Court Opinion

ID: 9939950
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-13 15:09:38.068408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:42:09.169429
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0650-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

YOHER JIMENEZ, a/k/a
YOHER A. CUBILLOS,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________

                   Submitted February 6, 2024 – Decided February 13, 2024

                   Before Judges Haas and Gooden Brown.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Bergen County, Indictment No. 11-07-1355.

                   Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Frank M. Gennaro, Designated Counsel, on
                   the brief).

                   Mark Musella, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney for
                   respondent (William P. Miller, Assistant Prosecutor, on
                   the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Defendant Yoher Jimenez appeals from a Law Division order denying his

petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We

affirm.

                                        I.

      We incorporate herein the procedural history and facts set forth in our

decision affirming defendant's conviction and sentence on direct appeal in State

v. Jimenez, No. A-5560-16 (App. Div. Jun. 17, 2020), certif. denied, 244 N.J.

303 (2020). The following facts are pertinent to the present appeal.

      The victim in this case was a thirteen-month-old baby girl. Id. at 3.

Defendant was in a relationship with the baby's mother, who left the child in

defendant's care on April 4, 2010. Defendant claimed at trial that he placed the

child in a bathtub full of water while he retrieved some boxes from his car. Ibid.

When he returned, he found the baby face down in the tub. Ibid. He removed

her from the tub, dried and dressed her, and took her to the superintendent of the

apartment building for help. Ibid. EMTs arrived and transported the baby to

the hospital, where she remained on life support for four days before dying. Ibid.

Defendant alleged that the child's death was accidental and that she "died from

her submersion in the bathtub water." Ibid.

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      The State's trial evidence told a different story. The medical examiner

performed an autopsy that revealed the child had fifteen rib fractures, two of

which were fresh.       Ibid.   The medical examiner brought in an expert

neuropathologist to review the case after the medical examiners discovered that

the child's brain was swollen and that "[t]here was an odd cluster of blood

vessels on the top surface of [her] skull[.]" Id. at 3-4.

      The neuropathologist found that the child's brain swelling "indicat[ed] a

deprivation of oxygen or blood supply." Id. at 4. The expert found signs of

prior brain trauma, which was not related to the child's death. Id. at 4-5. When

he examined the child's spinal cord, the expert found that it had been crushed.

Id. at 5-6. Once that crush injury occurred, the baby was no longer able to

breathe. Id. at 6. Thus, the baby's "submersion in water had no relevance

whatsoever to [the child's] death once the crush injury to the spinal cord

occurred[.]" Ibid.

      The neuropathologist opined that

            the spinal cord injury was unquestionably the actual
            cause of death. He deduced a powerful force must have
            been inflicted such that [the child's] head was suddenly
            moved ('hyper-flexed') far backward or far forward in a
            way that caused the bones of her spine to move against
            one another. Such a high cervical spinal cord injury is
            almost always fatal.

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            [Id. at 6-7.]

The medical examiner "issued a death certificate listing the cause of death as

acute cervical spinal cord injury and the manner of death as homicide." Id. at 7.

      In a statement to police, defendant claimed that he was "playing" with the

child in the bathtub. He admitted he held the baby by her feet and repeatedly

forced her head under the water. The child then hit her head on either the faucet

or the tub bottom. Defendant demonstrated his actions using a doll the police

provided him. After "playing" with the infant in this fashion, defendant stated

the baby looked like "she was about to go to sleep."

      Defendant claimed he took the child to the bedroom, and he demonstrated

for the police how he threw her body onto the mattress. He drove the heel of his

hand "real hard" into the child's stomach. Defendant told the police that when

the child turned purple, he went for help.

      During the interview, defendant admitted that he had previously hit the

child. He also gave

            varying accounts of how [the child] came to be
            critically unresponsive while in his sole care to: the
            building superintendent, the EMTs and police who
            responded to a 911 call, a detective at the hospital at
            which [the child] was treated, detectives during
            defendant's statement taken at the Prosecutor's Office,
            [the child's] mother, and at trial.

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                 [Id. at 30.]

       On direct appeal, defendant raised the same ineffective assistance of

counsel argument that he presents in the matter at hand. He asserted his trial

attorney was ineffective because he did not "subpoena Dr. Zhongxue Hua, a

forensic pathologist, whose trial testimony would have buttressed defendant's

defense that [the child] drowned while he left her alone in the bathtub,

countering the State's evidence as to her cause of death." Id. at 7-8. Finding

that this issue would be better addressed through a petition for PCR, we declined

to consider defendant's ineffectiveness of counsel argument in our decision on

direct appeal. Id. at 15.

       However, we set forth the facts underlying defendant's claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel in our opinion. Id. at 8-15. The parties are fully familiar

with these facts and, therefore, we need only briefly summarize them here.

       Defendant's prior attorney retained Hua sometime in 2013.         Id. at 8.

However, in 2016, the attorney advised the court that he had decided not to use

Hua as an expert. Id. at 9. A few months later, defendant hired a new attorney

for the trial.

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      Just before the trial began in January 2017, defendant's trial attorney listed

Hua on his witness list. Ibid. However, the attorney did not provide Hua's report

to the State until jury selection had begun. Id. at 10. Hua supplied a

            summary report, which the trial court later
            characterized as a net opinion[.] [The summary report]
            synopsized the doctor's review:

            1.     [The baby's] cause of death was due to her
                   drowning on April 4, 2010.

            2.     Her eventual brain death with global brain and
                   spinal hypoxic ischemia changes on [April 8,
                   2010] was due to her prolonged cardiopulmonary
                   arrest on [April 4, 2010].

            3.     The autopsy described discoloration of outer
                   table of left parietal skull was due to her medical
                   treatment and/or resuscitation.

            4.     [The baby's] rib fractures and healed subdural
                   membrane were not related to             . . . her
                   cardiopulmonary . . . arrest on [April 4, 2010] and
                   her subsequent death.

            5.     [The baby] had no evidence of fatal trauma on her
                   head and neck on [April 4, 2010].

            [Id. at 10-11.]

      However, defendant's trial counsel never called Hua as a witness at the

trial. The attorney advised that there was a dispute between Hua and the Office

of the Public Defender over the doctor's fee. Id. at 12. In addition, the attorney

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stated that Hua had scheduling issues which prevented him from testifying. Id.

at 12-13. And, as already mentioned, the trial court determined that Hua's report

was an inadmissible net opinion. Id. at 10.

      The jury convicted defendant of first-degree murder, second-degree

endangering the welfare of a child, and third-degree hindering apprehension or

prosecution. Id. at 1. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term

of life in prison, subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43 -7.2. Ibid.

We affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence on direct appeal. Id. at 2.

                                       II.

      Defendant filed a timely petition for PCR. Among other things, defendant

again argued that his trial attorney was ineffective because he failed to call Hua

as a witness at trial. Defendant argued that his attorney's failure to subpoena

Hua prevented him from presenting a complete defense.

      Following oral argument, the PCR judge rendered a thorough written

decision, concluding that defendant did not satisfy the two-prong test of

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), which requires a showing

that trial counsel's performance was deficient and that, but for the deficient

performance, the result would have been different.

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      The PCR judge identified the issue to be decided as "whether Dr. Hua's

testimony was such that, in its absence, defendant was unable to present a

defense and the jury received only a partial presentation of facts." In answering

this question in the negative, the PCR judge agreed with the trial court that Hua's

summary report was "an inadmissible net opinion." Therefore, the judge found

that the trial court would not have permitted Hua to testify even if defendant's

trial attorney had subpoenaed him to do so. 1

1
  This ruling was clearly correct. Expert opinions must "be grounded in 'facts
or data derived from[:] (1) the expert's personal observations, or (2) evidence
admitted at the trial, or (3) data relied upon by the expert which is not necessarily
admissible in evidence but which is the type of data normally relied upon by
experts.'" Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 53 (2015) (quoting Polzo v. Cty. of
Essex (Polzo I), 196 N.J. 569, 583 (2008)). "The net opinion rule is a 'corollary
of [N.J.R.E. 703] . . . which forbids the admission into evidence of an expert's
conclusions that are not supported by factual evidence or other data.'" Id. at 53-
54 (alteration in original) (quoting Polzo I, 196 N.J. at 583).

      Therefore, an expert is required to "'give the why and wherefore' that
supports the opinion, 'rather than a mere conclusion.'" Id. at 54 (quoting
Borough of Saddle River v. 66 E. Allendale, L.L.C., 216 N.J. 115, 144 (2013)).
The net opinion rule directs that experts "be able to identify the factual bases for
their conclusions, explain their methodology, and demonstrate that both the
factual bases and the methodology are reliable." Id. at 55 (quoting Landrigan v.
Celotex Corp., 127 N.J. 404, 417 (1992)). In short, the net opinion rule is "a
prohibition against speculative testimony." Harte v. Hand, 433 N.J. Super. 457,
465 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Grzanka v. Pfeifer, 301 N.J. Super. 563, 580
(App. Div. 1997)).

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      Just as importantly, the PCR judge found that even if Hua's net opinion

had been permitted in evidence, it would not have changed the result of the trial.

This is so because Hua's summary conclusions did not contradict the conclusions

of the State's experts.

      For example, Hua opined that the baby's death was due to drowning.

However, Hua did not respond or address the State's neuropathologist's finding

that the crushed spinal cord was the actual cause of death. The PCR judge stated,

"More strikingly, however, a finding that [the baby] died of drowning (rather

than a crush injury) does little to rebut the State's case-in-chief that the defendant

brutally beat and murdered" the baby. The judge further explained:

             Whether [the child] died of drowning or injury to her
             spinal cord has little bearing on this underlying
             argument. While defendant may have tried to utilize
             this alternate cause of death as a means to establish [the
             baby's] accidental death (contrary to murder), this court
             cannot readily find that such a defense would have been
             successful before the jury, which was presented with
             (1) defendant's confession to violently beating [the
             infant] in the bathtub, even after she went limp, (2)
             evidence of [the baby's] freshly broken limbs and crush
             injury to her spinal cord, (3) evidence of [the baby's]
             injuries indicating abuse, (4) defendant's admission of

       Hua's summary report failed to satisfy the requirements for admission. He
did not explain "the factual bases for [his] conclusions, explain [his]
methodology, [or] demonstrate that both the factual bases and the methodology
are reliable." Townsend, 221 N.J. at 55.

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                                          9
            inflicting prior harm to [the child], (5) defendant's
            inconsistent explanation of the events surrounding [the
            infant's] death, and (6) defendant's attempt to cover-up
            his actions by drying and dressing [the child] before
            seeking aid. [2]

      The PCR judge also rejected defendant's argument that his trial attorney

was ineffective because he did not call another expert as a witness when Hua

was unavailable. The judge noted that even now, "defendant has failed to

establish that there was or is an expert who would refute the opinion of the

State's expert[.]" Absent such evidence, defendant was not able to establish the

second prong of the Strickland test. The judge stated:

            [T]his court declines to find that [defense counsel] was
            ineffective for failing to secure Dr. Hua's appearance
            and testimony. [Defense counsel] acted reasonably in
            determining, as previous counsel had, not to call Dr.
            Hua. And, even if [defense counsel] had acted
            unreasonably, defendant's case was not prejudiced, and
            the outcome was not affected, by Dr. Hua's failure to
            appear.

                                      III.

      On appeal, defendant presents the following contentions:

            POINT ONE

2
   The PCR judge also explained how none of Hua's four other summary
conclusions contradicted those provided by the State's expert neuropathologist
and by the medical examiner.
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                                      10
            TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO RETAIN AND
            PRODUCE FORENSIC PATHOLOGIST, DR.
            ZHONGXUE HUA, AS A DEFENSE WITNESS AT
            TRIAL DENIED THE DEFENDANT HIS RIGHT TO
            PRESENT A COMPLETE DEFENSE, AND
            CONSTITUTED A PRIMA FACIE CLAIM FOR
            [PCR].

            A.     THE PREVAILING LEGAL PRINCIPLES
                   REGARDING CLAIMS FOR INEFFECTIVE
                   ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, EVIDENTIARY
                   HEARINGS AND PETITIONS FOR [PCR].

            B.     TRIAL COUNSEL'S NEGLECT TO ENSURE
                   THE PRESENCE OF DR. HUA AT TRIAL,
                   AND HIS MISREPRESENTATIONS ABOUT
                   DR.    HUA'S    AVAILABILITY   AS
                   DEFENDANT'S FORENSIC PATHOLOGY
                   EXPERT AMOUNTED TO INEFFECTIVE
                   ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

      When petitioning for PCR, the defendant must establish, by a

preponderance of the credible evidence, that he is entitled to the requested relief.

State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 541 (2013); State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459

(1992). To sustain that burden, the defendant must allege and articulate specific

facts that "provide the court with an adequate basis on which to rest its decision."

State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 579 (1992).

      The mere raising of a claim for PCR does not entitle the defendant to an

evidentiary hearing and the defendant "must do more than make bald assertions

that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel." State v. Cummings, 321

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                                        11
N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999).        Rather, trial courts should grant

evidentiary hearings and make a determination on the merits only if the

defendant has presented a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance, material

issues of disputed facts lie outside the record, and resolution of the iss ues

necessitates a hearing. R. 3:22-10(b); State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013).

We review a judge's decision to deny a PCR petition without an evidentiary

hearing for abuse of discretion. Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462.

      To establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the

defendant is obliged to show not only the particular manner in which counsel's

performance was deficient, but also that the deficiency prejudiced his right to a

fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987).

There is a strong presumption that counsel "rendered adequate assistance and

made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional

judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Further, because prejudice is not

presumed, Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52, the defendant must demonstrate "how specific

errors of counsel undermined the reliability" of the proceeding. United States

v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n.26 (1984).

      Where, as here, the defendant asserts that his attorney failed to call a

witness who would have exculpated him, he must assert the facts that would

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                                      12
have been revealed, "supported by affidavits or certifications based upon the

personal knowledge of the affiant or the person making the certification." State

v. Petrozelli, 351 N.J. Super. 14, 23 (App. Div. 2002) (quoting Cummings, 321

N.J. Super. at 170). When a defendant claims that trial counsel inadequately

investigated his case, he must also supply certifications supporting his claim.

State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013). In addition, deciding which witnesses

to call to the stand is "an art," and we must be "highly deferential" to such

choices. State v. Arthur, 184 N.J. 307, 321 (2005) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 689).

      Having considered defendant's contentions in light of the record and the

applicable law, we affirm the denial of defendant's PCR petition substantially

for the reasons detailed at length in the PCR judge's lengthy written opinion.

We discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's consideration of the issues, or

in his decision to deny the petition without an evidentiary hearing. We are

satisfied that the trial attorney's performance was not deficient, and defendant

provided nothing more than bald assertions to the contrary.

      Affirmed.

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