Court Opinion

ID: 9927756
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-29 22:01:30.014944+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:42.121321
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TIBOR KELEMAN,                                        )
                                                      )
                              Plaintiff,              )
                                                      )
       v.                                             )       Civil Action No. 23-2794 (RC)
                                                      )
GOVERNMENT OF HUNGARY, et al.,                        )
                                                      )
                              Defendants.             )

                                 MEMORANDUM OPINION

       This matter is before the Court on initial consideration of plaintiff’s application to

proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) and his pro se complaint (ECF No. 1). The Court grants

the application and, for the reasons discussed below, dismisses the complaint.

       Plaintiff Tibor Kelemen brings this action against the Government of Hungary and

Hungary’s Ministers of Justice, Interior and Foreign Affairs. See Compl. at 2. He alleges that

defendants have “abused their power on [him] mentaly [sic] and physically threatened and

humiliated [him]” since his arrival in the United States from Hungary in 2014. Id. at 4. Plaintiff

demands ownership of two real properties located in the District of Columbia currently “owned

by the Hungarian Government.” Id.

       “‘Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,’ possessing ‘only that power

authorized by Constitution and statute.’” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (quoting

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). Because federal courts

are “forbidden . . . from acting beyond [their] authority,” NetworkIP, LLC v. FCC, 548 F.3d 116,

120 (D.C. Cir. 2008), judges have “an affirmative obligation ‘to consider whether the

constitutional and statutory authority exist for [the Court] to hear each dispute,’” James Madison

Ltd. by Hecht v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Herbert v. Nat’l Acad. of

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Sciences, 974 F.2d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). Absent subject matter jurisdiction over a case,

the Court must dismiss it. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3).

       The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) is the “sole basis for obtaining

jurisdiction over a foreign state in our courts.” Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 812 F.3d 127, 135

(D.C. Cir. 2016). It “creates a baseline presumption of immunity from suit,” Fed. Republic of

Germany v. Philipp, 592 U.S. 169, 176 (2021) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1604), and “unless a specified

exception applies, a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim against a foreign

state,” id. (quoting Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993)). The Court therefore

“must make critical preliminary determinations of its own jurisdiction as early in litigation

against a foreign sovereign as possible.” Kilburn v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

376 F.3d 1123, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing Phoenix Consulting Inc. v. Republic of Angola, 216

F.3d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). Here, plaintiff fails to identify the exception under which he

proceeds, and given the dearth of factual allegations in the complaint, the Court cannot discern

which exception might apply in this case.

       Absent a clear basis for this Court’s jurisdiction, the complaint must be dismissed. An

Order is issued separately.

DATE: January 29, 2024                                CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER
                                                      United States District Judge

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