Court Opinion

ID: 9961484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-18 21:00:42.589793+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:49.514132
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 23-1696      Doc: 40         Filed: 04/17/2024     Pg: 1 of 21

                                               PUBLISHED

                                 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                     FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                                No. 23-1696

        WEST VIRGINIA HIGHLANDS CONSERVANCY; SIERRA CLUB,

                     Plaintiffs – Appellees,

               and

        APPALACHIAN HEADWATERS, INC, Nonparty in whose favor an order has been
        entered,

                     Party-in-Interest,

               v.

        ERP ENVIRONMENTAL FUND, INC; RECEIVERSHIP ESTATE OF ERP
        ENVIRONMENTAL FUND, INC.,

                     Defendants – Appellants,

               and

        VCLF LAND TRUST, INC, Nonparty against whom an order may be enforced,

                     Party-in-Interest,

               and

        DOSS SPECIAL RECEIVER, LLC,

                     Receiver.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at
        Huntington. Robert C. Chambers, District Judge. (3:11-cv-00115)
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        Argued: January 26, 2024                                   Decided: April 17, 2024

        Before AGEE and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Vacated and remanded with instructions by published opinion. Judge Agee wrote the
        opinion in which Judge Rushing and Senior Judge Keenan joined.

        ARGUED: Christopher M. Hunter, I, JACKSON KELLY PLLC, Charleston, West
        Virginia, for Appellants. Elizabeth A. Bower, APPALACHIAN MOUNTAIN
        ADVOCATES, INC., Lewisburg, West Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: M. Shane
        Harvey, JACKSON KELLY PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellants. Derek O.
        Teaney, APPALACHIAN MOUNTAIN ADVOCATES, INC., Lewisburg, West Virginia,
        for Appellees.

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        AGEE, Circuit Judge:

               This appeal turns on the proper interpretation of a consent decree negotiated by the

        parties and previously approved by the district court. Relevant here, that consent decree

        expressly prohibits the Receivership Estate of ERP Environmental Fund, Inc. (the

        “Receivership Estate”) from conducting surface coal mining at certain sites unless it is

        necessary for and incidental to reclamation of the site. The question presented is whether

        that prohibition also applies to a third-party permit transferee of a specific site—the

        Chestnut Oak Surface Mine in Lincoln County, West Virginia. The district court held that

        it did, broadly stating that all third-party permit transferees are bound by the terms of the

        consent decree. Because the district court’s interpretation cannot be squared with the plain

        text of the decree, we now vacate and remand with instructions.

                                                     I.

               The consent decree at issue here originates from a 2011 citizen suit under the Clean

        Water Act (“CWA”), 33 U.S.C. § 1365, and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation

        Act (“SMCRA”), 30 U.S.C. § 1270. The plaintiffs, the West Virginia Highlands

        Conservancy and the Sierra Club (collectively, the “Conservation Groups”), alleged that

        now-defunct Patriot Coal Corporation and three of its subsidiaries (collectively, “Patriot

        Coal”) violated federal environmental laws by discharging excessive amounts of selenium

        (a toxic pollutant) in connection with its surface mining operations. To resolve the

        litigation, the parties negotiated a consent decree, which the U.S. District Court for the

        Southern District of West Virginia approved. Among other things, the decree significantly

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        limited Patriot Coal’s surface mining operations in Central Appalachia and required the

        company to “reclaim” its mining sites—that is, to return the mined land to a useable state.

               Patriot Coal later went bankrupt, and ERP Environmental Fund, Inc. (“ERP”) was

        substituted as the defendant, taking on Patriot Coal’s obligations under the consent decree.

        ERP and the Conservation Groups later negotiated a Second Modified Consent Decree, the

        current version of the consent decree at issue here, which the district court approved in

        October 2016. 1 The Second Modified Consent Decree, which we refer to as the “Decree,”

        added a new term found in Paragraph 63. That provision, which applies to ERP as the

        “Substituted Defendant,” provides:

               Notwithstanding any other provision of this Second Modified Consent
               Decree, from the Effective Date of this Second Modified Consent Decree,
               Substituted Defendant and its Affiliated Companies shall not conduct Surface
               Mining at any location formerly owned or operated by Patriot Coal
               Corporation or one of Patriot Coal Corporation’s subsidiaries, except that
               Surface Mining necessary and incidental to reclamation. To the extent there
               is a conflict between this Paragraph 63 and any other Paragraph in Section
               VIII of this Second Modified Consent Decree, Paragraph 63 shall control.

        J.A. 334 (emphasis added).

               Like its previous versions, the Decree provides that the district court retains

        jurisdiction to enforce its terms.

               In 2020, ERP ran out of money and ceased all operations. As a result, a West

        Virginia state court appointed Doss Special Receiver, LLC (the “Receiver”) to administer

        ERP’s Receivership Estate. In this role, the Receiver is charged with managing ERP’s

               1
                The consent decree was first modified by Patriot Coal and the Conservation
        Groups in 2013.
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        business, which includes limited assets and millions of dollars in reclamation liabilities,

        and with bringing ERP’s operations into compliance with its mining permits, the CWA,

        and the SMCRA.

               In 2022, the Receiver sought to finance its administration of the Receivership Estate

        by authorizing third parties to surface mine at a former Patriot Coal facility—the Buck

        Fork Surface Mine. The Conservation Groups intervened, arguing that such surface mining

        would violate Paragraph 63 of the Decree. The district court below agreed, explaining that

        “[i]n obtaining operator assignments and entering into a reclamation services agreement,

        [the Receiver] authorized mining at [the] Buck Fork [Surface Mine] beyond that which is

        ‘necessary and incidental to reclamation,’” “in violation of paragraph 63 of the Second

        Modified Consent Decree.” W. Va. Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. ERP Env’t Fund, Inc.,

        Civil Action No. 3:11-0115, 2022 WL 5226026, at *7 (S.D.W. Va. Oct. 5, 2022).

               The Receiver did not appeal that ruling. Instead, it sought authorization in West

        Virginia state court to enter into a permit transfer agreement with a third party in connection

        with a different former Patriot Coal mine—the Chestnut Oak Surface Mine. In exchange

        for transferring the relevant mining permits and executing coal mining subleases at the

        Chestnut Oak Surface Mine, the Receiver would receive cash and a royalty for any coal

        mined. The third-party permit transferee would in turn fully reclaim the site so long as it

        could also remove coal in the process to offset the remediation costs. According to the

        Receiver, this arrangement would be in the Receivership Estate’s best interest because it

        lacks the resources and ability to reclaim the site and because the transaction would not

        only discharge reclamation liabilities at the Chestnut Oak Surface Mine but also offset

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        reclamation costs at other ERP sites. The West Virginia state court granted authorization

        for the permit transfer agreement, but in doing so, it specifically ruled that such

        authorization should not be construed to modify or otherwise affect the terms and

        conditions of the Decree.

               The Conservation Groups notified the Receiver of their position that such a permit

        transfer agreement would similarly violate Paragraph 63 of the Decree. The Receiver

        responded that third parties accepting transfer of the Chestnut Oak Surface Mine permits

        would not be bound by the Decree. At an impasse, the parties filed cross-motions before

        the district court to enforce the Decree.

               The district court agreed with the Conservation Groups and issued an opinion

        finding that the “Decree’s restrictions on surface mining, as laid out in Paragraph 63, are

        binding upon any third-party permit transferee.” W. Va. Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v.

        ERP Env’t Fund, Inc., Civil Action No. 3:11-0115, 2023 WL 2330427, at *7 (S.D.W. Va.

        Mar. 2, 2023). In doing so, the court relied in part on Paragraph 24 of the Decree, which

        states that “[t]he provisions of this Second Modified Consent Decree apply to and are

        binding . . . upon Substituted Defendant and any of its respective successors and/or

        assigns.” J.A. 298 (emphasis added). In the court’s view, state and federal surface mining

        laws, under which the Decree’s terms generally are to be construed, “indicate that a third-

        party permit transferee would constitute at least a ‘successor’” and thus would be bound

        by the Decree, including Paragraph 63. W. Va. Highlands Conservancy, Inc., 2023 WL

        2330427, at *4. The court drew further support for its holding from Paragraph 25, one

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        sentence of which provides: “In any event, all transferees . . . shall be bound by the terms

        of this Second Modified Consent Decree, consistent with applicable law.” J.A. 299.

               However, the district court deferred disposition “as to the question of whether

        proposed surface mining at Chestnut Oak is necessary and incidental to reclamation,

        pending further briefing.” W. Va. Highlands Conservancy, Inc., 2023 WL 2330427, at *7.

               The Receiver subsequently stipulated that “the mining proposed by the third-party

        transferee would not meet the [district court’s] interpretation of ‘necessary and incidental’

        to reclamation,” J.A. 526, and so requested that the court enter a final order resolving the

        cross-motions. Consequently, the district court issued an order granting the Conservation

        Groups’ motion to enforce the Decree and denying the Receiver’s competing motion. W.

        Va. Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. ERP Env’t Fund, Inc., Civil Action No. 3:11-0115,

        2023 WL 4351534, at *2 (S.D.W. Va. May 26, 2023).

               The Receiver timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

                                                     II.

               “This Court reviews the interpretation of a negotiated order—here, a consent

        decree—de novo.” United States v. S. Coal Corp., 64 F.4th 509, 514 (4th Cir. 2023). 2

               2
                 We note that some of our cases have suggested that review of a district court’s
        interpretation of a consent decree should involve some measure of deference. See, e.g., In
        re Grand Jury Subpoena (T-112), 597 F.3d 189, 202 (4th Cir. 2010). But since our
        interpretation of the Decree would be the same regardless, “we need not determine whether
        our plenary review incorporates some measure of deference.” Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau
        v. Klopp, 957 F.3d 454, 462 n.3 (4th Cir. 2020).
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               As the Supreme Court has long made clear, “[c]onsent decrees are entered into by

        parties to a case after careful negotiation has produced agreement on their precise terms.”

        United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971). Thus, consent decrees “cannot

        be said to have a purpose”; they merely reflect the agreement negotiated by adverse parties.

        Id. In that sense, a consent decree is a like a contract: its scope “must be discerned within

        its four corners, and not by reference to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the parties

        to it.” Id. For that reason, a consent decree’s interpretation is governed by “traditional rules

        of contract interpretation, and the district court’s authority is thus constrained by the

        language of the decree.” Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 404 F.3d 821, 832

        n.6 (4th Cir. 2005). We draw those traditional rules of contract interpretation from the law

        of the state in which the consent decree was entered—here, West Virginia. See Collins v.

        Thompson, 8 F.3d 657, 659 (9th Cir. 1993) (“When interpreting the terms of a consent

        decree, the court applies general contract principles using the law of the state where the

        agreement was made.”).

                                                      III.

               The central issue in this appeal is whether Paragraph 63’s prohibition on surface

        mining beyond that which is “necessary and incidental to reclamation” would apply to a

        third-party permit transferee (unrelated to ERP) of the Chestnut Oak Surface Mine.

               We begin with the text of Paragraph 63, which we restate below:

               Notwithstanding any other provision of this Second Modified Consent
               Decree, from the Effective Date of this Second Modified Consent Decree,
               Substituted Defendant and its Affiliated Companies shall not conduct Surface

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               Mining at any location formerly owned or operated by Patriot Coal
               Corporation or one of Patriot Coal Corporation’s subsidiaries, except that
               Surface Mining necessary and incidental to reclamation. To the extent there
               is a conflict between this Paragraph 63 and any other Paragraph in Section
               VIII of this Second Modified Consent Decree, Paragraph 63 shall control.

        J.A. 334 (emphasis added).

               By its plain terms, Paragraph 63 applies only to “Substituted Defendant and its

        Affiliated Companies.” J.A. 334. The Decree defines “Substituted Defendant” specifically

        as “ERP Environmental Fund, Inc.” J.A. 303. And it defines “Affiliated Company” as “any

        business organization or entity, regardless of form, directly or indirectly controlling,

        controlled by, or under common control with ERP Environmental Fund, Inc.” J.A. 299.

               There has been no suggestion by either party that an unrelated third-party permit

        transferee of the Chestnut Oak Surface Mine would satisfy either the term “Substituted

        Defendant” or the term “Affiliated Company.” To prevail, therefore, the Conservation

        Groups must identify another provision of the Decree that unambiguously extends

        Paragraph 63’s prohibition to such a transferee. They cite two: Paragraph 24 and Paragraph

        25. We consider these provisions in turn.

                                                    A.

               In relevant part, Paragraph 24 provides that “[t]he provisions of this Second

        Modified Consent Decree apply to and are binding . . . upon Substituted Defendant and

        any of its respective successors and/or assigns.” J.A. 298.

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               The Conservation Groups argue, and the district court found, that any third-party

        permit transferee would constitute a “successor” and so would be bound by the terms of

        the Decree, including Paragraph 63. 3 We disagree.

               To begin, the Decree does not define the term “successor.” But it does specify that

        terms “that are defined in the CWA, SMCRA or in regulations issued pursuant thereto shall

        have the meanings assigned to them therein.” J.A. 299. So we look to “the CWA, SMCRA

        or in regulations issued pursuant thereto” and ask whether any of those authorities define

        the term “successor” and thus supply the meaning for that term in the Decree. J.A. 299.

               The answer to that question is clearly no: nowhere in the CWA, SMCRA, or

        implementing regulations is the term “successor” defined.

               The Conservation Groups don’t dispute this fact. Instead, they point to federal and

        state surface mining regulations promulgated under the SMCRA that define the term

        “successor in interest.” And in their view, that’s close enough. To put a finer point on it,

        they contend that “[b]ecause federal and state surface mining regulations use ‘successor in

        interest’ and ‘successor’ interchangeably, it is of no import that the regulations define

        ‘successor in interest’ but not ‘successor.’” Response Br. 22.

        3
          The Conservation Groups also argue on appeal that a third-party permit transferee would
        separately constitute an “assign” under Paragraph 24. But they did not raise this argument
        below, so we decline to consider it here. See Agra, Gill & Duffus, Inc. v. Benson, 920 F.2d
        1173, 1176 (4th Cir. 1990) (“We will not accept on appeal theories that were not raised in
        the district court except under unusual circumstances that would result in a miscarriage of
        justice.”). And even if they had, it seems highly unlikely that an unrelated third-party
        permit transferee would constitute an “assignee” for reasons similar to those discussed
        below involving a “successor.”
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               As defined in the relevant regulations, “successor in interest” means “any person

        who succeeds to rights granted under a permit, by transfer, assignment, or sale of those

        rights.” 30 C.F.R. § 701.5; accord W. Va. Code R. § 38-2-2.122 (providing materially

        identical definition). 4 Applying that definition to the term “successor” in Paragraph 24 of

        the Decree, the Conservation Groups argue that a third-party permit transferee of the

        Chestnut Oak Surface Mine would constitute a “successor” and thus would be bound by

        Paragraph 63’s surface mining prohibition. The district court took the same view.

               That approach, however, contravenes the plain language of the Decree. Under the

        agreement’s express text, only those terms used in the Decree that are explicitly “defined

        in the CWA, SMCRA or in regulations issued pursuant thereto shall have the meanings

        assigned to them therein.” J.A. at 299. And the term “successor”—the term actually used

        in Paragraph 24—is not defined in any of those authorities, so there is no specialized

        meaning to “assign[]” to it. J.A. 299. Nor is there any other basis in the Decree or those

        regulations for assigning the meaning of the defined term “successor in interest” to the

        undefined term “successor.” 5

               4
                 These regulations’ definition of “successor in interest” is generally consistent with
        the ordinary meaning of that term. See Successor in interest, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th
        ed. 2019) (“Someone who follows another in ownership or control of property.”).
               5
                 Some of the relevant federal and state surface mining regulations could arguably
        be construed in some places to use the term “successor” as a shorthand for “successor in
        interest.” See, e.g., 30 C.F.R. § 774.17(d); W. Va. Code R. § 38-2-3.25.a.5. But there is
        nothing in the CWA, SMCRA, or related regulations that explicitly equates “successor” to
        a “successor in interest.” The salient fact is that only the term “successor in interest” is
        expressly defined in those regulations and the term “successor”—the term that ultimately
        matters—is not.
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               Of course, the parties were free to use the term “successor in interest” in Paragraph

        24. But they didn’t. Instead, they chose “successor,” and we must respect that choice.

        Indeed, “[o]ur task is not to rewrite the terms of [the Decree] between the parties; instead,

        we are to enforce it as written.” Fraternal Ord. of Police, Lodge No. 69 v. City of Fairmont,

        468 S.E.2d 712, 716 (W. Va. 1996).

               Accordingly, we look to the “plain and ordinary meaning” of the term “successor,”

        Bass v. Coltelli-Rose, 536 S.E.2d 494, 497 (W. Va. 2000) (citation omitted), mindful of the

        context in which the term appears, see Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. v. Hickman, 781

        S.E.2d 198, 213 (W. Va. 2015) (stating that contract terms “are to be read in their context”).

               When dealing with corporations like ERP, the term “successor” typically means “[a]

        corporation that, through amalgamation, consolidation, or other assumption of interests, is

        vested with the rights and duties of an earlier corporation.” Successor, Black’s Law

        Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 6 So the question becomes whether a third-party permit

               6
                  This definition, we note, is entirely distinct from that of the term “successor in
        interest,” both as defined in the relevant federal and state surface mining regulations and
        according to its ordinary meaning. As contrasted with the definition of the term “successor
        in interest,” which implicates only a succession to rights associated with the ownership or
        control of certain property, the definition of the term “successor” requires a succession to
        the rights and duties of an earlier corporation through amalgamation, consolidation, or
        other assumption of interests—like, for example, a corporate merger or stock purchase, see
        Amalgamation, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“The act of combining or uniting;
        consolidation <amalgamation of two small companies to form a new corporation>.”). Thus,
        the term “successor” takes on a different and more limited meaning than the term
        “successor in interest.”
                The district court saw it differently. In its view, “a ‘successor in interest’ requires a
        greater enmeshment between two corporate entities than a ‘successor,’ meaning that an
        entity that is a ‘successor in interest’ would be a ‘successor,’ too.” W. Va. Highlands
        Conservancy, Inc., 2023 WL 2330427, at *5; cf. Response Br. 25 n.5 (asserting that “a
        (Continued)
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        transferee of the Chestnut Oak Surface Mine would fall within the meaning of that term.

        We again answer in the negative.

               To be sure, a third-party permit transferee obtains the rights in connection with the

        relevant mining permits. 7 But by obtaining such permit rights, the transferee does not,

        “through amalgamation, consolidation, or other assumption of interests, [become] vested

        with the rights and duties of [ERP].” Id. Indeed, we agree with the Receiver that the

        contemplated permit transfer at issue in this case is more akin to an asset purchase—the

        transferee would be effectively purchasing mining rights for a specific mine. And as we

        and several other courts have recognized, merely purchasing an asset does not generally

        render the purchaser a “successor” to the seller. See, e.g., United States v. Carolina

        Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 838 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating that “[t]he settled rule is that

        a corporation which acquires the assets of another corporation does not take the liabilities

        of the predecessor corporation from which the assets are acquired” except in limited

        circumstances not present here); City Mgmt. Corp. v. U.S. Chem. Co., 43 F.3d 244, 251

        (6th Cir. 1994) (same); Bud Antle, Inc. v. E. Foods, Inc., 758 F.2d 1451, 1456 (11th Cir.

        1985) (same); Apache Stainless Equip. Corp. v. Infoswitch, Inc., No. 18-cv-04879-JMY,

        2020 WL 4195275, at *5 (E.D. Penn. July 21, 2020) (“[B]ecause Apache only acquired

        ‘successor-in-interest’ is a subspecies of a ‘successor’”). But that has it backwards.
        Because a “successor” acquires the rights and liabilities of another corporation, the
        “successor” relationship involves “a greater enmeshment between two corporate entities,”
        W. Va. Highlands Conservancy, Inc., 2023 WL 2330427, at *5, than does a “successor in
        interest” relationship, which requires only the acquisition of rights in certain property.
               7
                   In that respect, a third-party permit transferee could be a successor in interest.
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        certain assets, and did not assume the liabilities of Mepaco, Apache did not succeed or

        become a successor to Mepaco.”); Gismondi, Paglia, Sherling, M.D. v. Franco, 206 F.

        Supp. 2d 597, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that an asset purchaser did “not fit within the

        definition of the legal term ‘successor’”).

               Sidestepping the issue, the Conservation Groups argue that “a successor need not

        assume all of its predecessor’s assets, rights, and duties”; rather, “an entity can be a

        successor as to part of its predecessor’s estate.” Response Br. 30 (second emphasis added).

        To support this assertion, the Conservation Groups note that “Black’s Law Dictionary . . .

        recognizes that there are multiple species of successors, including ‘particular successors’

        ‘who succeed to rights and obligations that pertain only to the property conveyed.’”

        Response Br. 30 (cleaned up). They then point out that any third-party permit transferee of

        the Chestnut Oak Surface Mine would assume not just all the rights associated with the

        permits but also all the associated duties, “including [certain] environmental protection

        obligations.” Response Br. 30. As such, the Conservation Groups continue, the transferee

        would be properly characterized as a “successor,” namely, a “particular successor.”

               This argument fails for the same reason that the Conservation Groups’ previous

        argument fails—it seeks to rewrite the agreement. The Decree uses the term “successor,”

        not “particular successor” or any other subgroup of that term. Just as we will not read

        “successor in interest” in place of “successor,” we will not assign a more limited meaning

        to “successor” absent some indication that the parties intended that result. See Fraternal

        Ord. of Police, Lodge No. 69, 468 S.E.2d at 716.

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               Applying the ordinary meaning of “successor” in this context, it is clear that term

        does not encompass a third-party permit transferee of the Chestnut Oak Surface Mine by

        virtue of the permit transfer alone, even if the relevant permits impose certain duties on the

        transferee that were previously imposed on ERP. That is to say, by simply acquiring

        discrete mining permits for a particular mine, the transferee does not, “through

        amalgamation, consolidation, or other assumption of interests, [become] vested with the

        rights and duties of [ERP].” Successor, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). For that

        reason, we hold that Paragraph 24 would not bind an unrelated third-party permit transferee

        to Paragraph 63’s surface mining prohibition, which, by its express terms, applies only to

        “Substituted Defendant and its Affiliated Companies.” J.A. 334.

                                                      B.

               We turn next to the second provision that the Conservation Groups cite in support

        of their claim that a third-party permit transferee would be bound by Paragraph 63’s surface

        mining prohibition: Paragraph 25.

               In its entirety, that provision provides:

               Except for those restrictions on Large Scale Surface Mining set forth in
               Paragraphs 54 through 58 herein, the applicability and duration of which
               shall be governed solely by the terms of Section VIII, and the restrictions on
               Surface Mining set forth in Paragraph 63, no transfer of ownership or
               operation of any Facility shall relieve Substituted Defendant of its obligation
               to ensure that the terms of this Second Modified Consent Decree are
               implemented, provided, however that, prior to any transfer, any party
               desiring to transfer ownership or operation of any Facility shall provide a
               copy of this Second Modified Consent Decree to the proposed transferee and
               require the transferee to provide written confirmation to the Court
               acknowledging the terms of the Second Modified Consent Decree and that
               the transferee will be bound by those terms. In such event, the transferring
               party shall no longer be subject to this Decree. There shall be no requirement

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               to provide written confirmation to the Court if the ultimate parent of
               Substituted Defendant will change as a result of a transaction, but the
               Substituted Defendant owning or operating the Facility will not change. In
               any event, all transferees, subsequent owners, and operators shall be bound
               by the terms of this Second Modified Consent Decree, consistent with
               applicable law.

        J.A. 298–99.

               Following the district court’s lead, the Conservation Groups focus on the very last

        sentence of this paragraph: “In any event, all transferees . . . shall be bound by the terms

        of this Second Modified Consent Decree, consistent with applicable law.” J.A. 299

        (emphasis added). In their view, “all means all.” Response Br. 47 (cleaned up); accord W.

        Va. Highlands Conservancy, Inc., 2023 WL 2330427, at *7 (“[T]he last sentence of

        paragraph 25 is clear. All transferees, without qualification, are bound by the terms of the

        Consent Decree so long as it accords with applicable law.”). Thus, the argument goes, any

        third-party permit transferee of the Chestnut Oak Surface Mine would be equally bound by

        Paragraph 63’s surface mining prohibition. Again, we disagree.

               The fundamental problem with the interpretation advanced by the Conservation

        Groups and adopted by the district court is that it reads the final sentence of Paragraph 25

        in a vacuum. Contract terms “are not to be construed in a vacuum, but are to be read in

        their context.” Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 781 S.E.2d at 213. And that context is

        critical here as it plainly demonstrates that the phrase “all transferees” in the final sentence

        of Paragraph 25 refers to a specific subset of transferees that had been identified earlier in

        the paragraph: all transferees of a “Facility.” J.A. 298 (emphasis added).

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               We need not devote much time to this issue, for even a cursory review of Paragraph

        25 illustrates the point.

               Start with the first sentence, which comprises two parts. The first part provides that

        except as to certain surface mining restrictions set out elsewhere in the Decree, “no transfer

        of ownership or operation of any Facility shall relieve Substituted Defendant of its

        obligation to ensure that the terms of this Second Modified Consent Decree are

        implemented.” J.A. 298 (emphasis added). At the outset, then, Paragraph 25 cabins its

        terms to a specific context, or more accurately, a specific triggering event: the transferring

        of ownership or operation of any “Facility.”

               The second part of the first sentence and the entire second sentence, which

        collectively provide an exception to the general rule set out in the first part of the first

        sentence, reinforce Paragraph 25’s limited scope:

               provided, however that, prior to any transfer, any party desiring to transfer
               ownership or operation of any Facility shall provide a copy of this Second
               Modified Consent Decree to the proposed transferee and require the
               transferee to provide written confirmation to the Court acknowledging the
               terms of the Second Modified Consent Decree and that the transferee will be
               bound by those terms. In such event, the transferring party shall no longer
               be subject to this Decree.

        J.A. 298–99 (emphases added). Like the first half of the first sentence, the second half

        begins by identifying a specific context: when “any party desir[es] to transfer ownership

        or operation of any Facility.” J.A. 298 (emphasis added). And it is within that specific

        context that Paragraph 25 first uses the term “transferee”—three times, in fact. Thus, in

        each of those three instances, the term “transferee” unquestionably refers to a transferee of

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        a “Facility.” J.A. 298. Under the same logic, the term “transferring party” in the second

        full sentence of Paragraph 25 similarly denotes the transferor of a “Facility.” J.A. 298.

               In keeping with this narrow context, the third sentence of Paragraph 25 also employs

        the term “Facility”: “There shall be no requirement to provide written confirmation to the

        Court if the ultimate parent of Substituted Defendant will change as a result of a transaction,

        but the Substituted Defendant owning or operating the Facility will not change.” J.A. 299

        (emphasis added).

               Against this clear backdrop, there can be no doubt that the term “transferees” in the

        fourth and final sentence—“In any event, all transferees, subsequent owners, and operators

        shall be bound by the terms of this Second Modified Consent Decree, consistent with

        applicable law,” J.A. 299 (emphasis added)—likewise refers only to transferees of

        Facilities. To conclude otherwise would be to completely ignore the context by

        disregarding everything that preceded that final sentence—an indefensible result. See

        Antero Res. Corp. v. Directional One Servs. Inc. USA, 873 S.E.2d 832, 842 (W. Va. 2022)

        (explaining that a contract must be construed “to give meaning to every word, phrase and

        clause and also render all its provisions consistent and harmonious” (cleaned up)). It would

        be odd indeed for a single contract provision to repeatedly and consistently use a term

        within the confines of a specific context only to jettison those confines in the final sentence.

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        And here, there is simply no indication that the term “transferees” in the last sentence of

        Paragraph 25 refers to anything other than transferees of Facilities. 8

               Consequently, whether a third-party permit transferee of the Chestnut Oak Surface

        Mine would be bound by Paragraph 25 depends on whether the Chestnut Oak Surface Mine

        constitutes a “Facility” under the Decree. It does not.

               The Decree defines the term “Facility” as “Covered Outfalls and mining operations

        subject to the Covered Permits.” J.A. 301. The term “Covered Outfalls” is defined as “the

        discharge points for the Covered Permits as identified in Appendix A to this Second

        Modified Consent Decree.” J.A. 300. And the term “Covered Permits” is defined in

        relevant part as

               permits that were the subject of this litigation as those permits are now in
               effect and as they may be amended, modified, or renewed, following the
               procedures for such amendment, modification, or renewal prescribed by the
               applicable federal and state statutes and regulations and interpreted by this
               Court in relevant decisions for the duration of this Second Modified Consent
               Decree, including: WV/NPDES Permit[9] Nos. WV0099520, WV0093751,
               WV0096920, WV0096962, WV1014684, WV1017225, WV0099392,
               WV1016776, WV1020889, and WV1021028.

        J.A. 300.

               8
                 What’s more, interpreting the phrase “all transferees” in its broadest sense would
        lead to absurd results as it would encompass not just transferees of all mining permits but
        also transferees of any asset, thus binding them to all the Decree’s terms. See Transferee,
        Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“One to whom a property interest is conveyed”).
        We do not think the Decree countenances such a result.
               9
                 A “WV/NPDES permit” means “a West Virginia / National Pollutant Discharge
        Elimination System permit issued by [the West Virginia Department of Environmental
        Protection] pursuant to Section 402 of the CWA.” J.A. 304.
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               There’s no dispute that the Chestnut Oak Surface Mine WV/NPDES permit number

        is not among those listed in the definition of “Covered Permits.” See W. Va. Highlands

        Conservancy, Inc., 2023 WL 2330427, at *6 (identifying the WV/NPDES permit number

        for the Chestnut Oak Surface Mine as “WV1019759”). There’s also no dispute that, as a

        result, the Chestnut Oak Surface Mine is not “subject to [a] Covered Permit[]” and thus

        does not constitute a “Facility” under the Decree. J.A. 301. It follows, then, that Paragraph

        25 of the Decree does not extend Paragraph 63’s prohibition on surface mining to a third-

        party permit transferee of the Chestnut Oak Surface Mine.

                                                  ****

               In sum, neither Paragraph 24 nor Paragraph 25 would bind a third-party permit

        transferee of the Chestnut Oak Surface Mine to Paragraph 63’s prohibition on surface

        mining, a prohibition that expressly applies only to ERP and its Affiliated Companies. We

        have considered the Conservation Groups’ remaining arguments, including their assertion

        that any third-party permit transferee would be separately bound by the Decree under

        Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2), and find them meritless.

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                                                   IV.

              For the reasons given, we vacate the district court’s order and remand with

        instructions to deny the Conservation Groups’ motion to enforce the Decree and to grant

        the Receiver’s competing motion, consistent with this opinion. 10

                                                                   VACATED AND REMANDED
                                                                       WITH INSTRUCTIONS

              10
                  The Receiver’s motion requested a ruling both that (1) the Decree does not apply
        to a third-party permit transferee of the Chestnut Oak Surface Mine, and (2) the mining
        proposed for that mine was necessary for and incidental to reclamation. Our decision today
        resolves only the first issue and renders the second issue moot.
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