Court Opinion

ID: 9897441
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:11:35.715806+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:46.648826
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                           Mar 27 2023, 8:39 am

                                                                               CLERK
                                                                           Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                              Court of Appeals
                                                                                and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Joseph P. Hunter                                          Theodore E. Rokita
Quirk and Hunter, P.C.                                    Attorney General of Indiana
Muncie, Indiana                                           Alexandria Sons
                                                          Deputy Attorney General
                                                          Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Kevoszia Winston,                                         March 27, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          22A-CR-1455
        v.                                                Appeal from the Delaware Circuit
                                                          Court
State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable Thomas A.
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                       Cannon, Jr., Judge
                                                          Trial Court Cause No.
                                                          18C05-2001-MR-1

                                 Opinion by Judge Bradford
                               Judges May and Mathias concur.

Bradford, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1455 | March 27, 2023                                 Page 1 of 8
      Case Summary
[1]   Kevoszia Winston visited the apartment shared by Jesse Ross, Bryon Rhodes,

      and Seth Barton to buy marijuana. Later that day, Winston and Dimorrea

      Benning returned to the apartment. Keeping Ross and Rhodes at gunpoint in

      the living room, Winston and Benning took money, drugs, and guns from the

      apartment. As they left, Winston fatally shot Barton, who had been sleeping in

      a recliner. The State charged Winston with murder, felony murder, and Level 2

      felony robbery resulting in serious bodily injury. After Winston’s first jury trial

      was declared a mistrial, the trial court conducted a second jury trial. The jury

      found Winston guilty as charged. The trial court merged the murder verdicts,

      entered judgment of conviction for murder and Level 5 felony robbery, and

      sentenced Winston to an aggregate term of fifty-eight years of incarceration.

      Winston appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by finding a witness, who

      had testified at his first trial, unavailable to testify and admitting the witness’s

      prior testimony. We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   On the morning of January 9, 2020, Winston visited Ross, Rhodes, and Barton

      at their Muncie apartment to buy marijuana. The transaction proceeded

      without incident, and Winston left the apartment. Rhodes went back to sleep

      in his room while Ross and Barton continued sleeping in the living room.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1455 | March 27, 2023            Page 2 of 8
[3]   Some time later, Ross awoke to Winston, armed with a handgun, “going

      through a pair of jeans” while “crawling” on the floor next to where Barton was

      sleeping. Tr. Vol. II pp. 203, 228. Benning then brought Rhodes out of his

      bedroom at gunpoint and sat him on the couch with Ross. Winston “put his

      boot on [Barton’s] face and shoved him” to wake him up, but Barton kept

      sleeping. Tr. Vol. II p. 208.

[4]   Winston and Benning demanded money and drugs. They grabbed a backpack

      that contained marijuana and cash and took four handguns. As Winston and

      Benning prepared to leave, Winston tripped over his shoelaces and fell, causing

      Rhodes to laugh. Winston stood up and then shot Barton in the chest as he

      slept in the recliner. After the neighbors had called 911, police arrived and

      administered first aid to Barton to no avail.

[5]   On January 15, 2020, the State charged Winston with murder, felony murder,

      and Level 2 felony robbery resulting in serious bodily injury. The case

      proceeded to a jury trial; however, the trial court declared a mistrial on March

      30, 2021, due to the prosecutor’s illness. During this trial, Rhodes had testified

      that Winston had shot Barton and that he had wanted money and drugs. On

      April 18, 2022, a second jury trial began. At the second trial, Ross testified that

      Winston had demanded money and drugs and had shot Barton.

[6]   The State and Winston subpoenaed Rhodes to testify at the second trial. At

      trial, the State informed the trial court that it had sent “multiple subpoenas out

      to all the addresses we have on file for [Rhodes].” Tr. Vol. III p. 89. The State

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1455 | March 27, 2023         Page 3 of 8
      served Rhodes through an attorney that had been appointed to represent him in

      an unrelated criminal matter. Additionally, the State had “attempted multiple

      times to try to reach Mr. Rhodes by telephone[,]” but eventually had learned

      that that telephone number had been disconnected. Tr. Vol. II p. 89. The State

      had also sent officers to Rhodes’s last known addresses on “multiple

      occasions[,]” including the morning the second trial started. Tr. Vol. II p. 89.

      Rhodes’s attorney indicated that he also had been “unable to make contact with

      Mr. Rhodes.” Tr. Vol. III p. 90. As a result, the State asked the trial court to

      find that Rhodes was unavailable for trial and admit his testimony from the first

      trial. Over Winston’s objection, the trial court admitted Rhodes’s prior

      testimony, finding that “the State ha[d] met its burden of showing a diligent

      effort” to procure Rhodes’s presence at trial and that Winston had had an

      opportunity to cross-examine him at the first trial. Tr. Vol. III p. 92.

[7]   At the conclusion of the second trial, the jury found Winston guilty as charged.

      The trial court merged the murder verdicts, entered judgment of conviction for

      murder and Level 5 felony robbery, and sentenced Winston to an aggregate

      term of fifty-eight years of incarceration.

      Discussion and Decision
[8]   Winston argues that the trial court erred in finding that Rhodes was unavailable

      to testify and admitting Rhodes’s prior testimony. Generally, “the admission

      and exclusion of evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court,

      and we review [that decision] only for an abuse of discretion.” Griffith v. State,

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1455 | March 27, 2023         Page 4 of 8
       31 N.E.3d 965, 969 (Ind. 2015) (citing Wilson v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1265, 1272

       (Ind. 2002)). However, when the issue is one of constitutional law, as is the

       case here, we review that claim de novo. Jones v. State, 982 N.E.2d 417, 421–22

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. While the Confrontation Clause generally

       prohibits the admission of an out-of-court witness’s testimony, the United States

       Supreme Court has carved an important exception out of that rule. See Crawford

       v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004). Where a witness is unavailable for trial,

       and the opposing party had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness at a

       prior trial or proceeding, the Confrontation Clause will not bar the admission of

       that witness’s prior testimony. Id. at 57. A “witness is unavailable for purposes

       of the Confrontation Clause requirement only if the prosecution has made a

       good faith effort to obtain the witness’s presence at trial[.]” Garner v. State, 777

       N.E.2d 721, 724–25 (Ind. 2002). “Reasonableness is the test that limits the

       extent of alternatives the State must exhaust.” Id.

[9]    To start, Winston argues that, because the State presented no evidence

       regarding Rhodes’s availability besides what the State represented to the trial

       court, he was denied his fundamental right to confront a witness against him.

       Notably, Winston concedes that he had the opportunity to cross-examine

       Rhodes at the first trial. Despite that concession, however, Winston argues that

       the trial court’s finding that Rhodes was unavailable “was error” and his

       conviction “should be reversed.” Appellant’s Br. p. 13. We disagree.

[10]   For its part, the State argues that its efforts in procuring Rhodes’s attendance at

       trial were reasonable. In Berkman v. State, 976 N.E.2d 68, 76 (Ind. Ct. App.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1455 | March 27, 2023          Page 5 of 8
       2012), trans. denied, “the prosecutor indicated” to the trial court that the State

       “had unsuccessfully attempted to serve [the defendant] with a subpoena” and

       “had been unable to contact [the defendant] via telephone.” Under these

       circumstances, we concluded that the State had made a good-faith, reasonable

       effort to secure the defendant’s presence at trial. Id. In Winston’s case, the

       State sent “multiple subpoenas out to all the addresses” it had for Rhodes,

       including to Rhodes’s attorney in an unrelated criminal matter. Tr. Vol. III p.

       89. Moreover, the State attempted to contact Rhodes numerous times at a

       telephone number that had been previously used to contact him, but that had

       since become disconnected. The State also sent officers to Rhodes’s last-known

       addresses and his parents’ address on multiple occasions. Put simply, the

       State’s efforts were even more thorough than its efforts in Berkman. As a result,

       we have little trouble concluding that the State made a good-faith, reasonable

       effort to procure Rhodes’s presence at trial.

[11]   Additionally, the State continued to try to locate Rhodes even until the morning

       of the second trial. In the hours preceding trial, the State “had officers trying to

       locate [Rhodes] at those addresses.” Tr. Vol. III p. 90. We have previously

       held that such efforts to locate a witness on the day of trial, coupled with similar

       efforts prior to trial, constitute a good-faith, reasonable effort by the State to

       procure a witness. See Davis v. State, 13 N.E.3d 939, 946 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014),

       trans. denied.

[12]   In arguing that the State failed to present evidence establishing Rhodes’s

       unavailability, Winston relies on Kendrick v. State, 947 N.E.2d 509, 516 (Ind. Ct.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1455 | March 27, 2023            Page 6 of 8
       App. 2011), trans. denied. In that case, an investigator testified regarding the

       State’s attempts to procure a witness for trial. Id. at 516. Winston’s reliance on

       Kendrick, however, is misguided. We do not read that case to impose any

       testimonial requirement on the State to detail its efforts to procure an

       unavailable witness. The State’s conduct here is no less sufficient than its

       conduct in Berkman or Davis. In Berkman, “the prosecutor indicated” the State’s

       efforts to the trial court and we, accepting that as sufficient, admitted the absent

       witness’s prior testimony. Id. at 72. Likewise, in Davis, the “State [had] made a

       record to the trial court” of its efforts and we found that sufficient to conclude

       that the State’s efforts were reasonable. Id. at 943. Here, the State explained its

       efforts to the trial court after it had moved to admit Rhodes’s prior testimony.

       We cannot say that approach is insufficient to show that Rhodes was an

       unavailable witness.

[13]   Furthermore, even if we assume, arguendo, that the trial court erred in finding

       that Rhodes had been unavailable, that would have been a harmless error

       because Rhodes’s prior testimony was cumulative of Ross’s testimony. See

       Hunter v. State, 72 N.E.3d 928, 932 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (holding that the

       “improper admission of evidence is harmless error when the erroneously

       admitted evidence is merely cumulative of other evidence before the trier of

       fact.”), trans. denied. As Rhodes did in the first trial, Ross testified in the second

       trial that Winston had shot Barton as he left the apartment after the robbery.

       Because of this cumulative evidence, any error in the admission of Rhodes’s

       prior testimony was harmless. In short, we conclude that the trial court

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1455 | March 27, 2023           Page 7 of 8
       properly admitted Rhodes’s prior testimony because of the State’s good-faith,

       reasonable efforts to procure his presence at the second trial and Winston’s

       opportunity to cross-examine him at the first trial.

[14]   The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

       May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1455 | March 27, 2023       Page 8 of 8