Court Opinion

ID: 9479992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:34:50.709872+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:41.131894
License: Public Domain

BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
This case opens the window on the sometimes bizarre and topsy-turvy world of sentencing under the Guidelines. The defendants in this case were convicted of the same crime by the same jury in front of the same judge. They conspired to obtain the same amount of drugs1 from the same *1222DEA agent in the same county. They gave the same story to police upon arrest, used the same defense at trial and admitted the same relevant conduct to the same probation officer following conviction. Yet, in this case, the computed Guidelines sentencing range for Kost (57-71 months) was more than double that for O’Meara (27-33 months).
This result belies both common sense and reality. With respect to role in the offense, O’Meara was the far more experienced offender.2 He supplied over eighty percent of the cash for the transaction and the Government considered him to have played an equally culpable part.
Furthermore, with regard to the enhancement for obstructing justice, O’Meara was a willing beneficiary of Kost’s allegedly false trial testimony and, prior to conviction, had maintained the “gambling debt” version throughout the proceedings. In addition, under the Guidelines’ obstruction provision, Kost’s suspect testimony should have been evaluated “in the light most favorable” to him. See U.S.S.G. 3C1.-1, comment, (n. 2). This requirement, which parallels the standard for judgments of acquittal, cf. United States v. Rodriguez, 812 F.2d 414, 416 (8th Cir.1987), suggests that no obstruction enhancement should have been imposed if a reasonable trier of fact could have found Kost’s statements true. Under such a standard, the fact the jury in this case rejected Kost’s testimony is insufficient to sustain the enhancement if another jury could have reasonably believed it.3
Moreover, although both defendants admitted responsibility for their relevant offense conduct, under the probation officer’s application, the Guidelines permitted only O’Meara to receive the downward adjustment. This result was inequitable and absurd under the facts of this case. Kost admitted responsibility for his offense conduct both at trial and during the presen-tence investigation while O’Meara denied his culpability until the final hour. In addition, during pre-trial negotiations, O’Meara refused to accept a plea bargain that Kost had been willing to take.4
Whether the disparity in this case rests upon some inadvertent preference for personalities or because a more sophisticated offender successfully manipulated the system to his advantage, the end result is no less unsettling. Guideline sentencing “by the numbers” was supposed to eliminate such improper influences. As this case demonstrates, however, the Sentencing *1223Guidelines do not reduce disparity and in my judgment have failed in that regard.
The essential lie of the Sentencing Guidelines is that, by establishing “neutral criteria” which vastly restrict the district judge’s discretionary powers, they will eliminate disparity in sentencing. In reality, the present guideline system merely replaces one system of subjective sentencing with another. Indeed, the Guidelines are an intricate and complex code of sentencing and, as such, require extensive construction. Needless to say, this construction is not conducted by computers — much less by gods. Instead, the implementation of the present guideline system is highly dependent on the judgment calls of fallible human actors, who are no less susceptible to errors in judgment and differences in interpretation than their pre-Guidelines predecessors. Hence, where sentencing judges once applied their legal knowledge and life experiences to the facts of a given case, we now call on them to evaluate the defendant’s circumstances according to the dictates of a complex and cumbersome code.
Guideline sentencing is perhaps most disturbing, however, not because it continues to require subjective decision-making, but because these still-subjective determinations are in large part no longer conducted by the federal judiciary. Rather, due to the difficulty of mastering this complicated and ever-evolving guideline system, it seems to me that district courts have come increasingly to rely on the recommendations of the probation officer who prepares the presentence report. Consequently, it is a sad but true fact of life under the Guidelines that many of the crucial judgment calls in sentencing are now made, not by the court, but by probation officers to whose technical knowledge overworked district judges understandably, but all too often, uncritically defer. I cannot help but feel that we have lost something in this substitution of technical proficiency for the thoughtful exercise of discretion by the federal judiciary.
Accordingly, I would remand this case to the district judge with instructions to reduce Kost’s sentence using some common sense and an eye for consistency and just results. I would also ask the district judge to consider whether O’Meara’s sentence should be further reduced in accordance with my comments in footnote number one.

. The record in this case shows that Kost and O’Meara conspired to obtain four ounces of cocaine apiece. I cannot agree with the majority, however, that O’Meara’s offense level should have been computed based on the full eight-ounce amount. When the Government seeks an enhanced penalty under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1982), it bears the burden of proving drug quantity. United States v. Gordon, 876 F.2d 1121, 1126 (5th Cir.1989). Further, O’Meara remained accountable for Kost’s conduct only to the extent that it was reasonably foreseeable and furthered jointly agreed to criminal activity. See United States v. Warters, 885 F.2d 1266, *12221272-73 (5th Cir.1989); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, comment. (n. 1) (incorporated by reference into U.S.S.G. § 2D1.4, comment, (n. 1)).
In this case, the Government produced no reliable evidence, see United States v. Gooden, 892 F.2d 725, 727-28 (8th Cir.1989), that O’Meara could have reasonably foreseen Kost’s self-initiated negotiations for eight ounces of cocaine — much less a preponderance of the evidence as many courts now require, see, e.g., United States v. Silverman, 889 F.2d 1531, 1535 (6th Cir.1989); United States v. Harris, 882 F.2d 902, 906-07 (4th Cir.1989); United States v. Landry, 709 F.Supp. 908, 912-13 (D.Minn.1989). In fact( the only evidence on this point (i.e., Kost's instructions to the undercover agent as to O’Meara’s payment for the previously agreed to s/x-ounce amount) suggests that O’Meara remained totally in the dark. As a consequence, sentencing O’Meara based on the eight-ounce figure violated the minimum requirements of due process under any standard. Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91-93, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 2418-20, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (preponderance of evidence standard satisfies due process at sentencing).

. O’Meara’s presentence report noted eight previous infractions, including three drug offenses and a juvenile conviction for sexual assault. By contrast, Kost’s prior record consisted of an expunged drug possession charge and a $50 fine for a bad check.

. Accordingly, I am somewhat disturbed by the probation officer’s seemingly uncritical acceptance of O’Meara’s belated “confession.’’ Although the gambling story could well have been concocted to purely deceive authorities in the event of arrest, there was also reason to suspect O’Meara’s recanting during the final hour. O’Meara had steadfastly adhered to the “gambling debt” version prior to that occasion, and his substantial prior contacts with the criminal justice system likely made him sophisticated enough to recognize the potential benefit of telling authority figures what they wanted to hear.

. The Government’s offer during plea negotiations was conditioned on the joint acceptance of both defendants; therefore, Kost was unable to accept it without O’Meara’s concurrent acceptance.