Court Opinion

ID: 9847778
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:07:19.653757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:32.811502
License: Public Domain

Boslaugh, J.,
dissenting.
The identification testimony offered by the State in this case was not as satisfactory as it might have been. The opportunity of the victims to observe the offender was limited by the way in which the crimes were committed. If the exclusionary rules are applied too strictly in such cases, it becomes impossible to prosecute for offenses committed in such a manner.
At the time of the offense, January 22, 1972, the witness Patricia saw the profile of the offender at close *523range and heard his voice. Following a hearing in another case on February 8, 1972, she failed to identify the defendant. At the preliminary hearing on March 1 and 2, 1972, she said the defendant “fit the description of exact-y (exactly) what I saw.” She had an opportunity to hear the defendant’s voice at that hearing and advised the prosecutor on January 23, 1973, that she could make a positive identification. She heard the defendant’s voice again at the hearing on January 24, 1973, and made a positive identification at the trial based largely on profile and voice.
Her testimony was weakened by the failure to identify the defendant at the February 8, 1972, hearing and by some prior statements which were subject to interpretation. These matters were all before the jury, and in my opinion were questions to be decided by the jury. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Spencer, J., concurs in this dissent.