Court Opinion

ID: 9482731
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:59:12.065116+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:10.634018
License: Public Domain

GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. Irrespective of whether the occupational restriction is a technical “upward departure” from the sentencing range under the guidelines, the Bums requirement that the court must give notice to the defendant before the sentencing hearing applies in this case. An occupational restriction is a significant deprivation of a liberty interest — -just as is an extended sentence to prison not authorized by the guidelines. The Burns court recognized that for a defendant to take advantage of his right to comment before sentence on the appropriateness of a departure, he must be notified that the court is contemplating such a departure. Burns, 111 S.Ct. at 2186. Surely, it follows that in order for a defendant to comment effectively on an occupational restriction — a factually complex issue with myriad economic ramifications — he should be notified that the court is contemplating such a restriction before the sentencing hearing so that he may effectively prepare his comments.
The government argues that the defendant has such notice, because an occupational restriction is one of the conditions of supervised release authorized by the guidelines. I am unpersuaded. The court may impose numerous conditions of supervised release on the defendant under the guidelines. The guidelines are, therefore, not effective notice to the defendant that the court is actually contemplating any particular restriction, or indeed, any restriction at all. At most, the guidelines provide notice that the court may be contemplating one, or several, restrictions. Under the government’s argument, it is left to the defendant to guess which, if any, will be applied and which he must address in his allocution. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Bums recognized that absent notice that the court was going to depart from the guidelines, the defendant would be forced to anticipate and negate in a random and wasteful manner “every conceivable ground on which the district court might choose to de-part_” Id. at 2187. Clearly, that rationale applies here.
The majority argues that the defendant has several opportunities to attack the occupational restriction once it has been proposed. The majority points out that counsel can request a continuance for further preparation, counsel can move for reconsideration or modification after the sentence is imposed, and counsel can appeal the sentence. The majority argues that forcing the district court to provide notice before the sentencing hearing that it is considering an occupational restriction would be wasteful, given that the defendant has other opportunities to comment on the condition. The majority, however, does not offer any explanation as to why providing notice would be such a burden to the court or, contrary to the reasoning in Bums, why it would be a wasteful procedure.
It seems to me that the means by which the majority allows allocution are more burdensome than providing notice. If notice were required before the sentencing hearing and the defendant given an opportunity to comment effectively on the restriction, the district court’s decision would be better informed and less likely to be challenged afterward in the manner suggested by the majority. This case is such an example: a notice requirement might have prevented the district court from imposing the occupational restriction that the majority now finds it necessary to reverse. Furthermore, not only would the notice requirement be a more efficient means of allocution by allowing the defendant to effectively comment at the sentencing hearing, the notice requirement would also protect the defendant’s due process rights to a greater extent than the means suggested *521by the majority because those means arise after the sentence has already been imposed.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.