Court Opinion

ID: 9548157
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:58:29.836592+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:32.959817
License: Public Domain

RABINOWITZ, Justice
(concurring).
On three prior occasions this court has had the opportunity to construe Civ.R. 58.1
In Vogt v. Winbauer,2 after a trial by jury, the following notation was made in the civil docket of the superior court:
Enter Judgment on Jury Verdict #1 — ■ in favor of Pltf [appellee] in amt of $34,492.00 — pursuant to rule 58, civil procedure per Courts [sic] Instruction.
Under the provisions of Civ.R. 58, and in light of the docket entry, this court held that the “thirty-day period within which notice of appeal had to be given * * * commenced to run on * * * the date upon which the judgment upon the verdict was noted by the clerk in the civil docket.”3
The case of McCoy v. Alaska Brick Co.4 involved an issue as to the timeliness of a *988motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.5 After the jury had returned its verdict the clerk made the following notation:
Filed Verdict #1 pltf recover from deft. $10,400.00.
Some six days later a formal judgment was filed. At this time the clerk made the notation “Filed Judgment” in the civil docket.6 It was held that
In this case the clerk’s * * * notation ‘Filed Verdict #1 * * *’ was a notation that r verdict was returned and filed. It was not a notation of a judgment, for the reason that it said nothing about a judgment. Judgment was not entered until the clerk made the notation in the docket ‘Filed Judgment’ on November 15, 1962. The 10-day period for moving for judgment notwithstanding the verdict started running from that date.7
Prior to the case at bar, the only instance in which this court was called upon to construe Civ.R. 58 in a nonjury case occurred in In re Mountain View Public Util. Dist. No. I.8 In its opinion this court wrote:
Wood’s appeal was taken from the March 4, 1960 order denying the motion for reconsideration, and the receiver argues that this was not a ‘judgment’ from which an appeal could be taken under Rule 6. That is the generally accepted doctrine. The appeal ought to have been taken from the memorandum opinion of February 19, I960 which, although not formally a judgment and so labeled, will be considered as such here because it clearly evidences the judge’s intent to presently and finally dispose of the motion to void the receivership. (Emphasis furnished.) 9
This was the state of our precedents until the decision in the case at bar. I have doubts as to whether today’s opinion will clarify for the practitioner questions aris*989ing under Civ.R. 58. In light of these four precedents we now have construing Civ.R. 58, I think that a party, or his attorney, faces a potential dilemma in deciding whether or not to rely on a given docket entry or upon the trial “judge’s intent.”
For instance, in the case at har we hold that only that portion of the August 10, 1965, appeal is timely which relates to the July 28, 1965, order denying appellant’s Civ. R. 60(b) motion. Yet the record discloses that appellant’s Civ.R. 60(b) motion came before the lower court for hearing on June 25, 1965, at which time the trial court denied the motion. The clerk’s docket entry for June 25, 1965, reads “Hearing on Pltf’s Motion to Vacate Stipulation and Set for Trial by Jury (Denied).” It thus appears arguable that appellant’s August 10, 1965, notice of appeal was not timely under Supreme Ct. R. 7 if June 25, 1965, is viewed as the pertinent date for appeal purposes. To reach the conclusion that the lower court’s order of July 28, 1965, denying appellant’s Rule 60(b) motion is the crucial order, it is necessary to interpret the June 25, 1965, proceedings as tantamount to a withholding by the trial judge of a Civ.R. 58 direction to the clerk to enter judgment.10
I am of the opinion that adoption of the 1963 amendment to Rule 58, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, would, to a large extent, decrease the existing uncertainties in this area. In 1963, Fed.R.Civ.P. 58 was amended to read as follows:
Subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b) : (1) upon a general verdict of a jury, or upon a decision by the court that a party shall recover only a sum certain or costs or that all relief shall be denied, the clerk, unless the court otherwise orders, shall forthwith prepare, sign, and enter the judgment without awaiting any direction by the court; (2) upon a decision by the court granting other relief, or upon a special verdict or a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories, the court shall promptly approve the form of the judgment, and the clerk shall thereupon enter it. Every judgment shall be set forth on a separate document. A judgment is effective only when so set forth and when entered as provided in Rule 79(a). Entry of the judgment shall not be delayed for the taxing of costs. Attorneys shall not submit forms of judgment except upon direction of the court, and these directions shall not be given as a matter of course.11
*990Since this court has concluded that a consent judgment is normally not subject to appellate review (i. e. the dismissal of appellant’s complaint) unless a Rule 60(h) motion had been made to set it aside on the grounds of fraud, mistake, lack of consent, ■et cetera, I concur in the result reached by the majority, for in the case at bar appellant has proceeded in precisely this manner.
I concur in the court’s conclusion as to the timeliness of the appeal from the trial court’s denial of appellant’s Civ.R. 60(b) motion.

.Civ.R. 58 provides :

ENTRY OF JUDGMENT.

Unless the court otherwise directs and subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the verdict of a jury shall be entered forthwith by the clerk; but the court shall direct the appropriate judgment to be entered upon a special verdict or upon a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories returned by a jury pursuant to Rule 49. When the court directs that a party recover only money or costs or that all relief be denied, the clerk shall enter judgment forthwith upon receipt by him of the direction; but when the court directs entry of judgment for other relief, the judge shall promptly settle or approve the form of the judgment and direct that it be entered by the clerk. The notation of a judgment in the civil docket as provided by Rule 74 constitutes the entry of the judgment ; and the judgment is not effective before such entry. In all cases the notation of the judgment in the civil docket shall be made at the earliest practicable time. The entry of the judgment shall not be delayed for the taxing of costs, but a blank space may be left in the form of judgment for insertion of costs by the clerk after they have been taxed.

. 376 P.2d 1007, 1008-1009 (Alaska 1962).

. Supreme Ct.R. 7 (a) provides, as to time, that an appeal shall be taken within “thirty (30) days from the entry of the judgment appealed from.” Note : Civ.R. 54(a) provides in part:
Judgment as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies.

. 389 P.2d 1009, 1010-1011 (Alaska 1964).

. Civ.R. 50(b) provides in part:
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the moving ■party may move not later than 10 days after the entry of judgment to have the verdict and any judgment entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his motion for a directed verdict * * *. (Emphasis furnished.)

. McCoy v. Alaska Brick Co., supra note 4, at 1010.

. In regard to the notation “Piled Judgment” made on November 15, 1962, compare Civ.R. 74(a) which requires that the clerk’s notations
be brief but shall show the nature of each paper filed or writ issued and the substance of each order or judgment of the court * * *.
Note: In 'reaching its decision in McCoy, supra note 4, this court in part relied on the case of Danzig v. Virgin Isle Hotel, Inc., 278 F.2d 580, 582 (3rd Cir. 1960).
In that ease the court wrote:
In a case indistinguishable on its facts from the present case, in that there had been a verdict followed by a notation on the docket that the vei'dict had been filed, this court held that no judgment had been entered. * * * There is sound reason for this holding. Since the running of time for motions after judgment and for appeal begins from the entry of judgment, such entry, though not necessarily in any particular forms of words, should be unambiguous on its face so that counsel or a party consulting the docket will have no reasonable basis for doubt as to the nature and effect of what has been done or as to the timeliness of further proceedings. (Emphasis furnished.)

. 359 P.2d 951, 954 (Alaska 1961). Although mentioned in Patrick v. Sedwick, 387 P.2d 294, 296 (Alaska 1963), Civ.R. 58 was not directly in issue.

. United States v. F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co., 356 U.S. 227, 232, 78 S.Ct. 674, 2 L.Ed.2d 721, 726 (1958), was cited in support of the conclusion that the “judge’s intent” is determinative. Note: The opinion In re Mountain View Public Util. Dist. No. 1, supra note 8, does not make reference to the content of any docket entries. Compare McCoy v. Alaska Brick Co., supra note 4; and Vogt v. Winbauer, supra note 2.

. Although the record is slightly ambiguous on this point, I am of the opinion that such a conclusion can reasonably be reached.
The transcript of the June 25, 1065, hearing discloses, in part, that after the trial judge denied the Rule 60(b) motion the following franspired:
MR. BOYKO: Your Honor, may a judgment be submitted in this case so that we have something to appeal from, or shall we prepare it or what is Your Honor’s desire?
THE COURT: If you desire, you may although the stipulation was and it’s clear on the record that both parties said that the stipulation on file and that the Court’s order — the motion and order dismissing it could be. If you desire to present a formal order dismissing it, it may be 8 * * it may be done so if. * ⅜ *
⅜ ⅜ * ⅜ »
THE COURT: Well, you may proceed as provided for under the rules, Mr. Boyko.
(Note: This exchange took jdace after considerable argument was heard concerning the prior dismissal of appellant’s complaint.)

. I am of the opinion that the Advisory Committee’s Note demonstrates with clarity the reasons for, and purposes of, the amendment. The Advisory Committee’s Note to this amendment states :
Under the present rule a distinction has sometimes been made between judgments on general jury verdicts, on the one hand, and, on the other, judgments upon decisions of the court that a party shall recover only money or costs or that all relief shall be denied. In the first situation, it is clear that the clerk should enter the judgment without awaiting a direction by the court unless the court other*990wise orders. In the second situation it was intended that the clerk should similarly enter the judgment forthwith upon the court’s decision; but because of the separate listing in the rule, and the use of the phrase ‘upon receipt * * * of the direction,’ the rule has sometimes been interpreted as requiring the'clerk to await a separate direction of the court. All these judgments are usually uncomplicated, and should be handled in the same way. The amended rule accordingly deals with them as a single group in clause (1) (substituting the expression ‘only a sum certain’ for the present expression ‘only money’), and requires the clerk to prepare, sign, and enter them forthwith, without awaiting court direction, unless the court makes a contrary order. (The clerk’s duty is ministerial and may be performed by a deputy clerk in the name of the clerk. See 2S U.S.C. § 956; cf. Gilbertson v. United States, 168 F. 672 (7th Cir. 1909).) The more complicated judgments described in clause (2) must be approved by the court before they are entered.
Rule 58 is designed to encourage all reasonable speed in formulating and entering the judgment when the case has been decided. Participation by the attorneys through the submission of forms of judgment involves needless expenditure of time and effort and promotes delay, except in special cases where counsel’s assistance can be of real value. See Matteson v. United States, 240 F.2d 517, 518-519 (2d Cir. 1956). Accordingly, the amended rule provides that attorneys shall not submit forms of judgment unless directed to do so by the court. This applies to the judgments mentioned in clause (2) as well as clause (1).
Hitherto some difficulty has arisen, chiefly where the court has written an opinion or memorandum containing some apparently directive or dispositive words, e. g., ‘the plaintiff’s motion [for summary judgment] is granted,’ see United States v. F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co., 356 U.S. 227, 229, 78 S.Ct. 674, 2 L.Ed. 2d 721 (1958). Clerks on occasion have viewed these opinions or memoranda as being in themselves a sufficient basis for entering judgment in the civil docket as provided by Rule 79(a). However, where the opinion or memorandum has not contained all the elements of a judgment, or where the judge has later signed a formal judgment, it has become a matter of doubt whether the purported entry of judgment was effective, starting the time running for post-verdict motions and for the purpose of appeal. See id.; ‘ and compare Blanchard v. Commonwealth Oil Co., 294 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1961) ; United States v. Higginson, 238 E.2d 439 (1st Cir. 1956) ; Danzig v. Virgin Isle Hotel, Inc., 278 F.2d 580 (3rd Cir. 1960) ; Sears v. Austin, 282 E.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1960), with Matteson v. United States, supra; Erstling v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 255 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 932, 79 S.Ct. 320, 3 L.Ed.2d 304 (1959) ; Beacon Fed. S. & L. Assn. v. Federal Home L. Bank Bd., 266 F.2d 246 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 823, 80 S.Ct. 70, 4 L.Ed.2d 67 (1959) ; Ram v. Paramount Film D. Corp., 278 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1960).
The amended rule eliminates these uncertainties by requiring that there be a judgment set out on a separate document — distinct from any opinion or memorandum — which provides the basis for the entry of judgment. That judgments shall be on separate documents is also indicated in Rule 79(b) ; and see General Rule 10 of the U. S. District Courts for the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York; Ram v. Paramount Film D. Corp., supra, at 194.
See the amendment of Rule 79(a) and the new specimen forms of judgment, Forms 31 and 32.
See also Rule 55(h) (1) and (2) covering the subject of judgments by default.