Court Opinion

ID: 9668717
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:23:49.210522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:47.625082
License: Public Domain

TEAGUE, Judge,
concurring.
I write because I thought, at least implicitly, and in principle, the issue that the State raises in this cause, that applicant’s “affidavit” was insufficient, had been resolved when this Court refused the State’s petition for discretionary review in Owens v. State, Tex.Cr.App. No. 0376-189, May 24, 1989, rehearing denied, July 26, 1989. *98Also see Owens v. State, 763 S.W.2d 489 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1988).
It has always been my understanding since Article 11.07, V.A.C.C.P., became effective that a trial court has very limited powers under that statute. The statute clearly provides that, when it comes to jurisdiction, the trial court is acting solely on behalf of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Art. 11.07, § 2(b), supra. If the convicting court decides there are controverted, previously unresolved facts material to the legality of the applicant’s confinement, then it shall conduct a hearing; if the decision is to the contrary, it shall enter an order allowing the State to reply and shall decide which issues need to be resolved, and may hold a hearing and make findings of fact. This may also include the appointment of counsel. In either event, the clerk of the convicting court shall transmit everything to this Court, which makes the ultimate decision whether to grant or deny the application. In fact, the ultimate decision on any issue rests with this Court.
At least since September 1, 1987, when §§ 132.001,132.002, and 132.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code became effective, the Legislature of this State gave inmates of what was then denominated the Texas Department of Corrections, now the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, an alternative method to swearing to documents. Two, and only two, exceptions exist: taking an oath of office or giving an oath required to be taken before a specified official other than a notary public. Otherwise, unsworn declarations as provided in the above sections can now be used in lieu of any necessary sworn declaration, verification, oath or affidavit requirement. It is also immaterial that the legislature placed the above sections in the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Therefore, the provisions of the above sections may be used in an Art. 11.07, supra, proceeding, in lieu of any sworn declaration, verification, oath or affidavit that might be required by statute or case law.
My research to date reveals that the above came to us from the Federal system. See, for example, Liebman, 1 Federal Ha-beas Corpus Practice and Procedure, § 11.05. The reasons for such adoption should be obvious. Oftentimes, there was not a single notary public available at the particular unit. Also, the use of a notary public could become a favorite way to harass the inmate or his attorney by not being able to find the notary seal at that time. On the whole, however, notarizing legal papers was usually a nuisance to the more conscientious prison officials. Furthermore, the heading of S.B. 2451, which created sections 132.001-132.003, provides that the Act relates “to the manner in which defendants are ... released from confinement....” TEX.S.B. 245, 70th Leg., 1987 Tex.Gen.Laws 7064, 7110.
The unsworn declaration of applicant in this cause substantially complies with the above provisions. The State’s implicit contention that applicant’s petition fails to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court is totally without merit, as is the trial court’s findings of fact on this point. The trial court’s findings of fact (1) that the above sections are inapplicable to Art. 11.07, supra; (2) that a “justiciable case or controversy,” pursuant to Art. 11.07, supra, does not exist; and (3) that the trial court does not at this time have jurisdiction over the cause pursuant to Art. 11.07, supra, are also totally without merit. However, given the allegations that applicant makes, “improper admonishment and ineffective assistance of counsel,” and his support therefor, my vote is to summarily deny applicant any relief.
Therefore, I dissent to the order of this Court ordering a hearing to be held and the trial court entering new findings of fact and conclusions of law, but agree with the remainder of the opinion.