Court Opinion

ID: 9353230
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-11 16:00:41.133469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:09:18.648569
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-9507    Document: 010110795816        Date Filed: 01/11/2023     Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                           Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                          January 11, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  ABDALLAH KARIM,

        Petitioner,

  v.                                                           No. 22-9507
                                                           (Petition for Review)
  MERRICK B. GARLAND, United States
  Attorney General,

        Respondent.
                          _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, HARTZ, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
                    _________________________________

       Abdallah Karim, a native and citizen of Ghana, petitions for review of a Board

 of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision affirming an immigration judge’s (IJ) denial

 of asylum, restriction on removal, and protection under the Convention Against

 Torture (CAT). The IJ denied relief after finding Mr. Karim’s testimony was not

 credible. The BIA dismissed his appeal. Exercising jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.

 § 1252(a)(1), we deny the petition for review. As explained below, the adverse

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
 argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
 except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
 may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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 credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence revealing inconsistencies, not

 only between Mr. Karim’s testimony and the documentary evidence, but also in his

 explanations attempting to reconcile those discrepancies.

                                            I

        Mr. Karim entered the United States on August 16, 2011, and surrendered to

 Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers. The next day, he gave a sworn

 statement, indicating he spoke English and understood he could be subject to civil

 and criminal penalties for failing to tell the truth. Further, he swore his answers were

 true and complete.

        In his sworn statement, Mr. Karim indicated he is a Sunni Muslim who was

 born in Ghana. He said he had four brothers and sisters and fled Ghana because he

 was being threatened by a group called the “Land Guard.” Admin. R. at 286. He

 stated the Land Guard wanted to kill him and they had tortured his brother.

        The government charged Mr. Karim with being removable as a noncitizen who

 lacked valid entry documents at the time of his application for admission to the

 United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). He conceded the charge, but

 applied for asylum, restriction on removal, and CAT relief. He claimed to fear harm

 in Ghana based on his political opinion for exposing the Land Guard’s corrupt

 activities.

        During removal proceedings, Mr. Karim appeared before an IJ with counsel

 and indicated his “best language” was English. Admin. R. at 76. However, he later

 appeared for another hearing with counsel and requested an interpreter, indicating he

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 spoke English but his “best language [was] Hausa,” id. at 90. Ultimately, the IJ

 conducted Mr. Karim’s merits hearing through an interpreter, although at one point,

 his counsel paused to remind him to speak in Hausa rather than English. Id. at 194.

       During his merits hearing, Mr. Karim testified that the Land Guard is a group

 in Ghana hired by local chiefs to fight over land that does not belong to them. He

 first spoke out against the Land Guard in September 2010 at a “lorry park,” “where

 taxis come and . . . transport people around [the] area[.]” Id. at 152. He twice spoke

 at the lorry park, the second time before a crowd of forty to fifty people. The Land

 Guard had been recruiting young men, telling them the Land Guard’s work was not

 dangerous. But Mr. Karim told the men the Land Guard was lying to them and they

 should resist their recruitment efforts. He told the crowd the Land Guard was

 responsible for killing two police officers, and he reminded them that their Muslim

 faith forbade the Land Guard’s activities.

       Mr. Karim further testified that after his second speech at the lorry park, four

 or five members of the Land Guard followed him as he walked home. They accused

 him of exposing their activities, which they told him were none of his business. One

 of the men struck Mr. Karim on the back of his right shoulder with a stick decorated

 with metal. When he turned to confront the man, another man stabbed him in the

 abdomen with a pocketknife. Mr. Karim screamed for help and fell unconscious. He

 regained consciousness at a hospital and discovered his stab wound had been treated

 and stitched. He submitted into evidence a hospital record documenting the stabbing.

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       On cross-examination, the government questioned Mr. Karim about several

 inconsistencies and omissions in his testimony. The government noted his testimony

 that he was stabbed after giving a public speech about the Land Guard at a lorry park

 differed from his hospital record, which indicated he reported being “attacked by [a]

 mob at a mosque during a preaching session,” id. at 572. Mr. Karim explained that

 he falsely told the hospital staff he was attacked at a mosque during a preaching

 session because he knew the hospital gave more attention to “anything that involved

 religious conflict or religious violence.” Id. at 215. He stated he wanted to ensure he

 received the necessary medical attention and if he had told them he was attacked by a

 mob on his way home, the hospital staff would start asking questions that could delay

 treatment. The government pointed out, however, that an affidavit from Mr. Karim’s

 friend, Ahmed Abubakar, indicated he had been attacked by a mob while preaching

 about Islamic fundamentalism. See id.; see also id. at 574 (Abubakar aff., Apr. 3,

 2012). Mr. Karim replied that his speech tried to relate the Land Guard’s activities to

 Islamic fundamentalism. He further testified that if he had not told the hospital he

 was attacked at a mosque, they might have denied him treatment. The IJ later asked

 why he would have been concerned with getting treatment if his stab wound had

 already been stitched, to which Mr. Karim replied he thought he might need

 additional treatment.

       The government also questioned why Mr. Karim’s sworn statement to the CBP

 officer indicated he had four brothers and sisters, yet his amended asylum application

 listed only two sisters. Mr. Karim explained he has two sisters, and he listed two

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 extended family members as brothers. He identified his cousin, Suleman Karim, as a

 brother because they are very close. The government asked which brother he claimed

 had been tortured and why he omitted any mention of the alleged torture from his

 direct testimony. Mr. Karim replied that he was referring to Suleman, whom his

 mother had incorrectly told him had been tortured. He explained that “older folks

 give narratives,” id. at 211, and “she was just trying to say all sort[s] of things to

 me,” id. at 213. He testified that when he spoke to Suleman, however, Suleman

 clarified that he had not been tortured, only threatened. On redirect, Mr. Karim’s

 attorney asked what specifically his mother told him that made him think Suleman

 had been tortured. Mr. Karim testified that she told him the Land Guard “came and

 threatened your brother,” saying they would do to Suleman what they had done to

 him, which he understood to mean “an attack.” Id. at 227.

        Following the hearing, Mr. Karim submitted a second affidavit from his friend,

 Ahmed Abubakar, and an affidavit from his cousin Suleman. These affidavits

 ostensibly attempted to reconcile some of the discrepancies between Mr. Karim’s

 testimony and the documentary evidence. Ahmed Abubakar’s second affidavit

 indicated Mr. Karim “was attacked by an unknown mob/gang” while “he was

 preaching at a small mosque at the . . . lorry station against Islamic Fundamentalism

 and illegal activities of land guards.” Id. at 265 (Abubakar aff., Oct. 24, 2018).

 Suleman’s affidavit indicated he attended Mr. Karim’s “public sermon” about “the

 menace of land-guards” and “youth fleeing to join terrorist[] groups in neighboring

 West African countries.” Id. at 268 (Suleman Karim aff., Aug. 28, 2018). It further

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 indicated the public sermon was at a “lorry station” and “market square/mosque,” and

 after Suleman left, he learned Mr. Karim had been “attacked by a section of angry

 Land-guard.” Id.

       The IJ admitted these additional affidavits but found “[g]laring discrepancies”

 between Mr. Karim’s testimony and the documentary evidence he provided to

 substantiate “the central event of harm in his story.” Id. at 71. In particular, the IJ

 pointed out the difference between, on one hand, Mr. Karim’s testimony that he had

 been attacked and stabbed by four or five members of the Land Guard after speaking

 out against them at the lorry park, and on the other hand, his hospital record, which

 indicated he had been attacked by a mob while preaching at a mosque. The IJ

 acknowledged Mr. Karim admitted lying to the hospital to obtain quicker, better

 treatment. But the IJ found this explanation dubious because Ahmed Abubakar’s

 first affidavit indicated Mr. Karim actually had been attacked by a mob or a gang

 while preaching about Islamic fundamentalism. The IJ recognized Mr. Karim

 attempted to reconcile the discrepancy by providing the additional affidavits from

 Ahmed Abubakar and Suleman, but the IJ noted the additional affidavits were filed

 after the hearing where the discrepancies were scrutinized. The IJ acknowledged it

 was possible Mr. Karim’s speech about the Land Guard included religious

 components, but the IJ questioned why he would not have simply said it included

 religious components when confronted with the discrepancy between his testimony

 and the medical record. Instead, the IJ observed, Mr. Karim testified that he

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 fabricated the religious component to obtain faster, better treatment. The IJ found the

 affidavits did not rehabilitate this conflicting explanation.

       The IJ cited other inconsistences as well. The IJ questioned why Mr. Karim

 testified that he fabricated the story about being attacked at a mosque to receive

 treatment when he already had been treated. The IJ recognized he thought he might

 need additional treatment, but the IJ found that explanation unpersuasive and did not

 resolve the inconsistency with the additional affidavits, which indicated he had been

 preaching, at least in part, about religion at a mosque.

       The IJ also mentioned inconsistencies between Mr. Karim’s testimony and the

 sworn statement he gave to the CBP officer. While Mr. Karim’s sworn statement

 indicated his brother had been tortured, the IJ observed, Mr. Karim testified on

 cross-examination that his cousin, not his brother, was threatened, not tortured. The

 IJ acknowledged Mr. Karim’s explanations about referring to his cousin Suleman as

 his brother and being misinformed by his mother that Suleman was tortured. But the

 IJ found that, rather than clarify the discrepancies, Mr. Karim changed his testimony

 on redirect by stating his mother told him Suleman had merely been threatened.

       Based on these inconsistencies, the IJ found Mr. Karim was not credible and

 determined the other evidence failed to satisfy the standards for asylum or restriction

 on removal. Likewise, the IJ concluded Mr. Karim’s failure to present credible

 evidence of torture precluded his CAT claim. Accordingly, the IJ denied relief and

 ordered him removed to Ghana. The BIA upheld the adverse credibility finding,

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 concluded the other evidence failed to satisfy the standards for relief, and dismissed

 the appeal. Mr. Karim now seeks review.

                                             II

       A. Standards for Relief

       To obtain asylum, an applicant must establish they are a “refugee” as defined

 by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42), and then obtain a discretionary grant of relief. See

 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A); Diallo v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 1274, 1282 n.4 (10th Cir.

 2006). “To obtain . . . restriction on removal, an applicant must show that his [or

 her] ‘life or freedom would be threatened in the proposed country of removal because

 of [their] race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or

 political opinion.’” Ismaiel v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 1198, 1204 (10th Cir. 2008)

 (brackets omitted) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A)). And to obtain CAT relief, an

 applicant must demonstrate “‘it is more likely than not that he or she would be

 tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.’” Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R.

 § 1208.16(c)(2)). The burden of proof necessary to satisfy all three standards may be

 satisfied by an applicant’s credible testimony alone. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii)

 (asylum); id. § 1231(b)(3)(C) (restriction on removal); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2)

 (CAT relief).

       B. Standard of Review

       “This court reviews the BIA’s legal determinations de novo and its factual

 findings under a substantial-evidence standard.” Igiebor v. Barr, 981 F.3d 1123,

 1131 (10th Cir. 2020) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). “Credibility

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 determinations are factual findings . . . subject to the substantial evidence test.” Id. at

 1132 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has instructed “that a

 reviewing court must accept ‘administrative findings’ as ‘conclusive unless any

 reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’” Garland v.

 Ming Dai, 141 S. Ct. 1669, 1677 (2021) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). “This is

 a highly deferential standard.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Under this

 standard, we do not weigh evidence or independently assess credibility; rather, even

 if we disagree with the BIA’s conclusions, we will not reverse if they are supported

 by substantial evidence and are substantially reasonable.” Htun v. Lynch, 818 F.3d

 1111, 1119 (10th Cir. 2016) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

        Where, as here, the BIA issues an opinion by a single member affirming the IJ,

 “we will not affirm on grounds raised in the IJ decision unless they are relied upon by

 the BIA in its affirmance.” Uanreroro v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1197, 1204 (10th Cir.

 2006). “However, when seeking to understand the grounds provided by the BIA, we

 are not precluded from consulting the IJ’s more complete explanation of those same

 grounds.” Id.

        C. Discussion

        Based on the record before us, we cannot say any reasonable adjudicator

 would be compelled to find Mr. Karim credible. We note Mr. Karim’s hospital

 record appears to substantiate his allegation that he was stabbed for making some sort

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  of public pronouncement.1 Nonetheless, the BIA determined there was no clear error

  in the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, which was predicated on specific, cogent

  reasons. Prime among them, the BIA recognized, was that his testimony that he was

  attacked after speaking out against the Land Guard at the lorry park was inconsistent

  with his hospital record, which indicated he reported being attacked by a mob while

  preaching at a mosque. This was a permissible basis for discounting Mr. Karim’s

  credibility under the applicable legal standards. See Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d

  1187, 1193, 1201 (10th Cir. 2005) (upholding adverse credibility finding based in

  part on discrepancy between noncitizen’s testimony regarding her age when she was

  attacked and a letter from her doctor indicating noncitizen reported she was a

  different age at the time she was attacked). Although Mr. Karim tried to explain he

  fabricated the story about being attacked while preaching at a mosque, the BIA

  recognized this explanation conflicted with Ahmed Abubakar’s first affidavit, which

  indicated Mr. Karim actually had been preaching about Islamic fundamentalism.

  This is substantial evidence supporting the adverse credibility determination. See

  Igiebor, 981 F.3d at 1135 (concluding that adverse credibility finding was supported

  by substantial evidence because noncitizen’s explanation “only created further

  questions as to his honesty”).

        1
          The government does not specifically dispute Mr. Karim was beaten and
  stabbed, but it does argue that because he was found “to be not credible, his
  testimony and statements in the record should be treated as allegations.” Resp. Br. at
  2. The government’s argument does not question the hospital record, which indicates
  he was treated for a stab wound sustained while making a public pronouncement.
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         Still, Mr. Karim maintains he was speaking about both the Land Guard and

  religion when he was attacked, which he says is corroborated by the additional

  post-hearing affidavits he submitted from Ahmed Abubakar and Suleman. He points

  out the IJ gave these affidavits full weight, but he contends the IJ rejected them

  without giving specific, cogent reasons for doing so. The record shows otherwise,

  however. As the BIA explained, the IJ gave full weight to the affidavits, which

  indicated Mr. Karim had been speaking about the Land Guard and religion at a

  mosque located at a lorry park. The IJ acknowledged these affidavits might have

  resolved some inconsistencies, but they did not reconcile Mr. Karim’s explanation

  that he fabricated the religious aspect of his story to obtain faster, better treatment at

  the hospital. Indeed, contrary to his explanation that he fabricated the religious

  aspect of his story, the affidavits indicate his speech did compare the Land Guard to

  religious fundamentalists. The affidavits thus support the adverse credibility finding.

         Mr. Karim also contends the IJ provided deficient reasoning for rejecting his

  explanation that he fabricated the religious aspect of his story to ensure he received

  better, faster treatment. But the IJ pointed out Mr. Karim had already received

  stitches and his explanation that he thought he might need additional treatment was

  unpersuasive. The BIA determined the IJ did not clearly err in rejecting this

  explanation. See Kabba v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 1239, 1245-46 (10th Cir. 2008)

  (recognizing the BIA reviews an IJ’s credibility findings for clear error and “where

  there are two permissible views of the evidence, . . . the factfinder’s choice between

  them cannot be clearly erroneous” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Given

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  Mr. Karim’s conflicting explanations, “[a] reasonable adjudicator would not be

  compelled to find [him] credible,” Htun, 818 F.3d at 1120, because the record

  demonstrated a sound basis for discounting his credibility. See Chaib v. Ashcroft,

  397 F.3d 1273, 1278 (10th Cir. 2005) (“A proper incredibility determination can be

  based on inherent inconsistencies in the applicant’s testimony, lack of detail, or

  implausibility of the applicant’s story[.]”).

         Next, Mr. Karim faults the IJ’s analysis of the sworn statement he gave to the

  CBP officer. Although Mr. Karim acknowledges his sworn statement indicated his

  brother was tortured, he says he adequately explained this mistake based on faulty

  information provided by his mother. Mr. Karim contends he clarified on cross-

  examination that Suleman, his cousin, had been threatened, not tortured, so he

  omitted the torture allegation from his direct testimony. He therefore insists these

  discrepancies do not support discrediting him.

         To the extent Mr. Karim asks us to reweigh the adequacy of his explanations,

  we cannot do so. See Htun, 818 F.3d at 1119. To the extent he contends the BIA

  improperly rejected his explanations, we disagree. The inconsistencies cited by the

  BIA—that Mr. Karim’s sworn statement indicated his brother had been tortured when

  it was his cousin who had only been threatened—were substantial evidence

  supporting the adverse credibility finding.

         Moreover, the BIA observed that when the government asked Mr. Karim about

  why he did not mention his brother being tortured, he replied, “it was my mother who

  told me that,” Admin. R. at 210, meaning Mr. Karim’s mother told him Suleman had

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  been tortured. Yet on redirect, Mr. Karim testified his mother told him the Land

  Guard “came and threatened your brother,” saying they would do to Suleman what

  they had done to him. Id. at 227 (emphasis added). Noting this changing testimony,

  the IJ observed Mr. Karim initially testified his mother told him Suleman had been

  tortured, but on redirect testified she told him Suleman had been threatened.

  Mr. Karim insists he simply misunderstood his mother, and even if we agreed, we

  may not reweigh the evidence of his credibility, which is what Mr. Karim asks us to

  do. See Htun, 818 F.3d at 1119. Applying the deferential standard of review, we

  conclude Mr. Karim’s shifting testimony supported the adverse credibility

  determination because it exemplifies how his efforts to explain the omission “only

  created further questions as to his honesty,” Igiebor, 981 F.3d at 1135.

        Mr. Karim also challenges the reliability of his sworn statement, arguing that

  the CBP interview was informal and conducted in English. The BIA rejected this

  argument, and so do we. As an initial matter, we reject Mr. Karim’s premise that the

  adverse credibility finding was predicated simply on inconsistencies between his

  sworn statement and his testimony. The foregoing discussion demonstrates the

  adverse credibility finding was based, not simply on inconsistencies between the

  sworn statement and Mr. Karim’s testimony, but critically, on his failed attempts to

  explain those inconsistencies.

        In any event, there is no indication the CBP interview and Mr. Karim’s sworn

  statement were unreliable. Mr. Karim points out that Hausa is his native language

  but the CBP interview was conducted in English. Yet he told an IJ at a preliminary

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  hearing that English was his best language. And while Mr. Karim later stated Hausa

  was his best language, his attorney had to remind him during his merits hearing to

  speak in Hausa rather than English. Moreover, the record confirms that, as the BIA

  observed, Mr. Karim’s sworn statement bore sufficient indicia of reliability. Indeed,

  it was administered by the CBP officer, who advised Mr. Karim that it was very

  important to tell the truth because he could be subject to civil or criminal penalties or

  barred from receiving immigration benefits if he gave false information. Mr. Karim

  indicated he understood what the officer said to him, and he swore that his responses

  were true and complete. He then answered the officer’s questions. We discern

  nothing in this evidence to suggest any language barriers or comprehension

  difficulties, and nothing about the CBP interview or Mr. Karim’s sworn statement

  undermines the agency’s adverse credibility finding.

        Apart from challenging the adverse credibility finding, Mr. Karim contends the

  IJ inadequately explained what other evidence in the record, independent of his

  testimony, she considered in concluding that he failed to satisfy the standards for

  asylum and restriction on removal. Both the IJ and the BIA stated, however, that the

  IJ considered all the record evidence, even if it was not specifically discussed. “The

  BIA is not required to write an exegesis on every contention. What is required is

  merely that it consider the issues raised, and announce its decision in terms sufficient

  to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely

  reacted.” Ismaiel, 516 F.3d at 1207 (internal quotation marks omitted). We must ask

  whether the BIA’s decision is sufficient to permit our meaningful review, and here,

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  we are satisfied it is. The agency appropriately considered the record evidence in

  concluding Mr. Karim failed to satisfy the standards for asylum and restriction on

  removal.

        Finally, Mr. Karim challenges the denial of CAT relief based on what he says

  is the unsupported adverse credibility finding, but our disposition upholding that

  finding defeats his argument. See id. at 1206 (“[T]he IJ and BIA could reasonably

  refuse to believe [the noncitizen’s] claims of past torture and, reviewing all the

  evidence, remain unpersuaded that [he] satisfied his burden of proving that he would

  probably be tortured if [removed].”).

                                                  III

        Accordingly, the petition for review is denied.

                                                          Entered for the Court

                                                          Veronica S. Rossman
                                                          Circuit Judge

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