Court Opinion

ID: 9920999
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 00:09:14.416515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:48:00.132176
License: Public Domain

01/18/2024
                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                               AT JACKSON
                                   September 13, 2023 Session

       JESSICA NEAL v. PATTON & TAYLOR ENTERPRISES, LLC

                      Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County
                        No. CT-3767-21     James F. Russell, Judge
                         ___________________________________

                               No. W2022-01144-COA-R3-CV
                           ___________________________________

This appeal arises from a single-car accident in which the vehicle crashed into a fence,
dumpster, and construction materials in the far-right lane of a city street. The plaintiff,
who was sitting in the front passenger seat of the vehicle at the time of the accident,
executed a release with the driver and the driver’s insurance company. The plaintiff
subsequently filed a complaint against the construction company who placed the
construction materials on the street, alleging negligence and negligence per se. The
defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion on the
ground that the claim against the defendant was precluded by the release. The plaintiff
appealed. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed and
                                    Remanded

CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. STEVEN
STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., and ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, J., joined.

Daniel A. Seward, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jessica Neal.

Michael G. Derrick, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, Patton & Taylor Enterprises,
LLC.

                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION1

      1
          Rule 10 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals provides as follows:

      This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse
      or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion
                       I.      FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       In October 2015, Jessica Neal was riding in the front passenger seat of Danielle
Boyle’s vehicle in downtown Memphis when the vehicle ran through a fence and collided
with construction materials and a dumpster in the far-right lane of the street. As a result of
the crash, Ms. Neal allegedly suffered multiple injuries, including a crushed palate and loss
of five teeth. In November 2015, Ms. Neal executed a release with Ms. Boyle and Ms.
Boyle’s insurer, GEICO Advantage Insurance Company (“GEICO”).

        In September 2020, Ms. Neal filed suit against Patton & Taylor Enterprises, LLC
(“Patton & Taylor”) in the General Sessions Court of Shelby County, alleging that Patton
& Taylor was negligent in “maintaining, creating and/or supervising a construction site
that constituted an unsafe and dangerous condition” at the site of the accident and that
Patton & Taylor’s negligence was a “direct and proximate cause” of her injuries.2 The
general sessions court entered judgment for Patton & Taylor. Ms. Neal appealed to the
circuit court.

       After appealing from the general sessions court, Ms. Neal amended her complaint.
In the amended complaint, she alleged that Patton & Taylor was negligent in placing the
fencing, dumpster, and construction materials on the street without proper lighting or
signage and that Patton & Taylor’s negligence was the direct and proximate cause of her
injuries. She also alleged that Patton & Taylor was “guilty of violating” ordinances of the
City of Memphis and Shelby County, and that these violations “constitute[d] negligence
per se . . . .” Patton & Taylor filed an answer denying that it was liable for Ms. Neal’s
injuries and raising six affirmative defenses, one of which was that the claims of Ms. Neal
were barred under the “doctrines of release and/or accord and satisfaction.”

       In June 2022, Patton & Taylor moved for summary judgment on the ground that
Ms. Neal’s claims were barred by the release and, as an additional and alternative ground,
that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the cause of the underlying
accident. For this second ground, Patton & Taylor referenced a response to a set of
interrogatories from another lawsuit filed by Patton & Taylor against Ms. Boyle, wherein
she answered that the accident was caused by a sudden emergency and was unavoidable
due to an animal that suddenly ran out in front of the vehicle. In response to the motion
for summary judgment, Ms. Neal argued that the release did not include any claim against
Patton & Taylor and that Ms. Boyle’s interrogatory responses improperly rendered an

        would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion it shall
        be designated “MEMORANDUM OPINION,” shall not be published, and shall not be
        cited or relied on for any reason in any unrelated case.
        2
          Ms. Neal originally filed an action in the circuit court in September 2016. This action was
consolidated with Patton & Taylor’s action against Ms. Boyle. In June 2019, Ms. Neal took a voluntary
nonsuit without prejudice.
                                                -2-
expert opinion that she was not qualified to give. Ms. Neal also contended that Patton &
Taylor improperly used the “lay opinion testimony” of Ms. Boyle to establish that it was
not negligent. Additionally, Ms. Neal submitted an affidavit stating that she did not intend
to release Patton & Taylor and that she did not know that she had a potential claim or cause
of action against Patton & Taylor when she signed the release. In the affidavit, Ms. Neal
further stated that Ms. Boyle was not the cause of the accident.

       In August 2022, the trial court issued an order granting Patton & Taylor’s motion
for summary judgment on the ground that Ms. Neal’s claims were precluded by the release.
Because the court had granted summary judgment based upon the release, the trial court
did not rule upon the second ground. Ms. Neal subsequently appealed.

                              II.    ISSUES PRESENTED
       Ms. Neal presents the following issues for review on appeal, which we have copied
verbatim from her brief:

       1. Whether the release executed by appellant/plaintiff Jessica Neal to Danielle Boyle
       and GEICO Advantage Insurance Company is a release of liability to
       appellee/defendant Patton & Taylor Enterprises, LLC for the accident at issue;

       2. Whether appellee/defendant presented admissible evidence that negates an
       essential element of appellant’s claim or demonstrated that the appellant’s evidence
       at the summary judgment stage was insufficient to establish appellant’s claim
       through the interrogatory responses of Danielle Boyle taken in a lawsuit filed by
       appellee/defendant versus Danielle Boyle.

In its posture as appellee, Patton & Taylor presents the following issues for review on
appeal, which we have slightly restated:

       1. Whether the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Patton &
       Taylor on the ground that Ms. Neal released her claims against Patton & Taylor
       when she executed a general release that discharged the driver of the vehicle
       involved in the underlying accident, her insurance company, her successors and
       assigns, “and all other persons, firms or corporations of and from any and every
       claim” of liability arising out of the October 3, 2015 accident;

       2. Whether the trial court granted Patton & Taylor’s Motion for Summary Judgment
       based solely on the plain language of the release and without reaching the issue of
       causation, therefore rendering that issue moot on appeal.

For the following reasons, we reverse the decision of the circuit court and remand for
                                         -3-
further proceedings.

                             III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. “A disputed fact is material if it must be
decided in order to resolve the substantive claim or defense at which the motion is
directed.” Perkins v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 380 S.W.3d 73, 80 (Tenn. 2012) (quoting
Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 215 (Tenn. 1993)). Furthermore, “[a] disputed fact presents
a genuine issue if ‘a reasonable jury could legitimately resolve that fact in favor of one side
or the other.’” Id. (quoting Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 215). A trial court’s decision to grant
summary judgment is reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness. Falls v.
Goins, 673 S.W.3d 173, 178 (Tenn. 2023). On appeal, we must “make a fresh
determination about whether the requirements of Rule 56 have been met.” TWB Architects,
Inc. v. Braxton, LLC, 578 S.W.3d 879, 887 (Tenn. 2019) (citing Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr.
of Memphis, 477 S.W.3d 235, 250 (Tenn. 2015)).

        A moving party who does not bear the burden of proof at trial can meet its burden
of production “either (1) by affirmatively negating an essential element of the nonmoving
party’s claim or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party’s evidence at the summary
judgment stage is insufficient to establish the nonmoving party’s claim or defense.” Id.
(quoting Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 264). Then, “[t]he nonmoving party must demonstrate the
existence of specific facts in the record which could lead a rational trier of fact to find in
favor of the nonmoving party.” Id. at 889 (quoting Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 265). We accept
the evidence presented by the nonmoving party as true, allow all reasonable inferences in
its favor, and resolve any doubts about the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in
its favor. Id. at 887.

                                    IV.    DISCUSSION

                                     A.     The Release

        A release is a contract, and thus, the rules of construction for interpreting contracts
are used in construing a release. Jackson v. Miller, 776 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1989) (citing 76 C.J.S. Release § 38 (1952)). “A release ordinarily covers all such matters
as may fairly be said to have been within the contemplation of the parties when it was
given.” Id. at 118 (quoting 76 C.J.S. Release § 52 (1952)). “A corollary to this principle
is that a claim ‘of which a party was ignorant when the release was given is not as a rule .
. . embraced therein.’” Marlett v. Thomason, No. M2006-00038-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL
1048950, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2007) (quoting Jackson, 776 S.W.2d at 118). In

                                             -4-
determining the scope of a release, this Court has quoted, with approval, 66 American
Jurisprudence 2d 706, section 30, which states:

       The scope of a release is determined by the intention of the parties as
       expressed in the terms of the particular instrument, considered in the light of
       all the facts and circumstances. The intention of the parties is to be gathered
       from the entire instrument and in such inquiry that construction will be
       adopted which gives effect to each and every part of the instrument where
       that is possible. In interpreting a release to determine whether a particular
       claim has been discharged, the primary rule of construction is that the
       intention of the parties shall govern and this intention is to be determined
       with a consideration of what was within the contemplation of the parties
       when the release was executed, which in turn is to be resolved in the light of
       all of the surrounding facts and circumstances under which the parties acted.

Evans v. Tillett Bros. Const. Co., 545 S.W.2d 8, 11 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976).

        On appeal, Patton & Taylor maintains that the language of the release is
unambiguous, and therefore, this Court does not need to look beyond the plain meaning of
the document to determine the parties’ intent. However, even when a release was
unambiguous, this Court has looked to the facts and circumstances surrounding the
execution of the release to ascertain the parties’ intent. See, e.g., Richland Country Club,
Inc. v. CRC Equities, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 554, 558 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991); see generally
Individual Healthcare Specialists, Inc. v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee, Inc., 566
S.W.3d 671, 692 (Tenn. 2019) (noting that Tennessee cases on contract interpretation
“reflect balance; they demonstrate a definite focus on the written words in the parties’
contract, but they also consider evidence related to the situation of the parties and the
circumstances of the transaction in interpreting those words”). In Richland, the defendants
moved for partial summary judgment on the basis of a release included in agreements
signed by the plaintiff. Richland, 832 S.W.2d at 556. The trial court granted the
defendants’ motion, finding that the agreement was unambiguous and amounted to a
complete release of the claims asserted in the plaintiff’s complaint. Id. The plaintiff
subsequently moved the court to alter or amend the judgment and filed two affidavits
concerning the intention of the parties in signing the release agreement. Id. The trial court
refused to consider the affidavits and overruled the motion. Id. On appeal, this Court
found that the trial court erred because “it appear[ed] that the circumstances surrounding
the execution of the documents in this case, the situation of the parties, the business to
which the agreements related . . . and the subject matter of the agreements in general should
have been considered in construing the effect of the release.” Id. at 557. After considering
the circumstances through the affidavits entered by the plaintiff, this Court concluded that
summary judgment was inappropriate because “a trier of fact could draw different
inferences about the parties’ intent.” Id.

                                            -5-
        We reached the opposite result in Peatross v. Shelby County, No. W2008-02385-
COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 2922797 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2009). In Peatross, the
defendants asserted that a release signed by the heirs of a decedent released any claim that
the plaintiff, the administrator of the decedent’s estate, might have against the defendants.
Id. at *2. To determine whether the trial court correctly granted summary judgment on the
plaintiff’s claims, we “first consider[ed] the language of the [r]elease itself,” and then
examined “the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the [r]elease.” Id. at
*4. After finding that the language of the release “support[ed] defendants’ contention that
[the] plaintiff’s claims against them have been released[,]” we considered the affidavits of
the decedent’s children. Id. We explained that “‘in matters of unambiguous written
instruments absent proof of fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence and situations of like
character, the unspoken subjective intent of a party is not relevant.’” Id. (quoting Malone
& Hyde Food Servs. v. Parson, 642 S.W.2d 157, 159 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982)). In the
affidavits, the decedent’s children offered “only their subjective impression on their intent
when signing the [r]elease[]” and did not “point[] to any independent facts or circumstances
from which a jury could conclude that they did not intend to release parties in addition to
the [designated released party].” Id. This Court found that the “unspoken subjective
intent” of the decedent’s children was irrelevant and did not affect the reading of the “plain
language of the [r]elease.” Id. Therefore, the Court in Peatross found that the trial court
did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Id. at *5.

        After Peatross, this Court has in other cases followed the two-step process of
analyzing the language of the release and then the facts and circumstances surrounding the
execution of the release. For instance, in Harmon v. Hickman Community Healthcare
Services, Inc., No. M2016-02374-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 3267080, at *15 (Tenn. Ct. App.
June 29, 2018) rev’d on other grounds, 594 S.W.3d 297 (Tenn. 2020), this Court examined
a settlement agreement with a release signed by the children of a woman who died while
incarcerated in a county jail. At the time of the execution of the release, there were at least
five separate lawsuits pending in regard to her death. Id. at *16. We analyzed the language
of the settlement agreement and noted that the text “describe[d] the event giving rise to the
controversy, name[d] the four suits being settled, and list[ed] the people and entities that
benefit from the [a]greement.” Id. An additional defendant argued that it should be
released as an entity included in a clause in the settlement agreement that released “all other
persons, firms, and corporations . . . .” Id. at *17. We rejected this argument and stated
that we “fail[ed] to see any evidence that, when the [s]ettlement was executed, the parties
specifically intended [the d]efendant or [the defendant’s employee] to be included as an
‘other person[], firm[], and corporation[]’ of any [r]eleased [p]arty.” Id. Therefore, we
held that summary judgment was not appropriate on the basis of the settlement agreement.
Id.

       More recently, this Court in Sanford v. Sanford, No. E2021-00414-COA-R3-CV,
2022 WL 1651364, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2022), looked to the text and context in
analyzing the breadth of a release signed by a plaintiff. In Sanford, the plaintiff sued her
                                           -6-
former husband for fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of the disclosure warranty in
a marital dissolution agreement. Id. at *2. The trial court found that the plaintiff released
those claims in an agreed order and granted summary judgment in favor of the former
husband. Id. at *3. We first noted that the release language was unambiguous and
“reveal[ed] the parties’ intent that the release operate to broadly cover all claims, including
future claims, related to the [marital dissolution agreement].” Id. at *5. In examining the
facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the release, we determined that the
wife’s affidavit merely asserted that she did not intend to release all claims, and this
evidence did not “create a genuine issue of material fact as to what was within the
contemplation of the parties at the time of the release.” Id.

        We now turn to examine the language of the release in the present case. The release
signed by Ms. Neal contains a heading entitled “RELEASE IN FULL OF ALL CLAIMS”
at the top of the page. The top of the document also includes a claim number. On the side
of the page, “THIS IS A RELEASE IN FULL” is included in a boxed notation. The body
of the release states, in part:

       I[], Jessica Abdel Jaber3, a single Individual, Releasor(s) . . . do for myself[],
       my[] heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns, hereby remise,
       release, and forever discharge Danielle Cheri Boyle and GEICO Advantage
       Insurance Company, Releasee(s), successors and assigns, and/or [] her []
       associates, heirs, executors and administrators, and all other persons, firms
       or corporations of and from any and every claim, demand, right or cause of
       action, . . . on account of or in any way growing out of any and all personal
       injuries and . . . property damage resulting or to result from an accident that
       occurred on or about the 3rd day of October 2015, at or near Third Street, and
       especially all liability arising out of said accident including, but not limited
       to, all liability for contribution and/or indemnity.

The release designates Ms. Neal as the releasor and Ms. Boyle and GEICO as the releasees.
The release contains a clause releasing “all other persons, firms or corporations of and from
any and every claim . . . .” Patton & Taylor is not designated as a releasee, and the
document does not list Patton & Taylor as a party benefitting from the agreement.

       Regarding the language of the release, the trial court found that the release “clearly
and unambiguously discharges and releases ‘all other persons, firms or corporations,’
which includes Patton & Taylor, from all claims arising from the October 3, 2015
accident.” The trial court also stated that “[b]ecause the language of the release is
unambiguous, the court need not look beyond its terms to determine the parties’ intent at
the time plaintiff executed the release.” Thus, the court did not examine the statements in
Ms. Neal’s affidavit in its determination of her intent when she executed the release.

       3
           Jessica Abdel Jaber is now known as Jessica Neal.
                                                   -7-
However, as we noted in Richland, “the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
document[] in this case, the situation of the parties, the business to which the agreements
related, . . . and the subject matter of the agreement[] in general” should have been
considered by the trial court in “construing the effect of the release.” Richland, 832 S.W.2d
at 557. Thus, we now examine the facts and circumstances at the time the release was
executed.

       Ms. Neal’s affidavit sheds light on what was in her contemplation at the time she
signed the release. In the affidavit, Ms. Neal asserted the following:

       9. I did not have any personal knowledge and did not contemplate filing any
       claim or lawsuit against Defendant in this cause on or before November 16,
       2015.

       10. I first learned that I had a potential claim or cause of action against
       Defendant in this cause on or about December 17, 2015 after my attorney
       sent written notice of claim to Defendant.

       11. The Release that I entered into with Danielle Boyle and GEICO
       Advantage Insurance Company on November 16, 2015 was prepared by
       GEICO Advantage Insurance Company and does not refer to, list, or name
       Defendant in this cause of action as a Releasee(s) and I had no intention to
       release and did not release Defendant in this cause of action when I signed
       the release . . . .

These statements in Ms. Neal’s affidavit are distinguishable from the statements in the
affidavits in Peatross and Sanford. In Peatross, the decedent’s children entered an affidavit
“simply assert[ing] that they were not aware that the [r]elease applied to parties other than
the [designated releasee].” Peatross, 2009 WL 2922797, at *4 (“The unspoken subjective
intent of the [releasors] is therefore irrelevant and does not affect our reading of the plain
language of the Release.”). In the plaintiff’s affidavit in Sanford, she “simply assert[ed]
that her ‘intent was to release all claims [she] could have had at the time of the release, or
in the future, as to the stock issues and the medical premiums and medical expenses.’”
Sanford, 2022 WL 1651364, at *5. Here, however, Ms. Neal’s affidavit goes beyond mere
statements of her subjective intent. Specifically, Ms. Neal states that she did not know
about any potential claim against Patton & Taylor at the time the release was executed and
that she did not learn about such a claim until more than a month later when her attorney
“sent written notice of claim.” She states that the release was prepared by GEICO, and she
notes that the text of the release does not list Patton & Taylor as a named releasee. In
response, Patton & Taylor asserts that Ms. Neal had an “objective reason” to be aware of
her claims. Patton & Taylor argues that the dumpster and other materials at the
construction site were immediately apparent at the time of the accident. We find this
factual dispute concerning whether Ms. Neal knew about her potential claims against
                                              -8-
Patton & Taylor to be a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. The
issue of whether Ms. Neal knew about her potential claims must be decided to resolve
whether she intended to release her claim and whether this claim was in her contemplation
at the time of execution. See Jackson, 776 S.W.2d at 118 (“Claims in tort which . . . were
not known to the parties when they executed their release and which they did not intend to
affect when the settlement was made are not discharged by a release.”) (quoting 66
Am.Jur.2d Release § 33 (1973)) (concluding that a claim for loss of consortium was not
within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the execution of the release, when,
among other things, the plaintiffs did not know about the existence of the claim). The
competing statements between Ms. Neal’s affidavit regarding her lack of knowledge of the
claim and the “objective reason” pointed to by Patton & Taylor could lead a trier of fact to
“draw different inferences about the parties’ intent” when the release was executed.4 See
Richland, 832 S.W.2d at 557.

        After reviewing the language of the release and Ms. Neal’s affidavit, we conclude
that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Ms. Neal knew about her potential
claim against Patton & Taylor and intended to release this claim. Accordingly, we
conclude that the trial court erred in granting Patton & Taylor’s motion for summary
judgment on this ground.

                                             B.       Causation

       On appeal, Ms. Neal raises an issue regarding the second ground of Patton &
Taylor’s motion for summary judgment and argues that her allegations of negligence have
not been rebutted on the issue of causation. This Court has stated the following concerning
appeals of a grant or denial of summary judgment:

        The Rules of Civil Procedure expressly require that the trial court state the
        grounds for any grant or denial of summary judgment. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04
        (“The trial court shall state the legal grounds upon which the court denies or

        4
           In Richland, we recognized that the parol evidence rule is a “substantial problem.” Richland, 832
S.W.2d at 558. However, we stated that the evidence in the affidavits did not “contradict the final writing
and [was] relevant to the parties’ intent when they signed the agreement.” Id. Our supreme court has stated
that for a fully integrated contract, “general extrinsic evidence of context may be used to interpret the
contractual language in line with the parties’ intent, but the parol evidence rule prohibits the use of evidence
of pre-contract negotiations in order to vary, contradict, or supplement the contractual terms . . . .”
Individual Healthcare Specialists, 566 S.W.3d at 697. Here, the release is fully integrated because it
contains an integration clause, stating that the release “contains the entire agreement between the parties.”
See id. at 697 (“The contracts at issue . . . contained an integration clause, which indicates the parties’ intent
that the contracts embody their complete and exclusive agreement.”). Ms. Neal’s affidavit provides
“general extrinsic evidence of context” that elucidates her intent and which claims were in her
contemplation when signing the release, but it does not present any evidence of pre-contract negotiations
in order to “vary, contradict, or supplement” the language of the release. Therefore, we deem this use of
extrinsic evidence to be proper under the parol evidence rule.
                                                      -9-
       grants the motion, which shall be included in the order reflecting the court’s
       ruling.”). While this Court may sometimes affirm the trial court’s grant of
       summary judgment on different grounds than those stated, see City of
       Brentwood v. Metro. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 149 S.W.3d 49, 60 n.18 (Tenn.
       Ct. App. 2004), we have been directed by our supreme court that an
       archeological dig of the record to support a trial court’s action is not required.
       See generally Smith v. UHS of Lakeside, Inc., 439 S.W.3d 303, 314 (Tenn.
       2014). Rather, the Tennessee Supreme Court has stated that a trial court’s
       order granting or denying summary judgment must be the product of the trial
       court’s independent judgment. Id. As such, we have more recently declined
       to rule on issues that were not expressly addressed by the trial court. See
       Mid-S. Maint. Inc. v. Paychex Inc., No. W2014-02329-COA-R3-CV, 2015
       WL 4880855, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2015) (“Generally, when the
       trial court fails to address an issue in the first instance, this Court will not
       consider the issue, but will instead remand for the trial court to make a
       determination in the first instance.”).

Dent Rd. Gen. P’ship v. Synovus Bank, No. W2017-01550-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL
6173406, at *15 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2018). In its order granting summary judgment
on the first ground regarding the release, the trial court stated that “the second ground upon
which Patton & Taylor has moved for summary judgment need not be ruled upon and is
moot.” Because the trial court did not make any determination in the first instance as to
the merits of Patton & Taylor’s second, alternative ground, we decline to consider this issue
here. Instead, we remand for the trial court to make its determination on this second
ground.

                                   V.      CONCLUSION

       For the aforementioned reasons, we reverse the decision of the trial court and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs of this appeal are taxed
to the appellee, Patton & Taylor Enterprises, LLC, for which execution may issue if
necessary.

                                                      _________________________________
                                                      CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, JUDGE

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