Court Opinion

ID: 9625052
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:26:13.910942+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:00.086599
License: Public Domain

JACKSON, Justice.
This action was brought by plaintiff, Mack Freeman, against defendant, Motors Insurance Corporation, to recover under a fire insurance policy for the loss by fire of a Buick automobile which was covered by the policy.
Trial to the court resulted in a judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
As grounds for reversal, it is first urged by defendant that, under the evidence, the defendant is relieved of liability on the policy because of plaintiff’s failure to disclose the existence of a chattel mortgage against the automobile in violation of express terms of the policy which provided that the policy would not be in force while the automobile was subject to any mortgage not specifically declared and described in the policy.
It is admitted herein that defendant’s agent had full information concerning the mortgage involved and the decisive question raised by defendant’s contention is whether the knowledge of the agent is imputed to the defendant.
The material facts touching upon this issue are not in dispute. Plaintiff purchased the insured property from Frank Harber Buick, Inc., an automobile dealer, and in payment therefor traded in another automobile as a down payment and executed two promissory notes, one for $1,817.76 and the other for $1,260. Each note was se*330cured by a separate chattel mortgage to the dealer.
• The evidence further showed that one W. S. Easterling was soliciting agent for the defendant insurance company, and at the same time was employed by Frank Harber Buiclc, Inc. as its office manager. As office manager for the automobile dealer, Easterling had drawn the mortgage papers’ involved in this transaction and knew all the details concerning the purchase of the automobile, including the amount of the down payment, the promissory notes and the chattel mortgages. As agent for the defendant insurance company, Easterling had prepared, upon" the company’s printed form, the application for insurance upon which the policy was issued. The application as filled out by the agent showed only one mortgage in the amount of $1,817.76. It did not show that there was another mortgage in the amount of $1,260.
■S A witness for defendant testified that he was an underwriter for the defendant company and among his duties was that of passing upon applications for insurance; that the application for insurance involved here was examined and accepted by the witness; that he would not have approved the application, at least without further investigation, if the application had disclosed the truth about the $1,260 mortgage.
There was no evidence tending to prove that the plaintiff had concealed any information from Easterling; that he had colluded with Easterling, or that he had any reason to believe that Easterling would not disclose the required information to his principal.
It is conceded by defendant that, under the general rule, knowledge of an agent obtained within the scope of his authority is ordinarily imputed to his principal. But it is argued that the evidence in this case shows that Easterling, in concealing material information about the mortgage, was .acting in his own interest and in the interest of Frank Harber Buick, Inc. to promote the sale of the automobile and was acting adversely to the interest of this defendant. Therefore, it is concluded, this case comes within a recognized exception to the general rule to the effect that, “The knowledge of an agent is not imputed to his principal if the circumstances are such as to raise a presumption that the agent would not communicate such knowledge to the principal.”
In support of its contention, defendant invites our attention to the cases of Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Local Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 162 Okl. 141, 19 P.2d 612, 613, 86 A.L.R. 526; and Allen & Scott, Inc., v. Stahl, 181 Okl. 527, 72 P.2d 204.
A review of the cited cases reveals that they are not in point with the facts in the instant case and the rules therein announced are not controlling here.
The rule which is controlling under the facts in this case was .announced by this court in the case of National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Hearn, 205 Okl. 661, 240 P.2d 83, wherein the court said in the first paragraph of the syllabus :
“In the absence of fraud or collusion between the soliciting agent and the applicant, where the applicant answers questions contained in an application for a policy of insurance, fully and without withholding material facts, and the agent does not correctly write such information in answer to the questions propounded, such agent is acting for the insurance company and not as agent of the applicant. Knowledge of material facts gained by the insurance company’s soliciting agent is imputable to the company, and it is bound thereby.”
See also Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 172 Okl. 595, 52 P.2d 28.
We hold that information obtained by the agent of the company when writing the application for insurance is imputable to the company, and it is bound thereby, and an insurance company cannot escape liability on a policy in such case by showing that its agent did not correctly disclose such information,-even though the agent, in the concealment, may have been serving some personal interest of his own, in the absence of proof that the applicant knew, *331or should have known, that the company was being deceived.
A further proposition urged by defendant involves an issue of fact concerning the defense of wilful destruction of the insured property. There was conflicting testimony regarding defendant’s claim that plaintiff had wilfully burned the automobile. We have examined the record and find that the judgment of the court resolving this issue in favor of plaintiff is amply supported by the evidence and it will not, therefore, be disturbed on appeal.
Judgment affirmed.
JOHNSON, C. J., WILLIAMS, V. C. J., and CORN, DAVISON and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.
HALLEY, J., dissents.