Court Opinion

ID: 9697382
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:15:22.280774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:32.001037
License: Public Domain

OPINION ANNOUNCING THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

CAPPY, Justice.1
The issue presented in this case is whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the charges against appellee as a means of sanctioning the District Attorney for faffing to comply with a court order as to the time of trial. For the reason set forth herein we find that the trial court did abuse its discretion and thus, reverse the decision of the Superior Court and remand this matter to the trial court for a new trial.
On July 20, 1994 the trial court dismissed the charges of assault and harassment pending against appellee. The charges arose from an incident on June 27, 1991 when the police responded to appellee’s residence on an emergency call for assistance. The call for assistance was prompted by appellee’s physical assault on his wife. Appellee then proceeded to physically attack the police officer who responded to the call. As a result of this incident appellee was held for trial, which was set for December 2,1991.
Appellee failed to appear for trial on December 2, 1991 and a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. On January 20, 1992 the trial court granted the District Attorney’s motion pursuant to Rule 1100, Pa.R.Crim.P., to extend the time for trial until “sixty (60) days after availability” of appellee. Appellee was apprehended on May 3, 1994. Trial was scheduled for June 6, 1994. The case was not called for trial during the *625June 6, 1994 trial term.2 Appellee’s ease was thus automatically moved to the next available trial term, August 1, 1994. On July 6, 1994 appellee moved to dismiss the charges for failure of the District Attorney to bring him to trial within 60 days of his availability as required by the Order of January 20, 1992.
On July 20, 1994 a hearing was held on appellee’s motion to dismiss. At the hearing the trial court determined that the sole reason appellee’s case was not called for trial during the June 6th term was the unavailability of the prosecuting attorney assigned to the case. The subpoenaed witnesses were however available, as were appellee and the public defender. The assigned prosecutor was unavailable because he was on vacation. At the conclusion of the hearing the trial court granted the motion to dismiss “because the Commonwealth disobeyed our January 20, 1992, Order which required the Commonwealth to bring Defendant to trial no later than 60 days after he became available for trial.” (Trial Court Opinion at p. 4) The Superior Court, in a memorandum opinion, relying solely upon the opinion of the trial court, affirmed the decision of the trial court, with Ford Elliot, J., dissenting. This court granted allowance of appeal.
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee an accused the right to a speedy trial. This court adopted Pa.R.Crim.P., Rule 1100 as an administrative means of protecting the constitutional right to a speedy trial. Allegations that an accused has not been brought to trial in a timely fashion are normally addressed with reference to Rule 1100 and its constitutional underpinnings. However, in the case at bar, appellee’s speedy trial rights were not prejudiced by the District Attorney’s failure to bring appellee to trial within the sixty day limitation set in the January 20th court order, thus, Rule 1100 is not at issue. The question presented is whether, *626in imposing the severe sanction of dismissal of the charges because of the violation of the court order, the trial court abused its discretion.
As this Court stated in Coker v. S.M. Flickinger Company, 533 Pa. 441, 447-8, 625 A.2d 1181, 1184-85 (1993):
The term “discretion” imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion, and discretionary power can only exist within the framework of the law, and is not exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judges. Discretion must be exercised on the foundation of reason, as opposed to prejudice, personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary action. Discretion is abused when the course pursued represents not merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.
It is essential that orders of court issued by the presiding tribunal are complied with absent extraordinary circumstances. Here, at the request of the prosecutor, trial of this case was to take place within sixty (60) days after availability of appellee. On the original date set for trial, a date within the confines of the sixty (60) day framework, all of the witnesses, the accused, and his counsel appeared but, because the assigned prosecutor was unavailable, as he was on “vacation,” the trial did not take place. It is less than desirable, in a jurisdiction which does not have a twelve month criminal court trial calendar, and instead, disposes of its criminal cases by means of periodic terms of court, that a prosecutor’s personal vacation would take precedence over the trial of a criminal case to which he had been assigned some weeks prior. Furthermore, it is clearly disingenuous for that prosecutor to then argue that the trial court has no authority to enforce the order setting the date for trial. There are no extraordinary circumstances in the case sub judice which would condone a failure to abide by the subject order of court. Additionally, it is axiomatic that a court has inherent power to *627enforce its own orders of court and that this court will not interfere with enforcement absent an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Carson, 510 Pa. 568, 510 A.2d 1233 (1986); Commonwealth v. Waldman, 484 Pa. 217, 398 A.2d 1022 (1979).
Thus, the issue presented is not whether the court has the authority to sanction the Commonwealth for its failure to appear for trial on the date scheduled and, worse yet, on the date the Commonwealth itself had requested; but instead, whether the sanction employed is within the reasonable discretion of the trial court. This question was directly addressed by this court in Carson. In Carson, the trial judge dismissed the charges when the prosecutor assigned to the case failed to timely appear in his courtroom. The Superior Court reversed and reinstated the criminal charges; this court affirmed finding that the severe sanction of dismissal was unwarranted:
In criminal cases, sanctions may be imposed upon individuals, including counsel for either side; sanctions that vindicate the authority of the court to maintain its schedule and enforce its orders. The failure of a party to appear at a scheduled time must involve more than a mere failure of time; the failure must involve a failure of justice or prejudice to a defendant to justify the discharge of a criminal action. When such interests are not involved, the offending party may be otherwise sanctioned without defeating the public interest.
Carson, at 571-72, 510 A.2d at 1235.
In some cases, under some facts, it may be appropriate for a court to dismiss charges where the Commonwealth fails to abide by an order of that court. It is absolutely necessary for a court to have the power and the tools not only to control its own docket, but also to control its own courtroom. Thus, the option of dismissal of charges is rooted in common law and inherent in the authority of the judiciary. See Brocker v. Brocker, 429 Pa. 513, 241 A.2d 336 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1081, 89 S.Ct. 857, 21 L.Ed.2d 773 (1969).
*628Recently in Konya v. District Attorney of Northampton County, 543 Pa. 32, 669 A.2d 890 (1995), this court reaffirmed the concept that a court possess the inherent authority to dismiss a case where an order of that tribunal has been ignored or disobeyed by a litigant. In Konya the appellant filed a complaint in mandamus seeking to compel the District Attorney to bring criminal charges against the witnesses who allegedly perjured themselves in bringing about appellant’s criminal conviction. Appellant therein failed to perfect service of the complaint. The Commonwealth Court found that appellee had suffered no prejudice from the defective service, therefore the court ordered appellant to properly perfect service of the complaint within fourteen days or suffer dismissal of the complaint in mandamus. Appellant failed to comply with the Commonwealth Court’s order and the complaint was dismissed. This court affirmed the decision of the Commonwealth Court. In that case we found no abuse of discretion by the Commonwealth Court, even though appellee suffered no actual prejudice due to the imperfect service of process. Unlike appellee herein, the appellant in Konya had been specifically warned by the court that failure to comply with the order to perfect service would lead to dismissal of the complaint.
However, the discretion to dismiss is not unfettered and, as it is such a severe sanction, should be used only in instances of absolute necessity. Dismissal of criminal charges punishes not only the prosecutor, who was the offender in this case, but also the public at large, since the public has a reasonable expectation that those who have been charged with crimes will be fairly prosecuted to the full extent of the law. Thus, the sanction of dismissal of criminal charges should be utilized only in the most blatant of cases. Given the public policy goal of protecting the public from criminal conduct, a trial court should consider dismissal of charges where the actions of the Commonwealth are egregious and where demonstrable prejudice will be suffered by the defendant if the charges are not dismissed.
*629In the present case the prosecutor’s scheduling of a vacation during the June trial term was inappropriate. In a county where there are jury trial terms of limited duration, and where no July term was scheduled, vacation time of trial attorneys should be secondary to the needs of the criminal justice system to properly and speedily provide due process to those accused of criminal acts. Accepting the improper act of the prosecutor, we must acknowledge the fact that no prejudice accrued to this defendant by virtue of the delay in his trial. This defendant in particular would be hard pressed to complain of a one month delay after having fled the jurisdiction for three years. The severe sanction of dismissal of all criminal charges was an unreasonable response to the admittedly discourteous and inexcusable affront to the court occasioned by the prosecutor’s action in this case.
Although we acknowledge the inherent power of the trial court to act in order to preserve effectiveness of the judicial function, the sanction here was excessive and thus, an abuse of discretion. A less severe sanction levied directly at the offending attorney or the office of the District Attorney, such as a call for disciplinary action or the sanction of contempt with fine and costs, would have properly addressed the inexcusable conduct of the attorney, as well as the commensurate right of the public to have those accused of serious crimes brought to trial. It would also have reaffirmed the inherent and necessary power of the court to control its own business.
Accordingly, the decision of the Superior Court is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Jurisdiction is relinquished.
CASTILLE, J., files a concurring opinion in which NEWMAN, J., joins.
NIGRO, J., files a concurring opinion.
ZAPPALA, J., concurs in the result.

. This case was reassigned to this author.

. Lebanon County operates on a trial term calendar for jury trials. The District Attorney of Lebanon County controls the calendar by setting cases ready for trial to be called from an available list during the first week of every month that a trial term is scheduled. There is no trial term in July in Lebanon County.