Court Opinion

ID: 9671433
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:36:30.221402+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:09.824210
License: Public Domain

Brickley, C.J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I write separately to express my partial disagreement with the majority’s construction of Michigan’s rape-shield law, MCL 750.520j(l)(a); MSA 28.788(10)(l)(a), which generally excludes evidence of the complainant’s sexual conduct. However, an exception to the statute permits the admission of “[e]vidence of the victim’s past sexual conduct with *492the actor” if that evidence is material and if its “prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative value . . . I agree with the majority that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding the defendant from introducing evidence of specific acts of sexual activity between the defendant and the complainant. I also agree with the majority’s characterization of the test balancing prejudice and probative value. However, I would uphold the Court of Appeals conclusion that the word “past” as used in the exception permits the admission only of evidence of sexual conduct occurring before the alleged assault.
The majority concludes that the word “past” is ambiguous because there was disagreement regarding its meaning among the Court of Appeals judges. In performing statutory construction, it relies on People v Arenda, 416 Mich 1; 330 NW2d 814 (1982), to conclude that the primary purpose of the exception is to permit the admission of relevant evidence. Although I do not contest this characterization, I would not reach the issues whether the proffered evidence is relevant and whether its prejudicial nature outweighs its probative value. That analysis need only be performed if the evidence falls within the exception permitting the admission of evidence of past sexual conduct.
Although this Court does examine the legislative intent in performing statutory construction, the first consideration must be the language actually used by the Legislature. If that language cannot be construed to further the legislative intent, it is the purview of the Legislature to amend the statute. Further, a statute must be construed so as to give every word mean*493ing. “[I]n the interpretation of statutes, effect must be given, if possible, to every word, sentence and section . . . .” Drouillard v Stroh Brewery Co, 449 Mich 293, 303; 536 NW2d 530 (1995). The result reached by the majority renders the word “past” in the exception nugatory, thereby violating this rule of statutory construction. Accordingly, I must dissent.
The majority finds support for its conclusion in the dictionary definition of “past” as “ ‘having occurred during a time previous to the present.’ ” Ante at 484, n 8. However, the dictionary definition of “past” makes it meaningless in the context of the statute. In order for evidence of sexual conduct to be admitted at trial, the conduct must necessarily have occurred during a time previous to the trial. It would be impossible to admit evidence of future sexual conduct. The result reached by the majority could have been obtained had the Legislature worded the exception so as to permit the admission of “evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct with the actor” or “evidence of the victim’s other sexual conduct with the actor,” rather than evidence of “the victim’s past sexual conduct with the actor.” However, as the statute is written, in order to imbue “past” with meaning, this Court should find that only evidence of conduct that occurred before the alleged assault may be admitted.
The majority’s construction is not possible under the rule requiring that every word in a statute be given meaning. I conclude that the proffered evidence does not fall within the exception to the rape-shield statute permitting the admission of evidence of past sexual conduct because it deals with sexual conduct that occurred after the incident. The evidence should not be admitted under the current wording of the *494statute. Accordingly, I would remand the case to the trial court with instructions to apply the rule that “past” refers only to sexual conduct occurring before the alleged assault.