Court Opinion

ID: 9910033
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-14 19:00:44.02938+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:36.140449
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-30129        Document: 00517001584             Page: 1      Date Filed: 12/14/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                              Fifth Circuit

                                     ____________                                           FILED
                                                                                 December 14, 2023
                                       No. 23-30129                                    Lyle W. Cayce
                                     ____________                                           Clerk

   Glenn R. Stewart; Parc Gardens, L.L.C.; Maison
   Lafayette, L.L.C., doing business as Camelia Gardens, L.L.C.,

                                                                  Plaintiffs—Appellants,

                                            versus

   Morton M. Gruber; Gruber & Associates Architects,
   L.L.C.; Thomas Metzger; Metzger Architecture, L.L.C.,

                                                                 Defendants—Appellees,

   Frederick W. Keeney; F W Keeney & Associates,

                                      Third Party Defendants—Appellees.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Western District of Louisiana
                              USDC No. 6:20-CV-1479
                     ______________________________

   Before Clement, Haynes, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                      No. 23-30129

          Plaintiffs1 appeal from two interrelated district court orders: (1) the
   exclusion of their expert’s reports and testimony, and (2) the grant of De-
   fendants’ motion for summary judgment. We AFFIRM.
                                    I. Background
          Plaintiffs hired the Architect Defendants2 to design an apartment
   complex. Post-construction, Plaintiffs sued the Architect Defendants in
   Louisiana state court for professional negligence and breach of contract.
   Plaintiffs alleged that the architectural design was faulty and causing defects
   in the apartment building. They therefore sought damages to offset the al-
   leged cost of repairs and to mitigate the alleged deficiencies. The Architect
   Defendants jointly removed the lawsuit to federal court.
          In January 2021, the district court issued a scheduling order with an
   October 2021 deadline for Plaintiffs’ expert information and reports and a
   June 2022 trial date. In February 2021, certain Architect Defendants filed a
   third-party complaint against the Keeney Defendants,3 who had provided
   mechanical and plumbing design for the apartment complex. The Keeney
   Defendants filed a consent motion to extend pretrial scheduling deadlines,
   which the district court granted. The district court also issued a new sched-
   uling order with an April 21, 2022 deadline for Plaintiffs’ expert information
   and reports and a December 2022 trial date.

          _____________________
          1
             “Plaintiffs” refers to Glenn R. Stewart; Parc Gardens, L.L.C.; and Maison
   Lafayette, L.L.C., doing business as Camelia Gardens, L.L.C.
          2
            The “Architect Defendants” refers to Defendants Morton M. Gruber; Gruber &
   Associates Architects, L.L.C.; Thomas Metzger; and Metzger Architecture, L.L.C.
          3
            The “Keeney Defendants” refers to Third-Party Defendants Frederick W.
   Keeney and F W Keeney & Associates.

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          In February 2022, Plaintiffs produced in response to a discovery re-
   quest a field report that Dyke Nelson authored. Plaintiffs also indicated in
   the same discovery responses that they had “not yet retained expert wit-
   nesses in this matter.”
          Plaintiffs did not produce expert information or reports by the court’s
   April 21, 2022 deadline. But on April 26, 2022, Plaintiffs emailed to Defend-
   ants what they described as a “preliminary expert report,” (the “April 26
   Report”) noting that “[a]n amended report is currently being prepared.”
   The April 26 Report was effectively a restyling of Nelson’s field report that
   Plaintiffs had previously produced in discovery, with the addition of a sum-
   mary of Nelson’s firm and a list of the firm’s relevant projects and previous
   experience. In the same email, Plaintiffs stated that “while we are in the
   midst of discussing an extension of expert deadlines, I thought it prudent to
   circulate this draft.” The last line in the email requested that the Architect
   Defendants “[p]lease advise at your earliest convenience, no later than end
   of day [April 28, 2022] whether a Motion to Extend Expert Deadlines will be
   opposed.”
           On May 4, 2022, Plaintiffs’ counsel informed Defendants’ counsel
   via email that “[r]egrettably, after discussions and further review of the
   schedule, we do not have authority and will not be able to join in a motion to
   continue any dates or deadlines.” Plaintiffs also advised that an amended
   expert report would be forthcoming.
          Then, on May 13, 2022, Plaintiffs sent to Defendants a “supplemental
   expert report” (the “May 13 Report”). The May 13 Report included for the
   first time a page about Nelson’s qualifications, a list of rates charged by Nel-
   son’s firm, and a statement that “[t]he overall condition of the project is be-
   low industry standards for a product of this type (Class A Apartments).”

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          Finally, on June 15, 2022, Plaintiffs sent to Defendants an “amended
   and supplemental expert report” (the “June 15 Report”). The June 15 Re-
   port added a climate-zone map and a reference to the same, an opinion con-
   cerning violations of the construction agreement between the parties, and
   Nelson’s C.V.
          The Architect Defendants subsequently filed a motion in limine to
   strike Nelson’s expert reports as untimely and to prohibit him from testifying
   at trial. The Keeney Defendants filed a similar motion. The Architect De-
   fendants also moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiffs would not
   be able to show the applicable standard of care, or that the Architect Defend-
   ants breached such standard, if the district court struck Nelson’s reports and
   testimony.
          The district court granted Defendants’ motions in limine, striking
   Nelson’s expert reports and prohibiting his testimony. It also granted the
   Architect Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the basis that, with-
   out Nelson’s reports, opinions, and testimony, Plaintiffs could not establish
   the standard of care necessary to prove their case. The court therefore dis-
   missed Plaintiffs’ claims against the Architect Defendants with prejudice and
   dismissed the Architect Defendants’ third-party claims against the Keeney
   Defendants without prejudice. After the district court denied Plaintiffs’ mo-
   tion for reconsideration, Plaintiffs timely appealed.
                                  II. Jurisdiction
          Before reaching the merits, we must address a jurisdictional issue.
   Defendants’ jointly removed the case based on diversity jurisdiction under
   28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), but in their notice of removal, they alleged the
   residence, rather than the citizenship, of members of Plaintiff Maison

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   Lafayette, L.L.C.4 Because allegations of residency alone do not satisfy the
   citizenship requirement for purposes of complete diversity, see MidCap
   Media Fin., L.L.C. v. Pathway Data, Inc., 929 F.3d 310, 313–14 (5th Cir.
   2019), we requested a joint response from the parties addressing the diversity
   jurisdiction of federal courts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1653, see id. at 314
   (explaining that § 1653 allows us to overlook jurisdictional-pleading
   deficiencies if a party “can identify allegations and evidence in the record
   demonstrating diversity” (quotation omitted)); see also Seguin v. Remington
   Arms Co., L.L.C., 22 F.4th 492, 494–96 (5th Cir. 2022) (requesting a joint
   letter from the parties to address a pleading defect regarding the citizenship
   of an LLC).
           In response, the parties submitted a joint letter clarifying that Marion
   and Chuck Stewart are and at all relevant times have been citizens of
   Washington State. The parties also pointed to evidence in the record,
   namely, the relevant entities’ filings with the Louisiana Secretary of State, to
   support their correction regarding Marion and Chuck Stewart’s citizenship.
   Finally, the parties requested that we treat their joint letter as an amendment
   to the pleadings of citizenship in the joint notice of removal.
           28 U.S.C. § 1653 clearly states that “[d]efective allegations of
   jurisdiction may be amended, upon terms, in the trial or appellate courts.”
   (emphasis added). Pursuant to that statute, we see no need to take additional
   time in and from the district court on this issue, so we elect to treat the
   parties’ joint letter as an amendment to the pleadings of citizenship after

           _____________________
           4
            More precisely, Defendants alleged the residence of Marion Stewart and Chuck
   Stewart, both of whom are members of Parc Lafayette, L.L.C. and Lake Charles Gardens,
   L.L.C. Both entities, in turn, are members of Plaintiff Maison Lafayette, L.L.C. See Harvey
   v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., 542 F.3d 1077, 1080 (5th Cir. 2008) (explaining that “citizenship
   of a LLC is determined by the citizenship of all of its members”).

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   reviewing the parties’ proposed corrections and record cites that support
   such corrections. See Burdett v. Remington Arms Co., L.L.C., 854 F.3d 733,
   734 n.1 (5th Cir. 2017) (treating as an amendment to the pleadings a joint
   letter that corrected a jurisdictional pleading deficiency regarding the
   citizenship of an LLC’s members); Nadler v. Am. Motors Sales Corp., 764
   F.2d 409, 413 (5th Cir. 1985) (granting motion to amend on appeal allegations
   of an LLC member’s residence rather than citizenship after concluding that
   “the record shows a significant probability of complete diversity”). Based
   on the amendment to the pleadings regarding the citizenship of the parties,
   we are satisfied that the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
   1332(a).
          We thus have jurisdiction to review the district court’s grant of
   summary judgment, including its prior order excluding Nelson’s reports and
   testimony, under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Dickinson v. Auto Ctr. Mfg. Co., 733
   F.2d 1092, 1102 (5th Cir. 1983) (“[A] party may obtain review of prejudicial
   adverse interlocutory rulings upon [the party’s] appeal from adverse final
   judgment, at which time the interlocutory rulings . . . are regarded as merged
   into the final judgment terminating the action.”).
                             III. Standard of Review
          Because this case involves the exclusion of expert reports and
   testimony for the purposes of a summary judgment determination, “the
   applicable standards of review overlap somewhat.” Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d
   291, 300 (5th Cir. 2000). First, we review the exclusion of expert reports and
   testimony “only for an abuse of discretion [that] amounts to manifest error.”
   Id. We reverse the district court only in “unusual and exceptional cases.”
   Sandifer v. Hoyt Archery, Inc., 907 F.3d 802, 807 (5th Cir. 2018) (alteration
   adopted) (quotation omitted). After we have reviewed the exclusion of the
   evidence at issue, we then “review de novo the grant of summary judgment

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                                        No. 23-30129

   based on the evidence properly before the district court.” Munoz, 200 F.3d
   at 300. Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that
   there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
   to judgment as a matter of law.” Lincoln v. Scott, 887 F.3d 190, 195 (5th Cir.
   2018) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
                                      IV. Discussion
           Plaintiffs raise two issues on appeal: (1) whether the district court
   abused its discretion by excluding Nelson’s reports and testimony, and (2)
   whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of
   Defendants. We address each in turn.
       A. Exclusion of Nelson’s reports and testimony
           Plaintiffs assert that the district court abused its discretion by
   excluding Nelson’s reports and testimony pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
   Procedure 37(c)(1).5 We disagree.
           Rule 37(c)(1) provides that “[i]f a party fails to provide information or
   identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to
   use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing,
   or at trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” It also
   notes a court’s ability to impose other appropriate sanctions in addition to or
   instead of excluding the witness. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1).

           _____________________
           5
             Plaintiffs do not dispute that the April 26 Report was both untimely and
   incomplete. Additionally, Plaintiffs have forfeited the argument that Nelson’s subsequent
   reports complied with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B)
   because Plaintiffs have not adequately briefed that argument. See Rollins v. Home Depot
   USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021) (“A party forfeits an argument . . . by failing to
   adequately brief the argument on appeal.”).

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                                     No. 23-30129

          We review a district court’s “discretion to exclude evidence that was
   not properly designated by considering the following four factors: (1) the
   explanation for the failure to identify the witness; (2) the importance of the
   testimony; (3) potential prejudice in allowing the testimony; and (4) the
   availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice.”           Geiserman v.
   MacDonald, 893 F.2d 787, 791 (5th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).
          1. First factor: Plaintiffs’ explanation
          Regarding the first factor—Plaintiffs’ explanation—the district court
   noted that Plaintiffs did not explain their failure to timely designate a
   complete report.     Plaintiffs do not dispute this, nor do they offer an
   explanation on appeal. Accordingly, we hold that the district court properly
   concluded that the first factor favors exclusion. See 1488, Inc. v. Philsec Inv.
   Corp., 939 F.2d 1281, 1289 (5th Cir. 1991) (concluding that exclusion of
   expert witness “is particularly appropriate” when the party has “failed to
   provide an adequate explanation for their failure to identify their expert
   within the designated timetable”).
          2. Second factor: importance of Nelson’s reports and testimony
          Next, the district court held that the second factor—the importance
   of Nelson’s reports and testimony—“does not weigh in Plaintiffs’ favor.”
   The district court acknowledged Plaintiffs’ assertion that Nelson’s
   testimony would be critical to Plaintiffs’ case and that Nelson would have
   been Plaintiffs’ sole expert witness. But the district court reasoned that
   Nelson’s alleged importance to Plaintiffs’ case “only underscores the
   importance of plaintiffs’ compliance with the court’s deadlines.” The
   district court also stated that “the importance of testimony ‘cannot
   singularly override the enforcement of local rules and scheduling orders.’”
          Plaintiffs contend that the district court’s reasoning “flipped the
   second factor upside down.” Plaintiffs rely on Betzel v. State Farm Lloyds,

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   480 F.3d 704, 707–08 (5th Cir. 2007), which criticized two of our earlier
   decisions for concluding that an untimely-disclosed expert’s significance
   underscores the importance of complying with the relevant deadline.
   According to Plaintiffs, the importance factor must favor inclusion of the
   expert when exclusion leaves the proponent without an expert.
             We disagree. Although Nelson is indeed the only expert Plaintiffs
   offer, and therefore an important witness, the district court’s reasoning was
   not an abuse of discretion. That is because we have previously employed
   similar reasoning as the district court when addressing the second Geiserman
   factor.
             For example, in Geiserman, we assumed arguendo that the expert
   testimony at issue was significant to the proponent’s case and reasoned that
   the expert’s importance provided “so much the more reason to be sure [the
   expert’s] introduction was properly grounded.” 893 F.2d at 791. Although
   we did not explicitly state which party the importance factor favored, when
   weighing the four factors together, we reasoned that “[t]he claimed
   importance of expert testimony underscores the need for [the proponent] to
   have timely designated his expert witness so that [the opposing party] could
   prepare for trial.” Id. at 792. We also remarked that “[t]he importance of
   such proposed testimony cannot singularly override the enforcement of local
   rules and scheduling orders.” Id. Further, like the present case, exclusion of
   the expert at issue in Geiserman left the proponent without expert testimony
   and resulted in summary judgment. See id. at 793–94.
             Likewise, in Barrett v. Atlantic Richfield Co., we acknowledged the
   significance of the expert testimony at issue but stated that “the claimed
   importance of [the proponent’s] expert testimony merely underscores the
   need for [the proponent] to have complied with the court’s deadlines or at
   least informed the trial judge in advance if good faith compliance was not

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   possible.” 95 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 1996). Ultimately, we held that “the
   district court did not abuse its discretion in striking the testimony,” even
   though exclusion of the experts at issue left proponents without expert
   testimony and resulted in summary judgment. Id. at 383.
           Although Plaintiffs are correct that Betzel criticized Geiserman and
   Barrett for applying the importance factor in “unexpected ways,” and
   “standing it on its head,” Plaintiffs fail to contend with our rule of
   orderliness. See Betzel, 480 F.3d at 707–08. Under the rule of orderliness,
   “one panel of our court may not overturn another panel’s decision, absent
   an intervening change in the law, such as a statutory amendment, or the
   Supreme Court, or our en banc court.” Jacobs v. Nat’l Drug Intell. Ctr., 548
   F.3d 375, 378 (5th Cir. 2008) (emphasis omitted). “Indeed, even if a panel’s
   interpretation of the law appears flawed, the rule of orderliness prevents a
   subsequent panel from declaring it void.” Id. To the extent two panel
   decisions conflict, the earlier decision controls. GlobeRanger Corp. v. Software
   AG United States of Am., Inc., 836 F.3d 477, 497 (5th Cir. 2016). Because
   Geiserman (1990) and Barrett (1996) predate Betzel (2007), and we have not
   found a relevant intervening change in the law, Betzel’s criticism of the
   reasoning in those opinions does not render the district court’s reliance on
   such reasoning an abuse of discretion.
           We therefore hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion
   by concluding that the second factor “does not weigh in Plaintiffs’ favor.”6
           3. Third factor: potential prejudice to Defendants

           _____________________
           6
             Plaintiffs paraphrase the district court’s analysis as: “if the witness is so important,
   then you shouldn’t miss deadlines—factor two favors [Defendants].” While the district court’s
   focus was that the high importance of this expert did not favor the Plaintiffs’ position rather
   than that it helped the Defendants’ position, Plaintiffs correctly acknowledge that our
   precedent supports the Defendants on this element in this situation.

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          Turning to the third factor—potential prejudice to Defendants—the
   district court found the existence of “prejudice to [Defendants], who were
   not provided with a sufficient expert report until far past the deadline
   provided in the Scheduling Order.”           According to the district court,
   disregard for discovery deadlines “disrupts the court’s docket and
   opponent’s preparation, and thus, is prejudicial.” Acknowledging Plaintiffs’
   contention that the June 15 Report was fully compliant with Rule 26(a)(2)(B),
   the district court responded that Plaintiffs produced the June 15 Report less
   than a week before the close of discovery. Additionally, because Plaintiffs’
   discovery responses affirmatively represented to Defendants that they had
   not retained any expert witnesses, the district court concluded that
   Defendants were not on notice that Plaintiffs had retained Nelson as an
   expert prior to the April 21 disclosure deadline.
          Plaintiffs question whether Defendants suffered any prejudice at all
   aside from “los[ing] the advantage of litigating against Plaintiffs armed
   without an expert.” According to Plaintiffs, the district court’s only example
   of prejudice to Defendants was a five-day delay in the official designation of
   Nelson. Plaintiffs posit that “[w]hether or not the report Nelson provided
   on that date was substantively deficient, the notification delay was less than
   one week—disclosed with over seven weeks left in the discovery period.”
          We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
   concluding that the third factor favored Defendants. Even when “the degree
   of prejudice suffered by the [proponent] due to the late designation would
   not have been great, a district court still has the discretion to control pretrial
   discovery and sanction a party’s failure to follow a scheduling order.” 1488,
   Inc., 939 F.2d at 1288–89.       For example, in Geiserman, we held that
   designating an expert witness two weeks after the deadline to do so
   “disrupt[s] the court’s discovery schedule and the opponent’s preparation.”
   Geiserman, 893 F.2d at 791.        Additionally, even though Plaintiffs put

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   Defendants on notice of Nelson’s expert designation five days after the
   deadline, Plaintiffs do not contest that the April 26 Report lacked information
   required by Rule 26(a)(2)(B).        As the district court noted, Plaintiffs
   submitted their June 15 Report, which contained new information, less than
   a week before the close of discovery. By that time, Defendants’ experts had
   already submitted their own reports and been deposed.              Accordingly,
   Plaintiffs’ conduct deprived Defendants’ experts of an opportunity to
   address the new information in Nelson’s June 15 Report before the close of
   discovery.
          For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
   discretion by finding prejudice to Defendants.
          4. Fourth factor: availability of a continuance
          On the fourth factor—the availability of a continuance—Plaintiffs
   argue that the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider this
   factor at all. Plaintiffs also assert that any alleged prejudice could have been
   cured by allowing Defendants to depose Nelson and providing Defendants
   an opportunity to offer expert testimony in rebuttal. According to Plaintiffs,
   we have “repeatedly stated that continuance is the preferred methodology of
   dealing with a party’s attempt to designate a witness out of time.”
          We hold that the district court’s analysis of the continuance factor
   does not constitute an abuse of discretion. Plaintiffs’ assertion that the
   district court failed to consider the continuance factor whatsoever finds little
   support in the district court’s opinion. After the district court discussed the
   first three factors in sequential order, it turned to Plaintiffs’ refusal to join
   with Defendants in a motion to continue various deadlines, including
   Plaintiffs’ own expert disclosure deadline. Noting that Plaintiffs refused an
   opportunity to extend their expert disclosure deadline, the district court
   reasoned that a court “must have some sanction available to enforce its own

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   deadlines and rules.” Although the paragraph at issue does not explicitly
   label itself as the district court’s analysis of the continuance factor, the
   content of the paragraph does.
          Further, contrary to Plaintiffs’ contention, the district court’s
   consideration of Plaintiffs’ refusal to join Defendants in seeking a
   continuance is not an abuse of discretion. Plaintiffs attempt to support their
   position by pointing to cases in which we have considered the ability of a
   continuance to cure the specific prejudice alleged. See In re Complaint of C.F.
   Bean L.L.C., 841 F.3d 365, 374 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding that because a
   continuance would allow the prejudiced party to produce a rebuttal report
   and re-depose the proposed expert at issue, the continuance factor weighed
   in favor of admitting said expert); E.E.O.C. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 999 F.2d
   113, 116 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that “whatever prejudice would have
   resulted from permitting [the proposed expert] to testify could have been
   cured by a continuance”). But Plaintiffs fail to identify any precedent barring
   courts from considering whether the proponent of an untimely expert report
   declined an opportunity to cure such untimeliness by refusing to join a
   motion to continue that would have extended deadlines for both parties and
   therefore lessened any prejudice to the opposing party. Put another way,
   Plaintiffs were only willing to have extra time for them, not a similar
   extension for the Defendants who would need to, of course, have an expert
   that addressed the Plaintiffs’ expert. Such a notion on the part of the
   Plaintiffs was totally improper.
          Additionally, while it is true, as Plaintiffs assert, that “a continuance
   is the preferred means of dealing with a party’s attempt to designate a witness
   out of time,” that doesn’t end the matter. Campbell v. Keystone Aerial Survs.,
   Inc., 138 F.3d 996, 1001 (5th Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted). “Because of a
   trial court’s need to control its docket, a party’s violation of the court’s
   scheduling order should not routinely justify a continuance.” Hamburger v.

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   State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 361 F.3d 875, 884 (5th Cir. 2004); see also AIG
   Eur., Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 831 F. App’x 111, 116 (5th Cir. 2020) (per
   curiam) (“While continuances are the preferred means of dealing with
   untimely expert reports, they are the exception.”). We have also recognized
   that a continuance will “not deter future dilatory behavior, nor serve to
   enforce local rules or court imposed scheduling orders.” Geiserman, 893
   F.2d at 792; accord 1488, Inc., 939 F.2d at 1289 (quoting same).
          Here, Plaintiffs demonstrated a lack of respect for the court’s
   scheduling order by producing an untimely and deficient expert report and
   then “supplementing” its content over the course of two months in an
   apparent attempt to stretch the court’s deadline while, at the same time,
   declining to agree to a continuance for both sides. We therefore conclude
   that the district court did not abuse its discretion by deciding that a
   continuance would not be appropriate.
          In sum, after reviewing the district court’s analysis of the relevant
   factors, we conclude that this is not one of the “unusual and exceptional
   cases” in which the district court’s decision to exclude an expert’s report
   and testimony was “manifestly erroneous.” See Sandifer, 907 F.3d at 807
   (quotations and alteration omitted) (emphasis in original).
      B. Summary Judgment
          Next, we turn to Plaintiffs’ argument that the district court erred in
   granting the Architect Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
          The district court granted summary judgment after concluding that
   Plaintiffs did not produce evidence of the applicable standard of care for

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   Louisiana architects, an essential element of their claims.7 Plaintiffs argue
   that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to consider Nelson’s
   affidavit, which Plaintiffs produced for the first time with their summary
   judgment opposition, and which they contend provides evidence of the
   applicable standard of care. We hold that the district court did not abuse its
   discretion by excluding Nelson’s affidavit. See Geiserman, 893 F.3d at 793
   (“Since the court ruled that [the proponent] could not offer expert testimony
   at trial, [the proponent] cannot use that expert witness’s affidavit to oppose
   summary judgment.”). Accordingly, the district court did not err by granting
   the Architect Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
                                        V. Conclusion
           For the reasons discussed above, we AFFIRM the district court’s
   orders.

           _____________________
           7
            Plaintiffs do not dispute on appeal that establishing the applicable standard of care
   for Louisiana architects is an essential element of their claims, nor do they dispute that,
   under Louisiana law, they must do so through an expert.

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