Court Opinion

ID: 9881883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-04 16:01:13.020074+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:23.096179
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        OCT 4 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MICHELE FRU SHURE,                              No. 22-749
                                                Agency No.
             Petitioner,                        A201-744-722
 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                    Argued and Submitted September 13, 2023
                               Phoenix, Arizona

Before: GOULD, HURWITZ, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

      Michele Fru Shure, a native and citizen of Cameroon, petitions for review of

a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision that: (1) dismissed her appeal

from a decision by an immigration judge (“IJ”) denying her applications for asylum,

withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
(“CAT”); and (2) denied her motion to remand based on changed country conditions

in Cameroon. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of Fru Shure’s applications for relief

based on an adverse credibility determination. The BIA denied Fru Shure’s motion

to remand because Fru Shure only demonstrated an “incremental” change in country

conditions regarding violence against Anglophones. We deny Fru Shure’s petition.

      1. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). Where, as here, the BIA

adopts the IJ’s decision, we review both the BIA and IJ decisions. Duran-Rodriguez

v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2019). We review the agency’s adverse

credibility determination for substantial evidence. Dong v. Garland, 50 F.4th 1291,

1296 (9th Cir. 2022). Under that standard, “findings of fact are conclusive unless

any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id.

(citations omitted). “Thus, only the most extraordinary circumstances will justify

overturning an adverse credibility determination.” Id. (citations and quotations

omitted).

      2. No such extraordinary circumstances are present here.          Considered

cumulatively, the inconsistencies and omissions in Fru Shure’s submitted evidence

do not compel any reasonable adjudicator to find Fru Shure credible. Here, the IJ

noted two inconsistencies regarding dates: (1) Fru Shure testified that a doctor

visited her on October 28, 2018, but her doctor’s certificate was dated October 18,

2018; and (2) Fru Shure testified that she received treatment between October 28

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and November 6, 2018, but her nurse’s declaration stated she was treated

“[s]ometime in November 2018.” The date on the doctor’s certificate, October 18,

2018, is before Fru Shure’s first encounter with members of the Cameroonian

military, which she testified was on October 23, 2018. And the nurse’s declaration

undermines Fru Shure’s testimony that she sought medical treatment starting on

October 28, 2018. See Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 749–50 (9th Cir.

2022) (stating even minor time frame discrepancies can support an adverse

credibility determination).

      3. Considering the “totality of the circumstances,” a reasonable adjudicator

could conclude that Fru Shure was not credible. See Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d

1034, 1043–44 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). The IJ also

properly provided opportunities for Fru Shure to explain these inconsistencies and

omissions and, in its decision, offered “specific and cogent reasons” for rejecting her

explanations. Id. 1

      4. We review the BIA’s denial of motions to remand for abuse of discretion.

Movsisian v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005). “The BIA abuses its

1
       The IJ also noted that although Fru Shure provided photographs of injuries to
her right leg, none of the medical documentation provided referenced any such
injury. Fru Shure claims that she was never given the opportunity to explain the
discrepancy, but the IJ did question her about the cause of the right leg injuries. Even
discounting this issue, the date discrepancies offer substantial evidence to support
an adverse credibility determination.

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discretion if the decision was ‘arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.’” Rodriguez

v. Garland, 990 F.3d 1205, 1209 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Perez v. Mukasey, 516

F.3d 770, 773 (9th Cir. 2008)). For the BIA to grant a motion to remand based on

changed country conditions, a petitioner must “clear four hurdles: (1) she must

produce evidence that country conditions have changed; (2) the evidence must be

material; (3) the evidence must not have been available previously; and (4) the new

evidence would establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought.” Id. (cleaned

up).

       5. The BIA’s denial was not an abuse of discretion. The country conditions

evidence Fru Shure submitted to the BIA describes violence against Anglophones as

the continuation of preexisting strife.

       PETITION DENIED.

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