Court Opinion

ID: 9865107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:24:01.28043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:23.060673
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Butler
dissenting.
I join my brother Hilliard in dissenting from the judgment of disbarment.
Boutcher was admitted to practice twelve years ago. Before admitting- him, this court was required by law to be “satisfied” that he was “of good moral character.” C. L., §6000. That he has continued to be of good moral character is evidenced by the testimony of reputable members of this bar, and no one testified to the contrary, except the two women who swore to the misconduct charged against him in this proceeding’. As said by my brother Hilliard, Boutcher denied emphatically any wrongful conduct, and made a reasonable explanation of his connection with the transaction. Opposed to his testimony is that of two confessed perjurers, whose testimony, as I read the record, is not corroborated by any fact or circumstances inconsistent with Boutcher’s innocence. They confessedly committed perjury when they testified to the execution of the will; and their credibility was otherwise impeached by the testimony of credible witnesses, one of whom, who has been honored by his constituents by election to high office, said that both women “were generally reputed to be of the lowest moral type, were known for their trickery, falsity and unfairness in all business dealings, and bore the worst of reputations for truth and veracity.” I find nothing in the record to suggest that these two women, who so willingly falsified in their testimony concerning the execution of the will, have undergone a radical change in their moral character and are now enlisted under the banner of Truth. That their testimony is admissible in evidence, no one connected with the case has disputed. There has *509been no suggestion of a departure from the rule announced in Hoffman v. People, 72 Colo. 552, 212 Pac. 848, cited in the majority opinion. The probative force of such testimony in this case, however, has been challenged and, in my opinion, successfully challenged.
The charge against Boutcher- constitutes a crime, punishable, in a proper proceeding, by confinement in the penitentiary. His counsel stated truly, in oral argument: “If Boutcher did what he is charged with, he not only should be disbarred, but also should be in the penitentiary; if he did not do what he is charged wjth, this proceeding should be dismissed; there is no middle course.” On such a record as we have before us, I am unable to concur in finding Boutcher guilty of the felony with which he is charged.
For the reasons stated in my brother Hilliard’s opinion and in this opinion, I respectfully dissent.