Court Opinion

ID: 9720572
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:36:35.806718+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:19.614618
License: Public Domain

SAND, Justice
(dissent).
I respectfully dissent for the following reasons:
The cases cited in the majority opinion and the principles of law, as well as the rationale for which they stand, support rather than militate against the validity of § 65-01-02(4)(a)(l), North Dakota Century Code. Section 65-01-02(4)(a) provides as follows:
“ ‘Hazardous employment’ shall mean any employment in which one or more employees are employed regularly in the same business or in or about the establishment except:
(1) Agricultural or domestic service: or
(2) Any employment of a common carrier by railroad; or
(3) Any employment for the transportation of property or persons by nonresidents, where, in such transportation, the highways are not traveled more than seven miles and return over the same route within the state of North Dakota; or
(4) All members of the clergy and employees of religious organizations engaged in the operation, maintenance and conduct of the place of worship;” [Underscoring ours.]
The principal issue is whether or not subdivision (1), the agricultural exemption, is constitutional.
In every instance where this question was presented to a court it was upheld. However, in Gutierrez v. Glaser Crandell Company, 388 Mich. 654, 202 N.W.2d 786, 792 (1972), the court held invalid a classification within a classification relating to employees engaged in agricultural activities. The legal rationale parallels the case of Melland v. Johanneson, 160 N.W.2d 107 (N.D.1968), where the court declared unconstitutional § 54-03-21, NDCC, which prohibited state legislators from doing business with the state in excess of $10,000 per calendar year. But other than this Michigan case, every court has upheld the exemption and, for that matter, every court has upheld a similar exemption or exclusion in the Unemployment Compensation Act relating to agricultural services. Even the Michigan court of appeals, in the case of McDonald v. Chrysler Corporation, 68 Mich.App. 468, 242 N.W.2d 810 (1976), held that the workmen’s compensation statute which granted conclusive presumption of dependency to a wife living with a workman on the date of injury *109but the widow of the deceased workman living apart for justifiable cause was granted conclusive presumption of dependency did not deprive wives of equal protection of law on the basis that public policy permits special legislation if the state is to maintain an attitude of solicitude toward widows, and on the basis that it is the only source of competent nonhearsay testimony as to the issue of justifiable cause for living apart. This illustrates that even in matters of sub-classification the court will uphold it if there is some justifiable basis, but in the issue before us we are not involved with a subclassification and it is therefore not necessary that the state establish justification for its enactment. The reverse is true. The one seeking to have the statute declared invalid has the burden of establishing that there is no justification for the enactment.
Numerous court decisions concerned with this topic and the case law, together with the legal rationale, as well as the cases cited in support of the decision overwhelmingly support the validity of the agricultural service exclusion from the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
In New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 37 S.Ct. 247, 254, 61 L.Ed. 667 (1917), the Court upheld the validity of the exemption of agricultural employees in the New York Act.
The Workmen’s Compensation Act, Unemployment Compensation Act, and Minimum Hours and Wages Act were challenged in Doe v. Hodgson, 478 F.2d 537, cert. denied 414 U.S. 1096, 94 S.Ct. 732, 38 L.Ed.2d 555, and was upheld by the three-judge court. The court relied heavily upon Romero v. Hodgson, 319 F.Supp. 1201 (D.C.1970), in which the exclusion of agricultural labor from the Unemployment Compensation Act was challenged. Romero was summarily affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in 403 U.S. 901, 91 S.Ct. 2215, 29 L.Ed.2d 678 (1971). The Court in Romero noted that:
“The law of equal protection has undergone many changes in the past half century, and most important of these is, perhaps, the standard of deference to the legislature which came out of the turbulent thirties and which remains strong today. While many cases have shown the judiciary highly suspicious of legislative classifications which abridge what are called ‘fundamental’ or ‘constitutional’ rights, every presumption has run in favor of upholding the laws which deal with regulation of the economy, the public health, or the collection and disbursement of taxes.”
The court also said:
“When the legislature chooses to inaugurate a reform as sweeping as that which is represented by unemployment compensation, it is often forced to make compromises which, whether in the name of politics or economy, are often impossible of explanation in strictly legal terms. Realizing this, the Courts have refused to require that the State remedy all aspects of a particular mischief or none at all. Developments in the Law; Equal Protection, 82 Harv.L.Rev. 1065, 1084-87 (1969). See also Gonzales v. Shea, 318 F.Supp. 572 (D.C.1970).”
The so-called change of times, as stated in the majority opinion, is not in harmony with the above case.
This is not the first time that this question has been before this court. In State v. Hagan, 44 N.D. 306, 175 N.W. 372, 379 (1919), this court said:
“The fact that the act excludes from its operation domestic and agricultural employes, as well as railroad employes, does not give rise to the constitutional objection of unreasonable and arbitrary discrimination as a matter of law. The fact that the entire field subject to regulation has not been covered is not fatal. What trades and occupations may be regulated is ordinarily a matter for the Legislature, in the absence of a distinctive showing of an unreasonable and arbitrary discrimination or classification. Similar exclusions in other Compensation Acts have been upheld.”
There was one dissent, but three concurrences with the author. The only reasona*110ble conclusion that can be determined from State v. Hagan is that the court upheld the exclusion. In my opinion, it requires forceful, compelling reasons to reverse the former decision, particularly in matters of constitutionality where an act has a strong presumption of validity.
The exclusion of farm laborers and domestic service in the Texas Workmen’s Compensation Act was challenged in Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 249 U.S. 152, 157, 39 S.Ct. 227, 229, 63 L.Ed. 527 (1919). The Court, in upholding it, said:
“However, we are clear that the classification can not be held to be arbitrary and unreasonable. The Supreme Court of Texas, in sustaining it said (108 Tex. 96,110, 111, 185 S.W. 556): ‘Employees of railroads, those of employers having less than five employees, domestic servants, farm laborers and gin laborers are excluded from the operation of the act, but this was doubtless for reasons that the Legislature deemed sufficient. The nature of these several employments, the existence of other laws governing liability for injuries to railroad employees, known experience as to hazards and extent of accidental injuries to farm hands, gin hands and domestic servants, were all matters no doubt considered by the Legislature in exempting them from the operation of the act. Distinctions in these and other respects between them and employees engaged in other industrial pursuits may, we think, be readily suggested. We are not justified in saying that the classification was purely arbitrary.’
“There is a strong presumption that a Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience, and that its dis-criminations are based upon adequate grounds.”
The court further stated:
“The exclusion of farm laborers and domestic servants from the compulsory scheme of the New York Workmen’s Compensation Act was sustained in New York Central R. R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 208, 37 S.Ct. 247, 229, 61 L.Ed. 667, [677,] . . . upon the ground that the Legislature reasonably might consider that the risks inherent in those occupations were exceptionally patent, simple, and familiar. The same result has been reached by the state courts generally. Opinion of Justices, 209 Mass. 607, 610, 96 N.E. 308, [1 N.C.C.A. 557;] Young v. Duncan, 218 Mass. 346, 349,106 N.E. 1; Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co., 175 Iowa 245, 154 N.W. 1037, 287, L.R.A. 1917D, 15, Ann.Cas.1917E, 803, [11 N.C. C.A. 886;] Sayles v. Foley, 38 R.I. 484, 490-492, 96 A. 340, [12 N.C.C.A. 949]. Similar reasoning may be applied to cotton gin laborers in Texas; indeed, it was applied to them by the Supreme Court of that state, as we have seen. And the exclusion of domestic servants, farm laborers, casual employees, and railroad employees engaged in interstate commerce was sustained in Mathison v. Minneapolis Street R. Co., 126 Minn. 286, 293, 148 N.W. 71, L.R.A.1916D, 412, [5 N.C. C.A. 871].”
The exclusion of farming and ranching from the Workmen’s Compensation Act was challenged in State of Montana ex rel. Hammond v. Hager, 160 Mont. 391, 503 P.2d 52 (1972). In ruling that the exclusion was not arbitrary and unreasonable, the Montana Supreme Court took into consideration the expressions of the United States Supreme Court on the same subject and related subjects as to classifications and took note of what the United States Supreme Court said in Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88, 60 S.Ct. 406, 408, 84 L.Ed. 590, 593:
“Since the members of a legislature necessarily enjoy a familiarity with local conditions which this court cannot have, the presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and classes. The burden is on the one attacking the legislative *111arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.”
The Montana court continued;
“Under these circumstances, the rule that an act of the Legislature will not be declared invalid because it is repugnant to some provision of the Constitution, unless its invalidity is made to appear beyond a reasonable doubt, applies with particular force.

“Our legislature might have concluded to exclude farming operations because they were hazardous enough that the cost of coverage to the farmer would be an unnecessary and unreasonable burden, particularly since the legislature may not have believed that conditions of farm employment generally were similar to those of the industries the Act did cover.
“Speculating further, one could as well conclude that the legislature excluded coverage of farmers on the basis, for example, that a great majority of Montana farmers employ too few people to justify the cost and administrative expense required to comply with the Act; that most farm employees are too seasonal or casual to require coverage; or, that Montana’s farmers should not be put at a competitive disadvantage since most other states also exclude agriculture.”
The court also stated that the person seeking to invalidate the act has the burden to “negative every conceivable basis which might support the legislative action.”
I believe it is common knowledge, or at least well established, that a farmer is not able to pass on the costs to the purchaser or consumer, as is the situation in other commercial enterprises and business. The farmer is required to absorb any additional costs himself. This constituted the basis for a statute excluding classification of agricultural products from the statutory definition of commercial trading in Figenskau v. McCoy, 66 N.D. 290, 265 N.W. 259 (1936). To this should be added that it is common knowledge for farmers to exchange help, particularly with the family farm. Added to this is the further knowledge that minor members of the family, as distinguished from other businesses, perform work as part of the “growing up process” without any given salary, and also exchange services with other family farms. While other businesses also have members of the family working, in most instances they are adults and not minors, as the situation is on the farm.
In Lucas v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 222 Or. 420, 353 P.2d 223, the Supreme Court of Oregon in 1960 held valid an act which exempted relatives and members of the family from the Workmen’s Compensation Act unless the employer gave notice to the Commission before the injury. It is reasonable to assume that the legislature in excluding agricultural employees was aware that many farms had members of a family or relatives working on the farm, particularly exchange of help, etc., and that the problem of policing the Workmen’s Compensation Act would be monumental and too costly and therefore provided for the exclusions.
The majority opinion has not pointed to one single factor why the act is invidiously discriminatory. It simply states so without any support whatsoever. The exclusion does not fall within the suspect class, therefore the need to support the act is not present but it is up to the challengers to clearly illustrate and demonstrate that the act amounts to an invidious discrimination. This has not been done.
We might well, at this point, note what Justice Cardozo had to say in The Nature of the Judicial Process 141 (1921):
“The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure, He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to ‘the primordial necessity of order in the social life.’ Wide enough in all the con*112science is the field of discretion that remains.”
Chief Justice Burger, in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber et al., Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation v. Weber and United States et al. v. Weber, — U.S. —, 99 S.Ct. 2721, 61 L.Ed.2d 480 (1979), said:
“What Cardozo tells us is beware the ‘good result,’ achieved by judicially unauthorized or intellectually dishonest means on the appealing notion that the desirable ends justify the improper judicial means. For there is always the danger that the seeds of precedent sown by good men for the best of motives will yield a rich harvest of unprincipled acts of others also aiming at ‘good ends.’ ”
I cannot improve upon this when I consider what the majority opinion is attempting to do without any judicial basis, rationale, or justification.
The United States Supreme Court, in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1105, 6 L.Ed.2d 393, Chief Justice Warren said that:
“. . . The Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.”
In this same case Justice Frankfurter quoted from McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 24 S.Ct. 769, 49 L.Ed. 78, wherein the Court said:
“The decisions of this court from the beginning lend no support whatever to the assumption that the judiciary may restrain the exercise of lawful power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose or motive has caused the power to be exerted.”
He also quoted from Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 57 S.Ct. 554, 81 L.Ed. 772; Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 19 L.Ed. 482; Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 51 S.Ct. 522, 75 L.Ed. 1154; Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 61 S.Ct. 1050, 85 L.Ed. 1487, wherein the court said:
“Inquiry into the hidden motives which may move [a Legislature] to exercise a power constitutionally conferred upon it is beyond the competency of courts.”
Justice Frankfurter said further:
“Neither the Due Process nor the Equal Protection Clause demands logical tidiness. Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 33 S.Ct. 441, 57 L.Ed. 730. No finicky or exact conformity to abstract correlation is required of legislation. The Constitution is satisfied if a legislature responds to the practical living facts with which it deals. Through what precise points in a field of many competing pressures a legislature might most suitably have drawn its lines is not a question for judicial re-examination. It is enough to satisfy the Constitution that in drawing them the principle of reason has not been disregarded. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 69 S.Ct. 198, 93 L.Ed. 163. And what degree of uniformity reason demands of a statute is, of course, a function of the complexity of the needs which the statute seeks to accommodate.”
These principles of law have full application to the question under consideration here.
A similar observation and statement was made in Lindsey v. Normet by the United States Supreme Court, 405 U.S. 56, 92 S.Ct. 862, 31 L.Ed.2d 36, wherein it said:
“. . .a State is ‘presumed to have acted within [its] constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, [its] laws result in some inequality.”
We frequently talk about separation of powers, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial, and that each must respect the *113separate but equal branches of government. The majority opinion is clearly without any reservation proposing legislation and is, in fact, taking the position of the legislature. If we are going to maintain this respect for the three branches of government it is important that we, the members of the judiciary, refrain from intruding upon the legislative function and also from declaring a legislative act unconstitutional unless it is done pursuant to the long-standing principles and concepts of constitutional law.
For further authority on the validity of the exemptions of farm laborers, and, for that matter, any classification, see 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 497, pp. 275 and 276, as well as 81 Am.Jur.2d Workmen’s Compensation § 17. If you examine these authorities you will find that not one court where this question has been brought before it has declared it unconstitutional. All of the courts, and there are a sizable number, have held the exclusion valid. We may not, and should not, act as a super legislative body. If members of the judiciary want to enter the field of legislation there are ways to accomplish that and that is the way it should be done, but not by judicial fiat.
Because the Unemployment Compensation Act is in so many areas similar to the Workmen’s Compensation Act, and the same constitutional principles of law apply, it is well to observe what courts have said with reference to the exclusion of farm laborers from the Unemployment Compensation Act. In Halabi v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 171 Conn. 316, 370 A.2d 938 (1976), the court said:
“The approach to equal protection claims is substantially the same under both the federal and state constitutions. [Citations omitted.] Equal protection rights do not ‘prevent the legislature from dealing differently with different classes of people. It means only that classifications must be based on natural and substantial differences, germane to the subject and purpose of the legislation, between those within the class included and those whom it leaves untouched.’ [Citations omitted.] And, ‘it has long been settled that a classification, though discriminatory, is not arbitrary nor violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [of the United States Constitution] if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it.’ Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528, 79 S.Ct. 437, 441, 3 L.Ed.2d 480; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393.”
Another unemployment compensation exclusion was considered in Davoren v. Iowa Employment Security Commission, 277 N.W.2d 602 (Iowa 1979). In upholding the constitutionality of the exclusion, the Iowa court said:
“The nature of the burden upon one attacking a statute on equal protection grounds depends upon whether the classification is one subject to close judicial scrutiny or traditional equal protection analysis. Since the classification here is not based upon sex, race, alienage or national origin and does not involve fundamental rights, it is subject to the traditional equal protection standard. [See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 681, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 1768, 36 L.Ed.2d 583, 589 (1973).] Under that test the classification must be sustained unless it is patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. Id. It does not deny equal protection simply because in practice it results in some inequality; practical problems of government permit rough accommodations; and the classification will be upheld if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived to justify it. [Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161, 25 L.Ed.2d 491, 501-502 (1970).] The legislature has wide discretion in deciding classifications. [Cedar Memorial Park Cemetery Association v. Personnel Association, Inc., 178 N.W.2d 343, 350 (Iowa 1970).] Our view of the wisdom of the legislation is irrelevant. [Peel v. Burk, 197 N.W.2d 617, 619 (Iowa 1972).]”
*114In Varela v. Mounho, 92 N.M. 147, 584 P.2d 194 (App.1978), the court had under consideration a similar situation in which the constitutionality was approached indirectly. The court stated that asserted unfairness to farm laborers by exclusion of farm laborers from coverage under the workmen’s compensation act is a matter of legislative policy. This observation applies here. For further authorities on exclusion of farm labor under the unemployment compensation act see 76 Am.Jur.2d Unemployment Compensation § 29, p. 909 and following pages.
I pose the question: If this court concludes that the farm labor exclusion is unconstitutional, then by what legal means can the exclusion for domestic service, and workers for religious organizations be exempt? I see no difference in any basic legal principles applied to any of them. Further than that, how can the unemployment compensation act which excludes farm laborers be held valid if this particular classification and exclusion is held to be invalid and unconstitutional.
Also, on the question of classification, the Supreme Court in Ideal Bakery v. Schryver, 43 Wyo. 108, 299 P. 284 (1931), had under consideration the question whether or not bakery kitchen which employed machines could be validly included in the workmen’s compensation act as extra-hazardous operation. The court held it was a valid classification, and on page 294 of 299 P. said:
“The authority of the state to classify employees in groups identified by the business of the employer, without regard to whether the employee is exposed to the special hazards of the employer’s business, has been upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Melton, 218 U.S. 36, 30 S.Ct. 676, 54 L.Ed. 921, 47 L.R.A., N.S., 84; Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Railroad Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 31 S.Ct. 136, 55 L.Ed. 78, 32 L.R.A., N.S., 226, Ann.Cas. 1912A, 463. The act is not subject to constitutional objection.”
In Horst v. Guy, 211 N.W.2d 723 (N.D.1973), the court had under consideration the legislative definition of a resident of North Dakota which excluded veterans who served on continuous active duty for fifteen or more years immediately prior to August 5, 1964, and who had not established an actual abode in North Dakota prior to March 29, 1971, the effective date of the “bonus” Act. On page 730, the court took notice and recited the appropriate provisions of the State Constitution, including Section 20, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The court then set forth the following rules:
“1. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution permits the states a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than they affect others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective.
“2. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality.
“3. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.
“5. Only invidious discrimination is prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
“6. Neither the Due Process Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution demands logical tidiness. No finicky or exact conformity to abstract correlation is required of legislation. The Constitution is satisfied if a legislature responds to the practical living facts with which it deals. Through what precise points in a field of many competing pressures a legislature might most suitably have drawn its lines is not a question for judicial re-examination. It is enough to satisfy the Constitution that in drawing them the principle of reason has not been disregarded, and what degree of uniformity reason demands of a statute is a function of the complexity of the needs which the statute seeks to ac*115commodate.” ¶¶ 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of the syllabus, State v. Gamble Skogmo, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 749 (N.D.1966).
“5. Sections 11 and 20 of the North Dakota Constitution and § 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution do not prohibit or prevent classification, provided such classification is reasonable for the purpose of legislation, is based on proper and justifiable distinctions considering the purpose of the law, is not clearly arbitrary, and is not a subterfuge to shield one class or to burden another or to oppress unlawfully in its administration.” ¶ 5 of the syllabus from Melland v. Johanneson, 160 N.W.2d 107 (N.D.1968).
“In the instant case the purpose of the legislation in question is to compensate North Dakota veterans of the Vietnam Conflict in appreciation for their services rendered to their State and country. The intent is to compensate only residents of North Dakota; this is a valid legislative intent as there is no reason for the citizens of North Dakota to compensate residents of other States.”
In Horst v. Guy, 219 N.W.2d 153 (N.D. 1974), the court again had under consideration the bonus question. At this time the question was on the regulation which had been in effect and which, amongst other things, provided that the veteran must have been completely separated from continuous active duty after which he must have returned to North Dakota and re-established his home in the State of North Dakota prior to the effective date of the Act, March 29, 1971. The validity of the regulation was upheld, but before doing so the court took specific notice that a regulation, as a statute, is entitled to a reasonable presumption of constitutionality. A reading of these two cases leaves the unmistakable impression that the court gave serious consideration to the statute and rule which had been of long standing, and that no showing had been made that either one was invalid or unconstitutional.
On the subject of classification as it may involve the educational system which, in my opinion, as to importance, ranks way on top and one would believe no discrimination of any kind would be permitted. Yet the United States Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973), upheld the challenge claiming that the Texas school financing system discriminated on the basis of wealth and was unconstitutional under the equal protection clause. Before the court reached its conclusion, it particularly drew a distinction between those privileges and rights specifically granted under the constitution and those which are not. The Court said:
“A century of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause affirmatively supports the application of the traditional standard of review, which requires only that the State’s system be shown to bear some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes.”
The Court further said:
“Since the members of the Legislature necessarily enjoy a familiarity with local conditions which this Court cannot have, the presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and classes.” [Underscoring mine.]
The case of Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 49 S.Ct. 57, 73 L.Ed. 204 (1928), is important for two reasons: the United States Supreme Court in 1928 applied a far too strict a test on the regulation of pharmacy outlets (stores). The United States Supreme Court later reversed itself in North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy v. Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156, 94 S.Ct. 407, 414, 38 L.Ed.2d 379 (1973). This supports the proposition that the United States Supreme Court allows state legislatures greater latitude in developing classifications and regulations of businesses. Of equal importance is that the North Dakota Supreme Court stated that it felt bound by the earlier United States Supreme Court decision in concluding that § 43-15-35(5), NDCC, violated the due process clause of *116§ 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in the case of Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc. v. North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy, 202 N.W.2d 140 (N.D.1972). It is interesting to note that in this instance there is no expression that it is bound by any of the United States Supreme Court decisions even though they are claiming that the act is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, which is contrary to at least two United States Supreme Court decisions mentioned earlier herein. Does this mean that this court can pick and choose at its pleasure without any regard for judicial precedent? It would seem so.
Significantly, in the Snyder’s Drug Store case, 219 N.W.2d 140, this court stated:
“It is also well established that a classification although discriminatory is not arbitrary nor violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it. Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis, 240 U.S. 342, 36 S.Ct. 370, 60 L.Ed. 679 (1916); New York Rapid Transit Corp. v. City of New York, 303 U.S. 573, 58 S.Ct. 721, 82 L.Ed. 1024 (1938). Furthermore, a court need not know the special reasons, motives, or policies of a State legislature in adopting a particular classification, so long as the policy is one within the power of the legislature to pursue, and so long as the classification bears a reasonable relation to those reasons, motives, or policies.’ Signal Oil and Gas Company v. Williams County, 206 N.W.2d 75 at 83 (N.D.1973).”
In Hospital Services v. Brooks, 229 N.W.2d 69 (N.D.1975), this court held unconstitutional a statute which placed the responsibility and liability upon the children of their parents’ care at the State Hospital without regard to any other criteria. The responsibility arose because of birth and no other reason. Also, the son or daughter sued had no recourse against any brother or sister. The claim by the State was on an arbitrary basis and rested primarily upon who had the money. The author of the majority opinion in this case dissented, and said:
“Legislative enactments are entitled to every presumption or constitutionality and such presumption should prevail unless it is shown that it is manifestly viola-tive of organic law. The challenger has the burden of proving that the statute does not apply uniformly within a class of persons or that the class is based upon an unreasonable distinction or that it is an unnatural classification. [Citations omitted.] It appears to me that the trial court, and the majority opinion, places the burden on the appellant, rather than giving him the benefit of the presumption.”
This is exactly what the majority opinion is doing in this case. He also said, “Even though we might disagree with the moral principle involved, a classification based upon moral principle is not legally invalid.” In my view, the same applies here.
In City of Bismarck v. Materi, 177 N.W.2d 530 (N.D.1970), the court had under consideration the validity of a city ordinance permitting grocery stores operated by the owner-manager who regularly employs not more than three employees to do business on Sunday, whereas other businesses could not remain open. The court held that this did not constitute invidious discrimination as would be prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause, either under the United States Constitution or under the State Constitution. The court also observed that a statute is not to be struck down on the supposition that various differently treated situations may in fact be the same. There has been no showing, and no reason had been advanced, indicating that this principle or reason has been disregarded in the exemption provision. To the contrary, some convincing reasons have been stated.
In Signal Oil and Gas Company v. Williams County, 206 N.W.2d 75 (N.D.1973), we sustained the validity of § 57-02-04(3), NDCC, against the attack that it was unconstitutional because it classified for taxation as real property the machinery and equipment of oil and gas refineries and sugar beet refineries, while it did not classi*117fy the machinery and equipment of other processors of raw materials, such as lignite coal or potatoes, in such a manner.
In State v. Knoefler, 279 N.W.2d 658 (N.D.1979), we said:
“From our research, it appears that neither the United States Supreme Court, nor any Federal or State court has defined what constitutes an inherently suspect classification. Under these circumstances we do not believe it necessary or appropriate to formulate a definition. The United States Supreme Court, however, has treated classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin as inherently suspect, and a plurality, in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973), included sex as being a suspect classification and thus subject to strict judicial scrutiny. See also Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971). As to alienage, see Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 53 L.Ed.2d 63 (1970). As to race, see McLaughlin v. State of Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 85 S.Ct. 283, 13 L.Ed.2d 222 (1964). As to illegitimacy, see Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 96 S.Ct. 2755-, 49 L.Ed.2d 651; but Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 99 S.Ct. 518, 58 L.Ed.2d 503 (1978), should also be considered.
“Based upon the foregoing decisions, we do not believe that § 4-12-03.1, NDCC, ‘involves an “inherently suspect classification” or a “fundamental interest,” ’ and therefore is not subject to strict judicial scrutiny.”
The same concept applies here.
On the matter of economics, the 1979 North Dakota Legislature provided for special consideration in financial transactions for persons involved in advancing finances to a person beginning farming operations. This clearly illustrates that there is an economic factor to be considered in farming which supports the exclusion of agricultural services under the .Workmen’s Compensation Act.
Furthermore, it must be observed and noted that the act does not prohibit agricultural employees from being covered under the workmen’s compensation act for there is a' special optional coverage feature which permits every employer engaged in agricultural activities to secure workmen’s compensation coverage. The act in effect does not make it compulsory to secure workmen’s compensation coverage for agricultural employees, but it does not prohibit the coverage — it makes it optional.
The majority suggests there have been substantial technological changes in farm operations within the period when the act was enacted and to the present date. Be that as it may, it is a well accepted principle of law that a person may question the constitutionality of a statute only as it applies to him but not as it may be applied to others. This, of course, necessarily includes the factual basis upon which the act is being challenged. In this instance, the injury occurred while Benson was in the process of bringing in a heifer when the horse he was riding fell on him and injured his leg. Benson may not rely upon technological changes, such as the use of tractors, combines, etc., to say that the act is unconstitutional as applied to him. Riding horses is as old as the practice of farming. Facts upon which the constitutionality of a statute may be challenged generally are only those which apply to the individual involved in the challenge. United States v. Raines, 262 U.S. 17, 80 S.Ct. 519, 4 L.Ed.2d 524 (1960); State v. Gamble Skogmo, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 749 (N.D.1966).
The United States Supreme Court in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973), announced the rule that a litigant may assert only his constitutional rights unless he can present some weighty countervailing policies. Countervailing policies would be recognized only if there were a violation of a positive constitutional right, as an example, those stated in the First Amendment. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 14 L.Ed.2d 22 (1965).
I can see no technological changes in riding horses on a farm. By the greatest imagination, there is no countervailing policy involved here.
*118The majority opinion attempts to rely upon Rosebear v. Anderson, 143 F.Supp. 721 (D.N.C.1956), 245 F.2d 673 (8th Cir.1957), for support of its conclusion. Reliance upon this case is misplaced. In Rosebear the injured employee successfully resisted the application of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The employee did not want to be covered by the Act and brought a common law tort liability action against the farmer. The court held that because the farmer who had an option to come under the Act and did apply to come under the Act nevertheless failed to properly post notice in a conspicuous place of his election to come within the Act, and as a result the employee was not bound by the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The majority is placing a peculiar strained construction on Rosebear to reach the result it did. If this is an example of what it did to the other cases, I can readily understand why it reached the faulty conclusion it did.
The reference to Hughes v. Oklahoma, — U.S. —, —, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979), is totally unwarranted as a basis to support the conclusion of the majority opinion. The Hughes case is governed basically by the commerce clause. The provision of law involved was an attempt to interfere with the commerce clause. The workmen’s compensation statute does not attempt to regulate interstate commerce, as was the case in Hughes, and for that matter there is an exception granted for those employees involved in railroad and other types of employment engaged in interstate commerce.
Three standards of scrutiny, as set out in Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D.1974), were recognized in State v. Knoefler, 279 N.W.2d 658 (N.D.1979), where we said:
“The difficulty, however, remains in determining which standard applies.”
The majority opinion, without giving any reason or justification, merely states that the exclusion comes within the intermediate standard. I disagree.
In Dunn v. North Dakota Workmen’s Compensation Bureau, 191 N.W.2d 181 (N.D.1971), this court held that there was a valid basis for placing officers of a corporation in a different classification than those of a partnership who were also executive officers of the partnership. The court reasoned that a partner is an owner who may secure coverage by special contract with the Bureau, whereas executive officers of the corporation do not have such authority. Peculiarly, the Act did not specifically rule out partnership executive officers, but the court reached this by construction because the Act only referred to executive officers of corporations doing work similar to that performed by employees. This is an instance where the court rather than the legislature noted an exception and then upheld the exception.
The majority opinion concludes that the claim is to be paid by the Workmen’s Compensation Fund. All of the funds available to the Bureau, whether called catastrophe funds or otherwise, come from premiums collected from employers covered by the Act. How can this court imply or direct that these funds be used to pay the cost of the claim? What liability, if any, was incurred by those employer? If the legislature were to do this, then this court would have no hesitation to say it was invalid and unconstitutional because of lack of due process. I ask the question: What did the employers do to be penalized?
This entire question is one that should be resolved by the legislature and not by the court. If I were a member of the legislature I could vote to remove the exception, but as a member of the judiciary I cannot and should not.
On the basis of the majority opinion, I would have to conclude that from henceforth it would be difficult, if not legally impossible, to justify any exclusion or exemption because if this exclusion is legally considered to be an invidious discrimination then I have real difficulty in justifying any exemption or exclusion.
PAULSON, J., concurs.