Court Opinion

ID: 9918843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-16 18:07:17.626222+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:26.860087
License: Public Domain

The slip opinion is the first version of an opinion released by the Chief Clerk of the
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 1         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

 2   Opinion Number:

 3   Filing Date: January 16, 2024

 4   NO. S-1-SC-39355

 5   STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
 6         Plaintiff-Respondent,
 7   v.

 8   RAMON LORENZO,

 9         Defendant-Petitioner.

10   ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI
11   Amanda Sanchez Villalobos, District Judge

12   Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
13   Kimberly Chavez Cook, Appellate Defender
14   Mark A. Peralta-Silva, Assistant Appellate Defender
15   Santa Fe, NM

16   for Petitioner

17   Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
18   Maris Veidemanis, Assistant Attorney General
19   Santa Fe, NM

20   for Respondent
 1                                        OPINION

 2   THOMSON, Justice.

 3   {1}   We consider whether convictions of both the armed robbery of a diner and the

 4   aggravated battery of the diner’s owner violate a defendant’s right to be free from

 5   double jeopardy. We conclude that the conduct underlying both charges was unitary

 6   and that the State used evidence of the same force—a shooting which occurred

 7   during the robbery—to prove both convictions. Because the Legislature did not

 8   intend to allow multiple punishments for the same conduct, we hold that the

 9   convictions violate double jeopardy.

10   I.    BACKGROUND

11   {2}   On March 23, 2013, in Milan, New Mexico, there was a knock on the back

12   door of the WOW Diner shortly after closing time. The owner, Richard Rivard

13   (Victim), answered the door and was confronted by two former employees, Ramon

14   Lorenzo (Defendant) and Leo Galindo, both holding guns. Victim tried to close the

15   door, but the intruders overpowered him, pushing him back about ten feet. Defendant

16   pointed a gun between Victim’s eyes and said, “Where’s the money?” Looking down

17   the gun’s barrel, Victim saw the hammer cocked back with Defendant’s finger on

18   the trigger. Victim “grabbed the gun, pulled [his] head back [, but] the gun went off,”

19   shooting him in the face. He fell to the ground. Defendant and Galindo demanded to
 1   know where they would find the money as they searched the nearby office. They

 2   fled with about $1,800. Victim survived the shooting.

 3   {3}   A grand jury indicted Defendant on charges of armed robbery, conspiracy to

 4   commit armed robbery, aggravated burglary, conspiracy to commit aggravated

 5   burglary, aggravated battery by a deadly weapon, conspiracy to commit aggravated

 6   battery by a deadly weapon, tampering with evidence, and conspiracy to commit

 7   tampering with evidence. A felony failure to appear (FTA) charge was added when

 8   Defendant did not show up to his first trial date. A jury convicted Defendant of all

 9   counts except tampering with evidence and conspiracy to commit tampering with

10   evidence, resulting in a sentence of twenty-six and one-half years.

11   {4}   Defendant appealed, raising seven issues. State v. Lorenzo, A-1-CA-36648,

12   mem. op. ¶ 2 (N.M. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2022) (nonprecedential). The Court of

13   Appeals rejected six of Defendant’s arguments, but reversed and remanded to the

14   district court to vacate two of the conspiracy convictions on double jeopardy

15   grounds. Id. Defendant appealed to this Court, asserting for the first time that his

16   convictions of aggravated battery and armed robbery violate his right to be free from

                                              2
 1   double jeopardy.1 It is troubling to this Court that this second double jeopardy claim

 2   was not recognized until the petition for writ of certiorari. 2 Fortunately for

 3   Defendant, double jeopardy is not waivable and may be raised at any stage of a

 4   criminal case, including after judgment. State v. Martinez, 2007-NMCA-160, ¶ 5,

 5   143 N.M. 96, 173 P.3d 18.

 6   II.   DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROHIBITS MULTIPLE PUNISHMENT IN
 7         THIS CASE

 8   {5}   Double jeopardy “is a constitutional question of law which we review de

 9   novo.” State v. Swick, 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 10, 279 P.3d 747; U.S. Const. amend. V

10   (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy

11   of life or limb.”); N.M. Const. art. II, § 15 (“[N]or shall any person be twice put in

           1
             Defendant raised, and we granted certiorari on, seven issues: (1) ineffective
     assistance of counsel resulting from the State’s use of trial counsel’s statements at
     the first trial date for which Defendant failed to appear as evidence of his FTA
     charge, (2) improper joinder and failure to sever the FTA charge from the initial
     charges, (3) speedy trial, (4) questioning of a witness about her medicinal marijuana
     use, (5) sufficiency of the evidence of FTA, (6) implied juror bias, and (7) double
     jeopardy for the armed robbery and aggravated battery with a deadly weapon
     convictions. We quash the first six issues as improvidently granted and address only
     the double jeopardy issue.
           2
             The double jeopardy issue now presented is different from the one considered
     by the Court of Appeals and is raised for the first time here. Lorenzo, A-1-CA-36648,
     mem. op. ¶ 44 (“remand[ing] to the district court to vacate Defendant’s conviction
     for fourth degree conspiracy to commit aggravated battery and one of his convictions
     for third degree conspiracy”).

                                               3
 1   jeopardy for the same offense.”). When a single course of conduct results in multiple

 2   charges under separate criminal statutes, one of the charges may be barred by double

 3   jeopardy. State v. Bernal, 2006-NMSC-050, ¶ 7, 140 N.M. 644, 146 P.3d 289. We

 4   term this a double-description double jeopardy violation. Id. In reviewing a double-

 5   description challenge, we first determine “whether the conduct underlying the [two]

 6   offenses is unitary, i.e. whether the same conduct violates both statutes.” Swafford

 7   v. State, 1991-NMSC-043, ¶ 25, 112 N.M. 3, 810 P.2d 1223. If the conduct is not

 8   unitary, the analysis is complete because the acts are discrete and no violation of the

 9   defendant’s right against double jeopardy is possible. Id. ¶ 26. If the conduct is

10   unitary, we must next determine whether the Legislature intended for the unitary

11   conduct to be punished as separate offenses. Id. ¶ 25. “Only if the first part of the

12   test is answered in the affirmative, and the second in the negative, will the double

13   jeopardy clause prohibit multiple punishments in the same trial.” Id.

14   A.    The Conduct Underlying Both Charges Was Unitary

15   {6}   The unitary conduct analysis turns on whether the acts underlying the two

16   offenses are separated by “sufficient indicia of distinctness.”3 Id. ¶ 26. In

           3
            The Court of Appeals, in its double jeopardy analysis of the conspiracy
     convictions, assumed without discussing that the acts were unitary. Lorenzo, A-1-
     CA-36648, mem. op. ¶¶ 41-44. We complete the analysis here.

                                               4
 1   determining sufficiency, “we . . . look[] to the elements of the charged offenses, the

 2   facts presented at trial, and the instructions given to the jury.” State v. Sena, 2020-

 3   NMSC-011, ¶ 46, 470 P.3d 227. When examining the factual record, courts

 4   “consider such factors as whether [the] acts were close in time and space, their

 5   similarity, the sequence in which they occurred, whether other events intervened,

 6   and the defendant’s goals for and mental state during each act.” State v. Franco,

 7   2005-NMSC-013, ¶ 7, 137 N.M. 447, 112 P.3d 1104. Looking at the totality of the

 8   circumstances, “if it reasonably can be said that the conduct is unitary, then we must

 9   conclude that the conduct was unitary.” State v. Porter, 2020-NMSC-020, ¶ 12, 476

10   P.3d 1201 (text only)4 (quoting Swafford, 1991-NMSC-043, ¶ 28).

11   {7}   Here, the acts were close together in time and space. The entire episode, from

12   the time Victim opened the door to the time Defendant and Galindo left, was

13   described by Victim as “seven or eight minutes tops.” The altercation was also

14   contained spatially, taking place in the kitchen area of the restaurant.

15   {8}   The course of conduct underlying both offenses was also similar. Franco,

16   2005-NMSC-013, ¶ 7 (“The proper analytical framework is whether the facts

           4
             “(Text only)” indicates the omission of nonessential punctuation marks—
     including internal quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets—that are present in the
     text of the quoted source, leaving the quoted text otherwise unchanged.

                                                5
 1   presented at trial establish that the jury reasonably could have inferred independent

 2   factual bases for the charged offenses.” (internal quotation marks and citation

 3   omitted)). Each conviction was based on Defendant’s use of the gun. First, the gun

 4   was the means used to gain entry to the diner and rob Victim. Second, the gun was

 5   the weapon that assaulted Victim. Further, the acts were not interrupted by an

 6   intervening event.

 7   {9}    The State argues that Defendant’s conduct was nonunitary because “the force

 8   necessary to accomplish the robbery had already been threatened well before the

 9   shot was fired.” The State’s view of the conduct is that Defendant’s act of displaying

10   the gun satisfied the threatened force element of armed robbery. Therefore, the

11   gunshot after the struggle was a different use of force that satisfied the aggravated

12   battery. However, there are two distinct issues with the State’s argument.

13   {10}   First, the armed robbery was not complete with the threatened use of force.

14   The commission of the armed robbery began when Defendant and Galindo displayed

15   their guns and forcefully entered the diner. The robbery was not complete until they

16   took possession of the money. See NMSA 1978, § 30-16-2 (1973) (“Robbery

17   consists of the theft of anything of value from the person of another or from the

18   immediate control of another, by use or threatened use of force or violence.”

19   (emphasis added)). The events between the initiation and completion of the robbery

                                               6
 1   were part of a single course of conduct that occurred closely in time and space. See

 2   State v. Torres, 2018-NMSC-013, ¶ 19, 413 P.3d 467 (“When determining whether

 3   a defendant’s conduct is unitary, we have looked for an identifiable point at which

 4   one of the charged crimes had been completed and the other not yet committed.”

 5   (text only) (citation omitted)). The State would have us parse out each act by

 6   Defendant as an intervening event without looking for indicia of distinctness. This

 7   obstructs the purpose of the double jeopardy clause to guard against multiple

 8   punishments for the same conduct. “‘The Double Jeopardy Clause is not such a

 9   fragile guarantee that prosecutors can avoid its limitations by the simple expedient

10   of dividing a single crime into a series of temporal or spatial units.’” State v. Frazier,

11   2007-NMSC-032, ¶ 23, 142 N.M. 120, 164 P.3d 1 (quoting Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S.

12   161, 169 (1977)).

13   {11}   Second, the State’s presentation on appeal does not match its presentation at

14   trial. We note that, had the State opted for a different presentation at trial, it is

15   possible that the jury could have decided that different uses of force satisfied the

16   elements of each crime. For example, if the jury had determined that the threatened

17   use of the gun was sufficient for the robbery and separately that the discharge of the

18   gun satisfied the aggravated assault, then our analysis might be different. However,

19   as described in Part B.3, infra, the State’s legal theory, as presented in its closing

                                                 7
 1   argument, relies on the shooting of Victim to prove both offenses. The State may not

 2   now argue in the abstract about what it could have asked the jury to decide.

 3   {12}   We look finally to Defendant’s mental state during each act. Franco, 2005-

 4   NMSC-013, ¶ 7 (“To determine whether a defendant’s conduct was unitary, we

 5   consider . . . the defendant’s goals for and mental state during each act.”). Nothing

 6   in the record suggests that Defendant’s actions, including gaining entry into the

 7   diner, pushing Victim back from the door, and shooting Victim in the face, were

 8   driven by anything other than the desire to steal money from the diner. Thus, none

 9   of the Franco factors support the notion that the acts were “separated by sufficient

10   indicia of distinctness.” Swafford, 1991-NMSC-043, ¶ 26. We therefore conclude

11   that the conduct was unitary.

12   B.     The Legislature Did Not Intend to Permit Multiple Punishments Under
13          These Two Statutes for the Same Conduct

14   {13}   When conduct is unitary, we must next decide “whether the Legislature

15   intended to permit multiple punishments” for the charged crimes. Porter, 2020-

16   NMSC-020, ¶ 15; see also Torres, 2018-NMSC-013, ¶ 21 (acknowledging that

17   legislative intent is the touchstone for whether multiple punishments are

18   permissible). “In analyzing legislative intent, we first look to the language of the

19   statute[s]” to determine whether the Legislature explicitly authorized multiple

20   punishments for unitary conduct. Torres, 2018-NMSC-013, ¶ 21. Neither the armed

                                              8
 1   robbery nor the aggravated battery statute explicitly authorizes multiple

 2   punishments, so an analysis of the plain language of the statute does not resolve the

 3   issue. See § 30-16-2; NMSA 1978, § 30-3-5(A), (C) (1969); Porter, 2020-NMSC-

 4   020, ¶ 16. Thus, we must attempt to discern intent through other canons of

 5   construction. Torres, 2018-NMSC-013, ¶ 21.

 6   {14}   Early in our jurisprudence, we applied the statutory construction rule from

 7   Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). State v. Blevins, 1936-NMSC-

 8   052, ¶ 10, 40 N.M. 367, 60 P.2d 208; see also Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304 (holding

 9   a double jeopardy violation did not occur if each statute contained an element of

10   proof not required by the other). This Court has augmented the original mechanistic

11   application of Blockburger “to be more in line with United States Supreme Court

12   precedent.” Swick, 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 21. Rather than a strict elements test, the

13   “analysis demands that we compare the elements of the offense, looking at the

14   State’s legal theory of how the statutes were violated.” Porter, 2020-NMSC-020,

15   ¶ 8.

16   {15}   Here, both statutes allow for alternative conduct, so comparing the elements

17   of the offenses is inconclusive. An aggravated battery may be effectuated through

18   an “unlawful touching or application of force” that “inflict[s] great bodily harm or

19   does so with a deadly weapon or . . . in any manner whereby great bodily harm or

                                              9
 1   death can be inflicted.” Section 30-3-5(A), (C). Similarly, an armed robbery occurs

 2   when a theft results from the “use or threatened use of force or violence.” Section

 3   30-16-2. At first inspection, both aggravated battery and armed robbery involve the

 4   use of force, so the two crimes share a common element. However, this abstract

 5   commonality is not enough to declare that one crime subsumes the other because the

 6   two statutes could be violated by different conduct. For example, Defendant’s

 7   threatened use of force could be sufficient to violate the armed robbery statute, while

 8   the shooting could be the force used to prove aggravated battery. To establish a

 9   double jeopardy violation, the jury must have found that Defendant violated both

10   statutes with the same use of force. We must, therefore, determine which alternative

11   conduct the State actually proved by examining the statute, indictment, and jury

12   instructions. Porter, 2020-NMSC-020, ¶ 19 (“When a defendant is charged with

13   violating statutes that are vague, unspecific, or written in such a way that a defendant

14   could be convicted based on alternative conduct, we review the statutory language,

15   charging documents, and jury instructions used at trial to ascertain the state’s legal

16   theory.”).

17   {16}   We turn then to “the state’s legal theory of the case applied to the statutes at

18   issue to determine the elements of each offense the defendant committed. This

19   requires us to identify how the state alleged that a defendant violated the statutes at

                                               10
 1   issue.” Id. ¶ 18 (citation omitted). “[I]f we determine that one of the offenses

 2   subsumes the other offense, ‘the double jeopardy prohibition is violated, and

3    punishment cannot be had for both.’” Id. ¶ 20 (quoting Swick, 2012-NMSC-018,

 4   ¶ 27). In this case, the armed robbery offense subsumes the aggravated battery

 5   conviction because the same evidence, the shooting, was used to prove each element

 6   of force.

7    1.     The armed robbery conviction

 8   {17}   As is true of most modern statutes, armed robbery is a multipurposed statute

 9   that may be accomplished through alternative conduct. Here, Defendant could have

10   violated the armed robbery statute under either of two theories: (1) by robbing the

11   diner with force, through pushing or shooting Victim or (2) with the threatened use

12   of force, by wielding the firearm or pointing the gun at Victim’s head. Because there

13   are multiple acts that the State could have used to prove either theory of armed

14   robbery, we look to the indictment and jury instructions. See Porter, 2020-NMSC-

15   020, ¶ 19 (“[W]e review the statutory language, charging documents, and jury

16   instructions used at trial to ascertain the state’s legal theory.”).

17   a.     Grand jury indictment

18   {18}   The grand jury indictment reads:

19          Count I: Armed Robbery, . . . on or about March 23, 2013, [D]efendant
20          did take and carry away money, which had some value, from Richard

                                                 11
 1          Rivard[’s] immediate control, intending to permanently deprive
 2          Richard Rivard of the property, and the [D]efendant was armed with a
 3          handgun, a deadly weapon or an instrument or object which, when used
 4          as a weapon, could cause death or very serious injury, and [D]efendant
 5          took the property by use or threatened use of force or violence, a second
 6          degree felony, contrary to Section 30-16-2,(F) [sic] Section 31-18-16
 7          NMSA 1978.

 8   While the indictment specifies that Defendant was armed with a handgun and that

 9   he “took the property by use or threatened use of force or violence,” it does not

10   specify the force used or specifically whether the use of the handgun satisfied the

11   use of force element. We next examine the jury instructions for possible guidance.

12   b.     Jury instructions

13   {19}   The jury instruction read:

14          Instruction 7: For you to find [D]efendant guilty of Armed Robbery as
15          charged in Count 1 the state must prove to your satisfaction beyond a
16          reasonable doubt each of the following elements of the crime:

17          1. [D]efendant took and carried away monies, from Richard Rivard, or
18          from his immediate control intending to permanently deprive Richard
19          Rivard of the monies; the property had some value;

20          2. [D]efendant was armed with a handgun;

21          3. [D]efendant took the monies by force or violence or threatened force
22          or violence;

23          4. This happened in New Mexico on or about the 23rd day of March,
24          2013.

                                               12
 1   Like the charging document, the instruction includes both use of force and

 2   threatened use of force. The instructions do not clarify which conduct the jury found

 3   sufficient for the conviction. However, it does indicate the force or threatened use of

 4   force was predicated on use of the handgun.

 5   2.     The aggravated battery conviction

 6   {20}   Like the armed robbery statute, a defendant may accomplish a third-degree

 7   aggravated burglary violation through alternative forms of conduct if they: (1)

 8   “inflict[] great bodily harm,” (2) commit aggravated battery “with a deadly weapon,”

 9   or (3) “commit[] an aggravated battery in any manner whereby great bodily harm or

10   death can be inflicted.” Section 30-3-5. We, therefore, look again to the grand jury

11   indictment and jury instructions to understand which theory the State used to prove

12   its case.

13   a.     Grand jury indictment

14   {21}   The aggravated battery with a deadly weapon indictment is more specific than

15   that of armed robbery:

16          Count V: Aggravated Battery (Deadly Weapon), . . . on or about March
17          23, 2013, [D]efendant did touch or apply force to Richard Rivard, with
18          a handgun or an instrument or object which, when used as a weapon,
19          could cause death or very serious injury, and the defendant intended to
20          injure or [sic] another, a third degree felony, contrary to Section 30-3-
21          5(A)(F)&(C) [sic], Section 31-18-16 NMSA 1978.

                                               13
 1   Though the aggravated battery indictment specifies that the force used was with the

 2   handgun, it also leaves room for another object that could cause death or serious

 3   injury. We turn then to the jury instructions.

 4   b.     Jury instructions

 5   {22}   The aggravated battery jury instruction read:

 6          Instruction 12: For you to find [D]efendant guilty of Aggravated
 7          Battery as charged in Count V, the state must prove to your satisfaction
 8          beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements of the crime:

 9          1. [D]efendant touched or applied force to Richard Rivard by shooting
10          him with a deadly weapon.

11          2. [D]efendant intended to injure Richard Rivard;

12          3. This happened in New Mexico on or about the 23rd day of March,
13          2013.

14   {23}   Unlike the armed robbery conviction, only one conduct was sufficient to

15   prove Defendant violated the aggravated battery statute: shooting Victim in the face.

16   Thus, Defendant’s act of shooting Victim is sufficient to violate both statutes, so it

17   is possible that “one offense subsumes the other.” Porter, 2020-NMSC-020, ¶ 21.

18   However, it is also conceivable that the two statutes are violated by different forces

19   so that neither offense is subsumed. Because “the state’s legal theory cannot be

20   ascertained using the charging documents and jury instructions, we also review

21   testimony, opening arguments, and closing arguments to establish whether the same

                                               14
 1   evidence supported a defendant’s convictions under both statutes.” See Porter, 2020-

 2   NMSC-020, ¶ 19.

 3   3.     The State’s closing argument reveals that it relied on the same use of force
 4          for both crimes

 5   {24}   The State’s closing argument reveals its reliance on Defendant’s shooting of

 6   Victim as the legal theory supporting the conviction of both offenses. First, the State

 7   argued that the shooting was the required force for an armed robbery conviction:

 8          [Y]ou also have an instruction on armed robbery. In order to . . . prove
 9          that offense, you must find the evidence sufficient to show that the
10          Defendant took money away from Mr. Rivard[,] that he was armed with
11          a handgun[,] and that he used force or threaten[ed] to use force in order
12          to take the money. Obviously Mr. Rivard was unable to keep the men
13          from taking the money because he was shot. That was the use of force.

14   (Emphasis added.) The State then argued that the use of force for the aggravated

15   battery was also the shooting:

16          The next element’s instruction you have has to do with aggravated
17          battery and in this case what is required is that the evidence prove that
18          the Defendant injured Mr. Rivard by shooting him. . . . The Defendant
19          had to pull the trigger to shoot Mr. Rivard. He had to put the gun into
20          firing position.

21   (Emphasis added.) Under the State’s legal theory presented to the jury, the conduct

22   proving the armed robbery, the shooting, would always prove the aggravated assault.

23   {25}   Finally, this Court has noted in the past that when “one statutory provision

24   incorporates many of the elements of a base statute, and extracts a greater penalty

                                               15
 1   than the base statute, it may be inferred that the legislature did not intend punishment

 2   under both statutes.” Swafford, 1991-NMSC-043, ¶ 33. A first offense of armed

 3   robbery is a second-degree felony carrying a nine-year basic sentence.5 NMSA 1978,

 4   § 31-18-15(A) (2007, amended 2022). By comparison, both aggravated battery with

 5   a deadly weapon and robbery (without a deadly weapon) are third-degree felonies

 6   requiring three years imprisonment. Id. We recognize that the relationship between

 7   standards of punishment is not a dispositive factor. Swick, 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 9 n.1

 8   (“This Court and the Court of Appeals have used the quantum of punishment to

 9   support the proposition that the Legislature did not intend to punish the two crimes

10   separately, both when the amount of punishment is the same and when the amount

11   differs.”); State v. Caldwell, 2008-NMCA-049, ¶ 19, 143 N.M. 792, 182 P.3d 775

12   (“[T]his Court and our Supreme Court have previously noted that a difference in the

13   quantum of punishment alone is insufficient to overcome other indicia of legislative

14   intent.”). However, here, only one element separates a violation of a simple robbery

15   from an armed robbery—the use of a deadly weapon. See § 30-16-2. The particular

16   use relied on by the State to prove the armed robbery was the shooting; that is, the

           5
            This may be enhanced by one year if “a separate finding of fact by the court
     or jury shows that a firearm was used in the commission of a noncapital felony.”
     NMSA 1978, § 31-18-16(A) (1993, amended 2022).

                                               16
 1   shooting enhanced the punishment from a third-degree to a second-degree felony.

 2   But the shooting was also used by the State to prove the aggravated battery. Under

 3   the facts of this case, the aggravated battery, as a third-degree felony, functions as

 4   the “base statute” for the armed robbery. See Swafford, 1991-NMSC-043, ¶ 33. This

 5   further supports the inference that the Legislature did not intend for multiple

 6   punishments under both statutes for the same conduct.

 7   {26}   Because the shooting was the sole force used to prove the aggravated battery

 8   and armed robbery offenses, we hold that the aggravated battery conviction is

 9   subsumed in the armed robbery conviction, violating Defendant’s right to be free

10   from double jeopardy. See Porter, 2020-NMSC-020, ¶ 20.

11   III.   CONCLUSION

12   {27}   For the foregoing reasons, we remand to the district court to vacate

13   Defendant’s conviction for aggravated battery as it carries the shorter sentence. See

14   Torres, 2018-NMSC-013, ¶ 28 (“When double jeopardy protections require one of

15   two otherwise valid convictions to be vacated, we vacate the conviction carrying the

16   shorter sentence.”).

17   {28}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

18
19                                                 DAVID K. THOMSON, Justice

                                              17
1   WE CONCUR:

2
3   C. SHANNON BACON, Chief Justice

4
5   MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Justice

6
7   JULIE J. VARGAS, Justice

8
9   BRIANA H. ZAMORA, Justice

                                      18