Court Opinion

ID: 9582757
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:30:57.479334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:17.745166
License: Public Domain

Ness, Justice
(dissenting) :
Not subscribing to the narrow technical definition of “driving” adopted by the majority, I dissent.
While it is true that some courts in other jurisdictions have distinguished the terms “operating” and “driving” a motor vehicle, according a narrower definition to the latter, other courts have construed the terms as being synonymous. See State v. Michael, 141 W. Va. 1, 87 S. E. (2d) 595 (1955); State v. Sullivan, 146 Me. 381, 82 A. (2d) 629. As stated in 60 C. J. S. Motor Vehicles § 6(2) :
“The words ‘operate’ and ‘drive,’ as applied to motor vehicles, may be synonymous, since, according to popular acceptance, to operate a motor vehicle is the same as to drive it . . .”
This Court, in considering an indictment brought under the present statute’s predecessor, Section 46-343, Code of 1962, used the terms “operating” and “driving” interchangeably. State v. Sheppard, 248 S. C. 464, 150 S. E. (2d) 916 (1966). Although the exact language of the statute made it unlawful “to drive any vehicle within this State” while in an intoxicated condition, this Court stated:
“The act of operating a motor vehicle with impaired faculties is the gravamen of the offense . . .” State v. Sheppard, 248 S. C. at 466, 150 S. E. (2d) at 917. (Emphasis added).
*366I perceive no compelling reason why this Court should now abandon the common sense interpretation of the two terms in favor of a narrow, technical construction.
Moreover, even if a distinction is to be drawn between “operating” and “driving” a motor vehicle, the conduct of respondent arguably falls within the definition of “driving.” The term “driver” is defined in Sections 56-5-400 and 56-1-10(1) of the 1976 Code of Laws as: “Every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle.” (Emphasis added). The arresting officer in this case testified that in his opinion, respondent was in control of the car. Furthermore, when respondent was asked to get out of the car, the vehicle began to move forward and had to be stopped by another patrolman on the scene.
The majority’s strained construction of the statute cuts against the social purpose behind the provision, i.e., the apprehension of persons whose intoxication renders them unfit to operate a motor vehicle. Respondent here started his automobile and put the car in gear. The fact that his level of intoxication caused him to pass out before he accelerated the vehicle to actual motion should not remove his conduct from that intended to be proscribed by the statute.
I would reverse, on the basis that “operating” and “driving” are synonymous, or in the alternative, even if a distinction is recognized, respondent was in physical control of his vehicle and was therefore a “driver” under the Code definition of the term.
Littlejohn, J., concurs.