Court Opinion

ID: 9899651
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 15:04:37.380553+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:45.171132
License: Public Domain

SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                        STATE OF FLORIDA
                       _____________________________

                              Case No. 6D23-608
                      Lower Tribunal No. 2021-CA-002262
                       _____________________________

                               LLOYD L. BOWEIN,

                                   Appellant,

                                        v.

                      JOHN SHERMAN and IRENE SHERMAN,

                                   Appellees.
                       _____________________________

                Appeal from the Circuit Court for Collier County.
                           Lauren L. Brodie, Judge.

                               November 17, 2023

WOZNIAK, J.

      Lloyd L. Bowein (“Seller”), the owner of real property located in Naples,

Florida, appeals a final summary judgment ordering specific performance under a

sales contract with prospective buyers, John Sherman and Irene Sherman

(“Buyers”). 1 Because the sales contract contained a patent ambiguity based on its

      1
       This case was transferred from the Second District Court of Appeal to this
Court on January 1, 2023.
conflicting identifications of the property made subject to the sale, rendering the

contract void and unenforceable against Seller, we reverse the summary judgment.

                                     Background

      Seller listed four properties for sale on the multiple listing service (MLS), with

each listing identifying the list price as $2.5 million. Three of the properties were

“improved,” i.e., had a house built on them, and one property—537 96th Ave. N.—

was a vacant lot. Buyers sent Seller a standard form sales contract titled “Sales

Contract-As Is (Residential Improved Property).” The sales contract begins with the

statement that, if accepted, Seller has agreed to sell “the real property hereafter

legally described . . . (the ‘Real Property’).” The contract expressly states that the

“Real Property” and the items on that property will be collectively referenced as the

“Property.” On line 21, the contract asks for the address of the “Property,” which

Buyers filled in with “533 96th Avenue North, Naples, FL 34108”—just the one

parcel. Line 22 is titled “Legal Description of the Property,” and Buyers provided

(on Line 23) only the legal description of the one address—“Naples Park Unit 6 BLK

34 Lots 16 + 17”:

Lines 29 and 30 state that the purchase price of the “Property” is $2,000,000.

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      However, eight pages later, on line 463 titled “Other Terms and Conditions,”

Buyers identified all four properties as the subject of their offer:

      A dispute between the parties arose as to whether Buyers’ offer was $2 million

for one property or all four, and Seller refused to close. Buyers filed suit for breach

of the sales contract, seeking specific performance, and later moved for summary

judgment. The trial court found that, read as a whole and giving meaning to all of

the sales contract’s provisions, lines 464 through 467 were meaningful and operative

and that the “Other Terms and Conditions” portion did not conflict with the earlier

Legal Description of the Property. It ordered that all four properties be sold for $2

million and rendered summary judgment for Buyers.

                                       Analysis

      “The interpretation of a contract, including whether the contract or one of its

terms is ambiguous, is a matter of law subject to de novo review.” Real Est. Value

Co., Inc. v. Carnival Corp., 92 So. 3d 255, 260 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (citations

omitted). We further observe at the outset that “[t]he equitable remedy of specific

performance may be granted only where the parties have actually entered into a

definite and certain agreement.” Mintzberg v. Golestaneh, 390 So. 2d 759, 760 (Fla.

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3d DCA 1980) (citations omitted); see also Fla. Bank & Tr. Co. at W. Palm Beach

v. Field, 25 So. 2d 665, 666 (Fla. 1946) (“Specific performance is in order only

where there is a valid existing contract.”). To be enforceable, the agreement must

be definite as to, among other things, its subject matter. Nichols v. MoAmCo Corp.,

311 So. 2d 750, 751 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).

      Seller argues that the contract is not subject to specific performance because

of the sales contract’s ambiguity in the identity of the properties to be included in

the sale, i.e., an ambiguity in its subject matter. Page one of the contract gives the

address and legal description of one property and yet, eight pages later and in a

section labeled “Other Terms and Conditions,” the contract identifies four properties

as the subject of the offer. Seller asserts that the description in a real estate contract

of the property to be sold is not an “other term and condition,” but rather is the

subject matter of the contract itself, which subject matter is identified in the address

and legal description portions of the contract. He points out that nowhere on the first

page do Buyers reference the much later addition of three more properties. The two

different property descriptions constitute a patent ambiguity that was created by the

drafters/Buyers, he asserts, thus precluding enforcement of the contract. We agree.

      “[A] patent ambiguity is that which appears on the face of the instrument and

arises from the use of defective, obscure, or insensible language.” Crown Mgmt.

Corp. v. Goodman, 452 So. 2d 49, 52 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). The different legal

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descriptions and addresses in different parts of the sales contract on its face lead us

to conclude a patent ambiguity exists. See Carson v. Palmer, 190 So. 720, 722 (Fla.

1939) (“A patent ambiguity in the description of land is such an uncertainty

appearing on the face of the instrument that the Court, reading the language of the

instrument in the light of all facts and circumstances referred to therein, is unable to

derive therefrom the intention of the parties as to what land was to be conveyed.”);

Nationstar Mortg. Co. v. Levine, 216 So. 3d 711, 716 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (holding

internal contradiction “constituted a patent ambiguity because it appeared on the face

of the agreement; no extrinsic facts or evidence were needed to reveal the

ambiguity”).

      Because the ambiguity at hand is patent, parol evidence cannot be used to cure

it. See, e.g., Venema v. Tost, 424 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (holding use of

parol evidence to remove patent ambiguity in legal description contained in deed is

error and thus specific performance will not lie); Mendelson v. Great W. Bank,

F.S.B., 712 So. 2d 1194, 1196 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (“[I]f the instrument’s description

of the property is patently ambiguous, and the instrument furnishes no other

information from which the parties’ intention can be gleaned, the attempted

conveyance is void, and parol evidence may not be employed to cure the

deficiency.”); see also Carson, 190 So. at 722 (“In interpreting instruments courts

are always inclined to that interpretation which will give effect to the instrument; but

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where there is nothing in the instrument to show the grantors’ intention as to which

lot was to be conveyed, the courts are powerless and can do nought but declare the

instrument a nullity.”). Simply stated, a trial court cannot choose one contradictory

provision of a contract over another without impermissibly rewriting the contract.

See Emerg. Assocs. of Tampa, P.A. v. Sassano, 664 So. 2d 1000, 1002 (Fla. 2d DCA

1995) (“Florida courts have consistently declined to allow the introduction of

extrinsic evidence to construe [a patent ambiguity] because to do so would allow a

trial court to rewrite a contract with respect to a matter the parties clearly

contemplated when they drew their agreement.”). Here, the conflict in a material

term of this contract, its subject matter, renders the contract unenforceable; without

a meeting of the minds as to what real estate was being bought and sold, the contract

fails for indefiniteness, and it cannot be revived by parol evidence.

      While Buyers argue that reading the contract as a whole reveals no ambiguity,

reading the contract as a whole is actually what exposes the patent ambiguity: effect

cannot be given to the lines identifying a single property address and giving the legal

description of only that single property without ignoring the much later reference to

three additional properties as the subject of the offer. The initial language reflects

an intent to purchase only that single property, while the subsequent language

expresses an intent to purchase all four. Both provisions cannot be given effect.

Consequently, we reverse.

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      REVERSED.

WHITE and GANNAM, JJ., concur.

Lawrence J. Marraffino, of Lawrence J. Marraffino, P.A., Gainesville, for Appellant.

Daniel Hogan, of Boatman Richie, Naples, for Appellees.

 NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING
          AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED

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