Court Opinion

ID: 9493879
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:22:02.035508+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:05.016260
License: Public Domain

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because I believe Ms. Buckowich’s arguments to the district court encompassed a request for a modest departure, and because I do not believe it is clear from the record that the district court understood its ability to grant such a departure, I respectfully dissent.
Ms. Buckowich’s arguments to the district court are, as my colleagues point out, hardly a model of clarity. Nevertheless, I believe a fair reading of Ms. Buckowich’s *1086submissions encompasses the argument that her actions were “outside the heartland” of money laundering cases. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996). Specifically, Ms. Buckowieh’s actions constituted, in the language of the majority, “unusually innocuous use of banks to shuffle funds.” Maj. op. at 1084.
The district court did not respond directly to this argument. Perhaps it did not believe Ms. Buckowich was making this claim. Perhaps it recognized the argument, but did not believe that Ms. Buck-owich’s transgressions fell “outside the heartland” of money laundering cases, or it simply was not inclined to exercise discretion in her favor. Perhaps, however, the district court did not understand that it had the discretion to depart in such circumstances.
The majority does not discount entirely this latter possibility. Nevertheless, because the district court’s “top-of-range sentence demonstrates that the judge was not inclined to exercise discretion in Buck-owich’s favor,” remanding would not affect Ms. Buckowich’s sentence. Maj. op. at 1085. I do not believe that a “top-of-range” sentence eliminates the possibility that the district court would have granted Ms. Buckowich a departure had it understood its ability to do so.
Ideally, a district court, even in the face of a muddled presentation by counsel, informs the parties (and the appellate court) of the arguments it is addressing, its actions on those arguments, and the analytical process employed in reaching its decision. In the absence of such explanations, an appellate court is left with only circumstantial evidence as to the district court’s reasoning in reaching the end result.
In the present case, the circumstantial evidence is not sufficient to determine whether the district court understood that it could grant a “heartland” departure in these circumstances and whether the district court would have granted such a departure if it properly understood its authority. I, therefore, would remand the case to the district court. The district court, of course, could determine that Ms. Buckowich’s actions did not meet the criteria for a “heartland” departure. It also could refuse to exercise its discretion in her favor. In the absence of a clearer statement, however, I cannot be confident what path the district court would follow. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.