Court Opinion

ID: 9765859
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:22:41.135845+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:16.436877
License: Public Domain

Dillard, Judge,
concurring fully and specially.
I concur fully in the majority opinion. I do so with the understanding that our holding rests squarely on the fact that the trial court ordered genetic testing after it had already denied Venable’s motion to set aside the Paternity Acknowledgment and Final Order, thus, leaving no basis for such a ruling.
As I understand it, our decision leaves open for another day whether a putative biological father might, in certain circumstances,3 have standing to ask a court to compel genetic testing— before or contemporaneous with the filing of a motion challenging a judgment of paternity4—based upon a constitutional right to familial relations with the child, notwithstanding the lack of any statutory authority for doing so.

 See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U. S. 248, 248 (103 SC 2985, 77 LE2d 614) (1983) (holding that “[w]here an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by ‘comfing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child,’ his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause” (citation omitted)).

 We have recognized two procedural vehicles by which a final paternity judgment may be challenged: (1) a motion to set aside paternity pursuant to OCGA § 19-7-54; and (2) an extraordinary motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. See Roddenbery v. Roddenbery, 255 Ga. 715, 715-17 (342 SE2d 464) (1986).