Court Opinion

ID: 9678981
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:37:47.652731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:09.334756
License: Public Domain

O’HaRa, J.
Leave to appeal was granted in this case to review an order of the Court of Appeals.1 *319The order denied a stay of proceedings previously granted and denied the prayer of the appellants to dissolve a temporary injunction. The order remanded the cause to the circuit court for hearing on the merits.
This is a chancery case. The constitutional provision (Const 1963, art 6, § 5) abolishes the distinctions between law and equity proceedings. It did not abolish the historic difference between law and equity. We note this because it is as a court of equity we sit in the case at bar. In this, as in all other cases clearly in equity, we hear appeals de novo. The reason for this restatement of principle will appear decisionally later in our opinion.
In 1947, the legislature enacted what is generally referred to as the Hutchinson act. CL 1948, § 423-.201 et seq., as amended by PA 1965, No 379 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev and Stat Ann 1968 Cum Supp § 17.455 [1] et seq.).
We herewith set forth the title to the act as amended by PA 1965, No 379:
“An act to prohibit strikes by certain public employees; to provide the review from disciplinary action with respect thereto; to provide for the mediation of grievances and the holding of elections; to declare and protect the rights and privileges of public employees; and to prescribe means of enforcement and penalties for the violation of the provisions of this act.”
Its first section, as amended by PA 1965, No 379, defines a strike:
“As used in this act the word ‘strike’ shall mean the concerted failure to report for duty, the wilful absence from one’s position, the stoppage of work, or the abstinence in whole or in part from the full, faithful and proper performance of the duties of employment, for the purpose of inducing, influencing *320or coercing a change in the conditions, or compensation, or the rights, privileges or obligations of employment.”
The second section specifies the employees affected :
“No person holding a position by appointment or employment in the government of the State of Michigan, or in the goverment of any 1 or more of the political subdivisions thereof, or in the public school service, or in any public or special district, or in the service of any authority, commission, or board, or in any other branch of the public service, hereinafter called a ‘public employee,’ shall strike.”
In the late summer of 1967 the teachers in the School District for the City of Holland, Ottawa and Allegan counties, acting through their duly certified collective bargaining agency, did not resume their teaching duties on the day set by the board of education. If they were employees within the meaning of the statute they were on strike as that term is defined in the statute.
The school district sought an injunction restraining the teachers from withholding their services. A hearing was held and the trial chancellor issued a temporary injunction. The Court of Appeals denied continuation of a stay order previously granted and the prayer to dissolve the injunction. We likewise denied a stay order and declined to dissolve the injunction but granted leave to appeal. The case is before us in that posture. Regrettably, we have a meager record, the pleadings, transcribed colloquies between court and counsel, and oral argument. To the extent possible, in order that our decision be precedentially meaningful, we will discuss those basic issues which relate to the legal concepts which we consider must govern, and will not limit our*321selves to the narrow question of the propriety of the issuance of the temporary injunction.
"We acknowledge the very thorough and helpful briefs of the parties and those filed amicus curiae.
The first argument to which we must address ourselves is the challenge to the constitutionality of the statute. Appellants contend it violates guarantees in both our Federal and the State Constitutions. The constitutional rights claimed to he violated are those guaranteeing freedom of speech, assembly, freedom from involuntary servitude, and denial of equal protection of law. Appellants concede that the act has once been judicially declared free from constitutional infirmity. This Court so held in City of Detroit v. Division 26 of the Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees of America (1952), 332 Mich 237. Appellants argue, however, that in the intervening years Federal Supreme Court decisions, notably Garrity v. New Jersey (1967), 385 US 493 (87 S Ct 616, 17 L ed 562), have eroded the basis of this Court’s decision in the Detroit public employees’ case.
"We cannot agree. We are indeed mindful of the argument so vigorously advanced that public employees generally, and particularly teachers, are denied rights enjoyed by those in private employment, to their prejudice. The wisdom and philosophy of the act in question is not ours to question. We do not hold here that limitations upon the right to strike by public employees could not be exercised by a legislature in an unconstitutional manner. We are concerned with our act and it alone. We do not read Garrity, supra, either directly or by implication to have overruled Detroit v. Association of Employees hereinbefore cited. Garrity concerned itself with the privilege against self-incrimination as against job forfeiture, a principle not involved herein. To hold our act flatly unconstitutional we would have *322to disregard our own precedent and the overwhelming weight of nationwide authority. We reaffirm the principle that within limitations not here relevant the sovereignty may deny to its employees the right to strike.
Next, it is argued that if the act be constitutional, as we have here held, it is inapplicable to appellants for 2 reasons: first, because appellants are not “employees” within the meaning of the act, and second, that as to teachers, injunctive relief may not be granted because an alternative exclusive remedy is to be found in the act.
We consider the first. The principal thrust of this- argument is that, because no contracts of employment were in force between appellants and ap-pellee school district at the time the injunction issued, the involved teachers cannot he employees as a matter of law. It is contended that the school Code, specifically CLS 1961, § 340.569, as amended by PA 1965, No 14 (Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 15.3569), mandates such conclusion. Appellants refer to this argument as the “keystone issue.” This position is supported by the attorney general, a party hereto by our invitation. The issue divided us in disposing of the question of the dissolution of the temporary injunction and the continuance of a previously granted stay order thereof. It has been the subject of the most extensive briefing of any issue in the case, and was the focal point of appellants’ forceful presentation on oral argument. We note all of the foregoing in order that the parties may be fully aware that we have given to it the fullest and most careful consideration. In finality, we have come to the conclusion that Garden City School District v. Labor Mediation Board (1959), 358 Mich 258, of necessity must control. In that case the positions of the parties herein were reversed. In Garden City, the school board sought injunctive restraint against the *323State labor mediation board in its attempted mediation between teachers and the board. The school board challenged that jurisdiction, in part, on the ground that the school code required written contracts, and that the mediation board had no jurisdiction over the terms thereof. This Court said (pp 262, 263):
“Public school teachers are certainly persons ‘holding a position by appointment or employment * * * in the public school service.’
“Appellant school board contends, however, that the provisions of the school code of 1955 (CLS 1956, § 340.569 [Stat Ann 1959 Rev § 15.3659]), by providing that teachers shall be hired by written contract, denies jurisdiction to the labor mediation board for mediation as to any terms which might be included in such contracts.
“The written contract provision was first adopted in 1927, and the legislature was certainly familiar with its requirements when it adopted PA 1947, No 336, which we have quoted. We read these 2 acts together as allowing mediation of salary disputes in advance of the determination of the salary provisions of individual teacher contracts.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Since this Court concluded that there is jurisdiction to mediate grievances “in advance of the determination of salary provisions”, it follows that such jurisdiction would necessarily attach in advance of the executing of the written contracts themselves, which are required in the case of teachers, by the school code.
If teachers, as we have held, are subject to the provision of the Hutchinson act dealing with the mediation grievances in advance of signing written contracts, we can hardly hold with consistency that they are not subject to the no-strike provision of the same act for the same reason. We are con*324strained to bold that appellants were “employees” witbin tbe terms of tbe act.
We next tarn to tbe exclusivity of remedy argument. It is based on section 6 of tbe act,2 wbicb provides:
“Notwithstanding tbe provisions of any other law, any person bolding such a position who, by concerted action with others, and without tbe lawful approval of bis superior, wilfully absents himself from bis position, or abstains in whole or in part from tbe full, faithful and proper performance of bis duties for tbe purpose of inducing, influencing or coercing a change in tbe conditions or compensation, or tbe rights, privileges or obligations of employment shall be deemed to be on strike but tbe person, upon request, shall be entitled to a determination as to whether be did violate tbe provisions of this act. Tbe request shall be filed in writing, with tbe officer or •body having power to remove or discipline such employee, within 10 days after regular compensation of such employee has ceased or other discipline has been imposed. In tbe event of such request tbe officer or body shall witbin 10 days commence a proceeding for tbe determination of whether tbe provisions of this act have been violated by tbe public employee, in accordance with tbe law and regulations appropriate to a proceeding to remove tbe public employee. Tbe proceedings shall be undertaken without unnecessary delay. Tbe decision of tbe proceeding shall be made witbin 10 days. If tbe employee involved is held to have violated this law and bis employment terminated or other discipline imposed, be shall have tbe right of review to tbe circuit court having jurisdiction of tbe parties, within 30 days from such decision, for determination whether such decision is supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on tbe whole record.”
*325In this regard we find ourselves in liarmony with the holding of the Court of Appeals:3
“The claim of the defendants that section 6 of the public employees relations act is the only remedy available to the school board cannot be accepted by this Court. Its provisions for discipline of striking-public employees and review procedure for them cannot be interpreted to imply removing the historic power of courts to enjoin strikes by public employees. See 31 ALK2d 1142 and the cases cited therein.”
Additionally, we deem it necessary to observe that the whole section deals with after-the-fact remedies by the employee. The withholding of services and the cessation of compensation for services has had to have taken place before the section can operate. It must be said that appellants’ position is eminently, indeed inexorably, logical in this regard. The section cannot operate within a situation where in-junctive restraint of the withholding of such service has already been granted. We would find ourselves in a complete logical self-contradiction if we were to hold as we have here that courts retain their jurisdiction to issue a restraining order against withholding of services by public employees, and at the same time hold section 6 to be an exclusive remedy. The section seems to us to support the conclusion that the legislature intended that injunctive relief could be granted, but that courts are not required to grant it in every case involving a strike by public employees. To attempt to compel, legislatively, a court of equity in every instance of a public employee strike to enjoin it would be to destroy the independence of the judicial branch of government.
Having held that the Hutchinson act is without constitutional infirmity, that appellants are public *326employees and as such, subject to its no-strike provisions, and that the courts have jurisdiction to restrain prohibited strikes by public employees, but are not required to do so in every case, we turn to the question of whether in the case at bar the chancellor had before him that quantum of proof or uncontradicted allegations of fact which would justify the issuance of an injunction in a labor dispute case.
We here hold it is insufficient merely to show that a concert of prohibited action by public employees has taken place and that ipso facto such a showing justifies injunctive relief. We so hold because it is basically contrary to public policy in this State to issue injunctions in labor disputes absent a showing of violence, irreparable injury, or breach of the peace. For a recent discussion of this question, see Cross Company v. UAW Local No. 155 (AFL-CIO), 371 Mich 184. We further so hold because such an interpretation of the act would as before noted raise a serious constitutional question.
We indicated earlier that we deal with a meager record. No testimony was taken on the hearing upon the application for the temporary injunction. Simply put, the only showing made to the chancellor was that if an injunction did not issue, the district’s schools would not open, staffed by teachers on the date scheduled for such opening. We hold such showing insufficient to have justified the exercise of the plenary power of equity by the force of injunction. We are mindful of the exemplary conduct of the teachers when the writ, valid on its face, was issued. We are mindful, too, that the appellee district has cooperated by the maintenance of the previous year’s schedule of payments to the teachers as was conceded in oral argument.
We recognize that great discretion is allowed the trial chancellor in the granting or 'withholding of in-*327junctive relief. We do not, in ordinary circumstances, substitute our judgment for Ms. We bold bere, however, that there was a lack of proof which would support the issuance of a temporary injunction.
The order of the Court of Appeals, affirming the circuit court is reversed. Hearing the matter as we do de novo, we dissolve the temporary injunction hereinbefore issued, and remand to the circuit court for further, proceedings. We suggest that such proceedings inquire into whether, as charged by the defendants, the plaintiff school district has refused to bargain in good faith, whether an injunction should issue at all, and if so, on what terms and for what period in light of the whole record to be adduced. No costs, a public question.
Black and Adams, JJ., concurred with O’Haba, J.

 7 Mich App 569,

 CL 1948, § 423.206, as amended by PA 1965, No 379.

 7 Mich App 569, 574.