Court Opinion

ID: 9596144
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:46:29.838017+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:01.041495
License: Public Domain

KELLER, Justice, Concurring
in Part
and Dissenting in Part.
I agree with much of Section II of the majority opinion and would remand this matter for the trial court to appoint counsel for Appellant and to conduct an eviden-tiary hearing in Appellant’s underlying *459RCr 11.42 action. I write separately, however, because I adamantly disagree with the majority’s Section I conclusion regarding a needy person’s right to appointed counsel in RCr 11.42 proceedings. Accordingly, I would modify the majority’s Section II holding and, in addition to remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing on the matters discussed in the majority opinion, I would allow appointed counsel to supplement Appellant’s previous RCr 11.42 petition and raise any additional grounds for relief.
Over two (2) decades ago, in Commonwealth v. Ivey,1 this Court unanimously held that, through its adoption of KRS 31.110, the General Assembly has required the appointment of counsel for an indigent movant, upon his or her request, for the purpose of supplementing an RCr 11.42 petition. Today’s majority overrules Commonwealth v. Ivey without even addressing the primary rationale behind its holding, and bases its conclusion upon a flawed separation of powers analysis neither briefed nor argued before the Court. I find it perplexing that, after explicitly referencing — and ridiculing — the inadequacy of many pro se RCr 11.42 pleadings, the majority ignores the General Assembly’s clear intent “to provide meaningful, rather than nominal, protection to the rights of the indigent,”2 and nullifies the “statutory right to counsel [which] allows for resolution of all legitimate claims in the first motion and provides no inequity between the needy and rich.”3
The Ivey Court recognized that KRS 31.110(2)(c) gives needy persons a statutory right to appointed counsel in post-conviction proceedings and observed the appropriateness of this right in light of RCr 11.42(3)’s procedural default rules:
The primary question presented is whether the public advocacy statutes require the appointment of counsel upon request of a “needy person” to represent him in RCr 11.42 proceedings. We hold that the legislature has so provided.
Ivey presented the principal issue in this case by way of a CR 60.02 motion to set aside or to amend the order in the RCr 11.42 proceeding on the ground that the circuit court had improperly refused to appoint counsel for Ivey when so requested pursuant to KRS 31.110. The circuit court had ruled it was unnecessary to appoint counsel for Ivey pursuant to RCr 11.42(5) because the pleadings did not raise a material issue of fact. However, the CR 60 .02 motion and supporting memorandum raised the question of statutory requirement to provide counsel for needy persons in post-conviction proceedings upon request. To deny counsel to such a person was error.
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The provision for appointment of counsel found in RCr 11.42(5) was intended to set the minimum standard for post conviction relief proceedings. The legislature could and did provide for a more generous policy of appointing counsel for indigents, an action which is entirely consistent with its control of the purse strings of the Commonwealth.
RCr 11.42(3) provides: “The motion shall state all grounds for holding the sentence invalid of which the movant has knowledge. 'Final disposition of the mo*460tion shall conclude all issues that could reasonably have been presented in the same proceedings.” This rule has been consistently interpreted to bar successive motions under 11 .42. Without the assistance of counsel Ivey could be effectively precluded from raising valid grounds by failure to include such grounds at the time of his first motion. This inequity between the needy and the affluent is cured by the statute.
It is our opinion that KRS 31.110 and RCR 11.42 are complementary and clearly provide for appointment of counsel in the situation presented here.4
Contrary to the majority’s allegation that this Court has retreated from the Ivey holding, both this Court and the Court of Appeals have applied the Ivey holding5 and found error when trial courts have failed to appoint counsel in accordance with its holding.6 Although today’s majority deploys out-of-context language from Commonwealth v. Stamps to suggest that the Stamps Court questioned the Ivey Court’s interpretation of KRS 31.110, the quoted language refers to the Appellant’s contention that the trial court’s failure to appoint counsel constituted automatic reversible error,7 and the Stamps Court actually found error, but believed it harmless under the facts of that case.8
While this Court has not interpreted Ivey to require reversal whenever the trial court fails to appoint counsel (a conclusion which might warrant another look), we have never — until today, anyway — questioned the Ivey Court’s conclusion that KRS 31.110 grants needy persons a statutory right to appointed counsel in post-conviction proceedings. I believe we have done so largely because no other interpretation is even remotely defensible because the statute contains no ambiguity — KRS 31.110 unequivocally creates a right to appointed counsel in post-conviction matters;
(1) A needy person who is being detained by a law enforcement officer, on suspicion of having committed, or who is under formal charge of having committed, or is being detained under a conviction of a serious crime, is entitled:
*461(a) To be represented by an attorney to the same extent as a person having his own counsel is so entitled; and
(b) To be provided with the necessary services and facilities of representation including investigation and other preparation. The courts in which the defendant is tried shall waive all costs.
(2) A needy person who is entitled to be represented by an attorney under subsection (1) is entitled:
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(c) To be represented in any other post-conviction proceeding that the attorney and the needy person consider] appropriate. However, if the counsel appointed in such post-conviction remedy, with the court involved, determines that it is not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to bring at his own expense, there shall be no further right to be represented by counsel under the provisions of this chapter.9
I find KRS 81.110 susceptible to only one interpretation — the General Assembly intends to provide for the appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings— and today’s majority does not provide a viable alternative interpretation. Contrary to the majority’s view that KRS 31.110(2)(e) authorizes the Department of Public Advocacy to provide counsel in post-conviction proceedings, but does not contemplate that trial courts will appoint such counsel, KRS Chapter 31 explicitly references court appointment.10 And, of course, KRS 31.110(2)(e) itself contemplates “counsel appointed in such post-conviction remedy.”11
The majority dismisses KRS 31.110’s creation of a statutory right to appointed counsel in post-conviction proceedings on the basis of two (2) conclusions: (1) most of those pleadings are frivolous to begin with; and (2) the General Assembly has no authority to create such an entitlement.
At the outset, I fail to see how the first of these conclusions is at all germane to the inquiry of whether the General Assembly has provided a right to appointed counsel broader than that required by the state or federal constitutions or by RCr 11.42 itself. Although the majority purports to trumpet the “wisdom” of its holding by noting the “number of frivolous or facially meritless motions filed under the rule” 12 and suggesting that the statistics it cites demonstrate the “sheer volume and relative futility of RCr 11.42 motions,”13 an • empirical lack of success simply does not justify this Court’s substitution of its judg*462ment for that of the General Assembly. I believe the appointment of counsel is warranted if it only helps a handful of people.
Even if the majority is correct that litigants infrequently obtain relief under RCr 11.42, I believe that fact merely demonstrates the need for the assistance of counsel in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of those claims. Although the majority’s characterization implies the filing of intentionally meritless claims, the authority cited by the majority demonstrates to me that laypersons, untrained in the law, and struggling to do the best they can with forms passed on from inmate to inmate might, not unsurprisingly, produce inadequate pleadings. In my opinion, the appointment of counsel to assist laypersons, especially in light of the Anders-type procedure contemplated in the last sentence of KRS 31.110(2)(c), can only improve the quality of RCr 11.42 argumentation and reduce frivolous claims.
I also note that more recent data calls into question “the perception that there are an endless number of motions to vacate being recklessly filed across the Commonwealth.” 14 And, in any event, the law review article containing the figures the majority cites addresses only appellate court determinations reviewing trial court rulings in RCr 11.42 proceedings,15 and ignores cases where trial courts granted relief and the Commonwealth chose not to appeal. Unlike the majority, which commits a hasty generalization by equating the empirical lack of appellate success with wholesale futility of post-conviction remedies, the author cited merely concludes that “[t]he burden on the Kentucky Court of Appeals, which must hear all RCr 11.42 appeals except those in death penalty cases, appears quite out of proportion to the relief granted.”16 The author relies upon these statistics to support his recommendation that Kentucky modify its rules to limit direct appeal from trial court rulings denying relief in non-death penalty RCr 11.42 proceedings.17 The majority’s appropriation of these statistics to demonstrate the “wisdom” of its decision to disregard KRS 31.110(2)(c) ignores the fact that the author who compiled these statistics does not recommend any changes in existing procedures for appointment of counsel in post-conviction matters, and, in fact, appears to recognize the utility of appointed counsel in such proceedings.18
I find myself even more vexed, however, with the majority’s conclusion that the General Assembly’s adoption of KRS 31.110 violated the separation of powers doctrine by attempting to establish court procedures for the appointment of counsel.
*463The legislative branch unquestionably has the authority to create a statutory right to appointed counsel. The United States Supreme Court says so,19 and— until today, anyway — this Court has interpreted KRS Chapter 81 to create such a right,20 and has, in the exercise of its constitutional authority, adopted procedures for the appointment of counsel in accordance with KRS Chapter 31.21 In fact, this Court’s predecessor all but begged the legislature to create a statewide public defender system,22 specifically asked the General Assembly for guidance as to how such a system should be administered,23 *464and, when the General Assembly finally adopted KRS Chapter 31, celebrated it as a proper exercise of the legislative authority:
No better statement of the basic concept of the doctrine of separation of powers can be made that that contained in No. 78 of the Federalist Papers. Here, Hamilton states:
“Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive that, in a government in which they are separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The executive not only dispenses the honors but holds the sword of the community. The legislature not only commands the purse but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.” (emphasis supplied).
In the context presented, we are persuaded that it is the duty of the exeeu-tive department to enforce the criminal laws, and it is the duty of the legislative department to appropriate sufficient funds to enforce the laws which they have enacted. The proper duty of the judiciary, in the constitutionally ideal sense, is neither to enforce laws nor appropriate money. The judiciary’s reason for existence is to adjudicate.
With these principles considered, we now declare: First, the system of court-appointed uncompensated counsel does not meet the constitutional standards of either the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of this State.
Second, the Kentucky Public Defender Act of 1972 appears to provide means adequate to observe the required standards, if that act is properly construed, administered, and promptly put into operation.24
KRS 31.110 in no way infringes upon the judicial branch’s authority to “prescribe ... rules of practice and procedure for the Court of Justice,”25 but rather creates a statutory right to appointed counsel which allows indigent prisoners the equal protection of the laws. The Court of Justice is, by necessity, a part — indeed a vital part— of the administration of Kentucky’s established system for providing legal representation to indigent persons. In so doing, we do not abdicate any constitutional powers conferred upon the judiciary, but rather we fulfill our duty as a separate branch of government. The majority’s contrary conclusion is impossible to reconcile with this Court’s explicit declaration, in Pillersdorf *465v. Dept. of Public Advocacy,26 that the operation of the KRS Chapter 31 statutory framework does not implicate the judicial authority:
This is not a separation of powers case because ... no ultimate power of the judiciary (or any other branch of government) is in question .... This case is about the relevant provisions of the Kentucky Public Defender Act, KRS Chapter 31, and how to operate within its statutory framework.
KRS Chapter 31 is a comprehensive network of statutes enacted by the legislature in response to the dilemma created by both state and federal constitutional guarantees of effective representation for indigent defendants. The choice was clear: the state either must see that a defendant is provided counsel or it cannot proceed with a prosecution.
In Bradshaw v. Ball, this Court considered the question of whether the Commonwealth was required to compensate court-appointed attorneys representing indigent defendants....
Of equal consequence for the present case, the Court also addressed the separation of powers concern of where, in government, the practical task of providing effective counsel lies....
In 1972, the year of the Bradshaw decision, the General Assembly enacted the Kentucky Public Defender Act, KRS Chapter 31. In both sources of law, the allocation of responsibilities connected with the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants and the setting of fees are consistent with the separation of powers concept long ago expressed by Alexander Hamilton, and now embedded in our system of jurisprudence.27
No doubt the General Assembly's collective head will spin as it attempts to comprehend how this Court can tacitly accept direct intrusion upon the judicial power,28 but then dismiss three (3) decades of jurisprudence and manufacture a separation of powers controversy to justify “protecting our turf’ in the realm of appointment of counsel.
In Ivey, this Court properly found that KRS 31.110 creates a statutory right to appointment of counsel for needy persons in post-conviction proceedings. Today’s majority takes a giant leap backwards for no coherent reason. Because the prevailing view holds merely that trial courts are not required to appoint counsel unless the merits of the original RCr 11.42 petition require an evidentiary hearing, I would encourage the trial courts of this state to continue to make such appointments when requested for the purpose of supplementing RCr 11.42 petitions. I find it disconcerting that a majority of this Court does not recognize the importance of appointing counsel in post-conviction matters for needy persons who cannot afford to retain their own counsel. The General Assembly recognized the need for an equal playing field when it adopted KRS Chapter 31. Today’s majority opinion derails the legislature’s efforts and, unfortunately, restores the “inequity between the needy and affluent”29 which, in Ivey, this Court found *466“cured by the statute.”30
STUMBO, J., joins this opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

. Ky., 599 S.W.2d 456 (1980).

. West v. Commonwealth, Ky., 887 S.W.2d 338, 341 (1994).

.Ed Monahan & Rebecca DiLoreto, "The Scope of the Right to Counsel in Kentucky Post-Conviction Proceedings,” The Advocate, v. 22, no. 4, 34-37 at 37 (July, 2000) (hereafter, "Monahan & DiLoreto”).

. Commonwealth v. Ivey, supra note 1 at 457-8 (citations omitted and emphasis added).

. See Gilliam v. Commonwealth, Ky., 652 S.W.2d 856, 858 (1983) {"Ivey defines the right to appointment of counsel in post-conviction RCr 11.42 proceedings... . The holding in Ivey simply provides the movant with legal assistance in preparing and presenting grievances.”); Beecham v. Commonwealth, Ky., 657 S.W.2d 234, 236 (1983) ("The trial court is required to appoint counsel only upon request.”); Allen v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 668 S.W.2d 556, 557 (1984) ("The Ivey case does require that counsel be appointed, when requested, to assist an appellant in the presentation of an RCR 11.42 motion to vacate judgment.”). See also Ray v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 633 S.W.2d 71, 72 (recognizing the "statutory right to counsel which is set forth in KRS 31.110(1),” but declining to extend that right to CR 60.02 motions filed after the expiration of a sentence).

. Commonwealth v. Stamps, Ky., 672 S.W.2d 336, 339 (1984) (correctly characterizing the Ivey holding when stating "the statute is broader [than RCR 11.42(5)]. It provides for appointment of counsel on all RCR 11.42 motions where the movant so requests,” and finding the trial court's failure to appoint counsel erroneous, but harmless).

. Id. ("Thus, we are squarely confronted with whether our decision in Commonwealth v. Ivey mandates automatic reversal in every case where a defendant proceeding in forma pauperis has filed an RCR 11.42 proceeding and requested the appointment of counsel, but the trial court has failed to provide one.” (citation omitted)).

. Id. ("We hold that in the circumstances of this case, the trial court’s failure to appoint counsel for the RCr 11.42 motion was harmless error.” (emphasis added)).

. KRS 31.110 (emphasis added).

. See KRS 31.051(2) ("Any person provided counsel under the provisions of this chapter shall be assessed at the time of appointment, a non-refundable fifty dollar ($50) administrative fee .... ” (emphasis added)); KRS 31.120(1) ("The determination of whether a person covered by KRS 31.110 is a needy person shall be deferred no later than his first appearance in court ... [thereafter, the court concerned shall determine ... whether he is a needy person. However, nothing herein shall prevent appointment of counsel at the earliest necessary proceeding in which the person is entitled to counsel.” (emphasis added)); KRS 31 .120(2) ("In determining whether a person is a needy person ... the court concerned shall consider such factors as ...."); KRS 31.125(1) (“If court-appointed counsel has been provided to a juvenile .... ” (emphasis added)); KRS 31.250(1) ("Except for attorneys appointed pursuant to KRS ... 31.120 .... ” (emphasis added)).

. KRS 31.110(2)(c) (emphasis added).

. Majority Opinion at 59 S.W.3d 448, 453 (2001).

. Id. at 453.

. Monahan & DiLoreto, supra note 3 at 37.

. The author even concludes that “[a]ppar-ently, based on this survey, most of RCR 11.42 cases are correctly resolved at the trial court level." John S. Gillig, Kentucky Post-Conviction Remedies and the Judicial Development of Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.42, 83 Ky. L.J. 265, 344 (1994-95).

. Id.

. Id. at 387-390.

. See Id. at 273 ("[M]ost states either require the appointment of counsel to assist the indigent prisoner in the investigation and presentation of the claims or at least have in place a strong presumption in favor of such appointments.”); Id. at 294 ("[A]s the scope of federal habeus corpus review further contracts, the necessity for comprehensive post-conviction review in Kentucky theoretically increases proportionally.” (emphasis added)); Id. at 362 ("In appropriate cases, counsel should be appointed early in the process, because RCR 11.42(3) requires the movant to present all grounds for relief of which the prisoner has knowledge.”); Id. ("If counsel is appointed, the original motion to vacate is either substituted or supplemented by pleadings prepared with the assistance of counsel.”).

. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748 n. 12, 114 S.Ct. 1921, 128 L.Ed.2d 745, 755 n. 12 (1994):
Of course States may decide, based on their own constitutions or public policy, that counsel should be available for all indigent defendants charged with misdemeanors. Indeed, many, if not a majority of States guarantee the right to counsel whenever imprisonment is authorized by statute, rather than actually imposed.
Id. (citing illustrative statutory provisions from the states of Alaska, California, and New Hampshire.).

. See Commonwealth v. Ivey, supra note 1 at 457 ("The legislature could and did provide for a more generous policy of appointing counsel for indigents, an action which is entirely consistent with its control of the purse strings of the Commonwealth.” (emphasis added)); Commonwealth v. Stamps, supra note 6 at 339 ("Such right to counsel for a needy person as exists in an RCR 11.42 proceeding is provided by rule and by statute." (emphasis added)). See also Lewis v. Lewis, Ky., 875 S.W.2d 862 (1993) (finding a right to counsel in civil contempt proceedings premised exclusively on the basis of Kentucky statutory law: "[W]e hold that the statutes of the Commonwealth require that an indigent person has a right to appointed counsel in civil contempt proceedings prior to the execution of an order of incarceration.” Id. at 864 (emphasis added)). KRS Chapter 31 itself, of course, refers to "any right provided by this chapter” in a provision allowing waiver of counsel. KRS 31.140(1) (emphasis added).

. See RCr 3.05(2) ("If the defendant demonstrates that he or she is a needy person as defined in KRS 1.120 and the court so concludes, then the appointment shall continue for all future stages of the criminal proceeding.” (emphasis added)).

. See Warner v. Commonwealth, Ky., 400 S.W.2d 209, 211-212 (1966) ("We think it is appropriate for the time to defer to legislative action.”); Jones v. Commonwealth, Ky., 411 S.W.2d 37, 38 (1967) ("[W]e note that the General Assembly has not had an opportunity since publication of the opinion in Warner to act upon the problem; and until then we shall continue to be disposed to defer to legislative action.”); Commonwealth, Dept. of Corrections v. Burke, Ky., 426 S.W.2d 449, 450 (1968):
Appellee insists this vital matter of compensation involves the "administration of justice” and urges us to devise some system for the allowance of reasonable attorneys’ fees as necessary costs of administering the criminal laws of this Commonwealth. A present insurmountable obstacle is that no system we could devise would be workable since the judiciary has no funds available for this purpose. Although appellee argues to the contrary, we believe this subject is, and should be, a legislative matter. Only the legislature can provide sufficient funds to finance such a project, and of course the legislature must necessarily create the system under which these funds could be properly disbursed.
This very serious problem has been before us recently in Warner v. Commonwealth and Jones v. Commonwealth. In both cases, we expressed our intention to defer to legislative action. It is almost a matter of necessity that we do so.
... We cannot refrain from expressing the wish that other departments of government recognize this grave problem and take appropriate steps, as has been done in other states, to rectify the situation.
Id. (citations omitted); Jones v. Commonwealth, Ky., 457 S.W.2d 627 (1970) ("Hopeful that ... acceptable solutions to the problem may be forthcoming, we shall continue for the present to defer any judicial action.”).

.See Commonwealth, Dept. of Corrections v. Burke, supra note 22 at 450 (“But in the absence of some law ... there is simply noth*464ing to guide us with respect to the manner in which this appropriation could be properly expended.”); Jones v. Commonwealth (1970), supra note 22 at 632 ("A difficulty with a judicial direction for payment would be in the lack of any standards or guide for determining reasonableness of compensation and of any system for payment.”).

. Bradshaw v. Ball, Ky., 487 S.W.2d 294, 299 (1972) (citation omitted and underlined emphasis added).

. KENTUCKY CONSTITUTION § 116.

. Ky., 890 S.W.2d 616 (1994).

. Id. at 618-619 (italicized emphasis in original, underlined emphasis added).

. See Commonwealth v. Reneer, Ky., 734 S.W.2d 794 (1987) ("[W]e decline to hold K.R.S. 532.055 unconstitutional, and we accept its provisions for the time being under the principles of comity.” Id. at 798).

.Commonwealth v. Ivey, supra note 1 at 458.

. Id.