a professional corporation.
Under Texas law, a witness may not give legal conclusions or interpret the law to the jury. Puente v. A.S.I. Signs, 821 S.W.2d 400, 402 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied). Under the common law, no witness was permitted to render opinions on mixed questions of law and fact. See Frederick C. Moss, Beyond the Fringe: Apocryphal Rules of Evidence in Texas, 43 Baylor L.Rev. 701, 751 (1991). The Texas Supreme Court has relaxed that rule to permit expert witnesses to testify regarding such mixed questions when a proper predicate is laid. See Louder v. De Leon, 754 S.W.2d 148, 149 (Tex.1988); Birchfield v. Texarkana Memorial Hospital, 747 S.W.2d 361, 365 (Tex.1987). Lay or fact witnesses, however, are still subject to the general rule that a witness’ testimony must be limited to facts of which the witness has personal knowledge, and a witness must not give a personal opinion or legal conclusion unless he is an expert witness. See Regal Petroleum Corp. v. McClung, 608 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Tex. Civ.App. — Dallas 1980, no writ); Williams v. Hemphill County, 254 S.W.2d 839, 842 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1952, no writ); see generally Linda L. Addison, Texas Civil Evidence 7:34 (Rutter Group, Ltd.1995); cf. Lum v. State, 903 S.W.2d 365, 369-70 (Tex. App. — Texarkana 1995, pet. ref'd) (noting rule applicable in criminal case citing 2 Steven Goode, Olin G. Wellborn III & M. Michael Sharlot, Guide to the Texas Rules of Evidence: Civil and CRIMINAL Sec. 701.2 at 10 (Tex. Practice 1993)).
The trial court in the instant case ruled that Dean Aldave would be permitted to testify as a fact witness. As a fact witness, Dean Aldave is not allowed to give an opinion or testify regarding a legal conclusion. Therefore, Dean Aldave’s testimony was impermissible.
Nevertheless, in order to preserve the right to complain on appeal about the admission of testimony, Helping Hands was required to specifically object at the time the testimony was offered, with such clarity that the trial court might understand the precise nature of the objection. See Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Brown, 862 S.W.2d 636, 638 (Tex.App. — Tyler 1993, writ denied). The crux of Helping Hands’ argument before the trial court and the argument made in its cross point is that the Dean was providing expert testimony on a question of law. This objection and argument was sufficient to preserve Helping Hands’ complaint that Aldave’s testimony was a legal conclusion. Her legal opinions and conclusions were not permissible, and her testimony, taken as a whole, was tantamount to a legal conclusion.
In light of Dean Aldave’s credentials and the weight likely given her testimony by the jury, we conclude that the admission of her testimony was calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment. See Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(1); Gee, 765 S.W.2d at 396. Cross point number two is sustained.
*714CONCLUSION
With respect to Helping Hands’ disparagement claim, we have held the admission of Dean Aldave’s testimony constituted reversible error. The judgment of the trial court as to the disparagement claim is reversed, and the disparagement cause is remanded for new trial. With respect to the breach of contract claim, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and render a judgment in favor of Helping Hands in the amount of $11,885.00.

. The trial court ordered the remittitur without conditioning it on a new trial. Nevertheless, the standard of review remains the same. We conduct a factual sufficiency review and examine all of the evidence to determine if there is sufficient evidence to support the damage award. Horton v. Robinson, 776 S.W.2d 260, 268 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1989, no writ).

.Although we do not address this point of error, we believe some clarification is required based on our prior opinion in light of the arguments raised in United Way’s Motion for Rehearing. In its second point of error, United Way sought to attack the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the damage award. In its brief, however, United Way conceded there was some evidence to support the damage award by acknowledging that the record supported a damage award of $11,885.00. Therefore, United Way’s legal sufficiency challenge to the damage award would fail by its own concession. The proper standard of reviewing this point of error may have been confused by the manner in which United Way couched its point of error in terms of a no evidence review of the damages awarded in excess of $11,885.00.

. See Collins v. Collins, 904 S.W.2d 792 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1995), writ denied, 923 S.W.2d 569 (1996); Farm Serv., Inc. v. Gonzales, 756 S.W.2d 747, 750 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied).