Court Opinion

ID: 9747327
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:10:38.034504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:22.874388
License: Public Domain

MALLANO, Acting P. J.,
Concurring and Dissenting. — I concur in the disposition affirming the juvenile court’s order. But in my view, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) and the juvenile court did not err in not applying the relative preference provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.31 nine months after the disposition hearing (and when three-year-old Joseph was in a stable placement in a foster home) because section 361.3 did not require DCFS or the juvenile court to give preferential consideration to the paternal aunt at a time when no new placement for Joseph needed to be made. (§ 361.3, subd. (d).)
Subdivision (a) of section 361.3 provides in pertinent part that “[ijn any case in which a child is removed from the physical custody of his or her parents pursuant to Section 361, preferential consideration shall be given to a request by a relative of the child for placement of the child with the relative.” Because the rules of statutory construction require that all subdivisions of a statute be given effect and harmonized if possible (Khajavi v. Feather River Anesthesia Medical Group (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 32, 46 [100 Cal.Rptr.2d 627]), subdivision (a) must be read together with subdivision (d). Subdivision (d) provides in pertinent part that “[subsequent to the hearing conducted pursuant to Section 358 [(disposition hearing)], whenever a new placement of the child must be made, consideration for placement shall again be given as described in this section to relatives who have not been found to be unsuitable and who will fulfill the child’s reunification or permanent plan requirements.” Thus, subdivision (d) “specifically provides for the application of the relative placement preference if a child must be moved after disposition” to suitable relatives who will promote the child’s reunification or permanent plan. (Cesar V. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1032 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 243].)
If section 361.3, subdivision (a) is construed to require compliance with the relative placement preference throughout the entire reunification period regardless of whether a new placement needs to be made, subdivision (d) would be rendered superfluous and meaningless, a result to be avoided. (Schmidlin v. City of Palo Alto (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 728, 749 [619 Cal.Rptr.3d 365].)
DCFS’s interpretation of section 361.3 is consistent with the legislative history. Although the legislative history speaks generally of strengthening the *800relative placement preference provisions, a committee report addressing subdivision (d) stated that subdivision (d) applies “not only to the initial placement of the child, but also to any subsequent placements (where the child may be moved from an existing placement for any number of reasons, such as death or incapacity of the current caretaker).” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 270 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 14, 1993.)
DCFS’s interpretation of subdivision (d) of section 361.3 is consistent with the policy of promoting a child’s need for continuity and stability, important components of a best interest analysis. “The linchpin of a section 361.3 analysis is whether placement with a relative is in the best interests of the minor.” (Alicia B. v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 856, 862-863 [11 Cal.Rptr.3d 1].) As explained in In re Lauren R. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 841 at page 855 [56 Cal.Rptr.3d 151]: “The overriding concern of dependency proceedings, however, is not the interest of extended family members but the interest of the child. ‘ [Regardless of the relative placement preference, the fundamental duty of the court is to assure the best interests of the child, whose bond with a foster parent may require that placement with a relative be rejected.’ [Citation.] Section 361.3 does not create an evidentiary presumption that relative placement is in a child’s best interests. [Citation.] The passage of time is a significant factor in a child’s life; the longer a successful placement continues, the more important the child’s need for continuity and stability becomes in the evaluation of her best interests.”
This case does not present the situation where a suitable relative steps forward immediately after the dispositional hearing and is denied a placement assessment as untimely. In such a case, if the agency refuses to conduct an assessment or to change custody, an assessment may be triggered and a change of custody accomplished through the filing of a section 388 petition. (See In re Victoria C. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 536, 543 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 696] [petition for modification can be used to challenge all types of orders, including custody and placement orders, so noncustodial father properly brought petition to request removal of child from mother’s custody].)
I am also concerned that a contrary interpretation of the statute will result in increased burdens on the child welfare agencies, which will be forced to expend resources on assessments throughout the reunification period, even when the child remains for a substantial period of time in a stable foster care placement.
*801Here, Joseph’s placements were made at the dispositional hearing in July 2006 and again at the dispositional hearing on the section 342 petition in September 2006. Thus, Joseph’s relatives had two opportunities to request the relative preference for placement. It was undisputed that no new placement needed to be made for Joseph in April 2007, when he was in a stable foster home. I therefore conclude that section 361.3 did not come into play at the April 2007 hearing.
A petition for a rehearing was denied June 24, 2008, and respondent’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied September 24, 2008, S165106.
Corrigan, J., did not participate therein.

 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.