Court Opinion

ID: 9607816
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:02:16.809204+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:40.567474
License: Public Domain

HUNTLEY, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I.
I concur in Parts I and II of the majority opinion. Part I provides that the negligence of the wheel manufacturer and the mounting machine manufacturer should have been placed on the special verdict form for comparison of causation. I concur therein with some reservation in that the better rule of law might be to submit on the verdict form only actual parties to the case. An exception would be parties not properly before the court such as an employer in a case by an employee suing where negligence of both a third party and his employer is involved.
Only where the issue of the negligence of the “phantom defendant” is fully litigated can the jury realistically fix a percentage of causation. In the instant case, had Uniroyal truly desired to have a percentage of negligence assigned to the two missing parties, it could have filed a third party complaint or cross-complaint against them holding them in the case even though the plaintiff had dismissed them prior to trial. Accordingly, my preference would be that we require further briefing and analysis by counsel before rendering this decision which may have unanticipated consequences. Being forced to vote at this time, I join the majority based upon the analysis in Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Company, 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex.1984).
II.
I respectfully dissent from Part III of the majority opinion wherein the remittitur on loss of consortium is affirmed. The majority correctly quotes the rule of Dinneen v. Finch which authorizes a district court to enter remittitur:
“... If the disparity is so great that it appears to the trial court that the award was given under the influence of passion or prejudice.”
The majority opinion by citing Dinneen implies that the trial court properly considered and applied the Dinneen standard. The fact is, the trial court made no such finding, simply ruling that there was not enough (only sketchy) evidence in the record to sustain the award. We cannot properly supply the finding of passion or prejudice on appeal. The pertinent portion of the memorandum order is noted below in footnote.1
The trial court simply stated the evidence was sketchy. Sketchy or not, if there are facts in the record to sustain the jury, the judge does not have the power to overrule the jury and substitute his judgment unless he can fairly conclude the jury was acting under passion or prejudice. Although Mrs. Vannoy only testified for two pages of transcript, the trial court should have considered the extensive testimony about the injuries to Mr. Vannoy from which the effect on his relationship to the marital community is most obvious. Mr. Vannoy had a “blast type” injury to his upper right arm, he had multiple operations including skin grafting and installation and removal of plates, he sustained injuries to the muscles and linings over the bones, injuries to his ulnar nerve, injuries to the tendons that relate to the thumb, and he developed chronic arthritis from which he was still suffering at the time of trial and from which the doctor testified he would probably never recover.
From my vantage point I have noticed an increasing propensity among both trial and *547appellate judges to usurp the fact finding province of the jury under various pretexts. A judge’s oath of office includes a promise to support and defend the federal and state constitutions, both of which provide that the jury is the finder of facts such as to the extent of damages — we should restrain ourselves from gathering unto ourselves the power which the people have placed in the hands of the jury.
Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s decision relative to remittitur and remand for him to reconsider his decision under a proper application of the Dinneen standard.

. The court, having reviewed the briefs on file and hearing oral argument, took the Motion for Remittitur regarding the claim of Nadine Vannoy under advisement. A letter opinion was issued April 3, 1984. The Court stated therein:
“The Court finds that the actual evidence introduced on loss of consortium was very sketchy and would not justify an award of damages in the amount of $74,895.81. If I were sitting on the case, I would have awarded damages of $10,000.00. I feel that the jury’s decision also deserves some weight. Accordingly, I will grant defendant’s Motion for a New Trial unless plaintiffs agree to reduce the damages awarded to Nadine Vannoy for loss of consortium to $20,000.00.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
That Defendant’s Motion for Remittitur is hereby granted and that Nadine Vannoy’s loss of consortium damages are reduced to $20,-000.00.
That Defendant’s Motion for a New Trial is hereby granted unless Plaintiffs agree to reduce judgment as set forth above and acknowledge same in writing within 7 days or a new trial shall be ordered.”