Court Opinion

ID: 9525590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:05:18.720817+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:15:45.273320
License: Public Domain

LEWIS, P.J. dissenting: “The world is weary of the past, Oh, might it die or rest at last!” Shelley: Final chorus from Hellas. I respectfully dissent. I thought that the United States Congress had amended the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) in 1939 (53 Stat. 1404) to read that an “employee shall not be held to have assumed the risks of his employment.” (45 U.S.C.A. §54 (1986).) In Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. (1943), 318 U.S. 54, 87 L. Ed. 610, 63 S. Ct. 444, the United States Supreme Court held that, as a result of the 1939 amendment, FELA “requires cases tried under the Federal Act to be handled as though no doctrine of assumption of risk had ever existed.” (Tiller, 318 U.S. at 64, 87 L. Ed. at 616, 63 S. Ct. at 449-50.) In Uhrhan v. Union Pacific R.R. Co. (1993), 155 Ill. 2d 537, 617 N.E.2d 1182, the supreme court of Illinois barely gave the doctrine of assumption of risk brief recognition, in what may be described as dicta, in brushing off plaintiff’s claim that an employer should be barred from raising contributory negligence when an employee has assumed the risk. Surely the doctrine of assumption of risk should have died or come to rest. The doctrine, however, has the survival attributes not of Phoenix, the magnificent bird that rises from its ashes, but the Hydra, the multiheaded monster that comes back twice as bad every time you cut off one of its heads. One would think that Tiller and Uhrhan were large enough stones to keep the doctrine’s immortal head buried, but apparently they are not. Oh Hercules, where are you in our hour of need? Historically, the doctrine of assumption of risk was a defense available to the employer to defeat the employee’s claim. (Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. (1943), 318 U.S. 54, 87 L. Ed. 610, 63 S. Ct. 444.) Now the majority wants to make “assumption of risk” available to an employee to defeat an employer’s claim that the employee was contributorily negligent. There simply is no precedent for using the doctrine as a shield by an employee to prevent the trier of fact from examining the employee’s acts in contributing to his own injuries. The majority quotes from Uhrhan that “assumption of risk is predicated on an ‘employee’s voluntary, knowledgeable acceptance of a dangerous condition that is necessary for him to perform his duties.’ ” (Uhrhan, 155 Ill. 2d at 538, 617 N.E.2d at 1187, quoting Taylor, 787 F.2d at 1316.) To put it in more colloquial terminology, assumption of the risk is predicated on the fact that “the damn fool otta knowed that he would break his neck, if he tried such a stunt.” No one accused the plaintiff in this case of being a “damn fool” until the majority opinion. In fact, plaintiff’s counsel earnestly argued that there was no evidence of any contributory negligence by the plaintiff. Imagine counsel’s surprise when he reads the majority opinion and discovers that his client will receive an extra $250,000 because his client was the sole cause of the accident. The majority even says, “Generally, assumption of the risk involves a higher degree of culpability than negligence.” (255 Ill. App. 3d at 229.) Yet we award plaintiff for being more culpable in causing his own injury than we would have awarded him if he were less culpable. I now know how Alice felt in Wonderland. The majority recognizes that the recent supreme court case of Uhrhan is a major obstacle, and so the opinion attempts to distinguish it by creating a new use for the doctrine of assumption of risk. In Uhrhan, the supreme court merely defined assumption of risk and contributory negligence. The court said nothing about using assumption of risk to prevent the issue of contributory negligence by the employee from being presented to the jury. The supreme court clearly set forth the rule that “[a] defendant in a FELA case is entitled to have the jury instructed on contributory negligence if there is any evidence to support the theory.” (Uhrhan, 155 Ill. 2d at 547, 617 N.E. 2d at 1187.) Moreover, after defining contributory negligence as being “a careless act or omission on the plaintiff’s part tending to add new dangers to conditions that the employer negligently created or permitted to exist,” the court found that “a jury could reasonably find that plaintiff’s actions did add additional dangers to the situation.” (Uhrhan, 155 Ill. 2d at 548, 617 N.E.2d at 1187.) The court completely ignored assumption of risk and how it was distinguishable from the facts in the case. All we need to do, according to Uhrhan, is to review the evidence to see if there is any evidence that plaintiffs actions added additional dangers to the situation. If there were any acts by the plaintiff that increased the danger to himself, the employer is entitled to raise the issue of contributory negligence. There was evidence that plaintiff was wearing gaffs that might have increased the danger to himself. Plaintiff also descended a steep embankment covered with heavy brush that maybe he should not have descended. He did not use any brushcutters to clear a path. He apparently was not sure of his footing, because he admitted to falling by stepping on a tie butt that “creeled” under his foot. A cliff climber would not rest his weight on a foothold until he was absolutely sure that there was a solid rock to hold him. If he had not fallen due to the tie butt, then there would be a question of whether defendant had been negligent at all. Thus, it was a factual question as to whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent in resting his weight on a tie butt on a steep embankment. Clearly, there was enough evidence for a jury to find, and the jury did find, that plaintiff’s actions added to the dangers of the situation. One final matter before leaving the subject — the majority quotes from Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in Tiller that “an employee cannot be charged with contributory negligence simply because he ‘assumed the risk.’ ” (Tiller, 318 U.S. at 71-72, 87 L. Ed. at 620, 63 S. Ct. at 453.) However, it is only fair to complete the rest of Justice Frankfurter’s quote, “the inquiry is, did his conduct depart from that of a reasonably prudent employee in his situation?” (Tiller, 318 U.S. at 72, 87 L. Ed. at 620, 63 S. Ct. at 453.) Further, the majority opinion in Tiller held that “the question of negligence on the part of the railroad and on the part of the employee should have been submitted to the jury.” Tiller, 318 U.S. at 68, 87 L. Ed. at 618, 63 S. Ct. at 451-52. So let us forget assumption of risk and the fine distinctions between it and contributory negligence. Assumption of risk no longer exists in FELA cases for any reason or purpose. The only questions are whether the defendant was negligent and whether there were any acts of negligence on the part of the plaintiff that contributed to the accident. There was some evidence by the plaintiff that a jury could reasonably find to be negligent; therefore, the trial judge did not err in giving the instructions to the jury as to contributory negligence. The majority opinion also raises an important issue of custom and assumes certain matters to be true that I do not believe can be assumed. Whether there was a custom of wearing gaffs is a factual question, and it is used to assist the trier of fact to determine the standard of care to which the party should be held. (M. Graham, Cleary & Graham’s Handbook of Illinois Evidence §406.5, at 216 (5th ed. 1990).) “It must be emphasized that usage or practice does not in itself constitute a legal standard of conduct and that conformity with it does not necessarily constitute reasonable care or failure to conform negligence.” (M. Graham, Cleary & Graham’s Handbook of Illinois Evidence §406.5, at 217 (5th ed. 1990).) The old commonsense rule is that just because everyone does it, does not mean that such conduct is proper. We cannot say as a matter of law that it was customary for employees to wear gaffs, especially when the employee attempts to descend a steep hill covered with heavy foliage. We also cannot say as a matter of law that plaintiff exercised reasonable care for his own safety just because other employees wear gaffs, even while descending steep embankments. These are fact questions for the jury to determine. Accordingly, I believe that as an appellate court we must at a minimum give “full faith and credit” to our own supreme court’s rulings. We can do so in this case only by affirming the trial court.