Court Opinion

ID: 9490178
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:35:07.372996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:56.374259
License: Public Domain

HARRY T. EDWARDS, Chief Judge,
dissenting:
Appellants ask this court to decide whether Congress, through a purported House Rule of Procedure, can change the number of votes required to enact a bill into law. At issue here is House Rule XXI(5)(e) (“Rule”), which provides that
[n]o bill or joint resolution, amendment, or conference report carrying a Federal income tax rate increase shall be considered as passed or agreed to unless so determined by a vote of not less than three-fifths of the Members voting.
Under this Rule, Members of the House of Representatives who voted in favor of tax legislation have suffered a dilution of their votes from l/218th to l/261st of the votes necessary to pass a tax increase. As a consequence, these Members, a number of whom are appellants in this case along with the voters they represent and the League of Women Voters (“LOWV”), have suffered the requisite injury to satisfy the Article III standing requirements. I, therefore, dissent from the judgment of the majority dismissing this case for lack of standing. I also find that House Rule XXI(5)(e) eannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.
The presentment clause of the Constitution requires that
[ejvery Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives -and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States.
U.S. Const, art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (emphasis added). To determine the meaning of “passed” under the presentment clause, I look to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution, as well as Supreme Court precedent construing the clause. This evidence — along with longstanding traditions underlying our constitutional democracy — makes it clear that “passed” means “passed by a majority,” except in those few instances where the Constitution explicitly states otherwise. The rule-making clause of the Constitution, which merely provides that each House has the power to “determine the Rules of its Proceedings,” U.S. Const, art. I, § 5, cl. 2, surely is not an explicit exception to the presentment clause. Thus, in using the rulemaking clause to redefine what it means for a bill to be passed, Rule XXI(5)(c) rewrites the im*838perative of the presentment clause and, therefore, must be struck down.
If Congress is allowed to employ the rule-making clause to impose new supermajority requirements beyond those already stated in the Constitution, the potential for mischief is great. Two simple examples will suffice to highlight the problem:
Example One:1 The Clerk’s argument in favor of House Rule XXI(5)(c) would allow the House to adopt an internal rule of procedure that requires the votes of nine-tenths of its Members to pass a bill into law, thus giving one state, California, which elects over ten percent of the Members of the House, effective veto power over proposed legislation.
Example Two:2 Because the rulemaking clause applies equally to both Houses of Congress, the Clerk’s argument in favor of House Rule XXI(5)(c) would allow the Senate to adopt an internal rule of procedure that requires the votes of three-fifths, rather than one-half, of its Members to confirm a presidential appointee. The Senate, acting unilaterally, could thereby increase its own power at the expense of the President.
I think it is clear that the Framers never intended for Congress to have such unchecked authority to impose supermajority voting requirements that fundamentally change the nature of our democratic processes. It is for this reason that I find House Rule XXI(5)(c) to be an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s rulemaking power.3
A. The Jurisdiction of This Court
Before turning to the merits, I will first address the jurisdictional issues on which my colleagues decide this case. I disagree with the majority, because I find that appellants have fully satisfied traditional standing requirements and that the doctrine of equitable or remedial discretion does not act as a bar to judicial review of their claims.
1. Standing
It is well established that in order to satisfy the constitutional standing requirements of Article III, plaintiffs must demonstrate (1) that they have suffered injury that is concrete and particularized, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the conduct of which they complain; and (3) that the injury is likely to be redressed by a court decision in their favor. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136-37, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Under the precedent of this circuit, these requirements are satisfied by the dilution of appellants’ votes in favor of the Mink Amendment.
Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623 (D.C.Cir.1994), described in detail by the majority, clearly governs the result in this case. In Michel, this circuit found that congressional vote dilution constitutes cognizable injury for both the Members of Congress whose votes are affected and for the voters who rely on such Members to represent their interests. Id. at 625-26; see also Vander Jagt v. O’Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1170 (D.C.Cir.1983) (In a case challenging the allocation of House committee and subcommittee seats, this court found that Republican Members had standing to sue based on the alleged dilution of their votes by virtue of the disproportionate allocation of the seats.). The plaintiff Members in Michel suffered cognizable injury based on vote dilution where the value of each Member’s vote in the Committee of the Whole was diluted from l/435th to l/440th by a House Rule that gave the vote to the five territorial delegates. The court found standing despite the fact that after any vote in which the territorial delegates’ votes were outcome determinative, a new vote would be taken without including them.4
*839Like the majority, I, too, find that Michel stands for the proposition that “vote dilution is itself a cognizable injury regardless whether it has yet affected a legislative outcome.” Appellants here suffered vote dilution when they voted in favor of the Mink Amendment, which proposed an increase in corporate income tax rates.5 The vote-counting rule applicable to the Mink Amendment was Rule XXI(5)(c). The Mink Amendment was defeated by a vote of 96 to 336. Under Rule XXI(5)(c), each of the 96 votes in favor of the Amendment represented only l/261st of those necessary for passage, rather than the l/218th that they would have represented under the normal practice of “majority rule.” This vote dilution constitutes injury-in-fact sufficient to meet the Article III standing requirements.
The majority claims Rule XXI(5)(c) caused no cognizable vote dilution because 218 Members set upon passing an income tax increase could have attempted to avoid the effect of the Rule. According to the majority, the Members in favor of a tax increase can first seek to pass a resolution to amend or to repeal Rule XXI(5)(c) and then they can pursue passage of an income tax increase pursuant to a simple majority vote. The same could have been said to deny standing in Michel and Vander Jagt — i.e., the aggrieved Members in those cases could have been told to muster a majority of their colleagues to change the disputed rule — but the court eschewed any such view of standing. Even more noteworthy is the fact that, in Michel, the court found an injury even though the vote dilution at issue could never affect whether a bill became law. Thus, Michel makes clear that the substantive outcome is irrelevant — it is the vote dilution itself that causes the injury.
In an apparent effort to avoid what is obvious from Michel and Vander Jagt, the majority opinion uses a strand of the remedial discretion doctrine to change the requirements of Article III standing. The majority says that if a plaintiff can find an alternative remedy for the injury that is the subject of the law suit, then there can be no judicially cognizable injury to support Article III standing. This is an extraordinary holding that finds no support in the law on standing. Indeed, the only case law offering any support for this notion is the questionable remedial discretion doctrine of this circuit.6 See, e.g., Riegle v. Federal Open Market Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 881 (D.C.Cir.1981) (holding that dismissal of a legislator’s suit under a doctrine of remedial discretion is appropriate “[wjhere a congressional plaintiff could obtain substantial relief from his fellow legislators”). However, the remedial discretion doctrine never has been part of the standing inquiry, and the majority cites to no case that suggests otherwise. The question, thus, is not whether appellants could have prevented the vote dilution injury by repealing or amending House Rule XXI(5)(c). The question is whether appellants in fact have suffered vote dilution.
Having established that the vote dilution caused by Rule XXI(5)(c) satisfies the injury-in-fact prong of the standing inquiry, appellants’ challenge to Rule XXI(5)(c) also satisfies the next two prongs of the standing inquiry, causation and redressability. The Rule published by the Clerk causes the harm. And the harm could.be redressed by *840a declaration from this court that the Rule violates the Constitution.
Like the Members, the individual voters and the LOWV also meet the standing requirements. In Michel, this court, acting in reliance upon Supreme Court precedent that recognizes that voters have standing to challenge practices that dilute their vote, found that voters suffer cognizable injury through the dilution of the voting power of their representatives. See 14 F.3d at 626 (holding that it was of no significance that the voters’ vote dilution claim could be considered derivative of their representatives’ claim). Just such dilution occurred here where, by operation of Rule XXI(5)(c), a voter represented by a congressional Member who favored the Mink Amendment no longer had as much access to political power as a voter represented by a Member who opposed the Amendment.7 And, of course, the voters satisfy the causation and redressability prongs of the analysis for the same reasons as the Members.
The LOWV has representational standing pursuant to Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 2441, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977). Under Hunt, an organization such as LOWV has standing if (1) its members would have standing to sue on their own; (2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to its purpose, and (3) its claim and requested relief do not require participation by individual members. Id. The Hunt test is satisfied in this case. For one thing, the League’s members are no different than the individual voters, so they have standing to sue on the same terms. Furthermore, the interests the League seeks to protect are germane to its purpose. See Declaration of Becky Cain, President of the League of Women Voters of the United States (June 13, 1995), reprinted in J.A. 52, 53 (“The League is a non-partisan membership organization consisting of voters committed to the improvement and reform of representative democracy.”). Finally, the League’s claim and requested relief do not require participation by individual members. Therefore, all of the appellants — the Members, the individual voters, and the LOWV— meet the standing requirements under Article III of the Constitution.
2. Remedial Discretion
The District Court did not doubt the standing of appellants. Rather, the trial court dismissed all of appellants’ claims — the Members, the individual voters, and the LOWV — on the basis of its perceived remedial discretion. See Skaggs v. Carle, 898 F.Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C.1995) (“The [defendant’s] motion [to dismiss] will be granted on the sole ground of the doctrine of equitable or remedial discretion.”). This doctrine has been described as a “prudential self-imposed limitation” on the court’s jurisdiction. Michel, 14 F.3d at 628. It permits the court to decline to hear a case even when it has Article III jurisdiction over the controversy. The remedial discretion doctrine has never been adopted by the Supreme Court; and, as I have previously indicated, the constitutional status of the doctrine is questionable. See Melcher v. Federal Open Market Comm., 836 F.2d 561, 565 (D.C.Cir.1987) (Edwards, J., concurring). However, the doctrine remains the law of the circuit, by which I am bound.
The important point here is that, whether or not remedial discretion is a viable doctrine, it has no application in this case. Even assuming, arguendo, that the claims of the congressional Members should be dismissed, the Michel decision makes it clear that remedial discretion cannot be used against the non-congressional plaintiffs who possess standing. See Michel, 14 F.3d at 627-28 (Regardless of whether the remedial discretion doctrine bars the challenge of Members of Congress to the constitutionality of a voting rule change, the doctrine cannot be employed to bar a private citizen’s claim over which the court has jurisdiction.). In short, the doctrine never has been held to be applicable to claims other than those brought by legislators. See 14 F.3d at 628. (“[Remedial discretion] has no applicability to private vot*841ers.”); see also Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539, 546 (D.C.Cir.1985). Thus, it is plain here that this court must exercise its jurisdiction over the claims brought by the individual voters and the LOWV. Accordingly, because their claims are the same, it is unnecessary to decide whether the remedial discretion doctrine would mandate dismissal of the Members’ case. I, thus, turn to the merits of appellants’ challenge to Rule XXI(5)(c).
B. The Constitutionality of Rule XXI(5)(c)
The presentment clause of the Constitution says that “[ejvery Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States.” U.S. Const, art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (emphasis added). Although the word “passed” is not defined explicitly, an analysis of the Framers’ intent and Supreme Court precedent demonstrate that it means passed by a majority. The majority-passage rule is not a malleable default position. It is an unalterable constitutional demand. I, therefore, find that Rule XXI(5)(c) is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s rulemaking power.
1. The Intent of the Framers
In this case, unlike many law suits involving constitutional claims, the intent of the Framers is both evident and enlightening with respect to the issue at hand. The Framers had experienced supermajority voting requirements under the Articles of Confederation, and they specifically debated and rejected similar proposals when the Constitution was drafted and ratified. Historical evidence shows that, during their deliberations, the Framers positively concluded that a simple “majority vote” was sufficient for the passage of legislation in Congress. And nothing has changed since the Framers’ deliberations — either in the words of the Constitution or in societal conditions — warranting an alteration of their original intent. Thus, this case is unique in that there is actually something to be gained by starting the analysis of appellants’ claim on the merits with an assessment of the Framers’ intent.
a. The Constitutional Convention
The general rule governing parliamentary procedure at the time of the constitutional convention, which still holds true today, was that the act of a majority of a quorum is the act of the body.8 The presumption of parliamentary procedure therefore was a presumption of majority rule. Furthermore, at the constitutional convention, the Framers explicitly considered whether to adopt super-majority requirements and decided against them.
The Articles of Confederation had required a supermajority vote of the states for action on many issues. Under that system, each state was represented by no less than two and no more than seven Members, Articles of Confederation art. V, cl. 2, and each state had only one vote, Articles of Confederation art. V, cl. 4. The power to engage in a war, enter into a treaty, coin money, borrow or appropriate money, and appoint a commander in chief all required the agreement of nine of the thirteen states, a super-majority. Articles of Confederation art. IX, cl. 6. Speaking against a proposal to require a two-thirds vote on commerce regulations at the constitutional convention, Roger Sherman observed that “to require more than a majority to decide a question was always embarrassing as had been experienced in eases requiring the votes of nine States in Congress.” 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 450 (Max Far-rand ed., 1966) (hereinafter Farrand) (Madison’s Notes, Aug. 29). James Wilson made the same point. “Great inconveniences had, [Wilson] contended, been experienced in Congress from the article of confederation requiring nine votes in certain cases.” Id. at 451 (Madison’s Notes, Aug. 29). The Fram*842ers, thus, affirmatively decided against su-permajority requirements for the passage of legislation.
Later on during the convention, George Mason made a last ditch effort to require a supermajority on one class of legislation. He moved for a proviso that “no law in nature of a navigation act be passed before the year 1808, without the consent of % of each branch of the Legislature.” Id. at 631 (Madison’s Notes, Sept. 15). Mason’s proposal was defeated seven states to three. See id. Yet, even if Mason’s proviso had been accepted, the Constitution would have said only that passage of a navigation act shall require the consent of two-thirds of each House until 1808, implying that the general rule of parliamentary procedure, i.e., the majority-of-a-quorum rule, would apply thereafter. The convention’s defeat of Mason’s proviso makes even more clear its assumption that the majority-of-a-quorum rule would apply in all cases.
The text of the original Constitution explicitly provides for majority voting in three circumstances. See U.S. Const, art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (quorum); art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (election of President by electors); id. (election of President by House). Yet, the existence of these provisions does not imply that whenever the Framers meant to insist on a simple majority they said so in explicit terms. The Framers inserted the quorum clause because the size of a quorum was not dictated by any general rule of parliamentary bodies. The majority requirements governing the election of the President and Vice President address areas that are not a traditional function of a legislative body. Further, the majority requirement was imposed against the backdrop of a two-thirds quorum requirement for these functions. The Framers specifically indicated a majority would suffice to avoid any misapprehension that it had changed the established rule.9
The text of the original Constitution also provides for supermajority voting in seven distinct cases,10 and minority voting in three cases.11 In all other cases the Constitution is silent. The debates at the constitutional convention indicate that where the Constitution is silent, the Framers made a calculated judgment that a supermajority vote should not be required.
b. Writings Contemporaneous with the Constitutional Convention
Along with the debates at the constitutional convention, written commentary contem*843poraneous with ratification indicates that the Framers deliberately adopted the general rule of parliamentary procedure that a bill be considered passed where it receives the support of a majority of the quorum. James Madison observed that, in the constitutional debates, it had been argued “that more than a majority ought to have been required for a quorum, and in particular cases, if not in all, more than a majority of a quorum for a decision.” The Federalist No. 58, at 396 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). In explaining why supermajority votes were inappropriate for the passage of legislation, Madison said:
In all cases where justice or the general good might require new laws to be passed, or active measures to be pursued, the fundamental principle of free government would be reversed. It would be no longer the majority that would rule; the power would be transferred to the minority. Were the defensive privilege limited to particular eases, an interested minority might take advantage of it to screen themselves from equitable sacrifices to the general weal, or in particular emergencies to extort unreasonable indulgences.
Id. at 397.
Alexander Hamilton also defended the Convention’s decision to jettison the super-majority system of the Articles of Confederation, declaring that in votes on ordinary legislation the Constitution should not “give a minority a negative upon the majority.” The Federalist No. 22, at 140 (Alexander Hamilton). He explained that,
The public business must in some way or other go forward. If a pertinacious minority can controul the opinion of a majority respecting the best mode of conducting it; the majority in order that something may be done, must conform to the views of the minority; and thus the sense of the smaller number will over-rule that of the greater, and give a tone to the national proceedings. Hence tedious delays — continual negotiation and intrigue — contemptible compromises of the public good. And yet in such a system, it is even happy when such compromises can take place: For upon some occasions, things will not admit of accommodation; and then the measures of government must be injuriously suspended or fatally defeated. It is often, by the impracticability of obtaining the concurrence of the necessary number of votes,kept in a state of inaction. Its situation must always savour of weakness — sometimes border upon anarchy.
Id. at 141. Like Madison, Hamilton counseled that “much ill may be produced, by the power of hindering the doing what may be necessary, and of keeping affairs in the same unfavorable posture in which they may happen to stand at particular periods.” Id.
Madison and Hamilton, thus, explicate the rationale that motivated the Framers to reject supermajority requirements — a desire to protect majority rule in the final passage of legislation and to facilitate legislative change on substantive issues.
The Framers, however, were concerned about the tyranny of the majority. Madison recognized that a temporary majority would exercise power “adverse to the rights of other citizens.” The Federalist No. 10, at 57 (James Madison). He said: “To secure the public good, and private rights, against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our enquiries are directed.” Id. at 61. To prevent the tyranny of the majority, Madison; along with the other Framers, established a system of checks and balances— such as the presidential veto, which can only be overcome by a two-thirds majority of Congress. It was believed that these checks and balances would operate to restrain the majority more effectively than supermajority requirements for the passage of legislation, which had already failed under the Articles of Confederation. Recognizing that the presentment clause mandates that any bill receiving the vote of a majority of the Members be presented to the President, thus, does not require acceptance of the insupportable proposition that a majority must always prevail. Other cheeks and balances to restrain the majority are permissible and, in fact, consistent with the Framers’ intent.
*844c. The Rejection of a Legislative Su-permajority Requirement
Despite the evidence of the Framers’ intent from their debates at the constitutional convention and their contemporaneous writings, the Clerk argues that where the Constitution contains no explicit voting requirement, the Framers intended the House itself to decide the voting requirement for the passage of such legislation. According to the Clerk, majority rule for the passage of legislation is simply a default position. But this premise ignores the Framers’ concerns about supermajority requirements.12
The Clerk suggests that a legislative su-permajority requirement is somehow different from a constitutional supermajority requirement, claiming it is more consistent with majority rule since the majority itself can pass and repeal a legislative supermajority requirement. This argument ignores the fact that the Framers desired to preserve majority rule over substantive decisionmak-ing on the final passage of legislation. Allowing legislative supermajority requirements interferes with majority rule over substantive decisionmaking on the final passage of legislation. For, indeed, it is not clear that, where there is a majority in favor of a tax increase, the same majority will always favor repeal or amendment of a legislative supermajority requirement.
Consider the following hypothetical: 218 of 435 legislators favor a tax increase, a majority. Rule XXI(5)(c), in its present form, is in effect. One legislator who would vote in favor of a tax increase refuses to support a move to amend, repeal, or suspend Rule XXI(5)(c) on the ground that tax increases impose such a great burden on the citizenry that she believes the passage of tax increases should require more than majority support. The legislators who do not support the increase similarly refuse to support an attempt to amend or repeal the Rule. A vote to enact a tax increase into law receives only 218 votes, thus failing to become law because the supermajority requirement remains in effect. It is just this situation that was rejected by the Framers, who specifically decided not to require a supermajority over decisionmaking in most substantive areas. The Framers debated, decided, and enumerated the specific circumstances when a su-permajority is required. Any changes to the list of situations warranting supermajority votes must come through constitutional amendment — not by a simple decision of the House of Representatives.
d. Past Practice
Past practice also demonstrates that, until now, the Members always have acted as if they were bound by the vote of a majority of a quorum. Indeed, the House of Representatives, without exception, has followed the majority-of-a-quorum rule since its beginning. Thomas Jefferson’s Manual of Parliamentary Practice, prepared while Jefferson presided over the Senate as John Adams’s Vice President, makes this commitment explicit:
The voice of the majority decides. For the lex majoris partis is the law of all councils, elections, &c. where not otherwise expressly provided. Hakew. 93. But if the House be equally divided, “semper pre-sumatur pro negante,” that is, the former law is not to be changed but by a majority. Town col. 134.
Thomas Jefferson, A Manual of Parliamentary Practice, § 41, reprinted in Jefferson’s Parliamentary Writings, 407 (Charles T. Cullen ed., 1988). In 1837, the House adopted Jefferson’s manual for the conduct of its own proceedings, and Jefferson’s rule continues to operate to this day, except where it has been amended by later rules constitutionally promulgated by the House.
Rule XXI(5)(c) marks the first time the House has attempted to avoid the majority-of-a-quorum rule for the passage of legisla*845tion. Past practice, of course, does not determine what is constitutionally required; nevertheless, it provides good evidence that lawmakers have always assumed that the majority-of-a-quorum rule must govern.
2. Supreme Court Precedent
Although no Supreme Court decision has directly addressed the question whether a bill that receives the vote of a majority of the Members must be presented to the President, Supreme Court precedent provides guidance on the question. It demonstrates that the Court has understood the Constitution to require that bills that receive the vote of a majority indeed must be presented to the President; in other words, “majority rule” has been accepted without question by the Court.
a. Construing the Presentment Clause
In INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983), in the course of evaluating the constitutionality of the legislative veto, the Court explained the formulaic nature of the structure mandated by the presentment clause. In the course of its explanation, the Court repeatedly stated that a simple majority is all that is required for passage of legislation. The Court first found that the Framers “provid[ed] that no law could take effect without the concurrence of the prescribed majority of the Members of both Houses.” Id. at 948, 103 S.Ct. at 2783 (emphasis added). The Court then noted that, providing for Senate approval of treaties, “Art. II, § 2, requires that two-thirds of the Senators present concur ... rather than the simple majority required for passage of legislation.” Id. at 956 n. 21, 103 S.Ct. at 2786 n. 21 (emphasis added). Finally, the Court stated that the presentment clause:
requires action in conformity with the express procedures of the Constitution’s prescription for legislative action: passage by a majority of both Houses and presentment to the President.
Id. at 958, 103 S.Ct. at 2787 (emphasis added). The Court also noted that not even Congress and the President acting together could change the requirements of the presentment clause. The presentment clause “represents the Framers’ decision that the legislative power of the Federal Government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought, and exhaustively considered, procedure.” Id. at 951, 103 S.Ct. at 2784.
The Court’s explanation of the requirements of the presentment clause in Chadha is consistent with its analysis in United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 12 S.Ct. 507, 36 L.Ed. 321 (1892). In Ballin, the Court answered two questions: whether the Constitution prescribed a particular method for determining whether a majority constituting a quorum was present and whether the act of a majority of the quorum present, but less than a majority of the full House, had been sufficient to pass a bill. Although Ballin is not a presentment clause case, it sets out the methodology that determines the meaning of the clause.
The Court in Ballin makes it clear that where the Constitution is silent on voting requirements, the general law of parliamentary bodies applies:
[T]he general rule of all parliamentary bodies is that, when a quorum is present, the act of a majority of the quorum is the act of the body. This has been the rule for all time, except so far as in any given case the terms of the organic act under which the body is assembled have prescribed specific limitations____ No such limitation is found in the Federal Constitution, and therefore the general law of such bodies obtains.
Id. at 6, 12 S.Ct. at 509. This language indicates that unless the Constitution specifically provides otherwise, the Constitution embodies the general rules of parliamentary procedure. Because the presentment clause provides no explicit rule for counting votes for and against the final passage of bills, “the general rule of bodies obtains,” and “the act of a majority of the quorum is the act of the body,” as decided by the Framers, indicated in Ballin and reaffirmed in Chadha.13
*846It should be noted, however, that construing the presentment clause in accord with the general rules of parliamentary procedure (such that “passed” means passed by a majority of a quorum) does not invalidate all supermajority requirements. Requiring a supermajority to pass a bill into law can be distinguished from procedural rules — like the Senate cloture rule — that require a superma-jority to bring an issue to a vote. Although such supermajority requirements may hinder or help a bill to become law, these procedural rules do not explicitly conflict with the presentment clause requirement that a bill that has passed be presented to the President.
For example, Clause 2(h)(2) of House Rule XI authorizes committees to establish a quorum of only one-third for the reporting of legislation. Thus, a bill in committee that may enjoy the support of more than one-half of the House Members may nonetheless die in committee if a majority of the one-third quorum so chooses. While this Rule affects whether and when a bill comes to a vote, it does not purport to redefine what counts as passage of a bill or to alter the House’s duty to “present” to the Senate or the President any bill that has commanded a majority vote of a quorum of the House.14 The presentment clause, by virtue of the Framers’ adoption of the general rule of parliamentary procedure, merely defines the number of votes necessary to enact a bill into law. It does not speak to these other procedural matters.
b. Three Co-equal Branches of Government
Not only does House Rule XXI(5)(c) conflict with the general rule of parliamentary procedure outlined in Ballin and reiterated in Chadha, it also changes the finely tuned balance of power between Congress and the executive. By redefining what it means for a tax bill containing a tax increase to “pass,” House Rule XXI(5)(c) alters the responsibilities of the executive and opens the door for either House of Congress to use the rule-making power to adopt other requirements for the passage of legislation which destroy the system of cheeks and balances designed by the Framers.
Professor Jed Rubenfeld explains that reading the word “passed” in the presentment clause to embody majority rule supports the following principles that are fundamental to our constitutional system of checks and balances: “(1) every Senator and Representative gets one equal vote; (2) only the votes of Senators and Representatives count; (3) the relative power of the small and large states to pass laws cannot be changed; (4) no state can be given the power to veto legislation passed by a majority vote of the chamber; and (5) neither chamber can transform the legislative process from a two-tiered process with a decisive presidential veto, into a two-thirds-two-thirds process in which the President’s veto is a virtual formality.” See Rubenfeld, note 1 supra, at 85. According to Rubenfeld, allowing Congress to decide for itself what constitutes the passage of a bill calls each of these principles into question. For example, as mentioned in the introduction, if Congress could decide what constitutes passage of a bill, not only could Congress transform the President’s veto power, Congress could also make voting rules like a ninety percent majority rule that would give one state effective veto power over legislation.
*847The confirmation clause example (also cited in the introduction) illustrates the ramifications outside the presentment clause context of a decision upholding Rule XXI(5)(c). See Bloch, note 2 supra. Professor Bloch provides a striking demonstration of how Congress could use the rulemaking clause to increase its own power at the expense of the executive. The Constitution states that the President “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States.” U.S. Const, art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The Constitution does not specify the number of votes required for confirmation, so if Rule XXI(5)(c) is constitutional, the Senate could use the rulemaking clause to require that three-fifths of its members, rather than one-half, vote in favor of confirmation of a presidential appointee. The Senate thereby could essentially take over the appointment process from the President. Acceptance of the Clerk’s argument that Congress can use the rulemaking clause to change the number of votes required to pass a law amounts to acceptance of the proposition that each House of Congress can fundamentally alter the balance of power established by the Framers.
In sum, House Rule XXI(5)(c) conflicts with Supreme Court precedent, which recognizes that, consistent with the Framers’ intent, the Constitution adopted the general rule of parliamentary procedure, the act of a majority of a quorum is the act of a body. By altering this fundamental principle of parliamentary bodies, House Rule XXI(5)(c) works an unconstitutional change in the procedure that governs the relationship between Congress and the executive, and it opens the door for Congress to make further changes in our “finely wrought” system of checks and balances.
Conclusion
Because the majority opinion fundamentally alters standing doctrine to avoid reaching a significant constitutional question, I dissent. Under the law of this circuit on standing in “vote dilution” cases, this court has jurisdiction to reach the merits of appellants’ claim. The constitutionality of House Rule XXI(5)(e) is not a question that can be left unanswered by this court. By granting itself the power to change the number of votes required to enact a bill into law, the House violated the command of the presentment clause, which requires that all bills that receive the vote of a majority of a quorum of each House be presented to the President. The House’s action conflicts with the intent of the Framers and Supreme Court precedent. Allowing this Rule to stand permits Congress to use the rulemaking clause as a tool to redefine its relationship to the executive, a result that should not be countenanced by this court.

. See Jed Rubenfeld, Rights of Passage: Majority Rule in Congress, 46 Duke L.J. 73, 83-84 (1996).

. See Susan Low Bloch, Congressional Self-Discipline: The Constitutionality of Supermajority Rules, 14 Const. Comm. 1, 4-5 (1997).

. Appellants also challenge House Rule XXI(5)(d), which states that “It shall not be in order to consider any bill ... carrying a retroactive Federal income tax rate increase.” I can find no merit in this claim, so I do not address it.

.See 14 F.3d at 625 (citing the House Rule at issue in the case, which provides “[i]n a Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, the Resident Commissioner to the United States from Puerto Rico and each Delegate to the *839House shall possess the same powers and privileges as Members of the House” but "[wjhenever a recorded vote on any question has been decided by a margin within which the votes cast by the Delegates and the Resident Commissioner have been decisive, the Committee of the Whole shall automatically rise and the Speaker shall put that question de novo without intervening debate or other business. Upon the announcement of the vote on that question, the Committee of the Whole shall resume its sitting without intervening motion.”).

. See Declaration of Barbara K. Bracher, Principal Assistant General Counsel and Solicitor to the United States House of Representatives (July 14, 1995) (describing the application of Rule XXI(5)(c) to the Mink Amendment to H.R. 4), reprinted in Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 136-37.
It is clear from the record that the Mink Amendment was supported by at least some of the appellant Members. See, e.g., Declaration of the Honorable Patsy T. Mink (June 15, 1995), reprinted in J.A. 84; Declaration of the Honorable Bruce E. Vento (June 16, 1995), reprinted in J.A. 127.

. As indicated in part A.2. infra, even assuming its continued validity, the remedial discretion doctrine is not dispositive of this case.

. It is clear from the record that the Mink Amendment was supported by at least some of the appellant voters’ representatives. See, e.g., Declaration of June Austin (June 14, 1995) (represented by Congressman Maurice D. Hinchey, who voted in favor of the Amendment, see 141 Cong Rec. H3777 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1995)), reprinted, in J.A. 61.

. "In the Parliament, if the greater part of the Knights of the Shire do assent to the making of an Act of Parliament, and the lesser part will not agree to it, yet this is a good Act or Statute to last in perpetuum: and that the Law of majoris partis is so in all Counsels, Elections & c. Both by the rules of the Common law and the Civil." William Hakewill, Modus Tenendi Parliamentum: or The Old Manner of Holding Parliaments in England 93 (Abel Roper ed., 1671); see also George Petit, Lex Parlimentaria: or A Treatise of the Law and Custom of the Parliaments of England 165 (1689).

. Seven more explicit majority requirements were added by amendment: amend. XII (election of President by electors); id. (election of President by House); id. (election of Vice President by electors); id. (election of Vice President by Senate); amend. XXV, § 2 (Vice Presidential vacancy); amend. XXV, § 4 (declaration of Presidential inability); id. (response to Presidential declaration of no inability). All of these requirements pertain only to the unique task of the election or status of the President and Vice President.

. The original seven exceptions to majority rule were art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (the Senate conviction of an impeached official); art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (expulsion of a Member of either House); art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (overriding a presidential veto); art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (the presence of a quorum in the House for the election of the President); art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (Senate consent to a treaty); art. V (amendment of the Constitution); and art. VII (ratification of the Constitution itself by the States).
The Framers carefully debated each case in which they imposed a supermajority requirement. In each situation, the Framers found good reasons for requiring something more than a simple majority. For example, on impeachment, the Convention first entertained and rejected a proposal by Dickenson that "the Executive be made removable by a ... majority of the Legislatures of individual States.” 1 Farrand at 85 (Madison’s Notes, June 2). The Convention, of course, ultimately approved the requirement of a two-thirds vote by the Senate. On expulsions, Madison argued that "the right of expulsion ... was too important to be exercised by a bare majority of a quorum: and in emergencies of faction might be dangerously abused.” 2 Far-rand at 254 (Madison's Notes, Aug. 10) (footnote omitted). There was also extensive debate about the two-thirds rule for Senate ratification of treaties, see id. at 540 (Madison’s Notes, Sept. 7); id. at 548 (Madison’s Notes, Sept. 8). On amendments, after Elbridge Gerry argued that a simple majority should not be able to "bind the Union to innovations that may subvert the State-Constitutions altogether,” id. at 557-58 (Madison’s Notes, Sept. 10), James Wilson proposed the three-fourths of the states requirement that appears in the Constitution, id. at 559 (Madison’s Notes, Sept. 10).

.Art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (adjournment); id. (compelling attendance of absent Members); art. I, § 5, cl. 3 (entry of yeas and nays in Journal of Proceedings).

. Dyer v. Blair, 390 F.Supp. 1291 (N.D.Ill.1975) (written by now-Justice Stevens, who was then a Circuit Judge writing for a three-judge District Court panel), which the Clerk cites as support for this argument, is factually distinct from the case at bar. Dyer involved the vote required for state legislators to ratify an amendment to the Constitution. The federalism concerns that underlay that decision are not present here. Dyer's statements about the meaning of a constitutional silence on voting requirements, id. at 1306, thus, are inapposite to this case.

. Appellees and amicus mistakenly rely on Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 6, 91 S.Ct. 1889, 1892, 29 L.Ed.2d 273 (1971) (finding that West Virginia's requirement of a three-fifths majority of *846voters to increase tax rates or bonded indebtedness did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment). That case deals with the constitutionality of state supermajority requirements under the equal protection clause, not the presentment clause. Gordon simply does not address the federal legislative process.

. Judge Joyce Hens Green recognized the distinction between procedural rules that affect which bills reach the entire House and rules that alter what constitutes the passage of a bill. In Page v. Dole, Civ. No. 93-1546 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 1994), a challenge to the Senate’s cloture rule, which she dismissed for lack of standing, she suggested that impermissible vote dilution might result if Congress imposed a supermajority requirement for passage of a bill but did not result from the Senate's supermajority cloture rule. Rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that he had standing because the Senate cloture rule resulted in impermissible dilution of his Senator's vote, she said, "To put it more baldly, Senate Rule XXII [the cloture rule] is not the same as a vote for or against legislation." Page, slip op. at 15 (emphasis added).