Court Opinion

ID: 9897363
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:39.125929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:09.763422
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        Jun 21 2023, 8:28 am

                                                                               CLERK
                                                                           Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                              Court of Appeals
                                                                                and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Valerie K. Boots                                           Theodore E. Rokita
Megan Shipley                                              Attorney General of Indiana
Marion County Public Defender Agency
Indianapolis, Indiana                                      Ian McLean
                                                           Supervising Deputy Attorney
                                                           General
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Matthew T. McKinney,                                       June 21, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           22A-CR-2535
        v.                                                 Appeal from the Marion Superior
                                                           Court
State of Indiana,                                          The Honorable Sheila A. Carlisle,
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                        Judge
                                                           The Honorable Matthew E.
                                                           Symons, Magistrate
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           49D29-2202-F2-4152

                                  Opinion by Judge Tavitas
                               Judges Vaidik and Foley concur.

Tavitas, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2535 | June 21, 2023                                  Page 1 of 22
      Case Summary
[1]   Matthew McKinney was convicted of possession of methamphetamine, a Level

      4 felony; unlawful possession of a syringe, a Level 6 felony; and driving while

      suspended, a Class A misdemeanor. McKinney appeals and claims that

      evidence obtained by a canine sniff and subsequent search of his vehicle

      violated his rights under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States

      Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. We

      conclude that McKinney’s constitutional rights were not violated and,

      accordingly, affirm.

      Issues
[2]   McKinney raises two issues, which we restate as:

              I.       Whether the canine sniff and subsequent search of
                       McKinney’s vehicle violated McKinney’s rights under the
                       Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

              II.      Whether the canine sniff and subsequent search of
                       McKinney’s vehicle violated McKinney’s rights under
                       Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.

      Facts
[3]   On February 9, 2022, Trooper Lim Chol of the Indiana State Police was

      patrolling on Interstate 65 in Indianapolis when he observed a truck that had

      been spray painted with gold paint. The truck—later determined to be driven

      by McKinney—appeared to be traveling at the speed limit as other vehicles

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2535 | June 21, 2023          Page 2 of 22
      going over the speed limit passed it. Trooper Chol noticed that, when

      McKinney applied the brakes, the rear brake light lit up with an amber or white

      color instead of the statutorily-required red color. 1 Later examination revealed

      that the plastic brake light cover had been broken and that the light had been

      covered with red colored tape. Trooper Chol followed the truck in his patrol

      car and observed the truck drive across the “gore point line” 2 as it exited the

      highway. Tr. Vol. II p. 189. This too was a traffic infraction. Trooper Chol

      activated his emergency lights and pulled the truck over.

[4]   Trooper Chol approached the truck and observed McKinney in the driver’s seat

      and Tara Strahl in the passenger’s seat. Strahl had an Indiana Identification

      Card, but no driver’s license. Trooper Chol then ran the occupants’

      information through dispatch and learned that McKinney’s driver’s license was

      suspended and that Strahl’s driving privileges were suspended for life for being

      an habitual traffic violator. 3

      1
          Indiana Code Section 9-19-6-17(a) provides:

               A motor vehicle may be equipped, and when required under this chapter must be equipped,
               with a stop lamp or lamps on the rear of the vehicle that:
                   (1) displays only a red light, visible from a distance of not less than one hundred (100) feet
                   to the rear in normal sunlight;
                   (2) will be actuated upon application of the service (foot) brake; and
                   (3) may be incorporated with at least one (1) other rear lamp.
      2
        Trooper Chol testified that the gore point line is “the triangle line that divides the exit ramp from the main”
      road. Id.
      3
        Dispatch also told Trooper Chol that someone named “Matthew McKinney” had an outstanding warrant
      issued in Jasper County. Trooper Chol later learned that the warrant was no longer active.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2535 | June 21, 2023                                      Page 3 of 22
[5]   Because neither occupant of the truck could legally drive the truck, Trooper

      Chol knew that he would have to impound the vehicle. Trooper Chol then

      requested a canine officer to act as backup. In response to this call, Trooper

      Susan Rinschler arrived on the scene with her police dog, Maverick. Maverick

      is trained to detect the odor of marijuana, methamphetamine, heroin, powder

      and crack cocaine, and ecstasy. The troopers discussed the situation, and

      Trooper Chol returned to the truck. McKinney informed Trooper Chol that he

      was wanted on two warrants in Florida but that Florida had declined to

      extradite him. Trooper Chol instructed McKinney and Strahl to exit the truck

      and stand with him by his patrol car while Trooper Rinschler proceeded to have

      Maverick sniff around the truck. Before the sniff started, Trooper Rinschler

      asked McKinney if there was any contraband in the truck, and McKinney

      denied having any contraband.

[6]   Trooper Rinschler retrieved Maverick from her vehicle and directed him toward

      McKinney’s truck. Maverick ran along the passenger’s side of the truck and

      focused on the seam between the door and the front quarter panel. Maverick

      sniffed the rest of the truck on the passenger’s side, then again focused on the

      seam between the door and panel. He then jumped up at the seam, which

      Trooper Rinschler testified meant that Maverick was searching for the source of

      the odor he detected. Maverick then stared at Trooper Rinschler and, in

      Trooper Rinschler’s estimation, attempted to sit but remained standing.

      Trooper Rinschler stated that, because of the snow and slush on the road,

      Maverick likely did not want to do a full sit and get wet, so he did a “half sit,”

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2535 | June 21, 2023         Page 4 of 22
      Tr. Vol. III p. 16, or a “good try” at sitting. Tr. Vol. II p. 45. At that point,

      Trooper Rinschler directed Maverick to the driver’s side of the truck. Maverick

      again focused on the seam between the driver’s side door and the front quarter

      panel and jumped up at that location. Maverick then stared at Trooper

      Rinschler but did not sit down. Trooper Rinschler told Maverick that he was a

      “good boy,” gave him his reward ball, and put him back in her patrol car. Ex.

      Vol. II State’s Ex. 4 at 09:36.

[7]   Trooper Rinschler gave Trooper Chol a thumbs up gesture and informed him

      that Maverick had alerted to something in the truck. Trooper Rinschler

      searched the truck while Trooper Chol remained at his vehicle with McKinney

      and Strahl. Inside the truck, Trooper Rinschler found: a smoking device with

      what appeared to be methamphetamine residue on it; a baseball cap with a

      syringe and needle containing an unknown substance; a small black bag holding

      individual packages of suspected drugs and drug paraphernalia; digital scales

      with residue; individual packages of what appeared to be mushrooms; a green

      bag containing men’s underwear and syringes; and a bag of a crystal substance

      that was later determined to be over fourteen grams of methamphetamine.

[8]   On February 14, 2022, the State charged McKinney with Count I: dealing in

      methamphetamine, a Level 2 felony; Count II: possession of

      methamphetamine, a Level 3 felony; 4 Count III: dealing in marijuana, a Level 6

      4
       The State charged Count II as a Level 4 felony elevated to a Level 3 felony based on McKinney’s prior
      conviction for dealing in cocaine.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2535 | June 21, 2023                              Page 5 of 22
       felony; Count IV: possession of a controlled substance, a Level 6 felony; Count

       V: unlawful possession of a syringe, a Level 6 felony; and Count VI: driving

       while suspended, a Class A misdemeanor. The State subsequently amended the

       charging information to allege that McKinney was an habitual offender.

[9]    On March 22, 2022, McKinney moved to suppress the evidence found during

       the search of his truck, which McKinney claimed was conducted without

       probable cause and therefore violated his rights under both the Fourth

       Amendment and Article 1, Section 11. The trial court held a suppression

       hearing on April 12, 2022, and issued an order denying the motion to suppress

       on April 19, 2022.

[10]   Before trial, the State moved to dismiss Counts III and IV, which the trial court

       granted. A jury trial was held on August 18, 2022. McKinney objected to the

       introduction of the evidence obtained as a result of the search of his truck, and

       the trial court overruled his objections. The jury found McKinney not guilty on

       Count I, but guilty on Counts II, V, and VI. The State, however, declined to

       proceed on the elevation of Count II to a Level 3 felony, resulting in the jury

       finding McKinney guilty on Count II as a Level 4 felony. At a hearing on

       September 27, 2022, the trial court sentenced McKinney to seven years in the

       Department of Correction on Count II, and concurrent sentences of one year on

       Counts V and VI. McKinney now appeals.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2535 | June 21, 2023        Page 6 of 22
       Discussion and Decision
       Standard of Review

[11]   McKinney first argues that the State failed to establish probable cause that

       would justify the search of his truck and that the evidence found in the truck

       should have been suppressed. Because this case proceeded to trial where

       McKinney renewed his objection to the admission of that evidence, we review

       the trial court’s ruling on its admissibility, not the denial of the motion to

       suppress. Guilmette v. State, 14 N.E.3d 38, 40 (Ind. 2014) (citing Clark v. State,

       994 N.E.2d 252, 259 (Ind. 2013)). A trial court has broad discretion to rule on

       the admissibility of evidence. Id. (citing Clark, 994 N.E.2d at 259-60). “We

       review [the trial court]’s rulings ‘for abuse of that discretion and reverse only

       when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and

       circumstances and the error affects a party’s substantial rights.” Id. (quoting

       Clark, 944 N.E.2d at 260). “[W]hen an appellant’s challenge to such a ruling is

       predicated on an argument that impugns the constitutionality of the search or

       seizure of the evidence, it raises a question of law, and we consider

       that question de novo.” Id. (citing Kelly v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1045, 1050 (Ind.

       2013)).

       I. Fourth Amendment

[12]   The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

               The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
               and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
               be violated, and no [w]arrants shall issue, but upon probable

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2535 | June 21, 2023           Page 7 of 22
               cause, supported by [o]ath or affirmation, and particularly
               describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
               be seized.

       U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

[13]   “If a search is conducted without a warrant, the State bears the burden to show

       that one of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement applies.”

       Chauncy v. State, 204 N.E.3d 311, 315 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Farris v. State,

       144 N.E.3d 814, 819-20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020)). One such exception is the

       automobile exception, which allows police to search a vehicle without

       obtaining a warrant if they have probable cause to believe evidence of a crime

       will be found there. State v. Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d 1281 (Ind. 2010). “It is well

       settled that a dog sniff is not a search protected by the Fourth Amendment or

       Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.” Tinker v. State, 129 N.E.3d

       251, 255 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1034

       (Ind. 2013)), trans. denied. A dog sniff, however, might support probable cause

       to search a vehicle. Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d at 1286.

[14]   McKinney argues that the State failed to establish that Maverick’s behavior

       reliably demonstrated that he detected the odor of one of the various illicit

       drugs he is trained to detect and that the police therefore did not have probable

       cause to search McKinney’s truck. 5 Our Supreme Court has stated that

       5
         Surprisingly, the State did not argue below that the drugs and paraphernalia found in McKinney’s truck
       would inevitably have been discovered during an inventory search of the truck. See Clark, 994 N.E.2d at 272
       (explaining that improperly seized evidence need not be excluded if it would have inevitably been obtained

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2535 | June 21, 2023                               Page 8 of 22
       “[p]robable cause is ‘not a high bar,’ and is cleared when the totality of the

       circumstances establishes ‘a fair probability”—not proof or a prima facie

       showing—of criminal activity, contraband, or evidence of a crime.’” Hodges v.

       State, 125 N.E.3d 578, 581-82 (Ind. 2019) (quoting Kaley v. United States, 571

       U.S. 320, 338 (2014); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983)). “In fact,

       innocent activity will often supply a basis for showing probable cause.” Id.

       (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 243 n.13; McGrath v. State, 95 N.E.3d 522, 529 (Ind.

       2018)).

[15]   The United States Supreme Court explained the probable cause analysis as

       follows:

                A police officer has probable cause to conduct a search when the
                facts available to [him] would warrant a [person] of reasonable
                caution in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime is
                present. The test for probable cause is not reducible to precise
                definition or quantification. Finely tuned standards such as proof
                beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence
                . . . have no place in the [probable-cause] decision. All we have
                required is the kind of fair probability on which reasonable and
                prudent [people,] not legal technicians, act.

                In evaluating whether the State has met this practical and
                common-sensical standard, we have consistently looked to the
                totality of the circumstances. We [have] lamented the
                development of a list of inflexible, independent requirements
                applicable in every case. Probable cause . . . is a fluid concept—
                turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual

       by proper means) (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443-44 (1984)). The State, accordingly, does not
       argue inevitable discovery on appeal.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2535 | June 21, 2023                                Page 9 of 22
               contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of
               legal rules.

       Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 243-44 (2013) (citations and internal quotations

       omitted).

[16]   As for the use of drug-sniffing dogs to establish probable cause, the Court in

       Harris rejected the “strict evidentiary checklist” adopted by the Florida Supreme

       Court in that case; instead, the Harris Court held:

               [A] probable-cause hearing focusing on a dog’s alert should
               proceed much like any other. The court should allow the parties
               to make their best case, consistent with the usual rules of criminal
               procedure. And the court should then evaluate the proffered
               evidence to decide what all the circumstances demonstrate. If
               the State has produced proof from controlled settings that a
               dog performs reliably in detecting drugs, and the defendant has
               not contested that showing, then the court should find
               probable cause. If, in contrast, the defendant has challenged
               the State’s case (by disputing the reliability of the dog overall
               or of a particular alert), then the court should weigh the
               competing evidence. In all events, the court should not
               prescribe, as the Florida Supreme Court did, an inflexible set of
               evidentiary requirements. The question—similar to every
               inquiry into probable cause—is whether all the facts
               surrounding a dog’s alert, viewed through the lens of common
               sense, would make a reasonably prudent person think that a
               search would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime. A sniff
               is up to snuff when it meets that test.

       Id. at 247-48.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2535 | June 21, 2023          Page 10 of 22
[17]   Here, Trooper Rinschler testified to the following facts. Maverick was trained

       to detect the odor of six different illicit substances and has been with the State

       Police since 2006. He has been assigned to Trooper Rinschler since June 2016.

       Maverick was subjected to three months of rigorous training to detect drugs in

       high-stress environments; and Trooper Rinschler and Maverick participated in

       sixteen hours of monthly, federally-mandated training. In addition to this

       mandated training, Maverick and Trooper Rinschler participated in many other

       trainings, which included ten trainings in the two years prior to the encounter

       with McKinney. Maverick’s training included both single-blind and double-

       blind testing. He has been certified annually by an international dog

       certification agency. In approximately ninety percent of cases in which

       Maverick has indicated a positive response for the odor of drugs, either drugs

       were found or the occupant explained the reason for the smell of drugs in the

       vehicle. Thus, roughly only ten percent of Maverick’s alerts were not

       substantiated by the presence of drugs or the recent presence of drugs.

[18]   “[E]vidence of a dog’s satisfactory performance in a certification or training

       program can itself provide sufficient reason to trust his alert.” Harris, 568 U.S.

       at 247. “If a bona fide organization has certified a dog after testing his

       reliability in a controlled setting, a court can presume (subject to any conflicting

       evidence offered) that the dog’s alert provides probable cause to search.” Id. at

       247-48. Accordingly, the State here produced “proof from controlled settings”

       that Maverick was reliable in detecting drugs. Id. at 248.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2535 | June 21, 2023         Page 11 of 22
[19]   Nevertheless, McKinney argues that Maverick failed to display any objective

       behavior that would indicate that he detected the presence of drugs. We

       disagree. Trooper Rinschler’s bodycam video shows that she retrieved

       Maverick from her patrol car and gave him his reward ball, which Maverick is

       conditioned to desire and with which he is sometimes rewarded if he finds

       drugs. Maverick first jumped and placed his front paws on the side of the patrol

       car and focused on the ball that Trooper Rinschler had placed on the trunk.

       Trooper Rinschler then allowed Maverick to bite down on the ball as she

       carried the ball toward McKinney’s truck. There, she ordered Maverick to

       release the ball and, once he did, Trooper Rinschler pretended to throw the ball

       in the direction of the truck and instructed him to smell the truck. Maverick

       sniffed along the passenger side of the truck and showed particular interest in

       the seam between the passenger door and the front quarter panel; he then

       sniffed the rear wheel well, then the front wheel well, and returned to the seam.

       Trooper Rinschler explained that this is known as “bracketing,” in which a dog

       will go back and forth until the source of the odor is located. Tr. Vol. II pp. 38-

       39.

[20]   Maverick then jumped onto the side of the truck by the seam near the passenger

       door. Maverick briefly lowered his back legs, which Trooper Rinschler

       described as a “half sit,” and a “good try” at sitting down. Tr. Vol. II p. 45; Tr.

       Vol. III p. 16; see also Ex. Vol. II, State’s Ex. 3 at 09:09–09:12. Trooper

       Rinschler then directed Maverick to the driver’s side of the truck, where he

       again sniffed at the area of the seam between the driver’s door and the front

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2535 | June 21, 2023         Page 12 of 22
       quarter panel, briefly jumped up to sniff the around the outside mirror, and then

       again briefly lowered his back legs. At this point, Trooper Rinschler told

       Maverick he was a “good boy” and gave him the reward ball. Ex. Vol. II,

       State’s Ex. 3 at 09:31.

[21]   McKinney argues that Maverick did not give a final alert response to the

       presence of drugs by sitting as he was trained to do. McKinney claims that the

       behaviors described by Trooper Rinschler—quick movement, increased

       breathing, tail wagging, ear movements, and the attempt to sit down—were not

       sufficient to show that Maverick detected the presence of drugs. We disagree.

[22]   The trial court heard evidence that Maverick usually had a passive final alert

       response, such as sitting or freezing, but that a final response is merely one

       indication that a dog has detected drugs. Other indications that Maverick had

       detected drugs were provided as follows by Trooper Rinschler:

               [I]t’s how we know from our training and experience what the
               dogs are doing . . . they don’t technically have to do a final
               response for us to be like oh, there’s an odor. The handler
               should’ve already known that way prior to a dog sitting or
               pointing just from what they’ve been doing in their behavior
               prior to that.

       Tr. Vol. III p. 8. Moreover, Trooper Rinschler testified that Maverick did, in

       fact, attempt to sit, but “probably wasn’t going to sit his butt down on [the]

       slush” on the roadway that day. Tr. Vol. II p. 45. Trooper Rinschler’s

       testimony shows that she was trained to determine, based on Maverick’s

       behavior, when Maverick had detected the odor of drugs. The fact that
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2535 | June 21, 2023        Page 13 of 22
       Maverick did not fully sit down as his final response is not dispositive. 6

       Maverick’s behavior, viewed in the totality of the circumstances, is sufficient to

       show that there was a fair probability that the police would find contraband in

       McKinney’s truck.

[23]   Although we have found no Indiana case directly on point, the facts of this case

       are similar to those before the court in United States v. Hollerman, 743 F.3d 1152

       (8th Cir. 2014). In that case, the canine officer explained why his dog might

       have failed to give a final alert response as trained. Id. at 1156-57. The officer

       testified that his dog could have been overwhelmed by the odor of marijuana,

       thereby making it difficult for him to pinpoint the source of the odor. Id. at

       1157. As the dog went along the passenger side of the defendant’s truck, he

       “stop[ped] dead in his tracks and be[gan] to really detail the area between the

       bed of the truck and the cab of the truck.” Id. at 1154 (brackets in original).

       The officer then pulled his dog away from the truck and directed him to sniff

       another vehicle parked next to the defendant’s truck. The dog did not alert to

       anything or otherwise change his behavior while sniffing the other vehicle. Id.

       The officer then directed his dog to re-sniff the defendant’s truck, at which point

       he “stopped and detailed the same area as the first time.” Id. The officer then

       6
         McKinney also claims that Maverick’s behavior of jumping on his truck was new, and that this untrained
       behavior that cannot support a finding of probable cause. But Trooper Rinschler did not testify that this
       behavior was new. Instead, she testified that she tried to break Maverick of the habit of scratching at cars to
       avoid damaging them. Even if this behavior was untrained, this does not obviate a finding of probable cause.
       See United States v. Pierce, 622 F.3d 209, 214 (3rd Cir. 2010) (holding that dog’s alert to odor of drugs in a car
       supported a finding of probable cause even though the dog displayed untrained behavior by leaping into a car
       through an open window).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2535 | June 21, 2023                                   Page 14 of 22
       concluded that his dog was indicating that the defendant’s truck, more likely

       than not, contained contraband. Id.

[24]   On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that “‘all the facts surrounding [the dog]’s

       alert[s], viewed through the lens of common sense,’ ‘would make a reasonably

       prudent person think that a search would reveal contraband or evidence of a

       crime.’” Id. at 1158 (quoting Harris, 568 U.S. at 248). The court determined

       that the Fourth Amendment did not “require drug dogs to abide by a specific

       and consistent code in signaling their sniffing of drugs to their handlers.” Id. at

       1156. So long as law enforcement officers are able to “articulate specific,

       reasonable examples of the dog’s behavior that signaled the presence of illegal

       narcotics, [the] Court will not engage itself in the evaluation of whether that

       dog should have an alternative means to indicate the presence of drugs.” Id.

[25]   Similarly, in United States v. Parada, 577 F.3d 1275, 1281 (10th Cir. 2009), the

       Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not err when it found that a drug-

       sniffing dog provided sufficient probable cause to search a vehicle even though

       the dog did not act in accordance with his usual, trained final response and

       instead stiffened his body, breathed deeply, and attempted to jump into the

       window of the suspect’s vehicle. Despite evidence from the defendant’s expert

       that the dog did not give a defined final response, the court on appeal deferred

       to the district court’s finding that the dog indicated the presence of contraband.

       See id. (“We decline to adopt the stricter rule urged by [the defendant], which

       would require the dog to give a final indication before probable cause is

       established.”).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2535 | June 21, 2023        Page 15 of 22
[26]   The Fifth Circuit reached a similar decision in United States v. Shen, 749 Fed.

       Appx. 256 (5th Cir. 2018). There, the canine officer had worked with the drug-

       sniffing dog for approximately two years, the dog was certified by two

       independent organizations, the dog’s annual testing established that she reliably

       detected drugs in a controlled environment, and false-positives were explained

       by the lingering odor of drugs even if no drugs were found. Id. at 261. When

       the dog sniffed the defendant’s vehicle, the dog showed signs of interest,

       including an increased breathing rate, wagging of her tail, and sniffing more air.

       Id. at 261-62. At one point, the dog paused, sniffed the car’s door seam heavily,

       and stared at the passenger door seam for about one second. Id. at 262.

       Although the dog never made a final response by sitting down, the canine

       officer testified that the dog did not like to sit in water, and it was wet on that

       day. Id. “More importantly, [the canine officer] testified that [the dog] was

       acting as she has in the past when identifying a narcotic odor.” Id.

[27]   On appeal, the court concluded “[a]ll the facts surrounding [the dog]’s alert,

       viewed through the lens of common sense, would lead a reasonably prudent

       person to think a search of [the defendant]’s vehicle would reveal contraband.

       Id. at 261; see also Steck v. State, 197 A.3d 531, 544-45 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2018)

       (upholding trial court’s finding of probable cause based on dog-sniff of

       defendant’s vehicle even though the dog did not give a trained, final alert to the

       presence of drugs; the trial court relied on the canine officer’s testimony and the

       dog’s actions, which sufficiently indicated that the dog had detected the odor of

       drugs).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2535 | June 21, 2023          Page 16 of 22
[28]   Here, Trooper Rinschler testified to Maverick’s training and reliability. She

       also testified that, based on her training and extensive experience with

       Maverick, his behavior while sniffing McKinney’s truck indicated to her that

       Maverick had detected the odor of illicit drugs. Thus, Trooper Rinschler was

       able to “articulate specific, reasonable examples of the dog’s behavior that

       signaled the presence of illegal narcotic,” and we will “not engage . . . in the

       evaluation of whether [Maverick] should have used an alternative means to

       indicate the presence of drugs.” Hollerman, 743 F.3d at 1158.

[29]   McKinney cites several federal district court cases and a few federal circuit

       court cases, which we do not find persuasive. See Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Harsco

       Corp., 199 N.E.3d 1210, 1217 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (noting that lower federal

       court decisions may be persuasive but are not binding on state courts).

       Moreover, most 7 of the cases McKinney cites are distinguishable. Cf. United

       States v. Rivas, 157 F.3d 364, 368 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that dog’s behavior of

       “casting,” which can happen when a dog “maybe feels not a strong alert, but

       something that temporarily stops him and deters his attention at that point,”

       was insufficient to support a finding of probable cause where the dog’s handler

       did not testify and there was no evidence that “casting” indicated that there was

       a reasonable suspicion to conduct invasive border search); 8 United States v.

       7
        McKinney cites United States v. Jacobs, 986 F.2d 1231 (8th Cir. 1993), in which the court held that a dog sniff
       did not support a finding of probable cause because the dog only showed interest in and scratched at a
       package but never gave a full alert. This case, however, was decided decades before the United States
       Supreme Court’s opinion in Harris, which rejected rigid rules in favor of a totality-of-the-circumstances
       approach. We therefore do not find Jacobs to be persuasive.
       8
           This case too was decided decades before Harris.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2535 | June 21, 2023                                 Page 17 of 22
       Jordan, 455 F. Supp. 3d 1247, 1253 (D. Utah 2020) (holding that dog’s behavior

       did not support a finding of probable cause where: (1) the dog was walked

       around the car three times; (2) the officer repeatedly had to draw the dog’s

       attention to certain areas of the car by tapping on the vehicle; (3) the dog’s

       attention was repeatedly drawn away from the vehicle to items on the sidewalk

       or passing traffic, which required the officer to physically guide the dog back to

       the suspect vehicle; and (4) the dog never demonstrated any clearly objective

       behavior showing he had detected a target odor); United States v. Diaz, 2018 WL

       1697386 (D.S.C. Apr. 6, 2018) (discrediting dog handler’s testimony that dog

       sat down to indicate the presence of drugs where video did not provide a clear

       footage of the alert and dog handler’s testimony about the dog’s breathing was

       insufficient to support a finding of probable cause); United States v. Heir, 107 F.

       Supp. 2d 1088, 1091 (D. Neb. 2000) (finding evidence insufficient to establish

       probable cause where the only indication that dog detected the odor of drugs

       was that he sniffed more intensely and there was evidence that the officer may

       have engaged in behavior that caused the dog to sniff more intensely).

[30]   In contrast, here the State established that Maverick was a certified drug

       sniffing dog with a history of reliability. Maverick’s behavior, even without a

       full final response of sitting, was sufficient to indicate that he had detected the

       odors of the illicit drugs he was trained to detect. This is sufficient to establish

       probable cause to justify the warrantless search of McKinney’s truck, and the

       admission of the evidence found during the search did not violate the Fourth

       Amendment.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2535 | June 21, 2023          Page 18 of 22
       II. Article 1, Section 11

[31]   McKinney also claims that the search of his truck violated Article 1, Section 11

       of the Indiana Constitution. “Although Article 1, Section 11 contains language

       nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment, Indiana courts interpret Article 1,

       Section 11 independently.” Parker v. State, 196 N.E.3d 244, 257 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2022) (citing Hardin v. State, 148 N.E.3d 932, 942 (Ind. 2020)), trans. denied. If a

       search is challenged under Article 1, Section 11, “the State must show that the

       challenged police action was reasonable based on the totality of the

       circumstances.” Id. (citing Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 368 (Ind. 2014)).

       “‘The totality of the circumstances requires consideration of both the degree of

       intrusion into the subject’s ordinary activities and the basis upon which the

       officer selected the subject of the search or seizure.’” Id. (quoting Litchfield v.

       State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 360 (Ind. 2005). In Litchfield, our Supreme Court

       summarized this evaluation as follows:

               [A]lthough we recognize there may well be other relevant
               considerations under the circumstances, we have explained
               reasonableness of a search or seizure as turning on a balance of:
               1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation
               has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search
               or seizure imposes on the citizens’ ordinary activities, and 3) the
               extent of law enforcement needs.

       824 N.E.2d at 361.

[32]   “The Litchfield test applies broadly to governmental searches and seizures: ‘its

       application is comprehensive.’” Parker, 196 N.E.3d at 258 (quoting Watkins v.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2535 | June 21, 2023           Page 19 of 22
       State, 85 N.E.3d 597, 600 (Ind. 2017)). Applying these factors to the facts here

       leads us to conclude that the search of McKinney’s truck was reasonable under

       the totality of the circumstances.

[33]   The degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation had occurred

       was strong. As for the initial traffic stop of McKinney’s truck, Trooper Chol

       testified that he observed two separate traffic violations, either of which gave

       rise to probable cause to stop the vehicle. Additionally, the dog sniff provided

       probable cause for the search of the vehicle; the dog-sniff itself was not a search.

       Tinker, 129 N.E.3d at 255 (citing Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1034). The dog sniff,

       moreover, indicated the presence of illicit drugs inside the truck. McKinney’s

       arguments to the contrary merely rehash his Fourth Amendment argument that

       Maverick’s behavior was insufficiently objective to support a finding of

       probable cause. For the reasons set forth above in our Fourth Amendment

       analysis, we disagree. McKinney’s arguments that Maverick was unreliable

       due to the weather and merely excited about his reward ball, or that Trooper

       Rinschler’s bias influenced Maverick’s behavior are merely a request that we

       reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.

[34]   The degree of intrusion that the search or seizure imposed on McKinney’s

       ordinary activities was relatively low. The dog sniff itself was, as noted above,

       not a search and consisted of a minimal intrusion on McKinney’s ordinary

       activities. See Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1036 (holding that dog sniff of vehicle was

       “minimal” where the sniff occurred during valid traffic stop and occurred

       shortly after the vehicle was stopped); Crabtree v. State, 199 N.E.3d 410, 416

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2535 | June 21, 2023        Page 20 of 22
       (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (noting that dog sniff of door of hotel room was minimally

       intrusive where it occurred in the outdoor walkway of a hotel). Neither

       McKinney nor his passenger were able to legally drive the truck, and the truck

       was going to be impounded. Thus, the dog sniff did not interfere with his

       further use of the vehicle. Based on the dog sniff, the police did search the

       interior of his truck. But the search was not overly long, and McKinney was

       lawfully detained based on his traffic violations. Thus, the search did not

       interrupt McKinney’s lawful use of the truck. 9 This factor, therefore, does not

       weigh against a finding of reasonableness.

[35]   Lastly, the extent of law enforcement needs supports a finding that the police

       conduct was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. The needs of

       law enforcement to find evidence of drug activity is obviously high. See State v.

       Gibson, 886 N.E.2d 639, 643 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (concluding under a Litchfield

       analysis that the extent of law enforcement needs were high because “the

       trafficking of illegal drugs [is] frequently associated with violence and no

       simpler method exists for detection of hidden drugs than a dog sniff”); see also

       Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1036 (Ind. 2013) (holding that law

       enforcement needs are great when investigating drug trafficking).

[36]   Considering the Litchfield factors under the totality of the circumstances, we

       conclude that the actions of the police here were reasonable and there was no

       9
        McKinney argues that because the State did not introduce evidence regarding the police procedures for
       impounding a vehicle, we cannot consider whether the truck would have been subject to an inventory search.
       The fact nevertheless remains that neither McKinney nor his passenger could legally drive the vehicle.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2535 | June 21, 2023                            Page 21 of 22
       violation of Article 1, Section11. The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its

       discretion by admitting the evidence found in McKinney’s truck.

       Conclusion
[37]   The dog sniff of McKinney’s truck was sufficient to establish probable cause to

       search the truck. The search, therefore, did not violate McKinney’s rights

       under either the Fourth Amendment or Article 1, Section 11. Because the

       search was constitutionally sound, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

       admitting the items found during the search of McKinney’s truck. Accordingly,

       we affirm McKinney’s convictions.

[38]   Affirmed.

       Vaidik, J., and Foley, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2535 | June 21, 2023        Page 22 of 22