Court Opinion

ID: 9517045
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:02:07.976703+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:10.386456
License: Public Domain

OPINION
RILEY, Judge.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant-Defendant, Kristopher Abney (Abney), appeals his conviction for Count I, possessing material capable of causing bodily injury by inmate, a Class C felony, Ind.Code § 35-44-8-9.5.
We affirm.
ISSUE
Abney raises four issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as the following two issues:
(1) Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Abney's conviction for possessing material capable of causing bodily injury by inmate; and
(2) Whether the trial court properly sentenced Abney in light of Blakely v. Washington.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
At approximately 2:30 a.m. on June 22, 2003, Jail Commander Jeff Berlasty (Commander Berlasty) of the Fulton County Jail, received a report that the inmates of cellblock # 3 refused to retire to their cells for the nightly lock-down. Cellblock #3 consists of a common area, surrounded by four cells, with two cells upstairs and two cells downstairs. Although each cell only contains one bunk bed, on June 22, 2008, cellblock #3 held seven inmates. Three inmates were required to sleep on a mattress on the floor of their respective cells. Abney was assigned to the lower right-hand cell of cellblock # 8.
Upon his arrival at cellblock #3, Commander Berlasty performed a search of the cells. During this search, the inmates were removed and held in a separate area. While searching Abney's cell, Commander Berlasty recovered, besides Abney's personal effects, an item described as an altered binderelip. In addition, he found a small item partially inserted into a vent in the wall of Abney's cell. Commander Ber-lasty characterised this item as a shank, and described it as a hardened steel object with one end wrapped in a face cloth secured by a string and the other end sharpened to a point. The steel portion of this item originated from the altered binderelip found among Abney's personal effects. Following the search, Commander Ber-lasty confronted Abney with the discovery of the altered binderelip and shank. Although Abney admitted that he knew the *264shank was in the vent, he denied possession of it, and instead claimed that another inmate had left it there.
On July 9, 2003 the State filed an information against Abney, charging him with Count I, possessing material capable of causing bodily injury by inmate, a Class C felony. On April 9, 2004, the State filed an amended information. On April 21 through April 22, 2004, a jury trial was held. At the close of the evidence, the jury returned a guilty verdict on Count I. On July 7, 2004, after a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Abney to an executed sentence of seven years, to be served at the Department of Correction.
Abney now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
First, Abney contends that the State did not present sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for possessing material capable of causing bodily injury by inmate. Specifically, Abney claims that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he constructively possessed the device since he did not have exclusive use of his cell.
Our standard of review with regard to sufficiency claims is well-settled. In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims, this court does not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Williams v. State, 714 N.E.2d 671, 672-78 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). We only consider the evidence most favorable to the judgment and the reasonable inferences therefrom and will affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the conclusion of the trier-of-fact. Id. at 678. This court has held that a conviction for the crime charged may be based on cireumstantial evidence. Marrow v. State, 699 N.E.2d 675, 677 (Ind.Ct. App.1998); Duren v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1198, 1201 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied. Reversal is only appropriate when reasonable persons would be unable to form inferences as to each material element of the offense. Mabbitt v. State, 703 N.E.2d 698, 700 (Ind.Ct.App.1998).
The offense of possessing material capable of causing bodily injury by inmate as a Class C felony is defined by 1.C. § 85-44-3-9.5, in pertinent part, as: "[all person who knowingly or intentionally while incarcerated in a penal facility possesses a device, ... that: (1) is used; or (2) intended to be used; in a manner that is readily capable of causing bodily injury commits a Class C felony. Thus, in order to convict Abney, the State was required to prove that: (1) he knowingly possessed a device while incarcerated, and (2) that the device is intended to be used in a manner that is readily capable of causing bodily injury."
Here, the State prosecuted Ab-ney under the theory of constructive possession after conceding that Abney's cell was not under his exclusive possession. It is well-established that constructive possession occurs when a defendant has both (i) the intent to maintain dominion and control over the device and (i) the capability to maintain dominion and control over the item in question. Gee v. State, 810 N.E.2d 338, 340 (Ind.2004). The proof of a possessory interest in the premises on which the device is found is adequate to show the capability to maintain dominion and control. See id. at 341. In essence the law infers that the party in possession of the premises is capable of exercising dominion and control over all items on the premises. See id.; Martin v. State, 175 Ind.App. 503, 372 N.E.2d 1194, 1197 (1978) (a house or apartment used as a residence is controlled by the person who lives in it and that person may be found in control of *265any drugs discovered therein, whether he is the owner, tenant, or merely an invitee.). This applies regardless whether the possession of the premises is exclusive. (Geg, 810 N.E.2d at 341.
In the instant case, Commander Ber-lasty testified that although cellblock #3 was overcrowded on June 22, 2003, Abney was the sole occupier of the lower right-hand cell. Even though the record supports that inmates were free to move between cells during the day, Abney's cell contained only his mattress and his personal possessions. Therefore, we conclude that Abney was in possession of his cell and thus capable of exercising dominion and control over all items discovered on these premises. See id.
However, the law takes a different view with regard to the intent prong of constructive possession. When a defendant's possession of the premises on which the device is found is not exclusive, then the inference of intent to maintain dominion and control over the device must be supported by additional cireumstances pointing to the defendant's knowledge of the nature of the device and its presence. See id. These additional cireumstances can be found through a variety of means: (1) incriminating statements made by the defendant; (2) attempted flight or furtive gestures; (8) location of substances like drugs in settings that suggest manufacturing; (4) proximity of the contraband to the defendant; (5) location of the contraband within the defendant's plain view; and (6) the mingling of the contraband with other items owned by the defendant. Id.
In the case at bar, Commander Berlasty testified that the device was partially inserted into a vent in Abney's cell with the part secured by a cloth sticking out into the cell. He stated that even though the sharpened end of the device was inserted into the vent, the other end was visible from the cell and did not take long to be discovered during the search. Commander Berlasty elaborated that the sharpened end of the device was constructed of hardened steel, originating from an altered bin-derclip. The record shows that this altered binderclip was found on the desk of Abney's cell, amongst his other personal possessions. Furthermore, in his statement to Sergeant Edward Beaird of the Fulton County Sheriff's Department, Ab-ney admitted to knowing that the device was in his cell. As a result we conclude that Abney intended to maintain dominion and control over the device.
Next, Abney asserts that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the device was used or intended to be used in a manner readily capable of causing bodily injury. See I.C. § 35-44-3-9.5. We agree with Abney that the phrase "intended to be used" is part of the relative clause, modifying the antecedents "in a manner that is readily capable of causing bodily injury" and is not indicative of his level of culpability. See Hevenor v. State, 784 N.E.2d 937, 941 (Ind.Ct.App.2003). Rather, the culpability level for 1.C. § 85-44-3-9.5 is clearly defined in the opening sentence as "a person who knowingly or intentionally ... possesses."
During trial, Commander Berlasty described the device as a hardened piece of steel, sharpened to a point. He elaborated its usage as a defensive weapon, easily capable of causing bodily injury to guards, other inmates, and the public in general. Based on Commander Berlasty's testimony, we conclude that the jury could reasonably infer that the device was intended to be used in a manner readily capable of causing bodily injury. See I.C. § 35-44-3-9.5; see Williams, 714 N.E.2d at 672-73.
However, Abney now urges us to discard Commander Berlasty's testimony re*266garding the characterization of the device because of his limited time of employment in his current position. Nevertheless, Ab-ney's assertion amounts to nothing more than an invitation to reweigh Commander Berlasty's testimony. We decline this invitation.
In light of the evidence before us, we conclude that the jury could reasonably find that Abney was an inmate, possessing material capable of causing bodily injury. The record clearly indicates that Abney had both the intent and capability to maintain dominion and control over the device and that the device was intended to be used in a manner capable of causing bodily injury. See I.C. § 35-44-3-9.5. Accordingly, we find that there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the conclusion of the jury. See Williams, 714 N.E.2d at 672. Consequently, we hold that the State presented sufficient evidence to support Abney's conviction.
II. Sentencing
Next, Abney asserts that the trial court's imposition of an enhanced sentence violates Blakely v. Washington, -- U.S. --, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 LEd.2d 403 (2004), reh'g denied. Specifically, Abney contends that the trial court erred by enhancing his sentence based on aggravators which were not supported by jury findings. Conversely, the State maintains that Indiana's sentencing scheme differs from the one struck down in Blakely and that it therefore does not run afoul of the Sixth Amendment. - Alternatively, the State claims that, even if Blakely should apply, any error in this case is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
A. Blakely v. Washington
The determination of the appropriate sentence rests within the discretion of the trial court and we will not reverse the trial court's determination absent a showing of manifest abuse. Powell v. State, T5l
N.E.2d 311, 314 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). In Blakely, however, the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of aggravating factors used to increase the sentence for a crime above the presumptive sentence assigned by the legislature. Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2536. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that "[o|ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 580 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 LEd.2d 435 (2000)). The Supreme Court defined this statutory maximum as "the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." Id. at 2537. (emphasis in original). "In other words, the relevant statutory maximum is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings." Id. (emphasis in original). Furthermore, we are convinced that the Supreme Court's recent opinion in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. --, --, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (Stevens, J., writing for the Court) does not alter the Blakely rule as it applies in Indiana. As Justice Stevens espoused, "Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." Id., at 756. This statement is reinforced by Justice Breyer writing that, "the Court holds that ... the Sixth Amendment requires juries, not judges to find facts relevant to sentencing." Id., at 756.
*267Accordingly, we concluded in Krebs v. State, 816 N.E.2d 469, 475 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004), that it appeared that our trial courts no longer have discretion to sentence a criminal defendant to more than the presumptive sentence unless the defendant waives his right to a jury at sentencing, a jury first determines the existence of aggravating factors, or the defendant has a criminal history.
B. Indiana's Sentencing Scheme
As its main argument, the State maintains that Blakely does not apply to Indiana's sentencing scheme. In particular, the State alleges that Blakely does not require jury findings under Indiana's sentencing scheme because a presumptive sentence is merely a guidepost which enables the trial court to impose an appropriate sentence. We are not convinced.
We recently held that because in Indiana the presence of a single aggravating cireumstance may lead to an enhanced sentence, i.e., one greater than the presumptive sentence, the presumptive sentence equates to Blakely's statutory maximum. See Strong v. State, 817 N.E.2d 256, 261 (Ind.Ct.App.2004); Holden v. State, 815 N.E.2d 1049, 1059 n. 6 (Ind.Ct.App.2004); Berry v. State, 819 N.E.2d 443, 456 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). Based on this newly, established caselaw, we reject the State's assertion that the presumptive sentence functions as a sentencing guidepost. Consistent with our prior decisions, we hold that Blakely prohibits our trial courts from imposing a sentence greater than the presumptive one based on a factor not admitted by the defendant or submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
C. Use of Aggravating Circumstances
In the instant case, the trial court sentenced Abney to an enhanced sentence of seven years for possessing material capable of causing bodily injury by inmate as a Class C felony. Indiana Code section 35-50-2-6 provides that "a person who commits a Class C felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of four years, with not more than four years added for aggravating cireumstances or not more than two years subtracted for mitigating cireum-stances." Our review of the elaborate sentencing order reveals that the trial court enhanced Abney's sentence based on the following aggravators: (1) Abney's prior juvenile and adult criminal history that indicates a consistent inability to conform his conduct to the law and rules of society; (2) Abney's prior eriminal history indicates a high risk of future criminal behavior; (8) the crime for which Abney was convicted was committed while incarcerated for another alleged erime and while on probation for a Class B felony burglary conviction; and (4) past probation and short jail term have not deterred Abney from violating the law, demonstrating an inability to abide by the law, to reform his behavior and a disdain for the trial court's sentencing authority. In balancing these aggrava-tors, the trial court specifically addressed Abney's proffered mitigators but did not assign them any weight.
Abney now asserts error in the trial court's findings of the four aggravators. In particular, Abney alleges that (1) juvenile adjudications do not constitute prior convictions and thus must be supported by jury findings under Blakely; (2) several adult charges listed in the trial court's sentencing order resulted in dismissals, rather than convictions, and thus should be found by a jury; (8) the trial court's aggra-vator that, based on his criminal history, Abney has a high risk of committing future criminal behavior should be found by a jury; and (4) the trial court impermissibly used a material element of the offense to *268enhance Abney's sentence. We will discuss each of these arguments in turn.
In this court's recent opinion of Ryle v. State, 819 N.E.2d 119 (Ind.Ct.App., 2004), we specifically held that juvenile adjudications are considered "prior conviec-tions" under Apprendi, and thus can be properly identified by the trial court without any prior finding by the jury. However, our review of Abney's juvenile adjudications shows that only two charges of the total four charges resulted in formal adjudications. As a result, we conclude that only these two formal adjudications can be characterized as aggravators for the purpose of enhancing Abney's sentence.
With regard to Abney's adult criminal history, the record lists six separate offenses. The record reflects that two of these six offenses were dismissed. In light of Blakely's clear language that "Lolther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt," the dismissed offenses cannot be used as aggravators without a specific finding by a jury. See Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2536. No such finding was made in the instant case; accordingly, we conclude that only four offenses can be properly used as the basis of the aggravating cireumstance.
Further, we find that the trial court's generalized aggravators relating to Abney's possible future eriminal conduct and inability to conform his behavior to the law and rules of society fall outside the seope of Blakely. The trial court clearly based its assessment of Abney's future behavior on Abney's current juvenile and adult criminal history. Even though we found that several offenses listed in his criminal history cannot be used as aggra-vators, nevertheless, his history remains impressive, and properly supported the trial court's generalized aggravator. As we have held before, where an enhanced sentence is based upon a defendant's prior history and aggravators derived of that history, the Blakely analysis is not implicated. See Bledsoe v. State, 815 N.E.2d 507, 508 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), opinion on reh'g; Carson v. State, 813 N.E.2d 1187, 1189 (Ind.Ct.App.2004).
Lastly, Abney argues that the trial court used a material element of the instant offense as an aggravator. In its sentencing order, the trial court listed as aggravator "the crime for which [Abney] was convicted was committed while incarcerated for another alleged crime and while on probation for a Class B felony burglary conviction." (Appellant's App. p. 24). Yet, Indiana Code section 35-44-3-9.5 requires, as an element of the crime of possessing material capable of causing bodily injury by inmate, that the person charged be incarcerated in a penal facility. Thus, we agree that the trial court's finding of Abney's incarceration is an improper aggravator since it is also a material element of the crime. See Donnegan v. State, 809 N.E.2d 966, 978 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004) (holding that a material element of an offense cannot be used to enhance a sentence). However, we find that the trial court's finding that Abney committed the instant offense while on probation for a burglary conviction is a proper aggravator because it is derivative of Abney's eriminal history, and consequently, no Blakely analysis is triggered. See Bledsoe, 815 N.E.2d at 508.
Nonetheless, if one or more aggravating circumstances cited by the trial court are found invalid on appeal, we must next decide whether the remaining cireum-stance or cireumstances are sufficient to support the sentence imposed. See Patrick v. State, 819 N.E.2d 840 (Ind.Ct.App., *2692004). As we explained in Means v. State, 807 N.E.2d 776, 778 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trams. denied
Even one valid aggravating cireum-stance is sufficient to support an enhancement of a sentence. When the sentencing court improperly applies an aggravating circumstance but other valid aggravating cireumstances exist, a sentence enhancement may still be upheld. This occurs when the invalid ag-gravator played a relatively unimportant role in the trial court's decision. When a reviewing court "can identify sufficient aggravating cireumstances to persuade it that the trial court would have entered the same sentence even absent the impermissible factor, it should affirm the trial court's decision." When a reviewing court "cannot say with confidence that the impermissible - aggravators would have led to the same result, it should remand for re-sentencing by the trial court or correct the sentencing on appeal."
Here, the trial court identified four ag-gravators. While we invalidated some parts of these four aggravating circumstances under Blakely, we did not outright reject a single aggravating factor. As a result, Abney's enhanced sentence is based upon the following valid aggravators: (1) Abney's eriminal history consisting of two juvenile adjudications and four adult convictions; (2) his high risk to exhibit future criminal behavior; (8) the instant offense was committed while on probation for burglary; and (4) Abney's inability to abide by the law. The trial court did not attach any weight to Abney's proffered mitigators. Given the importance of these four aggravating cireumstances, combined with the non-existence of any mitigating factors, we refuse to hold that the trial court would have imposed a different sentence. See id. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not err by imposing an enhanced sentence. Accordingly, we are not in a position to revise Abney's sentence on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we find that the State presented sufficient evidence to con-viet Abney of the offense of possessing material capable of causing bodily injury by inmate, and the trial court did not err when it sentenced Abney to seven years executed, three years beyond the presumptive sentence for that crime.
Affirmed.
CRONE, J., concurs.
ROBB, J., concurs in result with opinion.