Court Opinion

ID: 9787884
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:27:01.88285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:02.047162
License: Public Domain

*460DAVIS, Judge
(dissenting):
{10 As the majority opinion correctly points out, Mother refused to relocate and, accordingly, Father has had custody of the children since August 2007. Thus, "the facts ... have materially changed regarding which parent is the children's primary caregiver," see supra note 2, and reversal would have little, if any, effect on Mother's ability to obtain a change of custody. Moreover, I agree that Mother has failed to challenge the trial court's factual findings. Notwithstanding these considerations, I respectfully dissent.
T11 In my view, the trial court's order requiring Mother to relocate or relinquish custody of the children sets bad precedent for two reasons. First, the trial court failed to give proper weight to Mother's long-term status as the children's primary caregiver. Second, there are other remedies available for visitation violations besides removing the children from the offending parent's custody. See 24A Am.Jur.2d Divorcee and Separation § 897 (2008) ("The ordinary method of enforcing custody and visitation rights is a contempt proceeding."); of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.9(9) (2007) ("Failure to comply with a provision of the parenting plan or a child support order may result in a finding of contempt of court."); Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, ¶ 29, 217 P.3d 733 (upholding trial court's determination that the wife was in contempt of court for failing to follow the court's visitation order).
T12 In determining whether a change of custody is in a child's best interests, trial courts consider a variety of factors, and the weight to be given to these various factors "ranges from the possibly relevant to the critically important. At the critically important end of the spectrum, when the child is thriving, happy, and well-adjusted, lies continuity of placement." Hudema v. Carpenter, 1999 UT App 290, ¶ 26, 989 P.2d 491 (emphasis added). Indeed, "[in considering competing claims to custody between fit parents . considerable weight should be given to which parent has been the child's primary caregiver." Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1988) (emphasis added); see also Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 1986) (stating that decisive factors in child custody determinations should include "the identity of the primary caretaker during the marriage"); Paryzek v. Paryzek, 776 P.2d 78, 82 (Utah Ct.App.1989) ("[In custody determinations, trial courts must examine a child's need for stability, and therefore, consider prior custody arrangements, including the duration of those arrangements, and the potential harm to the child if the arrangement is changed."). Accordingly, "a lengthy custody arrangement in which a child has thrived ought rarely, if at all, to be disturbed, and then only if the cireumstances are compelling." Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599, 604 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added).
113 Here, in considering the petition to modify the divorcee decree, the trial court failed to give any weight, let alone considerable weight, see Davis, 749 P.2d at 648, to the fact that Mother had been the children's primary caretaker their entire lives-both during the marriage and following the divoree. Instead, the trial court focused exclusively on Mother's role as primary caregiver after the move to Louisiana: "[Mother] hals] been the 'children's primary care giver and she appears to do a good job of meeting their basic needs. However, the Court does not put much weight on the determination that [Mother] is the primary care giver because her being in Louisiana necessitates this fact." (Emphasis added.) Rather than focusing only on the time in Louisiana, case law required the trial court to consider Mother's role as primary caregiver during the marriage, following the divorce, and during the pendency of the change of custody determination. See Davis, 749 P.2d at 648; see also Pusey, 728 P.2d at 120. The trial court's failure to do so, in my view, constitutes an abuse of its discretion.
1 14 Moreover, Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908 (Utah Ct.App.1995)-the case relied upon by the majority for the proposition that interference with visitation is a compelling cireum-stance that outweighs the primary caregiver factor in determining a change of custody-is *461distinguishable from this case in two important respects. First, in Sigg the mother obstructed the father's visitation with his children in egregious ways simply not present in this case.1 See id. 905 P.2d at 910-11. Second, the child custody evaluator in Sigg "recommended, both in her report and during trial testimony, that it would be in the best interests of the children to transfer custody to [the father]." Id. (emphasis added). In contrast, the child eustody evaluator in this case testified, "I would not remove the children from [Mother]. I'm opposed to that. So I'm not talking about leaving mom in Louisiana and having the kids come here. I do not support that." Because Sigg is distinguishable from the instant case, it has minimal application here. Rather, I believe Larson v. Larson, 888 P.2d 719 (Utah Ct.App.1994), is more analytically appropriate to determine whether there were compelling circumstances that outweighed Mother's lengthy primary caregiver status.
15 In any event, there are other remedies available if one parent is obstructing the other parent's visitation in violation of the terms of the divorcee decree. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-8-10.9(9); 24A Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation § 897. Under the facts of this case, forcing Mother to relocate or lose custody notwithstanding her lengthy primary caregiver status seems unnecessarily drastic.
16 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.

. For example, the mother moved with the children to New Zealand without ever informing the father of the move; in fact, the father had to eventually hire a private investigator to locate the children. See Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 910-11 (Utah Ct.App.1995). Once in New Zealand, the children were only allowed to speak to their father once on the phone and subsequent phone calls with him "were thwarted." Id. at 911. Additionally, during a five-week stay in New Zea-land to see the children, the father was allowed only one two-hour supervised visit and was otherwise prevented from seeing them. See id.