Court Opinion

ID: 9524612
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:54:59.708371+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:11:10.982150
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MILLER, dissenting: Because I believe that the imposition of a $40 marriage license fee does not significantly interfere with a decision as important as whether to marry and that the legislature, in enacting the statute in question, could have found a reasonable relationship between the purposes of the Act and the means and the classification used to achieve those purposes, I dissent from the majority opinion. A. Strict-Scrutiny Analysis Although marriage undoubtedly is a fundamental right (see Loving v. Virginia (1967), 388 U.S. 1, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1010, 87 S. Ct. 1817), not every restriction on marriage is subject to strict-scrutiny analysis. “[Rjeasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship” may be imposed without rigorous scrutiny by the courts. (Zablocki v. Redhail (1978), 434 U.S. 374, 386, 54 L. Ed. 2d 618, 631, 98 S. Ct. 673, 681; Moran v. Beyer (7th Cir. 1984), 734 F.2d 1245, 1246-47.) I do not believe that a State’s decision to impose a $40 fee on marriage licenses for the purpose, in part, of funding the Domestic Violence Shelter and Service Fund (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, par. 2403) significantly interferes with a decision to marry, and none of the parties contesting the fee raise that claim. In Califano v. Jobst (1977), 434 U.S. 47, 54 L. Ed. 2d 228, 98 S. Ct. 95, the Supreme Court refused to review under the strict-scrutiny test a Federal statute providing that social security beneficiaries permanently lost their benefits if they married nonbeneficiaries. Beneficiaries retained their benefits, however, if they married persons who also received social security benefits. The court unanimously held that strict-scrutiny analysis was inapplicable to review of the Federal provision, even though some persons who might otherwise have married were deterred from marriage by the rule. The court found that the law terminating benefits upon marriage did not interfere with the individual's freedom to make a decision as important as the decision to marry. (434 U.S. 47, 54, 54 L. Ed. 2d 228, 235, 98 S. Ct. 95, 99.) For similar reasons, I do not believe that the fee imposed here should subject the statute in question to a strict-scrutiny analysis as a significant interference on the decision to enter into marriage. Plaintiffs here do not allege that their decision to marry, or that of anyone else, was affected by the license fee. Rather, plaintiffs challenge only the use for which the fee was designated by statute. In contemplating marriage, few people consider how the State will appropriate their marriage license fee as a factor in their marriage decision. Certainly, a person’s disagreement with how marriage license funds are to be disbursed by the State is not such a significant factor in the marriage decision as to constitute a direct impediment on the right to marry. Although, as the majority points out, the power to tax is the power to destroy (M’Culloch v. Maryland (1819), 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 428, 4 L. Ed. 579, 607), mere possession by the State of the power to tax marriage licenses does not, of itself, constitute an impediment to the right to marry. Rather, it is the exercise of the taxing power in an oppressive manner which could impact upon the marriage decision. The Supreme Court, in Zablocki v. Redhail (1978), 434 U.S. 374, 386, 54 L. Ed. 2d 618, 631, 98 S. Ct. 673, 681, stated that strict scrutiny is not required of every regulation which affects marriage; rather, strict scrutiny is required only of those regulations which significantly interfere with the decision to enter into marriage. Strict scrutiny of a statute such as the one before us would be required only if the tax became burdensome to the point that it became a factor worthy of consideration to those deciding upon marriage. That claim has not been raised here. B. Rational-Relationship Standard The majority concludes that no rational relationship exists between the marriage license fee and any legitimate legislative purpose, and that the tax violates principles of due process. I believe that plaintiffs’ challenge to the statute invokes principles of equal protection separate from their due process claims. Nevertheless, for the reasons which follow, I would uphold the funding provisions of the Domestic Violence Shelters Act against both the due process and equal protection challenges to the statute. 1. Due Process The requirements of due process are met if a law bears a reasonable relationship to a proper legislative purpose and is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. (Kidd v. Industrial Com. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 534; Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Association v. Block (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 443, 454.) The majority finds that imposing a tax on marriage licenses does not bear a reasonable relationship to a legitimate public interest, because the relationship between domestic violence and the procurement of marriage licenses was not conclusively established. To comport with principles of due process, however, it is not necessary to establish a relationship between those who purchase marriage licenses and those who use the shelter program. For purposes of a due process, as opposed to an equal protection, analysis there need be no relation between the class of taxpayers and the purpose of the appropriation. (New York Rapid Transit Corp. v. City of New York (1938), 303 U.S. 573, 586, 82 L. Ed. 2d 1024, 1034, 58 S. Ct. 721, 728.) As the Supreme Court has explained, “[T]here is no requirement under the Due Process Clause that the amount of general revenue taxes collected from a particular activity must be reasonably related to the value of the services provided ***: ‘Nothing is more familiar in taxation than the imposition of a tax upon a class or upon individuals who enjoy no direct benefit from its expenditure, and who are not responsible for the condition to be remedied. A tax is not an assessment of benefits. It is, as we have said, a means of distributing the burden of the cost of government.' ” (Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana (1981), 453 U.S. 609, 620, 69 L. Ed. 2d 884, 897, 101 S. Ct. 2946, 2955, quoting Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co. (1937), 301 U.S. 495, 521-22, 81 L. Ed. 1245, 1260-61, 57 S. Ct. 868, 878.) This court has previously upheld tax statutes against constitutional attack where those who pay the tax are not the only beneficiaries of the tax revenues. See Titus v. Texas Co. (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 437 (statute upheld which taxed only gasoline-powered boats, although the tax proceeds benefited owners of sailboats and diesel-powered boats as well). Under due process principles, the challenged law, rather than the burdened classification, must bear a reasonable relationship to a legitimate public interest, and the means adopted must be a reasonable manner of accomplishing the desired objective. In the present case, all parties have agreed that the shelter program is a laudable program and a legitimate object of legislative creation. A taxing statute is directly related to raising revenue (see S. Bloom, Inc. v. Mahin (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 70, 77); the statute at issue here, therefore, is rationally related to its purpose. Furthermore, in light of the following equal protection analysis, the means used, i.e., taxing an identified class, is not arbitrary. I find that the funding provisions of the Domestic Violence Shelters Act do not violate constitutional due process proscriptions. 2. Equal Protection Under both the Federal and State constitutions, laws may treat differently persons who appear to be similarly situated if the legislative classification bears a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose. (Clements v. Fashing (1982), 457 U.S. 957, 962-63, 73 L. Ed. 2d 508, 515, 102 S. Ct. 2836, 2843; S. Bloom, Inc. v. Mahin (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 70.) In taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classification. (Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. (1973), 410 U.S. 356, 364, 35 L. Ed. 2d 351, 357, 93 S. Ct. 1001, 1006; Doolin v. Korshak (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 521, 528.) Classifications for purposes of taxation bear a strong presumption of constitutionality which can only be overcome “by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and classes.” (Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. (1973), 410 U.S. 356, 364, 81 L. Ed. 2d 351, 358, 93 S. Ct. 1001, 1006.) States are not required to convince the courts of the correctness of their legislative judgments. Rather, those challenging the legislative judgment must convince the court that the legislative facts upon which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental decision maker. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. (1981), 449 U.S. 456, 464, 66 L. Ed. 2d 659, 668-69, 101 S. Ct. 715, 724. Equal protection and due process analyses are the same except that equal protection pertains to the basis of differentiation in a legislative classification. (See J. Nowak, R. Rotunda, and J. Young, Constitutional Law 585-86 (1983).) In the present case, the gravamen of plaintiffs complaint is that there are no grounds to distinguish or separate those who are taxed under the statute from others who are not taxed, with respect to the domestic-violence shelters program. If persons marrying in Illinois as a class have characteristics different than the general population with respect to domestic violence, then this difference provides a rational basis for the legislative classification challenged here. The evidence is closely balanced as to whether the percentage of married persons who use the shelter program is higher than the proportion of married persons in the general population. Because of the strong presumption in favor of upholding taxpayer classifications, however, plaintiffs have the burden of showing that married persons as a class bear no greater relationship to the shelter program than does the general population. There is evidence indicating that the percentage of married persons eligible to use the program is higher than the percentage of married persons in the general population. Defendants’ sociological experts testified, for example, that serious violence occurs more often between family members, especially spouses, than between other individuals in society. I believe that the legislature could have found that purchasing a marriage license provides a rational ground of classification upon which to base a tax supporting the shelter fund. This view is strengthened by the weighty presumption of constitutionality which operates here with regard to taxpayer classifications. I do not find constitutionally prohibitive the fact that only persons presently entering into marriage in Illinois are taxed by the marriage license fee. The legislature may implement its programs one step at a time. (Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. (1981), 449 U.S. 459, 466, 66 L. Ed. 2d 659, 670, 101 S. Ct. 715, 725.) Although only a small percentage of those persons who are now married in Illinois have paid the tax, the class would expand as the number of marriages celebrated after the effective date of the statute increased and, eventually, all of those persons who had been married in Illinois would have paid the tax to fund the shelter. Finally, I do not believe that the result in Crocker v. Finley (1984), 99 Ill. 2d 444, controls the present case. In Crocker, the fee imposed on those seeking a divorce was found to be arbitrary. Unlike the present case, no evidence was presented in Crocker to establish a connection between those seeking a divorce and the incidence of domestic violence. It is difficult to equate those who are terminating the marital relationship with those who are entering into the relationship for purposes of analyzing the reasonable relationship between the marital state and domestic violence. In contrast to Crocker, evidence was adduced here to establish that the classification of those taxed was not arbitrary, which, taken with the presumption in favor of the classification, is enough to validate the classification. For the reasons stated, I believe that the funding provisions of the Domestic Violence Shelters Act violate neither the due process nor the equal protection guarantees of the United States and Illinois constitutions. I would, therefore, uphold the statute against constitutional attack. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH joins in this dissent.