Court Opinion

ID: 9844185
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:58:38.370309+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:29.441299
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Justice,
concurring and dissenting:
I concur in Parts II and III of the majority opinion, but dissent as to Part I.
As to Part I, the majority affirms the trial court’s dismissal of count II on the ground that it was a lesser included offense with count I, and that conviction on both counts would be prohibited by the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution.
*440Assuming that count II was a lesser included offense, I do not see that as constituting grounds for dismissal of the count. Certainly the defendant did not raise that as an issue, having pleaded guilty to it and not made any motion to dismiss. The trial court dismissed on its own motion. While I.C. § 18-301 may have precluded the trial court from sentencing on both counts I and II, see State v. Horn, 100 Idaho 192, 610 P.2d 551 (1980); State v. Brusseau, 96 Idaho 558, 532 P.2d 563 (1975), it would not have precluded the trial court from entering a conviction on both counts.
As to the double jeopardy argument of the majority, the Supreme Court of the United States has now made it clear that:
“The only function the Double Jeopardy Clause serves in cases challenging multiple punishments is to prevent the prosecutor from bringing more charges, and the sentencing court from imposing greater punishments, than the Legislative Branch intended. . . . ‘Where consecutive sentences are imposed at a single criminal trial, the role of the constitutional guarantee is limited to assuring that the court does not exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense.’ Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 2225, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977).” Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 697, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 1441, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980), [Blackmun, J., concurring].
I.C. § 18-301 permits a defendant to be twice prosecuted and convicted, but not twice sentenced, for the same act, State v. Horn, supra, State v. Brusseau, supra, and thus under the Whalen case no double jeopardy violation occurs.
The majority’s reliance on I.C.R. 48(a)(2) presumes that the trial court thought that the “ends of justice” required the dismissal. However, the trial judge never relied on I.C.R. 48(a)(2). He dismissed count II only because he thought it was a lesser included offense. For all we know the trial court may have thought that the “ends of justice” were not being served by the dismissal, but that he had no choice. As far as the record on appeal shows, the dismissal of count II was solely because the trial court thought it to be a lesser included offense with count I. In my view, a dismissal for this reason was incorrect.
I would reverse the trial court’s dismissal of count II and remand the matter for resentencing, the sentence to be imposed with due consideration for the limitations set out in I.C. § 18-301. State v. Horn, supra; State v. Brusseau, supra.