Court Opinion

ID: 9942967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 15:10:59.850696+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:39.370073
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

James Gray                                      :
                                                :
         v.                                     : No. 800 C.D. 2021
                                                :
Philadelphia District Attorney’s                :
Office,                                         :
                   Appellant                    : Submitted: December 4, 2023

BEFORE:           HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
                  HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
                  HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION
BY JUDGE CEISLER                                                FILED: February 22, 2024

         The Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office (DAO) appeals from a June 2,
2021 Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (Trial Court)
affirming a Final Determination by the Pennsylvania Office of Open Records (OOR)
ordering the DAO to release records requested by James Gray (Requester) pursuant
to the Right-to-Know Law (RTKL).1 Requester originally sought the release of six
sets of records purportedly in the DAO’s custody.                     Of these, Requester has
withdrawn his request for four, and stated that his request for a fifth has been
satisfied by records already released. The Trial Court nonetheless directed the DAO
to comply with the original request in its entirety. The DAO argues on appeal that
the request has been mooted with respect to the five items no longer sought by
Requester, and further argues that the only part of the request still in controversy
calls for a record that does not exist. After review, we reverse the Trial Court’s
order.

         1
             Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 65 P.S. §§ 67.101-67.3104.
                                        I. Background
       Requester, an inmate at the State Correctional Institution-Mahanoy, submitted
his original request to the DAO on July 10, 2020, seeking the following:
       1. [A] complete record of the [DAO’s] publicly announcing [of] the
       existence and release date of the racially discriminatory jury selection
       training tape by [former] Assistant District Attorney Jack McMahon
       [McMahon Tape].[2]

       2. [A] complete record of all news/press release letters, e-mails, or other
       records of communication notifying news media about the existence
       and release of the “McMahon Tape.”

       3. [A] complete record listing all individuals [who] and/or agencies
       [that] received a copy of the “McMahon Tape” or transcript of the same
       from the [DAO] (i.e., attorneys, defendants, prisons, jails, etc.).

       4. [A] complete record or official letter of notification sent to attorneys,
       criminal defenders, and/or other individuals regarding the existence and
       release of the McMahon [T]ape by the [DAO].

       5. [A] complete record listing the names and titles of all persons
       responsible for distributing the McMahon [T]ape and/or notifying
       individuals about the existence and release of the [T]ape.

       6. [A] complete record of all internal memos, general release
       information regarding the existence, release, distribution and contents
       of the McMahon [T]ape and transcript of the same generated by the
       [DAO].

       2
         Requester was referring to a 1987 videorecording in which former Philadelphia Assistant
District Attorney (ADA) Jack McMahon conducted a training session for the DAO on jury
selection. Therein, McMahon, who served under District Attorney Ronald D. Castille, offered
“various racial and gender stereotypes . . . as reasons to discriminate in the selection of jurors.”
Commonwealth v. Basemore, 744 A.2d 717, 729 (Pa. 2000). District Attorney Lynne Abraham,
Castille’s successor, released the McMahon Tape in 1997 to the attorneys of individuals whom
McMahon had prosecuted before juries. Commonwealth v. Cook, 952 A.2d 594, 601 (Pa. 2008).
In his Brief to this Court, Requester notes that he was prosecuted by McMahon in the year
following the recording of the McMahon Tape, convicted of first-degree murder, and sentenced to
life imprisonment without parole. Appellee’s Br. at 6.

                                                 2
Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 5a. After invoking a 30-day extension to respond
pursuant to Section 902 of the RTKL,3 the DAO informed Requester on August 10,
2020 that his request was denied. Id. at 8a.            In its letter to Requester, the DAO
explained that it was “unable to locate” records responsive to any of the six parts of
the request. Id.
       Requester timely filed an appeal to OOR on September 1, 2020. Id. at 10a.
Therein, Requester argued that the absence of responsive records was highly
improbable, given that the McMahon Tape received ample media attention after its
1997 release and led to extensive litigation. Id. at 19a-20a. Requester also cited
several appellate cases in which persons prosecuted by McMahon were said to be
notified of the McMahon Tape’s existence and argued that the DAO should be able
to find responsive records related to those cases. Id. at 21a. Additionally, Requester
argued that the DAO’s failure to supply him with a copy of the McMahon Tape or
notify him or his attorney of its existence violated his civil rights given that those
other individuals were provided with copies of the Tape. Id. at 21a-22a.
       In its defense, the DAO submitted a September 14, 2020 statement by acting
RTKL compliance officer, ADA Robbins, attesting that six department supervisors
“in the best position to know if their units possess any responsive records” were
asked whether any of the requested records were kept;4 none of the supervisors were
aware of any responsive records. Id. at 47a. ADA Robbins further asserted that the

       3
         Under certain circumstances, Section 902 permits an agency to extend its 5-day response
time to a right-to-know request by 30 days, with written notice to the requester. 65 P.S. § 67.902.

       4
          ADA Robbins stated that the DAO officials contacted included Jane Roh, its
Communications Director; Erica Rebstock, Supervisor of its Major Trials Unit; Nancy
Winkelman, Supervisor of its Law Division; Paul George, Assistant Supervisor of its Law
Division; Tracey Kavanaugh, Supervisor of its Post-Conviction Relief Act Unit; and Lawrence
Goode, Supervisor of its Appeals Unit. R.R. at 47a.

                                                3
DAO had no practical means of searching for responsive records, as its case
management system only permitted searches by a defendant name or identifying
number, a docket number, a district control number, or the name of some victims or
witnesses. Id. at 47a. Thus, an adequate search would entail looking manually
through “thousands of boxes of materials” in an off-site storage facility, “in the
hopes of finding a few responsive documents.” Id. In an accompanying letter brief,
the DAO asserted that any potentially responsive documents that may exist would
be exempt from disclosure pursuant to the RTKL’s exception for criminal
investigative information.5
       In correspondence dated September 28, 2020, OOR asked the DAO to clarify
whether it ever initiated a search of documents in its off-site storage facility, and
whether potentially responsive records have been destroyed pursuant to the DAO’s
record retention policies. Id. at 58a. In a second attestation, dated September 29,
2020, ADA Robbins explained that the only documents stored off-site are trial files,
which have not been digitized; thus, searching those files would require retrieving
“every file from off-site storage.” Id. at 62a. Regarding other categories of relevant
documents, such as internal memos or press releases, ADA Robbins stated that the
DAO had no policy requiring their retention. Id.
       On October 1, 2020, OOR issued a final determination granting Requester’s
appeal. Id. at 73a. Therein, OOR explained that, because no search of the files
stored off-site was conducted, “the [DAO] has not met its burden to establish that it
has completed a good faith search for the requested records.” Id. at 72a. OOR

       5
          Section 708(b)(16) of the RTKL exempts from public access any “record of an agency
relating to or resulting from a criminal investigation,” including “[c]omplaints of potential criminal
conduct other than a private criminal complaint” and “[i]nvestigative materials, notes,
correspondence, videos and reports.” 65 P.S. § 67.708(b)(16).

                                                  4
further determined that the original request was sufficiently specific to allow a good-
faith search for responsive records. Id. at 71a. The “year of creation and year of the
release of the [McMahon] Tape” themselves allowed for a sufficiently concise
search, OOR explained. Id. at 72a. OOR also rejected the DAO’s assertion that
extant documents would be exempt from disclosure, stating that the DAO had failed
to meet its burden of proof that the records “would in any way be related to a criminal
investigation, other than that they may be contained within a ‘trial file.’” Id. at 73a.
      The DAO filed a notice of appeal in the Trial Court on October 30, 2020,
which essentially reasserted the arguments made before OOR. Id. at 77a-105a. In
a supporting brief, the DAO stated that it searched the trial files from the cases cited
by Requester. Id. at 96a.      That search yielded a copy of a letter sent to counsel
representing William Basemore, who was prosecuted by the DAO and convicted in
1988 of first-degree murder and other crimes, notifying him of the release of the
McMahon Tape.6 See id. at 106a. The DAO argued that the Trial Court should
therefore vacate OOR’s order with regard to Item 4. Id. at 96a. Attached as exhibits
were a copy of the notification letter, along with a transcript of the McMahon Tape.
See id. at 106a, 110a. Requester filed a brief in response, in which he stated the
following:
      For the purposes of this appeal, [Requester] will only address and
      confine his argument to Item 3 of his original RTKL request.
      [Requester] respectfully withdraws his request for records at Items 1-2,
      & 5-6. Further, in light of the “good-faith effort to provide records” by
      the DAO, the [request] at Item 4 has been satisfied.

      6
         Basemore later appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing, inter alia, that the
McMahon Tape was evidence that his constitutional rights had been violated during his
prosecution. See Basemore, 744 A.2d at 727.

                                            5
Id. at 185a. Accordingly, Requester only asked the Trial Court to order the release
the record requested at Item 3: a “complete record listing all individuals and/or
agencies who received a copy” of the McMahon Tape. Id. at 187a.
       The Trial Court held oral arguments via teleconference on May 5, 2021,
during which the parties largely reiterated the arguments advanced in their briefs.
See Suppl. Record, Hr’g Tr., 5/5/2021. On June 2, 2021, the Trial Court issued an
order affirming OOR’s Final Determination without an accompanying opinion. Id.
at 208a. The DAO timely filed an appeal to this Court on July 2, 2021. Id. at 209a.
       In an opinion submitted to this Court pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a),7 the Trial
Court explains that Requester’s withdrawal of Items 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 was
“ineffective,” as requests may not be modified on appeal. DAO’s Br., App. A, Trial
Ct. Op., 9/7/2021, at 4. The Trial Court also rejects the assertion that the request
was insufficiently specific, as Requester provided a clearly defined subject matter,
scope, and timeframe of relevant documents. Id. at 8 (citing Off. of the Dist. Att’y
of Phila. v. Bagwell, 155 A.3d 1119, 1142-1143 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017)). Furthermore,
the Trial Court explains that the DAO failed to meet its burden of proving that
responsive documents did not exist, reasoning that “not being aware of any
responsive documents versus no responsive documents existing are two different
scenarios.” Id. at 7. The Trial Court expresses incredulity that “the DAO [could],
in good faith, assert that no responsive records exist . . . without undertaking specific
searches of areas where those records and documents might be found and providing
the Court with evidence of these efforts.” Id. Lastly, the Trial Court explains that
the DAO had not met its burden of proof that responsive records were exempt,

       7
         Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) provides that, upon the receipt of a notice of appeal, “the judge who
entered the order giving rise to the notice of appeal, if the reasons for the order do not already
appear of record, shall ... file of record at least a brief opinion of the reasons for the order.”

                                                6
referring to its written attestations as “conclusory” and lacking in supporting
evidence. Id. at 13 (citing Bagwell, 155 A.3d at 1129).
                                           II. Issues
       On appeal,8 the DAO argues that Requester’s appeal to OOR was rendered
“largely moot” by his withdrawal of five of the six items in his request. The DAO
further argues that the Trial Court lacked the authority to order the release of Items
3 and 5, which, in the DAO’s view, “do not exist.” DAO’s Br. at 20.
                                       III. Discussion
                    A. Partial Withdrawal of Requests on Appeal
       It is well settled that an actual case or controversy must be extant at all stages
of litigation, not merely at the time that a complaint is filed; otherwise, this Court
will dismiss an appeal as moot. Harris v. Rendell, 982 A.2d 1030, 1035 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2009). An “actual case or controversy” is one that is real rather than
hypothetical and affects someone in a concrete manner so as to provide a factual
predicate for reasoned adjudication.           Finn v. Rendell, 990 A.2d 100, 105 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2010). Exceptions to the mootness doctrine may be made where the
conduct complained of is capable of repetition yet likely to evade judicial review,
where the case involves issues of great public importance, or where one party will
suffer a detriment without the court’s decision. Horsehead Res. Dev. Co., Inc. v.
Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 780 A.2d 856, 858 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). As a pure question of

       8
          When a case under the RTKL reaches this Court from a court of the common pleas, our
standard of review is limited to determining whether findings of fact are supported by substantial
evidence, or whether the lower court committed an error of law or abuse of discretion in reaching
its decision. Kaplin v. Lower Merion Twp., 19 A.3d 1209, 1213 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). The
scope of our review is plenary. Allegheny Cnty. Dep’t of Admin. Servs. v. A Second Chance, Inc.,
13 A.3d 1025, 1029 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011).

                                                7
law, the issue of mootness is subject to a de novo standard of review. Commonwealth
v. Dixon, 907 A.2d 468, 472 (Pa. 2006).
       Our Supreme Court examined the mootness doctrine within the specific
context of the RTKL in Chester Water Authority v. Department of Community and
Economic Development, 249 A.3d 1106 (Pa. 2021). In that case, a state agency
denied a request for records of communication between the agency, a private
consulting firm hired to manage the finances of the City of Chester, and two firms
serving the agency as subcontractors. Id. at 1108. The state agency asserted various
reasons for the denial, including attorney-client privilege and the attorney work-
product doctrine. Id. at 1109. On the eve of oral argument before this Court, the
state agency released records that it had initially withheld on those two grounds. Id.
The requester nonetheless asked this Court to rule on whether the records had been
properly withheld before their release. Id. We dismissed as moot that portion of the
petition for review in light of the state agency’s disclosure of the records, holding
that the dispute between the parties was thereby rendered moot. See Finnerty v. Pa.
Dep’t of Cmty. and Econ. Dev., 208 A.3d 178, 180 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019).
       While reversing this Court on issues that are not instantly relevant, the
Supreme Court “affirmed as to the mootness of the attorney-client privilege and
work-product doctrine issues.” Chester Water Authority, 249 A.3d at 1115. The
requester maintained that the Supreme Court should apply the mootness exception
for matters important to the public interest, as every request under the RTKL entails
“a matter of great public importance.”9 Id. The Court rejected that argument,

       9
         The requester also argued that the mootness exception for matters capable of repetition,
yet evading review, should be applied. Chester Water Auth., 249 A.3d at 1115. The Court rejected
that argument as well, reasoning that a course of unreasonable conduct by the state agency could
be evaluated in its own right, “should it arise.” Id.

                                               8
observing that “not every claim arising under the [RTKL] crosses the high threshold
for exception.” Id. In the absence of a controversy meeting the requisite threshold,
the Court opted to follow “the general, prudential approach” that “courts do not
review moot questions.” Id.
       Instantly, Requester has stated that the release of a transcript of the McMahon
Tape and a copy of the Basemore notification letter satisfied Item 4 of his request.
See R.R. at 185a.           The DAO argued before the Trial Court that “OOR’s
determination compelling the DAO to disclose these records [was] therefore moot.”
Id. at 104a. The Trial Court disagreed, reasoning that “Request[e]r had already
initiated his OOR appeal before he attempted to withdraw portions of his initial
request,” and thus “lost the ability to modify, change[,] or add to his request in any
form.” Trial Ct. Op., 9/7/2021, at 4.
       On appeal to this Court, the DAO cites Chester Water Authority for its
assertion that, in the context of RTKL cases, “an appeal becomes moot when an
agency provides responsive documents during the pendency of the appeal.” DAO’s
Br. at 16. The DAO further argues that Requester’s withdrawal of Items 1, 2, 5, and
6 also rendered moot those parts of his appeal to the Trial Court, as “a RTKL
requester has the sole discretion to determine whether to appeal an agency’s denial
of a request in the first instance, whether to continue to seek the records during the
pendency of an appeal, or whether to withdraw the request altogether.” 10 Id. at 17.
Upon the withdrawal of a request, the DAO concludes, “a court has no authority to

       10
           We note that the DAO raises the issue of mootness as to Items 1, 2, 5, and 6 of the request
for the first time on appeal to this Court. The Trial Court therefore did not have an opportunity to
rule on whether those parts of Requester’s appeal were properly before it. “Under the mootness
doctrine,” however, “a case may be dismissed for mootness at any time by a court, because
generally, an actual case or controversy must exist at all stages of the judicial or administrative
process.” Pa. Liquor Control Bd. v. Dentici, 542 A.2d 229, 230 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988). Thus, we
decline to deem the issue waived by the DAO.

                                                  9
disclose the records.” Id. (citing Motley Crew, LLC v. Bonner Chevrolet Co., 93
A.3d 474, 476 (Pa. Super. 2014)).
       We first note our agreement with the DAO that Requester’s withdrawal of his
appeal as to Item 4 of his request rendered moot that part of this case. When an
agency’s denial is subject to appeal, Section 1101(a) of the RTKL places the burden
on the requester to “state the grounds upon which the requester asserts that the record
is a public record . . . and shall address any grounds stated by the agency for . . .
denying the request.” 65 P.S. § 67.1101(a). In this instance, Requester’s appeal to
the Trial Court made no such assertion; rather, Requester clearly stated that Item 4
had been satisfied and was therefore excluded from the appeal. As the Supreme
Court observed in Chester Water Authority, the release of the requested documents
settled any disagreement between the requester and the agency; “accordingly,” the
Court held, “the controversy has been mooted.” 249 A.3d at 1114. Thus, it was not
the Trial Court’s role to maintain claims on appeal that Requester had abandoned.
       We further determine that the same principle may be applied to Items 1, 2, 5,
and 6 of the request, where Requester’s withdrawal of his claims on appeal
eliminated any case or controversy as to those items.11 When the records identified
in those parts of the request were no longer subject to the request, the question of
whether the DAO fulfilled its duties became, at most, hypothetical. While Requester

       11
          In his Brief to this Court, Requester appears to revive his interest in obtaining the records
in question, noting the Trial Court’s conclusion that his “attempt to withdraw portions of his
request was ineffective because he lost the ability to modify or change his request in any form[,]
since he had attempted to do so after initiating his OOR appeal.” Requester’s Br. at 8. Such
arguments are legally insufficient to overcome a mootness determination, however, since the
controversy must be “extant at all stages of review.” Harris v. Rendell, 982 A.2d at 1035. See
Consol Pa. Coal Co., LLC v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 129 A.3d 28, 37-38 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015)
(explaining that, once a party supports its claim that an appeal is moot with credible evidence, the
burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a genuine issue still exists).

                                                 10
was free to continue his appeal from the DAO’s denial of Item 3 of the request, the
Trial Court had no reasonable basis for pursuing the rest of his appeal sua sponte.
Since no actual case or controversy exists where an agency has not released records
that are no longer requested, the Trial Court should have dismissed as moot those
components of the appeal.
       Since the instant case is technically moot as to five of the six items in the
request, our inquiry turns to whether the case falls within any of the exceptions to
the mootness doctrine.           The first exception to mootness—that the conduct
complained of is capable of repetition yet likely to evade judicial review—involves
two elements: (1) that the duration of the challenged action is too short to be fully
litigated prior to its cessation or expiration; and (2) that there is a reasonable
expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action
again. Commonwealth v. Buehl, 462 A.2d 1316, 1319 (Pa. Super.1983). In this
case, the duration of the DAO’s denial of the relevant parts of the request is not of
limited duration; meanwhile, we see no clear reason to suppose that Requester is
likely to be subject to repeated, similar actions.12
       Next, we determine if the matter falls under the mootness exceptions for
matters of great importance to the public interest, or for those where a party will
suffer a detriment without our decision. In Chester Water Authority, the Supreme

       12
          This matter therefore stands in contrast to Philadelphia Public School Notebook v.
School District of Philadelphia, 49 A.3d 445 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). In that case, as here, the
government agency released records that had been requested (texts of resolutions voted on by
school district officials) after an initial denial; OOR therefore dismissed the requester’s appeal as
moot. Id. at 447. This Court reversed, holding that the appeal fell under the mootness exception
for matters capable of repetition, yet likely to evade review, because the requester (a news service)
consistently reported on the officials’ regularly occurring meetings in its news coverage. Id. at
449. Thus, it was foreseeable that the requester would continue to seek similar records following
subsequent meetings. Id.

                                                11
Court rejected the argument that the dispute over the records in that case met “the
high threshold” for the public importance exception. 249 A.3d at 1115.                If
communications between a state government agency and a private firm tasked with
managing the finances of an entire city were insufficient, then it would be
unreasonable to conclude that the threshold is met in this instance. Finally, since
Requester disclaimed any interest in obtaining the records sought by all parts of his
request except Item 3, we see no reason to suppose that he would suffer a detriment
from the DAO’s failure to release records that were no longer requested. Under
these circumstances, we decline to make an exception to the mootness doctrine for
the instant matter.
      As noted above, the Trial Court did not directly address the DAO’s mootness
arguments. Rather, it reasoned that Requester’s withdrawal of his appeal as to Items
1, 2, 5, and 6 constituted an improper modification of his request, as requesters “may
not, on appeal, argue that an agency must instead disclose different records in
response to [a] request.” Trial Ct. Op., 9/7/2021, at 4 (citing Michak v. Dep’t of Pub.
Welfare, 56 A.3d 925, 930 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012)). Although we conclude that the
threshold question of mootness is dispositive of this part of the case, we note that the
general rule against modifying requests is inapposite here. As we explained in
Michak, the belated modification of requests to include new records is forbidden
because it would interfere with the agency’s duty under the RTKL to respond
promptly and specifically to the initial request. See also Dep’t of Corr. v. Disability
Rts. Network of Pa., 35 A.3d 830, 833 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (explaining that the
modification of requests under appeal is not permitted because it “preclude[s] the
[agency] from raising appropriate exemptions to disclosure”). That concern does
not arise when a requester states his intent to appeal from the denial of some distinct

                                          12
parts of his request but not others. To the contrary, we do not believe that the
RTKL’s purposes are meaningfully furthered by a court’s ordering of a government
agency to find, copy, and release records—a sometimes onerous and costly
process—that no one is seeking. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Requester
was permitted to withdraw Items 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 of his request,13 and that the
withdrawal rendered this case moot as to those items.
                                  B. Item 3 of the Request
         Next, we examine the DAO’s argument that the record requested at Item 3, a
“complete record listing all individuals and/or agencies who received a copy of the
‘McMahon Tape’ or transcript of the same from the [DAO] (i.e., attorneys,
defendants, prisons, jails, etc.),” R.R. at 5a., cannot be released because it does not
exist.
         Pursuant to Section 901 of the RTKL, an agency in receipt of a written request
for a record shall make “a good faith effort to determine . . . whether the agency has
possession, custody, or control of the identified record.” 65 P.S. § 67.901. The
burden of proving that a record does not exist, or is exempt from disclosure, is placed
on the agency responding to the request. Hodges v. Pa. Dep’t of Health, 29 A.3d
1190, 1192 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). To satisfy its burden of proof that it does not possess
a requested record, an agency may submit an unsworn attestation by the person who

         13
            We further note that our conclusion appears to be congruent with OOR’s current
understanding of the RTKL. For example, in Sheliga v. Pennsylvania Department of State (OOR
Dkt. No. AP 2021-0462, filed Aug. 5, 2021), OOR noted the requester’s stated intent to withdraw
his appeal as to two of four items in his original request; OOR ruled that the agency was therefore
“not required to take any further action” in response to those items. Id. at 8. See also Williams v.
East Stroudsburg Univ. of Pa. (OOR Dkt. No. AP 2022-1445, filed July 25, 2022) (determining
that the first item in a three-item request is “no longer at issue” following the requester’s partial
withdrawal of appeal). While OOR’s final determinations are not binding on this Court, we may
rely upon them for their persuasive value. Pennsylvanians for Union Reform v. Pa. Off. of Admin.,
129 A.3d 1246, 1256 n.16 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015).

                                                13
searched for the record or a sworn affidavit of nonexistence of the record. Id. at
1190.
        In Hodges, a requester sought from the Department of Health the license
verification and certificate of need for the private health care provider of the state
correctional facility in which the requester was incarcerated. Id. at 1191. The
Department of Health argued that it did not have authority over prison medical
facilities, and that certificates of need were no longer issued. Id. Additionally, the
Department of Health submitted an affidavit by its open records officer, attesting
that “she made a good faith and thorough inquiry to determine if the Department was
in possession of” the requested records. Id. While conceding that responsive records
may exist somewhere “under another spelling, another name[,] or another
classification,” the open records officer concluded that, “[b]ased on her search,” no
responsive records were within the Department of Health’s possession, custody, or
control. Id. at 1191, 1193. OOR determined that the Department of Health met its
burden of proof that it did not possess the requested records; this Court agreed. Id.
at 1193. We explained that the open records officer’s admission of the possible
existence of responsive records did not contradict her ultimate conclusion, since the
Department of Health “was not required to sift through all of its records in order to
determine if something under a different spelling or classification might possibly
relate to” the request. Id.
        Instantly, ADA Robbins’ unsworn declaration stated that she made inquiries
to six department supervisors about whether any responsive documents existed; all
responded that they were “unaware of any.” Id. With specific regard to Item 3, ADA
Robbins explained that the DAO did not possess a list of all recipients of the
McMahon Tape, and that it did not have “a searchable database that would allow the

                                         14
DAO to identify all cases” in which defendants were notified of the Tape. Id.
Furthermore, ADA Robbins attested, any relevant files would be in an off-site
storage facility, where they have not been digitized; thus, to compile the data sought
by Requester would involve searching “thousands of boxes of materials.” Id.
        Rejecting the DAO’s assertions, the Trial Court reasoned that ADA Robbins’
statements “do not demonstrate clearly to what extent if any that actual searches
were undertaken to attempt to locate potential responsive records.”14 Trial Ct. Op.,
9/7/2021, at 7. The Trial Court acknowledged that the department supervisors who
spoke with ADA Robbins were unaware of where responsive records could be found
but countered that lack of awareness of responsive records and the actual
nonexistence of responsive records “are two distinct scenarios.” Id. Thus, the Trial
Court concluded that ADA Robbins’ statements were “conclusory,” and failed to
describe “specific good faith efforts undertaken to locate the requested records.” Id.
at 8.
        We disagree with the Trial Court that the DAO failed to show that it fulfilled
its duties under the RTKL as to Item 3. Our primary point of disagreement concerns
the Trial Court’s excessively narrow definition of what actions constitute a search.
There is nothing in the RTKL or our case law requiring an agency to physically pore
through its archives in pursuit of a hypothetical record that could be anywhere, or
nowhere. To the contrary, we explained in Hodges that an agency has no duty to
perform an exhaustive search of all its files in order to retrieve a record of
indeterminate location or classification. Rather, we held that the agency may fulfill

        14
          Because it ruled that the DAO was required to release the records in all six items of the
original request, the Trial Court did not address the DAO’s appeal arguments as they related to
Item 3 specifically.

                                                15
its duty under the RTKL with “a good faith and thorough inquiry to determine if [it
is] in possession of the records requested.” 29 A.3d at 1191.
       The Trial Court is correct that a records custodian’s unawareness of a certain
record is not the same thing as the actual nonexistence of that record. It should be
clear that, if an open records officer denied access to a record merely by asserting
her lack of personal knowledge of the record, that assertion alone would be
insufficient to constitute a good-faith response. However, we believe that the Trial
Court’s concern is unwarranted in this instance, for two reasons. First, ADA Robbins
explained in her affidavits that she was not only relying on the department
supervisors’ unawareness of the records in question; rather, she and other DAO
employees carefully assessed what records from the relevant period are in the DAO’s
possession, and the means by which any relevant records in its case management
system may be accessed.
       The second reason is that we see no reasonable basis to suppose that a
complete record of all individuals and agencies to have received a copy of the
McMahon Tape from the DAO is currently in the DAO’s possession, or that one was
ever created in the first place.15 The sole explanation offered by Requester for his
belief that such a list exists is the assertion that the release of the McMahon Tape
“would not have been possible unless the DAO had compiled a ‘list of individuals’

       15
           While Item 3 of the request could also be interpreted as requesting the compilation of a
list based on research of the DAO’s files, we note that such a request would be clearly
impermissible. Section 705 of the RTKL provides that an agency responding to a request “shall
not be required to create a record which does not currently exist or to compile, maintain, format or
organize a record in a manner in which the agency does not currently compile, maintain, format or
organize the record.” 65 P.S. § 67.705. See also Uniontown Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr.,
151 A.3d 1196, 1206 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (explaining that the Department of Corrections had no
duty under the RTKL to compile prison-wide diagnosis data based on individual inmate medical
files, which would be “tantamount to the creation of a record”).

                                                16
that it determined should receive the [T]ape.”16 Requester’s Br. at 11. In the absence
of a reasonably precise identification of an existing record, or anything beyond
speculation, ADA Robbins could draw a valid conclusion that the requested list was
not in the DAO’s possession following her inquiries.
                                         IV. Conclusion
       Requester’s withdrawal of Items 1, 2, 5, and 6 of the request, and his statement
that a record provided by the DAO satisfies Item 4 of the request, obviates any
remaining case or controversy between the parties as to those items. Thus, we
conclude that the matter has been rendered moot regarding Items 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 of
the request. As for Item 3, we hold that the DAO met its burden of proof that the
requested record does not exist. Thus, we reverse the Trial Court’s order.

                                               __________________________________
                                               ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

       16
           In his Brief, Requester goes on to explain that, “[i]n other words, the names of the 19
defense attorneys who were recipients of the McMahon Tape did not appear out of thin air. What’s
more, the DAO has never explained the process it used to identify the 19 defense attorneys to
whom it sent the [McMahon] Tape.” Requester’s Br. at 11. It is entirely possible, however, that
District Attorney Abraham sent copies of the Tape to those 19 individuals without compiling a
complete list of all individuals and agencies in receipt, which is what the request demands.
Furthermore, no explanation has been given in this case as to why the DAO would have retained
such a list for over 26 years despite its lack of a policy requiring “the retention of internal memos.”
Id. at 62a.

                                                 17
           IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

James Gray                          :
                                    :
      v.                            : No. 800 C.D. 2021
                                    :
Philadelphia District Attorney’s    :
Office,                             :
                   Appellant        :

                                   ORDER

      AND NOW, this 22nd day of February, 2024, the order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in the above-captioned matter, dated June 2,
2021, is hereby REVERSED.

                                    __________________________________
                                    ELLEN CEISLER, Judge