Court Opinion

ID: 9919239
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 19:02:22.418416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:33.779678
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/17/24 P. v. Avila CA2/6
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

 THE PEOPLE,                                                2d Crim. No. B321824
                                                         (Super. Ct. No. 2017012237)
      Plaintiff and Respondent,                               (Ventura County)

 v.

 JOSE GUZMAN AVILA,

      Defendant and Appellant.

             Jose Guzman Avila appeals his conviction, by jury, of
continuous sexual abuse of a child under 14 years of age (Pen.
Code, § 288.5, subd. (a)),1 and two counts of lewd acts on a child.
(§ 288, subd. (c)(1).) The jury further found true the aggravating
factors that the victim was vulnerable and that appellant took
advantage of a position of trust. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.421(a)(3), (a)(11).) He was sentenced to state prison for 19
years 8 months. He now contends the trial court erred when it

      All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
         1

otherwise stated.
instructed the jury in terms of CALCRIM Nos. 357 and 362
regarding adoptive admissions and consciousness of guilt and
that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance at trial because
counsel failed to object to either instruction. Appellant further
alleges the trial court erred when it denied his motion for new
trial based on jury misconduct. Finally, appellant contends the
trial court erred when it failed to delineate the specific fines and
fees imposed at sentencing and when it prepared an abstract of
judgment that differs from the trial court’s oral pronouncements
at the sentencing hearing. We will order the trial court to
prepare a corrected abstract of judgment and, in all other
respects, affirm.
                                 Facts
             V was about 9 years old when her parents divorced.
About two years later, V’s mother, A, started dating appellant.
Appellant and A got married in 2014, when V was 12 or 13 years
old. From the time V was about 11 years old until she was 15,
appellant sexually abused her about once a week. He began by
fondling her buttocks. Over the next four years, appellant
touched V’s breasts and vagina, had anal and vaginal sex with
her, orally copulated her and forced her to orally copulate him.
             After V turned 12, she told her mother that appellant
was touching her. A told V, “to go talk to my aunts because she
didn’t want to deal with it.” V’s Aunt Gabby told V, “that my
mom was finally happy and that I just wanted to ruin their
marriage.” V stopped telling her mom that appellant was
abusing her because her mom didn’t listen. V felt like she didn’t
matter.
             Just before Thanksgiving in 2016, when V was 15
years old, A “caught” appellant on top of V while they were on the

                                 2
living room couch. Appellant had inserted his penis into V’s
vagina. When A entered the room, appellant got up and walked
into the kitchen. A followed him; as she passed by V, A slapped V
on the leg and called her a “slut.” A also claimed V never told her
about appellant’s abuse. Appellant left the house that night and
started staying with his father. Within a few weeks, V had
moved in with her biological father.
             V tried again to tell her mother that appellant had
been abusing her, but A would not listen. She claimed V never
said anything to her about the abuse. After that, V started
talking to other family members, “[b]ecause my mom couldn’t
deal with it.” V talked to her Aunt Andrea, her grandmother,
and her grandmother’s sister, Aunt Patty. V found it
uncomfortable to discuss the abuse with her family members.
While speaking with them, V denied that appellant sexually
penetrated her.
             After appellant moved out of their house, A had
several telephone conversations with him about V’s accusations.
Appellant denied ever touching V inappropriately. On one
occasion, when A was with V, she made a pretext call to
appellant. During the call, A told appellant that V had just came
home from the doctor and was pregnant. Appellant responded,
“Nothing happened. If she’s pregnant, it’s not mine.” V told
appellant, “don’t lie to my mom. You know what you did.”
Appellant continued to deny touching and raping V. Eventually,
however, he said, “Fine. I kissed her. Is that what you want to
hear? I kissed her.” Appellant also said that kissing V was “the
worst thing I have ever done in my life.” A described his voice as
sounding “sarcastic,” and “frustrated.” V told A that appellant

                                3
had never kissed her and was lying. Appellant hung up after V
accused him of lying.
             About three weeks after A caught appellant on the
couch with V, A’s mother and other family members told her that
they would report the matter to police if A did not. A went to
appellant’s home to tell him that her relatives were going to call
the police. Appellant called A’s aunt Patty and had “a very
unpleasant phone call with her.”
             Before she learned that he had been abusing V, Patty
had a close friendship with appellant. She testified that
appellant called her around Thanksgiving and was “hysterically
crying.” He asked her to forgive him “for ruining the family and
ruining everybody’s life.” Appellant continued to deny having
sexual relations with V but admitted that he had sexual thoughts
about her.
             Appellant called Patty again around December 12.
Patty put the call on speakerphone, so her mother and sister
Irma could hear the conversation. Appellant had just learned
that Child Protective Services and the sheriff had been contacted
about his abuse of V. He was angry at Patty for “ruining his
family.” Patty told appellant, “if he hasn’t done anything, why
did he keep apologizing to me? Again, he mentioned that he
never had sexual activity with [V]. He had sexual thoughts and
intent. [¶] My response to him was that anyone who has sexual
thoughts, intent, and an erect penis has no business of ever being
in contact with [V] or any children for that matter.” Appellant’s
response was “very heated” but he did not deny that he had an
erect penis when he was around V.
             During one of her conversations with appellant, Patty
again asked appellant why he kept apologizing to her. Appellant

                                4
“admitted he had sexual thoughts and that he was at the point of
half penetration.”
              Patty’s sister Irma testified that she overheard the
December 12 phone conversation because Patty put appellant’s
call on speakerphone. According to Irma, Patty told appellant
that A saw him with an erection while he was with V. Irma
recalled that appellant said, “Just because I am attracted to her –
this happens when I am around her. But he was vague in how he
said that when he’s around her, he has an erection.” Appellant
also denied that he ever “did anything.” Irma recalled him
saying, “Just because I’m around her and have an erection
doesn’t mean that I did anything.”
              Over the next several weeks, V gave three separate
interviews to three different police officers. The first two officers
were men; the third was a woman. V testified that she was
uncomfortable discussing her abuse with the male officers, so she
told them that appellant had groped her, but did not mention
anal or vaginal penetration. In the interview with the female
officer, V disclosed the anal and vaginal penetration.
                              Contentions
              Appellant contends the trial court erred when it
instructed the jury with the pattern jury instructions on adoptive
admissions (CALCRIM No. 357) and false statements reflecting a
consciousness of guilt (CALCRIM No. 362) because the evidence
at trial did not support the instructions. He contends he received
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because counsel failed to
object to either instruction. Appellant contends the trial court
erred when it denied his motion for new trial based on jury
misconduct. Finally, appellant contends the trial court erred
because it failed to specify the amount of a fine imposed under

                                  5
section 290.3 and when it prepared an abstract of judgment that
does not accurately reflect other fines and fees imposed at
sentencing.
                               Discussion
                           Instructional Error
              Adoptive Admission. The trial court instructed the
jury in terms of CALCRIM No. 357 that, “If you conclude that
someone made a statement outside of court that tended to
connect the defendant with the commission of the crime and the
defendant did not deny it,” and the jury finds that certain other
facts are true, it could “conclude that the defendant admitted the
statement was true.”2 Appellant contends the trial court erred
because the evidence at trial did not support this instruction. We
disagree.
              “‘“[B]efore a jury can be instructed that it may draw a
particular inference, evidence must appear in the record which, if
believed by the jury, will support the suggested inference. . . .”
. . .’” (People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 920-921

      2 The instruction provides: “If you conclude that someone
made a statement outside of court that tended to connect the
defendant with the commission of the crime and the defendant
did not deny it, you must decide whether each of the following is
true: 1. The statement was made to the defendant or made in his
presence; 2. The defendant heard and understood the statement;
3. The defendant would, under all the circumstances, naturally
have denied the statement if he thought it was not true; AND 4.
The defendant could have denied it but did not. If you decide
that all of these requirements have been met, you may conclude
that the defendant admitted the statement was true. If you
decide that any of these requirements has not been met, you
must not consider either the statement or the defendant’s
response for any purpose.” (CALCRIM No. 357.)

                                  6
(Alexander); see also People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266,
1298 [error to instruct on adoptive admissions where “there was
no properly admitted evidence of an adoptive admission”].) “‘[A]
trial court has broad discretion to determine whether a party has
established the foundational requirements for a hearsay
exception[,]’” and we review its “‘conclusions regarding
foundational facts for substantial evidence. . . .’” (Chism, supra,
at p. 1297, quoting People v. DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 132.)
             Appellant contends there was no evidentiary basis for
the instruction because appellant repeatedly denied abusing V.
However, during the pretext call with A and V, appellant
“sarcastically” said that he had kissed V. V accused him of lying
and insisted they had never kissed. Rather than deny V’s
accusations, appellant ended the call. Similarly, during his
conversation with Patty, appellant did not deny having an
erection around V. These incidents supplied an evidentiary basis
for the adoptive admission instruction because a reasonable trier
of fact could infer from appellant’s silence on both occasions that
he was lying and V was telling the truth.
             Because the trial court properly instructed the jury in
terms of CALCRIM No. 357, the “failure” of defense counsel to
object to the instruction did not constitute ineffective assistance.
(People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 437 (Boyette).)
             Consciousness of Guilt. The trial court instructed the
jury in terms of CALCRIM No. 362 regarding false statements
and the consciousness of guilt.3 Appellant contends the trial

      3The instruction provides, “If the defendant made a false or
misleading statement before this trial relating to the charged
crime, knowing the statement was false or intending to mislead,
that conduct may show he was aware of his guilt of the crime and

                                 7
court erred because his statements denying the sexual assaults
against V were not false, but were instead the defense theory of
the case. We are not persuaded.
              The trial court may properly give an instruction on
consciousness of guilt where there is “some evidence in the record
that, if believed by the jury, would sufficiently support the
suggested inference.” (People v. Coffman & Marlow (2004) 34
Cal.4th 1, 102.) It is not necessary that the facts giving rise to
the inference be conclusively established before the instruction
may be given. (Alexander, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 921.) Where
the inference is based on a defendant’s false or conflicting pretrial
statements, the falsity of those statements may be shown by the
testimony of others, “even when the [defendant’s] pretrial
statement is not inconsistent with defendant’s testimony at trial.”
(People v. Edwards (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1103.)
              “What matters is the falsity of the defendant’s
statements and their relevance to the charges against him, not
the means by which the are proven false. False statements which
‘are apparently motivated by fear of detection, or which . . .
suggest there is no honest explanation for the incriminating
circumstances’ may be used as evidence of the accused’s guilt.”
(People v. Mendoza (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 667, 673.)
              Here, the evidence showed that appellant made
conflicting statements to his wife A and to Patty regarding his
conduct with V. After A saw appellant on the living room couch

you may consider it in determining his guilt. If you conclude that
the defendant made the statement, it is up to you to decide its
meaning and importance. However, evidence that the defendant
made such a statement cannot prove guilt by itself.” (CALCRIM
No. 362.)

                                 8
with V, appellant denied any inappropriate contact with V.
During subsequent telephone conversations, appellant changed
his story, at first insisting he had done nothing wrong, then
admitting he had kissed V and then abruptly ending a call when
V accused him of lying. He followed a similar pattern in
conversations with Patty, shifting from complete denial, to
admitting “sexual thoughts and intent,” to tacitly accepting the
accusation that he had an erect penis around her, and then
finally admitting that he had been “at the point of half
penetration.”
             A jury could reasonably infer from appellant’s
changing stories that he made false or misleading statements to
deflect the suspicions of his family members and convince them
that V was lying. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in giving
the consciousness of guilt instruction to the jury. (People v.
Howard (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1000, 1025 [CALCRIM No. 362
properly given where “the jury could quite reasonably conclude
that defendant made a series of false statements to deflect
suspicion from himself”].) Because the instruction was supported
by substantial evidence, appellant’s trial counsel was not
ineffective for failing to object to it. (Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at
p.437.)
                            Jury Misconduct
             Appellant’s motion for new trial argued that
prospective jurors committed misconduct during voir dire by
discussing the case among themselves. He also submitted
declarations from two friends indicating they saw a witness make
“constant eye contact” with the jury foreperson and overheard the
foreperson comment on the case outside of the courtroom.
Appellant now contends the trial court erred in denying the

                                  9
motion without properly investigating these claims or holding an
evidentiary hearing on them. There was no abuse of discretion.
             At the end of the first day of voir dire, the first panel
of prospective jurors left the courtroom while the second panel of
prospective jurors was waiting in the hallway outside the
courtroom. The trial court swore in the members of the second
panel and instructed them to return the next morning. When
trial re-convened, defense counsel informed the trial court that A
stated she overheard prospective jurors commenting on the case
in the hallway before they first entered the courtroom. A claimed
to have heard prospective jurors say, “‘Poor little girl,’ and ‘Oh, it
happened three years ago.’”
             The prosecutor noted that A’s claim seemed
“distinctly implausible” because, when A claimed to have heard
the statement, the second panel of prospective jurors did not
know any factual details about the case. In addition, the first
and second panels had no opportunity to fraternize, because they
were in the same space only momentarily.
              The trial court reached the same conclusion. It
declined to question the prospective jurors individually. Instead,
the trial court decided to “just ask the jury if they – if anybody
has heard anything about this case from other jurors or knows
anything about the charges. If a hand goes up, then we’ll go
further from there. If no hands go up, then I don’t know what to
say.” Defense counsel replied, “I would agree that’s an
appropriate procedure, your Honor.” None of the prospective
jurors indicated they heard or knew anything about the case.
             Prior to sentencing, defense counsel filed a motion for
new trial based on juror misconduct. The motion was supported
by the declarations of A and two of appellant’s personal friends.

                                 10
A declared that, after lunch on the first day of voir dire, she
overheard the juror who would later become the foreperson say,
“‘Do you guys know what this is about?’” On the second day of
voir dire, A overheard a potential juror say, “‘Did you hear this is
a case about a stepdad who raped his stepdaughter?’” After that
comment, one of the women “made a loud gasp, and said, ‘That
poor little girl!’” Two days later, A claimed to have overheard the
forewoman say, “‘I don’t even know why he shows up, we are
going to find him guilty.’”
              Appellant’s friend Raul Reyes declared that he
noticed V’s Aunt Patty sit in the audience and “make constant
eye contact with the foreperson.” He also stated that he
overheard jurors discussing the case while waiting for the
courtroom to open. Martin Guzman declared that he heard a
juror say, referring to appellant, “‘Why is he even here?’”
Another juror put his finger to his mouth, gesturing for her to be
quiet. Guzman also noticed Patty making eye contact with the
forewoman and other members of the jury.
              The trial court declined to hear live testimony in
support of the motion because, after listening to A’s trial
testimony, it “found her to be noncredible, completely, as did the
jury.” The trial court stated, “I just don’t find her credible. So
listening to her testify would do nothing.” It also declined to hear
testimony from appellant’s other witnesses because they failed to
report the alleged misconduct when they first observed it. In
addition, “the things that they’re saying just factually couldn’t be
true.” Concluding the allegations were “highly suspect” and
lacked “any sort of credibility,” the trial court denied the motion
for new trial.

                                11
             Appellant contends the trial court erred when it
declined to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the allegations of
juror misconduct. We are not persuaded.
             “‘We review for abuse of discretion the trial court’s
denial of defendant’s postverdict request for an evidentiary
hearing into allegations of jury misconduct.’ [Citation.]” (People
v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 604.) Appellant has a right to
trial by an impartial jury that will decide the case based solely on
the evidence before it, without any improper influence. (In re
Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 293-294.) “Jurors ‘convers[ing]
among themselves or with anyone else, . . . on any subject
connected with the trial’ is juror misconduct. [Citation.] Juror
misconduct ‘“raises a presumption of prejudice that may be
rebutted by proof that no prejudice actually resulted.”’
[Citation.]” (People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 332.)
             The trial court did not abuse its discretion. First,
appellant forfeited the claim that he was entitled to a more
robust investigation of the misconduct allegations. When those
claims were first raised in the trial court, defense counsel agreed
with the trial court’s decision to question the second jury panel
collectively. Because defense counsel “fully acquiesced in the
court’s approach” and did not request further investigation at
that time, any claim that the inquiry was inadequate has been
forfeited. (People v. Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 136, 185.)
             Even if the claims had not been forfeited, we would
reject them because substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s factual finding that the claimed misconduct did not occur.
(People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 582.) Substantial
evidence supports the trial court’s finding that A, Reyes and
Guzman were not credible because they were obviously biased,

                                12
they delayed informing the trial court of the claimed misconduct
until after the jurors were excused, and their allegations were
inconsistent with facts known to the trial court. For example, A
claimed to have overheard conversation among prospective jurors
before those jurors had been sent to the courtroom and before
they had any means of knowing the subject matter of the case.
She claimed to have overheard other comments after the trial
court admonished her to avoid any contact with jurors. The trial
court directly observed A’s testimony at trial and, like the jury,
found her wholly unbelievable. In light of this evidence, the trial
court acted well within its discretion when it declined to hold an
evidentiary hearing and denied the motion for new trial.
                        Assessments and Fines
             At appellant’s sentencing hearing, the trial court
found that appellant “has no ability to pay for the cost of the state
restitution fund fee. . . . So I am going to waive that fee.” It then
ordered appellant to pay direct victim restitution to both V and
her biological father and to the Victims Compensation Board.
The trial court further stated, “Pursuant to [section] 290.3 of the
Penal Code, the defendant is ordered to pay a fine of $5,200,
including penalty assessment.” It did not specify how it arrived
at that figure or whether other fines and fees were struck based
on appellant’s inability to pay. The abstract of judgment reflects
the imposition of victim restitution, a fine of $5200 pursuant to
Penal Code section 290.3, a $120 fine pursuant to Penal Code
§1465.8 and a $90 fine pursuant to Government Code §70373.
The latter two fines were not mentioned by the trial court at
sentencing.
             Appellant contends the matter must be remanded to
permit the trial court to specify which fines, fees and assessments

                                 13
it intended to impose and which it intended to waive based on
appellant’s inability to pay. Respondent correctly concedes the
matter must be remanded for this purpose.
             The trial court is required to specify each fine and fee
imposed both at sentencing and in the abstract of judgment.
(People v. High (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1200.) “The
abstract of judgment should detail the amounts of and statutory
basis for the base fine and each of the penalty assessments
imposed.” (People v. Johnson (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1459.)
Here, the trial court’s statement is too general and the abstract of
judgment appears to differ in some respects from it. We will
remand the matter to permit the trial court to clarify which fines
and fees it intended to impose, if any, and which it intended to
waive based on appellant’s inability to pay. The trial court shall
then prepare and forward to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation a corrected abstract of judgment detailing the
specific fines, fees and assessments, if any, imposed.
                               Conclusion
             The matter is remanded for recalculation and
clarification of fines, fees and assessments imposed. The clerk of
the superior court shall prepare and forward to the Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation a corrected abstract of
judgment reflecting the trial court’s modifications and
corrections. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
             NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                      YEGAN, Acting P. J.
We concur:

             BALTODANO, J.            CODY, J.

                                 14
                    Ryan J. Wright, Judge

               Superior Court County of Ventura

                ______________________________

             Jennifer A. Mannix, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
             Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Marc A. Kohm, Deputy Attorney General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.