Court Opinion

ID: 9367730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-01 19:02:56.52405+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:02.944415
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/1/23 Palumbo v. Westley CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

VICTOR PALUMBO et al.,                                     B317641

     Plaintiffs and                                        (Los Angeles County
Respondents,                                               Super. Ct. No. LC104523)

         v.

DAVID WESTLEY et al.,

     Defendants and
Appellants.

HAN REALTY CORPORATION
et al.,

     Cross-complainants and
Appellants,

         v.

VICTOR PALUMBO et al.,

     Cross-defendants and
Respondents.
      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Huey P. Cotton, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
      Nick A. Alden for Defendants, Cross-complainants and
Appellants.
      GreenblattLoveridge, Fredric J. Greenblatt and Lisa L.
Loveridge for Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants and Respondents
Victor Palumbo and Nicole Palumbo.
      Clyde & Co US, Douglas J. Collodel; Carlson Law Group
and Jose A. Mendoza for Cross-defendants and Respondents First
American Team, Inc., Steve Sothear Vong and Adrian Karasek.

                            ******

       David Westley, Victoria Westley, and Han Realty
Corporation (collectively Westley) purport to appeal from denials
of Westley’s motions for summary adjudication against plaintiffs,
cross-defendants and respondents Nicole Palumbo and Victor
Palumbo (collectively the Palumbos), and cross-defendants and
respondents Adrian Karasek, Steve Sothear Vong and First
American Team, Inc. (FATI) (collectively cross-defendants), in
this litigation involving a real property sale. The denials of
Westley’s motions for summary adjudication are not appealable
orders and we therefore decline to discuss them. (Federal Deposit
Ins. Corp. v. Dintino (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 333, 343.) Westley’s
notice of appeal cites only Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1,
subdivision (a)(3)-(13), which provides no authority for an appeal
of denials of motions for summary adjudication.
       Another issue raised in this appeal is the propriety of the
trial court’s order granting a motion for good faith settlement,
which resulted in the dismissal of cross-defendants from the

                                2
proceedings. The remedy to challenge a trial court’s grant of a
motion for good faith settlement is via a writ petition. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 877.6, subd. (e);1 Main Fiber Products, Inc. v. Morgan &
Franz Ins. Agency (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1130, 1135.) On
December 27, 2021, Westley filed a petition for writ of mandate
in this court challenging the trial court’s order granting the
motion for good faith settlement. This court denied the writ on
December 30, 2021. (Westley v. Superior Court (B317220).)
       There is a split of authority as to whether a determination
of good faith settlement may be reviewed in an appeal following
the denial of a writ. (See Pacific Fertility Cases (2022) 78
Cal.App.5th 568, 579, 580-581, review granted, Aug. 17, 2022,
S275134 (Pacific Fertility) [filing of a petition for writ of mandate
is the exclusive means for obtaining appellate review of a trial
court’s good faith settlement determination]; Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Andreini & Co. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1423
(Maryland Casualty) [holding that § 877.6, subd. (e) does not
foreclose postjudgment review of determination of good faith
settlement]; Main Fiber Products, Inc. v. Morgan & Franz Ins.
Agency, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 1135 [holding that pretrial
petition for writ of mandate is the exclusive means of review of
determination of good faith settlement].) We choose to follow
Maryland Casualty in this matter and address the good faith
determination settlement. We find Westley has forfeited
substantive review of the settlement, and no due process
violation occurred in the trial court’s determination of good faith
settlement.

1    All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.

                                  3
       Finally, Westley’s appeal addresses one order that is
directly appealable prior to final judgment: the trial court’s order
granting cross-defendants’ motion to disqualify Westley’s counsel,
Nick Alden, as trial counsel.2 We find that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in disqualifying Alden because he has a
financial interest in the property that is the subject of this
litigation and because he is a key percipient witness in the
litigation. As set forth below, the order disqualifying Alden from
acting as Westley’s counsel in the litigation is affirmed.

                         BACKGROUND3
       This ongoing litigation involves disputed obligations with
respect to a residential real estate transaction. The following is a
brief explanation of the relevant facts.
       In 2011, Westley defaulted on mortgage payments on the
home located at 4950 Woodley Ave., Encino, California (the

2      In spite of his disqualification, Alden subsequently filed a
notice of appeal on behalf of Westley and submitted all appellate
briefs on behalf of Westley in this appeal. We sought
supplemental briefing from the parties on the question of
whether the notice of appeal was valid and whether Alden could
properly appear before this court on behalf of appellants. The
parties directed us to URS Corp. v. Atkinson/Walsh Joint
Venture (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 872, 887, which created a “bright
line rule” that “appeal of an order disqualifying an attorney
automatically stays enforcement of the order.” We therefore
permit the appeal to proceed with Alden as counsel. We
disregard arguments made in the supplemental briefing that
went beyond the scope of the inquiry.
3     Trial has not yet occurred in this matter, therefore all
factual statements are unproven allegations.

                                 4
property). On approximately December 7, 2011, Bank of America
initiated nonjudicial foreclosure on the property by recording a
notice of default. In January 2012, Westley hired Alden. Shortly
after he was hired, Alden introduced Westley to Karasek.
Karasek was introduced as a real estate agent specializing in
short sales. Subsequently, Westley, Karasek and Alden had a
few meetings to discuss the possibility of short selling the
property.
       Litigation ensued among Westley, Bank of America and the
Woodley Trust (the purported buyer in the foreclosure sale)
regarding the foreclosure proceedings.
       In August 2013, Westley hired Karasek to list the property
for sale. Karasek listed FATI as the broker, operating under the
license of Vong. The parties dispute whether Karasek was aware
of the encumbrances on the property. Alden has produced
testimony in this litigation that he informed Karasek of the liens
on the property and “repeatedly emphasis [sic] to Karasek the
need to inform potential buyers and agents that the property is in
litigation.”
       On March 17, 2014, Karasek produced a residential
purchase agreement from the Palumbos. Counteroffers were
exchanged, and on March 21, 2014, escrow was opened.
Subsequently, the Palumbos refused to sign the escrow
instructions until the liens on the property were removed. On
March 27, 2014, the Palumbos obtained a preliminary title report
showing that the property was in litigation and encumbered by
about $3.8 million in liens. The Palumbos claim that they were
not informed of the litigation in the sellers’ disclosures provided
to the Palumbos and their real estate brokers. They were told
that Westley was taking action to clear the issues disclosed on

                                5
the preliminary title report. The Palumbos decided to wait and
see if Westley could clear title through a quiet title action so that
the escrow could be concluded. The parties executed at least two
extension of time addendums to the close of escrow. When the
quiet title action concluded in Westley’s favor, Westley refused to
sell the Palumbos the property for the price contracted for.

                    PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       On or about April 20, 2017, the Palumbos filed their first
amended complaint (FAC) against Westley setting forth causes of
action for fraud/intentional misrepresentation, negligent
misrepresentation, breach of contract, breach of implied in fact
contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, unjust enrichment, specific performance, promissory
estoppel, and declaratory relief.
       On November 13, 2017, Westley answered the Palumbos’
FAC and filed a cross-complaint against the Palumbos and cross-
defendants alleging causes of action for declaratory relief;
indemnification; contribution; comparative fault and breach of
contract, among others.
       Westley filed two motions for summary adjudication. On
June 28, 2019, Westley filed a motion for summary adjudication
on its cross-claims against cross-defendants. The trial court
denied the motion. The court noted that Westley’s separate
statement of material facts was deficient and that disputed issues
of material fact existed.
       Westley also filed a motion for summary judgment or
summary adjudication against the Palumbos. No party has
provided a citation to the record showing such a motion. The
trial court denied the motion, as it was procedurally flawed and

                                  6
triable issues of material fact existed. The trial court’s formal
order denying both motions for summary adjudication was filed
on October 3, 2019.
        Westley filed a petition for writ of mandate in this court
challenging the trial court’s denial of the summary adjudication
motions. The writ was denied.
        Trial was set for November 30, 2021. In the weeks before
trial, the Palumbos and cross-defendants reached a settlement.
On November 26, 2021, cross-defendants served a motion for
determination of good faith settlement. Alden appeared on behalf
of Westley at the hearing on the motion. On December 8, 2021,
the trial court granted the motion for good faith settlement. The
cross-complaint of Westley was dismissed with prejudice as to
cross-defendants.4
        In preparing for trial, Alden disclosed that the property
was not, in fact, clear, and that he was holding an unrecorded
trust deed on the property in the approximate amount of
$904,000 that he could record at any time, which would fully
encumber the property and prevent a title insurance policy from
issuing. The case had been pending for over five years, yet
counsel for cross-defendants attested that Alden’s disclosure on
November 16, 2021, was the first time the unrecorded trust deed
had been revealed. Based on this disclosure, on November 24,
2021, counsel for cross-defendants served Westley with a motion
to disqualify Westley’s counsel, Alden. The motion cited two
grounds for disqualification: first, that Alden had a personal
financial interest in the outcome of the litigation; and second,

4    There is no indication in the record that the Palumbos were
dismissed as cross-defendants in this matter.

                                7
that the necessity of Alden’s testimony at trial would violate the
“advocate-witness” rule (citing Kennedy v. Eldridge (2011) 201
Cal.App.4th 1197, 1208).
      On December 8, 2021, the trial court signed an order
indicating that the settlement entered into between the settling
cross-defendants and the Palumbos was entered into in good faith
within the meaning of section 877.6. It was additionally ordered
that Westley’s cross-complaint be dismissed with prejudice as to
cross-defendants Karasek, FATI, and Vong.
      On December 8, 2021, the trial court signed a second order
indicating that good cause existed to grant the motion to
disqualify Alden as trial counsel for Westley. The court ordered
Alden disqualified as trial counsel.
      On December 9, 2021, Alden filed a notice of appeal on
behalf of Westley. The notice of appeal specified that Westley
was appealing only from an order or judgment under section
904.1, subdivision (a)(3)-(13). The notice of appeal attached the
order on the motion for determination of good faith settlement
and the order on the motion to disqualify Alden as trial counsel.

                         DISCUSSION
I.    Scope of appeal
      As set forth above, the denials of Westley’s motions for
summary adjudication are not appealable orders and we
therefore decline to discuss them. (Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
Dintino, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 343.)
      We will address the two remaining issues on appeal: the
good faith settlement order and the disqualification order.

                                8
II.   Good Faith Settlement Order
      A.     Appealability
      Section 877.6, subdivision (e) provides, in pertinent part,
“When a determination of the good faith or lack of good faith of a
settlement is made, any party aggrieved by the determination
may petition the proper court to review the determination by writ
of mandate. The petition for writ of mandate shall be filed within
20 days after service of written notice of the determination, or
within any additional time not exceeding 20 days as the trial
court may allow.” (§ 877.6.) As set forth above, there is a split of
authority on the question of whether such a determination is also
reviewable in a later appeal brought by a nonsettling party.
(Pacific Fertility, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 572, review
granted.) The Supreme Court granted review of Pacific Fertility
and will decide whether a petition for writ of mandate is the
exclusive means of challenging an order approving or denying a
good faith settlement under section 877.6. The present situation
leaves us with conflicting appellate decisions. We choose to
follow the line of cases holding that section 877.6, subdivision (e)
does not foreclose subsequent postjudgment review, provided a
writ has been timely filed pursuant to the statute. (Maryland
Casualty, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 1423.)
      Although there is no final judgment in this case, “‘in a case
involving multiple parties, a judgment is final and appealable
when it leaves no issues to be determined as to one party.’”
(Heshejin v. Rostami (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 984, 991.) As the
cross-defendants have been dismissed from the case with
prejudice, the judgment is final as to them. We therefore proceed
to review Westley’s appeal from the good faith settlement order.

                                 9
       B.    Applicable law and standard of review
       A good faith settlement “must strike a balance between the
competing public policies of encouraging settlements and the
equitable sharing of liability among parties at fault.” (PacifiCare
of California v. Bright Medical Associates, Inc. (2011) 198
Cal.App.4th 1451, 1464 (PacifiCare).) To determine whether a
party’s settlement is in good faith, the court must determine
whether it is in a “‘reasonable range’” considering that party’s
potential liability. (Ibid., quoting Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-
Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499.) The trial court
has “‘substantial latitude’” in making such a determination, and
its decision may be reversed only upon a showing of abuse of
discretion. (PacifiCare, supra, at p. 1464.)
       As in all cases, “it is the responsibility of the party
appealing to provide an adequate record on appeal.” (Kashmiri v.
Regents of University of California (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 809,
849.) An appealing party’s failure to provide an adequate record
to demonstrate error precludes adequate review and results in
affirmance of the trial court’s determination. (Estrada v.
Ramirez (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 618, 620, fn. 1.)
       C.    Westley has failed to demonstrate error
             1.     Due process
       Westley first challenges the motion on due process grounds,
arguing Westley was not afforded opportunity to file an
opposition or make meaningful argument. We find that Westley
has failed to show a violation of due process.
       In the weeks before trial, the Palumbos and cross-
defendants reached a settlement. On November 26, 2021, cross-
defendants served a motion for determination of good faith
settlement. Westley concedes that Alden received notice of the

                                10
motion and ex parte application for ordering shortening time a
few days before the hearing. Alden appeared on behalf of
Westley at the hearing on the motion on November 29, 2021. The
hearing was abruptly stopped and continued to the next day due
to the court reporter receiving word of a death in the family. On
November 30, 2021, Alden appeared again on behalf of Westley
and informed the trial court that he had been served on
November 26, 2021, at 5:26 p.m. Despite the short notice, the
trial court granted the motion. Westley complains that it is the
practice that, when a motion is filed with an order shortening
time, the court sets a hearing schedule. Westley complains that
this was the procedure employed by the previous judge, and
Alden relied on it. On December 8, 2021, the court entered an
order dismissing “Karasek, et al.” from the case.5
       Westley provides no citation to the record showing that
Westley objected to the short notice or asked for an opportunity
to brief the issue.6 Because Alden received notice and appeared
at the hearing, due process was satisfied. “‘[D]ue process
requires, “notice reasonably calculated, under all the

5     We reject Westley’s argument that the order dismissed the
Palumbos from the cross-complaint. There is no evidence in the
record that the trial court did so.
6     Respondents point out that the motion to disqualify Alden
as counsel was served on Westley the same day as the motion to
confirm good faith settlement, along with an ex parte application
shortening time. Although Westley did not file an opposition to
the motion for good faith settlement order, Westley opposed the
disqualification motion, which was heard the same day. The
decision to oppose the disqualification motion and not the motion
to confirm good faith settlement thus appeared to be a tactical
decision.

                               11
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections.”’” (In re DeJohn B. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 100, 106.)
At the hearing, Westley had an opportunity to object or seek
additional time and cannot claim error after apparently failing to
do so.7 (People v. Buford (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 975, 982
[“Apparently appellant was served . . . sometime between
March 22 and March 29, for at the . . . hearing held on the latter
date he did not seek a continuance or additional time for
preparation. . . . Under the circumstances, he cannot now claim a
denial of due process.”].)
      Further, the cases Westley cites are inapplicable. In
Dvorin v. Appellate Dept. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 648, 651, the appellate
department’s order directing the lower court to enter summary
judgment was a denial of due process where no party had moved
for summary judgment. The Dvorin court held, “Absent a motion,
ordering summary judgment denies the opposite party
opportunity to allege additional facts justifying trial of factual
issues.” (Ibid.) Such is not the case here, where the settling
parties served Westley with a motion, and Westley’s counsel
appeared at the hearing on the motion. In Spector v. Superior

7      At oral argument, Alden represented to this court that at
the hearing on the motion for good faith settlement, he objected
to the short notice. However, he failed to provide a citation to the
record showing such an objection. It was Westley’s burden to
show error, and in the absence of an adequate record, we
presume that the trial court acted correctly. (Foust v. San Jose
Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 187 [“the
cardinal rule of appellate review [is] that a judgment or order of
the trial court is presumed correct and prejudicial error must be
affirmatively shown”].)

                                12
Court (1961) 55 Cal.2d 839, 843, a judge refused to allow a party
to present any evidence or argument in support of his position.
Under those circumstances, the party was denied his opportunity
to be heard. (Ibid.) Westley has provided no citation to the
record suggesting that the trial court in this matter refused to
allow Westley to present evidence or argument at the hearing on
the good faith settlement motion.
       Under the circumstances of this case, where Westley was
served, appeared at the hearing, yet made no apparent objection
to the shortened time frame, and failed to ask the court for a
continuance, Westley’s due process claim fails.
              2.    Westley has forfeited review on the merits
       Westley argues that the settlement agreement between the
Palumbos and cross-defendants was not an honest agreement.
Instead, Westley argues, it was the result of a conspiracy
between the Palumbos and cross-defendants, in which the
Palumbos and cross-defendants covered for each other when in
fact it was Karasek who concealed information from the
Palumbos.
       Westley has not shown that the trial court exceeded its
discretion in finding that the settlement was in good faith.
Westley makes no effort to discuss cross-defendants’ potential
liability or whether the settlement is in a reasonable range, as
required by PacifiCare. Further, Westley fails to provide
citations to authority in support of the argument that the vague
assertion of a conspiracy between the parties provides adequate
grounds for rejecting the settlement. Therefore, we need not
discuss it. (Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37
Cal.App.5th 270, 277 [“‘When an appellant raises an issue “but
fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to

                               13
authority, we treat the point as waived.”’”].) Finally, we note that
Westley provides no citation to the record suggesting that an
objection to the settlement agreement on this ground was made
in the trial court, thus Westley has forfeited this argument by not
raising it below before the trial judge. Westley’s failure to raise
the issue below is particularly significant in this case, where his
objection is based on a highly factual argument—that the settling
parties were conspiring all along. “Failure to register a proper
and timely objection to a ruling or proceeding in the trial court
waives the issue on appeal.” (Bell v. American Title Ins. Co.
(1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1589, 1602.)
       Westley has failed to show error in the trial court’s order
approving the settlement.
III. Order disqualifying Alden
       The motion to disqualify Attorney Alden was made on two
grounds: First, in the week prior to the commencement of trial,
Alden disclosed that he had a significant pecuniary interest—a
$904,000 unrecorded trust deed—on the real property involved in
this matter. Second, Alden was a significant witness in the case,
in violation of California Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3.7.
       In the trial court, Alden asserted in opposition to the
motion to disqualify that the moving parties knew of Alden’s role
as a witness and his pecuniary interest in the case, thus they
purportedly waived any conflict of interest argument.8 On

8     Westley states that on December 14, 2021, Westley filed a
declaration of David Westley in support of Westley’s opposition to
the motion to disqualify Alden. However, the motion to
disqualify was granted on November 30, 2021. While Westley
agrees that November 30, 2021, was the date that the trial court

                                14
appeal, he also makes largely factual arguments—also largely
without citation to the record—that respondents knew he had an
interest in the property, knew he had met with Karasek and
knew he filed declarations in the underlying action. Alden
accuses cross-defendants of waiting until the last minute to raise
this issue, when it will create a hardship on his clients. Alden
cites Comden v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 906, 915
(Comden), for the proposition that “[i]t would be na[ï]ve not to
recognize that the motion to disqualify opposing counsel is
frequently a tactical device to delay litigation.” Alden argues
that judicial scrutiny is required “‘to prevent literalism from
possible overcoming substantial justice to the parties.’” (Ibid.)
       “‘“Trial courts in civil cases have the power to order
disqualification of counsel when necessary for the furtherance of

granted the motion to disqualify, Westley provides no citation to
the record. The Palumbos asserts that although a court reporter
was present for the November 30, 2021 proceedings, Westley
apparently made a strategic decision not to include the reporter’s
transcript of those proceedings in the record. In any event, the
trial court order granting the motion to disqualify counsel was
made on December 8, 2021, prior to the filing of David Westley’s
December 14, 2021 declaration. Because the December 14, 2021
declaration was filed after the court’s ruling, it is apparent that
the trial court did not consider it in ruling on the motion to
disqualify. Thus, we do not consider it. (Sangster v. Paetkau
(1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 163 [“We may consider only those
facts which were before the trial court, and disregard any new
factual allegations made for the first time on appeal.”]; see
Bombardier Recreational Products, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Canada
ULC (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 591, 604-605 [appellate court will
not consider additional evidence presented after court has
entered order].)

                                15
justice.”’” (Bell v. 20th Century Ins. Co. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d
194, 197 (Bell).) In considering whether to disqualify counsel, the
trial court must balance the “conflict between a client’s right to
counsel of his choice and the need to maintain ethical standards
of professional responsibility.” (Comden, supra, 20 Cal.3d at
p. 915.) The trial court’s paramount concern “must be to preserve
the public trust in the scrupulous administration of justice and
the integrity of the bar.” (People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v.
SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1135, 1145.)9

9      Westley cites In re Marriage of Murchison (2016) 245
Cal.App.4th 847, 851 (Murchison), for the proposition that a
party does not have standing to disqualify another party’s
attorney unless the complaining party has had an attorney-client
relationship with the attorney he seeks to disqualify. The
standing rule is irrelevant because a court has inherent authority
to disqualify a lawyer in the furtherance of justice where the
lawyer’s participation “‘will have a continuing effect on the
judicial proceedings.’” (Id. at p. 852.) In Murchison, a husband
objected to his wife’s attorney’s representation of her where the
attorney had purchased a home in which the husband and wife
each had an interest. The Murchison court saw “no continuing
effect Lawyer’s alleged misconduct will have on the subsequent
proceedings.” (Id. at p. 853.) Here, in contrast, where the
attorney in question has an interest in the subject matter of the
litigation and is a key witness on liability issues, the effect of his
disqualifying behavior will continue to affect the proceedings.
Under these circumstances, where Alden’s relationships and
interests in the matter are interrelated and conflicting, the trial
court has “‘an independent interest in ensuring trials are
conducted within ethical standards of the profession and that
legal proceedings appear fair to all that observe them.’” (Kennedy
v. Eldridge (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1205.)

                                 16
       A trial court’s decision on a disqualification motion is
generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People ex rel. City of
San Diego v. Experian Data Corp. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 1006,
1012.) The court’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, its
factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence, but its
application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary
and capricious. (Doe v. Yim (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 573, 581
(Doe).) We may reverse a trial court’s decision to disqualify
counsel only if “‘no reasonable basis for the action is shown.’”
(Bell, supra, 212 Cal.App.3d at p. 198.)
       Alden does not deny that he has a substantial unrecorded
lien on the property that is the subject of this dispute. California
Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1.8.1, prohibits an attorney
from entering into a business transaction with a client or
acquiring an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary
interest adverse to a client unless the attorney has satisfied
several requirements.
       Alden claims that his lien on the subject property exists to
cover his attorney fees. Alden argues that such a lien is not
barred by the Rules of Professional Conduct but only presents
certain disclosure requirements, including providing the client an
opportunity to seek independent legal advice and securing the
client’s written consent. (Citing Hawk v. State Bar (1988) 45
Cal.3d 589, 601.) Alden fails to cite specific evidence that he
fulfilled these requirements but asserts that he “disclosed to his
clients everything he was supposed to disclose, pursuant to the
State Bar Rules.” He provides no citation to the record showing
substantial evidence before the court of having done so. He cites
only the declaration of David Westley, filed after the trial court’s
decision in the matter. Alden provides no citation to any specific

                                17
portion of the declaration concerning the lien on the property, nor
does he include reference to a declaration filed by Victoria
Westley or any other client.
       Because Alden admits to his financial interest in the
property and fails to cite objective evidence that he has fulfilled
his obligations to all of his clients, substantial evidence in the
record supports the trial court’s determination that Alden’s
substantial interest in the property that is the subject matter of
this litigation undermined the integrity of the proceedings.10
       Alden also does not contest that he will be a key percipient
witness at trial. His principal argument in opposition to the
disqualification is that respondents “knew that Alden was a
percipient witness.” California Rules of Professional Conduct,
rule 3.7(a), provides in part:
       “A lawyer shall not act as an advocate in a trial in
       which the lawyer is likely to be a witness unless: [¶]
       (1) the lawyer’s testimony relates to an uncontested
       issue or matter; [¶] (2) the lawyer’s testimony
       relates to the nature and value of legal services
       rendered in the case; or [¶] (3) the lawyer has
       obtained informed written consent from the client.”
     Alden states that he obtained such written consent.
However, again he cites only the late-filed declaration of David
Westley. Alden fails to cite a specific page or paragraph number

10    Further, the trial court was permitted to resolve the factual
dispute before it as to the timing of Alden’s disclosure of his
interest in the property. Counsel’s declaration stating that
Alden’s first disclosure was at a November 16, 2021 meet and
confer meeting was substantial evidence supporting any implicit
finding that information concerning the lien was improperly
withheld for too long.

                                18
in which the necessity of Alden appearing as a witness is
discussed. Alden presents cites to no other evidence that was
presented to the trial court showing that he complied with this
rule. The court was not required to accept Alden’s
representation. Even if it did, the court was not required to
permit Alden to appear as both an advocate and a witness in the
matter before it if the court felt that permitting Alden to act in
these competing roles would undermine the integrity of the
proceedings going forward. (Murchison, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th
at p. 852.)
       We must presume that the trial court weighed the
competing interests at stake in making its determination that
Alden should not proceed as Westley’s counsel in this matter.
(Costello v. Buckley (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 748, 756-757
[“‘“Where the trial court has drawn reasonable inferences from
the evidence, we have no power to draw different inferences, even
though different inferences may also be reasonable.”’”].) Here,
the trial court was faced with two potential violations of the
California Rules of Professional Conduct, each of which, alone,
may have been sufficient to disqualify Alden. The trial court was
justifiably concerned with “the need to maintain ethical
standards of professional responsibility.” (Comden, supra, 20
Cal.3d at p. 915.) Alden has failed to set forth substantial
evidence showing an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. Under
the circumstances, we decline to find the disqualification order
arbitrary or capricious. (Doe, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 581.)

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                          DISPOSITION
       The good faith settlement order and disqualification order
are affirmed. The Palumbos and cross-defendants are awarded
their costs of appeal.

                                     ________________________
                                     CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

________________________
LUI, P. J.

________________________
BENKE, J.*

*      Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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