Court Opinion

ID: 9536748
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:06:34.873618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:55:12.889202
License: Public Domain

CONNOR, Justice
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
In my view, a dissent should not be undertaken lightly, and certainly not without searching inquiry into whether it is worthwhile. One may often disagree with many of the legal subtleties and verbal nuances of an opinion without sacrifice of conviction. Silent concurrence is then the rule of prudence. But on matters of vital principle, a dissent can be of value in preserving for the future those contentions and theories which may eventually control. In this sense, “A dissent in a court of last resort is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes the court to have been betrayed.” (Chief Justice Hughes, as quoted by Mr. Justice Douglas in “The Dissent: A Safeguard of Democracy,” 32 J.A.Jud.Soc. 104 (1948).)
I
I agree with the court’s disposition of this case except for the holding that Herman’s testimony was admissible.
The majority opinion relies upon People v. Varnum, 66 Cal.2d 808, 59 Cal.Rptr. 108, 427 P.2d 772 (Cal.1967), and People v. Denham, 41 I11.2d 1, 241 N.E.2d 415 (111.1968), for the proposition that statements obtained in violation of the rule laid down in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), can be excluded from evidence only by the person from whom they were obtained and not by another who is affected by the statement having been elicited. In other words, it is held that the benefits of the Miranda rule, which prohibits certain types of custodial interrogation of suspects by the police, cannot be asserted vicariously.
The theory underlying the Varnum case is that violations of the Miranda rule can be regarded as non-coercive if the statements are elicited under conditions which would have rendered them admissible under the due process standards which applied before the Miranda decision. In the absence of physical or psychological coercion of a degree which would render the state*624ments unreliable and violative of earlier notions of due process, the majority opinion in Varnum says in effect that breaches of the Miranda rule are not inherently coercive.
In that People v. Denham, supra, merely follows Varnum, without any meaningful discussion, nothing further need be said about it. In Varnum, the wife of one of defendant’s confessed accomplices was held in jail from about midnight until six o’clock the following morning, during which time she was induced through police interrogation, and through encouragement by her husband, to reveal the location of a murder weapon used by the defendant. The weapon was introduced in evidence at defendant’s murder trial. In affirming the conviction, the majority in Varnum held that the failure to accord the wife of the accomplice her rights under the 5th and 6th Amendments, as expounded in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966), did not bar use of the evidence thereby obtained.
The court in Varnum was presented with a distinct problem because in a related area it had abandoned the requirement of personal standing as a prerequisite to the assertion of a constitutional right. In People v. Martin, 45 Cal.2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (Cal.1955), it had ruled that evidence obtained in violation of the 4th Amendment was inadmissible, regardless of whose rights against unlawful search and seizure had been violated. It stressed that the purpose of the exclusionary rule in 4th Amendment violations was to deter unlawful searches and seizures by rendering inadmissible the evidentiary results of such police activity. To make the admissibility of such evidence turn on the standing of the objector, in the technical sense of showing a proprietary or possessory interest in the goods or premises unlawfully invaded, would permit the police to engage in widespread misconduct and purposeful violation of the constitutional provision.
In Varnum, the majority tried to distinguish its holding in Martin on the ground that while unreasonable searches and seizures always violate the constitution, there is nothing inherently unlawful in questioning suspects who have not been given proper Miranda warnings, “so long as the police refrain from physically and psychologically coercive tactics condemned by due process and do not use against the suspect any evidence obtained.” 427 P.2d, at 776. It then held that the rights protected by Escobedo and Miranda are not violated until the evidence obtained without the required warnings is actually introduced against the person whose rights were breached.
As the trenchant dissent of Justice Peters points out, the majority in Varnum converted a doctrine protective of fundamental constitutional rights into a mere rule of evidence. 427 P.2d, at 780. It is obvious that the Varnum majority exercised a policy choice not to extend its Martin principle beyond the 4th Amendment area. Unfortunately, that choice was based upon grounds which are inarticulate and upon a distinction which is difficult to defend.
In Alaska we have not taken a definite position on the standing necessary to assert 4th Amendment rights. It could be argued that we are also free to make a choice about the standing necessary to vindicate 5th and 6th Amendment rights. The United States Supreme Court has not yet laid down a final rule in these matters for the guidance of the states. But in exercising our choice, it would be far preferable to do so fully conscious of the bases and results of decision than to adopt sub silentio the questionable rationale of the Varnum case.
II
In order to understand how the exclusionary rule should function, we must look back into its origins and development. One of the significant earlier applications of the rule is found in Weeks v. United States, 232 *625U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914). That case laid to rest an earlier notion that courts could admit evidence obtained by an unlawful search and seizure because such evidence might have probative value. In reaching this conclusion, the court held that the 4th Amendment binds both executive officials and the court to operate within its limitations.
“This protection reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not, and the duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws.” 232 U.S., at 392, 34 S.Ct., at 344.
The court brushed aside the argument that the person victimized by a violation of 4th Amendment rights should be remitted to a civil action against the errant officials.
“What remedies the defendant may have against them we need not inquire, as the 4th Amendment is not directed to individual misconduct of such officials. Its limitations reach the Federal government and its agencies.” 232 U.S., at 398, 34 S. Ct., at 346.
In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928), the court constricted the breadth of the Weeks case in a wire tapping situation. The mere tapping of telephone lines in violation of a state law was held not to be a violation of the 4th Amendment which would require suppression of the evidence thereby obtained. The court held that the prohibitions of the 4th Amendment were intended to apply to the search and seizure for material objects, and did not cover evidence secured by the use of the sense of hearing. It also employed property law conceptions in holding that the telephone wires were not within the control of the defendant’s house or office, and were thus not within the areas to be protected. What is significant about the Olmstead case is the classic dissent of Mr. Justice Brandéis, foreshadowing as it did the later evolution of constitutional doctrine and legal theory. In his view the protection guaranteed by the 4th and 5th Amendments extended vastly beyond material things and encompassed a generalized right to privacy and personal. integrity.
“They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone — the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect, that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment. And the use, as evidence in a criminal proceeding, of facts ascertained by such intrusion must be deemed a violation of the Fifth.” 277 U.S., at 478-479, 48 S.Ct. at 572.
He then went on to state a second basis on which illegally obtained evidence should be barred from use in the courts: by allowing such evidence to be introduced, the courts make the government a party to the very wrong committed by its own officers.
“The court’s aid is denied only when he who seeks it has violated the law in connection with the very transaction as to which he seeks legal redress. Then aid is denied despite the defendant’s wrong. It is denied in order to maintain respect for law; in order to promote confidence in the administration of justice; in order to preserve the judicial process from contamination. The rule is one, not of action, but of inaction.” 277 U.S., at 484, 48 S.Ct., at 574-575.
“Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent, teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become *626a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means — to declare that the government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal— would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this court should resolutely set its face.” 277 U.S., at 485, 48 S.Ct., at 575.
More recently the authoritative decisions have held that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter official misconduct by the agents of government.
“The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effective available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it.” Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1444, 4 L.Rd. 2d 1669 (1960).
In extending both the 4th Amendment and the exclusionary rule to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), the court observed:
“Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore, constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit the right to remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured by the Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him, to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice.” 367 U.S., at 660, 81 S.Ct., at 1694.
Concurrently it has been recognized that it is the right to privacy and not merely interests in tangible property which are to be protected by the 4th Amendment. In extending protection to conversations overheard as a result of electronic surveillance of a public telephone booth, the court in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct. 507, 511, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), said, “For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” Property law distinctions have largely been abandoned as determinants of whether a particular search and seizure is valid. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961); and Warden Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 295, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed. 2d 782 (1967). Thus, the views of Mr. Justice Brandéis have become central to Fourth Amendment theory and to the application of the exclusionary rule.
Ill
In contrast to the exclusionary rule, the rule on standing to object to unconstitutionally obtained evidence is very blurred in its contours. Like the exclusionary rule, the principles of standing have their origin largely in search and seizure cases. Because it was associated with the common law relating to trespass, the law on standing in the earlier cases permitted only a narrow class of persons to assert the illegality of a search and seizure.1
The class was broadened somewhat in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S. Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960), in which one who had permissive use of an apartment of a friend was given standing to suppress unlawfully seized evidence. In this case property law concepts were abandoned as exclusive determinants of stand*627ing, and the court held that “any one legitimately on the premises” searched could prevent use of unlawfully obtained evidence against himself. 362 U.S., at 267, 80 S.Ct. 725. The decision still required standing in the sense that one must show that he is the victim of a search in order to claim suppression. The exclusionary rule was said to be a means of protecting the privacy of search victims. This reflects a theory that the exclusionary rule arises out of an interplay between the 4th and 5th Amendments, and that the evidence should be suppressed because it results in personal incrimination of the victim of the search. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 492, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886).2
But in other cases the court has seemingly rejected the personal incrimination rationale. In Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965), the court refused to give retroactive effect to Mapp v. Ohio, supra, by stressing that deterrence was the purpose of the exclusionary rule. In Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 86 S.Ct. 459, 15 L.Ed.2d 453 (1966), dealing with retroactive application of the self-incrimination privilege to the states, the court said that the “single and distinct” purpose of the exclusionary rule was deterrence.
Recently in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969), the court seems to revert to the Jones requirement that one seeking suppression of evidence (in this case acquired through wire tapping) show that he himself was the victim of an invasion of privacy.
On the other hand, the court has relaxed the standing requirement for persons asserting other constitutional claims. In Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 73 S.Ct. 1031, 97 L.Ed. 1586 (1953), NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L. Ed.2d 1488 (1958), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L. Ed.2d 510 (1965), litigants were permitted to vindicate constitutional jus tertii. While these cases can be explained on the ground that the holders of these rights might find it difficult to obtain an adjudication of their grievances in court, this would cover. the principle expressed in Mapp v. Ohio, supra, that, except for the exclusionary rule, “other remedies have been worthless and futile.” 367 U.S., at 652, 81 S.Ct., at 1690.
The upshot of all this is that the standing requirement rests on uncertain premises, is applied inconsistently, and has not been brought within any clear rationale other than outmoded property conceptions. What is worse is that the standing requirement is in direct conflict with the exclusionary rule. The decisions have only exacerbated, not lessened, the disharmony between the competing principles. For this reason numerous commentators have proposed that the standing requirement be clarified, modified, or simply abandoned.3
It must be recognized that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule is lessened to the extent that a standing requirement is imposed. On the other hand, there is probably a point where application of the exclusionary rule is of such marginally slight value in preventing police misconduct that the diminishing returns are outweighed by a need to require standing.
*628If we were to seek such a middle position, it would not be necessary to lay down a final rule in the case before us. We could limit our holding to the facts before us, leaving to the future a further development of principles.
No less a judicial moderate than Judge Friendly has proposed that the exclusionary rule should be applied by differentiating between mere errors of judgment or technical mistakes by police officers and conduct which is intentionally or flagrantly illegal. In the latter case the exclusionary rule would be applied as a restraint against deliberate violation of constitutional rights.
“The beneficent aim of the exclusionary rule to deter police misconduct can be sufficiently accomplished by a practice, such as that in Scotland, outlawing evidence obtained by flagrant or deliberate violation of rights. It is no sufficient objection that such a rule would require courts to make still another determination; rather, the recognition of a penum-bral zone where mistake will not call for the drastic remedy of exclusion would relieve them of exceedingly difficult decisions whether an officer overstepped the sometimes almost imperceptible line between a valid arrest or search and an invalid one. Even if there were an added burden, most judges would prefer to discharge it than have to perform the distasteful duty of allowing a dangerous criminal to go free because of a slight and unintentional miscalculation by the police.” H. Friendly, supra note 3, at 953 (footnotes omitted).
In my view the doctrine on standing should be balanced against the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule, and against the policies exemplified by the constitutional right in question. By such an approach we would avoid fixing an ironclad demarcation of the line of constitutional protection, leaving to the future the problems of how far these guarantees of fundamental rights must be implemented to preserve a just and free society. By the balancing technique we would fulfill one of the great salutary purposes of the exclusionary rule.
If the police can calculate with specificity those situations in which the fruits of constitutional violations cannot be suppressed, then no prophylaxis exists against oppressive, intentional misconduct directed against persons who are innocent of wrongdoing or who are not the targets of criminal prosecution. If, however, a margin of uncertainty is left, a cynical disregard of constitutional rights will carry with it enough hazards that it will tend to check such misconduct. This is why an “all-or-nothing” approach to the requirement of standing is an undesirable judicial technique to employ in cases of this kind.
IV
The Miranda case established that custodial interrogation by police officers, without proper warnings or an intelligent waiver, is an inherently coercive practice vio-lative of the 5th Amendment of the constitution.
Like the rules on search and seizure, the Miranda rule is one which is designed to restrain and deter police officers from violating the privilege against self-incrimination. It is a rule which sets up a legal category of per se coercion whenever it is violated. That the privilege against self-incrimination is a “personal” right makes no material difference. One can also waive his 4th Amendment protections against search and seizure.
What the decisions in Miranda v. Arizona, supra, and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964), accomplished was to bring the United States Constitution into the police station and jailhouse. What occurs in those places is part of “a criminal case” in which the accused may not be compelled to incriminate himself. Those precincts are as much within the province of constitutional protection and, perforce, the protection of the courts, as trials which occur in the courtroom.
*629Many of us might have debated the wisdom of either the Miranda or Escobedo decisions and the reasoning underlying them. But they are now binding rules of constitutional law to which we must give effect under the supremacy clause. A search and seizure which is constitutionally infirm does not become unlawful when its fruits are offered in evidence, it is unlawful from its inception. Similarly, custodial interrogation in violation of the Miranda rule does not become a violation of constitutional right only when the results are offered in evidence at a trial. The interrogation is unlawful at the beginning.
If we were to apply the exclusionary rule to police conduct which is intentionally or flagrantly illegal, reversal unquestionably would be required in the case before us.
Here there was a purposeful violation of the rights of the witness Herman. Con-cededly no probable cause existed to warrant his arrest. He was being held in custody. He had requested a lawyer. After a consultation between the police and a representative of the district attorney’s office, it was decided that his constitutional rights should be abridged, and that the interrogation should continue until the confession was obtained.4 The purpose of obtaining the confession was that it be used against Dimmiek. In other words, Dimmiek was at all times the target of the disregard by police and prosecutor of the positive requirements of the Miranda rule.5
The rule adopted today permits intentional defiance of the constitutional mandate against self-incrimination. The lengths to which it can be carried are illustrated by such recent cases as People v. Portelli, 15 N.Y.2d 235, 257 N.Y.S.2d 931, 205 N.E.2d 857 (N.Y.1965). There the police administered physical beatings to a witness until he inculpated the ultimate defendant. Applying a standing rule like that employed by the majority today, the court sustained the introduction of the testimony of this witness, while impotently deploring the misconduct of the police.
We should close the courtroom door to evidence obtained by intentional violation of fundamental constitutional rights. When we fail to do this we validate the role of government as lawbreaker. This will go a long way toward rendering constitutional principles an “empty promise” and not a guide for actual conduct. This is not a time to be undercutting fundamental guarantees.6
For the reasons given, I would reverse the conviction and order a new trial.

. Gaskins v. United States, 95 U.S.App. D.C. 34, 218 F.2d 47 (1955); In re Nassetta, 125 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1942); Kelley v. United States, 61 F.2d 843 (8th Cir. 1932); and Lewis v. United States, 92 F.2d 952 (10th Cir. 1937).

. What is often overlooked is that the actual issue in Jones was whether the defendant was “a person aggrieved” by an unlawful search under Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Thus it was a case of statutory interpretation rather than constitutional standing.

. H. Friendly, the Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 Cal.L.Rev. 929 (1965); White & Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search and Seizure, 118 U.Pa. L.Rev. 333 (1970); Comment, Search and Seizure: Admissibility of Illegally Acquired Evidence Against Third Parties, 66 Colum.L.Rev. 400 (1966); Comment, Standing to Object to an Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 34 U.Chi.L.Rev. 342 (1967); Note. 81 Harv.L.Rev. 707 (1968).

. How a prosecutor, being an officer of the court, could properly advise or encourage the police to violate fundamental constitutional rights is unclear. See Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340, 345 (Alaska 1989), where we said:
“The district attorney should comply with the ethical standards generally applicable to attorneys. AVhile we do not now hold that the United States and Alaska Constitutions necessarily protect those accused of crime against breaches of professional ethics, this court will not eagerly adopt controversial constitutional interpretations which would encourage unethical behavior."

. The record reveals that Officer Porter testified as follows:
“The same request was made by Mr. Dimmiek and one was not appointed at his — for him at that point but he was not questioned any further. It was felt by myself and a representative of the District Attorney’s office agreed that at this point there was no probable cause and probably no hope for any additional evidence turning up that would warrant or substantiate the arrest of Mr. Herman without a confession. So it was— the decision was made to go ahead and interview him after he had requested an attorney full well knowing that then this could not be used against him but merely for the value of the confession against Mr. Dimmiek.”

.For some of the broader implications of “adjusting” the 5th Amendment, see A. Goldberg, “Can We Afford Liberty?” 117 U.Pa.L.Rev. 665 (1969).