Court Opinion

ID: 9542956
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:40:38.20896+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:21.717761
License: Public Domain

URBIGKIT, Justice,
dissenting.
I disagree with the reasoning of the majority on both fact and principle. Again, we are faced with the issue causing the greatest divorce case strife involving exces-siveness of court ordered child support where the present capacity to pay is not clearly or factually shown. The record does project, conversely, that the trial court based the child support award on appellant’s previous salary during better economic times in Wyoming. This mistake was not made just once, but twice with the denial of the motion for new trial also grounded on excessiveness of the child support award. See Curless v. Curless, 708 P.2d 426, 431 (Wyo.1985), where the denial of such motion in addition to the initial child custody decree was considered on appeal. This issue takes on greater significance because of the present economic distress of Wyoming, and I reject the majority’s gloss on moral grounds as well as its disregard for Wyoming precedent. The current loss of population in Casper, which is the residence of these parties, is mute evidence of the bygone halcyon days of high employment and higher wages.
This court’s function for analysis of exercised discretion of the trial court is to determine if the amount of the child support, when all the surrounding circumstances are considered, is based on what the parent can reasonably be expected to pay, which means now, not in prior years when the state was blessed with high prosperity.
[I]t is imprudent to contend that, when the question involves support payments, the matter should be decided without consideration of the paying parent’s ability to pay, the recipient’s spending habits, and all other surrounding circumstances. Redman v. Redman, Wyo., 521 P.2d 584, 587 (1974). See also, § 20-2-113(a), W.S. 1977. This court in Redman agreed with the proposition that a child support order may not accurately reflect what children actually require but, rather, what the parent can reasonably be expected to pay. The circumstances of the parents are recognized by our controlling statute as well. Even in unbroken homes a child’s monetary needs must be limited by the parents’ income. Child support cannot be determined in a vacuum. If a child’s wants and needs were to be the sole criterion, then child support may have to fall upon the state since few parents are able to raise their children without having to make do with what they have.
Mentock v. Mentock, 638 P.2d 156, 158 (Wyo.1981) (emphasis added and footnote omitted). The majority concludes in a *260bland fashion that there was no abuse of that discretion because the child support award was not arbitrary or capricious. I find fault with such a short hand method of justice which does not even analyze this issue in relation to what the parent could reasonably be expected to pay at this time.1 I would reject the expediency portrayed when the decisional process looks only superficially to appellant’s income in relation to the child support and disregards other surrounding circumstances such as the property settlement, attorney fees, the childrens’ medical expenses, in addition to appellant’s own day-to-day living expenses. See W.S. 20-2-114 (which mandates that property division be based inter alia on “the burdens imposed upon the property for the benefit of either party and children ”) (emphasis added); 9A Uniform Laws Annotated, Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 309 at 400 (1987) (which specifically looks to “the financial resources and needs of the non-custodial parent”) and 2 J. McCahey, Valuation & Distribution of Marital Property §§ 41.04[2] and 41.06[7] (1988) (concluding that the amount of the property settlement and alimony must be considered as part of the parent’s financial resources for setting child support).2
This case does not amount to a simple equation of a father with steady income paying $350 child support. The testimony at the time of trial on December 4, 1987 revealed that appellant’s employment of cutting and burning beetle killed timber was only when the weather permitted and with a short indefinite future.3 The income from the landscaping was greatly varied, with one job bringing in only $30. Consequently, when one contrasts the lean present income of appellant with the court imposed responsibilities of $350 per month child support, $475 a month until $5,000 was paid to equalize the property division, the payment of appellee’s attorney’s fee of $2,537.50, and half of the childrens’ medical expenses, in addition to his own living expenses, one must find that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the child support figure which represented approximately 72% of appellant’s monthly income. Moreover, this conclusion is further borne out by the testimony presented that appellant could not financially stay afloat when paying the lesser amount of $250 per month child support during the divorce process.4
Realistically, a proper analysis of all the surrounding circumstances should not look to past earnings in a different economic climate. There was much testimony before the trial court that appellant had worked for Exxon in the boom years as an underground uranium miner and had earned a good wage and received bonuses when the employment ended. However, bonuses from a past time should not be figured into the amount of income for setting child support unless there is “evidence indicating any resumption of a bonus plan or any substitute arrangement providing additional income * * Petersen v. Petersen, *261208 Neb. 1, 301 N.W.2d 592, 595 (1981). There was no evidence of any present bonus plan and, in fact, the testimony indicated appellant had no present steady income. Actually, as is commonly known and could be judicially noticed, the Exxon mining operation no longer exists in Wyoming.
At the crux of appellee’s argument and perhaps at the back of the trial court’s mind was that appellant was intentionally bringing his income to an artificial low to avoid paying child support. Moreover, the majority now seems mesmerized by the perception that possibly appellant may have turned down other employment in recent years, at the expense of his children. Wyoming does impose a good faith obligation on a non-custodial parent to provide support.
A duty to pay child support is not satisfied merely by showing limited income. One obligated to support his child has a duty to make a good faith effort to generate enough income to discharge that obligation.
Manners v. Manners, 706 P.2d 671, 675 (Wyo.1985). However, there was no finding that appellant did not act in good faith to earn more.5 Further, testimony disclosed that there were few job offers, and that appellant had no prospects which would cause his economic situation to improve. Without that specific finding as sustainable by a record demonstrating that appellant intentionally, deliberately, or in bad faith was failing to generate the income, I cannot condone a practice which penalizes an individual caught in bad economic times by requiring him to pay an amount in excess of what he can.
While appellant may have a greater earning capacity when high paying jobs are again available, the trial court should award support based on current income, even if it is less than previous earnings.6 If appellant secures a job which increases his income, a modification of child support can also be secured. Woodward v. Woodward, 428 P.2d 389, 390 (Wyo.1967). Ap-pellee is not left without remedial opportunity. At this time, however, “[a] party’s ability to pay must be evaluated with regard to the party’s resources at the time of hearing.” In Re Support of Pearson, 111 Ill.2d 545, 96 Ill.Dec. 69, 490 N.E.2d 1274, 1277 (1986) (citing Elizer v. Elizer, 36 Ill.App.3d 552, 555, 344 N.E.2d 493 (1976)).
In observing what may be considered as a tunnel vision focus on the parent’s past income to award child support, I find an abuse of discretion in setting the child support award above what appellant can reasonably be expected to pay, and would remand the matter to the trial court.
That abuse of discretion does not denote misplaced intent, but rather results when the untenable decision “unfairly depriv[es] a litigant of a substantial right and den[ies] a just result * * *.” Wachtel By and Through Wachtel v. Beer, 229 Neb. 392, 427 N.W.2d 56, 64 (1988). That is this case, and consequently, I respectfully dissent.

. It bears repeating, although previously stated by this writer and many others, that “there is an intractable law of economics that persons do not pay more than they can (unless they rob a bank, etc.)."

. A career of experience in marital relations general practice engenders a second axiom of ex-husband behavior. “If he reasonably can pay, he will, but when faced with an order beyond his means, he will ordinarily pay nothing much of the time.”

. The exchange went as follows:
Q. Is there a way to know whether or not this employment will last?
A. Yes, they have a $60,000. budget.
Q. And so do you have any idea how long it will last?
A. Through this year and possibly next year, I mean through the winter this year into '88 until the snow goes off and then next—
Q. You weren't talking about this calender year.

.Cf. Hopkins v. Hopkins, 664 S.W.2d 273, 274 (Mo.App.1984) (where the court reversed a child support award finding a complete lack of an evidentiary basis as to the father’s ability to pay) and Olson v. Olson, 175 Mont. 444, 574 P.2d 1004, 1008 (1978) (where the court found the imposition of “an obligation to pay child support without any evidence of an ability to pay" unwarranted).

. For other state’s approaches to intentional depression of income, see: Philbin v. Philbin, 19 Cal.App.3d 115, 96 Cal.Rptr. 408, 411-12 (1971) (where ability to pay rather than current income could be considered only when there was a deliberate or intentional attempt to shirk his family financial responsibilities); Travis v. Travis, 19 Mich.App. 128, 172 N.W.2d 491 (1969) (where past earnings could be considered when the father was content to work part time without any explanation for not pursuing a full time livelihood); Boyer v. Boyer, 567 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Mo.App.1978) (where income from possible best efforts of parent could be imputed when it was shown he voluntarily declined to work); Weiss v. Weiss, 392 S.W.2d 646 (Mo.App.1965) (where former earnings were considered as well as present ones when the father voluntarily reduced his income shortly before trial); Holt v. Holt, 29 N.C.App. 124, 223 S.E.2d 542, 544 (1976) (where past income was not considered if honesty and good faith were present); and Annotation, Excessiveness Or Adequacy Of Money Awarded As Child Support, 27 A.L.R.4th 864 (1984).

. Perhaps another economic fact of the past eight years is not always perceived. The wage scale for blue collar employment nearly anywhere in this country has generally sustained severe deflationary reduction, while new employment for manually related occupations commands a singularly reduced hourly rate.