Court Opinion

ID: 9555605
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-14 16:07:33.483802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:37:07.561201
License: Public Domain

J-S19008-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
               v.                        :
                                         :
                                         :
 ROBERT LEONARD TAYLOR                   :
                                         :
                    Appellant            :   No. 1654 MDA 2022

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 24, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-06-CR-0001134-2020

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                        FILED: AUGUST 14, 2023

     Appellant, Robert Leonard Taylor, appeals pro se from the post-

conviction court’s October 24, 2022 order denying his timely-filed petition

under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. After

careful review, we vacate the court’s order and remand for further

proceedings.

     The facts of Appellant’s underlying convictions are not pertinent to our

disposition of his present appeal. We need only note that on March 2, 2021,

a jury convicted Appellant of various offenses, including aggravated assault

and carrying a firearm without a license. He was sentenced on March 10,

2021, to an aggregate term of 5 to 17 years’ incarceration. Appellant did not

file any post-sentence motions or a direct appeal.

     On November 24, 2021, Appellant filed a timely, pro se PCRA petition,

raising various claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness. David Long, Esq., was
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appointed as Appellant’s counsel. Rather than filing an amended petition on

Appellant’s behalf, Attorney Long filed a petition to withdraw and “no-merit”

letter in accordance with Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa.

1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en

banc).

       On September 22, 2022, the PCRA court filed an order granting Attorney

Long’s petition to withdraw. That same day, the court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P.

907 notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing. On

October 11, 2022, Appellant filed a pro se response, raising for the first time

a claim that his trial counsel had been ineffective for not filing a direct appeal

on his behalf. On October 24, 2022, the PCRA court issued an order denying

Appellant’s petition.

       Appellant filed a timely, pro se notice of appeal. He also timely complied

with the PCRA court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of

errors complained of on appeal.1 The PCRA court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion

____________________________________________

1 The court filed its Rule 1925(b) order on December 16, 2022, and directed

Appellant to file his concise statement within 21 days, or by Friday, January
6, 2023. While Appellant’s statement was not filed until January 9, 2023, the
proof of service attached to it indicates that he delivered that document to
prison authorities for mailing on December 30, 2022. Thus, we deem it timely.
See Pa.R.A.P. 121(f) (“A pro se filing submitted by a person incarcerated at a
correctional facility is deemed filed as of the date of the prison postmark or
the date the filing was delivered to the prison authorities for purposes of
mailing as documented by a properly executed prisoner cash slip or other
reasonably verifiable evidence.”).

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on January 17, 2023. Herein, Appellant raises six claims for our review, which

we reproduce verbatim:

     Claim 1.

     Trial counsel was ineffective when she failed to ask Officer
     Contreras how was he shooting at petitioner while simultaneously
     making a radio call about shots being fired.

     Claim 2.

     Trial counsel was ineffective when she failed to contact a witness,
     Willamarie Morales-Oliveras, who allegedly posted something on
     facebook saying “someone is going to die tonight”.

     Claim 3.

     Trial counsel was ineffective due to her failure to object to the
     playing a 911 call made by Bradley Duane as this was a violation
     of the Confrontation Clause.

     Claim 4.

     Trial counsel was ineffective when she failed to object to the
     absence of two witnesses, Michael Joseph Alberta and Bradley
     Duane. She was ineffective for failure to ask questions regarding
     the whereabouts of these witnesses and her failure to locate and
     interview them.

     Claim 5.

     Trial counsel was ineffective for not establishing who the victim
     was or who was he alleged to have been pointing the gun at during
     his crime. And that police never ascertained the name of the
     individual.

     Claim 6.

     Petitioner asked his PCRA attorney to challenge the fact that his
     Trial attorney did not file his Direct appeal and attorney said no
     merit.

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Appellant’s Brief at 2-4 (unnumbered).2

       We begin with Appellant’s last issue, as it is dispositive of our decision

to vacate the court’s order and remand for further proceedings. Appellant

argues that his PCRA counsel, Attorney Long, acted ineffectively by

disregarding Appellant’s request that counsel file an amended petition

asserting that Appellant’s trial counsel ineffectively failed to file a direct appeal

on Appellant’s behalf. According to Appellant, his “[t]rial attorney didn’t …

consult [with him] about filing a direct appeal.”          Appellant’s Brief at 4

(unnumbered). When he asked his trial counsel to file a direct appeal on his

behalf, she “disregarded his request.” Id. Appellant contends that he asked

his PCRA counsel, Attorney Long, to file an amended petition raising this trial-

counsel-ineffectiveness claim, but Attorney Long refused to do so.               Id.

Instead, Attorney Long petitioned to withdraw, leaving Appellant with no other

option than to raise this claim pro se, which he did in response to the court’s

Rule 907 notice.       Id.   The PCRA court deemed Appellant’s trial-counsel-

ineffectiveness claim waived, reasoning that Appellant improperly presented

it for the first time in his Rule 907 response, rather than seeking leave to file

an amended petition. PCO at 5 (citing Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d

1080, 1084-85 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating that “a petitioner must request

____________________________________________

2 We note that Appellant’s brief does not comply with the Rules of Appellate

Procedure, in that he does not include, inter alia, a Statement of the Questions
Involved (Pa.R.A.P. 2116) or a Summary of Argument (Pa.R.A.P. 2118).
Nevertheless, we can discern the issues Appellant is raising and the arguments
he makes in support thereof. Accordingly, we will overlook his briefing errors.

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leave to amend his petition in his Rule 907 response to raise new trial counsel

ineffectiveness claims”)). In response, Appellant explains that he “was not

aware that he himself could amend” his PCRA petition, which is why he asked

Attorney Long to do so. Appellant’s Brief at 4 (unnumbered). He insists that

Attorney Long acted ineffectively by refusing that request and seeking to

withdraw.

      Appellant argues that he may raise Attorney Long’s ineffectiveness for

the   first   time   on   appeal   under   our   Supreme   Court’s   decision   in

Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), discussed infra. See

id. at 8 (unnumbered). We agree. At the time of the Bradley decision, a

PCRA petitioner could raise a claim of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness only in a

response to a Rule 907 notice of intent to dismiss a petition without a hearing.

See Bradley, 261 A.3d at 397-98 (citing Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d

875 (Pa. 2009)). The Bradley Court expanded the manner in which a claim

of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness may be raised, holding “that a PCRA

petitioner may, after a PCRA court denies relief, and after obtaining new

counsel or acting pro se, raise claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness at the

first opportunity to do so, even if on appeal.” Id. at 400. Here, the PCRA

court denied Appellant relief and Appellant, acting pro se, has raised Attorney

Long’s ineffectiveness for the first time on appeal. We conclude that Bradley

permits us to review Appellant’s allegation of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness.

      However, in attempting to conduct this review, it quickly became

apparent that we must remand “for further development of the record and for

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the PCRA court to consider [this] claim[] as an initial matter.” Id. at 402.

Namely, Appellant provides “more than mere boilerplate assertions of PCRA

counsel’s ineffectiveness….” Id. (cleaned up). Attorney Long must be given

an opportunity to respond to the allegation that he refused Appellant’s request

to file an amended petition raising the trial counsel ineffectiveness issue, and

the PCRA court must make credibility determinations regarding this issue.

Clearly, Appellant’s claim raises “material facts” concerning counsel’s

representation, and “relief is not plainly unavailable as a matter of law” if

Appellant’s allegation is true. Id. (cleaned up).

      Thus, we vacate the order denying Appellant’s petition and remand for

the PCRA court to conduct a hearing regarding Appellant’s PCRA-counsel-

ineffectiveness claim.   Prior to that proceeding, the court shall appoint

Appellant new counsel, as this is his first PCRA petition. See Bradley, 261

A.3d at 391 (stating that a first-time PCRA petitioner has a rule-based right

to effective assistance of counsel) (citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 904; Commonwealth

v. Albrecht, 720 A.2d 693, 699-700 (Pa. 1998) (holding that the appointment

of counsel pursuant to Rule 904 carries with it an “enforceable right to

effective post-conviction counsel”)).   If the PCRA court finds that Attorney

Long acted ineffectively by failing to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for

not filing a direct appeal, the court must also then permit Appellant to present

evidence that his trial counsel acted ineffectively in this regard.   Upon the

PCRA court’s grant or denial of relief, if either Appellant or the Commonwealth

appeal that determination, the PCRA court should file a supplemental Rule

                                     -6-
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1925(a) opinion to address its decision.    Given that the PCRA court could

potentially reinstate Appellant’s direct appeal rights, we will not now address

his challenges to the PCRA court’s denial of his remaining trial-counsel-

ineffectiveness claims, which Appellant can reassert in a future proceeding.

See Commonwealth v. Miller, 868 A.2d 578, 580 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“When

a PCRA court grants a request for reinstatement of direct appeal rights nunc

pro tunc, it may address, but not ‘reach’ the merits of any remaining claims.”).

      Order vacated.      Case remanded with instructions.          Jurisdiction

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/14/2023

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