Court Opinion

ID: 9939559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-10 17:09:51.559544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:24.560003
License: Public Domain

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 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :          PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 BRANDON M. CARABALLO                     :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :     No. 1898 EDA 2023

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 9, 2023
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-09-CR-0003484-2021

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and DUBOW, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                           FILED FEBRUARY 9, 2024

      Brandon M. Caraballo appeals from the order denying his petition filed

pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). We affirm.

      By way of background, Appellant was charged with numerous offenses

for assaulting and threatening his former girlfriend, Lauren Dreyer (“Victim”).

At a non-jury trial, Victim testified that Appellant punched her in the face on

one occasion in April 2021 and later threw a television remote at her jaw

following an argument in May 2021. In an ensuing text message, Appellant

threatened to kill her. The trial court found Appellant guilty as to all counts,

including simple assault and terroristic threats. On March 18, 2022, the court

sentenced him to an aggregate two to five years in prison, followed by two

years of probation. Appellant did not appeal.
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       Appellant filed this timely pro se PCRA petition approximately four

months after sentencing. The PCRA court1 appointed counsel, who filed an

amendment to the petition. Therein, Appellant challenged the effectiveness

of trial counsel on several bases. The court issued a notice of its intention to

dismiss the petition on the merits pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, and Appellant

responded by filing a second amendment to the petition. Ultimately, the PCRA

court denied the petition without a hearing on June 9, 2023.

       This timely appeal followed. The court ordered Appellant to file a concise

statement of errors pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant complied.

Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:

     I.   Did the [PCRA] court err in denying Appellant’s [PCRA] petition
          without a hearing where trial counsel was ineffective in failing
          to:

          A. Object to repeated leading questions by the prosecutor
             during testimony of [Victim]?

          B. Object to irrelevant,             inadmissible,   and   inflammatory
             testimony of [Victim]?

          C. Object to irrelevant, inadmissible, and inflammatory text
             messages?

          D. Object to irrelevant, inadmissible, and inflammatory victim
             impact testimony?

          E. Request that the Bucks County judiciary be recused from
             hearing this matter?

Appellant’s brief at 8 (cleaned up).
____________________________________________

1 The Honorable Gary B. Gilman presided over both the bench trial and               the
PCRA proceedings.

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      We begin with the legal tenets pertinent to our review. “On appeal from

the denial of PCRA relief, our standard of review calls for us to determine

whether the ruling of the PCRA court is supported by the record and free of

legal error. We apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal

conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Wharton, 263 A.3d 561, 567 (Pa. 2021)

(citations omitted). Further, “[i]t is an appellant’s burden to persuade us that

the PCRA court erred and that relief is due.” Commonwealth v. Thomas,

270 A.3d 1221, 1226 (Pa.Super. 2022).

      Appellant’s issues all assert that the PCRA court erred in denying,

without a hearing, his claims that trial counsel was ineffective. In this vein,

we observe that counsel is presumed to be effective, and the petitioner bears

the burden of proving otherwise.     See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 236

A.3d 63, 68 (Pa.Super. 2020) (en banc). To do so, he must establish the

following three elements:

      (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable
      basis existed for counsel’s action or failure to act; and (3) the
      petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s error, with
      prejudice measured by whether there is a reasonable probability
      that the result of the proceeding would have been different.

Id. (citations omitted). Failure to prove any of the three elements will result

in dismissal of the ineffectiveness claim. Id. (citation omitted). Additionally,

“[w]e are not required to analyze the elements of an ineffectiveness claim in

any particular order.” Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 205 A.3d 274, 286 (Pa.

2019).

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       With regard to the prejudice prong, our Supreme Court has defined

actual prejudice as “[a] reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s lapse,

the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Commonwealth v.

Crispell, 193 A.3d 919, 932 (Pa. 2018) (cleaned up).

       In making this determination, a court hearing an ineffectiveness
       claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge
       or jury. Moreover, a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported
       by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than
       one with overwhelming record support. Ultimately, a reviewing
       court must question the reliability of the proceedings and ask
       whether the result of the particular proceeding was unreliable
       because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our system
       counts on to produce just results.

       A reasonable probability is a probability that is sufficient to
       undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding. Such a
       determination necessarily requires an assessment of the trial
       evidence as a whole, measured along with what is proffered on
       collateral attack.

Id. (cleaned up).

       As to the right to a hearing, we have stated thusly:

       It is well settled that there is no absolute right to an evidentiary
       hearing on a PCRA petition, and if the PCRA court can determine
       from the record that no genuine issues of material fact exist, then
       a hearing is not necessary. To obtain reversal of a PCRA court’s
       decision to dismiss a petition without a hearing, an appellant must
       show that he raised a genuine issue of fact which, if resolved in
       his favor, would have entitled him to relief, or that the court
       otherwise abused its discretion in denying a hearing.

Commonwealth v. Maddrey, 205 A.3d 323, 328 (Pa.Super. 2019) (cleaned

up).

       We now turn to Appellant’s issues. He first argues that counsel was

ineffective for failing to object to thirty-one instances of the prosecutor

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purportedly leading Victim during her direct testimony. See Appellant’s brief

at 16-17. The Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence state that “[l]eading questions

should not be used on direct or redirect examination except as necessary to

develop the witness’s testimony.” Pa.R.E. 611(c). The trial judge “has wide

discretion in controlling the use of leading questions,” and “the court’s

tolerance or intolerance for leading questions will not be reversed on appeal

absent an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Bibbs, 970 A.2d 440,

453 (Pa.Super. 2009) (cleaned up).

      Notably, Appellant does not analyze any individual leading question or

proffer any explanation as to how a particular question prejudiced him.

Rather, he asserts that the volume of leading questions itself suggests

prejudice because, but for the prosecutor’s conduct, Victim’s testimony may

have been different. Id. at 17. Appellant believes that trial counsel’s decision

not to object did not serve his interests. Id. at 17-18. At the very least, he

contends that the issue should have been decided only after a hearing. Id.

      The PCRA court determined that Appellant failed to prove the prejudice

prong of ineffective assistance of counsel since this was a bench trial and “a

trial judge sitting as a factfinder is ‘presumed to know the law, ignore

prejudicial statements, and disregard inadmissible evidence, and so will only

consider evidence for its proper purpose.’” PCRA Court Opinion, 7/26/23, at

12 (citing Commonwealth v. McFadden, 156 A.3d 299 (Pa.Super. 2017)).

The court indicated that Victim, Appellant’s former paramour, was generally

hesitant in testifying at trial, so even if Appellant had objected, it would

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nonetheless have permitted some use of leading questions on direct

examination. Id. at 14. Additionally, it determined that a number of the

purported leading questions listed by Appellant were “asked for the purpose

of eliciting testimony that was introductory or preliminary to other material

evidence[,]” whereas others were asked for clarification purposes. Id. The

court concluded that counsel’s decision not to object did not prejudice

Appellant, since even if there was a proper objection, the prosecutor simply

could have re-phrased any question. Id.

      On review, we find that the PCRA court’s decision to deny relief on this

issue without a hearing is supported by the record and free from legal error.

Specifically, Appellant has not demonstrated that his counsel’s failure to object

to these questions prejudiced him. While he lists thirty-one leading questions

in his brief, he neglects to discuss the context of the exchanges wherein they

took place. Our review of the entire testimony bears out the PCRA court’s

conclusion that many of these instances of “leading” questions occurred to set

up a next question or clarify a portion of the immediately preceding testimony.

By way of example, many of the inquiries that Appellant now contests came

immediately after Victim described a physical and verbal altercation with

Appellant, and the prosecutor expressly stated, “[s]o let’s just step back and

take it step by step for a minute,” before asking a series of questions that

referenced and sought to clarify Victim’s testimony. See N.T. Trial, 12/3/21,

at 36-39.

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      Appellant identifies no specific way in which Victim’s testimony would

have been different had counsel objected to these questions, beyond a bald

assertion of prejudice by volume. As the PCRA court correctly noted, to the

extent any questions were improper and counsel objected, the court would

have allowed the prosecutor to rephrase the question, and hence there was

no prejudice by counsel’s inaction. Additionally, since this lack of prejudice is

apparent from the record, the PCRA court did not err in denying relief without

a hearing. Therefore, this claim must fail.

      In his second issue, Appellant faults counsel for not objecting to portions

of Victim’s testimony that he asserts were irrelevant and contained improper

character evidence. Under Pennsylvania law, evidence is relevant if “it has

any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without

the evidence” and “the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”

Pa.R.E. 401(a)-(b). As a general rule, all relevant evidence is admissible and

all irrelevant evidence is inadmissible.    See Pa.R.E. 402.    However, even

relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the

danger of, inter alia, unfair prejudice. See Pa.R.E. 403.

      Testimony concerning a defendant’s prior bad acts is governed by

Pa.R.E. 404(b), which we have discussed as follows:

      Evidence of crimes other than the one in question is not admissible
      solely to show the defendant’s bad character or propensity to
      commit crime. Nevertheless:

            Evidence of other crimes is admissible to demonstrate
            (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) absence of mistake or

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            accident; (4) a common scheme, plan or design
            embracing the commission of two or more crimes so
            related to each other that proof of one tends to prove
            the others; or (5) the identity of the person charged
            with the commission of the crime on trial.
            Additionally, evidence of other crimes may be
            admitted where such evidence is part of the history of
            the case and forms part of the natural development of
            the facts.

Commonwealth v. Dozzo, 991 A.2d 898, 902 (Pa.Super. 2010) (cleaned

up).   “When offered for a legitimate purpose, evidence of prior crimes is

admissible if its probative value outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.”

Commonwealth v. Tyson, 119 A.3d 353, 358 (Pa.Super. 2015) (citation

omitted).

       Here, Appellant identifies in his brief fourteen places in Victim’s

testimony that purportedly reference Appellant’s bad character or irrelevant

matters. See Appellant’s brief at 20-21, 23-24. Generally, the testimony he

highlights related to prior, uncharged incidents of violence and threats

Appellant perpetuated against Victim. Id. at 20-21. Further, some of the

testimony Appellant characterizes as irrelevant included Victim’s fear of

Appellant and her explanations for why she did not immediately terminate her

relationship with him after previous bouts of abuse. Id. at 23-24. Appellant

asserts that none of this testimony was admissible because it was either

irrelevant or because it did not satisfy any cognizable exception pursuant to

Rule 404(b). Id. at 21-22. He alternatively contends that even if the evidence

was admissible, the probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair

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prejudice due to its inflammatory nature. Id. at 22-26. Accordingly, Appellant

faults trial counsel for not objecting to these remarks.

      The PCRA court rejected this claim on several bases, including because

some of the challenged testimony was offered for appropriate, non-propensity

purposes. See PCRA Court Opinion, 7/26/23, at 18. Notably, however, it

found that none of the admitted statements was “so egregious that they would

overcome the presumption that the [c]ourt, sitting as factfinder, would

disregard unduly prejudicial or inadmissible evidence.”         Id.   The court

concluded that had an objection been lodged by Appellant, “it would have been

futile.” Id.

      After review, Appellant has not convinced us that the PCRA court erred

in denying his petition as to this claim.    Assuming, without deciding, that

certain irrelevant or improper character testimony was admitted at the bench

trial, Appellant has nevertheless failed to prove the prejudice prong required

to show ineffective assistance of counsel. As the factfinder, the law presumes

that the trial judge will “ignore prejudicial statements[.]” McFadden, supra

at 309.    Our examination of the record shows that the majority of the

challenged remarks were made by Victim in passing, buried within her broader

testimony concerning the underlying charges. None of these statements was

belabored by the prosecution, nor did they appear to form the basis for

Appellant’s convictions for simple assault or terroristic threats.

      For instance, Victim testified that the incident where Appellant threw a

remote at her face was precipitated by an argument concerning his frequent

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telling of a story about beating his ex-paramour’s dog.          While Appellant

maintains that such testimony was prejudicial and cast him in a negative light,

he makes no attempt to persuade us that the learned trial judge was incapable

of considering this testimony solely as part of the res gestae of the assault.

In short, Appellant has not convinced us that but for trial counsel’s inactions,

the result of the bench trial would have been different. He is therefore not

entitled to relief on this claim.

      Next, Appellant asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

object at trial to the admission of screenshots of certain text messages

between Appellant and Victim.        See Appellant’s brief at 26-27.    Appellant

identifies five message threads particularly in his brief.      Id.   The threads

consisted of a conversation between Victim and Appellant occurring in the

days after an incident of violence, and therein Victim called Appellant a “liar”

and stated that he has “serious issues.”        Id.   As with his previous claim,

Appellant avers that the messages should not have been admitted because

they were either irrelevant to the underlying charges or because the

statements were inflammatory and highly prejudicial. Id. at 27.

      The PCRA court determined that, based on the record, there was a

reasonable basis for counsel’s actions in not objecting to admission of the text

messages. See PCRA Court Opinion, 7/26/23, at 19-20. It recounted that

the content of all text messages between Victim and Appellant were contained

in an extraction report, which was introduced into evidence over Appellant’s

relevancy objection.    Id. at 19.    The screenshots of the text messages in

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question were introduced later, and contained the same information as what

was already included in the admitted extraction report.         Id. at 19-20.

Therefore, the court determined that admission of the screenshots was merely

cumulative of the extraction report, and counsel accordingly had a reasonable

basis for not objecting a second time to the screenshots. Id. at 20.

      We believe that the PCRA court is correct, and therefore hold that it did

not err in denying relief as to this claim without a hearing.       The record

indicates that had trial counsel objected to the screenshots, it would have had

no bearing on the outcome of the proceedings since the substance of those

text messages were previously admitted in the extraction report over

counsel’s objection.   Thus, counsel had already objected to the disputed

messages based on relevance and will not be deemed ineffective for objecting

on this ground again, since doing so would have been fruitless. Additionally,

with his blanket assertions and lack of discussion as to the contents of the

screenshots, Appellant has not persuaded us that that the trial court failed to

disregard any prejudicial information from the text messages, and therefore

has not met his burden of proving prejudice by counsel’s decision not to

object. See McFadden, supra at 309.

      In his fourth issue, Appellant contends that trial counsel was ineffective

because he did not object to a portion of inflammatory statements made by

Victim that were included in the presentence investigation (“PSI”) report that

was admitted at Appellant’s sentencing hearing. See Appellant’s brief at 27-

29. Without identifying the exact remarks in his brief, Appellant nonetheless

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asserts that they contained “a litany of accusations regarding uncharged prior

bad acts which were not appropriate for consideration by the court.” Id. at

28. He argues that there was prejudice arising from these statements because

the trial court openly relied upon them in imposing a lengthy state sentence,

as the court read some of the statements into the record.           Id. at 28-29.

Appellant again reiterates that counsel had no reasonable basis to refrain from

objecting, and that this claim should have been developed through a hearing.

Id. at 29.

      The PCRA court concluded that Appellant failed “to explain how trial

counsel’s failure to object to the court’s reading of certain portions of the PSI

report into the record actually unduly prejudiced him, other than explaining

that all of the allegedly impermissible evidence had a cumulative prejudicial

effect.”   PCRA Court Opinion, 7/26/23, at 21 (unnecessary capitalization

omitted). The court acknowledged that Appellant likely disputed some of the

material included in the PSI report, but it noted that “the [trial c]ourt’s primary

concern was whether Appellant was motivated to get the treatment he

needed.” Id. It further indicated that “[w]hile it may not be appropriate to

state that the [c]ourt ignored the victim impact evidence presented in the

PSI report, the record shows that, upon imposing sentence, the [c]ourt

considered Appellant’s treatment needs and capacity for rehabilitation just as

much as, if not more than, the evidence of Appellant’s negative impact on the

victim.” Id. (emphasis in original). In finding that Appellant failed to prove

prejudice, the court highlighted that the sentence imposed was six months

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less than that requested by the Pennsylvania Department of Probation and

Parole. Id. at 21 n.7.

      Again, we find no error with the court’s decision not to grant relief. In

his brief, Appellant did not identify or analyze the particular statements that

should have been challenged, and therefore failed to meet his burden to

convince us that the claims had either arguable merit or prejudice. Further,

while the trial court did recognize and evidently consider certain portions of

Victim’s statement in the PSI, it also acknowledged on the record that

Appellant likely disputed them. See N.T. Sentencing, 3/18/22, at 15. There

is no indication in the record that the court improperly considered anything to

Appellant’s detriment in fashioning the sentence. See, e.g., Commonwealth

v. King, 182 A.3d 449, 459-60 (Pa.Super. 2018) (concluding that the

sentencing court was not unduly prejudiced by improper victim impact

statements, when the court “provided adequate and sound reasoning for the

sentence imposed”); Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 574 A.2d 610, 615

(Pa.Super. 1990) (stating that inflammatory statements in a PSI report are

“unlikely to have a significant effect on an experienced trial judge” and that a

sentence proportional to the seriousness of the charges reflects a lack of

unwarranted influence of any such statement on the judge).

      Likewise, our review of the record confirms the PCRA court’s assertion

that in sentencing Appellant, the trial court extensively discussed Appellant’s

rehabilitative needs, including his need for treatment for post-traumatic stress

disorder that potentially arose from his prior military service.      See N.T.

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Sentencing, 3/18/22, at 6-8, 12-15. Indeed, mindful that the trial court also

had the benefit of the PSI report, “we presume that the sentencing judge was

aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and

weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.”

Commonwealth v. Wallace, 244 A.3d 1261, 1279 (Pa.Super. 2021)

(cleaned up). As the court’s sentence reflects consideration of the appropriate

sentencing factors, Appellant has not proven that had trial counsel objected

to certain portions of the victim impact statement, his sentence would be any

different. This argument warrants no relief.

      In his final claim, Appellant contends that trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to file a motion for the trial court to recuse itself from conducting

the bench trial. See Appellant’s brief at 29-31. As to this issue, we have

stated:

            As a general rule, when circumstances arise during the
      course of trial raising questions of the trial judge’s bias or
      impartiality, it is the duty of the party, who asserts that a judge
      should be disqualified, to allege by petition the bias, prejudice, or
      unfairness necessitating recusal.

            There is a presumption that judges of this Commonwealth
      are honorable, fair and competent, and, when confronted with a
      recusal demand, are able to determine whether they can rule in
      an impartial manner, free of personal bias or interest in the
      outcome. If the judge determines he or she can be impartial, the
      judge must then decide whether his or her continued involvement
      in the case creates an appearance of impropriety and/or would
      tend to undermine public confidence in the judiciary. This is a
      personal and unreviewable decision that only the jurist can make.
      A judge’s decision to deny a recusal motion will not be disturbed
      absent an abuse of discretion.

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Commonwealth v. Kane, 188 A.3d 1217, 1225-26 (Pa.Super. 2018)

(cleaned up).

       At trial, County Detective Eric Lamdamia testified that his investigation

of the underlying case was triggered when he received information that

Appellant had sent Victim a threatening text message about the Honorable

Diane E. Gibbons, a jurist of the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County.2

See Appellant’s brief at 30.         Appellant believes that because there were

accusations that he made a threat toward the judiciary, there was an

appearance of impropriety in allowing Judge Gilman to hear the case. Id. He

asserts, without meaningful discussion, that a significant minority of the lay

community could have reasonably questioned the court’s impartiality in this

case. Id. at 31. Therefore, counsel should have filed a motion for the court’s

recusal.

       In addressing this issue, the PCRA court indicated that it considered

Appellant’s threat to Judge Gibbons as “veiled.” PCRA Court Opinion, 7/26/23,

at 22. It stated that it “was not of such a character that this [c]ourt had any

concern about its ability to conduct and decide the case, and subsequent
____________________________________________

2 None of the testimony at trial indicated the exact wording of the purported

threat. In his brief, Appellant asserts that the threat was alleged to have been
made by Appellant via text message stating that “while Judge Gibbons has a
reputation for being harsh, Appellant was harsher.” Appellant’s brief at 30.
The PCRA court indicated that it did not recollect the precise phraseology of
Appellant’s reputed threat and that it was not made part of the record.
However, it recalled that the threat “stated, to the effect, that while Judge
Gibbons may have had a reputation of being harsh, [Appellant] believed he
could be harsher than her.” PCRA Court Opinion, 7/26/23, at 22. Judge
Gibbons did not preside over either the non-jury trial or the PCRA petition.

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sentencing, fairly and impartially in all respects.”     Id.   The court further

determined that Appellant did not point to any identifiable bias from the court

in how it handled the case. Id. at 23. Finally, it noted that Appellant proffered

no reason as to why an alleged threat made against one trial judge would

necessarily require other trial judges from the same county to recuse

themselves. Id.

      Upon review, we find no error with the PCRA court’s decision. As the

court correctly articulated, Appellant advanced no argument or authority

supporting the proposition that a threat directed to one judge of the trial court

warranted recusal of all judges sitting on that court, or that such a threat

created an appearance of impropriety. Had trial counsel filed a motion for

recusal as to the entire bench of the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas, it

would have been destined to fail.       Failure to take a futile action cannot

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.

Davis, 262 A.3d 589, 596 (Pa.Super. 2021) (“Counsel cannot be found

ineffective for failing to pursue a baseless or meritless claim.”).

      In sum, Appellant has not met his burden of proving that his trial counsel

was ineffective. Likewise, he has not raised any genuine issue of material fact

that required resolution via a hearing. The PCRA court therefore did not err

in denying the petition without a hearing.

      Order affirmed.

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Date: 2/9/2024

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