Court Opinion

ID: 9589822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:49:01.215936+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:46.290297
License: Public Domain

Miller, Justice,

concurring:

While I agree that W. Va. Code, 7-10-4, violates due process principles and is therefore unconstitutional, the majority opinion does not adequately address the problem. Whenever this Court determines that a statute is unconstitutional, it has an obligation to delineate its reasons so that those who desire to have curative legislation enacted may have some guideline.
Furthermore, since this Court has in the past considered similar statutes and has held them not to violate due process standards, some passing reference should be made to those cases. Burdett v. Allen, 35 W. Va. 347, 13 S.E. 1012 (1891), involved a municipal ordinance authorizing the impoundment of domestic animals found running at large on public streets. This was followed by Haigh v. Bell, 41 W. Va. 19, 23 S.E. 666 (1895), which upheld a statute permitting double damages against the owner of hogs running at large, coupled with the right of the injured property owner to distrain the animals and sell them. Both of these cases upheld the right of the State through its police power to enact legislation to regulate stray animals.
It is a legitimate function of the State to control and protect animals which have been abandoned or subjected to inhumane treatment. Such right, however, is not *82completely unfettered and is ultimately circumscribed by due process. One must recognize that Burdett and Haigh were decided at a time when due process was perceived to have a much narrower application.
This Court has recognized restrictions imposed on governmental conduct by due process standards in the removal of children from their parents by the Department of Welfare. Custody may be temporarily taken in emergency situations which threaten the health or welfare of the child without the necessity of a due process hearing, but the State must subsequently provide a reasonably prompt hearing. In re Willis, 157 W. Va. 225, 207 S.E.2d 129 (1978); State ex rel. Lemaster v. Oakley, 157 W. Va. 590, 203 S.E.2d 140 (1974).
Another aspect of this problem was discussed in State ex rel. Payne v. Walden, 156 W. Va. 60, 190 S.E.2d 770 (1972), a case involving the seizure of property under the garnishment statute. The statute was found unconstitutional from a due process standpoint upon the general principle that:
“When one is deprived of a right, it matters not that the deprivation is minimal. A restriction of a property right, temporarily or permanently, is nevertheless a prohibited curtailment of a right protected by the Constitution when such is accomplished without notice or hearing, absent a showing of a special or extraordinary State or creditor interest.” 156 W. Va. at 76, 190 S.E.2d at 779.
In Payne, the Court indicated that procedural due process concepts did not in all instances dictate that before an owner could be deprived of his property on a temporary basis there must be a pre-seizure hearing. Cases were cited in which courts held that because of some overriding public policy, a pre-seizure hearing was not necessary under due process standards. Perhaps the best formulation of this exception is to be found in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 32 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1972), where the Court listed three criteria that must be met in order to obviate a pre-seizure hearing:
*83“First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to secure an important governmental or general public interest. Second, there has been a special need for very prompt action. Third, the State has kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person initiating the seizure has been a government official responsible for determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary and justified in the particular instance.” 407 U.S. at 91.
It is under these guidelines that we must test the constitutionality of W. Va. Code, 7-10-4.
There is a general public interest in seeing that animals are humanely treated and that something is done with abandoned animals so that they do not create a nuisance. This is the rationale that permits humane officers to round up stray animals whose ownership is undetermined. Thus, the first criterion is met. Burdett and Haigh recognize the police powers of the State are legitimately involved in this aspect of the regulation of animals.
For much the same reason, I believe that the second criterion can be substantiated in that there is a need for prompt action on the part of the State to intervene where animals are cruelly treated or abandoned. In re Willis, supra, and State ex rel. Lemaster v. Oakley, supra, provide an appropriate precedent.
It is upon the final criterion that the statute runs astray. The statute does not set sufficiently narrow standards whereby the State maintains strict control of its right to seize. It has, by the use of words “neglected or cruelly treated”, vested an impermissible amount of discretion in humane officers to determine in what instance they will make a seizure. Because we are dealing with due process considerations, before such a statute can be constitutionally acceptable, there must be specific standards as to what acts are deemed to constitute neglect and cruel treatment.
*84In this area there is an analogue to those cases where this Court has struck down statutes creating criminal penalties or deprivation of freedom when the statute lacked certainty and definitiveness. State v. Flinn, _ W. Va. _, 208 S.E.2d 538 (1974); State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 157 W. Va. 417, 202 S.E.2d 109 (1974).
The word “abandon” carries with it a sufficiently precise meaning and if it were the only standard set out in W. Va. Code, 7-10-4, the statute would not be unconstitutional under Fuentes. Certainly, as to abandoned animals the entire due process rationale disappers since there is no owner to whom notice and a pre-seizure hearing can be given.
Much of the problem connected with the looseness of the language would disappear if the “neglected or cruelly treated” phrase were restated in the language used in the criminal statute involving cruelty to animals. W. Va. Code, 61-8-19.
Finally, the State is required to provide a reasonably prompt post-seizure hearing where the facts of the particular case justify the absence of a hearing prior to the seizure. See, Fuentes v. Shevin, supra.