Court Opinion

ID: 9530180
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:58:00.447404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:01.076864
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE SULLIVAN delivered the opinion of the court: In his petition for rehearing, defendant states that he failed to call our attention to the recent case of People v. Rege (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 473, 356 N.E.2d 537, which he says is directly in point and conflicts with our opinion. In Rege, defendant was found guilty of the possession of more than 500 grams of a substance containing cannabis, in violation of the Cannabis Control Act (the Act). A request for probation was denied, and a sentence of one to three years was imposed. It appears that during the presentence hearing, the prosecutor erroneously stated on two occasions that the offense was the most serious one under the Act, where, in fact, it was only the most serious possession offense. Thereafter, the trial court in denying probation commented on the quantity of cannabis involved and the seriousness of the offense. The appellate court (People v. Rege (1975), 30 Ill. App. 3d 127, 332 N.E.2d 154) concluded that the interests of defendant and society would best be served by probationary supervision, rather than imprisonment, and on this basis the sentence was vacated and the cause remanded with directions to grant probation. After first affirming the conviction, our supreme court held in Rege that Supreme Court Rule 615 does not grant authority to a reviewing court to reduce a sentence of imprisonment to probation, citing People v. Bolyard (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 583, 338 N.E.2d 168. Then, it considered the import of the prosecutor’s erroneous statement in the light of the trial court’s comments, and stated: “The State’s Attorney undoubtedly intended his reference to mean ‘the most serious possession offenses.’ But that is not what he said. Perhaps, or even probably, they were understood by the judge as they were intended. But we cannot be certain. And because of that lack of certainty, coupled with the fact that the judge clearly considered the question whether probation should be granted a difficult decision and his expressed reason or his decision was the ‘seriousness of the offense,’ we have concluded to remand for such further consideration as the trial judge believes appropriate.” 64 Ill. 2d 473, 484, 356 N.E.2d 537, 542. It was also stated in Rege that appellate review of the denial of probation is limited to determining whether the trial court did in fact exercise its discretion or whether it abused that discretion by acting in an arbitrary manner. See also People ex rel. Ward v. Moran (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 552, 301 N.E.2d 300.  Thus, we believe the rule to be that when a trial court makes a comment which may indicate an arbitrary denial of probation and where a review of the record does not clarify the ambiguity, a reviewing court should remand for resentencing. However, where as here, such a review clarifies any initial ambiguity and establishes that the trial court did not act arbitrarily but, rather, exercised its discretion properly in the denial of probation, remandment is not required. For the reasons stated, the petition for rehearing is denied. LORENZ and WILSON, JJ., concur.