Court Opinion

ID: 9667638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:51:13.120845+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:39.448159
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I concur with the majority opinion with exception of the property division reversal. Upon a review of the parties’ circumstances under the factors enumerated in Michael v. Michael, 287 N.W.2d 98 (S.D.1980), et al., I do not believe that the trial court clearly abused its discretion.
The trial court’s award to appellee of the 160 acres of realty and outbuildings and machinery thereon is deceptive in nature. At first blush, it appears that this award, when compared to appellant’s award of approximately $9,000.00 in personalty and cash, is inequitable. Upon closer inspection, however, three pertinent considerations substantiate the trial court’s property division and reveal the true equitable posture of the parties.
First, although much of the farm assets were awarded to appellee, it is important to note that, as the trial court stated in its findings of facts, “[a]ll of the real and personal property of [appellee] is subject to a considerable mortgage indebtedness.” As indicated by his financial statement submitted to the trial court, appellee had a combined liability (short-term and long-term debts) of $295,663.53 as of September 1979. Approximately $268,000.00 of this liability consisted of a mortgage on the 160 acres and other long-term debts stemming from farm machinery, implements, and supplies. It should be noted that the trial court held appellee responsible for all indebtedness against any realty or personal property related to the farm. Indeed, ap-pellee’s net worth actually decreased more than $41,000.00 during the course of the parties’ marriage.
Second, it is undisputed that appellee entered into the marriage with considerable property, including the 160 acres of realty. This Court only considers the contributions made by each party during the marriage to the acquisition or accumulation of the marital estate. See Vaughn v. Vaughn, 252 N.W.2d 910 (S.D.1977); Hanson v. Hanson, 252 N.W.2d 907 (S.D.1977). Since appellee owned the 160 acres prior to the parties’ marriage, appellant is necessarily precluded from any property award which takes this realty into account. Thus, the majority opinion’s foundation (appellee’s seemingly large award of land assets) crumbles under closer scrutiny.
Third, the majority’s reference to the typical domestic duties performed by appellant is ill-advised. Appellant’s domestic contribution was poor and anything but typical. *138The following findings of fact by the trial court indicate appellant’s attitude toward her husband and family:
[Appellant], because of her working hours from 3 p. m. to 11 p. m. would invariably sleep in, requiring [appellee] to ready the [children] for school, to prepare breakfast for them, and to get them to the school bus on time.
[Appellee] did indeed look after all of the children — cooking meals, doing laundry, etc.
[Appellee] is very active in the Catholic faith and attends church regularly; and that he saw to it that [appellant’s children by a former marriage and the child of this marriage] participated regularly in their religious education offered by the Catholic church; that [appellant] would infrequently attend church and was in most cases indifferent to her religious responsibility towards the children.
[Appellant] on occasion would use drugs, some of which being identified as Dalmane and Tagamet; [appellant] admitted using these drugs and others occasionally to induce sleep; [appellee’s] Exhibit A indicates that [appellant] may have been using drugs to excess.
[Appellant] encouraged [appellee] to engage in sexual intercourse with other women, contending that such conduct would enhance their marriage. [Appel-lee] was at all times faithful to his marriage vows.
[Appellant] on different occasions has behaved in an erratic and irrational manner, and would explain this behavior as either unimportant or a product of other people’s imagination.
These findings speak for themselves. I, for one, do not consider this type of domestic performance a valuable contribution to the acquisition of the marital property.
The above factors, in my opinion, sufficiently indicate that the trial court made an equitable division of property and did not clearly abuse its discretion.
I am authorized to state that Justice DUNN joins in this concurrence in part and dissent in part.