Court Opinion

ID: 2964089
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:20:16.643748+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:50.492340
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 95-2108

                          GLORIA BLINZLER, Individually and
                           in her capacity as Wrongful Death
                           Beneficiary of James A. Blinzler,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                            MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.
                              _________________________
          No. 95-2199

                                GLORIA BLINZLER, ETC.,

                                 Plaintiff, Appellee,

                                          v.

                            MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

                                Defendant, Appellant.
                              _________________________

                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

                    [Hon. Ronald R. Lagueux, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________
                              _________________________

                                        Before
                                Selya, Cyr and Boudin,
                                   Circuit Judges.
                                   ______________
                              _________________________

               John  P. Barylick, with whom  Wistow & Barylick  Inc. was on
               _________________             _______________________
          brief, for plaintiff.
               Stephen B.  Lang, with whom Patrick B.  Landers and Higgins,
               ________________            ___________________     ________
          Cavanagh & Cooney were on brief, for defendant.
          _________________

                              _________________________

                                    April 12, 1996
                              _________________________

                    SELYA, Circuit  Judge.  These cross-appeals  require us
                    SELYA, Circuit  Judge.
                           ______________

          to  wend  our way  through a  maze  of unusual  facts  and subtly

          nuanced legal issues.   After exploring a little-charted frontier

          of  tort  law, we  reverse  the  district  court's  direction  of

          judgment  notwithstanding the  verdict  and reinstate  the jury's

          award  on  the  plaintiff's  claim for  negligent  infliction  of

          emotional distress.  In all other respects, we affirm the rulings

          of the lower court.

          I.  BACKGROUND
          I.  BACKGROUND

                    This  litigation arises  out  of the  tragic demise  of

          James Blinzler,  husband of the  plaintiff Gloria Blinzler.   The

          course  of events  leading  to James  Blinzler's  death began  on

          November 13, 1992,  when the Blinzlers  checked into a  Somerset,

          New   Jersey,  hotel   operated   by   the   defendant   Marriott

          International,  Inc. (Marriott).    Shortly after  8:30 p.m.  the

          decedent,  relaxing  in  his   room,  experienced  difficulty  in

          breathing.   Sensing  danger, he  ingested nitroglycerin  (he had

          suffered heart  attacks before) while  his wife called  the hotel

          PBX operator  and requested an ambulance.   The operator received

          the SOS  no later  than 8:35 p.m.  and agreed  to honor it.   She

          promptly told  the hotel's security  officer and  the manager  on

          duty  about   the  medical  emergency.     Though  the  defendant

          steadfastly maintains that the  operator also called an ambulance

          then and there, the  record, read hospitably to the  verdict, see
                                                                        ___

          Cumpiano v. Banco  Santander P.R.,  902 F.2d 148,  151 (1st  Cir.
          ________    _____________________

          1990),  indicates that she did not place this critical call until

                                          2

          some fourteen  minutes after receiving the  plaintiff's entreaty.

          The ambulance arrived at 9:02 p.m.  In the meantime the plaintiff

          watched her husband's condition deteriorate:  he collapsed on the

          bed, vomited  while  supine, and  apparently  stopped  breathing.

          During  this horrific  hiatus,  the plaintiff  twice asked  hotel

          personnel  whether  an  ambulance  had  been  summoned  when  the

          emergency first arose.  She was  twice falsely reassured (whether

          in honest error is not clear) that one had been called.

                    When the  paramedics arrived  on the scene,  they could

          not  locate a pulse and discovered that the decedent's airway was

          blocked.  Resuscitative efforts  restored the decedent's heart to

          a normal rhythm and  he was transported celeritously to  a nearby

          hospital.   Doctors diagnosed the  heart attack as  a "very small

          myocardial infarction."  Nevertheless, the brain damage resulting

          from  a  prolonged  period of  asystole  without  cardiopulmonary

          resuscitation led to James Blinzler's death three days later.

          II.  PROCEEDINGS BELOW, ISSUES ON APPEAL, AND RULES OF DECISION
          II.  PROCEEDINGS BELOW, ISSUES ON APPEAL, AND RULES OF DECISION

                    Invoking  diversity  jurisdiction,  28  U.S.C.     1332

          (1994),  the plaintiff  sued Marriott  in Rhode  Island's federal

          district court for  wrongful death (count 1),  loss of consortium

          (count 2), and negligent  infliction of emotional distress (count

          3).  She alleged in substance that the hotel failed  to summon an

          ambulance  in  a  timely   fashion  and  that  this  carelessness

          proximately caused  both her own damages and her husband's death.

          The jury  agreed, awarding  $200,000 for wrongful  death, $50,000

          for  loss of  consortium,  and $200,000  for emotional  distress.

                                          3

          Addressing a  variety of  post-trial motions, the  district judge

          upheld  the verdict on the first two counts, but granted judgment

          for the defendant on the third count.  Both sides appeal.

                    The cross-appeals raise several issues.  Two are in the

          forefront.   The  centerpiece of  the defendant's  appeal is  the

          assertion that the evidence  did not forge a causal  link between

          the  failure  promptly to  summon  an ambulance  and  the ensuing

          death.   In  contrast,  the  plaintiff's  appeal  hinges  on  the

          district court's extirpation of the jury verdict on her claim for

          negligent  infliction  of   emotional  distress.    Because   the

          defendant's contention that  the plaintiff failed as  a matter of

          law to prove causation  involves an across-the-board challenge to

          the jury verdict as  a whole, we deal first with  that issue.  We

          then  mull  the  plaintiff's  contention  that  the  lower  court

          erroneously  forecast  emergent  New   Jersey  law  on  bystander

          liability and therefore  erred in  setting aside  the verdict  on

          count  3.     Finally,  we  address   the  defendant's  remaining

          assignments of error.

                    Under the principles of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,  304
                                            _____________    ________

          U.S. 64,  78 (1938),  state  law (here,  the law  of New  Jersey)

          supplies  the substantive  rules  of decision  in this  diversity

          case.   Since  New Jersey law  is less  than explicit  on one key

          issue that concerns  us, we pause to comment  briefly on the role

          of a  federal court  in adjudicating controversies  controlled by

          state law.

                    In  its barest  essence,  borrowing state  law  demands

                                          4

          nothing  more  than  interpreting   and  applying  the  rules  of

          substantive  law  enunciated  by  the  state's  highest  judicial

          authority, or,  on  questions  to  which that  tribunal  has  not

          responded, making an informed prophecy of what the court would do

          in the same situation.1  See  Moores v. Greenberg, 834 F.2d 1105,
                                   ___  ______    _________

          1112  (1st Cir. 1987).  In  the latter instance, we seek guidance

          in analogous state court  decisions, persuasive adjudications  by

          courts  of sister  states, learned  treatises, and  public policy

          considerations identified in  state decisional law.   See Ryan v.
                                                                ___ ____

          Royal Ins. Co.,  916 F.2d 731, 734-35 (1st Cir. 1990); Kathios v.
          ______________                                         _______

          General Motors Corp., 862 F.2d 944, 949 (1st Cir. 1988).  As long
          ____________________

          as these signposts are legible, our task is to ascertain the rule

          the state court would most likely follow under the circumstances,

          even  if our independent  judgment on the  question might differ.

          See Moores, 834 F.2d at 1107 n.3.
          ___ ______

          III.  CAUSATION
          III.  CAUSATION

                    The  defendant  challenges the  entire  verdict  on the

          basis that  the  plaintiff provided  insufficient  evidence  from

          which a  reasonable jury  could  conclude that  the belated  call

          constituted  a proximate cause of  the ensuing death.   Under New

          Jersey law the  plaintiff bears  the burden of  proving that  the

          defendant's conduct comprised "a  substantial factor in producing

          the  harm" of which the  plaintiff complains.   Francis v. United
                                                          _______    ______
                              
          ____________________

               1Indeed,  this  kind of  predictive  approach  is among  our
          conceptions of law itself.   See Oliver Wendell Holmes,  The Path
                                       ___                         ________
          of the Law, 10 Harv. L.  Rev. 457, 461 (1897) ("The prophecies of
          __________
          what  the courts will do  in fact, and  nothing more pretentious,
          are what I mean by law.").

                                          5

          Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 829 (N.J. 1981).  When the  questioned
          ___________

          conduct  is an omission    the defendant's failure  to act rather

          than the defendant's maladroit  performance of an affirmative act

             this  rule is  easier to  state than  to apply.   In  the last

          analysis, it can rarely (if ever) be said with absolute certainty

          that  harm  would not  have befallen  the  victim if  the omitted

          action had been taken.

                    One species of  omission that occurs from time  to time

          involves the  generic charge  that, had  the defendant  done some

          particular  act,  the plaintiff  (or,  as  here, the  plaintiff's

          decedent) would have had  a better chance to ward  off threatened

          harm.  In  these so-called "loss of chance"  cases New Jersey law

          instructs  that the plaintiff can  carry her burden  by showing a

          "substantial possibility"  that the harm would  have been averted

          had  the  defendant acted  in a  non-negligent  manner.   Hake v.
                                                                    ____

          Manchester Township, 486 A.2d 836, 839 (N.J. 1985); see also Olah
          ___________________                                 ___ ____ ____

          v.  Slobodian,  574  A.2d  411, 417-19  (N.J.  1990)  (discussing
              _________

          Hake).2   Transposed to the  rescue context, this  rule renders a
          ____

          defendant's omission  actionable if  the plaintiff can  show that

          the omission  "negated  a  substantial  possibility  that  prompt

          rescue  efforts would have been  successful."  Hake,  486 A.2d at
                                                         ____

          839.

                              
          ____________________

               2It is commonly  thought that the "substantial  possibility"
          standard  is  more  lenient  than  a  standard  that  requires  a
          plaintiff to prove it is more likely than  not that a defendant's
          failure to act constituted a substantial factor in bringing about
          the victim's injury or death.  See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser
                                         ___                        _______
          & Keeton on Torts   41, at 44 (Supp. 1988).
          _________________

                                          6

                    Under these  authorities, the question here  reduces to

          whether the evidence, viewed  in the light most congenial  to the

          plaintiff,  supports  a  finding  that  the  defendant's  failure

          promptly to  call an ambulance negated  a substantial possibility

          that  James Blinzler  would have  survived.   We think  that this

          question warrants an affirmative answer.

                    The plaintiff submitted evidence that she beseeched the

          defendant to summon help at 8:35 p.m.; that an ambulance crew was

          available  and free  to  respond  at  that  time;  and  that  the

          defendant agreed to place the call  but then neglected to do  so.

          The  defendant actually made the call at 8:49 p.m. (some fourteen

          minutes later) and the  ambulance reached the scene at  9:02 p.m.

          (an  elapsed time of thirteen  minutes).  The  jury heard opinion

          evidence from  a renowned cardiologist that  serious brain damage

          (and,  hence,   death)  would  have  been   forestalled  had  the

          paramedics reached the  premises ten  minutes earlier.   On  this

          record, we believe that a reasonable jury could conclude that the

          defendant's  omission negated a  substantial possibility that the

          rescue  efforts  would  have  succeeded.    Put  another  way,  a

          reasonable jury could find (as this jury apparently did) that the

          ambulance likely would have  arrived fourteen minutes earlier had

          it been summoned  immediately; that the course of treatment would

          have been accelerated by a like amount of time; and that, but for

          Marriott's negligence James Blinzler would have survived.

                    The defendant tries to  parry this thrust in  two ways.

          One initiative involves  assembling a string of cases  (mostly of

                                          7

          hoary origin) in which courts have rejected plaintiffs' claims of

          negligence for failure  to rescue.   See, e.g.,  Foss v.  Pacific
                                               ___  ____   ____     _______

          Tel.  & Tel. Co.,  173 P.2d 144,  149 (Wash.  1946); Whitehead v.
          ________________                                     _________

          Carolina  Tel. &  Tel.  Co.,  129  S.E.  602,  605  (N.C.  1925);
          ___________________________

          Volquardsen  v. Iowa  Tel. Co.,  126 N.W.  928, 930  (Iowa 1910);
          ___________     ______________

          Lebanon, L. & L. Tel. Co. v. Lanham Lumber Co., 115 S.W. 824, 826
          _________________________    _________________

          (Ky.  1909).   These cases    all  of  which involve  fire damage

          coupled with some alleged  negligence on the part of  a telephone

          company in  respect to a telephone call  meant to summon the fire

          department    provide  little guidance.   In those  cases, unlike

          here,  the plaintiffs did not proffer evidence that, had the call

          gone through,  the rescuers (there, the  firefighters) could have

          reached  the scene in time to prevent  the harm (there, the rapid

          spread  of a conflagration that had already started).  See, e.g.,
                                                                 ___  ____

          Foss, 173  P.2d at 149;  Lebanon, 115 S.W.  at 826.   And perhaps
          ____                     _______

          more importantly, each  of those  cases draw on  Lebanon for  the
                                                           _______

          legal  standard of causation   a standard that differs materially

          from  New  Jersey's  standard.   See  Lebanon,  115  S.W. at  826
                                           ___  _______

          (stating that "it must be established with certainty that but for
                                                ______________

          their  negligence  the fire  would  have  been confined"  as  the

          plaintiff contends) (emphasis supplied).

                    This second point is aptly illustrated by the one entry

          in  Marriott's string citation  that does  not involve  a burning

          building:  Hardy  v. Southwestern  Bell Tel. Co.,  910 P.2d  1024
                     _____     ___________________________

          (Okla. 1996).  To understand Hardy, it is necessary to note that,
                                       _____

          in McKellips v.  St. Francis  Hosp., Inc., 741  P.2d 467,  475-77
             _________     ________________________

                                          8

          (Okla. 1987), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the  causation

          standard  of the Restatement (Second) of Torts   323 (under which

          a  plaintiff may prove  negligence in  a loss  of chance  case by

          showing that  the defendant's omission "increase[d]  the risk" of

          harm), applied in  medical malpractice cases.  Hardy    a case in
                                                         _____

          which  the  plaintiff   alleged  that  the   telephone  company's

          negligent operation of a 911 service prevented him from summoning

          rescue assistance and thereby proximately caused his wife's death

             postdated  McKellips.     The  Oklahoma  Supreme  Court  there
                        _________

          considered extending the causation  standard of Restatement   323

          to loss of chance claims outside the medical malpractice context.

          See Hardy, 910  P.2d at 1025.  It declined to  do so.  See id. at
          ___ _____                                              ___ ___

          1030.

                    Hardy,  fairly read,  confirms the  distinction between
                    _____

          proof  of causation in loss of chance cases under the traditional

          test (to which  Oklahoma adheres in  cases not involving  medical

          malpractice) and  under more modern standards  that focus instead

          on whether  a  defendant's conduct  has  significantly  increased

          particular   risks.     As  we   have  explained,   New  Jersey's

          "substantial  possibility"  standard applies  to  loss of  chance

          cases  in general,3  and it  is at  a minimum  as liberal  as the

          "increased  risk"  standard  endorsed   by  section  323  of  the

          Restatement.   See Olah, 574 A.2d at 419 (suggesting that whether
                         ___ ____

                              
          ____________________

               3Like  Oklahoma, New Jersey  has explicitly  adopted section
          323 of the Restatement for use in loss of chance  cases involving
          medical  malpractice.  See Scafidi  v. Seiler, 574  A.2d 398, 405
                                 ___ _______     ______
          (N.J. 1990); Evers v. Dollinger, 471 A.2d 405, 415 (N.J. 1984).
                       _____    _________

                                          9

          the  plaintiff "has  a substantial  possibility of  avoiding harm

          would ordinarily be subsumed  in the jury's determination whether

          a defendant's  deviation increased  the risk of  harm") (internal

          quotations omitted).   Since Hardy apparently would have stated a

          claim had the Oklahoma court applied the  more lenient "increased

          risk" standard,  see Hardy, 910 P.2d at 1030, Marriott's flagship
                           ___ _____

          case actually supports  a finding of  causation under New  Jersey

          law.

                    Marriott's  second attempt  to scuttle  the finding  of

          causation features its  lament that the  plaintiff did not  prove

          that the same traffic  conditions which were extant at  and after

          8:49 p.m.  were also extant at  and after 8:35 p.m.   This lament

          can  scarcely be taken seriously.  Juries  have the power to draw

          reasonable inferences from established facts.  It  is well within

          a jury's ordinary competence  to conclude that traffic conditions

          for an emergency vehicle do not change dramatically in a fourteen

          minute period that is well outside rush hour.

                    The defendant's suggestion that a highway  accident, or

          a diluvian tempest, or some other freak occurrence, later abated,

          might have delayed the ambulance if it began its run at 8:35 p.m.

          rather  than  at  8:49  p.m.  is  equally  jejune.    It  is  the

          plaintiff's  burden to prove her  case by a  preponderance of the

          evidence,  not beyond all conceivable  doubt.  In  the absence of

          some  reason  to suspect  changed conditions     and there  is no

          evidence  of any actual change  here   the  jury's inference that

          the  ambulance would  have arrived  in  roughly the  same elapsed

                                          10

          portal-to-portal time  is unimpugnable.   See Levesque  v. Anchor
                                                    ___ ________     ______

          Motor  Freight,  Inc.,   832  F.2d  702,  704   (1st  Cir.  1987)
          _____________________

          (explaining  that  the "perhapses"  that  dot  a factbound  trial

          record typically "are for factfinders to resolve   not for judges

          imperiously to dictate"); see also W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser
                                    ___ ____                        _______

          & Keeton  on Torts    41, at  269 (5th ed.  1984) (noting  that a
          __________________

          plaintiff does not have  to negate entirely the  possibility that

          the defendant's  conduct  was not  a  contributing cause  of  the

          harm).

                    Silhouetted against this  legal backdrop, the  evidence

          of  record,  visualized  most  favorably to  the  plaintiff,  see
                                                                        ___

          Cumpiano, 902 F.2d at 151, suffices to ground a finding that, had
          ________

          the defendant hailed an ambulance immediately upon request, there

          was  at least  a  significant possibility  that James  Blinzler's

          death  could have  been prevented.   Accordingly,  we are  not at

          liberty under New  Jersey law  to disturb  the jury's  conclusion

          that Marriott's negligence  constituted a  substantial factor  in

          the ensuing death.

          IV.  BYSTANDER LIABILITY
          IV.  BYSTANDER LIABILITY

                    The  most  vexing  issue  in  this  case  involves  the

          plaintiff's claim  of negligent infliction of emotional distress.

          This  claim is  based on  the injury  that she  experienced while

          watching her husband suffer as the beleaguered couple awaited the

          ambulance's  overdue  arrival.   We  start  this  segment  of our

          analysis with a discussion of the doctrine of bystander liability

          as it has evolved in  New Jersey, then shift our attention  to an

                                          11

          open question that  the district court  found to be  dispositive,

          and,  finally,  apply the  doctrine as  we  understand it  to the

          idiosyncratic facts of this case.

                    A.  General Principles of Bystander Liability.
                    A.  General Principles of Bystander Liability.
                        _________________________________________

                    American courts first recognized bystander liability in

          the landmark  case of Dillon  v. Legg, 441 P.2d  912 (Cal. 1968).
                                ______     ____

          Drawing  in part on precedents from English common law, the court

          ruled  that a  mother could  recover  for emotional  and physical

          injuries suffered "from witnessing  the [negligent] infliction of

          death  or injury to her  child."  Id.  at 914.   The Dillon court
                                            ___                ______

          implicitly suggested that any bystander should be able to recover

          for all objectively foreseeable injuries.  See id. at 920-21.  To
                                                     ___ ___

          help jurists navigate the reefs and shoals of foreseeability, the

          court attempted to elucidate guidelines based on Dillon's factual
                                                           ______

          scenario.  See id. at 920.
                     ___ ___

                    Twelve  years  later,  New  Jersey  embraced  bystander

          liability in  Portee v. Jaffee,  417 A.2d 521  (N.J. 1980).   The
                        ______    ______

          state  supreme court  did not  clasp Dillon  uncritically to  its
                                               ______

          bosom,   but,   rather,   abjured   a   tunnel-vision   focus  on

          foreseeability,  fearing that it would open the door to claims of

          emotional  distress advanced  on  behalf of  any onlooker  to any

          negligently caused event.4   See id.  at 527 (cautioning  against
                                       ___ ___

                              
          ____________________

               4New Jersey is not alone in its reluctance blindly to follow
          Dillon's lead.   See, e.g.,  D'Ambra v. United  States, 338  A.2d
          ______           ___  ____   _______    ______________
          524, 528  (R.I.  1975) (rejecting  rigid  foreseeability  focus).
          Indeed, even  the  progenitor  of  the doctrine  has  had  second
          thoughts.  See Thing v.  La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 826  (Cal. 1989)
                     ___ _____     ________
          (retreating from Dillon on this point).
                           ______

                                          12

          institutionalizing   "an   unreasonably   excessive  measure   of

          liability");  see also Carey v. Lovett, 622 A.2d 1279, 1286 (N.J.
                        ___ ____ _____    ______

          1993) (suggesting that treating foreseeability as a sole talisman

          would render it difficult to differentiate between legitimate and

          fraudulent  claims);  Prosser  &  Keeton,  supra,    54,  at  366
                                                     _____

          (warning  that  forcing  defendants  to pay  for  the  "lacerated

          feelings" of  every bystander would be  "an entirely unreasonable

          burden on human activity").

                    In an effort to furnish  a condign remedy for deserving

          injuries while at the same time avoiding "speculative results  or

          punitive  liability,"  Portee,  417   A.2d  at  526,  New  Jersey
                                 ______

          transmogrified  the Dillon  guidelines  into prerequisites  of  a
                              ______

          cause of action  for bystander  liability, see id.  at 528.   The
                                                     ___ ___

          Portee  court  concluded that  a  bystander  plaintiff should  be
          ______

          permitted to recover under New Jersey law only if she could prove

          (1)  the  death  or serious  injury  of  another  (caused by  the

          defendant's  negligence); (2)  an intimate  familial relationship

          with the victim; (3) her observation of the victim at the time of

          the injury  or immediately  thereafter; and (4)  severe emotional

          distress resulting  from the  observation.   See id.   Subsequent
                                                       ___ ___

          decisions have cut plaintiffs  some slack (but not very  much) in

          their  efforts to  fulfill this  quadrat of  requirements.   See,
                                                                       ___

          e.g., Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 377-78 (N.J. 1994) (holding
          ____  ______    ______

          that  unmarried  cohabitants  may  enjoy   an  intimate  familial

          relationship); Frame v.  Kothari, 560 A.2d  675, 678 (N.J.  1989)
                         _____     _______

          (explaining that a plaintiff  may recover without actually seeing

                                          13

          the injury so  long as  it is "susceptible  to immediate  sensory

          perception"  and the  plaintiff observes  the victim  immediately

          after the injury is inflicted).

                    These  four  elements  serve  a  critical  function  in

          keeping  bystander liability  within  reasonable bounds.   First,

          they furnish a set of guideposts that help to identify and define

          a range of  claims that are  presumptively valid while  excluding

          other claims that  society simply  cannot afford to  honor.   See
                                                                        ___

          Dunphy,  642 A.2d at 377  (noting that the  elements of bystander
          ______

          liability  "structure the kind of `particularized foreseeability'

          that ensures  that the class is winnowed . . . and that limitless

          liability is avoided").  Second   and relatedly   they combine to

          define  narrowly the  emotional interest  that the  law protects.

          See Carey, 622 A.2d at  1286; accord Thing v. La Chusa,  771 P.2d
          ___ _____                     ______ _____    ________

          814,   829 (Cal. 1989).   While "[t]he law should  find more than

          pity for one who is stricken by seeing that a loved  one has been

          critically injured  or  killed," Portee,  417  A.2d at  526,  the
                                           ______

          elements of  the bystander liability tort  frankly recognize that

          it is not the law's province to shield people from all anxieties.

          Since  the   ordinary  slings  and  arrows   of  human  existence

          inevitably  produce stress  and strain,  "only the  most profound

          emotional   interests  should   receive  vindication   for  their

          negligent injury."  Id.
                              ___

                    The common thread that runs through these cases is that

          emotional anguish  is  a natural,  perhaps omnipresent,  reaction

          whenever one is forced to watch a loved one suffer, and therefore

                                          14

          should   not   be  compensable   in   the   absence  of   special

          circumstances.  In  an effort  to hold the  line, New Jersey  law

          decrees  that  bystanders  may  recover  in  tort  only  for  the

          particularly  exquisite anguish that  occurs when they personally

          observe trauma strike a loved one like a bolt from the blue.  See
                                                                        ___

          Frame, 560  A.2d at 679  (explaining that bystander  liability is
          _____

          supposed  to  remedy the  "harm of  seeing  a healthy  victim one

          moment and a severely injured one the next"); Portee, 417 A.2d at
                                                        ______

          527  ("Discovering the  death or  serious injury  of an  intimate

          family member will always be expected to threaten one's emotional

          welfare.  Ordinarily, however, only a witness at the scene of the

          accident causing death or serious injury will suffer  a traumatic

          sense of loss that  may destroy his sense  of security and  cause

          severe  emotional distress.").   Thus, there  can be  no recovery

          unless  the  close relation's  helpless  watching  arises in  the

          context of a sudden, unexpected, and accidental injury.

                              B.  The Fork in the Road.
                              B.  The Fork in the Road.
                                  ____________________

                    The issue before us is whether the plaintiff's asserted

          injury  falls  within the  narrow  range  of bystander  liability

          claims  that are actionable under  New Jersey law.   The district

          court decided that  it did not.  The court  relied primarily on a

          series of bystander liability/medical  malpractice cases in which

          the  New Jersey  Supreme  Court placed  a  gloss on  its  earlier

          decisions and  indicated that a plaintiff must witness the actual

          act  of malpractice and appreciate  its effect on  the patient in

          order  to bring herself within  the class of  persons entitled to

                                          15

          recover.  See Carey, 622 A.2d at 1288 (declaring that a plaintiff
                    ___ _____

          must "contemporaneously  observe the malpractice and  its effects

          on the victim"); Frame, 560 A.2d at 681 ("In an appropriate case,
                           _____

          if  a  family  member  witnesses  the   physician's  malpractice,

          observes  the  effect  of  the malpractice  on  the  patient, and

          immediately connects the malpractice with the injury, that may be

          sufficient to  allow recovery  for the family  member's emotional

          distress.");  see also Gendek v. Poblete, 654 A.2d 970, 975 (N.J.
                        ___ ____ ______    _______

          1995) (rejecting a claim on the ground that the bystander did not

          "immediately connect[] any act  of malpractice" with the victim's

          death).

                    Here,  concededly, Mrs.  Blinzler  cannot satisfy  this

          added  requirement; she neither "witnessed" the negligence (which

          comprised  the hotel  operator's failure  immediately to  call an

          ambulance and  which occurred  six floors beneath  the Blinzlers'

          room) nor fully appreciated  at the time that the  negligence was

          hindering    needed    assistance   (indeed,    the   defendant's

          misrepresentations, if  believed, concealed the very  fact of the

          negligence).  Thus, to decide this case we must determine whether

          the   Gendek-Carey-Frame   gloss   applies   only   to  bystander
                __________________

          liability/medical malpractice claims  (as the plaintiff contends)

          or whether it applies  to all bystander liability claims  (as the

          defendant contends and as the  lower court concluded).   Although

          the answer  to the question  is by no  means free from  doubt, we

          think that the district court took the wrong fork in the road.

                    As  an initial matter, the New Jersey Supreme Court has

                                          16

          never imposed the added requirement that a plaintiff witness  the

          negligent act and contemporaneously connect it to the injury of a

          loved one  in any case  outside the medical  malpractice context,

          and  the  malpractice cases  in  which the  requirement  has been

          imposed  strongly suggest that  it is restricted  to that milieu.

          See  Gendek,  654  A.2d at  974  (describing  the  requirement as
          ___  ______

          "added"  and "special"  in that  it is  "imposed to  establish an

          indirect  claim  for  emotional  distress  arising  from  medical

          malpractice"); Carey, 622 A.2d at 1286 ("With medical-malpractice
                         _____                     ________________________

          claims, we have required that claimants observe contemporaneously
          ______

          the  act of  malpractice  and the  resultant injury.")  (emphasis

          supplied).   What is  more, crafting a  special set of  rules for

          bystander liability/medical  malpractice cases is not  in any way

          an  unprecedented flight  of fancy;  other courts  that recognize

          bystander liability claims in general sometimes treat such claims

          more restrictively  in the medical malpractice  setting, even, on

          occasion, barring them  outright.  See, e.g., Maloney  v. Conroy,
                                             ___  ____  _______     ______

          545 A.2d 1059,  1063-64 (Conn.  1988); Wilson v.  Galt, 668  P.2d
                                                 ______     ____

          1104, 1110 (N.M. 1983).

                    We note,  too, that  the added requirement  designed by

          the New Jersey Supreme Court for use in connection with bystander

          liability/medical  malpractice claims  is  grounded in  a set  of

          policy  considerations  that  do  not  seem  to  apply  to  other

          bystander liability  claims.  For one thing, the unique emotional

          interest  that  fuels  the  doctrine of  bystander  liability  is

          unaffected  in most  cases of  medical  malpractice for  the harm

                                          17

          caused  by, say,  misdiagnosis usually  does not  manifest itself

          until  days, weeks, months, or years have elapsed, and even then,

          the misdiagnosis  rarely culminates  in a single  spontaneous and

          shocking event.  See  Frame, 560 A.2d at 678-79  (explaining that
                           ___  _____

          in  the  typical  malpractice  case  "[g]rief  over  the  gradual

          deterioration  of a loved one, as  profound as that grief may be,

          often  does not arise from  a sudden injury,"  but, rather, under

          circumstances in which the  family members have had the  "time to

          make  an emotional adjustment").   It is largely  for this reason

          that   bystander   liability   must   be  even   more   "narrowly

          circumscribed in the context of a medical misdiagnosis or failure

          to  act."   Gendek, 654  A.2d  at 975-76.   New  Jersey chose  to
                      ______

          accomplish this circumscription  by limiting bystander  liability

          in the medical malpractice arena to those situations in which the

          putative plaintiff observes both  the act of malpractice and  its

          immediate effects,  and appreciates the interrelationship.   See,
                                                                       ___

          e.g., Frame, 560 A.2d at 681.  That rationale loses force outside
          ____  _____

          the medical malpractice context.

                    For another thing, the added requirement applicable  to

          bystander liability in  the medical malpractice  context reflects

          societal  concerns about the impact of  expanded liability on the

          delivery  of  health care.    See Gendek,  654 A.2d  at  975 ("In
                                        ___ ______

          considering the standards that govern an appropriate duty of care

          and  limitations of  liability in  [the health care]  setting, we

          must  be  especially mindful  of the  principles of  sound public

          policy  that   are  informed  by  perceptions   of  fairness  and

                                          18

          balance."); Carey, 622 A.2d at 1286 (voicing uneasiness about the
                      _____

          "effects of the expansion of  liability on the medical profession

          and  society,"  and   specifically  noting  sharp  increases   in

          malpractice   insurance  premiums);  Frame,   560  A.2d   at  681
                                               _____

          (emphasizing that  the special refinement  of bystander liability

          for  medical malpractice  cases is  at least  partly driven  by a

          desire  to   avoid  "unreasonably   burdening  the  practice   of

          medicine").  This group  of situation-specific policy concerns is

          best addressed by "narrowly circumscrib[ing]" bystander liability

          in the medical malpractice setting so as to minimize any "adverse
          __________________________________

          effect  on the  practice of  medicine or  on the  availability of

          medical  services."  Frame,  560 A.2d at  681.  Once  again, this
                               _____

          reasoning loses force outside the medical malpractice context.

                    The  language   of  the   New  Jersey  cases   and  the

          distinctive nature of the policy considerations that underlie the

          added requirement mark the  genesis of our belief that,  when the

          opportunity arises, the New Jersey Supreme Court will not engraft

          this health-care-specific requirement upon the body of cases that

          lie beyond the medical malpractice arena.  New Jersey has already

          expressed its view of general public policy concerns with respect

          to expanded liability for run-of-the-mine accidents by conferring

          a  right of recovery on  bystanders and defining  the elements of

          the tort.   See Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 377; Portee, 417 A.2d at 528.
                      ___ ______                   ______

          We  think it  is  no accident  that  in superimposing  the  added

          requirement on bystander liability/medical malpractice cases, the

          state  supreme court has been scrupulously careful not to imply a

                                          19

          broader  sweep.   Because  we  believe that  this  specificity is

          purposeful  rather than  serendipitous,  we hold  that the  added

          requirement imposed  by the  Gendek-Carey-Frame line of  cases is
                                       __________________

          applicable  only  to causes  of  action that,  at  bottom, charge

          health-care  providers with  malpractice.   The  district  court,

          therefore, took the wrong fork in the road.

                             C.  Applying the Principles.
                             C.  Applying the Principles.
                                 _______________________

                    Once we put the added requirement to one side, the only

          question  that remains open under this rubric is whether the jury

          lacked  evidence  satisfactory  to  support a  finding  that  the

          plaintiff's  injury  fell  within  the  standard   parameters  of

          bystander  liability that  obtain in  New Jersey  vis-a-vis suits

          arising outside the  medical malpractice context.   We think  the

          evidence sufficed.   Intimate relationship and third-party injury

          (i.e.,  a  spouse's death)  are not  in  dispute, and  the record

          contains  adequate  proof  of  severe emotional  distress.    The

          seminal New Jersey case suggests that, in addition to these three

          elements, a  plaintiff need  only show  that she  "observ[ed] the

          death . . . while  it occur[red]."  Portee, 417 A.2d at  527; see
                                              ______                    ___

          also supra p. 13 (recounting the four elements of the  tort under
          ____ _____

          New Jersey law).   This  last element    firsthand observation   

          corresponds to the distinct  emotional interest that is infringed

          when  an individual witnesses  a "shocking  event" and  "see[s] a

          healthy [family member] one moment and a severely injured one the

          next."  Frame, 560 A.2d at 679.
                  _____

                    We appreciate that things are not always what they seem

                                          20

          and that  it may be overly  simplistic to say that  in New Jersey

          firsthand observation of  a suddenly inflicted injury  to a loved

          one  invariably gives rise to the  unique emotional interest that

          underlies bystander liability.   Arguably, it  is not merely  the

          observation  of  the  injury  but  the  perception   that  it  is

          accidental or otherwise unwarranted that threatens a "plaintiff's

          basic  emotional  security," Portee,  417 A.2d  at 521,  and thus
                                       ______

          paves the  way for bystander liability.   See id. at  528 (noting
                                                    ___ ___

          that  it is  the "shock  and fright"  attendant to  observing the

          "accidental  death" of  an intimate  relation that  infringes the

          narrowly defined  interest in  emotional security).   Frame makes
                                                                _____

          this point most clearly, albeit in dictum:

                    Everyone is subject  to injury, disease,  and
                    death.   Common  experience teaches  that the
                    injury  or death  of one  member of  a family
                    often produces severe  emotional distress  in
                    another family  member.  A  threshold problem
                    is separating  the  grief that  attends  that
                    distress  when no  one is  at fault  from the
                    added  stress attributable  to the  fact that
                    the  injury  or  death  was produced  by  the
                    negligent act of another.

          Id. at  677.  And  while the  Portee elements have  not yet  been
          ___                           ______

          formally modified in this  respect,5 we think it is  not unlikely

          that New Jersey will move in this direction.  Cf. Thing, 771 P.2d
                                                        ___ _____

          at 829 (tightening  the elements of a bystander  liability action
                              
          ____________________

               5In Portee, the question was not raised squarely.  There the
                   ______
          plaintiff (the victim's  mother) arrived at  the scene after  her
                                                                 _____
          son became trapped in  an elevator.  She  did not witness  either
          the  initial   entrapment  or  the  act   of  negligence  (faulty
          maintenance)  that  caused the  accident.   It  was  quite clear,
          however,  that  the  mother  knew immediately  that  her  child's
          injuries had an  unnatural cause and stemmed from  the elevator's
          accidental collapse.

                                          21

          under California law to require that the plaintiff be "present at

          the scene of the injury-causing event" and be "then aware that it

          is causing the injury to the victim").  But there are two reasons

          why we need not cross this bridge today.

                    1.   The  evidence  here clearly  satisfies the  Portee
                                                                     ______

          requirements simpliciter.   The plaintiff witnessed  a sudden and

          shocking event when  she watched her  husband of forty-two  years

          undergo  excruciating chest  pain, vomit,  struggle to  catch his

          breath,  asphyxiate,  lose  consciousness,  and  ultimately  die.

          Because  she  "witness[ed]  the  victim  when  the  injury  [was]

          inflicted,"  Frame,   560  A.2d  at  678,   recovery  would  seem
                       _____

          appropriate under a formal incantation of the Portee elements.
                                                        ______

                    2.    The law  of  the  case  doctrine  eliminates  any

          potential problem as  to the  precise dimensions of  Portee.   At
                                                               ______

          trial's  end,  the  district court  charged  the  jury  that "the

          plaintiff must be present at the scene of the event  and be aware

          that the  victim  is being  injured."   The  defendant's  counsel

          objected generally to  the court's decision to  instruct the jury

          at all on count 3 (asseverating  that New Jersey law requires the

          plaintiff actually to witness  the negligent act) but he  did not

          object in  any  other,  more  specific respect  to  the  district

          court's formulation of  the basic  elements of the  tort.   Thus,

          even  if  New Jersey  might in  an  appropriate case  impose some

          intermediate limitation going beyond Portee but stopping short of
                                               ______

          mandating  that  the plaintiff  witness  the  negligent act,  the

          defense  formulated no  such intermediate  position at  the jury-

                                          22

          instruction  stage.     In  other  words,  the   content  of  the

          instruction stands as  the law  of the case  with respect to  the

          unembellished  contours  of  a  cause  of  action  for  bystander

          liability.  See Quinones-Pacheco  v. American Airlines, Inc., 979
                      ___ ________________     _______________________

          F.2d 1, 4 n.3 (1st Cir. 1992); Milone v. Moceri Family, Inc., 847
                                         ______    ___________________

          F.2d 35, 38-39  (1st Cir. 1988).  And as  we have already pointed

          out, the plaintiff's proof, measured against  the language of the

          trial court's instruction, suffices to create a jury question. 

                    Even if we assume arguendo  that the New Jersey Supreme
                                      ________

          Court  would  augment the  elements of  a non-medical-malpractice

          cause  of   action  for  bystander  liability   along  the  lines

          exemplified  by Thing,  the  verdict might  well be  sustainable.
                          _____

          From the  evidence adduced  at trial,  the jury rationally  could

          find  that during the  incident proper the  plaintiff twice asked
                                                                _____

          the  manager whether the ambulance  had been called.   Though she

          was (erroneously) assured that the call had been made punctually,

          she  asked the manager yet  again at the  hospital (receiving the

          same misinformation), and then checked  with the hotel three days

          later  (after her husband had  perished).  This  type of evidence

          arguably could  support an illation that  the plaintiff suspected

          all  along that a delay attributable to the defendant was causing

          injury  to her husband.  Watching the event while suspecting that

          her  husband's suffering  was being  unnecessarily prolonged  and

          worrying  that prospects  for his  rescue were  diminishing would

          appear  to be  the  kind of  distinct  emotional harm  for  which

          bystander liability would lie  under the premise of Thing.   See,
                                                              _____    ___

                                          23

          e.g., Bloom v. Dubois Regional Med. Ctr., 597 A.2d 671, 683  (Pa.
          ____  _____    _________________________

          Sup. Ct. 1991).

          V.  OTHER ISSUES
          V.  OTHER ISSUES

                    The defendant  raises a  salmagundi of other  issues in

          connection  with  its  appeal.    None  of its  asseverations  is

          persuasive.  Only three warrant discussion.

                             A.  The Evidentiary Rulings.
                             A.  The Evidentiary Rulings.
                                 _______________________

                    The defendant argues that it is entitled to a new trial

          because the district court  erred in certain evidentiary rulings.

          Its chief  complaint concerns the admission  of evidence relating

          to  the destruction of the so-called Xeta report (a printout that

          catalogues all outgoing calls from the hotel's PBX  operator) for

          November 13, 1992.   The defendant  destroyed this telephone  log

          approximately  thirty days after  the incident.   Had  the report

          been preserved, it would have pinpointed the very moment that the

          operator first placed the call for emergency assistance.

                    During the trial, the plaintiff sought to show that the

          defendant had  destroyed this evidence.   The defendant objected,

          contending that  it discarded  the  Xeta report  in the  ordinary

          course of business, pursuant to  established practice, and not as

          part  of an effort to  inter unfavorable evidence.   The district

          court  overruled the  objection  and permitted  the plaintiff  to

          introduce  evidence  at trial  of  the  existence and  subsequent

          destruction  of  the   Xeta  report,   leaving  the   defendant's

          explanation  to the jury.  We review the district court's rulings

          admitting or  excluding evidence  for abuse of  discretion.   See
                                                                        ___

                                          24

          Veranda Beach Club Ltd. Partnership v. Western Sur. Co., 936 F.2d
          ___________________________________    ________________

          1364,  1373 (1st Cir. 1991);  United States v.  Nazzaro, 889 F.2d
                                        _____________     _______

          1158, 1168 (1st Cir. 1989).  We see none in this instance.

                    When  a  document relevant  to an  issue  in a  case is

          destroyed, the trier of  fact sometimes may infer that  the party

          who obliterated it did so out of a realization  that the contents

          were unfavorable.   See Nation-Wide Check  Corp. v. Forest  Hills
                              ___ ________________________    _____________

          Distributors, Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 217 (1st Cir. 1982); see also 2
          __________________                                     ___ ____

          Wigmore on Evidence    285, at  192 (James H. Chadbourn  rev. ed.
          ___________________

          1979).   Before such an inference  may be drawn, there  must be a

          sufficient foundational showing that  the party who destroyed the

          document  had notice  both  of the  potential  claim and  of  the

          document's  potential relevance.   See  Nation-Wide, 692  F.2d at
                                             ___  ___________

          218.    Even  then,  the  adverse  inference is  permissive,  not

          mandatory.   If,  for example,  the factfinder believes  that the

          documents were destroyed accidentally  or for an innocent reason,

          then the factfinder is free to reject the inference.  See , e.g.,
                                                                ___   ____

          Jackson v. Harvard  Univ., 900  F.2d 464, 469  (1st Cir.),  cert.
          _______    ______________                                   _____

          denied,  498 U.S. 848 (1990); Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d
          ______                        ________    _____________

          910, 925-26 (1st Cir. 1988).

                    In this case, the defendant contends that there  was no

          direct evidence to show that it discarded the Xeta report for any

          ulterior reason.   This is true as  far as it goes    but it does

          not go very far.  The proponent of a "missing document" inference

          need not offer direct evidence of a coverup to set  the stage for

          the  adverse inference.    Circumstantial evidence  will suffice.

                                          25

          See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d
          ___  ____  ________________________________    ________

          1119, 1134 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 993 (1988).
                                      _____ ______

                    We do  not believe that  the district court  abused its

          considerable  discretion in  deciding  that the  totality of  the

          circumstances  here  rendered such  an  inference  plausible.   A

          reasonable factfinder could easily  conclude that Marriott was on

          notice all along that the  Xeta report for November 13,  1992 was

          relevant to likely  litigation.   Although no suit  had yet  been

          begun  when the defendant destroyed the document, it knew of both

          James Blinzler's death and  the plaintiff's persistent attempts  

          including  at least one attempt after Blinzler died   to discover

          when the call for emergency aid had been placed.  This  knowledge

          gave  the  defendant ample  reason  to  preserve  the  report  in

          anticipation of a legal action.  When the evidence indicates that

          a party is aware of circumstances that are likely to give rise to

          future litigation  and yet destroys potentially  relevant records

          without particularized inquiry, a factfinder may reasonably infer

          that the party probably did so because the records would harm its

          case.   See Vodusek v.  Bayliner Marine  Corp., 71 F.3d  148, 156
                  ___ _______     ______________________

          (4th Cir. 1995);  Partington v. Broyhill Furn.  Indus., Inc., 999
                            __________    ____________________________

          F.2d 269, 272 (7th Cir. 1993);  Nation-Wide, 692 F.2d at 219.  In
                                          ___________

          the circumstances  at  bar,  the trial  court  acted  within  its

          discretion in admitting the Xeta report.

                    The defendant also  chastises the  court for  admitting

          evidence of another missing  record.  The security  officer's log

          for  November  13,  1992 could  not  be  located,  and the  judge

                                          26

          permitted  evidence of that fact to go  to the jury.  Once again,

          the  ruling cannot  be  faulted.    The  defendant  had  no  good

          explanation for the  missing log,  and the jury  was entitled  to

          infer that the defendant destroyed it in bad faith.

                    To  cinch matters, these  two pieces of  evidence had a

          synergistic effect.  We think it would be proper for a reasonable

          factfinder to  conclude that the unavailability  of two important
                                                              ___

          documents, both  of which bore  upon the  timing of the  call for

          emergency assistance, was something more than a coincidence.  The

          veteran district  judge, after  hearing all the  evidence limning

          these mysterious disappearances, put it  bluntly in the course of

          ruling on post-trial motions:

                    I  will tell  you  now that  the Xeta  Report
                    raises a compelling inference in my mind that
                    personnel  at the Marriott  Hotel did destroy
                    that   record   willfully,  along   with  the
                    security  officer's daily  log of  that date.
                    The inference is compelling that the Marriott
                    Hotel was  hiding the delay of  the telephone
                    operator in making this telephone call.

          This  is a  harsh assessment    but  it is  based on  a firsthand

          appraisal of the  testimony and  it is one  that a rational  jury

          easily could draw on the record.

                              B.  The Motion to Reopen.
                              B.  The Motion to Reopen.
                                  ____________________

                    After the  plaintiff rested, the defendant  moved for a

          directed  verdict under  Fed. R.  Civ. P.  50(a).   After hearing

          arguments, the  district court permitted the  plaintiff to reopen

          her case in  order to  offer certain additional  evidence on  the

                                          27

          issue  of  causation.6    The  defendant  assigns  error  to this

          ruling.  There is none.

                    The Federal  Rules of Evidence give  the district court

          broad discretion in ordering  the proof.  See Fed.  R. Evid. 611.
                                                    ___

          This discretion extends to granting or denying motions to reopen,

          see Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321,
          ___ __________________    ________________________

          331-32 (1971); Rivera-Flores  v. Puerto  Rico Tel.  Co., 64  F.3d
                         _____________     ______________________

          742, 746 (1st  Cir. 1995); Lussier v. Runyon, 50  F.3d 1103, 1113
                                     _______    ______

          (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 69 (1995), and  such rulings
                      _____ ______

          are reviewed principally for abuse of that discretion.

                    A  trial court's  decision to  reopen is  premised upon

          criteria that are flexible and fact-specific, but fairness is the

          key criterion.  See Rivera-Flores, 64 F.3d at 746; Capital Marine
                          ___ _____________                  ______________

          Supply, Inc. v. Thomas, 719  F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir. 1983).   The
          ____________    ______

          specific factors  to be assessed  include the probative  value of

          the evidence sought to be introduced, the proponent's explanation

          for  failing to offer the evidence earlier, and the likelihood of

          undue  prejudice.  See Rivera-Flores,  64 F.3d at  746; Joseph v.
                             ___ _____________                    ______

          Terminix Int'l Co., 17 F.3d 1282, 1285 (10th Cir. 1994); see also
          __________________                                       ___ ____

          6A James W. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice   59.04[13], at 59-33
                             ________________________

          (2d  ed. 1993).   The  prospect of  prolonging the trial  is also

          material.  If the additional evidence is immediately available or
                              
          ____________________

               6The supplemental evidence  consisted of testimony  from two
          witnesses.    The  first,  plaintiff's   medical  expert,  simply
          clarified and confirmed his earlier testimony that James Blinzler
          would  have  survived  had  the  ambulance  arrived  ten  minutes
          earlier.   The  second  witness  (an employee  of  the  ambulance
          service) testified that  the ambulance service had a  unit ready,
          available, and on call at 8:35 p.m. on November 13, 1992.

                                          28

          nearly  so,  the trial  court will  have  a greater  incentive to

          permit the case  to be  reopened.  Conversely,  if gathering  the

          additional evidence  portends a  significant delay in  the trial,

          the  court ordinarily will have a greater reluctance to grant the

          motion.  See Moore, supra,   59.04[13], at 59-33.
                   ___        _____

                    Here, the additional evidence that the plaintiff sought

          to introduce  was non-cumulative.   It had  significant probative

          value on an essential element in the plaintiff's case, helping to

          connect the defendant's negligence to  the injuries claimed.  See
                                                                        ___

          supra  note 6.  There is no  sign that the plaintiff withheld the
          _____

          proof as a strategic  matter.  To the contrary, the  record shows

          quite  clearly that she attempted to streamline her case in chief

          and  offered  the  incremental  evidence  only  after  the  judge

          expressed  reservations about the state of the proof on the issue

          of causation.7

                    Notwithstanding  these   circumstances,  the  defendant

          insists   that   permitting  the   plaintiff  to   reopen  worked

          substantial prejudice  because the  defense hoped all  along that

          the  plaintiff  would   fail  to  prove   causation.    This   is

                              
          ____________________

               7This  is consistent  with  the method  of the  Civil Rules.
          Rule  50(a) exists  in part  to afford  the responding  party "an
          opportunity to cure any deficiency in that party's proof that may
          have been overlooked until  called to the party's attention  by a
          late  motion for  judgment."    Fed.  R.  Civ.  P.  50,  advisory
          committee's note (1991  amendment).  In  other words, Rule  50(a)
          should be construed "to  avoid tactical victories at the  expense
          of substantive interests."  Moore, supra,   50.08, at 50-89   The
                                             _____
          district court echoed this  sentiment when it granted  the motion
          to reopen,  stating:  "I allow the  plaintiff to reopen because I
          want  the truth.   I want  the facts.   I want to  achieve a just
          result in this case . . . ."

                                          29

          disappointment rather  than cognizable  prejudice.   The evidence

          taken after reopening consisted of only two witnesses and created

          no unfair surprise.   The added testimony simply fleshed  out the

          plaintiff's  basic theory of liability   that the time saved by a

          prompt  call might well  have led  to James  Blinzler's survival.

          Moreover, allowing  the plaintiff  to reopen did  not perceptibly

          delay  the trial  and did  not occasion  any interruption  of the

          defense case.  In any event, the district court prudently offered

          the defendant a continuance  so that it might regroup  and better

          rebut the  additional evidence.  By declining  the court's offer,

          the defendant  confirmed the  absence of  unfair prejudice.   See
                                                                        ___

          United  States v.  Diaz-Villafane,  874 F.2d  43, 47  (1st Cir.),
          ______________     ______________

          cert. denied, 493  U.S. 862 (1989).   Under these  circumstances,
          _____ ______

          the granting  of  the plaintiff's  motion  to reopen  comes  well

          within  the  heartland  of the  trial  court's  discretion.   See
                                                                        ___

          Rivera-Flores, 64 F.3d at 749.
          _____________

                          C.  The Emotional Distress Award.
                          C.  The Emotional Distress Award.
                              ____________________________

                    Where, as  here, a  federal court  sets aside  a jury's

          verdict and directs the entry of judgment as a matter of law, the

          court must also rule conditionally  on any concomitant motion for

          a  new trial.  See  Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(c).   In this instance the
                         ___

          district court held that, if it had erred in granting judgment as

          a matter of  law on count 3, then the jury's award of damages for

          emotional  distress should  stand.   The  defendant assails  this

          contingent  ruling and  argues  for  either  a  new  trial  or  a

          remittitur on count 3.   In its most cogent  aspect, the argument

                                          30

          is  based  on  the  premise  that  the  scanty  physical symptoms

          exhibited  by the  plaintiff simply  do not  justify an  award of

          $200,000 in damages.

                    Federal law  governs the question of  whether the trial

          court should order a remittitur in a diversity case.  See Donovan
                                                                ___ _______

          v. Penn Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648, 649 (1977).  Under applicable
             _________________

          federal  standards, appellate  review is  limited to  whether the

          district court abused  its discretion in deciding to  endorse the

          jury  award rather  than trim it  or set  it aside  as excessive.

          See, e.g., Ruiz  v. Gonzalez Caraballo, 929 F.2d 31, 34 (1st Cir.
          ___  ____  ____     __________________

          1991); Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 215 (1st Cir. 1987).
                 _________    _____

                    An  award of  damages will  not be  deemed unreasonably

          high or low as  long as it comports with some "rational appraisal

          or  estimate of the  damages that could be  based on the evidence

          before the jury."  Milone, 847 F.2d at 37 (citation omitted).  On
                             ______

          the  high side,  a damage  determination will  withstand scrutiny

          unless  it is  "grossly  excessive, inordinate,  shocking to  the

          conscience of the court, or  so high that it would be a denial of

          justice  to  permit  it  to  stand."    Correa  v.  Hospital  San
                                                  ______      _____________

          Francisco, 69 F.3d 1184, 1197 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting Grunenthal
          _________                                              __________

          v.  Long  Island R.R.  Co.,  393  U.S. 156,  159  & n.4  (1968)),
              ______________________

          petition  for  cert. filed,  64  U.S.L.W. 3605  (Feb.  26, 1996).
          ________  ___  _____ _____

          Moreover, "an appellate court's  normal disinclination to second-

          guess  a jury's  evaluation of  the proper  amount of  damages is

          magnified where . . . the damages entail  a monetary valuation of

          intangible losses, and the trial judge, having seen and heard the

                                          31

          witnesses at first hand, accepts the jury's appraisal."  Id.
                                                                   ___

                    Here, viewing the evidence of damages in the light most

          amiable to the plaintiff, see Toucet v. Maritime  Overseas Corp.,
                                    ___ ______    ________________________

          991 F.2d 5, 11  (1st Cir. 1993); Ruiz,  929 F.2d at 34,  we think
                                           ____

          that  the award, though  perhaps generous, passes  muster.  Under

          New Jersey law, no particular level of physical symptomatology is

          necessary  to  support  damages  for  emotional  distress.    See
                                                                        ___

          Strachan v. John  F. Kennedy Mem. Hosp., 538 A.2d  346, 353 (N.J.
          ________    ___________________________

          1988).8    The  testimony  in  this  record  indicates  that  the

          plaintiff watched helplessly  as her husband collapsed,  vomited,

          passed  out,  and became  cyanotic.   She was  still in  the room

          nearly fifteen minutes later when an oxygen mask was being placed

          over  her unconscious husband's mouth and nose.  In the aftermath

          of her husband's death, she experienced daily  flashbacks to that

          time  of  torment.   She  still  suffers  from  insomnia, cardiac

          palpitations, and shortness  of breath.   Coupled  with proof  of

          negligent   infliction  of  emotional   distress,  this  evidence

          justifies substantial compensation under New Jersey law.

                    Of course,  the task  of valuing noneconomic  losses in

          tort cases is an imprecise exercise.   There is no one  "correct"

                              
          ____________________

               8At  one  time  New  Jersey  courts  did  require  proof  of
          "substantial bodily injury or sickness" in all emotional distress
          cases.  See, e.g., Caputzal v. The Lindsay Co., 222 A.2d 513, 515
                  ___  ____  ________    _______________
          (N.J.  1966);  Falzone v.  Busch, 214  A.2d  12, 17  (N.J. 1965).
                         _______     _____
          Portee  changed  this rule  in  respect  to bystander  liability,
          ______
          permitting recovery  in the absence  of physical symptoms  if the
          circumstances are such that  severe emotional distress can easily
          be inferred.  See Portee, 417 A.3d at 527-28.
                        ___ ______

                                          32

          sum,  but, rather,  a  range  of  acceptable  awards.    In  many

          instances  the spread between the high and  low ends of the range

          will be great.  The choice within the range   which by its nature

          requires the decisionmaker to translate intangibles (such as pain

          and  suffering) into quantifiable dollars and cents   is a choice

          largely within  the jury's ken.   See  Correa, 69  F.3d at  1197.
                                            ___  ______

          Since we are unable to conclude on this record that $200,000 is a

          figure beyond  the wide  universe of acceptable  awards, we  must

          uphold  the  district court's  finding  that  the figure  is  not

          excessive.  See Ruiz, 929 F.2d  at 34 (explaining that the  court
                      ___ ____

          of  appeals "cannot,  and  will not,  without substantial  cause,

          overrule a  trial judge's considered  refusal to tamper  with the

          damages assessed by a jury").

          VI.  CONCLUSION
          VI.  CONCLUSION

                    We need  go no further.  The record adequately supports

          the jury's conclusion that  the defendant's inexplicable delay in

          calling  an  ambulance constituted  a  proximate  cause of  James

          Blinzler's  death   and  negligently  inflicted   both  emotional

          distress and  a loss of consortium  on his wife (now  his widow).

          Finding,  as  we do,  that  the law  of  New Jersey  permits this

          multifaceted  conclusion  to  remain   fully  intact,  that   the

          defendant's several challenges to evidentiary and case-management

          rulings are  meritless,  and that  the  damages awarded  are  not

          grossly excessive, we reinstate the jury verdict in its entirety.

          As a necessary corollary, we vacate the district court's entry of

          judgment for the defendant on count 3.

                                          33

          Affirmed in part  and reversed in  part.  Costs  in favor of  the
          Affirmed in part  and reversed in  part.  Costs  in favor of  the
          _______________________________________   _______________________

          plaintiff.
          plaintiff.
          _________

                                          34