Court Opinion

ID: 9720395
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:29:07.278615+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:03:29.232379
License: Public Domain

Riley, J.
(dissenting). This case involves the issues whether defendant’s state and federal constitutional right to counsel during custodial interrogation was violated by the failure of the police to tell defendant before he made a statement that an attorney had been retained for him by his family, and whether the conduct of the police, denial of access by the attorney to defendant, and denial to defendant of food and a place to sleep, rendered defendant’s statement involuntary. Because I believe that the holding and rationale of the Court of Appeals is correct, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The case the Court of Appeals makes is that defendant had been arrested and was in a custodial setting subject to interrogation by the police. The Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, protected by the safeguards in Miranda,1 had therefore attached. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not at*173tached, however, because that right attaches only at or after the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.2 People v Bladel (After Remand), 421 Mich 39, 52; 365 NW2d 56 (1984), citing United States v Gouveia, 467 US 180, 187; 104 S Ct 2292; 81 L Ed 2d 146 (1984).3 Virtually all Michigan case law regarding the right to counsel tracks the analysis by the United States Supreme Court of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.4
*174Defendant alleges violation of two corresponding rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. First, he claims that his waiver of Miranda rights was invalid because the police failed to inform him that a lawyer retained by his family had come to the police station to meet with him. Second, he claims that his statement was involuntary because of the denial of food and a place to sleep for the eleven hours before making the statement, as well as the failure to have an arraignment without delay. Nevertheless, for the reasons set forth below, I do not believe that the police actions invalidated defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel during questioning. Moreover, I believe that the statements were made voluntarily.
In Moran v Burbine, 475 US 412; 106 S Ct 1135; 89 L Ed 2d 410 (1986), the United States Supreme Court addressed facts similar to the present case, and found that the statement was admissible and that the defendant’s rights had not been violated. In Moran, an attorney retained for the defendant telephoned the police station and was given assurances that the defendant would not be further questioned until the next day. In fact, the interrogation continued that evening, and the defendant gave an inculpatory statement. The Court defined two dimensions of the Miranda decision, to be scrutinized by the courts under a totality-of-the-circumstances test: 1) the waiver of rights must be voluntary in the sense that it is the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception; and 2) the waiver must be made with a full awareness of both the *175nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon the right. Id. at 421.5 The Court then found:
Events occurring outside of the presence of the suspect and entirely unknown to him surely can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right. [Id. at 422.]
It further held:
Although highly inappropriate, even deliberate deception of an attorney could not possibly affect a suspect’s decision to waive his Miranda rights unless he were at least aware of the incident. [Id. at 423.]
Thus, the conduct of the police, while unethical, is relevant to the constitutional validity of a waiver only "if it deprives a defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them.” Id. at 424. Furthermore, and most significant to the present case, the Court then held, "[n]or are we prepared to adopt a rule requiring that the police inform a suspect of an attorney’s efforts to reach him.” Id. at 425. The Court cited practical difficulties with such a rule, such as defining the point at which police will be held accountable for knowing that the accused has counsel. Id.
The defendant in Moran propounded a similar argument to the one asserted in the present case— that if the accused were allowed to speak with retained counsel, he would have made no statement at all. The Court addressed this argument and held:
*176Because neither the letter nor purposes of Miranda require this additional handicap on otherwise permissible investigatory efforts, we are unwilling to expand the Miranda rules to require the police to keep the suspect abreast of the status of his legal representation. [Id. at 427.]
While the Court interpreted the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, it did indicate that "[n]othing we say today disables the States from adopting different requirements for the conduct of its employees and officials as a matter of state law.” Id. at 428. It further found that on "facts more egregious than those presented here police deception might rise to a level of a due process violation.” Id. at 432.
However, while the police in Moran lied to the defendant’s counsel regarding when the defendant would be questioned, the police in the instant case refused access to defendant by his attorney because defendant voluntarily waived his right to an attorney during the custodial interrogation.6 In fact, defendant testified that he understood his right to counsel and elected to waive it.7 The facts of the present case are not more egregious than those in Moran.
*177The Supreme Court reiterated the requirements for a valid waiver under the Fifth Amendment in Patterson v Illinois, 487 US 285, 292; 108 S Ct 2389; 101 L Ed 2d 261 (1988). There, the Court held that a valid waiver requires "a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.”
In Michigan, this Court has held that the Michigan constitutional privilege against self-incrimination need not be interpreted differently from the United States Constitution. Paramount Pictures Corp v Miskinis, 418 Mich 708; 344 NW2d 788 (1984). See also In re Moser, 138 Mich 302, 305; 101 NW 588 (1904). Article 1, § 17 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution provides, in part:
No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
Article 1, § 20 then provides that "[i]n every criminal prosecution, the accused shall have the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense . . . .” There is nothing conspicuous in the language of the Michigan Constitution that would distinguish it from the rights guaranteed by the federal constitution.8
*178Defendant cites People v Cavanaugh, 246 Mich 680, 686; 225 NW 501 (1929), for the proposition that "[hjolding an accused incommunicable to parents and counsel is a subtle and insidious method of intimidating and cowing, tends to render a prisoner plastic to police assertiveness and demands, and is a trial of mental endurance under unlawful pressure.” Not only was Cavanaugh decided before the Fifth Amendment became applicable to the states by incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment, but also in that case the accused had requested to speak with counsel, as well as his parents, which requests were denied.9 It is clear that the police may not refuse an accused’s request for counsel during interrogation. It is inappropriate, however, to fragment the finding in Cavanaugh and to assert that an accused has a separate right to call his parents, independent of the right to call counsel. As Sergeant Taylor testified, an accused may be denied a call to his relatives while the preliminary investigation is conducted in order to prevent interference by the accused and his family with evidence or witnesses.
The fact that Sergeant Taylor knew that Mr. Dean had been retained for defendant, and that Mr. Dean was present at the station ready to speak with defendant, may seem an abuse of power by the police. It does not, however, rise to the level of a constitutional wrong. Defendant testified several times that he knew he did not have to make a statement and that he knew he could wait to speak with an attorney before making his statement.10 Police-initiated questioning is *179not barred because defendant did not indicate that he wished to consult an attorney. People v Crusoe, 433 Mich 666, 692; 449 NW2d 641 (1989). There is no evidence that his lack of sleep or his lack of food for half a day overbore his will to make a statement.11 Perhaps if he had known that Mr. Dean was present he would have spoken with him and would not then have given his statement. That does not, however, invalidate his waiver of the right to counsel, which he made voluntarily and with knowledge of his rights and the consequences of making a statement, i.e., that the statement would be used against him in court'.
I believe that the right to counsel had not attached, and that defendant knowingly waived his right to consult with an attorney before making his statement.12 While the police conduct may have been objectionable, it does not amount to a constitutional violation. Thus, I am persuaded that the *180decision of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed.
Boyle and Griffin, JJ., concurred with Riley, J.

 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 76 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).

 I would find that no attorney-client relationship is formed where the defendant voluntarily waives his right to an attorney and he has no knowledge of attempts by an attorney to contact him.

 See also Moran v Burbine, 475 US 412, 430; 106 S Ct 1135; 89 L Ed 2d 410 (1986), where the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right does not apply before the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings. The Court further reasoned that it makes little sense to say that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at different times depending upon whether the accused has retained an attorney. And see People v Wright, 186 Mich App 566, 569; 465 NW2d 339 (1990).

 See, e.g., People v Bellanca, 386 Mich 708, 713; 194 NW2d 863 (1972). While we have deviated from federal precedent regarding the right to counsel at pretrial identification procedures, compare People v Anderson, 389 Mich 155; 205 NW2d 461 (1973), with Kirby v Illinois, 406 US 682; 92 S Ct 1877; 32 L Ed 2d 411 (1972); see also People v Jackson, 391 Mich 323; 217 NW2d 22 (1974), our Court in Anderson was in fact following federal precedent that was valid at the time. See United States v Wade, 388 US 218; 87 S Ct 1926; 18 L Ed 2d 1449 (1967). The general rule remains that a defendant has no right to counsel until the right attaches automatically after the initiation of adversarial judicial criminal proceedings. Bladel, supra; People v Crusoe, 433 Mich 666, 685, 698, n 1; 449 NW2d 641 (1989) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). The exception for pretrial identification procedures was established before a contrary federal rule was formulated and was maintained because of the unique elements of confrontation that these procedures present. See Anderson, supra. Normal custody interrogations have never been analyzed under the right to counsel simply because that right has not yet attached at this investigative stage.
Similarly, in People v Gonyea, 421 Mich 462; 365 NW2d 136 (1984), this Court held, in a plurality decision, that statements elicited in violation of a defendant’s art 1, § 20 right to counsel are inadmissible for both substantive and impeachment purposes. While under current Sixth Amendment analysis such statements are admissible for impeachment purposes, see Michigan v Harvey, 494 US 344; 110 S Ct 1176; 108 L Ed 2d 293 (1990), the Gonyea Court relied on federal case *174law valid at the time of its decision as a guide to its interpretation of the right to counsel guaranteed by the Michigan Constitution. Gonyea, supra at 469. See also Lucas v New York, 474 US 911; 106 S Ct 281; 88 L Ed 2d 246 (1985), wherein Justice White, dissenting from a denial of certiorari, noted the conflict existing at that time on this issue.

 See Wright, n 3 supra at 568.

 A different question would be presented if it were found as a fact that defendant made an equivocal request for counsel which was responded to by deceitful misrepresentation of his options. Where the police are aware that an attorney is present to represent a client, the failure to respond to an equivocal request for counsel with the knowledge of counsel’s presence may be found to be the kind of "police exploitation” which in combination with other circumstances would render a statement involuntary. See People v Conte, 421 Mich 704, 756; 365 NW2d 648 (1984) (opinion of Boyle, J.).

 Contrary to the implication by the majority that defendant merely asserted he did not have counsel, rather than clearly waiving his right to counsel, ante at 153-154, there are numerous instances where defendant clearly testified that he understood his rights to counsel, he believed it was his choice to make a statement in the absence of counsel, he never requested counsel, and he volunteered to make the statement.

 See discussion in n 4. Furthermore, Michigan case law does not support defendant’s assertion that he should be afforded more liberal rights to counsel during interrogation than were afforded him in the present case. In People v Moore, 51 Mich App 48; 214 NW2d 548 (1974), the Court of Appeals held that it was not error to admit a statement made by a defendant where the defendant was read his Miranda rights, refused to speak without counsel, and then initiated a meeting and at that time waived counsel. "Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred and their admissibility is not affected by the Miranda decision.” Id. at 51. See also People v Guidry, 67 Mich App 653, 660; 242 NW2d 461 (1976); People v Burton, 74 Mich App 150, 159; 253 NW2d 691 (1977), rev’d on other grounds 401 Mich 415; 258 NW2d 58 (1977).

 See Wright, n 3 supra at 568.

 There is no constitutional right to "friendly contact with others.” Brickley, J., ante at 170. The rights guaranteed in Miranda do not create a "cruel Hobson’s choice,” id. at 170, between waiving the right to remain silent and waiting for an attorney. The constitutional right *179to counsel during custodial interrogation guarantees that the defendant may remain silent and wait for an attorney, or elect to make a statement. Defendant understood that the choice existed, and understood he had the right to an attorney and the consequences of waiving that right, therefore, under the facts of the present case, any "conscious exclusion of friendly contact with others” was not unconstitutional. Id. at 170.

 I recognize that in certain cases police conduct may be extreme and require suppression of any statements made while in custody because the circumstances indicate defendant was coerced. People v White, 401 Mich 482; 257 NW2d 912 (1977) (the defendant was held incommunicado for close to thirty hours, never left alone, broke down and cried during interrogation, and was not advised of his right to counsel); People v Allen, 8 Mich App 408; 154 NW2d 570 (1967) (the defendant was held incommunicado and deprived of food and sleep for three days and three nights); People v Hamilton, 359 Mich 410; 102 NW2d 738 (1960) (the defendant was held incommunicado and interrogated for three days).
However, in the present case, defendant testified that at the conclusion of the eleven-hour detention, during which time the police were investigating the homicide, he still understood that he did not have to make a statement. The conditions of defendant’s detention and interrogation do not appear to have overborne his will.

 See Wright, n 3 supra at 570.