Court Opinion

ID: 9894163
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-31 18:04:04.210892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:49.958768
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/31/23 Reynolds v. Bacon CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 DON J. REYNOLDS et al.,                                           B320678

           Plaintiffs and Respondents,                             (Los Angeles County
                                                                    Super. Ct. No. 20STCV22155)
           v.

 JAMES V. BACON, SR.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Michael Small, Judge. Affirmed.
     Fisher Law Corporation and David S. Fisher for Defendant
and Appellant.
     Scali Rasumssen, Jeffrey W. Erdman, Colleen O’Brien and
Janae L. Hill for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
                      ______________________
      This case involves one part of a broader dispute among
family members over the control of the Allen Gwynn Chevrolet
dealership (AG Chevy or the dealership), which the litigants’
family has owned and operated for generations. Plaintiff Nancy
L. Reynolds is defendant James V. Bacon, Sr.’s sister. Plaintiff
Don J. Reynolds is Nancy’s son; plaintiff Stephen W. Bacon is
James’s son.1 In a prior opinion, Reynolds v. Bacon (Mar. 22,
2023, B317784) [nonpub. opn.], we addressed a dispute in probate
proceedings over control of family trusts that own shares of stock
in the dealership. Now, we must deal with a motion to compel
arbitration of lawsuits in which each side accuses the other of
misconduct in operating the dealership and in corporate
governance.
       Don, Stephen, and Nancy (collectively, respondents) filed
suit against James in June 2020. One week later, James filed a
separate suit—which the parties refer to as the “Glendale action”
after the location of the courthouse in which it was filed—against
respondents over largely the same issues. The cases were
consolidated and proceeded through nearly 18 months of
litigation, at which point James filed a motion to compel
arbitration of both consolidated cases on the basis of arbitration
agreements Don and Stephen signed years earlier as part of their
employment at the dealership.
       The trial court denied the motion on the ground that James
waived his right to compel arbitration by delaying too long, to the
prejudice of respondents. James now challenges that ruling.

      1 We refer to the parties by their first names in order to
avoid confusion. We intend no disrespect.

                                 2
       The analysis of this issue is complicated by the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan v. Sundance, Inc.
(2022) 596 U.S. 411 [142 S.Ct. 1708, 212 L.Ed.2d 753] (Morgan)
holding that under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA; 9 U.S.C. § 1
et seq.), federal law does not require a party opposing arbitration
on the basis of waiver to prove it was prejudiced by the other
party’s delay. (Morgan, supra, at pp. 416-419 [142 S.Ct. at
pp. 1712–1714].) California law has long required a showing of
prejudice as a condition of waiver of the right to arbitrate (see,
e.g., St. Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California (2003)
31 Cal.4th 1187, 1203 (St. Agnes)). While our Supreme Court has
taken up the question of how Morgan applies to cases decided in
our state courts and under the California Arbitration Act (CAA;
Code Civ. Proc., § 1280 et seq.) in Quach v. California Commerce
Club, Inc. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 470, review granted August 24,
2022, S275121 (Quach), it has not yet decided the issue.
       The trial court, which denied the motion to compel
arbitration prior to Morgan, made no finding as to whether the
arbitration agreement was governed by the FAA or CAA,
presumably because at the time it made no difference in the
analysis of the motion to compel. We need not decide that
question either because we hold that even under the stricter St.
Agnes test, there was substantial evidence to support the trial
court’s finding that James waived the right to arbitrate.2
Accordingly, we affirm.

      2 Because we affirm the trial court’s decision on the basis of
waiver, we do not consider respondents’ additional arguments for
denying the motion to compel arbitration, namely that
respondents’ claims were outside the scope of the arbitration

                                 3
           FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
      All four of the primary litigants in this case have been
closely involved with the ownership and operation of AG Chevy
for many years. James has been the president of the dealership
for decades, and Don and Stephen worked there from the 1990s
until 2020. Nancy was not a formal employee, but she alleges she
worked informally for the dealership in exchange for
compensation. The four control most of the shares in the
dealership through trusts established at the direction of Nancy
and James’s parents.
      The relationships among the family members grew
increasingly hostile in the 2010s, as Don and Stephen accused
James of mismanaging the dealership, and James alleged Don
and Stephen stole from the dealership by authorizing bonus
payments for themselves without James’s knowledge. Matters
came to a head in the spring of 2020, when James fired Don and
Stephen and repossessed their company cars, along with Nancy’s.
Don, Stephen, and Nancy convened meetings of the dealership’s
board of directors in James’s absence at which they passed
resolutions reversing James’s actions and sought to replace
James as the dealer operator3 of the dealership. James claims

agreements, and that Nancy, who did not sign an arbitration
agreement, was not bound by the agreements Don and Stephen
signed.
     3 The parties do not explain what a dealer operator is, but
the pleadings suggest that it is the individual recognized by
General Motors to represent and make decisions on behalf of a
dealership.

                               4
the board meetings were illegitimate4 and the resolutions of no
legal effect.
       The two sides filed complaints against one another within
the space of one week in June 2020. Respondents acted first,
alleging 16 causes of action against James. These included
derivative causes of action on behalf of the dealership for breach
of fiduciary duties as officer and director of the dealership, unjust
enrichment, and unfair competition. Respondents also asserted
several direct causes of action. These included claims of
conversion, for repossessing respondents’ cars; intentional
interference with contractual relations, for firing Don and
Stephen and ceasing payments to Nancy; and several related
claims. Respondents also sought declarations affirming that the
three of them, together with James, constitute the board of
directors, and that their actions at the May and June 2020 board
meetings were legitimate. They also demanded an accounting of
dealership finances.
       Four days later, James filed a separate complaint,5 the
Glendale action, alleging four causes of action against

        4 The sides disagree as to who the members of the board
were.
        5 We grant James’s request for judicial notice, which
includes the complaint in the Glendale action as well as
documents related to the probate matter. The trial court took the
Glendale action into account when denying James’s motion to
compel arbitration, and it is impossible to understand the court’s
reasoning without considering the Glendale complaint. The
probate matter is not central to the issues in this appeal, but the
inclusion of these documents does not prejudice respondents.
Respondents’ motion to strike related portions of James’s opening
brief is denied.

                                  5
respondents. The first cause of action was a derivative claim on
behalf of the dealership in which James alleged that Don and
Stephen breached their fiduciary duties by taking unauthorized
bonus payments, and that Nancy breached her fiduciary duties
by failing to repay $60,000 that the dealership erroneously paid
her. In the next two causes of action, James sought to remove
Don, Stephen, and Nancy from the board, and to invalidate their
actions at the May and June 2020 board meetings. The fourth
cause of action was for declaratory relief on the same issues
addressed in the previous causes of action. The trial court later
ordered the two cases, along with the probate proceeding,
consolidated.
       Over the succeeding 18 months, the parties conducted
extensive discovery, which led to frequent disputes. The trial
court accused both sides of “weaponizing discovery,” stated that
“this case has become a discovery nightmare for all sides and the
court,” and ultimately appointed a referee to adjudicate the
parties’ discovery motions. In February 2022, James filed a
notice of appeal from an order imposing discovery sanctions.
       In addition to conducting discovery, James filed two
demurrers. The first demurrer is missing from the appellate
record, but it appears to have been based on respondents’ failure
to notify the dealership or its board in writing before filing a
derivative suit on the dealership’s behalf, and, as to the causes of
action for interference with prospective economic advantage, the
lack of a third party with which James allegedly interfered. The
trial court sustained the demurrer in part and overruled it in
part, and granted respondents leave to amend. Respondents filed
a second amended complaint, and James again demurred on
similar grounds. This time, respondents gave James, as

                                 6
representative of the dealership, a copy of the complaint before
filing it, but he alleged respondents did not give him enough time
to investigate and respond before filing a derivative suit. James
also alleged that the causes of action for interference with
contractual relations and prospective economic advantage failed
to state a cause of action because James acted on behalf of the
dealership, and there was no third party with which he could
have interfered. The trial court overruled the second demurrer.
James later sought writ relief from the overruling of his second
demurrer, a petition we denied. (Bacon v. Superior Court
(May 12, 2022, B318944).)
       In February 2022, less than a month after the trial court
overruled the second demurrer, James filed a motion to compel
arbitration of the two consolidated suits. This was, by all
accounts, the first time James had mentioned the possibility of
deciding the dispute in arbitration. The motion was based on
arbitration agreements Don and Stephen signed nearly 20 years
earlier, in 2002. The agreements stated that, “The [dealership]
and the undersigned [e]mployee hereby agree that any dispute
with any party (including the [dealership]’s affiliates, successors,
predecessors, contractors, employees and agents) that may arise
from [e]mployee’s employment with the [dealership] or the
termination of [e]mployee’s employment with the [dealership],
must be submitted for resolution by mandatory, binding
arbitration.” Further, “[b]inding [a]rbitration under this
[a]greement shall be conducted in accordance with” the CAA, and
“[t]he parties will be permitted to conduct discovery as provided

                                 7
by California Code of Civil Procedure section 1283.05.”6 James
argued that all of Don and Stephen’s claims were subject to
arbitration under the agreement. Although there was no
indication that Nancy ever signed an arbitration agreement,
James argued that she too was required to arbitrate because “the
[c]laims by and against Nancy are intimately founded in and
intertwined with the underlying contract obligations of the
[a]rbitration [a]greement.”
       Respondents opposed the motion, arguing that James had
waived any right to arbitration by delaying too long before
demanding arbitration and by acting inconsistently with the
right to arbitrate. Respondents also argued that the consolidated
cases were outside the scope of the arbitration agreement, and
that Nancy was not bound by the arbitration agreements Don
and Stephen had signed.
       The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration.
The court did not issue a statement of decision, but explained its
reasoning during a hearing. The court found that “[James]’s
actions in this litigation are inconsistent with the desire to
arbitrate,” noting that James spent more than a year vigorously
litigating the case in court before raising the arbitration
agreement. In addition to the delay in asserting arbitration,
James “filed his own lawsuit, the Glendale action.” The court
found that respondents showed they had suffered prejudice from

      6 Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1283.05, “the
parties . . . shall have the right to take depositions and to obtain
discovery . . . as if the subject matter . . . were pending before a
superior court.” (Id., subd. (a).) However, “Depositions for
discovery shall not be taken unless leave to do so is first granted
by the arbitrator or arbitrators.” (Id., subd. (e).)

                                  8
James’s delay “by having to, in the crucible of trial court
litigation, engage in discovery motion after discovery motion.”
Although “my sense is that the arbitration agreement probably
does cover the claims here,” including potentially the claims
involving Nancy, the court found that “the request to arbitrate
has come too late in the day.”
       James timely appealed from the trial court’s order denying
his motion to compel arbitration.
                          DISCUSSION
A.      Background on Waiver of the Right to Arbitrate
        The leading California case on waiver of an arbitration
agreement is St. Agnes. The case involved the application of the
FAA, but the court noted that “the federal and state rules
applicable in this case are very similar” (St. Agnes, supra, 31
Cal.4th at p. 1194), and courts have subsequently applied St.
Agnes in cases involving waiver of arbitration under the CAA.
(See, e.g., Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 374–375.)
        The court in St. Agnes recognized that a party may waive
its contractual right to arbitration, but because of the “strong
policy favoring arbitration agreements” under both state and
federal law, “waivers are not to be lightly inferred and the party
seeking to establish a waiver bears a heavy burden of proof.” (St.
Agnes, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1195.) The court adopted a six-
factor test that originated in the Tenth Circuit of the United
States Court of Appeals in an FAA case (see Peterson v.
Shearson/American Exp., Inc. (10th Cir. 1988) 849 F.2d 464,
467–468) to determine waiver. The six factors are as follows:
“ ‘ “(1) whether the party’s actions are inconsistent with the right
to arbitrate; (2) whether ‘the litigation machinery has been

                                 9
substantially invoked’ and the parties ‘were well into preparation
of a lawsuit’ before the party notified the opposing party of an
intent to arbitrate; (3) whether a party either requested
arbitration enforcement close to the trial date or delayed for a
long period before seeking a stay; (4) whether a defendant
seeking arbitration filed a counterclaim without asking for a stay
of the proceedings; (5) ‘whether important intervening steps [e.g.,
taking advantage of judicial discovery procedures not available in
arbitration] had taken place’; and (6) whether the delay ‘affected,
misled, or prejudiced’ the opposing party.” ’ ” (St. Agnes, supra,
31 Cal.4th at p. 1196, quoting Sobremonte v. Superior Court
(1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 980, 992.)
       Although the St. Agnes court cautioned that “no single test
delineates the nature of the conduct that will constitute a waiver
of arbitration” (St. Agnes, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1195), the court
placed special emphasis on the question of prejudice. In cases
decided under federal law, “ ‘The presence or absence of prejudice
from the litigation of the dispute is the determinative issue . . . .’
[Citations.]” (Id. at p. 1203, quoting Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge
etc. Dist. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 180, 188.) The question of “whether or
not litigation results in prejudice also is critical in waiver
determinations” applying state law. (St. Agnes, supra, at
p. 1203.) In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court in St.
Agnes followed its own longstanding precedent that prejudice is
required for waiver of the right to arbitrate unless there has been
“ ‘judicial litigation of the merits of arbitrable issues.’ ” (Keating
v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 584, 605, quoting Doers, supra,
at p. 188.)
       The United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Morgan
eliminated a showing of prejudice as a prerequisite for waiver of

                                 10
arbitration in cases governed by the FAA and federal law. The
defendant in Morgan was initially content to litigate the
plaintiff’s Fair Labor Standards Act complaint in federal court,
but after eight months filed a motion to compel arbitration under
the FAA. (Morgan, supra, 596 U.S. at pp. 414–415 [142 S.Ct. at
p. 1711].) Under the waiver standard applied by the Eighth
Circuit before the case reached the high court, a party does not
waive arbitration unless it “knew of the right [to arbitrate]; ‘acted
inconsistently with that right’; and—critical here—'prejudiced
the other party by its inconsistent actions.’ ” (Id. at p. 415 [142
S.Ct. at p. 1712], quoting Erdman Co. v. Phoenix Land &
Acquisition, LLC (8th Cir. 2011) 650 F.3d 1115, 1117.) Because
the parties “had not yet begun formal discovery or contested any
matters ‘going to the merits,’ ” the Eighth Circuit panel held that
the delay in seeking arbitration had not prejudiced the plaintiff,
and there had therefore been no waiver. (Morgan, supra, at
p. 415 [142 S.Ct. at p. 1712].)
       The Supreme Court rejected the Eighth Circuit’s rule
requiring a showing of prejudice. That rule, like the equivalent
rule in California, had been justified on the basis of a “ ‘policy
favoring arbitration.’ ” (Morgan, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 415 [142
S.Ct. at p. 1712].) The court disagreed with the idea that this
policy required creating a special test for waiver of arbitration
not applicable to any other contractual right. Instead, the
purpose of the policy is “ ‘to place [arbitration] agreements upon
the same footing as other contracts.’ [Citation.]” Or, in other
words, “to make ‘arbitration agreements as enforceable as other
contracts, but not more so.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 418 [142 S.Ct.
at p. 1713].) Because “a federal court assessing waiver does not
generally ask about prejudice” outside the context of arbitration,

                                 11
there was no justification for doing so when considering
agreements to arbitrate. (Id. at p. 417 [142 S.Ct. at p. 1713].)
       The Supreme Court did not direct the application of a
specific test upon remand. A court might elect to apply its
existing waiver inquiry without a prejudice requirement, and ask
whether the defendant “knowingly relinquish[ed] the right to
arbitrate by acting inconsistently with that right.” (Morgan,
supra, 596 U.S. at p. 419 [142 S.Ct. at p. 1714].) Alternatively, a
court might “determine that a different procedural framework
(such as forfeiture) is appropriate. [Citation.] Our sole holding
today is that it may not make up a new procedural rule based on
the FAA’s ‘policy favoring arbitration.’ ” (Ibid.)
       California courts have held that in cases “where the FAA
applies, whether a party has waived a right to arbitrate is a
matter of federal, not state, law” (Davis v. Shiekh Shoes, LLC
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 956, 963), which suggests Morgan governs
FAA cases filed in state court. (See Correia v. NB Baker Electric,
Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 602, 619 [“On federal questions,
intermediate appellate courts in California must follow the
decisions of the California Supreme Court, unless the United
States Supreme Court has decided the same question
differently”].) But Morgan elsewhere expressly states that it does
not address any “role state law might play in resolving when a
party’s litigation conduct results in the loss of a contractual right
to arbitrate” in an FAA case (Morgan, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 416
[142 S.Ct. at p. 1712]), suggesting questions may remain about
its application to FAA cases in state court.
       At a minimum, the existing case law requiring a showing of
prejudice for a waiver of arbitration under the CAA (e.g.,
Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, supra, 59

                                 12
Cal.4th at pp. 376–377; Wagner Construction Co. v. Pacific
Mechanical Corp. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 19, 30; Keating v. Superior
Court, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 605) remains authoritative for now.
B.    Application to This Case
      The trial court decided the motion to compel arbitration
before the Supreme Court released its opinion in Morgan and
thus had no occasion to consider how Morgan affects the issue of
waiver in this case. Indeed, the trial court did not decide
whether the arbitration agreement is governed by the FAA or the
CAA,7 presumably because “the federal and state rules
applicable” to the question of waiver were, at the time, “very
similar.” (St. Agnes, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1194.) In their
appellate briefing, respondents argue that the arbitration
agreements are governed by the FAA, and that they need not
prove prejudice. James, for his part, argues for state law and a
prejudice requirement. We need not decide this issue because it
makes no difference to the outcome of the case. There was
sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that James
waived his right to compel arbitration even under the stricter St.
Agnes standard that the court applied.
       The trial court applied the six-factor St. Agnes test and
found that James waived any right to compel arbitration. The
court concluded that James acted “ ‘ “inconsistent[ly] with the
right to arbitrate” ’ ” (St. Agnes, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1196) by

      7 The agreement under which James sought to compel
arbitration mentions only the CAA, but this is not determinative
because “[t]he FAA applies to any ‘contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce’ that contains an arbitration
provision.” (Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 227,
238.)

                                 13
litigating the case extensively in trial court for more than 18
months. By doing so, James also substantially invoked “ ‘ “ ‘the
litigation machinery’ ” ’ ” (ibid.) before notifying the opposing side
of an intent to arbitrate. Although the case was not yet close to
the trial date, the court found that James “ ‘ “delayed for a long
period before seeking a stay.” ’ ” (Ibid.) In addition, James did
not merely “ ‘ “file[ ] a counterclaim without asking for a stay of
the proceedings” ’ ” (ibid.), but went so far as to file his own
separate lawsuit against the respondents on claims that he later
contended were subject to the arbitration agreement. Finally, the
court found that the delay in seeking arbitration “ ‘ “ ‘prejudiced’
the opposing party” ’ ” (ibid.) by requiring respondents, as the
trial court stated, “to . . . engage in discovery motion after
discovery motion after discovery motion after discovery motion
and go see a discovery referee, and so on.”
       “ ‘ “The question of waiver is generally a question of fact,” ’ ”
and for that reason we generally review the trial court’s decision
for substantial evidence. (Quach, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at
p. 478.) Nevertheless, “ ‘Where the relevant facts are undisputed
and only one inference may reasonably be drawn from the facts,
the waiver issue may be reviewed de novo.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.;
accord, Davis v. Shiekh Shoes, LLC, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at
p. 962.)
       James takes issue with several of the trial court’s findings,
but we focus first on the question of prejudice. We examined this
issue extensively in our recent opinion in Quach and concluded
that “a party’s delay in asserting the right to arbitrate is not
‘unreasonable’ merely because the party could have asserted it at
an earlier time. Rather, what makes the delay ‘unreasonable’ is
that it negatively impacts the party resisting arbitration, such as

                                  14
by requiring that party to expend resources it otherwise would
have saved by arbitrating the dispute, or by allowing the party
asserting arbitration to take advantage of judicial processes not
available in arbitration.’ ” (Quach, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at
p. 484.) Under this standard, we held that the defendant’s 13-
month delay before filing its motion to compel arbitration alone
did not prejudice the plaintiff. (Ibid.)
       James argues the trial court’s finding on prejudice was
inconsistent with Quach. Even if James indeed forced
respondents “to . . . engage in discovery motion after discovery
motion after discovery motion after discovery motion and go see a
discovery referee, and so on,” this did not prejudice respondents
because under the terms of the arbitration agreement, the parties
were entitled to the same discovery in arbitration as they could
have obtained in court. The discovery disputes may have been
unusually fierce, but there is no reason to believe they would
have been easier in arbitration.
       This argument overlooks another form of prejudice,
however: James took advantage of the trial court by filing two
demurrers. He also sought to appeal a sanctions order against
him—relief that would have been unavailable in an arbitration.
Shortly after the court overruled the second demurrer, making it
clear that he could not win the case easily in court, James filed
the motion to compel arbitration. This was nearly identical to the
conduct the court found prejudicial in Adolph v. Coastal Auto
Sales, Inc. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1443. The court rejected the
defendant’s attempt to take advantage of the system in this way,
reasoning that “ ‘ “[t]he courtroom may not be used as a
convenient vestibule to the arbitration hall so as to allow a party
to create his own unique structure combining litigation and

                                15
arbitration.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1452.) Moreover, while the motion to
compel arbitration was pending James continued to pursue relief
unavailable to him in arbitration by filing a writ petition seeking
review of the overruling of his second demurrer. (Bacon v.
Superior Court, supra, B318944.)
       James challenges the trial court’s ruling in several other
respects, none of which we find persuasive. He argues that the
trial court erred by treating the Glendale action that he filed
against respondents as tantamount to a counterclaim. We
disagree. The Glendale action addresses many of the same issues
as respondents’ original complaint, including both the propriety
of respondents’ purported board resolutions and the
circumstances of the termination of Don and Stephen’s
employment. James implicitly acknowledged as much when he
filed a notice of related case in which he affirmed that the cases
“involve[ ] the same parties and [are] based on the same or
similar claims,” and that they “arise[ ] from the same or
substantially identical transactions, incidents, or events
requiring the determination of the same or substantially identical
questions of law or fact.” By filing a cross-complaint, a defendant
implicitly acknowledges that the trial court, rather than
arbitration, is the proper venue for resolving a dispute. James
effectively did the same by filing a separate complaint on the
same subject matter with similar legal issues.
       James argues that the Glendale action is different because
he asserted only derivative claims against respondents, and
“there is no arbitration agreement that applies to corporate
governance matters.” But several causes of action in
respondents’ operative second amended complaint are also
derivative claims dealing with corporate governance matters, and

                                16
James moved to compel arbitration of not only respondents’
entire case but also the complaint that James himself filed. We
reject James’s 11th hour attempt on appeal to reframe his
argument about what is and what is not allegedly arbitrable after
having previously taken the position the entirety of the two
consolidated cases—including all corporate governance-related
causes of action—was arbitrable.
       James also argues that the trial court erred by overlooking
several factors favorable to James: that there has been no
determination on the merits of the case; that the timing of his
motion to compel was reasonable in light of the delays associated
with the COVID-19 pandemic; and that he did not act
inconsistently with the right to arbitrate. We disagree with the
last point—James’s extended participation in litigation in trial
court for nearly 18 months, including filing his own related
complaint in court that he later claimed was subject to
arbitration and seeking appellate intervention in the court
proceedings, was indeed inconsistent with asserting his right to
arbitrate. James may not be wrong about the other factors, but
“no single test delineates the nature of the conduct that will
constitute a waiver of arbitration.” (St. Agnes, supra, 31 Cal.4th
at p. 1195.) The trial court did not err in determining that the
factors against James’s position outweighed those in his favor.

                               17
                          DISPOSITION
      The trial court’s order denying appellant’s motion to compel
arbitration is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on
appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                          WEINGART, J.

We concur:

             ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

             CHANEY, J.

                               18