Court Opinion

ID: 9568428
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:03:37.695422+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:24:23.690780
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, J.
(concurring). I agree with the lead opinion that the 1986 WCAB order that was entered at the express direction of this Court1 was,' for all intents and purposes, this Court’s order. Levin, J., ante at 81-82. However, I disagree with the conclusion of *101the lead opinion that the amount of benefits subjected to coordination from March 31, 1982, through May 28, 1986, pursuant to this Court’s 1986 order, was not a final judgment. Id at 91. As stated by Justice Boyle in Pike v City of Wyoming, 431 Mich 589, 620; 433 NW2d 768 (1988), the principle of finality should apply to court rulings both with respect to eligibility for benefits and to the amount of those benefits. Accordingly, I would hold that the 1986 order was final with respect to accrued benefits subject to the order. Conversely, prospective benefits, accruing after the 1986 order, would not be final because “[t]here are no vested rights in the amount of liability established at the time of an injury.” Romein v General Motors Corp, 436 Mich 515, 531; 462 NW2d 555 (1990). Therefore, under our analysis in Romein, I believe that this employer had a vested right to coordinate benefits for the period subject to this Court’s remand order.2 Consequently, I believe that legal principles should lead to the conclusion that the employer should be allowed to coordinate benefits for that period.
Nevertheless, the equitable considerations presented by this employee and other similarly situated employees would justify this Court in setting aside the 1986 orders and precluding coordination.3 Pursuant to Romein, employees who were injured before March 31, 1982, but who quietly accepted coordination of their benefits after 1981 PA 203, are not sub*102ject to any coordination. In contrast, under my analysis, employees injured before March 31, 1982, like Quinton, who did not quietly accept coordination, but instead pursued their rights to appeal, which unfortunately resulted in disadvantageous results to them in this Court, would be subject to coordination for the period covered by this Court’s 1986 remand orders to the WCAB. However, it would be manifestly unfair to penalize employees who vigorously pursued their rights, while rewarding those similarly situated employees who did not pursue their rights. Further, the Legislature expressly indicated in 1987 PA 28 that it did not intend employees injured before March 31, 1982, to be subject to any coordination.4 Given the unfairness of treating employees injured before March 31, 1982, differently, in addition to the express legislative intent not to subject these employees to coordination of benefits, I believe that we should preclude coordination of benefits for all such employees.
In sum, I concur with the disposition of this case, remanding to the wcac for further proceedings. However, I would not reach the separation of powers issue addressed by the lead opinion. Instead, I would invoke our equitable power and grant equitable relief to Quinton.

 424 Mich 884 (1986).

 The subject period was from March 31, 1982, the effective date of 1981 PA 203, through May 28, 1986, the date of the WCAB order on remand from this Court.

 MCR 7.316(A)(7) provides that this Court may enter any relief that the case requires.

 See Levin, J., ante at 70, n 9.