Court Opinion

ID: 9747196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:02:32.939375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:11.446198
License: Public Domain

TIMLIN, J., Concurring.
With certain exceptions stated below, I concur with the discussion in the majority opinion and I concur completely with the disposition.
However, I disagree with the conclusion contained in the following statement on page 944 of the majority opinion under the heading “Evidence Supporting Restitution Award”: “Foster’s attorney failed to object to the restitution condition in the trial court. Therefore, any error is deemed waived for purposes of appeal.” The majority then cites People v. Walker (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013, 1023 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 902, 819 P.2d 861] and People v. Rivera (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1153, 1161 [261 Cal.Rptr. 93] as supporting authority for that proposition. In my view, neither of those two cases support that proposition.
Walker basically held in part that a defendant’s failure to object to a restitution fine under Government Code section 13967 at or before the time of sentencing waives a claim by the defendant on appeal that he was not advised by the court, pursuant to Penal Code section 1192.5 at the time his guilty plea was being proffered, that one of the consequences of his plea *956would be imposition of a mandatory restitution fíne. Walker does not concern the imposition of probation and the validity of any conditions of probation.
Rivera, too, is inapposite to this case. In Rivera, defendant was ordered to pay a restitution fíne under Government Code section 13967, subdivision (c), which the majority in its opinion here carefully demonstrates is distinctly different, both procedurally and substantively, from restitution ordered paid to victims as a condition of probation. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 947.) In Rivera, defendant contended that he was entitled to a jury trial on the “issue of restitution.” Without analysis or discussion, our colleagues in Division One merely noted that Rivera neither contested the amount of the restitution fíne under Government Code section 13967, subdivision (c), nor sought to have any hearing, by jury trial or otherwise, on the “restitution issue” and, therefore, waived that issue. (212 Cal.App.3d at p. 1160.) This is a far cry from a holding or even dicta suggesting that a defendant’s failure to object to a restitution order as a condition of probation is waived. In fact, in Rivera, the Attorney General contended that defendant was estopped to raise an issue related to the restitution order because he failed to raise it below, and the Rivera court rejected this contention, holding that a sentence which is unauthorized because of an error in the matter of restitution must be vacated and a proper sentence imposed whenever the mistake is brought to the attention of the trial court or the reviewing court. (212 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1163-1164.)
Thus, I am not prepared to subscribe to the principle that the failure of a defendant’s trial counsel to object to a probationary condition requiring restitution constitutes per se a waiver of an appellate challenge to the legality of such a condition in a particular case. But, more importantly, in this case Foster does not claim on appeal that the imposition of a restitution condition of probation was error. He contends that the court erred in admitting as proof of the amount of restitution payable to the victim-owner the original cost and not the replacement cost of the Persian rug. This is a claim of evidentiary error.
As to this contention, it is my view a waiver doctrine applies but it is one grounded in the principle that no court decision shall be reversed by reason of erroneous admission of evidence unless there appears of record an objection to or motion to exclude or to strike evidence. (People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 53 at fn. 19 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388].) The record shows Foster did not object at the sentencing hearing to evidence of the original cost of the Persian rug. Therefore, its admission cannot be attacked on appeal. Further, he did not introduce any evidence on the cost of *957replacing the rug to rebut the original cost being considered by the court as the replacement cost. Consequently, the court’s implied finding that the value of the rug was $8,000 at the time it was stolen was correct. It had the victim’s opinion as the owner of the rug that it originally cost $8,000, and absent contrary evidence, the court could reasonably conclude that its replacement cost was the same as the original cost, $8,000.
The majority in its discussion of whether Foster’s trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the admission into evidence of the original cost of the rug to establish its replacement value, makes the broad statement on page 946 of its opinion that “For most types of stolen property the original cost will be a fair approximation of the replacement cost.” Because there is no evidence in the record to support this comment, I refrain from joining the majority in that remark. Judicial notice of the depreciability of certain personal property and the appreciability of other personal property having unique qualities, viz., antiques, jewelry, art work and even Persian rugs, in my opinion, contradicts such a conclusion.
Finally, I disagree with the suggestion on page 946 of the majority opinion that People v. Voumazos (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 948, 958-959 [244 Cal.Rptr. 82] expressed an opinion that the original cost of a stolen item may not be treated as evidence of replacement cost for restitution purposes. My reading of Voumazos reveals no comment regarding original cost. Voumazos simply concluded that the statement by the owner of personal property to the probation officer as to the value of nonrecovered personal property was not proper evidence upon which to base a restitution amount, unless the owner’s statement or the probation officer’s testimony could establish that the sum claimed for loss of property was based on the replacement cost. (198 Cal.App.3d at pp. 958-959.)
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied June 24, 1993.