Court Opinion

ID: 9794127
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:00:03.300905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:16.250347
License: Public Domain

Judge ROY
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority’s holding that the term “good cause” as used in the Liquor Code with respect to the renewal of a liquor license without regulatory definition denies due process of law. In my view, while “good cause” is admittedly a broad term, sufficient guidelines and safeguards are present to prevent the unfettered discretion of the local licensing authority in renewing or refusing to renew a liquor license.
The statute provides in pertinent part as follows:
The licensing authority may refuse to renew any license for good cause, subject to judicial review.
Section 12-47-106(l)(b), C.R.S. (1991 Repl. Vol. 5B) (emphasis added).
The term “good cause” is not defined by the statute or regulation. “Good cause” is not, however, a standard without legal meaning. It has been defined as a substantial or legal justification, as opposed to an assumed or imaginary pretense. Tucker v. People, 136 Colo. 581, 319 P.2d 983 (1957). In a liquor license proceeding, the act complained of as constituting “good cause” should be one which adversely affects public decency, sobriety, and good order in itself. In re Appeal of Ohio Sportservice, Inc., 55 Ohio Misc. 1, 378 N.E.2d 498 (1976).
*172While the term good cause is frequently used in statutes, rules, and regulations, it has rarely been challenged as denying due process. It, and similar phrases, have survived such challenges. See Tiger Investments of Columbus, Inc. v. Ohio Liquor Control Commission, 8 Ohio App.3d 316, 457 N.E.2d 320 (1982) (“good cause”); Alexander v. Department of Agriculture, 111 Ill.App.3d 927, 67 Ill.Dec. 575, 444 N.E.2d 811 (1983) (“for cause and after a hearing upon reasonable notice”). In addition, the Alexander court held the statute at issue was constitutionally sufficient, without more, to advise the licensee of the criteria for continued licensing. See also Watso v. Colorado Department of Social Services, 841 P.2d 299 (Colo.1992).
In City of Manitou Springs v. Walk, 149 Colo. 43, 367 P.2d 744 (1961), our supreme court held that the local licensing authority may not arbitrarily or summarily deny the renewal of a fermented beverage license but may refuse upon a showing of “good cause.”
If, as here, a license has a fixed term subject to renewal, the licensee has no vested rights and is not entitled to due process with respect to renewal. Ficarra v. Department of Regulatory Agencies, 849 P.2d 6 (Colo.1993) citing Board of County Commissioners v. Buckley, 121 Colo. 108, 117, 213 P.2d 608, 612 (1949) (“There is no vested right in a licensee to continue in the liquor business beyond the expiration of the date of the license under which he operates.”).
Moreover, a liquor license may be suspended even when there is no statutory standard governing suspension. New Safari Lounge, Inc. v. City of Colorado Springs, 193 Colo. 428, 567 P.2d 372 (1977). Indeed, in general, a licensing board has the inherent power to revoke a license upon good cause shown after notice and hearing even when no power of revocation or applicable standard was provided for in the governing statute. State Board of Cosmetology v. Maddux, 162 Colo. 550, 428 P.2d 936 (1967).
Squire and the majority rely on Elizondo v. State, 194 Colo. 113, 570 P.2d 518 (1977) as standing for the proposition that the Department of Revenue must adopt regulations defining “good cause.” In Elizondo, in a situation in which neither the statute nor the regulations provided any standards whatsoever for the issuance or denial of a probationary driver’s license during a period of suspension, our supreme court held the statute unconstitutional. Here, however, unlike Eli-zondo, the statute does contain a standard and that standard, “good cause,” is, in my opinion, sufficient under the circumstances.
In this instance, the term “good cause” is used in a statutory and regulatory framework which contains a number of prohibited acts including, without exhausting the list: sales to persons under the age of twenty-one or sales to an habitual drunkard or visibly intoxicated person, § 12-47-128(5)(a)(I), C.R.S. (1991 Repl. Vol. 5B); sales at other than the licensed location, § 12-47-128(5)(g)(I), C.R.S. (1991 Repl. Vol. 5B); sales on unauthorized days, § 12-47-128(5)(c), C.R.S. (1991 Repl. Vol. 5B); failure to post specified warnings, § 12-47~128(5)(h), C.R.S. (1991 Repl. Vol. 5B); displaying certain signs, § 12-47-128(5)©, C.R.S. (1991 Repl. Vol. 5B); and permitting gambling unless specially licensed, § 12-47-128(5)(n)(I), C.R.S. (1991 Repl. Vol. 5B).
Squire was notified by the Director of the renewal hearing in accordance with § 12-47-106(l)(b). The notice specified alleged violations and matters to be considered at the hearing, and the hearing was limited to the matters noticed. The Liquor Code provides Squire with additional protections by permitting judicial review of any decision of the local licensing authority. Section 12-47-141, C.R.S. (1991 Repl. Vol. 5B).
I conclude that the standard of “good cause,” in conjunction with the procedural protections set forth in the Liquor Code, is adequate, without more, to protect against the uncontrolled exercise of discretionary power by the local licensing authority, and does not deny the licensee due process of law.