Court Opinion

ID: 9743446
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:33:40.056145+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:41.319331
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RAKOWSKI, dissenting: The majority agrees that a bond signed John E. Bradley, attorney at law for First Chicago, would not invoke jurisdiction pursuant to section 19(f)(1). Can it be, then, that a bond signed First Chicago by John E. Bradley is somehow sufficient? For the reasons that follow, the answer is no. Pursuant to section 19(f)(1), a party seeking judicial review of an Industrial Commission decision must file a written request for summons in the circuit court within 20 days of receipt of notice of decision. If an employer, other than certain enumerated governmental entities, is seeking review, it must additionally file a bond “conditioned that if he shall not successfully prosecute the review, he will pay the award and the costs of the proceedings.” 820 ILCS 305/19(0(2) (West 1996). Like the request for summons, the bond must be filed within the 20-day period. Because the bond requirement is statutory, strict compliance is required to vest subject-matter jurisdiction in the circuit court. Berryman Equipment, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 79. The definite and short period of time to secure review in the circuit court is obviously for the purpose of securing a speedy determination of all litigation. 3 T. Angerstein, Illinois Workers’ Compensation § 2118, at 15 (1952); City of Chicago v. Industrial Comm’n, 63 Ill. 2d 99, 103 (1976). The legislative intent is that the bond provide protection to the claimant (Celeste v. Industrial Comm’n, 205 Ill. App. 3d 423, 426 (1990)), by providing a fund from which the judgment will be paid and a short period of time in which the employer may perfect review in the circuit court. I. IDENTITY OF INDIVIDUAL SIGNING BOND Recently, in Berryman Equipment, we held that to allow an attorney to sign a bond without requiring the attorney’s written authority to bind the principal would circumvent the effect of the rulings in Deichmueller and Illinois Armored Car. Berryman Equipment, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 78-79. The rationale is that it is unlikely that a reasonable person would assume that an attorney hired to defend a workers’ compensation claim would have the authority to obligate the corporation financially. “Decisions relating to a corporation’s financial obligations are typically reserved for corporate officers and directors, not for attorneys representing the corporation.” Illinois Armored Car, 205 Ill. App. 3d at 999. In the instant case, the record and the bond are devoid of any evidence regarding the identity of John E. Bradley. We do not know if he is employed by First Chicago or, if he is, whether he is an officer, director, or has authority to bind the corporation in financial matters. The majority simply presumes that Bradley is not an attorney at law and states that this fact is decisive. According to the majority, as long as Bradley is not an attorney, there is no need for the bond to contain evidence that he had authority to bind First Chicago. Although all of the cases this court has reviewed regarding authority to sign bonds have involved attorneys, the rule is not so limited as is evidenced by our statement in Deichmueller: “[i]f it is not evident that the respondent is obligated by the bond during the 20-day filing period, the purpose of the bond, that a claimant has a method of collecting on an award against the respondent, is defeated, and strict compliance with the statute has not been met.” Deichmueller, 215 Ill. App. 3d at 276, rev’d on other grounds, 151 Ill. 2d 413, 416 (1992) (supreme court adopted conclusions and reasoning of appellate court). In accord with this reasoning, I submit that the rule, in a corporate context, should be that unless the bond is signed by an officer or director, i.e., someone who customarily has authority to bind the corporation in financial matters (see Illinois Armored Car, 205 Ill. App. 3d at 999), then the authority of the party signing the bond must accompany the bond. Whether that person is an employee of the corporation, a nonemployee-agent, or an attorney is without significance. As long as the authority of the person to bind the corporation is evident on the face of the bond, the purpose and spirit of the rule are satisfied — that it was reasonably evident from the face of the bond that it is signed on behalf of the corporation by someone with authority. Such a rule would protect the claimant by ensuring a valid bond to pay the award. Moreover, a rule that only attorneys must supply evidence of authority defies logic. I repeat, the purpose of the rule is that reasonable people, who are familiar with pertinent business practices, would reasonably believe, from the face of the bond, that the person signing on behalf of the corporation had the authority to bind and, thus, the bond is valid. In Illinois Armored Car, Deichmueller, and Berryman Equipment, the employers argued that it is reasonable to assume that the attorney had authority to bind the corporation to a bond. They reasoned that the attorney was hired to defend the corporation on a workers’ compensation claim and to seek judicial review in the circuit court. Because it is incumbent upon an employer seeking judicial review to file a bond, it is only reasonable that one would assume that the attorney had authority to sign the bond. In each case, however, we rejected this argument. We stated that the issue was not whether the person had authority. Rather, the proper inquiry was whether the authority was evident from the face of the bond. Thus, despite a cogent argument that an employer’s attorney would have authority, we nonetheless held that reasonable people would not expect the attorney to have the authority to bind the corporation in financial matters. Turning to the instant case, there is nothing on the face of the bond that would lead a reasonable person to believe that John E. Bradley has authority to bind First Chicago financially. We do not know his relationship, if any, with First Chicago. Is he an employee? Is he an officer? Does he have authority? There is not a clue. Assume, arguendo, that Bradley is an attorney and signs the bond John E. Bradley, attorney. The appeal must be dismissed without hearing. Yet, if Bradley omits his title and simply signs John E. Bradley, the trial court must conduct a hearing regarding his authority. Such a rule serves no rational purpose. II. EVIDENCE OF AUTHORITY OUTSIDE THE 20-DAY PERIOD I strongly disagree with the majority’s position that evidence of authority submitted after the expiration of the 20-day statutory period in section 19(f)(1) may be considered by the trial court so long as the person signing on behalf of the principal is not an attorney. The majority does not cite, nor can I find, any authority to support such a proposition. The majority reasons that because other cases involving attorneys signing bonds on behalf of employers allowed evidence of authority to be submitted subsequent to the expiration of the 20-day period, First Chicago should also be permitted to present evidence of Mr. Bradley’s status as an officer. Although it is true that in Deichmueller, Berryman Equipment, and Illinois Armored Car the employer either submitted or attempted to submit evidence of the attorney’s authority subsequent to the expiration of the 20-day period, in each case such authority was held to be without legal effect. “The failure to demonstrate this authority until after the statutory period expired does not meet the strict compliance standard required for circuit court review of Industrial Commission cases.” Illinois Armored Car, 205 Ill. App. 3d at 998, citing Arrington v. Industrial Comm’n, 96 Ill. 2d 505 (1983). In Deichmueller, we stated “[n]othing in the record at the time of the filing of the bond or during the 20-day time frame for filing appeal documents indicated that Deichmueller’s attorney had the authority, either actual or implied, to obligate Deichmueller to pay the bond.” Deichmueller, 215 Ill. App. 3d at 275. Accord Berryman Equipment, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 77-78. Rather than support the majority’s position, these cases clearly say that the trial court may not consider evidence filed subsequent to the 20-day jurisdictional period in section (19)(a)(l). The majority also places significant reliance on Lee v. Industrial Comm’n, 82 Ill. 2d 496 (1980), in support of its position. Lee, however, did not involve the authority of a person signing on behalf of a corporation, did not involve subject-matter jurisdiction of the circuit court and, accordingly, has no relevance whatsoever to the instant case. In Lee, an employer seeking circuit court review of an Industrial Commission decision filed a bond signed by one partner as principal and signed by the other partner as surety. The claimant moved to dismiss on the ground the partners were improperly acting in both capacities and that a bond in proper form was jurisdictional. The motion was allowed and the respondent’s subsequent tender of a bond with two partners as principals and a third person as a surety was refused. In reversing, the supreme court noted that the trial court relied upon Coultas v. Industrial Comm’n, 31 Ill. 2d 527 (1964), where it held that a bond not signed by the party against whom the award had been entered was insufficient to confer jurisdiction in the circuit court. The supreme court noted that Lee was different in that one of the partners/respondents did sign the original bond. The court also distinguished Peter H. Clark Lodge No. 483 v. Industrial Comm’n, 48 Ill. 2d 64 (1971) (no receipt of payment produced and exhibited), and Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 74 Ill. 2d 269 (1979) (failure to file a bond), because those cases, like Coultas, involved issues that deprived the trial court of jurisdiction. As such, the court concluded that all three cases were inapposite because they involved subject-matter jurisdiction. Instead, the Lee court relied on Smith v. Estate of Womack, 12 Ill. 2d 315 (1957), where it held a filing requirement to be nonjurisdictional, and Republic Steel Corp. v. Industrial Comm’n, 30 Ill. 2d 311 (1964), where it held that the circuit court’s failure to approve the bond in writing did not deprive it of jurisdiction. It is crystal clear in Lee that the supreme court held that a bond defect (improper surety) was not jurisdictional because the bond was signed by the partner who actually and presumptively had authority to bind the partnership. This is clearly evident from the concluding paragraph of the opinion where the court states “in accordance with the tenor of these cases [{Smith and Republic Steel — cases not involving subject-matter jurisdiction)], *** the trial court should have proceeded to determine the sufficiency of the bond tendered in connection with the post-trial motion.” Lee, 82 Ill. 2d at 501. Unlike the defect in Lee, the issue of a party’s authority to bind the corporation is clearly jurisdictional. Berryman Equipment, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 77-78; Deichmueller, 215 Ill. App. 3d at 276; Illinois Armored Car, 205 Ill. App. 3d at 996. Rather than supporting the majority’s position, Lee is to the contrary. By rejecting Coultas, Peter H. Clark Lodge No. 483, and Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., and relying on cases not involving subject-matter jurisdiction, the court clearly implies that the trial court would have been without subject-matter jurisdiction had the partner signing the bond been without authority. Until today, the rule was unambiguous. In order to vest the trial court with subject-matter jurisdiction over an appeal, an employer must file a bond within 20 days. Further, it must be apparent from the face of the bond that the signor has authority to bind the corporation financially. Thus, this division has consistently held that unless the bond is signed by an officer, or director (one who presumptively has authority), a statement of authority is necessary. Under this rule, subject-matter jurisdiction is easily determined by simply looking at the bond. Under the majority’s rule, however, a bond may be signed by anyone, so long as he does not say he is an attorney. Then, after expiration of the 20-day statutory period, the corporation may furnish the circuit court with supplemental material regarding the signor’s authority. A determination of subject-matter jurisdiction which previously took 20 days is now extended some unknown period. I respectfully submit that the old rule is simple and easy to apply. The majority rule will cause delay, uncertainty, and increased expense. . For the aforementioned reasons, I would affirm the trial court’s determination that it was without subject-matter jurisdiction. HOLDRIDGE, J., joins in this dissent.