Court Opinion

ID: 9534588
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:41:14.367754+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:31:57.910165
License: Public Domain

McFarland, J.,
dissenting: The issue before us is whether or not the trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion for a new trial constitutes an abuse of judicial discretion.
Judicial discretion is abused when judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, which is another way of saying that discretion is abused only when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. If reasonable persons could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Lumbrera, 252 Kan. 54, Syl. ¶ 5, 845 P.2d 609 (1993).
*734A panel of the Kansas Court of Appeals consisting of Judges Davis, Larson, and Rulon has reviewed the record herein and unanimously concluded no abuse of judicial discretion has been shown. (Memorandum opinion filed May 22, 1992.) I agree with the panel’s conclusion.
Issues involving claims of jury misconduct are very fact specific, both as to what misconduct occurred and as to the nature of the trial, including pertinent evidentiary matters and issues involved. Therefore, in order to view the alleged jury misconduct in proper perspective, it is necessary to set forth a rather detailed account of the pertinent issues and trial evidence. Inasmuch as this is a dissenting opinion, an effort must be made riot to be unduly repetitive of that which is set forth in the majority opinion.
I agree with the majority opinion and the opinion of the Court of Appeals that the juror comment as to the child’s ability to speak Spanish and speculation of cocaine overdose constitute jury misconduct.
As noted in the majority opinion, in order to prevail the plaintiff had to prove three claims: “First, she needed to prove that Dr. Winger’s treatment of Pablo fell below the required standard of care, i.e., that Dr. Winger was negligent. Second, she had to prove the doctor’s negligence caused or substantially contributed to Pablo’s death. Third, she had to prove that she sustained damages because of Pablo’s death.”
It is uncontroverted that plaintiff sustained damages as a result of Pablo’s death, and that claim is not involved herein.
Let us look first at the first claim, that Dr. Winger was negligent. An unknown man in his mid-30’s comes to a physician’s office complaining of chest pain and numbness in his arms. Both of plaintiff’s medical experts testified that by virtue of these symptoms (especially in a new patient) heart disease had to be considered as a possible cause thereof. In order to rule cardiac problems out, Dr. Winger should have ordered an EKG test. One of the experts felt certain enzyme tests should also have been ordered. Both testified the failure to order the EKG was negligence, with one expert testifying the failure to order the enzyme testing was also negligent.
The following special questions were submitted to the jury:
*735“1. Did the procedures used by Dr. Winger in making his diagnosis and rendering care and treatment to Pablo Saucedo fall below the standard of care required of a general family practitioner in Hugoton, Kansas, or communities of similar size, under the circumstances existing?”
“2. Did Dr. Winger’s diagnosis and treatment of Pablo Saucedo, or the lack thereof, cause or substantially contribute to Pablo Saucedo’s death or lessen his chances for survival?”
The jury answered question No. 1 in the affirmative. Whether or not the child spoke Spanish was relative only in determining whether Dr. Winger conducted an adequate examination of Pablo at the doctor’s office. It had nothing to do with the issue of the cause of Pablo’s death. On the issue of whether Dr. Winger’s conduct fell below the standard care, the plaintiff prevailed. The plaintiff has the burden of proof to show prejudice. Inasmuch as she prevailed on the only claim that the comments about the child related to, I find no basis for concluding that the trial court’s refusal to grant a new trial on this ground constitutes an abuse of discretion.
Let us focus on the second claim that plaintiff had to prove— that Dr. Winger’s conduct caused or contributed to Pablo’s death. This is the claim involved in the cocaine comment.
There was no autopsy performed herein at plaintiff’s request. Accordingly, no pathologist testified as to the cause of death. Plaintiff called two physicians to establish cause of death (the same two who testified as to standard of care). The facts available to each were Pablo’s medical records compiled on the day of his death (from Dr. Winger and the local hospital). Dr. Winger diagnosed Pablo as suffering from bronchitis and gastroenteritis. Both of plaintiff’s experts agreed with this diagnosis.
It was the theory of the plaintiff that Pablo died from coronary disease, either a myocardial infarction or cardiac arrhythmia. It was defendant’s theory that Pablo died of asphyxia from inhaling vomit. There was evidence supporting each of these possible causes of death. Plaintiff’s experts did not give strong testimony on the cause of death, but for purposes herein let us assume death was from coronary disease. What evidence was there that Dr. Winger caused or contributed to Pablo’s death?
On the morning in question, Pablo went to work. He came home about 10:00 a.m. complaining of chest pains and arm numb*736ness. Pablo had no regular physician, so Pablo and his family went to Dr. Winger that morning. It was after 11:00 A.M. when Pablo was examined by Dr. Winger. The doctor’s office is a short distance from the local hospital in an adjacent or nearby building. After the consultation, Pablo was directed to walk to the hospital for a chest x-ray. This he and his family did and Dr. Winger joined them when notified the x-ray was ready. Dr. Winger looked at it, was dissatisfied with the quality of the picture, and directed that another be taken. This was done.
Pablo was sent home a little before noon. He stopped by his workplace where his paycheck was picked up and went home from there and laid down. Almost immediately, he went into convulsions, and his face turned purple. An ambulance was summoned. Despite attempts to revive him, no vital signs were exhibited. He was transported back to the hospital. Plaintiff testified that about 30 minutes had elapsed between the time they left the hospital and returned thereto. Resuscitation was attempted and Pablo was pronounced dead shortly before 1:00 p.m.
Evidence lacking in this case is significant. Neither of plaintiff’s medical experts testified Dr. Winger should have treated Pablo as a medical emergency and had him transported for immediate hospitalization. Neither faulted Dr. Winger for having the patient walk to the hospital for the x-ray. One expert testified persons having myocardial infarction have a good survival rate if hospitalized, but neither said Pablo should have been hospitalized by Dr. Winger. One expert stated an EKG takes about 10 minutes, and the enzyme test can take as little as one hour to perform.
One must keep in mind the short time frame involved herein. The evidence of Dr. Winger’s falling below the standard of professional conduct was failure to order additional tests. There was no testimony that the failure to order the test or tests caused or contributed to Pablo’s death or that, if Dr. Winger had performed properly, Pablo would have survived or been more likely to survive.
In the context of these facts, we have a juror comment that the plaintiff’s uncle was a cocaine dealer and had been with Pablo two days previous to his death and the speculation that Pablo might have died of a drug overdose. One note of explanation is *737in order here: The uncle’s having been with Pablo two days before his death came out in the evidence and was not a part of the jury misconduct.
The trial court herein characterized the cocaine statement as a “wild comment,” which was a part of the mental processes of hammering out a jury verdict that cannot seriously be considered as affecting the judgment and is not grounds for a new trial. The court found the comments of juror Bultman to be jury misconduct, but that this misconduct did not substantially affect the jury’s determination of the cause of Pablo’s death.
In affirming the judgment herein, the Court of Appeals stated:
“The district court’s ruling on this allegation came directly from the pages of Brown v. Hardin, 197 Kan. 517, 523, 419 P.2d 912 (1966), where the court said:
‘Human nature being what it is, if every wild expression of opinion made in a jury room in the throes of hammering out a verdict could be made the basis for retrial jury verdicts could seldom be preserved. Such inquiries into the validity of jury verdicts, based on mental processes of the jurors, are foreclosed in Kansas, formerly by case law, now by statute.’
“The statute to which the Brown court is referring is K.S.A. 60-441, which reads:
‘Upon an inquiry as to the validity of a verdict or an indictment no evidence shall be received to show the effect of any statement, conduct, event or condition upon the mind of a juror as influencing him or her to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the mental processes by which it was determined.’ ”
In this country great confidence is reposed in trial by jury. On the whole the system works well, and no one has devised a better system for securing justice. However, jurors are human beings and human nature being what it is, wild or “off-the-wall” statements are bound to be made during jury deliberations. For example, in a trial seeking damages for a whiplash injury, it would not be at all surprising that jurors might comment on the seriousness or lack thereof of whiplash injuries in acquaintances. If jury deliberations were tape-recorded and made available to counsel, there would doubtless be few unchallenged verdicts.
It is easy in this case to let some aspects of the facts obscure the real issues. In our health-conscious society which is constantly bombarded with health warnings, few lay people would not be alerted to a. possible heart attack problem by just hearing about *738Pablo’s complained-of chest pains and numb arms. Assuming all plaintiff’s statements as to how Dr. Winger’s examination of Pablo was conducted are true (as opposed to Dr. Winger’s versions), there is much to criticize in Dr. Winger’s actions.
Pablo Saucedo’s death was tragic. However, in order to find Dr. Winger liable therefor, the jury was properly advised it had to find Dr. Winger’s conduct caused or contributed to Pablo’s death or lessened his chance for survival. This specific question was asked of the jury. It deliberated six hours and answered the question in the negative. A “yes” answer would have had to be based upon expert testimony — evidence that was lacking herein.
I find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the motion for a new trial. The cocaine statement was a wild comment which has not been shown to have prejudiced the plaintiff’s case under the facts herein. I would affirm the district court and the Court of Appeals.
Six, J., joins the foregoing dissenting opinion.