Court Opinion

ID: 9645475
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:26:18.638286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:28.672552
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION
HAMILTON, Justice.
I respectfully dissent.
On the state of the record in this case I think the trial court entered a correct judgment, and I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals. In the first place, I know of no sound reason why a Defendant cannot confess liability at any time before final judgment. Second, I cannot agree that the granting of the judgment notwithstanding certain jury findings has the legal effect of severing the issues of damages from the issues of liability so as to make applicable this Court’s holdings in the cases of Waples-Platter Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 156 Tex. 234, 294 S.W.2d 375 (1956); and Iley v. Hughes, 158 Tex. 362, 311 S.W.2d 648, 85 A.L.R.2d 1 (1958). Such a judgment may be wrong because there is evidence to support the disregarded jury findings, but it should not be wrong because the judgment has the legal effect of severing the liability issues from the damage issues.
I agree with the Court that if the Respondent’s admission of liability is ignored there is evidence to support the jury findings on liability, but I do say that the Petitioners have never in the trial court, the Court of Civil Appeals, or in this Court attacked the judgment on that ground. In fact, Petitioners have at all times contended that there was no evidence to support the findings of the jury on the liability issues. Petitioners in their brief before the Court of Civil Appeals, in its argument under a jury misconduct point makes this statement:
“The jury returns a verdict on liability contrary to all the evidence, and even contrary to the judicial admissions of appellee that he could not avoid the collision although he had applied his brakes for possibly 90 feet, and he admitted that the speed he was traveling prevented him from avoiding the collision.”
Whatever may be said about the judgment entered by the court, it was the identical judgment requested by both parties at one time or another, and if ever a trial court could be safe in entering a judgment it should have been in this situation. After the verdict came in and before judgment, *703Petitioners filed a motion to disregard the findings on the liability of the Defendant (Issues 1, 3 and 5), and having done so, to declare a mistrial, and in the alternative to enter judgment for the Petitioners in the amount of damages found by the jury, plus the amount of property damages as stipulated by the parties.
As a basis for this alternative request they stated in their motion that each of the liability Issues 1, 3 and 5, should be disregarded “when considered as a whole for the undisputed facts of this case, reflects as a matter of law that the Defendant was guilty of one or more of such facts of negligence, and that same was the proximate cause of the collision.” This motion of the Petitioners was overruled by the trial court and judgment was entered on the verdict for the Defendant.
Petitioners amended motion for new trial states in regard to Issue No. I:
“The Court erred in refusing to disregard the negative finding of the jury to Issue No. 1, and in denying plaintiff a judgment based thereon, for each of the following separately assigned reasons”:
“ * * * ” (Here follows a statement of facts supporting such contention.)
In regard to Issue Number V the motion states:
“The Court erred in failing to disregard the finding of the jury to Issue No. 5, and in denying recovery of damages based thereon, for each of the following separately assigned reasons”:
“ * * * ” (Here follows a statement of facts supporting such contention.)
It thus appears that Petitioners at all times, up until the very time the judgment was entered for them, were maintaining that they were entitled to judgment for the damages found by the jury, plus those, as stipulated. Here the Petitioners sought two inconsistent methods of relief and the Respondent requested that one of them be granted. The trial judge granted that relief on which both concurred. Therefore, Petitioner may not complain of the denial of the other, for if there was any error in granting the judgment entered, it was invited error. Harris v. Christianson-Keithley Co., 303 S.W.2d 422, 427-428 (Tex.Civ.App.1957, error ref’d n.r.e.).
I would affirm the judgments of the Court of Civil Appeals and of the trial court.