Court Opinion

ID: 9524435
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:52:39.341189+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:05.988589
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent.
Aliberti testified that he had only one discussion with his counsel about the possibility of his waiving a jury trial and that discussion occurred on the morning of trial. Aliberti’s trial counsel testified that he first *643discussed the possibility of waiving the jury trial on the day before the trial. The state’s attorney was not informed until the afternoon before trial. The trial court was advised on the morning of Aliberti’s scheduled jury trial, when Aliberti, upon recommendation of his trial counsel, waived his right to a jury trial.
The State claims that Aliberti knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. How can it be said that there was a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of this right when Aliber-ti’s counsel only provided him with half the information necessary to make such a waiver? Aliberti was never advised by his attorney on the full picture — the pros and the cons of waiving this constitutional right. His consent was a product of loss of hope, created by counsel. It certainly was not intelligent. It was foolish, even stupid. By encouraging, recommending (even coercing) Aliberti to waive his right to a jury, counsel’s assistance was ineffective. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
Aliberti’s trial counsel failed to meet his responsibility to consult in a meaningful manner with Aliberti on this important decision. Strickland, supra. A fair reading of this record reveals that counsel’s representation with respect to the question of jury trial waiver was so ineffective and casual that it evidences a manifest usurpation of Aliberti’s constitutional rights. State v. Anderson, 387 N.W.2d 544 (S.D.1986); State v. Phipps, 318 N.W.2d 128 (S.D.1982).
The prejudice suffered by Aliberti begins with the trial of his case to the court alone rather than to a jury composed of twelve of Aliberti’s peers. Factual determinations were left to a single mind rather than twelve. This was extremely damaging to Aliberti’s case because of the factual defense of diminished capacity chosen by Ali-berti’s trial counsel. The goal in a diminished capacity defense is to raise sufficient doubt in the mind of the jury as fact finder as to the prosecution’s proof of intent. See State v. Bittner, 359 N.W.2d 121 (S.D.1984); State v. Kills Small, 269 N.W.2d 771 (S.D.1978).
What was gained by giving up the right to a jury trial in this case? Nothing! Absolutely nothing! It would have been far, far wiser to obtain almost any minor concession in a plea bargain. The record indicates that Aliberti’s trial counsel scared Aliberti away from a jury trial. This was done on the basis that the presence and testimony of Aliberti’s mother and sister would unduly harm him before a jury but not before a judge. This is pure fiction and constitutes sufficient prejudice to Aliberti’s case for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
In addition, there was expert testimony that Aliberti’s trial counsel failed to conform his representation of Aliberti to the customary standards of skill and diligence of a reasonably competent defense lawyer practicing in Rapid City in his recommendation to Aliberti that he waive trial by jury. The expert stated: “[I]f there is going to be any doubt in a State’s case, ... the chances of creating that doubt or establishing that doubt are greater with a body of twelve people.”
I would reverse and remand for a new trial.