Court Opinion

ID: 9946518
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 20:03:13.051997+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:38.681804
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/29/24 Garaventa v. Binswanger CA1/5
                NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

        IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                 FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                            DIVISION FIVE

 JOSEPH GARAVENTA,
                                                               A165750
          Plaintiff and Appellant,
 v.                                                            (Contra Costa County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. MSC18-01289)
 WALTER BINSWANGER, III,
          Defendant and Respondent.

        Plaintiff Joseph Garaventa appeals following the trial court’s orders
sustaining without leave to amend the demurrers of defendant Walter
Binswanger, III. We affirm.
                                            BACKGROUND1
        Joseph Garaventa is one of five adult siblings; the others are Silvio
Garaventa, Jr., Marie Louise Adler, Louisa Binswanger, and Linda Colvis.2

        1 “ ‘ “[W]e treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly

pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” ’ ”
(Rincon Band of Luiseño Mission Indians etc. v. Flynt (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th
1059, 1085 (Rincon).) Our statement of the background facts reflects this
standard of review. We omit background facts not relevant to this appeal.
        2 For convenience, we will refer to the family members by their first

names. No disrespect is intended.

                                                        1
In 2015, after the siblings’ surviving parent died, Louisa became the trustee
of the family trust (Trust). The Trust controls 70 percent of the shares of the
family business (the Company) and the remaining 30 percent is divided
equally among the five siblings.
      The terms of the Trust provide for the equal distribution of the Trust’s
interest in the Company to the five siblings, and for the distribution of the
Trust estate to subtrusts for the benefit of the five siblings. Louisa, as
trustee, has not made these distributions, but has paid herself substantial
trustee fees and has paid significant additional fees to the law firm
representing her, where her son, respondent Walter Binswanger III (Walter
III), works as an attorney.
      Walter III advises Louisa and, in 2017, drunkenly bragged that he had
put together a plan whereby he; Louisa; Louisa’s husband, Walter
Binswanger II (Walter II); and Silvio would disadvantage Joseph, Linda, and
Linda’s husband.
      In 2018, Joseph was removed as CEO of the Company after expressing
concerns about Louisa’s actions as trustee. This removal was planned by
Louisa, Silvio, and Marie; and implemented by Louisa using her
supermajority control in the Company as trustee.
      In 2019, bullets were fired at a trailer on property owned by Louisa,
Walter II, and/or Walter III. More than six months later, Joseph received an
anonymous letter referring to the shooting, detailed below (part I.A, post).
      In 2020, Joseph filed the underlying lawsuit against Louisa, Walter II,
Silvio, and Walter III (collectively, Defendants), alleging claims for violations
of the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO; 18
U.S.C. § 1962, subds. (b)–(d)), intentional infliction of emotional distress,
breach of fiduciary duty, unfair business practices (Bus. & Prof. Code,

                                        2
§ 17200), constructive fraud, unjust enrichment, accounting, and negligence.
After Defendants filed a demurrer to the original complaint, Joseph filed a
first amended complaint, realleging the claims in the original complaint and
adding a claim for deceit.
      The trial court granted the parties’ stipulation to permit Joseph to file a
second amended complaint, which alleged the same claims. Defendants
demurred. The trial court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend as to
all causes of action against Walter III.
      The third amended complaint (3AC) alleged, as relevant here, claims
for RICO violations, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants filed a demurrer.
With respect to Walter III, the trial court sustained the demurrer without
leave to amend as to the RICO claims; sustained the demurrer with leave to
amend as to the intentional infliction of emotional distress and unjust
enrichment claims; and overruled the demurrer as to the breach of fiduciary
duty claim.
      The fifth amended complaint (5AC)3 alleged, as relevant here, claims
for intentional infliction of emotional distress and breach of fiduciary duty.
Defendants demurred. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave
to amend in its entirety as to Walter III, and subsequently entered judgment
dismissing Walter III from the case.
      Joseph appeals, challenging the orders sustaining without leave to
amend Walter III’s demurrers to the intentional infliction of emotional
distress, RICO, and breach of fiduciary duty claims.

      3 After Joseph filed a fourth amended complaint, the parties stipulated

to allowing Joseph to file a fifth amended complaint.

                                           3
                                 DISCUSSION
      We review an order sustaining a demurrer de novo, “independently
examin[ing] the operative complaint ‘to determine whether it alleges facts
sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.’ ” (Rincon, supra,
70 Cal.App.5th at p. 1085.)
I.    Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
      Joseph argues the trial court erred in sustaining Walter III’s demurrer
to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. “The tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress is comprised of three elements: (1)
extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of
causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional
distress; (2) the plaintiff suffered severe or extreme emotional distress; and
(3) the plaintiff’s injuries were actually and proximately caused by the
defendant’s outrageous conduct.” (Cochran v. Cochran (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th
488, 494 (Cochran).) We agree with the trial court that Joseph fails to allege
extreme and outrageous conduct.
      A.     Additional Background
      The conduct on which this claim is based is an anonymous letter to
Joseph, which is attached as an exhibit to the 5AC.4 The letter provides, in
its entirety, as follows:
      “We are contacting you to avoid a situation which will result in life-
changing ramification if our cautionary message is not taken seriously.
      “As the father of Andrew, Steven and Katherine, you undoubtably wish
to keep your children safe and protected. We too have family members that
we wish to keep safe and protected.

      4 The 5AC alleges that an attached photograph shows Walter II

“purchasing the stamp that was used to send the” anonymous letter.

                                        4
      “The Giacomelli family[5] is part of our family. Many of us are very
protective of Maria and her daughters since Ray’s death. Ray’s family is
loved and respected by many in our community. Anyone who is important to
Maria is important to us. This would include Maria’s son-in-laws, [sic] their
families and friends.
      “This is a cordial communication to advise you, your family members,
friends and caretaker against harassing, threatening or causing any harm or
disturbance toward Maria’s son-in-laws, [sic] friends or damaging any of their
possessions or property in the upcoming hunting season. Maria’s
grandchildren will also being [sic] enjoying the hunting season on the
property located across the levee from you. Do not allow anyone or anything
disrupt [sic] their enjoyment. This includes making false complaints or
allegations to the Game Warden against your neighbors in an effort to cause
them problems.
      “We are aware of the bullets that penetrated the trailers on Maria’s
son-in-law’s land. The trajectory of the slugs are from your property. Let’s be
very clear, you must prevent this dangerous behavior from being repeated.
We are holding you completely responsible for any harmful actions against
Maria’s family by one of your family members, guests or caretaker. Maria
wants no harm to come to her family, as YOU do not want harm to come to
Andrew, Steven or Katherine. Maria is not aware that we are contacting you.
Do not contact her regarding this letter. You are not to cause her any
anguish by involving her.
      “This message is a friendly notification to prevent innocent people in
your family and in Maria’s family from become [sic] victims because of some

      5 The 5AC alleges Maria Giacomelli and her family live on adjacent

property.

                                       5
escalating and ongoing feud. You, Mr. Garaventa need to control this
situation. You are responsible for everyone’s actions on your property. The
repercussions of causing harm to any of the Giacomelli family or friends will
not be pleasant. You can protect and keep your family safe by keeping all
others safe and protected as well. Take this recommendation seriously.”
      B.     Page Limitation
      In its order sustaining with leave to amend Defendants’ demurrer to
the intentional infliction of emotional distress count as alleged in the 3AC,
the trial court directed that additional allegations regarding this claim in a
subsequent pleading “shall not exceed one page, double-spaced.” Joseph
argues the trial court erred in imposing this limitation. Both parties agree
our review is for abuse of discretion.
      The court did not abuse its discretion. Joseph had previously been
granted leave to amend the claim, without page limitations, following the
court’s order sustaining Defendants’ demurrer to Joseph’s second amended
complaint. The 3AC was more than 25 pages long. The trial court carefully
considered the deficiencies in the allegations and we cannot say its
determination that any cure could be made in one page or less was an abuse
of discretion.
      C.     Extreme and Outrageous Conduct
      “In order to meet the [extreme and outrageous conduct] requirement of
the tort, the alleged conduct ‘ “. . . must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds
of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” [Citation.] Generally,
conduct will be found to be actionable where the “recitation of the facts to an
average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the
actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’ ” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] That
the defendant knew the plaintiff had a special susceptibility to emotional

                                         6
distress is a factor which may be considered in determining whether the
alleged conduct was outrageous. [Citations.] [¶] There is no bright line
standard for judging outrageous conduct and ‘ “. . . its generality hazards a
case-by-case appraisal of conduct filtered through the prism of the appraiser’s
values, sensitivity threshold, and standards of civility. The process evoked by
the test appears to be more intuitive than analytical . . . .” ’ ” (Cochran,
supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 494.) “In evaluating whether the defendant’s
conduct was outrageous, it is ‘not . . . enough that the defendant has acted
with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to
inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by
“malice,” or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to
punitive damages for another tort. Liability has been found only where the
conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to
go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’ (Rest.2d Torts, § 46, com. d, p.
73.)” (Cochran, at p. 496.)
      In Cochran, the litigants were former romantic partners who had a son
together, and whose relationship had become antagonistic. (Cochran, supra,
65 Cal.App.4th at pp. 491–492.) The defendant left a voicemail message
stating he was going to give the daughter of his former partner (both of whom
were plaintiffs) “ ‘ “the Value Jet around the world vacation package. She can
fly any time she wants to as soon as they start flying again. . . .” ’ This
message referred to the then recent crash of a Value Jet airliner in the
Florida Everglades which killed all aboard.” (Id. at p. 492.) “[F]or several
years before” leaving the voicemail message, the defendant “made both
general and specific threats against [the plaintiffs], including statements

                                        7
such as ‘You know how powerful I am,’ ‘you’ll be sorry,’ [and] he would have
them watched and followed wherever they went.” (Id. at p. 495.)
      The Court of Appeal held the voicemail message did not constitute
outrageous conduct: “To the extent the message . . . can be characterized as a
threat, its meaning is hidden and lacking in immediacy.” (Cochran, supra, 65
Cal.App.4th at p. 498.) The court noted the context was that “the parties to
an intimate relationship gone bad were now feuding. Those feuds are often
accompanied by an exchange of hostile unpleasantries which are intended to
sting whoever sits at the delivery end. While the pain inflicted might be real,
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress was never intended to
remove all such barbs. To hold otherwise would needlessly congest our courts
with trials for hurts both real and imagined which are best resolved
elsewhere. [¶] There is no indication that respondent ever took any steps to
either carry out his alleged threat or, at the least, make the threat appear
more real. Without more, the ‘Value Jet’ message which respondent allegedly
left is little more than the release of steam from the pressure cooker of the
parties’ ill will. As such, it is precisely what the Restatement had in mind
when it excluded ‘mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty
oppressions, or other trivialities’ from the tort and referred to the need for a
safety valve ‘through which irascible tempers may blow off relatively
harmless steam.’ ” (Ibid.)
      Joseph argues this case is more akin to Kiseskey v. Carpenters’ Trust
for So. California (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 222 (Kiseskey), in which agents of
the defendant union called the plaintiff on three occasions and told him,
“ ‘You are a no good son of a bitch and if you don’t resign the agreement and
get in set with the union, you’ll be put in the hospital;’ ” “ ‘Rejoin the union or
you might not live to regret it;’ ” and “ ‘Since you do not seem to be concerned

                                         8
about your safety and well-being, maybe you will be concerned about the
well-being of your life and children.’ ” (Id. at p. 229.) The Court of Appeal
held these calls “constitute outrageous conduct intended to inflict emotional
distress in order to compel behavior through threats of physical violence or
death . . . .” (Id. at p. 230.)
      We agree with the trial court that the anonymous letter does not
constitute outrageous conduct. Unlike the phone calls in Kiseskey, the letter
contains no direct threats of physical harm. To the contrary, the letter
characterizes itself as “a cordial communication” and “a friendly notification”
seeking to forestall an “escalating and ongoing feud.” The letter states the
author’s position that the gunshots originated from Joseph’s property, and
asks Joseph to refrain from engaging in conduct against others and to police
the conduct of individuals present on his property. Thus, the letter appears
to seek to defuse potential conflict. To the extent implied threats are present
in the letter, the threats are not immediate. The context of an ongoing family
dispute, as in Cochran, supports construing the letter as, at most, “the
release of steam from the pressure cooker of the parties’ ill will.” (Cochran,
supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 498.)
      Joseph also relies on allegations regarding his susceptibility to
emotional distress, to wit, his experience with his late spouse’s depression,
substance abuse, and eventual suicide in 2009; as well as allegations of
Walter III’s “history of extremely violent and deadly behavior, including life
threatening violence.” We note the letter does not reference or allude to
Joseph’s painful experiences with his late spouse, and Joseph does not allege
Walter III’s history of violence was directed at him or other family members.
Considering these allegations in combination with the substance of the letter,
the conduct was not extreme or outrageous. (See Cochran, supra, 65

                                       9
Cal.App.4th at pp. 495–496 [“Assuming for discussion’s sake alone that
appellants have sufficiently alleged facts showing they were susceptible to
emotional distress, ‘ “major outrage is still essential to the tort; and the mere
fact that the actor knows that the other will regard the conduct as insulting,
or will have his feelings hurts [sic], is not enough.” ’ ”].)
II.   Aiding and Abetting Louisa’s Breach of Fiduciary Duty
      “The elements of a claim for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary
duty are: (1) a third party’s breach of fiduciary duties owed to plaintiff; (2)
defendant’s actual knowledge of that breach of fiduciary duties; (3)
substantial assistance or encouragement by defendant to the third party’s
breach; and (4) defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing harm
to plaintiff. [Citations.] Some cases suggest a complaint must allege a fifth
element—that the aider and abettor had the specific intent to facilitate the
wrongful conduct.” (Nasrawi v. Buck Consultants LLC (2014) 231
Cal.App.4th 328, 343.)
      The 3AC and the 5AC both allege that Louisa, as trustee of the Trust,
owes fiduciary duties to Joseph, who has a beneficial interest in the Trust.
They further allege she breached those fiduciary duties by performing acts as
trustee to benefit her personally, terminating Joseph from the Company,
refusing to fund the subtrusts, and paying herself trustee fees. Finally, as
relevant here, the 3AC and 5AC allege Walter III provided “encouragement
and substantial assistance” and his actions “were a substantial factor in
causing harm to [Joseph].”
      When Defendants demurred to the 3AC, the trial court found sufficient
allegations that Walter III provided substantial encouragement by being “the
brains behind the plan to harm Joseph.” A different bench officer ruled on
Walter III’s demurrer to the 5AC. This bench officer found the allegations as

                                         10
to Walter III insufficient: “[Joseph] alleges Walter III is the chief advisor to
Louisa and the self-described architect and ‘brains.’ Plaintiff alleges Walter
III bragged that he had put together a plan for the Binswanger family and
Silvio to transfer wealth to themselves and deprive Plaintiff [and others].
Although the Court previously found Plaintiff had alleged facts sufficient to
show ‘substantial encouragement,’ the Court did not address the fourth
element: defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing harm to
plaintiff. Here, Plaintiff has not alleged how the conduct of . . . Walter III
was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s harm.”
      As an initial matter, Joseph argues the trial court’s order overruling
Walter III’s demurrer to the breach of fiduciary duty claim in the 3AC
precluded the court from sustaining Walter III’s demurrer as to that claim in
the 5AC. Courts of Appeal are split on this issue. (Compare Bennett v.
Suncloud (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 91, 96–97 [“when Judge Finkel overruled the
demurrer to the first, second, third, seventh, and ninth causes of action . . . ,
Judge Haber was foreclosed from rendering a new determination on the
viability of those claims unless some new facts or circumstances were brought
to his attention”]; with Pavicich v. Santucci (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 382, 389 &
fn. 3 [“[the defendant] was entirely within his rights to demur to the fifth
cause of action of the first amended complaint and amended cross-complaint
notwithstanding his prior unsuccessful efforts to demur to the fifth cause of
action of the original complaint and cross-complaint”].) We need not weigh in
on the issue because, as courts on both sides have found, our review is not
impacted by any such error. (Bennett, at p. 97 [“[N]ow that the case is before
this court, we are free to review both Judge Finkel’s and Judge Haber’s
orders and render an opinion based on the correct rule of law. We are not
required to sustain an erroneous trial court ruling because it came first.”];

                                        11
Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Boyle (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1036
[“[T]he role of this court entails review of the trial court’s ruling, not its
rationale. Thus, even if the trial court here were constrained by its prior
rulings in its consideration of the grounds raised on demurrers to the third
amended complaint, on review of the judgment, we are not so constrained
and are free to render an opinion based on the correct rule of law.”].)
      In sustaining Walter III’s demurrer to this claim in the 5AC, the trial
court found Joseph failed to sufficiently allege Walter III’s conduct was a
substantial factor in Joseph’s harm (an issue the trial court’s order on the
3AC did not expressly consider). “ ‘[C]ausation is an essential element of an
aiding and abetting claim, i.e., plaintiff must show that the aider and abettor
provided assistance that was a substantial factor in causing the harm
suffered.’ ” (American Master Lease LLC v. Idanta Partners, Ltd. (2014) 225
Cal.App.4th 1451, 1476.) “ ‘[T]he “substantial factor” test’ [citation] . . .
requires the plaintiff to ‘show some substantial link or nexus between
omission and injury.’ ” (Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2023) 14
Cal.5th 639, 661.)
      The 5AC alleges only generally that Walter III provided “strategic
advice” to Louisa, with no allegations about what he advised her on. Walter
III was not trustee of the Trust, nor did he have any governing authority in
the Company. His alleged boast that he developed a plan against Joseph,
Linda, and Linda’s husband was not specific to any of the alleged breaches of
fiduciary duty. Indeed, the 5AC identifies the planners of some of the alleged
breaches as persons other than Walter III: Joseph’s termination was planned
by Louisa, Silvio, and Marie; and actions involving a workers compensation
insurer were planned by Louisa and Silvio. Joseph’s briefs on appeal fail to

                                         12
explain how the allegations about Walter III satisfy the substantial factor
element.
       Joseph argues, in the alternative, leave to amend should have been
granted. However, Joseph fails to explain or identify what he would add to
an amended complaint. “[A]lthough we are required to decide ‘ “whether
there is a reasonable possibility that the defect [in the complaint] can be
cured by amendment[,] . . . [t]he burden of proving such reasonable possibility
is squarely on the plaintiff” ’ [citation] by ‘show[ing] in what manner he can
amend his complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of
his pleading.’ ” (LeBrun v. CBS Television Studios, Inc. (2021) 68
Cal.App.5th 199, 212.) Accordingly, we affirm the order sustaining Walter
III’s demurrer to this cause of action without leave to amend.
III.   RICO
       In its order on Defendants’ demurrer to the 3AC, the trial court
sustained the demurrer without leave to amend as to Joseph’s RICO causes
of action. We affirm.
       “RICO is contained in title 18 or the United States Code, sections 1961
through 1968. . . . [¶] Although RICO provides for a private cause of action in
federal district court, the California Supreme Court has held that state courts
have concurrent jurisdiction over RICO claims.” (Gervase v. Superior Court
(1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1228–1229.) To establish a civil RICO claim,
“[i]n general, . . . the plaintiff must prove that the defendant caused injury to
the plaintiff’s business or property by engaging in a pattern of racketeering
activity in connection with an enterprise which affects interstate commerce.”
(Gervase, at p. 1232.)
       The RICO statute provides that a “ ‘ “[p]attern of racketeering activity”
requires at least two acts of racketeering activity . . . .’ ” (Gervase, supra, 31

                                        13
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1231–1232.) “For an act or omission to qualify as
racketeering activity, it must be included in the list of activities set forth in
title 18 United States Code section 1961(1). While that list is lengthy, it does
not include every criminal or civil wrong a person or entity might commit,
and excluded actions, no matter how grievous, cannot qualify as racketeering
activity within the meaning of RICO. [Citation.] In addition, a common
element of all actions included in the list is a requirement that the action be
criminal in nature, that is, that it be chargeable, indictable, or punishable as
a crime.” (Id. at p. 1232.)
      The 3AC alleges various acts that Joseph claims constitute eight
different racketeering activities. Joseph’s opening brief argues only cursorily
that he alleged “the requisite predicate actions,” and distinguishes one case
relied on by Walter III below relating to one of the alleged acts of
racketeering. Walter III’s response brief goes through each alleged
racketeering activity and argues, with citations to authority, that the alleged
facts do not constitute the claimed criminal acts. For example, Joseph alleges
Defendants committed robbery when they took valuables from the family safe
after their mother’s death. As Walter III argues, this allegation fails to
establish the elements of robbery that the property was taken from the
person or in the person’s immediate presence, and was taken by means of
force of fear. (Pen. Code, § 211.) Joseph also alleges the anonymous letter
(see ante, part I.A) constitutes a threat involving murder. To constitute a
predicate act, a threat involving murder must be “chargeable under State
law.” (18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).) Penal Code section 422, subdivision (a), provides
criminal punishment for “Any person who willfully threatens to commit a
crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person,”
where the threat “is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as

                                        14
to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate
prospect of execution of the threat . . . .” The letter plainly does not satisfy
this requirement.
      In his reply brief, Joseph provides no response to these arguments or to
Walter III’s other specific arguments regarding the remaining alleged acts of
racketeering. “We need not analyze this issue further because ‘[i]t is not our
responsibility to develop an appellant’s argument.’ ” (SI 59 LLC v. Variel
Warner Ventures, LLC (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 146, 156.) “ ‘ “[E]very brief
should contain a legal argument with citation to authorities on the points
made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as
waived, and pass it without consideration.” [Citation.] [¶] “ ‘It is the duty of
[appellant’s] counsel, not of the courts, “by argument and the citation of
authorities to show that the claimed error exists.” ’ ” (Supervalu, Inc. v.
Wexford Underwriting Managers, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 64, 80–81.)
      Because Joseph fails to establish he alleged facts constituting a pattern
of racketeering, we affirm the trial court’s order sustaining Walter III’s
demurrer as to the RICO claims. We need not and do not consider the
parties’ arguments on the remaining elements of the RICO claims.
                                 DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.
                                                                      SIMONS, J.
WE CONCUR:
JACKSON, P. J.

BURNS, J.

Garaventa v. Binswanger (A165750)

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