Court Opinion

ID: 9425707
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:15:30.765137+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:57.086003
License: Public Domain

Me. Justice Powell,
concurring.
.In sweeping language, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 (1972), enunciated the principié that the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process requires an adversary hearing before an individual may be temporarily deprived .of. any- possessory interest in tangible personal property, however brief the dispossession and however slight his monetary interest in the property. The Court’s decision today withdraws significantly from the full reach of that principié, and to this extent I think it fair to say that the Fuentes opinion” is overruled.
I could have agreed that the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes in Fuentes were violative of. due process be*624cause of their arbitrary and unreasonable provisions. It seems to me, however, that it was unnecessary for the Fuentes, opinion to have, adopted so broad and inflexible a rule, especially one that considerably altered settled law with respect to commercial transactions and basic creditor-debtor understandings. Narrower grounds existed for invalidating the replevin, statutes in that case.
I
The constitutional guarantee of procedural due process applies to governmental deprivation .of. a legitimate “property” or “liberty” interest within the meaning of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. It requires that any such deprivation be accompanied by minimum procedural safeguards, including somé form of notice and a hearing; Arnett v. Kennedy, ante, p. 164 (separate opinion of Powell, J.); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593 (1972). In the present case, there can be no doubt, that under state law. both petitioner and respondent had property interests in the goods sought to be sequestered. Petitioner, as the vendee-debtor under an installment sales contract, had both title and possession of the goods subject to his contractual obligation to' cohtinuejbhe installment payments. Respondent, as the vendor-creditor, had a vendor’s lien on the goods as security for the unpaid balance.
The determination of what due process requires in a given context’ depends on a consideration of both the nature of the governmental function involved and the private interests affected. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895 (1961); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 263-266 (1970). The governmental function'in the instant case is to provide a reasonable and fair framework of rules'which facilitate commercial transactions on a *625credit basis. . The Louisiana sequestration statute is de- ' signed to protect thé legitimate interests of both creditor arid debtor. ' As to the creditor, there is the obvious risk that a defaulting debtor may conceal, destroy; or further encumber the goods and thus deprivé the creditor of his security. This danger is particularly acute where, as here, the vendor’s lien may be vitiated merely by trarisr ferring the goods from the debtor’s possession. In addi,tion, the debtor’s continued use of the goods diminishes their resale value. In these circumstances, a requirement of notice and an adversary hearing before sequestration would impose a' serious risk that a creditor could be deprived of his security.
Against this concern must be balanced the debtor’s real interest in uninterrupted possession of the goods, especially if the sequestration proves, to be unjustified. To be sure, repossession of certain items of personal property, even for a brief period, may cause significant inconvenience. But it can hardly be said that temporary deprivation of such property would necessarily place a debtor in a “brutal need” situatiori. Goldberg v. Kelly, supra; Arnett v. Kennedy, supra.
In my view, the constitutional guarantee df procedural due process is fully satisfied in cases of this kind where .state law requires, as a precondition to invoking the State’s aid to sequester property of a defaulting debtor, that the creditor furnish adequate security and make a specific factual showing before a neutral officer or magistrate of probable cause .to believe that he is entitled to the relief requested. An opportunity for an adversary hearing must then be accorded promptly after sequestration to determine the merits of the coritroyersy, with; the, burden of- proof on the creditor.
The Louisiana statute: sub judice satisfies these requirements arid differs materially from the Florida and *626Pennsylvania statutes in Fuentes.1 Those, statutes did' not require an applicant for a writ of replevin to make any factually convincing showing that the property was wrongfully detained or that he was entitled to the writ. Moreover, the Florida statute provided only that a post-seizure hearing be held eventually on the merits of the competing claims, and it required the debtor to initiate that proceeding. The Pennsylvania statute made no provision for a hearing at any time.
By contrast, the Louisiana statute applicable in Orleans Parish authorizes issuance of a writ of sequestration “only when the nature of the claim and the amount thereof, if any, and the grounds relied upon . . . clearly appear from specific facts shown by the petition verified by, or by' the. separate affidavit of, the petitioner, his counsel-or agent.” La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann., Art. 3501 (1961). The Louisiana statute also provides for an immediate hearing, and the writ is dissolved “unless the *627[creditor] proves the grounds upon which the writ was issued.” Art. 3506.
The Court’s opinion makes these points well, and I need not elaborate them further. In brief, the Louisiana statute satisfies the essential prerequisites of procedural due process and represents a fairer balancing of the interests of the respective parties than the statutes in Fuentes. I therefore agree that the Louisiana procedure1 should be sustained against petitioner’s challenge.
II
Mr. Justice Stewart reproves the Court for not adhering strictly to the doctrine of stare .decisis. Post, at 634^636. To be sure, stare decisis promotes the important considerations of consistency and predictability in judicial decisions and represents a wise and appropriate. policy in most instances. But that doctrine has never been thought to stand as an absolute bar to reconsideration of a prior decision, especially with respect to matters of constitutional interpretation.2 Where the Court errs in its construction of a statute, correction may always be accomplished by legislative action. Revision of a constitutional interpretation, on the other hand, is often impossible as a practical matter, for it requires the cumbersome route of constitutional amendment. It is thus not only our prerogative but also our duty to re-examine a precedent where its reasoning or understanding of the Constitution is fairly called into *628question. And if the precedent or its rationale is of doubtful validity, then it should not stand. As Mr. Chief Justice Taney commented more than a century ago, a constitutional decision of this Court should be, “always open to discussion when it is supposed to have been founded in error, Jso] that [our] judicial authority should hereafter depend altogether on the force of the reasoning by which it is supported.” Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 470 (1849).
Moreover, reconsideration is particularly appropriate in the present case. To the extent that the Fuentes opinion established a Procrustean rule of a prior adversary hearing, it marked a significant departure from past teachings as to the meaning of due process.3 As the Court stated in Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S., at 895, “[t]he very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.” The Fuentes opinion not only eviscerated that principle but also sounded a potential death knell for a panoply of statutes in thé com*629mercial field.4 This fact alone justifies-a re-examination of its premises. The Court today reviews these at length, and I join its opinion because I think it represents a reaffirmation of the- traditipnal meaning of procedural due process:
Mr. Justice Stewart,
with whom Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall concur, dissenting.
The Louisiana sequestration procedure now before us is remarkably similar to the statutory provisions at issue in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 (1972). In both cases the purchaser-in-possession of the property .is not afforded any prior notice of the seizure or any opportunity to rebut the allegations of the vendor before the property is summarily taken from him by agents of the State. In both cases all that is required to support the issuance of the writ' and seizure of the goods is the filing of a complaint and an affidavit containing pro forma allegations in support of the seller’s purported entitlement to the goods in question. Since the procedure in both cases is completely ex parte, the state official charged with issuing the writ can do little more than determine the formal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s allegations before ordering the state agents to take the goods from the defendant’s possession.1
*630The question before the Court in Fuentes was what ¡procedures are required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendmefit.when a State, at the behest of a private claimant, seizes goods in the possession of another, pending judicial resolution of the claimant’s assertion of superior right to possess the property. The Court’s analysis of this question began with the proposition that, except in exceptional circumstances,2 the deprivation of a property interest encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection 'must be preceded by notice to the affected party and an opportunity to be heard. The Court then went on to hold that a debtor-vendee’s interest in the continued possession of purchased goods was “property” within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection and that the “temporary, non-final deprivation of [this] property [is] ... a ‘deprivation’ in the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 407 U. S., at 85. Accordingly, Fuentes held that such a deprivation of property must be preceded by notice to the possessor and by an opportunity for a hearing appropriate under the circumstances; Matters such as *631requirements for the posting of bond and the filing of sworn factual allegations, the length and severity of the deprivation, the relative simplicity of the issues underlying the creditor’s claim to possession, and the comparative “importance” or “necessity” of the goods involved were held to be relevant to determining the form of notice and hearing to be provided, but not to the constitutional need for notice and an opportunity for a hearing of some kind.
The deprivation of property in. this case is identical to that at issue in Fuentes, and the Court does not say otherwise. Thus, under Fuentes, due process of law permits Louisiana to effect this deprivation only after. notice to the possessor and opportunity for a hearing. Because i would adhere to the holding of Fuentes, I dissent from the Court’s opinion and judgment upholding Louisiana’s ex parte sequestration procedure, which provides that the possessor of the property shall never have advance notice or a hearing of any kind.
As already noted, the deprivation of property in this, case is identical to- that in Fuentes. But the Court says that this is a different case for three reasons: (1) the plaintiff who seeks the seizure of . the property must file an affidavit stating “specific facts” that justify the sequestration; (2) the state official who issues the writ of sequestration is a-judge instead of a clerk of the court; and (3) the issues that govern the plaintiff’s right to sequestration are limited to “the existence of a vendor’s lien and the issue of default,” and “[t]here is thus far less danger here that the seizure will be mistaken and a corresponding decrease in the utility of an adversary hearing,” ante, at 618. The Court’s opinion in Fuentes, however, explicitly "rejected each of these factors as a ground for a difference in decision.
The first two purported distinctions relate solely to *632the procedure by which the creditor-vendor secures the State’s aid in summarily taking goods from the purchaser’s possession. _ But so long as the Louisiana law routinely permits an ex parte seizure without notice to the purchaser, these procedural distinctions make no constitutional difference. •
The Louisiana affidavit requirement can be met by any plaintiff, who fills in the blanks on. the appropriate -form documents and presents the completed forms tó the court. Although the standárdized form- in this case called for somewhat more information than that required by the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes challenged in Fuentes, such ex parte allegations “are hardly a substitute for a prior hearing, for they test no more than the strength of -the applicant’s own belief in his rights. Since his private gain is at' stake, the danger is all too great that his confidence in hi's cause will be misplaced. Lawyers and judges aré familiar with the-phenomenon of a party mistakenly but firmly, convinced that his view of the fácts arid-law will prevail, and-therefore quite willing to risk the costs of litigation.” 407 U. S., at 83.
Similarly, the fact that the official'who signs the writ after the ex parte application is a judge instead of a court clerk is of no constitutional significance. Outside Orleans Parish, this same function is performed by the court clerk. There is nothing to suggést that the nature of this duty was at all changed when the law wab amended to vest it in a judge rather than a clerk in this one parish. Indeed, the official comments declare that this statutory revision was intended to “mak[e] no change in the law.”3 Whether the issuing functionary be a judge or a court clerk, he can in any event do no more than ascertain the formal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s allegations, after *633which the issuance of the summary writ becomes a. simple ministerial act.4
The third distinction the Court finds between this case and Fuentes is equally insubstantial. The Court-says the issues in this case are “particularly suited” to ex. parte determination, in contrast tó the issues in Fuentes, which were “inherently subject to factual determination and adversarial input,” ante, at 617, 618. . There is, however, absolutely mo support for this purported distinction. In this case the Court states, the factual issues as “the,: existéñce.of a vendor’s lien and the issué.of default.” Ante,cat 618. The issues upon which replevin dépended in Fuentes were no different; the creditor-vendor needed only, to establish his security interest and the debtorvendee’s default. As Mr. Justice White acknowledged in his denies'dissent, the essential issue at any hearing would be whether “there is reasonable basis for his [the .creditor-vendor’s] claim of default.” 407 U. S., at 99-100. Thus, the Court produces this final attempted distinction out of whole cloth.
Moreover, Fuentes held that the. relative complexity, of the issues in dispute is not relevant to determining whether a prior hearing is required by due procesé'. “The issües decisive of the ultimate right to continued possession, of course, may be quite simple. The simplicity of the issues might be relevant to the formality or scheduling of a prior hearing. But it certainly cannot undercut the right to a prior hearing of some kind.” Id., at 87 n. 18 (citation omitted). Similarly, the probability óf suc*634cess on the factual issue does not affect the right to prior notice and an opportunity to be heard.
“The right to be heard does not depend upon an advance showing that one will surely prevail at the hearing. To one who protests against the taking of his property without due process of law, it is no. answer to say that in his particular case due process of law would have led to the same result because he had no adequate' defense upon the merits. It is enough to invoke the procedural safeguards of the Fourteenth Amendment that a significant property interest is at stake, whatever the' ultimate outcome of a hearing on the contractual right to continued possession and use of the goods.” Id., at 87 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In short, this case is constitutionally indistinguishable from Fuentes v. Shevin, and the Court today has simply rejected the reasoning of that case and adopted instead the analysis of the. Fuentes dissent. In light of all that has been written in Fuentes and in this case, it. seems., pointless to prolong the debate. Suffice it to say that I would reverse the judgment before us because the Louisiana sequestration procedure fails to comport with the requirements of due process of law.
I would add, however, a word of concern. It seems to me that unless we respect the constitutional decisions of this Court, we can hardly expect that others will do so. Cf. Roofing Wholesale Co. v. Palmer, 108 Ariz. 508, 502 P. 2d 1327 (1972). A substantial departure from precedent can only be justified, I had thought, in the light of experience with the application of the rulé to be abandoned or in the light Of an altered historic environ*635ment.5 Yet the Court today has unmistakably overruled a considered decision of this Court that is barely two years old, without pointing to any change in either societal perceptions or basic constitutional understandings that might justify this total disregard of stare decisis.
The Fuentes decision was in a direct line of'recent cases in this. Court that have applied the procedural due process commands of the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit governmental action that deprives a person of a statutory or contractual property interest with „no advance notice or opportunity- to be heard.6 In the short time that has elapsed since the Fuentes case was decided, many state and federal courts have followed it -in assessing the constitutional validity of state replevin statutes and other comparable state laws.7 No data have been brought to our attention to indicate that these decisions, granting to otherwise defenseless consumers the simple rudiments of due process of law, have worked any untoward change in the consumer credit, market or in other commercial relationships. The only perceivable change that has occurred since Fuentes' is in the makeup of this Court.8
*636A basic change in the law upon a ground no firmer than. a change in our membership invites the popular misconception that this institution is little different from the two political branches of the Government. No misconception coujd do more lasting injury to this Court and to the system of law which it is our abiding mission to serve.
Mr. Justice Brennan is in agreement that Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 (1972), requires reversal of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana.

 The.Court outlined the deficiencies of the statutes in Fuentes:
“There is [under the Florida statute] no requirement that the applicant make a convincing showing before the seizure that the goods are, 'in fact, ‘wrongfully detained.' Rather, Florida law automatically relies on the bare assertion of the party seeking the writ that he is entitled to one and allows a court clerk to issue the writ summarily. It requires only that the applicant file a-complaint, initiating a court action for repossession' and reciting in conclusory fashion that he is ‘lawfully entitled to the possession’ of the property, and that he file a security bond . . . .” 407 U. S., at 73-74 (emphasis added).
.The Court noted that the Pennsylvania statute required even less than the Florida statute, since the party seeking the writ “need not even formally allege that he is lawfully entitled to the property.” Id., at 78. All that was required was the filing of an “ ‘affidavit of the value of the property to be replevied.’” Ibid. Moreover, the Pennsylvania law did “not require that there ever be opportunity for a hearing on the merits of the conflicting claims to possession of the replevied, property.” Id., at 77.

 See St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 93 (1936) (Stone and Cardozo, JJ., concurring in result); Burnet v. Coronadlo Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 405, 406-408 (1932) (Brandéis, J., dissenting). For the view that stare decisis need not always apply even to questions of statutory interpretation, see Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U. S. 235, 255 (1970) (Stewart, J., concurring).

 The Fuentes opinion, relied primarily on Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337 (1969). That case involved a prejudgment garnishment of-wages in which the creditor had no preexisting property interest.' It is readily distinguishable from the instant case where the creditor does have a pre-existing property interest as a result of the vendor’s lien which attached upon execution of the installment sales contract. Indeed, depending on the number of installments’which have been paid, the creditor’s interest may often be greater than the ¡debtor’s. Thus, we deal here with mutual property interests, both of which are entitled to be safeguarded. Fuentes .overlooked this vital point.
".Ini addition, the Court recognized in- Sniadach that prejudgment garnishment of wages could as á practical matter “impose tremendous hardship” and .“drive a wage-earning family to the wall.” Id., at 340/341-342. By contrast, there is no basis for assuming that-sequestration of a debtor’s goods would hecessarily place him in such a “brutal need” situation.

 For a discussion of the far-reaching implications of the Fuentes rationale, see Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The Creditor Meets the Constitution, 59 Va. L. Rev. 335 (1973). The authors suggest that Fuentes could require invalidation of many summary creditor remedies in their present form. .

 The Louisiana Supreme Court held that Fuentes did not govern the present case. Essentially,. that court held that because the Louisiana vendor’s privilege is defeated if the vendee alienates the property over which the vendor has the privilege, this case falls within the language in Fuentes that “[t]here may be cases in which a creditor could make a showing of immediate danger tnat a debtor *630will destroy or conceal disputed goods.” Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67, 93 (1972). The Court today quite correctly-does not embrace this rationale. In discussing the “ ‘extraordinary situations’ ” that might justify the summary seizure of goods,- the Fuentes opinion stressed that these situations “must be truly unusual.” Id,., at 90. Sjfecifically, it referred to “special situations demanding prompt action.” Id., at 93. In effect, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that all vendor-créditors in the State can be conclusively presumed to be in this “special” situation, regardless of whether the individual vendor could make a showing of immediate danger in his particular case. But if the situation of all such vendors in a’ State could be conclusively presumed to meet the ."extraordinary,” “unusual,” and “special”' conditions referred to in Fuentes, the basic constitutional rule of that case would be wholly obliterated in the State.

 407 U. S., at 90-93.

 La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann., Art. 281 (1961).

 The Louisiana authorities cited by the Court are not to the contrary. Wright v. Hughes, 254 So. 2d 293 (La. Ct. App. 1971), and Hancock Bank v. Alexander, 256 La. 643, 237 So. 2d 669 (1970), stand only for the proposition that a writ should not issue unless the sworn allegations are formallj sufficient, which may mean nothing more than that the proper standardized form be completely filled in.

 See, e. g., North Dakota Board of Pharmacy v. Snyder’s Drug Stores, 414 U. S. 156 (1973); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

 See, e. g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337 (1969); and Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535 (1971).

 See, e. g., Turner v. Colonial Finance Corp., 467 F. 2d 202 (CA5 1972); Sena v. Montoya, 346 F. Supp. 5 (NM 1972); Dorsey v. Community Stores Corp., 346 F. Supp. 103 (ED Wis. 1972); Thorp Credit, Inc. v. Barr, 200 N. W. 2d 535 (Iowa 1972); Inter City Motor Sales v. Common Pleas Judge, 42 Mich, App. 112, 201 N. W. 2d 378 (1972); and Montoya v. Blackhurst, 84 N. M. 91, 500 P. 2d 176 (1972).

 Although Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice' Rehnquist *636were Members of the Court at the time that Fuentes v. Shevin was announced, they were not Members* of the Court when that case was argued, and they did not participate in its “consideration or decision.” 407 U. S., at 97.