Court Opinion

ID: 9391157
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-01 09:08:55.820048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:39.499534
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
    ___________________________

         No. 02-22-00206-CR
    ___________________________

      DOUGLAS ISIAQ, Appellant

                    V.

         THE STATE OF TEXAS

  On Appeal from the 16th District Court
         Denton County, Texas
      Trial Court No. F21-1781-16

  Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Womack, JJ.
  Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      A grand jury indicted Douglas Isiaq for injury to an elderly person, and he

pleaded guilty. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.04(a)(3), (c)(2). A jury found him

guilty, as instructed, and assessed his punishment at eight years’ confinement. See id.

§ 22.04(f) (providing that intentionally or knowingly causing bodily injury to an elderly

person is a third-degree felony), § 12.34(a) (providing that confinement range for

third-degree-felony is two to ten years). The trial court sentenced him accordingly.

Isiaq did not object to the sentence.

      Isiaq’s court-appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a

brief in support of that motion, in which he avers that, in his professional opinion,

“no meritorious ground for appeal exists in this case.” Counsel’s brief and motion

meet the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396,

1400 (1967), by presenting a professional evaluation of the appellate record

demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. See Stafford v. State, 813

S.W.2d 503, 510–11 & n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

      In compliance with Kelly v. State, counsel (1) provided Isiaq a copy of the

motion to withdraw and Anders brief; (2) informed Isiaq of his right to review the

appellate record and to file a pro se response; (3) informed him of his pro se right to

seek discretionary review should this court hold the appeal frivolous; and (4) took

concrete measures to facilitate his review of the appellate record. See 436 S.W.3d 313,

319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Although this court afforded Isiaq the opportunity to

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file a response on his own behalf, he did not do so. Likewise, the State declined to

file a brief.

        After an appellant’s court-appointed counsel files a motion to withdraw on the

ground that an appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, this court is

obligated to undertake an independent examination of the record to see if there is any

arguable ground that may be raised on his behalf. See Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 511.

Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75,

82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).

        We have carefully reviewed counsel’s brief and the appellate record. We agree

with counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit; we find nothing in

the appellate record that arguably might support this appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178

S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685

n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                      /s/ Dabney Bassel

                                                      Dabney Bassel
                                                      Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: April 27, 2023

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