Court Opinion

ID: 9839603
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-13 16:01:01.298154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:41:02.078999
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11524   Document: 29-1      Date Filed: 09/13/2023   Page: 1 of 9

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                                 No. 22-11524
                            Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       In Re: IVAN URIBE,
                                                                Debtor.
       ___________________________________________________
       IVAN URIBE,
                                                     Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       LAURIE K. WEATHERFORD,
       Chapter 13 Trustee,

                                                   Defendant-Appellee.

                         ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11524

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 6:21-cv-01976-PGB
                           ____________________

       Before WILSON, LUCK, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Ivan Uribe appeals the bankruptcy court’s order denying his
       motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his chapter 13 plan,
       and the district court’s dismissal of the appeal of the bankruptcy
       court’s order. After careful review, we affirm.
           FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

              In 2018, Uribe filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy. Un-
       der schedule D of the petition, Uribe listed Wells Fargo as the cred-
       itor holding a secured claim over a home he rented out for income.
       Laurie Weatherford was appointed as the trustee. After the bank-
       ruptcy court dismissed the case for failure to file a chapter 13 plan,
       Uribe filed his initial plan and moved to reinstate the case. Uribe
       proposed to make monthly payments from November 2018
       through October 2023. The bankruptcy court granted the motion
       to reinstate the case, and the plan was modified—after several pro-
       posed amendments by Uribe—to require monthly payments of
       $819.17 from May 2, 2019, through March 2, 2021, with a balloon
       payment of $172,000 due on April 2, 2021.
              In July 2020, Uribe again moved to modify the plan, asking
       for a pause in his monthly payments because he needed time to
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       22-11524              Opinion of the Court                      3

       replace his tenant who’d moved out during the coronavirus pan-
       demic. After a hearing presided over by Judge Vaughan, the bank-
       ruptcy court permitted Uribe to skip six monthly payments, but it
       did not modify the due date of the balloon payment. In March
       2021, Uribe moved yet again to modify the plan, asking to extend
       the pause in monthly payments for another month and to push the
       balloon payment back to March 2022. The bankruptcy court held
       a hearing—again presided over by Judge Vaughan—in May 2021
       and granted Uribe’s motion to modify, extending the balloon pay-
       ment deadline by five months but requiring monthly payments in
       the meantime.
              Uribe was delinquent in the amount of $3,126.94 by August
       2021, having missed numerous payments, so Weatherford moved
       to dismiss the case. After another hearing presided over by Judge
       Vaughan, the bankruptcy court dismissed the case without preju-
       dice. Uribe moved for reconsideration of the dismissal in Septem-
       ber 2021. He argued that his financing to cover the balloon pay-
       ment had fallen through before the dismissal but that he’d since
       been able to secure another source.
              In October 2021, the bankruptcy court held a hearing pre-
       sided over by Judge Jennemann. Uribe told the bankruptcy court
       that he’d secured lenders willing to loan him money so he could
       carry out his plan, he’d removed the second mortgage on his rental
       property, and circumstances related to both the pandemic and the
       rental market had improved. Weatherford argued that Uribe was
       attempting to “cram down” a non-homestead property but that he
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11524

       went twelve months without making any payments and, although
       Judge Vaughan had extended the plan multiple times, the case
       eventually was dismissed after Uribe failed to make the balloon
       payment. Counsel representing Wells Fargo clarified that Uribe
       hadn’t made any payments for sixteen months. In denying Uribe’s
       motion, the bankruptcy court reasoned that Uribe had ample time
       to fix the problem, but had failed to do so, and hadn’t made any
       substantial payments.
              The bankruptcy court entered an order denying Uribe’s mo-
       tion for reconsideration, signed by Judge Vaughan. The order was
       vacated the next day, at which time the bankruptcy court re-en-
       tered the same order signed by Judge Jennemann. The order deny-
       ing the motion for reconsideration noted that Uribe had “failed to
       provide any valid basis to reinstate the case.”
              Uribe filed a notice of appeal with the district court, appeal-
       ing both the order dismissing his bankruptcy case and the order
       denying his motion for reconsideration. He then filed a motion for
       extension of time to file his initial brief, which was granted, making
       his brief due on or before February 7, 2022.
              On February 8, 2022, Uribe filed a “motion for leave to sup-
       plement record on appeal,” seeking to supplement the record with
       the transcript of the final hearing before the bankruptcy court. He
       argued that he’d been diligently working on his initial brief and was
       acting in good faith but would be unduly prejudiced without the
       benefit of the hearing transcript. The next day, the district court
       denied the motion without prejudice, concluding that—because
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       22-11524               Opinion of the Court                       5

       Uribe had failed to file his brief by the deadline, and he couldn’t
       request any other relief without also requesting more time to file
       his initial brief—the motion effectively was a second motion for an
       extension of time to file an initial brief. And because Uribe hadn’t
       indicated when he ordered the transcript and his motion rested
       solely on his assertion—without explanation—that he needed the
       transcript, the district court concluded that Uribe hadn’t demon-
       strated that his failure to file a brief—and hence to prosecute the
       appeal—wasn’t the product of bad faith, negligence, or indiffer-
       ence. In denying the motion, the district court gave Uribe five days
       to submit an amended motion for extension of time but ordered
       that failure to do so would result in dismissal of his appeal. The
       order also required Uribe to attach his order form for the bank-
       ruptcy court transcript, an explanation for why he failed to timely
       request the transcript (if it wasn’t ordered within the required
       time), an explanation for why the transcript was necessary, and an
       estimate for when his initial brief would be completed.
              On February 14, 2022, Uribe submitted an identical motion
       for leave to supplement the record on appeal. The district court
       denied the motion and dismissed the appeal, noting that the re-
       newed motion ignored the court’s instructions and “merely re-
       peat[ed] the three-sentence argument presented in the original
       [m]otion, which the [c]ourt already rejected as deficient.”
             Uribe appeals the dismissal.
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                  22-11524

                           STANDARD OF REVIEW

              We sit as a second court of review in the bankruptcy context,
       independently examining the factual and legal determinations of
       the bankruptcy court and employing the same standards of review
       as the district court. Finova Cap. Corp. v. Larson Pharmacy, Inc., 425
       F.3d 1294, 1299–300 (11th Cir. 2005). We review the bankruptcy
       court’s factual findings for clear error and the bankruptcy court’s
       and district court’s legal conclusions de novo. Id. at 1300. But we
       review for abuse of discretion a district court’s order dismissing a
       bankruptcy appeal on procedural grounds. See Pyramid Mobile
       Homes, Inc. v. Speake, 531 F.2d 743, 746 (5th Cir. 1976). A district
       court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong principle of
       law or makes clearly erroneous findings of fact. In re Piazza, 719
       F.3d 1253, 1271 (11th Cir. 2013).
                                   DISCUSSION

               On appeal, Uribe argues ﬁrst that he followed the district
       court’s order on how to amend his motion to supplement the rec-
       ord and that the district court erred by construing his motion to
       supplement the record as a motion for an extension of time to ﬁle
       his initial brief.
              In bankruptcy appeals to the district court, the appellant
       must file a brief within thirty days after the docketing of notice that
       the record has been transmitted, unless the district court specifies
       different time limits. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8018(a). If the appellant fails
       timely to file a brief, the district court may sua sponte dismiss the
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       22-11524               Opinion of the Court                         7

       appeal after notice. Id. 8018(a)(4). Generally, dismissal upon disre-
       gard of an order, especially where the litigant has been forewarned,
       isn’t an abuse of discretion. Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837
       (11th Cir. 1989). But in the bankruptcy context, we’ve explained
       that because a brief—unlike a notice of appeal—isn’t a jurisdic-
       tional prerequisite, a showing of bad faith, negligence, or indiffer-
       ence is necessary in determining whether dismissal for failure to file
       a brief is appropriate. Brake v. Tavormina, 778 F.2d 666, 667 (11th
       Cir. 1985) (interpreting former Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8009(a)(1), requir-
       ing timely filing of briefs).
              The district court didn’t abuse its discretion by dismissing
       Uribe’s appeal for failure to comply with a court order. See Pyramid
       Mobile Homes, 531 F.2d at 746. A day after his initial brief was due,
       Uribe neither filed his initial brief nor moved for an extension of
       time to do so. Instead, he moved to supplement the record on ap-
       peal. Under these circumstances, the district court acted reasona-
       bly in construing this motion as one for extension of time, laying
       out detailed instructions on how to proceed, and providing ample
       forewarning of what would happen if Uribe didn’t comply. See Fed.
       R. Bankr. P. 8018(a); Moon, 863 F.2d at 837. Uribe demonstrated
       negligence and indifference by re-filing the same motion he’d filed
       the previous week and failing to address the district court’s instruc-
       tions—effectively ignoring the court order. See In re Beverly Mfg.
       Corp., 778 F.2d 666, 667 (11th Cir. 1985) (dismissal for failure to
       timely file brief is “proper only when bad faith, negligence or indif-
       ference has been shown”). The district court also provided Uribe
       with the opportunity to show that he was acting in good faith by
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       8                       Opinion of the Court                 22-11524

       instructing him to address whether he’d timely requested the tran-
       script from the bankruptcy court, but Uribe didn’t do so. See id.
       Therefore, Uribe hasn’t shown that the district court applied the
       wrong principle of law or made a clearly erroneous factual finding,
       and the district court didn’t abuse its discretion in sua sponte dis-
       missing his appeal. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8018(a)(4); In re Piazza, 719
       F.3d at 1271.
               Second, Uribe argues that the bankruptcy court’s order
       denying his motion for reconsideration was arbitrary and capri-
       cious because a bankruptcy judge who hadn’t heard the case’s ear-
       lier proceedings presided over the hearing on the motion. Ordinar-
       ily, we don’t review arguments that weren’t raised in the district
       court. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th
       Cir. 1998) (holding that issues not raised below normally are
       deemed waived). But because we sit as a second court of review in
       the bankruptcy context, independently examining the conclusions
       of the bankruptcy court, and because Weatherford doesn’t raise
       the issue of waiver in her brief, we’ll address the merits of Uribe’s
       argument on this issue. See Finova Cap., 425 F.3d at 1299–300.
              The bankruptcy court didn’t abuse its discretion in denying
       Uribe’s motion for reconsideration. See Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d
       1106, 1137 (11th Circ. 2000). Uribe’s argument is unpersuasive be-
       cause a diﬀerent—but still well-qualiﬁed—judge presiding over the
       hearing and ruling on the motion doesn’t constitute either newly
       discovered evidence or an error of law or fact. See In re Kello, 197
       F.3d 1116, 1119 (11th Cir. 1999) (“The only grounds for granting
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       22-11524               Opinion of the Court                       9

       Kellogg’s motion are newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors
       of law or fact.”).
              Finally, Uribe argues that the bankruptcy court’s order deny-
       ing his motion for reconsideration was arbitrary and capricious be-
       cause it was re-entered by the judge who’d presided over the mo-
       tion hearing after the original order was vacated. But this appears
       to be a mere clerical error that was quickly remedied and certainly
       doesn’t constitute an abuse of discretion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a)
       (“The court may correct a clerical mistake or a mistake arising
       from oversight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment,
       order, or other part of the record. The court may do so on motion
       or on its own, with or without notice.”).
             AFFIRMED.