Court Opinion

ID: 9461152
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:07:23.258561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:55.290305
License: Public Domain

ELY, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. I can recall no stronger case for a holding that the court’s failure, acting sua sponte, to present a cautionary instruction in respect to the prosecuting testimony of the accomplices constituted reversible error. Concerning this, I have hitherto expressed my general views in United States v. Randall, 491 F.2d 1317, 1321-1323 (9th Cir. 1974) (dissenting opinion).
In the present case, one of the accomplices who testified for the prosecution had been granted immunity in exchange for his incriminating testimony against the appellant, given by the accomplice *170before the grand jury. For a prior offense, this accomplice had been in the custody of federal penal authorities, but he was freed in advance of the time of the appellant’s trial.
The second accomplice who testified against the appellant was originally charged with the commission of three felonies in connection with the transaction involving the appellant. The prosecution dismissed two of these felony charges before this accomplice presented his testimony incriminating the appellant. Moreover, this prosecution witness had also been in federal custody because of a prior conviction and his application for parole had been rejected because of a pending criminal charge in a state court. But the state prosecution was apparently abandoned quite suddenly, whereupon this accomplice was released from federal custody on the same day that the first accomplice was released, only fourteen days before the occurrence of the appellant’s trial. The Government’s simultaneous releasing of these two felons on the same date would seem to be, of itself, remarkably coincidental.
The third accomplice offered by the prosecution was charged with three felonies arising from the transaction in which the appellant was alleged to have been involved. The Government dismissed all of the charges against this accomplice before he testified for the prosecution.
If the bare recitation of the above undeniable facts does not support my view that the trial judge should have instructed the jury that the testimony of the accomplices should be viewed with extreme caution, if not suspicion, then I doubt that elaborative argumentation could strengthen my foundation.1
I would reverse.

. To me, the failure of Fritts’ defense attorney to request the cautionary instruction is thoroughly inexplicable. Surely, this neglect cannot be attributed to any valid strategic decision. If I am correct, Fritts may possibly bo able to establish, in post-conviction proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, that he did not receive the effective representation of competent counsel.
In justice to Fritts’ appellate counsel, it should be noted that he did not represent Fritts at the trial level.