Court Opinion

ID: 9672641
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:58:19.765216+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:17.616771
License: Public Domain

WELLIVER, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
This case brings clearly into focus the problems Missouri courts have been encountering in the handling of default judgments. Default judgments are the result of either the intent, omission or negligence of clients or the omission or negligence of attorneys, or both. No easy or magic answer emerges for dealing with defaults. If judges deal softly with defaulters, the defaults will probably increase and the courts become inundated with requests for review. If a rule with the harshness of Vonsmith v. Vonsmith, 666 S.W.2d 424 (Mo. banc 1984), and the principal opinion prevails, we open the door to clients being hit with default judgments which may so far exceed their insurance, if any, as to wash out a lifetime of work and savings without benefit of judicial review. If the error or omission be that of the attorney trying to represent clients in this world of ever increasing paper shuffling, rules, regulations, and deadlines, application of the rule proposed in Vonsmith and the majority may serve only to hasten the escalation of legal malpractice premiums which will be passed on to clients. I cannot believe that these two alternatives are the only alternatives available for the courts’ fair and just treatment of this matter.
The problem is not new. Our former standing Rules Committee labored years before submitting to the Court in August 1979 a proposed revision of Rule 74 relating to defaults. The Court rejected that draft. A revised draft was submitted to the Court in January, 1983. That draft has been considered and recommended for adoption by the Missouri Bar Association. The suggested rule change now pends before us awaiting final decision.
In his dissenting opinion, Blackmar, J., makes a persuasive argument that the Vonsmith rule, so perfectly designed for our dealing with allegations of error on appeal, may have substantial shortcomings for dealing with defaults.
I confess my own second thoughts about my concurrence in Vonsmith.
Though Vonsmith may be read as suggesting that the filing of any post-judgment motion in the trial court will suffice as a prerequisite to appellate review, it has never been held that excessive damages as here alleged can be reviewed under Rule 74.32 in its present form. Application of the Vonsmith rule to these facts serves only to place appellant in the classic “catch 22” situation.