Court Opinion

ID: 9754966
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:19:47.435159+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:56:00.387665
License: Public Domain

Atcheson, J.,
dissenting: I respectfully dissent. Based on the undisputed evidence admitted during the bench trial, Defendant Jason Lee Martin Brown did not violate the criminal domestic batteiy statute, K.S.A. 21-3412a(a).
As of August 2010, when this case was tried, Brown and Amanda Packer lived together in Topeka. They are not married but are parents to a child who lived with them. On March 30,2010, Brown and Packer were in the midst of a loud argument. According to the trial testimony, they were exchanging only words — neither had laid hands on the other. Both agreed, however, their verbal jousting had become noisy and profane. Brown said he wanted to leave the residence and, thus, discontinue the argument. He testified that he “kept telling her I wanted to leave[;] I wanted this to end.” Brown said he asked Packer “to move out of [the] way.” Brown said that Packer placed herself between him and the exit. Packer testified Brown was going to leave the residence so she stood in the doorway to block his way. At trial, Packer agreed she was “pretty much” getting in Brown’s way.
*215As I understand the trial testimony, the couple lived in what they described as a trailer. Packer stood in a doorway between the living room where Brown was and the kitchen where the exterior door to die trailer was. To get out, Brown had to go through the doorway where Packer stood. Brown, then, pushed Packer s shoulder or upper chest (there is some discrepancy, though that seems legally insignificant) to get by her and out the trailer door. Packer fell on a sofa.
Police officers arrived shortly afterward. Neither Brown nor Packer called the authorities. I infer a neighbor hearing the ruckus probably did. Packer asserted she was uninjured, and the officers saw nothing to indicate otherwise.
The trial was, in a word, brief. All of the witness testimony is contained in about 14 pages of the record.
Under K.S.A. 21-3412a(a) domestic battery is: “(1) Intentionally or recklessly causing bodily harm by a family or household member against a family or household member; or (2) intentionally causing physical contact with a family or household member by a family or household member when done in a rude, insulting, or angiy manner/’ The statute essentially makes simple batteiy, as defined in K.S.A. 21-3412, a separate and somewhat more serious offense when committed between persons sharing a house or a family connection. Brown was charged under the second subsection of the statute. There is no question about the two being household members. And there is no question Brown intentionally caused physical contact with Packer. The only issue is whether that contact was done “in a rude, insulting or angry manner.”
As the majority points out, the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the State and, thus, in support of the trial court’s judgment of conviction. But I see no material dispute about the events. In its bench ruling, the trial court noted no material conflicts in the evidence and made no credibility findings. The trial court determined Brown shoved or pushed Packer during an argument to “effect an exit from a room.” The trial court then concluded: “I suppose that shoving someone in the midst of an argument can be considered rude, insulting, or angry. And I suppose *216that’s the answer to the question. So based on that, the Court would enter a finding of guilty.”
The record indicates the trial court found the issue to be at least mildly perplexing because while the argument itself plainly was rude, insulting, and angry, the physical contact really was not. The undisputed evidence showed that Brown told Packer he wished to leave and asked her to move out of the way. Rather than do so, Packer, knowing of Brown’s intention to leave, thwarted him by blocking the doorway. He then pushed her aside so he could leave.
Basically, the trial court concluded that any physical contact during a rude, insulting, or angry oral exchange must likewise necessarily be rude, insulting, or angry and, therefore, a criminal battery. But that cannot be correct.
If, during the argument, Brown saw a pack of feral dogs set upon a letter carrier delivering mail just up the street and pushed Packer aside to go to that person’s assistance, I don’t see that he would be guilty of battery. The physical contact would not have been done in a rude, insulting, or angry way. Similarly, had Packer backed into the kitchen and brushed against a hot burner on the stove igniting her shirt, Brown would not be criminally liable for grabbing her in an effort to extinguish the flames.
But other physical contact during an argument plainly would violate the statute. Had Brown been jabbing his finger into Packer’s shoulder to emphasize his side in the dispute, he would be guilty of domestic battery. Had Packer refused a demand that she shut up and Brown then slapped her, he would be guilty.
The essence of the offense is the nature of the physical contact itself; it must be rude, insulting, or angry. The surrounding circumstances establish a context that guides that determination. But simply because some of the circumstances may be that way, the contact does not automatically violate the statute. The district court and the majority both fail to acknowledge that distinction.
While the two sets of examples I have given are quite different from each other, they demonstrate that the offense of battery (or, here, domestic battery) contemplates a line between conduct that is proscribed and that which is not. Almost anytime the law draws a line, it may become difficult to distinguish between two sets of *217circumstances falling close to — but on opposite sides of — that line. They probably look a lot alike.
The majority dismisses the undisputed evidence that Packer blocked Brown’s way. But that evidence combined with the undisputed evidence Brown asked Packer to step aside so he could leave and her acknowledgement that she understood him goes to the core of the case and whether the law had been broken. In those circumstances, the physical contact was sufficiently distinct from the rude, insulting, and angry discourse swirling around it to fall on the noncriminal side of the line drawn in K.S.A. 21-3412a(a)(2).
Had Brown said nothing to announce his desire to leave and simply pushed Packer aside in the course of the argument and left the residence, those circumstances would have been much closer to the line. I am not sure on which side they would belong. But that case is not this one.
I do agree that self-defense has nothing to do with this case and would not justify Brown’s conduct as a means of protecting himself.
And Brown had no license to use some greater degree of force. Had Packer suffered “bodily harm,” Brown could have been prosecuted under the other means of committing domestic battery outlined in K.S.A. 21-3412a(a). That subsection criminalizes “intentionally or recklessly causing bodily harm” whether or not the perpetrator acts in a rude, insulting, or angry way. K.S.A. 21-3412a(a)(l). The offender need only engage in deliberate conduct resulting in such harm to violate that section, even if he or she never meant to hurt the victim. K.S.A. 21-3201(b). If the resulting harm were even graver or the force used likely to cause serious injury, the perpetrator could be prosecuted for felony battery. K.S.A. 21-3414(a)(l) (aggravated battery).
I would reverse the conviction and enter a judgment of acquittal.