Court Opinion

ID: 8768622
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-26 12:35:20.082973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:02:03.773563
License: Public Domain

NOYES, Circuit Judge.
In May, 1906, Fred L. Pomeroy, an officer of the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company, was indicted in the Circuit Court for offering, granting, and giving a rebate in violation of the so-called “Elkins Act.” Act Feb. 19, 1903, c. 708, 32 Stat. 847 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1907, p. 880). At the October term, 1906, for the trial of criminal causes, he was tried, convicted, and fined $6,000; the judgment being docketed at the time. Afterwards he died. In March, 1907, and after the final adjournment of the October term, the Circuit Court, upon the application of de*325fendant in error, as executrix of the will of said Pomeroy, entered an order declaring said judgment to have abated and to be no longer of any validity. The United States has taken the present writ to review such order.
At the outset the defendant contends that the government has no right to proceed in this way; that a writ of error can be sued out by the United States in a criminal case only to the Supreme Court, and to that court only in particular instances. The right of the government may be so limited in criminal cases. But this is not a criminal case. The issue in the criminal proceedings was the guilt of the accused. That issue had been determined before these proceedings were instituted. Indeed, the very occasion for these proceedings was the closing of the criminal case by the rendition of the judgment. Instead of being criminal in their nature, these proceedings constitute, in effect, a civil suit by the 'representative of Mr. Pomeroy’s estate to relieve it from the payment of the judgment, for a cause wholly apart from the question of his guilt or innocence. The contention that the United States has no standing to prosecute this writ is, therefore, not well founded.
The order declares the judgment of no validity. But when it was entered the court had lost control of the judgment. It was a final judgment, and the term at which it was rendered had expired before any steps were taken. The court had no power to make the order, and its action in making it was erroneous. Phillips v. Negley, 117 U. S. 665, 6 Sup. Ct. 901, 29 L. Ed. 1013; Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U. S. 410, 26 L. Ed. 797; United States v. 1,621 Pounds of Fur Clippings, 106 Fed. 161, 45 C. C. A. 263.
We are asked to determine whether the death of Mr. Pomeroy operated to vacate the judgment. But the question does not arise. If the death in itself vacated the judgment, the order was unnecessary. If it did not have that effect, the order was necessary, provided the court had had power to make it. But, necessary or unnecessary, the order was erroneous, because it affected a judgment over which the court had no control.
The order is reversed.