Court Opinion

ID: 9692814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:07:04.907884+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:29:21.204317
License: Public Domain

STEINMETZ, J.
(dissenting). The majority in Tahtinen v. MSI Insurance Company, 122 Wis. 2d, 158, 361 N.W.2d 673, filed this date, held sec. 631.43(1), Stats., requires stacking of uninsured motorist coverage. As I wrote in that case in a dissenting opinion, stacking of uninsured motorist coverage may be good public policy but that decision should be left to the legislature and if the legislature adopts stacking of uninsured motorist coverage, it should also set the limitations, if any. Uninsured motorist coverage is statutory protection created by the legislature and is not an area of liability originating in this court and therefore subject to change by this court. The majority opinion intrudes upon the legislative process and, therefore, I must dissent.
The holdings in Roe v. Larson, 99 Wis. 2d 332, 298 N.W.2d 580 (1980) and Vidmar v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 104 Wis. 2d 360, 312 N.W.2d 129 (1981) have existed for four and three years, respectively, and now by this case, their rulings as to drive other car exclusions are being reversed. This is hardly stare decisis, but rather, it is an example of how a change in the membership of this court or a case with more egregious facts can bring about a change in the law. This transitoriness is exactly why the uninsured motorist coverage as created by the legislature should be developed by the legislature.
*183The majority has converted uninsured motorist coverage to an accident policy with the only requirement for its application being a personal injury caused by an uninsured motorist. The majority ignores the clear meaning of sec. 632.32 (4), Stats., which provides:
“(4) Required uninsured motorist and medical payments coverages. Every policy of insurance subject to this section that insures with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall contain therein or supplemental thereto provisions approved by the commissioner.” (Emphasis added.)
The requirements of sec. 632.32 (4) (a), Stats.,1 govern uninsured motorist coverage. The benefits of uninsured motorist coverage apply “with respect to any motor vehicle . . . against loss resulting from liability . . . arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle.” (Emphasis added.) Now by judicial fiat, uninsured motorist coverage applies while the insured is in*184jured in an activity though not related to any of his vehicles and certainly not necessarily “arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle.” The only requirement is that the insured be injured by an uninsured motorist. In addition, the insured has uninsured motorist coverage even on cars he has not declared to his company (the Roe case). Now there is little reason for an insured to purchase more than one uninsured motorist coverage no matter how many cars or separate policies he owns unless he wants to insure against a catastrophic loss caused by an uninsured motorist. In that situation the insured will need the stacking and the corresponding financial benefit of having such coverage on more than one vehicle.
In Vidmar, 104 Wis. 2d at 369, we interpreted secs. 631.43(3) and 632.32, Stats., and upheld clearly stated “drive other car” exclusion clauses. We stated: “The insurer may, subject to the statutory requirements set forth in sec. 632.32, Stats., limit the scope of coverage, but as the drafter of the policy, it must use clear language when doing so.” I believe Vidmar is an accurate interpretation of secs. 631.43(3) and 632.32 and is still good law.
The majority supports its decision with citations to other jurisdictions that have judicially accepted stacking of uninsured motorist policies.2 It is worth stating that all but two of those states (Alabama and Washington) have some form of mandatory liability coverage so that the insurer’s exposure for uninsured motorist stacking is far less than where there is no mandatory liability coverage as is the law in Wisconsin. When Montana in Jacobson v. Implement Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 542, 548, 640 P.2d 908, 912 (1982), cited by the majority, states: “There is no connection between the insured and the automobile listed on the policy. The named automo-
*185bile merely illustrates that the person satisfied the legal requirement of purchasing insurance and has uninsured motorist coverage;” it has no significance in Wisconsin where there is no legal requirement of compulsory automobile liability insurance on each licensed vehicle. See also Bradley v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 409 Mich. 1, 294 N.W.2d 141, 147 (1980). The public policy and legislative intent embodied in this state’s uninsured motorist statute reflect the legislature’s reluctance to enact some form of compulsory automobile liability insurance. Instead, the legislature has relied on proof of financial responsibility under certain circumstances (see ch. 344, Stats.). In this regard, I believe the majority has mis-characterized the public policy and legislative intent of this state and has improperly applied this characterization to uninsured motorist coverage.
The majority opinion cites among other cases, Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Volkmann, 54 Ohio St. 2d 58, 374 N.E.2d 1258 (1978), as authority for the statement that: “ [T]he Welches are entitled to stack coverage under each of the policies, to the full amount of their damages, to the extent their damages do not exceed the aggregated policy limits of their uninsured motorist coverage.” (P. 178.) It is worth pointing out that the Ohio legislature has enacted both compulsory automobile liability insurance and Ohio Rev. Code Ann. sec. 3937.18(E).3 Two years after the Grange Mut. Cas. Co. case the Ohio legislature in R.C. 3939.18(E) made it unambiguously clear that insurance carriers may include provisions in auto*186mobile insurance contracts which preclude stacking of uninsured motorist coverage. Karabin v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 10 Ohio St. 3d 163, 462 N.E.2d 403, 406 (1984). This is entirely consistent with our holding in Vidmar.
I would wait for legislative development of uninsured motorist coverage and I will not participate in the judicial activism of the majority, no matter how desirable it may be. It is not a proper rationale in promulgating law by judicial fiat to state as the majority does that if the legislature does not agree with what this court has done, the legislature can change it.
I dissent.

 Sec. 632.32(4) (a), Stats., provides:
“(a) Uninsured motorist. 1. For the protection of persons injured who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom, in limits of at least $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident. The insurer may increase the coverage limits provided under this paragraph up to the bodily injury liability limits provided in the policy.
“2. In this paragraph ‘uninsured motor vehicle’ also includes:
“a. An insured motor vehicle if before or after the accident the liability insurer of the motor vehicle is declared insolvent by a court of competent jurisdiction.
“b. An unidentified motor vehicle involved in a hit-and-run accident.
“3. Insurers making payment under the uninsured motorists’ coverage shall, to the extent of the payment, be subrogated to the rights of their insureds.”

 The states cited are: Ohio, Michigan, Louisiana, Florida, Montana, Washington, Oklahoma, Alabama, Indiana and Hawaii.

 “Any automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance that includes uninsured motorist coverage may include terms and conditions that preclude stacking of uninsured motor vehicle coverage.” R.C. 3937.18 has subsequently been reamended effective June 23, 1982. Division (E) is now division (G) and the words “uninsured motorist coverage” were amended to read “coverages offered under division (A) of this section” to reflect the inclusion of underinsured motorist coverage in the section.