Court Opinion

ID: 9564116
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:54:31.969536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:14.017636
License: Public Domain

Justice Meyer
dissenting in part.
I join in the dissent of Justice Martin. I am writing separately in order to register my dissatisfaction with the majority’s treatment of the defendants’ peremptory challenge claim. Specifically, I disagree with the mode of analysis employed by the majority in discussing the defendants’ argument that the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks violated their sixth amendment right to an impartial jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community.
As the majority correctly notes, the defendants explicitly argue that this Court should adopt the reasoning of McCray v. Abrams, 750 F. 2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984); People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P. 2d 748 (1978); and Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E. 2d 499 (1979), which hold that a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to remove jurors on the basis of race can constitute a violation of a defendant’s right to a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community. However, while devoting several pages to a discussion of the holdings in these cases, the majority concludes that it is unnecessary to reach a decision as to whether to adopt the McCray-Wheeler-Soares fair cross-section analysis due to the fact that the defendants have failed to make out a prima facie showing of racially motivated peremptory challenges. I believe that this treatment constitutes an abdication of this Court’s responsibility as the highest appellate court in this State to completely adjudicate all issues which are properly presented to it. I realize that there are times that a *170court may wish to “side step” an important issue when the briefs and oral arguments fail to do the issue justice. Such is not the case here. The briefs on this issue by counsel for both defendants are excellent. This Court was presented with a request to adopt a new method of analyzing fair cross-section claims. This request was accompanied by scholarly, well-researched, well-written briefs. This issue is squarely before us. I think it is incumbent upon this Court to expressly adopt or reject the contention made by these defendants. The majority’s lengthy discussion of the question, and its ultimate failure to decide it, accomplishes virtually nothing. Of course, the one thing it does accomplish is to preserve decision on the issue for a future case presenting the same argument in the context of “death qualification” of the jury, thus presenting an opportunity to eviscerate our death penalty statute.
Having criticized the majority for its failure to explicitly adopt or reject the McCray-Wheeler-Soares fair cross-section analysis, I now set out my position on this question. I am of the opinion that the fair cross-section analysis utilized in those cases should be rejected by this Court. My opinion is based on several factors.
Initially, I am convinced that the sixth amendment fair cross-section analysis set forth in McCray has been completely eviscerated by the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Lockhart v. McCree, — U.S. —, 90 L.Ed. 2d 137 (1986). In that case the defendant argued that the removal for cause of jurors unalterably opposed to the death penalty prior to the guilt-innocence determination phase of a bifurcated capital trial violated his sixth amendment right to have a jury selected from a representative cross-section of the community. The Court refused to utilize the fair cross-section requirement to invalidate the use of either for-cause or peremptory challenges and reaffirmed the well-settled principle that the fair cross-section guarantee does not require that petit juries —as opposed to jury venires — reflect the composition of the community at large. Id. at —, 90 L.Ed. 2d at 147-48. See also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 42 L.Ed. 2d 690 (1975). The ultimate holding in Me Cray — that the use of peremptory challenges may constitute a violation of a defendant’s sixth amendment right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community — was emphatically rejected by the Supreme Court in *171McCree. This is clearly in accord with the holdings of the majority of courts which have addressed the issue that a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude minorities from the petit jury does not infringe upon the fair cross-section requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Whitfield, 715 F. 2d 145 (4th Cir. 1983); United States v. Childress, 715 F. 2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063, 79 L.Ed. 2d 202 (1984); Weathersby v. Morris, 708 F. 2d 1493 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1046, 79 L.Ed. 2d 181 (1984); Willis v. Zant, 720 F. 2d 1212 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1256, 82 L.Ed. 2d 849 (1984); Allen v. Hardy, 586 F. Supp. 103 (N.D. Ill. 1984); State v. Wiley, 144 Ariz. 525, 698 P. 2d 1244 (1985); Doepel v. United States, 434 A. 2d 449 (D.C. App.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1037, 70 L.Ed. 2d 483 (1981); Blackwell v. State, 248 Ga. 138, 281 S.E. 2d 599 (1981); People v. Williams, 97 Ill. 2d 252, 454 N.E. 2d 220 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 981, 80 L.Ed. 2d 836, reh’g denied, 467 U.S. 1268, 82 L.Ed. 2d 864 (1984); State v. Williams, 458 So. 2d 1315 (La. App. 1984), writ denied, 463 So. 2d 1317 (La. 1985); Nevius v. State, 101 Nev. 238, 699 P. 2d 1053 (1985); State v. Raymond, 446 A. 2d 743 (R.I. 1982).
Furthermore, I do not believe that article I, section 24 of the North Carolina Constitution should be interpreted in such a manner as to adopt the McCray-Wheeler-Soares cross-section analysis —the distinct minority view. I am of the opinion that the analysis employed in McCray, Wheeler, and Soares has the practical effect of extending the fair cross-section requirement to the petit jury. These cases acknowledge that the Supreme Court has never extended the fair cross-section requirement to the petit jury, but conclude that the requirement does guarantee a defendant a “fair chance” at such a jury. The sixth amendment and article I, section 24 of the North Carolina Constitution do guarantee a defendant a “fair chance” at a jury selected from a representative cross-section of the community. This right, however, is protected not by extension of the fair cross-section requirement to the petit jury, but through the effective protections afforded in the selection of the venire, the large number in the jury venire, and the limited peremptory challenges. Through these protections, both parties are accorded a fair opportunity to select an impartial and representative jury. The possibility that a prosecutor will systematically eliminate a defendant’s “fair chance” at a representative cross-section by systematically removing blacks or other racial *172minorities — McCray's ultimate concern — has been eliminated by the holding in Batson v. Kentucky, — U.S. —, 90 L.Ed. 2d 69 (1986), alluded to in the majority opinion.
This Court has never construed article I, section 24 of the North Carolina Constitution as extending the fair cross-section requirement to the petit jury. Several considerations counsel against doing so. First, because the venire is drawn from random lists, it is inevitable that there will be times when the list will include but a few members of a particular group. If the fair cross-section requirement were extended to the petit jury, the selection of individuals of that group to serve as jurors might be necessary. This process of individual selection would be fraught with the potential for abuse and the appearance of impropriety and partiality. Second, a requirement that the petit jury actually mirror the community would create an administrative nightmare. Third, assigning jurors as representatives of specific groups might influence the deliberative process by accentuating identifiable differences among jurors. Fourth, it is conceivable that a prospective juror who evidences an actual, specific bias could not be excluded if his removal would destroy the representative cross-section. See Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 Yale L.J. 1715 (1977).
For these reasons, I would vote to expressly reject the defendants’ argument under both the United States Constitution and the North Carolina Constitution.