Court Opinion

ID: 9458426
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:51:47.679378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:45.708853
License: Public Domain

JOHNSEN, Senior Circuit Judge,
in supplemental dissent.
Modification and substitution has now been made as to subdivision V of the previously-filed majority opinion. For convenience and facilitation in checking whether this represents anything more than a language change, I set out the modifications.
A.
The statements in the second and third sentences of the first paragraph of the subdivision as previously filed, reading,
“ * * * McDonnell made little effort to show that Green’s participation in the ‘stall-in’ would affect his ability to perform the job or to work harmoniously with other employees and supervisors. We need to evaluate this position in light of our cases dealing with job discrimination based on race”,
have been changed to read,
“* * * McDonnell rested its case upon a showing that Green had participated in unlawful civil rights activities as reasons for declining to rehire him.”
B.
Paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of the subdivision as previously filed, reading,
“When a black man demonstrates that he possesses the qualifications to fill a job opening and that he was denied the job, we think he presents a prima facie case of racial discrimination and that the burden passes to the employer to demonstrate a substantial relationship between the reasons offered for denying employment and the requirements of the job. Here, McDonnell has not demonstrated by any *354testimony or other evidence that Green’s participation in the ‘stall-in’ would impede his ability to perform the job for which he applied. There is no evidence that Green’s conduct would cause fellow employees or supervisors to refuse to cooperate with Green, thereby disrupting plant operations.
“In this connection, we note that McDonnell employs over thirty thousand men and women at its St. Louis plant. The record demonstrates that few employees were actually affected by the ‘stall-in’. We recognize that an employee’s participation in an activity such as a ‘stall-in’ could impede his ability to work harmoniously in surroundings characterized by close personal, or working, relationships among employees or between employees and management. This problem might be present at McDonnell, but the record is bare on this point. This aspect of the case remains for further exploration. On remand, McDonnell will have the opportunity to present evidence on this matter.
“We do not, as does the dissent, construe this remand as a command to McDonnell to rehire Green. The remand is required because the district court did not use the correct standard in determining whether McDonnell’s refusal to rehire Green was racially motivated. If McDonnell can demonstrate that Green’s participation in the ‘stall-in’ in some objective way reflects adversely upon job performance, McDonnell’s refusal to rehire Green will be justified. But, if McDonnell’s refusal to rehire Green rests upon management’s personal dislike for Green or personal distaste for his conduct in the civil rights field, Green is entitled to some relief.”,
have been changed to read (omitting here the footnote),
“When a black man demonstrates that he possesses the qualifications to fill a job opening and that he has been denied the job which continues to remain open, we think he presents a prima facie case of racial discrimination. However, an applicant’s past participation in unlawful conduct directed at his prospective employer might indicate the applicant’s lack of a responsible attitude toward performing work for that employer.
“Of the several civil rights protests which Green directed against McDonnell, the employer selected two, the ‘lock-in’ and the ‘stall-in’, as reasons for its refusal to rehire Green. Green should be given the opportunity to show that these reasons offered by the company were pretextual, or otherwise show the presence of racial discriminatory hiring practices by McDonnell which affected its decision.
“The district court did not use appropriate standards in determining whether McDonnell’s refusal to hire Green was racially motivated. On remand, both parties will have the opportunity to present evidence on this matter.”
C.
I am not certain as to the intended effect of these changes, and I suspect that the district court also will have difficulty in trying to assess the significance of the substituted language.
Thus, while the previous indication in the first paragraph of the subdivision has been stricken that McDonnell was required “to show that Green’s participation in the ‘stall-in’ would affect his ability to perform the job or to work harmoniously with other employees and supervisors”, the statement has been left standing in subdivision IV that “Additionally, as discussed in part V below, the district court failed to consider whether the reasons given by McDonnell for not rehiring Green were related to the requirements of the job”.
Further, the language used in the third paragraph of subdivision Y, as to the burden resting on McDonnell “to demonstrate a substantial relationship between the reasons offered for denying employment and the requirements of the job” *355and that “McDonnell has not demonstrated by any testimony or other evidence that Green’s participation in the ‘stall-in’ would impede his ability to perform the job for which he applied”, has now been changed to read, “However, an applicant’s past participation in unlawful conduct directed at his prospective employer might indicate the applicant’s lack of a responsible attitude toward performing work for that employer”.
The difficulty I have with all this is that the opinion continues to adhere to the position that such unlawful acts as Green committed against McDonnell would not legally entitle McDonnell to refuse to hire him, even though no racial motivation was involved, although they would entitle and would cause it to do so in the case of white persons. In taking the position that such unlawful and immediate misdeeds do not of themselves, even though no racial motivation is involved, provide a sufficient basis for McDonnell to refuse to hire Green, the majority thus are holding, not that Green is entitled to the same opportunity as a white, but that he is entitled to one of a different and greater degree.
As indicated in my original dissent, I am not able to read Title VII of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1964 as providing for such an inherently different employment opportunity or such a curbing employer prescription, nor do I believe that Congress, as a matter of respect for law adherence, would presume to impose such a requirement of business condonation upon employers in respect to the commission of unlawful acts against them, such as are here involved. And in the majority’s holding that, even though no racial motivation was involved, McDonnell was not entitled to refuse to hire Green because of his unlawful misdeeds against it, but that something more than this would have to exist in the situation, I confess that I am not able to see any practical difference, so far as McDonnell’s situation is concerned, between the opinion’s original statement, that it must be shown that the hiring of Green would result in “disrupting plant operations” and its substituted statement that “an applicant’s past participation in unlawful conduct directed at his prospective employer might indicate the applicant’s lack of a responsible attitude toward performing work for that employer”.
Any proof that would be possible in attempting to show that Green would be an industrial handicap to the operation of the plant, would necessarily involve opinion or subjective testimony which, as pointed out in my original dissent, the majority opinion declares to be of “little weight in rebutting charges of discrimination”.
I do not desire to prolong this discussion further, except to reiterate, as noted in my original dissent, that I believe the majority have engaged in a mistaken interpretation of the holding in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). I adhere to my original dissent, with this supplemental expression added.