Court Opinion

ID: 9411251
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-26 14:09:12.477075+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:05.744628
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Innovation Ridge Partners, L.P.,           :
Regional Industrial Development            :
Authority                                  :
                                           :
       v.                                  : No. 30 C.D. 2023
                                           :
Marshall Township Board                    :
of Supervisors                             :
                                           :
Appeal of: Innovation Center               :
Associates, LP                             : Submitted: June 9, 2023

BEFORE:       HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
              HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
              HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
JUDGE CEISLER                                                    FILED: July 26, 2023

       Appellant Innovation Center Associates, LP (Innovation) appeals two orders
issued by the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (Common Pleas). The
first order, issued on December 16, 2022, denied Innovation’s Petition to Intervene
in Appellees Innovation Ridge Partners, L.P. and Regional Industrial Development
Corporation’s (IRP and RIDC,1 individually, and Developers, collectively) appeal,
which pertained to Appellee Marshall Township Board of Supervisors’ (Board)
denial of IRP’s conditional use application (Application). The second order, issued
on December 19, 2022, approved the Board’s and Developers’ settlement agreement
regarding that appeal. After thorough review, we reverse the December 16, 2022

       1
         RIDC is incorrectly named in this appeal’s caption as “Regional Industrial Development
Authority.”
order, vacate the December 19, 2022 order, and remand this matter to Common Pleas
for further proceedings.
                                  I. Background
      Innovation owns a roughly 9-acre parcel of land, located at 2000 Innovation
Drive in Marshall Township, upon which it has built an approximately 90,000-
square foot office building (Property). Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 2073a-78a.
Innovation purchased this property from IRP, which is a subsidiary of RIDC2 and is
part of a larger 223-acre office park complex known as Innovation Ridge (Office
Park), which is in Marshall Township’s Residential, Research and Technology Park
District. Id. at 2075a-76a; see id. at 14a-15a, 1849a. The permitted uses for Office
Park’s 26 parcels, including the Property, are governed by a Master Plan, which was
approved by the Board in 2002. See id. at 15a-18a.
      In May 2021, an entity known as Millcraft Investments, Inc. (Millcraft) filed
a conditional use application with the Township, through which it sought to modify
the existing Master Plan, so that residential development would be allowed on a
number of Office Park’s parcels. Id. at 19a. Township staff then notified Millcraft
that it was not the proper applicant, because Millcraft did not possess an equitable
interest in Office Park. Id. On May 27, 2021, Robert Randall (Randall), an owner
and principal of Innovation, sent a letter to an executive at RIDC, in which Randall
stated that he was “adamantly opposed” to the proposed Master Plan changes,
because, in his view, “[a]llowing residential town homes would totally change the
environment of [Office Park] and make it even more difficult to lease [the
Property’s] building for commercial use.” Id. at 1249a. Shortly thereafter, in June
2021, IRP filed the Application on behalf of itself and/or RIDC. See id. at 19a.

      2
          See R.R. at 19a.

                                         2
       The Board then convened a public hearing regarding the Application on
September 13, 2021. Though no one sought party status during the course of the
hearing, a number of people, including Randall, offered comments after IRP had
finished presenting its case. Id. at 20a, 24a-26a.3 According to the Board, Randall
stated that he had been unable to find a tenant for
               the [Property’s] building, [but] offered his belief that the
               office [leasing] market will [improve]. He claimed that
               representatives of RIDC told him before he purchased [the
               Property] that there would be no more residential uses on
               the Property, although he did not identify any specific
               individual(s). He is opposed to modifying the Master Plan.
Id. at 24a. Thereafter, on December 6, 2021, the Board voted to deny the
Application, and memorialized this vote through a written decision issued on
December 14, 2021. Id. at 9a-10a, 26a.
       Developers appealed the Board’s denial to Common Pleas on December 23,
2021. Common Pleas subsequently held oral argument on May 24, 2022, and
encouraged the Board and Developers to negotiate a settlement. Id. at 2170a;
Developers’ Br. at 10-11. Thereafter, on November 3, 2022, the Board notified
Randall that it had reached a proposed settlement with Developers and that a public
hearing would be held regarding the proposal on November 7, 2022. R.R. at 2096a.
Randall attended the hearing and, on November 9, 2022, Innovation filed its Petition

       3
          It is unclear why Randall did not attempt to become a party during the course of the
Board’s hearing on the Application. The Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC), Act
of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 10101-11202, provides no meaningful guidance
about how to secure party status at an administrative hearing about subdivision or land
development issues, in contrast to its specific provisos about becoming a party to a zoning-related
hearing. See Miravich v. Twp. of Exeter, 6 A.3d 1076, 1078-79 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). Where, as
here, a local agency has adopted formal procedures governing the according of party status in a
land development-related hearing, an individual must comply with those procedures in order to
secure the right to subsequently appeal an adverse decision rendered in that matter. See id. at 1079-
80.

                                                 3
to Intervene. Id. at 2096a-97a. On November 14, 2022, the Board voted in favor of
adopting the proposed settlement agreement. Id. at 2170a. Common Pleas then held
oral argument regarding the Petition to Intervene on December 14, 2022, after which
it issued its December 16, 2022 order denying the Petition to Intervene, followed by
its December 19, 2022 order approving the proposed settlement agreement.
Innovation appealed to our Court shortly thereafter.4
                                        II. Discussion
       Innovation offers several arguments for our consideration, which we
summarize as follows. First, Common Pleas’ denial of the Petition to Intervene was
an abuse of discretion and was predicated upon errors of law, because the settlement
agreement gave Innovation standing to join Developers’ appeal as an original party
and would affect Innovation’s legally enforceable interests. Innovation’s Br. at 21-
27. Innovation next argued that the denial was legally and factually incorrect because
Innovation’s interests were no longer adequately represented by the Board, the
Petition to Intervene was timely, and intervention at that juncture would not have
prejudiced the Board or Developers. Id. at 27-31. Third, Common Pleas’ approval
of the settlement agreement unlawfully authorized the Master Plan’s revision, in
violation of the MPC and Marshall Township’s Zoning Ordinance.5 Id. at 31-38.

       4
         Developers subsequently filed a Petition to Require Posting of Appeal Bond in Common
Pleas on February 7, 2023, which Common Pleas granted on February 22, 2023. R.R. at 2024a-
42a, 2060a. Common Pleas conditioned Innovation’s ability to proceed with this appeal upon the
posting of a $6,000,000 bond within 10 days, and stated that the bond would be “forfeited” to
Developers in the event the appeal was “denied and dismissed.” Id. at 2060a. Innovation then filed
an Application to Eliminate Security Pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1737(a)(4) with this Court on March
3, 2023, which we granted on April 27, 2023. In doing so, we relieved Innovation of the obligation
to post the aforementioned bond and placed this appeal on an expedited schedule. Cmwlth. Ct.
Mem. and Order, 4/27/23, at 1-3.

       5
           Marshall Township Zoning Ordinance, Allegheny County, Pa., as amended (2007).

                                                4
Finally, Common Pleas improperly approved the settlement agreement, because the
Board and Developers violated Innovation’s due process rights by failing to provide
adequate notice regarding the terms of that agreement and an opportunity to object
thereto. Id. at 38-40.
      We begin with a recitation of the law regarding intervention in land use
appeals. Pursuant to Section 1004-A of the MPC:6
               Within the 30 days first following the filing of a land use
               appeal, if the appeal is from a board or agency of a
               municipality, the municipality and any owner or tenant of
               property directly involved in the action appealed from may
               intervene as of course by filing a notice of intervention,
               accompanied by proof of service of the same, upon each
               appellant or each appellant's counsel of record. All other
               intervention shall be governed by the Pennsylvania Rules
               of Civil Procedure.
53 P.S. § 11004-A. Moving on, Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 2327 offers
the following instructions regarding who may intervene in a matter:
               At any time during the pendency of an action, a person not
               a party thereto shall be permitted to intervene therein,
               subject to these rules if
                     (1) the entry of a judgment in such action or the
                     satisfaction of such judgment will impose any
                     liability upon such person to indemnify in whole or
                     in part the party against whom judgment may be
                     entered; or
                     (2) such person is so situated as to be adversely
                     affected by a distribution or other disposition of
                     property in the custody of the court or of an officer
                     thereof; or
                     (3) such person could have joined as an original
                     party in the action or could have been joined therein;
                     or

      6
          Added by the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L.1329, 53 P.S. § 11004-A.

                                              5
                     (4) the determination of such action may affect any
                     legally enforceable interest of such person whether
                     or not such person may be bound by a judgment in
                     the action.
Pa. R.Civ.P. 2327. However, the fact that a person falls into one of these categories
does not automatically entitle them to permission to intervene in a matter. Per
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 2329:
             Upon the filing of the petition and after hearing, of which
             due notice shall be given to all parties, the court, if the
             allegations of the petition have been established and are
             found to be sufficient, shall enter an order allowing
             intervention; but an application for intervention may be
             refused, if
                    (1) the claim or defense of the petitioner is not in
                    subordination to and in recognition of the propriety
                    of the action; or
                    (2) the interest of the petitioner is already
                    adequately represented; or
                    (3) the petitioner has unduly delayed in making
                    application for intervention or the intervention will
                    unduly delay, embarrass or prejudice the trial or the
                    adjudication of the rights of the parties.
Pa. R.Civ.P. 2329.
             Considering Rules 2327 and 2329 together, the effect of
             Rule 2329 is that if the petitioner is a person within one of
             the classes described in Rule 2327, the allowance of
             intervention is mandatory, not discretionary, unless one of
             the grounds for refusal under Rule 2329 is present.
             Equally, if the petitioner does not show himself to be
             within one of the four classes described in Rule 2327,
             intervention must be denied, irrespective of whether any
             of the grounds for refusal in Rule 2329 exist. See In re
             [Pa.] Crime Comm’n, . . . 309 A.2d 401, 408 n. 11 ([Pa.]
             1973); 7 Goodrich Amram 2d Intervention § 2329:3
             (1992). Thus, the court is given the discretion to allow or
             to refuse intervention only where the petitioner falls within
             one of the classes enumerated in Rule 2327 and only

                                          6
              where one of the grounds under Rule 2329 is present
              which authorizes the refusal of intervention.
Larock v. Sugarloaf Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 740 A.2d 308, 313 (Pa. Cmwlth.
1999). An appellate court’s scope of review regarding the disposition of a petition
to intervene is limited to scrutinizing the lower tribunal’s ruling for abuses of
discretion and errors of law. Acorn Dev. Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Upper
Merion Twp., 523 A.2d 436, 437 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987).
       Here, Common Pleas explained that it denied the Petition to Intervene
“because [Innovation] lacks standing, the Petition [to Intervene] was untimely, and
all parties would be significantly prejudiced by [Innovation’s] untimely
intervention.” R.R. at 2172a.7 Each of these conclusions, however, are factually
and/or legally erroneous.
       With regard to the first conclusion, it is unclear why Common Pleas referred
to Innovation’s putative lack of standing, as it provides no meaningful discussion to
buttress its conclusion on that point and, moreover, “the test for standing to initiate
litigation is not co-terminus with the test for intervention in existing litigation.”
Allegheny Reprod. Health Ctr. v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 225 A.3d 902,
910-11 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020). This focus upon standing is all the more curious,
considering that Common Pleas also stated that Innovation “presented testimony that
its building is less than 200 feet from [Developers’] proposed development and that
the settlement [agreement would] negatively affect[] its property interest, property
value[,] and leasing opportunities.” Common Pleas Op., 3/30/23, at 2. At minimum,
this unrebutted evidence supports Innovation’s right to intervene under Pennsylvania
Rule of Civil Procedure 2327(4). Notably, Developers state in their brief that they

       7
         As such, we need not address Innovation’s argument regarding adequate representation,
because that was not one of the reasons why Common Pleas denied the Petition to Intervene.

                                              7
and Common Pleas “accepted that [Innovation] has a ‘legally enforceable interest’
because it owns an [Office Park] parcel and has concerns regarding uses permitted
[on] parcels proximate to [the Property].” Developers’ Br. at 29.
      In addition, Common Pleas’ second and third conclusions, which present
essentially duplicative assertions that the Petition to Intervene was untimely, are
simply incorrect. Our decision in Keener v. Zoning Hearing Board of Millcreek
Township, 714 A.2d 1120 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998), provides us with guidance. In
Keener, a landowner was unsuccessful in its attempt to obtain variance relief from
the municipality’s zoning hearing board that would have enabled it to use its
property as a quarry. 714 A.2d 1120, 1121 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). The landowner
appealed this denial to the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County (Lebanon
County Court) and the municipality subsequently defended its decision over the
better part of the ensuing six years. Id. at 1121-23. At some point during these
proceedings, a neighbor intervened in opposition to the landowner’s appeal. Id. at
1121. Thereafter, the municipality and the landowner agreed to a settlement,
whereupon both parties sought judicial approval of the agreement and, in addition,
the landowner asked Lebanon County Court to dismiss the neighbor as an intervenor
because, in pertinent part, the municipality was adequately representing the
neighbor’s interests. Id. at 1121-22. Lebanon County Court granted the landowner’s
motion to dismiss the neighbor as an intervenor and approved the settlement
agreement, whereupon the neighbor appealed those rulings to our court. Id. at 1122.
Of particular relevance, we reversed the neighbor’s dismissal, reasoning that the
municipality had adequately represented the neighbor’s interests for an extended
period of time, but ceased to do so once it agreed to settle the appeal, because that
choice caused it to effectively ally itself with the landowner. Id. at 1123.

                                         8
Accordingly, we concluded that Lebanon County Court should not have dismissed
the neighbor from the appeal and, furthermore, should have given the neighbor an
opportunity to argue against judicial approval of the settlement agreement. Id.
       While Keener dealt with a settlement agreement’s impact upon adequate
representation of an intervenor, and not the timeliness of an intervention request, its
logic is still instructive. Similar to what occurred in Keener, Innovation’s interests
were largely coterminous with those of the Board, in that both entities opposed
Developers’ proposed revisions to the Master Plan, until the Board elected to switch
sides, so to speak, by agreeing to settle Developers’ appeal in November 2022. This
development appears to have taken Innovation by complete surprise, as there is no
proof that Innovation knew that Developers and the Board had been negotiating a
settlement; rather, it seems that Innovation was unaware of what had been going on
behind the scenes until the Board’s November 3, 2022 email to Randall. See R.R. at
2095a-96a.8 Thus, Common Pleas should have considered the timeliness of
Innovation’s Petition to Intervene in the context of these changed circumstances,

       8
          The Board argues that the Petition to Intervene was untimely because the Board
represented the public interest, rather than Innovation’s interests, and also expressed hope in its
written decision that Developers would “maintain further dialogue with the Township with regard
to potential modifications to the Master Plan[,]” while Developers maintain that the Petition to
Intervene was untimely because Innovation was put on notice in May 2021 that Developers sought
to amend the Master Plan. See Board’s Br. at 2-3; Developers’ Br. at 26-31. These points, however,
do nothing to change the fact that Innovation’s interests were substantially similar to those of the
Board, at both the local level and before Common Pleas, for nearly the entirety of this matter’s
proceedings. Nor do they show that Innovation was aware that settlement negotiations were taking
place or that the Board’s comments regarding “further dialogue” were anything more than
aspirational. Compare Twp. of Radnor v. Radnor Recreational, LLC, 859 A.2d 1, 3 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2004) (court of common pleas did not abuse discretion by denying petition to intervene where
proposed intervenors were aware of settlement negotiations between municipality and appellant;
had previously procured independent legal representation because they did not believe
municipality would adequately represent their interests; were invited to join settlement
negotiations, but declined to do so; and did not seek to intervene until after the settlement
agreement had been adopted by the municipality and approved by the court of common pleas).

                                                 9
rather than by focusing on the time that had elapsed between Developers’ filing of
their appeal with Common Pleas for the Board’s denial of their proposal to revise
the Master Plan, and Innovation’s attempt to interject itself into the matter. As we
have noted in the past, “[e]very delay on the part of the petitioner does not constitute
undue delay nor does the fact that intervention is not sought until an advanced stage
of the proceedings prove that there has been undue delay. It must be remembered
that [ ] Rule [2327] expressly permits intervention ‘at any time during the pendency
of an action.’” Wexford Sci. & Tech., LLC v. City of Pittsburgh Zoning Bd. of
Adjustment, 260 A.3d 316, 327 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (quoting 7 GOODRICH AMRAM
2d, Intervention, § 2329:8 (2021), Amram Commentary). Given that Innovation
sought to intervene only six days after Randall learned of the proposed settlement
agreement’s existence, and did so before that agreement was formally adopted by
the Board and approved by Common Pleas, Innovation, like the neighbor in Keener,
should have been given an opportunity to argue against judicial approval of that
settlement. As a result, Common Pleas abused its discretion when it concluded that
the Petition to Intervene was untimely.
                                   III. Conclusion
      Therefore, we reverse Common Pleas’ December 16, 2022 order, through
which it denied Innovation’s Petition to Intervene and vacate Common Pleas’
December 19, 2022 order, through which it approved the Board and Developers’
proposed settlement agreement. In addition, we remand this matter to Common

                                          10
Pleas, with instructions that it convene a hearing within 60 days, at which Innovation
shall be offered a chance to argue against judicial approval of that agreement.9

                                              ____________________________
                                              ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

       9
         We need not address the remainder of Innovation’s arguments, due to our disposition of
this matter.

                                              11
           IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Innovation Ridge Partners, L.P.,    :
Regional Industrial Development     :
Authority                           :
                                    :
      v.                            : No. 30 C.D. 2023
                                    :
Marshall Township Board             :
of Supervisors                      :
                                    :
Appeal of: Innovation Center        :
Associates, LP                      :

                                   ORDER

      AND NOW, this 26th day of July, 2023, it is hereby ORDERED:
      1.    The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County’s (Common Pleas)
            December 16, 2022 order is REVERSED;
      2.    Common Pleas’ December 19, 2022 order is VACATED;
      3.    This matter is REMANDED to Common Pleas, with instructions that it
            convene a hearing within 60 days, at which Appellant Innovation
            Center Associates, LP shall be given an opportunity to argue against
            judicial approval of the proposed settlement agreement between
            Appellees Innovation Ridge Partners, L.P., Marshall Township Board
            of Supervisors, and Regional Industrial Development Corporation.
      Jurisdiction relinquished.

                                       ____________________________
                                       ELLEN CEISLER, Judge