Court Opinion

ID: 9745262
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:44:13.667388+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:58.243131
License: Public Domain

STATON, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent. Under the circumstances surrounding the acceptance of Hill's guilty plea, the trial court erred in failing to hold a competency hearing. Forcing an incompetent accused to stand trial is a denial of due process, Tinsley v. State (1973), 260 Ind. 577, 298 N.E.2d 429, and the State must employ adequate procedures to prevent such a denial. Dragon v. State (1979), 270 Ind. 223, 383 N.E.2d 1046, cert. denied, 442 U.S. 912, 99 S.Ct. 2829, 61 L.Ed.2d 279. At *686the time Hill entered his guilty plea, his due process rights were protected by IC 1976, 35-5-3.1-1(a) (Burns Code Ed., 1979 Repl.) (repealed and replaced by IC 1976, 35-36-3-1(a) (Burns Code Ed., 1982 Supp.)), which provided for a competency hearing when the court had reasonable grounds for believing that the defendant was incompetent. The trial court had information before it which put Hill's mental state at issue; therefore it was a denial of due process for the trial court to accept Hill's plea and sentence him without holding a competency hearing.
The right to a competency hearing is not subject to the general principles of waiver because a defendant who may have been incompetent to stand trial cannot be considered to have knowingly waived his right to a competency hearing by failing to assert that right at trial. Evans v. State (1973), 261 Ind. 148, 300 N.E.2d 882. For'the same reason, Hill's negative response to the trial court's question whether he (Hill) had any doubt about his ability to understand the proceedings cannot constitute a waiver of his right to raise the competency issue, particularly when he was not represented by counsel at any stage of the guilty plea proceedings.
In addition to the information conveyed to the trial court at Hill's arraignment regarding his history of mental treatment and his use of Thorazine, the pre-sentence report, which was available to the trial court when it entered judgment against Hill and sentenced him, included information furnished by a mental health professional that Hill had been taking tranquilizers and other medication for an extended period of time, that he had a history of mental treatment and that he had been labeled a schizophrenic1 At the hearing on Hill's petition for post-conviction relief, psychiatric reports prepared three and six months after his sentencing were admitted into evidence. These reports indicate that Hill was having difficulty relating to other people and distinguishing reality from fantasy. Such reports may be considered in determining whether a hearing on Hill's competency to stand trial should have been held. Cf. Evans v. State, supra.
I believe that the information which the trial court had before it put Hill's competency into question. The majority, while acknowledging that the evidence on the ree-ord required an inquiry into Hill's competency, would allow the trial court to resolve its doubts informally, without following the statutory procedures. Our Supreme Court has recognized that a defendant's behavior in the trial court cannot override other reasonable grounds for a hearing:
"Although appellant behaved rationally at trial, a history of serious mental disorders, commitment to mental hospitals, or a prior court order of incompetency would put his competency into question."
Johnson v. State (1974), 262 Ind. 516, 521, 319 N.E.2d 126, 129 (emphasis added). Cf. Schuman v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 586, 357 N.E.2d 895. The uncontradicted evidence regarding Hill's drug use and history of mental treatment put his competency into question; therefore, the trial court erred in failing to hold a competency hearing.
Hill's competency could be determined from the record, which contains psychiatric information relevant to that determination. I would emphasize, however, that the issue is his competence in April, 1981, not in June or October of that year. Hill's behavior throughout the April, 1981 proceedings, which is preserved in the record, is also relevant to a competency determination, and he bears the burden of establishing his incompetency under Ind.Rules of Procedure, Post-Conviction Rule 1. Evans v. State, supra. I would reverse the trial court's determination regarding the need for a competency hearing and remand for such a hearing, reserving consideration of the other issues Hill raises in this appeal until it has been determined that he was competent to enter his guilty plea. Therefore, I dissent.

. When the trial court sentenced Hill and placed him on probation, one condition of that probation was that he pursue treatment at Wabash Valley Mental Health Center.