Court Opinion

ID: 9915435
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 15:09:30.398751+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:01.721574
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Erin Jackson,                                  :
                       Petitioner              :
                                               :
               v.                              :
                                               :
Pennsylvania Human                             :
Relations Commission,                          :    No. 46 C.D. 2023
                 Respondent                    :    Argued: December 4, 2023

BEFORE:        HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
               HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
               HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION BY
JUDGE COVEY                                                 FILED: January 5, 2024

               Erin Jackson (Petitioner) petitions this Court for review of the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission’s (PHRC) December 19, 2022 Final
Order. Petitioner presents three issues for this Court’s review: (1) whether the record
evidence established the existence of a prima facie case of failure to grant a
reasonable accommodation; (2) whether the requested accommodation imposed an
undue hardship upon Petitioner, such that granting it would be unreasonable; and (3)
whether the record evidence established the existence of a prima facie case of
retaliation. After review, this Court affirms.

                                        Background1
               On February 1, 2019, Lainey Scheller (Scheller) and her husband
signed a month-to-month lease (Lease) with Petitioner and her husband, Darnell
Jackson, to rent an apartment located at 104 Spring Street, Galeton, Pennsylvania
(Property), which is adjacent to Petitioner’s main residence. Scheller, her husband,

      1
          The facts are as found by the Hearing Examiner.
and their two children moved into the Property in February 2019. The rent was
$550.00 per month. The Lease specified that either party could terminate the Lease
by providing 30 days written notice. Petitioner and her husband permitted Scheller’s
dog, Violet, to move into the Property.
             Scheller was diagnosed with a disability, Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD), prior to moving into the Property. Violet was Scheller’s emotional
support animal (ESA). From February 2019, until June 2019, Scheller and Petitioner
were friends. On June 3, 2019, Violet died. On June 4, 2019, Scheller texted
Petitioner about getting a new dog; specifically, a puppy. That same day, Petitioner
responded that she and her husband would not allow a puppy in the Property because
the carpet was newer, and they were worried about a puppy causing damage.
Scheller responded by asking whether Petitioner and her husband would allow a
puppy if she agreed to sign a contract to replace the carpet if it got damaged.
Petitioner responded that the parties could discuss it further when Petitioner and her
husband returned from vacation, but they would not allow a puppy at the Property.
             When Petitioner and her husband returned from vacation on June 6,
2019, Scheller and Petitioner discussed Scheller getting a puppy. That same day,
Scheller presented Petitioner with a June 5, 2019 letter from her health care provider
(Doctor’s Note) explaining that the puppy was an ESA to help alleviate Petitioner’s
PTSD symptoms. On June 8, 2019, Scheller went to Petitioner’s house to again
discuss the possibility of getting a puppy.        After the discussion, Petitioner
immediately requested that her husband come home. When her husband arrived, he
called 911. When Galeton Borough Police Chief Christian J. Brackman (Officer
Brackman) arrived at Petitioner’s house, Scheller was no longer there. Petitioner
did not know where Scheller was when Petitioner’s husband called 911. Thereafter,
Petitioner put up no trespassing signs on Petitioner’s property. Petitioner had her
lawyer send Scheller a notice to quit, which was dated June 11, 2019. Scheller
                                          2
moved out of the Property on June 14, 2019. Scheller paid $88.91 for a U-Haul, and
$500.00 cash to movers who helped her move.                  The rent for Scheller’s next
apartment was $801.00 per month.

                                             Facts
               On or about July 15, 2019, Scheller filed a Complaint against Petitioner
with the PHRC. Therein, Scheller alleged that Petitioner failed to accommodate
Scheller’s alleged disability, PTSD, and retaliated against Scheller because of her
alleged disability. The Complaint was served upon Petitioner on August 7, 2019.
On or about August 19, 2019, Petitioner filed an Answer to the Complaint. On
September 17, 2021, following an investigation, the PHRC approved probable cause
findings.     The PHRC and the parties attempted to resolve the case through
conciliation; however, Petitioner refused to attend conciliation. Thereafter, the
PHRC approved the case for a public hearing. The parties waived their right to an
in-person hearing and the Hearing Examiner held a virtual hearing on May 27, 2022.
The parties submitted post-hearing briefs in August 2022.
               On September 2, 2022, the Hearing Examiner determined that
Petitioner had unlawfully discriminated against Scheller by denying her an
accommodation for her disability, and retaliating against Scheller because of her
disability in violation of Section 5(a) of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act
(PHRA), 43 P.S. § 955(a) (relating to unlawful discriminatory practices).2 The
Hearing Examiner recommended that the PHRC approve and adopt her proposed
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and opinion. The Hearing Examiner further
recommended a proposed final order. On December 19, 2022, the PHRC issued the
Final Order approving and adopting the Hearing Examiner’s proposed findings of

      2
          Act of October 27, 1955, P.L. 744, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 951-963.
                                               3
fact, conclusions of law, opinion, and final order directing that Petitioner: (1) cease
and desist from discriminating against anyone who requests a reasonable
accommodation under the PHRA; (2) cease and desist from retaliating against
anyone who engages in protected activity under the PHRA; (3) pay Scheller’s
reasonable, out-of-pocket expenses of $1,338.91 within 30 days; (4) pay Scheller
$5,000.00 in compensatory damages for Scheller’s embarrassment and humiliation
directly attributable to Petitioner’s discriminatory and retaliatory actions within 30
days; and (5) pay the Commonwealth $3,000.00 as a civil penalty pursuant to
Section 9(f)(2)(i) of the PHRA within 30 days.3 Petitioner appealed to this Court.4

                                              Discussion
                Initially, Section 5(h)(3.2) of the PHRA provides that it shall be an
unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to “[r]efuse to make reasonable
accommodations in rules, policies, practices[,] or services when such
accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use
and enjoy a housing accommodation.” 43 P.S. § 955(h)(3.2). Section 45.5(b) of the
PHRC’s Regulations similarly states, in relevant part:

                A person may not deny a person with a handicap or
                disability the opportunity to use, enjoy or benefit from
                housing accommodations or commercial property subject

      3
          43 P.S. § 959(f)(2)(i) (relating to civil penalties).
      4
        “Our scope of review . . . is limited to a determination of whether
      constitutional rights have been violated, whether necessary findings of fact
      are supported by substantial competent evidence[,] or whether the [PHRC]
      has made an error of law.” [Pa.] State Police v. [Pa.] Hum[.] [Rels.]
      Comm[’n], . . . 583 A.2d 50, 52 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1990) (citation omitted).
      The [PHRC] is the sole judge of witness credibility and evidentiary weight.
      Id.
Canal Side Care Manor, LLC v. Pa. Hum. Rels. Comm’n, 30 A.3d 568, 574 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011).
                                                    4
             to the coverage of the [PHRA] if the basis of the denial is
             the need for reasonable accommodations.
             (1) A person may not refuse to make reasonable
                 accommodations in rules, policies, practices[,] and
                 procedures when the accommodations may be
                 necessary to afford a person with a handicap or
                 disability equal opportunity to use and enjoy a
                 dwelling unit, including public and common use
                 areas.

16 Pa. Code § 45.5(b).
             Petitioner first argues that the record evidence failed to establish the
existence of a prima facie case of failure to grant a reasonable accommodation.
Specifically, Petitioner contends that Scheller never disclosed a disability or made
any request for an accommodation, and that Scheller failed to provide any evidence
that a puppy would serve a disability related purpose.
             However, Scheller testified:
             Q. Okay. And did you give [Petitioner] anything at that
             time?
             A. Yes, my document.
             Q. And can you tell me what document you’re talking
             about?
             A. An ESA letter for [an] emotional support animal.
             ....
             Q. Okay. Is this - can you see the document, [] Scheller?
             A. Yes, ma’am, I can.
             Q. Okay. And is this the [Doctor’s N]ote that you’re
             talking about that you gave to [Petitioner] on the 6th?
             A. Yes, ma’am, it is.
             Q. Okay. And this is a [D]octor’s [N]ote. Can you tell me
             who your doctor is who wrote this?
             A. Tom Sousa.
             Q. And is he your doctor?
             A. He was my doctor during this time, yes.

                                            5
            Q. Okay. And what’s the date on your [D]octor’s [N]ote?
            A. June 5th of 2019.
            Q. And what possessed you to get a [D]octor’s [N]ote for
            your ESA?
            A. In the situation [] I was put in, I needed to go and have
            my [D]octor’s [N]ote in order to have an [ESA].
            Q. So the reason that it’s dated the 5th is because you were
            aware that [Petitioner] did not want to allow you to have
            your - a new [ESA]. Is that correct?
            A. Yes.
            Q. Okay. And can you tell - and I’m sorry. Could you tell
            us again when you gave it to [Petitioner]?
            A. On the 6th of June.

Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 24a-26a.
            The Doctor’s Note stated:
            To Whom It May Concern[:]
            . . . Scheller is currently my patient at Butler VA
            Healthcare and I have been treating her for [PTSD] since
            November 13, 2018. I am intimately aware of her history
            and functional restrictions by his/her mental condition.
            She meets the definition of disabled under the Americans
            with Disabilities Act,[5] the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,[6]
            and the Fair Housing Act.[7]
            As a result of mental illness, [Scheller] has certain
            limitations related to anxiety, depression[,] and distress
            tolerance. In order to assist in alleviating these difficulties
            and improve her quality of life while using the dwelling
            unit you own and/or manage, I am prescribing an [ESA]
            that will help [] Scheller in dealing with her disability
            better.

      5
        42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
      6
        29 U.S.C. §§ 720-796.
      7
        42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631.

                                          6
               There exists a considerable amount of academic research
               that endorses the therapeutic benefits of [ESAs] for
               individuals with mental disabilities, such as that [sic] faced
               by [Scheller]. Upon request, I will provide the relevant
               studies and would be more than willing to answer any
               questions that you may have regarding my
               recommendation. Should you have any further questions,
               please do not hesitate to get in touch with me.

R.R. at 203a.8
               Scheller further related:
               Q. Okay. What did [Petitioner] say after you gave her the
               [Doctor’s N]ote? Did she read it in front of you?
               A. Yes. She asked what it was, looked at it, and said that
               I still couldn’t have a puppy.
               Q. And then tell us what happened next.
               A. We went our separate ways right after that one.

R.R. at 26a.
               As to whether Scheller disclosed a disability or made any request for
an accommodation, the Hearing Examiner concluded:

               Regarding the second element of the prima facie case,
               [Petitioner] disputes that she knew of Scheller’s disability.
               However, [Petitioner’s] testimony was not credible on this
               issue. [Petitioner] testified that Scheller never gave her the
               [D]octor’s [N]ote[,] but may have given it to [Petitioner’s]
               husband. [Petitioner] further testified that she never read
               the [Doctor’s Note] and that Scheller never explained the
               contents of the [Doctor’s Note]. [Petitioner’s] testimony
               was directly contradicted by Officer [] Brackman who was
               called to [Petitioner’s residence] on June 8, 2019.[9]
               Officer Brackman testified that he created a summary
               report of the incident. . . . According to Officer
               Brackman’s testimony, [] Scheller went to [Petitioner’s
               residence] and told [Petitioner] that there were federal
               laws that they could not refuse her getting a puppy for her
               PTSD. [] Scheller attempted to give [Petitioner] the paper

      8
          The Hearing Examiner accepted the Doctor’s Note into evidence. See R.R. at 24a.
      9
          See R.R. at 141a-149a (Officer Brackman’s testimony).
                                               7
                explaining the guidelines that dealt with the PTSD in-
                service dog. When asked who told him that information,
                Officer Brackman testified that [Petitioner] told him.
                Based upon Officer Brackman’s testimony, it’s clear that
                [Petitioner] knew about Scheller’s disability.
                Officer Brackman’s testimony also shows that Scheller
                requested a reasonable accommodation of being allowed
                to have a puppy serve as her [ESA]. Scheller informed
                [Petitioner] of her disability verbally and provided a letter
                from a social worker who was treating Scheller for her
                PTSD at the time.

Hearing Examiner Op. at 9 (italics added; internal citations omitted).
                Relative to whether Scheller provided any evidence that a puppy would
serve a disability related purpose, the Hearing Examiner explained:

                To satisfy the fourth element of the prima facie case,
                Scheller must show that the [ESA] may be necessary to
                afford her an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the
                dwelling. Here[,] Scheller testified credibly that Violet,
                the dog that she had when she initially moved into the
                [P]roperty was an [ESA][.10] Thus, Scheller had an [ESA]
                the entire time she lived there. In addition, [Scheller
                presented] the [Doctor’s Note] from the social worker who
                was treating Scheller for PTSD at the time of the incident
                ....
                Both Scheller’s testimony and the [Doctor’s Note] from
                her treating provider were uncontradicted. Therefore,
                Scheller has shown that the [ESA] may be necessary to
                afford her an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the
                dwelling.

Hearing Examiner Op. at 9-10 (italics added; internal citations omitted).

                After reviewing the PHRC’s findings of fact and the
                record testimony, [this Court] must disagree with
                [Petitioner’s] position. [Petitioner’s] assertions overlook
                the PHRC’s role as fact[-]finder. In discrimination cases,
                the PHRC has been recognized as an expert whose
                judgment will not be lightly substituted. Orweco Frocks,

      10
           See R.R. at 21a.
                                             8
            Inc. v. [Pa.] Hum[.] [Rels.] Comm[’n], . . . 537 A.2d 897
            ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1988).               Moreover, credibility
            determinations are within the province of the PHRC as
            fact[-]finder. In the present matter the PHRC properly
            determined that [Scheller’s] testimony was more credible
            than the testimony of [Petitioner].

H.S.S. Vending Distribs. v. Pa. Hum. Rels. Comm’n, 639 A.2d 953, 956 (Pa. Cmwlth.
1994). Accordingly, the record evidence established the existence of a prima facie
case of Petitioner’s failure to grant a reasonable accommodation.
            Petitioner next argues that the requested accommodation imposed an
undue hardship upon Petitioner, such that granting it would be unreasonable.
            Section 44.4 of the PHRC’s Regulations provides:

            Undue hardship--The factors to be considered in
            determining whether an undue hardship is imposed by the
            requirement that a reasonable accommodation be made to
            a person’s handicap or disability include, but are not
            limited to, the following:
                (i) The overall size and nature of a . . . public
                accommodation, including number of employes,
                structure and composition of workforce, and
                number and type of facilities. However, financial
                capability to make reasonable accommodations
                shall only be a factor when raised as part of an
                undue hardship defense.
                (ii) Good faith efforts previously made to
                accommodate similar handicaps or disabilities.
                (iii) The extent, nature and cost of the reasonable
                accommodation needed.
                (iv) The extent to which handicapped or disabled
                persons can reasonably be expected to need and
                desire to use, enjoy or benefit from the . . . public
                accommodation which is the subject of the
                reasonable accommodation in question.
                (v) Legal or proprietary interest in the subject of
                proposed reasonable accommodations including

                                         9
                 authority to make the accommodations under the
                 terms of a bona fide agreement, such as a lease,
                 governing or describing rights and duties with
                 respect to the subject.

16 Pa. Code § 44.4.
             Here, the Hearing Examiner concluded:

             Since Scheller established a prima facie case of
             discrimination, the burden shift[ed] to [Petitioner] to show
             that the accommodation requested[,] a puppy, was
             unreasonable. [Petitioner] argues that she did not agree to
             Scheller getting a puppy because puppies are not trained
             and the carpet in the apartment was fairly new and that
             [she] and her husband had issues with puppies in the past.
             These reasons do not show that a puppy was unreasonable.
             This finding is particularly true given that Scheller offered
             to pay for any damage the puppy caused. Yet, [Petitioner]
             acknowledged that she never responded to that offer.
             Since Scheller established a prima facie case and
             [Petitioner] failed to meet her burden of showing the
             requested accommodation was unreasonable[,] the
             Hearing Examiner finds in favor of Scheller on the
             reasonable accommodation claim.

Hearing Examiner Op. at 10 (italics added; internal citations omitted). This Court
discerns no error in the Hearing Examiner’s reasoning. Accordingly, the requested
accommodation did not impose an undue hardship upon Petitioner, such that
granting it would be unreasonable.
             Lastly, Petitioner argues that the record evidence did not establish a
prima facie case of retaliation. Specifically, Petitioner contends that she chose to
terminate the Lease due to Scheller’s behavior towards Petitioner, coupled with her
refusal to leave Petitioner’s property on June 8, 2019.

             A prima facie case of retaliation requires [Scheller] to
             show that (i) she was engaged in a protected activity; (ii)
             [Petitioner] was aware of the protected activity; (iii)
             subsequent to participation in the protected activity
             [Scheller] was subjected to an adverse [] action; and (iv)
                                          10
             there is a causal connection between participation in the
             protected activity and the adverse [] action. Robert
             Wholey Co[.], Inc. v. [Pa.] Hum[.] [Rels.] Comm[’n], . . .
             606 A.2d 982, 983 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1992). Upon showing
             a prima facie case, the burden shifts to [Petitioner] to
             articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its
             action. See McDonnell Douglas [Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
             792 (1973)]. Finally, the burden shifts to [Scheller] to
             show that [Petitioner’s] proffered reasons are pretextual.
             Id.

Spanish Council of York, Inc. v. Pa. Hum. Rels. Comm’n, 879 A.2d 391, 399 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2005).

             Relative to causation, the Hearing Examiner determined:

             The final element requires a showing that there is a causal
             connection between participation in the protected activity
             and the adverse action. “To establish the requisite causal
             connection a plaintiff usually must prove either (l) an
             unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the
             protected activity and the alleged retaliatory action, or (2)
             a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing to establish a
             causal link.” Lauren W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267
             ([3d] Cir. 2007). While the Third Circuit has rarely found
             that timing alone is sufficient to establish causation, it has
             done so. See Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 708 (3d
             Cir. 1989)[] (holding that the plaintiff “demonstrated the
             causal link between the two by the circumstance that the
             discharge followed rapidly, only two days later, upon
             Avdel[ Corp.’s] receipt of notice of [the plaintiff’s] [Equal
             Employment Opportunity Commission] claim.”).
             Here the timing is “unduly suggestive” of discrimination
             as the notice to quit was dated just [five] days after
             Scheller initially requested the accommodation. Since
             Scheller satisfied all five elements of the prima facie case
             for her eviction claim, she established a prima facie case
             of retaliation on that claim.

Hearing Examiner Op. at 13 (italics added). This Court discerns no error in the
Hearing Examiner’s reasoning. Accordingly, the record evidence supports a prima
facie case of retaliation.

                                          11
                      Conclusion

For all of the above reasons, the PHRC’s Final Order is affirmed.

                         _________________________________
                         ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

                           12
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Erin Jackson,                         :
                  Petitioner          :
                                      :
            v.                        :
                                      :
Pennsylvania Human                    :
Relations Commission,                 :   No. 46 C.D. 2023
                 Respondent           :

                                  ORDER

            AND NOW, this 5th day of January, 2024, the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Commission’s December 19, 2022 Final Order is affirmed.

                                    _________________________________
                                    ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
             IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Erin Jackson,                       :
                         Petitioner :
                                    :
            v.                      : No. 46 C.D. 2023
                                    : Argued: December 4, 2023
Pennsylvania Human Relations        :
Commission,                         :
                         Respondent :

BEFORE:          HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
                 HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
                 HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

CONCURRING OPINION
BY JUDGE WALLACE                                                   FILED: January 5, 2024

         I am constrained to agree with the Majority’s decision but write separately to
emphasize this as a cautionary tale for landlords.                  The application of the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA)1 in this case is harsh, particularly
because Petitioner, Erin Jackson, previously allowed a grown dog on the property.
Nonetheless, the PHRA provides an important bulwark against discrimination,
including discrimination against those with mental health disabilities. Whether a
landlord has one tenant or one thousand, he or she must comply with the PHRA. A
landlord would be wise to familiarize himself or herself with all legal obligations
and consult an attorney.
                                                     ______________________________
                                                     STACY WALLACE, Judge

1
    Act of October 27, 1955, P.L. 744, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 951-963.