Court Opinion

ID: 9554287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-08 17:00:53.368797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:24.199703
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        AUG 8 2023
                                                                     MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL ISIDORO SANCHEZ,                        No.   21-15632

                Petitioner-Appellee,            D.C. No. 4:17-cv-00224-RM

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
DAVID SHINN, Director of the Arizona
Department of Corrections; ATTORNEY
GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF
ARIZONA,

                Respondents-Appellants.

MICHAEL ISIDORO SANCHEZ,                        No.   21-16940

                Petitioner-Appellant,           D.C. No. 4:17-cv-00224-RM

 v.

DAVID SHINN, Director, Director of the
Arizona Department of Corrections;
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE
OF ARIZONA,

                Respondents-Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Arizona
                   Rosemary Márquez, District Judge, Presiding

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
                       Argued and Submitted April 18, 2023
                                Phoenix, Arizona

Before: OWENS and BADE, Circuit Judges, and BAKER,** International Trade
Judge.

      In this habeas action, David Shinn, in his capacity as the Director of the

Arizona Department of Corrections, timely appeals the district court’s order

holding that the state’s post-conviction relief (PCR) procedures for pleading

defendants are unconstitutional under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

Michael Sanchez timely cross-appeals the denial of his motion seeking immediate

release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).

      In state trial court, Sanchez pleaded guilty to one count of sexual contact

with a minor and one count of attempted sexual contact with a minor. The court

accepted his plea and sentenced him to prison accordingly. After his guilty plea

and conviction, Sanchez filed three separate PCR proceedings under Arizona Rule

of Criminal Procedure 32.4. In each of these proceedings, the court appointed

separate PCR counsel, and each appointed counsel found that there were no

colorable claims for relief and then remained in an advisory capacity only. In the

first and second PCR proceedings, Sanchez filed a pro se petition. The state trial

and appellate courts rejected his claims. In his third PCR proceeding, rather than

      **
             The Honorable M. Miller Baker, Judge for the United States Court of
International Trade, sitting by designation.

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filing a pro se petition, Sanchez moved for appointment of new PCR counsel and

raised an Anders argument for the first time. He contended that his third PCR

proceeding violated Anders because Rule 32 did not require the post-conviction

court to independently review the record for error. The state trial court denied

relief.

          On appeal, Sanchez reiterated his Anders challenge to his third PCR

proceeding. He additionally moved to supplement his petition for review and

argued that both his first and second PCR proceedings also violated Anders. The

state appellate court rejected his Anders challenge to his third PCR proceeding,

reasoning that it had previously “determined Anders review is not required for

pleading defendants” in State v. Chavez, 407 P.3d 85 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017)

(Chavez I)). The court did not, however, expressly address his Anders challenge to

his first and second PCR proceedings.

          Sanchez sought federal habeas relief in the district court, contending that the

state trial court did not comply with Anders in his first PCR proceeding. The

district court concluded that the Arizona appellate court erred in rejecting

Sanchez’s claim because of-right PCR petitions are the “functional equivalent of

first appeals as of right, a federal constitutional right to counsel exists during such

proceedings, and Anders safeguards are required.” The district court granted a

conditional writ ordering Sanchez’s release unless he was permitted to file a new

                                             3
PCR proceeding. Sanchez moved to convert the conditional writ to an

unconditional writ on the theory that the state had a duty to initiate his PCR

proceeding. The district court denied his motion. Sanchez appealed the district

court’s order denying the motion to convert, and Shinn appealed the order granting

conditional habeas relief.

      We review a district court’s grant or denial of a petition for writ of habeas

corpus de novo. Jones v. Taylor, 763 F.3d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 2014).

      1. Shinn argues that Sanchez did not exhaust his Anders claim. But we

conclude that Sanchez exhausted that claim by presenting it to the Arizona Court

of Appeals, where he cited “federal or state case law”—Anders—“that engages in a

federal constitutional analysis.” Fields v. Waddington, 401 F.3d 1018, 1021 (9th

Cir. 2005).

      Shinn further argues that Sanchez’s Anders claim is procedurally defaulted

because the state appellate court concluded that “Sanchez has not identified any

claim raisable in this untimely and successive proceeding.” Because the state court

did not expressly base its Anders holding on a procedural rule, we construe it “as

acting on the merits of [the] claim.” Chambers v. McDaniel, 549 F.3d 1191, 1197

(9th Cir. 2008); see also Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989) (highlighting

that a state court must “clearly and expressly state that its judgment rests on a state

                                           4
procedural bar”) (cleaned up). Thus, there is no procedural bar to our reaching

Sanchez’s Anders claim.

      2. Although the state appellate court did not expressly address Sanchez’s

Anders claim as it applied to his first and second PCR proceedings and instead

limited its discussion to his Anders challenge to his third PCR proceeding, we

“presume that the [former] claim was adjudicated on the merits.” Johnson v.

Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 301 (2013). Although “that presumption can in some

limited circumstances be rebutted,” id., we do not think it has been rebutted here.

Sanchez presented two similar Anders claims to the state appellate court, and “[t]he

possibility that the [state appellate court] had simply overlooked [Sanchez’s other

Anders claims]” was not raised by either party. Id. at 306. Moreover, “the fact that

[Sanchez’s three Anders] claims are so similar makes it unlikely that the [state

appellate court] decided one while overlooking the other[s].” Id. at 305.

      3. The district court erred in concluding that the state appellate court ruled

that Anders does not apply in PCR proceedings. The state appellate court followed

Chavez I, which we held “correctly found Anders applies to of-right PCR

proceedings.” Chavez v. Brnovich, 42 F.4th 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2022) (Chavez II).

      The district court further erred in not giving the required deference to the

state appellate court decision under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (providing that habeas relief may not be

                                          5
granted to applicants detained under state law unless the state court’s merits

determination “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States . . . .”). In Chavez II, the defendant similarly

brought an Anders claim after filing a Rule 32 PCR petition. We held that Chavez I

“did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law, as it could have

reasonably determined that Arizona’s of-right PCR procedure satisfied Anders and

its progeny.” 42 F.4th at 1103. Because the state appellate court here followed

Chavez I, we follow Chavez II and hold that the state appellate court could have

reasonably determined that “Arizona’s of-right PCR procedure satisfied Anders

and its progeny.” Id.

      For these reasons, we reverse the district court’s grant of conditional habeas

relief. We also dismiss Sanchez’s cross-appeal as moot.1

      In No. 21-15632, REVERSED. In No. 21-16940, DISMISSED as MOOT.

      1
       We grant Sanchez’s motion (Dkt. No. 24) to take judicial notice of
amendments related to Rule 32, and we deny Shinn’s motion (Dkt. No. 34-1) to
supplement the record as moot.

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