Court Opinion

ID: 9817947
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 05:05:08.535905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:10.456629
License: Public Domain

*428ON REHEARING.
1. The appellant in its petition for rehearing contends that this court erred in holding that it was hot entitled to a trial by jury before the Corporation Commission, as provided by section 19, art. 2 (Bill of Rights), of the Constitution (section 27, Williams’ Ann. Ed.). In the-original opinion this court held that the judicial power vested in the Corporation Commission by the terms of the Act of February 10, 1913, was within the original contemplation of the framers of the Constitution, in creating the Corporation Commission, that such power might be added within the discretion of the Legislature in order to fully regulate public service corporations and provide against abuse, discrimination, and excessive charges and to cause refunds therefor to be made, and that it was not contemplated that a jury, as required by section 19 of the Bill of Rights, should be had before the Corporation Commission. That opinion is still adhered to.
2. That part of section 20 of article 9 of the Constitution which provides that “no court of this state (except the Supreme Court, by way of appeals as herein authorized) shall have jurisdiction to review, reverse, correct, or annul any action of the Commission within the scope of its authority, or to suspend or delay the execution or operation thereof, or to enjoin, restrain, or interfere with the Commission in the performance of its official duties,” was construed in connection with section 6, art. 2, of the Constitution, wherein it was held that said provision applied to courts in this state only when they sat in like capacity as the Supreme Court on appeal from such orders. This holding is challenged in the petition for rehearing. Suffice it to say that, if this construction is not correct, said excerpt from said section 20 must fall, as it would have the effect to deny the appellant due process of law, as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitution, in that it deprived said appellant of a judicial review. In that contingency said section 6 of the Bill of Rights would remain in force, which guarantees to every person a speedy and certain remedy for every wrong and for every injury to person, property, or reputation. Under this section *429both legal and equitable jurisdiction may be invoked by - appellant for relief, unless denied by some other provision of the Constitution. Section 24 of article 9 provides:
“The right of any person to institute and prosecute in the ordinary courts of justice, any action, suit, or motion against any transportation or transmission company, for any claim or cause of action against such company, shall not be extinguished or impaired, by reason of any fine or other penalty which the Commission may impose, or be authorized to impose, upon such company because of its breach of any public duty, or because of its failure to comply with any order or requirement of the Commission; but, in no such proceeding by any person against such corporation, nor in any collateral proceeding shall the reasonableness, justness, or validity of any rate, charge, classification of traffic, rule, regulation, or requirement, theretofore prescribed by the Commission, within the scope of its authority, and then in force, be questioned.”
In this action the state acts for the individual, and said section 24 specifically prohibits the reasonableness of the order upon which the action is based, being brought into the question in such action. Said section 24 of article 9, therefore, cuts off the right of a judicial review as to the validity of said order, in an action brought to enforce the refund, but the right to invoke equity jurisdiction by the transmission company to have said order declared invalid is not denied, for' such proceeding is not collateral but direct.
In Morrill v. Morrill, 20 Ore. 96, 25 Pac. 362, 11 L. R. A. 155, 23 Am. St. Rep. 95, it is said:
“A collateral attack on a judgment is any proceeding which is not instituted for the express purpose of annulling,'correcting or modifying such decree. 12 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 147.”
This identical language is also approved in Peyton v. Peyton, 28 Wash. 278, 68 Pac. 757. The remedy by law not being available, that by equitable cognizance is. A judicial review by invoking equitable powers being afforded under the provisions of this Constitution, a direct attack was available to appellant to have declared void said order of the Commission of October 12, 1908. This constituted due process of law. State of Washing-*430ion ex rel. Oregon R. & Nav. Co. v. Fairchild et al., 224 U. S. 510, 32 Sup. Ct. 535, 56 L. Ed. 863.
3. The appellant's contention that the Act of February 10, 1913, should be construed by implication to amend section 24, art. 9, of the Constitution, so as to permit the reasonableness of the order to be challenged by way of defense in an action to recover the refunds, appears not to be well founded.
The title of the act is as follows:
“An act conferring authority upon the Corporation Commission to adjust controversies between parties growing out of refunds for public, services; to require all refunds to be turned over to the Commission; to determine the amount of refund and to whom due; and declaring an emergency.”
Section 1 of said act is as follows:
“The Corporation Commission is hereby vested with the power of a court of record to determine: First, the amount of refund due in all cases where any public service corporation, person, or firm, as defined by the Constitution, charges an amount for any service rendered by such public service corporation, person, or firm, in excess of the lawful rate in force at the time such charge was made, or may thereafter be declared to be the legal rate which should have been applied to the service rendered ; and, second, to whom the overcharge should be paid.”
Section 2 of the same act also provides:
“Upon ascertaining the amount of overcharge due from any public service corporation, person or firm, the Corporation Commission shall have authority to render judgment against such public service corporation, person, or firm, for the amount of such overcharge that may have been collected from the public in violation of any legal rate, or order of the Commission, if necessary to insure the prompt payment of the same to the Commission. ***’-•
Clearly this act contemplates that the validity of the right shall be tried out in other actions, to wit: ' (1) On appeal from the action of .the Commission; (2) by motion before the Commission to vacate or modify the order; and (3) by a direct proceeding in equity to determine its validity. The other sections of said act are also in harmony with this conclusion.
In the case of In re Engelhard & Sons Co., 231 U. S. 646, 34 Sup. Ct. 259, 58 L. Ed.-, it is said:
*431“The city was the proper party to make defendant in the suit as representative of all interested, and so throughout the whole proceedings. If we may suppose, in a case like the present one, there can be a distinction between the public interest and private interest, the subscribers of the company being the public, the representation of both interests was adequately fulfilled. It was in consequence of the motion of the city that the telephone company agreed to keep account of charges in excess of the ordinance rates, and, if they should finally be decided to be illegal, to pay into court the excess sums for distribution among its subscribers. It was the representative of all interests to provide for the creation of the fund; it is properly the representative of all interests to see to its proper distribution. This is a necessary deduction from the cases. It is the universal practice, sustained by authority, that the only mode of judicial relief against unreasonable rates is by suit against the governmental authority which established them or is charged with the duty of enforcing them. * * * ”
In the Engelhard case a municipal ordinance o‘f a municipality in the state of Kentucky fixing telephone rates had been challenged. The Supreme Court of the United States holds that' the municipality, in being a party to the .litigation, is in a sense a trustee for the subscribers, and that it is a proper party to vindicate their rights and cause refunds to be made. As was shown in the original opinion in this case, the state in all proceedings in the way of fixing rates, charges, classifications of traffic, rules, and regulations by the Corporation Commission, to be observed by transmission companies, is a necessary party to such proceedings before said Commission. Every supersedeas bond made to suspend or supersede such order pending its appeal to the Supreme Court is also required to run in the name of the state, and the state is the appellee in all such appellate proceedings, and to our mind the Engelhard case, recently decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, but which was not before this court when the original opinion was written, sustains the former conclusion of this court.
Careful consideration has been given to all appellant’s contentions, but, after mature deliberation, we have reached the conclusion that they are without merit; It follows that the petition for rehearing must be denied. " '
All the Justices concur.