Court Opinion

ID: 9378278
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-09 21:03:09.446339+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:20.030323
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/9/23; Opinion following order vacating prior opinion

                         CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                              DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                            E073979

 v.                                                            (Super.Ct.No. FVI1503175)

 JOHN M. OLIVA,                                                OPINION

          Defendant and Appellant.

        APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Tony Raphael,

Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part with directions.

        Jennifer Peabody and Arthur Martin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,

for Defendant and Appellant.

        Rob Bonta and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, Chief

Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland and Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorneys

        *Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this opinion is
certified for publication with the exception of “DISCUSSION” parts “A” and “B.”

                                                         1
General, Michael Pulos, Seth Friedman, Collette C. Cavalier, Kathryn Kirschbaum, Paige

B. Hazard and Joy Utomi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

       David Bustamante (the victim) was shot and killed in the parking lot of an In-N-

Out restaurant on Christmas Day in 2015. The victim was giving a tattoo to Nancy A.

when he told her he had to go out to meet a friend, who he was going to give tamales that

his mother had made. Ana S., who was Nancy’s girlfriend, was with them. While the

victim was driving, he received a phone call from a caller identified as Jboy 12th Street

on the victim’s phone advising him to drive to the In-N-Out in Hesperia. The victim

drove up to a red truck that was parked in the parking lot. The victim exited his vehicle

and the driver of the red truck immediately shot at the victim, yelling “La Eme” a term

for the Mexican Mafia. Both Nancy and Ana identified defendant as the shooter; cellular

telephone records placed defendant near the scene at the time of the shooting; and the

victim listed defendant’s cellular telephone number under the name Jboy 12th Street in

his contacts. Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, the special circumstances

of lying in wait and benefitting a criminal street gang, and weapons use and gang

enhancements.

       Initially, on appeal, defendant claimed that (1) the trial court violated his right to

due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment when it instructed the jury pursuant

to CALCRIM No. 315 that the jurors could consider the witnesses’ level of certainty

when evaluating witness testimony; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion and

denied his Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when it refused his request to

                                              2
continue sentencing to allow him to have DNA testing completed in order to potentially

file a supplemental motion for new trial.

       After this court issued its opinion on the above issues, affirming the judgment in

its entirety, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats.

2021, ch. 699 §§ 3, 4) (AB 333), effective January 1, 2022, which amended Penal Code

section 186.22 and added Penal Code section 1109.1 We recalled the remittitur, canceled

the remittitur, vacated our previous opinion and had the parties submit supplemental

briefing on the impact of AB 333 on the judgment in this case. Defendant contends that

AB 333’s amendments to section 186.22 changing the definitions of “criminal street

gang” and “common benefit to members of a gang” should be applied retroactively.

Based on these changes, remand for a new trial on the gang enhancements and the gang

murder special allegation is necessary. The People concede these changes to section

186.22 are retroactive and that the gang enhancements should be retried. The People

disagree that the gang murder special circumstance should be retried as this court should

find that the amendments do not apply to the gang special circumstance because the

amendments violate Proposition 21. If this court concludes that it is applicable to the

gang special circumstance, then remand for retrial is appropriate.

       In addition, defendant contends AB 333’s addition of section 1109, which

mandates that defendants who request to be tried separately on charged gang

enhancements must be granted a second-phase trial on the gang enhancements, should be

       1   All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

                                              3
applied retroactively. He insists that since the gang enhancements and gang special

circumstance were tried with the substantive crimes in this case, he is entitled to remand

for a new trial on all the charges. The People insist that section 1109 applies

prospectively, and even if it does apply, defendant was not prejudiced by the admission

of gang evidence at trial.

       We issue this new opinion addressing both the issues first raised on direct appeal

and the impact of AB 333.

                                PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       Defendant was charged in an amended information with one count of willful,

premeditated, and deliberate first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)).2 The

information further alleged the special circumstances that defendant intentionally killed

the victim while he was an active participant in a criminal street gang and the murder was

carried out to further the activities of the criminal street gang (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)) and

he was lying in wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)). It was additionally alleged that he

personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, which caused great bodily injury or

death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). It was also alleged that he committed the crime for the

benefit of and at the direction of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(c)).

Defendant was found guilty of all the charges. In a bifurcated proceeding, the court

found that defendant had suffered a prior serious and/or violent felony conviction (§§

       2   All further references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

                                              4
667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12, subd. (a)). Defendant was sentenced to 25 years to life

followed by life in prison without the possibility of parole.

                                   FACTUAL HISTORY

          A.    PEOPLE’S CASE-IN-CHIEF

                1.     SHOOTING

          On December 25, 2015, Nancy A. was given a Christmas gift by her girlfriend,

Ana S., of a tattoo. Ana contacted David the victim who was a tattoo artist. The victim

had previously given Nancy and Ana matching tattoos. The victim agreed to give the

tattoo to Nancy, and Ana booked the appointment for Christmas day. Nancy and Ana

only knew the victim from getting tattoos from him.

          Nancy and Ana picked up the victim from a restaurant around 1:00 p.m. in Ana’s

car. The victim was in a good mood. They then drove the victim to his house in

Victorville. They arrived at his house around 2:00 p.m. The victim set up the tattoo

machine in his room. The victim received a phone call as he was setting up the

equipment and talked for some time with the person who called him. He started on the

tattoo.

          Just before 3:00 p.m. on that day, the victim received another phone call. When

he got off the phone, the victim suggested to Ana and Nancy that they go get food and he

told them he had to first meet his friend. He wanted to give his friend tamales that his

mother had made. They got into the victim’s white SUV. The victim called the friend

from the car and asked his friend where he wanted to meet. Nancy believed they were

                                              5
going to deliver the tamales, get pizza and return to the victim’s house so he could finish

her tattoo.

       Nancy sat in the front seat and Ana sat in the back. The victim talked to his friend

on speakerphone while he was driving. Nancy could see the screen on the phone and it

showed he was talking to Jboy 12th Street. The friend told the victim to meet him at a

gas station located near the freeway at Mariposa and Main Streets in Hesperia. He was

not there when they arrived. The victim called his friend and asked where he was and he

directed him to the In-N-Out restaurant next door. The victim drove into the parking lot

of the In-N-Out and parked next to a red truck that was in the parking lot. The victim

pulled up so that the driver’s windows were facing each other.

       The driver of the red truck had his window down. Nancy and Ana identified the

driver of the red truck in court as defendant. Defendant asked the victim something about

Nancy being his “boy.” Nancy stated defendant’s voice sounded the same as Jboy 12th

Street who had been on the phone. The victim told him no, that he was just giving Nancy

a tattoo. Nancy handed the victim the bag of tamales and the victim got out of the car to

give them to defendant. Defendant pulled out a gun and shot the victim. Nancy stated

that the gun was a revolver and defendant shot at the victim until the revolver was empty.

The victim asked why he was shooting him when he fell to the ground. Defendant

responded “La Eme.” He repeated it several times while he shot the victim. Ana heard at

least four gunshots.

       Defendant quickly drove away. Nancy and Ana were afraid they would be shot

and ducked down to protect themselves. They got out of the passenger’s side door. Ana

                                             6
called 911. Nancy got out of the truck and ran to the victim. He was on the ground.

They told him to hang on and that they were getting him help. The victim was

nonresponsive.

       Nancy was shown a six-pack photographic lineup on the day of the shooting. She

was unable to identify anyone. She recognized defendant in court. She insisted he was

skinnier in the photographic lineup so she did not recognize him. Nancy was asked, “The

person in court, how sure are you that’s the individual that shot David the victim?” She

responded, “I’m a hundred percent sure.”

       Nancy did not recall stating to the police that the shooter had dark skin but

recalled she stated that the person was Hispanic. She described him as “heavyset.”

Nancy never saw defendant get out of his car. The victim was wearing a Raiders baseball

hat when he was shot.

       Ana described defendant as a Hispanic adult male with darker skin, possibly a

tattoo on his neck, and appeared to have acne scars on his face. She was shown

photographs from the victim’s social media accounts and identified defendant as possibly

being the shooter. She was not 100 percent certain. Ana chose defendant’s photograph

on that day from the six-pack photographic lineup. She believed it was the same person

she identified in court.

       An autopsy was performed on the victim on January 4, 2016. He was 37 years old

at the time of his death. He had five bullet wounds in his chest. He had a bullet wound on

his arm. Several bullets were taken out of his body. He died as a result of the bullet

                                             7
wounds. He likely died within a matter of minutes. The victim had a tattoo over his eye

that read, “hit um.”

              2.       INVESTIGATION

       San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Deputy Sprague was on patrol duty in Hesperia

on December 25, 2015. At 3:30 p.m. that day, he responded to reports of a shooting at

the In-N-Out parking lot near the intersection of Main Street and Mariposa. When he

arrived, there was a white SUV parked in the parking lot. There were no other cars.

Next to the SUV was a bleeding male, identified as the victim, and two females standing

over him. Both of the women were crying. Deputy Sprague initially felt a pulse and

observed gunshot wounds on the victim’s chest. However, after one minute, the victim

no longer had a pulse. The victim was transported to the hospital where he was

pronounced deceased.

       Detective Goodwin arrived at the In-N-Out around 6:00 p.m. On the ground near

where the victim’s body had been was a bag of tamales. A black and silver Raiders

baseball hat was found near the rear tire of the SUV. No cartridge cases or bullets were

found on the ground. Detective Goodwin obtained surveillance video from the In-N-Out

burger from between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m. that day.

       A burgundy or red truck entered the In-N-Out parking lot and met up with the

SUV. The truck left the parking lot at 3:34 p.m. Defendant became a suspect. He was

arrested on December 26, 2015. He was apprehended in a red truck matching the one

seen in the video surveillance.

                                            8
       The cellular telephone records for defendant’s phone were obtained. The victim’s

cellular telephone number was obtained and his phone records were reviewed. Based on

the records, at 1:57 p.m. and 1:58 p.m. on December 25, the victim made calls to

defendant’s phone. The victim was near his home in Victorville. Defendant’s cellular

telephone had a call made to it from the victim’s phone number. Defendant was at or

near his mother’s house which was in Hesperia.3

       At 3:32 p.m., the victim’s phone records showed he called defendant’s cellular

telephone and the records showed that the phone was using a cellular telephone tower

near the parking lot of the In-N-Out.

       Detective Goodwin also explained that each cellular telephone kept a log of GPS

coordinates for advertising purposes. The GPS location of the phone was usually within

30 feet of where the phone was located.4 The GPS records showed where defendant’s

phone had been. In the early morning hours of Christmas Day, at 12:50 a.m., defendant’s

phone was near the victim’s home. At 6:38 a.m., the phone was near his residence in

West Covina. The next GPS data was from 3:47 p.m. There was no data between these

times. At 3:47 p.m., the GPS showed the phone was at Ranchero Road in Hesperia. The

phone then appeared to travel to defendant’s mother’s house and pinged at that location

several times throughout the evening.

       3  Detective Goodwin explained that cellular telephones would ping off of cellular
phone towers which would give an approximate location of the cellular telephone when
the call was made.

       4  A sheriff’s deputy who was a technical investigator for the sheriff’s department
also testified to retrieving GPS data from a cellular telephone.

                                             9
       The victim’s phone was not found at the scene of the shooting. The last location of

the cellular telephone was logged at 3:50 p.m. on December 25 in the area of the 15

freeway and Ranchero Road. The victim’s phone records showed it had been at the In-N-

Out parking lot, then was taken south on the 15 freeway, and the last location was the off-

ramp at Ranchero Road off the 15 freeway. The victim’s phone was found on the ground

at the off-ramp of Ranchero Road near the 15 freeway. A baseball hat with a “P” on the

hat was found near the phone.5

       The victim’s phone was searched including his social media accounts. Several

photographs were taken from his two accounts. A contact in the victim’s phone was Jboy

12th Street which was attached to the number for defendant. The last phone call made on

the phone was to Jboy 12th Street at 3:32 p.m. A call was made to the victim from Jboy

12th Street at 3:17 p.m. The victim sent a text message to Jboy 12th Street at 1:44 p.m.

It said, “Traffic cool. Let me know when you start heading up so I can meet you.” At

1:46 p.m., the victim received a text message from Jboy 12th Street that said, “Went by

your house. Thought you were home. Seen the Navigator, but no one answered.” The

victim sent a message to Jboy 12th Street at 1:59 p.m. asking “So where are you so I can

meet you?” At 2:09 p.m., the victim sent a message, “Well, don’t leave without calling

so I can meet you.”

       The victim’s residence in Victorville was searched. An old cellular telephone

belonging to the victim was located. In the phone was a contact for Jboy 12th Street. A

       5   No DNA tests were performed on the victim’s phone or the baseball hat.

                                            10
search warrant was executed at defendant’s home located in West Covina. A cellular

telephone bill for defendant’s phone was obtained. It was the same number listed as Jboy

12th Street in the victim’s cellular telephone. A t-shirt with Money Motivated Ink was

found. This was a tattoo company owned by the victim.

        Defendant’s mother, Jacqueline Peterson, lived on Alston Street in Hesperia.

Defendant was driving his truck when he arrived around 2:30 p.m. at her house on

Christmas Day. He brought his girlfriend and her two children with him. Defendant left

the house between 2:30 and 3:00 p.m. but arrived home for dinner which occurred around

4:00 p.m. Peterson claimed defendant left the house to get cigarettes. Defendant seemed

normal when he returned for dinner.

        Peterson believed that defendant had been a member of a gang while living in

Pomona and that he had “Pomona” or “12th Street” tattooed on his head. Peterson

indicated that defendant was in the process of removing the tattoo from the back of his

head.

              3.     RECORDED JAIL CONVERSATIONS

        Defendant’s daughter spoke with defendant after the shooting and the conversation

was recorded. He told her to tell “Nato I said, sharks up.” He repeated the word sharks.

In another conversation, with his girlfriend, defendant started whispering. In the

conversation, he stated, “When I pulled In N out . . . That’s when I got mad . . . Fuck this

dude. I told you then but . . . David.”

                                             11
              4.     GANG EVIDENCE

       In 2012, defendant admitted to a detective from the San Bernardino County

Sheriff’s Department that he was a member of the 12th Street Sharky Pomona gang (12th

Street). His tattoos were documented.

       Detective Godoy was a designated gang expert. La Eme and 12th Street were both

criminal street gangs.6 12th Street was a Hispanic gang based in Pomona. The gang had

over 500 members and associates. La Eme was the Mexican Mafia under which 12th

Street would operate. The Mexican Mafia was capable of issuing an order from jail to a

gang member on the street to do work on behalf of the Mexican Mafia.

       Detective Godoy believed that defendant was an active 12th Street gang member

based on his prior contacts with law enforcement, his tattoos, and a recording after the

crime in this case in which he referred to sharks or sharkies. He had a “Pomona” tattoo

on his chest and on the back of his head which was a tattoo that a 12th Street member

would possess. He also had shark tattoos which was a 12th Street symbol. Gang tattoos

showed that defendant was a trusted member of the gang. Defendant also had a “G

shield” tattoo which was a symbol of the Mexican Mafia. The tattoo had to be earned by

doing work for the Mexican Mafia. Detective Godoy believed that defendant was an

associate of the Mexican Mafia. The victim was a member of the Monrovia Criminal

Street Gang. Defendant was depicted in a photograph wearing a baseball hat with a P on

it which was a symbol of 12th Street.

       6 The parties stipulated that La Eme and Pomona 12th Street were criminal street
gangs as defined in section 186.22, subdivision (b).

                                            12
       In Detective Godoy’s opinion, the shooting of the victim benefitted the Mexican

Mafia and the 12th Street gang. The crime would put other gangs in the area in fear that

a 12th Street member was working on behalf of the Mexican Mafia. It would benefit

12th Street, that they had a member doing crimes on behalf of the Mexican Mafia.

Further, mentioning La Eme would put the public in fear. The fact the crime was

committed in public in the daytime further would instill fear in others. He was unsure if

the victim was an associate of the Mexican Mafia. In searches of defendant’s residence

and his vehicle nothing was found connecting him to the Mexican Mafia.

       B.     DEFENSE CASE

       The only evidence presented was an excerpt from a book written by a former

member of the Mexican Mafia setting forth the rules of being a member. These included

that a member may not be a homosexual, an informant, a coward, must not raise a hand

against another member without sanction, not show disrespect for any member’s family,

not steal from another member, interfere with another member’s business activities, and

not politic against another member or cause deception within the organization. Further,

membership was for life and it was mandatory to assault/kill all defectors and dropouts.

                                      DISCUSSION

       A.     EYEWITNESS INSTRUCTION

       In his opening brief, defendant contended that the trial court violated his federal

constitutional due process rights by improperly instructing the jury pursuant to

CALCRIM No. 315 that a witness’s level of certainty is a factor to be considered in

evaluating the accuracy of identification testimony. He insisted that scientific studies

                                             13
have shown that certainty is not a determining factor of accuracy. After the initial

briefing was complete, the California Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v.

Lemcke (2021) 11 Cal.5th 644 (Lemcke) finding that CALCRIM No. 315 does not

instruct a jury that certainty equals accuracy and does not violate due process. In

Lemcke, the defendant presented expert testimony on eyewitness identification discussing

the relationship between certainty and accuracy. The parties submitted supplemental

briefing addressing whether the lack of expert testimony in this case renders it dissimilar

from Lemcke, and the instruction violated defendant’s due process rights.

               1.    ADDITIONAL FACTUAL HISTORY

       Here, the jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 315 in pertinent part as follows:

“You have heard eyewitness testimony identifying the defendant. As with any other

witness, you must decide whether an eyewitness gave truthful and accurate testimony.

[¶] In evaluating identification testimony, consider the following questions: [¶] “How

certain was the witness when he or she made an identification.” Several other factors

were listed.

       The jury was instructed in addition to CALCRIM No. 315 that, “You alone must

judge the credibility or believability of the witnesses. In deciding whether testimony is

true and accurate, use your common sense and experience. [¶] You must judge the

testimony of each witness by the same standards setting aside any bias or prejudice you

may have. You may believe all, part of none of any witness’s testimony. Consider the

testimony of each witness and decide how much of it you believe. [¶] In evaluating a

                                            14
witness’s testimony, you may consider anything that reasonably tends to prove or

disprove the truth or accuracy of that testimony.”

       They were further advised they must find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt based on all the evidence presented.

               2.     WAIVER

       The People contend defendant has waived the claim on appeal by failing to object

to the wording of the instruction in the trial court. There were no objections to the

instruction.

       In People v. Sánchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 461-462 (Sánchez), the court

considered the defendant’s argument that because there was “at best, a weak correlation

between . . . certainty and accuracy,” the trial court erred in instructing the jury with

CALJIC No. 2.92, the CALJIC equivalent to CALCRIM No. 315. However, it first

addressed waiver. The court stated, “The Attorney General argues the claim is forfeited

because defendant did not request that CALJIC No. 2.92 be modified. We agree. If

defendant had wanted the court to modify the instruction, he should have requested it.

The trial court has no sua sponte duty to do so.” (Sánchez, at p. 461.) As such, defendant

forfeited his claim of instructional error by failing to seek modification of CALCRIM No.

315 in the trial court.

       Defendant insists that if this court finds he waived his claim, that he received

ineffective assistance of counsel. Rather than address this issue, we will address the

                                              15
merits of defendant’s claim—despite him waiving the issue—in order to consider if

defendant suffered prejudice.7

               3.    LEMCKE

       In Sánchez, the court examined CALJIC No. 2.92 which contained similar

language as in CALCRIM No. 315 instructing the jury to consider in evaluating witness

testimony “ ‘the extent to which the witness is either certain or uncertain of the

identification.‘ ” (Sánchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 461.) The Sánchez court

acknowledged that “some courts have disapproved instructing on the certainty factor in

light of the scientific studies.” (Sánchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 462.) However, it found

the instruction was proper when uncertain and certain identifications were involved.

Moreover, it also found no prejudice concluding “[t]he instruction cited the certainty

factor in a neutral manner, telling the jury only that it could consider it. It did not suggest

that certainty equals accuracy. In this case, telling it to consider this factor could only

benefit defendant when it came to the uncertain identifications, and it was unlikely to

harm him regarding the certain ones.” Further, it found no prejudice as “the eyewitness

identifications were far from the only evidence connecting [the] defendant to the crimes.”

(Id. at p. 462.)

       7 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
show (1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced defendant.
(Strickland v Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688, 691-692; People v. Ledesma (1987)
43 Cal.3d 171, 216-217.)

                                              16
       In Lemcke, our high court revisited the issue in determining whether the certainty

language in CALCRIM No. 315 violated due process. The court found that “we find

nothing in CALCRIM No. 315’s instruction on witness certainty that operates to ‘lower

the prosecution’s burden of proof.’ “ (Lemcke, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 657.) It further

held, “the instruction does not direct the jury that ‘certainty equals accuracy.’ [Citation.]

Nor does the instruction state that the jury must presume an identification is accurate if

the eyewitness has expressed certainty. [Citation.] Instead, the instruction merely lists

the witness’s level of certainty at the time of identification as one of 15 different factors

that the jury should consider when evaluating the credibility and accuracy of eyewitness

testimony. The instruction leaves the jury to decide whether the witness expressed a

credible claim of certainty and what weight, if any, should be placed on that certainty in

relation to the numerous other factors listed in CALCRIM No. 315.” (Lemcke, at p. 657.)

       The California Supreme Court also stated that “Although the wording of the

instruction might cause some jurors to infer that certainty is generally correlative of

accuracy” the defendant presented expert testimony to “combat the inference.” (Lemcke,

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 657.) The court found this was an additional factor in finding that

defendant’s due process rights were not violated. It further referred to the other

instructions given to the jury, including that the jury had to find defendant guilty beyond

a reasonable doubt. (Id. at p. 658.)

       In Lemcke, the California Supreme Court further acknowledged that the form of

CALCRIM No. 315 “has the potential to mislead jurors” given “the empirical research

that ‘ “under most circumstances, witness confidence or certainty is not a good indicator

                                              17
of identification accuracy.” ’ ” (Lemcke, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 665.) Thus, while the

defendant “failed to establish that the trial court’s decision to include the certainty factor

in CALCRIM No. 315 violated his due process rights or otherwise constituted error under

the circumstances presented here[, the court recognized the] risk that the current version

of the instruction will prompt jurors to infer that an eyewitness’s certainty in an

identification is generally a reliable indicator of accuracy.” (Lemcke, at p. 669.) Thus,

the court directed “trial courts to omit the certainty factor from CALCRIM No. 315 until

the Judicial Council has the opportunity to consider how the language might be better

worded to minimize juror confusion on this point.” (Ibid.)

       Based on the findings in Sánchez and Lemcke, the instruction here did not violate

defendant’s due process rights. Defendant insists that CALCRIM No. 315 erroneously

invited jurors to infer eyewitness certainty provided accuracy. However, the California

Supreme Court has specifically stated that the instruction does not equate certainty with

accuracy. Defendant further contends that after Lemcke, without expert witness

testimony, the instruction violates due process. As stated, in Lemcke, the defendant

called an eyewitness identification expert who explained the limited circumstances when

certainty and accuracy are positively correlated. (Lemcke, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 657.)

       However, Lemcke first found that the instruction did not violate due process based

on the fact it was only one of several factors the jury considered in evaluating witness

testimony and it did not direct the jury that certainty equals accuracy. (Id. at p. 657.) The

court only addressed the expert witness testimony in further concluding that the

instruction did not violate due process but did not indicate that it was crucial to the

                                              18
analysis. The fact that there was no eyewitness identification expert testimony does not

render this case different from Lemcke.

               4.     PREJUDICE

       Further, even if the instruction should have been modified to exclude this factor,

any conceivable error was harmless under any standard. (Chapman v. California (1967)

386 U.S. 18, 24 [“harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard for constitutional

errors]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [reasonable probability standard for

state law errors].)

       Although the prosecutor noted during closing argument that the eyewitness

testimony from Ana and Nancy “really form the backbone of this case” there was

uncertainty in the identifications from Nancy and Ana. They both struggled to identify

defendant prior to trial. As stated in Sánchez, which was not overruled in Lemcke, “[t]he

instruction cited the certainty factor in a neutral manner, telling the jury only that it could

consider it. It did not suggest that certainty equals accuracy. In this case, telling it to

consider this factor could only benefit defendant when it came to the uncertain

identifications, and it was unlikely to harm him regarding the certain ones.”

       The court in Sánchez further found, as previously stated, that the eyewitness

identifications were not the only evidence connecting the defendant to the crimes.

(People v. Sánchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 462.) Similarly, here, the testimony of Ana

and Nancy was not the only evidence that supported that defendant was the shooter.

Defendant’s red truck was seen on In-N-Out surveillance entering and exiting the parking

lot around the time of the shooting. In addition, the victim and defendant exchanged

                                              19
telephone calls and text messages addressing meeting up that day. On the way to the In-

N-Out, Nancy stated that she saw the name Jboy 12th Street on the victim’s phone, which

was the contact for defendant. The GPS and cellular telephone tower evidence

established that defendant was in the area of the In-N-Out during the time of the shooting.

Defendant’s own mother provided evidence that he was away from her house in Hesperia

during the time of the shooting. Finally, defendant mentioned the In-N-Out and “David”

in his jailhouse conversation. As such, even though the eyewitness testimony assured

that defendant was the shooter, other circumstantial evidence established that defendant

shot the victim in the parking lot on Christmas Day. As such, he has suffered no

prejudice.

       B.     CONTINUANCE FOR MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

       Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his request for a continuance

of sentencing so that he could conduct DNA testing on the victim’s cellular telephone and

the baseball hat found nearby as such a request for a continuance was supported by good

cause. The denial also violated his rights to due process, a fair trial, and the right to

effective assistance of counsel at all stages of the trial proceedings. The matter should be

remanded for DNA testing to be performed on the phone and baseball hat, and depending

on the results, he should be given an opportunity to renew his request for a new trial.

              1.      ADDITIONAL PROCEEDINGS

       Prior to trial, defendant’s retained counsel, Mark Shapiro, sought several

continuances both to prepare for trial and to obtain DNA results on the “P” hat and the

victim’s cellular telephone. Defendant agreed to waive time from January 2017 through

                                              20
July 2017. The People had chosen not to test the items. Shapiro sought an order for

funding so he could conduct his own DNA testing and defendant agreed to waive time.

On October 27, 2017, Shapiro was still waiting for testing and defendant stated it was the

last time he was going to waive time. On December 1, 2017, defendant did not want to

waive time but agreed to a 60-day continuance. On February 9, 2018, Shapiro stated that

he was not ready to go to trial but defendant refused to waive time. Defendant reluctantly

agreed to a continuance if trial started in 60 days.

       On May 25, 2018, Shapiro again wanted to continue the case for DNA testing. On

July 6, 2018, the DNA had still not been tested but defendant did not agree to a

continuance. On July 13. 2018, Shapiro stated he was not ready to proceed to trial

because he was still waiting for the testing of the DNA on the baseball hat and the

victim’s telephone which was crucial to the defense. Defendant stated on the record, “I

don’t want to waive time I want to go forward.” The trial court found good cause to

continue the case over defendant’s objection. The baseball hat and the victim’s telephone

were being sent to an independent lab.

       On October 14, 2018, defendant refused to waive time but the attorneys were

engaged in trial. The trial began on October 16, 2018. During opening argument,

Shapiro argued to the jury that the police focused on defendant and did not look

anywhere else. They did not have DNA testing on the baseball hat and the victim’s

telephone.

                                              21
       The jury verdict was reached on November 5, 2018. Defendant obtained new

counsel on February 8, 2019. The matter was continued until June 2019 when

defendant’s new counsel filed a motion for new trial.

       Defendant’s counsel filed his motion for new trial on June 25, 2019. Defendant

raised several claims including that the People did not provide all of the discovery to the

defense, a recreation video of the shooting should have been excluded and improper gang

evidence was introduced. Further, he claimed ineffective assistance of counsel including

that his trial counsel failed to call a cellular telephone expert and failed to object to

inadmissible evidence. There was no mention of the DNA testing on the baseball hat or

the victim’s telephone. However, in defendant’s declaration, he stated that his trial

counsel never tested for DNA and fingerprints despite having an order to do so.

Defendant did not specify the items to be tested. The People filed opposition.

       The motion for new trial was heard on September 27, 2019. Defendant testified in

support of the new trial motion. He complained about the GPS evidence and that the

transcript of the jail call was inaccurate. Defendant also insisted that Shapiro convinced

him not to testify. There was no mention of the DNA testing. Shapiro also testified.

Shapiro stated that he had originally wanted to test the baseball hat and the victim’s

telephone. However, he and defendant agreed that they did not want to proceed with the

testing because Shapiro explained to defendant the aiding and abetting rule. Even if

defendant was not the shooter, he could have been present and aided and abetted the

shooting. Also, defendant wanted to hurry and go to trial. Shapiro did hire a private lab

to conduct the DNA test but stopped the process.

                                               22
       The matter was taken under submission and sentencing was scheduled for October

18, 2019. The matter was continued to October 25, 2019. The trial court issued a written

denial of the motion for new trial. In the denial of the motion for new trial, the trial court

noted, “Defendant faults Mr. Shapiro for not hiring a DNA expert. At the evidentiary

hearing, Mr. Shapiro testified that he obtained funding approval from the court . . . to

have an outside lab conduct DNA testing and that he wanted to conduct testing on [the

victim]’s cell phone and the hat that were found off Ranchero Road. Mr. Shapiro

testified that the defendant was not interested in having DNA testing completed and that

Mr. Shapiro also explained to the defendant that eve if someone else’s DNA came back

on one or more of these two items, the People can still proceed with their case against

defendant by relying on an aiding and abetting theory in light of the other evidence

showing that the defendant had arranged to meet with [the victim] when [the victim] was

shot and killed. At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Shapiro testified that the defendant was

constantly objecting to waiving time to continue the trial date and did not want to have

the DNA testing done. The court credits that testimony.” The trial court also concluded

that defendant had failed to show prejudice based on the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

       On October 25, 2019, the date of sentencing, defendant’s new counsel requested a

continuance in order to complete the DNA testing on the victim’s telephone and the

baseball hat. The items had been sent to a laboratory for testing but had been intercepted

by the mail service as suspicious. New counsel attested that the items had only recently

been received by the independent laboratory. Defendant’s counsel insisted the baseball

                                              23
hat and the victim’s telephone were relevant if DNA on the two items did not belong to

defendant. It was relevant to show he was not the shooter.

       The trial court noted that the motion for new trial had already been denied and that

new counsel had come on the case in February 2019. New counsel was aware all along

there had been no DNA testing. The trial court ruled, “And so looking as I sit here today,

and this has already been addressed in the Court’s order denying the motion for a new

trial, is the Court is not going to sit here and speculate at this juncture, you know, with

the delays that we’ve had in this case. And the Court has accommodated both counsel

with the delays. [¶] But I think at this point there’s nothing before the Court to indicate,

and the Court has already ruled on the motion for new trial. So the Court is going to

proceed forward with sentencing.”

              2.     ANALYSIS

       “Continuances shall be granted only upon a showing of good cause.” (§ 1050,

subd. (e).) “ ‘[T]he decision whether or not to grant a continuance of a matter rests

within the sound discretion of the trial court. [Citations.] The party challenging a ruling

on a continuance bears the burden of establishing an abuse of discretion, and an order

denying a continuance is seldom successfully attacked. [Citation.] [¶] Under this state

law standard, discretion is abused only when the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all

circumstances being considered.’ ” (People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 650.)

       “In reviewing the decision to deny a continuance, ‘[o]ne factor to consider is

whether a continuance would be useful.’ “ (People v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101,

1118.) The court considers “ ‘ “not only the benefit which the moving party anticipates

                                              24
but also the likelihood that such benefit will result, the burden on other witnesses, jurors

and the court and, above all, whether substantial justice will be accomplished or defeated

by a granting of the motion.” ’ ” (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1037.)

“ ‘There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so

arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer must be found in the circumstances

present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time

the request is denied.” (Mungia, at p. 1118.)

       Here, the trial court did not abuse its vast discretion in denying defendant’s motion

for continuance made after the denial of the motion for new trial. Initially, at the time

that defendant’s new counsel asked for the continuance, he had been representing

defendant for eight months. Counsel was aware of the DNA testing as Shapiro testified

regarding the decision not to conduct such testing at the motion for new trial.

Defendant’s new counsel provided no reason for waiting until sentencing to make the

request to test the items rather than in the motion for new trial. Although counsel stated

that somehow the items had been held up in the mail, counsel made no representation as

to any investigation into the DNA testing before sentencing. The DNA testing had been

an issue since the start of trial and did not constitute good cause to continue the

sentencing.

       Additionally, as noted by the prosecutor, the victim’s family was present in court

for the sentencing having traveled from Arizona and other areas to be present at the

sentencing. Defendant dismisses the importance of their presence arguing that they could

have put their statements on the record for later sentencing. However, the trial court

                                              25
reasonably could consider the families in deciding not to continue the sentencing. (See

People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1037.)

       Moreover, defendant failed to show that a continuance would be “useful.” (People

v. Mungia, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1118.) Defendant’s counsel insisted that the DNA

testing was relevant if it showed that the DNA on the victim’s phone and baseball hat did

not belong to defendant. This evidence, even if it showed DNA from some other party

would not have resulted in a reversal of defendant’s conviction. The trial court already

determined in denying the motion for new trial that such evidence would not change the

result of the proceedings.

       Further, as stated ante, defendant’s red truck was seen in the In-N-Out parking lot

at the time of the shooting; he was identified as the shooter; defendant’s cellular

telephone was tracked to the area of the shooting; the victim was on the phone with

defendant as he pulled into the In-N-Out parking lot to give him tamales; and defendant

mentioned “David” and In-N-Out during a taped jail conversation. Even if the DNA

testing had been complete, the fact that someone other than the victim or defendant was

on the items, that would not exonerate defendant. The trial court did not abuse its

discretion by denying defendant’s motion for continuance after the denial of his motion

for new trial.

                                             26
         C.    AB 333

               1.     RETRIAL OF GANG ENHANCEMENT—PENAL CODE SECTION

                      186.22, SUBDIVISION (B)(1)(C)

         Defendant contends the gang enhancement found true pursuant to 186.22,

subdivision (b)(1)(c), must be vacated and the cause remanded for the People to choose

whether to retry the enhancement based on AB 333’s amendment of section 186.22

effective after his trial. He insists that under the principles of In re Estrada (1965) 63

Cal.2d 740 (Estrada), the revisions should be applied retroactively since his case is not

final.

         Section 186.22 enhances the punishment of a person convicted of an enumerated

felony committed “for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal

street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in criminal conduct by

gang members.” (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1); see also People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th

657, 664 (Sek).) “[AB] 333 took effect on January 1, 2022 and amended section 186.22

by modifying the definitions of ‘pattern of criminal activity’ and ‘criminal street gang,’

and it clarified what is required to show an offense ‘benefit[s], promote[s], further[s], or

assist[s]’ a criminal street gang.” (People v. Perez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 192, 206,

review granted Aug. 17, 2022, S275090.)8

         8Despite review being granted by the California Supreme Court in many of these
AB 333 cases, the cases may be cited for their persuasive authority and for establishing
the existence of a conflict of authority. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115 (e)(3).)

                                             27
       “[T]he Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 333, which amended section 186.22

to impose new substantive and procedural requirements for gang allegations. Most

notably, the law defined ‘to benefit, promote, further, or assist’ as ‘to provide a common

benefit to members of a gang where the common benefit is more than reputational.

Examples of a common benefit that are more than reputational may include, but are not

limited to, financial gain or motivation, retaliation, targeting a perceived or actual gang

rival, or intimidation or silencing of a potential current or previous witness or informant.’

[Citation.] In addition, the law created a stricter requirement for proof of ‘a pattern of

criminal gang activity,’ which is necessary to prove that the group with which the

defendant is associated is indeed a criminal street gang. [Citation.] Previously, the

prosecution needed to prove only that those associated with the gang had committed at

least two offenses from a list of predicate crimes on separate occasions within three years

of one another. [Citation.] Under the newly amended law, the offense with which the

defendant is currently charged cannot be used as one of the two predicate offenses.

[Citation.] In addition, both predicate offenses must have been committed ‘within three

years of the date the current offense is alleged to have been committed,’ by gang

‘members,’ and must have been for the ‘common[] benefit[] [of] a criminal street gang.’ ”

(Sek, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 665.)

       The California Supreme Court has affirmed that these amendments to section

186.22 should be applied retroactively. In People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169 (Tran),

the court explained, “Estrada ‘stand[s] for the proposition that (i) in the absence of a

contrary indication of legislative intent, (ii) legislation that ameliorates punishment (iii)

                                              28
applies to all cases that are not yet final as of the legislation's effective date.’ [Citation.]

Estrada applies to statutory amendments ‘which redefine, to the benefit of defendants,

conduct subject to criminal sanctions.’ [Citation.] Here, ‘[AB] 333 essentially adds new

elements to the substantive offense and enhancements in section 186.22—for example,

by requiring proof that gang members ‘collectively engage’ in a pattern of criminal gang

activity, that the predicate offenses were committed by gang members, that the predicate

offenses benefitted the gang, and that the predicate and underlying offenses provided

more than a reputational benefit to the gang . . . .’ [Citations.] These changes have the

effect of ‘increas[ing] the threshold for conviction of the section 186.22 offense and the

imposition of the enhancement,’ with obvious benefit to defendants like Tran.” (Id. at pp.

1206-1207.)

       The People concede, and we agree, that the amendments could benefit defendant

and thus AB 333 applies retroactively to defendant’s case in relation to the gang

enhancement found true pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C). (See People v.

E.H. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 467, 478.) The appropriate remedy is to remand the matter

to the trial court to give the People an opportunity to retry the gang enhancement

allegation under the new law. (Sek, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 669) We vacate the true

findings on the section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(c), enhancement and remand to the trial

court for further proceedings.

                                               29
              2.     GANG SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCE—PENAL CODE SECTION

                     190.2, SUBDIVISION (A)(22)

       Defendant further contends the gang murder special circumstance found true by

the jury pursuant to section 190.2, subdivision (a)(22), must also be reversed based on the

same amendments to section 186.22 as discussed ante. The People argue that such

amendment violates the voter initiative Proposition 21 and should be excluded from the

amendments to section 186.22.

       Under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(22), the punishment for first degree murder is

death or life without the possibility of parole if “[t]he defendant intentionally killed the

victim while the defendant was an active participant in a criminal street gang, as defined

in subdivision (f) of Section 186.22, and the murder was carried out to further the

activities of the criminal street gang.” Section 190.2, subdivision (a)(22), expressly

incorporates the statutory definition of what constitutes a criminal street gang as set forth

in section 186.22, subdivision (f). AB 333 changed the definition of “criminal street

gang.” “Criminal street gang” was previously defined as an “ongoing organization,

association, or group of three or more persons . . . whose members individually or

collectively engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of criminal gang activity.” (Former

§ 186.22, subd. (f).) It is now defined as an “ongoing, organized association or group of

three or more persons . . . whose members collectively engage in, or have engaged in, a

pattern of criminal gang activity.” (§ 186.22, subd. (f).) The People concede these

amendments can be interpreted to apply to the gang special circumstance but contend that

such amendment is invalid as applied to section 190.2, subdivision (a)(22).

                                              30
       The gang special circumstance was part of the voter initiative Proposition 21

passed in 2000 whose purpose was to impose “severe penalties” for gang-related felonies.

(People v. Rojas (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 542, 550, review granted Oct. 19, 2022,

S275835.) “Proposition 21 does not permit any legislative amendment except upon two-

thirds passage of each house or enactments subject to voter approval.” (Id. at p. 553) In

Rojas, the court found that “[b]ecause [AB] 333 ‘takes away’ from the scope of conduct

that Proposition 21 made punishable under section 190.2, it is an amendment. While the

Legislature was free to amend Proposition 21 in this fashion, it could only do so with a

two-thirds vote in each house. [Citations.] [AB] 333 did not comply with that

requirement and therefore cannot amend Proposition 21.” (Id. at p. 555.) It concluded,

“The appropriate remedy is not to void [AB] 333 in its entirety, but rather to disallow this

unconstitutional application of [AB] 333. [Citation.] Consequently, we hold that [AB]

333 does not alter the scope or effect of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(22). (Id. at pp.

557-558.)

       Several other courts have found that AB 333 did not unconstitutionally amend

section 190.2, subdivision (a)(22). (See People v. Lee (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 232, review

granted on Oct. 19, 2022, S275449; People v. Lopez (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 1, 15.) In

Lee, the court explained that “amendment of the definition ‘criminal street gang’ by AB

333 does not prohibit what Proposition 21 authorized, or authorize what Proposition 21

prohibited. We find nothing to suggest that the electorate intended to impose a time-

specific incorporation of the term ‘criminal street gang’ in the gang-murder special

circumstance statute. Thus, we conclude that the term ‘criminal street gang’ as

                                             31
incorporated in the gang-murder special circumstance statute was ‘intended to conform at

all times’ and ‘remain permanently parallel’ to section 186.22.” (Lee, at p. 245.) The

court in Lopez found that the voters gave no indication of any intent to “ ‘freeze [the]

statutory definition’ ” of criminal street gang and that defendant should be entitled to the

benefit of the amendments. (Lopez, at pp. 22, 24-25.) We adopt the findings in Lee and

Lopez and find that AB 333 did not unconstitutionally amend section 190.2, subdivision

(a)(22).

       The People concede that if this court finds AB 333’s amendment of the gang

murder special circumstance is not unconstitutional, the proper remedy is remand to the

trial court for retrial. We agree and will order that the gang murder special circumstance

be reversed. We will remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

               3.    PENAL CODE SECTION 1109

       AB 333 added section 1109, which allows a defendant to request a bifurcated trial

when there is a gang enhancement allegation. (§ 1109, subd. (a); Sek, supra, 74

Cal.App.5th at p. 665.) If the defendant so requests, the trial court must try the case in

two separate phases: “(1) The question of the defendant’s guilt of the underlying offense

shall be first determined,” and then “(2) If the defendant is found guilty of the underlying

offense and there is [gang enhancement allegation], there shall be further proceedings to

the trier of fact on the question of the truth of the enhancement.” (§ 1109, subds. (a)(1)

and (a)(2).)

       Defendant insists that section 1109 should apply retroactively to his case under

Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740. All of his convictions should be reversed and the matter

                                             32
remanded for retrial of the offenses in two separate phases. The People argue section

1109 applies prospectively only and that any error in not bifurcating the proceedings was

harmless in any event.

       The Courts of Appeal are split on whether section 1109 applies retroactively.

Some courts have held that section 1109 applies retroactively under Estrada. (People v.

Burgos (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 550, 568, review granted July 13, 2022 (S274743); People

v. Ramos (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 1116, 1129-1130.) Other courts have found it applies

only prospectively. (People v. Ramirez (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 48, 65, review granted

Aug. 17, 2022 (S275341); People v. Perez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 207.) The issue is

currently under review with the California Supreme Court in Burgos. Most recently, in

People v Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at page 1208, the California Supreme Court declined to

resolve the split, concluding any failure to bifurcate the gang allegations was harmless.

       We need not decide the issue because we conclude any failure to bifurcate the

proceedings in this case was harmless. We therefore assume, without deciding, that

section 1109 applies retroactively. (People v. E.H., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 480

[assuming without deciding that section 1109 applies retroactively].)

       We find that the introduction of gang evidence in this case was not prejudicial

under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818. (Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 1209-

1210.)9 Initially, the gang evidence was properly admitted to prove the gang murder

       9 As the court in Tran, we reject defendant’s contention that review is subject to
the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.
The admission of gang evidence in this case did not render his trial fundamentally unfair.
(Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1209.)

                                            33
special circumstance. “[S]ection 190.1 ‘require[s] the truth of a prior murder conviction

special circumstance be tried only after the guilt determination, but other special

circumstances, including a gang special circumstance . . . , be determined at the same

time as the guilt determination.” (People v. Montano (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 82, 110.)

Section 1109 “does not apply to the determination of special circumstance allegations

under section 190.2 (a)(22).” (Montano at p. 114.) Hence, much of the gang evidence

introduced at trial was admissible to prove the gang murder special circumstance. As

such, defendant cannot show prejudice by the failure to bifurcate the finding on the gang

enhancements as the evidence was properly admitted at trial.

       Defendant has contended that the People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731

(Bigelow) exception applies, which requires a separate trial on a special circumstance in

general, or at least in this particular case. The gang evidence would not have been

admitted in the murder trial as it would have only been admissible in a bifurcated trial on

the special circumstance.

       In Bigelow, the court found that “If evidence relevant only to a special

circumstance is introduced at the guilt trial, . . . , it should be accompanied by a jury

instruction limiting its use. When that evidence is highly prejudicial, the court should

exclude it at the guilt trial and conduct a separate trial of the special circumstance

allegations.” (Bigelow, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 748, fn. omitted, italics added.) The

California Supreme Court addressed the Bigelow exception in People v. Fierro (1991) 1

Cal.4th 173, a death penalty case. In Fierro, the defendant moved to bifurcate trial on the

guilt phase and the special circumstance allegation, relying on Bigelow. The request was

                                              34
denied and the California Supreme Court upheld the ruling. It stated, “The court’s ruling

was correct. The statutory scheme plainly contemplates that, except where the special

circumstance alleged is that of a prior murder, the same jury which determines guilt shall

also at the same time determine the truth of the special circumstance allegation: ‘The

question of the defendant’s guilt shall first be determined. If the trier of fact finds the

defendant guilty of first degree murder, it shall at the same time determine the truth of all

special circumstances charged . . . except . . . where it is alleged that the defendant had

been convicted in a prior proceeding of the offense of murder in the first or second

degree.’ [Citation.] [¶] Defendant’s reliance on . . . Bigelow, supra, 37 Cal.3d 731, is

misplaced. In that case, one of the special circumstance allegations was murder for the

purpose of avoiding arrest or perfecting an escape. [Citation.] At the guilt phase the

prosecution presented evidence highly prejudicial to the defendant, indicating that he had

committed a dozen uncharged burglaries, robberies and thefts; the prosecution’s primary

theory of relevance was that the defendant committed each of the crimes to finance and

perpetuate an escape from custody, which was relevant to the special circumstance

allegation. Because of the ‘highly prejudicial’ nature of the prior-crimes evidence, we

concluded that the trial court should have conducted a separate trial of the special

circumstance allegation. [Citation.] [¶] The facts of the present case are not even

remotely similar to those in Bigelow. No evidence was presented to the jury during the

guilt phase which could be characterized as so ‘highly prejudicial’ [citation] that the

jury’s ability to render a fair and impartial verdict on the special circumstance allegation

would be impaired.” (Fierro, at p. 229.)

                                              35
       The Montano court recognized the Bigelow exception and Fierro. It noted, “Our

research discloses no published case holding bifurcation of a special circumstance murder

allegation is permissible other than as provided in section 1901.1 et seq.”10 (Montano,

supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 111.) Here, the prosecution was not seeking the death

penalty.

       Moreover, the gang evidence was relevant to the murder charge in this case and

not to just prove the special circumstance. It was admissible to show identity in that the

two witnesses, Nancy and Ana, observed that the victim was speaking with Jboy 12th

Street on his phone just prior to meeting up with defendant in the parking lot. The

shooter also shouted “La Eme” during the shooting tending to show that a gang member

committed the shooting. Evidence of a defendant’s gang affiliation can be admissible to

prove identity. (People v. Becerrada (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1009, 1022 [“ ‘Evidence of the

defendant’s gang affiliation—including evidence of the gang’s territory, membership,

signs, symbols, beliefs and practices, criminal enterprises, rivalries, and the like—can

help prove identity, motive, modus operandi, specific intent, means of applying force or

fear, or other issues pertinent to guilt of the charged crime’ ”].) Additionally, the

       10  Section 190.1, subdivision (a), which applies to death penalty cases, provides,
“(a) The question of the defendant’s guilt shall be first determined. If the trier of fact
finds the defendant guilty of first degree murder, it shall at the same time determine the
truth of all special circumstances charged as enumerated in Section 190.2 except for a
special circumstance charged pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section
190.2 where it is alleged that the defendant had been convicted in a prior proceeding of
the offense of murder in the first or second degree.”

                                             36
evidence admitted was not “highly prejudicial.” The Bigelow exception is not supported

in this case.

       Regardless, the evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming even without the

gang evidence. Defendant was positively identified by Nancy and Ana. Further, even

without the eyewitness testimony, defendant’s red truck was seen on In-N-Out’s

surveillance entering and exiting the parking lot around the time of the shooting. In

addition, the victim and defendant exchanged telephone calls and text messages

addressing meeting up that day. On the way to the In-N-Out, Nancy stated that she saw

the name Jboy 12th Street on the victim’s phone, which was the contact for defendant.

Even though defendant’s gang moniker was introduced, it was only to establish that it

was defendant on the phone and this evidence would have been admitted in some form

even if the gang reference was omitted. The GPS and cellular telephone tower evidence

established that defendant was in the area of the In-N-Out during the time of the shooting.

Defendant’s own mother provided evidence that he was away from her house in Hesperia

during the time of the shooting. Finally, defendant mentioned the In-N-Out and “David”

in his jailhouse conversation.

       The admission of gang evidence in this case was not prejudicial and a retrial on all

of the charges is not required.11

       11 We note that since we have ordered remand to the trial court for either retrial of
the gang enhancement and gang murder special circumstance, or resentencing, the trial
court shall apply all current sentencing laws at the time of resentencing. This shall
include, but is not limited to, the discretion to strike an enhancement pursuant to section
12022.53, subdivision (h).

                                            37
                                      DISPOSITION

       We reverse defendant’s sentence. We additionally reverse the true findings on the

gang murder special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)), and the gang enhancement

(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).) The People may elect to retry those allegations under the law

as amended by AB 333. If the People elect not to retry those allegations, defendant shall

be resentenced. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

       CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION

                                                        MILLER
                                                                                        J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ
                              P. J.

FIELDS
                                 J.

                                            38