Court Opinion

ID: 9496892
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:38:13.446948+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:52.484574
License: Public Domain

CLAY, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I join Parts I, III, and IV of the majority opinion. I also agree with Part II insofar as it rejects the untenable “ultimate employment action” doctrine, concludes that Sheila White’s removal from her forklift position and her thirty-seven-day suspension constitute adverse employment actions within the meaning of Title VII, and affirms the district court’s denial of Burlington’s Rule 50 motion. Although the majority properly rejected the “ultimate employment action” doctrine this court embraced in Dobbs-Weinstein v. Vanderbilt Univ., 185 F.3d 542, 545-46 (6th Cir.1999), I would be remiss if I failed to point out that such an express rejection of the “ultimate employment action” doctrine effectively overrules Dobbs-Wein-stein. I write separately, however, be*809cause I disagree with the rule the majority today embraces with respect to what constitutes an adverse employment action within the meaning of Title YII’s anti-retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C.2000e-3(a). Instead, I believe that the appropriate standard is the one articulated in the Ninth Circuit and advocated by the EEOC; i.e., an employer’s retaliatory action is sufficiently adverse for § 704(a) purposes if it would be “reasonably likely to deter [employees] from engaging in protected activity.” Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1242-43 (9th Cir.2000). The “reasonably likely to deter” standard is more consistent with § 704(a)’s statutory language and congressional intent, as well as Supreme Court case law.
A. Why the “Reasonably Likely to Deter” Rule is the Appropriate Standard for a Retaliation Case

1. Statutory and Case Law Support

The Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed courts, as a first step in interpreting a statute, “to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808, (1997). The inquiry is at an end “if the statutory language is unambiguous and ‘the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989)). It is readily apparent from a reading of § 704(a) that Congress placed no limitations on the reach of the anti-retaliation provision.
Section 704(a) states that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees ... because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge ... under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The word “discriminate,” in turn, is not defined in Title VII, but the scope is impliedly quite broad. A review of other Title VII provisions is revealing, inasmuch as § 703(a) prohibits employers from “failing] or refusing] to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (emphasis added). Thus, both §§ 703(a) and 704(a) use the term “discriminate,” but only the general discrimination provision (§ 703(a)) places limitations on the word “discriminate.” Congress chose not to place any limitations on “discriminate” within the meaning of § 704(a). Thus, a straightforward reading of the § 704(a)’s plain text makes clear that there is no statutory support for the idea that a decision to undertake retaliatory action must materially affect the terms and conditions of employment in order to violate its proscriptions. Indeed, the most natural reading of this language is that it prohibits any form of discrimination against an individual for opposing discrimination or filing a charge, regardless of whether that discrimination takes the form of, for example, termination, suspension, lateral transfer, harassment, or discipline. At least some of the circuits have expressly agreed. Smith v. Sec’y of Navy, 659 F.2d 1113, 1119 n. 56 (D.C.Cir.1981) (noting that the language of the anti-retaliation provision “speaks unconditionally” and is not “limit[ed] to acts causing particular harms such as the loss of a particular job or promotion”); Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243 (noting that language of the anti-retaliation provision “does not limit what type of discrimination is covered, nor does it pre- ’ scribe a minimum level of severity for actionable discrimination”); Knox v. State *810of Indiana, 93 F.3d. 1327; 1334 (7th Cir.1996) (“There is nothing in the law' of retaliation that restricts the type of retaliatory acts that might be visited upon an employee... .”).
Incorporating by reference the limitations placed on “discriminate”' in § 703(a) into “discriminate” in § 704(a) is altogether inappropriate. Such incorporation by reference is appropriate only when it is consistent with Congress’ expressed intent. Section 704(a)’s legislative history is scant, and therefore we are left to look to its plain legislative' text. Congress could quite easily have placed the same limitation on § 704(a) as it did on § 703(a), yet it chose not to do so. Congress’ legislative intent, by all indications, was to remove all obstacles from an employee’s ability to defend his or her Title VII rights by filing EEOC charges.
The Supreme Court, in Russello v. United States, confirmed its view against narrowly construing the meaning of a statute when the plain language unambiguously expressed its legislative purpose and intent. 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983). In determining the proper applicability of the word “interest” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1) in the context of a RICO case, the Supreme Court held that “ ‘[w]here Congress includes particular language in one section óf a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.’ ” Russello, 464 U.S. at 23, 104 S.Ct. 296 (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir.1972)). Specifically, in discussing the particular statutory provision at issue, the Court noted that “[t]he argument for a narrow' construction of § 1963(a)(1) is refuted by the language of the succeeding subsection (a)(2). The former speaks broadly of ‘any interest ... acquired,’ while the latter reaches only ‘any interest in ... any enterprise which [the defendant] has established[,] operated, controlled, conducted or participated in the conduct of in violation of section 1962.’ ” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962). The Court went on to express its belief that if Congress had intended to restrict § 1963(a)(1), it presumably would have done so expressly as it did in the immediately following subsection. Id.
Contrary to the majority opinion, this Court has already embraced this logic. In Lynch v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., we held that when looking to stay proceedings in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy context, a solvent co-defendant may not use the automatic stay provision in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), when the said provision facially stays proceedings “against the debtor,” and fails to suggest that these rights may be invoked by any one other than the defendant. 710 F.2d 1194, 1198 (6th Cir.1983). The Court noted “[it] is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that inclusion in one part of a congressional scheme of that which is excluded in another part reflects a congressional intent that the exclusion was not inadvertent.” Id. at 1197.
The Supreme Court case, Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843,. 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997), views § 704(a)’s legislative intent in this manner. In Robinson, the plaintiff sued his former employer, alleging that it had retaliated against him by giving him a negative employment reference to a potential employer. Id. There was no allegation that the former employer itself had made an ultimate employment decision, or that it took any adverse action that materially altered the plaintiffs job responsibilities. (Indeed, it could not have done so, given that the plaintiff was no longer working for the employer at the time.) Nevertheless, a unanimous Court allowed the plaintiffs claim to proceed after holding that former *811employees may challenge retaliatory actions. Id. at 346, 117 S.Ct. 843. Although Robinson dealt specifically with the issue of determining who is an “employee” for purposes of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision (as opposed to what constitutes an adverse employment action), its reasoning is pertinent: a former employee counts as an employee within the meaning of § 2000e-3(a), because otherwise an employee could be fired in retaliation and not be able to sue. In so holding, the Court noted that an alternative statutory interpretation would have undermined or vitiated one of Title VII’s most important purposes — maintaining “unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.” Id.
In line with the teachings of Robinson and the Supreme Court’s view that § 704(a) should not be limited in its construction, this Court, in EEOC v. Ohio Edison, also interpreted § 704(a) to be a broad anti-retaliation provision that should reach as far as its intended protections allow. 7 F.3d 541, 545-46 (6th Cir.1993) (holding that Title VII’s protections against retaliation extended to situations where an employee was discriminated against because his representative opposed an unlawful employment practice). In reaching this result, we stated that “[i]n enacting section 2000e-3, Congress unmistakably intended to ensure that no person would be deterred from exercising his rights under Title VII by the threat of discriminatory retaliation.” Id. at 513. We relied, in part, on the Supreme Court’s analysis of statutory interpretation in NLRB v. Scrivener, which held that “the language of a statute should not be read strictly, but should ‘be read more broadly1 if such a reading was also consistent with the ‘purpose and objective’ of the prohibition made illegal by the statute.” Id. at 545 (quoting NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 122, 92 S.Ct. 798, 31 L.Ed.2d 79 (1972)).
Additionally in Mattei v. Mattei, this Court once again chose to interpret the Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision broadly, as to prohibit any kind of adverse action. 126 F.3d 794, 798 (6th Cir.1997). There, we were asked to give meaning to the concept of discrimination as it is used in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). Id. The ERISA provision at issue was § 510 which made it unlawful, under certain circumstances, to “discriminate against” a participant or beneficiary. Id. at 797 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1140). The majority found guidance in Title VII’s and the ADEA’s interpretive use of the phrase “discriminate against,” noting that neither of these Acts defined this phrase, but rather their respective provisions “are consistently interpreted ... to forbid an employer to take any kind of adverse action against an individual because he has engaged in [ ] protected activity....” Id. at 806 (emphasis in original). We concluded that because the ERISA anti-retaliation provision at issue used the same phrase (“discriminate against”) as the Title VII and ADEA provisions, and was enacted after them, it was proper to assume that Congress intended for the ERISA provision “to have the same basic meaning.” Id. at 806.
Even more recently, the Supreme Court has cautioned courts against unwarranted limitations on otherwise unambiguous statutory text. In Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, the Supreme Court rejected the approach of many circuits to limit a Title VII plaintiffs ability to receive a mixed-motive jury instruction in cases where direct evidence of discrimination had not been submitted at trial, determining that a “direct evidence” requirement “is inconsistent with the text of [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)].” 539 U.S. 90, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 2153, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003). The Court reasoned, in pertinent part, that the § 2000e-2(m) “unambiguously states that a plaintiff need *812only ‘demonstrate]’ that an employer used a forbidden consideration with respect to ‘any employment practice.’ ” Id. On its face, “the statute does not mention, much less require, that a plaintiff make a heightened showing through direct evidence.” Id. The Court was further persuaded by a review of the term “demonstrates,” which Title VII, as amended in the 1991 Civil Rights Act, defined as “to ‘mee[t] the burdens of production and persuasion.’ ” Id. at 2154 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m)). The Court added, “If Congress intended the term ‘demonstrates’ to require that the ‘burdens of production and persuasion’ be met by direct evidence or some other heightened showing, it could have made that intent clear by including language to that effect in § 2000e(m). Its failure to do so is significant, for Congress has been unequivocal when imposing heightened proof requirements in other circumstances, including in other provisions of Title 42.” Id. at 2154. Desert Palace is instructive, inasmuch as it cautioned courts not to read limitations into statutory language, particularly where Congress expressly limited such terms in other provisions of the same title yet declined to do so in the presently reviewed statutory provision. We are faced with precisely the same situation. Section 703(a) expressly limited the scope of “discriminate” to actions relating to the employee’s “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Section 704(a) could just as easily have limited its scope of “discriminate,” yet chose not to do so. It is abundantly clear that the lessons of Desert Palace dictate that we not read such limitations into § 704(a) now.

2. Administrative Agency Support

In addition to support from the statutory text and Supreme Court case law, there is administrative agency support for the “reasonably likely to deter” view, inasmuch as the EEOC has interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 in this manner. While it is true that the EEOC Compliance Manual on Retaliation is not binding authority, the guidelines nevertheless “constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.” Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944)). It is persuasive authority. According to the EEOC, an “adverse employment action” means “any adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging in protected activity.” EEOC Compliance Manual Section 8, “Retaliation,” ¶ 8008 (1998). Under this approach, a number of retaliatory actions which are not expressly encompassed in a “materially adverse” standard would fall into the ambit of a § 704(a) violation, so long as they are reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in protected activity. The EEOC’s test is not unlimited however, for instance, “petty slights and trivial annoyances are not actionable, as they are not likely to deter protected activity.” EEOC Compliance Manual Section 8, “Retaliation,” 8-14. As the Ninth Circuit observed, the focus is not on the “ultimate effects of each employment action,” but rather on the “deterrent effects.” Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243. Given the primary purposes of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, this is where the emphasis properly lies.

3. Policy Considerations

From a policy (and logical) perspective, many factors support an interpretation of adverse employment action that extends beyond the boundaries of an employment decision that materially affects the terms and conditions of employment.
As noted above, a “materially adverse” standard would undermine the driving *813force behind § 704(a), which is to maintain “unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.” Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346, 117 S.Ct. 843. This Court has similarly observed that Congress, in enacting Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, “ ‘unmistakably intended to ensure that no person would be deterred from exercising his rights under Title VII by the threat of discriminatory retaliation.’ ” EEOC v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d 541, 543 (6th Cir.1993).
Indeed, the “materially adverse” rule would allow many types of retaliatory actions to go completely unaddressed and unpunished. For instance, the D.C. Circuit has held that negative job references to prospective employers and cancelling public events honoring an employee constitute retaliatory behavior, even though such retaliatory actions do not affect the terms and conditions of one’s employment. Passer v. Am. Chem. Soc’y, 935 F.2d 322, 331 (D.C.Cir.1991). The “materially adverse” rule does not make clear whether such adverse behavior on an employer’s part would fall within the ambit of § 704(a). It also seems to leave open the issue of retaliatory harassment. See Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 803 (4th Cir.1998) (recognizing the validity of a § 704(a) retaliatory harassment claim).
Contrary to the majority’s position, the Ninth Circuit’s “reasonably like to deter” standard adequately addresses the many varied forms of retaliation while safeguarding against a slippery slope effect by disallowing employees from litigating trivial annoyances. The inquiry would not be whether any adverse action has been taken but whether, as a matter of law, the adverse action would deter a reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity. This ferrets out suits alleging frivolous harms, while maintaining suits for very deleterious actions such as supervisor harassment. Moreover, there are no indications that the broad rules still employed in the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits 1 have opened unmanageable floodgates to aggrieved Title VII plaintiffs.
B. Why the Majority Opinion Incorrectly Rejected the “Reasonably Likely to Deter” Rule
Notwithstanding legislative, Supreme Court, and administrative support for a broad rule, the majority rejects the “reasonably likely to deter” standard, citing reasons that are less than persuasive. The majority suggests that the “reasonably likely to deter” standard is too broad. Yet the rule is no broader than the statutory language requires; nor is it any broader than that which is utilized in tort cases, which often involves a “case-by-case” analysis when compelling courts to employ a “reasonable person” standard in determining what constitutes a duty of care. The reasonable person standard is readily understandable, is not burdensome and is commonly used in legal discourse.2
*814In fact, this Court, in Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, previously embraced such an objective standard which the majority now claims to be unreasonable. 175 F.3d 378, 396 (6th Cir.1999) (en banc). In Thaddeus-X, a case involving a § 1983 action brought by'the state inmates against prison officials based on alleged retaliation, we adopted an objective standard in determining what constitutes an “adverse action.” Id. at 396, In determining “whether actions of lesser severity merit being deemed ‘adverse’ for purposes of a retaliation claim, we adopt[ed] the standard suggested by Judge Posner in Bart v. Telford, 677 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir.1982), that an adverse action is one that would ‘deter a person of ordinary firmness’ from the exercise of the right at stake.” Id. We reasoned that “[t]he benefits of such a standard are that it is an objective inquiry, capable of being tailored to the different circumstances in which retaliation claims arise, and capable of screening [out] the most trivial of actions from constitutional cognizance.” Id. at 398.
Moreover, The Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits all employ such,an .objective standard, .specifically in the Title VII context, and by so doing, none of the Circuits appear to have had any difficulty in determining what is adverse and what is frivolous. See, e.g., Doe v. Dekalb County School Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1449 (11th Cir.1998) (taking an “objective approach” to its case-by-case standard).
Furthermore, retaliation requires a broad rule because retaliation can- take many forms, perhaps more than Congress at the time of its drafting could think of or reasonably anticipate.. Nevertheless, it is not the function of this Court to graft its own policy values onto a statute; rather, it is this Court’s responsibility to discern Congress’ legislative intent in enacting the statute. In other words, we must determine whether Congress, not this Court, would envision a plaintiff like Sheila White receiving relief from the retaliatory actions allegedly perpetrated against her by Burlington Northern. Congress’ intent is manifest: to provide employees who have been victimized by discrimination with access to . appropriate statutory remedies under Title VII. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346, 117 S.Ct. 843.
The- majority’s approach would utilize the same standard for §§ 703 and 704 so that it would not be necessary to undertake individual reviews under the separate sections of the statute when cases arise. This approach similarly is unavailing since Title VII’s statutory language indicates that Congress intended for courts to treat general discrimination differently than retaliatory discrimination. Indeed, the recent Supreme Court case of Desert Palace emphasized the importance of statutory construction and the significance of statutory- language as.the starting point for a court’s analysis. 123 S.Ct. at 2153. Moreover, different purposes are involved here and it is logical that the two sections would be treated differently. Section 703(a) of Title VII never expected to shield protected groups from every little slight they encounter; its purpose was to assist in getting discriminated-against plaintiffs into the American workforce and to keep them there. As far as retaliation is concerned, congressional intent was clear: to provide *815“unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.” Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346, 117 S.Ct. 843.
Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, the rule on adverse employment actions to which the majority opinion adheres is quite ambiguous. In an attempt to obviate the need for a court’s case-by-case determination of what actions by an employer would be “reasonably likely to deter” an employee from engaging in protected activity, the majority points to this Court’s case law regarding what constitutes a “material adverse employment action.” The majority relies on Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management, Inc., which requires courts to look to “indices unique to a particular situation,” when considering whether or not an employment action is materially adverse. 97 F.3d 876, 886 (6th Cir.1996). This approach ultimately requires a case-by-case review to determine what is “unique” and what is not in each “particular situation.” Accordingly, if the goal is to provide guidance while making individual review obsolete, it would be more advantageous to utilize a better defined inquiry than that of Kocsis “indices unique to a particular situation.” This is particularly so when there is an alternative approach available which would also advance Title VII’s goal of equal access to its protections under the law. In the present case, the majority opinion concluded that the forklift transfer constituted an adverse employment action by classifying Burlington Northern’s action as an example of “indices unique to a particular situation.” While that may satisfactorily dispose of the present case, the majority opinion leaves unclear what other types of adverse actions would fall within the ambit of this category, absent a better delineation of the category. As a result, employers like Burlington Northern could continue to hide behind mere technicalities and claim that other deleterious harms not encompassed in today’s ruling, such as employer-sanctioned retaliatory harassment, do not qualify as adverse employment actions when the employee does not experience a demotion or a material change of duties.
The majority suggests that the EEOC’s position, in advocating the “reasonably likely to deter” standard, is inconsistent with its concession that legally cognizable adverse action should not encompass trivial slights. Yet no inconsistency is apparent. It is logical that a person pursuing solutions prescribed by EEOC standards would reasonably expect some backlash, in the form of a limited number of negative consequences, some unhappy colleagues and perhaps even some ostracism. The EEOC’s recommendation, however, allows redress only for those plaintiffs who can show that such retaliatory actions would reasonably deter the charging party from engaging in protected activity. EEOC Compliance Manual § 8, “Retaliation,” ¶ 8008 (1998). The majority essentially seeks to dismiss the EEOC’s approach because it supposedly lacks safeguards against trivial and petty allegations; however, by purporting to exclude trivial and unsubstantiated allegations in order to define the “adverse-employment-action element” narrowly so as not to frustrate the purpose of Title VII, the majority actually impedes Title VII’s effectiveness.
Moreover, the majority suggests that the “materially adverse” requirement, “properly interpreted ... accomplishes [§ 704(a)’s purposes] while appropriately counterbalancing the need to prevent lawsuits based upon trivialities” and that the “indices ... unique to a particular situation” standard accurately captures all other non-trivial actions taken against the employee. Yet Hollins v. Atlantic Co., 188 F.3d 652, 662 (6th Cir.1999), which utilized the “materially adverse” standard, rejected the employee’s argument that her unwarranted negative job evaluation con*816stituted an adverse employment action simply because it was not accompanied by monetary loss or anything else falling into the penumbra of adverse actions listed in Kocsis, 97 F.3d at 886. In other words, the “materially adverse” standard was ineffective in Hollins, because a negative job evaluation is not trivial; it is tangible. It is a black mark on one’s record that can have severe future consequences for an employee, inasmuch as an employer can use the unwarranted negative job evaluation to deny the employee future promotions. Similarly, it leaves unaddressed such other deleterious harms such as employer-sanctioned retaliatory harassment. The Hollins court made no attempt to utilize the “unique indices” category in order to afford the plaintiff relief. 188 F.3d at 662.
What the majority evidently intends (but fails to state expressly) is that it is unwilling to consider actionable a wide variety of non-trivial, tangible adverse employment actions in order to limit the number of legitimate, legally cognizable claims that can be filed by aggrieved employees. There is no other apparent reason for its analysis.
Finally, the majority also attempts to rely in part on the Supreme Court decision, Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998). However, such reliance is also misplaced. In Burlington, the Supreme Court, in devising an agency principle to govern employer liability for a supervisor’s harassment of an employee, observed that an employer is always liable for a discriminatory “tangible employment action.” The Court distinguished tangible employment actions from actions not obviously attributable to the employer, defining tangible employment actions as “the means by which the supervisor brings the official power of the enterprise to bear on subordinates.” Id. at 762, 118 S.Ct. 2257. A tangible employment action “requires an official act of the enterprise, a company act,” and would include such acts “as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment.” Id. at 765, 118 S.Ct. 2257. Elsewhere in the opinion the Court observed that “[a] tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Burlington, 524 U.S. at 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257. However, Burlington addressed Title VII’s § 703(a), not § 704(a) and, as discussed earlier, the respective scopes of § 703(a) and 704(a) necessarily differ.3
C. Conclusion
In 1999, a panel of this Court held that an adverse employment action, for purposes of a Title VII retaliation claim, must materially affect the terms and conditions of the plaintiffs employment. Hollins, 188 F.3d at 662. Our grant of the petition for rehearing en banc provided this Court with an opportunity to reconsider the validity of Hollins’ unreasoned importation of § 703(a)’s definition of an “adverse employment action” into § 704(a) and to clarify what actions are sufficiently adverse with respect to retaliation claims. A traditional statutory analysis and recognition of Title VII’s legislative intent does not dictate the majority’s continuing adherence to the “materially adverse” standard, and the rule set forth by the majority fails to pro*817vide the clarity desperately needed in this pervasive area of litigation. The lack of clarity in the majority’s approach could result in more court decisions against true victims of § 704(a) retaliation because the employer’s retaliatory actions conveniently manage to elude the confines of the “materially adverse” definition. Instead of following the majority approach, I would hold that the retaliatory actions Burlington Northern took against White constituted adverse employment actions because such actions are reasonably likely to deter an employee from engaging in protected activity.

. See Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that negative job references are actionable under § 704(a)); Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243; Jeffries v. Kansas, 147 F.3d 1220, 1231-32 (10th Cir.1998) (holding that, ''[i]n recognition of the remedial nature of Title VII, the law in this circuit liberally defines adverse employment action” and "takes a case-by-case approach to determining whether a given employment action is ‘adverse’ ”); Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 984-86 (10th Cir.1996) (construing Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision to protect an employee from a malicious prosecution action brought by a former employer); Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th Cir.1998) (holding that negative job evaluations, demotions, suspensions, disadvantageous transfer and toleration of harassment may be actionable as a retaliation claim).

. Cf. Morris v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 330 F.3d 854 (6th Cir.2003) (holding, under Tennessee law, that the reasonable person standard is utilized to determine whether or not sufficient *814evidence exists when contemplating a directed verdict motion in a res ipsa loquitur negligence case); U.S. v. Jones, 335 F.3d 527 (6th Cir.2003) {employing a - reasonable person standard when adjudicating the presence of apparent authority to determine whether entry was consensual in a Fourth Amendment context); FiveCAP, Inc., v. National Labor Relations Board, 294 F.3d 768, 786 (6th Cir.2002) (employing the objective "reasonable person" standard when determining whether or not work conditions are so "unbearable” as- to violate § 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act).

. The Ninth Circuit in Ray v. Henderson found defendant’s reliance on Burlington similarly misplaced when advocating that Title VII qualifies the type of employment actions that would constitute an "adverse” action. 217 F.3d at 1242, n. 5. The Court stated that Burlington did not set forth a standard for adverse employment actions in the anti-retaliation context. Id.