Court Opinion

ID: 9918633
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-16 13:05:39.782419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:13.723124
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                     No. COA22-434

                               Filed 16 January 2024

Watauga County, Nos. 18CRS50759-62, 18CRS50936

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

             v.

MICHAEL JUSTIN HAGAMAN, Defendant.

      Appeal by defendant from order and judgment entered 10 November 2021 by

Judge Gary M. Gavenus in Superior Court, Watauga County. Heard in the Court of

Appeals 21 March 2023.

      Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Zachary K.
      Dunn, for the State.

      Patterson Harkavy LLP, by Christopher A. Brook, for defendant-appellant.

      STROUD, Judge.

      Defendant-appellant appeals from an order and judgment entered pursuant to

a guilty plea for one count of indecent liberties with a child. In the plea agreement,

Defendant-appellant reserved his right to appeal from the trial court’s ruling on his

motion to suppress. Defendant-appellant argues on appeal the trial court erred in

denying his motion to suppress. For the following reasons, we affirm.

                                I.     Background

      The State’s evidence at the motion to suppress hearing tended to show that on
                                  STATE V. HAGAMAN

                                  Opinion of the Court

or about 25 May and 30 May 2018, Detective J.B. Reid of the Boone Police

Department was “conducting an undercover operation involving the distribution of

child pornography on certain file sharing networks.” Detective Reid found ten files

containing explicit videos of child pornography uploaded to a file sharing network on

the internet known as BitTorrent. Based upon the Internet Protocol (“IP”) address

that uploaded the videos, Detective Reid determined the files came from Defendant’s

residence.   On or about 6 June 2018, Detective Reid applied for, received, and

executed two search warrants permitting a search of (1) Defendant and his vehicle or

vehicle(s) in his control, and (2) Defendant’s residence. The warrants authorized law

enforcement to, in part, search for:

             6. Text files containing information pertaining to the
             interest in child pornography or sexual activity with
             children and/or pertaining to the production, trafficking in,
             or possession of child pornography.

             7. Correspondence…. Pertaining to the trafficking in,
             production of, or possession of visual depictions of minors
             engaged in sexually explicit conduct.

             8. Correspondence…. Soliciting minors to engage in
             sexually explicit conduct for the purposes of committing an
             unlawful sex act and/or producing child pornography.

             10. Names and addresses of minors visually depicted while
             engaged in sexually explicit conduct.

             12. Any book, . . ., or any other material that contains an

                                         -2-
                                        STATE V. HAGAMAN

                                        Opinion of the Court

               image of child pornography.

               13. Any and all documents and records pertaining to the
               purchase of any child pornography.

               14. Notations of any password that may control access to a
               computer operating system or individual computer files.
               Evidence of payment for child pornography[.]1

       We first note we need not discuss the vehicle search. As Defendant states in

his brief and confirmed by the record, “[h]e only filed a motion to suppress in file

number 18-CRS-50936, in which he ultimately pled guilty to one count of indecent

liberties. . . . Accordingly, [Defendant’s] appeal and appellate brief focuses exclusively

on file number 18-CRS-50936.” The indecent liberties with a child charge stems from

the search conducted in Defendant’s residence. Accordingly, we direct our focus to

that search.

       In the search of Defendant’s residence, State Bureau of Investigation Special

Agent Chris Chambliss assisted in the execution of the search warrant and found four

notebooks.     Special Agent Chambliss was “[p]rimarily looking for passcodes, or

keywords, or something that would potentially show something along those lines,

something that would further the investigation” during his initial review of the

notebooks. One of the notebooks included a reference to Defendant’s commission of

1 The order skipped numbers 9 and 11.

                                               -3-
                                  STATE V. HAGAMAN

                                   Opinion of the Court

a hands-on sexual offense involving a minor. Thereafter, Detective Reid applied for

two additional search warrants and identified the victim of the hands-on offense.

Ultimately, Defendant was indicted for (1) ten counts of second-degree sexual

exploitation of a minor and (2) two counts of first-degree sexual offense.

      On or about 28 June 2019, Defendant filed a (1) motion to suppress “evidence

seized in excess of the scope” of the initial search warrants and (2) motion to quash

the third and fourth warrants and suppress “any evidence seized thereby[.]” On or

about 4 March 2020, the trial court entered an order denying Defendant’s motion to

suppress and motion to quash. On or about 10 November 2021, Defendant entered a

guilty plea on ten counts of second-degree sexual exploitation of a minor and one

count of indecent liberties with a child reserving his right to appeal the order denying

his motion to suppress and motion to quash.

                            II.   Motion to Suppress

      Defendant contends (1) “[m]any of the trial court’s findings of fact are not

actually factual findings or are not supported by competent evidence” and (2) “search

of [his notebooks] went beyond the scope of the search warrants[,]” so the trial court

should have granted his motion to suppress.

A. Standard of Review

      As our Supreme Court has explained:

                                          -4-
                                  STATE V. HAGAMAN

                                  Opinion of the Court

             In evaluating the denial of a motion to suppress, the
             reviewing court must determine whether competent
             evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact and
             whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law.
             The trial court’s findings of fact on a motion to suppress are
             conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence,
             even if the evidence is conflicting.

State v. Williams, 366 N.C. 110, 114, 726 S.E.2d 161, 165 (2012) (citations and

quotation marks omitted). When “the trial court’s findings of fact are not challenged

on appeal, they are deemed to be supported by competent evidence and are binding

on appeal.” State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 168, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011).

      Appellate courts “accord[] great deference to the trial court” when reviewing

findings of fact because the trial court “is entrusted with the duty to hear testimony,

weigh [the evidence,] and resolve any conflicts in the evidence[.]” Williams, 366 N.C.

at 114, 726 S.E.2d at 165 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Our deference to

the trial court reflects that the trial court “sees the witnesses, observes their

demeanor as they testify and by reason of his more favorable position, he is given the

responsibility of discovering the truth. The appellate court is much less favored

because it sees only a cold, written record.” State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134-35, 291

S.E.2d 618, 620 (1982) (citation and quotation marks omitted).                In contrast,

“[c]onclusions of law are reviewed de novo and are subject to full review.” Biber, 365

N.C. at 168, 712 S.E.2d at 878. “Under a de novo review, the court considers the

                                         -5-
                                 STATE V. HAGAMAN

                                  Opinion of the Court

matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the lower tribunal.”

Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).

B. Challenged Findings of Fact

       Defendant challenges many findings of fact and grouped his arguments into

four categories based upon the nature of the challenge:        (1) finding 17 “is not

supported by competent evidence[;]” (2) findings 24-26 “are, in whole or in part,

conclusions of law and/or are not supported by competent evidence[;]” (3) findings 20,

21, and 27 are not findings of fact but conclusions of law; and (4) findings 19 and 23

are “not factual findings” but are instead the trial court’s interpretations of

Defendant’s argument or of caselaw.       (Capitalization altered.)   We review each

category in turn.

     1. Finding 17

       Finding 17 states:

             The court finds from the credible testimony that paper
             writings including notebooks often carry information
             regarding child pornography including passcodes or
             keywords,       correspondence,     communication      with
             individuals involved in child pornography, documentation
             of episodes of child pornography and other information that
             will further the investigation into child pornography.

       Defendant asserts finding 17 is “not supported by competent evidence” because

it

                                         -6-
                                   STATE V. HAGAMAN

                                    Opinion of the Court

               overstates the evidence in two ways. First, Agents
               Chambliss and Anderson did not testify that law
               enforcement “often” found information regarding child
               pornography in notebooks. . . Second, neither testified that
               he had ever discovered handwritten records that included
               correspondence or communications with individuals
               involved in child pornography or documentation of episodes
               of child pornography.

We disagree.

      Defendant engages in a hyper-technical, word-for-word interpretation of the

testimonies. First, Defendant mentions only Special Agent Chambliss and Special

Agent Nathan Anderson, but the trial court did not name these two specific agents in

finding 17. Another witness, Detective Reid, testified paper writings in this type of

investigation “commonly” include relevant items such as passcodes or passwords.

“Commonly” is the adverbial version of the word “common” meaning “occurring or

appearing frequently[.]”     Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 250 (11th ed.

2003). Similarly, the word “often” means “many times” or “frequently[.]” Id. at 862

(capitalization altered).   Thus, the word “commonly[,]” at least as used in this

testimony, is a functional equivalent of the word “often” as used in finding 17.

      Defendant also argues that “neither [Special Agents Chambliss nor Anderson]

testified that [they] had ever discovered handwritten records that included

correspondence or communications with individuals involved in child pornography or

                                           -7-
                                  STATE V. HAGAMAN

                                   Opinion of the Court

documentation of episodes of child pornography[;]” finding of fact 17 does not state

those two specific agents so testified. Finding of fact 17 simply finds “from the credible

testimony that paper writings . . . often carry information regarding child

pornography. . . [,]” not which specific law enforcement officers testified about this

information. Finding No. 17 is supported by the evidence.

   2. Findings 24-26

      Findings 24-26 state:

             24. A cursory reading of the notebook found in the Xterra,
             Exhibit D-1, although not revealing any passcodes, did
             reveal incriminating statements made by [D]efendant as to
             his possession of child pornography which was the crime
             providing for the search and was subject to seizure.

             25. During a cursory reading of one of the notebooks found
             in the residence, Exhibit D-2, although not revealing any
             passcodes, it did reveal incriminating statements made by
             [D]efendant relative to a new crime, the crime of indecent
             liberties, was subject to seizure, and was subsequently
             searched in detail pursuant to the June 11, 2018 search
             warrant. “Courts have never held that a search is
             overbroad merely because it results in additional charges.”
             United States v. Phillips, 588 F.3d 218 (4th Cir. 2009).

             26. The seizure of the notebooks both from the Xterra and
             the residence was within the scope of the June 6, 2018
             search warrants and the scope of the search authorized by
             the warrants included the authority to cursorily view each
             notebook.

Here, Defendant contends that (1) portions of findings 24-26 contain conclusions of

                                          -8-
                                  STATE V. HAGAMAN

                                   Opinion of the Court

law, and (2) portions of findings 24-26 are not supported by competent evidence.

      As to the label applied to “findings” 24-26, it is well-established that the labels

assigned by a trial court do not dictate the standard of review for this Court. State v.

Johnson, 246 N.C. App. 677, 683, 783 S.E.2d 753, 758-59 (2016) (“[W]e do not base

our review of findings of fact and conclusions of law on the label in the order, but

rather, on the substance of the finding or conclusion. See State v. Icard, 363 N.C. 303,

308, 677 S.E.2d 822, 826 (2009) (“Although labeled findings of fact, these quoted

findings mingle findings of fact and conclusions of law. While we give appropriate

deference to the portions of Findings No. 37 and 39 that are findings of fact, we review

de novo the portions of those findings that are conclusions of law.” (ellipses omitted)).

Thus, no matter how the trial court classified findings 24-26, we will “give appropriate

deference to the portions . . . that are findings of fact, [and] we review de novo the

portions of those findings that are conclusions of law.” Id.

      As to whether there was competent evidence to support the factual portions of

these findings, Defendant makes a two-sentence argument:

             To the extent this Court views the trial court
             characterization of law enforcement’s actions as a “cursory
             reading” or “cursorily view[ing]” of the notebooks as factual
             findings, they are not supported by competent evidence. As
             noted above, Agents Colvard and Chambliss read beyond
             the 30th pages of the two journals in question despite the
             fact that they were plainly substance abuse recovery

                                          -9-
                                STATE V. HAGAMAN

                                 Opinion of the Court

            journals. . . . This speaks to an in depth reading of the
            journals, not a skimming of their contents.

      Again, Defendant only challenges the hands-on sexual offense; Defendant does

not challenge the child pornography charges which were related to the initial

warrants. While Defendant does challenge the above findings in his brief and these

findings include references to the search of Defendant’s car, his motion to suppress

and appeal is limited to the hands-on offense, and Defendant concedes “[h]e filed a

motion to suppress in file number 18-CRS-50936, in which he ultimately pled guilty

to one count of indecent liberties, however. Accordingly, [Defendant]’s appeal and

appellate brief focuses exclusively on file number 18-CRS-50936.”

      The evidence supporting the indecent liberties charge was based upon one of

the notebooks found in Defendant’s home; thus, we only review Special Agent

Chambliss’s actions since he was the person who located and reviewed the notebook

which contained the reference to the hands-on offense. The notebook found in the car

referenced Defendant’s activities regarding child pornography, but the notebook from

Defendant’s car did not contain evidence regarding the hands-on offense.         As

Defendant only challenged the hands-on offense at his motion to suppress hearing

and on appeal, we need not discuss the notebook from Defendant’s car.

      Special Agent Chambliss testified that in looking through the notebooks for

                                        - 10 -
                                   STATE V. HAGAMAN

                                       Opinion of the Court

“passcodes” he discovered the passage regarding a hands-on offense, but he did not

read the notebooks “word for word[.]” Special Agent Chambliss’s testimony does not

say he “read beyond the 30th pages” as he was not reading “word for word” but was

looking through the journal for passcodes “when [he] noticed . . . [the notebook] had

language that was consistent with somebody talking about committing hands-on

offenses.” Thereafter, rather than going through the rest of the notebook continuing

to look for passcodes, as he could have done under the warrant, Special Agent

Chambliss informed other officers and they immediately applied for an additional

warrant specifically applicable to the notebook. Defendant fails to direct us to any

testimony which supports “an in depth reading of the [notebooks]” during the

execution of the initial search warrant.

      We further note that Defendant’s argument the notebooks were “plainly

substance abuse recovery journals” does not change our analysis. The search warrant

authorized the officers to look for:

             6. Text files containing information pertaining to the
             interest in child pornography or sexual activity with
             children and/or pertaining to the production, trafficking in,
             or possession of child pornography.

             7. Correspondence…. Pertaining to the trafficking in,
             production of, or possession of visual depictions of minors
             engaged in sexually explicit conduct.

                                              - 11 -
                                   STATE V. HAGAMAN

                                    Opinion of the Court

               8. Correspondence…. Soliciting minors to engage in
               sexually explicit conduct for the purposes of committing an
               unlawful sex act and/or producing child pornography.

               10. Names and addresses of minors visually depicted while
               engaged in sexually explicit conduct.

               12. Any book, …, or any other material that contains an
               image of child pornography.

               13. Any and all documents and records pertaining to the
               purchase of any child pornography.

               14. Notations of any password that may control access to a
               computer operating system or individual computer files.
               Evidence of payment for child pornography[.]

This sort of information could easily be kept in a notebook such as the ones the

officers found in Defendant’s home. As the Second Circuit persuasively recognized in

Riley,

               [i]t is true that a warrant authorizing seizure of records of
               criminal activity permits officers to examine many papers
               in a suspect’s possession to determine if they are within the
               described category. But allowing some latitude in this
               regard simply recognizes the reality that few people keep
               documents of their criminal transactions in a folder
               marked “drug records.”

U.S. v. Riley, 906 F.2d 841, 845 (1990).

         Even if the notebook was “plainly a substance abuse [notebook],” the apparent

topic of the notebook does not shield it from a cursory review in accord with the search

warrant. Just as “few people keep documents of their criminal transactions in a folder

                                           - 12 -
                                  STATE V. HAGAMAN

                                   Opinion of the Court

marked ‘drug records[,]’” few people keep passwords or other information regarding

their child pornography in a notebook marked “child pornography records.” Id.

Someone who records potentially incriminating information would logically seek to

keep it in a place where it is not obvious or easy to find.

      In opening the notebook and looking for “passcodes[,]” Special Agent

Chambliss discovered the hands-on offense. There is no dispute that the search

warrant allowed Special Agent Chambliss to seize and inspect the notebook to look

for passcodes, potential correspondence involving child pornography, names and

addresses of potential victims, and other potentially written information as listed

above. It is entirely reasonable to assume a written spiral-bound notebook with hand-

written notations might include information on a myriad of topics, including child

pornography. Defendant cites to no law, nor have we found any, requiring law

enforcement officers to limit their search for information or documents as authorized

by a valid search warrant in a manner dictated by a defendant’s own labels or

characterization of a document. A passcode such as Special Agent Chambliss was

looking for could be written in any sort of document or book, and a defendant would

most likely not want to make this sort of information easy for others to find and

identify. Accordingly, these findings are supported by competent evidence.

   3. Findings 20, 21, and 27

                                          - 13 -
                                   STATE V. HAGAMAN

                                    Opinion of the Court

      Defendant next contends findings 20, 21, and 27 are not findings of fact but

are actually conclusions of law and “therefore, are reviewed de novo.” Defendant

makes no other challenge to these findings. The State agrees with Defendant’s

argument. Findings 20, 21, and 27 state:

             20. A “commonsense and realistic” approach to the
             interpretation of the search warrants clearly indicates that
             the seizure of the notebooks was well within the purview
             of and authorized by the June 6, 2018 search warrants.

             21. Even assuming arguendo that paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 10
             and 12 did not authorize the seizure and cursory search of
             the notebooks, paragraphs 13 and 14 clearly did.

             ....

             27. That the June 6, 2018, June 11, 2018 and June 26, 2018
             search warrants were each based upon probable cause and
             were not issued or executed in violation of the
             Constitutional rights of the defendant and all items seized
             and searched thereby were seized and searched legally.

We again note, we will review “findings” under the appropriate standard depending

on their actual classification, not the label given by the trial court. State v. Icard, 363

N.C. 303, 308, 677 S.E.2d 822, 826 (2009). We agree these are conclusions of law, and

we review them below accordingly.

   4. Findings 19 and 23

      Findings 19 and 23 state:

                                           - 14 -
                                   STATE V. HAGAMAN

                                   Opinion of the Court

             19. [D]efendant argues that the June 6, 2018 search
             warrants should be interpreted in a “hypertechnical”
             manner. That is, since the focus of the search warrants
             dealt with computer, digital, photographic and video
             evidence that it cannot be expanded to include written
             materials such as the notebooks seized.

             ....

             23. Each of the officers could conduct “some cursory
             reading” of the notebooks discovered during the course of
             the searches to determine their relevance to the crime
             providing for the search. United States v. Crouch, 648 F.2d
             932, 933-34 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 952, 70 L. Ed.
             2d 259, 102 S. Ct. 491 (1981).

      Finally, as to the findings of fact, Defendant asserts findings 19 and 23 are “not

factual findings” nor “conclusions of law” because they represent the trial court’s

“characterization” of Defendant’s argument or of caselaw. The State, and we, agree.

Nonetheless, these “findings” do not affect this analysis since neither “finding” is

required to support the trial court’s conclusions of law because neither “finding”

actually finds facts upon which the trial court relied in making its conclusions. Thus,

we will not review them further.

C. Scope of Search Warrants

      Beyond Defendant’s challenges to the findings of fact, he argues law

enforcement’s search of his notebooks “went beyond the scope of the search warrants.”

The crux of Defendant’s argument is

                                          - 15 -
                     STATE V. HAGAMAN

                      Opinion of the Court

[W]hen conducting searches of a person’s papers, officers
“must take care to assure that they are conducted in a
manner that minimizes unwarranted instructions upon
privacy.” Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11
(1976). This reflects not only an aversion to “general
warrant[s] to rummage and seize at will[,]” Crabtree, 126
N.C. App. at 735, 487 S.E.2d at 578, but also due
consideration of the particular privacy interests at issue,
see 6 LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment § 4.6(a) (2020) [hereinafter “LaFave”].
Consistent with the textual constitutional commitment to
their protection, U.S. Const. amend. IV, searching a
person’s papers in executing a warrant raises “grave
dangers[,]” Andresen, 427 U.S. at 482 n.11. Given the
wariness of general warrants and the corresponding
commitment to protecting privacy rights, especially
relating to sensitive materials, id., law enforcement may
only search papers for “as long and as intensely as is
reasonable to find the things described in the warrant[.]”
LaFave § 4.6(a).
       Law enforcement is accordingly limited in its
examination of papers in executing a warrant. They are, of
course, permitted to search and seize evidence specified by
the warrant. Crabtree, 126 N.C. App. at 735, 487 S.E.2d at
578. Law enforcement may also seize evidence in plain
view, Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465, including materials that
are “clearly and immediately incriminating[,]” Crouch, 648
F.2d at 933. And courts recognize “that some innocuous
documents will be examined, at least cursorily, in order to
determine whether they are, in fact, among the papers to
be seized.” Andresen, 427 U.S. at 482 n.11. But a cursory
examination is a surface-level glance at materials, Cursory,
WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY (2nd ed. 1975) (defining
cursory as “hasty; slight; superficial; careless; without close
attention”); see also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328
(1987) (defining cursory inspections in a similarly narrow
fashion); this makes sense given the weighty privacy

                             - 16 -
                                 STATE V. HAGAMAN

                                  Opinion of the Court

             interests an individual has in his or her papers. Anything
             more intensive touching upon materials beyond the
             warrant authorization constitutes an impermissible
             search. See Hicks, 480 U.S. at 324-25, 328-29.

Defendant contends the journals were not “clearly and immediately incriminating[,]”

but they could be immediately identified as “sensitive” since they were substance

abuse recovery journals and thus presented “‘grave dangers’ of unwarranted invasion

of privacy[.]” Defendant argues that “Agents Colvard and Chambliss read, page by

page, more than 30 journal pages” despite the sensitive nature of the journals and

this examination was unconstitutional.

      According to Defendant, the agents were allowed to cursorily look in the

notebook but immediately upon discovering it was a substance abuse journal, they

should have looked no further, not even for passwords or passcodes.            Again,

Defendant is essentially arguing, with no legal support, that law enforcement officers

must trust and rely upon a defendant’s label on documents, particularly since the

notebooks were “substance abuse recovery journals.” But the evidence and findings

in this case do not support Defendant’s assertions.

      The initial search warrant allowed for the search of Defendant’s residence

including, “[a]ny and all documents and records pertaining to the purchase of any

child pornography” and “notations of any password that may control access” to a

                                         - 17 -
                                 STATE V. HAGAMAN

                                  Opinion of the Court

computer. Special Agent Chambliss testified he was in Defendant’s residence looking

at a document for notations of a password when he found the portion of the journal

suggesting a hand-on sexual offense, and he then sought and obtained another search

warrant. The State presented extensive testimony regarding how passcodes to access

online child pornography are often written on paper.        Special Agent Chambliss

testified that while he was specifically searching for “passcodes” page by page, he was

not reading every word on the pages, but instead flipping through looking for

information relevant to his search, and in that search he happened to see evidence of

a hands-on crime. Special Agent Chambliss immediately stopped looking at the

notebook, which he had not been reading “word for word,” spoke with a supervisor,

and another warrant was obtained. Defendant’s entire argument is premised upon

the manner in which Special Agent Chambliss looked at the notebook. But the

evidence does not support Defendant’s claim that Special Agent Chambliss carefully

read every word for the first 30 pages of the notebook and thus would have known

the notebook was a substance abuse journal as Defendant contends.

      In summary, the search was conducted in accordance with a properly issued

search warrant to search Defendant’s home for “[a]ny and all documents and records

pertaining to the purchase of any child pornography” and “notations of any password

that may control access” to a computer. During execution of the warrant an officer

                                         - 18 -
                                STATE V. HAGAMAN

                                 Opinion of the Court

looking for a “passcode” happened to find evidence of another crime, and then sought

another search warrant. The trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to

suppress or quash. This argument is overruled.

                              III.   Conclusion

      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

      AFFIRMED.

      Judges HAMPSON and GORE concur.

                                        - 19 -