Court Opinion

ID: 9739579
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:17:51.84006+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:12.981500
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SIMON, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur in the majority’s judgment that the defendant’s conviction for murder should be affirmed, but I dissent from the decision to impose the death penalty. For the reasons set forth in my separate opinions in People v. Lewis (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 129, 179 (Simon, J., dissenting), in People v. Silagy (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 147, 184 (Simon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and in People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504, 549 (Simon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), I have concluded that the Illinois death penalty statute violates the United States and Illinois constitutions. Moreover, the comments made by the assistant State’s Attorney during the sentencing hearing regarding the possibility of parole for the defendant if the jury chose not to impose the death penalty require that the death sentence be reversed. In People v. Walker (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 502, 515, this court held: “Our statute requires that the court or jury, as the case may be, consider aggravating and mitigating factors, which are relevant to the imposition of the death penalty. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1(c).) Whether or not the defendant may, at some future time, be paroled is not a proper aggravating factor to consider in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed.” The majority’s attempt to distinguish Walker from this case is unpersuasive. Here, as in Walker, the prosecution argued that the defendant might be paroled if he received a prison term. Here, as in Walker, the trial court overruled objections to this improper argument. Here, as in Walker, the jury may have considered the possibility of parole in determining whether the defendant should be executed, a factor that is not permitted by the Illinois death penalty statute. As this court said in Walker, “[in] a death penalty case, a high standard of procedural accuracy is required in determining whether or not that penalty will be imposed. The procedural errors in this case do not conform to the high standard which must be followed to insure that proper matters are considered in aggravation and that the penalty is applied in as uniform a manner as possible within the framework of an adversary proceeding.” 91 Ill. 2d 502, 517. California v. Ramos (1983), 463 U.S. 992, 1005 n.19, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1171, 1183 n.19, 103 S. Ct. 3446, 3454-55 n.19, is not in point. The defendant has not argued here that the United States Constitution prohibits the State from accurately characterizing its sentencing choices. Rather, he has argued that our death penalty statute prohibits the State from raising improper issues in the determination of aggravating factors. Our opinion in People v. Walker supports that contention. I would therefore vacate the sentence of death and remand to the trial court for resentencing.