Court Opinion

ID: 9838530
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 18:01:25.317056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:37.701894
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-30035        Document: 00516885233             Page: 1      Date Filed: 09/06/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Fifth Circuit

                                     ____________                                       FILED
                                                                                September 6, 2023
                                      No. 23-30035                                   Lyle W. Cayce
                                     ____________                                         Clerk

   Ronnie Williams,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

                                               Defendant—Appellee.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                                  No. 2:22-CV-1141
                     ______________________________

   Before Dennis, Engelhardt, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Plaintiff-Appellant Ronnie Williams applied for and was denied social
   security disability benefits by the Commissioner of Social Security. The
   district court affirmed, finding that the decision of the Administrative Law
   Judge (“ALJ”) was supported by substantial evidence and applied proper
   legal standards in evaluating the evidence. For the reasons that follow, we
   AFFIRM.

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-30035      Document: 00516885233           Page: 2   Date Filed: 09/06/2023

                                     No. 23-30035

                 I. Factual and Procedural History
          Plaintiff, who is now fifty-four-years-old, applied for Disability
   Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) on
   March 13, 2020, and March 30, 2020, respectively. Plaintiff alleged disability
   beginning on March 10, 2018, due to his degenerative disc disease, diabetes
   mellitus, hypertension, obstructive sleep apnea, obesity, post-traumatic
   stress disorder, anxiety, and depression. On August 3, 2021, the ALJ held an
   administrative hearing on Plaintiff’s applications. At that hearing, Plaintiff,
   his attorney, and a vocational expert appeared. On August 18, 2021, the ALJ
   issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled.
          Plaintiff sought Appeals Council review of the ALJ’s decision, which
   was denied. Accordingly, the ALJ’s August 18, 2021, decision stands as the
   Commissioner’s final administrative decision, subject to judicial review. The
   adjudicated period here begins with the alleged disability onset date (March
   10, 2018) and ends on the date of the ALJ’s decision (August 18, 2021).
          On April 26, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking judicial review
   before the district court. The magistrate judge issued a Report and
   Recommendation affirming the Commissioner’s decision. Over the objection
   of Plaintiff, the district judge adopted the Report and Recommendation and
   issued a judgment on December 9, 2022, affirming the Commissioner’s final
   decision. Plaintiff subsequently appealed.
                          II. Standard of Review
          Our review of the ALJ’s determination is both highly deferential and
   limited. Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 464 (5th Cir. 2005). Review is
   limited to whether the decision is supported by “substantial evidence” and
   whether the correct legal standards were applied. Id. at 461; 42 U.S.C. §
   405(g). We may not reweigh the evidence, substitute our own judgment, or

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   resolve conflicts of evidence. Singletary v. Bowen, 798 F.2d 818, 822-23 (5th
   Cir. 1986).
                               III. Discussion
          This appeal mostly centers around the weight afforded by the ALJ to
   various medical opinions in making a determination that Plaintiff was not
   disabled under the Social Security Act (“SSA”). To qualify for DIB and SSI,
   a claimant must suffer a disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The SSA
   defines a “disability” as a “medically determinable physical or mental
   impairment lasting at least twelve months that prevents the claimant from
   engaging in substantial gainful activity.” Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267,
   271 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). The Commissioner
   employs a sequential five-step process to determine whether a claimant is
   disabled within the meaning of that Act, as follows:
          “(1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful
          activity, (2) the severity and duration of the claimant’s
          impairments, (3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or
          equals one of the listings in the relevant regulations, (4)
          whether the claimant can still do his past relevant work, and (5)
          whether the impairment prevents the claimant from doing any
          relevant work.”
   Wills v. Kijakazi, No. 22-20609, 2023 WL 4015174, at *2 (5th Cir. June 14,
   2023) (quoting Webster v. Kijakazi, 19 F.4th 715, 718 (5th Cir. 2021)).
          “[T]he claimant bears the burden of proof with respect to the first
   four steps of the analysis.” Waters v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 716, 718 (5th Cir.
   2002) (citing Jones v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 524, 526 (5th Cir. 1987)). “If the
   claimant advances that far, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to ‘prove
   the claimant’s employability.’” Webster, 19 F.4th at 718 (quoting Keel v. Saul,
   986 F.3d 551, 555 (5th Cir. 2021)). And “[i]f at any step the Commissioner
   finds that the claimant is or is not disabled, the ALJ need not continue the

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   analysis.” Copeland v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Leggett
   v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995)). Here, the ALJ proceeded through
   all five steps and determined that Plaintiff was not disabled within the
   meaning of the SSA during the relevant time period.
           On appeal, Plaintiff first challenges the ALJ’s finding that “other jobs
   were available to [Plaintiff]” alleging such a finding was “not supported by
   substantial evidence because the limitations were derived from non-
   examining sources instead of from examining sources,” which Plaintiff
   contends was “in violation of 20 C.F.R. 404.1520c.” As explained below,
   Plaintiff’s argument reflects a misunderstanding of the revised regulatory
   framework governing his claims—i.e., disability claims filed on or after
   March 27, 2017.1
           Under prior Social Security regulations, a hierarchy of medical
   opinions dictated the weight that must be given by the ALJ tasked with
   deciding whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Treating
   physicians and other examining physicians were generally given the most
   weight while non-examining physicians were generally given the least

           _____________________
           1
             This misunderstanding is also reflected in the record below. Back at the district
   court, citing the old regulation, Plaintiff made the same argument that the ALJ’s reliance
   on non-examining sources was error. The district court correctly found that while the pre-
   2017 regulation “generally states that the SSA [must] give[] ‘more weight to the medical
   opinion of a source who has examined [a claimant] than to the medical opinion of a medical
   source who has not,” the old regulation did not apply to Plaintiff’s claims because it
   “applies only to claims filed before March 27, 2017.” Plaintiff’s earliest claim was filed on
   March 13, 2020. Because of that later filing date, Plaintiff’s claims were governed by the
   revised regulatory framework applicable to disability claims. On appeal, Plaintiff cites the
   correct regulation this time, but he makes the same argument that still substantively tracks
   the pre-2017 regulation.

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   weight.2 See id.; Hillman v. Barnhart, 170 F. App’x 909, 912-13 (5th Cir.
   2006).
            On January 18, 2017, the Social Security Administration promulgated
   new regulations applicable to disability claims filed on or after March 27,
   2017, found at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c and 416.920c, “revising . . . the rules
   regarding the evaluation of medical evidence.” See Revisions to Rules
   Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, 5853 (Jan.
   18, 2017) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404 and 416). As other courts have
   recognized, “[t]he new rules were expressly adopted pursuant to the . . .
   Commissioner’s statutory authority, see 42 U.S.C. § 405(a), and following
   formal notice-and-comment proceedings.” Rogers v. Kijakazi, 62 F.4th 872,
   877 (4th Cir. 2023). These new regulations eliminate the old hierarchy of
   medical opinions, no longer provide for any inherent or presumptive weight,
   and do away with the examining and non-examining physician terminology.
   Winston v. Berryhill, 755 F. App’x 395, 402 n.4 (5th Cir. 2018).
            Instead, in determining “what weight, if any, to give a medical
   opinion,” the ALJ must consider five separate factors: (1) supportability; (2)
   consistency; (3) the relationship with the claimant; (4) specialization; and (5)
   other factors. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c). While, under the new regulatory
   framework, a medical source’s “treatment relationship” with a claimant is a
   factor considered when assessing the persuasiveness of medical opinions, no
   controlling or deferential weight attaches to any medical opinion as a matter
   of course. See Rescission of Social Security Rulings 96–2p, 96–5p, and 06–
   3p, 82 Fed. Reg. 15263, 15263 (Mar. 27, 2017). Instead, the persuasiveness of
   any medical source’s opinion—whether that source is a treating, examining,
   or non-examining physician—depends most significantly on whether the

            _____________________
            2
                These regulations still apply to disability claims filed before March 27, 2017.

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   opinion is supported by objective medical evidence and the source’s own
   explanation of the opinion (i.e., the first factor) and the opinion is consistent
   with other evidence provided by medical sources of record (the second
   factor). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c), 416.920c(c). Said simply, under the new
   regulatory scheme, consistency and supportability are “the most important
   factors” considered. Id. § 404.1520c(b). In addition to the medical source’s
   treating relationship, other lesser factors considered include a medical
   source’s specialty, “familiarity with the other evidence in the claim” record,
   and “understanding of [the SSA’s] disability program’s policies and
   evidentiary requirements.” Id. §§ 404.1520c(c)(4)-(5), 416.920c(c)(4)-(5).
           Despite this new framework, citing our caselaw, Plaintiff asks us to
   reverse the district court because the ALJ did not, as a matter of course, give
   the most weight to opinions of examining physicians. The cases cited in
   support by Plaintiff are not in the context of claims filed after March 27, 2017,
   and, accordingly, reflect the old regulatory framework. See, e.g., Kneeland v.
   Berryhill, 850 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2017). That framework is simply not
   applicable to Plaintiff’s claims because his earliest claim was undisputedly
   filed on March 13, 2020. Absent something more, Plaintiff’s alleged
   assignment of error—that the ALJ did not give more weight to the opinions
   of examining physicians—is without merit.3

           _____________________
           3
              In a final attempt to add the old examining and non-examining physicians’
   framework back into the new regulatory framework applicable to his claims, Plaintiff
   misstates 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(v) for the proposition that “Social Security recognizes
   that a medical source has a better understanding of your impairment if he or she examines
   you than if the medical source only reviews evidence in your folder.” But the regulation in
   reality reads: “A medical source may have a better understanding of your impairment(s) if
   he or she examines you than if the medical source only review evidence in your folder.” 20
   C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(v) (emphasis added).

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          Plaintiff next argues that “[t]he error in this case specifically revolves
   around the fact that the ALJ does not explain why a medical source that did
   not examine the claimant at all is more supported than a medical source that
   did examine the claimant.” The new regulatory framework applicable to
   Plaintiff’s claims alters the SSA’s requirement that ALJs must explain the
   reasons for favoring one medical source opinion over another. Under the new
   framework, while ALJs must “articulate how [they] consider[ed] medical
   opinions” from all medical sources, such articulation need only explain how
   the supportability and consistency factors were considered. 20 C.F.R. §
   404.1520c(b)-(c). Only if differing medical opinions are “equally well-
   supported” (the first factor) and “consistent with the record” (the second
   factor) must the ALJ articulate how he considered, inter alia, the relationship
   between the medical source and the claimant (the third factor). Id. §
   404.1520c(b)(3), (c). Here, the ALJ did not find the differing medical
   opinions equally well-supported and consistent with the record—both
   findings that Plaintiff does not actually challenge on appeal. The ALJ was not
   required to explain how he considered the relationship between the medical
   sources and the claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c).
          Finally, and on a separate note, Plaintiff makes the conclusory
   argument that the ALJ’s rejection of “Dr. Dennis’ exam on the basis that he
   did not perform a standard mental health exam . . . is simply not accurate as
   the report states that a tele-health exam was performed.” We fail to see how
   the notation that a telehealth examination was performed means the ALJ’s
   finding that Dr. Dennis failed to perform a standard mental health
   examination was “simply not accurate.” Plaintiff offers no further
   explanation in his briefing. Because Plaintiff’s briefing on this issue is
   inadequate, he forfeited the argument. Rollins v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 8
   F.4th 393, 397 n.1 (5th Cir. 2021).

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                               IV. Conclusion
            For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district
   court.

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