Court Opinion

ID: 9949251
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-10 08:16:10.827229+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:14.216963
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed March 5, 2024

                                     In The

                    Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                             NO. 14-22-00420-CR

                         LOGAN LOSOYA, Appellant

                                       V.
                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the 351st District Court
                           Harris County, Texas
                       Trial Court Cause No. 1651869

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      A jury convicted appellant, Logan Losoya, of murder. Appellant timely
brought this appeal raising three issues. In his first issue, he contends that the
evidence is legally and factually insufficient to prove he murdered the
complainant, Piper Jones. In his second and third issues, he argues that he is
entitled to a factual sufficiency review under the Texas Constitution and under
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). We decline appellant’s invitation to
ignore extensive precedent from the Court of Criminal Appeals and this court on
factual sufficiency review and, concluding the evidence sufficient, affirm the
judgment of the trial court.

                          FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY REVIEW

      In his second issue, appellant argues this court has authority under the Texas
constitution to conduct a factual sufficiency review and that he is entitled to such a
review. Appellant argues that under article five, section six, the Texas constitution
provides that the “decision of [the Texas Courts of Appeals] shall be conclusive on
all questions of fact brought before them on appeal or error, requiring the courts to
make “a distinction between questions of law and questions of fact.” Tex. Const.
art. V, § 6(a). In appellant’s third issue, he contends that the denial of a separate
factual sufficiency review denies him of due process and equal protection.
Appellant argues that by failing to conduct a separate factual sufficiency review, he
is denied a “meaningful review” of whether the State has proved its case beyond a
reasonable doubt. Appellant argues that when a reviewing court must limit its
analysis to the evidence supporting the verdict, it can never reach the question of
whether the State proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt because “[a] juror’s
doubt arises from consideration of all of the evidence, not just the State’s
evidence.”   Appellant contends that we must conduct a review of all of the
evidence in a neutral light in order to evaluate whether a juror would have a
reasonable doubt. Appellant further argues that it is troubling that “Texas still
gives factual sufficiency review to civil cases, but not to most criminal cases” and
such “disparate treatment” violates the equal protection clause of both the U.S. and
Texas constitutions.

      In Brooks v. State, a plurality of the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the
factual sufficiency standard was indistinguishable from the legal sufficiency
standard in Jackson v. Virginia. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d 893, 902 (Tex. Crim. App.

                                          2
2010) (plurality op.); see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). The court
came to this conclusion because under the factual sufficiency standard, a court was
to review all the evidence in a neutral light yet not substitute its own resolutions of
conflicting evidence because the jury is still sole judge of evidentiary credibility
and weight. See id. at 901–02. The court reasoned that leaving the judgments of
evidentiary weight and credibility to the jury requires the court to review the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, thus making it indistinguishable
from the standard of a legal sufficiency review. See id. at 902.

      Since Brooks, the Court of Criminal Appeals has declined to conduct a
separate factual sufficiency review. Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 730 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010); Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
As an intermediate court of appeals, we are bound to follow the precedent of the
Court of Criminal Appeals. Ervin v. State, 331 S.W.3d 49, 53–54 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d); see also Tex. Const. art. V, § 5(a) (court of
criminal appeals is final authority for criminal law in Texas).             While an
intermediate appellate court’s decision “shall be conclusive on all questions of fact
brought before them on appeal or error,” the Court of Criminal Appeals has the
authority to determine questions of law including the standard of review that an
intermediate appellate court must use in conducting factual review. See Tex.
Const. art V, § 6(a); Roberts v. State, 221 S.W.3d 659, 663 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007). Thus, we are bound to follow the precedent of the Court of Criminal
Appeals. See Ervin, 331 S.W.3d at 54; Kiffe v. State, 361 S.W.3d 104, 109–10
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d); Temple v. State, 342 S.W.3d
572, 583 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010), aff’d, 390 S.W.3d 341 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2013).

                                          3
      We further note that we have previously reviewed and addressed the
constitutional challenges made by appellant and rejected them. See Mason v. State,
416 S.W.3d 720, 728, n.10 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d);
Mayer v. State, 494 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet.
ref’d); Houston v. State, No. 14-18-00726-CR, 2020 WL 1883421, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 16, 2020, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated
for publication); Garcia v. State, No. 14-19-00434-CR, 2021 WL 208191, at *1
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 21. 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
designated for publication); see also Malbrough v. State, 612 S.W.3d 537, 559–60
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d).

      We overrule appellant’s second and third issues.

                          SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

      In appellant’s first issue, he argues there is legally and factually insufficient
evidence to support his conviction for murder. Appellant argues that the State
offered no evidence that appellant intended to cause Piper’s death or serious bodily
injury. He contends that the State had no evidence that appellant was the person
who shot Piper and no evidence that any such act was intentional. Appellant
argues that there is no evidence that he shot Piper because she rebuffed his sexual
advances, as the State argued at trial. And finally, appellant argues that there is no
evidence connecting his ownership of a gun to the gun used to kill Piper.

A.    General Legal Principles

      In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we must view all the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517

                                          4
(Tex. Crim. App. 2009). This standard applies equally to circumstantial and direct
evidence.   Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 517–18.         Because the factfinder views the
evidence firsthand, the factfinder is in the best position to resolve conflicts in
testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence.
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 517 (“[U]nlike the factfinder––
who can observe facial expressions and hear voice inflections first-hand––an
appellate court is limited to the cold record.”). We presume the factfinder resolved
any conflicts in favor of the verdict and must defer to that resolution as long as it is
rational. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. The jury may use common sense and apply
common knowledge, observation, and experience gained in normal affairs when
drawing inferences from the evidence. Acosta v. State, 429 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2014). “After giving proper deference to the factfinder’s role, we will
uphold the verdict unless a rational factfinder must have had a reasonable doubt as
to any essential element.” Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 517.

       A person commits the offense of murder if the person intentionally or
knowingly causes the death of an individual or intends to cause serious bodily
injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of
an individual. Tex. Penal Code § 19.02 (b)(1)–(2). A person act intentionally with
respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his
conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. Id. §
6.03(a). A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of his conduct when he is
aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. Id. § 6.03(b).

      “The State may prove a defendant’s identity and criminal culpability by
either direct or circumstantial evidence, coupled with all reasonable inferences
from that evidence.” Jenkins v. State, 493 S.W.3d 583, 599 (Tex. Crim. App.
2016); see also Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 49–50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

                                           5
A lack of direct evidence is not dispositive on the issue of guilt.               Id.
Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing guilt, and
circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient. Id. The same standard of review
is used for both circumstantial and direct evidence. Id. “Under the Jackson test,
we permit juries to draw multiple reasonable inferences as long as each inference is
supported by evidence presented at trial.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 15 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007).      “Intent is most often proven through the circumstantial
evidence surrounding the crime, and the jury may infer the requisite intent from the
acts, words, and conduct of the accused, and the method of committing the crime
and the nature of the wound inflicted on the victim.” Zuniga v. State, 393 S.W.3d
404, 412 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. ref’d).            Evidence of a brutal
mechanism of death inflicted upon a defenseless victim may be probative on the
issue of intent or knowledge. Id. at 413.

B.    Background

      Early on the morning of September 21, 2019, a jogger found Piper’s body on
a trial near the Addicks Reservoir in Houston, Texas.        She suffered a single
gunshot wound to the head and was deceased for many hours before she was
found. The night prior to her death, appellant admitted he had been with Piper at
the reservoir. In text messages with a friend, appellant admitted to driving Piper to
the reservoir and sitting in his car with her at the reservoir.         In a phone
conversation with Piper’s mother, appellant said he dropped Piper off about a mile
away from where Piper’s body was found.           In both conversations appellant
indicated the two had argued and separated, Piper going off on her own. Appellant
reportedly said that not long after Piper left him, he heard a woman scream and a
gunshot. After leaving the area and going to work, appellant called 9-1-1 and told

                                            6
the dispatcher that he had heard a woman scream and a gunshot and was concerned
for his friend Piper.

      A sergeant from the Houston Police Department testified that he was
dispatched to a discharge of firearms call in the early morning hours of September
21, 2019, around 1:00 a.m.            The sergeant went to the location provided by
appellant in his 9-1-1 call—around the intersection of Brittmoore Road and
Hammerly Road. Having found nothing unusual at this location and because
appellant had also identified a “retention pond” in the call,1 the sergeant drove to
the nearest retention pond he knew of, one behind a gas station at the corner of the
intersection he was dispatched to.             After again finding nothing unusual, he
requested that dispatch call appellant back for further information. After the call-
back, dispatch informed the sergeant that there was no further information
provided by appellant. The sergeant then went “back in service.” The sergeant
testified that this call was unusual because, while they receive numerous
“discharge of firearms” calls, this one identified a possible victim. The sergeant
testified that there was more detail in this call slip than normal for this type of call.
The sergeant also listened to a portion of the 9-1-1 call and agreed that appellant
identified a large area where the gunshot may have occurred, but clearly indicated
Addicks Reservoir. The sergeant testified that he does not hear a 9-1-1 call when it
is made but is sent to respond by the dispatcher.

      A captain from the Houston Fire Department testified that he and his crew
responded to a call about a body on a jogging trail along the Addicks Reservoir
early in the morning of September 21, at approximately 7:00 a.m. After speaking
with the individual who reported the body, the captain testified he walked on the
jogging path and saw an obviously deceased individual. He testified she was

      1
          In the 9-1-1 recording, Losoya does not mention a retention pond.

                                                7
clearly deceased because of the pooling of blood, discoloration of the skin, and
lividity of the body. He observed a wound on her head but was not sure if it was a
gunshot wound based on his observation.

      A detective with the Houston Police Department testified that he went to the
scene, at the dead-end of Chatterton Drive, roughly the intersection of Chatterton
Drive and Sherwood Forest Street. There were no items on the body that enabled
the detective to identify the individual. The individual, Piper, was later identified
by her fingerprints through the medical examiner’s office. Piper suffered a single
gunshot wound to the head. At the time of her death Piper had loose change and a
lighter in her pocket. The detective observed a “spent bullet casing cartridge,” a
.45 caliber casing, about two to three feet away from the body. There were also
multiple other “corroded” bullet casings on the trail, .22 caliber casings and a
“WMA18”2 casing. The .22 caliber casings had gravel inside of them and were
located further away from the body on the same trail, near the trail entryway area.
Exhibits twenty-three through twenty-six depict four .22 caliber casings. Exhibit
nineteen depicts the distance of these casings from the body.

      The detective testified that there were no indications of any struggle around
or on Piper’s body. There did not appear to be any bruises or injuries apart from
the gunshot wound. He testified that some of the bruising on Piper’s face would
have been from impact with the ground after being shot. The swelling to Piper’s
face would have resulted from the bullet impact. The detective testified that there
was no indication that the body had been shot somewhere else and moved to this
location. Based on the pooling of blood and the lack of any drag marks on the
ground, the detective believed that Piper had been shot in that location. The .45

      2
         The detective testified that a “WMA18” casing is “more closely related to a .9
millimeter.”

                                          8
caliber bullet casing was located only two to three feet from Piper’s body. The
appearance of the casing was “clean, dark in color, empty within the cylinder
itself.” The detective testified that approximately eight to nine feet from the body
was the WMA18 casing. The detective testified that a single weapon is not
capable of firing both of the casings found near Piper’s body. The WMA18 casing
also had gravel on the inside of the casing and corrosion. The detective testified
that unlike the other bullet casings found at the scene, the .45 caliber casing was
the only “clean” casing that was found. No weapon was located at the scene
during the investigation. Piper’s cell phone was also not located at the scene.

        A forensic investigator with the Houston Forensic Science Center testified
that she documented and observed the area where Piper’s body was found. From
the footpath that led up to the trail going north, Piper’s head was 648 feet away on
the trail. She testified that the .22 caliber bullets casings and the WMA18 casing
looked impacted by the elements, and she believed they had been there for some
time.    The forensic investigator testified that she took measurements and the
WMA18 casing was eighteen feet north of Piper’s head, while the .45 casing was
only three feet east of Piper’s head. She also testified that the .45 casing appeared
to be “cleaner.” She testified that the WMA18 casing had some “sand in the
cracks and small gravel on the inside of the cartridge case” and “more closely
resembling the .22 caliber than the .45.” In the diagram admitted into evidence,
the .22 caliber casings were closer to the footpath than to Piper’s body. The
photographs show that the .22 caliber casings were grouped together near the
footpath.

        Piper’s boyfriend testified that Piper left their home in northeast Houston at
around 10:00 p.m. on Friday, September 20. Piper told him that she was going
with a friend named Monica to drop off some marijuana. Piper and the boyfriend

                                           9
have two young daughters that lived with them at the time. The boyfriend testified
he thought Piper’s story was unusual, that she was lying, and that when she did not
return home, he assumed she had runoff with another man. The boyfriend testified
that Piper always had her phone with her but that she had left her wallet at home
that evening.

      The boyfriend’s aunt testified that at the time of Piper’s death Piper and the
boyfriend lived with her at her home in northeast Houston. She remembered Piper
leaving that night and testified that Piper’s boyfriend did not leave the house at all
that evening. She testified that she set the house alarm at about 1:30 a.m. and then
went to bed. She testified that Piper’s boyfriend was asleep in the living room at
that time.

      Another sergeant from the Houston Police Department testified. At the time
of Piper’s death, the sergeant was one of two detectives assigned to the
investigation. The sergeant testified that on the evening that appellant was with
Piper, appellant clocked in at his work at 11:43 p.m. The sergeant testified that the
9-1-1 call came in at 12:23 a.m., or forty-three minutes after appellant arrived at
work. The sergeant admitted that he believed appellant was late for his shift and
he had asked someone at the front desk whether appellant was late. However, he
did not have a confirmation of who he talked to or a document showing appellant’s
work schedule.

      An assistant medical examiner testified that Piper’s cause of death was a
gunshot wound to the head and the result of homicide. Piper’s death likely would
have been immediate and it is unlikely she was able to walk after being shot. The
medical examiner was unable to pinpoint a time of death or say what type of gun
was used to kill Piper but also could not rule out a .45 caliber weapon. The
entrance wound was at the back of Piper’s head and the bullet exited over Piper’s

                                         10
left eyebrow. The medical examiner testified that there was no stippling on the
skin or soot near the gunshot wound. Typically such evidence is present when the
gun is pressed to the skin or in very close range. However, the medical examiner
also testified that Piper’s hair could have blocked the stippling or soot from
depositing on or near the entrance wound. Thus, the medical examiner could not
rule out the shooter being in close proximity to Piper when firing, despite the
absence of soot, because of Piper’s hair and where the bullet struck.

      A woman named Phyllis testified that on August 25, 2019, about a month
before Piper was murdered, appellant acquired a .45 caliber handgun.

      A friend of appellant’s, Lucia, testified about the conversation that she and
appellant had on the morning Piper’s body was discovered. Around 7:30 a.m. on
September 21, appellant texted Lucia to tell her he believed that there had been a
murder at the Addicks Reservoir the night before.         Three hours later Lucia
responded that she already knew about the murder. Appellant clarified that he was
not sure there was a murder and, “I know the victim.” Lucia shared a news story
with appellant confirming a murder at the reservoir, but not providing any
identifying characteristics of the victim. Appellant told Lucia that the victim was
his “crazy ex” that “stalked” him.      Lucia asked how he found out about it.
appellant responded:

      Last night I was giving her a ride home. She said she lived down
      [C]lay and [B]rittmore[.] We got out the car and she said she wanted
      to talk to me. She wanted a “hug”, she tried to kiss me, I pushed her
      away and she got pissed and stormed off. I left to the car, I heard a
      gun shot on my way out. I don’t know what happened exactly after
      that. She hasn’t answered her phone.
Lucia asked where he left Piper and appellant responded, “I parked the car where
we usually chill.” Lucia testified that she had been to the Addicks Reservoir

                                         11
several times and when she would go, she would enter the reservoir at Chatterton
Road. Lucia testified that appellant “always” parks there, is familiar with the area,
and could accurately describe it.

         Lucia questioned why appellant would leave his friend alone at the reservoir
and appellant responded that he “came back after I heard the gunshot . . . I didn’t
just leave her.” Appellant told Lucia he was not able to find her, so he called the
police. Lucia responded that she was sure that Piper made it home and she was
probably just ignoring him. Lucia next asked whether he killed Piper. Appellant
responded that he could not believe that Lucia would accuse him of killing his
friend. Lucia responded that she thought appellant’s story is “weird” and that she
was going to go to the reservoir and see what she could find out. In the remaining
messages the two discussed why appellant was with Piper and what they were
doing:

         [Appellant:3] She was my friend
         [Lucia:] I thought she was a stalker
         [Appellant:] No matter how crazy she is good person
         [Appellant:] She is but people have good hearts Lucy
         [Appellant:] I know you see the good in people no matter how stupid
         they are
         [Lucia:] THATS WEIRD WHO HANGS OUT WITH THEIR
         STALKERS
         [Appellant:] Your the one who told me to be nice!
         [Appellant:] I was hanging out with her btw
         [Appellant:] She told me she was gonna help me go see my son. . .
         [Appellant:] Thats the only reason I picked her up to begin with.

         3
          We recognize that missing punctuation and spelling errors exist within the messages
and have chosen to leave the messages “as-is” without noting such errors and omissions for
readability.

                                             12
[Appellant:] I haven’t seen him in over a month so yea I was kinda
desperate
[Lucia:] So then why go there?
[Lucia:] And I thought you said that she was the one that needed to
talk
[Appellant:] Bc we were on the back home coming from I.10, she kept
saying that she was having second thoughts.
[Appellant:] She wanted to talk, I’m the one who mentioned
[Addicks], she said she never been. I go all the time how the [f***]
was I suppose some [s***] would happen !!
...
[Lucia:] So you were calling the cops while you were at work?
[Appellant:] If all your gonna do is continue to [f***in] question me,
then forget it sorry I [f***in] bothered
[Lucia:] It just doesn’t add up to me
[Lucia:] I just need to find out if it was a girl [emoji]
[Appellant:] Please!!
[Lucia:] Im going out there to ask
[Lucia:] Im not sure if they’ll give me info
[Appellant:] Wait!
[Appellant:] It is a female
[Appellant:] Jessica found something.
[Lucia:] Okay and it was?
[Appellant:] [F***], look she said if you go up there asking questions
they might thing you have some involvement
[Lucia:] No? I’ve done it before
[Appellant:] Ok, be careful
[Lucia:] I can say I live around the area and I’m concerned
[Appellant:] Don’t ask to many questions, I don’t want them getting
the wrong idea
[Lucia:] I mean I could say how you had a friend that walked off on
you last night?
                                     13
      [Lucia:] And you never found her
      [Lucia:] And she won’t answer your calls
      [Appellant:] Wats goin on??
      [Appellant:] Wyd right now
      [Appellant:] Pick up
      [Appellant:] Pick up please
      [Appellant:] Come on Lucy please
      [Appellant:] Damn it Lucy pick up
      [Appellant:] Give me 5mins
      [Lucia:] 5 mins for?
      [Appellant:] Phone call
      [Lucia:] ??
      [Appellant:] Just pick up I’ll explain
      [Lucia:] Hold up
      [Appellant:] Ok
      [Lucia:] Okay
      [Appellant:] Call me back
      [Appellant:] I think I hit the power button
      [Appellant:] Lucy?
      [Appellant:] Can you talk??
      [Appellant:] This really important Lucy
      [Lucia:] I really can’t talk
      [Lucia:] Im with my brother we are going out of town in a bit
      [Appellant:] Let me just say what I need to say then I’ll leave alone

Lucia testified that when appellant called her that he sounded “frantic” and that
was abnormal. She also testified that prior to the night Piper was murdered
appellant had acquired a firearm, but she had never seen him with a firearm.

                                         14
        Another detective from the Houston Police Department testified regarding
the cell phone data collected in this case. The detective testified that from the data
he reviewed, both Piper and appellant’s phones were in the same vicinity, near
U.S. 59 and Hopper Road, around 9:46 p.m. on the night of the murder.4 The
phones moved south in the same general area as one another. Both phones traveled
south and then west from 10:04 p.m. to 10:13 p.m. After traveling northwest on
Highway 290, then southbound on Beltway 8, both phones were in close vicinity to
the reservoir at around 10:43 p.m.              At 11:21 p.m., appellant made two calls of
short duration to each of his sisters.               At 11:24 p.m., Piper’s phone stopped
communicating with cell phone towers. The detective testified that this could
mean the cell phone was turned off, destroyed, dumped in a lake, or ran “out of
service.” The detective testified that after the two calls and after Piper’s phone
stopped communicating, appellant’s phone was “bouncing off a different side of
that tower” it had been communicating with and was instead communicating with a
different side of the tower.             The detective testified that this is indicative of
appellant’s phone leaving the area. From 11:26 p.m. until 11:40 p.m., appellant’s
phone traveled north.           At 12:23 a.m. appellant called 9-1-1.                At 12:38 a.m.,
appellant began making phone calls to Piper.

        Kimberly Jones, Piper’s mother, testified that on Saturday morning Piper’s
boyfriend called her to ask if Piper was with Kimberly. After talking with Piper’s
boyfriend, Kimberly went to pick up Piper’s daughters. Kimberly then called area
hospitals to try and find Piper.             On Sunday she called the morgue and was
informed that Piper was deceased. She called Piper’s boyfriend and told him that
Piper was dead. Kimberly testified that Piper’s boyfriend was in shock at the
news.       That same day, Kimberly received Facebook messages from someone

        4
            Prior testimony established that Piper left her home around this time.

                                                   15
named “Sam Adams.”          After sending some messages, Sam Adams identified
himself as appellant. Appellant sent his phone number to Kimberly and talked
with her on the phone. He asked her whether Piper was alright because he was
with her on Friday night.        Kimberly asked appellant where Piper was, and
appellant responded that he had dropped her off at the Exxon gas station at
Brittmoore Road and Clay Road. After having her memory refreshed from her
statement to police in 2019, Kimberly admitted she did not mention any Exxon gas
station to the police in her statement. She only mentioned the neighborhood and a
park around Brittmoore Road and Clay Road. Kimberly testified that she had
never lived in that area and that Piper did not live in that area.

C.    Analysis

      Appellant argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient
because the State did not provide any evidence that appellant intentionally or
knowingly caused Piper’s death or intentionally or knowingly caused Piper serious
bodily injury. Appellant contends that there is no evidence that appellant was the
person who shot Piper and even if there was some evidence that would “support an
inference” that he was the shooter, there is no evidence that would give rise to a
reasonable inference that he intentionally or knowingly committed the offense.
Appellant argues alternatively that if there is evidence, it is only a mere modicum.

      Considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we
conclude the jury could reasonably infer that appellant intentionally murdered
Piper. The evidence showed that appellant was the last person to see Piper just
prior to her murder. Appellant had taken her to the reservoir—an area he knew
well because he had been there often. Appellant left the reservoir just after Piper’s
phone stopped communicating with cell towers. Appellant went to work and
clocked-in at 11:43 p.m. Appellant waited approximately forty minutes after

                                           16
clocking-in, and almost an hour after he left the reservoir, before calling 9-1-1.
Appellant could not tell the 9-1-1 dispatcher where precisely he and Piper were
despite having been there numerous times. In the 9-1-1 recording, appellant stated
he was “freaking out a bit” and his heart was “racing” even after being removed
from the scene for at least an hour and having never attempted to call Piper since
leaving the reservoir. Appellant had a .45 caliber firearm that he acquired about a
month prior to Piper’s murder. The officers opined that the .45 caliber shell casing
was more recent than all of the bullet casings found at the scene. The .45 caliber
casing was also the closest to Piper’s body, only three feet away. Piper was shot in
the back of the head and her death was immediate. Piper’s phone was missing and
never recovered.

      Appellant’s behavior after leaving Piper at the reservoir and the
conversations he had with the 9-1-1 dispatcher, Lucia, and Piper’s mother
highlighted the inconsistencies between his versions of events. In the 9-1-1 call
appellant indicated he was walking away from Piper and “tried going back to see
what was wrong with her, and I had seen some people walking in . . . and I heard a
scream and I heard a single gunshot. I turned and I ran. I went to the car and I left.
I tried to come back and I . . . didn’t know what to do.” In text messages with
Lucia, he said Piper “stormed off” and he went to the car and “heard a gunshot on
my way out.” Appellant never mentioned seeing anyone else on the trail. When
Lucia questioned why he would just leave Piper, appellant said he came back after
he heard the gunshot and he didn’t just “leave her.” Appellant then told Lucia he
could not find Piper and that he called the cops. In his conversation with Piper’s
mother, appellant stated he dropped Piper off at a gas station or a park
approximately a mile away from where Piper was discovered. Appellant told
Kimberly that when Piper stormed off, he sat in his car for five minutes and went

                                         17
to try and find her, again making no mention of seeing anyone else in the vicinity.
That is when he heard a woman scream and a gunshot.

      The evidence conclusively established that Piper was shot in the back of the
head with a firearm. She did not defend herself in any way. The bullet entered the
back of Piper’s skull, traveled through her head, and exited above her left eyebrow.
Her death was immediate. In the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence
showed that Piper was shot with a .45 caliber bullet from close range. Appellant
acquired a .45 caliber firearm about a month prior to Piper’s murder. The gunshot
wound Piper suffered, along with the other circumstantial evidence enumerated
above, is sufficient to show that appellant intentionally or knowingly caused
Piper’s death with a firearm. See Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 285–86 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2009) (rejecting argument that evidence was insufficient to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the shooter because no
eyewitness could affirmatively put the defendant at the scene); Watkins v. State,
333 S.W.3d 771, 781 (Tex. App.—Waco 2010, pet. ref’d) (“Where a deadly
weapon is fired at close range and death results, the law presumes an intent to
kill.”); see also Finley v. State, 529 S.W.3d 198, 203 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d) (concluding circumstantial evidence sufficient to uphold
conviction despite absence of eyewitness testimony that the defendant committed
the murder).

      Appellant argues that it is not reasonable for the jury to infer that the inverse
of appellant’s story was true—that he had a motive to kill Piper because he tried to
make a sexual advance and Piper spurned him and appellant became angry.
However, motive is not an element of murder, but a circumstance of guilt. Colone
v. State, 573 S.W.3d 249, 266 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). The State may, but is not
required to, offer evidence of motive. Id. at 267. However, in his own words

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during his call with the 9-1-1 dispatcher, appellant “got mad” at Piper and later
stated, “I’m not going to lie, I was really mad at her” when he allegedly left her at
the reservoir.

      Appellant contends that because there are so many .45 caliber weapons in
Texas, the fact that there was evidence that the .45 caliber bullet was believed to be
newer and, thus, likely the bullet caliber that killed Piper, is insufficient to
establish that appellant killed Piper. We disagree. The State presented evidence
that the .45 caliber casing was newer than the other casings and was the closest to
Piper’s body. This supports a reasonable inference that the .22 caliber casings all
grouped in close proximity to one another and a much further distance away from
Piper’s body were unrelated to Piper’s murder. This leaves only the .45 caliber
casing and the WMA18 casing. The .45 caliber was closer to Piper’s body, had no
weathering, and had no gravel on the inside of the casing. The WMA18 casing
was farther away from Piper’s body, was weathered, and had gravel on the inside
of the casing. Particularly considering that this area had significant rainfall and
flooding in the day prior to the murder,5 the jury could reasonably infer the .45
caliber was more recent and was the casing that housed the bullet that killed Piper.
One witness testified that appellant had acquired a .45 caliber firearm a month
before Piper’s murder. Lucia testified appellant acquired a firearm prior to Piper’s
murder. Appellant admitted to being at the scene and hearing a single gunshot.
His story about the events of that night changed, he was “freaking out a bit” and
his heart was “racing” despite waiting over an hour to call 9-1-1, he did not attempt
to call Piper until after he called 9-1-1 and over an hour after he left her at the
reservoir, and he was described as “frantic” when he thought Lucia would go to the
scene and ask questions.
      5
        The fact that Tropical Storm Imelda had come through Houston on Thursday,
September 19, 2019 was referenced throughout the trial.

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       Lastly, appellant contends that the “other evidence conclusively established
a reasonable doubt” but does not detail the evidence to which he is referring. We
have reviewed all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and
concluded that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Laster, 275
S.W.3d at 517.

       We overrule appellant’s first issue.

                                    CONCLUSION

       Having overruled all of appellant’s issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment
of the trial court.

                                        /s/    Ken Wise
                                               Justice

Panel consists of Justices Wise, Zimmerer, and Poissant.
Do Not Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

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