Court Opinion

ID: 9740738
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:41:08.379844+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:20.066321
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE STEIGMANN, dissenting: Although I agree with much of the majority opinion, particularly its overruling this court’s Pool decision, I respectfully dissent. While the case for designating Kevin the custodial parent is far from overwhelming, I am satisfied that the record contains sufficient evidence to support that decision on appeal. The majority reverses the trial court’s factual determination that Kevin would be the better custodial parent even though the trial court so ruled after conducting a five-day hearing at which dozens of witnesses testified. Deciding who should be the custodial parent after a divorce is frequently very difficult, and never does the trial court possess a greater advantage over this court than when it decides that issue. The trial court can detect nuances and subtleties as it evaluates the witnesses and prospective custodial parents. We cannot. Yet these ephemeral factors may legitimately play an important role as the trial court exercises its discretion and judgment. This case also reveals the morass that frequently arises out of the misguided practice of awarding joint custody. Despite the effort of those who endorse joint custody, this fundamental rule of physics still applies: no one (including a child) can be in two different places at the same time. Thus, the term "joint custody” is really an oxymoron that somehow has obtained legislative approval. However, this legislative recognition does not change the reality that true joint custody cannot exist, any more than legislative recognition of "being a little bit pregnant” would render that condition feasible. As a result of the problems created by the illogic of joint custody, we see in this case, and others, a concept developing that has no legislative recognition: the notion of "the primary physical custodian.” Thus, the majority writes that "[e]ven where the joint custody arrangement is terminated by agreement, however, there is no justification for ignoring the bond which has developed between the child and the primary physical custodian” (Emphasis added.) (266 Ill. App. 3d at 412.) The Illinois General Assembly has not statutorily recognized the status of "primary physical custodian,” and there would be no need for courts to do so if the fiction of joint custody were abandoned. I disagree with the majority’s statement that "[t]he trial court here should have given some weight to Brittany’s expressed preference [for her mother to be the custodial parent], in the absence of any showing the preference was coerced or based on improper reasons.” (266 Ill. App. 3d at 415.) This statement is not fair to the trial court; merely because it chose not to follow Brittany’s preference — and in doing so reached a result with which this court disagrees — does not mean the trial court failed to give any weight to that preference. In marital and other cases, this court constantly hears from aggrieved appellants that the trial court failed to consider some appropriate factor in reaching its decision when, in fact, the trial court considered that factor but found that other factors outweighed it. The position of these aggrieved appellants is essentially that the trial court could not have given any weight to a particular factor favoring them because, if the court had done so, the appellant would have won. Even though this argument is nonsensical, statements like that of the majority here, implying that the trial court gave no weight whatsoever to Brittany’s expressed preference, give succor to such arguments. Last, this ease also supports the position that not only is it unnecessary and unwise for the trial judge to interview the child of divorcing parents to determine her custodial preference, but it frequently amounts to nothing short of judicial child abuse. The parents are divorcing each other, but neither will (nor should) be divorcing the child. Thus, the trial court should do everything possible to strengthen and nurture strained relationships between the child and each of her parents during the traumatic process of divorce. Forcing a child to state a preference makes no sense, and judges who engage in this harmful practice should stop. Further, the preferences of a nine-year-old, as in this case, conveyed under strained circumstances, are not necessary for the trial court to make its custodial determination. As the majority states — and I agree — trial courts should utilize GALs if they wish to have the benefit of a neutral, informed opinion on the subject of custody. The GAL in turn can state his or her recommendations to the trial court, in that the GAL’s interview with his or her client should help form that recommendation. Obviously, however, that interview will occur under far less strained circumstances than when the child reveals her preference to a judge. I respectfully dissent.