Court Opinion

ID: 9883062
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 01:36:29.067727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:19.790603
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Shiras, ■
with whom, concurred
The 'Chief Justice, dissenting.
I am unable to concur in the judgment of the court, or in the reasoning used to support it.
If it be true, as is argued in the opinion, that, in the case of an administration of the estate of a decedent by proceedings in the probate court .of a State, the possession of the assets by the administrator is the possession of .the court, and such assets, as to custody and control, are to be deemed to-be in gremio legis, so as to bring the case within the doctrine of Covell v. Heyman, 111 U. S. 176, and kindred cases, then it would follow, as I think, that the plea of the administrator, wherein he set up the pendency of the-proceedings in the orphans’ coprt of the Státe as a bar to the bill of complaint, ought to have been sustained. Between the granting of the letters of administration, and the final distribution of the fund realized by the administration there is no-point of time when the jurisdiction and possession of the state court change their character, and hence, if it be the law that the possession and control Of the administrator is that.of the court, appointing him, within the meaning of .the cases cited by the majority, there can be no point, of time oi stage, of the-proceedings between their inception and conclusión when the process of another court can be legitimately invoked to take from the state court its power of control and. decision.
1 In this view Of the case, citizens of States other than that having -possession, and. control of the estate through its officer *623must, like the home residents, assert their claims in the state court; and if their claims have a Federal character, and if the state courts should disregard that feature of their rights, the remedy would he found in an ultimate appeal to the Supreme. Court of the United States.
But it is certain that such a view of this question cannot prevail without reversing a long line of decisions, of which Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425, may be cited as an early, and Borer v. Chapman, 119 U. S. 587, as a recent case and in which this court has held that the jurisdiction conferred on the Federal court by the Constitution and laws of the United States extends to controversies arising in the distribution of estates of decedents, where such jurisdiction is invoked by citizens of other States than that of the domicile, notwithstanding the peculiar structure of the local probate system.
The logic of the opinion of the majority, as I understand it, seems to require a reversal of the action of the court below in overruling the administrator’s plea, setting up that he was an officer of the state court, proceeding in the due and regular performance of his duties as such officer.
As, however, the opinion refrains from accepting ^his conusion,- though apparently rendered necessary by its own. reasoning, the next questions that arise are as to those particulars in which the opinion reverses the decree of the court below.
Having ^conceded that the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court had duly attached* under a bill in equity, brought by citizens oí’another State, alleging legitimate matters of controversy arising out of the distribution of the decedent’s estate, ihe opinion-of the majority proceeds to consider the propriety,of the action of the court below in the exercise of that jurisdiction.
The matters of controversy which formed the subject of the bill of complaint were two. The first was as to the legal effect of that provision of the will of the decedent which devised the proceeds of certain real estate, situated in the city of Pittsburgh, in equal shares to the “ Home of the Friendless ” and the “ Home for Aged Protestant.. Destitute *624"Women,” two charitable institutions organized under the-laws of the State of Pennsylvania. As the decedent left, no husband, children, brothers, or sisters, but certain first cousins and second cousins, a dispute arose whether both these classes were entitled to share in the distribution of the. estate, and this formed the second subject matter of the bifi.
In respect to the first matter, the court below held that,, while the will of the decedent could not operate as a testamentary disposition of the real estate in question, because such will had not been executed in conformity with certain, statutory requirements, yet that it constituted a valid declaration of a trust, under which the two charitable institutions, were entitled to the proceeds of the real estate.
The controversy between the two classes of cousins the court resolved in favor of the first cousins, following, in so doing, the construction put upon the Pennsylvania intestate, 'laws by the Supreme Court of that State.
■ This disposition by the court below of the two questions-before it is approved by this court, but, in the opinion of the majority, the court below erred in including in the scope of its final decree all the parties before it, and in not restricting-its decree to an adjudication of the case so far as the citizens, of States other than Pennsylvania were concerned.’
Be it observed that all the parties concerned in the matters: in controversy were before the Circuit Court. .The administrator, the two charitable institutions, and all the individuals, constituting both classes of cousins were parties plaintiff and defendant in the suit, and none of them, either in the court, below or in this court, objected to the jurisdiction of the' Circuit Court, except the administrator, and his plea to the jurisdiction had been rightfully, as is admitted by the majority opinion, overruled.
. In such a state of facts, why was not the action of the court fully .warranted in awarding a decree finally establishing the-rights' of the parties before it ?
' There is force and logical consistency in the position that the settlement of a decedent’s estate is not a suit at law or in *625equity, but that such an estate constitutes a res, as to which the jurisdiction of the probate court, when it once attaches, is exclusive.
The position of the court below in exercising its jurisdiction to the extent of final determination and enforcement is likewise consistent with reason, and, as I think, with the doctrine of our previous cases.
But the conclusion of the majority in the present case, requiring the court below to shorten its arm and to dismiss parties who were before it, assenting to its jurisdiction, is one that I cannot accept.
Let us see to what consequences such a doctrine will lead; and no better case than the one in hand is needed to illustrate its possible consequences.
The Federal court having held that the will of the decedent was efficacious as an acknowledgment of a valid trust, of course the real estate, which formed the subject of the trust, was withdrawn from the operation of the intestate law, and was declared to be the property of the cestuis que trusterit. From this it follows that the rest of the estate is to be equally divided among the first cousins, who are held to be entitled to it. Here we have a consistent decree that binds all the world, for all .concerned were before the court, and their contentions were all heard and considered. The administrator had no official or personal concern in the questions mooted. The suggestion that he would not be protected by obeying the decree of the Circuit -Court from his responsibility to the orphans’ court, which had appointed him, has no-force. If the decree of the Circuit Court were declared valid by this court, of course that decision would, involving as it-does a question of the jurisdiction of the Federal courts, be obligatory upon the state court, and a perfect protection to the administrator in carrying it into effect. There may be; some foundation for criticism in the action of the court below in going behind -the account that the administrator had filed in the orphans’' court, and in subjecting him. to verify his account before a master, but if this were error it did not affect the final decree, inasmuch as the account of the admin*626istrator, as filed in the orphans’’court, was approved and confirmed without change by the master.
But out of the decree recommended by the majority opinion all kinds of confusion and uncertainty may arise. The state courts may take a different view of the will of the decedent, and decline to find in it a valid declaration of a trust. In that event the amount of the estate would be increased by the proceeds of the sale of the real estate thus added to the fund for distribution. The citizens of States other than Pennsylvania, the extent of whose rights to participate in the fund had already been’ determined, and,- perhaps satisfied, 'under the decree, of the Circuit Court, could not avail themselves of such action of the state courts. Consequently the first cousins resident in Pennsylvania would receive larger shares of the estate than those received by the first cousins in other States, •and thus inequality would arise.
Again, if the state, courts should happen to change. their views as to the proper construction of the intestate law, and hold that second cousins were entitled to participate equally with first cousins, then the second cousins who were citizens of other- States would, under the decree of the Federal court binding upon them, receive nothing, while the second cousins living in Pennsylvania would . participate. So, too, it is entirely possible, under the division of jurisdiction recommended by the majority opinion, that all of the first cousins might be citizens of other States, and second cousins only be residents of Pennsylvania. Then, as the decree of the Circuit Court gave the estate only to first cousins, and as such decree would be forthwith enforceable, it might result that, when the state court reached an adjudication in favor of the second cousins,.there would be nothing left in which they could participate. Many other absurd consequences, not far fetched, but likely to occur, could be readily suggested, if the novel proposition of dividing jurisdiction should .prevail.
I submit that the error in the reasoning of the majority opinion is found in the latent assumption that the citizens of Pennsylvania have no rights in the Federal courts in Pennsylvania. The latter are treated as if they were courts only *627intended for the advantage of citizens of other States. Tet we know that, admittedly, citizens of Pennsylvania have the right to resort, as parties complainant,- to the Federal courts to enforce important rights and interests — such as arise, for instance, out of the patent laws. So, too, as I understand it, when citizens of Pennsylvania have been brought into the’ Circuit Court of the United States, as parties defendant' to a suit by citizens of another State, they have a right and interest in the decree of the court in their favor. The right of the foreign citizens is not to have the Federal court decide in their favor, but merely to have the controversy heard and determined by the Federal tribunal. The citizens of Pennsylvania who have been brought into the Federal court have a fight and interest in the decision, which, as it would have been' conclusive if against them, so it must be conclusive if in their favor. The Home for the Friendless ” and the “ Home for Aged Protestant "Women” should not, after á decision has been made in their favor, in a suit where all concerned were parties, b¿ turned out of the Federal court to wage, in another tribunal, with the same parties, the same question. Nor should the second cousins, resident in Pennsylvania, after having consented to submit their claims to adjudication in the Circuit Court, be permitted, as against the same parties, to try a second fall in the state court.
The apprehension is expressed in the opinion of the majority that the principles upon which the court below pfoceeded, in adjudicating finally upon the parties and questions before it, would lead to a conflict between the courts, Federal gnd state, and subject the administrator to a divided duty.
If the previous-reasoning is not altogether wrong, it will be readily seen that, on the contrary, a conflict between the State and Federal courts will-be brought about by an attempt to divide between them the jurisdiction and decision of the same subjects of litigation, and that the “ divided duty ”, which will perplex the administrator will be that of having to obey two courts instead of one.'
Tp conclude: either .the plea of the administrator, setting up the jurisdiction of the orphans’ court, as having already *628attached, and as being, therefore, exclusive,- ought to have been sustained, or the course of the court below, in dealing-with the subjects and parties before it, by a final decree, not. to be interfered with or thwarted, as between the same parties, by any other court, should be affirmed.
Jurisdiction has been defined by this court, in United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691, 709, to be “the power to hear and. determine a cause.” In Ober v. Gallagher, 93 U. S. 199, 206, it was said that a Circuit Court “ having obtained rightful jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of the action for one purpose, the court will make its jurisdiction effectual for complete relief.”
“ Jurisdictio est potestas de publico introducta cum, necessitate jurisdicendi' 10 Pep. 73. Jurisdiction is the power-introduced for the public good, with the necessity of expounding the law.
“ Juris effectus in executione consistit" Co. Litt. 289. The effect of law consists in execution.
I am unable to give my adhesion to a doctrine under which, in the distribution of the estate of a decedent, parties’ bearing-the same relation to it shall or may receive different treatment-as they may happen to be citizens of one State or another in. our Federal Union. The rights of all parties should be measured- by -the same yard stick. And when, as in the present-case, all persons concerned in the distribution of an estatehavé .been duly made parties to a suit in equity in the Circuit-.Court of the United States by a bill bringing into adjudication all thp questions between such persons, and their several, contentions have , been’heard and considered, the decree, osuch court ought to operate ais a decision final between the-parties and as to the matters in controversy.
I think the decree of the court below ought to be affirmed, and am authorized, to say that the Chief Justice concurs in. that conclusion, and in this dissent.
Mr. Justice Jackson, not having heard the argument, did. not take part in the decision.