Court Opinion

ID: 9672295
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:52:14.942926+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:15.272846
License: Public Domain

Robert W. Hansen, J.
(dissenting). Can the appellate court in this state require trial judges to file an annual report of their incomes, assets and liabilities, such report to include the assets owned and liabilities owed by their spouses and legal dependents?1
Power in legislature. The power to command necessarily carries with it the power to enforce the command. So we deal not only with the power to establish rules of judicial conduct, but to provide sanctions or penalties for such rules not being met. Except for the power of the people to recall holders of judicial office,2 the only constitutional authority for penalizing judicial misconduct is contained in art. VII, secs. 1 and 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution. Sec. 1 provides for impeachment by the state assembly and trial before the state senate of all civil officers, judges included.3 Thus the power to *535impeach is constitutionally placed in the legislative branch of our state government. Sec. 13 of art. YII of the constitution provides that any judge may be removed from office by address of both houses of the legislature if two thirds of all the members elected to each house concur.4 The only constitutional authority to discipline the judiciary now rests with the legislature. A change in this exclusivity of constitutional delegation of power has been proposed,5 but we deal with the constitution as it is, not as it may some day read. The majority concedes that this appellate court has no authority under the Wisconsin Constitution to remove or suspend a judge from office. This court has so held.6 *536However, the majority sees this court as somehow acceding to a right to punish, via contempt proceedings, by censure or reprimand, even though the power to suspend or remove a judge from office has been constitutionally placed with the legislature. This interpretation sees the removal from office of a judge for misconduct as one that, under our constitution, can be imposed only by the legislature as an appropriate penalty or sanction for misconduct, but sees the appellate court as having been delegated or retaining the right to impose the less onerous consequence of reprimand or censure. The writer sees the whole area of the consequences of judicial misconduct, from reprimand to removal, as having been constitutionally delegated to the legislative branch of our government. Such interpretation is supported by the provision in the impeachment constitutional provision, providing that the penalty may “not extend further than to removal from office.”7 So the writer would hold that the grant of disciplinary power to the legislature over judges may not extend further than removal from office, but includes the sole and exclusive right to censure or reprimand, as well as the sole and exclusive right under the constitution to remove judges from office. The writer would find the right to censure or reprimand a judge to be constitutionally placed, along with the right to suspend or remove from office, in the province of the *537legislature. The writer would place the right to enact rules related to judicial misconduct to be, subject to constitutional limits, in the same province.
No express authority. Such finding of a constitutional delegation to the legislature of any right to discipline judges is further buttressed by the absence of any express authority in the Wisconsin Constitution for this court to formally censure or reprimand for failing to comply with a rule of judicial conduct, not legislatively enacted. The Wisconsin Constitution, in creating the Wisconsin Supreme Court, expressly provided: “The supreme court, except in cases otherwise provided in this constitution, shall have appellate jurisdiction only . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.)8 One needs only a dictionary to determine the limits of “appellate9 jurisdiction only.” Whether this constitutional delineation of authority is seen as a grant of jurisdiction or as a limit upon the jurisdiction here makes no difference. What the court can do and what the court cannot do are alike spelled out. The supreme court in this state is limited to an appellate role, reviewing on appeal the actions and judgments of trial and inferior courts. There are only two exceptions, both in the same constitutional section. One is the power to issue certain writs in certain situations.10 That is not applicable *538in any way to the situation before us for we have no seeking of an original or remedial writ in the issuance of a judicial code provision or in seeking to enforce it. The other exception is that: “The supreme court shall have a general superintending control over all inferior courts . . . (Emphasis supplied.)11 Our court has held that: “The superintending power is over the courts and not over the person who happens to be judge of the court acting in an administrative capacity.”12 The constitutional reference is to the court processes, and there is authority for holding that, even as to matters in litigation, it is a control that “will be exercised only at the behest of a party to a proceeding in an inferior court and then for his protection.”13
The majority opinion responds that, while superintending control has up to now been used only to control courts in matters between parties to litigation, that does not mean that it cannot be broadened now or in the future. True enough, but only up to the limit of the constitutional authority delegated. We deal here with three separate and distinct grants of jurisdiction to the appellate court by the state constitution: (1) The appellate jurisdiction; (2) the original jurisdiction to be exercised by certain writs constitutionally named; and (3) the superintending control over inferior courts.14 Our court has held: *539“The power of superintending control is the power to ‘control the course of ordinary litigation in inferior courts,’ as exercised at common law by the court of King’s Bench, and by the use of writs specifically mentioned in the constitution and other writs there referred to or authorized.”15 The majority opinion responds that the decisions limiting “superintending control” to matters between parties to a litigation can be disregarded because “superintending” contemplates . . ongoing, continuing supervision in response to changing needs and circumstances.” But the limitation in the constitution is not in the word “superintending.” The limitation is in the phrase “over all inferior courts.” Disregard of precedent in statutory or constitutional construction is hardly the general rule, but, if done, ought not to include going beyond a constitutional authority as expressly granted and expressly limited.16
Actually, language about control over inferior courts appears twice in the state constitution. First, the constitution gives to the supreme court a “superintending control over all inferior courts.”17 Secondly, the constitu*540tion gives to circuit courts a “supervisory control” over “all inferior courts and tribunals.”18 It is difficult to see why the meaning or purpose would be any different in either reference. The majority does not suggest that the circuit courts have been given constitutional authority to order a report to them of assets owned or liabilities owed by spouses or children of county judges or municipal justices.
Thus, it was a long time ago that this court construed the constitutional grant of a superintending power over inferior courts to be limited to “. . . the power to ‘control the course of ordinary litigation in inferior courts,’ . . .” and only “. . . by the use of writs specifically mentioned in the constitution and other writs there referred to or authorized.”19 The construction then given the constitutional grant can now be altered, but what cannot be altered is the constitutional creation of this court as one with appellate jurisdiction only, given a superintending control only over inferior courts, not judges or their wives, and with original jurisdiction to be exercised only by certain named writs.20 For it remains true, today as at the turn-of-the-century, as this court said then, that:
“While the true limits of judicial power must be jealously guarded and firmly maintained, it would be as dangerous to extend as to limit the same, by giving to the language in which the jurisdiction was granted a meaning different from that which was in mind when the grant was made. The power of superintending control, as has been decided and before indicated, has to do only with controlling inferior courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction by the use of instruments mentioned specifically in the constitution or authorized thereby; . . ”21
*541No “inherent” power. Perhaps recognizing the length and the structural weakness of the bridge attempted between a constitutional grant of a superintending control over inferior courts and holding a judge in contempt for failure to report his wife’s assets and liabilities, the majority opinion begins with and stresses a claim of an “inherent” power of an appellate court to regulate and discipline trial judges. The claim is that the adoption of Rule 17 of the Judicial Ethics Code is an action of this court . . performed under its inherent power to function as the supreme court . . . .” In what it terms an “amplification” of such inherent power of an appellate court, the majority opinion does quote from a decision of this court that: “No one entertains the thought, whether it be called inherent or implied, that it is a power which transcends the constitution.”22 But no mention of the constitutional delegation or limitations upon the authority of this court accompanies the claim in the majority opinion that: “. . . this court, as the supreme court within a statewide system of courts, has an inherent power to adopt those statewide measures which are absolutely essential to the due administration of justice in the state.” This claim of power is mind-boggling. Can it be seriously asserted that four members of this court can adopt any “statewide measures” that they consider “absolutely essential” to the “due administration of justice?”
Where in the Wisconsin Constitution is there any basis or foundation for so caesarean a claim to an unlimited and unqualified power to do whatever it considers “essential” without regard to the grant and limits to its authority in the state constitution itself? That constitution does establish a “judicial power” or judicial branch of government in this state, providing: “The judicial power of this state, both as to matters of law and equity, *542shall be vested in a supreme court, circuit courts, and courts of probate. . . .”23 But this creation of an appellate court, trial courts and probate courts is followed, not only with a precise spelling out of the limited function of the appellate court, but also by an equally precise spelling out of the function and authority delegated to circuit courts as constitutionally established entities.24 We do not deal here with the common-law authority of courts to determine who should constitute or become attorneys at law.25 We do not deal with situations where public disclosure was required by statute,26 accomplished by regulation secured through public initiative,27 or pursuant to an express constitutional provision requiring disclosure.28 We deal solely with the constitutional grants of authority to the appellate court and the trial courts in this state. Unless those constitutional provisions as to each and both are to be disregarded, the *543writer sees no way in which the claim of an inherent power of the Wisconsin Supreme Court to discipline and penalize a trial court judge for failing to report his wife’s assets and liabilities to the appellate court can be located or sustained.
To the contention that requiring public disclosure of a trial judge’s personal assets, and those of his wife and dependents, this court went beyond “the ambit of the power of this court to promulgate,” the majority opinion responds that this argument “. . . ignores the recent erosion of confidence in and respect for public officials which has been so detrimental to our system of government.” The majority’s reference obviously is to the public interest served by financial disclosures on the part of those in public employment. It is puzzling, however, for the “growing skepticism” to which the majority refers as to the integrity of public officials “at all levels,” to some measure, derives in part from the claim of some in the executive branch of the federal government to an entitlement to do, not what the constitution or law of the land prescribed, but what, in their judgment, served the best interests or security of the nation. Mistakenly, they claimed and asserted an “inherent power” to do what they believed “absolutely essential” to the “due administration” of national affairs and security. Confusing the desirability of ends sought to be served with the legitimacy or constitutionality of means used does not serve either to lessen skepticism nor to strengthen constitutional government. The writer has not addressed himself to the desirability of the end sought to be served by Eule 17, but rather to the question of whether Eule 17 was, indeed, beyond “the ambit of the power of this court to promulgate.”
Separation of powers. The writer concurs completely with the contention in petitioner’s brief that: “. . . without an express grant of authority this court cannot create laws of judicial conduct, adjudge alleged violations *543aof those laws, and mete out discipline against judges . . . .”29 Stated generally, it is for the legislature to enact the laws, for the executive branch to administer them, and for the judicial branch to interpret and, within constitutional limits, apply them. Ours is a government of checks and balances, with powers thus separated between legislative, executive and judicial branches. No one such branch is to enact the law, administer the law, interpret the law and impose the penalty for its violation, at least not in the absence of specific constitutional authorization so to do. It follows that this court, in the absence of constitutional authorization, had and has no authority to (1) promulgate a Rule 17 requiring trial judges to report their income, assets and liabilities, and the assets and liabilities of their spouses and dependents; (2) provide a penalty or sanction for noncompliance with such promulgated Rule 17; and (8) apply such penalty or sanction to a trial judge, here a probate judge, who fails or refuses to comply with the requirements of Rule 17. This court has said that it cannot legislate.30 What is here accomplished goes well beyond legislating. Here this court makes the law, provides the penalty, administers the law and imposes the sanction for noncompliance. It would take, the writer submits, a constitutional amendment to make such merging of legislative, executive and judicial functions in a single court of one branch of our government constitutionally permissible.
For the reasons stated, each and all of them, the writer would hold that Rule 17, added to the Judicial Ethics Code, is not valid, being beyond the constitutional authority of this court to promulgate. It would then follow *543bthat the petitioner, the Honorable Charles E. Kading, is not in contempt of this court for failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 17. The writer would order the contempt proceedings against the Honorable Charles E. Kading dismissed.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Leo B. Hanley and Mr. Justice Connor T. Hansen join in this dissent.

 As required by Rule 17, issued by this court by divided vote on June 28, 1974, effective December 81, 1974, as an addition or amendment of the state Judicial Ethics Code, issued by this court on November 14, 1967, effective January 1,1968.

 Art. XIII, sec. 12, Wis. Const., providing, upon petition by a required number of qualified electors, elections shall be held “. . . for the recall of any elective officer after the first year of the term for which he was elected . . . .”

 Art. VII, sec. 1, Wis. Const, (as amended November, 1932), providing in part: “The court for the trial of impeachments shall be composed of the senate. The assembly shall have the power of impeaching all civil officers of this state for corrupt conduct in office, or for crimes and misdemeanors; but a majority of all the members elected shall concur in an impeachment. ... No judicial officer shall exercise his office, after he shall have been impeached, until his acquittal. Before the trial of an impeachment the members of the court shall take an oath or affirmation truly and impartially to try the impeachment according to evidence; and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present. . . .”

 Art. VII, sec. 13, Wis. Const, (as amended April, 1974), provides: “Any judge oí the supreme, circuit, county or municipal court may be removed from office by address of both houses of the legislature, if two-thirds of all the members elected to each house concur therein, but no removal shall be made by virtue of this section unless the judge complained of shall have been served with a copy of the charges against him, as the ground of address, and shall have had an opportunity of being heard in his defense. On the question of removal, the ayes and noes shall be entered on the journals.”

 In 1973, Assembly Joint Resolution 5 was considered by the legislature. (See: Wisconsin Legislative Council, “Report to the Legislature on Court Reorganization” (March, 1973)). It would have amended art. VII, sec. 13, of the Wisconsin Constitution, providing for legislative removal from judicial office, by adding: “Justices of the supreme court and all judges are subject to suspension or removal for cause or for disability by the supreme court in accordance with law and with procedural rules promulgated by the court. The office of the justice or judge is vacant on entry of the order for removal.” This resolution for a proposed constitutional amendment was not passed by the legislature.

 In re Code of Judicial Ethics (1971), 52 Wis. 2d vii at page ix, this court promulgating, as to judges violating the court-issued Judicial Ethics Code, that: “A judge may be removed or suspended* from office for:
“(a) Willful violation of a rule of the Code of Judicial Ethics;
“ (b) willful and persistent failure to perform his official duties;
*536“(c) habitual intemperance . . . ;
“(d) conviction of a felony involving moral turpitude,” but conceding, the asterisked footnote states: “*These sanctions require constitutional amendment.” (The sanctions or penalties of reprimand or censure were not listed as similarly requiring constitutional amendment.)

 Art. VII, sec. 1, Wis. Const, (as amended November, 1932), providing in material part: “. . . Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office, or removal from office and disqualification to hold any office of honor, profit or trust under the state; but the party impeached shall be liable to indictment, trial and punishment according to law.”

 Art. VII, sec. 3, Wis. Const.

 See: Webster’s, New International Dictionary (3d ed., unabridged), page 103: “. . . having the power to review and affirm, reverse, or modify the judgment or decision of another tribunal.” See also: Seiler v. State (1901), 112 Wis. 293, 299, 87 N. W. 1072, this court holding: “Appellate jurisdiction extends only to the revision of the decisions of inferior courts.” (Emphasis in opinion.)

 Art. VII, sec. 3, Wis. Const., providing in material part: “. . . [I]t [the supreme court] shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo warranto, certiorari, and other original and remedial writs, and to hear and determine the same.”

 Id.

 State ex rel. Department of Agriculture v. Aarons (1946), 248 Wis. 419, 423, 22 N. W. 2d 160.

 Petition of Heil (1939), 230 Wis. 428, 430, 284 N. W. 42, where petitioner, not a party to the action in the trial court, sought to invoke “superintending control over inferior courts,” this court holding: “It is considered that this court cannot entertain this action for two reasons: (1) Petitioner is not a party to the action in the circuit court, and it is a well established rule that superintending control will be exercised only at the behest of a party to a proceeding in an inferior court, and then for his protection

 Seiler v. State, supra, footnote 9, at page 299, this court holding: “In that [art. VII, sec. 3, Wis. Const.], as has been *539decided, there are separate and distinct grants of jurisdiction: ‘(1) the appellate jurisdiction; (2) the superintending control over inferior courts; and (3) the original jurisdiction to be exercised by certain writs.’ [Cases cited.] What the general nature of the limits of those distinct grants of power is, is a judicial question, and has been answered and the law in regard thereto firmly settled by the decisions of this court.”

 Id. at page 299.

 Id. at page 300, this court holding: “The term ‘superintending control’ then had a well-defined meaning, and it, and none other, was carried into the constitution by the framers thereof. In order to correctly understand that meaning, we must view the constitution from the standpoint of its framers. If we were not anchored firmly to the common-law idea of the extent of mere superintending control of one court over another, as distinguished from appellate jurisdiction, we should drift at once into confusion in respect to the scope of the authority of this court.”

 Art. VII, sec. 3, Wis. Const.

 Art. VII, sec. 8, Wis. Const.

 Seiler v. State, supra, footnote 9, at page 299.

 Art. VII, sec. 3, Wis. Const.

 Seiler v. State, supra, footnote 9, at page 300.

 In re Cannon (1932), 206 Wis. 374, 393, 240 N. W. 441.

 Art. VII, see. 2, Wis. Const., entitled: “Judicial power, where vested.”

 Art. VII, sec. 8, Wis. Const., entitled “Circuit Court, jurisdiction,” providing: “The circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal within this state, not excepted in this constitution, and not hereafter prohibited by law; and appellate jurisdiction from all inferior courts and tribunals, and a supervisory control over the same. They shall also have the power to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo warranto, certiorari, and all other writs necessary to carry into effect their orders, judgments and decrees, and give them a general control over inferior courts and jurisdictions.”

 See: In re Integration of Bar Cases (1946), 249 Wis. 523, 25 N. W. 2d 500, and (1956), 273 Wis. 281, 77 N. W. 2d 602; Lathrop v. Donohue (1960), 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N. W. 2d 404, affirmed (1961), 367 U. S. 820, 81 Sup. Ct. 1826, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1191; and In re Cannon, supra, footnote 22.

 See: County of Nevada v. MacMillen (1974), 11 Cal. 3d 662, 114 Cal. Rptr. 345, 522 Pac. 2d 1345.

 See: Fritz v. Gorton (1974), 83 Wash. 2d 275, 517 Pac. 2d 911.

 See: Stein v. Howlett (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 570, 289 N. E. 2d 409.

 Brief in support of the Honorable Charles E. Kading that Rule 17 of the Code of Judicial Ethics and enforcement thereof are unconstitutional, at page 15.

 Friedrich v. Zimmerman (1941), 238 Wis. 148, 154, 298 N. W. 760, this court holding: “The courts have no power to legislate.”