Court Opinion

ID: 9367210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-31 13:08:53.066415+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:57.939320
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                     San Antonio, Texas
                                MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                        No. 04-21-00494-CR

                                       Harvey GUTIERREZ,
                                             Appellant

                                                  v.

                                       The STATE of Texas,
                                             Appellee

                     From the County Court at Law No. 8, Bexar County, Texas
                                     Trial Court No. 620144
                            Honorable Mary D. Roman, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:       Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice

Sitting:          Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
                  Irene Rios, Justice
                  Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

Delivered and Filed: January 25, 2023

REVERSED AND REMANDED

           A jury convicted appellant Harvey Gutierrez of making a terroristic threat, a Class B

misdemeanor, and the trial court assessed punishment at confinement in the county jail for one-

hundred and eighty days, probated for twelve months’ community supervision. TEX. PENAL CODE

ANN. § 22.07(a)(2), (b) (providing that a “person commits an offense if he threatens to commit

any offense involving violence to any person or property with intent to . . . place any person in fear

of imminent serious bodily injury”). In one issue, Gutierrez complains that the trial court erred by

refusing to give a jury instruction on self-defense. We reverse and remand.
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                                         I. BACKGROUND

       Gutierrez was charged by information with making a terroristic threat to his former brother-

in-law, Jose Lopez. The alleged threat was made in front of the home of Lopez’s mother and

Gutierrez’s former mother-in-law, Elsa Esquivel-Lopez. The incident stemmed from Gutierrez

trying to pick up his minor son from Esquivel-Lopez’s care. At trial, the jury heard from Lopez,

Esquivel-Lopez, and two San Antonio Police Department (“SAPD”) patrol officers — Marissa

Garcia and Nathan Wood.

       Lopez testified that, on the day in question, Gutierrez went to Esquivel-Lopez’s home to

pick up his minor son. Lopez happened to be at Esquivel-Lopez’s home when Gutierrez arrived,

and the two met at the front door. Lopez recalled informing Gutierrez that, based on his

understanding of the child-custody order, Gutierrez was not entitled to have custody of his son on

the day in question. Gutierrez then, according to Lopez, stated, “Like I told [Magaly,] your sister,

if anybody came between me and my son . . . I would f--- them up.” Lopez retorted “Well, you’re

not going to get your son according to the courts. I guess, well, f--- me up.” After these words

were exchanged, Lopez observed Gutierrez go to his truck and “g[e]t a machete; and that’s when

[Lopez] went inside [his] mom’s house, locked the door, [and] told her to call the police.” Lopez

testified that he went into his mother’s home because he “felt threated by the machete.” Lopez

was afraid Gutierrez would cause “physical harm with the machete” to the home’s occupants,

including Gutierrez’s own son. After Lopez entered his mother’s home, Gutierrez “kept verbally

abusing [him and] saying a bunch of stuff as far as I’m going to get my kid. Nobody comes . . .

between me and my son.” Gutierrez also screamed, “Come outside. I’m going to f--- you up.

Let’s see how much of a man you are. Stop hiding behind your mom . . . always hiding behind

females or behind closed doors.” Gutierrez also banged and kicked the door. Lopez cursed back

to Gutierrez, “F--- you. You’re not going to get your son.”

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       Esquivel-Lopez testified that she was caring for her grandchildren, including her daughter

Magaly’s and Gutierrez’s son, on the day in question. Magaly had instructed Esquivel-Lopez not

to turn over her son to Gutierrez. Esquivel-Lopez overheard Lopez and Gutierrez speaking to each

other in English, which she does not understand, but she nevertheless described Gutierrez’s mood

as angry. She testified that, during the episode, Gutierrez kicked her front door and destroyed a

door decoration. Esquivel-Lopez further testified that she witnessed Gutierrez retrieve a machete

from his pickup truck, return to her front door with it, and “wanted for [Lopez] to go out.”

       Officer Garcia testified that she responded to a call placed by Magaly to Esquivel-Lopez’s

home. When Officer Garcia arrived, she observed Gutierrez standing next to a vehicle parked in

the roadway. Officer Garcia surmised that Gutierrez was upset based on his yelling toward the

house, pacing, and sweating.

       Officer Wood arrived after Officer Garcia. Officer Wood testified that he spoke with

Gutierrez, whom he described as “disheveled[,] . . . very sweaty, kind of agitated, and . . . speaking

aggressively to officers.” The State offered, and the trial court admitted, video footage from

Officer Wood’s body-worn camera (“bodycam”). In the video footage, Gutierrez denies kicking

at Esquivel-Lopez’s front door. When asked to explain what transpired, Gutierrez demonstrates

how Lopez strutted toward him while placing his right hand on his hip. When Officer Wood asks

whether Lopez had a weapon, Gutierrez responds, “I don’t know. Like I said, he’s in the military.”

Lopez’s movement prompted Gutierrez to ask Lopez, “What are you going to do?” It also

prompted Gutierrez to retrieve a machete from his pickup. Gutierrez specifically recalled, “I

grabbed [the machete] for like two seconds and then I threw it.” Gutierrez further states that it was

Lopez who threatened him by telling Gutierrez, “I’m going to f--- you up . . . I’ve been waiting for

me to f--- you up.” Gutierrez tells Officer Wood that Lopez has a “violent, criminal history” and

that Lopez’s family “starts fights with everyone in the neighborhood.” After Officer Wood arrests

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Gutierrez and on the patrol car ride to the police station, Gutierrez reiterates that “they’re

threatening me. Why aren’t they getting arrested? They have guns!”

       During the jury charge conference, Gutierrez’s counsel requested a self-defense instruction

by specifically asking:

       GUTIERREZ: Your Honor, everything is fine; but I do have an addition I would
       like to move the Court about, and that’s the issue of self-defense.
               The way — from our perspective, if you look at the body cam from the last
       officer, Mr. Gutierrez says that Jose Lopez had a handgun. And so he pulls a
       machete in defense would be our argument, but only briefly.
               So I’m just making the record clear that would be one addition that the
       defense asks for.

       STATE:          Your Honor, we’re not going to oppose this addition at this time due
       to the legal nature of these kind of additions. We feel that it would be necessary
       for the State to not oppose this being added to the charge.

       COURT:             The first witness, Jose Lopez, didn’t testify as to a gun. Was that
       asked?

       GUTIERREZ:         No, it was not asked.

       STATE:             We did not ask if he had anything in his hand, Judge.

       COURT:             And the officers didn’t talk to Mr. Lopez, either?

       STATE:             They did speak to him, Judge.

       GUTIERREZ:         Yes, they did.

       COURT:        Other than that, other than the assertion by the defendant, there’s no
       mention of a gun; is that correct?

       GUTIERREZ:         Correct.

       COURT:        I don’t see how it applies at all. And if he did have a gun, the
       defendant’s weapon wouldn’t have done much good.

       GUTIERREZ:         Well, I think that’s part of —

       COURT:         And that’s not even — you know, that’s — I mean, that had nothing
       to do with the issue. But I certainly would not want to face a gun with a machete
       in my hands; or I would make sure that there was at least 10 feet away, if not more.
       But, anyway, that request is denied. Thank you.

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       Ultimately, the jury convicted Gutierrez of making a terroristic threat, a Class B

misdemeanor. The trial court assessed punishment at confinement in the county jail for one-

hundred and eighty days, but in lieu of confinement, it placed Gutierrez on community supervision

for twelve months. Gutierrez timely appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence.

                                          II. DISCUSSION

       Gutierrez’s sole issue complains that the trial court erred by refusing to give a jury

instruction on self-defense.

A.     Standard of Review

       Appellate review of error in a jury charge involves a two-step process. Abdnor v. State,

871 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Initially, we determine whether error occurred; if

so, we must then evaluate whether sufficient harm resulted from the error to require reversal. Id.

at 731–32. The standard of review for jury-charge error depends on whether the error was

preserved. Jordan v. State, 593 S.W.3d 340, 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). On this record, it is

clear that both the trial court and the State understood Gutierrez’s request for a self-defense

instruction; nonetheless, the trial court refused it. Therefore, Gutierrez preserved his jury-charge

complaint, and we will review any error for “some harm.” Id.; see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.

ANN. art. 36.15; Francis v. State, 36 S.W.3d 121, 123 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

       A defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction when that defensive issue is raised by

the evidence, “whether that evidence is strong or weak, unimpeached or contradicted, and

regardless of what the trial court may think about the credibility of the defense.” Gamino v. State,

537 S.W.3d 507, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). In reviewing the denial of a requested self-defense

instruction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the requested submission to

determine whether evidence from any source will support the elements of the defense. Id.; see

also Krajcovic v. State, 393 S.W.3d 282, 286 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (“[E]ven a minimum quantity

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of evidence is sufficient to raise a defense as long as the evidence would support a rational jury

finding as to the defense.”).

B.     Applicable Law

       A person commits the offense of making a terroristic threat if he threatens to commit any

offense involving violence to any person with intent to place any person in fear of imminent serious

bodily injury. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07(a)(2). Section 9.04 of the Texas Penal Code is

titled “Threats as Justifiable Force.” Id. § 9.04. It provides:

       The threat of force is justified when the use of force is justified by this chapter. For
       purposes of this section, a threat to cause death or serious bodily injury by the
       production of a weapon or otherwise, as long as the actor’s purpose is limited to
       creating an apprehension that he will use deadly force if necessary, does not
       constitute the use of deadly force.

Id. (emphasis added). Section 9.04 is not a separate statutory defense; rather, it is incorporated

into the law of self-defense. Gamino, 537 S.W.3d at 510. The law of self-defense includes Section

9.31, which provides that “a person is justified in using force against another when and to the

degree [he] reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect [himself] against the

other’s use or attempted use of unlawful force.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31(a); see also

Gamino, 537 S.W.3d at 510. The use of force against another is not justified in response to verbal

provocation alone. Id. § 9.31(b)(1). Section 9.04 may apply to the offense of making a terroristic

threat. See Jaimes v. State, No. 03-96-00230-CR, 1997 WL 420978, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin

July 24, 1997, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) (observing that “Section 9.04 was

inartfully written” but noting that its “application in justification when a defendant is prosecuted

for the offense of making threats ‘by the production of a weapon’ is comprehensible.”).

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C.     Merits Analysis

       Gutierrez references Gamino, 537 S.W.3d at 510–12, in support of his contention that the

trial court reversibly erred by refusing his request for a self-defense instruction in the jury charge.

The State makes only a single, passing reference to Gamino. We find Gamino instructive.

       In Gamino, the complainant testified that the defendant and his girlfriend walked by him

and two friends. Id. at 508. The defendant, according to the complainant, overheard an innocent

conversation and mistook it as a threat to his girlfriend. Id. The defendant then stated, “I got

something for you,” walked to the driver’s side of his pickup truck, pulled out a gun, and pointed

it at them. Id. The defendant’s recollection varied significantly from that of the complainant. The

defendant testified that the complainant and his two friends threatened to “grab [his girlfriend’s]

ass,” “F her if they wanted to,” and “kick [his] ass.” Id. at 509. The defendant recalled that one

of the men stood up and came at him, the defendant then reached into his vehicle, grabbed his gun

and told the men, “stop, leave us alone, get away from us.” Id.

       The trial court denied the defendant’s request for a self-defense instruction. Id. The

Second Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court’s denial constituted reversible error, and

the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Id. at 509, 512–13. The Texas Court of Criminal

Appeals found that there had been some evidence, even if contradicted, that the defendant believed

the display of his gun was immediately necessary to protect himself against the complainant’s use

or attempted use of unlawful force, that the defendant’s purpose in displaying his weapon was

limited to creating an apprehension that he would use deadly force if necessary, and that his

conduct was not in response to a verbal provocation alone. Id. at 512. In reaching its decision,

the high court showcased, among other things, the defendant’s testimony that (1) the three men

said that “they were going to beat me . . . [;] they said they were going to kick my ass;” (2) he

believed there was a threat of deadly force because “it’s three of them and I’m one person that’s

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disabled;” and (3) he “felt like [his] life was in danger,” and it was “not because of what they said,

[but] because of their actions.” Id.

       In this case, Gutierrez states, at varying points on Wood’s bodycam footage, that (1) Lopez

strutted toward him while placing his right hand on his hip; (2) Lopez has a “violent, criminal

history”; (3) Lopez told Gutierrez, “I’m going to f--- you up . . . . I’ve been waiting for me to f---

you up”; (4) “they’re threatening me”; (5) Gutierrez did not know whether Lopez had a gun but

that Lopez is “in the military”; and (6) “they have guns.” As Gamino explains, a self-defense

instruction is warranted when a defensive issue is raised by the evidence — even evidence that the

trial court thinks is weak, contradicted, or lacks credibility. 537 S.W.3d at 510. In light of the

applicable standard of review, we conclude that Gutierrez’s statements, captured on Wood’s

bodycam, warranted inclusion of the self-defense jury instruction that he sought.

       Instead of addressing Gamino, the State, for the first time on appeal, contends that the trial

court did not err in refusing to include a self-defense jury instruction because Gutierrez’s “retreat”

to his pickup truck demonstrates that his brandishing of the machete was not “immediately

necessary” as contemplated by Section 9.31(a) of the Texas Penal Code. As authority, the State

references Henley v. State, 493 S.W.3d 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). We find the State’s argument

unpersuasive and its reliance on Henley misplaced.

       In Henley, the defendant was convicted of misdemeanor assault causing bodily injury to a

family member. Id. at 81. On appeal, the defendant complained that the trial court erred in

excluding evidence that he sought to introduce in support of his claim of defense of a third person.

Id. Specifically, the defendant “claimed that he was justified in pulling his ex-wife out of her car

by her hair, punching her in the face several times (resulting in two severe black eyes and several

cuts and bruises), and hitting her head against the concrete driveway, because he was concerned

that his ex-wife was not a fit parent and wanted to protect his two sons from the possibility of being

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harmed at some future time by people who were not present at the time of the assault.” Id. at 81–

82. The issue in Henley relates to the admissibility of evidence, not charge error. Id. at 82–83. In

this case, Gutierrez’s statements were captured by Officer Wood’s bodycam, which the State

proffered into evidence.

       Moreover, the State’s argument that Gutierrez is precluded from a self-defense instruction

because he “retreated” fails under the applicable standard of review, which requires us to review

the evidence in the light most favorable to the requested self-defense instruction. See Gamino,

537 S.W.3d at 507. Although Esquivel-Lopez testified that she witnessed Gutierrez retrieve a

machete from his pickup truck and return to her front door with it, Gutierrez’s statements on

Officer Wood’s bodycam footage are subject to a different interpretation. In it, Gutierrez states

that he possessed the machete “for like two seconds.” Further, Gutierrez does not indicate whether

he returned to Esquivel-Lopez’s front door with the machete. The State fails to direct us to any

authority that permits us to deviate from the applicable standard of review.

       Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Gutierrez, there is some evidence that

the above-described circumstances imposed a threat of bodily harm to Gutierrez for which it was

immediately necessary for Gutierrez to protect himself. See id. at 510; see also TEX. PENAL CODE

ANN. § § 9.04, 9.31(a). Therefore, the trial court erred by refusing Gutierrez’s requested self-

defense instruction under Sections 9.04 and 9.31.

D.     Harm Analysis

       “Some harm” means “any harm, regardless of degree,” Arline v. State, 721 S.W.2d 348,

351 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986), but it also means “actual harm and not merely a theoretical

complaint,” Jordan, 593 S.W.3d at 347. To assess harm, we must evaluate the whole record,

including the jury charge, contested issues, weight of the probative evidence, arguments of

counsel, and other relevant information. Jordan, 593 S.W.3d at 347.

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       We conclude that the record in this case demonstrates some harm. In his statement captured

on Officer Wood’s bodycam footage, Gutierrez states that Lopez was the initial instigator and

aggressor. Although the jury had to decide which version of events to believe — Lopez and

Esquivel-Lopez’s or Gutierrez’s — even if it had believed Gutierrez’s version, it could have

convicted him under the jury charge that it received. See Gamino v. State, 480 S.W.3d at 91 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2015), aff’d 537 S.W.3d 507, 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (“Under the charge

given to the jury, Appellant lost under both versions because Appellant’s use of a gun constituted

the unwarranted use of deadly force. Nothing in the charge provided that Appellant’s conduct

might have been justified or excused for any reason.”); see also Windham v. State, No. 02-19-

00063-CR, 2021 WL 386951, at *16 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 4, 2021, no. pet.) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication) (finding some harm where a defendant’s entire defense was built

around his justification based on self-defense and defense of his sons; and, in light of conflicting

versions of an event, the jury still could have convicted the defendant regardless of which version

it believed). In closing argument, the State asserted that Gutierrez had two choices when Lopez

denied him custody of his son — peacefully accept or “take action” in “the worst possible way.”

In other words, Gutierrez had no excuse. Accordingly, we hold that Gutierrez suffered some harm,

and we sustain his sole issue.

                                        III. CONCLUSION

       We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause for a new trial.

                                                  Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH

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