Court Opinion

ID: 9846946
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:51:00.759328+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:57.660112
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
concurring.
I fully agree with Divisions 1 and 3 of the majority opinion. I also agree with the majority’s holding in Division 2 that the trial court did not err in denying Tyson’s motion to be released on bail. I take this opportunity to express my opinion that one in Tyson’s position could clearly seek bail pursuant to OCGA § 17-6-1 (e). I think that a person in like circumstances should be able to seek bail pursuant to that statute because, as a result of the Court of Appeals’ reversal of his conviction, such a defendant is in the same position as a defendant I *695who is under indictment, but who has not yet been tried. Under that statutory provision, the defendant would have the initial burden of production, but the State would bear the burden of persuasion. See Ayala v. State, 262 Ga. 704, 705 (1) (425 SE2d 282) (1993).
Furthermore, a criminal defendant such as Tyson, who has obtained a reversal from which the State has sought certiorari, is in the same position as, and must be treated in a consistent manner with, a defendant who has procured a favorable trial court ruling which the State has appealed pursuant to OCGA § 5-7-1. In the latter situation, the defendant is entitled to seek release on reasonable bail pursuant to OCGA § 5-7-5. Because that statute does not itself provide any criteria upon which to base the decision to grant or deny bail, a trial court asked to make, such a decision must apply the same prerequisites found in OCGA § 17-6-1 (e) which it would apply where, as here, the State has petitioned for certiorari.
In my opinion, therefore, a criminal defendant has a right to bail under the circumstances set forth in OCGA § 17-6-1 (e), whenever the State initiates an appeal or petitions for certiorari.