Court Opinion

ID: 9786313
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 23:53:14.323873+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:43:52.751330
License: Public Domain

THORNE, Judge
(dissenting):
[ 32 The majority's analysis of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) is both insightful and, I believe, largely correct.1 The majority correctly concludes that whether an out-of-court communication is "testimonial" depends on the cireumstances surrounding the communication. Up to that point, I join with the majority opinion. However, I part ways with the majority when, after acknowledging that the question is factual in nature, it decides whether the communication in this case is testimonial instead of remanding the question to the trial court for a factual determination.
133 It is a cornerstone of our appellate process that we do not make factual findings. See Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58,¶ 19, 52 P.3d 1158. We are limited to the record before us and the factual findings as presented by the trial court. See American Fork City v. Singleton, 2002 UT App 331,¶ 6, 57 P.3d 1124. In the absence of such findings, we ought not substitute our own. Instead, we should remand, when allowed, and permit the trial court to first address the issue. See Singleton, 2002 UT App 331 at ¶¶ 6-11, 57 P.3d 1124 (vacating and remanding a defendant's guilty plea because "the trial court failed to make findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding whether there was probable cause to arrest" the defendant); see also 5 C.J.8. Appeal and Error § 710 (1998) ("[The reviewing court is confined to the facts specially found by the trial court.... [It] may not make findings of fact for or against appellant, and cannot consider evidence to find facts or make a decision upon them or supplement the facts found by the trial court with any additional facts([.]" (footnotes omitted)).
T34 Here, it is undisputed that the trial court failed to address, in any substantive way, the question of whether the out-of-court communication was testimonial in nature. Instead, when presented with Williams's Crawford challenge, the trial court announced only that the statements were admissible as hearsay exceptions under the Utah Rules of Evidence. See Utah R. Evid. 808(1)-(2) (defining the present sense impression and excited utterance exceptions to the hearsay rule). As a result, we have no findings concerning the circumstances surrounding the communication. Absent trial court findings, we are in no position to appropriate, ly determine the outcome of this issue. See Singleton, 2002 UT App 331 at ¶¶ 6-11, 57 P.3d 1124. Instead, we should remand this case to the trial court for consideration of whether the cireumstances .of the communication render it testimonial under Crawford.
*561 35 Accordingly, although I agree with the majority's view that the totality of the circumstances must be examined to determine whether an out-of-court communication is testimonial, I dissent from its decision to examine those cireumstances here in the absence of trial court findings. As a result, I also must dissent from the result reached by the majority, and would instead remand the question to the trial court.

. The majority properly concludes that Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), is not implicated unless the totality of the circumstances surrounding an out-of-court communication renders it "testimonial." However, I part ways with the majority when it suggests that Crawford should be read in the narrowest possible terms. By contrast, I read Crawford to suggest a very broad interpretation of the term "testimonial." See id. at 56, 124 S.Ct. 1354 ("[TJhere is scant evidence that [hearsay] exceptions were invoked to admit festimontal statements against the accused in a criminal case[.]"). I believe that Crawford was written to severely limit the admission of any out-of-court statement that directly bears on the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant. As a result, under Crawford, many out-of-court communications that have been permitted under the rules of evidence as excited utterances or present sense impressions may now be inadmissible. See Utah R. Evid. 803(1)-(2). Consequently, I believe a Crawford analysis should not turn on whether the communication was made in the heat of the ' moment, but on whether a reasonable person would conclude that the communication contained evidence of a defendant's wrongdoing, coupled with a conclusion that the speaker knew or should have known that the communication was likely to be utilized as substantive evidence of guilt.