Court Opinion

ID: 9696721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:56:00.289227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:25.942620
License: Public Domain

BROWN, Vice Chancellor
(Concurring) :
I concur with the majority in the decision reached on reargument, but I do so for a different reason. As noted in the first footnote to the foregoing opinion upon the petition for reargument, the trial judge elected not to be bound by the ruling of the judge who presided at the initial suppression hearing, but proceeded, over the objection of the State, to conduct his own hearing out of the presence of the jury on the issue of whether or not there was probable cause to sustain the arrest. The same police officer again offered the only testimony on this issue, and as a result the trial judge made his own finding of probable cause. His action in conducting his own hearing is perhaps understandable since he did not have the transcript of the first hearing available to him at the time. Presumably j as trial judge and being confronted with having to make an instant decision he chose to assume responsibility for all aspects of the case rather than to rely on the pretrial decision of a fellow judge based on facts and testimony not before him for examination. Whatever the reason, however, and regardless of the merit of such action, the fact remains that, in my opinion, the trial judge elected not to be bound by the prior finding of probable cause.
As a general rule, the pretrial ruling of one judge ordinarily becomes the law of the case in that court, and one judge of a court should not ordinarily review or disturb the rulings of another judge of the same court in the same case. However, although the judge before whom the later proceedings are had may adopt the ruling or decision of his predecessor in the case, he is not absolutely bound to follow it. 21 *915C.J.S. Courts § 195, p. 340; 132 A.L.R. 52, 68; Hall, et al. Modern Criminal Procedures 681-683.
It seems clear to me from the record that the trial judge adopted this latter alternative, and thereby removed the evidence of the first hearing from the consideration of this Court on appeal. In the absence of later discovered evidence or other circumstances warranting a new hearing, I feel that there should be one ruling on the issue of probable cause for purposes of an appeal, not two. For instance, where would we be if we were to find sufficient evidence to show probable cause at the first hearing, but not at the second ?
I therefore do not consider it necessary to review the decision of the judge who presided at the first hearing. I feel that the decision of the trial judge resulting from the second hearing is the one which must pass muster on appeal. Since I have previously agreed that his finding of probable cause was not supported by the evidence. I must still cast my lot for reversal of the conviction for the reasons set forth in the original opinion of this Court.