Court Opinion

ID: 9953445
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 06:07:28.110297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:55:08.392626
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                             COURT OF APPEALS

STATE TREASURER,                                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     March 21, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 363952
                                                                     Wayne Circuit Court
RANDALL RAAR #177223,                                                LC No. 22-009479-CZ

               Defendant-Appellant,

and

KRISANA RAAR and JPMORGAN CHASE
BANK,

               Defendants.

Before: O’BRIEN, P.J., and BORRELLO and HOOD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Defendant1 appeals as of right the trial court’s order appropriating and applying assets held
by defendant to reimburse the state of Michigan for the cost of defendant’s care while incarcerated,
pursuant to the State Correctional Facility Reimbursement Act (SCFRA), MCL 800.401 et seq.
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm.

       Following a hearing, the trial court granted plaintiff’s request under the SCFRA to
appropriate 90% of defendant’s assets, which included monthly pension payments and a joint bank
account, and apply those assets toward reimbursing the costs of defendant’s care during his
incarceration. On appeal, as in the trial court, defendant argues (1) that the application of the
SCFRA to him violated his right to equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment

1
 We use the term “defendant” to refer only to defendant Randall Raar because the other two named
defendants are not participants in this appeal.

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to the United States Constitution and (2) that he should have been granted the opportunity to
conduct discovery.

                                    I. EQUAL PROTECTION

        Regarding his Equal Protection claim, defendant argues that plaintiff intentionally and
unlawfully “targeted” his assets after learning that he had retained an attorney for purposes of
pursuing discretionary post-conviction relief. Defendant further argues that he was treated
differently from other similarly situated prisoners with assets who, unlike him, had not used their
assets to retain counsel to pursue post-conviction relief. Defendant maintains that the state
therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

        We review de novo the applicable constitutional and statutory issues implicated by
defendant’s Equal Protection claim. People v James, 326 Mich App 98, 103-104; 931 NW2d 50
(2018).

        “The equal protection clauses of the Michigan and United States constitutions provide that
no person shall be denied the equal protection of the law.” Lima Twp v Bateson, 302 Mich App
483, 503; 838 NW2d 898 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also US Const, Am
XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 2. Our Supreme Court has held that the Equal Protection Clauses of the
Michigan and United States constitutions are coextensive. Crego v Coleman, 463 Mich 248, 258;
615 NW2d 218 (2000). “The Equal Protection Clause requires that all persons similarly situated
be treated alike under the law.” Lima Twp, 302 Mich App at 503 (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “[L]egislation challenged on equal protection grounds is presumed constitutional and
the challenger has the burden to rebut that presumption.” Barrow v City of Detroit Election Comm,
301 Mich App 404, 419; 836 NW2d 498 (2013).

        Under the SCFRA, “[t]he state may recover the expenses incurred or to be incurred, or
both, by the state for the cost of care of the prisoner during the entire period or periods the person
is a prisoner in a state correctional facility.” MCL 800.404(8). Section 4(1) of the SCFRA
provides that the “attorney general may file a complaint in the circuit court for the county from
which a prisoner was sentenced, stating that the person is or has been a prisoner in a state
correctional facility, that there is good cause to believe that the prisoner has assets, and praying
that the assets be used to reimburse the state for the expenses incurred or to be incurred, or both,
by the state for the cost of care of the person as a prisoner.” MCL 800.404(1). “Upon the filing
of the complaint under subsection (1), the court shall issue an order to show cause why the prayer
of the complainant should not be granted.” MCL 800.404(2). Of crucial importance is MCL
800.404(3), which provides that “[a]t the time of the hearing on the complaint and order, if it
appears that the prisoner has any assets which ought to be subjected to the claim of the state under
this act, the court shall issue an order requiring any person, corporation, or other legal entity
possessed or having custody of those assets to appropriate and apply the assets or a portion thereof
toward reimbursing the state as provided for under this act.”

        Defendant in this case does not claim that the statute is facially invalid under the Equal
Protection Clause. See State Treasurer v Sprague, 284 Mich App 235, 244; 772 NW2d 452 (2009)
(observing that the Michigan Supreme Court has held that the SCFRA does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause because it applied equally to the class of all prisoners with “ ‘an estate’ ”),

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quoting Auditor General v Hall, 300 Mich 215, 225; 1 NW2d 516 (1942). Defendant instead
argues that the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause as applied to his factual situation.

        An as-applied equal-protection challenge requires the party challenging the statute to
“show both that (1) he ‘has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated,’
and (2) ‘there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.’ ” James, 326 Mich App at 106,
quoting Village of Willowbrook v Olech, 528 US 562, 564; 120 S Ct 1073; 145 L Ed 2d 1060
(2000). “To be considered similarly situated, the challenger and his comparators must be prima
facie identical in all relevant respects or directly comparable . . . in all material respects.” Lima
Twp, 302 Mich App at 503 (quotation marks and citations omitted; ellipsis in original). “A ‘class
of one’ may initiate an equal protection claim by alleging that he or she ‘has been intentionally
treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference
in treatment.’ ” Id., quoting Village of Willowbrook, 528 US at 564.2 However, if the challenger
“cannot establish that he was treated unequally in some material way, then there is no violation of
equal protection.” James, 326 Mich App at 106.

        A court’s evaluation of an equal protection challenge involves applying one of three
traditional levels of review: rational basis review, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. Crego,
463 Mich at 259; Barrow, 301 Mich App at 419-420, 419 n 7. “Traditionally, the rational basis
test applies where no suspect factors are present or where no fundamental right is implicated.”
Barrow, 301 Mich App at 419.3 Here, defendant concedes that no circumstances exist that would
warrant heightened scrutiny and that his claim is subject to rational basis review. “Under rational-
basis review, courts will uphold legislation as long as that legislation is rationally related to a
legitimate government purpose.” Crego, 463 Mich at 259. The test is highly deferential. Id. To
succeed in his claim, defendant “must negate every conceivable reason for the government’s
actions or show that the actions were motivated by animus or ill-will.” James, 326 Mich App at
106-107 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

        In this case, defendant alleges that he was treated differently from other prisoners with
assets because the SCFRA was enforced against him based on his use of assets to retain an attorney
to pursue post-conviction relief, while the SCFRA was not enforced against other prisoners with
assets who did not retain counsel. Hence, as defendant has framed his claim, he is similarly
situated to other prisoners with assets but plaintiff intentionally singled him out for different

2
 We recognize that “an as-applied claim can challenge more than just the [challenger’s] particular
case without seeking to strike the law in all its applications” and that a successful as-applied claim
would presumably become applicable to others in the same factual circumstances as the challenger.
James, 326 Mich App at 106 n 4.
3
  Suspect classifications that warrant strict scrutiny, which is the most heightened level of review,
include race, national origin, or ethnicity. Barrow, 301 Mich App at 420. Strict scrutiny also
applies when the statute interferes with a fundamental right. Id. Intermediate scrutiny “has been
applied to legislation creating classifications on such bases as illegitimacy and gender.” Crego,
463 Mich at 260.

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treatment by enforcing the SCFRA against him based on his use of his assets while plaintiff
simultaneously declined to enforce the SCFRA against other prisoners with assets.

        However, defendant has not provided any evidence of a single prisoner with known assets
who was excused from complying with the terms of the SCFRA regarding reimbursing the state
for the costs of the prisoner’s care during incarceration. Defendant asserts—without evidence—
that this has occurred but does not support his assertion with any allegation involving an actual
prisoner with known assets subject to the SCFRA. Accordingly, defendant has not met his burden
to establish that he was intentionally treated differently from other similarly situated individuals
and therefore cannot establish a violation of his right to equal protection. Lima Twp, 302 Mich
App at 503-504; James, 326 Mich App at 106.

                                        II. DISCOVERY

        Defendant also argues that he was wrongfully denied the opportunity to conduct discovery
related to plaintiff’s investigation, which he apparently believes would have provided evidence to
support his Equal Protection claim. However, defendant does not provide any offer of proof or
other legitimate basis for us to conclude that discovery would have stood a fair chance of
uncovering factual support for a finding that the SCFRA was not enforced against other prisoners
with assets pursuant to the terms of the act. As previously explained, without such evidence,
defendant cannot show that he was intentionally treated differently from other similarly situated
individuals and therefore cannot establish his claimed violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Accordingly, defendant has not shown on appeal that there was a fair chance that discovery would
have provided support for his defense against this SCFRA action. Dismissal of the action “is not
premature if the discovery does not stand a fair chance of uncovering factual support” to oppose
dismissal. State Treasurer v Sheko, 218 Mich App 185, 190; 553 NW2d 654 (1996). Defendant
has not demonstrated error requiring reversal on this ground.

       Affirmed. Plaintiff having prevailed may tax costs. MCR 7.219(A).

                                                             /s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
                                                             /s/ Stephen L. Borrello
                                                             /s/ Noah P. Hood

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