Court Opinion

ID: 9474359
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:55:33.153761+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:02.783900
License: Public Domain

GARTH, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Juan Martinez was charged with the willful, unlawful, and premeditated killing of Felipe Gomez in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 922(a)(1). He now appeals from his conviction and sentence of life imprisonment without parole for first degree murder, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of premeditation, and that the district court abused its discretion in failing to order a new trial based on new evidence.
At the request of the court made at oral argument, counsel submitted a supplemental argument addressed to the question whether the government’s failure to supply Martinez with this “new evidence” — Martinez’s own statement which he allegedly made to police upon his arrest — constituted a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). The majority now remands for a Brady hearing.
This case is a classic example of an appellate court deciding not the case before it, but the case that it wishes were before it. The majority today takes a case of relatively straightforward fact and law, dresses it up with imagined issues and conjectured circumstances 1 — none of which appear in the record and few of which have even been raised before us — and crowns it with a legal theory which defies both logic and precedent.
Faced with a mandatory sentence which it finds unpalatable, the majority has constructed out of whole cloth an untenable and unsupportable Brady theory requiring the prosecution to provide a defendant with evidence that the defendant already possesses in order to support a self-defense theory which the defendant never offered. Moreover, there is no principled justifica*312tion for a Brady remand predicated upon a self-defense theory in light of the undisputed evidence that Martinez delivered a coup de grace by firing two additional shots into Gomez’s back after Gomez had already been felled by two shots.
Implicitly recognizing the lack of justification for a Brady hearing, the majority has steadfastly declined to explain why it has remanded instead of affirming. Instead, the majority seeks to sweep the whole coup de grace episode under the rug by artfully claiming that because the totality of the evidence supports the jury’s finding of premeditation “we need not decide the government’s contention that the final one or two shots ... are sufficient, standing alone, to establish willful, premeditated and deliberate murder.” Maj. Op. at 305 n. 1.
No matter how skillfully the majority softens, reinterprets, or ignores the facts of Martinez’s actions, the coup de grace record as it stands leaves no room for an ersatz self-defense claim based on Brady. The majority engages in nothing less than judicial juggling to reach its desired result. It is primarily for this reason, even though there are other reasons that argue against remand, that I dissent from the court’s decision which remands this case to the district court for a Brady hearing.
I.
On March 4, 1984, at about eleven in the evening, Felipe Gomez was fatally shot four times. Gomez was found in front of Building # 4 of the Walter I.M. Hodge Pa-villion in Frederiksted, St. Croix. Juan Martinez was charged with premeditated murder. Because the setting in which Gomez’s murder took place is highly relevant to the issues which the majority now has created to support a remand, I think it is important to summarize the evidence leading to the majority’s conclusion.
The evidence at trial disclosed that Building # 4 is a three-story dwelling with two apartments on the ground level on opposite sides of the entry way. Each of the ground floor apartments has a front door and a side door opening onto the back porch area. The two doors are separated by a decorative brick wall through which one can see, but which prevents access from the front of the building to the back or vice versa. In order to go from one side of the brick wall to the other, one must walk entirely around the building. According to a scale-drawn location plan of the housing project introduced by the government, this distance is either approximately 105 feet or 285 feet, depending upon the direction (left or right) around the building that one chooses.
The autopsy report on Gomez reflected four gunshot wounds. Gomez was shot twice in the front: once in the head and once in the upper chest. The other two bullets entered Gomez’s back.
At trial, the government presented eyewitness testimony of the shooting. Miguel Lopez testified that he knew both Martinez and Gomez, and that on the night of the killing he had encountered Gomez walking towards Building #4, were Martinez was staying in Lopez’s ground floor apartment. Lopez testified that, from outside the building, he observed Gomez approach the front door and knock on it. He then heard the side door open and heard Martinez and Gomez argue through the designer brick work which separated the front of the building from the side door of the apartment. Lopez observed Martinez standing behind (inside of) the brick work wall. He then heard two or three shots ring out from Martinez’s side of the wall, and saw Gomez fall to the ground. According to Lopez, Martinez then walked around the building and fired an additional two shots into Gomez’s fallen body.
Another eyewitness, Bobbie Hersford, testified that he heard the three shots, went to his window, and observed a man whose face he could not see walk around to the front of Building #4 and fire a shot towards the ground. A third eyewitness, Maria Francis, testified that she observed a man walk towards the front of Building #4 and fire three shots at the ground. *313Francis later identified Martinez as the man she had observed.
A police officer who arrived first at the scene testified that he observed Gomez’s brother, Mario Rivera, trying to revive Gomez, but found no weapons at the scene.
Martinez testified to an alibi defense. Martinez maintained that he had left Lopez’s apartment around seven in the evening and went first to his sister’s house, and then to his father’s house. Martinez’s father, brother, and two sisters testified in corroboration of his story.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty of first degree murder. The district court judge sentenced Martinez on the same day to a mandatory sentence of life without parole.
II.
We must uphold a verdict of guilty if there is substantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, to support the verdict. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2150, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1977). The element of premeditation may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the homicide. Government of Virgin Islands v. Roldan, 612 F.2d 775 (3d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 920, 100 S.Ct. 1857, 64 L.Ed.2d 275 (1980); Government of Virgin Islands v. Lake, 362 F.2d 770 (3d Cir.1966), including the fact that the victim was unarmed.
The majority concludes that the evidence presented supports a finding of premeditation and deliberation. Maj. Op. at 305. Indeed, I suggest that this conclusion is mandated if for no other reason than that the evidence reveals that Martinez left the safety of his apartment and his secure position behind a brick wall to walk anywhere from 100 to 300 feet in order to shoot a wounded Gomez two more times. The conclusion of premeditation is plainly correct and one with which I completely agree.
The government in this case produced testimony that Martinez first shot Felipe Gomez from behind the sanctuary of a designer brick wall. Gomez was in front of the brick wall and Martinez was behind it. The government not only produced testimony that no weapons were found on Gomez's body, but it also adduced evidence that after firing the first shots, Martinez walked around the building complex (a distance of either 100 or 300 feet) in order to come out on the other side of the wall where Gomez was lying. Martinez then delivered the coup de grace by firing two shots into Gomez’s back while Gomez was on the ground. These elements overwhelmingly support the jury’s finding of premeditation and therefore first degree murder. Govt. of the Virgin Islands v. Landos, 477 F.2d 603, 606 (3d Cir.1973) (“Although the mental processes involved must take place prior to the killing, a brief moment of thought may be sufficient to form a fixed, deliberate design to kill.”); Wharton’s Criminal Law and Procedure (1957) Vol. 1 § 267, p. 564. (“... it is sufficient that only a moment elapsed between the plan and its execution, as long as the jury can conclude that there was some appreciable interval however small.”)
The majority chooses not to reach the question whether the final shots administered at close range by Martinez, standing alone, support the jury’s finding of premeditation. See Maj. Op. at 305 n. 1. Indeed, inasmuch as the totality of the evidence supports the jury’s verdict anyway, the majority need not reach this issue in the context of its review of the sufficiency of the evidence. However, since the majority goes on to order a remand on its newly found Brady theory, which remand would serve no purpose unless Martinez had a valid defense which could have been materially aided by the undisclosed information, the majority cannot avoid confronting the issue of the final shots. Yet, the majority refuses to do so.
I suggest that the reason the majority does not address the coup de grace evidence is that it cannot. No self-defense claim could withstand the undisputed evidence that not only did Martinez shoot Gomez twice after Gomez was rendered harmless and hors de combat, but the record *314discloses among other things that Gomez was shot twice in the back. With these stark facts revealed by the record, it is evident to me that the reason the majority prefers not to reach or address the question of whether Martinez’s final action and shots defeat any self-defense claim is that the answer is foreordained: no such defense is supportable.
There being no “reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different,” United States v. Bagley, — U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3384, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (plurality opinion), according to the standard adopted by the majority, any Brady claim which Martinez might have based on self-defense is palpably frivolous and no evidentiary hearing is warranted. United States v. Dansker, 565 F.2d 1262, 1264 (3d Cir.1977), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 1052, 98 S.Ct. 905, 54 L.Ed.2d 805 (1978).2
Despite the uncontradicted coup de grace evidence, Martinez points to testimony of government witnesses to the effect that Gomez, the victim, had previously threatened to kill Martinez, that Gomez had on a prior occasion fired shots outside Martinez’s residence, that Gomez was carrying a small kitchen knife on the night of the killing, and that Gomez’s killing followed an argument. According to Martinez, this testimony could now support an inference that Gomez was killed in self defense. Under our standard of review, however, we must draw all inferences in the government’s favor. The jury could properly find that Gomez was unarmed when he was killed, that the murder was premeditated, and that Martinez shot Gomez twice after Gomez had fallen.
III.
At trial, Martinez’s only defense was an alibi defense. The court scheduled sentencing directly after Martinez was convicted. During allocution, at the sentencing proceeding, Martinez for the first time admitted that he killed Gomez but implied that he had been threatened by Gomez with a shotgun and knife.
Martinez’s post trial confession took place in the following colloquy:
THE COURT: Will the defendant come forward, there being no reason to delay the sentencing in this matter?
THE DEFENDANT: Good afternoon.
THE COURT: This court is without an option, the jury having rendered its verdict. Therefore we will proceed with sentencing at this time.
Miss Fleetwood or Mr. Conte, do you care to be heard?
ATTORNEY FLEETWOOD [counsel for Martinez]: Your Honor, in light of the mandatory penalty in this case there is really nothing that we could say that would affect the decision. Therefore I would not allocute.
THE COURT: Mr. Jones?
ATTORNEY JONES [Assistant U.S. Attorney]: I have nothing.
THE COURT: Juan A. Martinez, before the sentence of this court is im*315posed, sir, is there anything you would care to say?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
* * * * *
Of this time I would have say that I commit the crime, but the reason I done do it is because the brother of the man take the shotgun that he was wearing that night and the knife and go and hide it. That’s what happened.
THE COURT: I’m sorry; I did not understand.
ATTORNEY FLEETWOOD: Your Honor, he is communicating new evidence in that he says now that he did commit the crime, that it was in self-defense, because the brother of the victim took a shotgun and knife that the victim had and hid it.
THE DEFENDANT: I talked to the detective, Vigo, and I tell him that I could pled guilty if he could get the shotgun and the knife that the man was wearing that night when I was sleeping and he went to the door to trick myself.
THE COURT: He went to the door to what, Mr. Martinez?
THE DEFENDANT: Huh?
THE COURT: He went to the door to what?
THE DEFENDANT: He went with a shotgun and a knife in he hand, a long knife so. It’s not a big knife like he said yesterday. I was sleeping when the guy was coming in with a gun.
THE COURT: This person being Marco Antonio Rivera?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Marco Antonio Rivera take the shotgun and the knife, and go with it and hide it. I stay in the place, hide, to seek what’s going on over there, but he opened the shot, and he take the shotgun, and then I was in the floor, and he take the knife and go with it. That’s what happened.
I don’t pled guilty, but I talk with Detective Vigo that he take it from them, I could pled guilty for myself, and I don’t have no problems with the justice.
THE COURT: When did you talk to Detective Vigo?
THE DEFENDANT: Last week because I was lying to my lawyer, and I be trying to lying to her because she was giving me a lot of advice that, if I don’t pled guilty, maybe she could find me in the First Degree Murder, and I still keep it in myself, but I couldn’t hide it.
That’s what happened; I talk to he.
THE COURT: Do you have anything else, sir?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: Remain where you are for a moment. Counsel for the defendant have anything they care to record at this time?
Do you want sentencing suspended so that you can investigate these matters?
ATTORNEY FLEETWOOD: We do, Your Honor, and I would anticipate filing a motion for a new trial.
THE COURT: Yes, sir?
ATTORNEY JONES: Your Honor, I’m assuming he’s saying that the decedent had the shotgun.
THE COURT: He’s saying that Marco Antonio Rivera had a shotgun and a large knife, I believe — is that correct?
THE DEFENDANT: yes.
The man who — who get killed by myself; right, because I submit that I do it — he was coming to the door. I was sleeping. He was beating in the louver with a knife. When he opened the window he got a shot gun in he hand. I know what is a shotgun. I just tell he, “Please go to sleep. You got your mother. My mother is dead. Go behave. Behave yourself.”
As I open the door, he try to grab me. That’s what happened; I fire after he.
THE COURT: This is Mr. Philipe Gomez you’re talking about?
THE DEFENDANT: Ves.
After that I went and hide, and I saw police somewhere come and take the *316shotgun from him and the knife that be on the floor.
App. 143-47.
Martinez then asserted his own “confession” as evidence discovered after trial requiring a new trial under Fed.R.Crim.P. 33. The court correctly denied the motion. To support a new trial, evidence must be truly “newly discovered.” United States v. Ian-nelli, 528 F.2d 1290, 1292-93 (3d Cir.1976). Evidence known to the defendant prior to trial is not newly discovered. States v. Bujese, 371 F.2d 120 (3d Cir.1967). Any self-defense claim as Martinez appears now to assert obviously was known to Martinez prior to trial. Indeed, his own statements at allocution attest to that fact. The majority does not reach Martinez’s new evidence argument, apparently finding it more creditable recast as a Brady issue. Indeed, the new evidence argument is plainly meritless.
IV.
In addition to his newly discovered evidence claim, Martinez claims that the government’s failure to inform defense counsel of statements made by Martinez to Officer D. Vigo was in violation of the requirement that the government turn over to the defense exculpatory evidence within its possession. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).3 According to Martinez, knowledge of these statements would have materially aided defense counsel in preparing his defense. Specifically, Martinez asserts that knowledge of these statements, combined with the evidence that Gomez may have been armed,4 would have prompted defense counsel to present an argument of self defense rather than the alibi defense actually presented. Even accepting Martinez’s assertion that the statements he made to Officer Vigo were both exculpatory and material to his defense, his Brady claim must nonetheless fail for the simple reason that the information sought — Martinez’s own statements— was already in the possession of Martinez the defendant. See United States v. Sta-rusko, 729 F.2d 256, 262 (3d Cir.1984); United States v. Dansker, 565 F.2d 1262, 1265 (3d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038, 97 S.Ct. 732, 50 L.Ed.2d 748 (1977).
With all due respect to my colleagues in the majority, that is all there is to this case. The rest is all sandcastles constructed by them out of grains of speculation and conjecture in order to justify a remand. The majority holds that Brady may be applied to require the government to turn over to a defendant or his attorney information, such as the defendant’s own statements, which the defendant already possesses. This holding is contrary to the jurisprudence of our sister circuits5 and properly reflects neither the law of this circuit nor the facts of this case.
A.
To support its legal argument, the majority cites United States v. Maroney, 319 F.2d 622 (3d Cir.1963), in which defendant had related to the police a witness’s version of the killing, which included a description of a struggle the defendant had with the *317victim of his shooting. Though a copy of this statement was in court during examination of the witness, defense counsel was not permitted to examine it, despite the defendant’s specific request.
In Maroney, this court held that failure to furnish the statement and therefore to disclose the evidence of “struggle” denied defendant a fair trial and thus due process. Significantly, although Maroney was decided some few months after the Supreme Court announced its decision in Brady, no analysis of the application of the Brady rule to material known to defendant appears in the opinion. Nor has Maroney ever been cited for the proposition that Brady requires disclosure of a defendant’s own statements. Indeed, this court affirmed a district court opinion which found Brady and Maroney to be “not in point” because the content of the information in question was “well known” to the criminal defendant. Pugliano v. Staziak, 231 F.Supp. 347, 354 n. 10 (W.D.Pa.1964), aff’d per curiam, 345 F.2d 797 (3d Cir.1965).6
Since Maroney was decided, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Agurs, has given us guidance in applying the Brady rule where, as here and unlike Maro-ney, no specific request for the information was made by the defense.7 In Agurs, the Supreme Court was careful to avoid a requirement that the prosecution must turn over all of its files to the defense; rather, the Court held, only information the lack of which would deprive the defendant of a fair trial, need be disclosed.8
It offends reason to hold that a defendant is denied a fair trial simply because the prosecution fails to turn over to the defendant or his counsel information that the defendant himself possesses. The fifth amendment guarantees a fair trial to the defendant — not to his attorney. Moreover, the Supreme Court, when it decided Brady, was not concerned with, and did not address, Brady’s duties and obligations. It fashioned the Brady doctrine only with respect to the duties and obligations that the government owes to the defendant.
Thus, Brady and its progeny require only that the government disclose information to the defendant where the defendant does not possess or know that information, and would thereby be denied a fair trial. Brady does not concern information of which the defendant has knowledge and which the defendant discloses to the government, because in that situation the defendant has not been unfairly disadvantaged if the government knows of the information or uses it.
*318Accordingly, Brady has no application to the circumstances of Martinez’s conviction in this case. Here Martinez admittedly knew of the actions that he, Martinez, had taken with respect to Gomez and of Gomez’s purported possession of weapons. He informed Detective Vigo of that information. Detective Vigo, perforce, knew that the information was known to Martinez. Martinez now complains that Brady is implicated because Vigo failed to relate this information back to Martinez and his attorney. Such a construction distorts Brady and stands the entire doctrine on its head.
This court, until now, has rejected such a tortured extension of Brady. In United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256 (3d Cir.1984), we found no Brady violation where the defendant independently obtained the information sought prior to trial. In United States v. Dansker, 565 F.2d 1262, 1265 (3d Cir.1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1052, 98 S.Ct. 905, 54 L.Ed.2d 805 (1978), while remanding an alleged Brady violation to the district court for a hearing, we specifically noted that those defendants who actually possessed the exculpatory information pri- or to trial, yet failed to present it, would not be able to assert a Brady claim.
As we stated in Starusko, “the government is not obliged under Brady to furnish a defendant with information he already has or, with reasonable diligence, he can obtain himself.” 729 F.2d at 262 (quoting United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852, 861-62 (5th Cir.1979)).9 Accord, United States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672, 674 (11th Cir.1983); United States v. Young, 618 F.2d 1281 (8th Cir.1980) (“The government is under no obligation to disclose to a defendant what he already knows,” so personal knowledge of the defendant bars a Brady violation.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 844, 101 S.Ct. 126, 66 L.Ed.2d 52 (1980). Here, it is not disputed that any statements Martinez made to officer Vigo were known to Martinez and in the possession of Martinez himself. Martinez may not place upon the government responsibility for his own failure to make full disclosure to his trial counsel.10
B.
In the face of the foregoing law and logic, the majority holds that a hearing is nevertheless necessary to determine if appellant’s Brady rights were violated. The majority suggests that disclosure to Martinez’s counsel of Martinez’s confession might have led to a different trial strategy, a possible self-defense argument, or conviction on a lesser included offense. The majority also offers a host of factual questions said to bear on the Brady question and therefore to necessitate a remand. In so doing, the majority departs radically from the record below and brings an entirely different and hypothetical case into existence.
The majority identifies three specific areas in which factual inquiry is necessary with respect to Martinez’s Brady claim. First, the majority holds that a remand is necessary to determine whether or not Martinez’s confession had been “reduced to writing,” thereby bringing it within the terms of Martinez’s specific discovery request. This issue was not raised below, and there is no evidence to contradict the government’s representation that appellant’s statement was not reduced to writ*319ing. See note 7 supra.11 In fact, Martinez does not argue or even suggest on this appeal that any written record was made of his statement. More important, this factual question is irrelevant to any issue actually before us. The majority finds the question significant in evaluating the “materiality” of the government’s failure to provide appellant with his own statement, i.e., what effect it had on the preparation of Martinez’s case and the fairness of his trial. The materiality inquiry, however, presumes the existence of a Brady issue in the first place; it cannot create one where the defendant’s own knowledge makes Brady inapplicable.
Second, the majority holds that on remand the district court must determine the extent of the information obtained from Martinez and whether the confession led to further investigation and the discovery of other possibly exculpatory evidence. Here, again, the majority freely speculates: Did the victim have a gun? Where was it? Did the victim’s brother seek to remove it? See Maj. Op. at 307 n. 6. These issues were not raised below, nor indeed have they been raised before us by Martinez. None of the eyewitnesses testified as to any gun in Gomez’s possession. The only evidence to support these issues is the statement of Martinez himself, which he chose not to put into evidence at trial. A remand on this question would merely be a license for Martinez to engage in a specula-tory expedition for exculpatory evidence that the majority guesses might be out there somewhere; it would have little to do with the case actually before us.
Third, the majority orders a remand to determine the extent of the prosecutor’s knowledge of Martinez’s confession. As the majority notes, in the presence of a true Brady violation, it probably does not matter if the prosecutor is personally aware of the exculpatory information, so long as he should have been. See cases cited in majority opinion, at 308 n. 8. The extent of the prosecutor’s personal knowledge, when it is not disputed that a detective with personal knowledge of the confession sat at the prosecution table at trial, is therefore irrelevant to any Brady issue in this case. The question is doubly irrelevant when the defendant’s own knowledge simply renders Brady inapplicable.
In addition to the irrelevant materiality questions outlined above, the majority requires remand to investigate “the relevence of Martinez’s untruthfulness.” Maj.Op. at 308. The majority instructs the district court to consider whether Martinez was incapable of communicating with his attorney, noting that Martinez spoke little English and may have distrusted his English-speaking lawyer. While apparently accepting the undisputed facts that Martinez knew about his own confession and chose to lie to his attorney and to the court in fashioning his alibi defense, to which his father, brother and two sisters also testified, the majority nevertheless suggests that Martinez’s knowledge may not bar his Brady claim. The majority is unclear as to what the district court must find on remand in order to conclude that Martinez may assert a Brady claim despite his personal knowledge of the information allegedly withheld by the prosecution. Presumably, however, it would involve a finding that Martinez was somehow justified in lying to his attorney and that therefore Martinez’s lie now imposes a duty upon the prosecution to disclose his confession. Precisely what would constitute this justification is also left unclear, but again one can *320only presume, despite the majority’s disclaimer, (Maj.Op. at 308 n. 9) that it includes “cultural differences” between defendant and attorney. On remand, therefore, the district court under the majority’s mandate must somehow distinguish between two kinds of lying: that which is “justified” and creates a Brady claim where a defendant’s knowledge would otherwise bar one, and that which is “unjustified” and gives rise to no special rights. Such a distinction, however, is clearly untenable.
First of all, the majority does not and cannot suggest that a “justified” lie is any less a lie than the lie interposed for “bad” reasons. The majority’s implied formulation simply makes no sense. A lie is a lie is a lie, regardless of motivation or culpability. If Martinez lied, then perforce he knew that he was telling untruths and concealing other facts, including the existence of his confession. If, in turn, he knew about his confession, as he unquestionably did, then there was no Brady violation.
Even if there were some relevance to the question of appellant’s motivation in concealing facts from his attorney, the distinctions between kinds of lies are far too subjective and elusive to be addressed in an evidentiary hearing. How can a disri’ict judge decide why a defendant lied?
Moreover, the potential justification for Martinez’s lying — the postulated cultural differences between Martinez and his attorney — presents a dangerously broad and amorphous ground for upsetting a judgment. The majority recognizes this and rejects the claim in virtually the same breath that it raises it. See Maj. Op. at 308 n. 9. The majority further suggests that appellant’s case may be analogous to that of the defendant in Nagell v. United States, 354 F.2d 441 (5th Cir.1966). In Nagell, a new trial was granted to defendant on the basis of “new evidence” when defendant’s organic brain injury resulted in a failure to disclose evidence to his counsel of which defendant was aware prior to trial. However, the defendant in Nagell was incapable of conveying the information to his attorney because of his mental disorder. This stands in sharp contrast to the present case, where appellant claims no mental defect but merely “cultural differences” and undifferentiated distrust, and simply chose to lie to his counsel.12 The majority apparently recognizes that Martinez may not, on remand, be able to satisfy Nagell, and in fact rejects the Nagell argument to the extent that it is based on “cultural differences” — the only conceivable basis available in this record. Maj. Op. at 308 and 308 n. 9.
In justifying a remand, the majority thus engages in a deftly choreographed double-bootstrap. On the one hand, the majority seems to reject Martinez’s alleged justifications for failing to tell his attorney about his confession. It is only these justifications that would give rise to a Brady obligation on the part of the government. Remand is nevertheless ordered because of the factual inquiries on materiality discussed earlier in the majority opinion. These inquiries, however, are totally irrelevant unless and until a prima facie Brady claim is made out. The majority therefore creates materiality issues dependent on the existence of a Brady issue, identifies no plausible basis for a Brady issue, and re*321mands anyway because of the materiality issues.
If the majority’s analysis and decision is to become the law of this circuit, it will undoubtedly lead to requests for remand in every case in which a defendant has taken the stand. While I do not argue that every criminal defendant who takes the stand lies, I think it is acknowledged that criminal defendants who testify frequently take liberties with the truth.
Under the majority’s thesis, it would not surprise me therefore to find that defendants who after conviction claim that their testimony was not the whole truth, would now seek a remand for an evidentiary hearing, citing as authority the remand granted in the instant case of Martinez, who not only lied but admitted to his falsehood directly after conviction. In each such instance, I can foresee the argument that evidence on remand must be adduced to satisfy the various factors outlined by the majority in this case. Indeed, I would expect that every defendant who testified in his own trial to the effect that he was not guilty of the charges against him but was nevertheless convicted by jury, would be in a position to claim that because the jury had convicted him (i.e. not believed him), his “lie” warranted a remand for an evidentiary hearing. Cf. United States v. Grayson, 550 F.2d 103 (3d Cir.1976), rev’d, 438 U.S. 41, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978); Poteet v. Fauver, 517 F.2d 393 (3d Cir.1975).
As the majority itself notes, see Maj. Op. at 309, the Brady rule has little to do with lying. To see just how far afield the majority strays in its ruminations about appellant’s lying and its speculations about facts not in the record before us, it is helpful to focus on that with which the rule is concerned. As this court noted in United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 262 (3d Cir.1984):
There can be no violation of Brady unless the government’s non-disclosure infringes the defendant’s fair trial right ____to constitute a Brady violation, the non-disclosure must do more than impede the defendant’s ability to prepare for trial; it must adversely affect the court’s ability to reach a just conclusion to the prejudice of defendant.
The Second Circuit has made an excellent statement of the purposes of the Brady rule:
In a recent case, Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794, 92 S.Ct. 2562 [2567], 33 L.Ed.2d 706 (1972), the Supreme Court reiterated that “[t]he heart of the holding in Brady is the prosecution’s suppression of evidence, in the face of a defense production request, where the evidence is favorable to the accused and is material either to guilt or to punishment.” (Emphasis supplied). In the context of the Brady requirement “any allegation of suppression boils down to an assessment of what the state knows at trial in comparison to the knowledge held by the defense.” Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 96, 87 S.Ct. 793, 808, 17 L.Ed.2d 737 (White, J., concurring).
* * * * * *
The purpose of the Brady rule is not to provide a defendant with a complete disclosure of all evidence in the government’s file which might conceivably assist him in preparation of his defense, but to assure that he will not be denied access to exculpatory evidence known to the government but unknown to him.
United States v. Ruggiero, 472 F.2d 599, 604 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939, 93 S.Ct. 2772, 37 L.Ed.2d 398 (1973)
It matters not whether or why defendant lied. The speculations of the majority notwithstanding, the facts of this case are simple and undisputed: Martinez, for whatever reason, chose to keep his guilt and prior admission of guilt from both his attorney and the court. That he raised the confession at sentencing shows that he was all too aware of it; that he only revealed it at that time shows that he intentionally *322concealed it as part of his strategy to present a false alibi defense.13
Indeed, not only did Martinez lie — he obviously also encouraged his father, his brother, and his two sisters to corroborate his falsehood. Any suggestion that Martinez did not remember or was unable to convey to his attorney the facts which form the matrix of his confession is a pure flight of fancy. In this context, the values of Brady are not served by requiring prosecu-torial disclosure of evidence that the defendant was intentionally suppressing. Brady is a rule of fairness for defendants, not a device to force defendants to be honest with their lawyers. Where a defendant choses not to provide his lawyer with information, the failure of the government to provide the same information, which it had received from the defendant himself, cannot possibly infringe that defendant’s right to a fair trial.
V.
I hope it is clear from the foregoing section that I am firmly convinced that no Brady issue exists in this case. Even if I were to conclude, however, that Martinez’s knowledge of his own confession does not bar a Brady claim, and even if his confession were construed as exculpatory, I fail to see how this “new” information would be either relevant or material to Martinez’s hypothetical self defense claims.
As Martinez apparently concluded when he decided to proceed with a fabricated alibi defense, the overwhelming evidence of premeditation in this case would negate any self-defense claim that Martinez could have based on his statement to the police. Indeed, a cursory review of the evidence adduced at trial reflects the inherent implausibility of the majority’s suggestion that such a defense would have been possible.
The evidence showed that Martinez chose to emerge from the sanctuary of his friend’s apartment to confront Gomez who was at the other side of a brick wall. From behind the protection of this brick wall, Martinez shot Gomez who, whether unarmed or “armed” with a three-inch kitchen knife, could present no threat at all. Even if these events could give rise to a self-defense claim, such a theory is shattered by the evidence that Martinez then walked all the way around the apartment building to deliver the coup de grace — two final shots into Gomez’s back as he lay on the ground.14
Even if Martinez’s statement that Gomez was carrying a gun — a statement which Martinez chose not to enter into evidence and which is corroborated by nothing in the record — were given credence on remand, the coup de grace evidence in this case clearly defeats any self-defense claim that Martinez might make. Therefore, even if a Brady issue involving a self defense claim properly appeared in this case, I would hold that Martinez had suffered no prejudice by the government’s-failure to acquaint him with his own confession.
*323Indeed, the evidence of the coup de grace puts the lie to the majority’s claim that, under Bagley, disclosure of Martinez’s statement made to Detective Vigo would have led to a “reasonable probability” of a different outcome. Maj. Op. at 309. It also dispels any notion that had Martinez “been candid with his attorney, the non-disclosed evidence [of purported self-defense] would still be of significant value to [his] case.” Id. Under no scenario could a self-defense claim be hypothesized which would withstand the undisputed facts of the last shots fired into Gomez’s body.
VI.
At first blush, it might seem that little harm could be done by a remand in this case. To the contrary: in order to justify a remand, the majority has been compelled to distort beyond recognition the jurisprudence of Brady v. Maryland and to ignore the factual record before us. Moreover, by so holding, the majority has been obliged to pervert the elements of the doctrine of self defense. The court also requires the district court to undertake the quixotic task of sorting out different kinds of lies and attaching different constitutional significance to each. I know that if I were the district court judge, I would not have the remotest notion of how to go about implementing the mandate of the majority opinion. I suggest that distinguishing between a “justified” and an “unjustified” lie, in addition to ascertaining the answers to the other inquiries required by the court’s remand in the context of this case, would be a Sisyphean task for any jurist.
From the majority’s opinion, it appears that the real reason for today’s holding is the majority’s abhorrence of the “penultimate” sentence of life without parole which Martinez faces. See Maj. Op. at 311.15 The majority also seems to feel that to affirm appellant's conviction would be to “punish” him for lying. See Maj. Op. at 309 (“denial of Brady’s protections to defendants who are not candid with their counsel, and indeed who lie in their testimony, appears to create an arbitrary penalty for lying____”).
Martinez was not sentenced to life in prison for lying, and his conviction can be affirmed now without reference to whether he lied. Martinez was tried, convicted, and sentenced for the cold-blooded murder of Felipe Gomez. Accused murderers who lie, to be sure, are still entitled to the protection of Brady, to the full panoply of constitutional rights, and to a thorough review by this court. Once we have determined that Martinez’s rights were honored, however, it is not our function to second-guess the wisdom of the Virgin Islands legislature in imposing harsh punishments in order to deter crimes of violence, at least in the absence of any claim that such a punishment is, itself, cruel and unusual.
The undisputed facts show that Martinez possessed the very information which he now claims the government should have given him. His rights under Brady were not violated. No unresolved issues of material fact exist. Any Brady claim in light of this record is palpably incredible. United States v. Dansker, 565 F.2d 1262, 1264 (3d Cir.1977), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 1052, 98 S.Ct. 905, 54 L.Ed.2d 805 (1978). The outcome of Martinez’s trial could be, and would be, no different under United States v. Bagley, — U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). Therefore, no purpose can be served by a remand.
The only appropriate disposition of Martinez’s appeal is to affirm the conviction and sentence imposed by the district court.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. See, e.g., Maj. Op. at 307 (was discovery request reduced to writing?); id. at 307 n. 6 (did the victim have a gun?); id. at 309 (was confession made under pressured circumstances?).

. The majority, without a shred of record support, baldly speculates as to whether "Martinez fired the fatal shot out of fear, and not in cold-blood as first-degree murder requires.” Maj. Op. at 306. Thus, having just concluded that it "need not decide" whether Martinez could possibly argue for self-defense, the majority seeks to have it both ways.
If the majority's unwarranted speculation that Martinez acted out of "fear” is intended as a putative self-defense theory for Martinez, it is simply irreconciliable with the majority’s refusal to deal with the compelling coup de grace evidence.
On the other hand, if the majority is suggesting by its language that Martinez could have made an argument for a reduced degree of homicide based on his fear or “heat of passion," such a theory is purely conjectural. There is not even a scintilla of evidence in the record that Martinez acted in the heat of passion when he shot Gomez. To the contrary, it is evident that the coup de grace shots had to have been fired in cold blood. Despite this, the district court judge did instruct the jury as to lesser degrees of murder, including a fatal shooting committed in the heat of passion (Transcript at 340). Thus the jury by its verdict rejected the very issue now suggested in the majority opinion.

. Martinez relies on two statements he made to Officer Vigo prior to trial as reported by Vigo to an investigator for the Federal Public Defender:
"I would plead guilty of killing Felipe Gomez if you could find the shotgun that he had;”
“What happened was, I, Juan Martinez, was in Miguel Lopez’ apartment, # 50 Walter I.M. Hodge Pavillion Project, and he, Felipe, came with a shotgun and a knife saying he wanted to kill me, so when he pointed the shotgun at me, I shot him.”
Affidavit of Andre D. Peterson. App. 14A.1-2.

. We observe that in one portion of Martinez’s statement he claimed that the brother of Gomez took and concealed the shotgun and the knife that he contends Gomez had with him. In the latter part of his statement, he claims "I saw police somewhere come and take the shotgun from him and the knife that be on the floor."

. See, e.g., United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406, 420 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1100, 97 S.Ct. 1123, 51 L.Ed.2d 549 (1977); Mag-laya v. Buchkoe, 515 F.2d 265, 268 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 931, 96 S.Ct. 282, 46 L.Ed.2d 260 (1975); Williams v. United States, 503 F.2d 995, 998 (2d Cir.1974).

. United States v. Padrone, 406 F.2d 560 (2d Cir.1969), also relied upon by the majority, is also inapposite. Although the court in Padrone ordered a new trial because the government had failed to provide defendant with a copy of his statement to the United States Attorney, no mention was made of Brady in the court's per curiam opinion. Instead, the case appears to have been decided on non-constitutional discovery grounds. Padrone had specifically requested the statement, and the court had ordered it produced. Moreover, unlike this case, where the statement in question was not used by the government, the prosecution in Padrone had used defendant’s statement to impeach him on the witness stand. Therefore, defendant suffered actual prejudice in the preparation for and conduct of his trial.

. Martinez did file a formal request for "all written or recorded statements or oral confessions or admissions, subsequently reduced to writing, summarized in police reports, made by the defendant____” Request for Discovery and Inspection, ¶ 1. However, the statements made by Martinez did not come within the terms of Martinez’s demand as they were not "reduced to writing.”

. United States v. Bagley, — U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) does not change the Brady standard. The requirement that a new trial be provided when under "the totality of the circumstances” it appears that "there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different,” id. at 3384, goes only to materiality. This language does not create a Brady issue where defendant’s prior knowledge of the information sought makes Brady inapplicable. To the extent that Bagley can be read as broadening our inquiry under Brady, however, I would only note that the language quoted by the majority opinion as speaking for the Court in Bagley comes from a portion of Justice Blackmun’s opinion joined only by Justice O’Connor. These portions of Bagley are therefore not appropriately cited to establish what "the Court” requires.

. The majority suggests that to the extent that Starusko holds that the government has no obligation to turn over to defendant his own statement it is in conflict with the earlier Maroney opinion and therefore must be ignored. See at 310 n. 10. However, as noted above, supra at 317, Maroney has never been relied on for its Brady analysis and is in fact distinguishable.

. It was represented to us at oral argument that investigation revealed that no record had been made of the "exculpatory" statements, and Martinez does not argue to the contrary. Indeed, had the information imparted to Vigo been deemed of any significance or consequence by the government and had it been known by the government, the government unquestionably would have confronted Martinez on cross examination with his prior statement that he was present and was threatened by Gomez — a statement directly contradicting Martinez’s alibi testimony.

. I am puzzled by the majority's references throughout its opinion to the discovery requirements of Fed.R.Crim.P. 16 which, of course, would only apply if Martinez’s statements had been reduced to writing or otherwise recorded. Under Rule 16(a)(1), even if a defendant knows of the existence of his statement, when such a statement has been recorded he may still need to obtain a copy of it in order adequately to prepare his defense to withstand impeachment. Where, as here, there is no evidence that a record was made or exists of a defendant’s statement, there is also no danger of such a statement being used to impeach the defendant’s credibility. In fact, no such impeachment was attempted in this case. See n. 10 supra. Therefore, the rationale of Rule 16 is not implicated in this case. Moreover, no Rule 16 issue is even present in the record before us.

. Appellant makes no claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, although there is an implicit suggestion in the majority opinion that would indicate that we should consider such an argument among the other "claims” which the majority has now created. Again, nothing in the record supports such a claim. In Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983), the Supreme Court rejected a claim that the Sixth Amendment guaranteed the right to a "meaningful relationship” between defendant and counsel, in the absence of evidence that counsel was unable to prepare adequately for trial. Id. at 12-14, 103 S.Ct. at 1616-17. Similarly, that Martinez may have lacked rapport with his counsel or distrusted her does not give rise to an ineffective assistance claim where nothing in the record shows that counsel was prevented from doing a competent job on his behalf. Short of such a genuine ineffective assistance claim, "cultural differences” between defendant and counsel cannot be cognizable in this court.

. The majority claims that Martinez might have been "pressured” into making his confession to Sgt. Vigo. Maj. Op. at 309. The record is completely barren of any support for this gratuitous suggestion. Not even during the sentencing colloquy which took place after the jury convicted Martinez did Martinez contend that pressure had been exerted upon him. The mere suggestion of such a claim or argument, when not a shred of evidence exists to support it, reveals the skewed nature of the majority’s reasoning and disposition.

. Title 14 § 43 of the Virgin Islands Code provides that self defense may not extend to the infliction of more harm than is necessary for the purpose of defense and that there must be a reasonable ground on the part of the defendant to believe that at the time the deceased was killed he, the defendant, was in imminent or immediate danger of his life or great bodily harm. Moreover, it is well settled that if the defendant has retreated and is out of danger and then renews the attack, he loses the right to claim self defense. Wharton’s Criminal Law (14th Ed. 1979) § 126 Volume II, p. 1320.
As the evidence clearly reveals, not only was Martinez shielded behind a brick wall and therefore in no danger from Gomez, but after Martinez had shot Gomez, he then continued to press his attack by walking around the building to deliver one to three additional shots. As previously stated, the record reveals that Gomez was shot twice in the back.

. In 1974, the Virgin Islands legislature amended 14 § 923(a) to provide for imprisonment for life (of a first degree murderer) without parole. Prior to the amendment, the punishment for first degree murder was life imprisonment. While I recognize that where a statute contains a mandatory life imprisonment term, the statutory language must be narrowly construed, see Government of the Virgin Islands v. Berry, 604 F.2d 221, 228 (3d Cir.1979), we at no time have ever intimated, nor could we, that where such a penalty is prescribed it may be avoided because of its severity.