Court Opinion

ID: 9628253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:14:27.467108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:01.629810
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Rehearing denied.
HALLEY, Justice
(dissenting).
It seems to me the majority opinion misses the point on tire first question raised by the defendant and that was that the trial court was without jurisdiction to grant an extension of time to prepare and serve case made and file appeal in the Supreme Court when the plaintiff was dead.
The plaintiff had released the defendant’s servant, its chief of police, for a monetary consideration which was paid. The defendant, Beale, and his insurance company were relieved on December IS, 1956, of all liability under the judgment taken against him and the City of Cleveland on October 23, 1956. On the motion of the City of Cleveland to be released and exonerated from all liability under the judgment entered October 23, 1956, the trial court sustained the defendant City’s motion on the ground that the release of the servant, released the master. This was done June 24, 1958. The plaintiff died on July 27, 1958. It was not until September 25, 1958, that an order was entered reviving the case in the name of Allie Minnie Hambright, Executrix of the Estate of Vandean Hambright, deceased. During this period, from the date of plaintiff’s death until the case was revived, the judgment was dormant and suspended. Any action taken in regard to getting additional time in which to make and serve case made and to file appeal in this Court would be a nullity until the case was properly revived.
On June 24, 1958, the day that defendant City’s motion for release from the judgment of October 23, 1956 was granted and the plaintiff was given sixty days on the same date in which, to make and serve case made, ten days were granted to suggest amendments and five days notice to be given by either party for settlement thereof. On August 19, 1958, the trial court again granted 30-10-5 to make, serve and settle case made and thirty days beyond the first three months for filing appeal was granted. On September 18, 1958, another extension of 30-10-5 was granted for preparing, serving and settling the case made was taken and also the time for filing the appeal was extended for an additional three months to the original three months fixed by law. It is dear that the time for filing this appeal expired on September 24, 1958, unless a valid order extending the time for filing the appeal was granted. This was not done. It is the defendant City’s contention and with it I agree, that as long as the case remained unrevived no order could be entered in the case that would bind the defendant City. We think the authorities cited by the defendant City show clearly what this Court’s position has been on this question through the years. In Boland v. Reily et al., 115 Okl. 107, 241 P. 742, 743, we held that an order reinstating a cause was void when the plaintiff had dismissed an action and then died since the original case had not been revived. In that case we said:
“ * * * No motion was made for, and no order entered, reviving the action after her death was suggested, and it is very clear that the trial court was without authority to make any order or to hear any testimony affecting the. merits of that case until after the action had been revived. * * * ”
Also in Cooper v. Cooper et al., 197 Okl. 232, 170 P.2d 242, 243, we said:
“It is of course true that upon the death of defendant or other party to an action the power of the court to further proceed therein is suspended until a revival is had as provided by statute. Such revival could be made upon consent without notice, but in *499the absence of such consent could only be made upon notice and hearing. 12 O.S.1941 § 1066. Until such hearing is had and order of revivor made and entered, the court, in the absence of a waiver, is without power to entertain any further proceeding in the case. * * * ”
We also call attention to 1 Am.Jur., Abatement and Revival, § 159, p. 105, which is:
“The statement often appearing in law actions where the common-law rule of abatement is changed, and in equity actions, that the action does not abate by death, which at common law would cause it to abate, must not be taken to mean that upon such event the action proceeds without any change. Upon the death of a party or the happening of any other event which would cause it to abate at common law, the action is suspended and the suspension has the same temporary effect on the rights of the parties as though the suit actually abated. In other words, the cause cannot proceed until someone is substituted for the decedent or other party. * * * ”
I am unable to see the pertinency of the Montana case relied upon in the majority opinion. State ex rel. Kennedy v. District Court, 121 Mont. 320, 194 P.2d 256, 2 A.L.R.2d 1050. Neither in my opinion is Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Davis, 194 Okl. 84, 147 P.2d 135, in point because of the fact differences.
The right of the trial judge to control his docket does not give him the right to revive a case on his own motion. Neither is it revived by him making orders in a case when it is dormant and suspended. Such orders made in this case are a nullity. Certainly the revivor sections of our statutes make no such provision. Sections 1063 and 1064, 12 O.S.1951, are controlling here. They are as follows:
“1063. Revivor, when. — -When one of the parties to an action dies, or his powers as a personal representative cease before the judgment, if the right of action survive in favor of or against his representatives or successors, the action may be revived and proceed in their names.”
“1064. Proceedings for revivor.— The revivor shall be by an order of the court, if made in term, or by- a judge thereof, if in vacation, that the action be revived in the names of the representatives or successor of the party who died, or whose powers ceased, and proceed in favor of or against them.”
Our revivor statutes have been strictly construed. See Jones v. Nye, 56 Okl. 578, 156 P. 332, L.R.A.1916E, 735 and Drew v. Thurlwell, 173 Okl. 405, 48 P.2d 1066, 100 A.L.R. 806. We held in Youts v. Tri-State Supply Co., 202 Okl. 240, 211 P.2d 1017, that a District Court is without jurisdiction to revive a cause after the expiration of one year from dormancy, even though the proceedings to revive had been commenced before the expiration of the one year, unless the failure of the court to act within the one year was due to the fault of the court.
In Halsey v. Van Vliet, 7 Kan. 474, it was held that an execution issued after the -death of the defendant but before re-vivor was absolutely void.
So I say here that simply put there can be no appeal of a case where the plaintiff has died after judgment was taken and the case was not revived until after' three months has elapsed from the date of the judgment sought to be appealed from. I dissent.
I am authorized to state that WELCH, J., concurs in the views herein expressed.