Court Opinion

ID: 9391481
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-02 14:13:25.36296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:43.037011
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Judges Huff, Lorish and Senior Judge Petty
UNPUBLISHED

              WILLIAM LESTER
                                                                             MEMORANDUM OPINION*
              v.     Record No. 1955-22-2                                        PER CURIAM
                                                                                 MAY 2, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                               FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PETERSBURG
                                            Dennis M. Martin, Sr., Judge

                              (Nicole M. Gibson, Assistant Public Defender, on brief), for
                              appellant. Appellant submitting on brief.

                              (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Lucille M. Wall, Assistant
                              Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Appellant, William Lester, challenges the sentence the trial court imposed after finding he

              had violated the conditions of his previously suspended sentence. After examining the briefs and

              record in this case, the panel unanimously holds that oral argument is unnecessary because “the

              appeal is wholly without merit.” Code § 17.1-403(ii)(a). Lester failed to timely file the

              transcripts or a written statement of facts in lieu of a transcript. Rule 5A:8. Without a transcript

              of the proceedings our review of the trial court’s exercise of discretion is constrained. Because

              Lester has the burden of establishing an abuse of discretion and has failed to do so, we must

              affirm the trial court’s judgment. Rule 5A:27(a).

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413.
                                         BACKGROUND

       In July 2012, Lester entered an Alford1 plea to robbery. The trial court convicted him of

robbery and sentenced him to 25 years’ imprisonment with 20 years suspended. Lester’s

previously suspended sentence was revoked and resuspended, in part, in August 2019.

       In July 2021, Lester’s probation officer reported that Lester had failed to report new charges

lodged against him in a neighboring jurisdiction and any employment he may have secured during

his probationary period. In subsequent addenda, Lester’s probation officer reported that the

Chesterfield General District Court had convicted Lester of four counts of attempted robbery, petit

larceny, trespassing, and obtaining money by false pretenses. The Chesterfield General District

Court sentenced Lester to 36 months, 30 days’ incarceration with all but 10 months suspended. The

trial court issued a capias, which was served on Lester in September 2021.

       After a hearing, the trial court found Lester had violated the terms and conditions of his

previously suspended sentence. The trial court then revoked Lester’s previously suspended

sentence, resuspended 16 years and 6 months, and removed Lester from supervised probation.

Lester appeals.

                                            ANALYSIS

       Subject to certain conditions not applicable here, after suspending a sentence a trial court

“may revoke the suspension of sentence for any cause the court deems sufficient that occurred at

any time within the probation period, or within the period of suspension fixed by the court.”

Code § 19.2-306(A). “In revocation appeals, the trial court’s ‘findings of fact and judgment will

       1
         “An individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly
consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his
participation in the acts constituting the crime.” North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37
(1970). Alford pleas allow “criminal defendants who wish to avoid the consequences of a trial to
plead guilty by conceding that the evidence is sufficient to convict them, while maintaining that
they did not participate in the acts constituting the crimes.” Carroll v. Commonwealth, 280 Va.
641, 644-45 (2010) (quoting Parson v. Carroll, 272 Va. 560, 565 (2006)).
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not be reversed unless there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion.’” Jacobs v. Commonwealth,

61 Va. App. 529, 535 (2013) (quoting Davis v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 81, 86 (1991)). “The

evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as the prevailing party

below.” Id.

       Lester contends that the trial court failed to give “sufficient weight” to his mitigating

evidence when it sentenced him to three years’ incarceration. Lester does not contest that he

violated the terms and conditions of his previously suspended sentence. He argues only that the

trial court “made no mention” of his efforts to address his substance abuse addiction or

homelessness and how those circumstances contributed to his non-compliance. He further

contends that the trial court made a “clear error in judgment” because it gave “significant

weight” to the Commonwealth’s aggravating evidence, and “less weight” to his mitigating

evidence.

       The record on appeal does not contain a timely filed transcript of Lester’s revocation

hearing. The trial court entered the revocation order on September 22, 2022. Under Rule

5A:8(a), a transcript must be filed no later than “60 days after entry of the final judgment,”

which was November 21, 2022. See Rule 5A: 8(a). Lester did not file the transcript with the

circuit court until November 28, 2022. Although we conclude that a timely-filed transcript, or

written statement of facts in lieu of a transcript, is not indispensable to addressing Lester’s

challenge, we are necessarily limited to a review of the manuscript record.

       We begin by noting that, “[a]bsent a statutory requirement to do so, ‘a trial court is not

required to give findings of fact and conclusions of law.’” Bowman v. Commonwealth, 290 Va.

492, 500 n.8 (2015) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 615, 627 (1982)). The

discretionary revocation guidelines recommended a sentence between one year, three months and

four years’ incarceration. It is well-established that the discretionary sentencing guidelines “are

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advisory only and do not require trial courts to impose specific sentences.” Runyon v.

Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 573, 577-78 (1999). A trial court’s decision regarding whether to

follow the sentencing guidelines is “not reviewable on appeal.” Code § 19.2-298.01(F). The

question of an appropriate sentence “is a matter that lies within the trial court’s discretion.”

Rhodes v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 645, 650 (2005) (citing Slayton v. Commonwealth, 185

Va. 357, 365 (1946)); Code § 19.2-306.1(B).

        The record reflects, and Lester does not contest, that he suffered new convictions during

the suspension period. Furthermore, this was Lester’s second revocation proceeding. “The

statutes dealing with probation and suspension are remedial and intended to give the trial court

valuable tools to help rehabilitate an offender through the use of probation, suspension of all or part

of a sentence, and/or restitution payments.” Howell v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 737, 740 (2007).

Considering Lester’s repeated probation violations, the trial court reasonably could conclude that

active incarceration was appropriate because Lester was not amenable to rehabilitation. “When

coupled with a suspended sentence, probation represents ‘an act of grace on the part of the

Commonwealth to one who has been convicted and sentenced to a term of confinement.’” Hunter

v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 582, 587 (2010) (quoting Price v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App.

443, 448 (2008)). Lester failed to make productive use of the grace that had been extended to him.

                                           CONCLUSION

        Finding no abuse of the trial court’s sentencing discretion, its judgment is affirmed.

                                                                                              Affirmed.

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