Court Opinion

ID: 9846754
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:47:59.695918+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:47.726375
License: Public Domain

KRUCKER, Judge
(dissents).
I cannot agree with the conclusion of the majority opinion that the State introduced sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. The rule that as an appellate court we are to view the evidence in a light most favorable to upholding the conviction does not require us to perform the acrobatics which the majority did in their efforts to glean from the evidence sufficient facts to make out the elements of grand theft.
*206In a criminal trial for the crime of theft, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt three elements: (1) a taking, or caption, of the personal property of another; (2) a carrying away, or asportation; and (3) criminal intent. In the case at hand, the State proved the following things: (a) that the defendant drove a 1957 Dodge into the gas station at 7:00 p. m.; (b) while defendant was there having his car serviced, the cash register was stolen; (c) that one-half hour later a “dark car” was driven into a desert area close to the service station; (d) that the next morning the stolen cash register was found in the area where the “dark car” had been driven; (e) that tire tracks near where the cash register was found matched the car that had been driven by the defendant at 7:00 the prior evening; (f) that a hubcap found near where the cash register was found fitted the car driven by defendant; (g) that a piece of the cash register found in the car driven by defendant matched a broken part in the cash register stolen from the service station.
There is no showing of defendant’s agency in the theft in any respect. The state did not show that he took the cash register, that he carried it away or that he entered into any conspiracy with anyone to commit the crime, or that he had any intent to commit crime. There is positive testimony by the station attendant that the defendant was not out of the car or the driver’s seat, and there is no testimony that any other person was at the scene at that time. There is no testimony directly connecting the defendant with the theft of the register. There were no other charges filed against any other person in connection with this incident. There was no showing that the “dark car” seen by Mrs. Smith was the Dodge. There was no time link established putting the Dodge in the desert area that night. It is easy to hypothesize that the Dodge was driven there before or after the time alleged. The hubcap found on the scene is decorated with a FORD emblem. There is no testimony as to the kind of hubcaps on the other three-wheels of the Dodge, only that there was: one missing.
Mere presence at the scene of the crime-is insufficient to establish guilt. State v. George, 95 Ariz. 366, 390 P.2d 899 (1964). All that is present here are the facts described above plus the testimony of the-other incident which, according to the majority opinion, “* * * tends, in some degree, to eliminate the hypothesis of coincidence.” Since there was never a conviction or even a charge made against anyone arising out of the incident at the Plummer garage. I am at a loss to see how the testimony of defendant’s presence there is relevant to prove anything, much less to be-used as a tenuous link in the chain of circumstantial evidence which the majority opinion deems sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused. All the “prior bad acts” cases cited by the-majority concerns situations where the defendant was closely connected with an actual crime. Here, the jury was merely presented a chain of circumstantial evidence with which to speculate. I believe-that this case can be disinguished from State v. Mendibles, 5 Ariz.App. 463, 428 P.2d 127 (1967). In Mendibles, the circumstantial evidence went to the jury, besides being much stronger, tended directly to prove elements of the crime charged,, while in the instant case the facts relied on can only serve to raise a weak inference, indirectly connecting the defendant with the commission of the crime. The trial court should have granted defendant’s-motion for a directed verdict of acquittal..
In State v. Hughes, 102 Ariz. 118, 426 P.2d 386 (1967), the court said that circumstantial evidence may properly be considered as proof of a crime only when it is consistent with the theory of guilt of the defendant and is inconsistent with every reasonable hypothesis of his innocence. Here,, coincidence is not eliminated. We can. still reasonably hypothesize that defendant might not have known that the cash register-was stolen while he was in the service. *207station, or that defendant might not have been present when the cash register was carried away and broken into, or that defendant might have been deceived into being a decoy by the owner of the car which he was driving at the time of the theft. There is no testimony as to how long after defendant drove into the gas station he retained possession of the car, or where the owner of the car was during and after the time of the theft. In State v. Alkhowarizmi, 101 Ariz. 514, 421 P.2d 871 (1966), when faced with a much stronger chain of circumstantial evidence than in the present case, the Arizona Supreme Court reversed a conviction for sodomy, stating:
“ * * * the circumstances proven by the state must not only be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, but also must be inconsistent with any hypothesis or theory which would establish or tend to establish his innocence.” (Emphasis supplied)
I do not feel that the State has established a chain of circumstantial evidence inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence in this case. The evidence put on falls woefully short of the mark and leaves too many pertinent questions unanswered to allow me to conclude that there is no reasonable doubt that defendant did not commit the crime charged.
The conviction should be reversed.