Court Opinion

ID: 2964498
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:26:33.073014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:56.716836
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 96-1863
                                   THERESA MARTIN,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,
                                          v.

                              SHAW'S SUPERMARKETS, INC.,
                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                                 ____________________
                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
                 [Hon. Morris E. Lasker,* Senior U.S. District Judge]
                                          __________________________

                                 ____________________
                                        Before

                                 Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________
                            Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________

                              and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
                                          _____________
                                 ____________________

            Scott W.  Lang with whom Susan  Forgue Weiner and  Lang, Xifaras &
            ______________           ____________________      _______________
        Bullard, P.A., Lisa M.  Sheehan, Kate Mitchell & Associates,  Betsy L.
        _____________  ________________  __________________________   ________
        Ehrenberg  and Angoff, Goldman, Manning,  Pyle & Wanger,  P.C. were on
        _________      _______________________________________________
        briefs for appellant.
            Betsy  L.  Ehrenberg  with  whom  Harold  L.  Lichten  and Angoff,
            ____________________              ___________________      _______
        Goldman,
        _______
        Manning,  Pyle &  Wanger,  P.C.  were on  brief  for United  Food  and
        _______   _____________________
        Commercial  Workers Local  Union 791  and National  Employment Lawyers
        Association, Massachusetts Chapter, Amici Curiae.
            Duane R. Batista with whom Sharon  R. Burger and Nutter, McClennen
            ________________           _________________     _________________
        & Fish, LLP were on brief for appellee.
        ___________

                                 ____________________

                                   January 28, 1997
                                 ____________________

                            
        ____________________

        *Of the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

                 BOUDIN,  Circuit  Judge.     This  case,  presenting   a
                          ______________

            difficult  preemption  issue,  began  in  January  1996  when

            Theresa   Martin   sued   Shaw's   Supermarkets,   Inc.,   in

            Massachusetts state  court for  alleged  violations of  state

            employment-compensation laws.   Martin, an employee of Shaw's

            since 1979, had injured her back in August 1994 while working

            as  a bakery clerk.   In September 1994,  she began receiving

            workers'   compensation   benefits   for    temporary   total

            disability.  Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152,   34.

                 In March 1995, Shaw's requested that Martin's physician,

            Dr.  James Coleman, establish any necessary work restrictions

            for  Martin.    Coleman  gave   Shaw's  a  list  of  physical

            restrictions and  indicated that Martin could  return to work

            if  these restrictions  were  respected.   Shaw's then  asked

            Martin  to  see  a  second  doctor.    Based  on  the  second

            examination, Shaw's  offered  Martin four  weeks of  modified

            duty, to be followed by return to her former position without

            restrictions.

                 Martin did not  return to  work.   Instead, through  her

            attorney,  she  again  asked   for  a  position  fitting  the

            restrictions  set  by Coleman.    Shaw's  responded by  again

            offering  Martin  her former  position with  no restrictions.

            When  discussion failed  to resolve  the matter,  Shaw's sent

            Martin  a letter in September 1995 informing her that she was

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            terminated.    The  letter  referred to  Shaw's  "policy  and

            contract language concerning extended periods of absence."

                 On  October 19,  1995,  Martin reapplied  for  full-time

            employment with  Shaw's, requesting  a  position with  duties

            modified as Coleman had recommended.  Shaw's did not respond.

            Later in the month,  Martin's union filed a grievance  on her

            behalf under its collective bargaining agreement with Shaw's,

            alleging  that  Martin  had  been   unjustly  terminated  and

            requesting her reinstatement with reasonable accommodations.

                 Three months  later, Martin filed the  present action in

            Massachusetts  state court, claiming that Shaw's had violated

            Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152,    75A, 75B(2), by failing to rehire

            her.  These sections  provide, respectively, that an employee

            who lost  her job as a  result of compensable injury  must be

            given rehiring  preference by  the former employer  over non-

            employee  applicants, id.    75A,  and that  no employer  may
                                  ___

            refuse  to hire an  employee because she  asserted a workers'

            compensation  claim, id.    75B(2).   Martin's  suit did  not
                                 ___

            contest Shaw's right to discharge her  in the first instance.

                 In  March 1996,  Shaw's  removed the  action to  federal

            court,  premising jurisdiction  under 28  U.S.C.   1331,  and

            moved to dismiss,  Fed. R.  Civ. P. 12(b)(6).   The  district

            court  granted Shaw's motion,  agreeing that  Martin's claims

            were  preempted  by  section  301  of  the  Labor  Management

            Relations  Act, 29  U.S.C.   185.   Martin  now  appeals this

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            ruling.   The  sole issue  on appeal  is whether  section 301

            preempts Martin's state-law claims.1 

                 Section  301 modestly  provides  only that  "[s]uits for

            violation  of  contracts  between  an employer  and  a  labor

            organization representing employees  . . . may  be brought in

            any district  court of the United  States having jurisdiction

            of the  parties . . . ."   29 U.S.C.   185.  But jurisdiction

            begat substantive  authority.  In Textile  Workers v. Lincoln
                                              ________________    _______

            Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957), the Supreme Court ruled that
            _____

            this section "authorizes federal courts to  fashion a body of

            federal   law  for  the  enforcement  of  .  .  .  collective

            bargaining agreements."

                 In turn, substantive authority  gave rise to preemption.

            In Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962), the
               _________    _______________

            Supreme Court  held that state  law is displaced  when courts

            are   "called  upon   to   enforce"   collective   bargaining

            agreements, because  those agreements should  be governed  by

            federal  doctrine,  rather  than varying  state  contract-law

            principles.  Then, two decades later,  the Supreme Court said

            that  "the pre-emptive  effect of     301 must  extend beyond

            [state-law]  suits  alleging  contract violations."    Allis-
                                                                   ______

            Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210 (1985).
            ______________    _____

                                
            ____________________

                 1The   asserted   jurisdictional  basis   for  removal--
            preemption--might appear to offend the well-pleaded complaint
            rule,  but where  section  301 preemption  is concerned,  the
            Supreme Court has  held that removal is proper.   Caterpillar
                                                              ___________
            Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1987).
            ____    ________

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                 Just how  far beyond  has never been  precisely settled.

            Allis-Chalmers  preempted  a  state-law  tort  claim  closely
            ______________

            relating  to the  handling  of a  labor-agreement  grievance.

            Shortly thereafter the Court declared that state-law claims--

            seemingly  of  whatever  character--are  preempted   if  they

            "require  construing  the  collective-bargaining  agreement."

            Lingle v. Norge  Div. of Magic Chef, Inc.,  486 U.S. 399, 407
            ______    _______________________________

            (1988).    Yet recently,  the  Supreme  Court cautioned  that

            section 301 "cannot be read broadly to pre-empt nonnegotiable

            rights conferred on individual employees as a matter of state

            law."  Livadas v. Bradshaw, 114 S. Ct. 2068, 2078 (1994).
                   _______    ________

                 Nevertheless, Livadas  repeated the basic test laid down
                               _______

            by  Lingle--namely, that  section  301  preempts a  state-law
                ______

            claim wherever a  court, in passing upon  the asserted state-

            law  claim,  would  be  required  to  interpret  a  plausibly

            disputed  provision of  the collective  bargaining agreement.

            Id.  At first blush,  this might seem a puzzling test:   both
            ___

            state and federal courts have authority to enforce collective

            bargaining agreements,  and so to interpret their provisions.

            See  Charles  Dowd Box  Co. v.  Courtney,  368 U.S.  502, 506
            ___  ______________________     ________

            (1962).

                 The explanation  lies in the Supreme  Court's concern to

            enforce arbitration clauses, almost always a feature of labor

            contracts.  If judges construed labor agreements in the first

            instance, the  Court believed  that  the arbitration  process

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            would be undermined, and there might be divergent readings of

            the  labor  agreement  and  interference  with the  grievance

            process itself.  Livadas, 114 S. Ct. at 2078; Allis-Chalmers,
                             _______                      ______________

            471 U.S. at  219.  Such  an arbitration clause is  present in
                              

            this case.

                 We thus begin  by asking, as we  have done in the  past,

            e.g., Quesnel v. Prudential  Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 8,  10-11 (1st
            ____  _______    ____________________

            Cir.  1995),  whether  resolution  of Martin's  claims  would

            require  an  interpretation   of  the  collective  bargaining

            agreement.    Our   premise  is  that   this  means  a   real
                                                                     ____

            interpretive  dispute  and not  merely  a pretended  dispute.

            Indeed,  the Supreme Court has  said that the  need merely to

            refer  in  passing  to  the agreement  will  not  necessarily

            preempt.  Livadas, 114 S. Ct. at 2078.
                      _______

                 Martin  has alleged  violations of  Mass. Gen.  Laws ch.

            152,     75A, 75B(2).   Section  75A creates  a  priority for

            rehiring:

                 Any  person who has  lost a job  as a result  of an
                 injury  compensable  under  this  chapter  shall be
                 given preference in hiring by the employer for whom
                 he worked  at the  time of compensable  injury over
                 any  persons not  at  the time  of application  for
                 reemployment employed by  such employer;  provided,
                 however, that a suitable job is available.

            The   relevant  portion  of  section  75B(2)--a  conventional

            prohibition against retaliation--states that "[n]o employer .

            .  . shall  . .  .  refuse to  hire  or in  any other  manner

            discriminate against  an employee  because  the employee  has

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            exercised  a  right afforded  by this  [workers compensation]

            chapter."  

                 If the statutes stopped here,  this might be a different

            case.   But  both statutory sections  also contain  a proviso

            that "[i]n the event any right  set forth in this section  is

            inconsistent   with   an  applicable   collective  bargaining

            agreement," the agreement shall prevail.  Id.    75A, 75B(3).
                                                      ___

            Shaw's  argues that  both  of Martin's  statutory claims  are

            inconsistent with  the  labor agreement;  that resolution  of

            this  "inconsistency" charge  requires interpretation  of the

            agreement; and that the  claims are therefore preempted under

            the Supreme Court's own rubric.

                 It is  very doubtful  whether, without  this last-quoted

            proviso,  Shaw's would  have any  plausible claim  of federal

            preemption.    Massachusetts has  an independent  interest in

            regulating  injury compensation; and  apart from the proviso,

            the elements of both Martin's  state-law claims appear to  be

            independent  of bargaining  agreement provisions.   There are

            other types of labor preemption, apart from Lingle's "require
                                                        ______

            construing" test,2  but Shaw's  does not argue  that Martin's

            state claims would be preempted absent the proviso.

                                
            ____________________

                 2Broadly speaking, most cases of preemption in the labor
            field involve  conflict, or potential conflict, between state
            law and federal  labor policy.   But  sometimes the  conflict
            arises out of some source other than the need to  interpret a
            labor  agreement.   E.g.,  Livadas;  San  Diego Bldg.  Trades
                                ____   _______   ________________________
            Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
            _______    ______

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                 Rather, Shaw's argues that Massachusetts has as a matter

            of  state law chosen to make the substantive rights conferred
                          ______

            by the  statutes depend  upon their not  being "inconsistent"

            with  a labor  agreement.   This court  endorsed just  such a

            reading  of the proviso of section 75B, which is identical in

            substance to the provision of section 75A, in Magerer v. John
                                                          _______    ____

            Sexton &  Co., 912  F.2d 525, 529-30  (1st Cir.  1990).   And
            _____________

            Magerer merely holds Massachusetts  to the literal wording of
            _______

            its own statute.

                 The question  remains whether Shaw's  labor agreement is

            colorably  inconsistent  with   Martin's  state-law   claims.

            Shaw's best argument rests  upon the agreement's  "management

            rights" clause, which states that Shaw's has the "sole  right

            to manage its business including . .  . the right[] . . .  to

            hire, assign and promote Employees."  Shaw's says that Martin

            is  a  former  employee  seeking  to  be  rehired,  that  the

            agreement regulates  this  subject (but  not  in a  way  that

            protects Martin in this case), and that in all other respects

            the union has  agreed to management's  right to choose  which

            former employees to rehire.

                 Martin  responds  that  the "management  rights"  clause

            cannot be inconsistent with her state-law claims in this case

            because  she is no longer covered  by the agreement.  Yet the

            agreement  does give  former  Shaw's employees  some specific

            priority  rights to  be rehired.   See  Collective Bargaining
                                               ___

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            Agreement Art. 12(B)  ("Full-time employees laid off  because

            of lack of  work when  no other full-time  work is  available

            shall be offered  part-time work  [if available] .  . .  .").

            And  the "management  rights"  clause by  its terms  embraces

            decisions as to hiring.

                 Martin   next  says   that   Shaw's  employee   handbook

            guarantees  to her  the very  right to  priority  in rehiring

            established  by  section  75A.   The  handbook  does  contain

            language  that  is  fairly  close to  the  rehiring  priority

            contained  in  section  75A,  suggesting  that  Shaw's itself

            treats  this  priority right  (although  not necessarily  the

            protection  against  retaliation)   as  consistent  with  its

            "management rights"  clause.  But for  purposes of construing

            the "management  rights" clause,  the handbook  is at  best a

            gloss.  

                 Whether the handbook does constitute a gloss and, if so,

            what weight it should be given are issues of interpreting the

            collective bargaining  agreement.    The  handbook  may  well

            weaken Shaw's reliance on the "management rights" clause; but

            the  handbook may simply be  a reference to  state law, whose

            application  Shaw's   has  now  rethought  in   the  face  of

            litigation.    To entertain  Martin's state-law  claims would

            still require  a court to  interpret the agreement,  which is

            precisely    what    Supreme    Court   precedents    forbid.

            Accord Magerer, 912 F.2d at 530.
            ______ _______

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                 Martin next asserts that  any waiver of statutory rights

            by  a  union  and   management  in  a  collective  bargaining

            agreement must be "clear and unmistakable."  See Livadas, 114
                                                         ___ _______

            S. Ct. at  2079 (citations omitted).   But Shaw's  preemption

            claim  does   not  depend   upon  a  "waiver"   of  statutory

            protections; indeed,  it is  unclear under  Massachusetts law

            that the statutory protections  can be "waived."  Cf.   Mass.
                                                              ___

            Gen. Laws ch. 152,    75B(3) (limiting waiver).   Rather, the

            statutes  themselves expressly  withhold protection  where it

            would   be  "inconsistent"  with  labor  agreements,  without

            requiring the inconsistency to be "clear and unmistakable."

                 We conclude  that under Supreme Court  and First Circuit

            precedent, Martin's state law claims are preempted.  This  is

            not   because   the   collective   bargaining   agreement  is
                                                                       __

            inconsistent with  the state claims asserted,  but because it

            may be so  and requires interpretation.   We could  ourselves
            ___

            remove the doubt by interpreting the agreement one way or the

            other, but  this course has  been foreclosed in  deference to

            the arbitration clause.   As  all of this  appears to  follow

            logically,  the question  remains  why the  outcome may  seem

            faintly troubling.

                 One  reason  is that  Massachusetts'  statutory proviso,

            making  the  rights  conferred  yield  to inconsistent  labor

            agreements,   may  be   producing   some  results   that  the

            legislature  did not intend.   When the statutes were enacted

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            in December  1985, Massachusetts might have  thought that the

            proviso  was necessary to  avoid preemption;  the legislature
                                       _____

            might  be   chagrined  to  discover  that   the  proviso  has

            unnecessarily curtailed workers' rights.  But this is at best

            a  debatable  inference,3  and   we  have  found  no  helpful

            legislative history. 

                 Possibly, the proviso could be construed to require more

            than  mere inconsistency.  Or  a state court  could hold that

            the rights conferred yield only to highly specific provisions

            in a labor agreement and not to a generic "management rights"

            clause.  But both readings would ignore the explicit language

            of the proviso.  Perhaps the state did intend to defer to the

            labor agreement even where it assisted the employer.  Despite

            the clear warning sent by  Magerer in 1990, Massachusetts has
                                       _______

            not chosen to amend the statutes.

                 The  other reason why the  outcome may seem troubling is

            that it could result in Martin having no claim at all against

            Shaw's,  even for  retaliation.   This charge is,  of course,

            merely  an  allegation;  but  even  if   it  proved  to  have

            substance, it  would be  preempted because of  the collective

                                
            ____________________

                 3Shortly  before  the  legislature acted  in  1985,  the
            Supreme  Court made clear that section 301 does not "give the
            substantive  provisions  of private  agreements the  force of
            federal  law,  ousting  any  inconsistent  state regulation."
            Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 212.   See also Metropolitan Life
            ______________                     ________ _________________
            Ins.  Co.  v.  Massachusetts,  471 U.S.  724,  755-56  (1985)
            _________      _____________
            (holding that state mandated-benefits laws were not generally
            preempted).

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            bargaining  agreement,  and  yet  the  agreement  may  itself

            provide no  remedy.   Preemption sometimes does  result in  a

            complete denial of remedies for obvious wrong, e.g., Smith v.
                                                           ____  _____

            Dunham-Busch, Inc., 959 F.2d  6, 11 (2d Cir. 1992),  but this
            __________________

            is not a result one eagerly embraces.  

                 Various possibilities may cushion  this outcome.  If the

            employee  handbook is  a gloss  on the  collective bargaining
                               __

            agreement,  perhaps  the language  already mentioned  may not

            only  defeat the  "management rights"  defense but  also give

            rise to affirmative obligations  on the part of  the employer

            enforceable through  arbitration.   Or,  perhaps  arbitration

            would yield a definitive  ruling that the "management rights"

            clause,  and any other clause  relied upon by  Shaw's, is not

            "inconsistent" with  the rights  contingently secured  by the

            statutes.  

                 If all  else  fails,  the union  is  free  to  negotiate

            language that eliminates this issue  the next time it  renews

            its  labor  agreement.     The  parties  entered  the current

            agreement in 1994,  well after Magerer  was decided, but  the
                                           _______

            absence of such language  in the present agreement may  be an

            oversight.  All that  it would take to prevent  preemption is

            an explicit  provision stating that nothing  in the agreement

            is intended to create management rights inconsistent with any

            workers' rights under sections 75A and 75B.

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                 Finally, in a reply  brief, Martin and her  union (which

            appears as an amicus  and has ably supported Martin)  offer a

            preemption  claim of their own.   They say  that a discharged

            non-union  worker could invoke the Massachusetts statutes and

            that  by allowing  the  collective  bargaining  agreement  to

            extinguish   Martin's   rights,  the   Massachusetts  proviso

            discriminates against  members or  former members  of unions,

            thereby  offending federal  labor  policy.   This, they  say,

            Livadas itself forbids.
            _______

                 Livadas  struck down  a  state  administrative  practice
                 _______

            because it effectively discriminated against union members as

            compared  with   non-members,  114  S.  Ct.   at  2074-75,  a

            preemption theory that  has nothing to  do with section  301.

            On the reasoning of Livadas, Massachusetts arguably could not
                                _______

            provide  that  a  rehiring   priority,  or  a  claim  against

            retaliation, would be made available only to workers who were

            not  members of  a union.   But  here Massachusetts  has done

            nothing of the kind.

                 Instead, the  proviso in  question permits the  union on

            behalf of its members to craft its own regime (the agreement)

            and  in it,  either to  preserve or  displace another  regime

            (specified provisions of  state law).   Viewed in the  large,

            there  is no discrimination  whatever against  union members;

            Massachusetts  simply allows  the  union to  negotiate for  a

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            different  package of benefits.  Next time, as we have noted,

            the union is free to bargain differently.

                 Affirmed.
                 ________

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