Court Opinion

ID: 9773742
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:57:24.909383+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:56.885828
License: Public Domain

WHITE, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
This is a case about contempt. About the contempt shown for the lawful, judicial authority of this State by one who swore an oath to uphold that authority. Although the principal opinion fails to see it, it is also a case about the law of contempt.
Contempt can be — as the majority suggests — “a complex area of the law.” But the contempt issues in this case involve the most basic concept in that body of law, the distinction between civil and criminal contempt:
Civil contempt is intended to benefit a party for whom an order, judgment, or decree was entered. Its purpose is to coerce compliance with the relief granted. A civil contemnor has at all times the power to terminate punishment by complying with the order of the court. Criminal contempt is punitive in nature and acts to protect, preserve, and vindicate the authority and dignity of the judicial system and to deter future defiance.1
The salient facts on this issue are not in dispute. Judge Conard issued a lawful order compelling the release of a prisoner, and Chief King chose to defy that order. In trying to enforce his order, Judge Conard told Chief King that he would either have to obey his order or face a contempt charge. *206Although Chief King complied with the order, he then publicly and repeatedly attacked the court, leading Judge Conard to file a charge of criminal contempt against him. It is clear that the proceeding initially contemplated by Judge Conard was a civil contempt hearing. Its purpose was to enforce compliance with his order compelling the release of Mr. Freeman.2 As such, his representation to Chief King — that all he had to do to avoid an appearance on that charge was to comply with the order — was not an attempt to make a deal; it was simply an accurate statement of the law of civil contempt. Chief King purged himself of the civil contempt when he released Mr. Freeman, and no proceeding on the matter was held. But Chief King did nothing to assuage the injury to the dignity of the court. Rather, he added insult by publicly and repeatedly defying its authority, proclaiming that he did not regret his actions and that he would do the same thing again. It was this outrageous conduct and, apparently, some research into the law of criminal contempt that led Judge Conard to charge Chief King with criminal contempt.3 Such a punitive sanction was appropriate. Chief King’s refusal to obey a lawful order was a direct, blatant challenge to the authority and dignity of the court. His subsequent defiance only compounded that wrong. Criminal contempt was a proper response.
Judge Conard tried repeatedly to explain this distinction to the Commission. It was not receptive to such a technical argument. The mode of analysis adopted by that body was straightforward. It saw this as simply a question of whether Judge Conard said that Chief King could purge himself of contempt by freeing Mr. Freeman and then, nevertheless, charged him with contempt. This is best exemplified by Commissioner Smith’s cross-examination, which led up to Judge Conard’s “promise was made in the ignorance of the law” statement.4 Viewed in *207context, this statement is not an admission that any agreement was made. It is a response to a question assuming that a promise had been made. While it is perhaps understandable that Commissioners were uninterested in the intricacies of contempt law, this Court can not be so cavalier.5 The principal opinion adopts the Commission’s paradigm without even pausing to consider whether it is appropriate. The majority treats this conversation as a negotiation, as if judges are required or encouraged to make deals to get their orders enforced. I do not see Judge Conard making an offer to Chief King in this conversation. He is, quite correctly, telling him what the consequences of his failure to obey will be. Nothing in that conversation suggests that Chief King will not face criminal contempt charges for his willful defiance of a lawful court order.
As the majority notes, misconduct requires more than an error of law or judgment, it requires a “transgression, dereliction, unlawful, or wrongful behavior, or impropriety that is willful in nature.” Both the Commission and the principal opinion seek to supply Judge Conard with an improper motive by noting that he only filed the contempt charges in response to attacks by Chief King. This is not an improper motive. Chief King’s announcement that he did not regret his defiance of the court’s order and that he would do it again greatly magnified the original injury to the dignity and authority of the court by making the challenge public and highlighting his continued disrespect for lawful authority. The fact that Judge Conard did not include the press statements as grounds for contempt is irrelevant. The initial act of defiance was the fundamental problem, and criminal contempt was appropriate to punish it.
Since I believe that Judge Conard had no wrongful motive in charging Chief King with contempt, I do not find that any of the Canons of Judicial Conduct were violated by the conduct alleged in Count 5. But one charge is particularly absurd. The principal opinion convicts Judge Conard of violating Canon 3A(3), which advises a judge to be “patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants....” Even a cursory review of the record shows the great lengths to which Judge Conard went to be reasonable. The patience he displayed — at eleven o’clock— after hours of open defiance by Chief King, in attempting to walk him through the legal basis for the release order is remarkable.6
*208Count 4 deals with the question of whether Judge Conard lied in his contempt affidavit when he said that, during the final call of the evening, Chief King “indicated that ... he was not sure if would follow the order of the court.” Contrary to what the principal opinion holds, the question of whether this statement is true does not depend upon whether an agreement existed between Judge Conard and Chief King. It depends upon whether the statement is true. Despite Chief King’s eventual acquiescence to Judge Conard’s order, he repeatedly equivocates about whether he will follow it:
Frank: Well anyway, that’s all there is to it you know. You can either do one of two things; you can inform me right now; that he is going to be released now and I will say that is still immediate even though it’s an hour late, or you can tell me you are not going to release him in which case you’ve got an order and I will see you in the morning.
Chief: Well the City Attorney just walked in, what are my options in discussing our conversation with him and calling you back?
The repeated questioning of the judge’s authority in the face of a lawful order was sufficient to support a criminal contempt charge. The fact that, after prolonged cajoling, Chief King eventually agreed to comply does not change the fact that he did express doubts as to whether he would enforce the Judge’s order. The affidavit’s allegation is literally true. It is not misleading since, for the purposes of criminal contempt, subsequent compliance with the order does not purge the contempt. Additionally, the evidence does not support the finding that this supposed untruth was willful. I would not find misconduct on Count 4.
I agree with the principal opinion that Judge Conard overstepped the bounds of his privileged right to reply to his attackers when he commented on the impending prosecution of Mr. Freeman. Accordingly, I eon-cur in the finding of misconduct on count 8. In addition to the mitigating factors cited by the principal opinion, I would also include the extreme provocation directed at Judge Co-nard by Chief King — who was more than merely “not blameless.”
I would reprimand Judge Conard for his misconduct on count 8.

. State ex rel. Chassaing v. Mummert, 887 S.W.2d 573, 578 (Mo. banc 1994).

. Judge Conard ordered Chief King to appear “to show just cause for [his] refusal to follow the valid order of a Circuit Judge” or face arrest.

. On December 1, two days after he issued the first show cause order, Judge Conard issued an entirely new order, requiring Chief King to appear and "show cause why he ... should not be adjudged guilty of, and punished for, Contempt of Court....”

. [Commissioner Smith]: I guess I'm a little confused. I think I'm supposed to be. I’m a layman here. And I think maybe when this Commission was established they expected a couple people here not to be familiar with the legal jargon and technicalities to exist as to interpret them that way and maybe a little different way. So I got to cut through all this. Maybe I can ask a question or make an observation and you can answer it. You won't have to go through too many questions. Seems to me like you told the police chief if he obeyed your order, he would not be held in contempt?
[Judge Conard]: Yes, sir.
Q: All right. Then you were going to withdraw the show cause?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: That’s semantics that I have problems with here. This is the layman. You had an agreement. He said okay. If you do this, I'm going to, and you are going to withdraw the show cause?
A: That's right.
Q: So then the police chief did what you wanted him to, the show cause was withdrawn?
A: And it was.
Q: But then it was reinstated?
A: That's correct.
Q: And was reinstated then apparently because he criticized the court?
A: Well, after he criticized the court, then I did the legal research and determined that the subsequent following of the act—
Q: What do you mean subsequent following of the act? I want this down in layman's words. What did he do then that would cause you again to issue that order?
Á: The fact that he decided to follow the order at 11:00 doesn't violate the contempt, the criminal contempt that occurred at 10:00 when you refused to follow it or earlier on the oral order.
Q: But you said there would be no such order and he did, regardless of his motives, he did what you wanted him to do. He released the prisoner. That’s what you wanted him to do?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Prisoner’s gone, fire is out?
A: Yes, sir.
[Judge Conard’s counsel]: This is a follow-up to Mr. Smith’s questions. I think the question that Mr. Smith is looking at, Judge Conard, is this, is that if the chief says okay, I’m going to release the prisoner and you say okay, that cancels the contempt, cancels an order to show cause, that in criminal contempt you cannot by later obedience eliminate the criminal contempt, am I right about that?
A: That’s my understanding of the law. Commissioner McQuie: But you have a promise, you promise this man do this and I won’t find *207you in contempt. What happens to that promise?
Commissioner Smith: That's my question.
A: Well, I guess that promise was made based on my ignorance of the law.

. While the authority cited in the principal opinion indicates that criminal contempt can be purged, its only authority on the topic is a 1920 California Court of Appeals case. Ryan v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.App. 71, 192 P. 1036, 1040 (1920). The principal opinion does not suggest what Chief King did that amounted to “a complete disclaimer of all contumacious intent.” Perhaps had he sent a letter to Judge Conard renouncing any desire to treat him disrespectfully — as the alleged contemnors in Ryan did — instead of going to television and attacking him, I would be more inclined to see that case as a relevant precedent. The majority cites no precedent for the proposition that a judge must excuse contemptuous behavior merely because the con-temnor eventually conforms his conduct to the requirements of the law.

. [Judge Conard]: Hey Dave, all I want you to do is follow that order. If you tell me you are not going to do it, that’s what you have told me, then I want you to come before the court and tell the court why you believe you don’t have to follow the order of the court. It’s just that simple. Chief [King]: I will tell you one thing, one of the things you have cited here is RSMo 544.170. I’ve got the provision here in front of me Frank. It deals with the 20 hour hold provision.
[Judge Conard]: Absolutely.
Chief [King]: What do you mean absolutely? It gives the police, as I read this, the right to hold somebody for 20 hours and if we hold them for longer than that, then we are in trouble.
[Judge Conard]: We get tired of pushing it; don’t stop halfway.
Chief [King]: What part am I missing?
[Judge Conard]: The last two sentences when it
talks about release. I can order him to be released.
Chief [King]: Now wait a minute, hold on, these are long sentences you know.
[Judge Conard]: That’s the attorney general's opinion. I can cite you the attorney general’s opinion, is that the annotated statutes or just the regular statutes?
Chief [King]: I have the Missouri Revised Statutes 1994.
[Judge Conard]: Get the red book.
Chief [King]: Yep.
[Judge Conard]: Okay, if you have the annotated statutes, it would contain a Missouri Attorney *208General’s opinion in there. The Attorney General's opinion is absolutely clear. The Circuit Judge has the authority to ...
Chief [King]: Wait a minute. Is this in fine print someplace at the end of this thing? It says cross references ...
[Judge Conard]: Oh yeah, if you’ve got that, then look at the bottom at Section 8 under the annotations.
Chief [King]: Well, no I don't think I’ve got the right book, I don’t think I have the hook you're talking about. There isn’t a section 8 in here.