Court Opinion

ID: 9895803
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 18:04:13.611056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:31.772907
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/8/23 Tucker v. 1400 Fig CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

DEAN E. TUCKER,                                           B324667

         Plaintiff and Appellant,                         (Los Angeles County
                                                          Super. Ct. No. 19STCV24308)
         v.

1400 FIG, LLC, et al.,

     Defendants and
Respondents.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Richard L. Fruin, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.

         Dean E. Tucker, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

     The Rodarti Group and Josef M. Rodarti for Defendants
and Respondents.

                                 _______________________
       Dean Tucker (appellant) appeals from an order releasing
the property of 1400 Fig, LLC (the LLC) and Soleiman Gabbay
(collectively respondents) from appellant’s mechanic’s lien and
also dismissing respondents from the complaint. We conclude
appellant’s mechanic’s lien was unenforceable due to his failure
to comply with preliminary notice and licensing requirements.
Thus we affirm the order releasing the mechanic’s lien and
dismissing respondents from the action.

                          BACKGROUND
      The LLC owns the real property at 1400 South Figueroa
Street, Los Angeles, California (property). Gabbay holds a
majority of the LLC’s membership interests.
      In November 2015, the LLC entered into a construction
contract with Fassberg Contracting Corporation (Fassberg) to
construct apartments on the property. Fassberg subcontracted
the electrical work to the appellant on January 7, 2016.
      When he started the work appellant had a valid
contractor’s license. However, between October 20, 2016, and
December 1, 2016, appellant’s license was suspended due to the
lapse of his contractor’s bond. Once a new bond was secured,
appellant’s contractor’s license was reinstated.
      After completing his work, appellant—unpaid for his
services—sent a preliminary notice to the LLC on November 11,
2018, asserting a claim for $860,000. Later appellant recorded
two mechanic’s liens. The first, recorded on June 3, 2019, expired
due to appellant’s failure to timely file a foreclosure claim. The
second, recorded on June 24, 2021, claimed appellant was owed
$975,627.48.

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       Fassberg filed a complaint on July 11, 2019, seeking
damages from appellant. Two years later appellant filed a
separate action against respondents to foreclose on his second
mechanic’s lien. Various other causes of action for damages
against Fassberg, its agent, the individual owners of Fassberg,
and the bank funding the construction project were asserted. The
cases were consolidated with Fassberg’s case designated as the
lead.
       Respondents filed a motion to release their property from
appellant’s mechanic’s liens. Following the August 30, 2022
hearing, the trial court took the matter under submission and
then issued its order on September 6, 2022. The trial court
determined appellant’s mechanic’s lien to be invalid because he
lacked a contractor’s license during part of the project and had
not complied with the notice requirements for recording a
mechanic’s lien. As a result, respondents’ property was released
from appellant’s liens and respondents were dismissed from
appellant’s complaint. Appellant’s subsequent motion for motion
for reconsideration was denied.
       Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The order was
appealable because it dismissed respondents from appellant’s
complaint.1

1      The order of dismissal was an appealable order because it
left no issue to be determined as to respondents. (Heshejin v.
Rostami (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 984, 991 [“‘it has long been the
settled rule that in a case involving multiple parties, a judgment
is final and appealable when it leaves no issues to be determined
as to one party’”].)

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                 CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
      Appellant challenges the order of dismissal on three
grounds. First, he argues the court lacked sufficient evidence to
conclude appellant failed to meet the preliminary notice
requirements before recording his mechanic’s lien. Second,
appellant contends the court abused its discretion by determining
he did not substantially comply with the contractor licensing
requirements. Finally, appellant asserts it was an abuse of
discretion to dismiss respondents after their property was
released from his mechanic’s lien.

                           DISCUSSION
I.     Applicable law and standard of review
       By the California Constitution and by statute, “contractors,
laborers, and suppliers” have the right to record a “mechanic’s
lien” against any property “upon which they have bestowed labor
or furnished material for the value of such labor done and
material furnished.” (Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 3; see Civ. Code,
§§ 8000-9566; RGC Gaslamp, LLC v. Ehmcke Sheet Metal Co.,
Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 413, 422 (RGC Gaslamp).)
       A subcontractor seeking to record a mechanic’s lien must
give preliminary notice to the property’s owner, the direct
contractor, and the construction lender prior to recording the lien.
(Civ. Code, §§ 8200, subds. (a)(1) & (c), 8400, subd. (a), 8410.)
Once the lien is recorded, the lien encumbers title to the property
and has priority over subsequently recorded instruments. (RGC
Gaslamp, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 422.)
       There are “a variety of measures [or mechanisms]” by
which an owner could obtain provisional relief from a mechanic’s
lien or “speedy” judicial review of such a lien, either before or

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immediately after its recording. (Connolly Development, Inc. v.
Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 803, 807.) These include the
owner’s statutory right to seek release of the mechanic’s lien
upon posting a bond in the amount of 125 percent of the lien and
the owner’s right to file an action for declaratory or injunctive
relief challenging the mechanic’s lien. (Id. at pp. 822-823.)
Another postlien mechanism identified later was for the owner to
file a motion in the contractor’s pending action to foreclose on a
mechanic’s lien. (Lambert v. Superior Court (1991) 228
Cal.App.3d 383, 386-387 (Lambert).)
        When a property owner files a motion to eliminate or
reduce a mechanic’s lien, the contractor bears the burden of
establishing the “probable validity” of the propriety and amount
of its lien by a preponderance of the evidence. (Lambert, supra,
228 Cal.App.3d at p. 387.) This standard requires the contractor
to prove a “‘prima facie case’” by establishing the “‘probable
outcome of the litigation’” in its favor. (Howard S. Wright
Construction Co. v. Superior Court (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 314,
319-320.)
        We review a trial court’s determination of the probable
validity of a mechanic’s lien for an abuse of discretion, reviewing
subsidiary factual findings for substantial evidence and
subsidiary legal rulings—such as the meaning of statutes—de
novo. (Howard S. Wright Construction Co. v. Superior Court,
supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 320.)
II.     Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding
        appellant did not comply with the preliminary notice
        requirement
        “A claimant may enforce a lien only if the claimant has
given preliminary notice to the extent required by Chapter 2

                                5
(commencing with Section 8200) and made proof of notice.” (Civ.
Code, § 8410.) When served by mail, the preliminary notice must
be sent by registered or certified mail, express mail, or overnight
delivery by an express service carrier. (Civ. Code, § 8110.) If
notice is given through the United States Postal Service, the
proof of service must include documentation or a return receipt
from the United States Postal Service. (Civ. Code, § 8118, subd.
(b).)
       Courts have required strict compliance with the
preliminary notice requirements, emphasizing “where the
Legislature has provided a detailed and specific mandate as to
the manner or form of serving notice upon an affected party that
its property interests are at stake, any deviation from the
statutory mandate will be viewed with extreme disfavor.”
(Harold L. James, Inc. v. Five Points Ranch, Inc. (1984) 158
Cal.App.3d 1, 6.) Meeting these requirements is a necessary
prerequisite to a valid lien claim. (Civ. Code, § 8200, subd. (c).)
       Here, appellant provided a proof of service that he used
registered mail, certified mail, express mail, or overnight delivery
by an express service carrier. However, missing from this proof of
service was the documentation or return receipt mandated by
Civil Code section 8118, subdivision (b). Appellant failed to
provide the necessary documents when asked to do so during
discovery.
       Though appellant contends his previous attorney had him
sign a false declaration that he did not have the certified mail
receipts—and claimed to have attempted to retract this

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declaration—appellant failed to provide the trial court with the
required documentation or return receipts.2
       Thus, substantial evidence supports the conclusion
appellant did not strictly comply with the requirements of Civil
Code sections 8118 and 8410. As a result appellant failed to
establish the prerequisite for validity of his mechanic’s lien. This
demonstrates the probable outcome of the litigation would be
that appellant could not establish the existence of a valid
mechanic’s lien. On this basis alone the order should be affirmed.
III. Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding
       that appellant did not comply with the licensing
       requirement
       Business and Professions Code section 7031, subdivision (c)
states: “A security interest taken to secure any payment for the
performance of any act or contract for which a license is required
by this chapter is unenforceable if the person performing the act
or contract was not a duly licensed contractor at all times during
the performance of the act or contract.” This allows the court to
determine whether there has been substantial compliance with
licensure requirements “if it is shown at an evidentiary hearing
that the person who engaged in the business or acted in the
capacity of a contractor (1) had been duly licensed as a contractor
in this state prior to the performance of the act or contract, (2)
acted reasonably and in good faith to maintain proper licensure,
and (3) acted promptly and in good faith to remedy the failure to
comply with the licensure requirements upon learning of the
failure.” (Id., subd. (e).)

2     In his motion to augment the record on appeal appellant
admitted the return receipts were not submitted to the trial court
as required by California Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).

                                 7
       California deliberately “imposes strict and harsh penalties
for a contractor’s failure to maintain proper licensure.” (MW
Erectors, Inc. v. Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co.,
Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 412, 418.) “Because of the strength and
clarity of this policy, it is well settled that [Business and
Professions Code] section 7031 applies despite injustice to the
unlicensed contractor.” (Hydrotech Systems, Ltd. v. Oasis
Waterpark (1991) 52 Cal.3d 988, 995.)
       Appellant commenced the electrical work after he entered
into the subcontract on January 7, 2016. He was notified by the
Contractors State License Board on September 20, 2016, that the
bond he had on file had been canceled, and he had one month to
obtain a replacement bond. He was also notified about his license
suspension on October 26, 2016. Appellant filed a replacement
bond and his license was reinstated effective December 1, 2016.
       Since appellant was not a duly licensed contractor between
October 20, 2016, and December 1, 2016, he was not licensed “at
all times” he was performing the electrical work. Therefore the
mechanic’s lien was unenforceable.
       While Business and Professions Code section 7031,
subdivision (e), provides for an evidentiary hearing to
demonstrate “substantial compliance” with licensing
requirements, appellant did not avail himself of this procedure.
Further, appellant’s opposition to respondents’ motion to release
the mechanic’s lien failed to provide a declaration containing
facts essential to meet his burden.
       Instead, appellant’s opposition included documents
showing his license and contractor’s bond history, which shows
appellant had been duly licensed as a contractor in California
prior to the contract. However, it does not contain facts showing

                                8
he acted reasonably and in good faith to maintain proper
licensure or that he acted promptly and in good faith to remedy
the failure to comply with the licensure requirements upon
learning of the failure.
      Rather, the record shows appellant was sent notice that he
had one month to obtain a replacement bond. His license was
then suspended for failing to obtain a replacement bond during
that month. This is evidence appellant did not act reasonably and
in good faith to maintain proper licensure.
      This is substantial evidence appellant had not complied
with the requirements of Business and Professions Code section
7031. He did not maintain his license at all times during the
performance of the electrical work, and he did not show he
substantially complied with the licensing requirements.
Therefore appellant could not establish the existence of a valid
mechanic’s lien and provide a further ground for affirming the
court’s order.
IV. Dismissal of respondents was not an abuse of
      discretion
      The court’s order released the mechanic’s lien and
dismissed respondents from appellant’s second amended
complaint at respondents’ request.
      Upon a sufficient factual showing, a court has inherent
power to dismiss an action “‘shown to be sham, fictitious or
without merit in order to prevent abuse of the judicial process.’”
(Muller v. Tanner (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 438, 443, quoting Lincoln
v. Didak (1958) 162 Cal.App.2d 625, 629.)
      Appellant’s second amended complaint contained a single
cause of action against respondents—foreclosure on the
mechanic’s lien. The court released the lien after finding

                                9
appellant could not establish a valid mechanic’s lien, and his
claim had no probable validity. Having no probable validity is a
factual basis for finding appellant’s sole action against
respondents to be without merit. It would be an abuse of judicial
process to allow an action to proceed after a showing it was
without merit.
      Appellant fails to explain how his action could proceed
against respondents after his claim against them had been found
to have no probable validity. There was no abuse of discretion.

                        DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their
costs of appeal.

                                     ________________________
                                     CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.

We concur:

___________________________
HOFFSTADT, J.

___________________________
KWAN, J. *

*     Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

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