Court Opinion

ID: 9753196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:03:07.368301+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:31.999303
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Me. Chief Justice Bell :
The decision of the Majority in this 1962 murder case is so unrealistic as to be incomprehensible. In 1962, appellant was tried before a jury and convicted of second-degree murder. He was represented throughout the trial and the sentencing proceeding by family-retained counsel. No post-trial motions were filed and no appeal was taken from the judgment of sentence.
In 1965, appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and in 1967 this Court unanimously affirmed the Order of the lower Court, which dismissed the writ. See Commonwealth ex rel. Norman v. Stitzel, 425 Pa. 184, 228 A. 2d 373 (1967). That case is well summarized in the syllabus and in a relevant footnote* on pages 184 and 185, respectively: “1. In adjudicating the merits of a habeas corpus petition filed *227by a relator who is in prison following a conviction of crime the trial court not only may, but should, consider the record in the criminal trial. [187]
“2. Tn this habeas corpus proceeding by a relator who was sentenced to prison in 1962 for second degree murder, it was Held that the court below had properly found that the relator’s confession was given freely and voluntarily to the police after he had been warned that he did not have to say anything and whatever he did say would be used against him in court.”
Appellant then filed a PCHA petition on June 5, 1967. A hearing thereon was fixed by the Court, but appellant asked for a continuance, and thereafter appellant continued the matter and the hearing petition indefinitely.
On November 1, 1968, appellant, while represented by counsel, filed another PCHA petition, claiming, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel in that he had never been informed of his right of appeal from the judgment of sentence. After a hearing, the lower Court dismissed his petition, ruling that appellant had finally litigated this issue before our Court at the time of appellant’s habeas corpus appeal, because our Court had the trial record before us at the time of appellant’s pri- or habeas corpus appeal. This is correct. However, appellant now takes this additional appeal, which the Majority now grant. What is the use of the Supreme Court ever rendering a decision against a criminal when the Court has briefs and a complete record before us and the criminal was represented by an attorney? Cf. Commonwealth v. Jones, 428 Pa. 208, 236 A. 2d 521; Pate v. Holman, 341 F. 2d 764, 775; McGriff v. Wainwright, 431 F. 2d 897; United States ex rel. O’Brien v. Maroney, 423 F. 2d 865; United States ex rel. Beard v. Rundle, 434 F. 2d 588.
Ts there never to be an end to appeals by a person convicted of murder? Furthermore, it is outrageous to *228let a convicted murderer, or indeed any criminal, play fast and loose—as this appellant has done—with the Supreme Court, or with any other Court.
In the light of the above-mentioned facts and circumstances, it is, I repeat, incomprehensible to me how this Court can remand for another hearing.
I very vigorously dissent.

 “It was also asserted below that Norman was denied the effective assistance of counsel in the filing and prosecuting of an appeal; however, this issue has not been pressed in this appeal.”