Court Opinion

ID: 9607952
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:03:55.591683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:42.026343
License: Public Domain

HOWE, Justice,
dissenting:
The majority correctly states that “[t]he attenuation analysis evaluates the relationship between official misconduct and subsequently discovered evidence to determine if excluding the evidence will effectively deter future illegalities.” (Emphasis added.) In applying that standard, I conclude that the evidence in this case should not be excluded. Therefore, I dissent.
The United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that “[t]he exclusionary rule operates as a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard against future violations of Fourth Amendment rights through the rule’s general deterrent effect.” Arizona v. Evans, — U.S. -, -, 115 S.Ct. 1185, 1191, 131 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3411-12, 82 L.Ed.2d 677, 687 (1984); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 S.Ct. 613, 620, 38 L.Ed.2d 561, 571 (1974)); see also State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1263 (Utah 1993); State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 689 (Utah 1990). Where “ ‘the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use ... is unwarranted.’ ” Evans, — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1191 *296(quoting United States v. Jams, 428 U.S. 433, 454, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 3032, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046, 1060 (1976)).
In Evans, a police officer pulled a ear over for a traffic violation. A computer inquiry indicated that there was an outstanding warrant on the driver. Id. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 1188. The officer placed the driver under arrest, and a search incident to that arrest turned up a bag of marijuana. Id. The police later discovered that the warrant upon which the arrest was based had been quashed seventeen days prior to the arrest. However, due to an error by a court clerk, the computer record had not been updated. Id. The State charged the driver with possession of marijuana, even though it conceded that the arrest violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at-, n. 1, 115 S.Ct. at 1189 n. 1. The driver sought to suppress the evidence.
The United States Supreme Court recognized that “the issue of exclusion is separate from whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated ... and exclusion is appropriate only if the remedial objectives of the rule are thought most efficaciously served.” Id. at 1192-93 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 906, 104 S.Ct. at 3412; Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348, 94 S.Ct. at 619-20). The Court likened the computer error to other eases where the illegality arose because a court later invalidated a search warrant or a statute upon which the police had relied in good faith— suppression would have no deterrent value. Id. — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1191-93; see Leon, 468 U.S. at 922, 104 S.Ct. at 3420; Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 990-91, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 3428-29, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349, 107 S.Ct. 1160, 1166, 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987). The Court concluded that the exclusionary rule did not require suppression of the marijuana because “the exclusion of evidence at trial would not sufficiently deter future errors so as to warrant such a severe sanction.” Id. — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1193.
This rationale is applicable here. It is now clear that the 1988 roadblock at which Shoul-derblade was stopped was constitutionally infirm. Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453-54, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 2487, 110 L.Ed.2d 412, 422-23 (1990); Sims v. State Tax Comm’n, 841 P.2d 6, 14-15 (Utah 1992) (plurality opinion). At the time of the' roadblock, however, no decision from either the United States Supreme Court or a Utah appellate court had held such roadblocks illegal. In fact, the roadblock was legal under a then-existing line of cases from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. See United States v. Corral, 823 F.2d 1389, 1392 (10th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1054, 108 S.Ct. 2820, 100 L.Ed.2d 921 (1988); United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 547 (10th Cir.1985); United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371, 1376 (10th Cir.1984); United States v. Prichard, 645 F.2d 854, 857 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 832, 102 S.Ct. 130, 70 L.Ed.2d 110 (1981). Utah is in the Tenth Circuit.
In Corral, an officer approached a truck stopped at a New Mexico roadblock and detected the odor of marijuana. Corral, 823 F.2d at 1390. The officer had the driver pull over to the side of the road, after which the passenger admitted to smoking marijuana. Id. at 1391. The officers sought and obtained consent to search the truck and eventually discovered approximately 474 pounds of cocaine. Id. at 1392. The Tenth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the roadblock:
The purpose of the roadblock set up by Officers Denton and Frisk was to check driver’s licenses, vehicle registrations and proof of insurance. This was a permissible and lawful purpose. The roadblock was set up with the knowledge and consent of the officers’ supervisor. It did not involve a single, random or selective stop chosen at the officers’ discretion.... Rather, the roadblock as implemented consisted of the stopping of every vehicle heading east on State Road 62/180 with the exception of the local supermarket delivery trucks which were permitted to pass uninspected for articulated and legitimate reasons. Hence, this roadblock was established in a systematic manner to stop vehicles in a pattern which protected the public from the officers’ unbridled discretion.
We hold that the roadblock passed constitutional muster.
Id. The roadblock in the instant case was similarly limited, with comparable measures *297to protect the public from the officers’ unbridled discretion.
“ ‘The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right.’” Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1268 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 612, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2266, 45 L.Ed.2d 416, 482 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 2365, 41 L.Ed.2d 182, 194 (1974)). “ ‘[Ejvidenee obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth. Amendment.’ ” Leon, 468 U.S. at 919, 104 S.Ct. at 3419 (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542, 95 S.Ct. 2313, 2320, 45 L.Ed.2d 374, 384 (1975)). Because the roadblock that resulted in the stop of Shoulderblade was proper under then-existing case law, the illegal police conduct was not willful or negligent, let alone flagrant or purposeful. The officers here had no knowledge — nor could they properly be charged with the knowledge — that the search was unconstitutional. They acted in good faith and were entitled to rely upon the most applicable ease law available. We should not expect these officers to question the judgment of the Tenth Circuit that had repeatedly approved this type of roadblock. Neither should we punish these officers for not accurately predicting what later courts would decide regarding the constitutionality of this practice. Invoking the exclusionary rule will have no deterrent effect on the officers; they will continue and should continue to rely on applicable law and should be held blameless if that law is later invalidated.
Admittedly, there is an absence of a temporal break or other intervening circumstance between the improper stop and the consent to search. However, these factors are also based on the deterrence principle. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1264. Where no deterrent effect will be felt, these factors do not require application of the exclusionary rule, which “‘is calculated to prevent, not to repair.’ ” Brown, 422 U.S. at 599, 95 S.Ct. at 2260 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1444, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669, 1677 (1960)). This is a case where strict adherence to the rule imposes greater cost on the legitimate demands of law enforcement and on society’s interest in placing all relevant evidence before the jury than can be justified by the rule’s deterrent purposes.
I would reverse the court of appeals’ decision and affirm defendant’s conviction.