Court Opinion

ID: 9828655
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:36:01.667071+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:51.489667
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In its motion for rehearing appellant presents for the first time the contention that fundamental error appears on the face of the record in this case in that the parties to the judgment ^nder attack, and which was annulled in this proceeding, were not parties to appellee’s present suit to have same set aside. .
An examination of the pleadings of ap-pellee and the judgment rendered herein discloses that neither the codefendants of appel-lee in the judgment under attack, nor the purchaser of the property in question, were made parties to the suit, though the existence of each of these is disclosed by the two instruments mentioned.
“A ibill in equity for relief against a judgment should join as defendants all persons really and beneficially interested in the judgment * * ⅜ including * * * persons claiming or acquiring interests in the property affécted by the judgment.” 34 O. J. 485, § 759.
“Where judgment is recovered against two or more as joint defendants all should join as plaintiffs in an action to enjoin its enforcement, or be joined as defendants in accordance with general rules in equity.” 34 O. J. 484, § 758.
See, also, 25 Tex. Jur. 653 § 234; Basham v. Holcombe (Tex. Civ. App.) 240 S. W. 691, and authorities there cited; Williams v. Nolan, 58 Tex. 708; Rone v. Marti (Tex. Civ. App.) 244 S. W. 639, 640; Bonner v. Pearson (Tex. Civ. App.) 7 S.W.(2d) 930.
Such defect of parties constitutes fundamental error. Dial v. Martin (Tex. Civ. App.) 8 S.W.(2d) 241.
Appellee’s prayer in part is “that upon hearing of this cause the judgment in cause No. 1709 be cancelled and set aside * * .* and that the sale of the aforesaid lots * * * be set aside.” The judgment rendered reads, in part, “that the judgment in cause No. 1709 * * * heretofore rendered in this court * * * be ⅜ * ⅜ cancelled, annulled and forever for naught held.” “It is further ordered that plaintiff * * * take nothing herein as respects her prayer for cancellation of the sheriff’s deed * * * to Homer D. Grant.” There is another recitation dismissing “her cause of action” for cancellation of the sheriff’s deed.
The pleadings disclose that Homer D. Grant was the purchaser of the property at sheriff’s sale under the judgment attacked by appel-lee and set aside by the court. One of his muniments of title was on the face of the judgment thus destroyed. McLean v. Stith, 50 Tex. Civ. App. 323, 112 S. W. 355; South Texas Lumber Co. v. Burleson (Tex. Civ. App.) 178 S. W. 961.
If appellee desired to cancel this judgment, she should either have 'brought all parties to and those materially and directly affected by it into court or alleged a valid excuse for her failure to do so. On the face of the record here, appellee’s codefendants in the judgment canceled were necessary parties. If facts exist which excuse their nonjoinder, these should have been alleged.
Motion for rehearing granted and judgment reversed and cause remanded.