Court Opinion

ID: 9671455
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:36:55.514484+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:44:55.424144
License: Public Domain

O’Connell, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority that because plaintiffs seek legal as opposed to equitable relief under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (wpa), MCL 15.361 et seq.; MSA 17.428(1) et seq., they would normally be entitled to present their cases to juries. Const 1963, art 1, § 14; Abner A Wolf, Inc v *590Walch, 385 Mich 253, 258-263; 188 NW2d 544 (1971), I also agree that state entities, such as the defendant universities, may ordinarily be sued only in the Court of Claims, MCL 600.6419; MSA 27A.6419, and that such trials are before the bench rather than a jury. MCL 600.6443; MSA 27A.6443. However, the majority infers that because certain provisions of the wpa could be construed as indicative of a Legislative intent to waive the sovereign right to be subjected only to trial before the bench, this right has been waived. With this inference, I disagree.
The state’s right as sovereign to be tried only by the court, as opposed to a jury, may be waived only by express statutory enactment or by necessary inference from a statute. Mead v Michigan Public Service Comm, 303 Mich 168, 173; 5 NW2d 740 (1942); McNair v State Hwy Dep’t, 305 Mich 181, 187; 9 NW2d 52 (1943). The WPA admits no express abrogation of this right, and the majority does not take this position. Rather, the majority concludes that the Legislature impliedly waived the immunity of state entities from being tried by a jury.
The case law is clear that such immunity may not be impliedly waived unless such an inference is necessary to the construction of a statute. Mead, supra; McNair, supra. Because the Michigan courts have not yet had occasion to address this precise issue, I have looked to analogous federal precedent, an approach expressly endorsed by the majority, ante, pp 578-579. As stated in Lehman v Nakshian, 453 US 156, 160-161; 101 S Ct 2698; 69 L Ed 2d 548 (1981):
[I]f Congress waives the Government’s immunity from suit, . . . the plaintiff has a right to a trial by jury only where that right is one of the “terms of [the Government’s] con*591sent to be sued.” [United States v Testan, 424 US 392, 399; 96 S Ct 948; 47 L Ed 2d 114 (1976)]. Like a waiver of immunity itself, which must be “unequivocally expressed,” . . . “this Court has long decided that limitations and conditions upon which the Government consents to be sued must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied." Soriano v United States, 352 US 270, 276; 77 S Ct 269; 1 L Ed 2d 306 (1957).
The language could be written in no more absolute terms — any waiver of the right to a bench trial must be unequivocally expressed.
In the present case, the majority’s inference that the Legislature has impliedly waived the right to be immunized from trial by juiy is not a necessary inference, and, therefore, is improper. The majority advances several possible justifications for its conclusion that the wpa reflects an implied waiver. First, the majority states that the Legislature “specifically included state entities among potential defendants as ‘employers.’ Section 1 [MCL 15.361; MSA 17.428(1)].” Ante, p 587. It is argued that this reflects a legislative intent to treat the state and private employers “equally.” However, defining “employer” so as to encompass the state is necessary to allow individuals to bring suit against the state, else they would likely be prohibited by the broad grant of immunity generally afforded the state. MCL 691.1401 et seq.-, MSA 3.996(101) et seq. This action necessarily reflects only the intent to subject the state to suit for violations of the wpa. It does not necessarily reflect a desire to treat the state and private employers equally. Because the majority’s inference is not a necessary one, Mead, supra-, McNair, supra, it may not properly be considered. Lehman, supra.
*592Second, the majority states that the Legislature’s act of allowing suit to be brought against the state in the circuit court evinces an intent to subject the state to trial by jury. Again, it is not necessary to draw such an inference; the Legislature’s action could easily be construed as a method to increase the convenience of plaintiffs by allowing them to bring suit in any county, rather than in only Ingham County, where the Court of Claims sits. Analogous federal decisions confirm this interpretation. See, e.g., Thornell v Chesapeake & O R Co, 166 F Supp 61 (WD Mich, 1958). The majority discounts this interpretation by stating ■that “such convenience concerns always exist when a party sues a state entity.” This may be true, but the truth of this assertion does not elevate the majority’s speculation to a necessary inference. The words of our Legislature fall far short of an “unequivocal expression” of an intent to waive the right of state entities to be tried by the court.
The majority proffers Barbour v Dep’t of Social Services, 172 Mich App 275; 431 NW2d 482 (1988), as putative support for its conclusion. However, the majority neither endorses nor follows the aberrant reasoning of Barbour, which relies on the concept of implied waiver expressly rejected by the United States Supreme Court. Lehman, supra. Therefore, the reference to Barbour being dicta, I do not address it.
Finally, I would clarify that, contrary to the implication of the majority, I have not assumed that “necessary inference” means “only conceivable inference.” Obviously, “necessary” means essential, not exclusive. The majority has set up something of a straw man in discussing this topic; I have not raised this argument and neither have the parties.
*593In sum, the inferences on which the majority relies are speculative. While the majority’s inferences are, beyond question, reasonable, the appropriate standard is not whether one can reasonably infer, but whether one must necessarily infer. The majority’s inferences are simply not “necessary” inferences. Therefore, in accordance with federal and Michigan precedent, I would conclude that there is no right to a trial by jury under the wpa against a state defendant in the absence of an express statutory abrogation of that right or an abrogation arising by way of necessary implication. Because neither exists in the present case, I would hold that the state entities retain their right to be tried before the bench.
Accordingly, in Docket No. 168358, I would reverse the decision of the trial court with respect to defendant Band only, who is sued individually, and who is subject to defend this action before a juiy. I would affirm the denial of trial by jury with respect to the remaining defendants in Docket No. 168358. In Docket No. 170339, because the sole defendant is a state university, I would reverse.