Court Opinion

ID: 9721831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:10:42.629322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:28.867956
License: Public Domain

WAHL, Justice
(dissenting in part, concurring in part).
I must respectfully dissent. In every generation, parents have viewed their children’s religious and political beliefs with alarm and dismay if those beliefs were different from their own. Under the First Amendment, however, adults in our society enjoy freedoms of association and belief. In my view, it is unwise to tamper with those freedoms and with longstanding principles of tort law out of sympathy for parents seeking to help their “misguided” offspring, however well-intentioned and loving their acts may be. Whether or not, as the majority opinion asserts, The Way of Minnesota, Inc. is a “youth-oriented,” “pseudo-religious group” which pursues its “fundraising strategy” in such a way as to inflict physical and psychological harm on its members, emphasis on this characterization beclouds the purely legal issues which are presented by this appeal.
The first of those legal issues is whether, as a matter of law, any of the defendants in this case are guilty of false imprisonment of the plaintiff. The elements of the tort of false imprisonment are (1) words or acts by defendant intended to confine plaintiff, (2) actual confinement, and (3) awareness by plaintiff that she is being confined. Blaz v. Molin Concrete Products Co., 309 Minn. 382, 244 N.W.2d 277 (1976). Any imprisonment “which is not legally justifiable” is false imprisonment, Kleidon v. Glascock, 215 Minn. 417,10 N.W.2d 394 (1943); therefore, the fact that the tortfeasor acted in good faith is no defense to a charge of false imprisonment. Accord, Strong v. City of Milwaukee, 38 Wis.2d 564, 157 N.W.2d 619 (1968). Thus, although the majority opinion correctly concludes that evidence concerning the activities of The Way and the impact of those activities upon plaintiff may have been relevant to the question of whether defendants acted so willfully and maliciously as to justify an award of punitive damages, such evidence has little bearing on the issue of defendants’ liability for false imprisonment.
The unrebutted evidence shows that defendant Norman Jungclaus, the father of the 21-year-old plaintiff in this case, took his adult daughter, kicking and screaming, to a small bedroom in the basement of the Morgel home on Monday, May 23. Norman Jungclaus admitted that she did not go with him willingly. Plaintiff curled up on the bed, plugged her ears, and cried. Defendant Perkins testified that plaintiff screamed and cried and pleaded with several people to let her go, but her pleas were ignored. This situation continued until 3 a. m. Tuesday. At one point that morning, plaintiff flew at her father, and he held her arms around her from the back, in his words, “for maybe a half an hour, until she calmed down again.” Plaintiff testified that defendant Mills told her papers had been drafted to commit her to Anoka State Hospital if she continued to refuse to cooperate with the “deprogramming.”
In its memorandum accompanying the order denying plaintiff’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the trial court stated:
It should be noted that there must be considerable room for doubt concerning that portion of the verdict finding that Norman Jungclaus did not participate in a false imprisonment. The evidence is unrebutted that he picked up his 21-year-old daughter Susan and took her into the basement without her permission or consent, and against her will. She remained there several days. However, Plaintiff stated that she was not seeking *134compensatory damages against her parents, and only $1.00 in punitive damages.
In that light, judgment notwithstanding verdict as to false imprisonment would be of no significance in the matter of compensatory damages. And whether or not Mr. Jungclaus's act was done maliciously or willfully so as to justify $1.00 punitive damages is clearly a matter for determination by the jury; and not the Court. Hence, judgment notwithstanding verdict against Norman Jungclaus as to false imprisonment must be denied. On practical grounds, a new trial will not be ordered for a potential $1.00 recovery in any event.
Thus, the trial court refused to grant judgment against Norman Jungclaus because any damages awarded would be insignificant. However, plaintiff’s complaint sought not only money damages but an injunction against further interference with her freedoms of religion, association, and expression. The value to plaintiff of a judgment in her favor, while not monetary, is nevertheless significant.
The majority opinion finds, in plaintiff’s behavior during the remainder of the 16-day period of “deprogramming,” a reasonable basis for acquitting defendant Jungclaus of the false imprisonment charge for the initial three days, during which time he admittedly held plaintiff against her will. Under this theory, plaintiff’s “acquiescence” in the later stages of deprogramming operates as consent which “relates back” to the events of the earlier three days, and constitutes a “waiver” of her claims for those days. Cases cited by the majority do not lend support to this proposition. Bustamonte addressed the meaning of “voluntary consent” to the search of an automobile by police in the context of a challenge based on Fourth Amendment grounds. In Faniel the court found that an employee, who was given a ride to her home by company personnel who intended to recover unauthorized electrical equipment, had not proved an absence of lawful consent sufficient to sustain a finding of false imprisonment.1
Moreover, Weiss does not lend support to the majority’s finding. While it is true that in Weiss the plaintiff testified that she was forcibly detained against her will, the court found her testimony not credible. Id. at 721. The court there found only that parents
have the right which all citizens have to peaceably dissuade Plaintiff of her particular religious views, provided they use no form of unlawful compulsion to effect their purpose. What occurred here was simply an effort, in private, to-persuade a willing listener to disavow the tenets of the Unification Church. * * *

It is clear that Plaintiff has the right to be free of any coercive attempt to speak with her * * *.
Id. at 722.
Certainly, parents who disapprove of or disagree with the religious beliefs of their adult offspring are free to exercise their own First Amendment rights in an attempt, by speech and persuasion without physical restraints, to change their adult children’s minds. But parents who engage in tortious conduct in their “deprogramming” attempts do so at the risk that the deprogramming will be unsuccessful and the adult children will pursue tort remedies against their parents. To allow parents’ “conviction that the judgmental capacity of their [adult] child is impaired [by her religious indoctrination]” to excuse their tortious conduct sets a dangerous precedent.
Here, the evidence clearly supported a verdict against Norman Jungclaus on the false imprisonment claim, and no reasonable basis existed for denying judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The trial court’s holding in this regard should be reversed.
The second issue which particularly concerns me was the instruction by the trial *135court that the jury could consider the fact that The Way paid plaintiff’s legal bills in assessing her credibility and awarding damages. I concur with the court’s holding that such an instruction is error, although in the context of this case harmless error. I write to emphasize the compelling reasons why such an instruction should not be given. First, the fact that The Way aided and encouraged plaintiff to bring the lawsuit has little to do with whether the defendants falsely imprisoned the plaintiff or whether they intentionally inflicted emotional distress on her. It is not uncommon for a layperson to talk to others and get advice before bringing a lawsuit. Nor is it uncommon for groups to provide money and other support to its members as they pursue individual causes of action. The contributions of the NAACP, which financially assists litigation aimed at eliminating racial barriers, were recognized, as the majority opinion notes, in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431, 83 S.Ct. 328, 337, 9 L.Ed. 405 (1963). Such aid not only allows a person to exercise his or her right to seek redress through our courts, it also effectuates that fundamental underpinning of our judicial system.
In the instant case, to admit evidence that The Way paid plaintiff’s attorneys fees improperly shifted the jury’s attention from the nature of defendants’ acts to the acceptability of The Way. Such a shift of attention could unduly prejudice plaintiff because she exercised her First Amendment right of association with an unpopular religious group.
Furthermore, that evidence was irrelevant to the motive for her claim for damages. The reason plaintiff altered the amounts of compensation sought from her parents was, according to her testimony, her belief that she had to sue for money. Only after the suit was commenced did she learn that she could sue for legal protection. Plaintiff was entitled to seek compensation from the defendants individually, all together, or in any combination. Therefore, that she chose to sue her parents for a token amount has little to do with who was paying the legal fees.
The fact that a group or others support a plaintiff and may derive some benefit unrelated to plaintiff’s cause of action should not be introduced at trial and considered by the jury as it determines plaintiff’s credibility and the amount of damages to be awarded. The ultimate effect can only be to deter plaintiffs and defendants from accepting assistance from groups or causes which may not be popular in our society. This would mean that in suits like the present one, plaintiffs with unpopular beliefs who cannot afford costly legal representation must forgo their rights to seek redress in our courts or utilize the courts at the risk that evidence of support from their minority religious or political group may be used to undermine all or part of their claims.
Lastly, I would address plaintiff’s claim that the trial court erred in denying her motion to amend her complaint or add a new cause of action. I agree that the motion was properly denied because it was untimely, but I would not conclude, as suggested by footnote 4 of the majority opinion, that defendant parents’ attempts to “deprogram” their daughter from her religious beliefs did not constitute a violation of her rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Although one federal court has so held, see Weiss v. Patrick, 453 F.Supp. 717, 722 (D.R.I.), aff’d, 588 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929, 99 S.Ct. 2858, 61 L.Ed.2d 296 (1979), a number of courts have reached the contrary conclusion. In Augenti v. Cappellini, 84 F.R.D. 73 (M.D.Pa.1979), for example, defendants’ arguments that their attempts to deprogram their son “were motivated solely by parental concern * * * to further his physical and mental health” did not persuade the court that the “invidiously discriminatory animus” necessary for a § 1985(3) action was lacking. Id. at 78. Several other cases interpreting the legislative history of § 1985(3) have determined that the protection of the provisions does extend to religious groups. See Jackson v. Associated Hospital Service, 414 F.Supp. 315 (E.D.Pa.1976), aff’d, 549 F.2d 795 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 832, 98 *136S.Ct. 117, 54 L.Ed.2d 93 (1977); Rankin v. Howard, 457 F.Supp. 70, 74-75 (D.Ariz. 1978); cf. Mandelkorn v. Patrick, 359 F.Supp. 692, 697 (D.D.C.1973). In reaching this conclusion, the court in Baer v. Baer, 450 F.Supp. 481 (N.D.Cal.1978) observed:
While religious status may differ from racial status because it is not a congenital and inalterable trait, membership in a minority religious group, like membership in a minority racial group, has often excited the fear, hatred and irrationality of the majority. Two thousand years of human history compellingly prove that no easier road to martyrdom is found than in adherence to an unpopular religious faith. For these reasons, and because the legislative history does not indicate otherwise, this court concludes that religious discrimination may be encompassed by the terms of § 1985(3).
Id. at 491.

. Indeed, People v. White, 53 Mich.App. 51, 218 N.W.2d 403 (1974), affirming the defendant’s conviction for attempted kidnapping, held that later consent does not relate back to previous acts by defendant. Id. at 55-56, 218 N.W.2d at 405.