Court Opinion

ID: 9790839
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:00:16.128552+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:31.997711
License: Public Domain

HARTZ, Judge (Specially Concurring). I join in all of Judge Bivins’ opinion except the discussion of the impact of State v. Osborne, 111 N.M. 654, 808 P.2d 624 (1991). I do, however, concur in the certification. In my view, if “unlawfulness” is an essential element of the offense, in the ordinary meaning of that phrase, then there is no way to save the conviction — defendant is entitled to a new trial. When the jury has not been instructed on an essential element of the offense, it is beyond the power of an appellate court to affirm the conviction on the ground that the facts at trial presented no real issue on that element. For an appellate court to make that determination is to arrogate a function that belongs to the jury. Such an act by an appellate court would be the equivalent of a court’s directing a verdict of guilty with respect to an element of the offense. Yet only a jury can decide whether the facts establish each element of the offense. See Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 267, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 2421, 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (Scalia, J., concurring). I suspect that an error of this nature would require setting aside the conviction not only on direct appeal but also on collateral attack through habeas corpus proceedings. Perhaps when Osborne stated that unlawfulness is an element of the offense, it did not mean “element of the offense” in the usual sense. Perhaps “unlawfulness” is an element that must be proved only in certain circumstances. It is not at all uncommon for the state to be required to prove certain facts beyond a reasonable doubt only when the matter is raised by the defendant. See, e.g., State v. Bell, 90 N.M. 134, 560 P.2d 925 (1977) (question of whether victim was wife of defendant in rape case); State v. Lopez, 109 N.M. 578, 787 P.2d 1261 (Ct.App.1990) (intent-to-retum defense to charge of receiving stolen property); SCRA 1986, 14-5101 (uniform jury instruction on insanity defense). The absence of any reference to “unlawfulness” in SCRA 1986, 14-925, the uniform jury instruction for the elements of criminal sexual contact of a minor under thirteen, suggests that our supreme court, at least at one time, viewed lawfulness as an issue to be raised by the defendant. Yet when a fact (such as the sanity of the defendant) must be proved only when the issue is raised by the defendant, the fact is ordinarily denominated as a matter of affirmative defense. Osborne explicitly states that lawfulness is not an exception or defense. Moreover, affirmative defenses, almost by definition, can be waived by a defendant. In Osborne our supreme court held that it was error not to instruct the jury on unlawfulness even though the defendant specifically objected to an instruction on the matter. Thus, Osborne appears to use the phrase “element of the offense” in its customary sense. In short, it appears to me that Osborne compels reversal in this case and will probably require setting aside (either on direct appeal or habeas corpus) a significant portion of the convictions heretofore entered in New Mexico for criminal sexual offenses against children under thirteen. Because of the importance of the issue, however, certification to our supreme court is appropriate.