Court Opinion

ID: 9734440
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:34:55.42018+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:48.621181
License: Public Domain

FLAHERTY, Justice,
dissenting.
Joined by my learned colleague, Mr. Justice Kauffman, I must emphatically dissent.
*247Analysis of this case properly begins with the observation that the issue of trial counsel’s effectiveness was fully waived under Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 372 A.2d 687 (1977). In Hubbard we stated:
The rule that emerges from these cases [Commonwealth v. Smallwood, 465 Pa. 392 [350 A.2d 822] (1976); Commonwealth v. Strachan, 460 Pa. 407 [333 A.2d 790] (1975); Commonwealth v. Twiggs, 460 Pa. 105 [331 A.2d 440] (1975); Commonwealth v. Dancer, 460 Pa. 95 [331 A.2d 435] (1975)] is that ineffectiveness of prior counsel must be raised as an issue at the earliest stage in the proceedings at which the counsel whose effectiveness is being challenged no longer represents the defendant.
Id., 472 Pa. at 277, n.6, 372 A.2d at 695, n.6. As mentioned in the majority opinion, direct appeal counsel, who was different from trial counsel, did not raise the issue of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. The claim that trial counsel was ineffective, therefore, was waived.
In January of 1979, when appellant filed a pro se petition under the PCHA, counsel was appointed for him. Appointed counsel amended the pro se petition and alleged the ineffectiveness of trial counsel. However, he did not allege the ineffectiveness of counsel for appellant on direct appeal. The court below, without hearing, dismissed the petition and no appeal of the dismissal was taken to this Court.
Section 4 of the Post Conviction Hearing Act1 provides, that an issue is waived if the petitioner knowingly and understandingly failed to raise it and it could have been raised on appeal. The act further provides that there is a rebuttable presumption that failure to appeal a ruling is a knowing and understanding failure, and appellant has not rebutted this presumption. It is clear, therefore, that the issue of appellate counsel’s effectiveness has been waived because no appeal of that ruling was taken to this Court.
In his present PCHA petition, petitioner again asserts that trial counsel was ineffective on three new theories. The *248majority opinion correctly notes that none of these issues were raised in either appellant’s direct appeal or his first PCHA petition. Majority opinion at 433. Furthermore, all of these issues were available and could have been presented in earlier proceedings. Section 5(b) of the Post Conviction Hearing Act provides in part:
The failure to raise any such issue in such petition shall be deemed a waiver of any right to future presentation of another petition containing grounds for relief that were available and could have been presented.
19 P.S. § 1180-5(b). (Supp.1979-80). In short, failure to present all theories at the earliest possible time constitutes a waiver. Cf. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 464 Pa. 117, 346 A.2d 48 (1975).
Appellant also asks us to review the issue of the effectiveness of every counsel who has represented him. Were we to address these issues, we would be ignoring the mandates set forth in the Hubbard case, discussed above, and also in Commonwealth v. Dancer, 460 Pa. 95, 331 A.2d 435 (1975), and there would never be any finality to post-trial proceedings.
In Dancer we stated:
Our Post Conviction Hearing Act and the principles of judgment finality mandate that claims of ineffectiveness of counsel may only be raised in PCHA proceedings 1) where petitioner is represented on appeal by his trial counsel, for. it is unrealistic to expect trial counsel on direct appeal to argue his own ineffectiveness, 2) where the petitioner is represented on appeal by new counsel, but the grounds upon which the claim of ineffective assistance are based do not appear in the trial record, 3) where the petitioner is able to prove the existence of other ‘extraordinary circumstances’ justifying his failure to raise the issue, Post Conviction Hearing Act § 4(b)(2), 19 P.S. § 1180-4(b)(2) (Supp.1974) or 4) where the petitioner rebuts the presumption of ‘knowing and understanding failure.’ Post Conviction Hearing Act § 4(c), 19 P.S. § 1180-4(c) (Supp.1974).
*249Id., 460 Pa. at 100-101, 331 A.2d at 438. The majority holds that appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is, under the case law and within the meaning of § 1180-4(b)(2), “extraordinary circumstances” which justify failure to raise the issue of ineffectiveness at the earliest possible time. Majority opinion at 433.
This holding is contrary to the requirement in Hubbard and § 1180-5(b) that ineffectiveness of counsel be raised at the earliest possible time. Further, the majority position defeats the principle of finality of judgment, reintroduces covertly the principle of fundamental error which was expressly abrogated in Commonwealth v. Clair, 458 Pa. 418, 326 A.2d 272 (1974), and encourages the filing of literally endless PCHA petitions by the same petitioner.
It is time for the Court to realize that we have inadvertently created a monster of inefficiency and judicial wastefulness in our past interpretations of the PCHA. That convicted prisoners, as a routine matter, should file endless petitions was never contemplated under the PCHA. Yet that is what the majority today approves.
Section 5(b) of the Act provides:
Any person desiring to obtain relief under this act shall set forth all of his then available grounds for such relief for any particular sentence he is currently serving in such petition and he shall be entitled to only one petition for each such crime. . . .
19 P.S. § 1180-5(b). (Emphasis added).
Further, it was only six years ago that we expressly overruled the doctrine of fundamental error in criminal trials. As we stated in Commonwealth v. Clair, supra:
The trial judge must be given an opportunity to rectify errors at the time they are made. As we have often said before: ‘[A] party may not remain silent and take chances on a verdict and afterwards complain of matters which, if erroneous, the Court would have corrected.’ Commonwealth v. Marlin, 452 Pa. 380, 382, 305 A.2d 14, 16 (1973). See also, Commonwealth v. Morgan, 448 Pa. 494, 295 A.2d 77 (1972).
*250Accordingly no longer will allegations of basic and fundamental error serve to enable parties in criminal matters to seek reversal on alleged errors not properly raised below.
Id., 458 Pa. at 423, 326 A.2d at 274. Yet the petition in this case is no more and no less than a claim of fundamental error and should not be entertained unless we wish to overrule Clair.
The basic issue in this case, not directly addressed by the majority, is whether we should limit collateral review of the same criminal conviction or permit an unlimited number of collateral attacks filed under the PCHA. We are called upon to reconcile a conflict in the law on this question. Cases cited by the majority, admittedly, can be read to reach the result of permitting unlimited PCHA appeals; but the clear mandate of Hubbard and Clair and the policy behind the act require a different result.
As the majority would have it, virtually any claim, no matter how insignificant, is cognizable on collateral review as long as that claim is cloaked with an allegation of ineffectiveness of counsel. No claim may be truly waived, nor may any criminal conviction become final, subsequent counsel may always generate new litigation by alleging the ineffectiveness of his predecessor. The effects of such practice are extremely serious: it vitiates the waiver doctrine and prolongs criminal litigation interminably.2 More significantly, because the focus of the inquiry at PCHA is rarely relevant to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, public confidence in our criminal justice system has been undercut. *251Ignoring guilt or innocence not only invites scathing attacks on the judiciary and the entire judicial system, engendering cynicism and suspicion on the part of ordinary citizens, but completely misconstrues the purpose of the act. The purpose of the act was to facilitate, in certain circumstances, additional review of convictions, not to fill the leisure hours of prisoners by permitting them to file endless post-conviction petitions. In fact, as mentioned above, the act specifically provides that a petitioner is entitled to only one petition.
In addition, this Court should not engage in the meaningless gesture of finding an issue waived, knowing full well that we will see the claim again, raised in an ineffectiveness context. Accordingly, I would limit collateral review to claims (1) constituting a denial of due process or fundamental fairness that (2) significantly implicate the truth determining process.3 Thus, defense counsel’s waiver of an issue, whether for reasons of strategy or negligence, would not constitute ineffectiveness cognizable in a second PCHA petition unless the issue waived met this two pronged test.
On subsequent PCHA petitions, our interest is to prevent the incarceration of innocent persons, not, as at earlier stages, to prevent law enforcement agencies from abusing their authority. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484 496, 96 *252S.Ct. 3037, 3047-3053, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976), reh. denied, 429 U.S. 874; 97 S.Ct. 197, 50 L.Ed.2d 158 (1977). It may be that a person convicted of a crime has had several lawyers and that the performance of these lawyers was in some respect imperfect. But a criminal defendant is not entitled to a perfect trial and it seems likely that if the accused were to be represented by fifty lawyers, some aspect of the performance of each could be decried as “ineffective”. Both the accused and society are entitled to a final determination, an end to the proceedings that will be opened only in the case of a colorable due process claim significantly implicating the truth determining process, which, were it unaddressed by the Court, could have the effect of imprisoning an innocent person.4 In short, a second post-conviction appeal should be the exception, not, as is presently the case, the rule.
When applied to the instant ease, this approach would preclude further review. Appellant has raised three claims in an ineffectiveness context regarding the jury instructions *253given at his trial, none of which, even if true, would constitute a due process denial that significantly implicates the truth determining process at trial. Accordingly, the claims should not be cognizable at PCHA, and the lower court’s dismissal of this petition is proper.
KAUFFMAN, J., joins this dissenting opinion.

. Act of Jan. 25, 1966, P.L. (1965) 1580, eff. March 1, 1966, 19 P.S. § 1180-4. (Supp. 1979-80).

. The difficulty of locating evidence when a new trial is awarded years after a criminal conviction is obtained is fully discussed by Judge Friendly in Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U.Chi.L.Rev. 142, 147 (1970). See Commonwealth v. Slavik, 449 Pa. 424, 432, 297 A.2d 920, 924 (1972):
It is evident that the orderly administration of justice requires that a criminal controversy, like any other litigation, some day must come to an end.
See also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), (Stevens, J. concurring); Bator, Finality in the Criminal Law, 76 Harv.L.Rev. 441 (1963).

. This problem has been recognized in the past. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 235, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1068, 22 L.Ed.2d 227 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting):
[G]uilt or innocence is at least one of the vital considerations in determining whether collateral relief should be available to a convicted defendant.
******
In collateral attacks ... I would always require that the convicted defendant raise the kind of constitutional claim that casts some shadow of a doubt on his guilt.
See Friendly, 38 U.Chi.L.Rev., supra at 142:
[C]onvictions should be subject to collateral attack only when the prisoner supplements his constitutional plea with a colorable claim of innocence.
See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976), reh. denied, 429 U.S. 874, 97 S.Ct. 197, 50 L.Ed.2d 158 (1977). (Fourth amendment claims which do not implicate the truth determining process are no longer cognizable on Federal collateral review).

. See concurring and dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Bell in Commonwealth v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 614, 235 A.2d 349, 357 (1967):
As so frequently happens in recent habeas corpus and recent post-conviction proceedings and appeals therefrom, there is no doubt of defendant’s guilt-indeed, in most of them, defendant relies solely upon' recently created legal technicalities and does not even allege his innocence.
A related consideration-that we should not create processes whereby persons guilty of crimes can escape just condemnation-is raised by Paul Bator, Finality in Criminal Law, 76 Harv.L.Rev. 441, 452 (1963):
[W]e should at least tentatively inquire whether an endless reopening of convictions, with its continuing underlying implication that perhaps the defendant can escape from corrective sanctions after all, can be consistent with the aim of rehabilitating offenders. The first step in achieving that aim may be a realization by the convict that he is justly subject to sanction, that he stands in need of rehabilitation; and a process of reeducation cannot, perhaps, even begin if we make sure that the cardinal moral predicate is missing, if society itself continuously tells the convict that he may not be justly subject to reeducation and treatment in the first place. The idea of just condemnation lies at the heart of the criminal law, and we should not lightly create processes which implicitly belie its possibility.