Court Opinion

ID: 9549445
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:18:36.549318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:19.775352
License: Public Domain

*161CARTER, J.
I dissent. In my opinion the petitioner is “a man more sinn’d against than sinning,” and if “moral turpitude” consists of something “contrary to justice,” the majority decision of this court in this case is a literal exemplification of that definition.
The majority opinion apparently concedes that petitioner’s dealings with Mrs. Haweis up to the time of her employment of Goodman as her attorney were entirely proper and that he made no misrepresentations to her in regard to the Shibley note and trust deed. The testimony of Mrs. Haweis that petitioner agreed to handle the financing problems and close up the estate for a fee of $200 or $250 is apparently disbelieved, as is her testimony with reference to representations which she claimed he made to her in regard to the trust deed and note.
The majority opinion states: “But assuming that the evidence requires findings that Fall made no misrepresentations to Mrs. Haweis either as to the value of the Shibley note or the purpose of assigning it to him, the record conclusively shows that when his client charged him with wrongdoing and demanded an accounting, without notice and in violation of the plainest principles of fair dealing, he endeavored to conclude a sale of the property which he had acquired from her. The evidence concerning the conduct of Mrs. Haweis reflects no credit upon her. Unquestionably she was a difficult and unappreciative client who had no scruples against obtaining legal services without paying an adequate amount for them. ’ ’
It therefore appears that the principal criticism of the petitioner by the majority opinion relates to his conduct with respect to' the sale of the note and trust deed under execution to satisfy his lien thereon without giving notice thereof to Mrs. Haweis or Goodman. However, the majority opinion also criticizes petitioner relative to his statements to Goodman in regard to the sale to Foulks of the property covered by the Shibley note and trust deed. In this regard the majority opinion states: “Unquestionably Fall represented to Goodman that the Shibley-Foulks escrow could not be closed but the asserted falsity of the statement is not satisfactorily shown by the record. On the contrary, there is substantial evidence which would justify Fall’s assertion. Apparently for some time Shibley was quite uncertain as to whether the sale could be concluded and he testified that “We had quite a good deal of confusion and argument over his [Fall’s] apparent failure to fulfill his part of the agreement under the escrow.’ He *162stated that Foulks ‘had been very apprehensive of the deal going through’; that the agent ‘told me and my mother that the Foulks were pulling out of the deal,’ and that Fall was so advised.”
The majority must have resorted to the art of clairvoyance in making the foregoing deduction, that while there is substantial evidence in the record to support the truth of Fall’s testimony, and there is no satisfactory evidence to the contrary, he nevertheless, “unquestionably represented to Goodman that the Shibley-Foulhs escrow could not be closed.”
But as I read the majority opinion the sole ground upon which it predicates its order that petitioner be disciplined is, that he caused execution to be levied upon the Shibley note and trust deed and had the same sold at execution sale without giving notice to either Mrs. Haweis or Goodman. This conclusion is reached notwithstanding the statement in the majority opinion that petitioner “was not required to give Mrs. Haweis notice of the execution sale.” This, the majority opinion classifies as “moral turpitude” and justifies its order suspending the petitioner from practice for the period of one year.
I have made a careful examination of the record in this case, and the picture I get therefrom amply justifies the statement I made at the beginning of this opinion that petitioner is “a man more sinn’d against than sinning,” and I can see no justification whatever for disciplining him for any conduct in connection with the Haweis estate or his dealings with Mrs. Haweis or Goodman.
The record discloses, and the majority opinion concedes, that petitioner undertook and performed services of substantial value in connection with the closing of the Haweis estate. No funds were available to pay for his services and he agreed to accept the Shibley note and trust deed which was of doubtful value, as full compensation for the services rendered by him After these services had been rendered, Mrs. Haweis repudiated her agreement-with him and attempted to prevent him from receiving the compensation to which he was entitled. Notwithstanding her testimony that he agreed to perform all of the services required in connection with the financing and closing of the estate for a fee of $200 or $250, the trial court allowed petitioner an ordinary fee of $957.96 and an extraordinary fee of $1,100; or a total of $2,057.96, ap*163proximately ten times the amount Mrs. Haweis said he had agreed to accept in full for his services. In addition to this allowance as fees, the trial court also allowed petitioner $25 for toll charges advanced and $521.78 for taxes paid by him, malting a total of $2,604.74. Notwithstanding this order of the trial court, Mrs. Haweis exerted every effort to prevent petitioner from receiving the amount so awarded and employed attorney Goodman to assist her in preventing petitioner from obtaining the amount to which he was entitled. After attorney Goodman was employed by Mrs. Haweis, petitioner requested that he be substituted in petitioner’s place as Mrs. Haweis’ attorney, but Goodman refused.
The majority opinion concedes that petitioner had a legal right to levy execution upon the Shibley note and trust deed to satisfy his lien for attorney’s fees and money advanced in connection with his handling of the Haweis’ estate. The majority opinion likewise concedes that there is no law which required him to give Mrs. Haweis notice of the execution sale of said documents. In other words, the majority opinion concedes that when he proceeded to have execution issued and the Shibley note and trust deed sold to satisfy his lien thereon, he was doing what he had a legal right to do, and there can be no question but that this was his unassailable right. It is plainly obvious, and the majority opinion does not assert to the contrary, that from the time Goodman was employed by Mrs. Haweis as her attorney, the relation of attorney and client between her and petitioner terminated, and he was under no obligation to treat her as his client or extend to her any professional courtesy that should not be extended to an adverse party; in other words, from the time he undertook to collect from Mrs. Haweis his fee and the money which he had advanced, she was as to him an adverse party, and he was justified in treating her as such. Certainly, an attorney is under no obligation to notify an adverse party that he intends to levy, execution on his property to satisfy a judgment against him, and the majority opinion does not assert the contrary.
I have always advocated and am a firm believer in high ethical standards in all professions, particularly in the legal profession, but I likewise believe that a professional man, including a lawyer; has some rights and that he is not required to yield to the avarieiousness of a client who not only refuses *164to pay just and fair compensation for the services rendered by his attorney, bnt attempts to discredit him without justification when the lawyer attempts to collect his fee. In the case at bar, the majority opinion states with respect to Mrs. Haweis: “Unquestionably she was a difficult and unappreciative client who had no scruples against obtaining legal services without paying an adequate amount for them.” And further, that she said: “That she would see him (Fall) ‘in hell’ before she would pay him any of the money awarded by the court.” To say that an attorney dealing with such a former client, after she has hired another attorney to represent her, is required to treat her differently from any other adverse party, is to my mind, placing a burden upon an attorney that was never contemplated by the State Bar Act or any rules of professional conduct ever promulgated by any responsible organization of lawyers or laymen. The majority opinion resorts to some fancy language in attempting to discredit the conduct of petitioner in connection with the execution sale of the Shibley note and trust deed. It states: “Moreover, passing the question as to whether Fall was entitled to execution upon the order fixing the amount due to him as fees and advancements, having obtained the writ and levied upon the note, although he was not required to give Mrs. Haweis notice of the execution sale, his actions in concealing her address from the sheriff when it was requested by that officer evidences a total disregard of her rights and an intention to circumvent her by fair means or foul. Mailing a notice to her on a date so late that it was doubtful whether she would receive it, much less have time to act upon it for the protection of her interests prior to the sale, was contrary to the plainest principles of honesty and fair dealing.”
A complete answer to the foregoing chastisement is, that if petitioner was not required to give Mrs. Haweis notice of the execution sale, he did not disregard her rights in failing to do so. If she was not entitled to notice of the sale, as the majority opinion concedes, petitioner was under no obligation to give her such notice. Having been discharged as her attorney, and she having employed an attorney in his stead, petitioner was no longer interested in the protection of her interests; in fact, he was attempting to protect his own interests which he had a legal and moral right to do. In view of the factual and legal situation which existed at that time it is im*165possible for me to understand how it can be said that his conduct in connection with the execution sale “was contrary to the plainest principles of honesty and fair dealing.” There is no claim or suggestion that he violated any trust or confidence reposed in him or used confidential information obtained while acting as her attorney.
The conclusion reached in the majority opinion is to my mind fanciful, unrealistic, unjust and in utter disregard of the facts and legal principles which the majority opinion concedes to be involved in this case.
I have some apprehension that lawyers who have had experience with clients of the type of Mrs. Haweis will feel, after reading the majority opinion, that it is the view of a majority of this court, that regardless of the conduct of the client, a lawyer has no rights which the client need respect. I do not agree with this view.
I am firmly convinced that there is no foundation whatever in either fact or law for the conclusion reached in the majority opinion and that the proceeding against the petitioner should be dismissed.
Schauer, J., concurred in the conclusion stated by Justice Carter.
Petitioner’s application for a rehearing was denied December 4,1944. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a rehearing.