Court Opinion

ID: 9796706
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:03:09.668831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:51:03.150944
License: Public Domain

*715WILKINS, Associate Chief Justice,
dissenting:
T 33 I respectfully disagree with the analysis and conclusions reached by my colleagues. I would defer to the evaluation of the trial court and affirm.
34 The differences between actually interviewing a juror and reading the transeript of such an interview are similar to the differences between skydiving and observing a black and white still photo of someone hanging from an open parachute. Only in the first instance does the actor have control over the course of events, the opportunity to make adjustments in the course of action, and the ability to use more than one of the senses to evaluate the cireumstances presented. In the latter, all dynamic adjustment by the observer is prohibited, and nearly all informational input is sereened out. There are good reasons behind the policy of the law that appellate judges defer to the on-the-seene observation, evaluation, and judgment of the trial judge in matters of this sort. The appellate judge is limited to the black and white "photograph" of the interview experienced by the trial judge. As a result, the trial judge is in a dramatically enhanced position, when compared with ours, to evaluate the post-trial interview of a challenged juror.
135 My colleagues conclude that the trial judge relied on "nothing more" than the juror's assurances of impartiality. However, there is no indication in the record that such was the case. More accurately, since all we can see in the record is the transcript of the conversation between juror Weinmuller and the trial judge, we assume there were no other indications. We do not know how Weinmuller behaved, or responded, or looked. We do not know how her tone of voice or inflections enhanced or detracted from her bare statements. We did not sit through the trial or the original voir dire examination. We did not have any opportunity to observe the other jurors, or the interaction of the jurors, or Weinmuller's behavior. Because we are limited to the printed record, we, as appellate judges, are severely limited when making evaluations of a person's credibility. And in this case, that is exactly what my colleagues suggest is the proper role of appellate review.
136 Today my colleagues would, and do, extend to post-trial juror challenges the same skeptical standard that we have previously encouraged trial courts to apply pre-trial when the expense and delay occasioned by replacing a questionable juror are significantly less. Moreover, we do so on marginal authority at best. Of the dozen cases relied upon by my colleagues for the proposition that a juror must be excused when it is determined after trial that a pre-trial voir dire question was not answered truthfully, only two involve post-trial challenges. The remainder draw on case law arising from the pre-trial setting of an untruthful response to a voir dire question.
137 Of the two post-trial challenge cases, only McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984), presents a coherent analysis of post-trial challenges. Our only prior case on point relied upon by my colleagues, State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 248 (Utah 1992) (Thomas II ), represents four different opinions of how such an examination should be handled.
138 Under MeDonough, the trial court faced with a post-trial challenge to a juror examines whether the juror failed to truthfully answer voir dire questions and, if so, whether truthful answers at the time of voir dire would have justified removal for cause. 464 U.S. at 556, 104 S.Ct. 845. Review of the decision in such an evaluation is deferential to the trial court's advantaged position in determining answers to both questions. Reversal of the trial court's decision requires a showing that the trial court abused its discretion in reaching the conclusion not to remove a challenged juror.
139 Utah law purports to adopt the Mc-Donough test, but fails to make clear how, if at all, our application deviates from the de-seription set out in McDonough. Without discussion, in State v. Thomas, 777 P.2d 445, 451 (Utah 1989) (Thomas I ), we remanded to the trial court to "hold a hearing and ... make a factual determination as to whether the two-pronged test of McDonough" had *716been met and, if so, order a new trial. No other considerations were attached to illuminate the matter. However, when the trial court held a hearing, and reached factual findings on those questions, it concluded the first prong of the MeDonough test had not been satisfied, and declined to excuse the juror. Thomas again sought appellate review, and in Thomas II, three members of this court disagreed with the factual determinations of the trial court, holding as a matter of law that the trial court could not have so found on the basis of the transcript. Unfortunately for us, all three members of the majority approached the question differently and the other two members of the court dissented, indicating that they would defer to the facts as found by the trial judge and affirm.
40 The consequence is that trial judges, litigants, and citizens still do not know what level of trust we will place in the determinations made by the trial court in post-trial juror challenges of this type. My colleagues today remove all doubt by applying a non-deferential standard approaching de novo review of the facts. I would not do so.
{141 Although I agree that wisdom lies in encouraging the removal of questionable jurors prior to trial when the problem may be remedied with little additional time and expense required, I differ on the standard after trial. I believe the standard set forth in McDonough is workable, without modification. I believe litigants, jurors, citizens, and justice are well served, and adequately protected, by a much higher level of deference to the determinations of the trial court under the McDonough test when: the challenge arises after trial has concluded.
142 I would accept the judgment of the trial court that this juror, although not truthful with regard to a part of the voir dire examination prior to trial, was able to evaluate the evidence on its own merit, and decide the case fairly. To hold otherwise is to invite unnecessary removal of jurors, and costly retrials, in situations where it is unwise. Surely the trial court is also aware of the necessity of fairness and justice, and occupies a much-advantaged position for resolution of the concern on a case-by-case basis.