Court Opinion

ID: 9776641
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:41:25.52061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:41.131827
License: Public Domain

REID, Chief Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur with the conclusion reached by the majority that the record supports the conviction of premeditated first degree murder.
I join Justice Daughtrey’s dissent that the failure of the trial court to charge mitigating circumstance (j)(8) requires a re-sentencing hearing. T.C.A. § 39-2-203(j)(8) (1982) provides:
The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication which was insufficient to establish a *89defense to the crime but which substantially affected his judgment.
A clinical psychologist, who had examined the defendant and studied his records from earlier mental examinations, diagnosed the defendant as suffering from borderline personality disorder, a condition characterized by impulsive and unpredictable behavior, emotional withdrawal, marked shifts in behavior and attitude, intense anger, suicidal gestures, and the inability to maintain any kind of enduring relationship with others. After having been abandoned as a small child, the defendant was placed with various foster families, until, at the age of 13, he was placed in an institution for children with behavioral problems, where he remained for four years. The records of that institution describe the defendant as suffering “burned child syndrome,” a condition characterized by feelings of fear and internal anger generated by parental abandonment. Later, while hospitalized in the psychiatric unit of a Texas hospital, the defendant was diagnosed as having “factitious disorder,” a condition where the sufferer seeks to play the role of patient because of the absence of any emotional connections with others. While incarcerated awaiting trial, he was sent to the Lakeshore Mental Health Center in Knoxville because of suicidal behavior. This evidence was proof that the defendant suffered a mental disease.
However, the majority opinion approves the trial court’s refusal to charge mitigating circumstance (j)(8) because there was no proof that, as a result of the mental disease, the defendant could not conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Of course, proof that the killing was the result of a mental disease would be proof of insanity and the defendant would be entitled to a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.
Insanity is a defense to prosecution if, at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, the person lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of the person’s conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of law.
T.C.A. § 39-ll-501(a) (1991); Graham v. State, 547 S.W.2d 531, 543 (Tenn.1977).
In all criminal cases in which the trial judge charges the jury on the law relating to the defense of insanity, the judge shall also charge the jury that if it should find the defendant to be not guilty by reason of insanity that it shall so state in its verdict.
T.C.A. § 40-18-117 (1990). By requiring proof that the defendant could not conform his conduct to the requirements of law, supra at 13-14, the majority seems to eliminate any mental condition less severe than insanity as a mitigating circumstance.
I would remand for re-sentencing, because the failure to charge mitigating circumstance (j)(8) was reversible error.