Court Opinion

ID: 9422586
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:03:27.694902+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:34.543170
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Goldberg,
whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Stewart join,
concurring.
I ■ concur in the opinion and judgment of the Court believing, as I do, that under all of the circumstances here the petitioner was denied procedural due process which the Constitution demands be accorded by the States to. applicants for admission to the bar. No conflict exists between ■ constitutional requisites and exaction of the highest moral standards from those who would practice, law. See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232, 238-239. Certainly lawyers and courts should be particularly sensitive of, and have a special obligation to' respect/the demands of due process. This special awareness, . however, does not alter uur' essential function or duty. In reviewing state action in this area, as in all others, we look to substance, not to bare form, to de*107termine whether constitutional mínimums have been honored.
The New York admissions procedures described in the opinion of the Court are fairly characteristic of those prevalent throughout the country. ' In general, they contemplate that.an applicant for admission who has successfully passed the bar examination will file an application before a court-appointed committee of lawyers which conducts an inquiry into his moral character and on the basis thereof recommends the grant or denial of admission by the court. Committee proceedings are often informal and, for the protection of the candidate, are generally not publicized. Committee member's are usually unpaid and serve in fulfillment of their obligation to the profession and as officers of the court. They perform an indispensable and very often thankless task. While the vast majority of candidates are approved without difficulty, in exceptional cases, such as this, either information supplied by the applicant himself or material developed in the course of the committee’s investigation gives rise to. questions concerning the applicant’s moral character.
The constitutional requirements in this context may be simply stated: in all cases in which admission to the bar is to be denied on the basis of character, the applicant, at some stage of the proceedings prior to such denial, must be adequately informed of the nature of the evidence against him and be accorded an adequate opportunity to rebut this evidence.' As I understand the opinion of the Court, this does not mean that in every case confrontation and cross-examination are automatically required. It must be remembered that we are dealing, at least at the initial stage of proceedings, not with‘a court trial, but with -a necessarily much more informal inquiry into an applicant’s qualifications for admission to the bar. . The circumstances will determine the necessary limits and incidents implicit in the concept of a “fair” hearing. Thus, for *108example, when the derogatory matter appears from information' supplied or confirmed by the applicant himself, or is of an undisputed documentary character disclosed to the applicant, and it is plain and uncontradicted that the committee’s recommendation against admission is predicated thereon and' reasonably supported thereby, then neither the committee’s informal procedures, its ultimate recommendations, nor a court ruling sustaining the committee’s conclusion may be properly challenged on due process grounds, provided the applicant has been informed of the factual basis of the conclusion and has been afforded an adequate opportunity to reply or explain. Of course, if the denial depends upon information supplied by a particular person whose reliability or veracity is brought into question by the applicant, confrontation and the right of cross-examination should be afforded. Since admission to the bar is ultimately a matter for the courts, there is ample power to compel attendance of witnesses as required.
Application of these principles to this case leads me to concur in the Court’s opinion and judgment. The record here, to say the least, is complex, muddled, and in many respects unsatisfactory. We are dealing with an applicant who first applied for admission 25 years ago. Comparison of his applications with facts later confirmed by the petitioner himself suggests a lack of complete candor in dealing with the committee. While this failure to disclose, along with other more .recently- occurring riiatters here present, might have supported a refusal to certify the petitioner’s character, there are present additional ele-, ments which indicate that the committee may have been motivated in its conclusion by charges made against the petitioner by certain informants, the evaluation of which would necessarily depend upon estimates of credibility. The record is not clear whether the petitioner actually requested an opportunity to confront and cross-examine *109these informants at the time of his first application in the late 1930’s. It is plain, however, that he now seeks that opportunity and there is no indication that the state court considered the claim to be Untimely. Moreover, at no point are we or the petitioner specifically advised by any finding of the committee or of the state courts as to the precise basis of denial to him of either his original or renewed applications for admission or his requests for reconsideration thereof. In substance, therefore, as the case reaches us, we are confronted with circumstances which, upon sifting, may or may not support the denial of admission to the bar. And our difficulties are compounded by the amended remittitur of the New York Court of Appeals which is fairly susceptible to the reading given it in the Court’s opinion — that confrontation is not constitutionally required in a bar admission case such as this in which the character committee appears to have relied, at least in part, for its adverse recommendation upon contradicted information supplied by informers whose credibility was challenged by the applicant. The net result, to me, therefore, is that this case, whatever it started out to be, has become one in which due process requires either de novo consideration of the petitioner’s application or an orderly sorting out of the issues and an articulated and constitutionally grounded decision on the merits of the petitioner’s claims to admission. New York procedures 'are, I am sure, adequate to effect the proper result upon remand.