Court Opinion

ID: 9703017
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:37:00.579416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:44.878202
License: Public Domain

McEWEN, Judge,
dissenting:
The majority holds that the Westmoreland County Municipal Authority’s maintenance of a hillside reservoir was not an abnormally dangerous activity as a result of its decision that “the value of the reservoir to the community outweighed its potentially dangerous qualities.” At 664. While the depth of my respect for my colleagues of the majority causes me great hesitation, I must, nonetheless, most respectfully, dissent.
Section 520(f) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts requires a court to consider, when determining whether an *523activity is abnormally dangerous, the “extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.” The comment to clause (f) provides:
“[The] value to the community may be such that the danger will not be regarded as an abnormal one. This is particularly true when the community is largely devoted to the dangerous enterprise and its prosperity largely depends upon it. Thus, the interests of a particular town whose livelihood depends upon such an activity as manufacturing cement may be such that cement plants will be regarded as a normal activity for that community notwithstanding the risk of serious harm from the emission of cement dust.” (emphasis supplied).
I am of the view that the application of clause (f) of Section 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts should result in a determination that the activity is not abnormally dangerous only when the individuals imperiled by the activity are also the individuals benefited by the activity. In the instant case, a small number of individuals in the community were subject to the risks posed by the reservoir while the benefits enured to the entire community.
We are here called upon to establish policy and I deem the fairer policy to be one that requires the court to weigh and balance the value to whom and the danger to whom, in determining whether an activity is or is not unreasonably dangerous under Section 520(f). Only when the segment of the community that receives the benefit of the activity is also the segment of the community which is placed at risk by the activity, should subsection 520(f) result in a finding that the activity is not abnormally dangerous. Thus, I would here find that consideration of the factors in Section 520 should result in a finding that the reservoir was abnormally dangerous since the activity imperiled only a small segment of the community while the benefits from the activity flowed to the entire community.
The concept of risk distribution mirrors, perhaps, a resolution of such discomfort as is triggered by the notion that many benefit from the risk of a few. Thus, I deem it *524preferable, at this stage of the history of strict liability, to apply the analysis and principles of risk distribution to cases arising under clause (f) of Section 520, since the imposition of strict liability in cases where an ultrahazardous activity benefits an entire community but poses a risk to only a small segment of that community will result in a more equitable distribution of the losses caused by such activity.
Justification for this interpretation of Sections 519 and 520 has been ably expressed by Chief Judge (now Senior Judge) Thomas J. MacBride in Chavez v. Southern Pacific Transportation, 413 F.Supp. 1203 (E.D.Calif.1976):
“[T]he risk distribution justification for imposing strict liability is well suited to claims arising out of the conduct of ultrahazardous activity. The victims of such activity are defenseless. Due to the very nature of the activity, the losses suffered as a result of such activity are likely to be substantial — an ‘overwhelming misfortune to the person injured.'____ By indirectly imposing liability on those that benefit from the dangerous activity, risk distribution benefits the social-economic body in two ways: (1) the adverse impact of any particular misfortune is lessened by spreading its cost over a greater population and over a longer time period, and (2) social and economic resources can be more efficiently allocated when the actual costs of goods and services (including the losses they entail) are reflected in their price to the consumer.”
Chavez v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., supra at 1209 (footnote omitted). Accord Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Company v. American Cyanamid Company, 517 F.Supp. 314 (N.D.Ill.1981); National Steel Service Center, Inc. v. Gibbons, 319 N.W.2d 269 (Iowa, 1982).
Nor do I believe that Section 521 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts would afford immunity to the Municipal Authority under the facts of the instant case. The Section 521 issue was not, of course, a subject of discussion by our esteemed colleague Judge Donald E. Wieand in his excellent opinion for the majority since that issue had not been raised *525by any of the parties and since that issue had become merely academic by reason of the conclusion of the majority that the activity of the Municipal Authority was not abnormally dangerous.
However, since this dissenting view has concluded that the activity of the Municipal Authority was abnormally dangerous, the nature of the immunity afforded by Section 521 becomes a pertinent issue. As we have noted, the majority does not discuss the issue, but it does note two Pennsylvania cases, namely, Lobozzo v. Adam Eidemiller, Inc., 437 Pa. 360, 263 A.2d 432 (1970) and Laventhol v. A. DiSandro Contracting Co., 173 Pa.Super. 522, 98 A.2d 422 (1953). Our scrutiny of those cases leads us to conclude that Section 521 is applicable only to public officers or employees. Justice Pomeroy in Lobozzo notes that “Section 521 and comment (a)2 thereto appear to recognize that governmental bodies must, on occasion, engage in ultrahazardous activity for the public benefit and that a public officer or employee has the duty of conducting such activity thrust upon him by virtue of his position. Because the governmental unit may be either immune from suit or immune from liability for harm caused by such activity, the full burden of absolute liability would fall squarely upon the individual public servant, absent the Section 521 exception. Yet, the individual public officer or employee can neither control the degree of hazard he will create nor dictate the compensation he will receive for the performance of his required duties.” Id. 437 Pa. at 363, 263 A.2d at 434 (emphasis supplied).1
*526Our research has uncovered but one pertinent case, McLane v. Northwest Natural Gas Company, 255 Or. 324, 467 P.2d 635 (1970), in which a wrongful death action was instituted against a public utility after the plaintiffs decedent was killed while insulating a gas storage tank under construction. The defendant argued that as a public utility it was authorized by the state to store and distribute natural gas and was, therefore, immune from liability by virtue of Section 521. The court quoted Section 521 of Tentative Draft No. 10 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provided “[t]here is no strict liability for an abnormally dangerous activity if it is carried on in pursuance of a public duty imposed upon the actor, or a franchise or authority conferring legislative approval of the activity.” The comment to the proposed draft provided, inter alia:
b. Even where there is no duty to engage in the abnormally dangerous activity, the defendant may be protected from strict liability by a sanction conferred by the legislature, under circumstances such as to indicate approval of the activity sufficient to confer immunity. Normally this is the case when, under a franchise, given to such a defendant as a common carrier, it is authorized but not required to accept dangerous commodities for transportation. It may likewise be the case where the legislature grants to a defendant authority to engage in an activity of the abnormally dangerous kind, as where, in wartime, a defendant is authorized to construct and operate a plant making explosives in an area of special danger.
On the other hand, it is not every authorization or permission to engage in an activity which can be taken to confer immunity from strict liability, by giving such approval to the activity as to indicate an intent that the defendant shall not be liable. In the absence of special circumstances indicating such an intent, the normal interpretation of the act of the legislature in granting a *527franchise or authority to act in such a manner is that the defendant is authorized to proceed, but must be strictly responsible if the activity in fact results in harm to those in the vicinity.
The McLane court held that “[t]he proposed section lends no aid to defendant’s contention. We do not believe the fact that the state has authorized defendant to engage in the abnormally dangerous activity in question demonstrates any intention to predetermine where responsibility should lie in the case of a non-negligent miscarriage of the activity.” Id. at 336, 467 P.2d at 641.
We hasten to note, of course, that the form in which Section 521 was adopted omits the terms “franchise” and “authority”, and specifically provides immunity for “public officers” and “employees” only. I, therefore, believe that Section 521 provides immunity only for public officers and employees and find it inapplicable to the activity of the Authority in the instant case.
I would, therefore, reinstate the judgment as entered by the distinguished Judge Joseph A. Hudock.
SPAETH, President Judge, joins this dissenting opinion.

. The precise ruling is that a private contractor is not within the exceptions created by Section 521 even though the private contractor is performing work at the direction and under the authorization of a governmental body. The decision also makes clear and certain that the insulation from liability for ultrahazardous activity is limited to governmental officials and is not meant to cover ultrahazardous activity at the direction of government agencies.
It might be argued that Section 521 assumed the immunity of government agencies and sought to extend that immunity to the officials of the government agencies. If that be so, the immunity that it assumed was the immunity that is conferred upon government while it carries *526out its governmental duties and not while it conducts proprietary operations.