Court Opinion

ID: 9580590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:06:32.724425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:23.170856
License: Public Domain

Clark, Judge,
dissenting.
Defendant was convicted under a two count indictment for violations of the Georgia Drug Abuse Control Act. The first count, a felony, was based upon a sale of phencyclidine on May 17, 1973, made to an undercover agent while at a party for young people. The second count charged a misdemeanor, that being possession of less than one ounce of marijuana. This latter incident occurred six days following the phencyclidine sale when the banned product was found upon appellant diming a routine search of all persons present at another location than that involved in the first offense.
1. My principal disagreement with the majority opinion centers on the issue of entrapment. Appellant testified that the female undercover agent approached him at a young people’s party and asked him to sell her some "little pink pills.” He testified that he refused, but that "she followed me around until I finally sold them to her.” (T. 52). He testified that 20 to 30 minutes elapsed before he gave in "just to get her off my back” after she had asked him "numerous times” to sell her. His explanation as to the pills was that "they were for my own use, I wasn’t going to sell them.” (T. 53) and that he did so only "after she kept nagging me.” (T. 55). He denied being in the business of dealing with or selling drugs. Although the agent had testified during the direct phase that the sale was made on a voluntary basis, that the offer to sell came from the appellant, defendant’s testimony was sufficient to create the issue of entrapment. Accordingly, the trial court erred in refusing to charge appellant’s written requests on this subject.
Appellant’s version of the sale transaction clearly *542came within the definition of "Entrapment as a Defense” as stated in Code Ann. § 26-905. That section reads: "A person is not guilty of a crime if by entrapment his conduct is induced or solicited by a government officer or employee, or agent of either [,] for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be used in prosecuting the person for commission of the crime. Entrapment exists where the idea and intention of the commission of the crime originated with a government officer or employee, or with an agent of either, and he, by undue persuasion, incitement, or deceitful means, induced the accused to commit the act which the accused would not have committed except for the conduct of such officer.”
The language of our Code closely parallels that used by the U. S. Supreme Court in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U. S. 435 (53 SC 210, 77 LE 413, 86 ALR 249) where the defense of entrapment was first recognized. As was quoted in Brown v. State, 132 Ga. App. 399, 400 (208 SE2d 183) from Sherman v. United States, 356 U. S. 369 (78 SC 819, 2 LE2d 848): "It occurs when the criminal conduct is 'the product of the creative activity’ of law enforcement officials.” See also Jones v. State, 101 Ga. App. 851, 852 (4) (c) (115 SE2d 576) where our court ruled entrapment to be a total defense.
As it is the duty of the trial judge to charge the jury on eveiy material issue in the case (Pass v. State, 95 Ga. App. 510 (98 SE2d 135)) the trial court erred in refusing defendant’s written requests for a charge on the subject of entrapment. Once the issue of entrapment is sufficiently raised the defendant is entitled to have the jury pass on the credibility of the entrapment defense under proper instruction from the court.
The majority opinion declines to recognize the entrapment defense because of certain answers given by defendant during cross examination. These consisted of his admission of possession and sale and concludes with this question and answer: "Q. And you are admitting your guilt under these two counts in the indictment; is that correct? A. Yes, sir.” We cannot construe this as constituting an in judicio admission of guilt as stated in the majority opinion for two reasons. The first is that it must be considered in the context of defendant’s entire *543testimony, particularly that presented during his direct which was re-affirmed during the cross examination. "Q. And you are not saying she enticed you, you said you sold it to her? A. After she kept nagging me, I did. Q. She kept nagging you. A. Yes.” (T. 55). The other reason arises from the very nature of the defense of entrapment. In effect, it consists of saying: "Yes, I committed the offense as charged, but I would not have done so if I had not been prevailed upon to do so by the officer.” As we pointed out in Reed v. State, 130 Ga. App. 659 (204 SE2d 335) an entrapment defense is that "The accused admits the commission of the offense while denying that he was inclined to commit the offense before the intervention of the law enforcement agent.”
Therefore the writer does not regard the quoted testimony of defendant in the third division of the majority opinion as being an in judicio admission of guilt. In fact, the refusal to charge the requested entrapment defense left the jurors no alternative excepting to return a guilty verdict on the basis of defendant’s admissions from the witness stand since they were left ignorant of the legal doctrine of entrapment.
The facts of our case differ from those of Garrett v. State, 133 Ga. App. 564, supra. In Garrett the defendant was clearly not induced to make the sale, our court’s opinion noting that "Defendant testified that there were no medical or moral, as opposed to legal, impediments to his sale of marijuana, and his testimony reveals a marked predisposition to use and sell it. In essence his testimony was that the marijuana laws are bad laws.” The court concluded that "the record here simply fails to raise an issuable defense as to entrapment.” In the case sub judice the record, specifically the testimony of the defendant, presented the entrapment defense. The defendant here was entitled to have the jury upon proper instructions from the court pass on the entrapment defense as requested by defense counsel.
2. Another error committed by the trial court which warrants a new trial was the court’s action in striking the testimony of the single person who was presented as a character witness for defendant. Defendant lived in the same house and worked with the same company as this *544character witness. The witness’ testimony was based upon his knowledge of the defendant’s reputation at their place of employment and in the community. It necessarily was limited to a period of four months which constituted the entire time defendant had resided in that locality. This testimony was stricken upon the state’s motion based on such limited period.
One familiar with the reputation of an accused at the defendant’s place of work may testify as to that fact. Atlantic & B. R. Co. v. Reynolds, 117 Ga. 47 (43 SE 456); Pethel v. State, 89 Ga. App. 8 (78 SE2d 428); Bennett v. George, 105 Ga. App. 527 (12) (125 SE2d 122). Since evidence as to good character may generate a reasonable doubt the proffered evidence seeking to establish defendant to possess a reputation for good character should have been admitted despite the time period involved being limited to a few months. The time limit would be a factor for the jury to consider in deciding if the evidence is éntitled to credit.
3. We turn next to those assignments of error in which appellant attacks the rulings which deprived him of a trial before a committing magistrate. Defendant had moved both orally and in writing for a preliminary hearing. The transcript indicates the trial judge’s denial order was based upon defendant having obtained his release by having furnished bail. Undoubtedly, this ruling was the result of a misconception that has existed among our bench and bar based on Bird v. Terrell, 128 Ga. 386 (57 SE 777) and Hopkins v. State, 5 Ga. App. 699 (63 SE 718) to the effect that posting a bail bond by an accused is a waiver of the committal trial.
The Bird case only dealt with forfeiture of an appearance bond and did not involve a trial for a criminal offense. The Hopkins case specifically observed that the defendant did not demand a committal hearing. Accordingly, neither of these cases should be construed to apply to an accused who furnishes bail bond to avoid incarceration. The exercise of the right of an arrested person to furnish bail does not constitute waiver of an accused’s entitlement to a preliminary hearing upon demand. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 (90 SC 1999, 26 LE2d 387) and Manor v. State, 221 Ga. 866 (148 *545SE2d 305) as to the importance of the preliminary hearing and its nature as a critical stage in a criminal prosecution.
Since, however, a trial court must be affirmed if its ruling is legally correct for any reason despite the mistaken basis, we are required to hold there is no merit in appellant’s assignments attacking the rulings which deprived him of a trial before a committing magistrate. This is due to our Supreme Court having repeatedly ruled that lack of a commitment hearing will not be construed as reversible error after indictment. See Douglas v. State, 132 Ga. App. 694 (209 SE2d 114) where our colleague, Judge Webb, has collected a lengthy list of controlling citations on this subject.
4. The court erred in sentencing the defendant to consecutive terms of imprisonment in the absence of such direction in the verdict. Wade v. State, 231 Ga. 131 (200 SE2d 271) ruled that under the statutes then in force it was for the jury to determine whether sentences imposed upon conviction on a multi-count indictment were to run concurrently or consecutively. The opinion further pointed out that "unless the jury specifies that the sentences imposed are to run consecutively, then the law (Code Ann. § 27-2510) is that they shall run concurrently.” Wade v. State, supra, p. 134. Our court in Stephens v. State, 132 Ga. App. 267 (208 SE2d 24) interpreted the Wade decision and the re-affirmance decision of Gandy v. State, 232 Ga. 105 (205 SE2d 243) thusly: "Only a jury can decide whether sentences are to be served consecutively or concurrently. As the jury verdict was silent on this phase of the sentencing the sentences are to be served concurrently.”
Although all of these decisions involved felonies only, they are based upon the statute codified as § 27-2510. Paragraph (c) thereof says "This section shall apply alike to felony and misdemeanor offenses.” Accordingly, where, as here, the multi-count indictment included both a felony and a misdemeanor, then the plain language of the statute stating that it "shall apply alike to felony and misdemeanor offenses” left the trial judge no choice but to provide for the sentences to run concurrently in the absence of the jury verdict stating otherwise.
5. As the writer of this opinion joined with the *546majority in Ellis v. State, 132 Ga. App. 684 (209 SE2d 106), I am in accord with Division 1 of the majority opinion that phencyclidine is a depressant or stimulant drug within the prohibition stated in the Georgia Drug Abuse Control Act.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen and Judges Evans and Stolz concur in this dissent.