Court Opinion

ID: 9729625
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:45:12.118566+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:00.277228
License: Public Domain

White, C. J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case. I have no disagreement with the factual statement in the majority opinion. I do. disagree with the interpretation and conclusion of prejudicial error. This is the first civil case, as far as I am able to discover, that a judgment has been reversed for error in an opening statement. The matter of the conduct of counsel in an opening statement, under our trial procedure, rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge who is there and is able to evaluate the situation much better than an appellate court reading the cold record from hindsight. He sustained the objections of the State to the alleged improper statements and properly admonished the jury in an instruction to disregard all statements of counsel unless supported by the evidence. It is my opinion that such a situation reacts to the detriment of counsel much more than to his benefit in the final result of most cases.
This is a condemnation case. The county court appraisers awarded $59,000, and the jury here awarded $63,500. The only witness for the State on valuation placed the damage at around $40,000. The State does not even assign as error the excessiveness of the verdict. The damage here was awarded for the actual taking of a substantial number of lots, with a portion of them having operating business buildings on them, all ad*55mittedly of high value. Our cases admit and allow an extremely wide area and depth of proof as foundation for valuation. The range extends to a showing of every possible inconvenience or disadvantage and the showing of every actual, available, or reasonably prospective use of property. The most that can be said of counsel’s statement is that it overstated as to valuation and quality of proof the evidence that he actually offered. For example, counsel’s reiterated statements as to expected proof of “net income,” in the opening statement is attacked, and yet the actual gross rentals were introduced in evidence and the witnesses took into consideration the income-producing use of the property in fixing valuation. There could have been, in my opinion, no confusion in the jurors’ minds, in this respect, because no evidence of “net income” was introduced, even though it could be a proper foundational element for valuation.’ I know of no better aid to the determination of market value of business property than capitalization of rental income. There is no suggestion of error in the reception of evidence in this respect or in the comments of counsel in the final argument in this area. Again, counsel in the opening statement did overstate the valuation figures that the “independent” witnesses did testify to’ They did, however, testify as to valuations well beyond the range of the actual jury verdict of $63,500. In the light of this situation, it is difficult to believe that the failure of the witnesses to testify to a figure beyond what they actually testified to could have resulted in prejudicial error in the verdict that it actually returned. We would have to assume that the jury disregarded the witnesses’ actual evidence and were in some way deluded into following the overstatement as to figures on valuation made in the opening statement.
The valuation testimony actually introduced touched on the general areas that it was claimed were overstated in the opening statement. No assignment of error is made as to the reception of evidence except as to' *56points that were not mentioned in the opening statement. I think it is significant that there were no objections to the final argument in the case and apparently there was no reiteration of the claimed overstatements by counsel at this vital point in the trial.
There may be cases where prejudicial statements may be made in the opening statement. But, in this case, it is difficult to believe that after a long trial the jury, on deliberation, would start drawing comparisons between the actual evidence (and proper arguments) and the opening statement, and then turn and rely in their final determination on a remembrance of some of the overstatements of counsel in opening. I can find nothing in the result or verdict reached that would indicate this. Section 25-853, R. R. S. 1943, provides: “The court in every stage of an action must disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or proceedings which does not affect the substantial rights of the adverse party; and no judgment shall be reversed or affected by reason of such error or defect.”
I feel further that the effect of our opinion is to imply that we are holding counsel to compliance with a strict rule that requires his proof to exactly conform to his opening statement, when many times he cannot know specifically what the evidence on a given point will be, and it may vary or change, or a witness may not testify according to information previously acquired by investigation. Perhaps it should be, but the exigencies and pressures of trial work' do not permit preparation and investigation that assures the proof will exactly conform to the opening statement. Its purpose is to furnish an understandable picture and structure of a case and a party’s theory and what he expects to prove. I cannot believe that the variances recited in this case caused any prejudice.
Further, we should not set up procedural rules by which we inject a collateral issue in a case, and by which a litigant may be deprived of his verdict and suffer a *57reversal as a result of an adverse holding on an issue foreign to the merits, namely, a comparison of the admissible proof with the common overstatements of counsel in an opening statement.
The majority opinion states: “* * * the court, on the failure of such proof becoming apparent and proper objection being made thereto, should admonish the jury to disregard such statements or, if an admonition be deemed inadequate to cure the error, declare a mistrial.”
I cannot believe that this is the rule in any jurisdiction. It requires the court to make a comparison between the evidence and the opening statement during the progress of the trial, determine whether counsel knew or should have known that such evidence would not be produced, and then communicate the result of such comparison to the jury. Such a rule places an undue burden upon the trial court, introduces collateral issues into the trial, and creates confusion in the minds of the jurors.
Judge Spencer authorizes me to say he joins in this dissent.