Court Opinion

ID: 9884577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:02:25.789856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:39.513203
License: Public Domain

Mr. Chief Justice Underwood, dissenting: I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the convictions for escape and theft cannot both stand. The Criminal Code provides: “When a person shall have been convicted of two or more offenses which did not result from the same conduct, either before or after sentence has been pronounced upon him for either, the court in its discretion may order that the term of imprisonment upon any one of the convictions may commence at the expiration of the term of imprisonment upon any other of the offenses.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 38, par. 1 — y(m), (emphasis supplied).) “Conduct” is defined in the Code as: “An act or series of acts, and the accompanying mental state.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 38, par. 2 — 4.) As discussed in Article 4 of the Code, “mental state” is the intent, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence with which a person acts in the commission of an offense. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 38, pars. 4 — 3 to 4 — 7.) The purport of subsection 1 — 7(m) is thus to permit consecutive sentences for multiple convictions which did not result from “the same act or series of acts, committed with the accompanying mental state” necessary to constitute the commission of an offense. Notwithstanding the purport of the statute, however, there has been confusion in its interpretation and application. The committee comments to subsection 1 — 7(m) state that: “ ‘Conduct’ is defined in section 2 — 4 and is used in the sense of ‘the same transaction’ discussed in Schlenger. [People v. Schlenger, 13 Ill.2d 63].” The Schlenger case reversed a conviction for grand larceny which was based on the same facts as a conviction of the same defendant for armed robbery. The court in Schlenger also referred to earlier cases which had characterized convictions for burglary and larceny as being based upon the “same transaction”. (See People v. Griffin, 402 Ill. 247; People v. McMullen, 400 Ill. 253; People v. Fitzgerald, 297 Ill. 264.) The committee comments have led to erroneous and unjustified interpretations of subsection (m), as represented by the majority opinion here. While it may be conceded that both Whittington’s escape and his theft of a car were part of the “same transaction”, there is no statutory authority which precludes conviction for two offenses which occur in the “same transaction”. The statute speaks much more narrowly, precluding only consecutive sentences where the offenses are a part of the same “conduct”. Were the committee comments correct, the decision of this court in People v. Lacey, ante, at 219 would be clearly wrong. In Lacey, we affirmed multiple convictions for burglary and theft without mention of the so-called “same transaction” rule, which the majority adopts in this case. If the statute prohibits conviction, as well as consecutive sentencing, Lacey is surely a more appropriate instance for its application than Whittington, for in Lacey the offenses, i.e., burglary-theft, are precisely those which the committee comments suggest as being the origin of the “same transaction” rule. I am compelled to dissent from what I consider to be the majority’s inconsistent and incorrect decision in this case, and shall discuss the statutory framework as I am convinced it should be interpreted. We have had no difficulty with the situations in which a single act is involved and have consistently disallowed multiple convictions in such cases. (See, e.g., People v. Stewart, 45 Ill.2d 310 (aggravated battery-attempted robbery) ; People v. Scott, 43 Ill.2d 135 (burglary with intent to commit theft — burglary with intent to commit rape— burglary with intent to commit deviate sexual conduct) ; People v. Duszkewycz, 27 Ill.2d 257 (rape-incest) ; People v. Schlenger, 13 Ill.2d 63 (armed robbery-grand larceny.) All of these cases, cited for support in the majority opinion, are single act situations. (See also, Chicago v. Hill, 40 Ill.2d 130, (disorderly conduct-obstructing traffic.) The confusion in this area arises where there is more than one act. In People v. Ritchie, 66 Ill. App. 2d 302, the Fourth District Appellate Court cited the committee comments to subsection (m) and held that convictions and concurrent sentences for both rape and burglary with intent to commit rape could not be sustained since they arose out of the “same conduct or transaction.” The rape in that case occurred after defendant’s forcible entry of the victim’s house trailer. The validity of this decision has been questioned by this court on two occasions. (See People v. Ritchie, 36 Ill.2d 392, 397; People v. Raby, 40 Ill.2d 392, 404.) In Ritchie, we found the State’s argument that the two convictions should be affirmed “convincing”, but held that the issue was no properly before us on review. However, in People v. Johnson, 44 Ill.2d 463, we considered this precise question and decided it directly contrary to the appellate court decision in Ritchie: Johnson, like Ritchie, involved multiple convictions and concurrent sentencing for rape and burglary. The defendant in that case argued for a broad construction of the statutory words, “same conduct” to mean the “same general transaction.” The court rejected this construction in “situations in which more than one offense arises from a series of closely related acts and the crimes are clearly distinct and require different elements of proof.” We held further in Johnson that rape and burglary are “separate and distinct crimes requiring entirely different elements of proof to sustain them. The rape has no necessary connection with the burglary as is evident when we stop to consider that the burglary was complete before the defendants laid a hand on the victim.” The same reasoning is directly applicable to the instant case. Whittington’s theft of a state-owned car occurred prior to his escape. The offense of theft occurs whenever a person knowingly “obtains or exerts unauthorized control over property of the owner” and “intends to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 38, par. 16 — 1 (a) and 1(d)(1).) Certainly the commission of the theft was instrumental in Whittington’s escape; yet it is a curious sort of reasoning which leads the majority to conclude from that fact alone that the defendant cannot be convicted for the theft. Had the escape been thwarted, the offense of theft would have been no less complete. Had Whittington been forced to abandon the stolen car prior to his escape, and nevertheless succeeded in escaping afoot, the two offenses would clearly be separate. But here, where Whittington was successful in escaping with the stolen car, the majority rewards his total success by finding conviction for the distinct crime of theft to be impermissible. Wholly apart from being, in my judgment, an incorrect interpretation of the statutory provisions, the result here is undesirable for it seems to say to prisoners contemplating escape that, “If your escape is successful, all lesser offenses which have aided your escape are unpunishable,” thereby encouraging the commission of the lesser offenses. I think the clear language of the statute prohibits this interpretation and that the recent holding of this court in Johnson, demands a contrary ruling in this case. I would restate the approach set forth in Johnson as follows : A series of acts should be treated as a single act until an additional factor is introduced which was previously absent, and which is an essential element necessary for the proof of a separate offense. That is, when more than one act and more than one offense are involved, and proof of the separate offense requires proof of at least one additional essential element, which was not in existence at the time of the first offense, then the offenses are separable and convictions may be had and sentences imposed on both. This test necessarily rejects a previous suggestion that the test in multiple conviction cases ought to be whether the offenses were “independently motivated.” (People v. Stewart, 45 Ill.2d 310.) The statutory definition of conduct includes “a series of acts with the accompanying mental state.” This is quite different from saying “a series of acts with the same underlying motivation,” as the former language envisages a breaking of the series of acts into separate and distinct offenses when additional elements of such further offenses are introduced with the accompanying mental state. An approach which focuses on the defendant’s underlying motivation allows an inmate to steal a state-owned vehicle or render a prison guard unconscious in his effort to escape, and conviction could be had only for the offense of escape if his ultimate motivation was simply to escape. The vice of that rationale, in addition to its departure from the statute, is, as earlier indicated, that it actually encourages the commission of lesser offenses in order to accomplish the greater. Section 3 — 3 of the Criminal Code provides further indication that the statutory framework has been misconstrued by the majority. Subsections (a) and (b) of section 3 — 3 set forth the framework which should clearly control in this case. “(a) When the same conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of more than one offense, the defendant may be prosecuted for each such offense. “(b) If the several offenses are known to the proper prosecuting officer at the time of commencing the prosecution and are within the jurisdiction of a single court, they must be prosecuted in a single prosecution, except as provided in Subsection (c), if they are based on the same act. “(c) When 2 or more offenses are charged as required by Subsection (b), the court in the interest of justice may order that one or more of such charges shall be tried separately.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 38, pars. 3 — 3(a) and (b). The committee comments disclose the consideration and rejection by the committee of a compromise suggestion which would have prohibited further prosecutions where the initial prosecution results in a conviction, “thus permitting only one sentence for a single course of conduct.” (Committe Comments, S.H.A., 1964, ch. 30, § 3 — 3, p. 130.) Therefore, under paragraph (a) as adopted, a defendant may be convicted and sentenced separately for each such offense based upon the “same conduct”. Paragraph (b) provides that several offenses must be prosecuted in a single prosecution only if they are based on the “same act”. Sections 3 — 3 and 1 — 7(m), read together, outline the legislature’s general plan with regard to multiple prosecutions and sentencing. When several offenses are based on the same act by defendant they must be combined in a single prosecution and only one conviction and sentence may be imposed. When several offenses are based on the “same conduct” [series of acts] of defendant he may be convicted of each, but only concurrent sentences may be imposed. When several offenses are not based upon the “same conduct”, they may be prosecuted separately and sentences may be' concurrent or consecutive. I believe the majority opinion perpetuates a misconception of the statutory provisions and overlooks the interpretation adopted in Johnson. This result is unjustified as a matter of law, and undesirable in its result. I would affirm both convictions. Culbertson and Crees, JJ., join in this dissent.