Court Opinion

ID: 9461663
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:22:10.431158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:13.038546
License: Public Domain

HASTINGS, Senior Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I agree with and concur in Part III, C and D, of the majority opinion wherein our court affirms the summary judgments below on defendants’ counterclaims four, five, six and seven in favor of the plaintiffs-counterclaim defendants.
I respectfully dissent from the result of the remainder of the majority opinion wherein our court reverses the summary judgments below in favor of plaintiffs on their complaint and counts one and two of defendants’ counterclaim and vacates the summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs on count three of defendants’ counterclaim.
In sum, I would affirm the judgment below in toto.
This litigation in the district court resulted in three well-considered memorandum decisions by Judge Bernard M. Decker. Tankersley v. Albright, N.D.Ill., 374 F.Supp. 530-537 (July 11, 1973), denied defendants’ motion to dismiss this action for lack of personal jurisdiction. I understand the majority here does not disagree with this result.
Tankersley v. Albright, N.D.Ill., 374 F.Supp. 538 — 551 (Feb. 5, 1974) and Tankersley v. Albright, N.D.Ill, 374 F.Supp. 551 — 558 (March 5, 1974), when read together reach the final results treated in the majority opinion. I am persuaded by the thorough and careful analysis of the underlying factual background and the considered treatment of the relevant issues and applicable law found therein. Since at this time it appears the McCormick-Patterson trust will terminate on April 1, 1975, I shall be content to rest my partial dissent upon the authority of these three opinions of the district court.
Summary judgment procedure was intended to serve a salutary purpose to meet a recognized need when it was devised. With deference, I cannot escape the conclusion that, not only in this circuit, but elsewhere, it has become so increasingly difficult to sustain a summary judgment on appeal that all of us are contributing to its untimely demise. Many outstanding members of the bar have expressed similar feelings.
Finally, since there was no trial of this case below on the merits, I respectfully disagree that the remand is subject to the strictures of our Circuit Rule 23. At this late hour I cannot see any justification for ordering that this complex litigation be dumped in the lap of another district judge.