Court Opinion

ID: 9390453
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 17:02:47.887888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:34.613201
License: Public Domain

IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                              DIVISION ONE

                   THOMAS JAMES KELLY, Petitioner,

                                     v.

   THE HONORABLE JOHN BLANCHARD, Judge of the SUPERIOR
    COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, in and for the County of
                MARICOPA, Respondent Judge,

          LOUISA ADEL MARIE GOINGS, Real Party in Interest
                           No. 1 CA-SA 23-0021
                             FILED 4-27-2023

 Petition for Special Action from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                            No. CV2021-016361
                 The Honorable John L. Blanchard, Judge

           JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF GRANTED

                                COUNSEL

Hill, Hall & DeCiancio, P.L.C., Phoenix
By Joel DeCiancio and Christopher Robbins
Counsel for Petitioner
Gage & Mathers Ltd., Phoenix
By Martin H. Mathers and Joseph D’Aguanno
Co-counsel for Real Party in Interest
Ahwatukee Legal Office, P.C., Phoenix
By David L. Abney
Co-counsel for Real Party in Interest
RAJ Law P.L.L.C., Phoenix
By Daniel Rubinov, Rafat H. Abdeljaber
Counsel for Amicus Curiae Arizona Trial Lawyers Association
                 KELLY v. HON BLANCHARD/GOINGS
                          Opinion of the Court

                                 OPINION

Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

C A T L E T T, Judge:

¶1             The Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure permit the superior
court to “order a party whose physical or mental condition is in controversy
to submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician or
psychologist.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 35(a)(1). When such an examination—
known as an “independent medical examination” or “IME”—occurs, the
individual examined “may request the examiner’s report, like reports of the
same condition, and written or recorded notes from the examination.”
Ariz. R. Civ. P. 35(d)(2). The party who requested the examination then has
twenty days to produce, among other items, “like reports of all earlier
examinations of the same condition[.]” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 35(d)(2)(B).

¶2             This special action requires us to interpret the phrase “like
reports of all earlier examinations of the same condition” in Rule
35(d)(2)(B). Real party in interest Louisa Adel Marie Goings (“Goings”)
argues the phrase refers to “like reports” of the same condition in any
individual the physician or psychologist has examined. Petitioner Thomas James
Kelly (“Kelly”) argues the phrase refers only to “like reports” of the same
condition in the individual who is examined.

¶3            We hold that “like reports of all earlier examinations of the
same condition” refers to “like reports” of the same condition in the
individual examined. We, therefore, accept special action jurisdiction and
grant relief.

             FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶4            Goings sued Kelly following an automobile collision. During
discovery, Kelly requested an order requiring Goings to submit to an IME.
Kelly later took the position that, under Rule 35, he (the party requesting
the IME) should only be required to produce “like reports” of the same
condition about Goings. Goings objected, arguing that Rule 35 requires
Kelly to produce “like reports” of the same condition about any individual
the physician conducting the IME has examined.

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                  KELLY v. HON BLANCHARD/GOINGS
                           Opinion of the Court

¶5            The superior court adopted Goings’s interpretation. Thus, in
the minute entry setting forth the parameters of the IME, the superior court
concluded Goings “is entitled to, and [the examining physician] shall
produce ‘like reports’ of other individuals with the same condition[.]”

¶6            Kelly petitioned for special action relief, asking that we vacate
the superior court’s minute entry and specify that “like reports of all earlier
examinations of the same condition” refers only to reports about the
individual examined.

                               JURISDICTION

¶7             Special action jurisdiction is both circumscribed and
discretionary. Arizona Rule for Special Action Procedure 3 sets forth those
questions, and only those questions, that can be raised in a special action.
See Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 3. Even when a party raises one of those three
questions, special action relief is unavailable “where there is an equally
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal[.]” Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a).
If a party raises one of the three allowable questions, and there is no equally
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by way of appeal, the decision whether
to accept jurisdiction nonetheless remains “highly discretionary.” See King
v. Super. Ct., 138 Ariz. 147, 149 (1983); State Bar Comm. Notes, Ariz. R.P.
Spec. Act. 3.

¶8             Special action jurisdiction is appropriate here. Kelly asserts
the superior court exceeded its authority under Rule 35 when setting the
production requirements for his requested IME. Kelly’s petition, therefore,
asks whether the superior court “is threatening to proceed . . . in excess of .
. . legal authority,” one of the three questions properly raised in a special
action. See Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 3(b).

¶9             Kelly does not have an equally plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy by way of appeal. The superior court’s minute entry is not a final
order or otherwise appealable. The minute entry requires the examining
physician to produce “like reports” about individuals who are not party to
this litigation. Not only does that requirement potentially implicate non-
parties’ confidentiality and privilege interests, but once production occurs,
it cannot be undone. At that point, the value of any subsequent appeal
becomes nil. Cf. Avila v. Super. Ct., 169 Ariz. 49, 50 (App. 1991) (“[I]f plaintiff
is wrongly compelled to submit to an examination the trial court was not
authorized to order, the damage will have been done and cannot be
remedied by an appeal.”); Green v. Nygard, 213 Ariz. 460, 462 ¶ 6 (App. 2006)
(“Moreover, a special action is the proper means to seek relief when a party

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                 KELLY v. HON BLANCHARD/GOINGS
                          Opinion of the Court

believes a trial court has ordered disclosure of material protected by a
privilege or work product shield.”). Kelly also claims the production
requirement makes it unlikely that any physician will perform an IME in
this case; Goings does not squarely contest that proposition.

¶10            The issue presented also warrants special action jurisdiction
for other reasons. The relief requested requires the resolution of a narrow
and purely legal issue involving the interpretation of a court rule. Given
the frequency of IMEs in civil litigation, the scope of Rule 35(d)(2)(B)’s
production requirement is a recurring matter of statewide importance. Our
superior court colleagues have split on the scope of Rule 35’s production
requirement, but the issue is one of first impression for this Court.1 Each of
these factors militates in favor of special action jurisdiction. See Vo v. Super.
Ct., 172 Ariz. 195, 198 (App. 1992) (“[W]here an issue is one of first
impression of a purely legal question, is of statewide importance, and is
likely to arise again, special action jurisdiction may be warranted.”). Thus,
we exercise our discretion to accept jurisdiction.

                                DISCUSSION

¶11              We review the interpretation of court rules de novo. Bobrow v.
Herrod, 239 Ariz. 180, 182 ¶ 7 (App. 2016). Like with statutes, interpreting
a court rule begins with the text of the rule. See id. (“We analyze procedural
rules using principles of statutory construction[.]”). Our task is to effectuate
the text if it is clear and unambiguous. See id. If the text of the rule, when
read in context, is unambiguous, our interpretative task ends, and we apply
the text as written without resorting to other methods of interpretation.
Olewin v. Nobel Mfg., LLC, 254 Ariz. 346, ___ ¶ 10 (App. 2023). If, on the
other hand, the text of the rule is ambiguous, we utilize other methods to
determine the meaning of the text, such as the statute’s “subject matter, and
historical background; its effects and consequences; and its spirit and
purpose.” State v. Gray, 239 Ariz. 475, 477 ¶ 6 (2016).

¶12            Rule 35 provides that the superior court may order a party or
other individual “whose physical or mental condition is in controversy to
submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician or psychologist.”
Ariz. R. Civ. P. 35(a)(1). The product of the IME is a report that “must be in
writing and set out in detail the examiner’s findings, including diagnoses,
conclusions, and the results of any tests.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 35(d)(1). The

1      Unlike the superior court’s interpretation in this case, the superior
court in Mohave County previously concluded Rule 35(d)(2)(B) does not
require production of reports on other persons.

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                 KELLY v. HON BLANCHARD/GOINGS
                          Opinion of the Court

individual examined, or the person who produces the individual examined,
may then request the production of the following three categories of
documents: “the examiner’s report, like reports of the same condition, and
written or recorded notes from the examination.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 35(d)(2).
If such a request is made, within 20 days of the later of the examination or
the request, the party who requested the examination must deliver
responsive documents, including, if requested, “like reports of all earlier
examinations of the same condition[.]” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 35(d)(2)(B).

¶13            At oral argument, both parties accepted that Rule
35(d)(2)(B)’s text is ambiguous. We similarly conclude the phrase “like
reports of all earlier examinations of the same condition” is ambiguous
when it comes to the issue presented because the Rule does not answer the
question, like reports about who? When read in context, the phrase “like
reports” specifies only that the reports required to be produced under Rule
35(d)(2)(B) are those “like” the “examiner’s report” required under Rule
35(d)(2)(A). The Rule does not specify whether the phrase “like reports”
refers to like reports about the party examined or like reports about all
others with the same condition whom the physician or psychologist has
examined. Goings states that “[t]here is no limitation of ‘like reports’
concerning the one person to be examined,” and takes that silence as
support for her interpretation. We conclude that silence creates ambiguity
and makes both parties’ dueling interpretations plausible. We, thus, utilize
secondary interpretive tools to resolve the interpretive quandary. See Fann
v. State, 251 Ariz. 425, 435 ¶ 27 (2021) (“Because there are two plausible
interpretations of the term [at issue], we consider secondary means of
interpretation.”).

¶14            Kelly’s interpretation (i.e., “like reports” refers to those about
the individual examined) is most consistent with surrounding text. Rule
35(d)(2) provides that, upon request, the party who requested an IME must
produce the examiner’s report, like reports of all earlier examinations of the
same condition, and all written or recorded notes made by the examiner
and examinee at the time of the examination. Under the noscitur a sociis
canon, “the meaning of an unclear word or phrase should be determined
by the words immediately surrounding it[.]” Id. at ¶ 29. The phrase at issue
is nestled between two phrases—“the examiner’s report” and “all written
notes made . . . at the time of the examination”—both of which refer to
documents containing information about the individual examined. This
suggests the phrase “like reports of all earlier examinations” similarly refers
to documents containing information about the individual examined and
not all other individuals the examiner previously saw.

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                 KELLY v. HON BLANCHARD/GOINGS
                          Opinion of the Court

¶15            Text in a neighboring subsection also supports Kelly’s
interpretation. Rule 35(d)(3) uses language nearly identical to (d)(2),
requiring the party who was examined to produce “like reports of all earlier or
later examinations of the same condition.” Because Rule 35(d)(3) is entirely
focused on the individual examined in an IME, the phrase “like reports of
all earlier examinations” therein refers to “like reports of all earlier . . .
examinations of the same condition” in the examinee. Like with statutes,
identical words used in different parts of the same rule are intended to have
the same meaning. See Obregon v. Indus. Comm’n, 217 Ariz. 612, 616 ¶ 21
(App. 2008) (“It is a ‘normal rule of statutory construction’ that ‘identical
words used in different parts of the same Act are intended to have the same
meaning.’” (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995))).
It would have been odd for the drafters of Rule 35 to use nearly identical
text in one manner in Rule 35(d)(2) and in a completely different manner
right next door in Rule 35(d)(3). Lacking any contextual indication that the
drafters intended that situation, we ascribe identical meaning to the nearly
identical phrases used in Rule 35(d)(2) and (d)(3).

¶16           Tellingly, the text of Rule 35(d)(2) places the burden of
producing “like reports” on “the party who moved for or noticed the
examination.” If the text of Rule 35 had placed that burden, instead, on the
examining physician or psychologist, Goings’s interpretation would make
more sense. But the text does not do so. Instead, placing the production
requirement on the requesting party, as Rule 35 does, supports Kelly’s
interpretation. One can imagine circumstances, even if rare, where a
requesting party will possess prior “like reports” about an individual
examined. For example, the requesting party might obtain “like reports”
through third-party discovery or through a pre-existing relationship with
the individual examined.           The insurer/insured, doctor/patient,
lawyer/client, and employer/employee relationship, among others, could
result in a requesting party obtaining “like reports” about the individual
examined. It is harder, if not impossible, to imagine examples where a
requesting party would possess “like reports” about all other persons who
a court-appointed physician or psychologist previously examined. Only
the appointed medical professional would be likely to possess all “like
reports” about prior patients, but that is not who Rule 35 requires to make
production.

¶17            The federal counterpart to Arizona Rule 35 uses identical
text—the party requesting an IME is required, when asked, to disclose “like
reports of all earlier examinations of the same condition.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
35(b)(1). Federal Rule 35’s drafting history and the purpose for including
that text further support our conclusion. The Advisory Committee Notes

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                 KELLY v. HON BLANCHARD/GOINGS
                          Opinion of the Court

to Federal Rule 35 explain that the U.S. Supreme Court added the text at
issue to Federal Rule 35(b)(1) in 1970 to “correct an imbalance in Rule
35(b)(1) as heretofore written.” Before 1970, Federal Rule 35 required the
party examined to provide “reports of all examinations of the same
condition previously or later made,” but the Rule did not require the party
requesting an examination to produce any prior reports. Fed. R. Civ. P. 35
Advisory Comm. Notes. According to the Advisory Committee, the 1970
“amendment cures this defect.” Id.

¶18            The Advisory Committee Notes do not expressly clarify
whether the new language added to Federal Rule 35 in 1970 was intended
to cover like reports about the individual examined or all other individuals
previously examined.2 But the Notes’ explanation regarding the purpose
for that language is still instructive. Interpreting Arizona Rule 35 to require
the party requesting an examination to provide prior reports about the
individual examined is most consonant with the stated purpose for adding
the text to Federal Rule 35—“correct[ing] an imbalance” in access to
information. Id. Requiring a party requesting an IME to produce “like
reports” about the individual examined while similarly requiring the
individual examined to produce “like reports” about herself achieves
equilibrium. Requiring a requesting party to, instead, produce “like
reports” about any individual with the same condition who a court-
appointed examiner has ever examined pushes the pendulum too far in the
opposite direction, thereby replacing one imbalance with another. Cf. CSX
Transp., Inc. v. Ryan, 192 S.W.3d 345, 349 (Ky. 2006) (“We believe such an
interpretation of [Kentucky Civil Rule] 35.02(1) is reasonable because it is
consistent with the purpose assigned to [Rule] 35.01 to maintain a level
playing field between the parties.”).

¶19           Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 1 instructs that the Rules
“should be construed . . . by the court . . . to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” Adopting
Goings’s interpretation of “like reports” would almost certainly generate
additional, potentially costly, litigation. How similar does a prior condition
in another individual need to be to qualify as the “same condition” in the
individual examined? How far can or must the party who requested an

2      The Advisory Committee Notes discussing the 1970 amendments to
Federal Rule 35(b)(1) cite La. Stat. Ann. Civ. P. art. 1495 (1960) and Utah R.
Civ. P. 35(c). In 1970, while both the Louisiana and Utah rules imposed a
disclosure obligation on the requesting party, neither unambiguously
required production of reports about other examinees. Thus, neither rule
is germane to the issue we confront.

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                 KELLY v. HON BLANCHARD/GOINGS
                          Opinion of the Court

IME or the superior court go to protect confidential or privileged
information about other individuals who are not party to the lawsuit?3
How far must a requesting party go to ensure an independent medical
examiner retains, reviews, and produces “like reports” stemming from
prior IMEs? These questions—and a host of others—could need answering.
See Cheff v. Am. States Preferred Ins. Co., 2023 WL 2330252, *4 (D. Mont.
March 2, 2023) (“Plaintiffs’ interpretation of [Federal] Rule 35(b) presents a
multitude of individual privacy concerns, as well as inevitable conflicts
with doctors’ professional obligations to protect their patients’ confidential
healthcare information.”). None of this is to suggest that Kelly’s
interpretation resolves all unanswered questions. On balance, though, that
interpretation is most consistent with Rule 1’s instruction.

¶20             Goings relies on an unpublished decision from a federal trial
court in Colorado adopting an interpretation of Federal Rule 35 like the
superior court’s interpretation of Arizona Rule 35. See Bryant v. Dillon Real
Est. Co., 2019 WL 3935174, *4 (D. Colo. Aug. 20, 2019). Bryant conflicts with
unpublished federal trial court decisions both before and after it was issued.
See Cheff, 2023 WL 2330252 at *5 (“[A] reasonable interpretation of the plain
language of Rule 35(b) in context with the rule’s other provisions and the
advisory committee notes does not justify plaintiffs receiving examination
reports of other individuals, completely unrelated to the pending
litigation[.]”); Howard v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 2014 WL 11955394, *1
(N.D. Ga. Feb. 10, 2014) (“The court interprets [Rule 35(b)(1)] as requiring
the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff only like reports of all earlier
examinations of the plaintiff regarding the same condition to which the
defendant may have access.”).

¶21           In any event, Bryant relies primarily on a comment in the
federal Advisory Committee Notes explaining that Federal Rule 35(b)(1)
was amended in 1970 partly to reflect “changes required by the broadening
of Rule 35(a) to take in persons who are not parties.” See Bryant, 2019 WL
3935174 at *4. Bryant misreads that comment, which refers to language
added to the end of Federal Rule 35(b)(1) to reflect that trial courts were
given authority in Rule 35(a) to order an examination of a non-party in the
custody or control of a party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 35(a) and Advisory Comm.
Notes. The comment does not refer to the “like reports” language added to
Rule 35(b)(1). See Cheff, 2023 WL 2330252 at *4 (“There is nothing in the

3      Rule 35(d)(4) provides the person examined waives any privilege
“[b]y requesting and obtaining the examiner’s report, or by deposing the
examiner. . . .” But that waiver applies only “in that action or any other
action involving the same controversy. . . .” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 35(d)(4).

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                KELLY v. HON BLANCHARD/GOINGS
                         Opinion of the Court

advisory committee notes to imply the rule should be extended to unrelated
non-parties who have previously been treated by the same physician for the
same condition.”). This misapprehension undercuts Bryant’s primary
reasoning and thus its persuasive value. We hold that “like reports of all
earlier examinations of the same condition” refers only to reports about the
individual examined.4

                              CONCLUSION

¶22          We accept special action jurisdiction, grant relief by vacating
in part the superior court’s minute entry, and remand for further
proceedings consistent herewith.

                        AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                        FILED: AA

4      Rule 35(d)(6) provides that “[t]his rule does not preclude a party
from obtaining an examiner’s report, or deposing an examiner, under other
rules.” Similarly, nothing in this opinion is intended to preclude a party
from seeking additional reports under other discovery rules or to suggest
appropriate limitations on third-party discovery involving expert
witnesses.

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