Court Opinion

ID: 9951134
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 17:03:17.598533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:17.283869
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/15/24 Pomer v. Temmerman CA6
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 MARSHALL I. POMER,                                                  H050191
                                                                    (Santa Cruz County
           Plaintiff and Appellant,                                  Super. Ct. No. 18CV00404)

           v.

 ROBERT E. TEMMERMAN, JR., et al.,

           Defendants and Respondents.

         Marshall I. Pomer appeals from a judgment following the trial court’s denial of his
motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication and later granting of defendants
Robert E. Temmerman, Jr. and Temmerman, Cilley & Kohlmann, LLP’s (TCK) motion
for summary judgment or summary adjudication. As is relevant to this appeal, the
parties’ motions were directed at Pomer’s cause of action for fraudulent concealment, in
which he alleged that Temmerman and TCK, who represented him as a beneficiary of his
mother’s trusts, failed to disclose their attorney-client relationship with the corporate
trustee. Although the defendants failed to meet their initial burden of showing that
disclosure of their relationship with the trustee was not required here, they did establish
as a matter of law that Pomer suffered no resulting damage. Because Pomer cannot
prevail on a common law fraudulent concealment cause of action without proving
damages, we affirm the judgment.
                                 I.    BACKGROUND
A.     The Complaint

       In February 2018, Pomer sued Temmerman and TCK, pleading causes of action
for legal malpractice, fraud by concealment, breach of fiduciary duty, and dual
representation. Pomer alleged the following in the complaint.
       Pomer’s mother, Frances Pomer,1 was co-trustee under the Sydney R. Pomer
Revocable Trust Agreement, together with the Northern Trust Bank of Florida (Northern
Trust), and the terms of the agreement gave Frances power of appointment. Frances was
also settlor and trustee of a trust under the Frances Pomer 2000 Irrevocable Trust
Agreement.
       On moving from Florida to California in 2005, Frances sought legal advice on
matters including the selection of a new corporate trustee in California to replace
Northern Trust. After Pomer and Frances jointly consulted Temmerman and TCK,
Pomer signed a written fee agreement with TCK and Frances retained separate counsel.
       To Pomer, TCK recommended Borel Bank & Trust (now known as Boston Bank,
the name we will use for consistency) as a successor corporate trustee, a recommendation
Pomer conveyed to his mother, who then appointed Boston Bank as the new corporate
trustee. Pomer alleged, however, that TCK had a conflict of interest, given its loyalties to
both Pomer and Boston Bank, and that TCK concealed the dual representation and the
conflict of interest. “Thus,” Pomer alleged, “Defendants facilitated the imposition of
excessive fees by Boston Bank and its attorneys.”
B.     The Motions for Summary Judgment/Summary Adjudication

       In December 2020, Pomer moved for summary judgment against Temmerman and
TCK, but confined the motion to the fraudulent concealment cause of action, specifying

       1
         Because she shares a surname with Pomer, we refer to Pomer’s mother by her
first name for clarity.

                                             2
that “[t]he other causes of action in the complaint are hereby forfeited.” In the
alternative, Pomer sought summary adjudication of the defendants’ “duty to disclose
[their] concurrent representation” of Boston Bank. The trial court denied Pomer’s
motion.
       Several months later, Temmerman and TCK moved for summary judgment.
       1.     Defense Evidence2

       Temmerman and TCK began representing Pomer in May 2009, agreeing to
represent only him and not Frances, who then obtained separate representation. Pomer’s
stated objectives were: (1) the removal of Northern Trust as co-trustee of the Sydney R.
Pomer Revocable Trust because of its refusal to pay Frances’s legal and living expenses;
(2) the appointment of a new corporate co-trustee, protecting Frances’s power of
appointment; (3) assurances that Frances’s legal fees and living expenses were paid
moving forward; (4) reimbursement for loans Pomer had made to Frances for in-home
care expenses; and (5) the eventual removal of Frances as co-trustee.
       On May 19, 2009, Pomer e-mailed Christine Kouvaris, an associate attorney at
TCK, mentioning two “pressing matters”: (1) Northern Trust’s refusal to pay for his
mother’s legal and living expenses; and (2) removal of his mother as co-trustee.
Kouvaris e-mailed Pomer, stating that his mother could exercise her power under the trust
agreement to remove Northern Trust as trustee but would need to appoint a new corporate
trustee. Kouvaris recommended Boston Bank, and also mentioned three other banks as
possible options. After a meeting with a trust officer at Boston Bank, Pomer told
Kouvaris that Boston Bank would be fine, stating also that he “might talk to a couple of
other potential trustees, but I think that having a trustee that your firm knows well is
important.”
       2
         We focus on the evidence provided in connection with the defendants’ motion.
We note, however, that the evidence presented in connection with Pomer’s motion was
largely indistinguishable.

                                              3
       When Kouvaris recommended Boston Bank to Pomer, it had recently become a
TCK client. About six months later, Boston Bank succeeded Northern Trust as co-trustee
and in 2011 became the sole trustee under the Sydney R. Pomer Inter Vivos Revocable
Trust Agreement.3 TCK and Temmerman never represented Boston Bank in any matter
related to Pomer.
       In March 2015, Pomer e-mailed Kouvaris to complain that Boston Bank was
delaying distribution of trust assets, and he expressed an interest in suing the bank for
breach of fiduciary duty and for reimbursement for some of the trustee and legal fees.
Kouvaris replied that Temmerman felt Boston Bank’s plan to seek court approval of the
intended distribution was reasonable, given potential litigation due to the disinheritance
of Pomer’s sister. Kouvaris also disclosed that TCK represented Boston Bank in other
matters and could not take an adverse position to it.4 Pomer responded that, “in case
Boston [Bank] persists in delaying,” he would accept Kouvaris’s offer to refer him to
other counsel who could represent him in litigation against the trustee.
       The next month, TCK notified Pomer that they were closing his file. In July 2015,
the probate court entered an order approving attorney fees and trustee fees for Boston
Bank, with the attorney fees reduced from the bank’s request.
       2.     Pomer’s Evidence in Opposition

       In opposing the defense motion, Pomer disputed the following: (1) whether
Boston Bank had participated in the filing of a petition seeking confirmation of Frances’s
power of appointment; (2) whether Kouvaris had “recommended” corporate trustees
       3
       Boston Bank at some point succeeded Frances as sole trustee of her Frances
Pomer 2000 Irrevocable Trust, as well.
       4
         In the e-mail, Kouvaris claimed to have previously told Pomer that Boston Bank
was a TCK client; in opposition to TCK’s motion, Pomer declared that he first learned of
the representation in the March 2015 e-mail. Kouvaris did not submit a declaration in
support of the motion, and TCK provided no evidence that they disclosed their
representation of Boston Bank before Kouvaris’s March 2015 e-mail.

                                              4
other than Boston Bank or just mentioned them as options; (3) whether he expressed that
it was important for the trustee to have a “good relationship” with TCK or instead had
stated that having a trustee that TCK “knows well” is important; (4) whether there were
foreseeable adverse consequences; and (5) whether Temmerman and TCK refused to
communicate with Boston Bank on Pomer’s behalf.
C.     Judgment and Appeal

       The trial court granted the defense motion, finding that the legal malpractice cause
of action was time-barred, and that Pomer could not demonstrate one or more of the
elements necessary for breach of fiduciary duty and fraudulent concealment.
       The trial court entered judgment for Temmerman and TCK on April 13, 2022.
Pomer timely appealed.
                                   II.    DISCUSSION
A.     Legal Principles and Standard of Review

       Where a defendant has prevailed on summary judgment, “ ‘ “we review the record
de novo to determine whether [they have] conclusively negated a necessary element of
the plaintiff’s case or demonstrated that under no hypothesis is there a material issue of
fact that requires the process of trial.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Saelzler v. Advanced
Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 767; Genisman v. Carley (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 45, 49
[defendant moving for summary judgment bears “ ‘the burden of showing that . . . one or
more elements of the cause of action cannot be established’ ”].) The moving defendant
“bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that [it]
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
25 Cal.4th 826, 850, fn. omitted (Aguilar).) Upon a defendant’s prima facie showing of
the nonexistence of a triable issue of material fact, the plaintiff “is then subjected to a
burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a
triable issue of material fact.” (Ibid.) “We liberally construe the evidence in support of
the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in
                                               5
favor of that party.” (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037;
Hampton v. County of San Diego (2015) 62 Cal.4th 340, 347.)
B.     Defendants’ Motion5

       To establish fraudulent concealment, a plaintiff must prove: (1) concealment or
suppression of a material fact; (2) by a defendant with a duty to disclose the fact to the
plaintiff; (3) the defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff by concealing or suppressing
the fact; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would, with knowledge of the
concealed or suppressed fact, have acted differently; and (5) plaintiff sustained damage as
a result. (Graham v. Bank of America, N.A. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 594, 606 (Graham).)
       In their motion for summary judgment, Temmerman and TCK argued that the
nondisclosure of their representation of Boston Bank was not a material fact, that they
had no duty to disclose the representation, that they had no intent to defraud Pomer, and
that Pomer suffered no damages.
       The Rules of Professional Conduct, “together with statutes and general principles
relating to other fiduciary relationships, ‘help define the duty component of the fiduciary
duty which an attorney owes to his client.’ ” (American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard,
Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1032.) Although a violation of
the Rules of Professional Conduct “does not in itself provide a basis for civil liability,”
the rules “ ‘help define . . . the fiduciary duty which the attorney owes to his or her
client.’ ” (BGJ Associates v. Wilson (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1227.)

       5
         Pomer concedes that his legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty causes of
action are time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure
section 340.6 for “[a]n action against an attorney for a wrongful act or omission,” and he
expressly asserts that those claims “are not the subject of this appeal.” Consequently, the
only cause of action at issue on this appeal is fraudulent concealment, and we do not
address the other causes of action, where Pomer has raised no claim of error. (See Keyes
v. Bowen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 647, 655–656.)

                                              6
       An attorney must provide written disclosure to a client of certain relationships
with a party or witness in the same matter. At the time of the relevant actions, Rules of
Professional Conduct, rule 3-3106 provided, in relevant part: “(B) A member shall not
accept or continue representation of a client without providing written disclosure to the
client where: [¶] (1) The member has a legal, business, financial, professional, or
personal relationship with a party or witness in the same matter; or [¶] (2) The member
knows or reasonably should know that: [¶] (a) the member previously had a legal,
business, financial, professional, or personal relationship with a party or witness in the
same matter; and [¶] (b) the previous relationship would substantially affect the
member’s representation; or [¶] (3) The member has or had a legal, business, financial,
professional, or personal relationship with another person or entity the member knows or
reasonably should know would be affected substantially by resolution of the matter;
or [¶] (4) The member has or had a legal, business, financial, or professional interest in
the subject matter of the representation. [¶] (C) A member shall not, without the
informed written consent of each client: [¶] (1) Accept representation of more than one
client in a matter in which the interests of the clients potentially conflict; or [¶]
(2) Accept or continue representation of more than one client in a matter in which the
interests of the clients actually conflict; or [¶] (3) Represent a client in a matter and at
the same time in a separate matter accept as a client a person or entity whose interest in
the first matter is adverse to the client in the first matter.”
       Pomer contends that subdivisions (B)(1) and (C)(3) of rule 3-310 both support his
assertion that Temmerman and TCK needed to disclose the representation of Boston
Bank and obtain written consent for continued representation. We agree that

       6
        Undesignated rule references are to the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Following a 2018 amendment, former rule 3-310 continues as part of current rule 1.7.
For consistency with the parties, we use the former numbering.

                                                7
rule 3-310(B)(1) required disclosure and that defendants’ failure to disclose therefore
could be considered the “concealment or suppression of a material fact.”
        Under rule 3-310(B)(1), disclosure is needed when the attorney has a specified
relationship with another party or witness in the same matter with his or her client. An
attorney-client relationship is a recognized legal and fiduciary relationship. (Barbara A.
v. John G. (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 369, 382.) It is undisputed that Temmerman and TCK
had an attorney-client relationship with Boston Bank.
        We acknowledge that, when Boston Bank first became trustee, there was no actual
adversity between Boston Bank and Pomer. But rule 3-310(B)(1), unlike
rule 3-310(C)(3), requires no adversity for its application, instead drawing a hard line
requiring disclosure when an attorney has certain relationships with different parties in
the same matter. Imposing a strict disclosure rule in such an instance is appropriate
because “[c]onflicts of interest broadly embrace all situations in which an attorney’s
loyalty to, or efforts on behalf of, a client are threatened by his responsibilities to another
client or a third person or by his own interests.” (People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808,
835.)
        Further, although rules 3-310(C)(1) and (2) pertain to representation of more than
one client in the same matter, rule 3-310(B)(1) on its face does not require that the
attorney represent both parties in the same matter; it applies to parties or witnesses in the
same matter with which the attorney has a relationship, whether or not the relationship
itself also arises from the same matter.
        We note that rule 3-310(B)(1) does not necessarily preclude an attorney from
representing a client in one matter while the client is a party in a separate matter with a
different client. Written informed consent is the solution: “[T]he client can make a
rational choice [citation], based upon full disclosures as to the risks of the
representations, the potential conflicts involved, and the alternatives available as required
by the particular circumstances.” (Sharp v. Next Entertainment Inc. (2008)
                                               8
163 Cal.App.4th 410, 430 [noting that the requirement of a writing “will ‘impress upon
[the] clients the seriousness of the decision the client is being asked to make and to avoid
disputes or ambiguities that might later occur in the absence of a writing’ ”].)
       Temmerman and TCK rely on Santa Clara County Counsel Attys. Assn. v.
Woodside (1994) 7 Cal.4th 525, in which the Supreme Court considered whether
rule 3-310, and the correlated duty of loyalty, barred the Santa Clara County Counsel
Attorneys Association from suing the County of Santa Clara in connection with a wage
dispute. (Id. at pp. 532, 534, 546.) The case is inapt: the putative conflict involved a
claim that the Association’s members had “a legal, business, financial, or professional
interest in the subject matter of the representation” (id. at p. 546) under rule 3-310(B)(4),
not the representation of clients with potentially adverse interests under rule 3-310(B)(1),
and the association and the county in their wage dispute did not have an attorney-client
relationship. (See id. at p. 547, fn. omitted [distinguishing the ethical duty “to forgo a
business opportunity or a potential client” from a requirement—“not . . . found
in . . . rules 3-300 or 3-310”—that attorneys “forgo [their] statutory rights against a client
to redress a legal injury”].)
       The defendants’ own evidence showed that they represented Pomer as of May
2009, and also began representing Boston Bank a few days later. Although they also
presented evidence that Pomer agreed to the appointment of Boston Bank as trustee, they
provided no evidence that they informed Pomer of their representation of Boston Bank or
that Pomer (or the bank, for that matter) gave informed written consent.
       Instead, Temmerman and TCK argued to the trial court, invoking “[t]he ACTEC
Commentary” without seeking judicial notice of the same: “[A] lawyer who represents a
corporate fiduciary in connection with the administration of a fiduciary estate or trust
should not be treated as representing the fiduciary generally for all purposes of applying
the professional rules of conduct with regard to a wholly unrelated matter, such as
another estate or trust administration.” But additional language in the commentary
                                              9
provides a more nuanced view than respondents’ characterization. (See The American
College of Trust and Estate Counsel, The ACTEC Commentaries on the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (6th ed. 2023), Commentary on MRPC 1.7, at p. 108,
<https://www.actec.org/wp-
content/uploads/2023/08/ACTEC_Commentaries_6th_Rev.pdf> [as of Mar. 14, 2024],
archived at <https://perma.cc/WQ57-Q4RP>.) The commentary specifically cautions:
“A lawyer who is asked to represent a corporate or private professional fiduciary in
connection with [an] estate or trust should consider discussing with the fiduciary the
extent to which the representation might preclude the lawyer from representing an
adverse party in an unrelated matter.” (Ibid.) It also recommends that a lawyer “trying to
keep open the possibility of such a future adverse representation on an unrelated
matter . . . should ask the corporate or private professional fiduciary for a prospective
waiver as to such representations.” (Ibid.) And it confirms: “Where a lawyer is already
representing another party adverse to the corporate or private professional fiduciary on an
unrelated matter, it will be necessary for the lawyer to comply with [Model Rule of
Professional Conduct] 1.7(b) as to both clients before undertaking to represent the
corporate or private professional fiduciary.” (Ibid.)
       Even reading the commentary as Temmerman and TCK do, Pomer’s
dissatisfaction with Northern Bank made it reasonably foreseeable that his interests as
beneficiary would again put him in conflict with a successor institutional trustee.
Therefore, Temmerman and TCK failed to meet their initial burden on the fraudulent
concealment cause of action as to their duty to disclose.
       Nor have respondents met their initial burden to demonstrate that the required
disclosure was not material. Although respondents argue that disclosure would not have
deterred Pomer’s “decision to push his mother to nominate Boston Bank,” the only
evidence they offer on this point was Pomer’s desire for a fiduciary with whom
respondents had a “good relationship.” It hardly follows from Pomer’s desire for a
                                             10
trustee known to and presumably well disposed to his own counsel that he would have
supported nomination of a trustee to whom his counsel owed a fiduciary duty.
       As for intent, Temmerman and TCK argue only that Pomer “provided no facts or
evidence to prove that [they] intended to defraud him.” This assertion is insufficient for
Temmerman and TCK to meet their initial burden of production on this element.
“Summary judgment law in this state . . . continues to require a defendant moving for
summary judgment to present evidence, and not simply point out that the plaintiff does
not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th
at p. 854, fn. omitted.) In other words, a moving defendant must affirmatively “produce
evidence that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support his or her claim.”
(Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.)
       The final element at issue is damages. Pomer alleged in his complaint that Boston
Bank’s fees were increased due to unnecessary delay and that Temmerman and TCK
“facilitated the imposition of excessive fees.” In their moving papers on summary
judgment, Temmerman and TCK argued that Pomer did not sustain any damages from
their representation of Boston Bank in other unrelated matters, and that the claim for
damages is barred by collateral estoppel because the Santa Clara County Superior Court
previously approved Boston Bank’s actions as trustee and its fees.
       Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, a prior determination
will be given conclusive effect in a later proceeding. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th
698, 715.) “[I]ssue preclusion bars relitigation of issues earlier decided,” when (1) “ ‘the
issue . . . to be precluded from relitigation’ ” is “ ‘identical to that decided in a former
proceeding’ ”; (2) the issue was “ ‘actually litigated in the former proceeding’ ”; (3) it
was “ ‘necessarily decided in the former proceeding’ ”; (4) the determination in the
former proceeding was “ ‘final and on the merits’ ”; and (5) “ ‘the party against whom
preclusion is sought [is] the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former
proceeding.’ ” (Id. at p. 716.)
                                               11
       Temmerman and TCK provide evidence of a July 2015 “Order on Request for
Allowance of Trustee’s Fees and Costs re Third Account.” In that order, although the
probate court noted that Pomer had made a “general argument that the ‘unnecessary
delay’ of Boston Bank had the effect of ‘inflating its fees,’ ” the court found that Pomer
had waived his objections to Boston Bank’s petition for fees and costs by filing only a
“Notice of Motion and Motion for Evidentiary Hearing”—without “any specific
objection to the fees and costs”—six days later than the deadline the court had previously
set for objections. The court acknowledged, however, its “duty to review all petitions
that come before it.” Despite the waiver of Pomer’s objections, then, we understand the
probate court performed that duty, “ ‘a duty imposed by law to inquire into the prudence
of the trustee’s administration.’ ” (Schwartz v. Labow (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 417, 427;
Prob. Code, § 17200, subds. (a), (b)(9).) After reviewing submitted billing statements
and declarations from Boston Bank and its counsel, the court approved the requested
trustee fees and costs in full, and approved counsel’s fees, less “a handful of entries” the
court determined “reflect[ed] time that [was] either not reasonable or not necessary.”
       The probate court thus determined the reasonable fees and costs to be paid Boston
Bank and its counsel, largely in its favor, and the court’s order spared the trusts the
“handful” of attorney entries deemed unreasonable or unnecessary. “[T]he prior
determination of an issue is conclusive in a subsequent suit . . . as to that issue and every
matter which might have been urged to sustain or defeat its determination.” (Pacific Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. McConnell (1955) 44 Cal.2d 715, 724–725; see also Border Business
Park, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1565–1566 [“an ‘issue’
includes any legal theory or factual matter which could have been asserted in support of
or in opposition to the issue which was litigated”].) And “[u]nlike claim preclusion, issue
preclusion can be invoked by one not a party to the first proceeding. The bar is asserted
against a party who had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first case but
lost.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 826.) As to damages, then,
                                              12
Pomer is collaterally estopped from relitigating the reasonableness of Boston Bank’s fees
for the work it performed. Temmerman and TCK thus carried their initial burden to
negate the element of damages.
       Pomer’s asserted right to disgorgement of fees from Temmerman and TCK does
not raise a triable issue of material fact as to damages. Unlike compensatory damages,
the equitable remedy of disgorgement is intended to “[reflect] not the harms the clients
suffer from the tainted representation, but the decreased value of the representation
itself.” (Fair v. Bakhtiari (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1153.) Disgorgement “deters
attorney misconduct” and “prevents fiduciaries from profiting from their fiduciary breach
and disloyalty.” (Ibid.) Pomer, however, conceded in his complaint that damages are an
element of a common law fraudulent concealment cause of action. (See Graham, supra,
226 Cal.App.4th at p. 606.) And he provides no authority for the proposition that the
abstract possibility of an equitable claim to disgorgement exempts him from the legal
necessity of proving damages for the sole cause of action he elected to maintain.
Moreover, “[w]here an attorney’s misrepresentation or concealment has caused the client
no damage, disgorgement of fees is not warranted.” (Slovensky v. Friedman (2006)
142 Cal.App.4th 1518, 1536 [causes of action for legal malpractice and breach of
fiduciary duty]; see also Frye v. Tenderloin Housing Clinic, Inc. (2006) 38 Cal.4th 23, 48
[“with respect to any claim for misrepresentation or concealment, there was no
damage”].)
       Pomer having failed to raise a triable issue of material fact as to damages, his
arguments as to disgorgement do not salvage his fraudulent concealment cause of action.
Accordingly, the trial court correctly granted the defendants’ motion as to the fraudulent
concealment cause of action. For the same reasons, we reject Pomer’s claim that the trial
court erred by denying his own motion.
                                 III.   DISPOSITION

       The judgment is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
                                             13
                                        _____________________________________
                                        LIE, J.

WE CONCUR:

_____________________________________
GREENWOOD, P. J.

_____________________________________
GROVER, J.

Pomer v. Temmerman, Jr., et al.
H050191