Court Opinion

ID: 9654879
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:53:47.403801+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:13.361811
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the majority opinion.
In my view, when Mowry, an assistant prosecuting attorney in the prosecutor’s office, first conferred with appellant concerning representation in the civil matter and it became clear to Mowry the civil matter was also subject to prosecution by the prosecutor’s office, Rule 1.7 came into play. Mow-*953ry was undertaking to represent a client (the appellant) in a matter in which his representation of that client would be directly adverse to another client (the State). In this situation, Rule 1.7 requires that each client must consent after consultation. I believe this rule requires Mowry to explain to the appellant that he holds a position of assistant prosecutor and will be rendering services to the State at the same time he is performing legal services for appellant in the civil case involving the assault that was the subject of the prosecution. Mowry could have proposed to appellant that he would establish a “Chinese Wall” by which he would be able to demonstrate that any information appellant gave Mowry would not be shared with anyone in the prosecutor’s office and that Mowry would not be involved in the prosecution of the case against appellant. If, despite this information, appellant was willing to consent to representation by Mowry in this matter, then insofar as appellant was concerned, Rule 1.7 would have been complied with.
In fact, Mowry made no such disclosure; appellant did not have information concerning the potential conflict and no consent occurred. Since the violation is now history, the issue becomes how to cure the problem, if there was a problem. It appears to me there are really only three possibilities: (1) to conclude that the problem was created by appellant, and, therefore, he is not entitled to relief; (2) to conclude that there is no problem; or (3) to conclude that Mowry caused the rule to be violated and, therefore, the appropriate remedy is to remove both he and those associated with him in the prosecutor’s office from the criminal case against appellant.
The dissenting opinion would opt for the second possibility and argues vigorously that there is no violation by anyone involved in the actual prosecution of defendant and that the problem belongs to Mow-ry and his private law firm. I disagree. As its fail-back position, the dissenting opinion points to the first possibility by arguing that the appellant either discovered, or should have discovered, the problem and objected to it and, having failed to do so, has waived his right to object. Absent the type of consultation and written consent contemplated by Rule 1.7 (and it is clear such consultation and consent was absent), the first possible remedy is also unsatisfactory. Mowry, who had full knowledge of his own dual capacity as a prosecutor and a civil attorney, could have avoided the whole problem by giving full information to appellant as soon as it became clear to Mowry that he had a conflict because the transaction giving rise to the civil matter also involved a criminal prosecution. Mowry created the problem; he and those associated with him in the prosecutor’s office should provide the solution. While his associates in the prosecutor’s office, such as Mr. Newberry, may not be at fault because the problem exists in the criminal case, it can only be solved by a remedial measure, which must affect one of the parties to that litigation, either the appellant or the State. This is the problem with the dissent’s position in seeking a remedy soley from Mowry and his private law firm. Between the parties to the criminal action, it is appropriate that the prosecutor’s office be disqualified and replaced by independent counsel having no connection to attorney Mowry.
For this reason, I concur in the opinion and the result reached by the majority.