Court Opinion

ID: 9952788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 19:03:24.698969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:44:29.746739
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/20/24 P. v. Bibiano-Lopez CA1/5
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     A163978
 v.
 EDUARDO BIBIANO-LOPEZ,                                                  (Alameda County
           Defendant and Appellant.                                      Super. Ct. No. 20-CR-013931-B)

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     A164061
 v.
 DAVID MARTIN,                                                           (Alameda County
           Defendant and Appellant.                                      Super. Ct. No. 20-CR-013931-A)

         Codefendants Eduardo Bibiano-Lopez and David Martin bring a
consolidated appeal from final judgment after being convicted of first degree
murder and sentenced to 25 years to life in prison. Codefendants jointly
contend (1) they received ineffective assistance of counsel when defense
counsel failed to move to strike expert testimony regarding the victim’s cause
of death and failed to object to testimony from an investigating officer
suggesting Bibiano-Lopez lied during his interview and (2) there is no
substantial evidence that they committed the murder. In addition, defendant
Martin contends (1) his due process rights were violated by a trial court order

                                                               1
requiring trial participants to wear face coverings to protect against the
spread of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) and (2) the trial court erred
by admitting fingerprint comparison evidence because it was scientifically
unreliable and more prejudicial than probative. We affirm.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
        On March 11, 2021, an information was filed charging codefendants
and Armando Sanchez1 with the murder of Jose Magdaleno Lechuga (victim)
(Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)).2 A joint trial began in June of 2021.
I.      Murder Evidence.
        A.    The victim is found bound, bloody and wrapped head to
              toe in duct tape.
        The victim lived in an apartment in Oakland. On November 13, 2018,
at 7:30 p.m. or 8 p.m., the victim’s son, J.L., visited his father at his father’s
apartment to pick up a heater. J.L. did not stay long since the victim was
getting ready for bed.
        The next day, J.L. called the victim around 10 a.m. to ask whether he
wanted to get together for a meal, as the pair did most days. The victim did
not answer his phone, despite J.L.’s repeated calling. Finally, J.L. became
worried and went to the victim’s apartment. After knocking repeatedly on
the door and driving around the neighborhood looking for the victim,3 J.L.
called a locksmith to unlock the apartment. The locksmith arrived about
4 p.m. J.L. used a crowbar to open the outer security door, and the locksmith
then picked the lock on the inside door.

        1 Sanchez was acquitted and is mentioned only where relevant to this

appeal.
        2 Unless otherwise stated, all statutory citations herein are to the Penal

Code.
        3 The victim’s car was in the apartment complex’s parking lot.

                                         2
      When the men entered, they immediately saw the victim’s body lying
on its back just inside the front door with duct tape wrapped around its legs,
chest and head. The locksmith ran away and called 911 while J.L. screamed,
“ ‘Dad, Dad.’ ” J.L. then retrieved a kitchen knife to cut some of the duct tape
off of the victim’s face, in a futile effort to enable him to breathe. Yet, the
victim was already dead.
      Paramedics and police began to arrive. The first responder, a
paramedic, found the victim’s body wrapped “from the head to the toe” in
duct tape. His arms were duct taped to his body, his hands were duct taped
together at the wrist, and his legs were duct taped above the knees and at the
ankles with the pants pulled down. Also, the body was lying in a pool of
blood and bound with rope.
      Officers noted the victim’s apartment appeared to have been the subject
of a “messy search” by multiple people, with cabinets and drawers opened,
the mattress overturned, and the toilet tank removed from the back of the
toilet. Officers also observed cleaning supplies near the body, an opened
package of nylon rope with the receipt still inside and a container of protein
powder. They found $1,500 in cash in an envelope in a cabinet, a digital
scale, and other items typically used to package and sell drugs in a trashcan.
      The victim’s neighbors reported hearing noises from the apartment the
previous evening that sounded like furniture being moved around. One
neighbor reported seeing a dark-colored Honda or Toyota that he did not
recognize in the parking lot. This neighbor saw an unknown male who,
similar to Bibiano-Lopez, appeared to be Hispanic, muscular and around six
feet tall. According to the neighbors, this male entered the car and drove
away with a woman who appeared pregnant.

                                         3
      B.        The Police Investigation.
      Officer Jose Barocio led the investigation. He suspected narcotics
played a role based on the presence in the victim’s apartment of a digital
scale, plastic wrappers, and $1,500 in cash. Officer Barocio speculated the
ransacked state of the apartment was consistent with people looking for
money or drugs. Officer Barocio later learned the victim was a police
informant in narcotics trafficking cases and was himself a narcotics
trafficker.
      Officer Barocio obtained surveillance video from the home improvement
store identified on the receipt found inside the plastic package that had
contained nylon rope. This video showed Bibiano-Lopez and Sanchez
purchasing the rope on November 12, 2018, two days before the victim was
discovered dead.
      An examiner with the Oakland Police Department’s crime laboratory
developed latent prints taken from various objects in the victim’s apartment.
Fingerprint expert Rebecca Coutant then examined and compared those
latent prints with reference fingerprints taken from each codefendant.
Through a process of identification known as ACE-V,4 Coutant found 12
fingerprints that matched Bibiano-Lopez’s reference fingerprints, including
seven on the protein powder container and lid, one on duct tape affixed to the
victim’s body, one on the plastic package that had contained nylon rope, and
three on the receipt and booklet found inside the package. Coutant found six
fingerprints matching Martin’s reference fingerprints, including three on
duct tape affixed to the victim’s body, one on a bottle of cleaning solution

      4 ACE-V is an acronym for analysis, comparison, evaluation, and

verification.

                                        4
found on a living room table, and two on the plastic package that had
contained the nylon rope.
        DNA testing was also conducted on various items found in the victim’s
apartment. Codefendants were excluded as DNA contributors to DNA taken
from a variety of items, including a water bottle, 60-plus pieces of duct tape,
and the rope. DNA expert Helena Wong noted, however, that the victim’s
DNA overwhelmed that of any different individual.
        C.    Bibiano-Lopez is arrested.
        On June 18, 2019, Bibiano-Lopez was pulled over in a traffic stop for
having no license plates while driving a dark blue Toyota Camry with a
young woman as his passenger. After initially cooperating, Bibiano-Lopez
fled the traffic stop at a speed of 50 to 60 miles per hour while one of the
officers was conducting a file check. The officers did not give chase because it
would have violated the department’s safety policy.
        Bibiano-Lopez was ultimately arrested on July 30, 2019, after the crime
laboratory identified him as a possible suspect based on the department’s
fingerprinting analysis. That same day, Officer Barocio interviewed
Bibiano-Lopez. Bibiano-Lopez initially denied knowing the victim but
eventually admitted the men were well acquainted, having spent time
together at a bar near the victim’s apartment as well as at the victim’s
apartment.
        D.    Martin is arrested.
        On October 20, 2020, Officer Barocio arrested Martin based on the
crime laboratory’s identification of his fingerprint on a piece of duct tape.
When officers searched Martin’s residence, they found a roll of black duct
tape.

                                        5
II.     The Verdicts, Sentences and Appeals.
        On August 10, 2021, the jury found codefendants guilty of first degree
murder. On October 22, 2021, the trial court sentenced codefendants to a
prison term of 25 years to life. Each timely appealed.
                                 DISCUSSION
        Codefendants jointly contend (1) they received ineffective assistance of
counsel when the defense failed to move to strike expert testimony relating to
the victim’s cause of death and failed to object to Officer Barocio’s testimony
that Bibiano-Lopez lied during his interview and (2) there is no substantial
evidence that they committed the murder. Defendant Martin alone contends
(1) his rights to confront witnesses and to a fair trial were violated by the
trial court’s order requiring trial participants to wear face coverings and
(2) the trial court erred by admitting fingerprint comparison evidence without
holding a hearing to assess its scientific reliability and because it was
significantly more prejudicial than probative. We address each argument
post.
I.      No Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
        We turn first to codefendants’ claims of ineffective assistance based on
defense counsel’s failure (1) to move to strike expert testimony relating to the
victim’s cause of death and (2) to object to officer testimony suggesting
Bibiano-Lopez lied. “To prevail on this claim, defendant must show, among
other things, that his ‘counsel’s performance was deficient, in that it fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms.’ [Citation.] In evaluating his claim, we ‘defer[] to counsel’s
reasonable tactical decisions’ and presume that ‘counsel acted within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance.’ [Citation.] Thus,
defendant ‘ “must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances,

                                         6
the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ” ’
[Citations.] His burden in this regard ‘is difficult to carry’ in this case,
because this is a direct appeal and the record does not disclose the reason for
counsel’s failure to object. [Citation.] For those reasons, we may reverse
‘only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical
purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason
and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory
explanation.’ ” (People v. Arredondo (2019) 8 Cal.5th 694, 711.)
Codefendants have not met this high standard. Simply put, their defense
was that someone else killed the victim. As such, there are several rational
explanations for the challenged omissions by counsel.
      A.    Failure to Move to Strike Expert Testimony.
      Dr. Thomas Rogers, a physician and forensic pathologist, testified
regarding the victim’s cause of death based on his review of an autopsy report
and documentation prepared by Dr. Melinik, who was unavailable for trial.
Dr. Rogers was present at the victim’s autopsy, but he was involved in
another matter and did not participate.5 Dr. Rogers nonetheless opined that
the victim died of asphyxia caused by suffocation and strangulation due to
the duct tape that covered his mouth, nose and neck. Dr. Rogers also opined
the victim suffered several nonfatal injuries, including blunt trauma and
bruises and lacerations to the head, neck, arms, hands, and leg. However,
Dr. Rogers acknowledged that he did not know whether the victim was
conscious when duct taped or the order in which the victim received his
injuries.

      5 Dr. Rogers acknowledged having no memory of being present for the

autopsy, although his presence was noted in Dr. Melinik’s autopsy report.

                                         7
      Following Dr. Rogers’s testimony, defense counsel advised the trial
court that they intended to move to strike Dr. Rogers’s testimony. However,
counsel made no such motion—which codefendants now label as a violation of
their constitutional right to effective legal assistance. They reason that
Dr. Rogers’s testimony violated California law by relating case-specific
hearsay from Dr. Melinik’s autopsy report to support his opinion about the
victim’s cause of death. (See People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665
(Sanchez).) This argument fails.
      Hearsay is “evidence of a statement that was made other than by a
witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth
of the matter stated.” (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) Hearsay evidence is
generally inadmissible unless it satisfies a statutory exception. (Id., § 1200,
subd. (b).)
      “Documents like letters, reports, and memoranda are often hearsay
because they are prepared by a person outside the courtroom and are usually
offered to prove the truth of the information they contain.” (Sanchez, supra,
63 Cal.4th at p. 674.) Thus, because Dr. Rogers did not perform the victim’s
autopsy, under Sanchez, he could not relate to the jury any observations
recorded in Dr. Melinik’s report if they were offered to prove their truth.
(Ibid.) While experts such as Dr. Rogers may rely on hearsay to form their
own independent opinions, they may not “ ‘relate as true case-specific facts
asserted in hearsay statements, unless they are independently proven by
competent evidence or are covered by a hearsay exception.’ (Sanchez, at p.
686.)” (People v. Turner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 786, 821.)6

      6 As the California Supreme Court recently explained:     “Some prior
cases had allowed experts to relate case-specific facts on the theory that the
material was not offered for its truth, but merely to show the basis of the
expert’s opinion. Sanchez pointed out the flaw in this logic: ‘When an expert

                                       8
      According to codefendants, when Dr. Rogers related facts to the jury as
true regarding the cause of the victim’s death—to wit, suffocation and
strangulation caused by duct tape wrapped around his head and neck—he
related case-specific hearsay from the otherwise inadmissible autopsy report,
which violated Sanchez.
      However, even if we were to agree with this argument, error in the
admission of hearsay requires reversal of the judgment only if “ ‘it is
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the [defendant] would
have been reached in the absence of the error.’ ” (People v. Watson (1956) 46
Cal.2d 818, 837; People v. Turner, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 823.) Here, it is not
reasonably probable that allowing Dr. Rogers to introduce case-specific
hearsay from the autopsy report regarding the cause of the victim’s death
affected the jury verdicts because there was no question the victim was
murdered; the question was who murdered him. (People v. Turner, supra, 10
Cal.5th at p. 821; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.) Defense
counsel could thus have reasonably decided against moving to strike
Dr. Rogers’s testimony to avoid prompting the prosecution to offer additional
evidence relating to the harm suffered by the victim as a result of being duct
taped—evidence that would have been gruesome, emotionally charged, and,
yet, not necessary to prove codefendants’ theory that they were not involved
in the victim’s death.

relies on hearsay to provide case-specific facts, considers the statements as
true, and relates them to the jury as a reliable basis for the expert’s opinion,
it cannot logically be asserted that the hearsay content is not offered for its
truth. In such a case, “the validity of [the expert’s] opinion ultimately turn[s]
on the truth” [citation] of the hearsay statement. If the hearsay that the
expert relies on and treats as true is not true, an important basis for the
opinion is lacking.’ (Sanchez, at pp. 682–683, italics omitted.)” (People v.
Turner, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 821.)

                                        9
      Indeed, when the victim’s body was discovered on November 14, 2018,
the fact that it had been badly beaten before being wrapped “head to toe” in
duct tape was established by a wealth of other evidence—including the
firsthand observations of first responders and other witnesses who testified
at trial. (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 58 [we presume the existence of
every fact in support of the verdict that could reasonably be inferred from the
evidence].) It was also undisputed the victim, a known drug trafficker, was
alive the previous evening when his son visited him. When J.L. found the
victim’s still warm body the next day, the first thing he did was get a knife
and cut the duct tape from the victim’s mouth, in a futile effort to help him
breathe. Under these circumstances, we defer to counsel’s tactical choice not
to dispute the fact that the victim died as a result of intentional murder by
challenging Dr. Rogers’s testimony. (People v. Arredondo, supra, 8 Cal.5th at
p. 711.) Accordingly, codefendants’ challenge to counsel’s failure to move to
strike this testimony fails.
      B.    Failure to Object to Lay Opinion.
      Codefendants next contend defense counsel provided ineffective
assistance by failing to object to Officer Barocio’s response when asked during
cross-examination whether Bibiano-Lopez was uncooperative during his
interview. Specifically, Barocio answered that Bibiano-Lopez was
“uncooperative” because he failed to “disclose the truth, in my opinion.” As
codefendants note, “a witness cannot express an opinion concerning the guilt
or innocence of the defendant.” (People v. Torres (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 37,
47.) As before, their claim nonetheless fails because they cannot overcome
the legal presumption that defense counsel had a rational tactical purpose for
not objecting to Barocio’s testimony. (People v. Arredondo, supra, 8 Cal.5th at
p. 711.)

                                       10
      Initially, codefendants misconstrue the record in arguing there could be
no reasonable tactical basis for allowing Officer Barocio to opine that
Bibiano-Lopez was guilty. Officer Barocio stated that Bibiano-Lopez failed to
disclose the truth—which was accurate. In his police interview,
Bibiano-Lopez initially denied knowing the victim before he ultimately
acknowledged having spent time with him at his apartment after meeting
him at a local bar. Defense counsel could have reasonably concluded there
was no point in objecting to witness testimony that was objectively true.
      Moreover, the record reflects that, in fact, defense counsel used Officer
Barocio’s response to codefendants’ advantage. On cross-examination,
defense counsel pressed Officer Barocio on this point: “So you had made up
your mind that my client did it and you were going to get him or try to get
him to confess; am I correct?” Barocio countered, “No, I just wanted the
truth, sir.” Further, in closing arguments, defense counsel repeatedly
accused Officer Barocio of assuming Bibiano-Lopez was guilty before
completing his investigation. Thus, defense counsel used the challenged
testimony to paint Officer Barocio as inept and biased in the eyes of the
jury—a strategy that may have worked to Bibiano-Lopez’s advantage but for
the other evidence of guilt. Accordingly, codefendants’ second challenge to
defense counsel’s representation also fails.7

      7 In a related petition for writ of habeas corpus (case No. A168148),

Bibiano-Lopez raises identical claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
based on his attorney’s failure to move to strike Dr. Rogers’s testimony and to
object to Officer Barocio’s testimony suggesting that he lied. For the same
reasons set forth herein, we deny Bibiano-Lopez’s petition by separate order
filed contemporaneously with this opinion.

                                       11
II.   Substantial Evidence Supported the Jury Verdicts.
      Codefendants next argue the evidence was insufficient to support the
jury’s verdicts because the mere fact that their fingerprints were found at the
victim’s apartment did not prove they were present at the victim’s apartment
when he was murdered. Not so.
      “In evaluating a claim regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, we
review the record ‘in the light most favorable to the judgment below to
determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which
is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] . . .
‘The standard of review is the same in cases in which the prosecution relies
mainly on circumstantial evidence.’ [Citations.] ‘We presume in support of
the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact reasonably could
infer from the evidence.’ ” (People v. Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 713.)
      Here, the evidence sufficed to prove codefendants were guilty of first
degree murder. The jury heard from multiple eyewitnesses that the victim’s
body was discovered bound, beaten, bloody and wrapped from head to toe in
duct tape. His apartment had been ransacked. In addition to finding items
commonly associated with drug trafficking, the police found an opened
package of rope with a receipt dated November 12, 2018, still inside. The
rope was found wrapped around the victim’s body. The police used the
receipt to trace the rope to a home improvement store where they discovered
surveillance video showing Bibiano-Lopez and Sanchez purchasing it just a
day or so before the murder.
      The police also conducted a fingerprint analysis using the suspects’
known prints to match them to latent prints found on various items in the
victim’s apartment. Bibiano-Lopez’s prints, 12 in total, were found on the

                                       12
duct tape affixed to the victim’s body, the plastic package that had contained
the rope, the receipt found inside this package, and a container of protein
powder. Martin’s fingerprints (three) were also found on the duct tape
affixed to the victim’s body. The fact that these fingerprints were made
contemporaneously with the victim’s murder was established by the
surveillance video of Bibiano-Lopez and Sanchez purchasing the rope on
November 12, 2018, just before the murder.
      Additionally, the victim’s neighbors observed a muscular Hispanic man,
about six feet tall, who matched Bibiano-Lopez’s description, in the parking
lot of their apartment complex around the time of the victim’s murder. A
neighbor observed this man enter what appeared to be a dark blue or gray
Toyota when leaving the parking lot. A few months after the murder,
Bibiano-Lopez and a passenger were pulled over in a traffic stop in a blue
Toyota matching this description. Finally, after initially cooperating with the
police officers during the traffic stop, Bibiano-Lopez fled at a high rate of
speed, suggesting his guilt.
      From this collection of evidence, the jury could have reasonably
inferred codefendants were guilty of first degree murder. (People v.
Westerfield, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 713.) Nothing more was required to affirm
their convictions.8

      8 As codefendants note, the fingerprint experts testified that they could

not tell the age of a print and that fingerprints can be transferred or remain
on a surface for years if left undisturbed indoors in a temperate environment.
However, when, as here, the circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s
findings, reversal is not warranted “ ‘simply because the circumstances might
also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.’ ” (People v.
Westerfield, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 713.)

                                        13
III.      No Violation of Martin’s Constitutional Rights to
          Confrontation and a Fair Trial.
       Codefendant Martin contends his constitutional rights to confrontation
and a fair trial were violated by a trial court order requiring him, his
attorney, jurors, and witnesses to wear face coverings during trial to protect
against COVID-19. This right was further violated, Martin contends, when
the court rearranged the courtroom for social distancing purposes by placing
prospective jurors behind him and his attorney during jury selection.
According to Martin, the court’s order interfered with (1) his evaluation of
prospective jurors during jury selection, (2) his evaluation of the jurors’
conduct during trial, (3) his and the jurors’ evaluation of witnesses, and
(4) his ability to communicate effectively with counsel. When, as here, the
relevant facts are undisputed, we review a defendant’s claim under the
confrontation clause de novo. (People v. Coulthard (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th
743, 773.)
       The People respond that Martin forfeited his challenge to the court’s
order as it relates to prospective jurors during jury selection, and to himself,
his attorney9 and the jury during trial, by failing to raise an objection below.
As to the witnesses, the People dispute that the order violated Martin’s right
of confrontation or a fair trial. We agree with both contentions.
       “As a general rule, a defendant’s failure to object to an alleged trial
error relieves an appellate court of the obligation to consider the claim on
review. [Citation.] The reason for this rule is to allow the trial court to
correct its errors and ‘to prevent gamesmanship by the defense.’ [Citation.]
We have applied this rule numerous times to find forfeiture of a

       9 The court permitted counsel not to use a face covering during closing

argument so long as counsel stood behind a podium behind an acrylic
enclosure.

                                        14
constitutional right of confrontation claim. [Citations.]” (People v.
Arredondo, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 710.)
      The People correctly note that defendant never objected to the trial
court’s COVID-19 order as it applied to prospective jurors, jurors, defendant
and defendant’s attorney. Had he done so, “ ‘the trial court would have had
an opportunity to correct [any] error [in requiring masks or socially distanced
seating], or to make additional findings on the record regarding the necessity
of [these requirements] as to’ ” these individuals. In the absence of any
objection, defendant has forfeited his claim. (People v. Arredondo, supra, 8
Cal.5th at p. 710, 2d & 3d bracketed insertions added.)
      Further, as to the order requiring testifying witnesses to wear face
coverings, we find no violation of defendant’s right to confront witnesses or to
a fair trial. In making this order at a pretrial hearing on July 19, 2021, the
trial court explained to counsel that the presiding judge recently issued an
order requiring “all persons in court facilities to . . . wear allowable face
coverings . . . regardless of vaccination status.” The court acknowledged face
coverings could “inhibit the accused’s right to confront and cross-examine.”
Accordingly, the court ruled that testifying witnesses would not wear face
masks but a clear face shield with “a drape” so “the jury can see their face.”
The victim’s son, J.L., was permitted to wear a face mask after he refused on
safety grounds to wear the face shield and drape. These orders were sound.
      “The confrontation clauses of the state and federal Constitutions
guarantee defendants the right to confront the witnesses against them. (U.S.
Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) ‘The right of confrontation
“seeks ‘to ensure that the defendant is able to conduct a “personal
examination and cross-examination of the witness.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.] Via the
confrontation right, a defendant is able to compel prosecution witnesses to

                                        15
appear before the jury so their credibility may be assessed.” (People v. Wilson
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 259, 289–290.)
      However, while “the constitutional right of confrontation is important,
it is not absolute.” (People v. Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 290.) “[W]hile
‘face-to-face confrontation forms “the core of the values furthered by the
Confrontation Clause,” [citation] . . . , it is not the sine qua non of the
confrontation right.’ [Citations.] Rather, ‘ “the Confrontation Clause reflects
a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial,” [citation], a preference
that “must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the
necessities of a case.” ’ [Citations.] The face-to-face requirement can be
dispensed with, but ‘only where denial of such confrontation is necessary to
further an important public policy and only where the reliability of the
testimony is otherwise assured.’ [Citations.] This public policy exception is
not a general one; it must be applied on a case-by-case basis.” (People v.
Alvarez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 28, 35.)
      Our state courts have routinely recognized a defendant’s right to
confrontation may be forced to yield to the important public interest in
protecting trial participants from risks associated with the spread of
COVID-19, a contagious and potentially deadly disease. (E.g., People v.
Molina (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 516, 520–521 [“California courts have
repeatedly rejected constitutional challenges to the use of masks during the
COVID-19 pandemic for both defendants and testifying witnesses, citing the
important state interest in protecting the public from a contagious disease,
the lack of effective alternatives to masking, and the relatively minimal
limitation that masks have on jurors’ ability to assess witness credibility”];
People v. Edwards (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 523, 525 [“The Constitution does
not require judges to imperil public health”]; People v. Coulthard, supra, 90

                                         16
Cal.App.5th at pp. 774–775 [defendant’s constitutional right to confront
witnesses was not violated when the trial court allowed witness to testify
remotely to protect against spread of COVID-19]; People v. Kocontes (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 787, 880 [“The unprecedented global health crisis required the
trial court to balance Kocontes’s constitutional rights, the jurors’ health, and
preserving judicial resources. . . . The record reflects the court remained
appropriately focused on these compelling interests”].)
      We find particularly apt a recent decision from our colleagues in the
Second Appellate District. In People v. Alvarez, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at
page 37, our colleagues addressed and soundly rejected an argument quite
similar to Martin’s argument: “The ‘ultimate goal’ of the confrontation
clause, ensuring the reliability of evidence (Crawford v. Washington [(2004)]
541 U.S. [36,] 61), ‘is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It
commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a
particular manner: by [subjecting it to] the crucible of cross-examination’ and
other procedural safeguards. (Ibid.) Those procedural safeguards are: (1) in-
person testimony; (2) given under oath; (3) subjected to cross-examination
and (4) the ability of the defendant and fact finder to view witness demeanor
for the purpose of evaluating credibility. ([Maryland v.] Craig [(1990)] 497
U.S. [836,] 845–846 [111 L.Ed.2d 666].) The ‘combined effect’ of these
elements of confrontation ‘ensur[es] that evidence admitted against an
accused is reliable and subject to the rigorous adversarial testing that is the
norm of Anglo-American criminal proceedings.’ (Ibid.)”
      “Here, all four safeguards inherent in confrontation were present.
Witnesses testified in the solemnity of the courtroom and in the presence of
defendant, under oath, and subject to rigorous cross-examination, ‘ “ ‘the
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.’ ” ’ (Craig,

                                       17
supra, 497 U.S. at p. 846.) Although face masks covered the witnesses’
mouths and the lower part of their noses, significant aspects of their
appearance, including the eyes, tops of the cheeks, and the body, were readily
observable as was [sic] posture, tone of voice, cadence and numerous other
aspects of demeanor: ‘Demeanor includes the language of the entire body
[and] jurors will be able to observe most facets of the witnesses’ demeanor.
They can observe the witnesses from head to toe. They will be able to see
how the witnesses move when they answer a question; how the witnesses
hesitate; how fast the witnesses speak. They will be able to see the witnesses
blink or roll their eyes, make furtive glances, and tilt their heads. The
Confrontation Clause does not guarantee the right to see the witness’s lips
move or nose sniff, any more than it requires the jurors to subject the back of
a witness’s neck to a magnifying glass to see if the hair raised during
particularly probative questioning.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Alvarez, supra, 75
Cal.App.5th at p. 38.)
      We agree wholly with this reasoning and apply it here. Accordingly, we
reject defendant Martin’s constitutional challenge to the trial court’s order
adopting reasonable and necessary COVID-19 safety protocols, including face
coverings and social distancing, for the protection of all trial participants.10

      10 In challenging the court’s COVID-19 order, defendant also complains

there were impediments to the jury’s ability to hear his attorney and the
witnesses due to “issues with the microphones being either turned off,
broken, or otherwise challenging to use.” However, his argument fails to
include a reasoned analysis supported by citations to the record and the
applicable law, or any showing of prejudice. Accordingly, we decline to
address it. (Citizens for Open Government v. City of Lodi (2012) 205
Cal.App.4th 296, 311 [“An appellant’s burden to prove prejudicial error is
well established. Indeed, it is part of our state’s Constitution. Because
[appellant] has failed to carry that burden, it is not entitled to reversal on
appeal”].)

                                        18
IV.   The Fingerprint Evidence Was Properly Admitted.
      Defendant Martin’s final challenge is to the admission of expert
testimony regarding the presence of codefendants’ fingerprints at the murder
scene. We begin with the relevant facts.
      Fingerprinting expert Coutant relied on an identification process
known as ACE-V to determine whether any of the latent fingerprints taken
from the victim’s apartment matched reference prints taken from known
individuals that included codefendants. This process involved placing the
latent prints and reference prints side by side and closely comparing them to
identify “consistencies and inconsistencies within the patterns . . . .” Using
this process, Coutant found several of codefendants’ prints on items found in
the victim’s apartment, including the duct tape affixed to his body.
      On cross-examination, defense counsel attacked both Coutant’s method
and her conclusions. She conceded there was no “generally accepted
confidence” for fingerprint identifications; nor was there a set number of
similarities between a latent print and a known print required to declare a
match. Further, she relied on the crime lab examiner to take proper steps to
avoid altering the latent prints. Coutant did not subscribe to the “one
discrepancy rule” followed by some experts wherein the possibility of a match
is eliminated if any single difference between the latent and reference prints
is identified. Nor was a “blind verification” performed by a second examiner
once Coutant matched the latent prints with codefendants’ reference prints.
Finally, she acknowledged her laboratory was understaffed, which sometimes
led them to rush identifications.
      On appeal, defendant claims the trial court erred by permitting
Coutant to present the results of the ACE-V fingerprint identification process
without first holding a hearing under People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24

                                       19
(Kelly) to assess its scientific reliability. In doing so, defendant relies
primarily on a 2009 report by the National Research Council of the National
Academy of Sciences, which, according to defendant, “found that nuclear
DNA analysis was the only forensic method that had been rigorously shown
to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high degree of certainty,
identify an individual.” He also references a federal case referred to simply
as “ ‘Mayfield’ ” where a man was misidentified based on a fingerprint
comparison made using the ACE-V method. Alternatively, he contends
admission of this evidence was an abuse of discretion under Evidence Code
section 352 because the evidence was substantially more prejudicial than
probative. Both contentions fail.
      “Under the Kelly test, when expert testimony relies on ‘ “a new
scientific technique,” ’ the proponent must establish ‘that the technique is
“ ‘sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field to which it belongs’ ” (quoting Frye [v. U.S. (D.C. Cir. 1923)] 293 F.
[1013,] 1014, italics omitted).’ ([Citation]; see Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p.
30.) Reliability need not be relitigated in every case. ‘[O]nce a trial court has
admitted evidence based upon a new scientific technique, and that decision is
affirmed on appeal by a published appellate decision, the precedent so
established may control subsequent trials, at least until new evidence is
presented reflecting a change in the attitude of the scientific community.’
(Kelly, at p. 32.)” (People v. Turner, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 801.)
      The logic of Kelly is that “[j]ust as jurors may be unduly persuaded by
the ‘ “misleading aura of certainty which often envelops a new scientific
process” ’ [citation], so too might they be unduly persuaded by familiar
methods of proof that have fallen into disrepute in the relevant scientific
community. Indeed, familiar methods of proof may pose a risk of deception

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precisely because they are familiar.” (People v. Daveggio and Michaud (2018)
4 Cal.5th 790, 831–832.)
      Coutant’s fingerprint comparison opinions fall outside the scope of
Kelly because her methodology (ACE-V) is far from new and is widely
accepted by both the scientific community and our appellate courts, including
the California Supreme Court. (People v. Daveggio and Michaud, supra, 4
Cal.5th at p. 832 [defendants’ reliance “primarily on a newspaper article
reporting on the ruling of a single federal district court” is “manifestly
insufficient to warrant reconsideration of a form of evidence [to wit,
fingerprint comparison evidence] that has for many years been universally
accepted”]; In re O.D. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1007, 1008 [“the Kelly
rule is inapplicable to the ACE-V method of fingerprint comparison because,
regardless whether it is generally accepted, fingerprint comparison is not the
type of scientific technique Kelly governs since it can easily be understood by
nonexperts and is unlikely to convey a misleading aura of certainty”]; People
v. Rivas (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 967, 975–976 [following In re O.D. in holding
that fingerprint evidence based on the ACE-V methodology is “not subject to
a foundational hearing under [Kelly] because fingerprint evidence is not a
novel scientific technique and does not have a misleading aura of certainty”].)
Neither one federal case nor the 2009 report referenced by defendant—which
predates People v. Daveggio and Michaud, supra, 4 Cal.5th 790, by nearly a
decade—persuades us otherwise. The trial court did not err in refusing
defendant’s request for a Kelly hearing before permitting Coutant to testify.
      Further, admission of Coutant’s testimony was not an abuse of
discretion under Evidence Code section 352. In reviewing defendant’s claim
under this provision, we apply the abuse of discretion standard. Accordingly,
the court’s ruling will not be disturbed unless the court exercised its

                                       21
discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that
resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. (People v. Chhoun (2021) 11
Cal.5th 1, 26.) Here, this standard is not met.
      To begin with, it is beyond dispute the fingerprint comparison evidence
was highly probative of codefendants’ guilt, as it tied them to the murder
scene and, in particular, to the victim’s dead body. And, as with any highly
probative evidence of guilt, the fingerprint comparison evidence was
naturally prejudicial to codefendants. However, this is not the type of
prejudice against which Evidence Code section 352 protects. Rather,
Evidence Code section 352 protects against undue prejudice, meaning that
which “ ‘uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against a party as an
individual . . . .’ ” (People v. Robinson (2005) 37 Cal.4th 592, 632.)
Fingerprint comparison evidence is not by its nature emotionally charged.
      Finally, to the extent defendant claims it was the unreliability of this
evidence that rendered it unduly prejudicial, he had ample opportunity,
which defense counsel took advantage of, to make this point to the jury.
Among other things, Coutant acknowledged on cross-examination: (1) there
was no “generally accepted confidence” for fingerprint identifications, (2) she
did not apply the “one discrepancy rule” whereby any single difference
between the prints would have eliminated the possibility of a match, (3) her
analysis was not verified by a second examiner, and (4) her laboratory was
rushed and understaffed. And, as in any case involving fingerprint evidence,
defendant, of course, had the right to call his own witness to show the jury
where the latent and known fingerprints did not match. (People v. Rivas,
supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at pp. 978, 981 [“defendant . . . could attempt to
impeach [the fingerprint expert] by questioning her about her qualifications
and the comparison of these prints or by introducing testimony of a defense

                                        22
expert, but [her] testimony was nonetheless admissible”]; People v. Venegas
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 47, 80 [“In most . . . instances, the jurors are permitted to
rely on their own common sense and good judgment in evaluating the weight
of the evidence presented to them”].)
       Under these circumstances, the court’s admission of the fingerprint
comparison evidence was not an abuse of discretion.
                                    DISPOSITION
       The judgment as to each codefendant is affirmed.

                                               Jackson, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

Simons, J.
Burns, J.

A163978/People v. Eduardo Bibiano-Lopez
A164061/People v. David Martin

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