Court Opinion

ID: 9789731
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:40:36.159728+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:24.114078
License: Public Domain

Johnson, J.
(dissenting) — The majority holds that the State may reduce an injured worker's compensation if that worker also receives Social Security retirement funds. I dissent from that holding for three reasons. First, because the majority selects the wrong date for determination of permanent disability, the majority’s interpretation of the relevant statutes works an injustice on injured workers. Second, the majority ignores our statutory mandate to interpret the Industrial Insurance Act (Act) liberally in favor of the injured worker. Finally, the majority's holding conflicts with the congressional purpose behind the Social Security Act, which I would hold preempts the state statute.
I
In concluding that the Department of Labor and Industries (Department) may reduce Harris's workers' compensation benefits by the amount of Social Security retirement funds Harris receives, the majority works an injustice on Harris and all similarly situated injured workers. Harris became totally disabled in 1979 because of work-related exposure to asbestos. He was 68 years old at the time of his disability and, despite the fact that his disability was never adjudicated as permanent, it is clear from the evaluations of his doctor that as of August 1981 Harris would never recover. See majority, at 464-65; Clerk's Papers, at 127. In 1986 the Department, pursuant to RCW 51.32.225, reduced Harris's disability award by $213.60 per month, the amount of Social Security retirement that he received. The reduction left Harris with a disability award of $955.09 per month. Clerk's Papers, at 77. The majority today approves of that reduction simply because Harris was not yet actually receiving a permanent total disability award as of June 30, 1986. *483In so doing, the majority unfairly penalizes workers who were in fact permanently disabled prior to that date.
The majority prohibits Harris and others similarly situated from litigating the question of whether they were permanently disabled prior to the cutoff date. According to the majority, the only relevant question is whether the injured worker was actually receiving, by Department adjudication order, permanent disability payments as of June 30, 1986. This interpretation leads to the absurd result that two workers who were in fact permanently disabled on the same date could receive drastically different compensation based solely on factors beyond their control. For example, if the Department had acted slowly on a particular claim and did not adjudicate permanency until after the cutoff date, that worker would receive less compensation than a worker whose claim was quickly adjudicated, even if both became permanently disabled on the same date. A similar result would occur if the Department initially wrongfully denied a worker's claim. In such a case, a worker would be subject to the offset, and thus receive less compensation, solely because the Department forced that worker to litigate his or her entitlement to those benefits. Statutes should be construed so as to avoid unlikely or absurd consequences. Ski Acres, Inc. v. Kittitas Cy., 118 Wn.2d 852, 857, 827 P.2d 1000 (1992). Therefore we should interpret the Act to avoid such potentially absurd results as those described above.
The exemption in RCW 51.32.225 applies to any worker who was in fact permanently disabled prior to July 1, 1986. lb apply that exemption, this court must first determine when permanent disability occurs. I would hold that such a determination should focus on the worker's injury as determined by medical evaluation when permanent disability occurs — not, as the majority holds, when the Department eventually adjudicates the question of permanent disability. My interpretation recognizes the practical consideration which drives all disability claims, a consideration the majority ignores: the injury itself controls all aspects of the claim. Thus benefits should be determined by the medical reports *484which would substantiate the worker's condition in determining the date of permanent disability, not by the date of adjudication.
My interpretation is consistent with our longstanding statutorily mandated policy that:
the guiding principle in construing provisions of the Industrial Insurance Act is that the Act is remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed in order to achieve its purpose of providing compensation to all covered employees injured in their employment, with doubts resolved in favor of the worker.
Dennis v. Department of Labor & Indus., 109 Wn.2d 467, 470, 745 P.2d 1295 (1987); see also RCW 51.12.010 ("This title shall be liberally construed for the purpose of reducing to a minimum the suffering and economic loss arising from injuries ... in the course of employment."). The majority dismisses the liberal construction mandate by concluding that the statute is not ambiguous. See majority, at 473.1 disagree.
A statute is ambiguous if its language is susceptible to more than one meaning. Yakima v. International Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Local 469, 117 Wn.2d 655, 669, 818 P.2d 1076 (1991). The record reflects that the Department previously interpreted and applied RCW 51.32.225 in much the same way as Harris argues it should be interpreted. See Department Policy on Application of Retirement Offset (Dec. 3, 1986); Clerk's Papers, at 64. Additionally, the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals (BIIA) split 2 to 1 on how to interpret the statute. Clerk's Papers, at 39. These two facts are clear evidence that the statute is ambiguous.
My interpretation of the statute recognizes the reality of the administrative procedures within which the statute operates. Administrative delay is built into the system. It is not uncommon for the Department to take several months to adjudicate a disability claim. Clerk's Papers, at 39. This is especially true in cases involving self-insured employers, since the bulk of the administrative work in those cases is done by the employer. Injured workers should not be penalized for administrative delay. Accordingly, the Department *485has established procedures for placing the worker on the pension rolls retroactively. Clerk's Papers, at 39. This retro-activity procedure is necessaiy for a fair and just treatment of the disabled worker, and it insures that workers are not unfairly penalized for administrative delay.
The majority's interpretation, however, undermines both the retroactivity procedure and the Act. That interpretation penalizes the worker who was permanently disabled prior to July 1, 1986, if the administrative delay extended beyond the cutoff date. Thus, the majority ignores the administrative reality of the disability pension system and unfairly penalizes workers for delays beyond the workers' control.
The majority implies that because Harris did not seek a determination of permanent disability under RCW 51.32-.055(2) prior to July 1, 1986, appellant cannot now argue that Harris was in fact permanently disabled before that date. See majority, at 472, 475 n.9. The majority's reasoning ignores the fact that Harris had no reason to seek such a determination. He had been receiving "time loss" checks for several years. The Department never notified Harris that it would reduce the amount of his award if he did not seek a determination of permanent disability. He thus had no reason to seek a determination of permanent disability.
The practical result of the majority's argument is that Harris's compensation is reduced because he did not request a determination of permanent disability. The statute the majority relies on, however, does not require Harris to seek such a determination. This statute provides that
[e]ither the worker, employer, or self-insurer may make a request [for a determination of permanent disability] or such inquiry may be initiated by the director [of the Department of Labor and Industries] on his or her own motion.
(Italics mine.) RCW 51.32.055(2). As a matter of statutory interpretation, we cannot penalize Harris for failing to seek a determination of permanent disability when the statute does not mandate that he do so. To the extent that the statute places a burden on anyone, then under our rule of liberal construction that burden should be on the Depart*486ment. There is no justification for concluding that RCW 51.32.055(2) requires a worker to request a determination of permanent disability or face the consequences of reduced benefits under the Social Security offset.
II
I also disagree with the majority's conclusion on the preemption issue. Federal preemption of state laws occurs whenever there is a conflict between state and federal statutes such that the state law is an obstacle to the full accomplishment of Congressional objectives. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153, 73 L. Ed. 2d 664, 102 S. Ct. 3014 (1982); see generally L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §§ 6-25 through 6-26 (2d ed. 1988). RCW 51.32-.225 is preempted because it conflicts with both the federal reverse offset provision and the overall purposes of the Social Security Act.
The amicus, Washington State Trial Lawyers Association, correctly points out that Congress's limitation of the use of reverse offsets to the field of disability law preempts RCW 51.32.225. Federal law authorizes states to reduce state workers' compensation benefits by the amount of federal disability benefits a claimant receives. See 42 U.S.C. § 424a(d). That statute does not authorize, and does not even mention, offsets for federal retirement benefits. Furthermore, § 424a only applies to injured workers under the age of 65. Thus it does not, on its face, authorize a state offset for those who, like Harris, are over 65. Because Congress expressly authorized reverse offsets only for disability benefits and only for recipients under the age of 65, we can infer that it did not intend to allow states to offset federal retirement benefits. See Kreidler v. Eikenberry, 111 Wn.2d 828, 835, 766 P.2d 438 (1989) (express mention of one thing in a statute implies the exclusion of other things not mentioned); State v. Williams, 94 Wn.2d 531, 537, 617 P.2d 1012 (1980) (when a statute specifically designates one class of things upon which it operates, it can be inferred the Legislature intended to omit all other *487classes unless such an interpretation would defeat clear legislative intent). The language of 42 U.S.C. § 424a(d) clearly expresses congressional intent to only provide for state offset of disability benefits, and I would hold it preempts any state attempt to extend offsets to other types of federal benefits.
The easy question on preemption is how we would view RCW 51.32.225 if the Legislature had failed to adopt it within the "window" period allowed by 42 U.S.C. § 424a(d). The answer certainly would be that since Congress did not specifically allow any state offsets other than those enacted prior to February 18, 1981, any such legislation would fail due to preemption. 2 Social Security Law and Practice § 26:65, at 43-44 (1987). Similarly, because Congress did not authorize any offset other than one for disability compensation, RCW 51.32.225 is preempted.
The purposes underlying the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 424a support that interpretation. The overall purpose of § 424a is to avoid "duplication of disability benefits". (Italics mine.) S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1943, 1944. Congress was concerned that an employee who collected both state and federal disability might receive more money than if he or she were working and therefore have no incentive to rehabilitate and return to work. Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 82-83, 30 L. Ed. 2d 231, 92 S. Ct. 254 (1971). Those concerns are not present in the case of retired workers such as Harris. Harris is not collecting duplicate disability benefits. He receives state disability benefits and federal retirement benefits, and he is entitled to both.
The majority's conclusion that disability benefits and retirement benefits are essentially the same for offset purposes, see majority, at 480, ignores important historical and policy differences between the two types of benefits. Federal retirement benefits, or "old age security", have been a part of the Social Security Act since its inception in the 1930's. See generally R. Stevens, Statutory History of the United States: Income Security (1970). Disability benefits were not added *488until 1956. Statutory History, at 505. Retirement benefits are designed "to assure support for the aged as a right rather than as a public charity, and in amounts which will insure not merely subsistence but some of the comforts of life . . .." H.R. Rep. No. 615 (Economic Security Bill), 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), quoted in Statutory History, at 147. Disability benefits, on the other hand, were added to the Social Security Act out of a concern that state workers' compensation benefits were inadequate to compensate injured workers for their loss. Statutory History, at 501. Thus, the two types of benefits have different histories and different purposes. This court should not ignore those differences in attempting to justify RCW 51.32.225.
Congress specifically authorized reverse offsets only of disability benefits. Because, as the majority acknowledges, RCW 51.32.225 extends Washington's reverse offset to cover retirement benefits, majority, at 467, that statute conflicts with 42 U.S.C. § 424a(d), and is preempted.
RCW 51.32.225 is also preempted because it conflicts with the overall goals of the Social Security Act. Federal law preempts any state law that is an obstacle to the full accomplishment of congressional objectives. Fidelity Fed. Sav., 458 U.S. at 153. Congress's objective in establishing federal retirement benefits was to assure retired workers of an adequate income. The retirement program should be construed liberally in favor of the retired worker. Tsosie v. Califano, 651 F.2d 719, 723 (10th Cir. 1981); Delno v. Celebrezze, 347 F.2d 159, 162 (9th Cir. 1965). Thus we should start with the premise that the worker is entitled to his or her federal retirement benefit unless a specific exception clearly applies. Because no such exception exists in this case, RCW 51.32.225 hinders the full accomplishment of the congressional objective of assuring that workers receive their retirement benefits.
Raskin v. Moran, 684 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1982) supports this conclusion. The plaintiffs in Raskin challenged a Wisconsin statute that reduced certain judges' salaries by an amount *489equal to the Federal Social Security retirement benefits they received. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that the Wisconsin statute conflicted with the goals of the Social Security Act, and was therefore preempted. Raskin, at 477. Specifically, the court held that the statute conflicted with a provision of the Social Security Act that prohibits any reduction in Social Security benefits for income earned past the age of 70. Raskin, at 478. The Social Security Act did not, however, expressly prohibit the application of the Wisconsin statute, and that statute did not directly prevent or impede the receipt of the benefits. Raskin, at 476-77. Instead, the Wisconsin statute thwarted the federal policy because the statute effectively deprived recipients of federal benefits. Raskin, at 477-78. The purposes of the Social Security Act were thwarted because "the federal government put[] money in the plaintiffs' left pocket while [the state took] a precisely equal amount of money from their right pocket solely because the money was received through the social security program." Raskin, at 479-80. This analysis applies equally to our case.
RCW 51.32.225 thwarts the objectives of the Social Security Act. Congress intended for qualified workers to receive federal benefits upon their retirement, unless specific provisions of the Social Security Act provide otherwise. The challenged statute allows the state to take from the worker's right pocket what the federal government put in the left pocket. Because that action is not specifically authorized by Congress, RCW 51.32.225 conflicts with the federal act and is preempted.
Conclusion
I would hold that RCW 51.32.225 is preempted by federal law, and that the Department is therefore prohibited from offsetting federal retirement benefits. Alternatively, I would hold that the exemption to RCW 51.32.225 should be interpreted to apply to all workers who can prove they were permanently disabled prior to July 1, 1986. In either case, I would reverse the granting of the Department's motion for *490summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.