Court Opinion

ID: 9721449
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:59:42.118859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:25.979622
License: Public Domain

GRODIN, J., Dissenting.
With all respect for my colleagues, I view this case as indistinguishable from Burkholder v. Superior Court (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 421 [158 Cal.Rptr. 86], as regards the validity of the second search; and I believe People v. Cook (1978) 22 Cal.3d 67 [148 Cal.Rptr. 605, 583 P.2d 130], precludes the rationale relied upon in the alternative by Justice Elkington (but forming the sole basis for Justice Newsom’s opinion) that the validity of the second search is irrelevant to the admissibility of the evidence. I therefore dissent.
There is in this case little if any dispute concerning the facts. I quote from the parties’ stipulated description of Soli’s land, the road leading to it, and the clearing where the entrails were found:
“Number one, that Joseph Soli owns assessor’s parcel number 14-430-45; and, 14-430-46. That this consists of a [sic] 160 acres, more or less. That the property is located approximately three miles southwest of Laytonville. That the property is accessible by road only from Highway 101 and then only through a gate with a lock on it. That from the locked gate to Soli’s land is approximately four miles across the rough road. That the road passes through Charles Sizemore’s lands, then through a gate to another person’s land and then to Soli’s property. That the parcel between Soli’s and Sizemore’s land is approximately 160 acres in size. That near Soli’s southern property line the *86same road meets a locked cable gate on Soli’s land and that this gate is maintained by Soli.
“That Soli has a ‘private property keep out’ sign on a tree visible from the cabled gate. That after passing through the cable gate in a northerly direction one passes through a grove of trees for approximately 200 feet before coming to a clearing which is enclosed on all sides by trees, where Soli maintains a trailer home, a cabin and other out structures.
“That a portion of Soli’s land along the south end of the grove of trees which would be near the gate is fenced, that the clearing is not visible from any neighboring lands. That there are no other roads, public or private, which leads [s/c] to the clearing or to the grove of trees. That the clearing and grove of trees are surrounded on the west, north and east by steep terrain. And finally, that all observations, photos, tangible evidence and statements by the defendants were the fruits of the initial intrusion by Deputy Rakes on January 25, 1979.”
It is undisputed that the entrails were found at the edge of the clearing, only 20 or 30 feet from the cabin. Soli testified that he located the cabin and trailer in the clearing for privacy reasons, and that he lived there on weekends. In addition to the “private property keep out” sign described in the stipulation, there was a “no trespassing” sign on the gate itself.
We are not dealing, therefore, with “open fields”; we are dealing with a trespass into someone’s private and enclosed yard adjacent to his weekend residence, under circumstances in which the owner has clearly and unmistakably indicated his desire to be left alone. Unless people waive their right of privacy by choosing to live in a rural area, it seems to me that Soli’s Fourth Amendment interest is quite substantial.
Soli’s privacy interest is, in any event, at least as great as that of the defendant in Burkholder. Indeed, it would be difficult to find two cases so similar on the facts. I quote from that opinion: “Herein, petitioner clearly entertained a subjective expectation of privacy in cultivating the marijuana patch on the property leased by him and under physical circumstances precluding visual detection from abutting property. Entry to the property was openly restricted by posted signs along, and locked gates across, the rural access road signifying an intention to deny access to the public in general, including government agents. (Cf. People v. *87Krivda (1971) 5 Cal.3d 357, 367... [overruled on other grounds, People v. Kaanehe (1977) 19 Cal.3d 1, 11, fn. 6..., and Madril v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 73, 77...]; People v. Sneed, supra, 32 Cal.App.3d 535, 542 [108 Cal.Rptr. 146].) The patch itself, located upon the side of a hilly area surrounded by trees, was totally concealed from view at ground level. The existence of the travel trailer supports an inference that petitioner at least occasionally resided upon the leased property. Unlike the factual circumstances disclosed in the cases upon which the People rely (People v. Superior Court (Stroud), supra, 37 Cal.App.3d 836 [112 Cal.Rptr. 764] [contraband in plain view from adjoining property]; Dean v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.App.3d 112 [110 Cal.Rptr. 585] [public view of marijuana growth from a vantage point on a ‘well-worn’ foot path apparently open to public use]; People v. Little, supra, 33 Cal.App.3d 552 [109 Cal.Rptr. 196] [property contiguous to highway and public facilities in a suspected crime area]), the marijuana patch was not in plain view and became observable only through a flagrant disregard of well-recognized ‘indicia’ or ‘badges of private ownership’ intended to exclude the general public. Nor were any unrestricted common areas or adjoining trails shown to exist inviting access to any part of the subject property. (Cf. Phelan v. Superior Court, supra, 90 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1011-1012 [153 Cal.Rptr. 738].) [¶] Under the totality of facts and circumstances shown, petitioner’s subjective expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable, no sound basis being apparent to reasonably foresee or anticipate that uninvited government agents would enter to perform a warrantless exploratory search. (See Phelan v. Superior Court, supra, 90 Cal.App.3d 1005, and cases discussed at pp. 1012-1013.) Short of erecting an impenetrable enclosure, we can conceive of no other feasible measures the rural dweller might reasonably undertake to assert and preserve his individual right of privacy. We agree with the Phelan court that no perceptible difference exists ‘between [wholly] fenced land on the one hand and open land having a particular enclosed area on the other hand, insofar as the Fourth Amendment is concerned.’ (Id., at pp. 1016-1017.) To contemplate a contrary conclusion would itself lend credence to a specter of citadel-like fortifications in order to safeguard an otherwise objectively reasonable expectation of privacy of the contemporary rural dweller, a refuge neither required by nor compatible with established constitutional principles.” (Burkholder v. Superior Court, supra, 96 Cal.App.3d at pp. 428-429.)1
*88In my view, therefore, the second search constituted an invalid intrusion in violation of the Fourth Amendment. My colleagues seek to justify the warrant notwithstanding that intrusion on the ground that Sizemore’s report (which I concede was not the basis of an illegal search) of itself provided sufficient basis for the warrant. That rationale, however, is clearly precluded by People v. Cook, supra, 22 Cal.3d 67. In that case, after dealing with the independent issue as to the effect upon a warrant of intentional misstatements in the underlying affidavit (id., at pp. 78-92), the court proceeded to consider Cook’s claim that the affidavit was defective because it failed to advise the magistrate of a prior “confirmatory” search. The court held that the omission of this information from the affidavit did not provide a basis for attacking the affidavit or the warrant (id., at p. 93), but that the fact of the confirmatory search could be asserted in the subsequent suppression hearing as grounds for urging that “the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant [was] inadmissible under general constitutional principles.” (Id., at p. 94.) The court then proceeded to overrule Krauss v. Superior Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 418 [96 Cal.Rptr. 455, 487 P.2d 1023], which held that the “magistrate’s independent decision to issue the warrant was in no way tainted by the officer’s illegal personal observations.” (Id., at p. 423.) The majority reasoned that under Krauss “a police officer need not rely solely on lawfully obtained probable cause; he can instead achieve ‘certain cause’ by conducting an unlawful confirmatory search, thus saving himself the time and trouble of obtaining and executing a warrant if he does not find the evidence... .Yet every time he fails to find the suspected evidence, he has also invaded the privacy of a citizen innocent of any wrongdoing. The second ‘search’ is therefore constitutionally unreasonable because it significantly contributes to increasing the risk of such invasions of privacy.” (22 Cal.3d at pp. 98-99.) Thus, upon proof of an unlawful search by law enforcement officials, “the evidence seized in the subsequent search of his premises under color of warrant will be inadmissible against him.” (Id., at p. 99.) We are bound by Cook, and Cook requires reversal.
Petitioners’ application for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied April 30, 1980.

I note that Justice Elkington’s description of the facts in Burkholder goes somewhat beyond the facts stated in that opinion.