Court Opinion

ID: 9789983
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:44:48.87431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:25.543024
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Knauss
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. Certainly I am not unmindful of the tragic consequences resulting to plaintiff from the unfortunate accident detailed in the record. Never*590theless I must dissent, for it is not every untoward result of an accident which gives rise to a claim sustainable in a judicial proceeding. Too often of late, actions have been determined by the tragic results suffered by a claimant rather than by the settled law applicable to the particular case.
The' majority opinion states that “one does not' stand in the guest relationship where the circumstances of passenger relationship arises involuntarily or forcibly. * * * So also where the transportation results from fraud on the part of the driver or operator, the consent or acceptance is thereby void and the passenger cannot be. held’ to have waived his or her rights to bring an action for injuries occasioned by the ordinary negligence of the driver.”
The record in the instant case' is devoid of any evidence indicating that the plaintiff “involuntarily or forcibly” entered defendant’s car. On the contrary, the testimony indicates that plaintiff was not only a willing but an anxious guest.
In the majority opinion it is admitted that defendant was guilty of nothing more than simple negligence in momentarily taking his eyes from the road while passing the'tennis courts, and that such negligence does not give rise to an enforceable claim against defendant for the damages ensuing under the guest statute. It is then argued that plaintiff was not a guest because defendant falsely represented that he had a driver’s license. It is manifest from the record that the only person deceived by this statement was plaintiff’s mother, who had no direct communication with defendant, and that plaintiff was a willing if not an anxious guest in defendant’s automobile. At no time did plaintiff by word or act seek to terminate the guest relationship voluntarily entered into by her. She was not a babe in arms unable to determine her own course of action. She was a high school girl possessed of at least average intelligence and the capacity to know and understand what she was *591doing. The tragic results might well have ensued had defendant possessed a driver’s license, and lack thereof did not directly or indirectly contribute to the accident. Plaintiff had previously been a guest in defendant’s automobile and did nothing on the day of the accident to indicate that upon abandonment of the original destination she was reluctant to proceed on the trip through Washington Park. She was in no sense an unwilling passenger, and certainly she was not a “captive” in defendant’s conveyance, nor was she forcibly abducted.
The only definition of a guest in this state is found in C.R.S. ’53, 13-9-1, and no exceptions are provided to the rule there announced. Whether the guest statute was applicable in the instant case was a question of law for the trial court and not one for determination by the jury. This is the universal holding of the courts. Some courts have held that “once a guest always a guest,” a doctrine with which I cannot agree. It is my considered opinion that an existing relationship of host and guest may be changed by protest and demand to be let out of the automobile. See Andrews v. Kirk, (Fla.) (1958) 106 So. (2d) 110, and Blanchard v. Ogletree, 41 Ga. App. 4, 152 S.E. 116. I quote from the headnote in Andrews v. Kirk, supra:
“Where one accepts invitation to become guest passenger in automobile without advance knowledge of any condition or propensity of driver tending to produce improper and incompetent driving, and when driver’s actions thereafter become such as to instill in passenger real and reasonable fear of accident causing death or bodily injury, passenger protests against such unlawful or negligent conduct of driver and demands to be let out of automobile, but driver refuses such demand and fails to heed protests, status of guest is changed to that of involuntary passenger, for whose injury driver may be held liable upon proof of either gross or simple negligence.”
The case of Ortman v. Smith, 198 F. (2d) 123 *592(C.A.S.D. 1952) involved facts very similar to those of the instant case. There, the driver, Judith, was twelve years and 8 months of age, and the facts set forth in the opinion are as follows:
“ * * * Plaintiff’s deceased daughter, Donna Jean Ortman, was 13 years old at the time and was a friend of Judith.
“On the day in question Judith came to the Ortman home and requested Donna Jean’s parents to permit Donna Jean to accompany Judith in a ride in the Smith automobile. Judith had the car alone at the time, and Donna Jean’s parents knew it and also knew Judith’s age. At first, plaintiff refused to let his daughter accompany Judith, but he finally relented and gave Donna Jean permission to go with Judith as long as they did not go outside of the town of Canistota. The two girls made a short trip within the town with Donna Jean’s infant sister, then they returned to the Ortman home and leaving the sister there, started on another ride, this time with the consent of Donna Jean’s mother only and again with the admonition not to go outside of town.
“By the time she returned to the Ortman home to leave the baby sister, Judith had picked up four other young girls, all of them friends of both Donna Jean and Judith. The six girls proceeded to a place called ‘Stanley Corners,’ about six miles east of the town of Bridge-water.”
The court goes on to describe the trip to Bridgewater, the children’s decision to go on to a farm near that town, and the subsequent accident wherein the automobile overturned and Donna Jean was killed. The court then applied those facts to the South Dakota guest statute which is substantially similar to our own and held that Donna Jean was a guest in the automobile, stating:
“As to the defendant Judith Smith, it was evident that the deceased Donna Jean Ortman was her guest within the express terms of the South Dakota Statute. *593She was being ‘transported by the * * * operator of a motor vehicle as (her) guest without compensation for such transportation’ and the Statute specifically denies a cause of action for damages against such operator for death ‘unless such accident shall have been caused by the willful and wanton misconduct of the * * * operator of such motor vehicle.’ It is also clear that the entire trip was of social character and that the passengers were there ‘through the promptings of friendship’ and there was nothing to suggest that it ‘was motivated by a mutual expectation of substantial benefit to the owner or operator.’ (Citations.) That a minor may be a ‘guest’ within the meaning of the term in so-called ‘guest statutes’ seems clear. (Citations.)”
The court there affirmed the action of the trial court in directing a verdict for defendants.
I quote from the concurring opinion in Akins v. Hemphill, 33 Wash. (2d) 735, 207 P. (2d) 195:
“ * * * the fact of rampant collusion induced the legislature to say that, as a matter of public policy, the stopping of collusive suits in host-guest cases is more important than maintaining the presumption that all witnesses tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. The legislature in effect said that it is better that there be an occasional injustice than a wholesale perversion of justice. To announce any other rule than that adhered to by the majority would again make a jury question out of any host-guest case in which the plaintiff would testify, truly or falsely that he had attempted to terminate the host-guest relationship prior to the accident.”
Under the majority opinion the question of driver-guest relationship is reduced to one of fact for the jury rather than a question of law for the court, as has always been the rule. As a result I envison a host of actions by persons, who under the statute are unquestionably guests who will attempt to persuade juries and the courts that they were induced to enter the vehicle by the false *594representations of the host that he was a competent driver, and but for a belief in such representations would not have entered the automobile or accepted the ride.
This is so far from my concept of the proper application of the guest statute that I must dissent.