Court Opinion

ID: 9391944
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-03 18:08:55.957698+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:43.677547
License: Public Domain

J-A05043-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    JOHN BROCK                                 :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 26 EDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 16, 2021
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                  Criminal Division at CP-51-CR-0708871-2003

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                                   FILED MAY 3, 2023

        John Brock (Appellant) appeals from the order denying his first petition

for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1     We affirm.

        This Court previously explained:

        At approximately 5:45 a.m. on June 2, 2003, police responded to
        a call for a shooting at the home of Valerie Copper, in Philadelphia.
        Upon arrival, officers encountered Etienne Johnson, who had been
        shot in the chest. Witnesses at the house described the shooter
        as a black male, 5’9”, and wearing a black and orange jacket. This
        description was broadcast over the police radio.

                While driving towards the scene within minutes of the
        initial call, Officer Timothy Hart observed Appellant a few blocks
        from the shooting, walking in the opposite direction. Appellant, a
        black male, was wearing an orange and black hooded sweatshirt
        underneath a black jacket. Officer Hart made a U-turn and exited
        his vehicle to approach Appellant. As he did so, Appellant
        immediately fled on foot. Officers Hart and Michael Shankin
        pursued Appellant.        Officer Shankin ultimately apprehended
____________________________________________

1   42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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      Appellant and brought him back to his police vehicle to be
      transported to the hospital for injuries sustained during his flight.
      Prior to Appellant being transported, Copper was brought to the
      area and she identified Appellant as the shooter. A search at the
      hospital revealed crack cocaine within Appellant’s clothing.

Commonwealth v. Brock, 4 A.3d 678 (Pa. Super. 2010) (unpublished

memorandum at 1-2) (affirming the trial court’s dismissal of charges based

on a Rule 600 violation).

      The   Commonwealth       successfully   petitioned   for   review.      The

Pennsylvania Supreme Court further explained:

      On June 3, 2003, the Commonwealth filed a criminal complaint
      against [Appellant], charging him with burglary, attempted
      murder, aggravated assault, criminal trespass, and firearms
      violations. [Appellant] was arrested on June 16, 2003. The case
      was first listed for trial on December 15, 2003, but was continued
      numerous times until March 8, 2005. On that date, [Appellant],
      who was on house arrest pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(E), failed
      to appear for court. A bench warrant for his arrest was issued on
      March 18, 2005; however, when police went to his residence on
      that date[;][ he was not there. Thereafter, the Commonwealth
      made no further efforts to locate him.

      On January 25, 2006, [Appellant] was arrested in Williamsport,
      Pennsylvania on unrelated charges.         On that same day, a
      Williamsport police officer notified authorities in Philadelphia that
      [Appellant] was in custody, but no attempt was made to secure
      his return to Philadelphia for trial. On September 27, 2006,
      authorities from the State Correctional Institute at Camp Hill
      (“SCI-Camp Hill”) notified Philadelphia police that [Appellant] was
      in custody on an unrelated matter.              At this point, the
      Commonwealth arranged for [Appellant’s] return to Philadelphia
      to stand trial on the June 3, 2003 charges.

      On May 24, 2007, [Appellant’s] attorney orally argued that
      [Appellant] was entitled to the dismissal of all charges, with
      prejudice, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600[,] because more than 365
      days of non-excludable time had elapsed from the date of the filing
      of the original criminal complaint. That same day, the trial court

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      held a hearing on [Appellant’s] oral motion. Eight months later,
      the trial court held a second hearing on January 18, 2008, at which
      the Commonwealth argued that [Appellant] waived his Rule 600
      claim by failing to file a written motion.         Additionally, the
      Commonwealth asserted that [Appellant] waived his Rule 600
      claim by failing to appear for the trial listing on March 8, 2005.
      On January 18, 2008, the trial court granted [Appellant’s] motion
      and dismissed the charges against him.

Commonwealth v. Brock, 61 A.3d 1015, 1016 (Pa. 2013).

      The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that Rule 600 requires a

defendant to file a written motion to dismiss. Id. at 1019. As Appellant had

not filed a written motion, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the

dismissal of charges and remanded the case to the trial court for further

proceedings.   Id. at 1019-20.    The Supreme Court held:       “[A] motion to

dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 must be made in writing, and a copy of

such motion must be served on the Commonwealth’s attorney.” Id. at 1020.

The Court further concluded that Appellant had waived his Rule 600 claim by

failing to appear on his scheduled trial date. Id. at 1022.

      This Court subsequently explained:

      Following remand, on May 19, 2014, Appellant filed a motion to
      suppress the revolver and other physical evidence, and on October
      30, 2014, he filed a motion to suppress Copper’s identification.
      Following several continuances, a hearing was held on November
      22, 2016. At the hearing, the Commonwealth presented the
      testimony of Officer Hart and Sergeant Daniel Gorman. Appellant
      did not call any witnesses[] but introduced into evidence the
      weather report for the morning of June 2, 2003. At the conclusion
      of the hearing, the trial court denied Appellant’s motions. N.T.,
      11/22/2016, at 50-52.

      ….

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        A jury trial occurred from November 29, 2016 to December 2,
        2016…. Additionally, because Copper died prior to Appellant’s
        trial, the trial court permitted the introduction of Copper’s
        preliminary hearing testimony, which detailed the events
        surrounding the shooting, as substantive evidence. See N.T.,
        11/28/2016, at 41-42 (ruling on the Commonwealth’s
        unavailability motion); N.T., 11/29/2016, at 61-72 (reading
        Copper’s redacted preliminary hearing testimony into the record).

        At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Appellant guilty [of
        aggravated assault, possession of an instrument of crime,
        violations of the Uniform Firearm[s] Act and not guilty of
        attempted murder and burglary]. Separately, Appellant pleaded
        guilty to PWID. On March 3, 2017, the trial court sentenced
        Appellant to an aggregate term of 15½ to 31 years of
        incarceration followed by 5 years of probation.

        Appellant filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial court
        denied. …

Commonwealth v. Brock, 215 A.3d 662 (Pa. Super. 2019) (unpublished

memorandum at 1-5), appeal denied, 222 A.3d 754 (Pa. 2019). This Court

affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence, and the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court denied allowance of appeal. See id.

        Appellant timely filed a pro se PCRA petition on March 18, 2020. The

PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition on August 18,

2020.     Although the PCRA court conducted several Grazier2 hearings,

Appellant chose to continue to be represented by appointed PCRA counsel,

William Ciancaglini, Esquire (Attorney Ciancaglini). On September 13, 2021,

the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss. Following appropriate notice,

____________________________________________

2   See Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).

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the PCRA court dismissed the petition on November 16, 2021. This timely

appeal followed. Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P.

1925.

        Appellant presents the following issues for review:

        Did the PCRA Court err and/or abuse its discretion when it denied
        [Appellant’s] petition under the PCRA where:

        a. counsel was ineffective for failing to seek dismissal based upon
           a violation of [A]ppellant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial;

        b. PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately raise and
           advance the claim premised upon the failure to seek dismissal
           based upon constitutional speedy trial rights; and,

        c. PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a claim that
           trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a Kloiber3
           jury instruction.

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (footnote added).

        In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, this Court “is limited to examining

whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the evidence of record

and whether it is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203

A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).            “The PCRA court’s

credibility determinations, when supported by the record, are binding on this

Court; however, we apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s

legal conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 105 A.3d 1257, 1265 (Pa.

2014) (citation omitted).

____________________________________________

3   See Commonwealth v. Kloiber, 106 A.2d 830 (Pa. 1954).

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        Appellant’s first two issues present layered claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel. “When analyzing such claims, we begin, as we must,

with the presumption that counsel acted effectively.”         Commonwealth v.

Johnson, No. 792 CAP, 2023 Pa. LEXIS 236, at *11 (Pa. filed Feb. 22, 2023).

        [T]o establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
        defendant     must     show,    by    a  preponderance      of   the
        evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the
        circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-
        determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or
        innocence could have taken place. The burden is on the defendant
        to prove all three of the following prongs: (1) the underlying claim
        is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic
        basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors
        and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that
        the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.

Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043 (citations omitted). The failure to satisfy any

prong     of   the   test   for   ineffectiveness   will   cause   the   claim   to

fail. Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 30 A.3d 1111, 1128 (Pa. 2011).

        Appellant argues all prior counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not

preserving his claim regarding his state and federal constitutional right to a

speedy trial. Appellant’s Brief at 33, 50.     See U.S. CONST., Amend VI; PA.

CONST., Art. I, § 9.

        “In evaluating speedy trial issues, our standard of review is
        whether the trial court abused its discretion, and our scope of
        review is limited to the trial court’s findings and the evidence on
        the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing
        party.” Commonwealth v. Miskovitch, 64 A.3d 672, 677 (Pa.
        Super. 2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Speedy trial
        analysis requires a two-step inquiry: “we first consider whether
        the delay violated Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, and if not, we may proceed
        to    the    four-part    constitutional     analysis    set   forth

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      in Barker [v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)].” Commonwealth
      v. Colon, 87 A.3d 352, 357 (Pa. Super. 2014).

Commonwealth v. Martz, 232 A.3d 801, 812 (Pa. Super. 2020). Barker’s

four-part constitutional analysis requires consideration of (1) the length of the

delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right;

and (4) prejudice to the defendant. See Commonwealth v. Bradford, 46

A.3d 693, 700-01 (Pa. 2012) (discussing Barker).

      Regarding the length and reason for delay, Appellant points to the delay

following his January 25, 2006 arrest in Williamsport. Appellant’s Brief at 42.

Appellant states that the Commonwealth took no action after being notified

by authorities in Williamsport that Appellant was in custody and available to

be returned to Philadelphia. Id. Appellant asserts the Commonwealth offered

no explanation for failing to take any action for a year. Id.

      Appellant also challenges the delay following litigation of his original

Rule 600 motion until the Supreme Court reversed and remanded his case.

Id. at 43. Appellant claims the Commonwealth’s “dereliction” caused a 5½

year delay. Id.

      Finally, Appellant asserts that his trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by claiming a Rule 600 violation, “without asserting a claim under

the state [and] federal constitution.”    Id. (emphasis omitted).      Appellant

argues the “extraordinary period of delay was prompted by the twin failures

of the Commonwealth and trial counsel.” Id. at 43-44.

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     Regarding the third Barker factor, Appellant claims he asserted his

speedy trial rights “more than a decade and-a-half ago.” Id. at 44. Appellant

argues the delay prejudiced his defense. Id. at 45. According to Appellant,

the Commonwealth destroyed the firearm used in the shooting, while the sole

eyewitness, Ms. Copper, died before trial.     Id.   Appellant states that the

Commonwealth presented no living eyewitness to the shooting. Id. at 46.

Appellant contends cumulative “events and errors resulted in impairment of,

and prejudice to, the defense.” Id. at 47.

     The PCRA court explained its rejection of Appellant’s claims as follows:

     In this instant case, Appellant was charged on June 2, 2003 and
     arrested on June 16, 2003. The case was initially listed for trial
     on December 15, 2003 but was continued numerous times until
     March 8, 2005.            In its 2010 opinion addressing the
     Commonwealth’s initial appeal in this case, the Superior Court
     noted that at the time of Appellant’s March 8, 2005, trial date,
     “252 days chargeable to the Commonwealth had elapsed.”
     Commonwealth v. Brock, 4 A.3d 678, slip op. at 10 (Pa. Super.
     June 8, 2010) (unpublished). Appellant failed to appear at the
     scheduled trial and absconded from house arrest. A bench
     warrant for Appellant’s arrest was issued on March 18, 2005.
     Appellant was arrested in Williamsport, Pennsylvania and held in
     custody for an unrelated matter. Appellant was not transported
     to Philadelphia for trial in this matter until September of 2006. On
     May 24, 2007, [trial counsel] made an oral motion for dismissal of
     all charges pursuant to Rule 600. It is at this procedural stage
     that Appellant avers that [trial counsel] should have also raised a
     constitutional speedy trial claim.

     A constitutional claim raised at that procedural posture would
     have failed because Appellant clearly did not act to assert his right
     prior to absconding from the jurisdiction and was responsible for
     the lengthy period of delay between his flight and trial. Further,
     while Appellant did demonstrate an assertion of his right to speedy
     trial after returning to the jurisdiction by raising a claim under
     Rule 600, such assertion was undermined by Appellant requesting

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     a further continuance while the motion was pending. It is evident
     after even a cursory analysis of the factors set forth in [Barker],
     given the history of the case, that a claim of violation of
     Appellant’s constitutional right to speedy trial brought by [trial
     counsel] at the same time as his failed Rule 600 motion would be
     without merit. Accordingly, Appellant’s claim that [PCRA counsel]
     was ineffective due to his failure to raise a claim of [trial counsel’s]
     ineffectiveness must fail.

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/29/22, at 12-13.

     Regarding the delay following remand, the PCRA court further

explained:

     The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court’s
     affirmation of the trial court’s ruling on the Rule 600 motion, and
     the case was remanded to this court on February 19, 2013.
     Appellant’s jury trial commenced on November 29, 2016. Over
     the course of more than three years between remand and
     trial, at least ten trial or hearing dates were continued due
     to defense requests, Appellant failed to appear for two
     scheduled trial dates, and Appellant requested time to
     obtain new representation twice. Further, Appellant again
     requested to postpone trial in order to obtain new counsel
     on the first day of trial on November 28, 2016. The request
     was denied, and trial commenced. Tr. at 8-16, Nov. 28, 2016.
     Appellant renewed his request at the outset of the second day of
     trial, November 29, 2016. Tr. at 4-5, Nov. 29, 2016. This request
     was also denied. Id. This pattern of behavior by Appellant clearly
     demonstrates a lack of assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and
     that Appellant in fact had the goal of postponing his trial for as
     long as possible. For these reasons, the constitutional speedy trial
     claim    underlying    [post-remand      trial   counsel’s] alleged
     ineffectiveness is without merit.           Accordingly, Appellant’s
     assertion that [PCRA counsel] was ineffective for failing to
     properly raise [post-remand counsel’s] ineffectiveness must fail.

Id. at 13-14 (emphasis added).

     The record supports the PCRA court’s analysis. Accordingly, Appellant’s

claims lack arguable merit.    See id.    We further observe that the record

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reflects that Appellant did not assert speedy trial rights while incarcerated in

Williamsport.     “Whether and how a defendant asserts his right is closely

related to the other factors … mentioned.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. The

United States Supreme Court emphasized: “[F]ailure to assert the right will

make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.”

Id. Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims would fail for this reason as well.

         Appellant next argues that PCRA counsel rendered ineffective assistance

by failing to claim prior counsel’s ineffectiveness for not requesting a Kloiber

instruction. Appellant’s Brief at 56-57. Regarding the arguable-merit prong

of his ineffectiveness claim, Appellant emphasizes that only one witness

identified him as the shooter. Id. at 60. Appellant states: “Valerie Copper

testified that she was hiding in a different room when she heard the shooting.”

Id. Upon leaving her hiding spot, she

         entered the room complainant was shot in. Copper testified that
         as she entered the room, she saw a man she identified as
         [A]ppellant running out the front door. She identified him by the
         jacket he was wearing as he fled the home. When asked if she
         knew the shooter, Copper told police in her interview on the day
         of the shooting that “I don’t know him from a can of paint.”

Id. at 60-61 (citations omitted).         Appellant claims that under these

circumstances, trial counsel should have requested a Kloiber instruction. Id.

at 61.

         A Kloiber instruction may be proper when an eyewitness is hindered in

identifying a defendant. Commonwealth v. Brown, 196 A.3d 130, 163 (Pa.

2018). Our Supreme Court explained that when

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       the witness is not in a position to clearly observe the assailant or
       he is not positive as to identity, or his positive statements as to
       identity are weakened by qualification, or by the failure to identify
       the defendant on one or more prior occasions, the accuracy of the
       identifications is so doubtful that the [c]ourt should warn the jury
       that the testimony as to identity must be received with caution.

Kloiber, 106 A.2d at 826-27. A Kloiber charge is not mandatory “[w]here

an eyewitness has had ‘protracted and unobstructed views’ of the defendant

and consistently identified the defendant ‘throughout the investigation and at

trial.’”   Commonwealth v. Ali, 10 A.3d 282, 303 (Pa. 2010) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Dennis, 715 A.2d 404, 411 (Pa. 1998)).

       Here, the PCRA court reviewed the evidence and concluded a Kloiber

instruction was not warranted:

             Appellant specifically asserts that “Ms. Copper’s testimony
       should have been received with caution because she testified, ‘I
       was hiding in the kitchen, in between a trash can and the
       basement door’ which obstructed Ms. Copper’s view to the living
       room of the house where the shooting occurred[,] and as a
       result[,] she did not actually witness the shooting occur.” Concise
       Statement ¶ 7, January 18, 2022 (edited for grammar).

             Ms. Copper was unavailable to testify at trial so the
       transcript of her testimony at the preliminary hearing was read to
       the jury. At the preliminary hearing, Ms. Copper testified that
       Appellant first came to her house with a woman she knew. Tr. at
       62, Nov. 29, 2016. The woman asked Ms. Copper to give her five
       dollars, so she could then give the money to Appellant. Id. Ms.
       Copper gave them the money and they left. Id. at 64. Before
       Appellant left, he said “Oh, I’ll be back. I’m coming back.” Id.
       Later, Ms. Copper was in her kitchen when she heard knocking on
       the door followed by commotion in the living room. Id. She
       looked around the corner and saw Appellant holding a silver gun.
       Id. She went back into the kitchen to hide and heard gunshots.
       Id. at 65. When she went into the living room, she saw Appellant
       running out the door. Id. at 67, 72. She knew it was [A]ppellant
       because of the jacket he was wearing. Id. at 72.

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            Ms. Copper positively identified Appellant as the person who
      was in her home holding the firearm. Ms. Copper had good
      opportunity to identify Appellant as the person holding the gun,
      as she had just seen him on her porch when he was looking for
      money and her view was unobstructed when she leaned back to
      look around the corner.       Ms. Copper’s identification of
      Appellant as the person holding the firearm remained
      positive and unqualified even after cross-examination and
      was not called into doubt by a prior failure to identify.

              Ms. Copper specifically testified that she did not see
      Appellant fire the gun. Id. at 66. The testimony that Appellant
      entered Ms. Copper’s home and brandished a firearm, along with
      Officer Hart’s testimony that he saw Appellant drop a silver
      handgun matching the one described by Ms. Copper, and Carl
      Rone’s expert testimony that the projectiles recovered from Ms.
      Copper’s house matched the handgun Appellant dropped, were all
      presented together as circumstantial evidence establishing that
      Appellant shot the victim. The jury was charged on the
      difference between direct and circumstantial evidence and
      fulfilled their role as factfinders by determining that the
      circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict Appellant.

            Because Ms. Copper positively identified Appellant as the
      person she saw holding a silver handgun in her home, and the
      jury was charged on the difference between direct and
      circumstantial evidence, a cautionary jury instruction was not
      required under Commonwealth v. Kloiber. Therefore, a claim
      that [trial counsel] was ineffective for failing to request such an
      instruction is without merit, and Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim
      as to [PCRA counsel] must fail.

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/23/22, at 15-18 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added).

      The PCRA court’s findings are supported by the record, and we discern

no abuse of discretion in the court’s legal conclusion. Consequently, we affirm

the dismissal of Appellant’s PCRA petition. See Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043;

Chmiel, 30 A.3d at 1128.

      Order affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/03/2023

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