Court Opinion

ID: 9724762
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:12:03.311201+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:05.435385
License: Public Domain

WOLLE, Justice
(dissenting).
In Scieszinski v. City of Wilton, 270 N.W.2d 450 (Iowa 1978), our court construed and applied Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure 48, 49, and 55 to determine whether the filing of a petition, without more, tolled the running of a statute of limitation. Notwithstanding the tolling language of rule 55, we held the action was barred because the record showed that the plaintiff had intentionally failed to serve the original notice. Id. at 453. We explained:
The plan for starting actions contemplates that ordinarily the defendants will promptly learn of the action, but this objective is defeated if the plaintiff intentionally makes its accomplishment impossible.
Id. at 452.
The majority distinguishes Scieszinski on the ground that in this case there was *131no evidence that the plaintiff deliberately defeated the prompt issuance and service of process on the defendant. It is critical to note, however, that while there was no evidence here of an intentional delay on the part of the plaintiff, neither did the plaintiff offer any explanation whatsoever why she did not have this notice served promptly, as required by rule 49. We do know from this record that the object of prompt service which our rules promote was defeated, service not having been accomplished until some seven months after the petition was filed.
I agree with the recent decision of the Iowa Court of Appeals in Becker v. Star Auto, Inc., 376 N.W.2d 645 (Iowa Ct.App.1985), which placed the burden upon the plaintiff to demonstrate good cause for not promptly accomplishing service of process upon a defendant. Id. at 648. Like Scieszinski, Becker, and authorities construing the former federal rules of civil procedure which were similar to our present rules, I would “distinguish between delay in service of process traceable to the plaintiff’s intentional act and delay attributable to other causes such as the clerk’s neglect.” Becker, 376 N.W.2d at 647; see Scieszinski, 270 N.W.2d at 453. See generally 2 Moore Federal Practice, 113.07 (2d ed. 1986).
The plaintiff is certainly in the best position to know why she did not deliver to the clerk of court with the petition written directions for the service of the original notice and copy of petition, as required by rule 49(a) which provides in pertinent part: “Written directions for the service of the original notice and copy of petition shall be delivered to the clerk with the petition.” To accomplish the spirit and purpose of our Scieszinski holding, we should place the burden of proof on the plaintiff to establish that she had an acceptable reason for failing to comply with the. important requirement of our rules that she initiate service of process when filing her petition.
In short, I would turn this case on what the record demonstrates. Intentional delay would not be an acceptable reason, nor would any other excuse which demonstrated that the plaintiff had not in good faith intended to have a defendant promptly served. See, e.g., Murphy v. Citizens Bank of Clovis, 244 F.2d 511, 512 (10th Cir.1957) (delay of one year between filing and service coupled with fact that suit was filed solely for the purpose of tolling statute of limitations evidenced a lack of dili-gency); Caribbean Construction Corp. v. Kennedy Van Saun Manufacturing & Engineering Corp., 13 F.R.D. 124, 126-27 (S.D.N.Y.1952) (plaintiff’s 17-day delay in service in order to get priority in taking depositions constituted lack of due diligence); De-Gas, Inc. v. Midland Resources, 470 So.2d 1218, 1221-22 (Ala.1985) (plaintiff’s failure to pay statutory filing fee demonstrated lack of bona fide intent necessary for the statute of limitations to be tolled); Ward v. Saben Appliance Co., 391 So.2d 1030, 1034-35 (Ala.1980) (plaintiff’s direction to clerk to withhold service until her attorney could further investigate the claim indicated that the complaint was not filed with bona fide intention that it be served immediately; statute of limitations was not tolled).
For these reasons, I would affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendant.