Court Opinion

ID: 9387050
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-14 16:08:42.547122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:11.078739
License: Public Domain

J-A04003-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 KARI A. MUIR                            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 MATTHEW R. GROSS                        :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :   No. 1492 MDA 2022

               Appeal from the Order Entered October 6, 2022
                In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
                  Civil Division at No: 2015-FC-000797-03

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                         FILED: APRIL 14, 2023

     Appellant, Matthew Gross (“Father”), appeals from the order entered on

October 6, 2022 in the Court of Common Pleas of York County following a

hearing on a contempt petition filed by Appellee, Kari Muir (“Mother”), to

which Father filed a counter petition and a request for sanctions.     Father

contends that the trial court abused its discretion and/or committed error of

law by finding Father in contempt of a custody order, by finding Father in

contempt for behavior not specifically prohibited by the custody order and for

matters not pled in Mother’s petition, and by precluding Father from

presenting testimony of a therapist. Following review, we affirm.

     As the trial court explained:

     Father and Mother share legal and physical custody of K.G.
     Mother and Father have an older child, S.G., who is now age
     nineteen [and] lives with Father. Mother agreed to Father having
     sole legal and sole physical custody of S.G. Mother and Father are
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       subject to a stipulated order of custody entered on September 17,
       2015 and orders of November 2, 2016 and September 25, 2018,
       which found both parties in contempt. On August 30, 2022,
       Mother filed a petition for contempt. On September 6, 2022,
       Father filed an answer, petition for special relief, and a counter
       petition for contempt. A hearing [] was held on September 23,
       2022, addressing the parties’ petitions for contempt and special
       relief. The court issued an order finding Father in contempt. On
       October 21, 2022, Father filed a notice of appeal and a concise
       statement of errors.

Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 11/9/22, at 1 (some capitalization omitted).1

       Father presents four issues for this Court’s consideration, which we have

reordered for ease of disposition:

       1. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and/or abused
          its discretion in finding Father in contempt of the custody
          order?

       2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred as a
          matter of law in finding [Father] in contempt and sanctioning
          him for alleged behavior that is not specifically prohibited in the
          underlying custody order?

       3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred as a
          matter of law for finding [Father] in contempt and sanctioning
          him for matters not pled in [Mother’s] petition for contempt?

       4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred by
          precluding [Father] from presenting the testimony of a
          therapist, which could corroborate [Father’s] defense, only to
          later find that [Father] was not being truthful?

Father’s Brief at 7-8 (some capitalization omitted).
____________________________________________

1We remind Father’s counsel that Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure
2111 requires, inter alia, that copies of the trial court’s order and the
appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement are to be attached to the appellant’s brief.
See Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(2) and Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(11) and (d), respectively.

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      In his first three issues, Father contends that the trial court erred or

abused its discretion by finding Father in contempt. As this Court reiterated

in Gross v. Mintz, 284 A.3d 479 (Pa. Super. 2022),

      Our standard of review concerning a trial court’s contempt findings
      is very narrow:

         This court’s review of a civil contempt order is limited to a
         determination of whether the trial court abused its
         discretion. If a trial court, in reaching its conclusion,
         overrides or misapplies the law or exercises judgment which
         is manifestly unreasonable, or reaches a conclusion that is
         the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will as shown by
         the evidence of record, then discretion is abused.

Id. at 489 (quoting B.A.W. v. T.L.W., 230 A.3d 402, 406 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(citation omitted)).

      Further:

      “To sustain a finding of civil contempt, the complainant must prove
      certain distinct elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1)
      that the contemnor had notice of the specific order or decree
      which he is alleged to have disobeyed; (2) that the act constituting
      the contemnor’s violation was volitional; and (3) that the
      contemnor acted with wrongful intent.” P.H.D. v. R.R.D., 56 A.3d
      702, 706 n.7 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). Moreover, “[a]
      court may exercise its civil contempt power to enforce compliance
      with its orders for the benefit of the party in whose favor the order
      runs but not to inflict punishment. A party must have violated a
      court order to be found in civil contempt.” Garr v. Peters, 773
      A.2d 183, 189 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citation omitted).

Id.

      In his broadly-worded first issue, Father argues that the trial court

abused its discretion by finding Father in contempt. In his brief, he focuses

on the court’s finding of contempt for Father’s use of the Our Family Wizard

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communication system to convey messages outside the permitted scope of

communications.    The September 25, 2018 order entered in this matter

specified, “It is the further order of court [that] Our Family Wizard is to be

used by the parties only for custody issues, children’s issues, and not for

anything else between the parties.” Order, 9/25/18, at 6.

      In her contempt petition, Mother provided specific examples of

“insulting” communications made by Father on the Our Family Wizard

platform. See Petition for Contempt and Enforcement, 8/30/22, at ¶ 10. In

addition, during the September 23, 2022 hearing, Mother testified as to

communications from Father using Our Family Wizard that Mother believed

were in violation of the September 2018 order.

      The trial court noted that “testimony was presented regarding Father

not limiting his comments on Our Family Wizard [OFW] to matters of custody

in relation to K.G. as ordered by this court on September 2[5], 2018.” Rule

1925(a) Opinion, 11/9/22, at 9 (citations omitted). Further, the trial court

found “testimony relevant to Mother’s allegation that Father uses Our Family

Wizard to harass her. Father objected as to relevance and was overruled.”

Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 11/9/22, at 13 (citations omitted).        While Mother

admits that on one occasion she did not “stick completely to a message about

the welfare of K.G.,” Mother’s Brief at 6, she correctly observes that specific

messages between the parties were reviewed by the trial court, giving the

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court “the opportunity to determine the credibility of both parties and the

written communication of both parties.” Id.

      With regard to the use of Our Family Wizard, we find no abuse of

discretion on the part of the trial court in finding Father in contempt,

recognizing that Father had notice of the September 25, 2018 order limiting

the scope of communications on Our Family Wizard, that Father’s use of Our

Family Wizard for communications outside the permitted scope was volitional,

and that he acted with volitional intent. Further, we find no abuse of discretion

in the trial court’s imposition of a $500 fine in this regard, or the court’s

willingness to permit Father to pay that fine without interest within 25 days of

the court’s order (assessing 6% annual interest after that time). Father’s first

issue fails.

      In his second issue, Father argues that the trial court abused its

discretion and/or erred as a matter of law “in finding him in contempt and

sanctioning him for alleged behavior that is not specifically prohibited in the

underlying custody order.” Father’s Brief at 6. As explained in the argument

section of his brief, Father’s contention relates to a statement Father made on

K.G.’s school medical form, indicating that Mother had been found to have

abused K.G.’s older sister. As Mother explained, she “was objecting to Father’s

false statement” and was asking the court to find Father “in contempt for this

statement as it was demeaning to Mother and did not promote effective co-

parenting as required by all the previous orders[.]” Mother’s Brief at 7.

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      Although the court did not assess any fine against Father for the

statement he provided on K.G.’s school medical record, the court did find that

the elements of contempt were satisfied with respect to the statement “that

included an inaccurate and slanderous statement regarding Mother.”          Rule

1925(a) Opinion, 11/9/22, at 4. The court specifically noted that Mother was

never found by a court to have abused K.G.’s sister “as this allegation was

never litigated.” Id. The court determined that:

      Listing a false allegation on documentation for K.G.’s school that
      Mother had been adjudicated abusive by a court of law is certainly
      not consistent with mutual consultation or following a harmonious
      policy. Father willingly made a false statement on [K.G.’s] school
      record and did so with wrongful intent, in this Court’s view.

Id. at 8. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s finding of contempt

with respect to the statement Father entered on K.G.’s school medical form.

Appellant’s second issue fails.

      In his third issue, Father claims the trial court abused its discretion by

“finding [Father] in contempt and sanctioning him for matters not pled in

[Mother’s] petition for contempt.” Father’s Brief at 7-8. A review of Father’s

brief reveals that he is mischaracterizing as “a finding of contempt” the trial

court’s imposition of sanctions stemming from Father’s litigious conduct.

      In her contempt petition, Mother requested that the court order Father

to correct the medical information on K.G.’s school medical form and to stop

harassing communications, including on Our Family Wizard.           In addition,

Mother requested “[a]ny other relief the court deems appropriate.” Mother’s

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Petition, 8/30/22, at 4.   Mother did not raise any issue regarding Father’s

“litigiousness.” Rather, it was Father who suggested he was entitled to counsel

fees based on Mother’s engagement in “obdurate, repetitive and bad faith

conduct to the detriment of [K.G.].” Father’s Request for Sanctions, 9/6/22,

at ¶¶ 33-34 (citing 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5339). As the court observed, “Apparently,

Father did not anticipate that in defending herself against this allegation,

Mother would allege that Father was the litigious party.” Rule 1925(a) Opinion,

11/9/22, at 9.

      The trial court determined that it acted within its discretion in finding

Father “litigious . . . to the point of being obdurate and vexatious.” Trial Court

Order, 10/6/22, at 2; Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 11/9/22, at 11.            The court

explained that it was “very unimpressed with father having filed a PFA, his

counterclaim prior litigation (sic).”   Id.   Consequently, the court awarded

Mother attorney fees in the amount of $1,417 for Father’s litigious conduct.

We find no abuse of discretion in this regard.

      It should be noted that Father did not ask the court to find Mother “in

contempt” for being litigious. Rather, Father sought a finding of contempt on

two bases: (1) Mother’s failure to notify Father immediately of K.G.’s exposure

to COVID-19 and her resultant (negative) test and follow-up appointment, and

(2) Mother’s disparagement of Father in the presence of the children. Father’s

Counter Petition for Contempt, 9/6/22, at 6-8. He then requested that the

court “deem Mother has engaged in obdurate, repetitive and bad faith

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conduct,” and award Father reasonable attorney fees and costs based on that

conduct.     Father’s Request for Sanctions, 9/26/22, at 8-9.       There was no

request for a finding of contempt related to Mother’s conduct in pursuing

litigation, nor could there be. As noted at the outset, “A party must have

violated a court order to be found in civil contempt.” Gross, 284 A.3d at 489.

Because there was no court order limiting or restricting initiation of litigation,

neither Mother nor Father could be found “in contempt” for being litigious.

However, the trial court appropriately reviewed Father’s request for sanctions,

as authorized by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5339, and was within its rights to conclude it

was Mother, not Father, who was entitled to an award of attorney fees for

Father’s conduct, which was “litigious . . . to the point of being obdurate and

vexatious.”    Trial Court Order, 10/6/22, at 2.    Again, we find no abuse of

discretion in this regard. Father is not entitled to relief on his third issue.

      In his final issue, Father argues that the trial court erred or abused its

discretion by precluding Father from presenting testimony of a therapist. “We

review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.”           In

Interest of M.R.F., III, 182 A.3d 1050, 1056 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation

omitted).

      Father claims the therapist’s testimony would have corroborated his

defense with regard to the note he inserted on K.G.’s school medical record

indicating that Mother had abused K.G.’s older sister, S.G.        The trial court

explained:

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       Father willingly made a false statement on child’s school record
       and did so with wrongful intent, in this court’s view. Father then
       sought to have the adult sibling’s therapist testify that there had
       been actual verbal or emotional abuse by Mother of the old[er]
       child. However, this testimony is irrelevant. Whether abuse [of
       the older child] was disclosed to the therapist is not at issue. The
       false statement at issue is Father’s statement that a court had
       adjudicated Mother abusive of the older child. Father asserts he
       did not know he could not disclose past abuse of the old[er] child
       on the young[er] child’s school forms. Again, the disclosure here
       was a false allegation that a court had established that Mother was
       abusive to [the older child,] S.G. Testimony was presented and
       Father acknowledged that this statement was not accurate.

Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 11/9/22, at 8 (some capitalization omitted).2

       We agree with the trial court that testimony from the therapist in

question was irrelevant. We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial

court for precluding the therapist from testifying.

       Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/14/2023

____________________________________________

2The therapist Father proposed to call as a witness provided therapy to S.G.
However, she was not K.G.’s therapist. See Notes of Testimony, 9/23/22, at
50 (identifying K.G.’s therapist by name).

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