Court Opinion

ID: 9717151
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:59:11.981871+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:51.655361
License: Public Domain

STATON, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent from the Majority Opinion since there is no evidence to support the trial court conclusion "that Walter Grosam, as a member of Local 41, knew or should have known of those constitutional requirements for the execution of contracts." This is a presumptive conclusion on the part of the trial court which cannot be supported by authority or by the evidence. I would reverse the judgment and order judgment entered for Grosam.
There was no evidence whatsoever that Grosam knew of the requirements for exe-ecution and approval of contracts. In fact Grosam was asked on cross-examination if he was familiar with the constitution and bylaws of Local 41. He replied, "No. Igo out there and work." He was asked, "Do you know anything about the constitution saying that it's the president and the secretary-treasurer who should sign all official documents?" "No, sir." "Did you ever ask Hoyle Green about that in 19817" "No, sir. He asked me if I wanted a job and gave me a contract." Grosam did not know if either contract was brought before the executive board or the membership nor was he even sure whether Hoyle Green was president in 1981 or who was the president in 1982. No one ever told him that the business manager did not have authority to execute contracts with M & K. He testified that in the twenty-five years that he was with the union the business manager always took care of it." Hoyle Green took care of it for four years, Charles Bowers took care of it, and now Don Hamilton is taking care of it ..." Grosam testified that in October, 1982 Bowers told Grosam to get a contract written up and Bowers verified that they discussed the contract at that time. Bowers testified that he believed he had the authority to sign the contract. Don Hamilton testified that in the past it had been up to the business manager to hire and fire employees without necessarily following strict approval procedures.
To hold that Grosam knew or should have known what procedures were required in the face of such a long standing course of dealing on the part of union officials themselves is unsupported by any evidence.
The key to apparent authority is that the appearance of authority has been caused by some conduct on the part of the principal. Storm v. Marsischke (1973), 159 Ind.App. 136, 304 N.E.2d 840, 842. The third party must reasonably believe that the authority exhibited is the type usually held by one in such a position. Yellow Manufacturing Acceptance Corp. v. Voss (1973), 158 Ind.App. 478, 303 N.E.2d 281.
I would hold that it was entirely reasonable for Grosam to believe that business manager Charlie Bowers had the authority to contract with M & K and that the union may not now deny that authority in order to avoid the contract. I also note that the union produced no evidence whatsoever that a business manager, or any other officer for that matter, could not contract for *660services which extended beyond his term of office. This was, in fact, the union's original claim in its letter of termination to M & K, rather than the blanket denial of all authority adopted later.
Though the evidence was conflicting on the question of when the contract was actually signed the election or after Bowers was defeated-it was uncontrovert-ed that Bowers signed the contract before he left office and Don Hamilton was sworn in. There is nothing to indicate that the business manager's authority and responsibilities terminate in the interim between the election and the swearing in of new officers. Even if Grosam believed M & K was more likely to receive favorable treatment from Bowers than from the new business manager, that does not negate his belief that Bowers had the authority to execute the contract. Since the results produced by the acts and declarations of an agent acting within the apparent scope of his authority are binding upon the principal, Yellow Manufacturing, supra 303 N.E.2d at 284, it is not necessary to analyze M & K's claim that the union ratified the contract.
Because I would hold that the October, 1982 contract was valid, I proceed to determine whether the evidence supports the trial court's finding that M & K was not performing according to the terms of that contract.
The contract provided for a minimum of two cleanings a week in the office portion of the union building and a minimum of four cleanings a week in the hiring hall and adjacent restrooms. Marianne and Karen both testified that they came in twice a week and gave the entire building a thorough cleaning. That takes care of the two times a week for the offices and accounts for two out of the four times for the hiring hall. Walter testified that he came in on mornings when the women had not been there the afternoon before, and he swept out the hiring hall and checked the adjacent restrooms for paper products. He said he came in "about two times" a week.
Charles Bowers testified that he would see Walter a couple times a week early in the morning sweeping out the hiring hall. That was the contract agreed to and although Don Hamilton testified that he thought M & K should clean more often because the premises were not clean enough, there was no evidence that M & K was not meeting at least the minimum requirements of the contract. It was absolutely uncontroverted that no one ever complained to M & K, to Marianne, Karen or Walter, about the quality of their work or the condition of the premises. Thus it is immaterial whether the hiring hall needed cleaning every day. Since the October, 1982 contract was valid, I cannot agree with the trial court's conclusion that M & K was required to perform with the frequen-ey or in accordance with the standards provided or implied under the February, 1981 contract. They were required to perform according to the 1982 contract and they did.
I would reverse the judgment and order judgment entered for Grosam.