Court Opinion

ID: 9516172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:36:22.261893+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:46.244106
License: Public Domain

*163SPAETH, Judge,
dissenting:
The majority acknowledges that this is an appeal from an order refusing to take off a compulsory non-suit. Its opinion, however, fails to consider appellant’s evidence by the standard appropriate to such an appeal. As a result, the majority does not recognize the lower court’s error in not allowing appellant’s expert witness to testify as to Pennsylvania high school football coaching standards. These failures—as I consider them to be—are especially to be regretted in a case in which the injury is the loss of sight in an eye.
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“A nonsuit should be entered only in a clear case, and, on appeal from the refusal to take off a compulsory nonsuit, the plaintiff must be given the benefit of all favorable testimony and every reasonable inference of fact arising therefrom and all conflicts therein must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff.” Cushey v. Plunkard, 413 Pa. 116, 117, 196 A.2d 295, 296 (1964) (emphasis added). The majority’s failure to apply this standard is manifest from its description of the game in which appellant was hurt. According to the majority:
[T]he only variations in this particular brand of touch football were that more than one forward pass could be thrown in the same “play” and that a forward pass could be thrown from beyond the “line of scrimmage.” It is quite apparent that these variations do change the game. It is just as apparent that they in no way render the game any more dangerous than it is in its more conventional forms.
Slip op. at 1038.
This description ignores important testimony favorable to appellant; indeed, it states the evidence in the light most favorable to appellee.
Appellant and two of his former schoolmates testified that although in “jungle football” a play was ended by a two-hand tag—and in that sense it was “touch football”—body blocking and tackling regularly occurred. N.T. 17-19, 58-59, 77-79. One of the schoolmates testified at some length *164as to why he found “jungle football” a rougher game than touch football. N.T. 78. When this testimony is recognized, instead of ignored, the proper statement of the case is that the testimony, viewed in the light most favorable to appellant, establishes that “jungle football” involves risks well beyond those normally associated with touch football.
I am unwilling to assume that appellant was aware of the special risks of “jungle football” and by his participation consented to them. But even if appellant was aware of the risks, because he had played “jungle football” before, slip op. of lower court at 2, I am not at all persuaded that he voluntarily assumed the risks.
In Jones v. Three Rivers Management Corp., 483 Pa. 75, 88, 394 A.2d 546, 552 (1978), the Supreme Court stated that “[assumption of the risk as a defense requires a demonstration that, in fact, plaintiff knew of the danger created by defendant’s negligence and explicitly, or implicitly accepted the risks created by this negligence.” (Emphasis added.) The Restatement of Torts (Second) § 496E states:
(2) The plaintiff’s acceptance of a risk is not voluntary if the defendant’s tortious conduct has left him no reasonable alternative course of conduct in order to
(b) exercise or protect a right or privilege of which the defendant has no right to deprive him.
Here, appellant has a right to participate in the varsity football program at Riverside High School. However, the high school’s coaches made participation in “jungle football” a virtual prerequisite to playing football in the fall. N.T. 9, 49. Appellant’s decision to play “jungle football” was therefore not a free decision: had he failed to play, he would have eliminated his chances of playing varsity football. The majority’s discussion of assumption of the risk ignores this aspect of appellant’s testimony.
The majority’s decision further ignores the fact that once appellant was at the practice sessions, he was hardly in a *165position to pick and choose which exercises he was willing to participate in. At the sessions, appellant was subject to the direction of the coaches, and also to pressure from his classmates. Appellant’s situation was like that of an adolescent at a summer camp, who may believe that the activities he is to participate in are dangerous, but feels he has no choice because everyone in the camp who is not injured or sick is required to participate. In such a situation, a New York court concluded that the adolescent does not assume the risk of his injury—a holding not affected by the fact that the adolescent could have left the camp and avoided the activity altogether. Sauer v. Hebrew Inst. of Long Island, 33 Misc.2d 785, 227 N.Y.S.2d 535 (1962), reversed on other grounds, 17 A.D.2d 245, 233 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (1962).
Finally, there is another aspect of the practice sessions, also ignored by the majority, that is against a finding that appellant voluntarily assumed the risk of his injury. The coaches were, above all, teachers of the football players. The players, we must remember, were not professional athletes; they were high school students, learning not only a game but sportsmanship and team play as part of their education. One may be sure that the players looked to their coaches for superior knowledge and training, and reposed a great deal of trust in them. In a very real sense, the players surrendered their judgment to their coaches, must as an inexperienced employee may be said to surrender his judgment to his more experienced employer or co-worker who assures him that a job the employee believes dangerous is, in fact, safe. If the employee proceeds to do the job on the basis of the assurance of safety and is injured, Prosser points out that the employee may not be said to have assumed the risk of his injury, for he has in effect “surrendered his better judgment.” Prosser, The Law of Torts § 68 (4th ed. 1971); see Ohmanns v. Driver, 252 Iowa 1066, 109 N.W.2d 446 (1961); Brown v. Lennane, 155 Mich. 686, 118 N.W. 581 (1908); Manks v. Moore, 108 Minn. 284, 122 N.W. 5 (1909). Unless the risks confronting the employee are so obvious and extreme that he should not have relied on the assurance of *166safety, Rohrabacker v. Woodward, 124 Mich. 125, 82 N.W. 797 (1900), the employee may recover. See Ohmanns v. Driver, supra ; Brown v. Lennane, supra ; Manks v. Moore, supra.
Here, although the coaches made no explicit promises that the practice sessions they conducted would be safe, the players had a right to rely on them to minimize the risks involved, consistent with the purposes of the sessions. Instead, the coaches directed appellant and the other players to participate in a game that had risks well beyond either conventional or touch football. As one court has put it, a participant in a sporting event may assume the risks involved as long as the players play by the rules, Franks v. Smith, 251 Or. 98, 444 P.2d 954 (1968); here, so far as body contact was concerned, the game appellant and the other players participated in had no rules. Moreover, as another court has held, a wrestler does not assume the risk of an injury that occurs when the referee supervising the match is momentarily distracted. Carabba v. Anacortes School District No. 103, supra. Here, the coaches were not momentarily distracted from supervising the game; they did not supervise the game at all because they themselves were participating in it.
The majority suggests that appellant’s injury “could have occurred just as easily in a game of ‘tackle football.’ ” Slip op. at 1038. This suggestion is still another manifestation of the majority’s failure to view the case in a light most favorable to appellant. The foundation of appellant’s case is the argument that the coaches were negligent in directing their charges to play “jungle football” without protective equipment. Given the testimony as to the frequency of body blocking and tackling in “jungle football,” a reasonable jury could have found that a helmet equipped with a face mask would have prevented appellant’s injury and was an item of protective equipment that coaches acting with a proper consideration of their charges’ safety should have provided. The majority’s suggestion that even with a helmet the injury could “easily” have occurred fails to give *167appellant the benefit of the rule of law expressed in section 442 of the Restatement of Torts (Second):
Where the negligent conduct of the actor creates or increases the risk of a particular harm and is a substantial factor in causing that harm, the fact that the harm is brought about through the intervention of another force does not relieve the actor of liability, . . .
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The premise of the majority’s discussion of the lower court’s discretion in admitting expert testimony is that appellant’s expert witness, Frank Cipriani, was called to describe the game of touch football. Thus, the majority says: “. . . it is obvious that there was no need of expert testimony. It is certainly within the ability of the average person to understand the game of touch football as described in the testimony.” Slip op. at 1039. This is a misconception that results from the majority’s mistaken belief that “jungle football” is no different than touch football.
Cipriani was not called to describe the game of touch football. He was called to testify that the coaches of the Riverside High School football team were not conducting summer football practice sessions in conformity with the safety standards maintained at other Pennsylvania high schools. He was also called to testify that the practice sessions were in violation of the rules promulgated by the Western Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic League. By not allowing this testimony, the lower court improperly restricted appellant in his attempt to prove the alleged negligence of the coaches.
In Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 457 Pa. 321, 338, 319 A.2d 914, 924 (1974), the Supreme Court noted that “[t]he standard of qualification [of an expert witness] is a liberal one: ‘If a witness “has any reasonable pretension to specialize knowledge on the subject under investigation he may testify, and the weight to be given to his evidence is for the jury: [citations omitted]. . . . ” McCullough v. Holland Furnace Co., 293 Pa. 45, 49, 141 A. 631 (1928).’ Moodie v. *168Westinghouse Electric Corp., 367 Pa. 493, 501, 80 A.2d 734 (1951).” Here, Cipriani’s testimony as to the safety standards appropriate to high school summer football practice sessions was based on specialized knowledge relevant to the question of whether the Riverside coaches were negligent in their conduct of the practice session during which appellant was hurt. See Sweeney v. Blue Anchor Bev. Co., 325 Pa. 216, 189 A. 331 (1937) (expert witness, if properly qualified, may testify as to whether common usage of business has been adhered to by defendant). The jury should therefore have had the opportunity to hear Cipriani’s testimony.
Had the lower court allowed Cipriani to testify, I believe it would have had a great deal more difficulty in concluding as a matter of law that appellant assumed the risk of his injury and that the coaches were not negligent in their conduct of the practice session. Although athletes have been held to have assumed the ordinary and foreseeable risks of their particular sports, see Podvin v. Somerton Springs Swim Club, Inc., 406 Pa. 384, 178 A.2d 615 (1962); Oberheim v. Pennsylvania Sports and Enterprises, Inc., 358 Pa. 62, 55 A.2d 766 (1947), they have not been held to have assumed risks not inherent in their sports but the result of the negligence or recklessness of other participants or supervisors of the sports. See Bourque v. Duplechin, La.App., 331 So.2d 40 (1976); Jackson et al. v. Livingston Country Club, Inc., et al., 55 A.D.2d 1045 (N.Y.1977); Jenks v. McGranaghan, 32 A.D.2d 989 (N.Y.1969); Whipple v. Salvation Army, 261 Or. 453, 495 P.2d 739 (1971); Carabba v. Anacortes School District No. 103, 72 Wash.2d 939, 435 P.2d 936 (1967); Wood et al. v. Postelthwaite et al., 6 Wash.App. 885, 496 P.2d 988, (1972) affirmed, 82 Wash.2d 387, 510 P.2d 1109 (1973). The present case is a good example of this distinction, for here appellant was injured while playing an unorthodox and dangerous form of football that carried risks not inherent in more conventional versions of the game.
I therefore conclude that the lower court erred in holding that as a matter of law, appellant voluntarily assumed the risks of the dangerous game he was negligently instructed *169to participate in. The order refusing to take off the non-suit should be reversed and the case remanded for trial consistent with this opinion.