Court Opinion

ID: 9366168
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-25 23:01:59.562001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:50.374247
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/25/23 P. v. Maddox CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,                                                     B317642

        Plaintiff and Respondent,                               (Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No. KA088924)
        v.

QUINTON MADDOX, JR.,

        Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mike Camacho, Judge. Affirmed.
      Tracy J. Dressner, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, David E. Madeo and Nicholas J. Webster,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                     ____________________
       Quinton Maddox appeals from an order summarily
denying, without appointing counsel, his petition for resentencing
under Penal Code former section 1170.95.1 We affirm.
                          BACKGROUND
       A jury convicted Maddox of second degree murder in 2011.
In our opinion on his direct appeal, we set forth the following
facts, which we include here solely to provide background and
context for the parties’ arguments; we do not rely on them to
resolve this appeal:
       On March 26, 2009, eight to 10 people, including Maddox
and Ocie May, gathered in an alley in the City of Covina. A fight
broke out between May and another individual, at the end of
which Maddox drew a gun and shot May, killing him. (People v.
Maddox (Nov. 8, 2012, B233872) [nonpub. opn.].)
       An information charged Maddox with one count of first
degree murder and alleged pursuant to section 12022.53,
subdivision (d) that Maddox personally and intentionally used a
firearm, which proximately caused great bodily injury and death.
       On the firearm enhancement, the jury was instructed with
CALCRIM No. 3150, which stated that to find the allegation true,
the jury had to find that “the People also have proved the
defendant’s act caused great bodily injury to or the death of a
person.” The jury was not instructed on the felony murder rule or
any theory of vicarious liability.
       Maddox’s first jury, in a trial presided over by Judge Mike
Camacho, found him not guilty of first degree murder, and

      1 Undesignated statutory references will be to the Penal
Code. Effective June 30, 2022, Penal Code section 1170.95 was
renumbered section 1172.6, with no change in text (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10).

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deadlocked on second degree murder. In Maddox’s retrial,
presided over by Judge Steven Blades, the jury found him guilty
of second degree murder and found on the verdict form that he
“personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, a handgun,
which caused great bodily injury and death to Ocie Daniel May.”
Judge Blades sentenced Maddox to forty years to life in prison.
       On October 8, 2021, Maddox filed a petition for
resentencing under former section 1170.95. He checked the boxes
stating that he “was convicted of 1st or 2nd degree murder
pursuant to the felony murder rule or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine,” that he requested counsel, and that he
“was convicted of 2nd degree murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or under the 2nd degree felony
murder doctrine.”
       On November 22, 2021, Judge Camacho summarily denied
the petition, without appointing counsel, on the ground that the
jury found Maddox was the actual killer, making him ineligible
for relief as a matter of law. In the course of denying the petition
Judge Camacho made two misstatements: That he had presided
over the trial in which Maddox was convicted, and that the
conviction was for first degree murder. In fact, Judge Camacho
presided only over the first trial, in which the jury deadlocked,
and Maddox was convicted only after a second trial, and only of
second degree murder.
       Maddox appeals.
                            DISCUSSION
       Maddox contends that several procedural errors—that the
petition was not assigned to his sentencing judge as required by
subdivision (b)(1) of former section 1170.95; that the trial court
failed to appoint counsel or wait for briefing by the prosecution

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before denying the petition; and that the stated reasons for
denying the petition were factually erroneous—mandate reversal.
We disagree.
       Senate Bill No. 1437 was enacted in 2018 to “amend the
felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is
not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act
with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) It accomplished this
by amending section 188, subdivision (a)(3), to require that all
principals to murder must act with express or implied malice to
be convicted of that crime, except for felony murder under section
189, subdivision (e). (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2.)
       For a felony murder conviction under section 189,
subdivision (e), Senate Bill No. 1437 required that the defendant
be the actual killer, an aider and abettor to the murder who acted
with intent to kill, or a major participant in the underlying felony
who acted with reckless indifference to human life. (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, § 3.)
       In 2021, the Legislature passed, and the Governor signed
into law Senate Bill No. 775, which amended subdivision (a) of
former section 1170.95 to permit relief for certain petitioners
convicted of “attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine,” resolving an ongoing issue in the courts.
(Sen. Bill No. 775 (2020-2021 Reg. Sess.) at § 2.) The amended
former section 1170.95, subdivision (a)(3), states that relief for
individuals convicted of attempted murder may be available if
they could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted

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murder because of changes that Senate Bill No. 1437 made to
sections 188 and 189 in 2018. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2-3.)
        Section 1172.6 now permits a person convicted of either
murder or attempted murder under a felony murder or natural
and probable consequences theory to petition the sentencing
court to vacate the conviction and resentence on any remaining
counts if the person could not be convicted of murder or
attempted murder under the new section 188 or 189. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a).) A petition for relief under section 1172.6 must include:
“(A) A declaration by the petitioner that he or she is eligible for
relief under this section, based on all the requirements of
subdivision (a). [¶] (B) The superior court case number and year
of the petitioner’s conviction. [¶] (C) Whether the petitioner
requests the appointment of counsel.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1).)
        If the petition contains the required information, the court
must appoint counsel and then conduct a prima facie analysis,
with briefing by the parties, as to the petitioner’s eligibility before
determining whether to issue an order to show cause. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961-970 (Lewis).)
        Here, Respondent concedes that the superior court erred in
by denying Maddox’s petition at the prima facie stage without
appointing counsel.
        However, any error is subject to review for harmless error
under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, which asks whether
it is reasonably probable that the petitioner would have obtained
a more favorable outcome if counsel had been appointed and
proper procedures followed. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp.
972-974.) This standard is not met where the record of conviction
shows as a matter of law that the petitioner was convicted under

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a theory of murder that remains valid after Senate Bill No. 1437.
(People v. Mancilla (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 854, 864.)
       Here, the jury was given no instruction on felony murder or
any theory of vicarious liability. Instead, it was instructed on the
firearm enhancement that to find the allegation true, it had to
find that “the People also have proved the defendant’s act caused
great bodily injury to or the death of a person.” The jury so
found, stating on the verdict form that Maddox “personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm, a handgun, which caused
great bodily injury and death to Ocie Daniel May.”
       By finding that enhancement true, along with the murder
conviction, the jury necessarily found that Maddox was the actual
killer, rendering him ineligible for relief under former section
1170.95. (People v. Cornelius (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 54, 57-58
[jury’s true finding that appellant personally used and discharged
a firearm in the commission of the murder within the meaning of
section 12022.53 and 12022.5, subdivision (a) constitutes implicit
finding that petitioner was the actual killer and thus
indisputably ineligible for relief]; People v. Garrison (2021) 73
Cal.App.5th 735, 745.)
       Therefore, any error in failing to appoint counsel and
summarily denying Maddox’s petition at the prima facie stage
was harmless. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 971, 973-974.)

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                         DISPOSITION
     The trial court’s order is affirmed.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                            CHANEY, J.

We concur:

             BENDIX, Acting P. J.

             WEINGART, J.

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