Court Opinion

ID: 9531596
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:13:18.765064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:32.438889
License: Public Domain

Utter, J.
(dissenting) — Independent judicial decision-making is one of the cornerstones of a society based on the rule of law. In order to preserve the ability of judges to make independent decisions, the Legislature has enacted a statute criminalizing the act of influencing judicial decisionmaking through, inter alia, threats of physical violence. Today, this court broadly interprets that criminal statute to apply to words and statements which have absolutely no possibility of influencing or intimidating judges. In doing so, it affirms the conviction of an individual who had neither the intention that his spontaneous expressions of frustration reach the ear of any judge, nor any reason to believe that they would. Because I believe this result is unfaithfol both to the language and intent of RCW 9A.72.160, I respectfully dissent.
I
In affirming Hansen's conviction, the majority concludes that the language of RCW 9A.72.160 criminalizes threats even where the person making the "threat" has no intent or knowledge that his or her words will be communicated to a judge. In relevant part, the statute provides:
(1) A person is guilty of intimidating a judge if a person directs a threat to a judge because of a ruling or decision of the judge in any official proceeding, or if by use of a threat directed to a judge, a person attempts to influence a ruling or decision of the judge in any official proceeding.
(2) "Threat" as used in this section means:
(a) To communicate, directly or indirectly, the intent immediately to use force against any person who is present at the time; or
(b) Threats as defined in RCW 9A.04.110(25).
RCW 9A.72.160. RCW 9A.04.110(25) states: " 'Threat' means to communicate, directly or indirectly the intent: (a) To cause bodily injury in the future to the person threatened or to any other person . . .".
*724The Court of Appeals concluded the statute was not violated where a defendant had neither intent nor knowledge that his statements would be transmitted or communicated to a judge because the statute applies only to threats directed to a judge. State v. Hansen, 67 Wn. App. 511, 516, 837 P.2d 651 (1992).4 The majority rejects this conclusion on the grounds that the statute "evidences a clear intent by the Legislature that RCW 9A.72.160 include threats communicated in an indirect fashion as well as direct threats." Majority, at 718. lb read the statute otherwise, the majority argues, would be to negate the definition of threat in subsection (2). Majority, at 718. This approach to the statute is a familiar one: the majority is purporting to apply the traditional rule of statutory construction that all statutory language be given effect where possible. See Cossel v. Skagit Cy., 119 Wn.2d 434, 437, 834 P.2d 609 (1992). The majority apparently reasons that if the Court of Appeals' construction renders some portion of the statute nugatory, it must be incorrect. A more carefiil reading of the statute reveals that not only is an intent or knowledge requirement compatible with the statutory language, it is more consistent with that language than is the majority's interpretation.
Under either prong of subsection (1), a defendant is guilty of intimidating a judge only when he or she "directs a threat to a judge". Standing alone, this language strongly implies that the defendant must intend or be aware that the threat will be communicated to, i.e., "directed] . . . to" the judge in some fashion. The majority finds this language to be modified, however, by the provision in subsection (2) which allows that threats may be communicated either directly or indirectly. In making this argument, the majority has confused the statute's treatment of the manner in which a threat is communicated to a judge with the issue of whether the threat is intended to be communicated to the judge at all.
*725Subsection (2) recognizes that a threat which is transmitted through a third party or an inanimate agency is communicated by the defendant to the judge just as effectively as one which is communicated directly. For example, telling a judge's spouse of one's intention to do harm to the judge, or leaving ominous messages on the judge's answering machine may qualify as communicated threats, even though not communicated directly. Allowing for this simple fact of modem communication is not tantamount to a legislative declaration that statements which are not themselves communications to the judge are punishable as intimidating a judge. In other words, the fact that a defendant may be punished for utilizing either direct or indirect means of communication does not compel the conclusion, as the majority argues, that a defendant may be punished for acts or words which are not communications to the judge at all.
This interpretation of the statute gives full effect to all of the language of the statute. Punishable threats may be made either directly or indirectly, as defined in subsection (2), but whether made directly or indirectly, they must be "direct[ed] ... to a judge", as required by subsection (1). In fact, by giving effect both to the "directed] ... to a judge" language of subsection (1) and the "directly or indirectly" language of subsection (2), this interpretation is actually truer to the rule against superfluous language than is the majority's interpretation, which essentially reads the "direct[ed]... to a judge" language out of the statute entirely. The language of RCW 9A.72.160 therefore does not contradict the interpretation adopted by the Court of Appeals, but supports it under our rule against reading statutes to contain inoperative language.
I suspect, however, that the majority's interpretation of RCW 9A.72.160 is driven less by the statutory language than by the majority's concerns about the purposes which the statute is designed to serve. This is a statute whose interpretation is subservient to what purpose it is conceived to serve. If the purpose of the statute is, as the majority *726argues, to protect the persons of judges from retaliation, it is irrelevant as to whether the judge is informed of the intent to retaliate. When the State becomes apprised of an intent to retaliate, by whatever means, the defendant is punished in order to deter the retaliation. A different result obtains if, as . Hansen argues and the Court of Appeals agreed, the purpose of the statute is to deter the intimidation of judges in order to preserve judicial independence and the smooth operation of the justice system. If RCW 9A.72.160 is an anti-intimidation statute, then the defendant's intent or knowledge regarding potential communication of the threat to the judge is critical because statements which are not intended to reach their object have little or no capacity to intimidate.
Unfortunately, RCW 9A.72.160 does not contain a statement of purpose. To remedy this lack, the majority pronounces without analysis that the purpose of the statute is "to protect judges from the threat of harm due by retaliatory acts because of past official actions by a judge." (Footnote omitted.) Majority, at 717. The majority reads RCW 9A.72-.160 to be a sort of "impermissible motives" statute, whereby defendants are punished solely for expressing the impermissible motive of retaliation rather than for the effect which their action may have.
The language, legislative history, and statutory context of RCW 9A.72.160 belie the majority's intuitions about the purpose of the statute. While the evidence of legislative intent is relatively scant, all of the evidence which is available points to the conclusion that RCW 9A.72.160 was intended as an anti-intimidation measure and not as a special protective device for the persons of judges. Most importantly, the crime which RCW 9A.72.160 defines is not "retaliating against a judge" or "threatening to retaliate against a judge", it is "intimidating a judge". Under the majority's interpretation of RCW 9A.72.160, it would be possible to be convicted of "intimidating a judge" even if the judge never became aware of the supposed threat. A person could make a statement to no one at all, with no intent that the statement be transmit*727ted to a judge or even heard by a third party, and yet be convicted of intimidating a judge if a third party happened to overhear the statement. It is impossible to understand how such acts could be construed as constituting the crime of "intimidating a judge". The characterization of the very crime which Hansen is accused of committing thus supports his contention that the purpose of the statute is to eliminate certain pernicious effects on the legal process and not merely to punish certain unworthy motivations.
Hansen's argument is also supported by RCW 9A.72.160's legislative history and its statutory context. The title of the biff which became RCW 9A.72.160 was "AN ACT Relating to interference with judicial proceedings . . .". See Laws of 1985, ch. 327, § 1. The statutory context into which the new law was placed was RCW 9A.72, "Perjury and Interference With Official Proceedings". This suggests that it was not the person of the judge which was of concern to the Legislature in enacting RCW 9A.72.160, but rather the evil which could result from the use of threats to influence and corrupt judicial proceedings. In sum, all the evidence available regarding the purpose of RCW 9A.72.160 points to construing that statute as an anti-intimidation measure.
This is not to suggest that judges should not be protected in the performance of their official duties or that we should not be concerned about possible retaliation against judges; instead, understanding the statute in this fashion recognizes that threats against judges are only of special concern when those threats endanger the operation of our system of justice. When possible violence against judges creates no such danger, our concern about judges should extend no further than the ordinary protections of the criminal law. If an individual commits a criminal act against a judge, for whatever reason, that individual should be prosecuted in the same fashion as any other criminal defendant. Unless we believe that the ordinary organs of criminal law enforcement are incapable of protecting judges from random or spontane*728ous violence, there is no rationale for extending special protection to the persons of judges.5
It is for this reason that the federal case law on which the majority relies is inapposite. 18 U.S.C. § 115, at issue in United States v. Berki, 936 F.2d 529 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 118 L. Ed. 2d 395 (1992), and 18 U.S.C. § 111, at issue in United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 43 L. Ed. 2d 541, 95 S. Ct. 1255 (1975), are specifically designed to be "protected persons" statutes. As explained by the Supreme Court in Feola, their purpose is to provide protection for federal officials in the performance of their duties, regardless of the possible impact that violence against those officials may have on their performance. 420 U.S. at 678-80. The Court reasoned:
In the congressional mind, . . . certainty required that these cases be tried in the federal courts, for no matter how 'respectable and well disposed,' it would not be unreasonable to suppose that state officials would not always or necessarily share congressional feelings of urgency as to the necessity of prompt and vigorous prosecutions of those who violate the safety of the federal officer.
420 U.S. at 684. That is, the federal statutes provide an additional layer of protection for federal officials above and beyond the ordinary protections of the (state) criminal law due to congressional concern that state government may not adequately prosecute those who harm federal officials. This fear is, of course, completely lacking here. Whatever the validity of the Court's concerns regarding state enforcement of the criminal law to protect federal officials, there can be no such concern with respect to state enforcement of the criminal law to protect state officials. Thus, the rationale *729supporting the broad construction given to the federal statutes is inapplicable to RCW 9A.72.160.
We should therefore interpret RCW 9A.72.160 as requiring proof that a defendant intended or was aware that his or her statements against a particular judge would in fact be communicated to that judge. The limited evidence available to this court as to legislative intent points only to the conclusion that the purpose which motivated the Legislature in enacting the statute was to ensure the efficient operation of the justice system by deterring the intimidation of judges. Given this purpose, it would be irrational to extend the applicability of RCW 9A.72.160 to statements which defendants do not intend to be transmitted to judges or are reasonably unaware will be. Such statements pose little or no risk of disrupting the legal process since people, including judges, are simply not intimidated by threats of which they have no knowledge.
II
Under this interpretation of the statute, the evidence before the trial court was insufficient to support Michael Hansen's conviction. "In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Joy, 121 Wn.2d 333, 338, 851 P.2d 654 (1993); State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992).
There was insufficient evidence to show that Hansen intended or knew his words would be communicated to the judge. The prosecution's case rested entirely on Hansen's single reference to blowing away the prosecutor, the judge, and the public defender during the conversation with attorney Youtz. Whatever threatening import can be attached to this isolated remark, there is nothing in it or in the surrounding circumstances which suggests Hansen wished or could have foreseen that Youtz would transmit the statement to Judge Dixon. Indeed, the circumstances surrounding Han*730sen's statement support only the opposite conclusion, that Hansen did not intend or reasonably foresee that his statements would be later communicated to Judge Dixon.
First, Hansen was at the time of the statement engaged in an attempt to obtain Youtz's services as an attorney. While the relationship necessary to trigger the attorney-client privilege legally did not exist at the moment of Hansen's statement since Youtz had expressly refused to handle the representation, this technical matter of privilege law is not dis-positive. The question is not whether an actual privilege existed, but rather whether Hansen could reasonably have believed that the conversation was one clothed in confidentiality. Since an ordinary person would likely have believed that statements made to an attorney during an attempt to obtain representation would be confidential, it is instead more appropriate to infer that Hansen intended and believed that his statements would not be transmitted to the judge.6
Second, the objective evidence regarding Hansen's emotional state refutes the proposition that Hansen intended or knew that the statements would be transmitted to the judge. Hansen made his statement in a fit of pique not over something which the judge had done, but rather over a grievance created by Youtz. This suggests that at worst Hansen's "threat" was designed not to intimidate the judge but rather only to induce Youtz to take Hansen's case. More likely, the "threat" was merely Hansen's spontaneous expression of frustration at a system which he perceived to be unresponsive. The fact that Hansen's statement was made only once supports this conclusion. Hansen certainly would not have intended that such a spontaneous expression be communicated to the judge, nor *731would he have had reasonable grounds to believe that it would be.
Third, Hansen did not even mention the judge by name during his entire conversation with Youtz. See Report of Proceedings (Testimony of Youtz), at 72. It would be extraordinary to believe that Hansen intended Youtz to transmit the statement to a judge whom he had not even named. It would also be extraordinary to conclude that Hansen knew or should have known that Youtz would determine the judge's name and then inform the judge.7 It is, instead, entirely more consistent to believe that Hansen viewed his own statement in the same manner which a reasonable person would, as a brief display of temper and nothing more.
The evidence is therefore such that only one conclusion can be reached regarding Hansen's intent or knowledge: he did not intend nor did he have reason to believe that his statements would be transmitted to Judge Dixon. No rational trier of fact could therefore have concluded that all of the elements of ROW 9A.72.160 were satisfied, and Hansen's conviction should be reversed.
Johnson and Madsen, JJ., concur with Utter, J.

One member of the panel at Division One dissented. The dissent, however, disagreed only with the application of the statute. The entire panel was therefore in accord as to the proper construction of the statute.

It is of course true that punishing defendants for any threats against a judge, even when not communicated to the judge, may have a marginal effect on judicial autonomy and decisionmaking. The knowledge that any person anywhere who voices the motive of retaliation will be criminally hable may allow judges a scintilla of additional peace in making difficult or unpleasant rulings. In the absence of clearer legislative intent, however, indeed in the face of evidence which points only in the opposite direction, we should not construe the statute on the basis of this limited and marginal impact.

I recognize the court today holds that attorneys have an affirmative obligation to disclose "true threats" to harm members of the judiciary. Majority, at 721. The question, however, is not whether Hansen's statements would be communicated to Judge Dixon, but whether Hansen intended or reasonably should have foreseen that they would be. Even if criminal defendants in the future will be held hable for knowing this relatively arcane rule of attorney conduct, it can hardly be applied to Hansen.

Of course, Hansen certainly should have been aware that Youtz could perform this relatively simple task. Again, the question is not whether Hansen was aware that Youtz could tell the judge, but rather whether Youtz would tell the judge.