Court Opinion

ID: 9601593
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:47:29.574762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:10.956785
License: Public Domain

*538NEWMAN, J.,
Concurring. — I agree with Justice Tobriner as to the disregard for precedential cases that seems to inhere in Justice Clark’s opinion. My aim in concurring separately is to explain why, even apart from those cases, the majority opinion should be regarded as sui generis, likely to evanish as a “legislative history” precedent affecting California’s jurisprudence.
The overriding issue in this case cannot be analyzed facilely. The statutes before us are technical and complex; the legislative histories of several of them are intricate. “How To Interpret Statutes Correctly” is a subject dealt with in a million and more pages, many of them penned by first-rate jurists.
One lesson learned from those writings is that conscientious judges glean only minimal aid from so-called canons of construction; e.g., “A specific provision relating to a particular subject will govern a general provision . , . .” (See p. 521 of the maj. opn., ante; cf. fn. 16 of Justice Tobriner’s opn.; Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed (1950) 3 Vand.L.Rev. 395, 401.)
Valid and reliable rules of statutory interpretation do exist. Three of them ought to be stressed here. First, in the words of Learned Hand: “When we ask what Congress [or another legislature] ‘intended’, usually there can be no answer, if what we mean is what any person or group of persons actually had in mind. Flinch as we may, what we do, and must do, is to project ourselves, as best we can, into the position of those who uttered the words, and to impute to them how they would have dealt with the concrete occasion.” (United States v. Klinger (2d Cir. 1952) 199 F.2d 645, 648.) The distingúished justice added, “He who supposes that he can be certain of the result, is the least fitted for the attempt.”1
Second, a judge should approach all legislative histories and related extrinsic aids with observable caution and care. They are data. They also are shards, too fragmented most of the time to tell us much about the whole urn or the deeds of those who helped craft it.
*539Third, authentic interpretation requires that complete laws be examined. To use snippets from laws is perilous. “When an attorney begins to analyze possible ambiguities without a complete list of all statutory words that affect his inquiry, he is as vulnerable as the engineer who in his calculations relies on an incomplete formula. Sentences, sections, and whole statutes must be read from beginning to end.”2
Here we are specially concerned with words that appear in chapter 1004 of laws the California Legislature enacted in 1975. That chapter is labeled “An act to amend Section 1203 of, and to add Section 1203.06 to, the Penal Code, relating to probation.” Both those code sections are set forth verbatim; § 1203 in 107 lines; § 1203.06, 43 lines.
Section 1203.06 is the basic statute we must construe. It begins, “Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1203 . . . [probation shall not be granted to . . . [a]ny person who used a firearm [etc.].” (The italics are mine. Justice Tobriner has set forth the full text in his fn. 4.)
The precise issue in this appeal from the trial court is whether the Legislature — even though its drafters wrote “Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1203” — really meant to say, instead, “Notwithstanding any other provision of law”. The issue arises because the Legislature has placed many probation statutes that are analogous to § 1203 and § 1203.06 in chapter 1, title 8, part 2 of the Penal Code, where § 1203 and § 1203.06 also appear. Yet most of those statutes do not mention § 1203. They rather provide that, in certain kinds of cases (not including this case), probation may not be granted “Notwithstanding any other provision of law . . . .”
Illustrating the Legislature’s having distinguished between “Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1203” and other, more comprehensive phrases is this short summary of several statutes pertaining to our analyses here:
(A) With § 1203.06 and § 1203.07 (both enacted in 1975), which begin “Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1203”, we must compare the adjoining § 1203.08 (enacted in 1976) and § 1203.09 (enacted in 1977), which begin “Notwithstanding any other provision of law . . . .” (See too Justice Tobriner’s comments re § 1203.08 on pp. 533-535 of his opinion.)
*540(B) With § 1202.5, which deals with theft and probation, which was enacted in 1978, and which reads “[H] Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1203” and “[1Í2] Notwithstanding Section 1203.1”, we must compare § 1170.1(g) (enacted in 1977); § 1203.14 (enacted in 1973), § 1203c (enacted in 1935), § 1208(a)[2d 1Í] (enacted in 1972), and § 2601 (enacted in 1975), each of which provides “Notwithstanding any other provision of law . . . .” See too § 12032 (“Notwithstanding any provision of law or of any local ordinance to the contrary”).
(C) Generally for words that in effect do seem parallel to “Notwithstanding any other provision of law” we must consider laws such as § 264.2 (“Probation shall not be granted [no exceptions]”); § 12311 (“No person . . . shall be granted probation”); § 337a.6 (a) and (b) and also Health and Safety Code § 11550 (“In no event does the court have the power”; cf. People v. Ruiz (1975) 14 Cal.3d 163, 166 [120 Cal.Rptr. 872, 534 P.2d 712]); and Senate Bill No. 278 (which in 1975 amended § 1203 and added § 1203.06) as it read when introduced by Senators Deukmejian and Presley on January 23, 1975. Their original § 1203(d), which allegedly allowed no exceptions, was of course changed by the Assembly’s amendment of August 28, 1975, discussed below.
Enlightenment flows also from Penal Code § 4. It declares that all the code’s provisions are to be “construed according to the fair import of their terms, with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice.” In truth, what seems to be the fair import of “Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1203”? Is it not that the words of § 1203.06 are to apply regardless of what the Legislature has pronounced in § 1203? To conclude that those quoted words (“Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1203”), still unamended, import also that § 1203.06 is to override laws other than § 1203 (e.g., § 1385) seems to distort plain meaning, to extend the words so that they voice not what the drafters intended but rather what some people now think those drafters should have intended.
None of the opinions written by my colleagues in this case suggests that the interpretation I thus propose, limiting § 1203.06’s exclusion to § 1203, would in any way obstruct the “objects” of the Penal Code or the goal of promoting “justice”. Accordingly the specific tests prescribed by § 4 of that code, on how we are to construe it, have been met.

Justice Clark’s Extrinsic Aids

Justice Clark’s opinion suggests that his and his majority colleagues’ conclusion as to the meaning of “Notwithstanding the provisions of *541Section 1203” is supported “by pertinent and timely expression of legislative intent existing when section 1203.06 was enacted” (p. 520 of the maj. opn.). He cites three documents; a Legislative Counsel “summary”, a Senate committee staff memo, and a press release issued by the Governor’s office. The Legislative Counsel document reads as follows:
“Existing law provides, except in unusual cases in the interest of justice, for denial of probation to a person convicted of robbery, burglary or arson who unlawfully was armed with a deadly weapon at the time of arrest or perpetration of the crime, or to a person previously convicted of any felony.
“Existing law also provides, except in unusual cases in the interest of justice, for the denial of probation to a person who is convicted of other specified felonies while unlawfully armed with a deadly weapon, or convicted of a crime in which a deadly weapon is used or attempted to be used or in which great bodily injury is inflicted or convicted, or who has been twice previously convicted of felonies, and for various other crimes.
“This bill would revise these provisions so that (1) probation and suspension of sentence would be denied, without any exception in unusual cases in the interest of justice, to any person who uses a firearm during the commission of various felonies, including murder, robbery, first degree burglary, prison escape, and various assaults, rapes and kidnappings, but probation would not be denied in such cases solely on the ground of being unlawfully armed with a firearm in the absence of use as specified above; (2) probation and suspension of sentence would be denied, without any exception in unusual cases in the interest of justice, to any person who is previously convicted of such felonies while armed during the commission of any subsequent felony or unlawfully armed at the time of arrest instead of being denied on the ground of a previous conviction of any felony; and (3) this bill would retain the provisions for denial of probation, except in unusual cases in the interests of justice, but would limit the application of such provisions as they presently relate to using, attempting to use, or being unlawfully armed with deadly weapons, in cases other than where a person was previously convicted once of any felony, to deadly weapons other than firearms.
“This bill would also delete an existing provision, which is inoperative, relative to the requirement of the concurrence of the district attorney for the grant of probation in certain cases.” (Italics added.)
*542Those four paragraphs were printed with the bill when it was introduced on January 23, 1975. Not one word was altered or added by the Legislative Counsel when the bill was amended in the Senate on May 13 and again, in the Assembly, on August 28. The phrase that concerns us, “Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1203”, was not included in the bilí until the Assembly passed its August 28th amendment.
Why did the Legislative Counsel not revise his summary after the August 28th amendment? Possibly he and his staff were much too busy during the final, hectic days of that legislative session. A juridical explanation, however, is that no revision was appropriate. Why not? Because the four paragraphs quoted above suggest that the Legislative Counsel, from January 23 on, regarded the bill as nothing more than an amendment to § 1203. Why is that so? Because both the Januaiy 23 and the May 13 versions of the bill were labeled “An act to amend Section 1203 of the Penal Code, relating to probation”; and when words of the proposed amendment were, on August 28, removed from § 1203 and utilized to create § 1203.06, the only pertinent change was to add, at the beginning of § 1203.06, “Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1203 99
What did the Legislative Counsel mean when he said “without any exception in unusual cases in the interest of justice”? (See the words italicized in parts (1) and (2) of his third paragraph quoted above.) Apparently what he meant was that the exclusion from § 1203 of “unusual cases in the interest of justice” would not apply. (See the words italicized in paragraphs 1 and 2 quoted above, and also part (3) of the third paragraph.) His phrase “[ejxisting law”, in paragraphs 1 and 2, refers to § 1203 only. It does not refer to § 1385 or to the line of cases discussed in Justice Tobriner’s opinion.

The Senate Committee Staff Memo

Justice Clark says that the Legislative Counsel’s paragraphs are consistent with a staff memo stating that the bill (apparently as introduced on Jan. 23) “Prohibits, without exception, the granting of probation to persons who have carried or used firearms in connection with certain crimes, for which probation may be obtained under existing law in unusual cases in the interests of justice.” Unfortunately that quotation has been bobtailed. The memo appears in appendix B of the Attorney General’s brief filed on October 8, 1976. As therein set forth its opening paragraph reads: “Prohibits, without exception, the granting of *543probation to persons who have carried or used firearms, in connection with certain crimes, for which probation may be obtained under existing law in unusual cases in the interests of justice (paras. (1) & (2), subd. (d), Sec. 1203, Pen. C.).”
What is the significance of that closing citation “(paras. (1) & (2), subd. (d), Sec. 1203, Pen. C.)”, which is not mentioned in the majority opinion? It tells us that the writer of the Senate committee memo, like the Legislative Counsel, was concerned with § 1203 only. His reference was to the existing § 1203(d) and its exclusion of “unusual cases in the interest of justice”. Nothing in the six-page memo or in any other document suggests that the writer or the Senate committee ever considered the impact of the August 28th amendment on § 1385 or on the cases stressed by Justice Tobriner. (See the memo’s full text in annex A, infra. The words “without exception” in comment 2 on page 553 clearly involve the reference in comment 1 on page 552 to § 1203(d)’s exclusion (“Except in ‘unusual cases’ where probation would serve ‘the interests of justice’ ”). No words in the memo express or imply any knowledge of or concern with any other Penal Code section.3)

The Governor’s Press Release

The press release from which Justice Clark quotes appears in appendix A of the Attorney General’s brief filed on October 8, 1976. (It is also in annex B, infra.) It indicates that the Governor with some vehemence did declare his views on “those who use guns to commit crimes”. Yet none of its words indicates that the Governor or his advisers had any knowledge regarding legislative intention with respect to the crucial phrase “Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1203”. The press release, like the Legislative Counsel document and the Senate committee memo, *544evidences no official concern whatsoever that affects the August 28th amendment or § 1385 or Justice Tobriner’s cases. (See too the second paragraph of Justice Tobriner’s fn. 6.)

Other Extrinsic A ids

Counsel have referred us to a congeries of other documents, some of which merit comment. Consider, for instance, the Attorney General’s letter of March 14, 1979, which reads in part: “[W]e invite the court’s attention to the view of Alan Sieroty, Chairman of the Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice in a colloquy with Louis Katz, an attorney from San Diego, representing the Criminal Defense Lawyers (see attachment — excerpts from hearing, supra). This makes it clear that the chairman of the committee understood that the discretion of the court to strike the allegation had been eliminated. This is consistent with all of the legislative histoiy presented to the court, and although it is a view expressed subsequent to the passage of the legislation, it may be considered.”
That is a puzzling inference. The paraphrased colloquy was reported as follows (italics added): “Chairman Sieroty: An armed robbeiy case, Mr. Katz, is kind of interesting. Under our law now, the judge would have no discretion to grant them probation.
“Mr. Katz: That’s right; under SB 42.
“Chairman Sieroty: No, under 287, was it? 278. That man would go to prison. He would not have any opportunity for probation. The only opportunity would be that you could convince the district attorney, as to what to say, and he might change the charge, or something else.
“Mr. Katz: Well, if they strike the allegation . . .
“Chairman Sieroty: Strike the allegation of utilization of a weapon in robbeiy. Then there would be a different situation. So what that bill has done is to change who exercises the discretion?
“Mr. Katz: The district attorney instead of the judge.
“Chairman Sieroty: That’s right. That is what I see happening in this process.
*545“Mr. Katz; And that’s what really concerns me that the charging authority, the'district attorney, will have the power to decide who does, or doesn’t, go to prison. Without the benefit of the Judicial System, the district attorney relies on the police report, and true, he has, maybe, the man’s past record, but then about how he charges the defendant is deciding either he goes to trial, or how the man is going to be sentenced, because if they charge an allegation of being armed, the judge has no discretion, and this is the thing we’re concerned about. . . .”
What exactly was meant by the chairman’s words, “Strike the allegation of utilization of a weapon in robbery. Then there would be a different situation.”? The only justifiable inferences, I submit, are (1) that both the chairman and Mr. Katz indeed did know about the § 1385 exception, and (2) that the chairman regarded “strike” cases as “different”, relevant generally perhaps but nonetheless beyond the scope of his on-going inquiry into Senate Bill No. 278, § 1203, and § 1203.06.
There are also letters from the Attorney General to the Assembly and its committee, to the Senate committee, and to the Governor. I have appended them here (as annexes D, E, F, G) first, because starkly they decorate footnote 8 in Justice Tobriner’s opinion;4 and second, because it will be seen that none of them contains any hint that its author’s concerns in any way extended beyond “. . . the provisions of Section 1203”.

“Subsequent” Legislative History

Readers may recall that the excerpt above from the Attorney General’s letter of March 14, 1979 recounts “a view expressed subsequent to the passage of the legislation”. Among many views like that one which might have affected our holding, most were expressed and commented upon during recent months — on TV and radio, in dispatches, editorials, letters to the editor, in tavern and town. The politicization of this proceeding *546after the summer of 1978 became phantasmagoric. A shrill, clamorous campaign — inspired and nurtured by experienced, well-financed, ambitious, and posse-like “hard on crime” advocates — has had a still incalculable but dismal impact on the judicial process in California.
As first presented to the Court of Appeal and then to us, this case might have been a useful vehicle for a much-needed examination of questions involving subsequent legislative history and its proper use by courts. In our letter of February 20, 1979 to counsel we sought comment on “the advisability of utilizing post hoc legislative declarations in litigation generally”. (See annex H, infra.)
Regrettably that needed examination will have to be postponed. Its essential focus has been caricatured, somewhat bizarrely, in several briefs and other statements made before, during, and after oral argument on rehearing here. Thus it is not timely yet for us to reweigh this oft-quoted dictum in Hilder v. Dexter (1902) A.C. 474, 477: “My Lords, I have more than once had occasion to say that in construing a statute I believe the worst person to construe it is the person who is responsible for its drafting. He is very much disposed to confuse what he intended to do with the effect of the language which in fact has been employed.”5 See part II of the State Public Defenders’s amicus brief filed on March 2, 1979 (“The statement in the Condit and Hanelt brief regarding legislative intent is unreliable and irrelevant to this case and should not be considered by this court”); Final Report of the Subcommittee on Legislative Intent of the Assembly Committee on Rules (1963) seriatim; Forsyth, Declaratory Legislation in California (1948) 36 Cal.L.Rev. 634; Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application of Statutes (1975) page 181: “[T]he court’s general duty of deference to the legislature would in many cases be better served by acting consistently with the enacted will of the Legislature than by acting consistently with the unenacted later will, despite the fact that the unenacted expression of intent was the more recent legislative expression.”
*547Finally, because in years ahead the chroniclers of this rehearing and of the whole melancholy tale may lack awareness of pertinent events and diverse pressures that have become so tangled, I think that I should review briefly some of the November 1978 to June 1979 developments regarding § 1203.06.
The trial court’s critical action here was during July 1976. On July 21, 1977, after the Court of Appeal had reversed that action, we granted a hearing; and oral argument was heard on February 6, 1978. Tutored and harsh comment began to appear at least as early as June 1978. (See Nicholson, People v. Tanner: An Update, L.A. Daily J. Rep. (Jan. 24, 1979) p. 4, at p. 6; cf. Nicholson & Condit, The Ultimate Human Right, Met. News (May 23, 1978) p. 2.)
During 1977 and 1978 the Legislature could of course have amended the law. In § 1203.06 the phrase “Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1203” could have been replaced by “Notwithstanding any other provision of law”, “With no exceptions”, or similar words. Except for a perplexing attack by the Republican gubernatorial candidate on October 10 and 11, 1978, however, the hullabaloo did not begin till November 1978. “If the State Supreme Court throws out California’s law mandating prison terms for criminals who use guns, Governor Brown said ... he will lead a fight to reinstate that law. ‘We will have mandatory prison sentences if I have to write the new law or a new amendment to the Constitution,’ Brown said.” (S. F. Chronicle, Nov. 9, 1978.) In early December, “Attorney General-elect George Deukmejian pledged to lead the fight to reinstate mandatory prison sentencing laws if they are overturned by the state Supreme Court.” (L. A. Daily J., Dec. 5, 1978.) “A freshman Assemblyman . . . proposed a constitutional amendment in anticipation of a controversial Supreme Court decision that may overturn a state sentencing law.” (The Recorder, Dec. 13, 1978.)
This court’s initial opinions were filed on December 22. “In Sacramento, Governor Brown reacted sharply .... [B]oth Brown and . . . Deukmejian promised to push for reinstatement of the mandatory prison penalty for gun-wielding criminals . . . .” (This World, Dec. 31, 1978.) The San Francisco Chronicle editorialized: “This law . . . must be *548re-enacted .... And it must be drawn in such a way that the California Supreme Court will have no leg to stand on if it should set out again to override the undoubted will of the people.” (Sunday Punch, Dec. 31, 1978. ) “Sen. Jerry Smith . . . said he saw no or little resistance to passage of the measure, since ‘all legislators feel strongly about this.’ ” Also, “[t]o help expedite matters Smith . . . received permission by a unanimous vote of the upper house to hold a hearing on the measure . . . next Tuesday [Jan. 9]”. (S. F. Examiner, Jan. 3, 1979.)
By that time the Governor seemingly had found that other matters were for him more pressing. “The leadoff witness in favor of the measure was newly inaugurated Republican Atty. Gen. George Deukmejian”, and the committee endorsed the bill unanimously. (L. A. Times, Jan. 10, 1979. ) Two days later it passed the Senate unanimously.6
Meanwhile, back at the Assembly committee where doubts had been expressed at a first meeting on January 8, the inquiry attracted notably fewer media people than did the Senate proceedings. Yet the questions raised there did seem more penetrating and perceptive, and several editorialists began to pronounce their second thoughts. See, e.g., page 6 of part II of the January 11th Los Angeles Times: “Now that the controversy over the Supreme Court’s decision has abated somewhat, the Legislature should take the time required to carefully debate a new statute. The . . . law must be just, and must have some flexibility to provide for the ‘extraordinary cases’ cited by Tobriner.”
Committee action eventually was postponed, and the prospect of new legislation is blurred. See the San Francisco Banner’s Assembly to bypass all sentencing bills . . . , May 4, 1979 (“labeled a ‘death wish’ by Michael Rushford, director of the California Chamber of Commerce Anti-Crime Department”); also the related dispatch from Sacramento in The Recorder, May 10, 1979 (“the Assembly Criminal Justice Committee yesterday approved two moderate measures on dangerous mentally ill offenders, but killed other, tougher sentencing proposals”). Concerning the views of “George Nicholson, a former Alameda County prosecutor who lobbies for the California District Attorneys Association, and Rod *549Blonien, chief legislative lobbyist for Attorney General George Deukmejian,” the San Francisco Examiner had earlier reported (Feb. 7, p. 5) that “their hope for an omnibus blanket for all mandatory terms is bogging down, as a legislative staff review of these laws begins to turn up inconsistencies and anomalies.”7
As noted above, all that seemed needed during the months that have followed December 22, 1978 was a simple amendment that replaced “Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1203” with “Notwithstanding any other provision of law” or an equivalent phrase. To date, the Assembly’s representatives have chosen not to observe the many ex cathedra edicts typified by the quote on my preceeding pages 547-548 from the San Francisco Chronicle, as well as these words from the San Francisco Examiner (Dec. 27, 1978): “The Legislature should make its intent so clear on this law that that issue never again could be raised by this court. And it should make achievement of the goal Act I as it assembles to face the tasks of the New Year.”

Conclusion

The incumbent Attorney General has advised as to what he and his colleagues “obviously intended”. Justice Clark’s opinion pronounces that “the Legislature has not assisted us in discerning its intent”.
With greater perception Justice Tobriner states, “The legislative disapproval of the trial court’s pre-1975 probation practice ... is by no means irreconcilable with a legislative decision to leave the trial courts’ section 1385 power intact; the Legislature may well have desired to disapprove the trial courts’ quite liberal pre-1975 probation practice without completely stripping such courts of their traditional power to strike allegations or findings in the truly extraordinary or exceptional case. [If] Indeed, the lead opinion’s ultimate determination to relieve Tanner of a prison sentence is eloquent testimony to the strength of the traditional, underlying judicial policies in this area, recognizing that exceptional circumstances — unforeseen by the Legislature — may in rare cases warrant a departure from a generally appropriate sentence.”
*550I share those views, and that four colleagues have not felt impelled to explain fully their reasons for disagreement is saddening. My own discussion has converged on evidence regarding the Assembly’s crucial amendment of August 28, 1975. That evidence, I believe, supports a finding that influential legislators who helped guide the final vote desired to restrict the discretion conferred by § 1203 but to retain the discretion conferred by § 1385. At first glance the former section’s stress on “the interests of justice” seems like the latter’s requirement that trial court action be “in furtherance of justice”. Analysis of the legislative and judicial histories helps prove, though, that the aims as well as the applications of the two sections have differed significantly.
*551Annex A

*552

*553

*554

*555

*556

*557Annex B

*558

*559Annex C

*560

*561Annex D

*562

*563Annex E

*564

*565Annex F

*566

*567Annex G

*568Annex H

 In subsequent pages, on the basis of the record in this case, I outline what appears to have happened to Mr. Deukmejian’s bill in Sacramento during the spring and summer of 1975. Via oral argument and correspondence he and other counsel were urged to help accumulate a record that would enable us to articulate as complete a narrative as possible. The scantiness of the record still, however, forfends all feeling of certainty.

 Newman and Surrey on Legislation (1955) page 645; cf. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes (1947) 47 Colum.L.Rev. 527, 543: “Spurious use of legislative history must not swallow the legislation so as to give point to the quip that only when legislative history is doubtful do you go to the statute.”

 Justice Clark’s fourth footnote quotes one sentence from an American Civil Liberties Union letter of September 18, 1975 to the Governor. A reading of the entire letter (see annex C, infra) discloses that its writer, like the Senate memo’s writer, was discussing § 1203 only. (See, e.g., the ACLU letter’s fifth paragraph.) Also of interest is that the ACLU merited no mention in the “HISTORY” paragraph that introduces the Senate memo as follows:
“Source: Attorney General
“Prior Legislation: SB 237 (1973) — held in Assembly
Committee on Criminal Justice
“Support: Calif. D.A.’s & P.O.’s Ass’n; Hueneme
Bay Republican Women, Federated; Irate
Taxpayers Committee
“Opposition: Calif. Probation, Parole, & Correctional
Ass’n; Chief Probation Officers Ass’n.
of Calif; Calif. Public Defenders Ass’n.”

 Also supplementing Justice Tobriner’s opinion, albeit informally and not warrantably, are these comments reported in the Metropolitan News of April 19, 1979 (p. 2): “Deputy Dist. Atty. Maurice Oppenheim, who argued the case the first go-around for the District Attorneys Assn, (as amicus curiae), said that Atty. Gen. George Deukmejian showed ‘unsurpassed ineptness as a state senator in drafting the ‘use a gun, go to prison’ law. [|] He said that Deukmejian, though the ‘foremost expert on criminal law’ in the Legislature and a ‘card-carrying lawyer, ’ had ‘ignored all the prior cases’ on judicial powers in drafting the bill.” (Italics added.)
A letter of September 22, 1977 to this court from Mr. Maurice Oppenheim states, with respect to a brief he had filed, “[T]he sentence reads, ‘Purity is not often an impediment of successful legislation.’ It should be corrected to read, ‘Purity is not always an ingredient of successful legislation.’ ”

 Cf. the Attorney General’s “remarks . . . prepared for delivery ... at oral argument” in the Metropolitan News, March 8, 1979; also his Should the Court Lift Its “Use a Gun, Go to Prison” Ruling? Yes: Judicial Leniency Is Rampant, Los Angeles Times (Mar. 4, 1979)-part V, paragraph 1: “My colleagues and I obviously intended to take away the discretion of the judges . . . because of the history of judicial abuse associated with them.”
That last reminiscence should be contrasted with the following quotation from the Assembly File Analysis supplied to the office of the Attorney General by the Legislative Counsel on March 13, 1979: “The [predecessor] Attorney General admitted there is no . statistical evidence that judges have abused discretion in granting probation in those cases *547covered by AB 289 [a companion bill to Mr. Deukmejian’s bill]. This was confirmed by the Bureau of Criminal Statistics.”
See too State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 7-105(1): “A member of the State Bar shall refrain from asserting his personal knowledge of the facts at issue, except when testifying as a witness.” Cf. Lase her at Large in 54 State Bar J. (1979) page 172, column 3.

 In its lead story regarding happenings on the Senate floor the San Francisco Chronicle, January 12, 1979, page 1, reported: “ ‘Perhaps we can tattoo it across the forehead of the court,’ snarled conservative Senator H. L. Richardson, R-Arcadia.” Cf. Nugent, Removal of Judges by Legislative Action (1979) 6 J.Legis. 140, 142, fn. 24: “In 1786, the Superior Court of Rhode Island ruled a statute unconstitutional. . . . In a fit of legislative pique, the lawmakers attempted to impeach the court. The impeachment effort failed, but the judges of the court somehow failed re-election at the next session.”

 Cf. Prison crowding shadows sentencing conditions (May 1979), State Bar Rep. Instructive as to how, if votes have been corralled, the whole Legislature can respond immediately and without ruffles and flourishes is Senate Bill. No. 1476, which on August 21 and August 25, 1978, respectively, passed the Assembly and Senate after this court’s four-to-three decision on July 31, 1978 in People v. Peters, 21 Cal.3d 749 [147 Cal.Rptr. 646, 581 P.2d 651]. (At the end of September, interestingly it was vetoed by the Governor.)