Court Opinion

ID: 9781391
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:36:20.104782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:26.024474
License: Public Domain

BENHAM, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion’s conclusion that the trial court’s failure to give a requested charge on accident does not warrant reversal. Appellant made statements that he shook and hit the victim with the intent to revive her. While appellant’s actions were intentional, appellant’s statements suggest the actual result, the victim’s death, was not. Even such slight evidence warranted an instruction on accident as the defense requested. See Hudson v. State, 284 Ga. 595 (4) (669 SE2d 94) (2008); Koritta v. State, 263 Ga. 703, 704 (438 SE2d 68) (1994); Goodwin v. State, 262 Ga. 903 (427 SE2d 271) (1993); Turner v. State, 262 Ga. 359 (2) (b) (418 SE2d 52) (1992); Hill v. State, 300 Ga. App. 210 (1) (684 SE2d 356) (2009). In this case, providing the instruction was paramount because the defense of accident was appellant’s sole defense.4 Tarvestad v. State, 261 Ga. 605 (409 SE2d 513) (1991) (“The trial court must charge the jury on the defendant’s sole defense, even without a written request, if there is some evidence to support the charge.”). See also Price v. State, 289 Ga. 459 (712 SE2d 828) (2011) (citing Tarvestad, supra). Therefore, the trial court erred when it denied appellant’s request for a charge on accident.
The cases cited by the majority supporting its conclusion that the failure to give the requested instruction did not amount to reversible error are distinguishable. For example, in Phillips v. State, 247 Ga. 13 (273 SE2d 606) (1981), the defendant did not make a request for a charge on accident. We declined to decide whether the failure to give the charge was error and noted that the failure to make a request, coupled with the fact that accident was not defendant’s sole defense, would “render such possible error harmless.” Id. Similarly, the defendant in DeBerry v. State, 241 Ga. 204 (243 SE2d 864) (1978) did not request a charge on accident. In this case, appellant requested the charge on accident before the case went to the jury for deliberation. The majority urges that because the jury was instructed on malice murder and the jury convicted appellant therefore, it would not have accepted appellant’s defense of accident and, as such, the failure to give the requested charge was harmless. *6If the logic of this argument is followed, however, there would never be a reason to give an accident charge in any malice murder case under any circumstance, a result which I doubt the majority actually intends. It is not for this Court to assume that the error in failing to give a charge on accident was harmless. Goodwin v. State, supra, 262 Ga. at 903. In fact, since the evidence was sufficient, but not overwhelming, the trial court’s failure to give the charge on accident was not harmless. Hill v. State, supra, 300 Ga. App. at 213-214. Accordingly, I would reverse. Id.; Goodwin v. State, supra, 262 Ga. at 903; Price v. State, supra, 289 Ga. at 461-462. See also Turner v. State, supra, 262 Ga. at 361 (judgment reversed where trial court failed to give requested charge on accident).
Decided October 17, 2011
Reconsideration denied November 7, 2011.
Charles M. Evans, for appellant.
Tracy Graham-Lawson, District Attorney, Billy J. Dixon, Assistant District Attorney, Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Dana E. Wolk, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Hunstein and Justice Melton join in this dissent.

 The majority argues that because appellant’s counsel asked expert witnesses about other possible causes of the victim’s death, appellant had more than one defense. Such questioning, however, is not a statutory defense such as accident or misfortune, but is more akin to impeachment or challenging the credibility of the expert’s conclusions. In any event, as the majority acknowledges, we cannot be sure from the record on appeal that appellant had more than one defense because the parties’ closing arguments were not transcribed.