Court Opinion

ID: 9900433
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:12:52.199016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:05.348070
License: Public Domain

No. 296               June 14, 2023                    337

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                 STATE OF OREGON,
                  Plaintiff-Respondent,
                            v.
             RICHARD DARREL EGGERS,
                 Defendant-Appellant.
               Lane County Circuit Court
                 20CR55734; A175078

  Charles D. Carlson, Judge.
  Submitted August 23, 2022.
   Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Mark Kimbrell, Deputy Public Defender, Office
of Public Defense Services, filed the briefs for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Colm Moore, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, and Mooney, Judge, and
Pagán, Judge.
  SHORR, P. J.
   Remanded for entry of a corrected judgment omitting
provision prohibiting defendant from possessing firearms or
ammunition pursuant to ORS 166.255 and ORS 166.250;
otherwise affirmed.
338   State v. Eggers
Cite as 326 Or App 337 (2023)                                              339

           SHORR, P. J.
         Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction
for one count of harassment “constituting domestic vio-
lence,” ORS 166.065(3), assigning error to the trial court’s
imposition at sentencing of a prohibition against “possess-
ing firearms or ammunition pursuant to ORS 166.255 and
166.250.”1 Defendant contends that the Class B misdemeanor
of harassment is not a conviction that triggers the firearm
prohibition in ORS 166.255 because it is not a “qualifying
misdemeanor” or “a misdemeanor that has, as an element
of the offense, the use or attempted use of physical force or
the threatened use of a deadly weapon.” ORS 166.255(1)(b),
(3)(e). We agree and therefore reverse that aspect of defen-
dant’s sentence.2
         The relevant facts at issue in this case are purely
procedural. In October of 2020, defendant was charged by
information with one count of fourth-degree assault consti-
tuting domestic violence after an incident with his brother.
The following month, the state filed an amended informa-
tion that reduced the charge to harassment constituting
domestic violence, alleging that defendant “did unlawfully
and intentionally harass and annoy [his brother] by sub-
jecting [his brother] to offensive physical contact” and fur-
ther alleging “that the foregoing crime constituted domes-
tic violence.” Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to the
offense, and the parties jointly recommended a sentence of
“36 months of court probation with credit for time served
considered served for jail days, no contact with the named
victim, and no weapons.”
          Following the entry of the plea and a recitation of
the factual basis for the conviction, the trial court asked the
parties to state their positions “with regard to the applica-
tion of [ORS] 166.255,” the firearm prohibition statute, opin-
ing that harassment was a “specified provision.” Defendant

     1
       Defendant does not challenge the special condition of his probation that
provides that he is not to “own, possess or have access to weapons.” Our decision
is limited to defendant’s argument regarding the imposition of the restriction
entered “pursuant to ORS 166.255 and 166.250.”
     2
       Defendant also raised a second assignment of error that he subsequently
withdrew and that we do not consider.
340                                                 State v. Eggers

argued that the prohibition did not apply and the state con-
tended that it did apply. Defense counsel specifically argued
that the “statute requires the Court to find that [defendant]
represents a credible threat to the physical safety of a family
or household member,” and stated:
   “I don’t believe that that applies in this case at all.
       “There * * * are hundreds of miles separating these par-
   ties now. This is a very low-level misdemeanor. We resolved
   it this way because from my perspective, I believe the State
   would have proof issues on an Assault at trial, and I think
   that it’s disproportionate punishment to revoke [defen-
   dant’s] gun rights based on this class B misdemeanor.”
The prosecutor, in turn, argued that
   “the statute applies. He—his brother—regardless of how
   close they are, is a family member, and it seems that this is
   domestic violence. It certainly is a family member.
       “This is a qualifying misdemeanor, it includes the use
   or attempted use of physical force that despite the disputes
   of fact, this is offensive physical contact which I think qual-
   ifies as physical force.”
          Following those arguments, the court stated its
ruling:
   “[Defense counsel], I hear what you’re saying, and maybe
   this will be the appeal which will correct this, but I think
   on its face the firearm provision does apply.
       “So, Sir, pursuant to ORS 166.255, as a result of this
   conviction, you are no longer allowed to knowingly possess
   firearms or ammunition.”
The court subsequently entered a judgment consistent with
that ruling, and this timely appeal followed. As explained
above, defendant assigns error to the trial court’s imposi-
tion of the firearm prohibition in ORS 166.255, contending
that the crime of harassment is not a “qualifying misde-
meanor” that “has, as an element of the offense, the use or
attempted use of physical force or the threatened use of a
deadly weapon.” ORS 166.255(1)(b), (3)(e).
        We first address the state’s contention that defen-
dant’s argument is unpreserved. Specifically, the state
Cite as 326 Or App 337 (2023)                                  341

contends that defendant’s trial argument against the impo-
sition of the firearm prohibition referenced ORS 166.255
(1)(a), which makes it unlawful for a person to knowingly
possess a firearm if the person is the subject of an order that
“[r]estrains the person from stalking, intimidating, molest-
ing or menacing a family or household member of the per-
son” and “[i]ncludes a finding that the person represents a
credible threat to the physical safety” of that person. The
state notes that defendant was not subject to a restraining
order and did not raise any argument in the trial court that
relied on ORS 166.255(1)(b).
   “Although the preservation requirement is not something
   that can be explained by a neat verbal formula, the essen-
   tial goal is straightforward: A party must provide the trial
   court with an explanation of his or her objection that is spe-
   cific enough to ensure that the court can identify its alleged
   error with enough clarity to permit it to consider and cor-
   rect the error immediately.”
State v. Vanornum, 354 Or 614, 632, 317 P3d 889 (2013)
(internal quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted).
That requirement is intended to “ensure that trial courts
have an opportunity to understand and correct their own
possible errors and that the parties are not taken by sur-
prise, misled, or denied opportunities to meet an argument.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court
has counseled “attention to the purposes of the rule and the
practicalities it serves.” State v. Walker, 350 Or 540, 548, 258
P3d 1228 (2011). As it explained in State v. Parkins, 346 Or
333, 341, 211 P3d 262 (2009), “[u]ltimately, the preservation
rule is a practical one, and close calls * * * inevitably will
turn on whether, given the particular record of a case, the
court concludes that the policies underlying the rule have
been sufficiently served.”
         Here, we conclude that the purposes of preservation
were met. First, defendant’s objection to the imposition of
ORS 166.255 was specific and clear enough to provide the
trial court with an opportunity to identify, understand, and
consider the issue defendant now presses. In alerting the
court and the state that he objected to the imposition of the
firearm prohibition in ORS 166.255, defendant sufficiently
raised the issue of the applicability of the firearm prohibition
342                                           State v. Eggers

under ORS 166.255 even if he did not explicitly address the
specific subparagraph now at issue on appeal. “The fact that
the level of detail or thoroughness with which a party artic-
ulates a position may leave something to be desired does not
mean that it was insufficient to serve the rule of preserva-
tion’s pragmatic purposes.” Walker, 350 Or at 550.
         More significantly, after defense counsel argued
that the firearm prohibition did not apply and offered her
“credible threat” argument, the prosecutor raised the very
argument at issue on appeal, contending that defendant
was subject to the firearm prohibition because harassment
is a “qualifying misdemeanor.” The trial court then ruled
that “on its face the firearm provision does apply * * * as a
result of this conviction.” (Emphasis added.) That sequence
of events is important for two reasons. First, it illuminates
that the trial court implicitly accepted the state’s argument
that harassment was a “qualifying misdemeanor” that “has,
as an element of the offense, the use or attempted use of
physical force or the threatened use of a deadly weapon,”
therefore establishing that the trial court had an oppor-
tunity to consider the argument defendant now makes on
appeal. ORS 166.255(1)(b), (3)(e). Second, it makes clear that
the state both understood defendant’s contention and in fact
responded to it. In other words, the state was not denied
the opportunity to meet defendant’s argument against the
imposition of the prohibition, nor should it be surprised by
defendant’s appellate argument now. See Parkins, 346 Or
at 341 (concluding that issue was adequately preserved
where it was raised by the state and ruled on by the trial
court, even though the defendant only addressed it “ambiv-
alently”). For those reasons, we conclude that defendant’s
appellate argument was adequately preserved.
         We turn to the merits of defendant’s appeal: the
contention that the trial court erred in imposing the firearm
prohibition in ORS 166.255 upon defendant’s conviction for
harassment because harassment is not a “qualifying misde-
meanor” that “has, as an element of the offense, the use or
attempted use of physical force.” ORS 166.255(1)(b), (3)(e).
We review a defendant’s sentence as well as questions
of statutory interpretation for legal error. State v. Nobles,
306 Or App 1, 2, 473 P3d 1108 (2020); State v. Heaston, 308
Cite as 326 Or App 337 (2023)                                        343

Or App 694, 697, 482 P3d 167 (2021). Because defendant’s
assignment of error turns on the definitions of “qualifying
misdemeanor” and “physical force” under ORS 166.255(1)
and (3), we turn to the familiar methodology for determin-
ing the legislature’s intent outlined in State v. Gaines, 346
Or 160, 171-72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009), considering the text
and context of the statute as well as any legislative history
that we find helpful.
          We begin with the relevant text of ORS 166.255:
       “(1) It is unlawful for a person to knowingly possess a
   firearm or ammunition if:
       “* * * * *
      “(b) The person has been convicted of a qualifying mis-
   demeanor and, at the time of the offense, the person was:
       “(A) A family or household member of the victim of the
   offense[.]
       “* * * * *
       “(3)   As used in this section:
       “* * * * *
      “(e) ‘Qualifying misdemeanor’ means a misdemeanor
   that has, as an element of the offense, the use or attempted
   use of physical force or the threatened use of a deadly
   weapon.”
(Emphasis added.) Thus, for harassment to constitute a
“qualifying misdemeanor” under the circumstances at issue
here, it must have, “as an element of the offense, the use or
attempted use of physical force.” As charged here, a person
commits the crime of harassment under ORS 166.065 if the
person intentionally “[h]arasses or annoys another person”
by “[s]ubjecting such other person to offensive physical con-
tact.” ORS 166.065(1)(a)(A). Thus, the elements of the crime
of harassment as charged in this case are (1) that the defen-
dant subjects another person to offensive physical contact,
and (2) that the defendant intentionally harasses or annoys
that person.3
    3
      The parties appear to agree that, in analyzing whether defendant was
convicted of a “qualifying misdemeanor,” we consider solely the statutory
344                                                       State v. Eggers

        The question, then, is whether the element of “offen-
sive physical contact” within ORS 166.065(1)(a)(A) consti-
tutes “the use or attempted use of physical force.” We con-
clude that it does not. Although those terms are not defined
in ORS chapter 166, the distinction between physical “force”
and offensive physical “contact” is clear from the plain
meaning of those words, as well as our case law construing
those words in other criminal contexts. “Force” is defined
as
   “1 a : strength or energy esp. of an exceptional degree
   : active power : vigor * * * c : power to affect in physical
   relations or conditions <the ~ of the blow was somewhat
   spent when it reached him> <the rising ~ of the wind> * * *
   3 a : power, violence, compulsion, or constraint exerted
   upon or against a person or thing * * * b : strength or power
   of any degree that is exercised without justification or con-
   trary to law upon a person or thing c : violence or such
   threat or display of physical aggression toward a person as
   reasonably inspires fear of pain, bodily harm, or death[.]”
Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 887 (unabridged ed
2002) (emphasis added). “Contact,” on the other hand, is
defined as “union or junction of body surfaces : a touching or
meeting <cooled by ~ with the air> <sexual ~> : impact <body
~ in football and hockey>.” Webster’s at 490. Thus, while
“use of physical force” denotes the conduct of using physical
strength or power, “offensive physical contact” refers to the
result of an offensive physical touching.
         Of course, some kinds of “offensive physical contact”
may result from “the use of physical force.” As our cases con-
struing the harassment statute have made clear, examples
of “offensive physical contact” may include “striking, slap-
ping, shoving, kicking, grabbing, and similar acts that are
an interference with the ‘contactee.’ ” State v. Sallinger, 11
Or App 592, 598, 504 P2d 1383 (1972); see also State v. Keller,
40 Or App 143, 145-46, 594 P2d 1250 (1979) (explaining that

elements underlying defendant’s conviction. In other words, they agree that we
do not examine the particular factual predicates for the crime. We agree. ORS
166.255(3)(e) defines a “[q]ualifying misdemeanor” as one that has certain con-
duct “as an element of the offense.” A qualifying misdemeanor is therefore not
defined by the particular factual conduct that was charged or that led to the
conviction.
Cite as 326 Or App 337 (2023)                              345

“our statement of illustrations—striking, slapping, etc.” in
Sallinger—“was not intended to be a comprehensive enumer-
ation of the acts prohibited by the statute” and that “ORS
166.065(1)(a) was intended to prohibit all forms of contact
that are comparable with, the equivalent of or substantially
similar to, striking, slapping, etc. in respect to interference
with the integrity of the victim”). But that does not mean
that “offensive physical contact” is equivalent to “the use
or attempted use of physical force.” As to ORS 166.065, the
state need only prove that the defendant caused the result
of “offensive physical contact” with the requisite mental
state; there is no requirement that the state prove that the
defendant used or attempted to use physical force. Cf. Keller,
40 Or App at 146 (concluding that spitting on another may
constitute “offensive physical contact” sufficient to prove
harassment under ORS 166.065).
          Case law construing “physical force” and similar
terms in other criminal contexts is consistent with that
view. For instance, we have construed the phrase “violent,
tumultuous or threatening behavior” within the second-
degree disorderly conduct statute, ORS 166.025(1)(a), which
prior case law had construed to mean “the use of physical
force or physical conduct which is immediately likely to pro-
duce the use of such force.” State v. Atwood, 195 Or App 490,
492, 98 P3d 751 (2004) (citing State v. Cantwell, 66 Or App
848, 676 P2d 353, rev den, 297 Or 124 (1984)). We concluded
that “actual but incidental physical contact” such as “grab-
bing hold of someone’s shoulder” to get their attention did
not rise to the level of “use of physical force” required under
the statute, concluding that use of physical force “connotes
the actual use of strength or power.” Atwood, 195 Or App
at 498. Similarly, in State v. Marshall, 350 Or 208, 217-18,
253 P3d 1017 (2011), the Supreme Court interpreted the
term “forcible compulsion” in the statute for first-degree
sexual abuse, ORS 163.427(1)(a)(B), which ORS 163.305
(1)(a) defines in part as “to compel by * * * [p]hysical force.”
The court concluded that “the level of force that is involved
must be greater than or qualitatively different from the sim-
ple movement and contact that is inherent in the action of
touching an intimate part of another.” Marshall, 350 Or at
221.
346                                            State v. Eggers

         Although those cases considered different criminal
statutes and phrases, they illuminate that when the legis-
lature uses the term “physical force” in the criminal code, it
intends something that is distinguishable from the inciden-
tal physical touching that may constitute “physical contact.”
“Although, in the abstract, there is nothing that precludes
the legislature from defining the same terms to mean differ-
ent things in the same or related statutes, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, we ordinarily assume that the leg-
islature uses terms in related statutes consistently.” State v.
Cloutier, 351 Or 68, 99, 261 P3d 1234 (2011).
          Despite that text and context, the state contends
that “offensive physical contact” is an element that consti-
tutes “the use * * * of physical force.” First, the state points
to the dictionary definitions of “force,” ranging from a “vio-
len[t]” or “exceptional” strength to “strength or power of any
degree that is exercised without justification or contrary to
law upon a person or thing,” see Webster’s at 887 (emphasis
added), contending that “physical force” does not require any
particular quality or degree and that the dictionary defini-
tions are thus “not particularly helpful in resolving what
kind of force satisfies the requirement in ORS 166.255(3)(e).”
The state also contends that cases like Marshall and Atwood
are inapposite to our analysis of ORS 166.255 because they
considered other statutory provisions. We are not persuaded
by those arguments. The state is indeed correct that one
of the dictionary definitions of “force” does not connote
any particular degree of strength. But cases like Marshall
and Atwood are relevant context for interpreting ORS
166.255, in light of the fact that they addressed the same
phrase within the same body of law, and those cases are
consistent with the vast majority of the dictionary defini-
tions of “force” in concluding that the use of “physical force”
denotes a degree of strength that is greater than a mere
incidental touching. See Webster’s at 887 (providing other
definitions of “force” as “strength or energy esp. of an excep-
tional degree,” “power, violence, compulsion, or constraint
exerted upon or against a person or thing,” and “violence
or such threat or display of physical aggression toward a
person as reasonably inspires fear of pain, bodily harm, or
death” (emphasis added)).
Cite as 326 Or App 337 (2023)                             347

         Finally, the state places significant weight on its
interpretation of the legislative history of ORS 166.255. In
the state’s view, ORS 166.255 was intended to “mirror” the
federal firearms prohibition for domestic abusers contained
in the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), specifically
18 USC section 922(g)(9). Because the federal provisions
applied to “offensive touching” at the time the Oregon leg-
islature enacted ORS 166.255, the state contends that the
legislature intended Oregon’s prohibition to apply to a con-
viction for harassment involving offensive physical contact
committed against a family member.
         To explain our consideration of that argument, we
briefly recount the legislative history of ORS 166.255. The
statute was introduced as Senate Bill (SB) 525 (2015) to
“codify the federal law in Oregon to ensure protection for
[domestic violence] victims.” Testimony, Senate Committee
on Judiciary, SB 525, Mar 25, 2015, Ex 4 (statement of
co-sponsor Sen Laurie Monnes Anderson). As introduced,
the bill hewed to the federal language in applying the fire-
arm prohibition to, in part, persons convicted of “qualifying
misdemeanor crime[s] involving domestic violence.” SB 525,
introduced (Feb 2, 2015). That original version also explicitly
defined “qualifying misdemeanor crime involving domestic
violence” to include several specific crimes as well as “[a]ny
other misdemeanor that involves as an element of the crime
the use of physical force or a deadly weapon.” Id.
         Proponents of the bill described that it would
“implement federal law.” Testimony, Senate Committee on
Judiciary, SB 525, Mar 25, 2015, Ex 15 (statement of Portland
Commissioner Dan Saltzman); see also, e.g., Testimony,
House Committee on Judiciary, SB 525, June 1, 2015, Ex 2
(statement of co-sponsor Sen Laurie Monnes Anderson)
(stating that bill “mirrors the federal law”). However, other
proponents acknowledged differences between SB 525 and
VAWA. See Testimony, Senate Committee on Judiciary, SB
525, Mar 25, 2015, Ex 5-6 (statement of Sybil Hebb, Oregon
Law Center) (calling SB 525 “similar” to VAWA and acknowl-
edging differences between SB 525 and VAWA); Testimony,
Senate Committee on Rules, SB 525, May 12, 2015, Ex 4
(statement of Sybil Hebb) (describing bill as “modeled after”
the federal prohibitions in VAWA).
348                                             State v. Eggers

         Later amendments to the bill changed the firearm
prohibition so that it no longer applied to persons convicted
of qualifying “misdemeanor crime[s] of domestic violence”—
the language borrowed from VAWA—but instead applied
to persons “convicted of a qualifying misdemeanor and, at
the time of the offense, the person was a family member of
the victim of the offense.” SB 525, -A4 amendments (May 1,
2015). The amendments also defined “qualifying misde-
meanor” as “a misdemeanor that has, as an element of the
offense, the use or attempted use of physical force or the
threatened use of a deadly weapon,” removing the specified
crimes that had been previously listed. Id. The bill was later
enacted with those amendments. Or Laws 2015, ch 497, § 2.
         About a year before the Oregon legislature passed
SB 525, the United States Supreme Court decided United
States v. Castleman, 572 US 157, 134 S Ct 1405, 188 L Ed 2d
426 (2014). In that case, the court considered whether a state
criminal statute prohibiting “intentionally or knowingly
caus[ing] bodily injury” to an intimate partner could result in
a conviction for a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence”
under 18 USC section 922(g)(9), defined in part as an offense
that “has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical
force” under 18 USC section 921(a)(33)(A)(ii). Castleman, 572
US at 161. The court concluded that Congress had intended
to incorporate the “well-settled” common-law meaning
of “force” when enacting 18 USC section 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).
Id. at 162-63. At common law, the element of “force” was
“satisfied by even the slightest offensive touching.” Id.
          In the state’s view, the Oregon legislature made clear
that it intended to “mirror” VAWA and necessarily adopted
Castleman’s definition of “force.” As a result, the state insists
that we “must regard the [United States Supreme] Court’s
interpretation in Castleman as authoritative for purposes of
ORS 166.255” and conclude that harassment satisfies the
“use * * * of physical force” element requirement.
         We agree that the legislature borrowed heavily
from VAWA in enacting ORS 166.255, especially in adopt-
ing its definition of a “qualifying misdemeanor” as a mis-
demeanor that has, “as an element of the offense, the use
or attempted use of physical force or the threatened use of
Cite as 326 Or App 337 (2023)                                349

a deadly weapon.” Compare ORS 166.255(3)(e) and 18 USC
§ 921(a)(33)(A)(ii). It is also true that, when interpreting stat-
utes with text borrowed from other jurisdictions, we “accord
a special status to prior interpretations by the highest court
of the relevant jurisdiction.” State v. Guzman/Heckler, 366
Or 18, 29, 455 P3d 485 (2019). Indeed, “[i]f the Oregon leg-
islature adopts a statute or rule from another jurisdiction’s
legislation, we assume that the Oregon legislature also
intended to adopt the construction of the legislation that the
highest court of the other jurisdiction had rendered before
adoption of the legislation in Oregon.” Id. (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
         However, the text and context of ORS 166.255 make
clear that, although the legislature copied many elements
from VAWA, it did not enact an identical copy of it such that
we must adopt Castleman’s analysis and interpret “offensive
physical contact” as equivalent to the use of “physical force.”
ORS 166.255 and 18 USC section 922(g) differ in import-
ant ways. Most obviously, section 922(g)(9) applies to those
convicted “of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,”
whereas ORS 166.255 applies to those convicted of a “qual-
ifying misdemeanor” committed against a family or house-
hold member. ORS 166.255 does not use the term “domestic
violence,” which has a specific meaning under ORS 135.230.
Compare ORS 135.230(1) - (4) (defining “[d]omestic violence”
as “abuse” or “[a]ttempting to cause or intentionally, know-
ingly or recklessly causing physical injury; * * * [i]nten-
tionally, knowingly or recklessly placing another in fear of
imminent serious physical injury; or * * * [c]ommitting sex-
ual abuse in any degree” between “family or household mem-
bers”) with 18 USC § 921(a)(33)(A) (defining “misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence” as a misdemeanor that “has, as
an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the
threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by” certain
persons). Indeed, harassment is not a “crime of domestic
violence” under Oregon law because it does not constitute
“abuse.” ORS 135.230(1); State v. Johnson, 317 Or App 134,
135, 503 P3d 1269, rev den, 369 Or 676 (2022) (accepting
state concession that trial court erred by entering judgment
that included “constituting domestic violence” as part of
harassment conviction in part because “harassment is not a
350                                           State v. Eggers

domestic violence crime as defined by ORS 135.230”). ORS
166.255 also differs from VAWA in how it deals with expunge-
ments, among other things. Compare ORS 166.255(3)(a)(C)
with 18 USC § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii). In addition to those statutory
differences, Castleman followed a statutory analysis that
differed considerably from our method of statutory interpre-
tation, relying almost exclusively on the common law rather
than the plain meaning of the text. See Castleman, 572 US
at 179-80 (Scalia, J., concurring) (opining that, in adopting
a “nonviolent definition” of “domestic violence,” the majority
had ignored the plain meaning of those words). We further
note that the legislative history does not reveal that the leg-
islature ever discussed Castleman at the time of the enact-
ment of ORS 166.255.
          Thus, although the legislature borrowed language
from federal law in enacting ORS 166.255, it did not do so
in a way that would lead us to conclude that federal law con-
trols over the text and context of ORS 166.255 itself. Where
the legislature has closely aligned a state statute with fed-
eral law, the later may indeed be particularly persuasive
evidence of the legislature’s intention. But where “the text
of the statute departs from” federal law, as is the case here,
federal law is “significantly less persuasive when it comes to
the meaning and scope of words and phrases * * * that are
not part of the federal formulation.” Penn v. Board of Parole,
365 Or 607, 618-19, 451 P3d 589 (2019). In those circum-
stances, we decide what the state law ultimately means, “in
accordance with our usual interpretive paradigm, without
following in lockstep the federal cases analyzing and apply-
ing” the federal law. Id. at 619. “Under our interpretive par-
adigm, the words that the legislature used in the enactment
are the best evidence of the legislature’s intention.” Id. at
619-20. At bottom, Oregon law applies the firearm prohibi-
tion in ORS 166.255(1)(b) only to those persons convicted of
a “qualifying misdemeanor,” or misdemeanor that, as rele-
vant here, has “the use * * * of physical force” as “an element
of the offense.” Considering both the plain meaning of “phys-
ical force” and how Oregon has interpreted “physical force”
in other criminal contexts, “offensive physical contact” is not
an element that is equivalent to “the use * * * of physical
force.”
Cite as 326 Or App 337 (2023)                           351

         In summary, ORS 166.255 applies a firearm pro-
hibition to certain persons convicted of “qualifying misde-
meanor[s],” which include misdemeanors that have, “as an
element of the offense, the use or attempted use of physical
force.” The elements of the crime of harassment, as charged
in this case, are that the defendant intentionally harasses
or annoys another person by subjecting that person to offen-
sive physical contact. ORS 166.065(1)(a). Because neither
of those elements necessarily involve the “use or attempted
use of physical force,” harassment is not a “qualifying mis-
demeanor,” and the trial court erred in applying the firearm
prohibition in ORS 166.255 at defendant’s sentencing for the
crime of harassment.
        Remanded for entry of a corrected judgment omit-
ting provision prohibiting defendant from possessing fire-
arms or ammunition pursuant to ORS 166.255 and ORS
166.250; otherwise affirmed.