Court Opinion

ID: 9765361
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:01:09.272514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:09.297593
License: Public Domain

FEDERICO G. HINOJOSA, Jr., Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the court’s denial of appellee’s motion for en banc consid*477eration. I would grant the motion because I believe that the panel has applied the wrong standard of review in arriving at its conclusion that no evidence supports the jury’s finding that portions of Treasury Notes purchased during marriage were Mr. Jones’ separate property.
The panel’s opinion correctly states that when an appellate court reviews a legal sufficiency or “no evidence” point of error, it considers only the evidence and reasonable inferences that tend to support the jury’s findings and disregards all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Havner v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc., 825 S.W.2d 456, 458 (Tex. 1992); Responsive Terminal Sys. Inc. v. Boy Scouts of Am., 774 S.W.2d 666, 668 (Tex. 1989); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 634-35 (Tex.1986). The panel then neglects to follow the rule that if there is any evidence of probative force to support the finding of the jury, a “no evidence” point must be overruled. In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661 (1951); see also Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex.1989); Holley v. Watts, 629 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex.1982). The panel considers the existing evidence, determines that it is not “clear and convincing” to sufficiently overcome the presumption of community property, and then summarily concludes that there is no evidence to support the jury finding.
Because the wrong standard of review is used, the panel determines that direct evidence beyond the language of the loan documents is necessary to prove the bank’s agreement concerning repayment. The panel’s opinion states:
the intention of the lender to look solely to the property of one spouse is an evidentia-ry factor of prime importance in showing by clear and convincing evidence that the spouses intended to hold the property as one spouse’s separate property, especially where there is no evidence of such an agreement.
The panel would require some “evidence otherwise” of MBank’s intent “to limit itself to satisfying the debt by only the collateral or only the separate property of Mr. Jones.” The panel, by concluding that Mr. Jones failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that portions of the Treasury Notes were his separate property, effectively steps into the shoes of the jury and judges the weight and credibility of the evidence; a role beyond the province of this court. Additionally, the panel assumes that such evidence of the parties’ intent is admissible without limitation, an assumption not always viable under the parol evidence rule. The nature of the bank’s agreement with Mr. Jones is surmised through the unambiguous language of the promissory note, the contents of which cannot be supplemented or varied by parol evidence to prove the intent of the parties without some showing of fraud, mistake, or accident. See Lindsay v. Clayman, 151 Tex. 593, 254 S.W.2d 777, 780 (Tex.1952); Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391, 405 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991), writ denied, 867 S.W.2d 766 (Tex.1993). Only if the intention of the parties as expressed on the face of the document is doubtful may the court resort to parol evidence to resolve the doubt. Id. (citing Miller v. Miller, 700 S.W.2d 941, 951 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1985, writ refd n.r.e.)). Cf. Broussard v. Tian, 156 Tex. 371, 295 S.W.2d 405, 406-407 (1956) (note contained no recital dealing with source of consideration; no ruling as to admissibility of parol evidence to show lender’s intent to rely on separate source of payment).
The panel determines that the evidence is not “clear and convincing” to sufficiently overcome the presumption of community property even though the promissory note was secured by the certificate of deposit and expert testimony characterized the asset and liability as separate property. The panel refuses to consider the evidence that the bank took the certificate of deposit in full payment of the debt and concludes that there is no evidence to support the jury’s findings.
I would hold that the record contains some evidence which, when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, supports the jury’s finding that the bank looked to Mr. Jones’ separate property for primary liability on the note. Finding some evidence of probative force to support the finding of the jury, I would overrule appellant’s “no evidence” point of error.
*478I would also grant appellee’s motion for en banc consideration because I believe that appellant’s factual sufficiency challenge has no support in the record. When we review a factual sufficiency or “insufficient evidence” point of error, we look at all of the evidence both in favor of and against the jury’s determination. Plas-Tex Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Tex.1989). We review the evidence, keeping in mind that it is within the jury’s role, not ours, to judge the credibility of the evidence, to assign the weight to be given to the testimony, and to resolve any inconsistencies within or conflicts among the witnesses’ testimony. Corpus Christi Teachers Credit Union v. Hernandez, 814 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex.App.— San Antonio 1991, no writ) (citations omitted). Having done so, we will set aside the verdict only if the evidence standing alone is too weak to support the finding, or the answer is so against the overwhelming weight of the evidence that it is manifestly unjust and clearly wrong. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.1986); Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex.1965); In re King’s Estate, 244 S.W.2d at 661.
The panel fails to identify the “overwhelming weight” of evidence which unjustly controverts the jury’s finding. The record reveals that the expert witness testimony went uncontroverted, and that appellant offered nothing in its case-in-ehief to show that the Treasury Notes should be characterized as all community property.
I would hold that the evidence standing alone is not too weak to support the finding and that the jury’s answer is not so against the overwhelming weight of the evidence that it is manifestly unjust and clearly wrong. Accordingly, I would overrule appellant’s “insufficient evidence” point of error.
YÁÑEZ, J., joins in the dissent.