Court Opinion

ID: 9902224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-24 15:04:39.981437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:47.925687
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: NOVEMBER 17, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                             NO. 2023-CA-0006-MR

AARON M. EASTHAM, II                                                 APPELLANT

              APPEAL FROM GREENUP CIRCUIT COURT
v.        HONORABLE BRIAN CHRISTOPHER MCCLOUD, JUDGE
                     ACTION NO. 18-CR-00162

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                               APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: COMBS, JONES, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

COMBS, JUDGE: Appellant, Aaron Eastham, II (Eastham), was convicted of

first-degree sexual abuse and received a sentence of five years. He appeals as a

matter of right. After our review, we affirm.

            In 2018, Eastham was still a minor who was living in foster care with

the family of A.M., the child-victim. On June 28, 2018, a Greenup County Grand

Jury indicted Eastham and charged him with the offense of sexual abuse first
degree in violation of KRS1 510.110, reciting that “on or about April 2, 2018,” he

subjected “A.M. to sexual contact while she was incapable of consent, because she

was less than twelve years of age.” On that date, A.M. was six years of age and

Eastham had just turned 18. The case was tried on August, 15, 2022, and a jury

convicted him of sexual abuse first degree, victim under 12. Eastham was

sentenced to five years.

                Eastham appeals as a matter of right.

                Eastham first argues that the trial court erred in denying defense

counsel’s motions for a directed verdict of acquittal on the charge of first-degree

sexual abuse because there was insufficient evidence of sexual contact. At the

close of the Commonwealth’s case, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict

of acquittal on the charge of first-degree sexual abuse and argued that the diagram

which A.M. had used to show where Eastham touched her did not show that he had

touched her in a sexual or intimate place. If a touching arguably took place, the

Commonwealth did not meet its burden to show that it was done in order to satisfy

a sexual desire. The trial court denied the motion. At the close of Eastham’s case,

defense counsel renewed the motion, which the court again denied.

                       On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must
                draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence
                in favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence is
                sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                            -2-
             a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a directed
             verdict should not be given. For the purpose of ruling on
             the motion, the trial court must assume that the evidence
             for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury
             questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to
             such testimony.

                     On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict
             is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly
             unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the
             defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.

Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991).

             KRS 510.110(1)(b)2. provides that “[a] person is guilty of sexual

abuse in the first degree when . . . [h]e or she subjects another person to sexual

contact who is incapable of consent because he or she . . . [i]s less than twelve (12)

years old[.]” The applicable version of KRS 510.010(7) defines “sexual contact”

as “any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person done for the

purpose of gratifying the sexual desire of either party[.]”

             Eastham argues that “it was not enough that [his] hand merely

touched the outside of A.M.’s vagina.” He contends that the Commonwealth failed

to provide sufficient proof from which the jury could make permissible inferences

that any touching was for sexual gratification. We cannot agree. “Sexual

gratification is a single element of the crime of sexual abuse in the first degree. . . .

Intent can be inferred from the actions of an accused and the surrounding

circumstances. The jury has wide latitude in inferring intent from the evidence.”

                                           -3-
Tungate v. Commonwealth, 901 S.W.2d 41, 42 (Ky. 1995) (quoting Anastasi v.

Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Ky. 1988)).

              A.M. testified that Eastham touched “her private” with his hand

inside of her clothes on the outside of her vagina. It was skin-to-skin contact.

A.M. further testified that Eastham had told her that they were boyfriend and

girlfriend, and that is what boyfriends and girlfriends do -- touch each other. It was

not clearly unreasonable for the jury to infer and to find beyond a reasonable doubt

that the touching was done was for the purpose of his sexual gratification. The

trial court did not err in denying Eastham’s motions for directed verdict.

              Eastham’s second argument is that the trial court erred when it denied

defense counsel’s motion for a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of

third-degree sexual abuse. KRS 510.130(1) provides that “[a] person is guilty of

sexual abuse in the third degree when he or she subjects another person to sexual

contact without the latter’s consent.” In denying the instruction, the trial court

explained that the only element which is different between first- and third-degree

sexual abuse is the age of the victim. First-degree sexual abuse requires the jury to

find that the victim was less than 12 years of age. Eastham contends that there was

no proof other than the language that the child was “of that age”; i.e., less than 12

years.

                                          -4-
              On appeal, Eastham argues that there was uncertainty in the

testimony about when and how old A.M. was when the touching occurred. He

speculates that “that if the jury had been given another option it may have

convicted on the lesser charge.” However, that argument is without merit.

              “A court is required to instruct a jury on all offenses that are

supported by the evidence.” Clark v. Commonwealth, 223 S.W.3d 90, 93 (Ky.

2007). In Clark, the defendant was charged with two counts of first-degree sexual

abuse. At issue was whether it was error not to instruct the jury on the lesser

offense of sexual abuse in the second degree. Our Supreme Court explained that

“the line dividing the offense of first-degree sexual abuse from second-degree

sexual abuse is whether the victim is under twelve years old . . . .” Id. It held that

“second-degree sexual abuse is not a classic lesser-included offense of first-degree

sexual abuse because the age of the victim at the time of the abuse is usually

clear.” Id. at 94. The Court noted the commentary in 1 WILLIAM S. COOPER AND

DONALD P. CETRULO, KENTUCKY INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES, CRIMINAL § 4.48:

“that if there is an issue as to the age of the victim, an instruction on Second–

Degree Sexual Abuse and/or Third-Degree Sexual Abuse should be given as a

lesser-included offense of first-degree sexual abuse.” Clark, 223 S.W.3d at 94, n.

7 (emphasis added) (cleaned up).

                                          -5-
               In the case before us, there is no issue as to the age of the victim. It is

undisputed that A.M. was six years old when Eastham sexually abused her. The

trial court did not err in denying counsel’s request for a lesser-included offense

instruction.

               Eastham’s third and final argument is that palpable error occurred

when Deputy Tabor and A.M.’s mother testified about what A.M. had told them --

and defense counsel did not object contemporaneously to the testimony as

impermissible hearsay.

               [Where an] issue is unpreserved for appellate review by
               contemporaneous objection . . . our review is governed
               by the palpable error standard found at Kentucky Rules
               of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10.26. For an error to be
               palpable, it must be easily perceptible, plain, obvious and
               readily noticeable. A palpable error “must involve
               prejudice more egregious than that occurring in
               reversible error. A palpable error must be so grave in
               nature that if it were uncorrected, it would seriously
               affect the fairness of the proceedings. Thus, what a
               palpable error analysis boils down to is whether the
               reviewing court believes there is a substantial possibility
               that the result in the case would have been different
               without the error. If not, the error cannot be palpable.

Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 348-49 (Ky. 2006) (cleaned up).

               In seeking reversal, Eastham and relies upon Bussey v.

Commonwealth, 797 S.W.2d 483 (Ky. 1990). In Bussey, our Supreme Court

explained as follows:

                                            -6-
                    To arrive at a conviction, it was necessary for the
             jury to believe the victim and disbelieve appellant. . . .
             This process was flawed when four law enforcement
             witnesses were permitted to bolster the victim’s
             testimony by repeating what he had told them.
             Accordingly, we must reverse the conviction.

In his reply brief, Eastham also relies upon Alford v. Commonwealth, 338 S.W.3d

240 (Ky. 2011), which holds that “[t]here is no hearsay exception for statements

made by an alleged victim of sexual abuse to a police detective.” Id. at 246. In

Alford, the victim’s “in-court and out-of-court statements [to police] were the only

evidence linking Appellant to the evidence of sexual contact.” Id.

             Bussey and Alford are distinguishable from the facts of the case

before us. In addition to A.M.’s testimony and the alleged hearsay issue related to

it, A.M.’s mother testified that she saw Eastham with his hand down her

daughter’s pants. Moreover, Eastham admitted on body-cam video that he

touched the outside of the victim’s private parts. We agree with the

Commonwealth that Eastham cannot establish that the result of the trial would

have been different if the victim’s mother and Deputy Tabor had not testified

about what A.M. had told them.

             Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction of the Greenup

Circuit Court.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                         -7-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:    BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Steven J. Buck           Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky      Attorney General of Kentucky

                         Courtney J. Hightower
                         Assistant Attorney General
                         Frankfort, Kentucky

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