Court Opinion

ID: 9756391
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:26:38.944184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:21.198889
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION BY
TODD, J.:
¶ 1 I agree with the Majority’s conclusion that the trial court properly denied Appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of a warrantless entry into his hotel room by police. I agree that there were exigent circumstances which justified the warrantless entry, and that the cocaine seized from Appellant’s hotel room was in plain view. Therefore, I concur in the result reached by my learned colleagues. I write separately, however, because I question the Majority’s determination that Appellant did not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in his hotel room since the rental period had expired and Appellant had not yet paid for another night’s stay.
¶ 2 In concluding that Appellant did not possess a legitimate expectation of privacy in his hotel room, the Majority notes that “it is uncontroverted that the rental period had expired at the time Officer Maurer entered the room. Appellant’s legitimate expectation of privacy expired along with the expiration of the rental period.” Majority Opinion, at 369. As support for its conclusion, the Majority relies on our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Brundidge, 533 Pa. 167, 620 A.2d 1115 (1993). I do not, however, read Brundidge so broadly.
¶ 3 In Brundidge, the appellee had registered for a motel room for one night for himself and a companion. Later that same evening, at approximately midnight, motel employees observed the appellee and his companion leave. By noon the next day, the motel’s checkout time, neither the ap-pellee nor his companion had returned, and a housekeeper telephoned the room to determine whether the occupants wished to retain the room for a second night. When she received no answer, the housekeeper entered the room to prepare it for the next guest. At that time, she discovered a diagram of the motel floor plan, became alarmed, and contacted the police. Following them entry into the room, police searched the closet of the room where they discovered a jacket inside of a protective bag. Inside the pocket of the jacket police discovered a plastic bag containing cocaine.
¶ 4 In denying the appellee’s motion to suppress the cocaine, the trial court determined that the appellee had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the room or anything found therein once checkout time had arrived and passed. The court further held that exigent circumstances existed to *371justify the warrantless search, since the appellee and his companion could return to the room at any time. On appeal, this Court held that the appellee had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the motel room, but reversed on the grounds that the police intrusion into the appellee’s enclosed personal effects had violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The Commonwealth appealed our decision to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which held:
The Superior Court correctly decided that while a guest in a motel or hotel room has a legitimate expectation of privacy during the period of time it is rented, no such expectation exists in the room or in any item in plain view to anyone readying the room after checkout time for the next occupant. Society is not prepared to recognize as legitimate a subjective expectation of privacy in a motel room in which the rental period has ended and the guest’s right to occupancy consequently has lapsed.
Id. at 173-74, 620 A.2d at 1118.
¶ 5 There are significant differences between the facts of Brundidge and those in the case sub judiee. In Brundidge, hotel personnel believed that the appellee and his companion had vacated the room. They were seen leaving late on the evening of check-in, and they had not returned by check-out time the following day. The housekeeper telephoned the room to see if the occupants wished to retain the room for another night, and when she received no answer, she entered the room in order to prepare it for the next guest.
¶ 6 Instantly, however, there was no indication that Appellant had vacated his motel room prior to the entry by police. Indeed, motel personnel suspected that Appellant was still occupying the room due to the smell of burning marijuana. There also was no indication that Appellant had been asked to vacate the room because he had not yet paid the fee for a second evening, and, in contrast to Brundidge, motel personnel were not in the process of preparing the room for the next guest. Under these circumstances, I am reluctant to extend the holding of Brundidge in order to conclude that Appellant’s expectation of privacy in a room in which he was still present expired at the precise moment his bill for a second night came due.
¶ 7 Notwithstanding the above, in view of the fact that there were exigent circumstances that justified the warrantless entry into Appellant’s room, I concur with the Majority’s holding that the trial court properly denied Appellant’s motion to suppress.