Court Opinion

ID: 9621139
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:52:10.042054+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:58.205971
License: Public Domain

RUSSELL, J.,
dissenting.
The defendant was a drunken driver who was guilty of gross negligence. From those facts alone, the majority opinion extrapolates a conclusion that his conduct “evinces a conscious disregard of the rights of others” warranting an award of punitive damages. There is only one road available to get the majority opinion to its destination: the theory that one who voluntarily becomes intoxicated and then undertakes to drive ipso facto evinces a conscious disregard of human life. That theory is the sole foundation upon which the majority opinion rests. Unfortunately, it is the theory espoused by a California court which we expressly disapproved in Essex v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 273, 283 n. 3, 322 S.E.2d 216, 221 n. 3 (1984).
We disapproved that theory for the very good reason that its premises do not support its conclusion: it does not follow from the fact of drunken driving that the drunken driver either intends to injure others or is indifferent to the risk that he might do so. Only speculation can get us to that conclusion, and we do not base jury instructions upon speculation. In this case, there is a complete lack of evidence concerning the defendant’s intentions, attitude, or state of mind. The award of punitive damages rests entirely on speculation.
The majority opinion wisely limits its operation to “the egregious set of facts presented in this case.” The bench and the bar may well be perplexed by the difficulty of relating other sets of facts to this one. Will a blood alcohol level of .20 % be sufficiently “egregious” to warrant an instruction on punitive damages? Will .15% be enough? .10%? .09%?
I would adhere to the rule which has served us well for many years: an instruction on punitive damages may be granted only where there is evidence, not mere speculation, that the defendant was motivated by malice, or that his conduct evinced “a conscious disregard of the rights of others.” Because the trial court correctly discerned the absence of any such evidence here, I would affirm.
COMPTON, J., joins in dissent.