Court Opinion

ID: 9391434
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-02 13:06:23.624685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:42.113080
License: Public Domain

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as
Disciplinary Counsel v. Reed, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-1420.]

                                        NOTICE
     This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
     advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
     promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
     South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
     formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
     the opinion is published.

                         SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-1420
                          DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. REED.
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
         may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Reed, Slip Opinion No.
                                   2023-Ohio-1420.]
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct,
        including engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness
        to practice law, knowingly making a false statement of fact or law to a
        tribunal, and failing to act with reasonable diligence in representing a
        client—Indefinite suspension, with credit for time served under interim
        felony suspension, and restitution ordered.
     (No. 2022-0955—Submitted January 10, 2023—Decided May 2, 2023.)
   ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme
                                 Court, No. 2021-027.
                                   ______________
                            SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

       Per Curiam.
       {¶ 1} Respondent, Ryan Shane Reed, of Urbana, Ohio, Attorney
Registration No. 0084670, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2009. On
May 28, 2020, we entered an interim remedial order suspending Reed’s license
pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(19). Disciplinary Counsel v. Reed, 161 Ohio St.3d 1223,
2020-Ohio-3113, 161 N.E.3d 726. On December 23, 2020, we suspended his
license on an interim basis following his conviction on multiple felony counts. See
In re Reed, 163 Ohio St.3d 1298, 2020-Ohio-6841, 171 N.E.3d 355. Those
suspensions remain in effect.
       {¶ 2} In a four-count complaint, relator, disciplinary counsel, charged Reed
with 19 ethical violations—2 arising from his criminal convictions and the
remaining 17 arising from misconduct related to his representation of three clients.
The parties entered into stipulations of fact, misconduct, and aggravating and
mitigating factors, and they submitted 90 stipulated exhibits. They also jointly
recommended that Reed be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law with
certain conditions on his reinstatement. Reed and two other witnesses testified at a
hearing conducted by a three-member panel of the Board of Professional Conduct.
       {¶ 3} The panel found that Reed had committed 16 of the stipulated rule
violations. On relator’s motion, the panel unanimously dismissed the three other
alleged violations. After weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors and
considering our precedent, the panel recommend that we indefinitely suspend Reed
from the practice of law, credit him for 18 months of the time served under his
interim felony suspension, and place certain conditions on his reinstatement to the
profession. The board adopted the panel’s report in its entirety and no objections
have been filed.
       {¶ 4} We adopt the board’s findings of misconduct and the recommended
sanction.

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                                January Term, 2023

                                 MISCONDUCT
                   Count One: Reed’s Criminal Convictions
       {¶ 5} In 2020, Reed’s girlfriend, P.S., and her then eight-year-old daughter
resided with Reed in his Urbana home. P.S. also worked as an administrative
assistant in Reed’s law office, which he operated out of his house.
       {¶ 6} On May 5, 2020, P.S. found Reed “passed-out drunk” on the couch in
his office. Later that day, she and Reed got into an argument, and Reed shoved her
as she tried to enter her car. P.S. walked across the street to escape the assault.
Sometime after P.S. left, Reed slashed two of the tires on her car. After returning
the next morning, P.S. called the Urbana Police Department to file a report. She
informed police that Reed was likely in court and that he was intoxicated.
       {¶ 7} That morning, Reed had appeared for a final evidentiary hearing in a
Champaign County domestic-relations matter. After the hearing, Urbana police
officers arrested Reed in the courthouse. As the officers escorted Reed to their
cruiser, Reed removed the mask he was wearing due to the COVID-19 pandemic,
at which point the officers noted an odor of alcohol coming from his person. The
arresting officers administered several field-sobriety tests, which Reed failed. Reed
was charged with domestic violence and assault related to the incident with P.S. the
previous day. And because Reed had driven to the courthouse that morning, the
police also charged him with operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol
(“OVI”), a first-degree misdemeanor.
       {¶ 8} Reed was arraigned around 8:30 a.m. on May 7. The judge issued a
temporary protection order (“TPO”) in favor of P.S. but gave Reed until noon that
day to retrieve his belongings from his home.
       {¶ 9} On May 14, despite the TPO, Reed returned to his home when P.S.
and her daughter were present. He fled when P.S. called 911. That evening, when
police questioned Reed over the telephone about his whereabouts that day, Reed
denied that he had been in Urbana. At the officer’s urging, Reed agreed to surrender

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himself to authorities the next morning. Reed failed to do so, and a warrant was
issued for his arrest.
        {¶ 10} On May 16, Reed contacted P.S. by text message and telephone in
violation of the TPO. Later that day, he crawled through a window of his home but
fled when the police arrived. He was quickly apprehended and arrested—and found
to be wearing a bulletproof vest.
        {¶ 11} In early June, the Champaign County Grand Jury returned a nine-
count indictment charging Reed with two felony counts of burglary, two felony
counts of violating a protection order, two misdemeanor counts of violating a
protection order, and one misdemeanor count each of OVI, domestic violence, and
assault. On June 18, Reed was arraigned on those charges in Champaign C.P. No.
2020 CR 100. He posted bond and was released the same day.
        {¶ 12} On June 22, Reed, while holding a knife, told his mother that he was
going to his home to kill P.S. Reed’s mother promptly informed Reed’s behavioral-
health counselor of the threat. Reed’s counselor immediately alerted the police,
and a high-speed chase ensued. During the chase, Reed drove his car at more than
99 m.p.h., lost control, and crashed into a tree. He was arrested at the scene with a
blood-alcohol level of 0.17. Reed was arraigned on charges of failure to comply
with an order or signal of a police officer, OVI, and inducing panic in Champaign
C.P. No. 2020 CR 135. The court set bond at $150,000. The next day, the judge
presiding over Reed’s earlier criminal case revoked Reed’s bond in that matter.
        {¶ 13} In early July, the Champaign County Grand Jury returned a four-
count indictment charging Reed with a felony count of failure to comply with an
order or signal of a police officer, two misdemeanor counts of OVI, and a single
misdemeanor count of inducing panic.
        {¶ 14} In late October, Reed pleaded guilty to amended counts of attempted
burglary (a third-degree felony), trespassing in a habitation (a fourth-degree
felony), and domestic violence (a first-degree misdemeanor) in Champaign C.P.

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                                January Term, 2023

No. 2020 CR 100. The state dismissed the six other counts in that case. In
Champaign C.P. No. 2020 CR 135, Reed pleaded guilty to an amended count of
attempted failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer (a fourth-
degree felony) and OVI (a first-degree misdemeanor). The state dismissed the two
remaining counts.
       {¶ 15} On December 3, 2020, the court sentenced Reed to 24 months in
prison in Champaign C.P. No. 2020 CR 100 and 18 months in prison in Champaign
C.P. No. 2020 CR 135, to be served concurrently, and imposed a three-year period
of mandatory postrelease control for the attempted burglary offense.
       {¶ 16} Reed stipulated and the board found that his conduct violated
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from committing an illegal act that
adversely reflects on the lawyer’s honesty or trustworthiness) and 8.4(h)
(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the
lawyer’s fitness to practice law). The board determined that the Prof.Cond.R.
8.4(h) violation captured Reed’s convictions that fall outside the scope of
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) but nonetheless adversely reflect on his fitness to practice law.
We find that his domestic-violence, attempted-failure-to-comply, and OVI
convictions fall outside of the scope of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) but are violations of
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h). See Disciplinary Counsel v. Bricker, 137 Ohio St.3d 35, 2013-
Ohio-3998, 997 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 21 (holding that a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h)
must be supported by clear and convincing evidence that the lawyer engaged in
misconduct that while not specifically prohibited by the rules, nonetheless
adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law). We adopt these findings
of misconduct.
                 Count Two: The Thomas and Baker Matters
       {¶ 17} On January 1, 2018, Brandon Thomas retained Reed and paid him
$7,000 to represent him in a criminal matter. Reed did not deposit Thomas’s
payment into his client trust account. After Reed entered a notice of appearance

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                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

and waived the preliminary hearing, Thomas was released on bond and returned to
his home in California. In late February 2018, the Miami County Grand Jury
secretly indicted Thomas on five felony charges and a warrant was issued for his
arrest. Thomas was arrested in California on the outstanding warrant in late June
or early July 2019. After Thomas’s arraignment, Reed filed a standard discovery
request and a motion to modify travel restrictions included in Thomas’s bond
conditions so that he could return to his job in California; the bond motion was
denied.
          {¶ 18} Thomas had difficulty communicating with Reed regarding the
status of his case. Consequently, he retained another attorney to serve as Reed’s
cocounsel. That attorney filed a notice of appearance in mid-January 2020, along
with a renewed motion for modification of Thomas’s travel restrictions. The court
granted that motion six days later, and Thomas returned to California. At the end
of January, the prosecutor informed Reed of the state’s plea offer, which the
prosecutor agreed to keep open through February 2020, but Reed did not
communicate that offer to Thomas.
          {¶ 19} After several continuances, the court set Thomas’s case for a
telephone status conference on May 7, 2020. Reed attended the arraignment in one
of his own criminal cases earlier that morning and joined the status conference
approximately 15 minutes late. The judge presiding over Thomas’s case asked
Reed if he had communicated the state’s plea offer to Thomas. Reed told the judge
that he had not spoken to Thomas because he “had no access to his client files due
to a domestic violence situation with a protection order in place.” However, that
protection order had been issued just moments before Reed joined the status
conference, and Reed had been aware of the plea offer for more than three months.
          {¶ 20} The judge then asked Reed why he had failed to appear for a May 5
pretrial conference in the case of another client, Dameek Curry Baker, which was
set for trial the following week. Reed stated that he did not appear because he “did

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                                January Term, 2023

not have his client file,” and that as a result, he also could not prepare for Baker’s
upcoming jury trial. But Reed has stipulated that he did not appear for that pretrial
conference because he was “passed-out drunk.” Moreover, the TPO issued against
him gave him until noon that day to retrieve items from his home. Based in part on
Reed’s false representations to the court, the judge vacated Baker’s impending trial
date. After learning of Reed’s interim remedial suspension, the judge appointed a
public defender to represent Baker. Additionally, Thomas retained new lead
counsel. Although Reed did not complete Thomas’s representation, he kept the
entire $7,000 fee.
       {¶ 21} The parties stipulated and the board found that Reed’s conduct
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably
informed about the status of a matter), 1.15(c) (requiring a lawyer to deposit
advance legal fees and expenses into a client trust account, to be withdrawn by the
lawyer only as fees are earned or expenses incurred), 1.16(e) (requiring a lawyer to
promptly refund any unearned fee upon the lawyer’s withdrawal from
employment), 3.3(a)(1) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly making a false
statement of fact or law to a tribunal), and 8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from
engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice). We adopt
these findings of misconduct.
          Counts Three and Four: The Diehl and Kermode Matters
       {¶ 22} In March 2020, Stacy Diehl met with Reed and paid him a $2,450
flat fee to represent her in a divorce action and, according to Diehl, a related civil-
protection-order (“CPO”) proceeding. Reed did not deposit those funds into his
client trust account. Over the next two weeks, Diehl was unable to reach Reed. He
did not respond to an email about the CPO, and after he failed to attend a hearing
on the matter, the court denied the CPO and dismissed the case.
       {¶ 23} Reed filed a complaint initiating Diehl’s divorce action in late May
or early June 2020. But he failed to respond to several emails and a telephone call

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                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

from Diehl seeking information about her case, due in part to his arrest on June 22.
After learning that Reed was in custody, Diehl terminated his representation and
retained new counsel. Reed waited almost a year before he refunded Diehl’s
retainer, less $400 that he had deposited with the court for costs.
        {¶ 24} In December 2019, Tina Kermode, a foster parent who was pursuing
the adoption of four foster children, retained Reed to represent her on a child-
endangering charge. She paid a flat fee of $1,500, but Reed did not deposit those
funds into his client trust account. Although Reed advised Kermode that she would
need to appear for her arraignment, he did not respond to her emails inquiring about
her case. He met her at the courthouse shortly before her arraignment to introduce
himself and spent approximately five minutes with her before she entered a not-
guilty plea.
        {¶ 25} Afraid that the children would be removed from her home, Kermode
emailed Reed seeking reassurance and asking additional questions about her
defense. Reed sent Kermode three emails, giving cursory answers to her questions
and transmitting the discovery he had received from the prosecutor. Kermode then
emailed Reed asking an additional question and attempting to schedule a time to
speak with him before her next court appearance; Reed replied, stating that he
would call her, but he failed to do so. Reed met with Kermode for approximately
five minutes on the morning of her pretrial conference and advised her to enter a
no-contest plea. Kermode followed his advice. The court found her guilty of the
charged offense and scheduled a sentencing hearing.
        {¶ 26} Kermode made numerous attempts to communicate with Reed after
her foster-parent caseworker told her that a conviction for child endangering would
disqualify her from serving as a foster parent and could be cause for removal of the
children from her home. Unable to reach Reed, she terminated his representation
and hired a new attorney. In early February, Reed told Kermode that he would
withdraw from her case, but he waited nearly three weeks to do so.

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                                  January Term, 2023

          {¶ 27} The court granted Kermode’s motion to withdraw her plea, but she
ultimately entered another no-contest plea to the same charge. Although Kermode
was permitted to adopt the foster children who had been in her care, she had to
relinquish her foster-parent license due to her conviction. Reed acknowledged that
he owes Kermode a refund of $750 because he failed to complete his representation
of her.
          {¶ 28} The parties stipulated and the board found that Reed’s conduct in the
Diehl and Kermode matters violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act
with reasonable diligence in representing a client), 1.4(a)(4) (requiring a lawyer to
comply as soon as practicable with a client’s reasonable requests for information),
1.15(c), and 1.16(e), and that his conduct in the Diehl matter also violated
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d). We adopt these findings of misconduct.
                          RECOMMENDED SANCTION
          {¶ 29} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions
imposed in similar cases.
          {¶ 30} The parties stipulated and the board found that four aggravating
factors are present in this case: Reed acted with a dishonest or selfish motive,
committed multiple offenses, harmed vulnerable clients, and failed to make
restitution to Thomas and Kermode. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(2), (4), (8), and (9).
The parties also stipulated to four mitigating factors—namely, that Reed made full
and free disclosure to the board and exhibited a cooperative attitude toward the
disciplinary proceedings, presented evidence of his good character and reputation,
had other penalties or sanctions imposed for his misconduct, and presented
evidence of other interim rehabilitation related to his diagnosed mental and alcohol-
use disorders. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(4), (5), (6), and (8).

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                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

       {¶ 31} The board adopted the parties’ stipulated mitigating factors and
noted that the testimony of Reed and his counselor established that Reed had been
diagnosed with generalized anxiety disorder and a severe alcohol-use disorder that
was in sustained remission (with the qualifier that Reed’s remission had been in a
controlled environment).     Reed presented evidence that he regularly attends
Alcoholics Anonymous (“AA”) meetings and counseling sessions, has entered into
a contract with the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”), has been sober
since his incarceration began in June 2020, and is firmly committed to recovery.
Although Reed testified that his alcoholism affected every aspect of his life, he did
not sufficiently establish that it contributed to his misconduct. Consequently, the
board did not find his diagnosed mental and substance-use disorders to be a
mitigating factor.   See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7).         It did, however, attribute
mitigating effect to Reed’s clean disciplinary record, see Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1),
and noted that Reed accepted full responsibility for his actions.
       {¶ 32} The parties jointly recommended that Reed be indefinitely
suspended from the practice of law and that he not be permitted to apply for
reinstatement until he has completed the postrelease control imposed in his criminal
cases and made full restitution of $4,000 to Thomas and $750 to Kermode. The
parties also recommend that we place conditions on Reed’s reinstatement to ensure
that he continues to comply with his treatment regimen and is mentally fit to resume
the practice of law. In addition, they agree that Reed should receive some credit
for the time served under his interim felony suspension.
       {¶ 33} In determining the appropriate sanction to recommend for Reed’s
misconduct, the board relied on three cases in which we imposed indefinite
suspensions with similar conditions for reinstatement on attorneys who committed
crimes and engaged in professional misconduct while abusing alcohol.
       {¶ 34} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Deters, 155 Ohio St.3d 478, 2018-Ohio-
5025, 122 N.E.3d 159, an attorney was convicted of misdemeanor counts of

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                                 January Term, 2023

maintaining physical control of a vehicle while under the influence, excessive
speed, improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle, assault, obstructing
official business, and twice violating a domestic-violence CPO that had been issued
in favor of his estranged wife, id. at ¶ 7-10. Deters also accepted fees but failed to
complete the work in 18 cases, failed to inform many of his clients of his
incarceration, failed to return their telephone calls, and failed to file two appellate
briefs, which resulted in the dismissal of one client’s case. Id. at ¶ 12, 15, 17. As
a result of Deters’s failure to appear at scheduled hearings, warrants were issued
for two of his clients and he was found in contempt of court. Id. at ¶ 6, 12. At the
time of his disciplinary hearing, Deters owed an aggregate amount of roughly
$29,000 in restitution to his former clients. Id. at ¶ 24.
       {¶ 35} Three aggravating factors were present—Deters engaged in a pattern
of misconduct, committed multiple offenses, and harmed vulnerable clients. Id. at
¶ 20. The only mitigating factors were Deters’s cooperation in the disciplinary
proceedings and the imposition of other sanctions. Id. at ¶ 21. Although Deters
had been diagnosed with alcohol and substance-use disorders and an underlying
mental disorder, he made no claim that they qualified as a mitigating factor under
Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7). Id. at ¶ 22. We indefinitely suspended Deters from the
practice of law, ordered him to make restitution to 14 clients, and imposed
conditions on his reinstatement requiring that he comply with his OLAP contract
and receive a prognosis from a qualified healthcare professional of his ability to
return to the competent, ethical, and professional practice of law. Id. at ¶ 23-25.
       {¶ 36} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Tinch, 160 Ohio St.3d 165, 2020-Ohio-
2991, 154 N.E.3d 78, we imposed a similar sanction on an attorney who committed
71 violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct arising from his criminal
conduct and his professional misconduct in 12 separate client matters. Id. at ¶ 2, 6,
9-11. In contrast to Reed, Tinch established the existence of a mitigating substance-
use disorder, id. at ¶ 15, but he also had an interim default suspension imposed for

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                               SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

his failure to respond to the disciplinary proceedings, id. at ¶ 2. His eventual
cooperation was tempered by his failure to accept responsibility and his lack of
remorse for the harm he had caused to his clients. Id. at ¶ 14-15. We indefinitely
suspended Tinch and afforded him no credit for the time served under his interim
remedial and default suspensions. Id. at ¶ 20.
        {¶ 37} Finally, in Disciplinary Counsel v. Wilson, 160 Ohio St.3d 528,
2020-Ohio-3050, 159 N.E.3d 1141, an attorney committed a felony “with the intent
to thwart or hamper the prosecution of a felony domestic-violence case” that was
pending against the partner of Wilson’s former secretary. Id. at ¶ 35. He also
committed a series of ethical violations with respect to eight clients, which included
the neglect of client legal matters, the failure to reasonably communicate with
clients, a false statement made to a tribunal, the failure to deposit unearned fees into
a client trust account, and the failure to promptly refund unearned fees. Id. at ¶ 13,
17, 24, 26, 33. At the time of his disciplinary hearing, Wilson owed just $200 in
restitution to one client. Id. at ¶ 32.
        {¶ 38} The aggravating and mitigating factors in Wilson were comparable
to those present in this case, id. at ¶ 35-36, and like Reed, Wilson failed to establish
his existing mental-health and substance-use disorders as mitigating factors, id. at
¶ 36. We indefinitely suspended Wilson from the practice of law, credited him for
the time served under his interim felony suspension, which by then had exceeded
two years, and imposed treatment-centered conditions on his reinstatement. Id. at
¶ 43.
        {¶ 39} After considering Reed’s misconduct, the applicable aggravating
and mitigating factors, and the sanctions imposed in Deters, Tinch, and Wilson, the
board concluded that an indefinite suspension coupled with an order of restitution
and the parties’ proposed conditions for reinstatement is the appropriate sanction
for Reed’s misconduct. Citing the condition that Reed not be permitted to petition
for reinstatement until he has successfully completed his term of postrelease

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                                January Term, 2023

control, his genuine remorse and acceptance of responsibility for his wrongdoing,
and his commitment to his treatment program, the board recommends that he
receive credit for 18 months of the time he has served under his interim felony
suspension. Having reviewed the record in this case and our precedent, we agree
with the board’s recommendation.
                                 CONCLUSION
       {¶ 40} Accordingly, Ryan Shane Reed is indefinitely suspended from the
practice of law in Ohio and ordered to make restitution of $4,000 to Brandon
Thomas and $750 to Tina Kermode within 90 days of this order. He shall receive
18 months’ credit for the time served under his interim felony suspension, but he
shall not be eligible to petition for reinstatement until he successfully completes
any terms of postrelease control imposed in relation to his convictions in State v.
Reed, Champaign C.P. Nos. 2020 CR 100 and 2020 CR 135 (Dec. 4, 2020). In
addition to the requirements of Gov.Bar R. V(25), Reed’s reinstatement shall be
conditioned on proof of (1) his compliance with his May 31, 2022 OLAP contract,
(2) his continued participation in AA, and (3) his continued treatment with Journey
4 Self, L.L.C., or another provider approved by OLAP. Reed shall also be required
to submit an opinion from his treatment provider stating that he is able to return to
the competent, ethical, and professional practice of law. Costs are taxed to Reed.
                                                             Judgment accordingly.
       KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER,
and DETERS, JJ., concur.
                               _________________
       Joseph M. Caligiuri, Disciplinary Counsel, and Karen H. Osmond, Assistant
Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.
       Coughlan Law Firm, L.L.C., and Jonathan E. Coughlan, for respondent.
                               _________________

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