Court Opinion

ID: 9682084
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:05:14.50916+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:50.911479
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
Notwithstanding that we granted this petition to review, inter alia, the constitutionality of Article 38.071, §§ 4 and 5, V.A. C.C.P., the majority expressly declines to reach that most important topical issue. I dissent.
To excuse its failure to address a ground for review that is in all things properly before the Court, the majority invokes “a rule of statutory construction,” Taylor v. State, 358 S.W.2d 124, at 125 (Tex.Cr.App.1962) (citing 12 Tex.Jur.2d 377, Constitutional Law, § 32 [now 12 Tex.Jur.3d 532, Constitutional Law § 34]. From authorities cited in its Slip Opinion, at 14, however, patently that rule is inapposite here.
Decisions relied on fall into one of three categories:
first, opinions by this Court on direct appeal, viz: Taylor v. State, supra; Parent v. State, 621 S.W.2d 796 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Smith v. State, 658 S.W.2d 172 (Tex.Cr.App.1983)
second, opinions by this Court on PDR admonishing a court of appeals that it *676need not have dealt with a constitutional question, namely: Briggs v. State, 740 S.W.2d 803, at 806-807 (Tex.Cr.App.1987); Coberly v. State, 644 S.W.2d 735, at 736 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Skinner v. State, 652 S.W.2d 773, at 776 (Tex.Cr.App.1983);
third, an opinion by a court of appeals stating the rule on direct appeal, i.e., Hypke v. State, 720 S.W.2d 158, at 159 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th] 1986) PDR refused.
That the rule of statutory construction may be applicable in a case on direct appeal does not mean that it also precludes this Court from deciding constitutionality of a statute in exercise of its jurisdiction, power and authority of discretionary review. Neither constitutional source, Article 5, § 5, nor implementing statutes, Articles 4.04, § 2; 44.45(a) and (b), V.A.C.C.P., impose any such restriction on the Court, and for us gratuitously to lay one down is to defeat plain constitutional intent and statutory purpose that this Court determine as a matter of sound judicial discretion when an important question of law should be settled by the Court.
In granting this ground for review we have recognized that the instant cause presents just such a unsettled question. Now, however, the majority would sustain other grounds, order a reversal and remand to the trial court. There, in the most likely event of a new trial, undoubtedly the same videotape will be received in lieu of live testimony from the minor victim — under aegis of the decision of the Beaumont Court of Appeals. Thus, other than ruling out admission of testimony concerning an extraneous offense, we settle nothing about the perplexing constitutional issue still in this case, and in others as well.
To refusal of the majority to cause this Court to perform the reviewing role in which it has been cast by law, I must dissent.