Court Opinion

ID: 9493048
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:56:40.145512+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:37.256248
License: Public Domain

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the court’s affirmance of Jackson’s conviction for first degree murder. I also concur in the court’s denial of Jackson’s actual innocence claim. The court’s reliance on speculation regarding the effect of additional evidence to overturn Jackson’s sentence, however, forces me to dissent from that portion of its opinion.
I
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the Supreme Court instructed us on how to evaluate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Although the majority follows Strickland’s analytical framework, it fails to apply its command that “every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight” and that our review of the decisions of trial counsel be “highly deferential.” Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Only by doing so can we remain true to the Court’s teaching that in order to set aside his sentence Jackson must show that his trial “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed [him] by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
The majority takes Jackson’s trial counsel to task for the following sins of omission. First, the majority chides counsel for not introducing evidence regarding Jackson’s childhood experience of beatings, neglect and possible mental illness. Second, the majority asserts that at the penalty stage, trial counsel’s failure to introduce evidence regarding the effects of phency-clidine (PCP) on Jackson’s ability to reason and premeditate prejudiced Jackson. We may not overturn his sentence, however, unless his counsel’s representation fell outside of “the wide range of reasonable conduct” and unless any errors created the “reasonable probability of a different result.” Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. At best, Jackson’s arguments convince me only that the additional evidence might have had “some conceivable effect of the outcome of the proceeding,” a standard which the Court expressly held, “is not enough.” Id. at 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052.1
II
The majority contends first that trial counsel did not present adequate evidence of Jackson’s social history. Specifically, the majority points to evidence that Jackson suffered repeated beatings as a child, that his mother choked him several times, that his childhood was characterized by neglect and instability, and that Jackson exhibited signs of mental illness in childhood and was diagnosed at one time as schizophrenic.
The majority relies on representations in the declarations of various family mem*1167bers and friends. These individuals did not testify at the evidentiary hearing before the district court, and the State was thus deprived of its opportunity to cross-examine them. Apparently the majority is little bothered by the lack of cross examination, the “greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.” California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970). In addition, those declarations were controverted by the declarations of others who asserted that they had never witnessed any abuse and that Jackson had been a happy child.
A
Putting that troubling matter aside, the majority stunningly asserts that it is enough that Jackson’s mother had stated in her deposition, but did not testify at trial, that she hit Jackson and choked him five to ten times. At the penalty phase of the trial, the jury heard from Jackson’s mother who testified that his father was “a hustler, gambler, a street person,” who was never around and did not care about his son. Trial counsel’s decision not to introduce additional evidence of his mother’s disciplining him was not “so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In fact, it might have undermined her role at the penalty stage as a sympathetic mother pleading for mercy for her son.
If there were additional evidence of abuse, trial counsel cannot be faulted for failing to churn it up. “[T]he ‘reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant’s own statements or actions.’ ” Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1386-87 (9th Cir.1996) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Today, Jackson appears more than willing to help his attorneys prepare for his defense, but in order to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, we must look at the reasonableness of counsel’s conduct in light of the information he knew at the time of trial. When counsel interviewed Jackson at that time, Jackson gave him no leads at all. He pointed him only to his mother and wife, whom trial counsel did interview. Although now Jackson and the majority fault counsel for not putting forth additional proof of a difficult childhood, at the time, Jackson gave him no indication that his youth had been marred by beatings and neglect. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (“And when a defendant has given counsel reason to believe that pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel’s failure to pursue those investigations may not later be challenged as unreasonable.”). In addition, when interviewed Jackson’s wife reported that Jackson and his mother had a good, affectionate relationship. She stated Jackson had never told her that he felt he had been abused as a child, or even complained about his childhood. Counsel had little reason to search out evidence of abuse.
Even assuming error in trial counsel’s decision not to put forth more evidence of harsh discipline, there is no reasonable probability that evidence of several chok-ings and beatings during childhood would have swayed the jury. When Jackson’s attorney interviewed his wife, she reported to him that her husband had a close relationship with his mother. This would have cast doubt on the significance of any lasting impact of the beatings and their now purported effect on his murder of the police officer. The jury had already decided that Jackson had deliberately murdered a police officer, they knew that Jackson had been abandoned by his father, but they also knew he had a good relationship with his mother. Only by sheer speculation can the majority conclude that evidence that his mother disciplined him by hitting him would have changed the jury’s verdict.
B
As for the evidence that Jackson may have shown signs of mental illness as a *1168youth, trial counsel had Jackson evaluated by two doctors who stated that he did not show any signs of mental illness at the time of trial. The two electroencephalograms showed no abnormalities. An attorney may reasonably rely on the reports of expert witnesses whom he hires to advise him. See Morgan v. Bunnell, 24 F.3d 49, 52 (9th Cir.1994). In determining whether Jackson’s counsel acted within the wide range of professional judgment, we must focus on the reasonableness of the attorney’s actions in light of what he was told by the experts. An attorney who hires two expert psychologists who in turn inform him that his client suffers from no mental illness acts reasonably when he does not pursue evidence that his client may have exhibited signs of mental illness as a child, particularly when the only indication of this was a juvenile record from thirteen years earlier.
Jackson has also failed to show prejudice. Considering the two expert conclusions of no mental illness, a report from when Jackson was sixteen revealing that he had been expected to develop stronger schizophrenic tendencies had no “reasonable probability” of changing the outcome of the sentencing proceeding.
Ill
The next category of evidence the majority faults trial counsel for not introducing is that dealing with the effects of PCP on Jackson’s ability to premeditate. The majority concludes that trial counsel should have had Dr. Mead or another expert testify that Jackson was grossly intoxicated at the time of the murder and had little recollection of the events. The trial record demonstrates, however, that such additional testimony as the majority demands had little chance of affecting the decision of the jury, which already had before it evidence both of Jackson’s PCP intoxication and of the effects of PCP.
Medical evidence during the guilt phase of the trial established the high level of PCP in Jackson’s blood, as well as the presence of amphetamines and cocaine in his urine. The level of PCP was so high that according to defense expert, Dr. Aniline, it would render a first-time user unconscious. Jackson admitted he was a chronic user of PCP and had used PCP the day of the murder. Dr. Aniline testified further that Jackson’s behavior at the time of the crime corresponded with PCP intoxication. Thus the jury knew that Jackson was high on PCP when he murdered the police officer.
The jury also heard at the guilt phase from Dr. Aniline that the effects of PCP are unpredictable, that individuals intoxicated with PCP remember only some things that happen during their high, and that even though they appear alert, they are not in fact entirely aware of what is happening and may not be processing information the way they normally would be. Finally and importantly, Dr. Aniline told the jury that a PCP user in Jackson’s state of intoxication would have an impaired ability to think and deliberate, though he could not conclude for certain whether or not Jackson had deliberated. As the district court found, all of this evidence was consistent with trial counsel’s strategy to explain how Jackson could have taken the actions he did and still be so intoxicated that his ability to think was impaired. Thus the jury had before it substantial evidence of the effects of PCP on a user’s ability to think.
Even if trial counsel were unconstitutionally ineffective for not using an expert witness who had examined Jackson at the penalty stage to testify to Jackson’s impaired ability to think, this would not have had a “reasonable probability” of producing a different sentencing outcome. At the penalty phase, the jury may consider all evidence presented at the guilt phase. See People v. Cummings, 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1330, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1 (1993) (In Bank). The jury that sentenced Jackson knew that PCP greatly impairs a user’s mental condition and knew that Jackson was high on PCP at the time of *1169the crime. Yet, it sentenced him to death. I simply cannot say that there is a reasonable probability that a jury knowing those facts would have come out differently if only an expert had put two and two together. The jurors were quite capable of doing this themselves. Moreover, whatever additional evidence of PCP’s effect on the ability to deliberate Jackson’s counsel introduced, the jury had before it other evidence of premeditation. Jackson went to the police ear, opened the door, grabbed the shotgun, and cocked the gun. There was also evidence that Jackson intentionally caused the officer to drop his guard before shooting him to death.2 Because of this evidence of premeditation and because the jury effectively had before it the evidence the majority wishes trial counsel had introduced, I cannot conclude that but for counsel’s decisions not to introduce the evidence there is a “reasonable probability” that the jury would have given a different sentence.
The evidence demonstrates that the jury was well aware that Jackson’s ability to think clearly may well have been impaired when he shot the police officer, but still imposed the death sentence. The majority speculates when it concludes that if an expert who examined Jackson weeks after the murder had told the jurors that Jackson’s ability to think at the time of the crime was impaired, there is a reasonable probability that they would not have imposed the death sentence. Perhaps the majority is inclined to the view that Jackson should not have received the death penalty: “[T]he evidence [of premeditation] was far from overwhelming; this is one highly unusual murder in the first degree, with an unplanned encounter between a grossly intoxicated, originally unarmed defendant suddenly ending in death.” Supra at 1164. For me, the point is that the jury knew all of that and still sentenced Jackson to death. I cannot usurp the role of the jury in determining the appropriate punishment by supplanting its judgment with my own.
IV
A sentence of death should not be imposed lightly nor without due consideration of all relevant factors. Nor should a federal court of appeals lightly overturn the sentence given by the jury, as well as the reasoned determinations of two state courts and a federal district judge, all of whom affirmed the sentence. Trial counsel’s decisions fell well. within the wide range of professional conduct and there is no “reasonable probability” that any errors he may have made affected the outcome of the proceeding. Thus, I must dissent from that portion of the opinion vacating Jackson’s capital sentence.

. The majority also alleges other errors by trial counsel-the length of the investigation and failure to investigate the circumstances surrounding the sodomy Jackson committed while in the military. The majority’s failure to explain how these actions prejudiced Jackson renders these arguments little more than makeweight. If Jackson cannot show prejudice, he has not established a violation of his right to counsel.

. At the evidentiary hearing before the district court, Dr. Aniline himself testified that these and other actions by Jackson show deliberation and premeditation.