Court Opinion

ID: 9770253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:55:40.194816+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:15.989927
License: Public Domain

LEIBSON, Justice
dissenting.
Respectfully, I dissent. We should reverse the conviction.
There was almost overwhelming evidence at trial supporting voluntary manslaughter as the appropriate verdict rather than wanton murder. This was the strong evidence suggesting Derossett was suffering from extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the homicide. Had he been convicted of this lesser degree of criminal homicide, the maximum sentence would have been 20 years rather than the 40 he got. This makes the present case classify as a “close” case wherein trial errors become very important in deciding upon the reliability of the verdict. The verdict is unreliable because of three trial errors which (when considered cumulatively) have such weight they should be viewed as reversible error. They are:
1) Refusing a challenge for cause against a prospective juror, Roberta Newsome, who lived only four doors from the parents and sisters of the victim, and knew the victim’s sisters “pretty well.” Surely she could not have been reasonably expected to return unconcerned to the same neighborhood if she were to show leniency towards the defendant. Recently, in Anderson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 909 (1993), we granted a new trial because a juror who was related by marriage to the complaining witness’s boyfriend, lived in the same general area as the boyfriend, and had been known to spend time with the boyfriend and boyfriend’s relations, failed to disclose these facts in answer to questions on voir dire. A fortiori, a juror who does in fact disclose a similar disqualifying relationship should have been excused for cause. The defense had to use a peremptory challenge to disqualify this juror, which means the error in failing to excuse for cause deprived the appellant of a due process right. Thomas v. Commonwealth, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 252 (1993).
2) The prosecutor’s comments (“this [victim] is my client”) were prejudicially improper, equivalent to making the prosecutor a “character witness” for the deceased.
3) Most importantly, permitting the prosecutor to cross-examine the defendant about prior violent behavior, when the defendant had not put his character for peacefulness in issue, was prejudicial error.
The defendant’s testimony on direct that he “had a stormy relationship with his wife” was not testimony which could be considered to open the door to whether he was a violent person by history. The defense’s initial objection was erroneously overruled. Defense’s further objections made after the prosecutor accused the defendant in front of the jury of having “pulled a gun” on his wife, and on “some other people,” while sustained, surely left the jury with the impression that the defendant was a violent person.
The defendant never said he was not a violent person. Cross-examination on this *200subject should have been cut off before it started, rather than the judge futilely attempting to correct the prejudice after the damage was done.
STEPHENS, C.J., joins this dissent.