Court Opinion

ID: 9688369
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:44:47.196232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:37.894993
License: Public Domain

Mackenzie, P.J.
Plaintiff appeals by leave granted from an order denying his motion to set aside an order to show cause and finding him in contempt of court for failing to pay alimony. We affirm.
Plaintiff-husband and defendant-wife were divorced in 1979 after almost thirty years of marriage. The record indicates that defendant has been ill much of her life and is unable to work. Plaintiff apparently worked for the United States government for a considerable period of time. Following a trial, a judgment of divorce was entered which, upon amendment, ordered plaintiff to pay defendant $130 per week in alimony until defendant’s death or remarriage. The judgment *656also awarded plaintiff his pension free of any and all interest of defendant.
Six years later, plaintiff filed a motion to determine rights and terminate alimony based on his plans for early retirement. Plaintiffs position was that upon his retirement he would no longer be obligated to pay alimony since his sole source of income would be his pension benefits. The trial court ultimately denied the motion, reasoning that the plain language of the judgment awarded permanent alimony until defendant’s death or remarriage, that plaintiffs retirement was foreseeable, and that nothing in the judgment suggested alimony was to be terminated upon plaintiffs retirement. The court referred the matter to the Friend of the Court for a determination of whether alimony should be reduced in light of plaintiffs reduction in income, if any, upon his early retirement. The Friend of the Court subsequently recommended no reduction.
Despite the court’s ruling, plaintiff stopped making his alimony payments. On May 5, 1986, defendant filed a petition for an order to show cause accompanied by an unverified affidavit. A hearing was set. When plaintiff challenged the affidavit, the trial court adjourned the show cause hearing and defendant then filed a verified affidavit. At a show cause hearing conducted June 30, 1986, plaintiff was found in contempt of court and ordered to pay his alimony arrearage or spend thirty days in jail.
Plaintiffs first issue on appeal is procedural. He contends that the court’s order finding him in contempt is void because it was based on an order to show cause entered without a proper affidavit. See MCR 3.606(A) and In re Contempt of Evelyn Nathan, 99 Mich App 492, 494; 297 NW2d 646 (1980). See also 5 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan *657Court Rules Annotated (2d ed), p 331. We disagree. Imperfect verification of a pleading is not a jurisdictional defect and may be cured by amendment. 1 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated (2d ed), p 275. Since the trial court adjourned the hearing pending defendant’s production of a verified affidavit, we are satisfied that the procedural defect did not deprive the court of jurisdiction to enter its contempt order or otherwise render the order invalid.
Plaintiffs second argument challenges the court’s determination that his alimony obligation should not be modified or terminated. Relying on Walker v Walker, 155 Mich App 405; 399 NW2d 541 (1986), plaintiff argues that payment of alimony should cease because his sole source of income is his pension, which was awarded to him free of any claim by defendant.
In Walker, the parties’ divorce was uncontested. Their property settlement agreement awarded the husband his pension benefits free of any claims by the wife. The parties also agreed that the husband would pay alimony. The husband subsequently moved to reduce his alimony obligation in anticipation of retirement. Recognizing that when a party consents to a judgment by stipulation the judgment is binding upon the parties and the court, the Walker panel concluded that the husband’s pension could not be recategorized as income in determining' his ability to pay alimony.
Walker is distinguishable from the instant case. The parties in Walker agreed that the husband’s pension benefits would be awarded to him as property, whereas in the instant case the parties proceeded to trial without such an agreement. Here, the court, in separate provisions, awarded defendant alimony, ordered the distribution of certain assets, and awarded plaintiff his pension. None of *658these provisions was dependent upon the others. The award of retirement benefits was not a part of the property settlement, nor was the award of alimony conditioned upon the property settlement or receipt of retirement benefits. Instead, the overall award was structured so that both plaintiff and defendant could adequately meet their living expenses.
In any event, we do not think that Walker should be read as establishing a per se rule terminating permanent alimony upon the retirement of the obligor. Such a rule is inconsistent with the general principles of equity which have traditionally governed this Court’s review of divorce actions. Instead, the decision whether to terminate alimony upon the retirement of the party obligated to pay alimony when a pension has been awarded to the obligor should be decided on a case-by-case basis. In this case, there is nothing in the record to suggest that defendant was expected to provide for her own support out of the limited property division after plaintiff’s retirement. It seems rather clear that the trial court was aware of plaintiff’s impending retirement and recognized defendant’s need for support assistance on an indefinite basis. Although the court awarded plaintiff his pension outright, the award of alimony for an indefinite period clearly indicates an intent on the part of the trial court to provide defendant a means of support even after plaintiff’s retirement. While the division of a marital asset such as a pension through an award of alimony is not always favored, see Keen v Keen, 160 Mich App 314, 316-317; 407 NW2d 643 (1987), it is an acceptable method of distributing a pension in some cases. See Hatcher v Hatcher, 129 Mich App 753, 766; 343 NW2d 498 (1983), Perry v Perry, 133 Mich App 453, 457; 350 NW2d 275 (1984), and Rust v *659Rust, 143 Mich App 704, 706; 373 NW2d 197 (1985). Such a remedy seems appropriate in the instant case given the limited cash resources available to defendant and given the liberal pension benefits to be enjoyed by plaintiff and which were accrued during this rather lengthy marriage.
The only remaining issue is whether the trial court erred in finding that plaintiff had failed to carry his burden of proving changed circumstances in support of his motion for modification. Rapaport v Rapaport, 158 Mich App 741, 746; 405 NW2d 165 (1987), modified 429 Mich 875 (1987). In our view, plaintiff has proven his retirement but has failed to show a change in the resources available to him for living expenses. Upon his retirement, plaintiff began receiving net regular monthly payments of $2,503.02, or $577.62 per week. Although it is unclear whether plaintiff’s pension benefits will become subject to income tax, the Friend of the Court referee estimated that, even allowing for tax deductions, plaintiff’s weekly checks will net him $430.21. At the time of the divorce, plaintiff’s net income was $474.20 per week. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order denying plaintiff’s motion for modification.
Affirmed.
L. P. Borrello, J., concurred.