Court Opinion

ID: 9402128
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-15 15:01:10.66209+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:57.996585
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                     ____________________
No. 22-2313
CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY
OF AMERICA,
                                                  Plaintiff-Appellant,

                                 v.

WYNNDALCO ENTERPRISES, LLC, et al.,
                                               Defendants-Appellees.
                     ____________________

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the
           Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
              No. 20-cv-03873 — John Z. Lee, Judge.
                     ____________________

    ARGUED FEBRUARY 14, 2023 — DECIDED JUNE 15, 2023
                ____________________

   Before ROVNER, KIRSCH, and JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit
Judges.
     ROVNER, Circuit Judge. This business insurance coverage
dispute calls on us to decide whether a broad catch-all provi-
sion in a violation-of-statutes exclusion relieves the insurer of
the duty to defend its insured in litigation over violations of
Illinois’ Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”), 740
ILCS 141 et seq. After Wynndalco Enterprises, LLC was sued
2                                                                No. 22-2313

in two putative class actions for violating BIPA, its business
liability insurer, Citizens Insurance Company of America,
filed this action seeking a declaration that it has no obligation
under the terms of the insurance contract to indemnify
Wynndalco for the BIPA violations or to supply Wynndalco
with a defense. Citizens’ theory is that alleged violations of
BIPA are expressly excluded from the coverage of the policy.
Wynndalco counterclaimed seeking a declaration to the con-
trary that Citizens is obligated to provide it with a defense in
both actions. The district court entered judgment on the
pleadings for Wynndalco, finding that the language of the
catch-all exclusion is ambiguous on its face and that, constru-
ing that ambiguity in favor of the insured, Citizens conse-
quently had a duty to defend Wynndalco. 1 We agree with the

    1 This is an issue that has divided the lower courts. Compare Thermoflex

Waukegan, LLC v. Mitsui Sumitomo Ins. USA, Inc., No. 21 C 788, 2023 WL
319235, at *5–*7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 2023), appeals filed, Nos. 23-1521 & 23-1578
(7th Cir. Mar. 20 & 27, 2023); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., S.I. v. Carnagio En-
ters., Inc., No. 20 C 3665, 2022 WL 952533, at *6–*7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2022);
Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Highland Baking Co., No. 20-cv-04997, 2022 WL
1210709, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2022); Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Thermoflex
Waukegan, LLC, 588 F.Supp.3d 845, 853–54 (N.D. Ill. 2022); Am. Family Mut.
Ins. Co., S.I. v. Caremel, Inc., No. 20 C 637, 2022 WL 79868, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 7, 2022) (all rejecting arguments that similar catch-all exclusions un-
ambiguously barred coverage for BIPA violations), with State Auto Prop. &
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Fruit Fusion, Inc., — F.Supp.3d —, No. 3:21-CV-1132-NJR,
2022 WL 4549824 (S.D. Ill. Sep. 29, 2022); Continental W. Ins. Co. v. Cheese
Merchants of Am., LLC, — F.Supp.3d —, No. 21-cv-1571, 2022 WL 4483886,
at *9–*16 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 27, 2022); Westfield Ins. Co. v. Archer Advisors, LLC,
No. 21 CH 1469 (Cook Cnty. Cir. Ct. Aug. 4, 2022) (unpublished transcript
attached to Citizens Br. as Exhibit A); Mass. Bay Ins. Co. v. Impact Fulfillment
Servs., LLC, No. 1:20 CV 926, 2021 WL 4392061, at *5–*7 (M.D.N.C. Sep. 24,
2021) (applying North Carolina law) (all concluding that similar catch-all
exclusions barred coverage for BIPA violations).
No. 22-2313                                                    3

district court that the facial breadth of the catch-all provision
gives rise to an ambiguity in the policy, in that the catch-all
provision appears to nullify coverage that the policy else-
where purports to provide. Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Wynndalco Enters., LLC, 595 F.Supp.3d 668 (N.D. Ill. 2022). The
narrowing construction that Citizens proposes to resolve that
ambiguity is not supported by the language of the provision
and does not, in fact, resolve the ambiguity. In view of what
the district court described as the “intractabl[e] ambigu[ity]”
of the provision, Citizens must defend Wynndalco in the two
class actions. Id. at 676.
                                 I.
    The litigation that has given rise to this coverage dispute
stems from a massive database of facial-image scans assem-
bled by Clearview AI, an artificial intelligence firm that spe-
cializes in facial recognition software. We accept as true the
following factual allegations gleaned from the two com-
plaints filed against Wynndalco.
    Clearview AI allegedly has extracted or “scraped” in ex-
cess of three billion photographs of individuals from online
social media, content-sharing, and digital payment platforms
(including Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, TikTok, Snapchat,
YouTube, Google Photos, LinkedIn, and Venmo); converted
those images into biometric facial recognition identifiers us-
ing proprietary algorithms; collected the original images and
their biometric counterparts into its database; and paired
those images with information as to where those images were
found on the Internet. Clearview AI has also created a facial
recognition application or “app” that allows a user to identify
an individual by uploading a photograph of that person to the
app. The app then allows the user to see other photographs of
4                                                     No. 22-2313

that same person on the media platforms or websites where
they appear, along with the identifying information (includ-
ing their name, address, and other personal information) as-
sociated with that individual. Thus, a user could take a pho-
tograph of a stranger on the street and upload the image to
the app, which converts the photograph into a biometric facial
scan, and (assuming the individual’s photos and information
are in Clearview AI’s database), determine who that person
is, and access any number of additional photographs of and
associated content (tweets, Facebook and Instagram posts,
YouTube and TikTok videos, LinkedIn profiles, etc.) created
by and about that individual. Clearview AI marketed the app
to law enforcement agencies, among others. See Kashmir Hill,
The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy As We Know It,
NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 18, 2020), available at https://www.ny-
times.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-
recognition.html?.
   The Chicago Police Department, through its purchasing
agent CDW-Government, gained access to the Clearview AI
database and its facial-identification app by means of a two-
year contract between CDW-Government and Wynndalco.
    Melissa Thornley and Mario Calderon are the respective
lead, named plaintiffs in two putative class actions filed on
behalf of themselves and other Illinois residents whose facial
images have been collected and scanned into the Clearview
AI database: Thornley, et al. v. CDW-Government, LLC, et al.,
No. 2020 CH 04346 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty. filed May 27, 2020);
Calderon, et al. v. Clearview AI, Inc., et al., No. 1:20-cv-01296-CM
(S.D.N.Y. filed Jul. 22, 2020). We shall refer to the two suits
using their surnames.
No. 22-2313                                                   5

    Wynndalco is an Illinois-based information technology
services and consulting firm. The Thornley and Calderon com-
plaints describe Wynndalco’s relationship with Clearview AI
in two different ways. According to the Thornley complaint,
Clearview AI was not able to sell access to its database and
app directly to the Chicago Police Department because it was
not an approved vendor for the department, whereas
Wynndalco was an approved vender. Thus, CDW-
Government contacted Wynndalco and entered into an ar-
rangement pursuant to which Wynndalco would purchase
the product from Clearview AI and then re-sell it to CDW-
Government. Wynndalco proceeded to make the purchase
from Clearview AI in December 2019 for the sum of $47,500,
and then immediately re-sold the product to CDW-
Government for $48,450.00. CDW-Government in turn re-
sold the product to the Chicago Police Department for
$49,875. By contrast, the Calderon complaint alleges that
Wynndalco is Clearview AI’s agent and that Wynndalco li-
censes and supplies the product to customers on Clearview
AI’s behalf. The Calderon complaint alleges that on January 1,
2020, the Chicago Police Department, through its agent,
CDW-Government, entered into a two-year, $49,875 contract
with Clearview AI.
     Both suits allege that Wynndalco’s role in this transaction
ran afoul of BIPA. Illinois became the first state in the nation
to enact biometric data privacy legislation when it promul-
gated BIPA. Broadly speaking, BIPA codifies an individual’s
right of privacy in and control over his or her biometric iden-
tifiers and biometric information. See Bryant v. Compass Grp.
USA, Inc., 958 F.3d 617, 621 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Rosenbach
v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1206 (Ill. 2019)).
“[The Act] imposes numerous restrictions on how private
6                                                          No. 22-2313

entities collect, retain, disclose and destroy biometric identifi-
ers, including retina or iris scans, fingerprints, voiceprints,
scans of hand or face geometry, or biometric information. Un-
der the Act, any person ‘aggrieved’ by a violation of its provi-
sions ‘shall have a right of action … against an offending
party’ and ‘may recover for each violation’ the greater of liq-
uidated damages or actual damages, reasonable attorney fees
and costs, and any other relief, including an injunction, that
the court deems appropriate.” Rosenbach, 129 N.E.3d at 1199–
1200 (quoting 740 ILCS 14/20). A violation of the statute as to
one’s biometric information is sufficient in and of itself to ren-
der an individual an “aggrieved person” entitled to pursue
relief; he or she need not suffer an actual injury as a result of
the violation. Id. at 1205–07. BIPA currently provides the
broadest private right of action among the states that have
adopted similar statutory protections for biometric data. See
Molly DiRago, The Litigation Landscape of Illinois’ Biometric In-
formation Privacy Act, American Bar Association Cybersecu-
rity and Data Privacy Committee (Aug. 20, 2021), available at
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/tort_trial_insur-
ance_practice/committees/cyber-data-privacy/the-litigation-
landscape/.
   The amended complaint in Thornley includes three counts
directed against Wynndalco. 2 The first of these counts alleges
that Wynndalco intentionally or recklessly violated section

    2  The proposed class in the Thornley suit is comprised of all current
Illinois citizens whose biometric identifiers or information were, at any
time between December 13, 2019, and April 30, 2020, included in the Clear-
view AI database as part of the product purchased by Wynndalco from
Clearview AI, resold to CDW-Government, and then resold again to the
Chicago Police Department.
No. 22-2313                                                                   7

15(c) of BIPA, 740 ILCS 14/15(c), by profiting from the named
plaintiffs’ and putative class members’ biometric identifiers
or biometric information in the Clearview AI app database.
Section 15(c) provides:
        No private entity in possession of a biometric
        identifier or biometric information may sell,
        lease, trade, or otherwise profit from a person’s
        or a customer’s biometric identifier or biometric
        information.
740 ILCS 14/15(c). The term “biometric identifier” is defined
to include, among other attributes, “face geometry.” 740 ILCS
14/10. A second, unjust enrichment count in the Thornley com-
plaint alleges that Wynndalco has unjustly benefitted from its
publication of the class members’ biometric information, to
the detriment of the named plaintiffs and the class. A third,
invasion-of-privacy count alleges that Wynndalco’s publica-
tion and exploitation of the plaintiffs’ biometric data
amounted to an unauthorized intrusion upon their seclusion,
causing them mental anguish. 3
   The first amended complaint in Calderon includes a single
count against Wynndalco. 4 It alleges that Wynndalco and its

    3  Wynndalco attempted to remove the Thornley case to federal court,
but we affirmed the district court’s assessment that, given the nature of
the statutory violations alleged in that case, the plaintiffs lacked Article III
standing to pursue relief in a federal forum, and the case was remanded
to Illinois state court. Thornley v. Clearview AI, Inc., 984 F.3d 1241 (7th Cir.
2021).
    4The proposed class in the Calderon suit is comprised of all individu-
als who, while residing in Illinois, had their biometric identifiers or infor-
mation captured, collected, or obtained by Clearview AI at any point
                                                                 (continued)
8                                                       No. 22-2313

officers violated BIPA by capturing, collecting, storing and
using the named plaintiffs’ and the other class members’ bio-
metric identifiers and/or biometric information without, inter
alia, their notice and permission in violation of section 15(b)
of the Act, 740 ILCS 14/15(b). That section provides:
    No private entity may collect, capture, purchase, re-
    ceive through trade, or otherwise obtain a person's
    or a customer's biometric identifier or biometric in-
    formation, unless it first:
         (1) informs the subject or the subject's legally
         authorized representative in writing that a bio-
         metric identifier or biometric information is be-
         ing collected or stored;
         (2) informs the subject or the subject's legally
         authorized representative in writing of the spe-
         cific purpose and length of term for which a bi-
         ometric identifier or biometric information is
         being collected, stored, and used; and
         (3) receives a written release executed by the
         subject of the biometric identifier or biometric
         information or the subject's legally authorized
         representative
    At the time of the sale of the Clearview AI app to the Chi-
cago Police Department, Wynndalco had business owner’s in-
surance coverage through a policy issued to it by Citizens ef-
fective from October 2, 2019, to October 2, 2020. Section II of

during the five years immediately preceding the filing of the Calderon
complaint.
No. 22-2313                                                    9

the policy sets forth the liability coverage for the business.
Section II(A)(1) provides liability coverage for, among other
injuries, “personal and advertising injury,” R. 20-1 at 83,
which section II(F)(14) defines, in relevant part, as an “injury,
including consequential ‘bodily injury,’ arising out of one or
more of the following offenses: … e. [o]ral or written publica-
tion, in any manner, of material that violates a person’s right
of privacy.” R. 20-1 at 100. Citizens does not dispute that
Wynndalco’s conduct, as alleged in the Thornley and Calderon
complaints, falls within the policy’s definition of “personal
and advertising injury.” But Citizens contends that coverage
of the Thornley and Calderon claims is barred by a catch-all
provision in a policy exclusion barring coverage for injuries
arising out of certain statutory violations. The exclusion in
question provides as follows (with the catch-all provision
highlighted):
       This insurance does not apply to:
       …
       q. Distribution of Material in Violation of
       Statutes
           “Bodily injury,” “property damage” or “per-
       sonal and advertising injury” arising directly or
       indirectly out of any action or omission that vi-
       olates or is alleged to violate:
           (1) The Telephone Consumer Protection Act
       (TCPA), including any amendment of or addi-
       tion to such law; or
          (2) The CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, including
       any amendment or addition to such law; or
10                                                          No. 22-2313

             (3) The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA),
         and any amendment of or addition to such law,
         including the Fair and Accurate Credit Transac-
         tion Act (FACTA); or
             (4) Any other laws, statutes, ordinances, or reg-
         ulations, that address, prohibit or limit the printing,
         dissemination, disposal, collecting, recording, send-
         ing, transmitting, communicating or distribution of
         material or information.
Policy § II(B)(1)(q) (bold emphasis in original; italicized em-
phasis added), R. 20-1 at 91–92. Citizens contends that the in-
jury alleged by the plaintiffs in both the Thornley and Calderon
complaints constitutes a “personal or advertising injury” that
arises, directly or indirectly, out of a violation of BIPA, which,
in Citizens’ view, is a “law” or “statute” of the type referenced
in the catch-all provision set forth in ¶ 4 of the exclusion. 5
    After Wynndalco tendered the two complaints to Citizens
and asked that it supply Wynndalco with a defense, Citizens
filed this diversity action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1),
seeking a declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202
that it has no duty to defend or indemnify Wynndalco (or its
officers) in either the Thornley or the Calderon suit, invoking
the catch-all provision of the violation-of-statutes exclusion.
Wynndalco and its officers answered the complaint, denied
the allegation that the injuries alleged in the Thornley and Cal-
deron suits were not covered by the insurance policy, and filed
a counterclaim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, Count I of which

     5The catch-all provision in the violation-of-statutes exclusion is the
sole basis on which Citizens contends it has no duty to defend or indem-
nify Wynndalco. See R. 20 at 8 ¶¶ 39–41.
No. 22-2313                                                    11

seeks a declaration that Citizens is, in fact, obligated to defend
them against the Calderon suit. R. 59 at 27–29. Count II of the
counterclaim alleged that Citizens had breached the insur-
ance policy by refusing to provide a defense for the Thornley
suit and the Calderon suit and seeks damages, including the
attorney’s fees and costs Wynndalco has incurred in defend-
ing against the two lawsuits. R. 59 at 29–31. Citizens answered
the counterclaim and denied its allegations.
    On the parties’ cross-motions for judgment on the plead-
ings, the district court entered judgment for Wynndalco, con-
cluding that the catch-all is facially ambiguous and therefore
not enforceable against Wynndalco. 595 F.Supp.3d 668. The
court deemed it so because a literal reading of the expansive
wording of that provision would preclude coverage not only
for violations of privacy-related statutes like BIPA, but a num-
ber of other statutory causes of action that the policy in the
first instance purported to cover, including slander, libel,
trademark, and copyright. Id. at 673–74. Given the ambiguity,
the court turned to two interpretive canons, ejusdem generis
and noscitur a sociis to determine whether a narrower reading
of the catch-all might be warranted based on the types of stat-
utes cited in the exclusionary provisions immediately preced-
ing the catch-all. But those canons, the court concluded, did
not resolve the ambiguity. In contrast to comparable policy
language at issue in West Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Krishna Schaum-
burg Tan, Inc., 183 N.E.3d 47 (Ill. 2021), the catch-all could not
reasonably be interpreted to reach only statutes regulating
methods of communication, given that the statutes specifi-
cally cited as excluded from coverage were not limited to
those regulating communication, as they were in Krishna Tan.
Wynndalco, 595 F.Supp.3d at 674. Citizens proposed that the
statutes singled out by name in the exclusion at issue here all
12                                                      No. 22-2313

regulate privacy, but the court pointed out that the cited stat-
utes regulate different forms of privacy, so there is no true
commonality among them suggesting that the catch-all pro-
vision should be read to reach only injuries resulting from vi-
olations of privacy-regulating statutes. Id. at 674–75. Conclud-
ing that the catch-all provision was thus “intractably ambigu-
ous,” id. at 676, the district court concluded that Citizens had
not affirmatively established that the claims against
Wynndalco were excluded from coverage and held that Citi-
zens had a duty to defend Wynndalco as to both the BIPA and
common law claims, id. 6
                                   II.
    We review the district court’s decision to enter judgment
on the pleadings de novo. E.g., StarNet Ins. Co. v. Ruprecht, 3
F.4th 342, 346 (7th Cir. 2021). In doing so, we apply the same
standard that we reference in reviewing a decision to grant a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for
relief. Mesa Labs., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 994 F.3d 865, 867 (7th Cir.
2021) (citing Landmark Am. Ins. Co. v. Hilger, 838 F.3d 821, 824
(7th Cir. 2016)). We therefore take the facts alleged in the
pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
and we will sustain the entry of judgment only if it is beyond
doubt that the nonmoving party cannot prove facts sufficient
to support its position and that the movant is entitled to relief.
See id. (citing Hilger, 838 F.3d at 824); see also Scottsdale Ins. Co.
v. Columbia Ins. Grp., Inc., 972 F.3d 915, 919 (7th Cir. 2020) (cit-
ing Housing Auth. Risk Retention Grp., Inc. v. Chicago Housing

     6Count II of Wynndalco’s counterclaim (seeking damages for Citi-
zens’ refusal to defend Wynndalco) was subsequently dismissed without
prejudice in order to facilitate the entry of final judgment. R. 121.
No. 22-2313                                                              13

Auth., 378 F.3d 596, 600 (7th Cir. 2004)). For purposes of the
motion, the pleadings include not only the complaint, the an-
swer, and counterclaims, but any written instruments at-
tached thereto. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c); see Federated Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Coyle Mech. Supply Inc., 983 F.3d 307, 312–13 (7th Cir. 2020);
Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 729 (7th Cir. 2014).
    The parties agree that Illinois law governs this dispute and
we have no reason to question them on this point: Apart from
the fact that Illinois is the forum state, Wynndalco is an Illinois
firm, and the injuries alleged in the two actions for which it
seeks a defense arose from Wynndalco’s role in the sale to the
Chicago Police Department of a product granting access to a
database containing biometric identifiers and information be-
longing to Illinois citizens. As this is a diversity case, our task
is to resolve the substantive questions as we believe the Illi-
nois Supreme Court would do. E.g., Newman v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 885 F.3d 992, 1000 (7th Cir. 2018). To determine whether
Citizens owes Wynndalco a duty to defend it in the Thornley
and Calderon litigation, we compare the allegations of the
Thornley and Calderon complaints with the relevant provisions
of the insurance policy to determine whether the nature of the
liability asserted falls within the scope of the policy’s cover-
age. E.g., United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Prate Roofing & Installations,
LLC, 7 F.4th 573, 579–80 (7th Cir. 2021). 7 The duty to defend is
broader than the duty to indemnify, id. at 579, so the insurer
must supply the insured with a defense so long as the facts

    7 Unless otherwise noted, all of the cases cited in this opinion applied
Illinois law.
14                                                           No. 22-2313

alleged potentially fall within the scope of the policy, see id. at
580 (collecting cases). 8
    Illinois regards the proper interpretation of an insurance
policy as a question of law. Mashallah, Inc. v. W. Bend Mut. Ins.
Co., 20 F.4th 311, 319 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Sanders v. Ill. Union
Ins. Co., 157 N.E.3d 463, 467 (Ill. 2019)). In examining the terms
of the policy, the normal rules of contract interpretation ap-
ply. Bradley Hotel Corp. v. Aspen Specialty Ins. Co., 19 F.4th 1002,
1006 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Windridge of Naperville Condo. Ass’n
v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co., 932 F.3d 1035, 1039 (7th Cir.
2019)); Hess v. Estate of Klamm, 161 N.E.3d 183, 187 (Ill. 2020).
Our primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to intentions
of parties as expressed in the policy language. Bradley Hotel
Corp., 19 F.4th at 1006; Hess, 161 N.E.3d at 187 (quoting Hobbs
v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Midwest, 823 N.E.2d 561, 564 (Ill. 2005)).
We construe the individual provisions of the policy not in iso-
lation but as a whole, giving effect to each and every provi-
sion whenever possible. E.g., Founders Ins. Co. v. Muñoz, 930
N.E.2d 999, 1004 (Ill. 2010). Provided there is no ambiguity in
the contract terms, we will accord those terms their ordinary
meanings and apply the policy language as written, so long
as doing so would not conflict with public policy. Clarendon
Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Medina, 645 F.3d 928, 933 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing
Hobbs, 832 N.E.2d at 564); Muñoz, 930 N.E.2d at 1004. Absent
some indication that the policy’s terms were intended to have

     8 Because we conclude that Citizens does have a duty to defend
Wynndalco, it is unnecessary for us to consider whether Citizens also
bears a duty to indemnify Wynndalco, a separate question that is gener-
ally considered premature to resolve unless and until the insured is held
liable on the claim for which it seeks coverage. See, e.g., Am. Bankers Ins.
Co. of Fla. v. Shockley, 3 F.4th 322, 331–32 (7th Cir. 2021).
No. 22-2313                                                       15

a technical connotation, we will also read the policy as an or-
dinary, reasonable layperson purchasing such a policy would
read them. I/N Kote v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins.
Co., 115 F.3d 1312, 1317 (7th Cir. 1997) (collecting cases); see
also Muñoz, 930 N.E.2d at 1004.
    Policy terms that purport to limit the insurance company’s
liability are construed in favor of coverage, but only when the
terms are ambiguous or susceptible to more than one reason-
able interpretation. Medina, 645 F.3d at 933 (citing, inter alia,
Hobbs, 823 N.E.2d at 564). Wherever possible, a court should
construe a policy so as to harmonize its provisions and avoid
reading an exclusion in such a way that it removes the cover-
age explicitly provided elsewhere in the policy. Gen. Agents
Ins. Co. of Am., Inc. v. Midwest Sporting Goods Co., 765 N.E.2d
1152, 1156 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (quoting Lincoln Logan Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Fornshell, 722 N.E.2d 239, 242 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)); see also
Panfil v. Nautilus Ins. Co., No. 12 C 6481, 2013 WL 6670779, at
*3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 2013), j. aff’d, 799 F.3d 716 (7th Cir. 2015);
Perry v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 48 N.E.3d 1168, 1173 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2015); Yates v. Farmers Auto Ins. Ass’n, 724 N.E.2d
1042, 1045 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000); Jones v. Universal Cas. Co., 630
N.E.2d 94, 98–99 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Mosby v. Mut. Life Ins. Co.
of N.Y., 92 N.E.2d 103, 107 (Ill. 1950) (“To [imply] in large and
heavy print that the insurer is liable for total and permanent
disability before age sixty, and then in smaller type and stand-
ard inking below to use language which purportedly limits
the insure[r]’s liability for total and permanent disability of
which proof is made before age sixty is so misleading as to create
an ambiguity which must be resolved in favor of the in-
sured.”) (emphasis ours).
16                                                    No. 22-2313

     The latter point deserves some amplification. In some in-
stances, the language of a policy exclusion may appear clear
in isolation, but when compared with a separate policy provi-
sion granting coverage for the same type of action or injury
that the exclusion ostensibly reaches, an ambiguity arises, in
that the exclusion appears to take away with one hand cover-
age that the policy purports to give with the other. See Panfil,
799 F.3d at 721–22 (quoting Cherrington v. Erie Ins. Prop. & Cas.
Co., 745 S.E.2d 508, 526 (W. Va. 2013)); see also Tews Funeral
Home, Inc. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 1037, 1045 (7th Cir.
1987) (per curiam), abrogated in part on other grounds, Nat’l Cy-
cle, Inc. v. Savoy Reins. Co., 938 F.2d 61, 64 (7th Cir. 1991). The
cases sometimes refer to this as the exclusion appearing to
“swallow” the coverage that the policy purports to grant the
insured. Wynndalco, 595 F.Supp.3d at 673; Fornshell, 722
N.E.2d at 242. Because the aim of policy interpretation is to
give effect to all provisions of the policy and avoid whenever
possible construing one provision in a way that tends to nul-
lify another provision, a court when confronted with such an
ambiguity must consider whether the reach of the “swallow-
ing” exclusion can be deemed more narrow than its plain
terms taken in isolation would otherwise suggest. Id.; see also
Midwest Sporting Goods, 765 N.E.2d at 1156–57. If the ambigu-
ity cannot be resolved in this way, it must be construed
against the insurer and in favor of coverage. Panfil, 799 F.3d
at 721.
   The plaintiff bears the burden in the first instance of show-
ing that its claim falls within the coverage of the policy. E.g.,
Bradley Hotel Corp., 19 F.4th at 1006 (citing Addison Ins. Co. v.
Fay, 905 N.E.2d 747, 752 (Ill. 2009). There is no dispute that
Wynndalco has met that burden here. The parties agree that
the injuries alleged in the Thornley and Calderon complaints
No. 22-2313                                                      17

qualify as “personal or advertising injur[ies]” in that a viola-
tion of BIPA is a violation of privacy, and the policy defines
“personal or advertising injury” to include, inter alia, the
“[o]ral or written publication, in any manner, of material that
violates a person’s right to privacy.” Policy § II(F)(14)(e),
R. 20-1 at 100. The burden thus falls on Citizens to affirma-
tively establish that an exclusion applies. Id. (citing Fay). “Ex-
clusions are read narrowly and apply only if their application
is clear and free from doubt.” Id. at 1006–07 (cleaned up); see
also Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., 990 F.3d 1073, 1078
(7th Cir. 2021) (“a decision to excuse an insurer’s duty to de-
fend based on an exclusionary clause in the contract ‘must be
clear and free from doubt’”) (quoting Evergreen Real Estate
Servs., LLC v. Hanover Ins. Co., 142 N.E.3d 880, 887 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2019)); Gillen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 830 N.E.2d
575, 582 (Ill. 2005) (“a policy provision that purports to ex-
clude or limit coverage will be read narrowly and will be ap-
plied only where its terms are clear, definite, and specific”)
(citing Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburg, Pa. v. Glenview Park
Dist., 632 N.E.2d 1039, 1042 (Ill. 1994)).
    Citizens, of course, argues that BIPA is a statute that falls
within the violation-of-statutes exclusion’s catch-all provision
for acts or omissions that transgress “[a]ny other laws, stat-
utes, ordinances, or regulations, that address, prohibit, or
limit the printing, dissemination, disposal, collecting, record-
ing, sending, transmitting, communicating or distribution of
material or information,” (Policy § II(B)(1)(q)(4), R. 20-1 at 91–
92) in that BIPA governs the collection (“recording”) as well
as the sale and transmission (“dissemination,” “sending,”
“communicating” and “distribution”) of information, in this
case biometric identifiers and information. There is no dispute
18                                                   No. 22-2313

that a literal, plain-text reading of the catch-all provision
would include BIPA violations.
    But we agree with the district court that a plain-text read-
ing of the exclusion gives rise to an ambiguity with respect to
what the policy does or does not cover. The Citizens policy
purports, in the first instance, to provide liability coverage for
a “personal and advertising injury,” which the policy defines
broadly to include not only the oral or written publication of
material that violates a person’s right of privacy (§ II(F)(14e))
but also, inter alia, the oral or written publication of material
that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages
a person’s or organization’s goods, products or services
(§ II(F)(14d)); the use of another’s advertising idea in one’s
own “advertisement,” (§II(F)(14f)); and infringing upon an-
other’s copyright, trade dress, or slogan in one’s own “adver-
tisement” (§II(F)(14g)). R. 20-1 at 100. These are all injuries
that are subject to, or potentially subject to, statutory causes
of action. See 740 ILCS 145 (Illinois Slander and Libel Act); 815
ILCS 510/2(a)(8) (Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices
Act provision defining deceptive trade practices to include
commercial disparagement of another’s goods, services, or
business); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) & (c) (Lanham Act provision for
civil action seeking relief for false designation of origin, false
or misleading description or representation of fact, and dilu-
tion of distinctive mark by blurring or tarnishment); 17 U.S.C.
§ 501 (federal Copyright Act provision for civil action seeking
relief for copyright infringement); 765 ILCS 1036/60 (Illinois
Trademark Registration and Protection Act provision for civil
suit seeking relief for trademark infringement). Reading the
exclusion’s catch-all provision literally and broadly would es-
sentially exclude from the policy’s coverage injuries resulting
from all such statutory prohibitions, as they all have to do
No. 22-2313                                                      19

with the recording, distribution, and so forth of information
and material. True, it would still leave non-statutory, com-
mon-law claims within the coverage of the policy, including
those for defamation. To that extent, a plain-text reading of
the exclusion might not render the coverage promised earlier
in the policy for “personal and advertising injuries” wholly il-
lusory. But as the district court pointed out, such a reading
would, as a practical matter, all but eliminate coverage for cer-
tain claims that are largely, if not exclusively, statutory in na-
ture (intellectual property claims in particular) and that the
policy by its express terms otherwise purports to cover.
Wynndalco, 595 F.Supp.3d at 673–74. For that reason, we agree
with the district court that this conflict between the competing
policy provisions granting and excluding coverage gives rise
to an ambiguity: the broad language of the catch-all exclusion
purports to take away with one hand what the policy pur-
ports to give with the other in defining covered personal and
advertising injuries. See First Mercury Ins. Co. v. Triple Location
LLC, 536 F.Supp.3d 326, 333 (N.D. Ill. 2021), appeal dismissed,
No. 21-1962, 2021 WL 5579015 (7th Cir. Oct. 13, 2021) (con-
cluding that “stark incompatibility” between dueling provi-
sions of policy purporting to grant and then exclude coverage
for same type of injury resulted in ambiguity) (citing, inter
alia, Yates v. Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass’n, supra, 724 N.E.2d at 1045);
accord, Gibson v. First Mercury Ins. Co., — F.Supp.3d —, No.
3:21-cv-1522 (SRU), 2022 WL 4599153, at * 12 (D. Conn. Sep.
30, 2022) (Conn. law).
    Citizens, however, contends that the catch-all exclusion
does not, properly understood, conflict with the provisions
for coverage of a “personal and advertising injury” and that,
consequently, there is no ambiguity. It reasons that if one ex-
amines the nature of the statutory causes of action expressly
20                                                   No. 22-2313

cited in the exclusion, just prior to the catch-all provision, one
can infer that the exclusion applies only to statutory causes of
action related to privacy. On this understanding, the reach of
the catch-all exclusion is much more limited than its language
would otherwise suggest and does not pose the prospect of
swallowing the coverage that the definition of “personal and
advertising injury” would otherwise provide. Citizens Br. 25–
29, 34–35.
    But note the sleight of hand here. The title heading of the
exclusion refers broadly to “Distribution of Material in Viola-
tion of Statutes,” and following the citation of four such stat-
utes, the catch-all provision purports to exclude from cover-
age a “personal or advertising injury” arising out of an act or
omission that is alleged to violate “[a]ny other laws, statutes,
ordinances, or regulations that address, prohibit or limit the
printing, dissemination, disposal, collecting, recording, send-
ing, transmitting, communicating or distribution of material
or information.” (Emphasis ours.) No mention, and indeed no
hint, of “privacy” appears anywhere in this language. Only if
one looks beyond the facially expansive sweep of the catch-
all provision and attempts to divine potential limiting clues
from the nature of the statutes cited immediately prior to the
catch-all provision might it be possible to arrive at the nar-
rowing privacy gloss for which Citizens advocates. But to do
that presumes that the language of the catch-all provision
means something other than what its terms ordinarily would
suggest on their face. This is inconsistent with Citizens’ em-
phasis elsewhere in its opening brief that the language of the
catch-all provision, including in particular the term “any,”
should be given a broad construction. Citizens Br. 18–19; see
also id. at 10 (noting its argument in favor of a broad interpre-
tation of the provision in the district court). Indeed, the
No. 22-2313                                                      21

narrowing approach that Citizens takes to construing the lan-
guage of the catch-all follows the ejusdem generis canon of con-
struction, a canon that typically comes into play only if there
is some doubt about the meaning of the terms used in a con-
tract or statute, as Citizens itself agrees. Citizens Br. 12–13, 16,
34. See generally Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 74–75, 105
S. Ct. 479, 482 (1984) (“the rule of ejusdem generis, while firmly
established, is only an instrumentality for ascertaining the
correct meaning of words when there is uncertainty”)
(cleaned up); Tourdot v. Rockford Health Plans, Inc., 439 F.3d
351, 353–54 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Ejusdem generis provides guid-
ance on how to interpret language where [the] meaning is not
plain. … [I]t applies only when it is not possible to determine
the meaning of the words unless one focuses on the context.”);
id. at 354 (rejecting party’s effort to use ejusdem generis to cre-
ate and then resolve ambiguity in policy language in order to
avoid otherwise facially broad scope of exclusion for “any il-
legal act”); cf. Continental W. Ins. Co. v. Cheese Merchants of Am.
LLC, supra n.1, 2022 WL 4483886, at *11 (rejecting application
of ejusdem generis to similar exclusionary provision: “[H]ere,
the text does not seem particularly ambiguous. Quite the op-
posite, it seems clear as a bell— and the clear message is that
the provision sweeps broadly. The text is undoubtedly broad.
But breadth is not the same thing as ambiguity.”).
    For these reasons, we agree with Wynndalco that the
catch-all provision of the exclusion is ambiguous. A plain-text
reading of that provision would swallow a substantial portion
of the coverage that the policy otherwise explicitly purports
to provide in defining a covered “personal or advertising in-
jury,” and arguably all of the coverage for certain categories
of wrongs—copyright infringement, to take one example—
that are entirely statutory in nature. As a general matter, an
22                                                           No. 22-2313

ambiguity should be resolved against the insurer and in favor
of the insured. Newman v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 885 F.3d 992,
999–1000 (7th Cir. 2018) (collecting cases). But we can now
consider whether resort to textual canons, and in particular,
ejusdem generis, results in a plausible, more narrow reading of
the catch-all provision that would nonetheless encompass an
injury resulting from a violation of BIPA, as Citizens urges.
     Ejusdem generis is a textual canon that seeks to clarify a
broad or general term by looking to the specific items preced-
ing that term for clues as to how that term should be con-
strued. “Where general words follow specific words …, the
general words are usually construed to embrace only objects
similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preced-
ing specific words.” Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 545,
135 S. Ct. 1074, 1086 (2015) (plurality) (cleaned up); see also
Poohbah Enters., Inc. v. Cnty. of Cook, 905 N.E.2d 781, 799 (Ill.
2009) (“Under the ejusdem generis doctrine, when a statutory
clause specifically describes several classes of persons or
things and then includes ‘other persons or things,’ the word
‘other’ is interpreted to mean ‘other such like.’”) (citing People
v. Davis, 766 N.E.2d 641, 645 (Ill. 2002)). 9 “The interpretation
is justified on the ground that, if the general words were given
their full and ordinary meaning, the specific words would be
superfluous as encompassed by the general terms. If the
[drafter] had meant the general words to have their unre-
stricted sense, it would not have used the specific words.” Id.
(citing 2A N. Singer & J. Singer, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 47:17, at 370–73 (7th ed. 2007)). So, for

     9 The ejusdem generis doctrine, like its companion doctrine, noscitur a
sociis, is used in the construction of contracts as well as statutes. See
Krishna, 183 N.E.3d at 161.
No. 22-2313                                                    23

example, where a will leaves to a particular devisee “my fur-
niture, clothes, cooking utensils, housewares, motor vehicles,
and all other property,” the general phrase “all other prop-
erty” will, absent contrary signals, be construed in light of the
specific items previously named to include not all types of
property, including real estate, but only other items of per-
sonal property. A. Scalia and B. Garner, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS, at 199 (2012).
    We applied the canon in Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund v.
Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 1037, 1040–42 (7th Cir. 1992),
to construe an insurance policy’s definition of a covered “per-
sonal injury” as including, inter alia, a “wrongful entry or evic-
tion or other invasion of the right to private occupancy.” (Empha-
sis ours.) The question was whether a toxic spill for which the
insured was allegedly responsible at least arguably qualified
as an “other invasion of the right to private occupancy,” such
that the insurance company was required to defend its in-
sured against the victim property owner’s suit. The insured,
of course, asserted that it did so qualify, given that the spill
literally interfered with the owner’s occupancy of its prop-
erty, even if the interference was unintentional and incidental
to the mishap. The insurer, on the other hand, argued that the
insured must have acted with the intent to deprive the prop-
erty owner of his right to private occupancy in order for its
act to fall within the scope of the catch-all phrase. The catch-
all phrase, we observed, was “fairly general and elastic,” but
“it d[id] not stand alone”: it was part of a definition that in-
cluded the two more specific terms directly preceding the
catch-all—"wrongful entry” and “eviction.” Id. at 1041. We
therefore looked to those specific actions and what they en-
tailed to decide whether, as the insurance company argued,
an intent to deprive the property owner of his right to private
24                                                 No. 22-2313

occupancy of the premises was an element of the catch-all
phrase. We concluded that it was not: although the cases were
clear that eviction required such an intent, there was no clear
indication that wrongful entry did.
       [O]ne can commit a wrongful entry under Mis-
       souri and Illinois law without intending to de-
       prive the occupant of his right of occupancy. It
       follows—despite our understanding of the term
       “eviction”—that the principal of ejusdem gene-
       ris does not limit the catch-all phrase “other in-
       vasion of the right to private occupancy” to con-
       duct undertaken with a motive to possess or to
       deprive another of possession.
Id. at 1042.
    So here, the question is whether the broad language of the
catch-all provision can be given a more focused scope by lo-
cating a common element among the four statutes cited just
prior to the catch-all provision and imputing that same ele-
ment to the catch-all provision itself. Again, Citizens’ theory
is that each of the four statutes singled out by the exclusion
regulates privacy in some way, and therefore we should con-
strue the catch-all provision to reach only statutes that like-
wise regulate privacy.
   As a starting point, we look to the Illinois Supreme Court’s
decision in West Bend Mutual Insurance Company v. Krishna
Schaumburg Tan, supra, which dealt with comparable exclu-
sionary policy language. The insured in Krishna had been
sued for violating BIPA by, among other things, disclosing the
biometric information it had collected from its customers to
an out-of-state vendor. As in this case, the insurance policies
No. 22-2313                                                     25

under review in Krishna provided liability coverage for an
“advertising injury” or “personal injury,” both of which the
policies defined to include an injury arising out of the “[o]ral
or written publication of material that violates a person’s right
of privacy.” But also as in this case, an exclusion in the policies
specifically barred coverage for an advertising or personal in-
jury arising out of a violation of two listed statutes, the Tele-
phone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) and the CAN-SPAM
Act of 2003, and then concluded with a catch-all provision
barring coverage for an advertising injury “arising directly or
indirectly out of any action or omission that violates or is al-
leged to violate … [a]ny statute, ordinance or regulation, other
than the TCPA or CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, that prohibits or
limits the sending, transmitting, communicating or distribu-
tion of material or information.” (Emphasis ours.) The in-
sured, relying on ejusdem generis, read the “other than” lan-
guage of the catch-all provision to signify that the catch-all
applied only to those statutes which, like the TCPA and CAN-
SPAM Act, regulate methods of communication. The insur-
ance company, on the other hand, argued that “other than”
should be construed to mean statutes that were different from
the TCPA and the CAN-SPAM Act, including in particular
BIPA, which of course did not regulate modes of communica-
tion.
    The Illinois Supreme Court began its analysis of the catch-
all provision by noting that the exclusion bore the heading,
“Violation of Statutes that Govern E-Mails, Fax, Phone Calls,
or Other Methods of Sending Material or Information,” and
all of the items listed in that heading were methods of com-
munication. 183 N.E.3d at 60. Moreover, the two statutes ex-
pressly identified in the exclusion both regulated methods of
communication: the TCPA regulated telephone calls and
26                                                   No. 22-2313

faxes, and the CAN-SPAM Act regulated emails. Id. Turning
then to the catch-all provision, the court observed that the
doctrine of ejusdem generis would suggest that the words
“other than” should be construed to reference statutes which,
like the TCPA and the CAN-SPAM Act, also regulated meth-
ods of communication. Thus, to the extent the meaning of
“other than” was unclear, resort to ejusdem generis counseled
in favor of reaching the catch-all provision to exclude cover-
age only for statutes “which regulate methods of communica-
tion like telephone calls, faxes, and emails.” Id. at 61. “[S]ince
the Act [BIPA] does not regulate methods of communication,
the violation of statutes exclusion does not apply to the Act,”
id. at 60, and the policies did not bar coverage for the com-
plaint filed against the insureds alleging violations of BIPA,
id. at 61. The insurer thus owed the insured a duty to defend
them in the underlying lawsuit. Id.
    We distill Krishna’s analysis down to this rationale: Where
a violation-of-statutes exclusion has a title or heading that
points to a particular category of statutes, where the statutes
expressly identified in the exclusion fall within that very same
category, and where there is some doubt about the reach of a
broad catch-all provision immediately following the ex-
pressly-identified statutes, it is an appropriate application of
ejusdem generis to construe the more general language of the
catch-all provision as encompassing only that same category
of statutes. Unfortunately, this rationale does not resolve the
ambiguity presented by the violation-of-statutes exclusion in
the Citizens policy.
   Although the policy exclusion in the Citizens policy is
broadly similar to the one at issue in Krishna, there are certain
important differences. First, in the Citizens policy, there is no
No. 22-2313                                                                27

language in the heading of the exclusion suggesting that only
a certain category of statutes is implicated by the exclusion:
the heading refers broadly to “Distribution of Material in Vi-
olation of Statutes,” period, with no additional words sug-
gesting that the exclusion is limited to statutes regulating
methods of communication, privacy, or any other particular
subject matter. For example, it is easy to imagine that the
scope of the heading, coupled with the broad language of the
catch-all provision, might include a violation of the Illinois
Trade Secrets Act, 765 ILCS 1065/1, et seq., which deals with
the misappropriation of proprietary commercial information
rather than individual privacy. 10 Second, although the exclu-
sion, as in Krishna, expressly identifies the TCPA and the
CAN-SPAM Act as laws that are implicated by the exclusion,
the Citizens exclusion also references the FCRA and FACTA
as statutes that are implicated, and in contrast to the first two
statutes, those additional statutes do not regulate methods of
communication: the FCRA regulates the reporting of credit
information, and FACTA, an amendment to FCRA, deals with
the accuracy of consumers’ credit-related records. Third, the
language of the catch-all provision here is broader, as it in-
cludes not only the sending, transmitting, communicating or
distribution of material or information, but also the printing,

    10 We recognize, of course, that titles and headings play a limited role
in the construction of a policy exclusion, and that terms used only in a
heading cannot be invoked as a basis for expanding the scope of an exclu-
sion. See Barth v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 886 N.E.2d 976, 982–83 (Ill.
2008) (citing 2 Mark S. Rhodes, COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INS. LAW § 15:57, at
302 (2d rev. ed. 1984)); Pekin Ins. Co. v. Tovar Snow Professionals, Inc., 970
N.E.2d 534, 537 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). Nonetheless, they are permissible in-
dicators of the meaning of the text that follows them. See Scalia & Garner,
READING LAW at 221.
28                                                 No. 22-2313

dissemination, disposal, collecting, and recording of material
or information. Citizens cites these differences as the spring-
board for an argument that the reach of the catch-all provision
is broader than the one at issue in Krishna and is expansive
enough to encompass injuries resulting from a violation of
BIPA.
    We agree with Citizens that these differences matter, at
least to some degree. Plainly, it is not possible here as it was
in Krishna to limit the exclusion to statutes regulating meth-
ods of communication, given that the two statutes added to
the list of those expressly covered by the exclusion are not
ones that regulate any method of communication. Moreover,
the additional terms added to the catch-all provision here, re-
ferring to the “collecting,” “disposal,” and “recording” of ma-
terial and information, arguably address something other
than communication.
    As we have noted, Citizens argues the harmonizing factor
among the statutes cited in its violation-of-statutes exclusion
is that they all address privacy. If one were to put that gloss
on the exclusion, one could readily read the catch-all provi-
sion as reaching injuries arising out of a violation of BIPA,
which protects the secrecy of one’s biometric information by
regulating, among other things, the collection, recording and
dissemination of such information. But other injuries, like
those stemming from slander and libel, copyright infringe-
ment, and trademark and trade dress infringement would re-
main untouched by the exclusion and thus within the scope
of liability coverage, on this understanding of the exclusion.
Reading the exclusion to apply solely to injuries resulting
from violations of statutes that protect privacy interests thus
No. 22-2313                                                    29

avoids the problem of the exclusion swallowing the policy’s
coverage provisions for “personal and advertising injuries.”
    Yet, as the district court pointed out, the statutes listed in
the exclusion encompass two distinct types of privacy: seclu-
sion and secrecy. 595 F.Supp.3d at 675; see Am. States Ins. Co.
v. Capital Assocs. of Jackson Cnty., Inc., 392 F.3d 939, 941 (7th
Cir. 2004). Seclusion is the right to be left alone. Auto-Owners
Ins. Co. v. Websolv Computing, Inc., 580 F.3d 543, 549 (7th Cir.
2009) (applying Iowa law, but referencing Illinois law);
Krishna, 183 N.E.3d at 58; Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Swiderski El-
ecs., Inc., 860 N.E.2d 307, 317 (Ill. 2006); Benitez v. KFC Nat’l
Mgmt. Co., 714 N.E.2d 1002, 1033 (Ill. App. Ct 1999). Statutes
regulating phone calls, faxes, and emails address that type of
privacy by imposing restrictions on these methods of commu-
nication when the individual has not consented to receive
them. See Websolv Computing, 580 F.3d at 549; Capital Assocs.,
392 F.3d at 941, 942. Secrecy, on the other hand, is the right to
maintain the confidentiality of one’s personal information. See
Websolv Computing, 580 F.3d at 549; Krishna, 183 N.E.3d at 58.
The FCRA and FACTA address the secrecy of one’s credit and
other personal identifying information by regulating how
that information is reported. See Websolv Computing, 580 F.3d
at 549; Krishna, 183 N.E.3d at 58. BIPA would fall into this
same secrecy-related subset of statutes regulating privacy in-
terests, as it regulates how one’s biometric information may
be collected, retained, and shared with others. See Krishna, 183
N.E.3d at 58. Our decision in Capital Associates, 392 F.3d at
941–43, notes the distinctions between these two different
types of privacy and admonishes courts to take care in distin-
guishing between them as they evaluate in what sense an in-
surance policy may be using the term “privacy.” Thus, only
by referencing privacy at a high level of generality can one
30                                                   No. 22-2313

find a common thread among these statutes—one that would
encompass privacy in multiple forms (seclusion in some cases
and secrecy in others) and addressing distinct interests.
    We are not convinced that ejusdem generis can resolve the
ambiguity presented by the exclusion in this way. As we
noted earlier, there is nothing in the language of the exclu-
sion—be it in the title or in any of the provisions that follow—
which points to privacy as the focus of the exclusion. And a
proper application of the ejusdem generis canon looks for a
readily discernible theme among the specific items cited in a
provision that in turn suggests how the broad language that
follows should be construed. Scalia & Garner, READING LAW,
at 199. Here there is no readily discernible theme—certainly
nothing, as the district court noted in the Cheese Merchants
case, that “jumps off the page,” 2022 WL 4483886, at *11, as a
common characteristic uniting the four statutes listed in the
exclusion, see id., at *11–*13. True, at a very high level of gen-
erality, one might describe all four statutes as bearing on in-
dividual “privacy,” id. at *13, but that would not be obvious
to the type of layperson or business purchasing this policy,
given the different ways in which the statutes operate to pro-
tect the two distinct categories of privacy interests we have
discussed. In this respect, the exclusion here stands in marked
contrast to the one at issue in Krishna, where the wording of
the exclusion’s heading indicated that it was statutes regulat-
ing methods of communication that were implicated by the
exclusion and the two statutes specifically named by the title
fell neatly into that very category of laws. There are no such
textual clues to guide the reader to the privacy gloss for which
Citizens advocates here. Only by engaging in a relatively so-
phisticated and nuanced examination of the four statutes sin-
gled out by the exclusion and the interests they protect might
No. 22-2313                                                                       31

one be able to identify generic privacy as a theme that unifies
those statutes and infer that the catch-all provision, notwith-
standing its sweeping language, should be limited to other
statutes that likewise address some aspect of personal pri-
vacy, be it seclusion, secrecy, or some other form of privacy. 11
That gives the ejusdem generis canon entirely too much work
to do.
    The noscitur a sociis textual canon fails to resolve the ambi-
guity posed by the catch-all provision for the same reasons.
“[T]he principle of noscitur a sociis—a word is known by the
company it keeps—[is used] to ‘avoid ascribing to one word
a meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with its accompany-
ing words … .’” Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. at 543, 135 S. Ct.
at 1085 (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575, 115
S. Ct. 1061, 1069 (1995)); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593,
604, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226 (2010) (“Under this canon, ‘an am-
biguous term may be given more precise content by the neigh-
boring words with which it is associated.’”) (quoting United

    11  As we noted in Capital Associates, “’[p]rivacy’ is a word with many
connotations.” 392 F.3d at 941. Secrecy and seclusion are the two principal
meanings, id., but there are other connotations, including, for example
personal autonomy and freedom from government regulation, which may
overlap with secrecy or seclusion to some extent, but which also reflect
distinct interests, see id. See also Pucillo v. Nat’l Credit Sys., Inc., 66 F.4th 634,
639–40 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting Persinger v. Sw. Credit Sys., L.P., 20 F.4th
1184, 1192 (7th Cir. 2021) (identifying four theories of wrongdoing encom-
passed by tort of invasion of privacy, including publicly placing a person
in a false light and appropriation of one’s name or likeness)); Websolv Com-
puting, 580 F.3d at 549 (same); RESTATEMENT (2D) OF TORTS § 652A (same);
Lovgren v. Citizens First Nat’l Bank of Princeton, 534 N.E.2d 987, 989–92 (Ill.
1989) (false light); 765 ILCS 1075/10 (recognizing right of publicity encom-
passing “[t]he right to control and to choose whether and how to use an
individual’s identity for commercial purposes”).
32                                                    No. 22-2313

States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 474, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010)).
As we have discussed, there are no readily-discernible clues
in the text surrounding the catch-all provision that point to
privacy as the factor that harmonizes the catch-all with the
other provisions of the violation-of-statutes exclusion.
    Consequently, we return to where we started: On a plain-
text reading, the catch-all provision has an extremely broad
sweep—so broad, in fact, that the exclusion on its face would
eliminate coverage for a number of statutory injuries ex-
pressly included in the definition of “personal and advertis-
ing injur[ies]” that the policy purports to cover. This clash be-
tween competing provisions of the policy gives rise to an am-
biguity, one that neither ejusdem generis nor noscitur a sociis can
plausibly resolve. We are left with no choice other than to con-
clude, as did the district court, that the catch-all provision in
the violation-of-statutes exclusion is “intractably ambigu-
ous.” 595 F.Supp.3d at 676. Applying yet another well-estab-
lished canon, we must construe that ambiguity against Citi-
zens and in favor of the insured. Panfil, 799 F.3d at 721. As the
catch-all provision says nothing about injuries arising from
statutes regulating privacy interests, and the policy defines a
covered “personal and advertising injury” so as to include an
injury arising out of the “[o]ral or written publication, in any
manner, of material that violates a person’s right of privacy”
(Policy § II(F)(14)(e), R. 20-1 at 100), we conclude that the in-
juries alleged in the Thornley and Calderon complaints at least
potentially fall within the coverage of the Citizens policy. Cit-
izens thus owes its insured, Wynndalco, a duty to defend it
against those complaints. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Shock-
ley, supra n.8, 3 F.4th at 331; Panfil, 799 F.3d at 721–22; Supreme
Laundry Serv., L.L.C. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 521 F.3d 743, 749
(7th Cir. 2008). This duty extends to the common law claims
No. 22-2313                                                 33

asserted against Wynndalco in the Thornley litigation, which
as Citizens itself argues, arise out of the same acts or omis-
sions as the BIPA claim asserted in that suit. Citizens Br. 42–
43.
    Having come to this conclusion, we need not separately
address whether, even if Citizens’ reading of the exclusion
were correct, the Thornley plaintiffs’ claim for a violation of
section 15(c) of BIPA, which focuses on profiting from bio-
metric information, falls outside of the wording of the catch-
all exclusion.
                               III.
   The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.