Court Opinion

ID: 9653085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:38:28.416914+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:56.355369
License: Public Domain

PARKER, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I cannot give my assent to the proposition that a federal court is powerless to grant relief to one who has been injured as the result of another’s abuse of the privileges of a suitor of that eourt. The power to administer justice as a court carries with it, as a necessary incident, the power to afford adequate redress for the abuse of the process or procedure of the eourt; and it is manifest that adequate redress involves the power to award money damages as well as to punish for contempt. Hughes Federal Practice, vol. 1, p. 449, § 580. An action for filing a libelous pleading is one growing out of the abuse of the procedure of the court; and the right to recover in such action involves necessarily the rules of practice of the court, whether embodied in formal written rules or in the court’s decisions. I think, therefore, that such action must be held to be one arising under the laws of the United States within the mean-; *650ing of the jurisdictional statute; that it may be instituted originally in the federal courts; and that, if instituted in a state court, it is removable into the federal courts under the statutes permitting the. removal of causes.
■ In reaching this conclusion two questions must be considered: (1) Whether an action for damages on account of a libelous statement contained in a pleading filed in a federal court is an action arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) whether the fact that the libelous statement was contained in the pleading is a part of the cause of action asserted or whether it is merely a matter of defense upon which the defendant may rely. I shall consider these questions separately.
On the first question, it must be remembered that a case is said to arise under the Constitution and laws of the United States, not only where demand is made for something conferred by them, but also wherever it appears that the correct decision of the ease depends on the construction of a law of the United States or that some title, right, privilege, or immunity on which the recovery depends will be defeated by one .construction of th"e law or sustained by the opposite construction. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 379, 5 L. Ed. 257; Osborn v. United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, 821, 6 L. Ed. 204; Little York Gold Washing & Water Co., v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199, 201, 24 L. Ed. 656; Starin v. New York, 115 U. S. 248, 257, 6 S. Ct. 28, 29 L. Ed. 388; Patton v. Brady, 184 U. S. 608, 611, 22 S. Ct. 493, 46 L. Ed. 713; Germania Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 119 U. S. 473, 476, 7 S. Ct: 260, 30 L. Ed. 461; Ray v. Poulnot (D. C.) 46 F. (2d) 677. And it must be remembered also that, if the right asserted by plaintiff is dependent upon, the construction placed upon a law of the United States, it does not defeat the jurisdiction that plaintiff’s, right may depend also upon application to the case pf principles of the common law. Southern By. Co. v. Prescott, 240 U. S. 632, 640, 36 S. Ct: 469, 60 L. Ed. 836; Bellaire, Benwood & Wheeling Ferry Co. v. Interstate Bridge Co. (C. C. A. 4th) 40 F.(2d) 323, 326. The rule as to this was thus-stated by Chief Justice Marshall in Osbom v. United States Bank, supra:
“We ask, then, if it can be sufficient to exclude this jurisdiction, that the ease involves questions depending on general principles? A cause may depend on several questions of fact and law. Some of these may depend on the construction of a law of the United States; others on principles unconnected with that law. If it be a sufficient foundation for jurisdiction, that the title.-or right set up by the party, may be defeated by one construction of the constitution or law of the United States, and sustained by the opposite construction, provided the facts necessary to support the action be made out, then all the other questions must be decided as incidental to this, which gives that jurisdiction. Those other questions cannot arrest the proceedings. Under this construction, the judicial power of the Union extends, effectively and beneficially, to that most important class of cases, which depend on the character of the cause. On the opposite construction, the judicial power never can be extended to a whole case, as expressed by the constitution, but to those parts of cases only which present the particular question involving the construction of the constitution or the law. ■ We say, it never can be extended to the whole case, because, if the circumstance that other points are involved in it, shall disable congress from authorizing the courts of the Union to take jurisdiction of the original cause, it equally disables congress from authorizing those courts to take jurisdiction of the whole cause, on an appeal, and thus will be restricted to a single question in that cause; and words obviously intended to secure to those who claim rights under the constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, a trial in the federal courts, will be restricted to the insecure remedy of an appeal, upon an insulated point, after it has received that shape which may be given to it by another tribunal, into which he is forced against his will. We think, then, that when a question to which the judicial power ’of the Union is extended by the constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of congress to give the circuit courts jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of fact or of law may be involved in it.”
The inquiry on the first question, then, narrows itself to this: Does the right to recover damages for the filing of a libelous pleading in the federal court depend upon any law of the United States.? Will the right upon which the recovery depends be defeated by one construction of the law of the United States or sustained by another? I think that this question must be answered in the affirmative. There is, of course, no federal statute giving a right of recovery for libel; but the rights and liabilities of litigants with respect to filing pleadings in the federal court are determined by the law -of the United States and not of the states, and that law must be looked to for the purpose of determining whether a pleading, filed in such court is permitted by *651the rules of practice'there prevailing, and, if not, whether the party who filed it may be ealled to answer in damages for so doing.
The suggestion of the majority, that' the right of plaintiff to recover in no wise depends upon the existence of the federal court but that the false statements would have been actionable if the court had not been validly created, is beside the point. As a matter of fact, the statements relied on are alleged to have been made in a pleading filed in the federal court; and the right to file that pleading depended upon a federal statute, what might properly be inserted in it depended upon the rules of the federal court, and whether the person filing it might be held accountable in damages depended upon the rights of litigants in the federal courts as determined by those courts in the exercise of powers granted them by the Constitution of the United States. A rule of court has the force and' effect of law. Weil v. Neary, 278 U. S. 160, 169, 49 S. Ct. 144, 73 L. Ed. 243; Rio Grande Irrigation & Colonization Co. v. Gildersleeve, 174 U. S. 603, 608, 19 S. Ct. 761, 43 L. Ed. 1103. And it is not necessary that the rules of court be written, for established practice has the same force and effect as a rule. Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. U. S., 288 U. S. 294, 325, 53 S. Ct. 350, 77 L. Ed. 796; Duncan v. U. S., 7 Pet. 435, 451, 8 L, Ed. 739.
Whether a person may be held liable in damages for statements contained in pleadings filed in court or whether such statements are absolutely privileged is a matter as to which there has been a conflict in the decisions. The English courts hold to the rule of absolute privilege, and this rule is followed in a number of the state courts in this country. 36 C. J. 1254, and cases there cited. The federal courts hold to the rule of qualified privilege. White v. Nieholls, 3. How. 266, 11 L. Ed. 591; Nalle v. Oyster, 230 U. S. 165, 33 S. Ct. 1043, 57 L. Ed. 1439; Anonymous v. Trenkman (C. C. A. 2d) 48 F.(2d) .571; Young v. Young, 57 App. D. C. 157, 18 F. (2d) 807. These decisions prescribe the rule of practice and lay down the rule of liability for litigants in the federal courts. The rule thus prescribed is just as binding on the courts as though prescribed by Act of Congress; and it is difficult to see why a cause of action depending upon the application of this rule does not arise under a law of the United States within the meaning of the decisions to which I have referred. It is true, of course, that, a ease does not arise under a law of the United States because a decision of the United States courts is relied upon by one of the parties. But these decisions which fix the liability for acts done in the course of litigation in the federal courts are more than mere decisions on the rule of privilege applied in actions foT libel. They fix the limits of proper practice in the federal courts and lay down the principles upon which- litigants in- those courts will be held to liability for. abuse of their •privileges as litigants. Litigants in the federal courts have a right to rely on the rules so established irrespective of what rules may prevail in the state courts; and a denial to the federal courts of the power to establish such rules would be a denial to them of the inherent power of all courts to control the proceedings before them. Abbott v. National Bank of Commerce of Tacoma, 175 U. S. 409, 20 S. Ct. 153, 44 L. Ed. 217, is in no sense a decision to the contrary. That was a writ of error to review a decision of the Supreme Court óf Washington which affirmed a judgment of the lower court dismissing a suit for libel on the ground that, an allegedly libelous statement contained in an answer filed in a suit in a federal court was privileged. Before the Supreme Court of the United States it was argued that there was error in the judgment of the state court: (1) Because it deprived plaintiff of property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) because it held that the federal court had jurisdiction'of the cause in which the allegedly libelous pleading was filed; (3) because it held that the matter contained in the pleading was privileged; and (4) because it held that such matter was pertinent and .material to the issue in that suit. The language which the majority thinks decisive of the ease here was used in disposing of the point raised under the Fourteenth Amendment. It was not-held in that ease that the question raised as to the jurisdiction of the federal court was not a federal question, but merely that the decision of the state court thereon was not reviewable under the applicable statute. See 175 U. S. at pages 412 and 413, 20 S. Ct. 153, 44 L. Ed. 217.
While the exact question here presented has not been before the courts in any reported case, a number of eases involve questions of very similar character. Thus in Bock v. Perkins, 139 U. S. 628, 11 S. Ct. 677, 35 L. Ed. 314, a marshal of the United States was sued in trespass for seizing property of plaintiff under a writ of attachment directed to him by a federal court. . It was held that he was entitled to remove the case into the federal court as a case arising under the laws of the United States. The court said: “A case, therefore, depending upon the inquiry whether a marshal or his deputy has rightfully executed a lawful precept directed to the former from a court of the United States is one arising un*652der the laws of the United States; for, as this court has said, ‘eases arising under the laws of the United States are such as grow out of the legislation of congress, whether they constitute the right or privilege, or claim or protection, or defense of the party, in whole or in part, by whom they are asserted.’ ” While this case dealt with the right of removal as it existed prior to the statute of 1887-88, and may not be in point as to whether the plaintiff’s case as distinguished from the defendants’ defense arose under the laws of the United States, it is direct authority for the position that a question arises under the laws of the United States when those laws must be looked to for determining the rights of the parties. Whether the federal question in the case at bar arises on the plaintiff’s ease or is a mere matter of defense is dealt with later in this opinion.
In Howard v. United States, 184 U. S. 676, 22 S. Ct. 543, 546, 46 L. Ed. 754, it was held that a suit could be instituted in .a federal court on a bond given by the clerk of that court, on the ground that such suit arose under the laws of the United States. The court, speaking through Mr. Justice Harlan, said: “The suit was directly upon a bond taken by the circuit court in conformity with the statutes of the United States, and the case depends upon the scope and effect of that bond and the meaning of those statutes. It was therefore a suit arising under the laws of the United States, of which the circuit court (concurrently with the courts of the state) was entitled to take original cognizance, even if the parties had been citizens of the same state.” Certainly the cause of action on a bond arises out of the contract therein contained just as truly as a cause of action for libel arises out of a libelous statement; and it can be just as truly said that the obligation of the bond exists irrespective of where it is filed as that the liability for libel exists irrespective of where the libelous statement is filed. But, as pointed out by the Supreme Court, the bond was taken pursuant to statute and the rights and liabilities thereunder are to be determined by the federal law; and in the ease at bar the pleading was filed pursuant to federal statute, the Conformity Act, and the rights and liabilities of the parties with respect thereto are to be determined by the federal law. It would seem that there is as much reason for holding that a cause of action with respect thereto arises under the laws of the United States in the one ease as in the other.
On similar principles it has been held that actions may be removed to the federal courts as arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, where the cause of action alleged was wrongfully causing a United States marshal to levy execution on plaintiff’s chattels [Hurst v. Cobb (C. C.) 61 F. 1], where a United States District Attorney was charged with malicious prosecution for causing the indictment and arrest of plaintiff under a criminal charge [Eighmy v. Poucher (C. C.) 83 F. 855], where a warden of a federal prison was sued by a prisoner for damages on account of personal injury resulting from negligence [Steele v. Halligan (D. C.) 229 F. 1011], and where defendants were sued for malicious prosecution oh account of alleged false testimony given before a grand jury and on trial in court [Rury v. Gandy (D. C.) 12 F.(2d) 620, 621], In Young & Jones v. Hiawatha Gin & Mfg. Co. (D. C.) 17 F.(2d) 193, a suit was held removable as arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, where it was brought to recover the value of cotton which had been burned in a warehouse licensed under the United States Warehouse Act (see 7 USCA § 241 et seq.).
In Rury v. Gandy, supra, Judge Cushman, in holding that the^ federal courts had jurisdiction of a suit for malicious prosecution arising out of a prosecution in the federal courts, said:
“Fundamentally, there are the same reasons for maintaining the jurisdiction in the present case that exist in an ancillary cause or in a ease of contempt of court, which latter is in its nature an ancillary proceeding. That with which the defendants are here charged is, in its nature, a contempt of court ; and the court should and does have jurisdiction, not only that it may give a remedy for the wrong, in the accomplishment of which, it is alleged, the court’s power has been used —power given and defined by national law— but the court has jurisdiction because of that public policy under which every government must be vigilant to see that those who, like the defendants, have been witnesses for the government in a criminal cause, are not wrongfully made to suffer because of that fact. Whether as complainants and witnesses before a grand jury of a court of the Unit-, ed States defendants violated the laws of the United States and perjured themselves, and thereby worked their malice upon the plaintiff, presents a federal question.”
The reasoning of Judge Cushman in this ease seems to me to be unanswerable, and it applies with equal force to the ease at bar; for there can be no difference in principle in holding a witness liable for damages for instituting a prosecution and giving testimony *653in a federal court and in holding a party liable for damages for filing in the federal court a pleading containing libelous and irrelevant statements. In both cases what the defendants are charged with is in its nature a contempt of court, and the court should have jurisdiction, not only that it may give an adequate remedy for the wrong in the perpetration of which the procedure of the court has been used, but also that it may protect litigants who have invoked its jurisdiction and who otherwise may be made to suffer because of that fact.
• The proposition that a libelous statement in a pleading in a federal court is to be dealt with just as though it had been made anywhere else, and that no question with respect thereto arises under the federal law because of its incorporation in a pleading filed pursuant to the practice of the federal courts, would necessarily lead to results entirely out of harmony with the whole theory of federal judicial power. Libel is a crime at common law and under the laws of most, if not all, of the states. In South Carolina it is made criminal by section (326)17 of the Criminal Code of 1922. If the proposition above stated be accepted as the law, it follows that the state may prosecute in its courts a litigant in a federal court for statements contained in a pleading filed in accordance with the rules of that court, and thus a pleading which the federal court might hold proper could serve as the basis of punishment in the state courts. Again, the state rule with respect to the privilege attaching to pleadings might vary from the federal rule, as it does in some of the states, and a litigant might find himself powerless to obtain redress for a wrong done him when judged by the federal rule, or might be held to liability for an act which the federal rule might justify as proper. Again, responsibility for libel under state laws is controlled by the Legislature; and the federal court might find itself powerless to afford adequate redress to persons aggrieved by wrongful acts done in the course of proceedings before it, or to afford adequate protection to litigants complying with its rules, because of the libel laws of the state. It will not do to say that the remedy in such cases is found in review of the state courts by the Supreme Court°of the United States under writ of certiorari; for, if no federal question is presented by reason of the fact that the alleged libelous pleading was filed in the federal court, then, of course, the Supreme Court has no right of review by eertiorari or otherwise.
I come then to the second question, viz., whether the fact that the libelous statement was contained in a pleading filed in the federal court is a part of the cause of action asserted or whether it is a mere matter of defense upon which the defendant may rely. This question is of importance because a ease is held to arise under the Constitution and laws of the United States only where plaintiff’s statement of his own cause of action shows that it does so arise, and that it is not sufficient that the defendant may find in the Constitution or laws of the United States some ground of defense. In re Winn, 213 U. S. 458, 29 S. Ct. 515, 53 L. Ed. 873; Venner v. New York Central R. Co. (C. C. A. 6th) 293 F. 373. It seems to me to be clear, however, that the federal question here is inherent in plaintiff’s cause of action. There can be no libel without a publication; and the only publication alleged is the filing of the pleading containing the alleged libel in a suit in a federal court. Plaintiff, therefore, has no cause of action except such as is dependent upon the procedure, the rules, and the practice of the federal courts. To use the language of Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn v. Bank of United States,.the federal question forms an “ingredient” of the cause.
It is true that in the law of libel and slander, privilege is ordinarily a defense to be established by the defendant; but this is not the case where the publication relied upon is in a court proceeding. In such case the burden rests upon the plaintiff to allege and show that the alleged libelous statement was not privileged under the rules and practice of the court. 37 C. J. 33; Miller v. Gust, 71 Wash. 139, 127 P. 845, 846; Hartung v. Shaw, 130 Mich. 177, 89 N. W. 701, 702; Mower v. Watson, 11 Vt. 536, 34 Am. Dee. 704; Liles v. Gaster, 42 Ohio St. 631; Cooper v. Phipps, 24 Or. 357, 33 P. 985, 22 L. R. A. 836; Calkins v. Sumner, 13 Wis. 193, 80 Am. Dec. 738. The reason for this distinction is well stated by the Wisconsin court in the case last cited as follows:
“Although where the words used are actionable in themselves, the law ordinarily implies malice from the act of speaking or writing them, and distinct proof of malice is not required; yet when they are written or spoken by parties, counsel, witnesses, jurors or judges in the course of a judicial proceeding, they are prima facie privileged. The circumstances under which they are thus spoken or written exclude the legal notion of malice, and it lies with the party complaining to establish that they were not pertinent or material to the subject in controversy, and that the speaker or writer was animated by ill-will and hatred. This principle is vindicated by the adjudications upon the subject, and is consistent with reason. For it would be ex*654tremely inconsistent, and I might say absurd, for'the law to presume that judicial proceedings of any Mnd are resorted to for the mere purpose of enabling parties to indulge their malice and utter slanders, and not in good faith, to attain some legitimate end, or to perform some lawfulaet or duty, which is useful and beneficial to themselves or others. On the contrary, the presumption is very strong, that persons so situated are using legal proceedings for proper purposes, and that what is said or done proceeds from sufficient cause and right motives-; and when that which thus transpires may constitute the basis of an action at all, it is only upon the ground that there is proof of express malice, and that the person complained of has availed himself of his position to gratify his malevolence, by defamatory expressions against parties or others, whieh have no connection with or bearing upon the subject under investigation.”
The Supreme Court of Washington, in Miller v. Gust, supra, in upholding a demurrer to a complaint alleging libel in a pleading filed in. court, said:
“The complaint before us does not charge that the allegations complained of, as found either in the offending complaint or in the affidavit, were not relevant and pertinent to the cause or subject there under inquiry. The very nature of that action invites the presumption that they were relevant and pertinent. Their relevancy and pertinency in that case constitute the one dominant, issuable fact in this ease, not the truth, falsity, or maliciousness of the words.”
And in Hartung v. Shaw, supra, the Supreme Court of Michigan, in sustaining a judgment on the ground that a declaration alleging libel in a pleading did not state a cause of action, said:
“Where a party shows in his declaration a publication presumptively privileged, it is his duty, in order to recover, to prove that the words spoken were not pertinent or relevant, and that they were not spoken bona fide. Mower v. Watson, 11 Vt. 536, 34 Am. Dec. 704; Henry v. Moberly, 6 Ind. App. 490', 33 N. E. 981; McNabb v. Heal, 88 Ill. App. 571; Johnson v. Brown, 13 W. Va. 71. If it be necessary to prove this, it is equally necessary to allege it.”
And Corpus Juris, vol. 37, p. 33, thus states the rule:
“Where the action is based on defamatory matter published in due course of a judicial proceeding, if the relevancy of the matter and its pertinency to the sub ject of inquiry are necessary in order to confer the privilege, its irrelevancy and impertineney must be alleged, and the facts showing the irrelevancy alleged should be set up in the declaration.”
To conclude, it seems clear to me that the allegation that the alleged libelous pleading was filed in the federal court was a necessary allegation of plaintiff’s cause of action, and not a mere matter of defense; that whether such allegation stated a cause of action depended upon the'statutes and rules of practice regulating procedure in the federal courts and the rule of those courts as to liability for libelous statements contained in pleadings; that a federal question was raised for this reason, as well as because the action was' an attempt to obtain redress for alleged abuse of the privileges of a litigant in the federal courts; and that as the right of plaintiff to relief depended upon the determination of this federal question, the action was properly removed into the court below. As was well said by the learned judge of that court :
“The decision in the case will involve the question of the jurisdiction of a court of the United States; the powers and functions of that court; and the rights, duties, and privileges of a litigant therein. If those questions do not arise out of the laws of the United States, then they do not arise out of any laws. All the powers and functions of a federal court arise from federal statutes and the Constitution of the United States, and likewise all the rights, duties, and privileges of a litigant in that court flow from and are protected by the laws of the United States. The mere fact that questions as to those rights and privileges may depend for their solution upon an application of the common law in no way negatives the proposition that the rights and privileges claimed flow from and arise out of the laws and Constitution of the United States.” 06 F.(2d) 162, 163.
If the case here is not removable to the federal courts, this must be so because it might not have been' brought in the federal courts in the first instance; and to deny the federal courts jurisdiction in such a case is to deny them power to afford redress to one who has suffered through abuse of their process or procedure. It cannot be that they are lacking in this fundamental power of all courts. Although the jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited, their power within the limits of that jurisdiction is plenary; and I cannot think that they are without power either to afford relief to those who have suffered through abuse of their process or procedure or to afford protection to suitors who are alleged to have been guilty of such abuse when called in question therefor elsewhere.
The idea that abuses of the process of the *655federal courts, or wrongful acts done in the course of judicial proceedings before them, can be redressed only .by the state courts, would strip the federal courts of a power essential to the maintenance of their power and dignity as courts. To visualize what this would mean, as a practical matter, one has only to remember the varying state enactments on the subject of libel and the varying procedures followed by the different state courts for- the redress of grievances. Litigants in the federal courts might well hesitate in the assertion of their rights, if faeed with the possibility of being called in question in other courts for acts done there and of having their liability therefor determined under the rules and procedure'of such other courts. I do not think that either principle or authority supports the rule which would deny to the federal courts a power so necessary to the proper discharge of their duties and the protection of litigants before them.