Court Opinion

ID: 9584700
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:51:49.639348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:40.361090
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur fully in the opinion of the majority. I write separately because of my concern that the proper standard for the admission of outcry testimony be maintained.
Contrary to the position of the dissent, a child’s outcry need not be made “immediately after the sexual assault” in order for such evidence to be admissible at trial. That has not been the law since 1986, when OCGA § 24-3-16, the Georgia Child Hearsay Statute, was enacted. See Ga. L. 1986, p. 668, § 1. Such evidence is not “res gestae” evidence. The amount of time between improper sexual contact and outcry may be one aspect a trial court looks at in order to determine “indicia of reliability’ for the admission of outcry testimony pursuant to OCGA § 24-3-16, but it is by no means dispositive. Medina v. State, 234 Ga. App. 13, 14 (505 SE2d 558) (1998); Wells v. State, 222 Ga. App. 587, 588 (2) (474 SE2d 764) (1996); Gregg v. State, 201 Ga. App. 238, 239 (3) (411 SE2d 65) (1991).