Court Opinion

ID: 9926586
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-25 09:12:23.954419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:26.810848
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS
                                       EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                                            EL PASO, TEXAS

     LEOPOLDO MORA,                                       §                   No. 08-23-00115-CR

                                       Appellant,         §                      Appeal from the

     v.                                                   §               226th Judicial District Court

     THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                  §                 of Bexar County, Texas

                                        Appellee.         §                    (TC# 2021CR9053)

                                        MEMORANDUM OPINION

          A jury found Appellant Leopoldo Mora guilty of first-degree murder in the shooting death

of Kenneth Salazar. The jury also found that Appellant had previously been convicted of at least

two of the three prior felony offenses alleged in the indictment’s habitual offender enhancement

paragraphs and sentenced Appellant to life in prison. In two issues on appeal, Appellant contends:

(1) his due process rights were violated when a law enforcement officer expressed his opinion

during the guilt-innocence phase that the shooting was not justified; and (2) his Fifth Amendment

rights were violated by a comment the prosecutor made during the punishment phase of his trial

that Appellant contends was an improper comment on his failure to testify at trial. For the reasons

set forth below, we find no reversible error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.1

1
    This case was transferred from the Fourth Court of Appeals pursuant to a Texas Supreme Court docket equalization

                                                          1
                           FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

         A. The guilt-innocence phase of the trial

         The shooting in this case took place in broad daylight on the evening of June 13, 2021, at

a motel in San Antonio where both Appellant and the victim had rented rooms. At trial, the State

played video footage from the motel’s security surveillance cameras, as narrated by several

witnesses, including the motel’s manager (Stacy Bahkta), another motel resident (Jasmine Lopez),

and three law enforcement officers. The footage demonstrated that prior to the shooting, Appellant

was standing in the doorway of his room, appearing to be “calm,” and holding a cell phone while

speaking with the victim, who stood outside. Following the conversation, the victim went to assist

another individual working on a vehicle in the motel’s parking lot, while Appellant went inside his

room. Approximately a minute later, Appellant stepped into the open doorway of his room, holding

a gun, and appearing to be “animated” or “agitated”; he then fired a single shot at the victim who

was standing approximately ten feet away. The victim fell to the ground, suffering a gunshot

wound to his upper abdomen. The evidence indicated Appellant got into the driver’s seat of a car

in the parking lot that had been driven into the lot by a woman, and he drove away.2 The victim

was transported to the hospital where surgery was performed, but he later died from the gunshot

wound.

         Jasmine Lopez—the only eyewitness to the shooting who testified at trial—recalled that

shortly before the shooting, Appellant and the victim were conversing and the victim gave

Appellant money; Lopez did not know why the money was exchanged. She testified that shortly

order. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. We follow the precedent of that court to the extent it might conflict with
our own. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
2
  The woman that drove the car into the parking lot was the daughter of the motel’s housekeeper who had frequently
visited Appellant prior to the shooting. She was in the passenger seat when Appellant drove away. She was not charged
as an accessory to the murder and did not testify at trial.

                                                         2
thereafter, while the victim was assisting another individual who was working on his vehicle, she

heard a single gunshot and saw the victim fall to the ground. Lopez testified that she did not recall

observing any animosity between Appellant and the victim prior to the shooting, and she could not

say why the shooting took place. Neither Lopez nor any of the other witnesses who reviewed the

motel’s security footage and testified saw any displays of animosity between Appellant and the

victim on the footage, and none observed the victim holding any weapons or making any

aggressive movements toward Appellant prior to the shooting. However, the footage did not

contain any audio; therefore, it was unclear whether any words were exchanged between the two.

       San Antonio Police Officer Anthony Espinosa testified that when he arrived at the scene

in response to a 911 call, he observed the victim on the ground surrounded by a group. At the

scene, Officer Espinosa was told the shot was fired from the room Appellant had been renting, and

Appellant had left the scene. The officer found a spent shell casing outside the door of Appellant’s

room, and after obtaining a search warrant, the police found a round of live ammunition inside the

room as well as a cell phone linked to Appellant. The gun used in the shooting was never recovered.

       At the close of the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, defense counsel did not deny that

Appellant had shot the victim; instead, he argued that—although the video footage did not reveal

what was said between the two prior to the shooting—“[s]omething was said . . . [s]omething

happened” that prompted the shooting.

       The jury found Appellant guilty of murder, as alleged in the indictment. The same jury was

tasked with determining Appellant’s sentence.

       B. The punishment phase of the trial

       During the punishment phase, defense counsel asserted a sudden-passion defense, again

arguing that something must have happened to agitate Appellant after his initial, seemingly calm

                                                 3
encounter with the victim. Defense counsel again acknowledged that it was impossible to discern

what, if anything, was said prior to the shooting. But, he argued, there must have been a

confrontation between the victim and Appellant that triggered him, and asked the jury to consider

“how upset a person has to be to shoot a person in broad daylight” with witnesses nearby. Over

the State’s objection that there was no evidence to support a sudden-passion defense, the trial court

instructed the jury that if Appellant established by a preponderance of the evidence that he shot

the victim “under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause,” he

was to be sentenced in accordance with the statutory guidelines for second-degree murder. The

jury rejected the defense.

           The State also presented evidence that Appellant had three prior felony convictions (as

alleged in the indictment’s habitual offender enhancement paragraphs) for: bribery, intent to

distribute a controlled substance, and felon in possession of a firearm.3 The jury found that at least

two of the enhancement paragraphs were true. After hearing testimony from the family members

of both Appellant and the victim, the jury sentenced Appellant to life in prison. This appeal

followed.

                                   THE ADMISSION OF OPINION TESTIMONY

           In Issue One, Appellant contends his due process rights were violated when the State

elicited the following testimony from Officer Espinosa during the guilt-innocence phase after the

officer had finished reviewing footage of the shooting:

           The Prosecutor: “Based on everything that we saw in the video, as well as
           everything you developed during the course of your investigation upon talking to
           witnesses and all that, did you see any reason or learn of any reason for [Appellant]
           . . . to employ self-defense against Kenneth Salazar?”

           Officer Espinosa: “Absolutely not.”

3
    Appellant pled “not true” to all three enhancement paragraphs.

                                                           4
           The Prosecutor: “Was he justified, in everything that we’ve seen, in using deadly
           force against Kenneth Salazar?”

           Officer Espinosa: “No.”

           According to Appellant, Officer Espinosa’s testimony that the shooting was not justified

constituted an improper legal conclusion regarding Appellant’s sudden-passion defense; Officer

Espinosa had “no facts to support his opinion”; and Officer Espinosa was “not qualified to provide

such an opinion[.]” Appellant contends admitting that testimony violated the Texas Rules of

Evidence governing the admission of opinion testimony and violated his due process rights,

asserting he was denied the right to a fair trial. He further contends we must reverse his conviction,

as admitting the testimony was harmful to his case under the standards set forth in Texas Rule of

Appellate Procedure 44.2 regarding errors of a constitutional magnitude.4 For the reasons set forth

below, we disagree.

           First, even if we were to assume Officer Espinosa’s testimony was improperly admitted,

Appellant has not cited any authority for the proposition that its admission violated his due process

rights, nor are we aware of any. 5 To the contrary, it is well-established that the erroneous

4
    Rule 44.2(a) provides:

           If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals constitutional error that is subject to harmless error
           review, the court of appeals must reverse a judgment of conviction or punishment unless the court
           determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction or
           punishment. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a).
5
  Although Officer Espinosa’s testimony came during the guilt-innocence phase of Appellant’s trial, the jury was
entitled to consider it in determining Appellant’s sentence, as all evidence presented in the guilt-innocence phase of
trial is automatically before the jury during the punishment phase. See Buchanan v. State, 911 S.W.2d 11, 13
(Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc) (recognizing that evidence admitted at the guilt-innocence phase of a defendant’s
trial may be considered by the trier of fact in assessing punishment); see also Wright v. State, 212 S.W.3d 768, 776
(Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. ref’d) (recognizing that evidence from the guilt-innocence phase of a trial is
automatically before the jury at the penalty stage, and a jury may consider all such evidence in determining a
defendant’s sentence). Accordingly, the improper admission of evidence during the guilt-innocence phase of a trial
may have a prejudicial impact on the jury’s sentencing decision. See Hough v. State, No. 03-01-00265-CR, 2002 WL
1025113, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin May 23, 2002, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) (recognizing that
because “evidence admitted at guilt/innocence may also affect the jury’s deliberations on punishment,” court would
consider whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence during the guilt-innocence phase of defendant’s trial and

                                                              5
admission of evidence, including opinion testimony, does not result in constitutional error. See

Cook v. State, 665 S.W.3d 595, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (concluding that any error in admitting

law enforcement officer’s testimony expressing his opinion on a complainant’s credibility in a

sexual assault case was of a nonconstitutional nature); Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 365

(Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (considering whether the erroneous admission of opinion testimony was

harmful under the standard for nonconstitutional error). In fact, our sister court concluded that the

admission of virtually identical testimony from a police officer—in which the officer opined that

the defendant was not justified in using deadly force—was to be analyzed under the harmless error

standard for nonconstitutional errors. See Holmes v. State, No. 14-22-00007-CR, 2023 WL

4883401, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 1, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication); see also Williams v. State, No. 12-07-00428-CR, 2009 WL 4377196,

at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler Dec. 2, 2009, pet. ref’d) (mem. op, not designated for publication)

(holding that the admission of officer’s testimony stating he did not believe defendant’s claim that

he assaulted his victim while acting in defense of others was nonconstitutional error).

         Moreover, to preserve error on appeal regarding the improper admission of evidence,

“there must be a timely and specific objection to the complained-of evidence.” Davis v. State, 313

S.W.3d 317, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A)). To be timely, a

party must object either before the evidence is admitted or, if not possible, “as soon as the

objectionable nature of the evidence [becomes] apparent and [move] to strike the evidence, that is,

to have it removed from the body of evidence the jury is allowed to consider.” Ethington v. State,

819 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc); see also Daniel v. State, Nos. 04-16-

whether it affected the jury’s sentencing decision) (citing Reyes v. State, 994 S.W.2d 151, 153 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)
(en banc) (recognizing that “[t]he prejudicial impact of an error committed during guilt/innocence may extend into
the punishment phase of a trial”)).

                                                          6
00576-CR, 04-16-00577-CR, & 04-16-00578-CR, 2018 WL 2694665, at *2 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio June 6, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (recognizing

same). Failing to object either before or at the time evidence is admitted, without a showing of a

legitimate reason to justify the delay, waives the claim of error. Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330,

355 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc). “If a defendant fails to object until after an objectionable

question has been asked and answered, and he can show no legitimate reason to justify the delay,

his objection is untimely and error is waived.” Lagrone v. State, 942 S.W.2d 602, 618 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1997) (en banc).

         Here, Appellant does not provide any legitimate reason for not timely objecting to Officer

Espinosa’s testimony. Nor does such a reason appear on the record. To the contrary, defense

counsel objected on two other occasions when the prosecutor asked other law enforcement officers

questions regarding whether they believed Appellant was justified in shooting the victim or

whether they believed Appellant acted in self-defense based on their review of the motel’s security

footage. 6 Accordingly, we conclude that any error in the admission of Officer Espinosa’s

testimony was waived. Appellant’s Issue One is overruled.

                  THE PROSECUTOR’S ALLEGEDLY IMPROPER COMMENTS

         In Issue Two, Appellant alleges that during the punishment phase, the prosecutor

improperly commented on his failure to testify at trial in violation of his Fifth Amendment right

to remain silent. Based on our review of the record, we conclude the prosecutor’s comment did

not violate Appellant’s Fifth Amendment rights, but even if it did, any such violation was cured

by the trial court’s instruction to the jury.

6
 In both instances, the trial court sustained defense counsel’s objections before the officers answered the prosecutor’s
questions.

                                                           7
       A. Standard of review and applicable law
       A defendant has a Fifth Amendment right not to testify at both the guilt-innocence and

punishment phases of his trial. See Randolph v. State, 353 S.W.3d 887, 891 (Tex. Crim. App.

2011). And a prosecutor may not directly or indirectly comment on a defendant’s failure to testify;

doing so violates both the state and federal constitutions, as well as Texas statutory law. Id. (citing

U.S. CONST. amend. V; Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10;

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.08). “Commenting on an accused’s failure to testify violates

his state and federal constitutional privileges against self-incrimination.” Archie v. State, 340

S.W.3d 734, 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). “It is basic and fundamental constitutional and statutory

law in this State that the failure of an accused to testify during his trial may not be the subject of

direct or indirect comment by a prosecuting attorney during his final jury argument.” Garrett v.

State, 632 S.W.2d 350, 351 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982).

       In determining whether a prosecutor’s comments constitute an impermissible reference to

an accused’s failure to testify, the challenged language “must be viewed from the jury’s standpoint

and the implication that the comment referred to the defendant’s failure to testify must be clear.”

Bustamante, 48 S.W.3d at 765. “It is not sufficient that the language might be construed as an

implied or indirect allusion.” Id. “A mere indirect or implied allusion to the accused’s failure to

testify does not violate appellant’s rights.” Rodriguez v. State, 446 S.W.3d 520, 537 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio 2014, no pet.) (quoting Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 490–91 (Tex. Crim. App.

1995)). Instead, the “test is whether the language used was manifestly intended or was of such a

character that the jury would necessarily and naturally take it as a comment on the defendant’s

failure to testify.” Bustamante, 48 S.W.3d at 765. “In applying this standard, the context in which

the comment was made must be analyzed to determine whether the language used was of such

                                                  8
character.” Id. A remark that calls attention to the absence of evidence only the defendant can

supply will result in reversal, but “if the language can reasonably be construed to refer to

appellant’s failure to produce evidence other than his own testimony, the comment is not

improper.” Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 491 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc); see also

Meridyth v. State, 163 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, no pet.) (prosecutor’s comment

that there was no evidence to support defendant’s claim that the substance found in his hat was not

cocaine or did not belong to him was not an improper comment on his failure to testify, where

there were other witnesses who could have testified on the subject). Thus, “a prosecutor may

comment on the defendant’s failure to produce witnesses and evidence so long as the remark does

not fault the defendant for exercising his right not to testify. Jackson v. State, 17 S.W.3d 664, 674

(Tex. Crim. App. 2000); see also Zambrano v. State, 431 S.W.3d 162, 173 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio 2014, no pet.) (recognizing same).

       C. Analysis

       During the punishment phase when defense counsel argued Appellant shot his victim in

sudden passion, the trial court instructed the jury that Appellant had the burden to establish his

sudden-passion defense by a preponderance of evidence, defining sudden passion as a “passion

directly caused by and arising out of provocation by the individual[.]” During closing arguments,

the prosecutor called the jury’s attention to the trial court’s instruction then argued Appellant had

not met his burden of showing he acted under the influence of sudden passion:

       One of the words to focus on when you go back and you take this back there with
       you and you read it is the word “provocation.” Think back to the first half of the
       trial, the guilt/innocence phase, when we brought in all the witnesses. You heard
       all the evidence. There is not one single shred of evidence that the victim, Kenneth
       Salazar, provoked the defendant in any way. No evidence whatsoever presented by
       the State or the Defense.

                                                 9
Defense counsel objected to this argument on the ground that it violated Appellant’s Fifth

Amendment rights. The trial court sustained the objection then admonished the jury that it “will

disregard that statement.” Appellant did not request any additional instructions.

           On appeal, Appellant continues to maintain that the prosecutor’s argument constituted an

improper comment on his failure to testify at trial and now contends, for the first time on appeal,

that the trial court’s instruction to disregard the prosecutor’s argument was insufficient to cure the

violation. We disagree with both arguments.

           As the State points out, when viewed in context, the prosecutor’s argument was in direct

response to Appellant’s defense that he shot the victim under the influence of sudden passion; the

prosecutor encouraged the jury to look at the entire record to determine whether Appellant met his

burden of establishing the defense, i.e., that he shot the victim as the result of provocation. The

prosecutor did not expressly fault Appellant for not testifying as to provocation, nor was Appellant

the only person who could have provided testimony on the subject. There were two other

individuals in the motel’s parking lot at the time of the shooting, and while only one of the

witnesses (Jasmine Lopez) testified at trial, she expressly testified that she did not see any evidence

of animosity between Appellant and the victim prior to the shooting. In addition, various witnesses

who reviewed the motel’s footage testified that they did not witness any animosity between

Appellant and the victim prior to the shooting, nor did they observe the victim holding any

weapons at the time. Accordingly, the prosecutor’s comment was a fair summation of the evidence

presented at trial on the issue of provocation, and we cannot say that the prosecutor’s argument

was of such a nature that the jury would have interpreted it as a comment on Appellant’s failure to

testify.

                                                  10
       Moreover, even if we were to conclude that the prosecutor’s argument was improper, the

conviction would not automatically be reversed as a result. See Crocker v. State, 248 S.W.3d 299,

305 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (recognizing that “[a] violation of the

prohibition against commenting on a defendant’s silence at trial is not automatically reversible

error”) (citing Madden v. State, 799 S.W.2d 683, 699 n.28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en banc)). To

the contrary, as Appellant recognizes, when a trial court promptly instructs the jury to disregard a

prosecutor’s improper comments, an appellate court will generally presume the instruction cured

any harm or prejudicial effect that may have resulted from such comments. See Dinkins, 894

S.W.2d at 357; see also Rougeau v. State, 738 S.W.2d 651, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc)

(holding that even if a comment could be construed as referring to a defendant’s failure to testify,

the prompt instruction given to the jury cured any harm). This is because “[t]he law generally

presumes that instructions to disregard and other cautionary instructions will be duly obeyed by

the jury.” Rodriguez v. State, 446 S.W.3d 520, 537 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.) (citing

Archie v. State, 340 S.W.3d 734, 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)); see also Wesbrook v. State, 29

S.W.3d 103, 115–16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en banc) (court will presume that the jury complied

with the trial court’s instruction to disregard a prosecutor’s improper comments) (citing Colburn

v. State, 966 S.W.2d 511, 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc)).

       An instruction to disregard a prosecutor’s improper comment will only be viewed as

inadequate if the comments were so “blatant” or “flagrant” that an instruction would not be able

to cure the resulting harm. See Dinkins, 894 S.W.2d at 356; see also Waldo v. State, 746 S.W.2d

750, 753 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (en banc) (recognizing same); Wilkerson v. State, 881 S.W.2d

321, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en banc) (only offensive or flagrant error warrants reversal when

there has been an instruction to disregard); Underwood v. State, 176 S.W.3d 635, 640 (Tex. App.—

                                                11
El Paso 2005, pet. ref’d) (“Only in the most blatant examples will an instruction to disregard fail

to cure any error.”). That is not the case here. And if it had been, the proper remedy would have

been to request a mistrial, which was not done in this case. See McGinn v. State, 961 S.W.2d 161,

165 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc) (recognizing that if “the prejudice arising from an erroneous

jury argument were incurable, a defendant would be required to request a mistrial to preserve error

on appeal because a mistrial would be the appropriate remedy”).

       Here, Appellant argues the trial court’s instruction to disregard the comment was “not

enough,” and a more specific instruction was warranted “explaining the prohibition against

considering silence adversely.” In support of his argument, Appellant cites our sister court’s

holding in Hunter v. State, 956 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1997, pet. ref’d). We do not,

however, find Hunter to be helpful to Appellant’s case. In Hunter, after the prosecutor made an

improper comment on the defendant’s failure to testify, the trial court instructed the jury to

disregard the comment and further referred the jury “back to the charge.” Id. at 144–146. In

concluding the trial court’s instruction cured any harm from the comment, the court found it

significant that the jury charge contained a paragraph detailing the defendant’s right to remain

silent and informing the jury it could not adversely consider the defendant’s failure to testify. Id.

at 146. The court, however, did not hold that it was necessary to refer the jury back to the jury

charge in every case to cure any harm stemming from the prosecutor’s comment; to the contrary,

the court recognized that a “boilerplate” instruction to disregard a prosecutor’s comment is

generally sufficient to cure all but the most blatant or egregious comments. Id. at 146 (citing Bower

v. State, 769 S.W.2d 887, 906–907 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc), overruled on other grounds,

Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc) (holding that prosecutor’s

                                                 12
comment on the defendant’s failure to testify was not so prejudicial that it could not be cured by a

general instruction to disregard the comment)).

       In the present case, not only did the trial court provide the jury a “boilerplate” instruction

to disregard the prosecutor’s comment, but the court also expressly instructed the jury in its charge

during both the guilt-innocence and punishment phases of Appellant’s trial that it was not

permitted to consider Appellant’s failure to testify in its deliberations for “any purpose

whatsoever.” In sum, any harm possibly resulting from the prosecutor’s comment was cured by

the trial court’s instruction. Appellant’s Issue Two is overruled.

                                          CONCLUSION

       The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                              LISA J. SOTO, Justice

January 18, 2024

Before Alley, C.J., Palafox, and Soto, JJ.

(Do Not Publish)

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