Court Opinion

ID: 9679952
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:13:46.974996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:50.179475
License: Public Domain

STUMBO, Justice,
dissenting.
Respectfully, I must dissent. The testimony of Reverend Brown was inadmissible, as it was given in violation of both Appellant’s attorney-client privilege and his clergy-communicant privilege. It is clear from the record that Reverend Brown first met Appellant through counsel, and acted throughout the first trial as a part of the defense team and as spiritual counselor to Appellant. His meetings with Appellant were initiated at the request of counsel, and he sat at counsel table with Appellant during that first trial. Appellant’s attorney during the first trial testified that she considered Reverend Brown a part of the defense team, and that she specifically told Reverend Brown that his communications with Appellant were confidential in nature because he was a member of the defense team.
While not in effect at the time of this trial, the Kentucky Rules of Evidence define the general rule of privilege as follows:
A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing the confidential communication made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client:
(1) Between the client or a representative of the client and the client’s lawyer or a representative of the lawyer....
KRE 503(b)(1).
“Representative of the lawyer” means a person employed by the lawyer to assist the lawyer in rendering professional legal services.
KRE 503(a)(4).
In Asbury v. Beerbower, Ky., 589 S.W.2d 216 (1979), this Court held that communications between Beerbower and her insurance company were protected by her attorney-client privilege.
The insured is ordinarily not represented by counsel of his own choosing either at the time of making the communication or during the course of litigation. Under such circumstances we believe that the insured may properly assume that the communication is made to the insurer as an agent for the dominant purpose of transmitting it to an attorney for the protection of the interests of the insured.
Supra, at 217 (quoting People v. Ryan, 30 Ill.2d 456, 197 N.E.2d 15, 17 (1964)).
Appellant did not choose his own defense counsel at his previous trial; rather, said counsel was appointed for him and counsel instructed him to cooperate with Brown because any communications made to Brown would be covered by the attorney-client privilege.
To determine whether the attorney-client privilege is applicable, we should look at the facts from the client’s perspective. Would Appellant have revealed the very information that allowed the jury to find that the victim was alive at the time of the sexual assault? I think not.
The clergy-communicant privilege applies to confidential communications made between a person and a clergyman in his professional character as a spiritual advisor. Brown, himself, testified that he ministered to Appellant and to the entire defense team. He prayed with and over Appellant, and expressed concern about the state of Appellant’s soul, and prayed with him out of that concern. Brown testified that he sought and obtained confessions from Appellant, and *558prayed over Appellant when he admitted guilt, urging Appellant to think of the victim’s young children and their feelings when the Appellant allegedly expressed “no remorse.” Appellant’s prior counsel testified that Brown prayed with Appellant and his lawyers during pretrial hearings and during trial recesses. Brown’s own testimony revealed that Appellant did not voluntarily confess to Brown, but rather confessed only upon repeated questions and over a period of time. Further, there is no evidence that Appellant spoke with Brown as a friend or in any capacity other than as a minister. In Wainscott v. Commonwealth, Ky., 562 S.W.2d 628, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 868, 99 S.Ct. 196, 58 L.Ed.2d 179 (1978), this Court stated that in order to invoke the minister-penitent privileges provided in KRS 421.210(4), the statement must be made to the minister in his professional capacity. Id. at 632-633. In that case, Wainscott asked a friend, who happened to be a minister, to come to the police station and meet with him. After conferring with the minister, Wainscott “wanted the Reverend Weiss to tell the police that he (Danny) had murdered Brenda.” Wainscott also “authorized the Reverend Weiss to accompany the police detectives, who found the knife where Danny told them he hid it. The Reverend Weiss testified that before Danny confessed, he ‘[r]elated some facts which he, in turn, asked me to relate to the detectives outside.’ ” Wainscott, at 632-633. Thus it was clear to the court in Wain-scott that the defendant therein spoke with the minister as a friend, rather than in his professional capacity.
Here, there is no evidence that Appellant spoke to Brown other than as a member of the defense team and as his spiritual counsel- or. Brown’s testimony was completely inadmissible.
LEIBSON, J., joins in this dissent.