Court Opinion

ID: 9306052
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-12-02 17:17:03.279345+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:13:54.702065
License: Public Domain

Carpenter, J.,
(concurring.) This motion was first heard by my Brother Aldrich, who intimated his opinion as above. Afterwards the appellant amended his answer so that it specifically admits all the other requirements of a valid will, and alleges that the supposed will of Matilda P. Jenness ought not to be proved, because the said Jenness was induced to execute the same by undue influence, overpersuasion, and artful misrepresentations. On these amended pleadings the motion was *897reargued before my Brother Aldrich, with whom I sat at his request and by consent of the counsel. I entirely concur in his conclusion.
I do not find that the question here raised has ever been decided by the supreme court of New Hampshire. The uniform practice in that court, as I understand from the cases, has been that on appeal from the probate of a will the issues in the first instance to be tried are whether the testator was of lawful age, of sane mind, whether the alleged will was duly executed, and, in case the question is raised, whether there was undue influence, or fraud, or whatever other thing may be alleged. These issues are tried by the court, unless one or more of them be put in dispute by the appeal. In the latter case the issues are sent'to a jury; and on trial, although the appellant may offer evidence only on those issues which he has put in dispute, still the proponent of the will must establish, by proof which the trial judge shall deem competent, all the allegations of fact which go to establish the existence of a valid will. This being the case, it is evident that the proponent, who stands in the position of plaintiff, has always the affirmative of some of the issues, and hence, according to the universal rule in all our courts, has the right to open and close. These issues having been determined, the court in the light of those findings, and from an inspection of the alleged will, determines the main issue in the case, and thereupon makes the final decree. The issue whether the propounded instrument is or is not the last will of the person deceased is therefore for the court alone.
In the present case the appellant admits on the record that every issue shall be found for the proponent, excepting only the issue of undue influence. • Upon that issue he evidently has the affirmative, and, as that is the sole issue for the jury, he ought to open and close. It has, indeed, been argued that it is contrary to the policy of the law to allow the appellant to admit any of the allegations which go to establish the validity of the will, and that they are public questions to be found by inquisition of the court. On this question I can add little to the lucid observations of the foregoing opinion. The requirements of the law and of public policy have been fully met by the inquisition heretofore had in the probate court. The decree of that court is in full force, and is itself competent evidence to this court of the facts thereby determined. Gen. Laws N. H. p. 484, § 12. And, as to the rights of the appellant, it is doubtless competent for him to waive them.