Court Opinion

ID: 9703112
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:40:35.578847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:18.289262
License: Public Domain

NIX, Chief Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I agree with the majority that the employer was not entitled to a termination of the employee’s benefits in light of credible testimony that Appellee continued to suffer residual impairment as a result of his work-related injury. However, I must dissent from the majority’s holding that Appellee is not entitled to partial disability benefits for the reasons that follow.
In Kachinski v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Bd. (Vepco Constr. Co.), 516 Pa. 240, 532 A.2d 374 (1987), this Court set forth the requirements necessary for an employer to successfully modify the benefits of an employee. The employer must produce medical evidence of a change in the employee’s condition and must then produce evidence of a referral or referrals to an open job or jobs which the employee has been medically cleared to perform. Id. at 252, 532 A.2d at 380. The burden then shifts to the employee to show that he or she has made a good faith effort in following through on the referral(s). Id. If no job results, the employee’s benefits should continue. Id. In the instant case, the employee was receiving benefits when the employer petitioned to have them terminated. However, the employer was not able to show that the employee’s work related injury had ceased. Therefore, a termination was not appropriate, and the employer continued to bear the burden of showing job availability as required by Kachinski. The fact that Appellee sought work on his own should not relieve the employer of its responsibility to pay partial disability benefits to an employee who has not fully recovered from his or her work injury. To do so provides a disincentive to an employee who would otherwise seek out alternate employment on his or her own. Under the majority’s analysis, the instant employee would have been better off if he had not found a job. If that were the case, the employer *491would have had to continue paying total disability benefits until the employer referred the employee to a position which resulted in a job.
In Zimcosky v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Bd. (United States Steel Corp.), 118 Pa.Commw. 209, 544 A.2d 1106 (1988), Zimcosky was released to his pre-injury position after suffering a work injury; however, his position was no longer available due to a departmental shutdown. The employer failed to present any testimony regarding work availability. The court rejected the employer’s argument that it was not required to show work availability because Zimcosky was released to his pre-injury position which was unavailable due to its elimination. The court, as required by Kachinski, “impose[d] the burden of proving work availability upon [the] employer where the claimant retains some residual disability and where the employer has eliminated the job position to which the claimant was to return.” Zimcosky at 213-14, 544 A.2d at 1108.
An employee is entitled to a percentage of the difference between his average weekly wage and his earning power. Section 512 of the Act provides for the payment of partial disability benefits. 77 P.S. § 512. “The term ‘earning power,’ as used in this section, shall in no case be less than the weekly amount which the employee receives after the injury....” Id. In the instant ease, Appellee had not fully recovered from his work injury, and he returned to a position where the weekly amount he was receiving, his earning power, was less than his pre-injury average weekly wage. The majority points out that an employee’s “ ‘earning power’ can, in some cases, be more than the employee is receiving in actual wages after the injury.” Op. at 488. However, the language of section 512 sets forth the situation where one’s earning power is more than the wages one actually receives: “[I]n those cases in which the employe works fewer than five days per week for reasons not connected with or arising out of the disability resulting from the injury shall not be less than five times his actual daily wage.... ” In other words, where an employee *492chooses to work part-time when he is capable of working full-time at an available position, his earning power is what he would receive in wages if he were working full-time. The instant employee is not encompassed by this portion of section 512; therefore, his earning power is the weekly amount he receives at his new position. Because this amount is less than what he had been earning at his pre-injury position, he is entitled to the difference between these two amounts as set forth by section 512.
The majority also cites section 772 in support of its position that Appellee is not entitled to payments. However, the cited language does not contemplate the situation presently before us. Rather, it refers to an employee who has returned to a position paying wages that are at least as great as his or her pre-injury wages and who then seeks to have payments under the original award resumed. In that situation, payments will only be resumed if the employee suffers a loss of earnings due to his or her work-injury. Appellee has not returned to a position paying at least as much as his pre-injury position, nor is he attempting to have previously altered benefits reinstated; therefore, section 772 is not applicable to the instant case.
Because Appellee continues to experience a physical manifestation of his work-related injury and has not returned to a position with an earning power at least as great as his pre-injury wage, I would affirm the Commonwealth Court’s Order remanding this matter for calculation of partial disability benefits. Therefore I dissent.