Court Opinion

ID: 9705453
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:07:01.554196+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:11.566846
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE LINN, dissenting: The majority concludes that “whether Albon maintained a proper lookout and acted reasonably under the circumstances is a question for the jury.” (161 Ill. App. 3d at 888.) The majority holds, therefore, that the trial court erred in directing a verdict for plaintiff. On the issue of liability I believe that a directed verdict is appropriate in this case. The record shows that Albon was negligent as a matter of law and that her negligence proximately caused plaintiff’s injuries. The evidence so overwhelmingly favors plaintiff that no contrary verdict based on this evidence could ever stand. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects. Consequently, I respectfully dissent. The majority applied the correct standard to this cause. A trial judge may enter a directed verdict in a case only when “all of the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand.” Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510, 229 N.E.2d 504, 513-14. The majority holds, however, that the jury, based upon the evidence in the instant case, could have reached a contrary verdict. They point to the facts that “the accident occurred at night and in the middle of the block, there was traffic on all sides, and the decedent was wearing dark clothes.” 161 Ill. App. 3d at 888. A driver has a duty to keep a safe lookout and must take into consideration the fact that he or she may be required to stop or slow a vehicle suddenly. Failure to maintain a safe lookout constitutes negligence on the part of the driver. (Gullberg v. Blue (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 389, 392, 406 N.E.2d 927, 930, citing Burroughs v. McGinness (1978), 63 Ill. App. 3d 664, 667, 380 N.E.2d 37, 39.) Albon, thus, owed a duty to the decedent to maintain a proper lookout. The majority points to facts, and the inferences that could be drawn therefrom, that provide an excuse or explanation for why she did not see the child. The majority reasons that the trial judge erred in directing a verdict for plaintiff since the jury could have reached a contrary verdict based on this evidence. I disagree. In Pantlen v. Gottschalk (1959), 21 Ill. App. 2d 163, 157 N.E.2d 548, we held: “[0]ne cannot look with unseeing eye and not see the danger which he could have seen by the proper exercise of his sight, or stated another way, one will be deemed to have observed that which would necessarily have been seen if he had looked, and will not be absolved of the charge of negligence in failing to look by testimony that he looked and did not see.” 21 Ill. App. 2d 163, 170, 157 N.E.2d 548, 551, cited in Grass v. Hill (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 709, 715, 418 N.E.2d 1133, 1137. This rule applies for the purpose of proving a plaintiff’s allegation of negligence. Mort v. Walter (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 391, 398, 457 N.E.2d 18, 22. Applying these principles to the instant case, I conclude that Albon was negligent as a matter of law. The record shows that on the night of the accident, visibility was clear and weather conditions were good. Albon testified herself that nothing obstructed her vision on either side of the street. The record further shows that the other drivers in the vicinity not only saw the decedent, but also saw R.T., who ran in front of the cars just prior to the time that the decedent did. Albon simply looked with an unseeing eye and failed to see the decedent, whom she would have seen had she kept a proper lookout. Notwithstanding the facts and inferences upon which the majority relies, I believe that the evidence in this case so overwhelmingly favors plaintiff that no contrary verdict could ever stand. The able trial judge, therefore, properly directed a verdict for plaintiff. For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.