Court Opinion

ID: 9840264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 17:10:50.486631+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:11:39.965892
License: Public Domain

J-S22010-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 RICO JAMAR MURPHY                        :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 1091 WDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 30, 2021
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-02-CR-0010514-2014

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                       FILED: September 15, 2023

      Appellant, Rico Jamar Murphy, appeals from the March 30, 2021 order

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County that dismissed his

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

      This Court previously summarized the factual history as follows:

      On June 17, 2017, [the victim] was riding a bicycle in the
      Hazelwood section of the City of Pittsburgh[, Pennsylvania,] when
      he suffered two gunshot wounds. One shot hit him in the back
      and penetrated vertebrae. The other shot entered his stomach.
      After surgery, [the victim] had difficulty walking. He had to use a
      cane. He had very little memory of the day of the shooting. He
      testified that he never saw the shooter.

      [An eyewitness] testified that she was with her mother leaving a
      [drug] store in her mother's Ford Mustang in the Hazelwood
      section of Pittsburgh. As she and her mother were driving down
      Tecumseh Street, she looked to her left and observed [the victim]
      riding a bicycle. As she watched [the victim], she observed
      Appellant approach [the victim] and shoot [the victim] two times.
      [The eyewitness] had an unobstructed view of Appellant and
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     clearly identified him as the shooter. She saw [the victim] fall to
     the ground and [the eyewitness’] mother accelerated their
     vehicle, attempting to pursue Appellant as he fled from the scene.
     They observed Appellant flee down a pathway near the scene of
     the shooting. [The eyewitness], fearing that Appellant had a gun,
     convinced her mother to discontinue pursuit of Appellant and
     return to [the victim] to render first aid. They attended to [the
     victim] and called 911 [emergency services. The eyewitness’]
     mother talked to [the victim] in an effort to keep him calm while
     emergency personnel were en route.

     After emergency personnel arrived, [the eyewitness] was
     interviewed by the police. She informed [police] officers that she
     saw the firearm used in the shooting. She described it as blue or
     purple. She provided a description of the shooter's clothing as a
     white t-shirt [and] long black basketball shorts.        She also
     described the shooter as a skinny, tall black male wearing a hat.
     Approximately ten minutes after the police arrived and []
     apprehended Appellant, [the eyewitness] was taken to Lytle
     Street, where Appellant was [being held] in [police] custody, and
     she identified [Appellant] as the person who shot [the victim.
     Appellant] did not have a white t-shirt on at the time. He also
     was not wearing a hat. He was, however, wearing a tank top.

     Detective Douglas Butler testified that he was one of the initial
     responders to the scene. Relying on information supplied to him
     when he arrived on scene, he and two other [police] officers began
     canvassing the area looking for the shooter. As he was walking
     on Lytle Street, he was greeted by a hysterical resident claiming
     that while her two sons were playing in the back yard, a black
     male jumped her fence[,] and the black male was holding a blue
     gun. The residents ran into the house. Detective Butler, Detective
     Fetty[,] and Detective O'Dille continued to canvass the area.
     Detective Butler eventually located Appellant lying face down in
     some brush, attempting to hide from the police. Appellant told
     Detective Butler that he [discarded] the firearm. Detective Fetty,
     who responded to the scene, observed Appellant just prior to his
     apprehension. Appellant was holding an object wrapped in a white
     t-shirt. Detective Fetty observed Appellant attempting to hide the
     item and the white t-shirt under a fence. After Appellant was
     placed in custody, a blue Cobra Enterprise [0].380 caliber firearm
     wrapped in the white t-shirt was recovered from the area where
     Appellant was observed trying to hide it. Bullet casings from
     [0].380 caliber ammunition were found at the scene[,] and trial

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       testimony established that the casings were fired from the firearm
       recovered in this case.

       After Appellant was taken into custody, he was interviewed by
       Detective Timothy Rush. Appellant initially told Detective Rush
       that he did not shoot [the victim] and he was in the area of the
       shooting because he had to go to the bathroom. Appellant
       claimed he became tired and laid down in the area where he was
       arrested. He also denied shooting [the victim]. After being
       confronted with the evidence that had been developed in this case,
       Appellant advised Detective Rush that he didn't want to go back
       to prison. He also asked Detective Rush “how much time he would
       get” if he were convicted of the charges relating to this incident.

       Gun shot residue was found on Appellant's right hand, front and
       back.

Commonwealth v. Murphy, 2018 WL 5023665, at *1-*2 (Pa. Super. filed

Oct. 17, 2018) (unpublished memorandum) (citation and original brackets

omitted).

       On August 31, 2016, a jury found Appellant guilty of aggravated

assault – serious bodily injury (Count 2), aggravated assault – use of a deadly

weapon (Count 3), persons not to possess, use, manufacture, control, sell or

transfer firearms (Count 4), and recklessly endangering another person

(Count 5).1 On November 21, 2016, the trial court imposed an aggregate

sentence of 12½ to 25 years’ incarceration.2

____________________________________________

1  18 Pa.C.S.A.        §§ 2702(a)(1),          2702(a)(4),   6105(a)(1),   and   2705,
respectively.

2 Appellant was found not guilty of attempted homicide (Count 1).    Appellant
was sentenced to 10 to 20 years’ incarceration for Count 2, and for sentencing
purposes, Count 3 merged with Count 2. The trial court imposed a sentence
of 2½ to 5 years’ incarceration on Count 4 with the period of incarceration set

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       On October 17, 2018, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of

sentence.     Murphy, 2018 WL 5023665, at *1.                   On April 16, 2019, our

Supreme      Court   denied     Appellant’s    petition   for    allowance   of   appeal.

Commonwealth v. Murphy, 206 A.3d 1027 (Pa. 2019). Appellant did not

seek discretionary review by the Supreme Court of the United States. As such,

Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on July 15, 2019.                   See 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (stating, “[a] judgment becomes final at the

conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme

Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the

expiration of the time for seeking the review”); see also U.S. Sup. Ct. R.

13(1) (stating that, “A petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of a

judgment of a lower state court that is subject to discretionary review by the

state court of last resort is timely when it is filed with the Clerk within 90 days

after entry of the order denying discretionary review.”).

       On May 5, 2020, Appellant filed pro se a PCRA petition, his first. Counsel

was appointed and subsequently filed an amended PCRA petition on November

19, 2020.     The Commonwealth filed an answer to Appellant’s petition on

February 18, 2021. On February 23, 2021, the PCRA court notified Appellant

pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907 of its intent to

dismiss his petition and provided Appellant twenty days in which to file a
____________________________________________

to run consecutively to the sentence imposed on Count 2. The trial court
imposed no further penalty on Count 5. Appellant received credit for 889 days
for time served.

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response. On March 14, 2021, counsel for Appellant filed a response. On

March 30, 2021, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition.

       On March 30, 2022, Appellant filed pro se a petition to reinstate his

appellate rights nunc pro tunc, which the PCRA court properly viewed as a

second PCRA petition.3 In his pro se petition, Appellant asserted that PCRA

counsel was ineffective for failing to inform Appellant that his petition had

been denied on March 30, 2021, and for failing to file a notice of appeal. Pro

Se Petition to Reinstate Appellate Rights Nunc Pro Tunc, 3/30/22, at ¶4. On

April 6, 2022, the PCRA court appointed new counsel to represent Appellant,

and directed the Commonwealth to file a response to Appellant’s petition. The

Commonwealth filed its response on April 13, 2022.

       On April 26, 2022, the PCRA court ordered Appellant to file an amended

PCRA petition within 20 days.          Appellant filed a counseled amended PCRA

petition on June 30, 2022, again asserting that original PCRA counsel was

ineffective for failing to inform Appellant of the denial of his first PCRA petition

and for not filing a notice of appeal. Amended PCRA Petition, 4/26/22, at

12-14 (unpaginated).        The Commonwealth filed an answer to Appellant’s

amended PCRA petition on August 24, 2022, in which the Commonwealth

agreed that Appellant was entitled to collateral relief in the form of

____________________________________________

3 It is well-established that a “petition for reinstatement of PCRA appellate
rights nunc pro tunc must be considered a second (and[, often times,]
untimely) PCRA petition.” Commonwealth v. Fairiror, 809 A.2d 396, 397
(Pa. Super. 2002), appeal denied, 827 A.2d 429 (Pa. 2003).

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reinstatement of his appellate rights nunc pro tunc. On August 30, 2022, the

PCRA court granted Appellant’s petition to reinstate his appellate rights nunc

pro tunc, and provided Appellant 30 days in which to appeal the March 30,

2021 order dismissing his first PCRA petition. Appellant filed a notice of appeal

on September 20, 2022.4

       Appellant raises the following issue for our review:

       Whether the [PCRA] court erred in dismissing the amended
       [PCRA] petition filed on November 19, 2020[,] wherein it was
       asserted that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a
       [jury] instruction [pursuant to Commonwealth v. Kloiber, 106
       A.2d 820 (Pa. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 875 (1954)]?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

       Preliminarily, we consider the timeliness of Appellant’s second PCRA

petition (petition to reinstate his appellate rights nunc pro tunc) as it

implicates our jurisdictional authority to review Appellant’s claim.          See

Commonwealth v. Reid, 235 A.3d 1124, 1143 (Pa. 2020) (stating, “it is

appropriate for an appellate court to consider sua sponte the timeliness of a

PCRA petition from which nunc pro tunc appellate rights have been reinstated,

even where the Commonwealth has not separately appealed (or appeals but

then withdraws its appeal) from the order granting relief”).

       As discussed supra, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on

July 15, 2019. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Therefore, Appellant had until
____________________________________________

4 Both Appellant and the PCRA court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure 1925.

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July 16, 2020 to file a timely PCRA petition.       42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)

(stating, a PCRA petition, “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be

filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final” unless the

petitioner alleges and proves one of the three enumerated exceptions set forth

herein). Appellant filed pro se his second PCRA petition on March 30, 2022,

more than 20 months after the expiration of time in which to file a timely PCRA

petition. As such, Appellant’s second PCRA petition was patently untimely.

       If a PCRA petition is untimely filed, the jurisdictional time-bar can only

be overcome if the petitioner alleges and proves one of the three statutory

exceptions, as set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Commonwealth v.

Spotz, 171 A.3d 675, 678 (Pa. 2017). The three narrow statutory exceptions

to the one-year time-bar are as follows: “(1) interference by government

officials in the presentation of the claim; (2) newly[-]discovered facts; and (3)

an after-recognized constitutional right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51

A.3d 231, 233-234 (Pa. Super. 2012), citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii).

A petition invoking an exception to the jurisdictional time-bar must be filed

within one year of the date that the claim could have been presented.5 42

____________________________________________

5 We note that effective December 24, 2018, the time-period in which to file

a petition invoking one of the three exceptions was extended from 60 days to
one year. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). This amendment applies to claims
arising one year prior to the effective date of the amendment, i.e., December
24, 2017, or later. Act 2018, Oct. 24, P.L. 894, No. 146, § 3. Because
Appellant filed his PCRA petition on March 30, 2022, this amendment applies,
and Appellant had one year in which to file a petition that validly invoked any
of the exceptions to the PCRA’s time-bar.

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Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2) (effective Dec. 24, 2018). If a petitioner fails to invoke

a valid exception to the PCRA time-bar, courts are without jurisdiction to

review the petition and provide relief. Spotz, 171 A.3d at 676.

      It is well-established that, to invoke the newly-discovered facts

exception, the petitioner must plead and prove facts that were “unknown” to

him or her, and that he or she could not uncover such facts with the exercise

of “due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1274 (Pa.

2007); see also Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267, 1271 (Pa. 2020)

(stating that, the newly-discovered facts exception “renders a petition timely

when the petitioner establishes that the facts upon which the claim is

predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence”).            PCRA counsel’s acts or

omissions that result in a complete foreclosure of appellate review of collateral

claims   can   constitute    ineffectiveness    per   se   and    may       trigger   the

newly-discovered     facts     exception   to     the      jurisdictional     time-bar.

Commonwealth v. Hipps, 274 A.3d 1263, 1269 (Pa. Super. 2022), appeal

denied, 288 A.3d 1292 (Pa. 2022).

      In his amended (second) PCRA petition, Appellant asserted

      PCRA counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing
      to ensure [Appellant] had been informed of [the dismissal of] his
      previous PCRA[ petition] and his right to appeal. Prior to [the
      PCRA court’s Rule 907] notice of intent to dismiss, [Appellant]
      expressed to counsel his desire to file a response in the instance
      his PCRA [petition] was dismissed.            This request was
      acknowledged by PCRA counsel in a letter dated March 15, 2021,
      which informed [Appellant] of the [Rule 907 Notice.] PCRA
      counsel [] provided a copy of the letter (see Exhibit [A]) but did

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      not use certified mail or any other records to document the date
      the letter was mailed. Additionally, PCRA counsel cannot confirm
      if [Appellant] received that letter, nor any other letters.

      PCRA counsel’s only other correspondence with [Appellant] during
      the 30-day period to appeal was a letter dated April 3, 2021, which
      informed [Appellant] of the PCRA dismissal ([see] Exhibit B).
      PCRA counsel cannot confirm the mail date or if [Appellant]
      received the letter. PCRA counsel did not speak directly to
      [Appellant] until a [tele]phone conversation on [] June 4, 2021.
      During this conversation[, Appellant] again expressed his desire
      to appeal [the order dismissing his petition] and that he did not
      receive any information regarding [the dismissal of] his PCRA[
      petition].

Amended PCRA Petition, 4/26/22, at 12-13 (unpaginated) (extraneous

capitalization omitted).

      A review of the record demonstrates that in a March 15, 2021 letter

directed to Appellant, original PCRA counsel acknowledged Appellant

“indicated that should the [PCRA] court order a dismissal [of his petition]

following the Commonwealth’s answer[, he] would like the opportunity to file

a response.”   Id. at Exhibit A.   Original PCRA counsel promised to keep

Appellant “posted as to the [PCRA court’s] decision.” Id. In an April 3, 2021

letter directed to Appellant, original PCRA counsel provided Appellant with a

copy of the order dismissing his PCRA petition and informed Appellant that he

had 30 days in which to file a notice of appeal. Id. at Exhibit B. Current PCRA

counsel certified to the PCRA court that original PCRA counsel would testify at

an evidentiary hearing, inter alia, that original PCRA counsel mailed notice of

the dismissal of Appellant’s petition together with notice of Appellant’s right

to appeal but cannot confirm that Appellant received the notice.        Id. at

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Certification. The April 3, 2021 letter was mailed via the United States Postal

Service without confirmation of Appellant’s receipt.          See id.; see also

Amended PCRA Petition, 4/26/22, at Certification (stating, original PCRA

counsel would testify that she is unable to confirm Appellant’s notice of his

right to appeal the order dismissing his PCRA petition).            Moreover, on

December 10, 2021, Appellant sent a letter directed to the clerk of courts for

the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County requesting a copy of his

docket sheet because he “would like to see what is going on with this case.”

Pro Se Letter, 12/6/21. The record shows that original PCRA counsel failed to

properly notify Appellant of the dismissal of his PCRA petition, advise him of

his right to file a notice of appeal, ascertain his desire to pursue further action,

and confirm that Appellant received relevant notices.

      Under the circumstances, these acts and omissions by original PCRA

counsel constituted ineffectiveness per se.         As of December 10, 2021,

Appellant was unaware of the status of his case and, in particular, that his

PCRA petition had been dismissed. At some point following December 10,

2021, Appellant became aware that this first PCRA petition had been dismissed

and that the period in which to file an appeal lapsed. As such, Appellant’s

second PCRA petition filed on March 30, 2022, setting forth a claim of original

PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness per se satisfied the newly-discovered facts

exception to the jurisdiction time-bar.         Consequently, Appellant validly

invoked jurisdiction in the PCRA court to grant him collateral relief by

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reinstating his appellate rights nunc pro tunc, and we now turn to a review of

Appellant’s claim.

      Appellant’s issue raises a claim that trial counsel provided ineffective

assistance. Appellant’s Brief at 17-20. Specifically, Appellant alleges that trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the trial court provide the

jury with a Kloiber instruction, which, Appellant contends, is required “for

situations in which the [eyewitness] lacked a good opportunity to view the

perpetrator as a matter of law or where the jury could so determine[.]” Id.

at 18-20. Appellant avers that the eyewitness testified at trial that “while she

was riding as a passenger in a vehicle, she approached an intersection, looked

to the left[,] and saw [Appellant] approach and fire two [gun] shots into [the

victim from] approximately 50 feet away” and “for approximately 10 seconds”

before Appellant fled. Id. at 18. Appellant argues that “[s]uch period [of

time] and distance at least arguably compels a conclusion that [the

eyewitness] lacked a good opportunity to clearly view the perpetrator of the

attack, or, in the alternative, at least arguably would have permitted the jury

to determine that she lacked an opportunity to clearly view the perpetrator of

the attack.” Id. at 18-19. Appellant further asserts that trial counsel had no

reasonable strategy for failing to request a Kloiber instruction and, as a result

of counsel’s omission, Appellant was prejudiced when the jury found him guilty

of the aforementioned crimes. Id. at 19.

      In addressing Appellant’s issue, we are mindful of our well-settled

standard and scope of review of an order denying a PCRA petition. Proper

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appellate review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a petition is limited to an

examination of “whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the

record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988,

992 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “The PCRA court’s findings will not

be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record.”

Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations

omitted). “This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court,

and we will not disturb those findings merely because the record could support

a contrary holding.”     Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 140

(Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). In contrast, we review the PCRA court’s

legal conclusions de novo.      Commonwealth v. Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20

(Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc), appeal denied, 101 A.3d 785 (Pa. 2014).

      “It   is   well-established   that   counsel   is   presumed   effective[.]”

Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 132 (Pa. 2012), citing Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-691 (1984). To plead and prove a claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel, “a petitioner must establish: (1) that the

underlying issue has arguable merit; (2) counsel's actions lacked an

objective[ly] reasonable basis; and (3) actual prejudice resulted from

counsel's act or failure to act.” Commonwealth v. Stewart, 84 A.3d 701,

706 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc), appeal denied, 93 A.3d 463 (Pa. 2014). “A

claim of ineffectiveness will be denied if the petitioner's evidence fails to meet

any of these prongs.”     Commonwealth v. Martin, 5 A.3d 177, 183 (Pa.

2010). “In determining whether counsel's action was reasonable, we do not

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question whether there were other more logical courses of action which

counsel could have pursued[. R]ather, we must examine whether counsel's

decision[] had any reasonable basis.” Commonwealth v. Washington, 927

A.2d 586, 594 (Pa. 2007). A petitioner establishes prejudice when he or she

demonstrates “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

[acts or omissions], the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 533 (Pa. 2009).

      In dismissing Appellant’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to request a Kloiber instruction, the PCRA court stated,

      Trial counsel was not legally deficient for failing to request a
      Kloiber instruction.        [The eyewitness] clearly identified
      [Appellant].       Her opportunity to view [Appellant] was
      unobstructed and there was no evidence that she had prior
      difficulty identifying [Appellant]. She never equivocated on her
      identification of [Appellant].     There are no facts of record
      demonstrating that [the eyewitness’s] opportunity to identify
      [Appellant] was impaired.

PCRA Court Opinion, 11/29/22, at 8.

      “A Kloiber charge is appropriate where there are special identification

concerns: a witness did not have the opportunity to clearly view the

defendant, equivocated in his identification of a defendant, or had difficulty

making an identification in the past.” Commonwealth v. Reid, 99 A.3d 427,

448 (Pa. 2014). “Our case law makes clear that the need for a Kloiber charge

focuses on the ability of a witness to identify the defendant.” Id. at 115. “A

Kloiber charge is not mandatory where an eyewitness has had protracted and

unobstructed views of the defendant and consistently identified the defendant

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throughout the investigation and at trial.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 196

A.3d 130, 163 (Pa. 2018) (citation, brackets, and original quotation marks

omitted).

      At trial, the eyewitness testified as to the events surrounding the

incident as follows:

      I was with my mother. She was driving a [M]ustang. We were
      leaving the [drug store] on Second Avenue. . . . So we were
      coming down Second Avenue and made a right onto Tecumseh
      Street. We were coming over the [railroad] tracks on Tecumseh.
      There's a stop over here on the right side for oncoming traffic and
      sometimes the [traffic does not] stop.

      So I looked as we were coming over the [railroad] tracks. I looked
      and I looked to the left, and as I looked to the left at that exact
      moment, I saw this man approach.          Mr. - what's his name?
      [Appellant.] I saw him approach [the victim], and he shot [the
      victim] twice as we were watching the whole thing. [Appellant]
      held the gun up and looked at us. Saw that somebody had [seen]
      him and raced the other direction.

N.T., 8/29/16, at 46-47. The eyewitness stated that her mother was driving

slowly when she witnessed the shooting because the vehicle was navigating

across railroad tracks. Id. at 49. The eyewitness was approximately 50 feet

from where the shooting took place and close enough to distinguish the color

of the gun. Id. at 49, 68. The eyewitness described clear daylight conditions.

Id. at 51. The eyewitness testified that the victim was riding his bicycle away

from where she was located in the vehicle and Appellant was jogging towards

the victim from the victim’s rear. Id. at 52. After Appellant shot the victim,

he looked in the direction of the eyewitness for about 10 seconds before

fleeing the scene and, according to the eyewitness, that was when she was

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able to see his face. Id. at 52-53. The eyewitness described the shooter as

“an African-American male” who was “[v]ery tall and very skinny, and he was

wearing tennis shoes,” a t-shirt, long basketball shorts, and a hat. Id. at

62-63. When asked how positive she was that the Appellant was the shooter,

the eyewitness responded, “Very positive.      I am very certain.     I am very

positive. Even if he would have changed his clothes, I would recognize his

face. I looked clear[ly] at him.” Id. at 80.

      In its charge to the jury, the trial court provided the following

instructions pertinent to the eyewitness’s identification of Appellant as the

shooter:

      You also heard the testimony of [the eyewitness], who identified
      [Appellant] as the person who committed the [offenses] in this
      case. In evaluating her testimony, in addition to all the other
      instructions I have given you, you should consider the following
      factors:

      Did the witness have a good opportunity to observe the
      perpetrator of the offense? Was there sufficient lighting for her to
      make her observations? Was she close enough to this individual
      to know his facial and other physical characteristics, as well as any
      clothing he was wearing?

      Has she made prior identification of [Appellant] as the perpetrator
      of these crimes at any other proceeding? Was her identification
      positive or was it disqualified by any evidence or any
      inconsistencies? During the course of the case, did the witness
      identify anyone else as the preparator?

      In considering whether or not to accept the testimony of that
      particular witness, you should consider all of the circumstances
      under which the identifications were made.

      Furthermore, you should consider all evidence relative to the
      question who com[m]itted the crime and including the testimony

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      of any witness from which an identify or non-identify of the
      perpetrator of the crimes may be inferred.

N.T., 8/31/16, at 372-373.

      Upon review, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law in the

trial court’s denial of Appellant’s petition.   A Kloiber instruction is only

necessary “when either the witness did not have an opportunity to view the

defendant clearly, equivocated on the identification of the defendant, or has

had   difficulties   identifying   the   defendant    on   prior   occasions.”

Commonwealth v. Sanders, 42 A.3d 325, 332 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal

denied, 78 A.3d 1091 (Pa. 2013). We concur with the PCRA court, and the

record supports, that the eyewitness had an unobstructed view of Appellant

on a clear, well-lighted day when Appellant looked directly at her after

shooting the victim, the eyewitness did not equivocate in her identification of

Appellant, remarking that she as “very positive,” and no evidence was

presented that the eyewitness had difficulties identifying Appellant on prior

occasions.   The eyewitness consistently identified Appellant as the shooter

both a short time after the incident and at trial. Furthermore, trial counsel

tested the veracity of the eyewitness’s ability to identify Appellant as the

shooter during cross-examination. See N.T., 8/29/16, at 68-79. Under these

circumstances, a Kloiber instruction would not have been warranted and

Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim is without arguable merit. Moreover, in light

of the jury instructions, as stated supra, we concur with the PCRA court that

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Appellant failed to show how he was prejudiced by the lack of a Kloiber

instruction.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/15/2023

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