Court Opinion

ID: 9579916
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:59:54.293333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:53.522553
License: Public Domain

Bernes, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In contrast to the majority, I believe that we must interpret the “or” in former OCGA § 34-9-200.1 (g) (6) as a conjunctive “and” in order to avoid an absurd result under the Georgia workers’ compensation statutes.
Under OCGA§ 34-9-261, an employee who sustains a temporary total disability is entitled to weekly workers’ compensation benefits for a maximum of 400 weeks from the date of injury. But, this cap on weekly benefits does not apply to an employee who suffers a catastrophic injury as that term is defined in the former and current versions of OCGA § 34-9-200.1 (g) (6). By placing a cap on payments for temporary total disability but not for catastrophic injuries, the General Assembly clearly intended to draw a legal distinction between these two categories of injuries, and certainly did not intend to define a catastrophic injury less strictly than the definition of temporary total disability. See James B. Hiers, Jr. and Robert R. Potter, Ga. Workers’ Compensation Law and Practice § 17-4, at 315, n. 3 (4th ed. 1999) (“The legislative intent was for there to be a cap for the vast majority of injuries, but for no cap to exist for the most significant or catastrophic injuries.”). Notably, however, the majority’s interpretation ofOCGA§ 34-9-200.1 (g) (6) as it existed in 1996 fails to draw any meaningful distinction between these two categories.
In prior cases addressing temporary total disability under OCGA § 34-9-261, we have held that in order for an employee to be found temporarily totally disabled, he must be “unable to return to his *529regular employment or to procure remunerative employment at a different occupation suitable to his impaired capacity.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Cedartown Nursing Home v. Dunn, 174 Ga. App. 720, 725 (2) (330 SE2d 905) (1985). See also Hensel Phelps Constr. Co. v. Manigault, 167 Ga. App. 599, 604 (2) (307 SE2d 79) (1983); Waycross Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Hiott, 141 Ga. App. 600, 601 (234 SE2d 111) (1977). Consequently, we have held that a finding of temporary total disability turns on whether the employee is able “to find any work for which he is suited by training and experience” as a result of the injury suffered. (Emphasis in original.) United States Fidelity &c. Ins. Co., 177 Ga. App. 684, 685 (340 SE2d 284) (1986). See H. Michael Bagley et al., Workers’ Compensation, 44 Mercer L. Rev. 457,460 (C) (1992). However, the majority defines the relevant “or” in former OCGA § 34-9-200.1 (g) (6) in the disjunctive, such that an employee can prove he has suffered a catastrophic injury by showing only that he cannot return to his prior work. Although the majority does not precisely define what constitutes “prior work,” it is clear that, at best, the majority has ruled that the statutory framework effective in 1996 defined catastrophic injury essentially the same as temporary total disability or, at worst, less stringently.
This cannot be the law. Well-established principles of statutory construction require that where the literal language of a statute would lead to an absurdity or contradiction, or would render some statutory language meaningless or mere surplusage, “then the literal must yield.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Nix, 220 Ga. App. 651, 652 (1) (469 SE2d 497) (1996). See also Colonial Life &c. Ins. Co. v. Heveder, 274 Ga. App. 377, 379 (618 SE2d 39) (2005). Applying this principle, Georgia courts on multiple occasions have interpreted the word “or” as having a conjunctive meaning “when necessary to carry out legislative intent and to avoid an unreasonable or absurd result.” Hawes v. Smith, 120 Ga. App. 158, 161 (5) (169 SE2d 823) (1969). See, e.g., Comer v. American Tel. &c. Co., 176 Ga. 651 (2) (168 SE 786) (1933); Clay v. Central R. & Banking Co., 84 Ga. 345 (10 SE 967) (1890); Vito v. Dhillon, 269 Ga. App. 899, 901-902 (1) (a) (605 SE2d 602) (2004); K Mart Corp. v. Adamson, 192 Ga. App. 884, 886 (386 SE2d 680) (1989). I believe that the present case likewise requires us to interpret “or” in the conjunctive, since applying the literal meaning would lead to the absurd result of allowing an employee to obtain catastrophic injury benefits by meeting a standard equal to or less strict than the standard for proving temporary total disability.
Furthermore, interpreting “or” as having a conjunctive meaning in this case would avoid the “unreasonable consequence[ ]” of undermining clear legislative intent. K Mart Corp., 192 Ga. App. at 886. See also Heveder, 274 Ga. App. at 379. In the recent case of Davis v. Carter *530Mechanical, 272 Ga. App. 773, 776 (1) (612 SE2d 879) (2005), this Court discussed the General Assembly’s intent behind enacting the 1995 amendment to OCGA § 34-9-200.1 (g) (6), which added the statutory language at issue here. We explained that the 1995 amendment “changed the Act’s definition of catastrophic injury to adopt language similar to that employed by the Social Security Administration ... in determining the availability of disability benefits” and “was an effort to bring the two provisions in line.” (Punctuation omitted.) Id. See also Thomas A. Eaton and David B. Mustard, Report of the Governor’s Workers’ Compensation Review Commission, 38 Ga. L.Rev. 1241,1308-1309 (VIII) (a) (2004). And, we pointed out that to qualify for disability under Social Security, a claimant must “not only [be] unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work.” (Emphasis supplied.) Davis, 272 Ga. App. at 776 (1) (quoting 42 USC § 423 (d) (2) (A)). The majority’s interpretation of the “or” contained in the 1995 amendment to OCGA § 34-9-200.1 (g) (6) undermines the General Assembly’s purpose discussed in Davis of adopting statutory language similar to the federal Social Security provision, which clearly set forth disability requirements in the conjunctive.
Decided July 13, 2006
Drew, Eckl & Farnham, John C. Bruffey, Jr., Christi L. Hodges, for appellants.
Westmoreland, Patterson, Moseley & Hinson, Thomas W. Herman, for appellee.
For these reasons, I am compelled to dissent from the majority opinion. This Court should reverse the superior court’s order that reinstated the decision of the administrative law judge.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Andrews and Presiding Judge Johnson join in this dissent.