Court Opinion

ID: 9583938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:43:11.94604+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:05:58.379356
License: Public Domain

*16Judge MARTIN (Robert M.),
dissenting.
The majority has determined that it was inherently prejudicial for the two principal prosecution witnesses to transport the jurors in this case and ordered a new trial. They state that Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 13 L.Ed. 424, 85 S.Ct. 546 (1965) is dispositive of the issue and that State v. Macon, 276 N.C. 466, 173 S.E. 2d 286 (1970), supports the conclusion they reach.
In Macon the Court acknowledged they were in full accord with the sound principles of constitutional law enunciated in the Turner case. However, they found the facts in the Macon case did not invoke their application.
In distinguishing Turner v. Louisiana, supra, the Court stated:
“We are in full accord with the sound principles of constitutional law enunciated in the Turner case. The facts in the case before us, however, do not invoke their application. In Turner the jury was sequestered — not so here. There, the deputies involved were ‘in actual charge of the jury.’ Here, they were only court officers or bailiffs. There the deputies were in continuous and intimate association with the jurors, eating with them, conversing with them, and doing errands for them throughout a three-day trial. Here, the deputies were not in the presence of the jurors outside the courtroom, had no communication at any time with them, and had no custodial authority over them. The exposure of the jury to these bailiffs was brief, incidental, and without legal significance. Hence, defendant not only fails to show actual prejudice — he fails to show circumstances affording any reasonable ground upon which to attack the fairness of the trial or the integrity of the verdict.”
State v. Macon, supra at 473, 173 S.E. 2d 290.
In the record in the case sub judice it was stipulated that thirty-eight jurors were called from Caldwell County. Sheriff Waddell, of Ashe County, was informed that drivers from the school system were unavailable to drive the activity buses. After finding that Lt. J. D. Parsons and himself were the only qualified drivers in his department, Waddell and Parsons drove the two buses with the prospective jurors from Caldwell County to Ashe *17County on May 19, 1980. Parsons also drove the jurors to lunch that day. After the jury was selected, Parsons drove one of the buses that made the return trip to Caldwell County. On May 20, 1980, Sheriff Waddell transported the jurors back to Ashe County. The trip between Caldwell County and Ashe County was one hour and forty-five minutes. The District Attorney had announced that Waddell and Parsons would be called as witnesses for the state. These facts were made known to the trial court on the morning of May 20, 1980.
The defendants moved for a mistrial and the trial court reopened voir dire on May 20, 1980; this being after the jury had been empaneled but before the presentation of any evidence.
At the special voir dire hearing, the jurors were questioned by the District Attorney, counsel for the defendants, and the trial court. The jurors all agreed that neither the Sheriff nor his deputies mentioned the case nor would the fact that Waddell and Parsons testifying influence their ability to render an impartial decision.
On 20 May 1981 the trial court made findings of fact which included that the motions for a mistrial were made before any evidence was presented, that none of the jurors had previously known the sheriff or his deputies, that many of the jurors did not hear anything that was said by the officers, that Sheriff Waddell was attempting to provide transportation in the fulfillment of his duties, and that the empaneled jurors had previously been instructed not to discuss the case with anyone. Based on these findings the trial court concluded that the defendants had not been prejudiced and the motions for mistrial were denied. It should be noted that from 20 May 1981 until the conclusion of the trial on 30 May 1981, there is no evidence of any out-of-court contact between these officers and members of the jury panel.
In State v. Hart, 226 N.C. 200, 203, 37 S.E. 2d 487, 489 (1946), the Court held:
“The decisions by the various courts have not been in accord, but we are now of the opinion that the weight of authority is to the effect that an officer is not necessarily disqualified from acting as custodian of a jury in a criminal case because he happens to be a witness in the case. It is our opinion, and *18we so hold, that actual prejudice must be shown before the result of the trial can be, as a matter of right, disturbed. . . . [T]he findings of the trial judge upon the evidence and facts are conclusive and not reviewable.”
In my opinion, this case does not present circumstances in which prejudice will be conclusively presumed under the principles of Turner v. Louisiana, supra, but rather in which prejudice must be shown under the principles of State v. Hart, supra.