Court Opinion

ID: 9616331
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:45:44.321925+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:57.359204
License: Public Domain

Littlejohn, Acting Associate Justice
(concurring and dissenting):
The writing of the opinion in this case originally fell to me. I submitted to members of the Court a proposed opinion affirming the trial court as modified. A majority of the Court, having taken a different view, I now order my original opinion printed as my concurring and dissenting opinion. It follows:
This appeal is from a jury verdict awarding respondent Small $100,000 for breach of an employment contract after retrial on the issue of damages. We affirm as modified herein.
Small commenced this action after appellant Springs Industries, Inc. (Springs) terminated her employment without honoring a four-step discharge procedure set forth in Springs’ employee handbook. At trial, Small won a jury verdict of $300,000. On appeal, this Court affirmed Springs’ liability for breach of the employment contract because the provisions of the employee handbook were enforceable despite Small’s otherwise at-will employment status. We remanded the case, however, for a new trial on the issue of damages finding the $300,000 award excessive. Small v. Springs Industries, Inc., 292 S. C. 481, 357 S. E. (2d) 452 *490(1987) (Small I). Upon retrial, Small won a jury verdict of $100,000. This appeal follows.
Springs contends the trial judge erred in failing to rule as a matter of law that Small was entitled to recover only lost wages to the date of her rejection of Springs’ offer of reinstatement.
After this Court’s decision in Small ISprings tendered Small an unconditional offer of reinstatement to her previous position, restoring her seniority and waiving the normal physical examination requirement. The offer specified that “[i]n all others respects [her] employment will be identical to that of other hourly-paid employees.” Small would also be given a “clean” disciplinary record.
This offer of reinstatement was not conditioned on settlement of the pending litigation of the parties. The offer was made by one authorized to contract on behalf of Springs. It was in writing and patently bona fide in all respects. Small, however, refused the offer. The only reason given for this rejection was that she no longer “trusted” Springs because the offer had come only after the decision in Small I. There was no reason for Springs to make any offer until it was determined that the discharge was irregular. No court in South Carolina had before this time held that an employee handbook had contractual impact. It was not until the ruling of this court in Small I that Springs became aware of the fact that such handbooks were part of the employment contract.
The offer being genuine on its face, it became the burden of Small to show to the court that reinstatement under the circumstances would be inequitable. Small had an obligation to mitigate damages by accepting employment. Small’s expert testified her lost wages to the time the unaccepted reinstatement offer expired totalled $24,911.
An employee seeking damages for breach of an employment contract has a duty to mitigate those damages. Small I, 292 S. C. at 486, 357 S. E. (2d) at 455. The question before us is whether this duty to mitigate requires an employee to accept an unconditional offer of reinstatement. We hold it does. Only if the jury finds reinstatement inequitable under the circumstances may future damages be considered. This rule is consistent with that followed in many jurisdictions *491for breach of an employment contract. See, e.g., Univ. of Alaska v. Chauvin, 521 P. (2d) 1234 (Alaska 1974); Billetter v. Posell, 94 Cal. App. (2d) 858, 211 P. (2d) 621 (1949); Ryan v. Mineral City High School Dist., 27 Colo. App. 63, 146 P. 792 (1915); Schwarze v. Solo Cup Co., 112[1]. App. (3d) 632, 68 Ill. Dec. 228, 445 N. E. (2d) 872 (1983); Flickema v. Henry Kraker Co., 252 Mich. 406, 233 N. W. 362 (1930); Smith v. Beliot Corp., 40 Wis. (2d) 550, 162 N. W. (2d) 585 (1968); see generally Annot., 72 A. L. R. 1049 (1931). An employer’s liability for the accrual of lost wages is therefore tolled when the employee rejects or accepts the offer of reinstatement.
Here the record is devoid of any evidence reinstatement under the terms offered would have been inequitable. In determining whether a jury issue is involved, we traditionally apply the scintilla rule. Its application is not always easy. The reasoning of the court in the case of In re Crawford, 205 S. C. 72, 30 S. E. (2d) 841 (1944) is equally applicable here.
In the case of Taylor v. Railway Co., 78 S. C. 552, 556, 59 S. E. 641, 643 [1907], this court said: ‘A scintilla of evidence is any material evidence that, if true, would tend to establish the issue in the mind of a reasonable juror. (Italics added.)
Whilst adhering to the scintilla rule, this court has recognized a rule supplemental to the scintilla rule, which is thus propounded in the case of National Bank v. Thomas J. Barrett, Jr., & Co., 173 S. C. 1, 174 S. E. 581, 582 [1934]; ‘If it be conceded that there may be deduced by a process of unusual finesse of reasoning that there is a scintilla of evidence * * * nevertheless there is another rule, more founded upon common sense and reason, to the effect that when only one reasonable inference not just one inference, but one reasonable inference, can be deduced from the evidence, it becomes a question of law for the court, and not a question of fact for the jury.’
Small would create a scintilla of evidence by bootstrapping her claim based on her own conclusions not supported by the record. She testified:
*492Q. ... and let me ask you why you have not accepted that offer of employment?
A. Because I don’t believe they would be fair to me.
We conclude that the judge should have held as a matter of law that Small was entitled to no further compensation after she rejected the offer. The jury was improperly permitted to consider future damages in reaching its verdict.
Our holding today entitles an employee to back pay and reinstatement for breach of an at-will employment contract based on violation of the provisions of an employee handbook. This remedy has been held appropriate by other courts addressing wrongful discharge of an at-will employee. See, e.g., Redemske v. Village of Romeoville, 85 Ill. App. (3d) 286, 40 Ill. Dec. 596, 406 N. E. (2d) 602 (1980); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. (2d) 561, 335 N. W. (2d) 834 (1983); see generally Annot., 44 A. L. R. 4th 1131 (1986). Moreover, it is the same remedy provided legislatively for wrongful discharge of an employee who pursues a worker’s compensation claim. S. C. Code Ann. § 41-1-80 (Supp. 1988). To judicially allow a greater recovery for wrongful discharge of an at-will employee in this instance would be an incongrous result. We find such a remedy equitable while consistent with the employee’s duty to mitigate.
Accordingly, the jury’s verdict is reduced to $24,911.