Court Opinion

ID: 9558970
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:19:42.088273+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:41.040610
License: Public Domain

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
This appeal presents the question whether Officers Ryan Bronner and Mike Sartain are entitled to qualified immunity on Eddie Howard’s claim that he was subjected to excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Because I do not agree with the Court’s conclusions that Howard was seized when the alleged constitutional violation occurred, that the officers’ actions were objectively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and that the alleged constitutional violation was clearly established, I respectfully dissent.
I. Howard was not seized when the alleged constitutional violation occurred
At the outset, it is worth reiterating that an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment requires that the plaintiff be seized when the constitutional violation occurs. Moore v. Indehar, 514 F.3d 756, 759 (8th Cir.2008). Here, the Court concludes that Howard was seized during the alleged constitutional violation because the officers had “pushed Howard to the ground and restrained him on the asphalt in spite of his attempts to move elsewhere.” Ante at 988. The Court’s analysis of the seizure issue, however, is incomplete. The Court neglects significant circumstances demonstrating that a reasonable person in Howard’s position would have understood that the situation began as a consensual encounter, was momentarily converted into a seizure, and then was converted back into a consensual encounter before the alleged constitutional violation occurred. Because the totality of the circumstances shows that a reasonable person in Howard’s position would have understood that he was free to refuse the officers’ medical treatment and terminate the encounter, see Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991), I would find that Howard was not seized when the alleged constitutional violation occurred.
“Not every encounter between a police officer and a citizen constitutes an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Barry, 394 F.3d 1070, 1074 (8th Cir.2005). To determine whether an encounter constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure, “the crucial test is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would ‘have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.’ ” Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988)); cf. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (noting that satisfaction of the “reasonable person” test described in Bostick is “a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for seizure”). We view the circumstances surrounding the encounter through the lens of a reasonable person in Howard’s situation, informed by the objective facts known to an individual in Howard’s position at that time. See Chestemut, 486 U.S. at 569, 108 S.Ct. 1975. The seizure inquiry is necessarily imprecise and requires case-by-case evaluation, since the result hinge's on the unique facts of each situation. United States v. Griffith, 533 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir.2008).
Here, the encounter began when Howard voluntarily and willingly sought assistance from the officers to provide protection from his pursuing assailants and *994medical aid for his gunshot wound. To this end, Howard first attempted to draw Officer Galley’s attention by honking and swerving his red Camaro while he was being pursued by his assailants in the green Mirage, and he then flagged down Officers Bronner and Sartain for help after fleeing his parked car. Ante at 986-87. The fact that Howard initiated contact is significant because it is more likely that a citizen would feel free to terminate the encounter when he, and not the police, invited the encounter. Cf. United States v. Valle Cruz, 452 F.3d 698, 705-06 (8th Cir.2006) (holding that an individual was not seized when she voluntarily pulled her vehicle over to wait for a traveling companion in another vehicle, which had been stopped by law enforcement); United States v. Summers, 268 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that defendant’s act of approaching the police officer supported the conclusion that the interaction was voluntary).
Although I agree with the Court that the situation was momentarily converted from a consensual encounter into a seizure because of the officers’ acts of drawing their weapons, ordering Howard to the ground, and forcing him down on .the ground, see ante at 988, the subsequent circumstances, viewed from the objective perspective of a reasonable person in Howard’s position, converted the situation back into a consensual encounter before the alleged constitutional violation occurred. Cf. United States v. Barnum, 564 F.3d 964, 972-73 (8th Cir.2009) (holding that a police officer’s acts converted a seizure into a consensual encounter); United States v. Ramirez, 476 F.3d 1231, 1240 (11th Cir.2007) (same). As the officers laid Howard on the ground, Howard apprised the officers that he was a victim rather than a perpetrator, yelling “I just got shot; the guys was over there, they’re back there.” Once the officers noticed Howard’s gunshot wound, they immediately holstered their weapons and began treating his injury. The officers’ actions removed from the equation most of those objective circumstances—the display of weapons, the use of coercive language or intonation, and acts and language indicating the person is under investigation—that could lead a reasonable person in Howard’s situation to believe that he was being seized. See Griffith, 533 F.3d at 983. Similarly, a reasonable person in Howard’s situation would understand that the remaining circumstances that might otherwise be indicative of a seizure—the presence of several officers and physical restraint—were clearly done in the furtherance of the officers’ provision of treatment to Howard. Cf. Morelli v. Webster, 552 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir.2009) (“Hallmark factors such as physical restraint ... may be suggestive, but in certain circumstances such factors may be perfectly consistent with an investigatory stop [instead of an unlawful detention].”).
After the officers holstered their weapons and began treating Howard, they asked him questions about his assailants and radioed dispatch “to tell the cops that it’s a green car and there’s four dudes in the car.” The officers’ questions concerning Howard’s assailants, when considered alongside the facts that the officers did not handcuff Howard, administer Miranda.9 warnings, or tell him that he was under arrest, would lead a reasonable person in Howard’s situation to believe that the officers accepted Howard’s claim that he was a victim and not the subject of police suspicion or investigation.10 Moreover, after *995the officers determined that Howard was the victim and not a suspect, this encounter occurred entirely for the benefit of Howard, the citizen, rather than for thé benefit of law enforcement, which typically enjoys the fruits of those encounters alleged to be seizures. Cf. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002) (encounter benefit-ted police drug interdiction efforts); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 211-12, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984) (encounter benefitted federal immigration law enforcement efforts); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 6-7, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (encounter benefitted law enforcement anti-theft efforts). Howard’s status as the intended beneficiary of the encounter further increases the likelihood that a reasonable person in Howard’s position would have understood that he was not being seized. Cf. United States v. Flores-Sandoval, 474 F.3d 1142, 1145 (8th Cir.2007) (“A consensual encounter does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.”).
I am not convinced that the officers’ acts of immobilizing Howard in accordance with their first-responder training and refusing his requests to move the continuing treatment onto a nearby patch of grass or against the officers’ police cruiser converted the consensual encounter back into a seizure. The Supreme Court has recognized that “not every governmental interference with an individual’s freedom of movement raises such constitutional concerns that there is a seizure of the person.” Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 618, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989). For instance, the Sixth Circuit has held that “a voluntarily confined individual who is bodily restrained by State actors, related to his consented-to medical treatment, has not been seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment’s application so long as a reasonable person in the patient’s position would believe that he was free to leave the State’s care.” Lawman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 681 (6th Cir.2008) (citing Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 573, 108 S.Ct. 1975). The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Lanman is instructive here. A reasonable person in Howard’s position, a citizen seeking and voluntarily consenting to assistance from police officers for treatment of a gunshot wound, “would believe that the restraint was part of the medical treatment he had authorized, and not an attempt by defendants to keep him there against his will.” 11 Id. Moreover, “[wjhile the facts viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff suggest that [Howard] did ask defendants to get off of him ..., there is no evidence to suggest that [he] expressed a desire to leave [their treatment] and defendants refused to allow him to do so.” See id.-, cf. United States v. Siwek, 453 F.3d 1079, 1086 (8th Cir.2006) (holding that an individual must make “an unequivocal act or statement” to withdraw his consent to search).12
Because a reasonable person in Howard’s position, a law-abiding citizen who sought out police officers, would have un*996derstood that he was not under suspicion of any crime and that he was free to discontinue the treatment and leave the situation, I would find that Howard was not seized when the alleged constitutional violation occurred.
II. The officers’ actions were objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
Even assuming that the officers seized Howard, I would find that the seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the officers’ actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances. In particular, I would find that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to spend four to six minutes attending to Howard’s life-threatening gunshot wound before responding to Howard’s complaints about the hot pavement, which caused injuries that were serious but not life-threatening.
The Court concedes that the officers’ actions were at least partially reasonable. Initially, the Court finds that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to force Howard to the ground at gunpoint and to administer first aid in the two to three minutes before Howard started to complain about the hot pavement. Ante at 989-90 The Court also indicates that the officers’ concern with limiting Howard’s movement in order to avoid further injuries “may have reasonably motivated their decision to prevent [Howard] from leaning on a police cruiser or moving to a nearby patch of grass.” Ante at 992-93. Finally, the Court suggests that “[if] Howard spent no more than a few minutes (as opposed to seven or eight minutes) on the pavement before he was moved to the blanket,” then the officers’ actions were “objectively reasonable and consistent with the Fourth Amendment.” Ante at 992-93 n. 8.
Nevertheless, the Court holds that the officers’ actions were not objectively reasonable based on at least four considerations. First, Howard complained that the pavement was hot and asked to move to a different location. Ante at 989-90. Second, the officers responded to Howard’s complaints four to six minutes later by “directing another officer to retrieve a blanket” from their police cruiser and placing the blanket underneath Howard’s back and shoulders. Ante at 990. Third, the officers “did nothing” during the intervening four to six minutes “except pin Howard’s arms and legs to the ground.” Ante at 990. Fourth, the blanket was “available immediately,” so the officers could have “order[ed] another officer to retrieve it” as soon as Howard started to complain, and there is no evidence that the officers had a “good reason” for waiting four to six minutes to respond to Howard’s complaints. Ante at 990.
The Court’s holding is premised on a theory of the alleged constitutional violation that the Court has itself constructed: basically, waiting too long to order a third officer to retrieve the blanket while “doing nothing” and without a “good reason.” As far as I can tell, Howard has never alleged that Officers Bronner and Sartain violated the Fourth Amendment in this manner. Instead, the focus of Howard’s complaint and his opposition to the officers’ motion for summary judgment was the officers’ affirmative conduct in forcing him to the ground at gunpoint and holding him down on the hot pavement. The crux of Howard’s constitutional claim was that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by using excessive force, which prevented him from getting off the pavement and moving to a different location. Howard could not prevail under this excessive force theory; as the Court seems to recognize, it was objectively reasonable for the officers to immobilize Howard on the pavement in order to avoid further injuries (and, of course, to limit the loss of blood). See *997ante at 990. On its own initiative, the Court converts the alleged constitutional violation into one of omission—the officers’ failure to respond to Howard’s complaints “with reasonable dispatch.” Ante at 990. The result is a glaring mismatch between the Court’s theory of the alleged constitutional violation and the specific facts set out in Howard’s opposition to the officers’ motion for summary judgment. Cf. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2) (“When a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, an opposing party ... must—by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule—set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.”).
If the constitutional violation is waiting too long to order a third officer to retrieve a blanket while in the meantime “doing nothing” without a “good reason,” then the plaintiff bears the burden under Rule 56(e)(2) of specifically asserting that Officers Bronner and Sartain did nothing except pin his arms and legs to the ground and had no good reason for failing to respond to his complaints with greater dispatch. In my view, Howard has not met that burden. On the contrary, Howard’s version of the facts tends to show that the officers were occupied with other tasks during the four to six minutes after he initially complained about the hot pavement and that the officers had a good reason for waiting four to six minutes before ordering a third officer to retrieve the blanket. According to Howard, Officer Bronner was applying pressure to Howard’s gunshot wound, Officer Sartain was restraining Howard’s legs to thwart Howard’s “attempts to scramble to his feet,” and both officers were asking repetitive questions with the obvious purpose of keeping Howard from slipping into unconsciousness. Thus, Howard has conceded that Officers Bronner and Sartain did something rather than nothing for the four to six minutes after he started to complain and that the officers had a good reason— treating his life-threatening gunshot wound—for waiting four to six minutes to respond to his complaints. As for the third officer who allegedly retrieved the blanket, Howard again falls short of his burden under Rule 56(e)(2) because he does not set out any specific facts about who the third officer was, when the third officer arrived on the scene, whether the third officer was occupied with other tasks before retrieving the blanket, or how long it took the third officer to locate the blanket and bring it to Officers Bronner and Sartain after being ordered to do so.
The Court’s analysis of the alleged constitutional violation is flawed in two additional respects. First, the Court’s analysis fails to account for the governmental interests at stake in this situation. As the Supreme Court has held, “[djetermining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of ‘the nature ■ and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’ against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)). The Court’s analysis focuses exclusively on the nature and quality of the intrusion on Howard’s Fourth Amendment interests without placing any countervailing governmental interest in the balance. Although the officers have not clearly articulated what interests they seek to defend, we may infer that one of the relevant interests is the interest of police in providing efficacious treatment to a person who seeks medical attention for a life-threatening injury. The interest in providing efficacious treatment necessarily implies that officers are entitled to some measure of deference in attending to the life-threatening injury before responding to comparatively less *998serious complaints. Placing this interest in the balance yields the conclusion that a reasonable officer could reasonably spend four to six minutes maintaining pressure on Howard’s wound, restraining Howard’s legs to thwart his attempts to scramble to his feet, and asking repetitive questions to keep Howard from slipping into unconsciousness before turning to other matters.13
Second, the Court’s analysis depends on the “20/20 vision of hindsight.” See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (“The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”). For example, the Court states that “by placing a blanket underneath Howard the Officers demonstrate[d] how easy and readily available such a solution was.” Ante at 992. The Court’s logic seems sound enough with the benefit of hindsight. But the Court fails to heed the Supreme Court’s admonition that the Fourth Amendment inquiry must make “allowance[s] for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments ... in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865. The medical emergency that Officers Bronner and Sartain confronted was tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving, forcing them to make immediate treatment decisions with potential life-or-death consequences. As a result, ordering a third officer to retrieve the blanket in the eighth minute of their encounter with Howard does not prove that the solution was “easy and readily available” four, five, or six minutes earlier. Not every delay in responding to a seized person’s complaints— even complaints that later seem vitally important and easily redressed—violates the Fourth Amendment. Cf. id. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (“Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).
As we have previously noted, “officials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for transgressing bright lines.” Littrell v. Franklin, 388 F.3d 578, 582 (8th Cir.2004) (quoting Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir.1992)). I am convinced that the officers in this case were operating in a gray area. Without the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, the officers could not have predicted whether Howard would survive the gunshot wound which severed the brachial artery in his arm. Equally, the officers could not have predicted the precise extent of the harm caused by Howard’s exposure to the hot pavement, though this harm was obviously not life-threatening. The officers faced a conflict between Howard’s complaints, their training not to move a person with a gunshot wound, and the *999other tasks that occupied their time and attention during the crucial four-to-six-minute interval. Under these challenging circumstances, the officers made what was at worst a “bad guess”—that the best course of action was to take steps that would maximize Howard’s chances of survival before responding to his complaints about the hot pavement. Judging this incident from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, I cannot say that Officers Bronner and Sartain should be denied qualified immunity, which protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” See Littrell, 388 F.3d at 582 (quoting Motley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)).
III. The alleged constitutional violation was not clearly established
Even assuming that the officers’ actions were not objectively reasonable under the circumstances, I would still find that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity because the alleged constitutional violation was not clearly established at the' time of their encounter with Howard. The Court reaches a contrary conclusion by defining the alleged constitutional violation at an excessive level of generality. Namely, the Court holds that “[a]s of 2002, it was clearly established that the Fourth Amendment was violated if an officer unreasonably ignored the complaints of a seized person that the force applied by the officer was causing more than minor injury.” Ante at 991. The Supreme Court has made clear that “the right the official is alleged to have violated must have been ‘clearly established’ in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). “This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
I am not convinced that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness of the officers’ actions was apparent. There is a dearth of pre-existing law concerning the use of excessive force in the course of providing treatment to a seized person who requested assistance from the police. Cf. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 753, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is crucial to look at precedent applying the relevant legal rule in similar factual circumstances. Such cases give government officials the best indication of what conduct is unlawful in a given situation.”). Cases involving an officer’s failure to respond to a suspect’s complaints about tight handcuffs seem in-apposite given the nature of the medical emergency that Officers Bronner and Sartain confronted. When a suspect complains that his handcuffs are too tight, the injury can be redressed by loosening the handcuffs.14 Identifying the proper course of action is not so simple when a person with a life-threatening injury complains of a condition that is likely to cause injuries that are not' life-threatening. Here again, without resorting to 20/20 hindsight, I would conclude that a reason*1000able officer could reasonably elect to focus his undivided attention on treating the life-threatening injury before responding to other complaints.
The Court does not identify any cases clearly establishing the amount of time that may elapse before an officer’s failure to respond to a seized person’s complaints—about tight handcuffs or any other potentially injurious condition—becomes a constitutional violation. And the Court’s analysis of the alleged constitutional violation in this case provides precious little guidance to officers who might face an analogous situation in the future.
What exactly does it mean, in practice, to “remedy[ ][a] situation with reasonable dispatch”? See ante at 990. Presumably, the clock starts running as soon as a seized person complains about a potentially injurious condition. But it would be absurd to suggest that police officers must always redress a seized person’s complaints within four to six minutes. What if Howard had suffered a grand mal seizure instead of a gunshot wound, would it then be reasonable for the officers to spend four to six minutes treating his life-threatening condition without “simultaneously” responding to earlier complaints? Or what if Officers Bronner and Sartain dispatched the third officer immediately but it took more than six minutes to find the blanket, buried beneath a pile of other equipment in the back of their police cruiser? In that situation, Howard would spend at least as much time on the hot pavement as he did in this case, yet the Court indicates that the officers’ conduct would no longer violate the Fourth Amendment. See ante at 992 n. 7. This suggests that the outcome of the Court’s constitutional inquiry depends more on whether the officers intended to redress Howard’s complaints with reasonable dispatch and less on whether the officers’ actual conduct was unreasonable. Cf. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (“An officer’s evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer’s good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional.”). It seems as if the most a reasonable officer could learn from the Court’s opinion is that ignoring a seized person’s complaints for four to six minutes is sometimes (often? always?) impermissible, while redressing such complaints within “a few minutes” is sometimes (often? always?) objectively reasonable. Compare ante at 992, with ante at 992-98 n. 8.
In my view, the contours of the right that the officers allegedly violated were not sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer would understand that it was unlawful to spend four to six minutes attending to Howard’s life-threatening gunshot wound before responding to his complaints about the hot pavement, which caused injuries that were serious but not life-threatening.
IV. Conclusion
In summary, I would conclude that Howard was not seized when the alleged constitutional violation occurred, that the officers’ actions were objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and that the alleged constitutional violation was not clearly established. Accordingly, I would reverse the district court’s denial of the officers’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity and remand with instructions to grant the motion. Because the Court concludes otherwise, I respectfully dissent.

. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

. Although it cannot factor into the objective inquiry, Howard’s subjective beliefs show he understood that the situation reverted back to a consensual encounter from a seizure. According to Howard’s testimony, the encounter changed from one where "[the police] proba*995bly thought that I was the bad guys” into one where "[the officers] instantly started asking questions [about the assailants in the green car].”

. Indeed, Howard himself even speculated that the officers’ restraint was based on a concern for his safety because "[they] didn't want me to move and hurt myself more than I was already hurt.”

. In concluding that Howard was seized, the Court impermissibly focuses on Howard’s subjective understanding of the situation rather than the understanding of an objectively • reasonable person in Howard’s situation. See ante at 988-89 (“[N]owhere in the record is it clear that Howard felt free to leave the Officers’ care, but was simply objecting to a specific application of force as part of his treatment.” (emphasis added)).

. The Court assumes that Officers Bronner and Sartain could have continued treating Howard’s life-threatening injury while "simultaneously dispatching another officer to retrieve a blanket.” Ante at 990 n. 5. To be sure, human beings generally are capable of performing more than one task at once. But the relevant question here is whether the Fourth Amendment required Officers Bronner and Sartain to shift part of their focus away, albeit momentarily, from maintaining pressure on Howard’s wound, restraining Howard's legs to thwart his attempts to scramble to his feet, and asking repetitive questions to keep Howard from slipping into unconsciousness. Although "[a] creative judge engaged in post hoc evaluation of police conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means by which the objectives of the police might have been accomplished,” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-87, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985), I do not think it was unreasonable for Officers Bronner and Sartain to spend four to six minutes working singlemindedly to save Howard’s life.

. Even so, an officer's failure to respond to such complaints does not necessarily violate the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., McGruder v. Heagwood, 197 F.3d 918, 920 (8th Cir.1999) (affirming the grant of qualified immunity to officers who ignored a suspect’s complaints that his handcuffs were too tight, holding that “objectively reasonable police officers could have believed that they were not using excessive force, though this belief may have been erroneous”).