Court Opinion

ID: 9719430
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:52:24.742892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:07.159591
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE TRAPP, dissenting: In the context of fact and reality, it is rational to recognize that upon the allegations made Champaign County did, in fact, suffer from the invasion of property, i.e., its tax resources as the result of the pleaded intentional acts of the defendant. For the purposes of the motion, the allegations in the pleading are deemed to be true. (Country Mutual Insurance Co. v. Drendel, 116 Ill.App.2d 466, 252 N.E.2d 757.) We urge that such facts sufficiently state a cause of action. McGill v. 830 S. Michigan Hotel, 68 Ill.App.2d 351, 216 N.E.2d 273. In Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 40 L.Ed.2d 642, 94 S.Ct. 2116, we find that where the rights as a civil debtor are preserved, there is no necessary constitutional barrier to a State requiring reimbursement for the costs of providing legal counsel to a criminal defendant. The Approved Draft of the American Bar Association Standards Relating to Providing Defense Services, Appendix E., §8 (1968), provides for civil recovery by a county of the costs of legal assistance, (1) as to tiróse persons who were not legally entitled to receive such assistance, and (2) those who on the date the suit was brought were able to reimburse the county.1  It is the public policy of the State to provide for the recovery by civil action of sums received as public aid through the recipient’s wrongful conduct. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 23, § 11—21. The criteria which are set out suggest a change of the policy stated in die cited State Highway & Public Works Com. v. Cobb (1939), 215 N.C. 556, 2 S.E.2d 565. Such case also appears distinguishable in that from the facts stated in the opinion the services in pursuit of the defendant were provided by the law enforcement apparatus regularly maintained rather than unusual services provided at an additional expense to the county as found here. Cobb states that there was neither statute or common law liability for the public expense incurred. Our courts have, however, adopted new concepts of liability where it was deemed that public interest required the imposition of liability. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182; Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 18 Ill.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89; Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 33 Ill.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253. For the reasons stated, I would reverse the judgment of dismissal and remand for further proceedings.   [RECOVERY FROM DEFENDANT] “(a) The [county] attorney may, on behalf of the [county], recover payment or reimbursement, as the case may be, from each person who has received legal assistance or another benefit under this Act: (1) to which he was not entitled; (2) with respect to which he was not a needy person when he received it; or (3) with respect to which he has failed to make the certification required by section 4(b); and for which he refuses to pay or reimburse. Suit must be brought within 6 years after the date on which the aid was received. (b) "the [county] attorney, on behalf of the [county], may recover payment or reimbursement, as the case may be, from each person, other than a person covered by subsection (a), who has received legal assistance under this Act and who, on the date on which suit is brought, is financially able to pay or reimburse the county for it according to the standards of ability to pay applicable under sections 1(3), 2(a), and 4(b), hut refuses to do so. Suit must be brought within 3 years after the date on which the benefit was received. ■■ (c) Amounts recovered under this section shall be paid into the [county] general fund, except that so far as they represent money provided by the state under section 12, they shall be paid into the [general fund] of the state.”