Court Opinion

ID: 9561253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:05:56.699678+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:42.016952
License: Public Domain

Barnes, Judge,
concurring specially.
I fully concur in the result and analysis of the majority in Divisions 1 and 2 of Case No. A99A1394, as well as Division 3 of Case No. A99A1395. Although I concur in the judgment in Division 4 of Case No. A99A1395, I write separately to elaborate on the facts and case law supporting the majority’s conclusion that the “Order and Final Judgment” which enforced the parties’ settlement agreement was an adjudication on the merits.
In this Order and Final Judgment, the trial court concluded that “[t]he parties entered into an enforceable settlement agreement as evidenced by correspondence dated August 21, 1996 and the First Lease Agreement” and that these documents “constitute the entire agreement between the parties;” Based on this finding, the trial court ordered Cato and Buford-Clairmont “to fully and completely carry out each of their obligations under these Agreements.”
The August 21, 1996 letter sent by Buford-Clairmont’s counsel states: “[T]his will confirm that the parties have reached an agreement to settle all matters by agreeing to execute a Lease Modification Agreement. . . .” The August 21, 1996 letter sent by Cato’s counsel states that “[a]fter the parties execute the lease modification agreement, counsel for the parties will execute and file mutual dismissals with prejudice with the Court.” Thus, contrary to the contention of Cato, the Order and Final Judgment adjudicated all matters which were or could have been asserted by Cato in the first lawsuit. See Basden v. Basden, 183 Ga. App. 188, 189 (1) (358 SE2d 317) (1987) (res judicata applied to settlement agreement incorporated into final divorce decree which settled all questions of division of property); see also Fowler v. Vineyard, 261 Ga. 454, 456 (2) (405 SE2d 678) (1991) (holding voluntary dismissal with prejudice is an adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata).
*56Decided November 22, 1999.
Silfen, Segal, Fryer & Shuster, Keith E. Fryer, for appellant.
Smith, Gambrell & Russell, Marcia M. Ernst, for appellee.
Our decision in Blakely v. Couch, 129 Ga. App. 625 (200 SE2d 493) (1973) does not require a different conclusion in this case. In that decision, we held that a consent judgment memorializing a settlement agreement could not have res judicata effect on a subsequent litigant who was not a party to the settlement agreement. Id. at 628-629. We also recognized that “[o]ur ruling here of course in no way limits the binding effect between the participating litigants of consent verdicts and judgment based thereon.” Id. at 629 (1).