Court Opinion

ID: 9717275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:01:02.168194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:52.237813
License: Public Domain

STEINMETZ, J.
(dissenting). To coin a phrase, “hard cases make bad law.” It is obvious that this is a hard case; the plaintiff, Gloria A. Watkins, has fought the good legal fight for nearly ten years before administrative agencies and in courts, including a previous appeal to this court. In pursuing and accomplishing this favorable legal result, she incurred a bill from her attorney in the amount of $2,658.36. Because there was no pay differential between Watkin’s previous position and the service zone position she sought, she received no monetary award. What she essentially received was a decision confirming that she had been a victim of unlawful racial discrimination and an order directing her employer not to repeat such action. The majority states this result and then legislates in order to compensate Watkins for her attorney fees.
If legislation has not been adopted to cure all wrongs in an area of employment and human behavior, then the appeal should be to the legislature, not to this court. It must be assumed that the legislature knew that it could grant attorney fees with a favorable award, but chose not to do so. Sec. 111.36(3) (b), Stats. (1975), makes no mention of awarding attorney fees. The broad language relied on by the majority in its analysis is “make written findings and order such action ... as will effectuate the purpose of this subchapter.” To say as the majority opinion does that the award of attorney fees is appropriate as an “action” to effectuate the purpose of *767the subchapter is not an interpretation of the statute, but rather is a rewriting of it to accomplish a desired purpose. With the result-oriented technique employed in this case, any potential is possible.
Anderson v. Labor & Industry Rev. Comm., 111 Wis. 2d 245, 330 N.W.2d 594 (1983), which is relied on in great part by the majority, was based on prior Wisconsin and federal decisions; however, no such foundation exists in this case since it deals with the award of attorney fees.
In Anderson, the court found the award of prejudgment interest by the commission permissible even though not directly stated in sec. 111.31(3), Stats. The federal district court cases cited at 259 of Anderson reasoned that although Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act did not expressly provide for interest on back awards, the liberal interpretation of that act which was intended to make whole the person discriminated against allowed the result. Further, in Anderson at 260, we relied on Wisconsin cases for the award of prejudgment interest on liquidated damages as long as they were capable of determination by application of some fixed standard. Back pay awards were capable of determination by application of a fixed standard and we reasoned therefore that prejudgment interest was permissible even though not mentioned specifically in sec. 111.36(3) (b).
Now, however, the majority lifts itself up by its own bootstraps by relying on the Anderson case in an area where the federal case law is sparse, fuzzy and not on point as to the award of attorney fees and in an area where there are no prior Wisconsin cases on point.
This court has previously considered the award of attorney fees. In Cedarburg L. & W. Comm. v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 42 Wis. 2d 120, 124-25, 166 N.W.2d 165 (1969), we held:
*768“As a general rule, in the absence of any contractual or statutory liability therefor, attorney’s fees and expenses incurred by the plaintiff in litigation of his claim against the defendant, aside from statutory court costs and fees, are not recoverable as an item of damages.”
In the present case we have neither a contractual nor statutory liability exception. Cedarburg also pointed out that: “An examination of authorities reflects that several states have statutory provisions which resolve this question [of attorney fees]. This state does not.” Id. at 124.
It is true that in Yanta v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 66 Wis. 2d 53, 224 N.W.2d 389 (1974) the primary issues were whether the Fair Employment Act created a civil cause of action and whether plaintiff’s complaint stated a cause of action. However, in holding that the plaintiff’s complaint did state a cause of action in seeking damages for lost wages while plaintiff was unemployed, we also stated: “We limit plaintiff’s right to damages to the right to seek recovery for lost wages rather than for emotional harm, harm to reputation, or attorney’s fees.” Id. at 62. (Emphasis added.) The statute has not been relevantly altered since 1974 when the Yanta case was decided.
In 1977 in the case of State (Dept. of Admin.) v. ILHR Dept., 77 Wis. 2d 126, 252 N.W.2d 353 (1977), we stated a principle of law which this court should not allow to be weakened in order to arrive at a desired result. We held at 136:
“It is a general rule that an administrative agency has only those powers which are expressly conferred or which are fairly implied from the four corners of the statute under which it operates. Racine Fire & Police Comm. v. Stanfield, 70 Wis. 2d 395, 399, 234 N.W.2d 307 (1975) ; Wisconsin Environmental Decade, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 69 Wis. 2d 1, 16, 230 N.W.2d 243 (1975). Therefore, no agency may issue a rule that is not expressly or impliedly authorized by the legislature. *769Kachian v. Optometry Examining Board, 44 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 170 N.W.2d 743 (1969). . . . This court has recognized the rule that any reasonable doubt of the existence of an implied power of an administrative agency should be resolved against the exercise of such authority. State ex rel. Farrell v. Schubert, 52 Wis. 2d 351, 358, 190 N.W. 2d 529 (1971). We are satisfied that such doubt exists in this situation, and therefore this power is not so implied.”
Not even a liberal interpretation of sec. 111.36(3) (b), Stats. (1975) allows for the majority’s holding, which is not judicially but legislatively conceived. The majority holds: “Finally, it is evident that the authority to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing complainant is necessary in order to fully enforce and give meaning to the rights created by the Act.” (Supra at 765.) Evidently, the legislature which adopted sec. 111.36(3) (b), did not agree with the majority since it could easily and clearly have provided for the commission to award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing complainant. The legislature did not and we should not in the absence of clear authority being granted to the commission.
In American Motors Corp. v. ILHR Dept., 101 Wis. 2d 337, 350, 305 N.W.2d 62 (1981), the court pointed out the same language of the statute to liberally construe the subchapter for the accomplishment of the purpose of an employer accommodating religious practices and then held: “ ‘We cannot, of course, by a liberal construction change the wording of a statute to mean something which was not intended by the legislature or by the plain language used.’ ” (Quoting Lukaszewicz v. Concrete Research, Inc., 43 Wis. 2d 335, 342, 168 N.W.2d 581 (1969).)
I would affirm the circuit court.