Court Opinion

ID: 9865276
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:30:02.821611+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:16.817354
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Francis E. Bouck
dissenting.
The petitions for rehearing suggest among other alleged errors that this court seems (1) to have misapprehended the principle announced in Simmons v. Fish, 210 Mass. 563, 97 N. E. 102, and (2) to have misconceived the import and propriety of the affidavits of jurors who served in the original trial. I think both points are well taken.
(1) Simmons v. Fish, supra, is the leading case on the subject. It is expressly approved in the court’s opinion herein. There can be no doubt about the existence of the power to order a new trial on the question of damages alone. The only real controversy is whether the specific ■facts and circumstances in a given case are such as render it improper to exercise the power.
It would be presumption for me to attempt an analysis of the able opinion by Chief Justice Rugg in the case cited, which I fear has not been correctly interpreted by the majority opinion. I merely urge that those interested in the subject read there his masterly statement of the fundamental principles involved.
(2) Counsel’s argument, that affidavits of jurors in a pending case cannot be received “to impeach their verdict, is as a general rule undoubtedly sound. It is clear, however, that this rule would not have been violated in the case at bar. The affidavits tendered by the plaintiffs in error, in opposition to the defendant in error’s motion for a retrial of the question of damages alone, should, I think, have been received in evidence. These affidavits tended not to invalidate the verdict, but to sustain it. The five juror affiants unequivocally showed, I think, that the issues of liability and damages were intertwined beyond the possibility of segregation. The inference from their language is irresistible that the verdict was an improper *496compromise between those convinced of liability and those not so convinced.
Let us examine the actual situation at the first trial.
The presiding judge displayed great skill and knowledge of the law, as well as patience, in disposing of numerous objections raised by both sides during a long trial that presented more than the usual number of intricate trial difficulties. He certainly treated the trial as a real legal controversy of no mean proportions.
For the purpose of showing that the question of liability was finally and properly settled, and to justify retrial as to damages alone, counsel for the defendant in error, evidencing commendable zeal for their client, contended in their motion .(a) that the verdict clearly established and settled the liability of the defendants, (b) that there was no conflict of evidence as to the physical conditions at the scene of the accident or as to the circumstances surrounding the occurrence, (c) that full testimony as to conditions and circumstances was presented by both sides with full opportunity for cross-examination, (d) that there was no substantial dispute as to any facts involved, (e) that the great and overwhelming preponderance of testimony was in support of the jury’s finding of liability, (f) that the liability was clearly shown, (g) that the instructions and rulings of the court were correct, (h) that the damages awarded were greatly inadequate, and (i) that the offer of counsel for the City and County of Denver, made in the presence of the jury, to admit that because of the old age amendment the plaintiff, being 57 years of age, had a life expectancy of only 2 years instead of the 16 years indicated by the mortality tables was prejudicial to the defendant in error and resulted in an inadequate award of damages.
It will be seen at once that many of the above lettered clauses would be valid arguments if the question were solely one of determining the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a verdict rendered. Clauses suchas (b),' (d) and (e),-however, are not true summaries of the evidence *497along the lines mentioned, for the ease was hotly contested on the facts, as a careful examination of the two-volume record, comprising about 110Ü folios, clearly shows. There was indeed a sharp conflict on every vital issue.
If, as the defendant in error’s counsel contended, the supposed inadequacy of damages resulted from what counsel for the City and County of Denver remarked in regard to old age pensions, I submit it is not just to charge such statement against the plaintiff in error Belcaro Realty Investment Company. It seems to me that justice to all could only have been accomplished by granting a new trial of the whole case.
In conclusion I quote by way of emphasis from the opinion in Waucantuck Mills v. Magee Carpet Co., 225 Mass. 31, 33, 113 N. E. 573, 574, as follows: “It was said in Simmons v. Fish, 210 Mass. 563, 570: ‘It is only in exceptional and extremely rare instances that the inadequacy of damages will not be so interwoven with liability that justice can be done without a new trial upon the whole case.’ It is hard to conceive of such a case. It is only when the reason for setting aside the verdict relates solely to damages dissociated from every other contributing, related or vitiating cause that ‘the new trial shall be limited to the question of the amount of damages.’ * * * Only by acting on this rule can justice be accomplished. * * * Indeed, it recently has been said that the granting of ‘partial new trials’ is a ‘practice . . . not to be commended.’ Norfolk Southern Railroad v. Ferebee, 238 U. S. 269, 274.”
For the reasons stated, and regretting that the pressure of work prevents a proper revision of this opinion, I dissent.