Court Opinion

ID: 9731332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:42:18.613446+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:17.024160
License: Public Domain

MYSE, J.
(dissenting). The concept that nude dancing is protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution is, for some, a difficult and unsettling proposition. Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court has clearly established that nude dancing is symbolic speech because it is expressive conduct within the protections of the First Amendment. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66, 581, 587 (1991) (plurality opinion). Because this conduct is intended to convey a specific meaning or message, it is entitled to First Amendment protection even if offensive to other members of the community. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (A principal "function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.").
In this case, the majority has decided that under the Twenty-first Amendment municipalities may regulate speech in licensed liquor establishments. This is a dubious conclusion that, at best, requires for its validity that the ordinance meet a number of very specific requirements.
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Twenty-first Amendment to grant extraordinary police powers to the states in the regulation of licensed liquor establishments. California v. La Rue, 409 U.S. 109, 114-15 (1972). However, as the majority notes, there is a substantial division of authority among the *575states as to whether this grant of power is automatically transferred to the states or whether state action is required before the authority contained within the Twenty-first Amendment may be exercised by the states. A significant number of states have found that the grant of power afforded by the Twenty-first Amendment is not self-actuating, but requires the state to take legislative action before these extraordinary police powers may be exercised by individual states. Massachusetts, New York, Alaska and Minnesota have all held that legislative action is required before these extraordinary powers may be utilized by the state. Wisconsin has not taken any legislative action to implement this grant of authority.
The majority, however, notes that other states have found that the grant of authority contained in the Twenty-first Amendment is self-actuating. Even if we assume for the purpose of argument that no grant of legislative action is necessary to bestow these extraordinary police powers upon the state, the majority has failed to cite any case that holds that these powers are vested in any governmental unit but the state itself. Nonetheless, the majority assumes not only that the State of Wisconsin has these powers, but that the City of Cumberland has them as well. We need not determine whether the State of Wisconsin has these powers without legislative action because it was not the state that enacted the ordinance in question. Our state government can and has granted significant powers of home rule to municipalities and other governmental units within it. This power, however, is vested in the state and is only granted to municipal units by the state. No inherent power of government exists in individual units of municipal government, Local Union No. 487 v. Eau Claire, 141 Wis. 2d 437, *576441, 415 N.W.2d 543, 544 (Ct. App. 1987), and the majority has failed to demonstrate any devise of power to municipal units of government permitting them to exercise the extraordinary police powers necessary to regulate conduct occurring within a licensed liquor establishment. The state's failure to grant such extraordinary powers to the City of Cumberland represents a significant defect in the majority's analysis.
The majority seeks to find a delegation of power from the state to municipalities in § 125.10, STATS., which authorizes license revocations and suspensions by a municipality. While unclear, the majority reasons that because the Cumberland ordinance, which declares certain conduct unlawful, authorizes license revocations, the municipality had the authority to enact the ordinance under § 125.10. The issue in this case, however, is not whether the municipality may enact an ordinance controlling license revocation, but whether it may enact an ordinance that penalizes persons for engaging in conduct that is protected as speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Section 125.10 does not provide municipalities with such power.
Municipalities may not regulate speech merely because it occurs in a licensed liquor establishment. For example, Edward Ben Elson announced his candidacy for political office while nude from the stage of a Madison tavern. Legitimate political discussions and debates occur on the premises of licensed establishments, including banquet halls, taverns and resorts all over this state. It is not enough to say, as does the majority, that because the speech or expressive conduct occurred in a licensed premises, it is subject to regulation.
*577I do not dispute that under the appropriate circumstances government may regulate nude dancing. To exercise police power, however, there must be a substantial government interest in issue. The majority correctly notes that the ordinance was not accompanied by any statement of legislative purpose. However, the problem is even more profound. The record is completely devoid of the identity of any substantial public purpose sought to be achieved by the ordinance in question. While I agree with the majority that no statement of legislative purpose is essential, I conclude that there must be some substantial governmental interest sought to be achieved by the exercise of police power. I decline to speculate as to what purpose the ordinance seeks to achieve because there is such a wide range of public purposes conceivable, some of which may support the governmental action involved and others that may not. On the basis of this record, it is entirely possible the ordinance was enacted to reflect the communities' tastes and ideals, rather than to serve the more substantial public interest of regulating prostitution, drugs or other illegal activities. Without any indication of the public purpose sought to be achieved by this ordinance or sufficient evidence of the existence of a substantial public interest in regulating nude dancing, the necessary foundation for the exercise of police power is absent.
The majority correctly identifies United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), as the framework within which the regulation of symbolic speech must occur. Among the prerequisites is that "the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Id. at 377. The Cumberland ordinance fails this essential test. The overbreadth of the ordinance is *578manifest in a variety of ways. For example, the ordinance restricts disclosing the pubic hair region. This restriction could potentially place persons wearing contemporary bathing suits in violation of the ordinance. Further, the ordinance prohibits the exposure of "any device, costume or covering which gives the appearance of or simulates genitals, pubic hair, perineum, anal region or pubic hair region." Under this restriction, a patron would be prohibited from wearing a t-shirt depicting a work of art portraying nudity. The majority disposes of this issue by simply concluding that such pictures do not "simulate" nudity. The ordinance, however, is not restricted to simulation, but renders illegal the "appearance" of nudity. Because this ordinance controls conduct significantly broader than that which is necessary to achieve its legitimate legislative purpose and because speech may not be limited any more than is essential to the furtherance of that interest, this ordinance fails the O'Brien test.
An inherent problem that arises when a governmental unit attempts to inhibit free speech, be it symbolic or otherwise, is determining when the government has gone beyond its legitimate powers. When one starts upon this perilous course and sanctions the government's regulation of symbolic speech that seems to have little social value, it throws the door wide open to government regulation of all speech, including that which has the utmost value to public discourse. The conduct subject to regulation in this case occurred in a tavern where admission is limited to those who exceed the age specified by law. Those who come to the tavern do so voluntarily and attend as a matter of choice. If there is a legitimate public interest in regulating nude dancing, the government may lawfully exercise its police power to regulate this activity. It must, however, *579demonstrate a legitimate public interest that is substantial and meaningful and must tailor the regulation so as to intrude upon the speech only to the extent essential to further its interest. Because this ordinance fails on both counts, I dissent.