Court Opinion

ID: 9571268
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:30:23.496677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:14.700348
License: Public Domain

Clinton, J.,
dissenting.
I have concurred in the dissent of Judge White on the merits, but another aspect of this case deserves comment. That aspect may be defined by the answer to the following conundrum. When is “the law of the case” not “the law of the case?”
This is the third appearance of thisi plaintiff before us. On the first appeal the plaintiff sought a declaration that he, Earl S'elders, was an insured under an automobile liability policy for the purpose of the uninsured motorist coverage thereunder. If he were, then State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company would be required to respond in damages to him if he should obtain a judgment against the present defendants who were the -uninsured motorists found by the jury in the present case to be responsible for the death of his minor children.
Because the children were not members of the plaintiff’s household, the answer to the issue in the original case turned upon the measure of damages applicable to any possible recovery by the plaintiff under the wrongful death statute. We held that the plaintiff qualified as an insured under subdivision (3) of the policy definition of insured as that definition applied to uninsured motorist coverage. Subdivision (3) thereof read as follows: “(3) any person, with respect to damages he is entitled to recover for care or loss of services because of bodily injury to which this coverage applies.” We then reiterated the long-standing rule as to the measure of damages for death of a minor child as follows: “ ‘The measure of damages in an action such as we have before us is the pecuniary loss which the parent sustains by reason of being deprived of the child’s services during his minority and the loss of contributions that might reasonably be expected to be made after reaching *289his majority.’ ” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Selders, 187 Neb. 342, 190 N. W. 2d 789. It seems clear to me that the foregoing holdings established the law of the case and that under the former holdings of this court not only was the trial court bound, but- so are we on this appeal. Master Laboratories, Inc. v. Chesnut, 157 Neb. 317, 59 N. W. 2d 571; Ripp v. Riesland, 180 Neb. 205, 141 N. W. 2d 840.
It is true, of -course, that the present defendants were not parties to the first action, but nonetheless the effect of our holding in the first case was that State Farm Mutual would, to the limits of liability afforded by the policy, be required to pay any judgment the plaintiff might be awarded against these defendants. Given that result, the consequences for purposes of application of the rule of the law of the case are the same as if the original action was between the defendants and their own liability insurer, had they one.
The answer is that the law of the case is not the law of the case when this court on the second appeal by a raw exercise of judicial fiat says it is not.
The trial court properly instructed the jury on the measure of damages in accordance with the applicable rules under all the previous decisions of this court and under the law of the case as laid down in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Selders, supra. The judgment should be affirmed.
Newton, J., joins in this dissent.