Court Opinion

ID: 9522164
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:18:48.370346+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:21.203642
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GILLERAN JOHNSON, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree that the defendant’s conviction should be affirmed. I also believe that the defendant is entitled to a $5 credit for the time that he was incarcerated on July 11, 2004. However, because I believe that the majority’s analysis is flawed in its determination that the defendant is entitled to a $5 credit for less than one hour that he spent in custody on July 10, 2004, I must dissent from that portion of the majority’s opinion. At the outset, I note that the majority incorrectly frames the issue that the defendant is raising before this court. In his reply brief, the defendant acknowledges that he was not incarcerated on July 10. The defendant argues, however, that he should be awarded a $5 credit for that day anyway because his being arrested and held at the sheriff s office for questioning was “the practical equivalent of incarceration at the jail.” Alternatively, the defendant contends that he should be awarded the credit to discourage the police from manipulating how much credit a defendant is entitled to. Rather than addressing these issues, the majority instead awards the defendant a $5 credit against his fine on the basis that he was in custody on July 10. In reaching this result, the majority treats the terms “custody” and “incarceration” as if they are synonymous. They are not. The term “custody” refers to actual imprisonment, as well as lesser restraints. People ex rel. Morrison v. Sielaff, 58 Ill. 2d 91, 93 (1974), citing Black’s Law Dictionary 460 (4th ed. 1951). “Custody” is a very elastic term, encompassing the mere power, legal or physical, of imprisoning or taking manual possession, as well as actual imprisonment or physical detention. People v. Willer, 132 Ill. App. 3d 63, 68 (1985). It is possible to be in custody without even being arrested. See People v. Smith, 150 Ill. App. 3d 524, 528 (1986). “Incarceration” is defined as “[imprisonment; confinement in a jail or penitentiary.” Black’s Law Dictionary 760 (6th ed. 1990). Thus, anyone who has been incarcerated is necessarily also in custody. However, someone who is in custody has not necessarily been incarcerated. See Smith, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 528. The distinction between custody and incarceration is important because a defendant is entitled to a credit against his fine only if he was incarcerated. Specifically, section 110—14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 provides: “Any person incarcerated on a bailable offense who does not supply bail and against whom a fine is levied on conviction of such offense shall be allowed a credit of $5 for each day so incarcerated upon application of the defendant.” 725 ILCS 5/110—14 .(West 2004). It should be noted that section 5—8—7(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections provides that a defendant is entitled to a credit against his prison sentence for the time he spent in custody prior to the imposition of his sentence. 730 ILCS 5/5—8—7(b) (West 2004). Specifically, that section provides: “The offender shall be given credit on the determinate sentence or maximum term and the minimum period of imprisonment for time spent in custody as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed, at the rate specified in Section 3—6—3 of this Code.” 730 ILCS 5/5—8—7(b) (West 2004). In its analysis, the majority confuses the requirements of these two statutes. The majority sets forth that a defendant is entitled to a credit against his fine for all days spent in custody prior to the imposition of sentence. 372 Ill. App. 3d at 837. In making this statement, the majority relies upon People v. McNair, 325 Ill. App. 3d 725, 726-27 (2001), People v. Smith, 258 Ill. App. 3d 261, 270 (1994), and People v. Raya, 250 Ill. App. 3d 795, 802-03 (1993). None of these cases supports the majority’s statement, as all three cases dealt with whether a defendant was entitled to credit against his fine for time that he had been incarcerated. Specifically, each of those cases addressed whether a defendant was entitled to credit against his fine for time that he was incarcerated after being found guilty but before being sentenced. See McNair, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 726-27 (defendant sought credit against his fine for period of time after the trial court revoked his bond and before he was sentenced); Smith, 258 Ill. App. 3d at 267-68 (defendant who was incarcerated for 114 days between when he was found guilty and when he was sentenced was entitled to a complete credit against the $100 street-value fine imposed upon him); Raya, 250 Ill. App. 3d at 802 (defendant sought monetary credit against his fine for his 51 days of pretrial and presentence incarceration). Later, the majority states that “[t]his court has consistently held that a defendant is entitled to a $5 credit for every full day and partial day that the defendant is held in custody following his arrest and prior to posting bond.” 372 Ill. App. 3d at 838. In support of this statement, the majority cites Smith, 258 Ill. App. 3d at 267-68, and People v. Stahr, 255 Ill. App. 3d 624, 627-28 (1994). In Smith, the reviewing court explained that “[t]he defendant was entitled to credit for the days he was in custody but did not supply bail.” Smith, 258 Ill. App. 3d at 267-68. Smith relied on People v. Plante, 253 Ill. App. 3d 472, 474-75 (1993). Plante in turn relied upon the Illinois Supreme Court case of People v. Hare, 119 Ill. 2d 441, 447 (1988). As noted above, at issue in Smith was whether the defendant was entitled to a credit against his fine for the period of time that he had been incarcerated. See Smith, 258 Ill. App. 3d at 267-68. In Plante, at issue was whether the defendant was entitled to a $45 credit against his fine for nine days spent in jail prior to trial. Plante, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 474. The State argued that he was not entitled to a credit, because he ultimately posted bail. Plante, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 474. In Hare, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed whether a defendant is entitled to the monetary credit provided by section 110—14 if he also received credit against a sentence of imprisonment for time spent incarcerated awaiting trial. Hare, 119 Ill. 2d at 444; see also People v. Hare, 144 Ill. App. 3d 279, 279-80 (1986) (noting that the defendant was seeking credit against his fine for the 23 days he had spent incarcerated prior to posting bond), aff’d, 119 Ill. 2d 444. Thus, both Plante and Hare involved situations in which the defendant was seeking a credit against his fine for time spent incarcerated prior to posting bond or bail. Although Smith and Hare both referred to a defendant receiving a credit against his fine for time that he had spent in custody, based on the facts of those cases it is apparent that those courts were using the term “custody” as meaning “incarceration.” Consequently, none of those cases supports the majority’s conclusion that a defendant is also entitled to a credit against his fine for being in custody without actually being incarcerated. Furthermore, the majority’s reliance on Stahr, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 627-28, is misplaced. In Stahr, this court set forth that the defendant was entitled to a $5 credit against her fine because “any portion of a day in custody constitutes a full day for purposes of section 110—14.” Stahr, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 627. In support of this proposition, the Stahr court relied on People v. Johns, 130 Ill. App. 3d 548, 549 (1984), People v. Leggans, 140 Ill. App. 3d 268, 272 (1986), and People v. Beech, 202 Ill. App. 3d 576, 580 (1990). In Johns, the defendant received credit against his fine for being incarcerated in the county jail for two days. Johns, 130 Ill. App. 3d at 548-49. In Leggans, the reviewing court determined that the defendant was entitled to a credit against his fine for those days he spent incarcerated for failing to post bond. Leggans, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 271-72. In Beech, at issue was whether the defendant was entitled to credit for time spent in jail pursuant to section 5—8—7(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections. Beech, 202 Ill. App. 3d at 580. Thus, none of the cases Stahr relies upon supports the majority’s proposition that a defendant is entitled to a monetary credit against his fine pursuant to section 110—14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure merely for time spent in custody. As to the arguments that the defendant actually raises before this court, section 110—14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the defendant is entitled to a credit against his fine for time that he was incarcerated, not for time that was “the practical equivalent of incarceration at the jail.” See 725 ILCS 5/110—14 (West 2004). Had the legislature intended for a criminal defendant to receive a credit against his fine for something less than incarceration, it would have been simple for the legislature to include language to that effect. However, the legislature did not, and this court cannot interpret the plain language of the statute in a way that the legislature did not intend. See In re Donald A.G., 221 Ill. 2d 234, 246 (2006) (explaining that in statutory interpretation, the best evidence of legislative intent is the language of the statute, and when possible, the court should interpret the language of the statute according to its plain and ordinary meaning). Finally, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the police acted improperly to “manipulate” the amount of credit that the defendant was entitled to receive. The record reveals that the defendant was arrested shortly after 11 p.m. on July 10, 2004, and was then transported to the sheriffs office about 30 minutes later. The defendant was then held in an interview room at the sheriffs office. At 12:10 a.m. on July 11, 2004, the defendant waived his Miranda rights and agreed to answer questions. After giving a written statement, the defendant was booked and placed in a jail cell. Although the defendant maintains that the decision of the police to interrogate him in an interview room rather than in a jail cell should be held against the police in determining how much credit he is entitled to against his fine, such an argument is without merit. The above facts demonstrate no intentional act on behalf of the police to deprive the defendant of a $5 credit against his fine. Accordingly, because the defendant was not incarcerated on July 10, 2004, this court should reject the defendant’s arguments that he is entitled to a $5 credit against his fine for that day.