Court Opinion

ID: 9916353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-09 20:02:42.955578+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:09.647805
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/8/24 P. v. Sucaldito CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          D080824

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. SCE406276)

 ARMANDO PIDOT SUCALDITO,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Herbert J. Exarhos, Judge. Affirmed.
         Gary V. Crooks, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Charles C.
Ragland, Assistant Attorneys General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Randall D.
Einhorn, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
         A jury convicted Armando Pidot Sucaldito of gross vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (a); count 1),
driving under the influence of drugs causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23152,
subd. (f); count 2), and driving with a suspended driver’s license (Veh. Code,
§ 14601.1, subd. (a); count 3). It found true allegations that he personally
inflicted great bodily injury (Pen. Code, §§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8), 12022.7, subd.
(a)).
        The court sentenced Sucaldito to four years in prison: the lower term of
four years for count 1, and a concurrent six-month term for count 3. It
dismissed count 2.
        Sucaldito’s sole contention is that there was insufficient evidence that
he caused the death of the victim to support his count 1 conviction. We
affirm.
                FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Prosecution Evidence
        On September 23, 2020, at about 6:50 a.m., a motorist was driving
westbound on Paradise Valley Road in San Diego County when a vehicle
going in the same direction passed her on the left. Immediately afterwards,
the motorist saw that vehicle going down a hill off the road. She immediately
called 911.
        At about 6:53 a.m., a California Highway Patrol officer was notified of
the crash and arrived at the scene about one minute later. He saw a fence
knocked down and a crashed vehicle at the bottom of a steep embankment.
He went down the embankment and spoke to the driver, Sucaldito, who
seemed distraught was outside the car and repeatedly said that his
girlfriend, Luzviminda Marzan, was in the back seat of the car. The officer
did not see anyone in the car. Sucaldito repeatedly said she was sleeping in
the back seat, and she was not wearing a seat belt. The officer saw that
Sucaldito’s vehicle’s windshield was shattered and had a large hole that was
consistent with a person being ejected from it. He located Marzan’s body

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about 15 to 20 feet in front of the badly damaged vehicle. Her body was still
warm to the touch.
      At approximately 6:58 a.m., a firefighter paramedic arrived at the
scene and took Marzan’s vital signs shortly after 6:59 a.m. Marzan had no
pulse and her pupils were dilated and nonreactive, which was indicative of
cardiac arrest. Her skin still felt warm. The paramedic found no obvious
signs of death such as rigor mortis or incineration. He immediately began
administering CPR. At 7:02 a.m., he discerned some electrical activity of
Marzan’s heart, and therefore tried defibrillation. At 7:17 a.m., she was
pronounced dead.
      The highway patrol officer went to the hospital to interview Sucaldito
that morning. Sucaldito said that before the accident, he had slept from
midnight to 2:00 or 3:00 a.m., after which he and his girlfriend went to a
casino. The accident happened while he was leaving there. As he was
driving, he got really sleepy, and started nodding off. He saw a flash of black
and felt an impact and strong pain to his chest. Sucaldito denied consuming
any alcohol or drugs before the crash, but admitted using methamphetamine
three days earlier.
      Blood taken from Sucaldito at 7:25 a.m. on the day of the crash later
tested positive for methamphetamine. That day, Sucaldito told a social
worker that he had been smoking methamphetamine in the car before the
accident.
      Postmortem samples of Marzan’s blood tested positive for
methamphetamine at a level that could be considered lethal for some
individuals but not for others. A toxicologist testified that methamphetamine
can redistribute in the body post mortem, meaning the portions of the drug in
surrounding tissues and organs may go back into the blood, particularly in

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the area of the chest cavity. This can result in the level of methamphetamine
being falsely elevated and reflect a higher measurement than the actual level
at the time of death.
      San Diego County Deputy Medical Examiner Dr. Robert Stabley
conducted Marzan’s autopsy. Marzan was 52 years old when she died. Dr.
Stabley testified she had abrasions or scrapes on the head but no hemorrhage
within her skull. She also had abrasions on her torso from the base of her
neck to her pelvic area, a sternum fracture, 17 of 24 ribs fractured, bruises
and lacerations on her lungs, a liver laceration, and a tear in her aorta that
resulted in blood loss into her chest cavity. Marzan also had signs of natural
disease, with one coronary artery having atherosclerosis or plaque
obstruction of up to 75 percent of blood flow, and two other coronary arteries
having 50 percent blockages.
      Dr. Stabley explained that bruises and abrasions do not occur after a
person’s death because blood stops flowing immediately. If someone gets
either bruises or abrasions on her skin after death, the wounds have a
different appearance: “Because there’s no blood flow in the skin, those
abrasions usually appear yellow or yellow orange and might actually have a
dry appearance around the edges.” Dr. Stabley therefore concluded Marzan
was still alive when she suffered the blunt force trauma. He likewise found
that the bruising of her lungs and accumulation of blood in her lungs
indicated they occurred when she was still alive. Dr. Stabley stated Marzan’s
fractured ribs could have affected her ability to breathe.
      Dr. Stabley opined that the manner of Marzan’s death was an accident.
The primary cause of death was blunt force trauma based on the totality of
the injury to her chest, but she might have died faster due to her
methamphetamine use and coronary disease. He explained that her death

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was due to a combination of multiple rib fractures and lung injuries. The
prosecutor asked Dr. Stabley separate questions about the likelihood that
Marzan died of a drug overdose or natural disease rather than blunt force
trauma. He replied, “Highly unlikely” to each question. Dr. Stabley testified
on cross-examination that he did not believe Marzan died of cardiac arrest
before the crash because she had injuries that were not bloodless, meaning
her heart was still pumping blood at the time of the crash.
B. Defense Evidence
      Sucaldito testified that on September 22, 2020, at approximately 10:00
p.m., he smoked methamphetamine. Afterwards, he napped for about two
hours in the car, while Marzan was smoking methamphetamine in the back
seat. At about 3:00 a.m. he drove Marzan to a casino. They left there at
about 6:30 a.m. He did not know if Marzan wore a seatbelt. She was lying
down in the backseat because she had chest pains and a headache. When he
talked to her, she did not respond; therefore, he thought she was sleeping.
Just before the accident, he turned around to look at her and asked her a
question, which she did not answer. When he turned back to look at the
road, he “just saw black,” and the crash occurred.
      On cross-examination, Sucaldito admitted that he never told the police
officer or medical personnel that in the minutes before the accident, Marzan
was not feeling well and had asked for medication. He agreed that this
information would have been important for the medical personnel to know
while they were treating Marzan.
      Forensic pathologist Dr. Todd Grey testified based on defense counsel’s
hypothetical paralleling the facts of this case. He concluded Marzan probably
died from methamphetamine intoxication and underlying coronary disease.
He stated the blunt force trauma and associated injuries she suffered would

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not have killed “an otherwise healthy person” as rapidly as Marzan actually
died. Instead, Dr. Grey stated he would expect her to still have electrical
activity of the heart or to be gasping for air in the minutes after the crash.
He opined that Marzan was likely already dead from methamphetamine
intoxication before the collision.
      On cross-examination Dr. Grey specified that in a healthy person, he
“would likely expect it to be probably at least 10 minutes before there was
absolutely no signs of any kind of reactivity” following the victim’s injuries in
the car crash. When asked how that timeline would change if the victim had
an underlying heart condition and had consumed methamphetamine, Dr.
Grey agreed the time frame would drop to around eight minutes after the
accident.
C. Jury Instructions
      The court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 590 on the elements
of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated: “To prove that the
defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The
defendant drove under the influence of a drug; [¶] 2. While driving that
vehicle under the influence of a drug, the defendant also committed an
infraction; [¶] 3. The defendant committed the infraction with gross
negligence; and [¶] 4. The defendant’s grossly negligent conduct caused the
death of another person.”
      The court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 302 on how to
evaluate conflicting evidence and decide what evidence, if any, to believe. It
also instructed with CALCRIM No. 332 that when there is conflicting expert
testimony, the jury “should weigh each opinion against the others [and]
examine the reasons given for each opinion and the facts or matters on which
each witness relied.” It instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 360 that in

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considering Dr. Grey’s reliance on Sucaldito’s statements, it “may consider
those statements only to evaluate [Dr. Grey’s] opinions” and not “as proof
that the information contained in [Sucaldito’s] statements is true.”
D. Closing Arguments
      The prosecutor argued to the jury that it had to decide between two
different versions of what caused Marzan’s death: “Because you get to decide
what the facts are in this case, you essentially get to decide which version of
the events is true. And you were presented with two different versions of
events. [¶] Version number one, [ ] Sucaldito was not under the influence.
He was just sleepy, which had nothing to do with crash effects that happened
in smoking methamphetamine. He had an unexpected medical emergency or
unexpectedly lost consciousness or unexpectedly blacked out without any
explanation. [¶] He drives off the side of the road and immediately after [ ]
Marzan had an unexpected, unexplained, unsubstantiated medical
emergency as well. And in fact, she had already died before she’s ejected
through the windshield. [¶] Or version two, that [ ] Sucaldito smoked
methamphetamine. After experiencing stimulating effects of
methamphetamine, he experienced the crash effects of methamphetamine.
and he displayed the signs and symptoms consistent with being under the
influence during the crash of methamphetamine. [¶] He blacked out or lost
consciousness, he drove off the side of the road and ejected his passenger, and
it was due to the blunt force trauma injuries from being forcibly ejected
through a windshield that [ ] Marzan died.”
      The prosecutor continued: “The real question is do you believe Dr.
Grey[?] [¶] You get to consider his ability to see, hear, or perceive the events
about which he testified. He did not perform the autopsy in this case. He did
not see it live. He did not see [ ] Marzan’s body. He was limited to the report

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and to the photographs provided to him. [¶] You get to consider his ability to
remember and describe events. Dr. Grey could not remember what all he
was asked to review to form his original written opinion and his opinion here
in court. [¶] You get to consider whether he is influenced by bias, prejudice,
or a personal interest in this case.”
      The prosecutor also argued that the paramedic detected Marzan’s body
warmth and electrical activity from her heart within the seven to eight
minutes that Dr. Grey believed was reasonable for a victim to still show signs
of life after the vehicular accident.
      Likewise, defense counsel in closing arguments highlighted the experts’
conflicting evidence: “Dr. Grey looked at all the evidence, and he sees
meth[amphetamine] toxicity with heart disease as the cause of death. And
Dr. Stabley looked at it and saw respiratory compromise caused by blunt
force trauma contributed to by meth[amphetamine] toxicity and heart
disease. These are both experienced, reasonable doctors, who came to
knowledgeable, reasonable conclusions.”
      Defense counsel argued that if the jury found that Marzan “reasonably
could have died from her methamphetamine use and her bad heart, then [ ]
Sucaldito is necessarily not guilty of count[ ] 1 and all the lesser included
offenses. Because all of the lesser included offenses of manslaughter require
that he specifically caused the death.”
                                  DISCUSSION
      In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the causation
element of his conviction for gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated,
Sucaldito specifically relies on Dr. Grey’s testimony that Marzan died before
the vehicle crashed due to methamphetamine intoxication and coronary
artery disease.

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                                I. Applicable Law
      We examine the merits of this contention according to well-established
principles governing our review. “To assess the evidence’s sufficiency, we
review the whole record to determine whether any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime . . . beyond a reasonable
doubt. [Citation.] . . . In applying this test, we review the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the [trier of fact] could reasonably have
deduced from the evidence. [Citation.] ‘Conflicts and even testimony [that] is
subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it
is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility
of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination
depends.’ [Citation.] . . . A reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted
unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support” ’ the [trier of fact’s decision.] [Citation.] [¶]
The same standard governs in cases where the prosecution relies primarily
on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] We ‘must accept logical inferences
that the jury might have drawn from the circumstantial evidence. [Citation.]’
[Citation.] ‘Although it is the jury’s duty to acquit a defendant if it finds the
circumstantial evidence susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of
which suggests guilt and the other innocence, it is the jury, not the appellate
court that must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Where the circumstances reasonably justify
the trier of fact’s findings, a reviewing court’s conclusion the circumstances
might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant
the judgment’s reversal.” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357-358.)

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                                  II. Analysis
      It was the jury’s exclusive role to determine the truth or falsity of the
determinative facts. (People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 162.)
Dr. Stabley’s testimony supported the jury’s verdict. Having performed the
autopsy, he concluded Marzan died from blunt force trauma from being
forcefully ejected from a moving vehicle. He concluded she broke several ribs,
making it difficult for her to breathe. As she developed several bruises and
lacerations, he opined that her blood was still circulating when she suffered
the blunt trauma, and she died afterwards. He specifically rejected the
proposition that Marzan died from methamphetamine intoxication or
coronary disease, although he concluded those were contributory factors that
could have hastened her death.
      The jury by its verdict agreed with Dr. Stabley’s analysis of the cause of
death and rejected Dr. Grey’s position. Under the applicable standard of
review set forth above, we may not disturb their findings. “Our duty begins
and ends with the determination as to whether there is in the record
evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, of sufficient substantiality to
warrant the conclusion arrived at by the [jury].” (People v. Rodriguez (1955)
132 Cal.App.2d 335, 338.) As stated, the prosecutor and defense counsel in
closing arguments framed this case as one involving expert witnesses with
conflicting opinions regarding Marzan’s cause of death, an issue that the
attorneys thoroughly argued and explored. Defense counsel was able to
cross-examine Dr. Stabley and impeach his credibility. To aid the jurors, the
court properly instructed them that they were to consider the experts’
opinions, but were not required to accept them as true or correct. They were
to decide what meaning and importance to give any expert opinion, and take
into account a number of specific factors when evaluating each expert’s

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credibility. The jurors were informed they could disregard any expert opinion
they found unbelievable, unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence.
Finally, the jurors were instructed with CALCRIM No. 332 on how to weigh
each expert’s opinion against the others. “The jury is presumed to have
followed the trial court’s instructions in the absence of any indication it was
unwilling or unable to do so.” (People v. Letner and Tobin, supra, 50 Cal.4th
at p. 196.)
                                DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                                       O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

KELETY, J.

CASTILLO, J.

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