Court Opinion

ID: 9560270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:46:26.180884+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:36.099440
License: Public Domain

Goodloe, J.
(concurring)—I agree with the majority's resolution of the first and third issues of this case, namely, that the evidence of the knife was properly admitted and that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a charge of criminal negligence. However, I believe the majority's analysis with respect to the second "issue" on the burden of proving or disproving intoxication is unnecessary to the disposition at hand. Moreover, I think the majority's language in that section conflicts with and confuses its later reasoning as to why criminal negligence is not negated by voluntary intoxication. For these reasons I write separately. If voluntary intoxication cannot negate negligence, then it does not matter who has the burden of proving or disproving intoxication.
The majority concludes that the State does not have the burden of disproving voluntary intoxication beyond a reasonable doubt because such intoxication is not an affirmative defense, but rather is merely "relevant to the trier of *894fact in determining . . . whether the defendant acted with a particular degree of mental culpability." Majority opinion, at 889 (construing RCW 9A.16.090). Although I express no opinion on the majority's substantive determination of the burden of proof issue, I do find this language to be problematic. By stating that intoxication is "relevant" to culpability, the majority then seemingly contradicts itself when it holds that intoxication need not have been considered here. See majority opinion, at 892-93. If intoxication is truly "relevant", then it should be submitted to the jury. By conceding relevance under RCW 9A.16.090 in its burden of proof analysis, the majority invites criticism that it is overriding the terms of the statute when it subsequently holds that matters of voluntary intoxication need not go to the jury in criminal negligence cases. See dissent by Pearson, C.J., at 896-98. I do not think the majority's holding that intoxication is not a defense to negligence is inconsistent with the statute. Yet this holding necessarily depends on recognizing that voluntary intoxication is irrelevant to the degree of culpability that constitutes criminal negligence.
There is no question that the Legislature has made voluntary intoxication relevant to the determination of whether the defendant acted with "any particular mental state" constituting a necessary element of the crime. See RCW 9A.16.090; State v. Rice, 102 Wn.2d 120, 123, 683 P.2d 199 (1984); State v. Fuller, 42 Wn. App. 53, 55, 708 P.2d 413 (1985). Yet it does not necessarily follow from this statutory language that intoxication is relevant to negligence. Because negligence does not require any subjective mental condition, it cannot be considered a "mental state" within the meaning of RCW 9A.16.090.
The Legislature has listed four levels of "culpability": intent, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. RCW 9A.08.010. I submit that only the first three of these may properly be considered mental states. See W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law §§ 27, 30 (1972). Intent, knowledge, and recklessness all require a particular subjective aware*895ness. Recklessness, for example, is met when the defendant "knows of and disregards a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his disregard ... is a gross deviation from conduct that a reasonable man would exercise in the same situation." (Italics ours.) RCW 9A.08.010(l)(c). In contrast, criminal negligence is characterized by a solely objective test: "fail[ure] to be aware of a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and [that] failure . . . constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable man would exercise in the same situation." (Italics ours.) RCW 9A.08.010(l)(d). Negligence is essentially a catchall category for persons whose conduct constitutes a gross deviation from reasonable care, yet who cannot be said to be subjectively aware of the risks they create. Since negligence requires no particular level of awareness, it cannot be negated by the fact of intoxication. See W. LaFave & A. Scott § 45. Cf. People v. Garcia, 250 Cal. App. 2d 15, 21 & n.2, 58 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1967). The actor's state of mind is purely irrelevant to a charge of criminal negligence; all that matters is what a reasonable person would have done.
The voluntary intoxication statute provides in part that intoxication may be taken into consideration in determining the mental state of the accused. RCW 9A.16.090. When the fact of intoxication negates the required mental state for an offense, the accused cannot be found guilty of that offense. At the same time, the statute provides that the mere fact of intoxication does not constitute a defense. For a defendant to use voluntary intoxication as a defense, he or she must show more than the fact of the intoxication; the defendant must show that the intoxication affected his or her mental state to the point where the requisite intent or knowledge, for example, could not be formed. Put differently, the mental state created by the intoxication must be incompatible with that required by the criminal code. See Fuller, at 55; State v. Boyd, 21 Wn. App. 465, 468-77, 586 P.2d 878 (1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. State v. Holsworth, 93 Wn.2d 148, 607 P.2d 845 (1980).
*896Looking at the issue in this manner, one can see that intoxication is not incompatible with "fail[ure] to be aware of a substantial risk". RCW 9A.08.010(l)(d). On the contrary, intoxication often is the cause of such a failure. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 2.08, comment 1(d), at 359 (1985). Moreover, intoxication cannot negate negligence since the fact that a defendant is intoxicated has no bearing on how a reasonable person would have acted in the same situation. In contrast, severe intoxication could negate recklessness by rendering the accused incapable of "know[ing] of ... a substantial risk". RCW 9A.08.010(l)(c). Similarly, severe intoxication could render the accused incapable of forming the requisite mental state for knowledge and intent crimes.
The intoxication statute is concededly somewhat ambiguous in its reference to "any particular mental state", since mental state is often used loosely to mean culpability or fault. Yet this use of the term is inaccurate, for some crimes such as negligence require a form of fault which is not at all mental. See W. LaFave & A. Scott, at 192, 194. Therefore, reading the criminal code as a whole and with the object of giving consistent meaning to each part can only lead to one conclusion: Intoxication may operate as a defense only to those crimes requiring actual, subjective mental state and not to criminal negligence which requires merely an objective set of circumstances. See W. LaFave & A. Scott § 45. In short, I would hold that voluntary intoxication is irrelevant to a charge of criminal negligence on the ground that negligence does not involve proof of a mental state. Accordingly, I would not reach the burden of proof issue.