Court Opinion

ID: 9885006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:27:41.186839+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:43.271721
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION

Gooper, J.
I cannot agree with the prevailing opin-
ion for the many reasons which I will set forth hereinafter. It would be a simple matter to concur in the result and evade the work that is necessary to write this dissent; however, I must live with my own conscience and I will never subscribe to the doctrine that the result justifies the means.
It is apparent that the prevailing opinion was written in anticipation of this dissent, as the opinion is replete with matters not before us, either by record or briefs.
The factual situation is very simple. The present proceedings, as shown by the record, were based upon a petition filed by a director of public welfare against a four-year-old child without any pretense of following the lawful procedure as required by law. It is apparent that the Clerk, without a proper court Order, issued summons for various persons ordering them to appear for trial the next day. The summons issued affirmatively shows that the petition filed was to declare the child delinquent, while the petition prays that the child be declared neglected. Also, there is no showing by the intrinsic record that the summons was served upon the parties therein at least twenty-four hours prior to the *680hearing, nor did the summons require the child to appear in court.
The record further reveals that the court’s minutes were not made until the morning of the trial, and the only interpretation which could be placed upon them, by the verbiage contained therein, is, that the proceedings were not commenced nor was the procedure, as outlined by the Juvenile Court Act, followed. There is nothing in the court’s minutes to show that he ever followed the conditions precedent as required by the Legislature in order to acquire jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the court failed to appoint a guardian ad litem, or any other responsible party, or person to represent and defend or file an answer on behalf of the child as provided for by statute, although the proceedings were against the child. It is my opinion that the court never acquired legal jurisdiction over the child named in the petition herein, the subject matter of the action, nor jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment the court did enter, and that the entire proceedings in this matter was void ab initio.
First, the intrinsic record which imports verity of the Harrison Circuit Court sitting as a Juvenile Court of Harrison County, discloses that its jurisdiction was not invoked in the manner provided for by the law applicable to Juvenile Courts as defined by our statutes. A review of the Juvenile Court Act, the same being ch. 347 of the Acts of 1945, reveals the Title, is as follows:
“An act providing for juvenile courts, defining their powers and jurisdiction, providing for the appointment of probation officers, referees and other employees, outlining their duties and authorities and specifying their compensation; providing for procedure in such courts including time and place of trial, providing for keeping records of *681such courts, the appointment of officers for same, fixing the term and salary of judges, the manner of election, the payment of salaries, the transfer of cases to such courts, conferring juvenile jurisdiction in certain counties in circuit and superior courts, making an appropriation, and repealing of laws or parts of laws in conflict therewith, and declaring an emergency.”
,Our Supreme Court has stated that the Act is constitutional and must be read in pari materia with §§9-3201, 9-3224, 10-1812 and 10-1816, see State ex rel. Gannon v. Lake Circuit Court (1945), 223 Ind. 375, 61 N. E. 2d 168, and also has stated that this Act also covers the entire subject matter of Juvenile Courts. Our Supreme Court held, “The act of 1945 purports to create a Juvenile Court system and covers the entire subject matter of Juvenile Courts in Indiana.” (My emphasis.) State ex rel. Hoffman v. Marion Co. Election Bd. (1948), 226 Ind. 421, 81 N. E. 2d 685.
In the case of Shupe v. Bell et al. (1957), 127 Ind. App. 292, at 295, 141 N. E. 2d 351, in discussing the Juvenile Court Act of 1945, we stated:
“The Act establishing Juvenile Courts in our state and outlining their procedure are special statutory proceedings, and the provisions of the statute must be followed. Board of Children’s Gdns. of Marion Co. v. Gioscio (1936), 210 Ind. 581, 585, 4 N. E. 2d 199; Ford v. State (1952), 122 Ind. App. 315, 104 N. E. 2d 406. It is in the nature of a civil proceeding and is not triable by jury. The proceedings are of a summary character and frequently held in chambers. The records of such proceedings are kept in special dockets that are confidential in nature and not open to the public, except on order of the court; the records are frequently destroyed and disposed of after a lapse of time, and prohibits ■the use of the evidence given in any case or proceeding in any other court. State ex rel. Bryant et al. v. Warrick, C. C. (1953), 232 Ind. 655, 658, 115 N. E. 2d 742.
*682“We know that courts do not assume jurisdiction, sua sponte. In proceedings to determine whether or not delinquent, dependent or neglected children should be made wards of the Juvenile Court, the jurisdiction of the court must be invoked by the verified accusation as provided for by §§9-3207 and 9-3208, supra. Not until the proper charge is filed may the court cite the party charged and attain jurisdiction over his person or the subject matter of the particular case. We believe the Act itself clearly indicates jurisdiction is dependent upon strict compliance with its provisions. ‘Statutes which take away, change or diminish fundamental rights, statutory remedies for rights unknown to the common law, and statutes which provide new and extraordinary remedies must be construed strictly both to the cases embraced within their terms and as to the methods to be pursued.’ 59 C. J., §669, p. 1130. The intent of the Legislature in conferring jurisdiction upon Juvenile ,Courts and the manner in which it is to be conferred, is stated in a clear, concise and unequivocal manner.”
Article 7, §8 of our Constitution provides that courts “shall have such civil and criminal jurisdiction as may be prescribed by law.” Our Supreme Court, in construing this section of the 'Constitution relative to the Juvenile Court Act of 1945, held that this provision means that the jurisdiction is subject to legislative control. State ex rel. Gannon v. Lake Circuit Court, supra.
In reviewing the Juvenile Court Act further, I find that §9-3207, Burns’ 1956 Repl., provides, in part:
“A person subject to the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court under this Act (§§9-3201 — 9-3225) may be brought before it by either of the following means and no other.” (My emphasis.)
“(a) By petition praying that the person be adjudged delinquent or dependent or neglected; (b) Certification and transfer from any other court before which any such person is brought *683charged with the commission of a crime. (Acts 1945, ch. 356, §7, p. 1724.)”
Sec. 9-3208, Burns’ 1956 Repl., is the legislative implementation of §9-3207, supra. The Legislature saw fit to make this implementation very specific. It was entirely within its right to do so, and we are called upon to see that its mandate is specifically carried out. The unalienable rights of every person to life, liberty and property in this state and nation cannot be taken away permanently or even temporarily, except in the specific manner provided by the law authorizing it. The statute under which the trial court can exercise jurisdiction specifies what shall be done by the court. State ex rel. Gannon v. Lake Circuit Court, supra; Shupe v. Bell, supra.
Sec. 9-3208, supra, provides:
“Any person may and any peace officer shall give to the court information in his possession that there is within the county or residing within the county, a dependent, neglected or delinquent child. Thereupon, the court shall, as far as possible make preliminary inquiry to determine whether the interests of the public or of the child require that further action be taken. Whenever practicable such inquiry shall include a preliminary investigation of the home and environmental situation of the child, his previous history and the circumstances of the condition alleged and if the court shall determine that formal jurisdiction should be acquired, shall authorize a petition to be filed by the probation officer. The proceeding shall be entitled ‘In the matter of, a child under eighteen (18) years of age.’ Such petition shall be verified and shall contain a statement of the facts constituting such dependency, neglect as defined in this act (§§9-3201 — 9-3225) and the name, age and residence of the child, so far as known to the person filing such petition; the names and residence of his parents, guardian or custodian, if known to the *684petitioner, and if not known, the petitioner should so state, of such dependent, neglected or delinquent child.” (My emphasis.)
iJuvenile Courts under our Constitution possess only such powers as are granted by the Legislature in express words, and those necessarily implied or incidental to those expressly granted, and those indispensable to the declared objects and purposes of the legislative enactment involved and to its continued existence. When the manner in which granted powers may be exercised are by statute restricted to a definite course of procedure, such procedure must be followed. State, ex rel. v. McCormack (1916), 185 Ind. 302, 305, 113 N. E. 1001; State, ex rel. VanHoy, Treas., etc. v. Able, Treas. (1931), 203 Ind. 44, 50, 178 N. E. 683; Drinkwater v. Eikenberry (1946), 224 Ind. 84, 64 N. E. 2d 399; Schisler v. Merchants Trust Co. (1950), 228 Ind. 594, 604, 94 N. E. 2d 665.
In construing the foregoing sections of the statutes in Shupe v. Bell, supra, our court stated:
“In the case of Kessler v. Williston (1947), 117 Ind. App. 690, 693, 75 N. E. 2d 676, this court stated in construing §9-3208, supra, that this section authorized an investigation to determine: (1) whether a petition alleging that a child is delinquent, dependent or neglected shall be filed and (2) whether the court shall proceed to a trial of the question.
“In construing the above sections, we believe it was the intent of the Legislature in such cases as the one before us that if the Judge of the Juvenile Court believed there was in his county, a delinquent, dependent or neglected child and that he further believed that formal jurisdiction should be acquired, the court shall authorize a petition to be filed by the Probation Officer of the Court, and no one else . . . under the acts of 1945, it is the legislative mandate that to acquire formal jurisdiction *685of the subject matter, it is necessary for the petition to be filed by the Probation Officer under the order of the Judge of said Juvenile Court.” (My emphasis.)
In the record in the case before us it affirmatively appears that the trial court did not follow the procedure as outlined by §9-8208, Burns’, supra,, prior to the filing of the petition. This will appear later herein when I set forth the trial court’s intrinsic record which imports verity. The necessity of following rules of procedure is well stated in the Supreme Court opinion of Hendrickson v. State (1954), 233 Ind. 341, 344, 118 N. E. 2d 493, wherein Judge Bobbitt, speaking for the court, stated: “The rules of procedure must usually be observed by litigants and they may not be ignored by' the courts.” (My emphasis.) See also Shupe v. Bell, supra; Board of Children’s Guardianship v. Gioscio (1936), 210 Ind. 581, 585, 4 N. E. 2d 199; State ex rel. Bryant v. Warrick Circuit Court (1953), 232 Ind. 655, 115 N. E. 2d 742.
Courts speak by their records and appellate tribunals can be informed only from the record made up of the entries by the Clerk and the exceptions certified by the trial judge and duly filed. Philips v. State (1930), 202 Ind. 181, 172 N. E. 904; Riley v. The State (1897), 149 Ind. 48, 48 N. E. 345.
Sec. 9-3104, 1956 Repl., Burns’, provides that the Clerk of the Circuit Court shall be the Clerk of the Juvenile Court and shall keep an order book record of the proceedings in a book known as the Juvenile Court Record. This section must be construed pari materia with §4-324, Burns’, relating to the duties of the Clerk of the Juvenile Court of each day’s proceedings of the Juvenile Court in the proper order book of the Juvenile Court.
*686Under §9-3104, swpra, it was incumbent upon the Clerk of the Juvenile Court to enter into the minutes or the record of the court every step, ruling or proceeding taken by the Judge of the Juvenile Court upon the day and date the court took the action in order that there be a proper order-book entry made of each and every proceeding and in order that the appellate tribunal can ascertain from the record whether or not the trial court carried out the conditions precedent mandated by the Legislature in juvenile proceedings.
We find our Supreme Court in the case of Town of Flora v. The Indiana Service Corp. (1943), 222 Ind. 253, at 258, 53 N. E. 2d 161, stated:
“The ancient common-law method of perpetuating a judgment was by engrossing the entire proceedings, including the pleadings, orders and final disposition upon parchment. The judgment was evidenced by this roll. 34 C. J., Judgments, §223 et seq. Our practice in this regard is regulated by statute. The pleadings in a cause are preserved' in the office of the clerk. §2-1052, Burns’ 1933, §157, Baldwin’s 1934. The court proceedings are recorded in order books. §4-324, Burns’ 1933, §1413, Baldwin’s 1934. The clerk is required to keep a judgment docket in which is entered pertinent data with respect to each judgment rendered. §2-2520, Burns’ 1933, §392, Baldwin’s 1934. It is well established, however, that when any question arises as to the nature, character or effect of a judgment it is proper to look to the antecedent pleadings and orders.”
The court’s intrinsic record reveals that the first proceedings in this matter occurred on the 31st day of May, 1957 when the Director of Public Welfare filed the following petition with the Clerk of Harrison County:
*687“IN THE HARRISON CIRCUIT COURT, MAY TERM, 1957 CAUSE NO. 318, JUVENILE IN THE MATTER OF VICKI GAILE WATSON, A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS
Cause No. 318 DELINQUENCY
TRANSCRIPT
“BE IT REMEMBERED that heretofore, to-wit on the 31st day of May, 1957, the Plaintiff, State of Indiana, by Anna M. Davis, Director of Public Welfare of Harrison County, Indiana, filed in the office of the Clerk of said court their complaint, which is in the words and figures following:
State of Indiana Before Harrison Circuit Court County of Harrison, SS: May Term________1957
In the Matter of Vicki Gaile Watson, a child under the age of eighteen (18) years
Petition to Declare Child Neglected
“Anna M. Davis, Director of Public Welfare of Harrison County, Indiana, being duly sworn upon her oath, says that Vicki Gaile Watson is a minor child under the age of eighteen years, to-wit: four years of age. That the parent of said child is. Clifford Watson who resides at Route #4, Corydon, Indiana.
“Petitioner herein says that said minor child does not have the proper parental care of guardianship.
“Wherefore petitioner herein asks said court that said minor child, Vicki Gaile Watson be declared neglected and for all other just and proper relief.
/s/ Anna M. Davis
Anna M. Davis, Director Public Welfare, Harrison County, Indiana
“Subscribed and sworn to before me the undersigned authority this 31st day of May, 1957.
/s/ John A. Cabefii
Clerk Harrison Circuit Court”
*688Thus, it appears that the record is devoid of any minutes showing a complaince with §9-3208, Burns’, supra, prior to the filing of the foregoing petition, nor is there any averment in the foregoing petition that Anna M. Davis, Director of Public Welfare of Harrison County, Indiana, filed the petition as Probation Officer of the Harrison Juvenile Court, pursuant to the order or under the direction of the Judge of the Harrison Juvenile Court, as required by §9-3208, Burns’. The petition reveals that she filed the petition solely as the Director of Public Welfare.
Sec. 9-3208, of the Juvenile Court Act, does not provide that the Director of Public Welfare can file a petition in juveline court, but provides, “If the court shall determine that formal jurisdiction should be acquired, shall authorize a petition to be filed by the Probation Officer.”
Our Supreme Court in discussing a similar situation in the case of Lowery v. State Life Ins. Co. (1899), 153 Ind. 100, 103, 54 N. E. 442, stated as follows:
“But the point is made that the question we have here does not relate to the subject-matter of the suit, but to the want of legal capacity in the plaintiff to bring the action. We think the question reaches further than the capacity of the plaintiff to sue. The mandate of the statute is ‘that no order, judgment or decree, enjoining or interfering with the business of an insurance company organized under the act, shall be made otherwise than upon the application of the Attorney-General.’ Here we have very explicit language that a court shall have no power to enjoin or interfere with the business ,of an insurance company except upon the condition stated, namely, the application of the Attorney-General. That the Assembly had the power to fix terms to such suits cannot be doubted, and that it has provided that no one but the Attorney-General, either upon his own motion or upon the approved request of the Auditor of State, shall be *689plaintiff in such suit, is beyond controversy. This being true, we have before us a plaintiff who has no right to file a complaint — who has no right or power to put in action the jurisdiction of the court —and, in the absence of such right or power, we have, in contemplation of law, a case without a plaintiff or a complaint. This situation defines itself. The right of jurisdiction in a court over a subject-matter may exist, but its valid exercise depends wholly upon its being invoked by one who is entitled under the law to set it in motion. ‘The power to hear and determine a cause is jurisdiction; and it is coram judice whenever a cause is presented which brings this power into action. But before this power can be affirmed to exist, it must be made to appear that the law has given the tribunal capacity to entertain the complaint against the person or thing sought to be charged or affected; that such complaint has actually been preferred; and that such person or thing has been properly brought before the tribunal.’ Sheldon v. Newton, 3 Ohio St. 494, 499; Damp v. Town of Dane, 29 Wis. 419. A Court has no power to do anything which is not authorized by law, and when its procedure is defined, its judicial functions are essentially controlled thereby. From this principle we have the doctrine as stated by Works on Courts and their Jurisdiction, at page 31, as follows: ‘Where a special statutory mode of acquiring jurisdiction is'\provided, that mode must be followed or the proceedings will be void.’ Freeman on Judgments, §119.”
Both the trial court, as shown by the record before us, and the appellees in their briefs, admit that the Welfare Director acted in her capacity as a Probation Officer of the Circuit Court under the Acts of 1936 rather than the Probation Officer under the Juvenile Court Act of 1945.
The court’s power and authority to appoint a Probation Officer of the Harrison Juvenile Court is found under §9-3117, Burns’, the same being a part of the *6901945 Juvenile Court Act setting up the Juvenile Court system of our state, and this Act covers the entire subject matter of Juvenile Courts in Indiana. See State, ex rel. Hoffman v. Marion County Election Board, supra.
The court’s minutes affirmatively admit that he did not follow the mandate of the Legislature regarding the appointment of a Probation Officer for his Juvenile Court because the County Council of Harrison County would not furnish the necessary funds to pay such officer. The failure of the County Council to appropriate funds did not relieve the Judge of the Juvenile Court of the responsibility of carrying out the legislative mandate. Courts are required to follow the law as enacted by our Legislature, the same as individuals. It is apparent from a review of §9-3117, Burns’, supra, that there is nothing in the Act which prohibited the Judge of the Harrison Juvenile Court from appointing a member of the local Board of Public Welfare as the Probation Officer of the Juvenile Court as a part of their welfare functions without additional salary under this Act. I cannot concede by the farthest stretch of imagination how, under the present law, the Director of Public Welfare for the County of Harrison, performing the functions of a Probation Officer of the Harrison Circuit Court, pursuant to the provisions of the Acts of 1936 (Spec. Sess.), ch. 3, §21, as found in Burns’ (1951 Repl.) §52-1120, being a part of the General Welfare Act, could have any legal authority to act as the Probation Officer of the Harrison Juvenile Court, unless she was appointed such Probation Officer under the Acts of 1945, as I have heretofore stated. Our Supreme Court has held the Acts of 1945 covers the entire subject matter of Juvenile Courts.
*691Sec. 9-3209, Burns’, requires that, “The court shall issue a summons reciting briefly the substance of the petition.”
The record is devoid of any evidence showing that the court issued the summons which I will set out hereinbelow. The summons which was issued shows on its face that it failed to properly recite briefly the substance of the petition filed. The child was never charged as being a delinquent child, as is set forth in the summons. I am sure if the court had had the preliminary investigation and followed the procedure, as outlined by §9-3208, Burns’, and had issued the summons as required by §9-3209, Burns’, he would have known the nature of the petition he had ordered filed against the child.
The summons also fails to summons the child or to require anyone to bring the child, against whom the petition was filed, into court. The summons and the return thereon in the records reads as follows:
“AND BE IT REMEMBERED THAT AFTER-WARDS, to-wit, on said 31st day of May, 1957, a Summons was issued for said defendant. STATE OF INDIANA, HARRISON COUNTY, SS: The State of Indiana to the Sheriff of Harrison County, Greetings:
“You are hereby commanded to summon Mr. and Mrs. William Housel, Mr. and Mrs. A. S. Deakins, Mr. and Mrs. Wayne Housel, Mrs. Marvin Cole, Cecil Snyder, Clifford E. Watson, Mrs. Lee Snider, Mrs. Kelso Housel to appear in the Circuit Court of Harrison County, before the Judge thereof, on the 1st day of June, 1957 at 9:30 A. M. at the Court House in Corydon to answer the complaint of Anna M. Davis, Director of Public Welfare petition to declare child delinquent and of this make due return.
‘WITNESS, the Clerk of said Court, and the seal *692thereof, hereunto affixed at Corydon, this 31st day of May, 1957.
“/s/ John A. Cabell, Clerk of Harrison Circuit Court I hereby certify that the above is a true copy of the original summons
/s/ Orlin L. Didelot, Sheriff
“This summons came to hand May 31, 1957, and was served as commanded by reading to and in presence and hearing of all within named defendants. Mr. and Mrs. William Housel, Mr. and Mrs. A. S. Deakins, Mr. and Mrs. Wayne Housel, Mrs. Marvin Cole, Fay and Cecil Snyder, Mrs. Lee Snider, Clifford D. Watson, Mrs. Kelso Housel.
“This summons came to hand_________, 19____, and I served the same by leaving a true and certified copy at the last and usual place of residence of within named
“This, the 31st day of May, 1957.
/s/ Orlin L. Didelot, Sheriff”
Sec. 9-3209, Burns’, requires that: “The court shall issue a summons reciting briefly the substance of the petition.” The record before us is devoid of any showing that the court ever issued a summons and the summons which apparently the Clerk issued shows on its face that it failed to properly recite briefly the substance of the petition filed as required by the statute. The child was never charged with being a delinquent child, as is set forth in the summons. The record is also devoid of the statutory requirement that, “The entry on the docket shall show whether or not the summons has been fully served and notice given in due time for trial and whether or not the issues have been formed.” (My emphasis.) Sec. 2-1105, Burns’. Also, there is no entry, nor does the summons on the face of it show, that the service of the summons was affected at least twenty-four (24) hours before the time fixed in *693the summons for the return thereof, as provided- for by §9-3210, Burns’.
It is apparent upon the face of the summons that the child against whom the petition was filed was not summoned into court, nor was anyone required by the summons to bring the child into court.
Our Supreme Court, in discussing cases concerning dependent or neglected children in juvenile courts has stated, “. . . is in the nature of a civil proceeding. It is not a criminal proceeding and is not done in the name of the state. ... It is a special statutory proceeding and the provision of the statute must be followed.” Board of Children’s Guardianship v. Gioscio, supra; State ex rel. Bryant v. Warrick Circuit Court, supra.
It is the law under our civil procedure that, “An infant-defendant shall appear and defend by guardian appointed by the court or chosen by such infant with the consent of the court.” Burns’, §2-209. Also, Burns’, §2-209a, provides: “All courts shall have power to appoint a guardian ad litem to defend the interests of any minor impleaded in any suit; and to permit any person, as next friend, to prosecute any suit in any minor’s behalf.”
The appellees in their brief admit that the proceedings before us were against the child because in the appellees’ brief they maintain, in substance, that the only motion for a new trial was filed by the father and natural guardian, and, as there was no motion for a new trial filed either by the child or by her next friend or by Watson as her next friend, there was no question saved except in respect to Watson individually, and the appellee is unable to perceive any authority by which he appears in this proceeding at all.
O'ur Supreme Court, in discussing Juvenile offenses *694relating to minors in the case of Harris, et ux. v. Souder, Supt., etc. (1954), 233 Ind. 287, 292, 119 N. E. 2d 8, stated:
“In the absence of express statutory authority, neither the infant, nor his guardian ad litem, can waive issuance and service of process, nor may either admit an issue against the infant in a suit at law or in equity. Wetherill v. Harris (1879), 67 Ind. 452, 472; DeLa Hunt v. Holderbaugh (1877), 58 Ind. 285; Abdil v. Abdil (1866), 26 Ind. 287; Richards v. Richards (1861), 17 Ind. 636; McEndree v. McEndree (1859), 12 Ind. 97; Pugh v. Pugh (1857), 9 Ind. 132; Martin v. Starr (1855), 7 Ind. 224, 226; Robbins v. Robbins (1850), 2 Ind. 74, Craine v. Parker (1849), 1 Ind. 374; Thompson v. Doe (1847), 8 Blackf. 336; Hough v. Doyle (1846), 8 Blackf. 300; Hough v. Canby (1846), 8 Blackf. 301.”
Our court in the case of Ford v. State (1951), 122 Ind. App. 315, 317, 104 N. E. 2d 406, stated: “The juvenile court cannot acquire jurisdiction in this type of action unless summons is issued and served as provided by the statute. . . .”
Our Supreme Court in the case of Harris, et ux. v. Souder, Supt., supra, at 290, 291, stated:
“In Ford v. State (1952), 122 Ind. App. 315, 104 N. E. 2d 406, the Appellate Court held that lack of notice under §9-3209, Burns’ 1942 Replacement (Supp.), made the judgment void. We agree with this contention. (My emphasis.)
Because of the many omissions and the authorities I have heretofore cited, I am of the opinion that if we are to afford • the child involved in this petition due process of law, as guaranteed by our Constitutions, it is incumbent upon us to reverse the trial court, with instructions to bring these proceedings anew, and that *695the statutes applicable to Juvenile Courts and the procedure thereof be followed strictly, as I do not believe that the juvenile court procedure of this state has been so far socialized and individual rights so ¡far diminished that a child may be taken into juvenile Court and be made a ward of the juvenile court without the strict compliance of the legislative mandate relating thereto. “When there is a lack of jurisdiction of the subject-matter in the trial court, the jurisdictional' question may be raised at any time before final decision and in any manner and if not raised by a party it is our duty sua sponte to raise and determine it. State ex rel. Ayers v. Ewing, Judge (1952), 231 Ind. 1, 10, 106 N. E. 2d 441, and cases there cited.” Wedmore v. State (1954), 233 Ind. 545, 549, 122 N. E. 2d 1.
As the court’s entire proceedings now before, us were without jurisdiction of the subject-matter and without jurisdiction of the child, its' judgment is wholly void.
Note. — Reported in 165 N. E. 2d 770. Transfer denied in which Jackson, C. J., dissents.