Court Opinion

ID: 9771794
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:53:36.16115+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:36.857840
License: Public Domain

LEIBSON, Justice,
dissenting.
Respectfully, I dissent.
The defendant was on trial, for a hideous and sensationalistic crime which received wide publicity, in a rural and sparsely populated area. Nevertheless, as does every defendant accused of a criminal offense, he *455had a constitutional right to be tried before a fair and impartial jury and to question the methods being used by the trial court to insure that such a jury is selected.
In order to preserve this basic constitutional right, the Kentucky legislature has statutorily mandated procedures for jury selection which, when followed, guarantee a defendant a trial before an impartial jury drafted from the community by lot rather than a jury of volunteers who may well be acting as vigilantes.
The principal substantial violation in the jury selection procedure was the failure to follow the provisions of KRS 29A.070 and .080 which relate to the use of juror qualification forms. KRS 29A.070 mandates that the circuit judge shall cause the jury qualification forms to be furnished to prospective jurors, who shall complete them faithfully under pain of criminal penalty. It provides a follow-up method to the circuit judge to be sure the completed forms are returned. See also II Ad.Proc., Jury Selection and Management, §§ 9-11.
KRS 29A.080(1) requires the judge to “enter” on the juror disqualification form, as well as on the list of names drawn from the jury wheel, the reasons for disqualification.
KRS 29A.070(7) follows up on this by requiring that the “contents of juror qualification forms shall be made available to parties or their attorneys of record,” with an exception not relevant here.
Thus a written reason, offered by the juror asking to be excused, and the judge’s ruling are both preserved in writing and available to the lawyer so he can verify that the jury panel consists of persons drafted for jury service rather than persons who are volunteers.
No valid reason was given to deny the defendant access to the jury qualification forms. The failure to do so was a substantial defect in the jury selection procedure.
There are two lists of names drawn from the jury wheel in the record, one for April 4 and one for April 18, with incomplete notations on one of the two lists as to the reasons why some of the jurors (not all) were excused. Rather than curing the problem, this exacerbates it. With one list there is no way for defense counsel to know why the jurors were excused. In the second instance, where there are only vague notations, such as “med” by the names of 35 of the 71 excused jurors and “work” by the names of 14 of those excused, there is no way for the lawyer to know what the juror wrote out as the underlying facts which made the offer of a reason to avoid jury service sufficient to excuse him.
Finally, in response to defense counsel’s objection that some jurors were excused in order to keep a medical or dental appointment the judge asked, incredulously, “You don’t want the jurors to keep their doctor appointments and their dental appointments as they accrue ... ?” It is hardly credible that jurors were excused from a month of jury service over the fact of such an appointment, which normally can be easily changed. Once again, this illustrates a lack of substantial compliance with the required jury selection procedures, rather than the opposite.
There is no right more fundamental to the success of the criminal justice system than the right to be tried by an impartial jury. That is the reason for the statutes, and the reason for requiring compliance with those statutes. In Robertson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 597 S.W.2d 864 (1980), we held that a criminal conviction should be reversed where the trial court deviated substantially from statutorily required random jury selection procedures even though the defendant showed no prejudice resulting from the manner in which the jury was selected. If the record is insufficient to show that a violation was only technical, and not substantial, the case should be reversed. The majority opinion erroneously places the burden on the defendant to show that he was prejudiced by some violation.
The court’s error in excusing jurors without adequate cause was compounded by the policy of permitting, but not requiring, jurors who appeared for service one term to volunteer to return at a later term to serve out their “judicial days.” There were 24 volunteer holdover jurors with the nota*456tion “the following are returning from other terms to finish their judicial days.” Seven of these “holdover jurors” served on Smith’s jury. Common sense tells us that individuals who want to keep serving on juries, particularly when a notorious case is coming up for trial, are less likely to constitute a neutral jury. A procedure that requires excused jurors who do not complete their term of service to return to do so at a time specified when they are excused, is acceptable. A procedure that permits jurors to return if they elect to do so, and, even worse, permits them to select them when to return, is not acceptable. It is incumbent upon our Court to stop such a pernicious practice, and to do so right now, and in this case. We are condoning a method of jury selection which is diametrically opposed to the concept of citizens drafted by lot from a cross-section of the community, which is the essential underpinning of the constitutionally protected right to a fair and impartial jury.
Smith requested funds to pay a psychologist or psychiatrist to testify during the death penalty phase in regard to results of earlier testing and to offer expert opinion as to the effect of intoxication and extreme emotional disturbance on Smith at the time of the crime as mitigating circumstances. Five experts were named in the request for funds, including Dr. Gergen, the Commonwealth’s expert. However, the trial court refused to order funds for any other expert except a Dr. Granacher who refused to come to court because an earlier examination was unpaid for.
KRS 31.110(l)(b) provides that indigent defendants are entitled “to be provided with the necessary services and facilities of representation including investigation and other preparation.” Psychiatric or psychological assistance was reasonably necessary to the defense in this capital case. Young v. Commonwealth, Ky., 585 S.W.2d 378 (1979). In fact, by ordering funds to pay Dr. Granacher's fee to testify in court, the trial court determined the necessity of this assistance. At the same time, by limiting the payment of the fee to an expert who clearly was not available to testify, the trial court effectively prevented Smith from obtaining any assistance of an expert at the penalty phase. The establishment of mitigating circumstances at the penalty phase is of the greatest importance when a defendant is facing the death penalty. To deny Smith the means to obtain expert testimony was an abuse of discretion.
Finally, the prosecutor’s closing argument in the penalty phase of the trial went far beyond the duty of a prosecutor to “prosecute with earnestness and vigor” and degenerated into a speech on the prosecutor’s personal moral views. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935). Essentially, much of his argument at the death penalty phase was to effectively tell the jury that “you owe it to me to return the death penalty.” This is a direct violation of the ABA Standards on proper argument.
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.4(e) states that a lawyer “shall not ... in trial ... state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of the accused....”
The trial was held in a rural county and many of the jurors were acquainted with the prosecutor. The prosecutor’s closing argument was tailored to play to a jury composed of personal acquaintances. The defense counsel did not enjoy this particular advantage. Given the impropriety of the closing argument and the resulting recommendation of death, prejudice could be implied. Niemeyer v. Commonwealth, Ky., 533 S.W.2d 218 (1976).
The present case is similar in character to Miracle v. Commonwealth, Ky., 646 S.W.2d 720 (1983), where we held that the error “committed by the manner” in which the jury panel was selected was compounded by the tie-in to the prosecutor’s closing argument, which “removed all doubt.”
I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
LAMBERT, J., joins in this dissent.