Court Opinion

ID: 9890583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-13 17:03:46.772415+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:47.879341
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/13/23 Transition Financial Services v. Wintrust Bank CA1/5

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION FIVE

                                                           A162930/A163318

                                                           (Alameda County
 TRANSITION FINANCIAL                                      Super. Ct. No. RG19002386)
 SERVICES, LLC,
          Plaintiff and Respondent,                        ORDER DENYING
                                                           APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR
 v.
                                                           REHEARING AND MOTION
 WINTRUST BANK,                                            TO AUGMENT THE RECORD
          Defendant and Appellant.                         AND MODIFYING OPINION
                                                           [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

BY THE COURT:
        Appellant’s petition for rehearing is DENIED. Appellant’s
motion to augment or correct the record is DENIED. (Vons
Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444,
fn. 3; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1); Ct. App., First Dist.,
Local Rules, rule 4(c).) The opinion filed on September 29, 2023,
shall be MODIFIED as follows:

                                                1
1. On page one, the third sentence of the second paragraph
   (“Although Wintrust . . . did not do so.”) is replaced, as
   follows:

         Wintrust had not proved its attorney fees and costs in
         the foreclosure action.

2. On page four, in the fourth paragraph, the word “new”
   immediately following “and amount of Wintrust’s” is
   deleted.

3. On page six, the second paragraph is replaced, as follows:

         Wintrust did not file a motion for attorney fees in the
         foreclosure action, and it never sought to appeal or
         modify the judgment in that case.

4. On page eight, the second sentence of the third paragraph
   is replaced, as follows:

         In the first action, Wintrust obtained a judicial
         foreclosure judgment and fixed the secured debt at
         about $244,000, which did not include attorney fees
         and costs.

5. The second full paragraph on page nine, which continues
   into page 10, is replaced as follows:

         Chacker and Hart support Wintrust’s position that it
         may not have been able to recover its fees in the
         judicial foreclosure action under section 1717. But
         the fact remains that Wintrust obtained a judgment
         in that case that did not include attorney fees as part
         of the secured debt. To avoid electing this remedy,
         Wintrust could have dismissed its judicial foreclosure
         claim before judgment entered and elected to proceed
         with nonjudicial foreclosure. Instead, Wintrust
         pursued judicial foreclosure all the way to judgment,
         then changed its strategy by pursuing a different
         remedy for more money. The record supports the

                              2
           trial court’s conclusion that Wintrust pursued
           inconsistent remedies.5

  6. The text of new footnote 5 (added at the end of the
     paragraph added by modification number 5, above) is as
     follows:

           In a petition for rehearing, Wintrust claims it
           attempted to put on evidence of its attorney fees and
           costs in the judicial foreclosure action, but the court
           sustained Transition’s objections and stated these
           items must be raised via post-judgment motion.
           Assuming this is true, and assuming the trial court
           erred, Wintrust did not resolve the issue in the trial
           court or file an appeal. In any case, it does not
           change the outcome here. Wintrust still had the
           same options—judicial foreclosure or nonjudicial
           foreclosure. It elected judicial foreclosure. It is stuck
           with that choice.

  7. At the end of the first partial paragraph on page 12 (which
     begins on page 11), the following new sentence is added:

           And with Wintrust still refusing to release the
           mortgage and the new lender balking, Herbstman
           authorized the second payment on February 1 to
           close the new financing and finally end the threat of a
           nonjudicial sale.

     The modifications make no change to the judgment.

                                                        BURNS, J.

WE CONCUR:

JACKSON, P.J.
SIMONS, J.

                                3
Filed 9/29/23 Transition Financial Services v. Wintrust Bank CA1/5 (unmodified
opinion)

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION FIVE

 TRANSITION FINANCIAL
 SERVICES, LLC,
          Plaintiff and Respondent,                             A162930/A163318

 v.                                                             (Alameda County
 WINTRUST BANK,                                                 Super. Ct. No. RG19002386)
          Defendant and Appellant.

      These consolidated appeals arise from the second of two
actions concerning Transition Financial Services, LLC’s liability
to Wintrust Bank on a mortgage-backed loan.

       In the first action, the trial court held Wintrust was
entitled to judicial foreclosure. But before judgment had entered,
Wintrust noticed a nonjudicial sale of the subject property and
claimed that Transition owed over $500,000 in attorney fees and
costs. Although Wintrust could have sought attorney fees and
costs in the foreclosure action, it did not do so. Transition filed
this second action to enjoin the sale and to determine the amount
owed.

       Two things then happened, and the order in which they
happened is important. First, the court entered judgment in the
foreclosure action. Second, a few days later, facing the potential
loss of the property at a nonjudicial sale, Transition paid

                                                1
Wintrust’s demands to release the mortgage, including the full
amount of attorney fees and costs.

      After trial in the second action, the court held that once
Wintrust obtained a judgment in the foreclosure action, it had
elected its remedy—judicial foreclosure—and fixed the amount
owed. The court rejected Wintrust’s argument that Transition’s
payment in the nonjudicial foreclosure process was voluntary.
The court ordered Wintrust to return what Transition paid
beyond the debt fixed by the prior judgment. We affirm.

                        BACKGROUND

                                A.

      Judicial and nonjudicial foreclosure can be exercised
alternatively or concurrently. (Vlahovich v. Cruz (1989) 213
Cal.App.3d 317, 322 (Vlahovich).) The lender can pursue both
remedies and then complete the one it later selects. (Ibid.) This
case requires us to decide how long the lender can put off that
choice—and how it affects the borrower’s right to pay off the debt
and avoid a sale.

      Some basic context is helpful. “Foreclosure” is so called
because it cuts off the borrower’s right to buy back the secured
property by exercising the equitable right of redemption. (See
BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1994) 511 U.S. 531, 541.) To
exercise this right, the borrower must pay all the secured debt,
which may include attorney fees and costs incurred to protect the
security. (Civ. Code, §§ 2903, 29051; see Chacker v. JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 351, 356–357 (Chacker).)
To aid this process, the borrower can request a payoff demand
statement of the full amount owed. (§ 2943.) The right of
redemption continues until either a judicial or a nonjudicial sale

      1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Civil Code.

                                2
is completed. (5 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2022)
§ 13:274.)

      In other ways, the two processes diverge. Most notably, in
a judicial foreclosure, if the property sells for less than the
outstanding debt, the lender may seek a deficiency judgment.
(Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1236.)
But to encourage a sale at full value, the borrower has a
continuing statutory right to redeem the property by paying the
foreclosure sale price. (5 Miller & Starr, supra, § 13:276.)
Nonjudicial foreclosure is faster and less expensive, but it offers
no possibility of a deficiency judgment. (Alliance Mortgage v.
Rothwell, supra, at p. 1236.) The borrower has no right of
redemption after a nonjudicial sale. (Ibid.)

                                 B.

       The loan at issue here was made by Wintrust to Transition
and a third entity, Phoenix Logistics, Inc. (Phoenix).2 It was
secured by a second mortgage against a commercial property
owned by Transition. Phoenix’s Chief Executive Officer, Fred
Saul, executed the loan documents on Transition’s behalf.
Ultimately, Phoenix went out of business and fell behind on the
payments. Wintrust contacted Transition’s majority owner,
Clifford Herbstman, to collect. Herbstman contended Saul was
not authorized to obtain the loan on behalf of Transition.

      Transition filed the first action in May 2017, seeking a
declaration that the mortgage was invalid. Wintrust filed a
cross-complaint seeking judicial foreclosure.

      In September 2018, Wintrust recorded a notice of default
against the subject property, beginning the nonjudicial
foreclosure process.

      2 Phoenix Logistics, Inc. is not a party to this appeal.

                                  3
      In October 2018, the court ruled in favor of Wintrust,
including on its claim for judicial foreclosure. The court found
that Transition owed $243,627.75 on the loan. This amount did
not include attorney fees although, according to Wintrust, the
loan agreement allows it to add attorney fees to the secured debt.

      By the end of 2018, the court was still addressing post-trial
issues and had not entered a judgment in the foreclosure action.

                                C.

      With the adverse ruling in the foreclosure action,
Herbstman sought a loan to pay Wintrust. He found a lender
and opened escrow. The escrow officer made a payoff demand to
Wintrust, which responded that over $800,000 was due on the
loan. This included over $500,000 in attorney fees. Wintrust also
recorded a notice of trustee’s sale scheduling a nonjudicial
foreclosure sale for January 30, 2019.

      In response, Transition filed this lawsuit and sought to
enjoin the sale and to determine the amount due on the
mortgage, including the propriety and amount of Wintrust’s new
claim for attorney fees.

      The then-assigned judge issued a temporary restraining
order subject to an $800,000 bond. The court stayed posting of
the bond until the assigned judge could confer with Judge Frank
Roesch, who had presided over the foreclosure action.

       According to Herbstman, Transition was unable to obtain a
bond, so he arranged to pay the full amount of Wintrust’s
demand, which Transition’s loan escrow tendered on January 24
or 25, 2019. Meanwhile, the newly filed action was reassigned to
Judge Roesch.

      On January 28, Wintrust rejected Transition’s offer, stating
that Transition now owed more money because Wintrust had
incurred additional attorney fees from the new lawsuit after it

                                 4
had sent the payoff demand. Counsel for Wintrust stated that it
would not release the mortgage “until we have resolved the
actual outstanding indebtedness, which continues to accrue.”

      Meanwhile, on January 29, the trial court entered the
judgment in the earlier foreclosure action. Consistent with the
ruling after trial, the court entered judgment in favor of Wintrust
on the judicial foreclosure claim and declared $243,627.75 due on
the loan. It stated Wintrust could seek attorney fees in the
manner prescribed by law.

       On February 1, Wintrust issued another payoff demand
statement for a further $17,724.63 in legal expenses and bank
costs, which Transition tendered the same day. Wintrust then
released the mortgage on Transition’s property.

      But the parties’ dispute continued. Transition maintained
Wintrust’s demand included an unreasonable amount (over
$500,000) of attorney fees, and it (Transition) was coerced into
paying the entire demand to avoid losing the property in a
trustee’s sale. It therefore continued to pursue its claim for a
determination of the amount owed on the mortgage.

       After a bench trial, the court ruled for Transition. It held
Wintrust elected judicial foreclosure in the earlier action, and it
was therefore barred from seeking the inconsistent remedy of
nonjudicial foreclosure. And since the prior judgment fixed the
amount due on the loan, Transition could recoup everything it
paid beyond what it owed on the judgment as a coerced
overpayment. The court rejected Wintrust’s argument that the
loan documents made its fees and costs from the foreclosure
action part of the secured debt, reasoning that Wintrust was
collaterally estopped from claiming the debt was more than it
proved in the prior action. And “Wintrust waived its costs and
attorney fees by operation of law when it neglected to [timely] file
either its memorandum of costs or its attorney fee motion” in that
case.

                                 5
       Wintrust appealed both the judgment in this case and the
trial court’s award of fees and costs to Transition as the
prevailing party. We consolidated these appeals by stipulation of
the parties.

      Wintrust never sought attorney fees in the foreclosure
action, or to appeal or modify the judgment in that case.

                          DISCUSSION

                                A.

      Wintrust contends the trial court erred by finding it elected
judicial foreclosure before accepting Transition’s payoff—and to
the extent there was an election, it merely barred a nonjudicial
foreclosure sale, without affecting the payoff process. We reject
these arguments and find substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s ruling.3

                                 1.

      The election of remedies doctrine is based on equitable
estoppel. (Fassberg Construction Co. v. Housing Authority of City
of Los Angeles (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 720, 759.) It holds that if a
plaintiff elects a remedy in lieu of an alternative and inconsistent
one and gains an advantage to the defendant’s detriment, the
plaintiff is precluded from seeking the alternative remedy. (Ibid.)
The issue is for the trial court to resolve, unless the facts can
support only one reasonable conclusion. (Ibid.)

      3 Wintrust further argues it did not waive its fees and costs

in the foreclosure action. To the extent this was an alternative
ground for the trial court’s ruling in this case, we need not
address it because we affirm the trial court’s ruling based on
election of remedies. And since no appeal of the foreclosure
action is before us, we do not address Wintrust’s request for an
order directing an award of fees and costs in that action.

                                 6
      In the foreclosure context, the doctrine is applied where a
lender (1) knowledgeably and unequivocally pursued a judicial
foreclosure action to judgment and (2) attempted to change
course in a manner prejudicial and unjust to the borrower.
(C.J.A. Corp. v. Trans-Action Financial Corp. (2001) 86
Cal.App.4th 664, 669–671 (C.J.A.).)

                                2.

       Wintrust does not dispute it knowledgeably and
unequivocally pursued judicial foreclosure to judgment in the
foreclosure action. And the record is clear that Wintrust chose to
file that claim, to litigate it through trial, and to seek entry of
judgment on the claim by submitting a proposed statement of
decision and judgment. As the trial court observed, that
submission was “[t]he last word from Wintrust” in the foreclosure
action.

       While disputed by Wintrust, substantial evidence also
supports the trial court’s finding that judgment entered in the
foreclosure action before Wintrust accepted Transition’s payoff.
Transition tendered its first payment to Wintrust on January 24
or 25, 2019. On January 28, Wintrust responded that this tender
was “insufficient to payoff the loan” and it would not release the
mortgage “until we have resolved the actual outstanding
indebtedness, which continues to accrue.” Wintrust’s response
was not an acceptance of Transition’s payoff but a rejection
pending a counteroffer. (See § 1585; Landberg v. Landberg
(1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 742, 750 [a qualified acceptance is a
rejection terminating the offer].) The next day, the court entered
the final judgment in the foreclosure action. A few days later, on
February 1, Wintrust accepted the payoff after it had issued a
demand for an additional $17,724.63, which Transition paid that
same day. The record thus supports the trial court’s finding that
the judgment (and hence Wintrust’s election of the judicial
foreclosure remedy) preceded the payoff.

                                 7
                                 3.

       Wintrust concedes entry of judgment in the foreclosure
action was inconsistent with its continued pursuit of a trustee’s
sale from that point. But it insists it was perfectly consistent to
accept a payoff from Transition to avoid a judicial foreclosure
sale.

       That is true so far as it goes: Transition’s right to redeem
the property continued until a sale was completed. (§ 2903.) But
the trial court did not find otherwise. Rather, it affirmed
Wintrust could “properly apply whatever funds it received to
satisfy the judicial foreclosure judgment and the indebtedness
established by that judgment.” However, Wintrust went much
further by tacking on over $500,000 in attorney fees to its payoff
demand statement and extracting those fees and more from
Transition under threat of a trustee’s sale.

      The record supports the trial court’s finding that this
nonjudicial remedy was inconsistent with Wintrust’s election in
the foreclosure action. In the first action, Wintrust obtained a
judicial foreclosure judgment, fixed the secured debt at about
$244,000, and never tried to add its attorney fees and costs to the
secured debt. Then, it changed course by proceeding with a
separate, nonjudicial foreclosure process in which it noticed a
trustee’s sale and sought more than $500,000 in attorney fees as
part of the secured debt.

      Wintrust does not squarely address these inconsistencies,
nor do the statutes and other authorities it cites. Rather than
arguing it acted consistently with its election of judicial
foreclosure, Wintrust seems to claim it should retain what it
secured at payoff because it could not recover these fees and costs
in the foreclosure action. It cites Chacker, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th

                                 8
351 and Hart v. Clear Recon Corp. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 322
(Hart).4

      In Chacker, a homeowner sued to stop nonjudicial
foreclosure proceedings against her home. (Chacker, supra, 27
Cal.App.5th at p. 353.) The trial court sustained demurrers by
the mortgage holders without leave to amend and awarded them
attorney fees under section 1717, finding the deed of trust
included attorney fee provisions for this purpose. (Chacker,
supra, at pp. 353–355.) The court of appeal reversed the attorney
fee award. (Id. at p. 356.) It reasoned that while the deed of
trust provisions allowed the mortgage holders to charge the
borrower for attorney fees incurred to protect their rights under
the instrument, they only permitted these fees to be added to the
underlying debt and did not authorize a freestanding contractual
attorney fee award. (Id. at pp. 356–359.) Hart similarly held a
provision in a deed of trust allowing attorney fees to be added to
the secured debt was not an attorney fee provision for purposes of
section 1717. (Hart, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 327.)

       Chacker and Hart support Wintrust’s position that it may
not have been able to recover its fees in the judicial foreclosure
action under section 1717. But here, Wintrust drops the thread.
It fails to explain why it didn’t follow Chacker and Hart in the
foreclosure action by offering evidence of its fees and adding them
to the secured debt. Alternatively, Wintrust could have
dismissed its judicial foreclosure claim before judgment entered
and elected to proceed with nonjudicial foreclosure. Instead,
Wintrust pursued judicial foreclosure all the way to judgment,

      4 Wintrust asserts that, as in Chacker and Hart, its fees

and costs became part of the secured debt per the loan
documents. We assume without deciding that Wintrust is correct
about this. If Wintrust is wrong—and its fees and costs did not
become part of the secured debt—they were not properly
demanded at payoff for that reason.

                                9
then changed its strategy by pursuing a different remedy for
more money. The record supports the trial court’s conclusion that
Wintrust pursued inconsistent remedies.

                                 4.

       Finally, the modern approach to election of remedies
requires us to consider the prejudice to the borrower caused by
the lender’s belated change of remedy. (C.J.A., supra, 86
Cal.App.4th at p. 670.) Substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s finding of prejudice. Transition was forced to tender a
much larger payoff to avoid foreclosure than it was adjudged to
owe in the foreclosure action, even while Wintrust preserved any
right to a deficiency judgment. (See Vlahovich, supra, 213
Cal.App.3d at p. 323.) Transition had to pay the full amount
without the benefit of a ruling on its arguments that the claimed
fees were excessive and impermissible. It had to bring an
otherwise unnecessary second lawsuit to protect its property from
foreclosure and recover its overpayments. (See C.J.A., supra, at
p. 671.) Wintrust’s change of course also undercuts the policy
favoring finality of actions by forcing the trial court and the
parties to revisit issues that were—or should have been—
addressed in the prior action. (See ibid.)

                                 B.

      Wintrust contends the voluntary payment doctrine barred
Transition from recovering any portion of its payoff. Again, we
disagree.

                                 1.

      The voluntary payment doctrine is rooted in the equitable
doctrine of economic duress. (See Rich & Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton
Development, Inc. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 1154, 1158.) Duress is
found where a person pays money that is not owed, which in
equity the receiver should not retain, to preserve his property or
protect his business interests. (Western etc. Oil Co. v. Title Ins. &

                                 10
Tr. Co. (1949) 92 Cal.App.2d 257, 266.) It requires a wrongful act
coercive enough to make a reasonably prudent person, with no
reasonable alternatives, succumb to the pressure. (Rich &
Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Development, Inc., supra, at p. 1158.)

      Requiring overpayment to secure the release of a mortgage
is duress. (Steffen v. Refrigeration Discount Corp. (1949) 91
Cal.App.2d 494, 497 (Steffen).) Based on this doctrine, a
mortgagor who disputes the amount demanded for redemption
can pay the full demand and recover the excess. (5 Miller &
Starr, supra, § 13:241.)

     We review the trial court’s findings concerning voluntary
payment for substantial evidence. (Steinman v. Malamed (2010)
185 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1556 (Steinman).)

                                2.

      There is plenty of evidence to support the trial court’s
findings that Transition’s payments were coerced and made
under protest. Wintrust noticed a nonjudicial foreclosure sale for
January 30, 2019. Transition promptly filed this action,
specifically alleging the indebtedness stated in the notice of sale
was “inaccurate and excessive,” complaining that Wintrust
“refuses to submit the fees incurred in [the foreclosure action] to
the court,” and asserting that “Wintrust is not entitled to any
recovery for attorney fees until the court determines such fees to
be reasonable.” Transition obtained a temporary restraining
order, but Herbstman testified it could not secure the required
bond. Bond agents uniformly told him they would need $800,000
in cash or a first lien on real property worth at least that much.
But Transition did not have access to that amount of assets and
there was an existing first lien on the property. Herbstman tried
to confirm the sale was off, but received ambiguous responses
from Wintrust and concluded its counsel “was doing all he could
to sandbag us into closing our eyes so he could sell” the property.
There was no word on the outcome of any judges’ conference

                                11
about the bond requirement, so Herbstman could not assume it
would continue to be stayed. Understanding he “could not go a
day longer” to close escrow before the sale, he told the escrow
company to pay Wintrust’s demand to protect the property—
which provided substantially all of his wealth and income.

       Wintrust claims there was no real threat that the sale
would proceed on January 30. It argues that even if the
injunction terminated, section 2924g, subdivision (d) required the
sale to be rescheduled to a date at least seven days later (unless a
court order directed an earlier sale). But Herbstman could not
predict what the judges might decide on the bond requirement,
and the trial court credited his testimony that he justifiably did
not believe Wintrust would reschedule the sale.

      Wintrust insists Transition had other reasonable options
than paying its demands. It posits that Transition (or
Herbstman) could have used the payoff financing to post a bond;
assigned the first lien on the property (held by another of
Herbstman’s companies) as security for the bond; petitioned to
reduce or eliminate the bond requirement or appealed it; or
obtained a mortgage on Herbstman’s residence to satisfy the
bond. However, Herbstman’s testimony provides substantial
evidence that these other options were unavailable or
unacceptably risky given the time constraints and other
circumstances Transition faced. As observed in Steffen, a
mortgagor under threat of foreclosure typically must sell or
refinance to save his property and can only do so if he satisfies
the mortgage as part of the same transaction. (Steffen, supra, 91
Cal.App.2d at p. 498.) The trial court reasonably concluded that
this was the only available path to a reasonably prudent
mortgagor here.

      Finally, Wintrust contends there was nothing wrongful
about its demands since it was entitled to pursue both judicial
and nonjudicial foreclosure until an election of remedies occurred.

                                12
We have already determined, however, that Wintrust elected
judicial foreclosure by pursuing that claim to judgment, and its
demands for more money in a separate process were inconsistent
with its election and therefore wrongful. Wintrust further argues
that for its demand to be wrongful, it must have known the
demand was false, citing dicta in Steinman. However, Steffen
imposed no such requirement and applied an earlier case where a
bank required an overpayment in error. (Steffen, supra, 91
Cal.App.2d at p. 497.) The Restatement of The Law of
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment approves Steffen in its
discussion of how a good faith demand can still be coercive.
(Rest.3d Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 14, illus. 14.) We
agree and affirm the trial court’s finding that Wintrust’s
demands were wrongful.

                                C.

       Finally, Wintrust appeals the trial court’s award of
attorney fees and costs to Transition as the prevailing party, but
only on the ground that the underlying judgment in Transition’s
favor should be reversed. Since we will affirm the judgment, we
will likewise affirm the award of fees and costs.

                         DISPOSITION

       The judgment is affirmed. The trial court’s award of
attorney fees and costs to Transition is affirmed. Transition is
entitled to its costs on appeal.

                                13
                                    ______________________
                                    BURNS, J.

We concur:

____________________________
JACKSON, P.J.

____________________________
SIMONS, J.

A162930/A163318

                               14