Court Opinion

ID: 9725696
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:01:37.32365+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:18.382894
License: Public Domain

Hannon, Judge,
concurring in part, and in part dissenting.
I concur in the majority’s opinion in all respects except its conclusion that the trial court did not err when it failed to instruct the jury on attempted second degree murder. When the evidence can support different and reasonable inferences, the jury must draw the inference determining the degree of criminal homicide. State v. Archbold, 217 Neb. 345, 350 N.W.2d 500 (1984). Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2027 (Reissue 1995), the court is required to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses when there is evidence tending to show those crimes were committed. State v. Archbold, supra. I can see no reason why this same rule does not apply when the crime is attempted murder rather than the completed crime.
As defined in the majority’s opinion, first degree murder is the purposeful, malicious, and premeditated killing of another person, whereas second degree murder is the malicious, intentional killing of another person. The elements of “purposeful,” “malicious,” “premeditation,” and alternatively, “malicious intention” are necessarily proved by circumstantial evidence. By the nature of things, when a jury considers whether a defendant is guilty of first degree murder or the lesser-included offense of second degree murder, it is deciding whether the evidence established an inference of premeditation beyond a rea*341sonable doubt, as well as perhaps deciding the credibility of the evidence which might support either inference. The second step mentioned in State v. Williams, 243 Neb. 959, 503 N.W.2d 561 (1993), that is, the court’s determination whether the evidence presented at trial justifies an instruction on the lesser-included offense, has a different application when the element which distinguishes the greater crime from the lesser crime is one of intent, which is necessarily proved by inferences from the evidence.
I regard this situation as distinct from that in State v. Tamburano, 201 Neb. 703, 271 N.W.2d 472 (1978), where the defendant wanted an instruction on the lesser-included offense of second degree sexual assault rather than first degree sexual assault on the basis that there was no penetration. In Tamburano, the State introduced evidence establishing penetration, and the defendant did not dispute this evidence. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the lesser-included offense instruction was not proper because the prosecution had offered uncontroverted evidence of that element and the defendant had offered no evidence to dispute that fact. In Tamburano, the factor which distinguished the greater crime from the lesser crime was a physical fact, whereas in this case, the distinction between the crimes is necessarily in the mind of the defendant. I am therefore convinced that there is a rational basis to find that appellant intentionally and maliciously attempted to kill Brown, but did not do so with premeditation.
The difference in the nature of the elements requires a different treatment. Therefore, I believe the trial court was required to instruct the jury on attempted second degree murder, and I would reverse the conviction because it failed to do so.