Court Opinion

ID: 9882385
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:09:03.662137+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:21.665808
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Travis v. Tall Tall Properties, L.L.C., 2023-Ohio-3370.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                   FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                              HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 HERMAN M. TRAVIS,                                   :          APPEAL NOS. C-220571
                                                                             C-220572
    and                                              :          TRIAL NO. A-2102130

 TIFFANY D. TRAVIS,                                  :              O P I N I O N.

        Plaintiffs-Appellants,                       :

    vs.                                              :

 TALL TALL PROPERTIES, LLC,                          :

    and                                              :

 CHRIS CASTLEMAN,                                    :

        Defendants-Appellees,                        :

    and                                              :

 DAVID J. HANNAH,                                    :

        Defendant.                                   :

Civil Appeals From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgments Appealed From Are: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: September 22, 2023
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Hoschscheid Law LLC and Tabitha M. Hochscheid, for Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Robbins, Kelly, Patterson & Tucker, LPA, Matthew C. Curran and Elizabeth M.
Johnson, for Defendant-Appellee Tall Tall Properties, LLC.,

Arnzen, Storm & Turner, P.S.C., and Aaron A. VanderLaan, for Defendant-Appellee
Chris Castleman.

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

CROUSE, Presiding Judge.

       {¶1}   Plaintiffs-appellants Herman and Tiffany Travis appeal the trial court’s

grants of summary judgment to defendants-appellees Tall Tall Properties, LLC,

(“TTP”) and Chris Castleman on the Travises’ claims for breach of contract and

fraudulent misrepresentation. On appeal, they contend that the trial court erred in

denying several discovery-related motions and in granting summary judgment to the

appellees. Finding these arguments to be without merit, we affirm the trial court’s

judgments.

                        1. Factual and Procedural Background

       {¶2}   In December of 2018, the Travises became first time homeowners when

they purchased a home from TTP. The home, 463 Marion Road, was listed for sale by

Castleman, TTP’s real estate agent. The Travises were represented in the transaction

by their own real estate agent, David Hannah. On November 10, 2018, the Travises

signed a contract to purchase the home for $98,900. The contract contained a real

estate inspection contingency, providing that the Travises had ten days to conduct an

inspection and that, if the inspection revealed a “material defect” to the property and

the parties could not negotiate an agreement in settlement of the condition, the

contract could be terminated.

       {¶3}   On November 12, 2018, the Travises were given a Residential Property

Disclosure Form (“RPDF”) that was filled out by Nicholas Vehr, the owner of TTP.

Section D of the RPDF concerned water intrusion. Vehr checked “yes” on the form in

response to the question asking, “Do you know of any previous or current water

leakage, water accumulation, excess moisture or other defects to the property,

including but not limited to any area below grade, basement or crawl space?” In

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

addition to checking yes, Vehr wrote on the form that “water leaked in basement.

Added downspout drainage to flow away from house in Nov.”

       {¶4}   Section E of the RPDF concerned structural components of the home,

including the foundation, basement/crawl space, floors, and interior and exterior

walls. On this section of the form, Vehr checked “yes” in response to a question asking,

“Do you know of any previous or current movement, shifting, deterioration, material

cracks/settling (other than visible minor cracks or blemishes) or other material

problems with [these structural components]?” Vehr also wrote on the space provided

on the form “cracks in interior plaster walls. Was not structural.”

       {¶5}   In accordance with the contract, the Travises had an inspection

conducted on the home. As relevant to this appeal, the inspection report issued to the

Travises revealed several potential problems with the property. The report indicated

that “settling cracks and water intrusion can be seen located at garage” and advised

that a qualified contractor should further inspect and make any needed repairs. The

report also noted that “signs of fungi growth and moisture intrusion are present in

basement” and recommended that an expert be contacted for correction. Last, the

report stated that “settling cracks that reveal daylight can be seen located at basement”

and again recommended that a qualified contractor inspect and make any necessary

repairs.

       {¶6}   After receiving the inspection report, the Travises prepared and gave to

TTP and Castleman a document referred to by the parties as Addendum #1. This

document listed various problems found during the inspection that needed to be

replaced or repaired by a licensed contractor. Included in the items listed on the

addendum were the cracks and water intrusion in the garage, the fungi growth and

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                        OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

moisture intrusion in the basement, and settling cracks that revealed daylight in the

basement.

        {¶7}    In response, TTP and Castleman prepared Addendum #1A. This

document provided a list of repairs that TTP agreed to have performed on the property

by a licensed contractor. Included in the list were the following items: “fill/seal all

visible settlement cracks on basement foundation walls,” and “clean/scrub areas

where water penetration was visible.” All parties agreed to and signed Addendum #1A.

        {¶8}    The Travises did not personally inspect the property prior to closing to

ensure that all repairs referenced in Addendum #1A had been performed. Instead,

their real estate agent inspected the property and informed them that all required

repairs had been made. Closing occurred on the property on December 31, 2018, but

the Travises did not enter the home until January 6, 2019. Shortly after moving in, the

Travises began to have concerns that all repairs required by Addendum #1A had either

not been made or had not been adequately made. According to Tiffany Travis, it looked

like the cracks in the walls had been painted over, and the paint began to peel off the

walls within a couple of months of the Travises taking residence. Herman Travis

likewise noticed that paint in the basement started to peel off the walls after a rain and

that the basement still suffered from water intrusion, requiring the Travises to place

their belongings in plastic bins to prevent damage.

        {¶9}    The Travises filed suit against TTP, Castleman, and Hannah. The

complaint contained a claim for breach of contract against TTP.1 In support of this

claim, the complaint alleged that TTP failed to adequately disclose the structural

damage which it either knew or should have known existed. It also alleged that

1 The sole claim for negligence against Hannah was ultimately dismissed with prejudice.

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

although TTP disclosed the water leakage in the basement, it misrepresented that the

leakage was remedied by diverting down spouts. It further alleged that TTP failed to

repair the addendum items in a workmanlike manner, resulting in the Travises

incurring significant repair bills and owning a house that was worth far less than its

purchase price.

       {¶10} The complaint also asserted a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation

against both TTP and Castleman. In support of this claim, the complaint alleged that

despite having a duty to do so, the defendants failed to disclose in the RPDF the

structural damage to the foundation and the need for repairs, and that they did so with

the intent to deceive the Travises into relying on the representation that all items

described in the inspection were rectified. It further alleged that the Travises

justifiably relied on the RPDF and were damaged by overpaying for the property.

       {¶11} TTP moved for summary judgment on April 26, 2022. On May 24,

2022, the Travises filed a request for both additional discovery pursuant to Civ.R.

56(F) and additional time to reply to TTP’s motion for summary judgment. The

request noted that the case-scheduling order had been modified and that discovery

was not set to be completed until November of 2022. It also explained that the Travises

were attempting to resolve discovery issues with TTP and that they wished to depose

Vehr and any individuals who worked on the property. The trial court denied the

Travises’ Civ.R. 56(F) request.

       {¶12} Castleman filed his own motion for summary judgment on August 12,

2022. Approximately one week later, on August 19, 2022, the Travises filed a motion

to compel discovery from TTP. In the motion, the Travises sought to compel

production of the repair and remodeling records from the date of TTP’s purchase of

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

the property through November 2019, as well as all communications between the

parties in this case. The motion was accompanied by an affidavit from the Travises’

counsel stating that all nonjudicial efforts to resolve the discovery dispute had been

exercised. The Travises additionally filed responses in opposition to both pending

motions for summary judgment.

       {¶13} After conducting a hearing, the trial court granted both TTP and

Castleman’s summary-judgment motions.

                                  2. Civ.R. 56(F) Motion

       {¶14} In their first assignment of error, the Travises argue that the trial court

erred by denying their request for additional discovery under Civ.R. 56(F) and for

additional time to reply to TTP’s motion for summary judgment.

       {¶15} We review a trial court’s decision to allow additional time for discovery

under Civ.R. 56(F) for an abuse of discretion. Dansberry v. Mercy Health-West Park,

1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-210304, 2022-Ohio-360, ¶ 12, citing Bank of Am. NA v.

Omega Design/Build Group, LLC, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-100018, 2011-Ohio-1650,

¶ 40. An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court’s decision was unreasonable

or arbitrary. Sharif v. Sharif, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-210472, 2022-Ohio-2856, ¶ 13,

citting Kane v. Hardin, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-180525, 2019-Ohio-4362, ¶ 6.

       {¶16} Civ.R. 56(F) provides that:

       Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion for

       summary judgment that the party cannot for sufficient reasons stated

       present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party’s opposition, the

       court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had

       or may make such other order as is just.

       {¶17} Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(F), “a party opposing a motion for summary

judgment may move for a continuance where that party needs more time to conduct

discovery.” Taft, Stettinius, & Hollister, LLP v. Calabrese, 2016-Ohio-4713, 69 N.E.3d

72, ¶ 28 (1st Dist.). If such a motion is filed, it “must be supported by an affidavit

establishing the reasons for the requested continuance.” Id.; Civ.R. 56(F).

       {¶18} The Travises failed to file an affidavit supporting their request for

additional time to conduct discovery. For this reason alone, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in denying the motion. See Calabrese at ¶ 28 (“the trial court did

not err in denying [the Civ.R. 56(F) motion] since the motion was not supported by an

accompanying affidavit, as required”).

       {¶19} But even if the Travises could get past the roadblock caused by the

failure to file an accompanying affidavit, we still find no abuse of discretion in the trial

court’s denial of their motion. The denial of a Civ.R. 56(F) motion “should be upheld

if the party fails to show that the requested discovery would have precluded summary

judgment.” Midland Funding LLC v. Farrell, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-120674, 2013-

Ohio-5509, ¶ 10.

       {¶20} In their motion, the Travises explained that TTP’s responses to their

written discovery requests were limited and contained many objections, and that they

sought additional time to resolve these issues, obtain documents from TTP, and to

depose Vehr and any individuals who worked on the property. The Travises did,

ultimately, take Vehr’s deposition on July 28, 2022. The Travises also filed a notice

that they would be deposing Mark Marrs, who performed the repairs on the property

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

for Vehr, on August 15, 2022. The record does not establish if Marrs was in fact

deposed, but such a deposition was never filed and made part of the record.

       {¶21} Following our review of the record, we find that the documents that the

Travises sought additional time to obtain concerning repairs that had been made to

the property prior to it being listed for sale were not relevant to the parties’ dispute

and the claims asserted in the complaint. The complaint alleged that TTP failed to

make adequate disclosures on the RPDF and failed to repair the issues that it was

obligated to fix under Addendum #1A. Documents pertaining to work that TTP had

done on the property prior to listing it for sale, including installing down spouts, are

not relevant to these issues. The Travises have failed to establish that the requested

discovery would have precluded summary judgment, and, on this record, we can find

no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of their motion.

       {¶22} To the extent that the Travises argue that the trial court erred in

granting summary judgment before discovery was complete, we find such an

argument to be without merit. “Where a party moves for summary judgment and the

nonmoving party argues that discovery is incomplete or a ruling would be premature,

this court reviews the trial court’s decision to decide the motion for an abuse of

discretion.” Anderson v. Jancoa Janitorial Servs., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2019-01-

018, 2019-Ohio-3617, ¶ 14. Here, where the Travises were able to depose Vehr and

where the documents that the Travises sought to obtain during the requested

extension of time for discovery were not relevant to the claims asserted in the

complaint, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court.

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                                   3. Motion to Compel

       {¶23} In their second assignment of error, the Travises argue that the trial

court erred by waiting until after it granted defendants’ summary-judgment motions

to rule on the motion to compel, and then denying it as moot. We review the trial

court’s ruling on a motion to compel for an abuse of discretion. Ijakoli v. Alungbe, 1st

Dist. Hamilton No. C-210366, 2022-Ohio-2423, ¶ 34.

       {¶24} The Travises sought to compel production of the repair and remodeling

records from the date of TTP’s purchase of the property through November 2019. The

motion was accompanied by an affidavit from the Travises’ counsel. As explained in

our analysis of the Travises’ first assignment of error, the records that they sought to

compel were not relevant to the claims asserted in the complaint. We accordingly find

no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the motion to compel and overrule

the second assignment of error.

                             4. Grant of Summary Judgment

       {¶25} In their third assignment of error, the Travises argue that the trial court

erred in granting summary judgment when evidence of material facts was being

unreasonably withheld and when a motion to compel was pending.

       {¶26} To the extent that this assignment of error implicates discovery issues

and the timing of the trial court’s rulings, we have already resolved those arguments

in our resolution of the first two assignments of error. Turning to the merits of the trial

court’s grants of summary judgment to TTP and Castleman on the claims for breach

of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation, we review the trial court’s decisions de

novo. Collett v. Sharkey, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-200446, 2021-Ohio-2823, ¶ 8.

“Summary judgment is appropriately granted when there exists no genuine issue of

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

material fact, the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law, and the evidence, when viewed in favor of the nonmoving party, permits

only one reasonable conclusion that is adverse to that party.” Id., citing State ex rel.

Howard v. Ferreri, 70 Ohio St.3d 587, 589, 639 N.E.2d 1189 (1994).

                            5. Claim for Breach of Contract

       {¶27} The elements of a claim for breach of contract are “the existence of a

contract, performance by the plaintiff, breach by the defendant, and damage or loss to

the plaintiff.” White v. Pitman, 2020-Ohio-3957, 156 N.E.3d 1026, ¶ 37 (1st Dist.),

quoting Becker v. Direct Energy, LP, 2018-Ohio-4134, 112 N.E.3d 978, ¶ 38 (2d Dist.).

       {¶28} The record established that the parties had a contract for the sale of the

property. TTP disclosed on the RPDF the issues with the water leakage in the basement

and the cracks on the interior walls. The Travises had an inspection conducted, which

revealed the water intrusion and cracks that TTP had disclosed on the RPDF and

advised the Travises to have a qualified contractor inspect the areas. Despite this

advisement, the Travises did not engage in any further inspection of the identified

areas. The record further established that TTP, through Addendum #1A, agreed to

perform certain repairs on the property, and that the Travises closed on the property

after accepting a representation from their own real estate agent that the required

repairs had been performed.

       {¶29} The cases of Nunez v. J.L. Sims Co., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-020599,

2003-Ohio-3386, and Roberts v. McCoy, 2017-Ohio-1329, 88 N.E.3d 422 (12th Dist.),

involve similar situations and are instructive. In Nunez, the buyers of a piece of real

estate sued the sellers and the real estate agents who dually represented both parties,

raising various claims concerning the defendants’ failure to make adequate lead-

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

based-paint disclosures. Nunez at ¶ 2. The complaint contained two claims for breach

of contract. On those claims, this court held that:

        With regard to the contract claims, on this record, the sellers disclosed

        everything that they had actual knowledge of with respect to the

        presence of lead hazards, including that the residence was of an age

        where such hazards were likely present, and they had no duty to perform

        any inspections prior to offering the property for sale. The Nunezes were

        free to conduct any buyer-paid-for inspections they wished. Reasonable

        minds could have only concluded that the Nunezes were not the victims

        of either a breach of contract or a breach of a fiduciary duty.

Id. at ¶ 24.

        {¶30} In the Roberts case, Roberts purchased property from McCoy, who

disclosed in an RPDF that “it appears the previous owner unhooked [the] laundry

room sink and let the basement flood, all water damaged materials were removed” and

that “I don’t believe there is any mold in the home.” Roberts at ¶ 3. Roberts later

discovered mold and sued McCoy. Id. at ¶ 5-6. She asserted, among other claims, a

claim for breach of contract relating to the representations made in the RPDF. Id. at ¶

6. The Twelfth District recognized that McCoy was only required to disclose defects to

the property that she had actual knowledge of, and it held that because no genuine

issues of material fact existed as to whether McCoy had actual knowledge of the

presence of mold, summary judgment was appropriately granted on the breach-of-

contract claim. Id. at ¶ 27.

        {¶31} In this case, no genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether TTP

had knowledge of conditions that it failed to disclose. Nor do any issues of fact exist as

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

to whether TTP adequately disclosed the water intrusion and structural issues with the

property. See id.; Nunez at ¶ 24. Rather, TTP disclosed the issues of which it was aware,

as well as information about previous steps it had taken to correct the problems. Most

telling, perhaps, is that in addition to receiving this information from TTP about the

water intrusion and cracking on interior walls, the Travises were presented with the

same information following an inspection and elected not to have a contractor further

look into the issues of concern. Even if TTP’s statement on the RPDF that the cracks

on the interior walls were not structural could be considered a misrepresentation, the

Travises were put on notice via the inspection report that there were structural

concerns with the property.

       {¶32} As to the allegation that TTP failed to adequately perform the repairs

required by Addendum #1A, the Travises had the ability to inspect the Addendum #1A

repairs performed by TTP and elected not to do so, instead relying on a representation

from their real estate agent that they were adequate. They accepted the repairs and

closed on the contract for purchase of the home.

       {¶33} On this record, we hold that the trial court did not err in granting

summary judgment to TTP on the claim for breach of contract.

                       6. Claim for Fraudulent Misrepresentation

       {¶34} The claim for fraudulent misrepresentation was asserted against both

TTP and Castleman. The elements of a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation are (1)

a misrepresentation or concealment when there is a duty to disclose, (2) that is

material to the transaction, (3) made falsely, or with knowledge of or reckless

disregard as to its falsity, (4) with the intent to mislead another into relying on it, (5)

justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation or concealment, and (6) resulting injury

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

proximately caused by the reliance. Greene v. Whiteside, 181 Ohio App.3d 253, 2009-

Ohio-741, 908 N.E.2d 975, ¶ 27 (1st Dist.).

       {¶35} Here, we have no problem affirming the trial court’s grant of summary

judgment on this claim because the record contains no genuine issues of material fact

as to whether the Travises justifiably relied on any misrepresentation or concealment

by TTP or Castleman—they did not. Not only did TTP disclose the water intrusion and

structural issues, but the inspection report provided to the Travises identified these

same issues and advised that a qualified contractor should examine the areas of

concern. The Travises elected not to have an extra inspection performed per the

report’s recommendation. Where their own inspection identified the issues of which

they now complain, the Travises cannot claim justifiable reliance on any alleged

misrepresentations or concealment made by TTP or Castleman. See Ponder v. Culp,

9th Dist. Summit No. 28184, 2017-Ohio-168, ¶ 15 (where plaintiffs were put on notice

by a home inspector of potential water problems in the purchased property, they could

not   have   justifiably   relied   on   defendants’    alleged   nondisclosures     and

misrepresentations); Kramer v. Ratterman, 161 Ohio App.3d 363, 2005-Ohio-2742,

830 N.E.2d 416, ¶ 22 (1st Dist.) (where defendants disclosed defects to the property as

required by law and plaintiffs chose not to have an inspection where one was clearly

warranted, plaintiffs could not claim justifiable reliance on the defendants’

representations).

       {¶36} The Travises claim for fraudulent misrepresentation additionally fails

because it is barred by the doctrine of caveat emptor. This doctrine “applies to sales of

real estate relative to conditions open to observation.” Layman v. Binns, 35 Ohio St.3d

176, 177, 519 N.E.2d 642 (1988), quoting Traverse v. Long, 165 Ohio St. 249, 252, 135

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                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

N.E.2d 256 (1956). The purpose of the doctrine is to provide finality in the sales of real

estate, as without it “nearly every sale would invite litigation instituted by a

disappointed buyer.” Id. It places the responsibility on buyers to discover patent

defects. Kramer at ¶ 13. To rely on the doctrine of caveat emptor, the following

conditions must be established: “(1) the defect must be open to observation or

discoverable on reasonable inspection, (2) the purchaser must have an unimpeded

opportunity to examine the property and (3) the vendor may not engage in fraud.”

Layman at 177.

        {¶37} The water intrusion and structural issues that were manifested by the

cracks in the interior walls were open to observation and were, in fact, observed by the

Travises’ inspector and noted in the inspection report. The Travises indisputably had

an unimpeded opportunity to examine the property and did engage in such

examination. While the Travises contend that the doctrine of caveat emptor is

inapplicable because TTP and Castleman acted fraudulently, the record does not

support this contention. Rather, these issues with the property were disclosed on the

RPDF.

        {¶38} We accordingly hold that the trial court did not err in granting summary

judgment on the claim for fraudulent misrepresentation. The third assignment of error

is overruled, and the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

                                                                      Judgments affirmed.

BERGERON and KINSLEY, JJ., concur.

Please note:
        The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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