Court Opinion

ID: 9536687
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:05:20.027386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:55:03.224213
License: Public Domain

SCHAUER, J.,
Dissenting.—Husband and wife are as free as other competent persons to contract with each other. (Civ. Code, §§ 158, 159.) There is no reason why they cannot enter into a property settlement agreement which includes a provision for alimony, as such, which shall be subject, within agreed limits, to control by the court. For example, the parties could agree to a maximum limit or to a minimum limit or to both maximum and minimum limits, or they could include a cost-of-living sliding scale, the exact amount of contributions in each case to be fixed by the court if the parties failed to agree. They could also provide for security to guarantee maximum payments or they could agree that the court might order complete termination of alimony upon the showing of the occurrence of some casualty.
A contract made by competent parties, and valid under the law of contracts, does not for some mysterious reason become subject to alteration in or disregard of its terms merely because the contracting parties are or were husband and wife. But when the contract by its terms provides for the payment of alimony the ordinary meaning of the word suggests that the amount of alimony shall remain subject to control of the court unless that primary meaning is expressly negated or limited by the contract. Changing the amount of alimony payments obviously is not an alteration of the contract where the contract provides for “alimony” and does not prohibit such changes.
Here, I cannot hold that as a matter of law the contract is not subject to the interpretation given it by the trial court. That contract was not in truth made a part of the decree of divorce. The majority opinion states that “The decree approved and incorporated by reference the provisions of the agreement and expressly ordered defendant to pay $500 per month ‘as agreed in said property settlement agreement.’ ” (Italics added.) But, as I have heretofore pointed out *638(Flynn v. Flynn (1954), 42 Cal.2d 55, 61-62 [265 P.2d 865]), the simple fact is that an agreement cannot be made a part of a judgment unless it is in truth incorporated in the judgment so that when the judgment is copied in the judgment book the whole of the judgment, necessarily including the agreement which is a part of it, is set forth word for word.
“ ‘In no case is a judgment effectual for any purpose until entered.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.) To enter a judgment means to copy it in the ‘judgment book’ so that it becomes a permanent and public record (see Code Civ. Proc., § 668), so that he who reads may know its content. Any portion of a judgment not entered in the judgment book would be ineffectual for any purpose. If the clerk by error omitted to enter any part of a judgment which had been filed, the error of the ministerial officer could be corrected; but if he has performed his duty and the judgment as entered is truly the judgment as rendered, and that judgment has become final, then neither this court nor any other court or person has power to add words to the language of that judgment.” (Flynn v. Flynn, supra.)
Inasmuch as the agreement was not incorporated in the decree, the trial court’s determination in the light of the entire record that the order for payment of $500 monthly was in the nature of an award of alimony, should be upheld.
I would affirm the judgment.