Court Opinion

ID: 9674410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:28:16.601126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:27.503246
License: Public Domain

On Application for Rehearing.
HARWOOD, Justice.
In brief in support of appellant’s (wife’s) application for rehearing, counsel has pointed out that a reversal and remandment of the judgment might well result in denying counsel for appellant an attorney’s fee for representing Mrs. Watson in the proceedings below in the event no further proceedings are had.
The original bill was filed by the appellee-husband: While the appellant filed a cross bill, the decree of divorce was awarded on the husband's amended bill. Under these circumstances counsel for the appellant-wife was, in the discretion of the court, entitled to be awarded a reasonable *430attorney’s fee for his representation of the wife. Penn v. Penn, 246 Ala. 104, 19 So.2d 353, and cases cited therein.
In its decree the lower court adjudged:
“4. That the said Mack W. Watson pay into Court the sum of $2,250 as full settlement of all claims of said Berta Louise Watson against him and that, of this sum, the sum of $500 be paid Hon. Walter Knabe as his solicitor’s fee hereunto pertaining.”
Since the lump sum award of alimony of $2,250 is rendered nugatory with the reversal of the decree, it would appear to be sounder to remand the matter of the amount of solicitor’s fee to he awarded the solicitor for the appellant to the lower court for further consideration. In other words, since the solicitor’s fee was carved out of the lump sum award, the lower court may have fixed the amount in the background of the lump sum award, whereas without such background the amount of the solicitor’s fee may have been fixed at a higher, or lower, figure than that arrived at by the court under the circumstances.
On original submission no request for a solicitor’s fee for prosecuting this appeal was requested. This matter was therefore not before us. Since further proceedings are yet open in the lower court, we will not now award a solicitor’s fee to counsel for appellant in connection with this appeal. However, we are clear to the conclusion that the solicitor for the appellant is entitled to a fee for his services to be determined by the lower court.
Counsel has argued other points in support of the application for rehearing. These matters were considered in our original opinion and we adhere to our original views.
Opinion extended, application overruled.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and LAWSON, GOODWYN, MERRILL and COLEMAN, JJ-, concur.