Court Opinion

ID: 9614451
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:25:34.604386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:12:50.760352
License: Public Domain

HUNSTEIN, Presiding Justice,
dissenting.
“Mr. Jackson, you didn’t call the police, did you?” That was the very first question out of the mouth of the assistant district attorney on the cross-examination of appellant. The second question was no better: “And you didn’t call 911 or the emergency to get [the murder victim] any help, did you?” The improper questioning did not stop there. The prosecutor also asked:
“But you were so afraid that you ran to the police and you told them that, hey, these guys tried to set me up, they tried to kill me ... is that what you did?”;
“You didn’t think that was important to tell the police if you called [sic] yourself acting in self-defense, I guess?”;
“And you didn’t think it was important to tell the police that you killed somebody since you were so afraid?”;
“And then back in June of 2001 did you ever tell the police, or the district attorney’s office, or anybody, that you had killed [the murder victim] and that you were acting in self-defense?”;
“And, Mr. Jackson, you are familiar with 911; is that correct?”;
“Was there anything that was hindering you from contacting the police — particularly Detective Balkcom — to let him know, hey, by *500the way, there is this guy that was trying to shoot at me, so I shot him and I killed him, was there anything preventing you from doing that?”;
“And from 2001 to 2003 the first time that you mentioned self-defense is here today in court?”;
“Did you contact the Atlanta police department and say, hey, these guys tried to attack me, I was acting in self-defense?”;
“So the first time that you said this or mentioned this is today in open court now that you’re on the stand, is that correct?”
Appellant was the last witness to testify. Closing arguments followed and the same prosecutor, while addressing the jury, maintained the focus on appellant’s pre-arrest silence:
In addition to Shelton Jackson’s testimony, I think it is very strange that somebody would all of a sudden two years later now take the stand and say they were acting in self-defense when he had ample opportunity to tell the police or to call 911 or to call anybody and let them know what happened. He chose not to do that and that is because he knew that they murdered [the victim] on May 17, 2001.
The law is very straightforward and clear: “the state may not comment on either a defendant’s silence prior to arrest or failure to come forward voluntarily, even when the defendant chooses to testify at trial.” Landers v. State, 270 Ga. 189, 190 (2) (508 SE2d 637) (1998). This easy-to-remember, bright-line rule has been the law of this State since 1991. Mallory v. State, 261 Ga. 625 (409 SE2d 839) (1991). Despite repeated reminders of this rule in cases since Mallory was decided, the State deliberately ignored this well-established rule when it cross-examined appellant and argued its case to the jury.
As the above questions establish, the improper questioning in this case was not a matter of a few questions or an unpursued issue, compare Moore v. State, 278 Ga. 397 (2) (b) (603 SE2d 228) (2004) (State did not persist in its improper questioning) or Rickman v. State, 277 Ga. 277 (4) (587 SE2d 596) (2003) (two improper questions posed). The improper questioning was the main focus of the State’s cross-examination of appellant, with ten specific questions about his pre-trial silence and numerous indirect questions supporting or leading up to the improper ones, over the course of a mere 14 pages of trial transcript. The strategy behind the improper questioning became manifest when the prosecutor used appellant’s pre-arrest silence as a central part of its argument during closing. Evidence that this Court has expressly recognized as too prejudicial to be allowed at trial was deliberately elicited for the tactical advantage it provided the State in undermining appellant’s sole defense.
*501Decided October 9, 2007.
Brian Steel, for appellant.
Thus, I cannot agree that this was merely “improper[ ] comment,” as the majority characterizes it. Maj. Op. p. 497. Rather, this was flagrant and repeated prosecutorial misconduct. The State deliberately used appellant’s pre-arrest silence to prejudice his defense. This intentional violation of well-established law should be met with the harshest condemnation by this Court. But even though it recognizes defense counsel’s deficiency in failing to object to this prosecutorial misconduct, the majority refuses to hold the State accountable by, yet again, excusing this misconduct as harmless under the rubric of “overwhelming evidence.” Yes, I agree with the majority that the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, see Maj. Op., Division 1, supra; but in no sense of the word can the evidence adduced in this case be considered “overwhelming.”
As the majority’s holding in this case amply demonstrates, “overwhelming evidence” no longer depends upon the amount and quality of evidence of guilt adduced at trial. Instead, “overwhelming evidence” has become the catch phrase that excuses all error.
Braithwaite v. State, 275 Ga. 884, 899 (572 SE2d 612) (2002) (Hunstein, J., dissenting). This case presents an even more egregious example of prosecutorial misconduct than that in Braithwaite, because here the State not only argued an impermissible topic to the jury, it elicited evidence too prejudicial to be allowed at trial and did so not just from any witness but from the defendant himself.
Under these circumstances, I would hold that for the purposes of the second prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984), appellant carried his burden of showing that his defense was prejudiced both by the admission of evidence the State improperly elicited on cross-examination regarding his prearrest silence and by the State’s use of that evidence during closing argument to undermine his claim of self-defense. Because evidence sufficient in this case to meet the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), was not so overwhelming as to render harmless the prejudice to appellant’s defense, I respectfully dissent to the majority’s affirmance of appellant’s conviction.
I am authorized to state that Justice Thompson joins this dissent.
*502PaulL. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Peggy R. Katz, Bettieanne C. Hart, Assistant District Attorneys, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Benjamin H. Pierman, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.