Court Opinion

ID: 9918294
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 16:00:59.509065+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:04.931347
License: Public Domain

22-6388
     Yang v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                            Zagzoug, IJ
                                                                           A208 445 346

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                 SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
 2   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
 3   Square, in the City of New York, on the 12th day of January, two thousand
 4   twenty-four.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7              SUSAN L. CARNEY,
 8              WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
 9              EUNICE C. LEE,
10                    Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   HUANG YANG,
14           Petitioner,
15
16                     v.                                        22-6388
17                                                               NAC
18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20              Respondent.
21   _____________________________________
22
23   FOR PETITIONER:                   Adedayo O. Idowu, Esq., New York, NY.
1    FOR RESPONDENT:                     Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
2                                        Attorney General; Walter Bocchini, Senior
3                                        Litigation Counsel; Monica M. Twombly,
4                                        Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration
5                                        Litigation, United States Department of
6                                        Justice, Washington, DC.

7          UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

8    Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

9    DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

10         Huang Yang, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks

11   review of a July 29, 2022 decision of the BIA affirming an October 23, 2018 decision

12   of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of

13   removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Huang

14   Yang, No. A 208 445 346 (B.I.A. July 29, 2022), aff’g No. A 208 445 346 (Immigr. Ct.

15   N.Y.C. Oct. 23, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying

16   facts and procedural history.

17         In lieu of filing a brief, the government moves for summary denial of Yang’s

18   petition for review. Summary denial is a “rare exception to the completion of the

19   appeal process” and “is available only if an appeal is truly frivolous.” United

20   States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

21   Yang has filed his brief, so rather than determining whether the petition meets the
                                              2
1    standard for frivolousness, we construe the government’s motion for summary

 2   denial as its brief and deny the petition on its merits.

3          We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decision, “including the

4    portions [of the IJ’s decision] not explicitly discussed by the BIA.” Yun-Zui Guan

5    v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005). We review the agency’s adverse

6    credibility determination “under the substantial evidence standard.” Hong Fei

7    Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018). “[T]he administrative findings of

8    fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to

9    conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

10         “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a

11   trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or

12   responsiveness of the applicant or witness, . . . the consistency between the

13   applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements (whenever made and whether

14   or not under oath, and considering the circumstances under which the statements

15   were made), the internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency of

16   such statements with other evidence of record . . . , and any inaccuracies or

17   falsehoods in such statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency,

18   inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other

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1    relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility

2    determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no

3    reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia

4    Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.

 5   Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Yang was not

6    credible as to his claim that he was arrested, beaten, and detained by Chinese

7    police because he attended an underground Christian church.

8          The record reflects multiple inconsistencies between Yang’s statements at

 9   his credible fear interview, his testimony, and corroborating evidence about the

10   arrest that is the sole basis of his claim of persecution. As an initial matter, Yang

11   has not challenged the reliability of the credible fear interview. But even if he

12   had, the agency did not err in relying on it. The agency may consider statements

13   made in a credible fear interview when assessing an applicant’s credibility so long

14   as “the record of [the] credible fear interview displays the hallmarks of

15   reliability.” Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585 F.3d 715, 725 (2d Cir. 2009). The record

16   displays those hallmarks: it contains a typewritten list of the questions posed and

17   Yang’s responses; the interview was conducted through an interpreter, and the

18   record reflects that Yang understood the questions; the interpreter read Yang a

                                               4
1    statement about the purpose of the interview, the importance of answering

2    truthfully, and the importance for asking for clarification as needed; and the

3    questions were “designed to elicit a potential basis for an asylum claim.” Id.

4    (quoting Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 181 (2d Cir. 2004)). Although

5    Yang testified that he sometimes had trouble understanding the interpreter’s

6    meaning, he stated at the interview that he understood the interpreter, and his

7    answers at the interview were responsive—confirming that he understood the

8    questions.

9          The multiple inconsistencies between Yang’s interview statements, his

10   testimony, and corroborating letters provide substantial evidence for the adverse

11   credibility determination. See Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020)

12   (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude an alien from showing that an IJ

13   was compelled to find him credible. Multiple inconsistencies would so preclude

14   even more forcefully.”). The IJ identified inconsistencies relating to when Yang

15   joined the church, the dates of physical harm, how he was beaten during a raid on

16   the church, how many officers were at the raid, how many church members were

17   arrested, how long he was detained, and the amount of bail paid. Review of the

18   record confirms these inconsistencies.

                                               5
 1         Yang challenges the inconsistencies regarding when he joined the church

 2   and when the police physically abused him. The record confirms that he stated

 3   at his interview that he joined the church in May, but he testified at the hearing

 4   that it was March when his friend introduced him to the church and when he

 5   joined the church. As to the dates of physical abuse, on cross examination, Yang

 6   reverted to the dates from his interview, stating that he may have forgotten the

 7   dates given the time that had passed. The agency was not required to credit that

 8   explanation because he initially gave specific, but different dates. See Majidi v.

 9   Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a

10   plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must

11   demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his

12   testimony.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).       Yang now argues that these

13   inconsistencies are attributable to the specific questions asked at the interview; but

14   this contradicts his explanation at the hearing that the dates he gave at the

15   interview were correct. Moreover, the interviewer clearly distinguished between

16   questions about threats and physical abuse.          Yang has not challenged the

17   remaining inconsistencies. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 541 n.1 (2d

18   Cir. 2005) (noting that issues not sufficiently argued in a petitioner’s brief “are

                                               6
1    considered waived and normally will not be addressed on appeal”); see also Shunfu

2    Li v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 141, 146–47 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that waived issues could

3    support adverse credibility determination).

4          In addition to the inconsistencies, the adverse credibility determination is

 5   bolstered by Yang’s lack of reliable corroboration.      “An applicant’s failure to

 6   corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of

 7   corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that

 8   has already been called into question.” Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273

 9   (2d Cir. 2007).     The letters from Yang’s mother and church friend were

10   inconsistent with his interview statements or testimony, and he did not present

11   testimony from his sister and parents who are living in the United States. See Yan

12   Juan Chen v. Holder, 658 F.3d 246, 253–54 (2d Cir. 2011) (upholding agency’s

13   conclusion that applicant’s husband’s lack of immigration status did not render

14   him unavailable to testify).

15         Given the multiple inconsistencies related to the alleged persecution and the

16   lack of corroboration, substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse

17   credibility determination. See Likai Gao, 968 F.3d at 145 n.8; Biao Yang, 496 F.3d at

18   273; see also Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d 289, 294 (2d Cir. 2006)

                                               7
 1   (“Where the IJ’s adverse credibility finding is based on specific examples in the

 2   record of inconsistent statements . . . about matters material to [a] claim of

 3   persecution . . . , a reviewing court will generally not be able to conclude that a

 4   reasonable adjudicator was compelled to find otherwise.” (quoting Zhou Yun

 5   Zhang v. INS, 386 F.3d 66, 74 (2d Cir. 2004), overruled on other grounds by Shi Liang

 6   Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 494 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2007)). The adverse credibility

 7   determination is dispositive because Yang’s claims for asylum, withholding of

 8   removal, and CAT relief were all based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v.

 9   Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).

10         For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

11   motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

12                                          FOR THE COURT:
13                                          Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
14                                          Clerk of Court

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