Court Opinion

ID: 9725289
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:38:55.820604+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:13.416624
License: Public Domain

Currie, J.
(concurring). This court recently stated in Turk v. H. C. Prange Co. (1963), 18 Wis. (2d) 547, 553, 119 N. W. (2d) 365, “However, in Wisconsin, specific elements of negligence can be alleged or supported in evidence without destroying the doctrine [of res ipsa loqui-tur].” Nevertheless, the evidence adduced by a plaintiff with respect to specific acts of negligence on the part of defendant may be so strong or all-inclusive as to render it improper to give a res ipsa loquitur instruction. I consider that the instant case presents us with an excellent opportuni*344ty to clarify some of the confusion which exists in the minds of the trial bench and bar on this point of when evidence of specific elements of negligence does render it improper to give such an instruction.
The nearest that the court’s opinion comes to stating a guideline on this point is this statement, “Specific elements of negligence not reaching the point of a prima jade case which is overcome by other evidence may be supported by application of the doctrine [of res ipsa loquitur].” To me this but confounds the confusion.
The use of the terminology of “prima facie case” and “overcome by other evidence” smacks of the concept that res ipsa loquitur is a rebuttable presumption. This court is firmly committed to the principle that res ipsa loquitur is not a presumption but creates an inference that the jury may apply or not as it sees fit. Therefore, it is ordinarily for the jury and not the trial court to decide whether defendant’s evidence has been sufficient to rebut the inference of negligence arising from the untoward happening of the accident causing personal injury or property damage where the instrumentality producing such result was in the control of defendant. There may be rare cases where the defendant’s evidence rebutting the inference of negligence arising by application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur must be accepted as a verity. However, in such a rare situation the problem then confronting the trial court will not be so much whether to instruct the jury on res ipsa loquitur but rather whether a verdict should be directed for defendant.
Apparently, when the majority opinion speaks of evidence of specific elements of negligence not creating a prima jade case, it means that such evidence standing alone would not support a verdict for plaintiff. I agree in that case the evidence adduced of specific elements of negligence should not render improper the giving of a res ipsa loquitur instruction if the situation is otherwise one where the giving of the in*345struction would be called for. However, it is possible to envisage situations in which the evidence adduced of specific elements of negligence would be sufficient to support a verdict for plaintiff and nevertheless the giving of a res ipsa loquitur instruction would be proper. One such situation would be where plaintiff claims defendant was negligent in respects A and B and the evidence relating to a specific act of negligence only tends to prove negligence in respect A but not B. Another such situation would be where plaintiff presents comparatively weak evidence of an act of specific negligence on the part of defendant, but the happening of the accident suggests that defendant may have been negligent in some other respect which plaintiff is unable to pinpoint. In this latter situation the jury might well reject the adduced evidence of a specific element of negligence, but still find for plaintiff if given a res ipsa loquitur instruction. It would be unfair to penalize a plaintiff for presenting what evidence of specific negligence he has by denying him the benefit of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
This suggests that the test of whether a res ipsa loquitur instruction should be given, in a situation where plaintiff has adduced evidence of a specific element of negligence, is whether this adduced evidence would render the giving of the instruction superfluous.