Court Opinion

ID: 9626009
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:59:10.551452+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:47.628671
License: Public Domain

Thompson, J.,
dissenting:
This case was here before. Short v. Hotel Riviera, Inc., 79 Nev. 94, 378 P.2d 979. I did not participate in that opinion. Had I participated I would have voted to sustain the summary judgment which the district court had entered for defendants Hotel Riviera, Inc., Musicians’ Protective Union, and Lewis Elias. It is my view of the law that Short did not then have a claim for relief, nor does he now have one. The trial of the case did not improve his legal position.
The trial record is extensive, but the controlling facts are few. Short conducted a relief band in Las Vegas, Nevada for the Mint Casino, the Thunderbird Hotel, the Sahara Hotel and the Riviera Hotel, on nights of the week when the orchestras regularly employed at those establishments were off duty. Short’s contract with the Riviera as the relief band conductor was terminable at the will of either party. The musicians who worked for Short could quit at will. Riviera terminated Short’s contract and hired Elias. It had a legal right to do so. Some of the musicians who worked for Short quit him and went to work for Elias. They were free to do so. Elias was surely entitled to solicit the Riviera job. The record does not disclose any effort by the Riviera or the Union to affect Short’s contractual relationships with the Mint, the Thunderbird, or the Sahara, nor was his relationship with any of them affected. Short continued to conduct a relief band for those establishments after losing the Riviera job.
*523Short’s charge against the defendants is that, in combination, they “conspired” to cause him damage. The nature of the conspiracy was to “pirate” his relief band and use it under a new conductor at the Riviera. The sequence of events, when viewed in a light most favorable to Short, may perhaps support an inference that the defendants (Riviera, Union and Elias) were so motivated. Yet, in my view, their conduct, singly or in concert, does not impose a liability to Short.
The power to terminate an employment contract at will does not give rise to a claim for damages in the employee upon discharge. A breach of contract does not occur when the power to terminate is exercised. Short was fully paid for the services he had actually performed for the Riviera. Upon termination, further performance by both parties alike was stopped, and without any legal damage to either. Precisely the same is true as to the relationship between Short and his musicians. Thus, Short’s claim for damages does not, and cannot, rest upon a breach of contract, for there was no breach. A fortiori, there is no claim upon a theory that the Union and Elias induced Riviera or the musicians to breach an agreement with Short. His sole claim is bottomed upon one word — conspiracy—and its unwholesome connotation. However, the charge means nothing in the context of this case.
A conspiracy is not actionable unless the alleged combination results in the perpetration of an unlawful act or some injurious act by unlawful means. Bliss v. Southern Pacific Company, 212 Or. 634, 321 P.2d 324; 11 Cal.Jur.2d 274. By definition, the alleged conspiracy is not actionable here. The combination, if it existed at all, did not perpetrate an unlawful act, nor were unlawful methods employed to bring about Short’s discharge. What one may lawfully do, many may lawfully do in combination. This general principle was recognized in Carlton v. Manuel, 64 Nev. 570, 187 P.2d 558, though in a different factual framework. Bliss v. Southern Pacific Company, *524supra, is squarely in point. There the plaintiff lumber company contended that the defendant railroad and its codefendant, another lumber company, conspired to cause the railroad to terminate the plaintiff’s lease of railroad land which the plaintiff used for a loading dock, and then leased that land to the codefendant for the same use. The railroad had the right to terminate the lease upon giving 30 days’ notice. It did so. The plaintiff’s claim for relief was dismissed summarily before a trial. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, carefully pointing out that if the offending action charged was the termination of the lease, there could be no tort to support the alleged conspiracy because the act of the railroad was the result of the exercise of an absolute contractual right. The court quoted Prosser on Torts: “* * * No case has been found in which intended but purely incidental interference resulting from the pursuit of the defendant’s own ends by proper means has been held to be actionable.” The mere addition of the word “conspired” or “conspiracy” does not enhance the legal position of Short in the case at bar. May v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Company, 189 Kan. 419, 370 P.2d 390; Bliss v. Southern Pacific Company, supra. Nor is reason, motive, intent or purpose a relevant inquiry, for Riviera and the other defendants had the right to do what they did. As the alleged conspiracy was to do that which they had the legal right to do, it was not to accomplish an unlawful purpose, nor were unlawful means used. Pearson v. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company, 7 Cir., 332 F.2d 439.
The rule of law announced in the prior opinion, Short v. Hotel Riviera, Inc., 79 Nev. 94, at 106, 378 P.2d 979, at 986 is: “When an act done by an individual is not actionable because justified by his rights, though harmful to another, such act becomes actionable when done in pursuance of combination of persons actuated by malicious motives and not having same justification as the individual.” It is, of course, true that there may be a point of combination beyond which the acts of each, *525otherwise lawful, become unlawful. That point is sometimes reached in cases involving boycotts, lockouts, blacklists and the like. Prosser on Torts, 2d Ed., p. 731. Every case cited by this court in the first opinion to support the quoted rule of law is a case involving that kind of a situation. None of those factors are present in the instant matter. There is no underlying social policy involved here. The rule of law announced in the first opinion, and followed again here, was never intended to have application to this kind of a case. It is erroneously applied, and I worry about its implications. The majority opinion means that an employer is in peril if he discharges a union employee serving at will and, before discharging him, arranges with the union for a replacement. There are many union shops in Nevada. It is common practice to arrange in advance for the replacement of an employee about to be fired in order that one’s business may continue smoothly and without interruption. A similar peril is imposed upon the union. It must not inform the employer that, upon the discharge of one of its members, another will be available as a replacement. Nor is the union member seeking employment free to solicit the job or the needed personnel to undertake it. When these events happen, sinister and malicious motives may be imputed to each alike and damages, both compensatory and punitive, authorized. The illusory “civil conspiracy” may be found by the trier of facts. That each defendant acted lawfully is of no significance. The discharged employee may be enriched nonetheless. Apparently, in these circumstances, our law will now permit money to be transferred from the so-called “civil conspirators” to the former employee. I cannot believe that this pronouncement is truly the law. Yet, it is the plain meaning of the holding of today’s case.
My brothers apparently find some comfort in the “law of the case” doctrine. I do not. Nor would my view be different had I participated in the first opinion. The divergent views regarding that doctrine are fully explored in the annotation, 87 A.L.R.2d 271 and need not *526be restated here. That doctrine should never be invoked to require the perpetuation of error. A court need not be ashamed to acknowledge its mistake and correct it before damage results. Though embarrassing, it is the only honorable course. I dissent.