Court Opinion

ID: 9468552
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:17:39.640616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:55.020986
License: Public Domain

PELL, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
While I continue to adhere to the position taken and the supporting reasons therefor expressed in my partial concurrence and partial dissent to the original opinion of this court, I do note the following in response to the Supplemental Opinion.
The Supplemental Opinion does address the case of United States v. Stanford, 589 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 983, 99 S.Ct. 1794, 60 L.Ed.2d 244 (1979), and purports to brush it aside as being distinguishable. I fail to discern that the Supplemental Opinion has demonstrated that the principles enunciated in Stanford are not applicable to at least a part of the items that the majority now veils in secrecy. The Supplemental Opinion states that the majority agrees with the holding in Stanford but that the disclosures challenged there, first of all, reveal nothing about the grand jury investigation, and second, that the disclosures were made only to persons legitimately connected with the documents. To the first of these grounds which the majority apparently finds as a basis of non-applicability of Stanford to the present case, as I endeavored to show in my original dissent at least some of the documents reveal nothing about what occurred before the grand jury. As to the second of the above so-called distinguishing features between Stanford and the present case this was phrased somewhat differently by Bag-got’s response to the opposition to the rehearing in banc as being disclosures of documents “which the complainants either personally executed or with which they were thoroughly familiar.” Certainly a letter to Baggot and his purchase and sales statements would be matters with which he was thoroughly familiar. Indeed, he presumably personally executed some of these. His connection with the documents would also seem to have been legitimate. Bag-got also argues in his response that the disclosure in Stanford was made for use in a criminal investigation rather than for civil purposes. Certainly it would seem that their disclosure in a criminal investigation *1245would be more prejudicial than in a civil investigation. The Government is seeking disclosure in both the present case and in Stanford.
I also note the Supplemental Opinion’s statement that “[o]nly those subpoenaed documents should be subject to Rule 6(e) which when reasonably considered in the context of the particular grand jury investigation are determined by the trial court to reveal some secret aspect of the grand jury investigation.” This presents what is indeed an anomalous attribute of the district court’s opinion. That court, while finding a grand jury nexus on many of the documents, nevertheless apparently was not sufficiently impressed that disclosure would “reveal some secret aspect of the grand jury investigation,” because the court nevertheless permitted disclosure under its supervisory power.
In sum, no doubt it is good policy to render obeisance at the shrine of grand jury secrecy, but that policy does not require that the worship should be cultish.