Court Opinion

ID: 9408499
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-12 20:04:45.011627+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:44.258917
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
            in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                        2023 IL App (3d) 210607-U

                                   Order filed July 12, 2023
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                  IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                            THIRD DISTRICT

                                                    2023

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                      )       Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                       )       of the 10th Judicial Circuit,
                                                      )       Peoria County, Illinois,
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                      )
                                                      )       Appeal No. 3-21-0607
             v.                                       )       Circuit No. 06-CF-1265
                                                      )
      CAMERON ALLEN PURYEAR,                          )       Honorable
                                                      )       Katherine S. Gorman,
             Defendant-Appellant.                     )       Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE ALBRECHT delivered the judgment of the court.
            Justices Brennan and Davenport concurred in the judgment.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                 ORDER

¶1          Held: The circuit court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for DNA testing.

¶2          Defendant, Cameron Allen Puryear, appeals the Peoria County circuit court’s denial of his

     motion for DNA testing. Defendant argues that the evidence sought to be tested had the potential

     to produce new, noncumulative evidence that is materially relevant to defendant’s claim of actual

     innocence. We affirm.

¶3                                         I. BACKGROUND
¶4          The State charged defendant with two counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1),

     (2) (West 2006)) for the death of John Buckley. The matter proceeded to a jury trial. Allen

     Buckley, John’s brother, testified that he lived with John and owned a white car that they both

     used. Officers were investigating a shooting in the neighborhood and questioned John and Allen.

     While speaking with the officers, Allen observed gang members watching him and John.

     Approximately one week later, September 20, 2006, at approximately 11 p.m., John drove the

     white car home. Shortly after 11 p.m., Allen heard two gunshots close to his apartment. He

     observed John stumble through the door and collapse. John died later that night from a gunshot

     wound to the chest. John’s girlfriend, Chelsea Tyler, testified that she was on the phone with John

     when she heard other voices with John on the line. Tyler heard one voice say, “[w]e heard

     motherfuckers snitching.”

¶5          Nicole Mitchell testified that on September 20, 2006, she hosted a party at her house with

     defendant, Milan Gibson, Tavar Carpenter, Cash Ballew, and several others in attendance. At the

     party, defendant posed for photographs holding an automatic “military gun.” Shortly after 11 p.m.,

     party attendants dispersed, and Nicole observed defendant “passed out” on her porch. At some

     point, Nicole saw a white car drive past her home and heard someone say, “[h]ey, there go that

     white car again.” Soon after, defendant left the porch and walked toward Linn and Richmond, an

     intersection that was one house north of Nicole’s home. A short time later, defendant, Erica

     Mitchell, Ballew and others entered quickly through Nicole’s front door. Defendant looked

     “scared” and everyone was “shooken up” and “crying.” Defendant asked Nicole if he could use

     her bathroom to wash his hands. Defendant spent the night at Nicole’s house and left early the next

     morning.

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¶6          Erica testified that she lived with her sister, Nicole, and was at home at the time of the

     murder. Around 11:30 p.m., Erica was standing with defendant, Gibson, and Carpenter outside of

     the house near the intersection of Linn and Richmond. Erica observed a white car drive by, and

     defendant and Gibson walked in the direction of the car. Erica heard an argument and then two

     gunshots from the area of the car, approximately four houses away. Erica ran back into the house

     and defendant entered behind her. Defendant had a “weapon” in his hand and said, “I shot

     somebody.” Defendant asked for bleach and proceeded to wash his hands with the bleach. Erica

     observed Ballew holding the black hooded sweatshirt that defendant had worn earlier in the day.

     Ballew asked for ammonia and threw the sweatshirt into the basement. The following night,

     defendant told Erica that he had shot John because John “tried to take his gun,” and “[n]ot to speak

     about anything that happened the night before.” Later, defendant told Erica that he “gets rid of

     snitches.”

¶7          On cross-examination, Erica stated that defendant wore the black hooded sweatshirt on and

     off throughout the day and into the night. Defendant was wearing the sweatshirt just prior to Erica

     hearing gunshots. After the shooting, defendant told Ballew to put the sweatshirt in the washer

     with bleach.

¶8          Peoria detective Katie Baer, responded to a separate incident at Nicole and Erica’s

     residence on September 23, 2006. Following a conversation with Erica, Baer learned information

     related to the September 20 murder. After, Baer located a black hooded sweatshirt in a pile of

     clothes near the washer and dryer in the basement. Baer did not know if the clothes were clean or

     dirty but described a “musty smell.”

¶9          Peoria police officer Scott Bowers testified that the black hooded sweatshirt located in the

     basement had “whitish” stains of an unknown origin on the front. Bowers did not believe that the

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       sweatshirt had been washed due to the stain. No DNA or gunshot residue analysis was completed

       on the sweatshirt. Bowers explained that gunshot residue was not conducted due to officers

       locating the sweatshirt in a pile of clothing three days after the murder, as “there would be no way

       to know whether between that time the gunpowder residue got put on there, if some of the other

       items in the pile of clothing had gunshot residue, those could easily be transferred onto this

       sweatshirt.” Bowers agreed that the “sweatshirt could have been put there a month before” it was

       located.

¶ 10          Kasey Vespa testified that defendant was her live-in boyfriend at the time of the murder.

       Vespa picked defendant and Gibson up from the intersection of Linn and Richmond the morning

       after the murder. After arriving at their apartment, Vespa observed defendant cleaning his firearm.

       Later that day, after dropping defendant and Gibson off at another house, Vespa removed

       defendant’s belongings from the apartment, including defendant’s firearm.

¶ 11          The jury found defendant guilty. The court sentenced defendant to 71 years’ imprisonment.

       On direct appeal, defendant presented several claims of prosecutorial misconduct. People v.

       Puryear, No. 3-08-0092 (2009) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). We

       affirmed, finding that any errors committed were not prejudicial in light of the overwhelming

       evidence of defendant’s guilt. Defendant filed a postconviction petition alleging various claims of

       ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Following a second-stage proceeding, the

       court dismissed defendant’s petition. Defendant did not appeal.

¶ 12          Defendant filed a motion for DNA testing, which is the subject of this appeal. The circuit

       court granted the State’s motion to dismiss, which argued that DNA testing would fail to provide

       any material evidence to advance defendant’s actual innocence claim due to the sweatshirt being

       handled by more people than just defendant, the strong inference from the trial evidence that

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       ammonia had been used on the sweatshirt, and the three-day delay in locating the sweatshirt. The

       court denied defendant’s motion to reconsider. Defendant appeals.

¶ 13                                                II. ANALYSIS

¶ 14          Defendant argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for DNA testing because

       the black hooded sweatshirt had the potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence materially

       relevant to defendant’s claim of actual innocence. Specifically, defendant contends that, under the

       State’s theory, the sweatshirt should contain his DNA, and if his DNA is absent, it would be

       materially relevant to his claim that he was not involved in the murder. Additionally, if another

       person’s DNA is recovered from the sweatshirt, it would bolster defendant’s alibi defense. We

       disagree.

¶ 15          Section 116-3(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 states that following a trial

       resulting in defendant’s conviction, a defendant may make a motion before the circuit court for

       forensic DNA testing on evidence secured in relation to the trial that:

                                  “(1) was not subject to the testing which is now requested at the time of

                      trial; or

                                  (2) although previously subjected to testing, can be subjected to additional

                      testing utilizing a method that was not scientifically available at the time of trial

                      that provides a reasonable likelihood of more probative results.” 725 ILCS 5/116-

                      3(a)(1), (2) (West 2020).

       Additionally, defendant must make a prima facie case that:

                                  “(1) identity was the issue in the trial *** which resulted in his or her

                      conviction; and

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                              (2) the evidence to be tested has been subject to a chain of custody sufficient

                      to establish that it has not been substituted, tampered with, replaced, or altered in

                      any material respect.” Id. § 116-3(b)(1), (2).

¶ 16          When a defendant has established a prima facie case, the court must assess the likelihood

       that the test results would materially advance defendant’s claim of actual innocence. People v.

       Stoecker, 2014 IL 115756, ¶ 26. This assessment requires evaluating the trial evidence to

       determine whether the testing is likely to produce “new, noncumulative evidence materially

       relevant to the defendant’s claim of actual innocence.” Id.; 725 ILCS 5/116-3(c)(1) (West 2020).

       Materially relevant evidence tends to significantly advance defendant’s claim of actual innocence.

       People v. Savory, 197 Ill. 2d 203, 213 (2001). A determination of whether the evidence is

       materially relevant requires consideration of the evidence introduced at trial, as well as an

       assessment of the evidence defendant is seeking to test. Id. at 214. We review de novo the circuit

       court’s denial of a motion for DNA testing. Stoecker, 2014 IL 115756, ¶ 21.

¶ 17          Initially, we note that the State concedes defendant made a prima facie showing that

       identity was an issue at trial. See People v. Grant, 2016 IL App (3d) 140211, ¶ 22. The State calls

       into question defendant’s prima facie showing of the chain of custody component, relying on

       potential tampering prior to the sweatshirt entering police custody. We have consistently held that

       chain of custody refers to what occurred with the evidence following its retrieval by the State. See

       People v. Perez, 2016 IL App (3d) 130784, ¶¶ 29, 32. Therefore, we find that defendant has

       established a prima facie case that the sweatshirt was subject to a sufficient chain of custody.

¶ 18          Next, we will assess the likelihood that results from DNA testing would materially advance

       defendant’s claim of actual innocence. See Stoecker, 2014 IL 115756, ¶ 26. In the present case,

       the absence of defendant’s DNA on the sweatshirt does not have the potential to be materially

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       relevant to a claim of actual innocence given the tenuous connection between the sweatshirt and

       the murder. First, the testimony at trial indicated that more than one person was likely involved in

       the shooting, and there was no eyewitness or direct evidence that the shooter wore a black hooded

       sweatshirt. Therefore, a DNA match to either defendant or another individual would not tend to

       establish that the matched individual committed the murder. Stated another way, a lack of

       defendant’s DNA would not be probative of defendant’s innocence as it would not eliminate him

       as a participant in the shooting. Moreover, evidence of defendant’s ownership of the sweatshirt

       was a minor part of the evidence at trial and not central to the State’s evidence of defendant’s guilt,

       considering defendant’s admissions and actions following the shooting. See supra ¶¶ 6-7, 10; see

       also Savory, 197 Ill. 2d at 215; People v. English, 2013 IL App (4th) 120044, ¶¶ 21-24 (the link

       between the crime and fingerprints too attenuated for additional testing to significantly advance a

       claim of actual innocence).

¶ 19          Second, the trial testimony established that forensic analysis was not completed due to the

       three-day delay in recovering the sweatshirt in a pile of other clothing. The record is silent as to

       who was in the house in those three days. DNA evidence could have been left by many people

       innocent of the murder, including individuals who touched the sweatshirt before or after the

       murder. Therefore, even if testing identified another person’s DNA or defendant’s DNA was

       absent, it would not tend to support his claim of actual innocence because there is no evidence to

       show what happened to the sweatshirt in the three days before being recovered. See Savory, 197

       Ill. 2d at 215; English, 2013 IL App (4th) 120044, ¶¶ 21-24. Accordingly, we find no error in the

       court’s denial of defendant’s motion for DNA testing.

¶ 20                                            III. CONCLUSION

¶ 21          The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.

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¶ 22   Affirmed.

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