Court Opinion

ID: 9493005
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:55:33.364673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:35.870047
License: Public Domain

BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge, specially concurring:
I join the judgment of the majority and its holding that under our decision in duPont v. Southern Nat’l Bank of Houston, Texas, 771 F.2d 874 (5th Cir.1985), Mr. Kuchera cannot recover his attorney ad litem fees as costs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d). duPont binds this panel to its holding. I nevertheless write separately to emphasize my conviction that we painted with too broad a brush in deciding duPont.
While duPont forecloses payment of Mr. Kuchera’s fees in his capacity as attorney, as opposed to guardian, ad litem pursuant to Rule 54(d), the court simultaneously revealed another possible avenue for compensating attorneys ad litem: “when an attorney ad litem acts to preserve a trust for the benefit of a minor, then his expenses, although not taxable as costs, can be recovered from the trust.” 771 F.2d at 883 (citing United States v. Equitable Trust Co., 283 U.S. 738, 51 S.Ct. 639, 75 L.Ed. 1379 (1931)). This rule is a well-established exception to “American Rule” that “absent statute or enforceable contract, litigants pay their own attorneys’ fees.” Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 257, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975). See id. (“[T]he 1853 [fee statute] was read as not interfering with the historic power of equity to permit the trustee of a fund ..., or a party preserving or recovering a fund for the benefit of others ..., to recover his costs, including his attorneys’ fees, from the fund ... itself[.]”). I believe that American General’s deposit of the funds into the district court’s registry, under the circumstances (where American General made no claims to the funds as such and whereby it relieved itself of potential liability for payment of the funds to the improper party) is sufficiently analogous to a settler’s contribution of funds to a trust to warrant application of this rule. Mr. Kuchera acted to preserve the interpleader funds for the benefit of the Gibbs children, and he may therefore be able to recover his fees from the insurance proceeds.
Unfortunately, here, the district court did not award fees against the fund on the basis of this theory, but instead pursuant to Rule 54(d). I would remand for consid*509eration of attorneys fees also under this alternative theory described in duPont.
Texas law, which provides for payment of ad litem fees by the prevailing party, see Tex.R. Civ. Proc. 141 (permitting an assessment of costs against a prevailing party for good cause shown on the record), articulates the compelling rationale for du-Pont’s alternative theory: “those who accept ad litem appointments should be reasonably sure of receiving a fee for their services.” Dover Elevator Co. v. Servellon, 876 S.W.2d 166, 171 (Tex.Civ.App.1998, no writ); see also Cahill v. Lyda, 826 S.W.2d 932, 933 (Tex.1992). Quite logically, without such assurances, courts might find themselves unable to obtain necessary representation for minors in court.1 Indeed, securing needed representation of minors is so important in Texas that the designation of the representative as “guardian ad litem” or “attorney ad litem” has little bearing on the recovery of attorneys’ fees: “the paramount concern is not the technical designation of the representative but the protection of the minor’s interest.” Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Welch, 702 S.W.2d 672, 674 (Tex.Civ.App. 1985, no writ).2 In my view, to the extent that duPont precludes payment of Mr. Kuchera’s fees pursuant to Rule 54(d), the reasoning of the Texas courts persuasively explains why such an outcome is undesirable.
I take some heart from our decision today to sanction the district court’s consideration of the availability of attorneys’ fees under Texas law, to be paid' either out of the insurance proceeds or by Carolyn Gibbs or American General. I remain convinced that an attorney, who in good faith and with good cause, undertakes an obligation imposed upon him by the district court both to protect the interests of minors and to file pleadings on their behalf, and who undisputably discharges this obligation in a faithful and responsible manner should not be abandoned by the system that has required and made use of his services. This is not to say that all attorneys’ fees incurred in connection with ad litem representation would be compensated merely because the attorney initiated some legal action. Certainly, unreasonable or bad faith efforts on behalf of the client should not result in compensation.
Here, however, the facts of the case indicated the complicity of a party, Carolyn Gibbs, in a criminal offense, and the district court found that Carolyn Gibbs more likely than not participated, in some manner, in Joel Gibbs’ death. In these circumstances, a reasonable attorney, consistent with his duties imposed on him by virtue of his appointment by the court, should have sought to recover the insurance funds for the Gibbs children, as Mr. Kuchera did. Far from “rolling the dice” and “gambling” on recovery, Mr. Kuch-era’s decision to intervene was virtually dictated by the facts themselves; he acted in a measured and reasonable manner, which was calculated to protect the best interests of the Gibbs children.3 His rea*510sonable and good faith efforts in this regard should not go uncompensated.
With these comments, I join the judgment of this court remanding Mr. Kueh-era’s claim for attorneys’ fees for further consideration by the district court and join the court’s opinion with respect to its resolution of American General’s claim for attorneys’ fees.

. In fact, the Supreme Court cites a similar explanation for the historic rule of equity permitting a trustee litigating on behalf of a fund to recover his attorneys' fees from the trust: " 'Such a rule of practice,’ it has been said, 'is absolutely essential to the safety and security of a large number or persons who are entitled to the protection of the law-indeed, stand most in need of it-but who are incompetent ... to ask for protection or redress.’ ” Equitable Trust, 283 U.S. at 744, 51 S.Ct. 639 (quoting Voorhees v. Polhemus, 36 N.J.Eq. 456, 458 (1883)).

. Significantly, Texas state courts routinely use "guardian ad litem" and "attorney ad litem” interchangeably. See Estate of Catlin, 936 S.W.2d 447, 452 (Tex.App.-Houston (14th Dist.) 1996, no writ) ("The attorney ad litem in this case was appointed pursuant to rule 173 which provides [for the appointment of a guardian ad litem.]”); Strawder v. Thomas, 846 S.W.2d 51, 64 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ) ("[C]ompensation to be paid to the guardian ad litem (attorney ad litem) shall be fixed by the court[.]”).

.In fact, had he not intervened on behalf of the Gibbs children, he would have exposed himself to a potential malpractice suit that either of the Gibbs children could have brought upon attaining the age of majority. *510See, e.g., Byrd v. Woodruff, 891 S.W.2d 689, 708 (Tex.App.Dallas 1994, no writ) (“We hold that the guardian ad litem ... can be liable in a civil action for damages resulting from a breach of his duties as a personal representative for the minor.”).