Court Opinion

ID: 9405451
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-28 16:13:10.877317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:22.069964
License: Public Domain

J-S09025-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 RONALD CALLOWAY                           :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :   No. 655 WDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 5, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-26-CR-0001065-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                        FILED: June 28, 2023

      Ronald Calloway appeals from the judgment of sentence of forty to 120

months of incarceration, followed by twelve months of mandatory state re-

entry supervision, imposed after a jury found him guilty of failure to verify his

address pursuant to his sexual offender registration requirements. We affirm.

      By way of background, Appellant pled guilty in 2007 to one count of

indecent assault as a misdemeanor of the first degree for an act occurring in

2006. He was sentenced to a period of incarceration of six to twelve months

and ordered to comply with the conditions of parole. One of those conditions

was compliance with Megan’s Law registration. See Commonwealth’s Exhibit

1 (Appellant’s Parole Minimum Summary, 9/7/11, at 1). Although it is unclear

from the record, it appears that Appellant remained incarcerated following the

expiration of the twelve-month maximum he received for the indecent assault
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conviction.1    Regardless, his Megan’s Law paperwork listed his registration

start date as October 17, 2012, and his registration end date as October 17,

2022.      See e.g., Exhibit 2 (Appellant’s Sexual Offender Registration,

11/12/20).

        Before discussing the conduct underlying Appellant’s failure to verify his

address, we take a brief detour into the pertinent amendments to sexual

offender registration in Pennsylvania. At the time Appellant was sentenced in

2007, he was subject to a ten-year registration term pursuant to Megan’s Law

III. Megan’s Law III remained the relevant statute on the books at the time

he began his registration in October 2012.

        Later that year, however, our legislature replaced Megan’s Law III with

Megan’s Law IV, more commonly known as the Sex Offender Registration and

Notification Act (“SORNA”). See Commonwealth v. Derhammer, 173 A.3d

____________________________________________

1 In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the trial court indicates that “Appellant’s
registration period was tolled because the Appellant was incarcerated. The
fact that that the Appellant was incarcerated was inadmissible because it was
more prejudicial than probative.” Trial Court Opinion, 7/8/22, at 2. Notably,
the record is devoid of any argument or decision related to the admissibility
of any periods of incarceration. However, we note with displeasure that the
transcript references several sidebar conferences, including the resolution of
objections, that were held off the record. It is possible that discussions
relevant to the issues discussed infra were held during those sidebar
conferences, but by virtue of Appellant’s failure to ensure their inclusion in the
certified record, this Court cannot consider anything that may have been
discussed therein in rendering our decision. See Commonwealth v. Lopez,
57 A.3d 74, 82 (Pa.Super. 2012) (noting that “it is an appellant’s duty to
ensure that the certified record is complete for purposes of review” and
whenever “portions of a proceeding are unrecorded, appellant’s burden to
supply a record may be satisfied through the statement in absence of
transcript procedures” (cleaned up)).

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723, 725 (Pa. 2017). After that, our Supreme Court held that Megan’s Law

III was unconstitutional in its entirety because its enactment had violated the

Pennsylvania Constitution’s single-subject rule.    See Commonwealth v.

Neiman, 84 A.3d 603 (Pa. 2013). Our High Court stayed its decision “to

provide a reasonable amount of time for the General Assembly to consider

appropriate remedial measures, or to allow for a smooth transition period” for

those registrants, like Appellant, whose offenses had been committed when

Megan’s Law III was in effect.     Id. at 616.   In response, the legislature

modified SORNA “to clarify that persons who were required to register with

the state police at any time before SORNA’s effective date, and whose

registration period had not expired, were still obligated to register with the

state police as provided in Section 9799.15[.]” Derhammer, supra at 726.

      Meanwhile, in 2017, our Supreme Court held the retroactive application

of SORNA upon defendants, like Appellant, whose crimes had been committed

before the passage of SORNA was unconstitutional pursuant to the ex post

facto clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution.      See Commonwealth v.

Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189, 1193 (Pa. 2017); see also Commonwealth v. Hart,

174 A.3d 660, 667 n.9 (Pa.Super. 2017) (“[T]he binding precedent emerging

from Muniz is confined to the determination that SORNA’s registration

requirement is punishment that runs afoul of the ex post facto clause of the

Pennsylvania Constitution when applied retroactively.”). In February 2018,

our legislature overhauled SORNA in response to Muniz. Of relevance here,

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individuals whose offenses were committed “on or after April 22, 1996, but

before December 20, 2012” fell under the provisions of Subchapter I. See 42

Pa.C.S. § 9799.52(1).        Thus, as of 2018, Appellant has been required to

register pursuant to Subchapter I.2

       Pertinent to this appeal, Subchapter I required Appellant to, inter alia,

inform the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) within three business days of a

change in residence and to report annually to verify his residence. See 42

Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.56(a)(2)(i) (notification regarding change of residence),

9799.60 (b) (annual verification of residence).             In compliance therewith,

Appellant registered a new address at Edgemont Drive in Uniontown,

Pennsylvania in November 2020. The home was owned by Appellant’s then-

girlfriend, Klarissa Hollins, and Appellant lived there with her until April 5,

2021, when he moved out as a result of a Protection From Abuse (“PFA”) order

Ms. Hollins obtained against him.              Despite having changed his residence,

Appellant did not update his address with PSP within the requisite three days.

Additionally, when he reported to PSP on April 26, 2021, for the annual

verification of his residence, he continued to list the Edgemont Drive address.

____________________________________________

2  We note that SORNA initially enlarged Appellant’s registration period to
fifteen years. However, Subchapter I reverted Appellant’s registration period
to the original ten-year period.

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Due to this failure to update his address, Appellant was charged as indicated

hereinabove.3

       On May 2, 2022, Appellant proceeded to a two-day jury trial.         Of

relevance to the instant appeal, the Commonwealth presented testimony from

PSP Trooper Jessica Zangla, as well as the above-cited Exhibits 1 and 2, to

establish that Appellant’s ten-year period of registration ran from October 17,

2012, to October 17, 2022. Appellant argued, among other things, that the

Commonwealth failed to prove why the registration start date was tolled until

October 2012, and therefore failed to establish that Appellant was subject to

registration in 2021. See N.T. Trial, 5/2/22, at 76. At the conclusion of the

trial, the jury found Appellant guilty.

       On May 5, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant as indicated

hereinabove. This timely appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial court

have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant raises the following issues for

our review:

       1. Whether the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient
          evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant]
          was subject to Megan’s Law registration at the time of the
          alleged offense, and thus failed to prove that [Appellant]
          violated 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1(a)(2).

____________________________________________

3 Although the Commonwealth initially charged Appellant for failure to comply
with Subchapter H’s registration requirements, the trial court permitted the
Commonwealth to amend the information to a violation of 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 4915.2, which relates to failure to comply with Subchapter I’s registration
requirements. See N.T. Trial, 5/2/22, at 14 (noting the court’s approval of
the amendment).

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      2. Whether the trial court erred in permitting the Commonwealth
         to offer the Megan’s Law file as a business record under Pa.R.E.
         803(6) or 902 where the documents were not properly
         authenticated?

      3. Whether [Appellant] was denied his Sixth Amendment right to
         confront witnesses against him where the Commonwealth was
         permitted to rely upon the unauthenticated Megan’s Law firm
         [sic] and Trooper Zangla’s hearsay testimony regarding
         Appellant’s registration start and end dates?

Appellant’s brief at 5 (reordered for ease of disposition).

      We first address Appellant’s sufficiency challenge “[b]ecause a

successful sufficiency of the evidence claim warrants discharge on the

pertinent crime[.]” Commonwealth v. Toritto, 67 A.3d 29, 33 (Pa.Super.

2013) (cleaned up).     We consider this claim mindful of our well-settled

standard of review:

      When reviewing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, we face a
      question of law. Accordingly, our standard of review is de novo.
      We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
      Commonwealth, as the verdict winner, and we draw all reasonable
      inferences therefrom in the Commonwealth’s favor. Through this
      lens, we must ascertain whether the Commonwealth proved all of
      the elements of the crime at issue beyond a reasonable doubt.

      The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every
      element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of
      wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, we may not weigh the
      evidence and substitute our judgment for the factfinder. Any
      doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the
      factfinder, unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that,
      as a matter of law, no probability of fact may be drawn from the
      combined circumstances. Critically, the jury, when ruling on the
      credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
      is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.

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Commonwealth v. Roberts, ___ A.3d ___, 2023 WL 2358844, at *1

(Pa.Super. 2023) (cleaned up). Appellant was charged with failure to verify

his address, which is defined in relevant part as follows:

      (a) Offense defined.--An individual who is subject to
      registration under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.55(a), (a.1) or (b) (relating
      to registration) or who was subject to registration under former
      42 Pa.C.S. § 9793 (relating to registration of certain offenders for
      ten years) commits an offense if the individual knowingly fails to:

            ....

            (2) verify the individual’s residence or be photographed as
            required under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.60 (relating to verification
            of residence)[.]

            ....

      (f) Applicability.--This section applies to:

            (1) An individual who committed an offense set forth in 42
            Pa.C.S. § 9799.55 on or after April 22, 1996, but before
            December 20, 2012, and whose period of registration under
            42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.55 has not expired.

18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.2.

      Appellant does not challenge the elements of the offense, but rather

whether the Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that

Appellant’s ten-year registration for his 2007 conviction had not expired as of

April 2021, where the Commonwealth did not present evidence of why his

start date did not begin until 2012. See Appellant’s brief at 20-21. In other

words, Appellant contests the statute’s applicability. According to Appellant,

“the jury could not reasonably infer that certain periods of time were tolled as

there was no evidence presented as to any tolling.” Id. at 21.

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       At trial, Trooper Zangla testified that, based upon Appellant’s Megan’s

Law file, he is classified as a ten-year registrant whose active registration

began on October 17, 2012.            See N.T. Trial, 5/2/22, at 40-41, 47.

Additionally, the Commonwealth introduced Appellant’s sexual offender

registration from November 2020, which he signed, and which states that his

ten-year registration period ran from October 17, 2012 to October 17, 2022.

See Commonwealth’s Exhibit 2 (Appellant’s Sexual Offender Registration,

11/12/20). Based on the foregoing, the evidence was sufficient for the jury

to determine that Appellant was subject to sexual offender registration when

he neglected to update his address in April 2021. See Roberts, supra at *3

(finding evidence sufficient to establish that defendant was a lifetime

registrant where the trooper “flatly told the jury that Roberts was a lifetime

registrant, and the jury believed him”).      It was squarely within the jury’s

purview to find Trooper Zangla and Appellant’s November 2020 registration

form    credible   in   determining   Appellant’s   registration   period.    The

Commonwealth bore the burden of establishing that Appellant was subject to

registration at the time he failed to update his address, it was not required to

explain why. Accordingly, Appellant’s first claim lacks merit.

       Appellant’s next issue attacks the trial court’s decision to permit Trooper

Zangla’s testimony about Appellant’s registration start and end dates based

upon hearsay evidence from an unauthenticated Megan’s Law file.              See

Appellant’s brief at 17-18. Specifically, Appellant challenges the admission of

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Exhibit 1 (Appellant’s Parole Minimum Summary, 9/7/11) and Exhibit 2

(Appellant’s Sexual Offender Registration, 11/12/20).

      We consider this claim mindful of the following legal principles.

Evidentiary rulings lie within the sound discretion of the trial court and will

only be overturned where the court has abused its discretion.             See

Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 265 A.3d 290, 297-98 (Pa. 2021).                “An

appellant cannot meet this burden by simply persuading an appellate court

that it may have reached a different conclusion than that reached by the trial

court; rather, to overcome this heavy burden, the appellant must demonstrate

that the trial court actually abused its discretionary power.”     Id. at 298

(cleaned up). This Court has explained that an abuse of discretion is “not

merely an error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or misapplication of

the law, or the exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the

result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of

record.” Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 749 (Pa.Super. 2014)

(cleaned up). Finally, an abuse of discretion based upon a disagreement with

the trial court’s decision is improper, as this Court is not permitted to

“substitute [our] own judgment for that of the trial court.” DiStefano, supra

at 298 (cleaned up).

      With respect to the admissibility of hearsay evidence, “Pennsylvania

Rule of Evidence 801 defines hearsay as an out-of-court statement made by

a declarant, which is offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter

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asserted. This type of evidence is generally inadmissible at trial unless it falls

into an exception to the hearsay rule.” Commonwealth v. Wallace, 289

A.3d 894, 895 (Pa. 2023) (cleaned up). The relevant exception in this appeal

is the business records exception, which provides as follows:

      A record (which includes a memorandum, report, or data
      compilation in any form) of an act, event or condition if:

            (A) the record was made at or near the time by--or from
            information transmitted by--someone with knowledge;

            (B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly
            conducted activity of a “business”, which term includes
            business, institution, association, profession, occupation,
            and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for
            profit;

            (C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity;

            (D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the
            custodian or another qualified witness, or by a certification
            that complies with Rule 902(11) or (12) or with a statute
            permitting certification; and

            (E) the opponent does not show that the source of
            information or other circumstances indicate a lack of
            trustworthiness.

Pa.R.E. 803(6).

      In considering this issue, we find persuasive this Court’s recent decision

in Commonwealth v. Fornah, 285 A.3d 900 (Pa.Super. 2022) (non-

precedential decision).   Therein, the defendant was charged with failing to

comply with Subchapter I’s registration requirements. Fornah was a lifetime

registrant under Subchapter I based upon a 1989 conviction for rape in

Washington state. In responding to a disturbance at Fornah’s residence, an

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officer learned that Fornah had an outstanding warrant in Washington for a

Megan’s Law violation.   The officer conveyed this information to the police

department’s Megan’s Law liaison, Detective Heather Halstead.         Detective

Halstead, in turn, confirmed Fornah’s triggering conviction, corresponding

registration   requirements,   and   outstanding   warrant   with   officials   in

Washington State, who supplied her with certified copies of the relevant court

records. When Detective Halstead informed Fornah that he was required to

register in Pennsylvania pursuant to SORNA, he disagreed, claiming he was

innocent of the underlying offense. Upon learning from the PSP that Fornah

had failed to register as a sexual offender, she obtained a warrant for his

arrest.

      At Fornah’s trial, PSP Trooper Chad Roberts testified that he was the

liaison for the Megan’s Law unit in Harrisburg and detailed, among other

things, the PSP SORNA checklist used with regard to Fornah’s registration

status. Fornah’s counsel objected to the testimony regarding the PSP checklist

as violative of Fornah’s right to confrontation and because it constituted

inadmissible hearsay. With respect to the hearsay challenge, the trial court

determined, over Fornah’s objection, that Trooper Roberts qualified as a

custodian for the PSP checklist:

      In his testimony, Trooper Roberts stated that as part of his
      professional duties he worked with the PSP Megan’s Law unit in
      Harrisburg, responsible for determining if an individual needs to
      register based on their past convictions. PSP maintains the state-
      wide registry of all persons convicted of sex offenses, including
      out-of-state offenders who were required to register in

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      Pennsylvania. Trooper Roberts had access to all of the records
      kept by the Megan’s Law Unit in Harrisburg, and those records
      were maintained under the care and custody of PSP in their
      regular course of business. Trooper Roberts stated that “we would
      obtain the actual records from the Megan’s Law Unit and be a
      keeper of those records to present in court testimony like we are
      here today.”

Id. (non-precedential decision at 13) (cleaned up). Pursuant to Rule 803(6),

this Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding

that Trooper Roberts qualified as a custodian for the PSP checklist.

      Here, Trooper Zangla testified that she was a Megan’s Law liaison for

the PSP. See N.T., 5/2/22, at 34. She explained to the jury the basic purpose

of Megan’s Law, that the PSP is tasked with maintaining Pennsylvania’s sexual

offender registry, and that the PSP works with other jurisdictions and state

agencies to monitor registration.    Id. at 35.   Additionally, Trooper Zangla

testified generally as to how offenders are notified of the need to register

initially and annually, where they go to register, and the time frame for

updating a change       in address    arising outside   the   annual reporting

requirement. Id. at 36-39. With respect to Appellant, Trooper Zangla brought

Appellant’s Megan’s Law file, which included “all of his registration and court

documentation, everything for Megan’s Law.” Id. at 40. Exhibits 1 and 2

were contained within that file and specifically pulled out as exhibits. Based

in part upon those exhibits, Trooper Zangla testified as to Appellant’s ten-year

period of registration and the attendant reporting requirements.

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      Considering the foregoing, the trial court determined that Trooper

Zangla, as a Megan’s Law liaison, was a custodian of the Megan’s Law file.

Further, it concluded that the file, which included Exhibits 1 and 2, was kept

in the regular course of the PSP’s activities. See N.T. Trial, 5/2/22, at 58-59;

N.T. Trial, 5/3/22, at 9-10. Upon review of the certified record, we discern no

abuse of discretion in the trial court’s conclusions.

      Appellant makes one final attempt at assailing the Commonwealth’s

evidence regarding the start date for his sexual offender registration.

Specifically, he argues that “Trooper Zangla’s hearsay testimony and the

documents contained in the Megan’s Law file were clearly testimonial in

nature, and thus [Appellant] was denied his right to cross-examine witnesses

who claimed his registration start date began on October 17, 2012, when he

was convicted of the underlying charge [in] 2007.” Appellant’s brief at 14.

      We consider this final argument within the following framework.

“Whether a defendant has been denied his right to confront a witness is a

question of law for which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of

review is plenary.”    Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 284 A.3d 465, 470

(Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned up).        Our Supreme Court has explained the

Confrontation Clause as follows:

      The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, made
      applicable to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment, provides
      that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
      to be confronted with the witnesses against him. [The U.S.
      Supreme] Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a
      defendant’s right to confront those who bear testimony against

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      him, and defined testimony as a solemn declaration or affirmation
      made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact. The
      Confrontation Clause, the High Court explained, prohibits out-of-
      court testimonial statements by a witness unless the witness is
      unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-
      examination.

Commonwealth v. Yohe, 79 A.3d 520, 530–31 (Pa. 2013) (cleaned up).

      To determine whether a statement is testimonial, “and, therefore,

subject to the protections of the Confrontation Clause . . ., a court must review

the statement itself in order to determine whether the primary purpose of the

evidence was to establish or prove past events relevant to a later criminal

prosecution.” Id. (cleaned up). Notably, “even if a record falls within the

business record exception, its admission may still violate the Confrontation

Clause   of   the   Sixth   Amendment      of   United   States   Constitution.”

Commonwealth v. Carter, 932 A.2d 1261, 1264 (Pa. 2007) (cleaned up).

      Once again, we find instructive this Court’s decision in Fornah. The

Fornah Court held that the “PSP’s worksheet was not testimonial and

therefore its admission through Trooper Roberts’[s] testimony did not violate

the Confrontation Clause.” Fornah, supra (non-precedential decision at 15).

In so holding, this Court observed that “the PSP worksheet was not created

for an evidentiary purpose and the PSP did not create the worksheet ‘under

circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe

that the [document] would be available for use at a later trial.’” Id. (non-

precedential decision at 15) (quoting Yohe, supra at 537 (citation omitted)).

Rather, we concluded that “the report’s primary purpose was to determine

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whether Fornah had to register under SORNA, and the PSP had a statutory

duty to maintain a sex offender database.       See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.67.”

Fornah, supra (non-precedential decision at 15-16) (cleaned up).

      Here, Appellant challenges the admission of Trooper Zangla’s testimony

and Exhibits 1 and 2. We begin with Trooper Zangla’s testimony. Plainly,

Appellant’s right to confront Trooper Zangla was not violated as there were no

out-of-court statements made by Trooper Zangla admitted at trial. Even if

there had been, she was clearly available and subject to cross-examination

and two rounds of re-cross-examination.      As to Appellant’s argument that

Trooper Zangla’s testimony regarding his registration start and end dates

based upon documents contained in the Megan’s Law file violated his right to

confrontation, our review of the record confirms that Appellant not only had

ample opportunity to attack her reliance on those documents and the

credibility of any testimony based thereon, but in fact did so. See N.T. Trial,

5/2/22, at 49-50 (“Your testimony that you been giving today is that you have

a bunch of documents that you went through and you are telling us what these

documents say; is that correct?”), 69-70 (highlighting that Trooper Zangla

was relying on parole documents while not being connected to the parole

board in any way). Accordingly, it is wholly apparent that Appellant was not

denied his right to confrontation with respect to Trooper Zangla’s testimony.

      We now turn to the documentary evidence. Upon review of the certified

record, we conclude that Exhibits 1 and 2 are similar to the PSP worksheet

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discussed in Fornah. To wit, Appellant’s Megan’s Law file was required to be

maintained pursuant to § 9799.67, which outlines the duties of the PSP

regarding the creation and maintenance of a statewide sexual offender

registry. The file was created to determine whether Appellant had to register,

not for an evidentiary purpose or in a manner that would lead an objective

individual to reasonably believe that the file would be used at a later trial. The

same holds true for the individually admitted documents contained therein,

i.e., Appellant’s parole summary and Appellant’s November 2020 sexual

offender registration. Since the contested documents are not testimonial, the

Confrontation Clause is not implicated and Appellant’s argument fails.

      To summarize, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to sustain

Appellant’s conviction, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

admitting Exhibits 1 and 2 pursuant to the business record exception, and the

admission of evidence regarding Appellant’s registration period did not violate

his right to confrontation. Thus, we affirm his judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/28/2023

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