Court Opinion

ID: 9795329
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:26:24.334786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:28:07.325695
License: Public Domain

VÁSQUEZ, Judge,
dissenting.
¶36 I agree with the majority regarding Burkhamer’s other jurisdictional arguments, but unlike my colleagues, I believe the trial court could have properly construed Burk-hamer’s “Objection to Defendant’s Final Judgment and Order Dismissing Claim” as a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(£), Ariz. R. Civ. P., 16 A.R.S., Pt. 2, thereby extending the time for him to file his notice of appeal.
¶ 37 I, of course, agree that this court is bound by applicable decisions of our supreme court and lacks authority to disregard them. However, I disagree with the majority’s view that Farmers Insurance Co. v. Vagnozzi, 132 Ariz. 219, 644 P.2d 1305 (1982); Desmond v. J.W. Hancock Enterprises, Inc., 123 Ariz. 474, 600 P.2d 1106 (1979); Hegel v. O’Malley Insurance Co., 117 Ariz. 411, 573 P.2d 485 (1977); and Arizona State Liquor Board v. Slonsky, 106 Ariz. 25, 470 P.2d 106 (1970), control this case and mandate a conclusion that we lack jurisdiction to decide this appeal on the merits.
¶ 38 First, I believe Slonsky’s holding was essentially gutted and not merely “refined” *192by Hegel, as the majority suggests. In Slon-sky, the court held that a particular motion did not extend the time in which a notice of appeal may be filed because it was not enumerated as a time-extending motion under the relevant rule. 106 Ariz. at 25, 470 P.2d at 106. But, in Hegel, the supreme court “overruled” any “suggestion” in Slonsky that only the title of a motion must be considered. 117 Ariz. at 412, 573 P.2d at 486. Thus, it does not appear that there is much, if anything, left of Slonsky after Hegel.
¶ 39 Second, Hegel, Desmond, and Vagnoz-zi are factually and procedurally distinguishable from this case and do not compel the result reached by the majority. All three of these cases specifically addressed the issue of whether a party’s motion should have been treated as a motion for new trial under Rule 59(a), Ariz. R. Civ. P. They do not address the issue presented here, which is whether a party’s filing could have been treated as a Rule 59(Z) motion to alter or amend the judgment. Unlike the majority, I believe that distinction alone provides sufficient basis for limiting Hegel, Desmond, and Vagnozzi to their facts and declining to apply them in this case.
¶ 40 And I do not believe that a Rule 59(Z) motion must comply with the same specificity requirements as a Rule 59(a) motion, even though they are both subparts of the same rule, because the scope of the remedies associated with new trial motions and motions to alter or amend the judgment is so different. The rule itself supplies the necessary distinction. Rule 59(a) provides: “A verdict, decision or judgment may be vacated and a new trial granted on motion of the aggrieved party for any of the following causes,” such as newly discovered evidence, accident or surprise, and misconduct of the jury or prevailing party. The granting of a Rule 59(a) motion for new trial results in a new trial after the entire judgment has been vacated. Rule 59(¿), in contrast, provides only for altering or amending a judgment, clearly a less extreme remedy than vacating a judgment and granting a new trial. See also Maganas v. Northroup, 112 Ariz. 46, 48, 537 P.2d 595, 597 (1975) (noting that “Rule 59(1) refers only to a motion to alter or amend a judgment” while “[t]he grounds for vacation of a judgment are set forth in ... Rule 59(a)”). Furthermore, Rule 59(c),11 which describes the required contents of a new trial motion, does not even mention, let alone require, the same contents for a motion to amend a judgment.12
¶41 The majority acknowledges that Sanders v. Foley, 190 Ariz. 182, 185, 945 P.2d 1313, 1316 (App.1997), the case upon which Burkhamer relies, “arguably supports the proposition that a trial court may treat an undesignated filing ‘as a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(0’” despite being factually distinguishable. However, the majority further states that “nothing in the record suggests that occurred here.” I disagree with that proposition. Although the court did not explain how it was treating Burkhamer’s objection, the fact that it did not dismiss the objection outright as being untimely or procedurally improper supports an inference that the court decided the objection on its merits.
*193¶ 42 Finally, I believe the majority unnecessarily emphasizes form over substance in faulting Burkhamer’s objection for his failure to cite Rule 59(1) and expressly ask the trial court to “alter or amend” its judgment. The rules of civil procedure are intended “to insure that every action receives a just, speedy and inexpensive determination.” Hegel, 117 Ariz. at 412, 573 P.2d at 486. To that end, courts may not “ignore the obvious intent and substance of a motion because it was inappropriately titled.” Id. Burkhamer’s objection to the judgment as being “overbroad” essentially sought the relief afforded by Rule 59(1), to alter or amend the judgment. Any errors in the procedure by which Burkhamer presented his objection, or in the manner in which the trial court handled the objection, are “harmless and non-prejudieial.” Hill v. City of Phoenix, 193 Ariz. 570, ¶ 10, 975 P.2d 700, 702 (1999) (“[A]n overriding purpose of the Rules of Civil Procedure is to dispose of cases on the merits where errors in procedure can be characterized as harmless and non-prejudieial.”).
¶ 43 Thus, I would conclude that, because Burkhamer had filed what could be construed as a Rule 59(1) motion, his appeal filed less than thirty days after the court’s denial of that motion was timely. See Ariz. R. Civ.App. P. 9(b)(3), 17B A.R.S. (providing that time for appeal is computed from date of entry of order disposing of Rule 59(1) motion); Performance Funding, LLC v. Barcon Corp., 197 Ariz. 286, n. 1, 3 P.3d 1206, 1207-OS n. 1 (App.2000) (motion to amend judgment extended time to appeal until thirty days after court ruled on it). I would therefore find that we have jurisdiction over this appeal and would reach its merits.

. Rule 59(c), Ariz. R. Civ. P„ 16 A.R.S., Pt. 2, provides:
1. The motion for new trial shall be in writing, shall specify generally the grounds upon which the motion is based, and may be amended at any time before it is ruled upon by the court.
2. Upon the general ground that the court erred in admitting or rejecting evidence, the court shall review all rulings during the trial upon objections to evidence.
3. Upon the general ground that the court erred in charging the jury and in refusing instructions requested, the court shall review the charge and the rulings refusing an instruction requested.
4. Upon the general ground that the verdict, decision, findings of fact, or judgment is not justified by the evidence, the court shall review the sufficiency of the evidence.

. Unlike the special requirements imposed by Rule 59(c) and case law for Rule 59(a) new trial motions, the supreme court has promulgated no such requirements of specificity for the other two time-extending motions: Rule 50(b), Ariz. R. Civ. P., 16 A.R.S., Pt. 1, motions for judgments notwithstanding the verdict or Rule 52(b), Ariz. R. Civ. P., 16 A.R.S., Pt. 1, motions to amend or make additional findings of fact.