Court Opinion

ID: 9498116
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:08:40.989735+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:37.791547
License: Public Domain

DYK, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The majority today holds with respect to the VEOA appeal that when Congress said “in no event may any ... appeal be brought ... later than 15 days,” it did not really mean “in no event.” With respect to the USERRA claim the majority gives “appeal” a different meaning than the well established meaning of that term. I respectfully dissent.
In my view, the Board should be affirmed both on the VEOA claim and on the USERRA claim. Kirkendall has failed to bring his VEOA appeal within 15 days as required by 5 U.S.C. § 3330a(d)(l)(B), and (since the USERRA proceeding is not an appeal) he is not entitled to a hearing under 38 U.S.C. § 4324 because he has failed to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.
*1280I
A
Turning first to the VEOA appeal, the majority holds that 5 U.S.C. § 3330a(d)(l)(B) is subject to equitable tolling under Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990). Ante at 1276-77. In every equitable tolling situation the threshold question is whether equitable tolling would be available in comparable private party litigation. As Irwin held, “it is evident that no more favorable tolling doctrine may be employed against the Government than is employed in suits between private litigants.” 498 U.S. at 96, 111 S.Ct. 453. We reemphasized this rule in Bailey v. West: “The rule we draw from Irwin is that the doctrine of equitable tolling, when available in comparable suits of private parties, is available in suits against the United States, unless Congress has expressed its intent to the contrary.” 160 F.3d 1360, 1364 (Fed.Cir.1998) (en banc) (emphasis added). The majority starts with the premise that: “There can be little doubt that Kirkendall’s employment discrimination claim is analogous to claims brought pursuant to Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act].” Ante at 1276. Because the Title VII statute of limitations between private parties in district court can be tolled, the majority holds that the Irwin equitable tolling presumption applies. Ante at 1276-77.
In my view, the majority’s mistake lies in failing to distinguish between original and appellate proceedings. While it is true enough that Kirkendall’s VEOA claim is analogous to a Title VII discrimination suit, his VEOA appeal is not analogous to an original district court civil action. The VEOA specifically states that the action before the Board is an “appeal” from the Department of Labor. See 5 U.S.C. § 3330a(d). Kirkendall’s VEOA appeal with the Board is thus analogous to an appeal to a court of appeals under Title VII. The analogous appellate filing deadline in private party Title VII cases is 28 U.S.C. § 2107, which is mandatory, jurisdictional, and cannot not be tolled.1 Browder v. Dir., Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 264-65, 98 S.Ct. 556, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978); Oja v. Dep’t of the Army, 405 F.3d 1349, 1358 (Fed.Cir.2005). Since equitable tolling would not be available for comparable private party litigation, it is not available under the VEOA for Kirkendall’s Board appeal.
B
Even if we were to assume that tolling would be available in comparable private party litigation, the question remains whether the statutory language here rebuts the presumption of tolling. Appellate filing deadlines are generally mandatory, jurisdictional, and not subject to equitable tolling. See Stone v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 514 U.S. 386, 405, 115 S.Ct. 1537, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995) (judicial review of the Board of Immigration Appeals); Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 45, 110 S.Ct. 1651, 109 L.Ed.2d 31 (1990) (petitions for writs of certiorari); Browder, 434 U.S. at 264-65, 98 S.Ct. 556 (appeals from district court); Oja, 405 F.3d at 1360 (judicial review of the Merit Systems Protection Board). Because appellate filing deadlines in general are not subject to equitable tolling between private parties, *1281such filing deadlines will also rarely be subject to equitable tolling against the government.
To be sure, we have held that some appellate filing deadlines may be equitably tolled. We held in Bailey that 38 U.S.C. § 7266, the filing deadline in the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, may be tolled. 160 F.3d at 1365. Bailey is plainly distinguishable. There, the relevant statute merely provided that the appellant “shall file a notice of appeal with the Court within 120 days.” 38 U.S.C. § 7266 (2000). This is hardly emphatic language that unequivocally precludes equitable tolling. Rather, it is a prototypical example of what the Supreme Court meant in United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 117 S.Ct. 849, 136 L.Ed.2d 818 (1997), when it stated that “[ojrdinarily limitations statutes use fairly simple language, which one can often plausibly read as containing an implied ‘equitable tolling’ exception.” Id. at 350, 117 S.Ct. 849.
However, the Supreme Court in Brock-am/p rejected the argument for tolling because the statute at issue “set[] forth its time limitations in unusually emphatic form.” Id. Thus, the use of emphatic language is indicative of congressional intent to foreclose equitable tolling. In contrast to the statute at issue in Bailey, the language of section 3330a(d)(l)(B) is sufficiently emphatic to rebut any presumption of equitable tolling.
Section 3330a(d)(l)(B) provides:
[T]he complainant may elect to appeal the alleged violation to the Merit Sys-terns Protection Board ..., except that in no event may any such appeal be brought ... later than 15 days after the date on which the complainant receives written notification from the Secretary. ...
5 U.S.C. § 3330a(d)(l)(B) (emphasis added). This is as emphatic, if not more so, than comparable appellate filing deadlines found at 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a)2 and 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1),3 which, as we have recently reaffirmed, cannot be tolled. Oja, 405 F.3d at 1358-60. The majority correctly notes that some of the other factors considered in Brockamp would favor finding equitable tolling available. Ante at 1276-78. However, as we held in Brice v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 240 F.3d 1367, 1372-73 (Fed.Cir.2001), not all the Brockamp factors need to be present to preclude equitable tolling. In my view, the emphatic plain language of section 3330a(d)(l)(B) decisively precludes equitable tolling in this case.
The majority suggests that the language in section 3330a(d)(l)(B) is comparable to the “barred” language in 28 U.S.C. § 2636(d), which we have held can be tolled. Ante at 1277. Contrary to the majority, the “barred” language is far less forceful than the “in no event may any ... appeal be brought” language of § 3330a(d)(l)(B). The Supreme Court addressed almost the exact same statutory language in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 111 S.Ct. 2773, 115 L.Ed.2d 321 (1991). Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933 provides:
*1282No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under section 11 or 12(a)(2) unless brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or the omission, or after such discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence, or, if the action is to enforce a liability created under section 12(a)(1), unless brought within one year after the violation upon which it is based.
In no event shall any such action he brought to enforce a liability created under section 11 or 12(a)(1) more than three years after the security was bona fide offered to the public, or under section 12(a)(2) more than three years after the sale.
Securities Act of 1933 § 13, codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2000) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court held in Lampf that the “3-year limit is a period of repose inconsistent with tolling.... Because the purpose of the 3-year limitation is clearly to serve as a cutoff, we hold that tolling principles do not apply to that period.” 501 U.S. at 363, 111 S.Ct. 2773. In my view the majority’s decision is not consistent with Lampf.
Finally, the majority considers it “particularly inappropriate” to literally apply a strict deadline because the YEOA was intended to benefit veterans. Ante at 1278. There is, of course, the canon of statutory construction that veterans “legislation is to be liberally construed for the benefit of those who left private life to serve their country.” Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 285, 66 S.Ct. 1105, 90 L.Ed. 1230 (1946). But this canon does not apply unless there is an ambiguity in the statute. In section 3330a(d)(l)(B), there is simply none to be found. “In no event” cannot plausibly be read to contain an equitable tolling exception. Lampf 501 U.S. at 363, 111 S.Ct. 2773.
II
The majority further holds that the Board erred in denying Kirkendall a hearing for his USERRA complaint under 5 U.S.C. § 7701. Section 7701 provides for a mandatory merits hearing in any “appeal” to the Board, whether or not there is a genuine dispute of material fact. Crispin v. Dep’t of Commerce, 732 F.2d 919, 924 (Fed.Cir.1984). Section 7512 of Title 5 of the United States Code generally defines the adverse actions that are appeal-able to the Board. Some agency actions in alleged violation of USERRA are appeal-able to the Board as adverse actions, for example, a demotion allegedly based on discrimination against the employee’s military service. See Yates v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 145 F.3d 1480, 1484 (Fed.Cir.1998) (“[I]n challenging an adverse action before the Board, an employee of a Federal executive agency may assert, as an affirmative defense, a violation of USERRA by the agency.”). A failure to hire — the action involved here — is not one of the appealable actions under section 7512. The question is whether 38 U.S.C. § 4324 makes all USERRA discrimination claims into appeals under section 7701.
The Board has held that
pure USERRA cases are not appeals of personnel actions. Rather, they are petitions for remedial action .... In an appeal before the Board, just like an appeal before a court of appeals, the Board reviews a decision that resulted from a due process proceeding.... In a petition for remedial action, the Board, like a trial court, determines only whether the petitioner has proved his or her claim for relief.
Bodus v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 82 M.S.P.R. 508, 516 (1999) (emphasis in orig*1283inal); see Jordan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 90 M.S.P.R. 525, 530 (2002). The majority today rejects the Board’s view and holds that all USERRA complaints are “appeals,” even where there is no adverse action.
The definition of an “appeal” is well established: “It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that cause.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).
Viewed under the Marbury definition, a USERRA claim under 38 U.S.C. § 4324 cannot be an appeal. Section 4324 provides:
(1) The Merit Systems Protection Board shall adjudicate any complaint brought before the Board .... A person who seeks a hearing or adjudication by submitting such a complaint under this paragraph may be represented at such hearing or adjudication in accordance with the rules of the Board.
(2) If the Board determines that a Federal executive agency or the Office of Personnel Management has not complied with the provisions of this chapter relating to the employment or reemployment of a person by the agency, the Board shall enter an order requiring the agency or Office to comply with such provisions and to compensate such person for any loss of wages or benefits suffered by such person by reason of such lack of compliance.
38 U.S.C. § 4324(c) (2000) (emphasis added). There is no “cause” before the agency which the Board must “revise[] and correct[ ].” Marbury, 5 U.S. at 175.
The majority nonetheless holds that section 4324 complaints are “appeals” because “USERRA claims originate when an agency makes an employment decision..., these employment decisions are then appealed to the board for review.” Ante at 1278. The majority draws the analogy to section 7512 adverse action appeals heard by the Board under 7701. Ante at 1278-79 (citing Price v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 398 F.3d 1322 (Fed.Cir.2005) (constructive suspension); Guillebeau v. Dep’t of the Navy, 362 F.3d 1329 (Fed.Cir.2004) (removal); Knight v. Dep’t of Def., 332 F.3d 1362 (Fed.Cir.2003) (reduction in force demotion)). But Congress does not consider all employment decisions to be appealable adverse actions. The failure to hire (whether or not based on discrimination) is not an adverse action. Under the majority’s theory, every employment discrimination claim is an appeal whether or not an adverse action is involved.
The majority’s theory in this regard is inconsistent not only with section 7701 but also with our 5 U.S.C. § 7702 jurisprudence. Section 7702 provides for pendent Board jurisdiction over certain discrimination claims, and provides in pertinent part:
[I]n the case of any employee or applicant for employment who—
(A) has been affected by an action which the employee or applicant may appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board, and
(B) alleges that a basis for the action was discrimination prohibited by—
(i) section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
the Board shall, within 120 days of the filing of the appeal, decide both the issue of discrimination and the appealable action ....
5 U.S.C. § 7702 (2000). The language of section 7702 itself draws a distinction between “issue[s] of discrimination” and “ap-pealable action[s].” The distinction is important because “appealable actions” are sufficient for Board jurisdiction under sec*1284tion 7701, but “issues of discrimination” under section 7702 are pendent claims and cannot provide an independent basis for Board jurisdiction. Cruz v. Dep’t of the Navy, 934 F.2d 1240, 1243 (Fed.Cir.1991) (en banc). That is, discrimination claims by themselves are not “appeals” falling under the Board’s section 7701 jurisdiction.
To buttress its statutory argument, the majority relies on the Board’s regulation at 5 C.F.R. § 1208.4, defining an appeal to include a complaint under USERRA. As the majority points out, we have previously noted this incongruity between the Board’s regulations and the Board’s holdings in cases such as Bodus. Metzenbaum v. Dep’t of Justice, 240 F.3d 1068, 1071 (Fed. Cir.2001). But given the well established meaning of “appeal,” the Board’s regulations are irrelevant. Even if the Board were otherwise entitled to Chevron deference in its interpretation of 5 U.S.C. § 7701 or 38 U.S.C. § 4324, Chevron would only apply if the statute were ambiguous. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600, 124 S.Ct. 1236, 157 L.Ed.2d 1094 (2004). In my view, the statutory requirement of an “appeal” is not ambiguous, and a USERRA complaint is clearly not an appeal. Under this interpretation of the statute, the petitioner here has not raised a genuine issue of material fact and is not entitled to a hearing. I respectfully dissent.

. Title VII discrimination suits filed in district court between private parties are subject to a 90 day statute of limitations in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(£) that is not jurisdictional and may be equitably tolled. Zipes v. Trans World. Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 394, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982). But an appeal from the original district court proceeding under Title VII to a court of appeals is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2107.

. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) provides:
lN]o appeal shall bring any judgment ... of a civil nature before a court of appeals for review unless notice of appeal is filed, within thirty days after the entry of such judgment ...
28 U.S.C. § 2107 (2000) (emphasis added).

. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any petition for review must be filed within 60 days after the date the petitioner received notice of the final order or decision of the Board.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1) (2000).