Court Opinion

ID: 9392203
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-04 16:01:01.316164+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:34.164458
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                      For the First Circuit

No. 21-1937

                    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Appellee,

                                v.

                      HIRAM JOSÉ RUIZ-VALLE,

                      Defendant, Appellant.

          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

        [Hon. Jay A. García-Gregory, U.S. District Judge]

                              Before

                    Gelpí, Lynch and Thompson,
                         Circuit Judges.

     Joanna E. LeRoy, Research & Writing Attorney, with whom Eric
Alexander Vos, Federal Public Defender, Franco L. Pérez-Redondo,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Supervisor, Appeals Division,
Jackson B. Whetsel, Assistant Public Defender, and Kevin E. Lerman,
Research & Writing Attorney, were on brief, for appellant.
     David C. Bornstein, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, and Mariana E.
Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate
Division, were on brief, for appellee.

                           May 4, 2023
           GELPÍ, Circuit Judge.          In 2016, Hiram José Ruiz-Valle

("Ruiz-Valle") pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a

firearm,   in   violation   of   18   U.S.C.   §§ 922(g)(1),    924(a)(2).

Following his initial release from prison, Ruiz-Valle's supervised

release has been revoked four times.

           Ruiz-Valle now appeals his latest revocation sentence on

the ground that the district court erred by imposing in violation

of   18    U.S.C.   § 3583(e)(3)      a     twenty-four-month    term   of

reimprisonment, and, by further imposing in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(h) a twelve-month term of supervised release to follow.1

     1 We quote these statutes at some length because their terms
are of significance to the disposition of the issue before us.
     Section 3583(e)(3) provides that a district court may "revoke
a term of supervised release, and require the defendant to serve
in prison all or part of the term of supervised release" upon a
finding "by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
violated a condition of supervised release."     But it also says
(emphasis ours) that
          a defendant whose term is revoked under this
          paragraph may not be required to serve on any
          such revocation more than 5 years in prison if
          the offense that resulted in the term of
          supervised release is a class A felony, more
          than 3 years in prison if such offense is a
          class B felony, more than 2 years in prison if
          such offense is a class C or D felony, or more
          than one year in any other case.
Section 3583(h) states that when a supervised-release term "is
revoked and the defendant is required to serve a term of
imprisonment that is less than the maximum term of imprisonment
authorized under subsection (e)(3), the court may include a
requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised
release after imprisonment." But it also states (emphasis ours)
that "[t]he length of such a term of supervised release shall not
exceed the term of supervised release authorized by statute for

                                  - 2 -
Moreover,    he    argues      that   § 3583(e)(3)        is    unconstitutional    as

applied to him.

            We affirm the sentence of reimprisonment imposed upon

revocation;       however,     vacate   the     subsequent        supervised-release

term.

I.      BACKGROUND

            Ruiz-Valle pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a

convicted     felon,      in    violation       of   18        U.S.C.    §§ 922(g)(1),

924(a)(2).       This offense carried a ten-year maximum imprisonment

sentence,2 and is a Class C felony per 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(3) --

for which the maximum supervised-release term is 36 months per 18

U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2). The district court ultimately sentenced Ruiz-

Valle to an eighteen-month term of imprisonment, followed by a

three-year supervised-release term.

            We     next   summarize      the    disposition         of    Ruiz-Valle's

sentences following his multiple supervised release revocations.

the offense that resulted in the original term of supervised
release, less any term of imprisonment that was imposed upon
revocation of supervised release."
     The importance of the highlighted language will be addressed
later.
     2 References and citations to section 924(a)(2) in this

opinion are to the provision as it existed at the time of
Ruiz-Valle's charged conduct.   These provisions have since been
amended by the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act, Pub. L. No.
117-159, § 12004, 136 Stat. 1313, 1329 (2022), which transposed
the penalty provision for section 922(g) from section 924(a)(2) to
924(a)(8), providing for a longer maximum period of imprisonment.
See United States v. Minor, 63 F.4th 112, 118 n.4 (1st Cir. 2023)
(en banc).

                                        - 3 -
Given that the first three of these are not the subject of this

appeal, we only indicate the outcome of each without tarrying into

further detail.

             Ruiz-Valle's first revocation, in January 2019, resulted

in reimprisonment of six months along with a new supervised-release

term of three years.          His second revocation, in October 2019,

resulted in another six-month imprisonment term plus two years of

supervised release.          The third revocation, in December 2020,

resulted in ten months imprisonment and two years of supervised

release.

             Ruiz-Valle was released from prison in May 2021.                   By

then   and   upon   completion     of    his     third   revocation      sentence,

Ruiz-Valle had collectively served twenty-two months in prison for

his several violations.       In August 2021, the U.S. Probation Office

sought his arrest for new supervised-release violations, to wit,

testing positive for cocaine use, failing to comply with his drug-

testing condition, failing to appear at his counseling sessions,

and    breaching    his    family's     peace    as   charged   in   a    criminal

complaint.

             At his fourth revocation hearing , defense counsel told

the    district    court   that   he    saw     "three   possible"    sentencing

"solutions" to Ruiz-Valle's latest supervised-release infractions:

(1) "four months" in prison and "more treatment," (2) "two years"

in prison and "no more supervision," or (3) "one year" in prison

                                       - 4 -
and   "no    further   supervision."          Ruiz-Valle's   sentencing      memo

requested option (1).          But at the hearing his lawyer requested a

"one year" prison sentence, with "no further supervision."                     In

defense counsel's view, sentencing Ruiz-Valle to two years in

prison -- after his client had already served twenty-two months in

prison on his earlier revocations -- would be "excessive."                 But he

also said that "before you would accumulate" already-served prison

"time, now you don't accumulate" it.

              Opposing the defense's request, the government stated

that it did not want Ruiz-Valle out "in a year" because he had "no

interest in rehabilitating himself" and so releasing him too soon

might lead to a "negative outcome."

             The district court classified Ruiz-Valle's violations as

Grade C and his Criminal History Category as II, and calculated an

advisory sentencing range of four to ten months imprisonment.                 The

court, however, varied upward and imposed the statutory maximum

sentence of two years in prison followed by one additional year of

supervised release.

             Ruiz-Valle objected to the sentence imposed, arguing it

was    procedurally     and    substantively     unreasonable.        He   first

insisted that the district court "cannot impose supervision after

it    imposes   [the]     statutory     maximum"     because    the   sentence

"exceeds . . . what is allowed by law" and offends "due process."

He    next   claimed    that    the   statutory-maximum      prison   term   was

                                      - 5 -
"excessive" and that "the lack of accumulation of the . . . prior

sentences imposing revocation, again, violated his right to have

a final sentence that is limited to the statutory maximum of . .

. imprisonment on a revocation."             He added that "any sentence over

a total accumulated of 24 months . . . should not be allowed."

And he concluded that "any sentence over a total accumulated of

twenty-four months . . . should not be allowed.

              The district court noted Ruiz-Valle's post-sentence

objections.     The government took no position as to the same.                 Ruiz-

Valle timely appealed.

II.    DISCUSSION

             Ruiz-Valle asserts that the district court erred under

§ 3583(e)(3)         by      imposing    a      twenty-four-month        term     of

reimprisonment without deducting the cumulative prison time served

for   all    four    violations.        Alternatively,    he    argues    that    if

§ 3583(e)(3)        indeed    authorizes     his   current     twenty-four-month

prison term, the same is unconstitutional.               He then claims that

the district court could not impose the new twelve-month term of

supervised release under § 3583(h).                 We address each argument

seriatim.

            A. REIMPRISONMENT UPON REVOCATION

             Section 3583(e)(3) pertinently provides (emphasis ours)

that "[a] defendant whose term is revoked under this paragraph may

not be required to serve on any such revocation more than . . . 2

                                        - 6 -
years in prison if such offense is a class C . . . felony."                        As

Ruiz-Valle sees it, the district court had to -- but did not --

"subtract the aggregate length of prior imprisonment terms imposed

upon       revocation    of    supervised      release     when   calculating    the

statutory maximum" for his last revocation.

               A dicta of ours indicates that Congress's 2003 addition

of the phrase "on any such revocation" meant that the provision's

statutory caps on post-revocation prison terms apply "afresh” to

each new revocation.             See United States v. Tapia-Escalera, 356

F.3d 181, 185-86, 188 (1st Cir. 2004).3 And "every court of appeals

to consider" whether the statutory caps reset with each new

revocation "has determined" that the 2003 amendment abolishes "the

credit       for   terms        of     imprisonment      resulting    from      prior

revocations."      United States v. Sears, 32 F.4th 569, 574 (6th Cir.

2022) (quotation marks omitted and collecting cases from the

Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits);

see also United States v. Cunningham, 800 F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th

Cir. 2015) (per curiam) ("hold[ing], as have each of the circuits

that have examined the question, that upon each revocation of

supervised release a defendant may be sentenced to the felony class

limits       contained        within    §     3583(e)(3)    without    regard     to

       Such statement is dicta because Tapia-Escalera addressed
       3

the proper reading of § 3583(e)(3)'s pre-2003 text. See id. at
188.

                                            - 7 -
imprisonment       previously   served    for   revocation        of   supervised

release").

              Ruiz-Valle responds with page after page of argument

that the district court (and those other circuits, apparently)

erred    by   misunderstanding     §    3583(e)(3)'s      text,    context,    and

legislative history -- committing a constitutional error to boot.

But the insurmountable problem for him is that he waived these

arguments     by   arguing   the   opposite     below.4      Noting     that   the

"statutory maximum" prison sentence for his revocation was "2

years", Ruiz-Valle repeatedly told the district court that it could

give him the maximum term.         He did say that a new prison term of

"two years after he's already served 22 months in other revocations

. . . could be excessive" -- a claim he made after discussing his

personal issues.       But he conceded that he could not "accumulate"

against the statutory maximum the "time" he had already spent in

prison on the prior revocations. And by telling the district court

that it could sentence him to 24 months in prison on his current

revocation, he waived any claim that the court could not do so --

on either statutory or constitutional grounds.              See United States

v. Chen, 998 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2021) (explaining that a party

waives an issue by "purposefully abandon[ing] it, either expressly

     4 The Federal Public Defender for the District of Puerto Rico
has represented Ruiz-Valle before the district court and now before
us.

                                       - 8 -
or by taking a contrary position" in the district court); see id.

(adding that "[a]n issue may also be waived if counsel's own

conduct invited the [district court's] ruling") see also United

States v. Gates, 709 F.3d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 2013) (emphasizing that

"a party cannot concede an issue in the district court and later,

on appeal, attempt to repudiate that concession and resurrect the

issue").

             Arguing against this conclusion, Ruiz-Valle reads his

counsel's      later    statements        as     preserving       these       error

claims-- statements      like    the       "lack     of     accumulation         of

the . . . prior sentences imposing revocation, again, violated his

right to have a final sentence that is limited to the statutory

maximum    of . . . imprisonment     on    a    revocation"      and   that    "any

sentence over a total accumulated of 24 months . . . should not be

allowed."    We are unconvinced.

             Counsel did not develop this "lack of accumulation" and

"total accumulated" statements into an objection that the court

could not impose the 24-month prison term.                And counsel's words

are not specific enough to preserve the error claims, particularly

since   he   conceded   just    moments        earlier    that   he    could    not

"accumulate" against the maximum term the "time" he had served in

prison on his prior revocations.               What is more, one can read

counsel's statements as saying the district court could not impose

supervised release after sentencing Ruiz-Valle to that prison

                                   - 9 -
term.   All of which cuts against Ruiz-Valle's preservation theory.

That is because these statements were not "sufficiently specific

to call to the district court's attention" that the prison term

violated    § 3583(e)(3).   See United States v. Espinoza-Roque, 26

F.4th 32, 36 (1st Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted).         And

"[i]ssues not squarely raised in the district court will not be

entertained on appeal."     See United States v. Barnett, 989 F.2d

546, 554 (1st Cir. 1993) (emphasizing that "[j]udges are not

expected to be mindreaders" so "a litigant has obligation to spell

out his arguments squarely and distinctly or else forever hold his

peace" (quotation marks omitted)).       Ruiz-Valle also offers no

persuasive reason for relaxing the raise-or-waive rule (as it is

known).

            The bottom line is that Ruiz-Valle did not preserve any

argument -- statutory or constitutional -- regarding the district

court's sentence of imprisonment vis-a-vis § 3583(e)(3).      Hence

whatever views we may have on these precise issues must be left

for another case on another day.

           B. SUPERVISED RELEASE ON REVOCATION

            Section 3583(h) relevantly provides (emphasis ours) that

when the district court imposes a new term of supervised release

"after imprisonment" upon revocation, that term "shall not exceed

the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the

offense that resulted in the original term of supervised release,

                                - 10 -
less any term of imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation."

No one disputes that Ruiz-Valle's § 922(g)(1) violation is the

crime underlying his original supervised-release term; that this

violation is a Class C felony; and that the maximum authorized

supervised-release term for that crime was 36 months.              Because the

district court sentenced him to an "aggregate term of [46] months"

in prison on all his revocations, and because 46 months "exceeds"

36 months, Ruiz-Valle argues that the court "erred in imposing

additional supervision."

             Citing United States v. Maxwell, 285 F.3d 336 (4th Cir.

2002), the government in its brief "concedes that once the district

court sentenced Ruiz[-Valle] to 36 months of imprisonment on his

revocations in this case, the court erred under § 3583(h) by

imposing additional supervised release."             The government insists,

however,   that      Ruiz-Valle    invited    the   error   he   now   tries   to

challenge.    Cutting through the parties' thrust and parry, we note

that Ruiz-Valle argued -- ultimately and concisely -- for "no

further supervision"       and so reject the government's invited-error

theory.

             "[W]e    ordinarily    review    sentences     imposed    following

revocation of supervised release for abuse of discretion."                United

States v. Rodríguez-Meléndez, 828 F.3d 35, 38 (1st Cir. 2016).

However, in this instance, even under plain-error review (which is

                                     - 11 -
not defendant-friendly), Ruiz-Valle prevails.5     See United States

v. Tapia-Escalera, 356 F.3d 181, 183 (1st Cir. 2004).

          Every circuit to consider the question agrees that when

imposing a term of supervised release following revocation of a

previous term of supervised release, § 3583(h) requires that the

term be reduced by all post-revocation terms of imprisonment

imposed with respect to the same underlying offense.     See, e.g.,

United States v. Rodríguez, 775 F.3d 533, 537 (2d Cir. 2014);

United States v. Zoran, 682 F.3d 1060, 1063 (8th Cir. 2012); United

States v. Hernández, 655 F.3d 1193, 1198 (10th Cir. 2011); United

States v. Vera, 542 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 2008); Maxwell, 285

F.3d at 342.   The rationale is straightforward:

          When the word "any" is properly read in its
          § 3583(h) statutory context, Webster's Third
          New International Dictionary provides that the
          word "any" means "all."          Specifically,

     5 Plain-error review requires the appellant to show "(1) that
an error occurred (2) which was clear or obvious and which not
only (3) affected the [appellant's] substantial rights, but also
(4) seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings." United States v. Rivera, 51
F.4th 47, 51 (1st Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). Pointing
to United States v. Rivera-Carrasquillo, 933 F.3d 33, 55 (1st Cir.
2019), the government insists that Ruiz-Valle waived any plain-
error argument by not trying to satisfy his plain-error burden in
his opening brief.     But Ruiz-Valle argued there that he had
preserved the § 3583(h) issue below.     And after the government
challenged preservation, he argued in his reply brief that the
district court's error "is overwhelmingly plain" even if he had
forfeited the issue.    So Ruiz-Valle's case is very much unlike
Rivera-Carrasquillo, where the defendant "admitted[]" in his
opening   brief   that  plain-error   review   applied  but   then
inadequately briefed his plain-error theory. See 933 F.3d at 55-
56.

                              - 12 -
            Webster's Third New International Dictionary
            provides that when the word "any" is "used as
            a function word to indicate the maximum or
            whole of a number or quantity," for example,
            "give me [any] letters you find" and "he needs
            [any] help he can get," the word "any" means
            "all."   Here, the word "any" in the phrase
            "less any term of imprisonment that was
            imposed   upon   revocation    of   supervised
            release," § 3583(h) (emphasis added), is
            obviously used as a function word to indicate
            the maximum or whole of a number or quantity
            just as the word "any" is used in the
            dictionary examples quoted above.

Maxwell, 285 F.3d at 341 (some citations omitted).       "Thus, a plain

reading of the reference to 'any term of imprisonment' in the

statute must include the prison term in the current revocation

sentence together with all prison time served under any prior

revocation sentences imposed with respect to the same underlying

offense."     Rodríguez, 775 F.3d at 537. Speaking for the Tenth

Circuit,     then-Judge    (now-Justice)   Gorsuch     explained   that

§ 3583(h)'s "language -- left unamended in 2003 and thus quite

unlike § 3583(e)(3) -- does (expressly) require a district court

to aggregate and credit all prior prison terms when determining

the maximum amount of supervised release it can impose for any

revocation."     See Hernández, 655 F.3d at 1198 (second emphasis

added).     "So as a defendant serves . . . more time in prison for

each revocation, a district court can impose         . . . less time on

supervised release."      Id.

                                - 13 -
            The     government's        main     response     is     that     absent

controlling cases on his side (from the First Circuit or Supreme

Court, which all agree he does not have), Ruiz-Valle must show

that his reading of § 3583(h) "is compelled by the statute's

language itself."         See United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 480

F.3d 62, 70 (1st Cir. 2007).             The government thinks that he has

not made this showing.          We do.    After all, Rodríguez and Maxwell

both held on plain-error review that a "plain" reading of § 3583(h)

requires aggregation.        Rodríguez, 775 F.3d at 536-37; Maxwell, 285

F.3d at 342.      Maxwell actually called this an "obvious[]" reading.

See 285 F.3d at 341.        We agree.     And we also find the government's

position here passing strange, seeing how it conceded in Maxwell

that this kind of error is "plain for purposes of establishing"

the clear-or-obvious "prong" of plain-error review.                      Compare 285

F.3d   at   342    (noting      that   "[t]he    phrase     'less    any    term   of

imprisonment      that    was   imposed       upon   revocation     of    supervised

release'"    in    §     3583(h)'s     last    sentence   "is      not    reasonably

susceptible to an interpretation which . . . ignore[s] any prior

terms of imprisonment imposed as part of prior postrevocation

sentences, for the same underlying offense"), with id. at 339

(noting that "[a]lthough the government opposed Maxwell's argument

in its appellate brief, at oral argument, the government candidly

                                       - 14 -
and forthrightly conceded all issues in the appeal in favor of

Maxwell").6

III.       CONCLUSION

              The district court's prison sentence upon revocation is

AFFIRMED, and the imposition of the one-year supervised-release

term to follow is REVERSED. Accordingly, we REMAND to the district

court for the limited purpose of entering judgment without any

additional term of supervised release in accordance with this

opinion.

       That the plain or obvious reading of the statute supports
       6

plain     error    distinguishes     Ruiz-Valle's    case    from
Caraballo-Rodríguez, an opinion the government relies on. See 480
F.3d at 71 (observing that "[t]he dictionary definitions" of key
statutory terms "do not prove [defendant's] claim").      It also
distinguishes his case from United States v. Richards, another
opinion the government cites to. See 243 F.3d 763, 771 (1st Cir.
2000) (concluding that an "interpretation" pressed on appeal was
not "obvious" under relevant statutory language).

                                 - 15 -