Court Opinion

ID: 9839684
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-13 19:04:09.931737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:23.853157
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/13/23 P. v. Carmona CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                                          D079779

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.
                                                                     (Super. Ct. No. SCE392322)
FRANCISCO GONZALEZ CARMONA,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Daniel G. Lamborn, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
for resentencing.
         Daniel J. Kessler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve
Oetting and Kristen Ramirez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
         Francisco Gonzalez Carmona was convicted and sentenced on charges
that he engaged in lewd and lascivious acts with and upon two children, and
sexually penetrated one of them. He contends the trial court erred: first, by
admitting in evidence out-of-court statements of alleged victims other than
the two to whom the charges pertained; and second, by sentencing Carmona
to an upper term of imprisonment without having specified any
circumstances in aggravation to justify the upper term. As to the first
assignment of error, we conclude Carmona forfeited his right to challenge the
out-of-court statements because his counsel did not object, move to strike, or
request a limiting instruction with regard to the statements at trial. As to
the second assignment of error, we conclude that resentencing is required in
order to comply with sentencing-law amendments that took effect shortly
after the trial court imposed its sentence. Hence we affirm the conviction,
vacate the sentence, and remand the matter for resentencing.
                                       I.
                     Factual and Procedural Background

      In 2021, the district attorney charged Carmona with offenses based on
allegations that he had sexually penetrated one of his granddaughters (the
first granddaughter) when she was below the age of 11, that he had engaged
in lewd and lascivious acts with and upon that same granddaughter at a time
when she was below the age of 14, and that he had engaged in lewd and
lascivious acts decades earlier with and upon one of his nieces (the niece)

when she, too, was below the age of 14.1

1      The offenses alleged were: one count of violation of Penal Code section
288.7, subdivision (b) (sexual penetration of a child 10 years of age or younger
by a person 18 years of age or older) with respect to the first granddaughter;
two counts of violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a) (commission
of a lewd or lascivious act upon or with a child under 14 years of age) also
with respect to the first granddaughter; and 13 counts of violation of the
same provision (§ 288, subd. (a)) with respect to the niece.

                                       2
A.    The Evidence Presented at Trial

     At trial, the prosecution presented testimony from the first
granddaughter and the niece; as well as a second granddaughter and one of
Carmona’s daughters (the daughter). As discussed in somewhat more detail
post, each of these witnesses testified that, when she was a child, she had
been touched inappropriately by Carmona and told by Carmona not to tell
others.
     The first granddaughter (who was the subject of counts 1 through 3) was
15 years old when she took the witness stand. She testified: that,
commencing when she was seven years old and continuing until a time when
she was 12 years old, Carmona had used his fingers, at times over her clothes
and at other times under her clothes, to touch (or rub) the outside and, over
time, the inside of her vagina on “many, many” (“more than 30”) occasions,
and also to touch her breasts on occasion during this same period; that this
touching had occurred in the bedroom of a family member’s home in the
United States and in the garden, living room, garage, and a bedroom
(Carmona’s bedroom) of Carmona’s home in Mexico; that she often “would
wake up to his touching”; that the touching sometimes hurt (“[a] seven” “on a
scale from one to ten with ten being the most force”); and that Carmona told
her not to tell anyone.
     The niece (who was the subject of counts 4 through 16) was an adult
with children of her own when she took the stand. She testified: that on
many occasions, beginning when she was seven years old or younger and
continuing until she was 13 or 14 years old, her uncle (Carmona) would insert
two or three fingers into her vagina; that, every time he touched her vagina,
he would simultaneously touch her breasts; that this touching had occurred
in a bedroom of Carmona’s home in the United States and in a bedroom of

                                       3
Carmona’s home in Mexico; that the touching was always inside her
underwear and under her shirt; that this touching occurred approximately
two to three times a month, when she was between 11 years old and 13 or 14
years old; that “[h]e would pull . . . down her [underwear and shorts] to put
his hand in”; that the touching hurt; that the touching would begin while she
was asleep and she would wake up to it; and that he told her “not tell anyone
because they wouldn’t believe [her]” and that “it would be his word against
[hers].”
     The second granddaughter—who was ten years old when she took the
stand—testified: that, on several occasions commencing when she was five
years old and continuing until a time when she was six years old, Carmona
had used his hand, at times over her clothes and at other times over her
underwear, to touch her vagina, her chest, and “[t]he back part where we go
to the bathroom number two”; that this touching had occurred in her bedroom
at her home in Mexico and in Carmona’s bedroom in his home in Mexico;
that, on one occasion in which Carmona touched her in this fashion, “he
locked the door to the bedroom [with just the two of them inside] and [she]
got very scared”; that on another occasion she “woke up to grandpa . . .
touching [her]”; that the touching hurt; that on multiple occasions Carmona
told her not to tell anyone; and that on at least one occasion he told her
“that[,] if I told anyone, he was going to take revenge.”
     The daughter—who was an adult with grown children of her own when
she took the stand—testified: that, for a period of time during her early teen
years and possibly earlier, Carmona used to use his hand and at least one
finger to touch her vagina “like probably a couple times a month”; that
“[s]ometimes it would be the outside of her vagina’’ and “sometimes it would
be the inside”; that “it hurt” when he touched the inside of her vagina; that

                                        4
he also used to touch her breasts during this period of time; that some of the
touching occurred in a van and some of it occurred in a trailer; that she “told
him to stop . . . every time” he touched her vagina and that “sometimes he
would [stop]” in response to her telling him to stop and that “sometimes he
wouldn’t”; that he used to tell her “[a]ll the time” not to say anything to her
mother; and that, when she finally reported the conduct, she was removed to
a series of group homes where she lived until she was 18 years old.
     The prosecution also presented testimony from 12 additional witnesses,
including five members of the Carmona family, three law enforcement
personnel, three social workers experienced in conducting forensic interviews
of children in situations involving allegations of child abuse, and a
pediatrician employed by Rady Children’s Hospital who specializes in child
abuse. The pediatrician testified that both granddaughters had tested
positive for a sexually transmitted infection (STI) and that, “in [a child] this
age . . . who is not reporting consensual sexual activity,” such a test result “is

definitive for [there having been] some type of sexual contact.”2
     In addition, the prosecution presented out-of-court statements made by
each of the two granddaughters, the daughter, and the niece. The out-of-
court statements of the granddaughters were introduced through video-and-
audio recordings of forensic interviews of the granddaughters by one of the

2      The pediatrician testified that, when asked, the first granddaughter
indicated that she had not been involved in any type of sexual contact apart
from the touching by Carmona. The record does not reveal whether the same
type of inquiry was posed to the second grandchild (who was below the age of
ten when the consultation with the pediatrician occurred). The pediatrician
also testified that the types of sexual contact through which an STI can be
transmitted include “when the offender’s secretions are on his or her hand
and then gets placed into the genitalia of a child,” and that an STI can be
transmitted “in the same way[] if there is contact with infectious secretions to
the mucus membranes of the anus.”

                                        5
social worker witnesses (the forensic examiner), accompanied by transcripts
of the interviews and testimony from the forensic examiner and a detective.
The daughter’s out-of-court statements were introduced via testimony from
two witnesses. One of these two witnesses was a retired sheriff’s deputy who
recounted an occasion in 1991, some 30 years earlier, when he had responded
to a radio call relating to a report of a family disturbance and the daughter,
aged 15, had told him that her father (Carmona) had been touching her
vagina and her breasts frequently over the course of the preceding two years.
The second of the two witnesses through whom the daughter’s out-of-court
statements were introduced was another one of the social worker witnesses
(the CPS social worker), now retired, who also had become involved following
the family disturbance in 1991. The niece’s out-of-court statements were
introduced via testimony from a detective.
      The defense presented no witnesses.

B.    Proceedings Related to the Use at Trial of the Challenged Out-of-Court
      Statements

      1.    The Defense’s Pre-trial Objections to the Challenged Out-of-
            Court Statements Being Used at Trial

     The use of the out-of-court statements at trial was not the first
indication that the prosecution intended to use the out-of-court statements of
the second grandchild and the daughter (the challenged out-of-court
statements) to establish guilt. At a pre-trial hearing the day before opening
statements, the court heard in limine arguments addressed to this very topic.
During the pre-trial hearing, the defense interposed objections to such use,

                                       6
citing Evidence Code section 3523 as the basis for the objections. The court
provisionally overruled these objections.
      With respect to the out-of-court statements of the second
granddaughter, defense counsel stated:
         “I would just submit on—just on 352, that if we get too into
         the weeds and building up and putting context and putting
         specifics to these prior statements when we are going to
         hear from [the second granddaughter and the daughter]
         directly, that we might be wasting time and that really
         becomes cumulative.”

In response, the court stated: “I will be sensitive . . . to any arguments that
some of the statements were cumulative, but at least initially I will rule that
those statements are admissible at this time.”
      Similarly, with respect to the out-of-court statements of the daughter,
defense counsel stated:
         “I think, once again, once we get more into the weeds of
         these . . . accusations and . . . allegations [by the daughter],
         it’s going to only expand the—what we need to examine
         with each and every witness.

         [¶] . . . [¶]

         “[I]t’s going to open up a whole other bag of issues. So I
         think that’s our concern is it’s just going to send us in all
         these different directions when we are just trying to stay
         focused on whether or not the allegations as posed by [the
         first granddaughter and the niece] are true.”

3      Evidence Code section 352 states: “The court in its discretion may
exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time
or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.”

                                        7
In response, the court stated: “The Court will allow limited disclosure of
[such evidence] subject to any further objections by [defense counsel], as far
as being cumulative or 352 material.”
      The arguments predicated on Evidence Code section 352 were the only
arguments defense counsel advanced as a basis for its objections.

      2.    The Absence of Any Objections at Trial to Use of the Challenged
            Out-of-Court Statements

      During its case in chief, the prosecution played the video recording of
the forensic interview of the second granddaughter for the jury, distributed
the transcript of that interview to the jury, examined the forensic examiner

about the interview,4 elicited from the retired sheriff’s deputy his account of
what the daughter had told him during his encounter with her following the
family disturbance in 1991, and elicited from the CPS social worker her
account of what the daughter had told her during the CPS agency’s follow-up
response in 1991—all without defense counsel renewing his pre-trial
Evidence Code section 352 objections to the challenged out-of-court
statements or interposing any other objection or request for a limiting
instruction, with respect to the use of such evidence.
     Before resting its case, the prosecution moved to admit in evidence
several trial exhibits, including the recordings of the forensic interviews of
the two granddaughters. The trial court asked defense counsel: “Any
objection to those . . . ? Defense counsel replied: “No.”

4      The prosecution also played for the jury the video recording of the
forensic interview of the first granddaughter (which is not being challenged
on appeal). In addition, it distributed the transcript of that interview to the
jury, and examined the forensic examiner about that interview.

                                        8
C.    Verdicts and Sentencing

      Following closing arguments, the jury convicted Carmona on each of
the charges, comprising 16 counts in all. With regard to the first
granddaughter, the jury returned verdicts finding Carmona guilty on one
count of the crime of sexual penetration with a child 10 years old or younger,
in violation of Penal Code section 288.7, subdivision (b), and on two counts of
the crime of lewd act upon a child, in violation of Penal Code section 288,
subdivision (a). With regard to the niece, the jury returned verdicts finding
Carmona guilty on 13 counts of the crime of lewd act upon a child, in
violation of section 288, subdivision (a).
      The jury also made a further pair of findings (one under a section of the

Penal Code relating to eligibility for probation,5 and the other under what is

commonly known as the one-strike rule6) on each of the two counts as to
which it found that Carmona had committed a lewd act upon the first
granddaughter. It was not asked to make findings as to any circumstances in
aggravation; nor did Carmona stipulate to any such circumstances.
      Some weeks later, the trial court pronounced a sentence as to each
count, resulting in the imposition of an aggregate term of imprisonment

5      “[W]e further find the allegation that [Carmona] did have substantial
sexual conduct with [the first granddaughter], a child under fourteen years of
age, in the commission of the above described felony of Lewd Act On A Child,
within the meaning of Penal Code section 1203.066[, subdivision] (a)(8), to be
True.”

6      “[W]e further find the allegation that [Carmona] has been convicted in
[this case] of committing an offense specified in subdivision (c) against more
than one victim, within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.61[,
subdivisions] (b)[,] (c) [&] (e) to be True.”

                                        9
totaling 30 years to life plus an additional 32 years.7 As to one of the
counts—count 4, for violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a)—the
court sentenced Carmona to imprisonment for the upper term of eight years.
In sentencing Carmona to the upper term on this offense, the court did not
specify any of the statutory “circumstances in aggravation” enumerated in
California Rules of Court, rule 4.421.
      Instead, the court stated:
         “Count [4], the court did look at that. Considered the
         longevity of the offenses, considered the circumstances of
         the offense in this particular case. Under rule 4.421(a), the
         court has considered the individual rules under that rule,
         and does find that the upper term is appropriate in this
         case; the upper term of eight years . . . .”

Thereafter, referring to all 16 counts, the court adverted to one of the
statutory circumstances in mitigation that are enumerated in California
Rules of Court, rule 4.423, stating: “The court is mindful of the defendant’s
lack of convictions.” (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.423(b)(1).) “But,” the
court continued, “the lives that Mr. Carmona has impacted over decades
deserve[] these sentences in this case.”
      This was the extent of the trial court’s articulation of its rationale for
imposing the upper term.

7     The 30 years to life is comprised of 15 years to life on count 1 plus an
additional 15 years to life on count 3, and the additional 32 years is
comprised of eight years on count four plus two years each on counts five
through 16, with all terms to be served consecutively. The court did not
impose a term of imprisonment on count 2 because it concluded “punishment
under this [count] is barred by Penal Code [section] 654.”

                                         10
                                       II.
                                  Discussion
      As noted ante, Carmona contends the trial court erred in two respects:
first, by admitting in evidence the challenged out-of-court statements (i.e.,
the out-of-court statements of the second granddaughter and the daughter);
and second, by sentencing him to the upper term of imprisonment without
specifying any circumstances in aggravation to justify the upper term. We
examine each of these contentions in turn.

A.    Admission of the Challenged Out-of-Court Statements

      1.    The Absence of an Objection at the Time of Trial

      In support of his contention that the trial court erred in admitting the
challenged out-of-court statements in evidence, Carmona argues that the

court incorrectly applied Evidence Code section 13608 and the fresh

8      Evidence Code section 1360 articulates circumstances under which,
“[i]n a criminal prosecution where the victim is a minor, a statement made by
the victim when under the age of 12 describing any act of child abuse or
neglect performed with or on the child by another, or describing any
attempted act of child abuse or neglect with or on the child by another, is not
made inadmissible by the hearsay rule.” (Evid. Code § 1360(a).) Carmona
contends that this provision applies only to statements by alleged victims to
whom the charges pertain, and not to other alleged victims; however, for
reasons stated in this opinion, we do not find it necessary to address this
contention.

                                       11
complaint doctrine.9 But these arguments do not help Carmona, because he
did not assert section 1360 or the fresh complaint doctrine as a basis for any
objection, motion in limine, motion to strike, or request for limiting
instruction at the time of trial.
      In this regard, Evidence Code section 353, subdivision (a) forecloses
reversal of a judgment based on erroneous admission of evidence absent an
objection or motion to strike that was timely made on grounds that are the
same as those being advanced on appeal. (Evid. Code § 353, subd. (a)] [“A
verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the judgment or decision
based thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous admission of evidence
unless . . . [t]here appears of record an objection to or a motion to exclude or
to strike the evidence that was timely made and so stated as to make clear
the specific ground of the objection or motion”].) The grounds that Carmona
advanced in support of the objections he expressed during the pre-trial
hearing (Evid. Code § 352) did not include the grounds he is advancing now.
And, in People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1 (Demetrulias), our Supreme
Court has stated:
         “Evidence Code section 353, subdivision (a) allows a
         judgment to be reversed because of erroneous admission of
         evidence only if an objection to the evidence or a motion to
         strike it was ‘timely made and so stated as to make clear
         the specific ground of the objection.’ Pursuant to this

9      The fresh complaint doctrine is a mechanism that “allows evidence to
be admitted for the limited purpose of showing that a complaint was made by
the victim, and not for the truth of the matter stated.” (People v. Ramirez
(2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1512, 1522 (Ramirez) [citing People v. Brown (1994)
8 Cal.4th 746, 761].) “Evidence admitted pursuant to this doctrine may be
considered by the trier of fact for the purpose of corroborating the victim's
testimony, but not to prove the occurrence of the crime.” (Ramirez, at p. 1522
[citing People v. Bernstein (1959) 171 Cal.App.2d 279, 285].) For reasons
stated in this opinion, we do not find it necessary to address this contention.

                                       12
         statute, ‘ “we have consistently held that the ‘defendant’s
         failure to make a timely and specific objection’ on the
         ground asserted on appeal makes that ground not
         cognizable.” ’ [Citation.] Under this principle, defendant’s
         claim that . . . admission of [the] evidence [challenged on
         appeal] violated [the] Evidence Code . . . is not cognizable;
         defendant forfeited his claim by failing to make timely
         objections or a timely motion to strike on that specific
         ground.”

(Demetrulias, supra, at pp. 20–21 [concluding defendant that had forfeited
his claim under Evid. Code § 1103, that evidence of victims’ peaceful
character was inadmissible].)
      Moreover, even if the objections that Carmona made during the pre-
trial hearing, and that the court provisionally overruled, had included the
two bases that he is advancing now (Evid. Code § 1360 and the fresh
complaint doctrine), such inclusion would not suffice to spare Carmona from
the consequences of his not having timely and specifically reiterated those
bases for objecting at the time of trial.
         “Neither of these bases of relevance was raised or discussed
         in the hearing on . . . motion[s] in limine, nor did defendant
         take advantage of the trial court’s offer to reconsider its in
         limine ruling at any point during trial. A tentative pretrial
         evidentiary ruling, made without fully knowing what the
         trial evidence would show, will not preserve the issue for
         appeal if the appellant could have, but did not, renew the
         objection or offer of proof and press for a final ruling in the
         changed context of the trial evidence itself.”

(People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 133.) Indeed, far from asserting at
(or before) trial the bases for inadmissibility that he is advancing now,
Carmona instead did the opposite—by acquiescing to the prosecution’s
motion to admit in evidence the recording of the forensic interview of the
second granddaughter.

                                        13
      2.    The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Argument

      Acknowledging the problem posed by the fact that his trial counsel did
not assert at trial the grounds for an evidentiary challenge that his appellate
counsel now advocates, Carmona asserts that—to the extent that the absence
of such a challenge at trial has resulted in a forfeiture—he received
ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial. To support this assertion,
Carmona asserts that the video of the forensic interview of the second
granddaughter was cumulative and especially prejudicial because it depicted
the second granddaughter at the age of eight (two years younger than the age
at which she testified at trial) “play[ing] with play dough,” “dr[awing] in
coloring books,” and “talk[ing] in [a] childlike way.”
      To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
establish “that counsel’s performance was deficient, falling below an objective
standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms” and “that,
absent [the claimed] error [by counsel], it is reasonably probable that the
verdict would have been more favorable to [the defendant].” (People v.
Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 940.) “If the record does not shed light on
why counsel acted or failed to act in the challenged manner, we must reject
the claim on appeal unless counsel was asked for and failed to provide a
satisfactory explanation, or there simply can be no satisfactory explanation.”
(People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1212.)
      Here, the record sheds no light as to why Carmona’s trial counsel did
not object or request a limiting instruction with respect to the challenged out-
of-court statements or as to whether an explanation for not objecting was
sought or received from trial counsel. However, on the record presented here,
we need not speculate as to why he acted or failed to act as he did, nor need
we consider whether any of various explanations on which we might

                                       14
speculate should be deemed satisfactory or unsatisfactory, because we
conclude it is not reasonably probable that the verdict would have been more
favorable to Carmona had the challenged out-of-court statements not been
used. Regardless of any conclusions the jury might have drawn from the
challenged out-of-court statements, the fact remains that jurors observed four
witnesses (representing two generations of the Carmona family) testify under
oath to having repeatedly endured pain, discomfort, and feelings of
helplessness as children due to numerous instances of molestation at the
hand of their grandfather/father/uncle over multiple periods of time spanning
decades. In addition, jurors heard testimony generally supportive of the
alleged victims’ accounts from 12 more witnesses. No family member or any
other witness testified on behalf of Carmona. These circumstances—with or
without the challenged out-of-court statements—furnished the jury a more
than sufficiently powerful basis on which to return verdicts of guilty on all
counts.
      For the reasons stated, we decline Carmona’s invitation to reverse his
conviction on evidentiary grounds. Ineffective assistance of counsel has not
been established. If it had been established, it would be harmless. (See
People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 439 [“even if we were to assume
evidentiary error, any error would be harmless” as “[t]here was
overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt”]; People v. Watson (1956) 46
Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).) Hence, in our view “ ‘[N]o reason appears why we
should not apply the established rule[] . . . that issues not raised in the trial
court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.’ ” (Johnson v. Greenelsh
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 598, 603.)

                                        15
B.    Sentencing

      Turning to the topic of Carmona’s sentence, we begin by noting that the
discretion accorded to trial judges in sentencing is much more circumscribed
today than it was on the date that the trial judge imposed sentence on
Carmona (November 29, 2021). (See generally People v. Lopez (2022)
78 Cal.App.5th 459, 464–465 (Lopez) [discussing amendments to sentencing
laws occasioned by enactment of Sen. Bill No. 567].) Whereas Penal Code
section 1170, subdivision (b), in effect on November 29, 2021 provided that:
         “When a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and
         the statute specifies three possible terms, the choice of the
         appropriate term shall rest within the sound discretion of
         the court.”

Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)(1), effective as of January 1, 2022
provides that:
         “When a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and
         the statute specifies three possible terms, the court shall, in
         its sound discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to
         exceed the middle term, except as otherwise provided in
         paragraph (2).”

      As the parties have acknowledged, this change applies retroactively to
all cases that were not yet final as of January 1, 2022. (See Lopez, supra, 78
Cal.App.5th at p. 465; see also People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 656
[“new laws that reduce the punishment for a crime are presumptively to be
applied to defendants whose judgments are not yet final”].) Of course, the
existence of this appeal means that this case is not yet final. Hence, as to
each count, Carmona’s sentence may not “exceed the middle term, except as
otherwise provided in paragraph 2” of section 1170, subdivision (b). (Pen.
Code, § 1170(b)(1).)

                                       16
         Paragraph 2 of section 1170, subdivision (b) provides that, in a jury
trial:
            “The court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle
            term only when [1] there are circumstances in aggravation
            of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of
            imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and [2] the facts
            underlying those circumstances [a] have been stipulated to
            by the defendant, or [b] have been found true beyond a
            reasonable doubt at trial by the jury.”

(Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (b)(2) (italics added).)
         Here, Carmona did not stipulate to, and the jury did not find, any
circumstances in aggravation, and the trial court did not articulate any such
circumstances in imposing sentence; yet the court imposed the upper (rather
than the middle) term as to count 4. In other words, the trial court did not
apply section 1170, subdivision (b) as amended (the new version of the
sentencing law). Thus we must determine whether prejudice resulted from
the fact that the trial court did not apply the new version of the sentencing
law. (See Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at pp. 465–467; Watson, supra,
46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
         In evaluating prejudice arising from a trial court’s having not applied
Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b) as amended, the courts of appeal

have adopted a variety of different methodologies10 that our Supreme Court,

10    See, e.g., People v. Flores (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 495, 500–501; Lopez,
supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at pp. 465–466; People v. Wandrey (2022) 80
Cal.App.5th 962, 981-982, review granted Sept. 28, 2022, S275942; People v.
Zabelle (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1098, 1110–1111; People v. Dunn (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 394, 405, review granted Oct. 12, 2022, S275655 (Dunn); People
v. Flowers (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 680, 686, review granted Oct. 12, 2022,
S276237; People v. Lewis (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1125, review granted May 17,
2023, S279147; People v. Falcon (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 911, 918–921, 923–
952 (Falcon) [discussing various courts’ approaches].

                                         17
“[h]aving granted review in People v. Lynch (May 27, 2022, C094174)
(nonpub. opn.), review granted August 10, 2022, S274942, . . . is now poised
to resolve.” (See Falcon, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 920.) Pending Supreme
Court resolution of this split, we will continue to apply the two-part test that
this court articulated in Lopez, supra:
         “[U]nder the new version of the triad system set forth in
         section 1170, the initial relevant question for purposes of
         determining whether prejudice resulted from failure to
         apply the new version of the sentencing law is whether the
         reviewing court can conclude beyond reasonable doubt that
         a jury would have found true beyond a reasonable doubt all
         of the aggravating factors on which the trial court relied in
         exercising its discretion to select the upper term. If the
         answer to this question is ‘yes,’ then the defendant has not
         suffered prejudice from the court’s reliance on factors not
         found true by a jury in selecting the upper term. However,
         if the answer to the question is ‘no,’ we then consider the
         second question, which is whether a reviewing court can be
         certain, to the degree required by People v. Watson (1956)
         46 Cal.2d 818, 836 . . . , that the trial court would
         nevertheless have exercised its discretion to select the
         upper term if it had recognized that it could permissibly
         rely on only a single one of the aggravating factors, a few of
         the aggravating factors, or none of the aggravating factors,
         rather than all of the factors on which it previously relied.
         If the answer to both of these questions is ‘no,’ then it is
         clear that remand to the trial court for resentencing is
         necessary.”

(Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 468, fn. 11 (original italics deleted and
additional italics and underlining added); see id. at pp. 465–468.)
      As can be seen in the language to which we have added italics, in order
for a reviewing court to apply the Lopez methodology, the trial court must
have specified in the record “all of the aggravating factors on which the trial
court relied in exercising its discretion to select the upper term.” Yet, in this
case, the trial court did not specify in the record any of the aggravating

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factors on which it relied. Instead, it merely stated that it had “[c]onsidered
the longevity of the offenses, considered the circumstances of the offense . . . ,
[and] considered the individual rules under . . . rule [4.421, subdivision (a),”
and “f[ou]nd that the upper term is appropriate”—without specifying the
conclusions (if any) it had drawn from those circumstances or those rules that
prompted it to “find . . . the upper term . . . appropriate.” Thus we conclude
that resentencing is necessary to ensure that Carmona’s sentence complies
with section 1170, subdivision (b) in its current iteration. Further, pursuant
to the full resentencing rule (see People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893),
that the trial court must reconsider the entire sentence—not just the
sentence as to count 4.
                                       III.
                                   Disposition

      The conviction is affirmed, the sentence is vacated, and the matter is
remanded to the trial court for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
Following resentencing, the trial court shall prepare an amended abstract of
judgment and forward a copy of the amended abstract to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is
affirmed.

                                                                     KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

DATO, J.

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