Court Opinion

ID: 9559650
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:32:54.912859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:27.632281
License: Public Domain

LUMPKIN, Vice-Presiding Judge:
concur in part/dissent in part
I concur in the results reached by the Court in this case, however, I must dissent to the Court’s attempt to create a trial procedure which disregards the Code óf Judicial Conduct and the rights of parties to a lawsuit.
The Court seeks to create a rule which would preclude the problems which developed at trial in this case. However, the proposal neither creates incentive for compliance, nor enforcement if there is failure to comply. In addition, the Court disregards the provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 5 O.S. 1981, Ch. 1, App. 4, and the tenuous ethical position in which the trial judge would be placed by the suggested procedure. Canon 3.A (4) states:
A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to law, and, except as authorized by law, neither initiate nor consider ex parte or other communications concerning a pending or impending proceeding. A judge, however, may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the law applicable to a proceeding before him if he gives notice to the parties of the person consulted and the substance of the advice, and affords the parties reasonable opportunity to respond, (emphasis added)
In addition, Canon 2 provides that a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities. This proposed ex parte procedure will create the appearance of impropriety in the eyes of the average citizen due to the secretive nature of the hearing.
Often problems of joinder are subject to being reconciled through the formulation of trial procedure, redacting of statements, and other trial management tools. Ex parte proceedings create an ethical quagmire for the trial judge and should be abhorred, not promoted, by this Court. If an ex parte hearing is conducted, how does *1339the trial judge then determine if any conflicts can be resolved? As we have seen, too often defense counsel incorrectly view “inconsistent” defenses as “mutually antagonistic” defenses. This problem is compounded by the Court’s incorrect statement in the proposed procedure which states that defense counsel must only show to the trial judge “that defendants will be prejudiced by joinder at trial”. That is not the standard for determining if mutually antagonistic defenses exist. The trial court must be afforded the ability to determine the true nature of the defense without being placed in the untenable position of being both inquisitor and judge. This does not mean the defense must disclose trial strategy, but disclosure must be made of sufficient evidence which will be presented at trial to allow the trial judge to determine if the defense is a “mutually antagonistic defense” which precludes a joint trial. The adversarial process ensures these issues are addressed openly by the parties who are familiar with their case and the trial judge maintains the appropriate judicial position of objective, unbiased adjudicator of the legal issues presented. The procedure suggested by the Court further clouds the issue and does not provide a definitive, enforceable procedure which will work to alleviate the type of situation which occurred in this case. I must therefore dissent to its adoption.