Court Opinion

ID: 9943250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 22:00:48.26574+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:44.049590
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                    ____________________
No. 22-2073
DONALD A. PIERCE,
                                             Petitioner-Appellant,
                                v.

FRANK VANIHEL,
                                             Respondent-Appellee.
                    ____________________

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the
          Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute Division.
      No. 2:20-cv-00177-JPH-MG — James Patrick Hanlon, Judge.
                    ____________________

  ARGUED NOVEMBER 7, 2023 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 22, 2024
               ____________________

   Before EASTERBROOK, WOOD, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.
    ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. An Indiana jury convicted Donald
Pierce of four counts of felony child molesting and of being a
repeat sexual oﬀender for molesting the ten-year-old daugh-
ter of his then-ﬁancée. At trial, his lawyer failed to object to
witness testimony that violated an Indiana evidentiary rule.
Pierce later petitioned for post-conviction relief in state court,
contending that his trial counsel’s failure to object deprived
him of constitutionally adequate representation. The Indiana
2                                                 No. 22-2073

Court of Appeals denied the petition after ﬁnding that
Pierce’s counsel’s failure to object was knowing and strategic,
and did not rise to the level of constitutionally deﬁcient per-
formance. Pierce now seeks habeas relief, arguing that the
state appellate court unreasonably applied Supreme Court
precedent and otherwise based its decision on an unreasona-
ble fact determination. We aﬃrm.
                       I. Background
A. Factual Background
    In June 2008, Indiana charged Petitioner Donald “Andy”
Pierce with three counts of Class “A” felony child molesting,
one count of Class “C” felony child molesting, and being a
repeat sexual oﬀender. Pierce went to trial, and a jury con-
victed him on all counts.
    The convictions stem from Pierce’s molestation of J.W., the
ten-year-old daughter of his then-ﬁancée. Pierce started da-
ting J.W.’s mother in 2004. He soon moved in with J.W. and
her mother, and in 2006 began to molest J.W. According to
J.W., the molestations occurred approximately every other
weekend for a year and included sexual intercourse, oral sex,
and fondling.
B. Procedural Background
    1. Trial and Direct Appeal
    There was no physical evidence of the molestation, and
J.W. was the only eyewitness. The state thus sought to prove
its case through the testimony of J.W. and the several adults
in whom she conﬁded. The state’s case consisted of seven wit-
nesses, testifying in the following order: J.W.’s paternal
grandfather, J.W.’s father, an investigating sheriﬀ’s deputy,
No. 22-2073                                                    3

J.W.’s mother, J.W., and two medical witnesses. Most of these
witnesses testiﬁed to what and when J.W. told them about
Pierce’s conduct. Pierce’s trial counsel did not object to this
sequence of witnesses.
   J.W.’s paternal grandfather testiﬁed ﬁrst, informing the
jury that J.W. initially told him about the “problems she was
having” with Pierce in 2007, when she divulged to him that
she once woke up to ﬁnd Pierce “fooling around” with her.
He did not contact law enforcement, but instead agreed to let
J.W. tell her mother.
    J.W.’s grandfather suﬀered a heart attack not long after
J.W. told him about the molestation, and by the time he recov-
ered, J.W. had yet to tell her mother. He testiﬁed that J.W. told
him that she had not talked to her mother because “what had
happened was consensual” and “fun.” J.W.’s grandfather
called J.W.’s maternal grandfather several days later to tell
him about the molestation.
   J.W.’s father testiﬁed second, reporting that he notiﬁed the
police after hearing about the allegations against Pierce from
J.W.’s mother. He testiﬁed that J.W. never told him about the
molestation. On cross-examination, he reiterated that when
he spoke to the police, “[a]ll he knew was … that [Pierce] had
touched her,” and that he did not know any “other speciﬁcs
about the amount of times or anything like that.”
   Sheriﬀ’s Deputy Debra Young was the state’s third wit-
ness. Young testiﬁed that she ﬁrst heard about the allegations
from J.W.’s father. Young subsequently contacted the Indiana
Department of Child Services, which set up a forensic inter-
view with J.W. In the meantime, Young also spoke with J.W.’s
mother, who informed her J.W. had revealed that there had
4                                                 No. 22-2073

been “incidents with [Pierce] that he had been in her bedroom
and she had awakened with him on top of her.”
    J.W. underwent two forensic interviews in the weeks that
followed, the ﬁrst of which took place the day after J.W.’s fa-
ther contacted the police. In that ﬁrst interview, J.W. stated
that Pierce had raped her “approximately four times,” begin-
ning around Valentines Day of 2007. J.W. also described wak-
ing up with Pierce on top of her and raping her.
    Young testiﬁed that second interviews are “not uncom-
mon,” and that a second interview was necessary after inves-
tigators “obtained more information from family members.”
After her ﬁrst interview, J.W. told family members that she
“hadn’t told the truth” and “had actually lied the ﬁrst” time.
Speciﬁcally, J.W. revealed that it “didn’t happen exactly like
she had said” because she “hadn’t been asleep during the in-
cidents.”
   So, J.W. sat for a second interview several weeks later, at
which she oﬀered a somewhat diﬀerent version of her story
consistent with the new account divulged to family members.
J.W. informed the interviewers that Pierce’s conduct began
around Easter of 2006, not Valentines Day of 2007, and that
she was awake, not asleep, at the time of the molestation.
Pierce had asked if she “wanted to play a game,” “trusted
him,” “loved him,” and “loved her mom.” At that point, he
removed their clothing and the two started “wrestling.”
Pierce then began “fondling her, touching her private parts
with his hands,” eventually “putting his private part in her
private part,” and “mov[ing] up and down on top of her.”
J.W. claimed that similar conduct happened “multiple times
… pretty much … every time that they were alone” on week-
ends spent at her mother’s house. J.W. explained that she had
No. 22-2073                                                   5

not revealed this information during the ﬁrst interview be-
cause she was “scared” and “didn’t want to hurt her mom.”
    J.W.’s mother testiﬁed next, recounting that Pierce and
J.W. seemingly “got along well,” and that Pierce “watched
[J.W.] a lot” while she was working. She testiﬁed that she dis-
covered the “inappropriate relations” between the two in
May 2007, after her parents informed her that J.W. had con-
ﬁded in her paternal grandfather that Pierce had “touched
her.” When she confronted her daughter with this infor-
mation, J.W. told her that Pierce “had come into her room at
night a few times.”
   J.W.’s mother further testiﬁed that J.W.’s story later
changed, which prompted her to set up the second interview.
Speciﬁcally, J.W. revealed that Pierce “didn’t come into her
room at night,” but instead “asked her to come into the bed-
room one day” while her mother was at work, and that this
“happened for a long time for about a year or more.” Accord-
ing to J.W.’s mother, J.W. stated that she had not disclosed
these details during the ﬁrst interview because she was afraid
that her mother was going to “hate her or be mad at her.”
   On cross-examination, Pierce’s trial counsel questioned
J.W.’s mother about her daughter’s “changing story.” J.W.’s
mother stressed that J.W. was “not a liar,” but simply “didn’t
want to tell me all the rest of the details.”
    J.W. took the stand after her mother. She described the al-
leged conduct, beginning with the “wrestling,” and Pierce
later telling her to take oﬀ her clothes, getting on top of her,
and molesting her. J.W. told the jury that this ﬁrst happened
about a year and a half before she told her grandfather, and
that she had not given him “all the details.” She testiﬁed that
6                                                   No. 22-2073

she did not speak with her mother because she “couldn’t look
[her mother] in the face and tell her.”
   The rest of J.W.’s testimony adhered to the version of
events she described in the second interview. J.W. explained
that she did not tell the interviewers “exactly” what happened
during the ﬁrst interview because she did not want to hurt her
mother. She insisted that the ﬁrst interview was “a lie,” telling
the jury that she ultimately gave a truthful account in the sec-
ond interview because she “couldn’t lie.”
   On cross-examination, Pierce’s trial counsel highlighted
the inconsistencies in J.W.’s story. Counsel asked whether
J.W. ever spoke with her father or mother about the conduct,
to which J.W. responded that she did not “go into details”
with them. Counsel also repeatedly asked whether the vary-
ing versions of J.W.’s testimony were lies, and J.W. conﬁrmed
that anything inconsistent with her second interview was in-
accurate. When counsel asked J.W. which parts of her story
she lied about, J.W. responded, “the part of me being asleep.”
   The state closed its case with the testimony of two medical
witnesses. The ﬁrst, a therapist, testiﬁed about the behaviors
and characteristics of child sexual abuse victims. The second,
a nurse who examined J.W., testiﬁed that she did not ﬁnd any
physical injuries on J.W. during her examination, but that it
was common not to observe injuries in child rape victims.
    Pierce called Deputy Young as his only witness. Young’s
testimony largely overlapped with her earlier statements,
with Pierce’s trial counsel drilling down on the inconsisten-
cies between J.W.’s two interviews. When Pierce’s counsel
asked Young whether J.W. “change[d] her story,” Young re-
sponded “yes,” explaining that J.W. stated she needed a
No. 22-2073                                                      7

second interview because she “hadn’t been truthful the ﬁrst
time” and had “lied about how and when it happened.”
    During Pierce’s closing statement, trial counsel argued
that it was plausible for a child to fabricate a molestation
story. Counsel repeatedly attacked J.W. as a “liar,” highlight-
ing the inconsistencies between her ﬁrst and second inter-
views and her numerous versions of the events. The evidence,
counsel stressed, was “essentially one person’s many, many
versions” of what transpired.
    Despite these eﬀorts to discredit the only eyewitness, the
jury convicted Pierce on all four counts of child molestation
and subsequently found he was a repeat sexual oﬀender. The
state circuit court sentenced Pierce to 124 years’ imprison-
ment.
    Pierce appealed on unrelated grounds. See Pierce v. State,
2010 WL 4253698 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). The Indiana Court of
Appeals aﬃrmed his convictions, but it remanded to correct
a sentencing error. Pierce then appealed to the Indiana Su-
preme Court, which similarly aﬃrmed the convictions but ex-
ercised its discretion under the Indiana Constitution to revise
his sentence to 80 years. See Pierce v. State, 949 N.E.2d 349, 352–
53 (Ind. 2011).
   2. Post-Conviction Proceedings
    Pierce subsequently pursued post-conviction relief, rely-
ing in part on an Indiana hearsay doctrine. Indiana eviden-
tiary rules limit the admission of a witness’s prior statement
as substantive evidence to certain situations. See Ind. Evid. R.
801(d); Appleton v. State, 740 N.E.2d 122, 124 (Ind. 2001).
Among these limitations is the “drumbeat” rule, under which
the state may not elicit a victim’s out-of-court statements from
8                                                   No. 22-2073

other witnesses before the victim herself testiﬁes. See Modesitt
v. State, 578 N.E.2d 649, 651–52 (Ind. 1991); Stone v. State, 536
N.E.2d 534, 536 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989). The danger of this
“drumbeat repetition” testimony is that it impairs the ac-
cused’s cross-examination rights by rendering the victim’s ac-
count increasingly unimpeachable as witnesses repeat her
version of events. Modesitt, 578 N.E.2d at 652. “By putting into
evidence the victim’s out of court charges” through “separate
and repetitive witnesses prior to calling the victim herself, the
prosecutor eﬀectively precludes [the accused] from eﬀective
cross-examination” because “the victim’s veracity has been,
in essence, vouchsafed by permitting the … witnesses to re-
peat the accusations of the victim.” Id. at 651 (cleaned up).
       a. State Circuit Court
    Pierce ﬁrst petitioned pro se for post-conviction relief in
state court in 2012, and amended his petition in 2017 after ob-
taining counsel. Among other alleged errors, Pierce invoked
the drumbeat rule to argue that he received ineﬀective assis-
tance of counsel due to trial counsel’s failure to object to the
sequence of the adult witnesses’ hearsay testimony.
    The Indiana circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on
the petition at which Pierce’s trial counsel testiﬁed. Pierce’s
counsel informed the court that the “defense solely was that
J.W. was a liar,” noting that she had observed a similar trial in
front of the same judge, so she “kind of knew what he let in
and what he didn’t let in.” When asked whether she was
“aware … of the possibility of objecting to [the sequence of]
testimony as drumbeat testimony,” Pierce’s counsel ﬁrst re-
sponded, “[a]s what, I’m sorry?” After clariﬁcation, she
added, “[u]m, no, that’s not one I would have made for this,
no.”
No. 22-2073                                                     9

    The state circuit court denied Pierce’s petition. Noting that
Pierce’s trial counsel had observed the trial judge in similar
cases, was familiar with his rulings, and chose not to object in
order to downplay the testimony, the state court determined
that her failure to object to the drumbeat testimony was a rea-
sonable strategic choice that did not rise to the level of consti-
tutionally deﬁcient performance. Additionally, the court
found that Pierce had not shown he had suﬀered prejudice as
a result of his trial counsel’s failure to object.
       b. State Court of Appeals
    The Indiana Court of Appeals aﬃrmed the circuit court’s
ruling in a split decision. The majority of the court agreed that
Pierce’s trial counsel’s failure to object was strategic. But, ra-
ther than reasoning as the circuit court had that Pierce’s trial
counsel was trying to downplay the testimony, the majority
found that she did not object because she was trying to “paint
J.W. as a liar” and have the jury “hear as many diﬀerent ver-
sions of J.W.’s ‘stories’ as possible.” The majority did not dis-
cuss Pierce’s trial counsel’s testimony at the post-conviction
hearing. It instead relied exclusively on the trial transcript,
reasoning that as early as its opening statement, counsel tried
to portray J.W. as a liar. The majority concluded:
       Trial counsel’s decision to permit the various
       witnesses to then inform the jury of the details
       of J.W.’s recounting of Pierce’s molestations to
       each of them was counsel’s explicit strategy.
       Trial counsel wanted the jury to hear all of the
       diﬀerent versions of the molestations that J.W.
       had reported because counsel wanted to use the
       variances among those versions to undermine
       J.W.’s credibility. The fact that that strategy did
10                                                 No. 22-2073

       not work out for Pierce does not demonstrate
       that Pierce received ineﬀective assistance of
       counsel.
Because the state court concluded that Pierce’s counsel was
not constitutionally deﬁcient, it did not address whether he
had suﬀered any prejudice.
    One judge dissented, concluding that Pierce’s trial counsel
“simply took a fatalistic approach to trial and wholly failed to
challenge any testimony by any State witness, including
drumbeat repetition of J.W.’s allegations.” The dissent
pointed out that trial counsel’s purported strategy of allowing
the jury to hear the evolving versions of J.W.’s account would
not have been “undermined” had she invoked the drumbeat
rule and insisted that J.W.’s testimony “not be preceded by a
parade of witnesses providing much detail and explaining
any inconsistency.” Instead, trial counsel “stood idly by while
the jury was inundated with drumbeat repetition of J.W.’s al-
legations, even before J.W. testiﬁed,” thereby “vouchsaﬁng”
J.W.’s testimony before it even took place and eroding Pierce’s
presumption of innocence. The dissent also concluded that
trial counsel’s failure to object was prejudicial given the im-
portance of J.W.’s credibility to the case and the absence of
physical evidence, eyewitnesses, or other corroboration.
   Pierce appealed the decision to the Indiana Supreme
Court, which denied review. See Pierce v. State, 143 N.E.3d 955
(Ind. 2020).
       c. Federal Habeas Petition
    Pierce subsequently brought this federal habeas petition
in the Southern District of Indiana, which the district court
denied. The district court held that the Indiana Court of
No. 22-2073                                                   11

Appeals reasonably applied clearly established law in deter-
mining that Pierce’s trial counsel strategically chose not to ob-
ject to the “drumbeat” testimony and therefore did not pro-
vide deﬁcient representation. The district court nevertheless
granted Pierce a certiﬁcate of appealability, citing the dissent
in the state court of appeals.
                          II. Analysis
    28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Ef-
fective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), provides the
statutory authority for federal courts to issue habeas corpus
relief for persons in state custody. We review the district
court’s decision de novo, “but our inquiry is an otherwise nar-
row one.” Schmidt v. Foster, 911 F.3d 469, 476 (7th Cir. 2018)
(en banc). Under AEDPA, a federal court cannot grant habeas
corpus relief unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim
(1) was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Su-
preme Court, or (2) was based on an unreasonable determina-
tion of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Schmidt, 911 F.3d at 477.
In applying these standards, we look to the last reasoned state
court decision to decide the merits of the case, “even if the
state’s supreme court then denied discretionary review.”
Thurston v. Vanihel, 39 F.4th 921, 928 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting
Dassey v. Dittmann, 877 F.3d 297, 302 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc)).
    Pierce claims that the Indiana Court of Appeals made two
interrelated errors under § 2254(d). First, he argues that the
Indiana Court of Appeal’s decision was “based on an unrea-
sonable determination of facts” because it unreasonably
found that trial counsel’s failure to object was a knowing stra-
tegic decision. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Second, he contends
that it unreasonably applied established Supreme Court
12                                                  No. 22-2073

precedent in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
See id. at § 2254(d)(1). We address each argument in turn.
A. Section 2254(d)(2)
    “A petitioner’s challenge to a state court decision based on
a factual determination under § 2254(d)(2) will not succeed
unless the state court committed an ‘unreasonable error,’ and
§ 2254(e)(1) provides the mechanism for proving unreasona-
bleness.” Ben-Yisrayl v. Buss, 540 F.3d 542, 549 (7th Cir. 2008);
see also Thurston, 39 F.4th at 929 n.2. Under § 2254(e)(1), “[w]e
start with the presumption that a state court’s determination
of fact is correct.” Winﬁeld v. Dorethy, 956 F.3d 442, 452 (7th
Cir. 2020). To rebut that presumption, a petitioner must show
by clear and convincing evidence that the ﬁnding was unrea-
sonable. Id. This is a “stringent standard.” Morgan v. Hardy,
662 F.3d 790, 799 (7th Cir. 2011). “[E]ven if ‘reasonable minds
reviewing the record might disagree’ about the ﬁnding in
question, ‘on habeas review that does not suﬃce to supersede
the trial court’s determination.’” Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290,
301 (2010) (quoting Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341–42 (2006)
(alterations omitted)).
    The Indiana Court of Appeals determined that Pierce’s
trial counsel made a knowing, strategic decision not to object
to the drumbeat testimony and Pierce does not put forward
clear and convincing evidence demonstrating the state court’s
conclusion was unreasonable. To the contrary, the state court
had before it suﬃcient evidence from which to conclude
Pierce’s counsel intentionally refrained from objecting be-
cause she wanted to make J.W. out as a liar by emphasizing
the evolution of J.W.’s shifting accounts over time, not be-
cause she was unaware of the rule. In trial counsel’s opening
statement, for example, she explained to the jury that it would
No. 22-2073                                                  13

see how J.W.’s tale “expanded” over “three short weeks.”
Trial counsel continued:
       All sorts of new … details emerged. To cover up
       the lies, she told the ﬁrst time, she said I lied
       about what I said the ﬁrst time. From there,
       [J.W.] just kept lying. Desperate people do des-
       perate things. [J.W.] has told seven versions. Do
       they match? No they don’t. You ladies and gen-
       tlemen are going to get to hear all of them. Please
       listen to the[m] explicitly. Pay attention how the
       stories keep getting bigger and bigger.
At the end of her opening statement, Pierce’s counsel again
urged the jury to “[p]ay attention to how the versions keep
getting bigger and better.” Then, as the adults testiﬁed,
Pierce’s counsel ensured that each witness informed the jury
of the details of J.W.’s accounts and eﬀectively cross-exam-
ined them about J.W.’s changing story. When J.W. eventually
took the stand, Pierce’s counsel highlighted the inconsisten-
cies in her story—inconsistencies the jury had heard
ﬁrsthand.
    While Pierce acknowledges this evidence, he claims the
state court’s ruling was unreasonable because it premised its
ﬁndings on a misunderstanding of the drumbeat rule: that a
drumbeat-based objection would have rendered the adult
witnesses’ testimony as to J.W.’s statements entirely “inadmis-
sible,” as opposed to inadmissible before J.W.’s own testimony.
According to Pierce, the drumbeat rule permitted the jury to
hear J.W.’s out-of-court statements from the adult wit-
nesses—it simply required the jury to hear them after J.W.
herself testiﬁed and was subject to cross-examination. We can-
not, however, review this kind of quarrel with the state court’s
14                                                  No. 22-2073

application of state law on habeas corpus. See Powell v. Fuchs,
4 F.4th 541, 548 (7th Cir. 2021) (“[O]n habeas review we cannot
overturn a state-court’s conclusions about state law.”); see also
Perruquet v. Briley, 390 F.3d 505, 511–12 (7th Cir. 2004)
(“[E]rrors of state law in and of themselves are not cognizable
on habeas review.”). To the extent the Indiana Court of Ap-
peals may have misapprehended Indiana’s drumbeat rule,
that mistake provides no grounds for relief under § 2254.
   Pierce also argues that the Indiana Court of Appeals ig-
nored evidence that his trial attorney was unaware of the
drumbeat rule. At Pierce’s post-conviction evidentiary hear-
ing, his counsel questioned trial counsel about her failure to
object. The following exchange ensued:
       Q: Okay. So if that was the truth [that J.W. testi-
       ﬁed ﬁfth], would you have considered an objec-
       tion to them testifying about, um, J.W.’s state-
       ments to them?
       A: Well, you know, it’s hearsay, but she was on
       the witness list for them and she would, I would
       have called her had they not, so in my mind this
       was going to come in one way or the other, I
       mean it was saving time in terms of them not
       having to call rebuttal witnesses and bringing
       people back to the witness stand. I mean I al-
       ready knew what they were going to say be-
       cause I’d, particularly [J.W.’s grandfather and
       mother], because I had done their depositions.
       And I’d also talked to [J.W.’s grandfather], uh, a
       couple of times just in, in interview type situa-
       tion, informally.
No. 22-2073                                                     15

       Q: Were you aware that you could, that, of the possi-
       bility of objecting to that testimony as drumbeat tes-
       timony? Are you familiar with that?
       A: As what, I’m sorry?
       Q: Drumbeat testimony, the, um, repeating the vic-
       tim’s story over and over again before she testiﬁes.
       Does that sound like a familiar basis for an objection
       to you?
       A: Um, no, that’s not one I would have made for this,
       no.
    This ambiguous exchange does not make the state court’s
strategic ﬁnding unreasonable. Pierce’s counsel faced back-to-
back questions about her knowledge of the drumbeat rule,
and she did not give a square answer to either. Her puzzled
response to the ﬁrst question does not exude familiarity, but
neither is it unequivocally unaware. Perhaps, as Pierce ar-
gues, his counsel had never heard of the drumbeat rule. But
equally plausible is the possibility that she simply did not
hear the question. Furthermore, Pierce’s counsel’s response to
the second question provided no greater clarity. She did not
say she was unfamiliar with a drumbeat objection. Instead,
she said that it was not one she “would have made.” Given that
answer, it is possible she was asserting that she simply chose
not to invoke the drumbeat rule in that instance.
    The fact that both interpretations are at least plausible pre-
cludes us from displacing the state court’s factual determina-
tion at the habeas stage. See Wood, 558 U.S. at 301 (“[A] state-
court factual determination is not unreasonable merely be-
cause the federal habeas court would have reached a diﬀerent
conclusion in the ﬁrst instance.”). Given that we cannot
16                                                  No. 22-2073

disturb the state court’s factual conclusion when “reasonable
minds reviewing the record might disagree about the ﬁnding
in question,” the ambiguous testimony here is not enough to
overcome AEDPA deference. Brumﬁeld v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305,
314 (2015); see also Powell, 4 F.4th at 549 (declining to disturb
the state court’s factual ﬁnding where there was “more than
one way to interpret” counsel’s actions); Rice, 546 U.S. at 342
(holding that federal courts may not use “debatable infer-
ences” to set aside a state court’s factual conclusion). Without
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, it was not un-
reasonable for the Indiana Court of Appeals to ﬁnd that
Pierce’s counsel’s failure to object at trial was strategic.
B. Section 2254(d)(1)
    We turn next to Pierce’s arguments under § 2254(d)(1), in
which he contends that the state court unreasonably applied
clearly established law in Strickland in concluding that his
counsel’s failure to object at trial was not constitutionally de-
ﬁcient.
    A petitioner raising a Strickland claim must demonstrate
two things. “First, he must show that counsel provided con-
stitutionally deﬁcient performance” and second, he must
“show that this deﬁcient performance prejudiced his de-
fense.” Dunn v. Jess, 981 F.3d 582, 591 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting
Winﬁeld, 956 F.3d at 451–52.) “Failing to prove either element
defeats a petitioner’s claim.” Id. (quoting Winﬁeld, 956 F.3d at
452). “This inquiry into a lawyer’s performance and its eﬀects
turns ‘on the facts of the particular case,’ which must be
‘viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.’” Laux v. Zatecky,
890 F.3d 666, 673–74 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Lockhart v.
Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 371 (1993)).
No. 22-2073                                                   17

    Strickland “calls for a deferential review of an attorney’s
conduct.” Meyers v. Gomez, 50 F.4th 628, 643 (7th Cir. 2022). In
order to minimize “the distorting eﬀects of hindsight” in as-
sessing counsel’s performance, courts “must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466
U.S. at 689. Counsel’s performance is deﬁcient only if the pe-
titioner identiﬁes “acts or omissions … outside the wide range
of professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690.
    The constraints AEDPA imposes on our review of state
court decisions adds an additional layer of deference to the
already deferential Strickland standard. Our task in habeas is
not to assess Pierce’s Strickland claims de novo. Rather,
AEDPA conﬁnes our inquiry to whether the Indiana Court of
Appeals’ determination that Pierce was not denied ineﬀective
assistance of counsel “was contrary to, or involved an unrea-
sonable application of” Strickland. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
“[AEDPA] is a deferential and ‘diﬃcult to meet’ standard.”
Jones v. Cromwell, 75 F.4th 722, 726 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011)). “A federal court
may not issue a writ of habeas corpus ‘simply because [it] con-
cludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-
court decision applied clearly established federal law errone-
ously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be un-
reasonable.’” Hough v. Anderson, 272 F.3d 878, 890 (7th Cir.
2001) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000)). Un-
reasonable “means more than incorrect.” Winﬁeld, 956 F.3d at
451. The state court decision must be “so lacking in justiﬁca-
tion that there was an error well understood and compre-
hended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103.
18                                                  No. 22-2073

    Under this “‘doubly deferential’” review, the state court’s
ﬁnding that counsel’s failure to object was a strategic decision
all but forecloses Pierce’s argument that the state court unrea-
sonably applied Strickland. Meyers, 50 F.4th at 643 (quoting
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009)). As a constitu-
tional matter, an attorney’s strategic decision to forgo lodging
a particular objection is diﬃcult to impugn. See Strickland, 466
U.S. at 690 (“[S]trategic choices made after thorough investi-
gation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtu-
ally unchallengeable.”). Strickland’s performance standard
“provides signiﬁcant latitude for permissible attorney con-
duct, and a prisoner ‘must overcome the presumption that,
under the circumstances, the challenged action might be con-
sidered sound trial strategy.’” Mosley v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 838,
847–48 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). We
must examine “whether, in light of all the circumstances, the
identiﬁed acts or omissions were outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at
690, and we may grant Pierce relief only if no reasonable ar-
gument can be made that counsel’s failure to object “was a
legitimate strategic decision.” Meyers, 50 F.4th at 643 (citing
Shannon v. Hepp, 27 F.4th 1258, 1267 (7th Cir. 2022)).
    Of course, Strickland’s presumption “applies only if the
lawyer actually exercised judgment.” Mosley, 689 F.3d at 848
(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91); Dunn, 981 F.3d at 591
(“But for this deference to apply, the decision must be—in
fact—strategic.”). Pierce points out that we have held that if
“the only reason counsel failed to object was [her] under-
standing that such testimony was not objectionable—and not
some strategic judgment—counsel runs the risk of rendering
performance that falls below the objective standard of reason-
ableness.” Carter v. Douma, 796 F.3d 726, 736–37 (7th Cir. 2015)
No. 22-2073                                                             19

(quotation marks omitted); see also Mosley, 689 F.3d at 848
(“The consequences of inattention rather than reasoned stra-
tegic decisions are not entitled to the presumption of reason-
ableness.”). But, given the state court’s reasonable ﬁnding that
Pierce’s counsel was familiar with the drumbeat rule, we can-
not characterize this as a case in which trial counsel made a
basic legal mistake or refrained from objecting due to “igno-
rance of the law.” Harris v. Thompson, 698 F.3d 609, 644 (7th
Cir. 2012).
    Under these circumstances, Pierce’s counsel’s decision to
refrain from objecting to the drumbeat testimony was a rea-
sonable strategic assessment. More precisely—and to put it in
the terms of AEDPA—it was not unreasonable for the Indiana
Court of Appeals to reach that conclusion. Pierce’s counsel’s
stated trial strategy was to paint J.W. as a liar by highlighting
the inconsistencies in her accounts over time. Pursuant to that
strategy, trial counsel elicited repeated admissions from the
adult witnesses that J.W.’s stories were inconsistent. A com-
petent attorney might well have determined that culminating
the trial with J.W.’s testimony rather than beginning with it
helpfully enabled the defense to undermine her credibility be-
fore she took the stand. We must therefore aﬃrm the district
court and deny the writ here because the state court has of-
fered a reasonable argument that counsel behaved compe-
tently.1

    1 Because the state court did not unreasonably apply Strickland in con-

cluding that trial counsel was not ineﬀective, we need not reach the ques-
tion of prejudice resulting from her purported ineﬀectiveness.
20                                            No. 22-2073

                     III. Conclusion
   For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is
                                                AFFIRMED.