Court Opinion

ID: 9646646
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:05:57.859685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:40.314575
License: Public Domain

on appellant’s motion for rehearing
DAVIDSON, Judge.
Appellant insists that we were in error in overruling his contention that racial discrimination was practiced against members of the Negro race in the selection and organization of the grand jury that returned the indictment in this case.
In deference to this insistence, we have again reviewed the *416testimony touching this question and remain convinced that a correct conclusion was reached originally.
We can but add to what we said originally the observation that in our opinion this record reflects that the grand jury commissioners, in drawing the instant grand jury, fairly and honestly performed the duties incumbent upon them not to discriminate against any race, nationality, creed, or class entitled to be given recognition or consideration in the drawing thereof.
It must be remembered that the guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment against discrimination in the organization of a grand jury is not limited or restricted to members of the different races but extends to and includes all classes and groups which, by reason of some special condition or fact situation, are established in the particular county or community. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S. 475, 98 L. Ed. 866, 74 S. Ct. 667.
It follows, therefore, that in the drawing and selection of a grand jury in this state all races, nationalities, and established classes are entitled to the same treatment and consideration in order that discrimination not be practiced against the members of any particular group or as between the several classes which are entitled to the same protection against discrimination.
Under the facts here presented, we are unable to arrive at the conclusion that members of the Negro race were discriminated against because of their race in the organization of the instant grand jury.
Appellant’s challenge of the correctness of our conclusion that that part of Art. 727a, Vernon’s C. C. P., which includes the “laws of the United States” has reference only to the act of Congress has given us much concern.
In support of his contention that Federal rules of criminal procedure are laws of the United States, appellant calls to our attention the fact that Congress conferred upon the United States Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules of procedure governing the trial of criminal cases in the Federal courts (Title 18, Sec. 3771, Chap. 237) and also that there is express Federal authority for the conclusion that a rule so promulgated under the power of and not vetoed by Congress has all the force and effect of a statute or law of the United States. Barkman v. Sanford, 162 F. 2d 592; Rattley v. Irelan, 197 F. 2d 585.
*417Upon further consideration, we have concluded that a determination of the question as to whether Federal rules of procedure are laws of the United States within the meaning of Art. 727a, Vernon’s C. C. P., is not necessary inasmuch as we have reached the conclusion that this case, under the facts presented, is governed by the rule announced by us in Dimery v. State, 156 Tex. Cr. R. 197, 240 S. W. 2d 293, to the effect that a failure to carry an accused before a magistrate vitiates a confession only when there is some casual connection between the failure to carry him before a magistrate and the making of the confession. We are unable to find from this record sufficient evidence to call for an application of the rule stated.
Accordingly, the facts before us do not warrant the conclusion that the confessions of appellant resulted from the failure of the arresting officer to carry him before a magistrate.
We remain convinced that reversible error is not reflected.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.