Court Opinion

ID: 9388616
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-21 05:04:51.866243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:21.421937
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     April 20, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 359546
                                                                     Ingham Circuit Court
DWAYNE DEMETRIOUS WILLIAMS,                                          LC No. 20-000508-FC

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: GADOLA, P.J., and PATEL and MALDONADO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Defendant appeals by right his jury-trial conviction of third-degree criminal sexual conduct
(CSC-III), MCL 750.520d(1)(a) (sexual penetration with a victim at least 13 and less than 16 years
of age).1 The trial court sentenced defendant to serve 35 to 180 months’ imprisonment and ordered
him to register and comply with the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA), MCL 28.721 et seq.
We affirm.

                                       I. BACKGROUND

        This case arises out of the sexual assault of a minor victim that occurred in January 2018.
The victim testified that defendant was her uncle by marriage. When she was approximately 14
years old, defendant picked her up from her mother’s home and brought her to defendant’s
apartment. While at the apartment, defendant handed her a glass of liquor and encouraged her to
drink it. She drank some of the liquor, and shortly thereafter began to feel dizzy. Defendant then
helped her off of the stool on which she was sitting, walked her to his bedroom, and helped her sit
on the bed. Defendant then took pictures of the victim. Her clothes were eventually removed,
though she stated that she could not remember who had removed them because she was “in and

1
  The jury found defendant not guilty of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-
I), MCL 750.520b(1)(f) (coerced or forced sexual penetration causing personal injury to victim)
and one additional count of CSC-III. Additionally, the trial court dismissed two counts of fourth-
degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-IV), MCL 750.520e.

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out of it.” The victim testified that defendant then joined her in the bed and sexually penetrated
her vagina with his penis. She believed that defendant had anally penetrated her with his penis as
well, but she admitted on cross-examination that she could not recall it and that she did not mention
anal penetration in the description of the assault that she gave the police.

         The prosecution presented an audio recording of defendant’s interview with a detective in
which he addressed the victim’s sexual assault allegations. In his interview, defendant admitted
that he sexually penetrated the victim and that he sent her some text messages that he “shouldn’t
have” after he believed he contracted a sexually transmitted infection from her. Defendant testified
on his own behalf, and his testimony primarily addressed the statements that he made during his
interview. Defendant testified that at some point after he brought the victim to his apartment, he
was surprised to find her naked in his bed. Defendant further testified that he did not “know what
to do,” so he removed his clothes and joined her in bed. While defendant testified that he could
not “recall” whether he penetrated the victim with his penis, he also stated that he was being
truthful during his interview with the detective, during which he told the detective that he
penetrated the victim with his penis. Defendant also testified that he and the victim were “going
at it” during which he “probably” ejaculated.

        The jury found defendant guilty of the lesser count of CSC-III, but it acquitted him of two
counts of CSC-I and one count of CSC-III. At sentencing, defendant stated that he had reviewed
the presentence investigation report (PSIR) with his trial counsel before the hearing. The PSIR
included information about the victim’s initial disclosure of the assault to the police, and it
indicated that defendant was required to register as a sex offender under SORA and that defendant
registered as a sex offender on October 14, 2021. The trial court asked if there were any
inaccuracies in the PSIR, and defendant stated that the only inaccuracy that warranted a change
was his address. Defendant also stated that he agreed with all of the offense variable (OV) scores,
and he did not make any objection. After the prosecution, defense counsel, and defendant all
addressed the trial court, the court sentenced defendant to serve 35 to 180 months’ imprisonment
for CSC-III and ordered him to register and comply with SORA. This appeal followed.

                     II. DEFENSE COUNSEL’S ADMISSION OF GUILT

      Defendant argues that his trial attorney unilaterally conceded guilt to the lesser charge of
CSC-III in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to autonomy in his choice of defense under
McCoy v Louisiana, ___ US ___; 138 S Ct 1500; 200 L Ed 2d 821 (2018). We disagree.2

        This Court reviews constitutional questions de novo, and if structural error occurred then
“automatic reversal is required.” People v Swilley, 504 Mich 350, 370; 934 NW2d 771 (2019)
(quotation marks and citations omitted). However, because the issue was not raised in the trial

2
  We note that defendant has not raised a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Indeed,
defendant states in his brief that “the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel analysis is
inapplicable . . . .” Rather, defendant’s argument on appeal is based solely on the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in McCoy. Therefore, the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of
counsel has not been applied. See Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 688; 104 S Ct 2052; 80
L Ed 2d 674 (1984).

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court, it is unpreserved. People v Green, 322 Mich App 676, 681; 913 NW2d 385 (2018).
Unpreserved issues are reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights, and a plain error occurs
if three requirements are “met: 1) error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or
obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights. The third requirement generally requires
a showing of prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings.”
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999) (citation omitted). Even if the three
requirements are met, “[r]eversal is warranted only when the plain, forfeited error resulted in the
conviction of an actually innocent defendant or when an error seriously affected the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of the defendant's innocence.”
Id. at 763 (quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted).

         The Sixth Amendment grants the accused in criminal prosecutions the right to “the
assistance of counsel for his defense.” US Const, Am VI. The United States Supreme Court has
held that compliance with the Sixth Amendment dictates that defense counsel cannot concede a
defendant’s guilt over the defendant’s objections. McCoy, ___ US at ___; 138 S Ct at 1505.
“Autonomy to decide that the objective of the defense is to assert innocence belongs” to the
defendant. Id. at 1508. “Because a client’s autonomy, not counsel’s competence, is in issue,” the
test for ineffective assistance of counsel does not apply. Id. at 1510-1511. If the defendant
“declines to participate in his defense, then an attorney may permissibly guide the defense pursuant
to the strategy she believes to be in the defendant’s best interest. Presented with express statements
of the client’s will to maintain innocence, however, counsel may not steer the ship the other way.”
Id. at 1509. Wrongful concession of guilt by defense counsel is a structural error, and it thus, if
established, requires reversal without being subject to harmless error review. Id. at 1511.

        Defendant’s argument is without merit because, contrary to his assertions, defense counsel
did not concede defendant’s guilt to CSC-III. He simply acknowledged the obvious: that the
evidence was much stronger for CSC-III than it was for CSC-I. Defense counsel began his closing
argument by imploring the jury “to look at count 5,” the CSC-III charge, “because it’s the only
[one] that is arguably is [sic] supported by what you’ve heard over the last 24 hours.” Later in the
argument, defense counsel stated:

               And it appears by his voluntary statement to the police that he’s relatively
       honest. Honest to the point that you all may well find him, find him guilty of count
       5. But, that’s all we are asking. If you are going to do that, I’m not asking you to
       do that, but if you do that, that’s the only count that fits the fact.

Near the end of his closing argument, defense counsel again addressed the CSC-III charge, and he
stated that the prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “defendant
engaged in a sexual act that involved entry into [MP’s] genital opening by defendant’s penis” and
that MP was “13, 14, or 15 years old at the time of this act.” Defense counsel continued:

              What’s missing from that? That does not require you to find the force or
       coercion, which is convenient because you didn’t hear any testimony regarding
       force or coercion. In fact, quite the opposite. You heard, I kind of went with it.
       She’s very vague about how, how it occurred. Not very descriptive at all and
       admitted a lot of the times, she was in and a lot of the time, she was out. Can you
       use that beyond a reasonable doubt to find that it occurred? You can’t. So, that

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       leaves you with what we used to call statutory rape, she was too young. I’m not
       encouraging you to find that. That’s the facts, however.

             Don’t be so put off when hearing this that you disregard very closely at the
       elements. [sic] If you’re going to hold him accountable, all we ask is that you hold
       him accountable for what it is the evidence, the evidence you heard and saw.
       Because the evidence shows that he didn’t. Thank you.

        Unlike McCoy, defense counsel never expressly conceded defendant’s guilt. Indeed, while
defense counsel did little to argue specifically against the CSC-III charge, he also explicitly stated
multiple times that he was not conceding defendant’s guilt. When viewed as a whole, it is clear
that defense counsel’s argument was that the jury should find defendant not guilty of all charges;
however, recognizing the compelling evidence against defendant, defense counsel argued that if
the jury believed the prosecution’s evidence it should nonetheless find him guilty only of CSC-III.
At no point did defense counsel say that defendant was guilty of CSC-III; rather, he stated that the
CSC-III charge was “the only [one] that [was] arguably . . . supported” by the evidence. Defense
counsel told the jury that it “may well find [defendant] . . . guilty” of CSC-III, but he also stated,
“I’m not encouraging you to find that” and “I’m not asking you to do that.” Defense counsel’s use
of words such as “if,” “arguably,” and “may well,” paired with his insistence that he was not asking
the jury to find defendant guilty in any capacity leads us to conclude that he did not concede
defendant’s guilt of CSC-III.

        Even if we were to view counsel’s arguments as a concession of guilt, defendant’s
argument would still be without merit because the record suggests that defendant did not take issue
with counsel’s strategy until after he was convicted and sentenced. In McCoy, the United States
Supreme Court granted cert to answer “whether it is unconstitutional to allow defense counsel to
concede guilt over the defendant's intransigent and unambiguous objection.” McCoy, 138 S Ct at
1507 (emphasis added). In this case, defendant’s appeal marked the first indication that he did not
approve of his counsel’s strategy. Defendant did not object to the strategy at any time during the
trial. Moreover, defendant was given the opportunity to address the court at sentencing and at no
point did he use the opportunity to express any dissatisfaction with defense counsel’s trial strategy.
Indeed, even in the affidavit prepared by defendant’s appellate counsel for his motion to remand
defendant acknowledges that he never objected to the strategy, arguing instead that he simply did
not know that defense counsel planned to make the concession. This comes in stark contrast with
McCoy, in which “the defendant vociferously insisted that he did not engage in the charged acts
and adamantly objected to any admission of guilt.” Id. at 1505. If defense counsel had conceded
the defendant’s guilt, the fact that defendant did not unambiguously object distinguishes this case
from McCoy.

       Therefore, defendant’s argument that his right to the assistance of counsel was violated is
without merit.

                               III. SENTENCING CHALLENGES

         Defendant raises four challenges arising from his sentencing. First, defendant argues that
the trial court improperly considered acquitted conduct because references to such conduct were
included in his PSIR. Second, defendant argues that the inclusion of this information in the PSIR

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resulted in a sentence based on inaccurate information. These arguments are without merit. Third,
defendant’s argument that the trial court improperly scored OVs 3, 4, 8, and 10 has been waived.
Finally, defendant’s argument that the trial court erred by requiring him to register as a sex offender
is without merit.

                                   A. ACQUITTED CONDUCT

       Defendant argues that information relating to the victim’s allegations—as recounted in the
agent’s description of the events—should have be stricken from the PSIR and that because the
information was not stricken he was sentenced based, in part, on acquitted conduct. We disagree.

        This Court reviews constitutional issues, such as due-process challenges, de novo. People
v Benton, 294 Mich App 191, 203; 817 NW2d 599 (2011). “[D]ue process is satisfied as long as
the sentence is based on accurate information and the defendant has a reasonable opportunity at
sentencing to challenge that information.” People v Williams, 215 Mich App 234, 236; 544 NW2d
480 (1996).

       An individual is guilty of CSC-III if he or she “engages in sexual penetration with an
individual” who “is at least 13 years of age and under 16 years of age.” People v Lewis, 302 Mich
App 338, 346; 839 NW2d 37 (2013). See also MCL 750.520d(1)(a). In contrast, relevant to the
charges in this case, an individual is guilty of CSC-I if he or she “(1) causes personal injury to the
victim, (2) engages in sexual penetration with the victim, and (3) uses force or coercion to
accomplish the sexual penetration.” People v Nickens, 470 Mich 622, 629; 685 NW2d 657 (2004).
As noted by defendant, the agent’s description of the offense in the PSIR includes a summary of
events related to the victim, specifically detailing the victim’s disclosures to the police that
defendant used force when he assaulted her. The PSIR clearly states, however, that defendant was
only found guilty of the lesser charge of CSC-III and acquitted of CSC-I, which was the only
charge filed against him that required a showing of force or coercion. See MCL 750.520b(1)(f);
Nickens, 470 Mich at 629.

       Defendant is correct that “a sentencing court may not rely even in part on acquitted conduct
when imposing a sentence for the defendant’s conviction.” People v Stokes, 333 Mich App 304,
310; 963 NW2d 643 (2020). It does not follow, however, that information about acquitted conduct
cannot appear in a detailed report of the history of the case in a PSIR. As explained by this Court:

         [A] sentencing court may review a PSIR containing information on acquitted
         conduct without violating Beck[3] so long as the court does not rely on the acquitted
         conduct when sentencing the defendant. Beck supports this conclusion. In Beck,
         our Supreme Court remanded for resentencing because the sentencing court
         unquestionably “relied” on acquitted conduct for its sentencing decision. A
         sentencing court that reviews a PSIR that merely contains information about
         acquitted conduct, however, does not necessarily rely on such information when
         sentencing a defendant. There must be some evidence in the record that the

3
    People v Beck, 504 Mich 605, 618; 939 NW2d 213 (2019).

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       sentencing court relied on such information to warrant finding a Beck violation.
       Had the sentencing court specifically referenced acquitted offenses as part of its
       sentencing rationale, a Beck violation would be apparent. But when PSIRs prepared
       by the Department of Corrections merely refer to an acquittal by a jury of offenses
       in a separate case, and the sentencing court does not refer to or expressly rely upon
       such acquitted offenses as part of its sentencing rationale, this Court cannot
       conclude that the sentencing court committed a Beck violation because such a
       conclusion would rest on speculation that acquitted conduct influenced the
       sentencing court's decision. [Id. at 311-312 (citation omitted).]

Under Stokes, information about the victim need not be stricken from the PSIR merely because it
involves acquitted conduct.4 See id. The record does not suggest that the sentencing court relied
on the information related to the victim’s statement that defendant used force. Absent some
indication that the trial court improperly relied on this information, defendant cannot show error
related to acquitted conduct. See id.

       Therefore, defendant is not entitled to a remand to have the information related to the
victim’s allegation struck from the PSIR.

                              B. INACCURATE INFORMATION

        Defendant argues that the PSIR’s inclusion of the victim’s statement suggesting that
defendant used force when he penetrated her should not have been included because it violated his
right to a sentence based on accurate information. We disagree.

        Defendant is correct that irrelevant or inaccurate information should not be included in the
PSIR. See People v Waclawski, 286 Mich App 634, 690; 780 NW2d 321 (2009). However, the
PSIR is an information-gathering tool, and its scope is “necessarily broad.” Morales v Mich Parole
Bd, 260 Mich App 29, 45-46; 676 NW2d 221 (2003). Under MCR 6.425(A)(1)(b), the PSIR must
include “a complete description of the offense and the circumstances surrounding it.” (Emphasis
added.) Information regarding the investigation of an offense forms part of the circumstances
surrounding an offense, and such information is not excludable merely because the investigation
also involved other alleged criminal conduct. That is, as detailed in the PSIR, it was the victim’s
allegations that defendant had forcibly assaulted her that prompted an investigation by the police,
and it was the police’s investigation into her allegations that prompted defendant’s own disclosure

4
  We note that the Michigan Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application in People
v Montez, ___ Mich ___; 979 NW2d 334 (2022), and has directed the parties to brief the issue
“whether references to acquitted conduct in the defendant's presentence investigation report
(PSIR) violated his right not to be sentenced on the basis of conduct of which he was acquitted, as
articulated in People v Beck, 504 Mich 605; 939 NW2d 213 (2019).” However, to the extent that
this order raises a question about the continuing viability of Stokes, “a Supreme Court order
granting leave to appeal does not diminish the precedential effect of a published opinion of the
Court of Appeals.” MCR 7.215(C)(2). Therefore, we remain bound by the guidelines articulated
in Stokes.

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that he sexually penetrated the victim. In this context, the police’s investigation of the victim’s
allegations, which ultimately led to defendant’s voluntary confession that he sexually penetrated a
14-year-old, formed part of the circumstances surrounding the CSC-III offense. In other words,
while the jury apparently was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that force was used, it is
undisputed that the victim initially alleged that force was used. The information was properly
included in the broad scope of the PSIR under MCR 6.425(A)(1)(b).

       Therefore, defendant’s argument that he was denied his right to a sentence based on
accurate information is without merit.

                                         C. OV SCORING

       Defendant argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court made sentencing
guidelines scoring errors with regard to OVs 3, 4, 8, and 10. However, we conclude that defendant
waived these challenges.

        “[W]aiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” Carines,
460 Mich at 763 n 7 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “When defense counsel clearly
expresses satisfaction with a trial court’s decision, counsel’s action will be deemed to constitute a
waiver.” People v Kowalski, 489 Mich 488, 503; 803 NW2d 200 (2011). “A defendant may not
waive objection to an issue before the trial court and then raise it as an error before this Court.”
People v Fetterley, 229 Mich App 511, 520; 583 NW2d 199 (1998). That is because the “waiver
has extinguished any error.” Kowalski, 489 Mich at 503 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

        At the sentencing hearing, the trial court specifically asked defense counsel if there were
any objections to the guidelines scoring. Defense counsel explained that he had discussed the
sentencing guidelines with the assistant prosecutor, saying that he and the prosecutor “actually
went over by email to get that all choreographed and done and we’re in agreement on the scoring.”
Defense counsel waived any objection to the trial court’s scoring of OVs 3, 4, 8, and 10 by
affirmatively agreeing to the scoring. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to relief in relation to
this argument.

                   D. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT

        Finally, defendant argues that he is entitled to resentencing to remove the SORA
registration requirement from the trial court’s judgment of sentence because the trial court did not
impose the requirement at his sentencing hearing. We disagree.

        “The construction and application of SORA . . . presents a question of law that is reviewed
de novo on appeal.” People v Anderson, 284 Mich App 11, 13; 772 NW2d 792 (2009). The trial
court’s findings of fact at sentencing are reviewed for clear error, which “exists when the reviewing
court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id.

       In this case, defendant was convicted of CSC-III, which is a Tier III “listed offense” under
SORA. MCL 28.722(i), (v)(iv). Because defendant was convicted of a “tier III offense,” he is
considered a “[t]ier III offender.” MCL 28.722(u)(ii). An individual “who is convicted of a listed

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offense after October 1, 1995” is required to register as a sex offender. MCL 28.723(1)(a). A tier
III sex offender must comply with the SORA registration requirements for life. MCL 28.725(13).

       SORA establishes a specific procedure that must be followed when an individual is
convicted of a listed offense. MCL 28.724(1) provides, “Registration of an individual under this
act must proceed as provided in this section.” MCL 28.724(5) describes the registration process:

               Subject to [MCL 28.723], an individual convicted of a listed offense in this
       state after October 1, 1995 and an individual who was previously convicted of a
       listed offense for which he or she was not required to register under this act, but
       who is convicted of any other felony on or after July 1, 2011, shall register before
       sentencing, entry of the order of disposition, or assignment to youthful trainee status
       for that listed offense or that other felony. The probation agent or the family
       division of circuit court shall give the individual the registration form after the
       individual is convicted, explain the duty to register and accept the completed
       registration for processing under [MCL 28.726]. The court shall not impose
       sentence, enter the order of disposition, or assign the individual to youthful trainee
       status, until it determines that the individual’s registration was forwarded to the
       department as required under [MCL 28.726].

        Nothing in the record suggests that the trial court did not adhere to SORA requirements
pursuant to MCL 28.724(5) before it sentenced defendant. Various documents filed with the trial
court and provided to defendant indicated that all of the charges filed against defendant, including
his CSC-III conviction, required compliance with SORA. The PSIR also indicated that registration
under SORA was required. Moreover, the PSIR further indicated that defendant did, in fact,
register as a sex offender on October 14, 2021, and the Department of Corrections had received
notice of his registration prior to drafting the PSIR. See MCL 28.724(5). Defendant stated at
sentencing that he had reviewed the PSIR and that the only inaccuracy was his address. Defendant
was afforded the opportunity to correct any and all inaccuracies in the PSIR at sentencing, and he
did not indicate that the PSIR’s indication that sex offender registration was required and that he
successfully registered on October 14, 2021 was inaccurate. Absent a defendant’s effective
challenge to the accuracy of the factual information contained in the PSIR, the information is
presumed accurate and the trial court is permitted to rely on it when it imposes a sentence. People
v Grant, 455 Mich 221, 233-234; 565 NW2d 389, 395 (1997).

       Therefore, the trial court’s reliance on the information contained in the PSIR regarding
defendant’s sex offender registration status was permissible, and it properly adhered to SORA’s
procedural registration requirements.

       Affirmed.

                                                              /s/ Michael F. Gadola
                                                              /s/ Sima G. Patel
                                                              /s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado

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