Court Opinion

ID: 9912789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-23 00:02:19.115304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:47.012090
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/22/23 P. v. Pickard CA2/4
            NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

     IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                           SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                        DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,                                                   B324268

       Plaintiff and Respondent,                              Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. LA009272
       v.

STEVEN RAY PICKARD,

       Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Gregory A. Dohi, Judge. Affirmed.
      John A. Colucci, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
  INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       In 1992, the Los Angeles County District Attorney filed an
amended information charging defendant and appellant Steven
Ray Pickard with various offenses, including murder. (Pen Code,1
§ 187, subd. (a).) The amended information alleged the special
circumstance that Pickard committed the murder while fleeing
from having committed burglary. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) The jury
convicted Pickard of evading a peace officer in a manner
proximately causing serious bodily injury (Veh. Code, § 2800.3)
and second degree commercial burglary (§ 459), but could not
reach a verdict on the murder count and special circumstance
allegation. The trial court declared a mistrial. Upon retrial, a jury
convicted Pickard of first degree murder and found the special
circumstance allegation true. The court sentenced Pickard to life
without the possibility of parole.
       In 2021, Pickard filed a petition for resentencing under
former section 1170.95.2 The trial court appointed counsel on
Pickard’s behalf. The prosecution filed a response to Pickard’s
petition, and Pickard’s counsel filed a responsive brief arguing
Pickard had made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief.

1     All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2      Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered
section 1170.95 to section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
There were no substantive changes to the statute. For the sake of
simplicity, we will refer to the statute by its new code section.
That section provides relief for certain individuals convicted of
murder under the felony murder rule, natural and probable
consequence doctrine, or any other theory of imputed-malice
liability. (See § 1172.6.)

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       After hearing argument, the trial court denied Pickard
relief, concluding although Pickard was convicted of murder
under a felony murder theory, the record demonstrated as a
matter of law he was the actual killer.
       Pickard timely appealed, and we appointed counsel to
represent him. On May 22, 2023, appellate counsel filed a brief
raising no issues and requesting discretionary independent
review of the record under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th
216.
       On July 17, 2023, Pickard filed a supplemental appellant’s
brief as a self-represented party. In his supplemental brief,
Pickard admits: “Appellant was the driver of a vehicle which
during a [p]olice pursuit from a traffic stop, struck another
vehicle which crossed in front of [a]ppellant’s vehicle, causing the
vehicle to flip [ ] numerous times, striking and killing Ms. Reyna
Martinez-Duarte, a[n] innocent bystander sitting on a [b]us
[b]ench.”

                          DISCUSSION

       Pickard’s concession is dispositive. (See, e.g., Gelfo v.
Lockheed Martin Corp. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 34, 48 [“A judicial
admission is a party’s unequivocal concession of the truth of a
matter, and removes the matter as an issue in the case.”].)
Although section 1172.6 provides relief for certain individuals
convicted under the felony murder rule, that relief does not
extend to individuals who were the actual killer. (See § 189, subd.
(e)(1) [actual killers still liable for felony murder under current
law]; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959 [section 1172.6
relief extends to convicted murderers who could not be convicted
under current law, but does not extend to actual killers].)
Because Pickard’s concession that he was the actual killer

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conclusively demonstrates as a matter of law he is ineligible for
relief, we reject his various arguments that he is entitled to relief
based on due process principles or recently-enacted changes to
the felony murder rule under section 1172.6.
       In addition to rejecting the arguments Pickard raised in his
supplemental brief, we have exercised our discretion to
independently review the record, and we conclude no arguable
issues exist in light of Pickard’s concession that he was the actual
killer. (See People v. Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.)

                          DISPOSITION

    The order denying relief is affirmed.
  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                     CURREY, P. J.
We concur:

COLLINS, J.

ZUKIN, J.

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