Court Opinion

ID: 9853109
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:42:44.682465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:40.976313
License: Public Domain

BLACKBURN, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
Because the disparaging use of the word “bastard” to provoke a police officer has previously been determined to support a jury conviction for disorderly conduct in Georgia, we must either find that the evidence in this case was sufficient to support the jury’s conviction of John Turner for this offense or overrule our previous holding. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.
In Bolden v. State,1 we explicitly held that the word “bastard” may be included in those considered to be fighting words. In that case, we affirmed the defendant’s conviction for disorderly conduct based on evidence that she called a police officer a “son of a bitch,” “mother fucker,” “pig,” “mother-fucking pig,” and a “bastard.”
In reaching this holding, we explained:
While the United States Supreme Court has limited abusive and obscene language prohibition to “fighting words,” and defines them as “words which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace,” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,2 this test has not been interpreted to mean that the state must prove the effect of the words upon a particular individual; that is, whether the individual to whom the words were addressed was incited to action by their utterance. [OCGA § 16-11-39] makes no distinction between the types of persons to whom the words *735are uttered. The fact that a policeman admits that he is used to hearing obscene language during the performance of his duties is not a defense available to the defendant under this code section. The jury is only required to determine that the words uttered were those, “which as a matter of common knowledge and under ordinary circumstances will, when used to or of another person in his presence,” naturally tend to provoke a violent response.
Bolden, supra at 316 (2).
In this case, while Officer Bruce was ticketing a motorist on the side of the road, Turner drove by and yelled a fighting word at him for no reason other than to provoke him. In response, Officer Bruce left the motorist he pulled over, who had commented on Turner’s conduct, chased Turner, and arrested him for disorderly conduct. In Evans v. State,3 we held that “[t]he jury is required only to determine that the words uttered would, as a matter of common knowledge, actually tend to provoke a violent response” (affirming the defendant’s conviction for disorderly conduct). Under these facts, the jury properly “found that the words [Turner] used were likely to provoke violence in the mind of [Officer Bruce],” Anderson v. State4 (affirming defendant’s conviction for disorderly conduct based on evidence that she told the sheriff that he was a “ ‘no-good son of a bitch’ ” and she would “kick his ‘ass’ ”). Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. See Person v. State5 (affirming defendant’s conviction for disorderly conduct for screaming at officer, “I’m not going to any g_d_n jail and I’m not wearing any mother-f_g handcuffs”) (punctuation omitted).
Moreover, Turner’s conviction in this case supports the underlying legislative purpose of our disorderly conduct law. That purpose is “to curtail criminal activity before it escalates into or causes immediate acts of actual violence.” Anderson, supra. The action taken by Turner in this case is of a type that engenders violent road rage and could jeopardize not only the safety of the speaker and the victim, but every other driver sharing the road with them. As such, reversing Turner’s conviction would undermine the statutory purpose of OCGA § 16-11-39.
For all of the above reasons, Turner’s conviction for disorderly conduct must be affirmed.
*736The arguments and cases raised by the majority do not require a different result. As an initial matter, the majority’s holding would require a reversal or disapproval of Bolden, supra.
Furthermore, although the majority cites Brooks v. State,6 this case supports Turner’s conviction. Brooks holds:
[W]e find that pointing to Officer Glasgow and yelling to a large crowd of 150 to 200 people that “(t)his man here is a dog” is the type of language commonly called “fighting words” which “naturally tend to provoke violent resentment.” See in this regard Johnson v. State,7 where we held that appellant’s loud and abusive use of obscene and insulting language to a policewoman, thereby attracting a crowd of people, constituted “fighting words.” Our conclusion is supported by Cantwell v. Connecticut,8 in which the United States Supreme Court held: “Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that instrument.”
Id.
The majority also cites Tucker v. State 9 Like Brooks, however, Tucker supports Turner’s conviction. In Tucker we held:
There is sufficient evidence in the instant case to find Tucker guilty of disorderly conduct under OCGA § 16-11-39 (a) (3). While seated at a crowded bar, Tucker, in a loud and boisterous voice, thrust obscenities upon innocent bystanders. He called women in the bar “f — ing c-ts” in conjunction with stating that the women could not prevent him from saying what he wanted to say. He utilized the phrase “f— you” several times, and became hostile and argumentative when Deputy Hodge asked him to calm down. Given these surrounding circumstances, Tucker’s response to Grayborn that he could say whatever the “f — ” he wanted to say could constitute “fighting words” in accordance with OCGA § 16-11-39 (a) (3). Tucker’s abusive and opprobrious words not only tended to provoke violent resentment, but in fact provoked Grayborn such that he was preparing to physically *737escort Tucker from the bar, and in Grayborn’s words, “slap the taste out of his mouth.”
Id.
As in both Brooks and Tucker, this case involves a defendant yelling a “fighting word” at a police officer who, in turn, reacts, approaches the defendant, and effects the defendant’s arrest. Both cases clearly, therefore, support Turner’s conviction.
The majority also relies on Lundgren v. State,10 but that case is wholly distinguishable from the present matter. In Lundgren, the defendant, in an intoxicated state, rudely commented on the breasts of a female EMT who was assisting him. In reversing the defendant’s conviction for disorderly conduct, we explained:
The remarks at issue, although certainly rude, crude, and socially unacceptable, were not “sufficiently belligerent to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” City of Macon v. Smith; 11 compare Johnson v. State, [supra]. While we do not condone these remarks, they cannot fairly be characterized as “fighting words” in the circumstances and context in which they were said. Therefore, Lundgren’s conviction cannot stand.
(Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 427.
In this case, on the other hand, Turner screamed a fighting word at Officer Bruce in a nonconversational tone which the jury could have inferred was confrontational and aggressive given the context and circumstances of the incident. As such, the jury was authorized to convict Turner of disorderly conduct.
Finally, the majority includes dicta contained in Cunningham v. State12 as support for its conclusion. Cunningham, however, involved the constitutional review of a Georgia statute prohibiting motorists from placing bumper stickers on their cars which contained profane or lewd words describing sexual acts, excretory functions, or parts of the human body. As such, Cunningham is distinguishable from the matter at hand.
We must affirm this conviction.
*738Decided July 6, 2005
Reconsideration denied July 28, 2005
Billy L. Spruell, for appellant.
Jerry Rylee, Solicitor-General, Larry A. Baldwin II, Assistant Solicitor-General, for appellee.

 Bolden v. State, 148 Ga. App. 315, 316 (4) (251 SE2d 165) (1978).

 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (62 SC 766, 86 LE 1031) (1942).

 Evans v. State, 188 Ga. App. 347 (1) (373 SE2d 52) (1988).

 Anderson v. State, 231 Ga. App. 807, 809 (1) (499 SE2d 717) (1998).

 Person v. State, 206 Ga. App. 324, 325 (1) (425 SE2d 371) (1992).

 Brooks v. State, 166 Ga. App. 704, 705 (305 SE2d 436) (1983).

 Johnson v. State, 143 Ga. App. 826 (240 SE2d 207) (1977).

 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 309-310 (60 SC 900, 84 LE 1213) (1940).

 Tucker v. State, 233 Ga. App. 314, 317 (2) (504 SE2d 250) (1998).

 Lundgren v. State, 238 Ga. App. 425 (518 SE2d 908) (1999).

 City of Macon v. Smith, 244 Ga. 157, 159 (259 SE2d 90) (1979).

 Cunningham v. State, 260 Ga. 827 (400 SE2d 916) (1991).