Court Opinion

ID: 9531046
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:06:54.638016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:19.844609
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Justice.
This is a driver’s license suspension case. We conclude that a motorist who is requested to submit to evidentiary testing for concentration of alcohol, or for the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances, must be allowed to give delayed assent to the testing, after first having refused to submit, when testing equipment and personnel are reasonably available. In this case, although the motorist gave delayed assent to submit to the testing while equipment and personnel were reasonably available, the motorist failed to carry the burden of proving that the delay produced by the original refusal would not have caused the outcome of the test to be materially affected.
I.
THE BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS.
On June 29, 1991, Officer Ryan of the Twin Falls Police Department arrested Daniel Pangburn for driving while under the influence and transported Pangburn to Twin Falls County Jail. Ryan asked Pang-burn to take a breath test at 2:10 a.m. Pangburn refused to take the test without first consulting with his attorney. Ryan and Pangburn signed an advisory form containing a statement that Pangburn could change his mind and take the test within one hour, provided Ryan had not left the jail and the testing equipment was available. Approximately forty-five minutes later, after speaking with his attorney, Pang-burn consented to take the breath test. Ryan had left the jail at approximately 2:35 a.m. to have breakfast and refused to come back when he received a call from the dispatcher at 2:55 a.m., which informed him that Pangburn wanted to take the test. Ryan testified at the suspension hearing that it would have taken him five minutes to return to the jail and that this would not have left adequate time to administer the test within the one hour provided in the advisory form. Another officer on duty at the jail, Corporal Brady of the Twin Falls County Sheriffs Office, was qualified to administer the test, but did not administer the test to Pangburn.
On July 31, 1991, a hearing was held before a magistrate judge in order to determine whether Pangburn had refused to take the breath test. The magistrate judge found that personnel were not available to administer the test when Pangburn consented because Ryan, as the officer who was responsible to administer the test, had left the jail. Although Brady was qualified to give the test, the magistrate judge ruled that no evidence showed that anyone requested that Brady administer the test or that Brady was authorized to give the test without the request. The magistrate judge noted that Ryan had not left until forty minutes after Pangburn initially refused to take the test. The magistrate judge also ruled that Pangburn had not carried his burden of proving that a forty to fifty-minute delay would not have materially altered the test results. The magistrate judge concluded that Pangburn had refused to take the test and ordered the suspension of Pangburn’s driver’s license for 180 days. On appeal, the district judge affirmed. Pangburn then appealed to this Court.
II.
THE TESTING EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL WERE REASONABLY AVAILABLE WHEN PANGBURN GAVE DELAYED ASSENT TO BE TESTED.
Pangburn asserts that the magistrate judge should not have rejected his delayed assent on the ground that testing equipment and personnel to administer the test were not readily available. We agree.
*141I.C. § 18-8002(4) directs the trial court to suspend driving privileges of a driver who refuses an officer’s request to submit to evidentiary tests. Our Court of Appeals has ruled that if a motorist initially declines to take a blood-alcohol test, but reconsiders and gives a timely and unequivocal assent, the motorist cannot be deemed to have refused the breath test. In re Smith, 115 Idaho 808, 770 P.2d 817 (Ct.App.1989). The Court of Appeals concluded in Smith that delayed assent will be deemed timely only if: (1) the assent is given while the motorist is still in police custody; (2) the assent is given when testing equipment and personnel are readily available; and (3) the delay produced by the initial declination would not cause the outcome of the test to be materially affected. The motorist has the burden of proving these requirements by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 812, 770 P.2d at 821.
The Court of Appeals accepted this flexible rule for delayed assent because “it better serves the public interest in obtaining scientific information about the blood-alcohol levels of motorists accused of driving under the influence.” Id. We agree with this rationale, and because of it, we accept the requirements contained in Smith, except we modify the second requirement. We conclude that the second requirement should allow delayed assent to be given when testing equipment and personnel are reasonably available. This amendment will facilitate securing testing results in more cases and is consistent with the objective of serving the public interest. To restrict the opportunity for delayed assent to occasions when equipment and personnel are readily available makes it possible for an officer to refuse to administer the test, even though both equipment and personnel are reasonably available.
In this case, both equipment and personnel were reasonably available. Brady was qualified to operate the machine and could have performed the test. Also, Ryan had told Pangburn that he had one hour to change his mind and had Pangburn sign a form indicating that he had one hour. Ryan left the jail before the hour had expired and testified that he could have returned within fifty minutes of the initial request, but that he refused to return. Therefore, Pangburn met the second Smith requirement as we have modified it.
III.
PANGBURN DID NOT PROVE THAT THE DELAY WOULD NOT CAUSE THE OUTCOME OF THE TEST TO BE MATERIALLY AFFECTED.
Pangburn asserts that he met the burden of proving the third Smith requirement. We disagree. We conclude that the magistrate judge correctly determined that Pangburn did not establish that the delay in taking the test did not cause the outcome of the test to be materially affected.
Pangburn asks us to fashion a per se rule providing that delay in assenting for a specified period of time would satisfy the third Smith requirement. Pangburn premises this position on statements by this Court in State v. Turner, 94 Idaho 548, 494 P.2d 146 (1972) (cited in Smith) and State v. Sutliff, 97 Idaho 523, 547 P.2d 1128 (1976). The portion of Turner to which Pangburn refers deals with the presumption of driving under the influence provided in earlier versions of our statutes. In discussing the presumption, the Court said:
The test revealed a blood alcohol content of 0.10%. Since alcohol content decreases at the rate of 0.01% to 0.02% per hour after the first forty-five to sixty minutes, the state’s chemical analyst testified that 0.10% was less than the “peak” alcohol content reached earlier that night. Properly instructed on the presumption established by I.C. § 49-1102, the jury returned a guilty verdict, and judgment of conviction was entered accordingly.
94 Idaho at 550, 494 P.2d at 148 (footnote omitted).
In Sutliff, the Court considered the admissibility of blood-alcohol test results:
Respondent argued successfully at trial that the possibility that his blood aleo-*142hoi was lower at the time of the accident than at the time of extraction of the samples rendered the results inadmissible absent a witness qualified to extrapolate the results back to the time of the accident. We disagree. At the least, the test results are relevant to corroborate witnesses’ testimony of observed physical manifestations of intoxication. The lapse of time prior to the extraction of samples goes to the weight to be afforded the test results and not to their admissibility.
97 Idaho at 524, 547 P.2d at 1129.
Neither of these cases deals with the refusal of a driver to take the test prescribed by I.C. § 18-8002(1), nor do they support a per se rule allowing a driver a specified period of time to give delayed assent.
The third Smith requirement is part of a flexible approach to allow delayed assent and balances the salutary objective of obtaining a blood-alcohol test result against the complexity created by further delay in testing. The Court spoke of this complexity in Sutliff:
Naturally, samples of blood, breath or other bodily substances obtained at the time of the accident would be ideal. However, extraction of the samples often requires a trip to a hospital or other medical facility and the exigencies of accidents may require a further delay. Frequently this works to the advantage of the defendant since the blood alcohol level is generally recognized to decline over time at a fairly predictable pace. However, as respondent points out, the interval of time between the offense and the extraction of the sample does not always work to the advantage of the defendant since the decline in blood alcohol does not begin for 45 to 60 minutes after the last drink.

Id.

This complexity dictates that in considering whether to allow delayed assent, we must require the motorist to carry the burden of proving that the delay would not materially affect the outcome of the test. Otherwise, the motorist and not the officer will determine when the test is administered. This would be contrary to the provisions and intent of I.C. § 18-8002.
In this case, the magistrate judge correctly ruled that Pangburn did not carry this burden.
IV.
CONCLUSION.
We affirm the suspension of Pangburn’s driver’s license.
We award costs on appeal to the state.
McDEVITT, C.J., and WOODLAND, J., Pro Tern, concur.