Court Opinion

ID: 9633708
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:57:26.701163+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:40.172849
License: Public Domain

RICHARDSON, P. J.,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority’s analysis except the conclusion that on remand, after the first appeal, defendant was “unable to stand trial” because his motion had not been finally resolved and, therefore, that the time in ORS 135.775 was tolled. In a technical sense, defendant’s motion to exclude certain evidence, filed July 16, 1986, was not completely resolved by the appellate judgment. However, I do not think that, in this case, the time after the appellate judgment until the trial is actually commenced should be charged to defendant under the theory that he was unable to stand trial.
*258The appellate process was completed when the appellate judgment was issued on February 16, 1989. The prosecutor, and perhaps the trial court were confused about when the trial court acquired jurisdiction to proceed after the remand. Under ORS 19.190 the trial court had jurisdiction when the appellate judgment issued. However, as the record shows, the prosecutor and the court concluded that an order of the trial court entering the mandate was necessary. Accordingly, the prosecutor sought an order, and the court entered it on May 26, 1989. There is no explanation of why the court waited that long to take jurisdiction under its theory that recording the “mandate” was necessary. On May 30,1989, the prosecutor moved for an extension of the time in ORS 135.775 to allow the state to prepare for trial. Defendant responded by moving, on June 28,1989, for a pretrial hearing to resolve the issues specified in the appellate judgment and to dismiss the indictment under ORS 135.775. The court dismissed the indictment, and the other motions were mooted.
It is the obligation of the prosecutor and the court to bring the matter to trial or to a hearing to resolve pretrial matters. Even though a defendant may file a motion that requires a hearing, there is no way for him to force the matter to be heard timely. State v. Crosby, 217 Or 393, 342 P2d 831 (1959). Our decision instructed the trial court what to do respecting defendant’s motion to exclude evidence. The matter was already before the court without the necessity for defendant to file an additional motion or otherwise request the court to act as the appellate judgment required.
A postponement to resolve the state’s appeal includes a reasonable time for the trial court to resolve the matter after the appellate judgment issues. It is probably difficult to determine, with any degree of precision, what a reasonable time would be. However, a three and one-half month delay on the basis of a misunderstanding of the effective date of the appellate judgment certainly cannot be considered reasonable nor be ascribed to defendant’s side of the delay ledger.
The majority appears to put much emphasis on the fact that it was defendant’s motion to exclude evidence that needed final resolution. In fact, the state had the laboring oar to convince the trial court to allow the evidence. Defendant had moved to exclude “other crimes” evidence that the state *259intended to offer to prove defendant’s identity as the killer in this case. The trial court excluded the evidence on alternate bases, either of which would have been sufficient: It was irrelevant to the issue of identity or, if it were relevant, the prejudicial impact made it inadmissible under OEC 403. We concluded that the evidence was relevant and its probative value strong and, in that light, the trial court would have to reconsider its determination that the evidence was excluded as unduly prejudicial. Although we “reversed” the order excluding the evidence, we did not hold that it was admissible. It was left for the state to convince the trial court that it had erred by excluding the evidence under OEC 403.
As the majority notes, 28 countable days had passed by February 16,1989, when the appellate judgment issued. If the subsequent period was not tolled, the 120-day time limit passed by May 19, 1989, and defendant was entitled to dismissal.
I dissent.