Court Opinion

ID: 9584922
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:53:58.865724+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:11.477242
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
dissenting. The majority opinion reverses the trial judge and grants a new trial in this damage suit on the sole ground that error was committed in the refusal to admit in evidence a certain document, which purported to be a writing containing information given by the plaintiff to the hospital authorities at the time he entered same. Plaintiff contended he was injured on the right-of-way of the railroad, and the railroad sought to impeach him by showing that he had stated to the hospital authority that he was injured in the washroom.
On cross examination, the witness who purportedly took the written statement testified that she had no independent recollection of this particular transaction, except for remembering her own handwriting; that she could not recognize the patient in the courtroom; that sometimes the per*656son who brings in the patient supplies the information that goes into the hospital records; that she could not remember whether that happened this time or not; it could have (Tr. pp. 142-144). It is important here to note that the plaintiff, Smalley, denied making any statement to the hospital authorities (Tr. 49). He testified that, "Mr. Hale may have taken care of that.”
The case sub judice is on all fours with Cheek v. State, 118 Ga. App. 385 (3) (163 SE2d 856) in which this court affirmed the trial judge in refusing to admit in evidence a written record made by an investigating officer, offered as a business record, for the purpose of impeaching a witness. This court states: "But the officer testified that he did not remember who made it. Since the reported statement to the investigating officer was not identified as having been made by a particular person, it was not admissible to impeach any witness.”
The majority opinion contends that under Code Ann. §38-711 and numerous decisions by this court "iacfe of personal knowledge by entrant or maker may be shown to affect its weight, but they shall not affect its admissibility.” The majority opinion then cites eight cases of this court, but not one is in point. None deals with the question of seeking to impeach a witness by introduction of a writing which contains information, impeaching in character, without introduction of evidence that the witness supplied the impeaching information.
Further, the record is silent as to appellant’s having laid the proper foundation for offering impeaching evidence. Code § 38-1803 provides for the impeachment of a witness by proof of prior contradictory statements, but certain preliminary requirements are made essential ingredients of such impeaching effort. Without same, no error can be shown by the losing party in the lower court. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Saul, 189 Ga. 1 (9) (5 SE2d 214); Johnson v. Roberson, 88 Ga. App. 548 (7) (77 SE2d 232). The transcript shows at p. 49 that the railroad’s counsel started into this question with plaintiff Smalley, but Smalley denied giving *657any such information, and counsel let it rest without laying the required foundation.
In addition, the excluded writing could not have damaged the railroad in its contention that it would impeach the plaintiff as to whether he was injured on the railroad’s right of way or in the washroom. The railroad’s switchman, Roy Gardin, who was on duty at the time, testified that the injury occurred on the railroad’s right of way (Tr. pp. 7-17). Claude M. Hale, its terminal trainmaster, on duty at the time, introduced as a witness by the railroad, also so testified (Tr. pp. 97-100).
This case was tried by a jury; the verdict of that jury has the approval of the trial judge; and I would affirm the lower court in refusing to grant defendant’s motion for new trial.
I am authorized to state that Judges Pannell and Quillian concur in this dissent.