Court Opinion

ID: 9521034
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:55:41.13559+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:33.521433
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE RYAN, dissenting: The primary reason for my dissent in this case is that the record before us just does not support the opinion of the court and is not sufficient to enable this court to decide the issues that have been presented. The opinion assumes, and the defendant argues, that the victim, Howard, had three prior battery convictions. This conclusion is based on the assertion that discovery procedures disclosed these convictions and that the State, as well as the defense counsel, knew of them. This may well be true, but there is not an iota of evidence of the convictions in this record, nor was there an offer of proof concerning any conviction of the victim of the offense of battery. The fact that all of this information may be contained in the lawyer’s file is a totally inadequate reason for the holding of this opinion. If we are going to adhere to the adversary system, the case should be tried and decided by the use of accepted adversarial procedures. A court on review should decide the issues before it on the record that has been made through the use of such procedures. We should not decide a case on review on what the appellant may have had in his file but did not offer in evidence. The sole basis for this court’s opinion is the ruling of the trial court in sustaining the prosecutor’s objection to a question by defendant on cross-examination of Bell as to whether the victim had been convicted of battery. As noted below and as stated in the opinion, there are two reasons for offering evidence of this nature. First, such evidence may tend to show that the defendant acted reasonably in using force, in which case it must also be shown that the defendant had knowledge of the victim’s prior conduct. Second, such evidence may show that the victim had a violent and aggressive character, which would tend to establish that he was the aggressor. When the judge sustained the objection to the defendant’s question on cross-examination concerning the prior battery convictions, the court indicated that its ruling was based on the fact that the defendant did not have knowledge of such prior convictions. If defendant’s line of questioning was not being pursued to show the reasonableness of defendant’s belief and action, defense counsel could easily have informed the court that the question was not put for that purpose but that he was attempting to establish that the victim had a violent and aggressive character and was therefore probably the aggressor. This he did not do. I will discuss later that the same evidence may not be admissible for both purposes and that a simple conviction of battery should not be sufficient to establish the victim’s character. It was therefore important that the court be informed as to the purpose for which the question was asked and the nature of the battery, if the purpose was to establish the victim’s violent and aggressive character. The objected-to question was asked in a cross-examination of the prosecution’s first witness. There is nothing wrong in asking such a question at that time; however, the proper and appropriate time for a defendant to establish his defense is not during the presentation of the State’s case, but during the presentation of the defendant’s case. At that stage of the trial, the defendant made no attempt to introduce any evidence of the victim’s prior convictions of battery. Thus the court had no opportunity to pass on the admissibility of such evidence. The opinion of this court speaks as though the court denied admission of evidence of these convictions. It did not, because such evidence was never offered. The appellate court properly noted that, after the sustaining of the objection to the question on cross-examination, the defendant did not make any other attempt to prove up the convictions. As noted above, I agree that there are two purposes for which evidence of the victim’s prior conduct may be admitted. However, I feel that the opinion of the court blurs the distinction between these two purposes and may lead to the belief that the same type of evidence is admissible in all cases where the issue of self-defense is involved, regardless of the defendant’s knowledge of the convictions. This is not so. There may be evidence of threats and conduct of the victim which, if known to the defendant, would be relevant to the question of the reasonableness of his belief that the use of force was necessary. However, the same threats or conduct may not be sufficient to establish that the victim was a person of a violent and aggressive character. Also, the mere fact that a person has been convicted of a battery is not necessarily evidence of a violent and aggressive character. Nor, if known by the defendant, would it have a bearing on defendant’s belief that the use of force was necessary. Such a conviction may arise out of a domestic dispute, or out of charges and countercharges growing out of a quarrel, and is often entered by default. Under our statute, any physical contact with an individual of an insulting or provoking nature constitutes a battery. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 12—3(a)(2).) Thus, an intended push or a slap may constitute a battery under our statute, but would not be evidence of violent and aggressive character. The opinion of the court, while acknowledging that the Pennsylvania court has held that any battery conviction demonstrates general aggressive propensities (Commonwealth v. Beck (1979), 485 Pa. 475, 478, 402 A.2d 1371, 1373), did not go so far as to hold that any battery conviction is admissible for such a purpose, and properly so because of the wide range of conduct which, under the Illinois law, may constitute a battery. I would hold that before there can be a reversal based solely on the sustaining of the objection to the question on cross-examination of Bell concerning the prior convictions of Howard for battery, defendant would have to inform the court not only of the purpose for which he was trying to show the prior convictions, but also he would have to make a representation to the court as to the nature of the conduct which was the basis for the prior convictions. For the reasons stated herein, I dissent. JUSTICE WARD joins in this dissent.