Court Opinion

ID: 9546641
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:33:20.185904+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:42.511270
License: Public Domain

SIMMS, Judge
(specially concurring):
Torbett v. State, Okl.Cr., 487 P.2d 357 (1971), leaves one with the false impression that on retrial after a successful appeal from a conviction, the defendant cannot, under any circumstances, be given a greater sentence than that which he received at the first trial. Such a construction is clearly contrary to the express language of North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969) which Judge Bussey cites in his opinion.
In stating the issue to be decided in Pearce, supra, Justice Stewart analyzed:
“ * * * We turn, therefore, to consideration of the broader problem of what constitutional limitations there may be upon the general power of a judge to impose upon reconviction a longer prison sentence than the defendant originally received.
“Long-established constitutional doctrine makes clear that, beyond the requirement already discussed, the guarantee against double jeopardy imposes no restrictions upon the length of a sentence imposed upon reconviction. * * * ” (Emphasis added)
*428A careful study of Pearce, supra, reflects, the Supreme Court of the United States was pronouncing two clear constitutionally sound edicts: First, that upon retrial and conviction, a defendant must be credited with time in custody awaiting retrial, and second, that a sentencing judge may not increase punishment on retrial after conviction by reason of retaliatory motivation. However, Pearce, supra, as Judge Bussey points out, does not preclude a judge from imposing a greater sentence after new trial following appeal, if the reasons therefore, alluded to in Pearce, supra, affirmatively appear in the record.
Even Mr. Justice Douglas, in his Separate Opinion in Pearce, supra, uses the fcjl-lowing language:
“ * * * In the second trial they were made to run the gantlet twice, since the Court today holds that the penalties can be increased.” (Emphasis added)
I must agree with Judge Bussey that the restrictions of Pearce, supra, as relates to increased sentence on retrial after appeal, governs only sentences by judges, and not sentences imposed by juries.