Court Opinion

ID: 9447986
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:19:14.564289+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:15.030305
License: Public Domain

RIVES, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I can see no real distinction between Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 1960, 362 U.S. 539, 80 S.Ct. 926, 4 L.Ed.2d 941, and this case. In our original opinion in this case,1 we had attempted to show its dif*99ference from the First Circuit’s decision in the Mitchell case, 265 F.2d 426, as follows:
“ * * * this is not a case of something transitory occurring to prevent the ship from being reasonably fit to permit a libellant to perform his task aboard the ship with reasonable safety and, persisting without being discovered, causing injury such as is dealt with in the Mitchell case, supra, and the other cases cited by appellants. This is a case of a happening ‘when the last batch of wheat came out of the funnels’, instantaneously rendering unfit quarters which until then had been, and, when the funnels cleared away, continued to be, entirely seaworthy.”
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court vacated our judgment and remanded the case to us “for consideration in the light of Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 80 S.Ct. 926, 4 L.Ed.2d 941.” 2
It is evident that the Supreme Court was not persuaded by our distinction of the Mitchell case; and it now seems to me that our distinction was not sound.
The Supreme Court’s decision in the Mitchell case, supra, removes any doubt that the shipowner’s duty to provide a seaworthy vessel is “absolute,” that is, a kind of liability without fault, and that the duty applies to an unseaworthy condition which may be only temporary. “The duty is absolute, but it is a duty only to furnish a vessel and appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended use.” 362 U.S. at page 550, 80 S.Ct. at page 933. In the present case the district court found:
“A last ‘shot’ of grain was called for, and was released into the bin. This quantity of grain completely covered the hatch opening (which was the only means of entrance and exit for the longshoremen, and was the only source of ventilation); hence, the longshoremen were working for the moment in an area completely enclosed and without access to outside air.” 3
It is clear that temporarily the bin where the libelants were working was not a reasonably safe place in which to work. I cannot understand how my brothers can think that the vessel and appurtenances were then “reasonably fit for their intended use.” It seems to me that in the light of Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., supra, there was a temporary unseaworthy condition for which the owner, Cardigan Shipping Company, Ltd., is liable. My brothers say: “Here the vessel was at all times staunch and fit for the service intended, the reception of grain which did not contain dangerous chemicals, and, since it was not intended or expected that grain so contaminated would be loaded into the bins, the ship was at all times seaworthy and fit for its service of receiving uncontaminated grain.” This statement, I submit, evidences a misconception of the question before us. Certainly the ship’s rail in the Mitchell case was a “staunch” and a “fit” rail until it was covered with “slime and fish gurry.” I would readily concede that the hold of the vessel in this case was a “fit” hold both before and sometime after the introduction of the fumigated grain. But the crucial point is whether the introduction of the fumigated grain rendered the ship temporarily unseaworthy, that is, long enough to injure the libelants.
The district court had made findings as to the damages sustained by each of the libelants. When made, such findings were academic since the district court also found an absence of liability. The appellants made a strong attack on the damages thus found as being grossly inadequate. If ultimately the district court’s decision is reversed, as I anticipate, then I think that those findings will become vitally important and they should, in my opinion, be vacated in order that they may be fully re-examined by the district court.

. Morales et al. v. City of Galveston, 1960, 364 U.S. 295, 81 S.Ct. 107, 5 L.Ed.2d 84.

. Morales v. City of Galveston, D.C.S.D.Tex.1959, 181 F.Supp. 202, 205.