Court Opinion

ID: 9570678
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:25:10.681608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:13:37.211284
License: Public Domain

*593PAUL H. ANDERSON, Justice
(dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice Gilbert and write separately to amplify my concern that the result of the majority opinion will be that property owners subject to eminent domain proceedings will be denied just compensation for the taking of their property. I have stated in a dissent to an opinion of this court that
The state’s ability to compel owners to relinquish property to the state for public purposes is a powerful intrusion upon the right to the quiet and peaceful ownership of property. * * * Both the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution expressly limit the state’s exercise of the eminent domain power by requiring the payment of just compensation. See U.S. Const, amend. V; Minn. Const, art. I, § 13. These constitutional safeguards are rooted in the idea that no single individual should be forced to bear the entire burden for the good of all.
To insure that owners subject to the eminent domain power are made whole when their property is taken, legal safeguards have been established to ascertain the proper measure of damages.
County of Anoka v. Blaine Bldg. Corp., 566 N.W.2d 331, 337 (Minn.1997) (Anderson, Paul H., J., dissenting).
Among the legal safeguards established to ensure that property owners are properly compensated is the requirement that when owners lose title and possession to property under eminent domain proceedings, they are entitled to money damages, plus interest on those damages. Ford Motor Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 143 Minn. 392, 395, 173 N.W. 713, 715 (1919). Here, the city took possession of respondent’s property under a quick-take procedure, but rather than pay damages to respondent at the time of taking, the city deposited the funds with the court. The city had the right to deposit the funds with the court and, once deposited with the court, the funds cannot be withdrawn without the permission of the court. Minn.Stat. § 117.042 (2000). There are numerous good policy reasons that underlie this deposit procedure, most of which are in place to protect the interests of the city as con-demnor.
Without a doubt, the statutory scheme subject to our analysis lacks the clarity necessary for a simple answer. Nevertheless, the majority fails to appreciate the overall scheme that the legislature has instituted to protect a condemnee’s constitutional right to just compensation while at the same time permitting a condemnor title and possession to the property subject to condemnation. The quick-take statutory scheme recognizes that for a multitude of reasons, a condemnor may need to acquire title and possession to the subject property before just compensation can be determined and before a final determination of the rights of all parties who may claim an interest in the property. However, to satisfy the constitutional just compensation requirements, a quick-take condemnor must pay the property owner directly or deposit in court an amount equal to the condemnor’s approved appraisal of value for the property at the time title and possession of the property is taken. Id.
The requirement that the condemnor make payment to the property owner under the quick-take procedure has the potential of exposing the condemnor to the risk of excessive payment. For example, if payment is made directly to the putative property owner, there is a possibility that other interests in the property, such as those of a mortgagee or a lien holder, will remain unpaid. If such an interest is not paid, the condemnor could lack clear title *594to the property and might be forced to pay additional funds in order to get clear title. To protect the condemnor from such a contingency, the legislature established the option of depositing the funds with the court. Once the funds have been deposited with the court, the funds can be distributed only under a court order. Payment under the supervision of the court helps to assure the condemnor that all valid interests in the property are compensated.
The legislature also understood that when funds are deposited with the court, there is the potential that no interest will be earned on the funds deposited by the condemnor pending resolution of title and other matters. Accordingly, the legislature established a procedure to protect the condemnor from the- possibility that the deposited funds would earn no interest. It required that the court deposit the funds in an interest-bearing account. Minn.Stat. § 117.042(b) (2000). Thus, the condemnor is assured that pending resolution of matters surrounding the quick take, funds deposited with the court, but subject to court order for distribution, will earn interest. This protection is important to the con-demnor because the just compensation that ultimately must be paid to the property owner includes interest.
The majority erroneously concludes that the interest rate on the funds deposited with the court is the benchmark for just compensation to be paid to the property owner. The majority takes a statutory provision that is in place to provide protection for the condemnor and uses it to establish the just compensation interest rate for the condemnee. I do not believe that this is what the legislature intended. As Justice Gilbert correctly points out in his dissent, the legislature has made specific reference to Minn.Stat. § 549.09 (2000) — the judgment rate of interest — as the benchmark for just compensation for the condemnee.
The majority attempts to use MinmStat. § 117.155 (2000) to support its position, but its rationale is undermined by its own recognition that this statute applies only to those situations when a property owner refuses to accept payment after the award is available or upon completion of condemnation proceedings. I submit that there is a very logical purpose for Minn.Stat. § 117.155 — to encourage acceptance of payment once available and to cause a recalcitrant condemnee to withdraw the funds. The situation contemplated by Minn.Stat. § 117.155 is very different from what we have before us today. Here, the funds deposited with the court were deposited to provide court-supervised protection for the interests of the condemnor. While either the condemnor or the condemnee can petition the court for release of the funds, the funds can be released only under the direction of the court. I fail to understand the majority’s position that even though the funds cannot be released without court order, they are available to the property owner in the same sense contemplated under Minn.Stat. § 117.155.
The majority cites to three cases, Ford; Warren v. First Division St. Paul and Pac. R.R. Co., 21 Minn. 424 (1875); and Fine v. City of Minneapolis, 391 N.W.2d 853 (Minn.1986), in support of its position. Ford and Warren are distinguishable because they operate under a statutory scheme different from the quick-take procedure and they deal with situations where funds clearly were available to the con-demnee. In Fine, we did not address the issue before us. Despite this, the majority attaches to language in Fine referring to the “owner’s immediate entitlement to funds.” The majority has relied on statements made in Fine that do not address the specific question before the court and *595has used this language to take us in a direction that is contrary to the statutory .scheme put in place by the legislature. When we go in the direction taken by the majority, we deny property owners just compensation by failing to compensate them with the interest rate as mandated by the legislature. Therefore, I dissent.