Court Opinion

ID: 9862997
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 02:48:44.305559+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:46:01.465778
License: Public Domain

*556On Petition to Rehear
Defendants have filed a petition to rehear and additional authorities have been cited by both parties.
As in their original brief, defendants again rely strongly on Dr. Wood’s testimony that there are two schools of thought as to whether it is best to examine the patient and run the risk of infection. His testimony on that subject was not developed to show how long such examination should be postponed according to the school of thought favoring delayed examination. His testimony, however, shows that all danger of infection had passed at the end of nine days when Mrs. Wooten was discharged from the hospital and there is no testimony that, according to any recognized school of thought, examination should be delayed after that danger has passed. His testimony is also to the effect that it is “common sense” that Mrs. Wooten’s present condition should not result from this type of operation and that the operating surgeon should take precautions to see that the tissues do not grow back together.
We attempted in our original opinion to make clear the conditions under which a declaration or admission by a physician would be admissible in a suit for malpractice and held that the declaration of Dr. Curry that he “should” have examined the patient implied that in this instance he failed to use his best judgment. The remarks of the trial judge in passing on the motion for a directed verdict indicate that if this language had been brought to his attention the case would have been allowed to go to the jury. In speaking of the alleged admission by Dr. Curry, he said:
*557“The doctor did not say ‘I should have done this thing’. He said, ‘If I had looked, I would have seen it’ as I understand the testimony.”
Defendants rely strongly upon Quickstad v. Tavenner, 196 Minn. 125, 264 N. W. 436; Loudon v. Scott, 58 Mont. 645, 194 P. 488, 12 A. L. R. 1487 and Fink v. Steele, 166 Md. 354, 171 A. 49. These cases proceed on the theory that an admission of failure to do what “should” have been done fails to show a lack of skill and judgment—not that it implies a failure to exercise the best judgment of which the physician was capable.
Where there is no emergency involved in the post operative care of a patient a physician is duty bound to exercise his own best judgment between standard and recognized methods and practices. See Casenberg v. Lewis, 163 Tenn. 163, 40 S. W. (2d) 1038; Quinley v. Cocke, 183 Tenn. 428, 192 S. W. (2d) 992 both in our original opinion, and 41 Am. Jur. 201.
Cases holding expressions by a physician more or less similar to that here involved competent as an admission and sufficient to carry the case to the jury include Pappa v. Bonner, 286 Ala. 185, 105, So. (2d) 87 (1958); Sheffield v. Renner (Cal. App., 1958) 328 P. (2d) 828; Rotan v. Breenbaum, 107 U. S. App. D. C. 16, 273 F. (2d) 830 (1959); Thomas v. Merriam, 337 P. (2d) 604 (Mont. 1959); Greenwood v. Harris, 362 P. (2d) 85 (Okla. 1961); Woronka v. Sewall, 320 Mass. 362, 69 N. E. (2d) 581; Mehigan v. Sheehan, 94 N. H. 274, 51 A. (2d) 632; Strickleman v. Synhorst, 243 Iowa 872, 52 N. W. (2d) 504. And see generally 70 C. J. S. Physicians and Surgeons sec. 62, p. 1008.
*558Upon further reflection we are constrained, both upon reason and the clear weight of authority, to adhere to our original view that plaintiffs are entitled to have their cases go to the jury. Accordingly the petition to rehear is denied.