Court Opinion

ID: 9881928
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-04 18:00:35.207024+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:26.812605
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50895        Document: 00516919310             Page: 1      Date Filed: 10/04/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                    _____________                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit

                                    No. 22-50895
                                                                                      FILED
                                                                                October 4, 2023
                                consolidated with
                                    No. 22-50921                                 Lyle W. Cayce
                                  _____________                                       Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                     Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   Carlos Ortega,

                                              Defendant—Appellant.
                     ______________________________

                    Appeals from the United States District Court
                         for the Western District of Texas
                     USDC Nos. 7:10-CR-242-1, 7:22-CR-40-1
                    ______________________________

   Before Clement, Haynes, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         In this consolidated appeal, Defendant-Appellant Carlos Ortega
   challenges the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his revocation
   sentence and the applicability of the career offender enhancement to the

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-50895      Document: 00516919310             Page: 2   Date Filed: 10/04/2023

                                    No. 22-50895
                                  c/w No. 22-50921

   sentence for his new convictions. For the reasons set forth below, we
   AFFIRM.
                                     I.       Facts
          Carlos Ortega has an extensive criminal background. This appeal is
   framed by three of his prior convictions. First, in 2005, Ortega pleaded guilty
   to the sale of dangerous drugs in violation of an Arizona state statute. The
   section of the statute under which he was convicted states: “A person shall
   not knowingly . . . [p]ossess a dangerous drug for sale.” Ariz. Rev. Stat.
   Ann. § 13-3407(A)(2). Ortega served his prison term and was released.
   However, soon after, he again faced criminal charges, this time in federal
   court. In 2010, he pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine with
   the intent to distribute and possession of a firearm after a felony conviction.
   The district court sentenced Ortega to a prison term and a term of supervised
   release.
          Ortega completed his prison term, and his supervised release began.
   But, shortly thereafter, he violated several terms of his supervised release.
   Around the same time as those violations, he was again indicted in federal
   court, this time for conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute
   methamphetamine and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
   trafficking crime. Ortega pleaded guilty to those new charges.
          Ortega then faced sentencing for both his new convictions and for
   violating the terms of his supervised release. As to the new convictions, the
   probation officer recommended that the district court apply the career
   offender enhancement based on Ortega’s two prior convictions for
   controlled-substance offenses. The district court, over Ortega’s objections,
   applied the enhancement and sentenced Ortega to a prison term of 267
   months for the drug charge and 60 months for the firearm charge, to run
   consecutively.

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           As to the revocation case, the probation officer calculated Ortega’s
   sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines’ policy statements. The
   range indicated that his sentence should be 33 to 41 months in prison.
   However, the district court observed that a sentence within that range would
   exceed the statutory maximum of 24 months in prison. See 18 U.S.C. §
   3583(e)(3); see also U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(b)(1). Accordingly, the district court
   sentenced Ortega to two prison terms of 24 months, to run consecutively to
   the term of imprisonment for his new convictions but concurrent with each
   other. Ortega timely appealed from the sentence for his new convictions and
   his revocation sentence, and we consolidated those appeals.
                                     II.    Discussion
           Ortega raises three issues on appeal. First, while not expressly
   asserting it in this way, his argument includes a procedural challenge to his
   revocation sentence. 1       Second, he attacks his revocation sentence as
   substantively unreasonable. Third, he challenges the application of the
   career criminal enhancement to his sentence for his new convictions. We
   address each issue in turn below.
       A. Procedural Reasonableness
          We begin with Ortega’s first argument challenging his revocation
   sentence on procedural grounds. Because Ortega did not object to any
   procedural errors in the district court, our review is for plain error. See
   Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009); United States v. Whitelaw,
   580 F.3d 256, 259 (5th Cir. 2009). We will reverse only if Ortega can

           _____________________
           1
              His “statement of issues” regarding the revocation sentence states: “Did the
   district court impose substantively unreasonable sentences by ordering Ortega to serve a
   consecutive 24-month imprisonment after imposing 327 months . . . .” However, the
   actual arguments include a procedural challenge.

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   demonstrate that the district court committed an error and that error (1) is
   clear or obvious and (2) affects Ortega’s substantial rights. Whitelaw, 580
   F.3d at 260. If Ortega makes such a showing, we have discretion to correct
   the error but only if it “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public
   reputation of judicial proceedings.”      Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135 (internal
   quotation marks and citation omitted).
          Ortega argues that the district court committed a procedural error
   because it failed to properly explain its sentence.        We disagree.     At
   sentencing, a district court is instructed to consider the relevant factors
   enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the non-binding policy
   statements found in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines. United
   States v. Mathena, 23 F.3d 87, 90–93 (5th Cir. 1994). In explaining its
   sentence, a district court “should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate
   court that [the district court] has considered the parties’ arguments and has
   a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.”
   Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). But, when a district court
   imposes a within-Guidelines sentence, it does not need to give a “lengthy
   explanation.” Id.
          The district court satisfied that standard here. It articulated on the
   record that it “reviewed the policy statements contained in [C]hapter 7 of
   the [G]uidelines and the sentencing factors set forth in [§ 3553(a)] in
   determining the appropriate disposition in this matter in relation to
   [Ortega’s] violations of his conditions of release.” It then imposed a
   sentence below the original Guidelines’ range (given the statutory maximum,
   the Guidelines lowered from 33–41 months to 24 months). Because “the
   record makes clear that [the district court] considered the evidence and
   arguments,” no more explanation was needed. See id. at 359. Thus, we
   conclude that the sentence was procedurally reasonable.

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      B. Substantive Reasonableness
          We now turn to Ortega’s challenge to the substantive reasonableness
   of his revocation sentence. Because Ortega preserved this challenge below,
   we review under the “plainly unreasonable” standard set forth in 18 U.S.C.
   § 3742(a). United States v. Miller, 634 F.3d 841, 843 (5th Cir. 2011).
   Accordingly, we will reverse only if we conclude after examining “the totality
   of the circumstances,” that the district court abused its discretion. United
   States v. Fraga, 704 F.3d 432, 439–40 (5th Cir. 2013); see also Miller, 634 F.3d
   at 843. Importantly, our review is deferential—“[t]he mere fact that we
   ‘might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate’
   is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court’s sentence.” United
   States v. Kippers, 685 F.3d 491, 500 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Gall v. United
   States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). “A sentence is substantively unreasonable if
   it (1) does not account for a factor that should have received significant
   weight, (2) gives significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or (3)
   represents a clear error of judgment in balancing the sentencing factors.”
   United States v. Warren, 720 F.3d 321, 332 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation
   marks and citation omitted).
          Ortega argues that the revocation sentence was plainly unreasonable
   considering the 327-month sentence that the district court had already
   imposed for his new convictions. We disagree. Under our precedent,
   consecutive within-Guidelines sentences are presumed to be reasonable.
   United States v. Candia, 454 F.3d 468, 474 (5th Cir. 2006). The sentence
   here was within Guidelines. Further, the Guidelines’ policy statement also
   provides that a revocation sentence shall run consecutively to any other
   sentence, even if both arose out of the same conduct, because a revocation
   sentence punishes a breach of trust rather than the criminal conduct.
   U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f), p.s.; see also U.S.S.G. Ch. 7, Pt. A, ¶ 3(b). The district
   court’s decision then to impose a consecutive sentence was not error, let

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   alone obvious error under existing law. See Warren, 720 F.3d at 332.
   Accordingly, we conclude that the sentence was substantively reasonable.
       C. Career Offender Enhancement
           Finally, we address Ortega’s argument that the district court erred in
   applying the career offender enhancement. We begin with a framing point.
   We review properly preserved challenges to the district court’s
   interpretation of the Guidelines de novo. United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez,
   517 F.3d 751, 764 (5th Cir. 2008). However, we review forfeited objections
   only for plain error. Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135. It is subject to debate whether
   Ortega properly raised this issue below. But we need not decide whether
   Ortega’s objection was sufficient to preserve the argument. As explained
   below, even under a de novo standard, the district court did not err in
   applying the enhancement.
           The career offender enhancement applies if a defendant has two prior
   felony convictions for controlled-substance violations. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).
   The district court concluded that the career offender enhancement applied
   based on Ortega’s 2005 conviction in Arizona and his 2010 federal
   conviction. On appeal, Ortega claims that his 2005 conviction in Arizona
   cannot qualify as a predicate prior controlled-substance offense because
   Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated § 13-3407(A)(2) is overbroad. 2
           Ordinarily, we apply a categorical approach to determine whether a
   prior conviction qualifies as a controlled-substance offense. See, e.g., United
   States v. Hinkle, 832 F.3d 569, 572 (5th Cir. 2016) (applying categorical
           _____________________
           2
             Ortega also asserts that § 13-3407 is overbroad because § 13-3407(A)(7)
   criminalizes an “offer to sell,” but we reject that argument. Ortega was convicted under
   § 13-407(A)(2), which criminalizes possession, not (A)(7) which is broader. Accordingly,
   Ortega’s actual crime of conviction was no broader than the federal offense on this point.
   See 21 U.S.C. § 844.

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   analysis to guideline career offender enhancement). Under the categorical
   approach, a prior conviction will qualify as a “controlled-substance offense”
   only if the elements of the least culpable conduct criminalized by the statute
   of prior conviction are “the same as, or narrower than” the federal definition
   of a controlled-substance offense. See Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500,
   504 (2016). Conversely, if the state statute at issue is broader than the federal
   offense, the state offense is not a categorical match. See id.
          If the state statute is overbroad, or in other words, is not a categorical
   match, we must then determine whether the state statute is divisible. See id.
   at 505. A statute is divisible if it “list[s] elements in the alternative, and
   thereby define[s] multiple crimes.” Id.; see also United States v. Lerma, 877
   F.3d 628, 631 (5th Cir. 2017). If the state statute is divisible, then we apply
   the modified categorical approach. Lerma, 877 F.3d at 631. Under this
   approach, we may look to certain documents, such as the indictment, jury
   charge, or plea agreement, to narrow the statute and determine what crime
   the defendant was convicted of. Mathis, 579 U.S. at 505–06
          Applying those principles here, we must first determine whether § 13-
   3407(A)(2) is a categorical match. The Government concedes that it is not—
   on its face, § 13-3407(A)(2) criminalizes the possession for sale of certain
   drugs which are not included in the equivalent federal statute. Compare
   Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3401, with 21 U.S.C. § 812. Accordingly, it
   is overbroad and not a categorical match with the federal offense. See Mathis,
   579 U.S. at 508–09.
          That § 13-3407(A)(2) is overbroad is not the end of the matter,
   though. We must next consider whether § 13-3407(A)(2) is divisible by drug
   type. See id. at 505–06. In doing so, we may look to state court precedents,
   the statute’s text, Arizona jury instructions, and Ortega’s record of
   conviction. See Monsonyem v. Garland, 36 F.4th 639, 644 (5th Cir. 2022)

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   (analyzing divisibility of a Texas criminal statute in removal context). It does
   not appear that any Arizona state court has definitively spoken on the
   divisibility of this statute.   Nevertheless, remaining indicia lead us to
   conclude that § 13-3407(A)(2) is divisible by drug type.
          Our conclusion first finds support in the text of the statute. See
   Mathis, 579 U.S. at 518 (“[T]he statute on its face may resolve the issue.”).
   Importantly, § 13-3407 provides for harsher sentences for certain drugs. See
   Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3407(B)(1), (3), (E)–(G). This suggests that
   the type of drug is a statutory element. See Mathis, 579 U.S. at 517–18. What’s
   more, the statute permits the state to charge defendants with multiple crimes
   for single acts of possessing multiple different types of drugs. See State v.
   Casteel, No. 1 CA-CR 07-0903, 2008 WL 4814482, at *1–3 (Ariz. Ct. App.
   Oct. 23, 2008) (describing such convictions). This further supports the
   conclusion that the type of drug is an element.
          Arizona jury instructions, while not dispositive, also support our
   conclusion that the relevant statute is divisible. That is because, as other
   courts have recognized, a conviction under § 13-3407 requires the state to
   prove that the substance at issue is a dangerous drug as defined by § 13-3401.
   See United States v. Sanchez-Murillo, No. CR-19-00795-PHX-SPL, 2019 WL
   3858606, at *3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 16, 2019) (discussing Arizona jury
   instructions). Thus, in order to prove a defendant possessed a dangerous
   drug, the state must necessarily present evidence identifying the particular
   drug the defendant possessed. See id.
          Finally, our conclusion finds support in Ortega’s conviction
   documents. See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005). Supreme
   Court precedent allows us to “peek” at Ortega’s conviction documents to
   discern a statute’s divisibility. Mathis, 579 U.S. at 518–19. Doing so here,
   Ortega’s    indictment     charged     him    with    knowingly     possessing

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   methamphetamine, a dangerous drug, for sale. The charging document thus
   references one particular dangerous drug to the exclusion of all others. This
   leads us to conclude that § 13-3407 is divisible.
          To sum up, based on § 13-3407’s text, Arizona jury instructions, and
   the record of prior conviction itself, we hold that § 13-3407(A)(2) is divisible
   by drug type. “Given this conclusion, the remainder of our analysis may be
   addressed in short order. Because the statute is divisible, we apply the
   modified categorical approach to see which offense, under [§ 13-3407(A)(2)],
   is the crime of conviction.” United States v. Garrett, 24 F.4th 485, 491 (5th
   Cir. 2022). In so doing, “we are permitted to look to the indictment and the
   judicial confession entered on [Ortega’s] guilty plea.” Id. Reviewing those
   documents, it is apparent that Ortega was charged with possession of
   methamphetamine, a federally punishable controlled substance. Thus, the
   district court did not err in concluding that Ortega had two prior controlled-
   substance convictions and thereby applying the career offender
   enhancement.
                                III.    Conclusion
          For the reasons discussed above, we AFFIRM the district court’s
   revocation sentence and application of the career offender enhancement.

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