Court Opinion

ID: 9535659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:51:44.42965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:18.072375
License: Public Domain

Riley, C.J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
Two issues are presented by this appeal. The first issue is whether the circuit court erred in remanding the case to the magistrate. The second issue is whether the magistrate abandoned his discretion in binding defendant over on second-degree murder charges after the second preliminary examination. The majority fails to address the first issue and focuses solely on the second.
I believe that the majority should have first decided whether the circuit court’s remand was proper because, if the remand was improper, the discretion issue would have been rendered moot. Therefore, I write separately to indicate that while I can concur in the conclusion implicit in the majority opinion that the remand was proper, I cannot agree with the ultimate conclusion reached by the majority that the magistrate abandoned his discretion by relying solely on People v Oster, 67 Mich App 490; 241 NW2d 260 (1976).
i
The first issue presented on appeal is whether the circuit court properly remanded the case to the magistrate to hear additional evidence. I find *137that the circuit court had authority to remand to the district court, and did not abuse its discretion in so ordering. I agree with the majority’s implicit finding and would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
This Court has long recognized the authority of the circuit court to remand once it has jurisdiction of a criminal case.1 In People v Miklovich, 375 Mich 536; 134 NW2d 720 (1965), the circuit court found insufficient evidence for a bindover, quashed the information, and remanded the case to the magistrate. The defendant argued , that once the motion to quash was granted, the circuit court was without jurisdiction to remand the cause. The Court stated:
Jurisdiction, having once vested in the circuit court, was not lost by virtue of the granting of the motion to quash the information. Therefore, the circuit court had authority, upon motion of the prosecutor, to remand to the examining magistrate for further examination. [375 Mich 539.]
See also People v Kennedy, 384 Mich 339; 183 NW2d 297 (1971), and Genesee Prosecutor v Genesee Circuit Judge, 391 Mich 115; 215 NW2d 145 (1974).
In People v New, 427 Mich 482; 398 NW2d 358 (1986), this Court again recognized the option of a circuit court judge to remand when there is an *138insufficiency of the proofs below.2 In the instant case, the Court of Appeals misinterpreted New as qualifying "the trial court’s authority to remand, the condition being that the evidence be insufficient to show the commission of the crime or the defendant’s participation in it.”3 However, the New Court stated that
[i]f, the circuit court judge finds the evidence insufficient to show the commission of the crime or defendant’s participation in it, he may either dismiss the charges or remand the cause to the examining magistrate for further examination. [Id. at 495.]
The language does not limit the court’s power to remand, but merely states that the court may remand despite insufficient evidence for a bind-over.
This Court has also acknowledged the authority of the circuit court to remand when it amends an information to include a new charge on which a defendant did not have a preliminary examination, People v Bercheny, 387 Mich 431; 196 NW2d 767 (1972).4 In Bercheny, the Court found that the amendment of the information addressed form rather than substance and that therefore remand or rearraignment was not required.
The authorities set out above acknowledge the power of circuit courts to remand once they have jurisdiction of a criminal case. There is no authority which precludes circuit courts from exercising *139the remand alternative. Although Miklovich authorizes remands where the evidence at the preliminary hearing is insufficient to bind over, it does not limit remands to such situations. Miklovich hinges on the reasoning that the remand was proper because the circuit court had jurisdiction. In the instant case, the trial court had jurisdiction once the magistrate filed the return on July 29, 1985. Once jurisdiction was vested in the circuit court, it had the power to issue the remand order so as to "fully effectuate [its] jurisdiction . . . .” MCL 600.611; MSA 27A.611.
The efficient administration of the criminal justice process strongly supports the power of a circuit court to remand in a situation presented by the instant case. The prosecution moved to remand because additional evidence arose after the first preliminary examination.5 The prosecution was not questioning the magistrate’s ruling, therefore an appeal was not an option. If the court was precluded from remanding, its only options would consist of dismissal or trying defendant on a potentially inaccurate charge. Although dismissal and refiling are certainly allowable, this would lend unnecessary complication and inefficiency to pretrial proceedings.
Having found that trial courts have authority to remand, I face the question whether the circuit court abused its discretion in remanding to the magistrate to hear additional evidence.
In order to find that a trial court abused its discretion, I would have to find that the trial judge breached the standards set out in Spalding v Spalding, 355 Mich 382, 384-385; 94 NW2d 810 (1959):_
*140Where, as here, the exercise of discretion turns upon a factual determination made by the trier of the facts, an abuse of discretion involves far more than a difference in judicial opinion between the trial and appellate courts. The term discretion itself involves the idea of choice, of an exercise of the will, of a determination made between competing considerations. In order to have an "abuse” in reaching such determination, the result must be so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences not the exercise of will but perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of passion or bias.
However, in People v Charles O Williams, 386 Mich 565, 573; 194 NW2d 337 (1972), the Court stated that "a somewhat stricter standard should be observed in criminal cases where loss of freedom by incarceration is often the penalty that a convicted defendant will suffer.”
I find that the circuit court was well within its discretion in remanding the case to the district court. Although the Supreme Court has not expressly placed limitations on remands in this situation, the court rules have recently restricted successive examinations in the following manner. MCR 6.110(F)6 provides:
Discharge of Defendant. If, after considering the evidence, the court determines that probable cause does not exist to believe either that an offense has been committed or that the defendant committed it, the court must discharge the defendant without prejudice to the prosecutor initiating a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. Except as provided in MCR 8.111(C), the subsequent preliminary examination must be held before the same judicial officer and the prosecutor must present additional evidence to support the charge. [Emphasis added.]
*141This rule insures fairness to those under investigation who are successively examined for the same offense. In the instant case, the motion to remand had the same effect as a refiling by the prosecution. At the first preliminary examination the magistrate found insufficient probable cause on the murder charge and bound defendant over for involuntary manslaughter. The prosecution moved to remand so that defendant could be examined again on the murder charge. The effect was the same as if the magistrate had dismissed the case for lack of probable cause on the murder charge and the prosecutor had refiled. Thus, the limitations on refiling found in MCR 6.110(F) should guide the Court in evaluating the trial judge’s exercise of discretion in granting the motion to remand.
The prosecution moved to remand to offer additional evidence which was unavailable at the earlier examination. The additional evidence addressed the element of malice which the magistrate found lacking at the first preliminary hearing. Defendant and the Court of Appeals admit that additional evidence was presented. Furthermore, the same magistrate that made the initial determination presided over the second hearing. There is no evidence that the prosecution’s motion to remand was made in bad faith or was made for the purpose of harassing defendant. I find that the circuit court’s actions comport with the limitations on refiling set forth in MCR 6.110(F) and do not constitute an abuse of discretion. I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
ii
The next issue to address is whether the magistrate wrongly bound defendant over on a charge of *142second-degree murder after the second preliminary examination. I dissent from the majority which found that the bindover was improper because the magistrate failed to examine the whole matter by relying solely on People v Oster, supra, in making his decision.7
A. EXAMINATION OF THE WHOLE MATTER
As this Court stated in People v King, 412 Mich 145, 154; 312 NW2d 629 (1981), a magistrate’s decision as to probable cause must be arrived at "after an examination of the whole matter.” The majority position is that the magistrate properly examined the whole matter at the first preliminary hearing, but failed to examine the whole matter at the second preliminary hearing. I disagree.
At the second preliminary examination, new evidence on the element of malice was presented. The medical examiner testified that the "knife wound inflicted on the decedent indicated a 'hook type’ thrust. [The medical examiner] also opined that the defendant would necessarily have been aware of impaling and withdrawing the knife.” Ante, p 130. This additional evidence spoke to the nature of the knife wound and reflected on the mental state of defendant. From this testimony, the magistrate could infer malice.
The autopsy report and examiner’s testimony were not available for the first hearing. However, at the end of the first hearing, the magistrate inquired about the findings in the autopsy report. *143Presumably, he inquired because he thought the report would be material to his determination. Given the relevance of the autopsy report to the incident, and its absence in the first hearing, the first hearing fell short of being an examination of all relevant information. The admission of the testimony at the second hearing facilitated a complete examination of the matter and supported the bindover for second-degree murder.
The magistrate’s opinion is indicative of his thorough examination at the second preliminary hearing. He makes detailed findings of fact with regard to the whole incident. Furthermore, in arriving at his decision, the magistrate refers to "additional” and "new evidence.” Viewing the entire opinion, it is clear that the magistrate considered and understood all of the relevant facts in making his decision. In my view, he made a sufficient examination of the entire matter.
B. ABANDONMENT OF DISCRETION
The majority holds that the magistrate abandoned his discretion in binding defendant over for second-degree murder. Again, I disagree.
I believe that the magistrate properly exercised his discretion in this case. Judging by the different outcomes of the two hearings, the magistrate had difficulty in deciding whether the evidence warranted a bindover for second-degree murder. This is understandable. The facts do not dictate a decision one way or another. It is undisputed that defendant stabbed and killed her boyfriend. What is disputed is whether the stabbing was accidental or intentional, and, if intentional, whether the killing was excusable.
In factually close cases, it is the hallmark of a magistrate that he exercise his discretion in deter*144mining whether probable cause exists to support a bindover, and that his findings not be interfered with by a reviewing court unless there is a "clear abuse of discretion.” People v Doss, 406 Mich 90, 101; 276 NW2d 9 (1979).
In People v Dellabonda, 265 Mich 486, 491; 251 NW 594 (1933), cited in People v Doss, supra at 101, the Court stated:
Primarily the question of probable cause is for the consideration of and determination by the examining magistrate. This court may not agree with the findings of such magistrate but it has no right to substitute its judgment for his except in case of a clear abuse of discretion. [Emphasis added.]
By overturning the magistrate’s decision in the instant case, the Court of Appeals engaged in fact finding and substituted its judgment for that of the magistrate. The majority states that "[although the magistrate’s reasons for reversing his initial determination might arguably support differing interpretations, the reading of the Court of Appeals is not without support in the record.” Ante, p 135 (emphasis added). I believe the majority is wrong to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals when the magistrate’s reasoning is subject to differing interpretations, and one of those interpretations constitutes a proper use of discretion. The Court of Appeals clearly erred because the magistrate’s decision was properly supported by at least one construction of his reasoning. It is an entirely reasonable construction of the magistrate’s opinion that he examined the whole matter, including the additional evidence, in binding defendant over for second-degree murder. By choosing another interpretation over a reasonable one supporting the magistrate’s findings, I believe that the Court of *145Appeals substituted its judgment for that of the magistrate. Deference should have been given the magistrate’s decision absent a clear abuse of discretion.
In my opinion, the magistrate did not rely solely on Oster in making his decision. Though he used Oster for legal guidance, he also considered the unique facts of this case, and the record amply supports the conclusion that he reviewed the whole matter in assessing the additional evidence which supported a bindover for second-degree murder. Essentially, the Court of Appeals usurped a legitimate exercise of discretion by the magistrate, and substituted its own judgment.
I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the involuntary manslaughter conviction.
Boyle and Griffin, JJ., concurred with Riley, C.J.

 The circuit court acquires jurisdiction from the district court upon the filing of a proper return by a magistrate before whom a defendant has been examined or waived examination, People v Curtis, 389 Mich 698; 209 NW2d 243 (1973); Genesee Prosecutor v Genesee Circuit Judge, 391 Mich 115; 215 NW2d 145 (1974); People v Johnson, 427 Mich 98; 398 NW2d 219 (1986).
MCL 600.611; MSA 27A.611 provides that "circuit courts have jurisdiction and power to make any order proper to fully effectuate the circuit courts’ jurisdiction and judgments.”

 The opinion in New, written by Justice Cavanagh, states that "[t]he bind-over procedure is structured so as to allow the prosecutor, upon remand by the circuit court, to attempt to remedy any insufficiency in the proof in order to establish the requisite probable cause.” 427 Mich 495.

 People v Stafford, 168 Mich App 247, 252; 423 NW2d 634 (1988).

 The Court adopted the opinion in People v Iaconis, 29 Mich App 443; 185 NW2d 609 (1971).

 The evidence was the testimony of the medical examiner concerning the autopsy report. The magistrate inquired about the findings in the autopsy report at the end of the first preliminary examination, but the report was unavailable at that time.

 MCR 6.110(F) became effective October 1, 1989.

 While I dissent to respond to the majority opinion and Court of Appeals decision, I think that a harmless error analysis would have been an effective way of disposing of the issues in this case. On appeal, defendant does not claim that there was insufficient evidence for a bindover on second-degree murder, nor does she claim that she was convicted of involuntary manslaughter on insufficient evidence.