Court Opinion

ID: 9514938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:52:35.78717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:22.913249
License: Public Domain

AMUNDSON, Justice
(dissenting).
[¶ 24.] In three prior decisions, this Court has addressed the issue of flight instructions. In State v. Fast Horse, 490 N.W.2d 496 (S.D.1992), State v. Waller, 338 N.W.2d 288 (S.D.1983) and State v. Hoover, 89 S.D. 608, 236 N.W.2d 635 (1975), the following instruction was given:
Flight by the defendant, after the crime has been committed, does not create a presumption of guilt. You may consider evidence of flight, if any, however, as tending to prove the defendant’s consciousness of guilt. You are not required to do so. You should consider and weigh evidence of flight by the defendant in connection with all the other evidence in the case and give it weight as in your judgment it is fairly entitled to receive.
In each of these appeals, this Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction. In doing so, however, this Court found error by the trial court in giving such instruction. Nevertheless, we found that error to be *54harmless or non-prejudicial, resulting in an affirmance.
[¶ 25.] Each time we have analyzed the appropriateness of the giving of this flight instruction, we began with the following mantra: “we might well be in accord with the Colorado Supreme Court in Robbins v. People, 1960, 142 Colo. 254, 350 P.2d 818, where it held that a flight instruction ⅛ rarely advisable and should never be given unless the peculiar facts of the case appear to make it essential’.... ” See Fast Horse, 490 N.W.2d at 501; Waller, 338 N.W.2d at 291; Hoover, 236 N.W.2d at 640-41. This Court has also stated that the giving of such instruction should be “used sparingly and only when the special circumstances and evidence require.” Fast Horse, 490 N.W.2d at 502. Words like “essential,” “rarely advisable,” “sparingly” and “special circumstances” quickly rise to the surface. Are the words contained in these statements: statements of law or mere platitudes? If they are the former, we should abide by what we say and mandate trial courts to heed our warning. If they are the latter, we should abandon such hollow legal cliches and allow courts to use the instruction anytime a criminal defendant leaves the scene of the crime. I submit that the former is the better course to follow.
[¶ 26.] In the case at hand, one undisputed fact is clear: Fender did not leave the jurisdiction. A court should not instruct on “flight” without having actual flight.2 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has stated that “the inference of guilt that may be drawn by the fact of flight only arises ‘immediately after the commission of a crime, or after [a defendant] is accused of a crime that has been committed.’ ” United States v. White, 488 F.2d 660, 662 (8th Cir.1973). “The requirement of immediacy of flight is greatly diminished, however, when the defendant knows that he is accused of or sought for the crime charged.” Waller, 338 N.W.2d at 292 (citing United States v. Hernandez-Miranda, 601 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir.1979); United States v. Jackson, 572 F.2d 636 (7th Cir.1978)). At the time of the alleged “flight,” Fender was neither accused of a crime nor out on bond.
[¶ 27.] Despite prior precedent, the majority submits that hearsay statements made by Fender to the arresting officer were the basis for the flight instruction. Evidence of flight is properly admitted only if the government can prove with direct evidence that the defendant knows he is being sought for the crime charged. See United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir.1977). Even if the majority could circumscribe the rules of evidence to analyze such statement, an intent to flee is not enough.3 See Fast Horse, supra (actually fled to California), Waller, supra (actually fled to Minnesota); Hoover, supra (actually fled to Missouri). Likewise, a plain reading of the instruction itself implies that the defendant had, in fact, left the *55jurisdiction. The language of the instruction relies on the “flight” of the defendant to have already transpired. As such, a flight instruction was unwarranted.
[¶ 28.] It is important to note that a flight instruction, most generally, will be incidental to the main charging instructions of the offense. Therefore, it will, except in the rarest of cases, never be considered harmless or non-prejudicial. However, “it is widely acknowledged that evidence of flight or related conduct is ‘only marginally probative as to the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence.’ ” Myers, 550 F.2d at 1049. How long are we going to continue to advise trial courts to give a flight instruction in limited circumstances, and then turn our head and affirm? Now is the time to step to the plate.
[¶ 29.] I respectfully dissent.

. The record reflects that even the trial court acknowledged the facts of this case are not of the traditional sort of “flight” that would warrant the giving of this flight instruction:
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THE COURT: [M]ost often the nature of the flight instruction is used in a little different circumstance than this; i.e., the guy gets out of his car when the highway patrolman stops and takes off across the field, that sort of thing.
The facts and circumstances here indicate this was a slower process, that from the time of the event defendant continued his employment, and as things slowly evolved both parties' positions changed ... his employment and those sorts of things. From and after the time of the arrest, I think is where one needs to also measure, plus his actions as you allege from the time of the event, that he was here and continued his employment, those sorts of things, and the jury needs to weigh it.

. There is nothing in the record that could describe Fender's conduct as constituting flight. Likewise, the statement that he may in the future move outside the jurisdiction does not rise to the level of flight. Rightfully so, the jury was not instructed that the possibility of Fender leaving the jurisdiction amounted to flight. However, the flight instruction actually given was improperly before the jury for its consideration.