Court Opinion

ID: 9790267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:49:48.42092+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:47:13.737304
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I agree that the judgment in the instant matter must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s failure to articulate any reasons therefor or to provide any guidance to the trial court upon remand.
The majority states that the trial court erroneously based its decision on the discretionary function exception to the otherwise liability of the highway district and notes that the trial court had neither omniscience nor the benefit of this Court’s opinion in Dunbar v. United Steelworkers of America, 100 Idaho 523, 602 P.2d 21 (1979), or Gavica v. Hanson, 101 Idaho 58, 608 P.2d 861 (1980). On that basis alone, this Court summarily reverses and remands “for further proceedings.”
The trial court, however, did not apparently base its ruling solely upon the ground set forth by the majority, but rather clearly stated that its ruling, in part at least, was based “considering the fact the accident in question occurred on the 20th day of August, 1977 and how I.C. § 6-904(1) read at the time of said accident * * The trial court was therein more perceptive than the majority in its quotation of the applicable governing statute. See I.C. § 6-904(1) as enacted by Chapter 150 of the Idaho Session Laws of 1971 and as amended by Chapter 167 of the Idaho Sessions Laws of 1974 and Chapter 272 of the Idaho Session Laws of 1978. It is clear that whatever the trial court may have had in mind as a result of those statutory changes, the “discretionary function” was not the primary consideration.
I do not purport to perceive and it is inappropriate here to attempt to unravel the legislative intent in that amendatory language to which the trial court made reference. It is my opinion, however, that, at least within the perimeters of the trial court’s decision, there was a failure to give any attention, consideration or discussion to the real issue in the case. That failure of the trial court is continued here.
The instant case and its record below differs substantially from many situations presented to this Court after the grant of a summary judgment. Here counsel has made and presented a substantial record delineating the factual issues which in most respects remain to be resolved by a trier of fact. Plaintiff-appellant contends that the roadway admittedly owned and maintained by the governmental entity was dangerous in one respect, i. e., the existence of a curve in that roadway. The record discloses the opinions of self-acknowledged experts stating conflicting views. Regardless of whether that particular stretch of roadway is “dangerous,” obviously a question is presented as to the applicability of I.C. § 6-904(8) exempting government liability which arises out of a design for a highway “where such plan or design is prepared in substantial conformance with engineering or design standards in effect at the time of preparation of the plan or design * * (Emphasis supplied.) Further, I would note that of substantial significance is plaintiff-appellant’s contention that the governmental entity here was negligent in failing to place signs adequately warning motorists in advance that they were approaching a “dangerous” segment of the highway. In*200evitably, that contention brings into focus the question of whether a curve in the highway in and of itself is “dangerous” and thereby a risk which had or should have been seen and assumed (see the dissent in Gavica), or on the other hand, whether a curve in a roadway is inert and neither dangerous nor non-dangerous, but rather made so by the lack of information furnished to a member of the traveling public approaching that segment of the highway. It is a long road which has no turning.
Thus, in my judgment, the instant case differs substantially from the factual pattern in Gavica. There the design or construction of the highway was not in question, but rather a hazard created by outside parties and forces creating a condition which made travel on the highways dangerous. In Gavica the question was whether the failure to warn of that known, acknowledged and admitted danger was negligence for which the governmental entity should respond in tort liability. Hence, the factual pattern was much more similar to that in Smith v. State, 93 Idaho 795, 473 P.2d 937 (1970), wherein there was no necessary danger from the design of the roadway. In the instant case it is the assertion of the plaintiff-appellant that the design and construction of the roadway was dangerous and the governmental entity was further negligent by not adequately warning of the dangerous design.
I believe the majority opinion errs in failing to supply any guidance to the trial court upon remand.