Court Opinion

ID: 9945805
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 16:06:56.845201+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:22:10.801369
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                            FOURTH DISTRICT

                      MACY D. HANSON and
            THE LAW OFFICE OF MACY D. HANSON, PLLC,
                    Appellants/Cross-Appellees,

                                    v.

            NATIONAL LEGAL STAFFING SUPPORT, LLC, and
                         RESOLVLY, LLC,
                     Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

                 Nos. 4D2022-3194 and 4D2022-3438

                          [February 28, 2024]

    Consolidated appeal and cross-appeal from the Circuit Court for the
Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Paige Gillman, Judge; L.T.
Case No. 502020CA0011664XXXXMB.

   Andrew A. Harris of Harris Appeals, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, and
Macy D. Hanson of The Law Office of Macy D. Hanson, PLLC, Madison,
Mississippi, for appellants/cross-appellees.

  Matthew Seth Sarelson and Zachary Stoner of Dhillon Law Group, Inc.,
West Palm Beach, for appellees/cross-appellants.

FORST, J.

   Macy D. Hanson and The Law Office of Macy D. Hanson, PLLC
(collectively “Hanson”), appeal from a final summary judgment in favor of
appellees National Legal Staffing Support, LLC, and Resolvly, LLC
(collectively “Businesses”). Businesses, in turn, cross-appeal the trial
court’s order denying their entitlement to attorney’s fees under a
contractual prevailing party provision.

   We reverse the trial court’s order granting summary judgment for the
reasons set forth in this opinion.

   Finding that Businesses are not the prevailing party in the litigation,
we affirm the cross-appeal without discussion.

                                    1
                               Background

   Businesses sued Hanson, alleging Hanson breached two settlement
agreements that resolved two underlying lawsuits. In the first underlying
lawsuit, Hanson, an attorney, represented clients in an action against
Businesses. This lawsuit was settled with an agreement signed by the
parties.

   In a second lawsuit, one of the Businesses sued a former employee
(“Employee”) because Employee executed an affidavit about Businesses,
and Hanson somehow acquired that affidavit. Hanson never officially
appeared on Employee’s behalf in the second lawsuit, but the settlement
agreement resolving that lawsuit specifically identified Hanson as one of
Employee’s attorneys. Hanson negotiated terms, emailed that settlement
agreement to Employee for signature, and later transmitted that signed
settlement agreement to the attorney representing Businesses. Hanson
also performed these same actions regarding the settlement agreement
resolving the first lawsuit.

    The settlement agreements from both lawsuits include provisions
specifying that the parties, “their counsel,” and “their attorneys” shall
refrain from engaging in certain behaviors, including, but not limited to,
authoring blog posts about the parties or the underlying litigation, and
disseminating Employee’s affidavit.     However, Hanson, a non-party
attorney, did not sign either settlement agreement. In fact, neither
settlement agreement includes attorney signature blocks.

    Hanson later authored a blog post response, commenting about the
outcome of the underlying litigation and remarking negatively about one
of the Businesses. He also filed Employee’s affidavit in at least one
subsequent lawsuit. It is undisputed that Hanson engaged in such
conduct, which Businesses contend makes Hanson liable for breaching
the settlement agreements. After Businesses sued Hanson (but not his
clients) for breach, Hanson responded that he is not bound by the
confidentiality and non-dissemination clauses of the settlement
agreements because he is not a party, did not sign the agreements, and
did not intend to be bound by them.

   Businesses moved for summary judgment and argued that Hanson is
bound because the settlement agreements’ unambiguous provisions
impose obligations on Hanson, which he violated. Hanson reasserted his
position that he is not liable for breach because, as a non-signatory, he is
not bound by the settlement agreements’ terms and conditions.

   The trial court agreed with Businesses and entered final summary
judgment in Businesses’ favor. Specifically, the trial court reasoned that
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Hanson is bound by the settlement agreements’ plain language,
recognizing that Florida law does not require a signature as a prerequisite
to be bound by a contract. The trial court also found that Hanson’s
undisputed conduct breached the settlement agreements’ applicable
confidentiality and non-dissemination provisions.

    Businesses subsequently moved for attorney’s fees pursuant to a
prevailing party attorney’s fee provision in one of the settlement
agreements. However, the trial court denied Businesses’ motion for
attorney’s fees, reasoning that the applicable provision’s plain language
mentioned only the parties, not counsel or third-party beneficiaries.
Hanson’s appeal of the summary judgment and Business’s cross-appeal
of the denial of the motion for attorney’s fees timely follow.

                                  Analysis

   The sole issue in this appeal is a narrow one: whether Hanson, a non-
signatory attorney to the settlement agreements that his clients signed, is
bound by the settlement agreements because they include provisions
purporting to bind Hanson specifically by name or by his role as “counsel”
or “attorney.” We answer this question in the negative from a purely
contractual standpoint and based on the record before us. 1

  A de novo standard of review applies to the trial court’s order granting
summary judgment. Roberson v. Enter. Leasing Co. of Fla., 364 So. 3d
1097, 1100 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023).

   The Settlement Agreements

    “A valid contract arises when the parties’ assent is manifested through
written or spoken words, or ‘inferred in whole or in part from the parties’
conduct.’” L & H Constr. Co. v. Circle Redmont, Inc., 55 So. 3d 630, 634
(Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (quoting Com. P’ship 8098 Ltd. P’ship v. Equity
Contracting Co., 695 So. 2d 383, 385 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)). “[I]t is a well
settled principle of contract law that where the terms of a contract are
unambiguous, the parties’ intent must be determined from within the four
corners of the document. In the absence of ambiguity, the language itself
is the best evidence of the parties’ intent and its plain language controls.”
Barakat v. Broward Cnty. Hous. Auth., 771 So. 2d 1193, 1194–95 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2000).

1 As they were not issues presented below, this opinion does not address either

the culpability of Hanson’s clients for Hanson’s disclosures, or the ethical
implications of Hanson’s conduct.
                                      3
   Here, the trial court utilized the plain language approach to conclude
that Hanson is bound based on the wording of the settlement agreements’
provisions that specifically name Hanson or his role as “attorney” or
“counsel.” While normally correct, this approach is problematic to these
facts because “[o]rdinarily, one who is not a party to a settlement
agreement cannot be bound by its terms.” Maxwell v. Edwards, 345 So.
3d 323, 325 (Fla 4th DCA 2022) (quoting Ahern v. Odyssey Re (London)
Ltd., 788 So. 2d 369, 371–72 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)); see also Axiom
Worldwide Inc. v. Becerra, No. 08-cv-1918, 2009 WL 1347398, at *6 (M.D.
Fla. May 13, 2009) (dismissing breach of contract claims against non-
parties to a settlement agreement when contracting party allegedly agreed
that a non-disparagement provision would extend to those non-party
distributors). The settlement agreements’ language tells us that the parties
intended for Hanson to be bound, not that Hanson, a non-party, intended
or agreed to be bound.

   Non-Signatory Attorney Distinction

   Florida law recognizes that a non-signatory can be bound by a contract,
but we have yet to find a Florida case that binds a non-signatory attorney
to the substantive provisions within a client’s settlement agreement.
Several jurisdictions outside of Florida have parsed out this distinction
with one case containing facts that strikingly resemble those here.

   In Milliner v. Mutual Securities, Inc., No. 15-cv-03354, 2021 WL
2645793, (N.D. Cal. June 28, 2021), the court explored the same issue
that is now before us. There, the plaintiff sued a non-signatory attorney
for breaching the confidentiality provision within his clients’ settlement
agreement after the attorney revealed information to a third party. Id. at
*1, *4. Like the settlement agreements’ provisions here, the confidentiality
provision in Milliner included references to counsel. Id. at *5.

   Ultimately, the Milliner court concluded the plaintiff failed to establish
that the attorney was bound by the settlement agreement and thus he
could not be held to have breached it. Id. at *6. The court reasoned: “The
settlement agreement does not name [sued attorney] (or any other
attorney) as a party to the agreement and he did not sign the document to
indicate his approval as to its form or content.” Id.

   Additionally, the Milliner court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the
attorney consented to being bound via his conduct of “negotiating the
agreement, advis[ing] his clients to sign the agreement, and then
accept[ing] the benefits of the agreement.” Id. Notably, here, these are the
exact actions that Businesses contend demonstrate Hanson’s intent to be
bound, and we similarly reject this argument. While it may be true that

                                      4
Hanson negotiated the settlement agreements, transmitted them to his
clients for their signatures, returned the settlement agreements to the
attorney representing Businesses, and benefitted from the settlement
agreements, these are customary actions performed by attorneys. See id.
Nor do Businesses direct us to any other affirmative conduct on Hanson’s
part to demonstrate his intent to be bound given that the settlement
agreements lack his signature. See L & H Constr. Co., 55 So. 3d at 634.

    Other courts have also found that contractual provisions imposing
obligations on attorneys will often not bind those attorneys when the
attorneys do not sign the agreement or merely sign as to “form and
substance.” See RSUI Indem. Co. v. Bacon, 810 N.W.2d 666, 671–72 (Neb.
2011) (commenting that attorney’s signature approving “form and
substance” neither demonstrated nor implied an intent for attorney to
incur personal liability under contractual provision); see also Sealed Party
v. Sealed Party, No. Civ.A. H-04-2229, 2006 WL 1207732, at *2, *14 n.49
(S.D. Tex. May 4, 2006) (noting that non-signatory attorney was not bound
by confidentiality provision in settlement agreement that specifically
imposed obligation on attorney).

                               Conclusion

   Because Hanson did not sign the settlement agreements, is not named
as a party, and did not manifest consent to be bound, we find that he is
not bound, and the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in
Businesses’ favor in their breach of contract lawsuit that solely named
Hanson. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Because the sole basis for Businesses’ cross-appeal was premised on their
status as a prevailing party, we find reversal moots that issue and affirm
the cross-appeal without discussion on the merits.

   Summary judgment reversed on appeal; cross-appeal affirmed as moot.

MAY and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.

                           *         *         *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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