Court Opinion

ID: 9750344
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:51:47.882743+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:08.088842
License: Public Domain

BECK, Judge,
concurring:
Although I agree with the majority’s ultimate disposition of this case, I write separately to clarify the precise basis for the panel’s affirming the trial court’s demurrer in favor of the St. Thomas Township Board of Supervisors (the Board). Simply stated, this case involves the decision by the Board not to reappoint appellant Burkholder as the Board’s secretary/treasurer. The Board’s decision was in complete accordance with the Township Code, 53 P.S. § 65511. As such, this case need not, and should not, involve a consideration of public policy exceptions to the general rule of discharge of at-will employees.
The facts show that Burkholder was appointed in 1986 to be the secretary/treasurer for the Board. Her appointment was made pursuant to 53 P.S. § 65511, which provides in pertinent part:
[t]he supervisors of each township shall meet, at a convenient time and place, on the first Monday in January of each year____ At such time the township supervisors shall organize as a board by electing one of their number as chairman and another member as vice-chairman. The board shall appoint a treasurer and a secretary[, or] may appoint one individual to serve as both secretary and treasurer.
53 P.S. § 65511 (Purdon Supp.1990). Therefore, by statute, the Board is authorized each January to appoint whomever it selects as secretary/treasurer.
*506Burkholder alleges that on January 6, 1987, she was informed by the Board that she was being discharged. A review of the record, however, indicates that at its annual meeting the Board decided to appoint someone other than appellant to the position of secretary/treasurer for the 1987 calendar year. The record therefore shows Burkholder was not discharged, but was not reappointed. The Board’s action taken on January 6, 1987, not to reappoint Burkholder was within its legitimate statutory authority. Appellant has presented no allegations suggesting that the Board acted outside of its authority.
The majority agrees that the above rationale is the basis for its decision. As the majority states, “[ijnstead, we base our decision in this case on the fact that defendants herein, within statutory mandates, did not discharge appellant, but merely failed to reappoint her as secretary/treasurer of St. Thomas Township.” See Majority Opinion, at 504. As such, the precise holding in this case is that an employee-at-will can not maintain a cause of action for wrongful discharge where her employer acting pursuant to statutory authority fails to reappoint her. Therefore, the majority’s lengthy discussion addressing public policy exceptions to at-will employment is dicta.
It is unfortunate that the majority addressed such an important issue where the issue was not properly before it. Other appellate courts have recognized the difficulty of the issue and have instructed us that decisions must be considered on a case-by-case basis. Field v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 388 Pa.Super. 400, 418-19, 565 A.2d 1170, 1179 (1989); Rinehimer v. Luzerne County Community College, 372 Pa.Super. 480, 490-91, 539 A.2d 1298, 1303 (1988), appeal denied, 521 Pa. 606, 555 A.2d 116 (1988); Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. Standard Pump Aldrich Div., 281 Pa.Super. 560, 572, 422 A.2d 611, 617 (1980). Unlike the majority, in this case I would abstain from analyzing or discussing the substantive merits of free speech and free association as public policy exceptions. The majority’s dis*507cussion of the public policy issues at any rate is merely dicta.