Court Opinion

ID: 9768029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:39:04.019096+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:35.641804
License: Public Domain

John I. Purtle, Justice, dissenting. The majority opinion presents a very sad picture because in this case of first impression we had the opportunity to construe the statute in its plain and ordinary meaning without the liability of following cases which twist the interpretation. The majority misinterpretation appears to be by design. The concurring opinion would go even further in denying legislated rights to one who makes a legitimate demand for these rights. For the concurrence to state that this valid exercise of statutory rights is a “ruse” and a mere “formality” is to disregard the express intent of the Arkansas General Assembly. If we were to require the appellant to pay the expense of a hearing in Arkansas, we would, in effect, be denying him the right to such a hearing. Act 705 of 1971 was enacted for the purpose of enabling Arkansas to participate in the “Interstate Agreement on Detainers.” The Arkansas General Assembly found that outstanding charges against prisoners and detainers based upon untried indictments, informations and complaints, as well as difficulties in securing speedy trials of prisoners incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produced uncertainties which obstructed programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. A detainer placed against a prisoner in another state often subjects the prisoner to greater restrictions than the general prison population: Most parole boards consider a detainer as an adverse factor, and some will automatically deny parole if a detainer is pending. A detainer generally affects the convict’s work assignments, barring him from trustee status, from working outside the prison walls, or even from participating in a prison industrial organization ... In addition, the uncertainty engendered by such an unresolved charge will usually cause the convict to take a negative attitude toward any rehabilitation program which the correction officials undertake. "Convicts — The Right to a Speedy Trial and the New Detainer Statutes,” 18 Rutgers L. Rev. 828 (1974). The Arkansas General Assembly further explained their reasoning in Article I (Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-3201 [Repl. 1977]): The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, in-formations or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the purpose of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determinátion of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints. The party states also find that proceedings with reference to such charges and detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of cooperative procedures. It is clear from the wording of the act that the General Assembly intended to provide for the orderly disposition of such “charges and detainers” with the purpose of helping in treating and rehabilitating prisoners. With these views in mind provisions were made for requiring certain procedures to be followed by the states as well as the prisoners. The appellant in the present case followed proper procedure in requesting a speedy disposition of the charges after a detainer was placed on him in the California prison. The State of Arkansas refused to comply with the request although California offered to return appellant here for disposition of the charges. The purpose of the act being to aid in treatment and rehabilitation, it should be liberally construed in favor of the prisoner. The majority opinion construes the act strictly against the appellant in direct contravention of the express words of the act. The majority maneuvers around the words “complaint” and “untried” in an attempt to justify its opinion. The acts speaks clearly of charges and detainers based upon indictment, information or complaint. However, it is evident to me that any detainer pending on a prisoner triggers the procedures and binds the states to comply with the agreement. A detainer based upon a complaint or petition to revoke a suspension or probation is just as much a detainer as one based upon an indictment or information. The contention that appellant’s alleged probation violation was not “untried” is erroneous. The detainer was based upon an alleged act which was never proven; it was not based upon the original conviction. By ignoring the request of appellant for a speedy disposition of the charges against him the state will effectively let appellant serve his required time in another state under adverse conditions and then have the additional satisfaction of seeing appellant serve the most time possible in Arkansas. I submit that is not how the agreement on detainers was to work. The Florida Court of Appeals squarely addressed the same set of facts as those presented in this case, and applied the same language in the same act and stated in a well reasoned opinion: ... we hold that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act which requires a hearing within 180 days of request applies to detainers based on charges of probation violation. Gaddy v. Turner, 376 So.2d 1225 (Fla. App. 1979). The majority makes a valiant effort to turn the immense power of the state (and now the various states who have ratified this act) against the clearly expressed rights given specifically to this class of people. To unbalance the scales so, is to do disservice to our fundamental constitutional precepts to which I firmly adhere. A single right abridged chips away and the fundamental rights guaranteed all of us. I cannot be a part of such an erosion.