Court Opinion

ID: 9611040
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:51:16.680103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:08.812782
License: Public Domain

BURNETT, Judge,
concurring specially:
Our decision conforms to a long line of authority in Idaho, holding that in a sex offense prosecution, evidence of other sexual misconduct with the victim or with third persons may be admissible for the purpose of corroboration. As illustrated by the cases we cite, such evidence may also tend to prove other allegations, such as intent or a common scheme. But the evidence can be highly prejudicial. A trial court must weigh, in each case, the probative value of the evidence against its likely prejudicial impact.
This balancing decision may be profoundly affected, in the future, by our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Byers, 102 Idaho 159, 627 P.2d 788 (1981). In Byers the court abolished the absolute requirement of corroboration in sex offense cases. Demise of the corroboration requirement is widely expected to encourage legitimate prosecutions. Byers, 102 Idaho at 162, 627 P.2d at 791. However, a more subtle effect may be to focus critical attention on the probative value of evidence of other sexual misconduct. The prosecution may no longer justify introduction of such evidence on the ground that it is relevant to a required showing of corroboration.
Idaho trial courts now should take a fresh look at the balance between probative value and prejudicial impact. We have noted in our decision that evidence of other crimes generally is not admissible to prove the offense charged. A person who committed other crimes might have been more likely to commit the crime in question; but the probative value of such evidence usually is outweighed by the unfair prejudice to the defendant. We have outlined the principal exceptions to this general rule. These exceptions are grounded in specific elements of proof of the crime charged. Evidence admissible under the exceptions must serve a genuine purpose other than suggesting that the defendant probably committed the crime charged because he committed other crimes. See McCormick on Evidence (2d Ed. 1972), § 190, at 447.
Sex offense cases, particularly those involving children, are emotionally explosive. The potential for runaway prejudice is great. However, these cases often are shrouded by layers of complex human relationships and behavior patterns that must be fully understood in order to establish the elements of the crimes charged.
In such circumstances, it will be especially crucial to identify the true purpose for which evidence of other sexual misconduct is offered. Purposes such as showing intent or proving a common scheme can no longer “tag along” with corroboration. They should be examined on their own merits and weighed directly against the prejudicial impact. In the post-Byers era, there will be no easy answers.