Court Opinion

ID: 9794437
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:05:34.847341+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:13:38.937988
License: Public Domain

Judge JONES
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority that the judgment of conviction must be reversed, but dissent from the remand ordered. In my view, the necessity for a new trial should depend on the trial court’s reconsideration of the “make-my-day” immunity issue.
I agree with defendant’s contention that the trial court erred in failing to grant her immunity from prosecution under § 18-1-704.5, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8B) because the decedent’s presence on her porch constituted an unlawful entry of her dwelling which the court failed to consider. I would, therefore, reverse and remand for further consideration of that issue.
Section 18-1-704.5 provides as follows: “(1) The general assembly hereby recognizes that the citizens of Colorado have a right to expect absolute safety within their own homes.
“(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 18-1-704, any occupant of a dwelling is justified in using any degree of physical force, including deadly physical force, against another person when that other person has made an unlawful entry into the dwelling, and when the occupant has a reasonable belief that such other person has committed a crime in the dwelling in addition to the uninvited entry, or is committing or intends to commit a crime against a person or property in addition to the uninvited entry, and when the occupant reasonably believes that such other person might use any physical force, no matter how slight, against any occupant.
“(3) Any occupant of a dwelling using physical force, including deadly physical force, in accordance with the provisions of subsection (2) of this section shall be immune from criminal prosecution for the use of such force.” (emphasis added)
A defendant seeking immunity under § 18-1-704.5 bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the statutory conditions for immunity. People v. Arellano, 743 P.2d 431 (Colo.1987); People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971 (Colo.1987).
The General Assembly’s use of both the term “home” and the term “dwelling” in § 18-1-704.5 is an inconsistency that appears to create an ambiguity.
Since a court, when construing a statute, must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly, we must look to the language of the statute itself, and give the statutory terms the accepted and understood meanings. People v. Guenther, supra. Furthermore, the history of an ambiguous statute is important in ascertaining legislative intent, and that legislative history may be reflected by successive drafts of a bill. See Haines v. Colorado State Personnel Board, 39 Colo.App. 459, 566 P.2d 1088 (1977); see also Three Bells Ranch Associates v. Cache La Poudre Water Users Ass’n, 758 P.2d 164 (Colo.1988).
As initially proposed, H.B. 1361 concerned the use of deadly force “within” the “residence” of the person using the deadly force. A compromise bill, which ultimately became enacted as § 18-1-704.5, was broader in that it covered use of physical force by “any occupant of a dwelling ... against another person ... [who] has made an unlawful entry into the dwelling....” (emphasis added) Thus, “dwelling” was the operative noun ultimately selected to describe the structure related to which an *1010occupant may use deadly force pursuant to the statute.
Section 18-l-901(3)(g), C.R.S. (1986 Repl. Vol. 8B) defines “dwelling” as a building which is used, intended to be used, or usually used by a person for habitation. This definition comprehends an entire building, and even includes those parts of a residence that are not usually used by a person directly for habitation, including an open garage. See People v. Jiminez, 651 P.2d 395 (Colo.1982).
It must be presumed that the General Assembly has knowledge of the legal import of the words it uses and intends that each part of a statute be given effect. Thus, I conclude that use of the word “dwelling” by the General Assembly was a deliberate, legislative choice, calculated to obtain the result mandated by its use of the word. See People v. Guenther, supra; § 2-4-201(l)(b), C.R.S. (1980 Repl.Yol. IB).
Further support for this construction of this statute may be found from the presumption that, if, as here, the General Assembly includes a term in a statute which it has defined elsewhere in an applicable statute, and which has been the subject of prior judicial construction, the General Assembly was cognizant of that interpretation and intended use of the word in concert therewith. See People v. Green, 734 P.2d 616 (Colo.1987). See also § 18-1-901(3)(g); People v. Jiminez, supra.
Here, the porch of defendant’s home, which is permanently affixed to the house, is covered by a roof and enclosed by a low brick wall on three sides with an opening at the top of the steps leading to the front door of the house. I agree with defendant that the porch is so integral a part of her house that, for purposes of § 18-1-704.5, it is a part of her dwelling.
Certainly, a permanently attached, covered, and partially-walled porch serves as an extension of a residence for purposes of many common activities associated with habitation. And, a porch is more widely used for those purposes which generally may be thought of as “habitation” than a garage, which our supreme court, prior to the promulgation of § 18-1-704.5, determined was part of a dwelling. See People v. Jiminez, supra.
Moreover, the courts of several other states have held that a porch is an integral part of a dwelling. See State v. Martinez, 229 N.J.Super. 593, 552 A.2d 232 (1989); State v. Bonano, 59 N.J. 515, 284 A.2d 345 (1971) (for purposes of self-defense, a “porch or other similar physical appurtenance is deemed to come within ... [the concept of dwelling-house] ”); State v. Scott, 162 Kan. 571, 178 P.2d 182 (1947) (“porches ordinarily constitute an integral part of the dwelling house”); Moree v. State, 152 Miss. 278, 119 So. 202 (1928) (“a charge that one entered a dwelling house is supported by proof that he came onto the front porch of such dwelling house”); Downer v. State, 10 Ga.App. 827, 74 S.E. 301 (1912) (“The front porch of a house is a part of the house itself....” See also State v. Green, 305 N.C. 463, 290 S.E.2d 625 (1982) (upholding convictions where defendant had broken and entered a storage room adjacent and appurtenant to the dwelling, the court held the term dwelling-house to include not only the house but appurtenant structures); Martin v. Tudo, 121 Ga.App. 240, 173 S.E.2d 403 (1970) (“ [T]he term ‘dwelling’ ... includes everything pertinent and accessory to the main building_”; holding that a contract containing the term “occupied dwelling” referred to “principal house ... and connected structures.”).
The prosecution, in effect, concedes that a porch which is totally enclosed in glass with a glass door would necessarily be included as part of a dwelling. However, the prosecution has urged this court to limit the definition of dwelling to include only a porch which satisfies those requirements. I conclude that this concept is both unworkable and inconsistent with the intent of the General Assembly in adopting § 18-1-704.5.
A determination that porches enclosed in glass with a glass door are part of a dwelling, but that porches enclosed in screen are not, or that porches enclosed with either glass or screen but without a closed entrance are not, would lead only to confu*1011sion and artificial distinction. Thus, I would have us necessarily conclude that the definition of a dwelling for purposes of § 18-1-704.5, as for statutes defining criminal acts, includes roofed, permanently affixed, open or closed porches.
In spite of the conflicting evidence, it is apparent from the trial court’s comments that it found that decedent entered defendant’s porch but had not gone in or through the doorway to the residence. This finding is supported by testimonial evidence at the hearing, and at trial from a neutral police officer. It is also supported by the presence of blood left on the floor of the porch from decedent’s wounds as he reeled off of the porch after the mortal wounds were inflicted. Thus, in my view, the statutory condition that decedent enter defendant’s dwelling was satisfied for purposes of invoking § 18-1-704.5.
Further, the trial court’s findings reveal that the court was confused as to whether the evidence demonstrated that the deceased’s demeanor on the porch satisfied the other elements of § 18-1-704.5 which may reasonably lead the occupant to use deadly force if entry into the dwelling is made.
Thus, under the circumstances of this case, I would conclude that decedent made an unlawful entry into defendant’s dwelling. However, I cannot discern from the trial court’s finding whether that entry was for purposes which otherwise trigger immunity for the use of any degree of physical force. Therefore, I would reverse the judgment of conviction and remand to the trial court for a new hearing on the defendant’s motion to dismiss consonant with the views expressed herein.
Were the case to be remanded, it is possible that, as before, the trial court would determine that defendant is not immune from prosecution pursuant to § 18-1-704.5. Under that circumstance, and the consequent necessity of a new trial, I would concur with Part II of the majority opinion.