Court Opinion

ID: 9897414
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:11:15.926825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:44.411103
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                             Apr 28 2023, 8:48 am

                                                                                 CLERK
                                                                             Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                Court of Appeals
                                                                                  and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Darren Bedwell                                              Theodore E. Rokita
Marion County Public Defender                               Attorney General of Indiana
Appellate Division
Indianapolis, Indiana                                       Jodi Kathryn Stein
                                                            Supervising Deputy Attorney
                                                            General
                                                            Indianapolis, Indiana

                                             IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Michael Charles Thomas Gaunt,                               April 28, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                        Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                            22A-CR-1632
        v.                                                  Appeal from the Marion Superior
                                                            Court
State of Indiana,                                           The Honorable Cynthia L. Oetjen,
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                         Judge
                                                            Trial Court Cause No.
                                                            49D30-1912-F1-48422

                                   Opinion by Judge Tavitas
                                Judges Vaidik and Foley concur.

Tavitas, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1632 | April 28, 2023                                   Page 1 of 12
      Case Summary
[1]   Michael Gaunt appeals his convictions for aggravated battery, a Level 1 felony,

      and neglect of a dependent, a Level 1 felony. Gaunt’s convictions were both

      elevated to Level 1 felonies based on the death of the victim. Gaunt argues that

      elevating both of his convictions based on the same death constitutes double

      jeopardy under one of the common-law rules that were identified in Richardson

      v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999), and adopted by our Supreme Court in

      Guyton v. State, 771 N.E.2d 1141 (Ind. 2002). Gaunt further argues that the trial

      court erred in its calculation of his credit time. We find that: 1) our Supreme

      Court supplanted the common-law double jeopardy rules in Wadle v. State, 151

      N.E.3d 227 (Ind. 2020); and 2) the trial court erred in calculating Gaunt’s credit

      time. We affirm as to Gaunt’s convictions, reverse regarding the trial court’s

      credit time calculation, and remand with instructions for the trial court to

      correct Gaunt’s credit time.

      Issues
[2]   Gaunt raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as:

              I.       Whether Wadle supplanted the common-law double
                       jeopardy rules identified in Richardson.

              II.      Whether the trial court erred in calculating the credit time
                       toward Gaunt’s sentence.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1632 | April 28, 2023              Page 2 of 12
      Facts
[3]   On December 20, 2019, Gaunt was watching his infant son, L.G., who was

      born in November 2019, while L.G.’s mother, Harley Jones, was out of the

      house. When Jones returned home, she observed that Gaunt was holding L.G.,

      who appeared “naked, lifeless, just blue almost, [and] not breathing.” Tr. Vol.

      II p. 72. Gaunt would not let Jones call 911 until approximately forty-five

      minutes later.

[4]   Emergency responders took L.G. to the hospital, where he was alive but non-

      responsive. L.G. was diagnosed with fractures in his right humerus and

      clavicle, “massive retinal hemorrhages,” hemorrhages between his brain and

      skull and within his brain, and swelling around his neck vertebrae. Id. at 180.

      The physicians attributed L.G.’s injuries to “[s]evere physical abuse including

      abusive head trauma.” Id. at 194.

[5]   Gaunt was arrested on December 21, 2019. On December 23, 2019, L.G. was

      pronounced brain dead, and he died hours later.

[6]   On December 27, 2019, the State charged Gaunt with two counts: Count I,

      aggravated battery to a child less than age fourteen; and Count II, neglect of a

      dependent. Regarding Count II, the State alleged that Gaunt neglected L.G. by

      “fail[ing] to obtain timely medical care for [L.G.’s] injuries[.]” Appellant’s

      App. Vol. II p. 33. Both counts were elevated to Level 1 felonies based on

      L.G.’s death.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1632 | April 28, 2023        Page 3 of 12
[7]    On January 28, 2022, Gaunt and the State executed a plea agreement, and the

       trial court set a sentencing hearing for February 17, 2022. The pre-sentencing

       investigation (“PSI”) report reflects that Gaunt had been in jail since December

       21, 2019, and would have served 790 actual jail days by the time the trial court

       held the February 17, 2022 sentencing hearing.

[8]    At the February 17, 2022 sentencing hearing, Gaunt withdrew his plea

       agreement. The trial court held a bench trial on April 25, 2022; found Gaunt

       guilty of both counts; and entered judgments of conviction on both counts. The

       trial court then set a sentencing hearing for June 23, 2022.

[9]    The State filed a second PSI report on June 21, 2022, which reflects that Gaunt

       had been in jail since December 21, 2019, and would have served 916 actual

       days as of the trial court’s June 23, 2022 sentencing hearing. The trial court

       sentenced Gaunt to two concurrent thirty-five-year sentences, each with two

       years to be served in community corrections and three years suspended to

       probation. The trial court’s sentencing order reflects that Gaunt was in jail

       since April 24, 2020, had served 790 actual days, and had earned 263 days of

       good time credit. The trial court’s abstract of judgment and order of

       commitment to community corrections reflect the same. Gaunt now appeals.

       Discussion and Decision
       I. Double Jeopardy

[10]   Gaunt first argues that the trial court erred by elevating both of his convictions

       to Level 1 felonies based on L.G.’s death. Gaunt argues that the trial court

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1632 | April 28, 2023        Page 4 of 12
       should have, instead, entered his neglect conviction as a Level 3 felony because

       elevating both convictions to Level 1 felonies based on the same death

       constitutes double jeopardy. We disagree.

[11]   We review double jeopardy violation claims de novo. See Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at

       237; Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 262 (Ind. 2020).

[12]   In Wadle and Powell, the Indiana Supreme Court set forth two new frameworks

       for analyzing whether a defendant’s convictions violate principles of substantive

       double jeopardy. 1 Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 247-50; Powell, 151 N.E.3d at 264-65.

       These cases explicitly overruled Richardson and held that our substantive double

       jeopardy jurisprudence would no longer be governed by the Indiana

       Constitution but would, instead, be driven primarily by “statutory rules of

       double jeopardy.” Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 235. Powell set forth a test for “when a

       single criminal act or transaction violates a single statute but harms multiple

       victims,” and Wadle set forth a test for “when a single criminal act or

       transaction violates multiple statutes with common elements and harms one or

       more victims.” Id. at 247. Gaunt’s convictions implicate two statutes, and,

       thus, the Wadle test is implicated.

       1
         Substantive double jeopardy refers to “claims concerning multiple convictions in a single prosecution, as
       opposed to ‘procedural double jeopardy’ claims, which concern convictions for the same offense in successive
       prosecutions[.]” Carranza v. State, 184 N.E.3d 712, 715 Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at
       248-49; Powell, 151 N.E.3d at 263). Our Supreme Court did not alter our analysis of procedural
       (“constitutional”) double jeopardy claims in either Wadle or Powell.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1632 | April 28, 2023                             Page 5 of 12
[13]   Gaunt does not argue that his convictions constitute double jeopardy under

       Wadle. Instead, he argues that we should apply the common-law rule that,

       when one conviction is elevated “based on the same bodily injury that forms

       the basis of [another] conviction, the two cannot stand.” Strong v. State, 870

       N.E.2d 442, 443 (Ind. 2007) (quoting Pierce v. State, 761 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Ind.

       2002)); see also Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 55 (Sullivan, J., concurring), at 57

       (Boehm, J., concurring in result). This common-law “elevation” or

       “enhancement” rule was one of five rules identified in Justice Sullivan’s

       concurrence in Richardson. 2 In Guyton, the Indiana Supreme Court adopted

       these common-law rules as additional bases for finding a double jeopardy

       violation independent of Richardson. 771 N.E.2d at 1143. Gaunt might have

       been entitled to relief under the common-law elevation rule. Compare Strong,

       870 N.E.2d at 444 (holding neglect charge could not be elevated based on same

       death that supported murder conviction), with McElroy v. State, 864 N.E.2d 392,

       2
           The five common-law rules articulated by Justice Sullivan were:
                (1) Conviction and punishment for a crime which is a lesser-included offense of another crime
                for which the defendant has been convicted and punished. . . .
                (2) Conviction and punishment for a crime which consists of the very same act as another crime
                for which the defendant has been convicted and punished. . . .
                (3) Conviction and punishment for a crime which consists of the very same act as an element of
                another crime for which the defendant has been convicted and punished. . . .
                (4) Conviction and punishment for an enhancement of a crime where the enhancement is
                imposed for the very same behavior or harm as another crime for which the defendant has been
                convicted and punished. . . .
                (5) Conviction and punishment for the crime of conspiracy where the overt act that constitutes
                an element of the conspiracy charge is the very same act as another crime for which the
                defendant has been convicted and punished. . . .
       Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 55-57 (Sullivan, J., concurring).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1632 | April 28, 2023                                 Page 6 of 12
       397-99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (holding convictions for operating a vehicle with an

       alcohol concentration equivalent of at least .10 and failure to stop after an

       accident could both be elevated based on the same death), trans. denied.

[14]   The State, meanwhile, argues that, in overruling Richardson, Wadle also

       replaced the common-law double jeopardy rules with its own test. We are

       constrained to agree with the State.

[15]   Several factors support the State’s interpretation. First, Wadle explicitly

       observed that the Indiana Supreme Court’s adoption of the common-law rules

       “announced by Justice Sullivan” as additional double jeopardy tests

       independent of Richardson “generat[ed] confusion among the bench and bar

       over the proper standard to address claims of double jeopardy” and resulted in

       “a patchwork of conflicting precedent.” Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 243-44. Further,

       Wadle’s stated purpose was to “articulate an analytical framework in which to

       resolve claims of substantive double jeopardy under Indiana law.” Id. at 237.

       This discussion suggests that, in announcing a new framework for analyzing

       substantive double jeopardy claims, the Court did not wish to retain the

       separate and conflicting common-law rules. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 157 N.E.3d

       1225, 1229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (making similar observations).

[16]   Second, Wadle enumerated at least three other sources of protection against

       multiple punishment other than the Wadle and Powell tests. See Wadle, 151

       N.E.3d at 250-53. Yet the Court in Wadle did not mention any of the common-

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1632 | April 28, 2023         Page 7 of 12
       law double jeopardy rules as additional sources of protection against multiple

       punishment.

[17]   Third, Wadle noted that “today, we have legislation codifying” several of the

       common-law double jeopardy rules. Id. at 247 (citing Ind. Code §§ 35-38-1-

       6 and 35-41-5-3). As a panel of our Court in Woodcock v. State observed:

                 It seems clear, then, that if the common law rules prohibiting
                 conviction and punishment in certain circumstances are codified,
                 and the second step of the Wadle analysis is to turn to statutory
                 language to determine intent regarding multiple punishment, . . .
                 the common law rules are incorporated into the Wadle analysis
                 and no longer exist independently.

       163 N.E.3d 863, 871 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (internal citation omitted), trans.

       denied.

[18]   Finally, several opinions from this Court have held that the common-law rules

       identified by Justice Sullivan did not survive Wadle as independent tests. See

       Morales v. State, 165 N.E.3d 1002, 1006-07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (elevation rule),

       trans. denied; Woodcock, 163 N.E.3d at 870-71 (“very same act” rule); Jones v.

       State, 159 N.E.3d 55, 62 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (continuous crime doctrine), trans.

       denied; Hill, 157 N.E.3d at 1229 (all common-law rules); Diaz v. State, 158 N.E.3

       363, 368 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (same); but see Shepherd v. State, 155 N.E.3d 1227,

       1240 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (holding that the same act rule survived Wadle), trans.

       denied; Rowland v. State, 155 N.E.3d 637, 640 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (same).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1632 | April 28, 2023        Page 8 of 12
[19]   The foregoing supports our conclusion that Wadle replaced the common-law

       double jeopardy rules. Accordingly, we cannot consider Gaunt’s reliance on

       the common-law elevation rule. Further, because Gaunt raises no argument

       that his convictions constitute double jeopardy under Wadle, we cannot say that

       Gaunt’s double jeopardy rights were violated.

       II. Time Served and Good Time Credit

[20]   Gaunt next argues that the trial court erred by only giving credit for 790 actual

       days and 263 days of good time credit at the time of sentencing. Gaunt

       contends that he is entitled to a credit of 916 actual days and 305 days of good

       time credit. The State agrees, and so do we.

[21]   Indiana Code Section 35-38-3-2(b)(4) requires trial courts to include in their

       judgments “the amount of credit time earned for time spent in confinement

       before sentencing.” “Determination of a defendant’s pretrial credit is

       dependent upon (1) pretrial confinement, and (2) the pretrial confinement being

       a result of the criminal charge for which sentence is being imposed.” Hall v.

       State, 944 N.E.2d 538, 542 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Bischoff v. State, 704

       N.E.2d 129, 130 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied), trans. denied. Because pre-

       sentence jail time credit is a statutory right, trial courts have no discretion in

       awarding or denying that credit.” Glover v. State, 177 N.E.3d 884, 886 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2021) (citing Perry v. State, 13 N.E.3d 909, 911 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)), trans.

       denied. In reviewing credit time assignments, we review matters of statutory

       interpretation de novo. Shepard v. State, 84 N.E.3d 1171, 1172 (Ind. 2017).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1632 | April 28, 2023          Page 9 of 12
[22]   The record reveals that Gaunt was in jail awaiting trial and sentencing from

       December 21, 2019, to June 23, 2022. He was, therefore, entitled to credit for

       915 actual days. The trial court appears to have found that Gaunt was only

       entitled to credit for 790 actual days based on the February PSI report, but that

       PSI report was outdated by the time Gaunt was sentenced on June 23, 2022.

       We cannot discern why the trial court found that Gaunt was in jail only since

       April 24, 2020.

[23]   As for the amount of good time credit to which Gaunt is entitled, Indiana Code

       Section 35-50-6-4 provides for good time credit according to four classifications.

       The classification is based on “the most serious offense of which the person was

       convicted.” Ind. Code § 35-50-6-4(h).

[24]   Gaunt contends, and the State agrees, that Gaunt should have been assigned to

       Class B credit time classification. Indiana Code Section 35-50-6-4 provides, in

       relevant part:

               (b) A person:

                        (1) who is not a credit restricted felon; and

                        (2) who is imprisoned for a crime other than a Level 6
                        felony or misdemeanor or imprisoned awaiting trial or
                        sentencing for a crime other than a Level 6 felony or
                        misdemeanor;

               is initially assigned to Class B.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1632 | April 28, 2023        Page 10 of 12
       “A person assigned to Class B earns one (1) day of good time credit for every

       three (3) calendar days or partial calendar days the person is . . . confined

       awaiting trial or sentencing.” Indiana Code § 35-50-6-3.1(c).

[25]   We agree that Gaunt should have been assigned to Class B credit time

       classification. A credit restricted felon is defined as a person who has been

       convicted of at least one of three offenses enumerated in Indiana Code Section

       35-31.5-2-72. 3 Gaunt has not been convicted of any of those offenses, and he,

       therefore, is not a credit restricted felon. Further, Gaunt was awaiting trial on

       Level 1 felony charges. Gaunt, thus, belongs in the Class B credit time

       classification.

[26]   As a person assigned to the Class B credit time classification, Gaunt was

       entitled to one day of good time credit for every three days of the 915 actual

       3
           Those offenses are:
                (1) Child molesting involving sexual intercourse, deviate sexual conduct (IC 35-42-4-3(a), before
                its amendment on July 1, 2014) for a crime committed before July 1, 2014, or other sexual
                conduct (as defined in IC 35-31.5-2-221.5) for a crime committed after June 30, 2014, if:
                  (A) the offense is committed by a person at least twenty-one (21) years of age; and
                  (B) the victim is less than twelve (12) years of age.
                (2) Child molesting (IC 35-42-4-3) resulting in serious bodily injury or death.
                (3) Murder (IC 35-42-1-1), if:
                  (A) the person killed the victim while committing or attempting to commit child molesting
                  (IC 35-42-4-3);
                  (B) the victim was the victim of a sex crime under IC 35-42-4 for which the person was
                  convicted; or
                  (C) the victim of the murder was listed by the state or known by the person to be a witness
                  against the person in a prosecution for a sex crime under IC 35-42-4 and the person
                  committed the murder with the intent to prevent the victim from testifying.
       Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-72.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1632 | April 28, 2023                                  Page 11 of 12
       days he served awaiting trial, which amounts to 305 days of good time credit.

       We, therefore, remand with instructions that the trial court’s sentencing order

       reflect Gaunt’s pre-sentencing credit time to reflect these numbers.

       Conclusion
[27]   We conclude that Wadle supplanted the common-law double jeopardy rules

       identified in Richardson and adopted in Guyton. Gaunt’s argument that his

       convictions violate the common-law elevation rule is, therefore, unavailing.

       The trial court, however, erred by crediting Gaunt with only 790 days of actual

       time and 263 days of good time credit. We, therefore, affirm as to Gaunt’s

       convictions, reverse regarding the trial court’s credit time calculation, and

       remand with instructions that the trial court credit Gaunt with 915 days of

       actual time and 305 days of good time credit against his sentence.

[28]   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

       Vaidik, J., and Foley, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1632 | April 28, 2023       Page 12 of 12