Court Opinion

ID: 9741033
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:48:08.990046+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:21.761130
License: Public Domain

McCORMICK,. Justice
(concurring specially). .
I agree that the trial judge gave a reasoned sentence within the range of his discretion in the present case.
I. Our review is made considerably easier because he complied with ABA Standards, Appellate Review of Sentences, § 2.3(c) (Approved Draft 1968). This illustrates that some sentencing judges do recognize the desirability of giving their reasons for sentences. Four highly salutary purposes are served. The reasonableness of the sentence is demonstrated; the defend*49ant knows why he received the particular sentence; this court on review knows why it was selected; and corrections authorities are given the benefit of the judge’s thinking. State v. Horton, 231 N.W.2d 36, 41 (Iowa 1975) (special concurrence). See, generally, Korbakes, Criminal Sentencing: Should the “judge’s sound discretion” be explained?, 59 Judicature 185 (November 1975); Kaufman, The Sentencing Process and Judicial Inscrutability, 49 St. John’s L.Rev. 215 (1975).
This case emphasizes that our review is more meaningful, and considerably more confident, when we know why the sentence was chosen. We need not take refuge here behind the principle that when the record does not show why the sentence was selected we will nevertheless presume the sentencing judge had a good reason for it. This presumption has been discredited by the frequency of cases in which judges have given reasons for their sentences and they include an unlawful reason. State v. Drake, 224 N.W.2d 476 (Iowa 1974); State v. Jackson, 204 N.W.2d 915 (Iowa 1973); State v. Milliken, 204 N.W.2d 594 (Iowa 1973); State v. Boston, 233 Iowa 1249, 11 N.W.2d 407 (1943).
We should commend the example set by the sentencing judge in this case to other judges by adoption of the standard followed here, ABA Standards, Appellate Review of Sentences, § 2.3(c), supra.
II. The record shows the sentencing judge also complied with the other applicable ABA sentencing standards. He selected a sentence which he concluded would provide “the minimum amount of custody or confinement which is consistent with the protection of the public, the,gravity of the offense and the rehabilitative needs of'the defendant.” ABA Standards, Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, § 2.2 (Approved Draft 1968). In so doing, he made full and appropriate use of the presentence report. See §§ 789A.3-789A.5, The Code.
After consideration of all factors bearing on the sentencing decision, he concluded the defendant “is in need of correctional treatment which can most effectively be provided if he is placed in total confinement.” ABA Standards, Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, § 2.5(c). See also ABA Standards, Standards Relating to Probation, § 1.3 (Approved Draft 1970).
While all, especially including the defendant, might not share the judge’s optimism regarding the rehabilitative prospects of imprisonment in this case, it seems clear the sentencing decision was within the range of fair discretion under these standards.
Our refusal to adopt these standards as mandatory criteria to be applied in sentencing permits perpetuation of the inequities, disparities, and unfairness which have led to-substantial justified criticism of sentencing practices. Coburn, Disparity in Sentences and Appellate Review of Sentencing, 25 Rutgers L.Rev. 207 (1971); Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U.Cin.L.Rev. 1 (1972); Mueller, Penology on Appeal: Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive Sentences, 15 Vand.L.Rev. 671 (1962). The standards do not require trial judges to do anything more than they should already be doing in the sentencing process, and their use would make it possible for us to do more than give lip service to the principle of appellate review of criminal sentences. Their adoption would be a positive step toward elimination of injustice in sentencing. See dissenting opinion in State v. Peckenschneider, 236 N.W.2d 344 (Iowa 1975), filed separately today.
I would adopt the ABA Standards advocated by counsel for the defendant in this case.
REYNOLDSON, J., joins in this special concurrence.