Court Opinion

ID: 9515334
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:55:48.403034+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:28.171851
License: Public Domain

ZINTER, Justice
(concurring).
[¶ 29.] I concur because, by Harrimaris own admission, the oral agreement was to be performed over a period of time exceeding one year. Therefore, it was unenforceable under the statute of frauds.
[¶ 30.] Harriman relies on authorities holding that such agreements are outside the statute of frauds because they could be performed in less than one year if death or some other contingency arose. However, that was not the nature of Harriman’s claim. Harriman testified that the agreement was to continue until retirement6 or *51until the business was no longer profitable. Accordingly, Harriman’s expert witness proffered a damage calculation that involved ongoing damages for up to twenty-nine years, or until 2029. Similarly, Harri-man’s counsel argued to the jury that their expert witness “testified that he made computations for twenty-nine years.” Finally, the jury actually awarded damages sustained from March 19, 2000 through the 2003 trial, and for further damages to be incurred in the future. Thus, there can be no dispute that the agreement sued upon, however denominated, was “not to be performed within a year from the making thereof; ...” within the meaning of SDCL 53-8-2(1).
[¶ 31.] In Brown v. Wisconsin Granite Co., 47 S.D. 635, 640, 201 N.W. 555, 557 (1924), this Court did not permit a terminated employee “to recover for the time he did not work, and the bonus he claimed would have been due him at the end of [a one] year [oral contract because] the alleged contract [was] invalid under the statute [of frauds].... ” Similarly, other courts recognize that “[s]ince the parties understood [that the contract would not terminate] within one year, the Statute of Frauds required the agreement to be in writing.” Wior v. Anchor Industries, Inc., 669 N.E.2d 172, 174-175 (Ind. 1996) (holding that a contract of employment until retirement was within the statute of frauds even though death or other contingency could end the contract earlier than one year). See also Gebhard v. GAF Corp., 59 F.R.D. 504, 506 (D.D.C.1973) (guaranteeing employment until age 65 brought purported contract within statute of frauds); Gilliland v. Allstate Insurance Co., 69 Ill. App.3d 630, 26 Ill.Dec. 444, 388 N.E.2d 68 (1979) (holding an oral agreement to employ an individual until retirement fell within the statute of frauds and was unenforceable); Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex. 1991) (holding that understanding to be employed for another eight to ten years until retirement was within the statute of frauds and unenforceable); Molder v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 665 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex.App.1983) (holding employee’s belief that he was contractually entitled to work for employer until retirement at age 65 meant that the contract fell within the statute of frauds).
[¶ 32.] The Indiana Supreme Court noted that a contrary ruling would “seriously undermine” the statute of frauds. Wior, 669 N.E.2d at 175. In fact,
[w]ere we to rule otherwise, the Statute of Frauds’ continued vitality in service contracts would be substantially eroded. Under the [contrary] analysis, any person with a service agreement intended to span a long period of time could avoid the writing requirement of the Statute of Frauds, since death could always occur within one year. Such a holding would seriously undermine the Statute of Frauds’ efficacy in encouraging written contracts and preventing fraud and perjury.

Id.

[¶ 33.] For these reasons, the trial court should be affirmed.

. UDI asserts that Harriman testified (in a deposition) that the agreement was to last until his retirement. Although Harriman disputes UDI’s assertion with respect to trial *51testimony, this dispute is of no consequence because the record reflects that in either event, the contract was to be performed over a period of time exceeding one year.