Court Opinion

ID: 9565328
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:19:18.639275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:34.196685
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because the facts established do not compel, as a matter of law, the conclusion that insured notified the insurer “as soon as practicable.” This condition in the policy, which must be met *264before the insurer is obligated to defend a tortfeasor suit and to pay a claim, cannot conclusively be said to have been met here.
Decided May 6, 1987
Rehearing denied June 9, 1987
Michael L. Wetzel, for appellant.
Charles 0. Gignilliat, Richard B. Russell III, John E. Stell, Jr., Jack C. Bell, for appellees.
Notice was given about 14 months after the collision and was triggered by receiving a claim from the other driver’s attorney. Insured had not reported it to the insurer earlier because it made the judgment that the incident was trivial, although it had no assurance that there would be no claim made against it or its driver. Yet there was damage to the other vehicle and the driver in deposition stated that he believed he told the insured’s driver that he was “shook up and had a stiff neck” but thought he was all right. The police were called at the insistence of the insured’s driver, who believed the matter significant enough to wait approximately two hours for them. He also believed it of enough consequence to be bound to notify his employer. The police filed a report but charged no one with a traffic violation.
“The time limitations in policies of insurance requiring a report of incident ‘as soon as practicable’ are subject to a factual determination. ‘The questions of the sufficiency of the excuse offered, and the diligence of the beneficiary in giving the notice after the removal of the disability, are generally questions of fact, to be determined by the jury, according to the nature and circumstances of each individual case.’ [Cits.]” Norfolk &c. Ins. Co. v. Cumbaa, 128 Ga. App. 196, 198-199 (2) (196 SE2d 167) (1973). See also North East Ins. Co. v. Townsend, 169 Ga. App. 886 (315 SE2d 463) (1984).
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with direction that the question be submitted to the factfinder, in that neither plaintiff nor defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen and Presiding Judge Banke join in this dissent.