Court Opinion

ID: 9534733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:42:26.352165+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:32:05.325099
License: Public Domain

STATON, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent. Everton knew he was taking a medication that would not tolerate alcohol. Yet, he purposely ingested several alcoholic drinks. His drunken conduct on the Amtrak train from Chicago to Indianapolis was so intolerable that he was taken off the train by the Crawfordsville Police Department. Ev-erton was arrested and charged with public intoxication and intoxication on a common carrier. While in the sole custody of the Crawfordsville authorities, Everton fell several times while in his jail cell and injured himself.
The trial court denied Amtrak's motion for judgment on the pleadings. In affirming this ruling, the Majority has misinterpreted Foster v. Purdue University (1991), Ind.App., 567 N.E.2d 865. Too, it has engrafted multiple duties and strict liability upon the Dram Shop Act which were never intended by the Indiana Legislature. IND.CODE § 7.1-5-10-15(a). The Majority has created a public policy which ignores personal responsibility for one's intentional conduct. The trial court should be reversed for these reasons.
First, Everton was injured because he attempted to stand but fell numerous times in his jail cell.8 That he continued to stand and fall, even after sustaining injury and receiving medical treatment, was an intentional act. Foster, supra, is applicable and controls. In Foster, the intoxicated plaintiff climbed a wall and dove about eight feet to a makeshift water slide resulting in his injury. Id. at 867. This court held that the injury was intentional and further held that the intoxicated plaintiff could not recover under the Comparative Fault Act, which expressly ex*368cludes intentional acts. IND.CODE § 34-4 83-2(A). Accordingly, it does not matter that Foster did not intend the consequences of his actions or that his judgment might be affected by his intoxication. Id. at 870.
As the Majority correctly states, intent in Foster referred to "consequences desired or consequences which the actor believes are certain or substantially certain to follow." Id. at 870. Under this definition, Everton's conduct was certainly intentional. While in the sole custody of the police, Everton fell several times in his jail cell, which would have indicated to him that he was in no condition to stand. The Foster court concluded that Foster experienced no accident. It further concluded, "While Foster's good judgment may have been affected by his level of intoxication, his action was nonetheless 'intentional'" Id. The same holds true for Everton.
Secondly, I disagree with the Majority's common law duty application to Everton's factual posture. The Majority cites Picadiity, Inc. v. Colvin (1988), Ind., 519 N.E.2d 1217, to support their position. Picadilly is not applicable here for several reasons. Pi-cadilly is not an intentional injury case. It involves a young lady who purchased liquor in an establishment which was very much akin to a "supermarket". Id. at 1219. After consuming the liquor and leaving the establishment for her home in Hope, Indiana, she became lost and "entered an interstate highway going in the wrong direction." Id. Her automobile collided with Colvin's automobile. Colvin was injured and brought a civil action against Picadilly. Relying primarily on Elder v. Fisher (1966), 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847, Justice Dickson wrote:
The common law liability applies when a negligent act or omission is a proximate cause of an injury, which injury 'need be only a natural and probable result thereof; and the consequence be one which in the light of cireumstances should reasonably have been foreseen or anticipated.'
Picadilly, supra (citing Elder, 247 Ind. at 605, 217 N.E.2d at 852). After Everton's custody had been delivered to the Crawfords-ville Police, a governmental entity with professional officers trained to handle persons in Everton's intoxicated condition, any speculation on the part of Amtrak that Everton would be injured as "a natural and probable result [of his intoxication] ... or ... [that his injury] in the light of cireamstances should reasonably have been foreseen or anticipated" is absurd. Id. At this point in time, any common law duty terminated. All possible control by Amtrak over Everton's conduct terminated. No right to control Everton's conduct was available-no right to control Everton's conduct was possible. Everton was absolutely in the sole custody and control of the Crawfordsville police. Everton was under arrest and charged with public intoxication and intoxication on a common carrier. This court in Foster concluded that "a right to control another person's actions is essential to the imposition of a corresponding duty." Id. at 869 (citing Sports, Inc. v. Gilbert (1982), Ind.App., 431 N.E.2d 534, trans. denied). At the time of Everton's injury, the Crawfordsville Police had an absolute right of control over Everton's conduct. Amtrak had none.
No common law duty was owed Everton by Amtrak. If one indeed existed, it was extinguished and laid to rest when the Craw-fordsville Police took custody of Everton and charged him with public intoxication, IND. CODE § 7.1-5-1-3, and intoxication on a common carrier, IND.CODE § 7.1-5-1-6.
Thirdly, the duty imposed by the Dram Shop Act ceased to exist when Amtrak turned Everton over to the Crawfordsville police authorities. Why? Because this was the "act" that pulled the blind down in front of foreseeability. Without reasonable foreseeability, there can be no proximate cause. An act is the proximate cause of an injury when such injury is the reasonably foreseeable, natural and probable consequence of the act. Schaffer v. Roberts (1995), Ind.App., 650 N.E.2d 341, 342-348. As a matter of law, Amtrak could not reasonably foresee that Everton, whether drunk or sober, would suffer injuries in his jail cell while under police protection. The Crawfordsville police had complete custody and control of Everton. He had been charged with violating the law. The police have a statutory duty to safeguard individuals such as Everton in their custody. *369IND.CODE $ 36-2-13-5(a)(7). When police take custody of an intoxicated person, they have the option of taking the person to jail, to the person's home or to the home of a relative, or to a medical treatment facility. IND.CODE § 12-28-15-1. The "act" of turning Everton over to the Crawfordsville police cut off any future foreseeability. It severed Amtrak's duty to Everton under the Dram Shop Act.
By stopping the train at Crawfordsville and calling the police, Amtrak was aiding the enforcement of the criminal law and seeking to protect Everton as well as the other passengers on the train from Everton's conduct. See Heger v. Trustees of Indiana University (1988), Ind.App., 526 N.E.2d 1041, 1043, trans. denied (a common earrier is bound to exercise reasonable care to ensure the safety of its passengers). It would be deplorable public policy to conclude that Amtrak's liability extended beyond the point that police had exclusive control over Everton. To hold that no reasonable action can be taken under the Dram Shop Act to terminate a duty once it has been assumed would be to turn a deaf ear to reason. Our General Assembly did not intend that the citizens of Indiana should be responsible for police actions. Because this is what the Majority proposes, I dissent.

. I disagree with the Majority's characterization of Everton's standing and falling as two separate acts. Under the circumstances of this case, standing and falling was one continuous act from which Everton knew injury was substantially certain to follow.