Court Opinion

ID: 9398243
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-30 17:04:51.563442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:31.780348
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/30/23 O’Neil v. Kistler CA4/1

                    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 IDA O’NEIL,                                                          D079932

           Plaintiff and Appellant,

           v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. D148731)

 DEBORAH KISTLER, as Successor in
 Interest, etc.,

           Defendant and Respondent.

         APPEAL from order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Jose S. Castillo, Judge. Affirmed.
         Ida O’Neil, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
         Robert Burns for Defendant and Respondent.

         Donn and Ida O’Neil divorced in 1980.1 Almost 20 years later, Ida filed
a request for order seeking sanctions, enforcement of judgment, and payment
of certain alleged arrears. After an evidentiary hearing, the court, per an
order dated November 1, 2021, denied Ida’s requested relief. Kevin O’Neil,

1        To avoid confusion, we refer to Donn and Ida by their first names.
the couple’s son, appeals the postjudgment order on Ida’s behalf as her
guardian ad litem.2 We affirm.

               FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      In September 1980, the family court entered an order formalizing the
dissolution of marriage between Ida and Donn. As part of that dissolution,
the court ordered that Donn “will further cooperate and use his best efforts to
assist [Ida] in obtaining survivorship pension benefits at no cost to [him].” A
year later, Donn remarried.
      In 1983, Ida contacted the United States Marine Corps (USMC). In
response, the USMC informed Ida, by letter, that the current beneficiary of
Donn’s survivor benefit plan (SBP) was his “current spouse” (Barbara) and
Donn “did not elect former spouses[ ] coverage and such an election is
necessary.” Additionally, the USMC explained that a court order is not
sufficient to make a coverage election. Instead, an election can only be made
by a member.
      Subsequently, Donn signed a letter, dated August 28, 1984, advising
the USMC he would like to elect Ida as the beneficiary of his SBP. The
following day, Donn formalized that election by signing form 1883, also
known as a “Survivor Benefit Plan Election Certificate.” A couple days later,
in a letter dated August 31, 1984, Ida wrote to the USMC, stating in relevant
part: “Pursuant to court order of August 28, 1984 where [the court] ordered
[Donn] to sign the attached Survivor Benefit Plan Election Certificate in
accordance with an Interlocutory Judgment, I am forwarding the form

2     We are aware of the issue here of a nonlawyer guardian ad litem
representing appellant in pro. per. We exercise our discretion to address the
issues on the merits rather than requiring the parties to further address
guardian ad litem issues or otherwise dismissing this appeal.
                                       2
(DD 1883) to be processed. [¶] If for any reason the form requires additional
information or is delayed in any way please notify me as it is my
understanding there is a September 23, 1984 deadline.” (Italics added.)
      In a September 11, 1984 order, the family court directed Donn to “sign
the letter and applications to designate [Ida] as the beneficiary of the military
survivor benefits.” Donn then executed another form 1883, dated September
14, 1984, again electing Ida to be the “full” beneficiary of his SBP. Above the
box that Donn marked for Ida to receive his “full” SBP, he added a footnote
explaining: “I have requested full coverage in a previous document which
was submitted in Aug, 1984. Again I request full coverage [sic] Ida O’Neil.”
Donn also wrote on the form that he was executing it pursuant to a “court
order” and that a “copy of interlocutory judgment is enclosed.”
      In May 2019, Donn, via a letter to the Defense Finance Accounting
Service (DFAS), again elected Ida as the beneficiary of his SBP. The DFAS
responded and informed Donn that his election could not be processed
because it “was received more than one year after the receipt of your court
order.”
      In August 2019, Kevin, on behalf of Ida, filed a request for order (RFO)
seeking enforcement of judgment, alternative security for loss of SBP,

attorney fees and costs, and sanctions.3 Approximately three months later,
the court entered a stipulated order to freeze $60,000 in Donn’s Lincoln
Financial account until February 19, 2020. In November 2020, Donn passed
away. His daughter, Deborah Kistler, initially represented him in the

3     The RFO also raises the issues of Donn’s arrearages on spousal support
and “freeze account.” As far as we can tell, Ida does not challenge the family
court ruling on these issues, so we do not discuss them further.
                                        3
proceeding as his guardian ad litem, then as his successor in interest upon
his death.
      In her September 2021 trial brief, Ida asserted that Donn violated the
1980 and 1984 orders by naming Barbara as the beneficiary of his SBP and
concealing from Ida the fact that Barbara was the beneficiary.
      In response, Kistler insisted Ida had the “ability” to implement the
1980 order “or modification . . . more to her suiting but she did not do so.”
She argued the freeze on her father’s Lincoln Financial account under the
2019 stipulated order had expired long ago in February 2020. Kistler further
contended attorney fees and costs should not be awarded because Ida brought
a “pervasively vexatious and incompetent litigation,” and monetary sanctions
were inappropriate because notice thereof was improper.
      At the September 2021 evidentiary hearing on the RFO, the family
court “not[ed] the difficulty of trying to recreate what happened many years
ago” and that it was Ida’s burden to present sufficient evidence to support her
requests for relief. It ultimately concluded Ida failed to meet her burden.
      On the request to enforce judgment, the family court found highly
probative the fact Donn twice, in 1984, executed 1883 forms to elect Ida as
the beneficiary of his SBP. Ida responded that, although Donn had executed
the forms, he concealed from her that Barbara was the beneficiary, and Ida
could not be named as a second beneficiary. Ida claimed that if Donn had
looked at his benefit record, he would have known Barbara was the
beneficiary of his survivor benefits. The court then inquired what step, if
any, “[Ida] took to ascertain that she was the S[B]P beneficiary after 1984”;
Kevin confirmed he was unaware of any such step. The family court also
observed, “it appears based on this lettering that [Ida] knew[,] she was
aware[,] or at least had some information about her designation and even

                                        4
lists these deadlines.” The court thus found Donn substantially complied
with the 1980 and 1984 orders on these bases.
      The family court also denied the sanctions request for want of sufficient
notice—that is, Ida failed to specify the “sanctions authority” and “grounds”
for sanctions. Finally, it denied without prejudice Ida’s request for
alternative security against Donn’s estate because no evidence was submitted
on the value of the estate and there was only a “passing reference” for
security in the RFO. The ruling at the evidentiary hearing was formalized in
a November 2021 order.
      Kevin then appealed in pro. per. as guardian ad litem of Ida.

                                 DISCUSSION

                                        I.

      “ ‘Our jurisdiction on appeal is limited in scope to the notice of appeal
and the judgment or order appealed from.’ [Citation.] We have no
jurisdiction over an order not mentioned in the notice of appeal.” (Faunce v.
Cate (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 170 (Faunce).) Likewise, “filing a timely
notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement.” (Bourhis v. Lord (2013)
56 Cal.4th 320, 329.)
      Here, the notice of appeal specifies the appeal is limited to the
November 2021 order. Ida nonetheless claims “[p]rior judges repeatedly
erred, by not impartially, competently, and summarily enforcing production
of monthly military pension records” and the 1980, 1984, 2019 orders
“designating” Ida as the beneficiary of Donn’s SBP. She further asserts that
“[e]ach judge also failed to acknowledge and correct the 1980 defective order.”
Ida appears to be relying on the November 2021 order as a means to
collaterally attack previously unappealed dispositions. But “ ‘[a]n
unappealed disposition or postdisposition order is final and binding and may
                                        5
not be attacked on an appeal from a later appealable order.’ ” (In re
Liliana S. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 585, 589.) Further, these purported past
failures of enforcement and alleged need to correct the “defective order” were
neither raised nor considered by the family court. Thus, these issues are not
reasonably encompassed within the November 2021 order. We therefore lack
jurisdiction to consider them. (See, e.g., Faunce, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at
p. 170 [declining to consider an issue not encompassed within the notice of
appeal for lack of jurisdiction].)
      In addition, the instant matter faces other procedural hurdles. A
judgment or order is presumed correct, and reversible error must be
affirmatively shown. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)
“Every argument presented by an appellant must be supported by both
coherent argument and pertinent legal authority.” (Kaufman v. Goldman
(2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 734, 743 (Kaufman).) “Generally, asserted grounds
for appeal that are unsupported by any citation to authority and that merely
complain of error without presenting a coherent legal argument are deemed
abandoned and unworthy of discussion.” (Wright v. City of Los Angeles (2001)
93 Cal.App.4th 683, 689.) And self-represented parties are held to the same
standards and procedural rules as parties represented by counsel.
(Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985; Doran v. Dreyer (1956)
143 Cal.App.2d 289, 290.)
      We have read Ida’s briefs several times and find the arguments therein
incoherent, confounding, and nearly incomprehensible. And it is not our role
to scour the record in search of an appellant’s arguments. (See In re
Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830; Kaufman,
supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 743.) In addition, Ida provides no statutes, case
law, or other authority supporting her arguments, much less a cogent legal

                                       6
analysis of how the law applies on the record before us. We may not act as an
advocate on her behalf in this circumstance by conducting our own legal
research and analysis in a search for some support for her conclusory
assertion of error. (See United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019)
36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153.) “ ‘In order to demonstrate error, an appellant must
supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal
analysis and citation to the record.’ ” (Id. at p. 162 [argument supported by
one, unexplained case citation held forfeited]; see Ewald v. Nationstar
Mortgage, LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 947, 948 [“[F]ailure to provide legal
authorities to support arguments forfeits contentions of error”].) Further, Ida
does not even acknowledge or discuss the appropriate standard of review for
her arguments. (See Ewald, at p. 948 [“ ‘Failure to acknowledge the proper
scope of review is a concession of a lack of merit’ ”].) Given these deficiencies,
we conclude Ida has forfeited any cognizable contentions on appeal. (See
United Grand Corp., supra, 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 146; Nelson v. Avondale
Homeowners Assn. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 857, 862.)

                                        II.

      However, to the extent we can discern Ida’s arguments here, if we were
to reach the substance of those arguments, we nonetheless would conclude
they lack merit.
      Ida appears to contend the family court erred in finding that Donn
substantially complied with the 1980 and 1984 orders. Because the question
of substantial compliance turns on the facts, we review the issue for
substantial evidence. (Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th
634, 651–652.) In 1984, Donn twice executed 1883 forms to elect Ida as the
beneficiary of his SBP as obligated by the 1980 and 1984 orders. Nothing in
the record shows how Donn failed to assist her in obtaining survival benefit

                                        7
prior to or after the 1984 order. Ida instead argues the family court erred in
not concluding Donn “secretly and fraudulently set up” Barbara as the
beneficiary. The record is devoid of evidence to suggest fraud. To the
contrary, the USMC’s July 1983 letter to Ida and her August 31, 1984 letter
to USMC suggest she was aware Barbara was the beneficiary and there was
“a September 23, 1984 deadline” to make Ida the beneficiary. Ida further
complains the family court erred by not recognizing that Donn “sabotage[d]”
her election as the beneficiary by using the wrong social security number in
his August 28, 1984 letter to the USMC. Yet, we note, more importantly,
Donn provided the correct social security number in the 1883 forms he
completed—that is the official form required to elect Ida, not the informal
letter. Ida’s contentions essentially go to the weight of the evidence offered.
In conducting a substantial evidence review, we do not reweigh the evidence
or determine whether substantial evidence supports the losing party’s version
of the events. (Do v. Regents of University of California (2013)
216 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1492.) As such, we conclude sufficient evidence
supports the family court’s finding that Donn substantially complied with the
orders.
      Additionally, Ida asserts the family court erred in not substituting her
lost survival benefits with an alternative security. We review this issue for
abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Gray (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 504, 514–
515; In re Marriage of Cooper (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 574, 580.) The record
before us shows Ida submitted no evidence to the family court on the value of
Donn’s estate. Given the dearth of evidence, we cannot say the family court
abused its discretion in declining to reach the alternative security issue at
the evidentiary hearing while allowing the matter to be raised in a future
motion with supporting evidence.

                                        8
      Finally, because Donn substantially complied with the 1980 and 1984
orders, there was no proper basis for the family court to award attorney fees
and costs or to impose sanctions against him.

                               DISPOSITION

      The November 1, 2021 order is affirmed. The parties to bear their own
costs on appeal.

                                                         HUFFMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

MCCONNELL, P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

                                      9