Court Opinion

ID: 9904309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 16:32:19.376434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:32.104418
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                      FIFTH DISTRICT

                                    NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                    FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                    DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

KC QUALITY CARE, LLC
A/A/O ESTEL JEAN-BAPTISTE,

             Appellant,

v.                                       Case No. 5D21-1578
                                         LT Case No. 2020-SC-058727-O

DIRECT GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,

          Appellee.
________________________________/

Opinion filed July 29, 2022

Appeal from the County Court
for Orange County,
Elizabeth Starr, Judge.

Chad A. Barr, of Chad Barr Law,
Altamonte Springs, for Appellant.

William J. McFarlane, III, and Michael
K. Mittelmark, of McFarlane Law,
Coral Springs, for Appellee.

HARRIS, J.
      KC Quality Care, LLC a/a/o Estel Jean-Baptiste (“KC Quality”), appeals

the trial court’s order granting Direct General Insurance Company’s (“Direct

General”) amended motion to dismiss the complaint. KC Quality argues in

part that the court improperly went beyond the four corners of the complaint

by considering extrinsic matters attached to Direct General’s amended

motion to dismiss, which were not incorporated, referenced, or contemplated

by the allegations of the complaint. We agree and reverse.

      Direct General issued a personal injury protection (PIP) policy to the

insured. The insured was subsequently involved in an automobile accident,

after which she assigned her benefits to KC Quality. KC Quality filed the

instant action against Direct General for breach of contract. In its motion to

dismiss the complaint, Direct General alleged that it had received in a

separate lawsuit a declaratory judgment against the insured that declared the

policy void ab initio. Therefore, Direct General argued, the breach of contract

action was moot as there were no benefits available for the insured to assign.

It attached the declaratory judgment to its motion to dismiss. Relying upon

the declaratory judgment, the trial court found that because the policy was

not in effect on the date of the automobile accident, KC Quality’s complaint

failed to state a cause of action for breach of contract. This was error.

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       When considering a motion to dismiss, a trial court is confined to the

allegations contained within the four corners of the complaint and must accept

all allegations in the complaint as true. Cintron v. Osmose Wood Preserving,

Inc., 681 So. 2d 859, 860–61 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). The court may not rely on

any documents that are not attached to or incorporated by the complaint. See

Hewett-Kier Constr., Inc. v. Lemuel Ramos & Assocs., Inc., 775 So. 2d 373,

375–76 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). The court may only determine whether the

complaint on its face contains allegations that are legally sufficient to state a

cause of action. Gallon v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 150 So. 3d 252, 254 (Fla. 2d

DCA 2014).

       The trial court found that KC Quality failed to state a cause of action

based solely on the declaratory judgment, which was not attached to or

contemplated by the complaint. The complaint alleged that the policy was in

full force and effect on the date of the accident. Notably, the court did not find,

nor does Direct General argue, that the complaint was insufficient on its face

notwithstanding the declaratory judgment. In fact, Direct General concedes

that the allegations of the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for

breach of contract. The allegations became insufficient, according to Direct

General, once the court was made aware of the declaratory judgment. Direct

General provided no legal support for its position, one which would allow the

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trial court to do precisely what the rules forbid—going outside the four corners

of the complaint when ruling on a motion to dismiss.

      Because the trial court erroneously considered information that did not

appear within the four corners of the complaint when granting Direct

General’s motion to dismiss, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

      REVERSED and REMANDED.

WALLIS and SASSO, JJ., concur.

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