Court Opinion

ID: 9662330
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:05:58.518625+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:38.645009
License: Public Domain

DAVIDSON, Judge
(dissenting).
Art. 1191, P.C., denouncing the offense of abortion, reads as follows:
“If any person shall designedly administer to a pregnant woman or knowingly procure to be administered with her consent any drug or medicine, or shall use towards her any violence or means whatever externally or internally applied, and thereby procure an abortion, he shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than two nor more than five years; if it be done without her consent, the punishment shall be doubled. By ‘abortion’ is meant that the life of the fetus or embryo shall be destroyed in the woman’s womb or that a premature birth thereof be caused.”
I cannot agree that such statute does not create two offenses. One offense which the statute denounces is that of abortion produced with the consent of the female, with punishment affixed at not less than two nor more than five years’ confinement in the penitentiary; the other is where the abortion is produced without the consent of the female, to which the punishment af*218fixed is not less than four nor more than ten years’ confinement in the penitentiary. Such is the plain wording of the statute. No occasion arises to speculate as to what the statute says or as to what it means. Consent or want of consent is a constituent element of the two offenses, without which the crime of abortion under the statute does not exist.
Surely it will not be contended that the crime of abortion can be charged without an allegation that same was done with or without the consent of the female.
Mr. Willson, in his Texas Criminal Forms, Sec. 529, calls attention to the fact that an indictment for abortion should allege consent or want of consent of the female in order to charge one with the crime.
The indictment returned by the grand jury of Nolan County in this case charged that appellant produced an abortion upon the alleged female without her consent. It was upon that indictment that appellant was tried.
Notwithstanding appellant’s objection, the trial court, under that indictment, submitted the offense of abortion with consent of the female, which was an offense separate and distinct from and carrying a different penalty from that alleged and charged in the indictment.
The jury returned into court the following verdict:
“We, the Jury, find the defendant guilty of abortion, but with the consent of the said Patricia Carter, and assess his punishment at confinement in the State Penitentiary for 3 yr.”
The trial court received and ordered the verdict filed, and thereafter entered judgment on that verdict finding appellant “guilty of the offense of abortion as found by the jury,” which, of necessity, was abortion with consent of the female. Sentence was duly passed upon that verdict, sentencing appellant to confinement in the penitentiary for a term of three years.
Now let us analyze the situation that is thus presented by the verdict, judgment, and sentence in the light of the indictment:
In the first instance, the minimum punishment authorized to be inflicted for the offense charged in the indictment — that is, abortion without the consent of the female — is four years *219in the penitentiary. Therefore the finding of three years by the jury is a punishment not authorized to be affixed under the indictment and is, necessarily, void. Neither a jury nor a court has authority to assess a penalty for the violation of a law different from that authorized to be fixed by the legislature.
Secondly, when the jury found that the abortion was committed with the consent of the female, they acquitted appellant of the offense, and only offense, charged in the indictment.
Instead of entering a judgment against appellant under that verdict, the trial court should have entered a judgment of not guilty, for the jury had expressly found that the offense charged in the indictment had not been committed by the appellant.
My brethren refuse to accept the theory that the statute creates two offenses of abortion and insist that there is only one offense, and that consent or non-consent of the female to the abortion is not an essential element of that offense but is a matter of enhancement of punishment, only.
It is apparent from what I have said that I do not agree to the correctness of that premise, and therefore any conclusion my brethren reach under that false premise is not, in my opinion, controlling of the question here presented.
I cannot help but wonder, too, how my brethren distinguish the rule of law controlling in rape cases from their position here. Rape may be committed either by consent or by force and without consent. We have always held that if force is alleged it must be proved. Cromeans v. State, 59 Texas Cr. R. 611, 129 S.W. 1129.
If my brethren are right, here, that the allegation in the indictment that the abortion was committed without the consent of the female may be disregarded and is not an essential element of the offense charged, then the rule stated is no longer controlling in this state, and, under their holding, an indictment charging rape by force and without consent of the prosecutrix will support a conviction for rape by consent. Moreover, in rape cases it has long been held that unless force is alleged in the indictment it is error to submit rape by force to the jury. Lyons v. State, 94 Texas Cr. R. 566, 252 S.W. 518.
The rule no longer attains under the holding of my brethren, because they authorize this case to be submitted to the jury *220with resultant conviction for abortion with consent, which was not alleged in the indictment.
The fact that the trial court submitted abortion with consent, over appellant’s objection, is sufficient and ought to require a reversal of this conviction, under the authority of the Lyons case.
Other matters may be cited to support my reasoning that the holding of my brethren is erroneous, but I content myself with only the following:
Under the holding of my brethren that consent or want of consent in an abortion case is not an essential element of that crime, there is no necessity for the indictment to contain an allegation relative to the question of consent. In other words, according to their holding, they say that an indictment for abortion which contains no allegation of consent or want of consent is perfectly valid.
I wonder what penalty a trial court would submit to the jury under such an indictment? Would he apply the penalty affixed to an abortion with consent, or would he apply the penalty affixed to an abortion without consent, or would he submit both to the jury and leave it to them to apply whichever penalty they desired?
Under the holding of my brethren, the trial court and the jury would be authorized and at liberty to pursue any or all of the courses mentioned. Such demonstrates the utter fallacy of the holding of my brethren.
I respectfully dissent from the affirmance of this case.