Court Opinion

ID: 9540468
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:16:25.321973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:57.642043
License: Public Domain

Sharp, J.,
dissenting: The majority opinion is based upon the premise that the plaintiff has alleged a cause of action against both defendant Marks and defendant McCartha. With this conclusion I cannot agree. Defendants were operating motor vehicles approaching each other on a curve from opposite directions. Plaintiff alleges that in the operation of his motor vehicle, Marks was negli*39gent in four respects: (1) he failed to keep a proper lookout; (2) he failed to keep his vehicle under proper control; (3) his speed was greater than was reasonable and prudent under the circumstances; and (4) he failed to decrease his speed when approaching a curve. His 5th allegation, that Marks was guilty of reckless driving, and his 6th allegation, that he failed to use due care, are mere conclusions. Troxler v. Motor Lines, 240 N.C. 420, 82 S.E. 2d 342. Plaintiff makes identical allegations against defendant McCartha, plus the additional one that McCartha failed to keep his vehicle on the right side of the highway and that he “came across the yellow marked center line and crashed head-on with great force and violence into the vehicle of defendant Adell Marks, and in which plaintiff was riding as a passenger in the right front seat.”
After making these specifications of negligence, plaintiff alleges that her injuries were “the direct result of both the individual negligent acts of each defendant herein complained of, and the joint and concurrent negligence of the two defendants herein complained of.” This allegation with reference to proximate cause is the pleader’s mere conclusion. “It is not sufficient for a complaint to charge a defendant with negligence. The complaint must go further and allege facts showing the negligent act was a proximate cause of the injuries of which plaintiff complains.” Green v. Tile Co., 263 N.C. 503, 505, 139 S.E. 2d 538, 540. Plaintiff here has alleged no facts which show that the negligence of Marks was a proximate cause of the collision. As long as McCartha stayed on his side of the road, Marks’ alleged speed, lack of control, and failure to keep a proper lookout on her side of the road could have played no part in the collision. There is no allegation that McCartha crossed the center line when Marks was at such a distance that, if driving at a reasonable speed, keeping a proper lookout, and having her car under control, she could have avoided the collision. Without such an allegation the complaint is demurrable as to Marks, and it will not support an issue of negligence as to her. Moore v. Hales, 266 N.C. 482, 146 S.E. 2d 385; Loving v. Whitton, 241 N.C. 273, 84 S.E. 2d 919.
When the complaint fails to state a cause of action against one of two defendants, the rule enunciated in Greene v. Laboratories, Inc., 254 N.C. 680, 120 S.E. 2d 82, does not preclude the defendant, against whom a cause of action is stated, from joining the other.
Ordinarily, when a defendant alleges a cross action for contribution against an additional defendant, he merely raises an issue, for the fact of their joint and concurring negligence will not usually have been established, as here, by a judgment rendered in a prev*40ious action between them. That this issue has already been determined should not preclude defendant from setting up his right to contribution in plaintiff's action, but it would seem that this pleading should be for the judge and not the jury.
For the reasons stated I vote to affirm the judgment from which defendant Marks appeals.
Bobbitt, J., concurs in dissenting opinion.