Court Opinion

ID: 9545054
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:05:17.316418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:59.875198
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION OP
TSUKIYAMA, O. J.
The basic issue presented in this case is whether the controversy in the court below involved a question of fundamental jurisdiction of the trial court or one of mere venue.
The fact that the cause of action did arise within the territorial jurisdiction of the County of Kauai or the Fifth Circuit and that defendant is the county itself is not in dispute. ft.L.H. 1955, § 215-21, provides: “The power and jurisdiction of circuit courts and circuit judges in chambers * * * shall be limited as follows:” (emphasis added). Subparagraph (i) of said section provides: “All civil actions other than those specified above shall be brought in the circuit where the cause of action arose or where the defendant is domiciled; * *
I accept the view that the first paragraph of § 215-21 above quoted does not necessarily deprive the circuit courts, other than the one designated as that in which the action shall be brought or tried, of all jurisdiction whatsoever with reference to the enumerated limitations. However, I do not concur in the purported deduction made in the court’s opinion from § 215-17 (f).
It is all too perspicuous that § 215-17 (f) deals with the subject of venue and not of jurisdiction in the first instance. As amended by Act 195, S.L.H. 1957, said subsection authorizes a circuit court under certain prescribed circumstances to transfer a case “pending in such court” *280to another circuit. The statute, in my opinion, presupposes that the case to be so transferred is pending in the court by virtue of that court’s original power and jurisdiction over the case. Absent such power and jurisdiction, it follows that the court is precluded not only from proceeding on the merits but from effectively entering an order transferring the case to another circuit.
If the bringing of a tort action in the wrong circuit court is ground for dismissal, as indicated by the majority, such result stems from the circuit court’s lack of power and jurisdiction. I am persuaded by the observation that the language of § 215-21 aforesaid which limits the power and jurisdiction of the circuit courts is clear and free from ambiguity and that such clarity, which reflects the intent of the legislative branch, should not be roiled by injecting extraneous elements or construction. Pub. Util. Com’n v. Narimatsu, 41 Haw. 398; Yoshizawa v. Hewitt, 31 Haw. 625; Territory v. Coe, 37 Haw. 601. When a statute expressly limits the power and jurisdiction of a court and no language appears therein susceptible of the construction that modifications or exceptions may be permitted, no stipulation, consent or waiver of or by the parties can generate a power or jurisdiction which is statutorily nonexistent.
I therefore respectfully dissent.