Court Opinion

ID: 9577030
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:31:03.277132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:51.442117
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice.
Mark Alan Dent, the 15-month-old son of Joe Edward Dent and Lee Anne Dent, stopped breathing at home, was successfully resuscitated, and was brought to Memorial Hospital of Adel. A physician admitted the child to the Hospital and ordered that he be placed on a pediatric apnea monitor. However, the child stopped breathing again and no one discovered the problem for several minutes. He died four days later. The Dents brought this wrongful death suit against the Hospital, alleging that their son died as a result of both ordinary and professional negligence on the part of the Hospital and its nursing staff. The trial court initially granted the Hospital’s motion for summary judgment, but that judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeals. Dent v. Memorial Hosp. of Adel, 200 Ga. App. 499 (408 SE2d 473) (1991). The case proceeded to trial, where the evidence conflicted in several respects, including whether the alarm on the apnea monitor failed to sound, whether the nursing staff failed to turn the alarm switch to the “on” position, and whether the Hospital’s crash cart lacked several essential items for pediatric patients. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Hospital after being instructed, in *317relevant part, that “if you find from the evidence in this case that the defendants did not commit any acts of professional negligence or malpractice, a verdict in the plaintiffs’ favor would be unlawful. . . .” In their appeal, the Dents contended that this instruction might have misled the jury to believe that it must find professional negligence in order to return a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that the charge could not have confused the jury into believing it could disregard the issue of ordinary negligence. Dent v. Memorial Hosp. of Adel, 227 Ga. App. 801 (490 SE2d 509) (1997). We granted certiorari to review this ruling of the Court of Appeals.
The Hospital urges that the plaintiffs did not object to the charge with the requisite specificity. The Dents’ objection that the charge “left out the possibility of a verdict based on ordinary negligence” was “stated distinctly enough for a ‘reasonable’ trial judge to understand its nature, enabling him to rule intelligently on the specific point.” Christiansen v. Robertson, 237 Ga. 711, 712 (229 SE2d 472) (1976).
The instruction which required a defense verdict if the jury found no professional negligence conflicted with other instructions which authorized the jury to consider ordinary negligence. “ ‘A charge containing two distinct propositions conflicting the one with the other is calculated to leave the jury in such a confused condition of mind that they can not render an intelligible verdict, and requires the grant of a new trial.’ [Cits.]” Clements v. Clements, 247 Ga. 787, 789 (2) (279 SE2d 698) (1981). See also Moreland v. Word, 209 Ga. 463, 466 (7) (a) (74 SE2d 82) (1953).
The jury cannot be expected to select one part of a charge to the exclusion of another, nor to decide between conflicts therein, nor to determine whether one part cures a previous error, without having their attention specially called thereto and being instructed accordingly.
Morrison v. Dickey, 119 Ga. 698 (2) (46 SE 863) (1904). The trial court’s charge was in irreconcilable conflict and was never properly corrected, and by no reasoning are we able to say that this conflict was harmless. See Johnson v. State, 148 Ga. App. 702, 704 (2) (252 SE2d 205) (1979); State Hwy. Dept. v. Hilliard, 112 Ga. App. 498, 499 (1) (145 SE2d 824) (1965); Baxter v. State Hwy. Dept., 108 Ga. App. 324 (132 SE2d 863) (1963).
The dissent opines that each criticism of the nursing staff’s actions was an assertion of professional negligence and that the allegations of ordinary negligence relate only to the purported failure of the hospital to train the nurses, which could not have proximately caused the child’s death apart from some failure of the nurses to *318meet the professional standard of care. Whether the negligence alleged by a plaintiff is ordinary negligence or professional malpractice is a question of law. Drawdy v. Dept. of Transp., 228 Ga. App. 338, 339 (491 SE2d 521) (1997). “ ‘If the alleged negligent act or omission of a hospital employee does not require the exercise of expert medical judgment, the fact that the employee also has expert medical credentials does not make the case one of “medical malpractice.” ’ ” Lamb v. Candler General Hosp., 262 Ga. 70, 71 (1) (413 SE2d 720) (1992). Whether to use certain equipment at all, what type of equipment to use, and whether certain equipment should be available in a specific case certainly are decisions which normally require the evaluation of the medical condition of a particular patient and, therefore, the application of professional knowledge, skill, and experience. However, the failure to operate equipment correctly or in accordance with a doctor’s instructions or to keep certain equipment on hand is only ordinary, not professional, negligence. See Robinson v. Med. Center of Central Ga., 217 Ga. App. 8, 9-10 (456 SE2d 254) (1995); Sparks v. Southwest Community Hosp. & Med. Center, 195 Ga. App. 858 (395 SE2d 68) (1990); Porter v. Patterson, 107 Ga. App. 64, 71 (1) (129 SE2d 70) (1962). An administrative act not involving professional knowledge, skill or experience is not required to be the subject of an expert opinion. Hillhaven Rehabilitation & Convalescent Center v. Patterson, 195 Ga. App. 70, 72 (2) (392 SE2d 557) (1990).
One such administrative act is a nurse’s application of a heating pad to a patient, pursuant to the doctor’s orders, but with the switch on the wrong setting. Porter v. Patterson, supra at 71-72 (1). Such an act is indistinguishable from the nurses’ alleged failure in this case to activate the alarm on the apnea monitor as the doctor had ordered. This allegation and other averments regarding incorrect operation of the apnea monitor by the nurses and their failure to follow the doctor’s orders are not ones of professional negligence. Moreover, the allegation that the nurses failed to ensure that the “crash cart” was equipped for pediatric patients is one of ordinary negligence. Lamb v. Candler General Hosp., supra at 71 (1); Jenkins County Hosp. Auth. v. Landrum, 206 Ga. App. 753 (426 SE2d 572) (1992).
The plaintiffs alleged and presented evidence that certain actions of the nurses themselves constituted ordinary negligence. Thus, the charge was erroneous and harmful in that it might have misled the jury into believing that it could not return a verdict in favor of plaintiffs based upon this ordinary negligence.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except Benham, C. J., Fletcher, P. J., and Sears, J., who dissent.