Court Opinion

ID: 9772746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:28:46.695985+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:48.105001
License: Public Domain

OVERSTREET, Judge,
dissenting on state’s petitions for discretionary review.
Appellant was convicted of two counts of forgery in two separate indictments and the trial court assessed punishment at ten years confinement and a $500 fine for each offense. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new punishment hearing. Watson v. State, 884 S.W.2d 836 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1994) and Watson v. State, No. 08-92-00224-CR (Tex.App.—El Paso 1994). We granted the State’s petitions for discretionary review to consider whether a general notice of appeal confers jurisdiction upon a court of appeals to review a conviction based upon a plea agreement in which a defendant received deferred adjudication probation and was later adjudicated and sentenced upon that initial plea of guilty.
Appellant entered a plea of guilty to two charges of passing a forged check in violation of V.T.C.A Penal Code, § 32.21(a)(1)(B). Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court deferred adjudication and placed Appellant on three years probation. The State filed a motion to adjudicate. In March, 1992, Appellant entered a plea of true to the State’s allegations and was sentenced by the trial *718court. Appellant appealed the sentence imposed, contending that the trial court violated her right to due course of law by prejudging her sentence. The State responded that the Court of Appeals was without jurisdiction to even consider Appellant’s appeal because she did not file a notice of appeal which complied with Tex.R.App.Pro. 40(b)(1). The Court of Appeals rejected the State’s argument and determined that the trial court assessed Appellant’s punishment, not based upon the evidence adduced at the adjudication hearing or after considering the full range of punishment, but rather with a prejudged sentence. The Court of Appeals concluded that this violated Appellant’s right to due course of law, reversed the decision of the trial court and remanded for a new punishment hearing.
Pivotal in the Court of Appeals’ decision was its conclusion that the notice requirements of Tex.R.App.Pro. 40(b)(1) did not apply.1 The Court of Appeals reached this conclusion by finding that the original order deferring adjudication did not assess punishment. The Court of Appeals also noted no plea bargain existed at the time guilt was adjudicated, when punishment was actually assessed. Watson, 884 S.W.2d at 837; and Watson, slip op. at 2. Relying on this Court’s opinion in Ex parte Hernandez, 705 S.W.2d 700 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), the court concluded that Appellant’s appeal was not governed by Rule 40(b)(1), but rather by the rule announced in Helms v. State, 484 S.W.2d 925 (Tex.Cr.App.1972) (declaring all non-jurisdictional defects are waived where the conviction is obtained by a voluntarily entered guilty plea). The Court of Appeals then reasoned that Appellant’s complaint referred to the manner in which punishment was assessed, which occurred after adjudication of guilt. Therefore, her appeal was not barred by the Helms rule. Watson, 884 S.W.2d at 838, citing Jack v. State, 871 S.W.2d 741 (Tex.Cr.App.1994) (holding plea of guilty without an agreed recommendation on punishment does not waive right to appellate review of non-jurisdictional issues arising subsequent to entry of the guilty plea); and Watson, slip op. at 2.
The State’s question for review asks:
Whether a general notice of appeal invests the court of appeals with jurisdiction to review a conviction based upon a plea agreement pursuant to which the defendant received deferred adjudication probation, but who was later adjudicated and sentenced upon that plea of guilty to a term of years without plea agreement[?]
The majority agrees with the State’s contention that continued reliance upon Hernandez is in error. The State notes that this Court held in Hernandez that Rule 40(b)(1) did not apply to an appeal from a negotiated plea which resulted in deferred adjudication because an order deferring adjudication was not appealable and was not considered punishment. The State observes that a defendant now has the right to appeal from an order deferring adjudication at the time the order is entered. Article 44.01(j), V.A.C.C.P.;2 Dillehey v. State, 815 S.W.2d 623 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). The State points out, *719and the majority agrees 3, that Art. 44.01(j) refers to adjudication as punishment, and that this Court’s holding in Dillehey implicitly holds that deferred adjudication is punishment by holding that such orders are appeal-able, thus undermining the rationale used in Hernandez. It adds that when Hernandez was decided, confinement was not one of the permitted probationary conditions of deferred adjudication, but in 1989, Article 42.12, § 5, V.A.C.C.P.,4 was amended to allow confinement as a condition of deferred adjudication. The State argues that these three events abrogate the rule announced in Hernandez, and that Tex.R.App.Pro. 40(b)(1) applies in the instant case. The State therefore concludes that because Appellant failed to comply with the notice requirements of Rule 40(b)(1), the Eighth Court of Appeals was authorized to consider jurisdictional defects only. See Lyon v. State, 872 S.W.2d 732 (Tex.Cr.App.1994); and Davis v. State, 870 S.W.2d 43 (Tex.Cr.App.1994).
The majority holds that the Eighth Court of Appeals erred in reaching the merits of nonjurisdietional complaints raised by appellant. See majority opinion at 715. The majority is mistaken that Hernandez has no continued use or effect on appeals arising from proceedings occurring after adjudication of guilt. Despite the enactment of Art. 44.01(j) and amendments to Art. 42.12, which refer to deferred adjudication as punishment and allow confinement as a condition thereof, the “punishment” in a deferred adjudication order is still different than that imposed by a regular order of probation after a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. When a defendant is placed on deferred adjudication probation, a judgment of guilt is not entered and sentence is not imposed. Rather,
[t]he course of developments in a criminal action has been temporarily stilled and the accused has been permitted an opportunity to demonstrate his capacity for prescribed good behavior during a specified period. If he succeeds the movement is reversed and disappears; however, should he fail, the movement in a criminal action continues with the normal incidents of trial.
Hernandez, 705 S.W.2d at 702, citing McIntyre v. State, 587 S.W.2d 413 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); see also Art. 42.12, § 5(e). Thus, the distinction made between punishment imposed after a plea of guilty where probation is ordered, and the “punishment” imposed where probation is ordered but adjudication of guilt is deferred is still significant.
With the enactment of Art. 44.01(j), defendants were given the right to appeal from an order deferring adjudication. Dillehey, 815 S.W.2d at 626. At first glance, this too seems to undermine the rationale of Hernandez. However, even a cursory reading of Dillehey reveals that its scope is limited to an inspection of the legislative intent enacting 44.01(j), and the Legislature’s design to allow defendants placed on deferred adjudication probation the opportunity to immediately appeal rulings on pretrial motions which were filed and appealed in compliance with Art. 44.02 [now Rule 40(b)(1) ]. Id., at 624-626. Dillehey does not purport to limit or otherwise speak to a defendant’s right to complain of errors which occur after adjudication of guilt; nor does the express language of Rule 40(b)(1).
The notice requirement of Rule 40(b)(1) applies to non-jurisdictional defects which occurred prior to entry of a plea if permission is granted by the trial court, or if the matters were raised by written motion and ruled upon before entry of the plea. This language has not changed, and Hernandez is still sound. A defendant is not precluded from prosecuting an appeal after adjudication of guilt, judgment and sentencing, merely because he initially bargained for deferred ad*720judication some time earlier. As such, the Court of Appeals did not err in relying upon this Court’s decision in Hernandez.
Furthermore, because there was no plea agreement entered when the trial court proceeded to adjudication of guilt, Appellant was not required to comply with Rule 40(b)(1).5 Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not exceed its jurisdiction in considering Appellant’s appeal and denying the State’s motion to dismiss the appeal. The decision of the Court of Appeals should therefore be affirmed.6 Because the majority does not do so I respectfully dissent.
BAIRD, J., joins.

. Tex.R.App.Pro. 40(b)(1) provides in pertinent • part:
(1) Appeal is perfected in a criminal case by giving timely notice of appeal.... Notice of appeal shall be given in writing with the clerk of the trial court. Such notice shall be sufficient if it shows the desire of the defendant to appeal from the judgment or other appealable order, but if the judgment was rendered upon his plea of guilty or nolo contendere pursuant to Article 1.15, Code of Criminal Procedure, and the punishment assessed does not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant and his attorney, in order to prosecute an appeal for a nonjurisdictional defect or error that occurred prior to entry of the plea the notice shall state that the trial court granted permission to appeal or shall specify that those matters were raised by written motion and ruled on before trial.

. Art. 44.01(j) provides:
Nothing in this article is to interfere with the defendant’s right to appeal under the procedures of Article 44.02 [now Tex.R.App.Pro. 40(b)(1)] of this code. The defendant’s right to appeal under Article 44.02 may be prosecuted by the defendant where the punishment assessed is in accordance with Subsection (a), Section 3d [now Section 5], Article 42.12 of this code, as well as any other punishment assessed in compliance with Article 44.02 of this code.

. See majority opinion at 714.

. Tex.Code Crim.Pro. Article, 42.12, § 5(b) provides in pertinent part:
On violation of a condition of community supervision imposed under Subsection (a) of this section, the defendant may be arrested and detained as provided in Section 21 of this article. The defendant is entitled to a hearing limited to the determination by the court of whether it proceeds with an adjudication of guilt on the original charge. No appeal may be taken from this determination. After an adjudication of guilt, all proceedings including assessment of punishment, pronouncement of sentence, granting of community supervision, and defendant's appeal continue as if the adjudication of guilt had not been deferred.

. I note that the existence of a second plea agreement after adjudication of guilt with respect to punishment to be assessed may result in the application of Rule 40(b)(1) and the imposition of its notice requirements. See Hernandez, 705 S.W.2d at 703. As there is no indication of a second plea agreement, we need not address that issue today.

. The State did not raise the issue of whether Appellant received a prejudged sentence upon adjudication, therefore we can not reach that issue here.