Court Opinion

ID: 9688101
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:04:47.085751+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:08:43.042729
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/24/23 P. v. Daniel CA2/6

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

 THE PEOPLE,                                                  2d Crim. No. B321320
                                                           (Super. Ct. No. 20F-03927)
      Plaintiff and Respondent,                             (San Luis Obispo County)

 v.

 JAMAL MITCHELL DANIEL,

      Defendant and Appellant.

      Jamal Mitchell Daniel appeals the judgment and three-
year prison sentence imposed after he admitted violating
probation. Appellant contends the sentencing court erred in
finding that his conviction of battery with serious bodily injury
(Pen. Code,1 § 243, subd. (d)) is a serious felony that qualifies as a
strike (§§ 667, (d)(1), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)). We shall order the
abstract of judgment modified to reflect that appellant’s battery
conviction is a serious felony. Otherwise, we affirm.

         1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
           FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
      In June 2020, appellant was charged in a five-count
information with battery with serious bodily injury (count 2) and
other crimes. The battery charge stated: “On or about June 24,
2020, in the County of San Luis Obispo, State of California, the
crime of Battery With Serious Bodily Injury in violation of
PC243(d), a Felony, was committed in that JAMAL MITCHELL
DANIEL did willfully and unlawfully use force or violence upon
the person of Darwin William Buss, resulting in the infliction of
serious bodily injury on such person. [¶] NOTICE: The above
offense is a serious felony within the meaning of Penal Code
Section 1192.7(c)(8).”2
      In August 2020, appellant pleaded no contest to count 2 in
exchange for the dismissal of the remaining counts. The parties
stipulated to a factual basis for appellant’s plea based on the
information and the preliminary hearing transcript. During the
plea colloquy, the court advised appellant “[y]our plea to Count 2
also constitutes a strike offense under California[’s] Three Strikes
Law. If you were to commit any future felony, it could be used to
increase any future punishment; you understand that?”
Appellant replied “[y]es, ma’am.” In exchange for appellant’s
plea imposition of sentence was suspended, he was placed on
three years of probation with various terms and conditions, and
the four remaining counts were dismissed.

      2 As relevant here, subdivision (c)(8) of section 1192.7

provides that a serious felony includes “any felony in which the
defendant personally inflicts great bodily injury on any person,
other than an accomplice.” Serious felonies qualify as strike
offenses for sentence enhancement purposes under the three
strikes law. (§ 667, subd. (d)(1).)

                                 2
       Appellant subsequently violated his probation. Prior to
admitting the violation, he urged the court to find that his
battery conviction did not qualify as a strike as provided in
People v. Bueno (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1503 (Bueno), because in
pleading to the offense he did not expressly admit that he
personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim as provided
in section 969f. The trial court judge, who had not taken
appellant’s plea, concluded that Bueno was inapposite because
appellant had admitted during his plea colloquy that he was
pleading to a strike offense. Accordingly, the court found that
appellant had been convicted of a serious felony that qualified as
a strike.
       After appellant admitted the probation violation, the court
terminated probation and sentenced him to three years in state
prison (§ 1170, subd. (h)(2) &(3)). Appellant was also awarded
1,101 days of custody credit, such that his prison sentence was
deemed served, and was ordered to report to parole within 24
hours of his release. The court told appellant, “You are going to
be on parole for probably three years.”
                           DISCUSSION
       Appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support
the sentencing court’s finding that his conviction of battery with
serious bodily injury is a serious felony that qualifies as a strike.
We disagree.3

      3 We reject the People’s contention that appellant’s claim is

moot because his custody credits were in excess of his three-year
prison sentence. If the court had not found that appellant’s
battery conviction was a serious felony that qualified as a strike,
it would have been required to sentence him to county jail rather
than state prison. (§§ 243, subd. (d), 1170, subd. (h)(2) & (3).)

                                  3
      In adjudicating claims of insufficient evidence, we review
the record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence.
(People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1067 (Delgado).) “In
other words, we determine whether a rational trier of fact could
have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving
the elements of the sentence enhancement beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (Ibid.)
      As we have noted, the information alleged that appellant
had committed a battery with great bodily injury and that the
offense was a serious felony as provided in section 1192.7,
subdivision (c)(8), i.e., that he had personally inflicted great
bodily injury on the victim in committing the offense. The
transcript of appellant’s plea hearing indicates that he pleaded
no contest to the battery charge, that he acknowledged he was
pleading to a strike within the meaning of the three strikes law,
and that in exchange for that admission other charges against
him were being dismissed. Appellant also expressed his
understanding that his current strike offense “could be used to
increase any future punishment.” Based on this evidence, the
court found appellant’s battery offense was a serious felony that
qualified as a strike.

And if appellant had been sentenced to county jail, he would not
currently be subject to parole supervision. (See People v. Butler
(2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1351, and cases cited therein].)
Because the court’s finding that the conviction is a serious felony
will plainly subject him to additional punishment if he suffers
another felony conviction in the future (§ 667, subds. (a)-(i)), we
also reject the People’s assertion that “[a]ppellant’s argument as
to any future effects of his serious felony conviction is not ripe for
review.”

                                  4
       Appellant claims the evidence is insufficient to support the
court’s findings because battery with serious bodily injury
qualifies as a serious felony and strike only if the prosecution
additionally proves the defendant personally inflicted great
bodily injury on a person other than an accomplice. (§ 1192.7,
subd. (c)(8); Bueno, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1507.) We reject
this claim because appellant admitted in his plea colloquy that he
was pleading to a strike offense, i.e. a serious or violent felony.
“Under section 969f, subdivision (a), when the People believe that
the defendant’s offense is a serious felony, ‘the facts that make
the crime constitute a serious felony may be charged in the
accusatory pleading’ and ‘[i]f the defendant pleads guilty of the
offense charged, the question whether or not the defendant
committed a serious felony as alleged shall be separately
admitted or denied by the defendant.’ (Italics added.) The section
was enacted in order to ‘prequalify a crime as a serious felony’ for
purposes of the three strikes law. [Citation.] The section allows
‘“the fact that a crime is a serious felony to be proven at the time
the first crime is tried so that it may become a matter of record.”’
[Citations.] Where the prosecution includes a serious felony
allegation and the defendant pleads guilty or no contest, section
969f, subdivision (a), requires the defendant to admit or deny the
allegation. [Citation.]” (Bueno, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1509.)
       In Bueno, the defendant previously had been charged with
battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)) with the
following separate allegation: “‘NOTICE: The above offense is a
serious felony within the meaning of . . . section 1192.7(c)(8).’”
The defendant entered a plea of no contest to the battery charge,
but did not admit the crime was a serious felony and no other
evidence was offered to prove it was. (Bueno, supra, 143

                                 5
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1507-1508.) The trial court nevertheless
found true an allegation that the prior offense was a serious
felony upon considering the information, the plea form and the
minute order reflecting the plea. (Id. at pp. 1506-1507.) Notably,
“The plea form and minute order [did] not reflect any advisement
that defendant could face enhanced punishment in the future
under the three strikes law.” (Id, at p. 1508.)
       On appeal, the People contended “that in pleading no
contest to the battery charge, Bueno admitted the offense was a
serious felony because the information alleged that it was a
serious felony within the meaning of section 1192.7, subdivision
(c)(8).” (Bueno, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1509.) In reversing,
the court of appeal reasoned “[t]here is no evidence in this record
of compliance with section 969f, subdivision (a); that is, there is
no evidence that Bueno admitted the serious felony allegation in
the information. Absent such evidence, we must treat the
allegation as dismissed.” (Bueno, at p. 1510.)
       Appellant, unlike the defendant in Bueno, admitted that
his battery conviction was a strike and was advised of the
consequences of entering a plea to a strike. The purpose of a
section 969f admission is to qualify a crime as a serious felony.
(People v. Leslie (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 198, 204.) A defendant
who makes a section 969f admission as part of a plea to an
offense concedes the offense is a serious felony, and “the serious
felony nature of the offense will become an explicit part of the
record of conviction, leaving no room for confusion if and when
the issue becomes relevant to the sentence for a subsequent
felony.” (Delgado, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1072.)
       Appellant contends the requirements of section 969f were
not met here because his plea did not refer to the underlying
legal basis for the crime being charged as a serious felony, and he

                                 6
did not admit the conviction would be considered a serious felony
as well as a strike. While the plea does not reference the
underlying conduct, the prosecution presented evidence appellant
made an admission that the conviction was to be considered a
strike. Requiring the prosecution to produce evidence of the
underlying basis of the conviction despite appellant’s strike
admission would contravene the purpose of section 969f, which is
to allow a serious felony allegation to be proven based solely on
such an admission. By entering a plea that the conviction would
serve as a strike, it was reasonable for the court to infer the basis
for which the conviction was a strike was that it was a serious
felony and subject to a proper section 969f admission. Viewing
the evidence of the conviction in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, a rational trier of fact could infer from defendant’s
plea that he committed a serious felony and that section 969f
served to qualify the crime as such. (People v. Leslie, supra, 47
Cal.App.4th at p. 204.)4
       Our Supreme Court has cautioned that when a defendant
is convicted of a crime that may or may not qualify as a serious
felony, “it is necessary that the abstract of judgment specify, with
scrupulous accuracy, the crime of which the defendant was

      4 We note that the court’s comments at sentencing and the

parties’ briefs on appeal reflect a mistaken belief that the
prosecution could have complied with section 969f by adding a
personal infliction of great bodily injury allegation (§ 12022.7) to
the battery charge. “Because the ‘great bodily injury’
contemplated by section 12022.7 is substantially the same as the
‘serious bodily injury’ element of section 243, subdivision (d)
[citation], the section 12022.7 enhancement cannot be applied to
the crime of battery with serious bodily injury unless it involves
domestic violence.” (People v. Hawkins (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th
527, 531.) There was no allegation of domestic violence here.

                                 7
actually charged and convicted.” (Delgado, supra, 43 Cal.4th at
p. 1072.) Had the trial judge that took appellant’s plea provided
further clarity, there would have been no confusion here.
Regardless, we conclude substantial evidence supports the
sentencing court’s finding that appellant’s battery conviction is a
serious felony that qualifies as a strike within the meaning of the
three strikes law.
       As appellant correctly notes, the abstract of judgment does
not reflect the court’s finding that he was convicted of a serious
felony. We shall order the judgment amended accordingly. (See
People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [trial court’s oral
pronouncement of judgment controls if different from the abstract
of judgment].)
                           DISPOSITION
       The judgment is ordered modified to reflect that appellant’s
conviction of battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d))
is a serious felony that qualifies as a strike (§§ 667, (d)(1), 1192.7,
subd. (c)(8)). The superior court clerk shall prepare an amended
abstract of judgment and forward a copy to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the
judgment is affirmed.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                      CODY, J.

We concur:

      GILBERT, P. J.                  YEGAN, J.

                                  8
                  Jacqueline H. Duffy, Judge
                 Denise Debellefeuille, Judge
           Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
               ______________________________

      Susan Wolk, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, Lindsay Boyd, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.