Court Opinion

ID: 9562333
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:26:40.345384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:18.128901
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I, respectfully, dissent as I cannot concur in the majority’s assessment that defendants’ omissions were so benign, and that Christy Florence’s inadvertence so plain, palpable and undisputed that her actions in going to the attic to perform routine home maintenance were (as a matter of law) the sole proximate cause of her fall. Further, it is my view that the majority’s reference to builder’s liability for negligent construction has little (if anything) to do with the viability of the Florences’ claims against defendants. The thrust of the Florences’ complaint is not simply negligent construction, it is that defendants’ failure (either intentionally or otherwise) to build their home within municipally prescribed safety standards was a proximate cause of Christy Florence’s fall, i.e., negligence per se.
“ ‘In determining whether the violation of [a building code standard, as adopted by municipal] ordinance [,] is negligence per se as to a particular person, it is necessary to examine the purpose of the ordinance and decide (1) whether the injured person falls within the class of persons it was intended to protect, and (2) whether the harm complained of was the harm it was intended to guard against. (Cit.)’ Rhodes v. Baker, 116 Ga. App. 157, 160 (2b) (156 SE2d 545) (1967).” Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Cooper, 177 Ga. App. 540, 541 (1) (339 SE2d 755). See McLarty v. Shirley, 122 Ga. App. 786, 787 (2) (178 SE2d 753). In the case sub judice, the local building code standards defendants failed to follow require an unobstructed walkway to any “furnace” located in the attic of a home and accessible lighting within reach of the entrance to the attic. Considering the high likelihood that most “furnaces” require routine maintenance and the fact that most attics are shadowy places which often cast an appearance (at least to the untrained eye) that the ceilings below are strong enough to support great weight, it is obvious that the intended purpose of the building code provisions defendants violated is to protect homeowners such as the Florences against the type of occurrence which forms the basis of the case sub judice. See McLarty v. Shirley, supra at 787 (2). Indeed, I see no reason for Clayton County officials to adopt such specific building standards unless these flooring and lighting requirements were to protect homeowners from the risk of injury while performing routine home maintenance. The only question remaining is whether defendants’ omissions were a proximate cause of the Florences’ damages.
“[W]here the plaintiff relies for recovery on grounds of negligence per se[,] it is ordinarily a jury question as to whether or not [violation *802of an underlying ordinance, statute or governmental regulation] was the proximate cause of the injury. Lane v. Varner, 89 Ga. App. 47 (2b) (78 SE2d 528).” Buckhead Glass Co. v. Taylor, 226 Ga. 247, 249 (1) (174 SE2d 568). In fact, except in “plain, palpable and undisputed cases where reasonable minds cannot differ as to the conclusions to be reached, questions of negligence, proximate cause, including the related issues of foreseeability, assumption of risk, lack of ordinary care for one’s own safety, lack of ordinary care in avoiding the consequences of another’s negligence, contributory and comparative negligence are for the jury. [Cits.]” Wade v. Mitchell, 206 Ga. App. 265, 268 (4) (424 SE2d 810). In the case sub judice, defendants not only failed to provide flooring and lighting as required by the local building code, these omissions were masked under piles of insulation and the cover of darkness. Further, contrary to the perception conveyed in the majority opinion, it is unrefuted that Christy Florence had never before been to the attic of her home to change the heating and air conditioning filter. In fact, there is no indication that Christy Florence was warned of dangers associated with changing the heating and air conditioning filter in her home and there is no proof that she was familiar with the structural frailty of the deceptively strong appearance of the unfloored dormer in her home. It is my view that these circumstances, along with other facts and inferences drawn from the record, raise genuine issues of material fact as to the proximate cause of the Florences’ damages. To say otherwise, not only ignores the venerable common law principle that matters of contributory negligence and proximate cause are almost always for the jury, Wade v. Mitchell, supra at 268 (4), but also fails to acknowledge that the policy behind the “superior knowledge” doctrine does not apply in cases where a third person creates a dangerous condition on the property of another. Girone v. City of Winder, 215 Ga. App. 822, 824 (2) (452 SE2d 794).
Decided June 21, 1995
Reconsideration denied July 12, 1995
Edward J. Bauer, Charles F. Peebles, for appellants.
Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Sybil C. Hadley, Jonathon E. White, for appellees.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Pope joins in this dissent.