Court Opinion

ID: 9791974
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:21:25.829402+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:39.923063
License: Public Domain

LAVENDER, Justice,
dissenting:
Because the court errs in its interpretation of continuing jurisdiction and forum, non conveniens under the UCCJA and Oklahoma case law, I must respectfully dissent from this decision. I would agree that Oklahoma had continuing jurisdiction to initially hear the petition for modification of custody. However, according to well established precedent,1 Oklahoma should have declined to exercise its jurisdiction. Under the circumstances of this case, Missouri is a more appropriate forum. l'O O.S.1981 § 1609.2
I.
In a modification of custody case, the court must first determine if it has jurisdiction and then, if jurisdiction should be exercised. Holt v. District Court, 626 P.2d 1336, 1341 (Okla.1981). Generally a decree state has continuing jurisdiction to modify a custody order. Roundtree v. Bates, 630 P.2d 1299, 1301 (Okla.1981). The intent of the UCCJA was likewise to maintain continuing jurisdiction in the state issuing the original decree. Id. at 1302. However, equally clear is the fact that a court was never deemed to have perpetual jurisdiction and that at some point it may lose jurisdiction. Id.
10 O.S. § 1616 states that a custody order of another state may be modified if that state “does not now have jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accordance with this act ...” A decree state that loses home state status and ceases to have significant connections and substantial evidence as between the child and one or both parents, must then meet one of the alternative prerequisites for maintaining jurisdiction or jurisdiction is lost. Roundtree, 630 P.2d at 1302-03. It is not enough therefore, to state as the majority has in their opinion that jurisdiction is maintained so “long as one parent still resides in the original state.” The UCCJA and Oklahoma case law require more.3 Nor do I find that Fry v. Ball, 190 *74Colo. 128, 544 P.2d 402, 405 (1975), cited by the majority, stands for such a proposition. Fry involved a petition for a Colorado court to modify a California custody decree by the grandparents, who had been appointed guardians and had moved with the child to Colorado. Both parents however, had remained in California. The court found that as between Colorado and California, the latter had the most significant contacts and substantial evidence as to the child and moreover, since both parents continued to reside in California, that state was the appropriate forum. Id. 544 P.2d at 406.
The Act states that for a decree rendering state to have continuing jurisdiction, the basis for that jurisdiction must remain “substantially in accordance” with the Act. Furthermore, for jurisdiction to be based on 10 O.S.1981 § 1605(A)(2), the “significant connection” to and “substantial evidence” in the state must be as to the child and one or more parents. A state must have more than just “some” evidence and the mere fact that one parent remains in the state would not be enough, without more, to maintain continuing jurisdiction.
II.
The majority herein recognizes that the intent of the Act was to prevent forum shopping by an unhappy parent seeking a more favorable review of another court. Certainly, this is one important element of the Act. But there are additional elements of the Act of equal importance. 10 O.S. 1981 § 1602 states in part that the purpose of the Act is to:
1.Avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other states in' matters of child custody which have in the past resulted in the shifting of children from state to state with harmful effects on their well-being;
2. Promote cooperation with the courts of other states to the end that a custody decree is rendered in that state which can best decide the case in the interest of the child;
3. Assure that litigation concerning the custody of a child take place ordinarily in the state with which the child and his family have the closest connection and where significant evidence concerning his care, protection, training and personal relationships is most readily available, and that courts of this state decline the exercise of jurisdiction when the child and his family have a closer connection with another state;
4. Discourage continuing controversies over child custody in the interest of greater stability of home environment and of secure family relationships for the child; (emphasis added).
The majority’s decision to have Oklahoma retain jurisdiction seems to be at odds with most of the above stated purposes as set forth by the Legislature. Oklahoma is not the state which can best decide whether there should be a modification of custody since the bulk of the evidence is in Missouri. Oklahoma should have declined jurisdiction where Missouri has a closer connection with the child given the length of time the children have been living there in contrast to the brief contact the children have had with Oklahoma while visiting their father here. By accepting jurisdiction, and changing, even temporarily, custodial privileges without adequate provocation4 the trial court has done exactly *75what this statute was intended to prevent, undermine the stability of the home environment.
III.
Oklahoma in a number of cases has consistently applied the reasoning of the UCCJA. In State ex rel. Murphy v. Boudreau, 653 P.2d 531 (Okla.1982), Petitioner brought an action to modify an Oklahoma custody decree. The custody decree was rendered in conjunction with a valid divorce decree, the determination for which neither party had questioned the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma court. While jurisdiction was much disputed and later contested in a New Mexico court, see Murphy v. Murphy, 96 N.M. 401, 631 P.2d 307 (1981), Oklahoma had original and continuing jurisdiction pursuant to its decree to modify a custody determination. The trial court declined to do so because it found New Mexico a more convenient forum. New Mexico had been the home state of the children for a considerable length of time and there were more significant contacts as to New Mexico than Oklahoma. Moreover, the court noted that in any event, Petitioner was in violation of “any existing custody order, either Oklahoma’s or New Mexico’s.”
The majority would now overturn Breaux v. Mays, 746 P.2d 708 (Okla.App.1987). In Breaux, the father sought to modify in Oklahoma a custody decree, however, the mother and children had been living in Texas for the past three years. The court stated that “there are certain circumstances under which [a] state can and should lose jurisdiction.” Breaux, 746 P.2d at 710. The court held that as between Texas and Oklahoma, Texas was the more proper forum. Though the court spoke in terms of losing jurisdiction when either of the two major bases for jurisdiction found in section 1605(A) 1 or 2 were absent, (home state status or significant contacts and substantial evidence as to the child) the facts of that case showed that indeed neither of the two major bases existed and that is the way the holding should be construed.
Losing home state status to Texas coupled with, as between Oklahoma and Texas, the more significant contacts were with Texas, was seen by the Court of Appeals in Breaux to be sufficient to require father, with whom the child was only visiting in Oklahoma, to go to Texas to litigate custodial changes. This was the essential holding in Breaux and the opinion should not be overturned.
IV.
Finally, the court is mistaken when it speculates that Missouri, under In re Marriage of Phillips, 723 S.W.2d 579, 582 (Mo.Ct.App.1987), would not exercise jurisdiction, even if this proceeding had been brought there. In Phillips, the Missouri trial court’s decision that it would not modify a Virginia custody decree was affirmed. However, unquestionably Virginia was still the home state of the child, there was neither significant contacts, nor substantial evidence as between the child and the state of Missouri and no emergency existed. Indeed, though the parents were divorced in 1982, the child had only been in Missouri for the first time for six weeks in 1985 when the petition for modification was sought. There is nothing to indicate by these facts, that given the circumstances in the present case, where the children had been living in Missouri for the past three years, Missouri would not recognize its jurisdiction. In fact, Missouri’s statutory language includes the “substantially in accordance” factor as to jurisdictional prerequisites which would give credence to the idea that Missouri would find it had jurisdiction for a modification determination.
V.
Turning now to the present case, I would hold, under the circumstances, herein, the *76Respondent court should not have exercised jurisdiction. 10 O.S.1981 § 1609. Missouri clearly is the appropriate forum.
1. Home State
As previously stated, the children had been living in Missouri for the past three years, and therefore Missouri has become their home state.
2. Closer Connections
The question is which jurisdiction has contacts that would “substantially” comply with the jurisdictional requirements of the Act. The official comments to the UCCJA state that:
[Jurisdiction exists only if it is in the child’s interest, not merely the interest or convenience of the feuding parties, to determine custody in a particular state. The interest of the child is served when the forum has optimum access to relevant evidence about the child and family. There must be maximum rather than minimum contact with the state. (Emphasis added.)
Commissioner’s Note, UCCJA, § 4, 9 U.L.A. 144, 142 (Master’s Ed.1979).
Missouri has been'the children’s home for the last three years. It is here that the children’s school, school records, extended family and friends, teachers, pediatricians, allergy clinic, church, etc. are available. Though certainly Oklahoma has some contacts with the children and one parent, the most significant contacts, as between the children and another parent, are in Missouri. Indeed, from the evidence submitted, it indicates that the children were only in Oklahoma for two weeks each summer.
3. Substantial evidence
Obviously the vast majority of evidence concerning the children will be in Missouri. As noted, the children made their home in Missouri for the past three years. Though the language of the statute speaks in terms of which state has “substantial evidence concerning the child’s present or future care, protection, training and personal relationships,” Missouri would still have the bulk of this evidence even though, the children have now been in Oklahoma for several months.
Additionally however, it is clear that the crucial issue to be contested is the quality of care exercised by the mother and her present ability to care for the children. Though this could be litigated in either Oklahoma or Missouri, it is more likely that all of the necessary evidence for this proceeding is in Missouri, not Oklahoma. Therefore, again Missouri is the more appropriate forum.
4.Contravenes the UCCJA purposes
Oklahoma should not retain jurisdiction as to do so would contravene the intended purposes of the UCCJA. The intent was to discourage continuing controversies over custody decisions that resulted in unilateral removal or retention of a child from his present home and preven[t] relitigation that shifts the child from state to state. Brauch v. Shaw, 121 N.H. 562, 571, 432 A.2d 1, 6 (1981). Though clearly this does not mean there will never be a need for modification, when the need does arise, it should be done in the state most able to reach an informed decision.
Furthermore, courts have held that custody should not, except in compelling circumstances, be changed when the child is in the temporary care of the noncustodial parent.
[A] parent with whom a child is visiting in another jurisdiction ordinarily should not be permitted, except in clearly compelling circumstances, to use the occasion to seek to divest the other parent of a judicially decreed right of custody. To permit this would place a premium on the abuse of the right of visitation and make it difficult for parties to agree on the free movement of the child from one parent to the other.
Bergen v. Bergen, 439 F.2d 1008, 1015 (3rd Cir.1971).
A California case, Ferreira v. Ferreira, 9 Cal.3d 824, 829 109 Cal.Rptr. 80, 109 512 P.2d 304, 307 (1973) held that “We have neither been able to find a perfect answer *77to the dilemma nor to invent a solution of our own. We can do no better than submit a realistic resolution: the court of the forum should ordinarily refuse to reopen the question of the custody of a child whose custody is vested under an existing decree in a nonresident parent.” The UCCJA was passed in California after this case, however, Schlumpf v. Schlumpf 79 Cal.App.3d 892, 145 Cal.Rptr. 190 (1978), held the language of Ferreira still valid.
VI.
Child custody decision are difficult decisions, modifications of custody harder still. Moreover, there may not be a “right” or “wrong” decision. A court can only attempt to “repair, patch and cover over, as best they can, the irreparable harm occasioned [by shifting custody] and reduce the harm to a minimum ...” Hopson v. Hopson, 110 Cal.App.3d 884, 905, 168 Cal.Rptr. 345, 360 (1980). All the more important for a court to be in the best position to make such a determination. It is not a question here that Oklahoma has continuing jurisdiction, but that given the facts, Respondent should have declined to exercise jurisdiction.
Regarding the problem of two courts, each having “jurisdiction” but only one of which should act, I find the following quotation from the Hopson opinion particularly instructive:
The commissioners realistically anticipated the problem of concurrent jurisdiction existing in more than one state. Therefore, they provided additional steps to assure that only one state makes the custody decision. The fact that one state has jurisdiction over a custody dispute ... does not preclude another state from jurisdiction.... The first step in the UCCJA’s orderly procedure for determining which court may exercise jurisdiction requires that the court must ascertain whether it has jurisdiction under the terms of the UCCJA; second, the court must determine whether there is a custody proceeding pending or a decree existing in another state which presently has jurisdiction. If the court finds that it has jurisdiction, and that there is no proceeding pending or a decree existing, then it must determine which state is the most convenient forum to exercise jurisdiction. If it finds another state is a more convenient forum, then under the standards of the UCCJA, it may not exercise jurisdiction (Carson v. Carson (1977) 29 Or.App. 861, 565 P.2d 763; affirmed 1978, 282 Or. 469, 579 P.2d 846).
Id. 110 Cal.App.3d at 899, 168 Cal.Rptr. at 356.
I would stay the trial court from proceeding to hear the father’s motion to change custody to himself. I would, however, continue the trial court’s temporary custody order in favor of father in force for a period of forty days from the finality of this court’s opinion provided father proceeds in the state of Missouri to litigate the custody issues in that forum during that time period. If no such effort by father is made during such forty day period the temporary custody order of the respondent Oklahoma court would no longer have any validity and the children would be returned to their mother. If on the other hand, father files his application in Missouri to modify the custody of the children, the question of extending the temporary order could then be addressed by the Missouri court.
I am authorized to state that HAR-GRAVE, C.J., and SIMMS and ALMA WILSON, JJ., join in the views herein expressed.

. See Breaux v. Mays, 746 P.2d 708 (Okla.Ct.App.1987); State ex rel. Murphy v. Boudreau, 653 P.2d 531 (Okla.1982); Roundtree v. Bates, 630 P.2d 1299 (Okla.1981); Holt v. District Court, 626 P.2d 1336 (Okla.1981); and Cooper v. Cooper, 616 P.2d 1154 (Okla.1980).

. 10 O.S.1981 § 1609 states in part;
A. A court which has jurisdiction under this act to make an initial or modification decree may decline to exercise its jurisdiction any time before making a decree if it finds that it is an inconvenient forum to make a custody determination under the circumstances of the case and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum.
B. A finding of inconvenient forum may be made upon the court's own motion or upon motion of a party or a guardian ad litem or other representative of the child.
C. In determining if it is an inconvenient forum, the court shall consider if it is in the interest of the child that another state assume jurisdiction. For this purpose it may take into account the following factors, among others;
1. If another state is or recently was the child's home state;
2. If another state has a closer connection with the child and his family or with the child and one or more of the contestants;
3. If substantial evidence concerning the child’s present or future care, protection, training and personal relationships is more readily available in another state;
4. If the parties have agreed on another forum which is no less appropriate; and
5. If the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of this state would contravene any of the purposes stated in Section 2 of this act.

. Nor would the PKPA (Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 (U.S.Code, tit. 28, § 1738A)) support such a holding. The relevant sections of 1738A are:
(c) A child custody determination made by a court of a state is consistent with the provisions of this section only if—
(1) such court has jurisdiction under the law of such state;
(d) The jurisdiction of a court of a state which had made a child custody determination consistently with the provisions of this section continues as long as the requirement of section (c)(1) of this section continues to be met and such state remains the residence of the child or of any contestant.
(f) A court of a state may modify a determination of the custody of the same child made by a court of another state, if—
(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child custody detemination; and
(2) the court of the other state no longer has jurisdiction, or it has declined to exercise such jurisdiction to modify such determination.
*74Section (c)(1) of 1738A would then still require that jurisdiction be satisfied under state law. Since Oklahoma’s Act holds that jurisdiction is only proper when it substantially complies with the prerequisites of the Act, it is not enough that only one parent reside in the state to have continuing jurisdiction, unless there are also significant contacts and substantial evidence as between the child and the state.

. The trial judge found that an emergency situation existed. The evidence does not support such finding. 10 O.S.1981 § 1605 states:
Prerequisites for jurisdiction
A. A court of this state which is competent to decide child custody matters has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modification decree if:
3. The child is physically present in this state and:
a. the child has been abandoned, or
b. it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise neglected or dependent;
The comments to § 3 of the UCCJA hold that: "This extraordinary jurisdiction is reserved for *75extraordinary circumstances.” Commissioners Note, UCCJA, § 3, 9 U.L.A. 123, 124 (Master’s Ed.1979). There was no evidence presented at the hearing that the welfare of the children was being threatened. To the contrary, the pediatrician testified that the one child he had seen, showed no signs of physical abuse. Further, the trial judge had no basis to find the wife was under going treatment for alcohol or drug abuse where the evidence presented was that she was seeking treatment for “emotional co-dependency.”