Court Opinion

ID: 9929954
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-05 20:02:40.937014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:01:46.801741
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/5/24 In re Ayden F. CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

  In re AYDEN F., a Person Coming
  Under the Juvenile Court Law.                                     B319898

                                                                  (Los Angeles County
  LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                               Super Ct. No. 21CCJP05595A)
  DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
  AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

  LORENA V.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, D. Zeke Zeidler, Judge. Affirmed.
      Janelle B. Price, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Melania Vartanian, Deputy
County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
               ____________________________________
                        INTRODUCTION

      Lorena V. appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction
findings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,
subdivision (b),1 and disposition orders declaring her seven-year-
old son Ayden F. a dependent child of the court and removing him
from her physical custody. Lorena contends substantial evidence
did not support the court’s jurisdiction findings or disposition
orders. We affirm.

        FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

        A.   A School Bus Driver Finds Ayden Running Down the
             Street Naked, and the Juvenile Court Detains Ayden
      On October 25, 2021 a school bus driver found Ayden, a
severely autistic seven-year-old, “running up and down the
street” with “no shoes or clothes on.” The bus driver walked
Ayden back to his home, knocked on the front door, and called for
someone to answer, but received no response. The bus driver
entered the house and knocked on a locked bedroom door, and a
man opened the bedroom door and asked where Ayden was. The
following day, a social worker from the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services went to Ayden’s
home to interview Lorena. The social worker smelled “a strong
odor of alcohol” when Lorena greeted her. Lorena denied she was
neglecting Ayden and made conflicting statements about where
she was the previous morning.

1       Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.

                                  2
       Lorena said Ayden had “developmental retardation” and
the “mentality” of a two-year-old. According to Lorena, Ayden
was “always supervised,” either by his babysitter or his adult
sister, Briana W. Lorena denied she had drunk any alcohol, but
said she had taken an over-the-counter medication for common
colds because she was sick. Lorena subsequently failed to show
up for a drug and alcohol test, and a few days later she tested
positive for amphetamine and marijuana. Lorena explained that
she took Adderall2 for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and
that she ate edible marijuana the weekend before the drug test.
       Michael F., Ayden’s father, who did not live with Lorena,
told the social worker that Lorena did not give Ayden “proper
attention.” Michael described Lorena’s demeanor when she
drank alcohol and expressed his concern about Ayden’s weight,
which in 14 months increased from 120 pounds to 200 pounds.
School personnel reported to the social worker that they
sometimes smelled alcohol when Lorena spoke to them and that
they often heard Lorena slur her speech. Several school
employees also said that they had difficulty reaching Lorena to
talk about Ayden’s frequent episodes of diarrhea and that Lorena
exacerbated Ayden’s digestion problems.
       The social worker asked Lorena to schedule a Child and
Family Team meeting. Lorena said she did not “see the point” of

2     “Adderall is the brand name of an amphetamine drug
commonly prescribed to treat the symptoms of attention deficit
disorder.” (People v. Tseng (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 117, 123, fn. 13,
trademark symbol omitted; see In re B.E. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th
932, 936.) “Like medicinal marijuana, Adderall is a controlled
substance (a derivative of amphetamine, and a schedule II drug)
and must be used under a doctor’s supervision and on a
demonstrated basis of need. It is, however, often abused.”
(People v. Beaty (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 644, 656.)

                                 3
having such a meeting because Ayden had only escaped from the
house once.3
       On December 8, 2021 the Department filed a petition under
section 300, subdivision (b)(1), alleging in three counts Lorena
and Michael endangered Ayden and placed him at substantial
risk of serious physical harm. The Department alleged (1) that
Lorena had a history of substance abuse and was a current
abuser of amphetamine, alcohol, and marijuana, which rendered
her incapable of supervising Ayden and providing regular care for
him and that Michael knew about Lorena’s substance abuse but
failed to protect Ayden by allowing him to remain in her care;
(2) Lorena had limited ability to provide appropriate care and
supervision of Ayden, who was autistic and developmentally
delayed, as evidenced by the incident where the bus driver found
Ayden alone and running naked in the street; and (3) Michael
was unwilling and unable to provide Ayden with ongoing care
and supervision. The court detained Ayden and placed him in
foster care under the Department’s supervision.

      B.    The Department Investigates Further; Lorena
            Struggles with Her Substance Abuse
      Over the next two and a half months, the Department
continued to investigate and monitor the family. Lorena denied

3      A “‘[c]hild and family team’” consists of “individuals who
are convened by the placing agency and who are engaged through
a variety of team-based processes to identify the strengths and
needs of the child or youth and their family, and to help achieve
positive outcomes for safety, permanency, and well-being.”
(§ 16501, subd. (a)(4); see In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 534,
fn. 4.) Lorena eventually participated in a meeting in
January 2022.

                                4
she had a substance abuse problem and minimized how often she
drank alcohol. When the social worker asked Lorena about her
arrest in 2020 for driving under the influence (the arrest report
indicated she drank four beers before driving), Lorena said she
was not really “driving” the car but was merely “moving” it
because “it was illegally parked.” Lorena also maintained her
version of the October 2021 incident, denying that Ayden was out
in the street or that the bus driver brought him home. During a
walk-through of Lorena’s home, the social worker smelled
marijuana and saw marijuana on a dresser in a room Lorena said
her adult son Dominic W. occupied.
       Michael reported that, at times when he dropped off Ayden
with Lorena or picked up Ayden from Lorena, he could tell by her
behavior she had been drinking. Michael was concerned Lorena
often gave Ayden “what he wanted to eat,” such as “four to five
yogurts in one sitting.” A physical examination of Ayden in
December 2021 revealed he was four feet nine inches tall and
weighed 215 pounds. Ayden’s medical records described his
conditions as “severe obesity” and “severe developmental delay.”
       A Department assessor concluded that, although Ayden
was seven years old, he behaved “as a child much younger than
his stated age.” Ayden’s foster mother told the assessor that
Ayden was not toilet trained and could not perform the activities
of daily living without assistance. The foster mother emphasized
Ayden could not be left unsupervised “for even a minute” because
of the “severity of his impulsive behaviors” and because he did
not understand those behaviors “are dangerous.” An assessor
from a regional center observed that Ayden “does not always
respond appropriately” to the word “no” and that, besides “come

                                5
here” and “sit down,” Ayden “does not respond to any other
instructions.”4
       In January 2022 Lorena failed to complete a substance
abuse treatment program because she missed classes, was often
late to classes, and at times did not show up for drug testing or
provided a diluted sample. The following month Lorena attended
a virtual substance abuse treatment program and, after a few
weeks, tested positive for amphetamine. Lorena’s substance
abuse counselor later informed the social worker that Lorena
missed her counseling session and had not returned any of the
counselor’s phone calls.

      C.     The Court Sustains the Petition and Removes Ayden
      At the combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the
juvenile court sustained the allegations in the petition, as
amended, and declared Ayden a dependent child of the court. At
disposition the court found that the Department had provided
reasonable services to prevent removal and that no available
services existed to prevent further detention. The court found
that Lorena “has unresolved substance abuse issues, which
clearly are connected to her lack of follow-up regarding [Ayden’s]
medical care,” and that Michael could not care for Ayden “at this
time.” The court removed Ayden from Lorena and Michael and

4     A regional center is a private nonprofit community-based
organization that contracts with the Department of
Developmental Services to coordinate services for individuals
with developmental disabilities. (See Morohoshi v. Pacific Home
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 482, 486; Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health
Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 479, fn. 3.)

                                6
placed him under the care and supervision of the Department for
suitable placement. Lorena timely appealed.5

                          DISCUSSION

      A.    Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile Court’s
            Findings Under Section 300, Subdivision (b)

             1.    Applicable Law and Standard of Review
      Section 300, subdivision (b)(1), “provides that a juvenile
may be adjudged a dependent of the court when ‘[t]he child has
suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer,
serious physical harm or illness, as a result of any of the
following: [¶] (A) The failure or inability of the child’s parent or
guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child. . . . [¶]
(D) The inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular
care for the child due to the parent’s or guardian’s mental illness,
developmental disability, or substance abuse.’” (In re N.R., supra,
15 Cal.5th at pp. 537-538;6 see In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622,
626-627; In re M.D. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 836, 848; In re S.F.

5     Michael did not appeal from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction
findings or disposition order. During the pendency of this appeal,
the court placed Ayden with Michael and transferred the case to
the juvenile court in Orange County Superior Court. The
transfer does not affect our jurisdiction to resolve this appeal.
(See In re Lisa E. (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 399, 404-405.)

6     The Supreme Court decided In re N.R. while this appeal
was pending. We gave the parties the opportunity to file
supplemental briefs on the effect of that decision on this case.
Both sides did.

                                 7
(2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 696, 712; In re L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th
840, 848.)
       “A court ‘need not wait until a child is seriously abused or
injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect
the child.’ [Citation.] And a parent’s ‘“‘[p]ast conduct may be
probative of current conditions’ if there is reason to believe that
the conduct will continue.”’ [Citation.] However, ‘“[t]o establish a
defined risk of harm at the time of the hearing, there ‘must be
some reason beyond mere speculation to believe the alleged
conduct will recur.’”’” (In re S.F., supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 712-713; see In re J.A. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1048; In re
L.W., supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 849.)
       “‘“‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the jurisdictional findings . . . , we determine
if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports
them. “In making this determination, we draw all reasonable
inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of
the dependency court; we review the record in the light most
favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues
of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.”
[Citation.] “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise
independent judgment, but merely determine if there are
sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.”’”’” (In re
S.F., supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 713; see In re L.W., supra,
32 Cal.App.5th at p. 848.) “‘The parent has the burden on appeal
of showing there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile

                                   8
court’s order.’” (In re L.B. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 402, 411-412;
see In re M.C. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 137, 151.)7

            2.     Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile
                   Court’s Finding Lorena’s Substance Abuse
                   Placed Ayden at Substantial Risk of Serious
                   Physical Harm
      Under section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(D), the Department
“must establish, as separate elements, that (1) substance abuse
(2) makes a parent or guardian unable to provide regular care for
a child and (3) this inability has caused the child to suffer serious
physical harm or illness or creates a substantial risk of such
harm or illness.” (In re N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 558.) The
Supreme Court has interpreted section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(D),

7      The Department argues that, because Michael did not
appeal from the court’s jurisdiction findings against him,
Lorena’s appeal from the court’s findings against her is not
justiciable. It is true that a “‘jurisdictional finding good against
one parent is good against both’” (In re Briana V. (2015)
236 Cal.App.4th 297, 308; see In re M.C., supra, 88 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 150-151 [“‘[b]ecause the juvenile court assumes jurisdiction
of the child, not the parents, jurisdiction may exist based on the
conduct of one parent only’”]) and that, “where jurisdictional
findings have been made as to both parents but only one parent
brings a challenge, the appeal may be rendered moot” (In re D.P.
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 283). But “a case is not moot where a
jurisdictional finding affects parental custody rights [citation],
curtails a parent’s contact with his or her child [citation], or ‘has
resulted in [dispositional] orders which continue to adversely
affect’ a parent.’” (Id. at pp. 277-278; see In re S.F., supra,
91 Cal.App.5th at p. 712.) Lorena’s appeal from the jurisdiction
findings is not moot because the findings resulted in a removal
order that continues to adversely affect her.

                                  9
“as assigning the term ‘substance abuse’ its ordinary meaning—
essentially, the excessive use of drugs or alcohol.” (N.R., at
p. 551; see ibid. [neither “a diagnosis by a medical professional”
nor “satisfaction of the prevailing criteria for a substance use
disorder as specified within the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)” is “essential under
section 300(b)(1)(D)”].)
       Substantial evidence supported the court’s finding Lorena
used drugs and alcohol excessively. Multiple people who
interacted with Lorena, including Michael, school employees, and
the social worker who interviewed Lorena the day after the bus
driver found Ayden in the street, reported that Lorena smelled of
alcohol or slurred her words when she spoke. Lorena tested
positive for marijuana and amphetamine in early
November 2021, shortly after Ayden escaped from the home, and
tested positive for amphetamine approximately two weeks before
the jurisdiction hearing. And, even after the court detained
Ayden, Lorena appeared intoxicated during two virtual visits
with him.
       Substantial evidence also supported the juvenile court’s
finding Lorena’s substance abuse made her unable to provide
regular care for Ayden. School personnel described Ayden’s home
care as woefully inadequate. Ayden attended school wearing
clothes and shoes stained with feces, and Lorena sometimes
failed to meet Ayden at the bus stop or took hours to pick him up
from school when his diarrhea was dripping onto his shoes and
clothes. And while Lorena gave many (inconsistent) excuses for
how Ayden got out of the house, she failed to ensure Ayden
remained safely inside the home. In fact, the evidence suggested
that Lorena was not even home when Ayden ran out of the house

                               10
and that she entrusted his care to someone else (probably
Dominic) who was in his bedroom behind a locked door.
       In addition to failing to ensure Ayden’s safety and maintain
his personal hygiene, Lorena contributed to, or at least failed to
prevent, Ayden’s rapid and unhealthy weight gain. At
215 pounds, Ayden’s body mass index was above the 97th
percentile for boys his age, which created serious health risks. As
Ayden’s physician stated, Ayden had a “very high” body mass
index. Yet, Lorena did not take steps to improve Ayden’s diet.
Ayden’s teacher regularly observed chocolate milk (even though
Ayden was lactose-intolerant) and sugary drinks in Ayden’s
lunchbox. School personnel frequently had difficulty reaching
Lorena to discuss proper care for Ayden. In less than three
months, from detention to shortly before the jurisdiction hearing,
Ayden lost 15 pounds under the care of his foster mother, who
gave him balanced meals and healthy snacks.
       And substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s
finding Lorena’s inability to provide Ayden regular care created a
substantial risk of harm. At the time of the jurisdiction hearing,
Lorena was still struggling with her substance abuse problem.
She missed classes and drug testing required by the Department-
approved substance abuse treatment programs. (See In re
Kadence P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1384 [“a missed drug
test, without adequate justification, is ‘properly considered the
equivalent of a positive test result’”], disapproved on another
ground in In re N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 560, fn. 18.) Shortly
before the jurisdiction hearing, Lorena missed her counseling
session and stopped communicating with her counselor.
       Lorena also remained in denial about her substance abuse
problem and how it impacted Ayden’s health and safety. (See

                                11
In re K.B. (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 593, 604-605 [“A court is entitled
to infer past conduct will continue where the parent denies there
is a problem.”], disapproved on another ground in In re N.R.,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 560, fn. 18; In re D.B. (2020)
48 Cal.App.5th 613, 622 [“Realizing conduct needs improvement
is a first step to improvement.”].) Lorena’s failure to acknowledge
her substance abuse led her to leave Ayden unsupervised and
placed Ayden at substantial risk of physical harm. (Cf. K.B., at
pp. 602-603 [where the mother left her children “largely
unsupervised every evening,” her “failure to supervise [was] the
direct and decisive evidence of substantial risk of harm”].)
Lorena’s 2020 arrest for driving under the influence (and her
attempt to downplay the seriousness of that conduct) was further
evidence her excessive drinking and poor judgment put Ayden’s
safety at risk. (See In re L.W., supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 850
[“recent DUI arrests and conviction for reckless driving provide a
nexus between [the mother’s] substance abuse and a substantial
risk of future harm to” her child].)
        Finally, Ayden’s very young mental age supported the
court’s conclusion Lorena’s substance abuse placed him at
substantial risk of serious physical harm. (See In re N.R., supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 559 [“a child’s youth and maturity level can bear
upon the care that the child may require and whether a parent’s
or guardian’s substance abuse places the child at substantial risk
of serious physical harm”].) As Lorena informed the social
worker, Ayden had the mentality of a two-year-old child and
required constant supervision and care. Ayden’s caregiver
emphasized that Ayden had “no sense of safety,” behaved
impulsively, and did not appreciate the risks of his actions, such
as running out of the house alone. Because Ayden required such

                                12
a high level of care, Lorena’s unresolved substance abuse problem
posed an even higher level of risk for Ayden than it would for a
child who had higher intellectual functioning or understood what
was unsafe. (See id. at p. 558 [“It is reasonable for courts to infer
that very young children require a substantial degree of close
supervision.”].)
       Lorena argues that, although “there was a momentary
lapse of supervision on October 25, 2021, there was no evidence
that this was a recurrent issue.” Lorena ignores the evidence and
the juvenile court’s finding that, in addition to her poor judgment,
her unresolved substance abuse put Ayden at risk. As discussed,
Lorena’s excessive drinking and drug use compromised her
ability to stay vigilant in ensuring Ayden stayed safe and
followed a strict diet to bring his weight down; in fact, she did the
opposite, by giving him sugary dairy products he could not easily
digest. In addition, a neighbor reported observing adults from
Lorena’s home look for Ayden outside the house on a previous
occasion. As the Department points out in its supplemental brief,
Lorena “was unclear” about which day of the week the bus driver
found Ayden naked and alone in the street (Lorena stated it was
a Sunday, even though the school bus only operated on
weekdays). Lorena’s apparent confusion about when Ayden ran
out of the house supported the reasonable inference Ayden’s
escape from the home was not a one-time occurrence. (See In re
K.B., supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 600 [“Without supervision,
nothing protects children from a world of serious and sudden
danger.”].)
       Lorena’s assertion she had a “valid prescription” for
Adderall is contrary to the evidence that, as of October 2021, her
psychiatrist no longer prescribed the drug for her. Indeed,

                                 13
Lorena told the social worker in early January 2022 she no longer
took Adderall; yet she tested positive for amphetamine the
following month. Though Ayden’s babysitter said she had never
seen Lorena under the influence of drugs or alcohol, multiple
witnesses, including the school secretary (who had 10 encounters
with Lorena during the month before the Department filed the
section 300 petition), reported frequently observing Lorena
slurring her words and smelling of alcohol. (See In re K.B.,
supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 604 [“father points to statements by
the children and family members that they had not seen the
father under the influence; but this does not nullify other
evidence in the record”]; see also In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766,
773 [‘“In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the jurisdictional findings . . . , we determine if
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports
them.’”]; In re L.B., supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at pp. 411-412 [same].)
       Lorena argues she provided regular care for Ayden because
she gave him food, clothing, and shelter. Lorena, however,
overlooks that the kinds and portions of food she gave Ayden
caused him to gain so much weight his doctor had to test for
complications from obesity, that Ayden’s clothing was stained
with feces, and that Ayden ran out of the home when Lorena left
him unsupervised. Lorena asserts there was no evidence that, on
the day the bus driver found Ayden in the street, she “was in the
home let alone responsible for [his] elopement due to [her]
substance abuse.” As discussed, however, the social worker
smelled a strong odor of alcohol when she spoke to Lorena the
day after Ayden escaped, and Lorena gave the implausible
explanation that the social worker had actually smelled cold

                                14
medicine.8 The juvenile court reasonably inferred Lorena’s
drinking led to the dangerous lapse in supervision. (See In re
N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 559 [courts may “discern an inability
to provide regular care and a substantial risk of serious physical
harm or illness from the evidence that has been introduced in a
particular case . . . and the reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from this evidence”].)9

      B.    Substantial Evidence Supported Removal

              1.    Applicable Law and Standard of Review
       Section 361, subdivision (c)(1), provides: “‘A dependent
child shall not be taken from the physical custody of his or her
parents . . . unless the juvenile court finds clear and convincing
evidence’ that ‘[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the
physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional

8     Lorena also explained the odor of alcohol by claiming she
used rubbing alcohol to clean the feces on Ayden’s wall, an
equally dubious claim.

9     Because substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s
finding Lorena’s substance abuse placed Ayden at risk of serious
physical harm, we do not decide whether substantial evidence
supported the court’s finding Lorena’s limited ability to care for
and supervise Ayden placed him at risk of serious physical harm.
(See In re M.D., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 852 [“‘[w]hen a
dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion
that a minor comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a
reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s finding of
jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases for
jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by
substantial evidence’”].)

                                15
well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and
there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical
health can be protected without removing the minor from the
minor’s parent’s . . . physical custody.’” (See In re M.D., supra,
93 Cal.App.5th at p. 856; In re I.R. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 510,
520.) “A removal order is proper if based on proof of parental
inability to provide proper care for the child and proof of a
potential detriment to the child if he or she remains with the
parent. The parent need not be dangerous and the minor need
not have been actually harmed before removal is appropriate.
The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child.” (In re
Lana S. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 94, 105, internal quotation marks
and citations omitted.) “The court may consider a parent’s past
conduct as well as present circumstances.” (In re L.O. (2021)
67 Cal.App.5th 227, 245, internal quotation marks omitted.)
      “We review a dispositional order removing a child from a
parent for substantial evidence, ‘“keeping in mind that the trial
court was required to make its order based on the higher
standard of clear and convincing evidence.”’ [Citation.]
‘[A]ppellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence in support of
a finding requiring clear and convincing proof must account for
the level of confidence this standard demands.’ [Citation.] In
applying this standard of review, ‘the question before the
appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains
substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could
have found it highly probable that the fact was true.’ [Citation.]
We view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing
party and give due deference to how the trier of fact may have
evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the
evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.”

                                16
(In re M.V. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 944, 960; see Conservatorship
of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995; In re I.R., supra,
61 Cal.App.5th at p. 520.) As in an appeal from the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction findings, “the appellant bears the burden of
showing ‘“there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial
nature”’ to support the dispositional removal order.” (In re L.O.,
supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 245; see In E.E. (2020)
49 Cal.App.5th 195, 206.)

            2.      Substantial Evidence Supported the Court’s
                    Order Removing Ayden from Lorena
      Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding
by clear and convincing evidence that returning Ayden to
Lorena’s home would create a substantial danger to his physical
health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being.10
The same evidence that supported the court’s jurisdiction
findings also supported the court’s removal order. (See § 361,
subd. (c)(1); In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 135.) As
discussed, by the combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing,

10    The Department argues Lorena forfeited her challenge to
Ayden’s removal because she did not object to removal or seek
custody of Ayden at the disposition hearing. Because Lorena
contends substantial evidence did not support the court’s removal
order, her failure to raise the issue in the juvenile court does not
preclude her from raising it on appeal. (See In re Cole L. (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 591, 605, fn. 11 [“A challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence on an issue as to which the [child protective agency]
has the burden of proof is not forfeited by a parent’s failure to
object in the juvenile court.”]; In re R.V. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th
837, 848 [a parent’s challenge to “the court’s dispositional order
on the ground of insufficient evidence . . . is not forfeited even if
not raised in the juvenile court”].)

                                 17
Lorena had yet to acknowledge her substance abuse problem
(claiming that she no longer took Adderall and that she drank
alcohol only when someone else was taking care of Ayden).
Lorena’s inconsistent explanations to the social worker about the
frequency of her drinking confirmed she was in denial about how
much she actually drank. That she failed to complete the
Department-approved substance abuse treatment programs
(whether for lack of attendance or inconsistent testing) further
supported the court’s finding.
       Lorena also failed to acknowledge her role in placing Ayden
in grave danger when she left him unsupervised that October
morning (by sticking to a version of the events the bus driver’s
account contradicted). The social worker tried to explain to
Lorena that Ayden could have been killed in the middle of the
street, but Lorena insisted she left him in the front yard for only
a few minutes while she went inside the house to retrieve a
mask. The juvenile court reasonably concluded that, without
fully accepting responsibility for placing Ayden at risk of serious
physical harm, Lorena would continue to abuse drugs and
alcohol, which would lead to further lapses in supervision. (See
In re M.D., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 857-858 [“A fact finder
could reasonably conclude, based on the evidence of [the father’s]
habitual parenting practices, coupled with his ongoing denial and
lack of insight, that it was highly probable returning [the child]
to his care put her at risk of physical danger.”]; In re A.F. (2016)
3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293 [“In light of [the] mother’s failure to
recognize the risks to which she was exposing the minor, there
was no reason to believe the conditions would not persist should
the minor remain in her home.”]; In re Kristin H. (1996)
46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1657-1658 [because the mother was “in
denial about both her substance abuse and the importance of

                                18
medical treatment of her mental problems,” there was “little
reason to believe that if [the child] were returned home, . . . the
‘downhill spiral’ . . . would not reoccur, placing [her] in danger”];
see also In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197 [“One
cannot correct a problem one fails to acknowledge.”].) In light of
Ayden’s special needs and developmental age, a lapse in
supervision would be all the more dangerous. (See Seiser &
Kumli, California Juvenile Courts Practice and Procedure (2022)
§ 2.126[2][a] [a child’s special needs are factors in the juvenile
court’s decision whether to remove a child from a parent with
substance abuse problems].)
      In addition, as the juvenile court found, Lorena’s substance
abuse interfered with her ability to follow up with medical care
for Ayden’s weight and digestion problems. Ayden’s foster
mother expressed her concern about the food Lorena fed Ayden
during visits because he always returned to his foster home with
“diarrhea and watery stool from his visits.” The juvenile court
could reasonably infer that, even after the court detained Ayden,
Lorena had difficulty following medical advice on maintaining a
healthy diet for Ayden.11
      Substantial evidence also supported the juvenile court’s
findings that the Department provided reasonable services and
that there were no reasonable means to protect Ayden without
removing him from Lorena. The Department referred Lorena to
substance abuse treatment programs that included drug testing,
but Lorena did not complete them satisfactorily. Lorena
continued to hide the amount and frequency of her alcohol
consumption and the fact Dominic, who left remnants of

11    Lorena was well aware of Ayden’s lactose intolerance, and
health care staff instructed her to give Ayden “lactose-free” foods.

                                 19
marijuana use in his room, resided in the home. Lorena’s
evasiveness made it impossible for the Department or the court
to trust she would stay sober or refrain from leaving Ayden in the
care of someone who also used drugs or drank during the day.12
(See In re E.E., supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 212 [“failure to
engage in services . . . such as failing to cooperate with the social
services agency, being less than forthcoming during interviews,
or missing drug tests” can “support removal from parental
custody at disposition”].)
       Lorena asserts that, except for one drug test, she tested
negative and that she completed various programs, which she
claims demonstrated her ability to safely care for Ayden. The
record does not support Lorena’s assertion. As discussed, in the
weeks leading up to the disposition hearing, Lorena failed to
complete a substance abuse treatment program (due to missed
tests) and a few weeks later tested positive for amphetamine.
While Lorena submitted certificates of completion from online
programs for parenting and substance abuse, those programs had
not been approved by the Department, and nothing in the
certificates indicated Lorena was testing clean. (See In re Natalie
A. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 178, 186 [father’s “past substance
abuse and failure to complete a drug treatment program”
supported the juvenile court’s finding his drug abuse “affected his
ability to adequately care for his very young children”]; cf.
§ 300.2, subd. (a) [“[s]uccessful participation in a treatment

12    On the day after Ayden ran into the street, the school
principal called Lorena and heard Dominic in the background
speaking with slurred speech. On that same day, Dominic told
the social worker that he had been drinking and was “buzzed.”

                                 20
program for substance abuse may be considered in evaluating the
home environment”].)
       Finally, Lorena argues the Department should have offered
her respite care,13 which the foster mother received to help her
take care of Ayden. But in 2021 Lorena received respite care
(40 hours per month) from a provider while she had physical
custody of Ayden. She also received caregiving support from
Briana and a babysitter. Nevertheless, an assessor observed that
Lorena “continue[d] to have difficulties with organization, time
management, and overseeing Ayden’s daily schedule.” In any
event, the record supported the court’s implied finding that, even
with additional childcare assistance, Lorena’s behavior would
still endanger Ayden’s physical health and safety because of her
unacknowledged and unresolved substance abuse problem.

13     Respite care is designed to give parents a break from caring
for a disabled child. (Harbor Regional Center v. Office of
Administrative Hearings (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 293, 303; see
§ 4690.2, subd. (a)(3) [one of the purposes of respite services is to
“[r]elieve family members from the constantly demanding
responsibility of caring for” a disabled person].)

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                         DISPOSITION

      The juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition
order are affirmed.

                                              SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

                  FEUER, J.

                  MARTINEZ, J.

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