Court Opinion

ID: 9946636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 22:03:34.83245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:19.903924
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (1st) 221139-U
                                            No. 1-22-1139
                                    Order filed February 29, 2024
                                                                                       Fourth Division

 NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
 limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
 ______________________________________________________________________________
                                     IN THE
                         APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                 FIRST DISTRICT
 ______________________________________________________________________________

 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                           )   Appeal from the
                                                                )   Circuit Court of
           Plaintiff-Appellee,                                  )   Cook County.
                                                                )
     v.                                                         )   No. 21 CR 1768
                                                                )
 DEEQWAN COLLINS,                                               )   Honorable
                                                                )   Charles P. Burns,
           Defendant-Appellant.                                 )   Judge, presiding.

           PRESIDING JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court.
           Justices Hoffman and Ocasio concurred in the judgment.

                                              ORDER

¶1        Held: We affirmed defendant’s sentence where the trial court neither improperly
                considered an element of the offense in aggravation nor abused its discretion in
                sentencing defendant to a prison term of seven years and six months for residential
                burglary.

¶2        Following a jury trial, defendant Deeqwan Collins was convicted of residential burglary

and sentenced to a prison term of seven years and six months. On appeal, defendant contends that

the trial court improperly considered an element of the offense in aggravation at sentencing,

erroneously considered his pretrial sentencing credit in determining the length of his sentence, and
No. 1-22-1139

imposed an excessive sentence that did not properly consider his rehabilitative potential. For the

following reasons, we affirm.

¶3     Defendant was charged with residential burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-3(a) West 2018)) for, on

or about June 4-5, 2019, knowingly and without authority entering the dwelling of Neal

Weisenburger with the intent to commit theft therein. Defendant was arrested for the offense in

January 2021.

¶4     The evidence at the April 2022 trial was that someone entered Weisenburger’s home on

the night in question while he and others were sleeping there. Weisenburger testified that, on the

morning of June 5, 2019, he noticed that his “personal electronics” (including a laptop computer,

tablet, and smartphone) that had been there in the evening were gone and an unfamiliar plastic

bottle was there. Before calling the police, Weisenburger confirmed that nobody in the home took

the electronics or left the bottle. Weisenburger did not know defendant, who did not have his

permission to be in his home or remove any items on June 5, 2019. A buccal swab from defendant

established that he was included as a possible source of the DNA from the bottle, as “the DNA

profile developed from the juice bottle is expected to occur approximately 1 in 1.2 septillion ***

unrelated individuals.” Following instructions and argument, the jury found defendant guilty of

residential burglary.

¶5     Defendant’s presentencing investigation report (PSI) stated that he was born in March 1993

and had a prior conviction for burglary in 2018, three offenses of criminal trespass in 2017, 2018,

and 2020, and retail theft under $300 in 2017. For the burglary conviction, he received two years’

of second chance probation pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.4(a) (West 2018) completed

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No. 1-22-1139

satisfactorily in 2020. Defendant received six months’ conditional discharge for one criminal

trespass offense and jail terms of 2 or 10 days for the other three convictions.

¶6     According to the PSI, defendant never knew his father, his mother used drugs throughout

his childhood, “he was a part of DCFS as a child because his mother burned his feet in a hot tub”

and she “was unfit to raise him and his siblings.” While he was manipulated and abused physically

and emotionally as a child and had no support from his parents, he had “a very good relationship

with his siblings.” Defendant completed the 11th grade but lost motivation to complete high school

when his grandmother died. He stated he had “plans on earning a GED in the future.” Other than

“odd jobs,” he worked one month as a forklift operator for $18.50 hourly. He was married with

one daughter, had “a beautiful relationship with his child,” and felt “his wife is his only supporting

relationship.” He lived with his family at the address on the PSI for about four months, they had

to leave previous lodgings due to unpaid rent, and he lived in a “rough” or violent neighborhood

but felt safe. He had no close friends, and he was not in a gang. He denied having ill health

physically or mentally and denied abusing alcohol or drugs.

¶7     At the June 2022 sentencing hearing, the State amended the PSI to add a second prior

conviction for burglary to which defendant pled guilty on the same day as the 2018 burglary

conviction already in the PSI, received the same sentence of second chance probation, and also

completed that probation satisfactorily in 2020. Defendant was on probation for the two buglaries

at the time he committed the instant offense. The State argued that defendant should receive six to

eight years in prison.

¶8     Defendant’s wife Adriannia Collins addressed the court, stating that he was a good father

to his own daughter and to his stepdaughter. She explained that defendant helped her through

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No. 1-22-1139

severe depression, his “personal upbringing, professional experiences, and academic background”

limited him to “extremely temporary and *** uncertain” odd jobs, and he was now improving

himself both financially (with an improved credit score) and spiritually. Defendant’s brother

submitted a letter describing defendant’s childhood when he was in poverty and how, after his

grandmother died, defendant became isolated until he met Adriannia, and has recovered his

purpose in life with his new family. Counsel argued that defendant made “a whole different

commitment to his life” in the interim between committing this offense in 2019 and when he was

charged, and sought the minimum sentence of four years in prison. Defendant declined to address

the court personally.

¶9     The court sentenced defendant to a prison term of seven years and six months. In imposing

sentence, the court stated that it considered statutory and non-statutory aggravating and mitigating

factors, including the support of defendant’s family, that he had a history of employment, and that

he “had less than a favorable childhood” with “domestic abuse.” The court noted that “[t]his is a

mandatory sentence. As we know residential burglary is a Class 1 felony, nonprobationable. I think

it’s a reasoning of the legislature that there should be increased penalties for someone that invades

the province of one’s home as compared to the province of one’s garage, office or even a car.”

¶ 10   The court explained that it was concerned about “a couple different things. No. 1, defendant

did that while he was on two separate probations, two separate probations for burglary. *** I’m

particularly concerned about the fact that he is on probation for burglary when he committed this

offense. He has isolated misdemeanor cases which is concerning to me, *** three separate criminal

trespasses. Also, a retail theft. Albeit that was a misdemeanor.” The court noted that on the other

hand, “his wife and his brother seem[] to paint a different picture.” The court expressly found that

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No. 1-22-1139

a sentence at the higher end of the range was inappropriate and would not properly account for the

mitigating factors but the minimum sentence was also inappropriate as the offense was committed

while defendant was on probation.

¶ 11    The court imposed a term of seven and a half years’ imprisonment. It then asked about

defendant’s pretrial detention credit. Defense counsel told the court that defendant had 248 days

on electronic monitoring and in custody, “and pursuant to the statute, which indicates with 12

hours of home confinement there is an additional 279.” The court asked “did I have him on 11

hours a day or did I have him on 24 hours a day” and then awarded “527 days time considered

served.” The mittimus reflects credit for 527 days.

¶ 12    Defendant timely filed a motion to reconsider his sentence. In the motion, he argued that

his sentence was excessive, the trial court did not consider all mitigating factors, and the court

considered in aggravation matters inherent to the offense. The court denied the motion after brief

argument. In finding the sentence “commensurate with all the factors in aggravation [and]

mitigation,” the court stated “I’m giving defendant credit for well in excess of a year and a half

that he spent walking the streets both on pretrial and on electronic home monitoring.”

¶ 13    On appeal, defendant first contends that, in imposing sentence, the trial court improperly

considered an element of the residential burglary offense in aggravation, specifically that

defendant entered a home during commission of the offense. 1 He also contends the court

erroneously considered his pretrial detention credit in determining the length of his sentence.

        1
           “A person commits residential burglary when he or she knowingly and without authority enters
or knowingly and without authority remains within the dwelling place of another, or any part thereof, with
the intent to commit therein a felony or theft.” 720 ILCS 5/19-3(a) (West 2018).

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No. 1-22-1139

¶ 14   The trial court may not consider a factor inherent in the offense in aggravation, but it is

appropriate to consider the degree and gravity of the defendant’s conduct including the threat of

harm to the public. People v. Jeffers, 2022 IL App (2d) 210236, ¶¶ 25-27 (citing People v. Saldivar,

113 Ill. 2d 256, 271-72 (1986)). The court is not required to refrain from mentioning factors that

constitute elements of the offense. Id. ¶ 24. There is a strong presumption that the court based its

sentencing determination on proper legal reasoning, and we must consider the record as a whole

rather than isolated remarks. Id. The defendant bears the burden of showing that the trial court

improperly considered in aggravation a factor inherent in the offense. Id. We review de novo

whether the court considered a factor inherent in the offense. Id. ¶ 23.

¶ 15   Here, taking the court’s sentencing remarks as a whole, it is apparent that the court was not

considering defendant’s entry into a home as an aggravating factor but merely explaining why the

legislature has imposed a higher felony class for residential burglary than for burglary. Residential

burglary is a class 1 felony punishable by 4 to 15 years’ imprisonment, while burglary of a non-

residential building is a class 2 felony punishable by 3 to 7 years’ imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/19-

1(b), 19-3(b) (West 2018); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-30(a), 5-4.5-35(a) (West 2018). The court clearly

separated the “reasoning of the legislature” in establishing the applicable sentencing range from

“[w]hat the Court is concerned about” in imposing a sentence within that range. Given this record,

we cannot say that the court considered an improper factor in imposing sentence.

¶ 16   As to defendant’s pretrial detention credit, we consider it decisive that the court imposed

its sentence of seven and a half years’ imprisonment before the topic of pretrial detention credit

was ever broached. The court’s comment in denying reconsideration about defendant “walking the

streets” may or may not indicate its displeasure with the legislature’s decision on credit as

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No. 1-22-1139

defendant argues. However, the record clearly shows the court awarded the full credit defendant

requested. The record does not show that the court abused its sentencing discretion based on this

isolated remark. See Jeffers, 2022 IL App (2d) 210236, ¶ 24.

¶ 17   Defendant also contends that his sentence is excessive.

¶ 18   The trial court has broad discretion in imposing a sentence, and its sentencing decisions

are entitled to great deference. People v. Snyder, 2011 IL 111382, ¶ 36; People v. Alexander, 239

Ill. 2d 205, 212 (2010). That is because it observed the defendant and the proceedings and is in a

superior position to consider factors such as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, moral character,

mentality, environment, habits, and age. Snyder, 2011 IL 111382, ¶ 36. We may not modify a

defendant’s sentence absent an abuse of discretion, which we find only if the sentence is greatly

at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of

the offense. People v. Webster, 2023 IL 128428, ¶¶ 21, 32. We may not substitute our judgment

for that of the trial court merely because we would weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors

differently. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 213.

¶ 19    Residential burglary is a class 1 felony punishable by 4 to 15 years’ imprisonment. 720

ILCS 19-3(b) (West 2018); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-30(a) (West 2018). Defendant’s sentence of seven

and a half years falls within this statutory range and is therefore presumed proper. Webster, 2023

IL 128428, ¶ 21.

¶ 20    Defendant does not dispute that his sentence falls within the applicable sentencing range.

Rather, he argues that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence in light of his self-rehabilitation

between the time of the offense and his arrest and his rehabilitative potential, noting his abusive

childhood, years of homelessness, and non-violent criminal history.

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No. 1-22-1139

¶ 21   “All penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with

the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. The

mandate is to balance the retributive and rehabilitative purposes of punishment. People v.

Elizondo, 2021 IL App (1st) 161699, ¶ 113. A defendant’s rehabilitative potential is not entitled

to greater weight than the seriousness of the offense, which is the most important factor in

sentencing. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 214: Elizondo, 2021 IL App (1st) 161699, ¶ 113. The trial

court is presumed to have considered any evidence in mitigation placed before it. People v. Garcia,

2023 IL App (1st) 172005, ¶ 67. It is not required to make express findings regarding a defendant's

rehabilitative potential. Elizondo, 2021 IL App (1st) 161699, ¶ 113. A sentence within the statutory

range is excessive if it was imposed without regard for the defendant’s rehabilitative potential.

People v. Elliott, 2022 IL App (1st) 192294, ¶ 58.

¶ 22   After reviewing the record, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

sentencing defendant to seven and a half years’ imprisonment. Here, the trial court had all the

mitigating factors now relied upon by defendant before it at sentencing, presented via the PSI,

counsel’s argument, and witness letters and testimony. See Garcia, 2023 IL App (1st) 172005, ¶

67 (trial court is presumed to have considered any evidence in mitigation placed before it).

Contrary to defendant’s characterization that the court “was predisposed to view [him] as

incorrigible,” it remarked more than once on the mitigating factors, including defendant’s new

family, family support, history of employment, and childhood domestic abuse, and expressly found

that those factors weighed against a higher sentence. Given this record, we cannot conclude that

the court had no regard for his self-rehabilitation and rehabilitative potential or that his sentence is

excessive. See Elliott, 2022 IL App (1st) 192294, ¶ 58. This is especially so where, as here,

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No. 1-22-1139

defendant committed a felony while on probation for another felony, a statutory aggravating factor

(730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a)(12) (West 2018)). 2

¶ 23    In conclusion, we do not find the prison term of 7½ years for residential burglary, an

offense with a sentencing range of 4 to 15 years, is greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose

of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense. Accordingly, the trial court

did not abuse its considerable sentencing discretion in the sentence, and the judgment of the court

is affirmed.

¶ 24    Affirmed.

        2
         As noted above, the PSI as supplemented at the sentencing hearing indicated that defendant had
prior convictions for burglary in 2018, for which he received concurrent sentences of probation that he did
not complete until 2020.

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