Court Opinion

ID: 9461118
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:06:07.888798+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:53.871193
License: Public Domain

AINSWORTH, Circuit Judge, with whom BROWN, Chief Judge, and DYER, SIMPSON, MORGAN and RO-NEY, Circuit Judges,
join (dissenting).
The question for decision is important and of first impression: Whether Texas’ right-to-work statutes are applicable to the agency shop clause in a collective bargaining agreement involving mobile maritime employees — in this case, seamen employed on vessels operating on the high seas, whose work is performed entirely outside the State of Texas.1
*283The majority concedes that neither the National Labor Relations Board nor the Court has ever been faced with the precise issue before us and that nothing in the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act expressly answers our question. It also concedes that the district court’s finding that a more substantial part of the administration and performance of the collective bargaining agreement occurs in Texas than in any other state is not decisive and that the number of Texas contacts, while relevant, is likewise not determinative. It proceeds nevertheless to “weigh all of the [Texas] contacts in the context of our national labor policy” and devotes the greater part of its opinion to an academic dissertation on our national labor policy, congressional intent and the benefits foreseen by Congress in banning"the closed shop, thereby allowing a greater measure of freedom to both employee and employer in the hiring process. The treatise, though interesting, is not relevant to the issues here.
There is no dispute about what Congress did when it enacted the Taft-Har-tley Act and included therein section 14(b) which authorizes a state, at its option, to enact so-called right-to-work laws. Pursuant to this provision, Texas passed such laws. The question to be determined is not the validity of such legislative enactments, but whether they are applicable to the collective bargaining agreement in this case. Unfortunately, by focusing on uncertain legislative history rather than on the precise issue of whether federal or state law should apply to the employment contracts of maritime workers performing no work in any state,2 the majority fi*284nesses the issue and ignores the impact of the central dispute in this case.
It is undisputed that the combined effect of sections 7 and 8(a)(3) of the Labor Management Relations Act, as interpreted by the Supreme Court,3 and section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act is to recognize the validity of an agency shop except in those states which prohibit them. The majority points out that Congress in passing section 14(b) carved out no exception for seamen. What the majority fails to discern, however, is that seamen have traditionally maintained an exceptional status in regard to the regulation and control of their employment, and that section 14(b) cannot reasonably be construed to remove them from that category. Seamen, particularly the type of blue-water seamen involved here, as wards of admiralty have been accorded a special status and protection under federal maritime law unknown to state law in the domain of the master-servant relationship.4 Unlike the land-based worker, the seaman’s employment and all of the rights and restrictions flowing therefrom, are determined by federal statutory and admiralty law, not state law. Hiring, discharge and various terms of employment are regulated by shipping articles mandated by federal statute.5 Compensation to seamen for illness, injury, disability and death is provided through the unique admiralty doctrine of maintenance and cure,6 and by special federal statutory enactments such as the Jones Act7 and the Death on the High Seas Act.8 Federal maritime law covers the gamut of a seaman’s employment relationship, including wages,9 maritime liens for the collection therefor,10 the protective pro*285cedures against attachment and assignments of wages,11 the rights accorded seamen to receive at every port half of unpaid wages earned12 and double payment for wages withheld without sufficient cause,13 physical qualifications and requirements for seaman,14 and disciplinary problems.15 In no employment field is the master-servant relationship so predominantly controlled by federal maritime law than in that existing aboard ship between the master of the vessel and the men who man it. Indeed, it does not appear that there is any aspect of the employment relationship which Texas law may properly control —except, of course, for the novel injection of Texas’ right-to-work law into the present labor contract. In practical effect, state regulation of this employer-employee relationship stops at the water’s edge.
The majority opinion places much emphasis on the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act, concluding that it indicates great concern with the hiring process and a willingness to substitute state law for federal standards where appropriate. Congress was in truth concerned about the adverse impact of compulsory unionism on the hiring process, but section 14(b) was not, as the majority suggests, designed to be the remedy for these ills. Section 14(b) was inserted into the Taft-Hartley Act merely to restate preexisting law, not to expand the jurisdiction of states relative to employment conditions involving maritime workers, traditionally the subject of federal law. The National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) itself was not intended to override state laws regulating the closed shop.16 Congressional amendment of what is now section ’8(a) (3) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U. S..C. § 158(a)(3), not the inclusion of section 14(b), was the chief tool designed to alleviate the perceived evils of compulsory unionism.
A careful reading of the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act shows that Congress felt that section 8(a)(3) would curb problems in the hiring process by removing prior union membership ''as an employment prerequisite and by providing that expulsion from a union would not necessitate discharge from employment so long as initiation fees or dues were not delinquent.17 Senator
*286Taft noted in debate that a prime example of problems generated by the closed shop was in the West Coast shipping industry.18 He then outlined the changes that would be made by section 8(a) (3) and, with no reference whatever to section 14(b), concluded that the abuses in the hiring process would thereby be corrected.19 Congress did indeed single out the maritime industry as a serious problem area, as noted by the majority opinion {ante, p. 277 & n. 10). The cited provisions of the legislative history, however, make no reference to section 14(b) as a palliative for these problems; rather, the amendments to section 8(a)(3) were deemed fully capable of solving these problems.20 Since the agency shop provision before us avoids the evils in the hiring process Congress was trying to correct, and since it is clearly valid under section 8(a)(3), it cannot be validly concluded that enforcement of this provision is contrary to federal labor policy.21
The majority opinion bases its holding on (1) the predominance of Texas contracts, (2) federal labor legislation, and (3) the significant interest which Texas has in applying its right-to-work laws. The consistent and traditional control by federal law of every phase of maritime employment relationships and contracts refutes the proposition that Employer’s contacts with Texas22 justify injecting ■ state law into federal maritime affairs. As to federal labor policy, it is clear from the previous discussion that the agency shop provision in question in the present contract is totally consistent with Congress’ desire for a fair hiring process. Moreover, whatever Texas’ interest, may be in applying its law to this contract, the State of Texas has not been sufficiently concerned either to invoke its laws itself or to intervene in these proceedings. Employer is seeking to avoid its own labor contract by vicarious assertion of Texas law. In any case, the admitted premise that the agency shop clause of the labor contract is in contravention of the law of Texas does not permit the conclusion that a clause contained in a New York contract and affecting employment performed solely outside of the State of Texas is invalid.
The result which the majority reaches in this case is somewhat impractical. The attempt of the Court, at the behest of Mobil Oil Company, to give extraterritorial effect to Texas’ right-to-work laws fails both in soundness and in logic. Here the majority has taken an employment relationship, traditionally one in admiralty, regulated in virtually all aspects by federal maritime law, involving seamen who are wards of admiralty, and has subjected this employment to state labor laws when none of the employees works in the state. How this can be done where all of the seamen’s work is aboard vessels plying the high seas, and where most (57%) do not even reside in Texas, is not explained. "Under the circumstances, the majority’s conclusion is neither practical nor realistic.
In my view, the original majority panel decision in this case is correct and should be reaffirmed. Under the circumstances, I dissent.
*287JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge, in which DYER, Circuit Judge, joins, concurring in the dissent of Judge AINS-WORTH :
Because I think this is an ideal case for the exercise of the primary jurisdiction by the NLRB, I would rather see this Court defer its decision and require the parties to present to the Board for its determination the issue — whether the Texas right to work provisions should apply under the 14(b) exception to § 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act to this agency shop contract. Since the Court is not so disposed, I concur fully without reservation in the dissent.
The Court’s opinion misplaces the emphasis of the Taft-Hartley Act1 2and this flaw in the ointment pervades the entire opinion. After tallying the almost due process-type contacts between the administration of the union agreement and the state of Texas, the Court rejects the job situs formula2 in favor of this multiple contacts rule because it finds direction in the legislative history of the National Labor Relations Act. In addition, the Court finds persuasive evidence for its conclusion from the fact that the Texas right to work law was designed to proscribe precisely this kind of agency shop agreement and to apply to these kinds of workers.3
After first agreeing that the legislative history of the statute has no express answers for this problem (see Court opinion page 273), the Court concludes that the job situs doctrine is, in any case, an improper rule of thumb because the intent of Congress in adopting the Taft-Hartley Act was to eliminate the much-abused hiring monopoly of the closed shop system. But the fallacy here —as pointed out by the dissent — is that the adoption of § 14(b) was unrelated to this goal. Instead, it was § 8(a)(3) of the Labor Management Relations Act4 that served this purpose.
*288Section 8(a)(3) expressly sanctions as a matter of federal policy union shop agreements with the important limitation that such agreements will not be valid “as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law.”5 While noting this “tension” between federal and state policy, the Court starts and finishes with the tacit assumption that the Court must find some applicable state law- — almost in a conflicts-of-law analysis. The basis for that assumption is in no way discernible from the Act itself or its legislative history. Instead, the emphasis of the Act is that union security agreements are of such importance that absent state proscription outlawing union shop employment relationships within that state, they will be favored. The job situs rule, though never before applied in precisely this situation,6 is merely a logical distillation of § 14(b). For that reason I think we should follow it here as did the panel.7
Although I do concur fully in the dissenting opinion of Judge Ainsworth, under the circumstances I believe that it would be better administration and more consistent with sound legal principles for the Court to refer this case to the NLRB under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. This is so because essentially the question here is whether state right to work amendments should be applied to this union contract under the National Labor Relations Act. The Supreme Court has approved8 and this Court9 has committed itself to this procedure repeatedly under various circumstances.
Two of the most significant instances were FPC cases where we ordered reference to the Commission for it to decide whether it had jurisdiction over the sale and purchase of royalties.10 The Commission held that it did. It then went to the D.C. Circuit where it determined *289that the FPC was in error and did not have jurisdiction.11' The significant thing here is that a Court may, and often should refer basic statutory construction problems — including even the agency’s jurisdiction — to the agency for os initial determination as to its own jurisdiction.
In addition the Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co. case12 is instructive on the scope and use of primary jurisdiction. There this Court referred an issue on the construction of the Interstate Commerce Act to the ICC. While the Supreme Court reversed this procedure because it thought that other issues should be reached first, they affirmed expressly in a very elaborate opinion that our primary jurisdiction reference was entirely proper and within the Court’s power.13 On remand the panel decided it on the merits and reached a result that made consideration by the administrative agency unnecessary.14
Primary jurisdiction is particularly invaluable for this case because, however, one may view the merits, it is acknowledged that the record below is inadequate to enable this Court to determine what, if any, partial remedies would be appropriate. (See Court’s opinion page 281). Where 57% of the employees covered by this agreement are not Texas residents, further findings of fact and exploration of alternative remedies would certainly appear to be mandated. No matter how it is sliced the Court is trying to divine congressional policy for a situation never before faced in accommodating § 8(a)(3) and § 14(b). That policy should first be explored by the agency charged with responsibility for administering the Act which contains as an integral part the quasi-judicial machinery for hearing and deciding cases by formal opinions which, until overruled by a competent Court, become as authoritative as the words of the Act.
it is not abdication — indeed it is performance of judicial duty in the highest sense — for us to defer to the NLRB the initial determination of the interpretation of the Act under the circumstances of this industrial situation.

. Tire highly controversial nature of so-called right-to-work laws is well known. No subject of labor relationship between employers and unions causes greater bitterness. Without attempting here to take sides on this troublesome issue, a few of the pros and cons will serve to demonstrate the heat which is engendered when the subject of such laws is raised.
For examide, the “free rider” issue is hotly disputed :
The unions claim that the worker who refuses to join tile union is a free rider, since the union is obliged by law to bargain for the entire work force. The nonmember gets all the benefits of union representation without paying dues. Management retorts that the nonunion member under a right-to-work law is not a free rider, but a forced rider, since the union demands that it bargain for the entire work force. The union, in turn, maintains that the law must provide, as it does, for the union to represent all workers, union and nonunion, for if each worker were able to bargain individually, the employer could discriminate against the union by maintaining two wage scales — one for the union and a higher one for nonunion workers. Under this arrangement it would not be long before the union would be mustered out of the plant.
Once again, the important consideration is not whether the nonunion worker is a *283free rider or a forced rider, but what the workers believe the ease to be. When nonunion employees work side by side with union employees there is bound to be friction if the union workers believe the nonunion workers are free riders. This friction runs counter to the aim of our national labor policy, which places industrial stability as its prime objective.
Marshal, “Right-to-Work,” Pro and Con, 17 Lab.L.J. 131, 136-137 (1966). As to more general aspects of the controversy, see also Dempsey, The Right-to-Work Controversy, 16 Lab.L.J. 387, 388 (1965), as follows :
An analysis of the campaigns to pass right-to-work laws usually shows that there is a vast difference of viewpoint on the interpretation of the meaning of these laws between opponents and proponents of the laws. Before the public, the advocates of the right-to-work laws take what might be called a contractual viewpoint. They aim to prevent a clause in the labor management contract which would make membership in a union a condition of employment. In their minds, the issue is as simple as that. To make a man become a union member or forfeit his job or right to work is regarded as un-American and dictatorial. In fact, according to this view, unions would be stronger the more voluntary they were.
The opponents of the right-Jo-work laws marshall their arguments based not on the contractual approach but on what might be called the integral viewpoint of the law. According to the union, collective bargaining, unionism and union security (closed shop or union shop) are a unity. An attack on one is an attack on all. Moreover, union security usually involves at least three additional activities: organization, collection of dues and some form of job control. The union in its campaign to stop these laws usually claimed that their true purpose was to restrict some or all of these activities.

. The evidence shows that the collective bargaining agreement was negotiated and executed in New York; that since 1942 labor contracts for the employee unit involved here have been negotiated in New York and that present negotiations for a successor contract have been occurring in New York. Mobil’s corporate headquarters remain in New York, and prior to 1962 its Marine Transportation Department was likewise headquartered there. Information extracted from vessel logs shows that of the eight tankers operated by the company, five of them making typical trips touching the port of Beaumont for a period of time in May and June 1972 were in that port only 5.5% of the total time. A sixth vessel did not touch the Texas port' during that period of time and part of July 1972. Many of the trips bypass Texas completely. For example, eight times a year a vessel travels from the East Coast to Puerto Rico and returns. At the time of the trial one of the vessels was en route to Guam on a 6-month charter, *284and had not been in a Texas port for 50 days. All of the vessels are located on the high seas or in non-Texas ports 80% to 90% of the time; 57% of the seamen are residents of states other than Texas.

. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 83 S.Ct. 1453, 10 L.Ed.2d 670 (1963) ; Retail Clerk’s Inter. Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 83 S.Ct. 1461, 10 L.Ed.2d 678 (1963).

. See, e. g., Garrett v. Moore-McCormack, 317 U.S. 239, 246-248, 63 S.Ct. 246, 251-252, 87 L.Ed. 239 (1942) ; Socony-Vacuum Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 430-431, 59 S.Ct. 262, 266, 83 L.Ed. 265 (1939) ; The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 122-123, 56 S.Ct. 707, 711-712, 80 L.Ed. 1075 (1936) ; Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 162, 55 S.Ct. 46, 49, 79 L.Ed. 254 (1934). Contractual matters have been specially scrutinized in order to protect seamen. “Our national legislature and the courts of admiralty have given particular expression to the wardship theory in matters relating to seamen’s contracts.” Norris, The Seaman as Ward of the Admiralty, 52 Mich.L.Rev. 479, 487 (1954).

. 46 U.S.C. §§ 563-568.

. The liberality of the remedy afforded by this ancient doctrine when compared to workmen’s compensation acts is shown in the following passage from Norris, The Law of Seamen, Vol. 1, 2d Ed., § 575:
A seaman becomes entitled to maintenance and cure by showing that his injury or illness arose while he was in the service of the ship. The injury or illness need not arise out of his employment and the right to the remedy is irrespective of contributory negligence unless due to his own willful misbehaviour. A land worker who seeks an award under most compensation acts must show that the disability was caused by accidental injury or by an occupational disease. Under the general maritime law an illness which manifests itself during the period of employment (although perhaps an aggravation of a preexisting condition, the seriousness of which was not known to the seaman) entitles him to recover the cost of his maintenance and cure until the maximum cure is reached. The illness may be nothing more serious than a simple cold, but if it disables the seaman to an extent that he cannot resume his employment, he is entitled to be paid for his expenditures for medicines, nursing care and the cost of maintaining himself. Moreover, the per diem rate j>resently allowed to seamen for the cost of maintenance and cure is generally on a more liberal scale than that accorded by compensation. Finally, a seaman is entitled to the cost of his maintenance and cure immediately following the onset of his illness or injury, whereas compensation laws generally include a hiatus prior to the accrual of weekly payments.

. 46 U.S.C. § 688.

. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768.

. 46 U.S.C. §§ 682-685.

. 46 U.S.C. § 953.

. 46 U.S.C. § 601.

. 46 U.S.C. § 597.

. 46 U.S.C. § 596.

. 46 U.S.C. § 672.

. 46 U.S.C. §§ 701-710.

. In its report on the N.L.R.A., the Senate committee stated that “the bill does nothing to facilitate closed-shop agreements or to make them legal in any State where they may be illegal.” S.Rep.No.573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1935) ; see also H.Rep.No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1935) ; S.Rep.No.105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1947), 1 Leg.Hist. L.M.R.A. 412. In explaining to Congress the reason for section 14(b)’s inclusion, the conferees for the Taft-Hartley Act stated as follows:
It was never the intention of the National Labor Relations Act, as is disclosed by the legislative history of that act, to preempt the field in this regard so as to deprive the States of their powers to prevent compulsory unionism. Neither of the so-called “closed shop” proviso in section 8(3) of the existing act nor the union shop and maintenance of membership proviso in section 8(a) (3) of the conference agreement could be said to authorize arrangements of this sort in States where such arrangements were contrary to the State policy. To make certain that there should be no question about this, section 13 was included in the House bill. The conference agreement, in section 14(b), contains a proviso having the same effect.
House Conf.Rep.No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1947), 1 Leg.Hist. L.M.R.A. 564, U.S.Code Cong.Serv. p. 1166. See also H. Rep.No.245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1947), 1 Leg.Hist. L.M.R.A. 335.

. After reiterating some of the problems of the closed shop, the Senate Report on the Taft-Hartley Act detailed the remedial provisions contained in present section 8(a)(3) and concluded:
It seems to us that these amendments remedy the most serious abuses of compulsory union membership and yet give employers and unions who feel that such agreements promoted stability . . .
the right to continue such agreements. (Emphasis added.)
S.Rep.No.105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1947), 1 Leg.Hist. L.M.R.A. 413.

. 93 Cong.Rec. 3952 (1947), 2 Leg.IIist. L. M.R.A. 1010.

. Id. at 3952-3953, 2 Leg.IIist. L.M.R.A. 1010-1011.

. S.Rep.Xo.105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1947), 1 Leg.IIist. L.M.R.A. 412-413; see the quotation from this passage in n. 17, supra.

. In any case the majority opinion does not fully explain how Congress could fairly be said to have intended that a Xew York employee of Mobil, who resides in a state where his employment contract was entered into and where agency shop provisions are permissible, and who performs no work whatever in Texas, should be prohibited by Texas law from enjoying the benefits of an agency shop provision in his employment contract.

. The great bulk of the contacts with Texas recited by Employer and the majority are relationships between Mobil and Texas. Insofar as tlie workers are concerned, it. is conceded that they perform no work in Texas, and that fewer than half are residents of Texas.

. 29 U.S.C.A. § 151.

. Northland Greyhound Lines, Inc., 80 NLRB No. 60 (1948) ; Western Electric Co., Inc., 84 NLRB No. 111 (1949).

. This argument appears to beg the question. Undoubtedly Texas right to work laws do apply to employment relations within the, state but whether these seamen fit that category is precisely the question here.

. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a) (3) that reads :
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization : Provided, That nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a. labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in this subsection as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later, (i) if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in section 159(a) of this title, in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made, and (ii) unless following an election held as provided in section 159(e) of this title within one year preceding the effective date of such agreement, the Board shall have certified that at least a majority of the employees eligible to vote in such election have voted to rescind the authority of such labor organization to make such an agreement: Provided further, That no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that such membership was not available to the employee on the same terms and conditions generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership ;
In addition to eliminating serious abuses of compulsory unionism, the legislative history indicates that Congress sought to “ensure the equal financial contribution of all employees who share in the benefits of union accomplishments through collective bargaining.” 11 IIous.L.Rev. 709, 711 (1974).

. 29 U.S.C.A. § 164(b) (1973).

. In its attempt to distinguish the previous job situs cases, the Court makes what appears to be an erroneous distinction. While it is true that Northland Greyhound Lines, Inc. and Western Electric Co. (see note 2, supra) were concerned with the application of state right to work laws to workers employed in more than one state, in order to determine which state’s law should apply to a multi-state contract, some state had to meet the criteria of 14(b). For that reason it is irrelevant whether the Board was selecting among several competing states or determining the appropriate application of one state’s law. Therefore, we should consider the formula developed by the Board in those cases for they are highly relevant to the case at bar.
For example, in Northland the “headquarters of the employees * * * the focal points of the employment relationship” were defined as a place “where employees report to work, receive their instructions, and are paid their salaries.” One benefit of this test, noted by the Board was that it would diminish the extraterritorial effect of the laws of any one state. 80 NLRB 288, 291 (1948). Also, in Western Electric Co. the NLRB applying this Northland test determined that the employees would be considered headquartered at their job site. 84 NLRB 1019, 1022 (1949).

. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, 5 Oir., 1973, 483 F.2d 603.

. Mitchell, Cole & Coke Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 230 U.S. 247, 33 S.Ct. 916, 57 L.Ed. 1472; General American Tank Car Corp. v. El Dorado Terminal Co., 1939, 308 U.S. 422, 60 S.Ct. 325, 84 L.Ed. 361; United States v. Western Pacific R.R. Co., 1956, 352 U.S. 59, 77 S.Ct. 161, 1 L.Ed.2d 126; Far East Conference v. United States, 1951, 342 U.S. 570, 72 S.Ct. 492, 96 L.Ed. 576; Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co. v. River Terminals Corp., 1959, 360 U.S. 411, 79 S.Ct. 1210, 3 L.Ed.2d 1334, 1959 AMC 1631.

. Agricultural Transportation Association of Texas v. King, 5 Cir., 1965, 349 F.2d 873; Carter v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 5 Cir., 1966, 365 F.2d 486, 497; River Terminals Corp. v. Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co., 5 Cir., 1958, 253 F.2d 922, 1958 AMC 1534 (after remand, 5 Cir., 1960, 274 F.2d 36, 1960 AMC 2064) ; Weymouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 5 Cir., 1966, 367 F.2d 84; J. M. Huber Corp. v. Denman, 5 Cir., 1966, 367 F.2d 104.

. Weymouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 5 Cir., 1966, 367 F.2d 84, 102-103; J. M. Huber Corp. v. Denman, 5 Cir., 1966, 367 F.2d 104, 111-112.

. Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, D.C.Cir., 1971, 149 U.S.App.D.C. 310, 367 F.2d 256, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976, 92 S.Ct. 2409, 32 L.Ed.2d 676.

. 253 F.2d 922, 1958 AMC 1534.

. Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co. v. River Terminals Corp., 1959, 360 U.S. 411, 421, 79 S.Ct. 1210, 3 L.Ed.2d 1334, 1959 AMC 1631.

. 5 Cir., 1960, 274 F.2d 36, 1960 AMC 2064.