Court Opinion

ID: 9698835
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:00:59.571816+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:06.541595
License: Public Domain

McCown, J.,
dissenting.
The opinion of the court acknowledges that the judgment of the trial court finding that there was permission to drive within the terms of the policy had the effect of the verdict of a jury and could not be set aside unless clearly wrong as a matter of law;. The opinion then proceeds to weigh and resolve conflicts in the evidence and to determine the weight to be given to the testimony, which obviously includes *440a determination of the credibility of each witness, and concludes that the trial court’s determination of the facts was clearly wrong. I disagree with that conclusion. The evidence was sufficient to support the findings and judgment of the District Court.
We have consistently held that in a case such as this it is not within the province of the Supreme Court to weigh or resolve conflicts in the evidence. The credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony are for the trier of fact. Merten v. Pedersen, 199 Neb. 34, 255 N. W. 2d 869.
It has also consistently been held that in testing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict, it must be considered in the light most favorable to the successful party, all conflicts must be resolved in his favor, and he is entitled to the benefit of every inference that can reasonably be deduced from the evidence. Fabricators, Inc. v. Farmers Elevator, Inc., 203 Neb. 150, 277 N. W. 2d 676.
In the present case there were only two witnesses; Janet, the owner of the automobile, and her 26-year-old sister, Sharon, the driver. Their testimony was conflicting and there were inconsistencies in the testimony of each. The owner testified that she had never given the driver permission to drive the automobile by herself. The driver testified that she had driven the car by herself, with the permission of the owner, on short trips to the drugstore about once a month over a period of some 2 to 3 years, and that approximately a month before the accident involved here the driver, with the permission of the owner, drove by herself to the doctor’s office and thereafter drove into downtown Omaha to pick up the owner at her place of employment. This testimony was uncontroverted by the owner. It is also undisputed that the owner had frequently given permission to the driver to drive the automobile over the period of 2 or 3 years before the incident on occasions when either the owner or another sister were present in *441the car. There was no testimony by either witness that the owner had ever refused permission to the driver to drive on any occasion except one time approximately 1 year before the incident here occurred, and there is no explanation as to the reason for that refusal. There was no discussion about driving the automobile at the time the owner delivered the keys to the driver along with her house keys. The driver testified that she assumed her sister wouldn’t mind her taking the car.
It seems clear that the evidence in this case as to implied permission was conflicting and contradictory, and it is undisputed that there was no express permission. The trial court, as the fact finder, resolved the evidence in favor of the driver. This court has now held, as a matter of law, that where only express permission has been granted during the prior course of conduct of the parties, implied permission is thereafter insufficient and only express permission can constitute permission under the terms of an automobile liability policy.
In this case the trial court was the fact finder. The posture of the case in this court is the same as though the case had been submitted to a jury under complete and proper instructions as to the law, and a jury had returned the same verdict the trial court did here. The judgment of the trial court was not clearly wrong as a matter of law and should have been affirmed as a matter of fact.