Court Opinion

ID: 9886346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 16:00:39.838833+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:11.025572
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                            For the Eighth Circuit
                        ___________________________

                                No. 22-3294
                        ___________________________

                             United States of America

                        lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

                                           v.

                                 Orlando Ray Gray

                       lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
                                       ____________

                    Appeal from United States District Court
                         for the District of Minnesota
                                 ____________

                             Submitted: June 12, 2023
                              Filed: October 6, 2023
                                  ____________

Before LOKEN, COLLOTON, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
                          ____________

LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

       Orlando Ray Gray was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm
in July and November 2020 and March 2021. 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2).
Gray pleaded guilty to Count 3, admitting in a Plea Agreement that he drove a stolen
vehicle in March 2021 and was arrested when he fled from the vehicle with two
loaded firearms. The government agreed to dismiss the other two counts. Gray
stipulated that he possessed a firearm on the dates charged in the other counts, and
that possession of those firearms was relevant conduct for sentencing purposes. The
parties agreed on other Guidelines calculations, but Gray did not agree with the
government’s contention that his offense level should be increased four levels
because he possessed a firearm “in connection with another felony offense” (drug
trafficking). USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). The parties agreed the district court1 would
determine this issue and “no evidentiary hearing is necessary.”

       At sentencing, the district court overruled Gray’s objection and imposed the
four-level increase, resulting in an advisory guidelines sentencing range of 130 to 162
months imprisonment. Gray appeals his 120-month sentence (the statutory
maximum). The issue on appeal is whether the district court erred by imposing the
four-level increase. “In applying § 2K2.1(b)(6) when the defendant has not been
convicted of another state or federal felony offense, the district court must find by a
preponderance of the evidence that another felony offense was committed, and that
use or possession of the firearm ‘facilitated’ that other felony. . . . When the issue is
whether the evidence supports these findings, we review the district court’s
determination for clear error.” United States v. Holm, 745 F.3d 938, 940 (8th Cir.
2014) (citations omitted). Finding no clear error, we affirm.

       The four-level increase at issue applies if Gray “used or possessed any firearm
or ammunition in connection with another felony offense.” USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).
Gray stipulated that his firearm possession on July 13, 2020 was relevant conduct to
his March 2021 offense of conviction. See USSG § 1B1.3(a) and comment.
(n.5(B)(ii)). Therefore, the increase applies if, as the district court found, Gray
possessed the firearm on July 13 in connection with a drug trafficking offense. The
issue turns on whether the district court clearly erred in finding, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that Gray’s firearm possession “facilitated, or had the potential of

      1
      The Honorable Paul A. Magnuson, United States District Judge for the District
of Minnesota.

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facilitating” another felony offense. § 2K2.1, comment (n.14(A)); see United States
v. Sneed, 742 F.3d 341, 344 (8th Cir. 2014).

      Gray’s Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), to which the defense made
no factual objection, stated in The Offense Conduct section of the Report:

  8. On July 13, 2020, Ramsey County [Violent Crime Enforcement Team],
     with the assistance of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),
     were conducting surveillance on a female they suspected to be involved
     in narcotics trafficking. The officers observed the female driving to
     different locations and committing suspected narcotics sales.
     Eventually, the female picked up a male, later identified as Orlando Ray
     Gray, from a gas station. The investigating officers asked the
     Maplewood Police Department (MPD) to conduct a traffic stop on the
     vehicle, and an MPD officer identified the driver as Elicia Maria
     Hernandez, the front passenger as Ida Mae Burton, and the rear
     passenger as Orlando Gray. As the occupants appeared nervous and the
     officer saw a glass “bong” style pipe, commonly used to smoke
     controlled substances, in plain view, he used a canine to search the
     vehicle and found 6 grams of methamphetamine and a black container
     containing a loaded . . . 40-caliber pistol . . . . where Gray was sitting.

 9.   On July 14, 2020, Gray, post Miranda, was interviewed by police
      officers while in custody. The defendant stated he knew drug dealers
      who dealt large quantities of narcotics and were members of the “Latin
      Kings” street gang. Gray stated he is like a bodyguard for Steve
      Rodriguez, a “Latin King” gang member, and that he has a reputation for
      “shooting.” Gray also stated the other occupants of the vehicle “call me
      when they want someone around with a gun.” He noted that [he] had a
      romantic relationship with Ida Burton. He met Elicia Hernandez for the
      first time that day but knew she was a pound level dealer and she “just
      got robbed for four pounds of methamphetamine.”

The PSR recommended a four-level § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) increase because Gray
possessed a firearm on July 13, 2020 while acting as a bodyguard for drug traffickers.

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       Gray’s pre-hearing Position on Sentencing repeated his Plea Agreement
objection to the four-level increase. Then, in a Supplemental Position on Guidelines
filed before the sentencing hearing, Gray argued that an increase for possession in
connection with drug trafficking was not warranted because the evidence is
insufficient to show that he knowingly possessed the 6 grams of methamphetamine
found in the back seat for drug trafficking, and he “did not tell police he possessed
the firearm on July 13 in his role as a bodyguard for individuals engaged in the sale
of narcotics.” Gray went on to argue at length that the firearm did not “facilitate” any
drug possession offense.2

      At sentencing, the district court challenged defense counsel’s emphasis on the
possession of 6 grams of methamphetamine in the back seat near Gray because “[t]he
PSR puts the 4 points of enhancement because he’s the enforcer for drug dealers.”
Defense counsel responded:

              Well, okay, so two answers to that. Number one is that the PSR
      attributes a statement to [Gray] that we have objected to, and I state here
      that Mr. Gray did not tell the police he possessed the firearm on July
      13th in his role as a bodyguard for individuals engaged in the sale of
      narcotics. . . . So that’s why the specific objection is raised that he didn’t
      tell them that as to that July 13th gun.

             And then the rest of the briefing . . . is that in order for the Court
      to [a]pply the enhancement, there has to be a drug trafficking offense,
      not just some general claim of misbehavior. And there is no drug
      trafficking crime otherwise charged, available in the PSR or in this
      entire case. It just doesn’t exist.

      2
        We have repeatedly emphasized that the addition of Application Note 14 to
USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6) in 2006 “established a higher threshold for proving that firearms
facilitated the drug offense when the separate felony is a drug-possession offense
rather than a drug-trafficking offense.” United States v. Dalton, 557 F.3d 586, 588
(8th Cir. 2009).

                                           -4-
The district court denied Gray’s belated objection, “adopt[ed] the PSR as written and
include[d] the 4-level” increase in determining the advisory guidelines range.

       On appeal, treating as fact his unproven assertion that paragraph 9 of the PSR
contains an inaccurate statement as to what he told police officers in his post-Miranda
interview, Gray argues the government (i) failed to prove a drug-trafficking offense,
and (ii) the 6 grams of methamphetamine found with Hernandez’s clothing in the
back seat of the car with Gray and his firearm does not establish possession in
connection with a drug possession offense. Like the district court, we need not
consider the drug-possession issue. We reverse for clear error only if we are “left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United
States v. Nilsen, 18 F.4th 587, 589 (8th Cir. 2021). Here, we conclude that the
unobjected-to facts in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the PSR, together with Gray’s other,
unchallenged admissions in the police interview, and the undisputed observations of
officers surveilling Hernandez’s vehicle that day establish that the district court’s “in
connection with” finding was supported by a preponderance of the evidence that was
properly before the court at sentencing:

       First, we note that Gray did not timely object to paragraphs 8 and 9 of the PSR,
so the district court was entitled to adopt every statement as proven.

       Second, Gray made no effort -- in the district court or on appeal -- to establish
the asserted PSR mistake. Apparently, Gray’s assertion is based on a recording of his
interview that was introduced as an exhibit at a contested motions hearing conducted
by a magistrate judge long before Gray’s guilty plea and sentencing. Gray made no
attempt to have the exhibit made part of the sentencing record, where it could be
reviewed and considered by the district court. So, objection not preserved.

        Third, Gray makes no effort to explain the significance of the asserted mistake
to the in-connection-with finding that is essential to the 4-level increase at issue. He

                                          -5-
simply argues the district court “committed procedural error by misinterpreting and
misapplying the Guidelines.” Again, sentencing issue not preserved.

       Finally, we consider what the undisputed evidence at sentencing did prove,
recognizing that “[t]he district court was entitled to draw reasonable inferences from
the record.” United States v. McArthur, 11 F.4th 655, 663 (8th Cir. 2021):

       (i) First, on July 13, 2020, police were surveilling Elicia Maria Hernandez, a
suspected narcotics trafficker. They observed Hernandez drive to different locations
and engage in suspected drug sales. Hernandez picked up Gray at a gas station.
When a local police officer stopped the vehicle, driver Hernandez, passenger Ida
Burton, Gray’s girl friend, and Gray in the back seat appeared nervous. Gray was
holding a glass pipe of a type commonly used to smoke methamphetamine. A canine
unit sniffed the vehicle and alerted to narcotics. In the rear driver’s-side back seat
where Gray had been sitting, officers found a clear bag containing six grams of
methamphetamine and a lunch box containing a loaded handgun and debit cards in
Gray’s name under a pile of clothing.

       (ii) Second, taken into custody, Gray admitted the handgun was his. During
a narcotics officer interview the next day, he told the officers he knew narcotics drug
dealers in the “Latin Kings” street gang, has a reputation for “shooting,” and acts as
a bodyguard for a “Latin Kings” drug dealer named Steve. He said that drug dealers
“call me when they want someone around with a gun.”

       (iii) Third, Gray also told the officers that he had a romantic relationship with
Ida Burton. He had just met Elicia Hernandez on July 13 but knew she was a pound-
level drug dealer who had recently been robbed of four pounds of methamphetamine.

     We conclude this was sufficient evidence for the district court to infer that
Hernandez was trafficking drugs on July 13 and had picked up Gray, a known

                                          -6-
“shooter,” to protect her trafficking activities from further robberies. Gray argues that
6 grams of methamphetamine in the back seat was too small a quantity to support an
in-connection-with drug trafficking or drug possession finding. That is a frequently-
litigated issue because, “[i]If the felony is for drug trafficking, Application Note
14(B) mandates application of the adjustment if guns and drugs are in the same
location.” United States v. Blankenship, 552 F.3d 703, 705 (8th Cir. 2009) (emphasis
added).

        A jury or sentencing court “may infer the required nexus when the firearm is
kept in close proximity to the drugs.” United States v. Shaw, 751 F.3d 918, 922 (8th
Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted). But proximity to specific drugs is not required. The
increase applies if Gray possessed any firearm “in connection with another felony
offense.” That includes serving as a bodyguard to protect Hernandez in her drug
trafficking with third parties that day, not just the distribution of the small quantity
of methamphetamine found with the firearm in the back seat of the vehicle Hernandez
was driving. Here, surveillance provided evidence that Hernandez was trafficking
narcotics. Gray admitted he was known as a “shooter” who protected drug dealers,
and he knew that Hernandez was a “pound level” drug dealer who had just been
robbed. On these undisputed facts, the court could find by a preponderance of the
evidence that Gray’s possession of the firearm facilitated -- was “in connection with”
-- Hernandez’s drug trafficking. The court did not clearly err in applying the four-
level § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) increase.

      The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
                     ______________________________

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