Court Opinion

ID: 9849493
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:40:57.529032+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:24.173469
License: Public Domain

Shanahan, J.,
dissenting.
The majority promulgates a procedural precept: no bifurcation (disposition of issues in separate trials). We have moved from disapproval of bifurcation in Humphrey v. Humphrey, 215 Neb. 664, 340 N.W.2d 381 (1983), to prohibition in Gerber.
The majority requires that atrial court must have disposed of *232every issue arising out of a dissolution proceeding before there is a final or appealable order. Consequently, whether a marriage is irretrievably broken, issues with respect to children (custody, visitation, and support) and issues involving alimony and marital property are absolutely inseparable and require collective disposition in order that a decree be subject to appellate review. However, we are overlooking the fact that those issues mentioned are distinct and essentially severable in a dissolution proceeding so that separate disposition is possible.
Bearing in mind that the Legislature has prescribed the statutory format for dissolution proceedings, there is no statutory prohibition of bifurcation in Nebraska’s dissolution statutes. To the contrary, our statutes permit discretionary bifurcation; for example, “When dissolution of a marriage or legal separation is decreed, the court may include such orders in relation to any minor children and their maintenance as shall be justified” (emphasis supplied) (Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-364 (Cum. Supp. 1982)); and “When dissolution of a marriage is decreed, the court may order payment of such alimony by one party to the other and division of property as may be reasonable” (emphasis supplied) (Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Cum. Supp. 1982)).
Other jurisdictions with dissolution statutes similar to Nebraska law have construed such statutes as discretionary permission for bifurcation. See, Putnam v. Fanning, 495 S.W.2d 175 (Ky. 1973); Drew v. Drew, 309 Minn. 577, 244 N.W.2d 491 (1976); In re Marriage of Fink, 54 Cal. App. 3d 357, 126 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1976); Hyman v. Hyman, 310 So. 2d 378 (Fla. App. 1975). One does not have to strain the imagination to envision situations where the best interests of the children or parties would be more suitably served through bifurcation, or where failure to bifurcate will work unnecessary hardship on those affected by a dissolution. Bifurcation should not occur merely for convenience of the litigants. Nevertheless, because there will be as many and varied situations as there are people involved in dissolutions, separate and final disposition of issues should be allowed in exceptional cases at the discretion and sound judgment of the district courts upon a showing of good cause. Prohibition of bifurcation presents a tidy and *233ordered judicial package, but people affected by dissolutions do not always have lives in a tidy and ordered package. A monolithic judicial mandate against bifurcation may ultimately become a source of hardship and more hurt in already painful situations.