Court Opinion

ID: 9893778
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-30 17:03:55.077912+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:29.690973
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/30/23 P. v. Mendiola CA6
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          H050488
                                                                     (Santa Clara County
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                  Super. Ct. No. CC933529)

           v.

 LEONCIO RAMON MENDIOLA,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         In exchange for a stipulated sentence of 19 years in prison, defendant Leoncio
Ramon Mendiola pleaded no contest to attempted murder and admitted a firearm use
allegation. In his previous appeal, a panel of this court remanded the matter to allow him
to request resentencing based on an ameliorative change in the law that took effect after
he was sentenced. On remand in 2022, the trial court denied his request. He argues in
this second appeal that reversal is again required based on a different change in the law
that took effect before the 2022 resentencing. For the reasons we explain here, we will
affirm the judgment.
                                               I.     BACKGROUND
         Our recitation of the facts is largely reproduced from our earlier opinion in
case Nos. H047240 and H047983. (People v. Mendiola (Jan. 4, 2022, H047240,
H047983) [nonpub. opn.].) (We have taken judicial notice of those cases at defendant’s
request.) Defendant was charged by information with attempted murder (Pen. Code,
§§ 187, 664) and shooting at an occupied vehicle (Pen. Code, § 246; unspecified statutory
references are to this code.) As to both felonies, the information alleged defendant
personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), and
personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (b)). He was also charged with
one misdemeanor count of exhibiting a firearm (§ 417, subd. (a)(2)). According to the
probation report, the charges stemmed from defendant shooting the driver of a vehicle in
the head, which caused partial paralysis.
       As part of a negotiated disposition, the prosecution amended the information to
remove the firearm discharge allegation and its 25-years-to-life sentencing enhancement
(§12022.53, subd. (d)) and instead alleged that defendant personally used a firearm
(§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), which carries a 10-year enhancement. Defendant pleaded no
contest to attempted murder and admitted using a firearm during that offense. He agreed
to serve 19 years in prison, consisting of the upper term of nine years for attempted
murder plus 10 years consecutive for the firearm use enhancement. He also agreed to
waive 365 days of presentence custody credit. The trial court sentenced defendant in
2014 consistent with the parties’ agreement, including dismissing the remaining charges
and special allegations.
       Representing himself, defendant petitioned for resentencing in 2019, contending
that he was entitled to the ameliorative sentencing change in Senate Bill No. 620 (2017–
2018 Reg. Sess.), which gave trial courts discretion to strike formerly mandatory firearm
use enhancements. After the trial court denied the petition because defendant’s judgment
became final in 2014 without a timely notice of appeal, defendant appealed and requested
relief from default. This court granted defendant’s request, considered the appeal, and
remanded the matter to allow him to renew his petition for resentencing under Senate Bill
No. 620.
       In August 2022, defendant pursued the requested resentencing in the trial court,
this time represented by counsel. His trial court filing in support of resentencing
referenced Senate Bill No. 620 and the Legislature’s “changes to Penal Code
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Section[s] 1385, 1016.7, 1016.8, 1170(b), 1170.1 and other parts of the Penal Code to
make it clear that in plea bargaining and sentencing the district attorney and the court are
to seek out rehabilitative measures for almost any defendant.” He further states that the
filing was “written with the above changes in mind.” Counsel asked “the court and the
district attorney” to “agree to a lesser punishment” for defendant and suggested three
ways of achieving that outcome: (1) reinstating the waived 365 days of presentence
custody credit, (2) resentencing defendant to the lower term of five years or the middle
term of seven years for attempted murder, and (3) striking the firearm use enhancement
or imposing a lesser enhancement in its place. In a written opposition to defendant’s
request for resentencing, the prosecution stated it would not “renegotiate the sentence and
agree to the above propositions.” Following a hearing in September 2022, the trial court
declined to exercise its discretion to strike the firearm use enhancement and ordered that
the original sentence would remain.
                                    II.   DISCUSSION
       Defendant argues the judgment must be reversed and the matter remanded for
resentencing so he can receive the benefit of Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)
and its amendments to section 1170. When defendant was originally sentenced in 2014,
trial courts had broad discretion under former section 1170, subdivision (b) to select the
appropriate term for offenses having a prescribed sentencing triad. Following Senate Bill
No. 567, which took effect on January 1, 2022, trial courts are now generally required to
select the middle or lower term (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1)) and may impose an upper term
“only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition
of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and the facts underlying those
circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(2).) Further, where any of several enumerated circumstances “was a
contributing factor in the commission of the offense,” the sentencing court must impose
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the lower term unless it finds “that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances [and] imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of
justice.” (§1170, subd. (b)(6).) As relevant here, among the specified factors is that the
defendant was under 26 years old at the time of the offense. (§1170, subd. (b)(6)(B);
§1016.7, subd. (b).)
       The parties correctly agree that the ameliorative sentencing change in Senate Bill
No. 567 applies retroactively under the reasoning of In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740.
But the Attorney General contends that defendant forfeited his right to raise the issue on
appeal, because the bill was already in effect at the time defendant requested resentencing
and defendant did not object on that basis to reimposition of the upper term at the
hearing. Defendant does not dispute that the forfeiture rule would apply if he had failed
to request resentencing under amended section 1170, subdivision (b), but argues that
defense counsel’s brief in support of resentencing did contain such a request.
       We agree that forfeiture applies to the record here. (See People v. Anderson
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233, 242, rev. granted Apr. 19, 2023, S278786; People v. Flowers
(2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 680, 683–684, rev. granted Oct. 12, 2022, S276237.) “Although
the court is required to impose sentence in a lawful manner, counsel is charged with
understanding, advocating, and clarifying permissible sentencing choices at the hearing.”
(People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353.) And, as this court indicated in People v.
Todd (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 373, 381–382, rev. granted Apr. 26, 2023, S279154 (Todd),
a defendant who received a stipulated sentence to an upper term before the enactment of
Senate Bill No. 567 (and whose case is not yet final) should be free to choose whether to
waive or invoke the requirements of amended section 1170, subdivision (b). It logically
follows that a defendant who does not invoke those provisions in the trial court when
given the opportunity to do so forfeits the right to raise the issue on appeal.
       Although defendant asserts he did invoke Senate Bill No. 567 in his request for
resentencing, we do not read his trial court pleadings as containing such a reference.
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Senate Bill No. 567 is not specifically mentioned among the legislative changes he cited.
The filing contains a section under the heading “The Importance of Penal Code
Sections 1170(b) and 1170.1” which merely appears to quote section 1170 verbatim
without any argument or analysis. The only other reference to section 1170 is its
inclusion in a non-exhaustive list of Penal Code sections authorizing trial courts to
dismiss or strike enhancements in the interest of justice. The document’s concluding
section asks the trial court and the district attorney to “agree to a lesser punishment”
possibly including, among other proposed options, a sentence of five years or seven years
for attempted murder “instead of the aggravated term” originally imposed. But that
request cannot fairly be read as suggesting that defendant’s original sentence did not meet
the requirements of amended section 1170, subdivision (b) or that defendant was
invoking any of those requirements.
       Our reading of defendant’s filing in the trial court is consistent with defense
counsel’s argument at the hearing. As defendant concedes on appeal, counsel did not
expressly object to reimposition of the upper term as being unlawful under section 1170,
subdivision (b) as amended. In fact, counsel asked the court to “be creative” and
suggested “certain possibilities” for resentencing—one being a sentence to the middle
term of seven years for attempted murder. When the court emphasized that counsel’s call
for “creativity” could nullify the negotiated disposition and result in a worse outcome for
defendant, counsel acknowledged the decision in People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685
(Stamps), and suggested “a plea bargain with the People” to include an alternative
weapons enhancement or other sentence reduction as a potential solution. The prosecutor
then spoke in opposition to defendant’s request for resentencing, and the court denied the
request without further argument from defendant.
       We acknowledge that defendant was 21 years old at the time of his 2008 offense,
and that amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b) could be relevant to his sentence.
But we conclude on this record that defendant forfeited his primary appellate contention
                                              5
by not invoking those amendments in the trial court, and we therefore address his
alternative argument that counsel’s failure to object on those grounds constituted
ineffective assistance.
       To establish ineffectiveness of trial counsel in violation of the right to counsel
under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a defendant must show
both deficient performance by counsel and prejudice from the deficiency. (People v.
Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216–217.) Deficient performance is rarely shown if there
was a tactical reason for trial counsel’s conduct. (See People v. Bolin (1998)
18 Cal.4th 297, 317 [affirming conviction where alleged failure to object may have been
“ ‘an informed tactical choice within the range of reasonable competence’ ”]; People v.
Cruz (1980) 26 Cal.3d 233, 255–256 [“except in rare cases, an appellate court should not
attempt to second-guess trial counsel as to tactics”].)
       The Attorney General argues that counsel could not have been ineffective in
failing to invoke Senate Bill No. 567 because defendant’s stipulation to an upper-term
sentence divested the trial court of sentencing discretion and rendered the new law
irrelevant in this case. We disagree for the reasons explained in Todd, supra,
88 Cal.App.5th at pp. 377–381. As the Legislature has declared in section 1016.8,
subdivision (b)(1): “The California Supreme Court held in Doe v. Harris (2013)
57 Cal.4th 64 that, as a general rule, plea agreements are deemed to incorporate the
reserve power of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws for the public good
and in pursuance of public policy. That the parties enter into a plea agreement does not
have the effect of insulating them from changes in the law that the Legislature has
intended to apply to them.” Senate Bill No. 567 would therefore apply notwithstanding
defendant’s stipulation to an upper term, but defendant must still satisfy his burden of
establishing counsel’s deficient performance.
       Defendant makes only the conclusory assertion that a “reasonably competent
attorney would have objected to the upper term because an objection could only inure to
                                              6
appellant’s benefit.” Yet defendant also devotes a significant portion of his appellate
brief to seeking a remedy that would prohibit a sentence of more than 19 years on
remand. Defendant’s argument implicitly acknowledges the risk that challenging the
reimposition of the upper term could result in a harsher sentence, as the California
Supreme Court explained in Stamps, where the defendant pleaded guilty in exchange for
a specified sentence and then invoked an ameliorative sentencing change on appeal.
(Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th 685 at p. 692.) The Supreme Court held that although Stamps
was entitled to seek the benefit of the new law, the trial court could not unilaterally
modify the plea agreement and so would have to rescind its approval of the agreement in
order for Stamps to pursue the relief he sought. (Id., at pp. 707–708.) This court has
since reached a similar conclusion concerning Senate Bill No. 567 in Todd, supra,
88 Cal.App.5th at pp. 381–382.
       In advocating for resentencing, defense counsel was expressly cognizant of the
Stamps decision and its possible significance—he discussed it in his brief to the trial
court and at the hearing, where he told the court he was “thinking about the Stamps case
in the back of [his] head.” Although counsel did not specifically invoke the requirements
of amended section 1170, subdivision (b), he was also aware of those requirements, as he
noted at the hearing that an upper term would not be appropriate “under our current
system” because there were “no aggravators agreed to.” We recognize the possibility that
counsel, though aware of Senate Bill No. 567, mistakenly believed it would not apply
retroactively; but the record reveals another, likelier possibility: counsel reasonably
believed in light of Stamps, and because there were “no aggravators agreed to” or found
true by a factfinder as required under Senate Bill No. 567, that invoking the new law
would risk nullification of the plea agreement and reinstatement of the original charges.
Significantly, those charges included a firearm discharge allegation carrying a penalty of
25 years to life. (§12022.53, subd. (d).)

                                              7
       The arguments made in the trial court by defense counsel, both in writing and at
the hearing, suggest that he was attempting to advocate for a lesser sentence while
avoiding the possibility of a negative outcome for his client. Specifically, he attempted to
gauge the willingness of the prosecution and the trial court to accept a reformulated plea
agreement—an approach contemplated by the Supreme Court in Stamps, supra,
9 Cal.5th at p. 707. After the prosecutor firmly expressed unwillingness to renegotiate
and the trial court indicated its apparent agreement with defense counsel’s interpretation
of Stamps, counsel did not at that point object to reimposition of the original sentence.
This record thus supports the conclusion that counsel made an informed tactical choice
not to object on Senate Bill No. 567 grounds. To the extent defendant means to suggest
that he was not properly advised about Senate Bill No. 567, or that counsel’s actions were
not consistent with his wishes at the time, such claims are more appropriately raised in a
habeas corpus proceeding. (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266–267.)
                                   III.   DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

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                               ____________________________________
                               Grover, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________
Greenwood, P. J.

____________________________
Lie, J.

H050488
People v. Mendiola