Court Opinion

ID: 9777789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:24:17.163747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:01.682854
License: Public Domain

SAM BASS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to the majority’s disposition of the chain of custody problem.
At the outset, I must emphasize that I can find no authority in Texas that squarely addresses the chain of custody issue in the context presented. However, I feel that issue must not be sidestepped.
The necessary predicate for the admission of tape recordings is outlined as follows: (1) a showing that the recording de*152vice was capable of taking testimony; (2) a showing that the operator of the device was competent; (3) the establishment of the authenticity and correctness of the recording; (4) a showing that changes, additions, or deletions have not been made; (5) a showing of the manner of the 'preservation of the recording; (6) the identification of the speakers; and (7) a showing that the testimony elicited was voluntarily made without any kind of inducement. Edwards v. State, 551 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex.Crim. App.1977). Reasonably strict adherence to the seven requirements is required for admission of sound recordings, and their admission is discretionary with the trial court. Id.
The Edwards requirements do not mean, however, that any alteration in a tape renders the tape per se inadmissible. Qui-nones v. State, 592 S.W.2d 933, 944 (Tex. Crim.App.1980). If the alteration is accidental and is sufficiently explained so that its presence does not affect the reliability and trustworthiness of the evidence, the recording can still be admitted. Id.
In the instant case, there was an attempt to explain or account for the gaps or alterations in the tapes; however, the controlling issue in this case is the chain of custody problem.
In Elliott v. State, 681 S.W.2d 98, 103 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984), affd., 687 S.W.2d 359 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), the seven requirements for the admissibility of tape recordings were met because, among other things, there was testimony that the tapes were locked in an evidence locker and remained in police custody precluding any changes, additions, or deletions and that the tapes remained in the locker until the day of the trial. See also Hoover v. State, 707 S.W.2d 144, 147 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no pet.). In Easley v. State, 472 S.W.2d 128 (Tex.Crim. App.1971), a break in the chain of custody mandated reversal. In that case, the evidence in question, marihuana, was mailed to the Department of Public Safety in Austin by mistake and then forwarded to the lab in Dallas. The chemist could not testify as to whether the package was opened in Austin and there was no evidence as to what happened to the evidence while it was in Austin. Further compounding the break in the chain of custody, the sheriff who had first acquired the evidence could not make a positive identification of the marihuana. There was a period when the evidence was in the control of unknown persons, and there was no evidence that these persons had not opened the package containing the evidence.
It is self-evident that tape recordings are not readily identifiable as the original version and are peculiarly susceptible to alteration, tampering,- and selective editing. United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112, 121 (3rd Cir.1975). Because proffer of such evidence may, in the particularized circumstances of a given case, involve one or more of these problems in varying degrees it is difficult to lay down a uniform standard for the admission of a tape recording, equally applicable to all eases. Id. The regularity which attaches to the handling of evidence within the control of public officials will not overcome the chain of custody problem. Id. at 122.
Officer Scalia testified that it would be a breach of TCPD policy for someone to take the tapes home with them, and he further testified that the prosecutor, Assistant District Attorney Clark, did not tell him where he was taking the tapes. Clark testified that he kept the tapes for one to two weeks at his home and office, in the presence of third parties, and failed to take requisite precautions to safeguard them. Clark admitted that he did not know that tapes could be magnetically erased, that while the tapes were at his office, they were on top of his desk where third parties could have had access to them, and that he failed to request that special safeguards be taken with respect to the tapes by Assistant District Attorney Burris with whom he shared that office. There is also some evidence that Clark may have tampered with the original tapes in the process of duplicating them and producing “cleaned up” copies. There is no evidence when the tapes were *153returned to the police department. The tapes were offered into evidence at the second hearing on the motion to suppress on July 8, 1985.
Such an unorthodox chain of events is clearly what a properly maintained chain of custody is designed to prevent and provides the basis for Officer Scalia’s testimony that tapes would be unreliable once removed from the police department. My colleagues argue that if discrepancies in the tapes are sufficiently explained, the requirement of an unbroken chain of custody is satisfied. I disagree. It is my opinion that chain of custody and alteration are two separate issues; satisfaction of the former is the threshold requirement.
The preservation of a proper chain of custody is even more imperative here because of the nature of the offense charged — any renunciation on the part of appellant or instigation on the part of Garcia would have been probative. Appellant’s testimony that he renounced the plan towards the end of the last tape is in fact corroborated by his subsequent conduct in eventually leaving Woods in the parking lot while approaching and entering Garcia’s apartment alone.
I agree with appellant that in these circumstances, the State had ample means, without the tapes, to relate the substance of the overheard conversations through the recollection of Garcia and the attending police officers.
Appellant put the State on notice that he questioned the tapes’ authenticity. “If there is a presumption of regularity it cannot in these circumstances substitute for evidence or shift to [appellant] the burden of disproving authenticity.” United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d at 122.
It is my opinion that the State has failed to meet the predicate set forth in Edwards v. State by failing to establish the proper and adequate chain of custody.
I would reverse the judgment and remand the cause for a new trial.