Court Opinion

ID: 9835559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 02:29:51.661873+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:05.419078
License: Public Domain

KAPSNER, justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 47] I respectfully dissent.
I
[¶ 48] Mercier argues law enforcement’s warrantless search of his wallet and backpack violate the Fourth Amendment. The State contends the searches constitute an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement because they were incident to Mercier’s arrest. The search of Mercier’s wallet was constitutional, but thé search of his backpack was not.
[¶49] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: .
The right of the1 people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and ef*494fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
North Dakota Const, art. I, § 8 also prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. The United States Supreme Court has held “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). A search incident to a lawful arrest is one such exception. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914).
[¶ 50] Incident to a lawful arrest, officers may search: 1) the arrestee’s person and 2) areas within an arrestee’s immediate control. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009). The justification for allowing a search of the arrestee’s person stems from the lawful nature of the arrest itself. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973). The justification for allowing warrantless searches of areas and items within the arrestee’s immediate control stems from law enforcement’s need to remove weapons that the arrestee might use in order to resist arrest or effect escape and to prevent concealment or destruction of evidence. Riley v. California, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2483, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014). See also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). “If there is no possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area that law enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the rule does not apply.” Gant, 556 U.S. at 339, 129 S.Ct. 1710.
[¶ 51] A number of courts have explained the distinction between searches of the arrestee’s person and searches of areas within the arrestee’s immediate control.
In Robinson, the Supreme Court distinguished between two types of search incident to arrest: the search of the person arrested and the search of the area within his control. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 224, 94 S.Ct. 467. These searches serve different purposes and are justified by different concerns. A search of the person incident to his arrest is based on the need to disarm the individual and to discover evidence. However, the search need not be justified by probable cause to search for weapons or evidence; the search of the person requires no additional justification beyond the fact of his lawful custodial arrest, which is itself justified by probable cause. Id. at 235, 94 S.Ct. 467.
“The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect. A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification.” Id.
The search of the area of the arrest, on the other hand, must be justified by the possibility that the arrestee might gain possession of a weapon or destroy evidence. The scope of an area search is, therefore, limited to the area within *495the arrestee’s immediate control. Gant, 556 U.S. at 335, 129 S.Ct. 1710.
People v. Cregan, 381 Ill.Dec. 593, 10 N.E.3d 1196, 1201-02 (2014). The Supreme Court of Washington has similarly explained:
There are .two discrete types of searches incident to arrest: (1) a search of the arrestee’s person (including those personal effects immediately associated with his or her person — such as purses, backpacks, or even luggage) and (2) a search of the area within the arrestee’s immediate control. A valid search of the latter requires justification grounded in either officer safety or evidence preservation — there must be some articula-ble concern that the arrestee can access the item in order to draw a weapon or destroy evidence. Byrd, 178 Wash.2d at 617, 310 P.3d 793 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969)). The former search does not; in analyzing the search of an arrestee, we utilize the United States Supreme Court’s rationale from the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution that “‘a search may be made of the person of the arrestee by virtue of the lawful arrest.’ ” Byrd, 178 Wash.2d at 617, 310 P.3d 793 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973)). In such eases, we presume that safety and evidence justifications exist when taking those personal items into custody as part of the arrestee’s person.
The distinction as to whether a particular personal item constitutes part of the arrestee’s person, as opposed to just part of the surrounding area, turns on whether the arrestee had “actual and exclusive possession at or immediately preceding the time of arrest.” Byrd, 178 Wash.2d at 623, 310 P.3d 793.
State v. Brock, 184 Wash.2d 148, 355 P.3d 1118, 1121 (2015) (emphasis in original).
[¶ 52] The United States Supreme Court has explained its evolving rationale for creating these distinctions:
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), laid the groundwork for most of the existing search incident to arrest doctrine. Police officers in that case arrested Chimel inside his home and proceeded to search his entire three-bedroom house, including the attic and garage. In particular rooms, they also looked through the contents of drawers. Id. at 753-754, 89 S.Ct. 2034.
The Court crafted the following rule for assessing the reasonableness of a search incident to arrest:
“When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might, seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. ... There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arres-tee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate control’ — construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he .might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.” Id. at 762-763, 89 S.Ct. 2034.
The extensive warrantless search of Chimel’s home did not fit within this exception, because it was not needed to protect officer safety or to preserve evidence. Id. at 763, 768, 89 S.Ct. 2034.
*496Four years later, in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), the Court applied the Chimel analysis in the context of a search of the arrestee’s person. A police officer had arrested Robinson for driving with a revoked license. The officer conducted a'patdown search and felt an object' that he could not identify in Robinson’s coat pocket. He removed the object, which turned out to be a crumpled cigarette package, and opened it. Inside were 14 capsules of heroin. Id. at 220, 223, 94 S.Ct. 467.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the search was unreasonablé because Robinson was unlikely to have evidence of the crime of arrest on his person, and hecause it believed that extracting the cigarette package and opening it could not be justified as part of a protective search for weapons. This Court reversed, rejecting the notion that “case-by-case adjudication” was required to determine “whether or not there was present one of the reasons supporting the authority for a search of the person incident to a lawful , arrest.” ‘ Id. at 235, 94 S.Ct. 467. As the Court explained, “[t]he authority to search the person incident to' a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a court' may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the' person of the suspect.” Ibid. Instead, a “custodial arrest of a suspect based' on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no -additional justification.” Ibid.
The Court thus concluded that the search of Robinson was reasonable even though there was no concern about the loss of evidence, and the arresting officer had no specific concern that Robinson might be armed. Id. at 236, 94 S.Ct. 467. In doing so, the Court did not draw a line between a search of Robinson’s person and a further examination of the cigarette pack found during that search. It merely noted that, “[hjaving in the course of a lawful search come upon the crumpled package of cigarettes, [the officer] was entitled to inspect it.” Ibid. A few years later, the Court clarified that this exception was limited to “personal property ,.. immediately associated with the person of the arrestee." United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (200-pound, locked footlocker could not be searched incident to arrest), abrogated on other grounds by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991).
The search incident to arrest trilogy concludes with Gant, which analyzed searches of an arrestee’s vehicle. Gant, like Robinson, recognized that the Chi-mel concerns for officer safety and evidence preservation underlie the search incident to arrest exception. See 556 U.S. at 338, 129 S.Ct. 1710. As a result, the Court concluded that Chimel could authorize police to search a vehicle “only when- the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.” 556 U.S. at 343, 129 S.Ct. 1710. Gant added, however, an independent exception for a warrantless search of a vehicle’s passenger compartment “when it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’” Ibid. (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632, 124 S.Ct. 2127, 158 L.Ed.2d 905 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)). That exception stems nót from *497Chimel, the Court explained, but from “circumstances unique to the vehicle context.” 556 U.S. at 343, 129 S.Ct. 1710.
Riley v. California, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2483-84, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014), See also Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 2175-76, 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016) (discussing the development of search-ineident-to-arrest case law).
[¶53] In this case, after law enforcement brought Mercier’s backpack to the scene, they instructed him to slowly retrieve his identification from the backpack while they shined flashlights inside and observed. While Mercier was reaching into the backpack, officers asked whether it contained any weapons. Mercier then told them the bag contained a knife. Upon hearing this, officers placed Mercier in handcuffs, removed the knife from the bag, and conducted a pat-down search of Mercier’s body oh which they found his wallet. The search revealed marijuana inside of Mercier’s wallet as well as his and Dewayne Liggins’ identification cards. Officers then informed Mercier he was under arrest and placed him in a squad car. After doing so, they searched Mercier’s backpack and found drugs and drug paraphernalia.
A
[¶54] The search of Mercier’s wallet was a permissible search incident to arrest because it was on his person when the officers searched and arrested him. A search incident to arrest is permissible even when the search precedes the arrest so long as the two are substantially contemporaneous and the search does not yield the evidence necessary to provide probable cause for the arrest. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111, 111 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980) (“Where the formal arrest followed quickly on the heels of the challenged search of petitioner’s pérson, we do not believe it particularly important that the search preceded the arrest rather than vice versa[,]” when the fruits of the search were “not necessary to support probable cause to arrest petitioner.”). See also State v. Overby, 1999 ND 47, ¶¶ 8-9, 590 N.W.2d 703. At the point his wallet was seized, Mercier had identified himself as a man the officers knew he was not, thus giving false information to a police officer. They had probable cause to arrest him independent of the evidence they obtained 'from the search of his- wallet. The wallet was on his person when he was arrested. The search of Mercier’s wallet was a permissible search incident to a lawful arrest.
B
E1T 55]- The. search of Mercier’s backpack, however, was unconstitutional. The State argues the backpack was subject to a search incident to arrest because it was within Mercier’s immediate control prior to the arrest. As noted above, in Robinson, the United States Supreme Court held police may, incident to a lawful arrest, search a container found on the arrestee’s person. 414 U.S. at 236, 94 S.Ct. 467 (“Having in the course of a lawful search come upon the crumpled package of cigarettes, [the officer] was entitled to inspect it.”). In a later case, United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977), abrogated on other grounds by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991), the Court clarified this rule and held items “not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee” may not be searched incident to arrest unless there is a danger the arrestee can reach the item to access a weapon or destroy evidence:
*498[W]arrantless searches of luggage or other property seized at the time of an arrest cannot be justified as incident to that arrest either if the “search is remote in time or place from the arrest,” Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367, 84 S.Ct. 881, 883, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964), or no exigency exists. Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal property not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer an incident of the arrest.
[¶ 66] Mercier’s backpack was not on his person and it was not immediately associated with Mercier when Officer McCarthy approached him. An officer left the scene after speaking with Mercier and took the backpack from an individual at a neighboring house. It is not clear whether the backpack was ever in Mercier’s control once it was brought to the scene. Nothing in the record indicates whether officers handed him the bag or maintained control of it while they allowed him to search for his identification. The only testimony on the issue indicates officers instructed Mer-cier to slowly remove his identification from the bag while the officers shined their flashlights into it. Shortly after he began searching, Mercier told officers the bag contained a knife. Officers then placed him into handcuffs, patted him down, and discovered he had given them false identification and had a bag of marijuana in his pocket:
Q. How did Mr. Mercier’s backpack— and at this time the person you knew as Mr. Liggins, how did his backpack get to the scene?
A. He said it was over at his friend’s across the road, so Officer Bratsch went to retrieve it. He gave a description of the backpack and then he went to retrieve the backpack and returned it.
Q. And once he came back with the backpack, what did the person — this subject say about the bag?
A. I asked him whether this was his backpack and he said it was.
Q. What did he say when you asked if anything illegal was in the bag?
A. We initially asked to search the bag and he said no and — because his identification card that he claimed was in there was in there, we told him to go through it but just in a slow manner so that — we didn’t want him pulling out any kind of weapon or anything like that. So we shined our flashlights inside the backpack while he looked.
Q. And did he indicate there were any weapons in the bag?
A. Yes. We asked if there were weapons in there and he said yes, there was a knife.
Q. And what did officers then do?
A, At that point he said he would retrieve it and we said no, we’ll retrieve the knife and the knife only, and placed him in handcuffs for safety purposes.
Officers then placed Mercier into the back of a squad ear and searched his bag.
[¶ 67] Under the Robinson analysis, a search of the person and items immediately associated with the person is constitutionally permissible as an incident of the arrest. But a police officer cannot create the immediate association between the item to be searched and the defendant that allows the item to be searched under the Robinson analysis. In cases following Robinson, and in every case cited in the majority opinion for search of the person incident to arrest, the item searched was immediately associated with the person when the person was approached by the *499police; the police did not create that immediate association. See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (blood alcohol content inherently a part of the person arrested); Robinson, 414 U.S. at 223, 94 S.Ct. 467 (crumpled cigarette package found on defendant’s person); State v. Woinarowicz, 2006 ND 179, ¶ 33, 720 N.W.2d 635 (defendant was clutching her purse when she was placed under arrest); State v. Brock, 184 Wash.2d 148, ¶ 1, 355 P.3d 1118 (arrestee was wearing the backpack at the time he was stopped by the police); State v. Byrd, 178 Wash.2d 611, ¶ 1, 310 P.3d 793 (defendant’s purse in her lap at time of arrest); People v. Cregan, 2014 IL 113600, ¶¶ 5-7, 381 Ill.Dec. 593, 10 N.E.3d 1196 (defendant was in possession of both bags when approached by officers); United States v. Gordon, 895 F.Supp.2d 1011, 1014-15 (D.Haw.2012) (defendant was carrying bag and wallet at time.of arrest); People v. Marshall, 2012 CO 72, ¶¶ 3, 17, 289 P.3d 27 (defendant stepped out of the car carrying a backpack and backpack at his feet when defendant was arrested).
[¶ 58] This Court has previously had to deal with a similar issue. Prior to- its limitation by Gant, the United States Supreme Court in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), held “when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.” In Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 302, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999), the United States Supreme Court extended the Belton “bright line” ability to search the passenger compartment of a car upon arrest to the ability to search containers belonging to non-arrested occupants of the vehicle. Recognizing that holding, this Court in State v. Tognotti, 2003 ND 99, ¶ 14, 663 N.W.2d 642 (limited by Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009)), held: “an arresting officer’s search of a purse belonging to a nonarrested occupant which is voluntarily left in the vehicle- is a valid search incident to the arrest of a passenger in the vehicle.”
[¶ 59] In so holding, this Court in Tog-notti had to consider whether a police officer could create the right to search a passenger’s property by ordering the passenger to leave the property in the car. This Court reviewed the caselaw from other jurisdictions that held “the police cannot create a right to search a container by placing it within the passehger compartment of a car or by ordering someone else to place it there for them.” Tognotti, 2003 ND 99, ¶ 19, 663 N.W.2d 642 (quoting State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 15 P.3d 1167, 1171 (2000)). Accord: State v. Boyd, 275 Kan. 271, 64 P.3d 419, 427 (2003); State v. Newsom, 132 Idaho 698, 979 P.2d 100, 102 (1998); State v. Seitz, 86 Wash.App. 865, 941 P.2d 5, 8 (1997). But see State v. Steele, 613 N.W.2d 825, 830 (S.D.2000).
[¶ 60] In Tognotti, holding the police officer could not create a right to search, this Court stated:
A purse, like a billfold, is such a personal item that it logically carries for its owner a heightened expectation of privacy, much like the clothing the person is wearing. We are, therefore, persuaded by the foregoing court decisions that the Fourth Amendment is violated when an officer directs that a purse be left in the vehicle and then proceeds to search the purse incident to the arrest of another passenger in the vehicle.
2003 ND 99, ¶ 20, 663 N.W.2d 642. Although the expansive right to search a vehicle accepted in Tognotti under Belton and Houghton has been restricted under *500Gant, the limitation on the ability of an officer to create a right to search has not.
[¶ 61] Our jurisprudence makes it clear the officers had no authority, without a warrant, to transport the backpack to the location where Mercier was being questioned. State v. Ressler, 2005 ND 140, 701 N.W.2d 915; State v. Nickel, 2013 ND 155, 836 N.W.2d 405.
[¶ 62] “[A] seizure deprives the individual of dominion over his or her person or property.” Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990). “A seizure of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an.individual’s possessory interest in .that property.” Nickel, 2013 ND 155, ¶ 20, 836 N.W.2d 405. Absent probable cause to believe the personal property seized is illegal itself or contains contraband, law enforcement may not transport an individual’s property from the initial place of seizure; such action interferes with the individual’s private possessory interest in the property and constitutes an unreasonable seizure. Ressler, 2005 ND 140, ¶ 19, 701 N.W.2d 915 (“A Terry stop of a package is distinguishable from a full-fledged seizure supported by probable cause, and we hold reasonable suspicion was an inadequate basis upon which to transport Ressler’s package to the law enforcement center.”).
Here, Officer Eisenmann had reasonable suspicion to suspect Ressler’s package, and this level 'of suspicion would have justified a decision to detain the package at We Ship pending further investigation. By transporting the package, however, police executed the seizure in a manner we believe is contrary to the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable seizures.
A seizure of a package based on reasonable suspicion affords government officials less command, dominion, or control over the package than they would possess if executing a full-fledged seizure based on probable cause or a warrant. A contrary conclusion-would distend the rationale for .a Terry stop to a point where it envelops a seizure based on probable cause or a seizure supported by a warrant. See Terry v, Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Police could not seize Ressler’s package to a greater extent than by placing it in them exclusive control, removing it from the location where it was submitted for shipping, and transporting it to a law enforcement center. This full-fledged seizure required either probable cause supported by an exception to the warrant requirement or a warrant to be valid. [United States v.] Place, 462 U.S. [696,] 701-02, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983); see Garmon v. Foust, 741 F.2d 1069, 1073-74 [ (8th Cir.1984) ] (finding exigent circumstances existed where a shipped parcel could be lost or mistakenly delivered). A Terry stop of a package is distinguishable from a full-fledged seizure supported by probable cause, and we hold reasonable suspicion was an inadequate basis upon which to transport Ressler’s package to the law enforcement center.
Ressler, at ¶¶ 18-19. See also Nickel, 2013 ND 155, ¶¶ 23-24, 31-33, 836 N.W.2d 405 (warrantless transportation of individual’s package to law enforcement center after officers observed plant material in vials held unconstitutional); State v. Heier, 2016 ND 158, ¶¶ 18-19 (holding Heier’s privacy interest in backpack interfered with by private individual, but Fourth Amendment does not apply to search or seizure by private person).
[¶ 63] In Mereier’s case, like in Ressler and Nickel, officers took Mercier’s personal property from a third party. They exercised dominion over his property by *501moving it from the place he had left it. Their act of exercising control over his property interfered with his possessory interest. This constitutes a seizure. Officers then transported his property from the place it was seized to conduct further in-' vestigation. If the officers believed they had reasonable suspicion to seize the backpack as part of an investigation, Ressler makes clear it was necessary to get a warrant to transport it from where it was located. The warrantless seizure and transportation of Mercier’s backpack was unreasonable and in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
[¶64] Even if the backpack was, in fact, in Mercier’s control at some point, the justifications for a search incident to arrest of items within the arrestee’s immediate control are still absent. At the time the backpack was searched, Mercier was handcuffed and secured in the back of a squad car, and the knife had already been removed. The search did not ensure officer safety. Nor did the search prevent the destruction of evidence; the bag was in the officers’ custody after Mercier was handcuffed and placed in the squad car. “If there is no possibility that ah arrestee could reach into the area that law enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the rule does not apply.” Gant, 556 U.S. at 339, 129 S.Ct. 1710. See also Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15, 97 S.Ct. 2476 (“Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal property not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer an incident of the arrest.”); United States v. Matthews, 532 Fed.Appx. 211, 218 (3d Cir.2013) (“However, ‘[o]nce law enforcement officers have [exclusive control over] luggage or other personal property not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee ..., and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer an incident of the arrest.’ ”) (“Here, there was no reasonable possibility that Matthews could have accessed the backpack at the time Officer Pomeroy executed the search, as he was handcuffed in the back of a locked police car. Thus, the District Court was correct in concluding that the search could not be justified under the search incident to arrest exception.”) (alteration in original).
[¶ 65] “[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2482. This case presents a situation where officers took an individual’s personal property from off scene, brought the property to the individual while he was detained, ordered the individual to retrieve an item from inside the property while they observed what was inside, asked the individual what was inside, physically restrained the individual based on his response to their question, placed the individual into a locked squad car, and then conducted a warrantless search of the personal property. It is unreasonable to permit law enforcement to act in this manner — to procure a citizen’s personal property from another location, bring it to the scene of the arrest, place it near the person, and then invoke the search-incident-to-arrest exception to sidestep the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.
II
[¶ 66] Because the district court improperly denied the motion to suppress the evidence found in the backpack, I would *502reverse the criminal judgment and remand for further proceedings.
[¶ 67] DANIEL J. CROTHERS, J, concurs.