Court Opinion

ID: 9844632
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:05:47.468797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:39.334627
License: Public Domain

BAKES, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in that part of the Court’s opinion which concludes that ‘the trial court was correct in ruling that the elements for establishing negligent misrepresentation were not proved and, therefore, the jury verdict for plaintiff cannot stand and must be vacated.’ Ante at 19. Having thus concluded ‘that the plaintiff did not present substantial competent evidence bringing this case within that doctrine ...’ the balance of the Court’s discussion in the opinion regarding the elements of a cause of negligent misrepresentation under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 552, is unnecessary dicta, and will only tend to confuse the law of this state, particularly in view of our recent decision in the case of Idaho Bank & Trust v. KMG Main Hurdman, [115] Idaho [1082], 772 P.2d 720 (1989), in which this Court just this year, when urged to adopt the tort of negligent representation as set out in Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 552, stated, ‘We decline to adopt the Restatement standard.’ [115] Idaho at [1084], 772 P.2d at 722. The Court having recently spoken on that issue, the Court’s dicta today is unfortunate.
I dissent from the Court’s decision ordering a new trial in this case. The majority reverses the trial court’s judgment notwithstanding the verdict and denial of a new trial, holding that ‘[t]he tendering to the jury of an inapplicable legal theory was certainly an irregularity in the proceedings, and an abuse of discretion which prevented Hudson from having a fair trial.’ Ante at 20. However, the parties chose the theory upon which they tried the case, and this Court has consistently held that ‘the parties to an action are bound by the theory on which they try it.’ Idaho Gold Dredging Corp. v. Boise Payette Lumber Co., 52 Idaho 766, 776, 22 P.2d 147, 150 (1933); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Wedgwood, 57 Idaho 682, 687, 69 P.2d 128, 129 (1937). It is difficult for me to understand how it can be an ‘irregularity’ or ‘an abuse of discretion’ to submit a case to the jury upon the theories which the parties select, and to which no objection is made. And I certainly hope that the majority opinion today does not stand for the proposition that every time a trial court grants a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, it must also grant a new trial because an ‘inapplicable legal theory’ has been tendered to the jury which, as a matter of law, is an ‘irregularity in the proceedings, and an abuse of discretion *513which prevent [the litigant] from having a fair trial.’ Ante at 20.
1989 Slip Op. 16-22 (emphasis in original).