Court Opinion

ID: 9544340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:54:50.645447+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:47.953220
License: Public Domain

PAPADAKOS, Justice,
dissenting.
Once again this Court has embroiled itself in a continuing drama over whether the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions are immune from suit for injuries they cause and, if they are, whether they can limit the amount of damages recoverable against them for such injuries. Carroll v. County of York, 496 Pa. 363, 437 A.2d 394 (1981); Gibson v. Commonwealth, 490 Pa. 156, 415 A.2d 80 (1980); Dubree v. Commonwealth, 481 Pa. 540, 393 A.2d 293 (1978); Mayle v. Pennsylvania Department of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709 (1978); Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public Education, 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973); Commonwealth v. Berks County, 364 Pa. 447, 72 A.2d 129 (1950); Merchants Warehouse v. Gelder, 349 Pa. *1451, 36 A.2d 444 (1944); Monongahela Navigation Company v. Coons, 6 Watts and Sergeant 101 (1843).
At issue is the interpretation of two sections of our Constitution which the majority continues to interpret to vest authority in the Legislature to decide for itself the extent to which the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions shall be immune from suits and to the extent it shall be subject, if at all, to pay damages for injuries caused.
Because I disagree with the majority’s conclusions on both questions at hand, I dissent.
Article I, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides:
All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the Legislature may by law direct.
This section, as presently worded, has been part of the organic law of this Commonwealth since 1790. In my opinion, this Section can be interpreted properly only if it is read in its entirety, for only then can a reading be made that will give consistent effect to the whole section.
As a starting point, I refer to the eloquent comments of the late Mr. Justice Manderino, whose dissenting views in Brown v. Commonwealth, 453 Pa. 566, 305 A.2d 868 (1973), best summarize my views on Article I, Section ll’s interpretation:
Section 11 has two sentences and they must be rea,d together ...
The first sentence of Section 11 is unequivocal. It protects everyone — without exception — -for all injuries. It specifically speaks of injuries to lands, goods, person or reputation. The first sentence says that everyone shall have remedy by due course of law — it does not say that sometimes there is a remedy and sometimes not. *146The sentence states that right and justice shall be administered without ... denial — it does not say justice can be denied sometimes and sometimes not. The first sentence of Section 11 must be read before proceeding to sentence two, and that first sentence could not have been written in more absolute terms even by one possessing divine rights. Can we possibly destroy the absolutely plain meaning of sentence one by an interpretation of sentence two, which requires a reach outside the people's written constitution? The written constitution contains no mention of immunity for the state — or inherent rights of the state — or inalienable rights of the state — or indefensible rights of the state. It is thus necessary for the majority to begin its interpretation of sentence two by reaching outside the written constitution. Just where that reach extends, we are not told.
If sentence two of Section 11 can be reasonably interpreted without destroying the clear meaning of sentence one or doing violence to the purpose of the entire Article in which the Section appears, we are bound in the name of reason to so interpret sentence two of Section 11. The only reasonable meaning of sentence two, in context, must be that it gives the legislature the right to implement procedurally the substantive rights granted so absolutely in the first sentence of Section 11.
Brown, 453 Pa. at 582-583, 305 A.2d at 876.
Everyone is guaranteed a remedy for his injuries and an open court in which to air the grievances. Commonwealth ex rel. Duff v. Keenan, 347 Pa. 574, 33 A.2d 244 (1943); Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147 (1853). The first sentence of Article I, Section 11 sets forth that a complete scope of remedies shall be available to individuals for all harms done to them. This first sentence represents a constitutional limitation against the Legislative Power and gúarantees that no governmental action can lessen in any way the rights of the people to seek redress for injuries suffered. No exceptions are contained in this sentence, and the guarantee is mandatory. This provision is also self-exe*147cuting. It can take effect without the aid of legislation, and being contained in the “bill of rights” is by its very nature self-executing. This right, reserved by the people from the general government, does not require the Legislature to make it effective. The use of “shall” indicates that the provisions are effective without legislation. See, Commonwealth by Shapp v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 454 Pa. 193, 311 A.2d 588 (1973); O’Neill v. White, 343 Pa. 96, 22 A.2d 25 (1941); Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. 79, 56 A. 327 (1903), and Article I § 25 of the Pennsylvania Constitution which declares that everything in Article One “is excepted out of the general powers by government and shall forever remain inviolate.”
Sentence two, however, has caused a raging judicial and legislative debate over the last twenty years. Its proper relation to sentence one is crucial to its proper application to the issues raised in this case.
This Court has, at times, ruled that this sentence created a basis for immunity from suits against the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions. Brown v. Commonwealth, 453 Pa. 566, 305 A.2d 868 (1973); Commonwealth v. Orsatti, 448 Pa. 72, 292 A.2d 313 (1972); Conrad v. Commonwealth, Department of Highways, 441 Pa. 530, 272 A.2d 470 (1971); Meagher v. Commonwealth, 439 Pa. 532, 266 A.2d 684 (1970); Bannard v. New York State Natural Gas Corp., 404 Pa. 269, 172 A.2d 306 (1961); Stouffer v. Morrison, 400 Pa. 497, 162 A.2d 378 (1960); Commonwealth v. Berks County, 364 Pa. 447, 72 A.2d 129 (1950). At other times we have ruled that this section creates no immunity from suits in favor of the Commonwealth or its subdivisions. Mayle v. Pennsylvania Department of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709 (1978) (abolishing sovereign immunity); Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public Education, 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973) (abolishing local governmental immunity); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971) (abolishing parental immunity); Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hospital, 417 Pa. 486, 208 A.2d 193 (1965) (abolishing charitable immunity).
*148Currently in vogue is the following interpretation of the meaning of sentence two of Article One, Section 11:
We now believe that this constitutional provision does not forbid judicial abrogation of the doctrine. Rather the Constitution is ... neutral — it neither requires nor prohibits sovereign immunity. It merely provides that the presence or absence of sovereign immunity shall be decided in a nonconstitutional manner____
Mayle 479 Pa. at 400, 388 A.2d at 716.
This reading would vest authority in the Legislature to raise the shield of immunity at will. In effect, the permissive language of the second sentence is being read as a qualification of the mandatory limitation placed on the legislative power by the first sentence. I am troubled by this interpretation for various reasons.
First, Article I of our Constitution is a Declaration of Rights. Each of the 26 Sections is concerned with withholding rights from the State.
To isolate one sentence out of twenty-six sections in the Declaration of Rights and say that it should be interpreted to protect the rights of the state — not the people — is ludicrous and violates all reasonable principles of construing written language in proper context.
Brown, 453 Pa. at 581, 305 A.2d at 875 (Dissent of Mr. Justice Manderino).
Both sentences of Section 11 must be read in a consistent manner which preserves for the people the various rights retained by them in the first sentence. Sentence two, which is framed in permissive language (“may” instead of “shall”), must be read in such a manner, then, that it does not qualify the imperative of Sentence 1, but in a way so that it complements that sentence. Had the second sentence read:
Suits shall be brought against the Commonwealth only in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the Legislature shall by law direct----
*149I would agree that Legislative Power existed on the subject of its immunity, but as the language exists, the only reasonable meaning of the second sentence, in context, is that the people have given the Legislature the option of creating a separate procedure for the litigation of cases where it or its subdivisions are involved. If it chooses not to legislate, however, that does not mean that right of redress does not exist, because that substantive right is declared by the first sentence. The courts are open and can litigate all forms of actions between parties as long as the Legislature does not indicate that its cases should be handled in another manner. In this respect, I view the Act of September 28, 1978, P.L. 788 No. 152, 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310, as the Legislature’s desired method of proceeding against the Commonwealth in eight types of cases. Similarly, in the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act of November 26, 1978, P.L. 1399, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8541-64, the Legislature has indicated the manner of proceedings against the Commonwealth’s Political Subdivisions in eight areas. But neither act can raise immunity as to other areas not covered by the acts because no such power is vested in the Legislature. To the extent that either of those acts attempts to create a shield of immunity for injuries caused, I would hold those sections to be unconstitutional.
This Court has already recognized that the people have not written immunity into the Constitution. Mayle, Ayala, Carroll. It is not a power delegated to the elected representatives. How is it, then, that anyone can reason that the section is “neutral” on the issue? If the power is not specifically delegated by the people, it is withheld and cannot be exercised by the government under the guise of “neutrality.” The current interpretation of “neutrality” is judicial double-talk, with which I disagree. We have always held that the constitution is not a grant of power to the Legislature; rather, it is a limitation of the powers exercised by the Legislature. Luzerne County v. Morgan, 263 Pa. 458, 107 A. 17 (1919); Collins v. Commonwealth, 262 Pa. 572, 106 A. 229 (1919); Commonwealth v. Herr, 229 Pa. *150132, 78 A. 68 (1910); In Re: Likins, 223 Pa. 456, 72 A. 858 (1909); Appeal of Lewis, 67 Pa. 153 (1870); Page v. Allen 58 Pa. 338 (1868); Commonwealth v. Hartman, 17 Pa. 118 (1857); Norris v. Clymer, 2 Pa. 285 (1845). The limitations on the powers of the Legislature are not to be determined from the general body of law, but from the Constitution itself. Erie & N.E.R. Co. v. Casey, 26 Pa. 287 (1856).
Furthermore, as Chief Justice Thompson stated in Page v. Allen, 58 Pa. 338, 346 (1868), “The expression of one thing in the constitution, is necessarily the exclusion of things not expressed. This I regard as especially true of constitutional provisions, declaratory in their nature. The remark of Lord Bacon, ‘that, as exceptions strengthen the force of a general law, so enumeration weakens, as to things not enumerated,’ expresses a principle of common law applicable to the constitution, which is always to be understood in its plain, untechnical sense.”
Nothing is clearer to me than the plain, untechnical language of Section 11. It simply guarantees that all people shall have remedies for their injuries without exception. Sentence two merely gives the Legislature the option of creating special Courts, Boards and Tribunals to handle controversies where they or their instrumentalities are parties. One need only review the Consolidated Statutes of the Legislature to find the countless Boards, Commissions, Agencies and Courts created for this very purpose (for example, see the Administrative Code, Eminent Domain Code, Liquor Code, Municipalities Planning Code, various City, Borough, Township, and County Codes, Vehicle Codes, and Jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court). It is also interesting to note that at about the time this Section became part of the Constitution, the Legislature was known to authorize, by statute, the appearance of the Attorney General before this Court to defend actions against the Commonwealth and to authorize the appropriation of monies to pay for damages owed by the Commonwealth, without limitation.
*151What is even clearer is the direct, mandatory language of Article III, Section 18 which provides, in pertinent part:
Other than Workmen’s Compensation, in no other cases shall the General Assembly limit the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to persons or property____
The majority concludes that since the Legislature has the authority to raise a shield of immunity against itself for injuries the Commonwealth causes, thereby reducing the recovery to nothing, it can likewise condition recovery to specific amounts for suits it permits, as it has attempted to limit here to $500,000.00 in the aggregate.1
This conclusion is reached by reference to the concerns and debates of the Drafters of the 1874 Constitutional Convention which drafted Article III, Section 18 as a reaction against legislation favorable to common carriers which limited damages recoverable against them. Additionally, the majority assumes that the Drafters of the Constitution might have imagined that the Commonwealth and its subdivisions were immune from suit in 1874 for injuries to persons or property; therefore, the Framers had no occasion to consider the effect of Article III, Section 18 on damages recoverable against the Commonwealth.
First, while the debates of the Constitutional Convention of 1874 and commentaries on that convention are interesting, they are irrelevant to an interpretation of a clear, unambiguous, mandatory, self-executing restraint on legislative power. This is one of the oldest Rules of Construction in the Commonwealth, having been stated and restated by this Court over and over again from 1825 to the present. In Eakin v. Raub, 12 Sergeant and Rawle 330 (1825), Justice Gibson noted that the Constitution contains whole will of the body from which it emanates and that the *152debates are of no value in determining that. See also, Commonwealth v. Mann, 5 Watts and Sergeant 403 (1843).
Resort to the debates of the convention may show the views of the individual members and the reasons for their votes:
[b]ut they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safe to construe the Constitution from what appears upon its face. Commonwealth v. Balph, 111 Pa. 365, 3 A. 220 (1886); see also County of Cumberland v. Boyd, 113 Pa. 52, 4 A. 346 (1886); Commonwealth ex rel. Margiotti v. Lawrence, 326 Pa. 526, 193 A. 46 (1937).
By Article III, Section 18, the people, in clear, unambiguous language, reserved unto themselves the right to obtain for injury sustained a remedy by due course of the law.
The people have withheld power from the legislature and the courts to deprive them of that remedy, or to circumscribe it so that a jury can only give a pitiful fraction of the damage sustained. Nothing less than the full amount of pecuniary damage which a man suffers from an injury to him in his lands, goods or person, fills the measure secured him in the Declaration of Rights. As well might it be attempted to defeat the whole remedy as a part ... A limitation of recovery to a sum less than the actual damage is palpably in conflict with the right to remedy by due course of law.
Passenger Railway Co. v. Boudrou, 92 Pa. 475 (1880).
No limitation or exception is contained by the language of the Section, except for Workmen’s Compensation cases, and no other exception should be written into the Section by this Court.
Secondly, it is a mistake to assume that the Commonwealth was considered immune from suit because such a conclusion ignores history. Extensive legislation already existed in 1874 permitting suits against the Commonwealth and its subdivisions in eminent domain cases, for contract *153breaches, escheat matters, and other matters where the attorney general was authorized to represent the Commonwealth, without a limitation on the damages recoverable.
Third, the majority’s interpretation of this Section could easily be read to protect only those actions which the Legislature or Constitutional Drafters were aware of in 1874. By implication, an application of this holding would permit the Legislature to limit damages in all public and private actions recognizable after 1874. Actions by or against women, product liability claims, malpractice cases, automobile accidents, nuclear power, gas, and electricity accidents, all unknown to the law in 1874, could be limited by such an interpretation.
I view this Section as a broad mandate by the people to the Legislature directing it not to meddle in the people’s right to recover against those responsible for injuring them. Article III, Section 18 wiped clean all statutory enactments in conflict with it when the Section became part of the Constitution in 1874 and stands as a bulwark, until the people otherwise direct, against all present and future attempts by the Legislature to fritter away the rights of the people. We do a great disservice to the people, whose trust we have accepted, to interpret this Section in any way but in their favor.
Instead, this Court now lets stand, upon no rational basis, a damage limitation which creates a different measure of damages recoverable depending upon whether the tortfeasor is a private individual, a political subdivision, or the Commonwealth. Apart from this Equal Protection of the Laws violation, the damage limitation creates a fund apportionable among all victims of a single tortious episode whether they be one or one hundred or more. As applied to this very litigation, 72 injured parties will be forced to share an aggregate $500,000, which will be insultingly inadequate to compensate many of them for their losses. It is alleged that such a limit on damages is a reasonable exercise by the Legislature to prevent depletion of the public funds, but this argument was rejected in Ayala and Mayle. This view *154also ignores the reality that these undercompensated victims of catastrophic proportions will quickly exhaust their meager recovery and become charges upon the very Commonwealth that should have adequately compensated them in the first place. It is thus illusory to boast that a limitation of damages protects the public treasury.
The majority’s present course is regrettable, because it ignores the duty entrusted to this Court of protecting rights reserved by the people, for the people, and instead creates rights in favor of the creature of the people, at the expense of the people, who in actuality, are the only sovereign under our form of government. Accordingly, I dissent.
LARSEN, J., joins this dissenting opinion.

. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8553(b) provides: Amounts recoverable — Damages arising from the same cause of action or transaction or occurrence or series of causes of action or transactions or occurrences shall not exceed $500,000 in the aggregate.