Court Opinion

ID: 9746218
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:09:12.859635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:10.498089
License: Public Domain

RIDGELY, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully disagree that the plea agreement with Brown served as a representation of any kind to Linda Charbon-neau. To be sure, it put Charbonneau on notice that Brown might be called as a witness, but there was no legal requirement for the prosecutors to call him to the witness stand or even to prosecute him.71 Furthermore, with three co-defendants involved, there is nothing unusual about trying one before another who can still exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege. While the majority describes the prosecutors’ choice not to call Brown as a witness as a “18th hour decision,” the timing of that decision was relevant only to a defense application for a continuance of the trial, which was not made. The State did identify Brown as a potential witness in response to the trial judge’s inquiry for purposes of preparing voir dire of the jury array, but the State had no obligation to disclose who would actually be called.72 Neither did the defense.
I also disagree with the majority’s assessment that the trial judge endorsed any fact or that he removed a critical credibili*322ty determination from the jury. The trial judge’s statement that it would not be “natural” for the State to call Brown as a witness was made in the context of whether a missing witness instruction was required as a matter of law. This Court has held that policy considerations of the State’s privilege to refuse to disclose the identity of an informant under D.R.E. 509 justified the State’s failure to call an informant as a witness.73 Here, the policy considerations which preclude prosecutors from offering testimony they know to be false justified their failure to call Brown as a witness as a matter of law.74 Instead of removing a credibility determination from the jury, the trial judge allowed the credibility of the witnesses to be determined based upon fair cross-examination and evidence that would not be unfairly prejudicial to Linda Charbonneau.
I- dissent from the majority’s conclusion that “the trial judge’s denial of the motion in limine fatally undermined the fairness of the trial.”75 To the contrary, the trial judge’s ruling under DRE 403 that Brown’s plea agreement and proffer was not admissible as substantive evidence was designed to protect Charbonneau’s right to a fair trial. Brown’s full proffer, which would not have been subject to cross-examination, inculpated Charbonneau directly in the murders. It specifically accused her of killing John Charbonneau and of being an accomplice to the murder of Sproates. The trial judge’s ruling under D.R.E. 403 was grounded upon precedent of this Court, which upheld the exclusion of a co-defendant’s guilty plea to avoid unfair prejudice to the defendant on trial. In Johnson v. State76 this Court said:
The standard for admission of a codefen-dant’s guilty plea is governed by Delaware Rule of Evidence 403, which states in part that “evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice...” D.R.E. 403. Determining whether the probative value of a particular piece of evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice is a matter that falls particularly within the discretion of the Superior Court, which has the first-hand opportunity to evaluate relevant factors. Lynch v. State, Del.Supr., 588 A.2d 1138, 1141 (1991); Williams v. State, Del Supr., 494 A.2d 1237, 1241 (1985). The Superior Court has broad discretion to admit or reject evidence, and absent an abuse of that broad discretion, the Superior Court’s ruling will be upheld by this Court. Diaz v. State, Del.Supr., 508 A.2d 861, 865 (1986).
Relying on precedents from other jurisdictions, the Superior Court concluded that, even though Johnson was arguing for the admission of Burgos’ guilty plea, the prejudicial effect to Johnson of admitting the evidence substantially outweighed its probative value, especially since Burgos did not testify at trial. (emphasis added). See United States v. McLain, 823 F.2d 1457, 1464-65 (11th Cir.1987) (holding that, in most cases, the admission of a codefendant’s guilty plea will substantially affect the defen*323dant’s right to a fair trial because the jury may regard the issue of the defendant’s guilt or innocence as settled); State v. Parente, 460 A.2d 480, 435 (R.I.1983) (recognizing that “evidence of a codefendant’s guilty plea is amenable to misuse”); State v. Stefanelli 78 N.J. 418, 396 A.2d 1105, 1111-12 (1979) (same). The record in this case indicates that the Superior Court carefully considered arguments for and against the admission of Burgos’ guilty plea. The record does not reflect that Superi- or Court abused its discretion in denying Johnson’s request to introduce evidence of Burgos’ guilty plea.77
If a co-defendant’s guilty plea may be excluded under D.R.E. 403, after careful consideration, so also may a proffer of the co-defendant which he made in conjunction with that guilty plea, provided its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
While the majority reverses the convictions because of the impeachment value of Brown’s plea agreement and proffer, the record shows that the trial judge left the door open for the use of Brown’s proffer in the cross-examination of Mellisa Rucinski. A trial judge is not required to make evi-dentiary rulings in advance of trial but rather, in his discretion, may defer a ruling on an evidentiary issue until the evidence is actually offered.78 Here the trial judge said:
The scope, depth, and limitations of cross-examination of Mellisa Rucinski will be determined at the time she is called to the stand, and the defense will have to show the connection of bias, interest and prejudice between whatever Brown said or accused in Rueinski’s testimony, and I will make a decision at that time on those points.79
During cross-examination of Mellisa Ru-cinski the defense did not seek to introduce Brown’s plea agreement or proffer.80 The record does not reveal why. Perhaps they recognized a better alternative.81 In any event, the defense successfully executed their strategy the majority says the trial judge prevented. The defense proved through the intrinsic evidence of Rucin-ski’s own testimony and her writings that she and Brown could not agree on the details of their own involvement in the murders. Rucinski wrote six pages of comments disputing Brown’s proffer. She was cross-examined about her comments and her writing was introduced as a defense exhibit during that cross-examination.82 She acknowledged that she went through what Brown said in detail and that *324he did not tell the truth.83 Brown’s accusation of her involvement in the Sproates murder was the subject of direct inquiry by the defense over the objection of the State:
Q. In fact, he [Brown] said you were in Magnolia with him when Billy Sproates was killed?
MS. RYAN: Objection
THE COURT: Overruled.
You can answer that question.
BY MR. KARSNITZ:
Q. That’s what he said?
A. Yes.
Q. Apparently, he didn’t take your advice to tell the truth?
A. No.84
Not only did defense counsel elicit testimony from Rueinski that Brown had lied, he skillfully obtained her admission that she had lied all four times she had an opportunity to speak about the case.85 Defense counsel had the opportunity to do what they told the trial judge they wanted to do, namely “to use certain statements made in the plea and proffer to test Ms. Rucinski’s possible bias and credibility.”86 It is undisputed that the defense was not “seeking to have Mr. Brown’s plea and proffer admitted to show the truth of what is said therein.”87 Since defense counsel carefully selected the portions of Brown’s proffer that they wanted to use in cross-examining Rueinski, I find no abuse of discretion in keeping the balance of Brown’s proffer from the jury’s consideration. Given the cross-examination which happened, the probative value of the proffer to further show Mellisa’s bias was slight and the potential unfair prejudice to Linda Char-bonneau was real. The record shows that the jury was fully aware that Brown and Rucinski’s statements were replete with inconsistencies and that Brown accused Rueinski of being involved in the Sproates killing. The foundation for an argument that Rueinski had a motive to lie because of Brown’s accusation was in front of the jury. What the jury did not know, because of the trial judge’s ruling, is that Brown accused Linda Charbonneau of killing John Charbonneau.
The trial judge carefully balanced the probative value of admitting the plea agreement and written proffer against the danger of unfair prejudice to Linda Char-bonneau. Ultimately, the trial judge permitted the defense to cross examine Rucin-ski, as they wanted, on the portions of Brown’s proffer they selected. I cannot say that the trial judge’s decision to exclude the balance of Brown’s plea and proffer under these circumstances exceeded the bounds of reason. Because the trial judge’s choices were matters within his broad discretion, I find no reversible error.
I respectfully dissent.

. Seth v. State, 592 A.2d 436, 439 (Del.1991) ("In the exercise of his [or her] official powers, the Attorney General has discretion in determining who shall be prosecuted and in what manner that prosecution shall take place.”).

. Liket v. State, 719 A.2d 935, 937-938 (Del.1998).

. Wheatley v. State, 465 A.2d 1110, 1112 (Del.1983).

. See DELAWARE LAWYERS RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, RULE 3.3 (A lawyer shall not knowingly offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.). While the prosecutors believed, based upon the investigation, that Brown would lie about Rucinski's involvement in the Sproates killing, there was no representation that they knew Mellisa Ru-cinski would testify falsely.

. See supra p. 4.

. Del.Supr., 604 A.2d 417, 1991 Del. LEXIS 403 (Order).

. Id.

. Dawson v. State, 581 A.2d 1078, 1087 (Del.1990).

. A-156. (emphasis added).

. The cross-examination and re-cross-examination of Mellisa Rucinski is reported in 128 pages of transcript. A-281 to A-401 and A-442 to A-450. There were two objections by the State relating to Brown’s proffer. The first objection was withdrawn when the prosecutor realized defense counsel was not offering Brown’s proffer but Mellisa’s comments on Brown’s proffer into evidence. A-321. The second objection by the State was overruled when defense counsel questioned Melli-sa Rucinski about Brown’s claim that Rucin-ski was with him when Sproates was killed. A-442.

. If the State had introduced Brown’s plea agreement and proffer, a reversal of Charbon-neau’s conviction would be required. See Allen v. State, 878 A.2d 447 (Del.2005). The challenges to defense counsel of defending during a post-conviction relief proceeding a tactic of introducing inculpatory evidence that the jury could use to convict their own client is self-evident.

. DX-2.

. A-442.

. A-442.

. A-362. Although damaging, this evidence did not preclude the jury from accepting Ru-cinski’s trial testimony about Linda Charbon-neau’s involvement as an accomplice.

. A-125. (emphasis added).

. Id.