Court Opinion

ID: 9908453
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 19:02:22.523914+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:11.608711
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/8/23 Burlesque Enterprise v. City of Los Angeles CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 BURLESQUE ENTERPRISE,                                            B324315
 INC.,
                                                                  (Los Angeles County
           Plaintiff and Appellant,                               Super. Ct. No.
                                                                  21STCV40709)
           v.

 THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES,

           Defendant and Respondent.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Curtis A. Kin, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
      Law Offices of Joshua Kaplan and Joshua Kaplan for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Hydee Feldstein Soto, City Attorney, Denise C. Mills, Chief
Deputy City Attorney, John W. Heath, Senior Assistant City
Attorney, Adrienne S. Khorasanee, Assistant City Attorney, and
Steven N. Blau, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendant and
Respondent.
                   _______________________

                       INTRODUCTION

       Burlesque Enterprise, Inc., the owner and operator of an
adult entertainment club, filed a lawsuit against the City of
Los Angeles, alleging the City revoked its license to operate the
club without notice or a hearing. After sustaining the City’s
demurrer to Burlesque’s complaint without leave to amend, the
trial court entered judgment in favor of the City.
       Burlesque challenges the order sustaining the demurrer to
two of its causes of action—violation of equal protection and
violation of procedural due process. On the former cause of
action, the trial court did not err; on the latter, it did. Despite
Burlesque’s allegation the City issued it a valid permit to operate
the club, the court ruled Burlesque did not have a property
interest to which procedural due process attached. That was
incorrect. And because the City does not argue any other ground
on which to affirm the order sustaining the demurrer to the cause
of action for violation of due process, we reverse.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      A.    The City Enacts a Zoning Ordinance for Adult
            Entertainment Businesses
      In 1978 the City enacted section 12.70 of the Los Angeles
Municipal Code (section 12.70), which sets zoning requirements
for adult entertainment businesses. (See Topanga Press, Inc. v.

                                2
City of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 1993) 989 F.2d 1524, 1526-1527
(Topanga Press).) Subdivision (C) of section 12.70, as amended in
1986, prohibits “the continued operation” after March 1988 of any
adult entertainment business within 500 feet of a residential
zone, subject to certain exceptions. (Section 12.70, subd. (C); see
L.A. Mun. Code, § 12.22, subd. (20)(a); Topanga Press, at
p. 1527.) Subdivision (C) of section 12.70 also prohibits any
person from maintaining more than one adult entertainment
business in the same building. (See Topanga Press, at p. 1527.)

      B.     The Federal District Court Issues an Injunction in the
             Topanga Press Litigation
      After the City enacted section 12.70, several existing adult
entertainment businesses filed a lawsuit against the City in
federal district court. (See Topanga Press, supra, 989 F.2d at
p. 1527.) The businesses claimed the various zoning
requirements were unconstitutional because the City did not
provide the businesses “reasonable alternative avenues of
expression” or sufficient possible relocation sites. (See id. at
pp. 1528, 1534.) In 1995, after the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order
granting a preliminary injunction enjoining the City from
enforcing section 12.70 (Topanga Press, at pp. 1527, 1534), the
City and the businesses reached a settlement. Pursuant to the
parties’ stipulation, the district court entered a permanent
injunction enjoining the City from initiating any proceedings
against the adult entertainment businesses named in the
injunction for operating within 500 feet of a residential zone or
for maintaining multiple adult entertainment businesses in the
same building (the Topanga Press injunction).

                                 3
      C.     Burlesque Tries To Sell Its Adult Entertainment Club;
             the City Holds a Hearing
      Since 2008 Burlesque has owned and operated a club that
qualifies as an “Adult Entertainment Business” and “Adult
Cabaret” under section 12.70.1 Sometime prior to 2020 Burlesque
agreed to sell the club to a company called 603 Investments, LLC.
Because Municipal Code section 103.08 requires a business to
obtain a new permit when there is a change in ownership, 603
Investments applied to the Board of Police Commissioners for a
new “Cafe Entertainment/Show—Adult” permit for the club.2 In
January 2020 the Board held a hearing and denied
603 Investments’ application because the club was within 500

1      An “Adult Cabaret” includes a “nightclub, bar, restaurant
or similar establishment which regularly features live
performances which are characterized by the exposure of
‘specified anatomical areas,’” including “[l]ess than completely
and opaquely covered . . . buttocks . . . or female breasts below a
point immediately above the top of the areolas . . . . ”
(Section 12.70, subd. (B)(3), (13).) According to Burlesque, the
club “offers staged female theatrical dance performances during
which the theatrical performer does expose her breasts or
buttocks . . . within a defined area of the stage . . . .” An Adult
Cabaret qualifies as a type of “Adult Entertainment Business”
under section 12.70. (Section 12.70, subd. (B)(17).)

2      “Cafe entertainment and shows” includes “every form of
live entertainment, . . . participated in by one or more persons.”
(L.A. Mun. Code, § 103.102, subd. (a).)

                                 4
feet of a residential zone and therefore section 12.70 prohibited
using the location as an adult entertainment business.

      C.     Burlesque and 603 Investments File a Petition for
             Writ of Mandate, Which the Trial Court Denies
       After the City denied 603 Investments’ permit application,
Burlesque and 603 Investments filed a petition for writ of
administrative mandamus against the City. In addition to
alleging the City denied 603 Investments’ permit application,
Burlesque and 603 Investments alleged that Burlesque had a
permit authorizing it to provide adult entertainment shows at the
club and that the City “denied [Burlesque] its right to
Due Process of Law” by “confiscat[ing] and revok[ing]”
Burlesque’s permit “without affording [Burlesque] any prior
notice or opportunity to be heard . . . .” In particular, Burlesque
and 603 Investments alleged that in February 2020 a detective
from the Los Angeles Police Department threatened Burlesque’s
owner that, if he did not surrender Burlesque’s permit, officers
would issue citations and publicly confiscate the permit.
Burlesque and 603 Investments further alleged the City was
estopped from revoking Burlesque’s permit or denying
603 Investments’ application for a new permit to provide adult
entertainment at the club because the City knew Burlesque “was
presenting staged topless dance performances” and had approved
its permit every year since 2008.
       The trial court denied the petition. On 603 Investments’
claim, the court ruled that substantial evidence supported the
Board’s determination the strip club was within 500 feet of a
residential zone and that 603 Investments failed to show
equitable estoppel precluded the City from enforcing

                                 5
section 12.70. For Burlesque’s claim, the trial court ruled
Burlesque failed to present evidence the City made an adverse
decision regarding Burlesque’s permit. Burlesque (but not
603 Investments) appealed from the final judgment denying the
writ petition.

      D.     Burlesque Files This Action Against the City
      While the appeal from the judgment denying the petition
for writ of mandate was pending, Burlesque filed this action
against the City.3 In its first amended complaint, Burlesque
made essentially the same allegations it made in its writ petition:
Burlesque had a permit authorizing it to provide adult
entertainment at the club; the City confiscated and revoked the
permit without providing Burlesque notice or an opportunity to
be heard; a detective from the Los Angeles Police Department
threatened to issue citations and publicly confiscate the permit if
Burlesque did not surrender it; and the City was estopped from
revoking the permit.
      Burlesque asserted some traditional, as well as some
uniquely titled, causes of action: violation of its procedural due
process rights; cruel and unusual punishment; “chilling effect on
freedom of expression”; and “statutory infirmities—
inapplicability of code to [Burlesque] . . . .” Burlesque also
asserted a cause of action for violation of its right to equal
protection. Burlesque alleged the Topanga Press injunction
precluded the City from enforcing section 12.70 against

3     Another division of this court has since affirmed the
judgment denying the petition for writ of mandate. (See
Burlesque Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (June 28, 2022,
B313486) [nonpub. opn.].)

                                 6
Burlesque because Burlesque was “similarly situated” to the
“adult entertainment venues named as Plaintiffs in Topanga
Press” and was a third party beneficiary of the Topanga Press
injunction.

      E.      The City Files a Demurrer to the First Amended
              Complaint, Which the Trial Court Sustains
       The City demurred to the first amended complaint. As
relevant here, the City argued Burlesque failed to allege
sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action for violation of its
equal protection rights because Burlesque was not similarly
situated to the businesses named in the Topanga Press injunction
in that Burlesque was not a party to the Topanga Press litigation
or named in the injunction. The City asked the court to take
judicial notice of the district court’s injunction in that case, which
showed neither Burlesque nor any business operating at the
location of Burlesque’s club was named in the injunction.
       The City argued Burlesque’s cause of action for violation of
procedural due process failed for two reasons. First, the City
contended “[d]ue process was provided” at the Board’s
January 2020 hearing on 603 Investments’ application for a
permit. The City supported its argument with a request for
judicial notice of the transcript of the hearing. Second, the City
contended Burlesque failed to allege a “deprivation of a land use
to which it was entitled.” Citing section 103.30 of the Municipal
Code, the City argued Burlesque’s permit “did not authorize
[Burlesque] to operate in violation of any laws.” (See L.A. Mun.
Code, § 103.30 [“[t]he granting of a permit by the Board does not
[¶] . . . [¶] (b) [r]elieve an applicant/permittee from compliance
with all applicable local, state, and federal laws, including those

                                  7
related to . . . zoning”].) Therefore, according to the City,
Burlesque never had a right to operate an adult cabaret at the
club. The City made similar arguments on each of Burlesque’s
remaining causes of action.
       The trial court granted the City’s requests for judicial
notice and sustained the demurrer to each cause of action. On
the cause of action for violation of equal protection, the court
ruled Burlesque failed to allege how the City applied
section 12.70 in an unequal manner. The court ruled Burlesque
could not enforce the Topanga Press injunction because
Burlesque was neither a party to the litigation nor referred to in
the injunction and Burlesque did not sufficiently allege it was a
third party beneficiary of the injunction.
       On the cause of action for violation of procedural due
process, the court ruled Burlesque “fail[ed] to sufficiently allege
that it had a legitimate interest in the permit to operate” the
strip club. The court stated that, “even if [Burlesque] had been
granted” a permit, Burlesque was “still required to comply with
zoning regulations,” and it was “undisputed that [Burlesque]
violated” section 12.70 “by operating within 500 feet” of a
residential zone. After ruling the remaining causes of action also
failed, the court gave Burlesque leave to amend its cause of
action for violation of equal protection, but sustained the
demurrer to the remaining causes of action (including violation of
procedural due process) without leave to amend.4

4      The City also contended that, if Burlesque stated any cause
of action, the trial court should stay the action pending the
appeal from the judgment denying the petition for writ of
mandate because the two actions involved the same parties and

                                 8
      F.    Burlesque Files a Second Amended Complaint;
            the City Files a Demurrer, Which the Trial Court
            Sustains Without Leave To Amend
      Burlesque filed a second amended complaint, alleging a
single cause of action for violation of equal protection. Burlesque
added an allegation that in 2004 the City sent Burlesque a letter
notifying Burlesque of certain revisions to the Municipal Code
applicable to establishments that provide adult entertainment.
Burlesque attached a copy of the letter, which stated: “Our
records indicate your business meets the criteria for adult
entertainment.” According to Burlesque, the letter showed that
the City “agreed that [Burlesque] was in effect a third party
beneficiary” of the Topanga Press injunction and that the City
“would continue to refrain from enforcing Los Angeles Municipal
Code § 12.70” against Burlesque.
      The City demurred again, arguing the letter did not show
Burlesque had a right to enforce the Topanga Press injunction
because the letter did not mention the injunction or section 12.70.
The trial court agreed and sustained the demurrer to the second
amended complaint, this time without leave to amend, and
entered judgment in favor of the City. Burlesque timely appealed
from the judgment.

same causes of action. Because the trial court sustained the
demurrer on other grounds, the court did not reach this issue.
The City does not argue on appeal that, now that the judgment
denying the petition for writ of mandate has been affirmed, claim
or issue preclusion bars Burlesque’s causes of action in this
action.

                                9
                          DISCUSSION

       A.     Standard of Review
       “‘In reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we examine
the operative complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges
facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.’”
(Mathews v. Becerra (2019) 8 Cal.5th 756, 768; accord, Martin v.
Gladstone (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 681, 688-689; Thompson v.
Spitzer (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 436, 451.) “We treat the demurrer
as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not
contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Mathews,
at p. 768, internal quotation marks omitted; accord, Martin, at
p. 689; Lauckhart v. El Macero Homeowners Assn. (2023)
92 Cal.App.5th 889, 899.) “‘[W]e accept as true even improbable
alleged facts, and we do not concern ourselves with the plaintiff’s
ability to prove [the] factual allegations.’” (Marina Pacific Hotel
& Suites, LLC v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 96, 104-105; accord, Nolte v. Cedars–Sinai
Medical Center (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401; see Alcorn v. Anbro
Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 496 [“the question of
plaintiff’s ability to prove these allegations, or the possible
difficulty in making such proof does not concern the reviewing
court”].) “[W]e give the complaint a reasonable interpretation,
reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Mathews, at
p. 768, internal quotation marks omitted; accord, Lauckhart, at
p. 899; Marina Pacific, at p. 105.)

                                 10
      B.     The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting the City’s
             Requests for Judicial Notice
       In sustaining the City’s demurrers to the first and second
amended complaints, the trial court granted the City’s request for
judicial notice of 18 exhibits submitted in support of the
demurrer. Burlesque spends a significant portion of its opening
brief arguing that, by filing a request for judicial notice, the City
“filed an improper speaking motion rather than the required
Motion for Summary Judgment under California Code of Civil
Procedure [section 437c] or a properly pled Demurrer.”5
       When ruling on a demurrer, courts “consider matters which
may be judicially noticed.” (Mathews v. Becerra, supra, 8 Cal.5th
at p. 768, internal quotation marks omitted; see Centinela
Freeman Emergency Medical Associates v. Health Net of
California, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 994, 1010; Martin v. Gladstone,
supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 698; Lauckhart v. El Macero
Homeowners Assn., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 899.) “‘The courts

5       “A speaking motion to dismiss or strike is one which is
supported by facts outside the pleadings,” which “ordinarily are
set forth in an affidavit or declaration . . . .” (Vesely v. Sager
(1971) 5 Cal.3d 153, 167, fn. 4.) Prior to 1956 a defendant could
file a nonstatutory speaking motion to dismiss an action. (See,
e.g., Cunha v. Anglo California Nat. Bank of San Francisco
(1939) 34 Cal.App.2d 383, 389.) Such motions were “addressed to
the ‘inherent right of a court to strike or dismiss a complaint
when it is made to appear by extraneous evidence that it is sham
and based upon false allegations.’” (Vesely, at p. 167.) In 1956
the Supreme Court abolished the non-statutory speaking motion.
(Pianka v. State (1956) 46 Cal.2d 208, 211-212; see Vesely, at
p. 167 [“‘nonstatutory speaking motions have . . . been superseded
by the procedure governing motions for summary judgment
contained in section 437c of the Code of Civil Procedure’”].)

                                 11
. . . will not close their eyes to situations where a complaint
contains . . . allegations contrary to facts which are judicially
noticed.’ [Citation.] ‘Thus, a pleading valid on its face may
nevertheless be subject to demurrer when matters judicially
noticed by the court render the complaint meritless.’” (McAllister
v. County of Monterey (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 253, 290; see Pich
v. Lightbourne (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 480, 490 [“in testing a
complaint against a demurrer, we may disregard allegations that
are inconsistent with . . . matters judicially noticed”].)
        Burlesque does not discuss any of the exhibits the trial
court took judicial notice of, much less explain through reasoned
argument and citations to authority why the trial court erred in
taking judicial notice of any particular exhibit. Therefore,
Burlesque has forfeited any contention the trial court erred in
taking judicial notice of any of the documents. (See L.O. v.
Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616, 620[“‘[w]hen an appellant fails
to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned
argument and citations to authority,’” the point is forfeited];
Estrada v. Public Employees’ Retirement System (2023)
95 Cal.App.5th 870, 889 [same]; see also L.O., at p. 620 [same for
failing “‘“to support an argument with the necessary citations to
the record’’”].)
        Moreover, we need only consider three documents of which
the trial court took judicial notice to dispose of Burlesque’s
arguments on appeal: (1) various provisions of the Municipal
Code; (2) the Topanga Press injunction; and (3) a City “Zone
Information and Map Access System (ZIMAS) Zoning Map” that
showed the City’s zoning designations for all lots within 500 feet
of the club. The first is subject to judicial notice under Evidence
Code section 452, subdivision (b), as a “[r]egulation [or]

                                 12
legislative enactment[ ] issued by or under the authority of . . .
any public entity in the United States.” (See Urgent Care
Medical Services v. City of Pasadena (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1086,
1094 [taking judicial notice of a city’s municipal code]; Union of
Medical Marijuana Patients, Inc. v. City of Upland (2016)
245 Cal.App.4th 1265, 1269, fn. 2 [same]; see also Evid. Code
§ 459 [“[t]he reviewing court shall take judicial notice of (1) each
matter properly noticed by the trial court”].) The second is the
proper subject of judicial notice under Evidence Code section 452,
subdivision (d), as a “[r]ecord[ ] of . . . any court of record of the
United States,” and Burlesque attached a copy of the Topanga
Press injunction as an exhibit to its first and second amended
complaints. (See Panterra GP, Inc. v. Superior Court of Kern
County (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 697, 708 [in reviewing an order
sustaining a demurrer, “[w]e also consider any exhibits to the
complaint”]; Hoffman v. Smithwoods RV Park, LLC (2009)
179 Cal.App.4th 390, 400 [same].) The third is relevant, for
purposes of this appeal, only to the order sustaining the
demurrer to the cause of action for violation of procedural due
process. Because we are reversing the order sustaining the
demurrer to that cause of action, we assume, without deciding,
the zoning map is subject to judicial notice. (See Venuto v.
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 116 [taking
judicial notice of a city’s zoning ordinance and zoning map].)

                                  13
      C.    The Trial Court Did Not Err in Sustaining the
            Demurrer to the Cause of Action for Violation of
            Equal Protection

              1.     Applicable Law
       “‘“The concept of equal protection”’” under both the United
States Constitution and California Constitution “‘“recognizes that
persons who are similarly situated with respect to a law’s
legitimate purposes must be treated equally.”’” (In re C.B. (2018)
6 Cal.5th 118, 134; accord, Perry v. City of San Diego (2021)
65 Cal.App.5th 172, 187; A.S. v. Miller (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th
284.) “Although ‘[e]qual protection challenges typically involve
claims of discrimination against an identifiable class or group of
persons[,] . . . a plaintiff who does not allege membership in a
class or group may state a claim as a “‘class of one.’”’” (Lafayette
Bollinger Development LLC v. Town of Moraga (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 752, 782; accord, Las Lomas Land Co., LLC v.
City of Los Angeles (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 837, 857; see Village
of Willowbrook v. Olech (2000) 528 U.S. 562, 564 [120 S.Ct. 1073]
[“[o]ur cases have recognized successful equal protection claims
brought by a ‘class of one,’ where the plaintiff alleges that she has
been intentionally treated differently from others similarly
situated”].) “To succeed on a class of one claim, a plaintiff must
establish that ‘(1) the plaintiff was treated differently from other
similarly situated persons, (2) the difference in treatment was
intentional, and (3) there was no rational basis for the difference
in treatment.’” (Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor
Relations Bd. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1118, 1144; see Lafayette, at

                                 14
p. 783; Bottini v. City of San Diego (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th
281, 318.)6
             2.     Burlesque Did Not Allege It Was Treated
                    Differently from Similarly Situated Persons or
                    Entities
      In its first and second amended complaints, Burlesque
alleged that, “since the [Topanga Press] injunction was entered in
the U.S. District Court,” the City has “not enforced the enjoined

6      In cases concerning discrimination against an identifiable
class or group, “[a]n equal protection analysis has two steps.
‘“‘The first prerequisite . . . is a showing that the state has
adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly
situated groups in an unequal manner.’”’” (Conservatorship of
Eric B. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1085, 1102, italics omitted.) In a case
pending in the Supreme Court, the Court has requested
supplemental briefing on the following issue: “Whether the first
step of the two-part inquiry used to evaluate equal protection
claims, which asks whether two or more groups are similarly
situated for the purposes of the law challenged, should be
eliminated in cases concerning disparate treatment of classes or
groups of persons, such that the only inquiry is whether the
challenged classification is adequately justified under the
applicable standard of scrutiny?” (People v. Hardin, review
granted Jan. 11, 2023, S277487.) Even if the Supreme Court
eliminates the first step in cases concerning disparate treatment
of classes or groups, however, it is not clear whether or how such
a holding would affect class-of-one claims. (See Conservatorship
of Eric B., at pp. 1108, 1113 (conc. opn. of Kruger, J.) [observing
that the United States Supreme Court has recognized the first
step “has a useful role to play in . . . cases involving so-called
‘“class of one”’ equal protection claims”].) Until the Supreme
Court articulates a different standard, we follow the standard for
class-of-one claims in Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agricultural
Labor Relations Bd., supra, 3 Cal.5th 1118.

                                15
provisions” of section 12.70 “against [the] Plaintiffs in Topanga
Press . . . .” Burlesque alleged that, like the plaintiffs in the
Topanga Press lawsuit, it was a “similarly situated adult
entertainment venue in the City of Los Angeles.”
       But it wasn’t. “To satisfy the first element”—that the
plaintiff was treated differently from other similarly situated
persons—“the plaintiff[ ] must not only demonstrate a disparity
in treatment but also that ‘the level of similarity between [it] and
the persons with whom [it] compare[s]’” itself is “‘extremely
high.’” (Squires v. City of Eureka (2014) 231Cal.App.4th 577,
594; accord, Cordi-Allen v. Conlon (2007) 494 F.3d 245, 251; see
Hu v. City of New York (2d Cir. 2019) 927 F.3d 81, 93 [where the
plaintiff does not show the defendant’s “subjective ill will” toward
the plaintiff, the plaintiff must show an “‘extremely high’ degree
of similarity between a plaintiff and comparator”].) A “class-of-
one plaintiff must be similarly situated to the proposed
comparator in all material respects.” (SmileDirectClub, LLC v.
Tippins (9th Cir. 2022) 31 F.4th 1110, 1123; see PBT Real Estate,
LLC v. Town of Palm Beach (11th Cir. 2021) 988 F.3d 1274, 1285;
Gianfrancesco v. Town of Wrentham (1st Cir. 2013) 712 F.3d 634,
640; Reget v. City of La Crosse (7th Cir. 2010) 595 F.3d 691, 695.)
As one court has stated, “the ‘similarly situated’ requirement
must be enforced with particular rigor in the land-use context
because zoning decisions ‘will often, perhaps almost always, treat
one landowner differently from another.’” (Cordi-Allen, at
p. 251.)
       True, Burlesque may have been an adult entertainment
business like the plaintiffs in the Topanga Press litigation, but
there was a material difference, evident from Burlesque’s
pleadings—Burlesque was not a party to the Topanga Press

                                16
litigation or the stipulated injunction. This difference is an
obvious reason the City would enforce section 12.70 against
Burlesque but not against the other adult entertainment
businesses Burlesque tried to compare itself to. Had the City
attempted to enforce section 12.70 against the parties in the
Topanga Press litigation, it might have violated a federal court
order. No such limitation precluded it from enforcing
section 12.70 against Burlesque. (See Conservatorship of Eric B.,
supra, 12 Cal.5th 1085, 1101 [the initial inquiry is not whether
persons are similarly situated in any respect, but “‘“‘whether they
are similarly situated for purposes of the [conduct] challenged’”’”];
Cordi-Allen v. Conlon, supra, 494 F.3d at p. 251 [“the proponent
of the equal protection violation must show that the parties with
whom he seeks to be compared have engaged in the same activity
. . . without such distinguishing or mitigating circumstances as
would render the comparison inutile”].)
        Similarly, the City had good reason for stipulating to the
injunction in the Topanga Press litigation. The plaintiffs in that
case sued the City and obtained a preliminary injunction
enjoining the City from enforcing section 12.70 against them.
(See Topanga Press, supra, 989 F.2d 1524.) Burlesque does not
cite any authority to support the proposition that, when
challenging a government entity’s enforcement of a statute or
ordinance, a party that has sued a government entity and
reached a settlement to resolve the proceedings is similarly
situated to a party that has not. (See Viske v. Basin Elec. Power
Co-op. (8th Cir. 1983) 712 F.2d 374, 375-377 [landowners who
obtained jury awards against an electric power collective
following condemnation proceedings were not similarly situated
to landowners in a different state who received higher payments

                                 17
from collective following test cases and a global settlement;
a party may not “turn hard bargaining into an equal protection
argument”]; see also In re C.B., supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 134 [equal
protection “does not require . . . that different things must be
treated as though they are the same”]; Baluyut v. Superior Court
(1996) 12 Cal.4th 826, 832 [“[u]nequal treatment which results
simply from . . . nonarbitrary selective enforcement of a statute
does not deny equal protection”].)
       Burlesque also contends it was a third party beneficiary of
the Topanga Press injunction (and presumably therefore
similarly situated to the parties named in the injunction). Even
if a party could, under appropriate circumstances, enforce a
consent decree as third party beneficiary of the decree,7
Burlesque did not adequately allege it was a third party
beneficiary.
       To be a third party beneficiary of a contract, a party must
show “not only (1) that it is likely to benefit from the contract, but
also (2) that a motivating purpose of the contracting parties is to
provide a benefit to the third party, and further (3) that
permitting the third party to bring its own breach of contract
action against a contracting party is consistent with the
objectives of the contract and the reasonable expectations of the
contracting parties.” (Goonewardene v. ADP, LLC (2019)

7      See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores (1975)
421 U.S. 723, 750 [“a consent decree is not enforceable directly or
in collateral proceedings by those who are not parties to it even
though they were intended to be benefited by it”]; In re Tobacco
Cases I (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1591, 1600, fn. 2 [“courts have
rejected the argument that consent decrees are contracts for
purposes of . . . ‘determining whether a third party beneficiary
action could be maintained for breach of that contract’”].)

                                 18
6 Cal.5th 817, 821; see Hernandez v. Meridian Management
Services, LLC (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1214, 1222; City of Oakland
v. Oakland Raiders (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 458, 472.) Burlesque
did not plead any facts suggesting that a motivating purpose of
the Topanga Press injunction was to benefit Burlesque or any
other business not named in the injunction. The injunction
enjoins the City from instituting any proceedings for violations of
certain provisions of section 12.70, subdivision (C), “against the
persons named below” and “at the locations within the City of
Los Angeles set forth below.” The injunction lists 20 separate
businesses and their addresses. The injunction does not list
Burlesque or any other business with the same address as
Burlesque’s club. And the injunction does not include any
language suggesting it was intended to benefit any person or
entity other than the named businesses. (See LaBarbera v.
Security National Ins. Co. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1329, 1341
[“‘‘“It must appear to have been the intention of the parties to
secure to [the third party] personally the benefit of its
provisions.’”’”]
        Nor does the City’s 2004 letter to Burlesque (or Burlesque’s
predecessor)8 add anything. The letter simply notifies the
addressee of certain revisions to the Municipal Code that “include
additional regulations for those establishments that provide
adult entertainment.” The letter states: “Our records indicate
your business meets the criteria for adult entertainment.” The
letter does not mention section 12.70, subdivision (C), or the
Topanga Press injunction. Like the Topanga Press injunction,

8    The letter is addressed to “Select Café, Entertainment and
Shows Business Operating in the City of Los Angeles.”
Burlesque alleged it has only been operating the club since 2008.

                                19
the letter contains no language suggesting a motivating purpose
of the injunction was to provide a benefit to Burlesque or any
other business not named in the injunction. Burlesque’s
allegation it is a third party beneficiary is an unsupported legal
conclusion, disregarded for purposes of reviewing the order
sustaining the demurrer. (See Loeffler v. Target Corp. (2014)
58 Cal.4th 1081, 1100 [“the reviewing court ‘does not . . . assume
the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law’”];
McBride v. Smith (2018) 18 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1173 [“‘Because
only factual allegations are considered on demurrer, we must
disregard any ‘contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or
law alleged [in the complaint.]”’”].)

      D.     The Court Erred in Sustaining the Demurrer to the
             Cause of Action for Violation of Procedural Due
             Process
      “Both the federal and state Constitutions compel the
government to afford persons due process before depriving them
of any property interest.” (Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v.
Los Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197,
212; accord, California DUI Lawyers Assn. v. Department of
Motor Vehicles (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 517, 529.) “‘The essence of
due process is the requirement that “a person in jeopardy of
serious loss [be given] notice of the case against him and
opportunity to meet it.”’ [Citations.] The opportunity to be heard
must be afforded ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.’” (Today’s Fresh Start, at p. 212; accord, California DUI
Lawyers Assn., at pp. 529-530.)
      Burlesque alleged that it held an “an annually renewed
City of Los Angeles Police Commission Permit authorizing Cafe

                                20
Entertainment/Shows Adult to be presented” at the club; that the
City last approved the permit in 2019 (although Burlesque did
not specify the date); and that in February 2020, without any
notice, a Los Angeles Police Department detective demanded that
Burlesque’s owner surrender the permit and threatened that, if
he did not, officers would issue citations and confiscate the
permit. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Burlesque’s
allegations, as we must in reviewing an order sustaining a
demurrer (Carroll v. City and County of San Francisco (2019)
41 Cal.App.5th 805, 811), Burlesque alleged that the City issued
it a permit to provide adult entertainment at the club (a property
interest) and that, while the permit was still valid, the City’s
agents effectively revoked the permit (a deprivation) without
providing Burlesque any notice or opportunity to be heard. These
allegations were sufficient to constitute a cause of action for
violation of Burlesque’s procedural due process rights.
(See Trans-Oceanic Oil Corp. v. City of Santa Barbara (1948)
85 Cal.App.2d 776, 778, 795 [“[i]n revoking a permit lawfully
granted” to a company to drill an oil well, “due process require[d]”
the city “act only upon notice to the permittee, upon a hearing,
and upon evidence substantially supporting a finding of
revocation”]; see also Kash Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles
(1977) 19 Cal.3d 294, 306-307 [ordinance that permitted
“summary seizure, retention and destruction” of noncompliant
newsstands, without providing newsstand owner a hearing on the
validity of the seizure, violated procedural due process]; cf. Logan
v. Zimmerman Brush Co. (1982) 455 U.S. 422, 434 [102 S.Ct.

                                21
1148] [“‘some form of hearing’ is required before the owner is
finally deprived of a protected property interest’”].)9
       The trial court ruled Burlesque did not sufficiently allege it
had a property interest in the permit. That ruling was incorrect.
“‘To have a property interest in a benefit’” to which due process
rights attach, the plaintiff must “‘have a legitimate claim of
entitlement to it.’” (Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales (2005)
545 U.S. 748, 756; see Saleeby v. State Bar (1985) 39 Cal.3d 547,
564; Hobbs v. City of Pacific Grove (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 311,
320.) Such entitlements are ““‘created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law.”’” (Town of Castle Rock, at
p. 756; accord, Hobbs, at p. 320; see Chan v. Judicial Council of
California (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 194, 200 [“a party must
demonstrate a promise or guarantee of a specific benefit or right
in the entity’s policies or state law”].)
       A person or entity does not necessarily have a statutory
entitlement to a permit. “The question of whether a statute
creates an expectation of entitlement sufficient to create a

9      There generally is no right to monetary damages for a
violation of procedural due process under either the United
States or the California Constitution. (Katzberg v. Regents of
University of California (2002) 29 Cal.4th 300, 309, 329;
see Fairview Valley Fire, Inc. v. Department of Forestry & Fire
Protection (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1272 [“[i]n the absence of
a statute otherwise providing for such damages, the denial,
suspension or revocation of a permit, license, certificate, approval
or authorization, will not give rise to a claim for damages”].) The
plaintiff, however, may seek declaratory relief or an injunction.
(Katzberg, at p. 307.) Burlesque sought, among other things, an
injunction requiring the City to reinstate its permit.

                                 22
property interest ‘will depend largely upon the extent to which
the statute contains mandatory language that restricts the
discretion of the [permitting authority] to deny [permits] to
applicants who claim to meet minimum eligibility requirements.’”
(Chan v. Judicial Council of California, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th
at p. 200.) “Once a permit has been issued,” however, “its
continued possession becomes a significant factor in the [holder’s]
legitimate pursuit of a livelihood. The revocation of a permit
thus involves state action affecting important interests of its
owner, and therefore cannot be accomplished without affording
the procedural due process required by the Constitution.”
(Traverso v. People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation (1993)
6 Cal.4th 1152, 1162.)
       Like other permits courts have held are statutory
entitlements, the permit here enabled Burlesque to operate a
business. (See Traverso v. People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation,
supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 1158, 1164 [permit for placing a billboard
was a property interest protected by due process]; Trans-Oceanic
Oil Corp. v. City of Santa Barbara, supra, 85 Cal.App.2d at
pp. 796-797 [permit for drilling an oil well was a property interest
that “cannot be taken away except by due process of law”]; see
also L.A. Mun. Code, § 103.02 [“No person may operate, engage
in, conduct or carry on any business without first obtaining a
permit issued by the Board of Police Commissioners.”].)
Moreover, the Municipal Code contains multiple provisions that
limit the City’s ability to revoke a permit, once issued, for “cafe
entertainment and shows.” (See Brown v. City of Los Angeles
(2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 155, 170 [“A statute, rule or regulation
may create an entitlement to a governmental benefit . . . if it sets
out the only conditions under which the benefit may be denied.”].)

                                23
The Municipal Code enumerates specific grounds on which the
Board may initiate disciplinary actions against permittees or
suspend or revoke permits; for example, where the “business has
been operated in violation of any of the applicable [permitting]
requirements” or where the permittee or its agent was convicted
of certain offenses relating to the business. (L.A. Mun. Code,
§ 103.34.1; see id., §§ 103.34, 103.35.) With certain exceptions,
the permittee is entitled to a “hearing to determine whether a
permit should be revoked, suspended, limited, or
conditioned . . . .” (Id. § 102.03.) The hearing “shall be initiated
by filing an accusation,” which “shall be a written statement of
charges . . . set[ting] forth in ordinary and concise language the
acts or omissions with which the respondent is charged,” and
which “shall specify the statutes and rules which the respondent
is alleged to have violated . . . .” (Ibid.) Because the City had
limited discretion to revoke Burlesque’s permit, Burlesque had a
statutory entitlement to which due process rights attached.
(See Hobbs v. City of Pacific Grove, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at
p. 325 [“once it issued a short-term rental license,” the city “did
not have authority to revoke that license prior to expiration of the
contemplated one-year term absent notice to the licensee and an
opportunity for the licensee to be heard”].)
       In ruling Burlesque did not have a property interest in the
permit, the trial court relied on section 103.30, subdivision (b), of
the Municipal Code, which states granting a permit does not
“[r]elieve an applicant/permittee from compliance with all
applicable” zoning regulations. That may be, but the trial court
conflated two issues: (1) whether Burlesque had a property
interest entitling it to notice and an opportunity to be heard and
(2) whether the City had grounds to revoke that property

                                 24
interest. Burlesque alleged the City issued it a permit to operate
an adult entertainment business at the club’s address.10 That the
City’s decision to revoke Burlesque’s permit may have been
justified (if, for example, the terms of the permit were
inconsistent with section 12.70) does not change the fact that,
once issued, the permit was a statutory entitlement the City did
not have unfettered discretion to revoke. Indeed, one of the
purposes of having a due process right is to make sure Burlesque
knew why the City was revoking the permit and had an
opportunity to contest the City’s decision, even if Burlesque’s
defense ultimately proves unsuccessful. (See Hughes v. Rowe
(1980) 449 U.S. 5, 13, fn. 12 [“‘the right to procedural due process
is ‘absolute’ in the sense that it does not depend upon the merits
of a claimant’s substantive assertions’”]; Kreutzer v. County of
San Diego (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 62, 72 [same]; see also Kreutzer,
at p. 72 [“when the agency must make an independent
determination of the facts before it may suspend or revoke” a
license, the “license may not be suspended or revoked without
granting a hearing to the licensee”].)
       The City makes a number of arguments why Burlesque
cannot “continue operating an Adult Cabaret at the [club] in
violation of Section 12.70.C,” including that “the constitutional
validity of provisions like Section 12.70.C requiring closure of
pre-existing uses is well recognized”; that Burlesque “lacks
standing” to challenge the amortization period of section 12.70,
which required all adult entertainment businesses within
500 feet of a residential zone to discontinue operations by

10    An allegation the City did not contest through any
judicially noticeable material.

                                25
March 1988; and that “the limitations period to challenge”
section 12.70 “expired in 1986.” The City commits the same
mistake the trial court did, confusing whether the City had
grounds to revoke the permit and whether Burlesque had a
procedural due process right to notice and an opportunity to be
heard before the City revoked the permit.11

11     As discussed, the City argued in the trial court that
Burlesque received notice and a hearing, and the City submitted
a transcript of the hearing on the permit application submitted
by 603 Investments. The City has abandoned that argument on
appeal. Moreover, the hearing transcript does not indicate the
City considered whether to revoke Burlesque’s existing permit
during the hearing. Similarly, the City does not argue its alleged
failure to provide Burlesque notice and a separate hearing prior
to revoking the permit was harmless in light of 603 Investments’
hearing. (See Hipsher v. Los Angeles County Employees
Retirement Assn. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 671, 702 [“Generally, a
party is not deprived of due process in an administrative
proceeding unless the deficiency in process resulted in
prejudice.”]; Faton v. Ahmedo (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1172
[“For due process purposes, the relevant inquiry is whether the
respondent was afforded notice and an opportunity to defend
(citation), and whether any procedural irregularities were
prejudicial.”].) And on an unrelated point, because Burlesque
does not contend the trial court erred in sustaining the City’s
demurrer to Burlesque’s other causes of action, we do not address
them.

                               26
                        DISPOSITION

      The judgment is reversed. The trial court is directed to
vacate its orders sustaining the demurrers to the first and second
amended complaint. The court is directed to enter a new order
(1) overruling the demurrer to the cause of action in the first
amended complaint for violation of procedural due process and (2)
sustaining without leave to amend the demurrers to the
remaining causes of action in the first and second amended
complaints. Burlesque is to recover its costs on appeal.

                                            SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

                  FEUER, J.

                  MARTINEZ, J.

                               27