Court Opinion

ID: 9930141
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-06 14:05:23.0656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:03:51.803604
License: Public Domain

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
                         Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

                               STATE OF MINNESOTA
                               IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                     A22-1788

                                  In re the Marriage of:

                           Brenda Lee Christiansen, petitioner,
                                      Appellant,

                                            vs.

                               Timothy Nels Christiansen,
                                     Respondent.

                                 Filed February 5, 2024
                                        Affirmed
                                      Gaïtas, Judge

                             Blue Earth County District Court
                                 File No. 07-FA-08-3847

Michelle K. Olsen, Jacob M. Birkholz, Birkholz & Associates, LLC, Mankato, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Tami L. Peterson, Saxton Peterson Law Firm, Mankato, Minnesota (for respondent)

      Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and

Wheelock, Judge.

                           NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

GAÏTAS, Judge

      Appellant-wife Brenda Lee Christiansen challenges the district court’s order

granting the motion of respondent-husband Timothy Nels Christiansen for modification of

spousal maintenance and ruling on wife’s related countermotion. Wife argues that the
district court failed to make adequate factual findings in its order and abused its discretion

in reducing wife’s permanent spousal-maintenance award, establishing the amount of

husband’s life-insurance obligation to wife, and denying wife’s motion for need-based

attorney fees. We discern no error and affirm.

                                          FACTS

       Husband and wife were married in 1989 and divorced in 2010. The parties had five

minor children at the time of their divorce, all of whom are now adults. At the time of the

divorce, wife was unemployed. Husband was employed by the Mankato Clinic and had a

gross monthly income of $33,551.

       A judgment and decree was entered pursuant to a stipulated settlement agreement

in a marital dissolution proceeding. The dissolution decree addresses spousal maintenance,

child support, and life insurance, among other things. Wife was awarded permanent

spousal maintenance. The parties agreed to impute $1,257 in gross income per month to

wife based on the assumption that she could obtain a minimum-wage, full-time position.

The decree requires husband to pay wife monthly spousal maintenance of $7,500 until her

death or remarriage. Additionally, it requires husband to “maintain his term life insurance

policy and his disability insurance policy in amounts sufficient to provide continued . . .

spousal maintenance” and to “create an insurance trust funded from the . . . policies,” “[t]o

secure the future payments of child support and spousal maintenance.” To enable wife or

her attorney to verify “from time-to-time” that the life-insurance terms remained in effect,

the decree requires husband to provide the appropriate authorizations. The decree does not

identify the amount of life insurance that existed at the time of the divorce.

                                              2
       In 2012, the parties each moved the district court to hold the other in contempt for

alleged violations of the terms of the dissolution decree. The district court denied the

contempt motions but reminded husband of his obligation to maintain life insurance

policies with wife as the beneficiary and ordered husband to provide yearly verification of

the existence of life insurance.

       In 2022, husband moved to terminate or decrease his spousal-maintenance

obligation and to eliminate the requirement to secure the obligation with life insurance.

Along with his motion, he submitted an affidavit accompanied by medical records, a letter

explaining his Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) income, an estimate of his future FMLA

income, a summary of his Mankato Clinic disability benefits, and his Northwestern Mutual

disability insurance policies. Husband’s affidavit stated that he had been diagnosed with a

terminal illness and did not anticipate working “for the remainder of [his] life.” According

to husband’s affidavit, his income will be “significantly limited,” such that he will not be

able to meet his own needs and comply with the spousal maintenance obligation under the

dissolution decree.

       Wife filed a countermotion requesting that the district court (1) deny husband’s

modification motion outright or temporarily suspend or reserve maintenance, (2) find

husband in contempt for failing to maintain suitable life insurance and failing to provide

regular verification of life insurance, (3) compel husband’s life insurance companies to pay

death benefits to her in the event of husband’s death, and (4) award wife conduct- and need-

based attorney fees. In an affidavit filed with her countermotion, wife represented that she

                                             3
relies entirely on spousal maintenance for support.         She submitted communications

between the parties and husband’s insurance application along with her affidavit.

         Neither party requested an evidentiary hearing on the motions. However, the parties

appeared before the district court to argue the motions.

         Following the hearing, the district court ruled on the parties’ motions. The district

court reduced husband’s spousal maintenance obligation to $3,800 per month. 1

Additionally, the district court ordered husband to maintain his existing $90,000 life-

insurance policy with wife as a beneficiary. The district court found husband in contempt

for failing to maintain the life insurance policy in a trust and for failing to provide wife

with annual verification of the policies. However, the district court stayed the order of

contempt to enable husband to purge the contempt by establishing the trust and providing

wife with the required verification. The district court denied wife’s other contempt claims 2

and her motion for attorney fees.

         Wife appeals.

                                         DECISION

         Following a marriage dissolution, the district court may modify spousal

maintenance “from time to time, on motion of either of the parties.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.39,

subd. 1 (2022). An appellate court reviews a district court’s decision regarding whether to

1
  The district court modified spousal maintenance retroactively to October 1, 2022, and
provided for the following spousal maintenance payments: $3,800 in October 2022;
$3,800 in November 2022; $4,631 in December 2022; $4,631 in January 2023; $3,970 in
February 2023; and $3,800 in March 2022 and thereafter.
2
    Wife’s other contempt claims are not at issue on appeal.

                                               4
modify an existing spousal-maintenance obligation for an abuse of discretion. Hecker v.

Hecker, 568 N.W.2d 705, 709-10 (Minn. 1997). A district court abuses its discretion if the

decision is based on an erroneous application of the law, is based on findings of fact that

are unsupported by the record, or results in a resolution that is contrary to logic and the

facts on record. Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997). Generally, an

appellate court will not set a district court’s finding of fact aside unless the finding is clearly

erroneous. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 52.01; see Bissell v. Bissell, 191 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Minn.

1971) (citing rule 52.01 in a maintenance-modification appeal). The clear-error standard

of review “is a review of the record to confirm that evidence exists to support the decision.”

In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 222 (Minn. 2021). “When the record

reasonably supports the findings at issue on appeal, it is immaterial that the record might

also provide a reasonable basis for inferences and findings to the contrary.” Id. at 223

(quotation omitted). When applying the clear error standard of review, appellate courts

(1) view the evidence in a light favorable to the findings, (2) do not reweigh the evidence,

(3) do not find their own facts, and (4) do not reconcile conflicting evidence. Id. at 221-

22. Thus,

               an appellate court need not go into an extended discussion of
               the evidence to prove or demonstrate the correctness of the
               findings of the [district] court. Rather, because the factfinder
               has the primary responsibility of determining the fact issues
               and the advantage of observing the witnesses in view of all the
               circumstances surrounding the entire proceeding, an appellate
               court’s duty is fully performed after it has fairly considered all
               the evidence and has determined that the evidence reasonably
               supports the decision.

                                                5
Id. at 222 (citation and quotations omitted); see Bayer v. Bayer, 979 N.W.2d 507, 513

(Minn. App. 2022) (applying Kenney on appeal in a family case); see generally Vangsness

v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 472, 474 (Minn. App. 2000) (discussing clear error

standard of review).

I.     Wife shows no error in the district court’s reliance on the parties’ written
       submissions to decide husband’s motion for modification of spousal
       maintenance.

       As a threshold issue, wife argues that the district court did not make “true findings

of fact on the evidence” and instead “merely recited the evidence with no proper analysis.”

Cf. Dean v. Pelton, 437 N.W.2d 762, 764 (Minn. App. 1989) (stating that a district court’s

recitation of the parties’ factual assertions “is not making true findings” because findings

“must be affirmatively stated as findings of the trial court”); Geske v. Marcolina, 624

N.W.2d 813, 817, n.3 (Minn. App. 2001) (citing this aspect of Dean). The thrust of wife’s

argument is that the district court erred by accepting as true the facts presented by the

parties in their written submissions. Wife urges us to remand for additional factual

findings. And, at oral argument to this court, wife’s attorney suggested that wife should

be permitted to present additional evidence on remand. We decline wife’s request to

remand the matter to the district court.

       Generally, the Minnesota General Rules of Practice presume that family court

motions will be submitted to the district court without an evidentiary hearing and based on

“affidavits, exhibits, documents subpoenaed to the hearing, memoranda, and arguments of

counsel.” Minn. R. Gen. P. 303.03(d)(1); see also Minn. R. Civ. P. 43.05 (stating that

“[w]henever a motion is based on facts not appearing of record, the court may hear the

                                             6
matter on affidavits presented by the respective parties”); Thompson v. Thompson, 739

N.W.2d 424, 430 (Minn. App. 2007) (noting that an evidentiary hearing is not necessary

in family-law matters “unless the district court determines that there is good cause for a

hearing”). A party must request an evidentiary hearing by motion. Minn. R. Gen. P. 303.03

(d)(2).

          Here, wife did not request an evidentiary hearing or seek to present additional

evidence during the proceedings below. Both parties submitted affidavits and documentary

evidence, and the district court considered husband’s modification motion and wife’s

countermotion based on the record before it. Although wife disagrees with some of the

district court’s factual findings, which we address further below, she shows no error in the

district court’s reliance on the record before it as a basis for its factual findings and ultimate

decision on husband’s motion to modify his maintenance obligation. See Loth v. Loth, 35

N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1949) (explaining that “error is never presumed” on appeal, that

it “must be made to appear affirmatively” before a reviewing court can reverse, and that

the burden of showing error rests upon the party who asserts it); Luthen v. Luthen, 596

N.W.2d 278, 283 (Minn. App. 1999) (citing Loth).

II.       The district court did not abuse its discretion in modifying husband’s spousal-
          maintenance obligation.

          Wife contends that the district court abused its discretion by reducing husband’s

spousal-maintenance obligation. She argues that the district court erroneously considered

husband’s gross income rather than his net income as a basis for its decision. And she

asserts that the district court erred in its application of the statutes governing modification

                                                7
and based its ultimate decision to reduce husband’s obligation on clearly erroneous factual

findings. Because the district court properly applied the law and its factual findings are

supported by the record, the district court did not abuse its discretion by reducing husband’s

spousal-maintenance obligation.

       A.     The district court properly considered husband’s gross income.

       Wife first argues that, in deciding whether to modify husband’s spousal-

maintenance obligation, the district court erred in considering husband’s gross income.

According to wife, the district court should have used husband’s net income to decide

whether husband had shown a substantial change in circumstances warranting modification

of his obligation. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2 (2022) (stating that a movant must

show a substantial change in circumstances rendering an existing award unreasonable and

unfair).

       This argument requires us to evaluate the district court’s application of the law.

“Determination of the applicable statutory standard and the interpretation of statutes are

questions of law that [appellate courts] review de novo.” Goldman v. Greenwood, 748

N.W.2d 279, 282 (Minn. 2008) (citations omitted).

       In support of her argument that the district court was required to consider husband’s

net income when addressing whether to modify maintenance, wife cites this court’s prior

decisions. See, e.g., Schreifels v. Schreifels, 450 N.W.2d 372, 373 (Minn. App. 1990) (“In

order to properly consider the financial ability of a spouse, the court must determine the

spouse’s net or take-home income.”); Kostelnik v. Kostelnik, 367 N.W.2d 665, 670 (Minn.

App. 1985) (determining that a district court errs when using gross income). However,

                                              8
those decisions predate amendments to the support statutes that require consideration of

gross income. See Minn. Stat. §§ 518A.29 (addressing calculation of gross income), .39,

subd. 2(a) (reviewing “substantially increased or decreased gross income of an obligor or

obligee” when considering a modification request) (2022). 3 The statutory changes make

clear that gross income is the applicable starting point that a district court must use when

addressing whether to modify a maintenance obligation. Thus, the district court did not err

in considering husband’s gross income when addressing whether to modify maintenance.

       B.     The district court properly applied the statutes governing modification
              of spousal maintenance, and the record supports the district court’s
              factual findings.

       Wife argues that the district court abused its discretion in reducing husband’s

spousal-maintenance obligations. She contends that husband failed to satisfy the statutory

standards for reducing the obligation. And she asserts that the district court clearly erred

in making some of the factual findings underlying its decision to reduce husband’s

obligation. We discern no error.

       A district court may modify a spousal-maintenance award if the moving party makes

a showing of one or more statutory modification factors that make the existing maintenance

award “unreasonable and unfair.”        Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(a); Backman v.

Backman, 990 N.W.2d 478, 485 (Minn. App. 2023); Youker v. Youker, 661 N.W.2d 266,

3
  Although these statutory sections relate to the computation of child support, caselaw
instructs that the definition of gross income in section 518A.29 applies to both child support
and spousal maintenance. Lee v. Lee, 775 N.W.2d 631, 635 n.5 (Minn. 2009) (holding that
the “income” from which spousal-maintenance payments are made is the “gross income”
defined in section 518A.29).

                                              9
269 (Minn. App. 2003) (stating that the moving party must first demonstrate “a substantial

change of circumstances,” and then “demonstrate that the[] changed circumstances render

the original award unreasonable and unfair”), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 2003).

              It is presumed that there has been a substantial change in
              circumstances . . . and the terms of a current support order shall
              be rebuttably presumed to be unreasonable and unfair if . . . the
              gross income of an obligor or obligee has decreased by at least
              20 percent through no fault or choice of the party.

Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(b)(5). 4

       Here, the district court cited the correct statutory provisions and, based on the

evidence submitted, determined that husband’s gross income decreased by over 20%

through no fault of his own. The district court concluded both that the 20% reduction in

husband’s gross income constituted a substantial change in circumstances and that this

change rendered his existing spousal-maintenance award unreasonable and unfair. Both of

these rulings are consistent with the statutorily required presumptions, and wife neither

rebutted the presumptions nor showed why the district court’s conclusions based on those

presumptions are defective.

4
 Wife argues that the 20% calculation in this section applies only in child-support settings
and not in spousal-maintenance matters. We do not agree. The definitional section of
chapter 518A states that, “For the purposes of this chapter [governing child support] and
chapter 518 [governing marriages and dissolutions], the terms defined in this section shall
have the meaning respectively ascribed to them.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.26, subd. 1 (2022).
The section then defines a “support order” to include both “the support and maintenance
of a child” and “the maintenance of a spouse or former spouse.” Id., subd. 21(a)(1), (3)
(2022). The 20% threshold applies to both child- and spousal-support orders. Lee, 775
N.W.2d at 635 n.5 (recognizing that the terms defined in chapter 518A likewise apply to
chapter 518).

                                             10
       When the district court determines that the existing award is unreasonable or unfair,

it may then modify the award, “in which case it would determine the amount and duration

of the modified award by applying the same statutory factors that are relevant to an initial

award of spousal maintenance, as those factors exist at the time of the [modification]

motion.”    Backman, 990 N.W.2d at 485 (internal quotations omitted); Minn. Stat.

§§ 518A.39, subd. 2(e) (noting that “the court shall apply, in addition to all other relevant

factors, the factors for an award of maintenance under section 518.552”), 518.552 (2022).

“In essence, the district court balances the recipient’s needs against the obligor’s ability to

pay.” Maiers v. Maiers, 775 N.W.2d 666, 668 (Minn. App. 2009). To determine the

amount and duration of the modified spousal-maintenance award under the second part of

this analysis, the district court considers:

                     (a) the financial resources of the party seeking
              maintenance, including . . . [child-support payments];
                     (b) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or
              training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find
              appropriate employment . . . ;
                     (c) the standard of living established during the
              marriage;
                     (d) the duration of the marriage . . . ;
                     (e) the loss of earnings, seniority, retirement benefits,
              and other employment opportunities forgone by the spouse
              seeking spousal maintenance;
                     (f) the age, and the physical and emotional condition of
              the spouse seeking maintenance;
                     (g) the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is
              sought to meet needs while meeting those of the spouse
              seeking maintenance; and
                     (h) the contribution of each party [to the] value of the
              marital property . . . .

Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(a)-(h).

                                               11
         Here, after determining that there was a substantial change in husband’s

circumstances, the district court thoroughly reviewed these eight statutory factors to

determine the amount and duration of the modified award. The district court found that:

(a) wife’s financial resources came primarily from her spousal-maintenance award,

(b) wife could find employment “with her current qualifications and receive minimum

wage,” (c) “[t]he parties enjoyed an upper-middle to upper-class lifestyle during the

marriage,” (d) wife was not in the workforce while the parties were married, (e) it was

unknown whether wife “forwent any employment opportunities,” (f) wife was in

“reasonable physical and emotional health,” (g) husband is currently only able to meet

“about 62 percent of his own needs” due to his terminal illness and inability to work, and

(h) husband “contributed all known financial assets” during the parties’ marriage. Based

on these findings, the district court determined that wife’s award should be reduced to

$3,800 per month.

         Although wife does not directly challenge the district court’s analysis of these

factors, she argues that the district court’s findings related to husband’s income and to the

parties’ expenses are clearly erroneous.

                1.     Factual findings regarding husband’s income.

         Wife challenges the district court’s findings regarding husband’s gross income. 5

We review a district court’s determination regarding a party’s income for the purpose of

establishing maintenance for clear error. Newstrand v. Arend, 869 N.W.2d 681, 685 (Minn.

5
    Wife does not challenge the district court’s findings related to her income.

                                               12
App. 2015), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 15, 2015). “Gross income” is “any form of periodic

payment to an individual, including, but not limited to, salaries, wages, [and]

commissions.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(a).

       The district court observed that the dissolution decree established husband’s gross

monthly income in 2010 as $33,551. Relying on husband’s written submissions, the

district court found that husband stopped working in August 2022 due to his terminal

illness. The district court found that following husband’s leave from work, his income

consisted of disability insurance payments. According to the district court, husband’s

monthly income would “fluctuate[] from October [2023] until March [2024], and then

become[] consistent from March onward” as follows: $26,293 in October 2023; $25,255

in November 2023; $32,233 in December 2023; $30,618 in January 2024; $28,895 in

February 2024; and $25,337 in March 2024 and thereafter.

       Wife argues that the district court “did not consider all sources of income for the

parties, including assets as a source of income.” She contends that the district court should

have considered husband’s 401K and brokerage accounts that have income-producing

capabilities. Wife also asserts that the district court did not properly analyze husband’s

disability insurance policy.

       However, as noted, wife did not request an evidentiary hearing to elicit further

testimony regarding husband’s income. In determining husband’s income, the district

court relied on husband’s unrebutted affidavit, crediting husband’s representations

regarding his income and his statements that he no longer has enough income to meet his

monthly needs and that his income will continue to decline. Because the record supports

                                             13
the district court’s findings regarding husband’s income, there is no clear error as to these

findings. Cf. Eisenschenk v. Eisenschenk, 668 N.W.2d 235, 243 (Minn. App. 2003) (“On

appeal, a party cannot complain about a district court’s failure to rule in her favor when

one of the reasons it did not do so is because that party failed to provide the district court

with the evidence that would allow the district court to fully address the question.”), rev.

denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 2003).

              2.     Factual findings regarding the parties’ expenses.

       Wife also challenges the district court’s findings regarding the parties’ expenses. A

district court’s calculation of living expenses must be supported by evidence presented by

the parties. Rask v. Rask, 445 N.W.2d 849, 854 (Minn. App. 1989).

       It is apparent that the district court relied on the parties’ affidavits and other

submissions to make findings regarding their respective budgets. The district court

determined that husband’s monthly costs were $40,414.87 based on the estimated budget

that husband submitted minus husband’s spousal-maintenance obligation. It also found,

based on husband’s affidavit, that husband had debts totaling $437,400.69. The district

court found that wife’s monthly expenses were $6,617, which is the figure that wife

supplied in her motion papers. Because the district court’s findings regarding the parties’

expenses are supported by the record, they are not clearly erroneous.

       Wife argues that the district court failed to assess the parties’ ability to meet their

own needs. She points out that the affidavit she submitted to the district court states that

her monthly budget of $6,617 is “basic,” that she has a lower standard of living than she

did during the marriage, that she has medical bills and expects a large tax bill, and that her

                                             14
budget does not “allow for any savings, retirement contributions or out-of-the-ordinary

expenses.” Wife notes that husband reported high monthly expenses related to church

donations, retirement savings, and vacations and hobbies, while she does not have funds

for similar activities. She criticizes the district court for failing to acknowledge her

hardships while accepting husband’s monthly budget “without any analysis.”

       We do not disagree with wife that there is a significant disparity between the budgets

of the parties. However, the district court also found that “[husband’s] medical care and

related expenses will significantly increase his necessary expenses” and that husband’s

expenses exceed his income. And given these circumstances, the district court further

found that by reducing husband’s spousal maintenance obligation to $3,800 per month,

each party would have income sufficient to meet their needs. The record supports these

findings and therefore they are not clearly erroneous.

       In sum, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining

that husband successfully showed a substantial change in circumstances that made his

existing spousal-maintenance obligation unreasonable and unfair and by reducing wife’s

award to $3,800 per month. The district court applied the correct statutory standards, and

its factual findings are based on the record that the parties submitted.

III.   The district court did not abuse its discretion by establishing the amount of
       husband’s life-insurance obligation to wife.

       Wife argues that the district court erred by “reducing” the amount of life insurance

that husband must maintain to secure his spousal-maintenance obligation. She contends

that husband was required to maintain “a stipulated $750,000 secured life insurance policy”

                                             15
for her benefit. Wife asserts that the district court effectively reduced husband’s life

insurance obligation by requiring him to maintain his existing $90,000 policy.

       A district court has discretion to secure a spousal-maintenance obligation by

requiring an obligor to obtain and maintain life insurance. Minn. Stat. § 518A.71 (2022);

Kampf v. Kampf, 732 N.W.2d 630, 635 (Minn. App. 2007), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 21,

2007). An appellate court will reverse a district court’s decision regarding life insurance

as security for a spousal-maintenance obligation only when the district court abused its

discretion. Maeder v. Maeder, 480 N.W.2d 677, 680 (Minn. App. 1992) (affirming district

court’s order to secure maintenance with life insurance because there was no abuse of

discretion), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 1992).

       Husband’s motion to modify his spousal-maintenance obligation sought to

terminate the requirement in the dissolution decree that he maintain life insurance for

wife’s benefit. The district court denied husband’s request and ordered husband to

“continue to maintain the existing life insurance policy of $90,000 with [wife] as a

beneficiary.” It also ordered husband to “modify the life insurance policy to be a trust with

monthly payments to [wife] in the amount equal to the amount [she] is receiving in spousal

maintenance at the time of [husband’s] death.”

       Wife argues that she is entitled to a life insurance trust in the amount of $750,000

based on the parties’ stipulated settlement agreement underlying the dissolution decree.

                                             16
Given the parties’ agreement, wife contends, the district court did not have discretion to

change the required amount of life insurance. 6

       However, the decree does not support wife’s contention. The judgment and decree

ordered husband to

               maintain his term life insurance policy and his disability
               insurance policy in amounts sufficient to provide continued
               child support and spousal maintenance, in the ordered
               amounts, in the event of his death or disability. To secure the
               future payments of child support and spousal maintenance,
               [husband] agrees to create an insurance trust funded from the
               above-referenced policies. The terms of the trust shall provide
               that the minor children and [wife] are to receive monthly

6
  Because the dissolution court entered a judgment based on the parties’ stipulation, we
have grave doubts about the viability of a post-judgment argument that is based on the
parties’ stipulation, as opposed to the resulting judgment entered by the district court based
on that stipulation. Specifically, in a family case, a stipulation is the agreement between
the spouses (before it is adopted or rejected by the district court), while a stipulated
judgment is the judgment that the district court enters based on that agreement. Cf. Toughill
v. Toughill, 609 N.W.2d 634, 638 n.1 (Minn. App. 2000) (noting that “[t]he district court
is a third party to dissolution proceedings and has the authority to refuse to accept the terms
of a stipulation in part or in toto” (quotation omitted)). If a district court adopts a stipulation
and enters a judgment based on that stipulation, the stipulation ceases to exist as a separate
creature and is “merged” into the resulting judgment. See Hecker v. Hecker, 568 N.W.2d
705, 709 (Minn. 1997) (distinguishing a “stipulation” as something that “represents the
parties’ voluntary acquiescence in an equitable settlement” from a stipulation that “has
been merged into the judgment and decree”); see also Shirk v. Shirk, 561 N.W.2d 519, 521-
22 (Minn. 1997) (noting that stipulations are “accorded the sanctity of binding contracts”
and “cannot be repudiated or withdrawn from [by] one party without the consent of the
other, except by leave of the court for cause shown,” but that “upon entry of a judgment
and decree based on a stipulation, different circumstances arise, as the dissolution is now
complete and the need for finality becomes of central importance[,]” and “[t]herefore,
when a judgment and decree is entered based upon a stipulation, . . . the stipulation is
merged into the judgment and decree and the stipulation cannot thereafter be the target of
attack by a party seeking relief from the judgment and decree”) (quotation marks omitted).
As a result, to the extent the stipulation here was adopted by the district court, it was
“merged” into the resulting stipulated judgment the district court based on that stipulation,
and there is no longer a stipulation to construe—any construction would be of the
stipulated judgment the district court based on that stipulation, not the stipulation itself.

                                                17
              payments from the trust in an amount equal to the child support
              and spousal maintenance obligations which would have
              otherwise been imposed upon [husband]. [Wife] shall be
              designated as trustee. At such time as there is no future
              obligation to pay child support or spousal maintenance,
              [husband] shall be entitled to name the beneficiaries of his
              choice or terminate the policies.

       A reviewing court must give the plain and ordinary meaning to the unambiguous

terms of a stipulated judgment and decree. See Starr v. Starr, 251 N.W.2d 341, 342 (Minn.

1977) (applying the general rule for construction of contracts to dissolution decrees).

Because the decree does not establish any specific amount of necessary life insurance, the

district court had discretion to consider whether husband’s existing life insurance was

sufficient.

       Wife argues that, even if the district court had discretion to address the amount of

life insurance required, the district court abused that discretion. We also reject this

argument.

       During the proceedings on the parties’ motions, wife presented evidence to the

district court that husband initially maintained a life-insurance policy of $750,000

following the dissolution, and that husband adjusted the policy in 2021 to provide $500,000

in benefits and then again in 2022 to provide $90,000 in benefits. The district court,

recognizing that it had discretion to determine how much security was justified, found that

husband’s existing $90,000 policy was sufficient. In finding that the existing policy was

sufficient, the district court observed that “[s]pousal maintenance that persists after an

obligor’s death is limited to the terms of the decree, and there is no requirement that the

security specifically correlate to the obligee’s need or the mandated maintenance award

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that existed in obligor’s lifetime.” The district court noted the silence of the decree as to

the specific amount of life-insurance required. It also acknowledged the uncertainty

concerning when, under the decree, husband’s spousal maintenance obligation would have

terminated due to wife’s remarriage or death. Finally, the district court stated that the

existing $90,000 life-insurance policy will provide wife with spousal-maintenance

payments for “almost two years” upon husband’s death.

       We are not persuaded that the district court’s decision was an abuse of discretion.

The district court correctly noted that the law does not require “security be strictly

equivalent” to a spousal-maintenance obligation. Head v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 449 N.W.2d

449, 453 (Minn. App. 1989) (requiring maintenance award to be reasonable), rev. denied

(Minn. Feb. 21, 1990). And the district court’s analysis reflects that it exercised its wide

discretion to establish the amount of necessary life insurance given the changed

circumstances presented.

IV.    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying wife’s motion for
       need-based attorney fees.

       Wife argues that the district court improperly denied her request for need-based

attorney fees. 7 She contends that the record establishes that she lacks the means to pay

attorney fees.

       A district court “shall award attorney fees, costs, and disbursements in an amount

necessary to enable a party to carry on or contest the proceeding” if it finds that three

7
  Wife does not challenge the district court’s denial of her motion for conduct-based
attorney fees.

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elements are met: (1) “that the fees are necessary for the good faith assertion of the party’s

rights in the proceeding and will not contribute unnecessarily to the length and expense of

the proceeding,” (2) that the party from whom fees are sought “has the means to pay them,”

and (3) that the party seeking fees “does not have the means to pay them.” Minn. Stat.

§ 518.14, subd. 1 (2022).

       On appeal, wife contends that she lacks the means to pay attorney fees. The district

court specifically considered and rejected this argument during the proceedings below,

determining that “[e]ach party is capable of paying their own attorney’s fees.” It found,

based on wife’s own assessment of her income and expenses, that she “has surplus income

of $1,000 each month,” which is “sufficient to cover attorney’s fees.” The district court

further found that husband did not have any surplus income to pay wife’s legal fees.

       We conclude that the district court’s findings regarding the parties’ resources are

founded in the record. Those findings support the district court’s determination that wife

had the means to pay her attorney fees and that husband did not have the means to pay

them. Thus, we discern no error in the district court’s denial of wife’s request for need-

based attorney fees.

       Affirmed.

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