Court Opinion

ID: 9386929
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-14 05:04:34.684786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:09.793930
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                           COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                    UNPUBLISHED
In re T. STRICKLAND-MILLER, Minor.                                  April 13, 2023

                                                                    No. 362593
                                                                    Kent Circuit Court
                                                                    Family Division
                                                                    LC No. 21-050441-NA

Before: SHAPIRO, P.J., and REDFORD and YATES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

      Respondent-father appeals the trial court’s order assuming jurisdiction of the minor child,
TS. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we reverse.

                                       I. BACKGROUND

        When TS was born in March 2021, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)
petitioned the trial court to remove the child from the mother,1 who was previously investigated
regarding the death of her first child. At the mother’s request, the trial court ordered that TS be
placed with the mother’s godmother. Initially, the mother named another man as TS’s putative
father, but as of August 2021, the trial court listed TS’s father as unknown. Meanwhile, respondent
maintained that he was TS’s biological father and requested a paternity test. In February 2022,
DNA test results revealed that TS was indeed respondent’s biological son. Just a few days later,
however, respondent was arrested and lodged in jail; he remained incarcerated pending various
felony charges.

        In May 2022, the trial court began listing respondent as TS’s legal father in court orders.
That same month, DHHS filed a supplemental removal petition with the trial court as to
respondent. The petition noted that TS was already in placement with “fictive kin” and sought
jurisdiction over TS with respect to respondent under MCL 712A.2(b)(1). The petition noted that
respondent was in jail facing criminal charges and alleged that he had not provided the names of
any appropriate relatives who could care for TS. At the adjudication hearing, respondent

1
 The mother entered a plea of admission to the removal petition. Because the mother is not a
party to this appeal, “respondent” as used in this opinion refers to respondent-father.

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challenged this allegation, arguing that he provided names of three family members who were
willing and able to provide proper care for TS. A foster care supervisor testified that she believed
that two of the family members were inappropriate for placement. She acknowledged, however,
that not one of the recommended family members was afforded a full, licensing assessment
because of TS’s court-ordered placement with mother’s fictive kin. The trial court found by a
preponderance of the evidence that the allegations in the petition were true and came within the
provisions of MCL 712A.2b.

                                            II. ANALYSIS

       Respondent argues that the trial court erred when it assumed jurisdiction over TS because
TS had proper care and custody at the time the supplemental petition was filed. We agree.2

        Child-protective proceedings take place in two phases: an adjudicative phase and a
dispositional phase. In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394, 404; 852 NW2d 524 (2014). In the adjudicative
phase, a trial court determines whether it can assert jurisdiction over a child. Id. “While the
adjudicative phase is only the first step in child protective proceedings, it is of critical importance
because the procedures used in adjudicative hearings protect the parents from the risk of erroneous
deprivation of their parental rights.” Id. at 405-406 (quotation marks, citation, and brackets
omitted). “The adjudication divests the parent of her constitutional right to parent her child and
gives the state that authority instead.” In re Ferranti, 504 Mich 1, 16; 934 NW2d 610 (2019). The
petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that one or more
statutory grounds for jurisdiction exist. Id. at 15. Because MCL 712A.2 “speaks in the present
tense,” the trial court must assess the statutory grounds on the basis of “the child’s situation at the
time the petition was filed.” In re MU, 264 Mich App 270, 279; 690 NW2d 495 (2004).

       In this case, the supplemental petition sought jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(1), which
provides that a trial court may exercise jurisdiction regarding a child

                [w]hose parent or other person legally responsible for the care and
        maintenance of the juvenile, when able to do so, neglects or refuses to provide
        proper or necessary support, education, medical, surgical, or other care necessary
        for his or her health or morals, who is subject to a substantial risk of harm to his or
        her mental well-being, who is abandoned by his or her parents, guardian, or other
        custodian, or who is without proper custody or guardianship. [MCL 712A.2(b)(1).]

        Respondent first argues that the trial court erred by assuming jurisdiction on the basis that
TS was without proper custody or guardianship. As an initial matter, we note that the box for
“lack of proper custody or guardianship” is not check-marked in the order of adjudication as one
of the jurisdictional grounds relied on by the trial court. In any event, it is well settled that a parent
can provide “proper care and custody” for a child through placement with an appropriate and

2
  We review for clear error a trial court’s decision to exercise jurisdiction in a child-protective
proceeding. In re BZ, 264 Mich App 286, 295; 690 NW2d 505 (2004). A trial court’s finding is
clearly erroneous if this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made.
See In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 152; 782 NW2d 747 (2010).

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willing relative. See In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 161 n 11; 782 NW2d 747 (2010); In re Sanders,
495 Mich at 421. Further, MCL 712A.2(b)(1)(C) provides that “ ‘[w]ithout proper custody or
guardianship’ does not mean a parent has placed the juvenile with another person who is legally
responsible for the care and maintenance of the juvenile and who is able to and does provide the
juvenile with proper care and maintenance.” In this case, the supplemental petition explained that
TS was placed under the care of fictive kin as previously ordered by the trial court. There was no
allegation, or evidence presented to show, that the fictive kin’s care and custody of TS was
improper. To the contrary, it was reported that the caregiver was meeting all of TS’s needs and
that TS was “progressing very well.” Accordingly, we agree with respondent that there was no
basis to assume jurisdiction for lack of proper custody or guardianship.

        Respondent next argues that the trial court erred when it found that respondent neglected
or refused to provide proper support for TS. The corresponding allegation in the supplemental
petition asserted that respondent “has not provided an appropriate relative to provide care and
custody of [TS] at this time.” This allegation correctly recognizes that a parent can provide proper
care through placement with a relative, as noted. However, it is not entirely clear why respondent
needed to offer possible relative placements when TS was already placed with an appropriate
caregiver per court order. Setting that aside, for the reasons discussed below, DHHS did not prove
the petition allegation regarding relative placement by a preponderance of the evidence.

         The adjudication hearing took place just months after respondent learned that TS was his
biological child. The evidence showed that, despite his inability to care for TS while in jail,
respondent provided information regarding three immediate family members whom he believed
were appropriate and willing to provide that care. DHHS did not produce evidence to demonstrate
that the relatives were not appropriate for placement. Indeed, the foster care supervisor
acknowledged at the hearing that the agency’s licensing unit did not fully pursue that determination
because of the trial court’s order placing TS with the mother’s fictive kin. The trial court found
that respondent provided at least two names, that his mother was not deemed suitable, and that no
investigation regarding his sister was completed. But the trial court’s next statement included its
conclusion that “the petition has been proven as required by a preponderance of the evidence.” As
it related to the relative-placement allegation, however, the trial court’s conclusion was clearly
erroneous given the incomplete investigation into the relative placement options offered by
respondent. Therefore, the trial court clearly erred when it found by a preponderance of the
evidence that it could exercise jurisdiction with respect to respondent on the basis that he had not
provided proper care for TS.

        We also note that, according to the order of adjudication, the trial court determined that it
could assume jurisdiction because TS was “subject to substantial risk of harm to his or her mental
well-being . . . .” MCL 712A.2(b)(1). However, there was no evidence to this effect presented at
the adjudication hearing, and there were no petition allegations relating to the young child’s mental
health. Accordingly, it was clear error for the trial court to assume jurisdiction on this basis.

       Finally, the trial court sua sponte assumed jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(2) on the
basis that the child’s “home or environment, by reason of neglect, cruelty, drunkenness,
criminality, or depravity on the part of a parent, guardian, nonparent adult, or other custodian, is
an unfit place for the juvenile to live in . . . .” This case is factually similar to In re Long, 326
Mich App 455; 927 NW2d 724 (2018). In that case, child-protective proceedings were initiated

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against the mother and a then-unknown father; the respondent-father later established paternity but
was incarcerated. Id. at 458. With respect to the father, the trial court exercised jurisdiction, in
part, under MCL 712A.2(b)(2) on the basis of an unfit home. Id. at 462. However, no allegation
was made that the home the child was living in at the time—the legal guardian’s home—was unfit.
Id. Because the child’s home was not “an unfit place for the juvenile to live in,” we held that the
trial court clearly erred when it exercised jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(2). Id. (quotation
marks omitted).

         This holding applies to this case. At the time the petition was filed, TS was living with
fictive kin per court order. There was no allegation that TS’s home was unfit, and the record shows
that the caregiver was meeting TS’s needs. Accordingly, the trial court clearly erred by assuming
jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(2). See also In the Matter of Curry, 113 Mich App 821, 827,
830; 318 NW2d 567 (1982) (holding that the trial court erred by assuming jurisdiction when both
parents were in prison when there was no showing that the grandparent’s home in which the
children were living was unfit).

        In sum, at the adjudication hearing the burden was on the petitioner to prove the
jurisdictional allegations. The only specific allegation relating to one of the jurisdictional grounds
was not established by a preponderance of the evidence. For the reasons discussed, the evidence
also did not support the other statutory grounds for jurisdiction relied on by the trial court in the
order of adjudication. Therefore, reversal is warranted.

        Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction.

                                                              /s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
                                                              /s/ James Robert Redford
                                                              /s/ Christopher P. Yates

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