Court Opinion

ID: 9843009
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:24:08.988639+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:25.055059
License: Public Domain

LEVIN H. CAMPBELL, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
I think it is premature to pass on the constitutionality of the Maine trademark dilution statute, Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 10, § 1530 (1981), without a determination whether, under Maine law, a pornographic parody of this kind would violate that statute.
Normally, we would ourselves make this determination, and, of course, we have jurisdiction to do so. There is, however, no realistic way for this court to predict how the Maine courts would apply the dilution statute in these circumstances. No Maine court has decided the question, and there appears to be no relevant precedent from other states having similar “dilution” statutes. Hence any decision of ours on whether, under Maine law, the Maine dilution statute proscribes defendant’s conduct would tend to be guesswork. My colleagues do not attempt this, and I do not suggest anything would be gained by doing so.
But we have an avenue to secure a meaningful determination of whether or not defendant's conduct violated the Maine law. We, or better, the district court on remand, could certify the question to the Maine *35Supreme Judicial Court. I recognize there is an obstacle to certification at this stage in the case. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court has expressed an unwillingness, as a matter of policy, to accept a certified question that will not be dispositive of a federal case. See Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 4, § 57 (Supp.1986); Me.R.Civ.P. 76B(a); White v. Edgar, 320 A.2d 668, 677 (Me.1974); In re all Maine Asbestos Litigation, 772 F.2d 1023, 1026 n. 4 (1st Cir.1985), cert. denied, — U.S.—, 106 S.Ct. 1994, 90 L.Ed.2d 675 (1986). The court might believe that situation was present here, as the case still awaits trial of the likelihood of confusion issue. If plaintiff proves likelihood of confusion, it might obtain on other grounds all the relief it requested, in effect mooting the dilution claim.
But while the Maine court might decline certification at this juncture, we could remand with directions to the district court to certify at a later time, whenever the proceedings below have reached a stage that certification is in order.7
Certification would permit the state court to decide whether or not a pornographic parody of this type constitutes trademark dilution under the Maine statute. For some of the same reasons suggested in Judge Bownes’s opinion, it may not — in which case there would be no need for us to address the constitutional issue at all. If, on the other hand, the state court were to hold that the dilution statute was offended by defendant’s conduct, we would have the benefit of the Maine court’s reasoning — which might give rise to somewhat different First Amendment issues depending, for example, on whether it rested solely on the special offensiveness of a pornographic parody, or whether it found the statute reached any parody.
It would, in any event, be more in keeping with the canons of constitutional adjudication and with the proper division of responsibilities between state and federal courts to ask the state court to determine the coverage of the trademark dilution statute in regard to conduct such as existed here. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 483, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“[t]he Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of____ Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter”) (citing Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 538, 31 S.Ct. 485, 488, 55 L.Ed. 570 (1911); Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 191, 29 S.Ct. 451, 454, 53 L.Ed. 753 (1909)); see also Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-72, 67 S.Ct. 1409, 1419-21, 91 L.Ed. 1666 (1947) (explaining why courts should avoid unnecessary constitutional adjudication).
I can understand why, with immediate certification probably unavailable, my colleagues do not care to delay. But there is no reason why the likelihood of confusion issue cannot be speedily resolved, after which, assuming the controversy continues, certification can take place. And I do not find the constitutional issue either easy or obvious, nor in such need of instant resolution that it cannot await a more deliberate process.
I would, therefore, remand without deciding the constitutional issue, directing the district court to certify to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, at an appropriate later stage in the proceeding, the question whether Maine’s dilution statute covers this type of conduct. Until we have the answer to this question, I would not consider the constitutional question. I therefore dissent.

. Were plaintiff to prove likelihood of confusion, controversy over the dilution claim might, of course, cease, making it unnecessary to decide that claim in this case. If so, that would simply be one more example of the fact that courts exist to decide live controversies, not abstract questions. Such a result should cause no alarm.