Court Opinion

ID: 9718514
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:26:21.402372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:59.937222
License: Public Domain

White, C. Thomas, J.,
dissenting.
The United States Supreme Court has held the word automobile is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears. See, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564. In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607, the Supreme Court held the stop of an automobile for even a brief period of time constitutes a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The court went on to criticize random stops by the Border Patrol not based on a reasonable suspicion. While the Supreme Court has not ruled on the specific issue of whether random stops by state patrolmen to check documents are constitutionally valid, the principles enunciated in Brignoni-Ponce clearly suggest that they are not. The majority persists in ignoring the language of the Supreme Court and the weight of authority by relying on State v. Holmberg, 194 Neb. 337, 231 N. W. 2d 672.
It is not necessary to again detail the authority contrary to the majority position except to mention cases decided since Holmberg whose language we feel is germane to the issue. Authority contrary to the majority’s opinion existing prior to Holmberg was set out in the dissent of McCown, J., in State v. Holmberg, supra.
It is to be noted that even authority relied on by the majority in Holmberg is now doubtful. In Holmberg, the majority discussed two cases from the *315Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals to support its position, United States v. Turner (8th Cir., 1971), 442 F. 2d 1146, and Rodgers v. United States (8th Cir., 1966), 362 F. 2d 358. Language found in United States v. Harris (8th Cir., 1975), 528 F. 2d 1327, plainly makes adherence to a rule allowing random stops of automobiles in the Eighth Circuit questionable. After stating that detention of an automobile by police is a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, the court in Harris said: “It is well settled in justifying such an intrusion, a police officer * * must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion” (Emphasis supplied.) Another case utilized by the majority in Holmberg, Lipton v. United States (9th Cir., 1965), 348 F. 2d 591, was limited by the holding in United States v. Carrizoza-Gaxiola (9th Cir., 1975), 523 F. 2d 239. Carrizoza-Gaxiola held that a warrantless stop which was part of an effort to detect stolen vehicles cannot be justified under the guise of a check for compliance with state licensing and registration requirements.
In two recent cases, courts considered the Holmberg rule and rejected it. See, United States v. Montgomery (D. C., 1977), 561 F. 2d 875; State v. Prouse (Del., 1978), 382 A. 2d 1359. In State v. Prouse, supra, the Delaware Supreme Court, in holding random stops inherently arbitrary, reasoned: “However, the factor which in our opinion makes random stops, absent justifying facts, unreasonable is the inherent arbitrariness of the procedure. The flaw in the process is that absolute discretion and authority is conferred upon the police to detain whomever they desire for whatever reason on the pretense of a documents check stop. Thus an officer prejudiced against any visibly identifiable group could stop a disproportionate number of persons in the group. No discrimination has been *316shown in the stop under examination here, but the evil of the possibility of discriminatory stops does exist. If we were to accept the State’s position, discriminatory stopping procedures could be practiced with little or no chance for judicial review.”
Citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Harris, supra, held that a reasonable suspicion standard was to be applied in random automobile stops.
The majority here would equate intuition with reasonable suspicion. Intuition is not reasonable suspicion, but rather selective suspicion. Selective suspicion, without more, is merely a mask for personal prejudices. The following testimony of the officer illustrates the inherently arbitrary nature of random stops: “Q. Tell me what specific facts led you to believe that the motor vehicle was stolen?
“A. The reason — there were no specific facts. I did not have a report saying that this vehicle was stolen. I did not know that this vehicle was stolen. I just felt that the driver of the vehicle did not fit the vehicle and I had an inkling, call it what you want, but I felt at the time that the vehicle could possibly be stolen.
“Q. All right. Tell me what facts gave you the feeling that —.
‘‘A. Okay, I will do the best I can.
“Q. Well, I hope so.
‘‘A. When I first observed the vehicle eastbound I saw that the driver at this time looked to be like a Mexican male driving a newer model Chevrolet and in my line of work people, or a car, if it is going to be stolen for various reasons a lot of times it is a newer model car, rather than an older model car, whether it be for profit, if you are going to steal a car, a lot of people will steal it so that they can make some money off it, or if they are going to steal a car they are going to take a car that is reliable, that gets *317them out of wherever they have been and will get them out of — to where they want to go, so the fact that it was a newer model car initially aroused my interest, along with the fact that Mr. Kretchmar at that time appeared to be a Mexican male. I thought that if he was a Mexican male, if he was possibly an illegal alien from Mexico, that there was a good chance that he had a car that would not belong to him, but there was no way I could tell whether this vehicle was his without stopping him and checking him out, getting his driver’s license and registration. * * *
“Q. (By Mr. Bolán) Based on that information and based on what those observations were at that time you stopped the motor vehicle; is that correct?
“A. Yes.”
The language of the Fourth Amendment is clear and unmistakable: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, * * Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Under the majority’s holding, a motorist using the roads of this state is without a constitutional guarantee against unreasonable seizure. In reality, the selective enforcement of the law sanctioned here allows the guarantee to adhere to some and not to others. The “others” are those of a specific ethnic type who may be driving a later model car, as here. What characteristics might be a catalyst to an officer’s intuition are open to speculation. The majority clearly says there are no Fourth Amendment rights to be free of arbitrary stops on a highway. I disagree.
McCown, J., joins in this dissent.