Court Opinion

ID: 9478752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:57:22.814169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:36.349751
License: Public Domain

LOGAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The language of the Federal Probation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3651, is clear: restitution may be ordered only for damages “caused by the offense for which conviction was had.” Here, conviction was had on the two counts to which Vance pleaded guilty, and the plain language of the statute limits restitution to damages charged in those two counts.1 Conviction was not had, and could not be had, on the four counts that were dismissed. See United States v. Orr, 691 F.2d 431, 432 (9th Cir.1982) (“restitution [can] be ordered only for amounts in counts upon which conviction was had and not for amounts set forth in dismissed counts, since a conviction for a greater amount could not have been had”). When the meaning of a criminal statute is plain, the statute will not be construed to include anything beyond its letter. See, e.g., United States v. Sparrow, 635 F.2d 794, 796 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1004, 101 S.Ct. 1717, 68 L.Ed.2d 209 (1980). And doubts about the meaning of a criminal statute are resolved in favor of the defendant. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348, 92 S.Ct. 515, 522, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971). The majority’s construction violates these rules.
The majority does not rely upon any legislative history to circumvent the plain language of § 3651; it does so by focusing on the word “offense,” ignoring the words “for which conviction was had,” concluding that the “offense” was the total scheme to defraud the banks. But a conviction was not had for the total “offense,” even giving that word a broad interpretation, because the government voluntarily dismissed four counts of the indictment constituting part of the “offense.”
If the term “offense” is not limited by the “conviction was had” phrase, there is nothing in the unitary scheme theory to prevent an order of restitution based on counts for which the defendant was acquitted. Although the majority appears to disclaim such a result by noting that “acquittal may be enough to bar restitution,” ante 1170 n. 3 (emphasis added), the logic of its interpretation of § 3651 is to the contrary. I do not see how the “conviction was had” words of limitation can be read out the section when dealing with a plea bargain and read back in when dealing with an acquittal. All of the cases I have found that directly confront the issue have held that an acquittal bars restitution on the particular count under § 3651. United States v. Pollak, 844 F.2d 145, 152 (3d Cir.1988) (using unitary scheme notion to award restitution on counts on which defendant was acquitted “would be at odds with the significance of an acquittal in our *1173criminal jurisprudence”) (footnote omitted); United States v. Johnson, 700 F.2d 699, 701 (11th Cir.1983) (“In a multiple count indictment, restitution is restricted to the counts that result in conviction,” not those for which the defendants “were acquitted or mistried.”); United States v. Brown, 699 F.2d 704, 711 (6th Cir.1983).
I also believe that our prior case law at least implicitly accepts the narrower reading I would give § 3661. United States v. Hill, 798 F.2d 402, 405 (10th Cir.1986), involved the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA), 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a) (now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)). We there held that restitution under the VWPA was not limited to amounts specified in the indictment or particular counts of an offense, but we stressed that “the VWPA does not contain [§ 3651’s] limiting language.” 798 F.2d at 405. We also stated that the main objective of the VWPA is compensatory and that the “decision of a prosecutor to indict a defendant and the manner in which a defendant is indicted have little, if anything, to do with the objectives of the VWPA.” Id. Finally, we noted that “[wjhile the VWPA provisions provide the district courts greater latitute in compensating crime victims, the VWPA also imposes several procedural requirements which were not in effect under the Federal Probation Act.” Id. at 406.
The VWPA does have a number of protections not present in § 3651, which justifies a very different construction of the two acts. Under the VWPA the court, in determining whether to order restitution, considers in addition to the amount of the victim’s loss, “the financial resources of the defendant, the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant’s dependents, and such other factors as the court deems appropriate.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a). Before the court acts it must disclose this information to the defendant, and “[a]ny dispute as to the proper amount or type of restitution shall be resolved by the court by the preponderance of the evidence.” Id. § 3664(c) & (d).
I believe that departure from the plain meaning of the statute to permit a restitution order in excess of the amounts charged in the counts on which there was conviction can only be justified on the basis of enforcing a bargain struck by agreement between the defendant and the government. See, e.g., United States v. Suter, 755 F.2d 523, 527 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1103, 105 S.Ct. 2331, 85 L.Ed.2d 848 (1985); United States v. Green, 735 F.2d 1203, 1205 (9th Cir.1984); United States v. Davies, 683 F.2d 1052, 1053, 1055 (7th Cir.1982); Phillips v. United States, 679 F.2d 192, 194 (9th Cir.1982). Requiring the agreement of the defendant ensures that the decision is a voluntary and knowing waiver of important rights. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1468, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243, 89 S.Ct. at 1712.
There can be no explicit bargain without a meeting of minds. Therefore, I could not hold that lack of notice to Vance on the amount of restitution he might be required to pay in excess of that set out in the counts to which he pleaded guilty could be harmless error. The circuits adopting the majority’s view of § 3651 might not require an explicit agreement to the larger restitution total, but they clearly require more specific notice of the amount of restitution that might be ordered than Vance received here.2 The Seventh Circuit’s rule implementing the unitary scheme theory, enunciated in United States v. Davies, 683 F.2d 1052 (7th Cir.1982), and quoted by the majority, presupposes notice to the defendant of the amount he may be called upon to pay. See id. at 1054 (amount of damages must be “admitted to by the defendant in the indictment, the plea agreement, and plea and presentence proceedings”). In Davies, the plea agreement itself provided for restitution as a condition of probation *1174and the defendant acknowledged the amount of loss caused by his fraud before the court accepted his plea. Id. at 1053, 1055; see also United States v. Paul, 783 F.2d 84, 88-89 (7th Cir.1986) (possibility of restitution was raised and discussed during plea hearing; restitution order modified on appeal to conform to amount defendant admitted during plea hearing).
In United States v. Woods, 775 F.2d 82, 83 (3d Cir.1985), relied on by the majority, “the likelihood of a restitution order and its extent were fully explained to [the defendant] by the district court before accepting the plea.” In rejecting the defendant’s contention that he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea, the Third Circuit stated that
“there can be no question on this record but that defendant was told in unequivocal terms that restitution would be imposed as a part of probation. The lengthy colloquy before the plea was accepted could not be clearer. It is also significant that after the district court stated its intention to impose restitution, it afforded the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his plea and go to trial. Thus, the court did not accept the plea until after the defendant indicated he understood that restitution would be ordered and that he had the option of asking for a trial.”
Id. at 86. The implicit notice requirement of Woods was formalized in United States v. Hawthorne, 806 F.2d 493 (3d Cir.1986). In Hawthorne, the Third Circuit held that
“[W]here a plea is sought on a count(s) on which restitution in an amount exceeding that charged in the particular count(s) may properly be imposed, the government must in the course of negotiating the plea, inform the defendant of the possibility that restitution will be required so as to afford the defendant a full opportunity to assess adequately all the consequences prior to entering a plea of guilty. In the absence of a provision for restitution in the plea agreement, the district court must, prior to accepting the plea, inform the defendant of the possibility of its imposition before a subsequent order of restitution in an amount exceeding that charged in the count(s) to which the defendant pleaded may be sustained.”
Id. at 499.
The majority also relies on the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in United States v. McMichael, 699 F.2d 193 (4th Cir.1983). In McMichael, although restitution apparently was not mentioned until the sentencing hearing, the district court
“recessed the proceedings to allow time for McMichael, his attorney, and the government’s attorney to determine how much had been embezzled and whether McMichael would be willing to repay that amount. When the parties returned, McMichael’s counsel advised the court that his client would agree to an order of restitution and that the amount of restitution should be $14,119.06. McMichael, himself, stated that the Bank of Virginia was entitled to at least $14,119.06 in restitution and that he wanted the court to order the repayment of that amount as a condition of probation.”
Id. at 194.
Section 3651 has now been repealed, and perhaps because of that this case is of no great moment except to Vance. But I write in dissent because legal principles applicable to the construction of criminal statutes and procedural protections are slighted by the majority opinion. I would limit the restitution order to the amounts expressed in the counts to which Vance pleaded guilty.

. A guilty plea is "itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment.” Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); see also United States v. Crockett, 812 F.2d 626, 629 (10th Cir.1987).

. The plea agreement was on a standardized printed form containing several pages, only part of which would be applicable to Vance. On page 3 the form referenced that Vance might have to pay restitution under the VWPA; on page 2 it stated he might be subject to a fine as high as $500,000. The form said nothing about § 3651 or any amount of restitution. R. Tab Min 12/14 Plea Agreement at 2, 3.