Court Opinion

ID: 9740658
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:39:41.47073+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:19.505644
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH, dissenting: I respectfully dissent and request that the supreme court revisit Mitchell, a case in which I was the trial court judge. In neither the case at bar nor Mitchell could the appellants have accurately monitored their cases given the multitude of mistakes in the circuit clerk’s office. Where these ministerial errors occur, trial courts should be able to correct those errors. The mistake here, as in Mitchell, was actually the fault of the circuit clerk. The only way counsel could have accurately monitored this case was to constantly, .even daily, initiate ex parte communications with the judge or, perhaps, his or her court reporter or secretary, if he is fortunate enough to have one. Such communication is certainly undesirable. Attempts to monitor the case through the circuit clerk’s office, in the face of obvious malfeasance, would be futile, as well as nearly physically impossible, given the traffic in our overworked, understaffed, underpaid clerks’ offices. Moreover, in Mitchell, monitoring the case through the clerk’s office would not have uncovered entry of the order because it was not entered in the docket sheet or the file but had been misplaced by the clerk. The clerk was, in fact, unable for a period of time to find the order I requested. In response to the Mitchell situation, the circuit clerk in Sangamon County established a system to ensure that docket entries and orders were sent out as ordered. This system required the circuit clerk to file and certify a written proof of service each time that a docket entry or order is sent out by mail as the trial court ordered. This was the practice followed in the case at bar on at least three occasions, two prior to April 14, 2000, and one following April 14, 2000, and was relied upon by the attorneys of record: “PETER PAPPAS VS 99 MR 000273 DONALD WALDRON PROOF OF SERVICE The undersigned certifies that service of the foregoing, together with a copy of the 9-15-99 docket referred to herein, was made by enclosing a true copy thereof in an envelope plainly addressed to: Atty Duane Young 1330 S. 8th St. Ste. 2 Spfld, Illinois 62703 and depositing the same in the U.S. Mail postage pre-paid on the 16th day of Sept[.], 1999. Anthony R Libri Circuit Clerk JB_ Deputy Clerk ([stamped] FILED Sep[t.] 16[,] 1999 CIV-7 Anthony E Libri[,] Jr.[,] Clerk of the Circuit Court [certified] SEAL [of the] 7th JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT * SANGAMON CO., ILL *)” “PETER PAPPAS VS 99 MR 000273 DONALD WALDRON PROOF OF SERVICE The undersigned certifies that service of the foregoing, together with a copy of the docket 10-26-99 referred to herein, was made by enclosing a true copy thereof in an envelope plainly addressed to: DUANE D[J YOUNG LABARRE, YOUNG & DIETRICH 1330 S. 8TH ST[.], SUITE 2 SPRINGFIELD!,] IL 62703 THOMAS C[J PAVLIK 1 SE OLD STATE CAPITOL SPRINGFIELD!,] IL 62701 and depositing the same in the U.S. Mail postage pre-paid on the 27th day of Oct[.] 1999. Anthony P[J Libri Circuit Clerk _B_ Deputy Clerk ([stamped] FILED Oct[.] 27[,] 1999 CIV-7 Anthony P Libri[,] Jr.[,] Clerk of the Circuit Court [certified] SEAL [of the] 7th JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT * SANGAMON CO., ILL *)” “PETER PAPPAS VS 99 MR 000273 DONALD WALDRON PROOF OF SERVICE The undersigned certifies that service of the foregoing, together with a copy of the docket 9-19-00 referred to herein, was made by enclosing a true copy thereof in an envelope plainly addressed to: DUANE D[J YOUNG LABARRE, YOUNG & DIETRICH 1330 S. 8TH ST[J, SUITE 2 SPRINGFIELD [,] IL 62703 THOMAS C[.] PAVLIK 1 SE OLD STATE CAPITOL SPRINGFIELD!,] IL 62701 and depositing the same in the U.S. Mail postage pre-paid on the 27th day of Oct[.] 1999. Anthony P[.] Libri Circuit Clerk _il_ Deputy Clerk ([stamped] FILED Oct[J 27[,] 1999 CIV-7 Anthony E Libri[,] Jr.[,] Clerk of the Circuit Court [certified] SEAL [of the] 7th JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT * SANGAMON CO., ILL *)” Unfortunately, on the critical occasion, April 14, 2000, the clerk failed to mail the trial court’s docket entry awarding summary judgment, although the clerk did enter a docket entry in the court file at the judge’s direction to strike the cause of action. The docket entry stated: “4/14/2000 DOCKET D Judge: APPLETON, THOMAS R. Rep: FITZGERALD [,] MARY This cause comes on for consideration on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by each party. Both parties are present by counsel. Arguments heard. Judgment is entered for [defendant. There exists no material question of fact that [defendant has not claimed a lien on any part of the business premises. The lack of a demand or claim of a lien precludes the commencement of the 90-day option period. THE CLERK IS DIRECTED TO SEND A COPY OF THIS DOCKET ENTRY TO MR. PAVLIK AND MR. YOUNG. CAUSE STRICKEN.” The circuit clerk’s entry stated: “4/14/2000 Cause Stricken Signed Judge APPLETON THOMAS R. Status: Cause Stricken. Report: Terminated Apr[.] 14, 2000.” (Although this entry refers to the judge’s signature, the record contains no docket entry or document bearing the judge’s signature.) The record, unfortunately, does not reflect whether or when the April 14, 2000, judgment order docket entry of Judge Thomas Appleton was placed in the court file or input into the clerk’s computer. Neither is the record clear when this information was available to counsel in the court file or the clerk’s computer. In fact, the docket entry itself, though dated April 14, 2000, does not indicate on what date and time the docket entry was actually placed in the computer or the court file. The fact that a court reporter enters a docket entry in his computer does not indicate whether the clerk’s office transferred the docket entry to the case file or the clerk’s computer contemporaneously or at a later date. Under such circumstances, where a judge takes a matter under advisement with the understanding that his or her ruling will be mailed to the parties at a later date by the clerk, and the judge thereafter rules in his or her chambers and directs the clerk to mail the ruling to the parties, but the clerk fails to mail the ruling, the court has not expressed its order publicly, in words, at the situs of the proceeding as required. See Granite City, 141 Ill. 2d at 127, 565 N.E.2d i at 931. While this trial court did not expressly state that it would rule by mail, the court practice was clearly to rule by mail. Graves should, therefore, control here. That is, since the order was never mailed to the parties or their attorneys, the order did not become final for purposes of appeal. Moreover, the supreme court in Mitchell additionally stated: “The ‘mistake’ in the instant case was the belief of the circuit court and Mitchell’s counsel that a motion to vacate the judgment order, more than 30 days after its entry, was a valid means by which the circuit court could reenter the same order and thereby start a new 30-day period in which to file notice of appeal.” Mitchell, 158 Ill. 2d at 151, 632 N.E.2d at 1013. Here, the court and counsel made no such “mistake,” and for that reason, the court should be allowed to correct the clerical error. The supreme court should follow the law prior to Mitchell that allowed courts to apply equitable principles to correct mistakes of ministerial officers (see Cesena v. Du Page County, 145 Ill. 2d 32, 38, 582 N.E.2d 177, 180 (1991)), and to excuse a litigant’s mistaken reliance on a judge’s erroneous direction (see Needham v. White Laboratories, Inc., 639 F.2d 394, 398 (7th Cir. 1981)). However, the supreme court distinguished Mitchell from these cases, stating: “We do not believe, however, that the case at bar is analogous to the cases which employ equitable principles to correct ministerial mistakes.” Mitchell, 158 Ill. 2d at 151, 632 N.E.2d at 1013. Mitchell actually involved the very mistakes found in Cesena and Needham: (1) the clerk’s mistake in failing to file and forward my decision and (2) the court’s erroneous direction to file a motion to vacate the judgment order on the grounds of the clerical error. Clearly, Mitchell involved both the error of the ministerial officer, the clerk, and the judge’s erroneous direction. The trial and appellate courts in Mitchell, therefore, should have been affirmed. Alternatively, since the Mitchell court distinguished its facts from Cesena and Needham, indicating a difference between the case at issue there from the cases that employ equitable principles to correct ministerial mistakes, the court here can clearly reverse to correct the clerk’s ministerial error, even relying on Mitchell. For these reasons, I would reverse the trial court’s judgment in this case.