Court Opinion

ID: 9581998
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:21:09.97783+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:22.676200
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
The trial court granted summary judgment to appellee on the first count of appellant’s complaint alleging negligent injury and death, which the parties and the court at the time apparently considered to be limited to the claim for wrongful death. We have affirmed this ruling in our opinion.
In her motion for rehearing appellant claims we overlooked another allegation of the first count for the personal tort against the deceased which survived to her as administratrix under Code Ann. § 3-505 and on which the statute of limitations had not run by virtue of Code Ann. §§ 3-1104 and 3-803.
We find that appellant is estopped by the final judgment on the second count. That judgment decided against her the issue of defendant’s liability which she is now trying to resurrect by contending it was part of the first count and that summary judgment was improperly granted on that allegation.
The second count realleged all of the allegations of the first count and added a claim for funeral, medical and other expenses. The *717second count was clearly for claims of the estate.
Prior to trial of the second count the trial court entered a pre-trial order determining that the only issues to be tried were the liability, if any, of the defendants, and the funeral, medical and other expenses.
A jury trial was had which resulted in a verdict and in judgment in favor of the defendants. Appellant took her appeal from this judgment solely as a vehicle to raise the issue of the validity of the grant of summary judgment on the first count. No error was assigned concerning the verdict and judgment, which is now final.
In the trial of the second count the parties and the issue of defendants’ liability were identical to those of the first count. Therefore, by that judgment for defendants on the second count appellant is estopped from raising any issue of defendants’ liability for personal tort, now claimed to be alleged in the first count.
“A judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be conclusive between the same parties and their privies as to all matters put in issue, or which under the rules of law might have been put in issue in the cause wherein judgment was rendered, until such judgment shall be reversed or set aside.” Code Ann. § 110-501. See Code Ann. § 38-623 and Smith v. Wood, 115 Ga. App. 265 (1) (154 SE2d 646).
Appellant’s additional contention that our holding is erroneous because it results in the statute of limitation starting to run in a wrongful death action arising from medical malpractice before death occurs has been resolved against her by our holding in DeLoach v. Emergency Medical Group, 155 Ga. App. 866 (1) (274 SE2d 38), where we said: “[T]he applicable period of limitations in (a wrongful death arising from medical malpractice) case is set forth in Code Ann. § 3-1101 et seq.” Id. at 867.

Motion for rehearing denied.