Court Opinion

ID: 9831547
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:10:34.314988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:35.687850
License: Public Domain

OX MOTIOX EOE EEHEARIXG.
We reversed the judgment and remanded the cause upon the ground that it appeared that the district judge did not consider the -recital in deed of dedication, in connection with the other circumstances in testimony, as evidencing the fact that Jack had conveyed the property in question to plaintiff. We are now requested by both parties to consider said deed of dedication along with such other facts as are shown by the testimony, and thus dispose of the appeal.
It appears that at -the time the property was conveyed to Jack in 1868 he and Judge Ballinger were and bad for many, years before been partners in the practice of law. They remained partners until Colonel Jack died, in 1880. During the time between 1868 and his death he asserted no title to the property and paid no taxes on it. The property was filled by Trueheart, Jack, the city of Galveston, and Judge Ballinger, acting for plaintiff, in which matter the latter expended some $3000 of plaintiff’s money. Ballinger & Jack owned jointly a block in the outlet which was thus filled. After the same wa-s filled the deed -of dedication of certain parts of the outlot, as streets, was made, which instrument (signed by Jack) recited that the property now in question was owned by plaintiff. Judge Ballinger for plaintiff paid the taxes on the property. What possession is shown has been that of plaintiff. After the death of Colonel Jack the property was not placed on the inventory *507of his estate, nor upon that of his wife’s estate, she being Ms sole devisee. Plaintiff does not testify, as is asserted by appellee, that, ho deed of conveyance was ever. made to him. He testified that he had no knowledge of any such deed. Ballinger was plaintiff’s agent and was authorized to invest proceeds of Ms Texas lands in Galveston property, and it was natural, considering their relations, that plaintiff never saw the deed, if any. The evidence shows that the deed from Jack to plaintiff, if any was made, can not be found or proven by ordinary methods.
We held in the former opimon that there were circumstances sufficient, in connection with the recital in the dedication deed, to warrant a conclusion of a deed from Jack to plaintiff for the property. We are still of that opimon. See authorities in former opimon, also Dunn v. Eaton, 23 S. W. Rep., 163; Fletcher v. Fuller, 120 U. S., 534. Only a fair probability of the existence of such a conveyance need be raised by the evidence in cases like this. The conduct, of Jack in reference to the property and that of his representatives, and the known conduct of Ballinger as plaintiff’s agent in reference thereto^ enforces the conclusion as its most reasonable explanation. As stated in the last, mentioned ease, “It is unnecessary, therefore, in the cases mentioned, that the jury, in order to presume a conveyance, should believe that a conveyance was in point of fact executed. It is sufficient, if the evidence leads to the conclusion that the conveyance might have been executed, and that its existence would be a solution of the difficulties arising from its nonproduction.”
If it appeared that the judge had considered and weighed ail the circumstances upon tMs issue, and had found that no conveyance was ever made by Jack to plaintiff, we possibly might not have been in position to reverse such finding of a fact. But he did not consider upon this issue the statement in the deed of .dedication, which was the act of Colonel Jack, and therefore we concluded the cause should be remanded, in order that the issue might be determined from all the facts' and circumstances. How this issue of fact is submitted to us, and we find, consistently as we think with the evidence, that a conveyance of the property in question was made by Jack to the plaintiff, and therefore we reverse the judgment and render judgment, here for the plaintiff for the property.

Reversed and rendered.

Writ of error refused.