Court Opinion

ID: 9586681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:13:58.143446+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:47.326770
License: Public Domain

Felton, Chief Judge,
dissenting. While the acceptance of late instalment payments by the defendant amounted to a waiver of the contract provisions requiring payment on or before the 29th day of each month, the effect of this waiver was in my opinion limited to' the individual instalments accepted after the contract date and did not constitute a quasi new agreement as to future instalments because of the express provision of the contract as follows: “. . . and failure of the holder to insist on full, absolute and complete compliance with any provisions of the contract, in any one. or more instances, shall not be deemed as a waiver of holder’s right at any and all times thereafter to such compliance . . .” In the absence of this provision, I think the requirements of notice contained in Code § 20-116 would apply, but I believe that this provision constitutes a waiver by plaintiff of the protection afforded him by Code § 20-116. A person may waive or renounce what the law has established in his favor, when he does not thereby injure others or affect the public interest. Code § 102-106.
The cases of Adams v. Washington Fidelity Nat. Ins. Co., 48 Ga. App. 753(2) (173 S.E. 247) and Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 54 Ga. App. 530 (188 S.E. 362) are insurance cases and do not have involved the same provision relative to the rights to insist on strict compliance by one party. The couii. in the first case simply applied the rule of waiver of strict compliance from which Judge Jenkins dissented, and we think correctly. In the second case the court grasped for some reason to hold that the non-waiver of the right to strict compliance was waived. Whether the court was right in so doing or not the case is not authority for the majority ruling here, because in this case there are no facts which could be said to constitute a waiver by the finance company of its right to rely on strict compliance with the provisions of the contract. I think that this decision is a radical departure from the generally accepted proposition that a party may waive his rights when by *786so doing he does not injure others or affect the public interest. Many contracts of various kinds now contain the provision against waiver of strict compliance. Of course, the result of a waiver by a debtor could possibly in some cases cause him injury. That consideration should, however, be weighed against the possibility of a harsher and a more injurious policy of insisting on strict compliance in the event a creditor cannot protect himself in leniency and indulgence granted to debtors. Until Code § 102-106 is changed the courts should follow it. If the cases cited above are authority for the majority holding they should be overruled.
Gardner, Presiding Judge, and Frankum, Judge, concur in the foregoing dissent.