Court Opinion

ID: 9742434
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:13:49.604351+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:32.694192
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE BURMAN dissenting: I would affirm the decision of the trial court. In my opinion the complaint rests principally upon two theories: common law unfair competition and a violation of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 121½, par. 311 et seq.) If any question of patent infringement is raised it is incidental to the primary questions presented by the case. Our courts have recognized the tort of unfair competition. It exists if the adoption and use of a name by the defendant is likely to cause confusion in the trade as to the source of products or is likely to lead the public to believe that the defendant is in some way connected with the plaintiff. 34 I.L.P. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names, and Unfair Competition, § 8 (1958): Lady Esther Ltd. v. Lady Esther Corset Shoppe Inc. (1943), 317 Ill.App. 451, 46 N.E.2d 165. In counts eight, nine, ten and eleven of the original complaint the plaintiffs alleged in essence that the defendants were manufacturing and selling a hood locking device under the name “Kar-Lok”, that the name Kar-Lok had become associated in the trade with the locking devices manufactured by the plaintiffs under United States Patent number 3,538,725, and that the business and good will established by the plaintiffs was injured as a result of the introduction of the defendants’ product into the plaintiffs’ sales area. Count eleven specifically alleged lost profits as a result , of the defendants’ wrongful acts. The substance of these counts exceeds what would be necessary to plead a cause of action for patent infringement and has every ¡appearance of an attempt to state a cause of action based upon unfair competition. The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 121½, par..312) provides that: ■ “A person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the course of his business, vocation or occupation, he: ■ (1) passes off goods or services as- those of another [or] (2) causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval or certification of goods or services [.] # # # This Section does not affect unfair trade practices otherwise actionable at common law or under other statutes of this State.” In counts eight through eleven of the original complaint the plaintiffs alleged in effect that the defendants were passing off their hood locking device as that of the plaintiffs, that this passing off created confusion among potential customers and that the plaintiffs’ profits were diminished as a result. Thus it seems clear that these counts were aimed at establishing a cause of action under paragraph 312 as well as that arising under common law. It may be that an ultimate determination of the issues raised by these two causes of action will necessitate a determination of whether the defendants are guilty of patent infringement. However, such a determination is permissible in a state court and does not defeat jurisdiction. Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co. (1897), 168 U.S. 255; American Harley Corp. v. Irvin Industries, Inc. (1970), 27 N.Y.2d 168, 263 N.E.2d 552. As the foregoing indicates, I believe that the plaintiffs’ action is cognizable in our courts. The temporary injunction enjoining the defendants from using the name Kar-Lok and from manufacturing, distributing or selling an anti-theft device embodying the specifications contained in the plaintiffs’ patent should be affirmed and the trial court should be allowed to determine the cause on its merits. In holding as it has, the majority has abrogated a common law cause of action to which the plaintiffs are entitled and has limited unnecessarily the scope of the remedies provided for by the legislature in the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Another likely result of the majority’s decision is that the plaintiffs will be deprived of any forum in which to assert their claims. The record reveals that the plaintiffs and defendants are citizens of Illinois. Therefore if the plaintiffs are to press their claims in the federal courts, as the majority suggests, the only possible ground for jurisdiction will be that the action arises under an act of Congress relating to patents. (See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).) Since it is arguable at best that the present case involves as an integral part the plaintiffs’ patent or the patent laws of the United States, the federal courts may well decline jurisdiction, leaving the plaintiffs with no opportunity to obtain relief from what appears to be a substantially injurious situation,