Court Opinion

ID: 9793936
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:55:21.916178+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:08:15.181868
License: Public Domain

SIMMS, Judge
(special concurring opinion) :
The primary thrust of Kirby v. Illinois, supra, cited by Judge Brett in his opinion, is that an accused’s constitutional right to counsel does not attach during pre-indictment proceedings, and defendant Kirby was not, therefore, entitled to counsel during a pre-indictment line-up identification.
It is my understanding that defendant Hill’s principal assertion of error is that the State, during its case in chief, introduced evidence of an extra-judicial identification of defendant over objection.
In this connection, referring again to Kirby v. Illinois, supra, the victim of the robbery, Shard, testified during trial of his identification of Kirby at. the police station, prior to there being any indictment filed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the conviction holding the admission of this testimony was not error. This finding was left undisturbed by the United States Supreme Court, as Judge Brett points out.
In Oklahoma, it has been well established that:
“It is error for the State to introduce into evidence, in the presence of the jury, the facts and circumstances surrounding a pre-trial identification of the defendant.”
Davis v. State, Okl.Cr., 467 P.2d 521, 522 (1970). Testimony brought out by the prosecution in chief of an extra-judicial identification or pre-trial line-up identifica*1078tion of defendant is inadmissible and constitutes reversible error. Gillespie v. State, Okl.Cr., 355 P.2d 451 (1960); Cothrum v. State, Okl.Cr., 379 P.2d 860 (1963). This is error notwithstanding a non-jury hearing concerning the validity of a line-up required by United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967); Jernigan v. State, Okl.Cr., 485 P.2d 778, 781 (1971).
In Cothrum, supra, Judge Nix, recognized that Oklahoma was in the minority with regard to the admissibility of extrajudicial identification evidence. Judge Nix also pointed out both the state and the defendant, in Cothrum, urged Oklahoma adoption of the majority position:
“When identification of any person is in issue, a witness who has on previous occasion identified such person may testify to such previous identifications.”
Initially, we feel most strongly that testimony of a victim concerning a pretrial identification is not only material, but most competent for corroboration. It has been recognized that prior identification of an accused is more reliable than a later courtroom identification for the reason that it is closer to the crime in point of time, thus affording less opportunity for fading or deterioration of the victim’s memory or changes in the accused’s appearance.
Further, it cannot be said that the defendant would be precluded from showing, or proving, that the victim was unable to identify the defendant as the perpetrator at some previous trial confrontation, therefore, the state should have the same opportunity. The sword, if you will, of prior extra-judicial identification must cut both ways.
This is not to say the entire gamut of extra-judicial identification activity is open and available to the prosecution. In our view, competent original testimony of the identifier, AFTER, and only after, the in-court identification has been made in such fashion as to satisfy the requirements of Wade and Thompson v. State, Okl.Cr., 438 P.2d 287, would include testimony to the effect that the identifier at a particular day, place, and time or times, had occasion to see, recognize and identify the defendant as the person who committed the crime.
Such testimony should not include all of the minute details and possible prejudicial circumstances under which the identification was made. This matter is reserved for cross-examination, the pre-identification evidentiary hearing and rebuttal. Such testimony should also, as we indicated above, be limited to the identifier and should not be extended to any third persons present at the identification. The testimony of third persons again should be relegated to rebuttal and evidentiary hearing status.
What we feel is the better and most acceptable view with regard to such identification testimony is that set out in People v. Gould, 54 Cal.2d 611, 7 Cal.Rptr. 273, 354 P.2d 865 (1960) wherein Justice Traynor wrote for a unanimous Court:
“Evidence of an extra-judicial identification is admissible, not only to corroborate an identification made at the trial [citation omitted], but as independent evidence of identity. Unlike other testimony that cannot be corroborated by proof of prior consistent statements unless it is first impeached [citations omitted], evidence of an extra-judicial identification is admitted regardless of whether the testimonial identification is impeached, because the earlier identification has greater probative value than an identification made in the courtroom after the suggestions of others and the circumstances of the trial may have intervened to create a fancied recognition in the witness’ mind, [citations omitted] The failure of the witness to repeat the extra-judicial identification in court does not destroy its probative value, for such failure may be explained by loss of memory or other circumstances. The extra-judicial identification tends to connect the defendant with the crime, and-*1079the principal danger of admitting hearsay evidence is not present since the witness is available at the trial for cross-examination, [citations omitted].”
The Gould rationale is still being followed (State v. Jiron, 27 Utah 2d 21, 492 P.2d 983 [1972]), and has never been overruled. The same, or similar, reasoning has been applied by Federal Courts and has been made the subject of statute elsewhere. See Clemons v. United States, 133 U.S. App.D.C. 27, 408 F.2d 1230 (1968) and N. Y.Code Crim.Proc., § 393-b.
For the reasons herein stated, we would affirm the findings of the trial court on Post-Conviction Appeal, and further, insofar as they are inconsistent with this opinion, would overrule Davis, Gillespie, Coth-rum, and Jernigan, supra.
BUSSEY, Presiding Judge.
I concur in the results of Judge Brett’s opinion for the reasons stated in Judge Simms’ Special Concurrence, and agree that insofar as Davis v. State, Okl.Cr., 467 P.2d S21; Gillespie v. State, Okl.Cr., 355 P.2d 451; Cothrum v. State, Okl.Cr., 379 P.2d 860; and Jernigan v. State, Okl.Cr., 485 P.2d 778, are inconsistent with this opinion, they are expressly overruled.