Court Opinion

ID: 9677776
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:59:30.3674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:58.299601
License: Public Domain

STEINMETZ, J.
(dissenting). I disagree with the decision of the court.
Some of the most unfortunate and ill-chosen words used in the history of the United States Supreme Court were those of Justice Blackmun in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 371-72 (1977), when he wrote:
“In this day, we do not belittle the person who earns his living by the strength of his arm or the force of his mind. Since the belief that lawyers are somehow ‘above’ trade has become an anachronism, the historical foundation for the advertising restraint has crumbled.”
The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (1966), defines anachronism as “after its own time; an obsolete or archaic form.. . .”
It is true, we do today pay proper respect to the person who serves society by the use of his strength or mechanical aptitude. However, that is a societal judgment *582and attitude toward individuals and their worth. This same judgment of individuals cannot be likened to society’s judgment of a group practicing the profession of law.
The individual in our society has been and always should be judged as such; however, when he or she is a member of a profession, a mantle of the group is placed on that person. This mantle can be referred to collectively as our “profession.” The entire profession is judged by the actions of individual members.
The language of Justice Blackmun has been interpreted by the attorneys arguing the instant case to mean that the profession of law is no longer entitled to a distinctive recognition, but is rather the equivalent of an individual’s trade and the bar association mentality is equivalent to a “guild mentality.”
According to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1967), a guild is:
“1: an association of men belonging to the same class, engaged in kindred pursuits, or having common interests or aims: as a: any of various medieval associations having both social and semireligious features b: a medieval association of merchants controlling local trade in some parts of Britain and sometimes constituting the local governing body c: a medieval association of members of a craft or trade established to promote the welfare of that craft and its members and sometimes replacing the merchants’ guild as a governing body d: any of various modern associations, societies, or brotherhoods resembling medieval guilds in their aims . . . broadly: FELLOWSHIP, SOCIETY. . . .”
That definition hardly describes an integrated bar association where membership of men and women is required, and the only common purposes are improvement in the representation afforded to society and protection against persons in the group whose conduct is less than professional.
*583The previously quoted words of Justice Blackmun may have led to the type of argument made in this case. However, later in his opinion Justice Blackmun charged the bar association and its individual members with guarding the public against deceptive advertising of attorneys in assuring “that advertising by attorneys flows both freely and clearly.”
Justice Blackmun also stated: “We suspect that, with advertising, most lawyers will behave as they always have: They will abide by their solemn oaths to uphold the integrity and honor of their profession and of the legal system. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, supra, at 379. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, within one opinion Justice Blackmun hints that attorneys may be tradesmen and later recognizes that they are professionals bound by their solemn oath. This latter characterization is consistent with the case of In the Matter of R. M. J., 455 U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 929, 71 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1982), in which the court stated: “Thus, in Bates, the Court found that the potentially adverse effect of advertising on professionalism and the quality of legal services was not sufficiently related to a substantial state interest to justify so great an interference with speech.” R. M. J., supra, 102 S. Ct. at 938. (Emphasis added.)
“Profession” is relevantly defined in The Random House Dictionary of the English Language as “a vocation requiring knowledge of some department of learning or science: ... Cf. learned profession.” (Emphasis added.)
“Learned profession” in the same book is defined as follows: “one of the three vocations of theology, law, and medicine, commonly held to require highly advanced learning, high principles, etc.. . .”
Perhaps we are so modernized in our attitude of sameness of individuals that the “learned” can be dropped; *584however, we still must recognize that the practice of law is a profession and not a trade.
A “trade” is defined in the same source book as “any occupation pursued as a business or livelihood . . . some line of skilled manual or mechanical work; craft. . . .” The references are to business endeavors as distinguished from service and also suggest employment of primarily physical skills.
When the oath administered to attorneys entering the practice of law in Wisconsin (sec. 757.29, Stats.) is examined, it obviously does not reflect a mere participation or interest in commerce, but rather the rendering of a professional service. The oath is not appropriate for an individual who earns his or her livelihood by engaging in a commercial trade. The oath reads:
“757.29 Attorneys regulated. (1) Attorney’s Oath. Each person admitted to practice as a member of the bar of any court of this state shall subscribe the roll of attorneys to be kept by the clerk and shall in open court take an oath or affirmation of the tenor following, to wit: I do solemnly swear:
“I will support the constitution of the United States and the constitution of the state of Wisconsin;
“I will maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers;
“I will not counsel or maintain any suit or proceeding which shall appear to me to be unjust, or any defense, except such as I believe to be honestly debatable under the law of the land;
“I will employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to me, such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and will never seek to mislead the judge or jury by any artifice or false statement of fact or law;
“Í will maintain the confidence and preserve inviolate the secrets of my client and will accept no compensation in connection with my client’s business except from my client or with my client’s knowledge and approval;
“I will abstain from all offensive personality and advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a *585party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which I am charged;
“I will never reject, from any consideration personal to myself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed, or delay any person’s cause for lucre or malice. So help me God.”
If the highest court in our land treats the “learned profession” of law as a trade, this attitude will fill our ranks with tradespeople, rather than professionals.
Justice Powell referred to the recognition accorded the legal profession in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975): “The interest of the States in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function of administering justice, and have historically been ‘officers of the courts.’ ” (Emphasis added.) This was also quoted in Bates, supra, at 361. See also: Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 383 (1963); Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 123-24 (1961); Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 157 (1971).
The Bates case in allowing attorney advertising placed limits on this form of commercial free speech. The court explained the need for such limitation: “Because the public lacks sophistication in legal matters, it may be particularly susceptible to misleading or deceptive advertising by lawyers.” Bates, supra, at 379.
Bates further held at 383:
“In holding that advertising by attorneys may not be subjected to blanket suppression, and that the advertisement at issue is protected, we, of course, do not hold that advertising by attorneys may not be regulated in any way. . . .
“Advertising that is false, deceptive, or misleading of course is subject to restraint. See Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S., at 771-772, and n. 24. . . . In fact, because the public lacks sophistication concerning legal services, misstatements that *586might be overlooked or deemed unimportant in other advertising may be found quite inappropriate in legal advertising.”
In the case of In the Matter of R. M. J., the court in discussing Bates held: “But the decision in Bates nevertheless was a narrow one. The Court emphasized that advertising by lawyers still could be regulated. False, deceptive, or misleading advertising remains subject to restraint, and the Court recognized that advertising by the professions poses special risks of deception — . . . .” R. M. J., supra, 102 S. Ct. at 935-36.
The Supreme Court in R. M. J. stated Bates “did not by any means foreclose restrictions on potentially or demonstrably misleading advertising.” 102 S. Ct. at 937. (Emphasis added.)
The states have a legitimate interest in controlling professional services advertising, and it was made clear in Bates and R. M. J., “that regulation — and imposition of discipline — are permissible where the particular advertising is inherently likely to deceive or where the record indicates that a particular form or method of advertising has in fact been deceptive.” R. M. J., supra, 102 S. Ct. at 937. (Emphasis added.)
I would hold that the advertising of Marcus and Tep-per was misleading in fact and, certainly, inherently likely to deceive. I would hold that though the advertising was directed toward the legitimate end of attracting clients, it was unprofessional and misleading. The question is who must be misled for the action to constitute unprofessional conduct, and the answer is the public, of course, not other attorneys. The attorneys who complained about the advertising in the present case were encouraged to be guardians of the integrity of their profession by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bates and subsequent cases for the very reason that the public is often unsophisticated in evaluating the accuracy of statements made in profes*587sional advertising. Certainly, the corporation executive would not be likely, without further knowledge or investigation, to contact the lawyers with the taximeter or bound wrists for legal services, but the less informed person in need of legal advice or services, such as discussed in Bates, might very well be attracted due to the misleading qualities of the ads.
The ads were placed in The Milwaukee Journal and the Milwaukee Sentinal with statewide circulation and yet the professed purpose was to attract clients in the Milwaukee area where the law office was located. The material of the ads was supposedly directed to urban residents, but it reached all readers of the papers. However, the major claims contained in the advertising had to do with offices of attorneys located in high overhead areas of downtown Milwaukee complete with their alleged extravagance and overstuffed chairs. The total idea presented is misleading and calls upon prejudices that may be held by consumers. Prejudice is not based on facts, but relies on all-inclusive characterizations being made about a group due to the isolated actions of a few.
As anyone with specific knowledge of the practice of law knows, attorneys’ fees are not “mostly” set at an hourly rate as indicated in the ad. That is only one fee method. There are various ways of setting fees, depending on the particular nature of the work and the client involved:
(1) flat fee,
(2) contingency fee,
(3) hourly rate,
(4) pro bono.
The amount an attorney charges also depends on training, knowledge, time and expertise, and those considerations are necessarily involved in determining the method of fee computation appropriate to the case.
*588The advertising attorneys in this case variously applied the fee charge appropriate to the nature of the case the same as those described above.
The ads in this case state the “minute you walk into their office the meter starts to run. And since the wheels of justice can turn exceedingly slow, your bill can start to spiral fast.” In one misleading statement two prejudices are appealed to; first, justice in this prospective client’s case will be the one where “justice can turn exceeding slow,” and, secondly, the same client’s case will automatically be subject to an hourly charge. This is a misleading and deceptive statement without any realistic or proven basis in fact. This deception is furthered by the large picture of a taximeter, which is not related to the practice of law, but rather to a common commercial experience of consumers. The appeal is crass, misleading and unprofessional and should be censured.
Lawyers do not “traditionally charge by the hour.” Some lawyers may do so for certain cases, but the ad uses the all-inclusive term of “lawyers,” and this creates an inaccurate and misleading impression.
The ad opines that “the high cost of justice today is anything but just.” This is misleading, since the total text of the ad suggests attorneys’ fees are the sole cause of the high cost, if such “unjust” expenses even exist. There is no empirical justification for this accusation; it denigrates the legal profession, and it is misleading.
The ad suggests a saving of one-half and more as an average. There is no justification for this statement, and verification of the figure is impossible. It is a misleading statement and a simplistic appeal to the unsophisticated consumers of legal services who possess a natural desire to shop for the best bargain. However, since it is a claim without substance, it is an emotional and deceptive ploy.
Finally, the ad suggests the client’s biggest legal problem may be the client’s lawyer. This also is a prejudice-*589oriented statement which is misleading and without foundation.
The other ad, picturing bound wrists, is sensationalistic and attention-getting, but more importantly, it is also unprofessional.
This ad also refers to the overhead of attorneys as being “out of sight.” That statement is particularly misleading when applied generally to attorneys throughout the state, and not just to the “downtown firm” referred to in the ad.
The claim is also made that the volume of cases of “most lawyers” is low. Such a foundationless generalization cannot be made without being deceptive and misleading to the consumer.
To refer to the "extravagance of client entertainment” and “fancy desks and the overstuffed chairs” is again an appeal to prejudice. It is posited without any established knowledge, and is inflammatorily and deceptively unprofessional.
The concern in this case is not how the firm treated the matter in terms of fee once the client was in the office, but rather whether the ads were deceptive and misleading in attracting the client to the office.
The attorneys in this case have by their advertising diminished the professionalism of the practice of law. Their crass commercialism, if uncensured, negates the high level of professionalism which has been established through years of efforts and which is still practiced by the vast majority of attorneys.
Without a doubt, professional pride and integrity are the hallmarks which distinguish the true lawyer from one who merely practices law. A truly professional lawyer has a compelling sense of pride in the profession and a demanding, uncompromising sense of 'integrity.
The standards to be applied to attorney advertising are presently uncertain and without previously established *590definition, and, therefore, the advertising in this case should not serve the example of acceptable, though minimally permissible conduct. The profession of law in its relationship to the public deserves higher standards.
Since the test of fairness has now been added to the standards, the ads under consideration in this case would certainly be unethical. I do find, however, that these ads were misleading and deceptive and, therefore, unprofessional under the code as it existed at that time.
I am authorized to state that Mr. JUSTICE WILLIAM G. CALLOW and Mr. JUSTICE LOUIS J. CECI join in this dissent.