Court Opinion

ID: 9759640
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:23:16.822522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:03.704555
License: Public Domain

Neil, Chief Justice
(dissenting in part).
The practice and procedure in the criminal Court of Haywood County with reference to the grand jury’s action, in finding and returning indictments and presentments, is contrary to the judicial history of this State. This is practically conceded by the majority opinion in citing cases to that effect, such as Garret v. State, 17 Tenn. 389, wherein it is held that the presentment “is signed by the grand jurors individually”; State v. Darnal, 20 Tenn. 290; and Glenn v. State, 31 Tenn. 19.
In Grilreath’s History of a Law Suit, Seventh Edition, Section 722, page 829, it is said:
“Now, when the grand jury wish to present an offense, they call upon the attorney general to prepare a presentment in the form of an indictment, which he submits to them without his signature; it is then signed by all of the jury and returned into court, and it is to this the defendant is to answer.”
We have no cases to the contrary. The foregoing rule of practice and procedure has been regarded by the Bench and Bar as the settled law of this State for more than a century, or since Garret v. State, supra, decided in 1836; and is the only practical method whereby an indictment or presentment is officially authenticated.
*76The majority opinion quotes the following excerpt from 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Information sec. 55, p. 910:
“By the weight of authority, in the absence of a statute, is it not necessary that an indictment or presentment shall be signed either by all of the grand jurors or by the foreman, * * *”
But the Assistant Attorney General for the State says with reference to this authority: ‘ ‘ The rule in this jurisdiction is to the contrary in view of our cases. ’ ’
I readily agree to the opinion of this Court in State v. Davidson, 171 Tenn. 347, 103 S.W.2d 22, 24, that:
“It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the design of the Code of 1932 was to make all offenses subject to prosecution upon presentment.”
But neither this case nor Stanley v. State, 171 Tenn.. 406, 104 S.W.2d 819 (also mentioned in the majority opinion) departs from the historical practice as set forth in Gilreath’s History of a Law Suit, supra.
Finally the majority contends: “In no case though is it laid down as a positive rule that the presentment must be signed by the grand jurors.” This statement is correct. But the cases cited repeatedly state that the presentment “is signed by the grand jurors individually”, or that “they will sign” it. I interpret the language used to mean that it is their legal duty to affix their individual signatures to it. It is an official act by each of them which cannot be delegated to another.
I do not dispute the general rule that a person may lawfully authorize another to sign his name and thus *77bind bim to any personal transaction. Bnt in the absence of a statute signatures by public officers to a public document, which they are required to sign in order to authenticate it, cannot be delegated. 80 C.J.S. Signatures sec. 9, p. 1295. While there is some authority to the contrary, there is no case in this jurisdiction, until this appeal reached this Court, holding that a grand juror may delegate to another the performance of any official act which resides solely within his sound discretion.
Moreover I feel that any departure from the time honored practice of requiring jurors to sign their individual names upon a presentment would result in troublesome, if not dire, consequences. It would open wide the door to controversies as to whether or not a grand juror had actually delegated the authority to another to affix his signature to a presentment.
I agree that under the facts of this ease the trial court should be affirmed. The defendant was not prejudiced by- the form of the presentment. It was prepared and signed by the District Attorney General and the record affirmatively shows that the grand jurors voted to report it as a true bill which was done. In my opinion the defendant had a fair and impartial trial, and there is no ground for complaint as to the result.
For reasons stated in the foregoing memorandum opinion, I feel that the Court should expressly disapprove the practice prevailing in Haywood County, and possibly other counties in the district, where grand jurors do not sign their individual names to a presentment. In other respects I concur with the majority.