Court Opinion

ID: 9889664
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 00:00:24.696822+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:58.188289
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60516        Document: 00516925816             Page: 1      Date Filed: 10/10/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________
                                                                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit
                                      No. 22-60516
                                    Summary Calendar                                  FILED
                                    ____________                               October 10, 2023
                                                                                 Lyle W. Cayce
   United States of America,                                                          Clerk

                                                   Plaintiff—Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

                                            versus

   Ronald Joseph Latiolais, III,

                                    Defendant—Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Northern District of Mississippi
                               USDC No. 1:20-CR-4-1
                     ______________________________

   Before Willett, Duncan, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         Following a jury trial, Ronald Joseph Latiolais, III, was convicted of
   transporting a minor in interstate commerce with the intent to engage in
   sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). The district court
   sentenced him to 60 months of imprisonment and five years of supervised
   release. The Government appeals, arguing that the district court erred by
   sentencing Latiolais below the 120-month statutory minimum. On cross-

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-60516        Document: 00516925816             Page: 2      Date Filed: 10/10/2023

                                        No. 22-60516

   appeal, Latiolais argues that the district court’s decision to preclude evidence
   of his purported mistake regarding the victim’s age deprived him of a fair
   trial. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the conviction but vacate
   the sentence and remand for further proceedings.
                                              I
           We first address Latiolais’s argument that the district court deprived
   him of a fair trial by not allowing him to present evidence that he made a
   mistake regarding the victim’s age. We review the district court’s evidentiary
   rulings for abuse of discretion, but we also review for harmless error. United
   States v. Sumlin, 489 F.3d 683, 688 (5th Cir. 2007). 1 “[A]ny error made in
   excluding evidence is subject to the harmless error doctrine and does not
   necessitate reversal unless it affected the defendant’s substantial rights.”
   United States v. Johnson, 880 F.3d 226, 231 (5th Cir. 2018) (alteration in
   original). In making that assessment, we consider all the evidence in the case
   and whether the improperly excluded evidence, if admitted, would have had
   “a substantial impact on the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Okulaja, 21
   F.4th 338, 346 (5th Cir. 2021) (internal quotations omitted). Having
   considered the evidence and the course of proceedings from the record, we
   conclude that the error Latiolais complains of, if error at all, was harmless for
   at least two reasons.
           First, despite Latiolais’s mistake-of-age defense, there was ample and
   uncontroverted evidence at trial that Latiolais knew the victim was underage.
   For example, just moments before Latiolais first met with the 13-year-old
   victim in person, she said, “I’m 17. I’m sorry. I really liked you, but I’m
   underage,” to which he responded, “Come back and talk.” The victim also
   suggested to Latiolais that if she left with him, it would “seem[] like

           1
            We can raise the harmless-error defense sua sponte. Jones v. Cain, 600 F.3d 527,
   541 (5th Cir. 2010).

                                              2
Case: 22-60516      Document: 00516925816            Page: 3    Date Filed: 10/10/2023

                                      No. 22-60516

   kidnapping.” To that end, the victim exhorted Latiolais to run away: “You
   need to run, Ron.” After hearing that evidence, along with testimony about
   Latiolais helping the victim climb out of the window of her parents’ house,
   the jury heard a recording of Latiolais’s interview with Mississippi police,
   during which he confessed that he “found out” that the victim was under 18
   years old when he met her.
          Second, despite the district court’s ruling that no evidence could be
   presented about Latiolais’s alleged mistake of the victim’s age, there were
   multiple instances at trial of just that. For example, the victim herself testified
   that she told Latiolais she was 19, the jury read texts in which the victim told
   Latiolais she was 19, and an investigating agent testified that the victim
   entered 19 as her age for the adult online dating website where she first made
   contact with Latiolais. In addition to that evidence, Latiolais’s counsel
   emphasized in closing argument that the victim had lied to Latiolais and that
   Latiolais had no bad intentions with her.
          In short, given the evidence at trial, there is no reasonable possibility
   that the admission of additional evidence and argument regarding Latiolais’s
   alleged mistake would have had an impact on the jury’s verdict, let alone a
   substantial one. See Okulaja, 21 F.4th at 347; see also United States v. Tuma,
   738 F.3d 681, 688 (5th Cir. 2013). We therefore conclude that, even if the
   district court erred in granting the Government’s motion in limine, that error
   was harmless.
                                           II
          We next address the Government’s contention that the district court
   erred by sentencing Latiolais below the 120-month statutory minimum. See
   18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (providing that a person convicted under this section
   “shall be fined . . . and imprisoned not less than 10 years or for life”). We

                                           3
Case: 22-60516      Document: 00516925816          Page: 4   Date Filed: 10/10/2023

                                    No. 22-60516

   review a district court’s decision to depart from the statutory minimum de
   novo. United States v. Phillips, 382 F.3d 489, 497 (5th Cir. 2004).
          According to the Government, the district court had no discretion to
   sentence Latiolais to 60 months because the Government did not file a
   motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) asserting that Latiolais had provided law
   enforcement with “substantial assistance” in the investigation of another
   person, and Latiolais does not otherwise meet the “safety valve” criteria
   under § 3553(f). Latiolais, on the other hand, argues that the district court
   properly exercised its discretion under § 3553(b)(2)(A)(ii) and considered
   “mitigating factors” in its decision to depart from the statutory minimum,
   including Latiolais’s age, life inexperience, and good employment record.
          We agree with the Government. As we held in Phillips, “USSG
   § 5K2.0, ‘in and of itself,’ does not permit the district court to depart below
   an applicable mandatory statutory minimum sentence.” Phillips, 382 F.3d at
   498 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 264 F.3d 527, 531 (5th Cir. 2001)). Thus,
   absent “the circumstances explicitly set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and
   § 3553(f),” the district court has no discretion to depart below the statutory
   minimum. Id. at 498–99. Latiolais does not argue that either of those
   “exclusive routes” for departure apply here, id. at 499, so we must conclude
   that the district court had no discretion to sentence him 60 months below the
   statutory minimum.
                                        III
          In sum, we hold that the district court’s error regarding the
   Government’s motion in limine (if error at all) was harmless but that the
   district court improperly departed from the 120-month statutory minimum.
   We accordingly AFFIRM Latiolais’s conviction but VACATE his
   sentence and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this
   opinion.

                                         4