Court Opinion

ID: 9709016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:38:07.057719+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:45.420374
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, specially concurring: There was substantial compliance with Supreme Court Rule 402 insofar as the sentence of the defendant to four years in the penitentiary. There was not substantial compliance with respect to the two-year mandatory supervised release period. With respect to the sentence admonishment, the following transpired: (a) The defendant was admonished at arraignment that he could receive a penalty of four to 15 years in the penitentiary; (b) the trial judge refused to concur in a plea agreement under which defendant would be sentenced to probation; (c) a plea agreement was entered into, and conditionally concurred in by the trial judge, which provided four years’ imprisonment as the maximum sentence; (d) at the sentencing hearing, the State’s Attorney recommended and asked that the defendant be sentenced to four years in the penitentiary; the defendant’s attorney indicated that the defendant should be placed on probation; (e) at the sentencing hearing and prior to sentencing, the court and the defendant went through the following litany: “Q. Mr. Lauderback, is there anything that you would like to say to me at this time? A. No your honor. Q. Nothing at all? A. I can’t think of anything.” (f) At the hearing on the post-trial motion, the defendant testified that he remembered the judge told him at arraignment that he could get four to 15 years. Defendant then made the self-serving statement that he did not remember this at the time he entered his plea. He admitted, however, that his attorney had, on more than one occasion, readvised him of the minimum and maximum term of incarceration provided by statute; on the day he pleaded guilty he had discussed with his counsel what sentencing alternatives would be available to the court under the terms of the plea agreement; and at no time had his counsel told him he would receive a sentence of imprisonment of less than four years. Also, in People v. McCoy (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 398, 385 N.E.2d 696, the supreme court stated: “While there appears to be no reason for failure to comply strictly with the explicitly stated requirements of Rule 402, every deviation therefrom does not require reversal. That the plea was ‘intelligent and voluntary’ may be shown by substantial, and does not require literal, compliance with the provisions of Rule 402. People v. Krantz (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 187.” (74 Ill. 2d 398, 402, 385 N.E.2d 696, 698.) As to this alleged inadequacy in admonishments, I respectfully disagree. With respect to the failure to admonish as to the mandatory supervised release period, however, I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the plea must be vacated. We must confine ourselves to the record which was made at the time of the change of plea, when the defendant was admonished that he could be sentenced to, at most, four years in the penitentiary. The McCoy court found that at the time of the change of plea, the defendant had been admonished of a term which was more than the defendant actually received including the parole period or mandatory supervised release period. In that context, the McCoy court found substantial compliance with Rule 402. The defendant here agreed to a maximum of four years in the penitentiary. It is only because the trial court failed to admonish the defendant at the time of the change of plea that he would receive a two-year mandatory supervised release period, in addition to the four-year term in the penitentiary, that I concur in the result reached by the majority.