Court Opinion

ID: 9721928
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:12:49.753188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:29.454855
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority understandably places great reliance upon Cowin v. Sears-Roebuck and Co. (1955) 125 Ind.App. 624, 129 N.E.2d 131 and upon Restatement 2d. of Torts § 288(c). The Cowin decision and Restatement § 288(c) are consistent but are not germane to the case before us.
In Cowin, the language of the ordinance was devoted to keeping the sidewalks free of snow, ice, dirt, and debris "so as to allow citizens to use the said sidewalks in an easy and commodious manner." 125 Ind.App. at 625, 129 N.E.2d 131. Although in a separate concurring opinion in Nyers v. Gruber (1971) 150 Ind.App. 117, 275 N.E.2d 863, 874, I discerned a safety concern in the Cowin ordinance, I will here assume, arguendo, that the ordinance in Cowin involved only imposition of the duty of a municipality to provide unobstructed walkways for members of the public, thus bringing the ordinance within that classification of enactments described in Restatement § 288(c). Subsection (c) of § 288 concerns enactments whose purpose is exclusively "to impose upon the actor the performance of a service which the state or any subdivision of it undertakes to give the public." Thus in holding that the ordinance did not impose tort liability for noncompliance, Cow-in and the Restatement are in accord.
The ordinance in the case before us differs. It requires more than the maintenance of unobstructed walkways so that the public might freely move about. One of the purposes, if not the primary purpose, of the Crown Point ordinance is to ensure safe sidewalks. It very straightforwardly requires abutting owners to "keep the sidewalk in a reasonably safe condition". Record at 69. Where safety is at least one purpose of the ordinance, it is difficult to ascertain for whose safety the duty is imposed, if not for pedestrians.
The correct response to the issue before us is the response given by the West Virginia Supreme Court in construing a somewhat less safety-oriented enactment. The West Virginia ordinance merely required abutting owners to "keep in good order and repair the sidewalk immediately abutting the property." Crago v. Lurie (1980) 166 W.Va. 113, 273 S.E.2d 344, 345. The court acknowledged that, as in Indiana, there is no common law duty upon an owner to keep the sidewalk adjacent to his property in a safe condition. Accordingly, the court correctly observed that, being in derogation of the common law, the ordinance must be strictly construed. In doing so, the court appropriately held that a violation of the ordinance constitutes prima facie actionable negligence when it is the proximate cause of an injury. However, because the instant defendant was a mere occupant or lessee rather than an owner, the court held that the ordinance did not apply.
Here, the ordinance in question creates a relationship between owners whose property abuts the sidewalk and those intended to be protected by the ordinance, i.e., pedestrians using the sidewalk. That relationship gives rise to a duty of reasonable care under the cireumstances. Violation of the ordinance *472does not establish liability or even negligence per se. However, if lack of reasonable care in failure to maintain or repair is established and is shown to be a proximate cause of injury, lability may be imposed.
I would reverse and remand with instructions to vacate the summary judgment and , for further proceedings.