Court Opinion

ID: 9586218
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:08:24.454071+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:25:36.137544
License: Public Domain

LEHMAN, Chief Justice,
dissenting, with whom MACY, Justice, joins.
Because I believe the hearing examiner’s decision awarding benefits is supported by substantial evidence, I respectfully. dissent.
Applying Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603 (LEXIS 1999)1, the hearing examiner found that Borchert’s shoulder injury had occurred over a substantial period of time. Disregarding this finding, the majority redecides the issue, concluding Borchert’s injury resulted from a single occurrence on or about April 22, 1995. This finding in hand, the majority then applies the statute of limitations found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-503(a) (Michie 1996 Supp.) (amended 1996)2 to reverse the hearing examiner’s award of benefits. Because I believe the hearing examiner’s finding — that Borchert’s injury was one occur*966ring over a substantial period of time — -is supported by substantial evidence, I would conclude his claim was timely under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-503(b) (LEXIS 1999).3
In Big Horn Coal Co. v. Wartensleben, 502 P.2d 187, 188 (Wyo.1972), this court wrote:
[W]here an employee in the course of his employment sustains an apparent trivial injury which does not result in present disability and which would not reasonably be expected to cause future disability, but which injury in fact over a period of latency does cause future disability, the time for giving notice of the occurrence of the injury to the employer runs from the time when it becomes apparent that such injury has resulted in, or is likely to cause, com-pensable disability.
See also Mitchell v. State Recreation Comm’n Snowmobile Trails, 968 P.2d 37, 40 (Wyo.1998). The determination of whether an injury was a single occurrence injury or an injury which appeared over time is one of fact. Murray v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Safety & Compensation Div., 993 P.2d 327, 330 (Wyo.1999). We
“afford respect and deference to an administrative agency’s findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence. Aanenson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Div., 842 P.2d 1077, 1079 (Wyo.1992) (quoting State ex rel. Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Div. v. White, 837 P.2d 1095, 1098 (Wyo.1992)). ‘Substantial evidence’ is a term of art, best described as ‘relevant evidence that a reasonable mind can accept as adequate to support an agency’s conclusion.’ Casper Oil Co. v. Evenson, 888 P.2d 221, 224 (Wyo.1995). Further, we consider only that evidence favoring the party prevailing below, leaving out of consideration conflicting evidence. Wyoming Steel and Fab, Inc. v. Robles, 882 P.2d 873, 876 (Wyo.1994) (quoting Matter of Injury to Carpenter, 736 P.2d 311, 312 (Wyo.1987)).”
Haagensen v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Compensation Div., 949 P.2d 865, 867 (Wyo.1997) (quoting Coleman v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Compensation Div., 915 P.2d 595, 598 (Wyo.1996)).
The hearing examiner made the following findings:
5. The Division and the Employer contend that the general nature of Claimant’s injury, if caused by the incident in April of 1995 would have been readily apparent to him at that time. However, Claimant testified at the hearing that he did not realize he suffered an injury while lifting the heavy carpet and other materials, as it was a common occurrence for him to feel and hear “popping” in his shoulders. Although he initially suffered some soreness from the incident the soreness went away after a weekend of rest.
6. Claimant underwent a periodical company physical in May 1995 pursuant to the practice of the company to conduct regular physicals. The examining physfician] indicated that the Claimant was able to continue working.
7. After April 1995, the Claimant began experiencing increasing aches and pains in the area of his shoulders, culminating in quite severe pain in the summer of 1996. Although Claimant’s testimony at the hearing does not comport in all respects with the accident report, the Office will find that, based upon the deposition of the treating physician Dr. Biddulph, the alleged injury is one occurring over a substantial period of time and that the application of benefits was filed within one year after the preliminary diagnosis was made known to the Claimant.
Instead of deferring to the hearing examiner on these findings, the majority writes: “We do not find substantial evidence to sup*967port the hearing examiner’s finding that Borchert’s injury was not readily apparent on April 22,1995.” However, Borchert testified that he did not believe he had reinjured his shoulder at that time. When asked why he did not think he had reinjured himself, Borchert attributed his soreness and pain to his arthritis — which leaves him in constant pain — and the effects of the weather. Although he testified he knew he had overexerted himself and he was sore for the weekend, the soreness went away after a few days. He also testified he thought he had just pulled some muscles and did not think the pain was significant enough to seek medical treatment. There is ample evidence to support the hearing examiner’s finding that the injury was one occurring over a substantial period of time.
The only way the majority can avoid affir-mance is to question Borchert’s credibility: “Only under oath does Borchert’s testimony become equivocal.” It first seizes on Borc-hert’s injury report, where he reported his injury was caused by unloading the roll of carpet on April 22, 1995. However, when Borchert’s statement on the injury report is taken in its entirety, the majority’s position becomes far less persuasive. On his injury report, Borchert wrote that his injury was caused by “[ejxcessive strain from unloading large roll of carpet, then weekly continued aggravation from unloading freight by hand.” On an attachment to the injury report, he wrote that the “initial strain” occurred April 22, 1995. Because Borchert refers to the events of April 22, 1995, as the initial strain, and because he asserted that continued aggravation caused his injury, his injury report, when viewed in his favor, can be read to support the hearing examiner’s finding that the injury was sustained over a substantial period of time.
Even when viewing the injury report as the majority does, it merely presents questions of credibility and of the weight to be given evidence — questions traditionally reserved for the hearing examiner, not for this court upon review of a cold record. It is well settled that the hearing examiner, as the trier of fact, is charged with weighing the evidence and determining the credibility of witnesses. Bando v. Clure Bros. Furniture, 980 P.2d 323, 331 (Wyo.1999); Morgan v. Olsten Temporary Services, 975 P.2d 12, 15 (Wyo.1999); Gonzales v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Compensation Div., 970 P.2d 865, 870 (Wyo.1998); E.H. Oftedal & Sons, Inc. v. Thompson, 966 P.2d 977, 981 (Wyo.1998); Everheart v. S & L Industrial, 957 P.2d 847, 852 (Wyo.1998); Pederson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Compensation Div., 939 P.2d 740, 742 (Wyo.1997); Corman v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Compensation Div., 909 P.2d 966, 971 (Wyo.1996); Latimer v. Rissler & McMurry Co., 902 P.2d 706, 711 (Wyo.1995); Hepp v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Compensation Div., 881 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Wyo.1994). Even if Borchert equivocates, I cannot accept the majority’s entry into the business of reweighing evidence and redetermining credibility.
The second issue involves the timeliness of Borchert’s request for a hearing. The hearing examiner wrote:
Due to the conflicting testimony and evidence concerning the dates that the Final Determination was written, mailed by the Division, received by the Claimant, the date that the Claimant prepared his response and mailed the same, the Office will conclude that the Claimant’s request for hearing was made in a timely manner.
There are two important facts that support the hearing examiner’s determination. First, there is Borchert’s testimony that he did not receive the Final Determination until a few days before a response was due and that he sent it overnight mail, via Federal Express, two days before the deadline. Second, there is nothing in the record to establish when the Division mailed the final determination to Borchert. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-601(k)(iv) (LEXIS 1999). Again, only by disbelieving or ignoring Borehert’s testimony can the majority find that the hearing examiner’s findings are not supported by substantial evidence. My review of the record satisfies me that the hearing examiner’s determination — that Borchert’s request for a hearing was timely — is supported by substantial evidence.
I respectfully dissent.

. Section 27-14-603(a) provides:
(a) The burden of proof in contested cases involving injuries which occur over a substantial period of time is on the employee to prove by competent medical authority that his claim arose out of and in the course of his employment and to prove by a preponderance of evidence that:
(i) There is a direct causal connection between the condition or circumstances under which the work is performed and the injury;
(ii) The injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work as a result of the employment;
(iii) The injury can fairly be traced to the employment as a proximate cause;
(iv) The injury does not come from a hazard to which employees would have been equally exposed outside of the employment; and
(v)The injury is incidental to the character of the business and not independent of the relation of employer and employee.

. Before its amendment in 1996, § 27-14-503(a) provided:
(a) A payment for benefits involving an injury which is the result of a single brief occurrence rather than occurring over a substantial period of time shall not be made unless in addition to the proper and timely filing of the reports of the accident, an application or claim for benefits is filed within one (1) year after the date the accident occurred or for injuries not readily apparent, within one (1) year after discovery of the injuty by the employee. The report of accident is not a claim for benefits.

. Section 24-14-503(b) provides:
(b) The right of compensation for an injury which occurs over a substantial period of time is barred unless a claim for benefits is filed within one (1) year after a diagnosis of injury is first communicated to the employee, or within three (3) years from the date of last injurious workplace exposure to the condition causing the injury, whichever occurs last, excluding injury caused by ionizing radiation to which the three (3) year limitation does not apply. If death results from ionizing radiation within one (1) year after a diagnosis of the medical condition is first communicated to the employee or if death occurs without the communication of a diagnosis to the employee, a claim shall be filed within one (1) year after the date of death.