Court Opinion

ID: 9948960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 15:15:30.961561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:25.232636
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  23-P-333

                                       K.M.

                                       vs.

                                     J.P.M.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

        This is an appeal from an order issued under G. L. c. 209A,

 § 3, after a two-party hearing.          In this appeal, the defendant-

 appellant, J.P.M., argues that the evidence before the judge was

 insufficient to support the judge's conclusion that the

 defendant had committed "abuse" as defined in G. L. c. 209A,

 § 1.   The question before us is whether the judge erred in

 concluding that the plaintiff, K.M., was in reasonable fear of

 imminent and serious physical harm.           G. L. c. 209A, § 1.       See

 Commonwealth v. Gordon, 407 Mass. 340, 349-350 (1990)

 (interpreting statute in conjunction with common-law definition

 of assault, such that it includes requirement that fear of

 imminent and serious physical harm be reasonable).              We affirm.

        The facts are well known to the parties and will not be

 recited in detail here.        On September 25, 2022, the parties met
in a Dunkin' Donuts parking lot in Hanover to exchange their

minor child for parenting time.       The parties, who were married,

had been living separately since August of 2022, and counsel

represents that on September 14, 2022, the defendant filed for a

divorce in Plymouth Probate and Family Court.       The plaintiff was

pregnant with the defendant's child, according to her affidavit

and testimony.

     Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the

prevailing party, the plaintiff did not respond during this drop

off to questions posed by the defendant concerning the details

of their divorce, his housing situation, and the marital home,

in which the plaintiff was living.       The defendant began yelling

and swearing at the plaintiff and would not hand over their son.

The plaintiff told the defendant that she was going to call the

police, which she did.   The defendant got out of the car in

which he had arrived with the minor child, grabbed the minor

child's two bags, put one on the ground, and tossed the other

toward the plaintiff.1   The bag hit the plaintiff, though it did

not injure her.   The police arrived after the defendant had

left.

1 The word "tossed" is used in a police report that was filed
after the plaintiff then called the police. The plaintiff's
subsequent testimony was somewhat stronger, but we will, for
present purposes, utilize the terminology preferred by the
defendant, "toss." The difference in language ultimately is
immaterial to our decision.

                                  2
     The defendant subsequently sent a text message to the

plaintiff stating that he was going to return to stay at the

marital home, where he had not lived for the prior six weeks.

The plaintiff informed the defendant that she would call the

police if he returned to the marital home, asked her own father

to spend the night with her in the house for her safety, and

bolted her doors shut that night out of fear.

     The next morning, the plaintiff filed ex parte for an abuse

prevention order under G. L. c. 209A.   In her affidavit, she

detailed not only the incident from the day before but also

other recent behavior which contributed to her fear.     The

affidavit stated that the defendant's behavior was

"progressively worse -- more erratic, confrontational and

destructive," and that it included throwing objects and even

smashing a vacuum cleaner in the garage.2   She also said in the

affidavit that the defendant is a one hundred percent (100%)

disabled Marine Corps veteran suffering from post-traumatic

stress disorder (PTSD), and that he has a license to carry and

access to firearms.   An ex parte order issued, and on October 5,

2022, a two-party extension hearing was held.   The defendant was

represented by counsel and was present at the hearing.

2 The defendant argues here that the vacuum cleaner was already
broken. We may assume, without deciding that is so, because
whether or not it was broken prior to his destroying it is
immaterial to our decision.

                                3
      The plaintiff testified that the defendant had "been

increasingly argumentative, he comes into the house unannounced,

confrontational, cryptic, paranoid."      She clarified that

"confrontational" meant that the defendant was "swearing,

yelling . . . [a]t [her], around [her], in front of [their]

son," and she testified that the behavior made her nervous.       She

testified that the defendant had thrown a glass bottle in the

garage, not at her but in her direction, and the defendant

testified that it smashed on the ground, which he did not clean

up.   The plaintiff also testified that the defendant had thrown

other objects when she was in the house and had destroyed a

vacuum cleaner.

      She also, significantly, testified regarding a text message

she had received from the defendant in September 2022,

containing a photograph of a woman in a medical establishment

wearing a mask and with a gauze bandage around her arm.        When

the plaintiff inquired into who the woman was and why the

defendant was sending her the picture, the defendant responded,

"If you don't know, which you should, ask around."

      The plaintiff testified that she was scared following the

defendant's throwing the child's bag at her and saying he was

coming back to stay at her home.       She testified that she was, at

the time of the hearing, afraid of the defendant.       She stated

that the conversation in the parking lot made her feel

                                   4
threatened, and that she took the cryptic text message as a

threat.

     The defendant, in essence, asks us to hold that on all

these facts and circumstances, as a matter of law, the plaintiff

could not have been in reasonable fear of imminent physical

harm.   We decline to do so.   The plaintiff described escalating

and confrontational interactions between the parties as they

went through a messy divorce during a time when she was pregnant

with the defendant's child.    The extremely troubling text she

received, which the judge could properly have interpreted as

threatening; the escalation up to and including the

confrontation in the parking lot in which the defendant threw or

tossed the child's bag at the plaintiff, striking her, albeit

not injuriously; and the subsequent threat to return to the

marital home following that confrontation, along with all the

other facts and circumstances, support the judge's conclusion,

which was based in part on credibility judgments that we are not

in a position to dispute, see Ginsberg v. Blacker, 67 Mass. App.

Ct. 139, 140 n. 3 (2006) ("We accord the credibility

determinations of the judge who 'heard the testimony of the

parties . . . [and] observed their demeanor,' the utmost

deference" [citation omitted]), that the plaintiff was indeed in

reasonable fear of imminent serious physical harm.

                                  5
Consequently, the issuance of the G. L. c. 209A order on October

5, 2022, following the two-party hearing, is affirmed.

                                      So ordered.

                                      By the Court (Rubin, Singh &
                                        Hershfang, JJ.3),

                                      Assistant Clerk

Entered:    March 8, 2024.

3   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                  6