Court Opinion

ID: 9694323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:37:23.911389+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:59.460453
License: Public Domain

NEWMAN, Justice,
dissenting.
Because I believe that the police lawfully stopped the vehicle and detained its occupants, I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the drugs obtained from Ms. Constantino’s purse must be suppressed.
The majority disregards a significant fact in determining that this case is indistinguishable from this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Melendez, 544 Pa. 323, 676 A.2d 226 (1996): the existence of a valid search warrant authorizing a search of the vehicle for contraband. In Melendez, the police stopped the defendant, searched her vehicle, and transported her back to her home where she and her codefendant were detained while the police waited for the arrival of a warrant to search the premises. Here, the police already had a valid search warrant that authorized the search for contraband of Ms. Constantino’s residence and, most notably, all vehicles located on the premises. Unlike in Melendez, a neutral magistrate had determined that there was probable cause that the vehicle in which Ms. Constantino was traveling contained contraband, and issued the search warrant that the police were about to execute. The question in this case, therefore, is whether the stop of the vehicle some distance from the premises where the search of that vehicle was authorized by the warrant was unlawful.
I believe there are two grounds that support the legality of the stop of the Constantinos’ vehicle. First, the police had *157probable cause to believe that the Constantinos were transporting drugs when they drove the vehicle off the premises about to be searched. We have defined “probable cause” as “occurring where the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge and of which he has trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” Melendez, 544 Pa. at 828, 676 A.2d at 228, n. 4 (citing Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967)). The warrant authorized the search for contraband of the vehicles at the residence, and therefore represented an independent magistrate’s determination that there was probable cause that the vehicle contained contraband.1 By driving this vehicle away from the residence, which the police had under surveillance, the Constantinos gave the police probable cause to believe that they were transporting contraband.
Further, the stop and detention of the Constantinos for the purpose of returning them to their residence while the police searched it comports with the Fourth Amendment pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981). In Summers, the Court upheld the detention of a suspect who was leaving his house as the police were about to execute a search warrant for narcotics. The police detained the individual and forced him to return to the residence while they conducted the search. The defendant challenged this initial detention, claiming that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him at that point. The Court held that, even assuming that there was no probable cause to arrest the defendant, the detention was nevertheless justified because: (1) the intrusion on the defendant’s liberty was minimal compared to the substantial invasion of the defendant’s privacy already autho*158rized by the issuance of a search warrant of his residence; (2) the detention is not likely to be abused as an improper means of gathering additional information not already available from the search; (3) the presence of the occupants during the search may facilitate an orderly completion of the search; and, (4) there is a legitimate law enforcement interest in preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found. Id. at 701-03, 101 S.Ct. 2587. The following passage best underscores the Court’s rationale in Summers :
We have already noted that the detention represents only an incremental intrusion on personal liberty when the search of a home has been authorized by a valid warrant. The existence of a search warrant, however, also provides an objective justification for the detention. A judicial officer has determined that police have probable cause to believe that someone in the home is committing a crime...The connection of an occupant to that home gives the police officer an easily identifiable and certain basis for determining that suspicion of criminal activity justifies a detention of that occupant.
Id. at 703-04, 101 S.Ct. 2587.
Here, the police decision to pursue the Constantinos and to stop their vehicle so that they could detain them during the search of their home was justified by the same considerations as the detention in Summers. The police had an independent magistrate’s determination that there was probable cause that the vehicle in which the Constantinos were driving contained contraband. There is, moreover, no question that the vehicle could have been searched pursuant to the warrant if it had remained at the Constantinos residence during the search, or that, if the police had executed the search warrant while the Constantinos were at home, the amount of drugs found on the premises would have given them probable cause to arrest Ms. Constantino and to search her purse incident to her arrest. In effect, the only significant factor that distinguishes this case from Summers is the distance between the house and the defendants at the time of their respective seizures. That distance, however, does not amount to a constitutionally-*159significant difference. See U.S. v. Cochran, 939 F.2d 337, 339 (6th Cir.1991) (Summers does not impose upon police a duty based on geographic proximity).
We have not previously held that Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits police from detaining an individual while executing a search warrant of that individual’s residence, as happened in Summers. This Court was quite careful, in Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 532 Pa. 62, 614 A.2d 1378 (1992), to distinguish Summers. In Rodriquez, the police officer entered an apartment building without a warrant and detained three women who were sitting on the front steps of the building. We noted two significant differences between Summers and the facts of Rodriquez: (1) the absence of a probable cause determination by a neutral and detached magistrate; and (2) the lack of a connection between the suspected criminal activity in the targeted residence and the persons actually detained. Id. at 68, 614 A.2d at 1380-81. We concluded that Summers did not apply, and went on to hold that the seizure in question violated the defendant’s rights under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. We did not, however, expressly state that seizures permissible under the Fourth Amendment pursuant to Summers would violate a defendant’s Pennsylvania constitutional rights. Nor did we address the question of the constitutionality under the Pennsylvania Constitution of Summers detentions in Melendez; rightfully so, because there was no warrant in Melendez. There is, therefore, no previous decision from this Court that prohibits Summers detentions under the Pennsylvania Constitution, and, furthermore, no reason for this Court not to apply Summers to this case.
In conclusion, I would affirm the Superior Court and permit the introduction of the evidence obtained subsequent to the stop of the Constantinos’ vehicle.2
CASTILLE, J., joins in this dissent.

. The majority downplays the fact that the warrant authorized the search of the vehicles located on the premises. Regardless of whether the warrant covered a search of the vehicle once it was removed from the premises, the determination by the magistrate that there was probable cause that the vehicle contained contraband surely gives the police reason to believe that the persons removing the vehicle from the scene were presently engaged in the illegal transportation of that contraband.

. If the stop of the Constantinos' vehicle were lawful, Ms. Constantino’s subsequent admission that "the dope is in my purse” undoubtedly gave *160the officer probable cause to arrest her for possession, of a controlled substance, and to search her purse incident to arrest.