Court Opinion

ID: 9538183
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:31:51.84031+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:37.157054
License: Public Domain

CLARK, J.
I concur in reversing counts I and II, but, for the reasons so well expressed by Justice Richardson, dissent from reversing counts III-V.
Regarding counts IV and V, the grand theft counts, the standard of diligence required by the majority is altogether unreasonable. That they make such unrealistic demands upon our hard pressed law enforcement officials suggests that the majority subscribe to what a Rand Corporation study refers to as the “media image of the working detective,” i.e., “that of a clever, imaginative, perseveran!, streetwise cop who . . . roamfs] the entire city for days or weeks trying to break a single case, which is ultimately solved by means of the investigator’s deductive powers.” (1 Greenwood & Petersilia, The Criminal Investigation Process, Summary and Policy Implications (Rand Corp. Report prepared under a grant from the Nat. Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, L.E.A.A., Dept, of Justice, 1975) p. 5 [hereinafter referred to as “Rand study”].)
The reality of criminal investigation, the Rand study reveals, is very different. To determine what factors contribute to case solution the Rand researchers analyzed a large sample of cleared crimes from a variety of crime types. In more than half of the cleared cases, they found, the identification of the offender was available at the time 'of the initial report because (1) the offender was arrested at the scene; (2) the victim or witness identified the suspect by name and address; or (3) some evidence available at the crime scene, such as a license plate or employee badge number, uniquely determined the identity of the suspect. Most of *581the remaining cases that were eventually cleared were solved through routine administrative actions: fingerprint search, informant tips, reviewing of mug shots, or arrests in connection with the recovery of stolen property. On the basis of these findings, the Rand study concluded that “with the possible exception of homicide, if investigators performed only the obvious and routine tasks needed to clear the ‘easy’ cases, they would solve the vast majority (97 percent) of crimes that now get cleared. All their efforts in relation to other cases have a very marginal effect on the number of crimes cleared' ” (Rand study, pp. 13-14, italics added.)
One of the policy implications of these findings, according to Rand, is that police departments should reduce follow-up investigation on all cases except those involving the most serious offenses. The rationale of this proposal: “Our data consistently reveal that a regular investigator’s time is preponderantly consumed in reviewing reports, documenting files, and attempting to locate and interview victims and witnesses on cases that experience shows will not be solved. Our data show, moreover, that most cases that are solved are solved by means of information spontaneously provided by a source other than those developed by the investigator. It follows that a significant reduction in follow-up investigative efforts would be appropriate for all but the most serious offenses in which public confidence demands some type of response.” (Rand study, p. 27.) That Rand made this recommendation—that the present level of follow-up investigative effort be reduced—is all the more significant in light of its finding that, under present practice, investigative efforts in over 86 percent of unsolved cases are suspended by the end of the first week. (Rand study, p. 19.)
In light of the Rand study, we can see that more, not less, than reasonable diligence was exercised in the investigation of this case. Despite the length of the majority opinion, this was, after all, not the crime of the century. It was a $15,000 arson and insurance fraud that involved no injury to innocent persons. Nevertheless, several investigators worked on it intensively for over two months before suspending their efforts because the suspect had an alibi and no motive was apparent. To demand a higher standard of diligence, given society’s limited resources and apparently unlimited propensity to crime, is completely unrealistic.
McComb, J., concurred.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied January 13, 1977. Clark, J., and Richardson, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.