Court Opinion

ID: 9790547
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:54:48.27024+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:30.126260
License: Public Domain

*395NEWMAN, J.
Defendant appeals her conviction for carrying a concealed weapon. ORS 166.240. She challenges the court’s denial of her pretrial motion to suppress evidence, arguing that the search of her purse and seizure of a pistol from it by an employe of a detoxification center violated her right against unreasonable searches and seizures under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. We reverse.
Defendant was one of three passengers in a car stopped by a Multnomah County Deputy Sheriff, because the driver had committed a traffic violation. The officer detected the odor of alcohol on the driver’s breath and administered field sobriety tests. The officer also detected alcohol on defendant’s breath and, when she failed to follow his instructions, he placed her under a civil hold for intoxication. The officer took her to the Hooper Detoxification Center (Center) and turned her over to the night supervisor.
As part of the regular intake procedure, Center personnel ask certain medical questions and tell admittees that they must give up their shoes, belts and valuables. They place valuables in a drop box in the admitting area and also perform a cursory search for any medication which may affect the admittee’s condition. The night supervisor testified at the suppression hearing that defendant answered questions adequately and that he had no reason to believe that she was in medical danger. His only recollection about her condition was that she was “very emotionally upset.” He searched her purse and discovered a small pistol wrapped in a purple cloth. The Center released her shortly thereafter, and the police arrested her for carrying a concealed weapon.
At trial, defendant moved to suppress the pistol. She argued that the civil hold was illegal and, in the alternative, that even if her detention was legal, the search was not. The court held that the officer acted within his discretion in holding defendant. As for the search, it made the following findings:
“1) Defendant was not under arrest for a crime;
“2) There was no probable cause or reasonable suspicion that defendant committed any crime;
“3) There was no emergency;
*396“4) That this search could not have been performed by a police officer;
“5) There is insufficient evidence of ‘state action’ so as to make this search unconstitutional.”
On the basis of finding 5, it denied the motion.
Defendant does not argue that the court erred when it concluded that the civil hold was legal, but that the search violated her rights under Article I, section 9. In response, the state argues that there was no “state action” and, therefore, no constitutional violation. Alternatively, it argues that, even if there was state action, the search was permissible.
Article I, section 9,1 is a limit on “state action,” and it does not apply to searches or seizures by private persons acting on their own volition. State of Oregon v. Olsen, 212 Or 191, 317 P2d 938 (1957); State v. Padilla, 9 Or App 162, 496 P2d 256 (1972). When, however, private parties act at the behest of the state or under the mantle of its authority, their actions are subject to constitutional limitations. State v. Lowry, 37 Or App 641, 588, P2d 623 (1978), rev den 285 Or 195 (1979).
“No hard and fast rule has been established for determining when official involvement is sufficient to bring the exclusionary rule into effect. Each case must be evaluated on its own facts.” State v. Lowry, supra, 37 Or App at 652.
The state argues that, because “there was no police involvement in the search, the exclusionary rule does not apply.” The argument is not persuasive. Defendant is not complaining of some wrong arising out of her voluntary association with the Center, but rather of actions that the Center took without her consent pursuant to statutory authority. She need not show that the actions of the Center are state action for all purposes, but only for the search of her *397purse.2 Although the police were not directly involved in the search, there was sufficient “official involvement” in it to constitute state action. A police officer took defendant into custody and transported her to the Center pursuant to ORS 426.460(1).3 She was not free to leave, nor did she consent to the search. In detaining, questioning and searching defendant, Center personnel were implementing the legislative directive of ORS 426.460(2)4 and were exercising authority that the statute gave them. In conducting the search of defendant’s purse, they were acting under authority of the state and were, therefore, bringing governmental compulsion to bear on her. They had authority over defendant similar to what the police would have had if the police had searched her purse. Under the circumstances here, the search was state action.
Other courts have reached the same conclusion under analogous circumstances. In People v. Zelinski, 24 Cal 3d 357, 594 P2d 1000 (1979), the California Supreme Court held that, when private security personnel conduct a search or seizure while engaged in a statutorily authorized citizen’s arrest and detention of a person, they are state actors. The court stated *398that the search was an “integral part of the exercise of sovereignty allowed by the state to private citizens” and that “[i]n arresting the offender, the store employees were utilizing the coercive power of the state to further a state interest.”
“Persons so acting should be subject to the constitutional proscriptions that secure an individual’s right to privacy, for their actions are taken pursuant to statutory authority to promote a state interest in bringing offenders to public accounting. Unrestrained, such action would subvert state authority in defiance of its established limits. It would destroy the protection those carefully defined limits were intended to afford to everyone, the guilty and innocent alike. It would afford de facto authorizations for searches and seizures incident to arrests or detentions made by private individuals that even peace officers are not authorized to make. Accordingly, we hold that * * * the state involvement is sufficient for the court to enforce the proper exercise of that power by excluding the fruits of illegal abuse thereof.” 24 Cal 3d at 367. (Footnotes and citations omitted.)
Similarly, federal courts have found state action in searches by an airline employe, United States v. Davis, 482 F2d 893 (9th Cir 1973), and by employes of a private corporation which was under contract with the government to manage the Sinai peacekeeping force. Dobyns v. E-Systems, Inc., 667 F2d 1219 (5th Cir 1982).
Because we find that there was state action, we must next decide whether the search violated the prohibition in Article, I, section 9, against “unreasonable” searches and seizures. In a line of cases beginning with State v. Newman, 292 Or 216, 637 P2d 143 (1981), the Supreme Court and this court have attempted to define the permissible scope of searches incident to a civil detoxification hold under ORS 426.460. In Newman, the court held that, in a nonemergency situation, a police officer’s search, without a warrant, of the purse of an intoxicated person for identification at the time the person is taken into custody for transportation to a treatment or holding facility is “unreasonable” and violates Article I, section 9. The officer did not arrest the defendant at any time before the search or act on probable cause. The court stated:
“The purpose of a purse or handbag is to carry personal things. An individual’s expectation of privacy in a purse is *399probably greater than in any other property except the clothing worn by a person. We do not think it was necessary for the police officer to know the name of the person that he was going to transport to the treatment or holding facility.” 292 Or at 222.
As the court stated, “[t]he test of each step in the police procedure [in dealing with an intoxicated person in a noncriminal setting] is reasonableness.” 292 Or at 224. Because the search was “unnecessary,” the court held it to be “unreasonable.”
In State v. Lawrence, 58 Or App 423, 648 P2d 1332, rev den 293 Or 801 (1982), and State v. Keyes, 61 Or App 434, 657 P2d 724 (1983), we applied Newman to strike down searches incident to civil holds. In Lawrence, the police took the defendant into civil custody because he was intoxicated and transported him to jail because the alcoholic treatment facility was full. At the jail, the defendant was put through the booking process, which was the same process as for persons charged with crime. The police inventoried the defendant’s property and found LSD in a closed container in his jacket. We held that the police could not open a closed container seized from the intoxicated defendant “when the purpose of doing so is to detect evidence of crime rather than to aid the person.” 58 Or App at 426. Moreover, we stated:
“Nonetheless, defendant was taken into custody in a noncriminal, nonemergency situation, as was the defendant in State v. Newman, 292 Or 216, 637 P2d 143 (1981), cert den 457 US 1111 (1982). In Newman, the court held that a search of the defendant’s purse for identification at the scene of the stop was unreasonable, because it was not necessary to know her identify in order to take her to the holding facility as authorized by ORS 426.460. That reasoning strongly suggests that there was no necessity here for the police to search defendant’s person or property at the scene, other than for their own safety if that was a concern. However, it is not that search, but the later one at the jail for the purpose of inventorying his belongings, that is challenged here.
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“* * * [T]he inventory process in noncriminal, non-emergency cases should be less intrusive than that considered reasonable in criminal cases.” 58 Or App at 428, 431.
In State v. Keyes, supra, the police took the visibly *400intoxicated defendant into custody and to the booking facility because they believed that the city’s treatment facility would not accept him because of the late hour. Before placing the defendant in the patrol car, the police patted him down and found no weapon but did find cocaine in his sports jacket. We held that a search of the defendant’s clothing was unreasonable when the initial “patdown” indicated that he was not carrying a weapon. We explained:
“In State v. Lawrence, supra, 58 Or App at 430, we pointed out that what may be reasonable police procedure with respect to a person under criminal arrest may not be so with respect to one under a ‘civil hold.’ The purpose of ORS 426.460 is to protect intoxicated persons. In dicta in Lawrence we said:
‘[I]t would seem reasonable for an officer taking an intoxicated person into custody to conduct a limited “patdown search” for weapons to ensure the safety of the officer, if the officer has a legitimate concern.’ 58 Or App at 430.
“We adhere to that view. However, that was not the kind of search conducted in the present case. There was no difference between this search and one conducted pursuant to a criminal arrest. The interior and exterior pockets of defendant’s clothing were searched for contraband as well as weapons. Given the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Newman that the search of defendant’s purse at the scene of the stop was unreasonable, because it was unnecessary to know her identify in order to take her to a holding facility, we similarly hold in this case that it was unnecessary to determine at the time of the stop whether defendant possessed contraband and to search the interior of defendant’s pockets for a weapon when a ‘patdown’ furnished no basis to believe there was one.” 61 Or App at 437. (Citation and footnote omitted.)
See also State v. Perry, 298 Or 21, 688 P2d 827 (1984).
The state argues that this case is distinguishable from those cited above, because the search here had a legitimate purpose: namely, to find out if defendant had ingested any drugs which might affect treatment. It argues:
“It was necessary to conduct a search rather than just asking defendant if she had taken any drugs because: (1) she had been taken into custody because of her intoxication and, therefore, the answers she might have given would not be reliable; and *401(2) she might have lied about the ingestion of illegal substances. Clearly, a search of defendant’s purse for this purpose was reasonable.”
 We disagree. “[A] person is entitled to a greater expectation of privacy in a civil hold situation than he is in a criminal case.” State v. Perry, supra, 298 Or at 28. Here, there was no probable cause or even reasonable suspicion before the search that defendant had committed any crime. A search of a civil hold detainee is reasonable only if it is necessary to effectuate the purpose of ORS 426.460 to protect the intoxicated person. State v. Lawrence, supra, 58 Or App at 430. Although the search of defendant’s purse was consonant with defendant’s civil hold status, that is, it was for treatment purposes, it was not necessary to accomplish that purpose. There was no emergency. Nothing in defendant’s symptoms suggested that she needed treatment beyond detention. Moreover, there was no evidence that defendant was unwilling or unable to answer questions concerning other drugs that she might have been using. Assuming that there may be circumstances in which it would be necessary to search a detainee’s purse for treatment purposes, the circumstances were not present here. A contrary result would be inconsistent with the greater expectation of privacy associated with the civil hold status. The search here was unnecessary and, therefore, unreasonable. The court erred in denying the motion to suppress.5
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

 Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution provides:
“No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.”

 On this record, we do not need to decide whether the Center is an entity whose actions are state action for all purposes. Accordingly, the issue here is not the same as the issue in the “state action” cases that the state relies upon: Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 US 830, 102 S Ct 2764, 73 L Ed 2d 418 (1982) (whether an employe of a private institution for maladjusted youth would be entitled to bring an action under 42 USC § 1983 for wrongful discharge); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 US 991, 102 S Ct 2777, 73 L Ed 2d 534 (1982) (whether the discharge of a patient who had voluntarily sought treatment at a private nursing facility would involve state action).

 ORS 426.460(1) provides:
“Any person who is intoxicated or under the influence of controlled substances in a public place may be taken or sent home or to a treatment facility by the police. However, if the person is incapacitated, the health of the person appears to be in immediate danger, or the police have reasonable cause to believe the person is dangerous to self or to any other person, the person shall be taken by the police to an appropriate treatment facility. A person shall be deemed incapacitated when in the opinion of the police officer or director of the treatment facility the person is unable to make a rational decision as to acceptance of assistance.”

 ORS 426.460(2) provides:
“The director of the treatment facility shall determine whether a person shall be admitted as a patient, or referred to another treatment facility or denied referral or admission. If the person is incapacitated or the health of the person appears to be in immediate danger, or if the director has reasonable cause to believe the person is dangerous to self or to any other person, the person must be admitted. The person shall be discharged within 48 hours unless the person has applied for voluntary admission to the treatment facility.”

 The state relies on State v. Marsh, 1 Or App 351, 462 P2d 459 (1969), where the defendant was taken into custody under ORS 426.215(1) and transported to the police emergency hospital. We upheld the seizure of a packaged substance from the defendant as reasonably related to diagnosing or treating his apparent mental or physical condition. We said that the prompt identification of the substance seized might be the key to effective emergency treatment. The defendant actually needed treatment (he was not released from hospital confinement for 20 days) and was emotionally disturbed to an extent that it was reasonable to believe that he could not be trusted to answer correctly questions concerning that treatment. On the other hand, defendant here did not receive treatment at the Center and was released only minutes after the search.