Court Opinion

ID: 9690603
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:26:11.244501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:00.129471
License: Public Domain

COOPER, Justice,
dissenting.
Since ... there has been no jury verdict within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment, the entire premise of Chapman review is simply absent. There being no jury verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt, the question whether the same verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt would have been rendered absent the constitutional error is utterly meaningless. There is no object, so to speak, upon which harmless-error scrutiny can operate. The most an appellate court can conclude is that a jury would surely have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt — not that the jury’s actual finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt would surely not have been different absent the constitutional error. That is not enough.
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). As in Sullivan, Appellant was denied the right to a trial by jury on the offense of robbery in the first degree.
Conviction of robbery in the second degree (“robbery 2nd”), a Class C felony, requires a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that in the course of committing theft, the defendant used or threatened the immediate use of physical force upon another person with intent to accomplish the theft. KRS 515.030. Robbery in the first degree (“robbery 1st”), a Class B felony, requires the jury to find those identical elements and additionally to find beyond a reasonable doubt one of three aggravating factors, i.e., that the defendant (a) caused physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; (b) was armed with a deadly weapon; or (c) used or threatened to use a dangerous instrument upon any person who is not a participant in the crime. KRS 515.020(1).
Appellant did not use physical force upon the victim, and the victim was not physically injured. KRS 500.080 contains the following definitions pertinent to this case:
(3) “Dangerous instrument” means any instrument, ... article, or substance *294which, under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used, or threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing death or serious physical inju-
(4) “Deadly weapon” means any of the following:
[[Image here]]
(b) Any weapon from which a shot, readily capable of producing death or other serious physical injury, may be discharged ....
Appellant was convicted of robbery 1st under an instruction that read as follows:

INSTRUCTION NO. 5

FIRST-DEGREE ROBBERY

You will find the Defendant guilty of First-Degree Robbery under this instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following:
A. That in this county on or about September 20, 2001, and before the finding of the Indictment herein, he stole currency from Stuckey’s in the Heartland Travel Plaza;
B. That in the course of so doing and with intent to accomplish the theft, he used or threatened the immediate use of physical force upon Nora Miller;
AND
C. That when he did so, he was armed with a .22-caliber revolver.
As held by the majority opinion, the trial court erred in deciding as a matter of law that the .22 caliber revolver was, in fact, a deadly weapon. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303,124 S.Ct. 2531, 2537, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004) (“[T]he ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.”)-, Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 2443, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) (Because “aggravating factors operate as the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense, the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.”) (citation and quotation omitted); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 2362-63, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”). Further, “the characterization of a fact or circumstance as an ‘element’ or as a ‘sentencing factor’ is not determinative of the question ‘who decides,’ judge or jury.” Ring, 536 U.S. at 604-05, 122 S.Ct. at 2441 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 492, 120 S.Ct. at 2363-64). Thus, I agree that Hicks v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 480 (Ky.1977), must be overruled (as must Commonwealth v. Potts, 884 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Ky.1994); Helpenstine v. Commonwealth, 566 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Ky.1978); Little v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 492, 494 (Ky.1977); and Commonwealth v. Hammond, 633 S.W.2d 73, 75 (Ky.App.1982)).
I also agree that the error would have been harmless if the evidence had been “overwhelming” that the .22 caliber revolver was a “weapon from which a shot, readily capable of producing death or other serious physical injury, may be discharged.” KRS 500.080(4). See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 1837, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (error in failing to instruct jury that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that misstatements in tax return and in affidavit filed in support of loan application were “material” deemed harmless error because evidence of materiality was overwhelming). Here, the revolver was defective because the pin *295that holds the revolving cylinder in place was missing. Thus, when the weapon is held upright in its natural firing position, the cylinder would fall out, making firing impossible. A Bullitt County deputy sheriff testified that despite the missing cylinder pin, the gun could fire. However, he admitted that he did not test-fire the gun to see if it would do so. Under this evidence, the jury could well have believed that the .22 revolver was not a “weapon from which a shot, readily capable of producing death or other serious physical injury, may be discharged,” thus was not a deadly weapon.
Although Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 544 S.W.2d 219, 220-21 (Ky.1976), did purport to carry forward into the penal code the common law notion that “an object is a deadly weapon if it is intended by the user to convince the victim that it is such,” Blakely, Ring, and Apprendi would now require a jury instruction on that theory. In fact, that theory was never discussed at the trial level. I believe that the scenarios in Kennedy and in the case sub judice more properly fall within the third aggravating factor in KRS 515.020(l)(c), i.e., “use[d] or threatened] the immediate use of a dangerous instrument upon any person who is not a participant in the crime.” (Emphasis added.) A gun that is not a “deadly weapon” because it is not one “from which a shot, readily capable of producing death or other serious physical injury, may be discharged” could still be a “[djangerous instrument ... which, under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used, or threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury.” KRS 500.080(3). In fact, Appellant did not threaten to shoot Miller; he only laid the .22 revolver on the counter, which Miller took to be a threat since Appellant was also demanding money. In fact, Appellant could have used the gun to bludgeon Miller, and it would have been proper to instruct the jury under that theory.
Finally, Appellant is entitled to a new trial because of the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on robbery 2nd as a lesser included offense in the event the jury failed to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defective .22 caliber revolver was a deadly weapon. It is the duty of the trial court in a criminal case to instruct the jury on the whole law of the case, RCr 9.54(1), and this rule requires instructions applicable to every state of the case deducible from or supported to any extent by the testimony. Webb v. Commonwealth, 904 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Ky.1995); Reed v. Commonwealth, 788 S.W.2d 818, 822 (Ky. 1987). A defendant has the right to have every issue of fact raised by the evidence and material to the defense submitted to the jury on proper instructions. Hayes v. Commonwealth, 870 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Ky. 1993). He is entitled to an instruction on any lawful defense that he has, Slaven v. Commonwealth, 962 S.W.2d 845, 856 (Ky. 1997), including the defense that he is guilty of a lesser included offense of the crime charged. “Although a lesser included offense is not a defense within the technical meaning of those terms as used in the penal code, it is, in fact and principle, a defense against the higher charge.” Id.; see also Brown v. Commonwealth, 555 S.W.2d 252, 256 (Ky.1977). An instruction on a lesser included offense is required if the evidence would permit the jury to rationally find the defendant not guilty of the primary offense, but guilty of the lesser offense. Commonwealth v. Wolford, 4 S.W.3d 534, 539 (Ky.1999) (citing Smith v. Commonwealth, 737 S.W.2d 683, 688 (Ky. 1987)).
Failure to instruct the jury on a lawful defense is not harmless error. Mondie v. Commonwealth, 158 S.W.3d 203, 209-210 (Ky.2005) (failure to instruct jury on de*296fense of protection against burglary required reversal); Nichols v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.Sd 683, 690 (Ky.2004) (failure to instruct on voluntary intoxication as defense to intentional assault was prejudicial because it deprived defendant of lesser included offenses of wanton or reckless assault in the fourth degree); Edwards v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 869, 860 (Ky.1968) (“The court did not affirmatively instruct the jury so as to encompass this theory of defense. The failure to so instruct was error .... In the circumstances shown in this case the defendant was entitled to an affirmative instruction within the rationale of the authorities cited, and we must reverse the judgment of conviction for the failure of the court to so instruct the jury.”); Evitts v. Commonwealth, 257 Ky. 586, 78 S.W.2d 798, 799-800 (1935) (“We have held repeatedly that, where an accused admits the offense, or essential elements of the offense, but relies upon facts or circumstances amounting to an avoidance of the crime, he is entitled to a concrete instruction upon his theory of the case, and a mere general instruction is not sufficient.... We are of the opinion that the failure of the court to give a concrete instruction on the defendant’s theory of this case was sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal.”); Sebastian v. Commonwealth, 585 S.W.2d 440, 441 (Ky. App.1979) (“We conclude that Sebastian was at least entitled to an instruction on his defense of entrapment. Failure to give such an instruction constitutes reversible error.”).
Accordingly, I dissent.
JOHNSTONE, J., joins.