Court Opinion

ID: 9734090
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:25:12.108318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:45.594682
License: Public Domain

HAINES, Chief Judge,
concurring.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the judgment of the bankruptcy court should be affirmed; I write separately for several reasons.
The majority concludes that the “totality of the circumstances” test is the proper measure of “undue hardship” for determining the dischargeability of student loan obligations under § 523(a)(8). It goes on to assay the correctness of the bankruptcy court’s determination exclusively under the totality of the circumstances model. The determination of the test to be applied to determine dischargeability is, pure and simple, a question of law, reviewed de novo. Abboud v. The Ground Round, Inc. (In re The Ground Round, Inc.), 482 F.3d 15, 17 (1st Cir.2007). We review the bankruptcy court’s conclusion of undue hardship as the determination of a mixed question of law and fact. Lorenz v. Am. Educ. Services/Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Lorenz), 337 B.R. 423, 429 (1st Cir. BAP 2006) On the “sliding scale” that applies to review of such questions, a *805determination of undue hardship falls toward the legal/policy end of the spectrum, calling for de novo review, as well. Id.
I have no quarrel with the majority’s conclusion that the debtor demonstrated undue hardship and, therefore, that her student loans should be discharged. This case, however, does not call for choosing between the totality of the circumstances test and the “Brunner ” test,19 as employing either test would result in affirmance. The majority’s rejection of the Brunner test is unnecessary to resolution of this appeal and, therefore, unwarranted. I am no fan of Brunner.20 The majority’s criticisms of it are well-taken. I am disinclined to enshrine the majority’s legal determination as a holding when it is of no consequence to this case.
Having lost below under the trial court’s careful consideration of the totality of the circumstances touching on the debtor’s case, the appellant begs us to “adopt” Brunner. But we need not respond (either “yes” or, as here, “no”) when the answer is of no moment.
Having withstood one appellate assault, the bankruptcy court’s factual findings are fixed. They include:
• “[GJiven the Debtor’s lack of recent work history, narrow work experience, failure to pass the bar exam, age, unsuccessful attempts to find employment in a variety of fields, and unsuccessful attempts to sell a novel and acquire a patent, the Debt- or had no reasonably reliable financial resources other than [ ... ] Social Security payments.”21
• “[I]f the Debtor participated in the Ford Program, her current financial status would result in her owing no monthly payments for her student loans.”22
• “But for the ability to live in the den of her father’s home, the Debtor, without some sort of financial aid, could easily become homeless. In view of her age and work history, her prospects for a better financial future are dim.”23
Taken together, these findings provide no basis to conclude that this debtor will ever have the financial resources to payoff (or even pay down) her student loan, on any terms.
One must ask, then, how could the failure to enroll in a program that would — as far as the judicial eye can see — require the debtor to pay nothing, be either a circumstance cutting against discharging the loan under the “totality” test or a lack of “good faith efforts” to pay under Brunner? Under either test, the court below was being asked to deny discharge of the loans on what basis? It could only be on the possibility that the debtor might win the lottery or that some equally improbable instance of financial good fortune could strike. Need it be said that, if such were a sufficient basis to deny discharge of a student loan, the prospect of ever discharging a student loan pursuant to § 523(a)(8) would become fantasy?
*806Furthermore, taking this case as the one that requires a choice between the totality of the circumstances test and Brunner credits a perverse application of the Brun-ner model. The Brunner court was concerned about debtors who resorted to bankruptcy and sought to discharge student loans without first making a good faith attempt at repayment.24 Flipping the test’s historical “good faith effort to repay” prong into the future is a misapplication.25 And in cases like this one, courts would no longer inquire whether a debtor could repay a student loan without undue hardship (as the statute asks). Instead, they would be required to consider whether: (1) when there exists no reasonable possibility of payment; and (2) there exists a program that would require no payment, discharge of student loans must be denied because the debtor cannot satisfy Brun-ner’s “good faith” prong ... because the debtor has not enrolled in the program?
Given that the choice of test makes no difference in this case, and that to make the unnecessary choice here can only contribute to the confusion surrounding undue hardship analysis, I am left to concur in the majority’s conclusion without joining it on the path it has taken to reach it.

. Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir.1987) (hereafter "Brunner ’’).

. See In re Lorenz, 337 B.R. at 432; Kopf v. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Kopf), 245 B.R. 731, 741 (Bankr.D.Me.2000).

. Supra at 4.

. Supra at 4.

. Bronsdon v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp.(In re Bronsdon), 2010 WL 147798, at *2, 2010 Bankr.LEXIS 71, at *6 (Bankr.D. Mass. Jan 8, 2010); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp v. Bronsdon (In re Bronsdon), 421 B.R. 27, 33 (D.Mass. 2009) (affirming the bankruptcy court's finding that Bronsdon would not be able to obtain employment in the future).

. Brunner, 831 F.2d at 397; see Cazenovia College v. Renshaw (In re Renshaw), 222 F.3d 82, 87 (2d Cir.2000) ("Congress enacted § 523(a)(8) because there was evidence of an increasing abuse of the bankruptcy process that threatened the viability of educational loan programs and harm to future students as well as taxpayers”); United Student Aid Funds v. Pena (In re Pena), 155 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir.1998) ("Section 523(a)(8) was a response to 'a rising incidence of consumer bankruptcies of former students motivated primarily to avoid payment of education loan debts' "); Andrews Univ. v. Merchant (In re Merchant), 958 F.2d 738, 740 (6th Cir.1992) (“The legislative history of the 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) teaches us that the exclusion of education loans from the discharge provisions was designed to remedy an abuse by students, who immediately upon graduation, filed petition for bankruptcy and obtained a discharge of their educational loans.”).

. See, e.g., In re Kopf, 245 B.R. 731; Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1310 (10th Cir.2004) ("Courts should base their estimation of a debtor's prospects on specific articulable facts, not unfounded optimism.”); Wilson v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Wilson), 2002 WL 32155401, *4 (Bankr.E.D.Va. Jun.25, 2002) ("Good faith effort also requires 'the debtor to have made payments when he or she was in a position to make such payments.’ ") (quoting Lohr v. Sallie Mae (In re Lohr), 252 B.R. 84, 89 (Bankr.E.D.Va.2000)); Maulin v. Salliemae (In re Maulin), 190 B.R. 153, 156 (Bankr.W.D.N.Y.1995) ("[T]he demonstration of good faith does not necessarily command a history of payment. It does require a history of effort to achieve repayment ... Relevant proof may ... include a history of some payment, the propitious use of deferments and the energetic exploration of employment options.”).