Court Opinion

ID: 9766071
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:31:11.93436+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:19.259451
License: Public Domain

Justice EAKIN
concurring.
I concur with the majority to the extent it holds HIA officers outside their jurisdiction are not “police officers in fact” for purposes of the Implied Consent Law. However, I believe an HIA officer who forms probable cause to stop a vehicle on airport premises, but who is unable to make a stop until the vehicle is outside airport property, is still a police officer for purposes of Implied Consent Law because he is in fresh pursuit. The question of whether he is a “police officer in fact” does not arise in this context.
The statute conferring power on HIA officers states, in pertinent part, “each [officer] shall have and exercise full power to make arrests without warrant for all violations of law which they may witness upon any part of the premises.” 71 P.S. § 1791.1. In construing this statute, this Court held in McKinley II,1 an HIA officer has the authority to enforce the Vehicle Code within his jurisdiction. McKinley v. PennDOT, 564 Pa. 565, 769 A.2d 1153, 1158 (2001). Although the General Assembly did not explicitly grant extra-territorial arrest powers to HIA officers, neither did they limit such officer’s power to pursue a suspect off airport property. Indeed, the statute *96says that once the offense is witnessed, the officer has “full power” to arrest without a warrant.
In McKinley II, this Court held the stop effectuated by the HIA corporal was illegal because the General Assembly has not explicitly granted HIA officers extra-territorial powers. Under the rules of statutory interpretation, the HIA officer enabling statute is to be given a liberal interpretation in order to effect its object and promote justice. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928. The object of having police officers with limited jurisdiction, such as the HIA police, is to have qualified persons on the premises in case a crime occurs. In order to promote justice, such officers may from time to time have to leave the premises to effectuate a traffic or other type of investigatory stop. This is not to say these officers may patrol areas outside their jurisdiction. On the contrary, such officers should be entitled to perform their law enforcement duties outside their jurisdiction only when they are in fresh pursuit. Thus, a fair reading of the statute leads to the conclusion that when an officer witnesses a violation of law within his jurisdiction, he is allowed to pursue the suspect until he is in a position to apprehend.
Otherwise, if an HIA officer attempts to effectuate a traffic stop, there is nothing to keep a suspect from fleeing airport property, leaving the officer standing at the border like the posse in a bad western movie, watching powerlessly at the suspect riding slowly away. The majority suggests the officer may summon the “appropriate law enforcement officials” in order to effectuate an arrest, but this is not always practical. It also ignores the urgency involved in dangerous situations, such as a person driving under the influence.
I agree with the majority to the extent that an HIA officer without probable cause to believe a violation has occurred on airport property is not a “police officer in fact” for Implied Consent Law purposes if he conducts an extra-jurisdictional traffic stop. However, if probable cause does exist, I believe the doctrine of fresh pursuit allows the stop and that which follows.

. I did not participate in McKinley II.