Court Opinion

ID: 9529874
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:55:02.825343+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:56.599084
License: Public Domain

ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice,
concurring in the result:
I concur in the result reached by the lead opinion because I believe it is dictated by the operation of prior case law and existing statutes. But I write separately to comment on the implications of today’s decision.
The modem labor market is becoming increasingly reliant on temporary workers who are supplied by labor agencies such as the defendant in the instant case. See Jonathan P. Hiatt, Policy Issues Concerning the Contingent Work Force, 52 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 739, 741 & n. 20 (1995) (“[T]emporary work has grown ten times faster than overall employment since 1982.”). This trend appears to be reflected across the entire spectrum of occupations and professions. In that context, the result we reach today has substantial potential to undermine the balance struck by *464the workers’ compensation system between when a worker may seek a tort recovery and when the worker is limited to workers’ compensation benefits. Today’s result also has the potential to sharply limit the growth in the use of temporary workers in Utah.
To explain: After today’s decision, Utah law permits a regular employee of a special employer using a loaned employee to obtain not only workers’ compensation benefits from the special employer, but also a tort remedy against the general employer of the loaned employee for the negligence of that loaned employee. Yet if the injured employee had been harmed by the negligence of one of his or her employer’s regular employees, no such tort recovery would be permitted under the workers’ compensation law. Similarly, we have held that the workers’ compensation law denies the loaned employee a tort remedy against a special employer for the negligence of its regular employee when the special employer’s payment to the general employer includes an amount for workers’ compensation coverage. Ghersi v. Salazar, 883 P.2d 1352, 1358 (Utah 1994). The result today, though dictated by the current workers’ compensation statutes and prior case law, puts the two workers — one loaned and one regular, but both statutory co-employees — on an unequal footing for no discoverable policy reason.
From the employee’s perspective, it is anomalous, to say the least, that Kunz, who collected workers’ compensation benefits from Anderson Lumber, has a tort remedy against Beneficial when he would have had no such remedy if he had been injured by a regular co-employee of Anderson, and that Aiken, if he had been the one injured, would have been limited to workers’ compensation benefits from Beneficial and would have had no tort remedy against anyone. From the employer’s perspective, it is also anomalous that special employers are immunized from all but workers’ compensation claims, but the financial risk resulting from the availability of tort remedies flowing from a loaned worker’s negligence rests on general employers (assuming the various tests for a respondeat superior relationship are satisfied).
Common sense suggests that the existence of these apparently irrational pockets of common law liability are inconsistent with the underlying objectives of Utah’s otherwise comprehensive workers’ compensation scheme. Common sense also suggests that these pockets of tort liability will become increasingly important to employers and employees as the temporary work force becomes a larger factor in the labor market. The present state of the law can only operate to frustrate the development of the temporary labor market in Utah by making it more costly for suppliers of temporary labor to do business and by discouraging workers from seeking employment with such suppliers. This is an issue the legislature should address, for only it is capable of a systematic approach to these problems.
The lead opinion suggests that I am overly concerned about the real world consequences of today’s ruling and seemingly attempts to dissuade the legislature from responding. I am sure the legislature is fully capable of judging the practical impact of today’s ruling and the feasibility of a response. I am content to have it do so.
Finally, I wish to address Justice Howe’s dissent. I agree with Justice Howe’s conclusion that on the basis of the record as it appears today, there is no possibility of finding Beneficial vicariously liable for Aiken’s acts. Nonetheless, I agree with the lead opinion that a remand is appropriate because the trial court did not have the opportunity to address this issue, and the record is therefore incomplete. Although it may be highly implausible, it is not inconceivable that the parties may have some evidence to add to the record that is relevant to showing a respon-deat superior relationship under our traditional legal tests. Because the parties should be allowed to have this opportunity, a remand is justified.