Court Opinion

ID: 9866326
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 03:54:24.184318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:20:25.811484
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
The petition for Habeas Corpus in this case was presented In Vacation to the Presiding Judge of this court.
While not required by law in such a case, it is permissible and we chose to file a written opinion in the case. From an examination of the written opinion we find that, by inadvertence, a copy of the ■orders and decrees of the circuit court, while referred to as set forth, are not so set forth.
We conclude, that while said orders and decrees are fully set forth in the respondent’s answer and appear in the files herein, still the omission, from where indicated in the opinion, may have given rise to what we conceive is a misunderstanding of the reason underlying the conclusion reached.
In the opinion filed, we tried to set forth, and we feel that we have clearly done so, that we fully recognize the jurisdiction of the circuit court to, in divorce proceedings, make awards and decrees touching the custody of minor children of the marriage. Further, we in the *603the opinion recognized and now recognize, that the minor children in divorce proceedings become the wards of the court to the extent that the circuit court retains jurisdiction of the question of the custody of the minor children. However, we do express in or opinion, that a circuit court in the exercise of its jurisdiction must proceed according to law.
We fully recognize that a writ of habeas corpus cannot usurp the powers of a writ of error or an appeal and disturb as to any finding of fact made by the court in the hearing of the case. However, we ■do hold that a writ of habeas corpus is in the nature of a writ of error in so far as it brings into review the legality of the authority by which the circuit court acts in making its award.
In the proceedings in this ease all parties in interest were present in chambers, either in person or by representative. The mother and thg child were under the observation of the judge. It was freely expressed and admitted by all present that the circuit court had not found the mother a morally unfit person.
When the return was made by respondent the very findings, orders and decrees of the court as set forth therein clearly showed upon the face of same, that the circuit court had found the parents of the minor child both financially and morally fit persons. Said findings, orders and decrees being in words and figures as follows:
“A decree of divorce is granted to the plaintiff on his petition, and the answer and cross bill of the defendant is by the Court dismissed. The custody of the minor daughter, Sheila Ann Tomlin-son, will remain for the present under the jurisdiction of this Court, and will be placed in the college or school known as Sisters of Notre Dame de Sion, at 3823 Locust Street, Kansas City, Missouri, there to receive her board, room and clothing and for her education, both literary and religious, until the further order of this court. And, it is further ordered that all expenses incurred in said school or college for the care, control and education of this minor child herein mentioned shall be paid for by the plaintiff, D. W. Tomlinson, IY.
“It is further ordered and decreed that both the father and the mother of said minor child may be permitted to see their daughter at reasonable times and under such rules and conditions as may be satisfactory and agreeable to the'Mother Superior of Notre Dame de Sion, and permission is also given to the mother and! father of said minor daughter to have said minor daughter with them during vacations, and such time shall be divided equally between said father and mother.
“It is further ordered that the plaintiff shall pay to Chet D. Yance as a further and additional fee the sum of $500.00, as a full and final payment for professional services rendered on behalf of *604the defendant in this cause, and the court costs herein shall be charged to the plaintiff.
“(Signed) Daniel E. Bird, Judge.”
The above is clearly to the effect, that an infant, admittedly not yet of school age, is taken from parental custody and control and parental care and turned over to an educational institution with orders that it be given religious and literary education. The parents are only permitted to see the child under rules and conditions satisfactory and agreeable to the head of the institution. However, in recognition of the fitness of the parents, the father is to meet all expenses and when this child, not yet of school age, is not in school its custody is awarded to its parents, time divided equally.
Our conclusion reached in this case is based upon the fact that in exercise of jurisdiction it is not sufficient that the act be in the name of the law, bnt that the act must be by virtue of the authority of law and the result reached must be by due process of law.
It is a fundamental principle of our law that fit parents are the legal custodians of their minor children. Our statutes declare this right and our courts maintain the exercise of this right.
The religious education ordered by the decree in question invokes the maintenance of such right and principles of public policy demand that such right be held inviolate.
The decree of the circuit court, that is involved in this proceeding, not only does not negative the fitness of the parents, but gives evidence in its own language that the parents are found to be fit custodians of the minor child! in question, in that both parents are awarded the custody of the child, that was admitted in our presence to be under school age, when not in school. Under such a condition of fact, we hold that under the finding of facts evidenced by the decree itself the award of custody to the school in question is not by virtue of the authority of law and as the result of due process of law.
As stated in the opinion, we conclude that as to the question of custody as between father and mother, we have not jurisdiction in the proceeding to determine. However, as the father by intervening petition negatived a desire for custody by himself, and as it appeared that prior to the orders of the circuit court the child had been in the custody of the mother, who at the time of this hearing was the only parent present, we deemed! it our duty to order our Marshal, in whose custody the child had been placed, to restore the status quo by delivering the child to her.
Motion for rehearing overruled.
All concur.