Court Opinion

ID: 9653947
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:59:46.300526+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:22.165024
License: Public Domain

George Howard, Jr., Justice, dissenting. I dissent in the disposition taken by the majority on petitioner’s request for writ of prohibition, or, in the alternative, mandamus or certiorari, to the Chancery Court of Jackson County. The fundamental issue involved in this case is not, as perceived by the majority, whether the trial court has inherent power to cite an officer of the court for contempt for the disobedience of its process, nor is it whether a court may initiate contempt proceedings on its own motion, but, on the contrary, the issue is whether a criminal contempt proceeding may be initiated by a private litigant in his civil action pending before the court whose order has been purportedly ignored or disregarded by a party who is not a party to the pending action and where such alleged disobedience occurred out of the presence of the court. It is generally recognized that civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an aggrieved party who has a pecuniary interest in the right to be protected, while criminal contempt proceedings are initiated by the court or the office of the prosecuting attorney, at the request of the court, for, indeed, the state is the real party in interest, and consequently, is a proper party to the proceeding. I submit that, indeed, in situations as we have, in the instant case, where a husband and wife are antagonists, in a support proceeding where emotions and attitudes are highly charged, and a third party, the Sheriff of Jackson County — Chief Law Enforcement Officer of the county, is caught in the middle, a disinterested source should be called upon by the trial court to initiate and prosecute the proceedings.1  It is clear from this record that even the trial judge had certain misgivings about the contempt proceedings initiated by Mrs. Stone against the sheriff in her civil action for the trial court, in its order of March 13, 1978, made the following observation: “(10) The Court hereby orders the cause inviting Danny Stone and Ralph Henderson [Jackson County Sheriff] shall be separated and that henceforth there shall be two separate files maintained with a complete file in each cause and henceforth, the matter involving Ralph Henderson shall be referred to as Ex Parte, Ralph Henderson. (Emphasis Added) “(11) The Court finds that the better practice would have been to obtain separate affidavits in the cause involving Danny Stone and Ralph Henderson.” However, after making the above finding, the court went on to further state: “The Court rejects the argument Ralph Henderson cannot be brought as a party in a civil contempt proceeding between a husband and a wife.” I submit, if this is true, why did the court suggest and even order that a separate file be opened and maintained for the sheriff? It is apparent that the trial court is caught in the midst of an antinomy. It is clear that the citation against Danny Stone is for civil contempt, while the citation against the Sheriff of Jackson County is criminal. The learned trial judge recognizing, as he must, the complications that were bound to develop in permitting the criminal contempt proceeding against the sheriff to be pursued in the wife’s civil action, ordered the proceedings against the sheriff to be designated as “Ex Parte, Ralph Henderson.” It is plain that in the criminal contempt proceeding, the sheriff is entitled to the presumption of innocence that is afforded every defendant in a criminal proceeding, while in a civil proceeding, this presumption is unavailable. Moreover, the sheriff’s guilt would have to be established by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, while in a civil proceeding, the burden of proof is measured in terms of preponderance of the evidence. I submit that although there are many cases in the Arkansas Reports, involving criminal contempt proceedings, designated or styled as “Ex Parte”, this is an inappropriate designation for a criminal contempt proceeding. Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, and Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third Revision, defines “Ex Parte”, in the context being used in this proceeding, as follows: “ 'Ex Parte', in the heading of a reported case, signifies that the name following is that of the party upon whose application the case is heard.” It is plain from this record that Sheriff Henderson did not petition the trial court for any relief, but, on the contrary, Mrs. Stone petitioned the court for an order and citation against him. Thus, the designation of the proceeding against the sheriff as “Ex Parte, Ralph Henderson”, is a misnomer. The proceeding against the sheriff is an action by the state, and consequently, should have been styled State of Arkansas v. Ralph Henderson.2  Finally, inasmuch as Mrs. Stone sought, improperly however, to initiate both civil and criminal contempt proceedings in her civil action by filing a purported verified petition, which the trial court construed as an affidavit, there is no accusation, not even a defacto one, in the misnomer “Ex Parte, Ralph Henderson” proceeding, since the trial court may not take judicial notice of its own records in other causes therein, even between the same parties. See: Lewis v. Lewis, 255 Ark. 583, 502 S.W. 2d 505; Murphy v. Citizens Bank of Junction City, 82 Ark. 131, 100 S.W. 894. I would, therefore, grant the requested relief.  One of the peculiarities of contempt proceedings is that the judge whose orders are disobeyed, or who is personally insulted by the defendant, may be the same judge who hears and decides the contempt charges. This may raise questions about the impartiality of the judge.   The following are a few of the many cases in the Arkansas Reports involving criminal contempt proceedings against individuals involving factual situations comparable to the one in the instant case: York v. State, 89 Ark. 72, Bene v. State, 22 Ark. 151, CarlLee v. State, 102 Ark. 122, State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 386.