Court Opinion

ID: 9680516
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:32:49.497477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:28.964224
License: Public Domain

DICKENSON, Justice.
The principal issue on appeal is whether the “judgment nunc pro tunc” corrected a “clerical error” or whether it improperly attempted to correct a “judicial error” in connection with the agreed terms of a joint custody arrangement involving two children.
The parents of the children, Sandra Lee (Hart) Lane and Everett Kinney Hart, appeared in court on June 4,1982, in order to present proof as to the terms of their agreement for division of their property, custody and support of their two daughters (Wendy Monette Hart, born September 13, 1971, and Kelly Dee Hart, born September 10, 1977), and related matters incidental to their divorce. A seven page Decree of Di*420vorce, which was “approved as to form and content” by their attorneys of record, was signed by the District Judge on June 14, 1982. After that Decree became final, the mother remarried and moved from Scurry County to Hale County and enrolled the older girl in school there. The father insisted that he had the right to establish and maintain the residence of the children in Scurry County. The mother disagreed. Their dispute resulted in a writ of attachment pursuant to which the Hale County Sheriff’s Department assisted the father in taking physical possession of the children; the father’s motion to hold the mother in contempt; the mother’s application for a writ of habeas corpus; and the father’s motion for judgment nunc pro tunc. The trial court refused to hold the mother in contempt, and it also refused to grant her writ of habeas corpus. After hearings on September 3 and 10, judgment nunc pro tunc was signed on October 20, 1982. The mother, Sandra Lee (Hart) Lane appeals. We affirm.
Appellant has briefed two points of error. Point one argues that the trial court erred in signing the Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc because the alleged mistake “was not a clerical error, but was an attempt to change the provisions of the decree.” We disagree.
The original decree provided in pertinent part:

IT IS DECREED that Petitioner, Everett Kinney Hart, as Joint Managing Conservator, shall have the following rights, privileges, duties and powers:
1. The right to have physical possession of the children as set out herein and the sole right to establish the children’s legal domicile;
* * * * ⅜ *
IT IS DECREED that Respondent, Sandra Lee Hart, as Joint Managing Conservator, shall have the following rights, privileges, duties and powers:
1. The right to have physical possession of the children as set out herein, SUBJECT to Petitioner’s- sole right to establish the children’s legal domicile;
* >k * * * *
9. Any other rights, privileges, duties and powers existing between a parent and children by virtue of law, subject to Petitioner’s right to establish and maintain the residence of the children.
The judgment nunc pro tunc added “and residence” after “legal domicile” in each of the paragraphs numbered “1” in the listing of each parent’s rights, privileges, duties and powers. No change was made in paragraph “9” which is quoted hereinabove.
At the hearing on June 4 the husband’s attorney stated that the parties agreed that the appointment of Mr. Hart as “joint managing conservator also includes the right to determine the residence of the children, exclusive of the wife’s right to do that.” Neither the wife nor her attorney brought it to the court’s attention that they were making any distinction between the terms “legal domicile” and “residence.” The original decree, which was “approved as to form and content” by both attorneys of record used the terms interchangeably, as shown by the paragraphs quoted above. The District Court stated during the hearing on September 10:
(T)here is no question that Mr. Hart and his attorney thought the agreement was that the residence of the children would be established by Mr. Hart.... I know that the Court thought at the time we had the hearing on June the 4th that that is what the agreement between the parties was.... (I)f there was any doubt in anybody’s mind that it included the right to establish the residence was in Mr. Hart, then it should have been determined right then and — if that was not the agreement — it should have been called to the attention of the court and the parties could have either withdrawn their proposed agreement for judgment from the Court and had a trial on it at that time. That was my understanding and that was the judgment that I intended to enter and thought I had entered. (Emphasis added)
*421The trial court was authorized to correct the mistake made in recording the original decree. See Tex.R.Civ.P. 316. The applicable rule is stated in Comet Aluminum Company v. Dibrell, 450 S.W.2d 56 at 58 (Tex.1970):
The law is now well settled in this state that clerical errors in the “entry” of a judgment, previously rendered, may be corrected after the end of the court’s term by a nunc pro tunc judgment, but that judicial errors in the “rendition” of a judgment may not be so corrected.
While it is a question of law as to whether the error in the original decree was a “judicial error” or a “clerical error” [see Finlay v. Jones, 435 S.W.2d 136 at 138 (Tex.1968) ], we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the error in this case was a “clerical error” which could be corrected by entry of the judgment nunc pro tunc. See Petroleum Equipment Financial Corporation v. First National Bank of Fort Worth, 622 S.W.2d 152 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.), and the authorities discussed therein. The terms “children’s legal domicile” and “residence of the children” were used interchangeably in the original decree, and the trial court’s quoted statement makes it clear that he intended to enter a judgment in accordance with the announced agreement that the father had the right to establish the “residence” of the children. It may well be that the nunc pro tunc decree was not actually needed, for the original decree could be interpreted by harmonizing paragraph 9 with paragraph 1 of the listing of the mother’s rights as to the two children. In any event the clarification made by the nunc pro tunc judgment will eliminate any uncertainty as to the mother’s rights and will, hopefully, avoid any further necessity for contempt hearings. Moreover, we have been cited no case under Tex.Fam.Code Ann. sec. 12.04(1) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)1 drawing any clear distinction2 between the terms “domicile” and “residence,” and we note that those terms are often used as synonyms. See Webster’s Dictionary of Synonyms (G. & C. Merriam Co. 1951); The Grosset Dictionary & Thesaurus (Grosset & Dunlap, Inc. 1969); The Random House Dictionary (Random House, Inc. 1978); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary—Unabridged (G. & C. Merriam Co. 1966).
The second point of error argues that the trial court erred in denying the motion for new trial because “while the decree purported to be a consent judgment, the evidence showed the parties had not agreed upon a material term of the judgment entered.” We disagree. First, the statement in open court that the father would have the right to determine the “residence” of the children was not directly contradicted at that hearing by the wife or her attorney. Second, the written decree which was approved by the wife’s attorney “as to form and content” clearly stated in paragraph 9 that the husband had the “right to establish and maintain the residence of the children.” The mother’s testimony in September cannot be used to impeach the proceedings which were held in June. That decree had become final and binding upon her, subject to the possibility of a Motion to Modify pursuant to Tex.Fam.Code Ann. sec. 14.08 (Vernon Supp.1982-1983). The fact that there was an oral agreement, rather than a written agreement, for the joint conservatorship does not render the decree void. See and compare Tex.Fam.Code Ann. sec. 14.06(a) (Vernon Supp.1982-1983) with Tex.R.Civ.P. 11.
The judgment nunc pro tunc is affirmed.

. See Speer’s Texas Family Law, sec. 13:36 (Simpkins 5th Ed. 1981).

. Cases such as Snyder v. Pitts, 150 Tex. 407, 241 S.W.2d 136 at 139 (Tex.1951), have discussed the distinction which can be made between “domicile” and “residence” and the fact that for some purposes a person can establish a second residence away from the domicile. No such distinction was drawn in the original decree in this case.