Court Opinion

ID: 9751577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:37:34.575578+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:34:45.772416
License: Public Domain

Justice EAKIN,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the reversal of the Superior Court’s order. After considering the four corners of the affidavit, I find there was sufficient probable cause therein to support the magistrate’s decision to issue the anticipatory search warrant.
This Court has previously noted:
*416The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a “substantial basis ... for concluding] that probable cause existed.”
Commonwealth v. Coleman, 574 Pa. 261, 830 A.2d 554, 560 (2003) (quoting Commonwealth v. Glass, 562 Pa. 187, 754 A.2d 655, 661 (2000)). The probable cause determination is made by employing a totality of the circumstances test, Commonwealth v. Jones, 605 Pa. 188, 988 A.2d 649, 655 (2010), which has been characterized as “a ‘practical, nontechnical conception ... a fluid concept — turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.’ ” Glass, at 663 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231-32, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)).
“A determination of probable cause based upon information received from a confidential informant depends upon the informant’s reliability and basis of knowledge viewed in a common sense, non-technical manner.” Commonwealth v. Luv, 557 Pa. 570, 735 A.2d 87, 90 (1999) (citation omitted). This Court has recognized, contrary to information from an anonymous informant, a known informant is far less likely to produce false information because a known informant puts himself at risk of prosecution for producing a false claim if the tip proves untrue. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 548 Pa. 484, 698 A.2d 571, 573-74 (1997) (relying on Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972)). “[I]nformation received from confidential informants may properly form the basis of a probable cause determination ... where police independently corroborate the tip, or where the informant has provided accurate information of criminal activity in the past, or where the informant himself participated in the criminal activity.” Luv, at 90 (citations omitted).
*417Regarding anticipatory warrants, the United States Supreme Court has stated:
[F]or a conditioned anticipatory warrant to comply with the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of probable cause, two prerequisites of probability must be satisfied. It must be true not only that if the triggering condition occurs there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place, but also that there is probable cause to believe the triggering condition will occur. The supporting affidavit must provide the magistrate with sufficient information to evaluate both aspects of the probable-cause determination.
United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 96-97, 126 S.Ct. 1494, 164 L.Ed.2d 195 (2006) (emphasis in original) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The Grubbs standard — that an affidavit for an anticipatory warrant must establish probable cause both that contraband will be found in the location to be searched, and that there is a fair probability the triggering condition will occur — meshes with the factors this Court discussed in Coleman for an issuing magistrate to consider in reviewing a request for an anticipatory search warrant.
In Coleman, concluding the anticipatory search warrant was properly issued, we followed the Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ standard requiring explicit information in the affidavit, which must establish: (1) the officer’s belief that a delivery of contraband is going to occur; (2) how the officer obtained this belief; (3) how reliable the officer’s sources are; and (4) the role of the officer in the delivery of the contraband. Id., at 564 (citing United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 703 (2d Cir.1989)).
While the affidavit here does not contain as much information as provided in Coleman, it nonetheless assuages Coleman’s concerns of police conjuring up scenarios to create probable cause. It contains all four enumerated elements: (1) Officer Hawkins believed a controlled buy of a specified amount of cocaine would occur between 7 p.m. and 10 p.m., on September 8, 2005, at 635 Morris Street; (2) she obtained this belief by debriefing a known confidential informant, twice; (3) *418this confidential informant had previously proven reliable, and would be the person purchasing the cocaine, and Officer Hawkins corroborated the background information through standard and trusted means 1; and (4) Officer Hawkins would be meeting with the informant prior to the purchase, controlling the buy, and police would not serve the warrant until the purchase was successful.
This information alone supports the magistrate’s finding there was probable cause to believe the informant would be able to conduct the controlled buy and contraband would be found in the house where it took place. See Luv, at 90.
The present challenge is superficially illogical, as probable cause did exist when the search happened — however, as this was an “anticipatory warrant,” the triggering event was not complete when the warrant issued, and Grubbs requires not only probable cause after the triggering event, but also a “fair probability” that the triggering event will in fact happen. The triggering event here was the completion of a controlled purchase of cocaine at the aforementioned location. The question is whether the information is sufficient to allow a magistrate to conclude there was a “fair probability” that the sale would happen as suggested.
While couched in terms of “anticipatory warrant,” this case therefore turns on a garden-variety warrant review — whether the information in the affidavit is manifestly insufficient for a magistrate to believe the triggering sale would occur. This is *419what the majority finds, spending considerable time talking about what the affidavit does not contain. This is an all too common methodology, looking at a document’s shortcomings rather than evaluating its contents. Looking at what is not there is a red herring, causing a departure from the actual question. Our evaluation of course has nothing to do with what is not in the affidavit — the test is solely concerned with what the affidavit does contain. If the contents are sufficient for a disinterested magistrate to find a “fair probability” the sale would happen, the warrant passes constitutional muster.
It is true, as my colleagues point out at length, the source of the informant’s information is not stated. If that were required, the affidavit fails. But again, this is not required — it is the wrong question. We have held an informant may be deemed reliable based on a number of factors, including those approved in Luv: where police corroborate the tip, or where the informant has provided accurate information of criminal activity in the past, or where the informant himself participated in the criminal activity. Those three, stated clearly in the disjunctive such that any one may suffice, are all present here, and the failure to state other reasons to believe the informant is irrelevant.
The affidavit here includes the following:
1. A known and registered informant told the police he or she can buy a specific amount of cocaine at a specific time from a named individual. Details about the individual are provided by the informant.
2. The officer independently confirmed the details about the individual.
3. The informant repeated the information to the officer the following day, to include the location of the proposed sale (the house in question), and a very specific window of time in which the purchase could occur.
4. The informant has proved reliable in the past, leading to a significant prior conviction involving thousands of dollars and similar amounts of cocaine.
*4205. The triggering event will be the known informant making a personal purchase under direction and supervision of the police.
We must see whether there is reason to credit the information, and whether that reason is sufficient. This affidavit has such reasons, both expressed and implied. It is there expressly in the form of prior reliability and corroboration. It is there impliedly, in that the informant is going to participate, and the consequences to the informant of this scale of lying to the officer would be substantial.
Given this, I find it difficult to conclude the sale would not occur. I find it extremely difficult to find there was not at least a fair probability it would occur. I find it difficult beyond peradventure to decide that no magistrate could ever make the conclusion there was a fair probability it would occur. As such, I dissent.
Chief Justice CASTILLE joins this dissenting opinion.

. In Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959), an informant told an agent Draper would arrive on a morning train from Chicago in possession of heroin. The informant provided the agent with a description of Draper and his mannerisms. The agent saw a man alight from a Chicago-based train exhibiting the physical attributes and mannerisms described by the informant. The United States Supreme Court noted that, with the informant's information being thus verified, the agent had "reasonable grounds” to believe the unverified intelligence was also true, such that the agent had probable cause to believe Draper was committing a narcotics violation. Id., at 313, 79 S.Ct. 329. Here, as in Draper, a previously reliable informant told the officer of a specific individual who would be conducting specific illegal activity at a specific location and time, and the officer verified the personal information to a degree roughly equivalent to that in Draper.