Court Opinion

ID: 9765037
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:48:39.967986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:04.069111
License: Public Domain

BENHAM, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I believe State Farm is not entitled to a credit for the amount Nationwide paid Grady Hospital for its treatment of the injuries Mr. Adams sustained due to the negligent acts of the tortfeasor. OCGA § 33-7-11 (b) (1) (D) (ii) (2000) provides in pertinent part:
. . . [Ajvailable coverages under the bodily injury liability insurance and property damage liability insurance coverages on [an under-insured or uninsured] motor vehicle shall be the limits of coverage less any amounts by which the maximum amounts payable under such limits of coverage have, by reason of payment of other claims or otherwise, been reduced below the limits of coverage. . . .
The Court of Appeals construed the language “payment of other claims or otherwise” to include a valid hospital lien paid by the tortfeasor such that State Farm’s UM exposure was increased in the amount of the hospital’s lien and that it could not offset the full $25,000 of the tortfeasor’s liability limit. Adams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 298 Ga. App. 249, 251-253 (679 SE2d 726) (2009). The Court of Appeals’ final conclusion is correct.
Key to statutory construction is giving effect to the legislative intent. Expedia, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 285 Ga. 684 (4) (681 SE2d 122) (2009) (“A statute must be construed ‘to give sensible and intelligent effect to all of (its) provisions and to refrain from any interpretation which renders any part of the statute meaningless.’ [Cit.]”); Mason v. The Home Depot U.S.A., 283 Ga. 271 (3) (658 SE2d 603) (2008) (when construing a statute, a court has a duty to give full *321effect to the legislative intent). The UM statute is remedial in nature and must be broadly construed to accomplish the legislative purpose. Smith v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 246 Ga. 50, 51 (268 SE2d 632) (1980). More specifically, Georgia’s uninsured motorist statute should be construed to “protect innocent victims from the negligence of irresponsible drivers.” Hinton v. Interstate Guaranty Ins. Co., 267 Ga. 516, 517-518 (480 SE2d 842) (1997) (UM statute was construed broadly to include a tractor in the term “motor vehicle” as found in OCGA § 33-7-11 (b) (1) (D)). Thus, the phrase “payment of claims or otherwise” must be construed broadly and remedially. Id. at 520.
Since the lien in question arises directly from the negligence of the tortfeasor, the hospital is entitled to recover from the patient’s cause of action against the tortfeasor. OCGA § 44-14-470 (b). See also Holland v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 236 Ga. App. 832 (1) (513 SE2d 48) (1999) (hospital lien may attach to cause of action against tortfeasor’s insurer).3 If a valid hospital lien is paid by the tortfeasor’s liability carrier,4 then the amount the insured receives is less than he would have received otherwise. Given the remedial purpose of the UM statute, it follows that the insured would be entitled to receive from his UM carrier the difference between his UM policy limit and the funds he actually received from the tortfeasor’s carrier after payment of the hospital lien. For example, in the absence of a valid hospital lien, there is no question appellee could recover $100,000 — $25,000 from the tortfeasor’s insurer and $75,000 from appellant’s UM carrier. However, because appellee was treated for injuries suffered in the accident, the hospital sought a lien pursuant to the hospital lien statute and received payment from the tortfeasor’s liability carrier, the majority opinion effectively penalizes appellee by limiting his potential recovery to approximately $90,782.34. In this case, such a result is not in keeping with the legislative purpose of the UM statute to protect innocent drivers from irresponsible motorists and, as such, I cannot join the majority’s opinion. Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Hunstein joins in this dissent.
*322Decided November 30, 2010
Reconsideration denied December 14, 2010.
Harper, Waldon & Craig, Thomas D. Harper, Kimberly A. McNamara, for appellant.
Chambers, Aholt & Rickard, Clyde E. Rickard III, Downey & Cleveland, Lauren R. Kruck, Rodney S. Shockley, Bryan M. Pulliam, Ryan A. Johnson, Sharon W. Ware, Jane N Wilkes, Carlock, Copeland & Stair, William M. Cheves, Jr., for appellee.
Wallace Miller III, Fulcher & Hagler, Sonja R. Tate, Turkheimer & Hadden, John D. Hadden, Robertson, Bodoh & Nasrallah, Mathew G. Nasrallah, amici curiae.

 Note that Holland, supra, is distinguishable from the instant case inasmuch as the injured party did not seek payment from his UM carrier and the Court of Appeals did not consider what, if any, effect of the hospital lien’s payment by the tortfeasor’s insurer had on available coverages under the UM statute.

 There is no statutory or other requirement that the hospital lien must be paid by the tortfeasor or the tortfeasor’s liability carrier. A hospital lien may also be paid from UM proceeds. See Chatham County Hosp. Auth. v. Barnes, 226 Ga. 508 (175 SE2d 854) (1970) (a hospital debt arising out of an auto accident may be paid from UM funds).