Court Opinion

ID: 9766547
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:52:39.453717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:23.695901
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:
Chief Justice Maxey’s dissent in Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419, 424, 32 A. 2d 889, 892 (1943) and Judge Hoffman’s dissent in Commonwealth ex rel. Staino v. Cavell, 207 Pa. Superior Ct. 274, 278, 217 A. 2d 824, 825 (1966) unequivocally demonstrate the wholesale infirmities of the tacit admission rule. I am pleased that this rule will no longer infect criminal justice in our Commonwealth, but I am disappointed that this result has been obtained only under the compulsion of the Supreme Court of the United States. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468, n. 37, 86 S. Ct. *921602, 1624, n. 37 (1966). In my view this Oonrt should have had the wisdom and insight to overrule the line of cases approving tacit admissions without such compulsion.
Furthermore, in my view, the introduction of a tacit admission so taints the trial proceedings that it deprives the defendant of a fair trial as a matter of federal constitutional law. Cf. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 86 S. Ct. 1761 (1966). Thus, while I agree with the majority that Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719, 86 S. Ct. 1772 (1966) leaves open the question of the retroactivity of this particular aspect of the Miranda decision, I would reach the opposite conclusion.
Even under the majority’s own view, I believe it is incumbent upon them to decide now whether a tacit admission is within the purview of Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368, 84 S. Ct. 1774 (1964). Commonwealth ex rel. Fox v. Maroney, 417 Pa. 308, 207 A. 2d 810 (1965), does not, as the majority asserts, foreclose Shadd’s Jackson claim in this proceeding. The issue in Fox was the admissibility of a confession, alleged to be involuntary for the first time in a habeas corpus petition. Because Fox’s lawyer was an experienced trial counsel who, at the time of Fox’s trial, knew that an involuntary confession was inadmissible, we held that the failure to object to the admissibility of the confession constituted a waiver. Shadd’s counsel, on the other hand, had no reason to suspect that a tacit admission could be excluded nor could he be expected to have foreseen the holding of Jackson v. Denno, supra; hence there can be no waiver of any objection. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 495, n. 69, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1639, n. 69 (1966). Since the holding of Jackson is retroactive, this case should be returned for a factual hearing, if as the majority intimates, but declines to decide, tacit admissions are included within the scope of that decision.
*93The majority’s disposition is to remand this case for a Douglas hearing so that the court below may determine whether appellant effectively waived his right to appeal. I agree that the record is inadequate on this point. However, in my view Shadd is entitled to a new trial and there is no need to remand for a factual hearing of any sort. Since the majority does not agree with me, I concur in that part of the decision which grants Shadd a Douglas hearing.