Court Opinion

ID: 9738021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:40:45.359939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:38:44.500298
License: Public Domain

KAUS, P. J.
I concur in the result, but believe that there should be some elaboration on the court’s Reference to People v, Wynn, 257 Cal.App.2d 664 [65 Cal.Rptr. 210]; People v. Alfreds, 251 Cal.App.2d 666 [59 Cal.Rptr. 647]; and People v. Bross, 240 Cal.App.2d 157 [49 Cal.Rptr. 402].
In People v. Huntington, 8 Cal.App. 612, 616 [97 P. 760] it was said: “. . . If the killing was manslaughter, it is not important that it be classified. The statute does not distinguish the kinds of manslaughter in prescribing the punishment, but, on the contrary, makes the punishment not exceeding ten years’ imprisonment for manslaughter; and the question as to whether any ease falls under the one head or the other does not appear to be material. ...”
In People v. Jackson, 202 Cal.App.2d 179, 182 [20 Cal.Rptr. 592] ; People v. Freudenberg, 121 Cal.App.2d 564, 594 [263 P.2d 875] ; and People v. Bones, 35 Cal.App. 429, 433-434 [170 P. 166], it was held unnecessary that a verdict or judgment specify whether a defendant was guilty of voluntary or involuntary manslaughter.
These holdings must be based on a theory that the definitions of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter in section 192 of the Penal Code merely describe the two ways in which the same crime can be committed. If voluntary and involuntary manslaughter are different crimes, it would logically fol*865low that all 12 jurors must agree which crime the defendant has committed and that they should so specify in their verdict.
In People v. Bross, supra, the two defendants were found guilty of voluntary manslaughter. On appeal they complained that the court had committed error in not instructing on involuntary manslaughter. It was held that there was evidence of involuntary manslaughter and that the court should have instructed on that theory. The court found People v. Jackson, supra, to he inapplicable and added: “. . . And while we are discussing the subject of degrees of manslaughter, can it be said in this ease that it is not material whether the case falls under one head or the other ? Is it not reasonable to assume that the Adult Authority, in determining the punishment, would fix the term of imprisonment for a shorter term when the crime was involuntary manslaughter than it would if the conviction were for voluntary manslaughter?” (240 Cal.App.2d at p. 171.)
While I agree that it surely must be material to the Adult Authority whether a defendant has been convicted of voluntary or involuntary manslaughter, it is obvious that if the Jackson-Freudenberg-Bones-Huntington line of cases is correct, it may never find out from the judgment. Therefore I do not understand how the court was able to brush Jackson aside quite so easily.
Further if the pre-Bross cases are still valid, it is puzzling why a defendant who has been convicted of voluntary manslaughter has standing to complain that an instruction on involuntary manslaughter, justified by the evidence, should have been given. Without such an instruction his attorney was free to argue that the facts, did not show an intentional homicide. With no instruction covering an unintentional killing, he could ask for an acquittal.
Since, however the Bross court recognized the defendants’ standing to complain, I can only conclude that it did so on the unarticulated assumption that had an involuntary manslaughter instruction been given, the defendants would have been entitled to a further instruction that the jury must unanimously decide which of the two kinds of manslaughter they committed. This means, of course, that sections 192 subdivision 1 and 192 subdivision 2 of the Penal Code do not merely describe two ways of committing the same crime, but define two distinct felonies.
The. same assumption must have been in the back of the *866court’s mind in People v. Alfreds, supra, 251 Cal.App.2d 666. There the defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. No instruction on involuntary manslaughter was given. In a previous opinion the court had held that such an instruction should have been given sua sponte and that the failure to do so amounted to reversible error: “Furthermore, although voluntary and involuntary manslaughter carry identical penalties upon conviction (People v. Doyle, 162 Cal.App.2d 158 [328 P.2d 7]), there is an important distinguishing factor. A conviction of voluntary manslaughter makes defendant ineligible for probation, except in unusual cases, as she is a person who ‘used a deadly weapon upon a human being in connection with the perpetration of the crime’ (Pen. Code, § 1203). Thus, we hold that the-court’s failure to instruct on involuntary manslaughter, sua sponte, was prejudicial and constituted reversible error.” (57 Cal.Rptr. 783, 786.) The court reversed. The Supreme Court granted a hearing and transferred the matter back to the Court of Appeal which then affirmed, but used similar language in the second opinion. (251 Cal.App.2d at p. 671.) The affirmance was based on invited error. (People v. Phillips, 64 Cal.2d 574, 581, fn.,4 [51 Cal.Rptr. 225,414 P.2d 353].)
Finally, in People v. Wynn, supra; 257 Cal.App.2d 664 the defendant was also convicted of voluntary manslaughter. Trial had been to the court, rather than to a jury and therefore there was no question of instructions. On appeal Wynn claimed that he was entitled to a modification of the judgment to show a conviction of involuntary rather than voluntary manslaughter. The court brushed aside the Attorney General ’s reliance on Jackson-Freudenberg-Bones-Huntington. It-mentioned that in People v. Forbs, 62 Cal.2d 847, 852 [44 Cal.Rptr. 753, 402 P.2d 825], the problem was noted but not decided. It referred to Bross and again pointed out that a defendant’s eligibility for probation may depend on whether or not it was found that he used a loaded weapon with intent to kill or merely held it without due caution. It continued: “It is concluded from the latter cases that defendant is entitled to raise the question of the type of manslaughter of which he could properly he convicted. ...” (257 Cal.App.2d at p. 676.) The judgment was, however, affirmed because the evidence supported the court’s finding of voluntary manslaughter. (See also People v. Pilgrim, 73 Cal.App.2d 391, 398-399 [166 P.2d 636].)
If Bross, Alfreds and Wynn really do mean what they so *867strongly imply, there was a much more basic error committed in the case at bar. The trial court defined voluntary and involuntary manslaughter but told the jury that it did not have to decide which kind the defendant committed, as long as they unanimously agreed it was manslaughter. If it was dealing with two different crimes this was a most fundamental error.
I entirely agree, however, that our reversal of the homicide count should be based on the court’s failure to define any of the misdemeanors the commission of which could have served as a basis for an involuntary manslaughter verdict. The problem which I have discussed is a most fundamental one which undoubtedly will have to be decided by the Supreme Court sooner or later. It was not discussed by counsel in the briefs. We- directed attention to it before the oral argument, but the presentation which followed was so inextricably interwoven with the defense’s insistence that Bseareega had been erroneously convicted of vehicular manslaughter, that the issue was never really isolated. Additional authority may be available at the time of the retrial.1 It is better that the next trial court be the first to rule.
Aiso, J., concurred.
Petitions for a rehearing were denied July 2, 1969, and the petitions of the appellant and of the respondent for a hearing by the Supreme Court were denied August 6, 1969.

 Indeed, it may be available now, but- has not been found by us.