Court Opinion

ID: 9953526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 14:19:02.230558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:39.886354
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 15, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                   Commonwealth of Kentucky
                              Court of Appeals
                                  NO. 2022-CA-0958-MR

WILLIAM WILLOUGHBY                                                             APPELLANT

                  APPEAL FROM JESSAMINE CIRCUIT COURT
v.               HONORABLE C. HUNTER DAUGHERTY, JUDGE
                          ACTION NO. 21-CI-00349

TINA MOORE AND TINA
HAMILTON MOORE,
ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE
OF DANA E. MOORE                                                                APPELLEES

                                         OPINION
                                        AFFIRMING

                                       ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: EASTON, ECKERLE, AND JONES, JUDGES.

JONES, JUDGE: William Willoughby appeals from an order of the Jessamine

Circuit Court granting summary judgment in favor of defendants Tina and Dan

Moore in this personal injury case.1 We affirm.

1
 Throughout the pendency of the underlying action, the defendant was referred to as Dan
Moore. The notice of appeal also identifies him as “Dan Moore.” However, he passed away
during the pendency of this appeal and probate documents identify him as “Dana E. Moore.”
This Court entered an order substituting Tina Hamilton Moore, Administratrix of the Estate of
                     I.     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

               In the summer of 2020, Dan Moore contacted Willoughby about

painting his barn. Willoughby is an experienced painter of both barns and fences

in the central Kentucky area.2 Willoughby visited Moore’s farm and quoted him a

price of $1,500.00 to paint the barn, including the metal roof.3 Moore informed

Willoughby that he wanted to remove various items and farm implements that

were near the sides of the barn and that he would contact Willoughby when he was

ready for him to start the job. Willoughby informed Moore that he could “spray

through” the various items near the barn, as well as vines that were attached to the

barn, but Moore was not receptive to this idea. The parties also discussed that

Moore would trim some tree branches near the stripping shed attached to the barn.

No written agreement was ever executed between the men.

               Willoughby arrived at Moore’s farm to paint the barn on or about

September 17, 2020. He testified that he noticed tree debris and rust on the roof of

the attached stripping shed, so he knew Willoughby had not cleared debris from

Dana E. Moore as a party appellee in place of Dan E. Moore. We refer to him as “Dan” in this
Opinion for the sake of simplicity.
2
 At the time of his deposition, Willoughby was forty-eight years old. He testified that he had
been painting barns since he graduated from high school. However, he estimated that from 2012
until the time of his fall in September 2020, he had only painted a total of four or five barns.
3
 It appears from the record before us that the initial quote to paint the barn and roof may have
been $1,200.00, but it is undisputed that Moore paid Willoughby $1,500.00.

                                               -2-
the roof of the barn. After painting the sides of the barn, Willoughby climbed a

ladder to access the barn’s roof, which he estimated to be approximately twenty

feet off the ground. Willoughby claims he was on the roof for less than one minute

before he realized he was standing on debris and, as soon as he realized his footing

was unstable, he fell off the roof.

             As a result of his fall, Willoughby sustained numerous injuries to his

arms, shoulders, spine, and neck. Nevertheless, he returned to Moore’s property

two days later to complete the job. Prior to returning, Willoughby rented a lift to

access the roof of the barn.

             Willoughby filed a complaint against the Moores on June 21, 2021,

alleging negligence and premises liability, negligence per se, and gross negligence.

Discovery commenced and, after the Moores deposed Willoughby on December

28, 2021, they filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Willoughby was

an independent contractor and the Moores did not breach the applicable duty of

care. In response, Willoughby argued he was an invitee and that the Moores had a

duty to discover and warn him about any defects or dangers in the roof. Following

a hearing on March 24, 2022, the circuit court agreed with the Moores and granted

summary judgment in their favor. The court entered two orders. One was

handwritten and contemporaneous with the hearing; the other was entered

approximately two weeks later. Willoughby filed a motion to reconsider, clarify,

                                         -3-
or alter, amend, or vacate, which was denied by the circuit court. This appeal

followed. Further facts will be developed as necessary.

                             II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

             Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Kentucky Rule

of Civil Procedure (CR) 56.03. The movants bear the initial burden of

demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute. The party

opposing the motion then has the burden to present, “at least some affirmative

evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.” Steelvest

Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 482 (Ky. 1991). When a

circuit court grants a motion for summary judgment, the standard of review for the

appellate court is de novo because only legal issues are involved. Hallahan v. The

Courier Journal, 138 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Ky. App. 2004). We must consider the

evidence of record in the light most favorable to the non-movant (i.e., Willoughby)

and determine whether the circuit court correctly found there was no genuine

issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 780 (Ky. App. 1996).

                                          -4-
              We review for abuse of discretion the circuit court’s implicit

determination that sufficient time had passed for discovery at the time it ruled on

the motion for summary judgment. Blankenship v. Collier, 302 S.W.3d 665, 668

(Ky. 2010).

                                    III. ANALYSIS

              On appeal, Willoughby’s arguments are often overlapping. He

generally argues the circuit court improperly granted summary judgment for

numerous reasons, including that there were questions of fact, and that discovery

was not complete. He also argues his general/ordinary negligence and premises

liability claims should move forward.

              Despite Willoughby’s attempts to muddy the waters with various

theories of liability, the most significant facts of the case are undisputed and our

task on appeal is straightforward. The issue before us concerns the applicable duty

of care the Moores owed Willoughby and whether they breached that duty. A

court may appropriately dismiss a claim on a motion for summary judgment when

the plaintiff fails to show a breach of the applicable duty of care, resulting in no

negligence as a matter of law. Shelton v. Kentucky Easter Seals Soc., Inc., 413

S.W.3d 901, 904 (Ky. 2013). Further, “questions of breach may be properly

decided by summary judgment when a [hazard] cannot be corrected by any means

or when it is beyond dispute that the landowner had done all that was reasonable.”

                                          -5-
City of Barbourville v. Hoskins, 655 S.W.3d 137, 142-43 (Ky. 2022) (internal

quotation marks and footnote omitted).

             “Kentucky law remains steadfast in its adherence to the traditional

notion that duty is associated with the status of the injured party as an invitee,

licensee, or trespasser.” Shelton, 413 S.W.3d at 909. However, “premises

liability claims are treated differently when the plaintiff is an independent

contractor as opposed to an ordinary business invitee.” Dexter v. Hanks, 577

S.W.3d 789, 795 (Ky. App. 2019) (emphasis added); Auslander Properties, LLC v.

Nalley, 558 S.W.3d 457, 467 (Ky. 2018) (“In the context of a premises liability

claim, a landowner is not liable to an independent contractor for injuries sustained

from defects or dangers that the independent contractor knows or ought to know

of.”).

             “An individual is the agent of another if the principal has the power or

responsibility to control the method, manner, and details of the agent’s work.”

Nazar v. Branham, 291 S.W.3d 599, 606-07 (Ky. 2009). “If, however, an

individual is free to determine how work is done and the principal cares only about

the end result, then that individual is an independent contractor.” Id. Whether

Willoughby was an independent contractor is a question of law. Uninsured

Employers’ Fund v. Garland, 805 S.W.2d 116, 117 (Ky. 1991).

                                          -6-
                 Moore contacted Willoughby about painting his barn.4 Willoughby

visited the barn and quoted Moore a price for the job. He was an experienced

painter and had his own painting equipment, including sprayers. Moore did not

direct the work in any way except to specify that he wanted the barn painted black

and the roof painted chrome. Willoughby was free to determine how best to paint

the barn, including what equipment to use. Moore was concerned only that the

barn and roof were painted, and he did not supervise the work. In fact, he left to

attend a baseball game on the second day of the painting. In other words, Moore

cared only about the result and did not interfere in Willoughby’s process of

painting the barn.5 We agree with the circuit court’s determination that

Willoughby was an independent contractor. See Everett v. Edelen, 672 S.W.3d

196 (Ky. App. 2023).

                 We now turn to the duty of care Moore owed to Willoughby.

                 In the context of a premises liability claim, a landowner
                 is not liable to an independent contractor for injuries
                 sustained from defects or dangers that the independent
                 contractor knows or ought to know of. Only when the
                 defect or danger is hidden and known to the owner, and
                 neither known to the contractor, nor such as he ought to

4
    It is undisputed that Willoughby had no contact whatsoever with Moore’s wife, Tina.
5
  Willoughby repeatedly points out that Moore should have informed him that he needed to use a
lift to access the roof of the barn. This argument has no basis in the law. Willoughby admitted
that he rented lifts to paint other barns in the past. Moore was under no obligation to furnish
Willoughby with any safety equipment. Auslander, 558 S.W.3d at 467.

                                                -7-
                know, is the landowner liable for the contractor’s injuries
                absent a warning.

Dexter, 577 S.W.3d at 795 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

                In other words, Moore had a duty to warn Willoughby of (1) hidden or

latent defects; (2) that Moore knew about; and (3) Willoughby did not or could not

discover himself. In contrast, if we accepted Willoughby’s argument that he was a

business invitee, Moore would have owed Willoughby a much more stringent duty

“to discover unreasonably dangerous conditions on the land and either eliminate or

warn of them.” Shelton, 413 S.W.3d at 909 (emphasis added).

                There were no hidden or latent defects on the roof. Willoughby

blamed his fall on unstable footing due to debris on the roof. Debris is not a

hidden or latent defect. There is no evidence that Moore knew any more about

possible debris on the roof than Willoughby could have discovered for himself

when he climbed the ladder. Moreover, it is undisputed that Moore had never been

on the roof of the barn. Although he agreed to remove items from the side of the

barn that would impede Willoughby’s sprayers, Willoughby only assumed Moore

would also inspect the roof of the barn and remove any debris.6 There is no

indication in the record that Moore agreed to do so. Willoughby admitted that

when he arrived to paint the barn, he believed Moore only completed

6
    See page 37 of Willoughby’s deposition.

                                              -8-
approximately half of the preparation work he had anticipated. Nevertheless,

Willoughby chose to move forward with painting the barn and roof. Willoughby

also admitted he had better knowledge than anyone about the condition of the roof

once he accessed it from a ladder. Accordingly, Willoughby failed to show a

breach of the applicable duty of care and there was no negligence as a matter of

law.

               Willoughby also argues his premises liability claim should move

forward independently. This argument is both baffling and without merit as this is

a premises liability case. See Dexter, 577 S.W.3d at 795. As far as Willoughby’s

argument that his general negligence claim should move forward, we are

unpersuaded. To recover, Willoughby would have to be something other than an

independent contractor and it would also necessarily mean Moore owed

Willoughby a different duty under the same set of undisputed facts.7 Willoughby’s

argument must fail.

               Finally, Willoughby argues that discovery was not yet complete. We

note the circuit court did not enter a discovery order. At the time the Moores filed

their motion for summary judgment on January 31, 2022, they had deposed

Willoughby and Willoughby had deposed Dan Moore. The parties had also

7
 Willoughby briefly states that his negligence per se claim should also move forward, but does
not provide any applicable statute as the basis for this claim, nor did he provide it to the circuit
court. Because he does not expand on this argument, we decline to address it.

                                                 -9-
answered interrogatories, requests for production of documents, and requests for

admissions. When Willoughby filed his response to the motion for summary

judgment on March 22, 2022, he also submitted additional discovery requests to

the Moores on the same date. Specifically, Willoughby requested to inspect the

barn and asked for additional documentation pertaining to repairs and maintenance

of the barn in the last ten years. Willoughby submitted additional discovery

requests after the circuit court granted the motion for summary judgment. The

circuit court entered summary judgment despite Willoughby’s outstanding

discovery requests and denied his motion to alter, amend, or vacate based, in part,

on outstanding discovery. We discern no error.

             Although a defendant is permitted to move for a
             summary judgment at any time, this Court has cautioned
             trial courts not to take up these motions prematurely and
             to consider summary judgment motions “only after the
             opposing party has been given ample opportunity to
             complete discovery.” Pendleton Bros. Vending, Inc. v.
             Commonwealth Finance and Admin. Cabinet, 758
             S.W.2d 24, 29 (Ky. 1988). Thus, even though an
             appellate court always reviews the substance of a trial
             court’s summary judgment ruling de novo, i.e., to
             determine whether the record reflects a genuine issue of
             material fact, a reviewing court must also consider
             whether the trial court gave the party opposing the
             motion an ample opportunity to respond and complete
             discovery before the court entered its ruling.

Blankenship, 302 S.W.3d at 668.

            Further,

                                        -10-
             [w]hether a summary judgment was prematurely granted
             must be determined within the context of the individual
             case. In the absence of a pretrial discovery order, there
             are no time limitations within which a party is required to
             commence or complete discovery. As a practical matter,
             complex factual cases necessarily require more discovery
             than those where the facts are straightforward and readily
             accessible to all parties.

Suter v. Mazyck, 226 S.W.3d 837, 842 (Ky. App. 2007).

             This is not a complex case. Willoughby claims he fell off the roof of

Moore’s barn due to debris that caused him to have unstable footing. This is

unrelated to any structural or maintenance issue and was not a hidden or latent

defect of the barn. Willoughby fails to explain what evidence he hoped to glean

from inspection of the barn nearly two years after the accident. After the circuit

court granted the motion for summary judgment, Willoughby noticed numerous

depositions, including Tina Moore and various individuals who worked on or in

the barn in the past. However, Willoughby fails to articulate how any of these

people could offer controverting evidence to his own assertion that he fell due to

debris on the roof. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it implicitly

determined sufficient time for discovery had passed when it granted the motion for

summary judgment.

                                  IV. CONCLUSION

             For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Jessamine Circuit

Court is affirmed.

                                         -11-
          ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:     BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:

Sandra M. Varellas        R. Craig Reinhardt
D. Todd Varellas          Neal J. Manor
Lexington, Kentucky       Lexington, Kentucky

                        -12-