Court Opinion

ID: 9654182
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:08:50.015118+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:06.536246
License: Public Domain

CALVERT, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
To affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals this Court must nullify jury findings which established three grounds of liability of Continental Bus System based on the negligence of its bus driver-in (1) failing to keep a proper lookout, (2) failing to apply his brakes, and (3) driving at an excessive rate of speed. The majority have reached their ultimate conclusion of no liability on the part of the Bus System by nullifying all findings of proximate cause. They apparently assume that the three findings of negligence have support in the evidence, but conclude that there is no evidence that any of such negligent acts or omissions was a proximate cause of the collision. I do not agree with that conclusion.
I can best present my views of the case by a separate discussion of the three grounds on which the trial court predicated liability. I shall discuss them in the order in which they are listed above. It should be borne in mind that the three grounds of liability are separate, distinct and alternative, and that the rule requiring the evidence to be viewed in its most favorable light in support of the verdict may, with respect to different findings, require an acceptance of exact opposite views of conflicting evidence. I know of no rule which permits us to test all findings by adoption of a single construction of the evidence which conforms with our view of the probable facts. We *88should also 'bear in mind our announced rule that “Appellate courts are without authority to set aside jury verdicts, particularly on questions of proximate cause in damage suits, upon conflicting facts— the undisputed facts must be ample and clear, and the circumstances most exceptional to justify such action.” Liberty Film Lines v. Porter, 136 Tex. 49, 146 S.W.2d 982, 983.
1. Failure to keep a proper lookout. I find in the record no evidence of probative force that the bus driver failed to keep a proper lookout. There is, therefore, no occasion to consider whether there is evidence that his failure to keep a proper lookout was a proximate cause of the collision. I do not reach the issue on which the majority nullify this ground of liability.
2. Failure to apply brakes. The bus driver admitted that he did not apply his brakes. The jury found that the failure was negligence. In my opinion there is evidence to support the finding, and its validity is not questioned by the majority. The majority ’simply say that the record shows conclusively and as a matter of law that the failure to apply the brakes was not a proximate cause of the collision because the collision would have occurred even if there had been a prompt application of the brakes. The two necessary elements of proximate cause are causation and foreseeability. Hopson v. Gulf Oil Corp., 150 Tex. 1, 237 S.W.2d 352, 355. The element said by the majority to be absent in this ground of liability thus appears to be that of causation.
The majority admit that, considered most favorably in support of the jury finding, the evidence will support a conclusion that there was three and one-half seconds of time intervening between the appearance of the Ford automobile in the wrong lane of traffic and the collision. The majority then reach their conclusion that the collision would have occurred in any event by viewing the photographs showing the point on the body of the Ford automobile at which the bus struck it and by concluding therefrom that the Ford would have needed “additional time” to have cleared from the path of the bus. I know of no evidence which shows, as a matter of law, that this “additional time” could not have been obtained by a prompt application of the brakes.
Assuming, as do the majority, that the bus was traveling at a speed of 54 miles per hour or 80 feet per second, it must have been approximately 280 feet from the point of collision at the time the Ford entered the wrong lane of traffic. It would have traveled that distance in three and one-half seconds. It is now generally agreed and accepted by the courts that the time necessary for a normal driver to react to danger is three-fourths of a second. See Chart, Blashfield’s Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, Vol. 9c, page 413; Vietmeier v. Voss, Mo., 246 S.W.2d 785, 788; Ashbrook v. Cleveland Ry. Co., Ohio App., 34 N.E.2d 992, 994; Standard Oil Co. v. Crowl, 8 Cir., 198 F.2d 580, 582. In three-fourths of a second the bus would have covered a distance of 60 feet, thus leaving over 200 feet in which the brakes on the bus would have been operating to decelerate its speed. With no evidence in the record to show the rate of deceleration of the speed of the bus the majority have nevertheless concluded, as a matter of law, that the rate of deceleration would not have been such as to allow the additional time necessary for the Ford to clear from the pathway of the bus. With the same evidence of speed and distance and the same photographs before it, the jury concluded that a prompt application of the brakes would have allowed the Ford time to clear to safety. The majority holding to the contrary is a denial to the jury of the right to select which of two reasonable inferences it would draw from the facts.
What has been said thus far has been in an endeavor to show that the legal *89conclusion of the majority on this phase of the case is erroneous even if their construction of the evidence be accepted. But the majority’s construction of the evidence should not be accepted; it is not the most favorable construction in support of the verdict of which the evidence is reasonably susceptible. As a matter of fact, the majority opinion completely ignores important testimony bearing on the length of the time period between the emergence of the Ford into the wrong lane of traffic and the collision, testimony from which the jury could reasonably have concluded that the driver of the bus had more than three and one-half seconds in which to apply his brakes and decelerate the speed of the bus.
Mrs. Wm. Gross, driver of the Chevrolet automobile which ran into the rear of the Ford and one of the defendants in the case, testified that after colliding with the Ford she closed her eyes, opened them, turned off the ignition key, turned, to her friend and asked if she was all right, and then heard the crash of the bus and the Ford at the same time her friend answered. The majority opinion recounts this testimony but apparently gives it no effect. There is in the record no estimate or opinion of the time consumed by the witness in the activities detailed, but the jury could conclude, on the basis of common knowledge and from the manner in which the witness related the events, that the period of time involved was ample for the bus driver to apply his brakes and so decelerate his speed as to allow the Ford to escape. But there was yet another basis for such a conclusion. On cross-examination of Mrs. Gross, counsel for Continental twice snapped his fingers to indicate a time lapse and inquired whether the time period between her collision with -the Ford and its collision with the bus was greater or less than that indicated. The record does not show how many times counsel snapped his fingers on the first occasion. On the second occasion he snapped them three times. Each time Mrs. Gross testified that the time which elapsed between the two collisions was longer than the time which elapsed while counsel was snapping his fingers. The record does not reflect how much time elapsed while counsel was snapping his fingers. For all we know it may have been three seconds, or five seconds, or ten seconds. In any event, the jury saw and heard the demonstrations, and in support of their verdict we must assume that from them the jury concluded there was time for the bus driver to apply his brakes and so decelerate his speed as to allow the Ford to escape. We must also assume that the demonstrations supported that conclusion. It was not the duty of the plaintiffs to prove how much time elapsed during the demonstrations; the evidence satisfied the jury. If Continental expected to contend that the demonstrations did not constitute evidence of probative force in support of the findings and to ask a reversal for that reason, it was under an obligation to further develop the matter so as to have the record reflect how much time elapsed during the demonstrations. This it did not do. And yet, in spite of Continental’s failure to show that this evidence does not and cannot support the jury’s verdict, the majority have nullified that verdict and rendered judgement for Continental. I respectfully submit that the majority should not ignore this highly material evidence which supports the jury’s verdict, the while professing to follow the rule requiring a consideration of all the evidence in its most favorable light in support of the verdict.
I cannot agree that this record shows, as a matter of law, that the collision would have occurred even if the bus driver had acted non-negligently in a prompt application of his brakes. The time elapsing between the emergence of the Ford into the wrong lane of traffic and the collision is vital to the majority holding. The record reflects that in fixing that time at three and one-half seconds the majority have not viewed the evidence in its most favorable light in support of the verdict. *90Moreover, the record does not compel a conclusion that three and one-half seconds, the time period accepted by the majority, was too little time for an avoidance of the collision by an application of the brakes on the bus.
3. Driving at an excessive rate of speed. As I understand the majority opinion on this phase of the case two reasons are assigned for nullifying the finding that the excessive speed of the bus was a proximate cause of the collision. They are that (a) the speed of the bus “only furnished the condition and gave rise to the occasion for the bus being present at the time and place of the collision” and (b) the bus driver could not foresee that the Chevrolet would strike the rear of the Ford and propel it into the wrong traffic lane. It thus appears that the element of proximate cause said by the majority to be absent from this ground of liability is that of foreseeability.
With respect to their holding that the speed of the bus only furnished the condition and gave rise to the occasion for the collision the majority state that the facts detailed in the opinion demonstrate “that speed at which the driver was driving the bus could not be a proximate cause of the collision, except as said by the Court of Civil Appeals ‘ * * * only in some such sense as that if its bus had not been on the highway at all the collision could not have occurred.’ ” It is interesting to note that the approved quotation from the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals was by that court borrowed from the opinion of the Eastland Court of Civil Appeals on original submission of Wright v. McCoy, 131 S.W.2d 52, 55, which court, on motion for rehearing, withdrew its holding that excessive speed could not, as a matter of law, be a proximate cause of a collision with a vehicle traveling in the wrong lane of traffic and thereby disavowed the very holding which the majority now approve as sound.
Approval by the majority of the quotation from Wright v. McCoy indicates that what they are actually holding is that speed of an automobile in its own lane of traffic can never be a proximate cause of a collision with an automobile proceeding in the opposite direction and in the wrong lane of traffic, because the law does not require that the driver of the speeding automobile foresee that the other will enter the wrong lane. There are cases from other jurisdictions which will support a holding either way on that question. See cases collected in the annotations in 77 A.L.R. 598, 601, and 47 A.L.R.2d 6, 95. The Texas cases on the question which I have found support a holding that excessive speed of a motor vehicle may be held to be a proximate cause of a collision with another vehicle in the wrong lane of traffic. Justiss v. Naquin, Tex.Civ.App., 137 S.W.2d 72, writ dismissed, judgment correct; Blocker v. Brown Express, Inc., Tex.Civ.App., 144 S.W.2d 451, writ refused; Womack v. Hazelwood, Tex.Civ.App., 271 S.W.2d 699, writ refused, n. r. e. It will be noted that this Court refused a writ of error in Blocker v. Brown Express, Inc., thus giving full approval to the opinion in that case and making that opinion as authoritative as one of its own opinions. The only case coming to my attention which even indicates a contrary holding is Davis v. Younger Bros., Tex.Civ.App., 260 S.W.2d 637, writ refused, n. r. e., and the holding, as a matter of law, that speed was not a proximate cause of the collision in that case must be considered as applying only to its peculiar facts which indeed are peculiar and need not be detailed here.
It is wholly out of keeping with reality to hold that an operator of an automobile traveling on a modern, heavily-traveled public highway cannot and should not reasonably foresee that an automobile approaching from the opposite direction may, for some reason, enter the wrong lane of traffic and thus be endangered by excessive *91speed which makes stopping or turning aside to avoid a collision impossible or more difficult. I apprehend that the court was correct in its statement in San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v. Behne, Tex.Com.App., 231 S.W. 354, 356, when, in referring to cases bearing on the element of anticipation in proximate cause, it said: “From them, however, it will be seen that our Supreme Court has uniformly applied what might, be termed a practical, common sense test, the test of common experience. The expression ‘natural and probable result’ has been used and interpreted to mean what should reasonably be anticipated in the light of common experience applied to the surrounding circumstances.” Common experience teaches that thousands of .automobiles enter wrong highway traffic lanes every day. It is a matter of common knowledge that a fair proportion of collisions on highways 'are “head-on” ■ collisions, resulting from one of the automobiles being in the wrong lane of traffic. I submit, therefore,- that we should not adopt a rule which must always result in a holding that speed is not a. proximate 'cause of a collision, as a matter of law, where the offending vehicle is in its own lane of traffic and. collides with another vehicle in the wrong lane of traffic.' Assume there is a collision between a motorist traveling at a speed of ninety miles per hour in his own lane of traffic and one traveling in an opposite direction who, as a reasonably prudent person, has concluded that he has ample time to pass a preceding automobile and has pulled into the wrong lane of traffic in order to do so. Should we and would we hold,' as a matter of law, that no liability for damages could be imposed on the speeder on the ground that he could not reasonably have foreseen that the injured' party would enter the wrong lane of traffic for the purpose of passing the preceding automobile? I think not. And if the correct answer is no, the majority’s theory that excessive speed only furnishes the condition and gives rise to the occasion for the collision but cannot be the proximate cause thereof has no validity.
In support of their holding that there is no proximate cause, as a matter of law, because the bus driver could not foresee that the Chevrolet would strike the rear of the Ford and propel it into the wrong lane of traffic the majority cite and quote at length from Wiley v. Mercer, 282 S.W.2d 87, a Court of Civil Appeals’ decision. I respectfully suggest that, considered in the light of a long line of analagous decisions by this- Court, this holding of the majority in this case, as well as the holding of the Court of Civil Appeals in Wiley v. Mercer on which it is based, are erroneous. This conclusion is inescapable under the very rule announced by the majority in the first part of their opinion, in which they say: “It is not necessary that the defendant should or would reasonably anticipate the very consequences or the exact nature of the plaintiff’s injury or the precise manner of its infliction in order that such consequence be foreseeable.”
The true rule is correctly stated by this Court in Sullivan v. Flores, 134 Tex. 55, 132 S.W.2d 110, 111, cited by the majority, where it is said that all that is required as a predicate for liability of a negligent defendant is that “As a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence, he should have anticipated the danger to others created by his negligent act, and the rule does not require that he anticipate just how injuries will grow out of that dangerous situation.” In that case the driver of a taxicab was negligently making a U turn in the middle of a street when a spare tire, properly attached to the rear of the cab, was knocked loose by another automobile and rolled several feet down the street, striking the minor plaintiff. The Court of Civil Appeals held no proximate cause as a matter of law, rea'soning that the defendant, although negligent, could not have foreseen that the plaintiff would be injured by the spare *92tire being knocked loose. This Court reversed the holding of the Court of Civil Appeals, saying: “Of course, he could not have anticipated the exact nature of such injuries, but liability does not depend upon his having been able to do so. It is sufficient if he should have anticipated an injury of the general nature of that suffered by this minor. It is, no doubt, unusual for a spare tire to be knocked from its setting and put in motion by a collision, but that fact does not exonerate the negligent driver from liability.” On the same theory it can be said in this case that it is unusual for one automobile to be knocked from its own into the wrong lane of traffic, but that fact does not exonerate the negligent driver from liability. In the same spirit this Court refused in Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. of Texas v. McLain, 133 Tex. 484, 126 S.W.2d 474, to hold, as a matter of law, that operatives of a train left negligently blocking a street could not foresee that an approaching motorist might fail to see the train and be forced at the last minute to make a sudden application of his brakes, thereby causing his automobile to skid on the wet street and strike the plaintiff pedestrian standing nearby. And in Carey v. Pure Distributing Corp., 133 Tex. 31, 124 S.W.2d 847, this Court, on the same theory, refused to hold, as a matter of law that the act of the defendant in negligently fastening oil cans in a truck was not a proximate cause of injuries to a plaintiff who was lying on a cot beside a road and was hit on the head by a flying lid which had been blasted loose from one of the cans when the can fell from the truck and struck the highway. Applicable here also is the rule laid down in Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Ballew, Tex.Com.App., 66 S.W.2d 659, 661, and quoted with approval by this Court in the recent case of Walker, Inc., v. Burgdorf, 150 Tex. 603, 244 S.W.2d 506, 510, as follows: “When the new cause or agency concurs with the continuing and co-operating original negligence in working the injury, the original negligence remains a proximate cause of the injury, and the fact that the new concurring cause or agency may not in such case have been reasonably foreseeable should not relieve the wrongdoer of liability.”
I submit that if the rules announced and followed in the foregoing cases be applied and followed in the instant case the finding of the jury that the excessive speed of the bus was a proximate cause of the collision should not be nullified on the theory that the bus driver could not have foreseen that the Chevrolet would strike the rear of the Ford and knock it into the pathway of the bus. To sustain the finding of proximate cause under that rule it is not necessary that the bus driver should have foreseen the manner in or by which the Ford entered the wrong traffic lane, whether by being propelled into it by another automobile, as it was, by skidding into it on the wet road surface, by the locking and grabbing of brakes on the left side, by the sudden pull of a blow-out of a tire on that side, or by being deliberately driven there by the operator in an effort to pass another automobile.
I am satisfied that the holding that excessive speed could not be a proximate cause of the collision cannot validly rest on an absence of the element of foreseeability. The question remains whether the holding can rest on an absence of the element of causation, a matter the majority seem not to have considered. In my opinion it cannot.
The jury made no finding as to what it regarded as a reasonable speed. Any speed less than 54 miles per hour would have allowed additional time for the driver to apply his brakes and decelerate his speed after the Ford entered the wrong traffic lane. The controlling facts on this phase of the case are that the bus and the three automobiles were approaching each other on a wet highway with the *93bus traveling at an excessive rate of speed of at least 54 miles per hour or 80 feet per second. At that rate of speed it covered the distance from where it was when the Ford entered its lane of traffic to the point of collision in a minimum of three and one-half seconds. It is not unreasonable to assume that the jury might have believed a .speed of 40 miles per hour was a reasonable speed for the heavy bus to have been traveling under the circumstances. At 40 miles per hour the bus would have been moving at a speed of 58⅜ feet per second, and at such speed would have required approximately five seconds to cover the same distance it would have covered in three and one-half seconds at 54 miles per hour. It thus appears that even under the majority’s version of the facts the excessive speed of the bus was a substantial factor in bringing about the collision. That is all that is required to establish the presence of the element of causation in proximate cause. Prosser on Torts, p. 321, sec. 46; Hopson v. Gulf Oil Corp., 150 Tex. 1, 237 S.W.2d 352, 355.
In my opinion the Court of Civil Appeals erred in holding, as a matter of law, that none of the negligent acts of the bus driver was a proximate cause of the collision. The Court of Civil Appeals also held that the jury findings of proximate cause were so contrary to the great weight and overwhelming preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong. That court’s jurisdiction on that question is final and would require a reversal of the trial court’s judgment and a remand of the cause for retrial- I do not share petitioner’s view that that question was not properly or adequately preserved by respondent for review by the Court of Civil Appeals. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remand the cause to the trial-court.
SMITH and WALKER, JJ., join in this opinion.