Court Opinion

ID: 2964727
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:30:10.582026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:00.699352
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 96-1779

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                   RICHARD ALSTON,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                   [Hon. Reginald C. Lindsay, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Boudin, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________

                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                 ____________________

            Lois M. Lewis, by Appointment of the Court, for appellant.
            _____________
            Paul  G. Levenson,  Assistant United  States Attorney,  with  whom
            _________________
        Donald K. Stern, United States  Attorney, was on brief for  the United
        _______________
        States.

                                 ____________________

                                     May 5, 1997
                                 ____________________

                 BOUDIN, Circuit  Judge.  In the  district court, Richard
                         ______________

            Alston was  found guilty by a jury of being a convicted felon

            in  possession of  a  firearm in  violation  of 18  U.S.C.   

            922(g)(1).  On this well-argued appeal, Alston makes a number

            of  claims  of error.   Most  are  readily answered,  but one

            issue--what happens  when the government alters  evidence for

            arguably   legitimate  reasons   but   to   the   defendant's

            disadvantage--requires more extensive discussion.

                 The  background facts are not  in dispute.   At about 10

            p.m.  on  November  13,  1992,  two  Boston  police  officers

            received  a tip from a confidential informant that a man near

            5  Fayston  Street in  Dorchester was  carrying  a gun.   The

            informant  advised that the man was black, and was dressed in

            jeans, a tan  jacket and  black baseball cap.   The  officers

            parked  their unmarked car across the street a few doors away

            and  saw  Alston emerge  from  5 Fayston  Street  wearing the

            clothing described by the informant.

                 In  plainclothes  but with  police  badges around  their

            necks,  the officers  left their  car and  approached Alston.

            According  to the officers, Alston moved his left hand in the

            direction of his coat pocket (he denies this), and one of the

            officers  grabbed Alston's  arm and felt  the outside  of the

            pocket.   Realizing that there  was a gun in  the pocket, the

            officer removed it and arrested Alston.

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                                         -2-

                 The gun seized  from Alston  was later  identified as  a

            Colt Model  1908  .25-caliber, semi-automatic  pistol.   When

            seized, the weapon was  rusted and pitted, and its  slide was

            stuck.    It  contained  no  magazine,  and  Alston  had   no

            ammunition.  The  gun's grip was wrapped  in electrical tape.

            It  is the government's later alteration  of this weapon that

            gives rise to the main issue in this case.

                 Alston was first  charged under  Massachusetts law  with

            possessing  a  firearm without  a  license  and possessing  a

            firearm with a  defaced serial  number.  M.G.L.  ch. 269,    

            10(a),  11C.   Shortly  thereafter,  the  state charges  were

            dismissed because  the  Boston Police Department's ballistics

            unit had determined that the gun was inoperable and therefore

            did  not  meet the  Massachusetts  definition  of a  firearm.

            M.G.L. ch. 140,    121.  The Boston Police  then sent the gun

            to the U.S. Treasury  Department's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco

            and Firearms ("ATF").

                 An ATF specialist used WD-40 oil and a rawhide mallet to

            free the slide.  He also buffed and polished part  of the gun

            in  a vain attempt to  determine the serial  number.  Another

            specialist then lubricated, disassembled and cleaned the gun,

            checked it for safety, reassembled it  and test fired it.  It

            appears  that fruitless  attempts  were made  to see  whether

            through ballistics marks the  weapon could be associated with

            any other crime.

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                                         -3-

                 In November  1994, a federal grand  jury indicted Alston

            under the felon-in-possession statute and also for possessing

            a firearm with  an obliterated serial number  in violation of

            18  U.S.C.   922(k).   The pertinent federal  definition of a

            firearm is  more expansive than the Massachusetts definition:

            It includes "any  weapon . . . which . .  . is designed . . .

            to  expel a projectile  by the action  of an explosive."   18

            U.S.C.    921(a)(3).  Thereafter, the  government dropped the

            serial number charge but proceeded on the felon-in-possession

            charge. 

                 Alston tried  unsuccessfully  to  suppress  the  gun  as

            unlawfully  seized, and  later objected  to its  admission at

            trial because it had been altered by the government.  Neither

            effort  was successful.  The  gun, and testimony  that it had

            been  test fired, were provided  at trial; the  jury was also

            told  how the gun had  been refurbished.   The jury convicted

            Alston in July 1995 after a short trial.  

                 In June  1996, Alston  was sentenced  to  188 months  in

            prison and three years of supervised  release pursuant to the

            Armed Career Criminal Act.  18 U.S.C.   924(e).  That statute

            provides  for a minimum sentence of 15 years if the defendant

            has  previously  been convicted  of  three  violent felonies.

            Alston   had  prior  Massachusetts   felony  convictions  for

            manslaughter in  1965, assault  and battery with  a dangerous

            weapon in 1968, and armed robbery in 1975.

                                         -4-
                                         -4-

                 On  appeal, Alston's  first claim  is that  the district

            court erred in refusing to suppress the gun as the product of

            an  unconstitutional search  and  seizure.   Alston's initial

            motion to suppress,  inadequately supported, had  been denied

            by margin order.  See United  States v. Lewis, 40 F.3d  1325,
                              ___ ______________    _____

            1334-35  (1st Cir.  1994).   But  thereafter, Alston  filed a

            motion  to reconsider  accompanied  by  an affidavit  setting

            forth  Alston's  version  of  events.   (The  government  had

            previously provided  affidavits of police  officers attesting

            to the tip and the reliability  of the unidentified informant

            based on prior accurate tips.) 

                 Alston's affidavit  said in  substance that he  had been

            moving a refrigerator with  a friend and had tossed  his coat

            onto the porch of the house.   As he lifted the refrigerator,

            something fell out onto the pavement and, in the dark, Alston

            threw it onto the porch.  When he moved the refrigerator into

            the  house and returned  to the porch,  the police approached

            him as  he was starting to  put on his coat,  patted him down

            and took the  firearm from  his pocket.   Alston's  affidavit

            admits that the "something"  he picked up "turned out"  to be

            the firearm; he does not say how it got into his coat pocket.

                 After  Alston  filed his  affidavit, the  district court

            reconsidered the  suppression  request but  again refused  to

            suppress.  The judge ruled that assuming Alston's  version of

            events  to  be  accurate,  the police  still  had  reasonable

                                         -5-
                                         -5-

            suspicion based  on the informant's information  to conduct a

            Terry  stop.   See Terry v.  Ohio, 392 U.S.  1, 21-22 (1968).
            _____          ___ _____     ____

            Reasonable suspicion was established, said the judge, because

            the  confidential informant had given reliable information in

            the past; and before stopping Alston, the police were able to

            confirm the informant's description of Alston at the location

            given by the informant.

                 Although  review  of this  appraisal is  plenary, United
                                                                   ______

            States v. Mendez-De Jesus, 85 F.3d 1, 2  (1st Cir. 1996), the
            ______    _______________

            district court was clearly  correct in saying that reasonable

            suspicion for a Terry stop  was created by such a tip  from a
                            _____

            previously reliable  informant.   See Adams v.  Williams, 407
                                              ___ _____     ________

            U.S.  143, 146-47  (1972); Lewis,  40 F.3d  at 1334-35.   And
                                       _____

            whether or  not Alston reached  for his pocket,  the pat-down

            search  was justified  because  the police  had a  reasonable

            suspicion that Alston might  be armed.  See United  States v.
                                                    ___ ______________

            Schiavo, 29 F.3d 6, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1994).
            _______

                 We  turn  now  to   the  issue  that  poses  the   chief

            difficulty,  namely, Alston s  properly preserved  claim that

            the  altered gun should  have been excluded  from evidence at

            trial.  Alston's argument is that the refurbishments rendered

            the evidence substantially  more prejudicial than  probative,

            warranting exclusion under Fed. R. Evid.  403; alternatively,

            he argues that the government deliberately deprived Alston of

                                         -6-
                                         -6-

            exculpatory evidence  in violation of the  Due Process Clause

            of the Fifth Amendment.

                 Alston does not dispute that the  gun was at all times a

            firearm under the federal statute.  His main objection to the

            government's alterations  to the weapon, although perhaps not

            his  only objection,  is  that they  tended to  undermine his

            claim  that he lacked scienter.   The principal argument made

            by Alston's counsel at  trial was that Alston had picked up a

            rusty piece of  metal in  the dark and--however  it may  have

            gotten into his pocket--Alston had not been aware that it was

            a gun.

                 It is common ground  that the defendant's knowledge that

            he  possesses a weapon is an element  of a crime.  And surely

            the  cosmetic improvements  to the  weapon--removal of  rust,

            cleaning  of the  gun  and some  restoration of  the handle--

            tended to  make it  more readily  recognizable as a  firearm.

            Alston's  story might be  especially hard  to believe  if the

            jury thought that the object at the time Alston picked it  up

            was the  cleaned-up and repaired weapon  received in evidence

            at his trial.

                 Nevertheless, Alston has an  uphill case under Rule 403.

            The  gun was  of  great  relevance  to the  prosecution;  its

            possession  was a  critical  element in  the  crime, and  the

            failure to offer into evidence the gun allegedly  seized from

            Alston  would  have   been  difficult  to  explain.    As  to

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                                         -7-

            prejudice, nothing prevented  Alston from offering  evidence,

            through the government's own witnesses, that when seized, the

            gun had  been in completely different  shape (rusted, pitted,

            and  with electric  tape around  the handle).   In  fact, the

            prosecutor brought  out most  of this information  himself on

            direct examination.

                 The  Boston police  expert  who first  examined the  gun

            testified that  the weapon--recognizable as a  handgun in its

            original state--had  been in "a severe  rusted condition" and

            was "totally brown from rust"; that the slide "would not move

            because  it  was  rusted  solid";  that  parts  were  missing

            including the magazine  and the grips around  the handle; and

            that  the  handle  was wrapped  in  tape.    Then ATF  agents

            testified  as to the cleaning  and test firing,  which can be

            done without a magazine simply by chambering a bullet.

                 Where  the district court  declines to  exclude evidence

            under  Rule 403, we reverse only where the district court has

            abused its discretion.  United States v. Cruz-Kuilan, 75 F.3d
                                    _____________    ___________

            59, 61 (1st  Cir. 1996) (district  court's Rule 403  decision

            stands  absent  "extraordinarily compelling  circumstances").

            Here,  the  evidence  sought  to  be  excluded  was  patently

            relevant  and  important,  while  testimony about  the  prior

            condition  of the  gun was  available to  mitigate prejudice,

            although  not wholly to eliminate it.  The district court did

            not commit reversible error.

                                         -8-
                                         -8-

                 More  interesting  is   Alston's  suggestion  that   the

            government violated due process requirements  by deliberately

            altering  evidence that,  in  its original  form, might  have

            helped  to exculpate  Alston.  The  government says  that bad

            faith is required for a  successful due process claim, citing

            us  to case  law  suggesting that  good faith  destruction of

            exculpatory evidence  by the government does  not violate due

            process.   See  Arizona v.  Youngblood,  488 U.S.  51,  56-58
                       ___  _______     __________

            (1988); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1984).
                    __________    _________

            Compare People v. Newberry, 652 N.E.2d 288, 292 (Ill. 1995).
            _______ ______    ________

                 Here,  no  basis exists  for a  charge  of bad  faith or

            negligence.    To see  if the weapon  had been used  in other

            crimes was  simply good police work.  And the test firing, so

            long  as  the  unjamming  and  rust  removal  were  admitted,

            properly helped  to confirm that  the gun  was "designed"  to

            expel  a bullet by explosion.  The only disadvantage of which

            Alston might fairly complain is that the  cleaning and repair

            work tended  to undermine his scienter argument; and there is

            no  reason  to think  that the  ATF anticipated  the scienter

            defense.

                 We are not  prepared to say that  the government's "good

            faith" is always and  everywhere a complete defense to  a due

            process  claim  where  the  government   deliberately  alters

            evidence that might otherwise have exculpated the  defendant.

            The   genre  involves   the  conflicting  interests   of  law

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                                         -9-

            enforcement and the protection of defendants; there is a vast

            kaleidoscope of  different  possible situations,  varying  in

            conduct,  motive,  justification and  effect.    It would  be

            surprising if  a single rubric or rule  provided a mechanical

            solution to such dilemmas.    The due  process standard, when

            no  more specific provision of the Bill of Rights governs, is

            one  of "fundamental fairness."   Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 485.
                                              _________

            Where law  enforcement and  criminal procedure are  at issue,

            the  courts   have  been  willing  to   examine  closely  any

            substantial  threat to  the  fairness of  the trial  process.

            E.g., Brady v.  Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963).   At the
            ____  _____     ________

            same time, we are  talking about a constitutional constraint:
                                               ______________

            however  phrased, the  threshold for  courts to  intervene is

            fairly  high.  See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73
                           ___ ______    __________

            (1952).  

                 In the present  case, it is enough that the government's

            alteration  of  the  evidence  did  not  significantly impair

            Alston's  ability to  present a legitimate  scienter defense.

            As already indicated, Alston was free  to present evidence to

            give  the jury  a reasonably  effective  picture of  what the

            weapon looked like  before it had been  cleaned and restored;

            and, as noted,  most of this evidence was brought  out by the

            prosecutor.   Yes, disputes might  exist as to  just how much

            rust  or  tape had  been removed;  but  we are  talking about

            overall fairness and not perfection.

                                         -10-
                                         -10-

                 In  his  brief  in  this  court, Alston  appears  to  be

            suggesting   a  different   objection  to   the  government's

            alterations, namely, that by cleaning the gun and freeing the

            slide, the government made the weapon a more menacing object;

            and  this in turn implied that Alston's possession of the gun

            presented  a greater threat to public  safety than the rusted

            and frozen weapon actually created.  It may well be that  the

            cleaned-up,   working   weapon   gave   the    prosecutor   a

            psychological edge.

                 Yet  Alston was not charged with being a danger but with

            being  a felon  in possession  of a  firearm.   The defendant

            cannot  ask  the   jury  to  nullify  the   law,  whether  by

            interpolating an  element that  does not exist  or otherwise.

            See  United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1190 (1st Cir.
            ___  _____________    _________

            1993),  cert.  denied, 512  U.S. 1223  (1994).   By  the same
                    _____________

            token, we do not think that it is an independent objection to

            evidence,   otherwise  properly   admissible,  that   it  may

            incidentally reduce the chance that the jury will nullify the

            law on its own.  

                 In rejecting  Alston's claims, we think  it worth adding

            that  trial judges  have  considerable  latitude in  handling

            situations of  this kind.    Rule 403  aside, the  spoliation

            doctrine--actually   several   different   rules--gives   the

            district court various remedies for seeking to assure  that a

            loss  of  evidence caused  by  one  side  does  not  unfairly

                                         -11-
                                         -11-

            prejudice the other.  See Sacramona v. Bridgestone/Firestone,
                                  ___ _________    ______________________

            Inc., 106 F.3d 444, 447  (1st Cir. 1997).  Under  such rules,
            ____

            bad faith is not an automatic requirement for relief.  Id.
                                                                   ___

                 Apart  from  his  attack  on the  government's  use  and

            alteration  of the  gun, Alston  has several  other arguments

            relating  to  trial  and  sentence.    One  of them--that  no

            rational jury could conclude  that Alston knew that he  had a

            gun--requires no extended discussion.  The gun  was a firearm

            under the  federal definition, Alston  had it in  his pocket,

            and the jury was  certainly not obliged to believe  the story

            that Alston thought  that the  gun was something  else.   See
                                                                      ___

            United States v. Staula,  80 F.3d 596, 605 (1st  Cir.), cert.
            _____________    ______                                 _____

            denied, 117 S. Ct. 156 (1996).
            ______

                 Alston  also attacks  his trial  attorney's performance.

            Normally, we  do not consider  such claims on  direct appeal,

            because the  record has  not been  developed in the  district

            court.  Mala  v. United States, 7  F.3d 1058, 1063 (1st  Cir.
                    ____     _____________

            1993),  cert. denied,  511 U.S.  1086 (1994).   But,  in this
                    ____________

            case, Alston did present  such a claim in the  district court

            through new counsel,  who supported the claim with  a 19-page

            memorandum; the government responded;  and the district court

            rejected the claim on the merits.   Thus, we may consider the

            claim.  United States v. Natanel, 938 F.2d 302, 309 (1st Cir.
                    _____________    _______

            1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1079 (1992).
                   ____________

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                 To establish a Sixth  Amendment violation, Alston has to

            show that  his lawyer's performance "fell  below an objective

            standard  of  reasonableness,"  and that  prejudice  resulted

            because,  absent   the  mistake  or  mistakes,   there  is  a

            reasonable  probability that  the  outcome  would  have  been

            different.   Strickland v. Washington, 466  U.S. 668, 687-88,
                         __________    __________

            691-92  (1984);  Scarpa v.  DuBois, 38  F.3d  1, 8  (1st Cir.
                             ______     ______

            1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 940 (1995).  Alston points to
                   ____________

            various  alleged  mistakes  by  trial counsel.    Even  taken

            together,  these  mistakes  do  not  satisfy  the  Strickland
                                                               __________

            standard.

                 The brunt  of Alston's  ineffective assistance claim  is

            that  Alston's   counsel,  instead   of  resting   after  the

            government presented  its case,  should have  offered several

            defense  witnesses   for  a  theory  that   the  defense  had

            originally proposed.    This approach,  outlined  in  defense

            counsel's  opening statement to  the jury, was  to retell the

            story  about  the  refrigerator move  and  then  to  argue or

            insinuate that  the informant  (to secure a  reward) probably

            placed  the gun in Alston's coat pocket after Alston had gone

            inside the house to deliver the refrigerator.

                 Alston had  subpoenaed the man who  allegedly helped him

            move the refrigerator,  and we will assume  that this witness

            might have  confirmed that part of the story.  But the notion

            that  the  informant planted  the  gun  is pure  speculation.

                                         -13-
                                         -13-

            Alston  now says that at least his trial attorney should have

            sought  disclosure  of  the  informant's  name.    Government

            privilege would  make this task difficult,  see United States
                                                        ___ _____________

            v. Batista-Polanco,  927 F.2d 14, 19-20 (1st  Cir. 1991), but
               _______________

            perhaps  not  impossible  if the  informant's  testimony were

            likely  to  be very  important to  the  defense.   Roviaro v.
                                                               _______

            United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59, 64-65 (1957).
            _____________

                 Still,  it  is  hard  to  imagine  the  privilege  being

            overcome where, as here, nothing suggested that the informant

            had actually planted the  gun.  Moreover, the  district judge

            knew  that in moving to suppress, Alston had himself filed an

            affidavit indicating that he  had picked up the gun  after it

            fell  out of  the refrigerator.   Whether he put  it into his

            pocket immediately or  left it on the  porch temporarily, the

            notion  of the informant as a deus ex machina was effectively
                                          _______________

            undermined.   There was  no likelihood  that the court  would

            have required disclosure of the informant's identity.

                 Overall, defense counsel at  trial had a very weak  hand

            to  play, since Alston was  caught in possession  of the gun,

            and his prior felony convictions were easily proved.  To rely

            on  the notion  that Alston  did not  know it  was a  gun was

            probably a thin reed (although one also grasped by  appellate

            counsel in this  court).  Nevertheless, the  decision to rely

            on  this  straightforward  defense  at  trial,  rather   than

            complicate  it  with an  even  less plausible  story  about a

                                         -14-
                                         -14-

            planted weapon, was  a choice well  within the discretion  of

            counsel.

                 Alston's last  claim of error relates  to enhancement of

            his  sentence under  18  U.S.C.    924(e), the  three-strikes

            provision for  violent felony convictions.   Alston says that

            due  to the  passage  of time,  his  civil rights  have  been

            restored  under  Massachusetts law  for  one or  more  of the

            convictions relied upon by the district court to comprise the

            three prior  violent felonies.  Under 18 U.S.C.   921(a)(20),

            a conviction "shall not be considered" where inter alia
                                                         __________

                 a person  . . . has had civil rights restored . . .
                 , unless  such .  . .  restoration of civil  rights
                 expressly provides  that the  person may not  ship,
                 transport, possess or receive firearms.

                 The district court replied  that since the first of  the

            three  convictions,  Alston has  at all  times had  his civil

            rights  suspended.  In  other words, as  the sentencing judge

            read the statute, a conviction  can still be considered under

            the  three strikes  provision,  even though  enough time  had

            otherwise passed under state law for the restoration of civil

            rights,  so  long  as  the  period  of  disability  had  been

            maintained  on account of a  later conviction.  This presents

            an  interesting problem which  need not  be resolved  in this

            case. 

                  Massachusetts materially restricts an  ex-felon's right

            to carry and traffic in firearms regardless of the passage of

            time.   United States  v. Estrella, 104  F.3d 3,  8 (1st Cir.
                    _____________     ________

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            1997).   In  Estrella,  we found  these limited  restrictions
                         ________

            trigger the above-quoted "unless" exception to  the provision

            relied  upon by  Alston as  restoring his  civil rights.   18

            U.S.C.    921(a)(20).   Estrella  was decided  after Alston's
                                    ________

            sentence and the  original briefing, but his  reply brief has

            no effective answer to that decision.

                 Some might think  that a 15-year sentence for carrying a

            rusty and inoperable handgun is  excessive where there is  no

            evidence that  the defendant was otherwise  engaged in crime.

            Others  might point  to  Alston's long  criminal record,  not

            fully related in  this opinion.  It may help  to complete the

            story by  recounting that,  at oral argument,  the prosecutor

            told us  that Alston  had  refused a  proffered plea  bargain

            looking toward a lesser sentence.  

                 Affirmed.
                 ________

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