Court Opinion

ID: 9745347
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:50:18.736713+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:58.780182
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, dissenting: I dissent. Although I agree with the majority that there can be a conjugal relationship without sexual intercourse, I do not agree that the circuit court’s finding that there was no conjugal relationship here was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. I agree with the majority that “[i]n each of the cases where termination of maintenance is sought under section 510(b), there will be a unique set of facts. No two cases in this area will be alike because no two personal relationships are alike.” (106 Ill. 2d at 466.) I fail to see, however, how a relationship utterly devoid of any evidence of affection or physical attraction can be found to be conjugal in nature within the contemplation of section 510(b). The evidence is undisputed that Mr. Montgomery is impotent, that he and Mrs. Sappington, although they did on a couple of occasions occupy the same room, have never slept in the same bed, have never kissed or engaged in any other activity which might be associated with a display of affection or a conjugal relationship. Although the extent of his contribution cannot be determined from the record, it does appear that they both bought groceries and that they shared utility bills. The testimony shows that they did not regularly share the evening meal and ordinarily did not have dinner together more than two or three times in any week. Mrs. Sappington testified that she would not refuse to go out with other men if she were asked. The testimony shows that Mrs. Sappington prepared a will which contained no provision for Mr. Montgomery and that she goes out socially 15 or 20 times a month, social occasions in which he is not included. There is no testimony whatsoever to indicate that they have mutual friends. The majority states that the parties exchanged gifts. The testimony shows that the gift to Mr. Montgomery was usually something like a belt or a necktie and that he could not recall whether he had bought her a birthday gift on her last birthday. The majority states that “[i]n effect, Montgomery took the place of the plaintiff in and around the household.” (106 Ill. 2d at 466.) It would not be overly cynical to suggest that if, by the activities shown by the evidence, Montgomery effectively took plaintiff’s place around the household, it is not surprising that the parties were divorced. Obviously the establishment of a conjugal relationship is a matter of intent. As noted by the majority, the term “conjugal” means matters belonging to or suitable or appropriate to the marriage state. A conjugal relationship which includes sexual intercourse does not cease to be conjugal because one of the parties become impotent, and there is, of course, no impediment to an impotent individual’s entering into a conjugal relationship. It requires, however, more than is shown by this record which, I reiterate, is utterly devoid of any evidence of any degree of affection between the parties or any degree of attraction which could lead to a sexual relationship. Despite its discussion of the definitions of “conjugal” (106 Ill. 2d at 462-63) and “cohabitation” (106 Ill. 2d at 464), the majority has given them the same definition. The circuit court found that there was no conjugal relationship between the parties because there was no evidence of a sexual relationship. We have repeatedly held that if a circuit court judgment is correct, it should be affirmed, even though the reason given for the judgment may be erroneous. Based on this record, the circuit court reached the correct conclusion, and its finding is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. I would affirm the judgments of the circuit and appellate courts.