Court Opinion

ID: 9557041
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 16:08:49.543694+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:22.526744
License: Public Domain

J-A05028-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 IN THE INTEREST OF: S.C., A              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                    :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
                                          :
 APPEAL OF: D.M., MOTHER                  :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :   No. 2597 EDA 2022

              Appeal from the Order Entered October 4, 2022,
           in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County,
             Civil Division at No(s): CP-46-DP-0000107-2022.

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                        FILED AUGUST 21, 2023

      D.M. (Mother) appeals the order issued by the Montgomery County

Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed the dependency petition filed by the

Montgomery County Office of Children and Youth (Montgomery OCY) and

granted sole custody of the parties’ six-year-old daughter, S.C. (the Child), to

Z.C. (Father). See P.R.J.C.P. 1409(A)(2).     The juvenile court agreed with

Montgomery OCY’s position that the Child would have been dependent but for

the fact that Father was a ready, willing, and able parent. The juvenile court’s

custody award effectively superseded the parties’ prior shared custody

arrangement.    On appeal, Mother alleges the court lacked jurisdiction and

failed to follow the Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure. After review, we affirm.

      The record discloses the following factual and procedural history. At the

outset, we note that three separate child protective services agencies were
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involved with the family: Bucks County Children and Youth Services (Bucks

CYS); Lehigh County Children and Youth Services (Lehigh CYS); and

Montgomery OCY, which was the agency that filed the subject dependency

petition.

      In November 2021, the family was under the investigation of the Bucks

CYS. Bucks CYS was investigating allegations that Father had sexually abused

the Child, but that Mother had coached the Child into making these claims.

Bucks CYS had previously dealt with sexual abuse allegations involving Father,

and those allegations were deemed unfounded.          During its investigation,

Bucks CYS removed the Child from Mother’s care and obtained an order

placing the Child in the care of Paternal Grandfather. See N.T., 9/20/22 (Day

1), at 34-35. At the time, Bucks CYS was unable to place the Child in Father’s

care, because Mother had filed a Protection From Abuse petition against Father

on behalf of herself and the Child, and that petition was still pending. Id. at

35. Ultimately, Bucks CYS chose not to proceed with a dependency petition.

The parents had left the county, and it was agreed that Father would have full

custody of the Child, subject to Mother’s supervised visits. Bucks CYS still had

concerns that Mother was coaching the Child into saying that Father sexually

abused her. Id. at 38, 39. So at the closure of the Bucks CYS case, Mother

and Father were ordered not to discuss allegations of sexual abuse with the

Child. Id. at 38.

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      In May 2022, following a hearing officer’s recommendation, Mother and

Father agreed to share custody of the Child. The agreement was reduced to

a custody consent order.

      In June 2022, the family came to the attention of Montgomery OCY after

it learned Mother went to multiple doctors’ offices alleging that Father sexually

abused the Child. Id. at 50. The referral source also claimed that Mother was

aggressive, and that she might be under the influence of drugs. Id. When a

Montgomery OCY caseworker interviewed Mother and the Child, the Child

stated that “Daddy touches me with his fingers,” but would not elaborate. Id.

at 52. The caseworker passed along the disclosure to Lehigh CYS, which was

also investigating allegations of Father’s sexual abuse.        In the interim,

Montgomery OCY asked Mother to provide a drug screen, which came back

positive for methamphetamine and THC. Id. at 53. Because Mother tested

positive, and because Lehigh CYS was investigating Father, Montgomery OCY

filed a dependency petition.

      The juvenile court set the adjudicatory hearing for August 2, 2022.

When Mother and the Child failed to appear for the hearing, and their location

could not be ascertained, the court issued a bench warrant. Mother and the

Child were ultimately found in the home of an unrelated male. The court then

issued an emergency protective order, which granted Montgomery OCY

emergency custody and placed the Child with Paternal Grandfather.          Soon

thereafter, Lehigh CYS determined that the sexual abuse allegations against

Father were unfounded.

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       The juvenile court held the rescheduled adjudicatory hearing on

September 20 and October 4, 2022.                At the hearing, Montgomery OCY

recommended that the juvenile court dismiss the dependency petition and

grant Father sole custody of the Child. The court agreed and issued such an

order on October 4, 2022.           Mother timely filed1 an appeal, wherein she

presents the following issues for our review:

              1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion or err as a
                 matter of law when, despite the withdrawal on the
                 record of the dependency petition by the solicitor of
                 the Office of Children and Youth, the juvenile court
                 awarded sole legal and physical custody of the child
                 to Father in contravention of the order of the family
                 court that had ordered sole physical custody to
                 Mother?

              2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
                 matter of law by finding Mother to be a drug addict
                 after jurisdiction was withdrawn from the juvenile
                 court by the withdrawal of the dependency petition on
                 the record by the solicitor for the Office of Children
                 and Youth?

              3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
                 matter of law by finding the Child was without
                 appropriate care, protection and support while in
                 Mother’s care after jurisdiction was withdrawn from
                 the juvenile court by the withdrawal of the
                 dependency petition on the record by the solicitor for
                 the Office of Children and Youth?

____________________________________________

1 In a children’s fast track case, the appellant’s concise statement of matters

complained of on appeal must be filed concomitantly with the notice of appeal.
See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Mother failed to comply with this Rule when she filed
her concise statement two weeks after her notice. However, we decline to
dismiss Mother’s appeal notwithstanding the circumvention. See In re
K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d 745 (Pa. Super. 2009).

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Mother’s Brief at 1.

       Notwithstanding the presentation of three separate claims, Mother only

advances two arguments in her Brief; insofar as we can discern, Mother

collapses her second and third issue into a single contention.2 First, Mother

argues that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to award Father sole custody.

Second, Mother argues that even if the juvenile court had jurisdiction, its order

was erroneous because the court failed to make the requisite findings before

it could award Father sole custody. Both arguments present questions of law.

Thus, we begin with our observation of the appropriate scope and standard of

review:

          We review orders in dependency cases by accepting the
          findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial
          court if they are supported by the record. See In re R.J.T.,
          9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). We are not, however,
          required to accept the trial court’s inferences or conclusions
          of law. See id. The appellate court must ensure that the
          record represents a comprehensive inquiry and that the trial
          court has applied the appropriate legal principles to the
          record. See In re L.B., 229 A.3d 971, 977 (Pa. Super.
          2020). If the question before us is a question of law, […]
          the scope of review is plenary. See in re K.L.S., 934 A.2d
          1244, 1246 (Pa. 2007).

Interest of J.B., 247 A.3d 447, 448 (Pa. Super. 2021).

____________________________________________

2 We caution counsel to be mindful of Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (providing that the

argument section of the brief shall be divided into as many parts as there are
questions to be argued).

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     We add that when the question presented is a question of law, the

standard of review is de novo. See, e.g., In re G.D., 61 A.3d 1031, 1036 (Pa.

Super. 2013).

   1. Whether the juvenile court had jurisdiction to enter its
      order dismissing the dependency petition and granting
      Father custody of the Child.

   The Juvenile Act defines a dependent child as, inter alia:

        A child who:

        (1)     is without proper parental care or control,
                subsistence, education as required by law, or other
                care or control necessary for his physical, mental, or
                emotional health, or morals. A determination that
                there is a lack of proper parental care or control may
                be based upon evidence of conduct by the parent,
                guardian or other custodian that places the health,
                safety or welfare of the child at risk, including
                evidence of the parent's, guardian's or other
                custodian's use of alcohol or a controlled substance
                that places the health, safety or welfare of the child at
                risk;

                […]

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302.

     Following an adjudicatory hearing, the court shall enter an order as to

whether the child is dependent. See Pa.R.J.C.P. 1409(A). At that point, the

court may make one of two determinations. Either the court finds the child is

dependent under Rule 1409(A)(1), or the court finds the child is not dependent

under Rule 1409(A)(2), which provides:

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          (2)       No dependency. If the court finds the child not to be
                    dependent or the court finds a parent ready,
                    willing, and able to provide proper parental care
                    or control, the court shall:

              (a)     dismiss the petition;

              (b)     order the child to be discharged from custody and
                      any restrictions ordered in the proceedings; and

              (c)     enter an order identifying individual(s) who will
                      have the legal and physical custody until such
                      order is modified by further order of the court.

Pa.R.J.C.P. 1409(A)(2)(a)-(c) (emphasis added).

       Instantly, the juvenile court determined that Father was ready, willing,

and able to provide proper parental care and control under Rule 1409(A)(2).

Consequently, the court dismissed the dependency petition under Rule

1409(A)(2)(a) and entered an order granting Father custody under Rule

1409(A)(2)(b)-(c).

       In her first appellate issue, Mother argues the juvenile court lacked

jurisdiction to award Father custody. Her argument is predicated on the fact

that the assistant solicitor for Montgomery OCY used imprecise terminology

during the adjudicatory hearing.               At various points throughout the

proceedings, the assistant solicitor stated it was Montgomery OCY’s position

that the dependency petition had been, or should be, “withdrawn.” See, e.g.,

N.T. (Day 1) at 7; 87.3      Mother claims that because Montgomery OCY sought

____________________________________________

3 Specifically, the Montgomery OCY Solicitor stated: “…our recommendation
today is that the dependency petition shall be withdrawn and father is a fit
and willing parent to take custody of this child.” See N.T. (Day 1) at 7.

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to withdraw its petition, the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to issue an order

under the Juvenile Act superseding the parties’ prior shared custody order.

      Mother’s argument strains credulity.          The position of the assistant

solicitor was clear: Montgomery OCY recommended that the court find Father

to be a ready, willing, and able parent; and that the court dismiss the petition

in accordance with Rule 1409(A)(2)(a).          Notwithstanding the assistant

solicitor’s occasional use of the term “withdraw,” there could be no confusion

as to what Montgomery OCY actually sought. The assistant solicitor made its

position clear from the outset of the proceedings. See id., at 3, 7. Indeed,

the   assistant    solicitor   used   the   terms    “withdraw”   and   “dismiss”

interchangeably:

         The court:       So you [(assistant solicitor)] are essentially
                          asking that the dependency petition be
                          dismissed and if there are any custody issues
                          that need to be changed that they be handled
                          by the family court unit. Is that essentially
                          what ---.

         Solicitor:       That’s correct, Your Honor. That is exactly
                          what we are asking. That the court dismiss
                          the petition and place custody with Father
                          and any other issues with regard to that go
                          to family court and notice to all parties with
                          regard to any future hearings as [well] as
                          court orders are provided when it goes to
                          family court, so the judge knows what is
                          going on when they have to address any
                          issues with regards to custody.

Id. at 83-84.

         The court:       But at the point – if I go along with [OCY’s]
                          proposal, you are asking me to allow physical

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                           and legal custody to be placed with Father;
                           therefore, OCY is out of the picture?

         Solicitor:        Correct, Your Honor. We are asking the court
                           to dismiss the petition.        It has been
                           withdrawn by OCY. We are asking that it
                           be dismissed and the court orders that
                           pursuant to Rule 1409 that Father is a fit and
                           willing parent and then they can go fight it
                           out all they want in family court.

Id. at 87 (emphasis added).

      This was not a case where, say, an agency had of change of heart and

sought to stop the adjudicatory hearing in its tracks – only for the juvenile

court to take the reins away from the moving party and charge full steam

ahead. Nor was it the case, as Mother alleges, that Montgomery OCY resorted

to “semantical word games” to help Father obtain a backdoor custody

modification. See Mother’s Brief at 4, 8-9. According to Mother, Montgomery

OCY “in collusion with Father, used the juvenile court to gain custody of S.C.

and avoid an evidentiary hearing on custody in family court.” Id. at 16.

      Mother’s forceful repudiation of the Agency’s position evinces a

misunderstanding      of   the   Agency’s   duty   to   protect   children   of   the

Commonwealth.      At the hearing, Montgomery OCY took the position that

Mother posed a risk to the Child’s safety, but that government intervention

was ultimately not appropriate, because Father was available to provide

suitable care. The assistant solicitor explained that the only reason the Child

had not been returned to Father’s care sooner, was because of the open

investigation with Lehigh CYS. See N.T., 10/4/22 (Day 2) at 3. By the time

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the court held the adjudicatory hearing, Lehigh CYS had determined that the

allegations against Father were unfounded, and Montgomery OCY had no

other concerns about Father’s ability to care for the Child. Id. at 3-4. Still, by

virtue of its dependency petition, Montgomery OCY hedged; if the court

disagreed with the Agency’s belief that Father was an appropriate caregiver,

then the Agency was prepared to go forward due to its concerns about

Mother’s ability to care for the Child. Simply because the respective positions

of Father and the Agency aligned at the hearing, does not mean the two were

nefarious confederates attempting to deprive Mother of custody without due

process. The position of Montgomery OCY was perfectly reasonable. And as

we explain below, Mother’s rights were safeguarded by proper procedures.

        We do not deny that law often turns on exact language, that something

as simple as a comma could have consequences which are as drastic and they

are unforeseeable.4 Here, however, we decline to put form over substance

and reverse a juvenile court’s careful determinations regarding the safety of

the Child, simply because the assistant solicitor misspoke. For these reasons,

we find Mother’s first appellate issue is entirely without merit.

____________________________________________

4 Indeed, we question whether it would have been more grammatically
appropriate for Rule 1409(A)(2)(a) to provide for the “denial” of the petition,
as opposed to its “dismissal.” See also Interest of J.B., 247 A.3d 447 (Pa.
Super. 2021) (referring to the “discharge” of the dependency petition, under
Rule 1409(A)(2)(a)).

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   2. Whether the juvenile court committed a procedural error when
      it dismissed the dependency petition without first determining
      Mother could not provide proper care to the Child?

      Regarding her second and third appellate issues, Mother argues that the

juvenile court’s order was erroneous, because it failed to follow proper

procedures.    Mother maintains that before the court could dismiss the

dependency petition and award Father custody, the court had to first

determine that Mother could not properly care for the Child. According to

Mother, the court failed to make this requisite finding and thus its order was

erroneous.

      We agree with Mother’s interpretation of the law, up to a point. A court

is empowered by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6341(a) and (c) to make a finding that a child

is dependent, if the child meets the statutory definition by clear and convincing

evidence. However, the definition of a dependent child contained in Section

6302 clearly states that a child must lack a parent (or guardian or other legal

custodian) who can provide appropriate care to the child. A child whose non-

custodial parent is ready, willing and able to provide such care does not meet

this definition. See In re M.L., 757 A.2d 849, 851 (Pa. 2000).

      This Court has explained:

         [I]t is the duty of the trial court to determine whether the
         non-custodial parent is capable and willing to render proper
         parental control prior to adjudicating a child dependent. If
         the court determines that the custodial parent is unable to
         provide proper parental care and control “at this moment”
         and that the non-custodial parent is “immediately available”
         to provide such care, the child is not dependent under the
         provisions of the Juvenile Act. Consequently, the court must
         grant custody of the allegedly dependent child to the non-

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            custodial parent. Once custody is granted to the non-
            custodial parent, “the care, protection, and wholesome
            mental and physical development of the child” can occur in
            a family environment as the purpose of the Juvenile Act
            directs. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(b).

In Interest of Justin S., 543 A.2d 1192, 1200 (Pa. Super. 1988); see also

M.L., 757 A.2d at 851.

      Courts are keenly aware of “the implications of saddling a parent with

the state involvement that accompanies an adjudication of dependency when

such an intrusion is unwarranted.” Interest of J.B., 247 A.3d 447, 451 (Pa.

Super. 2021). Courts are also aware how so-called “crossover cases” – i.e.,

cases involving both the family court and the juvenile court – may necessitate

orders that undo the family’s prior custody arrangement. We can appreciate

how it must seem unfair to Mother, that a child protective services agency can

intervene in the family’s custody dispute, put a thumb on the scale such that

the court deprives her of custody, only for the agency to bow out after the

entry of the order.

      However, the Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure anticipate the existence

of prior custody orders and safeguard against undue intervention.        Before a

juvenile court can issue an order modifying a family’s prior custody

arrangement under Rule 1409(A)(2), the court must first render heightened

findings.

      Specifically, the court must determine, after an evidentiary hearing, that

the custodial parent is currently unable to provide proper parental care. J.B.,

247 A.3d. at 451, 455; see also Pa.R.J.C.P. 1409 – Comment (“A trial court

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has the authority to transfer custody or modify custody to the child’s non-

custodial parent without a finding of dependency if sufficient evidence of

dependency would have existed but for the availability of the non-custodial

parent. In Interest of Justin S., 543 A.2d 1192 (Pa. Super. 1988.”)). We

reiterate that the burden of proof in a dependency proceeding is on the

petitioner to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that a child meets

the statutory definition of dependency. Interest of A.C., 237 A.3d 553, 563

(Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted).5 Thus, to modify a custody order in favor

of the non-custodial parent, the court must first determine, based on clear

and convincing evidence, that the child would have met the statutory

definition of a dependent child, but for the availability of the non-custodial

parent.

       In addition to these heightened findings, we note that the Rules

anticipate that such an award will be revisited.        As noted above, Rule

1409(A)(2)(c) requires the juvenile court to identify the “individual(s) who will

have legal and physical custody until such order is modified by further

order of court.” Pa.R.J.C.P. 1409(A)(2)(c) (emphasis added).

       On appeal, Mother argues the juvenile court never made the requisite

finding that the Child would have been dependent (due to Mother’s inability to

care for the Child) but for the availability of Father. See Mother’s Brief at 20.
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5 “Clear and convincing evidence” is “evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty,

and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,
without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” A.C., 237 A.3d at
558 (citation omitted).

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Mother claims that Montgomery OCY did not provide “a scintilla of evidence”

to prove its case. Id. at 22.

       Contrary to      Mother’s    characterization, the   juvenile   court   made

considerable findings that the Child would have been dependent but for

Father’s availability. See Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O.), 12/1/22, at 4 (infra).

Critically, the court rendered these findings after an evidentiary hearing. See

J.B., 247 A.3d at 451, 455. The question becomes whether those findings

constituted sufficient evidence that Mother was unable to provide “proper

parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other

care or control necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or

morals.” See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302 (defining “dependent child”).

       The juvenile court determined:

          Following Rule 1409(A) guidelines, the court looked at
          several pieces of evidence to determine that the Child was
          not [] dependent and awarded custody to Father, not
          Mother. The allegations against Father were unfounded,
          thereby making Father a fit and able parent pursuant to Rule
          1631(B)[Footnote omitted]. For Mother, however, OCY presented
          several pieces of evidence to the court to make a sufficient
          determination that Mother was not a willing and fit parent
          to the Child.

          One was Mother’s positive drug test result for
          Methamphetamine and THC.[6]         There is substantial
          evidence on the record that supports the court’s ruling on
          Mother’s drug test results. Counsel for OCY introduced
          evidence that Mother’s drug test results tested positive for
          Methamphetamine and THC. Mother tried to offer evidence
____________________________________________

6 We note that Mother’s doctor testified that Mother has a medical marijuana

card. See N.T. (Day 1), at 24.

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         that the medication [(Adderall)] being taken for her ADD
         could produce a false positive. However, OCY offered expert
         testimony in the form of a toxicologist, Erika Walker, directly
         rebutting Mother’s argument by testifying that the drug test
         went through a confirmatory process of the results and ruled
         out possibilities of false positives.

         Mother failed to offer any compelling evidence to conclude
         otherwise. The only evidence Mother was able to offer was
         testimony from her family Doctor Thomas G. Wilson, who is
         not a certified expert toxicologist. Dr. Wilson testified that
         he prescribed her Adderall to treat Mother’s ADD. Dr.
         Wilson confirmed that Adderall will test positive for
         Amphetamine, not Methamphetamine.

         In addition, Mother’s history of conduct with the court
         supports a determination of the court finding Mother unfit.
         Mother failed to appear at an adjudication hearing on August
         2, 2022 and a bench warrant was issued for Mother’s arrest
         for failing to appear and taking the Child to an unknown
         location. (The Child told the caseworker that she was hiding
         with an unrelated male, [J.A.], for the past week because
         Mother told her they had to hide from the caseworker and
         the police.) Mother also had a history of making false sexual
         abuse allegations against Father, all of which were deemed
         unfounded.

Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O.), 12/1/22, at 4 (citations to the record and original

footnote omitted)(style adjusted).

      As the record stands, Mother’s use of marijuana does not seem

particularly worrisome, especially in light of the fact that she had a valid

medical marijuana card. The positive test for methamphetamines was more

troubling. On that point, we acknowledge that the testimony was contested.

The toxicologist explained that when there is a presumptive positive test, as

there was here for methamphetamine, the sample is put through a

confirmatory process. The expert toxicologist stated that in her experience,

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she has never seen Adderall produce a false positive for methamphetamine.

See N.T. (Day 1) at 19.

      According to the juvenile court, Mother’s doctor testified that Mother’s

prescribed Adderall will not result in a positive test for methamphetamine.

See T.C.O. at 4. But that averment was not the doctor’s complete testimony.

The doctor clarified on re-direct examination that he has seen Adderall cause

a false positive for methamphetamine enough times that it concerns him. See

N.T. (Day 1) at 30-31. Be that as it may, the juvenile court was free to weigh

the toxicologist’s expert testimony more heavily than that of Mother’s family

doctor. The court’s reliance on the toxicologist’s testimony, over the family

doctor’s, was not improper.

      Upon review, we conclude that the juvenile court followed the

appropriate procedures when it dismissed the dependency petition and

awarded Father custody of the Child.     First, the court held an evidentiary

hearing and determined there was sufficient evidence of dependency due to

Mother’s lack of proper parental care. The Juvenile Act provides that evidence

of a lack of proper parental care includes evidence of a parent’s use of

controlled substances. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302. The court was persuaded by

the toxicologist’s testimony that Mother’s positive test for methamphetamines

was not a result of her prescribed medication. Moreover, proper parental care

includes care necessary to the Child’s physical and mental health. See id. We

do not ignore the finding that Mother has caused the Child to endure emotional

distress by coaxing the Child into making false allegations of sexual abuse

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against Father. Next, the court determined that the Child did not meet the

definition of dependency, because Father was an available to provide proper

parental care. The court was persuaded by the testimony that the allegations

of Father’s sexual abuse were false.         Lastly, in accordance with Rule

1409(A)(2)(c), the court indicated that Mother may seek modification of

Father’s custody award in family court. See Order of Court, 10/4/22 at ¶18.

      Briefly, we mention Mother’s secondary argument that the juvenile court

erred, because the Agency never made reasonable efforts at reunification.

See Mother’s Brief at 25. For support, Mother relies on Section 6351 of the

Juvenile Act, which mandates that courts must ascertain whether the child

protective services agency made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate

the need for removal from the child’s home, prior to the placement of the child

outside of the home. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(b)(2). Mother seems to reason

that, because Montgomery OCY did not make any efforts to alleviate its

concerns about Mother’s care, the court was barred from placing the Child

with Father. But Mother misconstrues this subsection. Section 6351(b) refers

to requisite placement findings that the juvenile court must make after the

child is found to be dependent, but before the court enters a dispositional

order pursuant to Section 6351(a)(1), (2), (2.1), or (3). As the Child was

never found to be dependent, this subsection does not come into play.

Mother’s argument is without merit because it puts the cart before the horse.

      To conclude: the juvenile court did not err when it dismissed the

dependency petition and awarded Father custody of the Child, pursuant to

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PA.R.J.C.P. 1409(A)(2).      The court had jurisdiction to issue its order

notwithstanding the assistant solicitor’s inadvertent use of the term

“withdraw” as it relates to the dependency petition.   Moreover, the court

followed proper juvenile court procedure. It held an evidentiary hearing and

thereafter determined that the Child would have been dependent but for the

availability of the non-custodial parent.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/21/2023

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