Court Opinion

ID: 9483134
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:12:25.766051+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:27.064534
License: Public Domain

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the rejection of Phillips’ claims other than the failure to give him notice of the adverse testimony of Gary Smith. On this point, however, I think the present result contradicts the holding of the panel that heard the first appeal in this case. In Phillips v. Brennan, 912 F.2d 189 (7th Cir.1990), the panel said:
We remand this case to the district court so that the government may be given an opportunity to raise any defenses it has. The court should determine whether Phillips was in fact denied sufficient notice of the evidence to be used against him. If so, the case should be remanded to the Parole Commission for rehearing with adequate notice to Phillips of all materials to be considered.
Id. at 192 (emphasis added). This holding applied specifically to Smith’s testimony. Id. at 191. Since the District Court found that there was no notice, that should end the matter.
On the merits, the majority claims that Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979) holds that prehearing notice of adverse information is not required by Due Process. This is incorrect. In fact, the Greenholtz Court expressly notes that the issue of notice was not before it: “The only other possible risk of error is that relevant adverse information in the inmate’s file is wholly inaccurate.... [Tjhere is no issue before us regarding access to [the inmates’] files.” Id. at 15 n. 7, 99 S.Ct. at 2108 n. 7.
In Pulver v. Brennan, 912 F.2d 894, 896-97 (7th Cir.1990), however, we appear to have held (although there are slight ambiguities) that Due Process requires advance disclosure of “materials the Commission will use in making their determination”:
Precisely because Congress authorized the Parole Commission to base their parole determinations on information which has not been proven in an adversarial setting, it codified prisoner due process rights designed to eliminate factual inaccuracies in Parole Commission materials.

Id.

In Pulver, the Commission considered written statements that Pulver, like Phillips, had committed another crime. Why should it make any difference whether such accusations are written or oral? The *391prisoner should still have advance notice so he can prepare to challenge the facts. Further, the Parole Commission should not be able to avoid the import of Pulver by the simple expedient of receiving oral testimony instead of written statements.
Confrontation between the inmate and the witness is not required. The Board can simply ask the witness to come in before the hearing in the inmate’s case, and the inmate can get a summary of the witness’ testimony well enough in advance to give it consideration. If necessary, the Parole Board can hold a new hearing. 28 C.F.R. § 2.28(f) (1991).
Nor need witness testimony be deterred. There are procedures to conceal the identity of the witness, see 18 U.S.C. § 4208(c)— procedures, by the way, that the Board did not think necessary in this case. And it should make no difference to the witness when the inmate learns of the testimony.
Nor is this harmless error. The first panel considered the question of harmlessness in depth and in detail, and held that the Board’s consideration of Smith’s testimony could not be considered harmless. Phillips, 912 F.2d at 191-92. We cannot say that the decision of the Board would have been the same without this testimony.
Fairness requires that oral testimony be treated in the same way as written information. I therefore respectfully dissent.