Court Opinion

ID: 9899042
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-15 20:04:01.411753+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:20.288824
License: Public Domain

SUPERIOR COURT
                                 of the
                          STATE OF DELAWARE

Jeffrey J Clark                                              Kent County Courthouse
Resident Judge                                                     38 The Green
                                                                  Dover, DE 19901
                                                              Telephone (302)735-2111

                                 November 15, 2023

Mr. John T. Driggus                                   Mr. Walter J. O’Brien, Esquire
33 Edgewood Road                                      Weber Gallagher
Dover, DE 19901                                       2 Penns Way, Suite 300
                                                      New Castle, DE 19702

                            Submitted: October 13, 2023
                            Decided November 15, 2023

RE: John T. Driggus v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,
    K23C-01-015 JJC

Dear Mr. Driggus and Mr. O’Brien:
       Plaintiff John Driggus sues Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company for compensation for injuries and property damage caused by
an accident occurring on January 13, 2021. He alleges the accident to be the fault
of another driver. Although Mr. Driggus’ complaint does not specify a particular
claim against State Farm, it provides reasonable notice that he seeks either uninsured
or underinsured motorist benefits (hereafter collectively “UM” benefits).
       At the accident scene, the police cited Mr. Driggus, and not the other driver,
with several traffic offenses. Mr. Driggus pled not guilty to the citations in the Court
of Common Pleas, and the court later dismissed the charges on the day of trial.
Notwithstanding this favorable outcome, he, in part, attempts to appeal that dismissal
in his civil complaint. As relief, he seems to request a criminal trial in the Court of
Common Pleas so he can demonstrate that the accident was the other driver’s fault.
       Initially, State Farm moved to dismiss Mr. Driggus’ suit because he failed to
allege (1) that the alleged tortfeasor had no insurance, which would be necessary for
an uninsured claim, or (2) that Mr. Driggus has recovered all available insurance
from the alleged tortfeasor, which would be necessary for an underinsured claim.
When both parties presented their positions, they referenced materials neither
incorporated into, nor integral, to the complaint. As a result, the Court converted the
motion to one for summary judgment.               The Court then provided the parties the
opportunity to supplement the record.
       After considering the parties’ positions and the record, the Court grants
summary judgment in State Farm’s favor for two reasons. First, Mr. Driggus
misunderstands the process and timing necessary in a criminal appeal. Second, Mr.
Driggus fails to meet a prerequisite to recover UM benefits from State Farm. He
has not exhausted the other driver’s insurance which precludes his UM claim.

                    Procedural Background and Facts of Record
       The facts recited below are those of record viewed in the light most favorable
to Mr. Driggus. On January 13, 2021, Mr. Driggus changed lanes on southbound
Dupont Highway, near Harrington.1 During that lane change, he and another car
collided.2 At the scene of the accident, a Delaware State Police trooper ticketed Mr.
Driggus for (1) failure to have an insurance card in his possession; (2) an improper
lane change; and (3) driving with an obstructed view.3              For the purpose of this
summary judgment motion, however, the Court assumes that the other driver’s

1
  Compl., Ex. 1 at 2.
2
  Id.
3
  Compl., Ex. 4 [hereinafter “Ct. of Common Pleas Criminal Dkt”].
                                              2
negligence was the sole cause of the accident. The Court also assumes that Mr.
Driggus suffered personal injuries and property loss because of the accident.
       From the outset, Mr. Driggus disagreed with the citations and challenged them
in the Court of Common Pleas.4 For Mr. Driggus’ benefit, it is important to
emphasize that he was involved in a criminal proceeding in that case and that the
State of Delaware was the opposing party, not State Farm. There, he pled not guilty
to the charges and demanded a jury trial.5 When the June 2022 trial day arrived, the
Court dismissed the charges pursuant to Delaware Court of Common Pleas Criminal
Rule 48(b).6
       Mr. Driggus then filed suit in the Superior Court (1) approximately six months
after the court dismissed his criminal case, and (2) nearly two years after the
accident. In his complaint, he demands compensation from State Farm for property
damage and pain and suffering.7          He also seeks to appeal the Court of Common
Pleas’ dismissal of the charges.8 In the portion of his complaint seeking to appeal
the dismissal, he contends that the other driver was at fault and that the State should
have ticketed the other driver.9 As a remedy, Mr. Driggus’ complaint seems to
request a criminal trial so he can relitigate the issue of fault.
       Presently, State Farm moves for summary judgment while focusing on the
UM aspect of this case. It contends that Mr. Driggus cannot demonstrate he qualifies
for UM coverage under 18 Del. C. § 3902 or his policy.10 Primarily, State Farm

4
  Id.
5
  Ct. of Common Pleas Criminal Dkt.
6
   See Ct. Com. Pl. Crim. R. 48(b) (providing that the court may dismiss all charges against an
accused where there is unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial).
7
  Mr. Driggus later filed an amended complaint clarifying that he seeks recovery for both property
damage and pain and suffering. Going forward, the Court will refer to the complaint and the
amended complaint collectively as “the complaint.”
8
  Compl.¶ 4.
9
  Id.
10
   Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss ¶¶ 4–5.
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contends that Mr. Driggus cannot show that the other driver had no insurance, which
forecloses an uninsured motorist claim. Alternatively, State Farm contends that Mr.
Driggus cannot show that he exhausted the other driver’s insurance coverage, which
forecloses an underinsured claim. State Farm further emphasizes that the two
separate two-year statutes of limitations that would apply to claims against the other
driver for property damage and personal injury have expired.11 In opposition, Mr.
Driggus does not address the exhaustion issue. Rather, he reiterates that he believes
the other driver to be at fault for the accident.12
       After the Court converted the motion to one for summary judgment, it
provided the parties until October 13, 2023, to supplement the record. 13 At the oral
argument, the Court invited Mr. Driggus to supplement his filings with any
correspondence that he had received from State Farm that could support an estoppel
argument against State Farm, or alternatively an argument that State Farm waived
its right to insist that he prove exhaustion of coverage.14             The Court raised those
issues because of (1) Mr. Driggus’ pro se status, and (2) State Farm’s representation
that it insured both Mr. Driggus and the other driver.               Circumstances where the
same carrier insures both parties involved in an accident can, in some circumstances,
cause confusion for a pro se claimant given the interplay between personal injury
protection coverage, liability coverage, and UM coverage.
       State Farm accepted the invitation to supplement the record. It did so with the
police report from the accident, a copy of the other driver’s declaration page, and a

11
   Id. ¶ 7.
12
   Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss ¶¶ 1–3.
13
   See Appriva S’holder Litig. Co., LLC v. EV3, Inc., 937 A.2d 1275, 1288 (Del. 2007) (recognizing
that if the Court opts to convert the motion from one to dismiss to one for summary judgment, the
Court must provide the parties at least ten-days’ notice to give the parties a reasonable opportunity
to respond and supplement the record).
14
   See 27 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 683, § 2 (1981) (explaining that an insurer may be estopped
from denying a claim where it "acts in [a] manner inconsistent with lack of coverage and insured
reasonably relies on those actions to its detriment”).
                                                 4
renewal notice for the other driver’s policy. In the police report, the investigating
trooper wrote that the other driver provided proof that he was insured at the time of
the accident.15     Furthermore, the other driver’s State Farm declaration page and
renewal notice demonstrate that the other driver had a valid automobile insurance
policy in effect between January 25, 2019, and January 25, 2021, which included the
day of the accident.16
       Mr. Driggus, on the other hand, did not supplement the record. Namely, he
provided no evidence that he exhausted other coverages. Nor did he provide
correspondence from State Farm that could support an inference that State Farm
somehow excused or waived the exhaustion requirement. Finally, he identified no
evidence that demonstrates any action taken by State Farm to mislead or confuse
him during the claims process.

                                          Standard
       When a party files a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and relies upon
matters outside the pleadings, the Court must either convert the motion to one for
summary judgment or decline to consider the supplemental materials.17 If the Court
converts the motion, it must provide the parties sufficient notice to permit them to
supplement the record to support their positions.18
       After conversion, Superior Court Civil Rule 56(c) provides for summary
judgment if there are no genuine issues of material fact, and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.              The movant carries the initial burden of
demonstrating that there are no genuine issues of material fact.19               If the movant

15
   D.I. 29, Ex. 1.
16
   Id., Ex. 2, 3.
17
   In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp. Shareholder Lit., 669 A.2d 59, 68 (Del. 1995).
18
   Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6).
19
   Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 680 (Del. 1979).
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meets his or her initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to
demonstrate a factual dispute.20 At that point, the non-movant cannot rest on mere
allegations or denials.21 Rather he or she must identify a factual dispute through
affidavits or other acceptable means.22 When deciding a motion for summary
judgment, the Court must consider the evidence of record in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party.23

                                        Discussion
       Summary judgment in favor of State Farm is appropriate for two principal
reasons. First, Mr. Driggus cannot appeal a decision in his criminal case with a civil
complaint, and he is otherwise barred from filing a criminal appeal under the
circumstances. Second, he has not exhausted the alleged tortfeasor’s insurance
coverage.
       At the outset, Mr. Driggus’ attempt to appeal the Court of Common Pleas’
dismissal of his criminal charges demonstrates a misunderstanding of certain aspects
of the criminal justice system.      Namely, the State of Delaware was the opposing
party in his criminal case, not State Farm.        Here, Mr. Driggus seeks to appeal the
lower court’s criminal decision in his civil complaint but does not include the State
of Delaware as a party. Furthermore, Mr. Driggus prevailed in his criminal case.
As the prevailing party, he could have obtained no better result than dismissal.
Simply put, there is nothing to appeal. Furthermore, he seems to seek a new criminal
trial to establish the other driver’s guilt, which is not possible because he was the
only named defendant. Finally, even if there were a basis for Mr. Driggus’ appeal,
the fifteen-day deadline to appeal a Court of Common Pleas’ decision expired

20
   Id.
21
   Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(e).
22
   Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1365 (Del. 1995).
23
   Id.
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approximately six months before he filed suit.24 Because Mr. Driggus did not file a
timely appeal, which is a jurisdictional requirement, the Court has no ability to
consider the matter.
       Turning to Mr. Driggus’ UM claim, State Farm meets its initial burden on
summary judgment by emphasizing that the record contains no evidence that he
triggered his UM claim by exhausting available insurance. In fact, State Farm goes
further by demonstrating that the other driver had coverage.                  Both showings
independently shift the burden to Mr. Driggus to demonstrate a material issue of fact
regarding exhaustion.
       A Delaware statute controls the inquiry regarding whether Mr. Driggus meets
his burden. It provides that a UM claimant who fails to meet certain requirements
has no valid claim.25 Specifically, 18 Del. C. § 3902(b)(3) provides that an insurer
is not required to pay UM benefits “until after the limits of liability under all bodily
injury bonds and insurance policies available to the insured at the time of the
accident have been exhausted by payment of settlement or judgments.” Given such
a condition, the Court cannot excuse a claimant’s obligation to exhaust other
insurance even when the claimant is unaware of the requirement. In summary, as
a matter of law, a claimant cannot recover UM benefits if that claimant cannot
establish that (1) the other driver had no insurance available, or (2) the claimant has
recovered all insurance available to the other driver.26
       In this case, Mr. Driggus does not contend that he exhausted the other driver’s
insurance. Moreover, the police report and the alleged tortfeasor’s declaration page
and renewal notice show that the other driver, in fact, had insurance. On this record,

24
   See Superior Court Criminal Rule 39(a) (“[a]ll appeals to Superior Court shall be taken within
15 days from the date of sentence . . .”).
25
   Martin v. Nat'l Gen. Assurance Co., 212 A.3d 269, 2019 WL 2402927, at *2 (Del. June 5, 2019)
(TABLE).
26
   Dunlap v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 878 A.2d 434, 439–40 (Del. 2005).
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there is no factual dispute that Mr. Driggus failed to recover those policy limits
through settlement or suit. As a result, he cannot recover UM benefits from his own
policy.
       As a final matter, the Court has considered an alternative to summary
judgment given Mr. Driggus’ pro se status. Namely, even though Mr. Driggus has
not asked to amend his complaint to include the other driver in the suit, the Court
has considered whether it should permit him to do so. Such an amendment, if it were
possible, could enable Mr. Driggus to trigger UM coverage by first exhausting the
other driver’s coverage.
       Under the circumstances of this case, however, such an amendment would be
futile.27 As State Farm correctly emphasizes, the two-year statutes of limitations to
sue the other driver have passed. 28          The accident occurred on January 13, 2021.
Mr. Driggus sued State Farm on January 11, 2023.29                   Notably, at the time Mr.
Driggus filed suit, he could have included the other driver as a party. At present,
however, significantly more than two years have passed since the accident. There
is now a jurisdictional bar to claims against the other driver, which the Court has no
ability to excuse. As a result, such an amendment would be futile because it would
not survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.30

27
   See Shaffer v. Dixon, 2023 WL 2493279, at *3 (Del. Super. Mar. 14, 2023) (declining to grant
leave to amend a complaint to avoid summary judgment because the amendment would be futile
as it would be subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim).
28
   See 10 Del. C. § 8107 (“No action to recover damages for … for injury to personal property
shall be brought after the expiration of 2 years from the accruing of the cause of such action.”);
see also 10 Del. C. § 8119 (“No action for the recovery of damages upon a claim for alleged
personal injuries shall be brought after the expiration of 2 years from the date upon which it is
claimed that such alleged injuries were sustained[.]”).
29
   In fact, a separate statute of limitations applies to his UM claim – three years from the date it
accrues. Allstate v. Spinelli, 443 A.2d 1286, 1289-90 (Del. 1982). Despite the longer limitation
period available to sue State Farm, the expiration of the statute of limitations against the other
driver makes it impossible for Mr. Driggus to satisfy the exhaustion requirement necessary for his
UM claim.
30
   Shaffer, 2023 WL 2493279, at *3.
                                                 8
      In summary, for summary judgment purposes, the Court assumes that Mr.
Driggus would have a valid underinsured claim if he could meet the exhaustion
requirement.   Unfortunately, he has not exhausted, and now cannot exhaust, the
other driver’s coverage.     It follows that summary judgment would remain
appropriate even if he were to amend his complaint.

                                    Conclusion
      For the reasons discussed above, Mr. Driggus’ civil suit is not the appropriate
mechanism to appeal a decision in a criminal case. Furthermore, he has not
exhausted the alleged tortfeasor’s insurance. As a result, Mr. Driggus cannot recover
UM benefits. Summary judgment in favor of Defendant State Farm must be
GRANTED.

      IT IS SO ORDERED.
                                             Very truly yours,

                                             /s/ Jeffrey J Clark
                                               Resident Judge

JJC:klc

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