Court Opinion

ID: 9549079
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:12:55.915211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:48.468198
License: Public Domain

BIRD, C. J., Concurring and Dissenting. Dissenting.
I concur in the majority's holding that trial courts retain discretion under Evidence Code section 352 to exclude evidence of prior felony convictions when their probative value is outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice. I also agree that the suggested factors set forth in People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441 [99 Cal.Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1] (see ante, at p. 307) should continue to guide the trial courts in their exercise of that discretion. However, I cannot join the majority’s conclusion that moral turpitude is a proper or a workable standard for determining the admissibility of prior felony convictions.
I.
Prior felony convictions are admissible to impeach a witness if they are relevant to a witness’s credibility. Justice Work’s persuasive opinion for a unanimous court in People v. Hoffman (Cal.App.) is herewith adopted as my own:*
[Ujnder the Constitution and laws of California, only those prior felony convictions relevant to [[a]] witness’s credibility may be used to impeach testimonial credibility.
*324Relevancy is the engine of the judicial search for truth. As Thayer stated: “There is a principle—not so much a rule of evidence as a presupposition involved in the very conception of a rational system of evidence . . . which forbids receiving anything irrelevant, not logically probative. ...” (Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence (1898) p. 264, quoted in McCormick on Evidence (2d ed. 1972) p. 433.) Wigmore states this basic axiom of evidence indirectly affects “the rules directed to prevent the jury from substituting passion and prejudice, instead of reasoning, as the foundation of its conclusion and the doctrine that even the legislature cannot establish a rule of decision that will deprive the judiciary of its power to investigate the facts by rational methods.” (1 Wigmore, Evidence (Tillers rev. ed. 1983) § 9, p. 665.)
In California, Evidence Code2 sections 210 and 350 [[set forth]] these principles. Section 210 states: “ ‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence, including evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness . . . having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” Section 350 provides: “No evidence is admissible except relevant evidence.” The impeaching relevance of prior felony convictions has most recently been controlled by section 7883 as construed by Beagle and its progeny. (People v. Barrick (1982) 33 Cal.3d 115 [187 Cal.Rptr. 716, 654 P.2d 1243]; People v. Spearman (1979) 25 Cal.3d 107 [157 Cal.Rptr. 883, 599 P.2d 74]; People v. Fries (1979) 24 Cal.3d 222 [155 Cal.Rptr. 194, 594 P.2d 19]; People v. Woodard (1979) 23 Cal.3d 329 [152 Cal.Rptr. 536, 590 P.2d 391]; People v. Rollo (1977) 20 Cal.3d 109 [141 Cal.Rptr. 177, 569 P.2d 771]; People v. Rist (1976) 16 Cal.3d 211 [127 Cal.Rptr. 457, 545 P.2d 833]; People v. Antick (1975) 15 Cal.3d 79 [123 Cal.Rptr. 475, 539 P.2d 43].)
While Beagle affirms the trial court’s discretion to weigh the probative value of prior felonies against potential prejudice to the defendant (§ 352), *325the threshold question to this balancing and the fundamental issue in all challenges to admissibility is whether the proffered evidence is probative of the issue to be resolved. The Legislature has established the sole trait relevant to impeaching credibility is truthfulness; that is, “[e]vidence of traits of his character other than honesty or veracity, or their opposites, is inadmissible to attack or support the credibility of a witness.” (§ 786.) “Since section 788 authorizes the use of [prior felony convictions] only ‘[f]or the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,’ the first factor which the trial court must evaluate is whether the prior felony conviction reflects adversely upon credibility. Although the commission of any felony is sometimes said to reflect upon the character of the individual convicted, such a belief would not justify the use of every type of felony conviction to impeach credibility. ‘Character is only an abstract group-term; what actually exists is a number of virtually separate traits, e.g., honesty, violence, benevolence, etc.’ (Wigmore, Science of Judicial Proof (1937) p. 106; original italics.)” (People v. Woodard, supra, 23 Cal.3d 329, 335.)
In defining the limits of relevance for impeachment, our Supreme Court has examined the elements of the prior offense. “ ‘Only a conviction which has as a necessary element an intent to deceive, defraud, lie, steal, etc., impacts on the credibility of a witness.’ [Citation.] It is not sufficient that the prior offense shows a ‘disrespect for law’ or a ‘character trait of willingness to do anything.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Barrick, supra, 33 Cal.3d 115, 123-124.) Thus, the nature of the act, and not the nature of the actor, is the dimension on which the court has scaled the probative value of prior felony convictions.
Violent or assaultive crimes have little or no bearing on one’s honesty or veracity. (People v. Beagle, supra, 6 Cal.3d 441, 453.) In People v. Rist, supra, 16 Cal.3d 211, the Supreme Court expressly disapproved the holding in People v. Delgado (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 242 [108 Cal.Rptr. 399], which held prior convictions for assault with intent to rape and attempted forcible rape involved elements of “stealth” and bore “some rational relationship to dishonesty.” (Id., at p. 250.) The Court of Appeal in People v. Nelson (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 11 [133 Cal.Rptr. 552], determined prior rape convictions were irrelevant to credibility. (Id., at p. 22.) []
The People argue article I, section 28, subdivision (f) of the state Constitution prohibits us from reaching this conclusion. To the contrary, our holding does violence neither to the intent nor construction of this section. We briefly review the evolution of impeachment by prior conviction.
At common law in the 17th century, a person convicted of an “infamous” crime was incompetent to be a witness. (2 Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn *326rev. ed. 1979) §§ 519-520, pp. 725-730.) Though difficult to specify, the usual and more broadly accepted infamous crimes included treason, felonies, and crimes involving falsehood. Such exclusions worked a further punishment for infamy and precluded the presumedly untrustworthy from presenting unreliable evidence. The rationale underlying the latter consequence was supported by a common belief of the times: Since “all treasons, and almost all felonies, were punishable with death, it was very natural that crimes, deemed of so grave a character as to render the offender unworthy to live, should be considered as rendering him unworthy of belief in a court of justice. [Fn. omitted.]” (1 Greenleaf, Evidence (16th ed. 1899) § 373, p. 514, quoted in Note, Constitutional Problems Inherent in the Admissibility of Prior Record Conviction Evidence for the Purpose of Impeaching the Credibility of the Defendant Witness (1968) 37 U.Cin.L.Rev. 168, 169.) “Nevertheless, in whatever degree the disqualification may have been thought of as a part of the punishment of the offender himself, it was obvious that this theory could not of itself justify the incidental punishment of innocent persons who might need the convict’s testimony; and hence the justification had ultimately to be founded on some more acceptable reason. Hence, as soon as the rule begins to be reasoned about, we find it placed upon the more plausible theory of actual moral turpitude, i.e., the person is to be excluded because from such a moral nature it is useless to expect the truth . ...” (2 Wigmore, op. cit. supra, at p. 726.) However, even this rationale was roundly criticized, and by the 19th century, exclusion of infamous criminals as witnesses was all but abolished from Anglo-American law in favor of decisional and statutory modifications allowing the infamous criminal to testify while permitting the conviction to be entered into evidence to affect the weight of his testimony. Typical of these changes was a New York statute which provided: “A person who has been convicted of a crime is a competent witness; but the conviction may be proved, for the purpose of affecting the weight of his testimony . . . .” (N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law, § 4513 (McKinney 1963).)
The modern evolution of these impeachment principles has resulted in considerable diversity in state practice. Nonetheless, the relevance of the prior conviction to credibility remains the primary, and in some jurisdictions exclusive, factor in admitting proffered impeachment evidence. (See 81 Am.Jur.2d, Witnesses, §§ 569-572, pp. 574-578; Annot. (1920) 6 A.L.R. 1608, supplemented by (1923) 25 A.L.R. 339, (1936) 103 A.L.R. 350, and (1946) 161 A.L.R. 233; 3A Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970) § 987, fn. 1, pp. 862-911 and § 987 (1984 pocket supp.) pp. 22-38; Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters (1961) 70 Yale L.J. 763, 774-778.)
As mentioned, relevance is the threshold test for the admission of prior felony convictions for impeachment. Whether relevance has been aban*327doned as a criterion under article I, section 28, subdivision (f) of the California Constitution depends on a proper construction of that section.
Section 28, subdivision (f) was added to the California Constitution in June 1982 with the passage of the Proposition 8 initiative. Under its terms, “[a]ny prior felony conviction . . . shall subsequently be used without limitation for purposes of impeachment . . . .” The People argue the prior felony convictions are free from any restraint on their admission for impeachment. However, a constitutional amendment must be plainly and naturally construed, relying on the ordinary and accepted meaning of its words. (Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 245 [149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281].) And such a construction must reach all the words. Thus, while the words “without limitation” undoubtedly unshackle some admissibility restraints, they do not eliminate the fact that the prior felonies are still being admitted “for purposes of impeachment.” Since 1965, section 780 has stated the general rule regarding impeachment: “[T]he court or jury may consider in determining the credibility of a witness any matter that has any tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of his testimony . . . .”4 (Italics added.) As can be seen, section 780 embodies the fundamental concept of relevance appearing in section 210. Further, section 786 explicitly refines the potential use of character evidence for impeachment by stating: “Evidence of traits of his character other than honesty or veracity, or their opposites, is inadmissible to attack or support the credibility of a witness. ” Thus, a plain reading of subdivision (f) in light of the long-accepted meaning of its words under the laws of California does not preclude the assessment of relevance in determining prior conviction evidence for impeachment.
A contrary interpretation proves too much. Any rational theory of impeachment by a prior felony conviction requires two inferential steps. First, the trier of fact must link the commission of the felony, i.e., conduct, to some propensity in the witness to lie, i.e., a character trait. From this propensity, the fact finder may then infer the witness is dishonest or untruthful. In the most obvious example, the fact finder hears evidence of the witness’s past conduct of making false statements under oath from which he can infer the witness has a character trait for untruthfulness, from which he may further infer the present testimony is likely incredible.
The People’s argument circumvents or totally eliminates the second inferential step. They argue the commission of any felony is itself probative *328of credibility. Stated most simply, they maintain all former felons will lie under oath. But this conclusion is betrayed by the flaw in its underlying premise. Conduct is the manifestation of many human motivations, and not an unerring reflection of character. Indeed, the line from one’s prior conduct to one’s present truthfulness is rarely straightly drawn.5 For example, one homicide may be a product of a premeditated and stealthily crafted scheme, effectuated by misrepresentations and false statements; another may be a spontaneous response to a foul and sinister provocation. While a conviction for either homicide would be a felony, it would be illogical to maintain each equally proves the witness’s present truthfulness. To argue otherwise is to support a belief common in the 17th century which considers neither modern advances in jurisprudence nor in psychology. Further, the offer of past felonious conduct in this example may support other inferences regarding the witness’s character, inferences not at issue in testing one’s credibility. For instance, a jury might infer a fortiori that both felons have a propensity for violence. Mindful of the potential prejudice in such evidence, the Legislature provided: “[Ejvidence of specific instances of his conduct relevant only as tending to prove a trait of his character is inadmissible to attack or support the credibility of a witness.” (§ 787.) Thus, the second inferential step cannot logically, nor legally, be excluded. It functions much like a filter, sifting the witness’s conduct to exclude logically irrelevant, and thereby potentially prejudicial, character evidence and to include assuredly relevant conduct demonstrating a propensity for truthfulness and honesty or the lack thereof. As Justice Jefferson states: “If the trait involved in the offense is that of dishonesty or untruthfulness, a felony conviction of such an offense has far greater probative value to impeach a witness than if the character trait is other than that of dishonesty or untruthfulness.” (2 Jefferson, Cal. Evidence Benchbook (2d ed. 1982) Witnesses, § 28.8, p. 924.) Our Supreme Court assures such high probative value by requiring that “[u]nless the conviction contains an element reflecting on defendant’s honesty, it may not be admitted.” (People v. Barrick, supra, 33 Cal.3d 115, 123.)
The People, however, argue the framers of subdivision (f) intended to free impeaching prior conviction evidence from a relevancy requirement. To effectuate the purpose of a law, the court must construe its provisions consistent with the intent of the lawmakers. (Sand v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 567, 570 [194 Cal.Rptr. 480, 668 P.2d 787].) This fundamental principle of statutory construction applies with equal force to constitutional *329amendments adopted by the initiative process. (Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra, 22 Cal.3d 208, 245.) “In construing an initiative measure, the California courts have often referred to the analysis and arguments in the voters’ pamphlet as an aid to ascertaining the intention of the framers and the electorate. [Citations.]” (Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, 143 [197 Cal.Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862], fn. omitted.)
The analysis of subdivision (f) by the Legislative Analyst states: “Prior Convictions. The measure would amend the State Constitution to require that information about prior felony convictions be used without limitation to discredit the testimony of a witness, including that of a defendant. Under current law, such information may be used only under limited circumstances.” (Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends, to Cal. Const., with analysis by the Legislative Analyst, Primary Elec. (June 8, 1982) p. 54.) [] [R]elevancy is neither specifically excluded by, nor incompatible with, the amendment’s analysis. Prior felony convictions are to be used to discredit the testimony of the witness, not to discredit the general character of the witness. Proof the witness is a “bad guy” is not evidence that he will lie under oath. Thus, the intended focus of impeachment is the credibility of the witness. The most logically consistent, assuredly accurate, and procedurally expedient way to challenge witness credibility is to present evidence discrediting the witness’s truthfulness. Felony convictions unrelated to truthfulness can support only irrelevant inferences and cannot further the stated purpose revealed in the voters’ pamphlet analysis.
Intent, however, can be best ascertained from the language of the constitutional amendment. (People v. Black (1982) 32 Cal.3d 1, 5 [184 Cal.Rptr. 454, 648 P.2d 104].) Courts must construe all provisions of a statute together, giving significance to every part in pursuance of the intended purpose. (Turner v. Board of Trustees (1976) 16 Cal.3d 818, 826 [129 Cal.Rptr. 443, 548 P.2d 1115].) In scrutinizing article I, section 28 in its entirety, we find the preamble, subdivision (a), promotes “a bill of rights for victims of crime” through “broad reforms in the procedural treatment of accused persons and the disposition and sentencing of convicted persons . . . .” This subdivision does not suggest these goals are to be effected through unrestrained admission of irrelevant and misleading prior conviction evidence. Subdivision (d), however, does specifically provide for a “right to truth-in-evidence.” It is highly significant that in ensuring this right, subdivision (d) provides, “relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction motions and hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether heard in juvenile or adult court.” (Italics added.) Harmonizing subdivisions (d) and (f), as we must, we find it highly improbable an elec*330torate seeking truth-in-evidence would require such evidence be relevant to the disputed issue, but in seeking the reform of impeachment, would find relevance to be unwanted or undesirable. An harmonious construction of the specific language of section 28 supports the survival of relevancy as a prerequisite to admitting prior felony convictions for impeachment.
This construction also finds support in other state courts construing similar impeachment laws.6 In People v. Montgomery (1971) 47 Ill.2d 510 [268 N.E.2d 695, 67 A.L.R.3d 816] the Illinois Supreme Court interpreted a statute stating: “ ‘No person shall be disqualified as a witness in any criminal case or proceeding ... by reason of his having been convicted of any crime; but such . . . conviction may be shown for the purpose of affecting his credibility . . . (Id., at p. 697; 111. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, par. 155-1 (1967).) Although the prosecution argued the trial court had no discretion to exclude a 20-year-old robbery conviction, the court determined relevance was fundamental to the admission of evidence and cited Wigmore for the proposition, “ ‘[n]one but facts having rational probative value are admissible.’” (People v. Montgomery, supra, at p. 697.) Similarly, the New Hampshire Supreme Court determined the trial court should exercise its discretionary powers and “should bear in mind that the use of prior convictions to show nothing more than a disposition to commit crime, or the crime currently charged, would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” (State v. Cote (1967) 108 N.H. 290 [235 A.2d 111, 116], cert. den. Cote v. New Hampshire (1968) 390 U.S. 1025 [20 L.Ed.2d 282, 88 S.Ct. 1412]), even though the controlling statute provided: “ ‘No person shall be incompetent to testify on account of his having been convicted of an infamous crime, but the record of such conviction may be used to affect his credit as a witness.’” (Id., at p. 115.) Even in State v. Driscoll (1972) 53 Wis.2d 699 [193 N.W.2d 851, 50 A.L.R.3d 554], a case cited for allowing impeachment by convictions not confined “to crimes having a relationship to the honesty or veracity of the witness” (81 Am.Jur.2d, Witnesses, § 571, p. 578), the Wisconsin Supreme Court mandated the balancing of relevancy against prejudice in admitting prior felony convictions for impeachment. (State v. Driscoll, supra, at pp. 857-858.)
Finally, we interpret subdivision (f) as we do to avoid conflict with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Established principles of *331judicial construction require California courts to adopt “an interpretation of a statutory provision which, ‘consistent with the statutory language and purpose, eliminates doubt as to the provision’s constitutionality’ [citation].” (People v. Amor (1974) 12 Cal.3d 20, 30 [114 Cal.Rptr. 765, 523 P.2d 1173].) In the present case, an interpretation of subdivision (f) allowing the unfettered admission of prior felony convictions for impeachment creates a significant constitutional problem.
Due process assures a criminal defendant a fundamentally fair trial. (Lisenba v. California (1941) 314 U.S. 219, 236 [86 L.Ed. 166, 179-180, 62 S.Ct. 280].) The control of evidence is central to this fairness. (Blackburn v. Alabama (1960) 361 U.S. 199, 206 [4 L.Ed.2d 242, 247-248, 80 S.Ct. 274].) In general, “[t]he function of legal process, as that concept is embodied in the Constitution, and in the realm of factfinding, is to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions. Because of the broad spectrum of concerns to which the term must apply, flexibility is necessary to gear the process to the particular need; the quantum and quality of the process due in a particular situation depend upon the need to serve the purpose of minimizing the risk of error.” (Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates (1979) 442 U.S. 1, 13 [60 L.Ed.2d 668, 679, 99 S.Ct. 2100].)
Although the United States Supreme Court has never determined the constitutionality of impeaching an accused with his prior felony convictions, the courts of California have found no due process infringements. (People v. Beagle, supra, 6 Cal.3d 441, 454; People v. Roberts (1966) 65 Cal.2d 514, 522 [55 Cal.Rptr. 412, 421 P.2d 420]; People v. Modesto (1965) 62 Cal.2d 436, 454 [42 Cal.Rptr. 417, 398 P.2d 753]; People v. Pike (1962) 58 Cal.2d 70, 93 [22 Cal.Rptr. 664, 372 P.2d 656]; People v. Harris (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 534, 538 [97 Cal.Rptr. 883]; People v. House (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 756, 763-764 [90 Cal.Rptr. 831], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Beagle, supra, 6 Cal.3d at pp. 451-452.) Early cases in this line addressed the potential and undue penalty suffered by a defendant testifying as a witness in his own behalf when prior felony convictions were introduced for impeachment. These courts found no violations under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and generally held: “[t]he defendant must weigh the danger of impeachment by the introduction of prior convictions for every witness he calls for the defense. ‘The fact that the witness may also be the defendant makes the choice more difficult but a denial of due process does not emerge from the circumstances.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Modesto, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 454.)
However, since 1967 the California courts have relied heavily on Spencer v. Texas (1967) 385 U.S. 554 [17 L.Ed.2d 606, 87 S.Ct. 648], for consti*332tutional analysis of impeachment questions. (See People v. House, supra, 12 Cal.App.3d 756, 763-764.) In Spencer, the Supreme Court faced the question of whether the use of prior felony convictions in a single-stage recidivist proceeding violated the due process clause. In finding the recidivist proceeding constitutionally firm, the Supreme Court analogized to the use of prior convictions for impeachment. The court suggested the potential prejudice of impeachment evidence is acceptable when it is “particularly probative” of a defendant’s credibility and “[t]he defendant’s interests are protected by limiting instructions [citation] and by the discretion residing with the trial judge to limit or forbid the admission of particularly prejudicial evidence even though admissible under an accepted rule of evidence.” (Spencer v. Texas, supra, 385 U.S. at pp. 560-561 [17 L.Ed.2d at pp. 612-613], italics added.) Though dictum, the Supreme Court’s statement reemphasizes the need to control evidence to assure a fundamentally fair trial.
The People’s position also finds no support in a hypothetical application of the specific test in Spencer. In its holding, the court stated: “In the face of the legitimate state purpose and the long-standing and widespread use that attend the procedure under attack here, we find it impossible to say that because of the possibility of some collateral prejudice the Texas procedure is rendered unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause as it has been interpreted and applied in our past cases.” (Spencer v. Texas, supra, 385 U.S. at p. 564 [17 L.Ed.2d at p. 614].) Although Spencer did not specify the particular state interest at issue (see id., at p. 570 [17 L.Ed.2d at pp. 617-618] (dis. opn. of Warren, C. J.)), we perceive of no legitimate state interest furthered by the uncontrolled admission of irrelevant and prejudicial prior felony convictions. (See generally, Mendez, California’s New Law on Character Evidence: Evidence Code Section 352 and the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies (1984) 31 UCLA L.Rev. 1003.) To require prior convictions be relevant to credibility places no greater burden on impeachment evidence than any other type of evidence. Further, as stated by Chief Justice Warren in his dissent in Spencer: “While this Court has never held that the use of prior convictions to show nothing more than a disposition to commit crime would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, our decisions exercising supervisory power over criminal trials in federal courts, as well as decisions by courts of appeals and of state courts, suggest that evidence of prior crimes introduced for no purpose other than to show criminal disposition would violate the Due Process Clause.” (Spencer v. Texas, supra, 385 U.S. at pp. 572-574 [17 L.Ed.2d at pp. 619-620], fns. omitted.) [End of adopted quote from opn. by Work, J.]
II.
In adopting moral turpitude as the standard for determining which felonies are admissible to impeach the credibility of a witness, the majority create *333enormous problems for our trial courts. Rather than providing clear guidance, the majority promulgate a rule which is guaranteed to have no certainty of application.
This court has recognized that “moral turpitude” is an “elusive concept incapable of precise general definition.” (In re Higbie (1972) 6 Cal.3d 562, 569 [99 Cal.Rptr. 865, 493 P.2d 97].) That it is “elusive” is evident from its various judicial definitions.
“One dramatic exposition of the term was rendered by this court in 1938, and has since been consistently followed: ‘an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man.’ (In re Craig (1938) 12 Cal.2d 93, 97 [82 P.2d 442]; see also Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners (1968) 68 Cal.2d 67, 73 [64 Cal.Rptr. 785, 435 P.2d 553]; In re Boyd (1957) 48 Cal.2d 69, 70 [307 P.2d 625].)” (In re Higbie, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 569.)
“Moral turpitude has also been described as any crime or misconduct committed without excuse (In re Hallinan (1954) 43 Cal.2d 243, 251 [272 P.2d 768]; In re Rothrock (1940) 16 Cal.2d 449, 453 [106 P.2d 907, 131 A.L.R. 226]), or as any ‘dishonest or immoral’ act, not necessarily a crime. [Citation.]” (In re Higbie, supra, 6 Cal.3d at pp. 569-570.)
It has also been defined as “ ‘everything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.’ [Citations.]” (In re McAllister (1939) 14 Cal.2d 602, 603 [95 P.2d 932]; In re Hatch (1937) 10 Cal.2d 147, 150 [73 P.2d 885].) In short, ‘“[t]here is no hard and fast rule as to what constitutes moral turpitude.’” (Id., at p. 151.)
It is clear from the various definitions that the term “moral turpitude” lacks legal precision. As one commentator stated, “[¡judicial definitions of moral turpitude are so imprecise that it is only a matter of conjecture whether a particular crime involves it.” (Note, Entrance and Disciplinary Requirements for Occupational Licenses in California (1962) 14 Stan. L.Rev. 533, 542.) Other commentators and courts have also exposed and condemned the uncertainty of the phrase “moral turpitude.”1 (Morrison v. *334State Board of Education (1969) 1 Cal.3d 214, 231 [82 Cal.Rptr. 175, 461 P.2d 375].)
Such an imprecise standard will cause confusion among the trial courts. Moreover, trial judges will apply their own personal views as to the mores of the community2 in deciding whether an offense involves moral turpitude. (See United States v. Zimmerman, supra, 71 F.Supp. at p. 537.) This will inevitably lead to inconsistent results and will require the reversal of many convictions.
The experience of one of our sister states should be a lesson for this court. Although Connecticut employed the moral turpitude standard in this context for 45 years, that state eventually abandoned it because of the “uncertainty in the meaning and application of the phrase ‘moral turpitude’ . . . .” (Heating Acceptance Corporation v. Patterson (1965) 152 Conn. 467 [208 A.2d 341, 343-344].) The Connecticut court noted that the trial courts in that state had encountered considerable difficulty in ruling on the admissibility of prior convictions where the presence or absence of moral turpitude had to be determined. “[A] definite rule, of certain application, would eliminate problems and difficulties at the trial level, on the part of both court and counsel, which in turn lead to mistakes and costly appellate procedure, if not to actual injustice.” (Id., at p. 343.)
By adopting the moral turpitude standard, the majority are incorporating into the criminal law, vast bodies of noncriminal law where different applications of the term have been made.3 In my view, the court has not considered the full implications of their actions. The following list of cases is a small sample4 of the vast case law that this court unwittingly is incorporating into the criminal law: Montag v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 721 [186 Cal.Rptr. 894, 652 P.2d 1370] (attorney discipline); In re Schwartz (1982) 31 Cal.3d 395 [182 Cal.Rptr. 640, 644 P.2d 833, 26 A.L.R.4th 1077]; Ambrose v. State Bar (1982) 31 Cal.3d 184 [181 Cal.Rptr. 903, 643 P.2d 486]; In re Rohan (1978) 21 Cal.3d 195 [145 Cal.Rptr. 855, 578 P.2d 102]; *335In re Calaway (1977) 20 Cal.3d 165 [141 Cal.Rptr. 805, 570 P.2d 1223]; In re Kristovich (1976) 18 Cal.3d 468 [134 Cal.Rptr. 409, 556 P.2d 771]; In re Hurwitz (1976) 17 Cal.3d 562 [131 Cal.Rptr. 402, 551 P.2d 1234]; In re Duggan (1976) 17 Cal.3d 416 [130 Cal.Rptr. 715, 551 P.2d 19]; In re Kirschke (1976) 16 Cal.3d 902 [129 Cal.Rptr. 780, 549 P.2d 548]; In re Honoroff (1975) 15 Cal.3d 755 [126 Cal.Rptr. 229, 543 P.2d 597]; In re Waisbren (1975) 15 Cal.3d 553 [125 Cal.Rptr. 479, 542 P.2d 639]; In re Lyons (1975) 15 Cal.3d 322 [124 Cal.Rptr. 171, 540 P.2d 11]; In re Kreamer (1975) 14 Cal.3d 524 [121 Cal.Rptr. 600, 535 P.2d 728]; In re Silverton (1975) 14 Cal.3d 517 [121 Cal.Rptr. 596, 535 P.2d 724]; In re Distefano (1975) 13 Cal.3d 476 [119 Cal.Rptr. 105, 531 P.2d 417]; In re Hanley (1975) 13 Cal.3d 448 [119 Cal.Rptr. 5, 530 P.2d 1381]; In re Cohen (1974) 11 Cal.3d 416 [113 Cal.Rptr. 485, 521 P.2d 477]; In re Wright (1973) 10 Cal.3d 374 [110 Cal.Rptr. 348, 515 P.2d 292]; In re Bogart (1973) 9 Cal.3d 743 [108 Cal.Rptr. 815, 511 P.2d 1167]; In re Fahey, supra, 8 Cal.3d 842; In re Higbie, supra, 6 Cal.3d 562; In re Plotner (1971) 5 Cal.3d 714 [97 Cal.Rptr. 193, 488 P.2d 385]; In re Jones (1971) 5 Cal.3d 390 [96 Cal.Rptr. 448, 487 P.2d 1016]; In re Langford (1966) 64 Cal.2d 489 [50 Cal.Rptr. 661, 413 P.2d 437]; In re Boyd (1957) 48 Cal.2d 69 [307 P.2d 625]; In re Hallinan (1957) 48 Cal.2d 52 [307 P.2d 1]; In re Hallinan (1954) 43 Cal.2d 243 [272 P.2d 768]; In re Rothrock (1940) 16 Cal.2d 449 [106 P.2d 907, 131 A.L.R. 226]; Stanford v. The State Bar of California (1940) 15 Cal.2d 721 [104 P.2d 635]; In re McAllister, supra, 14 Cal.2d 602; In re Craig (1938) 12 Cal.2d 93 [82 P.2d 442]; In re Hatch, supra, 10 Cal.2d 147; Jacobs v. The State Bar (1933) 219 Cal. 59 [25 P.2d 401]; Cartwright v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners (1976) 16 Cal.3d 762 [129 Cal.Rptr. 462, 548 P.2d 1134] (revocation of chiropractor’s license); Hartman v. Board of Chiropractic, etc. (1937) 20 Cal.App.2d 76 [66 P.2d 705]; Morrison v. State Board of Education, supra, 1 Cal.3d 214 (revocation of teacher’s certificates); Board of Trustees v. Judge (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 920 [123 Cal.Rptr. 830]; Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners (1968) 68 Cal.2d 67 [64 Cal.Rptr. 785, 435 P.2d 553] (revocation of medical doctor’s license); Matanky v. Board of Medical Examiners (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 293 [144 Cal.Rptr. 826]; Cadilla v. Board of Medical Examiners (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 961 [103 Cal.Rptr. 455]; Morris v. Board of Medical Examiners (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 704 [41 Cal.Rptr. 351, 12 A.L.R.3d 1301]; Bernstein v. Board of Medical Examiners (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 378 [22 Cal.Rptr. 419]; Hollingsworth v. Board of Medical Examiners (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 172 [10 Cal.Rptr. 343]; Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners (1966) 65 Cal.2d 447 [55 Cal.Rptr. 228, 421 P.2d 76] (certification of bar admittee); Thorpe v. Board of Examiners (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 111 [163 Cal.Rptr. 382, 8 A.L.R.4th 216] (revocation of license to practice veterinary medicine); Golde v. Fox (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 167 [159 Cal.Rptr. 864] (revocation of real estate broker’s license); Jennings v. *336Karpe (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 709 [111 Cal.Rptr. 776]; Ring v. Smith (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 197 [85 Cal.Rptr. 227]; Watkins v. Real Estate Commissioner (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 397 [6 Cal.Rptr. 191]; Otash v. Bureau of Private Investigators (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 568 [41 Cal.Rptr. 263] (revocation of private investigator’s license); Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Bd. (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 30 [152 Cal.Rptr. 285] (revocation of on-sale general liquor license).
The trial courts need clear guidance as to which felonies are admissible to impeach the credibility of a witness. Today’s decision not only lacks that clarity but is an open-ended invitation to judicial chaos.
Reynoso, J., concurred.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied April 18, 1985. Bird, C. J., and Lucas, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

 Brackets together, in this manner [], are used to indicate deletions from the opinion of the Court of Appeal; double brackets enclosing material are used to denote additions. (See Conservatorship of Early (1983) 35 Cal.3d 244, 247 [197 Cal.Rptr. 539, 673 P.2d 209].)

All statutory references are to the Evidence Code unless otherwise specified.

Section 788 states: “For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, it may be shown by the examination of the witness or by the record of the judgment that he has been convicted of a felony unless:
“(a) A pardon based on his innocence has been granted to the witness by the jurisdiction in which he was convicted.
“(b) A certificate of rehabilitation and pardon has been granted to the witness under the provisions of Chapter 3.5 (commencing with Section 4852.01) of Title 6 of Part 3 of the Penal Code.
“(c) The accusatory pleading against the witness has been dismissed under the provisions of Penal Code Section 1203.4, but this exception does not apply to any criminal trial where the witness is being prosecuted for a subsequent offense.
“(d) The conviction was under the laws of another jurisdiction and the witness has been relieved of the penalties and disabilities arising from the conviction pursuant to a procedure substantially equivalent to that referred to in subdivision (b) or (c).”

The standard dictionary definition of “impeach” also comports with the language of section 780. Illustrative is the entry in Webster’s New World Dictionary (2d college ed. 1982) at page 703: “1. to challenge or discredit... 2. to challenge the practices or honesty of . . . .” (Italics added.)

As Wigmore eloquently states: “From the point of view of modern psychology, the moral disposition which tends for or against falsehood is an elusive quality. Its intermittent operation in connection with other tendencies, and the difficulty of ascertaining its quality and force, make it by no means -a feature peculiarly reliable in the diagnosis of testimonial credit.” (3A Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970) § 922, p. 725, fn. omitted.)

The Federal Rules of Evidence expressly incorporate relevancy as a threshold test in admitting prior convictions to impeach. Rule 609(a) [(28 U.S.C.)] provides: “For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment. ”

United States v. Zimmerman (E.D.Pa. 1947) 71 F.Supp. 534, 537 (The term moral turpitude “has never been clearly or certainly defined” and is “lacking in legal precision.”); Jordan v. De George (1951) 341 U.S. 223, 235 [95 L.Ed. 886, 894, 71 S.Ct. 703, 710] (dis. opn. of Jackson, J.) (“[T]here appears to be universal recognition that [moral turpitude is] an undefined and undefinable standard.”); Note, Administrative Law: Professional and Occupational Licensing: Standard of Conduct for Administrative License Revocation (1956) 44 Cal.L.Rev. 403, 406 (Moral turpitude is “so ill-defined as to be almost devoid of any predictability as to what is or is not moral turpitude.”); Bradway, Moral Turpitude as the Criterion of Offenses that Justify Disbarment (1935) 24 Cal.L.Rev. 9, 19 (The term moral *334turpitude has a “vague, nebulous, discretionary meaning.”); Note, supra, 14 Stan. L.Rev. at page 542 (The moral turpitude standard is “uninformative and vague.”); see also Shapiro, Morals and the Courts: The Reluctant Crusaders (1961) 45 Minn. L.Rev. 897, 936-938.

It is well established that “ ‘ “[t]he concept of moral turpitude depends upon the state of public morals, and may vary according to the community or the times . . . (In re Higbie, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 570; In re Fahey (1973) 8 Cal.3d 842, 849 [106 Cal.Rptr. 313, 505 P.2d 1369, 63 A.L.R.3d 465].)

The term moral turpitude “constitute^] only [a] lingual abstraction!] until applied to a specific occupation and given content by reference to fitness for the performance of that vocation.” (Morrison v. State Board of Education, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 239.) Since the meaning of that term depends upon, and thus relates to, the occupation involved (id., at 227), different result.

A Lexis search of the term “moral turpitude” reveals over 550 cases.