Court Opinion

ID: 9863320
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 03:24:03.472736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:41:00.975379
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON PETITION TO REHEAR
McCANLESS, Justice.
The appellants, Glens Falls Insurance Company and the City of Oak Ridge, have filed their petition to rehear in accordance with Rule 32 of the Tennessee Supreme Court. The thrust of the petition is to urge this Court to reconsider its analysis of the evidence presented in the record and the conclusions drawn therefrom; to reconsider cases which the Court studied in making the decision in this case; and once again to reargue the equities of the result *185reached by the Court. None of these come within the purview of the petition to rehear. Rule 32 provides in part:
“A rehearing will be refused where no new argument is made, and no new authority adduced, and no material fact is pointed out as overlooked.”
As we observed in Sullivan v. Harpeth Development Corporation, 218 Tenn. 107, 401 S.W.2d 195, 199 [1966]:
“Now, the office of petition to rehear is to call to the attention of the Court matters overlooked; not to re-argue those things which the losing party supposes were improperly decided, after the Court has given the same full consideration. This Court has said, and says again, that a petition for a rehearing should never be used for the purpose of re-arguing the case on the points already considered and determined; unless some new and decisive authority has been discovered, which was overlooked by this Court.”
The burden of proof is of concern to the appellants. They admit they had the burden of proving wilful intentional conduct by the deceased under Section 50-910, T. C.A. On the issue of whether the original injury was the proximate cause of the subsequent death of plaintiff-appellee’s husband, appellants insist the burden should have been cast upon the plaintiff; however, as we held in our opinion, the evidence reveals that the death of the deceased directly resulted from his on-the-job injury. Defendants argued that his conduct amounted to an “independent intervening cause”, the burden of proof of which was upon the appellants, but which they failed to carry.
The petition to rehear is denied.
DYER, C. J., CHATTIN, J., and LEECH, Special Justice, concur.
FONES, J., dissents.