Court Opinion

ID: 9375513
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-27 23:00:13.652149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:59.438491
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     NORMAN R. STONER,                               DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         CH-1221-14-0418-W-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF                                   DATE: February 27, 2023
       TRANSPORTATION,
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           James P. Baker, Esquire, Springfield, Illinois, for the appellant.

           Russell B. Christensen, Esquire, and Mindy A. Kaiden, Esquire,
             Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review and the agency has filed a cross
     petition for review of the initial decision, which denied the appellant’s request for
     corrective action in this individual right of action (IRA) appeal . For the reasons

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                          2

     set forth below, we GRANT the petition for review and DENY the cross petition
     for review, VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the appeal to the Central
     Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                       BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant was the Division Administrator (DA) for the Illinois Division
     of the agency’s Federal Highway Administration (FHWA). Initial Appeal File
     (IAF), Tab 1 at 1, 11, Tab 18 at 24 of 38.          Historically, the Illinois Division
     did not approve the use of project labor agreements (PLAs), which are collective
     bargaining   agreements       between   procuring    organizations   (such   as   state
     departments of transportation) and labor organizations that establish the terms
     and conditions of employment for specific construction projects.          IAF, Tab 23
     at 123; Hearing Transcript, Day 1 (HT1) at 230 (testimony of the appellant). On
     February 6, 2009, President Obama signed an Executive Order that encouraged
     the use of PLAs in connection with large-scale construction projects, 2 provided
     the use was consistent with law. IAF, Tab 23 at 123-25.            Prior to the Order,
     agencies were prohibited from allowing states to require that contractors use
     PLAs on projects receiving Federal funds. Id. at 119. The Order reversed this
     prohibition. Id. at 119-20.
¶3        In July of 2009, President Obama appointed a new FHWA Administrator.
     Hearing Transcript, Day 2 (HT2) at 359 (testimony of the FHWA Administrator),
     438 (testimony of the appellant’s first-level supervisor).               The FHWA
     Administrator, Deputy Administrator, and Office of the Chief Counsel had
     authority over the agency’s review of PLAs.             HT1 at 79 (testimony of the
     appellant’s second-level supervisor). On May 7, 2010, the FHWA Administrator
     issued interim guidance on the use of PLAs.            IAF, Tab 23 at 119-22.     This

     2
       The Executive Order defined the term “large-scale construction project” as “a
     construction project where the total cost to the Federal Government is $25 million or
     more.” IAF, Tab 23 at 123.
                                                                                    3

     guidance assigned to the DAs the role of approving state use of PLAs. Id.; HT2
     at 412 (testimony of the FHWA Administrator). Under the guidance, DAs were
     to ensure that the use of a PLA for a particular project complied with all the
     requirements of Titles 23 and 49 of the U.S. Code and Code of Federal
     Regulations, including FHWA’s prohibition on one state discriminating against
     the employment of labor from any other state.     IAF, Tab 23 at 121; 23 C.F.R.
     § 635.117(b). The interim guidance also directed division offices to ensure that
     PLAs were used and structured in a manner so as to be “effective in securing
     competition,” as required by 23 U.S.C. § 112, which governs the process for
     awarding Federal-aid highway contracts. IAF, Tab 23 at 121.
¶4         In 2009 and 2010, the appellant, in coordination with FHWA’s Office of
     Chief Counsel, was responsible for reviewing and approving requests by the
     Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) to use PLAs on Federal -aid
     highway projects. IAF, Tab 1 at 11-12, Tab 18 at 28 of 38; HT1 at 81-82, 137
     (testimony of the appellant’s second-level supervisor).   Following the May 7,
     2010 interim guidance, the FHWA Administrator and Deputy Administrator
     centralized the approval process at FHWA headquarters. IAF, Tab 20 at 21; HT1
     at 239-40 (testimony of the appellant); HT2 at 360, 413-14 (testimony of the
     FHWA Administrator). Although the Illinois Division was no longer responsible
     for approving PLA requests, it continued to receive them, and the appellant
     provided recommendations and analysis regarding the requests before referring
     them to FHWA’s Deputy Administrator.            HT1 at 240-41 (testimony of
     the appellant).
¶5         The number of PLAs in Illinois increased dramatically after the PLA
     approval process was centralized, see IAF, Tab 23 at 190-99, and the appellant
     became concerned that IDOT was using PLAs to thwart competitive bidding and
     discriminate against out-of-state labor, HT1 244-48 (testimony of the appellant).
     On June 20, 2011, he met with two agents from the agency’s Office of Inspector
     General (OIG) and alleged various improprieties regarding implementing PLAs in
                                                                                     4

     Illinois. Id. at 8-9, 13 (testimony of an OIG agent), 249-51 (testimony of the
     appellant); IAF, Tab 23 at 159-63.       In particular, he alleged that State
     Government, organized labor, and the Federal Government were conspiring to use
     PLAs in Illinois to undermine competitive bidding on Federal-aid highway
     projects, as required by 23 U.S.C. § 112(a) and (b), by preventing nonunion
     companies from working on large-scale construction projects.          HT1 at 14
     (testimony of an OIG agent); IAF, Tab 1 at 13, Tab 23 at 159. He further alleged
     that PLAs were being used to prevent contractors outside the State of Illinois
     from bidding on       Federal-aid projects, effectively discriminating against
     out-of-state labor in violation of 23 C.F.R. § 635.117(b).         HT1 at 21-22
     (testimony of an OIG agent); IAF, Tab 1 at 13, Tab 23 at 160-61.
¶6         The appellant continued to provide the OIG with information during its
     investigation.   HT1 at 15 (testimony of an OIG agent), 252 (testimony of the
     appellant); IAF, Tab 45 at 77-78.     In the meantime, on July 19, 2012, the
     appellant’s second-level supervisor    informed the appellant that he was
     reassigning him to the DA position in Indiana because a change in leadership in
     Illinois was necessary due to “increasing tensions and issues” between the
     appellant and the Illinois Division’s stakeholders. IAF, Tab 18 at 28-30 of 38;
     HT1 at 107-09 (testimony of the appellant’s second-level supervisor).        The
     appellant’s second-level supervisor testified that he decided to reassign the
     appellant because of feedback the second-level supervisor received “over an
     extended period of time” from (1) the FHWA Administrator regarding FHWA’s
     “relationships with [its] partners and stakeholders in Illinois” and (2) the
     appellant’s first-level supervisor about the appellant’s “leadership style .”
     HT 108-09 (testimony of the appellant’s second-level supervisor).            The
     appellant’s request for reconsideration of this decision was unsuccessful, and he
     filed an administrative grievance of his reassignment. IAF, Tab 18 at 7-15 of 20,
     5-15 of 28, Tab 23 at 188-89.
                                                                                        5

¶7         The individual assigned by the agency as the fact-finder in connection with
     the appellant’s grievance recommended to the appellant’s second -level supervisor
     that he not reassign the appellant.    IAF, Tab 26 at 16-19.     He noted that the
     agency’s action was inconsistent with the appellant’s past performance
     evaluations, which were positive; the appellant was not provided with a formal
     opportunity to improve his perceived performance deficiencies; the decision to
     reassign him to another leadership position contradicted the stated reasons for his
     reassignment; and his reassignment may have been “politically motivated.” Id.
     On December 20, 2012, the appellant’s second-level supervisor denied the
     grievance but laterally reassigned the appellant to a position as Senior Advisor to
     the Director of Field Services North, effective January 13, 2013. IAF, Tab 18
     at 22, 30 of 38, 17-18 of 28. This position allowed the appellant to remain in
     Illinois. Id. at 22-24 of 38.
¶8         The appellant then filed a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel
     (OSC), alleging that the agency reassigned him in retaliation for his disclosures to
     the OIG. IAF, Tab 33 at 21-69. After OSC issued a close-out letter advising the
     appellant of his right to file an appeal with the Board, id. at 95-96, the appellant
     timely filed this IRA appeal, IAF, Tab 1.
¶9         On February 11, 2014, the OIG completed a report of investigation
     regarding the appellant’s allegations. IAF, Tab 45 at 74-82. Three days later, it
     issued a letter to the new FHWA Illinois DA stating that it was closing its
     investigation into the complaint, which it identified as anonymous, because the
     U.S. Department of Justice had declined to pursue any civil or criminal actions in
     connection with the matter. IAF, Tab 33 at 16-17. The OIG stated in this letter
     that “interviews and analyses were inconclusive” regarding the allegations of
     misuse of PLAs. Id. at 17. It went on to indicate that it had uncovered evidence
     that the IDOT had suspended a nonunion contractor ba sed “solely on information
     from an Illinois union rather than relying on the IDOT’s audit report, which had
     no findings.” Id.
                                                                                       6

¶10        Following a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision in
      which she found that the Board has jurisdiction o ver the appeal but denied the
      appellant’s request for corrective action.    IAF, Tab 54, Initial Decision (ID)
      at 8-11, 23. The administrative judge found that the appellant made a protected
      disclosure under the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2 012
      (WPEA), Pub. L. No. 112-199, 126 Stat. 1465; ID at 12-14, but failed to prove
      that his disclosure was a contributing factor in the decision to reassign him , ID
      at 14-19. The administrative judge further found, however, that if the appellant
      had met his burden of proving contributing factor, he would have been entitled to
      corrective action because the agency failed to prove by clear and convincing
      evidence that it would have reassigned him absent his whistleblowing activity.
      ID at 20-22.
¶11        On petition for review, the appellant challenges the administrative judge’s
      finding that he did not prove the contributing factor element of his claim.
      Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1.        In particular, he alleges that the
      administrative judge improperly credited the testimony of the agency officials
      involved in his reassignment, who denied knowledge of his disclosures.          Id.
      at 17-21.   He also argues that the administrative judge erred by treating the
      knowledge/timing test as the exclusive method for proving contr ibuting factor, id.
      at 12, and he asserts that he met the burden of proving contributing factor based
      on circumstantial evidence, id. at 13-16, 21-26. In addition, he contends that the
      administrative judge abused her discretion by denying his request to c all various
      witnesses. Id. at 26-27.
¶12        The agency has filed a response to the petition for review and a cross
      petition for review. PFR File, Tabs 3-4. It asserts that the appellant failed to
      make a protected disclosure under the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) or
      the WPEA, and it further contends that the administrative judge improperly
      applied the WPEA retroactively. PFR File, Tab 3 at 5, 11-26. The appellant has
                                                                                          7

      filed a response to the cross petition for review 3 and a reply to the agency’s
      response to the petition for review. PFR File, Tabs 6-7.

                                          ANALYSIS
      The administrative judge correctly found that the appellant’s disclosures to the
      OIG were protected.
¶13         Because the administrative judge properly concluded that jurisdiction exists
      in this matter, the appellant is required to establish a prima facie case of
      whistleblower retaliation by proving by preponderant evidence that he made a
      protected disclosure that was a contributing factor in a personnel action taken
      against him. Mastrullo v. Department of Labor, 123 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶ 12 (2015);
      see 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1). To establish that he made a protected disclosure, the
      appellant must demonstrate by preponderant evidence that he disclosed
      information that he reasonably believed evidenced a violation of law, rule, or
      regulation, gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority,
      or a substantial or specific danger to public health or safety.              5 U.S.C.
      § 2308(b)(8)(A)-(B); Mithen v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 119 M.S.P.R.
      215, ¶ 13 (2013). If the appellant makes out a prima facie case, then the agency
      is given an opportunity to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would
      have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the protected disclosure.
      5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1)-(2); Mastrullo, 123 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶ 12.
¶14         As previously noted, in its cross petition for review, the agency argues that
      the administrative judge improperly applied the WPEA retroactively. PFR File,
      Tab 3 at 5, 22-26; ID at 9-11. It further asserts that the appellant’s disclosures to
      the OIG were not protected under the prior WPA because he made them during
      the normal course of his duties. Id. at 6, 11-17. We disagree.

      3
        Given our finding below that the appellant made a protected disclosure, we need not
      address his assertion that the agency is estopped from arguing his disclosures are not
      protected. PFR File, Tab 7 at 6-7.
                                                                                         8

¶15           The WPEA was signed into law on November 27, 2012, with an effective
      date of December 27, 2012. Pub. L. No. 112-199, 126 Stat. 1465. Section 101(b)
      of the WPEA provided, as relevant here, that a disclosure made by an employee
      in the “normal course of [his] duties” was not excluded from protection if the
      employee could show that “in reprisal for the disclosure” the agency took a
      personnel action.        126 Stat. at 1466 (codified as amended at          5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(f)(2)); see Salazar v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 42,
      ¶¶ 9, 21 (concluding that the National Defense Authorization Act for 2018, Pub.
      L. No. 115-91, § 1097(c)(1)(B)(ii), 131 Stat. 1283, 1618, clarified that the
      slightly higher “in reprisal for” burden set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2) applies
      only to employees whose principle job functions are regularly investigating and
      disclosing wrongdoing).      This case is unusual in that the agency issued the
      decision reassigning the appellant to the Senior Advisor position before
      December 27, 2012, but his directed reassignment did not become effective until
      January 13, 2013. IAF, Tab 18 at 22 of 38, 17-18 of 28. However, even before
      the WPEA was enacted, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
      interpreted the WPA as protecting an employee who reports wrongdoing outside
      of normal channels. Huffman v. Office of Personnel Management, 263 F.3d 1341,
      1354 (2001), superseded by the WPEA as stated in Schoenig v. Department of
      Justice, 120 M.S.P.R. 318, ¶¶ 11-12 (2013); see Ontivero v. Department of
      Homeland Security, 117 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶¶ 16-17 (2012) (finding that an
      employee’s disclosures to agency officials in upper management were protected
      regardless of whether they were within the normal course of her duties because
      she did not make them within normal channels). Here the appellant made the
      disclosures at issue to the agency’s OIG, which was outside of normal channels.
      HT1 at 248-50 (testimony of the appellant). Therefore, the administrative judge
      properly found that the appellant’s disclosures were protected. 4 ID at 9-11.

      4
          The WPEA also expanded the Board’s IRA jurisdiction to include claims of reprisal
                                                                                             9

¶16         The agency further argues on review, as it did below, that the appellant’s
      disclosures to the OIG were not protected because he did not allege wrongdoing
      by any Federal employee or entity.         PFR File, Tab 3 at 17-19; IAF, Tab 53
      at 12-13. The administrative judge properly rejected this argument in the initial
      decision.   ID at 12-14.      Disclosures of wrongdoing by a state entity may
      constitute protected disclosures when the Federal Government’s interests and
      good name are implicated in the alleged wrongdoing. Miller v. Department of
      Homeland Security, 99 M.S.P.R. 175, ¶¶ 3, 12-13 (2005). As previously noted, in
      his disclosures, the appellant alleged that the approval process for PLA requests
      in Illinois was contrary to 23 U.S.C. § 112(a) and (b) and 23 C.F.R. § 635.117(b).
      Because FHWA was responsible for approving PLA requests, these disclosures
      implicated the legality of its actions. IAF, Tab 20 at 21.
¶17         On review, the agency also reiterates its argument from below that the
      appellant’s disclosures were not protected because they merely expressed his
      disagreement with the agency’s policy of encouraging the use of PLAs on
      Federal-aid highway projects. PFR File, Tab 3 at 19-22; IAF, Tab 53 at 14-17;
      see Webb v. Department of the Interior, 122 M.S.P.R. 248, ¶ 8 (2015) (holding
      that policy disagreements with agency decisions or actions are not protected
      unless they separately constitute a protected disclosure of one of the categories of
      wrongdoing listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)).            The administrative judge
      correctly rejected this argument in the initial decision, finding tha t the appellant’s
      objection to the PLA approval process extended beyond a belief that it was “a

      for a personnel action taken as a result of a prohibited personnel practice described in
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D). Colbert v. Department of Veterans
      Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 677, ¶ 6 (2014). Because we agree with the administrative
      judge’s finding that the appellant made protected disclosures over which the Board has
      IRA jurisdiction, we find it unnecessary to determine whether the Board alternatively
      has IRA jurisdiction over the appellant’s cooperation with the agency’s OIG, which is a
      protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C). See Colbert, 121 M.S.P.R. 677,
      ¶¶ 2, 7 (declining to give retroactive effect to the WPEA’s expanded IRA appeal rights
      over protected activities described in section 2302(b)(9)(A)(i) and (b)(9)(C) when all of
      the relevant events took place prior to the effective date of the WPEA).
                                                                                        10

      radical departure from former practice,” as argued by the agency.           ID at 14
      (quoting IAF, Tab 53 at 15); PFR File, Tab 3 at 20. Rather, as the administrative
      judge found, the appellant’s allegations concerned violations of Federal laws and
      regulations regarding the competitive bidding process. ID at 14; see 23 U.S.C.
      § 112; 23 C.F.R. § 635.117. Thus, we find no reason to disturb the administrative
      judge’s finding that the appellant met his burden of proving that his disclosures to
      the OIG were protected.

      The administrative judge correctly found that the appellant failed to prove that his
      disclosures were a contributing factor in his reassign ment under the
      knowledge/timing test.
¶18         Having found that the appellant proved by preponderant evidence that his
      disclosures to the OIG were protected, we turn to the question of whether he
      proved that they were a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to reassign
      him. A protected disclosure is a contributing factor if it in any way affects an
      agency’s decision to take a personnel action. Dorney v. Department of the Army,
      117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 14 (2012). One way to establish contributing factor is the
      knowledge/timing test. Wadhwa v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 110 M.S.P.R.
      615, ¶ 12, aff’d per curiam, 353 F. App’x 435 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Under that test,
      an appellant can prove the contributing factor element through evidence showing
      that the official taking the personnel action knew of the disclosure and that the
      personnel action occurred within a period of time such that a reasonable person
      could conclude that the disclosure was a contributing factor in the personnel
      action. Id.
¶19         An appellant also may satisfy the knowledge prong of the knowledge/timing
      test by proving that the official taking the action had constructive knowledge of
      the protected disclosure, even if the official lacked actual knowledge. Nasuti v.
      Department of State, 120 M.S.P.R. 588, ¶ 7 (2014). An appellant may establish
      constructive knowledge by showing that an individual with actual knowledge of
      the disclosure influenced the official accused of taking the retaliatory action. Id.
                                                                                          11

¶20         The appellant’s second-level supervisor testified that he decided to reassign
      the appellant based on the feedback of the appellant’s immediate supervisor and
      the FHWA Administrator.         HT1 at 110, 116 (testimony of the appellant’s
      second-level supervisor); HT2 at 439-40 (testimony of the appellant’s immediate
      supervisor). The administrative judge found credible the hearing testimony of the
      appellant’s first- and second-level supervisors and of the FHWA Administrator
      that they did not know about the appellant’s disclosure or his involvement with
      the OIG until after his reassignment. ID at 15-16; HT1 at 169 (testimony of the
      appellant’s second-level supervisor); HT2 at 421-22 (testimony of the FHWA
      Administrator), 502-03 (testimony of the appellant’s immediate supervisor).
      Applying the factors for resolving credibility issues set forth in Hillen v.
      Department of the Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987), the administrative judge
      found that these witnesses “gave unrebutted, forthright, and unequivocal
      testimony that was consistent and unambiguous regarding their lack of knowledge
      about the appellant’s OIG complaint.” ID at 15.
¶21         The appellant challenges these findings on review, reiterating his argument
      from below that these witnesses were not credible because of inconsistencies in
      their testimony.    PFR File, Tab 1 at 17-19; IAF, Tab 52 at 36-40.              More
      specifically, the appellant asserts that his second-level supervisor’s testimony that
      he   received    continuous    feedback    from    the    Administrator—concerning
      congressional and stakeholder complaints about the appellant over an extended
      period of time—is inconsistent with the Administrator’s testimony that he
      received, and passed on, only three such complaints. 5 PFR File, Tab 1 at 17-21;

      5
        The appellant also argues that his second-level supervisor contradicted himself by
      testifying at one point that he received feedback from the appellant’s immediate
      supervisor prior to making the reassignment decision, and at a different poin t that he
      did not have any discussions with her during the relevant timeframe. PFR File, Tab 1
      at 19 (citing HT1 at 110-112 (testimony of the appellant’s second-level supervisor)).
      However, our review of the testimony reveals that the appellant’s second -level
      supervisor consistently testified that he received feedback from the appellant’s
                                                                                              12

      HT1 at 86-89, 108-10 (testimony of the appellant’s second-level supervisor); HT2
      at 396-402 (testimony of the FHWA Administrator); IAF, Tab 52 at 37-38.
¶22         The administrative judge addressed this argument in the initial decision and
      found that any differences were “attributable more to the length of time between
      the events in question and the hearing, than to any attempt at deception or lack of
      forthrightness.” 6   ID at 15.   The appellant challenges this finding on review,
      arguing that it is unlikely that his second-level supervisor would “suffer a
      memory lapse” during the hearing because FHWA attorneys and human resources
      professionals previously coached the supervisor for a September 2012 meeting he
      had with the appellant to explain the reason for his reassignment.             PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 20.
¶23         The Board defers to an administrative judge’s credibility determinations
      when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on observing the demeanor of
      witnesses testifying at a hearing; the Board overturns such determinations only
      when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so. See Haebe v. Department
      of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002).             Here, the administrative
      judge’s credibility determinations were based explicitly on her observing and
      assessing the agency officials’ demeanor during the hearing. ID at 15-16. While
      the appellant disagrees with the credibility determinations, we find his challenges
      are not sufficiently sound to overturn them. The inconsistencies in the hearing
      testimony cited by the appellant do not involve the issue of whether the agency
      officials had knowledge of the appellant’s disclosure, and the appellant does not
      challenge the administrative judge’s finding that the witnesses consistently
      testified that they did not know about his disclosures. ID at 15. Thus, we agree
      with the administrative judge that the appellant did not show that his second-level

      immediate supervisor. E.g., HT1 at 83-84, 86-88, 108, 110-112, 141 (testimony of the
      appellant’s second-level supervisor).
      6
       The hearing in this case took place in June 2015, four years after the appellant’s initial
      disclosure to the OIG and almost 2½ years after his reassignment. ID at 1.
                                                                                        13

      supervisor had actual knowledge of his protected disclosures when he decided to
      reassign the appellant. ID at 16.
¶24         The administrative judge then considered whether the appellant proved
      contributing factor by showing that his second-level supervisor had constructive
      knowledge of his whistleblowing.        ID at 17-19.    The appellant argued that
      officials in the Office of the Secretary of Transportation (OST) who knew or
      should have known of his disclosures directed FHWA officials to re place him as
      Illinois DA. ID at 18; IAF, Tab 52 at 46. The administrative judge observed that,
      in support of his argument that OST officials were aware of his disclosures, the
      appellant relied on a letter to the Secretary of Transportation from a union official
      dated December 18, 2012, i.e., before the appellant’s upcoming transfer became
      public knowledge, asking the Secretary to consider IDOT’s Chief Counsel for the
      Illinois DA position. ID at 18; IAF, Tab 33 at 100-03; HT1 at 348 (testimony of
      the appellant). The administrative judge found that no reasonable person could
      conclude that OST officials had constructive knowledge of the appellant’s
      disclosures based on this letter, as it did not reference any whistleblowing
      matters. ID at 18. The administrative judge further found that it was likely that
      IDOT officials were aware that the appellant’s position could become vacant
      “long before” the letter because the appellant apparently informed IDOT in
      October 2012 that the FHWA was reviewing his effectiveness in his position, and
      he had asked his second-level supervisor to contact IDOT’s Secretary of
      Transportation about his working relationship with her. Id.
¶25         The appellant challenges this finding on review, arguing that neither he nor
      his second-level supervisor notified IDOT of his reassignment before it became
      public knowledge. PFR File, Tab 1 at 23 n.8 (citing HT1 at 116-18, 120, 156-57
      (testimony of the appellant’s second-level supervisor)). He reasons that, because
      his reassignment was not publicly known when the letter was sent, the labor
      official could have been aware of the upcoming vacancy in the Illinois DA
      position only through FHWA Headquarters or OST. PFR File, Tab 1 at 23 n.8.
                                                                                            14

¶26         This argument is unavailing. Even assuming that OST officials were aware
      of the appellant’s reassignment, he still has not shown that they were aware of his
      disclosures.   Thus, we discern no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s
      finding that the appellant failed to show that anyone in FHWA or OST had actual
      or constructive knowledge about his disclosures. ID at 18.

      We remand this appeal for further findings as to whether the appellant
      proved contributing factor notwithstanding his failure to satisfy the
      knowledge/timing test.
¶27         We next consider the appellant’s argument on review that the administrative
      judge improperly treated the knowledge/timing test as the exclusive method for
      proving contributing factor.     PFR File, Tab 1 at 12.      The agency argues that,
      absent evidence that anyone with knowledge of the appellant’s OIG disclosures
      was involved in or influenced the reassignment decision, the appellant cannot
      prove contributing factor. PFR File, Tab 4 at 19-20. Yet the knowledge/timing
      test is not the only way an appellant can establish that his protected disclosures
      were a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take a personnel action
      against him. It is the agency, not its individual officials, from whom an appellant
      seeks corrective action, and actual knowledge by a single official is not
      dispositive. See Dorney, 117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 12. An employee is not required to
      prove retaliatory motive. Rather, he “only needs to demonstrate . . . that the fact
      of, or the content of, the protected disclosure was one of the factors that tended to
      affect in any way the personnel action.” Marano v. Department of Justice, 2 F.3d
      1137, 1141, 1143 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 7        Any weight given to a whistleblowing

      7
        Historically, the Board has been bound by the precedent of the U.S. Court of Appeals
      for the Federal Circuit on these types of whistleblower issues. However, pursuant to
      the All Circuit Review Act, Pub. L. No. 115-195, 132 Stat. 1510, appellants may file
      petitions for judicial review of Board decisions in whistleblower reprisal cases with any
      circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      Therefore, we must consider these issues with the view that the appellant may seek
      review of this decision before any appropriate court of appeal.
                                                                                        15

      disclosure, either alone or in combination with other factors, can satisfy the
      contributing factor standard. Dorney, 117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 15.
¶28         The Board has held that, if an administrative judge determines that an
      appellant has failed to satisfy the knowledge/timing test, she shall consider other
      evidence, such as evidence pertaining to the strength or weakness of the agency’s
      reasons for taking the personnel action, whether the whistleblowing was
      personally directed at the proposing or deciding off icials, and whether they had a
      desire or motive to retaliate against the appellant.          Id., ¶ 15; Powers v.
      Department of the Navy, 69 M.S.P.R. 150, 156 (1995). We note that these factors
      are a nonexhaustive list of the evidence that may be relevant to a contributing
      factor determination.   See Dorney, 117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 15 (reflecting that the
      listed factors are the types of factors to be considered). The administrative judge
      did not address the alternative to the knowledge/timing test set forth in Dorney.
      ID at 14-19.
¶29         As discussed above, if the appellant makes out a prima facie case, then the
      agency is given an opportunity to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that it
      would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the protected
      disclosure.    Mastrullo, 123 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶ 12.     Although the administrative
      judge did not make findings as to whether the appellant proved contributing
      factor by means other than the knowledge/timing test, she did find that the agency
      failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have reassigned the
      appellant absent his disclosures. ID at 20-22. Specifically, she found that the
      record did not support the appellant’s second-level supervisor’s purported reasons
      for the reassignment.       ID at 21-22.     She observed that the appellant’s
      reassignment “appears to have been made for political expedience,” rather than
      for the agency’s stated reasons. ID at 22.
¶30         We note that some of the factors to be considered in assessing whether the
      agency has proven that it would have taken an action in the absence of protected
      activity are similar to those to be considered at the contributing fact or stage in a
                                                                                          16

      Dorney analysis.      See Carr v. Social Security Administration, 185 F.3d 1318,
      1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (in determining whether an agen cy has shown by clear and
      convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel action in the
      absence of whistleblowing, the Board will consider all the relevant factors,
      including the following: the strength of the agency’s evidence in support of its
      action; the existence and strength of any motive to retaliate on the part of the
      agency officials who were involved in the decision; and any evidence that the
      agency takes similar actions against employees who are not whistleblowers but
      who are otherwise similarly situated). However, the Board may not proceed to
      the clear and convincing evidence test unless it has first made a finding that the
      appellant established his prima facie case.      Clarke v. Department of Veterans
      Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 154, ¶ 19 n.10 (2014), aff’d per curiam, 623 F. App’x 1016
      (Fed. Cir. 2015). 8     Accordingly, the administrative judge should not have
      proceeded to the clear and convincing analysis without first determining whether
      the appellant proved contributing factor pursuant to Dorney, and we must vacate
      the initial decision’s findings regarding whether the agency met its burden by
      clear and convincing evidence.
¶31         Further constraining us from relying on the administrative judge’s clear and
      convincing findings in assessing the Dorney factors is the fact that the appellant,
      and not the agency, bears the burden of proving contributing factor, and that
      burden is preponderant evidence. Wadhwa, 110 M.S.P.R. 615, ¶ 12. Relying on
      the administrative judge’s now-vacated findings would effectively shift the
      burden of proof on the contributing factor element to the agency.
¶32         On review, the parties dispute the strength of the agency’s reasons for
      reassigning the appellant. PFR File, Tab 1 at 25-26, Tab 4 at 15-19, 24. The

      8
        Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit has disagreed with the Board’s
      decision in Clarke, it did so other grounds. Delgado v. Merit Systems Protection Board,
      880 F.3d 913, 923-25 (7th Cir.), as amended on denial of reh’g and reh’g en banc
      (7th Cir. 2018).
                                                                                        17

      appellant also addresses other factors he believes are relevant to a determination
      of contributing factor under Dorney. PFR File, Tab 1 at 14-17. We find that we
      are unable to resolve these issues on review.
¶33         During the hearing, the appellant’s second-level supervisor testified that he
      reassigned the appellant because the Illinois Division needed new leadership so
      that it could improve its relationship with its stakeholders. HT1 at 87-89, 107-12,
      151-52, 158 (testimony of the appellant’s second-level supervisor). The FHWA
      Administrator and the appellant’s first-level supervisor provided similar
      testimony.    The FHWA Administrator testified that the appellant was not
      sufficiently innovative or collaborative, HT2 at 406-07 (testimony of the FHWA
      Administrator), and the appellant’s first-level supervisor testified that the
      appellant was not collaborative and that his relationship with IDOT “wasn’t
      exactly where it needed to be” when he was reassigned , id. at 450-51, 462-63
      (testimony of the appellant’s first-level supervisor). The agency argues on review
      that these explanations justified its reassignment decision.       PFR File, Tab 4
      at 15-19.
¶34         As the administrative judge observed in conducting her analysis of the
      agency’s case, there is evidence undermining the agency’s rationale. ID at 22.
      For example, on July 5, 2012, just 2 weeks before the appellant’s second-level
      supervisor advised him that he intended to reassign him, the appellant’s first -level
      supervisor presented the appellant with his performance appraisal for the period
      from June 1, 2011, to May 31, 2012. IAF, Tab 5 at 58. She provided him with a
      summary rating of Exceeds Expectations.         Id. She also rated him as Exceeds
      Expectations in his critical performance element of “National Leadership,”
      commenting that the appellant “is now regularly meeting with the IDOT Secretary
      and various Deputy Directors of Highways” and “is building a strong relationship
      with the Chicago DOT commissioner.” Id. at 59, 65. According to her hearing
      testimony, by the spring of 2012, while “still not great,” the appellant’s
      relationship with his state partners was “getting better.”          HT2 at 528-29.
                                                                                            18

      Similarly, in his hearing testimony, the appellant disputed the agency’s claim that
      he was not receptive to innovation, and he asserted that he collaborated and built
      relationships with his state partners and stakeholders throughout his career. HT1
      at 193-96, 196, 261-62, 273, 292-93 (testimony of the appellant). On remand, the
      administrative    judge    must    make    credibility    findings   to   resolve    the
      conflicting testimony.
¶35         We next consider whether the disclosures were personally directed at the
      agency officials involved in the appellant’s reassignment.                See Dorney,
      117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 15.       The agency argues that the agency officials who
      reassigned the appellant were not personally named in, or impacted by, the OIG
      complaint.    PFR File, Tab 4 at 22.        It also asserts that the OIG “did not
      substantiate” the appellant’s allegations. 9 Id. The administrative judge did not
      address this issue. Therefore, we must remand it for her to assess the evidence
      and make credibility findings in the first instance.
¶36         The final factor specifically listed in Dorney, 117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 15, is
      whether the individuals involved in the appellant’s reassignment had a desire or

      9
        We are not persuaded by the agency’s suggestion that the OIG’s report, in essence,
      cleared the agency of wrongdoing. The issue before the Board is how the OIG
      investigation may have contributed to the agency’s actions at the time that it took them,
      rather than when the report was concluded, which was 13 months after the appellant
      was already in his new position. IAF, Tab 18 at 22, Tab 45 at 74; see Sherman v.
      Department of Homeland Security, 122 M.S.P.R. 644, ¶¶ 5, 8-11 (2015) (analyzing the
      issue of whether the appellant nonfrivolously alleged he met the knowledge/timing test
      by looking at whether the acting agency official knew of the appellant’s disclosure at
      the time he took the action). The OIG determined that the appellant’s allegations were
      serious enough to warrant an investigation. HT1 at 56-57 (testimony of an OIG agent).
      While the OIG’s report was ultimately inconclusive as to whether PLAs were being
      used improperly in Illinois, there was enough information to refer to the U.S.
      Attorney’s Office for possible action. HT1 at 11-12 (testimony of an OIG agent); IAF,
      Tab 33 at 16-17. Further, the investigation was extensive, resulting in approximately
      12 in-person interviews and taking over 2 years. HT1 at 40, 43 (testimony of an OIG
      agent); IAF, Tab 45 at 74-83. Finally, the investigation uncovered an instance when the
      IDOT suspended a contractor based on insufficient information. IAF, Tab 33 at 17.
      Therefore, the agency’s argument regarding the OIG’s findings appears to be neither
      accurate nor relevant to the contributing factor criterion.
                                                                                       19

      motive to retaliate against him. However, as discussed above, we have found the
      administrative judge properly determined that those involved in the reassignment
      decision had no actual or constructive knowledge of the appellant’s disclosures.
      Therefore, at the time they made the decision, these officials could have had no
      desire or motive to retaliate. Geyer v. Department of Justice, 70 M.S.P.R. 682,
      693 (1996) (observing that disclosures of which a deciding official has neither
      knowledge nor constructive knowledge cannot contribute toward any retaliatory
      motive on his part), aff’d per curiam, 116 F.3d 1497 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Table).
¶37        Other evidence may be relevant to a contributing factor determination. For
      example, the appellant argues that the timing of the agency’s action is suspicious.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 14-17.    He disagrees with the agency’s contention that the
      timing was related to the availability of the Indiana DA position, pointing to
      testimony by his first-level supervisor that this was just one of approximately
      20 DA positions that became open during the 4 years preceding his reassignment.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 26; HT2 at 535 (testimony of the appellant’s first-level
      supervisor).   To the extent that the agency justified its timing based on the
      complaints of stakeholders, he argues that his alleged difficulties with the IDOT
      and unions dated back to February 11, 2011 and prior, while the only “thing of
      significance” that occurred closer to when his reassignment was first proposed in
      July 2012 was “the OIG’s investigation.”        PFR File, Tab 1 at 14-16; HT1
      at 90-91, 108-12 (testimony of the appellant’s second-level supervisor), 254-55
      (testimony of the appellant); HT2 at 367-68, 374-82, 394-402, 415-16 (testimony
      of the FHWA Administrator); IAF, Tab 23 at 111, 116-17, 129, 136.
¶38        In connection with its investigation, the OIG began to interview IDOT
      officials in December 2011, approximately 7 months prior to the July 2012
      reassignment decision. HT1 at 51-53 (testimony of an OIG agent). Further, the
      OIG interviewed other IDOT officials and a state repre sentative before
      December 2012, when the appellant’s second-level supervisor denied the
      appellant’s administrative grievance of his reassignment.           HT1 at 51-53
                                                                                      20

      (testimony of an OIG agent); IAF, Tab 18 at 30. We agree with the appellant that
      the administrative judge should make findings regarding whether and to what
      extent the timing suggests the appellant’s protected disclosures led to the
      agency’s decision.
¶39         The record in this appeal was fully developed below and, as outlined above,
      the parties have presented extensive arguments regarding contributing factor on
      review. Because the appellant and the agency’s witnesses provided conflicting
      testimony regarding the agency’s purported reasons for reassigning the appellant,
      i.e., his management style and his relationship with the Illinois Division’s
      stakeholders, credibility remains an issue. Accordingly, we remand this appeal to
      the administrative judge to make further findings.
¶40         On remand, the administrative judge must consider whether the appellant
      has established that his protected disclosures were a contributing factor in the
      agency’s decision to reassign him. This analysis should include consideration of
      the relevant evidence. See Dorney, 117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 15. Further, it should
      include a discussion of any evidence that the appellant’s OIG disclosures set in
      motion a course of events that led to his reassignment.       See Marano, 2 F.3d
      at 1141-43.    If, after this analysis, the administrative judge finds that the
      appellant has not established that his protected disclosures were a contributing
      factor in the agency’s decision to reassign him, the administrative judge must find
      that the appellant is not entitled to corrective action.

      The appellant has not shown that the administrative judge abused her discretion
      by denying his witness requests.
¶41         Finally, we consider the appellant’s argument on review that the
      administrative judge abused her discretion by disapproving as witnesses FHWA’s
      Deputy Administrator 10 and four IDOT employees, three of whom were

      10
         The appellant’s contention that the administrative judge disapproved his witness
      request for FHWA’s Deputy Administrator appears to be incorrect. In her May 26,
      2015 status conference summary, the administrative judge s tated that the appellant
                                                                                           21

      interviewed by the OIG before the appellant’s reassignment. PFR File, Tab 1
      at 26-27. The appellant contends that the testimony of these witnesses would
      have established that persons involved in his reassignment had knowledge of hi s
      disclosures. Id. at 27.
¶42         During a prehearing conference, the administrative judge stated that she
      would defer ruling on the appellant’s witness requests for the IDOT employees
      until she received his response to her order directing him to set forth facts which,
      if true, would show that his second-level supervisor was improperly influenced by
      an IDOT official. IAF, Tab 28 at 3, Tab 30 at 4-5, Tab 37 at 1. In his response to
      that order, the appellant alleged that his second-level supervisor informed him
      during their July 2012 meeting that the decision to reassign him had been made
      by the FHWA Administrator in consultation with unnamed persons in OST. IAF,
      Tab 33 at 44, 98-99.       The administrative judge denied the appellant’s witness
      requests for the IDOT employees because he did not allege that any of them
      consulted with or influenced the Administrator or the appellant’s second-level
      supervisor. IAF, Tab 37. Because the appellant did not file any objections to the
      administrative judge’s ruling, he is precluded from raising this issue on review.
      See Tarpley v. U.S. Postal Service, 37 M.S.P.R. 579, 581 (1988) (holding that the
      appellant’s failure to timely object to rulings on witnesses precludes his doing so
      on petition for review).

                                             ORDER
¶43         For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Central
      Regional Office for the administrative judge to issue a new remand initial
      decision in accordance with this Remand Order. The administrative judge may
      adopt in her remand initial decision her prior findings that the appellant met his

      withdrew this request. IAF, Tab 44 at 2 n.1. The appellant had an opportunity to object
      to the accuracy of the summary, id. at 4, but failed to do so. Consequently, we need not
      address this witness request further. Tarpley v. U.S. Postal Service, 37 M.S.P.R. 579,
      581 (1988).
                                                                              22

burden to prove that the Board has jurisdiction over this appeal and that he met
his burden to prove by preponderant evidence that he made a protected disclosure.
If she determines that the appellant met his burden to prove contributing factor,
she may also adopt her prior finding that the agency did not prove by clear and
convincing evidence that it would have reassigned the appellant absent his
protected disclosures.

FOR THE BOARD:                                  /s/ for
                                        Jennifer Everling
                                        Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.