Court Opinion

ID: 9743487
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:34:39.545102+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:41.560818
License: Public Domain

PRENTICE, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent.
The majority has said “This case presents the same set of facts we faced in McKinley v. State, * * * where we affirmed the conviction of two counts of armed robbery under circumstances such as this.” However the factual situations are not the same, although the confusion is quite understandable. It is unfortunate, although inevitable, that through the over-burdening work load that we face, inartful language sometimes creeps into an opinion and makes the decision appear to be premised upon a theory other than that intended. Such is the case with McKinley which was decided correctly but, I believe, not upon the theory which the opinion would lead one to believe.
In McKinley, we unfortunately spoke of robbery of a “business establishment.” Now, there can be no such thing as a robbery of a business establishment. A theft may be perpetrated against a business establishment, as may a burglary; but by definition, a robbery may not. “A person who * * * takes property from another person : * * *; commits robbery, * * Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1.
McKinley was charged with the robbery of two persons and was convicted of the robbery of two persons, although the opinion referred to one of the robberies as the “robbery of that business.” Specifically, McKinley committed one robbery when he took the business establishment’s property from the proprietor’s wife and he committed another robbery when he took the proprietor’s personal belongings from him.
Our concern with “business establishment” and ownership of the property taken appears to spring from Williams v. State, (1979) Ind., 395 N.E.2d 239, decided only a short time before McKinley and fresh in our minds. In that case, Williams had committed what is commonly referred to as bank robbery. Actually, he took bank money from each of four different tellers in one branch bank at the same time. The issue was whether one or four robberies had been committed. Recognizing that under the strict wording of the statute, four robberies had been committed, we, nevertheless, also recognized the injustice inherent in a literal interpretation of the statute and elected to follow a line of federal cases and applied the “rule of lenity.”
“Under bank robbery statutes and more general criminal laws, the federal courts have applied the ‘rule of lenity’ as provided in Bell v. United States, (1955) 349 U.S. 81, 75 S.Ct. 620, 99 L.Ed. 905, where the Supreme Court held that:
‘[i]t may fairly be said to a presupposition of our law to resolve doubts in the enforcement of a penal code against the imposition of a harsher punishment.’ 349 U.S. at 83, 75 S.Ct. at 622, 99 L.Ed. at 910.” 395 N.E.2d at 248.
Elsewhere in the opinion references were made to the robbery of a business and distinctions were made premised upon the ownership of the property taken in the robberies.
In at least three opinions subsequent to Williams, we have applied the rule of Williams although not referring to it as a “rule of lenity.” Allen v. State, (1981) Ind., 428 N.E.2d 1237; Lane v. State, (1981) Ind., 428 N.E.2d 28; Rogers v. State, (1979) Ind., 396 N.E.2d 348. In at least five other subse*768quent opinions we have distinguished Williams, upon the basis that the property taken from multiple victims belonged to multiple persons or entities. McKinley v. State, supra; Ferguson v. State, (1980) Ind., 405 N.E.2d 902; Young v. State, (1980) Ind., 409 N.E.2d 579; Hatcher v. State, (1980) Ind., 410 N.E.2d 1187; Duvall v. State, (1981) Ind., 415 N.E.2d 718.
This focus upon ownership, however, has caused considerable confusion. For example, in Hatcher v. State, supra, this writer, for a unanimous court, erroneously referred to the robbery of the “business establishment,” although it was clear that the robbery was of Grace Nooe, an employee of the business establishment and from whom business establishment property was taken.
A similar inartful phraseology appears in Duvall v. State, supra :
“On May 8, 1978, the Hooks Pharmacy in Southport was robbed. Two males entered the store and took money from the cashier and from a customer.” Id. at 719.
The victims of the two robberies were the customer and the cashier; not the customer and the pharmacy.
The rule, which has been consistently applied though not always stated, is that where property taken in a criminal transaction belongs to more than one entity, there is one count of robbery for each person who is threatened with force, or placed in fear, and from whom property is thereby taken. The Court of Appeals correctly divined this rule from our cases despite our imprecise language.
Upon the facts of this case, the principle which emerged from Williams turns into a bane having no relationship to personal security, which is the interest which the Robbery statute seeks to protect.
The majority opinion is not supported by Williams and its progeny. Williams must be limited in its application as a rule of lenity, i.e. to reduce the number of crimes which could conceivably be charged under the literal wording of a statute. Its application to the case at bar, clearly results in increasing the number of charges beyond the number ascertainable under the statute.
Although Ruby Lewis had both her own property and her employer’s property taken from her by being put in fear, she was put in fear only once although undoubtedly it was a continuing state. Under the majority opinion, one who took, by threat of the custodian, the contents of an armored car would be guilty of as many robberies as there were owners of the contents; whereas under Williams, one who takes the property of one owner from several custodians (bank tellers) by putting each in fear, commits but one robbery. This incongruity cannot stand.
Criminal statutes are to be strictly construed against the State and in favor of a defendant where construction is necessary. Short v. State, (1954) 234 Ind. 17, 22, 122 N.E.2d 82. It is permissible, as in Williams, to depart from a strict construction of the statute when we believe that the Legislature could not have intended the harsh results ebbing from the letter of its law. It is not permissible, however to depart therefrom, in order to render the act more harsh. Here, by misconstruction of a rule adopted for leniency, the majority has found two crimes where the language of the statute declares but one.
Defendant committed but two crimes and is being punished for three. This clearly is a violation of his rights under both the state and federal constitutions against double jeopardy.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court as to two counts but reverse as to the third and remand the cause with instructions to vacate one sentence.
HUNTER, J., concurs.