Court Opinion

ID: 9905734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 00:03:52.140438+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:52.182898
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/29/23 P. v. Sanchez CA4/2
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      E080429

 v.                                                                      (Super.Ct.No. FWV22001920)

 ANGEL REY SANCHEZ,                                                      OPINION

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Corey G. Lee,

Judge. Affirmed.

         Ellen M. Matsumoto, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant

and Appellant.

         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Heather B. Arabarri and Steve

Oetting, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                                             1
       Angel Rey Sanchez argues his trial counsel provided him with ineffective

assistance by agreeing to a response the trial court provided to a jury question. He was

charged with two counts reflecting two acts of assault by means of force likely to cause

great bodily injury when attacking his estranged biological mother. As argued, the first

was punching and kicking her on a landing outside her apartment, and the second was

pushing her down the nearby stairs after she stood up and pointed a knife at him. The jury

asked the court to “specify the two 2 counts” and whether “specific evidence pertain[ed]

to one charge vs. the other.” With the agreement of counsel, the trial court concluded the

prosecution had clearly distinguished the two acts and responded to the jury by saying

only that the two counts pertain to two different acts.

       We conclude Sanchez’s claim fails for several reasons. The response to the jury’s

inquiry was legally correct. There was an evident reasonable tactical basis for agreeing to

it. And it is not reasonably probable the jury would have reached a more favorable result

if the trial court had reiterated the prosecution’s election as to which acts applied to

which count in its response. We therefore affirm the judgment.

                                               I

                                           FACTS

       This case involves a violent episode that led to Sanchez’s conviction by a jury on

two counts of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. (Pen. Code,

§ 245, subd. (a)(4); unlabeled statutory citations refer to this code.)

                                               2
       The victim was Sanchez’s biological mother, T.E., who had lost custody of

Sanchez many years earlier, when he was around five- to seven-years old. Sanchez and

T.E. had a limited relationship.

       On June 5, 2022, Sanchez went to T.E.’s apartment on Valley Boulevard in

Bloomington. There, Sanchez began drinking alcohol and became heavily intoxicated and

threw up inside her apartment. T.E. said she felt Sanchez was disrespecting her home and

feared his conduct would disturb her neighbors and cause her to lose her housing.

       T.E. opened her front door and told Sanchez to leave. Sanchez threatened to attack

her and then ran forward and pushed T.E. through the door to the landing outside her

apartment. T.E. dropped to the ground to protect her body, and Sanchez began punching

and kicking her. After T.E. stood up, Sanchez threw or pushed her down the stairs, and

she rolled to the bottom.

       T.E. testified that she kept a knife in the apartment to protect herself and was

holding it during the assault. She said she did not use the knife against Sanchez, but she

pointed it at him before he threw her down the stairs. She said she got up and went back

up the stairs to prevent Sanchez, who was still at the top, from going back into her home.

She said she still had the knife in her hand at that point. Sanchez told her he would leave

if she gave him the knife, which she did, and he left.

       T.E. called 911 and reported the assault. A San Bernardino deputy sheriff

responded to the call and found Sanchez face down on a sidewalk outside the apartment

building. The deputy said Sanchez was covered in vomit and appeared heavily

                                             3
intoxicated. Sanchez had scrapes on his back and finger and a cut on his nose. The deputy

said Sanchez appeared to be disoriented, unable to answer questions, and in and out of

consciousness. The deputy found T.E. “severely injured with multiple bumps, bruises,

scratches all over her face and her body.” A hospital examination found she had bruising

and abrasions on her face, hands, and back.

       Sanchez testified and denied assaulting T.E. He said he went to her house because

he had been in a homeless shelter and had a job interview. He wanted a place to shower

and help buying some clothes. T.E. gave him money, and they went to a liquor store

where he bought a pint of cinnamon-flavored whiskey and clothes. He said drinking that

amount normally would put him to sleep, but instead it put him into a state he had never

experienced before. He said he passed out and woke with a cut on his finger and marks

on his face. He said he believed T.E. had laced his drink. Sanchez admitted he did not

have a good relationship with his mother but said he would never assault her.

       In instructing the jury, the trial court used CALCRIM No. 875 for the assault in

count one and CALCRIM No. 875.1 for the assault in count two. As to the first count, the

court instructed the jury, “The defendant is charged in Count One with assault with force

likely to produce great bodily injury in violation of Penal Code section 245. [¶] To prove

that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that: [¶] . . . The

defendant did an act that by its nature would directly and probably result in the

application of force to a person, and [¶] . . . The force used was likely to produce great

bodily injury; [¶] . . . The defendant did that act willfully; [¶] . . . When the defendant

                                               4
acted, he was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that his act by

its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to someone; [¶]

AND [¶] . . . When the defendant acted, he had the present ability to apply force likely to

produce great bodily injury to a person.” The instruction for count two was identical but

added a fifth element—that “[t]he defendant did not act in self-defense.” The court also

instructed that simple assault is a lesser included offense for each count and reiterated

that the defense of self-defense applied only to count two. No instruction specified what

acts related to each count.

       In closing arguments, the prosecution elected Sanchez’s punching and kicking

T.E. as the assault for count one and the act of throwing T.E. down the stairs as the

assault for count two. As to count one, the prosecutor said the evidence was that Sanchez

“began to beat her. He kicked her. He punched her. . . . [¶] Therefore, that’s the act. The

kicking, the punching, that by its very nature would directly and probably result in force.”

As to count two, the prosecutor said, “[W]hat is Count 2? Count 2, you are going to be

presented with your packet that includes 875.1. It adds one additional element. The

defendant did not act in self-defense. . . . [¶] Count 2 is the stairs. . . . after Count 1, after

kicking her, after punching her, at some point they got up, and he lifted her up, and he

threw her down the stairs.” The prosecution also distinguished the two counts by arguing

T.E.’s knife never came out before count 1 and therefore, Sanchez’s self-defense claim

applied only to count 2.

                                                 5
       Defense counsel made the same distinction in her closing argument. Speaking of

inconsistencies in T.E.’s testimony, counsel said, “She says that the first part of what

happened, Count 1, is that Mr. Sanchez kicks and punches her. But her injuries don’t

quite line up with that; right? . . . [¶] Her injuries are consistent with falling down the

stairs and scraping. How many times did we hear about scraping? . . . So her injuries are

consistent with being pushed down the stairs. But there is no evidence whatsoever with

the Count 1 allegation, which is the kicking and punching. Remember, there’s two

different counts. Count 1 we have the initial kicking and the punching, and Count 2 is

pushing down the stairs.” Defense counsel similarly clarified that on “the allegation of

kicking and punching, we’re not claiming self-defense. But the allegation of pushing

down the stairs, we are claiming self-defense.”

       In argument, defense counsel questioned why there were two separate counts.

“Now, why are there two counts? Okay. This is a question that you should ask

yourselves. Why? Why did the People charge this as two separate counts, and where do

we draw the line? Why not charge him with one charge for kicking, and one count for

punching, and one count for pushing? Why not just charge him with five or ten counts? If

you believe it is excessively charged, that can be your determination as a jury. This is one

continuing line of conduct.” The prosecution objected that this argument misstated the

law, and the parties had an unreported bench conference, after which defense counsel

moved on to another topic. The court later put on the record that it had sustained the

                                               6
objection because it was improper to ask jurors to consider charging decisions, which are

not evidence.

       Early in their deliberations, the jury asked the court to “Please specify the 2

counts. Is specific evidence pertaining to one charge vs. the other[?]”The trial court

discussed possible responses with the prosecutor and an attorney standing in for

defendant’s trial counsel. The trial court included defendant’s trial counsel by telephone.

The parties agreed not to “clarify that one charge was kicking and punching versus the

second charge related to the stairwell incident” because “it was pretty clear during

closing arguments that Count 1 was pertaining to the kicking and punching, and Count 2

was pertaining to the stairwell incident.” Instead, the court decided to say only, “ ‘Counts

1 and 2 pertain to two different acts.’ Leave it at that, and send it back.”

       After receiving this answer, the jury requested a read-back of T.E.’s testimony

leading up to the point where she was questioned about the knife. The jury then asked for

a read-back of Sanchez’s testimony. When those read-backs were completed, the jury

asked, “Where did [T.E.] testify to being located before she was pushed/thrown down the

stairs. She answered numerous times.” The court responded by referring the jury to the

second paragraph of CALCRIM No. 200, which instructs, “You must decide what the

facts are. It is up to all of you, and you alone, to decide what happened, based only on the

evidence that has been presented to you in this trial.” The jury responded by requesting a

read-back of T.E.’s testimony about her location before being thrown down the stairs.

Ten minutes after that read-back, the jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts.

                                              7
       The trial court sentenced Sanchez to a total state prison term of four years—a

middle term three-year sentence on count one and a consecutive one-year sentence (one-

third the middle term) on count two.

                                             II

                                        ANALYSIS

       Sanchez’s ineffective assistance of counsel argument is viable only if the trial

court gave an insufficient answer to the jury’s request that he claims counsel should not

have agreed to. The jury asked the trial court to “specify the 2 counts” and instruct
                                                                              1
whether there “[i]s specific evidence pertaining to one charge vs. the other.” Sanchez

argues the court’s answer that the two counts “pertain to two different acts,” allowed the

jury to find him guilty of both counts based on only the acts of punching and kicking. He

says the court should have confirmed the prosecution’s closing-argument election that

count one related to his acts of punching and kicking while count two related to his act of

pushing or throwing the victim down the stairs. However, it is generally sufficient for the

prosecution to “make an election by ‘tying each specific count to specific criminal acts

elicited from the victim’s testimony—typically in opening statement and/or closing

argument.” (People v. Brown (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 332, 341 (Brown).)

       1 Sanchez concedes that because his trial attorney agreed to the trial court’s
answer, he has forfeited a direct challenge to the trial court’s decision on appeal. (People
v. Thornton (2007) 41 Cal.4th 391, 427; see also (People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th
1269, 1317 [invited error by proposing an answer the court gave the jury.]. He therefore
focuses his claim on ineffective assistance.

                                             8
       To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Sanchez must show (1) deficient

performance by trial counsel that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness

under prevailing professional norms, and (2) a reasonable probability he would have

obtained a more favorable result but for his trial counsel’s alleged deficient performance.

(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-688.)

       In deciding whether performance was deficient, we “give great deference to

counsel’s tactical decisions.” (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 703.) Where the

record does not show why counsel acted or failed to act in a certain way, we will reject

the claim “unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or

unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23

Cal.4th 978, 1069.) Here, the record does not disclose trial counsel’s basis for agreeing to

the response to the jury question, though the trial court indicated agreement with its

rationale that the prosecution’s election in closing argument was sufficient for the jury.

       With these standards in mind, we conclude Sanchez’s ineffective assistance claim

fails for several reasons. First, he cannot show his counsel’s agreement with the trial

court fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. When a jury sends out a

question, the court is presented with the statutory obligation “to provide the jury with

information the jury desires on points of law.” (People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936,

985.) Under “section 1138 the court must attempt ‘to clear up any instructional confusion

expressed by the jury.’ ” (People v. Giardino (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 454, 465.) “This

means the trial ‘court has a primary duty to help the jury understand the legal principles it

                                              9
is asked to apply. [Citation.] This does not mean the court must always elaborate on the

standard instructions. Where the original instructions are themselves full and complete,

the court has discretion under section 1138 to determine what additional explanations are

sufficient to satisfy the jury’s request for information. [Citation.] Indeed, comments

diverging from the standard are often risky.’ ” (People v. Solis (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th

1002, 1015, quoting People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 97, italics added.) Sanchez

argues the jury’s inquiry revealed confusion about the prosecution’s election, which the

trial court was required to clear up in its response.

       There is no requirement that the trial court build a prosecutor’s election into jury

instructions. In People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, our Supreme Court explained that

where the evidence discloses more acts than offenses charged, “[e]ither the prosecutor

must select the acts relied on to prove the charges, or the jury must be given an

instruction that it must unanimously agree beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

committed the same specific criminal act.” (Id. at p. 307.) This holding has come to be

known as the “ ‘either/or’ rule.” (People v. Gear (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 86, 90.) If the

prosecution had not made an election in this case, the trial court would have been

required to tell the jury that each juror must agree on the act or acts which constitute each

offense. (People v. Hawkins (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1454-1455.) Such an

instruction would have precluded the jury from convicting Sanchez under different

factual theories. But no such protection is necessary when the prosecutor in “argument

elect[s] what conduct by defendant amount[s] to the crime charged.” (Id. at p. 1455.)

                                              10
       Here, the prosecution made an election, so no unanimity instruction was required,

and the instructions were proper. Indeed, the closing arguments of both the prosecution

and the defense left no room for doubt that the focus of count one was Sanchez’s

punching and kicking T.E., whereas the focus of count two was his pushing or throwing

her down the stairs. In closing argument, the prosecutor said of count one “that’s the act.

The kicking, the punching,” and said of count two “after Count 1, after kicking her, after

punching her, at some point they got up, and he lifted her up, and he threw her down the

stairs.” Defense counsel reiterated the distinction in the same terms. “Count 1 we have

the initial kicking and the punching, and Count 2 is pushing down the stairs.”

       In addition, the inclusion of a self-defense element only as to count two, and the

argument about that element, further made clear which acts related to which counts. The

prosecution argued the self-defense claim applied only to count two because T.E. testified

that she showed Sanchez the knife after the punching and kicking incident. Defense

counsel agreed, arguing that on “the allegation of kicking and punching, we’re not

claiming self-defense. But the allegation of pushing down the stairs, we are claiming self-

defense.” (See People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 629 [“[T]he prosecutor’s

election could not have been more clear. She twice informed the jury, in simple language,

that count 5 was based on the incident in which Brugman held a gun to C.’s head and said

he would ‘smoke’ her. Consistently, the only evidence the prosecutor discussed in

arguing that the elements of that count were established was the evidence relating to that

same incident”].) Since the prosecution made an election that was so clearly presented,

                                            11
we conclude the instructions to the jury were full and complete and complied with the

either/or rule.

       Sanchez argues the jury’s request that the court “specify the 2 counts” and indicate

whether “specific evidence pertain[ed] to one charge vs. the other” shows they were

confused about the election. Assuming the jury was asking the court to clarify the

election (rather than direct them to evidence relevant to each act, which would not have

been appropriate) we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining

that no such clarification was necessary. The trial court stated: “So after discussing

whether we should clarify that one charge was kicking and punching versus the second

charge related to the stairwell incident, we contemplated basically being that specific. But

after further discussion and also communication with [trial counsel by phone], the

Court’s view is that it was pretty clear during closing arguments that Count 1 was

pertaining to the kicking and punching, and Count 2 was pertaining to the stairwell

incident. [¶] Because it was pretty clear at this point, the Court is suggesting just

language that says Counts 1 and 2 pertain to two different acts. And then see what other

questions they come up with.” In short, the trial court—and the parties—concluded the

election was so clear in specifying the two acts forming the basis of the two counts that

no clarification was required. However, the trial court answered in a way that specifed

Sanchez could not be convicted on both counts for the same act. We conclude this

decision by the trial court was well supported and it was not an abuse of discretion to

decline to offer further clarification of the election.

                                               12
       For the same reason, we conclude Sanchez’s trial counsel did not perform in an

objectively unreasonable fashion by agreeing to that response. The instructions as given

were compliant with the law because the prosecution made such a clearly demarcated

distinction between the acts. The court was not required to reiterate the election and,

because the election was so clear, reiterating it was unnecessary. Trial counsel did not

perform deficiently by either suggesting or agreeing to a response that was so reasonable

under the facts of the case.

       Sanchez’s reliance on People v. Loza (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 332 is misplaced. In

that case, a husband and wife were tried together for murder. (Id. at pp. 337-340.) The

trial court instructed the jury with a standard instruction that an aider and abettor was

“equally guilty” as the perpetrator. The jury sought clarification about whether an aider

and abettor could have a less culpable state of mind, yet the court simply referred the jury

to the instructions. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal held that the wife’s attorney was

ineffective in failing to object to the “equally guilty” language in the instruction and in

failing to object to the court’s response to the jury instruction. (Id. at pp. 349-350, 355-

356.) The instruction was misleading because an aider and abettor can be guilty of a

greater or lesser crime than a perpetrator, and there was evidence from which the jury

could have concluded the wife and husband had different mental states. (Id. at pp. 350,

354-355.) So defense counsel was ineffective in failing to seek a modification of the

instruction and in failing to object to the response to the jury’s inquiry. (Id. at p. 355.)

                                              13
       The difference from the facts of this case is stark. Here, Sanchez has identified no

error in the jury instructions, the prosecution’s election of which acts related to the two

counts was unambiguous and reiterated by defense counsel during argument, and the

response to the jury’s inquiry did not direct the jury to an erroneous or confusing

instruction. We see no basis in Loza for concluding the trial court abused its discretion by

deciding not to expressly include the prosecution’s election in its instructions to the jury

or that trial counsel performed deficiently by proposing or acquiescing to the response.

       Even if trial counsel could be found ineffective for agreeing to a reasonable and

legally sufficient response to a jury inquiry, Sanchez has not established his trial counsel

had no tactical purpose. Sanchez and the People dispute whether counsel reasonably

could have agreed to the response in the hopes that it would lead the jury to decide the

prosecution had overcharged Sanchez and refuse to convict on two counts. We think a

more obvious strategy was in play—counsel understood the distinction was so clear that

reiterating it was not important, but thought there was some risk the jury would think it

could convict Sanchez on both counts based on only one of the two acts. The court stated

that the parties agreed not to clarify the acts because “it was pretty clear during closing

arguments” and agreed to limit the answer to informing them that the two counts pertain

to two different acts. Pressing to clarify that the jury could not convict Sanchez on two

counts of assault based on only one of the two identified acts is a conceivable strategy,

which on direct appeal is enough to defeat a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

(People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1069.)

                                             14
       We also conclude for similar reasons that Sanchez did not show prejudice. It is not

reasonably probable he would have obtained a more favorable result but for his trial

counsel’s failure to request a clarifying statement from the court to support the

prosecution’s election. His argument turns on speculation that the jury ignored the

election and found him guilty of one count of assault for punching T.E. and a second

count of assault for kicking her. We conclude the attorneys in the case were too precise in

specifying that the punching and kicking were a single act related to count one for it to be

reasonably probable the jury could so misunderstand or would misapply what it had been

told. (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 341 [“there is an implicit presumption that the

jury will rely on the prosecution’s election and, indeed, is bound by it”].)

                                             III

                                      DISPOSITION

       We affirm the judgment.

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                                RAPHAEL
                                                                                            J.

We concur:

CODRINGTON
          Acting P. J.

FIELDS
                           J.

                                             15