Court Opinion

ID: 9955340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 14:03:07.98518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:34.051654
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                  STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                       Case No. 5D22-2671
                LT Case No. 2019-CA-002883-11J-L
                  _____________________________

FAYE CRUMP,

    Appellant,

    v.

AMERICAN MULTI-CINEMA, INC.
d/b/a AMC,

    Appellee.
                  _____________________________

Nonfinal appeal from the Circuit Court for Seminole County.
Jessica J. Recksiedler, Judge.

Josef Timlichman, of Josef Timlichman Law, PLLC, Aventura, for
Appellant.

R. David McLaughlin, and Michael W. LeRoy, of Fulmer LeRoy &
Albee, PLLC, Orlando, for Appellee.

                          March 28, 2024

SOUD, J.

     Appellant Faye Crump appeals the trial court’s denial of her
motion for leave to assert a claim for punitive damages in her
underlying personal injury action against American Multi-Cinema
d/b/a AMC. We have jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const.;
Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(G). We affirm, concluding the trial court
properly denied the motion because there is no reasonable
evidentiary basis for the recovery of such damages.

                                  I.

     Crump and her friend went to the movies at the AMC theater
in Altamonte Springs, Florida on February 24, 2018. While they
were inside Theater 11, which was “packed” because of a popular
movie having recently opened, an individual in the parking lot
fired a gun at a car passing by. As a result, approximately 300 to
400 people fled the parking lot area in front of the theater building,
many of whom entered the theater lobby.

     Relatedly, Crump heard someone in Theater 11 loudly say,
“Get out.” She then described “a herd of people” from the other side
of the theater running and screaming. Crump testified at her
deposition that she could not remember any other specific words
because she “went into shock and didn’t know what was
happening.” Crump did not see anyone she could identify as an
AMC employee inside the theater at that time. As people began to
run out of the theater, Crump fell and was stepped on by others
fleeing the theater. She testified she became dazed and blacked
out.

     According to Crump’s friend, Gary Capers, approximately ten
minutes after the movie started, a female AMC employee “busted
in the door” of Theater 11 loudly yelling, “Everybody has to leave.
Get out. Get out.” Capers then stood up and told Crump they
needed to leave. Before Crump could react, the crowd pushed
Capers out the door. Capers lost sight of Crump and did not see
her again until Crump exited the theater about thirty minutes
later. Capers did not hear the female employee say anything about
a shooting or a shooter.

     Initially, when the gun shots were fired, AMC General
Manager Thomas Stauffenberg heard a manager “scream[]” on the
handheld radio carried by employees “gun shots fired.” When
Stauffenberg asked him to repeat the statement, the manager
said, “Gun shots fired. Gun shots fired. Active shooter.” All radios
carried by employees had earpieces that were connected to the
handheld radios so that patrons at the theater could not hear the
radio transmission.

                                  2
     Elizabeth Gerson was one of two female AMC employees 1 who
entered Theater 11 where Crump was seated. While the movie was
playing and the lights were off, the other female employee
excitedly entered the theater and, according to Gerson, yelled
“Emergency, we need to leave the theater.” Gerson testified at her
deposition that when the other AMC employee did so, the patrons
did not panic but became “alert.” However, immediately
thereafter, a male individual—a guest who was not believed to be
an AMC employee—shouted, “Active shooter,” 2 which caused
everyone to panic and begin running and stumbling over each
other. Gerson herself was injured.

     Gerson believed her colleague’s conduct violated AMC’s policy,
which she understood at that time 3 to require employees to calmly
ask moviegoers to remain in their seats because that would cause
less panic. She also testified that she believed AMC could have
provided more training.

     AMC conducted required emergency operations training for
all its employees every six months. Such training covered “all
emergency evacuation systems,” including all weather-related
occurrences, guest service issues, power outages, bomb threats,
and active shooters. Training specific to active shooter scenarios
was provided in AMC’s “electronic learning classes or modules,”
which every employee was required to watch every six months.
Following completion of the electronic learning module, employees
were required to answer a series of assessment questions,
answering a minimum of eighty percent correctly. AMC’s
instruction to its employees involving an active shooter scenario

    1 Gerson is no longer employed at AMC.

    2 Nobody in Theater 11, other than this unidentified male,

described the situation as involving an active shooter.
    3 According to Gerson, AMC’s policy changed during her
employment. When she first began working, the policy was for
employees to calmly ask people to follow them as the employee led
them out of the theater. Then, the policy changed to as it existed
on the day of the incident, where an employee was to ask patrons
to remain in their seats.

                                 3
included that as they flee, “assist others if it is safe to do so.”
Employees also practiced emergency routines in the theaters
where they learned to assist guests during other types of
emergencies.

     Ultimately, and perhaps, in as little as thirty seconds after
Stauffenberg was notified over the radio of the gunshots, Clark
Irrizarry, the security guard working the premises, subdued the
identified shooter outside and held him on the ground until law
enforcement authorities arrived at the theater.

     Crump filed the underlying lawsuit in September 2019,
claiming she sustained injuries during the episode as a result of
AMC’s negligence. On July 25, 2022, pursuant to section 768.72,
Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.190(f), she
filed a motion for leave to amend her complaint to add a claim for
punitive damages for AMC’s alleged gross negligence. AMC filed
its response to the motion that same day and filed the deposition
transcripts of Crump, Capers, Gerson, Stauffenberg, and Irrizarry
just two days thereafter on July 27, 2022. Following a hearing on
September 7, 2022, at which no testimony was taken, the trial
court denied Crump’s motion in a written order filed October 7,
2022. 4 This appeal followed.

                                II.

     We review de novo the trial court’s order denying Crump’s
motion seeking leave to assert a claim for punitive damages. See
Hosp. Specialists, P.A. v. Deen, 373 So. 3d 1283, 1287 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2023) (citing Werner Enters., Inc. v. Mendez, 362 So. 3d 278,
281 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023)). In doing so, we view any record or
proffered 5 evidence in the light most favorable to the moving

    4 Given the procedural history of this case, Crump’s
arguments objecting to the timeline of the hearing on her motion
to amend do not warrant reversal.
    5  “‘Proffered evidence is merely a representation’ of the
evidence that a party proposes to present at trial.” Werner Enters.,
362 So. 3d at 281 (citing Grim v. State, 841 So. 2d 455, 462 (Fla.
2003)).

                                 4
plaintiff. Hosp. Specialists, 373 So. 3d at 1287 (citing Est. of
Blakely by and through Wilson v. Stetson Univ., Inc., 355 So. 3d
476, 481 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)).

                                 A.

     A plaintiff’s ability to assert a claim for punitive damages is
substantively governed by section 768.72, Florida Statutes. “[N]o
claim for punitive damages shall be permitted unless there is a
reasonable showing by evidence in the record or proffered by the
claimant which would provide a reasonable basis for recovery of
such damages.” § 768.72(1), Fla. Stat. (2017) (emphasis added).
This statute creates for a defendant “a substantive legal right not
to be subject to a punitive damages claim . . . until the trial court
makes a determination that there is a reasonable evidentiary basis
for recovery of punitive damages.” Globe Newspaper Co. v. King,
658 So. 2d 518, 519 (Fla. 1995); see also Hosp. Specialists, 373 So.
3d at 1287 (citing Globe Newspaper, 658 So. 2d at 519).
Accordingly, a plaintiff may not assert a claim for punitive
damages in an initial complaint. Rather, a plaintiff must “seek the
trial court’s permission before adding punitive damages to its
complaint.” Werner Enters., 362 So. 3d at 281.

      In requesting leave of court to add a claim for punitive
damages, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.190 requires a plaintiff
to file a motion for leave to amend the complaint. See Fla. R. Civ.
P. 1.190(a) and (f). The motion must attach the proposed amended
complaint, see Varnedore v. Copeland, 210 So. 3d 741, 745 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2017), which must plead sufficient allegations for the
recovery of punitive damages. “Given the nature of the applicable
statute and rule, the court must consider both the pleading
component and the evidentiary component of each motion to
amend to assert punitive damage claims.” Id. at 744 (citing Henn
v. Sandler, 589 So. 2d 1334, 1335–36 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)).

     In deciding whether to permit a claim for punitive damages,
the trial court acts as “a ‘gatekeeper’ to assess whether the
claimant has shown a reasonable evidentiary basis for the recovery
of punitive damages.” Hosp. Specialists, 373 So. 3d at 1287
(quoting Varnedore, 210 So. 3d at 745). In so doing, the trial court
“must first consider whether the proposed amended complaint
actually sets forth a claim that the defendants’ conduct was grossly

                                 5
negligent, as defined by” section 768.72. Varnedore, 210 So. 3d at
745. “Absent sufficient allegations, there would be neither a reason
nor a framework for analyzing the proffered evidentiary basis for
a punitive damages claim.” Id. The trial court’s gatekeeping
function “similarly tasks the trial court with preventing a party
from being subjected to a punitive damages claim when no
reasonable [evidentiary] basis for these damages has been shown.”
Hosp. Specialists, 373 So. 3d at 1288.

       By the plain language of section 768.72, punitive damages 6
are permissible “only if the trier of fact, based on clear and
convincing evidence, finds that the defendant was personally
guilty of intentional misconduct or gross negligence.” § 768.72(2),
Fla. Stat. Further, in Florida, a corporation or employer may
become liable for punitive damages for the conduct of an employee
or agent “only if” the employee’s conduct constitutes intentional
misconduct or gross negligence as defined by the statute and the
employer “actively and knowingly participated in such conduct[,] .
. . knowingly condoned, ratified, or consented to such conduct[,] or
. . . engaged in conduct that constituted gross negligence and that
contributed to the loss, damages, or injury suffered by” a plaintiff.
See § 768.72(3), Fla. Stat.; see also Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Elec.
Funds Transfer Corp., 326 So. 3d 753, 757 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021)
(citing Schropp v. Crown Eurocars, Inc., 654 So. 2d 1158, 1159
(Fla. 1995)).

    “‘Intentional misconduct’ means that the defendant had
actual knowledge of the wrongfulness of the conduct and the high
probability that injury or damage to the claimant would result and,
despite that knowledge, intentionally pursued that course of
conduct, resulting in injury or damage.” § 768.72(2)(a), Fla. Stat.
The term “gross negligence” is defined as conduct “so reckless or
wanting in care that it constituted a conscious disregard or

    6 As its name suggests, punitive damages are not designed to

compensate a plaintiff for sustained damages. Rather, such
damages “are private fines levied by civil juries to punish
reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence.” Hosp.
Specialists, 373 So. 3d at 1288 (citations omitted).

                                 6
indifference to the life, safety, or rights of persons exposed to such
conduct.” § 768.72(2)(b), Fla. Stat.

    As we noted in Hospital Specialists, “the Florida Supreme
Court has analogized the requisite level of negligence necessary for
the assessment of punitive damages under section 768.72 to that
necessary for a conviction for criminal manslaughter.” Hosp.
Specialists, 373 So. 3d at 1288 (citing Valladares v. Bank of Am.
Corp., 197 So. 3d 1, 11 (Fla. 2016)).

       The character of negligence necessary to sustain an
       award of punitive damages must be of a “gross and
       flagrant character, evincing reckless disregard of
       human life, or of the safety of persons exposed to its
       dangerous effects, or there is that entire want of
       care which would raise the presumption of a
       conscious indifference to consequences, or which
       shows wantonness or recklessness, or a grossly
       careless disregard of the safety and welfare of the
       public, or that reckless indifference to the rights of
       others which is equivalent to an intentional
       violation of them.”

Valladares, 197 So. 3d at 11 (quoting Owens–Corning Fiberglass
Corp. v. Ballard, 749 So. 2d 483, 486 (Fla. 1999)).

                                 B.

     As Florida’s law makes clear, the burden placed upon Crump
to allow her to amend her complaint to add a claim for punitive
damages, is—substantively speaking—not a modest one. She must
demonstrate a reasonable evidentiary basis that AMC’s conduct
was (as prior Florida precedent has described it) reprehensible,
gross and flagrant, reckless and wanton, and of such a nature that
it demonstrates a careless disregard for the life and safety of
others. She must proffer evidence that demonstrates the alleged
negligence reaches a level akin to that needed to sustain a
conviction for criminal manslaughter. And until Crump does so,
AMC has the legal right not to be subjected to a punitive damages
claim (and the discovery related thereto). See Globe Newspaper,
658 So. 2d at 519.

                                  7
     Crump filed her motion to amend her complaint to add a claim
for punitive damages, in essence claiming that AMC was grossly
negligent in failing to adequately train its employees and ensure
that AMC’s policies and procedures were followed so as to prevent
the panic and confusion that injured her. 7 The allegations set forth
in the proposed amended complaint fall short of the gross
negligence necessary for her punitive damages claim to proceed.
Additionally, Crump fails to make a reasonable showing from the
evidence presented to the trial court that demonstrates any
reasonable basis for the award of such damages. Simply stated,
Crump cannot meet her burden here.

     Initially, we conclude that the allegations pleaded in Crump’s
proposed amended complaint do not rise to the level of gross
negligence as defined by section 768.72. Crump’s allegations
against AMC cannot constitute tortious conduct “so reckless or
wanting in care that it constituted a conscious disregard or
indifference to” Crump’s life, safety, or rights. See § 768.72(2)(b),
Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Stated differently, in no way can the
alleged negligence reasonably be determined to be similar in
nature to that necessary to convict someone of criminal
manslaughter. See Hosp. Specialists, 373 So. 3d at 1288 (citation
omitted).

    Further, even assuming arguendo the legal sufficiency of the
proposed amended complaint, Crump fails to make a “reasonable
showing” of a “reasonable basis” for the recovery of punitive
damages, as required by section 768.72. First, as to any claim of
AMC’s vicarious liability for punitive damages because of the

    7  Crump’s motion at times appears to vacillate between
allegations of intentional misconduct and gross negligence.
However, consistent with the proposed Amended Complaint
including the desired punitive damages claim attached to Crump’s
motion, the trial court’s order makes clear that Crump seeks
punitive damages “solely . . . based upon an allegation that the
negligence was a gross negligence that occurred.” In any event,
there is utterly nothing before the trial court to provide any
reasonable basis for a jury to find intentional conduct by AMC as
defined by section 768.72.

                                 8
conduct of its employees, the actions of AMC’s employees at the
time immediately after the shots were fired in the parking lot area
simply do not rise to the level of gross negligence. Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to Crump, as we must, AMC’s
female employee “bursting” into the theater and “yelling”
something to the effect of “Emergency. Everybody has to leave. Get
out. Get out.”—even if determined by a jury to be negligent and
contrary to AMC’s policies—does not provide a reasonable
evidentiary basis for a finding of “gross negligence” as defined by
the statute. It cannot be reasonably shown that such conduct rises
to the level of being “so reckless or wanting in care that it
constituted a conscious disregard or indifference to the life, safety,
or rights of” Crump. See § 768.72(2)(b), Fla. Stat. The proffered
evidence fails to make any reasonable showing of conduct that is
reprehensible, flagrant, reckless and wanton, and demonstrating
a careless disregard for Crump. Additionally, there is no evidence
before the court that AMC “actively and knowingly participated in
such conduct[,] . . . [or] knowingly condoned, ratified, or consented
to such conduct[.]” See § 768.72(3), Fla. Stat. Indeed, the argument
set forth by Crump, that the employees’ conduct in evacuating the
theater violated AMC’s policies, precludes a reasonable
evidentiary basis that AMC participated in the conduct or
otherwise condoned, ratified, or consented to the conduct.

     Undoubtedly, the shooting outside in the parking lot sparked
panic at the AMC theater that seems to have ultimately made its
way into Theater 11. In such a setting of confusion and concern,
the conduct of AMC’s employees—even if determined negligent—
simply does not set forth any reasonable evidentiary basis for the
imposition of punitive damages.

     Finally, as to any claim of AMC’s direct liability for punitive
damages because of an alleged failure to adequately train its
employees, there is no reasonable evidentiary basis for a jury to
conclude that AMC itself “engaged in conduct that constituted
gross negligence and that contributed to the loss, damages, or
injury suffered by” Crump. See § 768.72(3), Fla. Stat. AMC
required its employees to complete emergency operations training
every six months, covering such topics as weather-related
occurrences, guest service issues, power outages, bomb threats,
and active shooters. Pertinent to the case sub judice, employees

                                  9
were required to complete mandatory “electronic learning classes
or modules” every six months, which provided training for active
shooter scenarios. This required training included the employees’
obligation to answer a series of assessment questions, answering
a minimum of eighty percent correctly. This training instructed
AMC employees as they flee to “assist others if it is safe to do so.”

     While the employees are alleged to have violated those policies
in the sudden burst of gunshots, there simply is inadequate
evidence proffered to the trial court from which a jury could have
a reasonable basis to award punitive damages against AMC based
on its own gross negligence.

                                III.

     Accordingly, as Crump failed to both (i) plead sufficient
allegations for the recovery of punitive damages and (ii) make a
reasonable showing by the proffered evidence of a reasonable basis
by which a jury could award punitive damages against AMC, see §
768.72(1), Fla. Stat., the trial court properly denied Crump’s
motion for leave to assert a claim for punitive damages. Therefore,
the order of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

    It is so ordered.

    EDWARDS, C.J., and MAKAR, J., concur.

                  _____________________________

       Not final until disposition of any timely and
       authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330
       or 9.331.

                  _____________________________

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