Court Opinion

ID: 9469309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:37:09.846797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:19.452395
License: Public Domain

TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Each of the Knaysis’ personal injury claims against A. H. Robins, Inc., was brought after the applicable statute of limitations had run.1 The sole question posed by the majority, therefore, is whether Robins’ statute of limitations defense is precluded by equitable estoppel.
Under New York law, an equitable estoppel reply to a statute of limitations defense is in the nature of an affirmative defense and it must be pleaded and proven by the plaintiff. Simcuski v. Saeli, 44 N.Y.2d 442, 406 N.Y.S.2d 259, 262, 377 N.E.2d 713 (1978); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c) and (d). In this case, the Knaysis pleaded equitable estoppel in the form of a reply to Robins’ amended answer. Record, vol. I at 109.
The burden of proof the Knaysis assumed under their equitable estoppel reply is thoroughly set forth in Jordan v. Ford Motor Co., 73 A.D.2d 422, 426 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1980):
[W]here a defendant induces a plaintiff to refrain from instituting an action, either by false statements of fact or by active concealment of the true facts, he may be estopped from using the Statute of Limitations to dismiss an otherwise untimely suit against him. General Stencils v. Chiappa, 18 N.Y.2d 125, 272 N.Y.S.2d 337, 219 N.E.2d 169 (1966); Erbe v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 13 A.D.2d 211, 214 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1961), appeal dismissed, 11 N.Y.2d 754, 226 N.Y.S.2d 692, 181 N.E.2d 629 (1962). Where the estoppel is based upon an actual misrepresentation by defendant, the plaintiff is required to allege that justified reliance upon the misrepresentation was the reason for not timely starting the action. Simcuski v. Saeli, 44 N.Y.2d 442, 406 N.Y.S.2d 259, 377 N.E.2d 713 (1978). Similarly, where concealment without actual misrepresentation is claimed to have prevented a plaintiff from commencing an action within the Statute of Limitations, the courts have invoked estoppel only where there was a fiduciary relationship which gave defendant an obligation to inform plaintiff of facts underlying the claim. See General Stencils v. Chiappa, supra; 1 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N.Y.Civ.Prac. par. 201.13.
Where the injured party is simply unaware that a cause of action is available to him, either due to lack of diligence on his own part or because of the difficulty of discovering the injury, the courts have not applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel. See Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714, 188 N.E.2d 142 (1963); Schmidt v. Merchants Dispatch Transportation Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824, 104 A.L.R. 450 (1936). A party against whom a claim exists is not, without more, under a duty to inform the injured party thereof, and such failure to inform does not constitute the kind of fraudulent concealment which gives rise to an estoppel. De Vito v. New York Cent. System, 22 A.D.2d 600, 257 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1965).
73 A.D.2d at 424, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 360-61 (emphasis supplied). See also Atkins & Durbrow, Ltd. v. Home Indemnity Co., 84 A.D.2d 637, 444 N.Y.S.2d 285, 286 (1981).
*1372Under the New York law, then, the Knaysis’ equitable estoppel reply must proceed on one of two theories. The first requires the Knaysis to prove that Robins made an actual misrepresentation to the Knaysis or to Mrs. Knaysi’s physician (who I will assume, arguendo, was her agent) that Robins intended would induce the Knaysis to believe that Mrs. Knaysi’s septic abortion could not have been caused by the Daikon Shield; that they, or the physician acting for them, justifiably relied on that misrepresentation; and that their reliance on the misrepresentation was the reason the Knaysis did not file a timely suit against Robins. Simcuski v. Saeli, 44 N.Y.2d at 448, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 262, 377 N.E.2d at 716; Atkins & Durbrow, Ltd. v. Home Indemnity Co., 84 A.D.2d at 637, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 286. Because this issue arose on Robins’ motion for summary judgment, the question for us, as it was for the district court, is whether the record created a question of fact which, if resolved in the Knaysis’ favor, would permit them to meet their burden of proof.
The Knaysis concede that Robins never directly or indirectly communicated with them, or vice versa. In Mrs. Knaysi’s affidavit and deposition testimony, she insists that she did not know that her IUD was a Daikon Shield and that she never heard or read anything regarding the Daikon Shield prior to December 8, 1977, when she read a news report stating that Daikon Shields might be a cause of septic abortions. Moreover, the record contains no evidence that Robins ever communicated in any way with Mrs. Knaysi’s physician, or vice versa. The record does not include the testimony of the physician, by way of affidavit or deposition. The record does contain deposition testimony of a Robins representative, but that testimony does not shed any light on any representation that may have been delivered to or received by the physician. The sole evidence in the record of a Robins representation concerning the Daikon Shield is examples of Robins’ advertising literature, which the majority assumes were delivered to and read by Mrs. Knaysi’s physician. This literature touts the Daikon Shield as being “safe,” but only in one instance, a brochure published in October 1972, does it contain what could be contended to be a misrepresentation intended to induce someone not to sue Robins over a septic abortion. That brochure, given to physicians for ultimate distribution to patients, stated that if pregnancy should occur with the Daikon Shield in place, no harm would result if the Shield was not removed. This brochure contains no reference to septic abortion. Nonetheless, an individual who had a septic abortion and read the brochure might be convinced that the Daikon Shield could not have caused the abortion and might therefore be lulled into not bringing suit against Robins.
I will assume, arguendo, that Mrs. Knaysi’s physician received and read Robins’ October 1972 brochure. There is absolutely nothing in the record, however, that even suggests that the physician believed what the brochure said or relied on it in any way. More importantly, nothing suggests that the brochure lulled the physician, and in turn the Knaysis, into a state of inaction viz-a-viz Robins. Without the critical link between the alleged misrepresentation and the Knaysis’ failure to bring this suit within the limitations period, the Knaysis cannot prevail.
The second equitable estoppel theory available under New York law requires the Knaysis to establish that Robins owed them a fiduciary duty. If Robins did, it could be equitably estopped from raising the statute of limitations defense upon the Knaysis’ demonstration that Robins, in violation of that duty, concealed the information they needed in order to bring a timely suit. Jordan v. Ford Motor Co., 73 A.D.2d at 424, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 360-61, citing General Stencils v. Chiappa, 18 N.Y.2d 125, 272 N.Y.S.2d 337, 219 N.E.2d 169 (1966); 1 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N.Y.Civ.Prac. par. 201.13.
Here, the Knaysis make no claim that Robins owed them or their physician a fiduciary duty. Consequently, they simply could not make out a prima facie ease under the second theory of equitable estoppel. *1373See Jordan v. Ford Motor Co., 73 A.D.2d at 424, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 361 (automobile manufacturer had no fiduciary duty to automobile owner and therefore could not be es-topped from raising statute of limitations where it simply failed to reveal to the public that the placement of the fuel tank in certain of its automobiles increased the seriousness of accidents involving rear end collisions).
Since the Knaysis failed to raise a material issue of fact as to their equitable estoppel reply to Robins’ statute of limitations defense, Robins was, and is, entitled to the summary judgment the district court gave it.
I dissent.

. The majority agrees with this proposition except as it applies to the Knaysis’ common law claim of fraud and deceit, which it does not address. See majority opinion at note 4. The district court held that the Knaysis’ fraud claim was subsumed by their products liability claim and was time barred. I agree.