Court Opinion

ID: 9736116
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:44:23.642692+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:04.481373
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(concurring in result).
I concur in the result of this opinion but disagree upon its reliance on State v. Steingraber, 296 N.W.2d 543 (S.D.1980). Steingraber is inapposite as it pertained to a question involving officers substantially complying, or not complying, with the statutory requirements of a “no-knock” entrance.
Rather, my position would be that the noncompliance with the statutory procedure, in this particular factual scenario, was immaterial as there was a valid search warrant and the failure to conform on the copy was of a slight, ministerial nature. *345State v. Glick, 87 S.D. 1, 5, 201 N.W.2d 867, 869 (1972); State v. Van Beek, 87 S.D. 598, 603, 212 N.W.2d 659, 662 (1973).
This search warrant was issued by a circuit judge in February 1984; although I cite it not for authority to determine the issue here, but to point out the transitory precedent of this decision, in July 1984, the United States Supreme Court legitimatized the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. In essence, per United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. -, -, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3414, 82 L.Ed.2d 677, 689 (1984),* the Nation’s highest Court held that the exclusionary rule should be modified “to permit the introduction of evidence obtained in the reasonable good-faith belief that a search or seizure was in accord with the Fourth Amendment.” (Citation omitted.)
Appellant is arguing that the action of the Rapid City Police Department was illegal and bases it upon an immaterial technicality, i.e., a copy of the search warrant served upon defendant was not exactly the same as the original. SDCL 23A-35-10 provides in part: “An officer taking property under a warrant shall give to the person from whom or from whose premises the property was taken, a copy of the warrant. ...” This is identical to Rule 41(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Our federal brothers have, in effect, buttressed the holdings in Glick' and Van Beek. “Violations of Rule 41(d) are essentially ministerial in nature and a motion to suppress should be granted only when the defendant demonstrates legal prejudice or that non-compliance with the rule was intentional or in bad faith. Failure to deliver a copy of the search warrant to the party whose premises were searched until the day after the search does not invalidate a search in the absence of a showing of prejudice.” United States v. Marx, 635 F.2d 436, 441 (5th Cir.1981) (citations omitted). “[Fjailure to serve even the warrant is merely a ministerial violation of Rule 41(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and would not render the search fatally defective.” United States v. Hubbard, 493 F.Supp. 209, 219 (D.D.C.1979), aff'd, 215 D.C.App. 206, 668 F.2d 1238 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926, 102 S.Ct. 1971, 72 L.Ed.2d 440 (1982). “Although important, the procedures required for execution and return of a search warrant, contained in Rule 41(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, are ministerial. Absent a showing of prejudice, irregularities in these procedures do not void an otherwise valid search.” United States v. McKenzie, 446 F.2d 949, 954 (6th Cir.1971). “In order to show prejudice in this context, [defendant] must show that [he was] subjected to a search that might not have occurred or would not have been so abrasive had [Rule 41(d), Fed.R.Crim.P.] been followed.” Hearn v. Internal Revenue Agents, 597 F.Supp. 966, 971 (N.D.Tex.1984). Here, defendant Jackson cannot show such prejudice. Thus, I concur with the majority opinion.

 On the same subject of the exclusionary evidence rule, see Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 3424; 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984) and Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984), both of which are companion cases and handed down by the United States Supreme Court on the same date. These three cases radically changed the law of evidence in criminal proceedings in the courts of this land. In 1961, Chief Justice Burger individually wrote that he would abolish the exclusionary rule. This philosophy has been gradually implemented throughout the courts and continues to be expanded.