Court Opinion

ID: 9638158
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:36:19.517231+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:04.431214
License: Public Domain

STEPHENSON, Justice,
dissenting.
After reading the majority opinion I have the feeling that the Workers’ Compensation Law as we know it is being radically changed from its traditional meaning. All of this results from the repeal of KRS 342.015(1) “release from all other liability” and the enactment of KRS 342.690(1) which speaks of the liability of the employer to a third person where the damages were “caused by a breach of any duty or obligation owed by such employer to such other.”
It is clear to me that this language is in answer to our opinion in Jackson County R.E. Coop. Corp and Koenig. KRS 342.-690(1) is an attempt to limit the effect of these decisions to the amount of compensation for which the employer is liable and not a vehicle to impose liability for contribution. The statute is aimed at indemnity, not contribution. To say that the statute relates to liability for contribution is to destroy the underlying basis of workers’ compensation.
It is nonsense to say that the legislature “did not intend to reward negligence” and that an intervention under KRS 342.700 provides the employer a “windfall.” Ordinary negligence on the part of the employer has never been a factor to be litigated, and intervention pursuant to KRS 342.700 has never been considered a “windfall.”
The most that can be gleaned from the statutory change is that there must be a breach of duty owed by the employer to the third party to impose any liability on the employer at all. The majority opinion paints with too broad a brush and opens *239the doors wide to involve the employer in every litigation involving negligence of a third party.
First, I do not subscribe to the statement in Jackson County R.E. Coop. Corp. that indemnity is a jural right which existed prior to the adoption of the Constitution of Kentucky. I do not believe there is any application of this principle to workers’ compensation. See Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Government Employees Ins. Co., Ky., 635 S.W.2d 475 (1982).
Secondly, the majority opinion recites and then seems to ignore the operative phrase of the statute that confines to breach of duty owed by the employer to a third person. This limitation can only mean the type situation where the third party could maintain an action against the employer initially. I have read the pleadings of Electric Plant Board and have concluded that no reasonable inference could be drawn that would demonstrate that Bur-rell had and breached a duty to Electric Plant Board.
The most ominous portion of the majority opinion from the standpoint of workers’ compensation is the recognition that if the award is for indemnity and exceeds the employer’s liability for worker’s compensation, there is a possibility that the employer would be liable for the excess.
This opinion, in my view, destroys the theory of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
I would limit the statutory change to indemnity and indemnity to the amount of liability for worker’s compensation in only those situations where the employer breached a duty to the third party.
I am of the opinion the trial court was exactly right in dismissing Electric Plant Board’s claim here and would affirm the judgment of the trial court. Accordingly I dissent.