Court Opinion

ID: 9851732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:18:46.789316+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:14.143768
License: Public Domain

HATHAWAY, Judge,
dissenting.
Dismissal with prejudice of this criminal prosecution was, in my view, inappropriate and a clear abuse of judicial discretion. It was precipitated by the Board of Supervisors’ refusal, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-4013, to allocate additional funds to meet the attorneys’ fees and costs of these indigent criminal defendants, albeit the court found funds were available. I believe the court abdicated its judicial responsibility and tossed the reins of the administration of criminal justice to the Board of Supervisors.
Dismissal of a criminal prosecution is an extreme measure which should not be ordered absent a showing of good cause. State v. Johnson, 122 Ariz. 260, 594 P.2d 514 (1979). Good cause exists where a defendant suffers actual prejudice as a result of the action or inaction of the prosecutor. See State v. Tucker, 133 Ariz. 304, 651 P.2d 359 (1982) (speedy trial violation); Pool v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 98, 677 P.2d 261 (1984) (intentional prosecutorial misconduct). The focal question in this case is whether dismissal of the prosecution is permissible where prejudice is anticipated rather than realized, where such prejudice can be avoided by other, less drastic remedial measures, and where such prejudice is caused not by the prosecution but by the county’s refusal to further fund the defense.
Clearly, indigent defendants are entitled to counsel, and the legislature has just as clearly mandated that counsel appointed by the court “shall be paid by the County ... *476such amount as the court deems reasonable, considering the services performed.” A.R.S. § 13-4013. It is likely that the defendants’ rights would have been prejudiced by requiring counsel and its support staff to serve without compensation through lengthy trials. It must be noted, however, that over $225,000 had already been expended by the county for the defense and that as of the date of dismissal payments were essentially current. The trial court found that Cochise County had funds available to it for the payment of the indigent fees. Therefore, the trial court could have, and in my view should have, ordered payment of such fees in due course as it found reasonable and necessary. Precedent for such a course is found in Alexander v. Deddens, 106 Ariz. 172, 472 P.2d 41 (1970), where our supreme court held that the trial court may properly order payment of such fees by the county. The court concluded, “[i]f, however, the Board of Supervisors or any other such body attempts to interfere with the discretion of the court in awarding counsel’s fees, then the court has the power to order the treasurer to make payment." 106 Ariz. at 173, 472 P.2d at 42. Ordering payment would have served the public interest in an unimpeded operation of the criminal justice system, a paramount duty of government. Ironically, the trial court recognized that interest when it explained in its decision to dismiss:
“This case is a case that should have been tried. There’s no question that this case should have been tried. The public has a right and an absolute right to have known what occurred in Cochise County during the two to three years that the Christ Miracle Valley Healing Church moved to Cochise County.”
The background of the case supports that observation. The prosecution arose from a violent confrontation on October 23, 1982, in Miracle Valley, Cochise County, between a contingent of Cochise County sheriff deputies and a large number of black members of a religious sect. The deputies were attempting to serve arrest warrants on a sect member when the confrontation deteriorated into a bloody melee. Injuries were sustained on both sides and two church members were shot.
Indictments were returned, charging sixteen counts of assault with a deadly weapon, three counts of disturbing the peace, three counts of reekless use of force, two counts of carrying a deadly weapon, and one count of possession of a prohibited weapon. With these indictments, the county attorney had the duty to carry forward the prosecution under A.R.S. § 11— 532(A)(1), and the board of supervisors was required to see that the county attorney faithfully performed the duties of office in accordance with A.R.S. § 11-251.
As noted above, in excess of $225,000 in public funds had been expended by the county towards defense attorneys’ fees and supporting staff. The case was prepared to go to trial, and, indeed, was at the eve of trial when the dismissal was entered. The option to continue was available to the trial court and could, have been exercised without actual prejudice to defendants. The court should not permit the administration of criminal justice to be wrenched from a neutral, dispassionate judicial discretion and be placed hostage in the unseemly arena of competing interests striving for funds. The dismissal with prejudice prevents the resolution of serious criminal charges on the merits to the detriment of the administration of criminal justice and, as the state points out, creates the risk of a new theory of defense — “outspend the budget and walk.” There is no evidence to support a finding that the defense counsel so acted in this case. But trial judges should exercise control to see that the risk created by the majority opinion does not eventuate.
Beyond the impact on the immediate parties, the holding of the majority portends far-reaching and pernicious consequences for the distribution of powers among the several branches of government. First, it undermines the authority and duty which is conferred by our constitution and laws upon the county attorney to prosecute *477where there is probable cause to believe a criminal offense has been committed. The county boards of supervisors may be encouraged to preclude controversial, unpopular, or embarrassing prosecutions simply by refusing to fund the defense. Second, the broader message of the majority’s holding is that a county may escape other statutorily mandated obligations by similarly refusing to appropriate the necessary moneys to pay for those obligations. What the state legislature has mandated — in this case, payment of indigent defense fees— the courts have the power to enforce. The holding of the majority undermines this fundamental principle by placing its imprimatur upon the trial court’s refusal to fulfill its responsibility in our democratic system of checks and balances. Although a budgetary expense may have been spared, criminal justice is poorer, as are we all.
I would reverse and direct that the order of dismissal be vacated.