Court Opinion

ID: 9704965
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:53:23.375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:06.917887
License: Public Domain

ROBERT M. BELL, Judge,
dissenting.
Although not explicitly stated, I read the majority opinion as rejecting the State’s contention that probable cause existed for the arrest of appellant and his companion as well as for search of appellant’s vehicle. To the extent that my reading is correct, I agree with the majority on this point. On the other hand, I disagree with its conclusion *99that the anonymous tip in this case, under the circumstances, provided a sufficient basis for a “Terry” stop.1
The majority acknowledges that the authorities are in conflict as to whether an anonymous tip, the details of which have been verified by the police, may serve as a predicate for a Terry stop. Compare United States v. White, 648 F.2d 29 (D.C.Cir.) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 924, 102 S.Ct. 424, 70 L.Ed.2d 233, 70 L.Ed.2d 235 (1981) and State v. Jernigan, 377 So.2d 1222 (La.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 958, 100 S.Ct. 2930, 64 L.Ed.2d 816 (1980)2 with Lunsford v. State, 652 P.2d 1243 (Okla.Cr.1982) and State v. Temple, 65 Haw. 261, 650 P.2d 1358 (1982). It then proceeds to formulate a general rule: “An anonymous tip may serve as a basis for a reasonable articulable suspicion if it is sufficiently detailed and corroborated that a reasonable person would regard it as reliable”, which it explicates as follows:
... An anonymous tip that a suspect is presently engaged in criminal activity would afford a sufficient basis for an investigative stop if the tip includes details, confirmed by police observation, which strongly indicate that the informant is sufficiently well acquainted with the individual identified in the tip to know that he may be involved with criminal activity.
Op. at 93. Building upon that principle, the majority asserts:
The caller informed the State Police that methamphetamines were being transported in Pennsylvania along Interstate 81 by a white male wearing an “Indiana Jones” *100style hat and a white female both occupying an automobile of a specific make, model and color with Pennsylvania tags. If that had been the extent of the tip given by the informant, it might well be questionable whether confirmation of that information would have justified even an investigatory stop. A mere description of the Thunderbird and its occupants could have been provided by any mischief maker who merely happened to observe the distinctive automobile as it travelled southward along Interstate 81. What sets this anonymous caller apart from the public at large, and what provides a reasonable basis for suspecting that his allegation of criminal activity may be true, is that he correctly informed the police that the Thunderbird would continue along Interstate 81 and cross over into Maryland in one to two hours. Considering that the automobile was carrying Pennsylvania tags, it is highly unlikely that one not intimately familiar with the car and its occupants—the mere casual observer—could have foretold the entry of the Thunderbird into Maryland one to two hours beforehand. Confirmation of that prediction, along with the later confirmation of substantially all of the other information provided by the informant, provided an articulable reasonable basis to suspect that the informant’s tip was true and thus to stop the Thunderbird and question its occupants, (footnote omitted)
Op. at 92-94. It relies upon Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) and Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959) for the proposition that the information provided by the anonymous tip in this case, when verified, tended to create a reasonable belief that the informant was credible and his information was reliable.
Before addressing the majority’s rationale for upholding the stop in this case, I think it appropriate to point out that the stop was unjustified for the simple reason that it was effected prior to police verification of the details of the tip. When appellant’s car was stopped, the police did not know, as they candidly admitted, the sex of the occupants, the *101race of the occupants, the color of the car, or whether the driver possessed an “Indiana Jones” type hat. All they knew was that the car was a distinctive, mid-sixties Thunderbird. Verification of most of the details of the tip thus occurred after, not before, the stop. This alone renders the stop illegal.
In any event, neither Gates nor Draper supports the proposition for which they are cited by the majority. In Draper, the only gap in the informant’s tip was the informant’s basis of knowledge. The informant was a person known to the narcotics agent and the information he had provided in the past had always been found by the agent to be accurate and reliable. It was on the basis of the proven reliability of the informant and the verification of the details of his tip that the Draper Court determined that the basis of the informant’s knowledge was also reliable and credible. In Gates, the tipster predicted that the suspects would engage in certain suspicious activities. Police verification that the suspects acted as the tipster said they would was a sufficient basis, the Court held, on which to conclude that both the tipster and the information he provided was reliable.
The tip in this case may not be credited either upon the Draper rationale or upon the Gates rationale. The informant was anonymous. Thus, he was not known to the police who acted on his tip, and, as far as is known, he had provided no information, reliable or otherwise, to the police in the past. Moreover, there is absolutely nothing suspicious, or even unusual, about a distinctive automobile with Pennsylvania license tags, occupied by a man and a woman proceeding southbound on 1-81 from Pennsylvania into Maryland. Since that is essentially the information provided, it is patent that the tip was not of suspicious or unusual activities. Verification of such information tells us nothing whatsoever about the reliability of the tipster, not to mention the reliability and credibility of the conclusion he wishes the recipient of the information to draw. To the extent that verification of that information even warrants suspicion it certainly does not warrant reasonable suspicion. The majority agrees, it appears, to this point.
*102That the tipster reasonably accurately predicts the approximate time that the Thunderbird will arrive in Maryland, does not justify a different conclusion. Any run-of-the-mill mischief maker could make a lucky guess that the car would proceed down 1-81 and into Maryland and, depending upon its location when observed in Pennsylvania, its estimated time of arrival. (It is relevant to note, in this regard, that the tipster provided himself an hour’s leeway.) If he guesses wrong, there is no harm done—no one is stopped and he certainly is not at risk. Even assuming, on the other hand, that the anonymous tipster knew appellant, the only thing that information concerning arrival time in Maryland proves or reasonably suggests is that the tipster also knew appellant’s itinerary. Again, it provides precious little, if any, insight into the tipster’s reliability or the reliability of his information. If a Terry stop is justified on the basis of information of this kind, it is difficult to imagine an anonymous tip that would not justify such a stop. Any statement which fixes the location of the suspect would qualify because it would be self-verifying—if the tipster says the suspect will be at point A and he is at point A, the verification of that fact, under the majority view, would provide a reasonable basis for suspecting that the tipster’s information is accurate. Because verification of the innocent and mundane details of a tip does not provide a basis for credibility of either the tipster or his information, I find the rule adopted by the majority to be merely a rationalization, under which any anonymous tip would provide the basis for a Terry stop.3 I, for my part, find State v. Temple, supra, persuasive, I would hold that, in the case sub judice, the tip was an insufficient basis on which to conduct a Terry stop.
While I recognize that the trial court found as a fact that appellant’s version of the events following the stop were less credible than that offered by the State, I nevertheless *103find it difficult to accept the conclusion, concerning the voluntariness of appellant’s consent to the search of his car, drawn both by the trial judge and the majority. Even in the State’s version, Trooper Keckler told appellant that he “believed” that he could search appellant’s car without appellant’s consent. The majority says that that statement is different from appellant’s version, in which the trooper stated “unequivocally” a right to search the Thunderbird with or without appellant’s consent. Considering the circumstances in which the statement was made, rather than focusing exclusively upon the words used, the distinction escapes me; the statements are, in my view, indistinguishable. That being the case, and again considering the circumstances under which the stop and search occurred, I believe that the events smack of coercion. I agree that they do not reach the level of coercion present in Whitman v. State, 25 Md.App. 428, 336 A.2d 515 (1975), but then that is not the issue. Whitman is but one case in which, on the facts and circumstances therein existing, coercion was found. Different facts, even facts less egregious than those in Whitman, also may justify a finding of coercion. In my view, the circumstances here suggest that the trooper’s statement of his belief that he could search the car whether appellant consented or not, resulted in appellant’s acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority.

. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) permits an officer, based upon a “reasonable articulable suspicion" that a crime is being or is about to be committed, to conduct an investigative stop of a person suspected of engaging in criminal conduct. Id., 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880.

. In dissent, Justices White, Brennan and Marshall would have granted certiorari “because the reliability of an anonymous or unidentified tipster is an issue that has divided the federal courts of appeal" and because the decision in Jemigan was "arguably” inconsistent with the Court’s prior cases. Id., 446 U.S. at 959-60, 100 S.Ct. at 2931.

. A standard requiring verification of only innocent details is susceptible to “cheating", i.e. manufacturing anonymous tipsters.