Court Opinion

ID: 9884127
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:39:30.720693+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:35.786558
License: Public Domain

RANDALL, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority on issue one wherein they find that when a child witness found competent and available to testify is not called to the stand, it is plain error to admit her hearsay communications as substantive evidence. I agree with the majority that, absent the improperly admitted hearsay, there was insufficient evidence to sustain appellant’s conviction. There was not “other overwhelming evidence of guilt” here, and thus *601I agree with the majority’s conclusion that, due to clear error revolving around a constitution defect, relief for appellant is mandated. I further agree with the majority on its confrontation analysis and its Dana and Bellotti analysis. I also agree with the majority’s handling of issue three relating to the challenge to a juror for cause. However, I strongly disagree with the majority's conclusion that the relief called for is not reversal and remand for a new trial, but a pure remand to allow the trial court to reconsider and clarify an unappealed issue, namely the pretrial determination that the child witness was competent to testify. The majority mandates the trial court to “clarify” and “reenunciate” whether he had in mind Minn.Stat. § 595.02, subd. 3 when he ruled B.L.L. competent to testify.
It is hard to get a handle on what the majority is doing because I find no precedent in the State of Minnesota or elsewhere for a straight remand1 to a trial judge in a felony case to “clarify” a pretrial ruling that resulted in, as the majority and I agree, the later improper admission at trial of evidence that cannot be handled by the “harmless error” doctrine.
I emphasize that the trial court conducted a proper pretrial competency hearing pursuant to a timely request by one of the parties and found B.L.L. competent to testify (this competency hearing was held on August 30, 1988, and B.L.L. was five years and three months old). The state did not seek relief from that August 30th pretrial hearing and claim that the trial court had erroneously found her competent to testify, and that the ruling would have a critical impact on the trial. The state had that right at that time to challenge this pretrial competency ruling pursuant to the procedure open to them under Minn.R.Crim.P. 28.04. The state did not, and all applicable time limits on pretrial rulings by the state have long since expired.
Thus, the competency of B.L.L. to testify is not an issue in the process of analysis of this ease. She was ruled competent at a proper hearing timely motioned. The finding of competency was not appealed and is not before us. Arndt v. American Family Insurance Co., 394 N.W.2d 791, 793 (Minn.1986) (Minn.R.Civ.App.P. 106 bars consideration of issues not raised by filing notice of review); see also Minn.R.Crim.P. 28.01, subd. 2 (rules of civil appellate procedure apply in criminal cases except as otherwise provided). In fact, the majority relies on the trial court’s finding of competency to support its conclusion that the admission of B.L.L.’s hearsay statements was plain and substantial error! Yet, having said that, the majority goes on with strained reasoning to conclude that they found “what may be a flawed competency hearing.” The majority gives as its reason that they have “uncertainty as to the range of factors considered by the trial court when it answered the question, ‘Is B.L.L. competent?’ ” An examination of settled law on the criteria for the" competency of child witnesses discloses one, and only one, terse and succinct statute:
A child under ten years of age is a competent witness unless the court finds that the child lacks the capacity to remember or to relate truthfully facts respecting which the child is examined. A child describing any act or event may use language appropriate for a child of that age.
Minn.Stat. 595.02, subd. l(i).
The only factors a trial court can consider are the child’s ability to remember or relate truthfully facts on which the child is questioned. The August 30th finding of competency was not challenged by the prosecution before trial, is not challenged by the defendant in his postconviction appeal, and thus becomes the law of the case. The majority discusses § 595.02, subd. 1(Z), the controlling statute, in terms of “public policy” and the effect that testimonial circumstances might have on a witness. The majority’s citation of Minn.Stat. § 595.02, *602subd. 4 (1988) and Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Coy v. Iowa, — U.S. -, -, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 2805, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988) to suggest that public policy supports their “testimonial ramifications” tint on Minn.Stat. § 595.02, subd. 3 is out of context. Neither § 595.02, subd. 4 nor Justice O'Connor’s remarks in Coy address a competency determination. Both presume that the child witness has already been found competent and speak to whether or not the child witness may avoid a physical confrontation (e.g. courtroom shields, video taping, et cetera) with the accused during the child witness’s testimony.
The majority does not find that, although competency was not appealed, their review of the record establishes that B.L.L. lacked the capacity to remember and relate facts truthfully. Instead, the issue the majority wants addressed on remand is what would the trial court’s ruling on B.L.L.’s competency have been had the trial court realized that by finding B.L.L. competent the state could not have B.L.L.’s out-of-court statements admitted as substantive evidence unless B.L.L. testified at trial pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 595.02, subd. 3(b)(i). In plain English, the majority criticizes the trial court and remands for clarification because the trial court did not set out in its finding of competency that it had considered what possible trial tactics and what possible production of witnesses the defense and prosecution would have to explore depending on which way the trial court’s ruling on competency went. I suggest it is the job only of defense counsel and prosecutor to choose trial tactics, including the production of evidence and witnesses, that they deem in their best judgment to serve their client. It is not for a trial judge, faced with an important pretrial ruling, to consider whether the outcome may or may not harm the defendant’s case or the prosecution’s case. However, that is implicit in the criticism leveled by the majority at the trial court.
On types of issues that come up for pretrial rulings, e.g., suppression of evidence, admission of confessions, competency, a trial court’s only protection from outside pressure and criticism is the ability to decide the issue on the law and the facts. The majority cannot bypass or escape this issue. Their analysis boldly states that they want the trial court to demonstrate “its recognition of the impact of a finding of competency in light of Minn.Stat. § 595.02, subd. 3(b).” The majority further states:
It appears that the import of the ruling that B.L.L. was competent to testify was not fully explored by the trial court.
The majority’s remand is foreign to the simple dictates of the controlling statute § 595.02, subd. 1(1).
The majority attempts to rationalize a straight “remand” without a reversal by relying on State v. Burns, 394 N.W.2d 495, 497 (Minn.1986). Even a cursory reading of Burns discloses that the facts and holding of Burns are inapposite to this case. In Bums, the supreme court addressed the trial court’s failure to hold the requisite § 595.02 pretrial hearing concerning out-of-court statements by child sex abuse victims. The holding of Burns was that the defendant did not timely object to the lack of a hearing; and further that the record clearly contained enough evidence of guilt so that the lack of a hearing, coupled with the failure to object, was harmless error. The pure holding of Burns is that the lack of timely objection and a harmless error analysis combined to uphold a conviction. On our facts, a competency hearing was held. No one appealed the result of the hearing, and thus the finding of competency becomes the law of the case. In addition, the majority does not analyze this case on the basis that the improperly admitted statements were harmless error, but emphasize, as I do, that admitting the statements was clear and substantial error, as the other evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. The supreme court in Burns did not speak to what they would have done had they found the failure to conduct the pretrial hearing to be a constitutional defect, and that it could not be considered harmless error because the other evidence left could not sustain the conviction.
*603The majority attempts to slide under Burns by taking a statement from Burns which indicates that an award of a new trial is not necessary if some other lesser remedy would be more appropriate. Id. at 497. The Burns court set out two examples; State v. Causey, 257 N.W.2d 288 (Minn.1977) and Doan v. State, 290 Minn. 105, 186 N.W.2d 518 (1971). An examination of both cases indicates no applicability to the facts of this case. Causey involved a timely challenge to the propriety of a search warrant. The challenge was overruled by the trial court and the state was allowed to admit evidence discovered in the search. Based on this evidence, the defendant was convicted. On appeal, the defendant argued that his motion to suppress was erroneously denied. The appeal turned on the sufficiency and accuracy of affidavits submitted in support of the request for a warrant. The supreme court remanded the case to the trial court for a post-trial determination of the state of mind of the government agent who made misrepresentations in the affidavit supporting the warrant. Thus, in Causey, the issue of the trial court’s pretrial suppression order was properly before the court because an objection was noted to the admission of the evidence before trial, and the trial court’s ruling on the objection was appealed.
Here, we have a pretrial competency hearing, properly conducted, from which no appeal was taken by the state. Nevertheless, the majority sends this case back to the trial court to reconsider its competency ruling in light of factors not contained in the statute governing the competency of child witnesses.
The next case. which the Bums court mentioned in passing as indicating that a remand may be appropriate, depending on the facts, is Doan. Doan was a 1971 case that preceded the modern rules of criminal procedure (which took effect on July 1, 1975) which now control pretrial hearings on admission and suppression of evidence through Minn.R.Crim.P. 11. In Doan, despite defendant’s contention that his confessions resulted from coercion and intimidation by the investigating officers, defendant’s statements were received in evidence over timely objection. The issue in Doan was whether there had been the pre-modern rule of criminal procedure separate hearing on the issue of voluntariness. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). The supreme court simply found that based on the record and defendant's timely objection to the admission of his inculpatory statements that a question remained as to whether the Jackson standards had been fairly met. Thus, there was a remand to the trial court to ensure that the defendant’s confession had been voluntarily obtained. Again, the essential elements of Doan are that a timely objection to the admission of evidence was made, and the supreme court, not sure, that the proper pretrial hearing had been held, and, noting the timely objection, remanded for a full hearing on defendant’s contentions.
Although the analysis of both the majority and this dissent is complex, the majority’s decision is clear and crystalizes the problem. The majority found the appellant’s sixth amendment right to confront and cross-examine his accusers was violated. The majority finds that this constitutional defect could not be remedied by a harmless error analysis. The majority finds that with the suppression of the improperly admitted hearsay statements, the record is insufficient to support the conviction and thus the error is not harmless and mandates relief. But the relief granted is a remand for reconsideration of the child witness’s competency, and the majority premises that remand, not on the statute controlling how a trial court determines competency of child witnesses, but on a demand that the trial court second guess its pretrial ruling of competency based on the knowledge that should the competency ruling stand, he must grant appellant a new trial.
The majority tips off the trial judge that should he clarify the unappealed competency ruling made over one year ago (August 30, 1988) and now change his mind and rule himself in error and find that B.L.L. was incompetent, the conviction will stand be*604cause the dictates of § 595.02, subd. 3(b)(ii) will now be met. I believe such a remand is unprecedented and puts the trial judge in an untenable position. He is told that he has erred, not in finding B.L.L. competent, but in allowing her out-of-court statements to be heard by the jury when the state did not call her as a witness. He is then told that his error in allowing in those hearsay statements is clear and substantial error and will mandate a new trial for the defendant unless he reconsiders and clarifies that ruling of competency, and reverses himself on it. Assume the trial court, at the original August 30th hearing or on remand, finds B.L.L., pursuant to the controlling statute, able to relate and remember facts, but specifically enters a finding of incompetency so that the state can use her out-of-court statements as substantive evidence pursuant to § 595.02, subd. 3(b)(ii). The defendant has now been improperly denied access to a witness. (The defendant in a criminal case has as much right to subpoena the victim as a witness as does the prosecution.) The defense in this type of case might well hold off its final decision whether to subpoena the child to testify, if the state does not, depending on how it views the strengths of the state’s case, and other intangibles and subjective elements that are best left to the discretion of the trial attorney. Suppose, mid-trial, he now states as part of the defense case-in-chief an intention to subpoena the victim and the trial court says, “sorry, but you can’t, I ruled her incompetent.” The defense attorney says, “but on the statutory criteria of her ability to relate and remember, you found she had passed.” The trial court replies, “but now I am told I have to factor into the finding of competency a recognition that how I rule will affect the state’s production of proof.” This is precisely where the majority’s analysis is heading the trial court.
The majority’s decision creates a series of hydra-headed issues. First, if the trial court on remand clarifies the competency ruling, decides he was wrong, and rules B.L.L. retroactively incompetent, does the defendant have standing to appeal that? The defendant did not place the pretrial ruling of competency as an issue before this court as part of his post-trial appeal. Is the trial court’s “clarification” order ap-pealable?
Second, if, as I suspect might happen, the trial court sticks by its August 30 competency ruling that B.L.L. was able to relate and remember, and that he does not intend to factor into § 595.02, subd. 1(Z) how competency might affect the trial tactics of the prosecution and the defense, does the state now get another appeal to this court challenging the trial court’s clarification? I assume the trial judge felt he was right when he first ruled B.L.L. competent. I assume he applied only the criteria set out in the statute, I can think of none other that he could.
The concept of a trial court being asked to acknowledge (speculate) the effect of the evidence either side may have to produce, depending on a pretrial ruling, is dangerous when examined in the light of day. Trial decisions by attorneys as to what witnesses to call or to have on their witness list but not call can and may properly change from day to day and hour to hour in a trial. A defense attorney or a prosecutor may, at a pretrial hearing, honestly indicate a predisposition to put this witness or that defendant on the stand or to submit this document and not that one, and yet each attorney reserves an absolute right to change his mind depending on the progress of the trial to date. For example, in this case the state may have had an announced pretrial disposition not to call B.L.L. as a witness, even though they knew she was available. The state could have properly and honorably changed its mind and put her on the stand. The defendant may have had an announced honest pretrial disposition not to subpoena her has a witness if the state did not. The defense attorney could have properly changed his mind at trial and issued a subpoena for her attendance. The burden to a trial court at a pretrial hearing speculating as to what the import of ruling on any issue will do to a party’s trial tactics is so intolerable it should not be imposed. Trial judges should be allowed to make pretrial rulings without *605having to engage in such speculation, and let the correctness of those rulings be answered on appeal.
For all the above reasons, since I agree with the majority that there was clear and substantial error, I find the only honest solution is a reversal and a remand for a new trial.
The state still controls future production of witnesses and its ability to comply with the dictates of § 595.02. First of all, at the second trial, either party can appropriately request the trial court for a second pretrial competency hearing. B.L.L. was born On May 30,1983, and thus is now approximately six and one-half years old. At that age, emotional maturity and the mental capacity of child witnesses to remember and relate truthfully in their own language facts that happened to them may change from year to year and even over shorter spans. The fact that B.L.L. was ruled competent on August 30, 1988, is not res judicata as to a new hearing before a second trial. She is not, and never has been, adjudicated legally incompetent, and her competency at a second trial is only subject to the plain language of § 595.02, subd. 1(1').
Following the second competency hearing, the state has the controlling statute § 595.02 squarely in front of it. Should she again be found competent to testify, the state will be faced with the simple trial decision of whether to put her on the stand and comply with § 595.02, subd. 3(b)(i) or attempt to make its case against defendant without her out-of-court statements, but with whatever other admissible evidence it has. On the other hand, should she now be found incompetent to testify, the state can attempt to make its case in compliance with the dictates of § 595.02, subd. 3(b)(ii).
This, to me, is a better result and in compliance with an accused’s right to a fair trial and a fair appeal. With the majority’s analysis, there is not so subtle pressure on the trial court to clarify an unappealed pretrial competency hearing, and reverse itself knowing then that the conviction will stand. My analysis leads to a second trial where again an objective competency hearing could be requested, and, following that decision, each party is free to plan trial strategy and produce the witnesses it deems proper.
I strongly dissent and would reverse and remand for a new trial for all the reasons stated above.

. This is not a postconviction hearing. This is a straight appeal on claimed errors of law which is a defendant’s right in a criminal case. In a criminal case a defendant has no obligation to make post-trial motions to correct errors, as is required in a civil case, in order not to limit the appeal to sufficiency of the evidence.