Court Opinion

ID: 9492314
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:37:52.970787+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:14.485745
License: Public Domain

KEITH, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The petition for rehearing in this case has been returned to the original panel for disposition, after the vote by the members of the en banc court fell short of achieving that majority which would have been required to vacate the opinion and judgment of the panel and require the appeal to be decided by the en banc court. Our decision today to deny the request for rehearing and adhere to the opinion and judgment delivers yet another blow to the constitutional rights of these young defenseless girls. I believe that no stronger a case exists for rehearing by the full court, and I vigorously dissent from the court’s decision to deny rehearing.
At the outset, I wish to note the sharply divided vote by which this court decided to deny rehearing en banc is this case, and that the judges who sustained the panel majority were not able to muster á majority among the court’s active judges in deciding to deny rehearing.1 In addition, I note that pursuant to Sixth Circuit Internal Operating Procedure 35(a), as a senior judge, I was not allowed to participate in the vote to rehear this case en banc when the court was polled. However, I emphasize that if it were not for this local rule, I would have voted to rehear this case, thereby tipping the scales in favor of a full en banc review.2
I believe that the seven-seven split among the judges vested with authority to vote on this petition is extremely significant for two reasons.3 First, the make-up of the sharp division among the court to rehear this case is most telling in that it reaffirms the point made throughout my original dissent — that the majority opinion’s outcome-driven result is not based upon the facts or the law, but upon a proclivity towards a displeasure with the state of the law as it stands on the controversial topic of a woman’s right to choose to have an abortion, and a minor girl’s right to do the same without parental consent. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-66, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 644, 99 S.Ct. 3035, 61 L.Ed.2d 797 (1979) (“Bellotti II”).
As I emphasized in my original dissent to the panel’s opinion in this case, see Memphis Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Sundquist, 175 F.3d 456, 468-97 (6th Cir.1999) (Keith, J., dissenting), regardless of where any member of this court may personally stand on this controversial topic, the highest court of our land has declared that every female in this country has a fundamental right to seek an abortion guaranteed to her by the United States Constitution — and in the case of a minor, to seek the abortion without parental eon-sent — absent undue burdens by the state. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992). This is the *602state of the law, and we as jurists have taken a solemn oath to uphold the law, not to pervert it to serve personal values or social policy preferences. However, in ignoring the monumental obstacles imposed by the State of Tennessee on minor girls seeking to obtain an abortion without parental consent — who frequently are victims of rape, incest, or abuse — the majority does violence to the state of the law and it does so for no other apparent purpose than to promote its stance on this controversial topic. The correctness of the law as espoused by Roe, Bellotti II, Casey and their progeny is not for this court to decide, and it is certainly not for this court to ignore or pervert.
My second reason for finding the seven-seven split among the court significant is that I believe it serves as a message of hope to the appellee in this case. That is to say, in my original dissent from the majority opinion, I urged Memphis Planned Parenthood and the young girls whom this decision affects not to become disheartened, noting that “hopefully, when your case is heard by jurists who choose to appropriately apply the law, today’s outcome will be different.” See Memphis Planned Parenthood, 175 F.3d at 497 (Keith, J., dissenting). As a beacon of hope, one-half of the active judges on this court chose to rehear this case in an apparent attempt to do just that: apply the law so as to reach the only legally appropriate result possible — affirm the district court’s preliminary injunction preventing the State of Tennessee from enforcing its Parental Consent for Abortions by Minors Act (“the Act”). I strongly urge the appel-lee to be inspired by this glimmer of hope in its quest in seeking justice in this case.
In terms of the state of the law, I begin as I did in my original dissent by emphasizing the great deference this court is to afford a district court’s decision when reviewing a challenge to a preliminary injunction. See Mascio v. Public Employees Retirement Sys., 160 F.3d 310, 312-13 (6th Cir.1998). That is to say, this court “ ‘will reverse a district court’s weighing and balancing of the equities only in the rarest of circumstances. ’ ” Id. (quoting Moltan Co. v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 55 F.3d 1171, 1175 (6th Cir.1995)). The equities weighed by the district court in determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction include “ ‘(1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable injury without the injunction; (3) whether the issuance of the injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by issuance of the injunction.’ ” Id. (quoting Rock & Roll Hall of Fame & Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Prods., 134 F.3d 749, 753 (6th Cir.1998)). These “ ‘four considerations applicable to preliminary injunction decisions are factors to be balanced, not prerequisites that must be met. ’ ” Id. (quoting In re DeLorean Motor Co., 755 F.2d 1223, 1229 (6th Cir.1985)) (emphasis added). Furthermore, it is undisputed that the “undue burden” test is the proper standard to be applied in determining whether the Act’s provisions would be found unconstitutional. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877, 112 S.Ct. 2791; Women’s Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 196 (6th Cir.1997), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 118 S.Ct. 1347, 140 L.Ed.2d 496 (1998) (citing Casey and adopting the undue burden test).
In applying the well-settled law of our circuit to the overwhelming and compelling facts of this case, it is clear that this case does not present the “rarest of circumstances” under which the district court’s decision should be disturbed, and the full court should have been afforded an opportunity via en banc review to correct the erroneous result reached by the panel majority. As illustrated by my original dissent, based upon the abundant factual record, the district court properly concluded that the appellee showed a substantial likelihood that the five provisions of the statute at issue imposed an undue burden on a minor’s right to receive an abortion with*603out parental consent, and were therefore unconstitutional under Casey. However, the majority simply ignored or carelessly dismissed the copious record to reach its contrary conclusion which is grounded in neither fact nor law.
For example, based upon the abundant factual record, the district court properly concluded that the twenty-four hour notice of appeal filing requirement likely imposes an undue burden on minor females and is therefore unconstitutional under Casey, in that it requires these girls to make telephone calls when they have little or no access to a telephone; requires that they be absent from home, work, or school when accountability is a problem; and requires that they familiarize themselves with a court system which at times appears ominous even to a sophisticated adult, all within a very narrow time frame. The majority’s conclusion that no undue burden is placed upon the minors because they may file a notice of appeal in advance of receiving an unfavorable ruling, is unsupported by the record where there is no indication that the minor girls will be capable of utilizing the advance appeal procedure, and where common sense and experience indicate that they likely will not be able to do so. The majority’s approach simply fails to consider the very real and perilous position that these girls face as a whole. Furthermore, and perhaps most compelling, is the fact that the majority’s reasoning does nothing to show that the district court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous or its legal conclusions are invalid based upon the deference we are required to provide the district court when reviewing its decision to grant a preliminary injunction. See Mascio, 160 F.3d at 312-13.
The record also supports the district court’s conclusion that the appellee showed a substantial likelihood that the other four provisions of the Act imposed an undue burden on the minors subject to the Act and would therefore be found unconstitutional under Casey. The majority’s conclusion otherwise regarding each of these provisions is once again groundless in fact or law, and does nothing to render unpersuasive the district court’s factual findings, let alone render them clearly erroneous. For example, the majority fails to recognize any of the district court’s findings of fact on the Act’s sound mind and intellectual capacity requirement, and the ambiguity this requirement presents; instead, the majority simply concludes that the requirement did not impose an undue burden based upon its interpretation of what the requirement seeks from the minor. Once again, without any legal or factual support, the majority reached a result-driven conclusion in clear violation of the scope of its review under Mascio, to say nothing of the majority’s blatant disregard for the undue burden test required by Casey. Likewise, as thoroughly described in my original dissent from the panel decision, the majority sweeps aside the district court’s abundant and well-supported factual findings the Act’s venue restriction, the Act’s de novo hearing requirement by the circuit court, and the Act’s pre-petition physician consultation requirement, to reach inapposite conclusions not supported by anything in the record.
Then, as if to trivialize the significance of this case, the majority simply does not bother to concern itself with addressing, let alone balancing, the remaining factors attendant to this court’s review of a preliminary injunction — whether the movant will suffer irreparable injury, whether issuance of the injunction would cause substantial harm to others, and whether the public interest would be best served by the issuance of the injunction; rather, the majority abruptly ends its “analysis” at the point of concluding that appellee failed to show a substantial likelihood that the five provisions of the Act are unconstitutional. Although it was within the power and purview of the majority to end its “analysis” there, its action in doing so constituted something of an abdication of the majority’s responsibility, considering the limited *604basis upon which this court is allowed to reverse a district court’s decision to grant a preliminary injunction, particularly in a case which involves fundamental liberties as guaranteed by our Constitution. In my opinion, the majority’s hasty conclusion starkly demonstrates its unwillingness to accurately apply the law in this case.
The district court stated that it was prompted by the fundamental nature of the rights at issue here to address the other factors relevant to a preliminary injunction, even though it had found by the wealth of facts on the record that the appellee had shown a strong likelihood that the Act’s provisions were unconstitutional. As I noted in my original dissent, I agree with the district court’s jurispruden-tially sound approach, especially in a case of this magnitude, and believe that the majority’s failure to consider and weigh these other factors presented yet another compelling reason to hear this case by the full en banc court. Considering the tenuous position of the girls to whom the Act pertains, as well as the fact that they are facing a most difficult and ominous decision likely without any emotional or financial support, all against the backdrop of a race for time where every passing day presents new obstacles and perhaps increased health risks, I believe that it was particularly necessary for the majority to consider such factors as the likelihood of irreparable injury. Furthermore, the denial of a protected constitutional right is a matter in which the public is always interested, and which should have been balanced and considered in this case. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 822 F.2d 1390, 1400 (6th Cir.1987).
Words cannot adequately express my deep-rooted convictions regarding the seemingly careless fashion in which the majority recklessly disregards the constitutional rights afforded to minor girls, a group of people who are the least able to defend their rights. I therefore adamantly dissent from the court’s refusal to correct this inequity through a rehearing by the full en banc court. I add as a note to Memphis Planned Parenthood and the young girls whom this decision affects that they should not become discouraged by what appears to be yet another defeat. Your fight for justice should not end here. Our Supreme Court has made it clear that the Constitution guarantees every female the fundamental right to choose to have an abortion, and in the case of a minor female the right to do so without parental consent, absent undue burdens imposed by the states. Because the extreme logistical hurdles imposed upon a minor girl seeking to have an abortion without parental consent by the State of Tennessee could not be more patently unconstitutional, I once again strongly encourage you to continue to pursue justice for the exercise of your constitutional rights. It is only through perseverance in what appears to be adversity that change occurs and the smallest voice is heard.
On a further note, I am compelled to add that I do not share Judge Boggs’ sentiments about making the final vote tally known via publication in this dissent from the denial for rehearing en banc. I am at a loss as to understand why any jurist would take exception to his vote being made publicly known on the controversial topic of abortion, although it appears that Judge Boggs “statement” was apparently spurred by his concern that his position on the abortion issue not be made known to the public.
Indeed, the vote of each panel member is routinely made known to the public in each and every case that is heard, whether the case is published or unpublished. When the court votes on a petition for rehearing en banc the result should be no different inasmuch as the “panel,” if you will, consists of the entire court. Whatever a jurist’s misgivings may be about making the final vote tally known via my published dissent, I personally see no useful purpose in compromising the public interest — indeed the public right —to the *605breakdown of the final vote tally by cloaking it in secrecy. The public interest served by making the individual vote of any active judge publicly known in a petition for rehearing en banc is certainly no less than the public interest served by making the individual vote of any panel member publicly known in any given case.
I emphasize that I have not violated any rule or internal policy by making the final vote tally known in my dissent; nor have I divulged any internal confidential communications. As public servants, the judges of this court have no right to engage in the reprehensible practices of secrecy and concealment advocated by Judge Boggs. Nothing in my dissent reveals anything about the internal deliberations of the court; and I have not requested that Judge Boggs explain why he voted as he did. But in the final analysis, he has no right to conceal his vote from the public. I remain adamant about making the final vote tally known regarding the decision to deny rehearing by the en banc court in this case, and will not remove this information which is of such vital public concern from my dissent.
With that said, I caution that we not lose sight of what is at issue in this case: the right of minor females to have an abortion without parental consent absent undue burdens by the state, as guaranteed to them by the United States Constitution and Supreme Court precedent. We should not be distracted by challenges from judges who take issue with their voting record on a given case being made known to the public. Indeed, there is absolutely no authority in this circuit to prevent such knowledge from being made publicly known.

.The judges voting to grant the petition to rehear this case are as follows: Chief Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr., and Judges Gilbert S. Merritt, Martha Craig Daughtrey, Karen Nelson Moore, R. Guy Cole, Jr ., Eric L. Clay, and Ronald Lee Gilman. The judges voting to deny the petition to rehear this case are as follows: Judges David A. Nelson, James L. Ryan, Danny J. Boggs, Alan E. Norris, Richard F. Suhrheinrich, Eugene E. Siler, Jr., and Alice-M. Batchelder.

. As a member of the original panel to hear this case, I would have been allowed to sit as a member of the en banc court had the petition to rehear this case been granted. See 6th Cjr.1.0 .P. 35(a).

. It is a well known in this circuit that a ''non-vote” constitutes a "no vote” on a petition for rehearing en banc; therefore, any attempt to distinguish a "non-vote” from a “no vote” is simply a distinction without a difference.