Court Opinion

ID: 9914971
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-03 21:00:57.163864+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:15:53.260962
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10154    Document: 26-1     Date Filed: 01/03/2024   Page: 1 of 6

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-10154
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       HARRISON BARRUS,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 0:18-cr-60255-RNS-1
                          ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                23-10154

       Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
             Harrison Barrus, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se,
       appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to modify the
       conditions of his supervised release, brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
       § 3583(e)(2), in which he sought to modify his supervised release
       conditions to “no conditions.” He argues that the imposition, or
       potential revocation, of supervised release violates the Double
       Jeopardy Clause because those actions constitute a second
       prosecution or punishment. After careful review, we affirm.
              We review the denial of a motion for modification of
       supervised release for abuse of discretion. United States v. Cordero,
       7 F.4th 1058, 1070 (11th Cir. 2021). Under the abuse-of-discretion
       standard, we will reverse only if it we have a “definite and firm
       conviction that the district court committed a clear error of
       judgment in the conclusion it reached.” United States v. Moran, 573
       F.3d 1132, 1137 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotations and brackets omitted).
       “A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes
       an error of law.” Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996).
              The Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause provides
       that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice
       put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “This
       guarantees against a second prosecution for the same offense after
       acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after
       conviction, and multiple punishments for the same
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       23-10154               Opinion of the Court                         3

       offense.” United States v. Bobb, 577 F.3d 1366, 1371 (11th Cir. 2009).
       The Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude punishment
       imposed on revocation of supervised release, however, since it
       constitutes a modification of the original sentence. See United States
       v. Woods, 127 F.3d 990, 992–93 (11th Cir. 1997) (examining a
       Double Jeopardy challenge in the context of a revocation of
       probation while citing cases about revoking supervised release
       because the two procedures are essentially the same); Johnson v.
       United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000) (“Treating postrevocation
       sanctions as part of the penalty for the initial offense . . . avoids
       [Double Jeopardy] difficulties.”).
               Moreover, supervised release is a form of punishment that
       “Congress prescribes along with a term of imprisonment as part of
       the same sentence.”        Mont v. United States, 139 S. Ct.
       1826, 1834 (2019) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583). Under § 3583(a), a
       district court “may include as a part of the sentence a requirement
       that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after
       imprisonment.” United States v. Hamilton, 66 F.4th 1267, 1275 (11th
       Cir. 2023).
              We recently joined the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits and
       held that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) was “not a vehicle to collaterally
       attack the legality of a defendant’s sentence.” Cordero, 7 F.4th at
       1070. Rather, “§ 3582(e) sets forth factors a court should consider
       in determining whether to modify or terminate a condition of
       supervised release and illegality or constitutionality is not one of
       them.” Id. We held that arguments concerning the legality and
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                  23-10154

       the constitutionality of a defendant’s sentence were “reserved
       properly for direct appeal or a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate
       sentence.” Id.
               In United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019), a plurality
       of the Supreme Court held that application of § 3583(k)’s
       mandatory five-year term of imprisonment, based on judicial fact
       finding, violated the defendant’s jury trial rights because the
       revocation sentence imposed resulted in a total sentence that
       exceeded the statutory maximum. Id. at 2383–84. Thus, it struck
       down 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k), which required a district court to impose
       a minimum term of incarceration upon a finding of certain
       violations of supervised release. Id. at 2374. Nevertheless, the
       plurality clarified that its holding was “limited to § 3583(k),” and
       that it was not addressing whether § 3583(e) implicated due process
       concerns. Id. at 2383–84. Moreover, it added that “an accused’s
       final sentence includes any supervised release sentence he may
       receive.” Id. at 2379. In a concurring opinion, Justice Breyer agreed
       that § 3583(k) was unconstitutional, but he did not reach the issue
       of § 3583(e)’s constitutionality. See id. at 2386 (Breyer, J.,
       concurring).
              Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion nor err in
       denying Barrus’s motion. For starters, because Barrus was
       challenging the illegality or constitutionality of his supervised
       release conditions, a § 3583(e)(2) motion was the improper vehicle.
       Cordero, 7 F.4th at 1070. Barrus did not file a direct appeal, nor did
       he challenge the conditions of his supervised release conditions in
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       23-10154               Opinion of the Court                         5

       a § 2255 motion. Id. As a result, the district court properly denied
       Barrus’s § 3583(e)(2) motion.
              But even if Barrus could raise his claim in a § 3583(e)(2)
       motion, his claim that his supervised release term or conditions
       violate the Double Jeopardy Clause would fail in any event.
       Notably, Barrus did not challenge a specific condition of his
       supervised release; rather, he broadly challenged his supervised
       release term. Under the caselaw, supervised release -- or the
       revocation of supervised release -- does not constitute a separate or
       second punishment. Mont, 139 S. Ct. at 1834; Woods, 127 F.3d at
       992–93. Likewise, Haymond confirmed that “an accused’s final
       sentence includes any supervised release sentence he may receive.”
       139 S. Ct at 2379. Thus, to the extent Barrus bases his Double
       Jeopardy challenge on receiving “separate” sentences, he is
       mistaken.
              Finally, to the extent that Barrus has challenged the potential
       revocation of his supervised release under the Double Jeopardy
       Clause, this claim is not ripe for adjudication, and we will not
       consider it. Under Article III of the Constitution, the federal courts
       are constrained to decide only “actual cases or controversies,”
       which means we will not adjudicate a claim that is unripe for
       review. United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1088–89 (11th Cir.
       2003). A claim is not ripe for review if it “rests upon contingent
       future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not
       occur at all.” Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998)
       (quotations omitted). In Zinn, we held that, although a prisoner’s
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       6                     Opinion of the Court                 23-10154

       challenge to a particular supervised release condition was generally
       ripe for review, speculative arguments concerning the
       implementation of the condition were not. 321 F.3d at 1088–89,
       90–92. Similarly here, any arguments Barrus has about any future
       revocation proceeding is speculative and we will not consider it.
       Accordingly, we affirm.
             AFFIRMED.