Court Opinion

ID: 9824641
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 11:03:45.816016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:39:56.200251
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing
In his brief in support of his application for rehearing appellant’s counsel states : “In our opinion the statement of facts in appellant’s brief on submission of this cause technically complied with the following portion of Supreme Court Rule 10, Code 1940, Tit. 7 Appendix:
“ ‘If the insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict or finding, in fact or law, is assigned, the statement shall contain a condensed recital of the evidence in narrative form so as to present the substance clearly and concisely.’ ”
“In our opinion the court overruled this phase of the case. The motion for a rehearing in the court below assigned, separately and severally, the overruling of that motion as to fact and law, which were made assignment of errors to this court.” We are still firmly of the opinion that the brief filed by the appellant in this cause was defective and failed to present to this court any matters for review. We will however condone this defective presentation to the extent of reviewing the sufficiency of evidence in fact and in law to sustain the verdict.
The appellant sets out the facts in this case as follows:
“Undisputed Evidence: This alleged accident happened in Blount County, Alabama, about 7 miles north of Warrior, Alabama, on Highway 31. This is a paved highway with asphalt top, 22 feet wide on each side of the bridge where the accident occurred. The bridge was a narrow bridge, 17x/i feet wide and 90 feet long. There were signs on the bridge and back on the highway from each end of the bridge giving notice of the narrow bridge. The de*590fendant’s car was traveling on the Highway from Birmingham north and entered plaintiff’s car was traveling from Cullman toward Birmingham along said Highway and entered the bridge from the North end. The plaintiff’s car was pulling a trailer 7 feet wide. The plaintiff’s car was a regular car, so was the defendant’s car, each being approximately 6 feet wide. On each side of the bridge there was bases around the post of the bridge at each end thereof which extended out some 4 to 6 inches.
“The appellant was driving on her right of the road at a speed of some 40 to 50 miles per hour and entered said bridge and the car and trailer of the plaintiff was some distance from the bridge. Under the admitted testimony of the plaintiff and her husband, the plaintiff’s car was traveling at a speed of 30 miles an hour and over close to his right side of the pavement in approaching said bridge and never slowed down any before the accident, although the driver of the car and the plaintiff herself saw the appellant’s car coming and knew that it was a narrow bridge and had'known it for some distance before reaching the bridge and the driver admitted that it would have taken him 1% lengths of the Courthouse room to have stopped his car at the speed it was traveling.
“The appellant’s car on entering the bridge, under her testimony, saw the other car coming and became very frightened that the car and trailer approaching the end of the bridge before she cleared it, swerved her car around the corner of the bridge which was between 1 aild 2 feet narrower on each side than the paved road and after striking the other car turned around with the rear end on a post on the side of the paved road and the front end turned toward, the center of the road. Appellant’s car was struck by the left front of appellee’s car between the door and the rear fender on the left side of her car.”
To these facts it should be added that the accident occurred in the early part of the afternoon. The preponderance of the evidence also tends to show that the defendant’s car had emerged from the bridge some 20 feet or more at the time she swerved into the plaintiff’s vehicle.
We think the following excerpts from the testimony of the defendant highly illuminating :
“Q. State just what was said between you there when she came back about this wreck? A. The first thing I can remember Mrs. Spizman asked me, do you always drive that fast? My answer was, Lady, I don’t know how this thing happened, I am terribly sorry that the accident happened.
“Mr. Rogers: That you didn’t know how it happened and you were terribly sorry it happened ?
“The Witness: That is exactly what I said.”
On cross examination:
“Q. You don’t tell the Jury that Mr. and Mrs. Spizman told the highway patrolman that you hit the middle of the bridge before you got across, do you? A. It was discussed, I am sorry I do not remember who brought it up.
“Q. Did you hit the middle of the bridge? A. No, I did not.
“Q. Well, did you tell them on that occasion that you did? A. I may have. * * * * * *
“Q. And I believe you told us while ago that you told Mr. and Mrs. Spizman there on that bridge or near the bridge that you just didn’t know how the thing happened, isn’t that right? A. That is exactly what I said.
“Q. And that is the truth about the whole thing, that you don’t know how it happened, isn’t that right? A. No, I don’t think that is exactly right.
“Q. Well, is that true— A. I will say —May I say this, that I think the whole thing happened so quickly that none of us really could tell you the one, two and three, that it happened just that way.”
The picture drawn from the evidence is clear that the defendant became panicky over the approach of the plaintiff’s automobile. She had entered the bridge at a speed of between 40 and 50 miles per hour. Application of the brakes caused her car to swerve into the plaintiff’s.
*591So far as disclosed by the evidence there is no basis for an inference of willful or wanton conduct on the part of the plaintiff.
We fail to find evidence in this case justifying a reasonable inference that the plaintiff on this occasion, with reckless indifference to consequences consciously and intentionally, did a wrongful act or omitted some known duty which produced the injury. No error therefore resulted in the court’s action in giving at the request of the plaintiff the general affirmative charge with hypothesis on defendant’s plea of recoupment charging wanton conduct to plaintiff or her agent. Law v. Saks, 241 Ala. 37, 1 So.2d 28; Salter v. Carlisle, 206 Ala. 163, 90 So. 283; Smith v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 165 Ala. 407, 51 So. 792.
The conclusion is clear that under the evidence a jury question was presented as to the question of fault and negligence causing this collision and injury. The jury’s determination of this question is amply supported by the evidence presented.
Application overruled.