Court Opinion

ID: 9693171
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:28:06.843879+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:03:25.920904
License: Public Domain

BROSKY, J.,
dissenting.
¶ 1 I dissent. The present appeal requires us to interpret whether the phrase, “within 1000 feet of a public or private elementary or secondary school,...” a phrase which is part of a sentence enhancement provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, 204 Pa.Code 303.10(b), should, as a matter of judicial function, be construed by this court to mean within 1,000 feet of the school building itself or within 1,000 feet of the outermost reach of the school’s real property.
¶ 2 To be certain, this is a case of judicial interpretation, plain and simple. The reason the matter is in controversy at all can be attributed to a less than perfectly precise choice of words by the Commission on Sentencing in drafting the provision. Further, I cannot assert that the majority’s interpretation of the phrase is unreasonable or patently incorrect. Their assessment clearly seems reasonable. However, the converse is true as well.
¶3 By way of popular connotation it seems to me that the term “school” connotes the school building itself, while terms such as “schoolyard,” “school grounds” or “school property” connote areas beyond the building. Clearly, it could be reasonably asserted that the term “school” means the school building and not the entire school grounds. Thus, we are faced with a situation where there are competing reasonable interpretations, i.e., the phraseology in question is ambiguous.
¶4 Interestingly, the Federal equivalent to 303.10 avoids the problem presented here by utilizing the language “within 1,000 feet of, the real property comprising a public or private elementary school.” 21 U.S.C.A. § 860(a). So too does 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6317, which was a direct enactment by our legislature as opposed to an enhancement promulgated by the Sentencing Commission. If this does not admit to a certain latent ambiguity in the usage of the phrase “school” as opposed to the term “the real property” of a school, it certainly admits that there are less ambiguous phraseologies available.
¶ 5 Not surprisingly, appellant argues that the failure to use a similar wording evinces the intent to enhance the sentences of only those who possess a banned substance within 1,000 feet of the building itself. However, in actuality, while the above may be true, the Commission’s failure to use the term “real property” might simply be the result of nothing more than the Commission’s failure to be as precise in its wording as was the United States Congress or a failure to even consider the matter at all.
¶ 6 Nevertheless, and semantics aside, there is a very sound reason we should construe the section in question to mean within 1,000 feet of the school building itself as opposed to within 1,000 feet of the school’s real property line, that reason being that 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1928 dictates that penal provisions be strictly construed.
¶ 7 Section 1928 commands us to construe penal provisions strictly. In cases such as these, where the language at issue is capable of two, or possibly more, interpretations § 1928 indicates that we should choose the stricter(est) construction due to the penal consequences which attach.6 *885Thus, in light of § 1928 and the ambiguous wording of § 803.10 I would construe that section to require the enhancement of a sentence where it is determined that the possession occurred within 1,000 feet of the school building. Since in the present case the Commonwealth presented no evidence of the distance from the school building to the spot where appellant possessed the cocaine, I believe it was error to apply the enhancement provision of § 303.10. Thus, I would vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.
¶ 8 The majority counters the thesis of this dissent by asserting that “today many schools of this Commonwealth have campus like settings, which consist of multiple school buildings, athletic fields, stadiums and playgrounds.” Apparently the majority is relying upon common experience to make this assertion since there is no citation to any such evidence entered below or similar citation to any studies or statistical profiles documenting this fact.
¶ 9 The majority is likely correct that some schools in the Commonwealth have real property lines beyond 1,000 feet of a school building. I am further aware, as noted above, that § 1928 does not compel an interpretation that would clearly negate the legislative intent of the regulation7 in question. Commonwealth v. Wooten, 519 Pa. 45, 545 A.2d 876 (1988). I further agree with the majority that the basic intent behind the enhancement in question is to provide additional deterrence to drug dealing near schools. However, 1,000 feet is a distance of greater than three football fields. I doubt that the majority of schools in the Commonwealth have property lines that extend more than 1,000 feet from a school building. Certainly few, if any, urban schools would possess this quality and few suburban schools as well. Thus, I do not believe a large percentage of schools would fall into the anomaly pointed out by the majority if the stricter interpretation were adopted.
¶ 10 But, even for those that do, it does not follow that the stricter interpretation will defeat the general intent of the enhancement provision, although it would likely lessen the effectiveness of that enhancement. Regardless of how you look at it 1,000 feet is 1,000 feet. It is a considerable distance. Assuming that the sentencing enhancement in fact deters drug dealing within 1,000 feet of a school building even those students attending the large campus-like schools will spend the majority of their time within 1,000 feet of the “school building.” Further, only the most brazen of drug traffickers would engage in the practice on school property, even if they are more than 1,000 feet from the school building, and its doubtful this decision will result in numerous drug dealers “setting up shop” a 1,001 feet from the school proper simply because the enhancement in question would not apply. Thus, it is dubious to contend that the stricter construction will lay waste to the intent behind the provision. In point of fact, either interpretation will promote the general purpose of the enhancement provision, although, obviously, the stricter interpretation will not promote the purpose as fully.
¶ 11 I would not argue with the majority that the interpretation they espouse would provide greater protection and therefore fulfill the objectives of the provision more fully. Indeed, the majority seems eager to adopt the interpretation that provides the most protection without regard to any possible argument to the *886contrary. Further, it could certainly be argued that the majority’s decision provides a better policy than the alternative. Indeed, in the absence of 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1928 I would not hesitate to join them. However, given the existence of 1 Pa. C.S.A. § 1928, I believe we are obligated to apply the stricter construction; thus I am compelled to dissent.

. Although the above premise is well established it does not mean that the legislature’s general intent should be ignored or that reason and logic should be abandoned. Commonwealth v. Henderson, 444 Pa.Super. 170, 663 A.2d 728 (1995). However, with regard *885to the language in question neither interpretation is illogical or strained and the phrase could reasonably be construed in either fashion. Thus, under these circumstances the stricter interpretation should be adopted.

. Generally, administrative rules and regulations are subject to the same principles of construction that apply to statutes. Smith v. Mitchell, 420 Pa.Super. 137, 616 A.2d 17, (1992). In fact, we relied, in part, upon 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1928 in concluding that a motor vehicle was not a "deadly weapon” for purposes of that sentence enhancement provision in Commonwealth v. Burns, 390 Pa.Super. 426, 568 A.2d 974 (1990).