Court Opinion

ID: 9387962
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-19 15:03:46.102826+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:16.471500
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                              FOURTH DISTRICT

                             FRANCES FRIES,
                                Appellant,

                                      v.

                TIM ANDERSON and LAURA ANDERSON,
                            Appellees.

                               No. 4D22-650

                               [April 19, 2023]

  Appeal from the County Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
Beach County; Marni A. Bryson, Judge; L.T. Case No. 50-2019-SC-
019717-XXXX-SB.

  Lisa Weber of The Law Office of Lisa Weber, P.A., Boca Raton, for
appellant.

   Dara Kustler, Poinciana, for appellees.

  ON MOTIONS FOR CLARIFICATION, REHEARING, REHEARING EN
                 BANC AND CERTIFICATION

PER CURIAM.

   Appellees have filed a 62-page motion for clarification, rehearing,
rehearing en banc, and certification.

    We deny all motions and write primarily to discuss appellees’ handling
of one case, which is relevant to their motion.

   This case began with the tenants’ (appellees’) claim for the return of a
$2,500 security deposit under section 83.49, Florida Statutes (2019).
Section 83.49(3)(c) entitles the prevailing party in such litigation to recover
“court costs plus a reasonable” attorney’s fee. Appellees initiated the
lawsuit by filing a handwritten, pro se statement of claim using a form
provided by the clerk of court. That statement of claim sought $2,500 in
damages “plus costs of court.” Appellees’ attorney later entered an
appearance. Appellees never sought leave from the trial court to file an
amended statement of claim adding a request for attorney’s fees.
   Appellees prevailed in the trial court and received an award of attorney’s
fees. Appellant timely objected to the motion for fees on the ground that
fees had not been sought in a pleading. The panel opinion reversed
because appellees failed to include their claim for attorney’s fees in any
pleading.

   Much of appellees’ motion appears to confuse a party’s entitlement to
recover attorney’s fees under a contractual provision or statute with the
pleading requirement for asserting a claim for fees under Stockman v.
Downs, 573 So. 2d. 835 (Fla. 1991), and its progeny.

  We focus on the motion’s discussion of another case from this court.
On page 7 of the motion, appellees say this:

      The Panel decision directly conflicts with its established
      holding Precision Tune Auto Care, Inc. v. Radcliffe, 815 So. 2d
      708 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), that where the parties’ [sic] have
      a contractual agreement with an attorneys’ fees provision
      that defines the term “costs” as “including attorneys’
      fees”, “a general request for costs in [plaintiffs’] complaint
      [is] sufficient to raise the issue [of entitlement to
      attorneys’ fees] under Stockman.”

(Emphasis in original). Of course, the use of quotation marks around the
last phrase in the excerpt above, beginning with “a general request,”
constitutes a representation to this court that the quoted language
appeared in the Precision Tune case.

   At page 45 of the motion, appellees again discuss Precision Tune:

      This District Court in Precision Tune Auto Care v.
      Radcliffe, 815 So. 2d 708, 711 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
      addressed [the matter of pleading for attorney’s fees] and has
      well settled that a plaintiff’s general request for costs in the
      complaint is sufficient to raise the issue of entitlement to
      attorneys’ fees where the statute and/or parties’ contractual
      agreement provides that “costs” include attorneys’ fees (when
      the statute does not require specific pleading of entitlement to
      such fees).

(Emphasis in original).

   If Precision Tune held that a general request for costs in a pleading is
sufficient to plead a request for attorney’s fees, then appellees would be

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entitled to rehearing or en banc consideration of the issue, because
Precision Tune would conflict with the panel decision.

   However, Precision Tune holds no such thing. We have scoured the
opinion for the language appellees quote on page 7 of their motion, which
purports to be a direct quote from Precision Tune.

   No such language appears in that case. In fact, we said the exact
opposite: “The plaintiff’s general request for costs in their complaint was
insufficient to raise the issue under Stockman.” Precision Tune, 815 So.
2d at 711.

   Nor has our research unearthed any other Florida case containing such
language.

    Precision Tune holds that a contract with a Virginia choice of law
provision was not subject to the fee-shifting language of section 57.105(2),
Florida Statutes (1998). 815 So. 2d at 710. The case goes on to state that
“[a] claim for attorney’s fees, based on either statute or contract, must be
pled, and a ‘failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the claim.’” Id. at 711
(quoting Stockman, 573 So. 2d at 837–38). The case also points out that

      [t]he plaintiffs here were required to set forth their claim for
      attorney’s fees in a pleading. The only way for them to have
      raised the issue two weeks before trial was to obtain “leave of
      court” through a motion to amend their complaint or “by the
      written consent of the adverse party.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(a).
      At such a motion hearing, Precision could have demonstrated
      how it was prejudiced by the late amendment or argued that
      the entitlement to attorney’s fees should have run from the
      date of the motion.

Id. at 712.

   Appellees’ misrepresentation of the holding of Precision Tune exceeds
the bounds of zealous advocacy. It is the practice of this court to read the
cases cited in briefs and motions.

   While a party is not required to plead a claim for attorney’s fees with
specificity under Caufield v. Cantele, 837 So. 2d 371, 378 (Fla. 2002), a
pleading should, at the very least, contain some mention of attorney’s fees
to preserve the right to claim them. See Sheoah Highlands, Inc. v.
Daugherty, 837 So. 2d 579, 584 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (holding that a
statement in a pleading that the client had been required to retain the

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services of an attorney in the prosecution of the case and is “indebted to”
the attorney “for the same” was sufficient to preserve a claim for fees).

GROSS, LEVINE and CONNER, JJ., concur.

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