Court Opinion

ID: 9709423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:47:15.94063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:48.754951
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE ALLOY, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case. The opinion is predicated on the proposition that this Third District Appellate Court is “bound” to reverse by virtue of a previous decision in the case of Hansen v. National Bank (1978), 59 Ill. App. 3d 877, 879, 376 N.E.2d 365, 367. The Hansen opinion was rendered in the Second District Appellate Court. The opinion in the instant case states that under the doctrine of stare decisis our court is “bound” to follow the Hansen case in the instant case. The conclusion, so expressed, is contrary to what has been the established law governing decisions of the appellate court, to the effect that an appellate court is not bound to follow the decisions of the appellate courts of other districts in this State. (Occhino v. Illinois Liquor Control Com. (1975), 28 Ill. App. 3d 967, 971-72,329 N.E.2d 353,357.) We are, however, required to follow the decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court. As has been noted, our position on the appellate level is similar to that of the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal. In those Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal, the decision of one Federal Circuit Court of Appeal is not binding in a different Federal Circuit Court of Appeal. Securities Exchange Com. v. Shapiro (2d Cir. 1974), 494 F.2d 1301. The appellate courts of this State have, historically, vigorously chartered courses for modification or improvement in the equitable principles applicable in cases without being limited by any previous opinion which may have been rendered in another district. The Illinois Supreme Court, as a result of this initiative and progressive analysis by the appellate courts of this State, has taken such decisions, where notably in conflict as between the respectivo districts, and has charted the course which the supreme court has determined was most effective in attaining the ends of justice, as to the parties in the case and, also, as a precedent which is most likely to achieve the objectives of the court in attaining a result which reflects an intelligent and equitable analysis, rather than a rigid acquiescence in a rule, once espoused, but now deemed to be unacceptable. While we recognize the value of stare decisis in determining the question of predictability, a more persuasive approach to the issue posed is the need to remove the dead hand of stare decisis so that the course of law may move into new horizons where proper. The experience of the appellate courts in fermenting progressive decisions has been such that as the appellate courts disagree, they have aided the supreme, court in establishing new rules which are more equitable and consistent with conditions today than when the old rules were adopted many years previously. The requirement that any appellate court opinion must be slavishly adhered to by the other appellate courts, until it is modified or reversed by the Illinois Supreme Court, dilutes and limits the value of appellate court review and aid to the supreme court. We must also recognize that the genesis of some of the opinions, which come out of respective appellate court districts, may simply amount to a preliminary analysis based wholly on inadequate briefs filed by the parties in the pending case. Such opinions would rarely be challenged or become the basis for a supreme court determination on petition for leave to appeal and thus may be welded, undeservedly, into a rigid limiting rule which perpetuates inequity, rather than progress. Under our present system, it is also impractical to circulate new opinions of the appellate court in such manner as to advise all the members of the court of the existence of such opinion, without slowing down the process of expediting decisions by procedures which would not be of aid to the Illinois Supreme Court in ascertaining or meeting the issues which require supreme court determination. The instant case should have been determined on the basis of the value of the Hansen case as a precedent under the facts in the instant case. Basically, giving binding effect to the Hansen case, under the stare decisis conception, serves no purpose other than to saddle the adverse possession concept with a dubious result which may linger too long as a binding precedent. From the language of the majority opinion it is clear that even the majority are “uneasy” about Hansen and see it as a dubious precedent. It should not be binding on our court in the instant case.