Court Opinion

ID: 9945053
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 22:00:48.33178+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:20.974955
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                     ____________________
No. 22-3194
CHICAGO JOE’S TEA ROOM, LLC
and PERVIS CONWAY, individually,
                                                Plaintiffs-Appellants,

                                 v.

VILLAGE OF BROADVIEW,
an Illinois Municipal Corporation, et al.,
                                               Defendants-Appellees.
                     ____________________

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the
           Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
          No. 1:07-cv-02680 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.
                     ____________________

 ARGUED SEPTEMBER 14, 2023 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 26, 2024
                ____________________

   Before ROVNER, HAMILTON, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.
    HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. This appeal presents a host of is-
sues arising from an eﬀort to prove lost proﬁts for a business
that never opened. In 2006, plaintiﬀ Chicago Joe’s Tea Room,
LLC hoped to open an adult entertainment business in a Chi-
cago suburb, the Village of Broadview. Chicago Joe’s encoun-
tered legal obstacles that it claimed violated its constitutional
2                                                  No. 22-3194

rights. For over ﬁfteen years, Chicago Joe’s has been seeking
tens of millions of dollars in lost proﬁts for that hypothetical
business.
    The district court excluded most of Chicago Joe’s evidence
and theories for lost-proﬁts damages. The exclusions were
based on a number of substantive and procedural problems
with the evidence Chicago Joe’s oﬀered. The court eventually
entered a ﬁnal judgment awarding Chicago Joe’s just $15,111
in damages. Chicago Joe’s has appealed.
   We aﬃrm. All issues in this appeal challenge decisions
that are left to the sound discretion of the district court, and
we ﬁnd no abuses of discretion. Along the way, we address
limits on using lay opinions to prove lost proﬁts for a business
that never opened, limits on the testimony that a rebuttal ex-
pert can oﬀer, exclusion of late or undisclosed evidence as a
discovery sanction, and denial of leave to amend a complaint
eleven years after the case was ﬁled.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
    A. Special Use Permit Denial, Constitutional Challenges, and
       a New Illinois Statute
     We begin with a brief outline of more than ﬁfteen years of
litigation, providing more issue-speciﬁc details later. Chicago
Joe’s Tea Room intended to open not a tearoom but a strip
club and restaurant in the Village of Broadview in Cook
County, Illinois, west of Chicago. The proposed club planned
to feature semi-nude dancing and to serve alcohol.
   In 2006, David Donahue contracted to buy land in the Vil-
lage from plaintiﬀ Pervis Conway with the goal of opening
Chicago Joe’s at that location. Donahue then assigned the land
contract to Chicago Joe’s, LLC, of which Donahue became the
No. 22-3194                                                   3

sole member in 2010. The land was zoned industrial, and in
December 2006, Chicago Joe’s applied for a special use per-
mit. In early 2007, the application was denied. Chicago Joe’s
had made clear that it intended to serve alcohol, but a Village
ordinance prohibited adult entertainment businesses from
selling alcohol. Shortly after that denial, the Village amended
its adult business ordinance to prohibit such businesses
within 1,000 feet of any residential area. Under that re-
striction, Chicago Joe’s would not have been able to open at
the proposed site even if it could resolve other issues.
    On May 11, 2007, Chicago Joe’s and Conway ﬁled this law-
suit against the Village of Broadview, members of the Zoning
Board, and members of the Village Board. The complaint
sought a variety of relief, including (1) a declaratory judgment
that both the special use ordinance and the alcohol prohibi-
tion ordinance violated the First Amendment; (2) an injunc-
tion against enforcement of the ordinances against Chicago
Joe’s; and (3) monetary damages for the unconstitutional de-
nial of the special use permit.
   In September 2008, Judge Gottschall granted and denied
in part cross-motions for summary judgment. Judge
Gottschall found that the alcohol ban was unconstitutional.
Chicago Joe’s Tea Room, LLC v. Village of Broadview, No. 07-cv-
2680, 2008 WL 4287002, at *19 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 2008). Judge
Gottschall also found that Chicago Joe’s had acquired a
“vested right” under Illinois law to proceed under the adult-
business ordinance as it existed at the time it applied for the
special use permit. Id. at *6.
     In the meantime, though, the State of Illinois had changed
its laws regarding adult businesses. On August 16, 2007, about
three months after this suit was ﬁled, the Illinois legislature
4                                                     No. 22-3194

amended 65 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11-5-1.5 in a way that
made it impossible for Chicago Joe’s to open anywhere in the
Village:
       [I]t is [ ] prohibited to locate, construct, or oper-
       ate a new adult entertainment facility within
       one mile of the property boundaries of any
       school, day care center, cemetery, public park,
       forest preserve, public housing, or place of reli-
       gious worship located in that area of Cook
       County outside of the City of Chicago.
The one-mile limit put the entire Village oﬀ limits for a new
adult entertainment business like Chicago Joe’s.
    B. Discovery and Damages Evidence
    In June 2012, the case was transferred to then-District
Judge Lee, who oversaw discovery, which closed in early 2015
after several extensions. Chicago Joe’s did not identify an ex-
pert witness for damages. It chose instead to rely on David
Donahue to oﬀer lay opinions about lost proﬁts, the lion’s
share of the damages it sought. The Village took Donahue’s
deposition on three separate occasions: July 25, 2013; March
7, 2014; and March 11, 2014, including as a Rule 30(b)(6) des-
ignated witness. The depositions examined Donahue’s calcu-
lations of Chicago Joe’s lost proﬁts based upon his experience
with a diﬀerent adult entertainment business called Polekatz.
    The Village responded by disclosing the expert report of
Gary R. Skoog, Ph.D., dated July 14, 2014. His report chal-
lenged the lost-proﬁts calculations of Donahue, oﬀering its
own conclusions and opinions of Chicago Joe’s ﬁnancial
losses. On October 3, 2014, Chicago Joe’s disclosed the rebut-
tal expert damages report of John Bradley Sargent.
No. 22-3194                                                            5

    Over six years later, in January 2021, Sargent provided a
“supplemental” report. That report provided two new, inde-
pendent calculations: (1) the actual costs incurred by Chicago
Joe’s; and (2) the projected lost proﬁts of Chicago Joe’s from
2007 to 2026. ECF 1074-6 at 7. 1 These values were original cal-
culations by Sargent, based on new ﬁnancial information and
documents from Polekatz and Chicago Joe’s. Id. at 5.
   C. The Village’s Motion for Reconsideration and Appeal
    In 2016, the parties engaged in another round of summary
judgment brieﬁng. The Village asked Judge Lee to reconsider
Judge Gottschall’s prior vested-rights holding. Judge Lee held
that the 2007 Illinois amendment to the adult business law de-
feated Chicago Joe’s claim that it had a vested right to proceed
under prior law. Judge Lee granted partial summary judg-
ment for the Village and dismissed Chicago Joe’s claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief, leaving only the damages
claim. Chicago Joe’s Tea Room, LLC v. Village of Broadview, No.
07-cv-2680, 2016 WL 1270398, at *5–7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2016).
Chicago Joe’s appealed that decision, and we aﬃrmed on June
29, 2018. Chicago Joe’s Tea Room, LLC v. Village of Broadview, 894
F.3d 807, 810 (7th Cir. 2018) (“Chicago Joe’s I”).
    The parties and the district court then focused on prepar-
ing for a trial on damages. In 2018, Chicago Joe’s also moved
for leave to ﬁle an amended complaint to add a challenge to
the constitutionality of the state’s 2007 amendment to the
adult business law. Judge Lee denied the motion as untimely
and prejudicial to the Village.

   1 All references to documents in the district court record are denoted

“ECF.”
6                                                   No. 22-3194

    D. Discovery Sanctions and the Final Stipulated Judgment
    As trial approached, the Village ﬁled a series of motions in
limine seeking to exclude virtually all of Chicago Joe’s evi-
dence of lost proﬁts, as well as other categories of damages
evidence, on both substantive grounds and as sanctions for
failure to make timely and proper disclosures during discov-
ery. In August 2022, Judge Lee granted all the relief the Village
sought.
    Upon Judge Lee’s appointment to the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, this case was reassigned to Judge Kennelly
on September 8, 2022. Chicago Joe’s ﬁled a motion for recon-
sideration of Judge Lee’s evidentiary rulings. Judge Kennelly
denied the motion and encouraged the parties to work out an
eﬃcient process for resolving the case. The parties agreed to
a stipulated judgment of $15,111 in damages—essentially just
out-of-pocket expenses—that would preserve Chicago Joe’s
right to appeal the district court decisions that had limited so
signiﬁcantly the available damages evidence.
   On appeal, Chicago Joe’s challenges the following deci-
sions of the district court:
    (1) the exclusion of David Donahue’s lost-proﬁts
        damages testimony and supporting evidence,
        as well as his opinion that Chicago Joe’s could
        have opened before the 2007 statutory amend-
        ment if the Village had granted the special use
        permit earlier that year;
    (2) the exclusion of the testimony, report, and sup-
        plemental report of Chicago Joe’s rebuttal ex-
        pert John Bradley Sargent;
No. 22-3194                                                     7

    (3) the exclusion of Polekatz business and ﬁnancial
        documents;
    (4) the exclusion of all evidence of damages that
        was not disclosed by Chicago Joe’s in compli-
        ance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
        26(a)(1)(A)(iii) and 26(e)(1); and
    (5) the 2018 denial of Chicago Joe’s motion for
        leave to amend the complaint to challenge the
        Illinois statute.
We discuss each issue in turn.
II. Donahue Testimony
   A. District Court Decision
    To prove lost proﬁts, Chicago Joe’s oﬀered what it called
lay opinion testimony from owner David Donahue, who had
experience with another adult entertainment business near
Chicago called Polekatz. Chicago Joe’s did not disclose Do-
nahue as an expert witness under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 26(a)(2). Chicago Joe’s Tea Room, LLC v. Village of Broad-
view, No. 07-cv-2680, ECF 963, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2021). The
district court held that under Federal Rule of Evidence 701,
Donahue’s lay opinion testimony had to be limited to opin-
ions based on his own personal knowledge, as opposed to
specialized knowledge or expertise under Rule 702. Id. at *3–
4.
    Chicago Joe’s argued to the district court that Donahue’s
lay opinions were based on his involvement with Polekatz,
where he worked for not quite two years from 2005 to 2007.
Id. at *4. During that time, Donahue had daily access to
Polekatz ﬁnancial and operational documents, which he
8                                                  No. 22-3194

claimed formed the basis of his lost-proﬁts estimates for Chi-
cago Joe’s. Id. at *4–7. The question is whether his opinions
were proper as lay opinions or required expertise and timely
disclosures of expert opinions.
    The district court found that Donahue’s calculations of
Chicago Joe’s lost proﬁts would go beyond his personal
knowledge of Polekatz’s operations. Id. at *6–8. His
calculations relied on a series of adjustments and inferences
based on diﬀerences between Polekatz and Chicago Joe’s
plans, as well as his specialized knowledge of the impact these
diﬀerences would have had on Chicago Joe’s revenues. Id. at
*5–7. Donahue’s “‘economic analysis’ of a business that never
opened require[d] specialized knowledge well beyond the
scope of Donahue’s particularized knowledge of Polekatz
and, thus, falls within the realm of expert opinion testimony.”
Id. at *7. Accordingly, the district court held that Donahue’s
testimony and supporting documents would not be
admissible under Rule 701. Id. at *8. The district court also
found that Donahue’s testimony should be excluded as too
speculative under the “new business rule” in Illinois law. Id.
     On appeal, Chicago Joe’s argues that the district court
erred in excluding the testimony under both Rule 701 and the
Illinois new business rule. The parties disagree on the appli-
cable standard of review. Chicago Joe’s argues that the district
court made a legal determination that we should review de
novo. The Village argues the district court’s order should be
reviewed for an abuse of discretion because it was a decision
on evidence admissibility under Rule 701. We ﬁrst address the
appropriate standard of review and then turn to the merits.
No. 22-3194                                                      9

   B. Standard of Review
    We review decisions to admit or exclude lay opinion
testimony under Rule 701 for an abuse of discretion. United
States v. Parkhurst, 865 F.3d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 2017). By
contrast, we review de novo whether a court applied the Rule
702 framework properly but more speciﬁc decisions to admit
or exclude expert testimony—once properly classiﬁed as
such—for an abuse of discretion. Id. Here, the district court
found that Donahue’s proﬀered lay opinion testimony on lost
proﬁts was not admissible under Rule 701. Chicago Joe’s, ECF
963, at *8.
    The line between expert and lay testimony is not always
sharp. See, e.g., Patterson v. Baker, 990 F.3d 1082, 1085 (7th Cir.
2021). We often address this boundary with testimony from
law enforcement oﬃcers, who regularly oﬀer dual-role testi-
mony as both lay and expert witnesses in the same trial. See
Parkhurst, 865 F.3d at 518. The Federal Rules of Evidence pro-
vide district judges leeway in navigating the line between
Rules 701 and 702 by focusing on the nature of the testimony
itself. See Fed. R. Evid. 701 advisory committee’s note to 2000
amendment; see also Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d
1153, 1176 (3d Cir. 1993) (district courts are given “broad dis-
cretion … concerning the admission or exclusion of testi-
mony”). Where the dividing line is not sharp, deference to the
district court’s determination is appropriate. We review the
decision to exclude Donahue’s testimony for an abuse of dis-
cretion.
   C. Rule 701 and Lost Proﬁts
   Under Rule 701, lay opinions must be (a) rationally based
on the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a clear
10                                                    No. 22-3194

understanding of the witness’s testimony or the determina-
tion of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientiﬁc, technical,
or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.
The ﬁnal requirement is designed “to eliminate the risk that
the reliability requirements set forth in Rule 702 will be
evaded through the simple expedient of proﬀering an expert
in lay witness clothing.” Fed. R. Evid. 701 advisory commit-
tee’s note to 2000 amendment. District courts also should not
allow the important disclosure and discovery requirements
for expert opinions in Rule 26(a)(2), (b)(4), and (e)(2) to be
evaded by that same tactic.
    Lay opinion testimony on lost proﬁts “is allowed in lim-
ited circumstances where the witness bases his opinion on
particularized knowledge he possesses due to his position
within the company.” Von der Ruhr v. Immtech Int'l, Inc., 570
F.3d 858, 862 (7th Cir. 2009), citing Fed. R. Evid. 701 advisory
committee’s note to 2000 amendment. Thus, the owner of an
established business with a documented history of proﬁts
may testify to his expectation of continued or expanded prof-
its when that opinion is based on his knowledge of and par-
ticipation in the day-to-day aﬀairs of his business. Id. at 862.
    Chicago Joe’s seeks to ﬁt Donahue’s opinions into that de-
scription. They did not ﬁt. The district court acted well within
its discretion in ﬁnding that Donahue’s testimony constituted
an economic analysis that exceeded the scope of his personal
knowledge that might have been permitted under Rule 701.
First, the district court’s conclusions are clearly supported by
the extensive diﬀerences between the planned Chicago Joe’s
and the actual Polekatz businesses. Second, Donahue lacked
personal knowledge to sustain key aspects of his testimony.
Because his involvement in Polekatz’s day-to-day operations
No. 22-3194                                                   11

ended in 2007, any information on its operations after that
date was outside his personal knowledge.
       1. Diﬀerences Between Chicago Joe’s and Polekatz
     Donahue’s calculations do not represent an owner’s ex-
pectation of continued or expanded proﬁts at an established
business. Cf. Von der Ruhr, 570 F.3d at 862. His eﬀorts to pro-
ject Chicago Joe’s likely proﬁts based on Polekatz’s ﬁnances
required expert-like analysis and adjustments. Donahue him-
self testiﬁed in a deposition: “This is not Polekatz’s budget …
It’s not a comparison.” ECF 1061-7 at 199. Donahue went fur-
ther, admitting, “No single number on this [spread]sheet …
would match up the exact number on any Polekatz historical
sales report because these are estimates for a diﬀerent busi-
ness at a diﬀerent location.” Id. at 157. The district court did
not abuse its discretion in taking Donahue at his word.
    The spreadsheet that formed the basis of Donahue’s testi-
mony was not created to calculate lost proﬁts for this litiga-
tion. Instead, Donahue drafted it in February 2007 “[t]o un-
derstand exactly what [Donahue] thought [Chicago Joe’s]
would earn by creating an expenditure sheet and a revenue
sheet so [Donahue] could determine what the net proﬁt might
be.” Id. at 275.
   The method used by Donahue in his calculations is not ap-
parent from the spreadsheet itself. Donahue explained in his
depositions that the calculations were based on: (1) his gen-
eral recollection of documents he viewed while working at
Polekatz for not quite two years (ECF 1061-7 at 55–58, 138, 160,
167, 194); (2) his general knowledge of the industry (id. at 132,
234, 242–43); and (3) his aspirations for a hypothetical busi-
ness, Chicago Joe’s.
12                                                 No. 22-3194

    This is a far cry from Chicago Joe’s portrayal of Donahue’s
lost-proﬁts testimony as just “hard numbers taken directly
from Polekatz documents,” combined with “simple logic”
that Chicago Joe’s would earn more proﬁt due to its more de-
sirable location. Donahue made many adjustments in his cal-
culations based on planned diﬀerences between Chicago Joe’s
and Polekatz. These included: a $20 entry fee as opposed to
Polekatz’s $10 fee (ECF 1061-7 at 135); using an entirely new
rate scheme for patron access to VIP spaces (id. at 129–30);
running a high-end steakhouse as opposed to providing only
pub fare (id. at 65); charging more for parking (id. at 141–42);
running valet directly as opposed to through a contractor (id.
at 67, 142–44, 209); charging a diﬀerent contractor fee (id. at
119–22); operating for diﬀerent hours (id. at 216); creating new
employee positions (id. at 214–16, 220); operating in a diﬀer-
ent geographic market (id. at 114, 157, 225), and owning its
own building as opposed to leasing (id. at 73–74, 237–38).
    Chicago Joe’s calls all these diﬀerences “adjustments” and
“straightforward calculations and comparisons.” But Do-
nahue’s “straightforward calculations” were built upon nu-
merous assumptions and inferences about the nature of the
market for adult entertainment businesses and where Chi-
cago Joe’s would ﬁt in that market. For example, the diﬀer-
ence between a $20 admission fee versus Polekatz’s $10 fee is
not just a matter of multiplying by two. Rather, that calcula-
tion is based on non-obvious assumptions about how poten-
tial customers would respond to a doubled price at a diﬀerent
business in a diﬀerent location.
   Lay opinions oﬀered under Rule 701 must be based on a
witness’s own perception and the reasoning process of an av-
erage person in everyday life, as opposed to specialized
No. 22-3194                                                   13

training or experience. See United States v. Fenzl, 670 F.3d 778,
782 (7th Cir. 2012). Regardless of the validity of Donahue’s as-
sumptions about price-elasticity of demand, his estimate was
not based on only the type of knowledge a layperson would
have. It required specialized knowledge excluded from Rule
701 testimony and should have been subject to the discovery
rules and gatekeeping that apply to expert opinions.
    The same problem applies to numerous other adjustments
Donahue made to account for the diﬀerences between
Polekatz and Chicago Joe’s. See Zenith Electronics Corp. v. WH-
TV Broadcasting Corp., 395 F.3d 416, 420 (7th Cir. 2005) (lay
witnesses cannot estimate lost proﬁts when “claimed losses
depend on the inferences to be drawn from the raw data, ra-
ther than these data … themselves”); see also BRC Rubber &
Plastics, Inc. v. Continental Carbon Co., No. 1:11-cv-190, 2014
WL 554565, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 11, 2014) (“Where, however,
lay witnesses seek to go beyond the existing business and
opine upon future sales, they are no longer supplying partic-
ularized knowledge derived from their positions in the busi-
ness,” but rather are “engaging in an economic analysis.” (ci-
tation omitted)).
    The many diﬀerences between Chicago Joe’s and Polekatz,
combined with the hidden assumptions Donahue used in his
lost-proﬁts estimates, support the district court’s ﬁnding that
his estimates did not qualify as lay opinion testimony under
Rule 701.
       2. Information Outside Donahue’s Personal Knowledge
   Chicago Joe’s asserts that in all three of Donahue’s
deposition sessions, “there is not a single instance in which
Donahue testiﬁed he was dependent on something he ‘was
14                                                 No. 22-3194

told’ or ‘had read’ from another source outside of his personal
knowledge.” Appellants’ Br. at 24. But Donahue admitted he
was no longer involved in the day-to-day operations of
Polekatz after April or May 2007. ECF 1061-7 at 57–58; 167.
Despite this, his lost-proﬁt projections continue out past that
date at a constant amount per year until 2020. Id. at 271–73;
ECF 1058-10.
    When asked how he estimated that Chicago Joe’s revenue
would have stayed the same year-over-year despite, for exam-
ple, a sharp ﬁnancial downturn in 2008, Donahue explained,
“it’s my understanding that the revenue [and] expenditures
of Polekatz have stayed consistent despite the downturn in
the economy.” ECF 1061-7 at 272. When pressed on where Do-
nahue learned this information about Polekatz’s revenue, he
said he would speak with a Polekatz consultant, a Mr.
Quaranta, a few times a week and would sometimes discuss
the ﬁnancial status of Polekatz. Id. at 273–74.
    In other words, the information Donahue was told by Mr.
Quaranta, not Donahue’s personal knowledge, is the founda-
tion for his opinion that Chicago Joe’s revenue would have
remained consistent even through a global ﬁnancial crisis.
That fact takes Donahue’s lost-proﬁts testimony further out-
side his personal knowledge and supports the district court’s
decision not to admit it as lay opinion testimony under Rule
701.
    Because Donahue was no longer involved in the day-to-
day operations of Polekatz after 2007, he did not have access
to the ﬁnancial and business documents that he claimed
formed the basis of his calculations while discovery was open
in this case. Instead, the Village and Chicago Joe’s had to sub-
poena Polekatz’s ﬁnancial records. After drawn-out litigation,
No. 22-3194                                                      15

Polekatz eventually produced the documents, including post-
2007 ﬁnancial records (when Donahue no longer worked for
Polekatz). Any new materials that Donahue had not originally
seen in the not quite two years he did the books at Polekatz,
which ended by mid-2007, were outside his personal
knowledge.
    Donahue’s lost-proﬁts calculations for Chicago Joe’s be-
gan partway through 2007, after he lost personal knowledge
of Polekatz’s current ﬁnances. ECF 1058-10 at 1. Because of
this, his calculations were not admissible lay opinions. See
Compania Administradora de Recuperacion de Activos Administra-
dora de Fondos de Inversion S.A. v. Titan Int'l, Inc., 533 F.3d 555,
560–61 (7th Cir. 2008) (witness’s opinions were not admissible
as lay opinions when they were based on events after he lost
ownership interest in company); see also Von der Ruhr, 570
F.3d at 862 (“In the realm of lost proﬁts, lay opinion testimony
is allowed in limited circumstances where the witness bases
his opinion on particularized knowledge he possesses due to
his position within the company.” (emphasis added)).
   D. Distinguishing Lightning Lube
   Chicago Joe’s relies heavily on Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco
Corp., 4 F.3d 1153 (3d Cir. 1993), which was discussed in the
Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 701. While the Third Cir-
cuit in Lightning Lube aﬃrmed admission of a lay opinion
about expected lost proﬁts, id. at 1175–76, Chicago Joe’s reli-
ance on this decision is not persuasive.
    Lightning Lube was a quick-lube franchisor. As a part of
its franchise agreements, the company provided oil, equip-
ment, and other services to its franchisees. Defendant Witco
supplied oil and equipment to Lightning Lube and its
16                                                 No. 22-3194

franchisees. After the relationship soured, Lightning Lube
sued Witco for compensatory damages under a tortious inter-
ference theory. The district court held that the owner of Light-
ning Lube could not testify as an expert but could oﬀer a lay
opinion about future proﬁts lost as a result of Witco’s alleged
misconduct. Id. at 1174–75. Speciﬁcally, the Lightning Lube
owner could base his opinions on Lightning Lube’s past re-
sults with existing franchisees and could extrapolate from
that experience to future franchisees. As noted, the Third Cir-
cuit aﬃrmed this decision.
    The critical diﬀerence here is that Lightning Lube had al-
ready been operating for several years and had existing fran-
chisees it used to estimate future lost proﬁts. The lay witness
in Lightning Lube based his lost-proﬁts calculations exclu-
sively on the time period in which he owned and operated the
company. Therefore, the court concluded, the owner could
properly base his lost-proﬁts opinions on his knowledge ob-
tained in day-to-day management of the company. Id. at 1175.
Donahue simply cannot oﬀer a similar personal foundation
for his opinions. He was drawing instead on more general ex-
pertise that called for disclosure and qualiﬁcation as an ex-
pert, which Chicago Joe’s did not do.
   Moreover, recall that we review for abuse of discretion. In
Lightning Lube, the appellate court reviewed a district court’s
decision to allow lay opinion testimony. 4 F.3d at 1176. Here,
we review the district court’s decision to exclude testimony.
Lightning Lube did not hold that the district court would have
abused its discretion by excluding the lay opinions oﬀered in
the case.
No. 22-3194                                                             17

   For all these reasons, the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it found that Donahue’s lost-proﬁts testi-
mony would not be admitted under Rule 701.
    E. The Illinois New Business Rule
     The parties also disagree on whether Donahue’s testimony
is allowable under the Illinois new business rule. See gener-
ally Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199
Ill. 2d 325, 264 Ill. Dec. 283, 770 N.E.2d 177 (2002). 2 In Illinois,
a plaintiﬀ pursuing damages for future lost proﬁts must es-
tablish those damages with “reasonable certainty.” Tri-G, Inc.
v. Burke, Bosselman & Weaver, 222 Ill. 2d 218, 305 Ill. Dec. 584,
856 N.E.2d 389, 406–407 (2006), quoting Barnett v. Caldwell Fur-
niture Co., 277 Ill. 286, 115 N.E. 389, 390 (1917). The plaintiﬀ
must oﬀer competent evidence that tends to establish the lost
proﬁts with a fair degree of probability. Tri-G, 856 N.E.2d at
407. Generally, such evidence involves past proﬁts in an es-
tablished business. Id.
   When the evidence involves expected proﬁts in a new
business, there is a concern about conjecture and speculation
because the business has yet to earn any actual proﬁts. Id.;
Midland Hotel Corp. v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 118 Ill. 2d
306, 113 Ill. Dec. 252, 515 N.E.2d 61, 66 (1987) (“recovery of

    2 We need not decide here whether Chicago Joe’s forfeited reliance on

this theory. We also recognize that this issue could raise an Erie Railroad
question: does Federal Rule of Evidence 701 or the Illinois new business
rule control in this federal-question case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983?
See generally Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). We do not
address this question here. Both sides told us at oral argument that they
would not be making any Erie arguments.
18                                                    No. 22-3194

lost proﬁts cannot be based upon conjecture or sheer specula-
tion”).
     When a plaintiﬀ does not have a track record of actual
proﬁts, Illinois courts have been skeptical about claims for lost
future proﬁts. E.g., SK Hand Tool Corp. v. Dresser Industries,
Inc., 284 Ill. App. 3d 417, 219 Ill. Dec. 833, 672 N.E.2d 341, 348
(Ill. App. 1996) (“a business which has not been proﬁtable
generally will be unable to provide competent proof by which
the proﬁts can be estimated with reasonable certainty”); see
also TAS Distributing Co., Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., 491 F.3d
625, 633 (7th Cir. 2007) (discussing general rule in Illinois that
“expected proﬁts of a new commercial business are consid-
ered too uncertain, speciﬁc and remote to permit recovery”).
    Experts may not guess the amount of potential lost proﬁts
where there is no historical data to demonstrate the likelihood
of those proﬁts. Meriturn Partners, LLC v. Banner and Witcoﬀ,
Ltd., 2015 IL App (1st) 131883, 391 Ill. Dec. 775, 31 N.E.3d 451,
459 (Ill. App. 2015); SK Hand Tool, 672 N.E.2d at 347 (“Illinois
courts have long rejected the use of speculative, inaccurate or
false projections of income in the valuation of a business”).
Still, as Chicago Joe’s points out, Illinois does not apply an
“inviolate rule that a new business can never prove lost prof-
its.” Tri-G, 856 N.E.2d at 407 (emphasis in original).
    For example, in Tri-G, the construction company plain-
tiﬀ’s lost-proﬁts claim was supported by testimony from the
principal of another construction company who had spent
years in the same business and built comparable houses for
comparable prices in the same subdivision. 856 N.E.2d at 407.
     Similarly, in Malatesta v. Leichter, 186 Ill. App. 3d 602, 134
Ill. Dec. 422, 542 N.E.2d 768 (1989), a plaintiﬀ who purchased
No. 22-3194                                                    19

a car dealership supported his lost-proﬁts claim with evi-
dence of proﬁts from the dealership’s prior owners who had
operated the same established business at the same location
for the same period for which plaintiﬀ sought damages. 542
N.E.2d at 781–82.
    Additionally, in Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520 (7th
Cir. 1986), we applied Illinois law and held that evidence of a
professional basketball franchise’s past proﬁts was “an excep-
tionally helpful guide” in calculating the damages for a com-
pany that tried unsuccessfully to buy the franchise. Id. at 551–
52.
    The cases described above diﬀer from this one because
they featured “evidence of revenues of a similar product or a
similar business in a similar market.” Ivey v. Transunion Rental
Screening Solutions, Inc., 2022 IL 127903, 465 Ill. Dec. 666, 215
N.E.3d 871, 880 (2022). As noted in Malatesta, these cases hold
that “evidence of the proﬁts of a person other than plaintiﬀ,
who operated the same established business at the identical
location for the period of time which plaintiﬀ seeks damages,
is not of such a speculative nature to require a ﬁnding that
plaintiﬀ’s lost proﬁts may not be proved to a reasonable cer-
tainty.” 542 N.E.2d at 782.
    As Donahue himself testiﬁed, however, Chicago Joe’s
would have been a diﬀerent business in a diﬀerent location
from Polekatz. ECF 1061-7 at 157. While he may have started
his calculations by using some Polekatz revenue ﬁgures, he
made numerous adjustments to his calculations to account for
diﬀerences between the two businesses. Notably, Donahue
factored into his calculations that Chicago Joe’s would be op-
erating in a diﬀerent geographic market. See id. at 260
20                                                          No. 22-3194

(Donahue explaining that Chicago Joe’s and Polekatz would
not be competitors because they would be in diﬀerent loca-
tions).
    The diﬀerences between Chicago Joe’s and Polekatz—dif-
ferent businesses, in diﬀerent locations, operating during dif-
ferent time periods—show that the district court did not
abuse its discretion by excluding Donahue’s estimates of lost
proﬁts as too speculative, especially when oﬀered as lay opin-
ions. 3
III. Sargent Expert Testimony and Reports
    Chicago Joe’s choice not to designate an expert witness for
damages resulted in an unusual question about the scope of
rebuttal testimony. To respond to Donahue’s lay opinions on
damages, the Village designated Dr. Gary Skoog as an expert
witness. Chicago Joe’s then designated John Bradley Sargent
as an expert rebuttal witness on damages to respond to the
Village’s expert. After the district court excluded Donahue’s
damages opinions, the Village made clear that it would not
need to call Dr. Skoog. That choice removed the grounds for
oﬀering rebuttal testimony from Sargent—there would be
nothing to rebut. The district court therefore granted the

     3 The district court, during a May 2022 hearing, held that it would be

impermissible under Rule 701 and Rule 26 for Donahue to testify as either
a lay or expert witness about how long it would have taken to construct
Chicago Joe’s based upon how long it took Polekatz to open. ECF 986 at
39–40. For many of the same reasons discussed above regarding the inad-
missibility of Donahue’s lay testimony on damages, we affirm the district
court’s holding. We also affirm the district court’s reasoning that Donahue
could not testify as an expert witness on these matters because he was
never disclosed as an expert witness under Rule 26. See Sections III, IV.B,
and V.A–V.B, below, on discovery sanctions.
No. 22-3194                                                   21

Village’s motion in limine excluding any testimony from Sar-
gent. As a separate ground for excluding Sargent’s opinions,
the district court found that he was acting essentially as a ven-
triloquist’s dummy for Donahue’s supposedly “lay” opin-
ions.
    The choice to exclude Sargent’s supposedly “rebuttal”
opinions was well within the district court’s discretion in
managing discovery and enforcing its case-management
deadlines under Rules 26 and 37. See King v. Ford Motor Co.,
872 F.3d 833, 838 (7th Cir. 2017) (courts review discovery sanc-
tions for an abuse of discretion). “The proper function of re-
buttal evidence is to contradict, impeach or defuse the impact
of the evidence oﬀered by an adverse party.” Peals v. Terre
Haute Police Dep’t, 535 F.3d 621, 630 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal
quotations omitted). “Testimony oﬀered only as additional
support to an argument made in a case in chief, if not oﬀered
to contradict, impeach or defuse the impact of the evidence
oﬀered by an adverse party, is improper on rebuttal.” Id. (in-
ternal quotations omitted).
    Chicago Joe’s also wanted to rely on a supposedly “sup-
plemental” report from Sargent submitted in 2021, with new
calculations that Sargent claimed as his own. His 2021 report
included projected lost proﬁts between $15 million and $35
million for Chicago Joe’s, a business that never opened. Dis-
covery closed in 2015. The district court had ample discretion
to treat this supposedly “supplemental” report as far too late
for orderly management of the case and preparation for trial.
    Rule 26(e) imposes a duty on parties to supplement dis-
covery responses. The rule is “intended to ensure prompt dis-
closure of new information, not to allow parties to spring late
surprises on their opponents under the guise of a
22                                                    No. 22-3194

‘supplement’ to earlier disclosures.” Barlow v. General Motors
Corp., 595 F. Supp. 2d 929, 935–36 (S.D. Ind. 2009), citing
among other cases Metro Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co., 145 F.3d 320, 324 (5th Cir. 1998) (aﬃrming exclusion of
late report presented as supplement: “The purpose of supple-
mentary disclosures is just that—to supplement. Such disclo-
sures are not intended to provide an extension of the expert
designation and report production deadline.”), and Solaia
Technology LLC v. ArvinMeritor, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 2d 797, 806
(N.D. Ill. 2005), citing in turn Coles v. Perry, 217 F.R.D. 1, 3
(D.D.C. 2003) (striking late-ﬁled report styled as a “supple-
mental opinion”); accord, Beller ex rel. Beller v. United States,
221 F.R.D. 689, 695 (D.N.M. 2003) (striking “supplemental” re-
port with opinions broader, deeper, and diﬀerent than those
provided in original timely report). “In other words, the duty
to supplement cannot be transformed into a right to ambush
just before trial.” Barlow, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 936 (emphasis in
original). Tolerating such tactics would serve only to add to
the length, complexity, and expense of litigation.
     Under Rule 37, the sanction for failure to disclose is auto-
matic and mandatory unless the sanctioned party can show
its violation was either justiﬁed or harmless. David v. Caterpil-
lar, Inc., 324 F.3d 851, 857 (7th Cir. 2003). Chicago Joe’s did not
disclose Sargent’s “supplemental” report until almost six
years after discovery had closed. It could not show that this
violation was justiﬁed or harmless. The district court did not
abuse its discretion by excluding Sargent’s 2021 “supple-
mental” report.
No. 22-3194                                                   23

IV. Polekatz Business and Financial Documents
   A. Subpoenaed Polekatz Documents Supporting Donahue Cal-
      culations
    In response to a motion in limine from the Village, the dis-
trict court also excluded a series of documents that were ob-
tained from Polekatz by subpoena. (Polekatz was not eager to
share its ﬁnancial records with the parties to this lawsuit.) The
documents were delivered to Chicago Joe’s in September 2019
and provided to the Village in March 2020. Three documents
were Polekatz ﬁnancial records, including: (1) Polekatz point-
of-sale records from 2011 to 2019; (2) Polekatz revenue records
from 2008 to 2018; and (3) a document vouching for the au-
thenticity of these records. ECF 1059-1, 1059-3, and 1059-7. Be-
cause these documents were meant to support Donahue’s cal-
culations, the district court excluded them for lacking rele-
vance once Donahue’s testimony was excluded. That decision
was also not an abuse of discretion.
   B. Failure to Disclose Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
      26
    Another set of documents had never been disclosed by
Chicago Joe’s under Rule 26(a) or 26(e) before they were pro-
vided to the Village on January 8, 2021. These Polekatz rec-
ords included: (1) construction records; (2) construction plans;
(3) advertising materials; and (4) lease agreements. ECF 1059-
4, 1072-7, 1072-8, and 1059-8. The district court excluded these
documents under Rule 37, explaining that Chicago Joe’s con-
ceded it could have produced these documents before the
close of discovery in 2015. Chicago Joe’s explained that it in-
tended to introduce the documents to prove that Chicago
24                                                         No. 22-3194

Joe’s could have opened before August 2007, when the
amended Illinois statute took eﬀect.
    Again, we review discovery sanctions for an abuse of dis-
cretion, looking at whether the failure to disclose was justiﬁed
or harmless and therefore did not warrant the mandatory ex-
clusion penalty in Rule 37(c)(1). David v. Caterpillar, Inc., 324
F.3d 851, 857 (7th Cir. 2003). The documents at issue were all
created before the 2015 discovery cut-oﬀ. Chicago Joe’s of-
fered no explanation for its failure to disclose the documents.
Because the documents were turned over long after discovery
closed, the Village also had not had an opportunity to contest
the evidence, leading to prejudice.
    Chicago Joe’s suggested any prejudice could have been
cured by reopening discovery. That might have been an op-
tion, but it still would have imposed more delay and expense
on the Village. When a party like Chicago Joe’s has failed to
meet its discovery obligations on numerous occasions, it has
no right to insist that the district court bail it out. The district
court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the various
Polekatz documents. 4
V. August 19, 2022 Order Granting Village’s Motions in Limine
   Two days before the then-scheduled June 6, 2022 trial date,
the Village ﬁled four additional motions in limine. ECF 990–
993. In those motions, the Village moved to exclude evidence

     4 ECF 1072-7 was produced by the Village during discovery in 2010.

See ECF 1007-1. That document contained Polekatz construction plans.
The document was not itself the subject of a discovery disclosure failure,
but it became irrelevant after the district court excluded Donahue’s late-
disclosed testimony about construction timelines. That document was also
appropriately excluded.
No. 22-3194                                                                  25

of Chicago Joe’s claimed millions of dollars in “obligation
damages” that were never disclosed under Rule 26. ECF 990.
The district court postponed the trial and ordered a full round
of brieﬁng on the motions. 5
    Chicago Joe’s objected to the motions as untimely and
prejudicial. Judge Lee was not happy about the Village’s tim-
ing, but he noted pragmatically that the Village would have
been able to raise the same evidentiary issues during trial.
Judge Lee ultimately addressed the merits and granted the
Village’s motions on August 19, 2022. His order barred Chi-
cago Joe’s from introducing any damages evidence that was
not properly disclosed under Rule 26. Judge Lee wrote: “De-
fendant (and, to a signiﬁcant extent, the Court) has remained
in the dark concerning exactly how much Plaintiﬀs are seek-
ing in damages or the factual grounds of those damages,” ECF
1018 at 5, and he explained that conclusion in detail. The eﬀect
of this order was to limit damages to out-of-pocket expenses
and costs incurred by Chicago Joe’s prior to August 2007. Id.
at 8.
    Rule 26 requires a party to disclose at the outset of a case
“a computation of each category of damages claimed,” and to
“make available … the documents or other evidentiary mate-
rial … on which each computation is based, including mate-
rials bearing on the nature and extent of the injuries suﬀered.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iii). As the case progresses, a party
also “must supplement or correct [this] disclosure … in a

    5 The other motions in limine sought to exclude additional trial exhib-

its: (1) under Rule 26, ECF 993; (2) for a lack of relevance after the exclusion
of Donahue’s testimony, ECF 992; and (3) for violation of the court’s di-
rective that new liabilities and expenses incurred after August 16, 2007
were not recoverable, rendering such evidence irrelevant, ECF 991.
26                                                  No. 22-3194

timely manner if the party learns that in some material respect
the disclosure … is incomplete or incorrect, and if the addi-
tional or corrective information has not otherwise been made
known to the other parties during the discovery process.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1), (e)(1)(A).
    Chicago Joe’s had submitted its initial Rule 26 disclosure
on December 7, 2012 and had not updated it in the interven-
ing decade. Regarding damages, the 2012 disclosure said in
its entirety: “Subject to further investigation and expert testi-
mony, the following information is available for review and
copying” at the oﬃces of its law ﬁrm. ECF 990-1 at 4. It then
listed only two sources: (1) Polekatz Gentleman’s Club LLC
Historical Sales Report run 2/23/07 at 1:33 pm; and (2) Chicago
Joe’s Tea Room Expenditure/Debt Table. Id. That was it.
    The district court found that this meager disclosure vio-
lated Rule 26 by failing to provide a top-line computation of
damages or any identiﬁcation of damages categories. Further,
because Chicago Joe’s never updated this initial disclosure,
the district court concluded that Chicago Joe’s had also vio-
lated the Rule 26(e) duty to supplement disclosures as the case
proceeded.
     A. Discovery Sanctions for Failure to Disclose Damage Calcu-
        lations
    The district court considered whether Chicago Joe’s had
shown the violations were justiﬁed or harmless. Chicago Joe’s
argues that the violations were harmless because it produced
the relevant documents in discovery and the Village was able
to take Donahue’s deposition several times. The district court
soundly rejected these arguments.
No. 22-3194                                                   27

    Rule 26 places the onus on a plaintiﬀ to provide (1) a top-
line computation of its claimed damages; and (2) speciﬁc cat-
egories of damages. Chicago Joe’s theory seeks to turn its
“duty to supplement [its] initial damages disclosures into an
opportunity and even a right to hold back [its] real damages
theories and computations until nearly the eve of trial.” Bar-
low v. General Motors Corp., 595 F. Supp. 2d at 935 (excluding
damages theories and evidence based on repeated failures to
make timely disclosures). That is not a sound use of the rule.
    Chicago Joe’s contends it could satisfy its duty to disclose
damages by producing quantities of ﬁnancial documents and
then letting the Village take depositions in which it could try
to piece together a damages theory from those fragments.
That is not correct. See Design Strategy, Inc. v. Davis, 469 F.3d
284, 295 (2d Cir. 2006) (Rule 26 “requires more than provid-
ing—without any explanation—undiﬀerentiated ﬁnancial
statements”). The purpose of mandatory disclosures is to “ac-
celerate the exchange of basic information about the case and
to eliminate the paper work involved in requesting such in-
formation, and the rule should be applied in a manner to
achieve those objectives.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory commit-
tee’s notes to 1993 amendment. The rule requires all parties to
disclose damages calculations “early in the case.” Id. Sprin-
kling various ﬁnancial documents among thousands of pages
of discovery over several years is neither “early in the case”
nor a “calculation,” nor does it serve to “accelerate the ex-
change of basic information.”
   To support its argument that it “otherwise” made its dam-
ages calculations known to the Village, Chicago Joe’s cites two
cases—Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2005), and
Gutierrez v. AT&T Broadband, LLC, 382 F.3d 725 (7th Cir. 2004).
28                                                  No. 22-3194

Chicago Joe’s fell far short of the plaintiﬀs’ eﬀorts in Westefer
and Gutierrez to make its damages calculations “otherwise”
known. First, neither case dealt with damages calculations.
Second, both cases involved a single piece of information, as
opposed to numerous discovery documents. Third, in both
cases, the parties were made aware of the initially undisclosed
information before the close of discovery. We discuss each
case in turn.
    In Westefer, prisoner-plaintiﬀs challenged their transfers to
various prisons as unconstitutional. 422 F.3d at 572. In their
initial answer to an interrogatory question, the prisoners did
not challenge the government’s stated reasons for their trans-
fers as untruthful or fabricated but instead simply asserted
the transfers were in retaliation for protected First Amend-
ment activities. Id. at 581 n.15, 582.
    The prisoners could not have challenged the government’s
asserted transfer reasons as false at the time of their interrog-
atory response because the government had not yet disclosed
in discovery the prisoners’ oﬃcial placement forms contain-
ing that information. Id. at 581–82. Once the government was
ordered to and did produce the forms, the prisoners oﬀered
aﬃdavits asserting the information in the forms was untrue.
Id.
    We overruled the district court’s exclusion of these aﬃda-
vits under Rules 26 and 37, reasoning that, despite not for-
mally revising their interrogatory response, the prisoners’ af-
ﬁdavits put “oﬃcials on written notice that the prisoners chal-
lenged the placement forms’ veracity.” Id. at 584. There was
no unfair surprise as a result of the prisoners’ failure to amend
their interrogatories because the aﬃdavits were suﬃcient to
comply with Rule 26’s requirements. Id. Chicago Joe’s
No. 22-3194                                                  29

numerous ﬁnancial documents and hours of deposition testi-
mony did not provide a clear and concise damages disclosure
comparable to the aﬃdavits in Westefer.
    Gutierrez, similarly, is not helpful to Chicago Joe’s argu-
ment. In that case, the issue was whether one particular per-
son had been identiﬁed as a potential witness. We agreed with
the district court that a deposition of another witness had re-
vealed before discovery closed that the person in question
might have relevant information. 382 F.3d at 732–33. That sit-
uation is not comparable to Chicago Joe’s repeated and con-
sistent failures to make a timely disclosure of its damages the-
ories and evidence in this case.
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in ﬁnding
Chicago Joe’s disclosure failure to be a violation of Rule 26
warranting the Rule 37 exclusion sanction. On the eve of a trial
where the principal issue would have been Chicago Joe’s
claimed lost proﬁts, the Village still had not been provided the
damages information required by Rule 26.
   B. Treatment of Timely Disclosed Documents
   Chicago Joe’s also argues that the district court erred by
not distinguishing between damages evidence that was un-
timely and damages evidence that Chicago Joe’s produced be-
fore the discovery cut-oﬀ in 2015. Rule 26 requires disclosure
of any documents upon which damages computations are
based, but doing so does not eliminate the requirement to pro-
vide the damages computations and categories the docu-
ments support. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iii) (“disclosing
party … must also make available … the documents or other
evidentiary material … on which each computation is based”
(emphasis added)).
30                                                             No. 22-3194

    While some documents underlying Chicago Joe’s claimed
damages were provided in a timely manner during discovery,
the required computations were not. In addition to prohibit-
ing a party from introducing into evidence at trial information
it failed to disclose, a district court may also under Rule 37
“impose other appropriate sanctions” including “prohibiting
the disobedient party from supporting or opposing desig-
nated claims or defenses, or from introducing designated
matters in evidence.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1)(C),
37(b)(2)(A)(ii); see also Dura Automotive Systems of Indiana, Inc.
v. CTS Corp., 285 F.3d 609, 615–16 (7th Cir. 2002) (discussing
district court’s authority to impose other appropriate sanc-
tions under Rule 37, reviewed for an abuse of discretion).
   For essentially the same reasons under Rule 37, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in choosing also to exclude
documents supporting Chicago Joe’s damages calculations
that were provided before the close of discovery. The Village
was never provided with a computation of damages or dam-
age categories by Chicago Joe’s. Because the Village had not
been given timely explanations of any theories those docu-
ments might be used to support, it would not have known
what additional discovery to pursue to address the docu-
ments. For all these reasons, we aﬃrm the district court’s
grant of the Village’s motions in limine in its August 2022 or-
der. 6

     6 Chicago Joe’s also argues that the district court abused its discretion

by excluding from trial Polekatz’s federal tax returns from 2007 to 2011
and related correspondence constituting ECF 1059-2. Chicago Joe’s says
these documents were meant to support the testimony of Donahue and
Sargent regarding lost profits. Because we have already affirmed the
No. 22-3194                                                            31

VI. Denial of Leave to Amend
     Turning to the ﬁnal contested issue on appeal, it bears re-
peating that the present action has been pending since May
11, 2007. By the time of Chicago Joe’s ﬁrst appeal, the parties
had already gone through multiple rounds of summary judg-
ment motions. The district court had granted summary judg-
ment for the Village on Chicago Joe’s claims for declaratory
and injunctive relief but had denied summary judgment on
its claim for damages. See Chicago Joe’s Tea Room, LLC v. Village
of Broadview, No. 07-cv-2680, 2016 WL 1270398, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 31, 2016). All that was left in the case was to hold a trial
on Chicago Joe’s damages for the constitutional violation
found in the district court’s September 11, 2008 order. The
trial was put on hold pending Chicago Joe’s ﬁrst appeal.
    In our June 2018 decision aﬃrming dismissal of Chicago
Joe’s injunctive claims, we said that “since 2007, Chicago Joe’s
has been proposing to use the property in a way prohibited
by an Illinois statute, yet without challenging that statute.”
Chicago Joe’s I, 894 F.3d at 811. That is why we found Chicago
Joe’s claims for injunctive relief were moot. Even if the court
had enjoined enforcement of the Village’s ordinances, Chi-
cago Joe’s proposed use of the property would have been ille-
gal under 65 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11-5-1.5. Id. at 816–17.
Only after we decided that appeal did Chicago Joe’s move to
amend its complaint to add, eleven years after it became an
issue, a challenge to the 2007 state statute.
  Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), leave to
amend should be given freely when justice so requires, but

exclusion of their testimony, the exclusion of the Polekatz tax returns is
moot.
32                                                  No. 22-3194

leave may be denied on account of undue delay, prejudice,
bad faith or dilatory motives, futility, or judicial economy. See
Barry Aviation Inc. v. Land O’Lakes Municipal Airport Comm’n,
377 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2004). We review denial of leave to
amend a complaint for an abuse of discretion. Id.
    The district court denied leave to amend, ﬁnding that Chi-
cago Joe’s had waited too long to challenge the state statute
and that granting the motion would cause undue delay and
prejudice to the Village. That conclusion was self-evident. It
certainly was not an abuse of discretion.
    Chicago Joe’s argues, though, that it had no reason to chal-
lenge the statute until 2016 because up until that time the dis-
trict court had ruled that Chicago Joe’s had a vested property
right to pursue its plans under the Village’s ordinances. Com-
pare Chicago Joe's Tea Room, LLC v. Village of Broadview, No. 07-
cv-2680, 2008 WL 4287002, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 2008) (hold-
ing that Chicago Joe’s had a vested right in continuation of
Village ordinance during pendency of its application), with
Chicago Joe’s Tea Room, LLC, 2016 WL 1270398, at *5–6 (holding
that Chicago Joe’s did not have a vested property right).
    This theory does not show the denial of leave to amend
was an abuse of discretion. The district court explained cor-
rectly that a property right under a local ordinance does not
trump a conﬂicting state statute. And as we explained in Chi-
cago Joe’s I, “Illinois statutes preempt conﬂicting ordinances
by non-home-rule municipalities” like the Village of Broad-
view, so any vested rights Chicago Joe’s might have had un-
der a Village ordinance could not defeat application of the Il-
linois statute. 894 F.3d at 816–17. Even if Chicago Joe’s
thought it had a vested right under the Village ordinance until
2016, it still did not have a right to open Chicago Joe’s under
No. 22-3194                                                    33

state law. The district court’s reasoning that a decade was far
too long to seek leave to amend still holds.
    Finally, Chicago Joe’s asserts that the prejudice to the Vil-
lage would have been minimal if the district court had
granted it leave to challenge the state statute because little ad-
ditional discovery would have been required. This argument
ignores one vital detail—the Village of Broadview had no
power to grant Chicago Joe’s relief for an unconstitutional
state statute. Granting leave to amend would likely have
brought the Illinois Attorney General into the case to defend
the state statute, causing additional complications and delays
in a case already more than a decade old and approaching a
trial of the remaining issues. The district court did not abuse
its discretion in denying leave to amend.
    To sum up, early in this prolonged lawsuit, Chicago Joe’s
made a tactical choice to try to prove lost-proﬁts damages
through a lay witness, Donahue. It also chose to be coy about
disclosing its damages theories and evidence, in violation of
its discovery obligations. The judges of the district court who
presided over this case over the years did not abuse their dis-
cretion in enforcing the Federal Rules of Evidence and Civil
Procedure to impose consequences for those choices. The
judgment of the district court is
                                                    AFFIRMED.