Court Opinion

ID: 9561006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:01:02.075168+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:28.190316
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13081    Document: 25-1     Date Filed: 08/21/2023   Page: 1 of 7

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-13081
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       JAMES M. WILLIAMSON,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 3:20-cr-00096-MCR-1
                          ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                22-13081

       Before BRASHER, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Court
       Judges
       PER CURIAM:
               James Williamson appeals his sentence of 360 months’ im-
       prisonment for production of child pornography, arguing that the
       district court erred in applying a 5-level enhancement under
       U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5 for engaging in a pattern of activity involving pro-
       hibited sexual conduct because the commentary stating the en-
       hancement applies to production of child pornography violated the
       statute authorizing the U.S. Sentencing Commission to promul-
       gate the guideline.
              We review de novo the interpretation and application of the
       Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Cingari, 952 F.3d 1301, 1305
       (11th Cir. 2020).
               We will not address a disputed guideline determination on
       appeal when a sentencing court explicitly states that the guideline
       determination was immaterial to the ultimate sentence imposed
       because it would have imposed the same sentence under its
       § 3553(a) authority so long as the sentence was reasonable. United
       States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347, 1348-49 (11th Cir. 2006). When the
       sentencing court makes such a statement, we will reduce the guide-
       line range in accordance with the defendant’s arguments and ana-
       lyze whether the sentence would be substantively reasonable under
       that alternative guideline range. Id. at 1349-50.
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       22-13081               Opinion of the Court                         3

              We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a defer-
       ential abuse-of-discretion standard of review. Gall v. United States,
       552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). The party challenging the sentence bears
       the burden of demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable.
       United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015).
       We examine whether a sentence is substantively reasonable consid-
       ering the totality of the circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The
       factors due consideration under the statute include the nature and
       circumstances of the oﬀense, the history and characteristics of the
       defendant, the oﬀense’s seriousness, promoting respect for the law,
       just punishment, adequate deterrence, protecting the public, the
       guideline range, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing dis-
       parities among similar oﬀenders. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). However,
       the weight given to any speciﬁc § 3553(a) factor is committed to the
       sound discretion of the district court. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at
       1254.
              The sentencing court also has wide discretion to conclude
       that the § 3553(a) factors justify a variance. United States v. Rodri-
       guez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010), abrogated on other grounds
       by Van Buren v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1648 (2021). A major vari-
       ance must be supported by more significant reasoning than a minor
       one, but the court need not discuss each factor in its justification.
       Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. Conduct that did not yield a conviction can
       serve as the basis of an upward variance if it relates to sentencing
       factors such as the history and characteristics of the defendant, re-
       spect for the law, adequate deterrence, and protection of the pub-
       lic. United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2022).
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                22-13081

       Additionally, the court can rely on factors previously considered in
       imposing an enhancement. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1264 (holding
       that varying upward from the guideline range to account for mul-
       tiple victims was not procedurally unreasonable, even when an en-
       hancement was applied on the same grounds).
              Here, it is unnecessary for us to address Williamson’s argu-
       ment that the district court erred in applying the 5-level enhance-
       ment under § 4B1.5(b) because the district court explicitly stated
       that it would have imposed the same 360-month imprisonment
       sentence even without the enhancement. If the court had not ap-
       plied the 5-level enhancement under § 4B1.5(b), then Williamson’s
       oﬀense level would have been 35 and, with his criminal history cat-
       egory of III, his guideline range would have been 210 to 262
       months. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A, Sentencing Table.
              Williamson has failed to show that his 360-month sentence
       would be substantively unreasonable under this alternative guide-
       line range when considering the record and the § 3553(a) factors.
       See Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1256. Despite Williamson’s claim that
       the court erred by failing to consider the signiﬁcant mitigating fac-
       tors of his traumatic childhood and mental illness, the court did
       take into account Williamson’s mitigation arguments in acknowl-
       edging that Williamson had endured trauma and was subject to
       “terrible” and “tragic” abuse as a child but concluded that “there’s
       just nothing that excuses” his oﬀenses and “you just can’t ﬁnd mit-
       igation on these facts and under these circumstances.” See Gall, 552
       U.S. at 51; Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254. Furthermore, the court
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       22-13081                Opinion of the Court                          5

       opted to run his federal sentence concurrently to his state sentence
       for the same conduct, potentially in recognition of his mitigation
       arguments, even though it stated that a consecutive sentence likely
       would not have been overturned given the seriousness of his of-
       fense and his long history of sexually abusing young girls.
               While Williamson claims the court did not adequately jus-
       tify what would have been a substantial upward variance, the court
       stated on the record that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors and
       explained, in detail, its rationale in sentencing Williamson. See Ro-
       driguez, 628 F.3d at 1264; Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. In particular, the dis-
       trict court assessed Williamson’s personal characteristics, empha-
       sizing that Williamson had engaged in a pattern of abusing children
       “[s]ince at least 2003,” and the character of Williamson’s oﬀense,
       underscoring that he engaged directly in the sexual abuse that was
       depicted in the photos and videos in addition to producing the im-
       ages and therefore merited a longer sentence than many others
       convicted of the same charge. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). On these
       grounds alone, the court stated that Williamson’s 30-year sentence
       would not have been substantively unreasonable even if imposed
       to run consecutively to his state sentence “given the egregious na-
       ture of the conduct and how long this has been going on and been
       a part of your life.” To the extent that Williamson takes issue with
       the court focusing on his prior child sex abuse oﬀenses, which are
       reﬂected in his criminal history score as part of the guideline calcu-
       lations, the court is not barred from taking his conviction and non-
       conviction criminal history into account as part of the § 3553(a)
       factors as well, especially because Williamson’s speciﬁc history of
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                22-13081

       child abuse was distinct from, and arguably more relevant than, his
       general criminal history score. See Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355; Rodri-
       guez, 628 F.3d at 1264; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court also con-
       cluded that fairness and “respect for the law” demanded a 30-year
       sentence, with at least 15 years served in federal prison in addition
       to Williamson’s state sentence, because Williamson’s state sen-
       tence did not account for his production of child pornography
       charge and Congress required a 15-year minimum sentence for that
       oﬀense. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
             Thus, the court considered the serious nature and circum-
       stances of Williamson’s oﬀense as both a physical abuser and a por-
       nographer, his criminal history of sexually abusing children, the
       need to punish him for his serious conduct beyond the minimum
       sentence given to less culpable oﬀenders, and respect for the law by
       imposing the minimum sentence for his federal charge in addition
       to time served concurrently to his separate state charge, consider-
       ing these factors more signiﬁcant than his mitigating circum-
       stances. Even though 98 months would be a substantial upward
       variance from the guideline range that would have applied without
       the § 4B1.5(b) enhancement, the court provided a signiﬁcantly
       compelling justiﬁcation for it in terms of the egregious oﬀense con-
       duct and Williamson’s history of sexual misconduct with minors.
              Because the sentence is reasonable under the alternative
       range that would have applied without the enhancement, any error
       by the district court in applying the enhancement was harmless.
       See Keene, 470 F.3d at 1348-50.
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       22-13081           Opinion of the Court                     7

             AFFIRMED.