Court Opinion

ID: 9675403
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:52:41.155711+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:34.301735
License: Public Domain

W. O. MURRAY, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I find that I am unable to' concur in the majority opinion and therefore respectfully enter my dissent thereto. Appellees’ petition states two causes of action, one seeking to set aside a royalty deed covering thirty acres of land, and the other in the nature of assumpsit for the recovery of an over-payment of purchase price for land in the sum of $300.
The cause of action to set aside the royalty deed is a suit to cancel a written instrument 'and is governed by the four-year statute'of limitations. Art. 5527, Vernon’s Ann. Civ. Stats. The suit was filed within the four-year period and was therefore timely brought. The jury found that ap-pellees were induced to sign the instrument by false representations and that they never in fact appeared before a notary public and acknowledged such instrument. Clearly under such findings they were entitled to-have this instrument set aside and can-celled and appellant does not here contend otherwise. I agree that this part of the judgment which cancels the royalty deed should be affirmed.
The second cause of action being one in the nature of assumpsit for money had and received is governed by the two-year statute of limitations. Art. 5526, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.Stats. It was not brought within that period and was therefore barred. 29 Tex.Jur. p. 736,' § 6, and p. 731, § 3; 28 Tex.Jur. p. 123, § 42; Johnson v. Johnson, Tex.Civ.App., 206 S.W. 369; Anders v. Johnson, Tex.Com.App., 288 S.W. 168; Mitchell Greer Co. v. Mitchell, Tex.Civ. App., 246 S.W. 690; Causeway Inv. Co. v. Nass, 131 Tex. 12, 111 S.W.2d 703, 112 S. W.2d 712, affirmed, Tex.Civ.App., 84-S.W. 2d 571; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. First Nat. Bank, Tex.Civ.App., 93 S.W.2d 562; Settegast v. Harris County, Tex.Civ.App., 159 S.W.2d 543.
Appellees contend that this is a suit based upon fraud and that limitation would not start to run until the discovery of the fraud, which was in November, 1949, immediately after which the suit was filed. I cannot agree that this is a suit based upon fraud. The recovery here • is not based upon injury resulting from fraud but simply for money had and received'. Where a suit is based upon fraud, injury resulting from such fraud must be shown. Ulmer v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., Tex.Ciy.App., 161 W.2d 862; Imle v. *518Brill, Tex.Civ.App., 234 S.W.2d 288 ; 20 Tex.Jur. p. 68, § 39. In order to have shown injury resulting from fraud appel-lees would be required to show the value of the ten acres purchased, and that as a result of such fraud they were induced to pay more than the ten acres were worth. Briley v. Hay, Tex.Civ.App., 13 S.W.2d 997. The measure of damages would be the difference between what they paid and the value of the ten acres. 20 Tex.Jur. p. 146, § 97;' 20 Tex.Jur. p. 190, § 134.
Appellees did not see fit to go into this matter but simply brought a suit for the recovery of the overpayment. This they were entitled to do even though they had made a profit out of their bargain. Appellant will not be permitted to be unjustly enriched at the expense of appellees, regardless of whether they have suffered any fraud damages or not. This i.s the very principle upon which a suit for money had and received is based. 4 Am.Jur. p. 509, § 20; 29 Tex.Jur. p. 733, § 2.
"Where a person obtains money of another by compulsion, extortion, oppression or fraud an action had and received will lie to recover it.” 4 Am.Jur. p. 513, § 23.
Such a suit is not one in tort but one based upon an implied contract to return the money. 54 C.J\S., Limitations of Actions, p. 185, § 1887 37 C.J. p. 936, § 305.
This record shows that appellees paid a total consideration of about $3,250 for the thirty acres of land and sold it for the handsome sum of $12,000. This, no doubt, is the reason they decided not to base their suit upon fraud but to simply sue for money had and received.
However, if by any stretch of the imagination, this suit could be said not to be one for money had and received but one based upon fraud, still it would be barred by the two-year statute of limitations. It will be borne in mind that after the payment of the $300 appellant did nothing further to conceal the fraud, but mailed to appellees a deed by which they would have discovered the fraud, if they had read it or had it read, because the deed recited a cash consideration of $500 and not $800, and further disclosed the fact that the grantor had'fraudulently retained one-fourth of the minerals. If this would not have constituted a discovery of the fraud, it would have been a discovery of such facts as would have caused a person of ordinary prudence to make an investigation and such investigation would have led to the actual discovery of the fraud. When ap-pellees did have their deed read, it immediately led to the discovery of the fraud. It is the duty of a purchaser to read the deed by which he acquires title to land. The fact that appellees did not read English or that they had great confidence in appellant, whom they testified represented the seller and did not represent them would not justify their negligence in not having their deed read. Carrillo v. Carrillo, Tex.Civ.App., 289 S.W. 88; Kuhlman v. Baker, 50 Tex. 630; Sherman v. Sipper, 137 Tex. 85, 152 S.W.2d 319, 137 A.L.R. 263; Powell v. March, Tex. Civ. App., 169 S.W. 936.
Furthermore, appellees knew at the time they made the $300 overpayment that they had purchased the ten acres for a cash consideration of $500, and that Pate, Briggs or any one else had no right to demand of them an overpayment of $300. This is illustrated Iby their testimony. Appellee Castulo Rodriguez testified on this subject as follows:
“Q. Well, on or about March 9th, when he came out to your place and told you he was ready to close the deal and told you you would have to pay another five hundred dollars, who did he say was requiring that five hundred dollars? A. Mr. Briggs told me that Robin Pate had told him that he would have to have five hundred dollars more for the land.
“Q. Did you believe that? A. I thought it was true.
“Q. If you had contracted with Briggs to buy it for five hundred dollars and taxes, why did you pay eight hundred dollars and the taxes? A. Well, for the reason that I already grubbed the land and if I didn’t pay that money I was going to lose everything.”
Appellee Clara Rodriguez testified as follows : “Q. Well, what did you think about *519his asking eight hundred dollars when you had only agreed to pay five -hundred dollar? A. Yes, we knew, but we had the land all cleaned up and if we didn’t do that we were going to lose a whole lot more.”
Appellees. knew they were paying $300 more than anybody had a right to require of them, but decided to do so in order to prevent a greater loss. The fact that Briggs represented to appellees that Pate wanted them to make the overpayment was incidental and collateral to the matter. 37 C.J.'p. 936, § 305, Note 72. In 37 C.J., p. 793, § 133, it is stated: “ * * * and the statute does not apply where no relief of any kind is asked -against defendant because of his fraud.” See also, 53 C.J.S., Limitations of Actions, § 91. See also Boyer v. Barrows, 166 Cal. 757, 138 P. 354; Obermeyer v. Kirshner, 225 Mo.App. 734, 38 S.W.2d 510; Byrd v. Rautman, 85 Md. 414, 36 A. 1099.
Appellees’ knowing at the time they made the cash payment that they were making an overpayment which neither Briggs nor Pate had a right to demand of them, was knowledge of the fraud, or was at least such knowledge as should have caused them to make an investigation which would have led to a discovery of the fraud. Appellees having waited more than two years to recover an overpayment, which they knew was an overpayment at the time they made it, were barred by the two-year statute of limitation. Art. 5526, supra. It follows that the claim for the recovery of the overpayment being barred, any claim for exemplary damages based thereon was -also barred by the same statute.
Furthermore, appellees having waived the fraud and having sued for money had and received, which is a suit ex contractu and not ex delicto, were not entitled to recover exemplary damages. There is no showing that appellees were injured by the alleged fraud in that they were induced to pay more for the land than it was worth; on the contrary it appears that perhaps they made a very nice bargain. They made the overpayment knowingly, apparently because they desired to buy their peace and thus avoid a lawsuit. Such facts do not present a case that will justify the recovery of exemplary damages in more than three times the amount of the overpayment which they knowingly made. The’ misrepresentation here related to who was going to receive the overpayment, -and did not relate to the value of the land. Appellees knew full well the amount of the land, its value and what- they were paying - for it. The only thing they did not know was. that Briggs was going to keep the overpayment and not turn it over to Pate.
In my opinion the judgment should be reformed so as to eliminate therefrom the recovery of the $300 overpayment -and the $1,000 for exemplary damages, and as'thus reformed the judgment should be áffirmed.