Court Opinion

ID: 9945160
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 15:01:35.878595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:24.221166
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USCA11 Case: 23-11736    Document: 17-1      Date Filed: 02/27/2024    Page: 1 of 12

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-11736
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        JAVIER RAMIREZ HERNANDEZ,
                                                                Petitioner,
        versus
        U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

                                                               Respondent.

                           ____________________

                    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals
                           Agency No. A216-371-185
                           ____________________
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        2                           Opinion of the Court                          23-11736

        Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Javier Ramirez-Hernandez 1 seeks review of the Board of Im-
        migration Appeals’ (“BIA”) final order affirming the Immigration
        Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for asylum, withholding of
        removal, and relief under the United Nations Convention Against
        Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
        Punishment (“CAT”). He argues that: (1) the BIA erred in affirm-
        ing the IJ’s decision to deny his application for asylum because the
        IJ, among other things, made an unsupported adverse credibility
        finding, relied upon a legally erroneous presumption, and failed to
        adequately consider country conditions evidence; and (2) the BIA
        erred in affirming the IJ’s denial of CAT protection, because it failed
        to adequately address the IJ’s conclusions about the evidence in the
        record. 2 After careful review, we deny the petition.
                                                 I.
              We review the BIA’s decision as the final judgment, but
        where the BIA expressly adopted the IJ’s decision or agreed with its

        1 The record refers to the petitioner’s surname as both “Ramirez Hernandez”

        and “Ramirez-Hernandez.”
        2 We do not address whether the BIA erred in determining that Ramirez-Her-

        nandez was ineligible for withholding of removal because he abandoned that
        issue on appeal by not raising it in his initial appellate brief. See United States v.
        Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 871 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 95 (2022)
        (“[I]ssues not raised in the initial brief on appeal are deemed abandoned.”).
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        23-11736               Opinion of the Court                          3

        reasoning, we review both decisions. Gonzalez v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
        820 F.3d 399, 403 (11th Cir. 2016). We do not consider issues that
        were not reached by the BIA. Id. Generally, courts and agencies
        need not make findings on issues if those findings are unnecessary
        to the results they reach. INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976).
        Further, issues not briefed to us are deemed abandoned. Campbell,
        26 F.4th at 871; Ruga v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 757 F.3d 1193, 1196 (11th
        Cir. 2014).
                “A petitioner contesting a final order of removal must ex-
        haust the administrative immigration process before he may be
        heard in federal court.” Bing Quan Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 881 F.3d
        860, 866 (11th Cir. 2018). “[F]ailure to raise an issue to the BIA
        constitutes a failure to exhaust.” Id. Exhaustion under the Immi-
        gration and Nationality Act (“INA”) is not jurisdictional, but it
        nonetheless must be enforced when a party asserts it. Kemokai v.
        U.S. Att’y Gen., 83 F.4th 886, 891 (11th Cir. 2023) (citing Santos-Zac-
        aria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411 (2023)).
               In a petition for review of a BIA decision, we review legal
        conclusions de novo. Perez-Zenteno v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 913 F.3d 1301,
        1306 (11th Cir. 2019). Whether an asserted group qualifies as a par-
        ticular social group under the INA is a question of law. Id. For
        legal determinations, we defer to the agency’s reasonable determi-
        nation of ambiguous statutory terms. Id.
               We review the agency’s factual findings, including adverse
        credibility determinations, for substantial evidence. Lyashchynska
        v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 676 F.3d 962, 967 (11th Cir. 2012). Under this
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11736

        standard, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
        agency’s decision, draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that
        decision, and affirm the BIA’s decision if it is supported by reason-
        able, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered
        as a whole. Id.; Perez-Zenteno, 913 F.3d at 1306. To reverse the fac-
        tual findings, we must find that the record compels reversal. Lyash-
        chynska, 676 F.3d at 967. “The trier of fact must determine credi-
        bility, and [we] may not substitute [our] judgment for that of the
        BIA with respect to credibility findings.” D-Muhumed v. U.S. Att’y
        Gen., 388 F.3d 814, 818 (11th Cir. 2014).
               We review the BIA’s factual determinations for the denial of
        CAT relief under the substantial evidence standard, where we will
        reverse the BIA only where the record compels it. Edwards v. U.S.
        Att’y Gen., 56 F.4th 951, 966 (11th Cir. 2022).
               A noncitizen’s credible testimony may be sufficient to sus-
        tain the burden of proof without corroboration. 8 U.S.C. §
        1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). Conversely, “the IJ’s [or BIA’s] extremely detailed
        adverse credibility determination alone may be sufficient to sup-
        port” the denial of an asylum seeker’s application. D-Muhumed, 388
        F.3d at 818–19; see also Chen v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 463 F.3d 1228, 1231
        (11th Cir. 2006) (stating that “[a]n IJ’s denial of asylum . . . can be
        supported solely by an adverse credibility determination”). In as-
        sessing the credibility of an applicant’s testimony, the IJ should con-
        sider the totality of the circumstances. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
               To be considered an adverse credibility determination, the
        IJ or BIA must state explicitly that the applicant’s testimony was
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        23-11736               Opinion of the Court                          5

        not credible. See Yang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 418 F.3d 1198, 1201 (11th
        Cir. 2005). Further, “the IJ [or BIA] must offer specific, cogent rea-
        sons for an adverse credibility finding.” Forgue v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
        401 F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Chen, 463 F.3d at 1231.
        The agency may rely on any inconsistency, regardless of its rele-
        vance to the applicant’s claim, to support an adverse credibility
        finding. Chen, 463 F.3d at 1233. An applicant’s omissions can be
        used as evidence to support an adverse credibility finding. See Xia
        v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 608 F.3d 1233, 1240 (11th Cir. 2010).
                Once the IJ or BIA has offered specific and cogent reasons,
        the burden shifts to the applicant to show that the IJ’s or BIA’s cred-
        ibility decision “was not supported by specific, cogent reasons or
        was not based on substantial evidence.” Chen, 463 F.3d at 1231 (cit-
        ing Forgue, 401 F.3d at 1287). However, an applicant’s explanation
        for omissions or inconsistencies must compel the conclusion that he
        is credible. Shkambi v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 584 F.3d 1041, 1051 (11th Cir.
        2009). This means that an applicant’s provision of tenable explana-
        tions for aspects of his claim that the agency found incredible may
        not compel the reversal of the credibility finding, especially in the
        absence of corroborating evidence. Chen, 463 F.3d at 1233. The
        weaker an applicant’s testimony, the greater the need for corrobo-
        rative evidence. Li Shan Chen v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 672 F.3d 961, 964
        (11th Cir. 2011). “[T]he mere fact that the record may support a
        contrary finding is not enough to justify a reversal of the finding.”
        Xia, 608 F.3d at 1239–41 (quotations omitted and alterations ac-
        cepted) (holding that an adverse-credibility determination was sup-
        ported where the applicant’s testimony “included at least one
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 23-11736

        internal inconsistency (how old she was when she had the abor-
        tion) and one omission (identifying data on the abortion operations
        certificate)” and where the petitioner did not provide corroborat-
        ing evidence that would have rebutted these inconsistencies and
        omissions).
                                         II.
               First, we are unpersuaded by Ramirez-Hernandez’s claim
        that the BIA erred in determining that he was not eligible for asy-
        lum. An applicant for asylum must prove that he is a “refugee” as
        defined by statute. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). A “refugee” includes
        any person who is unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling
        to avail himself of the protection of, the country of his nationality
        or where he last habitually resided, because of persecution or a
        well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, na-
        tionality, membership in a particular social group, or political opin-
        ion. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). The applicant bears the burden of
        proving qualification as a refugee. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i);
        Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1351 (11th Cir. 2009).
               “To establish asylum based on past persecution, the appli-
        cant must prove (1) that []he was persecuted, and (2) that the per-
        secution was on account of a protected ground.” Silva v. U.S. Att’y
        Gen., 448 F.3d 1229, 1236 (11th Cir. 2006). We’ve indicated that
        “persecution is an extreme concept, requiring more than a few iso-
        lated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation, and that
        [m]ere harassment does not amount to persecution.” Sepulveda
        U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1231 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotations
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        23-11736               Opinion of the Court                          7

        omitted). An applicant must also establish a nexus between the
        feared persecution and a protected ground by demonstrating that
        one of the enumerated grounds was or will be at least one central
        reason for persecuting him. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). “[E]vidence
        that either is consistent with acts of private violence . . . , or that
        merely shows that a person has been the victim of criminal activity,
        does not constitute evidence of persecution based on a statutorily
        protected ground.” Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 440 F.3d 1247, 1258
        (11th Cir. 2006). Additionally, “[a]n applicant for asylum who al-
        leges persecution by a private actor must prove that his home
        country is unable or unwilling to protect him.” Ayala v. U.S. Att’y
        Gen., 605 F.3d 941, 950 (11th Cir. 2010).
               An applicant who cannot demonstrate past persecution also
        has the burden of showing that it would be unreasonable for the
        noncitizen to relocate in the home country, unless the persecution
        is by the government or is government-sponsored. 8 C.F.R.
        § 208.13(b)(3)(ii).
                Here, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s decision to deny
        Ramirez-Hernandez’s asylum application and the BIA’s decision to
        affirm. For starters, the IJ and BIA found that Ramirez-Hernandez
        was not entitled to relief because he did not testify credibly, and the
        agency provided specific and cogent reasons for its adverse credi-
        bility finding. Forgue, 401 F.3d at 1287. Specifically, the BIA based
        its affirmance of this finding on Ramirez-Hernandez’s omission
        from his asylum application of two major instances of alleged harm
        he suffered in Mexico -- being robbed by police officers and being
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11736

        the victim of an attempted robbery at the factory where he worked
        -- that he later testified about before the IJ. Under our case law,
        these kinds of omissions may be used to support an adverse credi-
        bility finding. See Xia, 608 F.3d at 1240.
               Moreover, once the agency provided specific and cogent
        reasons for this finding, the burden shifted to Ramirez-Hernandez
        to prove that the finding was not supported by substantial evidence
        or based on specific and cogent reasons. Chen, 463 F.3d at 1231.
        His explanation for the omission of these events from his applica-
        tion was his belief that they were not “necessary” because they had
        occurred so long ago. However, his explanation does not account
        for why he then thought it necessary to discuss the incidents in
        front of the IJ, because it is similarly plausible that he was attempt-
        ing to embellish his claim during his testimony. In other words,
        we cannot say that his explanation “compels” the conclusion that
        he testified credibly, especially without any corroborating evi-
        dence. See Shkambi, 584 F.3d at 1051 (“Although Shkambi offered
        his fear as an explanation for these omissions and inconsistencies,
        that explanation does not compel a conclusion that Shkambi was
        credible.”); Chen, 463 F.3d at 1233 (“[W]hile Chen’s explanations of
        the implausible aspects of his claim are tenable, we cannot say, es-
        pecially given the relative lack of corroborating evidence, that
        these explanations would compel a reasonable fact finder to re-
        verse the IJ’s credibility determination.”). And because Ramirez-
        Hernandez’s testimony was his primary form of evidence, the
        BIA’s affirmance of the finding that he was not credible was
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        23-11736               Opinion of the Court                         9

        sufficient to support the agency’s denial of his asylum claim. See
        Chen, 463 F.3d at 1231.
                It’s also worth noting that Ramirez-Hernandez did not meet
        his burden of proof for asylum for other reasons as well -- namely,
        he failed to prove past persecution or a well-founded fear of future
        persecution. As we’ve explained, to establish past persecution, a
        petitioner must show, among other things, a nexus between the
        feared persecution and a protected ground, and, in cases of perse-
        cution by a private actor, that his home country is unable or un-
        willing to protect him. In this case, the BIA denied Ramirez-Her-
        nandez relief on the ground that he did not challenge two disposi-
        tive bases for the IJ’s finding of no past persecution -- (1) the IJ’s
        finding that his evidence failed to show a nexus between his alleged
        persecution and his proposed protected grounds, because his evi-
        dence showed only “common criminal acts” motivated by money
        rather than any protected ground; and (2) the IJ’s finding that his
        failure to alert the Mexican authorities of his alleged persecution
        resulted in an insufficient amount of evidence that his home coun-
        try was unable or unwilling to protect him. See Ayala, 605 F.3d at
        950; Ruiz, 440 F.3d at 1258. Indeed, Ramirez-Hernandez’s appeal
        to the BIA argued only that his proposed social groups were legally
        cognizable, which addresses only one of the several showings he
        was required to make.
                Because Ramirez-Hernandez did not challenge both of the
        IJ’s dispositive findings as to his past persecution claim, that claim
        is unexhausted. See Bing Quan Lin, 881 F.3d at 866. Further, the
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        10                         Opinion of the Court                        23-11736

        government raised this exhaustion issue in its briefing to us, which
        means that Ramirez-Hernandez’s past persecution claim is outside
        of our scope of review. 3 See Kemokai, 83 F.4th at 891.
                Nor did the BIA err in affirming the IJ’s finding that Ramirez-
        Hernandez failed to prove a well-founded fear of future persecu-
        tion. Again, an applicant who cannot demonstrate past persecu-
        tion has the burden of showing that it would be unreasonable for
        the noncitizen to relocate in the home country, unless the persecu-
        tion is by the government or is government-sponsored. 8 C.F.R. §
        208.13(b)(3)(ii). Because Ramirez-Hernandez failed to sufficiently
        prove past persecution, and because his only claim of government-
        sponsored persecution was properly disposed of by the adverse-
        credibility finding, he bore the burden of proving that it would be
        unreasonable for him to relocate within Mexico. Yet Ramirez-Her-
        nandez testified that his brother owned a ranch in a part of Mexico
        different from his hometown, and he provided no evidence to suf-
        ficiently prove that he could not reasonably relocate there or else-
        where within Mexico. Thus, the record does not compel reversal

        3 Ramirez-Hernandez’s petition also fails to the extent he argues that the IJ

        based its past persecution decision on a now-vacated decision, Matter of A-B-,
        27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (2018), vacated by Matter of A-B-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 307 (2021).
        First, he did not make this argument to the BIA, and thus failed to exhaust that
        claim. The government raised exhaustion of this issue, so that issue is outside
        of our scope of review. Second, the BIA did not cite to or otherwise rely upon
        the challenged legal authority in its affirmance of the IJ’s finding of no past
        persecution, and the bases it did articulate are sufficient to sustain its affir-
        mance. We may only review the bases relied upon by the BIA, not those ar-
        ticulated exclusively by the IJ. Gonzalez, 820 F.3d at 403.
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        23-11736               Opinion of the Court                         11

        as to his asylum claim on any of the grounds he put forth. See
        Lyashchynska, 676 F.3d at 967. Accordingly, we deny the petition
        as to this issue.
                                         III.
                We are also unconvinced by Ramirez-Hernandez’s claim
        that the BIA erred in affirming the IJ’s denial of CAT protection.
        To be eligible for CAT relief, an applicant must meet a higher bur-
        den of proof than for asylum eligibility and show that he will more
        likely than not be tortured if he returned to the designated country
        of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2); Lingeswaran v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
        969 F.3d 1278, 1293 (11th Cir. 2020). Torture is defined as severe
        pain and suffering and must be “inflicted by or at the instigation of
        or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official acting in an
        official capacity or other person acting in an official capacity.”
        8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1); see Reyes-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 369 F.3d
        1239, 1242 (11th Cir. 2004).
               In assessing an applicant’s eligibility for CAT protection, we
        consider all evidence “relevant to the possibility of future torture,”
        which includes “(1) whether the applicant has experienced past tor-
        ture; (2) whether []he could avoid future torture by relocating
        within the country; and (3) evidence about wider country condi-
        tions, including whether there have been gross, flagrant or mass
        violations of human rights in the country.” K.Y. v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
        43 F.4th 1175, 1181 (11th Cir. 2022), cert. denied sub nom. K. Y. v.
        Garland, 143 S. Ct. 2506 (2023). While all relevant evidence is to be
        considered, “[t]he evidence must demonstrate that the applicant
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                23-11736

        will be specifically and individually targeted for torture.” Id. The
        burden to show an individualized risk of torture means that “evi-
        dence of generalized mistreatment and some isolated instances of
        torture” is insufficient on its own to qualify for CAT protection.
        Jean-Pierre v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 500 F.3d 1315, 1324 (11th Cir. 2007).
               Here, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion
        that Ramirez-Hernandez failed to establish eligibility for CAT re-
        lief. Based on the agency’s adverse credibility finding -- that we’ve
        already affirmed -- the record contains no evidence that he faces a
        particularized and individualized risk of torture upon returning to
        Mexico. See K.Y., 43 F.4th at 1181. Instead, Ramirez-Hernandez
        relies upon country conditions information and evidence of gen-
        eral conditions and isolated instances of torture in Mexico. But this
        evidence, by itself, is insufficient to prove his eligibility for CAT
        protection, because it is not individualized to him. See Jean-Pierre,
        500 F.3d at 1324. Accordingly, we deny the petition as to this issue
        as well.
              PETITION DENIED.