Court Opinion

ID: 9540289
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:14:22.797796+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:49.882484
License: Public Domain

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by MURPHY, Judge, which HARRELL, J. joins.
I agree with the majority’s conclusions that (1) “a trial judge may not convict a defendant of an uncharged lesser included offense unless the parties are given an opportunity to present arguments on that offense before the trial court,” and (2) “[o]nce the court has given the parties that opportunity, the trial court may convict the defendant of the uncharged lesser included offense regardless of whether either party requests or agrees that the court should consider that offense.” I dissent, however, from that portion of the majority opinion in which those conclusions are applied to the facts of this case.
I.
I am persuaded that Petitioner is not entitled to reversal of the convictions for robbery with a dangerous weapon and use of a handgun in the commission of a felony. In my opinion, those convictions should be reinstated under the “slip of the tongue” rule applied in Reed v. State, 225 Md. 566, 171 A.2d 464 (1961), when this Court stated that “[ajlmost anyone can make a slip of the tongue, and judges are not immune from such errors.” Id. at 570, 171 A.2d at 466. I would hold that the “slip of the tongue” rule is equally applicable to the issue of whether, as soon as the Circuit Court announced that it was granting Petitioner’s motion for judgment of acquittal with *178respect to “count seven” (first degree assault), Petitioner could no longer be convicted of either robbery with a deadly weapon or use of a handgun.
In Reed, the defendant/appellant, who was charged with various offenses in a fourteen count indictment, elected to be tried before a judge of the Criminal Court of Baltimore. At the conclusion of the State’s case-in-chief, while moving for a “directed verdict” as to all counts, defense counsel argued that the defendant was entitled to a directed verdict as to the counts that charged him with “sale” of heroin and marihuana, “on the ground that the evidence showed that the sale alleged was made to a person other than the individual named in the indictment as the purchaser.” Id. at 569, 171 A.2d at 465. The trial judge overruled the motion as to the counts that charged the defendant with “possession” of drugs, but “granted [the motion] as to the sale.” Id. At this point, “[t]he defendant’s trial counsel ... rested the case as to possession and control and proceeded to argue those questions to the court.” Id. The record shows that, at the conclusion of that argument, the trial judge—after stating that he “was completely satisfied that this crime has been involved with narcotic drugs”—announced, “I will have to find him guilty on the count other than possession.”
On appeal to this Court, the defendant argued that he was entitled to a reversal of the convictions entered on the “possession” counts of heroin and marihuana on the ground that he had been acquitted of those counts by operation of law when the trial judge erroneously found him guilty of the “sale” counts that were no longer before the court. While rejecting that argument, this Court stated:
After a careful study of the entire colloquy relating to the sufficiency of the evidence both before and after the closing argument of defense counsel, we have no doubt (assuming no error by the court reporter) that a slip of the tongue is exactly what occurred in the judge’s statement of the counts upon which he was finding the defendant guilty____ Any different interpretation of the judge’s statement would lead to the conclusion that he was finding the defendant guilty of *179selling and dispensing [narcotic drugs], when the transcript makes it perfectly clear that he had already found the defendant not guilty of those charges because of the discrepancy in proof as to the identity of the purchaser.
Id. at 570-71, 171 A.2d at 466. From my review of the record in the case at bar, which includes the Circuit Court’s statement that “the assault merges into the robbery,” I have no doubt that a slip of the tongue is exactly what occurred when the Circuit Court granted the motion for judgment of acquittal with respect to “count seven.” I would therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and direct that Court to affirm Petitioner’s convictions for robbery with a dangerous weapon and use of a handgun in the commission of a felony.
II.
In the alternative, assuming that the judgment of acquittal entered on count seven required reversal of the convictions for robbery with a dangerous weapon and use of a handgun in the commission of a felony, a judgment of acquittal as to the first degree assault charged in count seven did not operate to prohibit the Circuit Court from convicting Petitioner of the lesser-included offense of (simple) robbery as well as the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor theft. While some degree of assault is a lesser included offense of the crime of robbery, a first degree assault is not an essential element of robbery. For that reason, if it is necessary that the case at bar be remanded to the Circuit Court for further proceedings, I would expressly hold that Respondent is entitled to a new trial on the charges of both' robbery and misdemeanor theft, rather than to merely present additional argument on the misdemeanor theft charge.
Judge HARRELL has authorized me to state that he joins this concurring and dissenting opinion.