Court Opinion

ID: 9712049
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:45:27.302048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:09.535145
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE MORAN, dissenting: Section 8 — 102 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) provides that a person who operates a motor vehicle for transportation of passengers may provide a bond as proof of financial responsibility (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95V2, par. 8 — 102). Section 8 — 104 of the Code provides that: “The surety of [a] bond shall provide for the payment of each judgment by the owner of the motor vehicle *** for any injury to or death of any person or for damage to property other than such motor vehicle, resulting from the negligence of such owner, his agent, or any person operating the motor vehicle with his express or implied consent ***.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95V2, par. 8— 104(2).) The last substantive amendment to section 8 — 104 was made by the legislature in 1957. Sixteen years later, this court interpreted what is commonly called an “omnibus clause” contained in a private automobile insurance policy. (Maryland Casualty Co. v. Iowa National Mutual Insurance Co. (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 333.) In Maryland Casualty, this court adopted the “initial permission doctrine” and interpreted the omnibus clause to provide “ ‘that once the initial permission has been given by the named insured, coverage is fixed, barring theft or the like.’ ” Maryland Casualty, 54 Ill. 2d at 342, quoting Odolecki v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. (1970), 55 N.J. 542, 549-50, 264 A.2d 38, 42. Today, 15 years after the decision in Maryland Casualty, and 32 years after the last substantive change in section 8 — 104, we now hold that the “plain language of the statute” requires those operating a motor vehicle for transportation of passengers to maintain omnibus coverage. (127 Ill. 2d at 238.) Because I believe the majority misapprehends the nature of the “initial permission doctrine,” I must respectfully dissent. The flaw in the majority’s argument is evidenced by this court’s decision in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. McManus (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 239. In McManus we stated that: “[w]e adhere to the view expressed in Maryland Casualty that where an insurer elects to include in its policy a broad provision extending liability coverage to persons operating or using a car with the permission of the owner, a further grant of permission from the initial permittee need not be shown in order to invoke the coverage.” (Emphasis added.) (McManus, 64 Ill. 2d at 243.) By using the word “elect,” this court made clear in Mc-Manus that the initial permission doctrine, as adopted in Maryland Casualty, is a rule of contract construction. The rule is invoked when interpreting an omnibus provision contained in a private contract of insurance. As a rule of contract construction, there can be no doubt that even in the face of an omnibus provision, the parties may contract to exclude coverage for certain permittees. Economy Fire & Casualty Co. v. Pearce (1979), 79 Ill. App. 3d 559, 564-65. The majority now takes our 1973 decision in Maryland Casualty, which interpreted a private contract of insurance, and uses it to interpret a statutory provision passed 16 years earlier, in 1957. In essence, the rule of contract construction announced in Maryland Casualty has, by judicial legislation, been elevated to the level of substantive law. As the majority states, a fundamental principle of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. (In re Petition of the Village of Kildeer to Annex Certain Property (1988), 124 Ill. 2d 533, 545.) Citing Maryland Casualty, the majority holds that the intent of the legislature in passing section 8 — 104 was to “mandate]] omnibus clause coverage.” There is simply no way the legislature could have intended that section 8 — 104 mandate omnibus clause coverage when the concept was not even recognized in this State when the legislature passed the statute. Whether the result reached in this case is desirable from a public policy standpoint is best left to the legislature. The majority’s conclusion is unsupported by any evidence of legislative intent and conflicts with the terms of the policy at issue in this case. I would therefore reverse the decision of the appellate court and affirm the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.