Court Opinion

ID: 9449556
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:15:01.81758+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:52.706600
License: Public Domain

CAMERON, Circuit Judge
(Specially Concurring).
I concur fully in the able opinion of Judge Hays and would add the following comments.
It cannot be mentioned too often that prosecutions such as these which we are reviewing are prosecutions for the violation of federal taxing laws, not for the violation of gambling laws. And, “in construing [the statutes] we would not be justified in resorting to collateral motives or effects [a congressional desire to suppress wagering] which, standing apart from the federal taxing power, might place the constitutionality of the statute in doubt.” United States v. Cala-maro, 1957, 354 U.S. 351, 358, 77 S.Ct. 1138, 1143, 1 L.Ed.2d 1394. In short, whether one gambles or not is of no concern to the federal government, except insofar as the taxing power alone is involved.
Judge Rives suggests in his dissent that to require affirmative proof that the defendants are aware of the taxing requirements will make convictions exceedingly rare. Besides the fact that we do not hold here that positive, affirmative proof is required, if that be the result, so be it. Such a possibility does not warrant, in my opinion, the suggestion in the dissent that we take judicial notice of the fact that all persons engaged in the gambling business are aware of the requirements. In dealing with this serious business of taking citizens’ liberties, we are not privileged to assume that the “tax is so well known as to be one of the most frequent subjects of conversation among professional gamblers.” The fact is that I doubt exceedingly if it is true that all “professional” gamblers know of the tax. Nor does such a possibility warrant a holding that defendants affirmatively establish ignorance of the requirements. To do so would certainly put the burden of proving innocence on the defendants, a result which is clearly unconstitutional. Moreover, taking judicial notice of defendants’ knowledge would in effect be to convert the crime charged to imprisonment for debt to the government, rather than for evasion of tax liabilities.
As Judge Rives states in his dissent, the issue of the correctness of the charge including in part: “ * * * The presumption is that every person knows what the law forbids and what the law requires to be done * * * ” is not before us. But necessarily before us is the old adage so often propounded in criminal cases: “Ignorance of the laws is no excuse.”
This case is really not an exception to that general rule. Ignorance of the criminality of evading taxes is no excuse, if one wilfully evades the tax, thus committing the crime. One must know, however, of the positive requirements of the federal law that one must register and pay the tax before he can wilfully evade it. It may be that this is the difference between sins of commission and sins of omission. It is a part of our legal heritage, however, that courts of law traditionally mete out punishment for sins of commission. Judgments on sins of omission are usually reserved for a Higher Court sitting at a later Day.