Court Opinion

ID: 9778714
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:16:59.760682+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:12.758725
License: Public Domain

ROBERT E. MORSE, Jr., Former Justice,
dissenting.
Because I would hold that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury’s finding of gross negligence and because the amount of punitive damages awarded appears excessive, I respectfully dissent.
The court’s charge defined gross negligence as “such an entire want of care as to indicate that the act or omission in question was the result of conscious indifference to the rights, welfare, or safety of the persons affected.” [Emphasis added.] This instruction permitted the jury to infer the subjective mental state of the defendant from evidence of the degree of care expended by the defendant on the affected person’s behalf. However, in Transportation Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10 (1994), the supreme court clarified the standard to be used in determining whether evidence is legally sufficient to establish gross negligence and the award of punitive damages. The Court opined that, rather than focusing only on the “entire want of care” portion of the definition of gross negligence, courts must also look for evidence of the defendant’s subjective mental state. Id. at 20.
Gross negligence has two components: (1) the act or omission, and (2) the defendant’s mental state. Id. at 21. With respect to the first component, the defendant’s conduct must create an extreme degree of risk; with respect to the second, the defendant must be consciously indifferent to the creation of that risk. Id. I interpret Moriel as instructing that evidence probative of a want of care on the part of the defendant is not necessarily probative of the defendant’s conscious indifference to the risk created by that want of care.
First, the evidence must establish that the defendant’s behavior exposed the plaintiff to an extreme risk of harm. Id. Evidence of a remote possibility of serious injury or a high *469probability of minor harm is insufficient to satisfy the “extreme risk” prong. Id. The defendant’s act must be unjustifiable and likely to result in serious harm. Id. In determining whether the defendant’s act involved an extreme degree of risk, we must examine the “events and circumstances from the viewpoint of the defendant at the time the events occurred, without viewing the matter in hindsight.” Id. at 22.
Second, in addition to proving an extreme degree of risk, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant acted with conscious indifference, which means that he must have had actual knowledge that serious harm was a highly probable result. Id This may be shown by circumstantial evidence. Id. Whether a reasonable person would have realized that his conduct created an extreme degree of risk is not the test. Id. Instead, the evidence must establish that the defendant had actual, subjective awareness of the risk and nevertheless proceeded in conscious indifference to the rights, safety, or welfare of others. Id.
In determining the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we consider only the evidence and inferences that tend to support the jury’s finding, disregarding all contrary evidence and inferences. Southern States Transp., Inc. v. State, 774 S.W.2d 639, 640 (Tex.1989). If there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the finding, the legal sufficiency challenge fails. Stafford v. Stafford, 726 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tex.1987). “When the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of its existence, the evidence is no more than a scintilla....” Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex.1983). Although we consider only evidence and inferences therefrom favorable to the jury’s finding and disregard all contrary evidence and inferences, this does not mean that we disregard the undisputed or conclusively-established facts. This is so because the probative value of evidence is only determinable when viewed in the factual milieu to which it relates. In light of Moriel, for evidence to be legally sufficient to support a gross negligence finding, the evidence must be probative of both an extreme risk of harm and the subjective conscious indifference of the defendant. Viewed in the undisputed factual context, I believe that the Ungs’ evidence of gross negligence falls short of legal sufficiency on both counts.
It was undisputed that Bun Meng Ung was struck and killed by a trailer that became disconnected from a truck as it traveled westbound on Interstate 10 near the Loop 610 interchange. There was a “bad spot” in the road, consisting of a raised area in the middle lane with three holes. An expert estimated that the holes were approximately two inches deep and one to two feet wide. The trailer hitch was a clamp-type hitch that opened and closed around a ball. The trailer hitch and ball were mismatched in that the hitch was a two-inch size and the ball one and seven-eighths. No safety chains were used; instead, the driver of the trailer had wrapped a coat hanger around the mouth of the hitch. When the truck hit the “bad spot,” the trailer became disconnected and veered into the blocked-off lane striking Ung and another workman. The expert witnesses on causation testified that the accident resulted from a combination of factors: potholes in the road, mismatched trailer ball and hitch, lack of a safety chain on the trailer, and lack of protective barriers.
At the time of the accident, Ung was working for appellant as a member of a crew cleaning debris from the shoulder of the road. The crew was progressing along the roadway as the cleaning was accomplished. The area in which the crew was working was protected by a closed driving lane, lined with orange steel barrels filled with sand. Although there was conflicting evidence regarding the precise location of buffer trucks at the time of the accident, two one-ton trucks and a dump truck were on site to shield the workers from errant vehicles. Lights on the back of each truck directed traffic away from the work area. Appellant had also put up signs ahead of the work site advising motorists of sweepers. The workers themselves wore brightly colored vests supplied by appellant.
Lyle Strandlien, Ung’s supervisor, testified that approximately one year earlier he had seen an accident in the same area involving a *470disconnected trailer. However, there was no evidence regarding the exact location of this prior accident in relation to the one in question and no evidence on the primary cause or contributing causes of the prior accident. No one had been injured in the earlier mishap. Other witnesses and former employees of appellant testified that they would not have placed workers in the location of a previous accident without adequate protection, advance warning signs, and a flag person.
This evidence, while perhaps sufficient to show ordinary negligence, is not legally sufficient to establish gross negligence. Certainly, there is always a risk of harm to anyone on the shoulder of a busy freeway, and appellant obviously was aware of this risk and took precautions to protect its workers by closing a driving lane, placing warning signs, and parking large trucks as buffers. The road cleaning crew was constantly advancing along the roadway, and any failure to have the buffer trucks optimally positioned at the moment of the accident would not in itself amount to any more than ordinary negligence. Considering the circumstances as they existed at the time of the accident, I would hold that appellees failed to establish appellant’s conscious indifference to an extreme risk of serious harm.
The Majority relies on the prior accident as evidence of appellant’s actual knowledge of the risk of harm, but no evidence showed that the prior accident was caused by the same “bad spot” in the road or that appellant knew that the accident was so caused. There was no evidence that the prior accident involved a mismatched trailer ball and hitch or the failure to use a safety chain. No evidence showed that the prior accident occurred in the exact same location.
Thus, the evidence does not establish that appellant was actually aware of an extreme risk to its workers from disconnected trailers veering into the work area. Nor did appellant’s actions, including the placement of warning signs, barrels closing a driving lane, and the use of buffer trucks, exhibit a conscious disregard of that risk. Significantly, the probative value of Ung’s evidence of conscious indifference of an extreme risk must be assessed in view of the undisputed fact that Strandlein, Ung’s supervisor, was standing a mere ten feet from Ung when Ung was struck by the trailer. Considering the factual context of the accident and Strandlein’s close proximity to Ung, I find the evidence legally insufficient to support a finding of gross negligence resulting from appellant’s conscious indifference; also, such finding is factually insufficient in that it is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unfair or unjust.
Although not specifically raised by the appellant, I have an additional concern about the award of punitive damages where the jury verdiet is not unanimous. Punitive damages are quasi-criminal in nature. See Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 20 n. 10. Unanimous verdicts are required in criminal cases. Tex. Code CRIM.PROC.AnN. art. 36.29 (Vernon Supp.1994). In civil cases, however, ten persons of a jury of twelve people may render a verdiet. Tex.R.Civ.P. 292. In the instant case, ten jurors rendered the verdict finding appellant guilty of gross negligence and awarding punitive damages of $2.5 million. Because of the quasi-criminal nature of such damages, I believe that a strong argument can be made for the proposition that a unanimous verdict should be required for the imposition of punitive damages against a defendant.1
Furthermore, “excessive damages ... may adversely affect commerce, employment, and the public regard for the judiciary.” Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Lemon, 861 S.W.2d 501, 531 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ filed) (Brown, C.J., dissenting). In Lemon, Chief Justice Brown found excessive an award of $10,000,000 in exemplary damages and advocated the invocation of a court’s constitutional fact finding powers to require a remittitur to an amount equal to the actual damages found. “Courts should *471be able to say ‘This is just too much.’ ” Id. As did Chief Justice Brown in Lemon, I would so limit any exemplary damages in this case. No actual damages were awarded plaintiffs, but they did receive death benefits through appellant’s workers compensation insurance, which could be considered tantamount to actual damages. Accordingly, I would appropriately limit any exemplary damage recovery.
Because there was no evidence of gross negligence, I would reverse the judgment. Finding for the appellant on a no evidence point, judgment could be rendered for appellant. However, at time of trial, the parties did not have the benefit of the Moñel decision clarifying the proper standard for the legal sufficiency of evidence of gross negligence. Therefore, the parties did not develop their positions in light of the new standard. In the interest of justice, I would remand for a new trial.

. But see In re V.R.S., 512 S.W.2d 350 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1974, no writ) (held that rendition of verdict by ten jurors that child had engaged in delinquent conduct was constitutional even though alleged delinquent conduct was sufficient to constitute felony for which a unanimous verdict would be required to convict an adult).