Court Opinion

ID: 9839360
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-12 21:00:38.246953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:22.337248
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-4532

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        SHELLY ANNE LEIPHAM,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at
        Clarksburg. Thomas S. Kleeh, Chief District Judge. (1:21-cr-00019-TSK-MJA-1)

        Submitted: August 30, 2023                                  Decided: September 11, 2023

        Before GREGORY, RICHARDSON and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Brian J. Kornbrath, Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL
        PUBLIC DEFENDER, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. William Ihlenfeld,
        Wheeling, West Virginia, United States Attorney, Sarah E. Wagner, Assistant United
        States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Clarksburg, West
        Virginia, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

              Shelly Anne Leipham was convicted on three counts of wire fraud, in violation of

        18 U.S.C. § 1343, five counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and three

        counts of money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). She was

        sentenced to 87 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Leipham argues that the district court

        erred by admitting at trial incriminating statements she made to law enforcement after her

        arrest and prior to receiving warnings in accordance with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.

        436 (1966). We affirm.

              We review a district court’s legal conclusions underlying a suppression

        determination de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Guijon-

        Ortiz, 660 F.3d 757, 762 (4th Cir. 2011). A defendant subject to custodial interrogation

        must be advised of her Miranda rights. United States v. Azua-Rinconada, 914 F.3d 319,

        325 (4th Cir. 2019). “Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words

        or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and

        custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating

        response from the suspect.” United States v. Bernard, 927 F.3d 799, 806 (4th Cir. 2019)

        (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)); see also United States v. Bell,

        901 F.3d 455, 463–64 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding that subtle compulsion alone is insufficient

        to qualify an officer’s remarks as interrogation under Innis). However, “when the police

        have no reason to expect that a question will lead a suspect to incriminate himself, that

        question cannot constitute an interrogation under Miranda.” United States v. Johnson, 734

        F.3d 270, 277 (4th Cir. 2013). Moreover, “the failure to administer a Miranda warning . . .

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        is harmless if it is clear that a rational factfinder would have found the defendant guilty

        absent the error.” Bernard, 927 F.3d at 807.

               After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court did not err in

        admitting the contested statements. Although Leipham was in custody at the time she made

        the incriminating statements, neither was she subject to interrogation, nor did the officers

        make any statements to Leipham that were designed to elicit a response or incriminating

        statements for purposes of Miranda. Here, any error in introducing the statements was

        harmless given the substantial evidence linking Leipham to her crimes.

               Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral

        argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

        before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                     AFFIRMED

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