Court Opinion

ID: 9627794
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:54:46.514888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:45:28.485970
License: Public Domain

SPENCE, J.
I dissent.
Defendant was charged by information with the possession of a narcotic in violation of Health and Safety Code, section 11500, a felony. The majority opinion affirms an order setting aside the information upon the ground that all the incriminating evidence was obtained by an alleged “unreasonable” search in violation of defendant’s constitutional rights. I cannot agree with the conclusion reached in the majority opinion, as I believe that the search was reasonable, and was not therefore in violation of the constitutional guarantees against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, §19.)
The facts in the present case are essentially different from those in any other ease which has been presented; and the conclusion that the search was reasonable may be rested solely upon its inherent reasonableness under the circumstances, and without regard to the question of whether such search was made as an incident of a lawful arrest.
The facts are adequately set forth in the majority opinion. The search was made shortly after midnight “at the San Diego County sheriff’s check station at the Mexican border” in a “routine check” made as defendant was driving the automobile along the public highway toward Mexico. Under these circumstances, it is my opinion that any such “routine search” at the border by local or federal officers is entirely reasonable.
The privilege of entering or leaving this state and country at the international border is one that must necessarily be subject to reasonable regulation in the interest of the enforcement of domestic and international law; and one seeking that privilege should not be heard to object to any routine search of his person and automobile made by any duly authorized officer. It is a matter of common knowledge that *259such searches by federal officers are customarily made in the enforcement of our customs and other regulations; and that such searches are customarily made by state and federal officers in the enforcement of regulations designed to prevent the spread of disease among persons, animals and crops, as well as in the enforcement of other regulations. It is further a matter of common knowledge that crime in general has assumed international proportions, and that the international traffic in contraband articles, and particularly narcotics, has become a serious menace to society, not only in this state and country but in all countries including those bordering on our own. It is therefore essential that routine searches at the borders be not only permitted but encouraged if we are to have any system of law enforcement that is worthy of the name. No authority has been called to our attention holding that such a routine search violates any constitutional guarantee; and it is indicated in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, at page 154 [45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543, 39 A.L.R. 790], that searches at the international borders are distinguishable from other searches.
I am therefore of the opinion that no invasion of any constitutional right may be predicated merely upon a routine search by duly authorized officers at the international border of the person and automobile of one seeking the privilege of entering or leaving this state and country; and as it is undisputed that defendant was seeking that privilege, I conclude that the search was reasonable, and that the evidence obtained through that search was properly admitted at the preliminary hearing.
In view of this conclusion, it is unnecessary to determine here whether the search may be justified upon the further ground that it was an incident of a lawful arrest.
I would reverse the order dismissing the information.
Shenk, J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied March 21, 1956. Shenk, J., and Spence, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.