Court Opinion

ID: 9446679
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 22:16:06.058676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:44.651472
License: Public Domain

On Petition of Appellant for Rehearing.
PER CURIAM.
The rehearing sought by the appellant is directed at our agreement with the trial court’s retention from the jury of any knowledge of the receipt by the appellee of workmen’s compensation paid by his employer, Bouligny.
The first point is that, as the remanding opinion of the Supreme Court made a jury question of the issue of whether the work let to Bouligny was a part of the appellant’s trade or business, seemingly the coverage of appellee by Bouligny in compliance with The South Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Law, and the appellee’s acquiescence therein, are facts material to this issue. 1952 Code, § 72-1 et seq. On this point we stand by our prior conclusion.
Payment and receipt of compensation were neither evidential of the scope of appellant’s activities. Whether or not the job was within appellant’s usual enterprises, Bouligny was obligated, or certainly well advised, under the State Act to afford compensation to the appellee as its employee. 1952 Code, § 72-118. Likewise, the latter’s acceptance did not commit him to the view that appellant was the general contractor as well as the owner, for he still would profit by any recovery against appellant in excess of the compensation. 1952 Code, § 72-125.
Not previously raised in the case, the other point now made in the petition is that, inasmuch as appellee’s acceptance of compensation automatically, under the State statute, assigned any right of action for his injuries to his employer, the suit cannot be maintained without a showing that the appellee primarily sues for the benefit of Bouligny, and this can be done only by proof of the provision and payment of compensation by Bouligny. Without this proof, appellant contends, it might be subjected to another action by the statutory assignee. 1952 Code, § 72-124.
 We, too, think the record ought to show Bouligny to be a use-plaintiff, but we still think this interest is not now relevant to the jury issue. Therefore, the evidence should be admitted before the trial judge only, without disclosure to the jury, unless controverted or unless *695some other basis for its admission develops in the trial, such as its pertinency to credibility of witnesses, or otherwise, as in Sprinkle v. Davis, 4 Cir., 111 F.2d 925, 931, 128 A.L.R. 1101. In the last event, the amount of the compensation must be kept from the jury, the irrelevance or limited relevance of the compensation award to a present recovery should be explained to them, and the purpose of the evidence strictly confined in argument as well as sharply circumscribed in the charge. Cf. 1952 Code, § 72-127.
An order will be entered remanding the case for a new trial in accordance with the original opinion as now modified.