Court Opinion

ID: 9653868
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:57:22.245697+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:02.997111
License: Public Domain

Judith Rogers, Judge, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. The chancellor was correct in her findings as to the division of the severance pay and the division of the racing cars as marital property. The chancellor also correctly found that the funds in the interest bearing bank accounts were marital property due to the parties’ dominion and control over them, despite the fact that the accounts were designated as being joint tenancies with the right' of survivorship and bore the social security numbers of the respective sons. The court rejected the argument that these were gifts to the sons. The chancellor then stated that she did not “know what to do.” Although she obviously knew the correct law to apply, she failed to carry out her decision by not giving the appellant credit for one-half the funds in the approximate amount of $34,000 placed in the name of the parties’ son, John Vincent, and his wife. There were other assets in the hands of the appellee to satisfy this $17,000 set off, and this should have been done. In affirming the chancellor on this issue, the majority seems to ignore the fact finding of the chancellor that this was marital property, which is, of course, subject to equal division upon divorce. Additionally, the majority appears not to recognize that the chancellor possesses the equitable authority to offset funds that have been removed from the jurisdiction of the court. I agree with the chancellor’s fact finding, and prefer to show her the way the result could comport with the facts and applicable law. More importantly, I also do not wish to provide encouragement to future litigants that marital funds can be removed from the court’s jurisdiction with impunity. Jennings, J., joins in this dissent.