Court Opinion

ID: 9773774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:58:00.918445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:57.164146
License: Public Domain

David Newbern, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part. As applied in this case, Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-207 (Repl. 1997) violates the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Mr. Bailey’s conviction of disorderly conduct should be reversed. The majority correctly rejects Mr. Bailey’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his resisting-arrest and public-intoxication convictions and rejects his arguments concerning jury instructions and the cross-examination of Trooper Newton. The jury received instructions on the disorderly conduct charge based upon the following three subsections of § 5-71-207: (a) A person commits the offense of disorderly conduct if, with the purpose to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm or recklessly creating the risk thereof, he: (1) Engages in fighting or in violent, threatening, or tumultous behavior; or (2) Makes unreasonable or excessive noise; or (3) In a public place, uses abusive or obscene language, or makes an obscene gesture, in a manner likely to provoke a violent or disorderly response; .... The verdict finding Mr. Bailey guilty of disorderly conduct did not specify the statutory ground or grounds on which it rested. We therefore can affirm Mr. Bailey’s disorderly conduct conviction only if each subsection is constitutional “on its face” and “as applied.” If, “in light of the instructions given by the trial judge, the jury could have rested its verdict on any of a number of grounds,” and if conviction on a particular ground “would violate the Constitution,” the conviction must be reversed even if it could have rested on a “severable and constitutional” ground. Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1970). Conceding that the evidence was sufficient to support a disorderly conduct conviction on either subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2) of the statute, the question remains whether a conviction pursuant to (a)(3) would violate the First Amendment. That subsection prohibits a person “in a public place” from using “abusive or obscene language,” or making “an obscene gesture, in a manner likely to provoke a violent or disorderly response.” In response to Mr. Bailey’s charge that subsection (a)(3) is facially overbroad, the majority correctly holds that it must be construed as prohibiting only “fighting words” as that concept has been developed by decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. As the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has observed, “[a] narrow judicial interpretation of criminal statutes affecting speech is necessary in order to insure that they prohibit only speech which is not constitutionally protected.” State v. John W., 418 A.2d 1097, 1101 (Me. 1980). So construed, § 5-71-207(a) (3) survives Mr. Bailey’s facial-overbreadth challenge. Therefore, a conviction based on subsection (a)(3) would not be unconstitutional on account of overbreadth. A conviction for disorderly conduct based upon § 5-71-207(a)(3) would, however, rest on “an unconstitutional ground,” Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. at 571, if that subsection, “as applied” to Mr. Bailey, punished him for engaging in speech short of “fighting words.” None of Mr. Bailey’s speech falls into that category. Therefore, if the jury convicted Mr. Bailey for disorderly conduct pursuant to § 5-71-207(a) (3), it necessarily convicted him for engaging in speech protected by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has directed that, “in cases raising First Amendment issues ... an appellate court has an obligation to ‘make an independent examination of the whole record’ in order to make sure that ‘the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.’ ” Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1038 (1991) (citations omitted). The “requirement of independent appellate review ... is a rule of federal constitutional law.” .... This obligation rests upon us simply because the reaches of the First Amendment are ultimately defined by the facts it is held to embrace, and we must thus decide for ourselves whether a given course of conduct falls on the near or far side of the fine of constitutional protection. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 567 (1995)(citations omitted). See also Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 386 n.9 (1987) (“The ultimate issue — whether the speech is protected- — is a question of law”); Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. at 566-67 (concluding, upon “independent examination of the whole record,” that wording on petitioners’ placards was not “fighting words”). We have followed this rule in resolving First Amendment issues raised in defamation cases. See, e.g., Thomson Newspaper Publishing, Inc. v. Coody, 320 Ark. 455, 461, 896 S.W.2d 897, 901 (1995). A review of the “whole record” in this case shows that Mr. Bailey did not utter any “fighting words” that could have subjected him to punishment under § 5-71-207(a) (3) consistently with the First Amendment. “Fighting words” are words “which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). Such language, in order to fall outside the protection of the First Amendment, must “have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is addressed,” Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 524 (1972), and it must produce a likelihood “that the person addressed would make an immediate violent response.” Id. at 528 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has “consistently construed the ‘fighting words’ exception set forth in Chaplinsky narrowly.” R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 428 (1992)(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). See also Diehl v. State, 451 A.2d 115, 120 (Md. 1982)(“Later decisions following Chaplinksy indicate the Supreme Court’s desire to limit the broad implications of the doctrine and to recognize that the use of an offensive expletive does not, by itself, deprive speech of protection”); 4 Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure § 20.40, at p. 246 (2d ed. 1992)(stating Supreme Court “does not look with favor on prosecutions for ‘fighting words’”). The majority opinion adequately conveys the abusive and offensive quality of the words used by Mr. Bailey in addressing Trooper Newton and Officers Geater and Randle. After listing some of the expletives, the majority concludes that Mr. Bailey “directed] various fighting words to the officers” and that, when considered together with “his surrounding conduct, such as standing up and grabbing . . . Officer Randle’s arm,” Mr. Bailey employed speech “in [a] manner likely to provoke a violent or disorderly response” (quoting § 5-71-207(a) (3)). As “[t]he context of the utterance must first be examined to determine whether the words are truly ‘fighting words,’ ” People v. Prisinzano, 170 Misc.2d 525, 648 N.Y.S.2d 267, 273 (N.Y. City Crim.Ct. 1996); see also R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. at 432 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Whether words are fighting words is determined in part by their context”), it is appropriate to review, as the majority opinion does, the words spoken by Mr. Bailey together with any accompanying physical movement. The key principle, however, is that fighting words “are punishable now not on a ‘per se’ basis but only when there is a likelihood of imminent disturbance.” Downs v. State, 278 Md. 610, 366 A.2d 41, 44 (1976). Mr. Bailey’s speech did not include any “inherently” inflammatory words. For years, courts have observed that the “fighting words” doctrine has evolved to the point that we no longer have per se “fighting words.” See, e.g., R.I.T. v. State, 675 So.2d 97, 99 (Ala.Cr.App. 1995) (“Words must be evaluated in the era in which they are uttered — words that constitute fighting words change from generation to generation, or even more quickly”). Depending on all of the circumstances, what may be a fighting word in one case may not be one in the next. In Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), the Supreme Court held that the defendant had not used “fighting words” when he wore a jacket in a courthouse hallway with the inscription “Fuck the Draft” on the back. The Maryland Court of Appeals once observed that “the use of the word ‘fuck’ is not punishable in the absence of compelling reasons.” Diehl v. State, 451 A.2d at 122. Other cases are in accord. See, e.g., R.I.T. v. State, supra (juvenile’s statement, “fuck you,” to officer held not to be fighting words); State v. Creasy, 885 S.W.2d 829 (Tenn.Cr.App. 1994) (statement to officer that he was a “s — t-b—l,” “m-f— —,” and “s— of a b-” held not to be fighting words); Robinson v. State, 615 So.2d 112 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992)(statement to Officer Lewis, “Fuck R. Lewis,” held not to be fighting words); Buffkins v. City of Omaha, 922 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1990) (various uses of word “asshole,” when directed to officer, held not to be fighting words); In re Welfare of S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d 412 (Minn. 1978)(“fuck you pigs” to officers held not to be fighting words). Even racial slurs are not “automatically” to be viewed as fighting words. In Downs v. State, supra, the defendant, while sitting in a restaurant within earshot of a uniformed State Trooper and a racially mixed clientele, remarked to his companions in a loud voice, “All the goddamn policemen in this County are no fucking good, they’re just after me. [T]he fucking niggers in this County are no better than goddamn policemen.” 366 A.2d at 42. The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the defendant’s conviction for disorderly conduct and held that the defendant’s speech could not be constitutionally punished as “fighting words.” The Court noted that, even if others in the restaurant had been “offended” by the speech, “there was no evidence that any person was so aroused as to respond in a violent manner.” 366 A.2d at 46. Mr. Bailey used almost every expletive imaginable at his residence and at the station following his arrest, but the record is devoid of any testimony that the officers, or anyone else who might have been present at either scene, were likely to respond with immediate violence. While at Mr. Bailey’s residence, the officers responded to his remarks by requesting him to be quiet and allow them to conduct their investigation. The officers never suggested in their testimony that Mr. Bailey’s tirade incited, or was even likely to incite, them to violence. Even when Mr. Bailey grabbed Officer Randle’s arm, the officer responded not with violence but by instructing Mr. Bailey “to sit down and be quiet,” a directive with which Mr. Bailey immediately complied. Mr. Bailey was not arrested in response to his physical movement against Officer Randle. Rather, it was Mr. Bailey’s continuous use of profanity, in spite of the officers’ request to be quiet, that prompted Officer Geater to arrest Mr. Bailey for disorderly conduct. Mr. Bailey also used profanity at the police station, but, again, there is no testimony to suggest that his speech tended to incite potential listeners to respond immediately with violence. To the contrary, the record shows that the officers were amused by Mr. Bailey’s invective. In addition, nothing in the record suggests that Mr. Bailey was closely situated to the officers during his verbal assault. Courts have held that speech cannot be classified as “fighting words” unless the defendant and the person he or she is addressing are closely situated to one another and are essentially “face to face.” People v. Prisinzano, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 272 and 274 n.3 (stating “the courts which have examined the face-to-face requirement have interpreted it as calling for extremely close physical proximity”)(citing Hershfield v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.App. 381, 383-385, 417 S.E.2d 876, 878 (1992); Garvey v. State, 537 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1975)). As the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has observed, “‘fighting words’ implies a direct, face-to-face confrontation and provocation . . . .” State v. John W., 418 A.2d at 1105-06. Mr. Bailey’s arrest occurred as he was addressing the officers, located on the street, from the steps of his front porch. No evidence suggests that there was a face-to-face encounter. Finally, it is important to consider the people to whom Mr. Bailey directed his remarks — police officers. As Justice Powell suggested in his concurring opinions in Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972)(“Lewis I”), and 415 U.S. 130 (1974) (“Lewis II”), “a properly trained officer may reasonably be expected to ‘exercise a higher degree of restraint’ than the average citizen, and thus be less likely to respond belligerently to ‘fighting words.’” Lewis II, 415 U.S. at 135 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell’s opinion was quoted favorably by the Supreme Court more recently in Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462 (1987), and has been approved by the courts of other states, see State v. John W., 418 A.2d at 1104; City of Toledo v. Grince, 48 Ohio App.3d 126, 548 N.E.2d 999, 1002 (1989)(“It is not unreasonable to expect that a police officer should be able to withstand such insults without retaliating”); as well as by the drafters of the Model Penal Code. See American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 250.2, Comment 7, at pp. 349-53 (1980). Other courts, however, have declined to adopt any rule that would alter the “fighting words” analysis on the basis that the addressee is a police officer. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hock, 696 A.2d 225 (Pa.Super. 1997). A police officer’s background and training are at the very least factors relevant in determining whether speech qualifies as “fighting words.” Law-enforcement officers, while “hard-working” and deserving of “better treatment from members of the public,” still must endure a fair amount of speech that is “boorish, crass, and initially, at least, unjustified.” Duran v. City of Douglas, Ariz., 904 F.2d 1372, 1377 (9th Cir. 1990). Such conduct on the part of an individual is “disgraceful,” but “it [is] not illegal; criticism of the police is not a crime.” Id. (citing Houston v. Hill, supra). Mr. Bailey clearly acted disgracefully toward the officers on the scene, but absent testimony to show that the officers were likely to respond to Mr. Bailey’s speech with immediate violence, the First Amendment requires that we reverse the conviction for disorderly conduct. I respectfully dissent. Imber, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.