Court Opinion

ID: 9682574
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:14:02.323972+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:40.139099
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Chattin,
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion holding personam jurisdiction of defendant, Crosman Arms Company, was acquired by a “tortious act or omission by it within this State.”
The words of the statute must be taken in their ordinary sense and without any forced or subtle construction to extend their meaning. Phillips & Buttorff Mfg. Co. v. Carson, 188 Tenn. 132, 217 S.W.2d 1 (1949); Burks v. State, 194 Tenn. 675, 254 S.W.2d 970 (1953); Ford Motor Company v. Pace, 206 Tenn. 559, 335 S.W.2d 360 (1960).
“The whole purpose of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent; *272and all rules of construction are but aids to this end. Woodroof v. City of Nashville, 183 Tenn. 483, 489, 192 S.W.2d 1013. Where the words of a statute are clear and plain and fully express the legislative intent, there is no room to resort to auxiliary rules of construction.” Anderson v. Outland, 210 Tenn. 526, 360 S.W.2d 44 (1962).
Unambiguous statutes must be construed to mean what they say. Montgomery v. Hoskins. 222 Tenn. 45, 432 S.W.2d 654 (1968).
There is no ambiguity in the words “any tortious act or omission within this State. ’ ’
The record shows the “tortious act or omission” of defendant alleged occurred in New York State and not “within” this State.
Defendant did nothing in this State. It shipped the rifles to this State by common carriers.
The occurrence of an injury in this State cannot serve to transmute an out-of-state tortious act or omission into one committed within this State under the wording of our statute. Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 209 N.E.2d 68, 24 A.L.R.3d 506, cert. den. Estwing Mfg. Co. v. Singer, 382 U.S. 905, 86 S.Ct. 241, 15 L.Ed.2d 158 (1965).
There remains whether jurisdiction in this case may be upheld under paragraph (a) which reads: “The transaction of any business within the state.”
By demurring to the plea in abatement, plaintiff admitted all facts well pleaded but not the conclusion of the pleader.
*273Plaintiff states in his brief:
“The defendant has a large volume of sales in Tennessee, and the accident involved here resulted from its extensive sales activities in the state, so that no problem of minimum contact is involved. ’ ’
However, the declaration does not bear out this statement. The declaration alleged:
‘ ‘ That in the loading and unloading of merchandise, a shipment of Crosman BB rifles had come into the warehouse; and one of the boxes, containing a Crosman V-350 BB rifle, had come open and another high school boy, named Terry Cathey, who was working after school with your minor plaintiff, did remove a new Crosman V-350 BB rifle from its container and loaded one BB shot into the barrel of the said rifle and fired at an empty box, causing a hole to be tom in same. That the said Terry Cathey cocked the said rifle again, and believing said rifle to be empty, did pull the trigger again. That there was another BB shot in the rifle, and it struck the minor plaintiff in his left eye, and said BB shot directly and proximatelv causing the loss of said eye. ’ ’
This allegation does not, in my opinion, satisfy the “minimum contacts” test as announced in International Shoe Company v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95, 161 A.L.R. (1945). The Supreme Court of the United States has consistently adhered to the “minimum contact” test of state jurisdiction over nonresidents.
In the following cases due process was held violated, under the circumstances involved, by subjecting a non*274resident to the jurisdiction of the local courts on the basis of an isolated transaction involving the sale of property. All such cases are based upon the provision of the State’s long arm statute containing the provision “ transact [ing] of any business within this State”. Morgan v. Heckle (D.C.Ill.) 171 F.Supp. 482 (1959); Purdy Co. v. Argen tina, 333 F.2d 95, cert. den. 379 U.S. 962, 13 L.Ed.2d 557, 85 S.Ct. 653 (1964); Conn v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 342 P.2d 871 (1959); Chassis-Trak, Inc. v. Federated Purchaser, Inc., (D.C.N.J.) 179 F.Supp. 780 (1960); Perlmutter v. Standard Roofing and Tinsmith Supply Company, 43 Misc.2d 885, 252 N.Y.S.2d 583 (1964); Old Westbury Golf & Country Club, Inc. v. Mitchell, 44 Misc. 2d 687, 254 N.Y.S.2d 679, affd. 24 A.D.2d 636, 26 N.Y.2d 438, affd. 18 N.Y.2d 670, 273 N.Y.S.2d 418, 219 N.E.2d 868 (1964); Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., (C.A. 4 N.C.) 239 F.2d 502 (1956); Darby v. Superior Supply Company, 224 Tenn. 540, 458 S.W.2d 423 (1970).
Defendant had no offices, representatives, salesmen, or any other contact with this State, under this record, other than to accept orders from Service Merchandise, Inc., through the United States mail and ship the material by common carriers in Interstate Commerce.
I would sustain the judgment of the trial court.
I am authorized to say Me. Justice Ceeson joins me in this opinion.