Court Opinion

ID: 9828328
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:17:56.41293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:47.229159
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellees have presented a very earnest and forceful motion for rehearing, which has been carefully answered in behalf of appellants. After a consideration of the motion and its reply, we feel confirmed rather than otherwise in the conclusion expressed in our original opinion that the court erred in failing to sustain appellants’ plea in abatement. We think that when articles 7 and 14 of the association and articles 3, 4, and 7 of the declaration of trust, and article 2 of the association’s by-laws are all carefully considered, it leads to the conclusion that in legal effect the suit, as presented in appellees’ amended petition, upon which they went to trial, was against three of the trustees, as stated in our original opinion. See McFadden v. Wiesse (Tex. Civ. App.) 168 S. W. 486. But, if mistaken as to this because of the fact appearing in the evidence that Henderson in March, 1921, agreed to sell his interest in the stock of the company and tendered his resignation as secretary and treasurer, and that such resignation was accepted, it would yet be true that neither allegation nor proof shows that a successor was elected in his place, or, if so, who he was. So that, at all events, the suit was against two of the undisputed trustees in the name of the corporation upon a petition which is entirely silent as to the will or any action on the part of the remaining two trustees. True, counsel who signed the petition were named in the articles of the association as trustees, *1087but they do not sue or appear as plaintiffs, their names are signed simply as counsel and not as trustees. We do not think any effect can be legally given to the fact that the original petition in this case was in the name of the association, joined by some of the trustees and pertain of the stockholders, for, upon the filing of the amended petition, the original petition under rules 12 and 14, promulgated for the government of the district and county courts, became of no further effect, and not even properly a part of the record on this appeal. We accordingly feel that we must adhere to our ruling as originally expressed on the appellants’ plea in abatement.
Nor do we see our way clear to reverse our ruling upon the second question discussed in our original opinion, particularly in view of the fact that as pointed out and as asserted by appellants in their answer to the motion there was evidence tending tp show that the parties to the written agreements and arti- ■ cles of association substantially construed those instruments and treated the rights of the parties thereto in accord with the interpretation given them in our original opinion. For instance, there was testimony to the effect that Scott, Henderson, and Kistler agreed upon the amount of the capitalization of the association before they went to get Mr. Johnson as attorney; and that it was also agreed between the three first named that they would give each of their wives $500 of the stock, and also give some stock to Mr. Clark’s wife and to Mr. Johnson’s intended wife, and that in' doing so neither Mr. Johnson nor Mr. Clark were consulted; that “we acted on that just as three partners”; that neither Mr. Clark nor Mr. Johnson ever made any claim at any time or anywhere to Mr. Scott; that he and Mr. Henderson had each agreed to put in their leases for $25,000 of .the capital stock of the company. Mr. Scott testified substantially that he was present at the time Mr. Henderson and Mr. Kistler agreed upon the sale of Mr. .Henderson’s stock, and that nothing was said*by any of the parties by way of protest to the right'of Mr. Henderson to the stock sold, which amounted to some 71,000 shares, and that no complaints were made upon the payment of dividends on the apportionment of stock as elaiméd by Scott and Henderson.
It is well settled in the authorities that, even though a contract be ambiguous, the practical construction of its terms by the parties will be adopted, even though the language used may suggest a different construction. See 6 R. C. L. 852-854; Railway Co. v. Johnson, 74 Tex. 256, 11 S. W. 1113; Bounds v. Hubbard City, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 233, 105 S. W. 56.
We conclude the motion for rehearing must be overruled.