Court Opinion

ID: 9398403
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-31 06:10:17.334457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:33.357460
License: Public Domain

Reversed, Rendered, and Opinion Filed May 23, 2023

                                               In The
                                  Court of Appeals
                           Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                       No. 05-21-00981-CV

        HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY, Appellant
                              V.
                   JANERY FRANCOIS, Appellee

                     On Appeal from the 68th Judicial District Court
                                 Dallas County, Texas
                          Trial Court Cause No. DC-17-08336

                            MEMORANDUM OPINION
                   Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Nowell, and Wright1
                            Opinion by Justice Partida-Kipness
         This appeal involves a dispute over the allocation of a third-party settlement

in a workers’ compensation case. Appellant Hartford Accident & Indemnity

Company, the workers’ compensation carrier, appeals the trial court’s judgment

following a bench trial. Hartford challenges the trial court’s allocation of the

settlement amount and award of additional attorney’s fees of $10,000. We conclude

the trial court’s allocation was erroneous and the additional award of attorney’s fees

   1
       The Hon. Carolyn Wright, Justice, Assigned
was an abuse of discretion. We reverse the judgment and render the judgment the

trial court should have rendered.

                                          BACKGROUND
        Appellee Janery Francois sustained a work-related injury in 2015. Hartford

paid Francois $356,669.73 in medical and indemnity benefits under her employer’s

workers’ compensation policy. Francois sued the owner and operator of the building

where she sustained her injury, Parmenter Realty & Investment Company, Inc., and

settled that claim for $150,000. Hartford then intervened in the lawsuit and asserted

its subrogation rights. Hartford and Francois disagreed on how the $150,000

settlement should be allocated in relation to the workers’ compensation lien. At the

center of the dispute was the parties’ disagreement of how to calculate “the net

amount recovered” by Francois under section 417.002(a) of the Texas Labor Code.

See TEX. LAB. CODE § 417.002(a) (“The net amount recovered by a claimant in a

third-party action shall be used to reimburse the insurance carrier for benefits,

including medical benefits, that have been paid for the compensable injury.”). The

dispute proceeded to a bench trial.

        At trial, Francois’s counsel maintained the “net recovery”2 is determined after

counsel’s 40% contingency fee is taken out of the gross settlement. Using this

framework, Francois calculated the “net recovery” to be $85,206.03 as follows:

    2
       Francois’s counsel referred to the “net amount recovered” of section 417.002(a) as the “net recovery”
at trial. These terms are not interchangeable. To accurately reflect the parties’ arguments, however, we will
use the term “net recovery” in this opinion when that is the term used by Francois below.
                                                    –2–
                                   $150,000 (𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)
                                  − $60,000 (40% 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑓𝑒𝑒)
                                    −$4,793.97 (𝑝𝑟𝑜 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠)
                                    $85,206.03 (𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦)

          Counsel next argued that the trial court could award him additional attorney’s

fees under section 417.003 because Hartford did not participate in the lawsuit against

Parmenter Realty. See TEX. LAB. CODE § 417.003(a).3 Francois’s counsel agreed any

fees awarded under section 417.003 could not exceed one-third of the “net

recovery.” See id. § 417.003(a)(1). Using that formula, counsel concluded he was

entitled to an award of $28,117.98 as section 417.003 attorney’s fees, which was

one-third of the net recovery of $85,206.03. By subtracting the section 417.003 fees

from the net recovery, Francois’s counsel argued Hartford’s recovery should be

$58,088.05:

                                    $85,206.03 (𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦)
                                  −$28,117.99 (§ 417.003 𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑠)
                                $58,088.04 (𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑑 ′ 𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦)

          Finally, Francois’s counsel argued he was entitled to attorney’s fees of

$10,000 defending the intervention and participating in the bench trial. He sought

   3
       Section 417.003(a) of the labor code provides:
       (a) An insurance carrier whose interest is not actively represented by an attorney in a third-party action
       shall pay a fee to an attorney representing the claimant in the amount agreed on between the attorney
       and the insurance carrier. In the absence of an agreement, the court shall award to the attorney payable
       out of the insurance carrier's recovery:
          (1) a reasonable fee for recovery of the insurance carrier’s interest that may not exceed
          one-third of the insurance carrier’s recovery; and
          (2) a proportionate share of expenses.
   TEX. LAB. CODE § 417.003(a).
                                                      –3–
those fees under section 37.009 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and

maintained he was entitled to such fees because Hartford refused to negotiate a lesser

recovery. Francois characterized Hartford’s unwillingness to negotiate a lower

subrogation lien as an improper tactic and intentional failure to follow established

law.

       Hartford, in contrast, argued that under the “first money” rule, Hartford’s

recovery is calculated by subtracting section 417.003 fees and expenses from the

gross settlement. Hartford’s calculation was simple:

                         $150,000 (𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)
                           −$50,000 (§ 417.003 𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑠)
                        −$4,793.97 (𝑝𝑟𝑜 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠)
                       $95,206.03 (𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑑 ′ 𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦)

       The trial court adopted Francois’s proposed allocation. Following a bench

trial, the trial court rendered judgment on Hartford’s declaratory judgment claim and

awarded $57,088.04 of the settlement to Hartford, and $92,911.96 to Francois and

her counsel. The $92,911.96 awarded to Francois and her counsel was comprised of

the following: (1) attorney’s fees of $60,000, which was 40% of the gross settlement,

(2) reasonable and necessary expenses of $4,793.97, and (3) section 417.003 fees of

$28,117.99, which was one-third of the “net recovery” calculated by the court. The

trial court also awarded Francois’s counsel additional attorney’s fees of $10,000

pursuant to TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.009. This appeal followed.

                                         –4–
                                     ANALYSIS
      Hartford brings two issues on appeal. First, Hartford challenges the trial

court’s allocation of the settlement amount. Second, Hartford contends the trial court

abused its discretion by awarding Francois’s counsel $10,000 in additional

attorney’s fees.

I.    Allocation of Settlement
      In its first issue, Hartford contends the trial court’s settlement allocation failed

to award Hartford the statutorily-required “first money” from Francois’s third-party

settlement. Hartford maintains it should have recovered $95,206.03, not $57,088.04

as awarded in the judgment. We review this issue de novo because it presents the

Court with a question of law concerning statutory interpretation and application.

Empower Texans, Inc. v. Dallas Cnty., 648 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2022, pet. denied) (citing Bush v. Lone Oak Club, LLC, 601 S.W.3d 639, 647 (Tex.

2020)).

      An employee may seek damages from a third party who is liable for an injury

that is compensable under the labor code. TEX. LAB. CODE § 417.001(a). When a

benefit is claimed by an injured employee, the insurance carrier is subrogated to the

rights of the injured employee. Id. § 417.001(b). The distribution of the proceeds

recovered from third parties is governed by section 417.002, which provides:

      (a) The net amount recovered by a claimant in a third-party action shall
      be used to reimburse the insurance carrier for benefits, including
      medical benefits, that have been paid for the compensable injury.

                                          –5–
Id. § 417.002(a).

      It is well-established that an insurance carrier is entitled to recover all benefits

paid to an injured worker out of the “first money” the worker recovers from a liable

third party. See, e.g., Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Ins. Co. of Am., 568 S.W.3d 650, 651,

655–56 (Tex. 2019) (citing TEX. LAB. CODE §§ 417.001–.002) (the insurance carrier

has the right to “the first money a worker receives from a tortfeasor,” and “the

employee has no right to any sums recovered from a third party until the carrier is

reimbursed in full.”) (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted); see also Tex.

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ledbetter, 251 S.W.3d 31, 35 (Tex. 2008) (“carrier gets the first

money a worker receives from a tortfeasor”); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Baker, 87 S.W.3d

526, 530 (Tex. 2002) (“For decades, the law has been that, under the Workers’

Compensation Act’s subrogation provision, ‘the first money paid [to] or recovered

by the employee, or his representatives, belongs to the compensation carrier paying

the compensation, and until it is paid in full, the employee, or his representatives,

have no right to any funds.’”) (quoting Fort Worth Lloyds v. Haygood, 151 Tex. 149,

246 S.W.2d 865, 869 (1952)). The subrogation right “creates a lien in favor of the

insurance carrier in the amount it has paid to an employee out of the first money

recovered from the third-party tortfeasor.” Tex. Workers’ Comp. Ins. Fund v.

Alcorta, 989 S.W.2d 849, 851 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.).

      “[U]ntil a carrier is reimbursed in full, ‘the employee or his representatives

have no right to any of such funds.’” Ledbetter, 251 S.W.3d at 36 (quoting Capitol

                                          –6–
Aggregates, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 408 S.W.2d 922, 923 (Tex. 1966)). “Thus,

rather than the employee owning the money and being forced to disgorge it, the

carrier is first entitled to the money up to the total amount of benefits it has

paid, . . . .” Argonaut Ins., 87 S.W.3d at 530. “After the carrier is fully reimbursed,

then any additional money goes to the employee.” Delgado v. Tex. Mun. League

Intergovernmental Risk Pool, No. 13-09-00126-CV, 2009 WL 2712416, at *2 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 31, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing TEX.

LAB. CODE § 417.002(b)). “First-money reimbursement is essential to the workers’

compensation system because it reduces costs to the carrier and, thus, to the

employer and the public.” Delgado, 2009 WL 2712416, at *2–3; Ledbetter, 251

S.W.3d at 35 (noting another benefit of first-money reimbursement is the prevention

of “double recovery by workers.”).

      However, a “first money” recovery does not always result in an insurer

recovering the full amount of the settlement. Rather, the subrogation amount must

be calculated in accordance with section 417.003, which provides that the

employee’s attorney may recover certain attorney’s fees and “a proportionate share

of expenses” as compensation for pursuing the third-party action. TEX. LAB. CODE §

417.003(a). That provision states:

      (a) An insurance carrier whose interest is not actively represented by an
      attorney in a third-party action shall pay a fee to an attorney
      representing the claimant in the amount agreed on between the attorney
      and the insurance carrier. In the absence of an agreement, the court shall
      award to the attorney payable out of the insurance carrier’s recovery:

                                         –7–
             (1) a reasonable fee for recovery of the insurance carrier’s
             interest that may not exceed one-third of the insurance
             carrier’s recovery; and

             (2) a proportionate share of expenses.

Id. § 417.003(a). “By enacting section 417.003, the legislature intended to

compensate claimants who perform work for the benefit of a subrogated insurance

carrier and to prohibit the worker’s compensation carrier from obtaining a ‘free ride’

from the efforts of the claimant’s attorney.” Caesar v. Bohacek, 176 S.W.3d 282,

285 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.).

      Here, it is undisputed that Hartford provided workers’ compensation coverage

and paid Francois $356,669.73 in medical and indemnity benefits. The parties also

agree Hartford did not participate in the underlying third-party action, and the

settlement was procured solely by the efforts of Francois’s counsel. As such, sections

417.001, 417.002(a), and 417.003(a) apply to the allocation of Francois’s settlement

with Parmenter Realty. TEX. LAB. CODE §§ 417.001, 417.002(a), 417.003(a). The

parties disagree, however, with the application of those provisions to the settlement.

      The dispute centers on the definition of “net amount recovered” in section

417.002(a) and how to calculate section 417.003 fees. Francois maintains the “net

amount recovered” is the settlement amount minus her counsel’s 40% contingency

fee and pro rata expenses. Hartford, in contrast, contends the “net amount recovered”

is $150,000 (the gross settlement) and section 417.003 must be calculated from that

amount. We agree with Hartford.

                                         –8–
      Chapter 417 of the labor code does not define “net amount recovered.” TEX.

LAB. CODE § 417.002(a). Two of our sister courts, however, have defined “net

amount recovered” as Hartford does here and explained how section 417.002 and

417.003 work together to allocate third-party settlement funds. See Alcorta, 989

S.W.2d at 852; see also Delgado, 2009 WL 2712416, at *4.

      For example, in Alcorta, the third-party settlement of $20,035.00 was less than

the subrogation lien of $28,031.11. Alcorta, 989 S.W.2d at 850. The trial court

allocated the settlement amount by awarding Alcorta’s attorney the amount of fees

for which she had contracted, $8,014.00, or approximately 40% of the recovery,

awarding Alcorta costs of court in the amount of $813.50, and awarding the carrier

the remaining balance of $11,207.50. Id. at 851. The San Antonio Court of Appeals

concluded the allocation was erroneous because the fees awarded to counsel

constituted “an impermissible circumvention of the statutory limit on attorney’s fees

as to the carrier’s subrogation recovery.” Id. at 852 (citing TEX. LAB. CODE §

417.003(c)). The Alcorta court noted that the Fund’s “recovery was $20,035.00,”

(i.e., the gross settlement), and the amount of fees permitted under the statute could

not exceed one-third of that recovery. Id. at 851–52 (noting that section 417.003 fees

“are payable out of the carrier’s subrogation recovery in an amount not to exceed

one-third of the insurance carrier’s recovery.”). In so holding, the court explained

the relationship between sections 417.002(a) and 417.003, and defined “net amount

recovered” as the settlement amount minus section 417.003 fees:

                                         –9–
      The “net amount recovered” by the employee is the third-party recovery
      less the employee’s attorney’s fees. That is, by statutory design, the
      “first money” owed to the carrier—the net amount recovered under
      section 417.002(a)—is a sum which has been reduced by allowable
      attorney’s fees under section 417.003. Defining “net amount
      recovered” in this manner gives meaning to both sections 417.002 and
      417.003.
Id. at 852 (internal citations omitted).

      The Thirteenth Court of Appeals similarly used the gross settlement amount

as the “net amount recovered” from which it then calculated the appropriate Chapter

417 allocation. Delgado, 2009 WL 2712416, at *4. In that case, Delgado received

$25,028 in settlement proceeds from the third-party tortfeasor, and the trial court

awarded Delgado’s trial attorney fees of $8,342.66, which was one-third of the

settlement proceeds. Id. The appellate court affirmed the allocation “[b]ecause the

award of attorney’s fees comports with section 417.003 of the labor code, . . .” Id.

In reaching that conclusion, the Delgado court explained that the “net amount

recovered” under section 417.002(a) is “the ‘first money’ owed to the carrier” and

“is a sum which has been reduced by allowable attorney’s fees under section

417.003.” Delgado, 2009 WL 2712416, at *3 (quoting Alcorta, 989 S.W.2d at 852).

      In both Alcorta and Delgado, the subrogation lien exceeded the third-party

settlement. Under those circumstances, the “net amount recovered” was calculated

by subtracting the fees and proportionate expenses permitted under section 417.003

from the total settlement amount. We agree with this approach.

                                           –10–
      Under Chapter 417, the insurance carrier has the right to “the first money a

worker receives from a tortfeasor,” and “the employee has no right to any sums

recovered from a third party until the carrier is reimbursed in full.” Stevenson v.

Texas Mut. Ins. Co., No. 05-21-00464-CV, 2022 WL 1514670 at *2 (Tex. App.—

Dallas May 13, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Ins.

Co. of Am., 568 S.W.3d 650, 655–56 (Tex. 2019)). Hartford is, therefore, entitled to

the first money Francois recovered in the settlement with Parmenter Realty, and

Francois has no right to the settlement money until Hartford is paid in full. See

Stevenson, 2022 WL 1514670 at *2. Here, the settlement amount ($150,000.00) does

not exceed the amount of Hartford’s subrogation interest ($356,669.73). Where, as

here, the settlement amount does not exceed the subrogation interest, the carrier is

entitled to the full amount of the settlement minus payment of attorney’s fees and

expenses that the carrier must pay to the claimant’s counsel pursuant to section

417.003. See id.; see also Delgado, 2009 WL 2712416, at *3; Alcorta, 989 S.W.2d

at 852. We conclude the trial court erred by using a “net amount recovered” that was

less than the total settlement to allocate the settlement under Chapter 417.

      Further, the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Francois’s counsel’s

attorney’s fees in excess of one-third of the total settlement. The $92,911.96 awarded

to Francois and her counsel included: (1) attorney’s fees of $60,000, which was 40%

of the total settlement, (2) reasonable and necessary expenses of $4,793.97, and (3)

additional attorney’s fees of $28,117.99, which was one-third of the “net recovery”

                                        –11–
calculated by the court. Section 417.003 caps any fees awarded to a claimant’s

attorney at “one-third of the insurance carrier’s recovery.” TEX. LAB. CODE §

417.003(a). As discussed above, Hartford’s recovery for the purposes of section

417.003 is the total settlement of $150,000. The trial court’s award of $88,117.99 in

fees is 58.7% of the total settlement and therefore, in excess of what is permitted

under the statute.

          Applying the authorities cited above, we conclude Hartford was entitled to

recover $95,206.03, which is the full amount of the $150,000 settlement minus

section 417.003 fees of $50,000 and proportionate expenses of $4,793.97 properly

awarded to Francois and her counsel.4 See TEX. LAB. CODE § 417.003(a); see also

Stevenson, 2022 WL 1514670 at *2. We sustain Hartford’s first issue, reverse the

trial court’s judgment on Hartford’s declaratory judgment action, and render

judgment awarding Hartford $95,206.03 and awarding Francois and her counsel

$54,793.97.

II.       Additional Attorney’s Fees
          In its second issue, Hartford argues Francois’s counsel was not entitled to

additional attorney’s fees under Chapter 37 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies

      4
      To support her allocation calculation, Francois relies on Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. Parrent,
No. 05-96-01144-CV, 1998 WL 182803, at *1(Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 20, 1998, no pet.) (not designated
for publication). We find Lumbermens Mutual inapplicable. Because the case was decided before January
1, 2003 and was not designated for publication, it has no precedential value. See City of Dallas v. Gatlin,
329 S.W.3d 222, 228 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 47.7(b)). Further, the
opinion applied a prior and now-repealed statute. Lumbermens Mut., 1998 WL 182803, at *1, n.2 (noting
that the workers’ compensation act applicable there was repealed in December 1989 and replaced by a new
workers compensation act effective January 1991).
                                                  –12–
Code (the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act or UDJA). We review an award of

attorney’s fees for an abuse of discretion. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at San

Antonio v. Mata & Bordini, Inc., 2 S.W.3d 312, 319 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999,

pet. denied).

      The UDJA provides that a trial court may award costs and reasonable

attorney’s fees when doing so is equitable and just. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §

37.009. The UDJA “entrusts attorney fee awards to the trial court’s sound discretion,

subject to the requirements that any fees awarded be reasonable and necessary,

which are matters of fact, and to the additional requirements that fees be equitable

and just, which are matters of law.” Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex.

1998). “Unreasonable fees cannot be awarded [under the UDJA], even if the [trial]

court believed them just, but the court may conclude that it is not equitable or just to

award even reasonable and necessary fees.” Id. A party need not prevail to be

awarded attorney’s fees under the UDJA. Castille v. Serv. Datsun, Inc., No. 01-16-

00082-CV, 2017 WL 3910918, at *10 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 7,

2017, no pet.) (mem. op.); Hunt v. Baldwin, 68 S.W.3d 117, 135 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.). The question of whether a fee award is equitable

and just “is not susceptible to direct proof but is rather a matter of fairness in light

of all the circumstances.” Ridge Oil Co., v. Guinn Invs., Inc., 148 S.W.3d 143, 162

(Tex. 2004). Hartford argues the award of $10,000 in attorney’s fees was not

equitable and just. We agree.

                                         –13–
         First, the award of additional fees to Francois is in direct contravention of the

limit on fees imposed by section 417.003 and constitutes a windfall for Francois.

TEX. LABOR CODE § 417.003(a) (the fee awarded by the trial court may not exceed

one-third of the carrier’s recovery). By awarding the additional fees, the amount of

fees awarded to Francois’s attorneys exceeds one-third of the net amount recovered

(in this case, the full settlement amount) and, therefore, violates the labor code. See

Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Barron, No. 05-96-00488-CV, 1998 WL 32710, at *4 (Tex.

App.—Dallas Jan. 30, 1998, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding award of $1,500 of

additional fees was improper because (1) the fees caused the plaintiff’s fees award

to exceed the amount permitted by section 417.003, and (2) such fees were not

recoverable under section 38.001 because the plaintiff failed to plead for Chapter 38

fees).

         Second, Francois provides no basis for such an award, nor any reason why

such an award is equitable and just. Francois’s counsel argued at trial that additional

fees should be awarded because Hartford “deliberately refused to agree to a three-

way split” of the settlement and relied on a Louisiana case to refuse the three-way

split:

         But I believe Hartford in this situation deliberately, deliberately refused
         to agree to a three-way split knowing that they should, and knowing
         what the law is. And they came into your court talking about some
         Louisiana case that they brought, completely different calculations.
         And because of what they did and how they acted, that’s why I believe
         in addition to how we believe the split should be done, I believe we
         should be awarded attorney’s fees.

                                           –14–
According to Francois’s counsel, the carrier, employee, and employee’s counsel

“always” agree to split a settlement three ways, and he has entered into those

agreements “dozens of times.” But Francois cites no authority to support an

argument that Hartford was under any obligation to reduce its lien and accept a

three- way split. Instead, counsel relied on a 1998 opinion from this Court to argue

Hartford was either required to agree to Francois’s proposed allocation of the

settlement funds or acted in bad faith by refusing the allocation. See Lumbermens

Mut. Casualty Co. v. Parrent, No. 05-96-01144-CV, 1998 WL 182803, at *1(Tex.

App.—Dallas Apr. 20, 1998, no pet.) (not designated for publication).

      The reliance on Lumbermens Mutual is misplaced. That case has no

precedential value because it was decided before January 1, 2003 and was not

designated for publication. See City of Dallas v. Gatlin, 329 S.W.3d 222, 228 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 47.7(b)). Further, the opinion

applied a prior and now-repealed statute. Lumbermens Mut., 1998 WL 182803, at

*1, n.2 (noting that the workers’ compensation act applicable there was repealed in

December 1989 and replaced by a new workers compensation act effective January

1991). Moreover, neither Lumbermens Mutual nor Chapter 417 required Hartford to

accept any payment less than the total amount of its subrogation lien. On the

contrary, Hartford has a statutory right to recover the entirety of the lien. See TEX.

LAB. CODE §§ 417.001–.002. As for Hartford relying on Louisiana law, the record

shows no such reference or reliance. Hartford consistently cited to binding Texas

                                        –15–
Supreme Court authority, including Ledbetter and Argonaut Insurance, persuasive

appellate court cases, and the plain language of the statute to support its arguments

concerning the proper allocation of the settlement. See, e.g., Ledbetter, 251 S.W.3d

at 35; Argonaut Ins., 87 S.W.3d at 530.

      Hartford was well within its rights to seek the full amount of reimbursement

permitted under Chapter 417. The award of additional attorney’s fees penalizes

Hartford for pursuing its statutory rights and is not equitable or just. See Mata &

Bordini, Inc., 2 S.W.3d at 319 (“Because both parties had legitimate rights to pursue,

the trial court did not act unreasonably or capriciously in determining that each party

should bear its own attorney’s fees.”). Under this record, we conclude the trial court

abused its discretion by awarding Francois additional attorney’s fees of $10,000. We

reverse the trial court’s award of those fees.

                                   CONCLUSION
      The trial court erroneously allocated the settlement in this case and abused its

discretion by awarding Francois additional attorney’s fees under the UDJA.

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and render judgment that

Hartford recover $95,206.03, and Francois recover attorney’s fees of $50,000 and

pro rata expenses of $4,793.97.

                                            /Robbie Partida-Kipness/
210981f.p05                                 ROBBIE PARTIDA-KIPNESS
                                            JUSTICE

                                         –16–
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                   JUDGMENT

HARTFORD ACCIDENT &                            On Appeal from the 68th Judicial
INDEMNITY COMPANY,                             District Court, Dallas County, Texas
Appellant                                      Trial Court Cause No. DC-17-08336.
                                               Opinion delivered by Justice Partida-
No. 05-21-00981-CV           V.                Kipness. Justices Nowell and Wright
                                               participating.
JANERY FRANCOIS, Appellee

       In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is REVERSED and judgment is RENDERED that appellant HARTFORD
ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY recover $95,206.03 and appellee
JANERY FRANCOIS recover attorney’s fees of $50,000 and pro rata expenses of
$4,793.97.

    It is ORDERED that appellant HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY
COMPANY recover its costs of this appeal from appellee JANERY FRANCOIS.

Judgment entered this 23rd day of May 2023.

                                        –17–