Court Opinion

ID: 9399220
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-02 15:06:57.795816+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:45.221059
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-515

                                  COMMONWEALTH

                                       vs.

                            RONYVAN V. GONCALVES.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       In this direct appeal from convictions, after a jury trial,

 of various crimes1 stemming from events at a car dealership in

 1 On September 8, 2009, the defendant was charged with three
 counts of breaking and entering a vehicle in the nighttime with
 an intent to commit a felony, G. L. c. 266, § 16, two counts of
 malicious destruction of property over $250, G. L. c. 266,
 § 127, two counts of assault and battery on a police officer,
 G. L. c. 265, § 13D, one count of mistreating or interfering
 with a police dog, G. L. c. 272, § 77A, one count of attempt to
 commit a crime (to wit, larceny over $250), G. L. c. 274, § 6,
 one count of larceny under $250, G. L. c. 266, § 30 (1), one
 count of possession of burglarious instruments, G. L. c. 266,
 § 49, one count of resisting arrest, G. L. c. 268, § 32B, one
 count of conspiracy, G. L. c. 274, § 7, and one count of
 receiving a stolen motor vehicle, G. L. c. 266, § 28 (a). He
 pleaded guilty to the charges in November 2009, but subsequently
 filed a motion to vacate his plea and for new trial, which was
 allowed on February 4, 2018. The jury trial from which the
 current appeal stems occurred in August 2019. The jury found
 the defendant guilty of two counts of breaking and entering a
 vehicle in the nighttime with an intent to commit a felony, two
 counts of malicious destruction of property over $250, one count
 of assault and battery on a police officer, mistreating or
the early morning hours of September 5, 2009, the defendant

argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the

convictions, and that the prosecutor argued facts not in

evidence during closing argument.     With the exception of the

conviction of assault and battery on a police officer, we

affirm.2

     Background.    We recite the Commonwealth's evidence,

together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn from it, in

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.       See Commonwealth

v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979).     Responding to a call at

2:16 A.M. on September 5, 2009, a uniformed police officer went

to a car dealership where he saw the defendant standing in

between rows of cars parked in the dealership's lot.      The

officer heard a loud, metallic banging, and then saw the

defendant throw something away, producing a similar metallic

sound.     Those items turned out to be lug nuts.   The windows of

two vehicles near where the defendant had been standing were

"smashed out," and one vehicle had been jacked up with "a heavy-

interfering with a police dog, attempt to commit a crime,
larceny under $250, and resisting arrest.

2 The Commonwealth concedes, and we agree, that the evidence was
insufficient to support the charge of assault and battery on
Officer Steven Somers, which rested on a theory of recklessness.
The Commonwealth has acknowledged that it failed to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the officer received more than a
trifling or transient injury. See Commonwealth v. Burno, 396
Mass. 622, 626-627 (1986).

                                  2
duty floor jack."3   In addition, one of the vehicles had a

screwdriver jammed into the lock on the driver's side door, and

there were several loose lug nuts on the ground around the cars.

     The officer announced himself as a police officer,

approached the defendant while pointing his gun, and instructed

the defendant to get down on the ground.   Instead, the defendant

fled, running across the car lot to an area with briars, and

then into the woods.   As the officer gave chase, a white U-Haul

van came from around the back of the dealership and sped out of

the lot.   The officer called for a K-9 officer to help locate

the defendant.

     A K-9 officer who happened to be in the area saw a white

van driving erratically and enter the highway going in the wrong

direction at almost the same time as he received the call to

respond to the dealership.   The K-9 officer decided not to

follow the van given the danger involved in chasing a vehicle

going the wrong direction on a highway, and instead went to the

dealership.

     The two officers then went into the woods where the

defendant had entered, and the police dog picked up a human

3 An employee of the dealership testified that replacing a
smashed window would cost about $500 between parts and labor,
replacing a set of regular lug nuts would be about $5 to $10
dollars, and replacing a set of locking lug nuts would be
between $75 and $80 dollars.

                                 3
scent.   The K-9 officer announced repeatedly and loudly that

they were the police, that they had a police dog, and that the

dog would bite if the defendant did not reveal himself first.

This is what, in fact, transpired because the defendant did not

emerge from his hiding spot.    The dog located the defendant, bit

him, and hung on, as trained.    The defendant repeatedly struck

the officers and the dog, and continued to do so even after he

had been instructed to stop.    Ultimately, the defendant stopped

fighting only when he was sprayed with mace or pepper spray and,

at that point, the police dog released him.

    The next day, police found the white van, which had been

stolen from a U-Haul dealer.    The defendant's cousin was the

driver of the van, and inside was a wheel with a tire and a

global positioning system (GPS) unit that had been taken from a

vehicle at the dealership.

    The defendant testified in his own defense, essentially

claiming that his cousin had taken him to the dealership without

any explanation, and that he had remained in the van while his

cousin had gone into the dealership lot.    Notably, the

defendant's testimony corroborated significant portions of the

Commonwealth's case, such as that he was at the dealership on

the night in question with his cousin, that his cousin had

picked him up in a U-Haul van, that he heard a banging noise

while at the dealership, that he saw his cousin "jacking" one of

                                  4
the cars, that he (the defendant) threw some lug nuts into the

woods, and that he ran into the woods, where he eventually was

located by a police dog and two officers.

    Discussion.      Sufficiency of the evidence.   "When reviewing

a motion for a required finding of not guilty, the 'question is

whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'"

Commonwealth v. Grassie, 476 Mass. 202, 207 (2017), S.C. 482

Mass. 1017 (2019), quoting Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677.      "Proof

of the essential elements of the crime may be based on

reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, . . . and the

inferences a jury may draw need only be reasonable and possible

and need not be necessary or inescapable."     Commonwealth v.

Kapaia, 490 Mass. 787, 791 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v. West,

487 Mass. 794, 800 (2021).    "[I]n order to convict on

circumstantial evidence, it is not necessary to show that it was

not in the power of any other person than the defendant to

commit the crime."    Cramer v. Commonwealth, 419 Mass. 106, 112

(1994), quoting Commonwealth v. Fancy, 349 Mass. 196, 200

(1965).   "The relevant question is whether the evidence would

permit a jury to find guilt, not whether the evidence requires

such a finding."     Commonwealth v. Norris, 483 Mass. 681, 685

                                  5
(2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 401 Mass. 745, 747

(1988).

          "Because the defendant moved for required findings at
     the close of the Commonwealth's case and again at the close
     of all the evidence, [w]e consider the state of the
     evidence at the close of the Commonwealth's case to
     determine whether the defendant's motion should have been
     granted at that time. We also consider the state of the
     evidence at the close of all the evidence, to determine
     whether the Commonwealth's position as to proof
     deteriorated after it closed its case" (quotation omitted).

West, 487 Mass. at 799-800, quoting Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin,

446 Mass. 188, 198 (2006).   "Deterioration occurs 'not because

the defendant contradicted the Commonwealth's evidence . . . but

because evidence for the Commonwealth necessary to warrant

submission of the case to the jury is later shown to be

incredible or conclusively incorrect.'"   Commonwealth v. Merry,

453 Mass. 653, 663 (2009), quoting O'Laughlin, supra at 203.

     As to the breaking and entering charge,4 the defendant

argues that the evidence was insufficient to permit the jury to

4 To prove the defendant guilty of breaking and entering a
vehicle during the nighttime,

     "the Commonwealth must prove four things beyond a
     reasonable doubt: [1] [t]hat the defendant broke into a
     [vehicle] belonging to another person; [2] [t]hat the
     defendant entered that [vehicle]; [3] [t]hat the defendant
     did so with the intent to commit a felony in that
     [vehicle]; and [4] [t]hat this event took place during the
     nighttime."

8.100 Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District Court
(2009). "A defendant's intent to commit a felonious larceny may
be proved in a number of ways." Commonwealth v. Hill, 57 Mass.

                                 6
find that he was the person who broke into and damaged the

vehicles, or that he had stolen anything.       Although it is true

that no one testified that they saw the defendant break into the

cars, direct testimony was not required.       The defendant's

proximity to the damaged cars, in the middle of the night, with

lug nuts in his hand, while one car was still jacked up, was

enough to permit the jury to infer that he was the person who

had damaged the cars with the intent to steal GPS equipment, and

that he had removed lug nuts in order to steal tires.       These

inferences were buttressed by the fact that the GPS unit located

in the van driven by the defendant's cousin, contemporaneously

present on the scene on the same night, had been stolen from a

car at the dealership.

       As to the charges of malicious destruction of property with

a value over $250,5 attempt to commit the crime of larceny over

App. Ct. 240, 247 (2003). See Commonwealth v. Lauzier, 53 Mass.
App. Ct. 626, 629 (2002) ("intent may be inferred from the
actual commission of the felonious act . . . as well as from the
circumstances attending the act" [quotation omitted]).

5   As the Supreme Judicial Court explained:

       "The felony offense of malicious destruction of property
       valued at over $250 has four essential elements, which must
       be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: the defendant injured
       or destroyed the personal property . . . of another; the
       defendant did so willfully; the defendant did so with
       malice; the value of the property so injured or destroyed
       exceeded $250."

                                  7
$250,6 and larceny under $250, the defendant similarly argues

that the absence of direct evidence that he was the person who

destroyed the cars, or that they had been destroyed on the night

in question (as opposed to some earlier date), or that he took

or carried anything away, required a finding in his favor.   For

the same reasons we have set out above, the defendant's argument

fails to persuade us.   The jury could use its common sense to

infer from the defendant's presence in the lot of a closed

dealership, in the middle of the night, while a repeated

metallic banging occurred, with lug nuts in his hand, standing

next to cars whose windows had been smashed, one having a

screwdriver jammed into the lock, that he had caused the

destruction to the vehicles on that evening, that he was

attempting to steal wheels or tires, and that he had, in fact,

Commonwealth v. DeBerry, 441 Mass. 211, 215 n.7 (2004). "Where
repairable damage or destruction is caused to a portion or
portions of a greater whole, the value of the property damaged
or destroyed is to be measured by the reasonable cost of the
repairs necessitated by the malicious conduct." Id. at 221-222,
quoting Nichols v. United States, 343 A.2d 336, 342 (D.C. 1975).

6 "The crime of attempt consists of the intent to commit the
underlying crime coupled with an overt act." Commonwealth v.
Green, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 901, 903 (2006), quoting Commonwealth
v. Horton, 434 Mass. 823, 836 (2001). "Larceny is the taking
without right of the personal property of another with the
specific intent to deprive the other of the property
permanently." Commonwealth v. Murray, 401 Mass. 771, 772
(1988).

                                8
caused the GPS unit located in the van to be taken and carried

away.

       As to the charge of resisting arrest,7 the defendant points

to his own testimony to argue that he merely struggled with the

police dog and does not remember having physical contact with

the officers.     But our task here is to view the evidence under

the familiar Latimore standard.        Taken in that light, the

evidence permitted the jury to find that the defendant

repeatedly struck the officers, despite being told to stop

resisting arrest.

       Closing.   During closing argument, the prosecutor stated

that "[t]he defendant was caught red-handed at the . . .

dealership in the process of stealing tires."       The defendant

7   Pursuant to G. L. c. 268, § 32B (a),

       "A person commits the crime of resisting arrest if he
       knowingly prevents or attempts to prevent a police officer,
       acting under color of his official authority, from
       effecting an arrest of the actor or another, by: (1) using
       or threatening to use physical force or violence against
       the police officer or another; or (2) using any other means
       which creates a substantial risk of causing bodily injury
       to such police officer or another."

"Fleeing from, or even resisting, a stop or patfrisk does not
constitute the crime of resisting arrest." Commonwealth v.
Grant, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 205, 209 (2008). Officers intending to
effect an arrest must "objectively communicate[] that intention
to the defendant prior to, or during, the pursuit" in order "to
satisfy the requirement that a defendant understand he is being
arrested." Id. at 209-210.

                                   9
lodged a timely objection on the ground that the evidence merely

showed that the defendant was observed holding lug nuts in his

hand, not that he was observed stealing tires.    Because the

defendant timely objected, we review to determine whether there

was error and, if so, whether the error was prejudicial, "i.e.,

'whether we can say with fair assurance that the error did not

influence the jury, or had but very slight effect'" (quotation

omitted).   Commonwealth v. Correia, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 27, 31 n.4

(2005), quoting Commonwealth v. McCoy, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 284,

290 (2003).

    The prosecutor did not stray beyond the permissible bounds

of argument.   As we have already noted, the evidence easily

permitted the jury to infer from the fact that the defendant had

lug nuts in his hand while standing next to a jacked-up car in

the middle of the night in the lot of a closed dealership, that

he was in the process of stealing tires.    Prosecutors may argue

"forcefully for a conviction based on the evidence and on

inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence."

Commonwealth v. Carriere, 470 Mass. 1, 19 (2014), quoting

Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 516 (1987).    Arguments

"ask[ing] the jury to draw an inference that was 'reasonable and

possible'" are not erroneous even if the inference does not

"flow[] inevitably from the evidence."     Commonwealth v.

                                10
Mazariego, 474 Mass. 42, 58 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v.

Marquetty, 416 Mass. 445, 452 (1993).

       Conclusion.   On count six of the complaint charging assault

and battery on a police officer, the judgment is reversed, the

verdict is set aside, and judgment shall enter for the

defendant.    The remaining judgments are affirmed.

                                       So ordered.

                                       By the Court (Green, C.J.,
                                         Wolohojian &
                                         Sullivan, JJ.8),

                                       Clerk

Entered:    June 2, 2023.

8   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                  11