Court Opinion

ID: 9459743
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:30:41.102261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:19.140478
License: Public Domain

*175LAY, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I would reverse.1
In the host of selective service cases which have been passed upon by the courts in recent years, this becomes the only decision which holds that a local draft board may justify by subsequent events postponement of a registrant’s induction in lieu of granting him his rightful statutory deferment. The concomitant denial of due process flowing from the registrant’s loss of his right to a personal appearance and an administrative appeal not only is contrary to the law of this circuit but the law everywhere else. See, e. g., United States v. Rundle, 413 F.2d 329, 332-334 (8 Cir. 1969); Davis v. United States, 410 F.2d 89, 95-96 (8 Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Vacca v. Commanding Officer, Ft. Hamilton, 446 F.2d 1079, 1083 (2 Cir. 1971); United States v. Feldman, 437 F.2d 888, 889 (9 Cir. 1971); United States v. Zablen, 436 F.2d 1075 (9 Cir. 1971); Magaro v. Cassidy, 426 F.2d 137, 141-142 (5 Cir. 1970); Nestor v. Hershey, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 73, 425 F.2d 504, 523-526 (1969); United States v. Turner, 421 F.2d 1251, 1252-1253, 1256 (3 Cir. 1970); United States v. Freeman, 388 F.2d 246, 249-250 (7 Cir. 1967), rehearing denied en banc (1968); Miller v. United States, 338 F.2d 973, 976-977 (9 Cir. 1967); Stain v. United States, 235 F.2d 339, 343 (9 Cir. 1956); Olvera v. United States, 223 F.2d 880, 883-884 (5 Cir. 1955), overruled on other grounds, Robertson v. United States, 404 F.2d 1141 (5 Cir. 1968), reversed on other grounds, 417 F.2d 440 (5 Cir. 1969); United States v. Vincelli, 215 F.2d 210, 213 (2 Cir. 1954), rehearing denied 216 F.2d 681; United States ex rel. Berman v. Craig, 207 F.2d 888, 890-892 (3 Cir. 1953); United States ex rel. Mulford v. Commanding Officer, 338 F.Supp. 1120, 1124 (E.D.N.Y.1971); Waguespack v. Tarr, 317 F.Supp. 448, 451-452 (E.D.La.1970); Weppler v. Hershey, 308 F.Supp. 447, 448-449 (N. D.Ill.1969); Williams v. Hershey, 307 F.Supp. 409, 411-412 (W.D.Wis.1969); Turley v. Selective Service System, Local Board No. 134, 301 F.Supp. 845, 853-854 (C.D.Cal.1969). Cf. Mulloy v. United States, 398 U.S. 410, 416-418, 90 S.Ct. 1766, 26 L.Ed.2d 362 (1970) ; Simmons v. United States, 348 U.S. 397, 75 S.Ct. 397, 99 L.Ed. 453 (1955); United States v. Bender, 469 F.2d 235, 239 n. 5 (8 Cir. 1972); United States v. Pickett, 460 F. 2d 1255 (8 Cir. 1972); McLain v. Selective Service Local Board No. 47, 439 F. 2d 737, 739 n. 3 (8 Cir. 1971); United States v. Kelly, 473 F.2d 1225, 1227-1228 (9 Cir. 1973); United States v. Fry, 203 F.2d 638 (2 Cir. 1953); United States v. Schmidt, 313 F.Supp. 456, 460 n. 2 (D.Minn.1970); United States v. Walsh, 279 F.Supp. 115, 121 (D.Mass. 1968).
*176The majority finds that the Board’s failure to grant Sheridan a II-S deferment in 1969 resulted in no prejudice to him. The “no prejudice” thesis is premised on the fact that Sheridan satisfactorily completed only nine hours of study his first year of enrollment at Creighton University and therefore his subsequent enrollment in the fall of 1970 at St. Scholastica College would have no longer entitled him to a II-S classification.2 It is then reasoned that the Board would have had to reclassify Sheridan as I-A in any event and therefore the Board’s “procedural irregularity” in failing to properly grant his lawful deferment in 1969 was a mere technicality resulting in no prejudice. As indicated, the main difficulty with such hindsight reasoning is that it is contrary to the overwhelming case law in the country. Numerous courts have held that an unlawful denial to reopen is not mooted because a registrant is no longer a student or otherwise fails to qualify for a student deferment. See, e.g., United States v. Rundle, 413 F.2d 329 (8 Cir. 1969); Nestor v. Hershey, 425 F.2d 504, 523-526 (D.C.Cir.1969); United States ex rel. Mulford v. Commanding Officer, 338 F.Supp. 1120, 1124 (E.D.N. Y.1971); Waguespack v. Tarr, 317 F. Supp. 448, 451-452 (E.D.La.1970); Weppler v. Hershey, 308 F.Supp. 447, 448-449 (N.D.Ill.1969); Williams v. Hershey, 307 F.Supp. 409, 411-412 (W.D.Wis.1969); Turley v. Selective Service System, Local Board No. 134, 301 F.Supp. 845, 853-854 (C.D.Cal.1969). Cf. United States v. Zablen, 436 F.2d 1075 (9 Cir. 1971). Contra Robinson v. Hershey, 2 SSLR 3191 (7 Cir. 1969). Subsequent events should never determine the loss of substantive rights flowing from a denial of procedural fair dealing. Such reasoning constitutes a dangerous precedent.
In Mulloy v. United States, 398 U.S. 410, 90 S.Ct. 1766, 26 L.Ed.2d 362 (1970), the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the procedural safeguards incorporated in the reopening of a registrant’s classification. The petitioner in Mulloy presented a credible claim for a conscientious objector exemption to his Local Board, but the Board refused to reopen his classification although they permitted him to appear. The Court said:
' “Because of the narrowly limited scope of judicial review available to a registrant, the opportunity for full administrative review is indispensable to the fair operation of the Selective Service System. Where a prima facie case for reclassification has been made, a board cannot deprive the registrant of such review by simply refusing to reopen his file. .
“ . . . The board could not deprive the petitioner of the procedural protections attending reopening by making an evaluative determination of his claim while purportedly declining to reopen his classification.” (My emphasis.) Id. at 416-418, 90 S.Ct. at 1771.
In an earlier case, Simmons v. United States, 348 U.S. 397, 75 S.Ct. 397, 99 L.Ed. 453 (1955), the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a registrant claiming a conscientious objector exemption because the Department of Justice failed to furnish him with a fair resume of adverse information in an FBI report as required by the Universal Training and Service Act. The government urged that no prejudice was shown, but the Court stated:
“The Government’s argument that no prejudice was shown and none resulted can be readily disposed of. *177. . . This is not an incidental infringement of technical rights. Petitioner has been deprived of the fair hearing required by the Act, a fundamental safeguard, and he need not specify the precise manner in which he would have used this right — and how such use would have aided his cause — in order to complain of the deprivation.” Id. at 405-406, 75 S.Ct. at 402.
The cases relied on by the district court and followed by the majority, United States v. Chaudron, 425 F.2d 605 (8 Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852, 91 S.Ct. 93, 27 L.Ed.2d 89; United States v. Spiro, 394 F.2d 159 (3 Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968); Bradshaw v. United States, 242 F.2d 180 (10 Cir. 1957); and Rowton v. United States, 229 F.2d 421 (6 Cir. 1956), are factually inapposite. They do not involve (1) the failure of the board to grant a statutory II-S deferment to which the registrant was entitled as a matter of law; (2) the denial of the lawful right to a reopening and personal appearance before the board; and (3) the denial of the benefit of the regulations which allow a registrant the right of appeal to the state appeal board and possibly the Presidential Appeal Board.
The “substantial prejudice” alleged in Chaudron was (1) that the local board’s clerk, instead of the board itself, sent the conscientious objector civilian work choices to Chaudron, even though the board subsequently ratified the selection; (2) that the board failed to reconsider Chaudron’s request for work assignment; (3) that since the local board without notification changed its number from 100 to 220, the board lacked jurisdiction; (4) that two of the four board members lived outside the board area; and (5) that the board was allowed to supplement the clerk’s account of a board meeting to include a reference to their direction to issue an Order to Report for Civilian Work and Statement of Employer form. The Chaudron court concluded that the petitioner’s conviction was “attributable to an unbending and adamant refusal to accept any civilian employment except that of his own choosing.” United States v. Chaud-ron, 425 F.2d at 612. In Spiro the petitioner complained that the board failed (1) to notify him that an appeal agent was available to advise him (this was posted on a bulletin board), (2) to apprise him that the appeal agent had ten days within which to request either reconsideration by the board or a Presidential appeal, and (3) to wait ten days after sending the notice of classification before issuing an induction order. In both Bradshaw and Rowton the claimants urged that they were prejudiced by the failure to post the names and addresses of advisors to applicants — the Rowton opinion described this as reliance on a “bare technicality.” Rowton v. United States, 229 F.2d at 422. Compare Steele v. United States, 240 F.2d 142 (1 Cir. 1956). None of these decisions approach the prejudicial magnitude fraught in a postponement of a lawful deferment and the ensuing denial of a personal appearance and an administrative appeal.
The requirement of proof of prejudice, after the fact, is ill-conceived. A registrant may change his whole course of life because a board erroneously postpones an induction rather than grant a proper deferment. A registrant wrongfully denied deferment might voluntarily terminate his schooling in anticipation of an early induction. A registrant should not have the negative burden to show that the harm could not have possibly occurred if the board had performed its lawful duty. It becomes untenable to say that the government can hide behind the absence of proof where its own conduct has created the fertile ground for prejudice to occur.3
*178Sheridan is now branded as a felon for the rest of his life. As such his prospects as a useful citizen in a competitive society are remarkedly diminished. It can be argued that his own conduct led him to this ignominous future, on the other hand, it is equally plausible that the callous and illegal action of his draft board was more instrumental. If Sheridan had been given his II-S deferment in 1969 without the threat of impending induction, perhaps he would have been motivated to earn better grades. There should be nothing novel in the realization that a prospect of impending service in the armed forces often lessens a young person’s enthusiasm for his present course of study. If Sheridan had been given a personal appearance, perhaps the local board or the appeal board would have been persuaded as to his sincerity in changing his school major and would have allowed him, in their discretion, to at least finish the current school term before again reviewing his classification. Perhaps the local board would have realized that since Sheridan was not actually classified II-S when he was enrolled at Creighton in 1969, that the first year to count for credit hours under the selective service regulation was 1970 and that he thus would have then qualified for a II-S deferment. Perhaps, Sheridan, if given a personal appearance and immediately informed of the Board’s intent to reclassify him, would have chosen to pursue instead some occupational deferment. Perhaps he would have immediately realized the necessity of seeking a conscientious objector classification before an induction order was mailed. See generally Nestor v. Hershey, 425 F.2d at 524-525. Who can say? It is all a matter of speculation — but this points up the difficulty in placing the negative burden on a registrant, after the fact, to show that the Board’s unlawful acts constituted prejudice. It has often been said, but the frailities of human nature seem to require its constant repetition, that it is fundamental to the preservation of a free society that government in its relationship with individual citizens must be strictly held to standards of lawful conduct. To sell short this concept on a hindsight rationalization of “no prejudice” arising from subsequent events strikes hard, in my judgment, at the basic concepts of constitutional justice.

. There can be no question that the registrant sent a request for a II-S deferment to his local draft board upon his enrollment in Creighton University in the fall of 1969. Although Sheridan did not make this request by using the proper Selective Service System Form 109, the Board was aware of his desire for such a deferment in July of 1969. Thereafter the selective service file shows that the local board received a punch card from Creighton University, signed by Sheridan, in the* fall of 1969 certifying that he was duly enrolled and satisfactorily pursuing a full course of study. It was then readily obvious to any reasonable person that this young man was requesting a II-S deferment. For the Board to ignore Sheridan’s request on the basis that he had not used the proper form was incredible. In Vaughn v. United States, 404 F.2d 586, 591 (8 Cir. 1968), reversed on other grounds, 339 U.S. 526, 90 S.Ct. 2230, 26 L.Ed.2d 776 (1970), Judge Matthes wrote:
“We believe, however, that classification in accordance with the law should not rest upon technical considerations. Substance, not form, is the controlling factor.”
The record is undisputed that Sheridan was entitled to a statutory II-S deferment in the fall of 1969. Breen v. Selective Service Local Board No. 16, 396 U.S. 460, 464-465, 90 S.Ct. 661, 24 L.Ed.2d 653 (1970). Yet the Board wrongfully chose to continue his I-A classification and simply postpone his order of induction.

. There is some evidence that only nine hours were transferred from Creighton to St. Scholastica because only grades of C or above could be transferred. Furthermore, because the Board failed to reopen the case and Sheridan was not permitted to appear and present evidence, it was never established that Sheridan could not complete his studies in the remaining three years. Although Sheridan did not fulfill the requisite 25% of his college credits in his freshman year, it surely was within the Board’s discretion to consider these additional factors before classifying him I-A.

. In United States v. Rundle, 413 F.2d at 332 (J. Mehaffy dissenting), in reversing the judgment, we said:
“However, in view of the fact that the evidence conclusively shows that at the time Rundle received his induction order in May, he was pursuing his education and upon certification of that fact to the board under 32 C.F.R. § 1622.15(b) and the statute 50 U.S.C. *178App. § 456 (i) (2) the board was nonetheless required to reopen and reconsider his I-A classification and cancel his induction order. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.14. See United States ex rel. Berman v. Craig, 207 F.2d at 890 (3 Cir. 1953). To hold otherwise would be to permit a board to disregard a mandatory duty to reopen by simply delaying consideration until the registrant’s status has changed sufficiently so that he is no longer entitled to the requested reclassification. Indeed, a board’s delay might in itself cause a change in a registrant’s status. The local board’s delay, coupled with both its evident reluctance to grant a II-S classification and the outstanding induction order might well have caused Bundle to conclude that registration for summer school was a futile act. For the same reason, Bundle’s subsequent withdrawal of his request for a II-S deferment on June 23 and his application then to be consideration for a I-A-O status cannot affect the board’s mandatory duty under the regulations to reopen and consider anew his classification.” (My emphasis.)