Court Opinion

ID: 9889921
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 19:04:28.398149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:49.506226
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/11/23 Ellorin v. O’Rear CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 BEN B. ELLORIN,                                                      D081135

           Plaintiff and Appellant,

           v.
                                                                      (Super. Ct. No. 37-2021-
 CHARLES O’REAR et al.,                                               00053188-CU-PO-CTL)

           Defendants and Respondents.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
John S. Meyer, Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.
         Ben B. Ellorin, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
         Horton, Oberrecht & Martha, Erin E. Schroeder and Andrew B. Dorr
for Defendant and Respondent Charles O’Rear.
         Davis Wright Tremaine, Spencer Persson and Andrew Row for
Defendant and Respondent Microsoft Corporation.
         Ben B. Ellorin appeals from a judgment of dismissal resulting from an
order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend. The trial court’s basis
for sustaining the demurrer was its conclusion that the complaint was time-
barred and that neither the delayed discovery rule nor any amendment could
cure this defect. Ellorin contends the trial court erred, not only in sustaining
the demurrer, but also in failing to consider pertinent evidence, in denying
him leave to file a brief in response to the court’s tentative ruling, and in
entering judgment not only for the defendant—Charles O’Rear—who had
filed the demurrer, but also for O’Rear’s two co-defendants: Microsoft
Corporation (Microsoft) and William Henry Gates III. For reasons discussed
post, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the complaint was time-
barred as to O’Rear and that neither the delayed discovery rule nor any
amendment could cure this defect. Hence we affirm the judgment as to
O’Rear. As to Microsoft and Gates, we reverse the judgment and remand the
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                      I. Allegations in the Complaint

      Because this appeal is from a judgment based on an order sustaining a
demurrer, we proceed as though all allegations of material fact pleaded in the
complaint have been admitted by the defendants. (See Blank v. Kirwan
(1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Dudek v. Dudek (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 154, 160, fn.
4; Centex Homes v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th
23, 26; Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d
593, 604 [in considering merits of a demurrer, “the facts alleged in the
pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be”].)

                                        2
Proceeding on this basis, we accept as true for purposes of this appeal the

following factual allegations set forth in the complaint.1

A.    Ellorin, the Ranch that He—or He and His Wife Veronica—Used
      to Own, and the Ranch’s Wild Turkey Hill

      Ellorin is a retired engineer who, from 1994 to 2003, owned—either
alone or together with his now-deceased wife, Veronica—a rural property (the
property or the ranch) located in in the town of Ramona in San Diego

County.2 The property was named Rancho Ellorin Hacienda Farms, and
Ellorin and Veronica derived much enjoyment from it.
         “We farmed, we raised animals, we enjoyed the vastness of
         the property, and were awed by its country atmosphere,
         beautiful oak[] trees, mature sycamore trees, streams,
         water falls, rock outcroppings, magnificent views and
         rolling hills.”
These rolling hills included one hill in particular that featured “a 360 Degree
view of the Ramona Valley as well as the best view of Mount Woodson, a

1     The complaint, filed by Ellorin proceeding in propria persona, consists
of 42 pages comprising: six template-type court forms (PLD-PI-001, PLD-PI-
001(2), PLD-PI-001(3), PLD-PI-001 (6), CM-010, and MC-030) that the
Judicial Council of California has promulgated and that Ellorin has filled in;
four attachments on pleading paper (including five pages of what appears
originally to have been a six-page document titled Plaintiff’s Declaration)
that Ellorin has incorporated by reference into the filled-in forms; and nine
exhibits.

2     The complaint includes several discrepancies. For example, it indicates
in some places that Ellorin alone owned the property and in other places that
Ellorin’s wife Veronica was a co-owner with Ellorin. As another example, the
complaint indicates in some places that Ellorin (or Ellorin and Veronica) lost
the property to foreclosure in 2003 and in other places that his (or their)
ownership of the property terminated in 2002.

                                       3
famous mountain only 2 Miles away.” Ellorin dubbed this hill “Wild Turkey
Hill.”

B.       The Sequence of Alleged Events Placed at Issue in the
         Complaint

         1.    1996-2002: Ellorin Battles Forces Threatening His Plans
               to Develop the Ranch, But Loses the Ranch to
               Foreclosure; He and His Family Experience Distress

         During the latter part of the 1990s and continuing through and
including at least 2002, Ellorin had “promising plans for the property” in
general and for Wild Turkey Hill in particular. The “centerpiece” of these
plans was to “construct[] a house at the top of [Wild Turkey Hill].” But
Ellorin’s plans foundered as a result of actions, taken by “radical
[environmental] groups[,] the County[,] the Courts and the State,” that
prevented him from developing the property in the manner in which he
desired to develop it. These actions were of sufficient concern to Ellorin that
he “fought from 1996 through 2002 in and out of the Courts” to overcome
them. “But [Ellorin’s efforts were] to no avail.” As a consequence of these
circumstances, Ellorin and his family experienced “physical, emotional, and
financial distress” during the 1996-2002 timeframe.
         2.    2002-2018: Ellorin is Confronted with an Image of Wild
               Turkey Hill Whenever He Uses a Computer; He and
               Veronica Puzzle at the Riddle of the Image’s Ubiquity, and
               They Experience Severe Distress

         “[H]oping to save the ranch,” Ellorin “travelled abroad [in 2002] to get
some construction projects going.” But this gambit failed, and Ellorin (or
Ellorin and Veronica) ended up losing the ranch to foreclosure in 2003..
         When Ellorin set out traveling abroad in 2002 in his efforts to save the
ranch, he “went . . . with limited resources” and “without a personal
computer.” However, due to the ubiquity of “computer shops,” he had ample
                                          4
access to computers—and that is how “[t]he nightmare . . . beg[a]n.” For,
beginning close in time to the 2003 foreclosure and continuing for many years
thereafter, Ellorin began finding that the monitor screen of “[e]very
computer . . . [he] went to” featured a prominent image of a site that Ellorin
“used to mow, clean[], and maintain[] from 1994 to around 2002” and atop
which the foreclosure had prevented him from constructing a house: Wild
Turkey Hill.
      The ubiquity of one specific image on the screen of every computer
Ellorin encountered is attributable to the fact that Microsoft had adopted
that image as the “[d]efault [digital] [w]allpaper” for a new operating system,

named Windows XP, that it launched in the early 2000’s.3 But what
accounted for the existence of this particular image? And how had this image
(the image) become the digital wallpaper of Microsoft XP?
      Ellorin’s reaction when he first saw the image was mixed.
         “[T]he first time . . . I saw the [image] . . . , I immediately
         recognized . . . Wild Turkey Hill. It brought me mixed
         feelings. I missed my family and my ranch and was happy
         to see it but surprised of how it got there.”
Ellorin speculated regarding the provenance of the image. But, his
speculation notwithstanding, Ellorin initially took no action.
         “I recalled . . . that several people . . . , including the realtor
         who [had] sold me the property, claimed that the ranch was
         included in the Registry of Film Making Venues. With this

3     None of the defendants has admitted that the location depicted in the
image is Wild Turkey Hill, and that among the exhibits to the complaint are
printouts of Wikipedia entries stating that the image is of a different location
altogether. Nonetheless, for the reasons noted at the beginning of Section I of
this opinion, ante, we proceed as though the allegations of material fact that
Ellorin has pleaded in the complaint have been admitted by the defendants.

                                          5
         in mind, I originally did not make the wallpaper sightings
         an issue.”
Then, “[a]s time progressed . . . and the prospect of . . . [obtaining
construction] projects [abroad] became dimmer . . . the thought of losing the
ranch was imminent and troubled [Ellorin] considerably.”
         “My property was foreclosed in 2003 via a Trustee’s Sale.
         From that time on, viewing the [image of Wild Turkey Hill
         on the Microsoft XP] . . . wallpaper was so distress[ing] and
         seeing it over and over and over again every[] . . . time I
         went to a computer shop was torture and unbearable.”
      The toll that the image and its ubiquity took on Ellorin’s wife, Veronica,
was even greater than the toll it took on Ellorin.
         “[Veronica’s] death was caused partly by experiencing
         emotional distress from 2001 through her death in 2012 by
         her exposure to the [image on the] Microsoft Windows XP
         Default Wallpaper . . . and her unanswered question why
         the picture of our distressed property was all over the
         Internet and was used as a Wallpaper by Microsoft without
         our knowledge and permission.”
      For 17 or 18 years—from 2001 or 2002 until the very last day of 2019—
the provenance of the image and the manner in which the image had become
the Windows XP default wallpaper, visible “all over the Internet,” remained
an enigma to Ellorin. However,
         “I was in a foreign country with limited resources and I
         relied on the thought that the [image] . . . was legitimate,
         and that there was nothing I could do to remove it. I did
         not have any reason to believe otherwise.”
Thus, despite the distress that the image and its ubiquity were causing him,
Ellorin took no action to investigate or to otherwise address the matter
during this period of time.

                                         6
        3.      2019-2020: Ellorin Discovers the False and Fraudulent
                Narrative Attending the Image; and He Experiences
                Further Distress

        On December 31, 2019, Ellorin, somewhat by happenstance, came
across the explanation for the enigma of the ubiquitous image of Wild Turkey
Hill.
             “[O]n December 31, 2019, after . . . [having] just returned
             from abroad after several years, [he] discovered the false
             and fraudulent narrative of the Microsoft Windows XP
             Default Wallpaper.”
Specifically, while “trying to . . . replace the old image default wallpaper
[on a] laptop computer,” Ellorin happened upon accounts, published on the
internet, indicating that the person who had captured the image was a
photographer named Charles O’Rear; that O’Rear maintained that the year
in which he had captured the image was 1996; that O’Rear had sold all rights
in the image to Microsoft (reportedly in exchange for a “low six figure[]” sum);
that Microsoft had named the image “Bliss”; and that “there had been
considerable speculation” over time as to where the landscape depicted in the
image was located, or if it was even real.
        The accounts Ellorin encountered on the internet on December 31,
2019, also revealed what Ellorin refers to as “the false and fraudulent
narrative of the Microsoft Windows XP Default Wallpaper” (the false
narrative). That is, an explanation of the image’s provenance in which
O’Rear falsely asserts (among other things), not that the landscape depicted
in the image is located in the town of Ramona, in San Diego County, but
rather that it is located in Sonoma County and that it was while O’Rear was
driving in Sonoma County en route to visit his girlfriend one day that he
(O’Rear) spotted the landscape and captured the image on his camera.

                                           7
      In addition to encountering the false narrative, Ellorin also realized, as
a result of O’Rear having claimed that the year in which he captured the
image was 1996, that O’Rear must have gained access to the ranch, during
the time that Ellorin or Ellorin and Veronica owned it (1992 to 2002 or 2003),
without authorization.
         “During this time, people of all backgrounds . . . frequently
         visited my ranch. [M]ost of them . . . knocked on my door
         and obtained permission before roaming the property.
         They ha[d] the decency to obtain permission first. In the
         case of . . . O’Rear[,] however, it was different. He
         trespassed [o]nto my property beyond my first and second
         gates when he took them pictures and without my
         permission.”
      Further, the December 31, 2019, discovery also revealed to Ellorin that
Microsoft was complicit.
         “Defendants publish[ed] an image with a false narrative
         across the Internet to be viewed by Billions of people
         worldwide. Microsoft was a major corporation. The
         organization was large and had all the resources. Microsoft
         should have been the ‘adult’ in the room with . . . O’Rear
         and . . . Gates . . . when they were making the deal [for the
         purchase and sale of the image]. Does anyone expect the
         Plaintiff to believe that Microsoft decided to publish the
         image as part of their major marketing program worldwide
         without vetting or making a background check of the ‘Bliss’
         location? Where is the property? Who owns the property?
         What is the status of the property? How did you find this
         property? What were you doing on the property? Did you
         have the Owner’s permission to enter the property? These
         are just [a] few of the questions Microsoft should have
         asked . . . O’Rear. These are common sense questions[,]
         and they reflect a fairly standard operating procedure
         during a vetting process. Plaintiff believes that Microsoft
         and . . . Gates . . . asked these questions to . . . O’Rear but
         purposely ignored [the answers to] them because they were
         overcome by greed [and other sentiments]. They thought
         that the Owners were naive, ignorant, and helpless.”

                                       8
In essence, the defendants “were remiss and irresponsible” and either
“decided to ignore the process or ignore the results of a process of a normal
due diligence that is a standard operating procedure for a project
development of this large scale.”
      Ellorin’s December 31, 2019, discovery of the false narrative sent him
into a physical, emotional, and financial tailspin.
         “Said discovery triggered an old physical, emotional, and
         financial distress that now resulted in tremendous renewed
         emotional distress like nightmares, anxiety, anger,
         insomnia, bodily pains, mental problems and others. This
         renewed distress is mainly due to the nature and the way
         the false information was gathered, used, published, and
         covered up to the detrement [sic] of the Plaintiff and the
         Billions of people around the world who used the[] Windows
         XP Operating System.”
      This physical, emotional, and financial distress occasioned by the
December 31, 2019, discovery of the false narrative was more intense than
that which had been occasioned by mere exposure to the image prior to
December 31, 2019.

         “Plaintiff and his old family[4] were subjected to distress for
         years when they were involuntarily subjected to viewing
         the ‘Bliss’ image. It was a distressful scenario then, but
         since the NEW discovery of the fraudulent narrative [o]n
         Dec. 31, 2019, it [has] become an unbearable nightmare for
         the Plaintiff and his new family as well. The emotional
         torture of continuously seeing the ‘Bliss’ while abroad was
         aggravated now considerably upon the discovery of the big
         lie that needs to be corrected.”

4     Although the record is not altogether clear on this topic, it appears
from the allegations in the complaint that, at some point during the period
spanning the events alleged in the complaint, Ellorin (perhaps following a
divorce from Veronica or perhaps following Veronica’s death) remarried.

                                        9
                            II. Procedural History

A.    The Complaint

      On December 20, 2021, just shy of two years after having discovered
the false narrative, Ellorin filed a complaint in the trial court. In the
complaint, Ellorin pleaded the matters described in the preceding section.
He also alleged “negligence” and an unspecified “intentional tort.” In
addition, he referred at least in passing to a variety of other types of actual or
supposed theories of action, including negligent infliction of emotional
distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, mail fraud,
“internet fraud,” “unauthorized use of private property,” unjust enrichment,
and wrongful death.
      In the complaint’s prayer for relief, Ellorin requested several different
remedies. These include (among other remedies): compensatory and
punitive damages in the amount of $27 million, and an order requiring
Microsoft to cease and desist from using the image as its Microsoft XP
wallpaper. The relief sought also includes an order requiring all of the
defendants “to publicly apologize to the Plaintiff and his old and new family
and to all the Billions of Microsoft users around the world”; “to respond to the
Millions of people who are still seeking and wondering where the real ‘Bliss’
hill is located, and to address their desire to save the ‘Bliss’ hill”; “to obtain
the 25 Acre portion of the property where [Wild Turkey Hill] is located
and . . . convey said site to the Plaintiff free and clear of any encumbrances,
to be saved, preserved, and protected in honor of Plaintiff’s Spouse who
passed away wondering why the image was used and published without her
permission.”

                                         10
B.    The Demurrer

      On March 21, 2022, O’Rear filed in the trial court and caused to be
served on Ellorin a “Notice of Demurrer and Demurrer” (original notice)
along with a brief and other supporting papers. In the brief, O’Rear argued
that the theories of action Ellorin had alleged in the complaint were time-

barred and insufficiently pleaded.5 The hearing on O’Rear’s demurrer (the
demurrer) was set for July 15, 2022.
      Thereafter, on June 17, 2022, O’Rear filed and caused to be served on
Ellorin an “Amended Notice of Demurrer and Demurrer” (amended notice).
Included in the amended notice was essentially the same information that
had been included in the original notice, along with several additional lines of
text, describing the grounds for the demurrer, that were consistent with the
arguments that had been set forth in the brief O’Rear had caused to be filed
on March 21. The brief, declaration, and exhibits that the amended notice
identified as furnishing support for the demurrer were the same brief,
declaration, and exhibits that the original notice had identified as furnishing
support for the demurrer.
      On July 6, 2022, Ellorin filed two briefs in which he argued against the
demurrer. The first of these two opposition briefs targeted what Ellorin
refers to as the original demurrer, and the second opposition brief targeted

5      We note for the sake of completeness that, contemporaneously with the
filing and service of his demurrer on March 21, 2022, O’Rear also filed and
caused to be served a motion to strike certain passages of the complaint and a
motion for an order requiring Ellorin to submit a $20,000 undertaking. The
trial court did not rule on either of these two motions. Instead, both motions
were taken off calendar at the time the court sustained the demurrer.
Inasmuch as neither of these two motions is a subject of this appeal, we do
not address them further in this opinion.

                                       11
what he refers to as the amended demurrer.6 To this second opposition brief,
Ellorin appended a copy of the first opposition brief and (as exhibits) copies of
responses by Ellorin to sets of special interrogatories, form interrogatories,
and requests for production that O’Rear had propounded to him. Neither of
the two opposition briefs included a request for leave to amend.
      On July 6, 2022 (the same day Ellorin filed his two briefs), O’Rear filed
a reply brief. Then, on July 14, 2022, the day before the hearing was

scheduled to occur, the trial court posted a tentative ruling on the demurrer.7

6      The first opposition brief was titled “Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of Overruling Defendant Charles O’Rear’s
Demurrer.” The second opposition brief was titled “Plaintiff’s Memorandum
of Points and Authorities in Support of Overruling Defendant Charles
O’Rear’s Amended Demurrer.” The word opposition does not appear in the
title of either of these briefs; however, the substance of each of these briefs
reveals that it is the functional equivalent of an opposition brief, and O’Rear
(in reply) treated each of these briefs as such. Ellorin’s belief that there were
two demurrers—one original, and the other amended—appears to derive from
his having interpreted the word “amended” in the amended notice as having
been intended to modify, not just “notice,” but also “demurrer.”

7      Ellorin argues “the Tentative Ruling was based on the original
demurrer and not on the amended demurrer.” However, as noted ante and
post, (1) O’Rear filed and served only one demurrer, (2) the brief, declaration,
and exhibits that the amended notice of demurrer identified as furnishing
support for O’Rear’s demurrer were the same brief, declaration, and exhibits
that the first notice of demurrer had identified as furnishing support for that
demurrer, and (3) both sets of opposition papers that Ellorin had filed—the
set he filed in opposition to what he understood to be O’Rear’s “original
demurrer” and the set he filed in opposition to what he understood to be
O’Rear’s “amended demurrer” (see ante text accompanying fn. 6)—were
before the court.

                                       12
C.    The Tentative Ruling on the Demurrer

      The tentative ruling revealed the trial court’s provisional conclusion
that the demurrer should be sustained without leave to amend. It also
revealed the basis for this provisional conclusion, which was a tentative
determination by the trial court that Ellorin’s claims were time barred, as the
lawsuit had not been filed until “long after the applicable statute of
limitations had run,” and that “there is no reasonable possibility that the
complaint [could] be amended to state a timely claim.” Nowhere in the
tentative ruling was there any reference to the discovery responses that
Ellorin had included as exhibits to his opposition briefs.

D.    The Hearing on the Demurrer

      The hearing on the demurrer went forward as scheduled on July 15,

2022,8 the day after the tentative ruling had been posted. Counsel for O’Rear

8      Ellorin states “[t]here was . . . no formal hearing on the [d]emurrer.”
But this statement is at odds with his description (see post) of what
transpired on July 15. If and to the extent Ellorin intends this statement as
an observation that participation in a hearing via telephone or video link is
less traditional than participation in person, we note that he is correct in this
regard—but that this observation is of no consequence inasmuch as the
partially in-person and partially remote nature of a hearing in the trial court
does not render the hearing any less official than it would be if conducted
entirely in person. (Cf. Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.670(a) and 3.672(a).) If
and to the extent Ellorin intends this statement as an observation relating to
the sequencing of the hearing on the demurrer and the proceedings on a case
management conference that had been separately noticed for the same
morning, we are unable to divine how the sequencing of these two
proceedings, both scheduled for the same day, would have had any bearing on
the substantive outcome of the demurrer. Viewed in any light, Ellorin’s
rendition (see post) of the exchanges that occurred among himself, the court,
and defense counsel during the July 15 proceedings reveals that a formal
hearing on O’Rear’s demurrer did indeed occur that day.

                                       13
appeared in person and submitted on the tentative ruling. Counsel for
Microsoft appeared remotely via video link, and Ellorin appeared remotely

via telephone or video link.9
      No transcript exists of the July 15 proceedings.] However, we
understand from the rendition of events that Ellorin has set forth in his

briefs on this appeal10 that, during the proceedings that occurred on July 15,
defense counsel argued “that the statute of limitations ha[d] expired and that
the Appellant should have known sooner,” and Ellorin “argued that the
statute of limitations findings on the tentative ruling was erroneous and not
based on facts” and that “the date of discovery and the date of filing were well
within the statute of limitations.” But “[t]he Court dismissed [Ellorin’s]
points.”
      We further understand from Ellorin’s rendition that, during the July 15
proceedings, Ellorin asked the trial court why the discovery responses he had
appended as exhibits to the second of his two opposition briefs (see ante) had

9     O’Rear contends Ellorin appeared via video link, but the trial court’s
minute order confirming the tentative ruling as the order of the court indicates
Ellorin appeared via telephone.

10     All descriptions of the July 15 proceedings that appear in the
paragraph corresponding to this footnote, and all such descriptions that
appear in the paragraph that follows, are drawn from the rendition of events
set forth in Ellorin’s briefs on appeal, rather than from the record.
Recognizing that the defendants’ recollections or characterizations of the
proceedings might differ from Ellorin’s (and even from one another’s), and
that no reporter’s transcript of the proceedings is available for corroboration,
we express no opinion as to the veracity or accuracy of any party’s rendition.

                                       14
not been filed and considered by the court.11 The court replied to this
inquiry by saying that the discovery responses “were not of the Court’s
concern.” Perceiving that he needed more time to analyze the tentative
ruling, and that he could not adequately address orally during the hearing
what he considered to be the trial court’s failure to grasp key temporal
elements of the allegations in the complaint and the manner in which the
discovery responses would elucidate those elements, Ellorin asked the court
for leave to respond in writing to the tentative ruling. The court denied this
request.
      Later the same day (July 15), the trial confirmed its tentative ruling as
the order of the court.

E.    Post-hearing Activity

      Ellorin states that, notwithstanding the court’s denial of leave to
submit a written response to the tentative ruling, he “decided to write the
brief anyway and submitted it to the Court on 07/16/2022 after [he] ha[d]
properly reviewed the tentative ruling.” But (per Ellorin) the court neither
considered nor acknowledged the brief.
      On July 25, 2022, ten days after entry of the trial court’s order
sustaining O’Rear’s demurrer, Microsoft filed and served on Ellorin a
demurrer of its own (the Microsoft demurrer), along with a motion to quash
service of the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. However, on August
1, 2022, before the Microsoft demurrer and motion to quash could be heard,
the trial court signed a judgment directing that the complaint be dismissed

11    Ellorin evidently was unaware that (see ante) the discovery responses
he had appended as exhibits to the second of his two opposition briefs had
been filed with that brief. At least one of the defendants (Microsoft) likewise
appears to be unaware that the discovery responses were filed.

                                       15
with prejudice as to all three defendants, and the clerk entered the judgment.
Thereafter Ellorin timely filed a notice of appeal from the judgment.

                           III. Standard of Review

      In reviewing a judgment predicated on an order sustaining a demurrer,
we apply a de novo standard. That is, we exercise our independent judgment
to ascertain whether the properly pleaded material factual allegations in the
complaint, together with facts that may be judicially noticed, suffice to state a
cause of action that could entitle the plaintiff to relief under any possible
legal theory. (Two Jinn, Inc. v. Gov’t Payment Serv., Inc. (2015) 233
Cal.App.4th 1321, 1344 (Two Jinn); Montclair Parkowners Assn. v. City of
Montclair (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 784, 790.)
      If the order includes a denial of leave to amend, then we also review the
order, and the resulting judgment, for abuse of discretion. The plaintiff may
establish an abuse of discretion by demonstrating that he could amend the
complaint to state a cause of action warranting an award of relief. (Goodman
v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349; Hayter Trucking, Inc. v. Shell Western
E&P, Inc. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1, 13.) If the plaintiff does not do so, then
we will affirm for lack of abuse. (Two Jinn, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1344, citing G.L. Mezzetta, Inc. v. City of American Canyon (2000)
78 Cal.App.4th 1087, 1091-1092 and Hernandez v. City of Pomona (1996)
49 Cal.App.4th 1492, 1497-1498.)

                                IV. Discussion

A.    The Statute of Limitations Defense

      As the California Supreme Court has explained: “ ‘Statute of
limitations’ is the ‘collective term . . . commonly applied to a great number of
acts,’ or parts of acts, that ‘prescribe the periods beyond which’ a plaintiff

                                        16
may not bring a cause of action.” (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th
383, 395 (Norgart).) Among the purposes of a statute of limitations is “to
protect defendants from the stale claims of dilatory plaintiffs” and “to
stimulate plaintiffs to assert fresh claims against defendants in a diligent
fashion.” (Ibid.) The statute of limitations “operates in an action as an
affirmative defense.” (Id. at p. 396.)
      “Under the statute of limitations, a plaintiff must bring a cause of
action within the limitations period applicable thereto after accrual of the
cause of action.” (Norgart, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 397; see also Code Civ.
Proc., § 312.) Consequently, we must determine both the applicable
limitations period(s) and the date of accrual for the cause of action pleaded in
the complaint.
      1.    The Applicable Limitations Periods

      The defendants argue, and Ellorin does not dispute, that the

limitations period set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 335.112 applies
to the legal theories pleaded in the complaint. This section, coupled with
companion section 335, provides that an action for “injury to, or for the death
of, an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another” must be
commenced within two years of such injury or death.
      We agree this limitations period applies to at least one of the legal
theories pleaded in the complaint; however, it is not the only limitations
period that applies. In this regard, it is the law in California that an
“appellate court[] reviewing a general demurrer [must] make a de novo
determination of whether the complaint alleges ‘facts sufficient to state a
cause of action under any possible legal theory,’ ” including even “legal

12    All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

                                         17
theories first raised by the reviewing court.” (Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto
Superstores California (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1244-1245.)
      As noted ante, the complaint includes reference to a variety of different
legal theories. Several of these—for example, negligence, negligent infliction
of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
wrongful death—come within the two-year ambit of section 335.1. But others
do not. By way of example, trespass upon real property, fraud, and unjust
enrichment arising from mistake (as opposed to contract) generally are
governed by the three-year statutes of limitations set forth in section 338.
(See Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (b) [trespass upon real property]; id., subd.
(d) [mistake]; and Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Dintino (2008) 167
Cal.App.4th 333, 348 [unjust enrichment arising from mistake].) For these
reasons, we apply both the two-and three-year limitation periods to Ellorin’s
cause of action. Hence his cause of action ordinarily would have to have
accrued no later than December 21, 2018—the date three years before the
filing of the complaint—in order for the complaint, at least in part, to have
been timely.
      2.     The General Rule for Defining the Accrual of a Cause of
             Action, and the Delayed Discovery Exception to the
             General Rule

      “The general rule for defining the accrual of a cause of action sets the
date as the time ‘when, under the substantive law, the wrongful act is done,’
or the wrongful result occurs, and the consequent ‘liability arises.’ ” (Norgart,
supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 397.) “In other words, it sets the date as the time
when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements [citations]—the
elements being generically referred to by sets of terms such as ‘wrongdoing’
or ‘wrongful conduct,’ ‘cause’ or ‘causation,’ and ‘harm’ or ‘injury.’ ” (Ibid.)

                                        18
      However, there is an important exception to this general rule. That
exception, known as the delayed discovery rule, or simply the discovery rule,
“postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has
reason to discover, the cause of action.” (Norgart, supra, 21 Cal.4th at
p. 397.) Explaining the operation of the discovery rule, our Supreme Court
has stated that: “[T]he plaintiff discovers the cause of action when he at least
suspects a factual basis, as opposed to a legal theory, for its elements, even if
he lacks knowledge thereof—when, simply put, he at least ‘suspects . . . that
someone has done something wrong’ to him [citation], ‘wrong’ being used, not
in any technical sense, but rather in accordance with its ‘lay understanding’
[citation]. He has reason to discover the cause of action when he has reason
at least to suspect a factual basis for its elements. [Citation.] He has reason
to suspect when he has ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘notice or information of circumstances to put a
reasonable person on inquiry’ ” ’ ” ’ [citation]; he need not know the ‘specific
“facts” necessary to establish’ the cause of action; rather, he may seek to
learn such facts through the ‘process contemplated by pretrial discovery’; but,
within the applicable limitations period, he must indeed seek to learn the
facts necessary to bring the cause of action in the first place—he ‘cannot wait
for’ them ‘to find’ him and ‘sit on’ his ‘rights’; he ‘must go find’ them himself if
he can and ‘file suit’ if he does. (Id. at pp. 397-398, fn. omitted.)
      “[U]nder the delayed discovery rule, a cause of action accrues and the
statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff has reason to suspect
an injury and some wrongful cause, unless the plaintiff pleads and proves
that a reasonable investigation at that time would not have revealed a
factual basis for that particular cause of action.” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-
Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 803 (Fox).) “[P]laintiffs are required to
conduct a reasonable investigation after becoming aware of an injury, and are

                                         19
charged with knowledge of the information that would have been revealed by
such an investigation.” (Id. at p. 808; see also Nguyen v. Western Digital
Corp. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1552 (2014).) The standard is an
objective one. A court’s inquiry is not “hypertechnical,” but rather asks
whether a plaintiff has reason “to at least suspect that a type of wrongdoing
has injured them.” (Fox, at p. 807.)
      Citing the general rule and the delayed discovery rule, the defendants
argue Ellorin’s cause of action accrued in 2002 because Ellorin has made the
following allegations in the complaint: that 2002 is the year in which he
began suffering as a result of the image; that Ellorin knew immediately that
this suffering (which he says, by 2003, had become unbearable torture) was
attributable to the image; and that the further suffering he experienced later,
after becoming aware of the false narrative, was merely a “renew[al]” of the
distress he had experienced previously and/or of the aspects of such distress
that had persisted unabated. Ellorin, by contrast, contends his cause of
action did not accrue until December 31, 2019, because it was not until that
date that he became aware of the false narrative and that he could not,

                                       20
through reasonable diligence, have discovered the false narrative earlier.13
As discussed post, we do not agree with either of these contentions.
      We do not agree with the defendants’ contention because, according to
the allegations in the complaint, Ellorin did not suspect in 2002 or 2003 that
anyone had done anything wrong to him. As noted ante, Ellorin alleges in
the complaint that, at or about the time in 2002 that he was first exposed to
the image, he recalled having been told by the realtor through whom he, or

13    The dominant theme of Ellorin’s accrual argument is the discovery
rule. However, also discernable in Ellorin’s briefs is a muted suggestion that
the defendants’ conduct has resulted in the existence of two independent
causes of action: one rooted in the defendants’ capture and publication of the
image itself, and the other rooted in their publication of a false narrative
about their capture and publication of the image. Distinguishing between
these two concepts, Ellorin states:
         “They could have used the true narrative based on the real
         location of the property in Ramona and that would have
         been fine. Plaintiff could have just swallowed the pain
         from the exposure to the image. It was this big lie that
         they have perpetuated up to this time that really affected
         the Plaintiff.”
       To draw an admittedly imperfect analogy, it is as though a person
alleging that his classic car had been stolen were to contend that he had been
injured, not only by the theft itself and by seeing the thief drive his car
around the block every day, but also by his discovery that the thief had been
telling others a false story about how he had come into possession of the car.
If the false story could reasonably be interpreted in some fashion as
denigrating the victim, then perhaps it would result in a cause of action—
supporting a theory of defamation—that would be separate and apart from
the cause of action arising from the original theft. But in the circumstances
presented here, in which no aspersion is being cast on the person claiming to
be aggrieved, we fail to see how the injuries Ellorin is attributing to the false
narrative discovered in 2019 can reasonably be cleaved off and disassociated
from the injuries being attributed to his having been continuously exposed to
the image dating as far back as 2001 or 2002.

                                       21
he and Veronica, had purchased the property in 1994 that the ranch had been
included on a registry of film making venues; and there is nothing in the
complaint to suggest that Ellorin had reason at that time to suspect that the
image might have been captured during the period of his ownership. As
Ellorin argues in his opening brief, “[his] distress [at that time] was purely on
the viewing of the image and [his and his family’s] disgust that they’[d] lost
the family ranch and not on any suspicion of fraud.”
      We do not agree with Ellorin’s contention because, per the allegations
in the complaint, it was long before December 31, 2019, that he had reason to
suspect that he had been wronged and to investigate. In the words of the
trial court:
          “Ellorin ‘suffered’ and was ‘subjected to distress’ and
          ‘emotional torture’ over the . . . decade [spanning 2001 or
          2002 to 2012]. Ellorin’s wife allegedly passed away in 2012
          due, in part, to the emotional distress associated with ‘her
          unanswered question why the picture of [their] distressed
          property was all over the Internet and was used as a
          Wallpaper by Microsoft without [their] knowledge or
          permission.’ No later than that point [i.e., 2012], the facts
          and circumstances were sufficient to raise a suspicion of
          wrongdoing. The complaint was not filed until nine years
          later—long after the applicable statute of limitations had
          run.” (Italics added.)

                                       22
We agree with the trial court.14
      Moreover, it is the law in California that, “ ‘ “[a] plaintiff whose
complaint shows on its face that his claim would be barred without the
benefit of the discovery rule must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time
and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery
despite reasonable diligence.” [Citation.] In assessing the sufficiency of the
allegations of delayed discovery, the court places the burden on the plaintiff
to “show diligence”; “conclusory allegations will not withstand demurrer.” ’ ”
(Grisham v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 623, 638; accord
NBCUniversal Media, LLC v. Superior Court (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1222,
1232.) Ellorin arguably has shouldered this burden as to requirement
number one inasmuch as he has alleged in the complaint that he discovered
the false narrative while “trying to change and replace the old image default
wallpaper of [his] current wife’s laptop computer” on December 31, 2021.
      But, as to requirement number two, he has not shouldered his burden
at all. To the contrary, he does not allege an inability to have made earlier
discovery, and he effectively concedes he was not diligent at all. That is—
notwithstanding his allegation in the complaint that, “[f]rom [2003]
on[ward], . . . seeing [the image] over and over again everytime [he] went to a
computer shop was torture and unbearable”—Ellorin nonetheless forthrightly

14     The trial court also premised its ruling in part on a discrepancy
between (1) Ellorin’s allegation that he had first learned of the false narrative
on December 31, 2019, and (2) the court’s conclusion (which Ellorin contends
is erroneous) that certain information set forth in printouts of web pages
included among the exhibits to the complaint reveal that Ellorin first learned
of the false narrative on an earlier date. However, because we conclude
without resorting to those printouts that the allegations in the complaint
defeat Ellorin’s invocation of the delayed discovery rule, we find it
unnecessary to consider this aspect of the trial court’s ruling in our analysis.

                                        23
states in his opening brief that “[t]here was no reasonable diligence until
. . . 2019” (italics added) because, prior to that time, he was abroad, had
limited means, and prioritized other matters.
         “Appellant . . . was abroad with limited resources, limited
         means and limited access to the internet and a computer.”
         “The family and Appellant endured the distress [occasioned
         by the image] because they were in a different Country and
         they had limited resources. There was no reasonable
         diligence until Appellant was back in the United States in
         2019. In addition, upon arrival in the US, Appellant’s
         priority was not to investigate the . . . issue [of the image of
         Wild Turkey Hill] but instead to do the following due to the
         family’s recent arrival to the US from living abroad for a
         long time.
         “1) Obtain the much-needed surgery for the reoccurrence of
         cancer which has metastasized.

         “2) Obtain housing for the family.

         “3) Enroll the four minor children in school.

         “4) Obtain medical insurance and medical checkups for the
         Appellant’s spouse and children.

         “5) Purchase a vehicle for the whole family’s use.

         “As a result, discovery was delayed until December 31,
         2019.”
(Italics added.)
      The importance of each of the afore-listed tasks notwithstanding, it
does not excuse, nor does it convert into reasonable diligence, Ellorin’s many-
years-long delay in investigating a matter that he alleges caused him and his
family so great a level of distress; and it does not rise to the level of
demonstrating an inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable
diligence. Indeed, long before 2019, Ellorin or someone acting on his behalf
could easily have visited one of what he alleges in the complaint were
                                         24
“computer shops which were plenty all around” to perform a simple internet
search in an effort to gather information with which to answer what he has
referred to as the “unanswered question,” dating at least as far back as 2012,
of “why the picture of our distressed property was all over the Internet and
was used as a Wallpaper by Microsoft without our knowledge and
permission.”

      3.    Ellorin’s Interrogatory Responses, and the Denial of His
            Request for Leave to File a Brief in Response to the
            Tentative Ruling

      Ellorin argues that the trial court erred because it “did not file, read,
and consider” his discovery responses, because it denied him leave to file a
brief in response to the tentative ruling, and because it did not file or
acknowledge the responsive brief that—the court’s denial of leave
notwithstanding—he went ahead and attempted to file “anyway.” Of course,
the inference intended to be drawn from these arguments is that, if only the
court had considered Ellorin’s discovery responses or his further brief, it

                                       25
would have overruled the demurrer—or perhaps granted him leave to amend

the complaint.15 But we are not persuaded.
      First, it should be noted that (as discussed ante) the discovery
responses that Ellorin says were not filed were in fact filed, and made a part
of the record, because they were among the items Ellorin included as exhibits

to the second of the two opposition briefs he filed on July 6, 2022.16

15     The defendants correctly point out that the purpose of a demurrer is to
test the sufficiency of the allegations that are pleaded in a complaint, not the
sufficiency of averments that appear in discovery responses. However, this is
not to say that such averments have no place in proceedings attendant to a
demurrer. After all, it often is based on such averments that courts decide
whether leave to amend should be granted. In this case, Ellorin did not ask
the trial court for leave to amend, nor has he requested such leave from this
court. Nonetheless, this court is vested with authority to consider granting
leave to amend on its own motion. (See City of Stockton v. Superior Court
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 746 [“[t]he issue of leave to amend is always open on
appeal, even if not raised by the plaintiff”].) But, even in the exercise of this
authority, we conclude that a grant of leave to amend in this case would be
futile because, for the reasons stated ante and post, we see no basis upon
which Ellorin can argue that he exercised reasonable diligence or that a
reasonable person would not have discovered the cause of action he alleges at
the time it occurred. (See generally Honig v. San Francisco Planning Dept.
(2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 520, 524 [holding “[a] demurrer is properly sustained
without leave to amend where the pleading discloses on its face that the
action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations”]; Foxborough v. Van
Atta (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 217, 231 [affirming denial of leave to amend in
circumstances in which “proposed amendment would have been futile
because it was barred by the statute of limitations”]).

16    We have considered Ellorin’s motion to augment the record, and have
accepted for filing the reply brief that he submitted in support of that motion.
However, because the discovery responses already are a part of the record
before this court, we deny the portion of the motion to augment in which he
seeks to place the discovery responses before this court.

                                       26
      Second, and more fundamentally, the discovery responses that are the
focus of Ellorin’s argument do not appear to advance Ellorin’s cause. Instead,
to the contrary, they appear to undercut it. This they do, for example, by
contradicting allegations in the complaint that relate to Ellorin’s

whereabouts and his access to computers during 2018 and 201917 and by
revealing that many of the types of injuries Ellorin alleges he experienced as
a result of discovering the false narrative in 2019 are of a kind with the types
of injuries he alleges having experienced previously as a result of viewing the

17     Ellorin alleges in the complaint that he discovered the false narrative
on December 31, 2019, having “just returned from abroad after several
years,” and he insinuates in his briefs on appeal that his failure to discover
the false narrative before that date is in significant measure attributable to
the fact that, prior to December 31, 2019, he had been “abroad with limited
resources, limited means and limited access to the internet and a computer.”
But his responses to Form Interrogatory Nos. 2.5(b) and 2.5(c), requiring him
to “[s]tate [his] residence addresses for the past five years” and “the dates you
lived at each address,” reveal that he resided continuously at addresses in the
United States (in California and Nevada) from some time in 2018 through at
least May 1, 2022.

                                       27
image.18 Thus the materials Ellorin argues the trial court should have
considered in ruling on the demurrer serve only to reinforce—not rebut—the
trial court’s conclusion that “there is no reasonable possibility that the
complaint can be amended to state a timely claim.”
      As for the denial of Ellorin’s request for leave to file a brief in response
to the tentative ruling, we are aware of no rule of court requiring a trial court
in the jurisdiction in which this case was venued either to post a tentative

18      Ellorin’s responses to Special Interrogatory Nos. 16 and 17, requiring
him to “state the type of health problems sustained by you upon which you
base your claim in this case” and “the date you first started to experience
[those] health problems,” list ten “health problems . . . [that Ellorin says he]
sustained after [his] Initial Exposure to the Bliss Image on or around 2003.”
These 10 health problems that Ellorin attributes to his “initial exposure to
the . . . image” are “insomnia, depression, anxiety, nightmares, bodily pains,
back spasms, headaches, papilliary [sic] thyroid cancer, psoriatic arthritis,
[and] flare up of previous PTSD from Vietnam war experience.” The same
two discovery responses list nine of the same ten health problems, plus 12
additional health problems, that Ellorin says he “sustained after [his]
discovery of the Fraudulent Bliss Narrative [o]n December 31, 2019.” The 21
health problems that Ellorin attributes to his discovery of “the fraudulent
Bliss narrative” were: “insomnia, depression, anxiety, anger, mental health
disorder, nightmares, bodily pains, increase in cholesterol level, testicular
cysts, back spasms, headaches, dizziness, loss of balance, enlarged prostate,
urology problems, vision problems, flare up of psoriatic arthritis and joint
inflammation, proliferation of lipomas, [and] flare up of previous PTSD from
Vietnam war experience.” Explaining this overlap, Ellorin states in response
to Special Interrogatory No. 4 that: “The recent discovery by the Plaintiff in
December 31, 2019, triggered the old distress that the Plaintiff and his family
have suffered as a result of their initial exposure to the image abroad.” This
statement, coupled with the overlap in alleged harms, tends to reinforce
allegations in the complaint that refer to the harm Ellorin allegedly
experienced on and after December 31, 2019, as an “aggravat[ion],” “[re-
]trigger[ing],” “renewal,” or other form of intensification or extension or
recurrence of harm previously caused or exacerbated during prior years as a
result of viewing the image.

                                        28
ruling or to permit a litigant to respond in writing to a tentative ruling. Rule
3.1308 of the California Rules of Court, which regulates procedures
applicable to tentative rulings, states that it “does not require any judge to
issue tentative rulings” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1308(e)); and rule 2.1.19
of the local rules of the Superior Court in San Diego County states that a civil
trial court “may issue a tentative ruling in a law and motion matter” and
defers the decision whether or not to do so to “the sole discretion of the
assigned judge” (Super. Ct. S.D. County, Local Rules, rule 2.1.19(C), italics
added). Ellorin was afforded the opportunity—to which all litigants or their
counsel desiring to respond to a tentative ruling issued in response to a
demurrer are afforded—to present oral argument at the hearing on the
demurrer. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1308(a)(1) [following issuance of a
tentative ruling, “oral argument must be permitted . . . if a party [gives
proper] noti[ce];” italics added].) Indeed, rather than being unfairly
disadvantaged by not being afforded an opportunity to respond in writing to
an advance revelation of the court’s tentative reasoning that many courts do
not offer at all, Ellorin (and the defendants) instead were advantaged by
being exposed in advance of the hearing to how the court was inclined to

                                       29
rule.19 The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ellorin leave to

file a written response to its tentative ruling.20

B.    Entry of Judgment, Not Only for O’Rear, but Also for Microsoft
      and Gates

      As noted above, after sustaining O’Rear’s demurrer, the court entered
judgment, not only for O’Rear, but also for Microsoft and Gates. Ellorin asserts
the trial court should not have entered judgment for Microsoft or Gates because
(he says) each of these defendants had failed to timely respond to the complaint
and thus was in default.. As discussed post, we conclude that Ellorin is correct

19     Although Ellorin acknowledges having read the tentative ruling two
and a half hours before the hearing commenced, he intimates—without
explicitly asserting among the grounds for his appeal—that he was impeded
in his efforts to communicate with the court during the July 15 proceedings.
He states, for example that, “[b]ecause of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Court
required . . . hearings [to] be done remotely” and that he “is disabled.”
However, the in-person appearance at the hearing by two attorneys for
O’Rear refutes the notion that remote appearances were required and
indicates instead that Ellorin had the option to appear in person, and Ellorin
does not state that any disability prevented him from attending and
participating in the proceedings in person. As another example, Ellorin
states that he “ha[s] a hearing problem” and had a “hard [time] . . .
communicat[ing] with the Court[,] especially when speaking on the telephone
and [repeatedly] getting interrupted by . . . Microsoft’s Counsel.” But
Ellorin’s rendition of statements made by counsel during the proceedings,
and of exchanges in which he engaged with the court during the July 15
proceedings, demonstrate that Ellorin had an opportunity, and availed
himself of the opportunity, to meaningfully participate in the hearing—even
if not to the extent, or in the manner, he might have preferred.

20    As noted ante, we have considered Ellorin’s motion to augment the
record, and have accepted for filing the reply brief that he submitted in
support of that motion. However, for the reasons set forth ante, we deny the
portion of the motion to augment in which he seeks to place before this court
the brief he attempted to file in response to the trial court’s tentative ruling.

                                        30
in asserting that judgment should not have been entered for Microsoft and
Gates. But the grounds on which we so conclude are not those espoused by
Ellorin.
      Focusing first on the grounds espoused by Ellorin, we note those grounds
find no support in the record. Specifically, the record reveals no indication that
a default was entered, or even requested, at any time as to any defendant.
Indeed, far from indicating that Microsoft or Gates was ever in default, the
record instead reveals that Microsoft was actively defending, (see ante) and

that Gates had not been served,21 as of the date of entry of judgment.
      Despite the absence of support for Ellorin’s assertion that Microsoft
and Gates were in default, we nonetheless are mindful of case law to the
effect that a California trial court, having entered an order sustaining a
demurrer, must not enter judgment of dismissal on that order in favor of a
defendant who did not join in the demurrer—even when doing so might be
prudent as a matter of judicial economy or to avoid additional expense to the
parties. (See Kennedy v. Bank of America (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 637, 642
[“Since the only vehicle before the trial court upon which it could act was the
demurrer of the [demurring defendant], the judgment of dismissal exceeds
the scope of the court’s ruling thereon insofar as it purports to . . . dismiss . . .
nondemurring defendants.”]; but cf. Pierce v. San Mateo County Sheriff’s

21      The record reveals that Ellorin caused a Civil Proof of Service form to
be filed on February 3, 2022 and again on February 16, 2022. But this form
did not include the summons among the documents it listed as having been
served, nor did it indicate that the individual who took delivery of the listed
documents was authorized to accept service on behalf of Gates. Rather, to
the contrary, it indicated that that individual had “confirmed [to the process
server that] he [wa]s authorized to accept [service] on behalf of The Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation [which is not a party to this case] and not
[on] . . . Gates . . . personally” (italics added).

                                         31
Dept. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 995, 1021 [“where the basis for the successful
demurrer applies equally to . . . Doe defendants,” dismissal of claims against
them may be appropriate].) On the basis of this authority, we conclude that
the trial court erred in including Microsoft and Gates in the judgment.
      Our conclusion in this regard notwithstanding, we note that the views
we express in this opinion—including our views regarding the statute of
limitations issues—constitute law of the case governing all further
proceedings in the trial court. (See Morales v. 22nd Dist. Agricultural Assoc.
(2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 85, 98–99 [“ ‘ “[q]uestions presented and decided by
[an] appellate court upon appeal from a judgment on demurrer become the
law of the case, and are not open to question on a subsequent appeal” unless
the evidence “ ‘is substantially different in a material respect” ’ ”]; see also
Penziner v. West American Finance Co. (1937) 10 Cal.2d 160, 169 [when issue
has been decided on appeal, parties are estopped from relitigating the same
case].) This circumstance, coupled with our observation that all three
defendants appear to be similarly (if not identically) situated insofar as the

statute of limitations is concerned,22 suggest that, when this case returns to
the trial court, the views we express with regard to statute of limitations
issues here may be as dispositive of Ellorin’s claims against Microsoft and
against Gates (if and when he is properly served) as they are of his claims
against O’Rear.

22     We note Microsoft has argued in support of its demurrer that “the
[trial] [c]ourt need only apply its prior ruling [on O’Rear’s demurrer in order
to be able] to sustain [Microsoft’s] demurrer.”

                                        32
                               V. Disposition
      The judgment is affirmed as to O’Rear, and reversed and remanded for
further proceedings as to Microsoft and Gates. As between Ellorin and
O’Rear, O’Rear is entitled to costs on appeal. As among Ellorin, Microsoft,
and Gates, each side shall bear its own costs on appeal.

                                                                  KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

DATO, J.

                                      33