Court Opinion

ID: 9703725
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:06:07.299207+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:51.451412
License: Public Domain

CAPPY, Justice, concurring.
Although I am in accord with the decision of the Majority, I write separately to articulate my position on the concept of general suspicionless searches in Pennsylvania.
I joined the dissent in Commonwealth v. Blouse, 531 Pa. 167, 611 A.2d 1177 (1992). At that time, I agreed with the position, articulated by then Mr. Justice Flaherty, now Mr. Chief Justice Flaherty, and Mr. Justice Zappala, that suspicionless searches were incompatible with the protections afforded the citizens of this Commonwealth under Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. That position failed to gamer a majority and the concept of general suspicionless searches became the law of this Commonwealth. Acknowledging that Blouse was the law, I followed the constitutional analysis set forth therein in Commonwealth v. Cass, 551 Pa. 25, 709 A.2d 350 (1998). I penned an opinion in Cass recognizing that certain searches could meet constitutional criteria under the reasonableness balancing test as articulated by the federal courts in Vernonia School District, 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995), Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990), Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 *350(1979) and United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976).
With the passage of time, I have come to accept the necessity for suspicionless searches aimed at a compelling state interest. (The everyday occurrence of walking through a metal detector at the airport readily comes to mind). My acceptance stemmed from the belief that the searches will be conducted with minimal intrusion, interfere with a limited privacy interest, and are necessitated by the fact that traditional law enforcement techniques are inadequate to address the compelling state interest at hand.1 In my mind, this framework meets the necessary balance of competing interests and offers the least offense to established principles of individual liberty and privacy.
However, I must acknowledge that both Mr. Justice Nigro in his dissent and Mr. Justice Saylor in his concurrence raise an important question. This court accepted roadblocks in the first place, as a legitimate means to combat the dangers of drunk driving where traditional law enforcement techniques failed. With the advantage of hindsight, 'can it really be stated that roadblocks satisfy this compelling state interest in a more efficient and effective manner than traditional law enforcement techniques? The balancing test established in Blouse was never intended to grant a license for the indiscriminate use of roadblocks in perpetuity if the purpose of those roadblocks is not met. The idea of general suspicionless searches is an anomaly. In order to justify such massive law enforcement actions, which admittedly interrupt individual liberty and privacy, there is more to balancing this equation than simply pitting the state interest against the individual interest. There must be empirical proof that this manner of search is effective where traditional methods of law enforcement are not.
*351In this case, Mr. Justice Nigro looks to statistics nationwide then cites to the numbers of this specific roadblock, 300 cars stopped, 3 DUI arrests, and declares the roadblock for DUI purposes ineffectual for all times. I am unconvinced that this is the appropriate manner for resolving this question.
Mr. Justice Saylor raises the issue, seeking information on the essential components of the balancing test. Upon review, I must agree with Mr. Justice Saylor that insufficient empirical information exists in this record to resolve the issue. However, I am convinced that it is a question that we as a court must eventually confront if law enforcement intends to continue using general searches as a tool in their arsenal. As the eloquent opinion offered by Madame Justice Newman is unable to address this issue as the record fails to provide sufficient data, I join the result therein and the concurrence of Mr. Justice Saylor.

. As originally identified in Tarbert, 517 Pa. 277, 535 A.2d 1035 (1987), the three factors considered in assessing the reasonableness of a general suspicionless search are 1) the strength of the public interest in effectively combating the problem, 2) the extent of the invasion of the citizen’s privacy and 3) the ability to achieve acceptable results by other means. Id., 535 A.2d at 1039.