Court Opinion

ID: 9516623
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:47:23.439093+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:28.691430
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring: The court today correctly holds that our decision in People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320 (1996), does not require defendant to withdraw his guilty plea in order to appeal the length of his sentence. I write separately in order to explain more fully why I believe this is so. In Evans, this court held that the motion-to-reconsider-sentence provisions contained in Rule 604(d) are inapplicable to situations where a defendant pleads guilty to certain charges in exchange for the State’s agreement to (i) dismiss other charges and (ii) recommend a specific sentence, a plea arrangement that we characterized as “negotiated.” Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 327. Our concern in such cases was that a defendant who attempts to reduce the agreed-upon sentence seeks “to hold the State to its part of the bargain while unilaterally modifying the sentences” earlier agreed upon. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 327. Relying on principles of contract law, we noted that the guilty plea and the sentence “go hand in hand” as material elements of the plea bargain. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 332. As I noted in my special concurrence in People v. Linder, however, not all negotiated pleas are the same. See People v. Linder, 186 Ill. 2d 67, 77-78 (1999) (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring) (explaining different plea bargain scenarios). In this case, defendant and the State agreed only as to charging. In exchange for defendant’s plea of guilty to the robbery charge, the State dropped the charge of aggravated battery. As such, the sentence did not go “hand in hand” with the plea. The State did not make any facet of sentencing an element of its bargain with defendant. When the State does not provide any sentencing inducement for a defendant in its plea bargain, such a “negotiated” plea, at least for purposes of the sentencing hearing, more closely resembles an “open” plea in that the trial court retains all of its discretion at sentencing. See Linder, 186 Ill. 2d at 79-80 (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring). As a result, the State can argue for a sentence from thé full panoply of penalties contained in the Unified Code of Corrections. Therefore, defendant’s motion to reconsider sentence does not run afoul of the agreement because the parties never made the sentence a part of their bargain. In such cases, all contract principles are honored, and none of the concerns of Evans arise. Notwithstanding the above, the State argues that, by reducing the charges, the State did make a sentencing concession because the sentence would have been greater had the aggravated battery charge not been dropped. I disagree. As the appellate court has noted, “an agreement by the State to reduce or dismiss charges against a defendant in exchange for the defendant’s plea to the reduced or remaining charges, which has the effect of reducing the sentencing range or the number of sentences a defendant could face, [does not] constitute [ ] an implicit agreement as to sentence.” People v. Mast, 305 Ill. App. 3d 727, 732 (1999). By agreeing to drop a charge, the State has made only the concession of forgoing its right to establish defendant’s guilt of that charge. To imply a sentencing concession on the part of the State in this circumstance would require this court to presume that defendant was, in fact, guilty of the charge. Such a presumption would, of course, fly in the face of the presumption of innocence that exists in our criminal justice system. The rule enunciated in Evans focused on returning the parties to their status quo. When a defendant pleads guilty solely in return for the dismissal of charges, the State and defendant receive just what they bargained for, i.e., a guilty plea in exchange for dismissing charges. The parties have not agreed as to the length of the sentence, which is left to the circuit court’s full discretion. Thus, no part of the bargain would be undermined by allowing defendant to seek reconsideration of the sentence decided by the circuit court alone. In reaching the same conclusion, our appellate court has aptly noted that “ ‘ “plea bargaining, when properly administered, is to be encouraged.” ’ Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 325, 673 N.E.2d at 247, quoting People v. Boyt, 109 Ill. 2d 403, 416, 488 N.E.2d 264, 271 (1985). Therefore, we should avoid a bright-line rule that places meaningless procedural obstacles in the path of an appeal.” People v. Zarka-Nevling, 308 Ill. App. 3d 516, 526 (1999). For these reasons and those expressed in the court’s opinion, I concur in today’s holding.