Court Opinion

ID: 9728958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:20:08.360646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:53.491855
License: Public Domain

LEDERBERG, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the OPINION on legal and public-policy grounds.
In pertinent part, G.L.1956 (1982 Reenactment) § 31-27-2.2, as amended by P.L.1983, ch. 43, § 1, states:
‘When the death of any person other than the operator ensues as a proximate result of an injury received by the operation of any vehicle, the operator of which is under the influence of, any intoxicating liquor * * * or [drugs] * * * the person so operating such vehicle shall be guilty of ‘driving under the influence of liquor or drugs, resulting in death.’”
Similarly, G.L.1956 (1982 Reenactment) § 31-27-2.6, as amended by P.L.1987, ch. 571, § 1, provides in pertinent part:
“When serious bodily injury of any person other than the operator is caused by the operation of any motor vehicle, the operator of which is under the influence of any intoxicating liquor * * * or [drags] * * * the person so operating such vehicle shall be guilty of driving under the influence of liquor or drags, resulting in serious bodily injury.”
“When interpreting a legislative enactment, this court must establish and effectuate legislative intent.” Kachanis v. Board of Review, Department of Employment and Training, 638 A.2d 553, 557 (R.I.1994). It is well settled that the Legislature is presumed to have intended the plain and ordinary meaning of the language of a statute. Ellis v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority, 586 A.2d 1055, 1058 (R.I.1991). The plain language of the two statutes at issue requires the state to prove only three elements: (1) the death or serious bodily injury of a person other than the defendant-operator occurred, (2) the death or serious bodily injury was the proximate result of the operation of a vehicle, and (3) the defendant-operator was under the influence of alcohol or drags. Nothing in these statutes requires the state to prove deficiency in the defendant-operator’s operation of the vehicle.
When the language of an enactment is unambiguous and expresses a clear and sen*1235sible meaning, this court is bound to apply the statute literally, without extension or construction. Kachanis, 638 A.2d at 557; Greenhalgh v. The City Council of the City of Cranston, 603 A.2d 1090, 1092 (R.I.1992). In fact, the majority opinion, supra, has explicitly reached this same conclusion: “[T]he statutes before us do not require a search for * * * legislative intent. The language is unambiguous.” Supra. Both enactments before us are clearly strict-liability statutes. Neither requires a causal connection between a defendant’s manner of operating a motor vehicle and the resulting death or serious bodily injury, but rather both require only that the death or serious bodily injury be caused by the operation of any vehicle, the operator of which is under the influence of any intoxicating liquor.
In its interpretation of these statutes, the majority does not require a causal connection between defendant’s intoxication and the death or serious bodily injury but does require a causal connection between defendant’s manner of operating a vehicle and the resulting death or injury. In other words, the majority requires the state to produce some evidence that defendant’s manner of operation of the vehicle was deficient, though the level of deficiency need not amount to recklessness or criminal negligence. By reading into these statutes a requirement that the death or serious bodily injury be caused by the “manner” of the operation of a motor vehicle, the majority has impermissi-bly rewritten the statutes and in consequence has circumvented and avoided their plain and literal meanings.
General Laws 1956 (1982 Reenactment) § 31-27-2, as amended by P.L.1990, ch. 496, § 1, makes the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of liquor or drugs a misdemeanor in this state. Persons who drive while intoxicated are therefore held accountable, regardless of whether a death or an injury occurred or did not occur. The harsh consequences of §§ 31-27-2.2 and -2.6 establish a public policy that holds persons strictly accountable for the criminal act of driving while intoxicated.
Unfortunately the majority’s opinion rewrites the clear public policy established by the statutes. The absence of language requiring a causal connection between a defendant’s manner of operating a vehicle and the resulting death or injury manifests an explicit attempt by the Legislature to create a more effective deterrent to drunk driving than a criminal statute requiring causation. The statutes establish a compelling deterrent to an individual who is about to engage in the criminal behavior of driving while under the influence of an intoxicating liquor precisely because of the statutes’ harsh and unforgiving application. See Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law 248 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing deterrent effects of strict-liability laws); see also Janet S. Harring, Note, Liability Without Fault: Logic and Potential of a Developing Concept, 1970 Wis.L.Rev. 1201, 1207 (“the imposition of a positive and high duty of care on the public can achieve a degree of positive deterrence if individuals are made aware that they are expected, on pain of criminal liability, to meet this standard”). The statutes in question are consistent with this viewpoint.
For the reasons stated above, I would sustain the appeal of the state, reverse the judgment of the Superior Court, and remand the case to the Superior Court for trial.