Court Opinion

ID: 9774213
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:11:36.434535+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:03.432836
License: Public Domain

LEVY, J.,
with whom ALEXANDER, J., joins, concurring.
[¶ 25] This Court has previously identified three values that are served by the voluntariness requirement: “ ‘(1) it discourages objectionable police practices; (2) *415it protects the mental freedom of the individual; and (3) it preserves a quality of fundamental fairness in the criminal justice system.’ ” State v. Sawyer, 2001 ME 88, ¶ 8, 772 A.2d 1173, 1176 (quoting State v. Mikulewicz, 462 A.2d 497, 500 (Me. 1983)). I write separately to emphasize that all three values are potentially compromised if a police detective persuades a crime suspect, prior to the administration of a polygraph examination, that the results of the exam are foolproof.
[¶ 26] The Constitution’s tolerance for the use of deception as an investigatory tactic by the police is not boundless. See, e.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534, 83 S.Ct. 917, 9 L.Ed.2d 922 (1963) (holding-confession involuntary when police falsely threatened to remove children from defendant’s custody if she did not cooperate); State v. Byram, 145 F.3d 405, 408 (1st Cir.1998) (stating that police trickery that rises to the level of coercion may result in determination that a confession is involuntary). A deception that actually compromises a suspect’s ability to make a “free choice of a rational mind,” State v. Coombs, 1998 ME 1, ¶ 10, 704 A.2d 387, 390, is inherently coercive and fundamentally unfair.
[¶27] Thus, where a suspect is persuaded, prior to a polygraph examination, that the results are foolproof, there is a heightened risk that the suspect will conform his or her post-examination statements to the allegedly foolproof results of the exam. In such a case, if the court determines that the deception was coercive and prevented the suspect from exercising free will, the resulting confession should be suppressed. See State v. Davis, 381 N.W.2d 86, 88 (Minn.Ct.App.1986) (determining that a confession was involuntary where, among other things, the examiner told the suspect that the polygraph test was foolproof); People v. Leonard, 59 A.D.2d 1, 397 N.Y.S.2d 386, 393-96 (1977) (holding that a confession was involuntary where, among other factors, during prolonged interrogation, the examiner told the suspect that the polygraph “machine was infallible and knew the truth just like defendant and God.”).
[¶ 28] In this case, Lavoie urges us to conclude that the deception — the use of a polygraph examination to prompt his confession — crossed the line, in part because Detective Mitchell persuaded him that the results of the polygraph examination would be foolproof. A review of the record establishes, however, that the suppression court was not compelled to find that this is what occurred. The transcript of the pre-examination interview reflects that Detective Mitchell told Lavoie that, in comparison to the printed results from a traditional analog polygraph machine, a computer’s visual depiction of the lines correlating to the physiological responses of the person being examined is foolproof. Mitchell did not tell Lavoie that the polygraph examination’s results are foolproof.
[¶ 29] The representation by a polygraph examiner that any aspect of a polygraph examination is foolproof rightfully calls into question the voluntariness of any confession prompted by the examination. The practice should be avoided. Considering Detective Mitchell’s representation in the context of the totality of the circumstances presented in this case, I am satisfied that suppression is not warranted and the judgment should be affirmed.