Court Opinion

ID: 9787951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:28:11.94969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:02.888084
License: Public Domain

Valente, J. P. (dissenting).
I am in agreement with the majority as to the unquestioned principle of law that a foreign corporation does not become amenable to suit in the State merely because a wholly owned subsidiary is doing business here. (Simonson v. International Bank, 16 A D 2d 55, 58.) It is only where the subsidary is shown to be an instrumentality used as a subterfuge for the parent corporation to conduct its regular business, that the corporate entities will be pierced and the subsidiary considered an agent of the parent company upon whom service can be made to assert personal jurisdiction over the parent. Moreover, I also agree that the determination as to whether the subsidiary is solely an instrumentality of the parent corporation is a factual question and each case must be decided on its peculiar facts. In the instant ease there was a comprehensive hearing before a Special Referee whose findings that Rolls-Royce, Ltd., was not doing business in this State and was not present here were confirmed by Special Term after a painstaking review. I cannot accept the view of the majority which would not only overturn those findings but would, in addition, interpret the facts established before the Eeferee as demonstrating that any claim of independence between the companies is illusory. Contrary to the majority, I would hold that the proof adequately established that Rolls-Royce, Ltd., *76with careful deliberation, maintained the complete separateness and independence of its — once removed—subsidiary in New York, and that it was established that there was no such complete domination as to make the subsidiary an agent or tool of the grandparent company. I, therefore, dissent and would affirm the order vacating the service.
McNally, Stevens and Steuer, JJ., concur in Per Curiam opinion; Valente, J. P., dissents and votes to affirm, in opinion.
Order, entered on September 30, 1963, reversed, with $20 costs and disbursements to the appellant, and the motion denied, with $10 costs.