Court Opinion

ID: 9844585
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:05:01.451867+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:38.342785
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Justice
(dissenting).
This case involves trafficking in heroin. Appellants were arrested, tried and convicted of the crime of possession of heroin and although the majority remands the cause for further proceedings, it has effectively prevented further proceedings by requiring suppression of the heroin.
I would hold that exigent circumstances validated the search pursuant to an arrest. Federal, state and local law enforcement officers had conducted surveillance of the premises in question here; had made a purchase of a substance known to have been acquired from the premises in question here; analysis had indicated said substance to be heroin; for some hours prior to the search law enforcement officers had observed the appellants and others loading what appeared to be all of their personal belongings into a motor vehicle; they observed the appellants together with all of their personal belongings and their children starting to depart from the premises; they ran toward the departing vehicle displaying and shouting of their authority as law enforcement officers and demanding that the appellants stop; the appellants attempted to flee; one of the officers noted one of the appellants bending down toward what he suspected might be the location of a weapon; after the stop and removal of the appellants and others from the vehicle, the officers searched that particular area of the vehicle (the glove compartment) and found therein a fully loaded 9mm Fabrique Nationale automatic pistol together with a canister containing 31 individual containers of heroin and $731 in cash; the quality of the heroin was at a concentration of 13.7%. In my opinion the record is clear that the federal, state and local law enforcement officers had probable cause to believe that trafficking in, and possession of, heroin was taking place at the premises in question.
In my judgment the arrest and the contemporaneous search of the automobile was not in violation of Fourth Amendment rights and the trial court’s denial of the appellants’ motion to suppress was correct and should be affirmed. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543; Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 59 S.Ct. 174, 83 L.Ed. 151; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564. See also the remarkably similar recent case of State of Nebraska v. Patterson, 192 Neb. 308, 220 N.W.2d 235 (1974); *393and People v. Williams, 541 P.2d 76 (Colo. 1975); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 96 S.Ct. 304, 46 L.Ed.2d 209 (1975); State v. LeBlanc, 347 A.2d 590 (Me.1975).
The sole basis of the majority decision herein is the asserted insufficiency of the affidavit upon which the search warrant was issued. The majority purports to examine the affidavit and conclude “the affidavit indicates the use of hearsay upon hearsay to establish probable cause.” In my judgment, such is an unnecessary and unwarranted inference and is contrary to the specific terms of the affidavit. No “informer” is mentioned nor is it indicated that the knowledge of the affiant came from any source other than his personal knowledge or police surveillance. The majority tells us, however, that we must assume the existence of certain facts and no others, must tax the issuing magistrate with its interpretation of the facts and then proceed to hold his decision erroneous because he could have only interpreted the affidavit as does the majority. I disagree. An equally fair interpretation of the affidavit might be that a law enforcement officer (perhaps Twedt himself) accompanied an unnamed person and saw him procure a substance from persons at the residence in question, thereafter purchased the substance, had it tested and found it to be heroin. If a police officer did accompany an unknown person into the residence to procure the heroin, perhaps the officer was wired for sound and the transaction was heard at a distance by other officers. There are any number of possibilities.
Having established that “hearsay” and an “informant” present probable cause problems in the instant case, the majority then uses the authority of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969) as authority for holding that the instant affidavit did not present the magistrate with probable cause. In Aguilar the affidavit for the search warrant stated only “affiants have received reliable information from a credible person and do believe that (narcotics) are being kept at the above described premises . . . ” In Spinelli the affidavit stated that the FBI “has been informed by a confidential, reliable informant that William Spinelli is operating a handbook and accepting wagers and disseminating wagering information by means of the telephones . . .” Thus, it is clear in both Aguilar and Spinelli that the very language of those affidavits indicated that the affiant’s knowledge was based solely on hearsay information received from an informant.
It is clear that hearsay information received from an informer may furnish sufficient probable cause for the issuance of a warrant. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965); United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971). Varon, Searches, Seizures and Immunities (2nd ed. 1974) Assuming that Aguilar and Spinelli maintain vitality following Harris (See 40 Fordham Law Review, 687), the only teaching of those cases is that hearsay information supplied by an informer must be more than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based merely on an individual’s general reputation. Statements regarding the reliability of an informer must be more than merely conclusory in nature, Spinelli, and these must set forth such underlying circumstances as are necessary to judge the validity of the informer’s conclusion, Aguilar.
I find nothing in any of the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court which requires the affidavit at issue here to be determined insufficient as showing probable cause. In Jones v. United States, supra, an affidavit for a search warrant indicated the receipt of information by an unnamed person. There it was held that although the affidavit did not set out affiant’s personal observations (as contrasted with the assertion of personal knowledge here), nevertheless *394other sources (here, police surveillance) provided a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. In United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965), an affidavit for a search warrant indicated the receipt of hearsay information but such was deemed sufficient because of the strong factual background which buttressed the hearsay and combined to establish probable cause. Some commentators argue that the opinion of the court in United States v. Harris, supra, has to some extent blunted the decisions in Aguilar and Spinelli, but in any event Harris held that an affidavit premised on information received from an unknown informer provided sufficient probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant in consideration of the totality of the circumstances which were used to evaluate an affidavit as meeting the standards for probable cause.
It is well-established that in an evaluation of an affidavit to determine the existence of probable cause great deference should be paid to the decision of the magistrate and his common sense should not be restricted. Jones v. United States, supra; United States v. Ventresca, supra. As was stated in Spinelli and reiterated in Harris, “A policeman’s affidavit should not be judged as an entry in an essay contest.” As was stated in Aguilar, “Thus, when a search is based upon a magistrate’s rather than a police officer’s determination of probable cause, the reviewing courts will accept evidence of a less ‘judicially competent or persuasive character than would have justified an officer in acting on his own without a warrant,’ ibid., and will sustain the judicial determination so long as ‘there was substantial basis for [the magistrate] to conclude that narcotics were probably present.’” As stated in Ventresca, “Observations of fellow officers of the Government engaged in a common investigation are plainly a reliable basis for a warrant applied for by one of their number.” See also Schmidt v. State, 17 Md.App. 492, 302 A.2d 714 (1973). As stated by the majority opinion in Spinelli, “In holding as we have done, we do not retreat from the established propositions that only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause, (citations) that affidavits or probable cause are tested by much less rigorous standards than those governing the admissibility of evidence at trial, (citations) that in judging probable cause issuing magistrates are not to be confined by niggardly limitations or by restrictions on the use of their common sense, and that their determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts, (citations).”
As stated in Harris, “The Fourth Amendment’s commands, like all constitutional requirements, are practical and not abstract. If the teachings of the Court’s cases are to be followed and the constitutional policy served, affidavits for search warrants, such as the one involved here, must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a commonsense and realistic fashion. They are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleadings have no proper place in this area. A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts towards warrants will tend to discourage police officers from submitting their evidence to a judicial officer before acting.”
I would finally note that the motions made to suppress both prior to and at the time of trial are only in conclusory language, i. e., that the affidavit “was not based on personal information of said affiant.” That, of course, is directly contrary to the language of the affidavit: “That he has probable cause to believe and is positive the same is true because of the following facts, of which he has personal knowledge.” The motion further states, “Said affidavit is based on hearsay evidence obtained by said affiant and the source or reliability of affiant’s information is not revealed or established.” As *395previously noted, the affidavit contains no reference to any information received from any other person whatsoever. That is merely an unnecessary inference drawn by the appellant and, of course, by the majority opinion herein. Further, insofar as the record reveals, no evidentiary hearing was either requested or conducted upon appellants’ motion to suppress.
As stated in State v. Holt, 415 S.W.2d 761 (Mo.1967), “Not only must defendant file a motion to suppress the controverted evidence, but he has the burden of presenting evidence to sustain his contentions.” See also State v. Gardner, 77 Mont. 8, 249 P. 574 (1926); People v. Robinson, 344 Mich. 353, 74 N.W.2d 41 (1955); People v. Ferguson, 376 Mich. 90, 135 N.W.2d 357 (1965); Alderman v. U. S., 394 U.S. 165, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969). Modern Criminal Practice, Hall et al, 1969, Chapter 12 at p. 704.
Aside from differences which are irrelevant here (such as the combination of the motion to suppress with one for the return of illegally seized property and the proper timing of a motion to suppress), there is no substantial difference between the Idaho and federal rules of criminal procedure in area of motions to suppress. Evidentiary hearings upon motions to suppress are widely utilized. Chin Kay v. U.S., 311 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1962); U. S. v. Lyon, 397 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1968); Batten v. U. S., 188 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1951). For additional cases on defendant’s burden of presenting evidence to sustain his motion to suppress see State v. Kolberstein, 8 Or.App. 307, 493 P.2d 176 (1972); Ortega v. Texas, Tex.Cr.App., 464 S.W.2d 876 (1971); State v. Wright, 11 Or.App. 560, 503 P.2d 514 (1972); Carter v. State, 274 Md. 411, 337 A.2d 415 (1975).
To summarize, I would hold first that the exigent circumstances here validated the search of the motor vehicle incident to a lawful arrest for which probable cause existed. Also, I would further hold that the affidavit on its face indicated the existence of probable cause justifying the issuance of the search warrant and appellants bore the burden of proving the illegality of the search by evidence at least placing in issue the assertions contained in the affidavit.
The essence of my disagreement with the result obtained by the majority herein is perhaps best expressed in the words of Hugo Black and Felix Frankfurter. In a dissent in Stewart v. United States, 366 U.S. 1, 21, 81 S.Ct. 941, 954, 6 L.Ed.2d 84 (1961), Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated:
“When a court of highest authority in this country thus interposes a bare technicality between a defendant and his just conviction, it is not too much to charge some of the laxity in our administration of the criminal law to a proneness on the part of courts of last resort to find error and to reverse judgments of conviction.”
In Whiteley v. Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 570, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 1038, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971), Mr. Justice Black dissenting said:
“With all respect to my Brethern who agree to the judgment and opinion of the Court, I am constrained to say that I believe the decision here is a gross and wholly indefensible miscarriage of justice. For this reason it may be classified as one of those calculated to make many good people believe our Court actually enjoys frustrating justice by unnecessarily turning professional criminals loose to prey upon society with impunity.”
Believing that the case at bar falls within those strictures, I would affirm the orders of the trial court denying the motions to suppress and affirm the judgment of conviction.
McFADDEN, J., concurs.