Court Opinion

ID: 9830513
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:15:50.185831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:23.751251
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[4] The appellee White has filed an earnest argument with his motion for rehearing, insisting that the facts in this case show an oral agreement to ship the cattle. We have again gone carefully over the testimony and feel assured that our conclusion in the original opinion is correct. The testimony of the original order for the cars, in the light of the Interstate Commerce Act, occurs to us does not amount to an agreement. White, in addition to his testimony set out in the opinion, testifies that he ordered the cars of Johnson, the agent of appellant for the shipment of the cattle, before delivering them. He thinks he ordered over the phone when he sold the cattle in the pasture.
“I told him that I had sold the cattle, to be weighed in Wichita, at a certain time, 10 o’clock Monday morning, and I wanted a special run. Then I went to town that evening. I believe the next morning, in company with A. J. Hill, I went to the depot to see Johnson. I met Mm on the platform. I stated the trade I had made with Frederick. Johnson told me he would do the best he could for me. I-Ie would get the best run he could for me. He called me up 3 or 4 days later, over the phone, and told me he could not get it for me. I would have to go on the regular pick-up. I told him I had sold about 400 head of steers to Frederick, to Wichita. I don’t believe I told him anything about the price. I told him I sold them to him to be delivered at Wichita, to be weighed at 10:30 Monday morning. I was to fill them,” etc.
The most that may be said of Hill’s testimony, on which appellee- so much relies, is that White told Johnson about his trade and what he wanted. Johnson “agreed that he would try to get a special run for the cattle.” White admits that Johnson afterwards told him he could not get' that run and that he would have to “go on the regular pick-up.” It occurs to us this does not meet the terms of an agreement for shipment. It was simply an order for cars. Johnson agreed to nothing, but that he would try to get a special run, which he afterwards notified appellant he could not get. The appellee, nevertheless, brought in his cattle for shipment. He did so knowing he would be required to. sign the contract he did sign. After 20 years’ experience as a cattle shipper and 13 years’ over this road, he must have known that the contract would answer the purpose of transportation for the caretaker, and also that it was a contract for the shipment. White’s testimony as to what was said and done before the shipment between him and the agent, shows no more than a request for cars, as provided for in the Interstate Commerce Act. Section 1, as amended by Act Cong. June 29, 1906, § 1 (U. S. Comp. St. 1913, § 8563, subd. 2), thereof provides:
“And it shall be the duty of every carrier subject to the provisions of this act to provide and furnish such transportation upon reasonable request therefor.”
The act defines “transportation” as including all cars, instrumentalities, and facilities of shipment in connection with the receipt *718and handling of property transported. When White ordered the cars for interstate shipment it was the duty of the railroad to furnish them under the federal act. Furnishing them did not make a contract, hut it was a duty imposed by the law. This testimony does not show the elements of a contract in our opinion, and especially when it was understood by White he would be required to enter into the contract. Congress has taken charge of interstate shipments from the time a request is made for the cars until final delivery under the contract of shipment.
[0] Furnishing cars for the shipment of property is within the federal act, and the conditions in the contract of shipment as to liability is controlling. Railway Co. v. Prescott, 240 U. S. 6S2, 36 Sup. Ct. 469, 60 L. Ed. 836.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.