Court Opinion

ID: 9919352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 23:02:36.459976+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:48.601104
License: Public Domain

NOTICE                  2024 IL App (4th) 231301-U
This Order was filed under
                                                                                    FILED
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is                                                     January 17, 2024
                                           NO. 4-23-1301                           Carla Bender
not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed                                                  4th District Appellate
under Rule 23(e)(1).               IN THE APPELLATE COURT                            Court, IL

                                            OF ILLINOIS

                                        FOURTH DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                          )      Appeal from the
            Plaintiff-Appellee,                                )      Circuit Court of
            v.                                                 )      Fulton County
 BRANDON SPAHN,                                                )      No. 23CF72
            Defendant-Appellant.                               )
                                                               )      Honorable
                                                               )      Thomas B. Ewing,
                                                               )      Judge Presiding.

                          JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court.
                          Justice DeArmond concurred in the judgment.
                          Justice Cavanagh dissented.

                                               ORDER

¶1       Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
               denying defendant pretrial release.

¶2               Defendant Brandon Spahn appeals from a detention order entered on November 14,

2023, by the Fulton County circuit court. On appeal, he argues that the State failed to meet its

burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the proof is evident or the presumption

great that defendant committed the offense charged; (2) defendant poses a real and present threat

to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific, articulable facts of

the case; (3) no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to

the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific, articulable facts of

the case, or defendant’s willful flight; and (4) that the trial court erred in its determination that no
condition or combination of conditions would reasonably ensure the appearance of defendant for

later hearings or prevent defendant from being charged with a subsequent felony or Class A

misdemeanor. We affirm.

¶3                                     I. BACKGROUND

¶4             In March 2022, defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated battery for

knowingly striking an individual over the age of 60 in the face with a club, a Class 3 felony. 720

ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(1), (f)(1), (h) (West 2022). After a March 2022 hearing where probable cause

was heard and found, bail was set at $15,000 and defendant was released. Following his failure to

appear in court, he was rearrested and placed back into custody, and bond was again posted.

Defendant was subsequently rearrested for failing to report to a probation officer and for missing

additional court dates. Bond was posted a third time, and defendant was again released.

¶5             On November 14, 2023, defendant failed to appear in court once more and was

arrested again. At that time, the State filed a petition to deny pretrial release based upon the

dangerousness standard set forth in section 110-6.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963

(725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023),

commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act (Act). A detention hearing was held the same day,

at which the State proffered that defendant had struck an elderly person over the age of 60 with a

club, causing bodily harm. The State further proffered that defendant faced multiple charges of

resisting arrest and that defendant had been under court supervision when these offenses began to

occur. He further had a history of felonies and drug abuse.

¶6             At the conclusion of the November 14 hearing, the trial court entered a written order

granting the State’s motion to deny defendant pretrial release. The court found there was probable

cause to believe defendant committed the charged offense and further found the State had proven

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by clear and convincing evidence that the proof was evident or the presumption great that

defendant committed a detainable offense and that no combination of conditions could mitigate

the threat his pretrial release would pose to the community.

¶7             This appeal followed.

¶8                                         II. ANALYSIS

¶9             Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal utilizing the notice of appeal form in the

Article VI Forms Appendix to the Illinois Supreme Court Rules. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(d) (eff. Oct.

19, 2023). The form lists several possible grounds for appellate relief and directs appellants to

“check all that apply and describe in detail.” Id. As grounds for relief, defendant checked the boxes

on the form stating that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he

committed the offense, that he was dangerous, and that no conditions short of detention could

mitigate the danger. Defendant did not provide any additional information beyond checking the

boxes indicated. Defendant’s appointed appellate counsel filed a waiver of his right to file a

memorandum in support of his notice of appeal; the State filed a memorandum in opposition.

¶ 10           We review a trial court’s ruling denying a defendant pretrial release for an abuse of

discretion. People v. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864, ¶¶ 10-11 (citing People v. Simmons, 2019

IL App (1st 191253, ¶¶ 9, 15). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the [trial] court’s decision is

‘arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable’ or where ‘no reasonable person would agree with the position

adopted by the trial court.’ ” Simmons, 2019 IL App (1st) 191253, ¶ 9 (quoting People v. Becker,

239 Ill. 2d 215, 234 (2010)).

¶ 11           Here, defendant has failed to satisfy his burden to persuade this court that the

grounds for relief identified in his notice of appeal were present under the specific, articulable facts

of this case. See, e.g., Insurance Benefit Group, Inc. v. Guarantee Trust Life Insurance Co., 2017

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IL App (1st) 162808, ¶ 44 (“[D]efendant, as the appellant, bears the burden of persuasion as to

[his] claims of error.”). An appellant may not satisfy his burden of persuasion by merely checking

a box on a form notice of appeal next to boilerplate language taken directly from the Act. At a

minimum, we believe the appellant, in addition to checking a box, must point to some specific

facts or aspect of the case that supports the requested ground for relief. See Inman, 2023 IL App

(4th) 230864, ¶ 13 (“[I]t is reasonable to conclude the Illinois Supreme Court, by approving the

notice of appeal form, expects appellants to at least include some rudimentary facts, argument, or

support for the conclusory claim they have identified by checking a box.”). This court is not to act

as an advocate or seek error on the appellant’s behalf but is “entitled to have the issues clearly

defined and supported by pertinent authority and cohesive arguments.” U.S. Bank v. Lindsey, 397

Ill. App. 3d 437, 459 (2009). Because defendant in the instant appeal articulated neither facts nor

case-specific argument in support of his requested relief, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 12           Moreover, we note that the record below provides ample support for the trial court’s

decision to deny pretrial release. Defendant had committed multiple crimes, some of which

included resisting arrest, and had a history of not appearing for court appearances or meetings with

his probation officer. His pretrial bond report also indicated that defendant “scored 10 out of 14

on the revised Virginia Pre-Trial Risk Assessment,” which indicated “a High Risk level to not

appear at future appointments with the court and to reoffend.” Although defendant testified at the

hearing that he would comply with all conditions of release, the trial court nevertheless concluded

that no combination of conditions would be sufficient. “ ‘[We] will not substitute our own

judgment for the trier of fact on issues regarding *** the credibility of the witnesses.’ ” Inman,

2023 IL App (4th) 230864, ¶ 11 (quoting People v. Vega, 2018 IL App (1st) 160619, ¶ 44).

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¶ 13           We acknowledge that the notice of appeal checked the box stating as a ground for

relief that “[t]he State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that

the proof is evident or the presumption great that defendant committed the offense(s) charged.”

Though the court made earlier findings of probable cause, this finding would not have been made

under a “clear and convincing” standard. The only thing presented at the hearing concerning the

offense was the charge; there was neither evidence nor a proffer. Defendant did not, however,

argue to the trial court that he had not committed the offense; his comments were solely directed

to the other issues relating to detention. Had the issue been raised by defendant, we believe the

court would have appropriately considered it. Generally, the failure to raise an issue at trial

constitutes forfeiture of that issue on appeal. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988).

¶ 14           Moreover, on appeal, defendant provides us with no further description of this

ground, and he did not file a memorandum as permitted by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(2)

(eff. Oct. 19, 2023). Illinois courts have frequently said “[a] court of review ‘is not simply a

depository into which an appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research.’ ” In re

Austin C., 353 Ill. App. 3d 942, 948 (2004) (quoting In re Estate of Thorp, 282 Ill. App. 3d 612,

616 (1996)). We decline to address an argument neither presented to the trial court nor adequately

articulated here.

¶ 15                                    III. CONCLUSION

¶ 16           For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 17           Affirmed.

¶ 18           CAVANAGH, J., dissenting:

¶ 19           I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion because, as a matter of

statutory law, the State had “the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that *** the

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proof [was] evident or the presumption great” that defendant committed the charged offense of

aggravated battery. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(1) (West 2022). We should read no qualification,

condition, or exception into the plain text of that statute. See People v. Young, 2023 IL App (4th)

230853-U, ¶ 13. I see no statutory basis for holding that the State’s burden in section 110-6.1(e)(1)

is conditional on defendant’s making any particular closing argument. I see no requirement in

section 110-6.1 (720 ILCS 5/110-6.1 West 2022)) that defendant answer the petition or raise an

issue by any other means. The averments in the petition are automatically at issue; section 110-

6.1(e) (id. § 110-6.1(e)) effectively says so.

¶ 20           Besides, whether defendant should be granted pretrial release was explicitly at issue

in defense counsel’s closing argument. That the State failed to carry its burden under section 110-

6.1(e)(1) is not a separate issue but, rather, is an argument on the issue of whether defendant should

be granted pretrial release. A party forfeits issues by failing to raise them below, not arguments on

issues. Brunton v. Kruger, 2015 IL 117663, ¶ 76.

¶ 21           The majority complains that “[a] court of review is not a depository into which an

appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research.” (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Supra ¶ 14. An argument is an assertion coupled with a reason for the assertion.

According to the notice of appeal, we should reverse the detention order (an assertion) because

“[t]he State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is

evident or the presumption great that defendant committed the offense(s) charged” (a reason for

the assertion). That is an argument. It is unclear to me what else defendant could have said to better

equip us to read the 16-page transcript of the detention hearing and perceive that the State presented

no evidence at all “that the proof is evident or the presumption great that defendant committed the

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offense(s) charged.” As for the burden of research, I do not see why much research would be

required. We merely should apply section 110-6.1.

¶ 22           In sum, the majority’s reasons for excusing the State from carrying its burden under

section 110-6.1(e)(1) strike me as unconvincing. It cannot reasonably be disputed that the State

failed to carry its burden of proof. Therefore, I would reverse the detention order and would remand

this criminal case for further proceedings.

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