Court Opinion

ID: 9556021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-15 21:00:29.282973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:43:55.535360
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-4339

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        CEDRICK TYLER ARMSTRONG, a/k/a Squeeze,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
        Raleigh. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (5:19-cr-00450-D-1)

        Submitted: June 28, 2023                                          Decided: August 14, 2023

        Before RICHARDSON and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit
        Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: W. Michael Dowling, THE DOWLING FIRM PLLC, Raleigh, North
        Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon,
        Assistant United States Attorney, Ashley H. Foxx, Assistant United States Attorney,
        OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               A jury convicted Cedrick Tyler Armstrong of possession of a firearm and

        ammunition after having been convicted of a felony offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

        §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2018). 1 The district court sentenced Armstrong to 120 months’

        imprisonment. Armstrong appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress

        evidence and the admission of a statement made by Armstrong’s coconspirator. We affirm.

               During the hearing on Armstrong’s motion to suppress, Investigator Todd Williams

        of the Wendell, North Carolina Police Department testified that, on October 12, 2018, he

        observed Armstrong driving a Jeep. Williams had prior knowledge from numerous prior

        interactions with Armstrong that Armstrong’s driver’s license had been indefinitely

        suspended in 2007 and had remained suspended during the eight years that Williams had

        been a police officer in Wendell. Williams had last checked Armstrong’s license status in

        June 2018. Williams testified that, upon observing Armstrong driving the Jeep, he had

        reason to believe that Armstrong was committing a traffic violation by driving without a

        valid license.

               Williams observed Armstrong drive the Jeep into the driveway of a house that

        Williams had under surveillance due to reports of drug activity at that location. Williams

               1
                 Section 924(a)(2) was amended and no longer provides the penalty for § 922(g)
        convictions; the new penalty provision in 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8) sets forth a statutory
        maximum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment for a § 922(g) offense. See Bipartisan Safer
        Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 117-159, § 12004(c), 136 Stat. 1313, 1329 (2022). The 15-
        year statutory maximum does not apply in this case, however, because Armstrong’s offense
        was committed before the June 25, 2022, amendment to the statute.

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        was familiar with the occupants of the house and their vehicle. Williams observed a man

        pacing in the front yard of the house. This man was not known to Williams to be an

        occupant of the residence, and Williams had not previously seen this man at that residence.

        Williams also noted that the occupant’s vehicle was not visible, leading him to conclude

        that the occupants of the residence were not home.

               As Williams continued to observe, Armstrong approached the man in the yard and

        the two men entered the residence. Minutes later, Williams watched the men carry a flat

        screen television out of the house and place it in the Jeep. The men went back into the

        house. When they again emerged, Williams saw that the other man was carrying a bag or

        a bundle and that Armstrong did not appear to be carrying anything. The unknown man

        got into the driver’s seat of the Jeep, Armstrong got into the passenger seat, and the men

        drove away from the residence.

               Williams had previously arrested Armstrong on robbery and drug charges, and he

        had knowledge that Armstrong had been implicated in a robbery of a house in this same

        area earlier in the year. Although Williams did not see burglary tools or any evidence that

        the men forced their way into the house, he was aware from an incident report from earlier

        that week that entry into this house could be gained by the use of a stiff card, like a credit

        card or an identification card. Williams testified that he believed the two men were

        committing a crime and, as the Jeep left the house, he followed and initiated a traffic stop.

               During the traffic stop, the driver, who was identified as Michael Lee Kent, opened

        the glove compartment, and Williams observed a white powdery substance in a baggie in

        the glove compartment. When Williams inquired what it was, Armstrong denied that there

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        were drugs in the vehicle and handed the baggie to Williams. Williams field tested the

        substance, which tested positive for cocaine. Williams then informed Kent that the

        substance was positive for cocaine and asked him to step out of the vehicle. Kent initially

        started to comply, and Williams started to place handcuffs on Kent. When Armstrong

        protested, Kent resisted Williams’ efforts, put the Jeep into gear, and drove off—dragging

        Williams for 25 to 30 feet and running over Williams’ foot. Kent and Armstrong engaged

        law enforcement in a high speed chase, during which shots were fired from their vehicle at

        the pursuing officer. That officer backed off and eventually lost sight of the Jeep. The

        officers subsequently learned that Kent had been living at the house Williams had under

        surveillance and that the television and other property he removed was his.

               The officers tracked Armstrong and Kent to an address in Raleigh, North Carolina,

        from which the officers recovered a firearm and ammunition matching a shell casing that

        was found along Kent and Armstrong’s flight route and a live round of ammunition that

        was found in the Jeep.

               Armstrong was arrested and charged with possession of a firearm and ammunition

        by a felon. He asserted that the traffic stop was unlawful and moved to suppress evidence

        discovered as a result of the traffic stop and the subsequent events, including the search of

        the house that resulted in the discovery of the firearm and ammunition. The district court

        determined that the traffic stop was valid and was supported by Williams’ reasonable

        suspicion that Armstrong had committed a traffic violation and, alternatively, by Williams’

        reasonable suspicion that Armstrong and Kent had committed a burglary of the residence

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        from which they removed the television and other property. The court therefore denied

        Armstrong’s motion to suppress evidence.

               On appeal from an order denying a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s

        legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Sueiro,

        59 F.4th 132, 139 (4th Cir. 2023). We may find clear error “only if we are left with the

        definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”             United States v.

        Crawford, 734 F.3d 339, 342 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

        Moreover, “[w]hen reviewing factual findings for clear error, we particularly defer to a

        district court’s credibility determinations, for it is the role of the district court to observe

        witnesses and weigh their credibility during a pre-trial motion to suppress.” United

        States v. Pulley, 987 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).

        Additionally, we “must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing

        party and give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and law

        enforcement officers.” United States v. Lull, 824 F.3d 109, 114-15 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal

        quotation marks omitted).

               “An officer may stop and briefly detain a person when the officer has reasonable,

        articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal

        activity.” United States v. Montieth, 662 F.3d 660, 665 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation

        marks omitted). For such an investigative stop to be lawful, the “police officer must be

        able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences

        from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).

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               A police officer may conduct a traffic stop of a vehicle based upon the officer’s

        reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred. Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct.

        1183, 1187-88 (2020). Such a stop is lawful even for a minor traffic violation, such as

        driving with a revoked license. Id. at 1190.

               Armstrong contends that Williams’ failure to verify the status of Armstrong’s

        driver’s license prior to initiating the traffic stop renders the stop unlawful. Based on our

        review of the record and the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the district

        court did not clearly err in finding that Williams’ belief that Armstrong had committed a

        traffic violation was reasonable and that the traffic stop was lawful. 2 See Sueiro, 59 F.4th

        at 139 (providing standard); Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1188 (stating that courts must permit

        officers to make “commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior” (citation

        omitted)). Accordingly, the district court properly denied Armstrong’s motion to suppress

        evidence discovered as a result of the traffic stop and the subsequent events, including the

               2
                  Armstrong contends that the district court did not account for Williams’ testimony
        in the state court that he had checked Armstrong’s driving status just prior to the traffic
        stop. He asserts that the failure to have verified that Armstrong’s license was suspended
        contemporaneously with the traffic stop defeats reasonable suspicion. During the
        suppression hearing, when asked about his state court testimony, Williams admitted that
        he “misspoke during that testimony” and explained that at that time, it was his “recollection
        that [he] ran [the report] that day. [He] did run [the report] that day, just not at that
        moment.” We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding Williams
        credible and in ruling that he had reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation justifying the
        traffic stop. See Pulley, 987 F.3d at 376 (requiring deference to district court’s credibility
        determinations).

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        firearm and ammunition discovered during the search of the house at which Armstrong and

        Kent were arrested. 3

               Armstrong also contends on appeal that the district court erred by admitting into

        evidence a portion of a recorded jail phone conversation in which Kent described the events

        of October 12, 2018. Armstrong concedes that most of Kent’s statement describing the

        events is admissible. He contends, however, that “the discrete statement that Kent made

        during this call that ‘Bruh star[t]s shooting’ was not against Kent’s penal interest” and

        therefore the district court erred in admitting that statement.

               We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of

        discretion, viewing the “evidence in the light most favorable to the proponent[ and]

        maximizing its probative value and minimizing its prejudicial effect.”            Burgess v.

        Goldstein, 997 F.3d 541, 559 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, we

        “will overturn an evidentiary ruling only if it is arbitrary and irrational.” Id. (internal

        quotation marks omitted). And we will not overturn a conviction due to an erroneous

        evidentiary ruling if the error is harmless—that is, if we “can say with fair assurance, after

        pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the

        judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.” Id. at 561 (internal quotation marks

        omitted).

               In light of our ruling, we need not consider the district court’s alternative bases for
               3

        denying Armstrong’s motion to suppress evidence.

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               Rule 804(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows the admission of an out of

        court statement by an unavailable declarant if (1) a “reasonable person in the declarant’s

        position would have made [the statement] only if the person believed it to be true because,

        when made, it was so contrary to the declarant’s proprietary or pecuniary interest or had so

        great a tendency to invalidate the declarant’s claim against someone else or to expose the

        declarant to civil or criminal liability” and (2) the statement “is supported by corroborating

        circumstances that clearly indicate its trustworthiness, if it is offered in a criminal case as

        one that tends to expose the declarant to criminal liability.” Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3).

               Rule 804(b)(3) only allows the admission of the self-inculpatory portions of a

        hearsay statement. Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 599, 604 (1994). It does

        not permit the admission of statements concerning the roles of other individuals in the

        alleged crime. Id. at 599-600. Whether a statement is “self-inculpatory” requires an

        analysis of the statement in the context and may be a matter of interpretation. Id. at 603.

        “A declarant’s statement is not magically transformed from a statement against penal

        interest into one that is inadmissible merely because the declarant names another person or

        implicates a possible codefendant.” Id. at 606 (Scalia, J., concurring).

               In ruling that the entirety of Kent’s statement, including the reference to Armstrong

        shooting at the police officers, was admissible, the district court found that the reference to

        Armstrong shooting “directly implicate[d] and inculpate[d] Kent in criminal conduct.” We

        agree with the district court’s reasoning that Kent’s statement that Armstrong shot at the

        police was “also inculpatory as to Kent based on either a conspiracy theory or an aiding

        and abetting theory.” The shooting took place as Kent and Armstrong were engaged in

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        joint criminal activity of attempting to flee from the police. Accordingly, the district court

        did not clearly err in finding that Kent’s statement about Armstrong’s criminal actions in

        furtherance of that joint activity was against Kent’s penal interest. See Burgess, 997 F.3d

        at 559; see also Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-48 (1946) (stating standard

        for coconspirator liability).

               In any event, our review of the record establishes that overwhelming evidence—

        outside of this challenged statement—supported the jury’s determination that Armstrong

        was in possession of a firearm and ammunition on October 12, 2018. Accordingly, we

        conclude that any error in the admission of this portion of Kent’s statement was harmless.

               We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Armstrong’s motion to suppress

        and affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

        legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument

        would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                         AFFIRMED

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