Court Opinion

ID: 9830941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:38:52.975625+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:28.510423
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[5] Appellees, Mrs. Eddie 0. Cox and R. E. Cox, present a motion for rehearing, which, in so far as it substantially presents the same contentions as were presented on original hearing, will be overruled without discussion, inasmuch as on those questions we see no reason to depart from the conclusions announced in our original opinion. They, however, further complain that, in the judgment rendered in this court in appellant’s favor, the appellee R. E. Cox was included. We find this to be true. The evidence makes it very clear that R. E. Cox acted in the matter solely as the agent of his mother, Mrs. Eddie Cox, and that this fact was well known to the appellant, J. L. Barton. In view of these facts, and in view of the further fact that there is no finding of the jury upon which we could properly base a judgment against R. E. Cox personally, and no evidence which shows his relation to the mistake or misrepresentation involved to be such as to create a personal liability, we did not originally intend that the judgment should be entered against him personally, nor did we intend our opinion to so direct, and the judgment was so entered by the clerk, without specific direction to so do. The judgment as here entered in this court will therefore be in this respect corrected.
[6] Appellees further insist that, in rendering the judgment in appellant’s vfavor, we adopted the wrong measure of damages; the insistence being that, inasmuch as there was evidence tending to show that the land which appellant gave in exchange for the Mrs. Cox 100 acres was of less actual value than as agreed upon at the time, the judgment should be reversed rather than rendered, to the end that the measure of damages might be applied in accordance with the rule announced by our Supreme Court in the case of George v. Hesse, 100 Tex. 44, 98 S. W. 107, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 804, 123 Am. St. Rep. 772, 15 Ann. Cas. 456. The question so presented has occasioned us considerable difficulty. In the case of George v. Hesse, Hesse exchanged certain property owned by him for certain lands owned by George, upon which George represented there was a “gusher of water,” or a strong flowing well of water, but wMch representation proved to be false, and I-Iesse sued for damages. The trial court adopted as the measure of damages the difference in value, if any, between the reasonable market value of the George lands which Hesse actually received, “without a gusher of water,” and the reasonable market value of the same land “with a gusher of water.” But the Supreme Court, after a review of the authorities, held that this was the wrong measure of damages; that the proper measure was the difference between the value of the property actually received by Hesse and that given by him in exchange therefor. In the case of Davis v. Fain, 152 S. W. 218, which was a ease of a partial deficiency in a lot, that constituted a part of a laundry plant which had been sold by the defendant in the suit, we indicated, in reversing the judgment, that the measure of damages announced in the George-Hesse Case should be applied.
There is perhaps no very satisfactory distinction to be made on the question under consideration between the cases referred to and the one before us. We wish to say, however, that the question as to the correctness of the measure of damages was not submitted in the case of Davis v. Fain, and what we there said was in the nature of a suggestion for the guidance of the court in a new trial. In that case, too, as will be found by an examination of the record, the sale was in gross and comprehended the building, machinery, furniture, fixtures, wagons, horses, etc., belonging to a laundry business; the deficiency in the lot being of small relative value and not apparently necessary to the business plant as purchased. It was insisted by the vendors to the effect that the value of the 15-foot deficiency shown in the lot was not in fact included in the consideration paid for the property, in view of all which we made the suggestion referred to. However, as the question was not really presented, what we there said is not necessarily controlling with us now. In the case of George v. Hesse, the misrepresentation was one of quality and not of quantity. Hesse contracted for land with a gusher upon it TMs he did not receive in whole or in part, for in no part of the land received did the quality contracted for inhere. An artesian well is a thing of intangible or speculative value, considered apart from the land upon which it was represented to be. Its substantial value was relative and qualitative. It arose from and was dependent upon its connection with the land there in controversy, and the value of the land in turn was largely affected by the existence or want of existence of a flowing well thereon. To undertake, therefore, to ascertain the value of either land or well separately was in great measure speculative, and the Supreme Court, therefore, evidently adopted and applied, as the most certain rule of finding the compensation of the defrauded party, the measure stated, to wit, the difference between the value of what Hesse actually gave as a whole and the value of that which he actually received. The decision evidences the effort of the court to apply to the circumstances of the case that measure of damages which would most certainly afford just compensation to the injured party, and at the same time minimize the probability of in*798justice to the party of whom complaint was-made by closing the door to conjectural or speculative results. The measure adopted will doubtless lead to the most certain and satisfactory results in all cases where the false representations are of quality and adhere in and to every part of the land to which the representations relate.
But in the case before us the misrepresentation or mistake was of quantity and not of «quality. The deficiency is not shown to affect any part of the landi actually received by the appellant. Nothing in the evidence shows that the relative value of the 84.04 acres actually conveyed to appellant is greater or less than it would be if the deficiency (the 16.96 acres not conveyed) was or had been added to it. Appellant received the improvements and all of the cultivated land, .and these improvements and cultivated lands have all the value, so far as the evidence shows, that they ever had. Appellant’s real .loss is the loss of the 15.96 acres that the ap-pellee failed to convey; and, when the value of these 15.96 acres is added to that which appellant already received, he will have substantially received that for which he contracted, and no more.
In the case of Hynes v. Packard, 92 Tex. 44, 45 S. W. 562, in a suit for a breach of warranty in conveying a less number of acres than contracted for, our Supreme Court ruled, in effect, that the damages to the complaining party should bear the same proportion to the whole purchase money as the value of the part to which the title failed bore to the value of that which he actually received, and this rule seems to have been applied in a great number of our cases. See authorities cited in 5 Encyc. Dig. of Texas Reports, p. 489.
In this respect we can see no sound reason for distinguishing between cases in which the cause of action declared upon is a breach of warranty and those, as here, where the deficiency arises by reason of a mistake. Indeed, this rule of the measure of damages was applied in this court in a case where there was a deficiency, and the right of action was expressly predicated upon alleged false representations. See Pruitt v. Jones, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 84, 36 S. W. 502. See, also, the recent case of Northcutt v. Hume, 174 S. W. 975, in which Mr. Justice Hendricks of the Amarillo Court of Appeals collates and reviews a great many authorities, saying, among other things, that, where there is a deficiency, the rule as to the measure of damages declared by the Supreme Court in the case of Hines v. Packard, supra, “is practically universal.” We are by no means clear that it was not our duty to the appellant to apply this rule in his favor in this case. The effect of the findings and undisputed evidence is that appellant 'paid a total sum of $7,750 for the appellee Mrs. Eddie Cox’s land, that the land actually received by him was worth $77.50 per acre, and that the land which he failed to receive was worth $47.50 per acre; and, had we applied the rule of proportionate value as the measure of appellant’s damages, a simple mathematical calculation will demonstrate that instead of the sum of $759, which we adjudged in his favor, he would have received a greater sum. But appellant has made no complaint in this respect, and appellee certainly has no ground to complain. Nor, as we think, is it clear that they have just cause of complaint in that we failed to apply the rule of damages declared in the case of George v. Hesse, for here the agreed value of appellant’s land conveyed as part of the purchase price to be paid by him was $5,000. He gave his vendor’s lien note for the remainder, $2,750, for which appellee contracted to convey her 100-acre tract. We feel no disposition to disturb the value of appellant’s land as thus agreed to upon a mere passing statement of the witness R. E. Gox that he did not think appellant’s land was worth the amount for which it was priced. It was certainly accepted by him in behalf of his mother at the price stated; he at that time valuing his mother’s tract at $7,750. If appellant’s land was worth less than had been agreed upon, the inference seems irresistible that appellee’s land was likewise worth less, otherwise she would have insisted on more for the exchange. So that, on the whole, we think appellee’s motion, with the correction already noted, should be overruled ; and, in the absence of any complaint on the part of appellant, we yet feel disposed to adhere to the measure of damages applied by us on original hearing as, under the circumstances of this case, most certainly and equitably fixing the compensation to which appellant is entitled.