Court Opinion

ID: 9742595
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:16:36.033951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:34.011296
License: Public Domain

Swainson, J.

(dissenting).

FACTS:1 On the evening of January 10, 1970, 15-year-old Mary Fortuna was baby sitting at the upstairs flat of Mrs. Peggy Siedlecki in Grand Rapids. After the children had been put to bed, Miss Fortuna watched television and read until approximately 2:30 a.m. when a knock was heard at the door. She went to the door and admitted a male (later identified as defendant Dennis Szczytko) after he requested to use the telephone to obtain assistance for Mrs. Siedlecki who he said was downstairs with car problems.
Upon being admitted into the flat, defendant sat down momentarily, requested and used the bathroom and attempted to make a phone call, apparently not reaching anyone. Defendant sat down again and then suddenly switched off the overhead lights and began to beat Miss Fortuna with his hands and a telephone receiver and to tear off her clothing.
The police, who had been summoned by a neigh*295bor, quickly arrived and frightened off defendant who fled through a back window. The police discovered the badly beaten unconscious body of Miss Fortuna naked except for her blouse which was wrapped around her neck. First aid was administered and after she regained consciousness, the police took Miss Fortuna to the hospital where she was treated for her injuries. The hospital examination revealed that she had not been sexually molested.
Miss Fortuna furnished the police with a description of her assailant. They began to search for defendant and arrested him two days later at a Grand Rapids hotel on charges of violation of a city ordinance prohibiting registering at a hotel under an assumed name.2 Defendant was taken in for questioning on this charge early on the morning of January 13th. He was given the Miranda3 warnings and consented to answer questions regarding the ordinance violation. He was advised again of his Miranda rights and the questioning shifted to the assault of Mary Fortuna. After further questioning, defendant made a 14-page confession in which he admitted beating the complainant. The confession was ruled admissible at a pretrial Walker4 hearing.
After his confession defendant was formally arrested and bound over to circuit court on charges of assault with intent to rape, MCLA 750.85; MSA 28.280, and assault with a dangerous weapon with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder, MCLA 750.84; MSA 28.279.
Defendant raised as his defense to the charges a claim of insanity resulting from a psychomotor *296epileptic seizure. At defendant’s jury trial expert witnesses were called to substantiate that defense. The trial was far from an objective battle of experts, however. The proceedings were marked by the emotional testimony of Miss Fortuna and the overzealous actions of the assistant prosecuting attorney. The court instructed the jury on possible verdicts including not guilty by reason of insanity. A verdict of guilty as charged was returned and defendant was sentenced to serve seven and one-half to ten years in state prison.
On appeal, appellant raised four issues of error before the Court of Appeals. In a lengthy opinion that Court reviewed each issue and affirmed the conviction. People v Szczytko, 40 Mich App 161; 198 NW2d 740 (1972). An application for leave to appeal was filed with the Supreme Court which we granted, 388 Mich 755 (1972), in order to consider the proper scope of advocacy under our prior decision of People v Cole, 382 Mich 695; 172 NW2d 354 (1969).
I.
We turn now to examine appellant’s primary claim of error.
Whether comments made by the prosecution to the jury in reference to the disposition of defendant in the event of the return of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity constitute reversible error?
In People v Cole, supra, this Court found it in the best interests of justice to allow the trial judge, upon request, to instruct the jury on the disposition of a defendant in the event of the return of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. The Court, in Cole, adopted the position of the Court of *297Appeals for the District of Columbia as set forth in Lyles v United States, 103 US App DC 22, 25; 254 F2d 725, 728 (1957):
"This point arises under the doctrine, well established and sound, that the jury has no concern with the consequences of a verdict, either in the sentence, if any, or the nature or extent of it, or in probation. But we think that doctrine does not apply in the problem before us. The issue of insanity having been fairly raised, the jury may return one of three verdicts, guilty, not guilty, or not guilty by reason of insanity. Jurors, in common with people in general, are aware of the meanings of verdicts of guilty and not guilty. It is common knowledge that a verdict of not guilty means that the prisoner goes free and that a verdict of guilty means that he is subject to such punishment as the court may impose. But a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity has no such commonly understood meaning. * * * It means neither freedom nor punishment. It means the accused will be confined in a hospital for the mentally ill until the superintendent of such hospital certifies, and the court is satisfied, that such person has recovered his sanity and will not in the reasonable future be dangerous to himself or others. We think the jury has a right to know the meaning of this possible verdict as accurately as it knows by common knowledge the meaning of the other two possible verdicts.”
In the present case, the defense properly requested the trial court to give the Cole-Lyles instruction. Prior to the court’s instructions, however, the assistant prosecuting attorney in his closing arguments made the following remarks:
"Counsel brings up, if you come back by reason of— not guilty by reason of insanity that the defendant will go to a mental institution appropriate considered and according to the laws of the State of Michigan. That’s right. But, all he has to do is, through some legal paper work ask to be released—
*298"Mr. Pawlowski [defense counsel]: Well, now, wait a minute. Objection.
"Mr. Zerial [assistant prosecuting attorney]: He brought it up on his argument, your Honor.
"The Court: You may proceed.
"Mr. Zerial: So all he has to do is say I am well now. I am well.
"Mr. Pawlowski: Mr. Zerial, you know this isn’t true. Now why are you saying this?
"Mr. Zerial: A writ of habeas corpus and—
"The Court: Just a moment. I think I will restrict you on this. I think that the matter of what the procedures are in the hospital is far beyond the province of this jury. I will restrict you on that.
"Mr. Zerial: I think when opposing counsel brings up an argument that I am allowed to rebut it and I say that—
"The Court: You may proceed. I will restrict you on that.”
Appellant argues that the above quoted remarks of the prosecuting attorney destroyed the ColeLyles instruction and hence require a reversal of his conviction. In response, the people contend that the disputed remarks were warranted because of prior statements concerning disposition made by the defense attorney; and, in any event, were rendered harmless by the corrective actions of the trial court.
The closing arguments of the defense counsel were not transcribed so it is impossible for us to judge the factual merit of the prosecution’s claim that the above quoted remarks were a direct response to the closing arguments of the defense.5 *299However, we find that a proper understanding of the holding in Cole makes such a factual determination unnecessary. Although our Court in Cole did not expressly restrict the prosecution or defense from arguing to the jury on the disposition of a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity, we find that the implicit rationale of Cole precludes such argument. Cole rejected the majority rule which forecloses all consideration of sentence or other disposition of a defendant from the *300jury. In its place was adopted the Lyles rule which permits the court in the limited case where a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is raised to " * * * definitively inform the jurors of the applicable law [regarding disposition] and to separate law from advocacy.” People v Hampton, 384 Mich 669, 680; 187 NW2d 404 (1971). When the Cole Court cut back the traditional maxim that the disposition of the defendant is not a proper concern of the jury " * * * the Court did not go so far as to allow either the prosecutor or the defense to comment upon the defendant’s disposition in such a case.” People v Lewis, 37 Mich App 548, 552; 195 NW2d 30 (1972).
The Court of Appeals in its opinion below found the closing remarks of the prosecution permissible under People v Singer, 174 Mich 361; 140 NW 522 (1913), which recognized the right of the prosecution to reply to defense arguments concerning possible sentences. We disagree with the Court of Appeals. The prosecutor’s argument in Singer was described by the Court as follows:
"The argument of the prosecuting attorney, apparently in answer to that made by respondent’s counsel, to the effect that a verdict of guilty did not necessarily mean a prison sentence or one for a long term, that the matter of the punishment was in the hands of the court 'and absolutely beside the case,’ an argument objected to, and to which an exception was entered, but concerning which ho ruling was asked or made.” 174 Mich 362; 140 NW 522.
The prosecutor in Singer factually stated the correct rule of law regarding sentencing and commendably sought to confine the jury to its proper deliberative role. Singer clearly cannot be claimed as authority for remarks such as those in issue in the instant case.
*301We, moreover, find Singer inapposite to the facts before us. Singer did not deal with the verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. As herein above discussed, the Cole-Lyles rule restricts exclusively to the trial judge the function of informing the jury on the law and procedures accompanying the return of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. Should either advocate overstep the bounds of this rule, the proper response should be to raise an immediate objection and request cautionary instructions of the court; not to engage in a further violation of the Cole-Lyles rule.
In examining the assistant prosecuting attorney’s remarks we are guided by " * * * the primary purpose of [the Cole-Lyles] instruction [which] is to insure that a defendant will not be found guilty because the jury fears that he will be set free if an insanity verdict is returned.” People v Hampton, 384 Mich 669, 676; 187 NW2d 404 (1971). In the present case, rather than aiding the trial court in the proper application of Cole, the prosecutor sought to kindle in the jury just that fear that the Cole-Lyles instruction is designed to alleviate. Similar prosecutorial conduct has been twice condemned by other panels of the Court of Appeals. People v Secorski, 37 Mich App 486; 195 NW2d 8 (1972); People v Lewis, supra. Likewise, courts in other states have reversed convictions obtained after the prosecutor has misleadingly argued to the jury that a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity will provide no protection to society since a committed defendant can quickly and easily obtain his own release from custody. Williams v State, 68 So 2d 583 (Fla, 1953); People v Mallette, 39 Cal App 2d 294; 102 P2d 1084 (1940); State v Johnson, 267 SW2d 642 (Mo, 1954); State v Nickens, 403 SW2d 582 (Mo, 1966); Smith v State, 220 So 2d 313 (Miss, 1969).
*302The prosecution finally argues that the disputed remarks were rendered harmless by the corrective actions of the trial court.6 We cannot agree. The remarks must be viewed in the context of the entire record. MCLA 769.26; MSA 28.1096; People v Robinson, 386 Mich 551, 563; 194 NW2d 709, 713 (1972). Viewed in context, we are not able to say beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutor’s erroneous deviation from the Cole-Lyles rule did not contribute to appellant’s conviction. People v Liggett, 378 Mich 706, 717; 148 NW2d 784 (1967); People v Robinson, supra.
The assistant prosecuting attorney should have been aware that the presentation of evidence and argument at this highly emotional jury trial required prudent handling if defendant was to receive a fair trial. Instead of being zealous in the pursuit of a fair trial, he was over-zealous in his efforts to obtain a verdict of guilty. We cite two éxamples in the margin below.7
*303Although we find it unnecessary to review appellant’s claim that this over-zealous conduct itself *304constituted prejudicial error, we note that these actions and statements formed a backdrop to the prosecutor’s misleading remarks that indicated that defendant could effect his own speedy release from custody if committed to a mental institution. Corrective instructions in some situations would assure us that the jury followed the law in reaching its verdict. In this case, however, we must conclude that the disputed remarks "may well have lead the jury to suspend its own powers of judgment in reviewing the evidence before it”. People v Humphreys, 24 Mich App 411, 419; 180 NW2d 328 (1970).
In the interests of justice, appellant’s conviction must be reversed.
II.
Defendant additionally argues that we find that the examining magistrate lacked sufficient evidence to bind him over to circuit court on the charge of assault with intent to rape and that the trial court erred in admitting defendant’s confession into evidence. After a thorough examination of these allegations, we find no reversible error in the opinion below (Parts I and II) on these issues.
The Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part. Defendant’s conviction is reversed and this case remanded to the Kent County Circuit Court.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Williams, J., concurred with Swainson, J.

 The facts of this case are set forth in greater detail in the opinion below. 40 Mich App 161; 198 NW2d 740 (1972).

 Grand Rapids Ordinance Code, ch 152, art 6, § 9.168a.

 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694; 10 ALR3d 974 (1966).

 People v Walker, 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965).

 Two other statements of the defense mentioning the need for treatment and the possible length of confinement at a treatment facility have been preserved on the record. The first appeared in defense counsel’s opening statement.
"You are going to hear an awful lot of testimony from defense’s two psychiatrists and the prosecution’s one psychiatrist. I am sure that not only I but the prosecution will attempt to have the doctors *299explain as clearly as possible as to what they are talking about, and you can be sure that I will do that, because I am sure that once you hear this testimony from the doctors that you will be of the opinion that I am, that this boy at the time did not know what he was doing, could not control his acts, had no motive whatsoever for committing this crime, and that you will form a conclusion that he needs psychiatric help and not punishment under the laws of this state.”
The second developed out of the direct examination of defense , expert, Dr. Lynn W. Blunt.
"Q. In your medical professional opinion do you feel that the defendant can be assisted in the—in a psychiatric way?
"A. I felt that there is some—that he does show some features which would make him amenable to treatment. Treatment would be directed at three things, actually; the psychomotor seizure disorder probably being the easiest to treat since he could be given anti-convulsive medication which he has never had because the situation has now been diagnosed. The other treatment would be directed at his underlying personality disorder, which I feel is present, and his alcoholism. I feel that his use of alcohol is very much contra-indicated with this abnormal EEG and his tendency toward psychomotor attacks. He would have to stop the use of alcohol.
"Q. Would this be an in-custody type of mental treatment for the most part?
"A. Yes it would.
"Q. And would you have any idea as to the length of time that would be required as far as this treatment would be concerned? Would it be a long time, short time?
'A. I would think that it would be a fairly long period of time. He would require in-patient treatment. The character disorder part would be difficult, the alcoholism would be the most difficult part to treat and I would think that he would require therapy over a period of several years, probably I would say 8 to 10 years, 6 to 10 years, possibly.
"Q. This would be in a psychiatric hospital?
"A. Yes. Under the Michigan Department of Mental Health.”
In neither case did the people object to the statement or testimony when presented at trial.

 In addition to restricting the assistant prosecuting attorney during his remarks concerning defendant’s disposition, the trial court delivered the following excerpt in the jury instructions:
"Now as I have indicated to you, you are not to base your verdict upon any speculation or guessing or surmising but base it upon the evidence as you have heard it and the exhibits as they have been received here in evidence. If you find the defendant guilty the ultimate punishment is not in your hands or disposition of the case, but that is in the sole discretion of the Court. If you find him not guilty by reason of insanity, then it would be the duty of the Court to commit him to the hospital authorities who would take over at that particular time. And I am not going to try to outline for you each and every possible verdict but I believe I have given you enough instruction so that you understand them.”

 On people’s direct examination, Mary Irene Fortuna gave testimony regarding the attack. She stated that she was fully dressed prior to the attack and remembered having her clothes torn off forcibly by defendant during the attack. She stated that she then fainted and when she revived found herself injured and naked; this latter testimony having already been independently established through the responding police officers. She further testified that her facial injuries required approximately 30 stitches and hospitalization for 5 or 6 days. Despite this prior testimony, the prosecution closed its direct examination of complainant in the following manner:
*303”Q. Okay. Would you look at Exhibit No. 5, People’s proposed exhibit; do those items look familiar to you? Would you look inside it?
"The Court: Perhaps you can help her take things out. (Witness crying)
"A. (Witness complied with the request.)
"Q. Mary, would you help me in identifying this piece of clothing?
"A. Yes.
"Q. What is that—what does that remind you of?
"A. That was the blouse that I was wearing.
"Q. Would you identify that for me, please?
"A. Those are the slacks.
"Q. Could you identify that?
"A. That is the girdle I was wearing.
"Q. Are these the panties . . .
"A. Yes.
"Q.. . . that you were wearing?
"A. Yes.
”Q. Is that the bra?
"A. Yes.
"Mr. Zerial: You may examine them.
(Mr. Zerial tossed the clothing on defense counsel table.)
' "The Court: Just a minute. Let’s put it back in the bag, Mr. Zerial.
"Mr. Pawlowski: Mr. Zerial, I would appreciate . . . '
"The Court: Just a moment. You don’t need to go into anything. Put it—will you put it in the bag, please, Mr. Zerial?
"Mr. Zerial: I thought he might want to look at them, your Honor.
"The Court: If he does, he may take them out.
"Mr. Pawlowski: May we have a short recess of about five minutes, your Honor?
"The Court: No, we will continue.
"Mr. Pawlowski: Your Honor, may the record show that the prosecuting attorney . . .
"The Court: We will take care of it at a later time.
"Mr. Zerial: I would say that they were tossed to opposing counsel. No other questions at this time, your Honor. You may cross-examine.”
During his closing statement the assistant prosecuting attorney made several questionable remarks. These remarks tended to misconstrue the expert psychological testimony and to cast contempt upon the defendant’s proffered defense of insanity. To avoid quoting out of context, we set forth that portion of the closing argument delivered immediately following the trial court’s curtailment of the remarks in issue in the body of this opinion.

"What—what can we do with this defendant? Very simply we can find him guilty. And what is the answer? I will tell you what the answer is, and it is, very simply, you find him guilty. You tell that 
*304
defendant you can’t go out and viciously beat someone like that. Yon tell him you can’t do that. You can’t do it nor no one else and come in and try to play off amnesia, try to play off that I don’t recall and play off insanity. You tell him that and I guarantee you that is what we can do. That is what we can effect. We can make the world safe for the little Mary Fortunas. That’s what we can do. We can ñnd him guilty and we can tell him we don’t buy that, that hocuspocus that you are trying to pull on us, this instant insanity. ”