Court Opinion

ID: 9776735
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:43:25.808863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:42.074493
License: Public Domain

ONION, Presiding Judge
(concurring).
I would make clear that the admonishment by the court is defective in that the court did not admonish the appellant relative to whether the pleas of guilty were prompted by “a delusive hope of pardon” as required by the mandatory provisions of Article 26.13, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P. See Crocker v. State, 485 S.W.2d 566 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Jefferson v. State, 486 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.Cr.App.1972) ; Ex parte Chavez, 482 S.W.2d 175 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Rogers v. State, 479 S.W.2d 4 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), and Ex parte Battenfield, 466 S.W.2d 569 (Tex.Cr.App.1971).
I concur in the result only because the appellant on direct examination by his own counsel was asked and answered the following question:
“Q Okay, but you are pleading guilty not because anybody threatened you or offered out any hope of probation or parole or anything like that?
“A No.”
This testimony was given prior to the entry of the judgment of guilty and the assessment of punishment. The written judgment entered on the same date as the plea of guilty reflects, in part, that appellant was duly admonished of the consequences of his plea and that it appeared to the court that the appellant was sane and not influenced in making his plea by any consideration of fear, or by any persuasion or delusive hope of pardon prompting him to confess his guilt, etc.
*179I cannot say, under the circumstances of the case, that the record is contrary to the recital in the judgment.
I do agree with the State that the best practice would have been for the admonishment to have included a determination of whether the plea was prompted by a delusive hope of pardon.
I concur.