Court Opinion

ID: 9519999
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:29:00.777525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:45:25.565872
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Judge
(dissenting).
I dissent from Division I of the majority’s opinion which holds the victim’s telephonic declarations to be admissible under the “present sense impression” exception to the hearsay rule. I find United States v. Narciso, 446 F.Supp. 252 (E.D.Mich.1977), to be instructive wherein the court stated:
*222[underlying Rule 803(1) is the assumption that statements of perception substantially contemporaneous with an event are highly trustworthy because: (1) the statement being simultaneous with the event there is no memory problem; (2) there is little or no time for calculated misstatement; and (3) the statement is usually made to one who has equal opportunity to observe and check misstatements. (emphasis added)
446 F.Supp. at 288, quoting Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence, ¶ 803(1) [01] (1975).
While the Coleman case, cited by the majority, provides authority for the proposition that independent verification of the facts giving rise to the declarant’s impressions is not an absolute prerequisite to admissibility, the court concludes that: “[i]n view of the facts and corroborative testimony of the appellant [defendant], we can see no reason to alter that practice in this case.” 458 Pa. at 119, 326 A.2d at 390, 74 A.L.R.3d at 959 (emphasis supplied).
In the absence of corroborative testimony of one who has had an equal opportunity for observation or substantial corroborative evidence, I would consider the present sense impression testimony of the otherwise unavailable declarant to be inadmissible. The declarant’s testimony in this case does not meet either criterion and should not have been admitted. Therefore, I would reverse trial court’s judgment and remand this case for new trial.
SNELL, J., joins in this dissent.