Court Opinion

ID: 9638938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:59:10.175882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:10.800728
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING AND ON COURT’S OWN MOTION FOR REHEARING
MILLER, Judge.
On original submission, a panel of this Court held that the evidence in the instant cause was insufficient to show that the appellant, who was convicted of attempted murder, had the specific intent to kill.
The State argues in its motion for rehearing en banc that since the offense of murder under V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 19.-02(a)(2), does not require that a person have the specific intent to kill, the panel was incorrect in engrafting such intent into the offense of attempted murder. As authority for its argument, the State refers us to Baldwin v. State, 538 S.W.2d 615 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), and Garcia v. State, 541 S.W.2d 428 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). After careful reconsideration, we find the Baldwin analysis to be incorrect and will accordingly deny the State’s Motion for Rehearing.
*740Nevertheless, although the State did not directly attack the holding of the panel opinion that the evidence was insufficient to show an intent to kill, we will en banc on our own motion, also reconsider that holding, find it erroneous, and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I.
INTENT REQUIRED TO COMMIT ATTEMPTED MURDER
We will first address the issue raised by the State on rehearing.
Prior to the 1973 enactment of the new penal code, Texas had neither a general attempt statute similar to V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 15.01,1 nor a statute which authorized a conviction for murder when only an intent to cause serious bodily injury exists as is now found in V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 19.02(a)(2).2
Although a specific intent to kill had been an essential element of the old penal code offense of assault with intent to murder,3 the question which arose in Baldwin was whether the new penal code’s enactment of § 19.02(a)(2) now permitted a conviction for attempted murder when a person acts with only the intent to cause serious bodily injury.
In Baldwin, supra, in an opinion approved by the Court, Commissioner Brown found that a specific intent to kill was no longer a necessary element of attempted murder. The analysis that justified this conclusion follows:
“In order to prove murder under V.T. C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 19.02(a)(2) the State must prove that the actor first, intends to cause serious bodily injury, second, the actor commits an act clearly dangerous to human life, that, third, causes the death of an individual.
“A person commits the offense of criminal attempt under V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 15.01 if, first, with the specific intent to commit an offense he, second, does an act amounting to more than mere preparation that third, tends but fails to effect the commission of the offense intended.
“Applying the foregoing analysis to the facts of the instant case the State was required to show the following elements of attempted murder. First, that the appellant intended to cause serious bodily injury.... Second, the State was required to show that the appellant committed an act amounting to more than mere preparation.... The third element of murder is not shown because the victim in this case did not die as a result of the acts of the appellant; therefore, the appellant failed to effect the commission of the offense intended.
“A specific intent to kill is not required under V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 19.02(a)(2) for the offense of murder to be committed. The specific intent, therefore, required under V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 15.01 would not be a specific intent to kill but need only be the intent to cause serious bodily injury. ” Baldwin, supra, at 616. (emphasis added)
This finding was reiterated by Commissioner Brown in Garcia, supra, and by Com*741missioner Keith in Teal v. State, 543 S.W.2d 371 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).
We initially note that § 15.01 plainly requires that a person must act “with specific intent to commit an offense.” (emphasis added) Baldwin attempts to construe that language to mean that a person may be convicted of an attempted offense when he acts “with the same intent required by the attempted offense.” If that were the language of the statute, then it would follow that the intent necessary to support a conviction for attempted murder could be the same as that required by § 19.02(a)(2) — the intent to cause serious bodily injury. The statute, however, is not so worded.
Indeed, § 15.01 defines the elements of criminal attempt in traditional terms. The element “with specific intent to commit an offense” has traditionally been interpreted to mean that the actor must have the intent to bring about the desired result, which in the case of attempted murder is the death of the individual.
Thus, a specific intent to kill is a necessary element of attempted murder. The authorities in support of this interpretation are numerous and convincing. See R. Perkins and R. Boyce, Criminal Law 637 (3rd ed. 1982);4 C. Torcía, 4 Wharton’s Criminal Law 565 (4th ed. 1981);5 W. LaFave and A. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law 428 (1972);6 Notes, Attempted Murder: Should Specific Intent to Kill be Required? 31 Baylor L.Rev. 243 (1979).
Moreover, the Baldwin conclusion leads to a potential overlap between the offenses of aggravated assault and attempted murder. Judge Odom correctly observed in his concurring opinion in Dovalina v. State, 564 S.W.2d 378, 385-86 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) that:
“Baldwin misconstrued the requirement of a specific intent to commit an offense by stating that the accompanying specific intent to cause serious bodily injury, required for murder under Sec. 19.-02(a)(2), would suffice, [emphasis in original] Such intent to cause serious bodily injury is not the same as the intent to commit the offense of murder. A killing under Sec. 19.02(a)(2) is murder notwithstanding the fact that no murder was intended. And for precisely that reason, Sec. 19.02(a)(2) may not support an attempted murder prosecution: A prosecution for an attempted offense will lie only if there is an intent to commit such attempted offense. The intent to cause serious bodily injury relied on in Baldwin and Garcia, supra, is the intent to commit aggravated assault under Sec. 22.02(a)(1), supra, and if such intent accompanies an act that tends but fails to effect serious bodily injury, the offense is attempted aggravated assault, not attempted murder, [empha*742sis added] If the act does cause serious bodily injury, the offense is aggravated assault, not attempted murder. Sec. 19.-02(a)(1) is the only form of murder that requires an intent to murder, and since Sec. 15.01(a) requires intent to commit the offense attempted, only Sec. 19.-02(a)(1) will support attempted murder.”
See also Notes, Attempted Murder: Should Specific Intent to Kill be Required? 31 Baylor L.Rev. 243 (1979).
Furthermore, if we were to apply the Baldwin interpretation of § 15.01 to the remaining subsection of § 19.02, other offenses would potentially overlap, such as attempted murder and robbery. For instance, is a person who is in the immediate flight from the commission of a robbery and who commits an act that is clearly dangerous to human life, such as driving his “getaway” car the wrong way down a one-way street, guilty of attempted murder even though no one is killed or even injured? According to the Baldwin analysis, the only intent necessary to commit attempted murder would be the intent required by § 19.02(a)(3) which in this instance would be the intent required to commit the robbery. We contend the Legislature did not intend for § 15.01 to have such absurd results.
We can only conclude that the cursory analysis of this issue in Baldwin, which was blindly followed by Garcia and Teal, supra, was erroneous and obiter dicta.7
For the reasons discussed and contrary to the State’s contention, attempted murder can only be committed by a person who has the intent to commit or complete the offense of murder, viz., the intent to kill. Baldwin, Teal, and Garcia are overruled to the extent they conflict with this holding.
The State’s motion for rehearing is denied.
II.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
We next address the issue which was not raised in the State’s brief on rehearing but which will be considered on our own motion en banc. We find the panel opinion incorrectly held the evidence was insufficient to prove that the appellant had the specific intent to kill.
The complainant, Dallas Police Officer Jerry M. Rhodes, testified that on the morning of April 18, 1977, around 1:00 a.m., he was driving his pickup truck down R.L. Thornton Freeway in Dallas when he observed the car in the lane just ahead of him weaving in and out of its lane. He next observed the front seat passenger stick part of his body out of the window and fire a shotgun toward the front of the car. Rhodes then testified:
“Q. What happened after that?
“A. Shortly thereafter we continued eastbound. I was behind the vehicle, I noticed the subject I believed had done the firing turn around and look at me. He stuck his body outside of the car.”
“Q. When he turned to look at you was he looking through the rear glass while inside the car or what?
“A. No, sir. He stuck his body, his upper part of his body outside of the car hanging from the passenger window and turned around and *743looked at the vehicle behind him which was me.
“Q. How much of his body was protruding out of the passenger window?
“A. Probably about a third of it.
“Q. The area around the navel or above?
“A. Right, yes, sir.
“Q. What did you then see him do?
“A. I saw him sit back down in the vehicle and reach in the back seat, pick up something that I didn’t know what it was. I was approximately fifty feet behind him. I saw him again stick part of his body out of his car and I noticed that he had a gun in his hand and the gun was fired at me.
“Q. What type of gun was this?
“A. This was a shotgun.
“Q. When you say he fired a gun at you, you mean fired it directly at you?
“A. Yes, sir. He fired, it directly at me. [emphasis added]
“Q. It wasn’t like he was trying to shoot your tire or anything like that?
“A. No, sir.
“Q. This is how great a distance?
“A. Approximately fifty feet.”
******
“Q. When the shots were fired were they fired directly at you or at another part of the pickup?
“A. They were fired directly at me.
“Q. The muzzle of the shotgun was pointed directly at you when the blast was fired?
“A. Yes, sir.”
Under cross-examination, Rhodes further explained:
“Q. And you said that he aimed the shotgun right at you. In other words, right at your body, driving the truck?
“A. Yes, sir.”
* * * * * *
“Q. The only reason that you believe that they attempted to murder you was the fact that you saw the shotgun aimed at you and the trigger pulled?
“A. I saw the shotgun aimed at me and the shotgun was fired at me.
“Q. That is the only reason you believe they attempted to or had any idea of killing you or murdering you at all?
“A. That’s correct.
“Q. And in fact the only damage to your vehicle was some place removed from where you were sitting and driving?
“A. The damage is to the front of my vehicle, the front of my truck. There is no concentrated damage on it whatsoever, but I was in front of my truck driving it.”
After the second shotgun blast, Rhodes passed the car, which had slowed down to about thirty-five miles per hour. He eventually exited the freeway at a spot where he felt he could drive into a service station and call the police if the other car attempted to follow him off the freeway. The other car, however, continued to travel down the freeway after Rhodes exited. Rhodes testified that while he was still on the freeway he wrote the license plate number of the car on his hand, mistaking one of the six digits. After exiting, he called the Mesquite Police Department to report the incident, describe the car and the two individuals in the car, and relay the license plate number. The next morning, Rhodes went to the Mesquite Police Department, where he had been told two suspects had been arrested, and identified appellant as the person who had fired the shotgun.
The appellant testified that although he was in the car on the night in question, he was the driver of the ear. His brother, who was the passenger, was drunk and was firing a shotgun out the window of the car in an attempt to hit the lights. Appellant testified he had no knowledge of any at*744tempt to shoot at Rhodes’ pickup. His brother did not testify at trial.
The specific intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon, Bell v. State, 501 S.W.2d 137 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), and a shotgun is a deadly weapon per se, Stallings v. State, 476 S.W.2d 679 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), unless in the manner of its use it is reasonably apparent that death or serious bodily injury could not result, Medford v. State, 86 Tex.Cr.R. 237, 216 S.W. 175, 177 (1919); Hatton v. State, 31 Tex.Cr.R. 586, 21 S.W. 679 (1893). For example, in Scott v. State, 46 Tex.Cr.R. 315, 81 S.W. 952 (1904), where the defendant fired a shotgun loaded with bird or squirrel shot at the complainant who was some 125 to 200 yards away, this Court held that it was not possible that any serious injury could have been inflicted and thus the shotgun was not in the manner of its use a deadly weapon. See also, Barnes v. State, 172 Tex.Cr.R. 303, 356 S.W.2d 679 (1961); and Hargrove v. State, 501 S.W.2d 878 (Tex.Cr.App.1973).
Applying the above rules to the facts in the instant case, the panel opinion found that the “firing of the shotgun did not occur with the capacity and under such circumstances as are reasonably calculated to produce the death of the other person”, and that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond ⅛ reasonable doubt that the appellant had the specific intent to kill. On rehearing, we find that the panel opinion failed to consider the totality of the facts before reaching its conclusion. The issue considered by the panel in this case was phrased as follows:
“Whether the shooting of a single barrel shotgun by a person in one motor vehicle toward another vehicle, a pick-up truck, with both vehicles traveling between 50 and 60 miles per hour at the time, with the distance between the vehicles being approximately 50', with the shell described as containing birdshot, with the bird-shot striking approximately the center of the front grill of the other vehicle and doing very minor damage, is sufficient evidence to sustain the element of the specific intent to kill the driver of the second or other vehicle, who did not sustain any bodily injuries?” Panel opinion at p. 737.
If the facts as posed in the above question were all that had been presented by the State in support of the element of intent, our holding might be different. In the instant case, however, Rhodes specifically testified that the appellant saw him, picked up the shotgun, and aimed the shotgun directly at him before pulling the trigger. Accordingly, the question of appellant’s intent to kill, under a traditional sufficiency of the evidence analysis, should be:
whether any rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Dennis LaFaine Flanagan had the intent to kill Jerry Rhodes when he reached into the backseat of the car he was traveling in and picked up a shotgun, leaned out the window of the car as it traveled between 50 and 60 miles per hour, aimed the shotgun muzzle directly at Jerry Rhodes who was driving a pickup truck about 50 feet behind him, and pulled the trigger of the shotgun causing it to firel
Under this analysis, there is clearly sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding. Appellant’s act of pointing and firing the shotgun directly at Rhodes, who was driving a car only 50 feet behind him, demonstrates that it was his “conscious objective or desire” to cause the death of his target.8
The panel opinion’s reliance on Burks v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 15, 165 S.W.2d 460 (1942), for authority to support its conclusion is misplaced for several reasons. The Court in Burks was faced with the situation wherein the defendant had pled guilty and then in support of his application for a *745suspension of sentence the State elicited testimony from the defendant denying that he had intended to kill the complainant. The question then was whether the trial court should have withdrawn the defendant’s plea of guilty and entered a not guilty plea (not verdict) since the evidence raised the lack of intent on the part of appellant. The Court did not hold that the evidence was “insufficient to establish that the defendant had the necessary intent to kill his victim”, see panel opinion at p. 738, but rather that the defendant’s testimony “reasonably and fairly” presented an issue of fact as to the defendant’s intent. Burks, supra 165 S.W.2d at 464. Thus the trial court could not, under the law, accept his plea of guilty. The Court did not hold that the trial court could not have found the defendant guilty under the same evidence if the defendant’s plea had been not guilty. To the contrary, the Court specifically found that the State had satisfied its burden of introducing evidence sufficient to show the defendant was guilty by the testimony of the complainant that the defendant had fired a shotgun at the complainant from about 75 feet away. Burks, supra at 464. Accordingly, the result in Burks would presumably have been different if the issue had not been raised during testimony on a guilty plea and if the State had not elicited from the defendant testimony specifically denying his intent to kill.
We find that the decision in Burks not only does not support the appellant’s position, but is actually antipodal. A rational trier of facts would not be irrational in concluding that appellant manifested an intent to kill Rhodes by reaching for, pointing, and shooting the shotgun directly at him from 50 feet away.9 Appellant’s first ground of error is overruled.
III.
REMAINING GROUNDS OF ERROR
We will next address appellant’s remaining grounds of error.
In his second ground of error, appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to identify appellant as the man who fired the shot.
Officer Rhodes testified that prior to the shooting he observed appellant lean the upper third of his body out of the car and turn directly toward him. He described the lighting conditions on the freeway as “pretty well plus my headlights had illuminated his vehicle.” He also testified that he got a good look at the subject, who was only 50 feet away. The next morning, Rhodes testified he went to the Mesquite Police Department and observed the following:
“A. Mr. Flanagan, Dennis Flanagan was sitting in a chair when I walked in to a little booking area there. I approached an Officer O’Neal of the Mesquite Police Department, he told me that they had arrested the two subjects which they believed had been involved in an attempted shooting or shooting. I asked him if they had said anything to him and he said no, that Joseph Flanagan had been quite hard to get along with and was creating some problems. He asked me if I knew which one did the shooting and I said, I turned around and I said, ‘Yes, sir, I know, there’s no doubt in my mind,’ and *746he asked me which one and I told him, I said it was Dennis.
“Q. At that time you identified this Defendant?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Dennis Flanagan is the one who had fired the shotgun at you earlier that morning?
“A. Right.
“Q. Now, was your identification of Dennis Flanagan there in the police station based on any kind of suggestions given you by the police?
“A. There was no suggestion because both Flanagan suspects had not talked to the Mesquite officer at all and I recognized Dennis from my contact with him on the freeway.
“Q. All right. You recognized him that morning and you recognize him now?
“A. Yes, sir.”
The appellant, of course, testified that it was his brother who fired the shots.
The trial court was the trier of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given to their testimony and as such was free to accept or reject the testimony of any witness. The court chose to believe the State’s version of the facts. Limuel v. State, 568 S.W.2d 309 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). The evidence as to identity was sufficient.
In this same ground of error, appellant appears to argue that the pre-trial identification tainted the complainant’s in-court identification. Examining the identification under a totality of the circumstances test, see Jackson v. State, 657 S.W.2d 123 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), we note that (1) the complainant had the opportunity to view the appellant at the time of the offense from 50 feet away on a well lit freeway while the appellant was hanging out the window of the car; (2) the complainant, a trained city of Dallas police officer, carefully observed the appellant prior to, during, and after the instant offense while driving behind, next to, and in front of the appellant’s car, and noted a description of the car and its occupants and a partial description of the license plate; (3) immediately after the offense, the complainant gave his description of the person who had fired the shots to the police, and nothing was presented at trial showing that the description was inconsistent with appellant’s physical characteristics; (4) the complainant was unwavering and immediate in his identification of appellant as the shooter; and (5) the time between the offense and the confrontation was only a matter of a few hours. We find that the witness’ prior observation of the accused was sufficient to serve as an independent origin for the in-court identification. Jackson, supra.
Appellant’s second ground of error is overruled.
In a third and multifarious ground of error, appellant contends he was denied effective assistance of counsel. He first claims that his trial counsel was surety on his bond and “It is probable that the hurry-up proceeding that Appellant went through was a result of his bond jumping one year earlier.” The “hurry-up proceeding” of which appellant complains apparently consists of the trial before the court wherein counsel failed to apply for probation, waived all pre-trial motions, including the motion to suppress identification, and waived a jury trial “where Appellant might have had a chance to obtain probation if an application for probation had also been filed.” Appellant also complains of counsel’s failure to perfect a bill of éxceptions on one matter and the “ineffeetivness [sic] of trial counsel’s cross-examination” illustrated by his failure to ask Rhodes the following questions:
“How do you know there were any shotgun pellets in your radiator whatsoever?
“Did you dig out the pellets from the radiator?”
The record reflects that trial counsel was surety on appellant’s bond and filed an “Affidavit of Surety to Surrender Principal” approximately four months before trial because of appellant’s failure to cooperate and a fear that appellant would leave *747the jurisdiction of the court. Trial counsel, in an apparent effort to diffuse the effect of appellant’s bond violation, also elicited at trial testimony from appellant explaining the circumstances surrounding his leaving the state while on bond and his voluntary return and surrender to the authorities. There is nothing in the record to support the claim on appeal that trial counsel was in any way prejudiced by appellant’s actions or that as a result he influenced appellant to his detriment or “hurried up” the proceedings.
Although the record reflects that appellant waived his right to a jury trial, nothing in the record reflects whether this waiver was made on counsel’s suggestion or at appellant’s insistence or that the decision to waive a jury trial and other pre-trial motions was not a valid trial strategy on the part of appellant’s trial counsel. In the face of a silent record, we decline to judge the decision on the basis of hindsight. See Passmore v. State, 617 S.W.2d 682 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Mercado v. State, 615 S.W.2d 225 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Witt v. State, 475 S.W.2d 259 (Tex.Cr.App.1971).
We also note that since the trial was before the court, there was no need for counsel to file a written request for probation. See Special Commentary, Art. 42.12, Y.A.C.C.P. There is no transcription of the court reporter’s notes from the punishment phase of the trial, so we cannot determine whether an oral motion for probation was made. Moreover, in light of the punishment assessed by the trial court, appellant would not have been eligible for probation. Mercado, supra.
Appellant also complains of trial counsel’s failure to perfect a bill of exceptions on certain matters, the only example being his failure to develop facts showing that “civilian witness, Charles Golden, visited Appellant in jail and asked his name....” Appellant fails to inform us in what manner such a visit, if it occurred, was harmful to appellant and the testimony at trial certainly does not give us any idea as to what the possible prejudice might be. Golden testified that on the night of the offense he saw a man hanging out of a car window firing a shotgun. Golden, however, was unable at trial to identify the man. Moreover, there is nothing in the record to reflect that such a visit occurred. To the contrary, trial counsel specifically asked appellant if he recalled whether “some people” came to see him while he was being held at the Mesquite Police Department. Although he remembered people coming in he could not recall whether either Rhodes or Golden was there.
Finally, appellant complains of trial counsel’s ineffective cross-examination at trial. We have examined the entire record and perceive no lack of effectiveness on trial counsel’s part. The questions posed on appeal as examples of counsel’s inadequacies appear to be of little or no significance in light of the testimony as a whole. Simply because counsel on appeal would have asked other questions or phrased some of them differently does not reflect on trial counsel’s total effectiveness.
The test to be applied in determining whether counsel provided constitutionally satisfactory services is the “reasonably effective assistance” standard, based upon the totality of counsel’s representation. Passmore, supra. See also Strickland v. Washington,— U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). From the record before us, we conclude that appellant was provided with reasonably effective counsel.
Appellant’s third ground of error is overruled.
Appellant has also written and filed in this Court a pro se brief. Appellant is not entitled to hybrid representation on appeal. We have, however, in the interest of justice examined the brief and find it to be without merit.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
ONION, P.J., and McCORMICK and CAMPBELL, JJ., concur in result.

. V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 15.01(a) provides:
"A person commits an offense if, with specific intent to commit an offense, he does an act amounting to more than mere preparation that tends but fails to effect the commission of the offense intended.” (emphasis added)

. V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 19.02(a) provides:
“A person commits an offense if he:
(1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual;
(2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual; or
(3)commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than voluntary or involuntary manslaughter, and in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempt, or in immediate flight from the commission or attempt, he commits or attempts to commit an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.”

.Robertson v. State, 426 S.W.2d 872 (Tex.Cr.App.1968); Young v. State, 384 S.W.2d 710 (Tex.Cr.App.1964).

. "The word ‘attempt’ means to try; it implies an effort to bring about a desired result. Hence an attempt to commit any crime requires a specific intent to commit that particular offense. ... ‘The fallacy in [the statement that an act which would be sufficient for murder if death results should be attempted murder if life is not taken] is that while a person may be guilty of murder though there was no actual intent to kill, he cannot be guilty of an attempt to commit murder unless he has a specific intent to kill’ ” (emphasis added). Perkins & Boyce, supra at 637-638.

. "To constitute an attempt, there must be an intent to commit a particular crime_ Although a murder may be committed without an intent to kill, an attempt to commit murder requires a specific intent to kill.” Wharton’s Criminal Law, supra at 571-572.

. "Some crimes, such as murder, are defined in terms of acts causing a particular result plus some mental state which need not be an intent to bring about that result. Thus, if A, B, and C have each taken the life of another, A acting with intent to kill, B with an intent to do serious bodily injury, and C with a reckless disregard of human life, all three are guilty of murder because the crime of murder is defined in such a way that any one of these mental states will suffice. However, if the victims do not die from their injuries, then only A is guilty of attempted murder; on a charge of attempted murder it is not sufficient to show that the defendant intended to do serious bodily harm or that he acted in reckless disregard for human life, [emphasis in original.] Again, this is because intent is needed for the crime of attempt, so that attempted murder requires an intent to bring about that result described by the crime of murder (i.e., the death of another)." (emphasis added) LaFave & Scott, supra at 428-429.

. The facts in each of the three cases would clearly have supported a finding of the specific intent to kill. The defendant in Baldwin was armed with a three and a half foot length of pipe, which he used to hit the victim several times on the head and arms, even after the victim had fallen to the ground. The victim’s skull was fractured during the assault, which necessitated immediate surgery to remove bone fragments from the brain and further surgery to insert a metal plate in the skull; at the time of trial, the victim still suffered from partial paralysis to his right hand as a result of the assault. In Garcia, supra, the defendant fired his .22 pistol several times at two people, hitting one in the abdomen. In Teal, the defendant pulled a pistol, pointed it between the victim’s eyes, and pulled the trigger. When the pistol failed to fire the first time, the defendant continued to pull the trigger, successfully firing several shots, one hitting the victim.

. V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Sec. 6.03, provides:
"(a) A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.”

. We find the comments of Presiding Judge Hurt in Hatton v. State, 31 Tex.Cr.R. 586, 21 S.W. 679 (1893), particularly appropriate in this case:
"When in a case the question arises as to whether the accused intended to kill, the means used by him may be looked to. If a deadly weapon is used in a deadly manner, the inference is almost conclusive that he intended to kill; on the other hand, if the weapon was not a dangerous one, or was not used in a deadly manner, the evidence must be established by other facts. But it would be a monstrous doctrine to hold that, because in fact the accused did not have the ability to kill, therefore he did not intend to kill. A. attempts to rape B., but fails, because physically unable to accomplish his purpose. A. shoots at B. with intent to kill. He fails because his gun was not true to the mark, or because his shot were not large enough to effect his purpose. To this doctrine we cannot assent.”