Court Opinion

ID: 9514122
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:44:40.751599+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:12.337484
License: Public Domain

SANDSTROM, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 38] I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 39] The majority suggests that the three-day notice and opportunity to pay before summary eviction is a mere formality. It is not. It was a required prerequisite to this eviction. Goodman Inv., Inc. v. Swanston Equipment Co., 299 N.W.2d 786, 789 (N.D.1980). In Goodman, this Court quoted favorably the South Dakota Supreme Court in Dakota Hot Springs Co. v. Young, 9 S.D. 577, 70 N.W. 842, 843 (1897):
No court, as far as our researches have extended, has held that without a demand of rent from the tenant in some form, a forfeiture could be predicated upon a failure to pay the same. Such a law would be so manifestly unjust, and would lead to such serious consequences, that we cannot give to our statute such a construction, unless required to do so by language clearer and more pointed than *784that used in the law we are now considering. ... A construction, however, that makes the service of a notice to quit a demand, thereby relieving the landlord from the necessity of making the common-law demand, and which gives the tenant the three days in which to pay his rent after such demand, it seems to us, carries into effect the clear intent of the lawmaking power.
Id. (quoting Dakota Hot Springs Co. v. Young, 9 S.D. 577, 70 N.W. 842; 843 (1897)). This Court then held:
We cannot conclude that by enacting our forcible-entry and detainer statutes the Legislature intended such a radical departure from the common law wherein prior to forfeiture a demand for payment had to be made under rather strict procedures to a situation in which no demand for payment is required and no opportunity to pay the rent is permitted. Rather, we agree with the rationale of the South Dakota Supreme Court as expressed in Dakota Hot Springs Co., supra, that the purpose of the notice to quit replaces the demand for payment and permits the tenant to pay the rent within the three-day period contained in the notice.

Id.

[¶ 40] The majority says, at ¶ 6, “Johnson asserts she did not receive the three-day notice.” But it was not a mere assertion as suggested by the majority. It was a finding of the court.
[¶ 41] The method employed in this case for both giving the three-day notice and for serving the summons and complaint — taping on the door — as a matter of law was available only “if the party cannot be found.” N.D.C.C. § 33-06-02 (recodi-fied at N.D.C.C. § 47-32-02). The majority asserts, at ¶ 20, with no citation to any authority that this requires “some degree of diligence.” But the overwhelming body of law requires diligence, not “some degree” of diligence.
[¶ 42] The United States Supreme Court held in Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 102 S.Ct. 1874, 72 L.Ed.2d 249 (1982):
But whatever the efficacy of posting in many cases, it is clear that, in the circumstances of this case, merely posting notice on an apartment door does not satisfy minimum standards of due process. In a significant number of instances, reliance on posting pursuant to the provisions of 454.030 results in a failure to provide actual notice to the tenant concerned. Indeed, appellees claim to have suffered precisely such a failure of actual notice. As the process servers were well aware, notices posted on apartment doors in the area where these tenants lived were “not infrequently” removed by children or other tenants before they could have their intended effect. Under these conditions, notice by posting on the apartment door cannot be considered a “reliable means of acquainting interested parties of the fact that their rights are before the courts.” Mullane, 339 U.S. [306], at 315 [70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950) ].
Of course, the reasonableness of the notice provided must be tested with reference to the existence of “feasible and customary” alternatives and supplements to the form of notice chosen. Ibid. In this connection, we reject appellants’ characterization of the procedure contemplated by 454.030 as one in which “ ‘posting’ is used as a method of service only as a last resort.” Brief for Appellants 7. To be sure, the statute requires the officer serving notice to *785make a visit to the tenant’s home and to attempt to serve the writ personally on the tenant or some member of his family. But if no one is at home at the time of that visit, as is apparently true in a “good percentage” of cases, posting follows forthwith. Neither the statute, nor, the practice of the process servers, makes provision for even a second attempt at personal service, perhaps at some time of day %ohen the tenant is more likely to be at home. The failure to effect personal service on the first visit hardly suggests that the tenant has abandoned his interest in the apartment such that mere pro forma notice might be held constitutionally adequate. Cf. Mullane, 339 U.S., at 317 -318 [70 S.Ct. 652].
Greene, at 453-55, 102 S.Ct. 1874 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
[¶ 43] In addition to finding that Johnson did not receive the notice, the district court concluded that one knock on the door or one ring of the doorbell was all that the law required to permit service by posting and that it had no discretion but to find the notice was legally sufficient. This does not meet the requirements of Greene.
[¶ 44] To effectuate service of the notice by posting, N.D.C.C. § 33-06-02 requires that the person “cannot be found.” As the vast case law holds, “cannot be found” requires diligence in trying to find the person. See, e.g., 62B Am.Jur.2d Process § 144 (2005) (stating the validity of statutes providing for substituted service of process may be held to depend on the fact that the defendant, after due diligence, cannot be found and noting if personal service can be effected by the exercise of reasonable diligence, substituted service is not to be resorted to). The majority interprets the legislative history as reflecting a desire to make the process easier for landlords and concludes that because no diligence is easier for the landlord, diligence is not required. See ¶21.
[¶ 45] This reasoning is seriously flawed.
[¶ 46] The legislature has instructed that words in a statute “be understood in their ordinary sense, unless a contrary intention plainly appears.” N.D.C.C. § 1-02-02. The words “cannot be found” mean “cannot be found.” “Cannot be found” requires diligence. See, e.g., 62B Am. Jur.2d Process § 144 (2005). Diligence requires a “continual effort to accomplish something.” Black’s Law Dictionary 488 (8th ed. 2004). Diligence means “constant and earnest effort to accomplish what is undertaken; persistent exertion of body or mind.” Random House Dictionary of the English Language 554 (2d ed. 1987).
[¶ 47] The majority’s analysis also casts doubt on the meaning of at least thirty other statutes that use the term “cannot be found”: N.D.C.C. §§ 4-12.2-24, 8-03-09, 9-12-28, 10-15-49, 10-19.1-123, 10-32-127, 10-33-114, 11-19.1-15, 11-20-06, 18-11-28, 23-06-21.1, 23-21-10, 23-35-09, 25-03.1-08, 25-03.1-36, 26.1-06.1A14, 27-20-23, 28-21-06, 30.1-20-14, 30.1-28-09, 32-18-03, 32-22-09, 36-11-20, 38-08-04.4, 41-03-35, 41-03-37.1, 44-09-06, 47-19-23, 54-44.4-09, and 60-01-39.
[¶ 48] The district court interpreted the law to give it no choice but to treat the ineffective notice as effective:
THE COURT: Yes. On February 5th at about 6:00 p.m., that he went to the location, that he attempted to find Ms. Johnson — he made an attempt to find her, knocked on the door, rang the doorbell, that he did not find her, and therefore, that he then posted on the front door.
*786That is — it’s clear that that is conspicuous, nailing to the front door is conspicuous. Ms. Johnson says she didn’t receive, I believe her that she didn’t receive it. However, the act of service is complete upon the posting on the front door. In this particular case, the legislature gives me no discretion. When that was posted on the front door, that service is complete. If it then blew off later, it doesn’t matter. The service was complete under the law.
(Emphasis added.)
[¶ 49] The district court erred as a matter of law.
[¶ 50] I would reverse and remand.
[¶ 51] DALE V. SANDSTROM