Court Opinion

ID: 9398810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-01 14:04:35.247168+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:36.679959
License: Public Domain

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             DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

                   Nos. 22-FS-0557; 22-FS-0558 & 20-FS-559

                   IN RE: PETITION OF P.M.B.; J.B., APPELLANT,

  (2021-ADASLD-000104, 2021-ADASLD-000105 & 2021-ADASLD-000106)

                                        and

               IN RE: PETITION OF S.H. & J.B., J.R.; J.B., APPELLANT

                          Nos. 22-FS-0667 & 22-FS-0668

               (2021-ADASLD-000133 & 2021-ADASLD-000134)

                      Appeals from the Superior Court of the
                               District of Columbia

                    (Hon. Adrienne J. Noti, Magistrate Judge)
                    (Hon. Robert A. Salerno, Associate Judge)

(Submitted February 15, 2023                              Decided March 22, 2023 ∗)

      Murphy B. Henry for appellant.

        Pamela Soncini, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Karl A. Racine,
Attorney General for the District of Columbia at the time the brief was filed,
Caroline S. Van Zile, Solicitor General, Ashwin P. Phatak, Principal Deputy
Solicitor General, and Graham E. Phillips, Deputy Solicitor General, were on the
brief, for appellee.

      ∗
          The decision in this case was originally issued as an unpublished
Memorandum Opinion and Judgment. Upon consideration of a motion to publish
filed by the District of Columbia, we grant the motion and publish this Opinion.
                                           2

      Before DEAHL, HOWARD, and SHANKER, Associate Judges.

      SHANKER, Associate Judge: J.B., the biological father of five children ranging

from five to ten years old, appeals from a Superior Court order affirming a magistrate

judge’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Granting Adoption

Petitions. 1 The magistrate judge found that (1) J.B. was unfit to parent the children,

and (2) J.B. withheld his consent to adoption contrary to the best interests of the

children. The magistrate judge also granted the adoption petitions of P.M.B., S.H.,

and J.B. Jr. (the “prospective adopters”). 2 J.B. asserts that the record does not

support the magistrate judge’s findings that he is unfit to parent and that he withheld

his consent to adoption contrary to the children’s best interests. J.B. also argues that

the magistrate judge committed legal error by (1) improperly comparing J.B. with

the prospective adopters, (2) relying on J.B.’s poverty and poor health as factors in

determining the children’s best interests, and (3) allowing prospective adopters’

counsel to ask leading questions during trial. For the reasons set forth below, we

affirm.

      1
        J.A.L.S., the biological mother of the children, consented to adoption and
takes “no position” on appeal. See Statement in Lieu of Brief (Appellee J.A.L.S.).
      2
         P.M.B. petitioned to adopt children J.O., J.A.M.B., and J.L.O. S.H. and J.B.
Jr. petitioned to adopt children J.E.X.M.B. and J.A.B.W.L.
                                          3

                                I.     Background

      In August 2018, amid allegations of chronic neglect, the Child and Family

Services Agency (“CFSA”) removed the children from their birth parents’ custody.

The children were eventually placed in foster homes with their prospective adopters.

In October 2018, the magistrate judge adjudicated the children neglected. See D.C.

Code §§ 16-2301(9)(A), -2320. Over the next several years, the magistrate judge

held a series of permanency hearings for the children. 3 See D.C. Code § 16-2323.

In each of these hearings, the magistrate judge found that CFSA had made

reasonable efforts to help J.B. achieve reunification but that J.B. had failed to make

adequate progress. At the October 2020 permanency hearing, CFSA requested a

permanency goal change to adoption, and the magistrate judge set an evidentiary

hearing, as required by In re Ta.L., 149 A.3d 1060 (D.C. 2016) (en banc).

      3
         The magistrate judge held at least five permanency hearings between
October 2018 and December 2020. At some hearings, the magistrate judge found
that J.B. had made progress in, for example, parenting classes and couples
counseling. At others, the magistrate judge found that J.B. had regressed or failed
to comply with recommended services, including therapy. In November 2020, J.B.
informed CFSA that he was moving to New York and would no longer participate
in the neglect case. At the following permanency hearing in December 2020, the
magistrate judge found that J.B. was no longer participating in services or
consistently visiting the children.
                                          4

      Between May and June 2021, the magistrate judge held a five-day Ta.L.

hearing via video conference, in which it heard testimony from two CFSA social

workers, the mother, and J.B. The magistrate judge found that CFSA had provided

J.B. with a reasonable plan to achieve reunification, but that J.B. had failed to make

adequate progress toward reunification. In particular, J.B. had refused to complete

his court-ordered mental health treatment and had not derived any benefit from his

parenting classes or domestic violence counseling despite completing those courses.

According to testimony, J.B. continued to “yell[ ] at and threaten” the children

during visits, display uncontrolled outbursts of anger, and verbally abuse the

children’s mother. Based on these findings, the magistrate judge concluded that

CFSA made “reasonable efforts in support of reunification” but that the parents

failed to make “adequate progress towards satisfying the requirements of the plan.”

On that basis, the magistrate judge changed the children’s permanency goal from

reunification to adoption. See D.C. Code § 16-2323. This court summarily affirmed

that ruling. Judgment, In re Jo.L., et al., Nos. 21-FS-0697 & 21-FS-0701 (D.C. Feb.

22, 2022) (finding that “the agency expended reasonable efforts” to achieve

reunification, including by “develop[ing] six written case plans that detailed each

parent’s requirements for reunification,” but that J.B. “either did not complete all of

the court-ordered services or failed to show improvement” in certain areas).
                                          5

      Following the goal change, the children’s respective foster parents filed

petitions to adopt. See D.C. Code §§ 16-302, -305. In January 2022, the magistrate

judge held a three-day adoption proceeding, see D.C. Code § 16-309, wherein it

heard testimony from seven witnesses, including three social workers, a forensic

psychologist, the prospective adopters, and J.B. The magistrate judge credited the

testimony of each of the social workers, the forensic psychologist, and the

prospective adopters.    The magistrate judge concluded “that much of [J.B.’s]

testimony lack[ed] credibility.”

      The social workers⸺all of whom had supervised the virtual 4 and in-person

visits 5 between J.B. and his children⸺testified that J.B. had significant ongoing

anger issues, failed to meaningfully interact with the children, and took no interest

in the children’s health, education, or wellbeing outside the short time he spent with

them each week. J.B. sometimes lashed out in anger or yelled obscenities at the

children and often conducted the virtual visits while he was at work, with others, or

      4
        In March 2020, the District of Columbia declared a public health emergency
due to the COVID-19 pandemic. As a consequence, J.B. usually met with the
children virtually.
      5
       One social worker ceased supervising in-person visits following the goal
change because she had received a threatening telephone call from J.B. and was
concerned for her safety.
                                          6

in places with poor Internet service. J.B. did, however, usually provide a meal during

in-person visits and gave each child a small allowance.

      Dr. Jennifer Carter, an expert in parenting capacity, testified regarding her

2019 evaluation of J.B. After J.B. arrived several hours late to his appointment, he

refused to complete any of the court-ordered testing except for the initial clinical

interview. J.B. also failed to engage in individual therapy. Dr. Carter opined that

J.B.’s failure to engage demonstrated a lack of motivation to reunify.

      J.B. testified that he was aware that he was required to take parenting classes,

engage in therapy, and participate in anger management classes. J.B. testified that

he had completed these services, but he provided no documentation of having

completed anger management classes or therapy. J.B. could not state where the

children attended school and claimed he was “kept in the dark” regarding their

mental and emotional health.

      Based on the above testimony, the magistrate judge found J.B. unfit to parent

the children and concluded that he was withholding his consent to adoption contrary

to the children’s best interests.   See D.C. Code §§ 16-304(e), -2353(b).        The
                                          7

magistrate judge also granted the prospective adopters’ petitions. See D.C. Code

§ 16-309.

      The reviewing associate judge, applying the same standard of review as this

court would apply on appeal of a judgment or order of the Superior Court, see In re

C.L.O., 41 A.3d 502, 510 (D.C. 2012), affirmed the magistrate judge’s rulings. The

reviewing judge rejected J.B.’s argument that the evidence presented was

insufficient to find him unfit or to find that he was withholding consent to adoption

against the children’s best interests, concluding that the magistrate judge’s findings

were “well-supported by the record.” The reviewing judge also concluded that the

magistrate judge properly considered J.B.’s housing situation.

                            II.    Standard of Review

      We review “a trial court’s order granting an adoption for abuse of discretion,

and determine[ ] whether the trial court exercised its discretion within the range of

permissible alternatives, based on all the relevant factors and no improper factor.”

In re T.J., 666 A.2d 1, 10 (D.C. 1995) (internal quotations omitted). “Legal
                                           8

questions are reviewed de novo, but findings of fact are reviewed for clear error.”

In re J.O., 176 A.3d 144, 153 (D.C. 2018). 6

      Regarding questions of fact, this court “must also respect the prerogative of

the [trial] judge . . . to determine credibility and weigh the evidence.” In re Jam.J.,

825 A.2d 902, 910 (D.C. 2003) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks

omitted). “The trial court’s findings of fact are entitled to great deference on appeal;

we cannot set them aside ‘unless they are plainly wrong or without any evidentiary

foundation.’” In re T.J.L., 998 A.2d 853, 860 (D.C. 2010) (quoting In re Baby Boy

C., 630 A.2d 670, 683 (D.C. 1993)). In particular, the reviewing court “will not

redetermine the credibility of witnesses where, as here, the trial court had the

opportunity to observe their demeanor and form a conclusion.” In re E.H., 718 A.2d

162, 169 (D.C. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).

      6
         “We are mindful that from a procedural standpoint, our role is to review the
order of the [Superior Court], not the magistrate judge.” In re C.L.O., 41 A.3d 502,
510 (D.C. 2012). We may, however, also “look to the findings and conclusions of
the fact finder on which [the Superior Court order] is based.” In re J.O., 176 A.3d
144, 153 (D.C. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).
                                          9

                                   III.   Analysis

                 A.    The record supports the magistrate judge’s
                      findings of fact and conclusions of law.

      An adoption ordinarily requires the consent of the biological parents. D.C.

Code § 16-304(a). But a court may waive the consent of one or both biological

parents if it finds both that the parent is unfit and that the parent is withholding

consent to the adoption contrary to the best interest of the child. D.C. Code

§ 16-304(e).

      J.B. first argues, in effect, that the record evidence does not support the

magistrate judge’s findings that he is unfit to parent and that he withheld his consent

to adoption contrary to the best interests of the children. We disagree. The record

amply supports the magistrate judge’s findings and conclusions, particularly in light

of our deferential standard of review.

               1. The magistrate judge properly found J.B. unfit to parent
                  under the In re S.L.G. factors.

      Biological parents have a fundamental liberty interest in preserving the

relationship between parent and child. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753
                                           10

(1982). This fundamental interest gives rise to a legal “presumption that the child’s

best interest will be served by placing the child with his natural parent, provided the

parent has not been proven unfit.” In re S.M., 985 A.2d 413, 417 (D.C. 2009). Due

to this presumption, a court must first make an independent assessment of parental

fitness before considering whether adoption is in the child’s best interest. In re Ta.L.,

149 A.3d 1060, 1081-82 (D.C. 2016) (en banc). The presumption of parental fitness

is “a strong one” that “reflects and reinforces the fundamental and constitutionally

protected liberty interest that natural parents have in the care, custody, and

management of their children . . . .” In re S.L.G., 110 A.3d 1275, 1286 (D.C. 2015).

Evidence of a parent’s unfitness must be clear and convincing. In re J.B.S., 237

A.3d 131, 147 (D.C. 2020) (en banc). “[T]he question of parental fitness is almost

always at the heart of any proceeding to terminate parental rights or waive a natural

parent’s consent to adoption.” In re S.L.G., 110 A.3d at 1286.

      Although “parental ‘fitness’ is not a statutorily defined term in this

jurisdiction,” it refers broadly to “the parent’s intention and ability over time to

provide for a child’s wellbeing and meet the child’s needs.” Id. The fitness inquiry,

therefore, turns on whether the parent “is, or within a reasonable time will be, able

to care for the child in a way that does not endanger the child’s welfare.” Id. at
                                           11

1286-87.       Though not exhaustive, the factors a court should consider when

determining whether a natural parent is fit include:

               [1] past or ongoing child abuse, neglect, maltreatment, or
               abandonment; [2] a failure to maintain contact with,
               nurture, or support the child; [3] involvement in criminal
               or other activities that are seriously inimical to a child’s
               welfare; [4] the inability or unwillingness to make
               reasonable efforts to correct the behaviors or conditions
               that led to the child’s removal from the parent’s custody,
               to provide a safe and stable home for the child, or to meet
               a particular child’s special needs; [5] chronic drug or
               alcohol abuse; and [6] mental health issues or other
               impairments that demonstrably interfere with the parent’s
               ability to care for the child or that expose the child to
               undue risk of harm.

Id. at 1287.

      In applying the S.L.G. factors, the magistrate judge found that J.B. was unfit

to parent “as evidenced by a variety of his behaviors: his failure to nurture the

children and to maintain appropriate contact with them . . .; his unwillingness to

make reasonable efforts to correct his behaviors . . .; his failure to provide a safe and

stable home . . .; and his mental health, domestic violence, and anger issues . . . .”

These findings are well supported by the record.
                                          12

      First, we find no clear error in the magistrate judge’s determination that J.B.

failed to maintain contact with or nurture his children. Although J.B. “seldom”

missed visits entirely, the quality of J.B.’s visits with the children was lacking. In

particular, J.B. was unable to give the children his undivided attention during their

weekly visits, which he often held during work or while he was preoccupied with

other matters despite having specifically requested those visitation times. On many

occasions, J.B. engaged with the children “for only approximately 15 minutes of the

one-hour visitation.” 7 Additionally, during virtual visits, J.B. was often unable or

refused to turn on his video camera or have consistent audio. J.B. appeared for

virtual visits on the Metro on several occasions, which caused additional

interference.

      The record supports the magistrate judge’s finding that when J.B. did commit

to his children, he often engaged in problematic behavior. During both in-person

and virtual visits, J.B. displayed “outbursts of anger,” including screaming at and

threatening the children. On one occasion, J.B. “physically grabbed” one of the

children from a social worker, took off his belt, and threatened to “whip his [child’s]

      7
        The magistrate judge weighed this fact particularly heavily: “Regardless of
his explanation [for holding shortened visits], [J.B.] was unable to give his children
his undivided attention for even 15 minutes a week. Parenting 10-15 minutes per
week is not sufficient evidence of the ability to independently parent and weighs
strongly against his fitness.”
                                         13

ass.” J.B. often used inappropriate language in front of the children and failed to

supervise them. Aside from these frequent outbursts of anger, J.B. was also unable

to console his children or connect with them emotionally.

      To be sure, as J.B. argues, virtual visits are not an ideal way to connect with

one’s children. We have never, however, held that such visits categorically impinge

upon a parent’s “right of visitation.” See Wilkins v. Ferguson, 928 A.2d 655, 667

(D.C. 2007). After all, such a right “is not absolute.” Id. Other jurisdictions,

moreover, have at least impliedly upheld virtual or telephonic visitations. See, e.g.,

In re J.C., 873 S.E.2d 757, 762-64 (N.C. 2022); Thaddeus v. Sec’y of Exec. Office

of Health and Hum. Servs., 193 N.E.3d 472, 420-21 (Mass. 2022); Interest of O.O.,

No. 13-21-00411-CV, 2022 WL 1559725, at *15-16 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi,

May 17, 2022); Interest of C.G., No. 20-1102, 2020 WL 7021684, at *2 (Iowa Ct.

App. Nov. 30, 2020). Here, virtual visits were justified due to the public health

emergency, see supra note 4, and because they allowed J.B. to see his children while

he was at work.

      Second, the magistrate judge’s determination that J.B. was unwilling to make

even basic efforts to correct the conditions that led to the children’s removal is

supported by the record. As the magistrate judge found, J.B. did not demonstrate
                                           14

that he can provide a safe and stable home, “as evidenced by his limited housing and

inability to [safely] care for [the children] during in-person visits.” J.B. declined to

provide his address to CFSA so that they could assess his housing. The magistrate

judge relied on J.B.’s own testimony that his housing situation was not suitable for

five children. J.B. also lacked any involvement in his children’s lives outside of his

short weekly visits and had not inquired about his children’s education or healthcare

needs. This is particularly problematic, as several of his children have special

mental, emotional, or educational needs.

      Third, we defer to the magistrate judge’s conclusion that J.B. was not willing

to comply with court-ordered plans to achieve reunification.            J.B. refused to

complete his court-ordered anger management courses. The magistrate judge did

not credit J.B.’s testimony that he attended anger management classes, as he

provided no proof of completion. Nor did J.B. complete a required psychological

examination or attend individual therapy, demonstrating, as the magistrate judge

found, “a lack of motivation to reunify” with his children. Although J.B. completed

“some” parenting classes and a 27-week domestic violence course (which he was

ordered to take following verbal and physical abuse of his then-wife), the magistrate

judge found that J.B. took little from these courses. For example, J.B. verbally

threatened J.A.L.S., the children’s birthmother, as recently as 2021.
                                           15

      As a result of J.B.’s unwillingness or inability to correct the conditions that

led to the children’s removal, J.B.’s children “have not returned to stay with him,

even temporarily, due to his failure to comply with court orders and his inability to

show that he has made any changes to ameliorate the issues that led to [the

children’s] removal.” Indeed, J.B. was not even granted unsupervised visitation

apart from a short period in 2019.

      Finally, we note that the magistrate judge reviewed J.B.’s fitness under both

the non-exhaustive S.L.G. factors and the Termination of Parental Rights (“TPR”)

factors set forth in D.C. Code § 16-2353(b) (both discussed in more detail below).

The reviewing judge and the District of Columbia, however, correctly applied only

the In re S.L.G. factors at the parental-fitness stage, reserving the TPR factors for the

consent-waiver/best-interest prong of the analysis.

      In In re S.L.G. we stated that “[t]he same statutory factors that guide the

court’s determination of a child’s best interest in a TPR or contested adoption

proceeding [that is, factors under D.C. Code § 16-2353(b)] also guide the court’s

assessment in that proceeding of the natural parent’s fitness vel non.” 110 A.3d at

1287. Later decisions, however, have stressed the procedural and substantive
                                          16

independence of the fitness test vis-à-vis the TPR best-interest factors. See In re

Ta.L., 149 A.3d at 1083; In re J.B.S., 237 A.3d at 143 (“[O]ur cases now generally

require that the trial court make a parental unfitness determination before

undertaking a ‘best interests of the child’ analysis.”). Additionally, Supreme Court

decisions and subsequent decisions of this court have consistently reserved the

best-interest factors for the consent-waiver inquiry. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760

(“But until the State proves parental unfitness, the child and his parents share a vital

interest in preventing erroneous termination of their relationship.”); In re D.R.M.,

198 A.3d 756, 763 (D.C. 2018); In re J.O., 176 A.3d at 153-54. This is because the

fitness inquiry is concerned primarily with “the parent’s intention and ability” to care

“for a child’s wellbeing and meet the child’s needs, with the basic inquiry focusing

on whether the parent is, or within a reasonable time will be, able to care for the

child in a way that does not endanger the child’s welfare,” rather than what would

be ideal for the child. In re J.O., 176 A.3d at 762. Accordingly, the fitness test

cannot correspond precisely with a best-interest analysis under the § 16-2353(b)

factors. Aside from the factors set out in S.L.G., we have not expanded on the

content of the fitness test.

       Whatever the exact nature of the fitness prong, the trial court does not commit

reversible error if (1) consistent with In re Ta.L., it “conducted a proper bifurcated
                                          17

analysis in which a threshold finding of unfitness preceded a determination of

whether the best interests of the child warranted a termination of parental rights,” In

re K.C., 200 A.3d 1216, 1241 n.21 (D.C. 2019), and (2) it assessed, at a minimum,

each relevant S.L.G. factor independently of the TPR factors. Here, even though the

magistrate judge considered the TPR factors under the same heading as its parental

fitness examination, it did so only after it independently analyzed J.B.’s fitness under

S.L.G. and found J.B. unfit under those factors, without regard to the prospective

adopters. Accordingly, the magistrate judge did not commit reversible error in this

respect.

      In sum, we cannot say, based on the record—described only in small part

above—that the magistrate judge abused her discretion in finding J.B. unfit to parent

the children.

                2. The magistrate judge correctly determined that J.B.
                   improperly withheld his consent to adoption contrary to the
                   children’s best interests.

      Although the consent of each biological parent is ordinarily required prior to

the granting of an adoption, D.C. Code § 16-304(a), the trial court may determine

that the parent’s consent should be waived pursuant to § 16-304(e), which provides

that a “court may grant a petition for adoption without any of the consents specified
                                          18

in [§ 16-304(a)], when the court finds . . . that the consent [is] withheld contrary to

the best interest of the child.” In re C.L.O., 41 A.3d 502, 510-11 (D.C. 2012).

Granting “an adoption over a natural parent’s objection is the functional equivalent

of a termination of parental rights.” In re J.O., 176 A.3d at 156 (internal quotation

marks omitted). Accordingly, the court must assess whether to waive the biological

parent’s consent under the same factors that apply in TPR proceedings, namely, the

best-interest factors set out in D.C. Code § 16-2353(b). In re S.M., 985 A.2d 413,

416 (D.C. 2009). These factors are:

             (1) The child’s need for continuity of care and caretakers
             and for timely integration into a stable and permanent
             home, taking into account the differences in the
             development and the concept of time of children of
             different ages;

             (2) The physical, mental and emotional health of all
             individuals involved to the degree that such affects the
             welfare of the child, the decisive consideration being the
             physical, mental and emotional needs of the child;

             (3) The quality of the interaction and interrelationship of
             the child with his or her parent, siblings, relatives, and/or
             caretakers, including the foster parent; . . .

             (4) To the extent feasible, the child’s opinion of his or her
             own best interests in the matter; and

             (5) Evidence that drug-related activity continues to exist
             in a child’s home environment after intervention and
             services have been provided . . . .
                                          19

D.C. Code § 16-2353(b). 8 The reviewing judge “has wide latitude in applying

th[ese] statutory criteria.” In re An.C., 722 A.2d 36, 39 (D.C. 1998).

      Again, J.B. does not argue that the magistrate judge applied an incorrect legal

standard or considered inappropriate factors, except as addressed below in Part III.B.

Rather, he argues only that the record does not support, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that he withheld his consent contrary to the children’s best interests. We

disagree. For largely the same reasons identified above and found by both the

magistrate judge and the reviewing judge, the record amply supports the magistrate

judge’s conclusions on each of the § 16-2353(b) factors.

      First, we see no clear error in the magistrate judge’s determination that J.B. is

unable to provide continuity of care for the children and is unlikely to provide

consistent, stable housing. As discussed above, J.B. has not demonstrated an interest

in the children’s education, healthcare, or emotional needs. Returning the children

to his care risks undoing the significant progress that they have made while in the

care of their foster parents. Many of the children presented with developmental

      8
        “[T]he constitutional requirement of clear and convincing evidence applies
only to proof of a parent’s unfitness to care for a child; once that is established, it
comports with due process for the child’s best interests to be proved by a
preponderance of the evidence, whether the parent consents or not.” In re J.B.S.,
237 A.3d at 147.
                                          20

delays and emotional difficulties after being removed from J.B.’s care. Now the

children “receive[ ] specialized services, including play therapy and trauma

informed therapy.” One of the children had a history of developmental and verbal

delays when she was in J.B.’s care, yet is now “at the top of her class in reading.”

Additionally, as described above and at length in both trial court opinions, J.B. lacks

sufficient housing to care for the children. Although J.B. asserts that he would take

steps to find adequate housing, the magistrate judge found his testimony not credible

in this regard.

      Second, we conclude that the record supports the magistrate judge’s

conclusion that both J.B.’s and the children’s “physical, mental, and emotional

health” counsel in favor of waiving J.B.’s consent. J.B. himself is in “poor physical,

mental, and emotional health” and may be physically unable to care for the children.

Similarly, and as discussed at length already, returning custody to J.B. risks physical,

mental, and emotional harm to the children. As Dr. Carter testified, “it would place

the children in a vulnerable position with adjustment difficulties that could manifest

in emotional and behavior[al] problems.”

      Third, the record supports the magistrate judge’s determination that J.B. and

the children do not share a nurturing and loving relationship such that it is in the
                                          21

children’s best interests to be returned to his custody. The record is rife with

examples of inappropriate comments and behavior toward the children, J.B.’s

inattentiveness during visits, his overall lack of concern for the children’s health and

educational needs, and his outbursts of anger. The relationship between J.B. and the

children stands in stark contrast to the relationship between the children and their

foster parents, which is “strong, healthy, and supportive.” Due in large part, no

doubt, to this relationship, several of the children have demonstrated concrete

lifestyle improvements since moving in with their respective foster parents.

      Finally, the record reflects that there is “some evidence” that two of the

children have expressed the desire to stay with their foster parents. For example,

one of the children “does not seem to engage with [J.B.] and reacts poorly after visits

with him.” The remainder of the children are too young to have a well-formed

opinion on the matter. Given the dearth of evidence on this point and the age of the

children, both the magistrate judge and the reviewing judge properly gave little

weight to this factor.

      Accordingly, the record supports the conclusion that the § 16-2353(b) factors

justify a finding that J.B. is withholding his consent to adoption contrary to the best

interests of the children.
                                          22

                 B.     The legal issues raised by J.B. lack merit.

      In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the record, J.B. raises three legal

arguments, each of which is unpersuasive.

             1. The magistrate judge did not improperly compare J.B. with
                the prospective adopters in assessing the children’s best
                interests under D.C. Code § 16-2353(b).

      J.B. argues that magistrate judge improperly compared him to the prospective

adopters. J.B. forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in his motion for review

in the Superior Court. See In re S.G., 581 A.2d 771, 783-84 (D.C. 1990) (holding

that father’s failure to raise argument in trial court proceeding amounted to

abandonment of the claim on appeal).

      In any event, while the inquiry at the second, best-interest stage of the analysis

is “not to determine whether the adoption petitioners would be better parents, or

would provide a better home for the children,” In re J.L., 884 A.2d 1072, 1077 (D.C.

2005); see In re S.L.G., 110 A.3d at 1287-88 (“this court has admonished that a

termination of a natural parent’s rights may not be based on a direct comparison of

the natural parent with the adoption petitioners”), the trial court is to consider “all
                                           23

persons involved with the child . . . in relationship to the best interests of the child,”

and “[t]he child’s relationship with the adoption petitioners may have a bearing on

the TPR decision,” In re S.L.G., 110 A.3d at 1288.                See also D.C. Code

§ 16-2353(b)(3) (court shall consider “the quality of the interaction and

interrelationship of the child with his or her parent . . . and/or caretakers, including

the foster parent”) (emphasis added); D.C. Code § 16-2353(b)(2) (court shall

consider “the physical, mental and emotional health of all individuals involved to

the degree that such affects the welfare of the child . . .”) (emphasis added). 9 The

record reflects that the magistrate judge simply engaged in that appropriate analysis.

      9
        In light of Ta.L., a court also may not compare the prospective adopters with
the natural parents at the first, parental-fitness step. See In re D.R.M., 198 A.3d 756,
763 (D.C. 2018) (“The determination of unfitness shall be focused on the parent’s
willingness and ability and, because unfitness is a separate determination, it should
not be made by comparing the birth parent’s fitness with that of the adoptive
parent.”). If the biological parent is found fit, there is a “strong presumption that
placement with a natural parent is in the child’s best interest.” In re J.O., 176 A.3d
at 156. Although it is theoretically possible that the best interest of the child can
override this presumption, see In re Ta.L., 149 A.3d at 1083, it is quite difficult “to
postulate a realistic factual situation where a ‘fit’ parent can be properly deprived of
parental rights” at the second prong of the analysis, Appeal of H.R. (In re Baby Boy
C.), 581 A.3d 1141, 1176-79 (D.C. 1990) (Newman, J., concurring). If, however,
the court finds that the biological parent is unfit, the presumption in favor of the
natural parent “falls away” at the best-interest stage. In re J.O., 176 A.3d at 156.

       Here, the magistrate judge properly considered J.B.’s fitness in isolation from
the prospective adopters and did not apply a presumption in favor of J.B. at the best-
interest stage.
                                           24

             2. The magistrate judge did not improperly terminate J.B.’s
                parental rights based on his inadequate housing.

      Relying on In re J.L., 884 A.2d 1072, J.B. argues that the magistrate judge

improperly “dwelt” on his lack of adequate housing, a consideration “directly related

to poverty and his poor health,” which would be impermissible factors to consider

in determining whether to terminate parental rights.          J.B.’s argument that the

magistrate judge placed undue weight on this factor is not supported by the record.

Although the magistrate judge did consider J.B.’s housing, she did so only in relation

to his ability to “actually care for his five children” and in the context of the

children’s best interests. See D.C. Code § 16-2353(b)(1) (in determining the child’s

best interest, a court must consider the “need for continuity of care . . . and for timely

integration into a stable and permanent home . . .”) (emphasis added). Far from

“dwel[ling]” on the issue, the magistrate judge properly considered J.B.’s housing

in relation to his parental responsibilities and as merely one factor among many in

ultimately terminating his parental rights. See In re J.L., 884 A.2d at 1077 (“Parental

rights, therefore, may not be terminated solely because of poverty, ill-health, or lack

of education or sophistication . . . .”) (emphasis added).
                                          25

             3. The magistrate judge did not abuse her discretion in allowing
                adoption petitioners’ counsel to ask leading questions.

      J.B. argues that “[t]hroughout [adoption] petitioners’ counsel[’s] direct

examination of the social workers in particular, there were instances of counsel

leading the witnesses.”     The record does reveal instances in which adoption

petitioners’ counsel asked leading questions. J.B., however, failed to raise this issue

when seeking review in the Superior Court. Even if he had preserved the claim, J.B.

does not identify, with sufficient specificity, which questions he finds objectionable

and what prejudice occurred as a result. See Wagner v. Georgetown Univ. Medical

Ctr., 768 A.2d 546, 554 n.9 (D.C. 2001) (the “bare mention” of a claim “does not

suffice to preserve the argument for our consideration”); D.C. App. R. 28(a)(10)

(brief must contain an argument “containing the appellant’s contentions and the

reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which

the appellant relies”). J.B.’s mere reference to counsel’s “leading questions” does

not sufficiently narrow the issue for our review. Id.

      In any event, “[t]he trial court has fairly broad discretion to allow leading

questions to be asked, and reversal is usually not required if the record shows that

the court exercised that discretion.” Bailey v. United States, 831 A.2d 973, 984 (D.C.

2003). The record “clearly and repeatedly demonstrates that the [magistrate judge]
                                       26

was alert to the possibility of prejudice and acted appropriately.” Id. at 984.

Although adoption petitioners’ counsel asked several leading questions, the record

shows that the magistrate judge often sustained J.B.’s objections or cautioned

counsel to avoid leading questions even without prompting from J.B.’s attorney.

                                IV.   Conclusion

         For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

                               So ordered.