Court Opinion

ID: 9666267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:09:29.755629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:25.668899
License: Public Domain

DONIELSON, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Initially, I believe that the trial court should have admitted Elaine’s testimony since it was relevant to defeat the defendant’s alibi defense and show he had a motive for being in the area where the crime was committed. I agree that the relevancy of her testimony hinges on the defendant’s knowledge that Elaine might be present at the Steinfelt home. Yet, contrary to the majority opinion, I believe Scott Maley’s testimony that he would be babysitting at the Steinfelt home is sufficient to show that such knowledge may have existed. Scott testified that he never babysat alone and would always go with his mother. Since the defendant was related to Elaine Johnson, it is possible that he would have been aware of this and would have expected Elaine to be at the Steinfelt home. Certainly, it is within the province of the jury to draw the inference from the evidence or to discard it as being too tenuous. We cannot say as a matter of law that knowledge cannot be inferred from Scott’s testimony. Furthermore, defense counsel would have the opportunity to attack the allegation that the defendant had knowledge during cross-examination and closing argument.
The fact remains that Elaine’s testimony coupled with Scott Maley’s testimony makes a fact of consequence more probable — that the defendant would be in the area of the Steinfelt home. This is all that is required. It is merely circumstantial evidence to be believed or not believed by the jury. As long as it is probative, there is no reason to exclude the testimony.
Even assuming the testimony was properly excluded, I do not believe sufficient prejudice was shown to require reversal at this point. Trial courts have considerable discretion in this respect since they are in a better position to gauge the effect of the testimony on the jury. State v. Cage, 218 N.W.2d 582, 586 (Iowa 1974). In this particular case, the question of prejudice is a close one. I am thus inclined to defer to the trial court’s conclusion that any prejudice could properly be eliminated by admonishing the jury. The defendant has not demonstrated Elaine’s testimony was so inherently flammable that an admonition would be insufficient. Furthermore, a finding of insufficient prejudice is particularly appropriate in a case such as this when other evidence supporting a conviction is so substantial. The victim identified the defendant as her attacker at trial, in a police videotape of the defendant, and in a photo lineup. The police discovered a wound on the defendant’s hand that an expert described as a tearing bite wound. This physical evidence was consistent with the victim’s allegation that she had bitten her attacker’s hand during the rape. Additionally, other physical evidence found on the victim matched hair and blood samples from the defendant.
In light of this overwhelming evidence, I do not believe that Elaine Johnson’s testimony should be characterized as prejudicial. It is highly unlikely that it was a determining factor in the decision of the jury. See State v. Peterson, 189 N.W.2d 891, 897 (Iowa 1971).