Court Opinion

ID: 9811007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:06:01.234892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:40:23.726891
License: Public Domain

BeogdeN, J.
Tbe insured failed to pay tbe ninth premium due on 22 November, 1931. On 21 December, 1931, be wrote a letter to tbe company, stating that it would be impossible to pay tbe premium at present and requesting an extension of time for ninety days in which to make tbe payment. One day after bis death, tbe company, not knowing of tbe death, wrote a letter, agreeing to extend tbe time upon certain conditions. Manifestly, tbe rights of tbe parties are to be determined at tbe time of tbe death of tbe insured. "What then, was tbe status of tbe parties at tbe time of tbe death of tbe insured? Tbe insured bad paid eight premiums on tbe policy and tbe ninth premium fell due on 22 November, 1931. Consequently, sucb premium was not paid either when due or within tbe grace period prescribed in tbe policy. Tbe insured bad borrowed tbe sum of $86.32 on tbe policy, and at tbe *868end of the eighth policy year the loan value was $93.00, and at the end of such year there was an extension provision of eight years and one month. The policy provided that at any time “after three annual premiums have been paid hereon . . . the company will within ninety days after receipt of written request by the insured, with a full and valid surrender of this policy and all claims hereunder, pay a cash surrender value as indicated in the table of guaranteed values,” etc. Hence, if the loan of $86.32 be subtracted from the cash of the loan value of the policy, to wit, the sum of $93.00, there would be a balance of $6.68. However, the policy provided that this cash surrender value was payable only “after receipt of written request by the insured, with a full and valid surrender of this policy and all claims hereunder.” The letter written by the insured on 21 December, 1931, is in no sense a request for the payment of the cash value as contemplated by the plain terms of the contract. It was a request for time indulgence and no more.
The plaintiff, however, asserts that at the time of his death the insured had an extension contract extending the life of the policy for eight years and one month. The extension clause was as follows: “At the expiration of three years from the date hereof, if any subsequent premium be not paid when due, the company will, without action on the part of the insured, extend this policy . . . for the term provided in the table of guaranteed values opposite the number of years for which annual premiums have been paid.” But the insured had borrowed $86.32 upon the policy, and it was provided in the contract that the “extended insurance shall be for as long a term as the balance left after deducting the indebtedness from the net value of the extended insurance as shown in the table, will purchase as a net single premium.” The indebtedness is known. It is $86.32. But what is “the net value of the extended insurance” as shown in the table? There was evidence, and the judge so found, that the “net value of the extended insurance”' was $82.27. Therefore, as the indebtedness was in excess of “the net value of the extended insurance,” the extension feature disappears from the case.
The plaintiff excepted to the testimony upon which the finding as to the “net value of the extended insurance,” was based, but it is generally accepted principle of law that parol evidence is admissible to explain technical terms. The principle was expressed in Neal v. Ferry Co., 166 N. C., 563, 82 S. E., 878, as' follows: “It is well settled that where words or expressions are used in a written contract, which have in particular trades or vocations a known technical meaning, parol evidence is competent to inform the court and jury as to the exact meaning of such expression in that particular trade or vocation, and *869it is for the jury to hear the evidence and give effect to such expression as they may find their meaning to be.”
The cash surrender value of the policy became effective only upon the “written request” of the insured and the “valid surrender of the policy.” Hence, as this provision has never been complied with, the plaintiff as beneficiary, is not entitled to recover the cash or loan value of $6.68.
Affirmed.
SohbNCK, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.