Court Opinion

ID: 9726968
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:14:48.200323+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:32.340973
License: Public Domain

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Prentice, J.
I have reviewed the evidence presented in this matter and I agree that upon the “sufficiency” standard employed by this Court in matters on appeal, the hearing officer’s findings are well supported. However, the hearing officer in these proceedings is an agent of this Court. His findings , are our findings. Thus when their correctness ; is challenged, we are at liberty to review the evidence de novo and substitute our findings for those of the hearing officer, if reasonable minds might differ. The gravity of the charges *707and the extreme action insisted upon by the majority compelled my detailed and very time-consuming review in this case.
It would serve no useful purpose to detail here my points of departure from the hearing officer’s findings, as I have been unable to convince my fellow justices of the correctness of my conclusions. Suffice to say that in my opinion, the evidence upon certain issues convinces me that the respondent is not temperamentally suited to the office he holds and has evidenced this by numerous acts of indiscretion tending to disrupt the judicial process and discredit the bench and bar. Accordingly, some disciplinary action is not only warranted but compelled. However, upon the more serious issues, those which if resolved against respondent mandate his removal, I do not find the evidence convincing to the degree that I would require before taking the extreme action adopted by the majority. So long as our trial judges are elected upon party tickets by popular vote—a tradition which the circumstances of this case indicates should be reversed—there will be fractional battle lines drawn and infighting that cannot but splash upon and adversely affect the court functions. Nevertheless, this at present is our system, and I think that we should override the mandate of the electorate under the authority of Article 7, Section 4 of our state constitution, only upon clear and convincing evidence that the responsibilities and duties of the office cannot be otherwise accommodated. To me, the evidence presented upon such charges does not rise to that level. Upon the less serious charges, I think the evidence clearly supports a finding of misconduct and warrants a reprimand and suspension for some brief and specified period. That such action might not remedy all of the unfortunate problems apparently existing between the bench and bar of Ripley County, to me, does not warrant our action today.
Note.—Reported at 823 N.E.2d 192.