Court Opinion

ID: 9827780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:51:04.276706+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:36.575892
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In view of the very earnest and able argument on the motion for rehearing, we should perhaps briefly add to what was said in our original opinion. It is urged that, in order to authorize the appointment of the receiver in cases of partnership, it is not necessary that it be “shown that the property or fund is in danger of being lost, removed or materially injured,” as required by Rev. St. 1895, art. 1465, and the case of Rische v. Rische, 46 Tex. Civ. App. 23, 101 S. W. 849, and Holder v. Shelby, 118 S. W. 590, are pressed upon us as sustaining this contention. We think we need not stop to consider whether the construction of the statute given in these cases be correct as they are easily distinguishable from the case here. In those cases it was expressly held that the fact of partnership had been established, and that the further fact of the exclusion of the complaining party from participation in the partnership business justified the receivership, stress being laid, in the leading case, on article 1492 of the Revised Statutes. Here, however, contrary to appellant’s contention, no partnership was in existence at the date of the application for the appointment. It is specifically denied by verified plea of ap-pellee, and appellee thus alleges the fact in his amended petition: “Plaintiff says that there has been an actual termination of the partnership relations between himself and defendant, but that there has never been a complete settlement of the partnership business.” This logically means that there is neither a partnership nor one in process of dissolution. It is already dissolved. As made by appellee’s petition, this seems to be a case where a partnership once existing has been dissolved with an express written agreement authorizing the principal owner of the partnership property to retain possession of at least the principal part thereof and sell it and out of the proceeds to pay himself for large advances and divide the remainder, if any. In other words, at best, appellee would seem to be in the main but a contingent creditor of the managing partner, and in no event entitled to the appointment of the receiver without showing danger of loss or injury. See City Nat. Bank of Dallas v. Dunham, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 184, 44 S. W. 603; People’s Inv. Co. v. Crawford, 45 S. W. 738; High on Receivers, §§ 3-511. But it may be said and in effect is said, as we understand, that the agreement giving appellant right of possession and power of sale does uot comprehend the personal property and choses in action specified in appellee’s petition, and that as to such property at least the appointment of the receiver was justified. It is evident from the record, however, that this property constitutes but an inconsiderable part of the whole over which the receiver was given dominion, and that, as to such property, appellee at most is but a joint owner entitled to partition, and hence afforded other adequate remedies. If, as we think must be admitted, appellee makes no ease for the appointment of the receiver as to the real estate in view of the uncontested agreement relating thereto, the court’s order as a whole should not be sustained be cause of allegations pertinent to the relatively small personal estate, especially as ap*858pellant’s controverting affidavits deny the material allegations relating to waste, injury, or danger of loss.
It is further strenuously insisted that the trial court passed upon the facts and that his findings thereon are conclusive; the case of Cemetery Co. v. Drew, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 536, 36 S. W. 802, being cited in support of the contention. In so far as the case referred to may be said to so hold, it seems to be in necessary conflict with the case of Falfurrias Immigration Co. v. Spielhagen, 127 S. W. 164, cited in our original opinion, in which our Supreme Court specifically holds that a receiver should not be appointed in cases where the material allegations of the petition therefor are denied under oath. Moreover, the rule giving conclusive effect to the trial court’s finding upon a conflicting state of facts, in our judgment, has no application where there has been no trial upon the merits, and where, as here, the facts under consideration are evidenced by written affidavits pro and con submitted upon the hearing of an application for an ancillary order.
We conclude that the motion for rehearing should be overruled.