Court Opinion

ID: 9849094
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:34:38.384345+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:00.975498
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
(dissenting). The question in this case is whether a civil damage action against noncommercial social hosts who unlawfully furnish alcohol to underage persons exists in Michigan to compensate for injury to the intoxicated person. I would hold that a cause of action does not exist against social hosts in favor of injured inebriates.
I
Appellees urge this Court to find a civil cause of action based upon violation of MCL 436.33; MSA 18.1004. Section 33(1) prohibits the knowing sale or furnishing of alcoholic beverages to persons *700under age twenty-one.1 While in the past this Court has found that violation of other criminal or penal statutes provided evidence of negligence,2 in my view it is inappropriate to do so in this instance.
The Michigan dramshop act, found at MCL 436.22; MSA 18.993, addresses itself to some of the problems caused by the misuse of alcohol. It is compensatory, preventive, and penal. While other sections of the Michigan Liquor Control Act prohibit the serving of intoxicated persons, MCL 436.29; MSA 18.1000, and the knowing sale or furnishing of liquor to underage persons, MCL 436.33; MSA 18.1004, MCL 436.22; MSA 18.993 specifically provides a civil cause of action against specified persons in favor of injured innocent victims. See generally Rangas v Suchorski, 372 Mich 396, 401; 126 NW2d 803 (1964). The Legislature declined to provide a cause of action for injured intoxicants, restricting recovery to injured innocent victims.
The course urged upon us today would provide a cause of action for an underaged person injured because of his own intoxication. Only two states *701have recognized a cause of action giving recovery to the inebriate rather than to third parties harmed by the inebriate. See Congini v Portersville Valve Co, 504 Pa 157; 470 A2d 515 (1983) (injured intoxicant stated a cause of action against his employer who violated a penal statute barring the furnishing of liquor to underaged persons), and Young v Caravan Corp, 99 Wash 2d 655; 663 P2d 834; 672 P2d 1267 (1983) (injured inebriate had cause of action against vendor who sold to the underaged person in violation of penal statute). Neither Pennsylvania nor Washington has a comprehensive dramshop act like MCL 436.22; MSA 18.993. Since the Michigan Legislature has consistently failed to provide such a cause of action against commercial vendors of alcohol, it would be anomalous to judicially provide such an action against social hosts. Indeed, MCL 436.33; MSA 18.1004 restricts the selling as well as the furnishing of alcohol to underaged persons. For a logically consistent implication of tort liability based upon violation of § 33, this Court would have to find a cause of action for an injured underage intoxicant against not only social hosts, but also commercial vendors. Such a result would be in clear violation of the legislative intent expressed in § 22.
The existence of two Court of Appeals decisions recognizing a cause of action based upon violation of the precursor of § 33, Lover v Sampson, 44 Mich App 173; 205 NW2d 69 (1972); Thaut v Finley, 47 Mich App 542; 209 NW2d 695 (1973), rev’d on reh 50 Mich App 611; 213 NW2d 820 (1973), does not require a different result. First, the doctrine of legislative acquiescence is less applicable to intermediate appellate court rulings than to rulings of the court of last resort. Our cases utilizing the doctrine of legislative acquiescence generally presume that the Legislature is aware of decisions of *702this Court and that if the Legislature disagreed with our decision, appropriate legislation would result. See Magreta v Ambassador Steel Co, 380 Mich 513, 519-520; 158 NW2d 473 (1968); Jeruzal v Wayne Co Drain Comm’r, 350 Mich 527, 534; 87 NW2d 122 (1957). Secondly, Lover and Thaut recognized causes of action in favor of injured third parties rather than injured intoxicants.
II
Finally, I believe that the type of harm which occurred in this case was not the kind of harm against which the increased drinking age imposed by Const 1963, art 4, § 40, and the resultant enactment of § 33 of the Liquor Control Act, MCL 436.33; MSA 18.1004, was meant to protect. Proposal D, adopted in 1978 by the people to increase the legal drinking age, and § 33, enacted by 1978 PA 531 to effectuate Proposal D, were primarily intended to protect innocent persons from the ravages of alcohol-related traffic accidents involving inebriates between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one.
Before a court adopts violation of a penal statute as the standard of care in a negligence action, the purpose of the legislation must be ascertained. Comment d of Restatement Torts, 2d, § 286, p 26 states:
The decision to adopt the [legislative] standard is purely a judicial one, for the court to make. When the court does adopt the legislative standard, it is acting to further the general purpose which it finds in the legislation, and not because it is in any way required to do so.
In this instance, the general purpose of Proposal D, the 1978 constitutional amendment which *703raised the drinking age from eighteen to twenty-one, must be ascertained. Indeed, the purpose of the people who adopted Proposal D is the most important factor, since 1978 PA 531 was enacted to effectuate the people’s intent in adopting Proposal D.3
While an incidental purpose may have been to protect youthful inebriates from the effects of their own intoxication, Felix v Milliken, 463 F Supp 1360, 1377-1378 (ED Mich, 1978), the purpose of Proposal D appears primarily to have been to decrease alcohol-related traffic accidents, see generally id. at 1377-1382, to decrease drinking problems in the schools, and to decrease the availability of liquor to persons under the age of eighteen. See, e.g., The Detroit News, November 1, 1978, at 10-D, col 1 & 2.4
The first purpose, the reduction of traffic accidents, is directed towards the welfare of the general public — decreasing traffic accidents caused by intoxicated persons between áges eighteen and *704twenty-one. The second purpose is directed towards improving discipline in schools. The third purpose is directed towards protecting persons younger than eighteen.
Therefore, I would conclude that the creation of a cause of action in this factual context is improper because the harm here was not of the kind which Proposal D and § 33 were primarily intended to prevent. Absent a clear and strong legislative intention to protect these persons from the effects of their own intoxication, I would decline to recognize a cause of action in favor of these appellees.
Ryan, J. I dissent from the decision of the majority for the reasons stated in Part I of Justice Boyle’s opinion:
Riley, J., took no part in the decision of this case.

 Section 33(1) provides:
"Alcoholic liquor shall not be sold or furnished to a person unless the person has attained 21 years of age. A person who knowingly sells or furnishes alcoholic liquor to a person who is less than 21 years of age, or who fails to make diligent inquiry as to whether the person is less than 21 years of age, is guilty of a misdemeanor. A suitable sign which describes this section and the penalties for violating this section shall be posted in a conspicuous place in each room where alcoholic liquors are sold. The signs shall be approved and furnished by the state liquor control commission.”

 See, e.g., Zeni v Anderson, 397 Mich 117; 243 NW2d 270 (1976) (violation of statute requiring pedestrian to walk on sidewalk or facing traffic creates prima facie case of negligence); Massey v Scripter, 401 Mich 385; 258 NW2d 44 (1977) (rebuttable presumption of negligence based on violation of statute requiring bicycle riders to ride on the right side of the road); Hardy v Monsanto Enviro-Chem Systems, Inc, 414 Mich 29, 47; 323 NW2d 270 (1982) (violation of safety statute is prima facie negligence).

 Senator Welborn, who voted against 1978 PA 531 because he felt that the people wanted stronger penalties, said:
"Mr. President and members of the Senate, I voted 'no’ on House Bill No. 6731. This bill is intended to implement Proposal D, the Constitutional amendment that was passed by the people of this state. I personally did not vote for Proposal D. In fact, I publicly advocated my opposition during the campaign. However, in my opinion, the people did speak very loudly on this. They did not speak on the issue of prohibiting alcoholic beverages to be sold or consumed by people under the age of 21 simply by giving them a slap on the wrist.” 1978 Senate Journal 2704 (emphasis added).

 In the Detroit News explanation of Proposal D, the arguments in favor of the amendment were stated as follows:
"Proponents are not pleased by the pending law raising the minimum age to 19. They say there has been an increase in alcohol-related traffic accidents and drinking problems in the schools as [a] result of the lower drinking age.
"Proponents say that when the law changed the drinking age to 18, it created a flow of alcohol to even younger children. They cite a recent study by a University of Michigan researcher, showing the lower drinking age has caused an average of 54 additional traffic deaths per year in Michigan over the past two years.”