Court Opinion

ID: 9753146
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:00:44.07136+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:30.913381
License: Public Domain

BuelijSTG, J.
(dissenting). The principal question involved on this appeal is whether the removal power vested in *214the Governor of the State of New Jersey by the New Jersey Constitution of 1947, Article V, Section IY, paragraph 5, includes the power to suspend an officer or employee prior to the hearing made mandatory by the Constitution.
It seems to me that the policy of cause and time of suspension from public office is for the Legislature to determine. Just as it is not a judicial function to lay down the grounds for forfeiture of a public office, Kobylarz v. Mercer, 130 N. J. L. 44, 47 (E. & A. 1943), so also is it without judicial or executive power to lay down the policy as to suspension from office unless expressly and emphatically invested therein by the Constitution of this State, or by valid legislative enactment.
It has been held that a state constitution “is not a grant but a limitation of legislative power,” that it is “presumed that the words employed have been carefully measured and weighed to convey a certain and definite meaning, with as little as possible left to implication,” and that the “constitutional limitation upon the exercise of legislative power must be clear and imperative.” State v. Murzda, 116 N. J. L. 219, 222—223 (E. & A. 1936). Cf. Behnke v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 13 N. J. 14, 25 (1953). The power to suspend an officer or employee of the State pending an investigation is deemed by the majority of the court to be implied from the constitutional grant of power to the chief executive of this State to investigate and after a hearing to remove such officer or employee of the State. If implied, its scope apparently is unlimited and may extend to any length of time, and to any reason, determined upon by a Governor, since no qualification thereof is contained in the Constitution. This constitutes a limitation upon legislative power to determine the rights and responsibilities appertaining to public office or employment. And it results in the clothing of the Governor with a broad power, tantamount to authority to terminate at will the service and remuneration of state officers and employees regardless of statutory provisions, including civil service requirements. If this were ordained by the State Constitution, its reasonableness would be for the people to *215assay. If not so ordained, it should not be imposed by judicial decision.
The broad power to suspend at will any state officer or employee is expressly given to the incumbent of no office under the Constitution, although heads of principal executive departments “serve at the pleasure of the Governor.” See N. J. Const. 1947, Art. V, Sec. IY, par. 2. And the Constitution also provides, Art. Ill, par. 1:
“1. The powers of the government shall be divided among three distinct branches, the legislative, executive, and judicial. No person or persons belonging to or constituting one branch shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as expressly provided in this Constitution.”
N. J. Const. 1947, Art. V, Sec. IV, par. 5, supra, is quoted in full in the majority opinion. In brief, it authorizes the Governor to investigate and “After notice, the service of charges and an opportunity to be heard at public hearing” to remove an officer or employee of this State (other than certain specific categories of officer or employee). Compare N. J. Const. 1947, Art. V, Sec. IV, par. 4.
The defendants asserted that the power to suspend is implied in the power to remove, and that it was so held in Vanderbach, v. Hudson County Board of Taxation, 131 N. J. L. 491, 494 (Sup. Ct. 1944), reversed 133 N. J. L. 126, 130 (E. & A. 1945); on remand, 133 N. J. L. 499, 509-512 (Sup. Ct. 1946), affirmed 135 N. J. L. 349 (E. & A. 1947). In the 1945 decision the former Court of Errors and Appeals indicated “indefinite suspension * * * without the statutory hearing, is inadmissible.” (133 N. J. L., at page 130). In the 1946 decision of the former Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Case said (133 N. J. L., at page 511) :
“ ‘We think it is apparent that the two powers [removal and suspension] cannot always be properly respectively described as the greater and the less, and consequently it cannot always be determined simply upon that ground that the suspension is valid because there was a power to remove.’” (Explanatory phrase supplied.)
Emphasis in the several decisions in the Vanderbach case, supra, was placed on the coincidence of appointing and re*216moval powers. The appointing power in the present case was not in the Governor.
The history of the constitutional power of the Governor is pertinent. The 1943 proposed constitution provided for investigation on complaint, with removal by the Governor after hearing; the 1944 draft authorized investigation by the Governor on his own initiative, with removal after hearing and judicial issuance of subpoenas. 3 Convention Proceedings, Constitutional Convention of 1947, State of New Jersey (1951), 1411, 1414. The original draft of the 1947 Constitution authorized the Governor to cause investigations to be made, to require written statements under, oath, and, after public hearing, to remove an employee. Ibid., pp. 1118-1119; 1 Id. (1949), pp. 180-181. The clause for judicial review was added by amendment. 1 Id. (1949), pp. 363, 395-396.
The monographs pertinent to the Convention proceedings, see 3 Id. (1951), p. 1383 et seq.; p. 1410 et seq., covered the subject of removal by the Governor rather thoroughly and did not suggest that the Governor should have the power of suspension.
In the Committee on the Executive, Militia, etc., several interesting comments were made: former Governor Alfred E. Driscoll approved the power to investigate and the power to remove (but did not suggest suspension powers be granted the Governor); and he said:
“This power to investigate should be * * * not subject to withdrawal by an unfriendly Legislature or * * * enlargement by a friendly Legislature. The power to investigate, if it is to have a real meaning, should be accompanied by the power to remove after a proper hearing.” (Emphasis supplied) 5 Id., (1953), p. 33.
And Mr. Charles R. Erdman, Jr., said:
“* * * it becomes more important than ever to make sure that the Governor be removed from all suspicion that he is in any way using these vast powers for any personal ambition * * 5 Id. (1953), p. 98.
See also 5 Id. (1953), pp. 56, 89, 91, 366, 375, 388, 415, 437, 476-477.
*217It was suggested to the Convention that “if the Civil Service is protected in the Constitution and the Governor removes a Civil Service employee, you have a conflict of jurisdiction.” 1 Id. (1949), p. 239. Senator David Van Alstyne, Jr., shortly thereafter addressed the Convention pointing out that the Governor’s power of removal would arise after notice, service of charges and public hearing, and that the words “for cause” were inserted to show that the clause in the Constitution gave the Governor a giiosi-judicial status. 1 Id. (1949), p. 240. Former Chief Justice Thomas J. Brogan observed that “If a state official is to be tried before the Governor and to be removed from office” it should be clear that he should have “a review of that conviction and removal * * * before a court of competent jurisdiction.” 1 Id. (1949), pp. 241-242. See also 1 Id. (1949), pp. 145-147, 235-243, 290.
Application of the principles declared in the Vanderbach case, supra, in the light of the history of Art. V, Sec. IV, par. 5 of the New Jersey Constitution of 1947, supra, leads me to the conclusion that the grant to the Governor of the removal power was not intended to, and did not, include the power of suspension. It follows that the power of the Legislature to control suspension of officers and employees of the State has not been impaired.
The Legislature has provided that no employee of the State under civil service “shall be suspended * * * for a period of greater than thirty days in the aggregate in any one year” without the right of appeal to the Civil Service Commission. L. 1938, c. 76, sec. 1, as amended by L. 1946, c. 184, sec. 1, N. J. S. A. 11:24.-1. The Legislature has also provided in the Civil Service Act “No such employee shall be suspended * * * for a period greater than five days at one time without the same right of appeal * * Ibid.
It was contended by the defendants that the judiciary may not review the action of the Governor. It has been said that no direct judicial review is available. Cf. Allan v. Durand, 137 N. J. L. 30, 32-33 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
*218However, an action in lieu of the former prerogative writ of mandamus is appropriate under B. S. 11:16 — 1, as amended by L. 1947, c. 201, sec. 5, to compel certification of the plaintiff’s pay, and similar relief to restore the plaintiff to the performance of his duties seems to be within the judicial power. This course constitutes at the most a collateral attack on the suspension order, and the jurisdiction obtains to resolve the issue of existence of the asserted power. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569 (D. C. D. C. 1952), affirmed 343 U. S. 579, 72 S. Ct. 863, 96 L. Ed. 1153 (1952).
Por the reasons hereinabove expressed I would reverse the judgment of the Superior Court, Law Division, and remand the matter to the Superior Court, Law Division, for reinstatement of the complaint and for further proceedings in accordance with the pertinent rules of practice and procedure.
Mr. Chief Justice Vanderbilt and Mr. Justice Oliphant join in this dissent.
For affirmance — Justices Heiler, Wachenfeld, Jacobs and Brennan — 4.
For reversal — Chief Justice Vanderbilt, and Justices Oliphant and Burling — 3.