Court Opinion

ID: 9760483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:57:21.39232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:12.751910
License: Public Domain

O’NEILL, Justice,
dissenting.
Because I believe the trial court erred in failing to include an instruction to the jury that a “trade secret” must be a secret, I respectfully dissent. I concur in the remainder of the majority opinion.
The court’s charge is essential to the jury’s deliberations, therefore “a charge must include an accurate statement of the law.” Abdnor v. State, 871 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (citing Cane v. State, 698 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). In Schalk v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that “it is axiomatic that the core element of a trade secret must be that it remains a secret.” 823 S.W.2d 633, 640 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1006, 112 S.Ct. 1763, 118 L.Ed.2d 425 (1992). The court acknowledged that “Texas trade secret law has its origins in the civil law arena.” Id. at 636 (citing BPI Systems, Inc. v. Leith, 532 F.Supp. 208 (W.D.Tex. 1981))(Fifth Circuit case applying Texas law utilizing the trade secret definition from the Restatement of Torts, citing Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex. 566, 314 S.W.2d 763, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 898, 79 S.Ct. 223, 3 L.Ed.2d 148 (1958)). In Stewart & Stevenson Services, Inc. v. Serv-Tech, 879 S.W.2d 89, 95 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied), this court approved the trial court’s instruction to the jury based upon the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) of TORTS § 757, comment b, which provides in pertinent part as follows:
The subject matter of trade secret must be secret. Matters of public knowledge or of general knowledge in an industry cannot be appropriated by one as his secret. Matters which are completely disclosed by the goods which one markets cannot be his secret.
Id. at 95. The court concluded: “From all the eases we have been able to find, it appears to be well settled that in order to be entitled to common-law protection, a trade secret must be secret .... we conclude that there is no cause of action for misappropriation of confidential information that is not either secret or, at least substantially secret.” Id. at 98-99 (emphasis in original)(eiting Wissman v. Boucher, 150 Tex. 326, 240 S.W.2d 278, 280 (1951); Hallmark Personnel of Texas, Inc. v. Franks, 562 S.W.2d 933, 936 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ); Lamons Metal Gasket Co. v. Traylor, 361 S.W.2d 211, 213 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston *743[14th Dist.] 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). More recently, the Texas Supreme Court has confirmed that “once a trade secret is made public all ownership is lost.” Computer Associates Intern’l v. Altai, 918 S.W.2d 458, 457 (Tex. 1994)(citing Luccous v. J.C. Kinley Co., 376 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Tex. 1964)(“It is self-evident that the subject matter of a trade secret must be kept secret”)).
In the present case, although the definition of “trade secret” tracked the statutory definition, it did not correctly state the law.1 The charge defined “trade secret” as something that “has value and that the owner has taken measures to prevent from becoming available to persons other than those selected by the owner to have access for limited purposes.” The trial court neither instructed the jury that the “trade secret” must be secret or substantially secret, nor did he submit an inquiry for the jury to make such a finding. Further, I disagree with the majority that the court’s definition of “trade secret” necessarily included the appellant’s requested definition that “an essential element of a trade secret is that it has remained a secret.” Because the jury charge lacked this essential instruction, it was not an accurate statement of the law and was defective.
It is undisputed that the appellant timely objected to the charge. Therefore, reversal is required if the error is calculated to injure the rights of the defendant, which means that there must be some harm to the accused from the error. Abdnor, 871 S.W.2d at 732 (quoting Almanza v. State, 686 S.W. 2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)). In making this determination, we must examine the error in light of the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, the argument of counsel and any other relevant information contained in the record of the trial. Id. at 733. As a substantial element of his defense, appellant sought to show that the alleged “trade secret” information was routinely replicated in the secondary parts market, the parts alleged to be trade secrets were capable of being, and were in fact, reverse engineered, and the drawings upon which the State relied were widely disseminated to third party buyers, vendors and suppliers. In sum, appellant’s entire defense centered around his contention that the alleged “trade secrets” were not secret. As a result, I do not believe, nor does the State contend, that the error is harmless. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment in Cause Number 653937 and remand for a new trial. In all other respects, I concur with the majority opinion.

. Although appellant makes a compelling argument that the statute’s vague and overbroad definition of "trade secret” renders it unconstitutional, I agree with the majority that this issue was not preserved.