Court Opinion

ID: 9854588
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:09:32.15483+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:10.007444
License: Public Domain

*722Deen, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur fully with the majority opinion, except for its conclusion in Division 2 that the appellant has left this court nothing to review by virtue of his confusing the law on voluntary intoxication with the law on withdrawal from conspiracy.
Dawson requested that the trial court give the following charge on the issue of withdrawal from conspiracy: “I charge you that a person would not be criminally responsible if his mind were so impaired by alcohol that he could not form intent to commit an act or understand the consequences of such act.” Heretofore, this charge has always addressed voluntary intoxication, and it is unusual to see it applied to withdrawal from conspiracy. “Good old rye whiskey,” sometimes resulting in a bacchanalian revel or wild merriment, may very well be a tonic for various complaints, Mason v. State, 1 Ga. App. 534, 536 (58 SE 139) (1907), but it has never served as a cure for conspiracy.
In any event, it matters little whether the charge deals with voluntary intoxication or withdrawal from conspiracy. While it may not be error to give the requested charge in some instances, see Pope v. State, 256 Ga. 195 (16) (345 SE2d 831) (1986), on numerous occasions this court has held that it is not error to omit it. Williams v. State, 180 Ga. App. 854 (2) (350 SE2d 837) (1986); Faircloth v. State, 175 Ga. App. 130 (332 SE2d 686) (1985).