Court Opinion

ID: 9955945
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 19:02:27.693801+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:41.783693
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/29/24 Ellis v. Alhambra Unified School District CA2/3

  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION THREE

DARYL ELLIS,                                                    B325864

      Plaintiff and Appellant,                                  Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No.
      v.                                                        19STCV19990
ALHAMBRA UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT et al.,

      Defendants and Respondents.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Jon R. Takasugi, Judge. Affirmed.
     Daryl Ellis, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
     Kessel & Megrabyan, Elizabeth M. Kessel, Armineh
Megrabyan, and Maria Markova for Defendants and
Respondents.
           _______________________________________
                        INTRODUCTION

       Plaintiff and appellant Daryl Ellis (plaintiff) appeals from a
judgment entered after the court granted a motion for summary
judgment filed by defendants and respondents Alhambra Unified
School District (District), Anna Kuo, and Christa Van Orden
(collectively defendants). Plaintiff does not challenge the merits
of the court’s ruling on the motion. Instead, he claims two
procedural errors warrant reversal of the judgment. Finding no
error, we affirm.

       FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

1.    Complaint; Trial Date
      Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit against defendants in June
2019. The operative fifth amended complaint, filed in February
2022, includes six causes of action under Government Code
section 12940 (discrimination on the basis of race, age, and
disability, failure to accommodate disability, harassment, failure
to prevent discrimination and harassment) and five additional
claims related to plaintiff’s employment and termination of
employment with the District.
      In April 2021, the court set the case for trial on August 22,
2022.

1 Although plaintiff appeals from a judgment entered after the court

granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, he only challenges
the underlying orders vacating the trial date and specially setting the
motion for summary judgment for hearing. In the interest of brevity,
we summarize only the factual and procedural details relevant to those
rulings.

                                  2
2.    Ex Parte Application to Continue Trial Date
        In May 2022, defendants filed an ex parte application
requesting a 180-day continuance of the trial date under
California Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(c), due to recent events in
trial counsel’s personal life that compromised defendants’ ability
to prepare a timely motion for summary judgment and to prepare
for trial. Specifically, on April 25, 2022, just a few days before the
second day of plaintiff’s deposition, trial counsel’s home sustained
major damage from a water leak which required her family to
relocate for three to four months. Due to that circumstance,
defendants took plaintiff’s deposition date off calendar and it had
not yet been rescheduled. Further, trial counsel’s young son had
recently developed severe asthma which was difficult to control.
This circumstance caused him to miss 90 percent of school over
the previous two months and numerous consultations with
medical specialists were scheduled during the coming weeks.
Counsel explained that, due to these disruptions, she had been
unable to complete discovery and file a motion for summary
judgment to be heard before the 30-day pretrial motion cut-off
date. She also anticipated that her family would be moving back
into their home either during or immediately before the
scheduled trial date, which she expected would again compromise
her ability to prepare for and litigate the trial.
        Plaintiff opposed defendants’ request for a continuance,
noting that plaintiff had been unemployed for several years and
sought to resolve the case and recover damages as soon as
possible. At the same time, however, plaintiff disclosed that one
of his attorneys was then suffering from health issues that made
it difficult or impossible for him to prepare for or participate in
the trial.

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      On May 9, 2022, the court denied defendants’ ex parte
application without prejudice.
3.    Ex Parte Application to Specially Set Motion for
      Summary Judgment
       On June 7, 2022, defendants filed their motion for
summary judgment and on June 8, 2022, defendants filed an ex
parte application to specially set their motion for summary
judgment for hearing on September 8, 2022 or any other date
convenient for the court. The application stated that at the ex
parte hearing on May 9, 2022, the court indicated it would
specially set a motion for summary judgment brought by
defendants. Based on the court’s directive, defendants
subsequently attempted to reschedule plaintiff’s second day of
deposition. Opposing counsel refused to agree to any date unless
defendants first agreed to produce the individual defendants for
their depositions. After all the depositions were completed,
defense counsel moved as quickly as possible to revise the motion
for summary judgment but suffered some delay in obtaining the
deposition transcripts. Counsel also reminded the court that the
trial could be impacted by delays due to her son’s health, her
family’s relocation, and the health of plaintiff’s lead counsel, as
outlined in the May 2022 ex parte application and opposition
thereto.
       Plaintiff opposed the ex parte application. Mainly, plaintiff
asserted that defendants should have filed their motion for
summary judgment to coincide with the previously scheduled
hearing date on July 21, 2022, more than 30 days prior to the
August 22, 2022 trial date. Plaintiff asserted that defendants
failed to show good cause for their failure to meet the 30-day
pretrial motion cut-off date and asked the court to deny their

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request to specially set the motion for hearing. The opposition
generally asserted that “[f]urther delays only to give Defendant[s]
another chance to file a[n] MSJ would be grossly unfair to
Plaintiff’s rights and highly prejudicial.”
       The court granted the ex parte application and allowed the
September 8, 2022 hearing date to stand. The court advanced and
vacated the final settlement conference and the August 22, 2022
trial date, and scheduled a trial setting conference for September
8, 2022.2
4.    Motion for Summary Judgment
      As noted, on June 7, 2022 defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment supported by declarations, exhibits, and
materials attached to a request for judicial notice. The motion
and accompanying materials were served by email per the
parties’ agreement.
      Plaintiff opposed the motion on the merits and did not raise
any issue relating to the service of the motion for summary
judgment and its supporting materials. Counsel did not raise any
issue relating to the service of the motion at the hearing.
      On September 14, 2022, the court granted defendants’
motion for summary judgment.
5.    Judgment and Appeal
     The court entered a judgment in favor of defendants on
October 18, 2022.
     Plaintiff timely appeals.

2 Pursuant to a subsequent ex parte application, the court continued

the hearing on the motion for summary judgment and the trial setting
conference to September 14, 2022.

                                  5
                            DISCUSSION

      Although plaintiff appeals from a judgment entered after
summary judgment, he does not challenge the merits of the
court’s ruling on the summary judgment motion. Instead, he
contends the court erred by vacating the August 22, 2022 trial
date and asserts he did not receive the required 75-day notice of
the hearing on the motion for summary judgment.3 We reject
both arguments.
1.    Appealability
       We first address defendants’ jurisdictional argument. As
defendants observe, the only item identified in plaintiff’s notice of
appeal is the October 18, 2022 judgment. Defendants claim we
lack jurisdiction to consider the court’s June 9, 2022 order—the
ruling attacked by plaintiff here—because that order was not
separately identified in plaintiff’s notice of appeal.
       Defendants are wrong. The June 9, 2022 order is not
appealable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1.) A nonappealable order may
properly be challenged in an appeal from an ensuing judgment.
(Id., § 906; see, e.g., Mosley v. Pacific Specialty Ins. Co. (2020) 49
Cal.App.5th 417, 422 [noting court of appeal may review any
nonappealable order encompassed within the judgment, even if
not identified in notice of appeal].)
       Sole Energy Co. v. Petrominerals Corp. (2005) 128
Cal.App.4th 212, cited by defendants, does not compel a different
result. There, the Court of Appeal noted that all appealable

3 Plaintiff also raises an issue regarding his medical records in his

reply brief. “We do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a
reply brief.” (Committee to Relocate Marilyn v. City of Palm Springs
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 607, 636, fn. 8.)

                                    6
judgments and orders must be specifically identified in a notice of
appeal to be reviewable on appeal. (Id., at p. 239.) The notice of
appeal at issue identified a judgment entered on January 30,
2003 as the subject of the appeal. The court held that it lacked
jurisdiction to review the trial court’s order granting a new trial,
entered on January 17, 2003, because that order was separately
appealable and “[t]he notice of appeal neither specifies the new
trial order nor makes it ‘ “reasonably clear” ’ Plaintiffs were
trying to appeal from it.” (Ibid.)
       Here, as noted, the June 9, 2022 order granting defendants’
ex parte application to specially set the motion for summary
judgment is not appealable. Accordingly, that order did not need
to be separately identified in the notice of appeal to enable our
review.
2.    Appellant’s Burden on Appeal
        There are fundamental rules and principles of appellate
practice which govern the types of issues and arguments that
may be raised on appeal, the form in which such arguments
should be made, and the manner in which the facts should be
stated. As will become evident, plaintiff’s presentation of this
case on appeal is inadequate in a number of ways.
        The most fundamental rule of appellate review is that the
judgment or order challenged on appeal is presumed to be correct,
and “it is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate
error.” (People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573.)
“ ‘All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on
matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be
affirmatively shown.’ ” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2
Cal.3d 557, 564.) Failure to provide an adequate record requires
that the issue be resolved against the appellant. (Maria P. v.

                                 7
Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295; see Oliveira v. Kiesler (2012)
206 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1362.)
       In addition, the parties must provide citations to the
appellate record directing the court to the supporting evidence for
each factual assertion contained in that party’s briefs. When an
opening brief fails to make appropriate references to the record in
connection with points urged on appeal, the appellate court may
treat those points as waived or forfeited. (See, e.g., Lonely Maiden
Productions, LLC v. GoldenTree Asset Management, LP (2011)
201 Cal.App.4th 368, 384; Dietz v. Meisenheimer & Herron (2009)
177 Cal.App.4th 771, 779–801 [several contentions on appeal
“forfeited” because appellant failed to provide a single record
citation demonstrating it raised those contentions at trial].)
Further, the parties must support their arguments by citing
relevant legal authority. (See, e.g., Landry v. Berryessa Union
School Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691, 699–700 [issue not
supported by pertinent or cognizable legal argument may be
deemed abandoned].)
       An appellant has the burden not only to show error but
prejudice from that error. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) If an
appellant fails to satisfy that burden, his argument will be
rejected on appeal. (Century Surety Co. v. Polisso (2006) 139
Cal.App.4th 922, 963.) “[W]e cannot presume prejudice and will
not reverse the judgment in the absence of an affirmative
showing there was a miscarriage of justice. [Citations.] Nor will
this court act as counsel for appellant by furnishing a legal
argument as to how the trial court’s ruling was prejudicial.
[Citation.]” (Ibid.) And it is well established that “ ‘[w]hen a
litigant is appearing in propria persona, he is entitled to the
same, but no greater, consideration than other litigants and

                                 8
attorneys [citations].’ [Citations.]” (Harding v. Collazo (1986) 177
Cal.App.3d 1044, 1056.)
      Large portions of plaintiff’s briefs fail to comply with these
basic principles of appellate practice. Giving his opening brief a
generous reading, we discern two cognizable arguments: the
court erred by vacating the August 22, 2022 trial date, and
defendants failed to provide him the statutorily required 75-day
notice of hearing on the motion for summary judgment. We
address these arguments in turn.
3.    The court did not abuse its discretion in vacating the
      August 22, 2022 trial date.
       Plaintiff contends the court erred in continuing the
August 22, 2022 trial date to allow defendants’ motion for
summary judgment to be heard. We disagree.
       We review a trial court’s order granting or denying a
continuance for an abuse of discretion. “ ‘The decision to grant or
deny a continuance is committed to the sound discretion of the
trial court. [Citation.] The trial court’s exercise of that discretion
will be upheld if it is based on a reasoned judgment and complies
with legal principles and policies appropriate to the case before
the court. [Citation.] A reviewing court may not disturb the
exercise of discretion by a trial court in the absence of a clear
abuse thereof appearing in the record.’ [Citations.]” (Reales
Investment, LLC v. Johnson (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 463, 468.)
       Trial continuances are disfavored and may be granted “only
on an affirmative showing of good cause.” (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 3.1332(c).) California Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(c) lists
seven circumstances that may indicate good cause. In addition,
“the court must consider all the facts and circumstances that are
relevant to the determination.” (Id., rule 3.1332(d).) Among other

                                  9
facts and circumstances, the trial court properly considers the
proximity of the trial date, whether there were previous trial
continuances, any prejudice that parties or witnesses would
suffer as a result of the continuance, and whether the interests of
justice are best served by a continuance, by the trial of the
matter, or by imposing conditions on the continuance. (Ibid.)
       We see no abuse of discretion here. No other trial
continuances had been granted previously. On June 9, 2022,
when the court continued the trial, the trial date was still several
months away and one of plaintiff’s lead attorneys had previously
indicated he might be unavailable for the trial due to a health
condition. Moreover, defendants planned to bring their motion for
summary judgment in a timely manner, but external
circumstances intervened and caused delays. Specifically, as
explained ante, defendants’ trial counsel’s home sustained major
damage in late April 2022 from a water leak which required her
family to relocate. As a result, plaintiff’s deposition was not
completed as scheduled. During the same period, trial counsel’s
son had developed severe asthma which was difficult to control
and caused counsel to be unavailable to work regularly due to her
son’s absences from school and to attend numerous medical
appointments. Defendants’ counsel was able to resume plaintiff’s
deposition in late May 2022 but only after she agreed to allow the
depositions of the two individual defendants. Due to the content
of the three new depositions, the draft motion for summary
judgment needed substantial revision—a process delayed by
difficulty obtaining the deposition transcripts despite counsel’s
attempts to expedite them. In sum, defendants’ counsel explained
that these disruptions left her unable to complete discovery and
file a motion for summary judgment to be heard more than 30

                                10
days before the August 22, 2022 trial date. Based on these facts,
we cannot conclude the court abused its discretion in concluding
good cause existed to continue the trial and allow a properly
noticed hearing on defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
       Moreover, even if the court did err by continuing the trial
date, plaintiff fails to establish any prejudice from the error. As
noted, we may only reverse a judgment upon a showing of both
error and prejudice from that error. Plaintiff does not explain
how the delay of the trial prejudiced him. He simply states that
the court’s ruling allowed defendants to bring a motion for
summary judgment which resulted in a judgment against him.
But to establish prejudicial error, plaintiff must demonstrate
some relationship between the alleged error and the entry of
judgment. Here, the judgment was entered after defendants
moved for summary judgment and plaintiff does not challenge
the correctness of the court’s order granting the motion for
summary judgment on the merits. To establish prejudicial error
in this circumstance, plaintiff needed to establish that the trial
continuance somehow prevented him from defeating the motion
for summary judgment on the merits. He has not attempted to do
so.
4.    Plaintiff received adequate notice of the hearing on
      the motion for summary judgment.
      Plaintiff repeatedly contends he did not receive the
required 75-day notice of the hearing on defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. The record reveals otherwise.
      Code of Civil Procedure4 section 437c, subdivision (a)(2)
provides, in pertinent part: “Notice of the motion [for summary

4 All unspecified section references are to this code.

                                    11
judgment] and supporting papers shall be served on all other
parties to the action at least 75 days before the time appointed
for hearing.” Section 1010.6, subdivision (a)(3) states that service
via email is “deemed complete at the time of the electronic
transmission of the document or at the time that the electronic
notification of service of the document is sent.” (Id.,
subd. (a)(3)(A).) Further, “[a]ny period of notice, or any right or
duty to do any act or make any response within any period or on
a date certain after the service of the document, which time
period or date is prescribed by statute or rule of court, shall be
extended after service by electronic means by two court days.”
(Id., subd. (a)(3)(B).)
        Here, it is undisputed that defendants served their notice of
motion and motion for summary judgment via email5 on June 7,
2022. Based on that date of service, and taking into account the
75-day required notice and the additional two days for electronic
service, the motion could have been heard, at the earliest, on
August 24, 2022.6 (See Barefield v. Washington Mutual Bank
(2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 299, 303 [noting two-day extension should
be added after the 75-day notice period is calculated].) And even
if the notice period is calculated starting on June 9, 2022, the
date the court specially set the motion for hearing, the motion
still could have been heard as early as August 26, 2022. As noted
ante, the motion was noticed for hearing on September 8, 2022,

5 The proof of service indicates the parties agreed to accept service by

email. Plaintiff does not contend otherwise.
6 The 75th day after June 7, 2022 was Sunday, August 21, 2022. As

that day falls on a holiday within the meaning of the statute, the 75-
day notice period ended on Monday, August 22, 2022. (§§ 12a, 12b.)

                                   12
well after the minimum required notice period. In short, plaintiff
received more, not less, than the 75-day statutorily required
notice of the motion for summary judgment.
      As plaintiff notes, trial courts lack the authority to shorten
the required 75-day notice period. (See, e.g., McMahon v.
Superior Court (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 112, 118 [holding “trial
courts do not have authority to shorten the minimum notice
period for summary judgment hearings”].) We agree. But
plaintiff’s contention that he did not receive 75-days notice of the
motion for summary judgment is based on the original trial date.
Plaintiff appears to argue that the court should not have allowed
defendants to file their motion for summary judgment because it
was “late” in relation to the August 22, 2022 trial date. In other
words, plaintiff urges that the only permissible hearing date
would have been at least 30 days before the original trial date, or
no later than July 22, 2022, and therefore the 75-day notice of the
motion should have been provided no later than May 9, 2022. But
once the court vacated the August 22, 2022 trial date, those date
calculations were no longer applicable. Instead, the required
notice period must be calculated in relation to the court-approved
hearing date of September 8, 2022. With respect to that date,
defendants were required to provide notice of the motion no later
than June 22, 2022. And as already noted, defendants served the
notice of motion on June 7, 2022 and the court confirmed the
hearing date on June 9, 2022.
      Further, and in any event, plaintiff waived any notice
defect by opposing the motion for summary judgment on the
merits and without further objection regarding notice. “[T]he
‘general rule is that one who has been notified to attend a certain
proceeding and does do so, cannot be heard to complain of alleged

                                13
insufficiency of the notice; it has in such instance served its
purpose. …’ ” (Carlton v. Quint (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 690, 697–
698 [plaintiff waived inadequate notice of summary judgment
motion, despite raising the issue in his opposition and at the
hearing, because he “never claimed he did not have adequate
time to prepare a response, appeared at the hearing, argued the
merits, never requested a continuance, and never claimed he was
prejudiced by the defective service or inadequate notice of
hearing”].) Here, plaintiff did not mention the notice issue in
either his written opposition to the motion for summary
judgment or at the hearing on the motion. Accordingly, the issue
is waived.

                        DISPOSITION

     The judgment is affirmed. Defendants and respondents
Alhambra Unified School District, Anna Kuo, and Christa Van
Orden shall recover their costs on appeal.

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                   LAVIN, J.
WE CONCUR:

     EDMON, P. J.

     EGERTON, J.

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