Court Opinion

ID: 9963440
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-25 16:00:53.114791+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:50.916673
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     SAMUEL GANNELLI,                                DOCKET NUMBER
                 Appellant,                          AT-0752-22-0454-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,                          DATE: April 24, 2024
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Joel J. Kirkpatrick , Esquire, Canton, Michigan, for the appellant.

           Clairanne Wise , Esquire, and Luke Archer , Springfield, Virginia, for the
             agency.

                                           BEFORE

                                Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
                             Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     mitigated the appellant’s removal to a letter of reprimand. Generally, we grant
     petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision
     contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an
     erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                       2

     the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either
     the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required
     procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the
     outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available
     that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record
     closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that
     the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting
     the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as
     expressly MODIFIED to supplement the administrative judge’s analysis of the
     lack of candor charge and her penalty analysis, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

                                         BACKGROUND
¶2           The appellant was a GS-1811-13 Criminal Investigator (Special Agent) for
     the agency’s Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), assigned to the West Palm
     Beach District Office in Florida. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 1, Tab 4
     at 19. On or around July 2020, the appellant was selected for reassignment to the
     Mazatlan, Mexico office, which is part of the North and Central American Region
     that was then-headed by Senior Executive Service (SES) Regional Director (RD),
     N. Palmeri.      Hearing Transcript (HT) at 240 (testimony of N. Palmeri), 264
     (testimony of the appellant). The appellant began attending Spanish language
     school, handing off his West Palm Beach investigative work, and going on a
     series of temporary duty assignments in Mazatlan. HT at 264-65 (testimony of
     the appellant). On February 25, 2021, while the appellant was still assigned to
     the West Palm Beach District Office, the appellant and RD Palmeri met with a
     Confidential Source (CS) 2 and conducted a debrief at the CS’s residence in
     Miami, Florida. IAF, Tab 1 at 9. On March 25, 2021, an agency official reported
     that RD Palmeri had met with a CS and other individuals despite a directive

     2
         CS and Confidential Informant are used interchangeably. IAF, Tab 1 at 10.
                                                                                      3

     prohibiting the meetings and requested an investigation. Id. The appellant was
     interviewed in connection with this investigation on April 30, May 26, and
     September 8, 2021. IAF, Tab 5 at 227-278, 406-490; Tab 7 at 4-57.
¶3        On December 22, 2021, the agency proposed the appellant’s removal based
     on the charges of improper association with a CI/Suspect, lack of candor, failure
     to follow written or oral instructions, and false statements/documents. IAF, Tab 1
     at 9-23. The charges alleged that the appellant engaged in improper association
     with a CS when he conducted a debriefing in a social setting at the CS’s
     residence, in the presence of the CS’s spouse and friends, and where the CS
     provided food and drinks; that the appellant knowingly provided less than candid
     responses to questions as to whether he consumed alcohol during the debriefing;
     that the appellant failed to timely submit a DEA-6 form documenting the
     debriefing; and that the appellant knowingly provided false statements to
     investigators regarding a violation of a confidentiality agreement.      Id.   On
     May 24, 2022, the deciding official, S. Sutherland, issued a decision letter
     sustaining the charges and removing the appellant effective the next day. IAF,
     Tab 1 at 24-26, Tab 4 at 19.
¶4        The appellant timely filed the instant petition for review. IAF, Tab 1. After
     holding the requested hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision
     mitigating the agency’s action. IAF, Tab 46, Initial Decision (ID) at 1. The
     administrative judge concluded that the agency did not prove its charges of
     improper association with a CI/Suspect, ID at 3-13, lack of candor, ID at 13-16,
     and false statements/documents, ID at 16-20. However, she sustained the third
     charge of failure to follow written or oral instructions.       ID at 16.      The
     administrative judge thereafter found that the agency proved nexus, ID at 20, but
     that the penalty of removal was beyond the maximum reasonable penalty for the
     sustained charge, ID at 20-23. The administrative judge mitigated the penalty to
     the maximum reasonable penalty warranted for the charge of failure to follow
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     written or oral instructions, which in this case she found to be a letter of
     reprimand. ID at 23.
¶5        The agency has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR) File,
     Tab 1. The appellant filed a response, PFR File, Tab 3, and the agency filed a
     reply, PFR File, Tab 4.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶6        On review, the agency argues that the administrative judge erred in finding
     that the agency did not prove its charges of improper association with a
     CI/Suspect, lack of candor, and false statements/documents, and that the
     administrative judge erred in mitigating the penalty of removal to a letter of
     reprimand. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-23. We address these arguments below.

     The administrative judge properly found that the agency did not prove the first
     charge, improper association with a CI/Suspect.
¶7        In the notice of proposed removal (NOPR), the agency alleged:
     [O]n February 25, 2021, you engaged in improper association with a CS
          when you met with a CS at the CS’s residence, and conducted a
          debriefing while the CS’s spouse was seated at the table with you, as
          well as RD Palmeri, and RD Palmeri’s spouse. In addition, while at
          the CS’s residence, you participated in a social setting where food
          and drinks, including alcohol, were provided by the CS. In the
          multiple hours you spent at the CS’s residence, there were other
          non-law enforcement personnel present on the CS’s property,
          including the CS’s family members, as well as a male and female
          friend of the CS’s, who were preparing the food. By your own
          admission, DEA sensitive law enforcement information was
          discussed during the CS debriefing, and the CS’s spouse was within
          hearing distance of the conversation.
     IAF, Tab 1 at 10. The agency cited two internal policies in support of its charge,
     which state that:
           DEA employees are prohibited from associating with individuals
           known or suspected to be involved in illegal drug trafficking or other
           criminal activity in other than a strictly professional capacity. This
           prohibition also applies to CSs and former CSs. Extrinsic social,
           financial or business contacts with individuals of this nature are
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           expressly prohibited. DEA employees are to strictly maintain only
           the highest standards of conduct with respect to informants, known
           criminals, or with individuals engaged in criminally violative
           activity.
           ...
           A Controlling Investigator shall not socialize with a CS except to the
           extent necessary and appropriate for operational reasons. Personal
           business, social, or romantic relationships between DEA employees
           or other authorized personnel and CSs are strictly prohibited.
     Id. at 12-13. In the proposal, the agency also further discussed several statements
     that the appellant made in his investigative interviews regarding the above
     allegations and his alleged improper association with the CS, including the
     appellant’s testimony that he and RD Palmeri were at the CS’s property for
     approximately 3-4 hours, during which the CS showed them around the property;
     the CS served food, wine, and beer; RD Palmeri brought his wife, and the wife
     and the CS’s spouse were “within earshot” when the appellant and RD Palmeri
     debriefed the CS about drug trafficking information. Id. at 10-13.
¶8        In the initial decision, the administrative judge thoroughly discussed the
     allegations and testimony cited in the NOPR regarding the circumstances of the
     February 25 debriefing, as well as the hearing testimony of S. Sutherland, the
     deciding official; the appellant; RD Palmeri; and J. Hunt, an expert in DEA
     policy and procedures relating to federal narcotic investigations, including
     control of cooperating sources and the implementing chain of command for
     special agents. ID at 3-9. Among other things, the administrative judge noted
     that the appellant testified that he had previously worked with the CS and
     RD Palmeri, and that, in early 2021, RD Palmeri ordered him to go to a
     debriefing of the CS because the appellant had knowledge of the inner workings
     in Mexico.    ID at 6-7.    The administrative judge noted that the appellant
     recognized that it “was not good” when RD Palmeri arrived at the debriefing with
     his wife but that he explained that RD Palmeri was a senior executive and agents
     are told to never to leave another agent alone with a CS. ID at 7; HT at 284-85
                                                                                        6

     (testimony of the appellant).     The administrative judge also noted that the
     appellant testified that because the three individuals had not seen each other in a
     while, there was time spent communicating on a personal level and the CS was
     excited to show them around his property. ID at 7. She also explained that both
     the appellant and RD Palmeri testified that during the debriefing, the appellant,
     RD Palmeri, and the CS sat down at one end of two 6-feet long picnic tables
     pushed together with the wives at the other end. ID at 7; HT at 271-72 (testimony
     of the appellant). The administrative judge also discussed J. Hunt’s testimony
     that informants are not “robots” and that agents cannot help having a certain level
     of social interaction with an informant who is trusting the agent with their life.
     ID at 9.
¶9         In analyzing the charge, the administrative judge reviewed the language of
     the two internal policies cited above and found, among other things, that a “fair
     reading” of the two provisions is that the DEA prohibits its agents from engaging
     in a personal, social relationship with a CS outside of the professional one, but
     that “some socialization with a CS is allowed as long as the agent is acting in a
     ‘strictly professional capacity’ and ‘to the extent it is necessary and appropriate
     for operational reasons.’” ID at 10; IAF, Tab 1 at 12-13. The administrative
     judge concluded that the appellant went to the February 25 debriefing in a
     “strictly professional capacity” because he was ordered to attend by a highly
     ranked superior in charge of his future placement and because there was no
     evidence that the appellant otherwise had a social friendship with the CS. ID
     at 10. In addition, the administrative judge found that the appellant’s conduct did
     not go beyond what she considered necessary and appropriate for operational
     reasons because she credited J. Hunt’s testimony that it is routine for agents to
     meet at an informant’s residence; she found that the appellant’s acquiescence to a
     tour of the CS’s property appeared to be nothing more than being congenial; and
     she found that although the spouses may have been within “earshot” of the
     debriefing, J. Hunt testified that he had met informants literally hundreds of times
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      in restaurants where a debriefing could be conducted in a manner where others
      cannot hear what is being said, and that this was no different. ID at 9-13. The
      administrative judge also found that the agency did not show that the appellant
      drank any alcohol during the debriefing or that the appellant’s presence alone
      while others were drinking showed that the appellant violated the agency’s
      improper association policies. ID at 12. Additionally, the administrative judge
      discussed the fact that although S. Sutherland testified that the appellant should
      have disengaged himself from the debrief at some point and violated DEA policy
      by not doing so, S. Sutherland’s “failure to acknowledge at least some of the facts
      that support[ed] the appellant’s position show[ed] a demeanor of a determined
      bias against him, which render[ed] S. Sutherland’s testimony unpersuasive.” ID
      at 11 (citing Hillen v. Department of the Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987)).
      The administrative judge thus concluded that the agency did not prove the charge.
      ID at 13.
¶10        On review, the agency first argues that the administrative judge erroneously
      interpreted and applied the two above-noted DEA policies by ignoring in her
      analysis the fact that the first policy states that DEA employees are to “strictly
      maintain only the highest standards of conduct with respect to informants” and
      that the second policy states that “[p]ersonal business, social, or romantic
      relationships between DEA employees or other authorized personnel and CSs are
      strictly prohibited.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 11-13; IAF, Tab 1 at 12-13. To this end,
      the agency claims that the administrative judge’s “selective” interpretation of
      these policies to mean improper association is “no personal social relationship
      outside of the professional one,” is contradictory to the plain language of the
      policies, and that DEA policy clearly prohibits more than simply a “relationship
      with informants outside of the DEA relationship.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 12-13; ID
      at 10. However, the agency’s arguments are unpersuasive. The administrative
      judge correctly cited the language of the policies the agency referenced in its
      NOPR in her initial decision. ID at 3; IAF, Tab 1 at 12-13. The administrative
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      judge did not, as the agency argues, find that improper association simply means
      no relationship with a CS outside of the DEA relationship. The administrative
      judge explained that the agency could prove its improper association charge by
      showing that the appellant’s conduct at the debriefing went beyond what is
      considered necessary and appropriate for operational reasons.                ID at 13.
      Although the administrative judge may have focused on a specific phrase in the
      first policy that states that DEA employees are prohibited from associating with
      CSs in “other than a strictly professional capacity,” and a phrase in the second
      policy that states that investigators shall not socialize with a CS “except to the
      extent necessary and appropriate for operational reasons,” a full reading of her
      analysis demonstrates that she correctly understood and applied the language of
      the two DEA policies. ID at 9-13. Her discussion encompassed an analysis of
      whether the appellant “strictly maintain[ed] only the highest standards of
      conduct” with respect to the debriefing. ID at 3, 9-13. We see no error in the
      administrative judge’s interpretation and application of the two DEA policies. 3
      See Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 106 (1997) (finding no reason
      to disturb the administrative judge’s findings when she considered the evidence
      as a whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned conclusions on issues
      of credibility).
¶11         The agency also puts forth that it believes that the appellant’s conduct at the
      February 25 debriefing was an extrinsic social contact with a CS, an association
      in “other than a strictly professional capacity,” was not of the “highest standards
      of conduct,” and was not “necessary and appropriate for operational reasons.”
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 13-14.         The agency reiterates that it believes that the

      3
        In addition, the second policy that the agency cited in its notice of proposed removal
      appears to apply only to “controlling investigators.” IAF, Tab 1 at 13. As the
      administrative judge noted, the agency did not present evidence that the appellant was a
      “controlling investigator.” ID at 9 n.4. However, we agree with the administrative
      judge that there is no need to address this discrepancy because the agency did not show
      that the appellant engaged in improper association as defined by either policy. ID at 9
      n.4.
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      appellant’s actions of touring the CS’s property, engaging in conversation
      unrelated to DEA business, and having dinner where both alcohol and the spouses
      were present, as a whole, are “material evidence” that the appellant improperly
      associated with the CS.    Id. at 13.   However, the agency’s arguments clearly
      constitute mere disagreement with the administrative judge’s weighing of the
      evidence and provide no reason for disturbing the initial decision.            See
      Broughton v. Department of Health and Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359
      (1987) (the appellant’s mere disagreement with the administrative judge’s
      weighing of the evidence does not establish a basis for review).
¶12        The agency also contends that the administrative judge erroneously looked
      at each aspect of the February 25 meeting separately, instead of looking at the
      entirety of the circumstances. PFR File, Tab 1 at 14 n.4. We disagree. Although
      the administrative judge considered in turn the various allegations the agency
      made in its NOPR as to why the appellant improperly associated with the CS, the
      administrative judge still implicitly considered the totality of the circumstances.
      ID at 9-13. Additionally, the agency argues that the administrative judge ignored
      J. Hunt’s testimony that it was not “operationally necessary” for non-DEA
      personnel to be present at a CS debriefing or to have dinner with the spouses
      present. PFR File, Tab 1 at 13; HT at 218-19 (testimony of J. Hunt). However,
      the administrative judge’s failure to mention all of the extensive testimony and
      evidence does not mean that she did not consider it in reaching her decision. See
      Marques v. Department of Health and Human Services, 22 M.S.P.R. 129, 132
      (1984), aff’d, 776 F.2d 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Table).
¶13        With regard to the first charge, the agency also argues in its petition for
      review that the administrative judge erroneously focused on whether the two
      spouses had “overheard” the debriefing in her analysis of whether the agency
      showed improper association, instead of that it was inappropriate for the spouses
      to be present at the briefing at all. PFR File, Tab 1 at 14-15. To this end, the
      agency emphasizes that the NOPR did not conclude that the spouses overheard
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      the debriefing; rather, it noted that the spouses were within “earshot” when the
      debriefing occurred, which was inappropriate as those non-DEA personnel could
      have potentially overheard sensitive, confidential information.    Id. at 15. The
      agency argues that the administrative judge erred in concluding that the spouses
      seated at the end of the table was no different than a restaurant setting, because
      her conclusion ignored an important distinction that, here, the “others” were
      spouses, in a venue hosted by the CS, where food and alcoholic drinks were
      present. Id.
¶14        The agency’s arguments are unpersuasive. In support of the first charge in
      the NOPR, the agency repeatedly discussed testimony from its investigative
      interviews regarding how the “CS’s spouse was seated at the table,” that “the
      CS’s spouse was within hearing distance,” “whether there were other people at
      the table,” and “whether the spouses were in earshot.” IAF, Tab 1 at 10-11. In
      the initial decision, the administrative judge noted that the proposed removal gave
      the “impression that the CS’s spouse was participating in the debriefing itself,”
      and she discussed testimony on this issue and stated that “the agency’s conclusion
      that [the spouses] overheard the details of the debriefing” was not supported. ID
      at 12. We discern no error in the administrative judge expounding on her reading
      of the proposed removal on this issue.     Furthermore, the administrative judge
      considered the agency’s argument as to the appropriateness of the spouses’
      presence because she specifically discussed hearing testimony on this issue,
      including S. Sutherland’s unpersuasive testimony that “it was highly improper to
      have a family member or others present while the debriefing was occurring,” ID
      at 5, the appellant’s consistent testimony that he has previously met a CS at their
      home with family members present, ID at 7, RD Palmeri’s testimony that the
      debriefing was limited to himself, the appellant, and the CS, ID at 8, and J.
      Hunt’s testimony that it was not apparent that the spouses overheard the
      debriefing and that it would have been worse for the appellant to have left
      RD Palmeri with the CS, ID at 9.            Although the agency disputes the
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      administrative judge’s conclusion that the presence of the spouses was similar to
      that of a debriefing being conducted near other patrons at a restaurant, the
      agency’s argument, as do its other contentions, simply disagrees with the
      administrative judge on this point. See Yang v. U.S. Postal Service, 115 M.S.P.R.
      112, ¶ 12 (2010) (stating that arguments that constitute mere disagreement with
      the initial decision do not provide a basis to grant the petition for review).
¶15         Finally, the agency argues on review that the administrative judge
      erroneously found that “the meal and drinks with the CS” did not violate agency
      policy. PFF File, Tab 1 at 16. In the initial decision, the administrative judge
      addressed the fact that the CS served food at the February 25 debriefing and
      stated that “there is no evidence that [the meal] was anything other than some
      bar-b-que ribs, which in and of itself appears somewhat harmless, [and] not
      violative of the agency’s policy,” citing in a footnote the agency’s policy
      regarding exchanging gifts and engaging in a financial transaction with a CS. ID
      at 12. The administrative judge also found that the agency did not show that the
      appellant drank any alcohol and that his presence while others were drinking was
      not unlike a restaurant setting and did not show that he violated the agency’s
      improper association policy. ID at 12. In its petition, the agency claims that the
      administrative judge “incorrectly relied” on its provision regarding gifts because
      the appellant was not charged with violating that policy. PFR File, Tab 1 at 16.
      However, the agency included this provision in the agency file, and the deciding
      official, S. Sutherland, testified that he believed an informant providing a meal
      was “tantamount to a gift.”      IAF, Tab 8 at 37; HT at 43 (testimony of S.
      Sutherland).   Furthermore, such an analysis goes to the issue of whether the
      appellant engaged in conduct with the CS that was “expressly prohibited.” IAF,
      Tab 1 at 12. The agency also reargues that the administrative judge failed to
      examine the meal “in the context of the totality of the circumstances,” and that
      the meal was not “somewhat harmless” because in combination with it being at
      the CS’s residence, with the spouses and alcohol present, the situation was not of
                                                                                      12

      the “highest standards of conduct” or “necessary and appropriate for operation
      reasons.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 16. However, these arguments, again, also provide
      no basis for disturbing the initial decision. See Yang, 115 M.S.P.R. 112, ¶ 12; see
      also Crosby, 74 M.S.P.R. at 106.

      The administrative judge properly found that the agency did not prove the second
      charge, lack of candor.
¶16        To prove a charge of lack of candor, the agency must prove that (1) the
      appellant gave incorrect or incomplete statements and (2) that he did so
      knowingly.    Fargnoli v. Department of Commerce, 123 M.S.P.R. 330, ¶ 17
      (2016). Unlike falsification, lack of candor does not require an intent to deceive.
      Id., ¶ 16. A lack of candor charge may involve a failure to disclose something
      that, under the circumstances, should have been disclosed to make the given
      statement accurate and complete.     Ludlum v. Department of Justice, 278 F.3d
      1280, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2002).     Lack of candor is a broader and more flexible
      concept whose contours and elements depend upon the particular context and
      conduct involved. Id.
¶17        In the NOPR, the agency alleged that during the appellant’s May 26, 2021
      supplemental interview, he “knowingly provided less than candid responses to
      [Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR)] Inspectors[’] questions as to
      whether [he] consumed alcohol during a CS debriefing, resulting in a lack of
      candor.” IAF, Tab 1 at 13. The proposal described the appellant’s responses to
      the questions of whether he brought or drank alcohol at the February 25
      debriefing as evasive, such as when he responded with answers like: “I’m a Bud
      Light drinker, sir. So, I don’t drink wine. If the CS had, I know the CS had other
      beer there, I just can’t remember what type exactly;” “To my recollection, no,
      sir;” “To my recollection, I can’t recall, sir, because typically when I meet with
      the CS, in particular, I always bring a big Diet Coke, because I know, I’ve known
      for years, CS drinks red wine, and I’m not a wine drinker. And, obviously, in my
      OGV I’m not going to drink.” Id. The NOPR also noted that in response to the
                                                                                         13

      investigators’ questions regarding whether the appellant brought alcohol, his
      answer included, “sir, if the CI said that I drank, yes, sir, I drank. I just don’t
      recall whether – I know that I don’t drink red wine. I know I don’t drink –,” IAF,
      Tab 1 at 13, and that in response to a later question as to “whether, if it was the
      CS that told them that [the appellant] drank alcohol, was it still [the appellant’s]
      statement that [he] did not drink alcohol, that [he] only drank soft drinks and
      water,” and the appellant replied “Sir, to my recollection, I do not recall if I drank
      alcohol. If this CS told you that I had alcohol at that meeting, then I had alcohol
      at that meeting,” Id. at 14; IAF, Tab 5 at 431, 457.
¶18        In the initial decision, the administrative judge discussed that while S.
      Sutherland testified that he did not find the appellant credible because the
      appellant provided qualified and rambling responses rather than merely saying
      “yes or no,” the appellant testified that he did not bring or drink alcohol during
      the entirety of the February 25 meeting and RD Palmeri testified that he did not
      see the appellant drink alcohol. ID at 14. In her analysis, the administrative
      judge concluded that the agency did not prove the first prong of the lack of
      candor test, that the appellant in fact gave false information, because the agency
      did not present any testimonial or documentary evidence that the appellant in fact
      drank alcohol during the debriefing. ID at 15. She also explained that she was
      “not convinced” the appellant lacked candor when he stated, “well if the CS said I
      drank, I drank,” because, although she found it a strange reply, she credited the
      appellant’s testimony that he was frustrated with the interview and exasperated
      with the number of times he was asked the same question. ID at 15-16. She also
      pointed out that when asked if the appellant had a beer or a glass of wine, the CS
      said “Yes. I think yes,” which she noted was hardly definitive and misrepresented
      by the investigators. ID at 16; IAF, Tab 5 at 367-68.
¶19        On review, the agency argues that the administrative judge erroneously
      discounted the fact that the appellant provided three conflicting responses as to
      whether he consumed alcohol and that the appellant admitted he made an
                                                                                         14

      inaccurate statement, which shows that it proved the appellant was not truthful.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 17. In this regard, the agency points out that the appellant first
      said “No, sir” in response to the question of whether he consumed alcohol,” and
      then said, “Sir, to my recollection, I do not recall if I drank alcohol,” followed by,
      “If this CS told you that I had alcohol at that meeting then I had alcohol at that
      meeting.” Id.; IAF, Tab 1 at 13-14, Tab 5 at 431, 457. The agency also disputes
      the appellant’s contention that he was frustrated by being asked the same question
      numerous times, noting that the appellant first stated “sir, if the CI said that I
      drank, yes, sir, I drank” in response to the agency’s questioning about whether the
      appellant brought alcohol, not whether he drank alcohol, which “directly
      contradicts” his frustration about being asked the same question repeatedly. PFR
      File, Tab 1 at 19; IAF, Tab 1 at 13, Tab 5 at 431.         Additionally, the agency
      contends that the administrative judge erred by failing to address the second
      prong of the lack of candor test, and it reargues that it proved the appellant’s
      intent to give an inaccurate statement concerning his own alcohol consumption.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 18.
¶20        We are not convinced by the agency’s arguments. The administrative judge
      thoroughly reviewed the agency’s charge, the hearing testimony related to this
      issue, and the case law regarding lack of candor in her initial decision.          ID
      at 13-16. Each of the appellant’s responses that the agency points out above were
      specifically discussed in the NOPR that the administrative judge reviewed. IAF,
      Tab 1 at 13-14. We agree with the administrative judge that the record does not
      show that the appellant in fact consumed alcohol during the February 25
      debriefing.   ID at 15.   Contrary to the agency’s assertions, the administrative
      judge’s focus on this issue was necessary to the analysis because the agency
      charged the appellant with lack of candor as to whether he “consumed” alcohol
      during the debriefing. PFR File, Tab 1 at 17 n.5; IAF, Tab 1 at 13. Further,
      although the agency contends that the appellant admitted his comment of “if the
      CS said I drank alcohol, then I must have had alcohol” was “inaccurate,” he
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      actually testified, “I was wrong in saying that, Your Honor. But at that point, I
      didn’t want to use profanity and be charged with unprofessional conduct.” PFR
      File, Tab 1 at 18; HT at 332 (testimony of the appellant).            Although we
      understand the agency’s arguments about the appellant’s responses and the timing
      of those responses, it is not obvious, and we do not agree, that the appellant
      necessarily made false statements as to whether he consumed alcohol given the
      repeated and convoluted nature of the agency’s questions during the investigative
      interview and after considering the appellant’s answers in context. IAF, Tab 5
      at 406-490.
¶21        In any case, we find that the appellant did not knowingly give an incorrect
      or incomplete statement. Although the administrative judge may not have made
      an explicit finding as to this second prong of the lack of candor test because she
      found that the appellant did not give a false statement, she made credibility
      findings that are sufficient to satisfy the same. Specifically, as noted above, the
      administrative judge concluded that she was “not convinced” the appellant lacked
      candor when he stated, “if the CS said I drank, I drank,” because she credited his
      testimony that he was frustrated with the investigative interview. ID at 15-16.
      We find that this is an implicit finding that the appellant did not give a knowingly
      false statement. Although the agency challenges the appellant’s contention that
      he was frustrated by the interview, its argument really boils down to disagreement
      with the administrative judge’s credibility determinations.      PFR File, Tab 1
      at 18-19. However, the Board must give deference to an administrative judge’s
      credibility determinations when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on
      observing the demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing, and the Board may
      overturn such determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for
      doing so. Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
      The agency has not presented sufficiently sound reasons here. Furthermore, in
      this regard we note that the two “conflicting” responses the agency alleges the
      appellant gave as to whether he consumed alcohol at the debriefing—“Sir, to my
                                                                                       16

      recollection, I do not recall if I drank alcohol,” followed by, “If this CS told you
      that I had alcohol at that meeting then I had alcohol at that meeting”—were both
      made during the interaction in which the administrative judge credited the
      appellant’s testimony that he was frustrated. PFR File, Tab 1 at 17; IAF, Tab 1
      at 13-14, Tab 5 at 457. Consequently, we find the agency’s arguments unavailing
      and affirm as modified her decision to not sustain the lack of candor charge.

      The administrative judge properly found that the agency did not prove the fourth
      charge, false statement/documents.
¶22        To establish a charge of misrepresentation, falsification, or lying, an agency
      must prove that an appellant (1) supplied wrong information; and (2) knowingly
      did so with the intention of defrauding, deceiving, or misleading the agency for
      his own private material gain.       Boo v. Department of Homeland Security,
      122 M.S.P.R. 100, ¶¶ 10-12 (2014). In the NOPR, the agency alleged that during
      the appellant’s third supplemental investigative interview on September 8, 2021,
      the appellant “knowingly provided false statements to OPR Inspectors’ questions
      regarding whether [he] spoke with anyone about [his] OPR interview, or theirs,
      with the intent to deceive DEA and evade the consequences for violating the
      [O]PR Confidentiality Agreement.” IAF, Tab 1 at 17. The NOPR explained that
      during the appellant’s first OPR interview on April 30, 2021, the appellant signed
      a confidentiality agreement prohibiting him from disclosing to anyone that he had
      been interviewed by OPR or that OPR was conducting an investigation into the
      meeting with the CS, that the agency later questioned the appellant about whether
      he had discussed the information from his OPR interview with anyone else or if
      anyone else discussed their OPR interview with him and that the appellant
      answered in the negative, and that the appellant’s statements that he did not
      violate the confidentiality agreement were false because RD Palmeri signed a
      sworn statement admitting that he and the appellant had discussed the appellant’s
      OPR interview. Id. at 17-18.
                                                                                      17

¶23        In the initial decision, the administrative judge thoroughly reviewed the
      NOPR and the testimony related to this charge, including the appellant’s and
      RD Palmeri’s testimony that RD Palmeri called the appellant on April 30, 2021,
      and directly asked him whether he had been interviewed by OPR, that the
      appellant responded affirmatively, and that no other details of the interview were
      discussed. ID at 16-19. She also noted that the appellant testified that he did not
      believe telling RD Palmeri about his OPR interview was a violation of the
      confidentiality agreement because RD Palmeri was his SES supervisor and
      employees are required to notify their supervisors when being interviewed by
      OPR; that he did not discuss the contents of his interview with anyone; and that
      he believed that he was providing truthful responses to OPR’s questions.        ID
      at 18-19. The administrative judge thereafter concluded that although there was
      no doubt that the appellant supplied incorrect information to OPR, he did not do
      so knowingly. ID at 19-20. The administrative judge credited the appellant’s
      testimony that he believed he was answering the OPR’s interview questions
      truthfully, including because his demeanor at the hearing was “straightforward
      without dissimulation” and his “testimony was direct and matter of fact with no
      pretense.” ID at 19. She also found that because the appellant informed his West
      Palm Beach supervisors that he had been interviewed by OPR, it was
      “understandable” that he believed he needed to inform RD Palmeri when directly
      asked, and because she credited the appellant’s testimony that he interpreted
      OPR’s questions as going to the content of his previous interviews rather than the
      mere fact that he was interviewed at all. ID at 19-20.
¶24        On review, the agency recognizes that the administrative judge made
      explicit demeanor-based credibility determinations with respect to this charge and
      that our reviewing court has held, as noted above, that the Board must defer to an
      administrative judge’s findings regarding credibility when those findings are
      based on the demeanor of the testifying witnesses and that it may overturn
      demeanor based credibility findings only if the Board has sufficiently sound
                                                                                      18

      reasons for doing so. Haebe, 288 F.3d at 1301; PFR File, Tab 1 at 20. Here, the
      administrative judge appropriately relied on the factors set forth in Hillen,
      35 M.S.P.R. at 458, to assess witness credibility and found the appellant to be
      credible. ID at 19. The agency does not challenge the administrative judge’s
      demeanor-based credibility findings, but instead argues that because the
      administrative judge’s two “remaining reasons” for finding that the appellant did
      not knowingly supply incorrect information are erroneous, her finding that the
      agency did not prove this charge is “untenable.”      PFR File, Tab 1 at 19-22.
      Nevertheless, the fact remains that the administrative judge’s conclusion is based
      on her demeanor-based credibility findings and that the agency has failed to
      provide a basis for disturbing those credibility findings. Therefore, we do not
      disturb the administrative judge’s determination that the agency did not prove the
      charge of false statement/documents.

      We discern no error in the administrative judge’s decision to mitigate the penalty
      to a letter of reprimand.
¶25        As discussed above, although the administrative judge did not sustain three
      of the agency’s charges, she did sustain the charge of failure to follow written or
      oral instructions, which alleged that the appellant failed to follow written
      instructions when he failed to prepare and submit a DEA-6 form documenting the
      February 25, 2021 debriefing within 10 business days of the debriefing. ID at 16;
      IAF, Tab 1 at 15. When, as here, not all of the agency’s charges are sustained,
      the Board will consider carefully whether the sustained charges warrant the
      penalty imposed by the agency. Blank v. Department of the Army, 85 M.S.P.R.
      443, ¶ 9 (2000), aff’d, 247 F.3d 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In doing so, the Board
      must first examine whether the agency has indicated either in its final decision or
      during proceedings before the Board that it desires a lesser penalty in the event
      not all of the charges are sustained. LaChance v. Devall, 178 F.3d 1246, 1260
      (Fed. Cir. 1999). If the agency has not so indicated, the Board may presume that
      the agency desires the maximum reasonable penalty and must examine whether
                                                                                         19

      the agency-imposed penalty is within the maximum limits of reasonableness. Id.
      The Board is ultimately required to independently balance the relevant Douglas
      factors with heightened sensitivity when reviewing agency penalties upon fewer
      charges than those brought by the agency. Id. at 1257; see Douglas v. Veterans
      Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981) (articulating a nonexhaustive list
      of 12 relevant factors to be considered in determining the appropriateness of an
      imposed penalty).
¶26        Here, the administrative judge reviewed the testimonial and documentary
      evidence and found that, although the deciding official testified that the failure to
      follow instructions charge was the least serious charge, the agency never stated
      that it desired that a lesser penalty be imposed if only one of the four charges was
      sustained. ID at 22; HT at 154 (testimony of S. Sutherland). The administrative
      judge therefore reviewed the penalty determination to determine whether removal
      was the maximum reasonable penalty for the single, sustained charge. 4 ID at 22.
      The administrative judge discussed S. Sutherland’s testimony that the appellant’s
      failure to timely submit a DEA-6 form was serious because that form documents
      not only the contents of the interview but the fact that it occurred, and the fact
      that he did not credit the fact that RD Palmeri instructed the appellant to delay
      preparing the DEA-6 form until after the appellant completed language school
      and could return to the CS for a follow-up interview.         ID at 22.    While the
      administrative judge acknowledged the agency’s need to keep timely and accurate
      records, she concluded that S. Sutherland’s assessment of the charge was
      erroneous because he did not consider as mitigating the fact that an SES directed
      the appellant not to submit a report at the time of the February 25 debriefing and
      that the appellant eventually submitted a DEA-6 form memorializing the
      information obtained during the debriefing.      ID at 22-23.    The administrative
      judge concluded that considering the appellant had no prior disciplinary record
      4
        In the initial decision, the administrative judge stated that her analysis turned on
      “whether demotion was in fact the maximum reasonable penalty,” instead of removal,
      however this seems to be a simple editing error. ID at 22 (emphasis added).
                                                                                       20

      and a good performance, removal was beyond the maximum reasonable penalty
      based on the sustained charge and that mitigation to a letter of reprimand was
      warranted. ID at 23.
¶27        On review, the agency argues that the administrative judge erred in
      mitigating the penalty because the record shows that the RD Palmeri never
      directed the appellant not to submit a DEA-6 form, and instead only directed him
      to conduct a full debrief of the CS when he was done with language school, and
      because the appellant’s later-submitted DEA-6 report did not mention the actual
      February 25 meeting and such information was needed to verify that the interview
      actually occurred. PFR File, Tab 1 at 22-23. However, the administrative judge
      considered all of these points in the initial decision.    ID at 16, 22-23.     The
      agency’s arguments again disagree with the administrative judge’s evaluation of
      the evidence, which provides no basis for granting its petition for review.     See
      Broughton, 33 M.S.P.R. at 359.
¶28        The agency also argues that the administrative judge “abused her
      discretion” and erred in her application of the law in mitigating the penalty
      because she did not indicate that she balanced the Douglas factors and she did not
      express how she concluded that a letter of reprimand was warranted. PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 23.   Contrary to the agency’s assertion, however, the administrative
      judge explicitly discussed Douglas and recited the list of factors to be determined
      in considering the appropriateness of the penalty. ID at 21-22. In her penalty
      analysis, the administrative judge also explicitly considered Douglas factors such
      as the nature and seriousness of the offense, the appellant’s past disciplinary
      record, the appellant’s past work record and his performance on the job, and
      numerous mitigating circumstances surrounding the charge.         ID at 22-23; see
      Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 305.      The agency has not pointed us to any specific
      Douglas factor that is especially relevant here that the administrative judge failed
      to consider or that supports a different penalty.     PFR File, Tab 1 at 23; see
                                                                                          21

      Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 306 (explaining that not all of the 12 factors will be
      pertinent in every case).
¶29         To the extent the agency suggests that a more severe penalty is warranted
      and contends that the administrative judge only presented a cursory analysis in
      deciding that a letter of reprimand was appropriate in this case, although we
      supplement the administrative judge’s penalty analysis herein, we are not
      persuaded that the administrative judge erred.       PFR File, Tab 1 at 22-23.       In
      addition to the Douglas factor findings above that the administrative judge
      properly discussed, we have considered, as did the deciding official, that the
      appellant has over 24 years of Federal service and 17 years of service as a Special
      Agent, that the appellant’s misconduct did not negatively affect the DEA’s
      reputation, and that a letter of reprimand is consistent with the agency’s table of
      penalties, which provides for a reprimand to removal for a first offense of failure
      to follow written or oral instructions. See Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 305-06; IAF,
      Tab 4 at 23-25. Although we note that the Board has long recognized that law
      enforcement officers are held to a higher standard of conduct than other
      employees, we find that here, the appellant’s singular failure to follow
      instructions in timely completing the DEA-6 form does not bear on his integrity,
      truthfulness, credibility, or ability to perform his duties at a satisfactory level, or
      indicate that he has a poor potential for rehabilitation. Cantu v. Department of
      the Treasury, 88 M.S.P.R. 253, ¶ 8 (2001); see Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 305-06;
      IAF, Tab 4 at 23-29. Upon balancing all of the relevant Douglas factors, we
      agree with the administrative judge’s decision to mitigate the penalty to a letter of
      reprimand.

                                             ORDER
¶30         We ORDER the agency to cancel the removal action and substitute it with a
      letter of reprimand. See Kerr v. National Endowment for the Arts , 726 F.2d 730
                                                                                        22

      (Fed. Cir. 1984). The agency must complete this action no later than 20 days
      after the date of this decision.
¶31         We also ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the correct amount of back
      pay, interest on back pay, and other benefits under the Office of Personnel
      Management’s regulations, no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this
      decision. We ORDER the appellant to cooperate in good faith in the agency’s
      efforts to calculate the amount of back pay, interest, and benefits due, and to
      provide all necessary information the agency requests to help it carry out the
      Board’s Order. If there is a dispute about the amount of back pay, interest due,
      and/or other benefits, we ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the undisputed
      amount no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this decision.
¶32         We further ORDER the agency to tell the appellant promptly in writing
      when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the actions it has
      taken to carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant, if not notified, should ask
      the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b).
¶33         No later than 30 days after the agency tells the appellant that it has fully
      carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement
      with the office that issued the initial decision on this appeal if the appellant
      believes that the agency did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition
      should contain specific reasons why the appellant believes that the agency has not
      fully carried out the Board’s Order, and should include the dates and results of
      any communications with the agency. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).
¶34         For agencies whose payroll is administered by either the National Finance
      Center of the Department of Agriculture (NFC) or the Defense Finance and
      Accounting Service (DFAS), two lists of the information and documentation
      necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from a Board decision
      are attached. The agency is ORDERED to timely provide DFAS or NFC with all
      documentation necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from the
                                                                                     23

Board’s decision in accordance with the attached lists so that payment can be
made within the 60-day period set forth above.

                 NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
                       YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST
                      ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
      You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney
fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set forth at Title 5 of
the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The
regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203. If
you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees
and costs WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION.
You must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the office that issued
the initial decision on your appeal.

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Boards final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.      You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file

5
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                      24

within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
                                                                                 25

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC    review    of   cases   involving   a   claim   of
discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.    5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.         See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                                                                                     26

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the    Whistleblower      Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 6   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

6
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                27

      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

FOR THE BOARD:                        ______________________________
                                      Gina K. Grippando
                                      Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C
                                 DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE
                                           Civilian Pay Operations

                          DFAS BACK PAY CHECKLIST
The following documentation is required by DFAS Civilian Pay to compute and pay back pay
pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805. Human resources/local payroll offices should use the following
checklist to ensure a request for payment of back pay is complete. Missing documentation may
substantially delay the processing of a back pay award. More information may be found at:
https://wss.apan.org/public/DFASPayroll/Back%20Pay%20Process/Forms/AllItems.aspx.

NOTE: Attorneys’ fees or other non-wage payments (such as damages) are paid by
vendor pay, not DFAS Civilian Pay.

☐ 1) Submit a “SETTLEMENT INQUIRY - Submission” Remedy Ticket. Please identify the
       specific dates of the back pay period within the ticket comments.

Attach the following documentation to the Remedy Ticket, or provide a statement in the ticket
comments as to why the documentation is not applicable:

☐ 2) Settlement agreement, administrative determination, arbitrator award, or order.

☐ 3) Signed and completed “Employee Statement Relative to Back Pay”.

☐ 4) All required SF50s (new, corrected, or canceled). ***Do not process online SF50s
       until notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***

☐ 5) Certified timecards/corrected timecards. ***Do not process online timecards until
       notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***

☐ 6) All relevant benefit election forms (e.g. TSP, FEHB, etc.).

☐ 7) Outside earnings documentation. Include record of all amounts earned by the employee
       in a job undertaken during the back pay period to replace federal employment.
       Documentation includes W-2 or 1099 statements, payroll documents/records, etc. Also,
       include record of any unemployment earning statements, workers’ compensation,
       CSRS/FERS retirement annuity payments, refunds of CSRS/FERS employee premiums,
       or severance pay received by the employee upon separation.

Lump Sum Leave Payment Debts: When a separation is later reversed, there is no authority
under 5 U.S.C. § 5551 for the reinstated employee to keep the lump sum annual leave payment
they may have received. The payroll office must collect the debt from the back pay award. The
annual leave will be restored to the employee. Annual leave that exceeds the annual leave
ceiling will be restored to a separate leave account pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805(g).
NATIONAL FINANCE CENTER CHECKLIST FOR BACK PAY CASES
Below is the information/documentation required by National Finance Center to process
payments/adjustments agreed on in Back Pay Cases (settlements, restorations) or as ordered by
the Merit Systems Protection Board, EEOC, and courts.
1. Initiate and submit AD-343 (Payroll/Action Request) with clear and concise information
   describing what to do in accordance with decision.
2. The following information must be included on AD-343 for Restoration:
       a.   Employee name and social security number.
       b.   Detailed explanation of request.
       c.   Valid agency accounting.
       d.   Authorized signature (Table 63).
       e.   If interest is to be included.
       f.   Check mailing address.
       g.   Indicate if case is prior to conversion. Computations must be attached.
       h.   Indicate the amount of Severance and Lump Sum Annual Leave Payment to be
            collected (if applicable).
Attachments to AD-343
1. Provide pay entitlement to include Overtime, Night Differential, Shift Premium, Sunday
   Premium, etc. with number of hours and dates for each entitlement (if applicable).
2. Copies of SF-50s (Personnel Actions) or list of salary adjustments/changes and amounts.
3. Outside earnings documentation statement from agency.
4. If employee received retirement annuity or unemployment, provide amount and address to
   return monies.
5. Provide forms for FEGLI, FEHBA, or TSP deductions. (if applicable)
6. If employee was unable to work during any or part of the period involved, certification of the
   type of leave to be charged and number of hours.
7. If employee retires at end of Restoration Period, provide hours of Lump Sum Annual Leave
   to be paid.
NOTE: If prior to conversion, agency must attach Computation Worksheet by Pay Period and
required data in 1-7 above.
The following information must be included on AD-343 for Settlement Cases: (Lump Sum
Payment, Correction to Promotion, Wage Grade Increase, FLSA, etc.)
       a. Must provide same data as in 2, a-g above.
       b. Prior to conversion computation must be provided.
       c. Lump Sum amount of Settlement, and if taxable or non-taxable.
If you have any questions or require clarification on the above, please contact NFC’s
Payroll/Personnel Operations at 504-255-4630.