Court Opinion

ID: 9955552
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 18:08:28.22556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:05.496437
License: Public Domain

140 Nev., Advance Opinion c21
                            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                      KIM A. JUDD,                                       No. 85734-COA
                      Appellant,
                      vs.                                                          FILE
                      THE STATE OF NEVADA,
                                                                          -
                      Respondent.                                                  MAR 28 20
                                                                                                      RT

                                                                              SY
                                                                                    EP DEPUTY CLERK

                                 Appeal from a judgment of conviction, entered pursuant to a
                      jury verdict, of one count of felony injuring or tampering with a motor
                      vehicle and one count of felony coercion. Seventh Judicial District Court,
                      Lincoln County; Gary Fairman, Judge.
                                 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

                      Katschke Law, LLC, and Franklin J. Katschke, Panaca,
                      for Appellant.

                      Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Dylan V. Frehner, District
                      Attorney, Lincoln County,
                      for Respondent.

                      BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS, GIBBONS, C.J., and BULLA and
                      WESTBROOK, JJ.

                                                      OPINION

                      By the Court, BULLA, J.:
                                 The consequences of criminal convictions vary widely between
                      misdemeanors and felonies, including the potential terms of incarceration.
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                   And sometimes crimes—such as coercion—can be punished as either.
                   Under NRS 207.190(2), criminal coercion is punishable as a felony if carried
                   out using physical force or the immediate threat of physical force. However,
                   absent the use or immediate threat of physical force, coercion is punishable
                   as a misdemeanor. In this opinion, we consider whether NRS 207.190(2)'s
                   use of the phrase "physical force" to distinguish between coercion being
                   punished as a felony versus as a misdemeanor should be limited to physical
                   force against a person, and not merely against property—in this case, a 1957
                   Chevrolet truck.     Because we conclude that the Nevada Legislature
                   intended for the distinguishing statutory element of "physical force" to be
                   limited to force against a person, the jury should have been so instructed.
                               In reaching our decision, we emphasize the importance of giving
                   proper jury instructions for the essential elements of a crime. Doing so is
                   particularly important where, as here, the jury's consideration of the
                   essential element of physical force, without proper instruction, resulted in
                   a felony conviction. As the district court failed to properly instruct the jury
                   on the definition of physical force as being limited to force against a
                   person—the essential element required for a felony conviction—we
                   necessarily reverse this conviction.       However, we affirm the felony
                   conviction for injuring or tampering with a motor vehicle, as the district
                   court correctly instructed the jury as to the proper measure of damages for
                   the partial destruction of property.
                                    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                               In 2020, Scott Reber purchased a 1957 Chevrolet truck. After
                   having mechanical work completed on the truck to render it drivable, Reber
                   dropped his truck off at the residence of a longtime acquaintance, appellant
                   Kim A. Judd, for restoration and repair work to the truck's exterior. Reber

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                   initially paid Judd about $1,000 for the repairs, but the two did not sign a
                   formal agreement.
                               When the work was not completed several months later, Reber
                   decided to retrieve his truck and have the work finished elsewhere. In a
                   phone call, Judd refused to return the truck unless Reber paid Judd an
                   additional sum for the repairs he had already made. Reber declined to pay
                   more and told Judd he was coming to retrieve his truck. At this point, Judd
                   retorted that if Reber came on to Judd's property, Judd would kill him.
                   Thereafter, Judd continued to threaten Reber, stating in text messages that
                   if Reber came to retrieve the truck, he would burn or damage the truck.
                   Judd then struck the truck several times with a sledgehammer and sent
                   Reber pictures of the damage. The following day, the sheriff accompanied
                   Reber to Judd's residence to retrieve the truck.
                               The State charged Judd with one count of felony coercion and
                   one count of felony injuring or tampering with a motor vehicle, and the case
                   proceeded to trial. During the settling of jury instructions, Judd raised two
                   objections. First, Judd objected to a proposed jury instruction setting forth
                   the elements of felony coercion without defining "physical force."
                   Specifically, as an alternative to the standard coercion instruction, Judd
                   offered an instruction adopting the definition of physical force as set forth
                   in NRS 193.303, which defines physical force as force used against "another
                   person." In connection with Judd's request for this instruction, Judd orally
                   requested dismissal of the felony coercion count because the State had failed
                   to present evidence that either physical force or the immediate threat of

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                   physical force had been used against Reber.' Second, Judd objected to the
                   State's proposed jury instruction regarding the proper measure of damages.
                   The State argued that because the truck was only partially damaged the
                   proper measure of damages was the cost to repair or replace the damaged
                   parts. Conversely, Judd argued for an instruction that the proper measure
                   of damages was the fair market value of each individual part at the time of
                   the damage, the total of which he asserted had to be less than the value of
                   the truck when Reber dropped it off, or less than $5,000. The district court
                   denied Judd's motion to dismiss, refused Judd's proposed instructions, and
                   specifically declined to give an instruction defining "physical force." The
                   jury found Judd guilty on both felony counts, and Judd was sentenced to a
                   maximum of 48 months in prison on each count, to run concurrently. This
                   appeal followed.
                               Judd challenges his convictions on several grounds, and we
                   address two in this opinion. First, we agree with Judd's argument that,
                   with respect to the felony coercion charge, the district court erred in failing
                   to give a jury instruction defining "physical force" as being limited to force
                   against a person, and therefore we necessarily reverse the felony coercion
                   conviction. But second, as to the charge of injuring or tampering with a
                   motor vehicle, we conclude that the district court correctly instructed the
                   jury on the proper measure of damages applicable to the partial destruction

                         'To the extent that Judd contends the district court erred in denying
                   his oral motion to dismiss at the close of the State's case, we note that no
                   statutory authority permits a motion to dismiss during a criminal trial for
                   insufficient evidence, and therefore the district court did not err in denying
                   Judd's motion. Cf. NRS 175.381(1) ("If, at any time after the evidence on
                   either side is closed, the court deems the evidence insufficient to warrant a
                   conviction, it may advise the jury to acquit the defendant, but the jury is
                   not bound by such advice.").
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                    of property. Thus, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further
                    proceedings consistent with this opinion.
                                                   ANALYSIS
                    The district court committed reversible error when it failed to instruct the
                    jury that NRS 207.190(2)'s use of the phrase "physical force" is limited to
                    force against a person
                                NRS 207.190 sets forth the crime of coercion and provides that
                                      1. It is unlawful for a person, with the intent
                                to compel another to do or abstain from doing an act
                                which the other person has a right to do or abstain
                                from doing, to:
                                      (a) Use violence or inflict injury upon the
                                other person or any of the other person's family, or
                                upon the other person's property, or threaten such
                                violence or injury;
                                      . . . ; or
                                      (c) Attempt to intimidate the person by
                                threats or force.
                                     2. A person who violates the provisions of
                                subsection 1 shall be punished:
                                      (a) Where physical force or the immediate
                                threat of physical force is used, for a category B
                                felony by imprisonment in the state prison for a
                                minimum term of not less than 1 year and a
                                maximum term of not more than 6 years, and may
                                be further punished by a fine of not more than
                                $5,000.
                                      (b) Where no physical force or immediate
                                threat of physical force is used, for a misdemeanor.
                                Although Judd does not challenge the elements of coercion set
                    forth in NRS 207.190(1), he contests his felony conviction under the statute.
                    To convict Judd of felony coercion under NRS 207.190, the State was
                    required to prove an additional element as set forth in subsection 2: the use
                    of "physical force or the immediate threat of physical force." Judd contends
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                   that the district court erred when it failed to instruct the jury that "physical
                   force," as used in NRS 207.190(2), is limited to force against a person.
                                Specifically, Judd argues that the district court should have
                   adopted his proposed jury instruction that applied the definition of "physical
                   force" from NRS 193.303. That provision, located within the general section
                   of criminal statutes governing the use of force by peace officers, states that
                   "[p]hysical force' means the application of physical, techniques, chemical
                   agents or weapons to another person." (Emphasis added.) Alternatively,
                   Judd proposes that the district court should have given an instruction that
                   physical force or threat of physical force must be used against a person. And
                   since the evidence at trial did not establish the requisite physical force
                   against a person, Judd contends the district court should have dismissed
                   that felony charge.      The State counters that Judd's proposed jury
                   instruction would have misstated the law, asserting that NRS 207.190(2)'s
                   plain language and legislative history support the conclusion that "physical
                   force" includes the use of force against both persons and property.2
                                We review a district court's refusal to issue a jury instruction
                   for an abuse of discretion or judicial error, but we review whether a
                   proffered instruction correctly states the law de novo. Nay v. State, 123

                         2 We  do not necessarily agree that Judd's proposed instruction
                   incorporating language from NRS 193.303 should have been the exact
                   instruction given in this case, but we recognize that Judd's primary
                   argument is that an instruction should have been given to define physical
                   force or threat of physical force as being against a person and not merely
                   property. We note that the district court has the ultimate responsibility of
                   ensuring that the jury is properly instructed. See Crawford v. State, 121
                   Nev. 744, 754-55, 121 P.3d 582, 589 (2005) ("And in the final analysis, the
                   district court is ultimately responsible for not only assuring • that the
                   substance of the defendant's requested instruction is provided to the jury,
                   but that the jury is otherwise fully and correctly instructed.").
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                    Nev. 326, 330, 167 P.3d 430, 433 (2007).         In this case, we must first
                    determine whether "physical force" as used in NRS 207.290(2), which
                    distinguishes felony coercion from misdemeanor coercion, requires force or
                    the immediate threat of force to be used against a person. Thus, to resolve
                    whether the district court abused its discretion or erred in failing to give an
                    instruction that "physical force" must be against a person, we necessarily
                    consider whether such an instruction encompasses a correct statement of
                    the law based on legislative intent.
                                   Our "starting point for determining legislative intent is the
                    statute's plain meaning." State v. Lucero, 127 Nev. 92, 95, 249 P.3d 1226,
                    1228 (2011). However, "when 'the statutory language lends itself to two or
                    more reasonable interpretations,' the statute is ambiguous," and this court
                    will "look to the legislative history [to] construe the statute in a manner that
                    is consistent with reason and public policy." Id. (quoting State v. Catanio,
                    120 Nev. 1030, 1033, 102 P.3d 588, 590 (2004)); see also Jones v. Nev., State
                    Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 131 Nev. 24, 28, 342 P.3d 50, 52 (2015) ("Because the
                    statute does not define [the disputed term] and the parties each advance a
                    different definition, we may look beyond the plain rneaning of the
                    statute . . . .").   Further, "[p]enal. statutes should be narrowly construed
                    where they are ambiguous."3 Romero v. State, 116 Nev. 344, 348, 996 P.2d
                    894, 897 (2000).

                           3We note that the phrase "physical force" is considered a legal term of
                    art that has different meanings in different statutory contexts. Cornpare
                    Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 141 (2010) (holding that the phrase
                    "physical force" as used in the Armed Career Criminal Act refers to "force
                    capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person"), with United
                    States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 163 (2014) (holding that a federal
                    statute's use of the phrase "physical force" when setting out a "misdemeanor
                    crime of domestic violence" includes "even the slightest offensive touching").
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                               NRS 207.190 does not define "physical force." And in this case,
                   the parties each ascribe different reasonable meanings to the phrase.
                   Under the State's reading, NRS 207.190(2)'s inclusion of "physical force"
                   pertains to all conceivable types of physical force against persons or
                   property based on the elements of coercion set forth in NRS 207.190(1)(a).

                   While the State acknowledges that the phrase "physical force" is not
                   included in NRS 207.190(1)(a), the State interprets NRS 207.190(2) to mean
                   that if a defendant uses any physical force to accomplish the actions set

                   forth in NRS 207.190(1)(a) (e.g., violence against persons or property), then
                   the crime is punishable as a felony.          Judd conversely interprets NRS
                   207.190(2)'s use of "physical force" to be a separate element required for
                   felony coercion and asserts it should be interpreted as physical force only

                   against a person. With this interpretation, Judd seeks to distinguish felony
                   coercion from misdemeanor coercion, as both felony and misdemeanor
                   coercion encompass the same elements set forth in NRS 207.190(1). Judd
                   relies on the narrower definition of "physical force" in NRS 193.303 to
                   support his argument that physical force must be against a person. See
                   Jones, 131 Nev. at 28, 342 P.3d at 52 (explaining that reasonable
                   interpretations may draw from "analogous statutory provisions"). Because
                   physical force" bears two reasonable interpretations in the context of the
                   statute, the phrase is ambiguous. See id. Thus, we next turn to the statute's
                   legislative history for additional insight.
                               In 1967, the Legislature added "physical force" as a required
                   element of felony coercion under NRS 207.190. See A.B. 71, 54th Leg. (Nev.
                   1967). The Legislature amended NRS 207.190 again in 1995 under S.B.
                   416, 68th Leg. (Nev. 1995), which classified all felony crimes under a letter-
                   coded felony scheme—category A felonies being the most serious and

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                   carrying the longest potential sentences. The bill classified felony coercion
                   as a category B felony—the category containing the second-most serious
                   felonies—which is how the crime remains classified today. See id.; NRS
                   207.190(2).
                                 In classifying felonies, the Legislature relied, in part, on a
                   report produced by the Nevada Department of Prisons detailing the average
                   sentence imposed and average time served for crimes separated by the
                   putative letter-coded tiers. See Hearing on S.B. 416 Before the Assemb.
                   Comm. on Judiciary, 68th Leg., at 757, 775 (Nev., May 17, 1995). That
                   report delineated felony coercion as a "serious crime" and category B felony
                   based on prior putative lists, as well as on the department's own
                   categorization of the crimes based on their elements.       Id. at 773, 775.
                   Within this list, the only other "serious crime" listed as a category B felony
                   that also required physical force as a necessary element was felony battery,
                   which limited the use of physical force to force against another person.4 See
                   id. at 775; Hobbs v. State, 127 Nev. 234, 238-39, 251 P.3d 177, 180 (2011)
                   (explaining that the physical force required for battery includes "the
                   intentional and unwanted exertion of force upon another" (emphasis
                   added)). Because the LeOslature viewed felony coercion and felony battery
                   as similarly serious crimes when designating them as category B felonies,
                   we conclude that it intended for the crimes' shared elements to carry the
                   same meaning and, therefore, for felony coercion's requirement of "physical

                         4During oral argument, the State suggested that extortion under NRS
                   205.320(2) punishes threats to injure property with the intent to gain money
                   as a category B felony. But unlike extortion, coercion requires the use of
                   physical force or the immediate threat of physical force as a necessary
                   element of the felony crime. Moreover, as the State duly noted, it did not
                   charge Judd with extortion.
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                   force" to only include force against a person. See Savage v. Pierson, 123
                   Nev. 86, 94, 157 P.3d 697, 702 (2007) ("[W]hen the same word is used in
                   different statutes that are similar with respect to purpose and content, the
                   word will be used in the same sense, unless the statutes' context indicates
                   otherwise . . . ."). Thus, although "physical force" in NRS 207.190(2) is not
                   defined as force against a person, we conclude that the legislative history
                   supports Judd's position that it was intended to be, contrary to the State's
                   position. We also note that the only reference to "force" in NRS 207.190(1)
                   involves coercion by lalttempt[ing] to intimidate the person by threats or
                   force." See NRS 207.190(1)(c) (emphasis added).
                               Interpreting felony coercion to require the use of physical force
                   (or the immediate threat of physical force) against a person, and not merely
                   against property, is both reasonable and avoids absurd results. See State v.
                   Quinn, 117 Nev. 709, 713, 30 P.3d 1117, 1120 (2001) (explaining that a
                   reviewing court's interpretation of an ambiguous statute "should be in line
                   with what reason and public policy would indicate the [L]egislature
                   intended, and should avoid absurd results" (quoting Gallagher v. City of Las
                   Vegas, 114 Nev. 595, 599-600, 959 P.2d 519, 521 (1998))). For example,
                   under the State's proposed reading of the coercion statute, a defendant
                   would be guilty of felony coercion if they used physical force or immediately
                   threatened physical force against any personal property, even if the
                   resulting damage would be less than $1.
                               The State, in its supplemental authorities on appeal, points to
                   Guerrina v. State, where the Nevada Supreme Court observed in dicta,
                   paraphrasing subsection 1 of the coercion statute, that "felony coercion
                   consists of the use or immediate threat of violence or injury against a person
                   or property, with 'the intent to compel another to do or abstain from doing

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                   an act which the other person has a right to do or abstain from doing." 134
                   Nev. 338, 346, 419 P.3d 705, 712 (2018) (quoting NRS 207.190(1)).         In
                   Guerrina, however, the supreme court affirmed the defendant's felony
                   coercion conviction because the defendant's immediate proximity to the
                   victim, accompanied with a command to disconnect the phone, arose to "an
                   immediate—albeit unspoken—threat of physical force" against the victim.
                   Id. at 347, 419 P.3d at 713 (internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast
                   to the facts in Guerrina, Judd and Reber were miles apart when Judd
                   threatened him over the phone, and that threat carried no immediate threat
                   of physical force against Reber's person, as Reber acknowledged at trial.
                   Thus, the holding of Guerrina is unpersuasive in resolving the matter before
                   US.

                               The State otherwise points to no controlling legal authority in
                   this jurisdiction, nor do we find any, where a felony coercion conviction was
                   affirmed based solely on the use of physical force or immediate threat of
                   physical force against property with no accompanying use or immediate
                   threat of force against the victim's person.5    Further, to the extent any

                         5At oral argument, the State discussed  United States v. Edling, 895
                   F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2018), where the United States Court of Appeals for the
                   Ninth Circuit, in deciding whether a conviction for felony coercion was a
                   "crime of violence" for federal sentencing purposes, looked to three
                   unpublished orders by the Nevada Supreme Court affirming felony coercion
                   convictions. Although those unpublished decisions involved defendants
                   forcefully depriving victims of phones they were using to call law
                   enforcement, the Ninth Circuit speculated that there was a "realistic
                   probability' that a defendant could be convicted of felony coercion without
                   using or threatening to use violent physical force against the person of
                   another" and therefore felony coercion under NRS 207.190 was not a "crime
                   of violence" under federal sentencing guidelines. Id. at 1159 (quoting U.S.
                   Sent'g Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2). We are not persuaded by the Ninth
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                   lingering ambiguity as to the statutory requirement of "physical force"
                   remains, the rule of lenity weighs in favor of Judd. Under the rule of lenity,
                   if a penal statute remains ambiguous after exhausting all other methods of
                   statutory interpretation, then the statute should be "interpreted in the
                   accused's favor." Lucero, 127 Nev. at 99, 249 P.3d at 1230 (quoting Moore
                   v. State, 122 Nev. 27, 32, 126 P.3d 508, 511 (2006)). Thus, the rule of lenity
                   further supports our interpretation that the requirement of "physical force"
                   under NRS 207.190(2) is limited to force against a person because this
                   resolves any remaining ambiguity in Judd's favor.6

                   Circuit's conjecture. Of course, the use of such force could be directed to
                   both property and a person, such as the use of physical force to grab a phone
                   from a person's hand and destroy the phone to prevent a call to law
                   enforcement. See, e.g., Gramrn v. State, No. 72459, 2018 WL 679548, at *1
                   (Nev. Feb. 1, 2018) (Order of Affirmance) (affirming a conviction of felony
                   coercion where the defendant hit a phone out of the victim's hand while the
                   victim was trying to call the police). Thus, to establish felony coercion, there
                   must be some temporal proxirnity between the intent to damage property
                   and the victim such that a reasonable person under the same circumstances
                   would feel immediately threatened by the use of physical force against their
                   person. See Santana v. State, 122 Nev. 1458, 1462-63, 148 P.3d 741, 744-
                   45 (2006). We also note that in Barber v. State, No. 77650, 2020 WL
                   3570435, at *1 (Nev. June 30, 2020) (Order of Affirmance), the supreme
                   court expressly declined to address whether physical force requires force
                   against a person for felony coercion because the issue was not preserved for
                   appellate review and, therefore, affirmed a felony coercion conviction in an
                   unpublished order based on the sufficiency of evidence where the
                   defendant's actions of "cut[ting] the lines to the land line" and removing the
                   battery from the victim's cell phone prevented the victim from calling for
                   help.

                         6 Indeed, when faced with a similar question—determining whether
                   the language "threat of physical injury" in a criminal statute included
                   threats to both property or a person, or solely to a person—the United States
                   Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit relied, in part, on the rule of lenity
                   to hold that the phrase only applied to threats of physical injury to a person.
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                               We therefore conclude that the district court erred in refusing
                   to instruct the jury that "physical force" must be against a person, which is
                   necessary to support the charge of felony coercion in accordance with NRS
                   207.190(2). Having concluded that the district court erred in failing to
                   properly instruct the jury, we now determine whether that error was
                   harmless. See Nay, 123 Nev. at 333-34, 167 P.3d at 435 (recognizing that
                   harmless-error review applies to jury instruction errors). "[A]n error is
                   harmless when it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury
                   would have found the defendant guilty absent the error." Id. at 334, 167
                   P.3d at 435 (quoting Wegner v. State, 116 Nev, 1149, 1155, 14 P.3d 25, 30
                   (2000), overruled on other grounds by Rosas v. State, 122 Nev. 1258, 1267-
                   68, 147 P.3d 1101, 1108 (2006) (further internal quotation marks omitted)).
                               At trial, Reber explicitly testified that Judd never used any
                   physical force against him and that he did not feel he faced any "immediate
                   threat of danger" when Judd, over the phone, threatened him and his
                   property if he attempted to retrieve the truck because they were more than
                   ten miles apart.7     Under these facts, we cannot conclude beyond a
                   reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found Judd guilty of felony
                   coercion for partially damaging Reber's truck had the district court properly
                   instructed the jury on the definition of "physical force" as being against a
                   person. Under these same facts, absent the district court's error in failing

                   United States v. O'Connor, 874 F.3d 1147, 1157-58 (10th Cir. 2017) ("[T]he
                   rule of lenity counsels courts to interpret [ambiguous criminal statutes] to
                   'avoid an increase in the penalty prescribed for the offense." (quoting United
                   States v. Manatau, 647 F.3d 1048, 1055 (10th Cir. 2011))).
                         7At oral argument, both parties agreed that, at the time Judd
                   threatened Reber, they were approximately 10 to 15 miles away from each
                   other.
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                      to properly instruct the jury, a rational jury could have found a reasonable
                      person in Reber's position would not have felt immediately threatened. See
                      Santana v. State, 122 Nev. 1458, 1462-63, 148 P.3d 741, 744-45 (2006)
                      (holding that, when determining whether a threat of physical force was
                      irnmediate for the purposes of NRS 207.190(2), the factfinder must
                      determine whether a reasonable person under the same circumstances
                      would have felt immediately threatened). As we cannot conclude beyond a
                      reasonable doubt that Judd would have been convicted of felony coercion
                      had a proper instruction regarding physical force been given, we agree that
                      the error was not harmless and necessarily reverse Judd's conviction of
                      felony coercion.
                      The district court properly instructed the jury on the appropriate measure of
                      damages
                                   Generally, the criminal charge of injuring or tampering with a
                      motor vehicle is punishable according to the extent of the property damage
                      caused.8 At trial, the State offered expert testimony to support a felony
                      conviction for the damage Judd caused to Reber's truck. Ronald Lourenco,
                      the owner of an autobody shop that provided Reber with an estimate of the
                      cost to repair the exterior damage to the truck Judd caused, testified that
                      the damaged exterior parts were not repairable and required replacement.
                      Lourenco also testified that he could not find original parts for the 1957
                      Chevrolet truck for sale—new or used—and therefore had to order replica

                            8Under NRS 205.274(1), it is unlawful to damage the motor vehicle of
                      another. If the cost of the damage to the motor vehicle is $5,000 or more,
                      then the defendant is guilty of a category C felony. NRS 193.155(1) (setting
                      forth the level of culpability for public offenses "proportionate to the value
                      of property affected"). If the cost of that damage is more than $250 but less
                      than $5,000, the defendant is guilty of a gross misdemeanor. NRS
                      193.155(2).
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                   parts. The shop's estimate costs for these replica parts totaled $17,594.80.
                   Judd offered no evidence of the parts' replacement value to the contrary.
                   Rather, Judd argued that each damaged part should be treated as its own
                   loss and, therefore, the proper measure of damages would be the combined
                   fair market value for each individual part at the time the damage occurred.
                   Judd asserts that this total had to be less than $5,000 because Reber
                   testified that the total value of the truck was less than $5,000 when he
                   purchased it. The jury ultimately found that the measure of darnages was
                   $5,000 or more, and Judd was therefore convicted of a felony for the damage
                   he caused.
                                On appeal, Judd essentially reargues his position below, that
                   the district court should not have instructed the jury that the proper
                   measure of damages was the cost to repair or replace its damaged parts, but
                   rather, the fair market value of each part at the time it was damaged. Judd
                   contends that the damaged exterior parts were not permanently affixed to
                   the truck and, therefore, each individual part should be considered its own
                   loss, thereby making the proper measure of damages the total fair market
                   value of the individual parts. The State counters that the district court
                   properly found that the truck, as a whole, was partially damaged and not a
                   total loss. Therefore, the district court correctly instructed the jury that the
                   measure of damages was the cost to repair or replace the parts necessary to
                   restore the truck. We agree with the State.
                                In Rornero v. State, the Nevada Supreme Court set forth two
                   standards for calculating property damage when determining a criminal
                   defendant's culpability based on the extent of the damage. 116 Nev. at 346-
                   49, 996 P.2d at 896-98.     When property is "completely destroyed," the
                   appropriate standard is the fair market value of the property at the time it

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                   was destroyed. Id. at 348, 996 P.2d at 897. "However, when property is
                   only partially destroyed," "the appropriate measure of damages is the cost
                   related to repair or restore the property." Id. Under the latter method, the
                   damage must be directly tied to the offense. Id. at 349, 996 P.2d at 897
                   (holding that the costs of hiring security following an incident were not
                   directly tied to property damage at a store).
                               In this case, Judd partially destroyed Reber's 1957 Chevrolet
                   truck by damaging individual exterior parts. Even though these parts were
                   not permanently affixed to the truck's frame, they had to be replaced—as
                   they could not be repaired—to restore the truck to its condition before Judd
                   partially damaged it. Thus, the proper measure of damages was the cost to
                   repair or replace the damaged parts. See Romero, 116 Nev. at 348, 996 P.2d
                   at 897. Based on the uncontroverted expert testimony at trial, we conclude
                   that the invoice of $17,594.80 for the replica replacement parts was directly
                   tied to the offense charged and represented the amount necessary to restore
                   the partially damaged truck.
                               Therefore, the district court correctly instructed the jury on the
                   proper measure of damages for the partial damage Judd caused to Reber's
                   1957 Chevrolet truck. And, based on the replacement value of the replica
                   parts necessary to restore the truck, we affirm Judd's felony conviction of
                   injuring or tampering with a motor vehicle causing damage of $5,000 or
                   more.9

                         9We   have considered other arguments raised by Judd on appeal,
                   including that the district court improperly allowed the State to amend the
                   information after the start of trial; abused its discretion in denying his
                   request to rernove a juror for misconduct; and erred in denying his motions
                   to set aside the conviction and conduct a competency evaluation and to
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                                                   CONCLUSION
                                We affirm Judd's felony conviction for injuring or tampering
                   with a motor vehicle because the district court correctly instructed the jury
                   on the proper measure of damages. However, we conclude that to affirm a
                   conviction of felony coercion, physical force or the immediate threat of
                   physical force must have been used against a person, not merely against
                   property. Therefore, the district court erred in rejecting a jury instruction
                   defining physical force or immediate threat of physical force as being
                   against a person. We further conclude that this error was not harmless.
                   Accordingly, we reverse Judd's conviction of felony coercion and remand for
                   further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                                               i f olswasfavisseaft,
                                                        Bulla

                   We concur:

                                               ,   C.J.

                       (41411                  ,   J.
                   Westburook

                   remove his attorney and conclude that they do not present a basis for
                   further relief.
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