Court Opinion

ID: 9929267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 06:05:50.884326+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:06:30.692050
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     February 1, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 362743
                                                                     Kent Circuit Court
JERELL LEMAR CHAPMAN,                                                LC No. 20-008921-FC

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: REDFORD, P.J., and RIORDAN and FEENEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Defendant, Jerell Lemar Chapman, was convicted after a jury trial of second-degree
murder, MCL 750.317; assault with intent to commit murder (AWIM), MCL 750.83; firearm
discharge from a vehicle causing death, MCL 750.234a(1)(d); and three counts of possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. The trial court
sentenced defendant to serve 30 to 45 years’ imprisonment for the second-degree murder
conviction, 19 to 30 years’ imprisonment for the AWIM conviction, 19 to 30 years’ imprisonment
for the firearm discharge from a vehicle causing death conviction, and two consecutive years’
imprisonment for the felony-firearm convictions. Defendant now appeals by right, arguing that he
presented a proper self-defense claim at trial and that there was insufficient evidence presented at
trial to show otherwise; that the prosecutor’s mention of his postarrest silence led to his
convictions; and that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court’s sentencing was
unreasonable and disproportionate. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm defendant’s
convictions and sentences.

                     I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

        This case arises out of an incident in which defendant fired multiple shots at the victim’s
vehicle, killing him instantly, following a verbal altercation with the victim and the victim’s
friends, JO and AG, at the Rivertown Crossings Mall in Grandville, Michigan.

        On October 2, 2020, the victim and his friends JO, AG, and AS drove to the mall in the
victim’s vehicle to buy a video game at a GameStop store. AS waited in the vehicle while the
other three went inside. On the same day, defendant and his girlfriend, KB, drove to the same mall

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in Grandville to buy video games at GameStop as well. Defendant and KB entered the store and,
after leaving briefly to retrieve their identification to purchase a video game, waited in line for
their turn to check out. JO entered the store and waited in line as well while the victim and AG
waited outside. While KB was at the register, JO headed toward the store’s exit, but then turned
around and asked defendant, “Is there a problem?” This verbal altercation escalated until KB had
to physically pull defendant away from JO. When defendant and KB exited the GameStop store,
JO was waiting for them with the victim and AG. JO asked defendant to come outside and fight.
Defendant and KB testified that the three individuals were pushing them to fight and continued to
follow them to the parking lot. AG testified that the parties decided to meet at the parking lot
across the street away from the surveillance cameras to physically fight. However, defendant
denied making any such agreement because he was unfamiliar with the area.

         The parties separated and drove away from the mall in their respective vehicles. The
understanding of both parties was that there would be a physical fight. The victim, JO, and AG
believed that they were following defendant to the designated parking lot. AG and JO both
testified that they followed defendant’s vehicle until defendant began driving in an unfamiliar
direction. At that point, they decided to go home. However, defendant stopped his vehicle parallel
with the victim’s vehicle. JO and defendant were arguing back and forth, and defendant testified
that JO and AG were antagonizing him. Defendant testified that he then saw JO hold up what
defendant believed to be a handgun, so he decided to shoot to protect himself and KB. Within
seconds, defendant fired eight shots at the victim’s vehicle without warning and then drove away.
Once AG, JO, and AS realized that the victim was shot and bleeding from his head, they stepped
outside the vehicle and tried to get help. An airsoft .177 caliber “BB gun” was found by police on
the inside of the front passenger door of the victim’s vehicle with an undisturbed candy wrapper
on top of it. However, AG, JO, AS, and even KB all denied seeing the BB gun brandished that
night.

        The minimum sentencing guidelines range for defendant’s second-degree murder
conviction was 22½ to 371/2 years. The trial court began sentencing by stating that the entire
incident was “a senseless situation all around” and that “everybody was really I would say
complicit at least in this senselessness, or at least how it began.” The trial court also recognized
that defendant was only 19 years old at the time of the incident. However, the trial court concluded
by stating that “whether it’s anger, whether it’s your background, whether it’s your fear, whether
it’s paranoia, whether it’s 19 year old-ism” that caused defendant to shoot and kill the victim,
defendant was dangerous, and furthermore, defendant was, at the time of the incident, on probation
for shooting someone else. Therefore, the trial court sentenced defendant on the higher end of the
minimum sentencing guidelines range to 30 to 45 years in prison for second-degree murder.

       Defendant now appeals.

                               II. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

       Defendant argues that he satisfied his burden of showing self-defense and that the
prosecution failed to meet its burden of disproving his theory of self-defense beyond a reasonable
doubt. We disagree.

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        Generally, we review “de novo defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence”
and view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime to have been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Meissner, 294 Mich App 438, 452; 812 NW2d 37 (2011).
“But more importantly, ‘[t]he standard of review is deferential: a reviewing court is required to
draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in support of the jury verdict.’ ”
People v Oros, 502 Mich 229, 239; 917 NW2d 559 (2018), quoting People v Nowack, 462 Mich
392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000). Furthermore, “[c]ircumstantial evidence and reasonable
inferences therefrom may be sufficient to prove all the elements of an offense beyond a reasonable
doubt.” People v Schumacher, 276 Mich App 165, 167; 740 NW2d 534 (2007). When reviewing
a sufficiency claim on appeal, “we must defer to the fact-finder by drawing all reasonable
inferences and resolving credibility conflicts in support of the jury verdict.” Id.

         In a criminal case, the prosecution must introduce “sufficient evidence to justify a rational
trier of fact in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 513-514;
489 NW2d 748 (1992) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The sufficiency of the evidence is
measured by “whether the evidence, taken as a whole, justifies submitting the case to the trier of
fact or requires judgment as a matter of law.” People v Clark, 172 Mich App 1, 6; 432 NW2d 173
(1988). The prosecution is not required to negate “every reasonable theory consistent with
innocence” so long as the elements of the offense are proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Nowack,
462 Mich at 400.

        Self-defense is an applicable defense to murder, manslaughter, and other crimes in which
the defendant took reasonable steps to defend himself or herself from an unlawful attack. People
v Dupree, 486 Mich 693, 707; 788 NW2d 399 (2010). The defendant must produce evidence that:
(1) he or she honestly and reasonably believed that he or she was in danger; (2) the danger feared
was death or serious bodily harm; (3) the action taken was immediately necessary at the time, and
(4) the defendant was not the initial aggressor. See People v Riddle, 467 Mich 116, 120, 126-127;
649 NW2d 30 (2002). Once the defendant satisfies this burden, the prosecution then bears the
burden of “disproving the common law defense of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.”
People v Reese, 491 Mich 127, 155; 815 NW2d 85 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted).1

1
  “Under the common law, the affirmative defense of self-defense justified the killing of another
person if the defendant honestly and reasonably believes his life is in imminent danger or that there
is a threat of serious bodily harm and that it is necessary to exercise deadly force to prevent such
harm to himself.” People v Guajardo, 300 Mich App 26, 35; 832 NW2d 409 (2013) (quotation
marks and citations omitted). Implemented in 2006, the Self-Defense Act (SDA), MCL 780.971
et seq., “codifie[s] the circumstances in which a person may use deadly force in self-defense or in
defense of another person without having the duty to retreat.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted). MCL 780.972(1)(a) of the SDA provides that “[a]n individual who has not or is not
engaged in the commission of a crime at the time he or she uses deadly force may use deadly force
against another individual anywhere he or she has the legal right to be with no duty to retreat if . .
. [t]he individual honestly and reasonably believes that the use of deadly force is necessary to

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       The prosecution presented the audio recording of a phone call that occurred between
defendant and KB’s grandmother while defendant was imprisoned. In this phone call, KB’s
grandmother told defendant that if the shooting was done in self-defense, defendant needed to
explain to the authorities what happened that evening. Defendant promptly responded that “it had
nothing to do with self-defense.” This admission strongly undermined his claim of self-defense at
trial.

       Defendant argues that his short stature and the fact that he was outnumbered and followed
show that he honestly and reasonably believed that he was in danger of serious injury or death.
However, if true, defendant could have chosen not to engage with JO when first confronted inside
the GameStop store. Once JO and the others began following him and KB through the mall, he
could have asked for help from mall security or simply stayed inside the mall within the presence
of security cameras and the crowds of people. Instead, defendant continued to the parking lot and
then agreed to engage in a fistfight at an alternate location without the presence of security
cameras. The fact that defendant continued to engage with JO and the others indicates that he did
not honestly and reasonably believe that he was in danger of serious injury or death, at least until
the shooting itself.

         Notwithstanding the sequence of events preceding the shooting, defendant argues that he
saw JO lift what he believed to be a handgun, and then he fired a shot at the victim’s vehicle in
response. It is true that an airsoft BB gun was found in the victim’s vehicle and that brandishing
it might justify a claim of self-defense. However, no one except defendant testified that the BB
gun was brandished that night. Furthermore, the BB gun was found with a candy wrapper on top
of it. If JO lifted the BB gun that evening as defendant testified, then after he held it up, he would
have had to have placed it back in the compartment and neatly placed the wrapper on top of the
BB gun after the chaotic shooting. This scenario seems unlikely, particularly in light of the fact
that no one except defendant testified that the BB gun was brandished. Thus, the jury may have
reasonably found that that the BB gun was not brandished as defendant testified. We are required
to make this inference in favor of the prosecution, see Schumacher, 276 Mich App at 167, and
conclude that defendant had no lawful basis to shoot at the other vehicle.

        Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence presented at trial for a rational trier of fact to
find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not act in self-defense. Defendant is not entitled
to reversal of his convictions on this basis.

prevent the imminent death of or imminent great bodily harm to himself or herself or to another
individual.”

                                                 -4-
                                   III. POST-MIRANDA SILENCE

        Defendant argues that he was deprived of due process and his Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination2 because the prosecution used his post-Miranda3 silence and request for
counsel against him. We disagree.

       Constitutional claims are reviewed de novo. People v Duenaz, 306 Mich App 85, 90; 854
NW2d 531 (2014). When a preserved, constitutional error is nonstructural in nature, the conviction
“should be affirmed if the reviewing court is satisfied that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.” People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 482; 581 NW2d 229 (1998). When a constitutional error
occurs during presentation of a case to a jury, the error may be assessed in context of the evidence
as a whole to determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. People v
Anderson, 446 Mich 392, 405-406; 521 NW2d 538 (1994).

        The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and the right to due process restrict
the use of a defendant’s silence in a criminal trial. See People v Clary, 494 Mich 260, 265; 833
NW2d 308 (2013). This privilege applies when a defendant was subjected to police interrogation
while in custody and his silence followed Miranda warnings. See People v Borgne, 483 Mich 178,
187-188, 191-192; 768 NW2d 290 (2009). “[A] defendant’s post-arrest, post-Miranda silence
cannot be used to impeach a defendant’s exculpatory testimony . . . or as direct evidence of
defendant’s guilt[.]” People v Shafier, 483 Mich 205, 213-214; 768 NW2d 305 (2009). However,
a single mention of a defendant’s post-Miranda silence does not automatically entitle him or her
to a new trial “if the reference is so minimal that silence was not submitted to the jury as evidence
from which it was allowed to draw any permissible inference.” Id. at 214-215 (cleaned up). That
is, reversal may not be warranted so long as the prosecution “does not specifically and expressly
attempt to use . . . the improper comment to impeach the defendant.” People v Dennis, 464 Mich
567, 579-580; 628 NW2d 502 (2001) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

       Shafier listed three factors for us to consider when assessing the prejudicial effect of a
prosecutor’s use of a defendant’s post-Miranda silence:

         (1) the extent of the prosecutor’s comments, (2) the extent to which the prosecutor
         attempted to tie defendant’s silence to his guilt, and (3) the overall strength of the
         case against defendant when considered in light of the degree to which the jury’s
         assessment of the evidence might have been affected by the prosecutor’s references
         to defendant’s silence. [Shafier, 483 Mich at 221.]

       In the present case, during cross examination, defendant testified that he did not tell police
during his arrest that he was acting in self-defense because: “I did what my father told me to do
and that was don’t say too much to them. Talk to my lawyers, my attorneys.” The prosecutor
responded, “Well, why would you have to talk to a lawyer if you were defending yourself?”

2
    US Const, Am V; see also Const 1963, art 1, § 17.
3
    Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).

                                                  -5-
Defense counsel objected, and the trial court sustained the objection. The prosecution then asked
defendant if he was advised of his rights after arrest, and defendant confirmed that he was. The
question now is whether the prosecutor’s reference to defendant’s post-Miranda silence deprived
him of his constitutional rights.4

        “[T]he more extensive a prosecutor’s references to a defendant’s post-arrest, post-Miranda
silence, the more likely it is that the references had a prejudicial effect.” Id. at 221-222. In Shafier,
the Court held that the prosecutor’s references had a prejudicial effect because the references were
“frequent throughout the trial,” including the prosecutor’s opening statement and closing
argument, as well as his case-in-chief and cross-examination of the defendant. Id. at 222. In the
present case, in contrast, the prosecutor referred to defendant’s silence with a single question,
followed by defense counsel’s objection, which was sustained by the trial court. The prosecutor
did not otherwise mention defendant’s post-Miranda silence throughout trial. Thus, the extent of
the prosecutor’s references to defendant’s post-Miranda silence, as well as her use of that silence
to show guilt, was inconsequential and not prejudicial to defendant.

        We acknowledge that the reference shed some light on defendant’s credibility because it
furthered the prosecutor’s theory that defendant did not initially act in self-defense and only
claimed self-defense as trial approached. However, the reference was “so minimal” that
defendant’s silence was not submitted to the jury as a means to draw a permissible inference; any
inference about whether defendant acted in self-defense was drawn from the ample evidence
presented by the prosecution throughout trial. See id. at 214-215.

        We also note that the evidence against defendant was substantial. None of the
eyewitnesses, other than defendant himself, testified that a BB gun was brandished. In addition,
the prosecution played a phone call during trial in which defendant explicitly stated that his actions
that day were not in self-defense. The strength of this untainted and independent evidence leads
to the conclusion that the prosecutor’s fleeting reference to defendant’s post-Miranda silence was
harmless.

        Accordingly, the prosecutor’s reference to defendant’s post-Miranda silence was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt and did not contribute to his convictions. Defendant is not entitled to
relief on this basis.

                                         IV. SENTENCING

        Defendant argues that the sentence imposed by the trial court was unreasonable and
disproportionate because the sentencing guidelines did not adequately consider all the important
factors surrounding the incident. Therefore, defendant argues, he is entitled to resentencing. We
disagree.

      We review the trial court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion. People v
Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). A trial court abuses its discretion if it imposes

4
 The prosecution on appeal acknowledges that the “question about needing a lawyer if he was
defending himself” was “concededly improper.”

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a sentence that “violates the principle of proportionality, which requires sentences imposed by the
trial court to be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and
the offender.” Id. Sentences that fall within the minimum sentencing guidelines range are entitled
to a “nonbinding rebuttable presumption of proportionality” on review by this Court. People v
Posey, 512 Mich 317, 360; ___NW2d___ (2023).

        Although the sentencing guidelines are advisory, trial courts must still consider the
guidelines when imposing a sentence. People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 391-392; 870 NW2d
502 (2015). When a trial court imposes a sentence that falls within the minimum sentencing
guidelines range, that sentence is presumed to be proportionate because it is within the sentencing
norm for that offense class. See Posey, 512 Mich at 358. However, we must still review the
sentence for reasonableness by determining “whether the trial court abused its discretion by
violating the ‘principle of proportionality’ . . . ‘which requires sentences imposed by the trial court
to be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the
offender.’ ” People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 459-460; 902 NW2d 327 (2017), quoting
Milbourn, 435 Mich at 636. This Court held in People v Sharp, 192 Mich App 501, 505; 481
NW2d 773 (1992), that defendants could overcome the presumption of proportionality by
presenting evidence of “uncommon” or “rare” circumstances.

        Defendant attempts to rebut the presumption of proportionality by arguing that the
sentencing guidelines did not adequately consider that: JO, AG, AS, and the victim pursued
defendant first; even if defendant was mistaken about the BB gun, defendant made an “impulsive,
juvenile mistake driven by fear” by shooting at the victim’s car; defendant is young and does not
have an extensive criminal history; defendant had a dysfunctional childhood; and defendant was
receptive to undertaking treatment and was courteous during these proceedings.

       Defendant fails to rebut the presumption of proportionality for the within-guidelines
sentence because the trial court fairly considered these factors on the record. The trial court
considered the fact that defendant was pursued first:

       And I know that these three men followed you. I saw the video. They followed
       you and your pregnant girlfriend outside . . . they were egging you on. . . . And
       everybody was really I would say complicit at least in this senselessness, or at least
       how it began.

        The trial court considered that defendant had a dysfunctional childhood: “And I did get
several letters . . . on your behalf from—your father, from some aunts, and other family members.
I got the memorandum from the social worker at the Defender’s office. And I read it where it
really gave an explanation of your—of your background.” The trial court also considered
defendant’s age and lack of criminal history, as well as the fact that the shooting was a senseless
mistake:

       But what theme I did see in the letters that I received from your family members
       and friends of your family is that you’re not a monster. . . . You are—you were at
       the time 19 years old, as [defense counsel] stated. Obviously at 19, most 19 year
       olds have no foreseeability. . . . I know that if you could do it all over again, that
       you would not have pulled that trigger.

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        Finally, the trial court recognized that defendant was receptive to undertaking treatment,
but ultimately observed that defendant was “dangerous” at the time: “whether it’s anger, whether
it’s your background, whether it’s your fear, whether it’s paranoia, whether it’s 19 year old-ism,
you’re dangerous.” Considering these facts, the trial court sentenced defendant within the
guidelines near the upper end of the minimum sentencing guidelines range for his second-degree
murder conviction.

        The trial court’s sentence was within the minimum sentencing guidelines range and did not
violate the principle of proportionality because the trial court considered numerous factors that
were not adequately reflected in the guidelines, and defendant failed to show any rare or unusual
circumstances. See Milbourn, 435 Mich at 636, 661. As the trial court accurately noted,
defendant’s actions had “permanent consequences.” Further, defendant had been convicted of
assault with a dangerous weapon and the trial court noted he was on probation at the time for
shooting someone else. In other words, not only did defendant shoot and kill the victim, but he
did so while being on probation for another improper shooting. Thus, the 30-year minimum
sentence was reasonable. Therefore, defendant failed to rebut the presumption of proportionality
reserved for his within-guidelines sentence. Defendant is not entitled to resentencing.

                                       V. CONCLUSION

       There were no errors warranting relief. We affirm.

                                                            /s/ James Robert Redford
                                                            /s/ Michael J. Riordan
                                                            /s/ Kathleen A. Feeney

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