Court Opinion

ID: 9741321
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:53:27.454201+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:23.458164
License: Public Domain

Kass, J.
(concurring). To be sure, “Miranda warnings, once given, are not to be accorded unlimited efficacy or perpetuity.” United States v. Hopkins, 433 F.2d 1041, 1045 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971). Whether, however, the lapse of time between initial warning and later statement is consequential, depends on answering a further question: “Did the defendant, with a full knowledge of his legal rights, knowingly and intentionally relinquish them?” Commonwealth v. Cruz, 373 Mass. 676, 687 (1977). *37Miller v. United States, 396 F.2d 492, 496 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1031 (1969). United States v. Standing Soldier, 538 F.2d 196, 201 n.5 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1025 (1976). The particular circumstances of the accused’s situation, e.g., psychological pressures, and the accused’s background, experience, and conduct are guides to assessing the voluntariness of a statement. Commonwealth v. Coplin, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 478, 482 (1993).
Here, the defendant is a double agent. He simultaneously participates in bank robberies and reports to the police on that particular specialty in criminal enterprise. He engages freely in conversations with the police, choosing what he wishes to talk about and not talk about. He appears serene in the conviction — mistakenly, as it turns out — that if he is circumspect about what he says, he can safely play a role in the criminal and prosecutorial worlds. In his dialogue with the police, the defendant displays knowledge of police practices, shuts off conversation so that he may reflect on his situation, and bargains for protective custody, bail, and a favorable disposition. Those actions manifest full knowledge by the defendant about his legal rights and a calculated relinquishing of the right to remain silent. When a person is selective in his utterances in this fashion, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that any statements made are spoken while conscious of the right to remain silent. Commonwealth v. Westmoreland, 388 Mass. 269, 278 (1983). It is divorced from reality to suppose that the defendant, acting as he did, had forgotten over the weekend the Miranda warnings administered late on the previous Friday. It is equally implausible that the conduct of the defendant, while he was consciously engaged in maneuver with the police, would have been influenced by a repetition of the Miranda warnings. In the particular circumstances, repetition would have been a formulaic ceremony.
I, therefore, disassociate myself from so much of the court’s opinion as suggests that in this case it was legally necessary in the interview on Monday to refresh the Miranda warnings earlier given to the defendant.