Court Opinion

ID: 9583855
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:42:36.445517+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:48.835286
License: Public Domain

ELLETT, Justice
(concurring in result) :
I agree that it is not necessary to make DeWayne Construction Company, employer of the plaintiff, a party to this action. The percentage of its negligence (which seems to be great) can be determined without its being a party to the cause.
Its negligence and the amount thereof is necessary however, in arriving at the proper judgment against the two remaining defendants.1 A judgment against those defendants will determine what the percentage of any judgment against them will be; and in case one defendant is compelled to pay more than its share, the statute on contribution among tort-feasors 2 would enable the proper adjustment to be made.
I do not agree that the driver of the truck in which plaintiff was riding cannot be a “joint tort-feasor” with the defendants. A jury may well find that he was negligent and that his negligence was a proximate cause of the accident.
I do agree that the comparative negligence law did not repeal the exemption from suit given an employer who furnishes workmen’s compensation insurance.
In the instant matter there is no claim made by the railroad that the plaintiff himself was negligent, in any particular. Even if the employer of the plaintiff were left in the case, the result would not be changed from what it would be by leaving it out.
Suppose the court finds that the employer was 90 per cent negligent and each defendant was 5 per cent negligent. That finding can be made whether or not the employer is left in the case. If it is in the case, the court would not render any judgment against it because of the provisions of the statute regarding workmen’s compensation.3
Since the negligence of each of the defendants is greater than that of the plaintiff, the plaintiff would recover a judgment against each defendant. However, the court would apportion the percentage of liability of each defendant to be 50 per cent for the reason that no judgment can be rendered against the employer of the plaintiff and the two defendants are equally at fault in causing the harm to the plaintiff.
Since the employer has no liability to the plaintiff it was immaterial whether or not it was brought into the case. The judgment of the trial court was proper and I therefore concur in affirming it. However, since no judgment could have been
*120rendered against the employer, I can see no reason for this appeal and so I would not award any costs in the matter.
MAUGHAN, Justice
(concurring):
In concurring, I reserve for future determination the following issue: Whether an employer who may have been negligent, concurrently causing the injuries to the employee, is entitled to reimbursement for compensation payments, pursuant to 35 — 1— 62(2), U.C.A.1953.

.78-27-38, U.C.A.1953; (Ch. 209, Sec. 2, L.Ut.1973).

. 78-27-40, 41, U.C.A.1953; (Ch. 209, Secs. 3 and 4, L.Ut.1973).

. 35-1-60, U.C.A.1953.