Court Opinion

ID: 9893583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-27 19:03:29.620562+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:35.194630
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/27/23 P. v. Clark CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C098193

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      (Super. Ct. No. 02F07480)

           v.

 ERNEST ERASTUS CLARK IV,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Ernest Erastus Clark IV appeals from the trial court’s denial of his
petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 Appellate counsel filed a
brief raising no arguable issues under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216
(Delgadillo) and requesting we exercise our discretion to review the record for arguable

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. Defendant petitioned for
resentencing under former section 1170.95. Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature
renumbered former section 1170.95 as section 1172.6 without substantive changes.
(Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We cite to section 1172.6 throughout this opinion.

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issues on appeal. Defendant filed a supplemental brief. Having considered the issues
raised in defendant’s supplemental brief, we affirm.
                                     BACKGROUND
       “While driving under the influence of methamphetamine, defendant . . . caused a
head-on collision resulting in serious bodily injury. One year later, again while driving
under the influence of methamphetamine, he caused another head-on collision, this time
killing two people and seriously injuring another. [¶] The jury found him guilty as
charged of two counts of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); counts 1
and 2), two counts of driving under the influence of a drug and neglecting a duty imposed
by law which caused bodily injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, [former] subd. (a); counts 3 and
4), and misdemeanor hit and run. (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a); count 5.) The jury
found true the allegation on count three that defendant caused death and bodily injury to
more than one victim. (Veh. Code, § 23558.) Defendant pled guilty to petty theft (§ 484,
subd. (a), count 6) and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 32 years to life plus
eight months. The court dismissed counts five and six.” (People v. Clark (July 18, 2006,
C048285) [nonpub. opn.].)2
       In 2019, defendant filed a prior petition for resentencing pursuant to
section 1172.6. The trial court denied the petition and we affirmed. (People v. Clark
(June 8, 2023, C091345) [nonpub. opn.].)3

2 We quote these facts not as providing any basis for our resolution of defendant’s
contentions on appeal, but merely as background.
3 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of our unpublished opinion affirming the
denial of defendant’s first petition for resentencing. (Evid. Code, §§ 451, 459.)

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       In 2022, defendant filed the current petition for resentencing. The trial court
denied the petition, concluding: “[B]ased upon the information provided by the parties at
the prima facie hearing, the changes to the laws regarding murder do not apply to
[defendant’s] second degree murder convictions. ‘The jury was not instructed on any
theory of liability for murder or attempted murder that required that malice be imputed.’ ”
The court further concluded that the record “shows the jury did not receive instructions
on an invalid theory of murder, rendering [defendant] ineligible for relief under [section]
1172.6 as a matter of law.”
                                       DISCUSSION
       Counsel filed a brief raising no arguable issues under Delgadillo, supra,
14 Cal.5th 216, and requesting we exercise our discretion to review the record for
arguable issues on appeal. Defendant filed a supplemental brief raising three issues.
       In his first argument, relying on In re Ferrell (2023) 14 Cal.5th 593, defendant
questions whether the theory of implied-malice murder violates due process. Defendant
asserts it is “difficult for a jury to” make a finding that a defendant killed with implied
malice or to “make a determination of the mental component without some sort of
medical or mental health training.” He continues: “A serious question of law and facts
remain[s] unanswered in this case. How can a jury of one’s peer[s] make or determine
defendant’s . . . mental component at the time of the car accident?” Contrary to
defendant’s implications, implied-malice murder remains a valid theory. (Id. at p. 602
[jury received instructions on valid theories of second degree murder including “implied-
malice murder without the felony-murder shortcut”]; People v. Schell (2022)
84 Cal.App.5th 437, 442 [the “theory of second degree implied malice murder, remains
valid notwithstanding the recent changes effected by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018
Reg. Sess.) and Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)”].) As the Supreme Court
stated in In re Ferrell, and as defendant acknowledges, “it is the jury’s province, in a
homicide case, to assess” the relevant danger at issue, “probe defendant’s state of mind,

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and determine whether or not a defendant killed with implied malice.” (In re Ferrell, at
p. 607, italics added.) Nothing in In re Ferrell supports defendant’s contention that
implied-malice murder violates due process. To the extent defendant conflates implied-
malice murder with imputed malice, defendant stands convicted of the former. As we
stated in affirming the denial of defendant’s prior petition for resentencing, section
1172.6 addresses imputed malice, not implied malice. (Clark, supra, C091345.)
Defendant has not satisfied his burden of establishing his entitlement to relief based on
application of the implied-malice murder theory.
       In his second argument, defendant asserts section 1172.6 violates the equal
protection clause of the United States Constitution. Where a law challenged on equal
protection grounds “neither draws a suspect classification nor burdens fundamental
rights,” courts employ a rational basis test. (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277,
288-289.) As stated by the California Supreme Court: “We first ask whether the state
adopted a classification affecting two or more groups that are similarly situated in an
unequal manner. [Citation.] If we deem the groups at issue similarly situated in all
material respects, we consider whether the challenged classification ultimately bears a
rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.” (Id. at p. 289.) Defendant asserts he
“has a serious drug addiction, making [him] part of an unpopular group of individuals
that commit the same and convicted with people that were intoxicated due to an infliction
[sic] of alcohol abuse, and yet the individuals convicted under this infliction [sic] seem to
be the ones . . . [section] 1172.6 appl[ies] to.” It is not entirely clear whether the
classifications raised by defendant are drug addicts as opposed to alcohol abusers or
addicts in general as opposed to non-addicts. In any event, he has established neither that
the statute treats similarly situated groups in an unequal manner nor that there is no
rational basis for doing so. (See In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408 [to
“demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by
citations to authority . . . .”]; see also Chatman, at p. 289 [classification in statute

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presumed rational until challenger shows that no rational basis for unequal treatment is
reasonably conceivable].)
       Lastly, defendant asserts he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because
his attorney made no argument on his behalf at his prima facie hearing. Assuming
defendant was entitled to the effective assistance of counsel (see Delgadillo, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 226 [“ ‘there is no constitutional right to the effective assistance of
counsel’ in state postconviction proceedings”]; id. at p. 227 [the right to counsel under
§ 1172.6, subd. (c) is “purely statutory”]), to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, a defendant must show (1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) the deficient
performance prejudiced defendant. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 691-
692; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-217.) Contrary to defendant’s
contention, counsel did advance arguments on his behalf. She did so in her written reply
to the People’s opposition. That she submitted on the written filings at the hearing, and
made no additional oral argument, does not mean she made no argument on defendant’s
behalf. Defendant has not established his attorney’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.
       Having addressed the specific contentions raised in defendant’s supplemental
brief, our review is complete. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 221-222, 232.)

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                                    DISPOSITION
      The trial court’s order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing pursuant to
section 1172.6 is affirmed.

                                                    /s/
                                                BOULWARE EURIE, J.

We concur:

    /s/
EARL, P. J.

    /s/
ROBIE, J.

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