Court Opinion

ID: 9766541
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:52:32.58914+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:23.675580
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Justice,
concurring.
Except for the holding that the Speedy Trial Act (Act) is unconstitutional because its caption violates Section 35 of Article III of the Texas Constitution, I agree with the reasons given for affirming Appellant’s *701conviction. Thus, I concur in the result reached.
The Act’s constitutionality cannot be determined by considering its stringent effects on the criminal justice system because whether the Act represents a wise public policy for our state is a question for the legislature and not the courts to determine. See Texas State Bd. of Barber Exam. v. Beaumont Bar. Col., 454 S.W.2d 729, 732 (Tex.1970). Therefore, my disagreement on the constitutional issue is not based upon the Act’s arguable merits. With this preface, I now will explain why I believe that the Act’s caption complies in all respects with this particular constitutional provision.
As far as I can determine, the Texas Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals have never interpreted Section 35 of Article III as requiring the caption of a criminal enactment to meet a stricter test of compliance than the caption of a civil statute. Therefore, I interpret this constitutional provision as requiring one standard of compliance. The harmonious interpretation and application of this constitutional provision to both fields of law is undoubtedly made more difficult by Texas having two coequal eourts-of-last-resort, each being responsible for the definitive interpretation of the constitution in their field of law. However, their coequal status has not kept the Texas Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals from striving for a harmonious, one-standard interpretation, as evidenced by their frequent citing of the other’s decisions in opinions interpreting and applying this particular provision. Whether Crisp has been correctly decided is for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to determine because we, as an intermediate appellate court, are bound by its decision. However, we must interpret and apply the holding in Crisp, and that is where I differ with my brethren.
The caption of Senate Bill 1043 which adopted the Act reads: “An Act relating to a speedy trial of criminal cases; amending the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1965, as amended, by adding Chapter 32A, by adding Articles 17.151 and 28.061, and by amending Articles 29.02 and 29.03; providing for an effective date; and declaring an emergency.” Act of June 16, 1977, ch. 787, 1977 Tex.Gen.Laws 1970. The State alleges that this caption violates Section 35 of Article III which provides:
No bill, (except general appropriation bills, which may embrace the various subjects and accounts, for and on account of which moneys are appropriated) shall contain more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title. But if any subject shall be embraced in an act, which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof, as shall not be so expressed.
Tex. Const, art. III, § 35 (emphasis added). Relying on Ex parte Crisp, 661 S.W.2d 944 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), the State argues that the caption is constitutionally defective because it gave no “hint” of the subject matter and contents of the bill, other than generally stating that it related to a speedy trial of criminal eases. In particular, the State complains that the caption failed to give adequate notice to the reader that the bill made major changes in the bail provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that the Act also required the mandatory dismissal with prejudice of a criminal case if the Act were violated by the State.
My brethren accept the State’s argument and hold that the caption “suffers the same fatal defect” as did the caption in Crisp.1 In support of their holding, they note that the caption failed to notify a reader that the body of Senate Bill 1043 made many substantial changes and additions in the law, required the mandatory dismissal of a prosecution for even an inadvertent violation of the Act by the State and made changes in the bail provisions. Specifically, *702they find fault with the caption because, although notifying the reader that the Act has something to do with a speedy trial in a criminal case, “it never states what the Act actually does in that relation.” Although Crisp dealt with the caption of an amend-atory act, as does Senate Bill 1043, 1 do not consider that opinion as controlling because the caption in Crisp is distinguishable from the caption of Senate Bill 1043. Furthermore, because Senate Bill 1043 is an amendatory act, I view the so-called deficiencies pointed out by my brethren as immaterial.
The caption in Crisp read as follows: “An act relating to offenses and criminal penalties under the Texas Controlled Substances Act.” Act of May 29, 1981, ch. 268, 1981 Tex.Gen.Laws 696. The most important distinction between the two captions is that the caption in Crisp did not specify the chapter, article or section of the law being amended. This is a critical difference because, under such circumstances, the caption had to express the general subject of the legislation, and it could not, as pointed out below, rely on the original act to notify the reader of the general subject of the amendments. Another important distinction is that the caption in Crisp referred to the Controlled Substances Act as the act being amended but failed to notify the reader that the bill also amended the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure in addition to the Controlled Substances Act. Crisp, 661 S.W.2d at 946. Under such circumstances, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the caption “failed to convey to the reader that character and quality of information the first sentence of § 35 requires for fair notice to ‘legislator, lawyer or “man on the street.” ’ ” Crisp, 661 S.W.2d at 950 (Clinton, J., concurring on petition for discretionary review) (quoting Schlichting v. Texas Board of Medical Exam., 158 Tex. 279, 310 S.W.2d 557, 561 (1958)).
In contrast, the body of Senate Bill 1043 did precisely what its caption notified the reader that it would do; it amended the Code of Criminal Procedure by adding Chapter 32A (Speedy Trial Act), by adding articles 17.151 and 28.061 (bail provisions), and by amending articles 29.02 and 29.03 (continuance provisions). In addition, the caption notified the reader that the bill was an act “relating to a speedy trial of criminal cases”. In Senate Bill 1043, all of the amendments were germane to and not too remote from the Code of Criminal Procedure. Thus, the body of Senate Bill 1043 was not broader than its caption and its caption was not misleading as was the caption in Crisp. Because of these striking differences in the two captions, I do not view the decision in Crisp as controlling.
The rule seems to be well-settled that the caption of an amendatory bill does not need to state the subject or specify the nature of the amendments where the caption specifies the chapter, article or section of the body of law being amended and the subject matter of the amendments are germane to or embraced within the title of the law being amended. See Smith v. Davis, 426 S.W.2d 827, 833 (Tex.1968); Shannon v. Rogers, 159 Tex. 29, 314 S.W.2d 810, 815 (1958); Schlichting, 310 S.W.2d at 562; White v. State, 440 S.W.2d 660, 665 (Tex.Cr.App.1969). The rule has been stated as follows:
“The title of an amendatory act is ordinarily sufficient to allow any amendment germane to the subject of the original statute, if it properly specifies the chapter and section, or the revision and article, to be amended. When the title of the original act is sufficient to embrace the matters covered by the provisions of the amendatory act, the title of the latter act is not required to state the subject of the law amended or to specify the nature of the proposed amendment. But new substantive matter contained in an amendment, which is not germane or pertinent to that contained in the provision amended, is invalid as legislation upon a matter not expressed in the title of the amendatory act.”
Walker v. State, 134 Tex.Crim. 500, 116 S.W.2d 1076, 1078 (1938) (approving the opinion of the Commission of Appeals) (quoting 39 Tex.Jur. 102) (emphasis added), *703cited, with approval in White, 440 S.W.2d at 665.2
The reason behind this rule is succinctly stated in Katz v. State, 122 Tex.Crim. 231, 54 S.W.2d 130, 132 (1932) (approving the opinion of the Commission of Appeals): “The reason for the holding appears to be that the naming of the article to be amended directs attention to all of the provisions therein, as the subject of the amending act, and that such provisions can be ascertained by reading the article to be amended.” Here, the caption clearly identified the Code of Criminal Procedure as the body of law being amended and further specified that the Code was being amended by, among other things, adding Chapter 32A. Under such circumstances, the critical question then becomes whether the content of Chapter 32A is germane to the content of the portion of the Code being amended. See Schlichting, 310 S.W.2d at 561. An amendatory bill is germane to an original act where the contents of the amendment are closely allied with or appropriate or relevant to the content of the law being amended. Id. The test is the closeness of the relationship of the new provisions or substantial changes to what went before. Id. at 562. The content of Chapter 32A, which adopted the Speedy Trial Act and requires the mandatory dismissal of a prosecution when the Act has been violated, is germane to the content of Chapter 32, which provides for the dismissal of prosecution under other circumstances. Therefore, the caption of Senate Bill 1043 would be sufficient under Section 35 of Article III even if the phrase “relating to a speedy trial of criminal cases” had been omitted.
Furthermore, under the circumstances, the caption did not have to apprise the reader of the details or the precise effect of the body of the bill. See White, 440 S.W.2d at 665; Smith, 426 S.W.2d at 833. Thus, the caption was not deficient, as my brethren charge, because it failed to tell the reader that the body of the bill made “many substantive changes and additions in the law” or that it required the “mandatory discharge of an accused for a slight and inadvertent violation of the Act by the prosecution, regardless of the heinousness of the offense or its commission.” Because the caption notified a reader that it was amending the Code of Criminal Procedure by adding Chapter 32A (Speedy Trial Act) and because the content of Chapter 32A is germane to Chapter 32, the portion of the Code being amended, I believe that the caption complies in all respects with Section 35 of Article III. This same rule applies with equal logic and force to any suggestion that the caption was insufficient because it did not notify the reader of the details or the precise effects of the amendments to the bail and continuance provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Additionally, I believe that the caption of Senate Bill 1043 also complied with Section 35 of Article III because it notified a reader that it was an act “relating to a speedy trial of criminal cases.” To comply with the constitutional requirement that the subject of a bill “shall be expressed in its title”, the caption needs only to state the *704general subject of the legislation and not its details. Robinson v. Hill, 507 S.W.2d 521, 525 (Tex.1974). Furthermore, the constitutional provision and the questioned statute are to be liberally construed in favor of constitutionality. Id. at 524. However, the caption must be specific enough to “put any reasonable caption reader on notice that he will find new matter in the body of the bill.” Bates v. State, 587 S.W.2d 121, 128-29 (Tex.Cr.App.1979).3
I believe that any reasonable caption reader, whether a legislator or interested citizen, who was interested in legislation affecting the speedy trial of criminal cases, would have been put on notice that he would find new matter “relating to a speedy trial of criminal cases” in the body of Senate Bill 1043. A cursory reading of the body of the bill would have disclosed that the Act, with all its stringent effects, was being enacted as a part of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Surely, an average legislator or citizen would not have been given the impression from the caption that further reading of the body of the bill was unnecessary because it did not contain provisions relating to that subject.
My brethren believe that the caption was deficient because it failed to inform the reader of the stringent effects of the Act. To accept such a premise would be to require the caption to state the details of the Act and its precise effects. As previously noted, such is not required. See Robinson, 507 S.W.2d at 525. Furthermore, to require the caption to also notify the reader that the body of the bill made “substantial changes in our criminal laws”, including “a major change in the bail provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure,” would be to apply a different standard of compliance. As the Texas Supreme Court pointed out in Schlichting, “[t]he judicial rule under discussion cannot possibly mean that the amendment, to be valid, must contain nothing new and no change that is important.” Schlichting, 310 S.W.2d at 562. Logically, the purpose of an amendatory act is to make changes, both major and minor, in the existing law. Whether those changes are major, as in this case, is within the purview of the legislature and not the courts. Therefore, I consider the so-called deficiencies pointed out by my brethren as being immaterial to the question of whether the caption adequately stated the general subject of Senate Bill 1043 when it notified the reader that the bill was an act “relating to a speedy trial of criminal cases.” Accordingly, for all of the above reasons, I cannot agree with the holding that the caption of Senate Bill 1043 violates Section 35 of Article III of the Texas Constitution.

. The Act’s caption has also been described as suffering from "the exact malady diagnosed in Crisp." Noel v. State, — S.W.2d — No. 827-83 (Tex.Cr.App. March 14, 1984) (McCormick, J., dissenting) (pending on motion for rehearing).

. Lest this court unknowingly stray too far from this rule, the following decisions best illustrate the liberal construction to be accorded a caption and the constitutional requirement when the caption of an amendatory act specifies the chapter, article or section of the body of law being amended and the amendments are germane thereto: Walker, 116 S.W.2d at 1078 (holding that a caption reading, "An Act amending Article 802, Penal Code of Texas, 1925, as amended by Chapter 424, Acts of the First Called Session, Forty-fourth Legislature, and declaring an emergency", was sufficient), cited with approval in White, 440 S.W.2d at 665; Nichols v. State, 32 Tex.Crim. 391, 23 S.W. 680, 681 (1893) (on rehearing) (holding that a caption stating, "An act to amend article 528, chapter 7, title 15, of the Penal Code of the state of Texas, as amended by the act of the 20th legislature, approved February 25, 1887", was sufficient); State v. McCracken, 42 Tex. 383, 384 (1875) (holding that a caption reading, "An Act to amend an Act entitled ‘An Act to adopt and establish a Penal Code for the State of Texas, approved August 26, A.D. 1871”’, met the requirement of Section 35), quoted with approval in Gunter v. Texas Land & Mortg. Co., 82 Tex. 496, 17 S.W. 840, 843 (1891); Board of Water Engineers v. City of San Antonio, 155 Tex. 111, 283 S.W.2d 722, 727 n. 3 (1955).

. In his opinion on the State’s petition for discretionary review in Crisp, Judge Miller suggested that a caption must be specific enough "to give a reasonable reader fair notice of the subject and contents of the bill.” Crisp, 661 S.W.2d at 946 (citing Bates, 587 S.W.2d at 128-29). Furthermore, he suggested that a “useful way to apply the standard” is as follows:
"If [an average legislator or interested citizen] interested in legislation on a particular subject would be prompted by the title to examine the body of the bill for provisions relating to that subject, then the title is sufficient. But if he would be likely to get the impression from the title that further reading is unnecessary because the bill does not relate to that subject then the bill is unconstitutional to the extent that it deals with that subject.”
Crisp, 661 S.W.2d at 948 n. 3 (quoting City of Brownsville v. Public Utility Commission, 616 S.W.2d 402, 407 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.)). Without expressly adopting or disavowing Judge Miller’s statement of the test or his "useful way” of applying it, Judge Clinton, in his concurring opinion on petition for discretionary review, which was apparently adopted as the majority’s position in the opinion on the State’s motion for rehearing, recognized that the “central theme of the decisions is that the constitutional mandate under consideration ‘is to facilitate and protect the legislative process by affording legislators and other interested people a ready and reasonably accurate means of knowledge of the contents of bills without their having to read the full text.’" Crisp, 661 S.W.2d at 949 n. 4 (quoting White, 440 S.W.2d at 664).