Court Opinion

ID: 9489615
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:19:42.134096+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:37.211459
License: Public Domain

POLITZ, Chief Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to reopen the Fadens’ bankruptcy so that INA’s address could be corrected. In interpreting whether a debt is dischargeable under section 523(a)(3), we have held that when a creditor’s claim has not been properly scheduled, the court may use its equitable power to reopen the case to allow a creditor to file a late proof of claim.1 In making this decision, as the majority correctly points out, we typically have considered the factors outlined in Robinson v. Mann.
The majority relies heavily upon the bankruptcy judge’s determination that Faden was “not credible as to why he did not make a good faith effort to provide a correct address.” The bankruptcy court found that Faden was not forthcoming and that his testimony was vague as to why an appropriate address was not provided. The majority concludes that these “fact findings” by the bankruptcy court “suggest” that Faden intentionally or recklessly avoided supplying INA’s proper address. I simply cannot agree. There was no finding by the bankruptcy judge that Faden was reckless or intentionally avoided giving the correct address to his counsel. In fact, there is nothing in the bankruptcy judge’s opinion to imply much more than a finding of negligence by the Fadens and, as we have previously ruled, “[i]f the failure is attributable solely to negligence or inadvertence, ... equity points to discharge.”2 The deference we owe to the credibility determinations of the bankruptcy judge cannot justify an implication of a finding of fraud from this record.
I find particularly troubling the majority’s assertion that a deficiency under Robinson’s first factor alone permits a court to deny the equitable relief of reopening the case. Robinson and its progeny clearly teach that all of the factors outlined therein are to be considered, not just one of them to the exclusion of the others. The majority would subtlety acknowledge this by noting that in Smith when faced with this same issue we went on to consider the amount of prejudice that had resulted to the creditor as a result of the failure to schedule properly, despite a finding of more than mere negligence or inadvertence under the first factor.3 Neither Smith nor Stone suggest that a finding of more than “mere negligence or inadvertence” would preclude equitable relief when there was absolutely no prejudice to the creditors caused by the failure to list. Indeed, while we have agreed with other circuits that a specific finding of intentional design, fraud, or improper motive would preclude discharge,4 we have never held that the other Robinson factors would not be considered in the analysis.
With this in mind and reviewing the record weighing all three Robinson factors, the result I reach is inexorable, and it is diametrically opposed to the decision announced today by the majority. The notice was sent to INA at an address located in the telephone directory. While the suite number was in error, the notice was actually sent to a building almost entirely occupied by CIGNA, the parent corporation of INA. All floors were occupied by CIGNA save one. There is no evidence in this record that this notice was not delivered. It was not returned to the bankruptcy court. I entertain no doubt *799whatever that this is not the type of deficient notice that qualifies a debt for non-discharge-ability.
Moreover, the weight of the two remaining factors tip the scales in favor of reversal. There would have been no disruption to the bankruptcy court in disposition of this matter by allowing the Fadens to amend their schedules with the “correct” address for INA. Further, there was absolutely no prejudice suffered by INA. The 1989 filing was of a no-asset liquidation. Creditors were informed of that filing and were told that it was not necessary to submit claims because of the asset posture of the case. Creditors were also advised that should assets be discovered which would provide a dividend, a subsequent notice would issue and creditors could then act to protect their interests. That is exactly what occurred. When assets developed, notice was given to INA and other creditors. INA filed a timely claim.
Under these circumstances the bankruptcy court should have allowed the Fadens the opportunity to correct the “incorrect” address for INA if such a technicality should have even been entertained. The court readily reopened the bankruptcy to deal with the assets which developed. Any technical address correction deemed necessary should have been allowed. In light of the complete lack of any prejudice whatsoever to this creditor, I am at a total loss to see how the commands of equity and fairness accorded bankruptcy proceedings have prevailed herein. To deny discharge to this debtor is, to me, a miscarriage of justice and is the very antithesis of the intendment of the bankruptcy act, one of out- very oldest federal laws.
I must also note that there is jurisprudence within our circuit suggesting that in a Chapter 7 no-asset ease, section 528(a)(3)(A) is inapplicable. For INA’s claim to be excepted from discharge by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3)(A), the failure to schedule must have deprived INA of an ability to file timely a proof of claim. Here, there was never any deadline set for the filing of proof of claims and, in fact, the notice of the meeting of creditors instructed creditors not to file a claim until instructed by the court to do so. Section 523(a)(3)(A) only applies where a proof of claim would have been required, and in no-asset cases, where the creditors are not instructed to file proofs of claim, section 523(a)(3)(A) by its very terms does not apply.5
For these reasons and mindful uppermost that bankruptcy law in general and section 523(a)(3) in particular should be construed with an eye toward equity, notions of equity compel me to the conclusion that the bankruptcy judge abused his discretion by refusing to reopen the Fadens’ bankruptcy so that the schedule could be amended.

. Robinson v. Mann, 339 F.2d 547 (5th Cir.1964).

. Stone v. Caplan (In re Stone), 10 F.3d 285, 291 (5th Cir.1994).

. Omni Mfg., Inc. v. Smith (In re Smith), 21 F.3d 660 (5th Cir.1994).

. Stone, 10 F.3d at 291.

. Smith, 21 F.3d at 663-64, n. 2; see also Stone, 10 F.3d at 291 (stating that if no proof of claim deadline has ever been set, § 523(a)(3)(A) is by its own tenns inapplicable); Gordon v. Bulbin (In re Bulbin), 122 B.R. 161 (Bankr.D.D.C.1990); In re Hunter, 116 B.R. 3, 4 (Bankr.D.D.C.1990).