Court Opinion

ID: 9653028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:37:17.297147+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:55.905170
License: Public Domain

GRANT, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The fact that a building is destroyed by fire does not show that the crime of arson was committed by anyone, in that there must be evidence that the fire was incendiary in origin. Faulk v. State, 608 S.W.2d 625 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). As stated in Adrian v. State, evidence that a crime has been committed must corroborate the confession. 587 S.W.2d 733, 734 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1979).
I would like to reexamine the evidence cited by the majority as corroborating the defendant’s statement to show that a crime had been committed, more specifically that someone designedly set the fire.
The majority opinion apparently relies upon the fact that gas had not been connected to the trailer to show that an accidental gas fire was not likely, but there was no suggestion in this case that the fire was gas-related. This evidence by no means eliminates other possible causes, such as defective electrical wiring, spontaneous combustion, or any other causes not incendiary in origin. See Adrian, 587 S.W.2d at 733; Burrow v. State, 481 S.W.2d 895 (Tex.Crim.App.1972). The evidence that the gas was not hooked up does not render it more likely that it was an incendiary fire than a fire from another origin.
Next, the majority cites evidence that someone had been in the trailer within a few hours before the fire. It has been held that motive and opportunity alone are not suffi-*490eient to establish that an accused set fire to a building, but there must be some testimony showing that the fire was incendiary in origin. Massey v. State, 154 Tex.Crim. 263, 226 S.W.2d 856 (1950). The presence of an unauthorized person in the trailer would indicate the crime of breaking and entering, but it does not show that anyone intentionally set fire to the trailer, nor does it render more likely that the fire was caused by a person rather than other causes. A fire could start from defective electrical wiring or other sources whether or not a person was present in the trailer.
The majority points to the fact that there had been an arson investigation. The mere fact that there was an investigation is not a circumstance that shows one way or another the probability of the occurrence of arson, especially since none of the investigators offered any evidence in any form that would suggest that the fire was incendiary.
None of the evidence offered by the State corroborates the corpus delicti. Other parts of the confession are corroborated, but under Texas law, there must be evidence corroborating the corpus delicti. (See majority opinion and the cases cited therein.)
The State argues in this case that if the corpus delicti was not properly corroborated, this court should reexamine the corpus delicti rule. I agree that this rule should be reexamined, but the Court of Criminal Appeals is the appropriate forum for such a change. The federal system no longer follows the rule requiring corroboration of the corpus delicti, but instead requires only substantial independent evidence that establishes the trustworthiness of the defendant’s statement. United States v. Kerley, 838 F.2d 932, 939-40 (7th Cir.1988) (citing Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 75 S.Ct. 158, 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954)).
In the present case, the evidence substantially supports the trustworthiness of the statement, but the evidence does not corroborate that this fire was of incendiary origin.
For that reasón, I respectfully dissent.