Court Opinion

ID: 2964730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:30:14.644808+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:59.914709
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

        No. 96-2190

                             ERIC DELGADO-BIAGGI, ET AL.,

                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                           AIR TRANSPORT LOCAL 501, ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                  [Hon. Juan M. Perez-Gimenez, U.S. District Judge]
                                               ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                           ___________
                           Selya and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
                                            ______________

                                 ____________________

            John Ward Llambias for appellants.
            __________________
            Malcolm A. Goldstein,  with whom Joel C. Glanstein, Manuel  Porro-
            ____________________             _________________  ______________
        Vizcarra,  O'Donnell,  Schwartz,  Glanstein  &  Rosen,  and  Lopez-Lay
        ________   __________________________________________        _________
        Vizcarra & Porro, were on brief for appellees.
        ________________

                                 ____________________

                                     May 5, 1997
                                 ____________________

                      STAHL, Circuit Judge.  Plaintiff-appellant     Eric
                      STAHL, Circuit Judge.
                             _____________

            Delgado-Biaggi1   brought   an  action   against  defendants-

            appellees  Air  Transport Local  501  ("Local  501") and  the

            Transport   Workers   Union  of   America,   AFL-CIO  ("TWU")

            (collectively,  "the  Union")   under  the   Labor-Management

            Reporting and  Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"), 29  U.S.C.    401 et
                                                                       __

            seq., claiming the  denial of due  process and the  arbitrary
            ____

            and discriminatory removal of his shop steward position.  The

            district  court  granted summary  judgment  in  favor of  the

            Union, from  which Delgado-Biaggi  now appeals.   Because the

            district court's failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil

            Procedure   56(c)   denied   Delgado-Biaggi    a   meaningful

            opportunity to oppose the Union's summary judgment motion, we

            vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

                                          I.
                                          I.
                                          __

                           Background and Prior Proceedings
                           Background and Prior Proceedings
                           ________________________________

                      We  recite the  pertinent facts  in the  light most

            favorable  to  Delgado-Biaggi,  the  party  opposing  summary

            judgment.  See Hachikian  v. F.D.I.C., 96 F.3d 502,  504 (1st
                       ___ _________     ________

            Cir. 1996).

                      Delgado-Biaggi joined the Local  501 chapter of the

            TWU in 1991 when he began  working for American Airlines as a

            baggage handler.  One  year later, Delgado-Biaggi was elected

                                
            ____________________

            1.  Delgado-Biaggi's wife, Nilda  Fernandez-Zayas, and  their
            conjugal partnership are also plaintiffs.  For simplicity, we
            refer only to Eric Delgado-Biaggi and his claims.

                                         -2-
                                          2

            to a union  shop-steward position  for the  bag room,  second

            shift.2   In September  1993, Delgado-Biaggi bid  for a first

            shift position, which he obtained because of his seniority.

                      In  October  1993,  shortly   after  Delgado-Biaggi

            changed work shifts, the  chairman of Local 501 handed  him a

            letter  from Local  501's  Executive Vice-President,  William

            Tlasek,  which  purported  to   acknowledge  Delgado-Biaggi's

            "resignation" of  his shop  steward's position.   In November

            1993, Delgado-Biaggi responded to Tlasek by letter, asserting

            that he  had not resigned as  shop steward and that  he had a

            right to remain in office unless he was duly removed pursuant

            to  Local 501's  bylaws.   Tlasek,  in  turn, responded  that

            Delgado-Biaggi's  shift-change   automatically  effected  his

            resignation under  Article VII(a) of the  union bylaws, which

            provides: "A Shop Steward who leaves the unit or shift he was

            elected by, will continue  to serve at the discretion  of the

            Executive Board."

                      Dissatisfied  with  that  response,  Delgado-Biaggi

            complained again to Tlasek by letter  dated January 14, 1994,

            also to  no avail.  Not willing to concede the issue, he then

            retained  an attorney who, in  March 1994, wrote  a letter to

            Local  501 claiming denial of  due process in  the removal of

            Delgado-Biaggi  as  steward.   The  leadership  of Local  501

                                
            ____________________

            2.  Shop  stewards are  union representatives  who personally
            handle problems that their fellow employees raise  concerning
            management.

                                         -3-
                                          3

            remained unmoved.   In April  1994, Delgado-Biaggi's  counsel

            attempted   to  appeal  by   letter  to  TWU's  International

            Executive Council.  The Council's stated reason for rejecting

            the  appeal was  Delgado-Biaggi's failure to  personally file

            the letter.  Delgado-Biaggi did  not resubmit his appeal, but

            instead commenced this litigation in June 1994.

                      On June  13, 1996,  after a desultory  beginning to

            the  prosecution of this case, the district court set a trial

            date of July 1, 1996.  On June 17, the Union responded to the

            setting  of the  trial date  by filing  a motion  for summary

            judgment.3   On  Friday, June  28, the  parties met  with the

            district  court  judge  in   chambers  for  a   non-scheduled

            conference.   During  this meeting,  Delgado-Biaggi announced

            his  intention  to  oppose  the Union's  motion  for  summary

            judgment with oral and  documentary evidence on the following

            Monday, July 1, the scheduled first day of trial.

                      The following Monday morning, before Delgado-Biaggi

            had  an opportunity  to  present his  opposing evidence,  the

            parties were handed an opinion and order granting the Union's

                                
            ____________________

            3.  We note  that  the  Union submitted  the  June  17,  1996
            summary judgment motion well  after the court's November 1995
            deadline for the filing of the dispositive motion.  The court
            allowed the untimely motion although, as the record reflects,
            the Union did  not first  seek and obtain  leave to file  the
            motion out  of time.  See  In re San Juan  Dupont Plaza Hotel
                                  ___  __________________________________
            Fire Litigation, 45 F.3d 564, 566 (1st Cir. 1995) (explaining
            _______________
            that  summary judgment  proponent must  obtain permission  to
            file motion out of time where filing deadline "had long since
            passed").

                                         -4-
                                          4

            motion for summary judgment.   The terse opinion  stated that

            "[t]he union's actions in [construing  Delgado-Biaggi's shift

            change as a resignation  of shop stewardship] were authorized

            by its by-laws, which make perfect sense, since, of course, a

            shop steward is of little  use if he does not work  the shift

            he represents."    The  order  concluded that  "none  of  the

            union's conduct violates the rights protected under 29 U.S.C.

              411."  The  court did  not entertain oral  argument on  the

            motion.

                      Thereafter,  Delgado-Biaggi  filed   a  motion   to

            reconsider  along  with   a  sworn  declaration   from  Jorge

            Brignoni, a  former Chairman of  Local 501.   The declaration

            stated  that  union  stewardships are  "never"  withdrawn  or

            deemed resigned as a result of a shift change, and that

                      [i]t  has  never  been  the  practice  in
                      Puerto Rico to consider a change of shift
                      as an automatic  resignation . . . .  The
                      only  case  where such  an interpretation
                      has  been  attempted  is  when  Mr.  Eric
                      Delgado was unilaterally  removed by  the
                      then Chairman Mr. Rafael Perez.

            Delgado-Biaggi   further  submitted   an  excerpt   from  the

            deposition of  Jose Rodriguez, a Board  member, who testified

            that  the Executive  Board had  never removed  Delgado-Biaggi

            from his shop  steward position.   The district court  denied

            the motion to reconsider.  This appeal followed.

                                         II.
                                         II.
                                         ___

                                      Discussion
                                      Discussion
                                      __________

                                         -5-
                                          5

                      On  appeal, Delgado-Biaggi argues that the district

            court  prematurely granted summary  judgment and  that, given

            the proper opportunity  to respond to the  Union's motion, he

            would have produced  evidence sufficient to  preclude summary

            judgment.  The Union offers a  host of arguments in favor  of

            upholding the  court's disposition of the  action and insists

            that "the district court handled the case properly."

                      Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that

            a summary judgment motion  "shall be served at least  10 days

            before  the time  fixed for  the hearing."   Fed. R.  Civ. P.

            56(c).   We have interpreted  Rule 56(c) to  allow an adverse

            party at  least ten days  to respond to a  motion for summary

            judgment.   See  Stella v. Town  of Tewksbury, 4  F.3d 53, 55
                        ___  ______    __________________

            (1st Cir. 1993) ("[S]ummary judgment targets should be secure

            in the knowledge  that they will  have at least  ten days  in

            which to  formulate  and prepare  their  best  opposition.");

            Melanson  v. Caribou Reefers,  Ltd., 667  F.2d 213,  214 (1st
            ________     ______________________

            Cir. 1981).  Indeed, "the purpose of Rule 56(c) is to allow a

            party to have a meaningful opportunity to challenge a summary

            judgment  motion."    Cia.  Petrolera Caribe,  Inc.  v.  Arco
                                  _____________________________      ____

            Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404,  409 (1st Cir. 1985) (internal
            _______________

            quotation marks and citation omitted).4

                                
            ____________________

            4.  We note that, while  Rule 56(c) refers to a  "hearing" in
            relation  to the ten day  proviso, the rule  does not require
            oral argument  in  connection  with  the motion.    See  Cia.
                                                                ___  ____
            Petrolera Caribe, 754 F.2d at 411 (explaining that the motion
            ________________
            may be "heard" on the papers).

                                         -6-
                                          6

                      The Union filed its  motion for summary judgment on

            Monday, June 17, 1996.  Excluding the day on which the motion

            was filed as well as the intervening Saturday and Sunday, see
                                                                      ___

            Fed.  R.  Civ.  P.  6(a), the  ten-day  requirement  afforded

            Delgado-Biaggi until the end of the business day Monday, July

            1, to submit  his opposition.   By ruling  on the morning  of

            July  1, before  Delgado-Biaggi  could  present his  opposing

            evidence,  the  district  court  denied   him  the  requisite

            opportunity  to contest  the motion.   As we  previously have

            admonished, the  "[ten day] notice requirement  is not merely

            window   dressing"  and  the  "proper  province"  of  summary

            judgment is "to  weed out  claims that do  not warrant  trial

            rather than simply  to clear  a court's docket."   Stella,  4
                                                               ______

            F.3d  at 55.   We find that  the court erred  when it granted

            summary   judgment   before   Delgado-Biaggi  exhausted   his

            opportunity to challenge the Union's motion.5

                      The   Union   overlooks   the    procedural   flaws

            accompanying the  entry of summary judgment  and endeavors to

            persuade  us  that,  in any  event,  the  record reflects  no

            genuine issue of material fact.  In Stella, we "decline[d] to
                                                ______

            delve into  the substantive  aspects of plaintiffs'  cause of

            action"  because  "leapfrogging to  the merits  would display

                                
            ____________________

            5.  The error  is somewhat  amplified by the  undisputed fact
            that, during the June  28 chambers conference, Delgado-Biaggi
            notified the district court that he would submit his opposing
            evidence the following Monday, July 1.

                                         -7-
                                          7

            much the same disregard  for established protocol that marred

            the district court's performance."   4 F.3d at 55.   Assuming

            harmless error jurisprudence applied  in such cases, we noted

            that  the  peculiar  procedural  regime  the  district  court

            employed in that case thwarted any such analysis.  See id. at
                                                               ___ ___

            56 n.4.

                      We acknowledge that this  case does not present the

            extreme procedural shortcomings involved  in Stella.  See id.
                                                         ______   ___ ___

            at 54  (reversing summary  judgment where,  on  first day  of

            trial, judge directed defendants to move for summary judgment

            and   afforded  plaintiffs  thirty  minutes  to  prepare  for

            argument).6  The district court's failure to comply with Rule

            56(c),  however, necessitates  that we  afford Delgado-Biaggi

            "every  latitude to show that [the Union] was not entitled to

            summary  judgment."   Melanson,  667 F.2d  at 214.   Assuming
                                  ________

            arguendo that  harmless error analysis applies  to Rule 56(c)
            ________

            infirmities,  we cannot  say  that the  court's noncompliance

            with the ten-day notice requirement was harmless.

                      The  sworn  statements   submitted  with   Delgado-

            Biaggi's motion  to reconsider  comprise evidence  that Local

            501 never  previously considered a shift-change  an automatic

                                
            ____________________

            6.  Although we construed the district court's proceedings in
            Stella as involving  a sua sponte grant  of summary judgment,
            ______                 ___ ______
            our  observations concerning  Rule 56(c)'s  requirements were
            not limited  to that summary judgment subset.   See 4 F.3d at
                                                            ___
            55;  see also Berkovitz v. Home Box Office, Inc., 89 F.3d 24,
                 ___ ____ _________    _____________________
            29-30 (1st Cir. 1996).

                                         -8-
                                          8

            resignation of a  shop steward's  position and  that, in  any

            event, the  Executive  Board never  exercised its  discretion

            within the  meaning of  Article VII(a) to  terminate Delgado-

            Biaggi's  stewardship.   Indeed, the  Union conceded  at oral

            argument before us that  there was no evidence in  the record

            to  establish  that  the  Board  had  met  to   exercise  its

            discretion.7   This  undisputed fact  undermines the  court's

            crucial   findings   in  its   summary  judgment   order  and

            sufficiently  raises  the  question  of a  genuine  issue  of

            material fact.  Thus,  we cannot view the  flawed proceedings

            below as involving harmless error.

                      Furthermore,  by  the  Union's own  reasoning,  its

            contention that  Delgado-Biaggi fails to state  a claim under

            the  LMRDA  depends  on  the Executive  Board's  powers  and,

            ultimately, the  disputed question  whether the Board  met to

            exercise its  discretion.   The Union's other  arguments also

            raise significant issues neither fully presented nor squarely

            addressed below.8  See In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire
                               ___ ______________________________________

                                
            ____________________

            7.  Without deciding the issue, we note  that the language of
            Article  VII(a)  appears  to  contemplate  the  uninterrupted
            service of  a shop  steward who changes  shifts, absent  some
            action by the Executive Board.

            8.  For example, the Union  argues that Delgado-Biaggi failed
            "to exhaust reasonable hearing  procedures (but not to exceed
            a four-month lapse of time) within [the union]" before filing
            his  action.     29   U.S.C.    411(a)(4).     This  argument
            potentially requires factbound  determinations regarding  the
            "reasonableness" of  the hearing  procedures and  the precise
            event that  triggered the  four month period.   The  district
            court  never reached  this issue  and, given  the undeveloped

                                         -9-
                                          9

            Litigation, 45 F.3d  564, 567, 568  (1st Cir. 1995)  (finding
            __________

            harmful  error  where  appellate  court  was not  "completely

            certain that  the merits  of the  summary judgment  issue had

            been fully  presented to  the  district court"  and where  "a

            significant  legal  issue,  not  squarely  addressed  by  the

            district   court"   remained   unresolved  due   to   court's

            abbreviated summary  judgment proceedings).  We  are loath to

            endorse  the  district  court's  disregard   for  Rule  56(c)

            protocol by reaching the merits of these undeveloped matters.

            See Stella, 4 F.3d at 55.
            ___ ______

                      We conclude that, largely because of the absence of

            evidence establishing Executive Board  action, as well as the

            procedural failure  below, remand for further  proceedings is

            the  appropriate solution.  See  In re San  Juan Dupont Plaza
                                        ___  ____________________________

            Hotel Fire Litigation, 45 F.3d at 568.
            _____________________

                                         III.
                                         III.
                                         ____

                                      Conclusion
                                      Conclusion
                                      __________

                      For the foregoing  reasons, we vacate  the judgment
                                                     ______

            of the district  court and  remand the  case for  proceedings
                                        ______

            consistent with this opinion.  Costs to appellants.
                                           ___________________

                                
            ____________________

            record, we decline to reach it at this time.

                                         -10-
                                          10