Court Opinion

ID: 9953535
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 14:19:11.076969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:39.883627
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 15, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2023-CA-0402-MR

LLOYD JACKSON STEVENSON                                               APPELLANT

                  APPEAL FROM LOGAN CIRCUIT COURT
v.              HONORABLE JOE W. HENDRICKS, JR., JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 22-CR-00153

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: GOODWINE, KAREM, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

MCNEILL, JUDGE: In 2022, Appellant, Lloyd Stevenson (Stevenson), was

indicted by a Logan County grand jury for first-degree sexual assault of a minor

under sixteen years of age, and for being a first-degree persistent felony offender

(PFO-1). With the advice of counsel, Stevenson pleaded guilty to the sexual

assault charge and an amended charge of PFO-2. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.

238 (1969). As a result, he agreed to serve a five-year prison sentence, enhanced

to eight years. Stevenson retained new counsel and filed a motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. He then filed a motion to withdraw the previous motion to withdraw,

and to enter an Alford plea. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).

The circuit court addressed this pending motion at the final sentencing hearing, and

specifically inquired whether there were any remaining issues. The parties

articulated their desire to proceed, and the court sentenced Stevenson in

accordance with his plea agreement. He appeals to this Court as a matter of right,

on the basis that his plea was invalid. For the following reasons, we affirm.

             When determining whether a guilty plea was entered
             knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, trial courts
             must consider the totality of the circumstances. This
             inquiry is inherently fact-sensitive and we review for
             clear error.

Commonwealth v. Patton, 539 S.W.3d 651, 653 (Ky. 2018) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted).

             If, however, the trial court determines that the guilty plea
             was entered voluntarily, then it may grant or deny the
             motion to withdraw the plea at its discretion.
             This decision is reviewed under the abuse of discretion
             standard. A trial court abuses its discretion when it
             renders a decision which is arbitrary, unreasonable,
             unfair, or unsupported by legal principles.

Rigdon v. Commonwealth,144 S.W.3d 283, 288 (Ky. App. 2004) (footnotes

omitted).

             In support of his argument on appeal, Stevenson asserts that he did not

believe that his sentence would be subject to the PFO enhancement and, therefore,

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that he would be parole eligible after serving twenty percent of a five-year term,

instead of an eight-year term. See Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d 558,

567 (Ky. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“A defendant’s eligibility for

parole is not a direct consequence of a guilty plea the ignorance of which would

render the plea involuntary.”). Stevenson further asserts that, because it is alleged

that the plea was entered involuntarily, that a hearing on his motion to withdraw

was required. See Williams v. Commonwealth, 229 S.W.3d 49, 51 (Ky. 2007).

             Having reviewed the arguments and record presented, Stevenson’s

specific assertions either lack adequate preservation, or are otherwise unpersuasive.

More precisely, the court engaged Stevenson during the plea colloquy concerning

the specific matters with which he now takes issue. The court also reminded

Stevenson that his sentence was ineligible for probation. Stevenson’s responses

indicate that he understood and lawfully consented to the plea. And he was

permitted to obtain conflict counsel to challenge his plea. Instead, all parties

agreed to move forward with sentencing. Therefore, a hearing on the motion to

withdraw would have been either moot or futile. In consideration of the totality of

the circumstances, we cannot conclude that the circuit court committed clear error,

or that it ultimately abused its discretion. Therefore, we AFFIRM.

             ALL CONCUR.

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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:    BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Erin Hoffman Yang       Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky     Attorney General of Kentucky

                        Matthew F. Kuhn
                        Rachel A. Wright
                        Assistant Attorneys General
                        Frankfort, Kentucky

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