Court Opinion

ID: 9569642
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:16:01.78976+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:03:41.602036
License: Public Domain

Hill, Justice,
dissenting.
Since 1974, Ga. Laws 1974, pp. 352, 356-358, we have had "judge sentencing” in cases other than death penalty cases.1
The problem in the case before us would not arise today in cases where the judge sets the second sentence. However, because the problem could arise today in cases where the jury sets the second sentence (e.g. murder), it may still be worthwhile to examine the Code section in issue.
Code Ann. § 27-2510(b) provides: "Where a person is convicted on more than one indictment or accusation at separate terms of court, or in different courts, and sentenced to imprisonment, such sentences shall be served concurrently, the one with the other, unless otherwise expressly provided therein.”
The majority say that the above subsection is applicable only to groups of offenses committed in a single crime spree where convictions have been obtained in separate courts or terms of court. One defect in this construction is that while the subsection does refer to different courts and separate terms of court, it makes no reference whatsoever to a single crime spree. Moreover, such construction is, I submit, wrong, as will be seen below.
The majority hold that the subsection is applicable to groups of offenses committed in a single crime spree where a person is convicted at separate terms of court. However, Code Ann. § 26-506(b) generally prohibits a person from being prosecuted at separate terms of court for offenses committed in a crime spree where the crimes are known to the prosecutor. That is to say, the majority has interpreted Code Ann. § 27-2510(b) to be applicable to circumstances which Code Ann. § 26-506(b) prohibits *512from arising in most cases. I therefore respectfully dissent.

For the history of judge versus jury sentencing in this state, see Gandy v. State, 232 Ga. 105 (205 SE2d 243) (1974).