Court Opinion

ID: 9410415
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-21 07:00:17.409345+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:57.654749
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     NAVIN KALICHARAN,                               DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         NY-0752-16-0167-I-4

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,                          DATE: July 20, 2023
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Lawrence Berger, Esquire, Glen Cove, New York, for the appellant.

           Chad Y. Tang, Esquire, and Leslie A. Saint, Esquire, Washington, D.C., for
             the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The agency has filed a petition for review, and the appellant has filed a
     cross petition for review of the initial decision, which sustained the charge of
     violating the agency’s use of deadly force policy and mitigated the penalty of
     removal to a 60-day suspension. Kalicharan v. Department of Justice, MSPB

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                       2

     Docket No. NY-0752-16-0167-I-4, Appeal File (I-4 AF), Tab 28, Initial Decision
     (ID).     For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the petition for review,
     DENY the cross petition for review, AFFIRM the initial decision insofar as it
     found that the agency proved its misuse of weapon charge, and REVERSE the
     initial decision insofar as it mitigated the penalty of removal.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2            The appellant was employed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
     of the Department of Justice (DOJ) as a special agent. Kalicharan v. Department
     of Justice, MSPB Docket No. NY-0752-16-0167-I-3, Appeal File (I-3 AF),
     Tab 14 at 31. On July 18, 2012, he witnessed from a window on the second story
     of his home an individual breaking into his wife’s vehicle, which was parked in
     front of their house. Id. at 33. He reportedly shouted at the individual at least
     three times to step away from the vehicle, but the individual did not respond. Id.
     The appellant left the window area, retrieved his agency-issued firearm, and
     returned to the window to display the weapon for the individual to see,
     announcing himself as a law enforcement officer. I-3 AF, Tab 14 at 34, Tab 15
     at 77.    According to the appellant, as soon as he announced himself as a law
     enforcement officer, the individual turned towards him and dropped his left arm
     toward his waist. I-3 AF, Tab 14 at 44-45. The appellant then fired one round
     from his agency-issued firearm to stop the apparent threat. 2 Id. at 45.
¶3            The shooting was investigated by the New York Police Department (NYPD)
     and the Queens District Attorneys’ Office (QDAO). I-3 AF, Tab 14 at 88-98,
     Tab 16 at 35. The DOJ Civil Rights Division (DOJ CRD) and the United States
     Attorneys’ Office for the Eastern District of New York (USAO EDNY) also
     2
       The appellant’s shot hit the suspect on the right side of his lower back. I -3 AF,
     Tab 14 at 33. Although the suspect claimed that he was running away when the
     appellant shot him, id. at 94, there was no evidence to support that claim, as a
     reenactment of the scene and ballistic testing supported the appellant’s version of
     events, id. at 94-97.
                                                                                       3

     investigated the incident. I-3 AF, Tab 16 at 35, 41. The QDAO, DOJ CRD, and
     USAO EDNY all declined prosecution. I-3 AF, Tab 14 at 33, Tab 16 at 10, 31.
     Additionally, the agency’s Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG), an
     independent review committee that investigates all FBI shooting incidents to
     evaluate the use of deadly force, I-3 AF, Tab 15 at 273, Tab 16 at 19-236, and the
     Office of Inspector General (OIG) performed administrative investigations,
     I-3 AF, Tab 15 at 69-250. The OIG investigation included a compelled interview
     of the appellant under oath. Id. at 77-78.
¶4        The SIRG and, subsequently, the OIG investigations determined that the
     appellant violated the agency’s use of deadly force policy, finding that there were
     insufficient facts to show that it was reasonable for the appellant to believe that
     the suspect posed imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury to the
     appellant or his family. I-3 AF, Tab 15 at 73, Tab 16 at 12, 35, 40. The OIG
     referred the matter to the FBI’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) for
     possible administrative action. I-3 AF, Tab 15 at 68.
¶5        On April 15, 2015, OPR issued a Report of Investigation (ROI) finding tha t
     the appellant did not comply with the agency’s use of deadly force policy and
     recommending that the appellant be dismissed from the rolls of the FBI. I-3 AF,
     Tab 14 at 134.    On May 8, 2015, a Chief of Adjudication at OPR issued the
     appellant a proposed notice of removal on four charges: (1) misuse of weapon—
     intentional discharge; (2) unprofessional conduct —off duty; (3) violation of
     miscellaneous rules/regulations; and (4) lack of candor/lying —no oath.         Id.
     at 102-130. The appellant responded orally and in writing. Id. at 48-51, 67-81.
¶6        On December 8, 2015, the Assistant Director of OPR issued a final decision
     to remove the appellant from his position, sustaining charges one and four, but
     finding charges two and three to be unsubstantiated. Id. at 32, 52-60. In the
     penalty determination analysis, the deciding official found the appellant’s refusal
     to accept responsibility, his prior discipline regarding the loss of a weapon, and
                                                                                        4

     his refusal to cooperate in the investigations to be aggravating factors.         Id.
     at 61-63. The appellant’s removal was effective December 28, 2015. Id. at 31.
¶7         On January 25, 2016, the appellant filed an appeal with the Board.
     Kalicharan v. Department of Justice, MSPB Docket No. NY-0752-16-0167-I-1,
     Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1. On April 7, 2016, he also filed an appeal with
     the agency’s internal Disciplinary Review Board (DRB), a committee comprised
     of employees from various divisions within the FBI who meet on a regular basis
     to review employee appeals of OPR’s final decisions. I-3 AF, Tab 7-30; I-4 AF,
     Tab 24 at 44-45. The DRB met on October 18, 2016, to review the appellant’s
     removal, 3 I-4 AF, Tab 24 at 45, and on October 21, 2016, it found that OPR
     reasonably concluded that the appellant violated the agency’s use of deadly force
     policy, I-3 AF, Tab 14 at 4-6. However, it found that substantial evidence did not
     exist to support the lack of candor/lying—no oath charge. Id. It also appears to
     have limited the scope of the agency’s reliance on the appellant’s refusal to
     cooperate with investigations as an aggravating penalty factor.            Id. at 5.
     Specifically, the DRB referred only to the appellant’s failure to cooperate after
     his OIG interview.    Id.    This failure to cooperate consisted of the appellant’s
     refusal to participate in a reenactment of the shooting. I -3 AF, Tab 14 at 38 n.29;
     I-4 AF, Tab 24 at 41. The administrative judge and the parties adjudicated the
     case solely on the charge relating to the use of deadly force. 4
¶8         On May 3, 2018, the administrative judge issued an initial decision on the
     written record. 5 ID at 2.     She found that the agency proved by preponderant

     3
       The initial decision states that the DRB met on February 4, 2016. ID at 6. However,
     the record shows that the DRB met on October 18, 2016, to review the appellant’s
     removal. I-4 AF, Tab 24 at 45.
     4
       Because the parties have not disputed that this is the sole charge at issue, our
     discussion will be similarly focused.
     5
      The appellant withdrew his initial request for a hearing. IAF, Tab 1 at 2; I -4 AF,
     Tabs 20-21.
                                                                                         5

      evidence that the appellant did not have a reasonable belief of imminent danger of
      death or serious physical injury towards himself or his family when he shot the
      suspect.   ID at 11.    She also found there to be a clear nexus between the
      appellant’s misconduct and the efficiency of the service. ID at 14. However, she
      found that the agency’s reliance on the three aggravating factors in its penalty
      determination was in error, and she mitigated the penalty of removal to a 60 -day
      suspension. ID at 15-23. She also found that the appellant failed to prove his
      affirmative defense alleging a due process violation. ID at 23-24.
¶9         The agency has filed a petition for review arguing that the administrative
      judge erred in mitigating the penalty of removal to a 60 -day suspension. Petition
      for Review (PFR) File, Tab 3 at 8-17. The appellant has filed a cross petition for
      review, arguing that the administrative judge applied an incorrect standard in
      finding that the agency proved the charge and that she erred in finding that he did
      not prove his affirmative defense. PFR File, Tab 7 at 5-13, 20-22. The appellant
      has also responded to the agency’s petition for review. Id. at 13-20, 22-23. The
      agency has filed a response to the appellant’s cross petition for review and a reply
      to the appellant’s response to its petition for review. PFR File, Tabs 11 -12.

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
      The agency proved the charge misuse of a weapon —intentional discharge by
      preponderant evidence.
¶10        The agency charged the appellant with intentionally firing his weapon
      outside the scope of the Deadly Force Policy, in violation of FBI Offense Code
      5.15 (Misuse of Weapon—Intentional Discharge). I-3 AF, Tab 14 at 102. The
      Deadly Force Policy only permits the use of deadly force “when necessary, that
      is, when the officer has a reasonable belief that the subject of such force poses an
      imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to another person. ” I-3 AF,
      Tab 15 at 256. The agency defines “reasonable belief” as being synonymous with
      probable cause and looks to “the totality of the facts and circumstances known to
                                                                                              6

      [the officer] at the time, and the logical inferences that may be drawn from them. ”
      I-3 AF, Tab 14 at 52, 152.
¶11         In removing the appellant, the deciding official relied on the SIRG and OIG
      reports, which both concluded that it was not objectively reasonable for the
      appellant to believe that the suspect posed imminent danger of death or serious
      bodily injury to him or his family.        I-3 AF, Tab 14 at 53-55.        The deciding
      official agreed with the SIRG’s and OIG’s questioning of the appellant’s
      judgment to point his weapon at the suspect over a property crime. Id. at 53-54.
      She considered the appellant’s claim that the suspect had moved his hand near his
      waist and began to turn towards the appellant when the appellant shot him. Id.
      at 55. However, she found that, given the appellant’s distance from the suspect,
      his use of a deadly weapon was not objectively reasonable. Id. at 55-56.
¶12         In the initial decision, the administrative judge agreed with the agency that
      the appellant did not have a reasonable belief that the suspect posed an imminent
      danger of death or serious physical injury towards him or his family when he shot
      from his second-floor window.         ID at 11.    Specifically, she agreed with the
      agency that a reasonable law enforcement officer would not have believed himself
      to be in imminent danger based on the facts and circumstances at issue here. Id.
      In making this finding, she credited the appellant’s description of the events
      immediately before and during the shooting. ID at 10 -11, 13.
¶13         In his cross petition for review, the appellant argues that the administrative
      judge did not correctly apply the standard set forth in Graham v. Connor,
      490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989), which provides that whether an officer violates the
      Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable seizures by using excessive
      force is determined from the standpoint of a “reasonable officer on the scene.” 6

      6
        In the initial decision, the administrative judge appears to have construed the
      appellant’s argument to be that a subjective, rather than an objective, standard should
      apply, and that the agency should have been limited to considering the propriety of the
      use of force exclusively from the perspective of the appellant at the moment he fired th e
                                                                                         7

      PFR File, Tab 7 at 5-6. The Court explained that “the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry is
      an objective one.”    Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.       Thus, the particular officer’s
      motivations are not relevant. Id. In furtherance of his argument that his use of
      force was reasonable under Graham, the appellant restates the circumstances
      surrounding the shooting. PFR File, Tab 7 at 10-12. The administrative judge
      acknowledged most of these facts as not in dispute. ID at 8 -9. To the extent the
      appellant is arguing that the administrative judge failed to consider his assertions
      as to what occurred, we are not persuaded. An administrative judge’s failure to
      discuss all of the evidence specifically does not mean that she did not consider it
      in reaching her decision. Marques v. Department of Health and Human Services,
      22 M.S.P.R. 129, 132 (1984), aff’d, 776 F.2d 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Table).
¶14        As to the appellant’s argument regarding the standard in Graham, we agree
      with the administrative judge that although the SIRG relied on language from
      Graham, the agency was not required to prove that the appellant violated the
      suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights in order to prove its charge . ID at 8 n.8. An
      agency may “establish and enforce reasonable rules governing the workplace .”
      Jonson v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 122 M.S.P.R. 454, ¶ 18 (2015)
      (quoting Carosella v. U.S. Postal Service, 816 F.2d 638, 642 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
      In other contexts, the Board has recognized that the inclusion in an agency’s
      policy of terms that also appear in a statutory context does not require it to prove
      that the employee committed a statutory violation. See id., ¶ 18 (observing that
      an agency is not required to prove an appellant violated Title VII when it charges
      him with violating its own policy or rule on sexual harassment). T he agency’s
      policy on the use of deadly force does not cite to Graham or to the Fourth

      shot. ID at 12; I-4 AF, Tab 27 at 9. Although his petition for review now seems to
      argue that an objective standard applies under Graham, he nonetheless appears to
      conflate the objective and subjective standard, arguing on review that there is no
      evidence to suggest that “he did not subjectively believe that, at the moment of
      discharge, the suspect had a gun.” PFR File, Tab 7 at 13.
                                                                                         8

      Amendment. I-3 AF, Tab 13 at 256-57. Thus, we discern no basis to require the
      agency to prove that the appellant violated the constitutional prohibition on
      unreasonable seizure and decline to distinguish the appellant’s situation from that
      of the officers in Graham or other Fourth Amendment cases that he cites. PFR
      File, Tab 1 at 5-12. Although the SIRG appears to have discussed the standards
      in Graham, that body investigates all FBI shooting incidents, including those that
      are referred for criminal prosecution in which a Fourth Amendment discussion is
      relevant. I-3 AF, Tab 15 at 273.
¶15        In its notice of proposed removal, the agency charged the appellant with a
      violation of its policy on the use of deadly force. I-3 AF, Tab 14 at 102. The
      proposing official did not rely on the Fourth Amendment or case law interpreting
      that amendment in finding that the appellant violated this policy.     Id. at 102,
      118-22. Although he referred to Graham, it was in the context of discussing the
      SIRG’s deliberations.    Id. at 121-22.    Similarly, the deciding official cited
      Graham and other Fourth Amendment cases in response to the appellant’s reply
      to the proposed removal. Id. at 50-58. However, her conclusion was that the
      appellant violated the agency’s policy, not the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 58. To
      the extent that the agency discussed Graham in its investigations or as
      background information in its proposed removal and removal decisi on, we decline
      to find that the agency was, as a result, bound by that case. See Otero v. U.S.
      Postal Service, 73 M.S.P.R. 198, 203-04 (1997) (declining to require an agency to
      prove that the appellant made a “threat” when it characterized his improper
      misconduct a number of ways in the charging letter, including as “threatening”).
¶16        We also agree with the administrative judge that the ap pellant violated the
      agency’s deadly force policy. ID at 7-13. At the point when he shot the suspect,
      the appellant estimated that the horizontal distance between himself and the
      suspect was approximately 30 feet, and the vertical distance was between 10 and
      25 feet. I-3 AF, Tab 14 at 41, 44-45. Although the appellant asserts that he had
      knowledge that his neighborhood was a high crime area, he did not tell
                                                                                           9

      investigators that he observed the suspect in any clothing he knew to be indicative
      of a local street gang, and the record does not otherwise indicate that he knew
      whether the suspect had a criminal history.          I-3 AF, Tab 15 at 79.    Further,
      although he claims his home had “multiple points of entry” for bullets, he does
      not provide any explanation for his purported belief that the suspect could reach
      him through these entry points. PFR File, Tab 3 at 11. We find that under these
      circumstances, his use of deadly force was not reasonable.          Accordingly, we
      affirm the administrative judge’s ruling in that regard, and we deny the
      appellant’s cross petition for review. 7

      The administrative judge improperly mitigated the penalty of removal to a 60-day
      suspension.
¶17         The administrative judge found that the agency failed to properly consider
      the   appropriate   Douglas    factors.    ID   at    15-21;   Douglas   v.   Veterans
      Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981) (providing a nonexhaustive list of
      factors that are relevant for consideration in determining the appropriateness of a
      penalty). Therefore, she reweighed the relevant factors, concluding that a 60 -day
      suspension was the maximum reasonable penalty. ID at 21 -23. On review, the
      agency argues that it correctly applied the Douglas factors and that the
      administrative judge’s mitigation of the penalty was in error. PFR File, Tab 3

      7
        In the appellant’s cross petition for review, he disputes the SIRG’s findings. PFR
      File, Tab 7 at 7. For example, he argues that the SIRG concluded that he had a duty to
      retreat, which conflicts with the standard set forth in Graham. I-3 AF, Tab 16 at 13.
      As previously discussed however, the appellant was not charged with a constitutional
      violation, and therefore, Graham does not apply. See supra ¶¶ 14-15; ID at 8 n.8. The
      administrative judge considered this argument and the appellant’s other arguments
      regarding the SIRG report and found them to be without merit. ID at 11-12. The
      appellant has not demonstrated any error in this finding, and we find no reason to
      disturb it. See Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 105-06 (1997) (finding
      no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s findings when she considered the
      evidence as a whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made reasone d conclusions).
                                                                                          10

      at 8-17.   We agree in part and find that removal is the maximum reasonable
      penalty for the appellant’s misconduct.
¶18         When the Board sustains all of the charges, it will review an
      agency-imposed penalty only to determine if the agency considered all of the
      relevant factors and exercised management discretion within toler able limits of
      reasonableness. Portner v. Department of Justice, 119 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 10 (2013),
      overruled on other grounds by Singh v. U.S. Postal Service, 2022 MSPB 15, ¶ 17.
      In doing so, the Board gives due deference to the agency’s discretion in
      exercising its managerial function of maintaining employee discipline and
      efficiency.   Id.   It is not the Board’s function to displace management’s
      responsibility or to decide what penalty it would impose, but to ensure that
      management judgment has been properly exercised and that the penalty selected
      by the agency does not exceed the maximum limits of reasonableness . Id. Thus,
      the Board will modify a penalty only when it finds that the agency failed to weigh
      the relevant factors or that the penalty the agency imposed clearly exceeded the
      bounds of reasonableness. 8 Id.
¶19         Here, the agency imposed the penalty of removal due to the following three
      aggravating factors:     the appellant’s refusal to accept responsibility, prior
      discipline, and refusal to cooperate with the investigations.        I-3 AF, Tab 14
      at 61-63; see Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 305-06. The administrative judge found that
      the agency improperly considered these Douglas factors as aggravating factors
      and mitigated the penalty of removal to a 60-day suspension. ID at 16-21. As
      discussed below, we agree with the administrative judge as to some, but not all,
      of these factors.    We reverse her finding that a 60 -day suspension was the
      maximum reasonable penalty.

      8
        On review, neither party disputes the administrative judge’s finding of nexus between
      the appellant’s misconduct and the efficiency of the service. ID at 14. PFR File, Tab 7
      at 4 n.4. We discern no basis to disturb this finding.
                                                                                        11

            The administrative judge erred in finding that the appellant’s refusal to
            accept responsibility was not an aggravating factor.
¶20         In the decision to remove the appellant, the deciding official stated that she
      considered the appellant’s refusal to accept responsibility for violating the policy
      as an aggravating factor, and the DRB agreed. I-3 AF, Tab 14 at 5, 61-62. In the
      initial decision, the administrative judge found that this consideration was
      inappropriate because the Board has held that it is improper to consider an
      appellant’s denial of misconduct as an aggravating factor.         ID at 17 (citing
      Fowler v. U.S. Postal Service, 77 M.S.P.R. 8, 15 (1997)). Thus, she concluded
      that it is also inappropriate to consider an appellant’s lack of remorse for the
      misconduct when that lack of remorse is a consequence of his denial of the
      misconduct. ID at 17 (citing Smith v. Department of the Navy, 62 M.S.P.R. 616,
      621 (1994)).
¶21         On review, the agency points to several Board cases that state that it is
      appropriate to consider the effect that an appellant’s refusal to take responsibility
      has on his potential for rehabilitation. PFR File, Tab 3 at 11. It observes that the
      deciding official and the DRB both expressed concern that the appellant’s lack of
      remorse suggested that he would display the same lack of judgment in the future.
      Id. at 11-12; I-3 AF, Tab 14 at 62. The agency also argues that the case cited by
      the administrative judge to support her conclusion that the agency incorrectly
      applied this factor, Smith, 62 M.S.P.R. 616, relied on a case, Walsh v. Department
      of Veterans Affairs, 62 M.S.P.R. 586, 595-96 (1994), that was subsequently
      overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court, LaChance v. Erickson, 522 U.S. 262
      (1998); PFR File, Tab 3 at 10 n.5. We agree.
¶22         In LaChance, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Board and the U.S.
      Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit that an agency could not use an
      employee’s false denials in selecting the penalty or as a basis for a misconduct
      charge. 522 U.S. at 264-65. The Court concluded that the Fifth Amendment right
      to remain silent does not prohibit an agency from taking action against an
                                                                                       12

      employee for false statements. Id. at 266-68. An employee’s rationalizations and
      lack of remorse for proven misconduct indicate little rehabil itative potential and
      are properly considered as aggravating factors. Neuman v. U.S. Postal Service,
      108 M.S.P.R. 200, ¶ 26 (2008).         In the instant case, the deciding official
      explained that the appellant’s failure to admit his actions were objectively
      unreasonable caused her to believe he would “never be able to candidly examine
      [his] actions and acknowledge [his] mistakes.”      I-3 AF, Tab 14 at 61.       She
      expressed the concern that his conduct could recur. Id. at 62. We agree that the
      appellant’s failure to apologize or acknowledge any wrongdoing suggested he
      would repeat similar misconduct in the future. Accordingly, it was appropriate to
      consider the appellant’s denial and lack of remorse as aggravating factors.

            The appellant’s prior discipline was properly considered to the extent it
            reflected on his potential for rehabilitation.
¶23        Within 1 year after the shooting incident at issue in this appeal, the
      appellant received a 3-day suspension for loss of his weapon. I-3 AF, Tab 14
      at 61. The loss resulted from the appellant’s leaving the weapon in the trunk of a
      vehicle parked in the same neighborhood as the shooting incident.         Id.   The
      appellant appealed the suspension, but it was upheld, effective December 12,
      2014. I-3 AF, Tab 15 at 59. Both the deciding official and the DRB considered
      this suspension as an aggravating factor. I-3 AF, Tab 14 at 5, 61; I-4 AF, Tab 24
      at 23-24. The administrative judge found that it was inappropriate to consider
      discipline for conduct that occurred 1 year after the July 18, 2012 shooting
      incident. ID at 18 (citing Cantu v. Department of the Treasury, 88 M.S.P.R. 253,
      ¶ 6 (2001) (finding that an agency erred in considering as part of the appellant’s
      past disciplinary record a suspension that was imposed after the incident on which
      the agency based his removal). We agree.
¶24        Citing a nonprecedential Board decision, the agency claims that there is no
      requirement that it consider only discipline for conduct that predates the instant
      misconduct.     Id.   at   13.   The    agency’s   arguments   are   unconvincing.
                                                                                         13

      Nonprecedential decisions are not binding on the Board except when they have a
      preclusive effect on the parties. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c)(2). Thus, we decline to
      consider the nonprecedential decision on which the agency relies. However, we
      modify the administrative judge’s finding to the extent the deciding official relied
      on the past misconduct to illustrate the appellant’s lack of rehabilitative potential.
      I-3 AF, Tab 14 at 61; I-4 AF, Tab 24 at 41-42. In particular, the deciding official
      found that the conduct underlying the appellant’s 3-day suspension showed he
      still had “not learned appropriate weapon handling and safet y.” I-3 AF, Tab 14
      at 61.     We find this to be a relevant and proper consideration in the penalty
      determination. See Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 305.

               The appellant’s declination of an agency request to reenact the shooting
               did not constitute a failure to cooperate with an investigation.
¶25            The agency also considered the appellant’s refusal to cooperate with the
      investigations as an aggravating factor. I-3 AF, Tab 14 at 61. Specifically, the
      agency asserted that, when it conducted the appellant’s compelled interview with
      the OIG, he was advised that he could be subject to disciplinary action, including
      dismissal, if he refused to answer or reply truthfully to each question. I-3 AF,
      Tab 15 at 102, 135; I-4 AF, Tab 24 at 30. At the end of the interview, the OIG
      asked the appellant if he and his wife would be willing to reenact the event at his
      home. I-3 AF, Tab 15 at 243. The appellant declined. I-3 AF, Tab 14 at 48. The
      agency then included his failure to cooperate in an investigation as an aggravating
      factor in his penalty analysis. Id. at 61.
¶26            The administrative judge acknowledged that an appellant can be removed
      for failure to cooperate in an investigation when, as here, he receives assurance
      that his statements will not be used against him in a criminal proceeding. 9 ID

      9
        In Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967), the Supreme Court held
      unconstitutional the use of statements obtained under threat of removal from office in
      subsequent criminal proceedings.
                                                                                        14

      at 20-21; Modrowski v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 252 F.3d 1344, 1350-51
      (Fed. Cir. 2001).     The administrative judge found that the appellant was only
      advised of his options to answer under the granted immunity or to remain silent
      and face dismissal with respect to the questions asked of him at the OIG interview
      and that there was no evidence that the notice extended to a declination of a
      request for a reenactment. ID at 21. As such, she found that the agency erred in
      using the appellant’s decision not to agree to the OIG’s request as an aggravating
      factor. Id.
¶27         On review, the agency argues that it was proper to consider the appellant’s
      failure to cooperate with the OIG investigation by declining a reenactment
      because he was informed that he would not be prosecuted by either local or
      Federal prosecutors and was provided “the appropriate notification regarding
      immunity and the requirement to respond to the questions.”          PFR File, Tab 3
      at 15-17.     In requesting that the appellant and his wife participate in a
      reenactment, the investigator stated at the end of the interview:

                  The only other thing that I have going forward, and that, that we
                  would like to request, and again, this is a request. Is we would
                  like to interview your wife, and if you would be willing to reenact
                  the, the event at your, at your residence, we would be interested
                  in doing that as well, going forward, just trying to document all
                  the facts. That’s a request. Okay?

      I-3 AF, Tab 15 at 243. The administrative judge found that the appellant was not
      on notice that his refusal to participate in the reenactment could result in
      discipline. ID at 21. After considering the language of the agency’s requests, we
      find that it created an impression that the appellant would suffer no consequences
      for his refusal.     Accordingly, we agree that the declination of the agency’s
                                                                                           15

      request did not constitute a refusal to cooperate and should not have been used as
      an aggravating factor. 10

            The agency-selected penalty of removal was reasonable.
¶28         In mitigating the penalty of removal to a 60-day suspension the
      administrative judge considered the agency’s guidelines for discipline, which
      state that the standard penalty for a violation of FBI Offense Code 5.15 (Misuse
      of Weapon—Intentional Discharge) is a 30-day suspension. ID at 21; I-3 AF,
      Tab 14 at 61.      Mitigating factors warrant a 5- to 14-day suspension, and
      aggravating factors warrant a 45-day suspension to dismissal. ID at 22; I-3 AF,
      Tab 14 at 61. The administrative judge concluded that, because the aggravating
      factors should not have been applied, but the offense was still a serious one, a
      60-day suspension was at the maximum reasonable penalty. ID at 22 -23.
¶29         On review, the agency argues that, even if the above factors were
      incorrectly considered to be aggravating, the nature and seriousness of the
      misconduct and the higher standard of conduct imposed on law enforcement
      officers still warrant removal. PFR File, Tab 3 at 8-10, 12-15. As discussed
      above, we found that the agency properly relied on the appellant’s denial of the
      misconduct and his lack of remorse and rehabilitative potential as aggrav ating

      10
         The appellant claims in his cross petition for review that the agency’s consideration
      of his alleged failure to cooperate as an aggravating factor also constituted a Fifth
      Amendment violation, which protects his right against self -incrimination. PFR File,
      Tab 7 at 20-22. The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to establish
      that either the Fifth Amendment or Garrity is applicable to a situation in which an
      appellant refuses a request to perform a voluntary reenactment unless otherwise
      specified. ID at 23. We agree. We have found that the appellant was informed his
      participation in the reenactment was voluntary. The privilege against self-incrimination
      applies when testimony is compelled. See DiMasso v. Department of Transportation,
      735 F.2d 526, 528 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (explaining that an employee’s Fifth Amendment
      right against self-incrimination was not violated when he was not required to answer the
      question posed to him in order to retain his job). Because the appellant was not
      threatened with any consequence, his decision not to reenact the shooting was not
      compelled.
                                                                                      16

      factors.   See supra ¶¶ 22, 24.    Further, it is well established that the most
      important factor in assessing an agency’s selected penalty is the nature and
      seriousness of the offense and its relation to the employee’s duties, position, and
      responsibilities. Martin v. Department of Transportation, 103 M.S.P.R. 153, 157
      (2006), aff’d per curiam, 224 F. App’x 974 (Fed. Cir. 2007).         The deciding
      official emphasized that the appellant’s misconduct was directly related to the
      agency’s mission and the appellant’s ability to exercise reasonable use of force in
      the performance of his duties in the future. I-3 AF, Tab 14 at 61-62. It is also
      well established that an agency is entitled to hold law enforcement officers to a
      higher standard of conduct than other Federal employees.              O’Lague v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 340, ¶ 20 (2016), aff’d per curiam,
      698 F. App’x 1034 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
¶30         Based on the foregoing, we reverse the administrative judge’s mitigation of
      the penalty and find the agency-selected penalty of removal to be reasonable. See
      Mahan v. Department of the Treasury, 89 M.S.P.R. 140, ¶¶ 2, 11-12 (2001)
      (upholding an agency-imposed penalty of removal when an employee fired her
      agency-issued weapon while off duty during a domestic dispute); Kranz v.
      Department of Justice, 62 M.S.P.R. 630, 634-37 (finding removal to be
      reasonable when an appellant violated state law by carrying his gun, which
      discharged during an off-duty altercation), aff’d per curiam, 43 F.3d 1486 (Fed.
      Cir. 1994); Hylton v. Department of Transportation, 13 M.S.P.R. 335, 337-38,
      340 (1982) (sustaining a removal when a supervisory police officer discharged his
      weapon twice at an airport in an attempt to apprehend a fleeing suspect
      notwithstanding 20 years of service and the fact that only the suspect was injured
      as a result of his actions).
¶31         Accordingly, we grant the agency’s petition for review, deny the appellant’s
      cross petition for review, and reverse the initial decision insofar as it mitigated
      the penalty. We affirm the appellant’s removal.
                                                                                     17

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 11
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.     You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of yo ur case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your c ase, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.             5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

11
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have upda ted
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                       18

      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeal s for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court   at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for t he Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim     of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.      5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination base d on
                                                                                19

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower    Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
                                                                                     20

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice describe d in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 12   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

12
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                           21

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.