Court Opinion

ID: 9712434
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:53:48.229772+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:12.161667
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE JIGANTI, dissenting: The majority concludes that although the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for attempted aggravated crimi- ' nal sexual assault, “numerous instances” of prosecutorial misconduct served to deny him a fair trial. Because I do not agree that the alleged acts of misconduct constituted a material factor in the jury’s verdict, I must respectfully dissent from this conclusion. It is well established that a prosecutor is allowed considerable latitude in presenting closing argument, and any comments should be considered within the context of the entire argument and with a view toward their impact upon the verdict in light of the evidence presented. (People v. Franklin (1976), 42 Ill. App. 3d 408, 415, 355 N.E.2d 634.) The testimony of the victim in the case at bar was not only clear and convincing, but also substantially corroborated. The comments cited by the majority as reversible error, i.e., that acquittal would mean “a seven year old’s testimony can never convict a defendant” and would “encourage potential sex offenders to abuse families” (156 Ill. App. 3d at 410), do not appear to be of a nature which would inflame the passions of the jury. The record reveals, moreover, that objections to the comments were sustained and the jury was instructed to disregard them. Although I do not condone the prosecutor’s conduct in briefly assuming the witness stand while recounting the victim’s testimony, I do not agree that it had the effect of confusing the jury as to the proper weight to be given the victim’s testimony. In light of the evidence presented, I cannot agree that the alleged acts of misconduct, considered either individually or cumulatively, had an effect upon the jury’s verdict.