Court Opinion

ID: 9745843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 13:35:15.28271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:05.097331
License: Public Domain

GATES, J.
With regret, I must respectfully dissent.
Naturally, I wholeheartedly agree with my colleagues that we should strive always to determine the intent of the Legislature and, in so doing, should turn first to the words of the statute, giving significance to every word and avoiding constructions which make some words surplusage. Unfortunately, when I do so in this instance, strive as I may, I am unable to ignore, and thereby eliminate, the word “residential” from Civil Code section 3135, a term there used not once, but twice.
No purpose, nor rule of grammar, has been suggested to explain why the drafters of this section would have expressly stated that the exception it creates applies to “residential” structures if they intended it to apply equally to “nonresidential,” i.e., “commercial,” structures. If such had been their intent, would they have written, “If any site improvement is provided for in a separate contract from any contract with respect to the erection of residential units or other structures, then the site improvement shall be considered a separate work of improvement and the commencement thereof shall not constitute a commencement of the work of improvement consisting of the erection of any residential unit or other structure”? (Italics added.)
Would not the following have been sufficient, as well as free of all possible ambiguity, “If any site improvement is provided for in a separate contract from any contract with respect to the erection of any structure, then the site improvement shall be considered a separate work of improvement and the commencement thereof shall not constitute a commencement of the work of improvement”?
Our Constitution (Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 3) mandates that protection be afforded those whose labors and materials increase the value of land, and it is of no consequence that their contributions occur after a lender’s lien is *1045perfected so long as that increase is part of a construction project, including site preparation, that was visibly commenced earlier. (Civ. Code, § 3134; Walker v. Lytton Sav. & Loan Assn. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 152, 156-157 [84 Cal.Rptr. 521, 465 P.2d 497].)
This, of course, is not to say that lenders are undeserving of suitable protection or that their role is socially less valuable than that of artisans and materialmen. While doubtless they are far better situated to safeguard their investments than are such potential lienors, in the absence of available and adequate financing, the latter will have nothing upon which to expend their labor and their supplies.
It is readily apparent, of course, why an exception to the general rule governing priorities should be made for residential housing, whether such construction takes the form of separate contracts entered into by one individual homeowner or occurs in the course of a massive modern project that will be spread over many years and which may involve many separate owners and many varying types of related structures. (See generally, Civ. Code, § 3131; E. D. McGillicuddy Constr. Co. v. Knoll Recreation Assn., Inc. (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 891, 896-898 [107 Cal.Rptr. 899].)
Nonetheless, though we lack the ability to conduct hearings on the subject in order to enlighten ourselves in the premises, an advantage afforded only to our legislative brethren, it also appears that persuasive arguments could be made for eliminating section 3135’s present residential restriction in cases involving the large commercial complexes that are so prevalent today. Less clear, however, is the need for such an exception when, as here, a single office building is planned and constructed as one indivisible project from the beginning of its site preparation to its ultimate completion. As a consequence, I personally would prefer to allow our legislators to assume the burden of making any necessary and appropriate amendments.
Appellants’ petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied September 30, 1993.