Court Opinion

ID: 9400116
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-07 16:00:58.662387+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:42.344702
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                            For the Eighth Circuit
                        ___________________________

                                No. 22-1388
                        ___________________________

                             United States of America

                        lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

                                           v.

                             Deshawn Tyrone Braziel

                       lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
                                       ____________

                    Appeal from United States District Court
                         for the District of Minnesota
                                 ____________

                            Submitted: January 9, 2023
                               Filed: June 7, 2023
                                  [Unpublished]
                                 ____________

Before SMITH, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.
                             ____________

PER CURIAM.

       Deshawn Tyrone Braziel pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a
firearm. His Guidelines range was 63 to 78 months’ imprisonment. The district court1

      1
       The Honorable Wilhelmina M. Wright, United States District Judge for the
District of Minnesota.
varied upward and sentenced him to 108 months’ imprisonment. Braziel appeals,
arguing that his sentence is unjust when compared to similarly situated defendants.
We affirm.

      The district court began its sentencing analysis by acknowledging the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. It remarked that a 108-month sentence was sufficient but
not greater than necessary to, among other things, “avoid unwarranted disparities
between [Braziel’s] sentence . . . and the sentences of defendants with similar records
who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” R. Doc. 76, at 20:4–7.

       The district court noted that this was Braziel’s fifth adult felony conviction and
that he has “a substantial criminal history [that] spans almost 20 years, and that
includes numerous felony and misdemeanor offenses and probation violations.” Id.
at 20:18–21. The district court also noted that Braziel’s prior sentences had failed to
deter him from committing crimes. The court specifically found that Braziel’s
criminal history indicated “an extreme disregard, disrespect for the law and that a
significant punishment is warranted to both deter [Braziel] from committing crimes
in the future as well as to protect the public from [him].” Id. at 21:1–5.

       The district court discussed Braziel’s proffered mitigating factors. These
included his lack of a father figure, witnessing his mother being abused, being shot
in the head at age 13, and associating with a street gang at an early age. The court
acknowledged that Braziel “may have felt the need to have a gun to protect
[him]self.” Id. at 21:18–19. However, the court concluded that these circumstances
did not excuse his behavior.

      On appeal, Braziel argues that the district court procedurally erred by ignoring
his sentencing-disparity argument and three cases involving similar charges and
defendants. Braziel also argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable

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because mitigating circumstances compel less prison time in comparison to those
three cases. We disagree.

       “When we review the imposition of sentences, whether inside or outside the
Guidelines range, we apply a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States
v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “We review a district court’s sentence in two steps: first, we review for
significant procedural error; and second, if there is no significant procedural error, we
review for substantive reasonableness.” United States v. O’Connor, 567 F.3d 395,
397 (8th Cir. 2009).

       First, the district court did not procedurally err by ignoring Braziel’s
sentencing-disparity argument. When a defendant presents non-frivolous arguments
for a variance, “the judge will normally go further and explain why he has rejected
those arguments.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357 (2007). But “not every
reasonable argument advanced by a defendant requires a specific rejoinder by the
judge.” United States v. Gray, 533 F.3d 942, 944 (8th Cir. 2008). When a district
court does not expressly mention a party’s arguments, but it is clear from the record
that “the district court was aware of [the] arguments, . . .we . . . presume that the
district court considered and rejected them.” United States v. Johnson, 619 F.3d 910,
922 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding the district court was aware of an argument raised in
defendant’s sentencing memorandum and referred to at sentencing hearing); see also
United States v. Black, 670 F.3d 877, 882 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding the district court
did not procedurally err by not expressly addressing defendant’s argument presented
in sentencing memorandum because the record demonstrated that the district court
read the memorandum and that it “was aware of the relevant factors and that it
considered them when determining [the defendant]’s sentence”).

       Here, Braziel made the district court aware of his argument and the three
related cases when he raised them at sentencing. And the district court expressly

                                          -3-
stated that it considered the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. “[T]he
absence of comment on [Braziel’s] argument ‘does not mean that it was not
considered.’” United States v. Miller, 857 F. App’x 877, 879 (8th Cir. 2021)
(unpublished per curiam) (quoting Black, 670 F.3d at 881). The distinctions that
Braziel makes for each of his cited cases fail to show that the district court abused its
discretion in determining his sentence based on the facts and factors it weighed
relative to him. Nor does Braziel cite any controlling authority for the proposition that
district courts are required to expressly compare the sentences of defendants in prior
cases and make findings about why each subsequent defendant deserves more or less
prison time in order to satisfy its obligation to avoid unwarranted disparity. Under
Johnson, the district court did not procedurally err.2

       Second, Braziel’s sentence is substantively reasonable because the district
court adequately addressed his mitigating circumstances. “Simply because the district
court weighed relevant factors . . . more heavily than [Braziel] would prefer does not
mean the district court abused its discretion.” United States v. Farmer, 647 F.3d 1175,
1179 (8th Cir. 2011). District courts are accorded substantial discretion in sentencing,
and the record in this case indicates that the district court considered Braziel’s
proffered mitigation evidence and found it wanting. His criminal history includes 11
adult convictions, 4 of which are felonies. Several of his past convictions were violent
in nature. The court also noted his intransigent recividism. Braziel has not shown that
the district court erred in weighing his mitigation evidence.

      2
       Braziel also argues, without any supporting caselaw, that the court failed to
address why his extensive criminal history warranted an upward variance when his
criminal history score was the lowest score qualifying for a criminal history category
VI. “[W]e regularly decline to consider cursory or summary arguments that are
unsupported by citations to legal authorities.” United States v. Marshall, 891 F.3d
716, 720 (8th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). We decline
to do so here.

                                          -4-
Accordingly, we affirm Braziel’s sentence.
               ______________________________

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