Court Opinion

ID: 9707156
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:03:54.149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:28.664805
License: Public Domain

*173Dissenting Opinion.
Bobbitt, J.
— I am unable to agree with the views expressed in the majority opinion for the reason stated in the majority opinion of the Appellate Court (Fickle v. Scampmorte (1961), 173 N. E. 2d 73), and for the further reason that the statute under which the attorney’s fees were here allowed provides only for allowance of necessa/ry expenses and disbursements, and the fees here allowed were, in my opinion, not necessary to the prosecution of the action for probate.
In my judgment no attorney’s fees were due under the personal contract between appellee, Frank J. Scampmorte, and his attorney because payment for his services was wholly contingent upon the successful probate of the Will.
The pertinent part of the contract of employment between such appellee and his attorney is as follows:
“In consideration of the legal services rendered and to be rendered by said party of the first part, the party of the second part ¿grees to pay all costs and expenses, and agrees to pay to party of the first part, as fees for such services, a sum equal to 15% of the net amount of said estate eventually transferred to the 2nd party in the event the admission to probate is granted without Opposition; 20% if appealed to Appellate Court & 25% if appealed to Supreme Court.
“Party of the first part accepts the retainer and employment from party of the second part aforesaid, and agrees to accept a fee equal to 15%, 20%, or 25% as above specified.”
Since the Will was not admitted to probate the contingency upon which the payment of attorney’s fees rested never happened. The happening of the contingency was a condition precedent to the right of *174the attorney to recover for his services. Byrd v. Clark (1930), 170 Ga. 669, 153 S. E. 737, 739; Robertson v. National Spiritualists’ Ass’n. (1930), (Tex. Civ. App.), 25 S. W. 2d 889, 893; 7 C. J. S., Attorney and Client, §188(a), p. 1071.
Under these circumstances appellee, Frank J. Scampmorte, was not liable for the payment of a fee to the attorney who represented him in his action to probate the Will and. the allowance by the trial court of attorney’s fees herein was not a necessary expense to the prosecution of such action.
I would deny the petition to transfer.
Jackson, J., concurs.
Note. — Reported in 183 N. E. 2d 838.