Court Opinion

ID: 9962264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-23 14:07:58.67465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:12.825583
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2649-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ALFONSO BOWEN, JR., a/k/a
EDDIE BARBOSA, EDDI
BARBOSA, ALFONSO BOWENS,
and JOSE BARETO,

          Defendant-Appellant.

                   Argued January 30, 2024 – Decided April 23, 2024

                   Before Judges Rose and Perez Friscia.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Hudson County, Indictment No. 19-11-1200.

                   Oleg Nekritin argued the cause for appellant (Law
                   Office of Robert J. De Groot, attorneys; Robert J. De
                   Groot and Oleg Nekritin, of counsel and on the briefs).

                   Meagan E. Free, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause
                   for respondent (Esther Suarez, Hudson County
                   Prosecutor, attorney; Meagan E. Free, on the brief).
PER CURIAM

      Following adverse decisions on various pretrial motions, defendant

Alfonso Bowen, Jr. pled guilty to four offenses charged in four indictments

pursuant to the terms of a global plea agreement. Pertinent to this appeal,

defendant pled guilty to fourth-degree aggravated assault by pointing a firearm,

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(4), as amended from second-degree unlawful possession of

a weapon without a carrying permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1), charged in count

one of Hudson County Indictment No. 19-11-1200, and was sentenced to a five-

year prison term with a five-year parole disqualifier under the Graves Act,

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c). The remaining seventeen offenses charged in the same

indictment primarily included drug and weapons offenses, and were dismissed

on the State's motion. 1

      On appeal, defendant challenges the denial of his motions: to suppress

evidence seized following the warrantless entry into his apartment and issuance

1
  Under the negotiated plea agreement, defendant also pled guilty to two counts
of third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance and fourth-
degree stalking. In exchange, the State agreed to recommend concurrent prison
terms of three years on the drug counts and eighteen months on the stalking
offense, and dismissal of the remaining offenses charged in each unrelated
indictment. None of these convictions is at issue in this appeal.

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of a warrant to search the premises, without an evidentiary hearing; for a Franks2

hearing; and for a spoliation of evidence ruling. More particularly, defendant

raises the following points for our consideration:

             I.     The court committed reversible error when it
                    denied . . . [d]efendant's motion to suppress
                    evidence obtained in violation of the [Fourth]
                    Amendment.

             II.    The [c]ourt improperly ruled that the State had
                    articulable suspicion to conduct a protective
                    sweep of the property.

             III.   The trial court failed to suppress evidence
                    discovered as a result of an improperly issued
                    [w]arrant, as it was based on an affidavit
                    containing unlawfully obtained evidence.

             IV.    The [c]ourt committed reversible error when it
                    failed to find spoliation of evidence resulting
                    from the State producing only a portion of the
                    video showing the shooting.

             V.     The [c]ourt improperly ruled without providing
                    [defendant] a plenary hearing.

             VI.    The court improperly denied . . . [d]efendant's
                    request for a Franks [h]earing.

2
  Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). A defendant is entitled to a Franks
hearing to challenge the veracity of a search warrant affidavit by demonstrating
a "substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and
intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant
in the warrant affidavit, and . . . the allegedly false statement is necessary to the
finding of probable cause." Id. at 155-56; see also State v. Howery, 80 N.J. 563,
567-68 (1979) (adopting the Franks standard in New Jersey).
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     Persuaded by the contentions raised in points II and V, we conclude the

court erroneously determined police lawfully entered defendant's residence

without a warrant under the protective sweep doctrine, and should have held a

plenary hearing regarding the application of the emergency aid exception to the

warrant requirement. We therefore remand the matter for a limited hearing on

the arguments raised in points I, II, and III. We reject defendant's claims

asserted in points IV and VI, finding insufficient merit to warrant discussion in

a written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(2), beyond the brief comments that follow.

Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand in part.

                                       I.

     Before considering defendant's arguments, however, we note he does not

challenge the legality of the five-year prison sentence imposed on his fourth-

degree conviction. Nor does the State address this issue.

     Apparently focused solely on the court's decision regarding the

admissibility of the evidence seized at defendant's residence and the video

footage related to his aggravated assault conviction, the parties did not provide

the transcripts of the plea and sentencing hearings, the presentence report, the

three unrelated indictments, or the unrelated judgments of conviction. Based on

the limited record provided on appeal, however, it appears defendant's sentence

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to a five-year prison term with a five-year parole disqualifier exceeds the

maximum sentence for a fourth-degree Graves Act offense. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-

6(a)(4) (providing an eighteen-month maximum term of imprisonment for a

fourth-degree conviction); N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c) (providing an eighteen-month

maximum parole disqualifier for a fourth-degree Graves Act offense).

      As defendant's sentence "exceed[s] the penalties authorized for a [fourth-

degree] offense," his sentence appears to be illegal. State v. Hyland, 238 N.J.

135, 145 (2019). Ordinarily, a remand for resentencing is required. See State

v. Romero, 191 N.J. 59, 80-81 (2007); see also State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240,

247 (2000) (recognizing an illegal sentence "may be corrected at any time before

it is completed"). Because we have not been provided the full record of the

proceedings, however, it is unclear whether the propriety of defendant's sentence

was raised before the trial court.

      Accordingly, we remand for clarification of the record, or resentencing

and issuance of an amended judgment of conviction, if warranted. On remand,

the trial court shall address the legality of defendant's sentence issue before

conducting an evidentiary hearing on defendant's suppression motion.

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                                        II.

      We summarize the pertinent facts and procedural history from the limited

record provided on appeal. That record includes the parties' trial court briefs

and appendices, which annexed several police reports and the search warrant

affidavit supporting the warrant issued in this matter.3

      The charges emanated from a shooting incident during the morning of

August 19, 2019, outside defendant's home in Union City. The State alleged

Joel Vargas shot defendant in the thigh, fled the scene in his car, tossed the gun

down a sewer, and confessed to his long-time friend, a Union City police officer.

At the time of the shooting, Ashley Ramos, defendant's girlfriend and Vargas's

co-parent, allegedly sought refuge from Vargas at defendant's house prior to the

incident. Ramos heard the gunshots from the basement of defendant's home.4

3
   See R. 2:6-1(a)(2) (permitting the inclusion of trial court briefs if referenced
in the court's decision or "the question of whether the issue was raised in the
trial court is germane to the appeal").
4
  We glean from the record that Vargas was charged in a separate indictment;
the disposition of those charges is not disclosed in the record. Ramos was
charged with one count of hindering apprehension in the same indictment as
defendant; the outcome of her charge is not disclosed in the record. Neither
Vargas nor Ramos is a party to this appeal.

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                                        6
       Police were first called to the scene shortly before 11:00 a.m. Officer

Nunez and a sergeant were the first to arrive on the scene.5 According to her

report, Nunez observed defendant "sitting on the top of the front porch with a

bullet wound to his left thigh and bleeding." In his report, Officer H. Rodriguez

stated he arrived with Officer Sanchez and saw Nunez "running up to the scene

with her first aid bag."       H. Rodriguez assisted Nunez until defendant was

transported to the hospital.

       Thereafter, Detective Polo, a crime scene investigator, responded to the

incident with four other detectives. According to his report, Polo spoke with

Officers Pina and A. Rodriguez, who "stated that when they arrived on scene

they noticed what appeared to be a male party with a shot [sic] wound on his left

thigh area inside of the [residence] in the rear apartment." After the ambulance

transported defendant to the hospital, Polo "began to photograph the entire

apartment, following the blood trail and also in an attempt to render aid to

anyone in the apartment." While photographing the blood spatters in defendant's

bedroom, Polo observed narcotics and drug paraphernalia.         At some point

thereafter, A. Rodriguez arrested defendant at the hospital and charged him with

narcotics offenses.

5
    We use the officers' surnames unless they share the same last name.
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      Sometime after noon, law enforcement reviewed and, using a police cell

phone, recorded a segment of footage from a neighbor's surveillance video;

police did not obtain the original footage. The ninety-second segment depicted

the shooting and – what police perceived was – defendant "reach[ing] for his

waist band and . . . display[ing] a weapon."

      Around 12:40 p.m., Ramos gave an audio-recorded statement to Polo at

the hospital. Ramos recounted the argument she had with Vargas that morning

concerning her relationship with defendant. Contending Vargas "broke into her

home," Ramos said she escaped and called defendant, who brought her to his

residence. Vargas thereafter telephoned defendant; a verbal argument ensued;

Vargas came to defendant's home; and Ramos heard eight gunshots and saw

defendant "running into the house with a gun[]shot wound on his leg." Fearing

Vargas was following, Ramos ran to the basement.

      That evening, police obtained a warrant to search defendant's home and

Vargas's car. The same affidavit supported both warrants. According to the

affiant, "Polo entered the residence to ascertain whether there were other

victims. He observed a blood trail from the front porch that led to both the

basement door and the door of [defendant's a]partment." Police executed the

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                                       8
warrant for defendant's home and seized the contraband Polo observed during

his walkthrough, and a firearm in the basement.

        After defendant was indicted, his first attorney moved to suppress the

evidence seized from his apartment, only challenging the sufficiency of the

search warrant affidavit and the scope of the search. Following oral argument,

the court issued a written statement of reasons and memorializing April 9, 2020

order. Although defendant did not challenge Polo's entry into the home, in a

footnote the court stated: "Based on the facts set forth by all, it appears clear

that the circumstances supported Polo's entry into the residence as emergency

aid."

        Thereafter, defendant retained another attorney, who moved for various

relief including reconsideration of the April 9 order and compulsion of the full,

original video footage from the neighbor's surveillance camera. Addressing the

footnote in the court's decision, defendant argued under two then-recent

decisions, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Caniglia v. Strom, 593

U.S. 194 (2021) (considering the community caretaker doctrine), and our

decision in State v. Radel, 465 N.J. Super. 65 (App. Div. 2020), aff'd 249 N.J.

469 (2022) (regarding the protective sweep doctrine), Polo was not lawfully on

the premises when he observed drugs in defendant's bedroom.

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                                       9
      Citing "conflicting police reports as to where [defendant] was found when

police arrived," defendant requested a plenary hearing. Apparently referencing

Nunez's and Polo's reports, defendant claimed: "One report states that he was

on his front porch. Another states that he was inside the home." Defendant

argued after he was removed from the scene police "did not have any basis to

believe that anyone in the home required additional aid."          According to

defendant, there was no emergency justifying Polo's warrantless entry.

      On August 30, 2021, the court issued a written decision and memorializing

order granting the reconsideration motion regarding the warrantless entry into

defendant's home, in view of the Court's decision in Caniglia. But the court

denied defendant's motion for the video recording, among other relief that is not

pertinent to this appeal.

      Regarding the video, the court was not persuaded by defendant's

contention that the entire video surveillance footage, depicting how long the

officers were on the scene before entering his home, was "relevant to determine

the timeline and proximity from the emergent response to the commencement of

the search." Defendant also sought the original recording to enhance the footage

so he could "determine whether the object in [his] hand [wa]s a firearm or a cell

phone." Accepting the State's proffer that it had provided defendant "the full

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                                      10
copy of the video" in its possession, the court rejected defendant's contention

that the State's Brady6 obligations were triggered. Nor was the court persuaded

that the indictment should be dismissed "due to spoliation" for failure to produce

the full video.

      On October 7, 2021, the court held oral argument on defendant's

suppression motion. Defendant primarily argued police unlawfully entered his

apartment and, as such, the State lacked probable cause to support the search

warrant. Noting Polo's purpose was "process[ing] the scene for evidence and

. . . taking photographs" after other officers had attended to defendant, defendant

maintained the State failed to demonstrate Polo's warrantless entry was justified

under the emergency aid or the protective sweep doctrines. Defendant renewed

his request for a plenary hearing.

      In response, among other arguments, the State countered defendant's

"discrepancies amongst the police reports" and Polo's "misstatements . . . seem[]

like a Franks argument." However, even if any misstatements "were excised

from the warrant," police had probable cause to support the warrant based on

the blood trail and defendant's access to the basement. See State v. Howery, 80

6
   Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (requiring the State to disclose
exculpatory evidence to the defense).
                                                                             A-2649-21
                                       11
N.J. 563, 568 (1979) (holding a Franks hearing is not required if a search warrant

affidavit contains sufficient facts establishing probable cause even after the

alleged false statements are excised).

      On November 19, 2021, the court issued a written decision and

memorializing order, denying defendant's suppression motion. The court found

the warrantless entry into defendant's residence was justified under both the

emergency aid and protective sweep doctrines, and that the Court's decision in

Caniglia was not applicable here. The court denied defendant's motion without

addressing his request for a plenary hearing.

                                         III.

     Well-settled principles guide our review. When the trial court holds an

evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, we are bound to uphold

the court's factual findings if they "are 'supported by sufficient credible evidence

in the record.'" State v. Evans, 235 N.J. 125, 133 (2018) (quoting State v. Elders,

192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007)). We are further obliged to defer to findings based on

the court's "review of documentary or video evidence." State v. Carrillo, 469

N.J. Super. 318, 332 (App. Div. 2021). "We do so to for institutional reasons:

to recognize the trial court's 'experience and expertise in fulfilling the role of

factfinder'; to maintain trial courts' 'legitimacy'; and to avoid duplicating efforts

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                                         12
without significantly improving decisional accuracy." Ibid. (quoting State v.

S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 380-81 (2017)).

       However, we owe no deference to a court's findings that are based on the

arguments of counsel or the unsupported "factual allegations in a brief." Id. at

333.    That is because such allegations are "not evidence, documentary or

otherwise." Ibid. Nor do we defer to a court's decision that there is no need for

an evidentiary hearing on a suppression motion, based on a determination –

made after a review of the parties' briefs – that there are no "material facts" in

dispute. Ibid. "Determining . . . if facts are in dispute is a matter of law" that

may be made by "examin[ing] side-by-side the parties' allegations." Ibid. The

determination of whether facts in dispute also presents issues of law we review

de novo. Ibid.

       Rule 3:5-7(c) mandates a testimonial suppression hearing when material

facts are in dispute. See State v. Parker, 459 N.J. Super. 26, 30 (2019); State v.

Green, 346 N.J. Super. 87, 90 (App. Div. 2001). As the Court has reaffirmed,

an evidentiary hearing is "[t]he proper mechanism through which to explore the

constitutionality of warrantless police conduct." State v. Atwood, 232 N.J. 433,

445 (2018); see also N.J.R.E. 104. "At evidentiary hearings, the State presents

witnesses to substantiate its basis for the challenged warrantless conduct, and

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                                       13
the defense is afforded the opportunity to confront and cross-examine the State's

witnesses." Ibid. Further "N.J.R.E. 104 hearings provide an opportunity to

probe adverse evidence through cross-examination." Ibid. Thus, New Jersey

"courts have recognized the importance of the ability to question witnesses in

case of factual disputes." Ibid.

     Notably, Rule 3:5-7(b) "does not require defendants to file an affidavit in

order to be entitled to a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a

result of a warrantless search." State v. Torres, 154 N.J. Super. 169, 173 (App.

Div. 1977). But the defendant's counterstatement of facts must assert more than

"[t]he mere allegation of a warrantless search, with the attendant burden of proof

on the State to justify same," or mere denial of "the truth of the State's

allegations." Green, 346 N.J. Super. at 91.

                                       A.

     The trial court found persuasive the State's argument that the emergency

aid and protective sweep exceptions to the warrant requirement applied in this

case – based on the police reports and search warrant affidavit. In his written

decision, the judge set forth the governing legal principles for warrantless

searches and both exceptions.      Accordingly, we need only summarize the

principles, adding recent authority.

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                                       14
     When exigent circumstances are present, "[p]olice officers serving in a

community-caretaking role are empowered to make a warrantless entry into a

home under the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement." State v.

Vargas, 213 N.J. 301, 323 (2013). The State must demonstrate "(1) the officer

had 'an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency require[d] that

he [or she] provide immediate assistance to protect or preserve life, or to prevent

serious injury' and (2) there was a 'reasonable nexus between the emergency and

the area or places to be searched.'" State v. Edmonds, 211 N.J. 117, 132 (2012)

(quoting State v. Frankel, 179 N.J. 586, 600 (2004)).

     "The emergency-aid doctrine . . . must be 'limited to the reasons and

objectives that prompted' the need for immediate action." Id. at 134 (quoting

Frankel, 179 N.J. at 599). "If, however, contraband is 'observed in plain view

by a public safety official who is lawfully on the premises and is not exceeding

the scope of the search,' that evidence will be admissible." State v. Hathaway,

222 N.J. 453, 470 (2015) (quoting Frankel, 179 N.J. at 599-600).

                                        B.

     In a non-arrest incident, such as this case, our Supreme Court has "placed

strict limits on the scope of the protective-sweep doctrine." State v. Radel, 249

N.J. 469, 495 (2022) (citing State v. Davila, 203 N.J. 97, 102-03 (2010)). Thus,

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"A protective sweep may only occur when (1) police officers are lawfully within

private premises for a legitimate purpose, which may include consent to enter;

and (2) the officers on the scene have a reasonable articulable suspicion that the

area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger." Davila, 203 N.J. at

102.

       After the trial court issued its decision in the present matter, the Court in

Radel held:

              First, when an arrest occurs outside a home, the police
              may not enter the dwelling or conduct a protective
              sweep in the absence of a reasonable and articulable
              suspicion that a person or persons are present inside and
              pose an imminent threat to the officers' safety. See,
              e.g., United States v. Lawlor, 406 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir.
              2005); United States v. Colbert, 76 F.3d 773, 776-77
              (6th Cir. 1996). Entering a home to conduct a
              protective sweep when an arrest is made outside a
              dwelling should be the rare circumstance, in light of the
              special constitutional protections afforded the home.
              Nevertheless, when objective facts provide the police
              with a reasonable and articulable suspicion that their
              lives may be placed in imminent danger by a person or
              persons inside the home, officers will be justified in
              entering the dwelling to carry out a protective sweep to
              safeguard their lives.

                    Second, this sensible balancing of the
              fundamental right to privacy in one's home and the
              compelling interest in officer safety will depend on an
              objective assessment of the particular circumstances in
              each case, such as the manner of the arrest, the distance
              of the arrest from the home, the reasonableness of the

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                                        16
            officers' suspicion that persons were in the dwelling and
            likely to launch an imminent attack, and any other
            relevant factors. A self-created exigency by the police
            cannot justify entry into the home or a protective
            sweep. See Davila, 203 N.J. at 97.

            [Radel, 249 N.J. at 477-78 (third citation reformatted).]

                                       C.

     Applying these legal principles here, we are satisfied a plenary hearing is

warranted to resolve material, disputed facts regarding the emergency aid

exception to the warrant requirement.       On appeal, defendant reprises his

contention that the police reports reveal discrepancies, which bear upon whether

Polo "had an objectively reasonable basis," Edmonds, 211 N.J. at 132, to enter

his residence to provide emergency aid to an occupant. Specifically, Nunez's

report indicates she saw defendant "sitting on top of the front porch," while

Polo's report indicates he spoke with Pina and A. Rodriguez, who told him they

observed defendant "inside of the [residence] in the rear apartment."

     These seemingly contradictory facts, and the inferences that can be drawn

therefrom, warrant a testimonial hearing to clarify whether police had already

entered the apartment before Polo arrived and, if so, whether any other officers

walked through the premises to ensure no one else needed aid. Resolution of

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                                      17
these facts will determine whether Polo's warrantless entry of the premises was

permitted under the emergency aid doctrine.

     On the existing record, we are not persuaded the protective sweep doctrine

applies here. According to the police reports, defendant was arrested at the

hospital – after he had been removed from the scene and the drugs were found

in his apartment. The State asserted Polo entered the apartment alone, to collect

and photograph evidence and render emergency aid. There is no indication in

any of the police reports that Polo entered defendant's home because he feared

an assailant or danger was present. On these facts, the State did not establish

Polo had "a reasonable and articulable suspicion" that someone inside posed an

"imminent danger" to his life, which would otherwise justify entering

defendant's "home to conduct a protective sweep." See Radel, 249 N.J. at 477.

We therefore conclude Polo's entry was not justified under the protective sweep

doctrine.

                                       IV.

     Defendant's argument that the search warrant affidavit was based on

unlawfully obtained evidence also must await the court's decision following the

plenary hearing. On this point, we note the court did not reach the State's

alternate argument that even if certain facts were excised from the affidavit, the

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                                       18
State had probable cause for issuance of the warrant. Because the State raised

the issue before the trial court, on remand, the court may consider the State's

argument, if renewed.

                                        V.

     Little need be said regarding defendant's argument that the court

erroneously denied his request for the full, original surveillance footage

regarding the incident and a Franks hearing was necessary to explore the

"potential conflict of interest between the police and Vargas." We affirm for the

sound reasons articulated by the trial court.

     We add only defendant has not cited, nor has our research revealed, any

authority stating police are obligated to gather video evidence depicting their

response to a crime scene after the incident unfolded. On remand, defendant is

free to explore the timeline of events during the testimonial hearing. Similarly,

we have been presented with no authority supporting defendant's argument for

a Franks hearing.

     Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in part for a plenary

hearing. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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