Court Opinion

ID: 9913494
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-27 23:02:11.225605+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:00:50.467643
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/27/23 P. v. Taylor CA1/2
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                         A164446
 v.
 ROBERT ED TAYLOR,                                                       (Mendocino County Super. Ct.
                                                                         No. SCUKCRCR202035040)
           Defendant and Appellant.

         A jury convicted Robert Ed Taylor of first degree burglary based on
evidence that he took “about $800” from a Motel 6 room occupied as a
residence by two people. The trial court sentenced Taylor, now age 63, to a
term of 25 years to life, enhanced by the Three Strikes law. (Pen. Code,
§§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A).)1
         The trial court imposed the lengthy sentence against an unusual
procedural backdrop, which forms the primary basis for Taylor’s appeal.

         1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. “The
‘Three Strikes’ law provides that for a defendant convicted of a felony who
has sustained two or more qualifying prior felony convictions—commonly
known as strikes—‘the term for the current felony conviction shall be an
indeterminate term of life imprisonment,’ with the ‘minimum term . . .’ being
the greatest of three options” (People v. Acosta (2002) 29 Cal.4th 105, 108),
one of which is 25 years (§§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(A)(ii), 1170.12,
subd. (c)(2)(A)(ii)).

                                                               1
Before trial, Taylor had reached an agreement with the People. The People
had agreed to dismiss three of the four prior strikes they had charged. Taylor
would submit to a bench rather than jury trial. And the People could rely on
testimony from Taylor’s preliminary hearing, including hearsay, without re-
calling witnesses.
      Based on discussions prior to the bench trial, however, the trial court
concluded that the parties disagreed on the basic terms of the agreement and
that the court could not enforce it. The court attempted to restore the status
quo by resetting the matter for a jury trial at which all the rules of evidence
would apply. The People used a new information to re-charge the three prior
strikes that the People had dismissed under the agreement, and to allege two
additional prior strikes not charged in the original information.
      Taylor contends the court erred by refusing to enforce the agreement.
Specifically, he argues the court lacked jurisdiction to reinstate the strike
allegations it had dismissed pursuant to the agreement. He also contends
the trial court abused its discretion by not dismissing the prior strikes in the
interests of justice. Taylor further argues that a 25-year-to-life sentence is so
grossly disproportionate to his offense that it amounts to cruel or unusual
punishment under the California Constitution.
      We find the trial court properly restored the status quo when Taylor
repudiated the parties’ agreement, including by reinstating the prior strikes
that had previously been charged. The court’s decision was not jurisdictional
error. We agree, however, that Taylor’s sentence was not appropriate and
that strikes should be dismissed in the interests of justice. We remand for
resentencing.

                                        2
                              BACKGROUND
   A. Taylor’s $800 Burglary at a Motel 6
      In May 2020, Ashlee J. and Will R. lived together at the Motel 6 North
in Ukiah.2 On the night of May 7, they went out to get food, leaving the door
to their room open, but returned because Will had forgotten his wallet. Will
lingered in the car while Ashlee went up the stairs to their room.
      Ashlee stopped on the stairs to talk to someone. When she looked up,
she saw Taylor in the room and called Will. Neither Ashlee nor Will had ever
seen Taylor before or given him permission to enter their room. Will ran past
Ashlee up the stairs and saw that their room was “ransacked.” Will asked
Taylor what he was doing there and punched Taylor in the face. Will
“push[ed] [Taylor] towards the stairway to go downstairs.”
      Ashlee noticed that about $800 was missing from her purse in the
room. She told Will that the money was missing and called 911 to report the
theft. Meanwhile, Will threw two bags off the balcony, which Taylor picked
up. Will then ran down the stairs to confront Taylor in the parking lot. Will
“t[ook] a knee” and went through Taylor’s bags, and he asked Taylor to empty
his bags and pocket. Taylor pulled out $800 and gave it to Will.
      An officer responded to Ashlee’s 911 call and found Taylor walking in
the area. Taylor denied he was coming from the Motel 6. Taylor said he was
walking from “the college” (nearby Mendocino College), which the officer
found strange because it was “1:00 o’clock, 12:00 o’clock in the morning.”
Deputy Sheriff August Kinney arrived, read Taylor his Miranda rights, and
arrested him. The officers discovered a Motel 6 room card in one of Taylor’s
pockets, which the investigation later determined to be an invalid card to

      2 The factual background concerning Taylor’s burglary comes from the

jury trial transcript.

                                       3
Ashlee and Will’s room. Deputy Kinney obtained video from a security
camera, which showed Taylor entering and exiting Ashlee and Will’s room
multiple times; he stayed inside the room for over 25 minutes before Ashlee
found him and Will confronted him.
   B. The Charges and the Agreement
      The People charged Taylor with first degree burglary. (§§ 459, 460,
subd. (a).) They alleged four prior strike convictions: two for making
criminal threats in 2016 (§ 422), one for second degree robbery with a firearm
in 1989 (§§ 211, 12022.5), and one for robbery with a firearm in 1979 (ibid.).
While in custody, Taylor refused to appear in court on several occasions,
refused to speak with a doctor for a competency evaluation, and filed several
motions under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 to dismiss his counsel,
which the trial court denied.
      The court held a preliminary hearing on July 28, 2020. Deputy Kinney
and Taylor himself were the only witnesses to testify. Deputy Kinney
recounted his investigation and his conversations with Ashlee and Will,
which included a discussion of their use of the motel room as a residence and
their interactions with Taylor on the night in question. Taylor testified that
he “was employed by Motel 6 painting homes by Michael, the owner of the
place.” Taylor said he “rented the room” he had entered with another person,
and that he “got a call that said to go by my room and close my door.” Taylor
stated he had a key to room 249. Ashlee and Will’s room, where they found
Taylor, was number 236. Taylor said that he entered to “make sure all the
property was in the room.” He testified the $800 he had with him was his
own, from his work painting at the motel.
      After hearing this evidence and viewing a 55-minute security camera
video of the incident, the court found sufficient evidence to hold Taylor to

                                       4
answer for first degree burglary. The People filed an information charging
Taylor with that offense and re-alleging the four prior strikes set forth in the
original complaint. Taylor pled not guilty and denied all of the strike
allegations.
      On October 2, 2020, the court and counsel discussed the terms of an
agreement. Taylor faced a sentence of 25 years to life as a consequence of his
prior strikes. The prosecutor agreed to “take that 25-year-to-life potential off
the table” if Taylor: “one, waives jury trial and [lets] us go by way of court
trial”; “[t]wo, he admits the first strike allegation, which is the 422
conviction” (for making criminal threats); and if Taylor was convicted, “he
would take the . . . mitigated aspect off the table,” meaning his “exposure
would either be 8 . . . or 12 years.” During the bench trial, “the preliminary
hearing transcript would be admissible with no objection to hearsay. The
[video] evidence that was used at that preliminary hearing would also come
in. . . . Additional evidence could come in, the defendant could choose to
testify, though he [doesn’t have] to testify.” “[I]f believed,” the evidence in the
preliminary hearing transcript “would be proof beyond a reasonable doubt,”
although Taylor was not admitting guilt.
      Taylor and his counsel expressed their agreement to the terms the
prosecutor described. The trial court proceeded to take Taylor’s waiver of his
right to a jury trial, which his counsel joined. The court next discussed
Taylor’s waiver of the confrontation clause. The prosecutor stated, “Judge,
let it also be in this case, not completely, but possibly a limited waiver of the
right of confrontation . . . . He doesn’t have to waive it completely, but to the
extent that the preliminary hearing transcript will be used as evidence, as I
have outlined there has to be a waiver of confrontation.” The court and
Taylor then had a colloquy: “So, Mr. Taylor, another aspect of this agreement

                                        5
is that at the court trial, . . . the transcript from the preliminary hearing can
be admitted as evidence, which will allow the court to read the transcript and
accept the testimony that was at the preliminary hearing without having
necessarily those witnesses come to court and testify at the court trial. [¶] Do
you understand that?” Taylor stated, “Yes your Honor.” The court explained
that any video or other evidence presented at the preliminary hearing could
be introduced at the court trial, and Taylor said he understood. Following an
exchange with counsel, the court asked: “So, Mr. Taylor, . . . you are agreeing
that [the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing] is admissible at the
court trial and some of th[at] evidence . . . may have been hearsay, and you
are giving up your right to object to that hearsay testimony at your court
trial. [¶] Do you understand that?” Taylor stated, “Yes your Honor.” The
court concluded, “So are you understanding that you are giving up your right
to confrontation so far as we had explained it?” Taylor again agreed.
      The trial court then stated that it would take Taylor’s admission to the
first strike allegation and would “go ahead [and] implement that part of the
agreement.” The court accepted Taylor’s admission and associated waivers.
The prosecutor stated, “Based on that admission . . . I am going to ask the
court to strike pursuant to this whole bargain the second, third and fourth
strike allegations which in practicality takes three strikes off the table.” The
trial court granted the People’s motion and dismissed the second, third, and
fourth strikes. It scheduled the bench trial for October 13, 2020.
   C. Trial Is Delayed and Taylor Refuses to Enter a Further Waiver
      On the day of the scheduled court trial, Taylor’s counsel requested a
competency evaluation and so the court vacated the trial date. The court
ultimately found Taylor competent to stand trial and reinstated the
proceedings on December 18, 2020.

                                        6
      The court re-confirmed that Taylor understood he was waiving his right
to a jury trial per the parties’ agreement. The prosecutor explained that
“what we’ve agreed to is that the evidence could include the testimony from
the preliminary hearing without hearsay objections.” Taylor’s counsel
agreed, but Taylor said, “What do you mean by that? The plaintiffs never
came to the preliminary hearing . . . . [¶] The only one that came to the
preliminary hearing was the officer. . . .” The prosecutor stated, “It was all
the testimony received without a hearsay objection,” both “the witness’s
testimony, and the officer’s testimony given.” Taylor protested: “There was
only one person that took the stand . . . and that was the officer. The
witnesses didn’t show up at court at all.” The court replied, “So I am going to
let your lawyer go ahead and explain it again to you when he sees you or
meets with you, whenever that happens.” The court rescheduled the bench
trial for January 6, 2021.
      The parties appeared late in the day on January 6, and the court stated
that the trial would be delayed “because of the volume of court proceedings
today.” At this point, the prosecutor expressed a concern that “[t]here’s
waivers that have to be entered” to effectuate the parties’ agreement and “we
don’t have those in place.” The prosecutor stated, “I don’t have a feeling we’re
going to get those in place, and so I don’t believe the procedure set up has
resulted in a meeting of the minds.” The prosecutor explained, “[T]he defense
has said that he has a right to confront witnesses, and the—the reality is the
procedure in place cannot go forward unless there’s a waiver of
confrontation.”
      The court stated that while it believed it had adequate jury trial
waivers from both parties, it must also take waivers of “the right to confront
and cross-examine witnesses, and the right against self-incrimination.

                                       7
Neither waiver did I take. So unless those waivers want to be entered today,
I don’t think we have a deal.” Taylor’s counsel objected, “Your Honor, I
believe we had a deal. I don’t believe there’s a basis for withdrawing that
deal. . . .” The court continued the matter “to think about it before I decide
that” the parties’ agreement “has to be set aside. I’m not prepared to make
that ruling today.”
      At a hearing the next day, the trial court summarized the history of the
case, including its view that because the parties “would be stipulating to
testimony presented at the preliminary hearing . . . whoever those people
are . . . that testified at the preliminary hearing would not be testifying at the
court trial which would require a waiver of the right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses.” Taylor’s counsel stated that Taylor would not enter
these waivers. The parties debated whether the agreement amounted to a
“slow plea” (pursuant to which the parties agree to a bench trial with
agreements concerning the use of evidence to expedite the trial, and with the
understanding the defendant is likely to be found guilty (see People v.
Morelos (2022) 13 Cal.5th 722, 744)), or was a procedural agreement for a
“shortened court trial.” Taylor’s counsel explained: “There, I think, may be a
misassumption that we are proceeding on a . . . slow plea. That is not the
case. For this to be a slow plea, Mr. Taylor would have essentially had to
acquiesce to his guilt in this matter . . . .” Taylor’s counsel stated that the
parties had instead agreed to “a shortened court trial.” “Mr. Taylor entered
into an agreement . . . that the preliminary transcript would be permitted to
come in without objection to hearsay. I made a specific record on that day
that that and only that was going to be agreed to . . . . In all other respects
Mr. Taylor asserted his right to have a traditional trial, albeit a court
trial . . . .” Taylor’s counsel insisted that there was no need “to take any kind

                                         8
of waiver of Mr. Taylor’s right of confrontation . . . .” According to Taylor’s
counsel, “At no point that day did we attempt to take a waiver of Mr. Taylor’s
right to confrontation . . . because we were not entering into a court trial
predicated on Mr. Taylor’s admission of guilt.”
      The prosecutor maintained that the agreement was a form of “slow
plea,” which did not necessarily require an admission of guilt—and in any
event, “we can’t do the procedure that counsel is suggesting without the
waivers that they say they’re not entering.” The prosecutor concluded, “we do
not have a meeting of the minds.” “So I’m asking the court to put the parties
back in their . . . status quo and let’s set it for a jury trial.”
      The court agreed. It said: “I don’t think there was a true meeting of
the minds in October regarding the type of proceeding we were all going
forward with.” “[T]his notion that it was a shortened court trial did require a
stipulation that the preliminary hearing testimony would come in without
objection. Now, you may say it was . . . without a hearsay objection, so maybe
you’re harboring a different kind of objection. But my understanding of it
certainly was it was coming in without objection which would require a
waiver of his right to confront whatever witness testified at the preliminary
hearing.”
      Taylor’s counsel again objected. He argued that the parties reached an
agreement in October, and he objected “to the court’s decision to relieve the
prosecution of its obligation to conduct the trial and to allow it to withdraw
the [jury trial] waiver.” The court responded, “I am sincerely hoping that
counsel can talk with one another and possibly put this agreement back
together,” but “at the time I took the waiver of jury, I don’t think I took the
right waivers regarding everything else,” so “there’s an error sewn into the
record.” Taylor’s counsel then suggested Taylor would be willing to enter

                                           9
some type of confrontation waiver, but not a “blanket” one. The court replied,
“let’s just call it out what we’re talking about. . . . [W]e had one or more law
enforcement officers come to the preliminary hearing and give Prop 115
testimony.[3] . . . Now we’ve designed a method to have a court trial . . . where
that same testimony would come in, and Mr. Taylor would have to waive his
right not only that the officers’ testimony comes in but any statements by any
witness that the officer [gave] . . . at the preliminary hearing would also come
in . . . and he’d be waiving his right to see and hear the witnesses testify that
the officer was quoting . . . . He would also have to [waive] his right to
confront witnesses and have you cross-examine them. . . .” The court
confirmed, “[A]m I being clear?” Taylor’s counsel responded that the court
was being clear. The court asked, “So is he prepared to do that?” Taylor’s
counsel responded, “No.”
      The court concluded, “All right. Then we definitely don’t have a
meeting of the minds because that was . . . fundamentally a premise that the
court was proceeding on that the underlying witnesses who were quoted . . .
at the preliminary hearing by a sworn peace officer, that their statements
would come in for the truth of the matter without objection.” The court set
the agreement aside and scheduled a jury trial.
   D. Taylor Is Convicted and Sentenced Under the Three Strikes Law
      On April 5, 2021, the People filed an amended information, again
charging Taylor with first degree burglary, re-alleging the four strikes from
the original information, and newly alleging two additional strikes: one from
2001 for assault with a deadly weapon with infliction of great bodily injury

      3 Under Proposition 115, voters added section 872, subdivision (b) to

allow peace officers with special training (or with five or more years of
experience) to provide hearsay testimony during preliminary hearings.
(Walker v. Superior Court (2021) 12 Cal.5th 177, 197.)

                                       10
(§§ 245, subd. (a)(1), 12022.7, subd. (a)) and one from 1979 for robbery (§ 211).
Trial began that same day. Taylor again testified in his own defense. He
now claimed that he went to the Motel 6 to buy marijuana from Will but said
Will was high on methamphetamine and accused Taylor of stealing drugs
from him. Taylor said his testimony at the preliminary hearing was different
because he was giving “all kinds of crazy answers because [he] was upset”
and “was just saying anything to get them to change this trial.”
      The jury returned a guilty verdict on the burglary charge on April 15.
At a separate court trial, the court found the allegations of Taylor’s six prior
strike convictions were true.
      Taylor moved for a new trial. He argued that the court did not have
jurisdiction to find he had more than one prior strike conviction “after
already having stuck those allegations pursuant to the motion of the District
Attorney and Penal Code section 1385.” In his briefing on that motion,
Taylor noted, “The court has authority under [section] 1385 to dismiss a
prosecution in the ‘furtherance of justice’ at any time,” argued that the court
presumably engaged in this analysis at the time his strikes were dismissed
and should not have “undo[ne] the striking of prior strikes . . . without proper
process,” and summarized the facts he claimed supported dismissing the
strikes in furtherance of justice. Separately, Taylor moved for a ruling that a
life sentence for his burglary conviction would constitute cruel or unusual
punishment under the California Constitution.
      The court denied both motions. At the hearing on the motion for a new
trial, the court stated, “I don’t find that there is sufficient evidence . . . based
on the [totality] of the evidence that I have reviewed in this case as to the
1385.”

                                         11
      On January 19, 2022, the court sentenced Taylor to a term of 25 years
to life imprisonment under the Three Strikes law. Taylor appealed.
                                 DISCUSSION
      Taylor argues that in October 2020, the trial court properly dismissed
his prior strikes in furtherance of justice pursuant to section 1385. He
contends that in January 2021, the court misinterpreted the parties’
agreement and erroneously found additional waivers were required to
effectuate it. The court’s conclusion allowed the People to “simply renege[] on
[the] agreement.” Taylor further argues that the court lacked jurisdiction to
reinstate the prior strikes at that point. Next, Taylor contends that even if
the court properly reinstated his strikes before trial, it abused its discretion
by failing to dismiss the strikes in furtherance of justice as invited by his
motion for a new trial. He raises a further challenge to his sentence under
article I, section 17 of the California Constitution, which bars cruel or
unusual punishment.
      As we explain below, Taylor repudiated a material term of the parties’
proposed submission procedure. The trial court properly restored the status
quo as a result. Section 871.5, on which Taylor relies for his jurisdictional
argument, does not apply under the facts of this case. We agree, however,
that justice requires five of Taylor’s six charged prior strikes be dismissed.
The trial court abused its discretion by finding otherwise.
                I. Restoring the Status Quo Prior to Trial
      While the parties have debated whether to call it a “slow plea” or
something else, the label does not matter—the trial court dismissed Taylor’s
strikes in October 2020 pursuant to an agreement between the parties, which
the court called “a form of resolution.” Like a plea agreement, this was “a
form of contract,” and must be “interpreted according to general contract

                                       12
principles.” (People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 767.) On appeal, if the
terms of the agreement as recited on the record are clear and explicit, they
govern. (Ibid.) If there is any ambiguity, we consider the circumstances
under which the disputed term was made and the matter to which it relates
“to determine the sense in which the prosecutor and the trial court (the
promisors) believed, at the time of making it, that defendant (the promisee)
understood it.” (Id. at pp. 767–768.)
      Our review is therefore de novo unless interpreting the agreement
turns on the credibility of extrinsic evidence. (People v. Paredes (2008) 160
Cal.App.4th 496, 507.) We review a determination that the defendant
breached an agreement with the People for substantial evidence. (See People
v. Fuentes (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1286, 1302–1303.)
      The terms of the agreement were not ambiguous to counsel or the trial
court. When the parties put their agreement on the record in October 2020,
the prosecutor said that “to the extent that the preliminary hearing
transcript will be used as evidence, as I have outlined there has to be a
waiver of confrontation.” The court explained to Taylor that it would “accept
the testimony that was at the preliminary hearing without having
necessarily those witnesses come to court and testify at the court trial.” The
court clarified that “some of th[at] evidence . . . may have been hearsay, and
you are giving up your right to object to that hearsay testimony at your court
trial” and “you are giving up your right to confrontation so far as we had
explained it.”
      It does seem possible that Taylor, as a layperson, just did not
understand what it would mean to allow the use of the preliminary hearing
testimony at the anticipated bench trial. Neither Will nor Ashlee had
appeared to testify at the preliminary hearing. It is possible that Taylor

                                        13
believed his attorney would get the chance to examine them at the bench trial
even if the People could use the preliminary hearing testimony from Deputy
Kinney about what Will and Ashlee had told Kinney. As the court explained
at length when the deal broke down, however, it was a “fundamental[] . . .
premise” that the statements of “the underlying witnesses . . . would come in
for the truth of the matter without objection.”
      Whether or not the agreement was ambiguous, by late 2020 and early
2021, Taylor did not agree to a bench trial without the right to examine Will
and Ashlee. At the December 2020 hearing addressing the parameters of the
court trial, Taylor twice interjected to protest that Ashlee and Will “never
came to the preliminary hearing . . . . [¶] The only one that came to the
preliminary hearing was the officer. . . .” The court continued the matter to
let Taylor’s counsel “explain it again to [him],” then continued the matter
again “to think about it before I decide that” the parties’ agreement “has to be
set aside.” Before making that ruling, the court very specifically asked if
Taylor was willing to waive his right to confront “the witnesses . . . that the
officer was quoting” and Taylor’s counsel answered, “No.”
      Taylor urges the waivers the trial court already took back in October
2020 were sufficient, and claims the court improperly demanded waivers “as
to the entire court trial” at the January 2021 hearing rather than some more
limited alternative. To the contrary, the court did not seek a “blanket”
waiver of the confrontation clause, but focused on whether Taylor agreed to a
waiver as to Ashlee and Will’s statements as related by Deputy Kinney
during his preliminary hearing testimony. Whether or not the October 2020
waivers had been sufficient, Taylor now rejected this fundamental premise of
the submission procedure the parties had contemplated. He either breached

                                       14
the agreement or else there had simply been no meeting of the minds in the
first place.
      “When either the prosecution or the defendant is deprived of benefits
for which it has bargained, corresponding relief will lie from concessions
made.” (People v. Collins (1978) 21 Cal.3d 208, 214.) “The goal in providing a
remedy for breach of the bargain is to redress the harm caused by the
violation without prejudicing either party or curtailing the normal sentencing
discretion of the trial judge. The remedy chosen will vary depending on the
circumstances of each case.” (People v. Mancheno (1982) 32 Cal.3d 855, 860.)
“The usual remedies for violation of a plea bargain are to allow defendant to
withdraw the plea and go to trial on the original charges, or to specifically
enforce the plea bargain.” (Id. at pp. 860–861.)
      Here, the court could not specifically enforce the parties’ agreement by
forcing Taylor to involuntarily waive his constitutional rights and coerce a
slow plea (or procedural agreement). Nor could it alter the agreement’s terms
over the People’s objection to become more favorable to Taylor, allowing him
to maintain his right to confront Ashlee and Will at the bench trial. (See
People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 701.)
      Under the circumstances, the court could allow the People to withdraw
from the agreement and restore the parties to their status quo. (See People v.
Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at pp. 214–215 [“when the defendant withdraws his
guilty plea or otherwise succeeds in attacking it, counts dismissed pursuant
to a plea bargain may be restored”], citing In re Sutherland (1972) 6 Cal.3d
666, 672 [“Since by granting relief we are in effect permitting defendant to
withdraw his guilty plea, the ends of justice require that the status quo ante
be restored by reviving the four dismissed counts”]; see also People v. Cantu

                                       15
(2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 604, 607 [before defendant pleads guilty or otherwise
detrimentally relies on a bargain, the People may withdraw from it].)
                                II. Section 871.5
      Taylor argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to allow the People
to reinstate Taylor’s prior strikes, and add new strikes, via a new
information. Taylor argues the People failed to file a timely motion pursuant
to section 871.5. Taylor also relies on People v. Dethloff (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th
620 (Dethloff).
      Section 871.5 provides in relevant part: “(a) When an action is
dismissed by a magistrate pursuant to Section 859b, 861, 871, 1008, 1381,
1381.5, 1385, 1387, or 1389 of this code . . . or a portion thereof is dismissed
pursuant to those same sections which may not be charged by information
under Section 739, the prosecutor may make a motion in the superior court
within 15 days to compel the magistrate to reinstate the complaint or a
portion thereof and to reinstate the custodial status of the defendant under
the same terms and conditions as when the defendant last appeared before
the magistrate. [¶] (b) Notice of the motion shall be made to the defendant
and the magistrate. The only ground for the motion shall be that, as a
matter of law, the magistrate erroneously dismissed the action or a portion
thereof.” (§ 871.5, subds. (a), (b).)
      Section 871.5 does not appear to apply to the facts here. First, the trial
court had not “erroneously dismissed the action or a portion” of it. Second,
the strikes could also be (and were) alleged by information. (See § 871.5,
subd. (a) [section 871.5 applies when part of an action “is dismissed . . .
pursuant to [section 1385 and other stated] sections which may not be
charged by information”], italics added.) Third, in addition to re-alleging the
three dismissed strikes, the People alleged two new strikes in their new

                                        16
information. Taylor does not argue that adding these strikes was barred by
section 871.5.4
      Neither section 871.5 nor Dethloff concerns the trial court’s jurisdiction
to remedy a defendant’s breach of an agreement with the People, which does
not depend on specific statutory authority. (See People v. Collins (1996) 45
Cal.App.4th 849, 863–864.) Further, the Dethloff decision is distinguishable
because the charges at issue had been dismissed due to insufficient evidence
at a preliminary hearing. (See Dethloff, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 623.) The
court did not hold that the People must use a section 871.5 motion to seek
reinstatement of strikes dismissed under section 1385, as opposed to re-
alleging those strikes in an amended information. In sum, the trial court
correctly interpreted the parties’ agreement and provided an appropriate
remedy when it became apparent that either the parties had never had a
meeting of the minds or else that Taylor had repudiated the agreement.
             III. Striking Strikes in Furtherance of Justice
      “[A] trial court’s refusal or failure to dismiss or strike a prior conviction
allegation under section 1385 is subject to review for abuse of discretion.”5

      4 Taylor did not oppose the addition of the two new strikes below and

did not address it in his opening brief on appeal. In his reply brief, he argues
that charging the new strikes was improper only in response to the People’s
argument that any error in reviving the three dismissed strikes was
harmless, which we need not address. Even if section 871.5 somehow applied
here, the People still would have alleged and proved three strikes for
purposes of sentencing under section 667 (the strike that had never been
dismissed plus the two new strikes in the new information).
      5 Taylor did raise the interests of justice under section 1385 in his

motion for new trial. We decline to find that he forfeited this argument by
virtue of the fact that his brief focused primarily on the jurisdictional
question under section 871.5. Even if he had forfeited the argument, we
could still reach the merits. (See People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393,
400.)

                                        17
(People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375.) The discretion of a trial
judge “ ‘ “is subject to the . . . legal principles governing the subject of its
action, and to reversal on appeal where no reasonable basis for the action is
shown. [Citation.]” ’ ” (People v. Jacobs (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 728, 740,
quoting Westside Community for Independent Living, Inc. v. Obledo (1983)
33 Cal.3d 348, 355.) “ ‘[T]he ‘legal principles that govern the subject of
discretionary action vary greatly with context’ ” and derive from the “
‘statutes under which discretion is conferred.’ ” (Jacobs, at p. 737.)
      The Three Strikes law “creates a strong presumption that any sentence
that conforms to [its] sentencing norms is both rational and proper.” (People
v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) But there are extraordinary
circumstances where, “ ‘in light of the nature and circumstances of his
present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the
particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may
be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should
be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more
serious and/or violent felonies.’ ” (Id. at p. 377, quoting People v. Williams
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.) In “an extraordinary case—where the relevant
factors described in Williams . . . manifestly support the striking of a prior
conviction and no reasonable minds could differ—the failure to strike would
constitute an abuse of discretion.” (Carmony, at p. 378.) Unfortunately, this
is such a case.
      The disparity between Taylor’s wrongful actions and his 25-year-to-life
sentence is distressing in a way reminiscent of the concerns expressed about
the shortcomings of the Three Strikes law in the days leading up to People v.
Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. Taylor’s burglary was non-
violent. He immediately returned the $800 he had stolen when confronted.

                                         18
Based on the record of the jury trial, his crime appears opportunistic rather
than calculated. The security video shows that the door to Ashlee and Will’s
room was left open when they departed, and that Taylor went in and out of
the room slowly during the offense. When Ashlee and Will returned and
discovered Taylor in their room, Taylor “came out of the room” and Will
“punched him in the face.” Taylor did not hit back. Taylor went downstairs,
leaving his belongings behind, and Will confronted him and went through
Taylor’s bags. Again, Taylor did not fight back. Will asked Taylor to empty
all of his bags, and “he did.” Will asked Taylor what was in his pocket and
“he pulled out the money and he gave it to [Will].” Others were present from
the moment Ashlee observed Taylor in her room until “neighbors” of Ashlee
and Will “start[ed] to surround [them]” as Will confronted Taylor. Ashlee and
Will did not say they were frightened by the burglary.
      While Taylor’s actions caused a conflict that could have resulted in
others getting hurt, and while his testimony lacked any credibility, we must
focus on “the crime actually committed, not a crime that might have
occurred.” (People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1142.) Ultimately,
Taylor’s behavior was not violent or threatening, and no one was hurt other
than Taylor himself.
      We also consider Taylor’s prior strikes and personal background. The
remoteness of the majority of his strikes—four of which occurred in 2001 or
much earlier, including two when Taylor was a youth—is a factor in
mitigation. (People v. Avila, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1141.) Neither of
Taylor’s two more recent strikes for criminal threats involved violence, and
these occurred during a time when a probation report characterized Taylor as
“delusional.” The record reflects that Taylor has periodically suffered from
related mental health issues since at least 2015, and likely for much longer.

                                      19
(See id. at pp. 1143–1144.) While Taylor may have been a “career criminal”
decades ago, his recent offenses appear uncalculated and related to his
mental health struggles, for which he has accepted treatment over the years.
(See id. at pp. 1144–1145.) We must also consider his age—over 60 years old
at the time he was convicted. (See id. at p. 1144.)
        Residential burglary is a serious felony. We do not trivialize the
feelings of “violat[ion]” that Ashlee and Will experienced in this case upon
discovering that Taylor had “ransacked” their room and “gone through . . .
personal belonging[s].” Still, given Taylor’s persistently non-violent behavior
during the offense and the other circumstances discussed above, no
reasonable person could view the Three Strikes sentence imposed here as
just.
        We observe that before Taylor derailed the anticipated bench trial, the
People and the trial court had agreed that Taylor ought not be sentenced as a
Three Strikes offender. While the court appropriately restored the status quo
when the People lost out on the deal they sought in exchange for dismissing
strikes off the bat, Taylor’s assertion of his right to confrontation should not
have so altered the interests of justice that a 12-year sentence became a 25-
year-to-life sentence.6 The trial court was not in any way bound by the failed
agreement between Taylor and the People, but under the circumstances it
should have sentenced him as a two-strike offender in furtherance of justice.
The 25-year-to-life sentence was unnecessarily punitive under the
circumstances.

        6 While two of Taylor’s six prior strikes were not alleged in the

complaint and original information, the parties and the trial court were
aware of them at the time they agreed Taylor should be sentenced as a two-
strike offender in October 2020.

                                         20
      We remand the matter for the court to resentence Taylor. We need not
reach Taylor’s argument that the sentence violates the state constitutional
proscription against cruel or unusual punishment. (See People v.
Williams (1976) 16 Cal.3d 663, 667 [“we do not reach constitutional questions
unless absolutely required to do so to dispose of the matter before us”].)
                                 DISPOSITION
      The sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded for resentencing
with the direction to the trial court to strike all but one of Taylor’s prior
strike convictions (leaving one under § 422) and to reconsider his sentence.

                                        21
                                         _________________________
                                         Markman, J.*

We concur:

_________________________
Stewart, P.J.

_________________________
Richman, J.

People v. Taylor (A164446)

     * Judge of the Alameda Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

                                    22