Court Opinion

ID: 9965882
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-03 17:09:33.423247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:49.382028
License: Public Domain

J-S02007-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  QUADIR JEFFRIES                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1719 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 24, 2020
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-51-CR-0005829-2014

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  QUADIR JEFFRIES                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2496 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 24, 2020
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-51-CR-0005830-2014

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.:                               FILED MAY 3, 2024

       Quadir Jeffries appeals from the order, entered in the Court of Common

Pleas of Philadelphia County, dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. After careful review,

we affirm.

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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      This Court previously adopted the trial court’s factual summary of these

cases as follows:

      In early January[ ]2014, [R.M.,] was working as a pizza delivery
      driver[,] was driving his vehicle when he noticed a woman, later
      identified as Kimberly Cook, walking down the street near 54th
      Street and Lansdown[e] Avenue in Philadelphia. R.M. honked his
      horn at Cook and pulled over his vehicle to talk with her, hoping
      to exchange phone numbers and meet with her later. At this time,
      Cook identified herself as “Zah.” While [R.M.] and Cook were
      talking and exchanging phone numbers, Cook noticed that [R.M.]
      had an amount of U.S. currency on the passenger side floor of his
      vehicle.

      After meeting [R.M.], Cook told her boyfriend, co-defendant
      Hakim Blatch, about the meeting and ask[ed] Blatch to rob [R.M.]
      Blatch agreed and arranged to have co-defendants [Jeffries] and
      Alonzo Wallace aid in the robbery. The plan was for Cook to
      accompany [R.M.] to his house, while Blatch, Wallace, and
      [Jeffries] followed in a separate car. Cook would then open the
      door for Blatch, Wallace, and [Jeffries] to enter and rob [R.M.]

      On January 18, 2014, Cook called [R.M.] under the false pretense
      of meeting [R.M.] to have sex. Cook arranged for [R.M.] to pick
      her up near 56th Street and Lansdown[e] Avenue later that
      evening. Cook, Blatch, Wallace, and [Jeffries] then headed to 56th
      Street and Lansdown[e] Avenue in [Jeffries’] car. Also with them
      was Cook’s friend, Crystal Collins. Cook wished to have Collins
      present with her, as Cook did not know [R.M.] and was nervous
      about meeting him alone. Blatch, [Jeffries], and Wallace waited
      in [Jeffries’] car around the corner from where [R.M.] was
      waiting[,] while Cook and Collins exited the vehicle and met with
      [R.M.]

      [R.M.] arrived at the corner of 56th Street and Lansdown[e]
      Ave[nue] and waited for approximately 45 minutes before Cook
      arrived, accompanied by Collins. [R.M.] had both women get into
      his car and drove to his apartment on the 4200 block of North 7th
      Street in Philadelphia. While [R.M.] was driving, Cook was texting
      Blatch, providing directions as to where [R.M.] was driving and
      the address at which they stopped.

                                    -2-
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     Upon arriving at [R.M.]’s apartment, [R.M.], Cook, and Collins
     went inside and had a conversation about sex. While they were
     talking, Blatch, [Jeffries], and Wallace arrived at [R.M.’s]
     apartment, finding the outside door locked, and Blatch texted
     Cook to tell her to open the door. At this time, Cook asked if she
     could go outside to smoke a cigarette, and [R.M.] gave her the
     keys to his car, telling her that he had a lighter inside of it. Cook
     then went downstairs and opened the door for [Jeffries] and
     Wallace to enter the building and directed them to [R.M.]’s
     bedroom. [Jeffries] and Wallace entered the building and went
     upstairs while Cook went to the street corner, throwing away
     [R.M.’s] keys, where she was later joined by Collins. As Collins
     left the building, Blatch entered.

     After letting Cook out of the apartment and watching her go down
     the steps, [R.M.] closed his door, only to reopen it and see men
     rushing up the steps. [R.M.] attempted to close his door, but
     [Jeffries] and Wallace kicked the door in, forcing [R.M.] to the
     ground. While [R.M.] was on the ground, [Jeffries] and Wallace
     pistol whipped him with handguns while demanding that [R.M.]
     tell them where the money was[] and threatening to shoot him.
     Blatch joined [Jeffries] and Wallace while they were beating [R.M.]
     The assailants rummaged through [R.M.’s] room looking for
     cash[] and found a cookie tin with marijuana and cash. They
     failed to find th[e] large sum of cash that was in [R.M.’s] pocket.

     [M.S.], who lived in the apartment across from [R.M.], heard the
     commotion and opened his door to see what was happening.
     [M.S.] saw two men standing in [R.M.’s] broken doorway.
     Wallace, noticing [M.S.] open the door, turned towards [M.S.] and
     shot at him. Closing the door as Wallace turned, [M.S.] ducked
     and was shot through the door, with the bullet striking his left
     arm. Had [M.S.] not ducked, the bullet would have struck [M.S.’s]
     heart. As the three robbers left the apartment building, [Jeffries]
     fired a shot at a security camera inside the front door.

     Hearing the assailants leave, [R.M.] checked on [M.S.] while
     [M.S.] called the police. Police responded and were let into the
     house by [R.M.] [M.S.] and [R.M.] were transported to Temple
     University Hospital for medical treatment.

     Police recovered one [nine-millimeter] fired cartridge case and
     one [40 caliber] fired cartridge case from the first-floor hallway of
     the home. Police also recovered the video tapes of the home

                                     -3-
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     surveillance system that covered the front entryway into the
     building. The inside camera appeared to be damaged by a
     gunshot. After his release from the hospital, [M.S.] found the [40
     caliber] bullet that had struck him in his room and gave that bullet
     to the landlord, who turned it over to police.

     Later [on the night of the shooting], Blatch, Cook, Collins, Wallace,
     and [Jeffries] all met at a speakeasy on Jackson and Taney
     Streets. While the group was together, they discussed Wallace
     shooting [M.S.] and [Jeffries] shooting out the camera. At this
     time, Blatch stated that Wallace and [Jeffries] had already pistol-
     whipped [R.M.] by the time Blatch got upstairs. [Jeffries] gave
     Collins some money at the speakeasy while Blatch gave Cook
     some marijuana.

     Police provided the media with a copy of the surveillance video, in
     an effort to get public help in identifying the robbers. Deputy
     Sheriff Martin Samuels, who knew both Blatch and [Jeffries] from
     his time patrolling the area, watched the video of the assault and
     identified Blatch and [Jeffries] as two of the perpetrators. Police
     also conducted an analysis of the phone [R.M.] had used to
     contact Cook, and from that, were able to identify Cook as a
     suspect in the case. Police put Cook’s photo in a photo array and
     showed it to [R.M.], who identified Cook as the person he stopped
     on the street and who set him up for the robbery.

     [Jeffries] was arrested on February 23, 2014. Police made several
     efforts to locate Blatch and Cook in February and March 2014, but
     were unable to locate them. Blatch and Cook were arrested on
     June 4, 2014. Wallace was arrested on June 11, 2014. After her
     arrest, Cook provided a statement to police, detailing her
     involvement in the robbery. Cook also identified Blatch, Wallace,
     and [Jeffries] to police. A cell tower analysis of the location of
     Blatch’s cell phone on the night of the robbery corroborated Cook’s
     statement to the police regarding the events surrounding the
     robbery.

Commonwealth v. Jeffries, 169 A.3d 1157 (Pa. Super. 2017) (Table).

     The Commonwealth charged Jeffries at Docket Number CP-51-CR-

0005829-2014 (No. 5829) with crimes against M.S., including attempted

                                     -4-
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murder,1 aggravated assault,2 criminal conspiracy,3 and firearms not to be

carried without a license.4 At Docket Number CP-51-CR-0005830-2014 (No.

5830), the Commonwealth charged Jeffries with crimes committed against

R.M., including aggravated assault,5 robbery,6 and burglary.7

       On December 10, 2015, following a consolidated jury trial, Jeffries was

convicted of the above-mentioned offenses and found not guilty of attempted

murder. The trial court deferred sentencing and ordered the preparation of a

pre-sentence investigation report.             On February 17, 2016, the trial court

conducted a sentencing hearing and sentenced Jeffries to an aggregate

sentence of 20 to 40 years in prison. Jeffries filed a timely notice of appeal,

and, on April 12, 2017, this Court affirmed Jeffries’ judgments of sentence.

See Jeffries, supra.

       On March 13, 2018, Jeffries filed a pro se PCRA petition, his first, at both

docket numbers. Subsequently, Jeffries retained Teri Himebaugh, Esquire,

who entered her appearance on Jeffries’ behalf.             On September 11, 2019,

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a).

2 Id. at § 2702(a)(1).

3 Id. at § 903.

4 Id. at § 6106(a)(1).

5 Id. at § 2702(a)(1).

6 Id. at § 3701(a)(1)(ii).

7 Id. at § 3502(a)(1).

                                           -5-
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Attorney Himebaugh filed an amended PCRA petition. On March 5, 2020, the

PCRA court issued notice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 of its intent to dismiss

Jeffries’ petition without a hearing. On April 9, 2020, Jeffries filed a pro se

response to the Rule 907 notice. On April 20, 2020, Attorney Himebaugh filed

a motion to withdraw. On July 24, 2020, the PCRA court granted Attorney

Himebaugh’s motion to withdraw, and dismissed Jeffries’ PCRA petition.

       On July 30, 2020, the PCRA court appointed James F. Berardinelli,

Esquire, to represent Jeffries on appeal.        On August 17, 2020, Attorney

Berardinelli filed a notice of appeal to this Court. On October 30, 2020, Jeffries

filed a pro se application for relief with this Court, in which he requested to

proceed pro se on appeal. Subsequently, on November 23, 2020, Attorney

Berardinelli filed a motion to withdraw in this Court. On that same day, this

Court remanded the matter to the PCRA court to conduct a Grazier8 hearing.

On December 15, 2020, this Court granted Attorney Berardinelli’s motion to

withdraw.

       On December 28, 2020, the PCRA court conducted a Grazier hearing

and determined that Jeffries’ waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent, and

voluntary. This Court then issued a briefing schedule on January 5, 2021.

However, Jeffries failed to file a brief, and this Court dismissed Jeffries’ appeals

on March 23, 2021.

____________________________________________

8 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).

                                           -6-
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      On March 29, 2021, Dennis Turner, Esquire, entered his appearance on

Jeffries’ behalf.   On November 29, 2021, Attorney Turner filed, at both

dockets, a PCRA petition, Jeffries’ second, alleging that Jeffries was in

administrative custody at SCI Forest when this Court issued its January 5,

2021 briefing schedule.     Jeffries argued that, as a result of being in

administrative custody, he was unable to access the prison library and, thus,

was unable to comply with this Court’s briefing schedule. On March 17, 2022,

the Commonwealth filed a response and agreed that an evidentiary hearing

was necessary.

      On June 3, 2022, the PCRA court conducted an evidentiary hearing. At

this hearing, evidence was presented that this Court’s briefing schedule was

sent to the wrong prison address. See PCRA Court Opinion, 8/22/22, at 2-3.

At the conclusion of the PCRA hearing, the PCRA court granted Jeffries’ second

PCRA petition and reinstated his right to appeal nunc pro tunc, at both

dockets, from the PCRA court’s July 24, 2020 order dismissing his first PCRA

petition.

      On July 3, 2022, Attorney Turner filed a notice of appeal, nunc pro tunc,

at No. 5829, in which he purported to appeal from the June 3, 2022 order

reinstating Jeffries’ direct appeal rights. Subsequently, on August 1, 2022,

Attorney Turner filed a motion to withdraw.

      On August 15, 2022, Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire, entered his appearance

on Jeffries’ behalf. Attorney Goldstein filed, in this Court, an application to

remand the appeal at No. 5829, in which he requested permission to fix

                                     -7-
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Attorney Turner’s error in the nunc pro tunc notice of appeal, and to file an

amended notice of appeal correctly stating that Jeffries was appealing from

the July 24, 2020 order dismissing his first PCRA petition. This Court granted

Attorney Goldstein’s request and remanded for a corrected notice of appeal.

       On remand, Attorney Goldstein filed a PCRA petition at No. 5830, in the

PCRA court, in which he requested that he be allowed to file another nunc pro

tunc notice of appeal from the July 24, 2020 order dismissing the first PCRA

petition at No. 5830. Attorney Goldstein argued that Attorney Turner had

erroneously failed to appeal at No. 5830, and that Attorney Turner’s failure

amounted to per se ineffective assistance of counsel. The PCRA court granted

Attorney Goldstein’s PCRA petition and reinstated Jeffries’ appellate rights at

No. 5830, nunc pro tunc. Subsequently, Attorney Goldstein filed a corrected

nunc pro tunc notice of appeal at No. 5829, and a nunc pro tunc notice of

appeal at No. 5830. On November 9, 2022, this Court sua sponte consolidated

Jeffries’ appeals. See Pa.R.A.P. 513.

       Both Jeffries and the PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.9

Jeffries now raises the following claims for our review:

____________________________________________

9  On November 20, 2020, the PCRA court prepared its first Rule 1925(a)
opinion when it originally dismissed Jeffries’ first petition, a second Rule
1925(a) opinion on August 22, 2022 in response to Jeffries’ second petition,
and a third Rule 1925(a) opinion on January 30, 2023, addressing Jeffries’
claims from the prior PCRA petitions for the instant nunc pro tunc appeals. In
its January 30, 2023 Rule 1925(a) opinion, the PCRA court incorporated its
prior 1925(a) opinions. See PCRA Court Opinion, 1/30/23, at 1-24; PCRA
Court Opinion, 8/22/22, at 1-3; PCRA Court Opinion, 11/20/20, at 1-12.

                                           -8-
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      1. Whether PCRA counsel and trial counsel failed to properly
      challenge the warrantless search of [Jeffries’] cell phone where
      the police seized the phone, called the phone[’s] number, and
      then looked at the phone’s screen before obtaining a search
      warrant?

      2. Whether [Jeffries] received [] ineffective assistance of counsel
      when trial counsel failed to object as the prosecutor argued in
      closing that he had thoroughly investigated the case and could
      personally vouch for the most important witness’s credibility?

      3. Whether trial counsel should have objected when the trial court
      failed to instruct the jury that it was required to reach a
      unanimous decision with respect to the object of the alleged
      conspiracy?

      4. Whether trial counsel erred in failing to call defense witnesses
      who would have impeached the credibility of one of the
      Commonwealth’s critical identification witnesses?

      5. Whether the Commonwealth committed a Brady violation
      requiring a new trial where the Commonwealth failed to disclose
      that the witness had been promised a time served sentence and[,]
      instead[,] argued that she could receive a sentence of up to 100
      years?

Brief for Appellant, at 8.

      When reviewing the [dismissal] of a PCRA petition, our scope of
      review is limited by the parameters of the [PCRA]. Our standard
      of review permits us to consider only whether the PCRA court’s
      determination is supported by the evidence of record and whether
      it is free from legal error. Moreover, in general[,] we may affirm
      the decision of the [PCRA] court if there is any basis on the record
      to support the [PCRA] court’s action; this is so even if we rely on
      a different basis in our decision to affirm.

Commonwealth v. Heilman, 867 A.2d 542, 544 (Pa. Super. 2005)

(quotations and citations omitted).

      Where a petitioner challenges the PCRA court’s decision to deny a

request for an evidentiary hearing, “[a] reviewing court on appeal must

                                      -9-
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examine each of the issues raised . . . in light of the record to determine

whether the PCRA court erred in concluding that there were no genuine issues

of material fact and denying relief without an evidentiary hearing.”

Commonwealth v. duPont, 860 A.2d 525, 530 (Pa. Super. 2004). “[T]here

is no absolute right to an evidentiary hearing on a PCRA petition, and if the

PCRA court can determine from the record that no genuine issues of material

fact exist, then a hearing is not necessary.” Commonwealth v. Springer,

961 A.2d 1262, 1264 (Pa. Super. 2008) (quotation marks and citation

omitted).

      In his first four claims, Jeffries challenges the effectiveness of his

counsel. Generally, counsel is presumed to be effective and “the burden of

demonstrating ineffectiveness rests on [the] appellant.” Commonwealth v.

Rivera, 10 A.3d 1276, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2010).

      To satisfy this burden, an appellant must plead and prove by a
      preponderance of the evidence that[:] (1) his underlying claim is
      of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of conduct pursued by
      counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed to effectuate
      his interests; and, (3) but for counsel’s ineffectiveness there is a
      reasonable probability that the outcome of the challenged
      proceeding would have been different. Failure to satisfy any prong
      of the test will result in rejection of the appellant’s ineffective
      assistance of counsel claim.

Commonwealth v. Holt, 175 A.3d 1014, 1018 (Pa. Super. 2017) (internal

citations omitted).

      In his first claim, Jeffries argues that prior PCRA counsel rendered

ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to challenge trial counsel’s

ineffectiveness where trial counsel failed to file a motion to suppress Jeffries’

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phone, found during a search of his home, based upon the purported

testimony of his minor brother, R.H.B.10 See Brief for Appellant, at 18-26.

Jeffries contends that R.H.B. was home when police executed an unrelated

search warrant on Jeffries’ home.11 See id. at 21-26. Jeffries asserts that

R.H.B. was playing with Jeffries’ phone when police ordered R.H.B. to give

them the phone, and that the police did not have a warrant for Jeffries’ phone.

See id. at 24-25. Jeffries posits that his prior counsel rendered ineffective

assistance for failing to pursue a motion to suppress the contents of the phone.

See id. In support of his contention, Jeffries argues that there is arguable

merit to a motion to suppress his phone because it was obtained without a

warrant, and that police conducted a “search” of his phone when they called

the phone number and looked at the screen of his phone. See id. (citing

Commonwealth v. Fulton, 179 A.3d 475, 487 (Pa. 2018) (“any search of a

cell phone requires a warrant”)). Jeffries further contends that prior PCRA

counsel lacked a reasonable basis for failing to raise this claim because the

United States Supreme Court had already decided Riley v. California and

____________________________________________

10 In his first claim, Jeffries presents a layered claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel, which he raises for the first time on appeal. See Commonwealth
v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381, 405 (Pa. 2021) (allowing PCRA petitioner to raise
claims of ineffective PCRA counsel at the first opportunity to do so, even if on
appeal).

11It is undisputed that police were executing a search warrant on Jeffries’
home for an unrelated investigation.

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United States v. Wurie, 574 U.S. 373 (2014).12 See Brief for Appellant, at

24-25. Jeffries argues that he, therefore, suffered prejudice and is entitled to

a new trial or, in the alternative, a PCRA evidentiary hearing for the PCRA

court to assess R.H.B.’s credibility. See id. at 25-26. We disagree.

       Where ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal is asserted, to prove

prejudice, the appellant must show that there is a reasonable probability that

the outcome of the appeal would have been different but for counsel’s deficient

performance.      See Commonwealth v. Staton, 120 A.3d 277, 295 (Pa.

2015). Our Supreme Court has held that remand for an evidentiary hearing

is unnecessary where an appellant fails to satisfy all three prongs of the

ineffective assistance of counsel test. See Commonwealth v. Spotz, 870

A.2d 822, 833 (Pa. 2005).

       Jeffries’ first claim is predicated on trial counsel’s failure to find,

investigate, and call Jeffries’ brother, R.H.B., as a witness. It is well settled

that a PCRA petitioner cannot prevail on a claim of trial counsel’s

ineffectiveness for failure to call a witness unless the petitioner shows that:

       (1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available to testify
       for the defense; (3) counsel knew or, or should have known of,
       the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing to testify
       for the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony of the
       witness was so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a fair
       trial.

____________________________________________

12 In Riley/Wurie the United States Supreme Court held that warrantless
seizures of cell phones may be permissible as a result of a search incident to
arrest, but the subsequent search of a cell phone is unconstitutional without
a warrant. See id. at 386-87.

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Commonwealth v. Washington, 927 A.2d 586, 599 (Pa. 2007). To satisfy

the prejudice prong of this analysis, a PCRA petitioner “must show how the

uncalled witnesses’ testimony would have been beneficial under the

circumstances of the case.”    Commonwealth v. Gibson, 951 A.2d 1110,

1134 (Pa. 2008) (citations omitted).

      We further observe that we must remand for an evidentiary hearing “in

cases where the PCRA court declined to hold a hearing, and where an

assessment of witness testimony was essential to a petitioner’s ineffectiveness

claims[.]” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 540 (Pa. 2009). This

is so that the PCRA court can observe the witness and make credibility

determinations based upon the live testimony of the witness. See id. at 539

(noting “one of the primary reasons PCRA hearings are held in the first place

is so that credibility determinations can be made; otherwise, issues of material

fact could be decided on pleadings and affidavits alone”).

      Instantly, the verified statement, appended to Jeffries’ response to the

Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss, states as follows:

      My name is [R.H.B.] I am [] Jeffries[’] younger brother. I
      remember the day that the police came into my house. My
      brother was already in police custody. I was 8 years old and had
      just come home from school. I got home before my mom did[,]
      so I was alone.

      I heard banging on the door so I [] peek[ed] through the pee[p]
      hole, then [went] upstairs to my room and called my mom[.]
      Then[,] right after that[,] I heard banging, voices[,] and moving
      something[] downstairs. I was really scared.

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      [] I called my mom using [m]y brother’s cell phone. When the
      police came into my house they came up the stairs and found me
      in my room. I was crying and talking on the phone to my mom.
       The police officer was yelling at me to tell him who was on the
      phone. I think my mom could hear what the police were yelling
      at me. I was ordered to hang up the phone by police[,] so I did.

      They took me out of the bedroom[ and] downstairs to the living
      room. One of the police used his phone to dial my brother’s phone
      number. The phone I had been on [] rang once. The[ police]
      asked for the pass[]code. They were police so I did what they
      said[,] but I accidentally gave them the wrong passcode. I was
      very frightened and I mixed up the pass[]code. I saw the officer
      playing with the phone trying the numbers I had given him. That’s
      when I gave police [the correct passcode to Jeffries’] phone[.]

      [Jeffries’ trial attorney] never spoke to me before [his] trial. Even
      though I was young[,] I would have been willing to testify if I was
      asked to. I am still willing and available to testify at any hearing
      that may be held in this case.

Revised Verified Affidavit of R.H.B., 2/4/20, at 1-2.

      In its opinion, the PCRA court concluded that Jeffries had failed to

establish the prejudice prong. See PCRA Court Opinion, 1/30/23, at 14-16;

PCRA Court Opinion, 11/20/20, at 9-11.          In particular, the PCRA court

concluded that even if trial counsel had successfully challenged and

suppressed Jeffries’ phone, it would not have changed the outcome at trial.

See PCRA Court Opinion, 1/30/23, at 12-16. After review of the record, we

agree.

                                     - 14 -
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       At trial,13 the Commonwealth presented R.M.’s testimony of the

incident, and he identified Cook as the woman he saw on the street when he

was delivering pizzas. See N.T. Jury Trial (Day 1), 12/3/15, at 201-02. R.M.

testified that he “hollered” at Cook because he “liked the way her back was.”

Id. at 202-03. R.M. and Cook exchanged contact information and agreed to

meet up for sex. Id. at 202-06 (R.M. testifying Cook texted him four days

later to “hook up”). Cook and R.M. met and, as the evening progressed, Cook

asked if she could go outside to smoke. See id. at 206-20 (R.M. detailing

evening’s events). R.M. testified that shortly after Cook exited the apartment,

several men ran up the stairs and into his apartment. See id. at 220. The

men began to assault R.M. and demanded money. See id. at 220-23. R.M.

then identified Jeffries, in court, as one of the men who attacked him. See

id. at 222-23.

       Further, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Cook, who

acknowledged that she engaged in a conspiracy with Jeffries and Blatch to rob

R.M. See N.T. Jury Trial (Day 3), 12/7/15, at 57-136 (Cook testifying on

direct examination about nature of conspiracy and agreement between Cook,

Jeffries, Blatch, and Wallace to rob R.M.).

       Based upon the foregoing, we agree with the PCRA court that the above

evidence was so overwhelming that Jeffries cannot establish prejudice for his

____________________________________________

13 We provide only a shortened version of the facts here, as we accepted the

PCRA court’s detailed summary above.

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claim that trial counsel should have suppressed his phone records. See Holt,

supra. Assuming arguendo that R.H.B.’s purported testimony would be found

credible,   the   foregoing evidence      presented at Jeffries’ trial was   so

overwhelming that suppression of the phone records would not have changed

the outcome of the trial. Therefore, the PCRA court did not err in dismissing

Jeffries’ PCRA petition without an evidentiary hearing, and, accordingly, we

grant Jeffries no relief on this claim.

      In his second claim, Jeffries raises a layered ineffectiveness claim that

his prior PCRA counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to preserve

his claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by

failing to object to the prosecutor’s closing argument. See Brief for Appellant,

at 26-31. Jeffries argues that the prosecutor vouched for Cook’s credibility

and honesty by continuously stating that he had personally verified the

information Cook provided to the Commonwealth.          See id. at 28. Jeffries

asserts that the prosecutor’s statements constituted impermissible witness

bolstering. See id. at 28-31. Jeffries contends that a prosecutor is “generally

considered a trustworthy figure by jurors” and that trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance by allowing the prosecutor to lend his trustworthiness

to Cook’s testimony. Id. at 30. We disagree.

      Our standard of review for a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is
      limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion. In
      considering this claim, our attention is focused on whether the
      defendant was deprived of a fair trial, not a perfect one. Not every
      inappropriate remark by a prosecutor constitutes reversible error.
      A prosecutor’s statements to a jury do not occur in a vacuum, and

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      we must view them in context. Even if a prosecutor’s arguments
      are improper, they generally will not form the basis for a new trial
      unless the comments unavoidably prejudiced the jury and
      prevented a true verdict.

Commonwealth v. Bedford, 50 A.3d 707, 715-16 (Pa. Super. 2012)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Additionally, “[a] prosecutor

is free to present his argument with logical force and vigor so long as there is

a reasonable basis in the record[.]” Commonwealth v. Reid, 99 A.3d 470,

507 (Pa. 2014).

      Further,    “[i]n   determining   whether    the   prosecutor   engaged   in

misconduct, we must keep in mind that comments made by a prosecutor must

be examined within the context of defense counsel’s conduct. It is well settled

that the prosecutor may fairly respond to points made in the defense[’s]

closing.”   Commonwealth v. Judy, 978 A.2d 1015, 1019-20 (Pa. Super.

2009) (quotations and citations omitted).

      “Vouching” is a “form of prosecutorial misconduct occurring when a

prosecutor ‘places the government’s prestige behind a witness through

personal assurances as to the witness’s truthfulness, and when it suggests

that information not before the jury supports the witness’s testimony.’”

Commonwealth v. Ramos, 231 A.3d 955, 959 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citations

omitted). “Improper bolstering or vouching for a government witness occurs

where the prosecutor assures the jury that the witness is credible, and such

assurance is based on either the prosecutor’s personal knowledge or other

information not contained in the record.”        Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 30

A.3d 1111, 1180 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted).

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      Instantly, the PCRA court addressed this claim as follows:

      [Jeffries] claims that PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to
      raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim for failure to
      challenge prosecutorial misconduct that occurred during the
      prosecutor’s closing argument. In particular, [Jeffries] claims that
      the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of . . . Cook.
      [Jeffries] specifically complains that the prosecutor stated, among
      other things, that the Commonwealth had “fact-checked” Cook’s
      testimony and that it was “100 percent accurate.” N.T. [Jury Trial
      (Day 5)], 12/9/[]15, at 117. In addition, [Jeffries] notes that the
      prosecutor stated he had scrutinized Cook’s testimony, that his
      job was to present truthful evidence, and that he would not have
      put her on the stand if he had found out that she was lying.

                                     ***

      Here, defense counsel, in his closing argument, made an ad
      hominin attack on the prosecutor, accusing [the prosecutor] of
      intentionally distorting the evidence to make it appear that
      [Jeffries] was guilty. In particular, in the course of arguing that
      [] Cook was not credible, defense counsel noted that . . . “not one
      district attorney” followed up with an investigation of Cook’s ex-
      boyfriend, who was alleged to be an international drug dealer.
      [See id. at 68.] Accordingly, instead of properly arguing the
      weaknesses in the Commonwealth’s evidence, defense counsel
      chose to personally attack the prosecutor and accuse him of
      intentionally omitting evidence that contradicted his theory of the
      case in order to paint an unfair and inaccurate picture of the facts.

PCRA Court Opinion, 1/30/23, at 19-20.

      Based upon our review of the record, we agree with the PCRA court’s

determinations. In the defense’s closing, counsel additionally implied that the

prosecution engaged in “deception . . . fabrication . . . [and] sneakiness” in

its investigation and presentation of the prosecution’s case. See N.T. Jury

Trial (Day 5), 12/9/15, at 73. Defense counsel further accused the prosecutor

of failing to disclose “things that went down with [Cook] and the deal and the

                                     - 18 -
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omissions.” Id. at 74. While the prosecutor’s comments may have amounted

to impermissible vouching for Cook’s credibility, we are constrained to

consider those comments in the context of defense counsel’s closing

arguments. See Judy, supra. Therefore, we conclude that the comments

by the prosecutor were a fair reply to defense counsel’s argument and,

consequently, Jeffries’ prior counsel were not ineffective for failing to preserve

and raise this claim. Accordingly, Jeffries is entitled to no relief on this claim.

      In his third claim, Jeffries argues that his prior PCRA counsel were

ineffective in failing to preserve a claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance of counsel by failing to object to the trial court’s instruction on

conspiracy. See Brief for Appellant, at 31-37. Jeffries contends that the trial

court was required to instruct the jurors that they must “unanimously agree

that the defendants conspired to commit at least one specific crime.” Id. at

31. Jeffries asserts that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury and,

consequently, Jeffries posits his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

by failing to object to the deficient instruction. Id. at 31, 34-37. We disagree.

      The PCRA court addressed this claim as follows:

      During its final charge on the law, the [c]ourt instructed the jury
      on the charge of conspiracy as follows:

         The defendants are each charged with conspiracy to commit
         burglary, robbery, and/or aggravated assault. So[,] even
         though there’s only one conspiracy charge listed on the
         form, there’s three alleged goals of the conspiracy. It would
         be sufficient for you to find one, two, or all three, any of
         those would be sufficient if you find proven beyond a
         reasonable doubt the charge of criminal conspiracy.

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       Now, in Pennsylvania[,] joining in a conspiracy or creating
       a conspiracy is itself a crime even if the crime or crimes the
       people planned is not carried out. The members of the
       conspiracy are still responsible for the distinct crime of the
       conspiracy.

       In general terms, a conspiracy is an agreement between two
       or more persons to commit a crime, and a conspiracy exists
       once two conditions are met: [f]irst, there is an agreement,
       and then one of the members commits some act to help
       achieve the goal of the conspiracy.

       Now I am going to explain each element in greater detail.

       The first element of a conspiracy is an agreement. It could
       be stated in word or unspoken but acknowledged, and it
       must be an agreement in the sense that two or more people
       have come to an understanding that they agree to act
       together to commit a crime or crimes. Their agreement
       does not have to cover the details of how the crime or crimes
       will be committed, nor does it have to call for all of them to
       have participated in actually committing the crime or
       crimes. They can agree that one of them will do the job,
       but what is necessary is that the parties do agree, that is to
       say, that they come to a firm, common understanding that
       a crime will be committed.

       Now[,] although the agreement itself is the essence of the
       conspiracy, a defendant cannot be convicted of conspiracy
       unless he or a fellow conspirator does something more, what
       we call an overt act[,] in furtherance of the conspiracy.

       The overt act is an act by any member of the conspiracy
       that would serve to further the goal of the conspiracy. It
       could be criminal or noncriminal in itself as long as it’s
       designed to put the conspiratorial agreement into effect to
       show that [the] parties have a firm agreement and are not
       just thinking or talking about committing a crime. The overt
       act shows that the conspiracy has reached the action stage.
       If the conspirator actually commits or even attempts to
       commit the agreed-upon crime, that would be an overt act
       in furtherance of the conspiracy. But a small act or step

                                   - 20 -
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        that is much more preliminary and a lot less significant can
        satisfy the overt act requirement.

        The Commonwealth may prove a conspiracy by direct
        evidence or by circumstantial evidence.        People who
        conspire often do their conspiring secretly and try to cover
        up afterward, and in many conspiracy trials, circumstantial
        evidence is the best or even the only evidence on the
        questions of whether there was an agreement, that is to
        say, a common understanding, and whether the
        conspirators shared the intent to promote or facilitate
        committing the object crime.

        Therefore, you may, if you think it proper, infer that there
        was a conspiracy from the relationship, the conduct, and the
        acts of the defendant and his alleged coconspirators and the
        circumstances surrounding their activities; however, the
        evidence of this must support your conclusion beyond a
        reasonable doubt.

        And a defendant cannot be convicted merely because he
        was present with others or even because he knew what the
        other or others planned or were doing. There must be proof
        of an agreement between the defendant and another person
        or persons to form or continue a conspiracy, and to be
        proved guilty of being a conspirator, the defendant must
        have intended to act jointly with the other coconspirators
        and must have intended that the crime or crimes alleged to
        be the goal of the conspiracy would be committed.

     N.T. [Jury Trial (Day 5),] 12/9/15, at 165-69.

     While [Jeffries] argues that the instruction was unlawful, apart
     from the first paragraph, it tracks exactly the language of
     Pennsylvania’s Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instruction for
     conspiracy. See Pa. SSJI(Crim), § 12.903A. This instruction
     accurately states the law. Moreover . . . [t]he [c]ourt concluded
     its instructions by notifying the jurors that their verdict must be
     unanimous. [See N.T. Jury Trial (Day 5), 12/9/15, at] 186. This
     sufficiently imparted to the jury the need to unanimously agree
     on an objective.

     [Jeffries] contends that trial counsel should have requested that
     the [c]ourt use the alternative instruction set forth at section

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      12.903B, which explicitly states, “Before any defendant can be
      convicted, the 12 jurors must agree on the same person whom
      the defendant allegedly conspired with, the same object crime,
      and the same overt act.” Pa. SSJI(Crim), § 12.903B. However,
      the Subcommittee Note to that instruction states that this
      alternative is only necessary “where the evidence is complex, a
      potential variance exists between the charge and the proof, and
      there is some real possibility of juror confusion[.]” Subcommittee
      Note to Pa. SSJI(Crim), § 12.903B.

      Here, the evidence was not complex and there was no possibility
      of juror confusion. The defendants agreed to break into the
      victim’s home, assault him, and rob him. All three objects
      (burglary, robbery, and aggravated assault) were integral to the
      agreed[-]upon crime. Moreover, the jury convicted [Jeffries] of
      all three object offenses. Therefore, there was no potential for a
      conviction to result from different jurors finding that the object
      crimes were different.

      Accordingly, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to
      challenge the [c]ourt’s jury instruction on the charge of
      conspiracy. As a result, PCRA counsel could not have been
      ineffective for failure to raise a meritless claim. No relief is due.

PCRA Court Opinion, 1/30/23, at 21-23.

      After our review of the record, we agree and adopt the PCRA court’s

determinations and conclusions regarding Jeffries’ third claim.         See Pa.

SSJI(Crim), § 12.903A; id. at § 12.903B; see also id. Subcommittee Note.

Accordingly, we afford Jeffries no relief on this claim. See Commonwealth

v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 738, 754 (Pa. Super. 2014) (Pennsylvania courts

afforded broad discretion in phrasing jury instructions, and “[o]nly where

there is an abuse of discretion or an inaccurate statement of law is there

reversible error.”) (citation omitted).

      In his fourth claim, Jeffries argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance of counsel by failing to call two witnesses who would have

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impeached Samuels. See Brief for Appellant, at 37-47. We address these

witnesses together, as their proposed testimony is similar and both proposed

testimonies are related to Jeffries’ overarching claim that his trial counsel

rendered ineffective assistance for failing to impeach or rebut Deputy Sheriff

Samuels’ identification of Jeffries.

       Jeffries asserts that Samuels was biased against Jeffries because Ms.

Blatch, Jeffries’ mother,14 repeatedly turned down Samuels’ advances. See

id. at 41-43. Jeffries contends that Samuels testified that he was familiar with

Jeffries due to encountering Jeffries at Ms. Blatch’s water ice truck from 2008-

2011; however, prior to trial, Samuels had been unable to identify Jeffries in

the video and had only identified Blatch as one of the perpetrators. See id.

at 42-44. Jeffries posits that Samuels’ identification of him was therefore a

misidentification, either intentional or mistaken, and that trial counsel should

have called Ms. Blatch to rebut Samuels’ testimony. See id. at 44.

       Jeffries further argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

of counsel by failing to call Ms. Blatch, who would have testified that Jeffries

was under house arrest, or incarcerated, during the times that Samuels

allegedly purchased water ice from Ms. Blatch. See id. at 44-45. Jeffries

alleges that trial counsel was aware of Ms. Blatch’s testimony, because trial

counsel had originally intended to call Ms. Blatch to rebut Samuels’ testimony,

____________________________________________

14 Relevantly, it is undisputed that Ms. Blatch operated a water ice truck at

Wilson Park from 2008 through 2013. See id. at 41-44. Ms. Blatch often had
family members assisting her. See id.

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but that trial counsel inexplicably failed to call Ms. Blatch to the stand. See

id. at 44-46.

      Similarly, Jeffries argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance of counsel for failing to call Charlene McGuffie to refute Samuels’

testimony. See Brief for Appellant, at 46-48. Jeffries asserts that McGuffie

would have testified as follows:

      I am 56 years young. I reside[d] in Wilson Park for 21 years. I’ve
      been [on] Wilson Park[’]s Resident Council for 5 years, also
      worked for Philadelphia Housing Authority for 10 years. I’ve lived
      across the street for many years as [Jeffries] grew up. . . . [Ms.
      Blatch] purchased a water ice truck and I never saw [Jeffries]
      work with her on that truck. [Jeffries] had a little brother [R.H.B.]
      who work[ed] with [Ms. Blatch] and [R.H.B.’s] friends. I know
      this because I’ve always watched everything that went [on] on
      Bail[e]y Terrace for years. . . . I’ve bought candy [and] water ice
      for my grandchildren many, many times over the years and
      always [R.H.B. was] serving me[, not Jeffries.] I lived on the block
      [between] 1998 [and] 2018.

Id. at 46-47. Jeffries posits that trial counsel had no reasonable basis for

failing to call McGuffie based upon the above proffered testimony. See id. at

47.   Jeffries argues that, in light of McGuffie’s and Ms. Blatch’s proposed

testimony, it is clear that Samuels’ identification of Jeffries was mistaken or

intentional. See id. Jeffries contends that his trial counsel’s failure to call

McGuffie and Ms. Blatch constituted ineffective assistance of counsel because

it permitted the jury to rely on the unchallenged identification testimony of

Samuels, a member of law enforcement. See id. at 47-48. We disagree.

      The PCRA court addressed these claims as follows:

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     At trial, the Commonwealth called [] Samuels to explain how the
     police initially came to identify [Jeffries] as one of the assailants
     in this case. Before becoming a deputy sheriff, Samuels had been
     a Philadelphia Housing Authority [officer] for 20 years, and had
     spent six of those years patrolling the Wilson Park Projects.
     During that time, he came to know [Jeffries] and [] Blatch.
     Samuels testified that he came to know [Jeffries] through his
     interactions with him during his community policing[.] Samuels
     also testified that he knew [Ms. Blatch], who sold water ice in front
     of her house, and that he would see [Jeffries] around his mother
     when he bought water ice from her.

     During the investigation of the shooting and robbery at issue, the
     Philadelphia police released the surveillance video to the public to
     see if anyone knew the assailants depicted in the video. Samuels
     viewed the video on YouTube and recognized both [Jeffries] and
     Blatch. As a result, he contacted the Philadelphia police and
     positively identified both [Jeffries] and Blatch as the robbers.
     Samuels testified there was absolutely no doubt in his mind that
     the two men in the video were [] Blatch and [Jeffries].

                                    ***

     The record refutes [Jeffries’] claim that trial counsel was
     ineffective for failing to call [Ms. Blatch and McGuffie]. First, the
     impeachment value of these witnesses was de minim[i]s. As for
     Samuels’[] alleged bias, defense counsel elicited from Samuels on
     cross-examination that he had a romantic interest in [Ms.] Blatch,
     and that he had asked her out, but she had never responded.
     Accordingly, counsel already had a basis to argue that Samuels
     was biased against [Jeffries] because [his mother] had spurned
     [Samuels’] attempts to start a relationship.

     The proffered testimony of [Ms.] Blatch and McGuffie that
     [Jeffries] did not work at the water ice stand had even less
     impeachment value, since Samuels never testified that he saw
     [Jeffries] working at the stand. Rather, Samuels only testified
     that he had seen [Jeffries] “around” [Ms.] Blatch when she was
     selling water ice. Accordingly, there was no reason for defense
     counsel to believe that calling these two witnesses would
     meaningfully help his case.

     Moreover, apart from the testimony of Samuels, there was
     overwhelming evidence establishing the identity of [Jeffries] as

                                    - 25 -
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      one of the assailants. [] Cook, who set up the robbery, testified
      that [Jeffries] accompanied Blatch and Wallace to [R.M.’s]
      apartment in order to rob [R.M.] and that [Jeffries] had shot out
      the camera as they left. The video surveillance footage recovered
      from the home clearly depicted defendant as he entered the home
      and again as he left the home following the attack. [Jeffries’] face
      was not obstructed and the jury had a clear view of [him] in the
      surveillance footage.      This surveillance video, alone, clearly
      established [Jeffries’] identity.

      Finally, [R.M.] identified [Jeffries] in court as the first person
      coming up the stairs. Given the strength of this evidence, even if
      the proffered witnesses could have substantially impeached the
      credibility of Samuels, that would not [] give rise to a reasonable
      probability that the outcome of this trial would have been
      different.

      Accordingly, the record establishes that it was reasonable for trial
      counsel not to call these two witnesses, and that in any event, his
      failure to call them could not have prejudiced [Jeffries]. For that
      reason, the PCRA [c]ourt properly rejected the claims regarding
      those witnesses without a hearing.

PCRA Court Opinion, 1/30/23, 10-12 (citations omitted).

      We conclude that the record supports the PCRA court’s conclusions and

determinations. As we noted supra, a PCRA petitioner “must show how the

uncalled witnesses’ testimony would have been beneficial under the

circumstances of the case.” Gibson, supra. As discussed by the PCRA court,

Ms. Blatch’s and McGuffie’s proffered testimony would have had minimal

impact on the outcome of the case. See PCRA Court Opinion, 1/30/23, at 10-

12. Indeed, Jeffries was readily identifiable from the surveillance video of the

robbery, which the jury had the opportunity to view.        See id. at 11-12.

Consequently, Samuels’ alleged bias against Jeffries due to Ms. Blatch refusing

                                     - 26 -
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Samuels’ advances, several years prior, is of no moment.           See Gibson,

supra. Accordingly, Jeffries is entitled to no relief on this claim.

      In his fifth claim, Jeffries argues that the PCRA court erred in denying

his PCRA petition where the Commonwealth failed to disclose its plea

agreement with Cook, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

See Brief for Appellant, at 48-54. Jeffries asserts that the Commonwealth

represented to the jury, and to Jeffries, that, in exchange for Cook’s

testimony, Cook received a reduction in charges, but that there had been no

agreement for a more lenient sentence. See id. at 48-50. Jeffries contends

that on October 12, 2015, Cook sent a handwritten letter to her boyfriend, in

which Cook purportedly represented that she had agreed to a “time served”

sentence in exchange for her testimony. See id. at 52-54. Jeffries posits that

the Commonwealth lied to the jury, and to Jeffries, about the nature of Cook’s

plea agreement, because of the October 12, 2015 letter, and Cook received a

sentence of 11½ to 23 months’ incarceration and was immediately eligible for

parole. See id. We disagree.

      Our Supreme Court has explained

      in order to establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show
      that: (1) the evidence was suppressed by the state, either willfully
      or inadvertently; (2) the evidence was favorable to the defendant
      either because it was exculpatory or because it could have been
      used for impeachment; and (3) the evidence was material in that
      its omission resulted in prejudice to the defendant. However, the
      mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might
      have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of
      the trial, does not establish materiality in the constitutional sense.
      Rather, evidence is material only if there is a reasonable

                                     - 27 -
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      probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense,
      the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
      reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
      confidence in the outcome.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 168 A.3d 97, 109 (Pa. 2017) (citations,

quotation marks, and brackets omitted).       Further, “[t]o obtain a new trial

based on the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose evidence affecting a

witness’s credibility, the defendant must demonstrate that the reliability of the

witness may be determinative of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.”

Commonwealth v. Tharp, 101 A.3d 736, 747 (Pa. 2014).

      The PCRA court addressed this claim as follows:

      [Jeffries’] claim is premised upon a letter Cook [allegedly] wrote
      to co-defendant [] Blatch two months prior to the trial, in which
      Cook allegedly wrote, “I pleaded guilty and they dropped some of
      my charges they also want me to testify against yall [sic] if yall
      [sic] don’t take a deal[.] I don’t want to do that but they said if I
      do I will get time served[.]” Defense Exhibit P8 to Amended First
      [PCRA] Petition. [Jeffries] argues that this letter proves that the
      Commonwealth made a promise to Cook, which was never
      disclosed to the defense, of a time-served sentence in exchange
      for her testimony at trial.

      [Jeffries’] claim was properly rejected by the [PCRA c]ourt. In
      support of the claim, PCRA counsel submitted a hearing
      certification signed by counsel averring “i[]t is believed and
      averred” that [] Cook would testify at a hearing that she wrote the
      letter to [] Blatch in which she stated she would get a time-served
      sentence in exchange for testifying. Amended First [PCRA]
      Petition[, at] 43. Counsel acknowledged that she was unable to
      authenticate the letter or even locate and interview Cook.
      Amended First [PCRA] Petition[, at] 34 n.7. Moreover, [Jeffries]
      never averred that Cook claimed that she was actually promised
      anything by the prosecutors in exchange for her testimony; only
      that she wrote to [] Blatch, against whom she had agreed to
      testify, making such a claim. Of course, Cook, who was in a
      relationship with [] Blatch at the time the letter was allegedly

                                     - 28 -
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      written, had a strong motive to lie to [] Blatch in an effort to justify
      to him her decision to testify against him. In any event, absent
      any proffered evidence of an actual promise made by the
      Commonwealth to Cook, [Jeffries] was not entitled to a hearing
      on this claim.

PCRA Court Opinion, 1/30/23, at 17-18 (emphasis added, some citations

omitted).

      After   review   of the    record, we     agree   with    the   PCRA court’s

determinations and conclusions regarding this claim.           Further, we observe

that, at trial, Cook testified as follows:

      Prosecutor: Do you understand what “open plea” means?

      Cook: Yes.

      Prosecutor: What’s an open plea?

      Cook: That I could get anywhere from 50 to 100 years.

      Prosecutor: That’s the maximum you could receive?

      Cook: Yes.

      Prosecutor: An open plea as opposed to a negotiated plea means
      there’s no numbers that are discussed between you and your
      attorney as well as you, myself, and my boss, right?

      Cook: Yes.

                                       ***

      Prosecutor: And that I will be obligated under this agreement to
      tell the judge whether or not you testified truthfully in any and all
      matters that you are called to testify on?

      Cook: Yes.

      Prosecutor: And if you don’t testify truthfully, what is your
      understanding there?

                                       - 29 -
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      Cook: The deal is over.

      Prosecutor: And you say “deal.” What does that mean? The word
      “deal,” what does that mean?

      Cook: The agreement.

      Prosecutor: In other words, I can make a recommendation to—

      Cook: Yes.

      Prosecutor: [--your sentencing judge] and ask for up to the max,
      right?

      Cook: Yes.

      Prosecutor: But as far as your sentencing, if you testify truthfully,
      [your sentence is entirely up to the judge?]

      Cook: Yes.

      Prosecutor: Did you understand that when you signed this on
      October 1—

      Cook: Yes.

N.T. Jury Trial (Day 3), 12/7/15, 125-28. From this exchange, we conclude

that Cook had a clear understanding that her plea deal was not for “time

served.” See id. Rather, Cook would receive no recommendation on sentence

from the prosecution in exchange for her testimony in the instant case. See

id.   Thus, as the PCRA court noted in its opinion, it is likely that Cook

attempted to convey this “time served deal” in order to preserve her

relationship with Jeffries’ co-defendant Blatch.     See PCRA Court Opinion,

1/30/23, at 17-18; see also id. at n.7 (“In the letter purportedly written by

Cook, she repeatedly expresses her love for [] Blatch.”).        In light of the

                                     - 30 -
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foregoing, we conclude that the PCRA court did not err in denying Jeffries a

hearing on this claim.

      Order affirmed.

Date: 5/3/2024

                                   - 31 -