Court Opinion

ID: 9397136
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-24 16:09:15.747577+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:21.673797
License: Public Domain

J-S02037-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 BASS PRO OUTDOOR WORLD LLC              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                   Appellant             :
                                         :
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 HARRISBURG MALL LIMITED                 :   No. 1085 MDA 2022
 PARTNERSHIP                             :

                 Appeal from the Order Entered July 8, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Civil Division at No(s):
                            2018-CV-06921-CV

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and DUBOW, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                FILED: MAY 24, 2023

     Appellant, Bass Pro Outdoor World LLC (“Tenant”), appeals from the

order entered in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas granting the

Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Harrisburg Mall Limited Partnership

(“Landlord”) and the order denying Tenant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Taken together, the trial court orders determined that the lease between

Tenant and Landlord did not require Landlord to indemnify Tenant for the costs

Tenant incurred in defending a slip and fall case. We reverse the orders and

remand with instructions.

     The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows.      In 2003,

Tenant entered into a lease agreement (“Lease”) with Feldman Lubert Adler

Harrisburg LP for a retail location in the Harrisburg Mall.    In June 2012,
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Landlord acquired the Harrisburg Mall and assumed the rights and

responsibilities set forth in the Lease.

      The Lease includes a “General Definitions” section which defines the

“Common Areas” as including, inter alia, parking areas and facilities. Lease,

9/30/03, at § 1.3(a).       Pursuant to the Lease, Landlord’s maintenance

obligations extended to all parking lots. Id. at 6.1(c). Landlord agreed to

maintain the Common Areas, at its sole cost and expense, in good and safe

condition. Id. at § 6.1(a).

      Critical to our analysis is that the Lease contained an indemnification

provision, which provided that Landlord must indemnify Tenant for, inter alia,

any lawsuit arising from the maintenance of the Common Areas:

      Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein, except
      for the negligent acts of Tenant, Landlord agrees to indemnify and
      hold Tenant harmless with respect to any and all claims, actions,
      injuries, damages, liability, costs and expense, including
      reasonable attorney’s fees, arising with respect to the possession,
      use, occupancy, management, repair, maintenance or control of
      the Common Areas[.]

Id. at § 6.1(c).    This provision, however, relieves the Landlord from the

obligation to indemnify Tenant if the claim arises from the negligent “acts” of

Tenant. Id.

      The Johnson Action

      On July 11, 2017, Janet and Dale Johnson filed a Complaint against

Tenant and other defendants, but not Landlord, alleging that Mrs. Johnson

tripped and fell over a piece of rebar protruding from pavement while walking

through the parking lot outside of Tenant’s Harrisburg Mall location.       Mrs.

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Johnson asserted, inter alia, that Tenant was negligent in failing to properly

maintain the public parking lot area and in failing to “notify the appropriate

entity and/or individuals responsible for repairing and/or correcting any

hazardous condition or defect located in the public parking area[.]” Johnson

Complaint, 7/11/17, at ¶ 27(c).

       Following discovery, Tenant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment

asserting that the Johnsons had not provided any evidence, beyond mere

speculation, of the location where Mrs. Johnson fell, let alone the existence of

a dangerous condition at the location. Thus, Tenant concluded that because

the Johnsons could not prove that a specific, dangerous condition had caused

Mrs. Johnson’s fall, they had not presented a prima facie negligence claim.

       The trial court agreed, granted Tenant’s Motion for Summary Judgment,

and dismissed the Johnson’s claims against Tenant. At no point during the

Johnson Action did the plaintiffs establish that Tenant engaged in negligent

“acts.”

       The Instant Action

       On October 19, 2018, Tenant filed a Complaint against Landlord,

asserting claims for Breach of Contract and Negligence and seeking to enforce

the indemnification provision of the Lease.1 Tenant alleged that it was entitled

to, inter alia, reimbursement of its costs of defense from the Johnson Action.

____________________________________________

1 Tenant filed its Complaint against Landlord during the pendency of the
Johnson Action.

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       Following completion of discovery, Tenant filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment seeking judgment as a matter of law against Landlord.           Tenant

asserted that the record demonstrated that Landlord breached its Lease with

Tenant by refusing to indemnify it for the costs of defense of the Johnson

Action.2

       Landlord responded with its own Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

Landlord argued that it was not obligated to indemnify Tenant because the

Johnsons had alleged that Tenant had been negligent and the indemnification

provision in the Lease did not apply to claims of negligent “acts” of Tenant.

Response, 3/4/22, at 7 (quoting Lease at § 6.1(c)).

       The trial court entered an order denying Tenant’s motion. The court

concluded that because the Johnson plaintiffs had alleged that Tenant was

negligent in failing to notify Landlord of the need for parking lot repairs, this

alleged negligence relieved Landlord of its obligation to indemnify Tenant.

Using the same reasoning, the trial court granted Landlord’s Cross-Motion for

Summary Judgment.

       Tenant appealed both orders. Both Tenant and the trial court complied

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Tenant raises the following issue on appeal:

       Whether the trial court committed reversible error in granting
       [Landlord’s] Motion for Summary Judgment and denying
       [Tenant’s] Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to the clear
____________________________________________

2 Tenant also asserted that the doctrine of equitable estoppel precluded
Landlord from asserting that it had no obligation to indemnify Tenant.

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      and unambiguous terms of the parties’ contractual lease
      agreement requiring [Landlord], as landlord, to hold [Tenant], as
      tenant, harmless with respect to any and all claims, actions,
      injuries, damages, liability, costs and expenses, including
      reasonable attorney’s fees, arising with respect to the possession,
      use, occupancy, management, repair, maintenance or control of
      the common areas.

Tenant’s Brief at 5.

                                      A.

      Our Supreme Court has clarified our role as the appellate court as

follows:

      On appellate review [ ], an appellate court may reverse a grant of
      summary judgment if there has been an error of law or an abuse
      of discretion. But the issue as to whether there are no genuine
      issues as to any material fact presents a question of law, and
      therefore, on that question our standard of review is de novo. This
      means we need not defer to the determinations made by the lower
      tribunals. To the extent that this Court must resolve a question
      of law, we shall review the grant of summary judgment in the
      context of the entire record.

Summers v. Certainteed Corp., 997 A.2d 1152, 1159 (Pa. 2010) (citations

and quotation marks omitted).

      A trial court may grant summary judgment “only in those cases where

the record clearly demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact

and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.

(citation omitted); see also Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2(1). “When considering a motion

for summary judgment, the trial court must take all facts of record and

reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the non-moving

party.”    Summers, 997 A.2d at 1159.      “In so doing, the trial court must

resolve all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact

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against the moving party, and, thus, may only grant summary judgment

where the right to such judgment is clear and free from all doubt.”              Id.

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

      The instant dispute involves the interpretation of the Lease between the

parties. “A lease is a contract and is to be interpreted according to contract

principles.” Hutchison v. Sunbeam Coal Corp., 519 A.2d 385, 389 (Pa.

1986). Because contract interpretation is a question of law, our standard of

review is de novo, and the scope of review is plenary. Ragnar Benson Inc.

v. Hempfield Twp. Mun. Auth., 916 A.2d 1183, 1188 (Pa. Super. 2007).

      Our Supreme Court has set forth the principles governing contract

interpretation as follows:

      The fundamental rule in contract interpretation is to ascertain the
      intent of the contracting parties. In cases of a written contract,
      the intent of the parties is the writing itself. Under ordinary
      principles of contract interpretation, the agreement is to be
      construed against its drafter. When the terms of a contract are
      clear and unambiguous, the intent of the parties is to be
      ascertained from the document itself. . . . While unambiguous
      contracts are interpreted by the court as a matter of law,
      ambiguous writings are interpreted by the finder of fact.

Ins. Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 905 A.2d 462, 468-69

(Pa. 2006) (citations omitted).

                                        B.

      Tenant   claims   that   the   trial   court   erred   in   interpreting   the

indemnification provision of the Lease in Landlord’s favor. Tenant’s Brief at

16-31. It argues that the plain language of the Lease requires Landlord to

indemnify it for costs it incurred in defending against the Johnson Action

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because the trial court in the Johnson Action dismissed the negligence claims

against Tenant. Id. at 25.

       Following our review of the plain language of the relevant provision of

the Lease, we agree with Tenant that the trial court erred in interpreting the

indemnification provision as relieving Landlord from its obligation to indemnify

Tenant for the cost of defense in the Johnson action. As stated above, the

Lease only relieves Landlord from the duty to indemnify Tenant when Tenant

has engaged in negligent acts:

       Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein,
       except for the negligent acts of Tenant, Landlord agreed to
       indemnify and hold Tenant harmless with respect to any and all
       claims, actions, injuries, damages, liability, costs and expense,
       including reasonable attorney’s fees, arising with respect to the
       possession, use, occupancy, management, repair, maintenance or
       control of the Common Areas[.]

Lease § 6.1(c).

       The Lease clearly and unambiguously relieves Landlord from its

indemnification obligation only when Tenant actually engages in negligent

“acts.” It does not cover claims alleging negligent “acts.” To accept the trial

court’s interpretation of this provision requires us to re-write this provision to

relieve Landlord from its obligation to indemnify when a party alleges that

the Tenant was negligent. We cannot and will not do so.3
____________________________________________

3 Furthermore, we respectfully disagree with the dissent’s conclusion that
Landlord’s duty to indemnify is only triggered when a damages award is
entered against Tenant in a third-party action. See Dissent at 3-4. The clear
and unambiguous language of the indemnification provision requires Landlord
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Following our review, we find that there was no evidence that Tenant

engaged in negligent acts. At best, the Johnsons merely alleged that Tenant

did so. This finding is supported by the trial court’s determination that the

Johnsons failed to establish that Tenant was negligent and dismissal of the

Johnsons’ negligence claims against Tenant.

       As stated above, pursuant to the clear and unambiguous language of

the Lease, an allegation of Tenant’s negligence, without more, is not sufficient

to relieve Landlord of its indemnification obligation. Rather, the Lease requires

that Tenant engaged in a negligent “act.” Because there is no evidence that

Tenant engaged in a negligent “act,” the Lease obligates Landlord to indemnify

Tenant for its costs of defense for the Johnson Action.         The trial court,

therefore, erred in reaching a contrary conclusion.

                                               C.

       In light of the foregoing, we reverse the trial court’s July 8, 2022 order

granting summary judgment in favor of Landlord. We also reverse the trial

court’s June 7, 2022 order denying Tenant’s Motion for Summary Judgment,

and we remand for the court to enter an order granting Tenant’s Motion for

Summary and determine the amount of Tenant’s damages.

____________________________________________

to indemnify Tenant “with respect to any and all claims, actions, injuries,
damages, liability, costs and expense” that arise from possession or use
of the Common Areas. Here, the Johnson Action—which brought claims
arising from use of the common parking area—triggered the indemnification
provision.

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     June 7, 2022 order reversed.      July 8, 2022 order reversed.   Case

remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction relinquished.

     President Judge Panella joins the memorandum.

     Judge Olson files a dissenting memorandum.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/24/2023

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