Court Opinion

ID: 9947359
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 17:10:23.5171+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:23.483718
License: Public Domain

J-S43046-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  VICTORIA R. BEAMAN                           :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :          PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
  ERIC GIBBS                                   :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :         No. 522 MDA 2023

                 Appeal from the Order Entered October 5, 2022
                  In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
                  Domestic Relations at No(s): 00763-SA-2020

BEFORE:      McLAUGHLIN, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                            FILED: MARCH 4, 2024

       Appellant, Eric Gibbs, appeals from the order entered in the York County

Court of Common Pleas, which found him in contempt for failing to make

support payments to Appellee, Victoria R. Beaman, as well as failing to report

status changes and failing to comply with job search directives. We vacate

and remand.

       The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows.

On January 24, 2022, the York County Domestic Relations Section (“DRS”)

filed contempt petitions against Appellant at two different docket numbers,

1604 SA 2018 and 763 SA 2020. In the petitions, DRS alleged that Appellant

did not comply with child support orders by failing to: 1) pay as ordered; 2)

provide information; and 3) comply with job search directives.            The court

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S43046-23

scheduled a hearing on the matter for March 2, 2022. The scheduling order

noted that Appellant had “the right to a lawyer, who may attend the

conference-hearing and represent you.”            (Order, filed 1/24/22, at 2)

(capitalization omitted).1       Appellant subsequently failed to appear at the

hearing, and the court issued a bench warrant. Appellant was apprehended

on or about August 26, 2022, and the court rescheduled the contempt hearing.

       On October 5, 2022, Appellant appeared pro se at the hearing. At the

conclusion of the hearing, the court found Appellant in contempt at each

docket number, and it sentenced him to three months’ incarceration, effective

from August 26, 2022. The court also imposed a term of eighteen months of

probation with the following conditions: 1) Appellant must pay support as

ordered on a regular and timely basis; 2) Appellant must report all

employment status changes within seven days; and 3) Appellant must comply

with all job search requirements when unemployed or not paying the full

amount of support. The court set a cash purge amount of $1,000.00 and a

work purge of forty days in the county prison’s “Outmate” program.

       On October 31, 2022, Appellant timely filed a single, pro se notice of

appeal listing both lower court docket numbers. The notice of appeal included

a pro se “motion for post-trial relief” claiming that, among other things, the

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1 The order also explained that the Lawyer Referral Service of the York County

Bar Association could provide Appellant “with information about agencies that
may offer legal services to eligible persons at a reduced fee or no fee.” (Order,
filed 1/24/22, at 2) (capitalization omitted).

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court had violated Appellant’s right to counsel.   The notice of appeal also

contained a completed application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

(“IFP”). On January 17, 2023, this Court remanded the matter and directed

the contempt court to rule on Appellant’s open motion to proceed IFP. This

Court also ordered the contempt court to determine whether Appellant was

entitled to appointed counsel on appeal.

       On January 24, 2023, the contempt court granted IFP status and

appointed current counsel. On March 20, 2023, this Court directed counsel to

file separate, amended notices of appeal at each of the underlying docket

numbers. Counsel complied and timely filed the amended notices of appeal

on March 31, 2023.2

       Appellant now raises one issue for our review:

          Did the [contempt] court deny [Appellant] his right to
          counsel where it proceeded in the absence of counsel, did
          not seek or secure any waiver of counsel, and went on to
          find [Appellant] in contempt and order him incarcerated?

(Appellant’s Brief at 4).

       On appeal, Appellant maintains that the court erred in finding him “in

contempt and ordering his incarceration without first appointing counsel to

represent him.” (Id. at 11). Appellant initially suggests that the contempt

hearing was criminal in nature, and he “had a Sixth Amendment right to

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2 The related appeal from the contempt order at 1604 SA 2018 is docketed in

this Court at 1550 MDA 2022.

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counsel and was entitled to the protections of Pa.R.Crim.P. 121.” (Id.) Even

if the contempt hearing was civil rather than criminal, Appellant asserts that

he possessed a due process right to counsel. Appellant cites Commonwealth

v. Diaz, 191 A.3d 850 (Pa.Super. 2018), for the proposition that an indigent

defendant’s right to appointed counsel is triggered at any proceeding where

the court finds a likelihood of imprisonment. Because his contempt hearing

resulted in imprisonment, Appellant insists that the court should have

appointed counsel before imposing the sentence.             Moreover, Appellant

contends that he did not waive his right to counsel. Appellant concludes that

this Court must reverse the order finding him in contempt and remand the

matter for proceedings with the assistance of counsel. We agree.3

       “In reviewing a trial court’s finding on a contempt petition, we are

limited to determining whether the trial court committed a clear abuse of

discretion.” Rogowski v. Kirven, 291 A.3d 50, 57 (Pa.Super. 2023) (quoting

P.H.D. v. R.R.D., 56 A.3d 702, 706 (Pa.Super. 2012)).           “This Court must

place great reliance on the sound discretion of the trial [court] when reviewing

an order of contempt.” Id.

          The determination of whether a particular order
          contemplates civil or criminal contempt is crucial, as each
          classification confers different and distinct procedural rights
          on the defendant.         There is nothing inherent to a
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3 Further, DRS “would concur in the relief sought by [Appellant], in so far as

the order of the finding of contempt and sentence be vacated.” (DRS’s Brief
at 10). DRS also “concedes that the record of the contempt court below is
void of any waiver of right to counsel.” (Id.)

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         contemptuous act or refusal to act which classifies the act
         itself as “criminal” or “civil.”    The distinction between
         criminal and civil contempt is rather a distinction between
         two permissible judicial responses to contumacious
         behavior. These judicial responses are classified according
         to the dominant purpose of the court. If the dominant
         purpose is to vindicate the dignity and authority of the court
         and to protect the interest of the general public, it is a
         proceeding for criminal contempt. But where the act of
         contempt complained of is the refusal to do or refrain from
         doing some act ordered or prohibited primarily for the
         benefit of a private party, proceedings to enforce
         compliance with the decree of the court are civil in nature.
         The purpose of a civil contempt proceeding is remedial.
         Judicial sanctions are employed to coerce the defendant into
         compliance with the court’s order, and in some instances, to
         compensate the complainant for losses sustained.

            The factors generally said to point to a civil contempt
            are these: (1) Where the complainant is a private
            person as opposed to the government or a
            governmental agency; (2) where the proceeding is
            entitled in the original … action and filed as a
            continuation thereof as opposed to a separate and
            independent action; (3) where holding the defendant
            in contempt affords relief to a private party; (4) where
            the relief requested is primarily for the benefit of the
            complainant; and (5) where the acts of contempt
            complained of are primarily civil in character and do
            not of themselves constitute crimes or conduct by the
            defendant so contumelious that the court is impelled
            to act on its own motion.

Lachat v. Hinchcliffe, 769 A.2d 481, 487-88 (Pa.Super. 2001) (internal

citations omitted). A contempt order used to coerce a parent into paying their

support obligation and arrearages is properly characterized as civil.     See

Barrett v. Barrett, 470 Pa. 253, 260, 368 A.2d 616, 619 (1977).

      This Court has declined to impose an automatic right to court-appointed

counsel for all civil contempt proceedings involving an indigent defendant’s

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failure to pay court-imposed fines and costs.        See Diaz, supra at 862.4

Rather, “an indigent defendant’s right to court-appointed counsel is triggered

in any proceeding in which the court finds there is a likelihood of

imprisonment.” Id. at 862 (footnote omitted).

          [U]pon the trial court’s determination at the civil contempt
          hearing that there is a likelihood of imprisonment for
          contempt and that the defendant is indigent, the court must
          appoint counsel and permit counsel to confer with and
          advocate on behalf of the defendant at a subsequent
          hearing. An indigent defendant has the option of knowingly,
          intelligently, and voluntarily waiving that right to appointed
          counsel.

Id. at 862-63.

       Instantly, the court found Appellant in contempt due to his failure to

comply with child support orders. Thus, the contempt proceedings were civil

in nature. See Barrett, supra; Lachat, supra. The court also determined

that a prison sentence was warranted. Because Appellant was an indigent

defendant who faced imprisonment for civil contempt without waiving his right

to counsel, the court abused its discretion by failing to appoint counsel to

advocate on Appellant’s behalf.            See Rogowski, supra; Diaz, supra.

Accordingly, we vacate the contempt order and sentence, and we remand for

a new contempt hearing where Appellant may be represented by counsel.

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4 Although Diaz began as a criminal matter with the entry of a guilty plea for

retail theft charges, the parties agreed that the appellant subsequently
proceeded to a civil contempt hearing due to his failure to pay certain fines
and costs. See Diaz, supra at 861.

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     Order vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 03/04/2024

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