Court Opinion

ID: 9844541
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:04:24.015816+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:37.075864
License: Public Domain

SHILLINGLAW, Justice, dissenting. I am unable to agree with the opinion of Justice McGHEE. First, as to the disposition of the motion to dismiss the appeal, the opinion states the question to be: “Does the filing of a motion for a new trial and the time which elapses until an order is entered thereon toll the time for taking an appeal?” The majority opinion, finding that the judgment was entered on April 25, 1957, that the motion for a new trial was filed May 3, 1957, and that the appellants had then consumed 8 days of the 30-day period in which to appeal, held that the appellants had 22 days in which to file an appeal after the motion for a new trial was denied on August 27, 1957. The appeal being filed on August 30, 1957, the appellants still had 19 days remaining at the time of the filing and, consequently, the appeal was held timely. I agree that the appeal was timely, but how did the majority arrive at this conclusion ? They hold it was timely because the movant obtained substantial relief from the judgment in the form of a remittitur. From the reasoning of the majority, I must conclude that had there been no remittitur, the appeal would not have been timely. How is a movant to know what disposition is to be made of his motion? Is the right of appeal to depend upon what action the trial judge may take on the motion for a new trial? It is apparent that, with our 30-day limitation period for appeals, such will often be the case. I cannot acquiesce in the result that will follow from such a ruling. It is noted that the appellant still appeals from the excessiveness of the verdict. Secondly as to the disposition of the merits of the case. The following exchange took place during the examination of Officer Martin, who was not an eyewitness to the accident: “Q. Now, Mr. Martin, from your investigation, did you, or could you determine which one of the two vehicles entered the intersection first? A. According to my investigation, I believe— “Mr. Sherman: If the Court please, just a minute. I am going to object to that question. I don’t believe that, the witness was not there when it occurred, and it would be — any opinion which he would give would be based necessarily upon any information which he received, which would be hearsay — on the speed of the vehicle and different things like that, and I don’t believe that the witness could conscientiously say, based from any investigation which he made. It would necessarily have to be based on hearsay statement. “Mr. Garland: No, if the Court please, we are not asking the witness to repeat hearsay. We are asking him merely if his investigation disclosed. We are not asking him to repeat what somebody told him. “The Court: You are asking him to draw a conclusion from his investigation? “Mr. Garland: That’s what I am asking him, from the facts- — the physical facts as he found them — if he could determine which vehicle in fact entered the intersection first. “The Court: That is on the physical facts ? “Mr. Garland: Yes, sir. “The Court: I think that would be good. He can answer that. “Q. (Mr. Garland continuing.) Can you answer that, Mr. Martin? A. Through my investigation, and in my opinion, as a result of the investigation, I believe Mr. Scofield entered the intersection first.” There is no conceivable way that such a determination could have been made without taking into consideration the speed of the vehicle. Such testimony was, in my opinion, highly prejudicial and constituted reversible error. That the testimony was based on hearsay was admitted on cross examination: “Q. * * * So your assumption was based on the fact that he told you he was going twenty-five miles per hour and the fact that he was thirty-one feet in the intersection, well, when the truck was about twenty-seven feet, is that correct? A. That is correct.” (Emphasis mine.) The opinion comments that the defense counsel did not move to strike “so much of the answer of the witness made immediately following the objection and ruling, as might have been based on what the appellee said as to his speed.” Obviously not; the precise point which counsel was trying to establish was that the opinion of the witness Martin was based on hearsay. I note the following statement on page 11 of appellant’s brief in chief: “Thus showing that the basis for his statement was at least partially from hearsay, as our objection pointed out. It would have been just as correct to allow the officer to testify as to the speed of the vehicles prior to impact.” Appellant then cites Stuart v. Dotts, 89 Cal.App.2d 683, 201 P.2d 820, 822: “Opinion evidence may be given from personal observation on subjects such as whether a party is intoxicated but not <on facts related by other parties.” From this, I would not say that appellant completely abandoned his “hearsay objection.” For the above reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the court below. Accordingly I dissent.