Court Opinion

ID: 9522528
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:27:55.1142+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:03:09.265759
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION

Bobbitt, C. J.
I dissent from the majority opinion herein and because it appears to me to be so manifestly in error, I feel impelled to state my reasons for disagreeing.
First: The action herein was originally commenced by appellant to condemn a part of appellee’s land for highway purposes. Appellee, pursuant to Acts 1905, ch. 48, §5, p. 59, being §3-1705, Burns’ 1946 Replacement, filed objections to the proceedings. These objections were overruled on October 9, 1959, and the same day the court, pursuant to Acts 1905, ch. 48, §4, p. 59, being §3-1704, Burns’ 1946 Replacement, appointed appraisers to assess damages and benefits, if any, which appellee might sustain by reason of the location of the proposed highway.
On November 4, 1959, the appraisers filed their report which showed damages assessed as follows:
1. The value of land appropriated------$12,750
2. The value of improvements on land taken___________________________18,500
3. Damages to residue because of land and building appropriated ____________ 18,750 .
Total damages__.___________$50,000.
*514On November 10, 1959, appellant filed exceptions to the appraisers’ report, and on November 13, 1959, ap-pellee filed her exceptions to the appraisers’ report. Subsequently, on December 28, 1959, while the exceptions were still pending, appellee filed her petition for an injunction seeking to prevent the State from selling or otherwise making disposition of the buildings located on part of the land sought to be appropriated and for which damages had been allowed in the appraisers’ report.
From an order granting such injunction this appeal is prosecuted.
A part of appellee’s house and a shed are located on land which the State seeks to appropriate for permanent right-of-way. However, in order that these buildings could be removed from the permanent right-of-way, an area of land completely surrounding both the house and shed was included in the total land to be appropriated, and such area was referred to in the complaint as “temporary” right-of-way.
At' the hearing on the petition for injunction one of the appraisers testified that in arriving at the award made in the appraisers’ report, damages were allowed for the “shed and house” and other buildings “on the back” which could be removed with a tractor.
The record here clearly, and without conflict, discloses that the State of Indiana has fully complied with the provisions of the statute for exercising the right of eminent domain. Appellee seeks to prevent the exercise of- that right by the extraordinary remedy of injunction. The statute1 gives her an adequate remedy at law. Having such remedy she cannot invoke injunctive relief and thereby nullify the purpose and effect of the *515Eminent Domain Statute. Heugel v. Townsley (1938), 213 Ind. 339, 341, 12 N. E. 2d 761; Livingston v. Livingston (1921), 190 Ind. 223, 230, 130 N. E. 122; Shedd v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. (1934), 98 Ind. App. 42, 182 N. E. 278 ;2 Halstead v. City of Brazil (1925), 83 Ind. App. 53, 57, 147 N. E. 629.
Appellee’s remedy here is provided by Acts 1905, ch. 48, §8, p. 59, being §3-1707, Burns’ 1946 Replacement. She has properly filed exceptions to the appraisers’ report, and after trial and judgment on the issues raised by such exceptions she may appeal to the Supreme Court of Indiana.3 Acts 1925, ch. 201, §1, p. 487, being §4-214, Burns’ 1946 Replacement; Boyd v. Logansport, etc., Traction Co. (1904), 161 Ind. 587, 589, 69 N. E. 398; Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Darling, et al. (1958), 128 Ind. App. 456, 458, 149 N. E. 2d 702.
The majority opinion attempts to justify the extraordinary remedy of injunction herein by taking out of context certain language found in §3-1707, swpra, and enlarging the scope of the section to include injunc-tive relief such as is here requested.
Section 3-1707, supra, provides:
“Any party to such action aggrieved by the assessment of benefits or damages may file written exceptions thereto in the office of the clerk of such court in vacation, or in open court if in session, within ten [10] days after the filing of such report, *516and the cause shall further proceed to issue, trial and judgment as in civil actions; the court may .make such further orders, and render such finding and judgment as may seem just. Such judgment as to benefits or damages shall be appealable by either party as in civil actions to the . . . Supreme Court.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The clause upon which the majority opinion relies, “the court may make such further orders, and render such finding and judgment as may seem just” pertains solely to the subject-matter covered by the section, i.e., matters pertaining to the assessment of benefits or damages. Certainly the Legislature never intended by the use of the language in this clause to authorize a court to issue an injunction nullifying an order of condemnation rendered under proceedings regularly instituted and prosecuted under the provisions of the Eminent Domain Statute. This section authorizes the court to make further orders in the original condemnation action to provide for full compensation to the property owner arising because of extensions, additions, and capital expenditures, made after the condemnation proceeding has been instituted. Public Service Co. v. City of Lebanon (1943), 221 Ind. 78, 86-88, 46 N. E. 2d 480.
In my judgment an injunction will not lie for the purpose for which appellee has attempted to invoke in-junctive relief in this case. ■
Second: The question of the uncertainty of the location of the line between that portion of the right-of-way designated as permanent and that designated as temporary was not raised in the trial court and is not presented- here. Neither is any question properly presented for our consideration concerning the use which the State intends to make of the land taken for tempo*517rary right-of-way. This court has no authority to consider questions not raised in the trial court and properly presented here.
Third: Acts 1938, ch. 18, §18, p. 67, being §36-118, Burns’ 1949 Replacement, provides, in part here relevant, as follows:
“The state highway commission is hereby given the right, in the name of the state of Indiana, to purchase, or by voluntary grants and donations receive or otherwise acquire, lands and rights necessary for the construction, repair and maintenance of any state highway, and necessary for the relocating, widening or straightening of any state highway, or necessary for the clearing and removing of obstructions to the vision at highway crossings and curves, or for any other purpose or use contemplated by this act. The state highway commission is hereby endowed with the right of eminent domain in so far as the same may be necessary or proper for the carrying out of the provisions of this act.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Under the above statute the State may acquire such rights or title as are necessary to carry out the purposes authorized in the Act.4 11 I. L. E., Eminent Domain, §151, p. 730; 11 I. L. E., Eminent Domain, §10, p. 571.
While I recognize that the State can appropriate only such rights in lands as are clearly within the limits of the authority granted by the statute,5 I believe that the statute here is broad enough to permit the taking for temporary use, if such use is reasonably necessary to carry out the purposes for which the permanent taking of land or property is authorized. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Smith (1912), 177 Ind. 524, 540, 97 N. E. *518164; Northeastern Gas Transmission Co. v. Collins (1952), 138 Conn. 582, 87 A. 2d 139, 145; Brady v. Road Directors for Allegany County (1925), 148 Md. 493, 129 Atl. 682, 687; Hepburn v. Jersey City (1901), 67 N. J. L. 114, 50 Atl. 598, 599 (affirmed, 67 N. J. L. 686, 52 Atl. 1132) ; Weitzner v. Stichman et al. (1947), 296 N. Y. 907, 72 N. E. 2d 625.
In my judgment the taking of that part of appellee’s land designated as temporary right-of-way was, under the record here, necessary to the construction and establishment of the proposed highway.
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court.
Note. — Reported in 173 N. E. 2d 652.

. Acts 1905, ch. 48, §5, p. 59, being §3-1705, Bums’ 1946 Replacement.

. For the appeal of this case see: Shedd v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. (1934), 206 Ind. 35, 188 N. E. 322, 90 A. L. R. 1020. For an attempted injunction in the Federal Courts see: Shedd v. State Line Generating Co. (N. D. Ind. 1929), 34 F. 2d 287, 289; Shedd v. State Line Generating Co., 7 Cir. (1930), 41 F. 2d 505 (Cert. denied, 282 U. S. 884, 75 L. Ed. 780, 51 S. Ct. 87).

. The provision for appeal to the Appellate or the Supreme Court as provided by §3-1707, Burns’ 1946 Replacement, was limited to the Supreme Court by Acts 1907, ch. 148, §1, p. 237, which amended Acts 1901, ch. 247, §9, p. 565, being now §4-214, Burns’ 1946 Replacement.

. Acts 1933, ch. 18, §18, p. 67, being §36-118, Burns’ 1949 Replacement.

. 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain, §3.213(1), p. 229.