Court Opinion

ID: 9577059
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:31:19.125665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:53.343690
License: Public Domain

CURTIS, J.,
Dissenting. — I am unable to agree with that portion of the majority opinion which holds that during the period of time just prior to the rendition of the judgment the plaintiff was totally disabled and therefore entitled to receive disability payments during said period of time. From the evidence in the record it must be assumed that this condition is permanent, and therefore the effect of the opinion, if permitted to become the final decision of this court, will entitle the plaintiff to receive total disability payments during the remainder of his life.
The majority opinion adopts the definition of total disa*407bility given, in Hurwit v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 45 Cal. App. (2d) 74, 81 [113 Pac. (2d) 691], which holds that total disability is “a disability which prevents his [the insured's] working with reasonable continuity in his customary occupation or in any other occupation in which he might reasonably be expected to engage in view of his station and physical and mental capacity.” I am in accord with this definition of the term “total disability,” but does the evidence in this case by any reasonable interpretation show that the condition of the insured during the time in question prevented his working with reasonable continuity in his customary occupation ? It is conceded by the majority opinion that while in his then condition plaintiff could perform no manual labor, his mental faculties were unimpaired. He was able to drive an automobile and frequently drove to his farms. He was able to negotiate leases, arrange finances for crops, buy supplies, and participate in selling his grain. As stated by his physician, he “could perform all the secretarial work connected with the farm. ’ ’ Since his accident he has participated in the negotiation of leases, has signed notes, negotiated loans, talked to grain buyers, and has attended to the buying of crops. While the actual conduct and control of farm operations has been left in the. hands of his son, he held conferences with his son regarding the transactions incident to the actual operation of the farms, such as the kind of crops to be planted and the time and price for the selling of such crops.
With this undisputed evidence before us, can it be said that the plaintiff was totally disabled? Total disability, as we have seen, is defined as a condition which prevents the insured from working with reasonable continuity in his customary occupation. The above evidence shows that during the entire period covered by his present claim, the plaintiff has worked continuously in his customary occupation. It is true that he has not performed all the duties required of that occupation, but it is equally true that he has performed at least some of said duties. Moreover, it cannot he disputed that he has performed not only a substantial part- of such duties, but a most important .part of those duties.
The present ease cannot be distinguished from the case of Dietlin v. General American Life Ins. Co., 4 Cal. (2d) 336 [49 Pac. (2d) 590]. That case holds that where the insured’s *408duties are twofold, as were the duties of the plaintiff in this ease, and the injury prevented him from performing one class of such duties but did not render him unable to perform another and substantial part of such duties, such injury is not total, and the insured is not entitled to recover under a policy of insurance providing for benefits in case of total disability. The conclusion of the court in that case is contained in the following paragraph of the decision, at p. 345:
“There is no contention that it is necessary that appellant be helpless and unable to perform any of his daily duties, to constitute total disability. However, where he is disabled only from performing one or more of those duties, and is able to perform others, he is only partially disabled. It was so held on the former appeal, where it was said: ‘Although the evidence was sufficient to show that after November 22, 1929, he was disabled from performing “one or more important daily duties pertaining to his occupation,” such disability was clearly a partial disability and not a total disability as defined in the policy as he was not disabled from performing “any and every duty pertaining to his occupation.” ’ ”
While I do not contend that the rule announced in the majority opinion requires that the disability, in order to be total, must render the insured incapable of performing “any and every duty pertaining to his occupation,” it does seem both logical and reasonable to hold that when the insured is able to perform not only a substantial, but the most important part of his former duties, he is not and cannot be totally disabled. While as a result of his injury, the plaintiff was prevented from performing any physical duties required in carrying on his farm operations, his mental faculties were unimpaired, and with the assistance of his son, who after his father’s injury performed the physical work, he operated his extensive farming ventures to the same extent as before his injury.
A recent case decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts is very much in point. In that case the policy of insurance was practically the same as that carried by the plaintiff in the present case at the time of the injury. The insured was a farmer and with the assistance of three employees, he performed all the work upon the farm. After his injury he employed a fourth. Due to his injury he was unable to perform any manual labor about his farm. The case was decided upon an agreed state of facts. The conclusion of the court was as follows: “Upon the agreed facts it is plain *409that the insured is unable to perform the manual labor he had previously done, and that the restriction of his activities in this respect is due to the impairment of his right arm and hand. The record does not disclose that this impairment is accompanied by any pain or suffering. His disability has not been shown to come within the terms of the policy. Indeed his disability has not prevented him from continuously supervising and managing the operations of his dairy and farm as a means of a livelihood, (citing numerous authorities.) ” (Azevedo v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 308 Mass. 216, 219, 220 [31 N. E. (2d) 559, 561].)
I think that both reason and the authorities impel a reversal of the judgment.