Court Opinion

ID: 9379980
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-16 20:02:39.77871+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:06.452392
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/16/23 Timed Out v. Prisma Entertainment CA2/3

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
 opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
 opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION THREE

 TIMED OUT LLC,                                                 B309791

      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                 Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No. BC663581
      v.

 PRISMA ENTERTAINMENT
 LLC,

      Defendant and Respondent;

 CHIPPEWA,

      Intervenor and Appellant.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Gregory Keosian, Judge. Affirmed.
      Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Lann G. McIntyre,
Christopher J. Bakes, and Caitlin E. Higgins for Intervenor and
Appellant.
      Conkle, Kremer & Engel, Eric S. Engel, and Zachary Page
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
     Hall Griffin and John T. Griffin for Defendant and
Respondent.
           _______________________________________

                       INTRODUCTION

       Intervenor and appellant Chippewa appeals from orders
denying its motion to vacate the judgment and granting a motion
for attorney’s fees brought by plaintiff and respondent Timed
Out, a limited liability corporation. Timed Out sued Prisma
Entertainment, a limited liability corporation (Prisma) as the
assignee of claims of six professional models whose images were
misappropriated and used to promote a fully nude strip club
operated by Prisma. Chippewa provided marketing and social
media promotion services to Prisma.
       Chippewa intervened in the action following the jury’s
$50,000 verdict and Timed Out’s request for more than $500,000
in attorney’s fees, which Prisma failed to oppose. Chippewa
contended in the trial court, and continues to assert here, that
the trial was a sham proceeding and the verdict obtained was the
product of collusion and fraud. Chippewa’s allegations stem from
a partial settlement reached by Timed Out and Prisma. Although
the settlement related to the claims of two models whose images
were used by Prisma without Chippewa’s involvement, it
required Prisma to cooperate with Timed Out as to certain
aspects of the trial, to assign its claims against Chippewa (e.g.,
for indemnification) to Timed Out, and to assist Timed Out in
any future litigation against Chippewa.
       The trial court denied Chippewa’s motion to vacate the
judgment, finding that the parties had conducted a legitimate
and adversarial trial. We see no abuse of discretion in the court’s

                                 2
ruling. Chippewa also challenges the court’s award of attorney’s
fees. We see no error in that ruling. Accordingly, we affirm the
orders.

       FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1.    The Parties
       Timed Out is a company that specializes in the protection
of privacy and publicity rights in the talent and modeling
industry. As pertinent here, Timed Out received assignments of
claims for misappropriation of images from six models: Jessica
Charm Killings, Kristina Chai, Leanna Decker, Kimberly
Cozzens, Ursula Mayes, and Katrina Van Derham.
       Prisma owns and operates Plan B Gentlemen’s Club
(Plan B), a fully nude strip club in Los Angeles.
       Chippewa is a California corporation. At all relevant times,
Chippewa was doing business as Much and House Public
Relations and Marketing Management. Prisma retained
Chippewa in 2014 to provide social media strategy and publicity
services.
2.    The Operative Pleadings
       Timed Out, as the assignee of the models’ claims, sued
Prisma, asserting causes of action for statutory and common law
violation of the right of publicity. Specifically, Timed Out alleged
that Prisma used the models’ images in social media posts and on
Plan B’s website to market, promote, and advertise its business
in a manner that suggested the models either endorsed the club
or were working for the club as fully nude strippers. According to
Timed Out, such use of the models’ images diluted the value of
the images and caused financial harm to the models in the form
of lost income due to the negative association with a fully nude

                                 3
strip club. Timed Out sought damages in excess of $265,000 as
well as punitive damages.
       Prisma filed a cross-complaint against Chippewa alleging
that Chippewa was responsible for all aspects of its website,
social media, and publicity. Prisma sought declaratory relief and
various forms of indemnity. Chippewa answered the cross-
complaint and filed a special answer to the complaint.
3.    Partial Settlement
       The case was called for trial on January 15, 2020. After the
jury had been impaneled but before opening statements, Timed
Out advised the court that it had reached a partial settlement
with Prisma. Specifically, Prisma and Timed Out had settled the
claims of two of the six models, Kimberly Cozzens and Ursula
Mayes.1
       In general terms, the settlement required Prisma to pay
Timed Out $175,000 to settle the two models’ claims, to dismiss
its cross-complaint against Chippewa, and to assign its legal
claims against Chippewa to Timed Out. Prisma also agreed to
cooperate in the “prompt and efficient” resolution of the trial. In
addition, Prisma agreed that Timed Out could call Prisma’s
corporate representative, Frank Grundel, as a witness during
trial and that Grundel would testify “truthfully and
cooperatively.” Prisma also agreed to “reasonably cooperate” with
Timed Out in any future action by Timed Out against Chippewa.
For its part, Timed Out agreed to limit its execution of any
judgment obtained at trial against Prisma to $20,000.

1Chippewa had not provided the marketing services relating to those
models’ claims.

                                 4
      As required under the settlement, Prisma executed an
assignment conveying to Timed Out all its claims against
Chippewa and its insurers and it also immediately dismissed
without prejudice its cross-complaint against Chippewa.2
4.    Trial; Verdict
      Trial proceeded over the course of three days.3 The jury
found in favor of Timed Out on the claims of all four models and
awarded a lump sum of $50,000 in damages. The court awarded
additional costs and attorney’s fees under Civil Code section 3344
in an amount to be determined.
5.    Posttrial Motions and Rulings
      5.1.   Motions
      Timed Out filed a motion seeking attorney’s fees of
$504,369 and additional costs of $32,053.104 under Civil Code
section 3344, subdivision (a) and Code of Civil Procedure
section 1033.5, subdivision (c)(5). With respect to attorney’s fees,
Timed Out noted that its attorneys took the case on a partial
contingency basis. And although the fees requested far exceeded
the total amount recovered through the jury trial and the partial
settlement, Timed Out asserted that such a request was not

2Chippewa’s counsel had not been advised of the partial settlement or
dismissal of the cross-complaint prior to the in-court announcement.
3Because the evidence presented at trial is not relevant to the issues
on appeal, we need not summarize it.
4These costs were in addition to the $11,829.74 claimed in Timed
Out’s cost memorandum. Prisma did not move to tax those costs.

                                   5
unusual. In particular, Timed Out observed that two trials5 had
been required and each trial accounted for approximately half of
the requested fees. Prisma did not oppose the motion.
      Timed Out served Chippewa with copies of its cost
memorandum as well as its motion for attorney’s fees and
additional costs. Timed Out also advised Chippewa that the
partial settlement with Prisma included an assignment to Timed
Out of all Prisma’s rights and claims against Chippewa.
Chippewa immediately requested and received copies of the
settlement and the assignment. Chippewa learned, among other
things, that in exchange for the $175,000 settlement from Prisma
relating to the claims of two of the six models, Timed Out had
agreed to limit its enforcement of the judgment against Prisma to
$20,000.
      Shortly before Timed Out’s motion for attorney’s fees and
additional costs was to be heard, Chippewa filed an ex parte
application seeking leave to intervene in the action under Code of
Civil Procedure section 387.6 Chippewa noted that Prisma did not

5 The first trial ended in a mistrial after jury selection, opening
statements, and the presentation of testimony from two witnesses. The
court granted Prisma’s request for a mistrial, which was based on the
death in the family of Prisma’s trial representative, over Timed Out’s
objection.
6 Subdivision (d)(1) of that section provides, “The court shall, upon
timely application, permit a nonparty to intervene in the action or
proceeding if either of the following conditions is satisfied: [¶] (A) A
provision of law confers an unconditional right to intervene. [¶] (B) The
person seeking intervention claims an interest relating to the property
or transaction that is the subject of the action and that person is so
situated that the disposition of the action may impair or impede that

                                   6
oppose Timed Out’s posttrial cost and attorney’s fees requests.
And given that Chippewa could, at some point, be required to
indemnify Prisma for the portion of the judgment over $20,000 as
well as any award of attorney’s fees and costs, Chippewa
requested the opportunity to protect its interests by participating
in the postjudgment phase of the litigation.
       Over Timed Out’s objection, the court granted Chippewa’s
request to intervene. The court continued the hearing on Timed
Out’s motion for attorney’s fees and additional costs to give
Chippewa time to oppose that motion.
       Chippewa subsequently moved to vacate the judgment.
Chippewa asserted that the judgment had been obtained by fraud
and collusion and was therefore voidable. Specifically, Chippewa
contended that the settlement was collusive on its face and,
because the full terms of the settlement had not been disclosed
either to the court or to Chippewa, it resulted in a sham trial
designed to benefit Timed Out and Prisma, to the detriment of
Chippewa. Due to the settlement, Chippewa contended, Prisma
had not fully defended itself during the trial.
       Timed Out and Prisma opposed the motion, asserting that
the settlement was not collusive, that they were not obligated to
disclose all the terms of the settlement, and, in any event, that
Chippewa would have the opportunity to defend its interests if
and when an action for indemnity was filed.
       Chippewa also opposed Timed Out’s request for attorney’s
fees. As in its motion to vacate, Chippewa argued the judgment
had been procured by fraud and Timed Out’s request for fees and

person’s ability to protect that interest, unless that person’s interest is
adequately represented by one or more of the existing parties.”

                                     7
costs should be denied in its entirety due to that fraud or on the
basis of unclean hands. In the alternative, Chippewa asserted
that the amount of fees requested—more than $500,000—was
unreasonable and should be reduced.
      5.2.   Rulings
       The court denied Chippewa’s motion to vacate the
judgment. The court found that the settlement and the
assignment were not collusive, standing alone, as such
arrangements are commonplace in the insurance context. And
the court further found, contrary to Chippewa’s contention, that
Timed Out and Prisma had conducted an adversarial trial on the
merits.
       The court granted Timed Out’s motion for attorney’s fees
and additional costs under Civil Code section 3344. The court
found the amount of fees requested to be excessive and awarded
fees of $306,378.30, a substantial reduction from Timed Out’s
original request.
6.    Appeal
      Chippewa timely appeals from the postjudgment orders
denying its motion to vacate the judgment and granting Timed
Out’s motion for attorney’s fees.

                          DISCUSSION

1.    The court did not abuse its discretion in denying
      Chippewa’s motion to vacate the judgment.
      Chippewa contends the court erred in denying its motion to
vacate the judgment. Specifically, Chippewa asserts that the

                                 8
settlement was collusive, resulted in a sham trial, and constitutes
extrinsic fraud.7 We disagree.
      1.1.   Standard of Review
       We review an order denying a motion to vacate made on
equitable grounds for an abuse of discretion. (See Hudson v.
Foster (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 640, 661.) “ ‘In doing so, we
determine whether the trial court’s factual findings are supported
by substantial evidence [citation] and independently review its
statutory interpretations and legal conclusions [citations].’
[Citation.] [¶] ‘ “In assessing whether any substantial evidence
exists, we view the record in the light most favorable to
respondents, giving them the benefit of every reasonable
inference and resolving all conflicts in their favor.” [Citation.]’
[Citation.] ‘ “A finding … based upon a reasonable inference …
will not be set aside by an appellate court unless it appears that
the inference was wholly irreconcilable with the evidence.
[Citations.]” [Citation.] “[W]hen the evidence gives rise to
conflicting reasonable inferences, one of which supports the
finding of the trial court, the trial court’s finding is conclusive on
appeal. [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
      1.2.   Analysis
     “Extrinsic fraud usually arises when a party is denied a fair
adversary hearing because he has been ‘deliberately kept in

7Chippewa also claims the court abused its discretion by failing to
address Prisma’s counsel’s duty to fully disclose the terms of the
settlement. Because Chippewa cites no legal authority to support its
argument, we disregard it. (See Keyes v. Bowen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th
647, 655–656 [noting that matters not properly raised or that lack
adequate legal discussion will be deemed forfeited].)

                                  9
ignorance of the action or proceeding, or in some other way
fraudulently prevented from presenting his claim or defense.’
[Citation.] Where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from
exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him
by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false
promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had
knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the
plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority
assumes to represent a party and connives at his defeat; or where
the attorney regularly employed corruptly sells out his client’s
interest to the other side,—these, and similar cases which show
that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of
the case, are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set
aside and annul the former judgment or decree, and open the
case for a new and a fair hearing.’ (United States v. Throckmorton
(1878) 98 U.S. 61, 65–66.)” (Kulchar v. Kulchar (1969) 1 Cal.3d
467, 471; Luxury Asset Lending, LLC v. Philadelphia Television
Network, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 894, 910–911.)
        “ ‘ “Collusion has been variously defined as (1) ‘a deceitful
agreement or compact between two or more persons, for the one
party to bring an action against the other for some evil purpose,
as to defraud a third party of his right’; (2) ‘a secret arrangement
between two or more persons, whose interests are apparently
conflicting, to make use of the forms and proceedings of law in
order to defraud a third person, or to obtain that which justice
would not give them, by deceiving a court or its officers’; and
(3) ‘a secret combination, conspiracy, or concert of action between
two or more persons for fraudulent or deceitful purposes.’
[Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Andrade v. Jennings (1997)
54 Cal.App.4th 307, 327 (Andrade) [citing Span, Inc. v.

                                 10
Associated Internat. Ins. Co. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 463, 484].) In
the insurance context, “collusion occurs when the insured and the
third party claimant work together to manufacture a cause of
action for bad faith against the insurer or to inflate the third
party’s recovery to artificially increase damages flowing from the
insurer’s breach.” (Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Parks (2009) 170
Cal.App.4th 992, 1013 (Safeco).)
       The court found that the settlement, standing alone, did
not evidence fraud or collusion. In particular, the court noted that
similar agreements have been routinely upheld in the insurance
context, i.e., when an insurer fails to defend an insured against a
claim brought by a third party and the insured settles the claim
and assigns its rights against its insurer to the third party. (See,
e.g., Safeco, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 1013 [“Where the
insurer declines the defense, the insured ‘is free to make the best
settlement possible with the third party claimant, including a
stipulated judgment with a covenant not to execute. Provided
that such settlement is not unreasonable and is free from fraud
or collusion, the insurer will be bound thereby.’ ”].) Chippewa
apparently concedes the point but maintains there is additional
evidence of fraud and collusion the court failed to consider when
it denied the motion to vacate the judgment.
       Chippewa compares the present case to Andrade, supra.
Andrade is distinguishable, however. That case involved an
injured ship captain, his employer, the employer’s insolvent
insurer, and the employer’s excess insurer committed to insure
claims in excess of $1 million. (Andrade, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 312–314.) The captain and his employer negotiated a
settlement of $1.5 million and the captain subsequently obtained
a judgment close to that amount after a prove-up hearing in

                                11
which the employer did not participate. (Id. at pp. 320–321.) The
reasonable settlement value of the captain’s claim, however, was
between $150,000 and $250,000. (Id. at p. 329.) The captain had
agreed not to enforce the judgment against the employer and,
because the primary insurer was insolvent, the inflated
settlement amount was specifically designed to trigger the
employer’s excess coverage. (Id. at pp. 329–330.) The settlement
negotiations and signed agreement, as well as its terms, were
concealed from the excess carrier. (Id. at pp. 330, 334.)
       The court of appeal affirmed the jury’s finding in favor of
the excess insurer that the settlement and subsequent judgment
were the result of collusion between the captain and the
employer. (Andrade, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at pp. 329–334.) The
court focused its analysis on several key factors, none of which
are present in the case at bar. Mainly, the court noted the
substantial disparity between the reasonable value of the
captain’s claim ($150,000 to $250,000) and the judgment (in
excess of $1.5 million.) (Id. at p. 331.) In the present case,
however, no such disparity exists, as Timed Out requested
$95,000 in damages and the jury awarded $50,000. The Andrade
opinion also noted that the amount of the settlement between the
captain and his employer was far higher than any settlement or
judgment in any similar case in recent memory. (Ibid.) Here,
there is no evidence that a $50,000 verdict relating to the four
models’ claims is out of line with verdicts and settlements of
similar cases. Indeed, the only evidence in the record on this
point is the settlement in which Prisma agreed to pay $175,000 to
settle two models’ claims. By comparison, the $50,000 jury
verdict relating to four models’ claims seems reasonable. Finally,
and as to the quality of the defense offered, the employer in

                               12
Andrade stipulated to liability, did not contest damages, made no
opening or closing argument, presented no evidence, and did not
object to any evidence submitted by the captain. (Id. at p. 320.)
As a result, the captain received a judgment in the amount he
requested. (Id. at pp. 320–321.) But there, the evidence suggested
that the captain’s case suffered from serious flaws, including the
absence of evidence of causation and evidence of the captain’s
contributory negligence. (Id. at pp. 331–332.) The present case is
not analogous, as we now explain.
       Chippewa claims that the settlement, and particularly
Timed Out’s agreement to cap its enforcement of the judgment
against Prisma at $20,000, “gave Prisma the assurance it needed
to only present a perfunctory and halfhearted defense that was
mostly aimed at assisting Timed Out in prevailing at trial.” The
court, however, rejected Chippewa’s position and found that “the
judgment entered in this action was not the product of collusion.
Prisma and Timed Out conducted a full trial on the merits of the
claims of four models; Prisma presented opening argument,
conducted cross-examination, and offered closing arguments that
cited the testimony elicited in cross-examination. In that
argument, Prisma argued not merely for a reduction in damages,
but also argued that the four models at issue had not been
harmed at all by Prisma’s misappropriation.” In addition, the
court noted, Timed Out sought $95,000 in damages for the four
models and recovered a substantially reduced amount of $50,000.
       The court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence.
We have reviewed the trial transcript and agree that the parties
conducted a legitimate and adversarial proceeding. In addition,
two of the attorneys representing Prisma submitted declarations
in support of Timed Out’s opposition to Chippewa’s motion to

                               13
vacate the judgment.8 Both attorneys explained that they had
hoped to obtain a defense verdict in the case, relieving Prisma
(and, potentially, Chippewa) of any liability to the four models.
The attorneys also attested that the terms of the settlement were
not confidential or secret—they simply were never asked to
provide a copy of the settlement to Chippewa.
       Chippewa also insists that the trial was rigged in Timed
Out’s favor because the settlement required Prisma to cooperate
with Timed Out in certain respects. For example, the settlement
required Prisma to allow Timed Out to call its corporate
representative Frank Grundel as part of its case in chief and
further required Prisma to make Grundel available for an
interview prior to his testimony.9 Although such a practice may
not be commonplace, nothing about the provision suggests
malicious or deceptive intent, inasmuch as it requires Grundel to
testify truthfully. In any event, Chippewa does not contend that
Grundel’s testimony was either false or unduly influenced by
Timed Out. In other words, Chippewa has not explained how this
settlement provision resulted in any detriment.
       Chippewa also complains that Prisma failed to object to
certain testimony and failed to dispute that Timed Out was the

8   Prisma joined Timed Out’s opposition.
9 The settlement states, “Prisma agrees that Timed Out may, in its
sole discretion, call Frank Grundel as a witness in its case in chief in
the Action, and that Mr. Grundel will testify truthfully and
cooperatively with Timed Out. Prisma will make Mr. Grundel
reasonably available to Timed Out’s counsel in advance of his trial
testimony to interview for purposes of the trial testimony, and
Mr. Grundel will cooperate and speak truthfully with Timed Out’s
counsel.”

                                    14
assignee of each of the models’ claims. But again, Chippewa has
not cited any testimony that was, in fact, objectionable nor does
Chippewa claim that Timed Out was not the assignee of the
models’ claims. To demonstrate that it was harmed in some way
by the settlement and subsequent trial, Chippewa must do more
than note the absence of objection. It must also explain why a
valid evidentiary objection should have been made and how the
failure to make the objection resulted in some harm.
       In addition, Chippewa repeatedly claims that it was
“deprived … of the opportunity to present its defense and
meaningfully participate in the trial” by “misleading statements
and partial disclosure regarding the terms and scope of the
settlement agreement.” Specifically, Chippewa relies on the
following colloquy:
       Mr. Page:10 “Your Honor, before we do that, over the
weekend, Timed Out and Prisma were able to resolve some of the
issues in the case that’s going to—that’s going to streamline the
trial a little bit and reduce some of the time. I think we need to
take a few procedural steps to put that into effect.
       Court: “Okay.
       Mr. Page: “In general terms, at least as it concerns the
court, is that we’ll no longer be hearing and the jury will not be
deciding the claims as it relates to Ms. Cozzens and Ms. Mayes.
[¶] If he hasn’t already, I understand that [counsel for Prisma] is
going to be filing a request for dismissal of the cross-claim
without prejudice, and I think that would take Chippewa out of
the case and narrow that issue so the jury would not be deciding
it anymore.

10   Counsel for Timed Out.

                                15
       Court: “Okay.
       [¶] … [¶]
       Court: [to counsel for Chippewa] “Ms. Vallejo, you are off
the hook. We’ll go ahead and dismiss without prejudice as to the
cross-complaint.”
       From there, Chippewa argues that “[a]s a result, Chippewa
was excluded from the trial and prevented from presenting a
defense.” We disagree with Chippewa’s characterization of the
events. First, Chippewa was not prevented from presenting a
defense. By virtue of the dismissal of the cross-complaint,
Chippewa was no longer required to defend against Prisma’s
indemnity claims at the trial. To the extent the indemnity issue
might arise in a future proceeding, nothing in the settlement or
assignment restricts Chippewa’s ability to defend itself. In other
words, the dismissal of the cross-complaint changed the timing,
not the substance, of the litigation of the indemnity issue.
       Second, and as to the models’ claims, Chippewa was not
excluded from the trial, as evidenced by the fact that Chippewa’s
counsel attended the remainder of the trial. Nor was Chippewa
prevented from assisting Prisma in defending against Timed
Out’s claims. Although Chippewa’s counsel observed the trial
from the gallery rather than at counsel table, that appears to
have been her choice. Both counsel for Prisma indicated that
Chippewa’s counsel was never asked to leave counsel table or told
not to participate in the defense of Timed Out’s claims, and
nothing in the settlement impacted her ability to do so.
       In any event, Chippewa was aware from the outset of the
litigation that it might be required to indemnify Prisma for any
damages recovered. Nothing in the settlement or assignment
altered Chippewa’s potential liability to Prisma or prevented it

                               16
from intervening in the action if it believed Prisma was not
adequately protecting itself and, by extension, Chippewa.
2.    The court did not abuse its discretion by excluding
      attorney declarations submitted in opposition to the
      motion for attorney’s fees.
       Chippewa challenges the award of attorney’s fees to Timed
Out on two grounds. Neither has merit.
       First, Chippewa contends the order awarding attorney’s
fees is “infected by the same fraud and collusion that allowed
Timed Out to obtain a verdict in its favor in the first instance.”
But as we have said, the court’s finding that the judgment was
not the result of fraud or collusion is well supported. Chippewa’s
argument fares no better with respect to the attorney’s fee award.
       Second, Chippewa asserts that the court erred by excluding
two expert declarations submitted in support of its opposition to
Timed Out’s motion for attorney’s fees. We review the court’s
ruling on the admissibility of expert opinion evidence for an
abuse of discretion. (See King v. State of California (2015) 242
Cal.App.4th 265, 293 (King).)
       Chippewa had argued in its opposition to Timed Out’s
motion for attorney’s fees that no fees should be awarded because
Timed Out’s attorneys violated various Rules of Professional
Conduct and Business and Professions Code section 6068. On this
point, Chippewa submitted “declarations of two attorney ethics
experts, David B. Parker and Murray B. Greenberg, each of
whom opines that Timed Out’s counsel violated Rules of
Professional Conduct, Rules 3.3, 3.4, and 8.4 and [Business and
Professions] Code § 6068.” The court sustained Timed Out’s
objections to both declarations, stating that the “testimony
concerning the violation of ethical obligations or the collusive

                                17
nature of the trial are legal issues that are properly the province
of this court to decide.” We agree.
       “An expert witness’s opinion testimony must be ‘[r]elated to
a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience that the
opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact.’ (Evid. Code,
§ 801, subd. (a).) Although otherwise admissible opinion evidence
‘is not objectionable because it embraces the ultimate issue to be
decided by the trier of fact’ (id., § 805), an expert is not allowed ‘to
testify to legal conclusions in the guise of expert opinion. Such
legal conclusions do not constitute substantial evidence.
[Citation.] “The manner in which the law should apply to
particular facts is a legal question and is not subject to expert
opinion.” ’ [Citation.]” (King, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 292.) In
support of its ruling, the court quoted the following passage from
Summer v. A.L. Gilbert Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1155, which is
directly on point: “ ‘While in many cases expert opinions that are
genuinely needed may happen to embrace the ultimate issue of
fact (e.g., a medical opinion whether a physician’s actions
constitute professional negligence), the calling of lawyers as
“expert witnesses” to give opinions as to the application of the
law to particular facts usurps the duty of the trial court to
instruct the jury on the law as applicable to the facts, and results
in no more than a modern day “trial by oath” in which the side
producing the greater number of lawyers able to opine in their
favor wins. [Citation.]’ ” (Id. at p. 1179.) Although the issue was
for the court, rather than the jury, to decide, the point is equally
applicable.
       Both expert declarations offered by Chippewa recite the
applicable law (provisions of the Business and Professions Code
and the Rules of Professional Conduct), summarize the pertinent

                                  18
facts (statements to the court, content of the settlement, and the
like), and then apply the law to the facts. Greenberg’s
declaration, for example, ends with the following statement: “I
conclude that the Agreements themselves, Timed Out’s and
Prisma’s failures to disclose, and Timed Out’s and Prisma’s acts
in furtherance of the Agreement breached the named Rules of
Professional Conduct, Rules 3.3, 4.1, and 8.4, and Business and
Professions Code section 6068[, subdivision] (d). All have been
materially violated. These Agreements were not akin to
stipulating regarding the conduct of trial, because stipulations
regarding trial must be disclosed to the Court and become part of
the record. Here, the opposite occurred. The parties avoided
disclosure to the Court.”11 Plainly, the “opinions” found in the
declarations were, in fact, legal conclusions on an issue
committed to the discretion of the court. As such, they were
properly excluded.

11Parker’s declaration is nearly identical to Greenberg’s. Parker’s
concluding statement, quoted above, is identical to Greenberg’s, but
adds to the final sentence, “and contrived to create the false
appearance of a contested trial.”

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                           DISPOSITION

       The orders denying the motion to vacate the judgment and
granting the request for attorney’s fees are affirmed.
Respondents Timed Out, LLC and Prisma Entertainment, LLC
shall recover their costs on appeal.

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                LAVIN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:

      EGERTON, J.

      NGUYEN, (KIM) J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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