Court Opinion

ID: 9703346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:52:48.240656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:47.708192
License: Public Domain

LARSON, Justice
(dissenting in part).-
I dissent as to that part of division II which deals with the sufficiency of notice. The language of section 17A.19(2) that “such mailing shall be jurisdictional” should be interpreted to mean that the fact of notice is jurisdictional but the manner of service is not if the means used are as good as, or better than, mailing. Here, personal service of the copies was made and should be found to be sufficient compliance with the notice requirement.
It is reasonable to presume that “mailing” is provided for as the manner of service not to make it the exclusive means of service but, in the interest of simplicity and *15economy, to make an exception to the general rule that provisions for notice, without specifying the manner of service, shall be by personal service. See 58 Am.Jur.2d Notice § 22, at 504 (1971). The language of our statute which makes personal service unnecessary should not be interpreted so as to make it insufficient.
The position of the majority that personal service of notice here was not sufficient compliance with the statute is particularly incongruous in view of the fact that we have taken judicial notice that mail service is inherently undependable, Smith v. Iowa Employment Security Commission, 212 N.W.2d 471, 473 (Iowa 1973), and in fact amounts to a “national disaster.” Eves v. Iowa Employment Security Commission, 211 N.W.2d 324, 326 (Iowa 1973).
I would hold that this notice was sufficient to give jurisdiction to the district court and proceed to dispose of the other issues, including the remaining issue of jurisdiction under division II.