Court Opinion

ID: 9796699
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:03:04.57629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:51:02.767284
License: Public Domain

EDMONDS, J.,
dissenting.
The majority holds that defendants are exempt from the provisions of the Oregon Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (ORLTA) because their arrangement with plaintiff falls within the provisions of ORS 90.110(1) and (3). For the reasons that follow, I dissent.
The questions presented by this case are questions of statutory interpretation. Therefore, our task is to discern the intent of the legislature. In that quest, we are guided by the template established in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). ORLTA was enacted in 1973 and is patterned after the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. Brewer v. Erwin, 287 Or 435, 438, 600 P2d 398 (1979). The act is intended to be a comprehensive statutory scheme dealing with the terms of rental *746agreements; it imposes obligations on landlords and on tenants, and it spells out their remedies. Id. However, ORLTA does not apply to all rental agreements. ORS 90.110 provides:
“Unless created to avoid the application of this chapter, the following arrangements are not governed by this chapter:
“(1) Residence at an institution, public or private, if incidental to detention or the provision of medical, geriatric, educational, counseling, religious or similar service, but not including residence in off-campus nondormitory housing.
“(2) Occupancy of a dwelling unit for no more than 90 days by a purchaser prior to the scheduled closing of a real estate sale or by a seller following the closing of a sale, in either case as permitted under the terms of an agreement for sale of a dwelling unit or the property of which it is a part. The occupancy by a purchaser or seller described in this subsection may be terminated only pursuant to ORS 91.130. A tenant who holds but has not exercised an option to purchase the dwelling unit is not a purchaser for purposes of this subsection.
“(3) Occupancy by a member of a fraternal or social organization in the portion of a structure operated for the benefit of the organization.
“(4) Transient occupancy in a hotel or motel.
“(5) Occupancy by a squatter.
“(6) Vacation occupancy.
“(7) Occupancy by an employee of a landlord whose right to occupancy is conditional upon employment in and about the premises. However, the occupancy by an employee as described in this subsection may be terminated only pursuant to ORS 91.120.
“(8) Occupancy by an owner of a condominium unit or a holder of a proprietary lease in a cooperative.
“(9) Occupancy under a rental agreement covering premises used by the occupant primarily for agricultural purposes.”
*747Preliminarily, I agree with the majority’s assertion that
“[t]he enumerated exclusions essentially fall into two groups: (1) exemptions for short-term housing and (2) exemptions for housing where the primary relationship between the parties is something other than a traditional residential landlord-tenant relationship. The exclusions in ORS 90.110(4) and (6) govern short-term housing (‘[tjransient occupancy in a hotel or motel’ and Vacation occupancy’ respectively). Underlying those exclusions is an assumption that the occupant of the property has a primary residence somewhere other than the property at issue and that short-term housing should not be subject to ORLTA. The remainder of the exclusions exempt arrangements where the primary relationship between the parties is something other than a traditional residential landlord-tenant relationship.”
196 Or App at 730-31 (footnote omitted). However, the majority fails to grasp the import of its understanding regarding legislative intent. Later in this opinion, I will address the importance of understanding the role that the primary relationship between the parties plays in the construction of ORS 90.110.
Second, this case on its facts intuitively suggests there ought to be an exemption in the law that benefits defendants, given their commendable purpose. We need to be mindful, however, that we cannot legislate in this case. We do not create statutory law; rather, we take the words of the statutes in accordance with their commonly understood meaning and ask whether defendants’ proposed meaning is consistent with the meaning of the words that the legislature intended. Any exercise beyond that function exceeds our authority as the judicial arm of the government.
Finally, neither the Supreme Court nor we have been required to interpret the words in either ORS 90.110(1) or ORS 90.110(3). The template for our task is well-established. To determine the legislature’s intent, we must first examine the text in the context of ORLTA. PGE, 317 Or at 610. In that analysis, we consider rules of statutory construction that bear directly on the reading of the text in context. Id. at 611. Context includes related statutes, as well as prior versions of statutes. See id.; State v. Webb, 324 Or 380, *748390,927 P2d 79 (1996). If the meaning of a statute is not clear from the text and context, we then resort to legislative history and, if necessary, to general maxims of statutory construction. PGE, 317 Or at 611-12.
ORS 90.100 establishes definitions of “landlord,” ORS 90.100(20), and “tenant,” ORS 90.100(42), in broad, encompassing terms. Additionally, ORS 90.115 provides that ORLTA is to have broad application.1 It follows that any exception to the coverage provided by ORLTA ought to be strictly and narrowly construed so as to not defeat the legislature’s overall purpose. Otherwise, the exceptions to the act, broadly construed, could eviscerate its regulatory effect.2 For instance, ORS 90.110(1) indicates that defendants are excluded from coverage under that exclusion if their arrangement with plaintiff involved “Residence at an institution, public or private” that was incidental to “the provision of medical, geriatric, educational, counseling, religious or similar service [s].” Here, defendants concede that they provide no direct counseling or similar rehabilitative service to Oxford House-Ramona residents. That fact ought to be enough to disqualify them from exempt status because, if the exception in subsection (1) is expanded to encompass them, it is also broad enough to encompass other institutions that do not meet the statute’s requirements.
Defendants rely, however, on the fact that the residents provide moral support and reinforcement to each other. In defendants’ view, that fact satisfies the requirement of ORS 90.110(1) of an occupancy incidental to the provision of a service similar to a counseling service. However, the language of subsection (1) cannot be plausibly interpreted to encompass defendants’ interpretation. First, the statute *749requires residence at an “institution, public or private.” Second, the residency furnished by the institution must be “incidental to detention or provision of medical, geriatric, educational, counseling, religious or similar service [s].” The meaning of the two parts of the statute when read together are unambiguous. The institution that provides the residence must also provide one of the enumerated services or a similar service. But here, as expressed above, Oxford House-Ramona does not contend that it provides a counseling or similar service to its residents.
The majority contends, however, that, because discussions of drug and alcohol problems occur between residents in Oxford House-Ramona and are intended to occur under the Oxford House model to facilitate recovery, the residents provide each other with services similar to counseling, i.e., “peer supervision, support, and counseling.” The majority posits that those actions can be attributed to defendants because, “when members of an Oxford House act, it is, in fact, Oxford House acting.” 196 Or App at 739 n 6. Residence in an Oxford House residence is in a sense a kind of membership, i.e., a group of people, but it does not follow from that fact that, when residents provide peer reinforcement through discussions about their addictions and other problems, they are defendants’ agents. Rather, the record indicates that, although the Oxford House model encourages the residents to support each other, defendants do not supervise their residents or otherwise offer them any services. Indeed, the Oxford House model is specifically designed to provide for unsupervised recovery, the antithesis of an institution that provides services where residence is incidental to the service provided. Because there is no evidence that peer reinforcement is the primary object of the arrangement between Oxford House and its tenants, the majority’s theory under ORS 90.110(1) fails.
If, for the sake of argument, the residents of Oxford House-Ramona act as the agents of defendants when they interact with other residents, defendants still do not qualify for the exemption under ORS 90.110(1) because the peer reinforcement provided by residents to each other is not similar to “counseling.” “Counseling” is “a practice or professional service designed to guide an individual to a better *750understanding of his problems and potentialities by utilizing modern psychological principals and methods[.]” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 518 (unabridged ed 2002). The record indicates that Oxford House residents are roommates and, like many roommates, they discuss their problems with each other, confront one another about problems, and prefer to live with others who hold similar views. Nothing in the record indicates that the residents’ reinforcement of each other or their peer counseling constitute the professional therapy that the statute’s language contemplates or that the residents are aware of, trained in, or utilize modern psychological therapeutic methods. Under any common understanding of the meaning of the text of ORS 90.110(1), it reasonably cannot be said that the activities that residents direct at each other constitute “counseling or similar services” within the meaning of the statute.
Finally, even if it can be said that defendants furnish a living environment in which the kind of counseling contemplated by the statute can occur, defendants are not the kinds of institutions that ORS 90.110(1) excludes from ORLTA coverage. The services listed in the statute — medical, geriatric, educational, counseling, and religious — indicate the kinds of institutions to which ORS 90.110(1) applies. All of the institutions listed in the statute are institutions whose primary purpose is to provide one of the enumerated services or a similar service. That principle was recognized in Gray v. Pierce County Housing Authority, 123 Wash App 744, 97 P3d 26 (2004). In that case, the court considered whether the Pierce County Housing Authority (PCHA), qualified for an exemption under RCW 59.18.040(1). That statute provides that “[Residence at an institution, whether public or private, where residence is merely incidental to detention or the provision of medical, religious, educational, recreational, or similar services * * *” is excluded from coverage under Washington’s Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. The court concluded that PCHA did not qualify under the statute, even though it provided the kind of educational services to residents contemplated by the statute, because PCHA’s primary purpose was to provide housing for low-income tenants. Gray, 123 Wash App at 758-59, 97 P3d at 33. The court also concluded that, because PCHA was not the kind of institution *751to which the statute applied, it need not determine whether the plaintiffs residence was incidental to the provision of any educational service.
Defendants are similar to the PCHA in that their primary purpose is not to provide one of the enumerated services in ORS 90.110(1) to which residence is incidental, but, rather, to provide low-cost housing in which individuals can support each other as they recover from addictions. Thus, even if the peer reinforcement that occurs between residents can somehow constitute “services” provided by defendants, the fact remains that defendants’ primary purpose is to provide low-cost housing. That understanding is also consistent with one of the trial court’s written findings in this case:
“While I certainly do recognize that Oxford House exists for the sole purpose [of] assist [ing] drug and alcohol dependent individuals in their recovery, the way in which Oxford House does so is to provide drug and alcohol free housing. It is the housing that is central to the relationship.”
The trial court’s finding is supported by uncontroverted evidence in the record that defendant’s primary purpose is to provide housing. Because a reasonable trier of fact could not conclude on the summary judgment record before us that that purpose is secondary or incidental to some other purpose of defendants, they are not the kind of institutions to which ORS 90.110(1), by its terms, applies.
In summary, there are three independent but related reasons in light of the statutory requirements why defendants do not qualify under ORS 90.110(1): (1) Defendants provided no services to plaintiff of the kind enumerated in the statute; (2) plaintiffs occupancy in Oxford House Ramona was the primary and not the incidental object of the arrangement between her and defendants; and (3) even if it could be held that defendants provided the kind of services to plaintiff contemplated by the statute, defendants themselves are not the kinds of institutions that ORS 90.110(1) excludes from ORLTA because their primary purpose is to provide a particular kind of living environment to individuals recovering from addictions. In contrast, the statute requires that the residency be “incidental” to the service provided.
*752Defendants also rely on ORS 90.110(3). That statute provides that an “arrangement” is not governed by ORLTA if the relevant landlord-tenant relationship consists of an “[o]ccupancy by a member of a fraternal or social organization in the portion of a structure operated for the benefit of the organization.” The key phrase in the statute is the phrase “fraternal or social organization.” The statute itself does not provide a definition of those terms. Also, the text and context of those terms do not indicate how broadly the legislature intended those terms to be understood. Indeed, the terms are ambiguous as demonstrated by the majority’s reasoning. The majority, relying on selected dictionary definitions of “fraternity” and “social” interprets those terms to refer to “associated groups of people with the same pursuit,” 196 Or App at 733, and groups of people that are “concerned with the welfare of human beings as members of society,” 196 Or App at 734 (internal quotation marks omitted). Those definitions are plausible, but so are definitions that are more limited. Fraternal organizations can be understood to include groups traditionally considered to be fraternal organizations, such as
“the grand and subordinate lodges of the Masons, the grand and subordinate lodges of the Knights of Pythias, the Knights of Columbus, the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, the Fraternal Order of Eagles, the Loyal Order of Moose, the Independent Order of Odd Fellows, the Oregon State Grange, the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars.”
ORS 307.134 (defining “fraternal organization” for the purpose of exemption from property taxes). Similarly, social organizations such as the Salvation Army, United Way, YMCA, and YWCA could have been contemplated by the legislature when it used the phrase “fraternal or social organization.” Moreover, there are any number of plausible definitions that exist along with those alternatives. It is apparent from all of the above possibilities that ORS 90.110(3) is ambiguous because its terms are susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.
Indeed, the uniform act on which ORLTA was patterned was designed to be “somewhat vague,” Comment, The Evolution of the Oregon Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 56 Or L Rev 655, 665 n 59 (1977), and the drafters of the uniform act “tried not to be too detailed [and] felt that much *753should be left to the courts in developing the details of a landlord/tenant relationship,” Minutes, Senate Local Government and Urban Affairs Committee, SB 159, Feb 1, 1973, 2 (statement of James Clarke, member, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws). In effect, the ambiguity in the phrase “fraternal or social organization” amounts to a legislative delegation of the statute’s meaning to the courts. However, that delegation is not unfettered. Any meaning developed by us must be consistent with the legislature’s overall intent.
Given that ORS 90.110(3) is ambiguous, I turn to its legislative history. There is scant history of the Oregon legislature’s own intentions. However, a commentary to a uniform act that is enacted by the Oregon legislature is part of the act’s legislative history. State of Oregon DCS v. Anderson, 189 Or App 162, 169, 74 P3d 1149, rev den, 336 Or 92 (2003). As stated above, ORS 90.110(3) finds its source in the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. The commentary to the uniform act states that the act “is not intended to apply where residence is incidental to another primary purpose!.]” Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act § 1.202 Comment, 7B ULA 539 (2000). The majority contends that the commentary’s reference that the act is not intended to apply where occupancy or residence is incidental does not apply to any of the subsections of ORS 90.110 other than subsection (1). 196 Or App at 732-33 n 3. However, there is nothing in the commentary’s language that expressly limits its reference to subsection (1). Indeed, the Commentary suggests otherwise by expressly referring to “athletic club[s]” as one kind of exempt fraternal or social organization, thereby distinguishing such organizations from arrangements where occupancy or residency is the primary purpose of the arrangement. In summary, the suggestion from the available legislative history is that the legislature intended the exceptions to ORLTA to be limited to arrangements where residence or occupancy is not the primary object of the arrangement. However, that suggestion may not be strong enough to preclude the doubt that the ambiguity in the words “fraternal or social organization” in ORS 90.110(3) raises.
Under such circumstances we are required to undertake a third-level PGE analysis, see PGE, 317 Or at 612, to ascertain what the legislature would have intended if it had *754contemplated the facts of this case. We can be confident; the legislature would not have intended that ORS 90.110(3) produce results that are “inconsistent with the apparent policy of the legislation as a whole.” State v. Vasquez-Rubio, 323 Or 275, 282-83, 917 P2d 494 (1996). With that guidance, we turn back to the whole of ORS 90.110.
Legislative intent may be indicated by common threads in all the exemptions in ORS 90.110. For example, ORS 90.110(1) excludes an arrangement between an institution that exists to provide particular kinds of service to tenants where residence at the institution is secondary to the provision of that service. ORS 90.110(2) excludes short-term occupancy by a purchaser of real property prior to the closing of a sale. That occupancy must be for less than 90 days, or the relationship will be covered by ORLTA. Thus, under that exception to ORLTA, the residency is secondary to the real estate sale. Similarly, ORS 90.110(4), ORS 90.110(5), and ORS 90.110(6) cover short-term arrangements when the actual residency in those kinds of tenancies is secondary to the primary purpose of the tenancy. But if the tenancies described in subsections (4) and (5) exceed 30 or 45 days, respectively, then those types of arrangements are covered by ORLTA.3 Those exceptions to the exceptions in the ORLTA farther show a legislative intent to focus on the primary object of the arrangement. Similarly, ORS 90.110(7) excludes residence by employees in the premises in which they work where that occupancy is conditioned upon continued employment, and ORS 90.110(8) excludes occupancy by condominium owners and those who hold a proprietary lease in a cooperative. Finally, ORS 90.110(9) excludes occupancy subordinate to agricultural-related purposes.
One thing is common to all of the above exemptions: they apply to particular kinds of occupancies and residencies where the occupancy is subordinate to another primary purpose. That common thread leads to the conclusion that the legislature intended to exclude certain rental arrangements in which occupancy was secondary to another primary purpose of the arrangement specified in the exception, as the majority itself observes. When that expression of legislative *755intent is considered in light of the overall purposes of ORLTA, the breadth of the majority’s construction of the term “fraternal” as “groups of people organized for a common purpose or goal” becomes untenable because it fails to differentiate between the primary and secondary objects of such arrangements. Taken to its logical extension, the majority’s reasoning means that all kinds of groups of people fall within the exception in subsection (3) of the statute; it would exclude for instance, groups of people whose primary object in living together is because they want to live in a particular kind of housing, e.g., low cost, smoke free, alcohol free, drug free, urban, or rural. In those arrangements, the occupancy is not secondary to the benefits of the relationship; rather, the benefits of the occupancy in such arrangements are the primary objects of the arrangement. Here, too, there is no evidence that peer counseling was the primary object of plaintiffs occupancy or residency in Oxford House-Ramona. In sum, while the majority acknowledges that the exclusions in ORS 90.110 exempt arrangements when the primary purpose of the relationship between the parties is something other than a landlord-tenant relationship, see 196 Or App at 730-31, it fails to apply that understanding to the facts of this case where low-cost housing is, as supported by uncontroverted evidence in the record, the primary object of the arrangement between plaintiff and defendants.4
That same analytical flaw also exists in the majority’s interpretation of the words “social organization” in ORS 90.110(3), which it interprets to refer to groups that are “concerned with the welfare of human beings as members of society.” 196 Or App at 734-35 (internal quotation marks omitted). Many groups are concerned with the welfare of human beings as members of society to some degree. Again, such an expansive definition thwarts the intended broad application *756of ORLTA to regulate all landlord-tenant arrangements. Furthermore, it ignores the scheme of ORS 90.110, which excludes a number of rental arrangements in which the tenant’s residence or occupancy is secondary to the primary purpose stated in the exceptions. Nonetheless, the majority asserts that “Oxford House’s primary purpose is to assist addicts in recovery.” 196 Or App at 736. But that assertion is belied by the uncontroverted evidence that defendants in this case furnish no therapy or counseling services to their occupants. Rather, Oxford House’s purpose, according to the record in this case, is to furnish low-cost housing so that its residents can personally address their addictions in a drug-free living environment.
Finally, the majority posits that its construction of the term “social” is consistent with the meaning given to that term in a Connecticut statute in YMCA of Stamford v. Bentley, 37 Conn L Rptr 397 (Conn Super Ct 2004). But in that case, the court based its decision that the YMCA was a social organization in large part on the YMCA’s charter, which declared that the primary purpose of the YMCA was to “ ‘carry out various charitable projects for the religious, social, and educational development of its members.’ ” In contrast to those facts, the record in this case establishes that residence at Oxford House-Ramona is not secondary to defendants’ social purposes. Indeed, in its manual, Oxford House declares that “Oxford House has as its primary goal the provision of housing and rehabilitative support for the alcoholic who wants to stop drinking and stay stopped.” In a discussion of that primary goal, the manual states, “Oxford House is group housing.” (Emphasis added.) With those statements in mind, the puzzle of whether defendants fit within the meaning of the ambiguous ORS 90.110(3) can be resolved in light of the general legislative intent demonstrated by ORS 90.110 and ORLTA as a whole. It seems unlikely that the legislature would have intended to enact a specific exception with strict requirements in ORS 90.110(1) and then create an accompanying ambiguous exemption that permits an organization to evade the requirements imposed in the previous exception. That observation becomes particularly persuasive in light of the broad application of ORLTA and the corresponding legislative policy to limit its exceptions to arrangements where residence is not primary.
*757In summary, any interpretation of the words “fraternal or social organization” must be consistent with the underlying policies of ORLTA. Those governing policies are the broad regulatory policy of the act as a whole and the constraint on the scope of the exceptions to the act to arrangements where residence is not the primary object of the arrangement. Defendants do not qualify for the exceptions in ORS 90.110(1) and (3) because their characteristics do not satisfy the requirements of either subsection in light of the statutes’ underlying policies. We lack the authority to create any other exception to the act; that task belongs exclusively to the legislature, and for purposes of this case, it means that defendants’ argument can only be properly made to the legislature.
For those reasons, I dissent.
Brewer, C. J., and Wollheim, J., join in this dissent.

 ORS 90.115 provides:
“This chapter applies to, regulates and determines rights, obligations and remedies under a rental agreement, wherever made, for a dwelling unit located within this state.”

 The majority takes exception to this understanding. 196 Or App at 730 n 1. It says, “Our task is to make sense of them as a whole.” Id. I could not agree more. However, it does not make sense to ascribe a broad regulatory purpose to the legislature and then to negate that purpose by interpreting the statutory exceptions to exceed the boundaries of what the legislature has expressed.

 See also ORS 90.100(43); ORS 90.100(45).

 The majority attempts to reason itself out of its self-created predicament by asserting that “[t]he primary relationship between parties may be something other than a landlord-tenant relationship even if the primary purpose of the landlord or tenant or both is housing.” 196 Or App at 737.1 confess that I do not understand the majority’s reasoning as it relates to the text of ORS 90.110(3). Under ORLTA’s language, the nature of the relationship or arrangement between the parties, whether it is a landlord-tenant arrangement or an exempt arrangement, is always determined by the arrangement’s primary purpose or object as the majority appears to acknowledge.