Court Opinion

ID: 9939579
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-10 17:11:12.683857+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:25.471848
License: Public Domain

J-S37009-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :           PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
 V.                                        :
                                           :
                                           :
 BRIAN ADORNO                              :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :      No. 2624 EDA 2022

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 28, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-51-CR-0009110-2017

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                      FILED FEBRUARY 08, 2024

      Appellant, Brian Adorno, appeals from the post-conviction court’s

September 28, 2022 order denying his timely-filed petition under the Post

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. Appellant raises two

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. After careful review, we affirm.

      Appellant summarized the facts of his underlying convictions in this

case, as well as in a related case, as follows:

      At around 1:15 a[.]m. on June 24, 2017, at the 2900 block of
      American Street in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, [Appellant]
      physically assaulted the victim, S.A. (“the victim”). [Appellant]
      punched the victim numerous times in the face and chest. The
      victim escaped from [Appellant], drove away in her vehicle, and
      was followed by [Appellant], in his vehicle.

      Following a brief vehicle chase, [Appellant] rammed his vehicle
      into the back of the victim’s vehicle. The collision caused the
      victim’s vehicle to crash[] and become stuck between a wall and
      a light pole. [Appellant] and the victim exited their vehicles, and
      [Appellant] approached the victim. [Appellant] shoved the victim
      against the wall, punched her in the face, knocked her to the
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      ground, and, while she was lying on the ground, kicked her in the
      face.

      [Appellant] eventually left in his vehicle. Paramedics and police
      arrived and assisted the victim. The victim was transported to the
      emergency department, and reported suffering from pain,
      dizziness, headaches, difficulty breathing through her nose, and
      blurry vision. She was diagnosed with a maxillary fracture, and
      extensive bruising and swelling in her face. The victim underwent
      surgery to correct the maxillary fracture.

      On July 26, 2017, [Appellant] was charged, at [CP-51-CR-
      000]9129-2017, with possessing an instrument of crime, simple
      assault, and recklessly endangering another person.

      On September 13, 2017, as the victim was driving home from
      dropping her daughter off at school, she noticed [Appellant]
      following her in his vehicle. [Appellant] passed the victim, and
      pulled in front of the victim’s vehicle. The victim slowed her
      vehicle, turned onto a cross-street, and, fearing that [Appellant]
      would crash into her vehicle, brought it to a stop. [Appellant]
      stopped his vehicle behind the victim’s vehicle[] and exited his
      vehicle. He then approached the victim’s vehicle, opened the front
      passenger-side door, and entered the passenger compartment,
      without the victim’s permission.

      [Appellant] punched the victim in the face between ten and twenty
      times. [Appellant] then reached for a 10-inch knife in his pocket,
      at which time the victim exited her vehicle and ran down the
      street. [Appellant] initially pursued the victim, but at some point
      stopped and fled the scene in his vehicle. The victim sought help
      from a nearby bystander, who called the police.

      Police and paramedics arrived and took the victim to the hospital.
      As a result of the assault, the victim suffered a broken nose, a
      maxillary fracture, extensive bruising and swelling in her face and
      both eyes, and cuts to both lips. The victim underwent surgery to
      correct the broken nose.

Appellant’s Brief at 8-9.

      Based on the September 13, 2017 assault of the victim, Appellant was

arrested and charged in the instant case (CP-51-CR-0009110-2017) with

aggravated assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a); simple assault, 18 Pa.C.S. §

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2701(a); recklessly endangering another person, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705;

harassment, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(1); stalking, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709.1(a)(1);

and possessing an instrument of crime, 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(a).

      The trial court consolidated Appellant’s two cases for a non-jury trial.

On June 18, 2018, Appellant was convicted of all counts in both cases. On

October 15, 2018, Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 8 to 16

years’ incarceration at both cases.     Pertinent to the instant appeal, the

Commonwealth sought imposition of the deadly-weapon enhancement of the

Sentencing Guidelines, which calls for enhanced guideline ranges where a

deadly weapon is possessed or used during the commission of an offense.

See 204 Pa.Code § 303.10(a)(1), (a)(2). Here, the trial court concluded that

the deadly weapon “possessed” enhancement applied. See N.T. Sentencing,

10/15/18, at 7-8. Thus, the court utilized an enhanced, sentencing-guideline

range of 81 to 99 months’ incarceration, rather than the standard range of 72

to 90 months’ incarceration, for Appellant’s aggravated assault conviction. Id.

at 5, 8. Ultimately, Appellant received a term of 7 to 14 years’ incarceration

for that offense.

      Appellant filed a timely, post-sentence motion, which the court denied

on October 29, 2018. Appellant then filed a timely direct appeal and, after

this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence, our Supreme Court denied his

petition for allowance of appeal on December 2, 2020. See Commonwealth

v. Adorno, 237 A.3d 1084 (Pa. Super. 2020) (unpublished memorandum),

appeal denied, 242 A.3d 914 (Pa. 2020).

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      On May 10, 2021, Appellant filed a timely, pro se PCRA petition. Counsel

was appointed and filed an amended petition on Appellant’s behalf on October

6, 2021. Therein, Appellant raised various claims of ineffective assistance of

Appellant’s trial counsel, Gregory Weyer, Esq. On September 28, 2022, the

court held an evidentiary hearing at which Attorney Weyer and Appellant

testified. On September 29, 2022, the PCRA court issued an order dismissing

Appellant’s petition.

      Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and he complied with the PCRA

court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal. On December 15, 2022, the judge who presided

over Appellant’s PCRA proceeding sent this Court a letter stating that she had

resigned from the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in light of

her appointment to the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania, and that her findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth at

the close of the PCRA hearing adequately explained the basis for her decision

to dismiss Appellant’s petition.

      Herein, Appellant states two issues for our review:

      [I.] Whether the court erred in not granting relief on the PCRA
      petition alleging trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object
      and litigate the search and seizure of Appellant’s vehicle on date
      of arrest?

      [II.] Whether the court erred in not granting relief on the PCRA
      petition alleging trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
      adequately explain the guilty plea offer?

Appellant’s Brief at 7.

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     Our standard of review regarding an order denying post-conviction relief

under the PCRA is whether the determination of the court is supported by the

evidence of record and is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Ragan, 923

A.2d 1169, 1170 (Pa. 2007). This Court grants great deference to the findings

of the PCRA court, and we will not disturb those findings merely because the

record could support a contrary holding. Commonwealth v. Touw, 781 A.2d

1250, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2001).

     Additionally, we recognize that, in regard to ineffectiveness claims,

     [c]ounsel is presumed effective, and to rebut that presumption,
     the PCRA petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s performance
     was deficient and that such deficiency prejudiced him.           In
     Pennsylvania, we have refined the Strickland v. Washington,
     466 U.S. 668 (1984)[,] performance and prejudice test into a
     three-part inquiry.      Thus, to prove counsel ineffective, the
     petitioner must show that: (1) his underlying claim is of arguable
     merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable basis for his action or
     inaction; and (3) the petitioner suffered actual prejudice as a
     result. See Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973 (Pa. 1987).
     If a petitioner fails to prove any of these prongs, his claim fails.
     Generally, counsel’s assistance is deemed constitutionally
     effective if he chose a particular course of conduct that had some
     reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s interests.
     Where matters of strategy and tactics are concerned, a finding
     that a chosen strategy lacked a reasonable basis is not warranted
     unless it can be concluded that an alternative not chosen offered
     a potential for success substantially greater than the course
     actually pursued. To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must
     show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
     unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have
     been different. A reasonable probability is a probability that is
     sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the
     proceeding.

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Commonwealth v. Charleston, 94 A.3d 1012, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2016)

(internal brackets added by Charleston omitted). Moreover, “[a] court is not

required to analyze the elements of an ineffectiveness claim in any particular

order of priority; instead, if a claim fails under any necessary element of the

ineffectiveness   test,   the   court   may   proceed to   that   element first.”

Commonwealth v. Tharp, 101 A.3d 736, 747 (Pa. 2014).

      Instantly, Appellant first argues that Attorney Weyer was ineffective for

not filing a motion to suppress a knife that was recovered during a warrantless

search of Appellant’s vehicle. According to Appellant,

      at the time of [his] arrest, he was already in custody and outside
      of his vehicle that was approximately one hundred (100) feet
      away from his person. Appellant contends that the officer, after
      handcuffing Appellant, without his consent or [a] warrant, took his
      car keys and signaled the vehicle’s alarm system via the key fob
      to locate the vehicle. Subsequently, the police then found the
      vehicle and conducted a full search and seized a knife that [was]
      presented at trial as key evidence.

      Trial counsel was informed of such, but neglectfully took no steps
      to litigate … a [suppression] claim. There was no reason for
      counsel to not litigate a suppression motion. Appellant was
      prejudiced as the discovery of the knife prejudiced his defense.

Appellant’s Brief at 15-16.

      After careful review, we conclude that no relief is due. Initially,

      [t]his Court has previously found that the failure to file a
      suppression motion under some circumstances may be evidence
      of ineffective assistance of counsel. However, if the grounds
      underpinning that motion are without merit, counsel will not be
      deemed ineffective for failing to so move. The defendant must
      establish that there was no reasonable basis for not pursuing the
      suppression claim and that if the evidence had been suppressed,

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       there is a reasonable probability the verdict would have been more
       favorable.

Commonwealth v. Watley, 153 A.3d 1034, 1044 (Pa. Super. 2016) (cleaned

up).

       Here, aside from quoting the Fourth Amendment of the United States

Constitution, and citing Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution,

Appellant does not cite or discuss any legal authority to support that a motion

to suppress the knife would have been granted, had Attorney Weyer filed one.

As the Commonwealth convincingly argues,

       [u]nder controlling precedent at the time of defendant’s trial in
       2018, police needed only probable cause—the existence of which
       [Appellant] rightly does not contest—to conduct a warrantless
       search of his car. No exigency beyond the “inherent mobility of a
       motor     vehicle”    would  have    been    necessary.        See
       Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102, 138 (Pa. 2014). Although
       the Pennsylvania Supreme Court later overruled that precedent,
       holding that the state constitution requires both probable cause
       and exigent circumstances for a warrantless search of a vehicle,
       it did not do so until December of 2020, two and a half years after
       [Appellant’s] trial. See Commonwealth v. Alexander, 243 A.3d
       177 (Pa. 2020).

Commonwealth’s Brief at 11. We agree. Again, Appellant offers no discussion

of why a suppression motion would have succeeded under the pertinent legal

authority in 2018. He also fails to address why probable cause was lacking to

justify the warrantless search of his vehicle. Consequently, he has failed to

demonstrate arguable merit to his ineffectiveness claim.

       Nevertheless, we also point out that Appellant offers no relevant

response to the PCRA court’s conclusion that Attorney Weyer offered a

reasonable basis for his decision to not seek to suppress the knife. See N.T.

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PCRA Hearing, 9/28/22, at 30. Namely, Attorney Weyer testified at the PCRA

hearing that “[a] big part of [his] defense strategy was to question [the victim]

about the knife, specifically that she never brought up the knife until her third

statement” to police. Id. at 12. Thus, Attorney Weyer explained that he did

not seek to suppress the knife because he planned to use that evidence to

attack the victim’s credibility.   Id.    Again, Appellant offers no developed

argument challenging the reasonableness of Attorney Weyer’s decision in this

regard. Accordingly, he has failed to prove that counsel acted ineffectively.

      In Appellant’s second issue, he claims that Attorney Weyer acted

ineffectively by failing to advise Appellant, during plea negotiations, that a

deadly-weapon sentencing enhancement might apply to his case. According

to Appellant, had he been notified about the possibility of a sentencing-

guideline enhancement, he would have accepted the Commonwealth’s plea

offer of 4 to 8 years’ incarceration, rather than proceeding to trial.

      Again, no relief is due. Preliminarily, we recognize that,

      a post-conviction petitioner seeking relief on the basis that
      ineffective assistance of counsel caused him or her to reject a
      guilty plea must demonstrate the following circumstance:

         [B]ut for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a
         reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been
         presented to the court (i.e., that the defendant would have
         accepted the plea and the prosecution would not have
         withdrawn it in light of intervening circumstances), that the
         court would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction
         or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would have
         been less severe than under the judgment and sentence
         that in fact were imposed.

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Commonwealth v. Steckley, 128 A.3d 826, 832 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting

Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 164 (2012)).

      In this case, we conclude that Appellant has failed to demonstrate that

he would have accepted the plea offer, had he been told of the possibility that

a deadly-weapon enhancement might apply.            Although Attorney Weyer

testified at the PCRA hearing that he did not recall specifically discussing with

Appellant the possibility of a deadly-weapon enhancement applying if

Appellant proceeded to trial, counsel did inform Appellant of the statutory

maximum applicable to his aggravated assault charge, as well as the standard

sentencing guideline ranges for that offense, when discussing Appellant’s

decision to plead guilty. See N.T. PCRA Hearing at 8, 18. Specifically, the

statutory maximum term for aggravated assault is 20 years’ incarceration,

and Appellant’s standard-range guidelines for that offense were 72 to 90

months’ incarceration, plus or minus 12 months in the aggravated/mitigated

range. See id. at 18. Thus, as the PCRA court pointed out, applying the

deadly-weapon “possessed” enhancement only raised Appellant’s guideline

range by nine months. Id. at 30.

      Additionally, Attorney Weyer testified that Appellant’s decision to reject

the plea offer and proceed to trial was premised on the fact that he had been

found not guilty based on a claim of self-defense in another, unrelated case,

and he had “the belief that there was a potential way to get a not guilty on

[the] aggravated assault” charge in the instant case, as well.       Id. at 10.

Counsel testified that he told Appellant “what [he] thought” about the offer

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and explained the risks of proceeding to trial. Id. More specifically, Attorney

Weyer testified that he advised Appellant that “there [were] arguments that

this could have been a simple assault as opposed to aggravated assault based

on … [the] credibility attacks that [counsel] wanted to … pursue[] at trial of

the [victim]….” Id. at 11. Importantly, counsel testified that he would not

have advised Appellant differently regarding the plea offer, even had counsel

been aware of the possibility of the deadly-weapon enhancement applying.

Id. Furthermore, Attorney Weyer stated that Appellant’s decision to proceed

to trial was his, and his alone. Id. at 10.

      Given this record, Appellant has failed to prove that he would have

accepted the plea agreement had he known that a sentencing enhancement

might apply. When deciding to proceed to trial, Appellant was well-aware that

he faced a statutory maximum term of 20 years’ imprisonment for aggravated

assault, and he knew the sentencing guidelines called for a minimum of 72 to

90 months’ incarceration in the standard range. According to Attorney Weyer,

Appellant decided to proceed to trial because he believed he could be acquitted

on his claim of self-defense, and counsel testified that his advice to Appellant

regarding the plea would not have changed, even had they discussed the

sentencing enhancement. Consequently, we are unconvinced that Appellant’s

decision to reject the plea offer would have changed, had he known of the

possibility that a deadly-weapon enhancement might raise his sentencing

guideline ranges by nine months. As the Commonwealth stresses, Appellant

“bore the burden to show that his decision to reject the plea offer, stand trial,

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and risk a much longer sentence than the one called for in the plea offer was

affected by the allegedly deficient advice about a potential enhancement

under the advisory sentencing guidelines.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 13-14

(citing Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 315 (Pa. 2014)). We discern

no error in the PCRA court’s decision that Appellant failed to meet this burden.

      Order affirmed.

Date: 2/8/2024

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