Court Opinion

ID: 9631695
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:46:35.433996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:59.007352
License: Public Domain

JOSEPH, C. J.,
dissenting in part; concurring in part.
The majority makes a great deal more out of the state’s venue evidence than it deserves. Even taking it in the best light that the majority focuses on it, I am not persuaded that there was sufficient evidence to permit the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the third degree sex crimes occurred in Multnomah County.
ORS 131.315(5) provides, in part:
“If an offense is committed in or upon any * * * vehicle * * * in transit and it cannot readily be determined in which county the offense was committed, trial of the offense maybe held in any county through or over which the conveyance passed.”
Defendant would make the distinction between a vehicle “in transit” and one not “in transit” hinge on whether the vehicle was moving or parked at the time of the assaults. That is down-right silly. All that needs be said is that the state did not assert the statute as a venue theory in the trial court.
I dissent from the part of the majority’s opinion affirming denial of defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the third degree sex crimes. I concur otherwise.