Court Opinion

ID: 9540810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:19:57.769818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:07.379076
License: Public Domain

Justice FLAHERTY,
dissenting in part II-F, but concurring in the judgment.
Although I concur in the majority’s holding on this portion of the opinion, I respectfully dissent from its reasoning.
First, I disagree with the majority that defendant’s failure to provide this Court with “page 15” of the trial court’s charge precludes a meaningful review of his objection to the trial justice’s instructions concerning force and coercion. Although I agree that it is the obligation of a party who claims error to furnish a sufficient record so that the merits may by weighed, in my opinion, defendant’s objection is sufficiently clear from the transcript that he provided for our review. It is apparent from the on-the-record colloquy between counsel and the trial justice that defendant objected to the justice’s instruction concerning implied threats because there was no evidence of implied threats presented at trial.20 This Court previously has explained that “[i]n the absence of the transcript or other adequate record of the proceedings in the court below, we are unable to consider the issues raised by defendant’s appeal.” State v. Jennings, 117 R.I. 291, 294, 366 A.2d 543, 545 (1976). Although it is true that defendant failed to produce “page 15” of the instructions, he nevertheless provided an adequate record, which is all that he was required to do. See State v. Udin, 419 A.2d 251, 263 (R.I.1980) (although defendant’s failure to provide complete transcript “hampered our inquiry,” the record was nevertheless adequate to assess the merits of his argument on appeal).
*719Second, I do not agree that the instruction requested by defendant on force and coercion was “identical to the instruction given” by the trial justice.21 Part II-F, supra. With respect to force and coercion, defendant requested the following:
“Force or coercion means when the accused does any of the following:
“(i) Uses or threatens to use a weapon, or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a weapon.
“(ii) Overcomes the victim through the application of physical force or violence.
“(in) Coerces the victim to submit by threatening to use force or violence on the victim and the victim reasonably believes that the accused has the present ability to execute these threats,
“(iv) Coerces the victim to submit by threatening to at some time in the future murder, inflict serious bodily injury upon or kidnap the victim or any other person and the victim reasonably believes that the accused has the ability to execute this threat.”
In contrast to defendant’s requested instruction on the issue of force and coercion, the trial justice’s instruction contained language concerning implied threats. The trial justice instructed the jury as follows:
“Force or coercion means overcoming the victim through the application of physical force or violence against her will and without consent. It also includes compelling the victim to submit by threatening to use force or violence and the victim reasonably believed that the defendant had the present ability to carry out such threats.”
“The State need not prove that the defendant actually or by words spoken expressly threatened [Jane] because a threat may be implied as well as expressed. In other words, [Jane] need not have actually heard any threatening words in order for her to have been reasonably in fear of her assailant.”
It is noteworthy that contained in the trial justice’s instruction, but absent from defendant’s request, is language concerning implied threats. Therefore, I do not believe that Gardiner has waived his right to appeal on this issue.
Because Gardiner raised a timely objection, provided an adequate record of that objection, and did not waive his right to appeal this issue by requesting a similar instruction, I believe it is the obligation of this Court to assess the merits of his argument.
This Court previously has explained that “[w]hen instructing the jury, the trial justice ‘should reasonably set forth all of the salient and essential propositions of law that relate to material issues of fact which the evidence tends to support.’ ” State v. Fisher, 844 A.2d 112, 116 (R.I.2004) (quoting State v. LaRoche, 683 A.2d 989, 996-97 (R.I.1996)). We also have cautioned that “‘[t]he jury’s attention should not be directed to various propositions of law unless the record contains evidence which supports and requires it.’ ” Id.; see also Anter v. Ambeault 104 R.I. 496, 500, 245 A.2d 187, 139 (1968) (“it is improper for a trial justice to give [jury] instructions which are unsupported by the evidence in the record”).
Gardiner does not challenge the legal accuracy of the trial justice’s instruction that force or coercion may be based on *720express or implied threats, but instead argues that the instruction was improper in this case because there was no evidence that would support a conviction based on the use of threats. He maintains that his conviction should be reversed because the jury returned a general verdict, and therefore his conviction may be based on grounds not supported by the evidence.
It is apparent from the record that the testimony at trial does not support a finding of guilt based on the theory that Gard-iner used implied threats to compel Jane’s sexual submission.22 Therefore, the trial justice’s instructions to the jury should not have included this extraneous proposition of law. To evaluate the impact of this instruction, however, it is necessary to distinguish between jury instructions that are legally insufficient and those that are not factually supported by the evidence.
To support his argument that the trial justice’s instruction on threats justifies reversal of his conviction, defendant relies on State v. Chapman, 229 Conn. 529, 643 A.2d 1213 (1994), a case factually similar to the case before us. In that case, the Supreme Court of Connecticut upheld a defendant’s conviction after the trial justice instructed the jury that it could convict him for sexual assault if it found that he had compelled the victim’s sexual submission either by force or threat of force. Like Gardiner, Chapman argued that reversal of his conviction was warranted because the evidence did not support a conviction based on threats. Relying on an earlier Connecticut ease, State v. Williams, 202 Conn. 349, 521 A.2d 150 (1987), Chapman contended that instructing the jury on a factually unsupported theory of guilt was a violation of due process. However, the Supreme Court of Connecticut noted that after Williams was decided, the United States Supreme Court clarified the distinction between legally insufficient and factually insufficient jury instructions. See Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 112 S.Ct. 466, 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991). Because the instruction in Chapman was the latter, the court rejected Chapman’s argument and upheld his conviction.
In Griffin, the United States Supreme Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that her conviction should be set aside because the jury returned a general verdict after it was instructed that it could convict based on alternate grounds, one of which was not supported by the evidence. The Court explained:
“When * * * jurors have been left the option of relying upon a legally inadequate theory, there is no reason to think that their own intelligence and expertise will save them from that error. Quite the opposite is true, however, when they have been left the option of relying upon a factually inadequate theory, since jurors are well equipped to analyze the evidence * * *. ‘It is one thing to negate a verdict that, while supported by evidence, may have been based on an erroneous view of the law; it is another to do so merely on the chance — remote, it seems to us — that the jury convicted on a ground that was not supported by adequate evidence when there existed alternative grounds for which the evidence was sufficient.’ ” Griffin, 502 U.S. at 59-60, 112 S.Ct. 466 (quoting United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385, 1414 (7th Cir.1991)).
The distinction between factually insufficient and legally insufficient jury instructions was central to this Court’s holding in *721State v. McLaughlin, 621 A.2d 170, 176 (R.I.1993), in which we vacated a defendant’s involuntary manslaughter conviction and rejected the state’s argument that the jury instruction at issue was factually insufficient rather than legally incorrect. In that case, the jury was instructed that it could convict the defendant for manslaughter based on two alternate grounds, one of which was criminal negligence. We held that it was legally incorrect for the trial justice to instruct on criminal negligence in the absence of a legal duty to act on behalf of the deceased victim.
In this case, however, the trial justice’s instruction to the jury on sexual assault by use of implied threats was legally correct, even though conviction on such grounds was not supported by the evidence. But sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support a conviction based on penetration by force, coercion, or lack of consent because of Jane’s mental disability. In light of this evidence, it is highly improbable that the jury, which was required to unanimously agree not only on a verdict but also its reasoning,23 decided to convict Gardiner based upon a theory of guilt that was wholly unsupported by the evidence. See State v. Chapman, 229 Conn. 529, 643 A.2d 1213 (1994). For this reason, I do not believe that the trial justice’s instruction to the jury warrants reversal of his conviction, and therefore concur in the Court’s holding.

. After defendant's objection to the instruction on "page 15," the trial justice probed the merits of his objection by offering a hypothetical scenario on implied threats. Counsel responded by stating "[b]ut that’s not the testimony.”

. Indeed, the record contains defendant’s requested instruction with the trial justice’s handwritten "No” in the margin.

. I agree with the majority that because Gardiner requested a charge that contained an express threat element, he has waived any objection thereto, whether supported by the evidence or not.

. At the urging of defense counsel, the trial justice clarified that to find defendant guilty, the jurors must be unanimous not only in the result, but also in their reasoning. The trial justice explained that:
“[there are] two separate ways that the State can proceed to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. You may find that the State has proved one or the other or both, but your verdict must be unanimous!]* * *• All 12 [jurors] must agree on the means by which the statute was violated."