Court Opinion

ID: 9898058
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:28:10.617775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:10.001551
License: Public Domain

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                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

       STATE OF WASHINGTON,
                                                         No. 84638-8-I
                            Respondent,
                                                         DIVISION ONE
                     v.
                                                         PUBLISHED OPINION
       LAWRENCE DUNBAR SMALLEY,

                            Appellant.

              MANN, J. — Lawrence Smalley was convicted of assault in the second degree,

       domestic violence. At sentencing the trial court imposed a 10-year domestic violence

       no-contact order prohibiting Smalley from contact with his victim. Smalley argues that

       the trial court erred in entering the no-contact order for 10 years from the date of

       sentencing without taking into account credit for time served. We affirm.

                                                    I.

              Smalley was arrested and charged by amended information with assault in the

       first degree, domestic violence for stabbing his roommate Gary Johnson with a knife. A

       jury found Smalley guilty of the lesser included crime of assault in the second degree.
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       No. 84638-8-I/2

       By special verdict, the jury also found that Smalley was armed with a deadly weapon

       and that Smalley and Johnson were members of the same household at the time of the

       commission of the crime.

              On January 24, 2022, Smalley was sentenced to 26 months of confinement. The

       trial court also entered a postconviction domestic violence no-contact order preventing

       Smalley from contacting Johnson for 10 years. The no-contact order expires January

       24, 2032—10 years from the date of sentencing. Smalley appeals.

                                                    II.

              Smalley argues that the trial court erred in imposing a no-contact order that

       expired 10 years after the date of sentencing because it failed to consider credit for time

       served. We disagree.

              We review sentencing conditions for an abuse of discretion. State v. Warren,

       165 Wn.2d 17, 32, 195 P.3d 940 (2008). But we review questions of statutory

       interpretation de novo. State v. J.P., 149 Wn.2d 444, 449, 69 P.3d 318 (2003). In

       interpreting a statute, we look first to its plain language. J.P., 149 Wn. 2d at 450. If the

       plain language of the statute is unambiguous, then this court’s inquiry ends. J.P., 149

       Wn. 2d at 450.

              The Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW permits trial

       courts to impose “crime-related prohibitions” such as no-contact orders when

       sentencing defendants. State v. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d 106, 120, 156 P.3d 201

       (2007). Under RCW 10.99.050(1), when a defendant is found guilty of a crime and a

       condition of the sentence restricts the defendant’s ability to have contact with the victim,

       such condition shall be recorded and a written certified copy of that order shall be

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       No. 84638-8-I/3

       provided to the victim. An order issued under RCW 10.99.050 in conjunction with a

       felony sentence remains in effect for a fixed period determined by the court, which may

       not exceed the adult maximum sentence. RCW 10.99.050(2)(d). Prohibiting contact

       with the victim may be enforced after completion of the defendant’s sentence. RCW

       9.94A.637(6).

              Smalley was found guilty of assault in the second degree, a class B felony. RCW

       9A.36.021(2)(a). The statutory maximum sentence for that crime is 10 years. RCW

       9A.20.021(1)(b). Thus, the trial court was authorized to order Smalley to have no

       contact with the victim, Johnson, for 10 years beginning on January 24, 2022, the date

       of sentencing.

              Smalley disagrees, first citing State v. Granath, 190 Wn. 2d 548, 554-55, 415

       P.3d 1179 (2018), for the proposition that the expiration date of a no-contact order must

       be calculated by taking the maximum term and subtracting credit for time served

       because the length of the no-contact order is tied to the length of the no-contact

       condition. Smalley’s reliance on Granath is misplaced.

              In Granath, our Supreme Court held that RCW 10.99.050(1) does not give a

       district court, whose jurisdiction is limited by statute, independent authority to issue no-

       contact orders. Granath, 190 Wn.2d at 556-57. Rather, RCW 10.99.050(1) merely

       authorizes a district court to enter a no-contact order that records the no-contact

       condition of a sentence. Granath, 190 Wn.2d at 556. And because the no-contact

       condition of the sentence at issue in Granath lasted only two years, the district court

       erred by entering a five year no-contact order. Granath, 190 Wn. 2d at 557. But, unlike

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       No. 84638-8-I/4

       in this case, Granath involved a nonfelony sentence and was silent on whether a court

       must give credit for any previous time served.

                 Following the decision in Granath, the legislature amended RCW 10.99.050.

       Under amended RCW 10.99.050(2), the length of a no-contact order in conjunction with

       a felony sentence may not exceed the adult maximum sentence for the underlying

       felony:

                 (d) An order issued pursuant to this section in conjunction with a felony
                 sentence or juvenile disposition remains in effect for a fixed period of time
                 determined by the court, which may not exceed the adult maximum
                 sentence established in RCW 9A.20.021.

       The legislature’s findings explained:

                 The legislature believes the existing language of RCW 10.99.050 has
                 always authorized courts to issue domestic violence no-contact orders in
                 adult and juvenile cases that last up to the adult statutory maximum in
                 felony cases and up to the maximum period for which an adult sentence
                 can be suspended or deferred in nonfelony cases. However, in State v.
                 Granath, 200 Wn. App. 26, 401 P.3d 405 (2017), aff’d, 190 Wn.2d 548,
                 415 P.3d 1179 (2018), the court of appeals and supreme court recently
                 interpreted this provision to limit domestic violence no-contact orders in
                 nonfelony sentences to the duration of the defendant’s conditions of
                 sentence. The legislature finds that this interpretation inadequately
                 protects victims of domestic violence. The legislature intends to clarify the
                 trial courts’ authority to issue no-contact orders that remain in place in
                 adult and juvenile nonfelony cases for the maximum period of time that an
                 adult sentence could be suspended, and in adult and juvenile felony cases
                 for the adult statutory maximum.

       LAWS OF 2019, ch. 263, § 301(1). The legislative findings support the plain language of

       the statute: in felony cases, the trial court has authority to issue no-contact orders that

       remain in place for the adult statutory maximum.

                 Smalley also argues that reducing a no-contact order by time served is

       consistent with State v. Navarro, 188 Wn. App. 550, 354 P.3d 22 (2015). But the part of

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       No. 84638-8-I/5

       Navarro on which Smalley relies involved sexual assault protection orders. See

       Navarro, 188 Wn. App. at 555. By statute, sexual assault protection orders “shall

       remain in effect for a period of two years following the expiration of any sentence of

       imprisonment and subsequent period of community supervision, conditional release,

       probation, or parole.” RCW 9A.44.210(6)(c) (emphasis added). Thus, those orders are

       explicitly tied to the end of a sentence, as such, credit for time served must be

       considered. In Navarro, the court held “[b]ecause an offender’s actual release date is

       unknowable at the time of sentencing, a sexual assault protection order should not

       provide a fixed expiration date.” 188 Wn. App. at 555-56. And more applicable here,

       the separate no-contact orders issued in Navarro that extended to the maximum term of

       10 years for the crime were upheld. 188 Wn. App. at 556-57.

              RCW 10.99.050(2)(d) permits the trial court to impose a no-contact order to

       remain in effect up to the adult maximum sentence. For class B felonies, the maximum

       sentence is 10 years. RCW 9A.36.021(2)(a); RCW 9A.20.021(1)(b). The trial court did

       not err.

              We affirm.

       WE CONCUR:

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