Court Opinion

ID: 9949316
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-11 14:07:45.650234+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:43.362284
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3566-21

WAWA, INC.,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BARRINGTON
REDEVELOPMENT, LLC,
BARRINGTON URBAN
RENEWAL REDEVELOPMENT,
LLC, and BOROUGH OF
BARRINGTON,

     Defendants-Respondents.
_____________________________

                   Argued October 5, 2023 – Decided March 11, 2024

                   Before Judges Vernoia, Gummer, and Walcott-
                   Henderson.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Camden County, Docket No. L-4108-18.

                   Philip S. Goldberg argued the cause for appellant
                   (Shook, Hardy & Bacon, LLP, attorneys; Philip S.
                   Goldberg, Joseph Henry Blum and Erin Loucks Leffler,
                   on the briefs).
            Amy L. SantaMaria argued the cause for respondents
            Barrington Redevelopment, LLC, and Barrington
            Urban Renewal Redevelopment, LLC (Kaplin Stewart
            Meloff Reiter & Stein, PC, attorneys; Amy L.
            SantaMaria, on the brief).

            Timothy J. Higgins argued the cause for respondent
            Borough of Barrington.

PER CURIAM

      Plaintiff Wawa, Inc., appeals from a series of orders denying its summary-

judgment motions and granting in whole or in part the summary-judgment

motions and cross-motion of defendants Barrington Redevelopment, LLC

(Barrington Redevelopment), and Barrington Urban Renewal Redevelopment,

LLC (BURR) (collectively the Landlord defendants) and defendant Borough of

Barrington (the Borough), ultimately requiring plaintiff to pay a "special

assessment" related to financial assistance the Borough had provided to BURR.

Because the motion judge erred in finding plaintiff contractually responsible for

that "special assessment," we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

                                       I.

      We discern the material facts from the summary-judgment record, viewing

them in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.         See Memudu v.

Gonzalez, 475 N.J. Super. 15, 18-19 (App. Div. 2023).

                                                                           A-3566-21
                                       2
      In 2001, the Borough Council adopted an ordinance approving a

redevelopment plan for certain blocks of property it previously had designated

as an area in need of redevelopment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-6.

Barrington, N.J., Ordinance No. 753 (Aug. 14, 2001). The Borough Council

approved Resolution 9-2011-99 on September 13, 2011, naming Delco

Development, LLC (Delco), or its assigns, as the redeveloper of at least two

blocks. Barrington Borough Council Resolution 9-2011-99 (Sept. 13, 2011).

Barrington Redevelopment was Delco's assignee for purposes of Resolution

9-2011-99.

      On July 25, 2012, plaintiff, as the tenant, and Barrington Redevelopment,

as the landlord, entered into a "land lease agreement" (the Lease) in which

plaintiff agreed to lease from Barrington Redevelopment, approximately two

acres of land located at Route 30 and Bell Avenue in Barrington, "proposed as

Block 57.01, Lot 1" (the Leased Premises), for twenty years with the option to

extend the term of the Lease. The "Leased Premises" section of the Lease

referenced "a separate parcel" located "[i]mmediately adjacent to the Leased

Premises" and "identified as Phase I on the Concept Plan (the 'Adjacent

Parcel')." The Concept Plan was attached as an exhibit to the Lease. According

                                                                         A-3566-21
                                      3
to the Lease, both plaintiff and Barrington Redevelopment, had approved the

Concept Plan.

      In the Lease, plaintiff recognized that Barrington Redevelopment or its

affiliate was or would be the redeveloper for the Leased Premises pursuant to a

redevelopment agreement with the Borough, which was described as "the

current owner of a portion of the Leased Premises." Plaintiff also acknowledged

Barrington Redevelopment could assign the Lease to "an 'urban renewal' entity

that would acquire fee title to the Leased Premises for the purpose of

effectuating a financial agreement under New Jersey's Long Term Tax

Exemption Law [(Tax Exemption Law)], N.J.S.A. 40A:20-1 [to -22] . . . which

entity shall assume all of [Barrington Redevelopment's] obligations under this

Lease." The Lease referred to the financial agreement under the Tax Exemption

Law as a "PILOT" agreement. We understand "PILOT" to stand for "payment

in lieu of taxes."

      Section 7A of the Lease is entitled "Landlord's Work . . ." and provides

that the Landlord at its "expense shall obtain Landlord's Approvals and complete

all of the site work described in the final Land Development Plans, and all other

Landlord's Approvals (collectively, 'Landlord's Work') . . . ."

                                                                           A-3566-21
                                        4
      Paragraph (a)(iv) of Section 7 of the Lease defines "Land Development

Plans" as:

             the final and preliminary plans prepared by the
             Deciding Engineer for the development of the Leased
             Premises based upon the Concept Plan, and showing,
             among other things, building footprints, the fuel
             dispensing facility and canopies, signs, . . . sidewalks,
             parking areas, access drives and driving lanes, curb cuts
             for ingress and egress permitting all turning movements
             to and from each road abutting the Leased Premises
             (subject to approval by the New Jersey Department of
             Transportation) as shown on the Concept Plan as well
             as the other potential users for the proposed
             development, curbing, grading, retaining walls,
             installation of water, sewer and storm water drainage
             lines, but excludes Tenant’s Construction Plans . . . as
             signed off on by all Applicable Authorities without any
             conditions or qualifications unacceptable to Tenant in
             its reasonable discretion.

      Paragraph (a)(v) of Section 7 of the Lease defines "Landlord Approvals"

as "all approvals necessary to perform Landlord's Work and to allow Tenant to

submit architectural plans for building permits for Tenant's Use . . . ." and

includes "all New Jersey Department of Transportation ('DOT') and local

highway occupancy permits for the construction of . . . all work within the public

rights of way of the adjacent public streets."

      The list of activities enumerated in the Landlord's Work section of the

Lease includes:      "[c]learing and rough grading the leased premises";

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                                        5
"[i]nstallation of all utility lines, wiring, and facilities"; design and construction

of "all of the storm water management"; "[r]elocation or removal of public and

private utility lines, poles or facilities within or outside of the Leased Premises,

including without limitation, PSE&G, Verizon, and fiber optic cable, as

necessary to complete construction in accordance with the final Land

Development Plans"; and "[e]ntering into any public works agreements for

roadways and access to the Leased Premises, if applicable, and installation of

all on and offsite improvements required by Landlord's Approvals, including but

not limited to (if applicable), all paving, curbing, and utility pole relocation

required within DOT rights of way."

      Section 11 of the Lease, entitled "Liens and Taxes," provides:

                   (a) Beginning on the Rent Commencement Date,
             Tenant shall pay to the applicable taxing authority all
             real estate taxes and assessments that may be levied,
             assessed or charged against the Leased Premises by any
             governmental authority. . . . "Taxes" shall include gross
             receipts taxes, taxes on rents and other similar taxes
             imposed on Landlord or Tenant. Tenant understands
             and agrees that all or a portion of the Taxes may be
             payable pursuant to a financial agreement under New
             Jersey's Long Term Tax Exemption Law, N.J.S.A.
             40A:20-1 [to -22], in which case all payments due
             under the financial agreement shall be considered
             Taxes and payable by Tenant as otherwise applicable to
             Taxes in this Lease.

                                                                               A-3566-21
                                          6
                   (b) If the Leased Premises is separately assessed,
            Landlord shall endeavor to arrange to have all notices
            concerning tax assessments, changes in assessments,
            tax rates and changes, and tax bills (collectively, "Tax
            Bills") sent directly from the applicable governmental
            authorities to Tenant . . . . If the Leased Premises is
            separately assessed, Tenant shall have the right, at its
            sole cost and expense, to contest the amount or validity
            of the taxes applicable to the Leased Premises by
            appropriate administrative and legal proceedings either
            in its own name, Landlord's name, or jointly with
            Landlord, by counsel selected and engaged by Tenant.
            Landlord shall execute and deliver to Tenant whatever
            documents may be reasonably necessary or proper for
            Tenant to contest the taxes, or which may be necessary
            to secure payment of any refund which may result from
            such proceedings.

      Thus, in the Lease, plaintiff and the Landlord expressly acknowledged the

Landlord could assign the Lease to an urban renewal entity that could effectuate

a PILOT agreement under the Tax Exemption Law, and they agreed payments

under that agreement would be considered "taxes" for purposes of the Lease and

plaintiff would pay those "taxes."

      Two days after it executed the Lease, Barrington Redevelopment

identified as the "Redeveloper" and as Delco's assignee, entered an agreement

with the Borough regarding the redevelopment of some of the lots included in

the redevelopment plan approved in Ordinance No. 753 (the Redevelopment

Agreement). The parties to that agreement anticipated the redevelopment would

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                                       7
be performed in two phases, with Phase I being "the construction of a gasoline

filling station and convenience store on a portion" of the property and Phase II

being "the construction of a retail restaurant on the remaining portion" of the

property.

      The Borough and the Redeveloper acknowledged the Redeveloper

intended "to qualify . . . as an 'urban renewal entity' pursuant to [the Tax

Exemption Law] and enter into a [PILOT] Agreement for all improvements to

the redeveloped property."

      The Redevelopment Agreement required the Redeveloper to purchase

from the Borough the property to be redeveloped for $3,750,000 and to

"complete certain public improvements which will be made for the

Redevelopment Project and benefit the general public as a whole." The public

improvements were described in an exhibit attached to the Redevelopment

Agreement:

             As a result of the Redevelopment Project – Phases 1
             and 2, the following "Public Improvements" are
             proposed:

             • Creation of Bell Avenue Extension (to serve as site
               access and a jug-handle).

             • Widening of the White Horse Pike (N.J.S.H. Route
               30) to accommodate an exclusive westbound left-
               hand turn lane to Bell Avenue extensions.

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                                       8
            • Installation of a traffic signal at the intersection of
              the White Horse Pike (N.J.S.H. Route 30) and
              Copley Road (County Route 666).

            • Widening of the White Horse Pike (N.J.S.H. Route
              30) to accommodate an exclusive westbound right-
              had turn lane to Copley Road (County Route 666).

            • Installation of Street Lighting.

            • Installation of stormwater management facilities
              (i.e. inlets, piping and detention basin) to
              accommodate the runoff generated by Bell Avenue
              Extension.

The Redeveloper agreed to complete the public improvements "at its own cost

and expense but subject to a [$1,900,000] credit against the Purchase Price."

      In a September 15, 2014 memorandum to Tom Juliano, who was the

managing member of Delco and had executed the Lease and the Redevelopment

Agreement on behalf of Barrington Redevelopment, counsel1 summarized his

"understanding of our proposal for the terms of the financing we are discussing

with the Borough . . . for the redevelopment project." He described the "[t]ype

of financing" as a "[s]pecial assessment against the two redevelopment parcels

(percentages to be worked out). We need to work out how the funds will get to

1
  It is not clear whether counsel represented Juliano, Delco, or Barrington
Redevelopment or some combination of them.
                                                                          A-3566-21
                                       9
Delco for the redevelopment project." He identified "[q]ualified redevelopment

bonds" as the "[s]ource of funds" and indicated "[t]he two property owners will

pay to the Borough the debt service on the Bonds as and when due."

      In March 2015, BURR, identified as the "Redeveloper," and the Borough

entered an "Agreement to Provide Financial Assistance for Redevelopment"

(Financial Assistance Agreement). In that agreement, the Borough and the

Redeveloper referenced the property previously determined by the Borough to

be an area in need of redevelopment and the Redeveloper's intention to construct

on one lot of that property "a gasoline filling station and convenience store" and

"a retail restaurant" on another lot. Those two lots were collectively defined as

the "Property" and the construction on those two lots of the Property was defined

as the "Project."

      To "facilitate the Project," the Borough agreed to provide the Redeveloper

with $2,740,000 2 in "financial assistance," which was defined as "Borough

Financing" the Borough would fund by "issuing a series of short-term bond

anticipation notes." Attached to the Financial Assistance Agreement was a

"Project budget," which "reasonably represent[ed] the Redeveloper's estimate

2
   According to the Borough's Chief Financial Officer Denise Moules, the
principal amount ultimately was $2,788,000.
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                                       10
. . . of the costs and expenses for the portion of the Project to be funded from

the Borough Financing." With a total cost of $2,740,000, the budget included

the following items:

            MOBILIZATION & LAYOUT                       35,000.00
            SITE CLEARING & DEMO                        44,000.00
            SOIL EROSION CONTROL                        17,870.00
            EARTHWORK                                  282,858.29
            STORM                                      150,000.00
            CONCRETE                                    90,154.00
            PAVING                                     515,000.00
            STRIPING & SIGNAGE                          19,844.00
            FENCE & GUIDE RAILS                         11,209.00
            LANDSCAPING                                  8,950.00
            RETAINING WALLS                             35,000.00
            SITE LIGHTING / ELECTRICAL                  50,000.00
            SIGNALIZATION                              317,096.00
            TRAFFIC SAFETY & CONTROL                    75,000.00
            NJDOT PERMIT/INSPECTION FEES               187,250.00
            NJDOT ESCROW FEES                           40,000.00
            POLICE TRAFFIC SAFETY                       60,000.00
            ROADWAY LIGHTING                            18,800.00
            GEOTECHNICAL TESTING                         3,879.83

                  ....

            SITE SUPERVISION                           172,868.00
            CONSTRUCTION CONTINGENCY/                  171,024.88
            WINTER CONDITIONS/INSURANCE
            NJDOT BOND                                  18,196.00
            PSE&G POLE RELOCATION                      356,000.00
            TOWNSHIP INSPECTION ESCROWS                 60,000.00
            ESTIMATE

                                                                          A-3566-21
                                      11
        The Redeveloper agreed to "repay the Borough Financing" in installments

payable on October 1 of 2015 through 2024. Payments in 2015 and 2016 were

for "the cost to issue the then outstanding Bond and all interest due and owing

on the outstanding Principal." Installment payments on the principal began in

2017.

        The Redeveloper and the Borough agreed "[t]he obligation to repay the

Borough refinancing will be a special assessment and lien against the Property."

In paragraph twelve of the Financial Assistance Agreement, entitled "Special

Assessment":

             The Redeveloper and the Borough acknowledge and
             agree that the Redeveloper's acceptance of the Borough
             Financing from the Borough is a benefit for municipal
             improvements pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:5-7 and N.J.S.A.
             40:56-21. The Redeveloper's obligation to repay the
             Borough Financing pursuant to that Agreement is a
             special assessment and a lien on the Property.

In the next paragraph, the Redeveloper and the Borough agreed "the Borough

Financing shall not be consider[ed] a construction loan."

        Juliano executed the Financial Assistance Agreement on behalf of the

Redeveloper. He never had any discussions about the agreement with anyone at

Wawa. Defendants never advised plaintiff about the agreement. Plaintiff had

no role in the negotiations of the agreement, did not sign it, and was not a party

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                                       12
to it. The Lease contained express language regarding a PILOT agreement, the

Tenant's and Landlord's agreement to treat payments under the PILOT

agreement as "taxes," and the Tenant's agreement to pay those "taxes." It was

silent as to any Financial Assistance Agreement and did not include any

agreement between the Tenant and Landlord to have the Tenant make the

repayments due under a Financial Assistance Agreement or to treat the payments

due under any Financial Assistance Agreement as a "special assessment."

      The Borough Council passed Resolution 3-2015-39 on March 10, 2015,

approving the Financial Assistance Agreement and authorizing the Borough's

mayor to execute it.      Mirroring the language in the Financial Assistance

Agreement, the Resolution contained the same descriptions of "Property" and

"Project" and stated, "the obligation to repay the Borough refinancing will be a

special assessment and lien against the Property." The agenda for the March 10,

2015 Borough Council meeting said nothing about the adoption, imposition, or

consideration of any "special assessment." It simply set forth a list of resolutions

to be "read and approved" during that meeting. Resolution 3-2015-39 was

identified in that list as a resolution "Authorizing Execution of a Financing

Agreement Between the Borough of Barrington and [BURR] for the White

                                                                              A-3566-21
                                        13
Horse Pike Redevelopment Project," a description devoid of any reference to

"special assessment."

      Former Borough Council member Kirk Popiolek 3 testified that the

Borough's adoption of the Financial Assistance Agreement by resolution was

the extent of the process the Borough took to approve the "special assessment."

He was not aware of any reports or other documentation showing any type of

Borough evaluation in levying the "special assessment" other than the Financial

Assistance Agreement.     He was not aware of any evaluation or analysis

regarding apportioning the "special assessment" between the two lots within the

Property or other adjacent properties.

      On January 4, 2016, BURR, described as "an urban renewal entity formed

and qualified under the Tax Exemption Law," and the Borough entered into a

"Financial Agreement for Long Term Tax Exemption" (the PILOT Agreement).

Under the terms of the PILOT Agreement, improvements to the property, which

was described as being one lot, were held to be tax exempt under the Tax

Exemption Law for a period of twenty years. In consideration for that tax

exemption, BURR agreed to pay the Borough "an annual service charge for

3
  Popiolek was an elected member of the Borough counsel from 2004 to 2019
and for some of those years served as the Borough's Director of Economic
Development and Director of Administration and Finance.
                                                                         A-3566-21
                                         14
municipal services" in quarterly installments on the dates when "real estate tax

payments are due." The Borough's Tax Collector's Office subsequently sent to

BURR notices entitled "Payment in Lieu of Taxes" that included information

regarding the quarterly installment payments that were due. Plaintiff has made

those payments in accordance with the express understanding and agreement

concerning payments due under the PILOT Agreement as set forth in Section 11

of the Lease.

      The Borough, not the Borough's Tax Collector's Office, addressed to

Juliano an invoice dated August 16, 2017, stating that on October 1, 2018, a

total payment of $391,145.72 was due, which was comprised of $348,500 for

"2017 Special Assessment for WAWA Redevelopment – Principal,"4

$41,147.78 for "2017 Special Assessment for WAWA Redevelopment –

Interest," and $1,497.94 for "Professiona[l] Services – Processing BAN (Parker

McCay)."5       The Landlord defendants requested the invoice be revised to

eliminate the itemized charges. On August 17, 2017, at 2:24 p.m., the Borough's

4
  $348,500 equals one eighth of the principal amount of $2,788,000 in financial
assistance provided by the Borough to BURR.
5
   Given the definition of "Borough Financing" in the Financial Assistance
Agreement, "BAN" appears to be an abbreviation for "bond anticipation notes."
See also Nuveen Mun. Tr. v. Withumsmith Brown P.C., 752 F.3d 600, 601 (3d
Cir. 2014) (defining "BAN" as a bond anticipation note).
                                                                          A-3566-21
                                      15
Chief Financial Officer Denise Moules sent Juliano an e-mail attaching "the

revised invoice." At 2:41 p.m., Juliano sent Moules an e-mail, asking her if she

could "revise [the invoice] to say Special Assessment Tax." That evening, she

responded in an e-mail stating, with a happy face emoticon, "Third time is the

charm."

      In a September 6, 2017 letter to plaintiff, Barrington Redevelopment's

Senior Property Manager Jay Rizzo enclosed "the 2017 Special Assessment tax

bill for your store located at 280 White Horse Pike in Barrington, NJ." He

instructed plaintiff to "[p]lease make payment direct to the Borough of

Barrington." Like the initial invoice sent to Juliano, the enclosed invoice was

dated August 16, 2017, and was from the Borough to Juliano. Unlike the initial

invoice, the enclosed invoice did not include a breakdown of charges. Instead,

it sought the total amount, $391,145.72, which was described as "2017 Special

Assessment Tax for WAWA Redevelopment," using Juliano's requested

language. Plaintiff's third-party provider responsible for plaintiff's tax payments

paid the invoice on behalf of plaintiff.

      In early November of 2017, Megan Dugan, who was plaintiff's Supervisor

of Real Estate Services and Property Management, sent e-mails to Moules

asking for information regarding the invoice, including "what this charge is for

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                                       16
and if there are any documents or written agreements that [she could] have

access to . . . ." In a subsequent e-mail, Moules apparently told Dugan the

"property owner" had told her "this tax bill is Wawa's responsibility." In a

December 3, 2017 e-mail, Moules told Juliano, "the responsibility for payment

is still with your company."

      In a February 20, 2018 letter to Barrington Redevelopment, plaintiff's

deputy general counsel stated plaintiff had paid the Borough $391,145.72, which

she described as a "portion of the financing that Landlord and/or its affiliate

received from the Borough to develop the Leased Premises and surrounding

property." Because those funds were "used to perform Landlord's Work" and

because Section 7A of the Lease required the Landlord to "complete all of

Landlord's Work at Landlord's sole cost and expense," plaintiff demanded the

Landlord reimburse plaintiff's payment to the Borough.              Barrington

Redevelopment refused to reimburse plaintiff, contending plaintiff was

responsible for the payment under Section 11(a) of the Lease.

      On October 31, 2018, plaintiff filed a complaint against the Landlord

defendants, seeking reimbursement of the $391,145.72 it had paid to the

Borough and a judgment declaring it was not in default of any of its Lease

obligations, the payments due under the Financial Assistance Agreement were

                                                                         A-3566-21
                                     17
the Landlord defendants' obligation, and the Landlord defendants were solely

responsible for paying all costs associated with "Landlord's Work," including

any assessment levied on the property pursuant to the Financial Assistance

Agreement. Plaintiff also pleaded causes of actions based on breach of contract,

breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment,

and common-law fraud.        The Landlord defendants filed an answer and

counterclaims in which they sought a judgment declaring plaintiff was not

entitled to a reimbursement and was responsible for the "2018 assessment . . .

and any and all future assessments and real estate taxes that may be levied,

assessed or charged against the Lease Premises . . . ." The Landlord defendants

also pleaded causes of action based on breach of contract and unjust enrichment.

      Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on October 2, 2020, and the

Landlord defendants cross-moved for summary judgment.              After hearing

argument, the motion judge in October 30, 2020 orders denied plaintiff's motion

and granted in part the Landlord defendants' motion, declaring plaintiff was

obligated to pay:

            all assessments levied against the Leased Premises by
            any governmental authority pursuant to Section 11(a)
            of the Lease; subject to [its] right to dispute the amount
            of the assessment charged as a result of the [Financial
            Assistance] Agreement as material facts may exist as to

                                                                           A-3566-21
                                       18
            whether [it] owes the entire amount or a proportional
            amount.

In a decision placed on the record, the judge rejected plaintiff's interpretation of

the Landlord's Work provision of the Lease but indicated he perceived then "no

basis whatsoever for this assessment . . . to lay entirely on lot number one" and

concluded he did "not have enough information on [which] to make a

determination" on that issue and did not want to "take th[e] right away from

Wawa to attempt . . . to challenge the fact that the assessment wasn't

apportioned."

      Plaintiff served on the Borough a request pursuant to the Open Public

Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, for "[a]ll documents related to

taxes, assessments, or liens levied [or] assessed against or related to the property

designated as Block 57, Lots 1 and 2" or BURR from 2012 through the present.

The Borough produced approximately twenty pages in response to the request.

During his deposition, Popiolek reviewed the records produced by the Borough

in response to plaintiff's OPRA request.       He was not able to identify any

documents relating to the purported "special assessment."

      Plaintiff moved again for summary judgment on May 14, 2021. Plaintiff

argued, among other things, that "[b]ecause the process in levying a special

assessment under New Jersey law was not followed, the special assessment

                                                                              A-3566-21
                                        19
[wa]s invalid and [the Landlord defendants had] improperly passed" along the

obligation to pay for it. On June 29, 2021, the Landlord defendants opposed the

motion and cross-moved for summary judgment. In a July 9, 2021 order and a

decision he placed on the record that day, the judge denied plaintiff's motion but

allowed plaintiff to amend its pleadings to name the Borough as an additional

party. Plaintiff had not moved for leave to amend. The judge told counsel the

Borough "ha[d] to be in the case." The judge declined to decide the cross-motion

at that time.

      Consistent with the judge's directive, on August 18, 2021, plaintiff filed

an "amended complaint including action in lieu of prerogative writs" in which

it named the Borough as an additional defendant "to confirm that the [Financial

Assistance Agreement] repayment obligation is not a real estate assessment,

special assessment, or other assessment under New Jersey law."           Plaintiff

requested "review, hearing and relief from the Borough's decision to

characterize the Redevelopment Defendants' repayment obligation under the

Assistance Agreement as a 'special assessment and lien' because they were made

informally and decided on an ex parte basis."

      The Borough answered the amended complaint and subsequently moved

for summary judgment, defending the validity of the "special assessment" and

                                                                            A-3566-21
                                       20
asserting plaintiff's challenge of it was time-barred.     Plaintiff opposed the

Borough's motion, again moved for summary judgment, and moved for

reconsideration of the October 30, 2020 orders.

      After hearing argument, the judge, in a decision placed on the record, held

again that plaintiff was obligated under the Lease to pay all special assessments,

including the repayment obligation labeled in the Financial Assistance

Agreement as a "special assessment." The judge also found plaintiff's challenge

to the "special assessment" was time-barred and apportioning the entire

assessment to plaintiff was not "inappropriate." 6

      In May 27, 2022 orders, the judge denied plaintiff's summary-judgment

and reconsideration motions and granted the Borough's motion. In a June 7,

2022 order, the judge granted the Landlord defendants' cross-motion for

summary judgment and ordered plaintiff to pay the "special assessment"

imposed in the Financial Assistance Agreement.            The judge entered a

6
  Neither the Financial Assistance Agreement nor the Resolution authorizing its
execution apportioned the entire assessment to plaintiff or the Leased Premises.
To the contrary, both the Financial Assistance Agreement and the Resolution
provided the "special assessment" was on "the Property," which was described
in both documents as having two lots, one lot for a "gasoline filling station and
convenience store" and another lot for a "retail restaurant."
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                                       21
"supplemental order" on June 27, 2022, requiring plaintiff to pay the Landlord

defendants' attorney fees and costs, totaling $214,831.09.

       On appeal, plaintiff argues, among other things, the motion judge erred

in finding plaintiff had a contractual obligation to pay the "special

assessment." We agree.

                                        II.

      We review a grant or denial of summary judgment de novo, applying the

same standard as the trial court. Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022).

That standard requires us to "determine whether 'the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.'"

Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021) (quoting R. 4:46-

2(c)). "Summary judgment should be granted . . . 'against a party who fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to

that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.'"

Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449, 472 (2020) (quoting Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). We do not defer to the trial court's legal

analysis or statutory interpretation. RSI Bank v. Providence Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,

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234 N.J. 459, 472 (2018); Perez v. Zagami, LLC, 218 N.J. 202, 209 (2014). We

review a trial court's order on a reconsideration motion under an abuse-of-

discretion standard. Branch, 244 N.J. at 582.

      The question at the heart of this appeal is whether plaintiff is contractually

responsible under the Lease for the repayment obligation BURR incurred in the

Financial Assistance Agreement.       Our analysis of that issue is guided by

"familiar rules of contract interpretation." Barila v. Bd. of Educ. of Cliffside

Park, 241 N.J. 595, 615 (2020) (quoting Serico v. Rothberg, 234 N.J. 168, 178

(2018)).

      "It is well-settled that [c]ourts enforce contracts based on the intent of the

parties, the express terms of the contract, surrounding circumstances and the

underlying purpose of the contract." Id. at 615-16 (quoting In re County of Atl.,

230 N.J. 237, 254 (2017)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks

omitted).   "The plain language of the contract is the cornerstone of the

interpretive inquiry; 'when the intent of the parties is plain and the language is

clear and unambiguous, a court must enforce the agreement as written, unless

doing so would lead to an absurd result.'" Id. at 616 (quoting Quinn v. Quinn,

225 N.J. 34, 45 (2016)). "Contracts should be read 'as a whole in a fair and

common sense manner.'" Manahawkin Convalescent v. O'Neill, 217 N.J. 99,

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118 (2014) (quoting Hardy ex rel. Dowdell v. Abdul-Matin, 198 N.J. 95, 103

(2009)). "If we conclude that a contractual term is ambiguous, we 'consider the

parties' practical construction of the contract as evidence of their intention and

as controlling weight in determining a contract's interpretation.'" Barila, 241

N.J. at 616 (quoting County of Atl., 230 N.J. at 255). "In a word, the judicial

interpretive function is to consider what was written in the context of the

circumstances under which it was written, and accord to the language a rational

meaning in keeping with the express general purpose." Ibid. (quoting Owens v.

Press Publ'g Co., 20 N.J. 537, 543 (1956)).

      Applying those rules of interpretation, we are convinced plaintiff is not

contractually responsible under the Lease for BURR's repayment obligation

under the Financial Assistance Agreement. The Lease expressly requires the

Landlord, at its expense, to obtain the Landlord's Approvals and to complete the

Landlord's Work.      Holding plaintiff responsible for BURR's repayment

obligation would render meaningless those provisions of the Lease. A review

of the budget attached to the Financial Assistance Agreement confirms that

conclusion.

      The budget identifies "the costs and expenses for the portion of the Project

to be funded from the Borough Financing" to be provided to BURR pursuant to

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the Financial Assistance Agreement.            The budget includes "NJDOT

PERMIT/INSPECTION FEES," "NJDOT ESCROW FEES," and "NJDOT

BOND" for a total of $245,446. Yet, paragraph (a)(v) of Section 7 of the Lease

defines "Landlord Approvals" as "all approvals necessary to perform Landlord's

Work and to allow Tenant to submit architectural plans for building permits for

Tenant's Use . . . ." and includes "all New Jersey Department of Transportation

('DOT') and local highway occupancy permits for the construction of . . . all

work within the public rights of way of the adjacent public streets." The budget

includes "PSE&G POLE RELOCATION" for $356,000. Yet, paragraph (a)(iii)

of Section 7A of the Lease includes as Landlord's Work "[r]elocation or removal

of public and private utility lines, poles, or facilities within or outside of the

Leased Premises, including without limitation, PSE&G . . . ." The budget

includes "SITE CLEARING AND DEMO" and "SOIL EROSION CONTROL"

for a total of $61,870. But paragraphs (a)(i) and (a)(ii) of Section 7A of the

Lease include as Landlord's Work "[c]learing and rough grading of the Leased

Premises" and "[e]rosion and sediment control of the Leased Premises." The

budget includes "STORM" for $150,000. But paragraph (a)(iv) of Section 7A

of the Lease provides the "Landlord shall be responsible for installing the initial

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onsite storm water management quality and quantity control systems to the

extent shown on the final Land Development Plans."

      To hold plaintiff responsible for BURR's repayment obligation would

impose on plaintiff the costs of Landlord's Approvals and Landlord's Work that

plaintiff and the Landlord expressly agreed in the Lease would be the Landlord's

sole responsibility. Thus, pursuant to Sections 7 and 7A of the Lease, plaintiff

cannot be held responsible for Burr's repayment obligation under the Financial

Assistance Agreement.

      We are equally convinced that Section 11 of the Lease does not make

plaintiff responsible for BURR's repayment obligation. Under paragraph (a) of

Section 11, the "Tenant shall pay to the applicable taxing authority all real estate

taxes and assessments that may be levied, assessed or charged against the Leased

Premises by any governmental authority." Even using the "special assessment"

term with which BURR and the Borough chose to label the repayment

obligation, the "special assessment" created by those parties in the Financial

Assistance Agreement was not "levied, assessed or charged against the Leased

Premises."    (Emphasis added).      Paragraph 12 of the Financial Assistance

Agreement specifies that the repayment obligation "is a special assessment and

a lien on the Property." "Property" was defined as both "Lots 1 & 2." Thus, it

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was designated as a "special assessment" against the Property as a whole, not

the Leased Premises. Because it was not an assessment against the Leased

Premises, plaintiff did not have an obligation under Section 11 to pay it.

      Had it been a "special assessment" against the Leased Premises, plaintiff,

under the express language of paragraph (b) of Section 11 of the Lease, had the

right to contest the validity of the assessment and the Landlord had the

obligation to "execute and deliver to Tenant whatever documents may be

reasonably necessary or proper" for plaintiff to contest it.       The Landlord

admittedly did not provide that notice to plaintiff or deliver any such documents,

not even the Financial Assistance Agreement that purportedly created the

"special assessment," to plaintiff. If the "special assessment" had been an

assessment against the Leased Premises, surely the Landlord defendants would

have complied with their obligation.

      And there may have been reason to contest validity of the "special

assessment." In paragraph 12 of the Financial Assistance Agreement, which is

the paragraph labelling the repayment obligation a "special assessment," BURR

and the Borough acknowledged and agreed the acceptance of the Borough

Financing was "a benefit for municipal improvements pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:5-

7 and N.J.S.A. 40:56-21." N.J.S.A. 40:56-21 provides:

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             All assessments for benefits for local improvements
             under this chapter shall be made by the officer or board
             charged with the duty of making general assessments of
             taxes in the municipality, except where there is
             provided by law a board for the making of all such
             assessments, in which case all assessments shall be
             made by such board.

             The governing body of every municipality in which no
             board is provided by law for the making of all
             assessments for benefits accruing from local
             improvements may by ordinance create a general board
             for that purpose, which board shall thereafter make all
             such assessments.

The parties dispute whether the procedures required in N.J.S.A. 40:56-21 and in

related statutes, see, e.g., N.J.S.A. 40:56-22 to -27 were followed and, thus,

whether the "special assessment" purportedly created in the Financial Assistance

Agreement was legally valid. But, we do not need to reach or decide that issue

given our conclusion plaintiff was not contractually responsible under the Lease

for the repayment obligation BURR incurred in the Financial Assistance

Agreement.

      The motion judge erred in finding plaintiff was contractually responsible

for BURR's repayment obligation. Consequently, he erred in the October 30,

2020 orders in granting the Landlord defendants' initial cross-motion for

summary judgment and in denying in its entirety plaintiff's initial summary-

judgment motion.

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      Considering de novo plaintiff's motion, we conclude the judge should

have granted the motion as to the first count, in which plaintiff sought a

judgment declaring it is not contractually obligated under the Lease to make

payments due under the Financial Assistance Agreement. Because Barrington

Redevelopment submitted an invoice to plaintiff requiring plaintiff to pay for

part of the Landlord's Approvals and Landlord's Work contrary to Sections 7

and 7A of the Lease and plaintiff paid that invoice, the judge should have

granted plaintiff's motion as to the second count (breach-of-contract claim) as

to Barrington Redevelopment. See Woytas v. Greenwood Tree Experts, Inc.,

237 N.J. 501, 512 (2019) (setting forth the elements of a breach-of-contract

claim). Given the finding of a breach of contract and that plaintiff's implied-

covenant claim was based on the same contract and sought the same damages,

the judge should have denied plaintiff's motion as to the third count (implied-

covenant claim). See Wade v. Kessler Inst., 172 N.J. 327, 344 (2002) (holding

a defendant who has breached a "literal" contractual term cannot "be found

separately liable for breaching the implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing when the two asserted breaches basically rest on the same conduct").

We do not address plaintiff's remaining causes of action because plaintiff did

not brief them. See N.J. Dep't of Env't Prot. v. Alloway Twp., 438 N.J. Super.

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501, 505 n.2 (App. Div. 2015) (finding "[a]n issue that is not briefed is deemed

waived upon appeal").

      In sum, as to the first and second counts of the complaint we reverse the

October 30, 2020 order granting the Landlord defendants' cross-motion for

summary judgment and the October 30, 2020 order denying plaintiff's summary-

judgment motion. We vacate all subsequent orders, including the July 9, 2021

order denying plaintiff's summary-judgment motion and giving plaintiff leave

to amend its pleadings, because the judge should have granted plaintiff's

summary-judgment motion as to the first and second counts of the complaint in

the October 30, 2020 order, thereby rendering unnecessary the subsequent

proceedings. We remand the case to the trial court and direct the court to issue

an order granting plaintiff's initial summary-judgment motion filed on October

2, 2020, as to the first and second counts of the complaint, with a declaration as

to the first count that plaintiff is not contractually obligated under the Lease to

make payments due under the Financial Assistance Agreement and entering

judgment in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $391,145.72 plus interest, if any,

to which plaintiff may be legally entitled.

      Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for proceedings consistent

with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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