Court Opinion

ID: 9638391
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:42:54.852589+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:33.062224
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice O’Brien:
Justice Roberts in his “opinion in support of the order of the court” would permit a charge on voluntary manslaughter in this case which is highly prejudicial to appellant. Twice the court instructed the jury that a verdict of voluntary manslaughter is not proper when there is a direct intent to kill. First: “Voluntary manslaughter consists in the unlawful killing of another without malice . . . and that means without direct intent to kill. . . later: “If you bear in mind that manslaughter is never accompanied by legal malice, that is, by a direct intent to kill. . .”. Justice Roberts himself clearly points out that these instructions were erroneous. However, he refuses to reverse for this error, although from his opinion it is not exactly clear on which of two grounds he bases Ms result. Either he is of the view that the error was cured by other portions of the charge, or he believes that appellant’s failure to take a specific exception to the portions complained of precludes our review, or both. I can agree with neither conclusion.
The court also charged, “The act of killing must, of course, be voluntary. That is what the very name of the crime implies, because voluntary manslaughter involves an intentional act.” This hardly cures the faulty language to the effect that a finding of intent to kill precludes a verdict of voluntary manslaughter. *397Informing the jury that voluntary manslaughter by its nature requires an intentional act, by no means informs them that voluntary manslaughter is consistent with an intent to kill. The act itself can well be intentional without any intent to kill being present. In view of the fact that the evidence in this case only barely supports the verdict of first degree murder, I conclude that the erroneous instructions were definitely prejudicial to appellant.
Nor are we precluded from reversing on this ground merely because no special exception was taken. Regardless of what effect Pa. R. Crim. P. 1119(b), effective August 1, 1968, may have on future appeals,1 it clearly is inapplicable to the present case. To state, as Justice Roberts does, that the Rule reflects the existing case law at the time of its adoption, is simply to ignore the consistent view of this Court. That view was very recently summarized in Commonwealth v. Williams, 432 Pa. 557, 248 A. 2d 301 (1968), where the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Beld, stated: “The Commonwealth contends that appellant’s failure to take an exception to the charge prevents our consideration of any errors therein. Because of fairness to all the parties to the litigation and the speedy administration of trials and of Court business, it is a well established general rule that an appellate Court will not reverse (1) on a point (a) where no exception was taken by appellant or (b) to which only a general exception was taken, or (2) on a ground not raised in or by the Court below.
“However, this general rule will not he applied where there is basic and fundamental error which affects the merits or justice of the case, or, as some cases express it, offends against the fundamentals of *398a fair and impartial trial or deprives a defendant of c. . . “that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice,” and, hence, denies him due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment’.” [Citations omitted throughout quote]. (Emphasis in original). None of the cases cited by Justice Roberts is inconsistent with this view that where there is fundamental error in the charge, this Court will not permit the verdict to stand. Surely where fundamental error in a charge results in a verdict of first degree murder and a sentence of life imprisonment, it glorifies procedure beyond all bounds of reason to affirm such a verdict.
I dissent.
Mr. Justice Cohen joins in this dissent.

 Since it is not now before us, I express no opinion as to the effect of that Buie.