Court Opinion

ID: 9653859
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:57:17.441619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:02.906116
License: Public Domain

James R. Cooper, Judge, dissenting. The majority has affirmed this case on the ground that the question raised by the appellant has not been preserved for appellate review. I dissent because I believe that the appellant was presented no meaningful opportunity to raise the issue. It is noteworthy that the present appellant was the appellee before the Commission, having prevailed before the administrative law judge. The majority holds that the appellant should have presented his due process question to the Commission because he knew that current law required the Commission to make credibility determinations in the absence of an opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. I maintain that the majority demands an uncommon degree of precognitive ability on the part of appellees who come before the Workers’ Compensation Commission. The appellee, who did not bring the appeal, is thus required in his answer both to anticipate that the Commission will reverse the administrative law judge’s decision, and that the basis for the reversal will be that the Commission, which did not see the witnesses, will disagree with the specific finding of credibility made by the administrative law judge who had the witnesses before him. Nor do I agree that it is necessary to petition for rehearing before the Workers’ Compensation Commission in cases such as this in order to preserve an issue for appeal. First, Hamilton v. Jeffrey Stone Co., 6 Ark. App. 333, 641 S.W.2d 723 (1982), is distinguished by the fact that, in Jeffrey, the statute of limitation question that was the subject of the appeal was plainly in issue at the administrative law judge level and throughout the proceedings. In the case at bar, no question of the constitutionality of the Commission’s review procedure arose until the Commission’s decision was rendered. Second, although we have held that the Commission has the authority to grant petitions for reconsideration, no explicit statutory authority exists for this procedure, Morrison v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 11 Ark. App. 161, 668 S.W.2d 47 (1984), and I have found no case holding that an issue was not preserved for appeal due to the appellant’s failure to petition the Commission for reconsideration. Finally, the Commission issued its opinion in this case prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Wade v. Mr. C. Cavenaugh’s 298 Ark. 363, 768 S.W.2d 521 (1989), which held, for the first time, that the Commission may rely on the administrative law judge’s observations and comments concerning the claimant’s demeanor, conduct, appearance, or reactions at the hearing. The appellant’s due process issue is therefore particularly apropos now, when the effect of the Wade decision is unclear in light of the long line of cases holding that the Commission is the sole judge of a witness’s credibility. Because of the manner in which this case has come before this Court, and because of the significant question presented by the appellant’s argument, I would remand to the Commission for a determination of the due process question advanced by the appellant.