Court Opinion

ID: 9561520
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:11:04.00378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:50.853752
License: Public Domain

Agid, J.
(dissenting) — I cannot agree with the majority's disposition of this case because an exceptional sentence based on the defendant's callous disregard for the effects of *220chemical abuse is not the same as one based on the now-impermissible aggravating factor of "future dangerousness".
Bolton, who admitted to the presentence writer and the trial court that he has been abusing alcohol since age 10, killed another person while driving with a blood alcohol level of .29. Although he has been in treatment for his alcoholism twice and admitted to the court that alcohol has rendered him dysfunctional in most aspects of life, he is aware of and continues to disregard the effects of alcohol on his behavior. The presentence report described this history:21
[Bolton] began using alcohol when he was 10 years old and he has had a number of Driving While Intoxicated citations, alcohol-related accidents, job losses, school problems, and relationship problems with the opposite sex as a result of his alcohol abuse. He has continued to abuse alcohol since the offense described in this report and had another Driving While Intoxicated and Hit and Run accident which has not yet been disposed of in King County. . . .
Bolton has been involved in substance abuse treatment on two occasions. His first treatment effort was at Milam Recovery Center where he said he left three days before he was scheduled to finish the treatment program because counselors were "pressuring" him. He later completed a 21 day treatment program at Cedar Hills but has never voluntarily participated in Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous. His drinking has continued with only minor interruptions since he was 10 years old.
This court has recognized callous disregard for the effects of chemical use as an aggravating factor in a number of cases. The first case to do so was State v. Weaver, 46 Wn. App. 35, 43, 729 P.2d 64 (1986) (quoting State v. Loitz, 366 *221N.W.2d 744, 746 (MLnii. Ct. App. 1985)), review denied, 107 Wn.2d 1031 (1987).22 There the court stated that
[w]hile intoxication at the time of the offense is not a valid factor, ... a history of chemical abuse and disregard for its effects is a valid factor to consider.
The same aggravating factor was upheld in State v. Roberts, 55 Wn. App. 573, 582-83, 779 P.2d 732, review denied, 113 Wn.2d 1026 (1989) and State v. Thomas, 57 Wn. App. 403, 408, 788 P.2d 24 (using a future dangerousness rationale with callous disregard as one element of the analysis), review denied, 115 Wn.2d 1003 (1990); State v. Dunivan, 57 Wn. App. 332, 337, 788 P.2d 576 (1990) (recognizing callous disregard as an aggravating factor although facts did not support its use in this case).
The majority takes the position that disregard for the effects of substance abuse is the same as future dangerousness. Therefore, it reasons, callous disregard for chemical abuse is no longer a permitted basis for an exceptional sentence because the Supreme Court held in State v. Barnes, 117 Wn.2d 701, 818 P.2d 1088 (1991) that future dangerousness may only be used as an aggravating factor in cases where the defendant was convicted of a sex offense.23 This *222view overlooks the significant differences between callous disregard and future dangerousness.24
Future dangerousness is a judicial prediction of the "likelihood [that] an individual may pose a danger to the public in the future." (Italics mine.) State v. Pryor, 115 Wn.2d 445, 454, 799 P.2d 244 (1990). Therefore, a sentence in which the court relies on future dangerousness as an aggravating factor must include an evaluation of amenability to treatment, as this "is crucial in assessing" what the defendant may be expected to do after he is released from confinement. Pryor, at 454.
The callous disregard aggravating factor says nothing about what the defendant may do at some future time. Rather, it focuses on the defendant's especially culpable mental state at the time of the offense.25 It is the defendant's proven awareness of a serious substance abuse problem which has, in the past, led to similar criminal behavior, accompanied by an unwillingness to take steps to cure the problem, that makes *223him more culpable when he again repeats the behavior than he would be if he had not had prior warnings and an opportunity to change his behavior. Thus, greater culpability is a valid basis for an exceptional sentence because it makes the charged offense "more onerous than that contemplated by the Legislature when it established the standard sentence range" for the offense. Weaver, 46 Wn. App. at 43; see also Roberts, 55 Wn. App. at 582-83; Dunivan, 57 Wn. App. at 337-38.
This is not the same rationale as that employed in the future dángerousness analysis where the focus is on protecting society from a person who, because he is not amenable to treatment, presents a significant danger of reoffending in the future. See, e.g., Pryor, 115 Wn.2d at 454; State v. Post, 118 Wn.2d 596, 616, 826 P.2d 172 (1992) (protection of the public is invalid as a separate aggravating factor because it "is the very rationale of the future dangerousness factor").
I do not read the remand in State v. Craft, noted at 118 Wn.2d 1015 (1992), as mandating reversal in this case. The trial court in Craft did not rely on callous disregard of the effects of alcohol abuse in imposing an exceptional sentence. It did rely, in part, on its prediction that Craft was and would continue to be a threat to the community; i.e., future dangerousness. This court recognized that the trial court's exceptional sentence was based on future dangerousness in its unpublished opinion remanding the case to the trial court for reconsideration of its exceptional sentence. State v. Craft, noted at 64 Wn. App. 1007 (1992). No mention was made of the callous disregard rationale by this court or by the trial court. Thus, the majority must rely on its conclusion that callous disregard and future dangerousness are the same factor and respond to identical sentencing concerns in order to conclude that the trial court in Craft cannot rely on callous disregard when it resentences the defendant. Because I disagree with that major premise, I cannot agree that, by remanding Craft, the Supreme Court rejected callous disregard of the effects of chemical abuse as a separate, valid aggravating factor.
I agree with the majority, for the reasons stated in its opinion, that the trial court could not rely on the pending *224charges in King County. However, because I believe callous disregard is neither the same as future dangerousness nor an impermissible aggravating factor in a vehicular homicide case, I would remand the case to the trial court to determine whether the court would still impose an exceptional sentence disregarding the pending charges.

Bolton disputed none of the facts in the presentence report at sentencing. His attorney stated that Bolton had given "complete and accurate" information to the presentence writer. Bolton told the sentencing judge: "I've been troubled all my life because of alcoholism ... I have never had any responsibility because I've always been drunk." Under ROW 9.94A.370(2), the trial court may properly consider any information not disputed by the defendant, including information in the presentence report to which he does not object.

Because the Minnesota statute is similar in many respects to ours, Washington courts frequently rely on cases from Minnesota in interpreting the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981. State v. Collicott, 118 Wn.2d 649, 658 n.15, 827 P.2d 263 (1992); State v. Nordby, 106 Wn.2d 514, 521, 723 P.2d 1117 (1986).

It should be noted that Barnes does not rule out all indices of "dangerousness" as grounds for exceptional sentences in cases other than those involving sex offenses. For example, in State v. McAlpin, 108 Wn.2d 458, 740 P.2d 824 (1987), the court held that it was proper to consider the defendant's convictions prior to age 15 even though they could not be counted in the standard range. "Society is entitled to view the long-term repeater of crimes from an early age as a greater threat and as requiring longer institutional supervision than one whose criminal proclivities are not as deeply ingrained." 108 Wn.2d at 464. Accord, Dunivan, 57 Wn. App. at 337 (trial court may consider "washed out" convictions as an aggravating factor in a vehicular homicide case).

Tbis confusion is not unique to the majority in this case. In at least three cases, the court has treated the "callous disregard" aggravating factor as a component of the future dangerousness factor. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 53 Wn. App. 306, 315, 766 P.2d 1120, review denied, 112 Wn.2d 1015 (1989); State v. Campas, 59 Wn. App. 561, 565, 799 P.2d 744 (1990), remanded, 118 Wn.2d 1014 (1992); State v. Thomas, supra. In these cases, the courts cite a history of substance abuse, combined with treatment and counseling and followed by continued disregard for the effects of chronic abuse of alcohol or drugs, as supporting the conclusion that the "defendant poses a significant threat to society of continued criminal activity... [and] supporting] a finding of future dangerousness." Davis, 53 Wn. App. at 315. In those cases the defendant is, as the majority says, punished in part for a voluntary failure "to profit from [alcohol] treatment". Majority, at 217. However, if we recognize that the callous disregard factor is confined to past behavior, rejection of or failing in substance abuse treatment is simply an indication that the defendant is, in fact, aware that he has a serious substance abuse problem, has been made aware of its effects and nevertheless chooses to ignore them. While he may be compelled by his addiction to alcohol to drink, it does not compel him to drive or to commit a crime.

In other contexts, the Supreme Court has recognized that a greater level of culpability than that accounted for by the Legislature in the presumptive sentencing range is an appropriate basis for an exceptional sentence. See, e.g., State v. Batista, 116 Wn.2d 777, 787-88, 808 P.2d 1141 (1991) (where facts establish a higher level of culpability than is accounted for in the standard range, an exceptional sentence maybe imposed); State v. Fisher, 108 Wn.2d 419, 428, 739 P.2d 683 (1987) (same).