Court Opinion

ID: 9644206
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:50:08.224185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:52.833681
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge,
concurring:
The difference between Behrend and this case is that in Behrend the telephone company did not plead the Commission’s primary jurisdiction, but in this case it did. Primary jurisdiction having been pleaded, the lower court properly remitted the matter to the Commission, for at least counts two, three, and four of the complaint concern the adequacy of the service provided by the telephone company, which is a matter within the Commission’s jurisdiction. Where I differ with the majority’s opinion is in its statement, or at least implication, that the first count of the complaint also concerned matters within the Commission’s jurisdiction. I do not think it did; at least I am not sure.
The first count of the complaint alleged, inter alia, that correctly dialed numbers resulted in connections with wrong numbers, and that even when correct connections were made, conversations could not be carried on because of low volume or static, or because of disconnections. Complaint, paragraphs 7 10. These incidents occurred, it is further alleged, because of the telephone company’s negligent and wilful “fail[ure] to maintain its equipment in proper and adequate repair and in failing to use reasonable care in the operation and maintenance of the WATS line telephone service and its telephone system, thereby failing to provide reasonable, rapid and efficient service.” Complaint, paragraph 12. These allegations are at least arguably within the following passage from Behrend:
The question of utility policy as it affects the public is not now before this court, nor is the determination of the *512reasonableness or adequacy of Bell’s methods of providing service. This is an action for damages and the fact that the regulation of utility service is exclusively in the PUC’s jurisdiction does not remove from the court’s jurisdiction an action for damages based on a failure of service, any more than the PUC’s power to promulgate safety regulations prohibits the courts from hearing a claim for personal injuries resulting from unsafe utility equipment.
242 Pa.Super. at 58, 368 A.2d at 1158 (citations omitted).
I think the majority’s treatment of the first count may be correct, if it means to say that when a plaintiff pleads a utility’s negligent failure to maintain adequate service, the proper procedure is: first, referral to the appropriate agency to decide the standards of “adequate service”; second, if the agency finds the utility’s service to have been inadequate, referral back to the court for decision on the issues of negligence and damages. See Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 19.01 (1958 & Supps. 1970,1976); Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 409 U.S. 289, 302-06, 93 S.Ct. 573, 34 L.Ed.2d 525 (1973); United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 353, 83 S.Ct. 1715,10 L.Ed.2d 915 (1963); Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574, 72 S.Ct. 492, 96 L.Ed. 576 (1952). However, I cannot tell if this is the majority’s rule. Without clarification, the majority’s decision in this case, when read with Behrend, will, I fear, confuse the members of the trial bench and bar when they are next confronted with a similar case.
I nevertheless concur in the result reached by the majority because of Studio’s failure to appeal from the Commission’s order. Whether or not the first count of the complaint was properly before the Commission, Studio treated it as though it were. If Studio disagreed with the Commission’s disposition, it was obliged to challenge the Commission’s order, not collaterally before this court, but by direct appeal.