Court Opinion

ID: 9672814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:00:40.977256+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:18.503184
License: Public Domain

R. M. Maher, P.J.
(concurring). I agree with the majority that the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant should be affirmed. On its way to affirmance, the majority rejects the holding of this Court in People v David, 119 Mich App 289; 326 NW2d 485 (1982). I was on the panel that decided David and the present case has caused me to reexamine its precepts. After rethinking that opinion, .1 now believe that David was incorrectly decided.
In David, the affidavit contained a hearsay statement received from an unnamed informant. The informant had told the affiant that his marijuana had been purchased from someone in a trailer. The affidavit then described a "controlled buy”:
"The informant was searched and found not to be in possession of drugs. While under constant police surveillance, the informant entered the trailer. When the informant returned to the police, he possessed drugs.” David, supra, p 294.
*143The David Court concluded that the hearsay satisfied the first prong of the two-prong test emerging from Aguilar v Texas, 378 US 108; 84 S Ct 1509; 12 L Ed 2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v United States, 393 US 410; 89 S Ct 584; 21 L Ed 2d 637 (1969). The Court found, however, that the second prong was unmet because the "affidavit made no allegation that the informant was credible or that his information had proven reliable in the past”. David, supra, p 294. The majority opinion in the present case correctly criticizes that statement. The second prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test is satisfied if the affidavit contains "underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the * * * [informant’s] information [was] 'reliable’ ”. Aguilar v Texas, 378 US 114. The underlying circumstance in David was the controlled buy. As the Court itself remarked: "On the basis of this evidence [the results of the controlled buy], the police had cause to believe that the informant got the drugs while in the trailer.” People v David, supra, p 294.
David, nevertheless, concluded that the hearsay in the affidavit failed to pass the Aguilar-Spinelli test. The Court then considered whether the other allegations in the affidavit — namely, those describing the controlled buy — were sufficient to establish probable cause. The Court concluded that they were not sufficient:
"We are not convinced that a controlled buy alone is enough to establish probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. There must be some indication of the reliability of the buyer-informant so that a conclusion that a purchase actually took place may be legitimately drawn.” David, supra, p 295.
The majority opinion in the present case criticizes *144that conclusion. And, again, the majority is correct. Even if we assume arguendo that the controlled buy in David does not alone establish probable cause to believe that a purchase took place in the trailer, it did establish, I now believe, that the drugs were located in the trailer. To authorize a search warrant the affidavit need only establish probable cause to believe that the items sought are where they are alleged to be. Thus, I now hold that a description of a controlled buy in an affidavit is sufficient to establish probable cause for a search warrant unless circumstances indicate otherwise.
Insofar as David is inconsistent with the above remarks, I disavow it. My reflections on that case cause me to conclude that the affidávit involved in the case now before us is adequate. The hearsay was sufficiently detailed and extensive to pass the first prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test. The second prong is also satisfied. The description of the controlled buys reveals the underlying circumstances from which the affiant concluded that the informant’s information was reliable. Moreover, the controlled buys alone establish probable cause to believe that the marijuana was located in the place to be searched.
I conclude, along with the majority, that the search warrant was not defective and that the trial court’s denial of defendant’s suppression motion should be affirmed.