Court Opinion

ID: 9747706
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:28:24.737645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:25.778590
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Spaeth, J.:
I join the majority opinion, but I believe it may be *69helpful to add a comment on our terminology, which has become fuzzy.
The essential features of the lower court’s order are two: the visits directed are brief and repetitive (“First and Third Saturdays of each month 1:00 P.M. to 7:00 P.M.”); and the mother and her parents are excluded from participating in the visits because otherwise disagreeable arguments, hard on the child, would probably occur. The lower court called this arrangement “partial custody.” I would too. Sometimes, however, we have called such an arrangement “limited custody” or “divided custody.” See Commonwealth ex rel. English v. English, 194 Pa. Superior Ct. 25, 166 A.2d 92 (1960); Commonwealth ex rel. Heller v. Yellin, 174 Pa. Superior Ct. 292, 101 A.2d 452 (1953). I suggest that we no longer use these terms, and that we limit use of the term “partial custody” to cases where psychological considerations, as in the present case, or geographical reasons, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Moore v. Moore, 172 Pa. Superior Ct. 255, 94 A.2d 93 (1953) (child to spend one week per month with father, when the distance between the parties’ homes was too great to permit an ordinary visitation order), require that the non-custodial parent see the child out of the presence of the custodial parent. This would leave only three terms: “custody,” “partial custody,” and “visitation.”
The importance of thus limiting and distinguishing among the terms we use is that it may then be made plain that each term carries with it a particular standard.
In deciding who should have “custody,” the hearing judge, as we have repeatedly said, should apply as his standard the best interests of the child. See, e.g., Augustine v. Augustine, 228 Pa. Superior Ct. 312, 324 A.2d 477 (1974); Commonwealth ex rel. Bender v. Bender, 197 Pa. Superior Ct. 397, 178 A.2d 779 (1962). In applying this standard, the judge must carefully examine the fitness of both parties contesting custody, and make *70his determination on the basis of a comprehensive record. Gunter v. Gunter, 240 Pa. Superior Ct. 382, 361 A.2d 307 (1976); Commonwealth ex rel. Grillo v. Shuster, 226 Pa. Superior Ct. 229, 312 A.2d 58 (1973). In deciding whether to grant “visitation,” the judge may apply a far more permissive standard.1 While visitation may be denied, that should be done only when visits are shown to be detrimental to the child (for example, as when evidence of improper or dangerous conduct is shown). Commonwealth ex rel. Heston v. Heston, 173 Pa. Superior Ct. 260, 98 A.2d 477 (1953); Leonard v. Leonard, 173 Pa. Superior Ct. 424, 98 A.2d 638 (1953). An effort should be made to avoid estrangement between parent and child. Thus a child may be compelled to visit a parent even when the child has expressed a wish not to. Commonwealth ex rel. Lotz v. Lotz, 188 Pa. Superior Ct. 241, 146 A.2d 362 (1958). In Commonwealth ex rel. Turner v. Strange, 179 Pa. Superior Ct. 83, 115 A.2d 885 (1955), we distinguished the standard to be applied in awarding visitation from that to be applied in awarding custody: “Only when the evidence clearly shows that a mother is unfit to associate with her children should she be denied the right to see them .... The appellant does not seek complete custody of the children, nor under the evidence would she be entitled to it. She does seek, and is entitled to, the right to see her children.” Id. at 86, 115 A.2d at 887.
When “partial custody” is awarded, the standard to be applied should depend upon the sort of partial custody. The more closely partial custody approaches *71custody, the more closely should the standard approach that applied in awarding custody. Such a situation will be presented where the order of partial custody provides that the child is to stay with the non-custodial parent for an extended period, such as a summer vacation. This is especially likely to occur when the parents live far apart. Cf. Davidyan v. Davidyan, 229 Pa. Superior Ct. 495, 327 A.2d 139 (1974) (mother, awarded custody, lived in Scotland; child to visit father, who lived in United States). However, the more closely partial custody approaches visitation, as where the child is to be with the non-custodial parent for frequent but short visits, the more closely should the standard approach that applied in awarding visitation.
In the case before us, the partial custody awarded more closely approaches visitation than custody. The hearing judge was therefore correct in considering the factors involved in an award of visitation. Thus she found no “severe mental or moral deficiency on the part of the father which would constitute a real and grave threat to the welfare of the child,” Opinion at 118a, and she refused to deny an award simply because the father had not provided support for the child and had not attempted to enforce his visitation rights for two years. Likewise, in its opinion the majority has applied the same standard, observing that “[wjhile Virginia’s criticisms of Charles are numerous and spirited, they do not include anything which would constitute a real and grave threat to the welfare of the child.” Majority Opinion at p. 68.
For these reasons, I agree with the majority that the lower court’s order granting appellee partial custody should be affirmed.
Hoffman, J., joins in this opinion.

. In Commonwealth ex rel. Rosequist v. Rosequist, 216 Pa. Superior Ct. 388, 392, 268 A.2d 140, 142 (1970), “visitation” is defined as “the right of the parent to go to see the child wherever he might be and ... not ... the right of the parent to take possession of the child.” This definition, however, was formulated in order to construe a statute, Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, §733, as amended, 18 P.S. §4733. I find it unnecessarily restrictive and not descriptive of most visitation orders.