Court Opinion

ID: 9549481
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:19:22.805593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:23.354566
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting.
State v. Monroe, 103 Idaho 129, 645 P.2d 363 (1983), was not an inadvertent illustration of erudition on the part of this Court, but the only course of action open after the Supreme Court of the United States vacated this Court’s earlier opinion, 101 Idaho 251, 611 P.2d 1036 (1980), and remanded for further consideration in light of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981).
Justice Huntley’s opinion accurately declares the proper applicability of Edwards to this case, and pungently notes that “[t]his Court, in fulfilling its responsibilities to supervise the administration of justice, has a duty to encourage adherence to, not evasion of, the procedural safeguards which promote fair trials and due process.” Those remarks well express the same thoughts which I entertained when the Court in its 1980 opinion affirmed Monroe’s conviction, while all the while not deigning to dispose of views set forth in the dissenting opinion.
It is significant to point out in this Gale-gar case that at the time of the suppression hearing, which was in October of 1978, Edwards had not been decided. It was handed down between Monroe I, May 15, 1980, and Monroe II, May 12,1982. There is no doubt in my mind but that Judge Walters would have reached a contrary result had he had the benefit of Edwards, but he did not. Nor is it likely that he had the benefit of People v. Grant, 45 N.Y.2d 366, 408 N.Y.S.2d 429, 380 N.E.2d 257 (N.Y.Ct.App.1978), which, though decided in the summer of 1978, appears to not have been published until late 1978 or early 1979. Grant was heavily relied upon by the dissenting opinion in Monroe I, 101 Idaho at 261, 611 P.2d at 1046. In that dissenting opinion, mention was also made of the failure of the officers to take the Monroe defendant before a magistrate, as the law of Idaho requires, especially after the right to counsel had been claimed, 101 Idaho at 260, 611 P.2d at 1405, and of the fact that, if a magistrate was not immediately available, Monroe should have been in a cell awaiting the magistrate’s pleasure, and not baited by police pressures which led to his confession. Id. In a similar vein and at greater length in Monroe II, relying on the views of Justice Bakes as expressed in State v. Wyman, 97 Idaho 486, 497, 547 P.2d 531, 542 (1976), I pointed out that “suppression of the confession was also mandated by violations of statutory procedures for ... immediate arraignment before a magistrate.” 103 Idaho at 133, 645 P.2d at 367. Footnote 5 of that opinion pointed to the exemplary views of Judge James Towles of the First District:
“ ‘As to the delay in arraignment, it is the Court’s opinion that there was no reasonable excuse nor was the delay itself reasonable. If the police officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant, he also had sufficient probable cause to present the facts to a Magistrate for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and to permit the Magistrate to fix bond, if appropriate. Therefore, the excuse that the officers were too busy or were gathering additional evidence and therefore could not take the defendant before the Magistrate, is not credible. If further evidence needed to be secured, the arrest should not have been accomplished.
*535“ ‘This lends credence to the defendant’s argument that the delay was for the purpose of obtaining a statement more than for any other reason, and cannot be condoned by the Court as a clear violation of the duty of a police officer to present an accused before a neutral and detached Magistrate “forthwith”. The day in question was a Monday and the Court was open and available.’ State v. LaMere, Crim. No. 12613 (1979).”
State v. Monroe, 103 Idaho at 133 n. 5, 645 P.2d at 367 n. 5 (emphasis added).
It must also be remembered that with Calegar, the arrests made were by ununiformed police who did not have any warrant in hand. Accepting that a warrant had issued, and accepting also that the police officers had sufficient reason to believe that Calegar had committed a crime and were informed that a warrant had issued, I.C. § 19-603(3); State v. Crawford, 99 Idaho 87, 577 P.2d 1135 (1978), the absence of a warrant at hand was all the more reason to comply with the law requiring an arrested person to be taken forthwith before a magistrate. The complaint upon which the warrant had been issued was signed before Judge Carey on the 8th day of April, 1978 (although inexplicably not filed the same date), and it is reasonable to assume that police officers who can find a magistrate when they want a warrant issued should be able to find a magistrate before whom they are required to immediately take an arrested person — “forthwith.” Anything less than complete compliance with the law is not acceptable. The police officers who enforce the law should be informed as to what the law requires of them in the performance of their duties. Justice Bakes in his Wyman opinion clearly perceived this philosophy.
Today, however, writing for a majority of the Court, he finds many reasons and ways in which Calegar’s statutory and constitutional rights have not been violated.
In a reasoning which I do not profess an ability to comprehend it is said that Edwards itself somehow justifies the police in detaining Calegar at the station and in persisting in their efforts to get him to talk notwithstanding that he unequivocally, informed them that he would not do so, wanted counsel, and directed that they not open his suitcase. It is pointed out ever so nicely that the warrantless search of his suitcase was justified under the consent theory, under the inventory theory, under the contraband theory, and under the concealed weapon theory. All of which leads me to suggest a closer examination of the testimony of — not Calegar, who did not testify — the police officers.
It borders on the asinine to even suggest that Calegar’s suitcase was a source of danger to the police officers. John F. Carroll, an officer of the Boise City Police testified as to Calegar’s arrest in Canyon County. While a cartoonist could more ably portray the scene, Carroll’s testimony vividly portrays him pointing a shotgun at Calegar from around the corner of a house, and saying, “Police, Calegar, freeze.” Calegar, who was approaching a vehicle dove into it on the passenger side. A Manuel Sanchez was at the wheel, and with him was his small daughter. Another ununiformed officer named Botcher was with Carroll. On the officer’s commands, all three persons “exited” the vehicle and on command became prone on the ground, and, other than the small child, were immediately handcuffed — weapons being kept pointed at or near their heads. The suitcase, meanwhile, was in the vehicle. Not one officer ever testified to considering the suitcase as a threat, and their testimony indicates capable officers who would not render themselves so ridiculous as to assert such an absurdity. Calegar was taken to the Canyon County jail in a Canyon County marked vehicle, and the others, Sanchez and daughter, were driven there by Carroll.
Instead of taking Calegar to a magistrate, he was kept around and given further warnings and asked further questions, until some 45 minutes later when Detective Wood arrived from Boise “and took command of the situation,” by which apparently was meant more skilled interrogation including a tape recorder.
*536All this time, since the arrest, the suitcase was not a threat, but it was a curiosity. Officer Carroll removed it from the vehicle which Calegar had “exited,” and at the jailhouse turned it over to the jailer, who, said Carroll, wanted to inventory it — which he thought required him (the jailer) to open it. The prosecutor’s question and Carroll’s answer leave little doubt as to what Calegar thought about it all:
“Q. Who is present now?
“A. Myself, the jailer, Detective Botcher, Mr. Calegar, and some other deputies that I’m not aware of who they were.
“Q. Now, at this time did Mr. Calegar make any statements when the jailer brought up the question of inventory of the case you had possessed and you had placed in his proximity?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Okay, what did Mr. Calegar say about that case at that time?
“A. He then said that we would have to get a search warrant to search it, that he absolutely did not want us to open it.
“Q. Now, did he make any specific statement as to an inventory of that particular case?
“A. Only that he didn’t — just, you know, emphatic that he didn’t want us to open it.
“Q. What did you do in response to that?
“A. I told him that I would re-take custody of it, seal the case, turn it over to Detective Wood when he came over, and it along with Mr. Calegar would be transported to Boise where it would be booked into our property locker.
“Q. So I take it, if we can back up here for a moment, you advised the defendant of his rights pursuant to the Miranda card, once at the scene of his arrest and once also in the Canyon County Jail?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Now, when did the discussion take place or not the discussion, but the booking procedure take place in relation to the time when the question came up about the case itself, was it before or after that happened?
“A. It happened before he was booked in when we discussed the case downstairs.”
Tr., (Motion to Suppress) pp. 74-75.
That same cross-examination also leaves little doubt that, intentionally or not, impermissible questioning took place after Calegar had by then twice insisted on his right to not be interrogated.
“Q. Now, you’ve indicated I believe two if not three times that you did not attempt to question the defendant or do anything along those lines. Would you indicate why not?
“A. Because I told him of the facts that I had in regards to the case, that there was a warrant out for his arrest, that he had been identified from a photo lineup, and as far as I was concerned we had the right subject. I had no questions to ask of him.
“Q. Was any particular person to be assigned the actual investigation of this case from the Boise Police Department?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Who was that?
“A. Detective Wood.
“Q. Okay. That was not yourself, and this case was not assigned to you for investigation?
“A. No, sir.
“Q. Now, you do and are aware of a question or I think we can call it an interrogation process that did take place involving this defendant?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. And that took place by means of Detective Wood questioning, and you were present, and it was tape recorded?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Do you recall prior to that if any other person was questioned or interrogated prior to Mr. Calegar making a statement?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Who was that?
“A. Mr. Sanchez.
“Q. Were you also present or aware of the tape recording or the interrogation of Mr. Sanchez?
*537“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Who conducted that questioning or interrogation?
“A. Detective Wood.”
Tr. (Motion to Suppress), pp. 74-75. The scenario at the time of Detective Wood’s appearance and his taking command was a Calegar insisting on his rights, or what he knew of them, and a suitcase sealed with tape and marked as police evidence. Enter Wood:
“MR. DONNELLY: We would call Officer Wood back to the stand again.
DIRECT EXAMINATION CONTINUED “BY MR. DONNELLY:
“Q. Would you restate your name please?
“A. Stan Wood.
“Q. And, Officer Wood, you’re the same officer who previously testified this morning in this hearing, is that correct?
“A. That’s correct, yes.
“Q. You remember that you’re still under oath at this time?
“A. Yes, I do.
“Q. I had questioned you earlier this morning, Officer Wood, regarding your involvement in the preliminary investigation of the armed robbery as it related to the preparation of a photographic lineup, and there are two other areas that I would like to address now at this point in time.
“First of all, in addition to the preparation of the photographic lineup, did you have additional functions or duties with respect to the investigation of this offense? ''
“A. Yes.
“Q. Okay. Such as the examination of any particular suspects?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Okay. With respect to that function, did you have the occasion to come into contact with Michael Calegar?
“A. Yes, I did.
“Q. When would that have been?
“A. That would have been April 8th.
“Q. And approximately what time of the day would it have been?
“A. About 6:00 o’clock in the evening I believe.
“Q. And where was that at?
“A. Canyon County Jail.
“Q. And had you gone from your office in Boise to the Canyon County Jail for the purpose of questioning or interrogating Mr. Calegar?
“A. Yes, that’s partially correct.
“Q. Was there an additional function or purpose?
“A. Yes, to gather any evidence that was there; to continue the investigation at that point.
“Q. How did you know that Mr. Calegar had been arrested?
“A. I was notified by our dispatch.
“Q. Upon proceeding to the Canyon County Jail, where did you discover or find Mr. Calegar?
“A. He was upstairs when I first saw him in the booking area of the Canyon County Jail.
“Q. And who was present at that time?
“A. Officer Carroll, and I believe his name is Jim Vail, the jailer on duty at that time. Also, Alex Sanchez.
“Q. Were there any other officers present that you observed?
“A. There may have been some other jail personnel in the area. I wouldn’t recall their names.
“Q. As you entered the room, can you describe for me what was occurring, what was transpiring?
“A. I believe Mr. Calegar was sitting in the booking office. I believe Mr. Vail was filling out some forms on him; and I met Officer Carroll in the hall just outside the booking office.
“Q. All right. And upon encountering Officer Carroll, did he turn over to you at that time any property?
“A. Yes, he did.
“Q. What did he turn over to you?
*538“A. It would have been a green Samsonite overnight case.
“Q. Did he advise you of the source, where he had obtained this case?
“A. Yes, he did.
“Q. Was that case sealed at that time in any fashion?
“A. Yes, it had police evidence stickers on it.
“Q. Do you know who had attached those?
“A. Officer Carroll had stated that he had.
“Q. But you did not observe him do that actually?
“A. No.
“Q. Okay. Did you then take custody of the suitcase?
“A. Yes, I did.
“Q. And what did you do with it at that point?
“A. Went downstairs with the suitcase and interviewed Alex Sanchez.
“Q. And where was Michael Calegar at that point?
“A. I believe he remained upstairs during that time.
“Q. Was he then with Officer Carroll?
“A. No, he remained in the custody of the Canyon County authorities.
“Q. Was Officer Carroll with you then when you questioned or interrogated Mr. Sanchez?
“A. Yes, he was.
“Q. And how long did that process take, approximately?
“A. Maybe 15 minutes.
“Q. Following the completion of that questioning, what did you do then?
“A. I then talked to Michael Calegar.
“Q. And did you have him brought down by the sheriff’s office or by Officer Carroll?
“A. I believe it was Canyon County authorities that brought him down.
“Q. Where did the questioning or interrogation of Mr. Calegar take place?
“A. It was downstairs in the court house there in one of the investigators offices.
“Q. And during the questioning of Mr. Calegar who else was present?
“A. Officer Carroll.
“Q. Was there anyone else present?
“A. Not that I can recall.
“Q. Did you utilize a tape recorder at all in the taking of this statement from Mr. Calegar?
“A. Yes, I did.
“Q. Was that tape recorder recording at the time that Mr. Calegar entered the room?
“A. I don’t believe so. I believe I turned it on after he entered.
“Q. Was Mr. Calegar in handcuffs at the time that you commenced the interrogation?
“A. No, he was not.
“Q. What were the conditions of the area like at that time, was it a lighted room?
“A. Yes, it was an office.
“Q. Okay. Were you seated at a desk?
“A; Yes.
“Q. Where was Mr. Calegar seated?
“A. Across from me at the same desk.
“Q. What did you advise Mr. Calegar at that time?
“A. I advised him of his Miranda rights.”
Tr. (Motion to Suppress), pp. 103-107.
“MR. HOWEN: Detective Wood, I believe you have before you marked as state’s exhibit number 3. Will you briefly identify what you have for the record?
“THE WITNESS: Yes. This is a tape recording that was taken of Alex Sanchez and Michael Calegar during the evening of April the 8th of this year. Also, my department number is written on it.
“MR. HOWEN: Your Honor, I believe we can set it up so we can begin right with the first conversation with Mr. Calegar.
*539“(Whereupon, a tape recording is played in open court at this time.)
“Q. (By Mr. Donnelly) Officer Wood, we just had played as you are aware the tape which you made of the conversations that you had with Mr. Calegar on the evening of April the 8th, 1978. Let me ask you, officer. How long a period of time was involved in the process of your examination or interrogation of Mr. Calegar?
“A. It was approximately 15 minutes after 6:00 when I advised him of his rights, and I believe the tape stated it was a few minutes after 7:00 or before 7:00 when it ended. So it would have been roughly 40 or 45 minutes.
“Q. The tape itself does not appear to be that extensive in terms of actual time being utilized. Were there conversations that you had with Mr. Calegar that were not recorded on that particular tape?
“A. The tape ran out after the first half of it. It ran out. I didn’t realize it at that time. We probably talked for another 5 minutes, somewhere in that area. I’m not sure exactly how long. At that point he stated he was wanting to contact an attorney, and he made the call. At that point I realized the tape was off and I changed it back over.
“Q. All right, and the resumption of the tape on side 2 thereof appears to be the point at which Mr. Calegar has all ready made his phone call to counsel?
“A. That’s correct.
“Q. And if I understand the indication on that tape apparently he made a determination at that point to not discuss the matter with you further based on advice of counsel?
“A. That’s right, yes.
“Q. Nevertheless, you continued to examine him with respect to matters that occurred relating to the robbery itself, is that not right?
“A. That’s correct.
“Q. Let me ask you, Officer Wood. Is the normal procedure for yourself to continue questioning despite the request of an individual in custody that that activity be ceased?
“A. Would you repeat that please?
“Q. Is it your normal practice to continue interrogation or questioning of an individual in custody despite the fact that that person has indicated that he does not want to talk to you further at that point?
“A. Not once that he tells me he doesn’t want to talk to me any further, no.
“Q. Is it your statement that Mr. Calegar did not indicate that to you?
“A. He did not state that to me.
“Q. He did not state that explicitly to you in those words, is that what you mean?
“A. That is correct.
“Q. Were you under the impression that he wanted to continue to talk to you at that point regarding the robbery?
“A. Not particularly wanted to. He hadn’t expressed really one way or the other. He said that he thought that he was going to take the advice of his attorney.
“Q. Which was communicated to you to be what?
“A. He didn’t tell me what you had said. I advised him when he got ready to call you that you would probably advise him not to talk to me.
“Q. Well, the problem I’m having is that it appeared to me at least from reviewing the tape itself that the indication of Mr. Calegar was thoroughly clear and unequivocal, and that is that he did not on advice of counsel desire to proceed with the matter further at that point.
“MR. HOWEN: Judge, I’ll object to that as being argumentative at this time.
“THE COURT: Sustained.
“Q. (By Mr. Donnelly) Well, let me ask perhaps differently, Officer Wood.
“ Was it your opinion at that point in time once we get to what is now side 2 of that tape that is in evidence, that Mr. Calegar was still willing to talk to you at that point?
“A. It was my opinion that he had been told by you not to talk to me. However, he was still willing to talk.
*540“Q. Okay. Did you discuss with Mr. Calegar at any point in time your need to obtain a search warrant to review the contents of the suitcase which you had in your custody?
“A. No, I did not.
“Q. Are you aware of Officer Carroll having discussed that at all with Mr. Calegar?
“A. I wasn’t until today.
“Q. Did you ever attempt to get a search warrant for a search of that particular valise or suitcase?
“A. No, I did not.
“Q. Did you open that suitcase yourself, Officer Wood?
“A. Mr. Calegar did.
“Q. Who else was present at that time when that occurred?
“A. No one at that time. Officer Carroll had left a little bit before that.
“Q. The opening of the suitcase occurred subsequent to Mr. Calegar’s telephone call to counsel?
“A. That is correct, yes.
“Q. In the suitcase itself apparently were discovered certain items or various items, some of which is apparently money, is that correct?
“A. That is.
“Q. In response to discovery filed by the prosecutor here, there is an indication of a cash amount of money in the sum of $1,165.36. Is that the amount that was discovered in this case?
“A. I’m sorry, what was the amount?
“Q. $1,165.36.
“A. No, there’s approximately $1,105.00 found in the suitcase.
“Q. Was there additional money that you obtained from Mr. Calegar or from his residence?
“A. The additional money was obtained through Jim Vail who was the jail authority over there at that time, the jailer, had been taken from the person during the start of the booking procedure.
“Q. But not in the suitcase apparently? “A. No.
“Q. Did you break the seal on the suitcase itself?
“A. I don’t remember whether I did or the defendant did.
“Q. Did you advise Mr. Calegar that he had a right not to consent to that search of that valise?
“A. No, I did not.”
Tr. (Motion to Suppress), pp. 114-119.
In State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 660 P.2d 1336 (1983), just short of two months ago, this Court, absent Justice Huntley, had before it a strikingly similar case. In that case, as in this, the majority experienced little trouble in affirming the introduction of the defendant’s confession. In that case, too, I was unable to join' the Court’s opinion, and was obliged to recite at length the teachings of Miranda, and the further clarifications made in its progeny. Much of that which I wrote in Mitchell is applicable here — in particular with regard to interrogation which continues after the giving of the Miranda warnings. The opinions in Calegar’s case should not be considered by the trial bench and bar without contemporaneously revisiting the salient excerpts from Miranda which are found in the dissenting opinion in Mitchell. The proposition before the Court today is serious enough, however, to merit repeating here the police stratagems to which the Miranda court gave recognition, and then condemned, and then proscribed:
“The Miranda Court also concerned itself with modern techniques of interrogation, and its discussion is directly applicable to the interrogation of Mrs. Mitchell, who was an accused defendant confronted by three police officers in the isolation of a motel room, a definite psychological advantage to the police officers, if we are to accept
“ ‘that the modem practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented. As- we have stated before, “Since Chambers v. *541Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716, this Court has recognized that coercion can be mental as well as physical, and that the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition.” Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206, 80 S.Ct. 274, 279, 4 L.Ed.2d 242 (1960). Interrogation still takes place in privacy. Privacy results in secrecy and this in turn results in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the interrogation rooms’
384 U.S. [436] at 448, 86 S.Ct. [1602] at 1614 [16 L.Ed.2d 694] (emphasis added).
“ ‘The officers are told by the manuals that the “principal psychological factor contributing to a successful interrogation is privacy — being alone with the person under interrogation.” The efficacy of this tactic has been explained as follows.
“ ‘ “If at all practicable, the interrogation should take place in the investigator’s office or at least in a room of his own choice. The subject should be deprived of every psychological advantage. In his own home he may be confident, indignant, or recalcitrant. He is more keenly aware of his rights and more reluctant to tell of his indiscretions or criminal behavior within the walls of his home. Moreover his family and other friends are nearby, their presence lending moral support. In his own office, the investigator possesses all the advantages. The atmosphere suggests the invincibility of the forces of the law.” ’
384 U.S. at 449-50, 86 S.Ct. at 1615 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). ‘The examiner is to concede him the right to remain silent. “This usually has a very undermining effect. First of all, he is disappointed in his expectation of an unfavorable reaction on the part of the interrogator. Secondly, a concession of this right to remain silent impresses the subject with the apparent fairness of his interrogator.” ’
384 U.S. at 453-54, 86 S.Ct. at 1617 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
“ ‘From these representative samples of interrogation techniques, the setting prescribed by the manuals and observed in practice becomes clear. In essence, it is this: To be alone with the subject is essential to prevent distraction and to deprive him of any outside support. The aura of confidence in his guilt undermines his will to resist. He merely confirms the preconceived story the police seek to have him describe. Patience and persistence, at times relentless questioning, are employed. To obtain a confession, the interrogator must “patiently maneuver himself or his quarry into a position from which the desired objective may be attained.” When normal procedures fail to produce the needed result, the police may resort to deceptive stratagems such as giving false legal advice. It is important to keep the subject off balance, for example, by trading on his insecurity about himself or his surroundings. The police then persuade, trick, or cajole him out of exercising his constitutional rights.’ ”
384 U.S. at 455, 86 S.Ct. at 1617 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 660 P.2d 1336 (1983) (footnote 3).
The Miranda court, as noted in the Mitchell dissent, observed that the three various Miranda defendants “in other settings ... might have exercised their constitutional rights. In the police-dominated atmosphere, they succumbed.” 384 U.S. at 456, 86 S.Ct. at 1618. Calegar, however, claimed his rights, not once but twice — before Detective Wood appeared on the scene to begin his interrogation, but when again Calegar claimed his rights, the officer bulled his way ahead with the interrogation, attempting to explain it away later by giving his opinion that Calegar was “willing” to be interrogated. The officer’s opinion is apparently to be accepted as tantamount to compliance with Miranda’s directive that:
“If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a state*542ment is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490, n. 14 [84 S.Ct. 1758, 1765, n. 14, 12 L.Ed.2d 977].”
384 U.S. at 375, 86 S.Ct. at 1628 (emphasis added).
and again this caveat from Miranda:
“After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.” 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. at 1630 (emphasis added).
and yet another excerpt which teaches the requirements placed on a prosecutor to establish waiver once the right to counsel and the right to remain silent have been invoked:
“ ‘Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver.’ ”
384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628 (emphasis added).
Even a cursory reading of the examination of Detective Wood excerpted above should readily inform even the uninitiated that the police officers were engaging in the sort of “Mutt and Jeff” play mentioned in Miranda, thereby enabling the police to intimate to Calegar that, notwithstanding his warnings and interrogation by Officer Carroll, he nevertheless had to undergo further examination by Detective Wood, and enabling the latter to testify that he didn’t know of Calegar’s having told Officer Carroll that it would take a search warrant to open the suitcase.
All considered, one would not expect to find a more clear-cut violation of the precepts of Miranda:
“It is obvious that such an interrogation environment is created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. This atmosphere carries its own badge of intimidation. To be sure, this is not physical intimidation, but it is equally destructive of human dignity. The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of our Nation’s most cherished principles — that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself. Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surrounding, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice.” 384 U.S. at 457-58, 86 S.Ct. at 1618-19 (qqemphasis added).
Surely it cannot be seriously contended that Detective Wood’s bull-dozing along with his interrogation of a Calegar who had both invoked his right to remain silent and his right to assistance of counsel was only after Calegar thereafter gave his “consent to be questioned.” 384 U.S. at 445, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. Once it was established at the suppression hearing that Calegar had invoked those rights, there was no obligation on his counsel to proceed further until the prosecution came forth with evidence upon which a waiver of those invoked rights may be predicated. 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628.
Behind it all, however, is the ever-permeating thought that these controversies need not often arise in Idaho if the police officers are given some schooling in that which the law of Idaho requires of them when they deal with citizens suspected of or charged with criminal activity. As Judge Towles pointed out, and which banner I carried forth in Mitchell, the police officers for the most part need only comply with the statute, I.C. § 19-515, which requires them to take an arrested person before the nearest available magistrate, and a failure to do so, if not excusable on some solid basis, is a strong indication that delay is for the very *543purpose of police-dominated, isolated, jailhouse secret interrogation.
In conclusion, I turn to three other passages from the text of Miranda, which to my mind are clearly dispositive of the issue presented.
“Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked. If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning. If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he wants one before speaking to police, they must respect his decision to remain silent.
“If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived 'his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490, n. 14 [84 S.Ct. 1758, 1765, n. 14, 12 L.Ed.2d 977]. This Court has always set high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 [58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461] (1938), and we re-assert these standards as applied to in-custody interrogation. Since the State is responsible for establishing the isolated circumstances under which the interrogation takes place and has the only means of making available corroborated evidence of warnings given during incommunicado interrogation, the burden is rightly on its shoulders.
“The warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our opinion today are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant. No distinction can be drawn between statements which are direct confessions and statements which amount to ‘admissions’ of part or all of an offense. The privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner; it does not distinguish degrees of incrimination. Similarly, for precisely the same reason, no distinction may be drawn between inculpatory statements and statements alleged to be merely ‘exculpatory.’ If a statement made were in fact truly exculpatory it would, of course, never be used by the prosecution.”
384 U.S. at 473-77, 86 S.Ct. 1627-29 (emphasis added).