Court Opinion

ID: 9480767
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:57:46.780864+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:53.550378
License: Public Domain

EBEL, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority’s treatment of all but the following two issues. First, I do not agree that plaintiff has asserted a separate contractual claim for wrongful denial of benefits. In my opinion, plaintiff’s sole claim is predicated upon a violation of his rights under section 510 of ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1140), as enforced through 29 U.S.C. § 1132. Accordingly, I would not reverse and remand for further consideration of a claim under section 502(a)(1)(B).
Admittedly, there are some vague references in the record which, if considered in isolation, could arguably provide some support for the majority’s view that plaintiff has filed a separate claim for benefits due him under the terms of the retirement plan. However, after examining the record in its entirety, and particularly upon review of the briefs on appeal, I believe it is clear that plaintiff’s request for benefits is linked only to his discriminatory termination claim under section 510 of ERISA.
At the trial level, plaintiff stated in his brief in opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment that he “filed the present case under section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act.” R. Doc. 5 at 1. In addition, defendant characterized plaintiff’s claim as follows: “[pjlaintiff’s sole claim arises under section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act.” R. Doc. 4 at 1 (Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment). Nowhere did plaintiff dispute this characterization. Indeed, the district court itself apparently understood the limited nature of plaintiff’s claim because the order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment only described plaintiff’s claim as one under section 510 for discriminatory constructive discharge.1
*1208It is even clearer on appeal that plaintiff is asserting only a claim under section 510 of ERISA and that the only issue raised before us is the appropriate statute of limitations for a section 510 ERISA claim.2 Appellee’s brief on appeal once again characterizes plaintiffs claim as one solely under section 510 of ERISA. See Appellee’s Br. at 2-3 (“Mr. Held’s sole claim arises under section 510 of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act_" (emphasis added)). Once again, plaintiff does not dispute this characterization of his claim. Indeed, in his reply brief, plaintiff ratifies this description. See Appellant’s Reply Br. at 1 (“The parties agree: (a) that the controlling federal statute, section 510 of ERISA, lacks a statute of limitations provision ...” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 2-3, 11, 13 (making clear that plaintiff is asserting rights only under section 510 of ERISA). Not once in any of the briefs on appeal does plaintiff ever assert a claim under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) for benefits under the terms of his plan, nor is that statutory provision ever cited to us. So far as I can tell, it was never cited to the district court either, and it is perfectly clear that neither the district court nor either party thought that the case was being tried for recovery of benefits “due ... under the terms of his plan.” 3
I do not think it is appropriate to expand the plaintiff’s claim sua sponte on appeal after briefing and oral argument. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from that portion of this court’s opinion reversing and remanding “with respect to Mr. Held’s claim for recovery of benefits under § 1132.” Maj.Op. at 1207. To the extent that plaintiff’s claim under section 1132 is premised upon a violation of section 510 of ERISA, I agree with the majority opinion (and the district court) that it is barred by N.Y.Civ.Prac.L. & R. § 214(2). Because I believe that is the only way in which section 1132 is implicated in this case, I would affirm the district court’s June 5, 1989 judgment in its entirety.
Second, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the most analogous statute of limitations in an action under section 510 of ERISA is the state limitations provision applicable to employment discrimination cases. However, unlike the majority, I do not read Trustees of the Wyoming Laborer’s Health & Welfare Plan v. Morgen & Oswood Constr. Co., 850 F.2d 613 (10th Cir.1988), as precluding us from considering whether any of the alternative limitation provisions in ERISA should be applied in lieu of a state statute of limitations. Morgen & Oswood involved only the issue *1209of what limitations period should be applied in an action brought under ERISA by trustees of certain multiemployer pension and insurance funds against an employer for delinquent contributions. The substantive provision involved in that case was 29 U.S.C. § 1145, which requires employers to make their agreed contributions to mul-tiemployer plans, and the statute of limitations analysis involved the determination of the cause of action that was most analogous to the substantive obligations under section 1145.
Here, by contrast, we are dealing with an entirely different substantive obligation— one that arises under section 510 of ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1140). That provision prohibits an employer from firing an employee or otherwise taking action against him in order to interfere with his protected rights under an employee benefit plan. This is quite a different underlying substantive right, and it is analogous to different state and/or federal rights. Accordingly, the result in this case is not dictated by Morgen & Oswood.
In any event, the court in Morgen & Oswood did not even consider other possible statute of limitations provisions in ERISA that might be analogous except for a brief conclusion that the limitations period contained in 29 U.S.C. § 1113 (which applies to actions brought to redress a fiduciary’s breach of its obligations) should not be applied. Morgen & Oswood, 850 F.2d at 618 n. 8. Rather, the court briefly directed its attention to the limitations period contained in § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 160(b)) and then turned its attention to analogous state statutes of limitation. The court acknowledged that it was appropriate to borrow a state statute of limitations only “ ‘if it is not inconsistent with federal law or policy to do so.’ ” Id. at 618 (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1942, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985)). The question we need to resolve, which was not decided by Morgen & Oswood, is whether it “frustrate[s] or significantly interfere^] with federal policies” to borrow a state statute of limitations to bar a claim under section 510 of ERISA. Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 621, 627, 102 L.Ed.2d 665 (1989).
When, as is the case under section 510 of ERISA, there is no federal statute of limitations for a particular substantive right, we have been admonished that “the general rule [is] that statutes of limitation are to be borrowed from state law.” Id. at 625. The only exception to this general principle is “ ‘when a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking.’ ” Id. (quoting DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2294, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983)).
The limitation provisions contained in other sections of ERISA are not sufficiently analogous to a section 510 claim to justify overriding the general rule that the most analogous state statute of limitations should be incorporated. Indeed, neither party argues here that there is an analogous limitations provision found in other sections of ERISA or elsewhere in federal law that should be adopted instead of a state law provision. I believe that a claim of retaliatory discharge under section 510 is more closely related to a state-law employment discrimination suit than to an action under other sections of ERISA for breach of fiduciary duty, see 29 U.S.C. § 1113; for the termination of a single-employer plan, see 29 U.S.C. § 1370(f); for an action involving a multiemployer pension plan, see 29 U.S.C. § 1451(f); or for an action initiated by, or brought against, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 1303(e)(6), (f)(5); 1368(d)(2). Therefore, although I believe that we have to consider the applicability of federal statutes of limitation (particularly those found in ERISA), nothing in Morgen & Oswood precludes such an analysis. There are no federal provisions more suitable for application to a claim under section 510, and, as a result, I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the three-year statute of limitations period of N.Y.Civ.Prac.L. & R.
*1210§ 214(2) was properly applied to plaintiff’s claim under section 510.

. The thrust of plaintiffs claim is that his employment was terminated before he could qualify for retirement benefits under the plan. He alleges that his employer caused his termination so as to preclude him from ever acquiring any nonforfeitable rights under the plan. Thus, he does not appear to be seeking to enforce a separate contractual claim to “benefits due to him under the terms of his plan,” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), but rather he is suing because his termination allegedly prevented him from ever acquiring such benefits, in violation of section 510 of ERISA.
The majority refers to paragraph 6 of the complaint, in which plaintiff alleged that he would have had "a non-forfeitable right to 100% of [his] accrued benefits upon completion of ten years of service with the defendant.” R.Doc. 1 at 2, ¶ 6. As paragraph 7 of the complaint makes clear, however, plaintiff alleges that it was his discriminatory constructive discharge, in violation of section 510, which prevented him from completing the requisite ten years of service. R.Doc. 1 at 2, ¶ 7. Nevertheless, the majority argues that it is at least possible that plaintiff “has a colorable claim to something less than ‘100% of accrued benefits’ based on his employment of more than nine years with MHLC.” Maj. Op. at 1203 n. 7. It is true that on appeal plaintiff has not "concedefd] that as a result of his premature discharge he lost his rights to all benefits under the company pension *1208plan.” Maj. Op. at 1204 (emphasis in original). However, it is equally true that plaintiff nowhere affirmatively asserts that he has a vested contractual right to any plan benefits, either in his complaint or on appeal. It is plaintiff's duty affirmatively to state his claims and to preserve them on appeal. A claim is not made and preserved merely by failing to expressly deny its existence.

. See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. at 12 (“Congress designed section 510 of ERISA to protect the employment relationship that gives rise to an individual’s pension rights and its prohibitions were aimed primarily at preventing employers from discharging or harassing their employees in order to keep them from obtaining vested rights.’’); id. at 14 (”[C]ourts faced with the selection of a statute of limitations have variously characterized section 510 cases as contract actions; liability created by statute; and actions of employment discrimination or breach of fiduciary duty.... A section 510 action is brought under the authority of 29 U.S.C. § 1132_" (citations omitted)); id. at 16 ("Because the heart of a section 510 claim is restitution of the employee's retirement income, it is evident that Puerto Rico law provides a five-year limitations period for the plaintiff’s claim.’’).

. The majority suggests that this may be a case where there is a " ‘judgement ... not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked.’ ” Maj. Op. at 1204 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d)). Yet, the district court’s order dismissed the entire complaint pursuant to defendant’s motion for summary judgment. If plaintiffs complaint included a claim for vested contractual benefits, it, of necessity, was also dismissed, and that dismissal was not appealed. Therefore, it would be final. If the complaint did not contain such a claim, I believe that any subsequent attempt to bring such a claim would be barred by the doctrine of res judicata. If, notwithstanding the unqualified dismissal of the entire case, the district court’s order was not a resolution of the entire case (as the majority apparently suggests) we would lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal because it would be interlocutory in nature.