Court Opinion

ID: 9638667
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:49:52.720837+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:08.505822
License: Public Domain

DAVID B. GAULTNEY, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
In issue two, appellee argues the Local Government Code gives him permission to sue the City on a contract through the “sue and be sued” language applicable to general law municipalities. See generally Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 51.013,51.033 (Vernon 1999). In 1970, the Supreme Court held “sue and be sued” language in a 1925 statute creating a navigation district waived the District’s immunity from suit. See Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Brownsville Navigation Dist., 453 S.W.2d 812, 813-14 (Tex.1970). The statute provided that “[a]ll navigation districts established under this Act may, by and through the navigation and canal commissioners, sue and be sued in all courts of this State in the name of such navigation district. ...”8 The Supreme Court found the statute was “quite plain and gives general consent for District to be sued in the courts of Texas in the same manner as other defendants.” Missouri Pacific, 453 S.W.2d at 813.
The Supreme Court has continued to reference the operation of “sue and be sued” language as waiving sovereign immunity. See generally Texas A & M Univ.-Kingsville v. Lawson, 87 S.W.3d 518, 520-21 n. 21 (Tex.2002); see also Travis Co. v. Pelzel & Assocs., Inc., 77 S.W.3d 246, 249-50 (Tex.2002) (“sue and be sued” language in earlier statute “arguably show[ed] intent to waive sovereign immunity -”) (citing Missouri Pacific with the parenthetical explanation that Missouri Pacific held a “statute containing ‘sue and be sued’ language provided consent to suit.”); Federal Sign v. Texas Southern Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401, 408 (Tex. 1997) (citing Missouri Pacific as an example of the Court’s recognition of consent to suit in a statute providing the navigation district could “sue and be sued”). Although not citing Missouri Pacific, and not finding waiver in the statute at issue, the Court in Wichita Falls State Hospital stated, “[W]e have little difficulty recognizing the Legislature’s intent to waive immunity from suit when a statute provides that a state entity may be sued or that ‘sovereign immunity to suit is waived.’ ” Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 696-97 (Tex.2003).
The Supreme Court’s holding in Missouri Pacific remains controlling authority. We must apply the holding to the specific statute at issue. As I read the “sue and be sued” language in the applicable provisions of the Local Government Code, a general law municipality is subject to suit on a contract. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 51.013, 51.033 (Vernon 1999). In section 51.014, the Local Government Code grants the City the authority to contract, and I view any waiver of immunity to suit intended by the “sue and be sued” language as related to the City’s ability to enter into enforceable contracts. See Tex. *815Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 51.014 (Vernon 1999).
Of course, Missouri Pacific did not expressly limit itself to contract claims. Nor does the Local Government Code’s “sue and be sued” provision distinguish between a suit grounded in contract and one grounded in tort or statute. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 51.013, 51.033 (Vernon 1999). Because the statute does not make that distinction, following Missouri Pacific arguably would lead to a waiver of immunity to suit here on the tort claim and the Whistleblower claim, as well as the contract claim. But a municipality’s immunity on tort claims relating to governmental functions has existed alongside the statutory “sue and be sued” language.9 In 1987, the Legislature added section 101.0215 to the Tort Claims Act, defined many functions of a municipality as governmental, and waived the municipality’s immunity from suit and liability to the limited extent allowed under the Act.10 See Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 101.021(Vernon 1997), § 101.0215 (Vernon Supp.2004); see also Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. 101.025(a) (Vernon 1997) (“Sovereign immunity to suit is waived and abolished to the extent of liability created by this chapter.”). Therefore, when a party sues a municipality for tort claims involving governmental functions, a court does not have jurisdiction unless those claims fit within the terms of the Tort Claims Act.
Just as we must follow the Supreme Court precedent of Missouri Pacific, we are not at liberty to ignore the Tort Claims Act. The Tort Claims Act’s limited waiver of immunity to suit must be harmonized with the “sue and be sued” waiver in the Local Government Code and the holding in Missouri Pacific. The statutes may be harmonized by restricting the “sue and be sued” waiver to claims based on contracts. In this case, the Tort Claims Act governs the extent of the waiver of immunity to suit in Stockman’s tort claim, and the Whistleblower Act governs waiver of immunity to suit in his Whistleblower claim.
Missouri Pacific must be narrowly read in this manner if the Local Government Code provision is to be consistent with the Tort Claims Act. Although arising out of a wrongful death claim, Missouri Pacific involved the railroad’s indemnity claim against the governmental entity. Missouri Pacific, 453 S.W.2d at 812-13. The basis of the indemnity claim was a written agreement. Id. Reading Missouri Pacific narrowly, the District’s authority to enter into that written agreement carried with it the possibility of being sued for a violation of the agreement.
The waiver of immunity to suit intended by the “sue and be sued” language appears to be coextensive with the power given to the City to enter into an enforceable contract. I would hold the “sue and be sued” provision in the Local Government Code waives immunity from suit only on the contract claim.11 I therefore respectfully *816dissent from the majority’s resolution of issue two, but I concur on issues one and three.

. See Act effective Feb. 19, 1925, 39th Leg., R.S., ch. 5, § 46, 1925 Tex. Gen. Laws 7, 21 (current version at Tex. Water Code Ann. § 62.078 (Vernon 2004)).

. See City of Galveston v. Posnainsky, 62 Tex. 118, 125 (1884); see also Act approved Jan. 27, 1858, 7th Leg., R.S., ch. 61, § 9, 1858 Tex. Gen. Laws 69, 70, reprinted in 4 H.P.N. Gammel, The Laws of Texas, 1822-1897, at 941, 942 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898).

. See Act of June 3, 1987, 70th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 2, § 3.02, sec. 101.0215, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 37, 47-48 (amended 1997, 1999, 2001) (current version at Tex Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 101.0215 (Vernon Supp.2004)).

.Two law review articles read the "sue and be sued” provisions as referring to an entity’s legal capacity to sue and be sued — as giving a particular entity a legal existence in the courts. See George C. Kraehe, "There's Something About Cities: Understanding Proprietary Functions of Texas Municipalities and Governmental Immunity." 32 Tex Tech. L.Rev. 1, 35-36 (2000); A. Craig Carter, "Is Sue and Be Sued Language a Clear and Unam*816biguous Waiver of Immunity?” 35 St. Mary’s L.J. 275, 289-300 (2004).