Court Opinion

ID: 9365032
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-20 21:00:57.677147+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:42.910244
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-1051

        ANDREW KING,

                             Plaintiff - Appellant,

                      v.

        JASON K. UTT, individually and in his capacity as agent and employee of City of
        New Martinsville; FRIEND ESTEP, individually and in his capacity as agent and
        employee of City of New Martinsville; and CITY OF NEW MARTINSVILLE, a
        West Virginia Political Sub-Division

                             Defendants - Appellees.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at
        Wheeling. John P. Bailey, District Judge. (5:21-cv-00171-JPB)

        Submitted: October 4, 2022                                        Decided: January 19, 2023

        Before DIAZ, THACKER, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Louis J. Kroeck, IV, LJK LAW, PLLC, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for
        Appellant. Kenneth L. Hopper, PULLIN, FOWLER, FLANAGAN, BROWN & POE,
        Morgantown, West Virginia, for Appellees.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               This case began with the January 2018 arrest of Andrew King’s (“Appellant”)

        fraternal twin brother, Alexander King, for retail theft in North Versailles, Pennsylvania.

        During that arrest, Alexander King falsely identified himself as “Andrew King.” After

        Alexander King’s initial appearance before a magistrate judge, he was released on an

        unsecured bond pending his preliminary hearing. But Alexander King did not appear at

        the preliminary hearing.

               On February 22, 2018, a judge on the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas

        issued a bench warrant for Appellant for his failure to appear for the preliminary hearing.

        Two months later, on April 21, 2018, New Martinsville, West Virginia police officers Jason

        K. Utt (“Officer Utt”) and Friend Estep (“Officer Estep”) arrested Appellant pursuant to

        the bench warrant. Following his arrest, Appellant spent one night at the New Martinsville

        Police Department and six days at the Northern Regional Correctional Facility. Ultimately,

        Appellant was released once it was determined that he was not the correct individual.

               In this appeal, Appellant challenges the district court’s dismissal of the complaint

        he filed as a result of this incident. For the reasons below, we affirm.

               In August 2019, Appellant filed suit in the district court for the Western District of

        Pennsylvania against the city of New Martinsville and New Martinsville Police Officers

        Utt and Estep (collectively, “Appellees”), as well as the Allegheny County Sheriff’s Office,

        Allegheny County, a North Versailles Police Officer, and North Versailles Township (the

        “Allegheny County Case”). The district court for the Western District of Pennsylvania

        determined that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Appellees and dismissed the Allegheny

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        County Case against Appellees without prejudice. As a result, Appellant filed this action

        in the Northern District of West Virginia against Appellees alleging violations of his

        constitutional rights. Specifically, the complaint raises the following four federal claims

        for relief: (1) a claim for false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) a claim for

        wrongful incarceration in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) a claim for violation

        of due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (4) an excessive force

        claim in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, Appellant also brings several

        claims pursuant to West Virginia law, including claims for: (1) negligent retention and

        hiring; (2) negligent training and supervision; (3) tort of outrage/intentional infliction of

        emotional distress; and (4) battery.

               On November 1, 2021, Appellees moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to

        Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court determined that Appellant’s

        claims fail as a matter of law because he was arrested and detained pursuant to a facially

        valid warrant. Therefore, the district court granted Appellees’ motion and dismissed

        Appellant’s complaint in its entirety. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal.

               The crux of Appellant’s claims on appeal are rooted in his contention that Appellees

        knew that they arrested the wrong person but nonetheless did not release him immediately.

        Specifically, Appellant alleges that he immediately informed Officers Utt and Estep that

        they should be looking for his brother, Alexander King. According to Appellant, Officer

        Utt stated that he would need to take Appellant into custody but “[Appellant] had

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        permission to kick his twin brother’s butt.” J.A. at 7, ¶ 17. * Appellant also maintains that

        Officers Utt and Estep knew Alexander King, and as a result, they knew that Appellant and

        Alexander King do not look alike. In addition, Appellant asserts that Appellees knew that

        he was wrongfully detained because his girlfriend and his mother contacted New

        Martinsville and Pennsylvania officials to explain that the wrong man had been arrested.

               “This Court reviews a district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil

        Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo.” Skyline Restoration, Inc. v. Church Mut. Ins. Co., 20 F.4th

        825, 829 (4th Cir. 2021). “To survive a 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must contain

        sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

        face.” Rockville Cars, LLC v. City of Rockville, Maryland, 891 F.3d 141, 145 (4th Cir.

        2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, “[w]hile a complaint attacked by

        a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s

        obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and

        conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”

        Barrett v. Pae Gov’t Servs., Inc., 975 F.3d 416, 434 (4th Cir. 2020).

               Appellant’s challenge to the dismissal of his complaint centers on his contention

        that Officers Estep and Utt were not entitled to qualified immunity because they had actual

        knowledge that they were detaining the wrong person. “Under the doctrine of qualified

        immunity, government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded

        from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

               *
                   Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.

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        statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Dean

        ex rel. Harkness v. McKinney, 976 F.3d 407, 413 (4th Cir. 2020). In order to overcome the

        qualified immunity defense, “a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to set forth a violation

        of a constitutional right, and the court must conclude that this right was clearly established

        at the time of the alleged violation.” Sims v. Labowitz, 885 F.3d 254, 260 (4th Cir. 2018).

               With respect to Appellant’s Fourth Amendment false arrest claim, the district court

        determined that “the question of whether [Officers] Utt and Estep violated [Appellant’s]

        constitutional rights depends on whether they had probable cause to arrest him at the time

        of his arrest.” J.A. 113. In reaching the conclusion that probable cause existed to arrest

        and detain Appellant, the district noted that “[Officers] Utt and Estep had a facially valid

        warrant issued by a judicial officer at the request of the [North Versailles Police

        Department].” Id. at 114. Here, to the extent that Appellant challenges the probable cause

        determination supporting his initial arrest and detention, any such challenge lacks merit

        because Appellant does not allege that Officers Utt and Estep had any involvement in

        obtaining the bench warrant. Instead, as Appellees point out, “Officers Utt and Estep only

        got involved in the tail-end of the situation involving Appellant as their first connection to

        this matter began only after the at-issue warrant was issued.” Appellees’ Br. at 21. Because

        Appellant has not offered any facts which call into question the state court’s probable cause

        determination, Appellant’s argument that Officers Utt and Estep violated his constitutional

        rights is unavailing. See Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 184 (4th Cir. 1996)

        (“Once a pretrial seizure has been rendered reasonable by virtue of a probable cause

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        determination by a neutral and detached magistrate, the continuing pretrial seizure of a

        criminal defendant—either by detention or by bond restrictions—is reasonable.”).

               To the extent that Appellant contests the dismissal of his Fourteenth Amendment

        wrongful incarceration claim, this claim is indistinguishable from Appellant’s Fourth

        Amendment false arrest claim, and thus, it is subject to dismissal for the same reasons as

        the false arrest claim.

               As for Appellant’s remaining claims, we conclude that Appellant waived the

        dismissal of his due process, excessive force, and state law claims since he did not address

        any of these claims in his opening or reply brief. See Carter v. Lee, 283 F.3d 240, 252 n.11

        (4th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e observe that this Court normally views contentions not raised in an

        opening brief to be waived.”). Lastly, the district court properly dismissed Appellant’s

        claims against the City of New Martinsville because “as there are no underlying

        constitutional violations by any individual, there can be no municipal liability.” Grayson

        v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 697 (4th Cir. 1999).

               Appellant also argues that the district court erred by considering materials outside

        the pleadings in dismissing his complaint. It is well settled that when “deciding whether a

        complaint will survive a motion to dismiss, a court evaluates the complaint in its entirety,

        as well as documents attached or incorporated into the complaint.” E.I. du Pont de

        Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 448 (4th Cir. 2011). We have also

        explained “[c]onsideration of extrinsic documents by a court during the pleading stage of

        litigation improperly converts the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.”

        Zak v. Chelsea Therapeutics Int’l, Ltd., 780 F.3d 597, 606 (4th Cir. 2015); see also E.I. du

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        Pont de Nemours & Co., 637 F.3d at 448–49 (“Such conversion is not appropriate where

        the parties have not had an opportunity for reasonable discovery.”).              However,

        “[c]onsideration of a document attached to a motion to dismiss ordinarily is permitted only

        when the document is integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint, and when the

        plaintiffs do not challenge the document’s authenticity.” Zak, 780 F.3d at 606–07

        (alterations adopted and internal quotation marks omitted).        In addition, “courts are

        permitted to consider facts and documents subject to judicial notice without converting the

        motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.” Id. at 607.

               On this point, Appellant argues that the district court erred by considering matters

        outside of the pleadings without providing notice or an opportunity to conduct reasonable

        discovery.   Specifically, Appellant contests the district court’s consideration of two

        exhibits that Appellees attached to their motion to dismiss. That is, (1) the bench warrant

        issued by the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas; and (2) a motion to dismiss filed

        by the Allegheny County Sheriff’s Office (the “Allegheny County Motion”) in the

        Allegheny County Case. We conclude that the district did not err in considering these

        exhibits for two reasons. First, the bench warrant is plainly integral to Appellant’s claims,

        its authenticity is uncontested, and it is explicitly referenced in Appellant’s complaint.

        Second, Appellant failed to offer any argument as to why the court’s consideration of the

        Allegheny County Motion was improper. Moreover, Appellant does not dispute that both

        the bench warrant and the Allegheny County Motion are matters of public record, and as

        such, the district court was entitled to consider them without converting the motion to

        dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville,

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        708 F.3d 549, 557 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[C]ourts may consider relevant facts obtained from the

        public record, so long as these facts are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff

        along with the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint.”) (internal quotation marks

        omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015).

               Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Appellant’s complaint. We

        dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

        presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional

        process.

                                                                                          AFFIRMED

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