Court Opinion

ID: 9694549
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:46:23.5099+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:03.256000
License: Public Domain

Wachenfeld, J.
(dissenting). I am in accord with the majority opinion as to the disposition of the procedural question. Other than this phase of it, I must dissent.
*596This is an aftermath of the main case, already decided by our court, 12 N. J. 505 (1953). We divided four to three. The majority opinion made new criminal law and for the first time held it was no longer necessary to allege in the indictment itself the requirements as stated in the statute with reference to the age of the defendant.
I did not agree with it then nor do I now, but I am of course bound by the opinion. Some of the arguments on this second hearing go to the age of the defendant, and although they have merit in my Anew of the case, I am still in the minority. There are, however, tAvo other points which I think require consideration and plainly call for a reversal.
It is entirely factual as to whether or not the evidence in this sordid case brings it within the hounds of carnal abuse as recognized by our decisions and definition, Which is clear-cut and unequivocal and has stood for many years. State v. Hummer, 73 N. J. L. 714 (E. & A. 1906).
If one question on the direct examination of the complaining witness, Avhich was objected to and the objection sustained, is eliminated from the record, there is not the slightest bit of evidence in this case bringing it Avithin the admitted definition of the crime charged.
What, then, is our obligation under the circumstances, with the record as it now stands before us? The defendant’s interests were not fully protected as no motion to strike the answer from the record was made. Technically it is still there, but the intent of the court was clear and evident and there can be no doubt as to the purport of the ruling. I hesitate in assuming that as a court of law and justice wo have a right under these circumstances to ignore the court’s ruling and still consider the answer merely because of a failure to make the customary motion suggested by our practice.
This type of case is usually so repulsive to the lay mind as to cause an explosive and emotional rejection of the customary protective presumptions in a criminal case; but no matter how vicious or despicable the crime may be, there *597is nothing justifying the curtailment of the applicable legal doctrines and constitutional safeguards by judicial interpretation. The rights of an accused to a fair trial and the constitutional guarantees are not to be impaired by reason of the nature of the crime charged, nor will the public be benefited by denying the defendant essential justice. Judicial approval of such inroads lays the foundation for other invasions upon the freedoms we have always thought were ours.
This case has an unusual factual foundation. After the alleged commission of the crime, the matter lay dormant for over two years. No criminal complaint was made; no prosecution ensued. One gathers from the evidence that the matter was disposed of on some sort of promise made by the defendant’s sister. We cannot even surmise as to what it might have been, but the record informs us that more than two years thereafter the prosecution was started by the making of a complaint. These circumstances are part of the record and must be taken into consideration. I am compelled to conclude that the testimony was insufficient to sustain the crime of carnal abuse of which the defendant was charged.
There is another reason why I must vote for a reversal. The State offered the testimony of a physician who examined the child in question on March 3, 1950, more than two years after the commission of the offense charged. His testimony was objected to as too remote and because there was no connection shown that what he found was caused by any act of the defendant. The testimony did not in any way connect the defendant with the commission of the crime charged, nor does it show the physical condition was caused by any act of the defendant.
The patent remoteness is obvious, and no authority is cited to support the admittance either by the State or this court. I doubt if there is any; my research has not disclosed it. Yet the defendant’s conviction may well be attributed to the admitted evidence, although it was so remote in point of *598time as to make its value uncertain and speculative. Remoteness of such magnitude leaves nothing to discretion.
I would reverse the judgment of conviction below.
For modification — Chief Justice Vanderbilt, and Justices Oliphant, Jacobs and Brennan — 4.
For reversal — Justices Heher, Wachenfeld and Burling — 3.