Court Opinion

ID: 9513316
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:34:12.858809+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:49.267864
License: Public Domain

VANDE WALLE, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 18] Because I believe the majority confuses whether a false statement is willful with the motivation for making the false statement, I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 19] I agree, as we said in F.O.E. Aerie 2337 v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau, 464 N.W.2d 197, 201 (N.D.1990), that to “trigger the statutory consequences, a false statement must be intentional, not inadver*440tent ...” or, as we said in Hausauer v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau, 1997 ND 243, ¶ 14, 572 N.W. 2d 426 “[t]he Bureau must prove the claimant’s state of mind was purposeful in making the false statement.” However, I do not equate the requirement the false statement be intentional or the maker’s state of mind be purposeful with a requirement that it be intentionally made to mislead. It is enough, I believe, the maker intended to make a false statement. There is no requirement that the intent be to deceive the Bureau. I read the ALJ’s comments, as cited in the majority opinion, that the Bureau was misled, whether or not the claimant intentionally misled the Bureau, and that it was not necessary to determine the motivation for making the false statements to mean only that the reason for making the false statements is not material if the claimant intended to make them. Thus, for example, if the claimant made the false statements because he did not want it a matter of record that he worked at a sale, rather than to mislead the Bureau, it would make no difference. The false statement was still purposefully made. Compare Black’s Law Dictionary (6th edition) “[i]n civil actions, the word [willfully] often denotes an act which is intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental.”
[¶ 20] In his recommended Conclusions of Law, subsequently adopted by the Bureau, the ALJ, at paragraph II, concluded in part “[b]ut a false statement must be intentional to trigger the statutory consequences of reimbursement and forfeiture of future benefits. F.O.E. Aerie 2337, i.d. at 200. A false statement must be intentional, not inadvertent, and material, not peripheral.”
[¶21] If there is any doubt as to the meaning of the words in paragraph IX, and I do not believe there is, they must be read in light of the statements in paragraph II. When so read, they can only mean, as the ALJ said, that the false statement must only be intentionally made and that it is not necessary to determine the motivation or purpose for making them. I believe the majority misconstrues a few selected words of the ALJ. In so doing, I fear the majority has now set up an additional hurdle, not required by the statute, which will require proof not only that the claimant intentionally made a false statement but that it was made for the purpose of misleading the Bureau. Thus it will be a defense that the claimant intended to mislead someone other than the Bureau even if the false statement did, in fact, mislead the Bureau. That cannot be the purpose of section 65-05-33. See, e.g., F.O.E. Aerie 2337, at 201 (VandeWalle, J., concurring specially) (concluding reason for enactment of section 65-05-33 is “statement which could have misled the Bureau ... ”). I would affirm the judgment of the district court affirming the order of the Bureau forfeiting Hopfauf s future workers compensation benefits.
[¶ 22] Gerald W. Vande Walle, C.J.