Court Opinion

ID: 9522107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:18:06.506029+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:18.948370
License: Public Domain

SHIELDS, Presiding Judge,
concurring.
I, too, vote to affirm the trial court's judgment. However, I disagree with the majority's rationales. Instead, I vote to affirm the trial court's judgment on the basis that the trial court properly applied the law of issue preclusion to bar Hockett's legal malpractice claim.
I. Issue Preclusion in Indiana
Issue preclusion 1 is a doctrine designed to preclude unnecessary relitigation of issues. An explanation of this doctrine was supplied by the Indiana Supreme Court in Town of Flora v. Indiana Service Corp. (1944), 222 Ind. 253, 257, 53 N.E.2d 161, 163. Issue preclusion applies:
[where the causes of action are not the same, but where some fact or question has been determined and adjudicated in the former suit, and the same fact or question is again put in issue in a subsequent suit between the same parties. In such cases the former adjudication of the fact or question, if properly presented and relied on, will be held conclusive on the parties in the latter suit, regardless of the identity of the causes of action, or the lack of it, in the two suits. When the second action between the same parties is on a different cause of action, claim, or demand, it is well settled that the judgment in the first suit operates as an estoppel only as to the point or question actually litigated and determined, and not as to other matters which might have been litigated and determined. In such cases the inquiry must always be as to *1000the point or question actually litigated and determined in the original action.
Town of Flora opines that issue preclusion is available only if an issue actually litigated and decided in the first suit is raised in a second suit. Our supreme court has stated:
The application of [issue preclusion] involves a two-step process: (1) determine what the first judgment decided; and (2) examine how that determination bears on the second case.
Webb v. State (1983), Ind., 453 N.E.2d 180, 183, cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1081, 104 S.Ct. 1449, 79 L.Ed.2d 767; State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Glasgow (1985), Ind.App., 478 N.E.2d 918, 924. In State Farm, the judgment in the first action was for the plaintiff. However, the judgment was silent on whether the defendant's lability was predicated on negligent or intentional conduct. Therefore, this court held that State Farm, the insurer of the defendant in the first action, was not precluded from litigating the issue of the negligence of the defendant in the first action in the subsequent action by the successful plaintiff against State Farm. State Farm, 478 N.E.2d at 924-25. Similarly, in Webb, issue preclusion was held inappropriate because the issues in the multiple actions were not identical. Thus, in Webb, our supreme court held Webb could be prosecuted for the murder of the second of two victims although he had been acquitted of the murder of the other victim. The court hypothesized that the first jury could have reached its verdict on an issue other than the determination that Webb was not present at the murder scene.
Also, Town of Flora states that issue preclusion is available only in subsequent suits between the identical parties. However, the notion of identical parties has traditionally included privies. "A privy is one who, after the commencement of the action, has acquired an interest in the subject matter affected by the judgment through or under one of the parties, as by inheritance, succession, or purchase." Tobin v. McClellan (1947), 225 Ind. 335, 344, 73 N.E.2d 679, 683. In addition, in determining the parties, modern cases look beyond the nominal parties and treat as parties those persons whose interests are involved.2 As stated in Bigelow on Estoppel 145 (6th ed. 1913); "Identity of parties is not a mere matter of form, but of substance. Parties nominally the same may be in legal effect, different; and parties nominally different may be, in legal effect, the same." Thus, the identity of parties requirement has not been limited strictly to the denominated parties but has been expanded to include real parties as well as privies.
Mutuality is commonly recited as yet another requirement for the application of issue preclusion. State v. Speidel (1979), 181 Ind.App. 448, 453, 392 N.E.2d 1172, 1175. "Estoppel is mutual if the one taking advantage of the earlier adjudication would have been bound by it had it gone against him." Tobin v. McClellan (1947), 225 Ind. 335, 345, 73 N.E.2d 679, 683. However, the requirement of mutuality as a condition imposed by our supreme court to the application of issue preclusion is questionable. The supreme court cases upon which this court has relied as imposing the mutuality requirement concern the application of claim preclusion, not issue preclusion. See e.g. Tobin, 73 N.E.2d 679; Hoosier Stone Co. v. Louisville, New Albany and Chicago Railway Co. (1891), 131 Ind. 575, 31 N.E. 365; Maple v. Beach (1873), 43 Ind. 51; Dayton v. Fisher (1870), 34 Ind. 356. However, the fact remains that, inadvertent or not, this court has en-grafted the mutuality requirement upon issue preclusion. Speidel, 392 N.E.2d 1172.
However, in the federal courts, as well as in most jurisdictions, there is no mutuality requirements.3 In Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation (1971), 402 U.S. 313, 91 S.Ct. 1434, 28 L.Ed.2d 788, the United States *1001Supreme Court ruled that an action which established a patent's validity provided a defense in subsequent actions regarding the same patent. In so ruling, the requirements of mutuality and identity of parties were abandoned by the court, at least as to the party asserting issue preclusion defensively.4 The recognized goal was "limiting relitigation of issues where that can be achieved without compromising fairness in particular cases." Id. at 328, 91 S.Ct. at 1442. Thus misallocation of resources can be prevented. Id. To that end "determining whether the party against whom estop-pel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate is a most important safeguard." Id. at 329, 91 S.Ct. at 1443. This determination requires a consideration of such factors as whether the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted 1) had a choice of forum, 2) had the incentive to litigate, 3) is subject to the same standards in the second litigation, or 4) was deprived of erucial evidence or witnesses in the first litigation without fault of his own. But the court said there is no "automatic formula" and the "decision will necessarily rest on the trial court's sense of justice and equity." Id. at 333-34, 91 S.Ct. at 1445.
Indiana, too, has recognized a defensive exception to the requirements of mutuality and privity, "namely, that they are not necessary where the liability of the defendant ... is dependent on or derived from the liability of one who was exonerated in an earlier suit by the same plaintiff on the same facts." Mayhew & Huston v. Deister (1969), 144 Ind.App. 111, 122, 244 N.E.2d 448, 454; Speidel, 392 N.E.2d at 1177 n. 6. The Mayhew court cited typical examples of such derivative liability as "master and servant, principal and agent, and indemnitor and indemnitee." Mayhew, 244 N.E.2d at 454; Glass v. Continental Assur. Co. (1981), Ind.App., 415 N.E.2d 126, 128. Thus this exception allows defensive use of issue preclusion when a defendant's liability is dependent on or derived from the liability of one who was exonerated in an earlier suit and, accordingly, is limited to defendants sharing some sort of mutually dependent relationship.
A recent case by this court indicates that Indiana may be willing to carve out other exceptions to its mutuality and identity of parties requirements for defensive use of issue preclusion. In Turner v. Estate of Turner (1983), Ind.App., 454 N.E.2d 1247, Turner shot and killed his parents but was found not guilty of their murders by reason of insanity. The administratrices of the parents' estates subsequently sought to terminate Turner's right to receive his intestate share. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the estates and ordered that Turner serve as constructive trustee of his intestate share, and that he not receive any benefit from his parents' death. This court reversed reasoning that, since Alien committed no legal wrong, the equitable doctrine barring a person from profiting from his wrongful conduct did not apply. Although the holding was not based on issue preclusion, the court noted:
Generally, the results reached in criminal proceedings are not considered res judi-cata in civil cases, in part, because of the difference in the burden of proof.... However, at the time of Allen's criminal trial he had the burden of establishing *1002his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence, ... the same being true in the instant case. While neither party raises the issue, we note that the doctrine of collateral estoppel may well have been applicable under the present cireumstance-es inasmuch as the issue and burden of proof were identical in both the criminal and civil proceedings.
Id. at 1248-49 n. 2. This language demonstrates this court's willingness to further consider issue preclusion without identity of parties and without mutuality. The instant case presents compelling circumstances for further reconsideration of the necessity of requiring identity of parties and mutuality in that limiting relitigation-of issues can be achieved without them without compromising fairness.
IIL - Precluding Legal Malpractice Claims
Several jurisdictions have invoked the doctrine of issue preclusion to bar litigation of a legal malpractice claim.
The Court of Appeals of New York held a party who unsuccessfully attempted to vacate his guilty plea on grounds that his plea was involuntary and pressured by counsel was precluded from relitigating these issues in a legal malpractice claim. Vavolizza v. Krieger (1974), 33 N.Y.2d 919, 352 N.Y.S.2d 919, 308 N.E.2d 439. The court found the substance of the malpractice action was that the "plaintiff was literally forced into the guilty plea by defendant [his defense counsel] and plaintiff was not guilty and never wanted to plead guilty." Id. 352 N.Y.S.2d at 922, 308 N.E.2d at 441. Because these allegations were identical to those decided on the merits against the plaintiff in his prior proceeding to vacate his guilty plea where he had a full and fair opportunity to prove them, the Court of Appeals of New York invoked the doctrine of issue preclusion to bar his legal malpractice claim.
An alternative use of issue preclusion to bar a legal malpractice claim is illustrated by another New York case, Carmel v. Lunney (1986), 119 App.Div. 50, 505 N.Y. S.2d 735. In this case the court held a defendant who pled guilty to a securities law violation could not maintain a malpractice action against his attorneys because his unattacked guilty plea precluded him from establishing that his attorneys' malpractice was the proximate cause of his damages.
A Texas appellate court found that a defendant who unsuccessfully appealed his conviction on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel was estopped from asserting legal malpractice in a subsequent action. Garcia v. Ray (1977), Tex.Civ.App., 556 S.W.2d 870. The court found that both actions involved the same adjudicated question. The court noted:
The standard of proof generally in a criminal case is usually different than in civil actions,. However, on the other hand, how could you test the adequacy of counsel any better than by having the direct point determined by the highest court of our State in the related criminal case?
Id. at 872.
The District of Columbia Circuit has applied issue preclusion to bar a legal malpractice action. McCord v. Bailey (1980), D.C.Cir., 636 F.2d 606. In McCord, a con-viected Watergate burglar sued his defense attorney for malpractice, conspiracy to represent him incompetently, and conspiracy to deprive him of his civil rights. MeCord had previously and unsuccessfully raised the same malpractice allegations in a coram nobis petition and in an appeal of his conviction. Summary judgment for the attorneys on the malpractice claim was affirmed on grounds of issue preclusion because the contentions were the same, the legal standards for proving ineffective assistance of counsel and malpractice were equivalent, and the ineffective assistance claim was actually litigated in a proceeding where McCord had every incentive to aggressively argue the ineffectiveness of his counsel and had a full and fair opportunity to do so. The court said "a hearing now would amount to little more than a 'useless ritual' ", Id. at 610, and concluded, "Having twice raised these issues and lost, McCord *1003cannot raise the claims anew in a civil case." Id. at 611.5
In sum, these cases recognize issue preclusion in malpractice claims because issues of negligence, causation or injury have been negated by prior judgments. Critically, issue preclusion was deemed appropriate without identity of parties or mutuality. We, too, deem the doctrine appropriate if the party against whom it is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.
III, Hockett's Cloim
There is an identity of issues in Hockett's legal malpractice claim and his post-convietion relief proceeding: the alleged ineffective assistance of Hockett's counsel, Breu-nig and Gilroy. Following Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, our supreme court has applied a two-step analysis in reviewing claims of ineffective assistance. Under the first step, "the defendant must demonstrate that the alleged acts or omissions by counsel fell outside the wide range of competent professional assistance." Richardson v. State (1985), Ind., 476 N.E.2d 497, 501. This step has also been referred to as applying the standard of "reasonably effective assistance." Burr v. State (1986), Ind., 492 N.E.2d 306, 308. The second step is the prejudice component: "the defendant will be entitled to relief only if the reviewing court determines that counsel's errors had an adverse effect upon the judgment." Richardson, 496 N.E.2d at 501, Burr, 492 N.E.2d at 306.
On the other hand, the elements for a cause of action for legal malpractice are:
1) the employment of the attorney (the duty);
2) the failure of the attorney to exercise ordinary skill and knowledge (the breach); and
8) that such negligence was the proximate cause (causation);
4) of damage to the plaintiff (damage).
Fiddler v. Hobbs (1985), Ind.App., 475 N.E.2d 1172, 1173.
The first step of the Strickland standard and the breach element of legal malpractice are identical, {e., counsel must act reasonably. In addition, the second step in the Strickland standard, prejudice, and the causation element of a malpractice claim are identical. Further, the burdens of proof applicable to a post-conviction relief petition and a legal malpractice claim are identical. Both are civil proceedings using a preponderance of the evidence standard. Hence, Hockett's post-conviction relief proceeding and his malpractice claim meet the same standard factor of the Blonder, Tongue Laboratory test of fairness with which I agree. In addition, although Hock-ett did not have his choice of forum, his incentive to litigate his relief claim was certainly as great, if not greater, in his post-conviction relief proceeding than his incentive to litigate his malpractice claim. The fourth factor, deprivation of crucial evidence or witnesses without fault in the first litigation, is not an issue. Thus, we can only conclude that Hockett had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim at his post-conviction relief hearing. He had his day in court.
Accordingly, fairness dictates that a limited deviation from the doctrines of mutual ity and identity of parties be applied in this case to bar Hockett from relitigating the issues of negligence and proximate cause in his legal malpractice action against Breunig and Gilroy. Therefore, the trial court properly granted judgment against Hockett.

. Issue preclusion is also referred to as collateral estoppel, as a branch of res judicata, and as estoppel by verdict or finding.

. On occasion, persons who are real parties in interest have been included within an expanded definition of privies. See e.g. In Re Estate of Nye (1973), 157 Ind.App. 236, 299 N.E.2d 854.

. 1B Moore's Fed.Prac. 0.441[2], 0.441[3.-2] (1984).

. - Blonder-Tongue addressed defensive use of issue preclusion. The defensive limitation was later abandoned, permitting a nonparty plaintiff to estop a losing defendant. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore (1979), 439 U.S. 322, 332-33, 99 S.Ct. 645, 652-53, 58 L.Ed.2d 552. The Parklane court, following Blonder-Tongue, said the purposes of issue preclusion are "protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation." Id. at 326, 99 S.Ct. at 649.
The court conceded that offensive use of issue preclusion is more problematic than defensive use. For example, offensive use of issue preclusion may increase litigation "since potential plaintiffs will have everything to gain and nothing to lose by not intervening in the first action." - Id. at 330, 99 S.Ct. at 651. Offensive use of issue preclusion could also be unfair to a defendant who did not have a great incentive to litigate in the first action, or where the procedural opportunities differ in the two actions in a way that might cause a different result, Id. at 330-31, 99 S.Ct. at 651. The court nevertheless concluded that the preferable approach is not to prohibit use of offensive issue preclusion, but to allow the trial court discretion to apply it when it would not be unfair to the defendant. Id. at 331, 99 S.Ct. at 651.

. - Arizona follows the McCord holding regarding issue preclusion. Thus an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which was determined adversely to the client in his motion for new trial of the criminal case, cannot be reasserted in a malpractice action. King v. Superior Court (1983), Ariz., 673 P.2d 787, 791 n. 4.