Court Opinion

ID: 9665091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:39:27.158322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:12.944837
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING JULY 12, 1993 856 S.W.2d 306 1. Appeal & error — rehearing — reargument of points made on appeal prohibited. — Mere reargument of points already made on appeal is prohibited in a petition for rehearing by Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 2-3 (g). 2. Trial — jury instructions — instructions do not conform to ami — when proper to use. — When instructions are requested which do not conform to AMI, they should be given only when the trial judge finds the AMI instructions do not contain an essential instruction or do not accurately state the law applicable to the case, and it is not error for the trial court to refuse to give a non-AMI jury instruction if the other instructions given covered the issue. 3. Trial — jury instructions — assumption of disputed fact— error. — The assumption of a disputed fact in a jury instruction is prejudicial error. 4. Trial — jury instruction — matter covered by instructions GIVEN — NO ERROR TO REFUSE PROFERRED INSTRUCTION. — Where taken together, the instructions given, including Court’s Instruction No. 8A, instructed the jury that a buyer must give notice to a seller upon breach of a contract to recover damages, which is precisely the substance of the instruction petitioner proffered without the binding language; therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing petitioner’s proffered instruction. Petition for Rehearing denied. Daily, West Core, Coffman & Canfield, by: Robert W Bishop, for petitioner. Pryor, Barry, Smith, Karber & Alford, by: Gregory T. Karber, for respondent. Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice. Precision Steel Warehouse, Inc. (PSW) has filed a petition for rehearing of our decision in Precision Steel Warehouse, Inc. v. Anderson-Martin Mach. Co., 313 Ark. 258, 854 S.W.2d 321 (1993).  PSW makes three arguments in its petition for rehearing, only one of which is not merely a reargument of points already made as prohibited by Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 2-3(g) — the tender of PSW’s Proposed Instruction No. 8 which was rejected by the trial court. The appellee in its original brief stated “that PSW had elected to withdraw the instruction entirely” and it was not therefore submitted in any form. Appellee’s Br. 10. We mistakenly relied on this statement and refused to consider this point on appeal. We were wrong. In examining the record of the trial, we find that PSW’s Proposed Instruction No. 8 was tendered to the trial court and an appropriate objection was made as to its exclusion, the net result of which is that our holding in this regard was in error. Inasmuch as the issue was properly preserved for appeal, we now examine this requested instruction for a determination as to whether or not the trial court committed prejudicial error in refusing to accept this instruction and charge the jury with its contents. In doing so, we hold the trial court was not in error.  The wording of the instruction PSW sought to have read to the jury was: You are instructed that Anderson-Martin Machine Company is barred from any remedy unless you find that it notified Precision Steel Warehouse, Inc. of any breach within a reasonable time after it discovered or should have discovered such breach. Inasmuch as this jury instruction sought by PSW does not conform to the Arkansas Model Jury Instructions (AMI), we examine this proposed instruction in light of our Per Curiam issued April 19, 1965, found at AMI Civ. 3d, p. VII, which requires AMI to be used unless the trial judge finds that the AMI does not accurately state the law, and if AMI are refused, the trial judge is to state his reasons for refusing AMI. In other words, when instructions are requested which do not conform to AMI, they should be given only when the trial judge finds the AMI instructions do not contain an essential instruction or do not accurately state the law applicable to the case. Smith v. Stevens, 313 Ark. 534 (June21,1993); Newman v. Crawford Constr. Co., 303 Ark. 641, 799 S.W.2d 531 (1990); Ventress v. State, 303 Ark. 194, 794 S.W.2d 619 (1990). Furthermore, it is not error for the trial court to refuse to give a non-AMI jury instruction if the other instructions given covered the issue. Cavin v. State, 313 Ark. 238, 855 S.W.2d 285 (1993); Williams v. State, 304 Ark. 279, 801 S.W.2d 296 (1990); Henderson v. State, 284 Ark. 493, 684 S.W.2d 231 (1985).  The trial court refused the requested instruction on the basis that PSW refused to allow the trial court to modify the instruction by changing the “is” to “may be,” and the court felt that using the word “is” made it a binding instruction. The assumption of a disputed fact in a jury instruction is prejudicial error. Weatherford v. Wommack, 298 Ark. 274, 766 S.W.2d 922 (1989); Porter v. Lincoln, 282 Ark. 258, 668 S.W.2d 11 (1984); Thiel v. Dove, 229 Ark. 601, 317 S.W.2d 121 (1958). PSW argues that the wording of the proposed instruction is taken directly from Ark. Code Ann. § 4-2-607(3)(a) (Repl. 1991), and the court erred by failing to instruct the jury on a statute applicable to the case. That code section states: Where a tender has been accepted. . .[t]he buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy. Ark. Code Ann. § 4-2-607(3)(a) (Repl. 1991). In examining the instruction given by the trial court to the jury, we cannot say that the jury received inadequate instruction on the requirement that a buyer give notice to a breaching seller. In addition to the general instructions contained in AMI 101-103, 202 and 2301, the record reflects that the jury was instructed on breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty for a particular purpose, and breach of contract. The Court’s Instructions No. 5 and 6 covered breach of express warranty and contained a specific requirement that mandated notice even though the similar AMI 1011 contains no wording requiring notice. Instruction No. 7 covered breach of implied warranty for a particular purpose and made no mention of notice, and none was contained in the similar AMI 1010. Instruction No. 8 covered consequential damages for breach of contract but made no mention of notice; Instruction No. 9 covered limitation of damages to repair or replacement; and Instruction No. 10 addressed an exclusive remedy clause. Finally, Instruction No. 8A operated to instruct the jury about notice required by a buyer to a breaching seller: You are instructed that where the Buyer has accepted goods and then given notification that they are nonconforming, the Buyer may recover as damages for the loss resulting in the ordinary course of events from Seller’s breach as determined in any manner which is reasonable. (Emphasis added.)  This is precisely the substance of the instruction PSW desired to be given to the jury in Defendant’s Requested Instruction No. 8 without binding language. Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying PSW’s requested instruction. Taken together, the instructions given, including Court’s Instruction No. 8A, instructed the jury that a buyer must give notice to a seller upon breach of a contract to recover damages. We have held that it is not error to refuse an instruction if the instructions given embrace the instruction disallowed. Barnes, Quinn, Flake & Anderson v. Rankins, 312 Ark. 240, 848 S.W.2d 924 (1993); Newman v. Crawford Constr. Co., supra. Accordingly, the petition for rehearing is denied.