Court Opinion

ID: 9377375
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-07 18:08:10.54315+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:13.857800
License: Public Domain

J-S05026-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    CHRISTOPHER STEELE                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 848 WDA 2022

              Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 8, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s):
                          CP-25-CR-0001105-2018

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                                FILED: MARCH 7, 2023

       Christopher Steele appeals, pro se, from the order, entered in the Court

of Common Pleas of Erie County, dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the

Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After careful

review, we affirm.1

       In December 2018, Steele was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of

66-180 months’ incarceration after being found guilty by a jury of aggravated

assault, reckless endangerment, possession of an instrument of crime, and

criminal use of a communication facility.          Steele filed a timely motion for

____________________________________________

1  On December 7, 2022, our Court granted the Commonwealth’s application
for an extension of time within which to file its brief. We ordered that the brief
be filed on or before January 4, 2023. To date, the Commonwealth has not
filed a brief.
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reconsideration asserting an Apprendi2 issue as well as an excessiveness of

sentence claim. While his motion was pending, Steele filed a direct appeal3

and a pro se PCRA petition, a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and a

motion for the appointment of PCRA counsel.4 On February 7, 2019, the trial

court denied Steele’s motion to reconsider. On February 28, 2019, the trial

court dismissed, “as prematurely filed,” Steele’s pro se PCRA petition and

motions, due to his pending direct appeal.5 See Order, 2/28/19.6 On July 6,

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2 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding every factor
necessary to defendant’s punishment must either be admitted or found by
jury beyond reasonable doubt).

3 Technically, our Court should have quashed Steele’s appeal as premature.
See Commonwealth v. Borrero, 692 A.2d 158, 159-60 (1997) (if post-
sentence motions filed, judgment of sentence does not become final for
purposes of appeal until trial court disposes of motion or motion deemed
denied by operation of law; Court required to quash appeal “[b]ecause we are
precluded from exercising jurisdiction over appeals from non[-]final orders or
judgments.”); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 720, Comment (“No direct appeal may
be taken by a defendant while his or her post-sentence motion is pending.”).

4 The Erie County Clerk of Records forwarded these pro se motions to counsel-
of-record, Robert Barbato Jr., Esquire. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 576(A)(4). See also
Commonwealth v. Jette, 23 A.3d 1032 (Pa. 2011) (petitioner’s pro se
motion filed while petitioner represented by counsel is impermissible hybrid
representation). “[I]ndeed, [such] pro se motion[s] have no legal effect, and,
therefore, are legal nullities.” See Commonwealth v. Williams, 151 A.3d
621, 623 (Pa. Super. 2016).

5 The pro se petition alleged ineffectiveness of trial counsel, a constitutional
violation, after-discovered evidence, and an illegality of sentence claim.

6 On March 5, 2019, counsel filed a motion to reinstate Steele’s appellate
rights nunc pro tunc due to counsel’s failure to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal. On March 12, 2019, this Court

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2020, our Court reversed Steel’s criminal use conviction on the basis of

insufficient evidence, affirmed his remaining convictions, and remanded for

resentencing.     See Commonwealth v. Steele, 234 A.3d 840 (Pa. Super.

2020). Steele was resentenced on August 18, 2020, to an aggregate term of

57-180 months of incarceration, followed by a three-year probationary tail.

       On August 21, 2020, Steele filed a pro se PCRA petition. On September

2, 2020, the trial court appointed PCRA counsel, who filed a “supplement” to

Steele’s PCRA petition.7 On October 20, 2020, the PCRA court gave Steele

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intention to dismiss his petition without a

hearing. Steele did not file a response. On December 3, 2020, the PCRA court

denied the petition. Steele filed a timely collateral appeal. Our Court affirmed

____________________________________________

granted the motion to reinstate Steele’s appellate rights nunc pro tunc and
ordered Steel to file his Rule 1925(b) statement by March 25, 2019. However,
on May 7, 2019, our Court dismissed the appeal due to counsel’s failure to file
an appellate brief. See Order, 5/7/19. On July 22, 2019, counsel filed a
motion to reconsider dismissal of the appeal, alleging that he had recently
been appointed to represent Steele and “had not been able to obtain the case
file for th[e] matter” by the briefing deadline. See Motion To Reconsider,
7/22/19. Subsequently, Steele filed a pro se application for relief seeking
appointment of new counsel. On August 2, 2019, our Court entered an order
reinstating Steele’s appeal, directing the trial court to determine whether
counsel has abandoned Steele and to “take further action as the court may
deem necessary.” Order, 8/2/19. On remand, the trial court held a hearing
and determined that Steele’s new attorney “will comply with all necessary
requirements pursuant to [Steele’s] pending appeal.” Trial Court Order,
8/29/19.

7Steele alleged trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek enforcement
of a plea agreement that was purportedly reached at the magisterial level.

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the PCRA court’s order.    Commonwealth v. Steele, 270 A.3d 1152 (Pa.

Super. 2021) (Table).

      On April 14, 2022, Steel filed the instant pro se PCRA petition. On April

20, 2022, the PCRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss the petition

without a hearing, pursuant to Rule 907. Steele filed a pro se response to the

court’s Rule 907 notice and, on June 8, 2022, the PCRA court dismissed

Steele’s petition.

      Steele filed a timely pro se notice of appeal and court-ordered Rule

1925(b) statement. On appeal, Steele presents the following issues for our

consideration:

      (1)   Whether the [PCRA court] abused [its] discretion and
            committed reversible error in denying [Steele’s] PCRA
            petition without an evidentiary hearing . . . where disputed
            issues of factual matters exist involving [d]ue [p]rocess and
            [d]ouble [j]eopardy violations of the United States and
            Pennsylvania Constitutions that entitle [Steele] to [PCRA]
            relief[.]

      (2)   Whether the [trial judge] failed to find that Magistrate Paul
            A. Bizzarro erred and abused his discretion when he failed
            to record the terms of the original plea agreement arrived
            at before him in [c]ourt [which] substantially prejudiced
            [Steele] and violated [his] [d]ue [p]rocess [rights.]

      (3)   Whether the [PCRA court erred by] fail[ing] to find that the
            Magistrate Paul A. Bizzarro erred and abused his discretion
            when he failed to conduct a colloquy record of [Steele’s]
            original plea of guilt [which] substantially prejudice[d
            Steele] and violat[ed Steele’s] [d]ue [p]rocess [rights.]

      (4)   Whether the [PCRA court erred by] fail[ing] to find that the
            Magistrate Paul A. Bizzarro erred and abused his discretion
            when     he    arbitrarily  cancelled   [Steele’s]   original
            disposition/[Steele’s] original plea of guilt [and] violated
            [Steele’s] [d]ue [p]rocess and [d]ouble [j]eopardy [rights.]

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      (5)    Whether the [PCRA court erred by] fail[ing] to find that the
             District Judge John A. Bozza erred and abused his discretion
             in failing to make the necessary determination to conduct
             an adequate search into the ambiguities with the plea
             agreement [and] violate[d Steele’s] [d]ue [p]rocess
             [rights.]

      (6)    Whether the Hon[orable] John J. Mead failed to find that the
             [Honorable] John J. Gerhart erred and abused his discretion
             when he failed to remain fair and impartial towards [Steele]
             before, during, and after trial [and, thus,] violat[ed Steele’s]
             [d]ue [p]rocess and [d]ouble [j]eopardy [rights.]

      (7)    Whether the [PCRA court erred by] fail[ing] to find that the
             totality of the Commonwealth’s conduct substantially
             prejudiced [Steele] before, during, and after trial [and,
             thus,] violated [Steele’s] [d]ue [p]rocess and [d]ouble
             [j]eopardy [rights.]

      (8)    Whether the [PCRA court] failed to find that all [of Steele’s]
             prior counsel prejudiced [him] in their combined layered
             ineffective assistance of counsel [by] failing to provide
             [Steele] with meaningful counsel[.]

      (9)    Whether the [a]ppellate [c]ourt erred and abused its
             discretion in denying [Steele’s] (1st) PCRA [a]ppeal attempt
             when it made its determination based upon a self-serving
             statement from ineffective counsel[,] rather than
             independently investigating the record . . . especially where
             there was no record[.]

      (10) Whether the [PCRA court] erred and abused [its] discretion
           when he failed to find that [Steele’s] current (2nd) PCRA
           petition should be an extension of [his] (1st) PCRA appeal
           attempt since [Steele] was prejudiced by ineffective
           assistance of counsel on his (1st) PCRA attempt[.]

Appellant’s Brief, at x-xii.

      When reviewing an order denying PCRA relief, we must "determine

whether it is supported by the record and is free of legal error."

Commonwealth v. Cousar, 154 A.3d 287, 296 (Pa. 2017). Furthermore,

we note:

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      [T]he PCRA court has discretion to dismiss a petition without a
      hearing when the court is satisfied “there are no genuine issues
      concerning any material fact, the defendant is not entitled to post-
      conviction collateral relief, and no legitimate purpose would be
      served by further proceedings. To obtain reversal of a PCRA
      court’s decision to dismiss a petition without a hearing, an
      appellant must show that he raised a genuine issue of fact which,
      if resolved in his favor, would have entitled him to relief, or that
      the court otherwise abused its discretion in denying a hearing.”

Id. at 297 (citations and some punctuation omitted).

      Before we may address Steele’s issues on appeal, we must first

determine whether the PCRA court had jurisdiction to consider his PCRA

petition.   Generally, a petition for PCRA relief, including a second or

subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment

of   sentence   is   final.    See    42    Pa.C.S.A.   §   9545(b)(3);    see   also

Commonwealth v. Alcorn, 703 A.2d 1054 (Pa. Super. 1997). There are,

however, exceptions to the time requirement, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§

9545(b)(1)(i),(ii), and (iii).   Where the petition alleges, and the petitioner

proves, that an exception to the time for filing the petition is met, the petition

will be considered timely.           These exceptions include interference by

government officials in the presentation of the claim, after-discovered facts or

evidence,   and      an   after-recognized    constitutional   right.     Id.    See

Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. 2000). A PCRA

petition invoking one of these exceptions must “be filed within one year of the

date the claims could have been presented.” Id.; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9545(b)(2).     The timeliness requirements of the PCRA are jurisdictional in

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nature and, accordingly, a PCRA court cannot hear untimely petitions.

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157 (Pa. 2003).

       Here, Steele’s judgment of sentence became final on September 18,

2020, when the time expired for him to file a direct appeal. See Pa.R.A.P.

902.   Thus, Steele had until September 18, 2021, to file a timely PCRA

petition. The current petition, filed on April 14, 2022, is, therefore, patently

untimely. Thus, unless Steele pleads and proves a timeliness exception to the

PCRA time-bar, the PCRA court had no jurisdiction to consider the merits of

his petition. See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 845 (Pa. 2012) (if

PCRA petition deemed untimely and no exception pled and proven, petition

must be dismissed without hearing because court lacks jurisdiction to consider

merits of petition).

       Because Steele’s petition does not plead, let alone prove, any PCRA

timeliness exception, his petition is time-barred.   See Commonwealth v.

Brown, 111 A.3d 171 (Pa. Super. 2015) (where petitioner neither

acknowledged untimeliness of petition nor alleged any exception to PCRA

time-bar, petitioner failed to “plead and prove” any section 9545(b)(1)

exception); see also Commonwealth v. Wharton, 886 A.2d 1120, 1126

(Pa. 2005) (“Exceptions [to the PCRA jurisdictional time-bar] cannot be raised

for the first time on appeal[.]”).   Thus, the trial court properly dismissed

Steele’s petition. Cousar, supra.

       Order affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/7/2023

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