Court Opinion

ID: 9840046
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 00:00:45.94156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:06:14.937966
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60651         Document: 00516895510             Page: 1      Date Filed: 09/14/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                      ____________                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                                                                       FILED
                                       No. 22-60651
                                                                              September 14, 2023
                                     Summary Calendar
                                     ____________                                 Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                       Clerk
   Victor Manuel Alvarez,

                                                                                  Petitioner,

                                             versus

   Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,

                                                                                Respondent.
                      ______________________________

                         Petition for Review of an Order of the
                             Board of Immigration Appeals
                               Agency No. A078 859 591
                      ______________________________

   Before Jones, Southwick, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          Victor Manuel Alvarez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for
   review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing
   his appeal and affirming the immigration judge’s (IJ’s) denial of his request
   for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-60651       Document: 00516895510            Page: 2      Date Filed: 09/14/2023

                                       No. 22-60651

          This court reviews the BIA’s decision and considers the IJ’s decision
   only to the extent it influenced the BIA. Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d
   511, 517 (5th Cir. 2012). The BIA’s factual findings are reviewed for
   substantial evidence, and its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Id. The
   substantial evidence test “requires only that the BIA’s decision be supported
   by record evidence and be substantially reasonable.” Omagah v. Ashcroft, 288
   F.3d 254, 258 (5th Cir. 2002). This court will not reverse the BIA’s factual
   findings unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion.                  Chen v.
   Gonzalez, 470 F.3d 1131, 1134 (5th Cir. 2006). The petitioner has the burden
   of showing that the evidence is so compelling that no reasonable factfinder
   could reach a contrary conclusion.” Id.
          Alvarez argues that the Government should be equitably estopped
   from denying his citizenship given that it took four years to adjudicate his
   adoptive father’s naturalization application and another two years to process
   Alvarez’s application for an adjustment of status. Because the BIA did not
   have jurisdiction over Alvarez’s equitable estoppel claim, we review the issue
   de novo. See Robertson-Dewar v. Holder, 646 F.3d 226, 229 (5th Cir. 2011).
          Alvarez has not alleged that the Government purposefully “delayed
   ruling on [his] application with the intent of not acting therein until he had
   aged out of the statute.” Robertson-Dewar, 646 F.3d at 230; see 8 U.S.C.
   § 1431(a).    Moreover, even if we were to agree with Alvarez that the
   processing delays in his case were unreasonable and/or unwarranted, delays
   alone are not sufficient to demonstrate affirmative misconduct on the part of
   the Government. 1 See INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, 19 (1982) (“Proof only
          _____________________
          1
            Alvarez argues that the Government’s conduct in his case amounted to more than
   mere negligence and delay because of systematic backlogs existing at the former
   Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) during the time that his adoptive father’s
   naturalization application was pending. But even the alleged systematic nature of the
   delays within the INS does not demonstrate anything more than “negligence, delay,

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                                          No. 22-60651

   that the Government failed to process promptly an application falls far short
   of establishing such conduct.”); see also Robertson-Dewar, 646 F.3d at 230
   (requiring affirmative misconduct “that goes beyond mere negligence or
   delay”).
           In the alternative, Alvarez argues that this court should exercise its
   equitable powers to treat his application for an adjustment of status as being
   approved on the date it was filed, when he was 16 years old. But treating
   Alvarez’s application for an adjustment of status as approved on the date he
   filed it would contravene the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1255(b). Thus,
   equitable tolling in Alvarez’s case would be inconsistent with the Supreme
   Court’s statement that “[n]either by application of the doctrine of estoppel,
   nor by invocation of equitable powers, nor by any other means does a court
   have the power to confer citizenship in violation of [the statute’s]
   limitations.” INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 885 (1988).
           Alvarez also argues that the IJ erred in denying his request for deferral
   of removal based on an adverse credibility determination, which was upheld
   by the BIA. 2 Credibility determinations are factual findings that this court
   reviews for substantial evidence. Morales v. Sessions, 860 F.3d 812, 817 (5th
   Cir. 2017).

           _____________________
   inaction, or failure to follow an internal agency guideline.” Robertson-Dewar, 646 F.3d at
   229. Moreover, as the Government notes, the systematic nature of the problems at INS
   tends to show that Alvarez’s application was not singled out for disparate treatment, but
   was simply caught up in an inefficient Government agency.
           2
              Despite Alvarez’s prior conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to
   distribute cocaine, the criminal-alien jurisdictional bar in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) does not
   preclude this court from reviewing factual challenges to the BIA’s CAT order.
   See Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2020); see also Tibakweitira v. Wilkinson, 986
   F.3d 905, 911 (5th Cir. 2021).

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                                     No. 22-60651

          The IJ found that Alvarez’s testimony regarding how he became
   involved in the drug trafficking conspiracy was directly contradicted by the
   factual proffer from his criminal case. The factual proffer states the following
   in relevant part:
          ALVAREZ further explained that he had been held responsible
          for the theft of $1.9 million dollars by another individual from
          a Mexican cocaine trafficker in Chicago known as “Guero”
          (ZEPEDA) and that as a result, he was sent to Florida to par-
          ticipate in the planned cocaine deal as a way to repay the debt.
   Alvarez testified that his former roommate Angel Lopez had stolen $1.9
   million from the cartel and that this theft had led to Alvarez’s involvement in
   drug trafficking. This testimony, the IJ found, was directly contradicted by
   the factual proffer from Alvarez’s criminal case, which according to the IJ’s
   reading, indicated that Zepeda had stolen the cartel’s money, not Lopez.
          Alvarez responds that the IJ’s reading of the factual proffer is clearly
   erroneous. He claims that he never told federal agents that Zepeda stole the
   cartel’s money. He maintains that the money was stolen from Zepeda by
   Lopez, which is consistent with his testimony before the IJ.
          Though the factual proffer is not a model of clarity, the IJ’s finding
   that Alvarez’s testimony was inconsistent with the proffer is reasonable given
   that the factual proffer states that the $1.9 million was stolen “by another
   individual” without any mention of Lopez. Further, Alvarez’s possible
   alternate reading of the evidence is insufficient to show that the record
   compels the conclusion that Alvarez testified credibly. See Chen, 470 F.3d at
   1134; see also Revencu v. Sessions, 895 F.3d 396, 401 (5th Cir. 2018).
          Alvarez also challenges the IJ’s reliance on his failure to assert his
   claim of coercion during his criminal case as a basis for finding that he was
   not credible. Though Alvarez testified that he was “recruited” into the drug
   trafficking organization by the two men who threatened him at his apartment,

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   the IJ noted that there was no mention of coercion in either the factual proffer
   or in the transcript from Alvarez’s sentencing hearing. The IJ also found it
   “very significant” that Alvarez’s alleged coercion was not addressed at
   sentencing given that a claim of coercion would tend to mitigate Alvarez’s
   culpability and could serve as a basis for a downward sentencing departure
   under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.12.
          Alvarez responds that he did not discuss the alleged coercion at
   sentencing because his codefendants were present.           The Government
   contends that this response is illogical given that a U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 motion
   had been filed, and Alvarez knew that his cooperation would be discussed at
   sentencing. Even if Alvarez’s response were logical, however, “[n]either an
   IJ nor the BIA is required to accept a petitioner’s explanation for [the] plain
   inconsistencies in [his] story.” Morales, 860 F.3d at 817 (internal quotation
   marks and citation omitted). As such, the IJ reasonably relied on the
   unsupported nature of Alvarez’s testimony that he was coerced into joining
   the drug conspiracy. See Omagah, 288 F.3d at 258.
          The IJ also found that Alvarez was not credible because he omitted
   from his testimony any discussion of his plan to steal cocaine from the drug
   trafficking organization. Alvarez argues that the IJ’s reliance on this omission
   was improper because he had not been confronted with it at his removal
   hearing or been given an opportunity to explain on the record. See Nkenglefac
   v. Garland, 34 F.4th 422, 429 (5th Cir. 2022).
          The BIA did not explicitly address Alvarez’s confrontation argument
   in adopting the IJ’s adverse credibility finding. The BIA did, however,
   endorse the IJ’s reliance on the omission in finding that Alvarez was not
   credible.   Nonetheless, because the other specific discrepancies and
   omissions relied on by the IJ and discussed in the BIA’s decision are sufficient
   to support the adverse credibility determination, any error in the IJ’s reliance

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                                    No. 22-60651

   on this omission is not sufficient to warrant reversal of the BIA’s adverse
   credibility finding. See Chen, 470 F.3d at 1134.
          Alvarez has failed to demonstrate that, under the totality of these
   circumstances, no reasonable factfinder could make an adverse credibility
   ruling in his case. See Morales, 860 F.3d at 817. Substantial evidence
   therefore supports the BIA’s adverse credibility determination. See id.
   Without credible evidence, the BIA had no basis to grant Alvarez’s request
   for CAT relief. See Chun v. INS, 40 F.3d 76, 79 (5th Cir. 1994). As such, we
   need not consider Alvarez’s arguments related to the BIA’s alternative
   finding that even if Alvarez were credible, he had failed to show that he was
   eligible for protection under the CAT See Efe v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 899, 907-
   08 (5th Cir. 2002).
          The petition for review is DENIED.

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