Court Opinion

ID: 9469169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:33:55.962003+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:15.656897
License: Public Domain

SWYGERT, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
In reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion we must determine whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact. A court should grant summary judgment only if it is certain that there are no unresolved factual issues. Greenebaum Mortgage Co. v. Town & Garden Associates, 385 F.2d 347, 349 (7th Cir. 1967). The court should view the materials before it in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and must give him the benefit of all reasonably drawn inferences. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). We do not try the issues of fact; we only determine whether there are issues to be tried. Homan Mfg. Co. v. Long, 242 F.2d 645, 656 (7th Cir. 1957).
The majority affirms the district court on two grounds. First, contrary to the district court, the majority asserts that there is no genuine issue of fact as to whether there was an implied contract between the parties. Second, the majority agrees with the district court that there is no genuine issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff was the procuring cause of the eventual transaction. I disagree. I believe that both issues are best left to the trier of fact.
I
The majority contends that there was no contract. It states that the verbal acts as well as the surrounding circumstances cannot support the conclusion that there was a meeting of the minds as to whether plaintiff was to serve as a finder for the defendant.
First, the majority states that the parties never discussed the amount of a finder’s fee, or any formula for computing it. Nonetheless, a contract for a finder’s fee can be formed without an explicit determination of the amount of the fee; if unstated, the amount is what is reasonable under the circumstances. Ehrman v. Cook Electric Co., 630 F.2d 529, 531 (7th Cir. 1980).
Second, the majority contends that the circumstances surrounding the parties’ interaction did not create an implied-in-fact contract. The issue is not whether the *556plaintiff’s case is strong or weak; the issue is whether “under Illinois law there were sufficient factual questions to mandate jury consideration.” Id. at 530-31, n.4. Gammon could not reasonably think that Lirtzman was acting gratuitously. The only reasonable explanations for his presence, therefore, was either that he was working on behalf of DiLorenzo and Certified or that he was acting as a finder, i.e., he was bringing the parties together. The majority concludes that Gammon reasonably assumed that DiLorenzo represented Certified and that Lirtzman was his assistant. I do not see how the limited evidence available to us compels this conclusion. I would leave the drawing of inferences to the trier of fact. Its role is to determine what a person reasonably assumed in light of the circumstances before him.
Third, the majority contends that Lirtzman was currying favor with both Certified and National through his actions. Even if true (and again, this is an inference that the trier of fact should make), this is not inconsistent with his also being a finder.
Dispute about whether a contract has been formed are disputes about “states of mind.” What was the intent of the parties, and what was the respective uptake of each party as to the intent of the other? Contractual intent is “traditionally understood to be for the trier of fact.” Charbonnages De France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 415 (4th Cir. 1979). Moreover, comprehending a person’s intent involves making inferences from what he says or does, or does not say or do. Disputed inferences made from the undisputed facts are not properly decided by summary judgment. American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. London & Edinburgh Ins. Co., 354 F.2d 214, 216 (4th Cir. 1965). Both factors are present in this case, and both factors are peculiarly insusceptible to summary judgment.
The district court held that Lirtzman presented considerations from which a jury might infer that a contract existed. I agree. I believe that the majority has incorrectly played the role of trier of fact. See Ehrman v. Cook Electric Co., 630 F.2d 529, 531 (7th Cir. 1980).
II
In order to prevail the plaintiff must show not only that there was a contract between him and the defendant, but also he must show that he was the procuring cause of the 1978 transaction. The majority presents two distinct arguments in holding that the plaintiff was not the procuring cause of the 1978 sale. First, it contends that the 1978 sale was entirely different from the 1975 proposal in which the plaintiff was involved. Second, it argues that several events that amounted to intervening causes occurred between 1975 and 1978.
In 1975 National proposed selling its Wisconsin and Chicago plants. This proposal fell through because Certified was interested only in the Chicago plant, and National refused to split off and sell the single asset. In 1978, however, National did split off and sell the Chicago plant to Certified. It escapes me how these two transactions are “entirely different.” If A proposes to purchase “Block Avenue” from B, while B only wants to sell “Block Avenue and White Avenue” together, but if eventually B does decide to sell “Block Avenue” to A, it seems to me that the eventual sale is very much related to the original proposal. Lirtzman brought to Certified’s attention that National wanted to sell its assets, and eventually Certified got what it wanted of these assets. I think it is quite clear that the eventual deal is intimately related to the original proposal — the relationship is that of part to whole.
A person is not the procuring cause of a transaction if the transaction comes about only because of intervening causes. The majority holds that three intervening events, either separately or together, constituted intervening causes. The three events are (1) the merger of National into Fuqua; (2) the consequent writing down of Hawthom-Mellody’s assets; and (3) the change in government regulations relating to the sale of Wisconsin milk in the Chicago market. These events, it says, enabled the 1978 sale to be made and thereby foreclosed the pos*557sibility of the plaintiff being the procuring cause of the sale. These events may or may not have constituted intervening causes — I do not profess to know on the limited evidence available to us. What puzzles me is how the majority can resolve this issue without engaging in the role of a trier of fact. The issue of causation is quintessentially a factual one. The defendant has alleged that these intervening events enabled the sale to take place; the plaintiff contests this assertion. The dispute is a factual one. It seems to me that each side should be allowed to present its views and make its best case to the trier of fact. The factfinder should determine whether these events constitute intervening causes.
I dissent.