Court Opinion

ID: 9785823
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 22:34:28.602835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:07.519250
License: Public Domain

HILL, Justice.
[T1] Appellant, Bonnie A. MeCann (MeCann), seeks review of the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee, City of Cody. McCann was injured in an automobile accident which she claimed was caused by the negligence of the City of Cody and its contractor, Harris Trucking and Construction Company (Harris). The district court granted summary judgment in Cody's favor because MeCann's complaint did not allege that she had complied with the constitutional and statutory requirements of maintaining such an action against a governmental entity, as required by our ruling in Beaulieu v. Florquist, 2004 WY 31, ¶¶ 10-15, 86 P.3d 863, 866-69 (Wyo.2004) (Beaulieu II ). We affirm the district court's summary judgment order.
ISSUES
[¶2] McCann raises these issues:
A. Did the district court err in finding that the administrative prerequisites for the filing of a claim under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, W.S. § 1-839-101 et seq. could be distinguished from the constitutional and statutory prerequisites.
B. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment for a failure to satisfy the pleading mandates of Beaulieu v. Florquist, 2004 WY 31, 86 P.3d 863 (Wyo.2004) (Beaulieu II) where all of the constitutional and statutory requirements for the filing of a claim under the Governmental Claims Act were met by [MeCann] and the compliance paragraph of the Complaint referred to these requirements as administrative prerequisites rather than constitutional and statutory prerequisites, when the requirements are the same.
*1079Cody rephrases the issues into this statement:
The district court properly found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because [MeCann's] complaint failed to allege that she complied with the Wyoming Constitution and Wyoming Governmental Claims Act when she filed her claim against the City of Cody.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
[¶3] McCann filed a complaint against Cody on April 6, 2007. In that complaint, McCann alleged that on December 15, 2005, a waterline was broken in the course of a construction project being done at the behest of Cody. That work was being done by Harris Trucking. Water from the broken waterline backed up onto the roadway and instantly froze. No signage or other warning devices were in place when McCann happened onto the scene in her automobile. The icy conditions caused her car to flip over. McCann suffered significant personal injuries and her car was damaged. MeCann further contended that her damages were caused, at least in part, by negligent acts committed by Cody. In her complaint, McCann asserted that:
[The administrative prerequisites for the filing of this claim have been met inasmuch as [McCann's] Verified Notice of Claim was served upon the City of Cody, Wyoming at the office of its business manager on December 26, 2006 to which there has been no response.
McCann filed an amended complaint adding Harris as a defendant, and that complaint contained a provision identical to that quoted above. The claim McCann filed with the City of Cody on December 7, 2006 included a "Verification Affidavit" which attested to the truthfulness of her claim "under penalty of perjury." On December 7, 2006, an identical claim was filed with the State of Wyoming, containing the same affidavit.
DISCUSSION
[¶4] In Bequliey II we held: -
Many cases have come before this court involving the statutory and constitutional requirements for making a claim against a governmental entity. In resolving the issues raised in those cases, we have created a rule whereby, in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court, the complaint must allege the filing of a claim with the governmental entity and it must allege the date of that filing. Amrein v. Wyoming Livestock Bd., 851 P.2d 769, 771 (Wyo.1993); Awe v. University of Wyoming, 534 P.2d 97, 102 (Wyo.1975), overruled on other grounds by Dye by Dye v. Fremont County School Dist. No. 24, 820 P.2d 982, 986 (Wyo.1991).
Many of our prior cases have dealt with the necessity of alleging such filing and the date of filing under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113 (LexisNexis 20083), or similar statute, as a condition precedent to suit.... However, as early as Utah Const. Co. v. State Highway Commission, 45 Wyo. 403, 19 P.2d 951, 953 (1933), we held that statutes granting the right to sue the state must be construed in consonance with the constitution, and that plaintiffs cannot comply with the constitution by reducing a claim to judgment and then filing that judgment as a claim against the state. The gist of that dual holding is that a claim filed with the governmental entity must meet the constitutional, as well as the statutory, requirements. In Beaulieu I, 2001 WY 33, ¶ 13, 20 P.3d at 526, we reiterated that precept: "It never has been questioned that a claim against the State must comply with the requirements of Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7." A logical inference from that statement is that, just as in the case of a plaintiff's failure to allege his claim's compliance with statutory requirements, failure to allege his claim's compliance with constitutional requirements results in a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, our precedent on this issue is not consistent. Even in Beaulieu I, 2001 WY 33, ¶ 14, 20 P.3d at 527, where we recognized that governmental claims must meet constitutional requirements, we also noted that this court "has ruled that the execution requirements of art. 16, § 7 can be waived by failing to assert the issue in the trial court. ..." That suggests that the *1080constitutional requirements are not jurisdictional, because the question of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time and is not waived even if not raised below. Boyd, 909 P.2d at 325 (quoting United Mine Workers of America Local 1972 v. Decker Coal Co., 774 P.2d 1274, 1283-84 (Wyo.1989); Nicholaus v. Nicholaus, 756 P.2d 1338, 1342 (Wyo.1988); Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Wyo v. Bell, 662 P.2d 410 at 415 (Wyo.1983). We have, in fact, previously stated that the constitutional signature and certification requirements, unlike the statutory filing requirements, are not jurisdictional:
The State ... contends that an omission of the correct certification results in a failure of subject matter jurisdiction, and the issue can be raised at any time in the proceeding. We do not agree with this contention. The failure to verify or certify as the constitution now reads is nothing more than a defect or an irregularity that is not jurisdictional.
Martines v. City of Cheyenne, 791 P.2d 949, 958 (Wyo.1990).
We now believe that Martines was wrongly decided and that it must be overruled. The above-quoted statement from Martinez was supported by a citation to In re Bear River Irr. Dist., 51 Wyo. 343, 65 P.2d 686 (1937). Bear River Irr. Dist., however, did not involve the filing of a governmental claim nor did it involve the signature and certification requirement of Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7. Rather, Bear River Irr. Dist. concerned a petition for the organization of an irrigation district, and a provision in the statutory Code of Civil Procedure that required pleadings to be verified. Bear River Irr. Dist.'s holding that the failure to meet that statutory verification requirement was "but a defect or irregularity" that was not jurisdictional simply should not be equated with the failure to comply with a constitutional signature and certification requirement for the presentation of a claim against a governmental entity. In re Bear River Irrigation Dist., 65 P.2d at 687. Over a hundred years ago, we recognized the special significance of the signature and certification requirements when governmental claims are involved:
[Lt is plain that the purpose of requiring a full itemized statement was to hedge a county board about with such restrictions in the allowance of bills that the individual citizens and taxpayers might have the means of knowing the cause and validity of county expenditures, and that the requirement for verification has for its object a showing of good faith and honesty in the presentation of the bill, and some evidence of the truth, justness, and correctness of the claim. As was said in a recent case, the provisions are "designed to protect the board from im-portunities to pass upon claims before they are presented in such a way as to be considered intelligently, to enable it to easily eliminate improper charges from claims, and to enable taxpayers to detect abuses in the allowance of claims."
Houtz v. Board of Com'rs of Uinta County, 11 Wyo. 152, 70 P. 840, 842 (1902) (quoting Northern Trust Co. v. Snyder, 113 Wis. 516, 89 N.W. 460 (1902)).
The rule that the timely filing of a proper claim with the governmental entity is a condition precedent to suit is a judicially created rule. Awe, 534 P.2d at 102. Heretofore, we have limited the application of that rule, when determining the presence or absence of subject matter jurisdiction, to the statutory requirements; that is, we have required only that the complaint allege the filing of the claim and the date of such filing. We now hold, however, that the complaint must also allege compliance with the signature and certification requirements of the state constitution. No proper claim has been filed if it does not meet those constitutional requirements, so the district court does mot obtain subject matter jurisdiction until those constitutional requirements are met That, in effect, was the essence of the holding in Bequlieu I.
It is important to distinguish between the constitutional signature and certification requirements and the judicially created condition precedent requirement. *1081While we recognized as long ago as Utah Const. Co. that governmental claims must meet the constitutional requirements, we have not heretofore required that complaints allege such compliance. It is our intention clearly to do so now. Inasmuch as the courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over a governmental claim that has not met the constitutional requirements, it shall henceforth be incumbent upon the plaintiff in such a case to allege in his or her complaint not only compliance with statutory filing requirements, but compliance with constitutional signature and certification requirements. This rule shall apply to all complaints filed after the date of publication of this opinion. [(Emphasis added.]
Beaulieu II, ¶¶ 10-15, 86 P.3d at 866-869. Beaulieu II was published on March 25, 2004.
[¶5] Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7 provides:
No money shall be paid out of the state treasury exeept upon appropriation by law and on warrant drawn by the proper officer, and no bills, claims, accounts or demands against the state, or any county or political subdivision, shall be audited, allowed or paid until a full itemized statement in writing, certified to under penalty of perjury, shall be filed with the officer or officers whose duty it may be to audit the same.
[¶6] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-89-118 (Lexis-Nexis 2009) provides:
(a) No action shall be brought under this act against a governmental entity unless the claim upon which the action is based is presented to the entity as an itemized statement in writing within two (2) years of the date of the alleged act, error or omission, except that a cause of action may be instituted not more than two (2) years after discovery of the alleged act, error or omission, if the claimant can establish that the alleged act, error or omission was:
(i) Not reasonably discoverable within a two (2) year period; or
(ii) The claimant failed to discover the alleged act, error or omission within the two (2) year period despite the exercise of due diligence.
(b) The claim shall state:
(i) The time, place and cireumstances of the alleged loss or injury including the name of the public employee involved, if known;
(ii) The name, address and residence of the claimant and his representative or attorney, if any; and
() The amount of compensation or other relief demanded.
(c) All claims against the state shall be presented to the general services division of the department of administration and information. Claims against any other governmental entity shall be filed at the business office of that entity. In the case of claims against local governments the claim submitted need not be acted upon by the entity prior to suit.
[¶7] Our decision in Beaulieu II is dis-positive here. We have repeatedly upheld the stringency of that rule over the intervening years. Gose v. City of Douglas, 2008 WY 126, ¶¶ 14-18, 193 P.3d 1159, 1163-64 (Wyo.2008); Coffinberry v. Board of County Commissioners, 2008 WY 110, ¶ 4, 192 P.3d 978, 980 (Wyo.2008) (failure to comply with statutory requirements; no mention of constitutional requirements); Cantrell v. Sweetwater County School Dist. No. 2, 2006 WY 57, ¶ 7, 133 P.3d 983, 985-86 (Wyo.2006); Hochalter v. City of Gillette, 2005 WY 125, ¶¶ 10-21, 120 P.3d 674, 677-80 (Wyo.2005); Lavatai v. State, 2005 WY 133, ¶¶ 1-13, 121 P.3d 121, 121-25 (Wyo.2005) (see especially ¶¶ 8-13 discussing "substantial compliance"); Wilson v. Town of Alpine, 2005 WY 57, ¶¶ 5-7, 111 P.3d 290, 291-92 (Wyo.2005), Jauregui v. Memorial Hospital of Sweetwater County, 2005 WY 59, ¶¶ 6-7, 111 P.3d 914, 916 (Wyo.2005); Wooster v. Carbon County School Dist. No. 1, 2005 WY 47, ¶¶ 6-22, 109 P.3d 893, 895-900 (Wyo.2005); Laughter v. Board of County Commissioners, 2005 WY 54, ¶¶ 14-16, 110 P.3d 875, 880-81 (Wyo.2005); Bell v. Schell, 2004 WY 153, 101 P.3d 465 (Wyo.2004).
*1082CONCLUSION
[T8] In the instant case, McCann did not include in her complaint an averment that she had complied with the requirements we set in the above cited cases. This was true both with respect to the statutory requirement and the constitutional requirement. For these reasons the district court did not acquire subject matter jurisdiction of the complaint and we, likewise, have no jurisdiction here.
HILL, J., delivers the opinion of the Court; BURKE, J., files a dissenting opinion, with whom KITE, J., joins.