Court Opinion

ID: 9624807
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:18:15.934426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:08:29.887015
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting.
I cannot agree with yet another majority opinion that portrays Idaho jurisprudence at what will be perceived to be at very low ebb.
Justice Bakes’ truncated version of the law prior and subsequent to the enactment of the Uniform Services Former Spouses Protection Act (USFSPA) must be fleshed out so the reader may fully understand the travesty perpetrated by the majority today. Prior to 1981, Idaho courts regularly and faithfully treated military retirement benefits as community property, at least to the extent such benefits vested or accrued while the husband and wife were domiciled in a community property state. Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96 Idaho 672, 535 P.2d 53 (1975). In the summer of 1981, the United States Supreme Court decided McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 69 L.Ed.2d *1005589 (1981). McCarty held that, under federal law, military retirement benefits could not be characterized and considered as community property in property divisions upon divorce. Subsequent to McCarty, this Court “reluctantly” complied with the McCarty holding. Rice v. Rice, 103 Idaho 85, 645 P.2d 319 (1982).
On February 1, 1983, USFSPA, P.L. 97-252, 10 USC § 1408 (enacted September 8, 1982) took effect. The USFSPA granted trial courts the discretion to include a division of military retirement benefits in final dissolution decrees, should applicable state law so allow. The USFSPA left no doubt that it was enacted in response to McCarty:
Subject to the limitations of this section, the court may treat disposable retired or retainer pay payable to a member for pay periods beginning after June 26, 1981 [the date of the McCarty decision], either as property solely of the member or as property of the member and his spouse in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of such court.
10 USC § 1408(c)(1).
Moreover, the legislative history available for the USFSPA shows that the Act not only effectively voided the McCarty decision, but also was intended to apply retroactively to protect those spouses of uniformed servicemen whose divorces occurred during the twenty-month effective period of McCarty.
The purpose of this provision is to place the courts in the same position they were in on June 26, 1981, the date of the McCarty decision, with respect to treatment of non-disability military retired or retainer pay. The provision is intended to remove the federal preemption found to exist by the United States Supreme Court and permit state and other courts of competent jurisdiction to apply pertinent state or other laws in determining whether military retired or retainer pay should be divisible. Nothing in this provision requires any division; it leaves that issue up to the court applying community property, equitable distribution or other principles of marital property determination and distribution. This power is returned to the court retroactive to June 26, 1981 [the effective date of the McCarty decision]. This retroactive application will at least afford individuals who were divorced (or had decrees modified) during the interim period between June 26, 1981 and the effective date of this legislation the opportunity to return to the courts to take advantage of this provision. (Emphasis added).
Senate Report No. 502, 97th Congress, 2nd Session 16, reprinted in 1982 U.S.Code Congressional and Ad.News 1596, 1611.
In short, the USFSPA was enacted solely to ameliorate the effects of McCarty and to return to the states the power to decide the extent to which military retirement benefits could be considered in dissolution proceedings; it specifically provides a cause of action where a decree has been entered or modified. Idaho quickly responded to the USFSPA by reinstating its Ramsey decision. Griggs v. Griggs, 107 Idaho 123, 686 P.2d 68 (1984).
Thus, Justice Bakes is flat wrong in his approach to Mrs. Curl’s motion for relief from the property decree under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(5) upon the ground that “a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated.” McCarty was not mere persuasive precedent from another jurisdiction. It was a binding directive upon state courts from the Supreme Court of the United States which had the power to interpret federal law governing military benefits in the absence of a positive act by Congress. That precedent was voided by the USFSPA as evidenced by its returning power to state courts to divide military pensions as of the effective date of McCarty.
Where Congress has so acted within its area of plenary power, state courts, today ours being represented by our majority of three, may not act inconsistently. This point was made convincingly by Justice Rehnquist in his McCarty opinion.
... Congress may well decide, as it has in the Civil Service and Foreign Service contexts, that more protection should be *1006afforded a former spouse of a retired service member. This decision, however, is for Congress alone. We very recently have re-emphasized that in no area has the Court accorded Congress greater deference than in the conduct and control of military affairs. See Rostker v. Goldberg [453 U.S. 57] ante. at 64-65, 69 L.Ed.2d 478, 101 S.Ct. 2646 [at 2651-52], [(1981)].
Thus, the conclusion that we reached in Hisquierdo [v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 99 S.Ct. 802, 59 L.Ed.2d 1 (1979)], follows a fortiori here:
Congress has weighed the matter, and ‘it is not the province of state courts to strike a balance different from the one Congress has struck.’ 439 U.S. [572] at 590, 59 L.Ed.2d 1, 99 S.Ct. 802 [at 813] (1979).
McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 2743, 69 L.Ed.2d 589 (Emphasis added).
McBride was a wrongly decided case the likes of which we should today not hesitate to overrule. McBride rigidly employed a wooden analysis of the doctrine of res judi-cata to preclude the wife’s attempted reopening of a dissolution judgment, in order to consider military retirement benefits as community assets in a situation where the parties filed for, and received a final divorce decree subsequent to-the enactment of the USFSPA, but before the effective date thereto. This Court ignored the substantial line of authority which recognizes the extraordinary circumstances presented by those cases where divorce decrees were finalized during the twenty-month effective period of McCarty. I am now convinced that these authorities are persuasive. Specifically, I look to Flannagan v. Flannagan, 42 Wash.App. 214, 709 P.2d 1247 (1985), wherein the court recognized the uniqueness of the situation and allowed for examination of a final decree in light of the USFSPA, despite the acknowledged importance of the doctrine of res judicata.
While we recognize the importance of finality of judgments, some situations justify an exception to this ‘doctrine of finality.’ We hold that the circumstances presented in these cases are sufficiently extraordinary to permit the use of a CR 60(b)(ll) [a procedural mechanism analogous to portions of I.R.C.P. Rule 60(b) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60.] motion to reexamine the final decrees in light of the USFSPA.
709 P.2d at 1249.
The Flannagan court relied upon the well-articulated congressional intent “that the USFSPA apply retroactively to eliminate all effects of the McCarty decision....” 709 P.2d at 1250, quoting from In re Marriage of Konzen, 103 Wash.2d 470, 693 P.2d 97, cert. den., 473 U.S. 906, 105 S.Ct. 3530, 87 L.Ed.2d 654 (1985) (emphasis added). Additionally, the court relied heavily upon the “extraordinary circumstances” present where divorce decrees were finalized during the twenty-month effective period of McCarty.
We agree that the McCarty period cases present ‘extraordinary circumstances.’ Those circumstances are as follows; First, the clear Congressional desire of removing all ill effects of McCarty; second, the alacrity with which the Congress moved in passing the USFSPA; third, the anomaly of allowing division of military retirement pay before McCarty and after USFSPA, but not during the twenty-month period in between; and fourth, the limited number of decrees that were final and not appealed during that period.
709 P.2d at 1252.
Finally, the Court emphasized that, in light of the extraordinary circumstances there detailed, “[allowing reopening of these cases will not provide a springboard for attacks on other final judgments.” 709 P.2d at 1252. In short, Flannagan correctly notes the limited nature and effect of allowing reopening in those cases were divorce decrees were finalized in the twenty-month effective period of McCarty. This situation is unique, and the dearth of possible claimants seeking reopening on these grounds in Idaho should readily compel all of us to conclude that providing for reopening in this limited situation will not lead to disrespect for the doctrine of finali*1007ty of judgments, nor the haphazard dismemberment thereof.
Further, and importantly, most states which have both a procedural mechanism for the reopening of final judgments and have considered the retroactive application of the USFSPA to final decrees have allowed reopening. Thorpe v. Thorpe, 123 Wis.2d 424, 367 N.W.2d 233 (1985); Koppenhaver v. Koppenhaver, 101 N.M. 105, 678 P.2d 1180 (App.1984); Castiglioni v. Castiglioni, 192 N.J.Super. 594, 471 A.2d 809 (1984); Edsall v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. 240, 693 P.2d 895 (1984). In Idaho, we also have, under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(5), such a procedural mechanism allowing for reopening of judgments.
For a time the courts of this state also were under legislative authorization to reopen property settlements, legislation which is totally ignored by the majority today and in McBride when that case was reheard:
CHAPTER 68
(S.B. No. 1076)
AN ACT
RELATING TO ACTIONS FOR DIVORCE; AMENDING CHAPTER 7, TITLE 32, IDAHO CODE, BY THE ADDITION OF A NEW SECTION 32-713A, IDAHO CODE, TO ALLOW MODIFICATION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY SETTLEMENTS, JUDGMENTS, OR DECREES WHICH BECAME FINAL IN THE PERIOD OF JUNE 25, 1981, TO FEBRUARY 1, 1983, BY ALLOWING THE INCLUSION OF MILITARY RETIREMENT BENEFITS IN THE SETTLEMENT, JUDGMENT, OR DECREE, TO PROVIDE A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, AND TO PROVIDE A SUNSET CLAUSE.
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:
SECTION 1. That Chapter 7, Title 32, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby amended by the addition thereto of a NEW SECTION, to be known and designated as Section 32-713A, Idaho Code, and to read as follows:
32-713A. MODIFICATION OF DIVORCE DECREE — EFFECTIVE DATE.
1.Community property settlements, judgments, or decrees that became final on or after June 25, 1981, and before February 1, 1983, may be modified to include a division of military retirement benefits payable on or after February 1, 1983, in a manner consistent with federal law and the law of this state as it existed before June 26, 1981, and as it has existed since February 1, 1983.
2. Modification of community property settlements, judgments, or decrees under this section may be granted whether or not the property settlement, judgment, or decree expressly reserved the pension issue for further determination, omitted any reference to a military pension, or assumed in any manner, implicitly or otherwise, that a pension, divisible as community property before June 25, 1981, and on or after February 1, 1983, was not, as of the date the property settlement, judgment, or decree became final, divisible community property.
3. Any proceeding brought pursuant to this section shall be brought before July 1, 1988.
4. This section shall remain in effect until July 1, 1988, and on that date it is repealed and null and void.
Approved March 24, 1987.
1987 Idaho Gen.Laws, Ch. 68, 122-23.
Of particular note is the date the act was approved — March 24, 1987 — a little over two months after McBride was filed on January 7, 1987. It is not too great a leap of imagination to surmise that the act was passed in response to, and to correct, the McBride travesty. Indeed, much as with McCarty vis-a-vis the USFSPA, the act may be read as overruling McBride legislatively. Yet today’s majority chooses to accord McBride the reverence which is ordinarily reserved for the judicial doctrine of stare decisis. (A notable exception is the aberration, Duthie v. Lewiston Gun Club, 104 Idaho 751, 663 P.2d 287 (1983).) In Idaho that doctrine may henceforth be escalated to mean that all prior cases will be upheld and applied no matter how ill-princi*1008pled or wrongly decided. It will make work at this level speedier, but it will poorly serve the trial bench and bar and the people of Idaho.
Justice Bakes is also flat wrong in his misapplication of the second ground for relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(5), that it is “no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.”
In Idaho the equity, or better put, the inequity of the situation was seen and decreed by our legislature4 in its statement of purpose guiding the enactment of I.C. § 32-713A, quoted above.
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
Background: A U.S. Supreme Court decision handed down on June 26, 1981, precluded military retirement pensions from consideration as community property in divorce cases.
The court in its decision urged Congress to correct the situation which it did by enacting the Federal Uniformed Services Former Spouses Act (U.S.Code 1408) providing that military retirement pensions can indeed be considered as community property. The bill was enacted on February 1, 1983.
In Idaho, this left a gap of two years during which courts were unable to treat military retirement pensions as community property.

Purpose: The bill would correct that inequity and provide a procedural mechanism to permit courts to reopen the few military divorce cases that fell into that 2 year gap.

Cited in McBride, 112 Idaho at 972, 739 P.2d at 271 (Bistline, J. dissenting on rehearing) (emphasis added). This statement of purpose, like the act itself, is wholly ignored by today’s majority as it was by the majority in McBride. It is thus that our Idaho jurisprudence is brought into disrepair and disrepute.
Justice Bakes likewise errs in his application of the word “prospective” in the rule. As sole support, he cites the discredited and disreputable McBride decision. Surely a property decree that awards the husband as his sole property his military retirement benefits, if any, is prospective in its application. The benefits are yet to be received.
As used in Rule 60(b)(5) a “prospective judgment” is used in contrast “with those that offer a present remedy for a past wrong,” such as a judgment for money damages. 11 Wright and Miller, § 2863, p. 205 (1973 ed.). Judgments prospective in their application do not require unscrambling of the past and do not involve the rights of third parties. Id. at 202. Equitable decrees, such as injunctions and property divisions, which require the parties to do, or refrain from doing some act, and which potentially require future court oversight, are prospective judgments par excellence.
But according to Justice Bakes, all judgments that have some effect, however slight, on the day of entry, are not prospective. This interpretation would dictate that no judgments would be prospective and eliminate that ground for relief under I.R. C.P. 60(b)(5). If a decree that awards retirement benefits which are not yet payable, and which mil be paid on a monthly basis in the future, is not prospective’in its application I am hard pressed to say what is prospective.
Looking beyond Justice Bakes’ niggling application of the rules is the larger fault that this Court has thus abdicated its inherent power to act to correct an inequity pointed out to us by I.C. § 32-713A and its Statement of Purpose quoted above. I have made this point on a prior occasion:
What surfaces all too clearly in the majority disposition of this case, and its refusal to even mention the Idaho legislation, is the overriding obsession of one member of the Court, unfortunately joined by two others, that unless the inequity can be cured by one of the *1009court’s plethora of rules, it cannot be done at all.
A principle entirely forgotten by those who are today’s majority, is that rules sometimes emanate from appellate decisions. The 1882 rules promulgated by the Territorial Supreme Court specifically stated that rules of practice established in the decisions of the court shall remain in force as heretofore, and were in addition to those made administratively — which were few, thirty-one in all.
Today, we have a court which has so fettered itself with rules made administratively, that it has well-nigh emasculated itself. One recent exception comes to mind. In Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 591 P.2d 1078 (1979), the Court by decision, and not by rule, held ‘that the statutory power to award attorney’s fees applies to the members of this Court as well as to the district judges throughout the state.’ Today, in stark contrast, the Court has the statutory power to correct an inequity, but turns it away ostensibly because the statutory power does not fit into any particular pigeonhole of the various court-made rules affording relief from judgments.
Today’s inaction by the majority presents a sad commentary on the intellect and capabilities of this Court to function as earlier courts have functioned. Finding itself with a 613 page bound volume of rules plus a 1986 pocket parts of 357 more pages of rules, but without a specific rule thought applicable, to applying a legislative remedy, this Supreme Court will be unique in deeming itself no longer able to act by deciding a case which will itself provide a case-law rule— all notwithstanding a legislative enactment which is all the authority needed.
McBride v. McBride, 112 Idaho at 972-73, 739 P.2d at 271-72 (Bistline, J. dissenting on rehearing).
Thus, today’s majority of three refrains from acting where this Court clearly has always heretofore been aware of its inherent power to do so. The three also refuse to obey a directive of the Congressional plenary power over federal retirement benefits. Finally, the three choose to ignore an act of our own Idaho legislature which authorized reopening property settlements like the Curls’. That today’s three very likely cast themselves as careful and conservative believers of judicial restraint presents an irony that would be amusing were not the consequences so serious — for Mrs. Curl in this case, and also for the lamentable debilitation of our Idaho jurisprudence.

. "[0]n an adequate showing the courts will provide relief if it is no longer equitable that the judgment be enforced, whether because of subsequent legislation, a change in the decisional law, or a change in the operative facts.” 11 Wright and Miller, § 2863, pp. 209-10 (1973 ed.)