Court Opinion

ID: 9919474
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-18 16:06:22.873965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:22.703947
License: Public Domain

IMPORTANT NOTICE
        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.”
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, RAP 40(D), THIS
OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN
UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A
COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG
WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO
THE ACTION.
                                                  RENDERED: JANUARY 18, 2024
                                                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Supreme Court of Kentucky
                                  2022-SC-0195-MR

WILLIAM HARRIS                                                      APPELLANT

                ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
V.                HON. ANGELA MCCORMICK BISIG, JUDGE
                  NOS. 19-CR-002071-001 & 22-CR-000317

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                APPELLEE

                   MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                    AFFIRMING

      This appeal comes before the Court as a matter of right 1 from the

Jefferson Circuit Court, where Harris was convicted of murder, felon in

possession of a handgun, and being a persistent felony offender in the first

degree. He was sentenced to thirty-five years in prison. The only issue

presented is whether the Commonwealth violated discovery rules by failing to

provide Harris with enhanced or magnified surveillance video used at trial,

when the original unenhanced or unmagnified video was disclosed. Finding no

abuse of discretion, we affirm the convictions.

                                     I.   Facts

      On July 11, 2019, Harris and a friend drove to the St. Williams

Apartments in Louisville. A woman, Kiara Graves, recognized the red Dodge

Charger Harris and his friend were in. She walked up to converse with them.

      1 Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b).
Jermaine Thompson was also near the car. Graves heard Thompson and Harris

argue about whether Thompson had killed a man identified as “Reece.” The

argument escalated, and Harris told Graves to move, at which point he began

shooting Thompson. Thompson retreated to a nearby alley. Graves testified

Harris followed him into the alley, and although she did not see it, she heard

several more shots fired. Thompson died at the scene. Harris and his friend

drove off in the red Charger.

      Graves did not immediately inform police about her knowledge of the

shooting. It was not until a few weeks afterward that she came forward. Graves

identified Harris as the shooter, and he was arrested on July 29, 2019.

      At trial, the Commonwealth introduced video surveillance footage from a

nearby complex that shows the red Charger in the upper left corner of the video

and a group of people gathered around it. The Commonwealth concedes that

the footage is out-of-focus, and it is not possible to identify any persons from

the video. Later, the Commonwealth stated its intent to introduce an enhanced

or magnified portion of the video showing the red Charger. Defense counsel

objected, arguing the video had been manipulated because there was a change

in the pixelation. The trial court overruled the objection, concluding the

enhanced video simply magnified a portion of the original video that had been

disclosed and no substantive change to the content of the video had occurred.

In other words, to quote the trial court, “this is just basically a zoom-in. And I

think a zoom-in of a video that is already in the record is not a changed or

different exhibit.”

                                         2
      Important to our conclusion is that the enhanced video was not admitted

into evidence. In fact, the jury sought to review the enhanced video during

deliberation, but the trial court refused and only allowed them to view the

unmagnified video that had been admitted into evidence without objection.

Another important fact to note is the Commonwealth’s concession that “the

focus on the magnified footage has not been sharpened and it is still not

possible to identify anyone by their facial features.”

                                   II.    Analysis

      Evidentiary rulings of a trial court are subject to an abuse of discretion

standard of review. Mason v. Commonwealth, 559 S.W.3d 337, 342 (Ky. 2018).

The Rules of Criminal Procedure provide a trial court may order “the

Commonwealth to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph

books, papers, documents, data and data compilations or tangible objects or

copies or portions thereof, that are in the possession, custody or control of the

Commonwealth . . . .” RCr 7.24(2).

      Harris relies on Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and cases based

on Brady for his argument. Brady stands for the rule that “the suppression by

the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due

process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,

irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Id. at 87. We

reject its application to this context. There is no evidence that has been

suppressed by the Commonwealth. Indeed, we have held that “Brady only

applies to ‘the discovery, after trial, of information which had been known to

                                         3
the prosecution but unknown to the defense.’” Bowling v. Commonwealth, 80

S.W.3d 405, 410 (Ky. 2002) (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103

(1976)). There is nothing about the enhanced video that constitutes information

known to the Commonwealth but unknown to the defendant, nor did this

discovery occur after trial. We have also stated that Brady “turns on fair

disclosure and does not create the right to discovery in a criminal trial.” Taylor

v. Commonwealth, 611 S.W.3d 730, 738 (Ky. 2020) (citing Bowling, 80 S.W.3d

at 410). Finally, we are reluctant to characterize this evidence as “favorable to

the accused,” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985), since the video

does not enable personal identification of any persons recorded. It is certainly

not exculpatory, and it is difficult to say that it constitutes “impeachment

evidence” of a Commonwealth witness. Id. That observation aside, the fact that

the video in dispute is merely a magnified portion of a video that had already

been disclosed to Harris means that Brady is inapplicable. Bowling, 80 S.W.3d

at 410.

      Since Brady does not apply the only question is whether the trial court

abused its discretion in allowing the video to be shown at trial. Crucial to that

analysis is that the enhanced video was not admitted into evidence, and it was

refused to the jury during their deliberations. The trial court explicitly stated it

was a demonstrative exhibit only. After review of the cited portions of the

record, we agree with the Commonwealth that the enhanced video was only

                                         4
shown during the Commonwealth’s closing arguments. 2 That being the case,

we simply cannot conclude that the trial court’s actions were arbitrary or

unsupported by sound legal principles.

      Demonstrative exhibits shown to the jury but not admitted into evidence

are only subject to basic rules of relevance under KRE 3 403. But this specific

exhibit was merely a magnified part of a video that had been admitted into

evidence. There is no argument that the original video was irrelevant or more

prejudicial than probative. Critically, the enhanced portion did not make

personal identification possible, therefore, we cannot say its portrayal as an

exhibit during closing arguments was more prejudicial than probative; nor that

the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose the video prior to trial violated RCr

7.24(2) since the original video was disclosed to Harris.

      Harris’ convictions are affirmed.

      VanMeter, C.J.; Conley, Keller, Lambert, Nickell and Thompson, JJ.,

sitting. All concur. Bisig, J., not sitting.

      2 Harris alleges that the enhanced video was shown three times throughout trial

but gives only one citation to the video record for that statement. After review, the
cited portion of the record only pertains to an issue where apparently the jury had
asked if they could get closer to the screen to review the evidence. The correct portion
of the record—which we were under no obligation to find, Dennis v. Fulkerson, 343
S.W.3d 633, 637 (Ky. App. 2011)—reveals defense counsel at trial conceding that the
enhanced video was only shown during closing statements. In another portion of the
brief, it is averred the enhanced video was played “during police testimony,” but there
is no citation to the record for support. We ignore statements unsupported by the
record. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Bond, 351 S.W.2d 55, 56 (Ky. 1961).
      3 Kentucky Rules of Evidence.

                                           5
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Adam Meyer
Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Russell M. Coleman
Attorney General of Kentucky

Jenny L. Sanders
Assistant Attorney General

                               6