Court Opinion

ID: 2964604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:28:10.232579+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:58.067766
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

          No. 96-1136
                          AMARILIS PARRILLA-BURGOS, ET AL.,
                               Plaintiffs - Appellants,

                                          v.
                           FELIX HERNANDEZ-RIVERA, ET AL.,
                               Defendants - Appellees.

                                 ____________________
                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                   [Hon. Salvador E. Casellas, U.S. District Judge]
                                               ___________________
                                 ____________________

                                        Before
                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                           Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________

                         and DiClerico, Jr.,* District Judge.
                                              ______________
                                _____________________

               Joan  S.  Peters,  with  whom  Andr s  Guillemard-Noble  and
               ________________               ________________________
          Nachman, Santiago & Guillemard were on brief for appellants.
          ______________________________
               John F. Nevares,  with whom  Lizzie M. Portela  and Smith  &
               _______________              _________________      ________
          Nevares were on brief for appellee Carlos J. L pez-Feliciano.
          _______
               Roxanna Badillo-Rodr guez, Assistant Solicitor General, with
               _________________________
          whom  Carlos  Lugo-Fiol,  Solicitor  General,  and  Edda Serrano-
                _________________                             _____________
          Blasini, Deputy  Solicitor General,  were on brief  for appellees
          _______
          Fernando V zquez-Gely, Felipe Aponte-Ortiz, Angel  L. D az, Angel
          L. Hern ndez-Col n and Luis E. L pez-Lebr n.

                                 ____________________
                                    March 19, 1997
                                 ____________________

                              
          ____________________

              Of the District of New Hampshire, sitting by designation.

                    DiClerico, District  Judge.  The  plaintiffs, relatives
                    DiClerico, District  Judge.
                               _______________

          of the decedent, Lionel Galletti Roque ( Galletti ), brought this

          action under 42  U.S.C.   1983 against the defendants, members of

          the  Puerto  Rico Police  Department,  seeking  damages allegedly

          suffered  when  one  of the  defendants,  F lix  Hern ndez Rivera

          ( Hern ndez ), shot and killed Galletti  during a fight at a bar.

          The district  court  granted summary  judgment  in favor  of  the

          defendants, finding that  Hern ndez, who was on  medical leave at

          the time  of the shooting,  was not acting  under color of  state

          law.  The district court  initially denied the defendants  motion

          for summary  judgment, but reconsidered  that ruling in  light of

          our decision  in Mart nez v. Col n, 54 F.3d 980 (1st Cir.), cert.
                           ________    _____                          _____

          denied, 116  S. Ct. 515 (1995).   In this appeal,  the plaintiffs
          ______

          challenge the  district court s grant  of summary judgment.   For

          the  reasons  expressed  below, we  affirm  the  district court s

          decision.

                          Factual and Procedural Background1
                          Factual and Procedural Background
                          _________________________________

                    On January 2,  1989, at around 10:00  p.m., plaintiffs 

          decedent,  Galletti, was  drinking  at a  bar  in Trujillo  Alto,

          Puerto Rico, known as Carlos  Place.  Galletti was accompanied by

          Angel  Ram rez  Fonseca,  Ilari n  Rosado,  and  two  individuals

          identified only  as Algar n and  Ity.  At that  time, codefendant

          Hern ndez,  an  officer  of the  Puerto  Rico  Police Department,
                              
          ____________________

            In reviewing the decision on the defendants  motion for summary
          judgment, we recount and consider only those facts that have been
          alleged by the plaintiff or are not in dispute.

                                         -2-
                                         -2-

          arrived with  an unidentified group  of his friends.   Hern ndez,

          who  was on  medical leave  due  to gastroenteritis,  was not  in

          uniform  but was carrying  his police identification  and service

          revolver.    Police  department policy  states  that  Puerto Rico

          police officers are on duty twenty-four hours a day and therefore

          each officer is  required to carry  identification and a  service

          revolver at all times.

                    Inside Carlos   Place, Hern ndez  approached Galletti s

          group and words and threatening glances were exchanged.  Galletti

          challenged  Hern ndez  hostile attitude, stating that he had done

          nothing to  provoke it.   Hern ndez responded,  I ll look  at you

          whichever way I please, because I m a cop. 

                    The situation escalated.   Hern ndez slapped Galletti s

          friend Ity.   Galletti told  Hern ndez,  Well, you don t  have to

          give me  dirty looks.  You look at me  really bad and I have done

          nothing to you.    Hern ndez replied,  I look at anybody  I want,

          because I m a cop.   Anybody I decide I want to  look at dirty, I

          look  at  them dirty.     At this  point  the owner  of  the bar,

          apparently  concerned by the  interchange, told  Hern ndez,  Just

          because you  are the law,  you don t need to  intimidate people, 

          and asked him  to leave.   Hern ndez  told the bar  owner not  to

          meddle  and to leave the combatants  alone because it was none of

          his business.

                    By this time  the conflict had attracted  the attention

          of patrons outside  the bar, who  entered the bar to  better view

          the  confrontation.    According  to  the  plaintiffs,  Hern ndez

                                         -3-
                                         -3-

          identified himself to the crowd  as a police officer, saying that

          he  was  supposed to be there  to establish the peace  and order 

          and  showed them his police identification, apparently to prevent

          them from interfering  in the conflict.  This  stopped the fracas

          for about five minutes.

                    However, as Hern ndez was  leaving the bar, one  of his

          friends  and one of  Galletti s friends resumed  hostilities.  At

          this point,  Galletti told Hern ndez,   Well, you leave  the gun,

          and  me and you will have it out, outside.   Hern ndez responded,

           I  don t need  a gun  to  fight you.   Come  on,  step outside. 

          Hern ndez,  despite his  statement  to  the  contrary,  took  his

          service revolver  with him as  both parties went outside.   While

          Galletti took off his sweater, Hern ndez threw a beer can at him.

          Galletti responded by pushing Hern ndez.  Hern ndez then took out

          his service revolver  and fired six shots at Galletti.  The first

          shot missed Galletti  and hit a bystander  but the next five  hit

          Galletti, killing him.

                    On December 27, 1989, Galletti s survivors brought this

            1983  action against Hern ndez2  and other supervising officers

          (the  supervisory defendants ).3  On August 30, 1991, supervisory

          defendant  Carlos  L pez  Feliciano filed  a  motion  for summary

                              
          ____________________

            Hern ndez  never answered the complaint, and the district court
          entered a  default against him on August 31,  1990.  He played no
          further role in the case or the subsequent appeal.

            The  other officers  named  as  defendants  are:  Carlos  L pez
          Feliciano,  Luis L pez  Lebr n, Angel  Hern ndez,  Luis Carrillo,
          Angel  D az, Fernando V zquez-Gely,  F lix Aponte-Ortiz, and Jos 
          Lucena.

                                         -4-
                                         -4-

          judgment, which the  other supervisory defendants joined,  on the

          ground that  Hern ndez was  not acting under  color of  state law

          when he shot Galletti.

                    On  November  1,  1991,  Judge Carmen  Consuelo  Cerezo

          denied  the motion  for summary  judgment.   On  March 31,  1992,

          supervisory  defendant   L pez  Feliciano  filed   a  motion  for

          reconsideration  of  that decision.    At  this  time, the  other

          supervisory  defendants filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that

          the  plaintiffs  had  not alleged  facts  necessary  to establish

          supervisory  liability.  Judge  Raymond L. Acosta  referred these

          motions  to  Magistrate  Judge Jes s  Antonio  Castellanos  for a

          report and recommendation.

                    On April  29, 1994, Magistrate  Castellanos recommended

          that: (1)  the motion  for reconsideration  filed by  supervisory

          defendant L pez Feliciano  be denied; (2)  the motion to  dismiss

          filed  by   supervisory  defendants  Luis  L pez   Lebr n,  Angel

          Hern ndez, Angel  D az, Fernando V zquez-Gely, and  F lix Aponte-

          Ortiz  be  denied;  and  (3)  the  motion  to  dismiss  filed  by

          supervisory  defendants Luis Carrillo and Jos  Lucena be granted.

          On March  16, 1995,  Judge Salvador E.  Casellas issued  an order

          adopting the magistrate s report and recommendation.4  On May 31,

          1995, we  issued our decision  in Mart nez v. Col n,  54 F.3d 980
                                            ________    _____

          (1st  Cir.), cert.  denied, 116 S.  Ct. 515  (1995).  On  June 6,
                       _____________

          1995,  supervisory  defendant  L pez Feliciano  filed  a  motion,

                              
          ____________________

            This order  ended  the involvement  of  supervisory  defendants
          Carrillo and Lucena in the action.

                                         -5-
                                         -5-

          joined in by the remaining supervisory defendants, requesting the

          district court to reconsider its decision on the summary judgment

          motion  in  light of  Mart nez.    On  November 29,  1995,  Judge
                                ________

          Casellas vacated  the  court s order  of  November 1,  1991,  and

          dismissed the case on the ground that defendant Hern ndez was not

          acting  under color of  law  for the  purposes of   1983 when  he

          killed Galletti.  The plaintiffs appealed this decision.

                                      Discussion
                                      Discussion
                                      __________

                    The  plaintiffs assert that the district court erred in

          determining  as a  matter of  law that  Hern ndez  acts  were not

          taken under color  of state law.5   Specifically, they  challenge

          the district court s application of Mart nez to this case.6
                                              ________
                              
          ____________________

            Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part:

                    Every person  who,  under color  of  any  statute,
               ordinance, regulation,  custom, or usage, of  any State
               or  Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
               causes  to  be  subjected, any  citizen  of  the United
               States  or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
               to  the  deprivation  of  any  rights,  privileges,  or
               immunities secured  by the Constitution and laws, shall
               be liable  to the  party injured in  an action  at law,
               suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

          42 U.S.C.A.   1983 (West 1994).   We discuss this issue in  terms
          of  color of state law  despite the  fact that Puerto Rico is not
          a state because  Puerto Rico  enjoys the functional equivalent of
          statehood in regard to section 1983 and, thus, state law includes
          Puerto Rico law.   Mart nez, 54 F.3d at 984.
                             ________

            The plaintiffs also  contend that in granting  summary judgment
          for  the defendants  Judge  Casellas  abused  his  discretion  by
          vacating both  the prior order  of Judge  Cerezo denying  summary
          judgment and his own order adopting the report and recommendation
          of  Magistrate  Castellanos.   The  plaintiffs  assert  that this
          action was improper due to the law of the case established by the
          prior decisions.    We disagree.   Under  the circumstances,  our

                                         -6-
                                         -6-

                            1.  Summary Judgment Standard
                            1.  Summary Judgment Standard

                    A  district court may  grant summary judgment  only  if

          the  pleadings,  depositions,  answers  to  interrogatories,  and

          admissions  on file, together  with the affidavits,  if any, show

          that there is no genuine issue  as to any material fact and  that

          the moving party is  entitled to a judgment as a  matter of law. 

          Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  In this case,

                    summary judgment will lie if the record, even
                    when  taken in the  aspect most  favorable to
                    the nonmovant  fails to  yield a  trialworthy
                    issue  as to some material fact.  In applying
                    this principle,  it is  important to  bear in
                    mind that not every  genuine factual conflict
                    necessitates  a trial.   It  is  only when  a
                    disputed fact has the potential to change the
                    outcome  of the suit  under the governing law
                    if found favorably to  the nonmovant that the
                    materiality hurdle is cleared.

          Mart nez, 54 F.3d at 983-84 (citation omitted).  For the purposes
          ________

          of  this  appeal,  we  exercise  de novo  review  and  adopt  the
                                           _______

          plaintiffs  version of all controverted facts.  See id.
                                                          ___ ___

                                2.  Applying Mart nez
                                2.  Applying Mart nez
                                             ________

                    The   plaintiffs  assert   that   the  district   court

          improperly applied  Mart nez to this  case.  In Mart nez,  an on-
                              ________                    ________

                              
          ____________________

          decision  in  Mart nez  provided  ample  justification   for  the
                        ________
          district court to  revisit its prior decisions  concerning action
          under  color  of  state law,  and  the  court did  not  abuse its
          discretion by  so doing.  See  United States v. Lachman,  48 F.3d
                                    ___  _____________    _______
          586, 590  (1st Cir. 1995)  (district court judge has  latitude to
          revisit own earlier  rulings); United States v.  Rivera-Mart nez,
                                         _____________     _______________
          931 F.2d 148, 150-51 (1st  Cir. 1991) (district court has ability
          to reopen  issues  when controlling  authority  makes  subsequent
          contrary decision of law).

                                         -7-
                                         -7-

          shift7 police officer accidentally shot  and maimed a fellow off-

          shift officer while harassing that officer in the  station house.

          See 54  F.3d at 982, 987.   The harassing officer never expressly
          ___

          asserted his authority as a police officer, but he was in uniform

          and armed  with  his service  revolver.   See id.  at  987.   The
                                                    ___ ___

          defendants were other police officers, at least one of whom was a

          supervisor, who observed the incident but did not intervene.  See
                                                                        ___

          id.  at 983.   We reviewed the district  court s award of summary
          ___

          judgment  in favor  of the  defendants and  held that,  under the

          totality of the circumstances, it  was clear that the officer was

          not acting under color of state law because he was engaged in the

          personal pursuit of private violence, making the grant of summary

          judgment against the plaintiff appropriate.  See id. at 988.
                                                       ___ ___

                    Mart nez articulates the standard to be applied in this
                    ________

          case to determine  whether Hern ndez  was acting  under color  of

          state  law when he shot and killed Galletti.   As we said in that

          case,  [p]rivate violence -- even  private violence engaged in by

          one who  happens to  work for  the state  -- has different  legal

          ramifications  than  violence   attributable  to  state  action. 

          Mart nez, 54 F.3d at  985; see also Screws v.  United States, 325
          ________                   ________ ______     _____________

          U.S. 91, 111  (1945).   Thus, whether a police  officer is acting

          under color of state law turns on the nature and circumstances of

          the officer s conduct and the relationship of that conduct to the

          performance of his  official duties.   Mart nez, 54  F.3d at 986.
                                                 ________
                              
          ____________________

            We  use  the term   on-shift   rather than  the  term  on-duty 
          because,   as  noted  supra,  Puerto  Rico  police  officers  are
                                _____
          considered to be on-duty twenty-four hours a day.

                                         -8-
                                         -8-

           The  key  determinant is  whether  the  actor,  at the  time  in

          question, purposes to act in  an official capacity or to exercise

          official responsibilities pursuant to state law.   Id.  
                                                             ___

                    One  relevant  facet  of this  inquiry  is  whether the

          defendant has purported  to act under color  of state law or,  in

          other words, has acted  under  pretense of  law.   See Screws  v.
                                                             ___ ______

          United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945); Mart nez, 54 F.3d at 987.
          _____________                           ________

          Action occurs  under pretense  of law  when an  individual imbued

          with  official authority purports to exercise that authority when

          actually acting wholly  outside of it.  See Mart nez,  54 F.3d at
                                                  ___ ________

          986-87.  However, as we have stated,

                    [e]ven  though   acting under  color  of law 
                    includes  acting  under pretense of  law  for
                    purposes  of a  state action  analysis, there
                    can be no pretense  if the challenged conduct
                    is  not related in some meaningful way either
                    to  the officer s  governmental status  or to
                    the performance of his duties.

          Id. at 987.  Therefore, it is not enough for an individual merely
          ___

          to purport to exercise official  power in order to trigger   1983

          liability, but rather the individual must actually be engaged  in

          the abuse of official power  granted by the government.  See West
                                                                   ___ ____

          v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988); Mart nez, 54 F.3d at 986.
             ______                          ________

                    The  pivotal issue to  be determined, then,  is whether

          Hern ndez    was  engaged   in  purely   personal   pursuits  or,

          conversely, whether he was acting under color of state law.   Id.
                                                                        ___

          at 987.   In conducting  this inquiry, we must  assess Hern ndez 

           conduct  in light of the totality of surrounding circumstances. 

          Id.  In Mart nez, we identified several factors that are relevant
          ___     ________

                                         -9-
                                         -9-

          to, but not necessarily determinative of, the issue, including: a

          police  officer s garb; an  officer s duty status,  including the

          existence of  a regulation  providing that  officers are on  duty

          twenty-four hours a day; the officer s use of a service revolver;

          and, the location of the incident.  See id. at 986, 987.
                                              ___ ___

                    The plaintiffs  have resisted this  formulation of  the

          issue.  At oral  argument, the plaintiffs urged  us to find  that

          Hern ndez  acted under  color of  state law  because but  for his

          official authority,  he could never  have done what  he did.   We

          recognize that some language in  Mart nez might appear to support
                                           ________

          such an  expansive position.   See 54 F.3d  at 986  ( In general,
                                         ___

          section 1983  is not  implicated unless  a state actor s  conduct

          occurs in the course of performing  an actual or apparent duty of

          his office, or  unless the conduct  is such that the  actor could

          not  have  behaved in  that  way  but for  the  authority of  his

          office. ).    However,  that  statement  merely  articulates  the

          minimum threshold that must be met for action to be considered as

          occurring under color  of state  law and does  not set forth  the

          specific test to  be applied in determining  whether a challenged

          act was committed under color of state law.  In fact, in Mart nez
                                                                   ________

          we rejected such a sweeping  standard for   1983 liability.  See,
                                                                       ___

          e.g., id. at 987 ( [W]e must assess the nature of his  conduct in
          ____  ___

          light of the totality of surrounding circumstances . . . . ), 988

          (  While a  police officer s use  of a state-issue weapon  in the

          pursuit  of private activities  will have  furthered   the   1983

          violation in a literal sense,   a court needs  additional indicia

                                         -10-
                                         -10-

          of state authority to conclude that the officer acted under color

          of state  law.  ) (citation omitted).   We will not  jettison our

          settled case  law to embrace  such a broad standard  of liability

          here.

                    The plaintiffs  also  asserted at  oral  argument  that

          endorsing the result reached by the district court would bring us

          into conflict with the decisions  of other circuits.  Contrary to

          this  assertion,  the  approach we  articulated  in  Mart nez and
                                                               ________

          endorse  here  is consistent  with  the approach  taken  by other

          circuits that have considered the issue of whether the actions of

          police  officers are taken under color  of state law.  See, e.g.,
                                                                 ___  ____

          David v.  City and County of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344, 1351-54 (10th
          _____     _________________________

          Cir. 1996); Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809, 818-19 (3d
                      _____    ___________________

          Cir.  1994); Pitchell  v. Callan,  13 F.3d  545, 547-49  (2d Cir.
                       ________     ______

          1994); United States  v. Tarpley, 945 F.2d 806,  808-09 (5th Cir.
                 _____________     _______

          Cir. 1991);  Gibson v.  City of Chicago,  910 F.2d  1510, 1516-19
                       ______     _______________

          (7th 1990); Jones v. Gutschenritter,  909 F.2d 1208, 1211-12 (8th
                      _____    ______________

          Cir. 1990); Revene v. Charles  County Comm rs, 882 F.2d 870, 872-
                      ______    _______________________

          73 (4th Cir. 1989).  While not explicitly  adopting a totality of

          the   circumstances  test,   these   courts  have   examined  the

          circumstances surrounding a  challenged act to  determine whether

          it  was committed under color of  state law.  Given the intensely

          fact-specific nature  of such  analysis we  find it  unremarkable

          that none of  the cases cited by the plaintiffs  are so factually

          similar to this  case as to  persuade us to adopt  the particular

          outcome the plaintiffs desire.

                                         -11-
                                         -11-

                           3.  Application of the Standard
                           3.  Application of the Standard

                    With  these preliminary matters  aside, we now  turn to

          the  substance  of this  appeal  -- the  review  de  novo of  the
                                                           ________

          district court s grant of summary judgment on the color-of-state-

          law  issue.   The plaintiffs  point to  the following  factors to

          justify    1983 liability: the twenty-four hour a day regulation;

          Hern ndez   repeated statements that he was a police officer; his

          use of  his service revolver  in the shooting; his  statements to

          patrons that he  was there to   keep the peace   and that he  was

           handling  the  situation ;   and  his  display  of   his  police

          identification.  These  factors, they argue, raise  a trialworthy

          issue as to whether Hern ndez was acting under color of state law

          on the night that he killed Galletti.  

                    We agree that some of these factors weigh in favor of a

          finding  of   1983 liability.  In particular, Hern ndez  comments

          to patrons that he was there to keep the peace and his display of

          his  police identification might, viewed in isolation, support an

          inference that  Hern ndez was  acting  under pretense  of law  by

          purporting  to  act in  his  official  capacity.   However,  that

          conclusion  was  belied  by  the  rest  of  Hern ndez   behavior,

          especially  his repeated assertions that  he could do things such

          as  look dirty  at Galletti because he was a police officer.

                    Mere statements  by individuals that they  are entitled

          to a  special privilege because  of their official status  do not

          constitute action  under color  or pretense of  state law  if the

          asserted  privilege lies  clearly  outside  the  scope  of  their

                                         -12-
                                         -12-

          official duties.   Statements  by Hern ndez  that he  could  look

          dirty  at  Galletti because  he was a  police officer  so clearly

          fell outside his official capacity that they did not constitute a

          reasonable pretense that he was acting as a police officer at the

          time.  

                    Even more significantly, the  final interchange between

          Galletti and  Hern ndez  prior to  their  going outside  the  bar

          dominates any  characterization of  the events  of that  evening.

          Both parties agree that at  a point just before Galletti s death,

          he invited  Hern ndez outside  to settle  their differences  in a

          fight.  Hern ndez  accepted.  From the time that the two left the

          bar  until Hern ndez  shot Galletti,  Hern ndez  made no  further

          pretense that he was acting as a police officer.

                    Whatever brief pretense  Hern ndez may have made  to be

          acting in his official capacity by showing his identification and

          stating that he was  keeping the peace ended when the  two agreed

          to fight it out.  In Mart nez, we stated:
                               ________

                    The campaign  of terror  that [the  harassing
                    officer]  mounted  was patently  personal  in
                    nature,  and   [the  victim]   unquestionably
                    realized as  much; indeed, there was  not the
                    slightest  indication  that   [the  harassing
                    officer s] conduct was undertaken pursuant to
                    the  authority of  his office.   Plainly, the
                    fact that  [the victim] walked  away numerous
                    times shows  that he was not  so intimidated 
                    by  [the  harassing  officer s]  status as  a
                    policeman  as  to cause  him to  refrain from
                    exercising his legal right[s]. 

          Mart nez, 54  F.3d at 988  n.6 (quoting Jones  v. Gutschenritter,
          ________                                _____     ______________

          909 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1990)).  Here, any possibility that

          Galletti  was intimidated by Hern ndez  claims of official status

                                         -13-
                                         -13-

          is belied by the undisputed  fact that Galletti invited Hern ndez

          to engage in a private brawl.   Because Hern ndez made no further

          pretense of official action, there  is not enough evidence in the

          record, even taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs,

          to support the inference that Hern ndez was acting under color of

          state  law  when  he  shot  Galletti.    As  the  district  court

          concluded,

                       Galletti s   reaction  in   the   face   of
                    Hern ndez   openly  hostile  behavior towards
                    him serves  to buttress  our conclusion  that
                    Hern ndez    actions    constituted   private
                    conduct outside  the line  of duty,  and that
                    the latter s  status as  an  officer did  not
                    enter into his taunting of the decedent.  The
                    particular interaction between  Hern ndez and
                    Galletti was of a distinctly personal nature,
                    and Galletti unquestionably realized as much.
                    The fact that Galletti not only initiated the
                    confrontation,   but   subsequently   invited
                    Hern ndez to  fight  it out  outside  the bar
                    shows  that  he  was  not so  intimidated  by
                    Hern ndez  status as a policeman  as to cause
                    him to  refrain  from  exercising  his  legal
                    rights. 

          We agree, and this conclusion ends our inquiry.8

                                      Conclusion
                                      Conclusion
                                      __________

                    For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of
                                                     affirm
                                                     ______

          the district court.

                              
          ____________________

            The action-under-the-color-of-state-law issue  being decided in
          favor  of the defendants, the remainder of the plaintiffs  claims
          unravel.  With  no underlying   1983 violation by Hern ndez, none
          of the other defendants can be found liable under the supervisory
          liability theory forwarded by the plaintiffs.

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