Court Opinion

ID: 2964376
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:24:44.671404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:54.967609
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-1907

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                 MICHAEL INDELICATO,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                      [Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge]
                                            ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Boudin, Circuit Judge.
                                        _____________

                            Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________

                              and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                 ____________________

            James L. Sultan, by  Appointment of the Court, with whom Rankin  &
            _______________                                          _________
        Sultan was on briefs for appellant.
        ______
            Paula J.  DeGiacomo, Assistant United  States Attorney, with  whom
            ___________________
        Donald K. Stern, United  States Attorney, was on brief  for the United
        _______________
        States.

                                 ____________________

                                   October 15, 1996
                                 ____________________

                 BOUDIN, Circuit  Judge.   In the district  court Michael
                         ______________

            Indelicato pled  guilty to various charges  of possession and

            distribution  of cocaine,  conspiracy to  distribute cocaine,

            wire  fraud, and conspiracy to defraud the United States.  18

            U.S.C.    371,  1343; 21 U.S.C.     841(a)(1), 846, 853.   He

            was tried on four related charges of possessing  firearms and

            ammunition,  having  previously  been convicted  of  a  crime

            punishable by  more than  one year  in prison.   18 U.S.C.   

            922(g)(1).  In a  jury-waived trial on stipulated facts,  the

            district  court found  Indelicato guilty  on those  counts as

            well.  United States v. Indelicato, 887 F. Supp. 23 (D. Mass.
                   _____________    __________

            1995).  Indelicato now appeals from these firearms possession

            convictions and from his sentence on the drug counts.

                                          I.

                 The background  facts are  easily summarized.   In 1993,

            Indelicato  pled  guilty  in  Massachusetts  state  court  to

            assault  and battery with  a knife  and carrying  a dangerous

            weapon (the knife).  Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265,   13A; ch. 269,

              10(b).  The  state court ultimately sentenced him to a one-

            year  suspended sentence  and  $7,500  in restitution,  which

            Indelicato paid.  Both  offenses are misdemeanors under state

            law but punishable by a maximum  of two and one-half years in

            prison.

                 On May 7, 1994, federal agents arrested Indelicato.  The

            agents searched his home and place of business and found four

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            firearms (including an Uzi semiautomatic weapon) and numerous

            forms   of  ammunition.     The  ensuing  indictment  charged

            Indelicato, among  other offenses, with  violating 18  U.S.C.

              922(g)(1), which makes it unlawful for any person "who  has

            been  convicted  in  any  court of,  a  crime  punishable  by

            imprisonment for a  term exceeding one year . .  . to ship or

            transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or

            affecting commerce,  any  firearm or  ammunition  . .  .  ."1

            Indelicato   stipulated   that   the    interstate   commerce

            requirement was satisfied.

                 However, 18  U.S.C.     921(a)(20)  excludes  from  this

            category "[a]ny  conviction which  has been expunged,  or set

            aside or  for which  a person  has been pardoned  or has  had

            civil rights restored . .  . unless such pardon, expungement,

            or restoration  of civil  rights expressly provides  that the

            person   may  not  ship,   transport,  possess,   or  receive

            firearms."   At trial, Indelicato argued  that this exclusion

            applied  to him  because  Massachusetts never  took away  his

            civil rights and because  he suffered no restrictions  on his

            state firearms privileges.

                 The district court rejected Indelicato's argument, quite

            properly relying upon United States v. Ramos, 961 F.2d  1003,
                                  _____________    _____

                                
            ____________________

                 118 U.S.C.   921(a)(20)(B)  excludes from this  category
            persons convicted of state  misdemeanors punishable by a term
            of  imprisonment of  two years  or less.   Because  his state
            crimes carried a larger  maximum sentence, Indelicato did not
            fall within this exception.

                                         -3-
                                         -3-

            1007-10 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 506  U.S. 934 (1992), which
                                ____________

            held  that   rights  never   taken  away  cannot   have  been

            "restored."     Long  after  the   district  court  sentenced

            Indelicato,  this court  (in February  1996) sitting  en banc
                                                                  _______

            announced  its decision in United States v. Caron, 77 F.3d 1,
                                       _____________    _____

            5-6  (1st  Cir.) (en  banc), cert.  denied,  116 S.  Ct. 2569
                              ________   _____________

            (1996),  which  overruled  Ramos  on a  different  issue  and
                                       _____

            explicitly reserved judgment  on whether  civil rights  never

            taken away could be "restored."

                 At Indelicato's  sentencing in July  1995, the  district

            court imposed concurrent terms  of 168 months imprisonment on

            the  cocaine counts  (based primarily  on the  weight of  the

            drugs), 120 months on the firearms possession counts, and  60

            months on  the fraud counts,  as well as  supervised release,

            fines, assessments and forfeitures.

                                         II.

                 Our  principal  concern  on  this  appeal  is  with  the

            firearms  possession counts,  which present  an issue  of law

            that we review de  novo.  As originally  enacted in 1968,  18
                           ________

            U.S.C.    922(g)(1)  made criminal  gun possession  by anyone

            previously  convicted  of  a crime  (the  predicate  offense)

            punishable  by more  than one year  of imprisonment,  but the

            statute  allowed   an   exception  for   state   misdemeanors

            punishable by two years or less of imprisonment.  18 U.S.C.  

            921(a)(20).  In 1983, the Supreme Court held that a predicate

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            offense under  section 922(g) is defined by  federal law, and

            that state expunctions of state convictions did not avoid the

            ban of section 922(g)(1).  Dickerson v. New Banner Institute,
                                       _________    _____________________

            Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 111-12, 115 (1983).
            ____

                 Congress  reacted  to  Dickerson  and  like  rulings  by
                                        _________

            enacting  in 1986  the Firearms  Owners' Protection  Act, 100

            Stat.   449,  which   in  pertinent   part  amended   section

            921(a)(20)'s  definition   of   predicate  offenses.      The

            amendment, which remains in effect today, provides that state

            law  defines what  constitutes  a predicate  "conviction" for

            purposes  of section  922(g)(1) and  other provisions  of the

            statute.    It  also  excludes  convictions  that  have  been

            "expunged" or "set aside,"  or for which the person  has been

            "pardoned" or "has had civil  rights restored."  Congress has

            provided no definition of "civil rights" or "restored." 

                 The  main  issue for  us  is whether  the  "civil rights

            restored"  provision in section 921(a)(20)  protects one who,

            like  Indelicato, never  had his  civil rights taken  away at

            all.  It is common ground that misdemeanants in Massachusetts

            do  not lose the  rights that we and  most courts describe as

            "civil rights" under  the statute:   the rights  to vote,  to

            serve  on a jury, and to hold  public office.  Caron, 77 F.3d
                                                           _____

            at  2.  But the  government argues, based  on plain language,

            that a defendant cannot have "restored" to him what the state

            never took away. 

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                 The  issue  is difficult  because  it  pits the  literal

            language  of   the   statute  against   Congress'   perceived

            rationale.    Clearly  the   ordinary  reading  of  the  word

            "restored" supports the  government.  This  court so held  in

            Ramos, 961 F.2d  at 1007-08, although over  a strong dissent,
            _____

            and the  Second  Circuit  followed  Ramos on  this  issue  in
                                                _____

            McGrath  v. United States, 60 F.3d 1005, 1007 (2d Cir. 1995),
            _______     _____________

            cert.  denied, 116  S. Ct.  929 (1996).   But  there  are two
            _____________

            different  reasons  why  we are  not  inclined  to  treat the

            literal language  as precluding further  inquiry, quite apart

            from the determination of the en banc court in Caron treating
                                          _______          _____

            the present issue as an open one in this circuit.  See Caron,
                                                               ___ _____

            77 F.3d at 5-6.2

                 First,  a ready  explanation exists  why Congress  might

            have used  the term  "restored" without intending  to exclude

            persons like Indelicato.  The incidents that gave rise to the

            amendment  (in  particular,  Dickerson),  and  what  Congress
                                         _________

            thought to  be the ordinary case, involved the deprivation of

            civil  rights and  their  subsequent  restoration  (e.g.,  by
                                                                ____

            pardon).  Indeed,  there is no indication in  the legislative

            history  that Congress gave any attention to the rare case in

                                
            ____________________

                 2Although we  think that  Caron  frees us  to treat  the
                                           _____
            issue  as open despite Ramos, we have taken the precaution of
                                   _____
            circulating this opinion  in advance to all  of the circuit's
            active judges.  This informal circulation does not preclude a
            petition   for   rehearing   or   suggestion   of   en   banc
                                                                _________
            reconsideration. See Trailer Marine Transport Corp. v. Rivera
                             ___ ______________________________    ______
            Vazquez, 977 F.2d 1, 9 n.5 (1st Cir. 1992).
            _______

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            which someone convicted of a serious crime would not lose one

            or more of the three civil rights that have been used by most

            courts as touchstones under this section.

                 Second, as  explained later in this opinion,  it is hard

            to  find any reason why  Congress would have  wished to adopt

            the  distinction now  urged  by the  government.   In  United
                                                                   ______

            States  v. Cassidy, 899 F.2d  543, 549 n.13  (6th Cir. 1990),
            ______     _______

            the Sixth  Circuit went so far  as to say that  there was "no

            rational basis"  for  distinguishing between  a criminal  who

            never lost his civil  rights and one who had  them taken away

            and  then  restored by  statute.   As  the Supreme  Court has

            reminded us, "[l]ooking beyond the naked text for guidance is

            perfectly  proper when  the result  it apparently  decrees is

            difficult  to  fathom or  where  it  seems inconsistent  with

            Congress' intention . . . ."  Public Citizen v. Department of
                                          ______________    _____________

            Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 455 (1989).
            _______

                 Where  language  is  not  conclusive,  courts  turn   to

            legislative history and purpose.   Most broadly, it has  been

            suggested   that   Congress'   main   purpose   in   enacting

            section 921(a)(20) was to let the states decide who may carry

            guns.   E.g., United States v. Bost, 87 F.3d 1333, 1334 (D.C.
                    ____  _____________    ____

            Cir. 1996);  Caron, 77  F.3d at  3; Ramos,  961 F.2d  at 1011
                         _____                  _____

            (Torruella, J.,  dissenting).   If so,  it might  follow that

            Massachusetts--having declined to restrict the gun possession

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            rights  of misdemeanants  like  Indelicato--should  have  its

            preference followed as a matter of course.

                 This is  too sweeping  a contention.   Congress  in 1986

            deliberately gave  the states much latitude  to determine who

            would fall under the ban of  the federal statute; but it  did

            not give the states carte blanche as  to the manner of making
                                _____________

            this  determination.   Rather, Congress  created a  structure

            that  allows  the  state  to  make  this   decision  only  in

            mechanically defined ways--such as by expungement  or setting

            aside of a conviction, pardon or restoration of civil rights.

            For instance, if  a state  does not restore  a felon's  civil

            rights  but expressly  allows  him to  possess firearms,  the

            felon  may still  be  prosecuted under  the federal  statute.

            United States  v. Thomas,  991 F.2d  206, 214-15  (5th Cir.),
            _____________     ______

            cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1014 (1993).
            ____________

                 Although Congress did not  specify which civil rights it

            had  in  mind,  the   plurality  view  among  the  circuits--

            explicitly adopted  by this court in  Caron--is that Congress
                                                  _____

            had in mind  the core  cluster of "citizen"  rights that  are

            typically lost by felons and restored by pardons, namely, the

            right to vote, to serve on  a jury and to hold public office.

            Caron, 77  F.3d at 2.   Indeed,  when the Senate  debated the
            _____

            amendment,  Senator  Sasser  noted  that  under  the  federal

            statute, convicted  felons "lose most  civil rights--to vote,

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                                         -8-

            hold  office, and  so  on .  . .  ."   131 Cong.  Rec. 18,182

            (1985).

                 To key the  federal statute to these  civil rights makes

            sense only on  one assumption: that  Congress thought of  the

            attribution of these rights as expressing "a state's judgment

            that  a particular person or  class of persons  is, despite a

            prior   conviction,   sufficiently  trustworthy   to  possess

            firearms."  McGrath, 60  F.3d at 1009.  Accord  United States
                        _______                     ______  _____________

            v. Meeks, 987  F.2d 575,  578 (9th Cir.),  cert. denied,  510
               _____                                   ____________

            U.S. 919  (1993).  This "trustworthiness"  rationale is about

            the  best that  we  or anyone  else  has managed  to  explain

            Congress' approach.

                 The tightest application of this rationale might suggest

            that  Congress intended  to  allow  firearms possession  only

            where a state has made an individualized decision  to restore
                                      ______________

            civil rights as, for  example, by an individual pardon.   But

            the    statute   contains   no    explicit   requirement   of

            individualized  action.   And this  court in  Caron, together
                                                          _____

            with  most  other circuits,  see 77  F.3d  at 2  n.1,  4, has
                                         ___

            rejected such a requirement of individualized action.

                 If individualized action is not  required, it is hard to

            see why Congress would wish to distinguish between one  whose

            civil rights were never taken away (Indelicato) and one whose

            civil rights  were mechanically taken  away and  mechanically

            restored.  The  government has supplied  no such reason,  nor

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            has  any  court done  so.   The  distinction  could certainly

            create an anomalous  result in various situations, such  as a

            jurisdiction  that did  not deprive  a misdemeanant  of civil

            rights but took away the rights of a felon and  then restored

            them  by statute on the felon's completion of his prison term

            and period of supervision.

                 The  government's  best  argument, ad  hominem  but  not
                                                    ___________

            without force, is that Indelicato is a perfect example of the

            kind of  previously convicted criminal who ought to be barred

            from  possessing  a firearm.    Indelicato  had earlier  been

            convicted of an assault with a  knife; he was engaged in drug

            operations;  and  his  collection of  weapons  and ammunition

            provided ample reason to  think that he was a  very dangerous

            man.    Yet  because   Massachusetts  law  does  not  deprive

            Indelicato  of his  civil  rights, Indelicato  can do  what a

            federally convicted forger could not.

                 But  the ad  hominem  argument is  somewhat  misleading.
                          ___________

            Indelicato is  already serving  a very long  federal sentence

            for the drug offenses; and if civil rights were not deemed to

            be  "restored" to him, neither would they be restored to some

            other misdemeanant  in Massachusetts whose crime  might be so

            pacific that  no one would  think that  it made any  sense to

            deprive  him of the opportunity  to possess a  firearm.  See,
                                                                     ____

            e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws  ch. 56,   50 (alteration  of ballots).
            ____

            Congress  can fix the flaws in the present statute; we cannot

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            do so without  creating other  flaws and  the possibility  of

            some new injustice.

                 We recognize that our conclusion is contrary to two very

            able  opinions--our own circuit's earlier two-to-one decision

            on this issue in  Ramos and the Second Circuit's  decision in
                              _____

            McGrath, relying directly upon Ramos.  But Ramos' decision on
            _______                        _____       _____

            the point  at issue  drew some of  its force  from its  other

            holding  that  Congress had  intended  restoration  to be  an

            individualized decision--a  defensible position, but  one now

            rejected by Caron and  most other circuits.  As  for McGrath,
                        _____                                    _______

            it  must be  set against  the contrary  views of  three other

            circuits--the Fifth,  Sixth and Tenth.   Thomas, 991  F.2d at
                                                     ______

            212; Cassidy, 899 F.2d at 549 n.13; United States v. Hall, 20
                 _______                        _____________    ____

            F.3d 1066, 1069 (10th  Cir. 1994).  Ultimately, there  can be

            no  perfect answer on a point that Congress did not consider.

                 The issue before us  is unlikely to matter outside  of a

            very few states.   Most states do take  away from every felon

            at least one of  the three civil rights in question.  Vermont

            (the  subject of McGrath)  appears to be one  of the very few
                             _______

            states  where a  felon does  not lose at  least one  of these

            rights  upon  conviction; and  even  Vermont  preserves those

            rights only  for a  felon who  is not  actually incarcerated,

            McGrath, 60 F.3d at 1007 &  n.2.  And most circuits have held
            _______

            that all three  civil rights  must be restored  to avoid  the

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            federal  ban.3   Thus,  actual  restoration is  likely  to be

            required in most cases.

                 Conversely,  misdemeanants  are  normally  free  of  the

            federal ban by virtue of a different exception in the federal

            statute (see  note 1,  above) save  where the  misdemeanor is
                     ___

            punishable by more  than two years  in prison.   This too  is

            unusual,  the  traditional  distinction  between  felony  and

            misdemeanor being the potential for  a sentence of more  than

            one year.  W. LaFave & A. Scott, 1 Substantive Criminal Law  
                                               ________________________

            1.6,  at 41 (1986).   This does not  preclude the possibility

            that  when  Congress  understands  the  implications  of  its

            statute  for  a problem  it did  not  foresee, it  may prefer

            another result.

                 We conclude, therefore, that Indelicato's  civil rights,

            to  the extent  that they  were never  taken away,  should be

            treated as  "restored" for  purposes of the  federal statute.

            Here,  the   government   concedes  that   misdemeanants   in

            Massachusetts do  not lose their civil rights.  Accord Ramos,
                                                            ______ _____

            961 F.2d at 1008.  Nor are we concerned with the exception to

            the exception--the "expressly provides" proviso at the end of

                                
            ____________________

                 3United States v. Horodner, 91 F.3d 1317, 1319 (9th Cir.
                  _____________    ________
            1996); United States v.  Flower, 29 F.3d 530, 536  (10th Cir.
                   _____________     ______
            1994), cert.  denied, 115 S. Ct. 939 (1995);  United States v.
                   _____________                         _____________
            Essig, 10 F.3d  968,, 976  (3d Cir. 1993);  United States  v.
            _____                                       _____________
            Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 734 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
            _________                                   ____________
            S. Ct. 1374 (1994); United States v. Driscoll, 970 F.2d 1472,
                                _____________    ________
            1478-79 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S.  1083 (1993).
                                     ____________
            But see United  States v.  Dupaquier, 74 F.3d  615, 618  (5th
            _______ ______________     _________
            Cir. 1996).

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            section  921(a)(20)--for  the government  also  concedes that

            Massachusetts  does not restrict  a misdemeanant's  rights to

            "ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms."

                 As  this  case illustrates  all  too  well, the  federal

            statute,  as now drafted, gives  rise to a  host of difficult

            and  obscure  issues  that   Congress  ought  to  resolve  by

            reexamining  this statute.  It  is patent that  Congress as a

            whole did not appreciate the great variety  and complexity of

            state  provisions that would have  to be meshed  with the new

            federal statute or the odd results that would follow.  One of

            the senators  made  this  very  point,  but  only  after  the

            amendment  had   passed.    132  Cong.   Rec.  28,488  (1986)

            (statement of Sen. Durenberger).

                 Yet, the  proliferated case law, the  conflicts, and the

            utter  waste of time incurred by courts and litigants are all

            secondary reasons for revision.  The main reason for Congress

            to revisit  the statute is that  it does not do  the job that

            Congress  expected it to do in reliably sorting out those who

            present  a  special   danger--and  warrant  special   federal

            restrictions  on possession  of firearms--from  those who  do

            not.   Wherever  one  chooses  to  draw  the  line  (and  the

            conflicting  policies  are  for  Congress  to  balance),  the

            present line is too ragged and erratic to protect the public.

                                         III.

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                 At sentencing in July  1995, Indelicato conceded that he

            received about  35 kilograms of cocaine  from Amilcar Antonio

            Imbert, as  supported by  evidence from  beeper records.   He

            disputed Imbert's testimony that Imbert had delivered cocaine

            to Indelicato  on many different occasions,  including a ten-

            kilogram  transaction, and  argued that  the total  amount of

            cocaine  that he purchased was  less than 50  kilograms.  The

            district court concluded that the amount of drugs exceeded 50

            kilograms,   and   sentenced   Indelicato   to   168   months

            imprisonment  on   the  drug  counts,  the   minimum  of  the

            applicable range for this quantity.

                 On appeal,  Indelicato continues to dispute the quantity

            of  cocaine attributed  to him.   But a review  of the record

            indicates that  the government  presented enough  evidence to

            support the district court's finding (which need be only by a

            preponderance)  that  Indelicato   purchased  more  than   50

            kilograms  of cocaine  from Imbert.   Indelicato  conceded 35

            kilograms, although  the more accurate estimate  by the judge

            of the sales recorded by beeper  records was 36.25 kilograms.

            Imbert  also   testified  that  he  sold   ten  kilograms  to

            Indelicato on  one occasion that  would not have  appeared in

            the beeper records.  

                 The question, then, is whether  the district court had a

            sufficient basis for finding an additional four kilograms not

            represented  in the  beeper  records.   The court  concluded,

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            based  on Imbert's  testimony,  that Imbert  sold cocaine  to

            Indelicato several  times each month for  at least one-and-a-

            half months  prior to the  beeper records and  independent of

            the  ten-kilogram  sale.   Imbert  also said  that  each sale

            involved  whole kilograms  (or  more) or  large fractions  of

            kilograms.   We think that these  multiple deliveries of such

            quantities over the course of six weeks provides a sufficient

            basis  for the conclusion  that at least  four more kilograms

            should be attributed to Indelicato.

                 Credibility   judgments  at  sentencing  are  the  trial

            judge's province, United States v. Webster, 54 F.3d 1, 5 (1st
                              _____________    _______

            Cir. 1995),  and the  fact that  the district  judge rejected

            some of Imbert's testimony as not credible does not mean that

            she could not credit other aspects of his testimony.  Because

            the district court's findings for sentencing were not clearly

            erroneous, e.g., United  States v. Wihbey,  75 F.3d 761,  776
                       ____  ______________    ______

            (1st Cir. 1996), we affirm the drug quantity determination.

                 The defendant's  convictions and sentence  for violating

            18 U.S.C.   922(g)(1) are  vacated; his sentence on  the drug
                                       _______

            counts is affirmed; and the  case is remanded for entry of  a
                      ________                   ________

            modified judgment consistent with this opinion.

                 It is so ordered.
                 ________________

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