Court Opinion

ID: 9546555
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:32:02.738041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:36.492064
License: Public Domain

CARTER, J.
I dissent. The facts in this case are clear. Plaintiff purchased milk from a dairy which bottled and sold it. The bottle broke in her hand without any act or omission on her part that could have been the cause of it. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is clearly applicable to such a ease.
The majority opinion concedes the factors necessary for the application of that rule. First, that the control of the defendant must be present when the alleged negligent act occurs, but need not be present when the injury occurs. Second, that “glass milk bottles, unless defective, do not ordinarily break.” Third, that the dairy was under a duty to inspect the bottles for defects. With those requirements satisfied there can be no doubt that the doctrine was properly invoked by the trial court. If bottles do not ordinarily break if they are not defective, the inference follows by virtue of the doctrine that they were defective. If they were defective, it was the duty of defendant bottler to inspect the bottles and discover the defect. The failure to do so or the doing of it in a negligent manner may be inferred from the fact that the bottle was defective. Hence, we have the inference that defendant was negligent in either wholly failing to inspect the bottles or in failing to make a reasonable and careful inspection. Defendants’ evidence clearly shows that a defect would be discoverable by reasonable inspection. Its employee who had charge of the bottling testified: “The Court: You never let one that you could see was chipped or cracked; is that it? *624A. I never let any of them go through. Q. That you could see was chipped or cracked § A. Well, we could see them. Q. You could see them? A. Oh, sure.” Once it is established that bottles do not ordinarily break unless defective, a duty to inspect exists, and the bottle breaks, the inference arises that defendant bottler was negligent in failing to inspect or in making an improper inspection. The burden of going forward then shifts to the defendant to convince the trier of fact that he made a proper inspection. If he is successful he prevails in the action; if not, the inference of negligence stands unimpeached and cannot be disregarded by the trier of fact. (See Druzanich v. Criley, 19 Cal.2d 439 [122 P.2d 53].)
One of the primary policies underlying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is that it is made available because the defendant is in a better position than plaintiff to explain how and why the event transpired and that he exercised due care. (19 Cal.Jur. 705-6.) In the instant case the defendant was in such a superior position. It knew whether or not it had made an inspection, and if so the character and extent thereof. It was the bottler of the milk and had control of the bottles and the bottling process. It had the burden of explaining how a defective bottle escaped its inspection, if any. The trier of fact may well have believed that defendant either failed to make any inspection, or was careless in doing so, resulting in a cracked or chipped bottle being delivered to plaintiff.
It is no answer to that reasoning to assert, as does the majority opinion, that plaintiff must show that reasonable inspection would have revealed the defect. The bottle would not have broken except for a defect. The inference follows that it was defective. The defendant being in the superior position as the bottler and handler of the bottles, was required to assume the burden of convincing the trier of fact that it had done all that was required of it to discover that defect, or that a reasonable inspection would not have revealed it. If plaintiff were compelled to make that proof she would deprive herself of the doctrine because she would be proving specific negligence, namely, the particular character of the defect and what must be done to discover it. If plaintiff relies upon specific acts of negligence he cannot avail himself of the doctrine. (19 Cal.Jur. 713.) Res ipsa loquitur is based upon probabilities. This court may from common knowledge assume that the probabilities point to a chip or crack in *625the bottles as being the cause of the breaking rather than some other defect. It cannot be doubted that a reasonable inspection would reveal such a defect. Defendant bottler was obligated to proceed with its explanation such as that the bottle was not cracked or chipped, a careful inspection had been made, or the defect was latent and not discoverable by a reasonable inspection. It was a bottler and handler of the bottles and was in a superior position to produce evidence on those subjects.
This court may say as a matter of common knowledge that it is negligence for a bottler to use and distribute defective bottles. No opinion evidence on the part of plaintiff concerning the nature of defects in bottles and their discoverability is necessary. This is plain from the analogy of malpractice cases where ordinarily expert testimony is necessary to establish liability of the physician. But where the act is such as leaving a sponge in a patient following an operation, which clearly would not be done by a prudent person, res ipsa loquitur applies and expert testimony is unnecessary to establish negligent conduct. (Ales v. Ryan, 8 Cal.2d 82 [64 P.2d 409].)
It has been held that the doctrine applies to breaking of bottles containing pressure generating liquids. (Bradley v. Conway Springs Bottling Co., 154 Kan. 282 [118 P.2d 601] ; Ortego v. Nehi Bottling Works, 199 La. 599 [6 So.2d 677] ; Lanza v. De Ridder Coca-Cola Bottling Co., (La.App.) 3 So.2d 217; Auzene v. Gulf Public Service Co., (La.App.) 188 So. 512; Stolle v. Anheuser-Busch, 307 Mo. 520 [271 S.W. 497, 39 A.L.R. 1001] ; Benkendorfer v. Garrett, (Tex.Civ.App.) 143 S.W.2d 1020; Macon Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Crane, 55 Ga.App. 573 [190 S.E. 879]; MacPherson v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 129 N.J.L. 365 [29 A.2d 868]; Macres v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Mich. 567 [287 N.W. 922]; Healey v. Trodd, 124 N.J.L. 64 [11 A.2d 88]; affirming 122 N.J.L. 603 [7 A.2d 640]; Middlesboro Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Campbell, 179 Va. 693 [20 S.E.2d 479]; Ashkenazi v. Nehi Bottling Co., 217 N.C. 552 [8 S.E.2d 818]; Georgia-Alabama Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. White, 55 Ga.App. 706 [191 S.E. 265]; Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Danneman, 25 Ga. App. 43 [102 S.E. 542].)
In Meyers v. Alexandria Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Ltd., (La. App.) 8 So.2d 737, the court, although not expressly discussing the necessity of evidence on the discoverability of defects *626in the bottle, in effect holds that the bottler was negligent in not perceiving the defects in the bottle. The court stated at page 739:
“The manager stated that the bottles are inspected twice before they are filled and once after they are filled to determine any defect in the container, or bottle, or any foreign matter that might possibly have been in the bottle. If a bottle is found to be defective in either of the two first inspections and prior to its being filled, it is thrown aside and not used and at the end of the day such bottles are destroyed or broken. This indicates that defects are sometimes found in the bottles. It is reasonable to visualize how a defect in a bottle could escape the notice of the inspector. After the bottles are filled, they are again inspected for defects in the bottle, but principally to ascertain if there are any foreign substances in the contents.
“The defendant’s bottler testified that the gas pressure is tested every hour or so to see that the volume of gas is not excessive; that if the volume of gas becomes too great, then the regulator is adjusted and reset; that occasionally a bottle explodes while in the process of being filled or immediately thereafter. He did not testify or seek to explain the cause of these explosions. As a bottle will not explode unless there are defects in the bottle or unless it has been improperly filled and charged, it stands to reason that there was negligence in not perceiving the defects in the bottle or in the bottling process.” (Emphasis added.) Although the majority opinion expressly states that it is not deciding the issue in cases with the above-mentioned factual background, nevertheless such cases- holding the doctrine not applicable are cited in support of its conclusion. The opinion thus gives implied sanction to these authorities because the reasoning there employed would defeat recovery in the exploding bottle cases.
Great reliance is placed upon Licari v. Markotos, 110 Miss. 334 [180 N.Y.S. 278] and Bruckel v. J. Milhau’s Son, 116 App.Div. 836 [102 N.Y.S. 395]. The applicability of res ipsa loquitur or the absence or presence of an inference of negligence as such was neither considered nor discussed by the court in those cases.
The duty of a bottler of milk in regard to containers is established by statute. Section 694, of the Agricultural Code provides in part: “All containers of any kind in which milk ... is kept, stored, transported or delivered shall be sound, smooth, free from rust or open seams. . . .” (Emphasis added.) *627A mandatory duty is placed upon the bottler of milk to use sound containers. Certainly a defective bottle is not a sound one. It has been held that the mere failure of a brake on a train to properly function is sufficient to give rise to an inference of inefficiency in violation of a statute requiring efficient brakes, and hence recovery by the injured person. (Newkirk v. Los Angeles Junction Ry. Co., 21 Cal.2d 308 [131 P.2d 535].) In the instant case the breaking of the bottle without cause raises an inference that it was not sound. Recovery should therefore follow.