Court Opinion

ID: 9581030
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:11:09.593343+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:39.974433
License: Public Domain

*613HABHAB, Judge
(specially concurring).
I concur with the judgment reached by the majority; however, I would find no error in admitting into evidence the rebuttal testimony of the psychologist concerning child sexúal abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS).1
The admissibility of CSAAS is an issue of first impression in Iowa. 'A number of courts in other jurisdictions, however, have permitted expert testimony regarding CSAAS.2 See People v. Bergschneider, 211 Cal.App.3d 144, 259 Cal.Rptr. 219, 226 (1989); People v. Sanchez, 208 Cal.App.3d 721, 256 Cal.Rptr. 446, 454 (1989); People v. Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 249 Cal.Rptr. 886, 891-92 (1988); Brady v. State, 540 N.E.2d 59, 70-71 (Ind.Ct.App.1989); Westbrook v. State, 186 Ga.App. 493, 368 S.E.2d 131, 134 (1988). But see Lantrip v. Commonwealth, 713 S.W.2d 816, 817 (Ky.1986).
CSAAS has five stages:
Stage one is secrecy, an element inherent in the adult-child relationship, where a child understands certain things should not be disclosed. Stage two is helplessness, the absence of power a child has in a relationship with a parental figure or trusted adult. The first two stages are present in every child and establish a child's potential to become a victim of sexual abuse. Stages three through five occur as the result of abuse. Entrapment and accommodation, the third stage, occurs after the child fails to seek protection. Stage four, delayed disclosure, occurs when the child tells someone about the sexual abuse. In retraction, the final stage, the child denies abuse has occurred.
Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 249 Cal.Rptr. at 888 (footnote omitted).
In State v. Gettier, 438 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 1989), the Iowa Supreme Court upheld the admission of testimony by a psychologist concerning the typical symptoms exhibited by individuals suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder. Independent evidence presented showed that the victim had displayed some of these symptoms. As a result, the evidence of post-traumatic stress disorder “was relevant as tending to show that [the victim] had been traumatized.” Id.
The distinction between CSAAS and post-traumatic stress disorder, in regard to expert testimony, is that a normal, non-sexually-abused child will display the same characteristics as a sexually-abused child. CSAAS, however, is useful and relevant to explain a “misconception” intimated by the evidence. See Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d at 394, 249 Cal.Rptr. at 891. I would permit expert testimony regarding CSAAS if the expert’s testimony is being admitted for the purpose of dispelling misconceptions which the jury may have concerning how children react to abuse.3 The State must carry the burden of demonstrating the existence of a misconception which the expert’s testimony is intended to dispel. See id., 249 Cal.Rptr. at 892.
Turning to the facts of this case, the psychologist’s testimony was offered to rebut the apparent misconception that the complainant was not afraid of the defendant following the incidents of sexual *614abuse. I would conclude the admissibility of the psychologist’s testimony concerning CSAAS was a matter within the discretion of the trial court.
I suggest in future cases where expert testimony concerning CSAAS is introduced, the jury be instructed it is not to use such testimony for the purpose of determining whether the complainant was sexually abused. Cf. id., 249 Cal.Rptr. at 892 (jury must be instructed that expert’s testimony is not to be used in determining the truth of complainant’s accusations); Sanchez, 208 Cal.App.3d 721, 256 Cal.Rptr. at 454 (if requested, jury must be given limiting instruction concerning CSAAS evidence).

. The psychologist used the term "victim accommodation syndrome” at trial rather than CSAAS. CSAAS, however, is the correct designation. See Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 Int’l J. Child Abuse & Neglect 177 (1983).

. CSAAS’s purpose is to explain why child sexual abuse victims exhibit various kinds of behavior, thereby aiding mental health professionals in the victims’ treatment. See Summit, supra note 1, at 179-80.

. The court in Bowker detailed the following examples:
[W]here a child delays a significant period of time before reporting an incident or pattern of abuse, an expert could testify that such delayed reporting is not inconsistent with the secretive environment often created by an abuser who occupies a position of trust. Where an alleged victim recants his story in whole or in part, a psychologist could testify on the basis of past research that such behavior is not an uncommon response for an abused child who is seeking to remove himself or herself from the pressure created by police investigations and subsequent court proceedings.
203 Cal.App.3d at 394, 249 Cal.Rptr. at 892.