Court Opinion

ID: 9391018
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 21:04:48.351994+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:38.964169
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (5th) 220144-U
             NOTICE
                                                                                           NOTICE
 Decision filed 04/28/23. The
                                                                                This order was filed under
 text of this decision may be               NO. 5-22-0144
                                                                                Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
 changed or corrected prior to
                                                                                not precedent except in the
 the filing of a Petition for                   IN THE                          limited circumstances allowed
 Rehearing or the disposition of
                                                                                under Rule 23(e)(1).
 the same.
                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                               FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

TYLER REAKA,                                    )     Appeal from the
                                                )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee,   )     St. Clair County.
                                                )
v.                                              )     No. 21-MR-61
                                                )
CAPTAIN D’S, LLC,                               )     Honorable
                                                )     Julie K. Katz,
      Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant.   )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

         JUSTICE BARBERIS delivered the judgment of the court.
         Justices Welch and Vaughan concurred in the judgment.

                                             ORDER

¶1       Held: The circuit court erred by denying defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s petition
               for entry of judgment pursuant to section 19(g) of the Workers’ Compensation Act,
               where defendant made full payment of the Commission’s final award prior to the
               filing of plaintiff’s petition.

¶2       Plaintiff, Tyler Reaka, appeals the order of the circuit court of St. Clair County that granted

his petition for enforcement of judgment, pursuant to section 19(g) of the Workers’ Compensation

Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/19(g) (West 2020)), and interest on the unpaid portion of his workers’

compensation award, pursuant to section 2-1303 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS

5/2-1303 (West 2020)), arguing that the court erred by denying his requests for section 2-1303

interest on the total award from September 9, 2015, attorney fees, penalties, and to depose prior

counsel for defendant, Captain D’s, LLC. Defendant cross-appeals, arguing that the court erred by

                                                   1
ruling that defendant owed additional compensation when the court denied defendant’s motion to

dismiss, pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2020)). Alternatively,

defendant argues that the court erred by ruling that it owed section 2-1303 interest. For the

following reasons, we reverse the court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss and vacate the

court’s judgment against defendant.

¶3                                      I. Background

¶4     The following procedural history and facts are derived from the pleadings and exhibits

contained in the record on appeal. We note that this case has a lengthy procedural history as a

result of multiple appeals and numerous filings in the section 19(g) proceedings. We recite only

those facts necessary to our resolution of this appeal.

¶5     On December 30, 2003, plaintiff filed an application for adjustment of claim, seeking

benefits under the Act for injuries he allegedly sustained to his neck, cervical spine, and left knee

while working for defendant on January 3, 2001. The matter ultimately proceeded to an arbitration

hearing on February 8, 2011.

¶6     On March 24, 2011, the arbitrator issued a decision denying plaintiff benefits for his

cervical spine injury but awarding him benefits for his left leg injury. Specifically, the arbitrator

awarded plaintiff medical expenses in the amount of $21,407.47, pursuant to section 8(a) of the

Act (820 ILCS 305/8(a) (West 2010)), and permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits in the

amount of $51,615 ($516.15 per week for 100 weeks), representing 50% loss of the use of the left

leg, pursuant to section 8(e) of the Act (id. § 8(e)). The arbitrator also ordered defendant to pay

penalties in the amount of $10,859.49 under section 19(k) of the Act (id. § 19(k)) and attorney fees

in the amount of $4281.49 under section 16 of the Act (id. § 16), based on defendant’s

unreasonable and vexatious nonpayment of medical benefits related to plaintiff’s left leg injury. In

                                                  2
total, the arbitrator awarded plaintiff $88,163.45. The arbitrator further ordered defendant to pay

plaintiff interest, if any, at a rate of 0.15% under section 19(n) of the Act (id. § 19(n)).

¶7      Defendant did not file a petition for review of the arbitrator’s decision with the Illinois

Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission). Defendant instead paid plaintiff $88,163.45,

the total amount of the arbitrator’s award, on April 19, 2011.

¶8      Plaintiff filed a petition for review of the arbitrator’s decision with the Commission after

he received defendant’s payment. 1 The Commission issued a decision on February 2, 2012,

affirming and adopting the arbitrator’s decision. The Commission ordered defendant to pay

plaintiff interest under section 19(n) of the Act, if any. The Commission also ordered that

defendant “shall have credit for all amounts paid, if any, to or on behalf of [plaintiff] on account

of said accidental injury.”

¶9      Plaintiff sought judicial review of the Commission’s decision in the circuit court of St.

Clair County. The court entered an order on September 9, 2015, setting aside the Commission’s

decision and remanding the matter back to the Commission to award plaintiff benefits for his

cervical spine injury.

¶ 10    Defendant appealed the circuit court’s order to the workers’ compensation division of the

appellate court (appeal No. 5-15-0425WC). Plaintiff moved to dismiss defendant’s appeal,

asserting that the court’s September 9, 2015, order was interlocutory and not appealable. The

appellate court granted plaintiff’s motion and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on

March 3, 2016. 2

        1
         Plaintiff alleged in the petition for review that he placed the petition in the mail on April 27, 2011,
and the petition was file-stamped by the Commission on June 9, 2011.
        2
            The appellate court did not issue a Rule 23 order or an opinion.
                                                       3
¶ 11   On April 4, 2017, the Commission issued a decision and opinion on remand in accordance

with the circuit court’s September 9, 2015, order. Despite finding no basis in law or fact for the

court’s order, the Commission found that plaintiff’s cervical spine condition was causally

connected to his January 3, 2011, work accident. Accordingly, the Commission awarded plaintiff

PPD benefits in the amount of $103,230 ($516.15 per week for 200 weeks), representing 40% loss

of use of the person as a whole, pursuant to section 8(d)(2) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8(d)(2) (West

2016)), and medical expenses in the amount of $147,961.17, pursuant to section 8(a) of the Act.

The Commission also awarded plaintiff PPD benefits in the amount of $51,615 ($516.15 per week

for 100 weeks), representing 50% loss of use of the left leg, pursuant to section 8(e) of the Act.

The Commission ordered defendant to pay plaintiff interest under section 19(n) of the Act, if any.

The Commission further ordered defendant to pay plaintiff $125,595.58 as a penalty under section

19(k) of the Act, $10,000 as a penalty under section 19(l) of the Act (id.§ 19(l)), and $50,238.23

for attorney fees under section 16 of the Act. In total, the Commission awarded plaintiff

$488,639.98.

¶ 12   On April 27, 2017, defendant sought judicial review of the Commission’s April 4, 2017,

decision and opinion on remand before the circuit court. Plaintiff filed a motion to quash summons

and dismiss judicial review. The court subsequently denied plaintiff’s motion, finding sufficient

compliance with section 19(f) of the Act (id. § 19(f)) to perfect jurisdiction.

¶ 13   On April 26, 2018, the circuit court entered an order confirming the Commission’s April

4, 2017, decision and opinion on remand. Defendant appealed the court’s order to the workers’

compensation division of the appellate court (appeal No. 5-18-0288WC). Plaintiff filed a motion

to dismiss the appeal, asserting that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to review the

Commission’s decision. The appellate court ordered that plaintiff’s motion be taken with the case.

                                                  4
¶ 14   On May 30, 2019, the workers’ compensation division of the appellate court issued an

unpublished decision finding that defendant failed to strictly comply with the procedural

requirements set forth in section 19(f)(1) of the Act, and thus, failed to confer the circuit court with

subject-matter jurisdiction. Captain D’s, LLC v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 2019

IL App (5th) 180288WC-U, ¶ 30. Thus, the appellate court concluded that the circuit court’s April

26, 2018, order confirming the Commission’s decision on remand was void. Id. Defendant filed a

petition for rehearing, which the appellate court denied on June 27, 2019.

¶ 15   Also, in June 2019, defendant issued various payments to plaintiff. Specifically, defendant

paid plaintiff $4998.07 on June 21, 2019, $185,833.51 on June 26, 2019, $147,961.17 on June 26,

2019, $103,030 on June 27, 2019, $55.71 on June 28, 2019, and $200.30 on June 28, 2019. In

total, defendant paid plaintiff $442,078.76 in June 2019.

¶ 16   On March 8, 2021, plaintiff filed a petition for enforcement of judgment and interest on

the Commission’s award pursuant to section 19(g) of the Act. Plaintiff attached to the petition a

certified copy of the Commission’s April 4, 2017, decision and opinion on remand. Plaintiff

alleged that defendant made partial payment of the Commission’s award. Plaintiff further alleged

that he “requested full payment of the award and all accrued interest on the total award at 9%.”

Plaintiff requested that the circuit court enter judgment against defendant in the amount of $51,615

for PPD benefits awarded by the Commission, in addition to “interest at 9% on the total award

from September 9, 2015.” Plaintiff additionally requested that the court order defendant to pay

attorney fees, penalties, costs, and any other relief the court deemed appropriate for defendant’s

“knowingly and willfully improper and illegal appeals, responses, motions and petitions.”

¶ 17   On April 6, 2021, defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the

Code. Defendant alleged in the motion that it tendered full payment of the Commission’s award,

                                                   5
and that its tender of full payment constituted a defense to a section 19(g) petition. Defendant

attached as an exhibit to the motion a copy of the arbitrator’s March 24, 2011, decision awarding

plaintiff $88,163.45 in benefits under the Act, including PPD benefits in the amount of $51,615

for his left leg. Defendant alleged that it paid plaintiff $88,163.45—the full amount awarded by

the arbitrator on March 24, 2011—on April 19, 2011, which included the $51,615 award of PPD

benefits for plaintiff’s left leg. Defendant further alleged that, after it unsuccessfully attempted to

appeal the Commission’s April 4, 2017, decision and opinion on remand, it paid plaintiff a total of

$442,048.76 in the following installments: $4998.07 on June 21, 2019; $185,833.51 on June 26,

2019; $147,961.17 on June 26, 2019; $103,000 on June 27, 2019; $200.30 on June 28, 2019; and

$55.71 on June 28, 2019.

¶ 18    In support of its allegations regarding payment, defendant attached the affidavit of Paula

Williams, the payment history records custodian for the third-party administrator of the workers’

compensation benefits for defendant in plaintiff’s claim. Williams attested that the payment history

records related to plaintiff’s claim revealed that the third-party administrator paid plaintiff

$88,163.45 on April 19, 2011, $4998.07 on June 21, 2019, $185,833.51 on June 26, 2019,

$147,961.17 on June 26, 2019, $103,000 on June 27, 2019, $200.30 on June 28, 2019, and $55.71

on June 28, 2019. Williams attached as exhibits to her affidavit redacted payment ledgers that

listed the payment amounts, payment dates, and corresponding check numbers. The exhibits

attached to the affidavit indicated that defendant paid plaintiff $88,163.45 for “Permanent

Disability” on April 19, 2011, and $103,0303 for “Permanent Disability” on June 27, 2019.

        3
         While defendant’s motion to dismiss and Williams’s affidavit indicated that defendant paid plaintiff
$103,000 on June 27, 2019, the documents attached to Williams’s affidavit indicated that defendant paid plaintiff
$103,030 on June 27, 2019.
                                                       6
¶ 19   In addition, defendant alleged that plaintiff’s appeals following the arbitrator’s March 24,

2011, decision involved only the cervical spine injury. In support, defendant attached as an exhibit

to the motion a copy of plaintiff’s brief to the Commission, wherein plaintiff stated that his “appeal

involve[d] only the cervical spine injury and issues.” Defendant further alleged that counsel for

plaintiff confirmed during argument before the circuit court on December 18, 2017, that defendant

paid all benefits the arbitrator awarded on March 24, 2011, including the PPD benefits totaling

$51,615 for plaintiff’s left leg injury. In support, defendant attached as an exhibit a copy of the

transcript from the December 18, 2017, hearing, wherein counsel for plaintiff stated “when they

found out what the award was on the knee, they didn’t appeal or anything. They just paid it, all the

penalties and everything.” Thus, defendant argued that the court should deny plaintiff’s request

for PPD benefits of $51,615 for his left leg, because defendant satisfied its obligation regarding

the PPD benefits “long ago.”

¶ 20   Defendant also alleged that it paid the award in full in June 2019, including interest at a

rate of 0.15% pursuant to section 19(n) of the Act. Defendant claimed it owed $834.09 for section

19(n) interest through June 20, 2019, which was 0.15% of “$251,191.17 ($103,230.00 for [PPD]

benefits for the neck/cervical spine and $147,961.17 for medical benefits for the neck/cervical

spine).” Defendant claimed it paid $4998.07 on June 21, 2019, and $55.71 on June 28, 2019, for

section 19(n) interest. Thus, defendant argued that the circuit court should deny plaintiff’s request

for additional section 2-1303 interest because it overpaid the interest owed on the award.

¶ 21   On April 22, 2021, plaintiff filed a response to defendant’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff

disagreed that defendant “satisfied its [PPD] obligation in the Remand Decision dated April 4,

2017, because it paid a PPD award in an earlier Arbitrator Decision dated March 24, 2011.”

Plaintiff asserted that the case involved two separate decisions issued six years apart, which were

                                                  7
based on different facts and circumstances. According to plaintiff, “the March 24, 2011, decision

was not a final decision” and the payments for that award were not before the circuit court.

(Emphasis in original.) Plaintiff maintained that his section 19(g) petition pertained to the

Commission’s April 4, 2017, decision and opinion on remand, which was “a separate, new and

distinct decision from the March 24, 2011, decision and it has not been paid in full.” (Emphasis in

original.) Plaintiff noted that defendant appeared “to imply the Commission erred by awarding the

same PPD in the April 4, 2017, Remand Decision that the Arbitrator awarded in the March 24,

2011, decision.” According to plaintiff, defendant should have requested that the Commission

recall and correct the decision or raised the issue before the circuit court, as permitted by section

19(f) of the Act. Plaintiff further asserted that defendant waived review of the issue by failing to

raise the issue in the prior proceedings.

¶ 22   In addition, plaintiff argued that he was entitled to interest at a rate of 9% of the total

amount of the Commission’s April 4, 2017, decision and opinion on remand, pursuant to section

2-1303 of the Code, from the date of the circuit court’s September 9, 2015, order. Thus, plaintiff

requested that the court deny defendant’s motion to dismiss and allow him to proceed with his

section 19(g) petition. Plaintiff also requested that the court allow him to depose prior counsel for

defendant on the issue of penalties and sanctions.

¶ 23   On August 6, 2021, after receiving additional filings from both parties, the circuit court

entered an order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss in part and granting the motion in part.

Relying on Patel v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 2012 IL App (1st) 103217, and Estate of Burns v.

Consolidation Coal Co., 2015 IL App (5th) 140503, the court found that it lacked discretion to

modify the Commission’s April 4, 2017, decision, and that it lacked authority to award defendant

credits or offsets. Accordingly, the court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss to the extent it

                                                 8
alleged that plaintiff’s section 19(g) petition should be dismissed because defendant tendered full

payment of the award. However, the circuit court dismissed the portion of plaintiff’s section 19(g)

petition that requested “interest at the rate of 9% per annum from any date prior to the entry of

judgment herein, pursuant to section 19(g).” In doing so, the court found that the appropriate

interest rate was 0.15%, pursuant to section 19(n) of the Act, and that the 0.15% interest rate

applied to the unpaid PPD benefits. The court also dismissed plaintiff’s request for penalties and

sanctions, noting that section 19(g) allowed it to award reasonable costs and attorney fees, not

additional penalties or sanctions. Accordingly, the court denied plaintiff’s request to depose prior

counsel for defendant on the issue of penalties and sanctions. The court set the matter for a status

conference on September 17, 2021.

¶ 24   On September 17, 2021, following the status conference, the circuit court entered an order

directing the parties to submit argument and supporting documentation that addressed the issues

left unresolved by the court’s August 6, 2021, order, including the appropriate amounts of interest,

attorney fees, and costs.

¶ 25   On October 8, 2021, plaintiff filed his argument in support of the section 19(g) petition.

Regarding the issue of interest, plaintiff again argued that he was entitled to section 2-1303 interest

at a rate of 9% on the entire amount of the Commission’s April 4, 2017, decision from September

9, 2015, to June 30, 2019. Plaintiff further argued that he was entitled to 9% interest on the unpaid

amount of the Commission’s decision from June 30, 2019, to the date of the court’s “final 19(g)

Order.” In addition, plaintiff again argued that he was entitled to sanctions and penalties for

defendant’s actions after the proceedings before the Commission. Plaintiff also requested that the

circuit court “reconsider” its denial of his request to depose prior counsel for defendant.

                                                  9
¶ 26   On October 29, 2021, defendant filed a response to plaintiff’s argument supporting the

section 19(g) petition. Defendant asserted that plaintiff improperly sought reconsideration of the

circuit court’s August 6, 2021, order, which was beyond the scope of the court’s September 17,

2021, order. Defendant argued that the court properly determined that section 19(n) interest at a

rate of 0.15% applied, and that such interest applied to the unpaid portion of the award from April

4, 2017. Defendant claimed it owed approximately $354.23 in section 19(n) interest (0.15%

interest on $51,615 from April 4, 2017, through October 29, 2021). Defendant maintained,

however, that it previously overpaid interest and owed no additional interest to plaintiff. Defendant

maintained that it did not owe the $51,615 in PPD benefits for plaintiff’s left leg but, assuming it

owed that amount, “and further assuming judgment is eventually entered by this Court pursuant to

Plaintiff’s 19(g) Petition, then [it] would owe approximately $21,254.07 in interest at the time the

judgment is entered by this Court pursuant to Plaintiff’s 19(g) petition (9% interest on $51,615.00

from April 4, 2017 through October 29, 2021 is $21,254.07, before deducting any overpayment of

the 19(n) interest outlined above).” Defendant further asserted that the court should deny plaintiff’s

request for attorney fees and costs, because plaintiff failed to provide a specific amount and

documentation in support of his request.

¶ 27   On November 4, 2021, following a hearing, the circuit court entered an order directing the

parties to submit proposed orders consistent with the court’s prior rulings. The court noted that if

plaintiff submitted a fee petition with his proposed order, defendant would have 30 days to respond

and “no judgment to be entered without any fee petition being responded to by Defendant.”

¶ 28   On December 3, 2021, defendant filed a motion to supplement the record. Defendant

alleged in the motion that it tendered a check to plaintiff in the amount of $51,967.65 on November

23, 2021. According to defendant, the check represented payment for 50% loss of the use of

                                                 10
plaintiff’s left leg ($51,615) and section 19(n) interest ($361.65). As such, defendant asserted that

it paid all compensation owed to plaintiff. Thus, defendant requested that the circuit court grant its

motion to supplement the record, find that it paid all compensation due and owing, and grant any

other relief the court deemed proper.

¶ 29   On December 8, 2021, plaintiff filed an objection to defendant’s motion to supplement the

record. Plaintiff alleged that, during a prior hearing before the circuit court, defendant agreed that

it owed $51,615 and interest at a rate of 9% per annum pursuant to section 2-1303 from the date

of the Commission’s April 4, 2017, decision to the date of payment, which totaled approximately

$21,500. Plaintiff asserted that it was unnecessary for the court to find defendant paid all

compensation due and owing on a motion to supplement, that defendant’s request amounted to an

admission it owed compensation since April 4, 2017, and that defendant’s motion served no

purpose where both parties previously submitted proposed orders to the court. Thus, plaintiff

requested that the court deny defendant’s motion to supplement the record.

¶ 30   On December 9, 2021, defendant filed a response to plaintiff’s objection. Defendant

asserted that plaintiff’s objection included multiple misstatements of defendant’s “positions and

arguments regarding the 50% of the left leg ($51,615.00) and interest owed.” Defendant claimed

it never conceded that it was liable for 50% of the left leg and any additional section 19(n) interest

awarded in the April 4, 2017, decision on remand. Defendant further claimed it never conceded

that it was liable for section 2-1303 interest at a rate of 9% per annum, “unless and until this

Honorable Court enters judgment on any unpaid amounts.” (Emphasis in original.) Defendant

clarified its position that only section 19(n) interest applied, and section 19(n) interest only applied

to unpaid PPD and medical benefits. Defendant maintained that the court’s August 6, 2021, order

required it to pay PPD benefits for plaintiff’s left leg ($51,615) and section 19(n) interest ($361.65)

                                                  11
from April 4, 2017, through December 3, 2021. Defendant claimed that it issued a check to plaintiff

for those amounts and, thus, it paid all compensation due and owing. Thus, defendant argued that

the court should dismiss plaintiff’s section 19(g) petition with prejudice “because there is nothing

to award Plaintiff in this 19(g) proceeding.”

¶ 31   On December 10, 2021, plaintiff filed a response to defendant’s response. Plaintiff alleged

that defendant was required to show it made full payment of the award prior to the filing of the

section 19(g) petition. Plaintiff asserted that defendant “agree[d] the award of 50% of a leg and

Section 19(n) interest was unpaid on March 8, 2021, the date the 19(g) Petition was filed.” Plaintiff

disagreed with defendant’s claim that it could avoid section 2-1303 interest by paying the unpaid

balance of the award at any time before the circuit court entered a final order on the petition.

¶ 32   On February 4, 2022, the circuit court held a hearing on all pending matters. The court

entered an order allowing defendant time to respond to caselaw provided by plaintiff. The court

indicated that the matter would be taken under advisement after it received defendant’s response.

¶ 33   On February 18, 2022, the circuit court entered a written order that addressed all issues left

unresolved by the August 6, 2021, order. In the order, the court declined plaintiff’s request to

reconsider its ruling on the issue of penalties and sanctions. The court also declined plaintiff’s

request to reconsider its denial of the request to depose prior counsel for defendant. However, the

court reconsidered its prior ruling on the issue of interest and ordered defendant to pay plaintiff an

additional sum for interest, finding that plaintiff was entitled to section 2-1303 interest at a rate of

9% per annum on the unpaid portion of the award ($51,615) from the date of the Commission’s

April 4, 2017, decision to the date defendant made payment. The court also granted defendant’s

motion to supplement the record and found that defendant paid section 19(n) interest in the amount

of $361.65 on November 23, 2021. Accordingly, the court credited defendant the amount of

                                                  12
interest paid and ordered defendant to pay interest in the amount of $21,313.14 ($21,674.79 -

$361.65) within 30 days of the entry of the order. The court denied plaintiff’s request for attorney

fees and costs, finding a good-faith disagreement existed as to the amount owed.

¶ 34   On March 11, 2022, defendant filed a second motion to supplement the record. Defendant

alleged in the motion that it tendered a check to plaintiff in the amount of $23,023.12 on March 9,

2022, representing “9% interest on $51,615.00 from April 4, 2017, through March 18, 2022.”

Defendant indicated that it “need[ed] the record to reflect all the payments made to Plaintiff.”

¶ 35   On March 14, 2022, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from the circuit court’s February 18,

2022, order. On March 17, 2022, defendant filed a notice of cross-appeal.

¶ 36                                       II. Analysis

¶ 37   On appeal, plaintiff argues that the circuit court erred by denying his requests for section

2-1303 interest on the total award, attorney fees, penalties, and to depose prior counsel for

defendant. On cross-appeal, defendant argues that the court erred by denying its section 2-619

motion to dismiss and granting the section 19(g) petition because it paid the full amount of the

Commission’s award. Defendant also argues that the court erred by ordering it to pay section 2-

1303 interest on the Commission’s award.

¶ 38   Because the issue is dispositive, we consider only whether the circuit court erred by

denying defendant’s section 2-619 motion to dismiss. Defendant maintains that the court

incorrectly ruled that it owed the additional PPD benefits for plaintiff’s left leg injury. Defendant

asserts that it paid plaintiff the full amount of the PPD benefits awarded for his left leg injury prior

to the filing of the section 19(g) petition. We agree.

¶ 39   This court reviews the circuit court’s ruling on a section 2-619 motion to dismiss de novo.

Patel, 2012 IL App (1st) 103217, ¶ 8 (citing Simmons v. Homatas, 236 Ill. 2d 459, 477 (2010)).

                                                  13
Our resolution of this issue also requires us to construe section 19(g) of the Act, which presents a

question of law subject to de novo review. Id. (citing Johnson v. Johnson, 386 Ill. App. 3d 522,

534 (2008)).

¶ 40   A section 2-619 motion to dismiss raises affirmative matters that negate a claim and does

not challenge the allegations set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading. Id. ¶ 12 (citing Provenzale v.

Forister, 318 Ill. App. 3d 869, 878 (2001)). “This motion admits the legal sufficiency of a

complaint, but asserts affirmative matters that avoid or defeat the allegations contained in the

complaint.” Id. (citing Miner v. Fashion Enterprises, Inc., 342 Ill. App. 3d 405, 413 (2003)).

¶ 41   Section 19(g) of the Act provides that “either party may present *** a certified copy of the

decision of the Commission when the same has become final, *** whereupon the court shall enter

a judgment in accordance therewith.” 820 ILCS 305/19(g) (West 2020). “When an employer fails

or refuses to pay a final award, section 19(g) provides a statutory remedy for a claimant to reduce

the award to an enforceable judgment in the circuit court.” Estate of Burns, 2015 IL App (5th)

140503, ¶ 17 (citing Aurora East School District v. Dover, 363 Ill. App. 3d 1048, 1054 (2006)).

Section 19(g) is “designed to permit speedy entry of judgment on an award, and the requirements

for the court’s subject matter jurisdiction are strictly construed.” Aurora East School District, 363

Ill. App. 3d at 1055. The circuit court’s inquiry in such proceedings is limited to determining

whether the requirements of section 19(g) have been met. Ahlers v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 73 Ill. 2d

259, 268 (1978). The court cannot question the jurisdiction of the Commission, question the

legality of the Commission’s actions, review the Commission’s decision, or “otherwise construe

the Act, even if the decision appears too large on its face.” Aurora East School District, 363 Ill.

App. 3d at 1055. “The only defense to a section 19(g) petition is full payment of the final award.”

                                                 14
Dallas v. Ameren CIPS, 402 Ill. App. 3d 307, 312 (2010) (citing Aurora East School District, 363

Ill. App. 3d at 1055).

¶ 42   In the present case, the arbitrator issued a decision on March 24, 2011, denying plaintiff

benefits for his cervical spine injury but awarding him benefits for his left leg injury. The arbitrator

awarded plaintiff a total of $88,163.45, which included an award of PPD benefits in the amount of

$51,615. The arbitrator also ordered defendant to pay interest at a rate of 0.15% under section

19(n) of the Act. Defendant paid plaintiff $88,163.45 on April 19, 2011. The Commission

subsequently affirmed and adopted the arbitrator’s decision. The circuit court thereafter reversed

the Commission’s decision and remanded the matter back to the Commission to award plaintiff

benefits for his cervical spine injury. The Commission ultimately issued a decision and opinion on

remand on April 4, 2017, awarding plaintiff benefits totaling $488,639.98. The Commission’s

decision awarded plaintiff $147,961.17 in medical expenses and $103,230 in PPD benefits for his

cervical spine injury, in addition to the $51,615 in PPD benefits for his left leg injury. The

Commission also ordered defendant to pay interest pursuant to section 19(n) of the Act, if any. In

June 2019, following an unsuccessful attempt to appeal the Commission’s decision and opinion

on remand, defendant paid plaintiff $442,078.76. Defendant paid plaintiff a total of $530,242.21

from April 19, 2011, to June 28, 2019.

¶ 43   Plaintiff filed a section 19(g) petition on March 8, 2021, alleging that defendant failed to

pay the full amount awarded by the Commission in its April 4, 2017, decision and opinion on

remand. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that defendant failed to pay $51,615 in PPD benefits for his

left leg injury, as well as interest at a rate of 9% per annum on the total award from September 9,

2015. Defendant filed a section 2-619 motion to dismiss, asserting that it tendered full payment of

the final award. Defendant claimed it paid plaintiff $88,163.45, which included the $51,615 in

                                                  15
PPD benefits, on April 19, 2011, after the arbitrator issued a decision on March 24, 2011.

Defendant further asserted that it overpaid interest under section 19(n) of the Act when it tendered

full payment of the award in June 2019.

¶ 44    After carefully reviewing the record and applicable law, we conclude that the circuit court

erred by denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the section 19(g) petition, where the record reveals

that defendant paid the full amount of the final award prior to the filing of the petition. As an initial

matter, we note that plaintiff did not allege in the section 19(g) petition that defendant failed to

pay section 19(n) interest. Plaintiff alleged only that defendant failed to pay $51,615 in PPD

benefits and requested section 2-1303 “interest at 9% on the total award from September 9, 2015.”

As plaintiff recognizes in his brief to this court, “[i]f the employer pays the full award and all 19(n)

interest to the claimant before the claimant files a section 19(g) petition, the employer does not

owe any interest under section 2-1303.” See Dobbs Tire & Auto v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation

Comm’n, 2018 IL App (5th) 160297WC. Because plaintiff did not allege that defendant failed to

pay section 19(n) interest, we consider only whether defendant failed to pay the $51,615 in PPD

benefits prior to the filing of the section 19(g) petition.

¶ 45    We again note, and plaintiff does not dispute, that defendant paid plaintiff $88,163.45 on

April 19, 2011, which included a sum of $51,615 for PPD benefits awarded for claimant’s left leg

injury. Despite this, plaintiff maintains that defendant failed to pay the full amount of the

Commission’s April 4, 2017, award. Although difficult to discern, plaintiff appears to assert that

defendant’s prior payment of PPD benefits pertained to the arbitrator’s March 24, 2011, decision

and did not pertain to the benefits awarded in the Commission’s April 4, 2017, decision and

opinion on remand. Plaintiff also appears to assert that defendant failed to properly raise the issue

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of its prior payment as provided in section 19(f) of the Act and that it is precluded from raising the

issue in a section 19(g) proceeding. We disagree with plaintiff’s assertions.

¶ 46   We reject plaintiff’s claim that this case involves “two final awards.” As noted, the

arbitrator issued a decision on March 24, 2011, denying plaintiff benefits for his cervical spine

injury but awarding plaintiff benefits for his left leg injury, including an award of PPD benefits in

the amount of $51,615. Plaintiff filed a petition for review of the arbitrator’s decision with the

Commission; thus, the arbitrator’s decision was not a final decision. See 820 ILCS 305/19(b)

(West 2020) (providing that an arbitrator’s decision becomes the final decision of the Commission

unless a party files a petition for review within 30 days of receiving the arbitrator’s decision). The

Commission issued a decision affirming and adopting the arbitrator’s decision on February 2,

2012. Plaintiff sought judicial review of the Commission’s decision in the circuit court; thus, the

Commission’s February 2, 2012, decision was not a final decision. See id. § 19(f)(1) (providing

that the Commission’s decision becomes final and conclusive unless reviewed by the circuit court).

¶ 47   The circuit court entered an order on September 9, 2015, setting aside the Commission’s

decision and remanding the matter back to the Commission to award benefits for plaintiff’s

cervical spine injury. Defendant sought to appeal the court’s decision, but the workers’

compensation division of the appellate court dismissed the appeal because the circuit court’s order

remanding the matter back to the Commission was not a final and appealable order. See Pace Bus

Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 337 Ill. App. 3d 1066 (2003) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction

where the circuit court’s order remanding the case back to the Commission was not a final,

appealable order). The Commission issued a decision and opinion on remand on April 4, 2017,

reversing its prior decision affirming and adopting the arbitrator’s March 24, 2011, decision in

accordance with the circuit court’s September 9, 2015, order. The Commission awarded plaintiff

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benefits for his cervical spine injury, including PPD benefits, in accordance with the court’s order

in addition to the PPD benefits awarded for his left leg injury. The Commission’s April 4, 2017,

decision and opinion on remand became the sole final decision and award after defendant failed to

successfully appeal the decision as provided under section 19(f) of the Act. Thus, contrary to

plaintiff’s assertion, the present case involves only one final decision and award.

¶ 48   Next, we reject plaintiff’s assertion that he is entitled to a windfall on a technicality,

because defendant failed to properly address the issue of its prior payment before the Commission

and circuit court as required by section 19(f) of the Act. It appears from the record that defendant

did not raise an issue regarding its prior payment of benefits because both parties agreed that

defendant paid all benefits related to plaintiff’s left leg injury, and that the only remaining issues

related to plaintiff’s cervical spine injury. Notably, plaintiff’s petition for review filed with the

Commission indicated that he only sought review of the arbitrator’s denial of benefits for his

cervical spine injury. Moreover, counsel for plaintiff agreed that defendant paid all benefits

relating to plaintiff’s left leg injury at a subsequent hearing before the circuit court. Under these

circumstances, we find it proper to consider the payment defendant made prior to the issuance of

the Commission’s April 4, 2017, decision and opinion on remand.

¶ 49   We also reject plaintiff’s assertion that it was “unlawful” to raise the issue of whether

defendant paid all compensation due and owing under the Commission’s April 4, 2017, decision

and opinion on remand before the circuit court or this court. Plaintiff’s assertion is premised upon

his distortion of defendant’s arguments. According to plaintiff, defendant’s argument that it made

a full payment of the award “seem[ed] to imply the Commission erred by awarding the same PPD

in the April 4, 2017, Remand Decision that the Arbitrator awarded in the March 24, 2011 decision.”

However, defendant did not argue that the Commission erred, it merely argued that it paid the full

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amount awarded by the Commission—the sole defense to a section 19(g) petition. See Dallas, 402

Ill. App. 3d at 312 (“The only defense to a section 19(g) petition is full payment of the final

award.”).

¶ 50     We find the cases cited by plaintiff and the circuit court inapplicable to the present case.

See Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469 (1994) (holding that an employer cannot seek

to recover the amount of an overpayment of benefits by filing a claim under section 19(g) of the

Act); Patel, 2012 IL App (1st) 103217 (holding that an employer cannot apply credit for

overpayment of TTD benefits to avoid entry of judgment pursuant to section 19(g) of the Act);

Estate of Burns, 2015 IL App (5th) 140503 (holding that the employer was not entitled to offset

the amount of a federal claim against the state workers’ compensation benefits under section 19(g)

and that the employer was not entitled to offset the amount of the Commission’s award pursuant

to an alleged oral settlement agreement). In the instant case, defendant has not filed a section 19(g)

petition seeking to recover the amount of an overpayment, nor has it sought to apply credit for

overpayment of TTD benefits to avoid entry of judgment pursuant to section 19(g). In addition,

defendant has not asserted that it is entitled to an offset for the amount of a federal claim or that it

is entitled to offset the amount of the Commission’s award pursuant to an oral settlement

agreement. Defendant instead asserts that it made full payment of the final award—a proper

defense to a section 19(g) proceeding—when it paid plaintiff $51,615 in PPD benefits for his left

leg injury. In our view, the caselaw does not prohibit consideration of this payment in determining

whether defendant made full payment of the final award in a section 19(g) proceeding.

Accordingly, we find it proper to consider the $51,615 payment defendant made to plaintiff on

April 19, 2011, in determining whether defendant made a full payment of the Commission’s final

award.

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¶ 51   We find our decision consistent with public policy and the purpose of the Act. Specifically,

the employee should not receive a windfall at the employer’s expense due to the employer’s

prompt payment of benefits. See Messamore v. Industrial Comm’n, 302 Ill. App. 3d 351, 359

(1999) (“In drafting the Act, the legislature was careful to protect injured workers and to encourage

employers to make prompt payments before the amount of liability is certain.”). Denying an

employer the ability to assert that it made payments of benefits prior to the issuance of a final

decision of the Commission in a section 19(g) proceeding would encourage delays as employers

attempt to resolve every ambiguity before paying benefits.

¶ 52   In sum, the record reveals that the Commission awarded plaintiff benefits totaling

$488,639.98 in its April 4, 2017, decision and opinion on remand. The record also reveals that

defendant paid plaintiff a total of $530,242.21 from April 19, 2011, to June 28, 2019. 4 Defendant’s

payments included a payment of $51,615 for PPD benefits for plaintiff’s left leg on April 19, 2011.

Plaintiff does not dispute that he received such payments from defendant prior to filing his section

19(g) petition. Thus, the record demonstrates that defendant tendered full payment of the final

award prior to the filing of the section 19(g) petition.

¶ 53   Because the record demonstrates that defendant tendered full payment of the final award

prior to the filing of the section 19(g) petition, we hold that the circuit court erred by denying

defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s petition. It follows that the court should not have reached

the additional issues raised by the parties regarding section 2-1303 interest, attorney fees, and

penalties.

       4
         The record also reveals that defendant made additional payments to plaintiff during the section
19(g) proceedings.
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¶ 54                                   III. Conclusion

¶ 55   For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the St. Clair County circuit court’s order denying

defendant’s motion to dismiss and vacate all orders entered by the court following its denial of the

motion to dismiss.

¶ 56   Reversed.

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