Court Opinion

ID: 3309974
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-07-05 17:23:36.125789+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:59.607590
License: Public Domain

I concur in the judgment of affirmance and I agree with the conclusion of Justice Burnett that the provision in the lease of 1905, requiring the ending of the term upon a sale of the premises by the lessor, is a condition and not a mere covenant. I do not think, however, that the opinion fully states the grounds upon which the judgment must rest. The provision for the termination of the lease upon a sale of the premises was solely for the benefit of the lessor. (Foley v. Constantino, 43 Misc. 91, [86 N.Y. Supp. 780].) He could undoubtedly waive the benefit thereof and, without terminating the lease, he could sell and convey the premises subject to the lease. The grantee, if the lessor did not act in the matter prior to the conveyance, could also waive the right and continue the lease in force. In that case the lessee would have no right to declare the lease terminated and demand payment for his improvements. The part of the provision which was for his benefit was that which gave him the right to demand payment for his improvements as a condition concurrent with the exercise by the lessor or his grantee of the option to terminate the lease. If either attempted to exercise *Page 723 
the option, the lessor could demand payment for his improvements and the lease would not terminate until such payment was made. The evidence shows that the grantee, Diepenbrock, refused to pay for the improvements when the sale to him was made. As neither he nor Brown, the original lessor, paid or offered to pay the lessee for the improvements, the right which they had to terminate the lease upon that sale was thereby waived and the lease continued in force unaffected by the sale. The lessee had the right to continue in possession of the premises for the full term of five years. Instead of doing so, however, the lessee voluntarily executed another lease on November 17, 1906, seven days after the sale and two days after the rent in question became due, whereby he and his son became lessees of the premises upon different terms of rent for the period of one year beginning December 1, 1906. This transaction abrogated the previous lease for all that part of the original term subsequent to the beginning of the new lease. But it did not relieve the lessee from the obligation to pay the rent already accrued under the old lease at the time the new lease was made, nor did it preserve to him the right to demand payment for his improvements. The making of this new lease may have been unwise, but there is no claim that it was not voluntarily and intelligently made. The lessee must take the consequences of the condition in which he has voluntarily placed himself and pay the rent accrued under the old lease in accordance with his contract to do so.
Henshaw, J., and Angellotti, J., concurred.