Court Opinion

ID: 9495687
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:08:28.517066+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:09.282228
License: Public Domain

MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the judgment of the court because I do not agree that U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) (2001) allows for the four-level increase in the offense level assessed in this case. I am not sure, in the first place, that the guideline provision at issue here even has a plain meaning, but if I had to say that it did and what it was, I would come to a conclusion opposite from the one that the court reaches. Meaning, plain or otherwise, must be gleaned from context, and the court gives the context of the words that it is construing no significance at all. Here, the context makes it relatively plain to me that the word “any” refers to any firearm that is mentioned in the indictment.
For one thing, § 2K2.1(b)(5) is found in the part of the guidelines entitled “Offense Conduct,” so the presumption arises that, at least in cases of doubt, the sub-section has to do with conduct that occurred in the course of committing, planning, or concealing the offense that is charged. This presumption draws strength (indeed, becomes virtually irrebuttable) when we notice that § 2K2.1(b)(5) is one of a group of subsections that U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b) labels “Specific Offense Characteristics”: Surely this must mean characteristics that are specific to the offense with which the defendant is charged. There is nothing whatever in the record to connect the assault on Officer Shumholster with the weapons described in the indictment, and the government admits as much.
In rendering its judgment, moreover, the court overlooks § 2K2.1(b)(4), which immediately precedes the sub-section at issue here, and which provides a two-level increase “[i]f any firearm was stolen.” In this sub-section, the phrase “any firearm” quite obviously refers to a firearm charged in the indictment, otherwise it makes no sense. It is a familiar principle of statute-*1058ry construction that identical phrases in a statute, particularly when they occur in close proximity, are ordinarily to be given identical meanings. See, e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 143, 114 S.Ct. 655, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994); United States v. Dinwiddle, 76 F.3d 913, 926 (8th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 613, 136 L.Ed.2d 538 (1996). The court does not refer to this principle or explain why it is not applicable in the present case.
The court relies on United States v. Scolaro, 299 F.3d 956 (8th Cir.2002), to support its conclusion, but I suggest that the case is inapposite because it involved the question of what the phrase “another felony offense” means. There is no hint in that case that the court thought that the other felony could be one which was unconnected to the firearms described in the indictment, and there could not have been such a hint, because it was conceded by all that those very firearms were in fact involved in the events that the court determined constituted “another felony offense.” See id. at 957-58. I can likewise glean no relevant guidance from the holding in United States v. Sutton, 302 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir.2002) (per curiam), a case from another circuit, which the court reads backwards to provide a makeweight for its result.
The court also opines that the defendant’s proposed reading leads to absurd results, apparently because he might escape an increase in his offense level by ridding himself of a particular firearm. He might indeed do that, but I see nothing absurd in the fact that he would thereby escape punishment. An offender will frequently evade prosecution or escape conviction for a crime involving possession by ridding himself or herself of the relevant object: The government’s case will simply fail for lack of proof.
In sum, .it seems to me more than arguable that the plain meaning of § 2K2.1(b)(5) renders it inapplicable to Mr. Mann’s case. At the very least, I believe that his proposed construction is more reasonable than the government’s. Even if it were not, it is familiar law in this circuit that “[wjhere there are two plausible readings of a guideline provision, we apply the rule of lenity and give the defendant the benefit of the reading that results in the shorter sentence.” United States v. Oetken, 241 F.3d 1057, 1060 (8th Cir.2001); see also United States v. Hutton, 252 F.3d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir.2001); United States v. Phans, 176 F.3d 434, 436 (8th Cir.1999). The court omits to mention these cases and does not explain why they do not govern the instant situation. Since I cannot see how the meaning that Mr. Mann wants us to attribute to the relevant guideline can possibly be characterized as implausible, I respectfully dissent from the court’s judgment.