Court Opinion

ID: 9384721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-04 19:02:37.03573+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:56.037968
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/4/23 In re AH. V. CA2/2

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

In re AH. V. et al., Persons                               B314507, B317268
Coming Under the Juvenile                                  (Los Angeles County
Court Law.                                                 Super. Ct.
                                                           No. 17CCJP00988C-G)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

MICHAEL V.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Debra R. Archuleta, Judge. Affirmed.
     Elizabeth Klippi, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, Acting County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                            ******

      In these consolidated cases, appellant Michael V. (father)
appeals from two orders: the order of July 2021 in which the
court denied father’s request to have the children returned to his
care, additional family reunification services, authorization that
the children attend meeting at father’s temple and that a temple
member serve as a visitation monitor; and the order of December
2021 that terminated the parental rights of appellant and
mother, Christy D. (mother). The appeal involves five children:
Ah. (born 2013), Asa. (born 2014), twins Am. and Asi. (born
2016), and Mi. (born 2019).
      Father challenges the order terminating his parental rights
to the five children, asserting that the finding of adoptability
made during the December 2021 hearing was nullified by events
that occurred after the hearing. We disagree and affirm both
orders.

                        BACKGROUND
Detention and section 300 petition—Ah., Asa., Am., and
Asi.
      In October 2017, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a petition under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b),1 on

1    All further unattributed statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.

                                2
behalf of Ah., Asa., Am., Asi., and mother’s two older children, D.
and Ma.,2 alleging that the parents placed the children at risk of
serious physical harm when they transported four of the children
in the back of a padlocked U-Haul truck without appropriate
ventilation, car seats, seatbelts, or water, when the family moved
from Nevada to California in September 2017.
       The petition further alleged that mother’s mental and
emotional condition, resulting in her involuntary hospitalization
in August 2017, placed the children at risk of harm.
       On October 26, 2017, a removal warrant was obtained, and
the children were removed from mother after one of them
disclosed mother had pushed him down the stairs and struck him
with a belt. The juvenile court detained the children from both
parents on October 31, 2017, and ordered monitored visits for
both parents.
       DCFS filed a first amended petition on November 21, 2017,
alleging that mother’s physical abuse of the same child had
placed him and his siblings at risk of harm.
Adjudication hearing—Ah., Asa., Am., and Asi.
       At the March 20, 2018 adjudication hearing, the juvenile
court sustained an amended petition, declared the children
dependents of the court, and removed them from parental
custody.3 The court accorded both parents family reunification
services and monitored visits.

2      D. and Ma. are not subjects of this appeal and have
different fathers from the five children in this case.
3     D. had been previously dismissed from the petition because
he had turned 18. The court removed Ma. from mother and
placed him with his father.

                                 3
Detention, section 300 petition, and adjudication hearing
regarding Mi.
       On April 1, 2019, DCFS filed a section 300 petition on
behalf of infant Mi. Though it had obtained authorization from
the juvenile court to remove the baby from the parents, DCFS
was unable to do so because the parents were uncooperative and
Mi.’s whereabouts were unknown.
       Mother was present at the April 2, 2019 detention hearing
but father was not. The juvenile court found a prima facie case
for detaining Mi., issued a protective custody warrant for him,
and accorded the parents monitored visits. DCFS located and
detained Mi. on May 3, 2019.
Prior appeal concerning Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
(ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.)
       Father and mother challenged the orders that established
dependency jurisdiction over Mi., his removal of him from
parental custody, and continued the out-of-home placement of
Ah., Asa., Am., and Asi. The sole issue raised in the prior appeal
was whether there had been compliance with the inquiry and
notice requirements of the ICWA and related California law.
       The children’s mother initially reported possible Cherokee
ancestry. Throughout the case, father identified an ever-
expanding list of Indian tribes in which the children may have
existing or future membership, including Apache, Cherokee,
Blackfeet, Nanticoke, Lenni-Lenape, Califa Indian, Siksika,
Chumash, and the El/Bey clan. DCFS investigated and provided
notice to the tribes. The juvenile court, after receiving the tribes’
responses, found there was no reason to know the children were
Indian.
       We affirmed the juvenile court’s ICWA findings based on
substantial evidence and held that both the juvenile court and

                                  4
DCFS had complied with ICWA’s inquiry and notice
requirements. (In re Ahnyia V. (May 13, 2020, B298852) [nonpub.
opn].)
Reunification Period
       Reunification efforts continued throughout 2019 and 2020,
during which the children were placed in multiple homes. The
children were initially placed with Ms. B. Each of the children
received physical examinations, and no medical issues were
detected.
       Father, a self-identified Moor, stated he would not
cooperate with the police, court, or government officials, citing
their lack of jurisdiction over the Moors. Despite these
statements, father visited the children and participated in some
services. At the June 19, 2018 progress hearing, the court
granted DCFS discretion to expand father’s visits with the
children if it found his home satisfactory.
       Ah. was seen at a clinic due to her below-average weight,
and, after being on a special diet, she gained some weight. Asi.
was diagnosed with asthma and prescribed albuterol and a
nebulizer. No other medical concerns were noted for the children.
Ah. adjusted well to kindergarten and enjoyed school. Asa., Am.,
and Asi. were enrolled in childcare and thriving.
       The caregiver reported the children’s mental health
services were terminated due to a lack of funding and requested
the children be reconsidered for services. The children were
assessed and found to be ineligible for the developmental
disability services provided by the Regional Center of the
Department of Developmental Services (Regional Center).
       At the six-month hearing on November 6, 2018, the court
found father to be in substantial compliance with his case plan
and mother to be in partial compliance with hers. DCFS was

                                5
ordered to provide the parents with continued reunification
services and to expand father’s visits to a minimum of 10 hours of
unmonitored visits per week.
       DCFS was not able to place the children in a single home
and, as a result, Ah. and Asa. were placed in one home; Am. and
Asi. were placed in another; and after Mi. was detained, he was
placed in a third.
       During the reunification process, DCFS expressed concern
that father had not cooperated with DCFS’s efforts to assess Mi.
and that his home smelled of marijuana during his unmonitored
visits with the children.
       After March 29, 2019, father stopped communicating with
DCFS and no longer visited the children. Father stated he was
not ready to have any of the children returned to his care.
       Mother moved to Illinois and remained there for the
remainder of the proceedings.
       At the one-year hearing, the juvenile court terminated
mother’s reunification services as to Ah., Asa., Am., and Asi.
Reunification services continued to be offered to mother for Mi.
and to father for all of the children.
       The children were then placed together in a single home
with K.T., who was identified as a family friend and the
children’s godmother. DCFS expressed concerns about the
placement and K.T.’s ability to properly care for the children,
particularly after it was disclosed that K.T., father and another
woman were in a polyamorous relationship. There was concern
that K.T. was permitting father unauthorized access to the
children.
       While in K.T.’s care, the children continued to receive
therapy and treatment. Ah., who liked school and was
developmentally on target, was assessed and determined not to

                                6
need therapy as there were no reported significant challenges in
the home, school, or social setting. Asa., always happy and in a
good mood, was referred to the Regional Center because he was
borderline in motor and personal skills. Asi., who was not yet of
school age and not receiving therapy, was using a nebulizer and
inhaler for asthma and had been referred to the Regional Center
because her speech development was delayed. Am. had trouble
ambulating, and Mi. was not meeting his developmental
milestones, so they too were referred to the Regional Center.
      DCFS then reported father wanted the children to be
removed from K.T. because she was not following their religion’s
laws. Instead father wanted them placed with Brother M. El.
from his temple. The Regional Center was unable to assess the
four children referred for services because father said that there
was nothing wrong with his children, and he refused to consent to
assessments.
      At the February 27, 2020 hearing, the court terminated the
reunification services provided to father for all the children and
to mother for Mi. Also, the children needed to be placed in new
homes because K.T. was giving father the foster care funding and
allowing him unlimited access to the children. Ah. and Asa. were
placed in one home and the three younger children were placed in
Ms. G.’s home.
      Ms. G. reported that the children were adjusting well to her
home and bonding with her. She and her husband, Mr. G., were
interested in adopting all the children, and, as a result, the two
older children, Ah. and Am., were also placed with her.
      Asa., Am. and Asi., had been accepted by the Regional
Center, and it was reported that the children liked living with
Mr. and Ms. G. and appeared comfortable with them.

                                7
       During this period of supervision, father and mother had no
in-person visits with the children. While awaiting the hearing to
determine parental rights, father’s counsel was granted leave to
withdraw. The court appointed new counsel over father’s
objection, as father did not complete the necessary waiver to
proceed in propria persona.
Section 366.26 hearing
       The hearing to determine parental rights was held on
December 8, 2021. Ah. was eight, Asa. was seven, Am. and Asi.
were five, and Mi. was three. Father argued the existence of the
beneficial parental relationship that mother joined. Children’s
counsel and DCFS asked the court to terminate parental rights.
       Father testified that he called the children three times a
week and claimed they were excited to see him when they arrived
for in-person visits.
       Asa. testified that during the phone calls father would
repeatedly ask if he wanted to live with father. Asa. replied that
he did not want to live with father and that he wanted to be
adopted.
       Ah. testified that father had not called the children until
August 2021, four months before the hearing. She added that she
did not like talking to father on the phone because he would
repeatedly ask if she wanted to live with him. When asked, she
replied that she did not want to live with father and that she
wanted to be adopted.
       The juvenile court found that the beneficial parental
relationship had not been established with the children due to
the parent’s failure to make regular visits during the pendency of
the case. The juvenile court also found that the children did not
have a significant bond with father because they testified that
they would not be sad if they never saw father again.

                                8
      The juvenile court also found, by clear and convincing
evidence, that all the children were generally and specifically
adoptable and thus terminated parental rights, freeing the
children for adoption. The current caregivers were designated the
prospective adoptive parents.
      Father and mother filed timely appeals: father in B314507
and mother in B317268. We granted father’s motion to
consolidate the appeals on March 17, 2022, and ordered all future
submissions to be made in B314507. Mother’s appeal was
dismissed on March 1, 2022, at her request.
      In March 2022, the caregivers provided notice that they no
longer could be adoptive parents. The children were then placed
with Ms. A., but, due to safety concerns regarding stairs in her
home, Ah. and Asa. were then placed with Ms. S., and Am., Asi.,
and Mi. were placed in a different home. Subsequently, due to
concerns about their asthma, Asi., Am., and Mi. were relocated
with Ms. W.
      Asa. is developmentally on target and receiving medication
for hyperactivity and impulsivity. He has been referred to
Intensive Field Capable Clinical Services through the Los
Angeles County Department of Mental Health. Ah. is
developmentally on target and has been practicing relaxation and
mindfulness coping skills. Her current caregiver is assisting her
with her emotional needs. Additionally, Asa. and Ah.’s caregiver
has expressed interest in adopting them, and the children have
also expressed a desire to be adopted by their caregiver.
      Asi. is doing well and is scheduled to receive mental health
services for fighting and arguing with Am., her twin sibling. Am.
has developmental delays and is extremely hyperactive and
distractible. He has been referred to outpatient mental health
services.

                                9
      Mi. is not in school and has no urgent mental health
concerns. His current caregiver is interested in obtaining legal
permanency for him.
      The May 25, 2022 report indicates Ah., Asa., Am., and Asi.
have had eight placements, and Mi. has had seven.

                           DISCUSSION
I.     Father waived all grounds other than adoptability
       Father appeals from the December 2021 findings and
orders terminating his parental rights, as well as the findings
and order at the review hearing in July 2021. He provides
argument, however, only concerning the children’s adoption
prospects.
       “‘“‘Contentions supported neither by argument nor by
citation of authority are deemed to be without foundation, and to
have been abandoned.’ [Citation.]” [Citation.] Nor is an appellate
court required to consider alleged error where the appellant
merely complains of it without pertinent argument. [Citation.]
Since [the appellant] does not address the issue, we treat it as
abandoned and comment no further.’” (Poway Royal Mobilehome
Owners Assn. v. City of Poway (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1460,
1480.)
       Here, father did not provide pertinent argument on any
findings or orders at the July 2021 hearing and did not offer
argument on anything from the December 2021 hearing, except
the finding of adoptability. Consequently, we consider father’s
appeal from all other issues abandoned, and we limit our review
to the finding that the children were adoptable.
II.    Applicable law and standard of review
       Father argues the finding the children were generally and
specifically adoptable is not supported by sufficient evidence, and

                                10
their ages and disabilities make them unlikely to be adopted. He
also requests we take judicial notice of the fact the children are
no longer placed with Mr. and Ms. G. to support his argument
that they were not specifically adoptable.
       We granted father’s request for judicial notice on October 2,
2022, and took notice of the facts in minute orders and reports
showing the children were no longer placed with the G.’s and had
been placed in two separate homes. We also granted father’s
motion to take additional evidence under Code of Civil Procedure
section 909.
       The question of whether a dependent child is likely to be
adopted “focuses on the child rather than on the prospective
adoptive family.” (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642,
1650 (Sarah M.).) A juvenile court may terminate parental rights
“only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that it is
likely the child will be adopted within a reasonable time.” (In re
Carl R. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1060 (Carl R.); see § 366.26,
subd. (c)(1).) When determining adoptability, the court must
consider whether the child’s “age, physical condition, and
emotional state” will make it difficult to find someone willing to
adopt the child. (Sarah M., at p. 1649.)
       “Usually, the fact that a prospective adoptive parent has
expressed interest in adopting the minor is evidence that the
minor’s age, physical condition, mental state, and other matters
relating to the child are not likely to dissuade individuals from
adopting the minor.” (Sarah M., supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1649-1650.) However, if a child’s age, poor physical health,
physical disability, or emotional instability suggests that the
child will have a difficult time finding someone willing to adopt
the child, the child may nevertheless be considered adoptable if

                                11
“a prospective adoptive family has been identified as willing to
adopt the child.” (Id. at p. 1650.)
       If a child is found to be generally adoptable, “the
availability of prospective adoptive parents” is “irrelevant” and
the juvenile court need not inquire into the suitability of a
particular placement. (Carl R., supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1062.) “When a child is deemed adoptable only because a
particular caretaker is willing to adopt, the analysis shifts from
evaluating the characteristics of the child to whether there is any
legal impediment to the prospective adoptive parent’s adoption
and whether he or she is able to meet the needs of the child.” (In
re Helen W. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 71, 80.)
       The law does not require the juvenile court to find a
dependent child “generally adoptable” or “specifically adoptable”
before terminating parental rights. (In re A.A. (2008) 167
Cal.App.4th 1292, 1313.) All that is required is clear and
convincing evidence of the likelihood that the child will be
adopted within a reasonable time. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re
Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 406 (Zeth S.).)
       In reviewing the juvenile court’s adoptability finding, “‘we
determine whether the record contains substantial evidence from
which a reasonable trier of fact could find clear and convincing
evidence that [the child] was likely to be adopted within a
reasonable time.’” (In re Gregory A. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1554,
1561-1562.) “We give the court’s finding of adoptability the
benefit of every reasonable inference and resolve any evidentiary
conflicts in favor of affirming.” (Id. at p. 1562.)
III. The adoptability finding was supported by
       substantial evidence
       The issue here concerns whether the juvenile court had
sufficient evidence to support its finding that the children were

                                12
generally adoptable. Father argues that the evidence was lacking
because the children have certain limiting physical and mental
conditions, and the original prospective adoptive parents later
decided not to adopt them. “When reviewing a finding that a fact
has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question
before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole
contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder
could have found it highly probable that the fact was true,” giving
deference to the trial court’s evidentiary findings.
(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011-1012.) After
reviewing the record, we conclude that the court’s finding was
supported by clear and convincing evidence.
      First, the children’s ages do not provide grounds for finding
they were not generally adoptable. Ah. was eight years old, Asa.
was seven years old, Am. and Asi. were five years old, and Mi.
was three years old. Father fails to identify any evidence in the
record that shows their ages will make it difficult for any of the
children to be adopted. Additionally, in In re Elise K. (1982) 33
Cal.3d 138, a 10-year-old was considered to be at the “turning
point” of adoptability. Since all the children here were under 10,
and short of the “turning point,” their ages do not present a lack
of substantial evidence of their adoptability.
      Second, father also fails to identify any evidence showing
each child had substantial mental or physical conditions that
would prevent them from forming loving, trusting relationships
with potential adoptive parents. Eight-year-old Ah. needed
treatment for a physical ailment that caused her to walk on her
toes. Asa., age seven, has asthma, a hard time focusing, and
issues with his motor and personal skills. The five-year-old twins,
Am. and Asi. have asthma, heart murmurs, developmental

                                13
delays, and are in therapy. Mi., age three, has asthma and
developmental delays.
      Disabilities alone are “not a bar to adoptability.” (In re J.W.
(2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 263, 265.) “Very few children in the
dependency system are without problems.” (Id. at p. 268.) No
evidence in the record shows it will be difficult to find someone
willing to adopt these children based on their physical and
emotional needs.
      On the contrary, the record contains ample evidence from
which a reasonable fact finder could find it probable that the
children are likely to be adopted within a reasonable time. They
are young and their physical, behavioral, and mental health
needs had improved by the time of the hearing. Therefore, their
particular needs did not take them out of the realm of being
“generally adoptable.”
      Third, the juvenile court had evidence that Mr. and Ms. G.
wanted to adopt the children. “[A] prospective adoptive parent’s
willingness to adopt generally indicates the minor is likely to be
adopted within a reasonable time either by the prospective
adoptive parent or by some other family.” (Sarah M., supra, 22
Cal.App.4th at p. 1650.) This willingness to adopt by Mr. And
Ms. G. provided the court with sufficient evidence to support its
finding that the children were generally adoptable.
      Despite father’s argument that the finding was in error
because, after the December 2021 hearing, the caregivers, Mr.
and Ms. G., decided not to adopt the children, that fact does not
undermine the court’s finding of adoptability. As noted above,
when a child is generally adoptable, the juvenile court need not
inquire into the suitability of a particular placement. (Carl R.,
supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 1062.) All that is required is clear
and convincing evidence of the likelihood that the child will be

                                 14
adopted within a reasonable time. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); Zeth S.,
supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 406.)
       Based on the evidence here, including the children’s ages,
physical and mental conditions, and the interest of the
prospective adoptive parents, we conclude that the juvenile
court’s finding of adoptability was supported by substantial
evidence.
IV. Postjudgment facts do not completely undermine the
       adoptability finding
       Father also argues the failure of the adoptive placement
following the December 2021 hearing is grounds to reverse
because it completely undermines the juvenile court’s findings.
Given the general rule that “an appeal reviews the correctness of
a judgment as of the time of its rendition, upon a record of
matters which were before the trial court for its consideration,”
we must disagree with father. (Zeth S., supra, 31 Cal.4th at
p. 405.)
       The trial court decides questions of fact, and the appellate
court decides questions of law. (Zeth S., supra, 31 Cal.4th at
p. 405.) Review of juvenile dependency orders is governed by
generally applicable rules of appellate procedure, with proper
deference paid to the factual findings and uncontested rulings of
the juvenile court, with all appropriate inferences to be drawn in
favor of the judgment below. (Ibid.)
       Therefore, “consideration of postjudgment evidence of
changed circumstances in an appeal of an order terminating
parental rights, and the liberal use of such evidence to reverse
juvenile court judgments and remand cases for new hearings,
would violate both the generally applicable rules of appellate
procedure, and the express provisions of section 366.26 which
strictly circumscribe the timing and scope of review of

                                15
termination orders, for the very purpose of expediting the
proceedings and promoting the finality of the juvenile court’s
orders and judgment.” (Zeth S., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 413.)
       It is only in rare and compelling cases that postjudgment
evidence may completely undermine the juvenile court’s
judgment under review, such as occurred in In re B.D. (2019) 35
Cal.App.5th 803. There, the mother asked the appellate court to
consider additional evidence on appeal that the prospective
adoptive parents had a history of criminal behavior and sexual
abuse and that the child was physically abused and afraid of
several people in the household, information that undermined the
trial court’s finding that the child was specifically adoptable by
these parents because the child had high-needs and a history of
mental instability that had to be managed with a regimen of
psychotropic medication and intensive therapy. The court had
found that the prospective parents understood the child’s
challenging circumstances and were committed to adopting him.
On appeal, the parties stipulated that evidence after the
termination of the parental rights undermined the juvenile
court’s findings that the child was likely to be adopted. Based on
both the newly obtained information concerning the prospective
adoptive parents and the parties’ stipulation, the Court of Appeal
reversed and remanded with instructions for the juvenile court to
obtain updated information whether the child was likely to be
adopted within a reasonable time.
       The postjudgment evidence offered by father does not
undermine the trial court’s order under review. The juvenile
court found the five children were generally adoptable, and the
failure of the specific adoptive placement immediately after the
hearing does not prove otherwise.

                               16
       The evidence below shows that none of these children are
high-needs, require a regimen of medication or intensive therapy,
or have any other condition that makes them unlikely to be
adopted. Although the children are not without problems, they
are receiving and responding to services. The current caregivers
have expressed a desire to obtain legal permanency or adoption
for three of the children. Therefore, the postjudgment evidence
does not completely undermine the trial court’s finding that the
children are likely to be adopted.

                         DISPOSITION
     The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                    ________________________
                                    CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

________________________
LUI, P. J.

________________________
ASHMANN-GERST, J.

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