Court Opinion

ID: 9929505
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 20:03:48.817275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:25:04.418023
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (1st) 232173-U

                                                                                    Sixth Division
                                                                                  February 2, 2024

                                          No. 1-23-2173B

 NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
 limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                      IN THE
                          APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                  FIRST DISTRICT
  ______________________________________________________________________________

 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                         )   Appeal from the
                                                              )   Circuit Court of
           Plaintiff-Appellee,                                )   Cook County.
                                                              )
      v.                                                      )   No. 22 CR 1046601
                                                              )
                                                              )   Honorable
 Joel Johnson,                                                )   Margaret Ogaret,
                                                              )   Judge, Presiding.
           Defendant-Appellant.                               )

       JUSTICE TAILOR delivered the judgment of the court.
       Presiding Justice Oden Johnson and Justice Hyman concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER

¶1      Defendant-appellant Joel Johnson appeals under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h) (eff.

Sept. 18, 2023) from the circuit court’s order entered on November 2, 2023, which denied him

pretrial release under Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Pretrial

Fairness Act.

¶2     On August 18, 2022, Johnson was arrested and charged with first-degree murder (720 ILCS

5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2022)). The charge was based on allegations that Johnson forcefully shook his

nine-week-old baby, J.J., which caused his death. The court set Johnson’s bail at $10 million and
No. 1-23-2173B

required him to have no contact with his girlfriend, Kaylee, their older son, J.J., or with Kaylee’s

other child, W.M.. Because Johnson could not pay the bond, he was detained. On September 15,

2022, a grand jury indicted Johnson on two counts of murder.

¶3     On September 22, 2022, Johnson filed a motion to reduce his bond, which the court denied.

The court said at the time that if Johnson posted bond and was released, he should be placed on

electronic monitoring and GPS with no movement. On October 24, 2023, after the Pretrial Fairness

Act became effective, Johnson filed a motion for pretrial release, asking the court to remove the

cash bond requirement that was previously set at $10 million. Counsel for Johnson argued that

Johnson has strong family ties, a “minimal criminal history[,]” “no record of missing court

appearances or proceedings,” and that he “does not pose a real and present threat to the safety of

any person or persons in the community.” In addition, Johnson’s counsel argued that conditions

could be put in place so that Johnson would have no contact with his girlfriend, Kaylee, or any

contact with his children without DCFS supervision. Counsel also argued that electronic

monitoring would suffice to ensure Johnson’s appearance in court. In response, the State filed a

petition seeking to deny Johnson pretrial release.

¶4     According to the State’s proffer, in April 2021, Johnson was living with his girlfriend,

Kaylee, their 9-week-old infant, J.J., their 18-month-old son J.J., and Kaylee’s seven-year-old son,

W.M.. On the morning of April 23, 2021, Kaylee fed baby J.J. and put him in his bassinet, which

was located in the bedroom she shared with Johnson. When Kaylee left for work around 11 am,

baby J.J. was asleep. Johnson stayed at home with W.M., J.J. and the baby.

¶5     W.M., who was doing online school, heard baby J.J. crying for most of the day. Around 1

pm, Johnson texted Kaylee and said he woke up to find their 18-month-old son standing over baby

J.J.’s bed with a toy phone in his hand and blood around baby J.J.’s mouth. When Kaylee did not

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No. 1-23-2173B

respond, Johnson messaged her again around 1:51 pm, saying he believed she would respond to

his texts if he said the children were dead.

¶6     When Kaylee arrived home around 4 pm, she observed that baby J.J. seemed irritable

and lethargic. She attempted to feed him, but he wouldn’t eat. Around 5:30 pm, she took baby J.J.

to Johnson’s mother’s house to determine if she should take him to the hospital. Johnson texted

Kaylee and asked her not to go to the hospital, but she took baby J.J. anyways because his condition

had worsened. When they arrived at Elmhurst Hospital around 9 pm, baby J.J. was almost

immediately transferred to Lutheran General Hospital due to bleeding on his brain. At Lutheran

General, baby J.J. was diagnosed with non-accidental traumatic head injury. The documented

medical concerns included a subdural hematoma, acute respiratory failure with hypoxia, cerebral

herniation, retinal hemorrhage on both eyes, and traumatic brain injury. Medical personnel

concluded that the bleeding on baby J.J.’s brain was due to severe trauma. A board-certified

physician on child abuse was consulted. She stated that baby J.J.’s injuries were consistent with

being shaken and concluded that the injuries could not have been caused by being dropped, falling

down the stairs, or by being struck by an object, such as a toy phone. Baby J.J. was pronounced

dead on April 29, 2021, and the death was ruled a homicide. The medical examiner’s report

indicated that baby J.J.’s cause of death was “close head injuries due to abuse,” and that the injuries

he sustained were caused by “extreme force” and were inconsistent with being hit with a plastic

toy. Medical records from baby J.J.’s primary care physician prior to this incident showed that

baby J.J. had been healthy and had been developing normally.

¶7     After Johnson was released from police custody on April 27, 2021, records from his phone

revealed that he made multiple searches regarding “how much force does it take to cause shaken

baby syndrome[,]” “child negligence sentencing in Illinois[,]” and “sentencing for involuntary

manslaughter in Illinois.”

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 No. 1-23-2173B

 ¶8      The State indicated that the case took approximately a year to charge because Johnson had

 been “cohabitating with the pertinent witness in this case,” his girlfriend Kaylee. The State noted

 that in 2019, Johnson had been found guilty of battering Kaylee while she was pregnant with their

 child. He punched, choked, and dragged her, and was sentenced to supervision. It noted that

 Johnson had also received supervision as a result of a DUI from 2014. Based on these facts, the

 State argued that Johnson “poses a real and present threat to safety, specifically of the children in

 that household as well as to [Kaylee].”

 ¶9      After the State’s proffer, Johnson’s counsel argued that the evidence against Johnson was

 circumstantial and advised the court that Johnson and Kaylee had another child after the incident

 at issue.

¶ 10     The court found that “the proof is evident and the presumption great the defendant has

 committed a qualifying offense.” It also found that Johnson “poses a real and present threat to

 safety, specifically of the children in that household as well as to the witness identified as, I believe

 it was Kaylee, by the State in that household.” The court said it was “taking into consideration

 pursuant to the statute the nature and circumstances of the charged offense” and found it was an

 “extremely violent offense.” The court noted that the medical report indicated that the injuries

 sustained by baby J.J. were the result of “extreme force.” It noted that while the evidence was

 circumstantial, it was nonetheless “compelling considering who had access to that child at the time

 *** even taking into consideration the timeline identified by the defense in this case.” It therefore

 found there was more than sufficient evidence to detain Johnson.

¶ 11     The court stated that “[b]ased on the level of force involved in this case with that child, I

 do believe that [Johnson] poses a threat to persons in the community, not only children, but

 generally persons *** based on his background.” The court noted Johnson’s “prior violent criminal

 history” and said the fact that his prior battery case “involved a violent act on another vulnerable

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 No. 1-23-2173B

 person” caused its “concern for the community to be heightened.” The court also found that

 Johnson’s prior DUI supervision indicated that “he may indeed potentially be a threat to the safety

 of the community.”

¶ 12    The court found that no condition of pretrial release could mitigate the significant threat to

 the safety of those persons and the general community or prevent Johnson’s willful flight from

 prosecution. It based its decision on a number of factors, including the nature and circumstances

 of the charged offense, Johnson’s “prior violent criminal history” as well as “the nature and

 seriousness of the risk of obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice process that

 would be posed by the [Johnson’s] release.” The court noted that the case took more than a year

 to charge, and that this delay may have been the “result of [Johnson’s] interaction with that witness

 Kaylee.” It noted that Johnson and Kaylee had another child together after baby J.J.’s death, which

 “arguably could have led [Kaylee] to withhold information.” The court also found a “potential[]

 *** risk of nonappearance in court” despite the fact that Johnson made no attempts to flee during

 the year the case was under investigation because of the seriousness of the charged offense and the

 fact that Johnson “faces [a] significant penalty if convicted.” The court also considered Johnson’s

 character, ties to the community, employment, financial resources, and family support, but

 ultimately found that “no condition or combination of conditions set forth in pretrial release can

 mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person in the community in this matter

 based on the specific facts of this case.” It therefore ordered Johnson to remain in custody.

¶ 13     On appeal, Johnson argues that the court abused its discretion when it “gave improper

 weight to the nature and circumstances of the crime itself” and determined that Johnson posed a

 danger to the community based on his background.

¶ 14    We review for an abuse of discretion whether the trial court properly considered the

 statutory non-exclusive list of factors in determining whether the defendant poses a real and

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 No. 1-23-2173B

 present threat to the community. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g) (West 2022); see also People v.

 Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864, ¶ 11. “[I]n considering [the] trial court’s decision to deny bail,

 the reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because it

 would have balanced the appropriate factors differently.” People v. Vingara, 2023 IL App (5th)

 230698, ¶ 10 (citing People v. Simmons, 2019 IL App (1st) 191253, ¶¶ 9, 15). We will find an

 abuse of discretion only if the trial court’s judgment was fanciful, arbitrary or unreasonable, or if

 no reasonable person would agree with its position. Vingara, 2023 IL App (5th) 230698, ¶ 10.

¶ 15     We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that Johnson met the

 dangerousness standard and posed a real and present threat to the safety of the community.

 Although Johnson argues that the court gave “improper weight to the nature and circumstances of

 the crime,” the record reflects that the trial court based its decision on a number of statutory factors,

 including Johnson’s previous battery of his pregnant girlfriend—“a violent act on another

 vulnerable person”—and        his prior DUI supervision. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g) (West 2022)

 (listing factors the court can consider in making a determination of dangerousness, including the

 “nature and circumstances of any offense charged[,]” “any evidence of the defendant’s prior

 criminal history indicative of violent, abusive or assaultive behavior[,]” and “[a]ny other factors,

 including those listed in Section 110-5 of this Article deemed by the court to have a reasonable

 bearing upon the defendant’s propensity or reputation for violent, abusive, or assaultive behavior,”

 including defendant’s “past relating to drug or alcohol abuse.”) These facts led the court to believe

 that Johnson “may indeed potentially be a threat to the safety of the community[.]” Accordingly,

 we find no abuse of discretion.

¶ 16     Next, Johnson argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it found that the State

 presented clear and convincing evidence showing that no condition or combination of conditions

 could mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or prevent his willful flight

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No. 1-23-2173B

from prosecution. We will not reverse a trial court’s findings that the State presented clear and

convincing evidence showing that mandatory conditions of release would fail to protect any person

or the community, and/or that defendant had a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution

unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Swan, 2023 IL App (5th)

230766, ¶ 11. “A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite

conclusion is clearly evident or the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the

evidence presented.” People v. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322, 332 (2008). “Under the manifest weight

standard, we give deference to the trial court as the finder of fact because it is in the best position

to observe the conduct and demeanor of the parties and witnesses.” Id.

¶ 17   Section 5/110-6.1(e) requires the State to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that “no

condition or combination of conditions *** can mitigate (i) the real and present threat to the safety

of any person or persons in the community *** or (ii) the defendant’s willful flight.” 725 ILCS

5/110-6.1(e)(3) (West 2022)). Here, the trial court’s decision to deny pretrial release was based in

part on the same concerns it articulated when it found that Johnson posed a threat to the safety of

the community, including the violent nature of the crime charged, Johnson’s prior battery of his

pregnant girlfriend, and his prior DUI. In addition, the court relied on “the nature and seriousness

of the risk of obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice process that would be posed

by [Johnson’s] release.” See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(2) (West 2022) (noting that the State can

prove that a defendant poses a “real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the

community” based on defendant’s conduct, including “the obstruction of justice”). Although

Johnson argues that the State offered no evidence to prove that Johnson attempted to obstruct the

investigation of the case, the fact that the case took more than a year to charge led the court to

conclude that Johnson’s cohabitation and interactions with Kaylee during that time and the fact

that they were having another child “arguably could have led [Kaylee] to withhold information.”

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No. 1-23-2173B

The State’s proffer also included Johnson’s text messages to Kaylee, in which he suggested that

their 18-month-old son had caused the injuries to baby J.J. with a toy phone and asked Kaylee not

to take baby J.J. to the hospital. Taken together, we find that this evidence supports the trial court’s

conclusion. The court also concluded that Johnson posed a “potential[] *** risk of nonappearance

in court” even though he had made no attempt to flee during the year-long investigation because

he “faces [a] significant penalty if convicted.”

¶ 18   Johnson argues that the court’s finding—that he posed a risk of willful flight—was against

the manifest weight of the evidence because Johnson had no history of missing court hearings and

had made no attempt to flee during the year-long investigation. Even if the evidence did not support

the trial court’s findings regarding Johnson’s potential flight from prosecution, “it is enough to

detain a defendant if the court finds that no conditions of release could mitigate either the safety

risk or the defendant’s willful flight.” People v. Reed, 2023 IL App (1st) 231834, ¶ 30 (citing 725

ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(1)-(3) (West 2022)). Because we do not find the trial court abused its discretion

in determining that no condition or combination of conditions could sufficiently mitigate the real

and present threat that Johnson poses to the community, we need not address this argument.

¶ 19   We affirm the trial court’s order granting the State’s petition for pretrial detention.

¶ 20   Affirmed.

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