Court Opinion

ID: 9925320
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 15:03:27.812968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:50.024644
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                        SECOND DISTRICT

                             ELISEO SOTO,

                                Appellant,

                                       v.

                          STATE OF FLORIDA,

                                Appellee.

                             No. 2D22-1764

                            January 19, 2024

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Robin F. Fuson,
Judge.

Wade M. Whidden of Whidden Johnson, P.L., Tampa, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Natalia Reyna-
Pimiento, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

BLACK, Judge.

     Eliseo Soto appeals from his judgment and sentence for sexual
battery. On the issues preserved and raised by Soto, we affirm his
conviction but reverse his sentence.
     Soto raises two sentence-related issues, one of which requires
reversal. The supreme court has stated that "consideration . . . of the
defendant's failure to accept responsibility" is not foreclosed by the
statutory sentencing scheme. Davis v. State, 332 So. 3d 970, 975 (Fla.
2021). Thus we cannot conclude, as Soto urges, that fundamental error
occurred where the trial court considered and commented upon Soto's
failure to accept responsibility for the crime. However, we agree with
Soto that reversal of his sentence is required where the trial court failed
to apply the correct framework in considering Soto's request for a
downward departure sentence.
     Although none of the statutory mitigating factors applied to Soto,
he asked that the court consider nonstatutory mitigators and downward
depart from 94.5 months in prison, the lowest permissible sentence
indicated on his scoresheet. Soto submitted evidence in support of his
request. In imposing sentence, the court stated:
           So, my hands are pretty much tied by the fact that he
     was found guilty, and his score sheet, his criminal
     punishment score sheet, does not offer me an opportunity to
     go below guidelines if I wanted. And there [has] been
     certainly nothing really brought forward today that would be
     a legal justification to go below guidelines. So, having said
     that, I'm going to adjudicate him guilty and sentence him to
     94.5 months in the Florida State Prison, followed by eight
     years of sex offender probation.[1]
     "Generally, we review an order on a motion for downward departure
for an abuse of discretion. 'But because the issue here revolves around
the trial court's applying an incorrect standard in determining whether to
exercise its discretion, we apply a de novo standard of review.' " White v.
State, 350 So. 3d 401, 403 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) (first citing Banks v. State,
732 So. 2d 1065, 1068 (Fla. 1999); and then quoting Barnhill v. State,

     1 Although the court initially pronounced eight years of sex offender

probation, it quickly revised its pronouncement to a seven-year term of
probation.
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140 So. 3d 1055, 1060-61 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)). As this court has
recognized, "[t]he analytical framework a trial court must follow in
considering a request for a downward departure from the sentencing
guidelines is well established." Kezal v. State, 42 So. 3d 252, 254 (Fla.
2d DCA 2010).
     First, the court must determine whether it can depart, i.e.,
     whether there is a valid legal ground and adequate factual
     support for that ground in the case pending before it (step
     1). . . .

     Second, where the step 1 requirements are met, the trial
     court further must determine whether it should depart, i.e.,
     whether departure is indeed the best sentencing option for
     the defendant in the pending case.
White, 350 So. 3d at 403 (quoting Banks, 732 So. 2d at 1067-68). Where
the trial court erroneously believes that it legally does not have the
discretion to depart, the reviewing court must reverse the sentence.
Kezal, 42 So. 3d at 254.
     The court's statements that its hands were tied and that Soto's
scoresheet prevented the court from departing establish that the court
mistakenly believed it could not depart. The court's next statement, that
there was "nothing really brought forward . . . that would be a legal
justification" to depart, is unclear and does not cure the misconception
evinced by the first statements. See Williams v. State, 286 So. 3d 892,
898 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (reversing a sentence based on the uncertainty
as how the trial court reached its conclusion where it was "possible that
the trial court, instead of determining that it could not depart,
determined that it could depart but decided in its discretion not to depart
and simply stated it unclearly"); Childers v. State, 171 So. 3d 170, 173
(Fla. 1st DCA 2015) ("Although th[e court's] latter statement provides an
indication that the court found that Appellant failed to present sufficient

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evidence of the necessary elements under [the statutory mitigating
factors], we cannot say for certain based upon the court's other
statements . . . . It is unclear whether the trial court rejected Appellant's
request for a downward departure sentence based upon a misconception
as to its authority to depart . . . or based upon a finding that Appellant
failed to present sufficient evidence to support a departure sentence
under the statute."); see also Camacho v. State, 164 So. 3d 45, 48 (Fla.
2d DCA 2015) (expressing uncertainty as to the basis of the trial court's
ruling and reversing the sentence, stating that "[b]ased on the court's
limited ruling, we are inclined to believe that the trial court erroneously
concluded that it did not have the authority to reach the discretionary
decision in step two [of the Banks' framework]").
     We affirm Soto's conviction without prejudice to any right he may
have to file a postconviction motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.850 or a petition pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.141(d). We reverse Soto's sentence and remand for a new
sentencing hearing.
     Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded.

SILBERMAN and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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