Court Opinion

ID: 9397133
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-24 16:09:14.597929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:21.840252
License: Public Domain

J-S08014-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    MICHAEL DWAIN MATHEW                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 270 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 1, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-21-CR-0000603-2020

BEFORE:       OLSON, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                       FILED: MAY 24, 2023

        Appellant, Michael Dwain Mathew, appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered on February 1, 2022, following his jury trial conviction for

failure to comply with registration requirements, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.2. We

affirm.

        The trial court summarized the facts and procedural history of this case

as follows:

        [Appellant] was convicted in Oregon on November 19, 1993, for
        an offense [of sexual abuse1] that occurred on or about August 8,
____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1  Upon our review of the record, Appellant was convicted of first-degree
sodomy in Oregon in 1993.         The equivalent crime in Pennsylvania is
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123. SORNA classifies
offenders and their offenses into three tiers. Commonwealth v. Lacombe,
234 A.3d 602, 611 (Pa. 2020), citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.14. Involuntary
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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       1993.      He committed his Oregon offense prior to this
       Commonwealth’s enactment of [the Sex Offender Registration and
       Notification Act (SORNA)]. However, he was required to register
       in Oregon as a sex offender in accordance with Oregon Law before
       he moved to Pennsylvania in 2009.

       On or about June 1, 2009, [Appellant] relocated to Pennsylvania.
       Due to his Oregon conviction, he [was] required to register as a
       lifetime sexual offender with the Pennsylvania State Police under
       Pennsylvania’s sexual offender registration law.[2] He completed
       his initial registration with [the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP)]
       at that time. As part of his initial registration, he executed
       [r]egistration forms acknowledging that he was required to
       register as a sex offender, that he had to report changes of
       address within three (3) business days, and that failure to provide
       such information when registering would subject him to arrest and
       felony prosecution pursuant to [] 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.2. Since
       that time, he registered every year, up to and including October
       23, 2019.

       In 2019, [Appellant] was under Perry County supervision for
       unrelated offenses. He was required to report changes of address
       as [a condition of that] supervision. On December 3, 2019, he
       contacted his Perry County Probation Officer to report that his
       house burned down. He told his [probation officer] that he had
       moved from [a residence on] Clay Street [] to [] North 18th Street
       [in] Harrisburg[, Pennsylvania]. His [probation officer] advised
       him that he also needed to update his address with PSP [for
       compliance with sexual offender reporting requirements].

       On February 5, 2020, [PSP] generated an investigation request
       and [forwarded] it to the East Pennsboro Township Police
       Department, asking that it investigate whether [Appellant] was [in
____________________________________________

deviate sexual intercourse is a tier III offense, subject to lifetime sex offender
registration. Id. at 613. Appellant does not dispute this determination.

2 Because Appellant was a sex offender registrant in Oregon in 2009 when he
relocated to Pennsylvania, he was also required to register as a sex offender
in Pennsylvania. See T.P.B. v. Pennsylvania State Police, 264 A.3d 828
(Cmwlth. Ct. 2021), affirmed sub nom., T.P.B. v. Pennsylvania State
Police, Megan's L. Section, 278 A.3d 843 (Pa. 2022) citing former 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9795.2(b)(4)(iii)-(v) (effective Jan. 1, 2007 through Feb. 20,
2012).

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       compliance] with his sexual offender reporting requirements. His
       last reported address to the PSP [] was [] Clay Street [] which is
       under East Pennsboro’s jurisdiction. At some point the same day,
       [Appellant] reported in-person to [PSP] and again signed an
       acknowledgment of his SORNA obligations. At that time, he also
       reported a change of address stating that on February 4, 2020, he
       moved to [] Executive Park Drive, Harrisburg[, Pennsylvania.]

       [A police officer from] the East Pennsboro Police Department
       investigated [the] report from [PSP]. He found that the Clay
       Street residence [] burned down on November 12, 2019. It was
       no longer a viable residence after the fire. [Appellant] did not
       report his new address to PSP until February 5, 2020. Based upon
       that information, [Appellant was charged] with [failure to comply
       with registration requirements].

Trial Court Opinion, 6/28/2022, at 1-3 (footnotes and record citations

omitted).     On November 2, 2021, a jury convicted Appellant of the

aforementioned crime.         On February 1, 2022, the trial court sentenced

Appellant to 31 to 62 months of imprisonment. This timely appeal resulted.3
____________________________________________

3  Appellant filed a notice of appeal on February 14, 2022. After transcripts
from trial were filed, the trial court directed Appellant to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
by an order entered on March 28, 2022. Appellant complied timely on April
18, 2022. On June 28, 2022, the trial court filed an opinion pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

On December 20, 2022, Appellant filed a pro se application with this Court
requesting the appointment of substitute counsel from outside of the Public
Defender’s Office. Appellant averred that he had no contact with appointed
counsel since February 2022. Because appointed counsel filed an appellate
brief on behalf of Appellant, it was clear that counsel had not abandoned
Appellant. Accordingly, on December 28, 2022, we entered an order denying
Appellant’s request for substitute counsel and directing counsel of record to
advise Appellant in writing regarding the status of his appeal and to file a copy
of said correspondence with this Court within 14 days. To date, counsel has
not responded to this Court’s order.

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       On appeal, Appellant presents the following issue for our review:

       I.     Was the evidence sufficient to establish [the] requisite mens
              rea that Appellant “knowingly” failed to comply with SORNA
              registration requirements?

Appellant’s Brief at 7.

       Appellant acknowledges that he “was in technical violation” of his

obligation to comply with registration requirements when he “reported [his]

most recent address to the PSP several months after a fire destroyed his last

reported home[.]” Id. at 13; see also id. at 15 (“Acknowledged, technically,

[Appellant] violated the SORNA registration requirements.”).           Appellant

____________________________________________

“It is well settled that an indigent is entitled to free counsel, but not to free
counsel of his choice.” Commonwealth v. Person, 498 A.2d 432, 436 (Pa.
Super. 1985) (citations omitted). “Although the right to counsel is absolute,
there is no absolute right to a particular counsel.” Id. (citations omitted).
Moreover, our Supreme Court has recognized:

       Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 122(C) provides “[a]
       motion for change of counsel by a defendant for whom counsel
       has been appointed shall not be granted except for substantial
       reasons.” Pa.R.Crim.P 122(C). To satisfy this standard, a
       defendant must demonstrate he has an irreconcilable difference
       with counsel that precludes counsel from representing him.
       Commonwealth v. Spotz, 756 A.2d 1139, 1150 (Pa. 2000),
       citing Commonwealth v. Tyler, 360 A.2d 617, 619 (Pa. 1976).

Commonwealth v. Wright, 961 A.2d 119, 134 (Pa. 2008). The decision
whether to appoint new counsel is discretionary. Id. (citation omitted).

Here, we denied Appellant’s application for relief since he had not
demonstrated that he had an irreconcilable difference with counsel that
precluded counsel from representing him. Indeed, counsel filed an appellate
brief with this Court arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support
Appellant’s conviction. However, we certainly do not condone counsel’s
inattention to this Court’s subsequent directives.

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asserts that he was “transient” and moved from place to place in the months

following the complete loss of his residence and all his belongings, but

“concede[s] that homelessness or transience is not a defense to violating

SORNA.” Id. at 13-14. Appellant recognizes that “[h]e should have reported

the moves within [a] certain allotted time, but [contends he] had no means

of registering in person at a PSP barracks, as required by SORNA” because he

sold his car.    Id. at 13.    Appellant further recognizes that he updated his

probation officer about his change of residency, albeit well after the three-day

period   for    notifying   PSP   under    SORNA’s   sex   offender   registration

requirements, but also asserts that his probation officer “made no effort to

assist him in complying with the law[.]” Id.      Instead, Appellant argues that

the Commonwealth failed to prove that he “knowingly” violated the law. Id.

at 16. “To put it another way,” Appellant posits that “he acted within the spirit

of the law.” Id. (emphasis in original). Appellant claims that he “made []

best effort[s] to report to [PSP and] did not attempt to absolutely avoid

registering[.]” Id. at 23. Appellant suggests he “is a victim of circumstances,

and those circumstances, temporarily, led to his noncompliance.” Id. at 24

(emphasis in original).       Finally, Appellant points out that he “successfully

complied with the law during the [prior] 10 years[.]” Id. at 25. Accordingly,

Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction

for failure to comply with registration requirements. Id. at 29.

      This Court has recently determined:

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     When reviewing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, we face a
     question of law. Accordingly, our standard of review is de novo.
     We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
     Commonwealth, as the verdict winner, and we draw all reasonable
     inferences therefrom in the Commonwealth's favor. Through this
     lens, we must ascertain whether the Commonwealth proved all of
     the elements of the crime at issue beyond a reasonable doubt.

     The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every
     element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of
     wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, we may not weigh the
     evidence and substitute our judgment for the factfinder.     Any
     doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the
     factfinder, unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that,
     as a matter of law, no probability of fact may be drawn from the
     combined circumstances. Critically, the jury, when ruling on the
     credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
     is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.

     As for the substantive law, [we have explained above that] SORNA
     assigns registration requirements of varying durations to
     convicted sexual offenders. The statute ties the length of an
     offender's registration period to the severity and number of
     underlying crimes for which the offender has been convicted. See
     Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.55 (imposing ten-year-registration and lifetime-
     registration requirements for various offenders).

     […Registrants] “shall provide the Pennsylvania State Police with
     all current or intended residences, all information concerning
     current or intended employment, and all information concerning
     current or intended enrollment as a student.” 42 Pa.C.S.A.
     § 9799.56(a)(1)(iii).

     Furthermore, sexual offenders [who are subject to registration
     requirements]:

       shall inform the Pennsylvania State Police within three
       business days of:

          (i) A change of residence or establishment of an
          additional residence or residences.

                                  ***

     42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.56(a)(2).

                                  ***

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     The registration obligations are ongoing.

                                     ***

     A registrant who “knowingly fails to register with the Pennsylvania
     State Police as required under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.56 ... [or to]
     verify [their] residence or be photographed as required under 42
     Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.60” commits the crime of failure to comply with
     SORNA-registration       requirements.       18      Pa.C.S.A.    §
     4915.2(a)(1),(2) (subsection numeration omitted).

Commonwealth v. Roberts, -- A.3d --, 2023 WL 2358844, at *1-2 (Pa.

Super. Mar. 6, 2023) (internal case citations and most quotations omitted).

“[H]omelessness is not a defense for failing to satisfy the registration

requirements[.]”   Commonwealth v. Demmitt, 45 A.3d 429, 432 (Pa.

Super. 2012) (en banc), citing Commonwealth v. Wilgus, 40 A.3d 1201,

1208 (Pa. 2012) (“Wilgus II”).

     Moreover,

     The legislature has defined “knowingly” as follows:

        A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element
        of an offense when:

        (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the
        attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of
        that nature or that such circumstances exist; and

        (ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is
        aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause
        such a result.

     18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b)(2).

                                     ***

     To violate 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.2(a)(1),(2), a registrant must
     “knowingly fail to register” or “knowingly fail to verify.” 18
     Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.2(a)(1),(2). Therefore, a registrant must be
     aware that [his conduct involves a failure to report a change in

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      residence or to verify required information with PSP and that he]
      is practically certain [that a] fail[ure] to report [or] to verify
      [information will result from his conduct.] The mens rea is simply
      that the actus reus of failure be committed knowingly.

      In most cases, such a failure will be knowing, because a rational
      actor knows when he fails to do something. The only exceptions
      would be in cases where a registrant has dementia, is in a coma,
      or suffers from a similar mental incapacity.

      A registrant's reason for failing to report or to verify is irrelevant
      to the mens rea analysis, where, as here, the registrant knew he
      failed to report or to verify.

Roberts, 2023 WL 2358844, at *3-4.

      Here, there is no dispute that Appellant was subject to lifetime reporting

requirements under SORNA and that he was aware that he was required to

report a change of residence with PSP within three days. Moreover, Appellant

does not challenge our Supreme Court’s prior pronouncements that

homelessness is not a defense to failing to report change of residence.

Appellant clearly knew that he had a duty to, but failed to, report. As set forth

in Roberts, Appellant’s reason for failing to report is wholly irrelevant. For all

of the foregoing reasons, Appellant’s claim that the Commonwealth failed to

present sufficient evidence to support his conviction lacks merit.

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     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

     Judge McCaffery joins this Memorandum.

     Judge Colins notes dissent.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/24/2023

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