Court Opinion

ID: 9939351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 20:08:26.493586+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:40:58.054112
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Heiney, 2024-Ohio-490.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                 SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                      LUCAS COUNTY

State of Ohio                                     Court of Appeals No. L-23-1156

        Appellee                                  Trial Court No. CR0201502287

v.

Jake P. Heiney                                    DECISION AND JUDGMENT

        Appellant                                 Decided: February 9, 2024

                                            *****

        Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and
        Evy M. Jarrett, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

        Jake P. Heiney, Pro se.

                                            *****

        DUHART, J.

        {¶ 1} This case is before the court on appeal by appellant, Jake Heiney, pro se, from

the June 22, 2023 judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons

that follow, we affirm.
                                   Assignments of Error

       {¶ 2} Heiney did not separately number his assignments of error, instead listing

them all in one paragraph. We have separated them out here, and numbered them, for

ease of analysis.

             1. The trial court errored by not providing an order for the custodian

       of records (presumedly the clerk of courts) to make copies of the paper

       records and photographs of the exhibits for the record for which the state of

       Ohio (i.e., prosecutor’s office) could then review for [sic] prior to the return

       of Heiney’s property exhibits (i.e., maintaining a complete record while not

       allowing the state of Ohio (i.e., prosecutor’s office) unsupervised access to

       the original record).

             2. The trial court errored by not waiving or modifying Heiney’s court

       costs as required by law.

             3. The trial court errored by not canceling Heiney’s financial

       sanctions as required by law.

                                        Background

       {¶ 3} A thorough discussion regarding the facts of this case is set forth in State v.

Heiney, 2018-Ohio-3408, 117 N.E.3d 1034 (6th Dist.) (Hereinafter “Heiney 1”). The

following facts are relevant to this appeal.

2.
       {¶ 4} Heiney was an orthopedic surgeon who ran his own medical practice. In the

underlying criminal case against him, “the state alleged that Heiney touched two female

patients inappropriately while examining them in 2015. The state also alleged that

Heiney altered electronic medical records ‘in an attempt to provide a medical rationale

for his groping [one of the patient’s] breasts and buttocks.’” State v. Heiney, 6th Dist.

Lucas No. L-19-1115, 2020-Ohio-2761, ¶ 2 (Hereinafter “Heiney 2”).

       {¶ 5} Following a jury trial, Heiney was convicted of two counts of gross sexual

imposition, in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(1) and (C), felonies of the fourth degree, and

one count of tampering with records, in violation of R.C. 2913.42(A)(1) and (B)(1)(2)(a),

a misdemeanor of the first degree. He was sentenced to 180 days in jail and assessed a

$1,000 fine for the tampering with records charge, and sentenced to four years of

community control for the two gross sexual imposition charges, to include, inter alia, 90

days in the county work release program, 200 hours of community service, and the

payment of a fine of $2,000 for each count. He was also designated a Tier 1 sex

offender, ordered to pay costs assessed pursuant to R.C. 9.92(C), R.C. 2929.18, and R.C.

2951.021 and ordered to reimburse the state of Ohio and Lucas County for the costs of

supervision, confinement, assigned counsel, and prosecution. Heiney appealed, we

affirmed the judgment, and the Ohio Supreme Court declined further review. Heiney 1 at

¶ 181, discretionary rev. denied, 2018-Ohio-5209. Heiney filed a petition for a writ of

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certiorari, which was denied by the United States Supreme Court. Heiney v. Ohio, 140

S.Ct. 108, 205 L.Ed.2d 40 (2019).

       {¶ 6} Heiney also filed a motion for postconviction relief, which was denied, and

that denial was affirmed on appeal. Heiney 2 at ¶ 41.

       {¶ 7} On March 21, 2023, Heiney, pro se, filed a motion with the trial court

seeking release of his defense exhibits as his “sentence has been completed,” and relief

from his remaining financial sanctions1 and court costs due to a change in circumstances -

specifically that he is destitute, under federal bankruptcy protection, on Medicaid, and

has been determined to be fully disabled by the Social Security Administration. The state

opposed this motion, and on June 21, 2023, the trial court granted Heiney’s motion, in

part, allowing his request for the release of his trial exhibits “after review and scan by the

[s]tate of Ohio,” but denying Heiney’s requests regarding the financial sanctions and

court costs.

       {¶ 8} Heiney appealed.

1
  Although the trial court ordered Heiney to pay $5,000 in fines and “to reimburse the
state of Ohio and Lucas County for the costs of supervision, confinement, assigned
counsel, and prosecution,” in Heiney’s motion he only makes mention of the $5,000
fines, stating that he was “assessed $5,000 in financial sanctions.” Thus, we have
similarly limited the term “financial sanctions” to his sentenced fines.

4.
                                    Law and Analysis

                                     Return of Exhibits

       {¶ 9} Although the trial court granted Heiney’s request for the return of his

exhibits, Heiney objects to the trial court first allowing the state to have “unsupervised

access” to the original records. Heiney contends that the proper procedure would be for

the trial court to order the custodian of the records to make copies, and for those copies to

be maintained in the original record and made available for the state to review. The state

contends that this issue is moot as the exhibits at issue were already scanned and

photographed and are being held “in compliance with the local rules and the Rules of

Superintendence.” Thus, according to the state, it is not in a position to have

“unsupervised access” to the records.

       {¶ 10} In support of this argument, the state provided the court with the affidavit

of a paralegal in the Lucas County Prosecutor’s Office, who averred that upon receiving

the trial court’s judgment entry, she verified with employees of the clerk of courts that the

documentary evidence introduced by Heiney had already been scanned and his one item

of physical evidence had been photographed. She further averred that the prosecutor’s

office “will rely on the clerk to keep the records” and “does not intend to duplicate the

effort already made by the clerk’s office.”

       {¶ 11} While the paralegal’s affidavit is not part of the trial court record, the Ohio

Supreme Court has “held that an event that causes a case to become moot may be proved

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by extrinsic evidence outside the record.” Pewitt v. Lorain Corr. Inst., 64 Ohio St.3d

470, 472, 597 N.E.2d 92 (1992), citing Miner v. Witt, 82 Ohio St. 237, 92 N.E. 21 (1910).

Additionally, we note that Heiney has not objected to the affidavit and arguably has

conceded that this issue is moot as, in his reply brief, he makes no arguments regarding

this, and he merely requests that the court “vacate the lower court’s rulings on denying

relief regarding court costs and financial sanctions,” and grant affirmative relief regarding

these same court costs and financial sanctions.

       {¶ 12} After reviewing the parties’ arguments we agree this issue is moot.

Heiney’s first assignment of error is not well-taken.

                                        Court Costs

       {¶ 13} In his motion in the trial court, Heiney requested the court either waive,

suspend, or modify his remaining court costs. The trial court denied this request, in-part,

citing to State v. Taylor, 161 Ohio St.3d 319, 2020-Ohio-3514, 163 N.E.3d 486, for the

proposition that courts are not required to take into consideration a defendant’s ability to

pay when ruling on such a motion.

       {¶ 14} Heiney contends that this was error as he is now disabled and receiving

Medicaid assistance, and thus entitled to the same elimination or reduction in court costs

that a non-disabled citizen is entitled to when there is a change in circumstances. He also

maintains that the trial court got the facts wrong, and therefore any analysis undertaken

by the trial court was not based on the facts of the case. He points to his age and the

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amount he paid toward the court costs and financial sanctions prior to being determined

to be disabled as two facts the trial court got wrong, although he does not provide

evidence regarding the actual amount paid, nor does he set forth his actual age.2 Further,

based on these allegedly inaccurate facts, Heiney asserts that “it is wholly inappropriate

for the trial court to believe it has a better understanding of Heiney’s ability for

employment based on the court’s conjecture and speculation compared to that of the

Social Security Administration that made the official determination after extensive

research and careful determination that Heiney is incapable of substantial gainful

activity.” (Emphasis deleted.) Additionally, he contends that the trial court’s ruling is

based upon the trial court judge’s bias.

         {¶ 15} The state maintains that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

denying Heiney’s request regarding court costs, noting that he is “still in his 40’s and has

offered no suggestion that he suffers from a permanent disabling condition,” and

additionally points to his “intellectual acumen, as demonstrated by his advanced

professional degree and maintenance of a professional occupation for much of his adult

life.”

         {¶ 16} Pursuant to R.C. 2947.23(C), a trial court has continuing jurisdiction to

“waive, suspend, or modify the payment of the costs of prosecution * * * at the time of

2
  We note there is a document in the record that contains his date of birth, which would
have made him 48 years old at the time of the trial court’s judgment entry. The trial court
stated he was 45 years old.

7.
sentencing or at any time thereafter.” The statute “provides no explicit criteria that a

court should use in deciding whether to waive, suspend, or modify costs.” Taylor at ¶ 8.

The Ohio Supreme Court has concluded that “a trial court is not required to consider the

defendant’s ability to pay in assessing a motion to waive, suspend, or modify court costs

under R.C. 2947.23(C), though it is permitted to do so.” Id. at ¶ 16.

       {¶ 17} We review a trial court’s denial of such a motion for abuse of discretion.

State v. Macksyn, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2023CA00023, 2023-Ohio-3309, ¶ 22, citing State

v. Kelley, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2018CA00062, 2018-Ohio-5372, ¶ 19. “The term ‘abuse of

discretion’ connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court’s

attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio

St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983), quoting Steiner v. Custer, 137 Ohio St. 448, 31

N.E.2d 855 (1940).

       {¶ 18} Heiney asserts that the trial judge’s opinion was based upon her “personal

dislike of Heiney.” We note that Heiney has not provided us with any specific statement

or action made by the judge that we could consider regarding this argument. Moreover,

Heiney previously filed an affidavit of disqualification and the Ohio Supreme Court

concluded that “Heiney * * * failed to establish that [the trial court judge] is biased or

prejudiced against him or that she cannot be impartial and open-minded in his case.” In

re: Disqualification of Hon. Lori Olender, No. 23-AP-030 (April 17, 2023). Heiney has

8.
not provided any new evidence here. Therefore, we find no evidence that the trial court’s

opinion is based upon bias.

       {¶ 19} We also find that Heiney has not been treated any differently because of his

disability, and thus, has not been denied equal accommodation of relief under the

Americans with Disabilities Act or similar Ohio statute. Heiney has provided the court

with no evidence or citation to legal authority supporting his claim that “it is a common

practice to eliminate or reduce court costs for non-disabled citizens when a defendant has

a change in circumstances.”

       {¶ 20} Heiney also argues that Taylor should not apply to him as he is disabled

and receiving Medicaid assistance. However, we note that Taylor has been applied when

a defendant “received only Social Security Disability income,” and the trial court’s denial

of the defendant’s motion to waive jury costs was affirmed by the appellate court. State

v. Bolin, 4th Dist. Athens No. 21CA14, 2022-Ohio-3375, ¶ 9, 20. Heiney has cited to no

contrary law.

       {¶ 21} Regardless, the trial court did consider Heiney’s ability to pay, which

Heiney also claims was error as it was based on speculation. The trial court concluded

that Heiney “is only 45 years of age and with a medical degree, an extremely well

educated man.” The trial court also noted that while he cannot work in his chosen

profession, “many people now work exclusively from the comforts of their own home.”

Although Heiney takes issue with the finding that he can work, as he was determined by

9.
the Social Security Administration to be “incapable of substantial gainful activity,” this

finding was not controlling on the trial court. Moreover, there is no evidence in the

record that Heiney will not be able to work in the future, nor do we find that the fact that

he cannot work would require that the trial court grant his motion as the Ohio Supreme

Court has stated, in Taylor, that “‘[W]aiver of costs is permitted—but not required—if

the defendant is indigent.”’ Id at ¶ 7, quoting State v. White, 103 Ohio St.3d 580, 2004-

Ohio-5989, 817 N.E.2d 393, ¶ 14.

       {¶ 22} After reviewing the record, the parties’ arguments, and the trial court’s

order, we do not find the trial court’s failure to waive, suspend, or modify Heiney’s court

costs to be an abuse of discretion.

       {¶ 23} Accordingly, we find Heiney’s second assignment of error not well-taken.

                                      Financial Sanctions

       {¶ 24} Regarding the trial court’s denial of his request for the waiver, suspension,

or modification of his financial sanctions, Heiney maintains that the trial court

inappropriately applied Taylor, which only concerns court costs, and improperly

combined its analysis of his requests regarding court costs and financial sanction when

they should be treated separately.

       {¶ 25} Heiney argues that R.C. 2929.18(G) allows the trial court to suspend his

financial sanctions, as does R.C. 2303.23. He also asserts the trial court did not consider

his disability status when making such a determination, and that he should be treated the

10.
same as non-disabled persons who are granted relief when financial sanctions are “due

and uncollectable.” He also generally claims that the trial court’s actions “run counter to

the rules and laws as set out by the Ohio legislature, the Ohio Supreme Court, and the

U.S. Constitution,” and are “in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act Title II

and associated Ohio laws.”

       {¶ 26} The state counters that R.C. 2929.18(G) only provides for suspension, not

waiver, of financial sanctions, and that such a decision is within the trial court’s

discretion. Additionally, the state asserts that R.C. 2929.18(G) does not specify which

factors the court should consider, and that the trial court appropriately considered the

gravity of Heiney’s offenses.

       {¶ 27} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.18(G), a trial court may suspend financial sanctions

if the court finds “that an offender satisfactorily has completed all other sanctions

imposed upon the offender.” Similarly, R.C. 2303.23 states that a trial court may “direct

the clerk of the court to cancel all or part of the claim” any time to the court finds an

amount owed to the court to be due and uncollectible. As these statutes use the word

“may,” the decision is within the trial court’s discretion and we can reverse only upon a

showing of an abuse of discretion. See Bell v. Turner, 172 Ohio App.3d 238, 2007-Ohio-

3054, 874 N.E.2d 820, ¶ 14 (4th Dist.).

       {¶ 28} Here, we do not find the trial court abused its discretion. While the trial

court’s decision does not clearly separate its analysis regarding court costs from its

11.
analysis regarding financial sanctions, we do not find this to be an abuse of discretion as

each analysis can be similar to the other.

       {¶ 29} With respect to Heiney’s contention that the trial court, by considering

costs and financial sanctions together, improperly applied Taylor to its consideration of

his motion for financial sanctions, we first note that R.C. 2303.23 was discussed in

Taylor, where the court stated that R.C. 2303.23 was “merely permissive” and does “not

require consideration of ability to pay.” Taylor at ¶ 15. More to the point, this argument

is not relevant here as the trial court did consider Heiney’s argument that he was indigent

and that he has “paid everything he can spare.” The trial court commented on Heiney’s

relative youth, his education, the fact that it might be possible to work from home, and

the “seriousness of the offenses of which [he] was convicted” when it determined not to

suspend his financial sanctions. With regard to Heiney’s claims regarding being treated

similarly to nondisabled persons, as discussed above, we find he has not provided any

evidence or case law to support this claim.

       {¶ 30} As we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying

Heiney’s request with regard to his financial sanctions, we find his third assignment of

error not well-taken.

12.
                                       Conclusion

       {¶ 31} The judgment of the Lucas County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.

Pursuant to App.R. 24, Heiney is hereby ordered to pay the costs incurred on appeal.

                                                                       Judgment affirmed.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Christine E. Mayle, J.                         ____________________________
                                                       JUDGE
Myron C. Duhart, J.
                                               ____________________________
Charles E. Sulek, P.J.                                 JUDGE
CONCUR.
                                               ____________________________
                                                       JUDGE

       This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
  Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
       version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

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