Court Opinion

ID: 9725276
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:38:20.685729+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:12:05.636266
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BURKE, dissenting: Based upon this record, I am not strongly persuaded that the trial court in fact imposed the sentence as a penalty for defendant’s conduct while on probation. See People v. Young, 138 Ill. App. 3d 130, 142 (1985). The majority correctly states the rule that a reviewing court may consider the remarks of the trial court to determine whether the record shows that the trial court considered the original offense, as required, in resentencing the defendant. But the majority fails to elaborate that Young also requires that those remarks “must be taken in context, and read in their entirety, including arguments of counsel.” Young, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 142. In this case the prosecutor began his argument by stating: “Judge, let us not forget we are here to re-sentence the defendant for his original offense and that the original offense is this defendant who prayed [sic] upon a 13 year old girl through the computer and his predatory actions in communicating with that girl and ultimately meeting up with that young girl 13 years of age and engaging in oral sex, having that young girl perform oral sex on [him]. That is what happened in the original case.” The trial court first commented that it considered the arguments of counsel, the statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation, and the presentence report, which referenced the original offense. In view of these comments, the record shows that the trial court considered the original offense in imposing the sentence. During its remarks, the trial court also made specific findings of fact based upon the evidence presented in aggravation. The trial court found that defendant, while on sex offender probation, made computer contact with a person he believed to be a 16-year-old girl and attempted to meet her for the purpose of having sex. The trial court was free to consider this conduct as evidence concerning rehabilitative potential. People u. Bouyer, 329 Ill. App. 3d 156, 161 (2002). The court stated: “I don’t think there was any doubt but that this person and the defendant knew this was a 16 year old girl. The — having said that, I — need to look at how likely is he to be rehabilitated? The evidence is he’s been on sex offender probation for a little more than a year and in that time he has gotten — made attempts to meet with a 16 year old girl and not only make the attempt but show up. He certainly thought it was going to be a 16 year[ ] old girl in light of the e-mails that were sent. I think it is unlikely that he has any future rehabilitative potential at this point in time, and I at this point believe that I have an obligation to look at what is best not just for him and his rehabilitative potential, which I did consider but also what’s in the best interest for society. I believe society needs to be protected from this type of conduct. I would agree that there’s going to be a hardship to the defendant and to his family by me sending him to the Department of Corrections. There is no doubt that is the case, and there’s no doubt that I feel badly for his mother, father, cousin, wife and his baby. The bottom line is, we’re here because of the conduct of the defendant, not because of what I did, not because of what the State did, not because of what the police did, not because of what [Mary R] did, although I guess I’m grateful she did what she did, but we’re here considering the conduct of the defendant and the conduct of the defendant indicates that the sex offender probation has had effectively no impact on him and that he was attempting to do again the same things that brought him back before me. This conduct is intolerable. This conduct is dangerous, and I’m going to order that he serve 7 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections ***.” The task of weighing factors in aggravation and mitigation is the function of the trial court. People v. Torres, 269 Ill. App. 3d 339, 350 (1995). When the trial court’s comments are read in their entirety, they focus on defendant’s rehabilitative potential in light of the fact that his probation for the original sex offense had no effect on his conduct. It is not surprising that the trial court emphasized defendant’s lack of rehabilitative potential, given that defendant was attempting to commit the same offense of which he was originally convicted while on probation for that original offense. In Young, the court cautioned that, in view of the deference accorded sentencing determinations, such determinations as follow upon the revocation of probation should not be more easily overturned than sentencing determinations generally. Young, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 142. It stated: “An analysis which suggests that the trial court (1) cannot consider the conduct which resulted in the probation being revoked, or (2) cannot consider such conduct past a certain point in the sentencing hearing, or (3) that thereafter a sentencing judge must specifically state that he nevertheless is sentencing the defendant solely on the basis of the original offense — and has considered the conduct which was the basis for the revocation only to the extent of the defendant’s rehabilitative potential — is not only without merit but reflects a head-in-the-sand attitude. When the trial court originally imposed the sentence of probation, it made that determination on the basis of all of the records and reports available. Conduct which leads to revocation of probation has been regarded as a ‘breach’ of the court’s trust, or as otherwise causing the court to lose confidence in the defendant’s rehabilitative potential.” Young, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 140. In this case, the trial court’s comments evince its loss of confidence in defendant’s rehabilitative potential and nothing more. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.