Court Opinion

ID: 9829550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:25:23.438285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:02.850631
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Counsel for appellee Victor Francis has filed his motion for rehearing based upon two contentions, the first of which is that this court erred in holding, since the undisputed evidence shows that appellee’s claim was not filed with the Accident Board within 6 months after the occurrence of -his injury, that it was incumbent upon him to show that good cause existed for not having filed his claim within such time, and that having failed so to do, his claim was, by the terms of the compensation statute, barred by limitation at the time same was by the appellee filed with the Accident Board, in thai the proviso in the compensation statute that for good cause shown the Accident Board may, in meritorious cases, waive strict compliance with the 6 months’ period prescribed for filing claims with the Accident Board (Vernon’s Ann. Civ. St. 1925, art. 8307, § 4a), confers upon said board arbitrary and absolute authority to waive 'the filing of such claims within 6 months, and therefore neither the district court nor this court has authority to inquire into the question as to whether good cause existed for not filing the claim within 6 months.
We are of opinion, as we were at the time of filing our original opinion, that if our finding that there was no evidence showing a good reason why the claim was not filed within 6 months, as required by law, was correct, then our holding that the claim was barred at the. time of its filing was correct.
 It has been held by the weight of authority, we think, that, the Workmen’s Compensation Act having created the right to be enforced and provided the remedy therefor, each step in the progress of the maturity of a claim from the time of the injury to its final adjudication is a mandatory requirement necessary to the exercise of jurisdiction by the first and all succeeding statutory agencies. Such is the holding by our Supreme Court in the ease of Mingus, Receiver, v. Wadley, 115 Tex. 551, 285 S. W. 1084. In that case it is said:
“The general rule is that where the cause of action and remedy for its enforcement are derived, not from the common law, but from the statute, the statutory provisions are mandatory and exclusive, and must be complied with in all respects, or the action is not maintainable.”
In Texas Employers’ Insurance Association v. Nelson (Tex. Civ. App.) 292 S. W. 652, it is said:
“In order to sustain the jurisdiction of the district court in rendering the judgment it did render in this case, the plaintiff must have alleged and proved: (1) Notice to the subscriber of the injury; (2) a claim for compensation must have been made by the injured party to the Industrial Accident Board within 6 months after the occurrence of such injury; (3) the party dissatisfied with the final ruling or decision of the Accident Board shall, within 20 days after the rendition of such final decision, give notice to the board and to the adverse party that he will not abide by such final decision, and shall, within 20 days after giving such notice, bring suit .in the county where the injury occurred to set aside such final decision of the board. Articles 8306 and 8307, Vernon’s Ann. Texas Statutes 1925.
“The district court, in enforcing the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Vernon’s Ann. Civ. St. 1925, art. 8306 et seq.), is a court of limited jurisdiction — the remedies for such enforcement being derived from the statutes, the statutory provisions are mandatory and exclusive and must be complied with in all respects, or the action is not maintainable.
“Each step in the progress of the maturity of a claim from the time of the injury to its final adjudication is a mandatory requirement, necessary to the exercise of jurisdiction by the first and succeeding statutory agencies.”
See, also, Home Life Accident Co. v. Orchard (Tex. Civ. App.) 227 S. W. 705; Georgia Casualty Co. v. Ward (Tex. Civ. App.) 221 S. W. 298; Bushnell v. Ind. Board, 276 Ill. 262, 114 N. E. 497; Northwestern Malt & Grain Co. v. Industrial Co., 313 Ill. 534, 145 N. E. *141at page 90; In re Fierro’s Case, 223 Mass. 378, 111 N. E. 957; In re Barry’s Case, 240 Mass. 409, 134 N. E. 260.
Tie second contention is that we erred in our finding that there was no evidence to support a finding by either the Accident Board or the district court that good cause existed for appellee’s failure to file his claim with the Accident Board within the 6 months’ period.
Since our attention has been by the motion directly called to certain evidence which had not theretofore been pointed out, we have carefully examined the statement of facts, and, after so doing, we have reached the conclusion that appellee’s contention is sustained by such statement.
In addition to the facts stated in the original opinion, it is shown that there was an understanding among the employees of the Ford Company, the employer of Francis, and said company that, when an employee got hurt, he was to report to the first aid room, and that after so doing it became the duty of a clerk in the superintendent’s office to prepare 'and file the claim of an employee who suffered an injury with the Accident Board; that it was the custom of the employer to make up a statement relative to injuries suffered by an employee and send a copy to the Accident Board.
We think the Accident Board, as well as the trial court, might have reasonably concluded from the facts shown that the claimant probably relied on the clerk, to whom he reported his injury and whose duty it was to file such claims, to file'his claim in proper time. Such being the case, we are not at liberty to set aside the findings of the trial judge that good cause was shown for not having filed the claim within 6 months after the injury occurred.
For the reasons here pointed out, the motion of appellee is granted, and the judgment heretofore rendered by this court is set aside, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Granted.