Court Opinion

ID: 9900780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-20 15:05:19.400769+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:17.957244
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1928-19

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ISAAC J. GREY, a/k/a
YUSIN J. RAVENELL, and
ISSAC RAVENELLGREY,

     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________

                   Argued November 8, 2023 – Decided November 20, 2023

                   Before Judges Haas and Gooden Brown.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Mercer County, Indictment No. 18-04-0223.

                   Zachary G. Markarian, Assistant Deputy Public
                   Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E.
                   Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; James K. Smith,
                   Jr., Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and
                   on the briefs).

                   Jeffrey C. McElwee, Jr., Assistant Prosecutor, argued
                   the cause for respondent (Angelo J. Onofri, Mercer
            County Prosecutor, attorney; Jeffrey C. McElwee, Jr.,
            on the brief).

PER CURIAM

      In an April 13, 2018 superseding indictment, a Mercer County grand jury

charged defendant Isaac J. Grey with first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-

3(a)(1) and (2); third-degree possession of a weapon (knife) for an unlawful

purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d); fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon

(knife), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d); second-degree tampering with a witness, N.J.S.A.

2C:28-5(d); third-degree tampering with a witness, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a); and

fourth-degree certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7.

      After a multi-day trial, the jury convicted defendant of murder, possession

of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, and both counts of witness tampering. The

jury acquitted defendant of unlawful possession of a weapon. Based upon that

verdict, the State agreed to dismiss the certain persons not to have weapons

charge.

      At sentencing, the trial judge merged the possession of a weapon

conviction into the murder count, and the third-degree tampering with a witness

conviction into the second-degree tampering conviction. The judge sentenced

defendant to forty years in prison on the murder conviction, subject to an eighty-

five percent period of parole ineligibility under the No Early Release Act,

                                                                            A-1928-19
                                        2
N.J.S.A. 2c:45-7.2, and to a consecutive seven-year prison term on the witness

tampering conviction.

        On appeal, defendant raises the following contentions:

              POINT I

              THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO
              CONFRONTATION WHEN THE TRIAL COURT
              HELD THE GROSS[1] HEARINGS AT THE END OF
              THE TRIAL, WELL AFTER THE TESTIMONY OF
              THE TWO-DECLARANT WITNESSES, THUS
              DENYING DEFENDANT HIS RIGHT TO CROSS-
              EXAMINE THE DECLARANTS ABOUT THEIR
              PRIOR STATEMENTS.

              A.    Danielle Rogers.

              B.    Ernest McCleese.

              C.    Legal Argument.

              POINT II

              DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL ON
              THE MURDER COUNT BY THE JUDGE'S
              REFUSAL TO GIVE AN ADVERSE INFERENCE
              CHARGE BASED UPON THE PROSECUTOR'S
              FAILURE TO PRESERVE A CRUCIAL PORTION
              OF A SURVEILLANCE VIDEO.

              A.    Detective Osterman's Testimony.

1
    State v. Gross, 121 N.J. 1 (1990).

                                                                        A-1928-19
                                         3
             B.    The Fact That The Defense Could Not Establish
                   A Brady[2] Violation Did Not Justify the Trial
                   Court's Refusal To Give An Adverse Inference
                   Charge.

       Having considered defendant's arguments in light of the record and the

applicable law, we affirm.

                                        I.

       Late in the evening of June 30, 2015, Bayshawn Chavis found the victim,

Edward Nock, bleeding in the living room of Nock's apartment. The State's

proofs at trial provided the following timeline of events.

       Chavis lived in the same apartment complex as Nock. Earlier in 2015,

Chavis learned that defendant, defendant's girlfriend Lillian Robinson, and

Robinson's young child were homeless. Chavis knew Nock was not using his

apartment at that time. Chavis asked Nock if defendant, Robinson, and the child

could stay in Nock's apartment beginning in June 2015. Nock agreed.

       Robinson testified that soon after moving in, defendant allowed another

woman, Ebony Durant, to live in the apartment. Robinson described Durant as

defendant's "other girlfriend." Defendant also permitted a man named Kevin to

move in.

2
    Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 51 (1988).
                                                                         A-1928-19
                                        4
      Sometime before 1:00 p.m. on June 30, 2015, Nock returned to the

apartment for the first time and found five people now living there. Robinson

testified that the adults all sat around together "drinking" and "getting high," but

that Nock and defendant argued "two or three times" during the course of the

day. According to Robinson, the arguments were "[a]bout a lot of people being

in [Nock's] apartment that he didn't know about." Defendant, Robinson, Durant,

and Nock also made a trip to the liquor store because Nock wanted alcohol.

      Robinson stated that at some point during the day, Nock asked everyone

to leave, but he refused to let them take their possessions with them. Robinson

testified the cycle of arguments and peacemaking attempts continued for about

eight hours.

      Sometime before 9:26 p.m., defendant and Nock began to argue again.

Robinson testified that Durant told them to calm down but instead defendant

"reached on his side and got a knife." Defendant held the knife in his hand and

was "like just arguing with [Nock], and then he stabbed him in the stomach."

      Defendant immediately told Robinson to "get all your stuff with

everything with your name on it" so that "it can't be traced back to anybody that

was in the house." Video evidence showed all of the apartment's occupants,

except Nock, exiting the front of the apartment complex at 9:26 p.m.

                                                                              A-1928-19
                                         5
      Robinson testified that Durant and Kevin split from the group. Defendant

stated he was going to drop the apartment keys off with someone. Defendant

then met back up with Robinson and her child and they stayed with friends that

night in Trenton. The next morning, they went to defendant's sister's house in

Philadelphia.

      According to a statement Chavis's girlfriend, Danielle Rogers, provided

to the police, defendant knocked on her door, admitted he had stabbed Nock,

gave her Nock's apartment keys, and told her to have Chavis "call the cops."

Rogers called Chavis and "told him to come home quick." Once Chavis returned

to his and Rogers's shared apartment, Rogers "told him what happened" and gave

him the keys.3

      Chavis testified he took the keys and went to Nock's apartment. He found

Nock bleeding on the couch and called an ambulance. When the police arrived,

Chavis identified defendant as a potential suspect and provided them with his

physical description.   Nock was taken to the hospital where he died at

approximately 11:20 p.m. from blood loss from a stab wound to his abdomen.

3
  At trial, Rogers repudiated her statement. After allowing the State and defense
counsel to examine Rogers on the witness stand, the trial judge conducted a
Gross hearing and determined that Rogers's statement was admissible. This
issue will be discussed in greater detail in Section II of this opinion.
                                                                           A-1928-19
                                       6
       At trial, Chavis testified he ran into defendant earlier in the evening

around 9:00 p.m. outside of "the corner store" that was across the street from the

apartment complex. Chavis and defendant briefly discussed the issues defendant

was having with Nock, including defendant's assertion that Nock was trying to

have sex with Durant. Defendant told Chavis he wanted to "poke him up,"

meaning stab Nock. Chavis testified he told defendant that Nock "ain't worth

it" and defendant should "[j]ust get your stuff and just get out of his house."

       When the conversation ended, Chavis went to a friend's house. About

forty-five minutes later, he received a call from Rogers telling him that

defendant was at the apartment with Nock's keys.

       The Philadelphia Police arrested defendant in Philadelphia the next day.

He was later extradited to New Jersey. State Police Detective John DeHart

testified that he and a detective from the prosecutor's officer picked up defendant

in Philadelphia on September 28, 2015. During the ride back to New Jersey,

defendant spontaneously stated "that he stabbed [Nock] in self-defense."

DeHart pulled over and read defendant his Miranda4 rights. After defendant

signed the Miranda card, he made no further statements.

4
    Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
                                                                             A-1928-19
                                        7
      On April 12, 2018, defendant, Chavis, and Ernest McCleese were together

in a holding cell at the Mercer County Detention Center. Chavis testified that

defendant approached him and wanted to talk. Defendant claimed "some other

guy" killed Nock. Defendant told Chavis that he knew that Chavis had sisters

and also a child. Chavis felt threatened by the comments. Later, defendant told

Chavis he could "come up with $5,000 for [Chavis] not to show up to court – or

to change my statement and say the other guy did it." In order to avoid a

confrontation, Chavis "told [defendant] [he] wasn't coming to court." McCleese

witnessed this conversation and gave a statement to the State confirming

Chavis's account. 5

                                      II.

      In Point I of his brief, defendant argues that his Sixth Amendment right

of confrontation was violated when the trial judge directed him to cross-examine

Rogers and McCleese about the statements they gave to the police and

5
  McCleese repudiated this statement at trial and claimed that he did not hear
anything that defendant said and, instead, received all the information he told
the police from Chavis. After allowing the State and defense counsel to examine
McCleese on the witness stand, the trial judge conducted a Gross hearing and
determined that McCleese's statement was admissible. This issue will be
discussed in greater detail in Section II of this opinion.

                                                                          A-1928-19
                                       8
repudiated at trial before determining at a Gross hearing that the statements were

admissible. We disagree.

      By way of background, a party seeking to admit a prior inconsistent

statement as substantive evidence at trial must satisfy the standards of N.J.R.E.

803(a)(1). That rule provides hearsay exceptions not dependent on a declarant's

unavailability, including situations where a "declarant-witness testifies and is

subject to cross-examination about a prior otherwise admissible statement," and

the statement "is inconsistent with the declarant-witness'[s] testimony at the trial

or hearing . . . ." N.J.R.E. 803(a)(1).

      If a witness testifies at trial that they cannot recall the underlying incident

or whether they even made such a statement, a prior inconsistent statement may

be admitted into evidence under this rule if the lack of recall was feigned by the

witness. State v. Brown, 138 N.J. 481, 542 (1994), overruled on other grounds

by State v. Cooper, 151 N.J. 326, 377 (1997). In other words, "a 'judge may

. . . conclud[e] under the circumstances the claimed lack of memory of the event

is untrue and in effect an implied denial of the prior statement, thus qualifying

[the prior statement] as inconsistent and nonhearsay.'" State v. R.Y., 242 N.J.

48, 70 (2020) (quoting Brown, 138 N.J. at 542).

                                                                              A-1928-19
                                          9
      Where such feigned lack of recollection occurs, the practical limitations

on cross-examination do not rise to the level of a Confrontation Clause violation.

State v. Cabbell, 207 N.J. 311, 337 (2011). However, when it is revealed in an

N.J.R.E. 104 hearing that a witness asserts they are unable to recall certain facts,

even if feigned recollection is suspected, the witness should still take the stand

as the allegedly inconsistent prior statement is only admissible if the witness

testifies before the jury. State v. Slaughter, 219 N.J. 104, 117 (2014) (citing

Cabbell, 207 N.J. at 336-37).

      When the statement in question was not made under oath and is being

offered by the party calling the witness, as here, the trial court must evaluate the

reliability of the statement under the framework established in State v. Gross,

216 N.J. Super. 98, 109-10 (App. Div. 1987). The Gross factors direct trial

courts to evaluate the reliability of such prior inconsistent statements by

analyzing:

             (1) the declarant's connection to and interest in the
             matter reported in the out-of-court statement, (2) the
             person or persons to whom the statement was given, (3)
             the place and occasion for giving the statement,
             (4) whether the declarant was then in custody or
             otherwise the target of investigation, (5) the physical
             and mental condition of the declarant at the time,
             (6) the presence or absence of other persons,
             (7) whether the declarant incriminated himself or
             sought to exculpate himself by his statement, (8) the

                                                                              A-1928-19
                                        10
            extent to which the writing is in the declarant's hand,
            (9) the presence or absence, and the nature of, any
            interrogation, (10) whether the offered sound recording
            or writing contains the entirety, or only a portion of the
            summary, of the communication, (11) the presence or
            absence of any motive to fabricate, (12) the presence or
            absence of any express or implicit pressures
            inducement or coercion for making the statement, (13)
            whether the anticipated use of the statement was
            apparent or made known to the declarant, (14) the
            inherent believability or lack of believability of the
            statement, and (15) the presence or absence of
            corroborating evidence.

            [Gross, 121 N.J. at 10.]

      With this essential background in mind, we next review what transpired

at trial concerning the statements provided by Rogers and McCleese. On the

fourth day of trial, the prosecutor learned that Rogers had indicated she would

not comply with a subpoena to testify at trial. The judge held a N.J.R.E. 104

hearing at which Rogers testified. Rogers stated she did not stand by what she

said in the statement she gave to the police about defendant bringing the keys to

Nock's apartment to her so that she could give them to Chavis. The judge

excused Rogers so that she could confer with her attorney.

      The State then presented the testimony of Detective Roberto Reyes, who

had taken Rogers's statement. Reyes testified that he recorded Rogers's answers

                                                                           A-1928-19
                                       11
to his interview questions "word for word" and typed a statement, which Rogers

reviewed for accuracy, and then signed.

      Rogers returned to the courtroom and again told the judge she did not

intend to testify.   Later in the afternoon, Rogers was sworn in for testimony

before the jury.     When questioned by the State, Rogers denied knowing

defendant and denied making the statement to Reyes.           Rogers repeatedly

answered "no" or "I don't know" to questions about the night of the incident.

      At the end of the State's direct examination, the State advised the judge

that it would seek to admit Rogers's previous statement under the Gross decision.

Defense counsel stated that if the court ultimately decided to admit the

statement, he should be given the opportunity to cross-examine Rogers.

However, the court told him that if the statement was later formally admitted

"you won't be able to cross-examine a piece of paper, but this is your opportunity

to cross-examine the witness."

      Defense counsel then cross-examined Rogers.         Through his thorough

questioning, defense counsel was able to get Rogers to state that no one ever

asked her to give information to the prosecutor's office about the events of June

30, 2015; she never met with the prosecutor's office; she did not remember being

                                                                            A-1928-19
                                       12
in the apartment complex on that date; she did not know Nock; she never met

defendant; and had not seen or heard from Chavis since June 2015.

      Later that day, the State called Reyes to testify before the jury. He

repeated his N.J.R.E. 104 hearing testimony concerning the statement he took

from Rogers.

      That same afternoon, McCleese took the stand before the jury.         He

contended that contrary to what he had told the police in his statement, he did

not hear anything defendant said to Chavis in the jail cell. He could only hear

what Chavis said. McCleese claimed that all the information he put in the

statement came from Chavis. McCleese also asserted that he provided the

information that he did in the statement so the prosecutor's office would "help

[him] with [his] case."

      Before the State completed its direct examination, the judge reminded

defense counsel that "when it's your turn to cross-examine, you may very well

want to . . . go ahead and cross[-]examine [McCleese] how you see fit" because

after a Gross hearing the entire statement could be admitted into evidence.

When the State completed its direct examination, defense counsel got McCleese

to admit that the information in his statement had been given to him by Chavis

and did not come from his personal knowledge.

                                                                         A-1928-19
                                     13
      The State then called Detective Scott Peterson, who had taken McCleese's

statement. Peterson stated he recorded the questions and answers during the

interview and that McCleese reviewed and signed the written statement.

Peterson stated there was "no deal" offered to McCleese in exchange for the

information he provided.

      On the sixth day of trial, the court held Gross hearings outside the

presence of the jury concerning Roger's and McCleese's prior inconsistent

statements. The judge heard oral argument and, after applying the Gross factors

to each of the statements, found they were both admissible. Detective DeHart

then read the two statements into the record before the jury.

      The judge later instructed the jury that "[e]vidence has been presented

showing that at a prior time Danielle Rogers and Ernest McCleese each said

something that is inconsistent with their testimony at this trial." The judge

continued, "[i]n deciding whether their respective prior statements, if made, are

credible, you should consider any relevant factors including: [the judge listed

the fifteen Gross factors]." The judge concluded his instruction on this matter

as follows:

              [A] witness'[s] prior inconsistent statement under
              police questioning must be carefully examined and
              assessed in light of all the surrounding circumstances

                                                                           A-1928-19
                                       14
             including their interest and given the statement at the
             time.

             If you decide that the statement given by Danielle
             Rogers on July 1[], 2015 and by Ernest McCleese on
             April 18[], 2018 is reliable then you may consider it for
             its truth and weigh it along with all other evidence in
             this case.

             However, if you decide that their respective statements
             are not reliable, then you may not consider it for any
             purpose.

      On appeal, defendant does not directly contest the trial judge's

determination that Rogers's and McCleese's statements were admissible based

on a consideration of the Gross factors. Instead, defendant asserts that the judge

should have given defense counsel a second opportunity to cross-examine the

two witnesses after the Gross hearings were held and the statements entered into

the record. Defendant claims that he was not able to fully cross-examine Rogers

on "what she had told the police" because "it was not clear that her prior

statement would even be admitted into evidence because the judge had yet to

rule on its admissibility at the Gross hearing" and that "[t]he same is true for

McCleese."

      This argument lacks merit. Under N.J.R.E. 611(a), the trial court is

entrusted with "reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating

witnesses and presenting evidence to (1) make those procedures effective for

                                                                            A-1928-19
                                       15
determining the truth; (2) avoid wasting time; and (3) protect witnesses from

harassment or undue embarrassment." "The conduct of a trial, including cross-

examination and its appropriate limits, is within the discretion of the trial court."

Persley v. N.J. Trans. Bus. Ops., 357 N.J. Super. 1, 9 (App. Div. 2003).

"Exercise of that discretion is ordinarily not interfered with unless there is a

clear abuse of discretion which has deprived a party of a fair trial." Ibid.

      Defendant now posits that the trial judge violated his Sixth Amendment

right to confrontation by having defense counsel cross-examine Rogers and

McCleese when they were available in court and had testified on direct

examination concerning the statements each of them had given to the police.

We reject that argument. The record belies any claim that defense counsel was

precluded from posing questions to Rogers and McCleese concerning the written

statements; indeed, the judge afforded defense counsel ample opportunity to

conduct an exhaustive cross-examination of the two witnesses. Counsel took

full advantage of that opportunity and had each witness confirm that they were

not standing by the statements they previously gave to the police.

      We add that defendant has not specified any questions his counsel was

precluded from posing by the judge's decision. We therefore conclude that

defendant was not deprived of the right to a fair trial. To the contrary, defendant

                                                                               A-1928-19
                                        16
was given a full and fair opportunity at trial to confront the evidence the State

presented against him, including Rogers's and McCleese's prior inconsistent

statements that were admitted as substantive evidence.

                                       III.

       In Point II, defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial on the murder

count because of the trial judge's "refusal to give an adverse inference charge

based upon the prosecution's failure to preserve a crucial portion of the

surveillance video." Specifically, defendant alleges that the State collected but

did not turn over twenty-five minutes of video footage. Defendant argues that

this missing footage may have shown either defendant, Chavis, or both returning

to the apartment complex from the corner store where the alleged conversation

between them occurred. If so, defendant asserts that he could have impeached

Chavis's testimony by showing that defendant did not return to Nock's apartment

in the time window described by Chavis. However, because the State never

obtained the twenty-five minutes of footage in the first place, the judge correctly

found that defendant was not entitled to the adverse inference charge he sought

at trial.

       "In order to establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show that: (1)

the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence is favorable to the

                                                                             A-1928-19
                                       17
defense; and (3) the evidence is material." State v. Russo, 333 N.J. Super. 119,

134 (App. Div. 2000) (citing State v. Martini 160 N.J. 248, 268-69 (1999)).

"Exculpatory evidence includes not only material that is directly exculpatory of

a defendant, but also evidence that may impeach the credibility of a State

witness." Ibid. (citing State v. Spano, 69 N.J. 231, 235 (1976)). "The materiality

standard is satisfied if defendant demonstrates that there is a reasonable

probability that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the

proceeding would have been different." Ibid. (citing United States v. Bagley,

473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).

      "An adverse-inference charge" is another "permissible remedy for a

discovery violation . . . ." State v. Dabas, 215 N.J. 114, 140 (2013). Our

decisional law states that adverse inferences in favor of a criminal defendant are

required in cases where: "the State fails to present a witness who is within its

control, unavailable to the defense, and likely to give favorable testimony to the

defendant[,]" ibid. (citing State v. Clawans, 38 N.J. 162, 170-75 (1962)); law

enforcement destroyed "interview notes in the post indictment stage[,]" ibid.

(citing State v. Zenquis, 251 N.J. Super. 358, 370 (App. Div. 1991)); and for the

destruction of a booking room video in an instance where defense counsel

explicitly requested preservation of the recording before the defendant's

                                                                            A-1928-19
                                       18
indictment, State v. Richardson, 452 N.J. Super. 124, 137 (App. Div. 2017). A

defendant is not "obliged to show the State acted in bad faith and the evidence

was exculpatory" in order "to demonstrate a discovery violation or to justify an

adverse inference charge." Id. at 138 (citing Dabas, 215 N.J. at 141). Where

the evidence in question is both exculpatory and requested by defendant, any

suppression by the State "violates due process, regardless of the prosecution's

good faith." State v. Robertson, 438 N.J. Super. 47, 67 (App. Div. 2014), aff'd

on other grounds, 228 N.J. 138 (2017).

      When reviewing the decision to grant or deny an adverse inference on

appeal, we must first determine "if the trial court had the legal authority to give

the adverse-inference charge . . . ." Dabas, 215 N.J. at 132. Where, as here, the

argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by declining to issue an adverse

inference charge, the reviewing court "must then answer whether the trial court

abused its discretion in not doing so." Ibid.

      The facts underlying defendant's claim on this point are as follows.

Sheriff's Officer William Osterman was assigned by the prosecutor's office to

"pull video from the" apartment complex where Nock lived. Osterman testified

before the jury that he went to the security office and asked for video available

from 9:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. on the date of the murder, June 30, 2015. Osterman

                                                                             A-1928-19
                                       19
obtained three camera views, brought the video back to the office, downloaded

it onto an internal hard drive, transferred to discs, and gave the discs to Detective

DeHart for the case file. The discs were all provided to defendant's counsel

during discovery.

      Osterman testified that the times displayed on the videos were accurate

and that the time stamp of the beginning of the first video read 9:25 p.m. On

cross-examination, defense counsel raised this discrepancy with Osterman and

argued there must be twenty-five minutes missing from the tape Osterman had

brought to court. When Osterman could not provide an immediate explanation,

the trial judge dismissed the jury and conducted a N.J.R.E. 104 hearing.

      During his testimony at the hearing, Osterman conceded he might not have

"notice[d] that [he] didn't get from 9 to 9:25, which is very possible." He also

stated that because it was time consuming to pull video, he might not have

checked the videos for accuracy. Instead, he might have only checked one of

the three camera angles he received and, upon seeing it possessed all the video

requested, declined to check the other two angles. During the hearing, the State

insisted it did not possess, or fail to produce, the twenty-five minutes in

question, stating that what it produced "is what we have." The judge made a

                                                                               A-1928-19
                                        20
preliminary ruling that there had been no Brady violation by the State, and

defense counsel continued his cross-examination of Osterman before the jury.

     After additional argument later in the trial, the trial judge confirmed that

the State had not withheld a portion of the video Osterman obtained from

defendant. The judge stated:

           Once again, Detective Osterman testified he did not
           edit, he did not delete it. I find he's a credible witness.
           I also find that [the] [S]tate['s] representation that [it]
           provided everything [to] the defendant that [it] had is a
           truthful representation. Therefore, . . . there's no basis
           for me to find that, number one, evidence was
           suppressed and certainly that it was suppressed in bad
           faith.

           In . . . conclusion, the [c]ourt finds that the defendant
           has not demonstrated a violation of his Brady rights,
           because the police never had possession of a small
           portion of the surveillance video, namely the nine to
           9:25 on one of three camera angles.

           Secondly, nothing in the record indicates that the
           missing footage contained exculpatory evidence, and
           by that I mean that certainly that a third party looking
           at it would have been apparent that it would have
           exculpatory value.

           And, finally, number three, the [c]ourt finds the police
           did not act in bad faith, and failure to contain the
           entirety of the surveillance, this [c]ourt concludes that
           they never had that missing [twenty-five] minutes.

                                                                           A-1928-19
                                      21
     Later, during the charge conference, defense counsel asked the judge to

give the jury the following adverse inference instruction concerning what he

argued was the missing twenty-five minute segment of one of the tapes:

           You have heard testimony that the Mercer County
           Prosecutor's Office destroyed and failed to preserve
           video surveillance footage from [the apartment
           complex]consisting of twenty-five minutes (21:00 to
           21:25) for one camera . . . looking out into the courtyard
           on June 30, 2015. Under our court rules, the prosecutor
           has a duty to produce to the defense evidence in its
           possession following the return of the indictment. If
           you find that the State has destroyed and failed to
           preserve evidence in its possession following the return
           of the indictment, then you may draw an inference
           unfavorable to the State which in itself may create a
           reasonable doubt as to defendant' guilt. In deciding
           whether to draw this inference, you may consider all the
           evidence in the case, including any explanation given
           as to the circumstances under which the evidence was
           destroyed. In the end, however, the weight to be given
           to the destruction of the evidence is for you and you
           alone to decide.

     The trial judge denied defendant's request for this adverse inference jury

charge. The judge stated:

            [T]his adverse inference, as drafted by defendant
           indicates, you've heard testimony that the Mercer
           County Prosecutor's Office destroyed and failed to
           preserve video surveillance footage. . . . [M]y findings
           were just the opposite. I don't want to repeat all the
           reasons I did on the record earlier today in denying your
           request for [a] Brady violation. Obviously, if I found
           there had been a Brady violation[,] I would be giving

                                                                         A-1928-19
                                      22
            an instruction such as what is proposed by defendant as
            an adverse inference, but since I found just the
            opposite, I will not give this adverse inference
            [instruction].

      Under the circumstances presented in this case, we are satisfied that the

trial judge did not abuse his discretion by denying defendant's request for an

adverse inference jury instruction regarding Offerman's handling of the video

tape. Here, the judge found that there was insufficient evidence demonstrating

that Offerman lost or destroyed a twenty-five-minute portion of the tape; he

simply failed to obtain it in the first instance. We accord great deference to the

judge's finding based upon his unique opportunity to see and hear the witnesses.

State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470-71 (1999). Because that portion of the video

was never in the State's possession, it did not violate Brady by failing to provide

it to the defense in discovery.

      Similarly, there was no evidence that Offerman "destroyed and failed to

preserve video surveillance footage" as stated by defense counsel in the

proposed adverse inference charge. Again, the judge made a factual finding,

fully supported by the record, that the police "never had possession" of the

twenty-five minute segment. Because the State did not suppress any evidence

in this matter, the judge did not abuse his discretion by denying defendant's

request for an adverse inference charge. Dabas, 215 N.J. at 132.

                                                                             A-1928-19
                                       23
Affirmed.

                 A-1928-19
            24