Court Opinion

ID: 9893545
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-27 17:05:02.054388+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:27.607204
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/27/23 Law Finance Group v. Key CA2/2
Opinion on remand from Supreme Court

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

 LAW FINANCE GROUP, LLC,                                                B305790

           Plaintiff and Appellant,                                     (Los Angeles County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. 19STCP04251)
           v.

 SARAH PLOTT KEY,

           Defendant and Respondent.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Rafael A. Ongkeko, Judge. Affirmed.
      Frost, Christopher L. Frost; Greines, Martin, Stein &
Richland, Cynthia E. Tobisman and Alana H. Rotter for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
      Grignon Law Firm, Margaret M. Grignon and Anne M.
Grignon for Defendant and Respondent.
               _________________________________
        We consider this appeal again on remand from our
Supreme Court. In our original opinion, we reversed the trial
court’s order vacating an arbitration award and directed the trial
court to confirm the award. (Law Finance Group, LLC v. Key
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 307, 325 (Law Finance Group I).) We
concluded that respondent Sarah Plott Key was untimely in
seeking to vacate the award under Code of Civil Procedure
section 1288.2.1 (Id. at p. 318.) We held that: (1) to make a
timely request to vacate an arbitration award under section
1288.2, a response to a petition to confirm the award must be
filed within 100 days of service of the award, even if the petition
to confirm itself is filed within 100 days; (2) the 100-day deadline
under section 1288.2 is jurisdictional; and (3) Key’s tardy
response to appellant Law Finance Group, LLC’s petition to
confirm could not be excused by the doctrines of equitable
estoppel or equitable tolling.2 (Id. at pp. 321–322.)
        Our Supreme Court agreed with us on the first point. The
court rejected Key’s argument that her request to vacate the
arbitration award was timely because she complied with the time
for filing a response to Lender’s petition to confirm the award
under section 1290.6. (Law Finance Group, LLC v. Key (2023)
14 Cal.5th 932, 946 (Law Finance Group II).) Consistent with
our prior opinion, our Supreme Court concluded that section
1290.6 does not supersede the 100-day requirement in section
1288.2. Rather, both statutes should be read together to require

      1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.
      2 We follow our Supreme Court’s lead in referring to Law
Finance Group, LLC as “Lender” in this opinion.

                                 2
compliance with the time limits in each section. (Id. at pp. 946–
947.)
       However, the court reversed our other two holdings. The
court concluded that the 100-day deadline under section 1288.2 is
not jurisdictional. (Law Finance Group II, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
pp. 946–949, 952–953.) The court further held that nothing in
the statutory language or policy underlying section 1288.2
demonstrates that the Legislature intended to preclude the
courts from “applying traditional principles of equity to section
1288.2’s statutory deadline.” (Id. at p. 956.) Thus, section 1288.2
is “subject to both equitable tolling and claims of equitable
estoppel.” (Ibid.) In light of that holding, the court remanded for
us to “determine in the first instance whether equitable
considerations should excuse Key’s failure to comply with the
statutory deadline.” (Id. at p. 960.)
       We now conclude that the doctrine of equitable tolling
applies to excuse Key’s tardy filing. We also affirm the trial
court’s ruling vacating the arbitrators’ award on the ground that
the award violated Key’s unwaivable statutory rights and
contravened an express public policy governing consumer loans.
       We reject Lender’s argument that, in reaching this
decision, the trial court should have reviewed de novo whether
Lender’s loan to Key was a consumer loan. The principle that
trial courts need not defer to arbitrators’ findings when such
deference would contravene public policy does not apply here. In
any event, Lender never asked the trial court to engage in such a
de novo review and therefore forfeited its argument on appeal.
We therefore affirm.

                                 3
                         BACKGROUND
       We only briefly summarize the background facts, which are
discussed in more detail in Law Finance Group I and Law
Finance Group II.
1.     The Loan
       Key filed a probate action against her sister, Elizabeth
Plott Tyler, claiming that Tyler had procured an amendment to a
trust through undue influence over the sisters’ mother. (Law
Finance Group II, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 942.) When Key’s
money ran short, she obtained a $2.4 million loan from Lender to
finance the probate litigation (the Loan). (Ibid.) Lender provided
the Loan pursuant to a contract (Contract) that included the
obligation for Key to pay interest in the amount of 1.53 percent
per month, compounded monthly, along with various fees. (Ibid.)
       Key prevailed in the probate action and repaid the
principal amount of the Loan to Lender. (Law Finance Group II,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 942.) However, she claimed that the
interest and fees were unlawful under the California Financing
Law (CFL). (Fin. Code, § 22000 et seq.)
2.     The Arbitration
       Pursuant to the Contract’s arbitration provision, the
parties arbitrated the dispute over interest and fees. (Law
Finance Group II, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 943.) The arbitrators
found that the Loan was a consumer loan and, based on that
finding, ruled that the compound interest and fee provisions in
the Contract were therefore unlawful under the CFL. (Ibid.)
However, the arbitrators also awarded Lender damages
consisting of simple interest on the Loan, plus an additional
amount for default interest. The award amounted to about
$800,000 in damages, plus attorney fees and costs and the

                                4
expenses of the arbitration. (Ibid.) The arbitrators served their
final award on September 19, 2019. (Ibid.)
3.     Court Proceedings
       On October 1, 2019, Lender filed a petition to confirm the
arbitration award. (Law Finance Group II, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 943.)
       On October 10, 2019, attorneys for Key and Lender
discussed procedural issues concerning the petition. (Law
Finance Group II, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 943.) In that call, Key’s
attorneys disclosed that Key intended to file a petition to vacate
the arbitration award. (Ibid.) The attorneys agreed that the
10-day period under section 1290.6 for Key to respond to Lender’s
petition “will not apply.” (Id. at p. 944.) They also agreed that
Key would file a peremptory challenge to the judge who had been
assigned to hear the petition and would waive personal service of
the petition. In return, Lender’s attorneys agreed to cooperate in
setting up a joint briefing schedule on the parties’ dueling
petitions, working backward from an agreed hearing date that
would be set with the new judge. (Ibid.)
       After additional communications and the disqualification of
another trial judge, the parties eventually agreed on a hearing
date of February 20, 2020. They further discussed and agreed
upon the details of filing and serving the petitions. On
January 27, 2020, 130 days after the arbitrators had served their
award, Key filed her petition to vacate the award. Nine days
later, on February 5, 2020, Key filed her response to Lender’s
petition. Her response requested an order vacating the award.
(Law Finance Group II, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 944.)
       In her filings, Key argued that the arbitrators had exceeded
their authority by awarding damages after finding that the Loan

                                5
was a consumer loan. Key claimed that, under Finance Code
section 22750, the arbitrators should have declared the Loan
void—and, as a result, not awarded any damages—because
Lender had attempted to charge unlawful compound interest and
fees on a consumer loan. (Law Finance Group II, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 944.)
       Lender’s response to Key’s petition to vacate argued that
Key’s petition was untimely because it failed to meet the 100-day
deadline for such a petition under section 1288. (Law Finance
Group II, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 944.) The trial court agreed, but
found that Key’s request to vacate the arbitration award in her
response to Lender’s petition was timely under section 1290.6,
presumably because the parties had agreed to waive the 10-day
response period. (Ibid.) The trial court’s order also stated that,
“If there is a need to extend the time to the actual filing date to
enable the court to decide the petition on its merits, the court
finds good cause to grant such an extension.”
       On the merits, the trial court granted Key’s request to
vacate the arbitration award. The court concluded that the
arbitrators’ award violated Key’s unwaivable statutory rights and
contravened an explicit legislative expression of public policy in
the CFL by failing to find the Contract void after making findings
that the Contract’s interest and fee provisions were unlawful.
(Law Finance Group II, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 944–945.)
                            DISCUSSION
1.     Standard of Review
       This court reviews de novo the trial court’s ruling on a
motion to confirm an arbitration award, except that the
substantial evidence standard applies “[t]o the extent that the
trial court’s ruling rests upon a determination of disputed factual

                                6
issues.” (Lindenstadt v. Staff Builders, Inc. (1997) 55
Cal.App.4th 882, 892, fn. 7 (Lindenstadt).)
       Here, the trial court made no factual findings concerning
Key’s estoppel arguments. It was unnecessary for the court to do
so because the court accepted Key’s argument—subsequently
rejected by both this court and our Supreme Court—that the time
period to file a response to a petition to confirm under section
1290.6 supersedes the 100-day requirement in section 1288.2.
       The trial court stated that it had reviewed the evidence of
the parties’ communications leading up to the hearing, and that
based on that evidence, “the court finds Key’s response is timely
under [section] 1290.6 and should be considered on its merits.”
As mentioned, the court also added that it found “good cause” to
grant an extension if one was necessary to enable the court to
reach the merits.
       This good cause finding apparently referred to the portion
of section 1290.6 that permits the trial court to order an
extension of the time to file a response to a petition to confirm
“for good cause.” (§ 1290.6.) At most, we can infer from this
finding that the trial court identified no bad faith that would
have made an extension of the deadline unfair to any party. The
finding did not directly concern any issue of equitable relief.
Thus, the finding did not include any determination of disputed
facts to which we must defer under the substantial evidence
standard of review.
       In any event, the evidence of the timing and the content of
the parties’ communications leading up to Key’s filing of her
request to vacate is essentially undisputed. Whether equitable
tolling should apply is therefore an issue of law that we decide
independently. (See Singh v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1998) 63

                                7
Cal.App.4th 135, 139–140 [court reviewed the application of
equitable tolling independently as an issue of law where the “key
facts which would affect the application of equitable tolling are
undisputed”].)
       We review de novo the trial court’s decision to vacate the
arbitrators’ award on the ground that the arbitrators exceeded
their powers. (Santa Monica College Faculty Assn. v. Santa
Monica Community College Dist. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 538,
544.)
2.     The Doctrine of Equitable Tolling Excuses
       Key’s Late Filing
       As its name suggests, the doctrine of equitable tolling is
based on the inherent equitable power of the courts to “ ‘soften
the harsh impact of technical rules which might otherwise
prevent a good faith litigant from having a day in court.’ ” (Saint
Francis Memorial Hospital v. State Dept. of Public Health (2020)
9 Cal.5th 710, 719 (Saint Francis I), quoting Addison v. State of
California (1978) 21 Cal.3d 313, 316 (Addison).) The doctrine
applies when three elements are present: “ ‘[(1)] timely notice,
and [(2)] lack of prejudice, to the defendant, and [(3)] reasonable
and good faith conduct on the part of the plaintiff.’ ” (Saint
Francis I, at p. 724, quoting Addison at p. 319.) Although the
doctrine is often applied in cases where a plaintiff pursues one
legal remedy which causes it to miss the statute of limitations on
another, the doctrine is not limited to that factual scenario.
(Saint Francis I, at p. 725.) Rather, to determine if the doctrine
applies, courts must “analyze whether a plaintiff has established
the doctrine’s three elements.” (Id. at pp. 725–726.)
       The first two elements are clearly present here. Key
provided timely notice of her intent to seek an order vacating the

                                 8
arbitration award. Less than a month after the arbitrators had
served their final award, Key told Lender’s counsel that she
intended to petition to vacate the award. The parties thereafter
coordinated the timing of a hearing on both Lender’s petition to
confirm and Key’s petition to vacate. Thus, Lender knew well
within the 100-day deadline that Key intended to seek an order
vacating the award.
       Lender also was not prejudiced by Key’s filing of her
request to vacate 39 days after the 100-day deadline. The timing
was the result of cooperative conduct between the parties to
schedule a mutually convenient date for the hearing on both the
petition to confirm and the request to vacate within the
constraints of available court dates. Lender in fact received
tangible benefits from this cooperation, including an agreement
by Key’s counsel to accept service of Lender’s petition to confirm
and to file an affidavit disqualifying the first judge who had been
assigned to the matter.
       The third element—reasonable and good faith conduct—
“encompass[es] two distinct requirements: A plaintiff’s conduct
must be objectively reasonable and subjectively in good faith.”
(Saint Francis I, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 729.) With respect to the
second requirement, there is no evidence here that Key acted in
bad faith. She did not obtain any litigation advantage from the
delay in filing her request to vacate the arbitration award, other
than the shared benefit of mutually agreeable hearing and filing
dates.
       The more difficult issue is whether Key acted reasonably in
failing to meet the 100-day deadline under section 1288.2. The
test is objective. (Saint Francis I, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 729.) To
determine whether Key’s conduct was reasonable, we must decide

                                 9
whether her actions were “fair, proper, and sensible in light of the
circumstances.” (Ibid.)
        In our prior opinion, we concluded that Key could not
reasonably have relied on any agreement by Lender to extend the
100-day deadline under section 1288.2 for two reasons. First,
unlike section 1290.6, section 1288.2 does not contain a provision
permitting the parties to extend the filing deadline “by an
agreement in writing between the parties.” (§ 1290.6; see Law
Finance Group I, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 317.) Second, we
noted the numerous cases that had treated the 100-day deadline
to file a petition to vacate under section 1288 as jurisdictional.
(Law Finance Group I, at p. 322.) We cited the legal principle
that attorneys are charged with knowledge of the law, and
concluded that, while Key “might have been misled about
[Lender’s] intention to waive the 100-day deadline,” Key “could
not have reasonably believed that [Lender] had the legal
authority to do so.” (Id. at p. 324.)
        Our Supreme Court’s opinion in Law Finance Group II
negates the second of these reasons. The court has now
explained that the time deadline in section 1288.2 is not
jurisdictional, and that the deadline may be extended through
operation of equitable principles. In light of that holding, our
analysis of Key’s conduct necessarily changes.
        Even if the parties did not have authority under section
1288.2 to extend the 100-day filing deadline by stipulation (as
they had under section 1290.6 to extend the 10-day response
time), in light of the cooperation between the parties in arranging
hearing and filing dates on both the petition to confirm and the
request to vacate Key could reasonably have believed that Lender
at least did not intend to raise a timeliness objection to her

                                10
filings.3 And, of critical importance for our current analysis, our
Supreme Court’s conclusion that the filing deadline in section
1288.2 is not jurisdictional means that Key could reasonably rely
on that belief. Because the law did not preclude Lender from
waiving the deadline, the principle that Key’s counsel was
charged with knowledge of the law does not undermine the
reasonableness of her reliance. Had Lender not raised a
timeliness objection to Key’s request to vacate, it could have
waived or forfeited any such objection.4
       In this respect, the facts in this case are distinguishable
from those at issue in Saint Francis Memorial Hospital v. State
Dept. of Public Health (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 965, 969 (Saint
Francis II), which Lender cites. In that case, as here, the Court
of Appeal considered the applicability of equitable tolling on
remand from our Supreme Court. The Supreme Court had held

      3 There is no indication in the record that Key expected
such an objection. Indeed, had she anticipated a timeliness
objection, she presumably would have filed her petition to vacate
earlier.
      4 The conceptual difference between waiver and forfeiture
is not important in this context. (See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th
1287, 1293, fn. 2 [“the correct legal term for the loss of a right
based on failure to timely assert it is ‘forfeiture,’ because a person
who fails to preserve a claim forfeits that claim”].) A defense
based upon a statute that is not jurisdictional in nature may be
waived or forfeited. (See Law Finance Group II, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 950; Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hospital (2017) 2
Cal.5th 330, 342 [whereas noncompliance with a jurisdictional
rule “cannot be excused or forfeited,” a party can forfeit its
noncompliance with a rule that is merely mandatory “by failing
to object”].)

                                 11
that equitable tolling could apply to the time for filing a petition
for a writ of administrative mandamus and remanded for the
Court of Appeal to consider whether the facts warranted applying
the doctrine in that case. (See Saint Francis I, supra, 9 Cal.5th
at pp. 730–731.)
       On remand, the Court of Appeal held that equitable tolling
did not apply. The court concluded that the party who had
missed the filing deadline did not meet the reasonable conduct
requirement because the “plain terms of the relevant statutes”
showed that the statutory time period for filing a petition for a
writ of administrative mandate began to run as soon as the
agency issued its decision stating that the decision was “effective
immediately.” (Saint Francis II, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 976.)
The court reasoned that “it is not objectively reasonable for an
attorney to miss a deadline to file a petition due to a failure to
appreciate easily ascertainable legal principles.” (Id. at p. 969.)
       That same reasoning applies here to the extent that Key
mistakenly believed that timely compliance with the response
period under section 1290.6 meant that the 100-day requirement
under section 1288.2 was inapplicable. Both this court and our
Supreme Court have rejected that legal proposition based on
established principles of statutory interpretation. But, as our
Supreme Court has now held, the law did not preclude Lender
from waiving or forfeiting the 100-day deadline under section
1288.2. Based upon the parties’ communications, Key could
reasonably expect that Lender would not object to her filings as
untimely. Absent such an objection, Lender would have forfeited
its timeliness objection. Key therefore could not know based
upon legal research alone that she needed to file her request to

                                12
vacate the arbitration award within the 100-day period under
section 1288.2.
       That Key did not act more carefully in negotiating with
Lender does not mean that her reliance on Lender’s apparent
intention to proceed with a hearing on the merits was
unreasonable. As we noted in our prior opinion, whether or not
Lender’s conduct misled Key is irrelevant if the section 1288.2
deadline is jurisdictional. But the statute is not jurisdictional,
and principles of equity therefore apply. The effect of Lender’s
apparent acquiescence to the filing and hearing schedule that the
parties discussed is therefore significant. We decline to hold that
a party acts unreasonably for purposes of equitable tolling if it
does not sufficiently paper the file to preclude the possibility of a
litigation “gotcha” by its opponent.
       Thus, the doctrine of equitable tolling excused Key’s failure
to meet the 100-day deadline under section 1288.2. We therefore
proceed to consider Lender’s arguments challenging the merits of
the trial court’s ruling.
3.     The Trial Court Did Not Err in Accepting the
       Arbitrators’ Findings that the Loan Was a
       Consumer Loan
       A.    The principle that a trial court should
             review de novo an arbitrator’s findings
             that contravene public policy does not
             apply here
       A trial court’s authority to disturb arbitration awards is
limited. “[B]oth because it vindicates the intentions of the parties
that the award be final, and because an arbitrator is not
ordinarily constrained to decide according to the rule of law, it is
the general rule that, ‘The merits of the controversy between the

                                 13
parties are not subject to judicial review.’ ” (Moncharsh v. Heily
& Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 11 (Moncharsh), quoting O’Malley v.
Petroleum Maintenance Co. (1957) 48 Cal.2d 107, 111.) Section
1286.2 effectuates this policy by limiting the authority of trial
courts to vacate arbitration awards to specific grounds. One of
those grounds applies when arbitrators have “exceeded their
powers and the award cannot be corrected without affecting the
merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted.”
(§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(4).)
       But this general rule of judicial deference to an arbitrator’s
findings is not without exception. Where an arbitrator makes a
finding that would violate a party’s unwaivable statutory rights
or that would contravene a public policy explicitly set forth by our
Legislature, trial courts may not defer to the arbitrator’s finding
and must instead engage in de novo review of that finding; that is
because the courts have an independent duty to enforce such
rights and public policy, and may not abdicate that duty by
deferring to an arbitrator’s ruling that does not safeguard those
rights and public policy. (Richey v. AutoNation, Inc. (2015) 60
Cal.4th 909, 916 (Richey); Loving & Evans v. Blick (1949) 33
Cal.2d 603, 609, 614 (Loving); Ahdout v. Hekmatjah (2013) 213
Cal.App.4th 21, 38 (Ahdout).) This exception is the reason why
trial courts will engage in de novo review of an arbitrator’s
finding that a contract is valid or enforceable where a party
challenging that finding argues it was made in contravention of a
statutory right or explicit public policy; deferring to the
arbitrator’s finding that the contract is valid in this situation
risks leaving that right or public policy unenforced. (Ahdout, at
pp. 24, 38–39 [so concluding where arbitrator’s finding that
party had not acted as a contractor contravened public policy that

                                 14
unlicensed contractors may not retain compensation for
contracting work]; Loving, at pp. 608, 610, 615 [same, where
failure to comply with state licensing requirements rendered
entire transaction giving rise to arbitration and resulting award
invalid]; Lindenstadt, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 892 [same,
where arbitrator’s finding that party acted lawfully as a finder,
rather than unlawfully as an unlicensed real estate broker,
determined whether agreement was valid].)
       Lender seeks to invoke this exception here, urging that the
trial court should have engaged in a de novo review of the
arbitrators’ findings that the Loan is a consumer loan.
       This argument is not well taken.
       Unlike in Ahdout, Loving, and Lindenstadt, Lender is not
challenging an arbitrator’s finding that a contract is lawful
notwithstanding a statute or public policy that might render it
unlawful. That is because the arbitrators in this case determined
that there was an overriding public policy—namely, the CFL
(Fin. Code, §§ 22750, subd. (b), 22309, 22306)—and went on to
find that the Contract in this case contravened that public policy
and was therefore invalid. Thus, there is no need for greater
judicial scrutiny in order to safeguard a statutory right or express
public policy. The de novo review standard simply does not apply
in this context. (Accord, Bacall v. Shumway (2021) 61
Cal.App.5th 950, 959 [rejecting application of exception in
similarly “opposite scenario” where party argued “award must be
vacated because the arbitrator erroneously failed to enforce a
legal contract”].)
       The only reason that Lender received an award in its favor
is because the arbitrators—notwithstanding their finding that
the Contract was void—still awarded a remedy. But we need not

                                15
evaluate whether the remedy awarded in this case was
appropriate—under any standard—because Lender does not
dispute that, if the Loan was a consumer loan and the interest
provisions in the Contract therefore violated the CFL, the remedy
afforded by the arbitrators is invalid. Thus, there is no basis for
applying de novo review.
       Because the exception specifying de novo review is
inapplicable, Lender is left claiming that the arbitrators’ finding
that the Loan is a “consumer loan” is an error of fact and law. As
such errors are outside of the limited judicial review of
arbitration awards (Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 11 [“an
arbitrator’s decision cannot be reviewed for errors of fact or
law”]), Lender’s claim necessarily fails.
       B.    Lender failed to preserve its argument that
             the trial court was required to conduct a
             de novo review
       An additional reason exists to reject Lender’s argument
that the trial court was required to conduct a de novo review of
the legality of the Contract: Lender never asked the trial court to
review the evidence supporting the arbitrators’ findings. Indeed,
Lender petitioned to confirm the award, and expressly argued
that “[no] grounds exist to correct or vacate the award”—yet, such
grounds would have to exist to trigger the exception for de novo
review. Lender has therefore forfeited the argument that the
trial court was required to do so. (See Richey, supra, 60 Cal.4th
at p. 920, fn. 3 [plaintiff waived argument that arbitrator’s
findings were based upon an illegal contract provision when he
failed to raise the argument in the trial court].)
       Lender argues that it was not required to request a de novo
review of the evidence in the trial court because it was Key’s

                                16
responsibility to obtain “independent findings on every issue
necessary to obtain vacatur.” As discussed above, there was no
apparent legal justification for the trial court to review the
arbitrator’s findings on the issue of whether the Loan was a
consumer loan, much less a legal requirement that it do so. But
even if independent findings were necessary here, Lender does
not cite any authority showing that it was Key’s obligation to ask
for them. And, in any event, even if Key had such an obligation,
Lender still was required to object to Key’s proposal for a
procedure that Lender now claims was improper.
       “ ‘An appellate court will ordinarily not consider procedural
defects or erroneous rulings, in connection with relief sought or
defenses asserted, where an objection could have been but was
not presented to the lower court by some appropriate method.’ ”
(Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 180, 184,
fn. 1, quoting 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Appeal,
§ 276, pp. 4264–4265.) In particular, objections to evidence are
forfeited if not made. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).)
       Key sought an order vacating the arbitrators’ award on the
ground that the remedy awarded to Lender violated public policy
in light of the findings that the arbitrators had made regarding
the Contract. Her request therefore invited the trial court to rely
on the arbitrators’ findings as the factual and legal support for
vacating the arbitration award. (See Loving, supra, 33 Cal.2d at
p. 621 (dis. opn. of Carter, J.) [whether or not contract was valid
is mixed question of law and fact].) If Lender believed that the
trial court could not properly rely on those findings, Lender was
required at a minimum to object to the procedure that Key
proposed.

                                 17
        Finding error in the trial court’s reliance on the arbitrators’
findings here in the absence of any contrary request or objection
by any party would be particularly unfair to the trial court in
light of the deference that the courts must give to arbitrators’
findings. As discussed above, the courts’ authority to revisit
arbitration findings is very limited. And even when an exception
exists permitting such review, a party must invoke it. The
findings at issue here did not exceed the arbitrators’ powers or
the scope of the arbitration. Under these circumstances, there
was no reason for the trial court to review the arbitrators’
findings absent a request by a party, or even to consider whether
it had the authority to do so. If Lender believed that the trial
court was required to independently review the evidence and law
that the Loan was a consumer loan in connection with Key’s
request to vacate the arbitrators’ award, it should have asked the
court to conduct such a review.
        Lender also urges this court to apply an exception to the
rule that appellants may not raise new issues on appeal because
the question whether the trial court was required to conduct a de
novo review of illegality was a “purely legal issue.” That may be
so, but the legal issue also bears on a factual one. Considering a
purely legal issue for the first time on appeal may be permissible
if it can fairly be done on the existing factual record and does not
depend upon facts that were not presented in the trial court. (See
Redevelopment Agency v. City of Berkeley (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d
158, 167 [exception to waiver rule applies “where the theory
presented for the first time on appeal involves only a legal
question determinable from facts which not only are
uncontroverted in the record, but which could not be altered by
the presentation of additional evidence”].) And even when that is

                                  18
the case, whether to make an exception to the general rule is
“largely a question of the appellate court’s discretion.” (Ibid.)
      Here, Lender does not seek to have this court decide an
issue of law based on the existing factual record. Rather, its
argument is that the factual record itself is lacking. It would be
unfair to find reversible error in the trial court’s failure to find
particular facts when Lender never requested such findings.
                          DISPOSITION
      The trial court’s order is affirmed. Key is entitled to her
costs on appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                            LUI, P. J.
We concur:

      ASHMANN-GERST, J.

      HOFFSTADT, J.

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