Court Opinion

ID: 9555601
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-14 16:07:31.656385+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:37:05.056169
License: Public Domain

J-A14041-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 TIMOTHY MARKS                            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 SHANNA MARKS                             :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 2622 EDA 2022

            Appeal from the Decree Entered September 14, 2022
           In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County
                Civil Division at No(s): C-48-CV-2016-09322

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                        FILED AUGUST 14, 2023

      Shanna Marks (“Wife”) appeals pro se from the order issuing a final

decree divorcing her from Timothy Marks (“Husband”). We affirm.

      The trial court provided the factual and procedural history of this case,

which we set forth in relevant part, as follows:

            [Husband filed a Complaint in Divorce on October 26, 2016,
      seeking a divorce under, inter alia, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3301(d) and
      asserting, among other things, that “[t]he parties are not
      currently living as husband and wife, and will have lived separate
      and apart continuously for a period of at least two years at the
      time of the hearing of this matter . . . .” Complaint, 10/26/16, at
      ¶ 13.]

            [T]he parties litigated equitable distribution before the
      [Divorce] Master [on] October [15,] 2021[,] and the Master issued
      his report and recommendations on November 2, 2021.

           On November 19, 2021, [Wife] filed exceptions to the
      Master’s recommendations.

             On January 19, 2022, after review of the exceptions, [the
      trial court] issued [its] [o]rder disposing of [Wife’s] exceptions.
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      [The trial court] accepted the Master’s recommendations.
      Further, [the o]rder directed: “The parties will be divorced from
      their bonds of matrimony via a decree to be entered
      contemporaneously with this Order.” However, according to the
      docket[,] no final divorce order was entered contemporaneously
      with the January 19, 2022 Order.

                                    ****

            On September 14, 2022, the final [d]ivorce [decree] was
      presented to the [trial court] by Husband’s counsel[,] and [the
      court] signed the same . . ..

                                    ****

             On October 14, 2022, Wife filed a[ pro se] appeal [from] the
      [d]ivorce [d]ecree signed on September 14, 2022. Therefore, the
      final [d]ivorce [d]ecree . . . was placed before the Superior Court
      on [a]ppeal.

                                    ****

             [The trial court] directed [Wife] to file a Concise Statement
      of Matters Claimed of on Appeal as required by Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
      . . ..

            [The court] received a copy of [Wife’s pro se c]oncise
      [s]tatement on November 10, 2022. . . ..

Trial Court Opinion, 11/14/22, at 1-4 (paragraphs re-ordered for clarity). The

trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)

      Wife raises the following issues for our review:

         1. Whether the case was ripe for trial. Act 102 3301(d) the
            separation law changed from 2 years to 1-year effective
            November 4, 2016[?] [sic]

         2. Whether the conduct of [H]usband and [W]ife[,] after filing
            of the complaint[,] is sufficient to extend the date of
            separation beyond the date of the service of the
            complaint[?]

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          3. Whether the separation date has an effect on equitable
             distribution, support, apl, custody[sic][?]

          4. Whether the record was complete and accurate[?]

          5. Whether there was fraud in the court[?]

Wife’s Brief at 6.

       Our standard of review in divorce actions is well-settled:

       It is the responsibility of this Court to make a de novo evaluation
       of the record of the proceedings and to decide independently of
       the . . . lower court whether a legal cause of action in divorce
       exists. However, in determining issues of credibility, the lower
       court’s findings must be given the fullest consideration[,] for it
       was the lower court who observed and heard the testimony and
       demeanor of various witnesses.

Frey v. Frey, 821 A.2d 623, 627 (Pa. Super. 2003) (internal citations,

brackets, and quotations omitted).

       Initially, we observe that the argument section of Wife’s brief speaks

only to the issue of separation and whether the trial court’s ruling regarding

the date of separation was in error. See Wife’s Brief at 30. Wife’s remaining

issues are thus undeveloped and thereby waived. See Karn v. Quick & Reilly

Inc., 912 A.2d 329, 336 (Pa. Super. 2006) (providing that “[a]ppellate

arguments which fail to adhere to [the Rules of Appellate Procedure] may be

considered waived, and arguments which are not appropriately developed are

waived.    Arguments not appropriately developed include those where the

party has failed to cite any authority in support of a contention”).1

____________________________________________

1 Regarding pro se litigants, this Court has stated:

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       In her sole preserved appellate issue, Wife challenges the divorce decree

based on her assertion that the parties had not been separated for the

requisite amount of time. Section 3301(d) of the Divorce Code provides:

             (1) The court may grant a divorce where a complaint has
       been filed alleging that the marriage is irretrievably broken and
       an affidavit has been filed alleging that the parties have lived
       separate and apart for a period of at least one year and that the
       marriage is irretrievably broken and the defendant either:

              (i) Does not deny the allegations set forth in the affidavit.

             (ii) Denies one or more of the allegations set forth in the
       affidavit but, after notice and hearing, the court determines that
       the parties have lived separate and apart for a period of at least
       one year and that the marriage is irretrievably broken.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3301(d) (emphasis added).2

       The Divorce Code defines “separate and apart” as:            “Cessation of

cohabitation, whether living in the same residence or not.         In the event a

complaint in divorce is filed and served, it shall be presumed that the

____________________________________________

       While this court is willing to liberally construe materials filed by a
       pro se litigant, we note that appellant is not entitled to any
       particular advantage because [s]he lacks legal training. Further,
       any layperson choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding
       must, to some reasonable extent, assume the risk that his lack of
       expertise and legal training will prove his undoing.

Rich v. Acrivos, 815 A.2d 1106, 1108 (Pa. Super. 2003) (internal citations
and quotations omitted).

2 The prior version of the statute, effective up to December 4, 2016—thus, in

effect at the time Husband filed his complaint—required two years of
separation.

                                           -4-
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parties commenced to live separate and apart not later than the date

that the complaint was served.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3103 (emphasis added).

      Regarding cohabitation, this Court has explained:

      “[C]ohabitation” means “the mutual assumption of those rights
      and duties attendant to the relationship of husband and wife.”
      Thus, the gravamen of the phrase “separate and apart” becomes
      the existence of separate lives not separate roofs. This position
      follows the trend of Pennsylvania case law in which a common
      residence is not a bar to showing that the parties live separate
      and apart. The ties that bind two individuals in a marital
      relationship involve more than sexual intercourse.

Frey, 821 A.2d at 628 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

      As for the statutory presumption that the date of separation is the date

the divorce complaint was filed, this Court has articulated the presumption’s

function as follows:

      A presumption . . . is a procedural device which not only permits
      an inference of the presumed fact, but also shifts to the opposing
      party the burden of producing evidence to disprove the presumed
      fact. Failure to meet this burden of production will normally result
      in a decision . . . in favor of the party invoking the presumption.
      In short, the party attempting to rebut the presumption has the
      burden of proof.

McCoy v. McCoy, 888 A.2d 906, 912 (Pa. Super. 2005) (internal citations,

quotations, and brackets omitted).

      Wife contests the trial court’s finding that she and Husband lived

separate and apart for more than two years by the time of the evidentiary

hearing on October 15, 2021. Wife argues that the final separation occurred

only on August 27, 2021, “when husband abruptly, and forcefully, ceased

cohabitation with the wife. The husband subsequently terminated supporting

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the wife by; refinancing, canceling, and/or closing all accounts. Husband then

filed for emergency custody of the two children . . ..” Wife’s Brief at 30.

      The trial court considered this issue and concluded it was meritless.

According to the trial court, following the October 15, 2021 hearing before the

Divorce Master, the court on January 19, 2022 adopted the Master’s report.

See Trial Court Opinion, 11/14/22, at 2; see also Order, 1/19/22, at ¶ 11.

The trial court, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion again accepted the Divorce Master’s

report. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/14/22, at 5. The Divorce Master’s report

set forth his findings as follows:

            Before discussing the marital estate, it is necessary to
      address the date of separation. Wife contended that the parties
      had not been separated for one year and contended the parties
      had reconciled. . . ..

             The date of separation is presumed to be the date of the
      filing of the divorce complaint. This presumption “is a procedural
      device which not only permits an inference of the ‘presumed’ fact,
      but also shifts to the opposing party the burden of producing
      evidence to disprove the presumed fact.” [] McCoy, 888 A.2d [at
      912 . . ..

            There are no bright line rules whereby certain behavior
      establishes an intent to live separate and apart. Rather, all facts
      must be examined and weighted together. . . ..

             Applying Pennsylvania law to the facts presented in this
      case[,] it is clear that Wife failed to present sufficient evidence to
      establish that the parties had reconciled. The . . . parties made
      attempts to reconcile, discussed the withdrawal of the divorce
      complaint[;] Husband continued to financially support Wife, and
      the parties had sexual relations. Nevertheless, the testimony and
      evidence presented never clearly established that the parties had
      reconciled. On the contrary[,] all evidence showed that these
      efforts failed and despite the stop-and-go progress of the case, at
      no time did the parties actually resume life as husband and wife.

                                      -6-
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      Therefore, the undersigned finds the date of separation to be
      October 26, 2016.

Divorce Master’s Report, 11/2/21, at 2-3.

      Based on our review, we conclude Wife is due no relief. In addition to

the statutory presumption that the separation date is the date of the filing of

the complaint, Husband testified that, notwithstanding some reconciliation

attempts, the separation date was October 26, 2016, which was nearly five

years before the evidentiary hearing. See N.T., 10/15/21, at 20-21, 30. Wife,

during her testimony, did not offer any evidence to rebut the statutory

presumption that separation occurred as of the filing of the divorce complaint.

See N.T., 10/15/21, at 65-84. The most Wife established on this point was

during her cross-examination of Husband in which he conceded the two

continued to have sexual intercourse up to August 2021, though Husband also

testified to his belief that Wife was having a sexual relationship during the

same time with another man. See id. at 51. For the foregoing reasons, Wife’s

appellate issue merits no relief.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/14/2023

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