Court Opinion

ID: 9378487
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-10 17:08:19.489924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:21.650562
License: Public Domain

J-S36004-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    YASSIN HAYTHAME MOHAMAD                    :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 236 WDA 2022

              Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 8, 2022
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County
               Criminal Division at No.: CP-26-CR-0000399-2007

BEFORE:      STABILE, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                          FILED: March 10, 2023

        Appellant Yassin Haythame Mohamad appeals from the August 8, 2022

order of the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County (“PCRA court”), which

dismissed his petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46.1 Upon review, we vacate and remand.

        The facts and procedural history of this case are undisputed. Briefly, as

recounted by a prior panel of this Court on collateral review:

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 Appellant purported to appeal from the PCRA court’s February 8, 2022 notice
of intent to dismiss his pro se petition. However, the appeal lies properly from
the order denying relief filed on August 8, 2022. While technically premature,
we deem his notice of appeal timely filed and have changed the caption
accordingly. See Commonwealth v. McGarry, 172 A.3d 60, 63 n.1 (Pa.
Super. 2017) (deeming appeal proper despite premature notice of appeal
where the PCRA court subsequently entered a final order dismissing the PCRA
petition); Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5).
J-S36004-22

     Appellant was convicted by a jury of two counts each of attempted
     homicide, aggravated assault, and simple assault arising from an
     altercation with corrections officers in 2006 at SCI-Fayette where
     he was serving prison sentences imposed in Philadelphia, Luzerne,
     and Cumberland Counties. On December 14, 2007, the trial court
     sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 20
     to 40 years, to be served consecutively to the sentences that he
     was already serving.

     Appellant filed a timely appeal from his judgment of sentence that
     was dismissed on April 9, 2008 for failure to file a docketing
     statement. Appellant filed a timely first PCRA petition on February
     5, 2009 and following an appeal from a denial of PCRA relief, his
     appeal rights were reinstated nunc pro tunc in 2015. On June 23,
     2016 this Court decided Appellant’s direct appeal and affirmed the
     judgment of sentence. No petition for allowance of appeal was
     filed

     On February 4, 2020, Appellant, acting pro se, filed [a] PCRA
     petition[, his first]. In this PCRA petition, Appellant asserted three
     grounds for relief: 1) a claim that the Commonwealth allegedly
     withheld a camera recording of the altercation between him and
     the corrections officers; 2) a claim of ineffective assistance of his
     direct appeal counsel; and 3) a claim of newly discovered evidence
     of an inmate witness to the altercation. On April 2, 2020, the
     PCRA court issued a notice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 of its
     intent to dismiss Appellant’s 2020 PCRA petition without a hearing
     as untimely. On April 27, 2020, the PCRA court entered an order
     noting that Appellant had failed to respond to the Rule 907 notice
     and dismissing the PCRA petition.

     On May 22, 2020, Appellant timely appealed the April 27, 2020
     dismissal of his 2020 PCRA petition, pro se, to this Court. On June
     25, 2020, this Court ordered the trial court to appoint counsel for
     Appellant or inform the Court why Appellant was not entitled to
     counsel. The trial court appointed counsel to represent Appellant,
     and in December 2020, counsel filed an application to withdraw
     and filed and served on Appellant an [Anders v. California, 386
     U.S. 738 (1967)] brief in which he concluded that there was no
     ground for reversal of the dismissal of Appellant’s PCRA petition.

Commonwealth v. Mohamad, No. 571 WDA 2020, 253 A.3d 326 (Pa. Super.

Filed April 30, 2021) (internal citations and footnote omitted). On April 30,

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2021, we dismissed the appeal as moot because the PCRA court had vacated

its April 27 dismissal order.2 Thereafter, the docket reveals that the PCRA

court took no further action on Appellant’s PCRA petition other than to permit

appointed counsel to withdraw on October 7, 2021.

       On January 24, 2022, while his first petition was lingering in the PCRA

court, Appellant filed the instant—his second—petition. Following the issuance

of a Rule 907 notice, the PCRA court dismissed as untimely the second

petition. Appellant pro se timely appealed. Both Appellant and the PCRA court

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       On appeal,3 Appellant pro se presents two issues for our review:

       [I.] Whether the PCRA court erred and/or abused [its] discretion
       when it ruled on the merits of petition without first deciding on the
       discovery request?

       [II.] Whether the PCRA court erred in denying [Appellant’s]
       petition as untimely when he established that the government
       officials interfered with the presentation of his claims by failing to
       turn over exculpatory and impeachment evidence in violation of
       [Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)] within the plain
       language of the timeliness exception and that the Commonwealth
       failed to disclose any discoveries in this case.

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (sic).

____________________________________________

2 Specifically, the PCRA set aside the dismissal order on May 4, 2020 to allow
Appellant additional time to respond to its Rule 907 notice. Appellant
responded on May 22, 2020.
3“In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA court’s
determination ‘is supported by the record and free of legal error.’”
Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Rainey, 928 A.2d 215, 223 (Pa. 2007)).

                                           -3-
J-S36004-22

      Here, we need not address the substance of Appellant’s appeal, because

the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s second petition while his first petition

still was pending before the court. As stated, following this Court’s April 30,

2021 decision, wherein we noted that the PCRA court vacated its dismissal of

Appellant’s first PCRA petition, the PCRA court did not issue any order

disposing of the first petition. Indeed, for all intents and purposes, the first

petition still was pending before the PCRA court when Appellant filed the

second petition on January 24, 2021.      Thus, to the extent the PCRA court

dismissed as untimely Appellant’s second petition, it erred.

      Separately, in Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 181 A.3d 359 (Pa.

Super. 2018) (en banc), appeal denied, 190 A.3d 1134 (Pa. 2018), we held

that “PCRA courts are not jurisdictionally barred from considering multiple

PCRA petitions relating to the same judgment of sentence at the same time

unless the PCRA court’s order regarding a previously filed petition is on appeal

and, therefore, not yet final.” Montgomery, 181 A.3d at 365 (noting that

“nothing bars a PCRA court from considering a subsequent petition, even if a

prior petition is pending, so long as the prior petition is not under appellate

review”).

      Under Montgomery, the PCRA court was not divested of jurisdiction to

consider Appellant’s second petition, because the first petition still was

pending before the court and no appeal had been taken. We, therefore, are

constrained to remand this matter to the PCRA court to address and dispose

of Appellant’s now two pending petitions.

                                     -4-
J-S36004-22

     Order vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

     Judge Colins joins the memorandum.

     Judge King concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/10/2023

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