Court Opinion

ID: 9898791
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-15 07:09:52.058079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:55.582403
License: Public Domain

AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed November 9, 2023

                                    S   In The
                             Court of Appeals
                      Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                No. 05-23-00536-CV

              IN THE INTEREST OF A.S. AND D.S., CHILDREN

                On Appeal from the 305th Judicial District Court
                             Dallas County, Texas
                     Trial Court Cause No. JC-21-1143-X

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION
                 Before Justices Pedersen, III, Garcia, and Kennedy
                            Opinion by Justice Kennedy
      Mother appeals an order terminating her parental rights to child D.S. and

appointing her possessory conservator of child A.S. In her first issue, she challenges

the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding

that termination of her rights as to D.S. is in the child’s best interest. In her second

issue, she contends the trial court abused its discretion by appointing a non-parent

managing conservator of A.S. We affirm. Because all dispositive issues are settled

in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(a), 47.4.

                    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      Mother and Father met in Louisiana and were in a relationship for a few years,

during which time they moved to Texas and had two children, A.S. and D.S. The
family     lived    with    Father’s      mother      (“Paternal     Grandmother”),        Paternal

Grandmother’s husband, Father’s brother, and Paternal Grandmother’s godson.

Mother worked at Walmart from 6:00 a.m. to 3 p.m. while Father cared for the

children, and Father worked at Cici’s Pizza from 4 p.m. until 10 p.m. while Mother

cared for the children.

       On the morning of December 4, 2021, at about 5:00 a.m., Mother went to

work, leaving seven-week-old D.S. and 14-month-old A.S. in the care of Father, who

was still asleep. At about 11:30 a.m., Father began sending messages to Mother that

something was wrong with D.S. and to call him. Mother finished checking out the

customers in her line and stepped away from her cash register to call Father. When

he did not answer, she left work immediately to drive home. On the way home, she

was able to video call Father, who showed her D.S. Mother thought D.S. looked

like he was having a seizure and instructed Father to call 9-1-1. When Mother

arrived home, emergency medical personnel were examining D.S., but they declined

to transport D.S. to a medical facility. Mother and Father drove D.S. to the hospital

where he was examined and admitted to the neonatal intensive care unit.

       That evening, CPS1 Special Investigator Megan Wash, went to the hospital

with the understanding that “there was a child, one-month-old, with severe head

injury.” Wash spoke to the social worker and medical staff familiar with D.S.’s case

   1
      The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services initiated the underlying case and will be
referred to throughout this opinion as either “CPS” or “the Department.”
                                                –2–
before speaking to the parents individually. Mother told Wash she did not know

what had happened to D.S. and wanted to know what could have happened. Wash

went to the family’s home and spoke to Father who stated that he had woken up at 7

a.m., put on a show for A.S., went downstairs to smoke a cigarette for about twenty

minutes, and returned to find D.S. on the floor. Father indicated that D.S. had either

rolled off of the bed or had been caused to fall off of the bed by 14-month-old A.S.

Father stated that sometime between 10 a.m. and 11 a.m., he told Paternal

Grandmother that D.S. was “acting funny.” After talking with both parents and the

nurses, Wash determined Father’s explanation that D.S. fell off of the bed could not

have caused his injuries. She further determined that a safety plan was necessary for

A.S. because she suspected that Father was responsible for D.S.’s injuries and

Mother was going to stay at the hospital with D.S. Mother named one of Father’s

relatives, Paternal Cousin, to care for A.S. A.S. remained in the care of Paternal

Cousin, while D.S. was eventually discharged from the hospital into the care of

foster parents in Houston.

      On December 5, Dr. Kristen Reeder, a child abuse pediatrician with the

REACH Clinic at Children’s Medical Center, performed a medical evaluation on

D.S. Upon examination, Dr. Reeder discovered that D.S. had a skull fracture on the

right side of his head that had separated, bleeding around both sides of his brain,

multiple areas of brain swelling, and one area of brain tissue damage. He also had

two bone fractures on his lower leg and metaphyseal corner fractures near his ankle,

                                         –3–
which had been discovered after D.S.’s initial x-rays on the day he was admitted.

The injuries to his leg were already in the healing state, indicating that they happened

at least a week prior. Mother and Father both reported that, the previous day, D.S.

had slept all day and had to be woken up to be fed, which Dr. Reeder noted was

unusual for a child. To explain D.S.’s head injuries, Father informed Dr. Reeder that

D.S. had fallen off the bed, but Dr. Reeder testified that, although it was feasible for

a child to fall from the bed, such a fall would not cause the severity of D.S.’s injuries.

Father offered no explanation for the injuries to D.S.’s leg. Dr. Reeder testified that

the metaphyseal fractures indicated at the ends of the bone and are referred to as

“‘highly specific for inflicted injury’ because especially in a little infant they are . . .

caused by a violent pulling or yanking on the bone.” She further stated that the

presence of these fractures, at D.S.’s age of seven weeks, were odd “unless [they

were] inflicted [on] him.”

       Detective Timothy Roundtree with the Mesquite Police Department

interviewed both Mother and Father about D.S.’s injuries. Mother reported simply

that she had left D.S. in Father’s care while she worked, Father contacted her about

D.S.’s acting differently, and she told Father to call 9-1-1 to get medical treatment

for D.S. The detective confronted Father with the fact that the version of events he

had given previously—D.S. falling off the bed—did not explain the extent of D.S.’s

injuries. Father admitted he had been holding D.S. in his lap while playing a video

game. When he began losing, Father became extremely mad and stood up, causing

                                           –4–
D.S. to fall. Father caught D.S. by the ankle, causing the newborn to swing and hit

his head against the bedframe. Father also admitted to forcefully shoving a pacifier

into D.S.’s mouth because the newborn was crying. The detective testified Father

was later charged with one count of serious bodily injury to a child.

         On December 7, the Department2 filed an original petition for protection of a

child, for conservatorship, and for termination in suit affecting the parent–child

relationship. In its original petition, the Department stated its intent to reunify

Mother and Father with the children but alternatively sought to terminate their

parental rights on the grounds they knowingly placed or allowed the children to

remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered the children’s physical or

emotional well-being3 and engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with

persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the children’s physical or

emotional well-being.4

         The case proceeded to a bench trial, which took place on December 10, 2022,

and continued on January 10, February 6, February 7, February 15, and February 17

of 2023. The Department called several witnesses to testify, including Dr. Reeder,

Detective Roundtree, Special Investigator Wash, and Betty Cannon, a therapist

   2
       See supra note 1.
   3
       See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D).
   4
       See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).
                                                –5–
whom Mother had been ordered to visit. Paternal Grandmother testified on behalf

of Father, and Mother’s only witness was herself.

         After considering the evidence and arguments of counsel, the trial court

terminated the parent–child relationship between Father and both children based on

findings that Father had knowingly placed or allowed the children to remain in

conditions or surroundings that endangered the children’s physical or emotional

well-being5; that Father engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with

persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the children’s physical or

emotional well-being6; and that termination of the relationship was in the children’s

best interest. The trial court further terminated the parent–child relationship between

Mother and D.S. based on findings that Mother had knowingly placed or allowed

D.S. to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered D.S.’s physical or

emotional well-being7 and that termination of the relationship was in D.S.’s best

interest.8

         The trial court appointed the Department as permanent managing conservator

of D.S. Finally, the trial court appointed Paternal Cousin as managing conservator

of A.S. and Mother as possessory conservator A.S., after finding appointment of

Mother as permanent managing conservator of A.S. would significantly impair the

   5
       See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(D).
   6
       See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).
   7
       See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(D).
   8
       See Fam. § 161.001(b)(2).
                                         –6–
physical health or emotional development of A.S. and that Mother requires

assistance and guidance in making decisions regarding the welfare of A.S.

         Mother filed her notice of appeal. Father did not file a notice of appeal.

                                              DISCUSSION

I.       Termination of the Parent–Child Relationship with D.S.

         In her first issue, Mother challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the

evidence to support the trial court’s finding that termination of her rights as to D.S.

is in the child’s best interest.9

         A court may terminate a parental relationship if it finds by clear and

convincing evidence (1) one or more statutory grounds for termination and (2) that

termination is in the child’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)–(2).

Clear and convincing evidence is proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of

fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be

established. Id. § 101.007.

         In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting an order

terminating parental rights, we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to

the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a “firm

belief or conviction that its finding was true.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex.

2002). “To give appropriate deference to the factfinder’s conclusions and the role

     9
     Although Mother cites both sections 161.001(2) and 161.003(a)(5) of the family code, the Department
did not seek, and the trial court did not grant termination under section 161.003. Therefore, we only address
Mother’s issue under section 161.001(2).
                                                    –7–
of a court conducting a legal sufficiency review, looking at the evidence in the light

most favorable to the judgment means that a reviewing court must assume that the

factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder

could do so.” Id. In other words, we will disregard all evidence that a reasonable

factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible. Id.

      In a factual sufficiency review, we consider whether the disputed evidence is

such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved the disputed evidence in

favor of its finding. Id. “If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that

a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so

significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or

conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient.” Id.

      A strong presumption exists that the best interest of the child will be served

by keeping the child with a parent. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006)

(per curiam). Prompt and permanent placement of a child in a safe environment is

also presumed to be in the child’s best interest. See In re K.S.L., 538 S.W.3d 107,

115 (Tex. 2017) (citing FAM. § 263.307(a)). Several statutory factors relevant to this

appeal should be taken into account in evaluating a parent’s willingness and ability

to provide the child with a safe environment, including the child’s age and

vulnerabilities; results of psychological evaluations of the parents; whether there is

a history of substance abuse by the child’s family; the willingness and ability of the

child’s family to complete counseling services and to cooperate with an agency’s

                                          –8–
close supervision; and the willingness and ability of the child’s family to effect

positive and personal changes within a reasonable period of time. See In re S.B.,

No. 05-20-01066-CV, 2021 WL 1940453, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 14, 2021,

no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing FAM. § 263.307(b)(1), (6), (8), (10), (11)).

      In addition to these statutory factors, we look to other non-exclusive factors

relevant to the best-interest determination, including (1) the child’s desires, (2) the

child’s present and future emotional and physical needs, (3) the present and future

emotional and physical danger to the child, (4) the parent’s parental abilities, (5) the

programs available to assist a parent to promote the child’s best interest, (6) the

parent’s plans for the child, (7) the stability of the home, (8) the parent’s acts or

omissions that may indicate the parent–child relationship is not a proper one, and (9)

any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions. See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d

367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976); see also In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018)

(citing FAM. § 263.307; Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72). A best-interest finding need

not be supported by evidence of every Holley factor, particularly if there is

undisputed evidence that the parental relationship endangered the child’s safety. See

In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002).

            A. D.S.’s Desires

      The trial court heard evidence that D.S. was approximately 14 months’ old at

the time of trial. Further, the injuries D.S. sustained caused him to have significant

developmental delays such that he cannot speak or walk and has cortical blindness

                                          –9–
so that he can only see shadows or movement. Therefore, due to his age and injuries,

D.S. was not able to express his desires. See In re C.V. L., 591 S.W.3d 734, 754

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, pet. denied) (noting first Holley factor of child’s desires

“is generally considered neutral” when child does not testify due to young age). The

court heard testimony from Paternal Grandmother and Mother regarding the sole in-

person visit Mother had with D.S. at his foster home. According to Paternal

Grandmother, Mother held D.S. and he was smiling. Mother related that when she

held and talked to him, D.S. “was smiling and it’s like he knew I was his mom.”

However, we have previously held that “evidence that a child loves a parent and

enjoys visits is only marginally relevant to a best interest finding.” See In re D.W.,

445 S.W.3d 913, 926 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied). Accordingly, we

conclude on the record of this case that this factor is neutral, weighing neither in

favor of nor against termination of parental rights.

            B. D.S.’s Physical and Emotional Needs

      Witnesses testified extensively as to D.S.’s physical needs, and there was little

evidence as to his emotional needs. Debbie Guedry, a CASA supervisor, testified

she had worked with CASA for over seven years on over sixty cases and had not had

“as medically fragile of a case as [D.S.’s].” As previously noted, D.S.’s injuries

resulted in significant developmental delays, causing him to be unable to speak or

walk or see much more than shadows. At the time of trial, D.S. required nursing

care 24 hours each day and a feeding tube. During his days and nights, D.S. lay on

                                        –10–
a medical crib that is elevated as he had difficulty sitting up without assistance and

required several different exercises to stretch his muscles as well as glasses to help

him see better. At the time of trial, D.S. had a total of nine different physicians, all

of whom were located in the Houston area. According to Guedry, she had attended

conferences with D.S.’s medical providers and testified as to her opinion that it

would not be in D.S.’s best interest to move to a different location with different

providers. There was also evidence that D.S.’s condition would not improve but

instead that his physical needs would grow as he grew larger and remain unable to

speak or walk or feed himself. According to Dr. Reeder, D.S. “will have a low

quality of life, will require . . . significant medical care . . . for the rest of his

shortened life.”

      As for D.S.’s emotional needs, Angeline Wolf, the CPS caseworker who had

been assigned to this case since December 2021, testified D.S.’s foster mother in

Houston wanted to adopt D.S. Guedry testified that foster mother had been “very

good” with D.S. and that she had observed the foster mother be very interactive with

D.S. Mother testified she would love D.S. the same way his foster mom would. In

light of this record that shows D.S.’s extensive physical needs as well as the fact that

D.S.’s head injuries and broken bones were sustained before his removal from

Mother’s custody, we conclude this factor is related to the remaining Holley factors

below. See, e.g., In re D.W., 445 S.W.3d at 926 (noting second and fourth Holley

                                         –11–
factors are related). Accordingly, we will weigh these factors together at the

conclusion of this section of the opinion.

            C. Present and Future Emotional and Physical Danger to D.S.

      The record evidence indicated D.S. faced physical danger from his injuries,

more specifically any cessation or change in his care. As discussed above, D.S.’s

medical needs were extensive at the time of trial and were anticipated to become

only more so with time as he grew larger with age. The trial judge heard testimony

that while D.S. remained in the hospital in Dallas, his name had been removed from

the Department’s petition because “they were not expecting him to live.” Guedry

testified as to her belief that it was due to D.S.’s medical providers and his foster

mother that he was still alive at the time of trial. Several witnesses, including the

therapist CPS required Mother to see, expressed concern that Mother did not

understand the full extent, the severity, or the permanence of D.S.’s injuries. The

concern underlying much of this testimony was that Mother had moved to

Shreveport, and Wolf testified she did not know what resources or providers were

available to Mother or D.S. in that city. Mother did not offer any testimony

regarding what resources or providers were available in Shreveport, only that she

had made plans and attempted to reach out to governmental agencies, like Medicaid

and CPS.

      In addition to the physical danger to D.S. in the event of inadequate care for

his injuries, there was the evidence that D.S. had suffered those life-threatening

                                        –12–
injuries while in Father’s care and that he had suffered other injuries of fractured

bones while in Mother’s and Father’s custody. Dr. Reeder testified that the fractured

bones D.S. suffered are referred to as “‘highly specific for inflicted injury’ because

especially in a little infant they are . . . caused by a violent pulling or yanking on the

bone” and that they appeared to have been sustained a week prior to D.S.’s head

injury. No explanation was provided by Father or Mother for those injuries. The

record contained some evidence that there were times between the time Father left

for work and the time Mother returned home that the children were left without care

from any particular adult living at the home. There was also evidence that Father

had been adjudicated for the sexual assault of his five-year-old cousin when he was

sixteen years old. Thus, the record contains evidence of risk for physical danger to

D.S. from abuse while in Mother’s care, if only from others whom she might trust

to care for D.S. as she did Father and the other adults living with her and the children.

See FAM. § 263.307(b)(8) (courts may consider whether there is history abusive or

assaultive conduct by the child’s family or others who have access to the child’s

home in determining whether child’s parents are willing and able to provide child

with safe environment); see, e.g., In re C.J.P., No. 05-22-00233-CV, 2022 WL

7936574, at *10 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 14, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.)

(concluding evidence of Mother’s neglect, physical abuse, and failure to intervene

to stop Father’s abuse of children weighed in favor of terminating parental rights in

discussion of third Holley factor).

                                          –13–
      As for emotional danger, several witnesses testified as to their concern that

Mother did not understand the criminal nature of Father’s actions that resulted in

D.S.’s injuries and that Mother would permit Father to visit or otherwise contact

D.S. CASA advocate Nancy Cherwitz testified that when she met with Mother and

Wolf in August 2022, it appeared to her that Mother did not think Father had done

anything wrong, with respect to causing D.S.’s injuries, and that Mother did not

understand why Father was not allowed to see D.S. or A.S.            Wolf, the CPS

caseworker, similarly testified that Mother told Wolf that she did not believe Father

intentionally injured D.S.

      Mother testified that Father should have his parental rights to both children

terminated, and she expressed her understanding that Father needed to be kept away

from A.S. because of what D.S. “had went through, it was very serious.” She also

admitted that she told her therapist that she wanted her children to have their Father

around. Mother testified she meant she would allow him to have video calls with

A.S. and D.S. Mother explained her understanding that, because Father had been

charged with injury to a child, he could not leave the state of Texas to visit Mother

where she lived in Shreveport and could not “harm the kids on the video visit.” See

In re C.J.P., 2022 WL 7936574, at *12 (concluding evidence of Mother’s

demonstrated inability to protect her children from the emotional and physical

dangers of domestic violence could support trial court’s conclusion that children had

and would continue to be subject to emotional and physical danger).

                                        –14–
            D. Mother’s Parental Abilities

      Witnesses testified as to three main concerns with regards to Mother’s

parental abilities. First, as noted above, Cherwitz and Wolf testified they did not

believe Mother understood the criminal nature of Father’s actions that caused D.S.’s

injuries and thus would not protect D.S. from future contact with or other potential

harm from Father. As discussed above, Mother testified her belief that D.S.’s head

injuries were the result of an accident, not caused by any intentional conduct by

Father and that she did not see any harm in continuing to allow him to contact both

children with video calls.

      Second, several witnesses, including Betty Cannon, the therapist CPS

required Mother to see between twenty-five and thirty times, expressed concern that

Mother did not understand the full extent, the severity, or the permanence of D.S.’s

injuries and thus would not be prepared to care for him. Cannon testified that when

she discussed D.S.’s future care and physical needs as he grew older, including that

he would need “someone to change him on a daily basis, feed him, pick him up,

[and] carry him everywhere,” Mother told her, “no, I’m not accepting that from my

child.” According to Cannon, Mother said she had seen D.S. making developmental

progress at a level appropriate for his age and even at a level appropriate for an older

infant and that Mother did not believe the medical reports and did not understand

that his injuries were permanent. Cannon admitted it was not unreasonable for

Mother to question the accuracy of the medical reports, but Cannon also “felt as

                                         –15–
though [Mother] was not fully comprehending . . . how [caring with a child with

developmental delays] would change her lifestyle.”

      The third concern raised, particularly by Cannon, was that Mother was easily

influenced and lacked good decision-making abilities. Cannon related that Mother

would rely on the advice of others to make decisions, even what furniture and

furnishings to include in her home. According to Cannon, Mother was aware that

Father was abusing marijuana on a regular basis to relieve stress and did not believe

it would affect his ability to take care of the children while Mother was at work. See

FAM. § 263.307(b)(8) (courts may consider whether there is history of substance

abuse by child’s family in determining whether child’s parents are willing and able

to provide child with safe environment); see also In re L.E.H., No. 05-18-00903-

CV, 2018 WL 6839565, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 31, 2018, no pet.) (mem.

op.) (considering Father’s awareness of Mother’s history of substance abuse as

evidence in support of trial court’s best-interest finding)). Cannon testified Mother

needed oversight when parenting A.S. and that she was not capable of parenting

D.S., even with oversight. Cannon testified one of the areas she worked on with

Mother was parenting skills and had observed Mother applying those skills with

A.S., but Cannon still concluded “that the only thing [Mother] needed was somebody

to kind of help her oversee some of the higher functioning skills of parenting with

her child.”

                                        –16–
      Mother offered evidence of completing services assigned to her by CPS,

disputed Cannon’s assessment, and offered evidence of the parenting certificate she

had received. Mother testified that she had contacted Medicaid and the CPS agency

in Shreveport about resources to care for D.S. and that she planned to have her

mother care for D.S., as well as receive training herself. Cannon testified that she

had observed at least one visit between Mother and A.S. and that the parent–child

dynamic between them appeared healthy.

            E. Programs Available to Assist Mother

      There was limited evidence regarding what programs were available to assist

Mother. Wolf testified she did not know of what resources were available to Mother

in Shreveport. Mother testified she had contacted Medicaid and CPS in Shreveport.

According to Mother, Medicaid told her D.S.’s medical records in Houston were

necessary “to see how they can get me some type of assistance for his—for the

nursing that he has there.” Mother also testified that CPS in Shreveport told her it

would help get her training to care for D.S. and that it would help her obtain benefits

through Medicaid.

            F. Mother’s Plans for D.S.

      Even after the trial court heard testimony that D.S. required nursing care

twenty-four hours a day, a feeding tube through his navel, several daily stretching

exercises, and care from nine physicians, Mother did not testify as to any more

specific plan for caring for D.S. other than that she had contacted Medicaid and CPS

                                         –17–
in Shreveport and that her mother, Maternal Grandmother, would help her care for

A.S. and D.S. if both were returned to her. There was some evidence that Maternal

Grandmother had some training or certification as a nursing assistant. Mother

admitted that she did not contact Medicaid in Shreveport until January 2023, after

the first trial hearing, despite the fact that she had moved to Shreveport in September

2022. Mother stated her plan was to quit her job if D.S. was placed with her and that

Maternal Grandmother would help her with rent and other expenses.

               G. Stability of Mother’s Home

         The record reflects that when D.S. was first injured and A.S. was removed

from Mother’s care in December 2021, Mother lived in Paternal Grandmother’s

home with Father and other paternal relatives. Mother testified that two days after

D.S.’s injury, she moved into her own apartment away from the “drama” at Paternal

Grandmother’s home. Around August 2022, Mother decided to move to Shreveport

and did so in September 2022.10 According to Mother, she lived in an apartment in

Shreveport within minutes of Maternal Grandmother and at least one maternal aunt.

Mother offered pictures of the one-bedroom studio apartment she was renting and

testified she had lived there since early October 2022. Mother also testified that she

    10
      There was conflicting evidence as to whether the CPS caseworker encouraged Mother to move to
Shreveport. The CPS caseworker denied that she had done so and instead testified that Mother informed
her that she needed to move to Shreveport because she had lost her job and had been evicted from her
apartment for failure to pay her rent. Mother testified she had never been evicted nor had she told anyone
at CPS that she was evicted. According to Mother, she applied for and obtained a hardship transfer to
obtain a job at a Walmart in Shreveport and then moved to an apartment there with the help of her mother
and her aunt.
                                                 –18–
had applied for and obtained a transfer from her job with Walmart in Dallas to a

Walmart in Shreveport. Mother stated her plan was to quit her job if D.S. was placed

with her and that Maternal Grandmother would help her with rent and other

expenses.

            H. Mother’s Acts and Omissions and Excuses for Same

      The evidence in the record consistently established that Mother was not at

home when D.S. began seizing. Further, there was evidence that Father admitted to

causing head injury to D.S.—while Mother was at work—by standing from a seated

position while holding the infant in his lap, catching the infant’s ankle, and—

whether intentionally or not—causing D.S.’s head to hit the bedframe. However,

there was also evidence that D.S. had healing bone fractures that Dr. Reeder testified

were likely caused by pulling or yanking on D.S.’s legs, and there was evidence that

on December 3, 2021, Mother and Father had to wake D.S. to feed him and that he

had some amount of redness or swelling over one of his eyes. Neither Mother nor

Father offered any explanation for the cause of D.S.’s healing bone fractures.

Therefore, the trial court could found that even if Mother did not harm D.S. herself,

she left him in the care of Father who admitted to harming D.S.

      Moreover, there was evidence that Mother was aware that Father regularly

used marijuana, and Mother testified—even after Cannon testified as to explaining

to Mother the danger of leaving Father alone to care for young children while under

the influence of marijuana—that she thought it was a good decision to leave her

                                        –19–
children with Father at 5 a.m. in the morning, knowing that he had smoked marijuana

before going to bed around midnight. According to Cannon, she believed that

Mother’s conduct indirectly resulted in D.S.’s injuries because she was aware of

Father’s drug use and did not think it would have any great effect on his ability to

take care of their children. Mother’s only explanation for her lack of concern about

Father’s drug use was that she did not think Father acted any differently when he

was under the influence of marijuana.

            I. Summary of Facts and Conclusion

      As noted above, the concerns about D.S.’s current and future physical and

emotional needs, the physical and emotional danger he continued to face and

Mother’s parenting abilities are all related. D.S. was particularly vulnerable due to

his injuries and age at the time of trial. See FAM. § 263.307(b)(1) (child’s age and

physical vulnerabilities).   There was evidence that Mother—even though she

testified she understood that D.S. required nursing care around the clock—had not

made any efforts to prepare for that care, outside of contacting CPS in Shreveport

and Medicaid and obtaining her own mother’s agreement to assist her with D.S.’s

care. There was repeated testimony that when presented with the opportunity to

discuss D.S.’s medical care with his medical providers, Mother did not take those

opportunities, instead she remained silent. See id. Further, there was evidence that

Mother, although she testified she would limit Father’s access to D.S., still believed

the incident that caused D.S.’s injuries was an accident, did not comprehend the

                                        –20–
criminal nature of Father’s conduct in causing D.S.’s injuries, and did not understand

the inherent danger Father presented as someone who was abusing marijuana while

caring for a newborn and a toddler barely older than a year.             See FAM. §

263.307(b)(6) (results of psychological and developmental evaluations of child and

Mother), (7) (history of abusive conduct by child’s family), (8) (history of substance

of abuse), (10) (willingness of child’s family to effect positive environmental and

personal changes), (11), (12)(E) (protection from repeated exposure to violence),

and (12)(F) (child’s family’s understanding of child’s needs and capabilities). All

of that evidence could cause the trial court judge to be concerned about Mother’s

ability to protect D.S. from future injuries.

      Taking into account non-exclusive factors set forth in Holley, we conclude the

record contains legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s

finding that it was in D.S.’s best interest that Mother’s parental rights to him be

terminated. See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976).

      In support of her first issue, Mother asks why if D.S. would be in a “vegetative

state” the remainder of his life should Mother’s parental rights be terminated. This

Court has previously held that the Holley factors focus on the best interest of the

child, not the best interest of the parent. See In re K.D., No. 05-18-00849-CV, 2018

WL 6187660, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 27, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.)

(emphasis added). Moreover, underlying this question is the presumption that D.S.

                                         –21–
could suffer no further harm from contact with Mother. Based on the record and

evidence in this case, we conclude the trial court could have found otherwise.

      Mother’s first issue is overruled.

II.   Conservatorship of A.S.

      In her second issue, Mother argues the Department did not overcome the

parental presumption and thus the trial court abused its discretion in naming Mother

the possessory conservator instead of the managing conservator of A.S.

            A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

      In its final order ordering the appointment of Mother as possessory

conservator of A.S., the trial court’s made the finding that the appointment of Mother

as managing conservator of A.S. “is not in the best interest of the child, because the

appointment of [Mother] would significantly impair the physical health or emotional

development of the child.” That language tracks that of section 153.131 of the

family code.

      “It is a rebuttable presumption that the appointment of the parents of a child

as joint managing conservators is in the best interest of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 153.131(b)). “[U]nless the court finds that appointment of the parent or parents

would not be in the best interest of the child because the appointment would

significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional development, a parent

shall be appointed sole managing conservator or both parents shall be appointed as

joint managing conservators of the child.” Id. § 153.131(a). The strong presumption

                                           –22–
that the best interest of a child is served by appointing a natural parent as managing

conservator is deeply imbedded in Texas law. See In re A.M., No. 05-19-00412-CV,

2019 WL 4071998, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 29, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(citing Lewelling v. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Tex. 1990), In re J.T.S., No.

05-17-00204-CV, 2018 WL 1465535, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 26, 2018, no

pet.) (mem. op.), and In re B.B.M., 291 S.W.3d 463, 468 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009,

pet. denied)).

        To support a finding of significant impairment, the evidence must do more

than merely raise a suspicion or speculation of possible harm. See In re A.M., 2019

WL 4071998, at *2 (citing In re B.B.M., 291 S.W.3d at 467). Instead, the evidence

must support the logical inference that some specific, identifiable behavior or

conduct of the parent, demonstrated by specific acts or omissions, will probably

harm the child. Id. (citing In re B.B.M., 291 S.W.3d at 467; R.H. v. D.A., No. 03-

16-00442-CV, 2017 WL 875317, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 2, 2017, pet.

dism’d) (mem. op.)). This is a heavy burden that is not satisfied by merely showing

the nonparent would be a better choice as custodian of the child. See id. (citing In

re B.B.M., 291 S.W.3d at 467). Acts or omissions that constitute significant

impairment include, but are not limited to, physical abuse, severe neglect,

abandonment, drug or alcohol abuse, or immoral behavior by the parent. See id.

(citing In re B.B.M., 291 S.W.3d at 469). A factfinder may infer the present fitness

of the parent to be managing conservator from the parent’s recent, deliberate past

                                        –23–
misconduct. See id. (citing R.H., 2017 WL 875317, at *5). But evidence of past

misconduct, standing alone, may not be sufficient to show present unfitness. See id.

(citing R.H., 2017 WL 875317, at *5). “When a nonparent and a parent are both

seeking managing conservatorship, the ‘close calls’ go to the parent.” See id.

(quoting In re B.B.M., 291 S.W.3d at 469) (citing In re F.E.N., No. 18-0439, 2019

WL 2667029, at *2 (Tex. Jun. 28, 2019) (per curiam)).

       “[A] finding that appointment of a parent as managing conservator would

significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional development is

governed by a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.” See In re A.M., 2019 WL

4071998, at *3 (quoting In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex. 2007)). The

heightened standards of proof and review for termination decisions do not apply.

See id. (citing In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d at 616).              Instead, conservatorship

determinations “are subject to review only for abuse of discretion, and may be

reversed only if the decision is arbitrary and unreasonable.” See id. (quoting In re

J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d at 616) (citing In re L.W., No. 02-16-00091-CV, 2016 WL

3960600, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jul. 21, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“A trial

court abuses its discretion if the court acts without reference to any guiding rules or

principles, that is, if the act is arbitrary or unreasonable.”).

       Legal and factual sufficiency are not independent grounds of error in

conservatorship cases but are relevant factors in determining whether an abuse of

discretion occurred. See In re A.M., 2019 WL 4071998, at *3 (citing In re L.W.,

                                           –24–
2016 WL 3960600, at *2). To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion

because the evidence was insufficient to support its decision, we consider whether

(1) the trial court had sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its discretion and

(2) erred in its exercise of that discretion. Id. (citing In re L.W., 2016 WL 3960600,

at *2). We conduct the applicable sufficiency review with regard to the first

question. Id. (citing In re L.W., 2016 WL 3960600, at *2). We then determine

whether, based on the elicited evidence, the trial court made a reasonable decision.

Id. (citing In re L.W., 2016 WL 3960600, at *2). The trial court is the sole judge of

the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. See id.

(citing In re M.A.M., 346 S.W.3d 10, 14 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied)).

            B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Not Appointing
               Mother as Managing Conservator of A.S.

      Mother urges that the evidence in the record shows, at the time of trial, she

was a presently suitable person to have custody of A.S. Mother points to the

testimony from her therapist Cannon who stated Mother had maintained

employment at Walmart, maintained a place to stay, and had obtained an appropriate

size bed for A.S. in her apartment. Cannon also testified that the only thing she

believed Mother needed was someone to help her oversee the higher functioning

skills of parenting with her child. Mother also relies on the evidence that she had

completed the services required of her by CPS and had family support from her own

mother and aunt.

                                        –25–
      The evidence in the record contains more than what Mother relies on. The

record also contains the evidence discussed above in analyzing the trial court’s

decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights to D.S., including her refusal to

acknowledge Father’s conduct as criminal and her minimization of his drug use

while caring for both D.S. and A.S. See In re K.N.D., 424 S.W.3d 8, 10 (Tex. 2014)

(per curiam) (holding that a reviewing court may examine a parent’s history with

other children as a factor of the risks or threats of the environment in context of

examining whether child removed for abuse or neglect under chapter 262 of Texas

Family Code).

      Based on all the evidence in the record, we conclude the trial court had

sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its discretion and did not err in appointing

a non-parent managing conservator of A.S. See In re A.M., 2019 WL 4071998, at

*3 (citing In re L.W., 2016 WL 3960600, at *2). Put another way, we cannot

conclude the trial court acted arbitrarily or unreasonably by finding that the

appointment of Mother as a managing conservator would significantly impair A.S.’s

physical health or emotional well-being. See FAM. § 153.131(a).

      We overrule Mother’s second issue.

                                        –26–
                                   CONCLUSION

      We affirm the trial court’s final order terminating Mother’s parental rights to

D.S. and appointing non-parent managing conservator of A.S.

                                           /Nancy Kennedy/
                                           NANCY KENNEDY
                                           JUSTICE

230536F.P05

                                       –27–
                                  S
                           Court of Appeals
                    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

IN THE INTEREST OF A.S. AND                  On Appeal from the 305th Judicial
D.S., CHILDREN,                              District Court, Dallas County, Texas
                                             Trial Court Cause No. JC-21-1143-X.
No. 05-23-00536-CV                           Opinion delivered by Justice
                                             Kennedy. Justices Pedersen, III and
                                             Garcia participating.

      In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, we AFFIRM the trial
court’s May 12, 2023 Final Order in Suit Affecting the Parent–Child Relationship.

    It is ORDERED that appellee the TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY
AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES recover its costs of this appeal from
SHATERRICA JOHNSON.

Judgment entered this 9th day of November 2023.

                                      –28–