Court Opinion

ID: 9647404
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:35:23.332889+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:35.990594
License: Public Domain

*285
ON APPELLEE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING

Asserting four points of error, appellee Jerold W. Gormley, D.D.S., has filed a motion for rehearing of this cause. In his motion, Dr. Gormley contends that this court erred in: (1) applying- the statute of limitations found in the Texas Deceptive Trade Praetices-Consumer Protection Act1 (DTPA) to appellant Marion Stover’s claim that Dr. Gormley, a health care provider, knowingly and intentionally made false representations concerning Stover’s surgery and recovery;2 (2) applying the discovery rule so as to avoid Dr. Gormley’s affirmative defense of limitations to Stover’s DTPA claims; (3) reversing a portion of the trial court’s summary judgment on a point not asserted by either party; and (4) reversing a portion of the trial court’s summary judgment on an issue Stover did not expressly present to the trial court. We remain, convinced that our disposition of the appeal was correct. Consequently, for the following reasons, Dr. Gormley’s motion for rehearing must be overruled.
Regarding Dr. Gormley’s first point, we remain convinced, for reasons given in our original opinion, that the statute of limitations provided in section 17.565 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code is applicable to Stover’s DTPA claims. In his second point, Dr. Gormley argues that by failing to plead the discovery rule to avoid his defensive plea that the DTPA allegations were barred by the statute of limitations, “Stover waived that defense.” We disagree.
We pointed out in our original opinion that section 17.565 provides that its two-year limitation period begins to run from the date the “consumer discovered or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered” the false, misleading or deceptive act or practice giving rise to the cause of action. In Burns v. Thomas, 786 S.W.2d 266 (Tex.1990), also cited in our original opinion, the Texas Supreme Court commented that “[t]he legislature essentially wrote the discovery rule into the DTPA” by including the above quoted language in the statute of limitations. Id, at 267. The court went on to say that in order to claim the benefit of the statute on summary judgment, the defendant must “bear[ ] the burden of establishing as a matter of law that the plaintiff either discovered or should have discovered the acts giving rise to the cause of action.” Id. See also Eshleman v. Shield, 764 S.W.2d 776, 777 (Tex.1989).
To be entitled to summary judgment, a defendant must establish, as a matter of law, one or more defenses to the plaintiffs cause of action. Bryant v. Gulf Oil Corp., 694 S.W.2d 443, 445 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). For the reasons we iterated in our opinion, Dr. Gormley failed to sustain his burden of establishing, as a matter of law, that Stover either discovered or should have discovered the alleged acts giving rise to her cause of action.
In the point of error asserted in her brief, Stover contended that the trial court erred in entering Dr. Gormley’s summary judgment based upon the plea of limitations. This point is sufficient to permit her to challenge whether Dr. Gormley met his burden of showing his entitlement to the trial court judgment. City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority, 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex.1979); Malooly Brothers, Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex.1970).
As stated above, we continue to believe the disposition of the case made in our original opinion was correct. Accordingly, Dr. Gorm-ley’s motion for rehearing is overruled.

. Tex.Bus. & Com.Code Ann. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp.1994).

. Appellee argues that appellant’s DTPA claims against a health provider should be controlled by the limitations statute of the Texas Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act. See Tex. Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp.1994).