Court Opinion

ID: 9891664
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-19 14:17:54.939293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:00:02.694260
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Bruister, 2023-Ohio-3794.]

                                COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                       :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                 :
                                                                No. 112410
                 v.                                  :

DARIN BRUSITER,                                      :

                 Defendant-Appellant.                :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 19, 2023

          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                              Case No. CR-11-549689-A

                                               Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Anthony T. Miranda, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                  Paul Croushore, for appellant.

LISA B. FORBES, P.J.:

                   Darin Brusiter (“Brusiter”) appeals from the trial court’s journal entry

denying his postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. After reviewing the

facts of the case and pertinent law, we affirm the lower court’s judgment.
I.   Facts and Procedural History

               In April 2011, Brusiter was charged with two counts of aggravated

murder, with murder-for-hire and firearm specifications, kidnapping, insurance

fraud, and tampering with evidence in relation to the killing of Asia Harris

(“Harris”).   Harris’s husband Samuel Wilson was also charged in the same

indictment. Brusiter filed a motion to suppress the statements he made to the police

as being in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d

694 (1966). On May 2, 2012, the court denied Brusiter’s motion and that same day

he pled guilty to one count each of aggravated murder, kidnapping, insurance fraud,

and tampering with evidence. The state dismissed the second count of aggravated

murder and the murder-for-hire specification. The court sentenced Brusiter to an

agreed term of “33 years to life” in prison.

               Brusiter filed a direct appeal of the trial court’s denial of his motion

to suppress. This court affirmed Brusiter’s convictions, finding that he waived his

right to appeal pretrial rulings when he pled guilty and the trial court complied with

Crim.R. 11(C)(2) in accepting this guilty plea. “We have previously held that where

a trial court carries out the mandates of Crim.R. 11(C)(2), no prejudice accrues to

the appellant where the court fails to inform him of the effect of his plea on pretrial

motions.” State v. Brusiter, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98614, 2013-Ohio-1445, ¶ 7

(“Brusiter I”). “Consistent with [case law] authority, Ohio courts, when confronted

with defendants who have pled guilty to aggravated murder and subsequently

sought to appeal pretrial rulings, have found such arguments waived.” Id. at ¶ 8. In
finding that Brusiter waived his right to challenge the denial of his motion to

suppress, this court also concluded that “the record on appeal affirmatively

demonstrates that [Brusiter] entered a voluntary, knowing and intelligent guilty

plea as required by Crim.R. 11.” Id. at ¶ 9.

               Brusiter filed an application to reopen Brusiter I, pursuant to

App.R. 26(B), in which he argued that his appellate counsel was ineffective for

failing to argue that his murder and kidnapping convictions should merge as allied

offenses. See State v. Brusiter, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98614, 2013-Ohio-3803

(“Brusiter II”). This court denied the application to reopen, finding that in Brusiter

I, his convictions “were affirmed because [his] guilty plea waived any error relating

to the motion to suppress,” and “the parties had stipulated that the murder charge

and the kidnapping charge would not merge as allied offenses.” Id. at ¶ 3.

               While Brusiter I and Brusiter II were pending, Brusiter filed a

petition to vacate or set aside judgment of conviction or sentence based on a claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel in the trial court. In March 2014, the trial court

denied this postconviction motion, and Brusiter appealed arguing that “the trial

court abused its discretion in denying him an evidentiary hearing on his petition for

postconviction relief.” This court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, finding that

the trial court “did not abuse its discretion in denying Brusiter’s petition without a

hearing because he failed to satisfy his burden to provide sufficient, operative facts

outside the record to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient.” State

v. Brusiter, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101908, 2015-Ohio-1549, ¶ 12 (“Brusiter III”).
This court also found that, because Brusiter “could have raised his claims regarding

trial counsel in his direct appeal, * * * his challenges are barred by res judicata.” Id.

at ¶ 14.

               On August 12, 2015, Brusiter filed a pro se motion to withdraw guilty

plea due to newly discovered evidence. In this motion, Brusiter argued that he

should be entitled to withdraw his plea, based on a breach of his plea agreement,

because he received a letter dated May 31, 2015, from the Ohio Attorney General

Collections Enforcement Section (the “OAG”). In this letter, the OAG stated that the

Ohio Crime Victims Reparations Fund granted a claimant, Brenda Cook, an award

of $15,679.07 in relation to the murder of Harris. This letter “demand[s] settlement

of this claim * * *.” According to Brusiter, this letter breached his plea agreement

because his sentencing journal entry reflects that costs and fines were waived and

no restitution was ordered.

               On February 26, 2020, Brusiter, who was represented by counsel at

this time, filed a second motion to withdraw guilty plea. In this motion, Brusiter

argued that there are two reasons he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea.

“First, there is a manifest injustice due to ineffective assistance of counsel at a critical

stage in the proceeding (plea negotiation, plea agreement, and appeal). * * * Second,

* * * Brusiter’s rights to Due Process and protection from self-incrimination under

the Fifth Amendment were violated during the investigation and later in the motion

to suppress hearing.”
               The trial court summarily denied both motions to withdraw guilty

plea on February 8, 2023. It is from this order that Brusiter appeals raising one

assignment of error for our review.

      I.     The trial court erred in denying Mr. Brusiter’s timely motion to
             withdraw his guilty plea, and in doing so without hearing the
             evidence.

               Before reaching the merits of Brusiter’s appeal, we note that in

Brusiter’s appellate brief, he presents arguments concerning only the denial of his

February 26, 2020 motion to withdraw guilty plea. Therefore, we will not address

his 2015 pro se motion to withdraw guilty plea.

II. Law

      A. Postsentence Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea

               Appellate courts review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to withdraw

a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion. State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 526, 584

N.E.2d 715 (1992). See also State v. Hines, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108326, 2020-

Ohio-663, ¶ 7. A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision “‘is unreasonable,

arbitrary or unconscionable.’” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450

N.E.2d 1140 (1983), quoting State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.3d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144

(1980). The Ohio Supreme Court recently explained that an abuse of discretion

“involves more than a difference in opinion.”        State v. Weaver, Slip Opinion

No. 2022-Ohio-4371, ¶ 24. That is, a trial court’s judgment that is “profoundly and

wholly violative of fact and reason” constitutes an abuse of discretion. Id.
              Pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1, a “motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no

contest may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest

injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and

permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea.” This court has stated that

manifest injustice “comprehends a fundamental flaw in the path of justice so

extraordinary that the defendant could not have sought redress from the resulting

prejudice through another form of application reasonably available to him or her.”

State v. Sneed, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80902, 2002-Ohio-6502, ¶ 13.

              “A trial court is not automatically required to hold a hearing on every

postsentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea. * * * A hearing is required only if the

facts alleged by the defendant, accepted as true, would require that the defendant be

allowed to withdraw the plea.” State v. Vihtelic, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105381,

2017-Ohio-5818, ¶ 11. We “review a trial court’s decision whether to hold a hearing

on a postsentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion.” State

v. Simmons, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109786, 2021-Ohio-1656, ¶ 20.

      B. Res Judicata

              “Res judicata bars the assertion of claims against a valid, final

judgment of conviction that have been raised or could have been raised on appeal.

* * * Ohio courts of appeals have applied res judicata to bar the assertion of claims

in a motion to withdraw a guilty plea that were or could have been raised at trial or

on appeal.” State v. Ketterer, 126 Ohio St.3d 448, 2010-Ohio-3831, 935 N.E.2d 9,

¶ 59. See also State v. Nicholson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97567, 2012-Ohio-1550,
¶ 11 (“Nicholson could have raised the issue on direct appeal but did not do so.

Accordingly, any argument regarding the validity of his plea is now barred by res

judicata.”).

III. Analysis

               On appeal, Brusiter argues that “the trial court should have at least

held an evidentiary hearing on the questions presented of ineffective assistance of

counsel in failing to apply the new standards that ineffectiveness of counsel during

a critical stage makes the plea involuntary, unintentional, and unknowing.” Brusiter

supports this argument by citing to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in

Garza v. Idaho, 586 U.S. 2, 139 S.Ct. 738, 203 L.Ed.2d 77 (2019). Brusiter’s

argument is based on his assumption that the

      U.S. Supreme Court recently changed the standards of ineffective
      assistance of counsel set by Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S.
      668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, by adopting it partially and
      holding that the “prejudice” requirement is presumed if the
      ineffectiveness of counsel was during a critical stage of the hearing.

However, our reading of Garza does not align with Brusiter’s assumption.

               Garza did not change the standard for ineffective assistance of

counsel. Rather, the Garza Court explained the court’s previous holding regarding

circumstances when a presumption of prejudice arises as articulated in Roe v.

Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000):

      We hold today that the presumption of prejudice recognized in Flores-
      Ortega applies regardless of whether a defendant has signed an appeal
      waiver. This ruling follows squarely from Flores-Ortega and from the
      fact that even the broadest appeal waiver does not deprive a defendant
      of all appellate claims. Accordingly where, as here, an attorney
      performed deficiently in failing to file a notice of appeal despite the
      defendant’s express instructions, prejudice is presumed “with no
      further showing from the defendant of the merits of his underlying
      claims.” See Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S., at 484, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145
      L.Ed.2d 985.

Garza at 749-750.

               The Garza opinion applies to cases in which “an attorney performed

deficiently in failing to file a notice of appeal despite the defendant’s express

instructions” to do so and the defendant signed “an appeal waiver.” Id. See also

State v. Cognati, 9th Dist. Summit No. C.A. No. 29905, 2022-Ohio-601, ¶ 145

(applying Garza and Flores-Ortega in holding that “counsel’s failure to follow Mr.

Cognati’s express instructions to file an appeal would constitute deficient

performance, and prejudice would be presumed”). Upon review, we find that Garza

does not apply to the case at hand, which is Brusiter’s fourth appeal. This case is not

an example of counsel failing to file an appeal despite Brusiter’s express instruction

to do so.

               Furthermore, we find that Brusiter’s 2020 motion to withdraw his

guilty plea, which alleged ineffective assistance of counsel and the improper denial

of his motion to suppress, is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Brusiter filed a

direct appeal in which he challenged the trial court’s denial of his motion to

suppress. This court, in Brusiter I, affirmed Brusiter’s convictions, finding that he

waived his right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress by pleading guilty.

This court also found that Brusiter’s guilty plea was voluntary, knowing, and

intelligent. Id. at ¶ 9. In Brusiter II, this court reiterated the holdings in Brusiter I.
Brusiter II at ¶ 3. Additionally, this court rejected Brusiter’s ineffective assistance

of counsel claim in Brusiter III and found that this claim was barred by the doctrine

of res judicata, because it was not raised in Brusiter’s direct appeal. Brusiter III at

¶ 14.

                The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Brusiter’s

motion to withdraw his guilty plea without holding a hearing. The motion was filed

almost nine years after he pled guilty to aggravated murder and other offenses

associated with the death of Harris. Brusiter’s arguments concerning ineffective

assistance of counsel and the suppression of evidence were rejected by this court in

his previous appeals. Accordingly, Brusiter’s sole assignment of error is overruled.

                Judgment affirmed.

        It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

        The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

        It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment

into execution.

        A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

LISA B. FORBES, PRESIDING JUDGE

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., and
MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR