Court Opinion

ID: 9893478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-27 14:07:14.23244+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:15.896560
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: OCTOBER 20, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

               Commonwealth of Kentucky
                         Court of Appeals
                           NO. 2023-CA-0482-WC

SHERRI DOOM                                                      APPELLANT

                 PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
v.             OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
                       ACTION NO. WC-19-50668

MCCRACKEN COUNTY BOARD OF
EDUCATION; COMMONWEALTH
OF KENTUCKY WORKERS’
COMPENSATION BOARD; AND
HONORABLE STEPHANIE L.
KINNEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGE                                                            APPELLEES

                                  OPINION
                                 AFFIRMING

                                ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; EASTON AND KAREM, JUDGES.

KAREM, JUDGE: Sherri Doom (“Doom”) petitions this Court for review of the

decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board (the “Board”) affirming an

Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) Opinion and Order dismissing her claims for

permanent income or medical benefits. The ALJ based the dismissal on Doom’s
failure to submit a causation opinion supporting her allegations that a work

accident caused a permanent injury and necessitated lumbar fusion surgery.

Following a review of the facts and law, we affirm.

          BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

             In 1998, Doom underwent lumbar fusion surgery at the L4-L5 level

for an injury sustained when she fell from a truck she was inspecting. The facts as

outlined by the ALJ are not in dispute:

             [After the 1998 surgery], she was physically unable to
             return to her work in the trucking industry. She then
             started selling insurance. She began working with
             Kentucky Farm Bureau in 2003. Doom drove a school
             bus for McCracken County from 2008 to 2013, in
             addition to her work as an insurance agent. She returned
             to work for McCracken County in 2018 as a bus monitor
             where she earns $11.97 per hour. She occasionally
             drives a school van for student trips.

                   Doom underwent a revision discectomy at the L4-
             L5 level in 2008 or 2009. . . .

                    On December 17, 2019, Doom was directed to
             report to the local Kentucky Transportation Cabinet
             office for a random drug screen. She stated the office
             was in a temporary location, and there were no handrails
             along the steps. She missed a step as she was exiting the
             office, fell forward and caught herself on her hands and
             knees. . . . She returned to work and continued working
             until her April 2021 [L4-L5 lumbar fusion] surgery. She
             missed approximately two and a half months of work
             after the fusion surgery, returning in July 2021. She has
             missed no additional work since returning from the
             surgery. She testified the 2021 surgery resolved her low
             back pain.

                                          -2-
Dr. K. Brandon Strenge (“Dr. Strenge”) was Doom’s treating physician and

performed staged revisions to the lumbar fusion at L4-L5 on April 14, 2021, and

April 19, 2021.

            On November 23, 2021, Doom filed an Application for Resolution of

Injury Claim (“Form 101”) with the Kentucky Department of Workers’ Claims

wherein Doom identified Dr. Strenge as the physician “whose report will be

provided[.]” Dr. Strenge did, in fact, author a report dated October 9, 2021, which

provided an opinion on causation and permanent impairment. As required, Doom

provided a Medical Waiver and Release (“Form 106”) with which her employer

could obtain her medical records.

            On February 23, 2022, Dr. Magone, an independent medical

evaluator, examined Doom. Dr. Magone listed correspondence from Dr. Strenge,

dated October 9, 2021, as a source document in the Independent Medical

Evaluation Report. However, this report was never submitted to the ALJ for

consideration before the final hearing. At the final hearing, conducted by video

conference, the following exchange took place:

            ALJ: Well, then let me take a moment to review the
            evidence that’s been submitted in this claim. We’ll start
            with the form 101 since that is the pleading that sort of
            gets everything going. So, [attorney for Doom], you
            filed the form 101 on Ms. Doom’s behalf that included
            various attachments. Then it looks like you filed some
            wage records, as well. Did you file anything else, sir?

                                        -3-
            DOOM’S ATTORNEY: I’m just trying to make sure Dr.
            Strenge’s report was attached to the 101.

            ALJ: You can look if you would like, sir.

            DOOM’S ATTORNEY: I’m double checking. I just
            want too (sic) make sure that I did that. Yeah, it’s in the
            record. It looks like actually [defense counsel] filed it.

            ALJ: So again, we have form 101 with attachments and
            then filings regarding wage records. You didn’t file
            anything else; is that correct, sir?

            DOOM’S ATTORNEY: That is correct.

            ALJ: Now, [defense counsel], on behalf of McCracken
            County Board of Education, you’ve deposed Ms. Doom
            previously. I note that transcript had four exhibits; does
            that sound correct?

            DEFENSE COUNSEL: Exactly right.

            ALJ: We’ve got it looks like three filings from
            Orthopedic Institute of Western Kentucky?

            DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes.

            ALJ: We’ve got an AWW post as well as an AWW1.
            We have a report from Doctor Magone, M-A-G-O-N-E.
            We also have some records of reports from Nelson
            Chiropractic as well as a report from Doctor Darryl, D-
            A-R-R-Y-L, Thomas, T-H-O-M-A-S. Does that cover
            everything that the defendant filed?

            DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, that covers
            everything.

            Following the hearing, and pursuant to ALJ order, Doom filed a brief

that mistakenly referenced Dr. Strenge’s report as having been filed with the Form

                                        -4-
101. “‘Again, the patient was essentially asymptomatic prior to the work injury

and the work injury is what brought her symptoms into reality requiring surgery

after failing attempts at conservative measures.’ Report of Dr. Strenge, filed with

Form 101.” (Emphasis in original.)

             The ALJ rendered her opinion on October 11, 2022, and it was not

until after the ALJ dismissed the claim for lack of a supporting opinion that Doom

realized the omission of the pertinent opinion from Dr. Strenge. Doom filed a

Petition for Reconsideration on October 19, 2022, attaching Dr. Strenge’s

correspondence in an effort to correct the prior omission. Doom argued that her

attorney believed he had filed Dr. Strenge’s letter with the Form 101. Doom

further argued her counsel’s belief was bolstered by the failure of defense counsel

to file a motion to dismiss or seek summary disposition of the matter. Further,

Doom maintained that her employer was not prejudiced by failing to attach the

report because she believed Dr. Magone had a copy of it prior to filing his

Independent Medical Evaluation Report. Doom asked that she not fall victim to

procedural rules based on her attorney’s mistaken belief that he had timely filed

Dr. Strenge’s letter.

              The ALJ overruled the motion as failing to set forth any patent errors.

Doom then filed a notice of appeal with the Board. Subsequently, the Board

                                         -5-
entered an opinion affirming the ALJ regarding Dr. Strenge’s letter. This appeal

followed.

                                        ANALYSIS

              Before addressing the substance of the arguments on appeal, we begin

by discussing Doom’s conformity, or lack thereof, with the appellate rules of

procedure. Doom’s brief does not “contain at the beginning of the argument a

statement with reference to the record showing whether the issue was properly

preserved for review and, if so, in what manner.” Kentucky Rule of Appellate

Procedure (“RAP”) 32(A)(4).

              “Compliance with [RAP 32(A)][1] is mandatory.” Smothers v. Baptist

Hospital East, 468 S.W.3d 878, 881 (Ky. App. 2015) (citation omitted). The

purpose of this rule is to ensure “that we, the reviewing Court, can be confident the

issue was properly presented to the trial court and therefore, is appropriate for our

consideration.” Oakley v. Oakley, 391 S.W.3d 377, 380 (Ky. App. 2012).

              “Our options when an appellate advocate fails to abide by the rules

are: (1) to ignore the deficiency and proceed with the review; (2) to strike the brief

or its offending portions, [RAP 31(H)(1)][2]; or (3) to review the issues raised in the

1
 Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 76.12 has been replaced with a nearly identical
provision about requiring preservation statements contained in the new Rules of Appellate
Procedure effective January 1, 2023.
2
 CR 76.12(8) has been replaced with RAP 31(H)(1): “A brief may be stricken for failure to
substantially comply with the requirements of these rules.”

                                              -6-
brief for manifest injustice only[.]” Hallis v. Hallis, 328 S.W.3d 694, 696 (Ky.

App. 2010) (citing Elwell v. Stone, 799 S.W.2d 46, 47 (Ky. App. 1990)).

             In this case, Doom made a due process argument for the first time on

appeal to this Court and failed to state in her brief where this argument was

preserved for our review. Due to this failure to provide the required preservation

statement, we decline to address Doom’s due process argument.

             However, because the record is small, we have determined Doom

preserved her argument regarding whether the case should be sent back to the ALJ

for findings of fact and a determination of whether excusable neglect occurred.

Therefore, we will ignore the deficiency and proceed with a review of this

argument.

             a. Standard of Review

             In Tryon Trucking, Inc. v. Medlin, 586 S.W.3d 233 (Ky. 2019), the

Supreme Court stated:

                    The well-established standard of review for the
             appellate courts of a workers’ compensation decision “is
             to correct the [Workers’ Compensation] Board only
             where the Court perceives the Board has overlooked or
             misconstrued controlling statutes or precedent, or
             committed an error in assessing the evidence so flagrant
             as to cause gross injustice.” E.g., Western Baptist Hosp.
             v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Ky. 1992); Butler’s
             Fleet Serv. v. Martin, 173 S.W.3d 628, 631 (Ky. App.
             2005); Wal-Mart v. Southers, 152 S.W.3d 242, 245 (Ky.
             App. 2004). See also Special Fund v. Francis, 708
             S.W.2d 641, 643 (Ky. 1986) (if the fact-finder finds in

                                         -7-
             favor of the person having the burden of proof, the
             burden of appeal is only to show that there was some
             substantial evidence to support the decision); cf. Gray v.
             Trimmaster, 173 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Ky. 2005) (if the ALJ
             finds against the party having the burden of proof, the
             appellant must “show that the ALJ misapplied the law or
             that the evidence in her favor was so overwhelming that
             it compelled a favorable finding”).

Id. at 237-38.

             b. Discussion

             Throughout the record, Doom readily admits that the failure to submit

Dr. Strenge’s causation letter was an oversight on her part. As such, she motioned

the ALJ to reopen her claim under Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 342.125

based on excusable neglect, asking that the ALJ reassess her claim and consider

Dr. Strenge’s opinion regarding causation.

             KRS 342.125 states:

             (1) Upon motion by any party or upon an administrative
             law judge’s own motion, an administrative law judge
             may reopen and review any award or order on any of the
             following grounds:

                 (a) Fraud;

                 (b) Newly-discovered evidence which could not have
                 been discovered with the exercise of due diligence;

                 (b) Mistake; and

                 (d) Change of disability as shown by objective
                 medical evidence of worsening or improvement of

                                        -8-
                    impairment due to a condition caused by the injury
                    since the date of the award or order.

(Emphasis added.)

                While KRS 342.125(1)(c) lists “mistake” as a valid ground for

reopening a claim, the statute does not contain the specific term “excusable

neglect.” However, Doom argues the justification for reopening a non-Workers’

Compensation judgment via CR 60.023 can be equated to reopening a Workers’

Compensation Claim under KRS 342.125(1)(c), citing Wheatley v. Bryant Auto

Service, 860 S.W.2d 767 (Ky. 1993).

                In Wheatley, an ALJ had previously found the employee permanently

disabled from a work-related wrist injury. Id. at 768. The ALJ awarded a twenty-

five percent disability for so long as Wheatley was disabled, but for a period not to

exceed 425 weeks. Id. Thirty-five days later, the ALJ realized he had mistakenly

3
    CR 60.02:

         On motion a court may, upon such terms as are just, relieve a party or his legal
         representative from its final judgment, order, or proceeding upon the following
         grounds: (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (b) newly
         discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in
         time to move for a new trial under Rule 59.02; (c) perjury or falsified evidence;
         (d) fraud affecting the proceedings, other than perjury or falsified evidence; (e)
         the judgment is void, or has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
         judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is
         no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (f)
         any other reason of an extraordinary nature justifying relief. The motion shall be
         made within a reasonable time, and on grounds (a), (b), and (c) not more than one
         year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion
         under this rule does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.

                                                 -9-
applied the 425-week duration of benefits limitation to the claim. Id. The ALJ

subsequently amended the order to reflect that benefits would continue for so long

as Wheatley was disabled, as provided by the statute in effect at the time of injury.

Id.

             The employer appealed to the Board, arguing that the ALJ erred in

reopening the case. Id. In considering the litigants’ arguments, the Supreme Court

recognized that applying the laws, as they were interpreted at the time, could end

in injustice for the employee:

                    Apparently, the seminal case in Kentucky
             establishing that the reopening statute (then Kentucky
             Statutes § 4902) for workers’ compensation claims may
             be invoked for mistakes of law as well as fact is Stearns
             Coal & Lumber Co. v. Vanover, 262 Ky. 808, 91 S.W.2d
             518 (1936). There we said, at 519:

                    Clearly, if a mistake of law is “good cause”
                    for review of an order or decision of the
                    board, it is not perceived why our statute
                    authorizing a review on the ground of
                    mistake should not include mistakes of law
                    as well as fact. Indeed, the plain purpose of
                    the statute is to enable the board to deal with
                    the situation in such a way as to prevent an
                    injustice being done. We therefore conclude
                    that, unless the case has been passed on by
                    the court on appeal, the board may at any
                    time within the period for which
                    compensation is allowed change or revoke
                    any order on the ground of mistake of law.
                    (Emphasis added.)

             ....

                                         -10-
                    Here we believe that the ALJ was acting properly
             and in the interest of justice when he availed himself of
             the statutory remedy set out in KRS 342.125 to correct
             his admitted mistake in applying the law in this
             compensation proceeding, just as could have been done
             under CR 60.02 had it been a civil proceeding. Since the
             authority for correcting this mistake was statutory, there
             was no prohibition by reason of the finality of the
             decision against making the correction, such as there
             would be had there been a court decision where finality
             had attached. Accordingly, the decisions of the Court of
             Appeals and the Board holding otherwise are reversed,
             and the Order of the ALJ reinstated.

Id. at 768-69.

             Wheatley is easily distinguishable from the case sub judice in that the

mistake in Wheatley was a mistake of the ALJ on the application of the law, not a

mistake, as here, by the claimant. We find no law extending the application of

“mistake” to actions on the part of a claimant that might be otherwise forgiven as

“excusable neglect” under CR 60.02.

             Moreover, the Supreme Court noted in an opinion rendered

subsequent to Wheatley that “[a]lthough the regulations that govern workers’

compensation proceedings have adopted several of the Rules of Civil Procedure,

they have not adopted CR 60.01 or CR 60.02. KRS 342.125(1) states the only

grounds for reopening a final workers’ compensation award.” Burroughs v.

Martco, 339 S.W.3d 461, 465 (Ky. 2011).

                                        -11-
             Had the legislature wanted to include “excusable neglect” on the part

of a claimant as valid grounds to reopen a claim, it would have promulgated a

regulation identical to CR 60.02 allowing it. Without clear direction from the

Supreme Court or amendment of KRS 342.125, we cannot apply “excusable

neglect” as grounds for reversal in the case sub judice.

                                     CONCLUSION

             For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Board’s opinion.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                       BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:

Edwin A. Jones                             R. Christion Hutson
Jared K. Holt                              Paducah, Kentucky
Paducah, Kentucky

                                        -12-