Court Opinion

ID: 9927544
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-28 22:42:02.847692+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:18.556937
License: Public Domain

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT                                               Reporter of Decisions
Decision:    2024 ME 1
Docket:      Pen-23-81
Submitted
  On Briefs: September 27, 2023
Decided:     January 9, 2024

Panel:        STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ.

                              IN RE CHILDREN OF BILLIE S.

DOUGLAS, J.

         [¶] Billie S. appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Bangor,

Roberts, J.) terminating her parental rights to her children pursuant to 22 M.R.S.

§ 4055(1)(B)(2) (2023). The mother contends that the judgment does not

make adequate, independent findings of fact to support termination. We agree

and vacate the judgment.

         [¶2] The sole witness at the March 2, 2023, hearing on the petition for

termination of parental rights1 was the Department of Health and Human

Services caseworker, who had just been assigned to the case two months

earlier. The caseworker testified that she had reviewed the case file, had

spoken with her supervisor as well as with the caseworker previously assigned

  1  The mother failed to appear at the hearing. Her counsel’s motion to continue the hearing was
denied because the mother had notice of the hearing and no reason was offered to account for her
absence.
2

to the case, and had reviewed the petitions for termination that were prepared

and filed in June 2021 by the previous caseworker. She also testified that she

had reviewed specifically paragraph nine of each petition2 (which summarizes

the facts alleged in support of termination) and believed their contents still to

be true to the best of her knowledge.

        [¶3] Counsel for the Department requested that the court take “judicial

notice” of paragraph nine of each petition “relative to the mother, relative to the

father of [the older child],3 and relative to the best interests in light of the direct

testimony of the same effect subject, of course, to cross.”4 There was no

objection, and counsel for each parent and the guardian ad litem affirmatively

agreed with this request. Following cross-examination of the caseworker by

the parents’ counsel, the Department rested. With the admission of the reports

of the guardian ad litem, the evidence closed.

    2 The Department filed two termination petitions because the children had different fathers. The

father of the younger child is deceased. The parental rights of the father of the older child were
terminated in this matter, and he did not appeal.

    Here, counsel for the Department had mistakenly referred to the younger child by name,
    3

however, it is clear from the record that he was referring to the older child.
    4 The mother further contends that the court abused its discretion by taking judicial notice of
paragraph nine in each petition because the facts set out therein are “subject to reasonable dispute.”
M.R. Evid. 201(b). Because we determine that the judgment does not set out adequate factual
findings, we decline to address this and other issues the appeal raises. See In re Kenneth H., 1997 ME
48, ¶ 5, 690 A.2d 984 (noting that effective appellate review requires “specific findings of fact that
would inform the parties or this [C]ourt of the basis of [the trial court’s] decision”) (quoting
In re Amber B., 597 A.2d 937, 938 (Me. 1991)).
                                                                                                 3

       [¶4]     Ruling from the bench, the court said that it had “reviewed

Paragraph 9 and the petition that was admitted into evidence, heard the

testimony of the caseworker, and . . . reviewed [the two latest guardian ad litem

reports],” and found on the basis of that evidence

       that the parents are unwilling or [un]able to protect the children
       from jeopardy, and those circumstances are unlikely to change
       within a . . . time reasonably calculated to meet the [children’s]
       needs. They are unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the
       . . . children within the time reasonably calculated to meet the
       children’s needs. I’m not going to find abandonment. And in terms
       of [the mother], of course, I’m also not going to find that she’s failed
       to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify . . . . I further
       find that termination is in the children’s best interest, and I will sign
       an order once [the Department has] prepared it . . . .

At the court’s request, the Department's counsel subsequently submitted a

proposed order of termination of the mother’s parental rights to the children.5

       [¶5] The proposed order submitted by the Department indicated a

finding by clear and convincing evidence that the mother “is unwilling or unable

to protect the [children] from jeopardy and these circumstances are unlikely to

change within a time calculated to meet the [children’s] needs” and “that it is in

the [children’s] best interest[s] that [her] parental rights be terminated.”6 In

   5 The proposed order also terminated the parental rights of the father of the older child.

   6 The proposed order (which consisted of court form PC-036 filled in by counsel) deviated from
the court’s ruling from the bench, however, in two respects. First, the box indicating a finding of
4

the section on the form order entitled “Specific Findings,” the following was

written:

       See ¶ 9 of both petitions re: [the mother]
           ¶ 9 of [the older child’s] petition re: [the father]
           ¶ 9 of both petitions re: best interests
       See GAL reports
       See also testimony of caseworker.

The order was issued on March 20, 2023. The mother filed a timely appeal.

M.R. App. R. 2B(c)(1).

       [¶6] Although couched at times in terms of a challenge to the sufficiency

of the evidence, the focus of the mother’s challenge on appeal is on the adequacy

and form of the judgment’s findings of fact. Thus, she contends that the

judgment lacks independent, specific facts to support the ultimate findings as

to parental unfitness and best interests of the children, and instead

incorporates in full a paragraph of the termination petitions, the guardian ad

litem reports, and the entirety of the caseworker’s testimony.

abandonment was checked, even though the court had expressly ruled from the bench that “I'm not
going to find abandonment” as to the mother. Second, the box indicating a finding that the parent is
unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the children within a time reasonably calculated to meet
the children’s needs was not checked, despite the court's contrary finding from the bench with
respect to the mother. Counsel preparing a proposed order at the direction of the court should make
every effort to ensure that the proposed order submitted to the court reflects the rulings from the
bench.
                                                                                 5

      [¶7] A judgment terminating parental rights must set forth specific,

independently made findings of fact. In re David G., 659 A.2d 859, 862-63 (Me.

1995); see also M.R. Civ. P. 52(a) (“[I]n every action for termination of parental

rights, the court shall make specific findings of fact and state its conclusions of

law . . . as required by 22 M.R.S. § 4055.” (emphasis added)). It must contain

more than “merely a synopsis” of testimony or evidence and a recitation of the

elements of 22 M.R.S. § 4055. In re Dylan B., 2001 ME 31, ¶ 4, 766 A.2d 577; see

also In re Kenneth H., 1997 ME 48, ¶ 3, 690 A.2d 984 (concluding that a synopsis

of trial testimony and “near-verbatim recitation” of section 4055(B)’s language

were inadequate as findings); In re Amber B., 597 A.2d 937, 937-38 (Me. 1991)

(holding findings of fact merely referencing the statutory elements to be

inadequate). Moreover, “we will not infer factual findings in a termination case”

when adequacy of the findings is the issue presented. In re Aubrey R., 2017 ME

37, ¶ 2-3, 157 A.3d 212.

      [¶8] Here, the judgment recites the court’s ultimate findings with respect

to the applicable statutory elements and then incorporates as its “specific

findings” entire portions of the record evidence—the guardian ad litem reports,

all trial testimony, and paragraph nine of each petition. These are not “specific

findings of fact” required by Rule 52(a) or our prior decisions. They do not
6

reflect an independent articulation of the particular facts forming the basis of

the court’s reasons in support of its ultimate findings regarding the mother’s

parental unfitness or the children’s best interests.7 Because the judgment lacks

adequate findings that would sufficiently inform the mother and this Court of

the basis of the court’s decision, we must vacate the judgment.

        The entry is:

                           Judgment vacated. Remanded to the District
                           Court for further proceedings consistent with
                           this opinion.

Neil J. Prendergast, Esq., Fort Kent, for appellant mother

Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Hunter C. Umphrey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office
of the Attorney General, Bangor, for appellee Department of Health and Human
Services

Bangor District Court docket numbers PC-2020-58 and PC-2020-59
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY

   7 The difficulty of appellate review due to lack of specific findings is further compounded here by

contradictions reflected in portions of the incorporated testimony and reports. As one example, the
March 2, 2023, report of the guardian ad litem states that “[t]he visits [that] did occur went well” and
that the mother “interacted well and appropriately with the children.” The caseworker, on the other
hand, testified that visits “go okay” and that there were “some concerns about [the mother’s] ability
to be appropriate in her conversations with [the children].”