Court Opinion

ID: 9841824
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-22 20:07:54.767353+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:35.445985
License: Public Domain

Me. Justice Field
dissenting.
I am -unable to concur with my associates in their opinion or judgment in the present case.
The case comes before us on writ of error to the Supreme Court- of California, affirming the judgment of the Superior Court of the city and county of San Francisco, and an order of that court, denying a new trial in an action brought by the people of the State against the Central Pacific Railroad Company to recover moneys alleged to be due by it to the State, for taxes for the fiscal year of 1887, upon assessments made by the state Board of Equalization. The Supreme Court of the State affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court against that company in disregard, in my opinion, of the long established doctrine of this court, that the powers of the general-government and the instrumentalities of the State, called into exercise in enforcement of those powers, cannot be impaired or their efficiency lessened by taxation or any other action on the part of the State. This doctrine has been constantly asserted by this court when called upon to express its opinion thereon, its judgment being pronounced by the most illustrious Chief Justice in its history with the unanimous concurrence of his associates. It has become a recognized principle, made familiar in the courts of the country by the decision of this court in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, and Osborn v. United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 738. The disregard *129of this doctrine in the present case recalls the aphorism of Coleridge, applied with equal force, but not more applicable, to moral principles. “ Truths,” he says, “ of all others the most awful and interesting, are too often considered as so true that they lose all the power of truth and lie bed-ridden in the dormitory of the soul, side by side with the most despised and exploded errors.” It would seem that the truth of the constitutional doctrine has lost some of its force by the' very fact that it has heretofore been considered so true as never to be questioned.
By the act of Congress of July 1, 1862, c. 120, 12 Stat. 489, the Union Pacific Railroad Company was organized by Congress, and authorized and empowered to lay out, construct, furnish and maintain a continuous railroad and telegraph, with the appurtenances, from a point on the 100th meridian of longitude west from Greenwich, between the south margin of. the valley of the Republican River and the north margin of the valley of the Platte River, in the Territory of Nebraska, to the western boundary of Nevada Territory; and was vested with all the powers, privileges and immunities necessary to carry into effect the purposes of the act. In aid of the great work thus inaugurated, railway corporations by the States through which the overland railroad projected was to pass were called into existence. If rights, powers, privileges and immunities were conferred by state authority upon these state corporations, they constituted a portion of their franchises, subordinate to those conferred by the general government, and comprised with those of that government an essential part of the means for the efficiency and usefulness of the auxiliary corporations..
The powers, privileges and immunities conferred upon the state corporations by the United States were necessarily paramount to those derived from the State. When the powers, privileges and immunities of such state corporations were derived solely from the authority of the State they were generally designated, when spoken of collectively, as the state franchise or franchises of the corporation, and when the rights, powers, privileges and immunities were supposed to be *130derived solely from the United States they were generally designated, when spoken of collectively, as the Federal franchise or franchises of the corporation. When no indication of the source of the franchise or franchises was specified, the rights, powers, privileges and immunities involved in that term held by the deféndant were usually designated as the franchise or franchises of the company specifically, without other description, and the term included the powers, privileges and immunities conferred by both Federal and state authority. The term embraced all those powers, duties and immunities which were conferred, or supposed to be conferred, upon the railroad company for its operation from either source,' or from both sources.
By section 9 of the general act óf 1862, mentioned above, the Central Pacific Bailroad Company was authorized to construct a railroad and telegraph line from the Pacific coast, at or near San Francisco, or .the navigable waters of the Sacramento Biver, to the eastern boundary of California, upon the same terms and conditions in all respects as were contained in the act for the construction of the overland railroad and telegraph line, and to meet and connect with the railroad and telegraph line on the eastern boundary of California. Each of the companies was required to file its acceptance of the conditions of the act in the Department of the Interior within six months after its passage.
By the tenth section of the general act the Central Pacific Bailroad Company, after completing its road across the State of California, was authorized to continue the construction of the railroad and telegraph through the territories of the United States to the Missouri Biver, including the branch roads specified in the act, upon the routes indicated, on the terms, and conditions provided in the act in relation to the Union Pacific Bailroad Company, until the roads should meet and connect, and the whole line of the railroad and branches and telegraph should be completed.
By section 16 of the act mentioned, power was given to the Central Pacific to consolidate with the other companies named therein.
*131By section 17 it was provided that in case the company or companies failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the act, Congress might pass an act to insure the speedy completion of the road and branches, or put the same in repair and use, and direct the income of the railroad and telegraph line to be thereafter devoted to the use of the United States; and further, that if the roads mentioned were not completed so as to form a continuous line from the Missouri River to the navigable waters of the Sacramento River by July 1, 1876, the whole of the railroads mentioned and to be constructed under the provisions of the act, together with all their property of every kind and character, should be forfeited to and taken possession of by the United States.
The eighteenth section provided that when the net earnings of the entire road should reach a certain percentage upon its cost, Congress might reduce the rates of fare thereon, if unreasonable in amount, and might fix and establish the same by law; and it declared that the better to accomplish the object of the act, namely, to promote the public interest and welfare by the construction of the railroad and telegraph line, and to keep the same in working order, and to secure to the government at all times (but particularly in time of war) the use and benefits of the same for postal, military and other purposes, Congress might, at any time, having due regard for the rights of the companies named, add to, alter, amend or repeal the act, and the companies were required to make annual reports as to the matters mentioned to the Secretary of the Treasury.
By the act of Congress of July 2,1864, c. 216, 13 Stat. 356, amendatory of the act of July 1, 1862, additional powers, rights, privileges, immunities and property were granted to the companies engaged in the great national work proposed by Congress in the former act, in order to secure the completion of that work, which, at that time, was of imminent necessity.
By section 16 of this last act it was provided that should the Central Pacific Railroad Company complete its line to the eastern boundary of the State of California before the line of *132the Union Pacific Railroad shall have been extended westward so as to meet the line of the first named company, that company might extend its line eastward one hundred and fifty miles on the established route so as to meet and connect with the line of the Union Pacific Railroad, complying in all respects with the provisions and restrictions of the act as to the Union Pacific Railroad, and when it was completed should enjoy all the rights, privileges -and benefits conferred by the act on the latter company.
It is found by the court that the Central Pacific Railroad Company accepted the provisions of the acts of 1862 and 1864; and that on or about October 21, 1864, that company assigned to the Western Pacific Railroad Company, a corporation created and then existing under the laws of California, all its rights under the acts of Congress, so far as they related to the construction of the railroad and telegraph line between the cities of San José and Sacramento,in California; and that this assignment was ratified and confirmed by Congress, in the act of March 3, 1865, to amend the constituting acts of 1862 and 1864.
The act of March 3, 1865; c. 88, 13 Stat. 5U4, provided that section 10 of the act of July 2, 1864, should be so modified and amended as to allow the Central Pacific Railroad Company, and the Western Pacific Railroad- Company of California, the Union Pacific Railroad Company, and the eastern division of the Union Pacific Railroad Company, and all other companies provided for in the act of July second, eighteen hundred and sixty-four, to issue their six per centum thirty years’ bonds, interest payable in any lawful money of the United States, upon their separate roads. And the companies were thereby authorized to issue respectively their bonds to the extent of one hundred miles in advance of a continuous completed line of construction, and the assignment made by the Central Pacific Railroad Company of California to the Western Pacific Railroad Company of the State, of the right to construct all that portion of the railroad and telegraph from the city of San José to the city of Sacramento, was thereby ratified and' confirmed to the Western Pacific Railroad Company, *133with, all the privileges and benefits of the several acts of Congress relating thereto, subject to the conditions thereof.
The Central Pacific Railroad Company was empowered, by the State of California to construct within its limits various lines of railroad, and to equip them with the appurtenances essential to give to their operations efficiency and usefulness. It is conceded that until April 4,1864, the Central Pacific Railroad Company and other, railroad corporations of the State exercised and enjoyed what are termed the franchises of its corporations, that is, the rights, powers, privileges and immunities conferred upon them by state authority, and also various powers, duties, privileges and immunities conferred upon them by the general government, and which are termed their Federal franchises. But on that date, the 4th of April, 1864, the legislature of California abrogated the state franchises of. those corporations, and substituted by adoption in their place the Federal franchises which have remained in force ever since.
The provisions of the act of .Congress of July 1, 1862, and of July 2, 1864, state with entire distinctness the rights, powers, duties, privileges and immunities of the principal railroad — that of the Union Pacific — and of the auxiliary roads connecting therewith. The most essential features are the following:
I. The act of July 1, 1862, authorized the Union Pacific Railroad Company to construct its road, vesting it with all powers necessary for that purpose, and requiring it to transport mails, troops and munitions of war. This was a plain' exercise of the express power “ to establish post roads ” and of the implied power to construct military roads.
II. The same act authorized the Central Pacific Railroad Company to construct its road on the same terms and conditions as those of the U nion Pacific.
III. The third section of the act of July 2, 1864, provided in the usual form for the exercise by both companies of the Federal right to acquire the right of way for the construction of these post and military roads.
IY. The Central Pacific company was thus made the agent of the government in its exercise of the constitutional *134power to establish post roads and military roads. FTo state law could have obstructed or impeded the Federal government in the exercise of this power or in any degree whatever have limited or facilitated the Central Pacific company in the enjoyment of the Federal franchise thus conferred.
Y. If the consent of the State was necessary to the establishment of this road by the United States it will be found in the statute of California enacted in 1852, which, independent of its preamble, reads as follows:
“ Seo.' 1. The right of way through this State is hereby granted to the United States for the purpose of constructing a railroad from the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans.” Statutes of California of 1852, ch. 77, § 1, p. 150.
If the consent of the State was necessary to the complete substitution of the Federal franchise for any then existing state franchise for the construction of the road, it will be found in the act of the legislature of the State of California of April 4, 1864, which, after a comprehensive grant to the company of all necessary privileges and powers, including the State’s right of eminent domain, made, as the act recites, “ to enable said company more fully and completely to com- - ply with and conform to the provisions and condition of said act of Congress,” concludes with the following language : “ Hereby confirming to and vesting in said company all the rights, privileges, franchises, power and authority conferred upon, granted to, or vested in said company by said act of Congress; hereby repealing all laws and parts of laws inconsistent or in conflict with the provisions of this act or the rights and privileges herein granted.” Statutes of California, 1863-64, c. 417, § 1, p. 471. In the opinion of the majority of the court, delivered by the Chief Justice, it is said that the general rule expressed by Mr. Justice Miller in the State Railroad Tax cases, 92 U. S. 575, “that the franchises, capital stock, business and profits of all corporations are liable to taxation in the place where they do business and by the State which creates them,” admits of no dispute at this day, and then the opinion adds that the question here is not a question of the value of the state franchises, but *135■whether those franchises existed, for if in 1887 the plaintiff in error (the Central Pacific Railroad Company) possessed any subsisting rights or privileges, otherwise called franchises, derived from the State, then they were taxable, and the extent of their value was to be determined by the Board of Equalization. A complete answer to the ground of the opinion is found in the act of the legislature of California of April 4, Í864, passed twenty-three years before 1887, to which I have above referred, which abrogated the state franchises previously existing, and substituted in their place the Federal franchises.
The Federal franchises for the construction of the Central Pacific Railroad from the Pacific coast to the eastern boundary line of California as a part of the continuous military and post road to the Missouri River established by Congress could háve had ho rival in a state franchise for the construction of the same road; but in order that this might never be questioned, the legislature of the State of California obliterated its own franchises when it ratified and confirmed the franchises given by the Federal government to the Central Pacific Railroad Company. How then can the State twenty-three years later tax alleged state franchises claimed by its authorities to underlie the Federal franchises? Suppose the alleged state franchises should be sold for a delinquent tax thereon under the authority of the State, and an attempt should be made to place the purchaser in possession, a Federal judge would, of course, be applied to for an injunction, which would undoubtedly be granted, and the shadow of the shade of the state franchises would appear no more.
But, notwithstanding this express abrogation of the state franchises, meaning by that the powers, duties, rights, privileges and immunities of the state corporations conferred by the legislature of the State of California, and the substitution in place thereof-of the franchises conferred by the general government, the State of California has since the abrogation of the state franchises and the substitution of the Federal franchises in various ways subjected that railroad and its franchises, whether derived from state or Federal authority, which were *136essential to the successful working of the road brought into existence by the Federal government, to heavy burdens in the way of taxation, and thus imposed an additional obstacle to the efficiency of the Central Pacific Railroad in the execution of the general operations of the overland railroad.
. The question presented is whether the burden thus imposed upon the franchises, roadbed, rails and rolling stock of railroads, whether or not operated in more than one county, can be ■ lawfully assessed upon them when they constitute the grant of the general government, or an essential part of, or are appurtenant to the franchises of the state corporation which is used as an instrumentality of the overland road. The state Board of Equalization has assessed the franchises of the State as a distinct element in the estimate of the valuation of the railroad, carrying its estimate to an enormous sum in many instances, as, in the present case, to the sum of eighteen millions, and at the same time it has assessed the Federal franchises, that is, those derived from th¿ general government, as a distinct and separate element in the estimate of' the valuation of the railroad, and has blended the two' franchises in determining the valuation of the railroad for the purpose of taxation.
It seems to me as an extravagant if not an absurd position, in the face of the specific legislation by the State, abrogating its franchises of the Central Pacific Railroad Company, and substituting the Federal franchises in their place, to contend that the state franchises still exist and can be enforced and be made the subject of estimate in the valuation of the railroad for taxation. The Federal franchises, standing alone, cannot be impeded or hampered in any way by state legislation. This would follow had not the State expressed itself in the emphatic way it has done: “Confirming to and vesting in said company all the rights, privileges,- franchises, powers and authority conferred by the grant to or vested in said company by said act of Congress, hereby repealing all laws and parts of laws inconsistent or in conflict with the provisions of this act, or the rights and privileges herein granted.” The state franchises thus abrogated and discarded cannot be again *137restored to life by mere words, however often repeated and with whatever asseveration made. The dishonored franchises are gone forever.
Independently of this view, the two franchises, the so ■called state franchise and the so-called Federal franchise, if both exist at the same time, are to be treated as necessarily so blended together that they cannot be separated and given a distinct valuation in the total estimate. And even when separated, were that possible, the inevitable blending follows the moment the value of the railroad becomes a matter of serious consideration for the purpose of fixing the amount of the assessment. I construe the state and Federal franchises as being simply the right conferred upon them to complete and operate the road. And whatever part the state or Federal franchises may have played in accomplishing this result, the separate effect of either cannot be distinguished from the other, and apply to each and every mile of the road. The two franchises have interlaced each other at everjr step of their exercise. It follows that the separate estimation of the taxation of the so called state franchises when they existed, which, as appears, was only for a limited period, was impossible, and, for many reasons, which we will state, it was never intended that such state franchises should be assessed and taxed as a separate entity in the estimate of the value of the railroad.
In the case of California v. Pacific Railroad, 127 U. S. 1, 34, this court decided that, as the assessments of the state Board of Equalization against the Central Pacific Railroad Company of 1883 and 1884, and the assessment against the Southern Pacific Railroad Company of 1883, included the franchises conferred by the United States upon those corporations, respectively, the assessments were void as repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States and the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the several States. 127 U. S. 41, 42, 43.
It appears by the record that the complaint in this action contains nineteen counts, upon the same number of alleged causes of action. The first count is for state taxes; the other counts are for county taxes.
*138In People v. Central Pacific Railroad Co., 83 California, 393, 399, it was held by the Supreme Court of the State that section 3670 of its- Political Code, prescribing a special form of complaint, was in conflict with its constitution, and that a complaint in an action to recover taxes levied upon a railroad could not join causes of action in favor of the several counties through which the road runs. But that is not material in the present action.
Each of the eighteen counts alleges that the defendant is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of California, engaged in operating a railroad in more than one county of the State. . The State sets forth its claims for a, recovery, and asks for judgment in its favor for the several assessments stated against the franchises, or some portion thereof, which constitute a grant of the general government, or appurtenances to the grant of the state corporation, rendering it efficient and useful as an instrumentality of the overland road, the great work undertaken by the general government. The complaint alleges in its several counts that in August, 1887, which, as stated above, was twenty-three years after the state franchises to the defendant had been abrogated and annulled, the state Board of Equalization, for the purpose of state and county taxation for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1888, assessed to the defendant, then 'the owner and operator thereof in more than one county in the State, the franchise, roadway, roadbed, rails and rolling stock of the defendant’s railway, then within the State, at the sum of eighteen millions of dollars; and that within ten days after the third Monday in August of that year the board apportioned the total assessment of the franchise, roadway, roadbed, rails and rolling stock of the defendant to the counties in the State in which defendant’s railway was located, in proportion to the number of miles of defendant’s railway laid in such counties; and the amounts of the total assessment thus apportioned by the board, to the counties respectively, and the number of miles of defendant’s-railway laid in the counties respectively..
The complaint concludes with a demand for judgment *139against the defendant for the several sums of state and county tax alleged to. be delinquent and unpaid as stated therein, aggregating the sum of $295,740.71, with five per cent thereon for delinquency and non-payment, with interest at the rate of two per cent on the amount from the last of December, 1887; also for the costs of suit and for attorney’s fees.
To the complaint a demurrer, general and special, was interposed by the defendant. The Superior Court overruled the demurrer with leave to the defendant to answer the complaint.
The answer of the defendant puts in issue most of the material allegations of the complaint, and sets up various special and affirmative defences. One of those defences is that the “ franchise ” assessed to the defendant by the state Board of Equalization was derived from the government of the United States through certain acts of Congress (commonly known as the Pacific Bailroad Acts); that the same is held and used by the defendant as one of the means and instrumen-talities of the Federal government, and was, therefore, not taxable by the State; and that the assessment of this franchise was so blended with the whole assessment as not to be separable therefrom; .and that the whole assessment was, there fore, void.
On the trial of the issues presented by the pleadings, the complainant was allowed by the court, against the objection .of the defendant, to. introduce in evidence (1) the duplicate record of assessment of. railways by the state Board of Equalization for 1887, filed in the office of the comptroller of the of the State of California, October 11, 1887. The court overruled the objections of the defendant and admitted the paper in evidence, and an exception was taken to the ruling of the court. The duplicate record of assessment of railways by the state Board of Equalization for 1887, which was dated August 13, 1887, simply states that the defendant owns a certain railway in the State, operated in more than one county, being the entire railway of the company in the State, and then follows this paragraph, without any evidence in support of its averment:
“ And it appearing that the actual value of the franchises, *140roadway, roadbed, rails and rolling stock of said company within the State, at the said date and time, was and still is the sum of eighteen million dollars; therefore, it is hereby ordered that the said franchise, roadway, roadbed, rails and rolling stock, for the year 1887, be, and the same are hereby, assessed to the said Central Pacific Railroad Company at the sum of eighteen million dollars.”
The evidence mentioned in the duplicate record of assessment of railways was the only proof offered by the plaintiff in support of any of its causes of action, and that evidence, it is plain, was not entitled to any weight in the determination of the case, not being supported by any other evidence.
On the part of the defendant evidence was offered to show that the state Board of Equalization knowingly included the value of the “ Federal franchise ” in the assessment in question, as it had done in the assessment which was afterwards before this court, and declared void, in California v. Pacific Railroad, Company, and in other assessments.
The findings of the Superior .Court, as to the allegations of the complaint, were that they were true, except as to counsel fees, as to which it was found that a reasonable compensation for the services of two of the counsel employed was 7i per cent on the amount recovered, and per cent for the third counsel.
As to the affirmative allegations for the answer, the court among other things found :
“ That on the 13th day of August, 1887, the state Board of Equalization of the State of California did, for the purposes of taxation for the fiscal year 1887, assess, as a unit, and not separately, the franchise, roadway, roadbed, rails and rolling stock of defendant’s railroad, then being and situate within the State, at the sum and value mentioned in the amended complaint, and did then and there enter such assessment upon its minutes and in its record of assessment; that such assessment is the one upon which the several taxes mentioned in the complaint herein are based, and no other assessment than the one aforesaid was ever made by the Board of Equalization or other assessor of the property of defendant for the fiscal year ; *141that the board did, at the time and in the manner alleged in the'amended complaint, apportion the assessment and transmit it and the apportionment to the county and city and county auditors, and the assessment and' the apportionment thereof were entered upon the assessment rolls of the counties and the cities and counties as alleged in the amended complaint, as hereinbefore found.
“ That the board of equalization, in making the assessment, did assess the franchise, roadway, roadbed, rails and rolling stock of defendant’s railroad. at their full cash value, without deducting therefrom the value of the mortgage or any part thereof, or the value of the bonds issued under the acts of Congress, given and existing thereon, as aforesaid, to secure the indebtedness of the company to the holders of the bonds, and, in making such assessment the board did not deem nor treat the mortgage or bonds as an interest in the property, but it assessed the whole value of the property as assessed to defendant in the same manner it would have done had there been no mortgage thereon.”
The conclusions of law from the findings were that plaintiff was entitled to recover judgment for the several principal sums of state and county taxes,- found in the record of assessments of railways to be delinquent and unpaid; also interest upon the principal sums from the 27th day of December, 1887, at the rate of seven per .cent per annum, up to the date of judgment; also ■ to recover five per cent penalty upon the principal sums; also fees for legal services rendered herein by two of the counsel, a sum equal to seven and one-half per cent on the amount recovered, and by the third counsel a sum equal to two and one-half per cent of that amount.
Judgment was entered upon the findings, in favor of the plaintiff, for the sums mentioned, and a motion for a new trial was overruled.
The majority of the Supreme Court'of the State, in their opinion, sustained the contentions of the State upon the questions presented, with the exception of the questions in respect to interest on the amount of taxes, and the fees of one of the counsel, and affirmed the judgment entered.
*142Mr. Justice McFarland dissented from the opinion of the court. This dissenting opinion expresses so fully and clearly and satisfactorily the views which I entertain, that they are set forth in full:
“In my opinion,” says Justice McFarland, pp.. 598, 599, “ the assessment in question [that of 1887] is void under the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases of California v. Central Pacific Railroad Company and Southern Pacific Railroad Company, 127 U. S. 1, because it includes a Federal franchise, and thus -attempts to tax one of tÓe means or instrumentalities employed by the United States government for carrying. into effect its sovereign powers. That this cannot be done by a State has. been the established law ever since the decision of the Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, in 1819. The principle was fully recognized and declared by this court in San Benito County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 77 California, 518, and in San Francisco v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 California, 140.
“The only difference between the cases in 127 U. S. and the case at bar is that in the former the trial court found that the state Board of Equalization included in the assessment the value of ‘ all franchises and corporate powers held and exercised by the defendant.,’ while in the case at bar the court below found that the said board in making the assessment for the year 1887 ‘ did not include in its said assessment any Federal franchise,’ But the assessment in both instances was exactly the same, namely, ‘the franchise’ of the railroad.. In the former cases it does not appear that the trial court received any evidence on the question as to what ‘ the franchise ’ included ; and it is probable that the finding was based-upon the language of the assessment alone. In the case at bar the court did receive evidence as to what the members of the board intended by the words ‘the franchise,’ and it appears in the record that the court, after having concluded that ‘from a preponderance of evidence before it the Federal franchise of défendant was not assessed or. included in the assessment,’ proceeded to say that ‘ if by a preponderance of such evidence defendants could have shown that the State *143.intended to' and did include the Federal franchise in the assessment, I think the court would have to disregard it as incompetent. The effect of such parol evidence would be to contradict the record, which cannot be done.’ Now, if it was competent to introduce testimony to show the intent of the members of the board when they made the assessment, then the court clearly erred in ruling out certain evidence offered on that point by appellant. . . .
“ On the other hand, if the record of the board should alone be considered, then it simply appears that ‘ the franchise ’ was assessed; and I cannot possibly see how that phrase can be construed to mean anything else than the whole franchise of the railroad — all of the franchise belonging to it. It means just what the lower court has found it to mean, as above quoted, in said cases in 127 U. S. The words ‘ the franchise ’ clearly, in my judgment, include the right of the appellant to do businéss — and', the whole of that right. That right is a unit and inseparable. The court below found [see finding 30] that the board ‘ did assess as a unit, and not separately, the franchise, roadway,’ etc. And I cannot conceive how a court can, first, separate it, or, second, if it could, how it could determine which part to throw away. Moreover, the main foundation of the doctrine of McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, is that the power, to tax includes the power to' destroy; and thus a State might, under the guise of taxation, destroy or materially cripple an instrumentality of the Federal government. And is it not manifest that in the case at bar that principle protects the instrumentality here involved from injury or destruction under the pretence that' only that part of the unity which comes from the State is taxed ?. Are not the effects and consequences the same ?
“In my opinion, therefore,” adds the dissenting Justice, “without discussing the other questions involved, the judgment should be reversed.”
To review and reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court, affirming the judgment of the Superior Court for the city and ■county of 'San Francisco, a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State was sued out of this court, and several assign*144ments of error were filed for its consideration. My attention will be confined to those deemed the most important.
1st. The Supreme Court should have reversed the judgment of the Superior Court for the city and county of San Francisco on the ground that upon the finding of facts in the record the value of the “ franchise ” of the Central Pacific Bailroad, derived from the United States, called Federal franchise, was-included in the assessment of the franchise, roadway, roadbed, rails and rolling stock of the railroad, made by the state Board of Equalization for the year 1887, and was inseparable therefrom; and that the whole of the assessment was therefore illegal and void under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
2d. The Supreme Court should have reversed the judgment-of the Superior Court, because that-court found that the state Board of Equalization on August 3; 1887, did, for the purpose of taxation for the fiscal year, 1887, assess as a unit, and not-separately, the franchise, roadway, roadbed and rolling stock of the Central Pacific Bailroad, then being Avithin the State-of California.
3d. The Supreme Court should have reversed the judgment of the Superior Court upon tha ground that the property of the Central Pacific Bailroad Company, including the franchise, and every part of the franchise of the railroad was and is subject to the lien of the mortgage of the United States to secure the indebtedness of that company to it, and the United States had and have an interest and ownership therein to the extent of the lien, and, therefore, the franchise of the railroad could not and cannot be taxed or assessed for taxation by the State of California, under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
4th. The Supreme Court should have reversed the judgment-of the Superior Court on the ground that that court admitted in evidence the portion of the duplicate record of assessment of railways by the state Board of Equalization for the year of 1887, relating to the assessment of the property of the plaintiff in error for that year without proof of its correctness.
The facts Avhich are the basis of the several assignments of *145error are contained in the legislation or authorized statements of Congress or of the States mentioned, or in the findings of the court. Their legality and validity are thereby fully established.-
By the legislation of Congress to which I have referred, as well as by the legislation of the State of California, it is plain that the Central Pacific Railroad Company was made one of the means of accomplishing the great work of Congress, and whenever, by any act of the state authorities of California, the franchise of the Central Pacific Railroad Company Was included in the assessment of the franchise, roadway, roadbed, rails and rolling stock of that company, there was necessarily included the franchise thus derived from the legislation of Congress. Indeed, treating the franchise of the railroad as meaning its power to construct the work contemplated and to conduct its operations, it is difficult to see how, in any respect, its franchise could be treated other than as one entire whole. Its power to construct the road authorized by the government, and to carry on its operations, could not be under the control of the state authorities so as to interfere in any respect with the full exercise of the powers, privileges and immunities granted by Congress.
And’ it was specially found by the court below, in its thirtieth finding of fact, that the state Board of Equalization on August 13, 1887, for the purpose of taxation for the fiscal' year 1887, assessed'as a unit, and not separately, the franchise, roadway, roadbed, rails and rolling stock. It was, therefore, unlawful that its taxation by the State should in any respect impede, retard or delay the exercise of the powers conferred by Congress upon the Central Pacific Railroad Company or defeat its action. Nor could any part of the powers, privileges and immunities conferred upon the railroad be separated •from the rest, so as to be treated as’ an independent part thereof, and any part considered as the special grant of the State, and superior to or in any way impairing the control thereof by the United States pursuant to their legislation.
It also appears from the legislation of Congress that the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to issue and did *146issue to the Central Pacific Railroad Company bonds of .the United States, in designated amounts per mile, to aid in the construction of its road, which bonds and interest were to be repaid by the company, at their maturity, and that, to secure such repayment, the United States- were to hold a lien upon all the property of the railroad company to the extent of the bonds thus issued. Any taxation of the property or franchises of the Central Pacific Railroad Company, without the consent of Congress, was hence an impairment of such lien of the United States, and, therefore, invalid.
The Superior Court of the city and county of San Francisco erred in receiving in evidence the portion of the duplicate record of the assessment of railways by the state Board of Equalization for the year 1887, relating to the assessment of the property of the plaintiff in error, for the obvious reason that such duplicate in no way established the legality and Validity of the assessment.
This court, in the case of California v. Pacific Railroad Companies, 127 U. S. 1, adjudged that the State of California had no power, without the consent of Congress, to tax the franchises derived by the Central Pacific Railroad Company from the government of the United States, or any franchise conferred on it by that government, or any part of any franchise granted to that company by the United States. The opinion of the court was delivered by Mr. Justice Bradley.
“ Assuming,” he said, “ that the Central Pacific Railroad Company has received the important franchises referred to by grant of the United States, the question arises whether they are legitimate subjects of taxation by the State. They were granted to the company for national purposes and to subserve national ends. It seems very clear that the State of California can neither take them away, -nor destroy nor abridge them, nor cripple them by onerous burdens. Can it tax them ? It may undoubtedly tax outside visible property of the company situated within the State. That is a different thing. But may it tax franchises which are the grant of the United States? In our judgment it cannot. What is a franchise ? . . . Generalized, arid divested of the special form *147which it assumes under a monarchical government based on feudal traditions, a franchise is a right, privilege or power of public concern, which ought not to be exercised by private individuals at their mere will and pleasure, but should be reserved for. public control and administration, either by the government directly, or by public agents, acting under such conditions and regulations as the government may impose in the public interest, and for the public security. Such rights and powers must exist under every form of society. Under our system, their existence and disposal are under the control of the legislative department of the government, and they cannot be assumed or exercised without legislative authority. No private person can establish a public highway, or a public ferry, or railroad, or charge tolls for the use of the same, without authority from the legislature, direct or derived. These are franchises. No private person can take another’s property, even for a public use, without such authority; which is the same as to say, that the right of eminent domain can only be exercised by virtue of a legislative grant. This is a franchise. No persons can make themselves a body corporate arid politic without legislative authority. Corporate capacity is a franchise. The list might be continued indefinitely.
“ In view of this description of the nature of a franchise, how can it be possible that a franchise granted by Congress can Le subject to taxation by a State without the consent of Congress ? Taxation is a burden, and may be laid, so heavily as to destroy the thing taxed, or render it valueless. As Chief Justice Marshall said in McCulloch v. Maryland, ‘the power to tax involves the power to destroy.’ Recollecting the fundamental principle that the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States are the supreme law of the land, it seems to us almost absurd to contend that a power given to a person or corporation by the United States may be subjected to taxation by a State. The power conferred emanates from, and is a portion of, the power of the government that confers it. To tax it, is not only derogatory to the dignity, but subversive of the powers of the government, and repugnant to its paramount sovereignty. It is unnecessary to cite cases on this *148subject. The principles laid down by this court in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; Osborn v. The Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738; and Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, and numerous cases since which have followed in their lead, abundantly sustain the views we have expressed. It may be added that these views are not in conflict with the decisions of this court in Thomson v. Pacific Railroad, 9 Wall. 579, and Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5. As explained in the opinion of the court in the latter case, the tax there was upon the property of the company, and not upon its franchises or operations. 18 Wall. 35, 37.
“ The taxation of a corporate franchise merely as such, unless pursuant to a stipulation in the original charter of the company, is the exercise of an authority somewhat arbitrary in its character. It has no limitation but the discretion of the taxing power. The value of the franchise is not measured like that of property, but may be ten thousand or ten hundred thousand dollars, as the legislature may choose. Or, without any valuation of the franchise at all, the tax may be arbitrarily laid. It is not an idle objection, therefore, made by the company against the tax imposed in the present case.”
The important cases bearing upon the subject intervening between the great Bank cases and Thomson v. Pacific Railroad and Railroad Company v. Peniston, were Weston v. The City of Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, 467; Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County, 16 Pet. 435; Bank of Commerce v. New York City, 2 Black, 620; The Banks v. The Mayor, 7 Wall. 16, and National Bank v. Commonwealth, 9 Wall 353; and in those cases the doctrine was consistently maintained and enforced that a State cannot lay a tax which bears upon a power of the National Government, or, in the judgment of the court, may hinder, impair or burden any “ operation ” of that Government, or interfere with or affect the efficiency of any “ agency ” of the National Government in performing the functions by which it is designed to serve the United States.
In Weston v. The City of Charleston, this court declared the tax on the stock of the United States, involved, to be unconstitutional, because it “ operated upon the power ” to borrow *149money on the credit of the United States,'and was deemed by the court to be “ a burden, however inconsiderable,” on “ the operations of government.”
The court, speaking by Chief Justice Marshall, in that case, again declared that the State cannot by taxation, or otherwise, “ retard, impede, burden or in any manner control the operation of the- constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vésted in the General Government.”
The case of Dobbins v. The Commissioners of Erie County, adjudged that a state tax on an officer of the United States, fpr his office, or its emoluments, was • void, mainly because of “ its interference with the constitutional means ” employed by the government to execute its powers.
The court, speaking by Mr. Justice "Wayne, said: “ Does not a tax by a State upon the office, diminishing the recompense, conflict with the laws of the United States, which secures it to the officer in its entirety ? It certainly has such an effect; and any law of a State imposing such a tax cannot be constitutional, because it conflicts with a law of Congress made in pursuance of the Constitution.”
The principles declared in Weston v. The City of Charleston governed the decisions of the court in Bank of Commerce v. New York City and in The Banks v. The Mayor, which adjudged that the bonds and other securities of the United States are “ as much beyond the taxing power of the States as the operations themselves in furtherance of which they were issued.”
The court again declared, in those cases, that any interference by the state governments tending to the interruption of, or in derogation of, the full legitimate exercise of the powers granted to the National Government was prohibited by the Constitution.
The theory of the majority of the court below was that the franchise of this railroad can be segregated into two franchises, a state franchise and a Federal franchise. But the franchise of the railroad, or the right in the company to operate its railroad, is a single right, from how many sources soever *150derived; and, being derived from the National Government, that right could not be assessed for taxation, agreeably to the Constitution of the United States, whether or not the right had been granted by the State also to the railroad company. The theory of the separation of the franchise into two distinct rights for the purpose of taxation by California is effectually disposed of by Mr. Justice McFarland, at the close of his opinion, in these few words:
“ The court below found that the board 'did assess as a unit, and not separately, the franchise, roadway,’ etc. People v. Cent. Pac. Rd. Co., 105 California, 599. I cannot conceive how a court can, first, separate it, or second, if it could, how it could determine which part to throw away. Moreover, the main foundation of the doctrine of McCulloch v. Maryland is that the power to tax includes- the power to destroy, and thus a State might, under the guise of taxation, destroy or materially cripple an instrumentality of the Federal Government. And is it not manifest that in the case at bar that principle protects the instrumentality here involved from injury or destruction under the pretence that only that part of the unity which comes from the State is taxed ? Are not the effects and consequences the same % ”
The fact that each government has granted the right, does not create two rights. The two grants taken together confer nothing more than each of them separately conferred. A tax on “the franchise” of the Central Pacific Railroad, being nothing more nor less than a tax on the right of the company to operate its road, is a tax on its right to operate its railroad granted by the United States, or on the franchise granted by that government.
How is that part of the franchise'granted by the State to. be separated from that part granted by the General Government ? What part of the life of this being is at the mercy of the State ? Upon what member of its body may the tax collector execute his judgment of death %
If we should consider the right of the Central Pacific Railroad Company to operate its road, derived from the State, as one thing, and its same-right derived from the United States *151as another and distinct, or different, thing, what results will follow ? Plainly these.
If the State can tax the right so derived from itself, it can levy a tax upon it as it pleases, and may sell the right assessed, in case of non-payment of the tax. There can be no such thing as. taxable property which cannot be sold for the tax, and the title to which cannot be transferred to the purchaser. By such a sale the property will pass from the delinquent to the purchaser. If a sale could be made of this particular right, then the Central Pacific would lose the right, and the purchaser would gain it.
It is obvious that the right to operate its railroad cannot, . by virtue of the State’s taxing powers, be taken from the Central Pacific Railroad Company, or conferred upon any other corporation or individual. Nothing, then, would pass by such a sale, and as there is nothing to sell or transfer, there can be nothing to assess.
If the position asserted by the defendant in error, the State of California or the people of the State, (considering both expressions as meaning substantially the same contesting organization,) that the so called state franchise of the Central Pacific Railroad can be separated from the Federal franchise of that company, and separately valued, and subjected to taxation, be maintained, destructive consequences would follow, as will be seen from a brief consideration.
In Northern Pacific Railroad v. Trail County, 115 U. S. 600, 610, the court, in referring to a sale, for taxes, of lands belonging to a railroád company, said: “ A valid sale for taxes being the highest exercise of sovereign power of the State must carry the title to the property sold, and if it does not do so, it is because the assessment is void. It follows that if the assessment of these taxes (those previously stated to have been levied upon the lands of the company) is valid and the'proceedings well conducted, the sale confers a title paramount to all others, and thereby destroys the lien of the United States for the costs of surveying these lands. If, on the other hand, the sale would not confer such a title, it is because there exists no authority to make it.” There would seem to be no doubt, *152therefore, that the State cannot be held to have had the power to tax the so called state franchise of the Pacific Railroad so long as it was of any validity, and previously and subsequently to its abrogation the State plainly possessed no such power unless the court is prepared to decide expressly, as the effect of the legislation, that Congress intended that the State should be able to divest the company' of that franchise, and to transfer by a tax sale the title of the franchise to the purchaser as against both the company and the United States; and in that way to destroy the right and interest of the government of the United States in the franchise. There is clear and conclusive evidence in the Pacific Railroad legislation that Congress intended that the so called state franchise, so long as it remained of any value, should not be subject to state legislation, and that the right and interest of the United States therein, whilst of any value, should not be destroyed by the State in the exercise of its taxiing power. For example, section 5 of the act of July, 1, 1862, provides that the issue and delivery of' bonds to the company, referring to bonds the issue and de-' livery of which were authorized by the act, shall ipso facto constitute a first mortgage on the whole line of the railroad and telegraph, together with the rolling stock, fixtures and property of every kind and description, and on the refusal or failure of the company to redeem its bonds, or any part of them, when required by the Secretary of the Treasury in accordance with the provisions of the act, then the road, with all rights, functions, immunities and appurtenances thereunto belonging, also all lands granted to the company by the United States, may be taken possession of by the Secretary of the Treasury for the use and benefit of the United States. The only change made in this provision in regard to the security-of the United States for the subsidy bonds is by section 10 of the act of 1864, which is that “the lien of the United States bonds shall be subordinate to that of the bonds of -any or either of said companies hereby authorized to be issued on their respective roads, property and equipments, except as to the provisions of the sixth section of the act, to which this act is an amendment relating to the transmission of dispatches, *153and the transportation of mails, troops, munitions of war, supplies and public stores for the government of the United States.”
The subsidy bonds are, therefore, a mortgage upon any subsisting state franchise of the railroad, which may be taken possession of by the Secretary of the Treasury for the use and benefit of the United States, on. the refusal or failure of the company to redeem the bonds, or any part of them, when required by the Secretary of the Treasury. Congress manifestly intended that the rights of the United States'under this mortgage, in respect to the state franchise, if any such existed, should not be destroyed or disturbed by the State in the exercise of its taxing power, or any other power. If the so called state franchise of the railroad is a thing of value, as the assessment in these cases claims it to be, in the estimation of the state Board of Equalization, it is a valuable part of the security of the United States for the redemption of the subsidy bonds, which the Secretary of the Treasury has the right to take possession of in the contingency mentioned in the act. The franchise, if it existed and possesses any value, cannot, therefore, in my opinion, be taken from under the mortgage, and transferred to a purchaser at a tax sale bjr the State of California.
Take, again, the provisions of the sinking fund act-of May 7, 1878, which appropriates and applies the earnings of the company in the exercise of all the franchises of the company for the purposes and in the manner named. In the face of that act, it cannot be believed that Congress supposed that there was power reserved to the State to- control or affect its interest or right in the franchise or franchises of the railroad, so long as it- or they possessed any value.
There can be no doubt that a tax to be levied on ■ the so called state franchise, whilst it was in existence, was a tax upon an instrumentality by which the government effects its objects, and a tax upon the operations of that instrumentality, within the doctrines of this court in the great cases to which I have referred.
The United States selected this corporation as an agency for carrying out a national object, and the right of the cor*154poration to operate its railroad, or, in other words, the franchise of the railroad, whether conferred by state or national authority, or by both the State and Nation, is an instrumentality by which the United.States effects its objects.
As a tax on. the franchise of the Central Pacific Eailroad while in existence was nothing more nor less than a tax on the right of the company to operate its railroad, such a tax was a tax on its right to operate its railroad derived from the government of the United States, and, therefore, unconstitutional.
There are no operations of the corporation, as an agency of the government, which are performed exclusively in the exercise of any state franchise in connection with its railroad, assuming the existence of any such franchise, but all its operations are in the exercise of its entire franchise, and a tax purporting to be levied on any state franchise is, therefore, a tax on the operations of the corporation in the exercise of the Federal franchise, and a tax directly on the Federal franchise itself.
In National Bank v. The Commonwealth, where the right of the States to tax the shares of the national banks was. reaffirmed, it was expressly conceded that the agencies of the National. Government are uncontrollable by state legislation so far as it may interfere with, or impair, their efficiency, in performing the service, or the functions, for which they are employed, or designed to perform.
The Supreme Court of California in the case of San Benito County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 77 California, 518, accepted the authority of the decision of this court, in California v. Pacific Railroad Companies, 127 U. S. 1, and held that an ordinance of the board of supervisors of San Benito County imposing a license tax upon corporations or individuals engaged in the business of carrying persons or freight for hire on railroad cars in the county was void, so far as it assumed to affect the Southern Pacific Eailroad Company, as the tax was deemed to be levied upon the use of the franchise granted to the company by the United States, or the operations of the> railroad in the exercise of that franchise
*155•It was determined that tbe franchise, of that company and its use were equally beyond the taxing power of the State, or any of its political subdivisions, agreeably to the decision of this court in California v. Pacific Railroad Companies, which the court felt constrained to obey.
“ The franchise ” of a railroad, which is contemplated by the state constitution, and authorized to be assessed for taxation by the state Board of Equalization, is nothing but the right to operate the railroad, including the incidental right to charge and take tolls thereon, and the like.
The constitution applies equally to all railroads, whether owned by corporations or associations or individuals, and the assessment provided for is wholly independent of the ownership or the character of the ownership of the railroad property assessed.
The tax proposed by the constitution is consequently and necessarily a tax upon the operations of the railroad, in the exercise of the franchise or right to operate the property.
The right of the Central Pacific Railroad Company to construct, maintain and operate its railroad, in the State of California, was conferred upon the company by and derived by it from the government of the United States, and any assessment of the right of the company to maintain and operate its railroad, in that State, for. state taxation, is void, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, whether or not the company received the same right from the State of California.
The right of the company to operate its railroad in the-State is a single right, and a single thing, whether the right was derived by the company from one or more than one government, and it cannot be subjected to taxation by the State of California.
In conclusion, it appears, beyond all controversy, that the State imposed burdens, in the way of taxation, upon the exercise of powers and privileges conferred by the Congress of. the United States upon the Central Pacific Railroad Company and other companies of. the State, rights, powers and privileges which were granted in furtherance of the great object *156of Congress in the creation and operation.of the overland railroad, and also imposed burdens by taxation upon the mortgage held by the United States as security for the subsidy bonds issued to the company. And for such irregular and illegal action.the judgment of the Supreme Court of. the State should be reversed.
I have shown that the franchises granted by the State of California to the Central Pacific Bailróad Company were abrogated and annulled by express legislation of the State on the 4th of April, 1864, and that the taxation was subsequently made against the railroad company upon an assessment of the value of its franchises thus discarded and thrown away, and after the Federal franchises, that is, franchises derived by grant of the United States, had been substituted in their place and confirmed by the State, with a release of all inconsistent and conflicting provisions with the rights and privileges thus granted.
I have also shown that the assessment of the property of the defendant made in 1887 was twenty-three years after the law was passed abrogating and annulling the franchises of the State upon which the valuation for taxation was made.
I have also, shown that the United States hold a lien, constituting a first mortgage on. the whole line of the railroad and telegraph, together with the rolling stock, fixtures and property of every kind and description, as security for certain subsidy bonds issued to the company, and on the refusal or failure of the company to redeem such bonds, or any part of them, when required by the' Secretary of the Treasury, in accordance with the provisions of the act, then the road, with all rights, functions, immunities and appurtenances thereunto belonging, also all lands granted to the company by the'United States, might be taken possession of by the Secretary of the Treasury for the use and benefit of the United States.
If the taxation levied in the present case can be - enforced against the defendant, in face of the facts thus stated, there will be developed a new and unknown power of taxation possessed by the State, in the existence of- which I shall not willingly believe.
*157It seems to me, clear as the sun at noonday, thiat the taxation imposed by the State of California upon the exercise of the powers, rights, privileges and immunities constituting the franchises of the United States, or of the State to the overland railroad company, or to any of its auxiliary companies, to aid in the construction of the overland railroad and its connecting roads, is directly inimical to the rights and interests of the United States, and that the blending of the franchises of the United States and of the State, and the subjection of either to taxation and to sale, which must follow if' the taxation be valid, would necessarily lead to the direct and speedy destruction of the different roads; and thus we should see, in the same century in which this greatest enterprise of our country was undertaken by its government and carried to completion and successful operation, that enterprise utterly destroyed — the completeness of the ruin being marked by the contrast with its original construction and successful operation, rendering its destruction the more significant and deplorable.
I am of opinion that the judgment of the Supreme Court of California affirming the judgment of the Superior Court of the city and county of San Francisco, and an order of that court denying a new trial in an action brought by the people of the State against the plaintiff corporation, should be reversed, and a new trial in that action granted.