Court Opinion

ID: 9426927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:19:17.276364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:03.852494
License: Public Domain

Mr. Chief Justice Burger,
concurring.
I concur fully in the Court’s opinion.
This is but another in a long line of cases in the federal courts raising questions concerning the authority of the States *137to regulate and administer matters peculiarly local in nature. Too often there is confusion as to what the Court decides in this type of case. The issue here, of course, is not whether prisoner “unions” are “good” or “bad,” but, rather, whether the Federal Constitution prohibits state prison officials from deciding to exclude such organizations of inmates from prison society in their efforts to carry out one of the most vexipg of all state responsibilities — that of operating a penological institution. In determining that it does not, we do not suggest that prison officials could not or should not permit such inmate organizations, but only that the Constitution does not require them to do so.
The solutions to problems arising within correctional institutions will never be simple or easy. Prisons, by definition, are closed societies populated by individuals who have demonstrated their inability, or refusal, to conform their conduct to the norms demanded by a civilized society. Of necessity, rules far different from those imposed on society at large must prevail within prison walls. The federal courts, as we have often noted, are not equipped by experience or otherwise to “second guess” the decisions of state legislatures and administrators in this sensitive area except in the most extraordinary circumstances. This recognition, of course, does not imply that a prisoner is stripped of all constitutional protection as he passes through the prison’s gates. Indeed, this Court has made clear on numerous occasions that the Constitution and other federal laws protect certain basic rights of inmates. E. g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U. S. 817 (1977). Rather, it “reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism” on our part to understand that needed reforms in the area of prison administration must come, not from the federal courts, but from those with the most expertise in this field — prison administrators themselves. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 405 (1974). And, in the last half dozen years, enlightened correctional administrators have made significant strides in the area of prison reform. *138Notable in this respect are the grievance procedures instituted by the Federal Bureau of Prisons* after pilot experiments, and now by a number of States including North Carolina, which permit inmates to register their complaints with penal officials and obtain non judicial relief. However, while I applaud such procedures, and indeed urged their adoption, W. Burger, Report on the Federal Judicial Branch- — -1973, 59 A. B. A. J. 1125 (1973), I do not suggest that the procedures are constitutionally mandated. Similarly, we do not pass today on the “social utility” of inmate organizations, whether they be characterized as “unions” or otherwise, but only on whether the Constitution requires prison officials to permit their operation.

Statistics compiled by the Federal Bureau of Prisons indicate that in 1975 alone, more than 5,000 complaints by inmates were brought to the attention of federal prison officials pursuant to the grievance procedures. Approximately one-fourth of these complaints were ultimately resolved in favor of the inmate. Preliminary figures for 1976 indicate an even greater utilization of the grievance procedures; it is estimated that more than 10,000 complaints were registered by inmates during that year. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 31-32, n. 15. The development of this grievance procedure appears to have slowed down the rate of growth of federal prisoner petitions filed in the federal district courts. 1975 Annual Report of the Director, Administrative Office of the United States Courts XI48-XI51.