Court Opinion

ID: 9370108
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-10 20:02:37.036427+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:19.484218
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/10/23 P. v. Delgado CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                        (Shasta)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C096161
 c
          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                                 (Super. Ct. No. 20F7124)

           v.

 DANNY DON DELGADO,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Danny Don Delgado appeals from a postconviction order granting the
People’s motion to require him to pay approximately $3,600 in victim restitution.
Defendant’s appointed counsel filed an opening brief raising no legal issues and asking
this court to independently review the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979)
25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). Counsel informed defendant of his right to file a supplemental
brief, and he has not filed one. In the interest of judicial economy, we exercise our
discretion to independently review the record.

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       We conclude the trial court erred in awarding victim restitution as it relates to
relocation expenses under Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(I) because there
was no verification by law enforcement or a mental health treatment provider supporting
the necessity of the victim’s relocation costs. (Statutory section citations that follow are
found in the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.) We reverse the restitution order as to
relocation expenses and remand for further proceedings, including affording the People
the opportunity to provide the required verification.

                      FACTS AND HISTORY        OF THE   PROCEEDINGS
       In October 2020 defendant was involved in a domestic dispute with his girlfriend
while they lived together in a fifth-wheel trailer on defendant’s mother’s property.
During an argument, defendant broke several items of his girlfriend’s property, including
a mirror, cabinet, and table, and also took her purse, phone, and keys. Defendant
followed his girlfriend outside the trailer and threatened and assaulted her. His girlfriend
called police, and the next day, an officer forced open the trailer door (since defendant
had taken the victim’s keys) and searched inside where he saw the damaged mirror.
       In December 2020, defendant pleaded no contest to one count of corporal injury
on a spouse or cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a)) and admitted a prior strike conviction
(§ 1170.12) in exchange for eight years in prison and dismissal of the remaining charges
and allegations. After waiving referral for a probation report, the trial court immediately
sentenced defendant to the stipulated term of eight years. The court ordered victim
restitution, but reserved jurisdiction on the amount. Nothing in the record shows
defendant appealed the judgment.
       In June 2021, the People sought approximately $3,000 in direct victim restitution
based on costs to replace property defendant or the police had damaged during the
October 2020 altercation, and costs related to moving the fifth-wheel trailer from the
property. To support the restitution request, the People submitted pictures of the

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damages incurred, copies of receipts to fix the damage and to relocate the trailer, and a
sworn statement from the victim describing the damage and the reason for relocating due
to safety concerns.
       Defendant objected to certain amounts claimed for moving the trailer, including
costs to relocate the trailer, to replace a worn tire that blew during the move, and to fix
damage to the skirting on the trailer caused by the blown tire. His opposition brief noted
that although a victim might be entitled to costs for relocation, law enforcement had to
verify the need to relocate.
       At a contested hearing in April 2022, the trial court awarded $3,654.93 in victim
restitution, including relocation costs, finding that defendant’s girlfriend had to move the
trailer for immediate safety reasons given defendant’s criminal conduct and his unknown
whereabouts, and that she would not have had to move the trailer had defendant not
committed the charged offenses.
       Defendant timely appealed.
       Defendant’s counsel filed a Wende brief, served defendant with a copy of the brief
and the appellate record, and informed defendant that he could file a supplemental brief
within 30 days. Appellate counsel’s notice to defendant did not indicate that his appeal
might be dismissed as abandoned if he did not file a supplemental brief.

                                        DISCUSSION
       In Wende, our Supreme Court held that “Courts of Appeal must conduct a review
of the entire record whenever appointed counsel submits a brief on direct appeal which
raises no specific issues or describes the appeal as frivolous.” (People v. Delgadillo
(2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 221 (Delgadillo).) The Wende procedure applies “to the first
appeal as of right and is compelled by the constitutional right to counsel under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” (Ibid.)

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       In Delgadillo, our Supreme Court held that Wende independent review is not
constitutionally required in an appeal from a postconviction order denying a section
1172.6 petition for resentencing because the denial does not implicate a defendant’s
constitutional right to counsel in a first appeal as of right. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at pp. 222, 224-225.) The court further found that general due process principles
regarding fundamental fairness did not compel a Wende independent review of the order.
(Id. at pp. 229-232.) Nevertheless, in the interest of judicial economy, the court exercised
its discretion to conduct its own independent review of the record given that the lower
court’s “suboptimal” notice to defendant referenced Wende but did not indicate that his
appeal might be dismissed as abandoned if he did not file a supplemental brief. (Id. at
pp. 222, 233.)
       While Delgadillo addressed the application of Wende’s review procedures in the
specific context of a postconviction relief order under section 1172.6 (Delgadillo, at
p. 231, fn. 5 [“[i]n this case, we are not deciding Wende’s application to other
postconviction contexts, which may present different considerations”]), which is not the
type of postconviction order at issue here, the same principles may nonetheless apply
given that this does not appear to be a first appeal as of right. (See People v. Akins
(2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1381, fn. 3 [recognizing restitution order constitutes a
postjudgment order].) However, we need not decide whether Delgadillo in fact governs
review of the instant order because, like the Supreme Court, we shall exercise our
discretion to conduct an independent review of the record.
       Having independently reviewed the record, we conclude the trial court abused its
discretion by awarding relocation costs as an item of victim restitution without complying
with the verification requirements in section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(I). (People v.
Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 663 [a trial court’s restitution order is reviewed for
abuse of discretion]; People v. Baudoin (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1184, 1191 (Baudoin)

                                              4
[failure to comply with statutory requirement for verification of costs to relocate away
from a defendant mandated reversal of restitution order].)
       Section 1202.4 provides that a crime victim “who incurs an economic loss as a
result of the commission of a crime shall receive restitution directly from a defendant
convicted of that crime.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (a)(1).) Under subdivision (f) of section
1202.4, in every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the
defendant’s conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the
victim in an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss claimed by
the victim or any other showing to the court. (§ 1202.4, subd. (f).)
       As relevant here, section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(I) provides that recoverable
restitution costs include “[e]xpenses incurred by an adult victim in relocating away from
the defendant, including, but not limited to, deposits for utilities and telephone service,
deposits for rental housing, temporary lodging and food expenses, clothing, and personal
items.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(I).) The subdivision, however, expressly requires that
such relocation costs “be verified by law enforcement to be necessary for the personal
safety of the victim or by a mental health treatment provider to be necessary for the
emotional well-being of the victim.” (Ibid.)
       In this case, the court awarded the victim relocation expenses after finding that she
moved the trailer for purposes of her immediate safety since officers had been unable to
locate defendant, and defendant had threatened to burn down the victim’s trailer and blow
up her car if she attempted to leave. Essentially, the victim relocated to get away from
defendant and to ensure he did not know her whereabouts. Under those circumstances,
the verification requirements in section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(I) applied. (See
Baudoin, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 1192.)
       But nothing in the record shows that the People submitted the requisite
verifications. The request for restitution did not include a letter or other type of
verification from either law enforcement or a mental health professional stating that

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relocation was necessary for the victim’s safety or mental health. (Compare People v.
Mearns (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 493, 497, 502-503 [finding that a letter submitted by a law
enforcement investigator at the restitution hearing stating the victim’s mobilehome that
was sold was incapable of being secured from intruders because of its shoddy
construction, and that the victim was in constant fear of being assaulted again in the
mobilehome sufficiently satisfied section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(I)’s verification
requirements].)1 We therefore remand the matter for a new restitution hearing regarding
relocation expenses, including affording the People the opportunity to provide the
necessary verification. (Baudoin, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 1196 [reversing restitution
order and remanding for further proceedings to provide the People an opportunity to
submit proper verification of relocation costs]; see also People v. Harvest (2000)
84 Cal.App.4th 641, 645, 650 [restitution award made at resentencing does not implicate
double jeopardy and is not constitutionally barred]; People v. Thygesen (1999)
69 Cal.App.4th 988, 996 [remanding for new restitution hearing following reversal of
restitution award].)

1  To the extent People v. Mearns, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at page 503, held in the
alternative that the court’s restitution order regarding relocation costs was also authorized
under the first sentence of section 1202.4, subdivision (f) regardless of the specific
verification requirements in section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(I), we disagree for the
reasons expressed by the court in Baudoin. (See Baudoin, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1184-1185 [“To read the first sentence of section 1202.4, subdivision (f) as permitting
imposition of moving related costs for relocating away from the defendant (including to
prevent the defendant from finding the victim again) without giving force to the
verification requirement set forth in section 1202.4(f)(3)(I) renders section 1202.4(f)(3)(I)
surplusage and a nullity[,]” which should be avoided under settled rules of statutory
construction].)

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                                       DISPOSITION
       The order of restitution is reversed insofar as it included relocation expenses, and
the matter is remanded for a further restitution hearing at which the People shall have the
opportunity to verify the relocation costs pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(I).

                                                  HULL, J.

We concur:

ROBIE, Acting P. J.

MAURO, J.

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