Court Opinion

ID: 9791655
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:15:22.883225+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:37.678214
License: Public Domain

McINTYRE, Justice
(dissenting).
All members of our court seem to agree testimony which the commission sought to elicit from Merrill Dunham had to do with the sale of lands which were shown to be sufficiently comparable to the lands involved; and that this testimony should not have been excluded.
Having so concluded, we should not I think justify the exclusion of this testimony by saying it was harmless error.
It is true we said in Robertson v. State Highway Commission, Wyo., 450 P.2d 1003, 1004, the critical consideration is the “seriousness of the error,” not its occurrence. But this court long ago adhered to the principle that the exclusion of competent evidence is presumed to be prejudicial. Owens v. Frank, 7 Wyo. 457, 53 P. 282, 283, 75 Am.St.Rep. 932.
For more recent holdings to the effect that prejudice is to be presumed from the exclusion of competent evidence or the admitting of improper evidence, see Valley Transp. System v. Reinartz, 67 Ariz. 380, 197 P.2d 269, 271; Henry v. Baber, 75 Nev. 59, 334 P.2d 839, 840; and Hill v. Bank of San Pedro, 41 Cal.App.2d 595, 107 P.2d 399, 406. See also Morrison v. City of Butte, 150 Mont. 106, 431 P.2d 79, 83.
In Stroud v. Hansen, 48 Cal.App.2d 556, 120 P.2d 102, 104, the court said prejudicial error will not be presumed in excluding evidence unless the question to which objection has been sustained shows affirmatively that the answer would elicit proof favorable to the party making the inquiry *458and that it bears upon a material and relevant issue.
We are dealing with a situation where the offer of proof did show affirmatively that the answer would elicit proof favorable to the party making inquiry. Also, it cannot and is not denied that the inquiry bore upon a material and relevant issue.
Another area of full agreement seems to be that the parties in the case before us presented two separate theories in arriving at the “after value” of defendant’s ranch. The majority opinion assumes the jury rejected the commission’s theory. I cannot be sure it did, however, because it seems to me we are unanimously admitting the commission was improperly cut off in the development of its theory.
Then too, it is difficult for me to join in saying the admitted error was not prejudicial because the excluded evidence would have been “cumulative.” It is indeed difficult to classify the limits of cumulative evidence where the opposing side is granted unrestricted freedom to use all of its witnesses and evidence in the development of its theory. It would be like saying one side is to be limited in the number of comparables it can tell the jury about, while the other side can have as many as it pleases to influence the jury.
If exclusion of the evidence which the commission sought to offer by its witness Dunham was erroneous, as we say it was, then I would say the error was prejudicial.
ADDENDUM
In view of the dissent, and as the writer of the majority opinion, I feel impelled briefly to express my own views upon the matters raised in order that there be no misunderstanding as to the reasons underlying our holding that the ruling excluding the detail of the two “compara-bles” involved, even though error, was harmless under Rule 61, W.R.C.P. In the first instance the dissent seems to overlook the fact that the commission in this appeal has relied solely on procedural errors and thus concedes that the verdict of the jury was sustained by substantial evidence and was well within the range of the evidence as to the “after value” of the defendant’s property. Recalling that our Rule 61 was taken verbatim from Rule 61 of the Rules of Federal Procedure, it may not be amiss to quote from the case of Tugwell v. A. F. Klaveness & Company, 5 Cir., 320 F.2d 866, 868, certiorari denied 376 U.S. 951, 84 S.Ct. 967, 11 L.Ed.2d 970, which reads as follows:
“ * * * The unsuccessful plaintiff recognizing the adequacy of the record to support the finding that the accident did not occur, seeks a reversal because of two procedural rulings each related to the receipt of evidence. *
“The difficulties of that attack are formidable. These bear emphasis at the outset since the problem is not the simple one of identifying the two incidents and then under microscopic examination ascertain whether in one way or another the rulings lack perfection. Under command of F.R.Civ.P. 61 and 28 U.S.C.A. § 2111, ours is a more substantial function which epitomizes the very nature of adjudication. We must determine whether, assuming the action under review to have been erroneous, was it really harmful to the complaining party ? * * * ”
In the annotation of innumerable Federal cases relating to the admission and exclusion of evidence as set forth in 28 U.S.C.A., pp. 179-198, the foregoing rationale has, with the exception of the rare case where the error was determined to be prejudicial per se, been adhered to and in no case coming to my attention was there a holding based upon an abstract legal principle “that the exclusion of competent evidence is presumed to be prejudicial.” Neither does the case of Owens v. Frank, 7 Wyo. 457, 53 P. 282, 75 Am.St.Rep. 932, stand for such a principle. That case involved an alleged fraudulent sale made to defeat the rights of existing creditors and plaintiff had called a witness to testify as to a conversation had with the seller concerning the circumstances under *459which the sale was made. Sufficient was disclosed by the record to show that the testimony sought was in support of the “crux” of plaintiff’s case. The witness claiming privilege, however, refused to divulge all of the conversation. No offer of proof was made as to what the witness would testify, and it was contended by the defendant that plaintiff thus had not shown that the conversation was material or competent to any issue presented in the case. This contention was rejected and because the ruling was based on “privilege” rather than “materiality” it was said that it would “be presumed that the excluded testimony would have been material.” That holding hardly supports the proposition that this court “long ago adhered” to a principle that any exclusion of material or competent evidence in a civil action is presumed to be prejudicial. To the contrary, in Robertson v. State Highway Commission, Wyo., 450 P.2d 1003, 1005, involving a procedural error in an eminent domain proceeding, it was said, “This brings us to the general rule that prejudice is never presumed.” It is academic that rulings on the admission and exclusion of evidence are procedural and that concept would seem to negate any understanding that Owens laid down a conflicting principle. In the Robertson case, supra, we also adhered to the principle that “the burden is upon the appealing litigant to establish prejudicial error.” Fairly recently, in Cederburg v. Carter, Wyo., 448 P.2d 608, 611, we held an exclusionary ruling of testimony with respect to the relevant and material issue of speed in a negligence case was not error under the circumstances of that case and then went on to say:
“ * * * In any event, appellant fails to show us, either by authority or reason, how the ruling could have been prejudicial to defendant. On appeal, the appellant has the burden of showing harmful error. * * *”
As stated in the majority opinion here, that has always been the holding of this court and we have not said that such a burden was aided by a presumption. Our views with respect to an appellant’s burden under Rule 61 are fully supported by holdings of the Federal courts made both prior to and subsequent to the adoption by this court of Rule 61. In Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 63 S.Ct. 477, 482, 87 L.Ed. 645, 144 A.L.R. 719, rehearing denied 318 U.S. 800, 63 S.Ct. 757, 87 L.Ed. 1163, it was said:
“ * * * Mere ‘technical errors’ which do not ‘affect the substantial rights of the parties’ are not sufficient to set aside a jury verdict in an appellate court. [Citations.] He who seeks to have a judgment set aside because of an erroneous ruling carries the burden of showing that prejudice resulted. * * * ”
See also Bonner v. Polacari, 10 Cir., 350 F.2d 493, 496; Slatinsky v. Bailey, 8 Cir., 330 F.2d 136, 141; Creekmore v. Crossno, 10 Cir., 259 F.2d 697, 698; and Railway Express Agency v. Epperson, 8 Cir., 240 F.2d 189, 193-194.
With respect to the comment that the commission was “improperly cut off in the development of its theory” on the critical and subsidiary issue of whether the ranch was damaged as a whole or only to the extent of the damage inflicted upon the lands in close proximity to the highway, the record, in all due respect to my associate, does not bear out that assumption. The major portion of the evidence related to this issue. Both Dunham and Goodman, the two valuation witnesses of the commission, testified freely and at length in support of the commission’s theory. Both said that they were familiar with the operations of the Miller Ranch as a cattle ranch; were familiar with the plans and specifications for the underpasses and structures underlying the highway; discussed in some detail how each of the underpasses and structures fit into the operations; and each gave it as his opinion that although there were some problems to be overcome for which an allowance had been made the structures were adequate to permit continuation of the operation of the Miller Ranch as a unit. When it *460is considered that the evidence pertaining to the theories was most conflicting and that the jury resolved the conflict, it can scarcely be said that the majority assumed that the jury rejected the theory advanced by the commission. Such was the fact.
Likewise there is nothing in the majority opinion that would suggest that this court or the trial court “granted unrestricted freedom” in the use of “comparables” to the defendant and not to the commission. The fact is, if it is of any significance, that only one of defendant’s witnesses, the witness Arnold, without objection specifically testified to the detail of two sales of other ranch property as compared with the three “comparables” about which both of the commission’s witnesses freely testified. The significant thing is that neither the dissent nor the commission points out on the basis of the record wherein the detail of the excluded “com-parables” was anything more than cumulative.