Court Opinion

ID: 9849870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:48:12.546605+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:27.640048
License: Public Domain

FAnson, C.J.,
dissenting.
I do not agree with the holding of the majority that the argument to the jury by the plaintiffs counsel requires reversal of the judgment and remand of the case for a new trial.
Here, defendant’s counsel told the jury in his opening statement that payment by the defendant into court of the amount equal to plaintiff’s medical expenses, plus $2,500 for her pain and suffering, was a reasonable offer for her damages. In his closing argument to the jury, defendant’s counsel again stated “we felt [twenty-five hundred additional dollars] was a fairly reasonable sum.”
It was in response to the above statements by defendant’s counsel that plaintiff’s counsel told the jury what, in his opinion, would be a fair award to the plaintiff.
Even if the argument of plaintiff’s counsel was error, which I do not concede under the circumstances here, it was invited by defendant’s counsel, and it did not constitute grounds for reversal and a new trial. See MacGregor v. Bradshaw, 193 Va. 787, 795, 71 S.E.2d 361, 365-6 (1952); Brann v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 181 Va. 213, 221-22, 24 S.E.2d 424, 427 (1943).
The majority opinion concludes that the argument of counsel influenced the jury in arriving at the amount of its verdict. The effect of this is to say that the argument was so prejudicial that the amount of the damages fixed by the jury was excessive. But defendant did not assign as error that the verdict was excessive. Indeed, it was conceded in oral argument before us by counsel for the defendant that he could not say the verdict was excessive as a matter of law. Hence, I cannot conclude that the argument was prejudicial to the defendant. See Phillips v. Fulghum, 203 Va. 543, 549, 125 S.E.2d 835, 840 (1962).
For the reasons stated, I would affirm the judgment.
Compton, J., joins in this dissent.