Court Opinion

ID: 9907358
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 14:00:43.663924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:02:21.207805
License: Public Domain

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                                                               [PUBLISH]

                                     In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                            ____________________

                                  No. 22-11330
                            ____________________

        A1A BURRITO WORKS, INC.,
        a Florida corporation,
        A1A BURRITO WORKS TACO SHOP 2, INC.,
        a Florida corporation,
        JUNIPER BEACH ENTERPRISES, INC.,
        a Florida corporation, on behalf of themselves and those similarly
        situated,
                                                     Plaintiffs-Appellants,
        versus
        SYSCO JACKSONVILLE, INC.,
        a Delaware corporation,
                                                      Defendant-Appellee.
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        2                         Opinion of the Court                      22-11330

                                ____________________

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Middle District of Florida
                      D.C. Docket No. 3:21-cv-00041-TJC-JBT
                             ____________________

        Before GRANT, TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges, and HUFFAKER, ∗ District
        Judge.
        HUFFAKER, District Judge:
                Plaintiffs A1A Burrito Works, Inc.; A1A Burrito Works Taco
        Shop 2, Inc.; and Juniper Beach Enterprises, Inc. (the Restaurants)
        purchase packaged poultry products from Defendant Sysco
        Jacksonville, Inc., for eventual resale to consumers. The
        Restaurants brought a putative class action alleging that Sysco
        violated the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act
        (FDUTPA) and breached its contracts with the Restaurants when
        Sysco regularly delivered underweight boxes of poultry. The
        district court dismissed the Restaurants’ claims with prejudice on
        the grounds that the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA or the
        Act) preempted their state law claims. According to the district
        court, the Restaurants’ claims impermissibly sought to impose on
        Sysco labeling requirements that are “in addition to, or different
        than” the requirements prescribed by federal law. The question for

        ∗
         Honorable R. Austin Huffaker, Jr., United States District Judge for the Middle
        District of Alabama, sitting by designation.
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        22-11330              Opinion of the Court                       3

        this Court is whether the Restaurants plausibly pleaded state law
        claims premised on Sysco’s allegedly misleading labels on its
        poultry packages that are not preempted by federal law.
               After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argument,
        we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further
        proceedings. On this record, the Restaurants have not shown that
        the district court erred in dismissing their FDUTPA claim as
        preempted. But the district court did err in dismissing the
        Restaurants’ breach of contract claim to the extent the Restaurants
        allege that they did not receive the amount of poultry for which
        they paid in accordance with their contracts with Sysco. Such a
        claim is not preempted because it merely seeks to enforce the
        parties’ private agreements regarding the cost and weight of
        poultry packages and does not amount to a state imposing a
        labeling requirement inconsistent with federal regulations.
                                        I.
                                        A.
               Several federal statutes regulate food products. The United
        States Department of Agriculture regulates egg products under the
        Egg Products Inspection Act, see generally 21 U.S.C. §§ 1031–56;
        meat products under the Federal Meat Inspection Act, see
        generally 21 U.S.C. §§ 601–95 (FMIA); and poultry products under
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        4                         Opinion of the Court                   22-11330

        the PPIA, see generally 21 U.S.C. §§ 451–73. 1 The Food and Drug
        Administration regulates all other food products under the Federal
        Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, see generally 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399i
        (FDCA or FDC Act).
               As relevant here, the PPIA regulates the weighing and
        labeling of poultry products. See generally 21 U.S.C. §§ 451–73.
        The Act prohibits the sale or transport of “misbranded” poultry
        products. Id. § 458(a)(2)(A). In turn, the term “misbranded” applies
        to a poultry product “if its labeling is false or misleading in any
        particular” or “unless it bears a label showing . . . an accurate
        statement of the quantity of the product in terms of weight,
        measure, or numerical count,” with allowances for “reasonable
        variations” established by regulation. Id. § 453(h)(1), (h)(5)(B). The
        Act also contains an express preemption clause prohibiting states
        from imposing “[m]arking, labeling, packaging, or ingredient
        requirements . . . in addition to, or different than, those made under
        this chapter.” Id. § 467e. However, the Act allows states to exercise
        “concurrent jurisdiction,” consistent with the Act’s requirements,
        over the inspection of poultry products for the purpose of
        preventing the distribution of misbranded products. Id.
               The Act’s implementing regulations require labels to “bear
        a statement of the quantity of contents in terms of weights or
        measures.” 9 C.F.R. § 381.121(a). Like the statute, the regulations

        1 The parties’ briefs discuss both the FMIA and the PPIA.
                                                                The district court’s
        opinion below addressed only the PPIA. Since the parties’ dispute
        unquestionably concerns poultry products, our opinion focuses on the PPIA.
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        22-11330               Opinion of the Court                        5

        prohibit false or misleading labeling. Id. § 381.129(a) (“No poultry
        product subject to the Act shall have any false or misleading
        labeling or any container that is so made, formed, or filled as to be
        misleading.”).
               Additionally, the regulations incorporate weighing pro-
        cedures contained in the National Institute of Standards and
        Technology (NIST) Handbook 133, Fourth Edition, January 2005
        (Handbook), which is published by the United States Department
        of Commerce. Id. § 442.2. The Handbook was “developed
        primarily for the use of government officials” but “should also be
        useful to commercial and industrial establishments in the areas of
        packaging, distribution, and sale of commodities.” U.S. Dep’t of
        Com., Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., NIST Handbook 133,
        Checking the Net Contents of Packaged Goods iii (4th ed., Jan.
        2005).
              The Handbook sets forth six basic test procedures for
        weighing products:
              1. Identify and define the inspection lot.
              2. Select the sampling plan.
              3. Select the random sample.
              4. Measure the net contents of the packages in the
                 sample.
              5. Evaluate compliance with the Maximum
                 Allowable Variation MAV) requirement.
              6. Evaluate compliance with the average require-
                 ment.
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                 22-11330

        NIST Handbook 133, supra, at Ch. 2.3, page 10 (emphasis omitted).
               The Handbook explains the pros and cons of testing
        packages among different levels of the supply chain: retail,
        wholesale, and point-of-pack. The Handbook explains that retail
        testing is “an easily accessible, practical means for State, county and
        city jurisdictions to monitor packaging procedures and to detect
        present or potential problems.” Id. at Ch. 1.1, page 1. It cautions
        that retail testing generally “is not conducive to checking large
        quantities of individual products of any single production lot,” and
        “[t]herefore, follow-up inspections of a particular brand or lot code
        number at a number of retail and wholesale outlets, and ultimately
        at the point-of-pack are extremely important aspects in any
        package-checking scheme.” Id. at Ch. 1.1, page 1. The Handbook
        further notes that “[a]t the point-of-sale, a large number of
        processes may affect the quality or quantity of the product.
        Therefore, there may be many reasons for any inspection lot being
        out of compliance.” Id. Examples include mishandling the product
        in the store, the retailer’s failure to rotate stock, mishandling by a
        distributor, failure of some part of the packaging process, and
        moisture loss. Id. at Ch. 1.1, pages 1–2.
               The Handbook also explains the purpose of random
        sampling and the procedures for implementing it. Random samp-
        ling “is necessary to ensure statistical validity and reliable data,”
        and improper sampling “can lead to bias and unreliable results.” Id.
        at Ch. 1.3, page 4. Random sampling “is accomplished by using
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        22-11330                  Opinion of the Court                             7

        random numbers to determine which packages are chosen for
        inspection.” Id. 2
               But the Handbook also states that “shortcuts” and “audit
        tests” may be used “to speed the process of detecting possible net
        content violations.” NIST Handbook 133, supra, at Ch. 1.3, page
        4. These shortcuts include “using smaller sample sizes” and
        “selecting samples without collecting a random sample.” Id. The
        shortcuts cannot be used to take enforcement action, however.
               The Handbook explains that food package content labels
        must meet two separate requirements to be considered “accurate.”
        Id. at Ch. 1.2, page 2. First, accuracy must be “applied to the
        average net contents of the packages in the lot.” Id. “The second
        requirement is applied to negative errors in individual packages.”
        Id. Concerning the individual package requirement, the Hand-
        book states: “[P]ackages that are underfilled by more than the
        Maximum Allowable Variation specified for the package are
        considered unreasonable errors. Unreasonable shortages are not
        generally permitted, even when overages in other packages in the

        2 The Handbook sets forth a detailed package selection procedure using

        random numbers, which includes: (1) identifying each package in the lot of
        packages with a specific number; and (2) obtaining a series of random
        numbers, which indicate exactly which packages in the lot will be taken for
        the sample. Id. at app. B, page B-1. To select a random starting place on the
        series of random numbers, the Handbook instructs to “choose a starting page
        in the random number table and with eyes closed, drop a pencil anywhere on
        the page to indicate a starting place in the table.” Id.
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        8                        Opinion of the Court                    22-11330

        same lot, shipment or delivery compensate for such shortage.” Id.
        at 2–3.
                                            B.
               The Restaurants routinely order packaged food products,
        including poultry products, from Sysco pursuant to contracts called
        Distribution Agreements. A copy of A1A Burrito Works’
        Distribution Agreement with Sysco is attached to the second
        amended complaint (Distribution Agreement). The Distribution
        Agreement sets forth, among other things, pricing and delivery
        terms. As relevant here, it provides that pricing is determined
        based on a fee per pound. 3 The Distribution Agreement also
        contains Sysco’s warranty that its products will “not be adulterated
        or misbranded within the meaning of the FDC Act” (i.e., not falsely
        or misleadingly labeled).
                In their second amended complaint (the operative
        complaint), the Restaurants allege that their contracts with Sysco
        call for pricing to be determined based on a fee per pound. They
        also allege that on thirteen separate occasions over an
        approximately one-year period, they ordered and paid for 40-
        pound boxes of poultry but received less than 40 pounds. Each
        package was labeled, and the Restaurants were charged for, 40
        pounds, but each package weighed less, ranging from 34.7 pounds

        3 For the sake of clarity, record citations are based on the CM/ECF document

        page and paragraph numbers.
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        22-11330               Opinion of the Court                       9

        (resulting in an overcharge of 5.3 pounds) to 37.3 pounds (resulting
        in an overcharge of 2.7 pounds).
              The Restaurants allege that in weighing the poultry
        packages received from Sysco, they “undertook a good-faith,
        commercially reasonable weighing process consistent in all
        material aspects with NIST Handbook 133,” and that the process
        “considered the maximum and minimum allowable variations of
        weight for the type of Packaged Food, whether the product was
        frozen or thawed, and the tare weight.”
               The Restaurants further allege that in August 2021, the
        Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services
        inspected Sysco poultry packages at two of A1A Burrito Works’
        locations. The state inspectors inspected multiple packages that
        were advertised and sold as weighing 40 pounds, but each package
        was underweight.
               The Restaurants filed a putative class action in state court
        against Sysco, asserting claims for breach of contract under Florida
        law and violation of the FDUTPA, FLA. STAT. § 501.201 et seq.
        Sysco removed the case to federal court and filed a motion to
        dismiss. The Restaurants sought and obtained permission to
        amend their complaint twice.
               In the operative complaint, the Restaurants allege that Sysco
        systematically delivered underweight poultry packages to its
        restaurant customers. Consequently, according to the Restaur-
        ants, the labels on the poultry packages were misleading
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                22-11330

        concerning weight in violation of the FDUTPA. Concerning the
        breach of contract claim, the Restaurants allege that they had
        entered into Distribution Agreements with Sysco that provided for
        pricing to be based on a fee per pound and in which Sysco
        warranted that its products (1) “will meet the written specifications
        provided by Sysco” and (2) “will not be adulterated or misbranded
        within the meaning of the FDC Act.” The Restaurants further
        allege that “despite being charged based on specified advertised
        weights, Sysco delivered lower weights while simultaneously
        charging for higher weights.” Thus, according to the Restaurants,
        Sysco breached its contracts with them and other class members
        when it charged and collected payment for “contractually agreed-
        upon” 40-pound poultry packages while delivering packages
        weighing less. The Restaurants claim damages “consisting of the
        difference in price between what was purchased and what should
        have been delivered.”
               Sysco moved to dismiss the second amended complaint,
        raising several grounds for dismissal or narrowing of the issues,
        including that the Restaurants’ claims were preempted by the
        PPIA. The district judge referred the motion to the magistrate
        judge, and the magistrate judge recommended that the second
        amended complaint be dismissed with prejudice, addressing only
        Sysco’s preemption argument. The magistrate judge concluded
        that the Restaurants’ claims were preempted because they would
        impose different standards for testing the net weight of Sysco’s
        boxes of poultry than the standards prescribed by federal law. The
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        22-11330               Opinion of the Court                        11

        magistrate judge reasoned that the second amended complaint
        demonstrated that the Restaurants’ weighing procedures are
        “materially different” than the federal procedures governing Sysco
        because, for example, the Restaurants “did not follow, or followed
        different, requirements regarding inspection lots, random
        sampling, and evaluating average net weight.” Citing cases from
        the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the
        magistrate judge opined that to avoid preemption, the Restaurants
        “must plausibly allege that the process they used in testing [Sysco’s]
        compliance with its net weight label statement is the same as that
        governing [Sysco].”
                The magistrate judge characterized as vague and conclusory
        the Restaurants’ allegation that they undertook a good-faith,
        commercially reasonable weighing process consistent in all
        materials aspects with the Handbook. The magistrate judge also
        criticized the second amended complaint for not indicating the
        “total number of packages received from [Sysco] during the
        relevant time period, how the underweight packages were selected
        from that total for testing (whether there was a random sample
        taken from a defined inspection lot), or that [the Restaurants]
        obtained average weights of multiple packages.” The magistrate
        judge rejected the Restaurants’ position that, “from the limited
        sample of underweight packages at the retail level,” the court could
        “reasonably infer that [Sysco’s] wholesale process is somehow
        flawed or suspect, and thus, [Sysco] is liable for misleading
        labeling.”
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                22-11330

                The magistrate judge also observed that the PPIA does not
        necessarily preempt a breach of contract claim because Sysco “may
        have voluntarily taken on additional obligations by contract.” But
        according to the magistrate judge, the contract terms at issue
        “expressly invoke the same federal requirements that determine
        preemption,” citing the second amended complaint’s allegation
        and the Distribution Agreement’s provision that “Sysco represents
        and warrants that all Products . . . will not be adulterated or
        misbranded within the meaning of the [Federal Food, Drug, and
        Cosmetic Act].” Thus, according to the magistrate judge, the
        preemption analysis for the FDUTPA and breach of contact claims
        is the same—the Restaurants “must plausibly allege that [Sysco’s]
        labels are misleading as defined by federal law”—but the
        Restaurants had not done so. The magistrate judge did not discuss
        the second amended complaint’s allegations that the parties’
        contract calls for pricing to be determined based on a fee per pound
        and “despite being charged based on specified advertised weights,
        Sysco delivered lower weights while simultaneously charging for
        higher weights.”
              The district judge adopted the report and recommendation,
        granted Sysco’s motion, and dismissed the Restaurants’ second
        amended complaint with prejudice. The Restaurants timely
        appealed.
                                        II.
              “We review preemption determinations de novo.”
        Cavalieri v. Avior Airlines C.A., 25 F.4th 843, 847 (11th Cir. 2022)
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        22-11330               Opinion of the Court                      13

        (per curiam) (quoting Bailey v. Rocky Mountain Holdings, LLC,
        889 F.3d 1259, 1266 (11th Cir. 2018)). And we review a district
        court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss de novo, accepting the
        complaint’s factual allegations as true and construing them in the
        light most favorable to the nonmovants. Id.
                                        III.
                                        A.
               The Restaurants argue that, at a minimum, their breach of
        contract claim is not preempted. They assert that, despite acknow-
        ledging that “customers may seek greater contractual protections
        that do not rely on federal standards for mislabeling,” the district
        court nonetheless improperly conflated their FDUTPA and breach
        of contract claims and failed to separately analyze their
        independent breach of contract claim—that Sysco failed to deliver
        the products contracted and paid for. The Restaurants explain that
        their contracts with Sysco provided for pricing to be based on a fee
        per pound, and despite being charged for specified weights, Sysco
        “delivered different and lower weights while charging for higher
        weights.” Thus, according to the Restaurants, Sysco breached its
        contracts with them “by not delivering contractually agreed-upon
        weights for which the Restaurants paid as per the contract.” Sysco
        does not respond to this argument, instead focusing on the
        operative complaint’s allegations that Sysco violated the FDC Act-
        related warranty.
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        14                        Opinion of the Court                    22-11330

                We have not yet addressed breach of contract claims in the
        context of PPIA preemption. But in the context of other federal
        statutes, both this Court and the United States Supreme Court have
        held that breach of contract claims seeking to enforce a defendant’s
        voluntary undertaking are not preempted because such claims do
        not amount to a state imposing a requirement inconsistent with
        federal regulations. For example, we have found breach of
        contract claims against airlines concerning pricing not to be
        preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), even though
        the ADA prohibits state regulation of airline pricing. 4 Am. Airlines,
        Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 222 (1995) (“We hold that the ADA’s
        preemption prescription bars state-imposed regulation of air
        carriers, but allows room for court enforcement of contract terms
        set by the parties themselves.”); Cavalieri, 25 F.4th at 846
        (“Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim seeks merely to enforce the
        parties’ private agreements regarding the cost of passage and does
        not invoke state laws or regulations to alter the agreed-upon
        price.”).
              In Cavalieri, the plaintiffs alleged that they had purchased
        commercial airline tickets from the defendant airline, entering into
        a contract whose terms are reflected in the airline’s “Contract of
        Carriage and the issued tickets.” 25 F.4th at 846. According to the

        4 Unlike the PPIA, which prohibits states from imposing labeling or packaging

        requirements “in addition to, or different than” federal requirements, 21
        U.S.C. § 467e, the ADA prohibits states from imposing any law or regulation
        related to an air carrier’s pricing, see 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).
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        22-11330                Opinion of the Court                          15

        plaintiffs, the ticket price included all taxes and fees. Id. However,
        the airline later told the plaintiffs that they “had to pay an additional
        $80 ‘Exit Fee’ before being allowed to board their flights.” Id. The
        district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ putative class action
        complaint on the grounds that the breach of contract claim was
        preempted by the ADA. Id. at 847. The plaintiffs appealed, and we
        reversed. Id. at 854. In rejecting preemption’s applicability, we
        explained how the plaintiffs alleged that the airline had agreed to
        transport them to their destination for the ticketed price, “inclusive
        of all fees and taxes,” and the airline allegedly breached that
        agreement by charging an additional Exit Fee. Id. at 851. We thus
        concluded that the plaintiffs’ claim “seeks recovery solely for the
        alleged breach of [the airline’s] own, self-imposed undertaking
        regarding the price charged for transport.” Id.
               Additionally, in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, the
        Supreme Court held that an express warranty claim was not
        preempted by another federal labeling statute—the Federal
        Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)—even though
        the express warranty was located on the product’s label, explaining
        that “a cause of action on an express warranty asks only that a
        manufacturer make good on the contractual commitment that it
        voluntarily undertook by placing that warranty on its product.”
        544 U.S. 431, 444 (2005). The plaintiffs in Bates sued the manu-
        facturer of Strongarm, a weed killer used on peanut crops, over a
        label on the product. Id. at 434–36. The label stated: “Use of
        Strongarm is recommended in all areas where peanuts are
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        16                      Opinion of the Court                   22-11330

        grown.” Id. at 435. The plaintiffs alleged that the manufacturer
        knew or should have known that Strongarm would stunt peanut
        growth in soils with pH levels of 7.0 or greater, and that when the
        plaintiffs used Strongarm on their farms, whose soils have pH
        levels of 7.2 or higher, Strongarm damaged their peanut crops and
        failed to control the growth of weeds. Id. The plaintiffs brought
        an express warranty claim under Texas law concerning the label’s
        “warranty” that the product’s use was recommended “in all areas
        where peanuts are grown.” Id. at 435–36.
                FIFRA’s preemption provision prohibits states from
        “impos[ing] or continu[ing] in effect any requirements for labeling
        or packaging in addition to or different from those required under
        this subchapter.” 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b). 5 The Fifth Circuit Court of
        Appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal on preemption
        grounds, interpreting § 136v(b) to preempt any state law claim in
        which “a judgment against [the manufacturer] would induce it to
        alter its product label.” Bates, 544 U.S. at 436 (citation omitted).

              The Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiffs’ express
        warranty claim was not preempted. Id. at 444. The Court
        observed that common-law rules requiring manufacturers “to
        honor their express warranties or other contractual commitments

        5 This language is comparable to the PPIA’s preemption provision, which

        prohibits states from imposing labeling or packaging requirements “in
        addition to, or different than, those made under this chapter,” 21 U.S.C.
        § 467e.
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        22-11330               Opinion of the Court                      17

        plainly do not qualify as requirements for ‘labeling or packaging,’”
        explaining that such rules do not require manufacturers to “label
        or package their products in any particular way.” Id. (emphasis
        added). The Court acknowledged that the manufacturer’s express
        warranty was located on the product’s label but reasoned that an
        express warranty claim “asks only that a manufacturer make good
        on the contractual commitment that it voluntarily undertook by
        placing that warranty on its product.” Id. And “[b]ecause this
        common-law rule does not require the manufacturer to make an
        express warranty, or in the event that the manufacturer elects to
        do so, to say anything in particular in that warranty, the rule does
        not impose a requirement ‘for labeling or packaging.’” Id. at 444–
        45.

               Citing Bates, at least one district court in this circuit has
        observed that the PPIA generally would not preempt an express
        warranty claim “because an express warranty claim merely holds
        the defendant responsible for delivering the product as warranted.”
        Kuenzig v. Kraft Foods, Inc., No. 8:11-cv-838-T-24 TGW, 2011 WL
        4031141, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 12, 2011) (citing Bates, 544 U.S. at
        431).

              The Restaurants argue that their independent breach of
        contract claim—that they have a contract with Sysco under which
        they seek relief for Sysco’s alleged failure to deliver what was
        contracted and paid for—is not preempted because Sysco
        voluntarily undertook obligations to deliver contractually agreed-
        upon weights at contractually agreed-upon prices. We agree. The
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                22-11330

        Restaurants pleaded a breach of contract claim seeking merely to
        enforce the parties’ voluntary agreement regarding pricing and
        weight, and it does not depend on federal labeling or packaging
        standards. Cf. Cavalieri, 25 F.4th at 846. The Restaurants allege
        that Sysco agreed for the pricing of packaged poultry to be based
        on a fee per pound, and that Sysco breached that agreement by
        charging the Restaurants for packages containing 40 pounds while
        delivering packages containing less. Thus, similar to the express
        warranty claim in Bates and the breach of contract claim in
        Cavalieri, the Restaurants’ claim asks only that Sysco honor the
        contractual obligations regarding prices and weights of packaged
        poultry that Sysco voluntarily undertook when it entered into
        Distribution Agreements with the Restaurants. See Bates, 544 U.S.
        at 444; Cavalieri, 25 F.4th at 851. A common-law rule requiring
        Sysco to honor its contractual commitments “plainly do[es] not
        qualify as [a] requirement[] for ‘labeling or packaging’” because
        such a rule does not require Sysco to label or package its poultry
        products “in any particular way.” See Bates, 544 U.S. at 444.
        Because the Restaurants’ breach of contract claim does not impose
        any labeling or packaging requirement on Sysco, the PPIA does not
        preempt it. See id.

               Sysco’s alleged obligation to deliver the amount of packaged
        poultry for which the Restaurants were charged and for which they
        paid, and not some lesser amount, is a self-imposed undertaking,
        the alleged breach of which gives rise to a cause of action that the
        PPIA does not preempt. In focusing exclusively on the Rest-
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        22-11330              Opinion of the Court                      19

        aurants’ allegation and the contract provision concerning the FDC
        Act, the district court overlooked the more straightforward breach
        of contract claim that was pleaded in the operative complaint.
        Thus, we conclude that the district court erred in dismissing the
        Restaurants’ breach of contract claim.

                                        B.

                The Restaurants also argue that the district court erred in
        dismissing their FDUTPA claim as preempted. They argue that the
        Handbook was designed to assist government employees con-
        ducting compliance testing and did not create a pleading standard
        for businesses seeking to bring claims concerning mislabeled
        products. They further contend that it is impossible for businesses
        to strictly comply with all of the Handbook’s weighing procedures
        prior to filing a lawsuit.

                The district court reasoned that to avoid preemption, the
        Restaurants “must plausibly allege that the process they used in
        testing [Sysco’s] compliance with its net weight label statement is
        the same as that governing [Sysco].” On appeal, Sysco distances
        itself somewhat from this position, and it insists we need not hold
        that the Restaurants were required to “follow every jot and tittle”
        of the Handbook’s weighing procedures. Instead, according to
        Sysco, we may affirm the district court on the grounds that the
        procedures allegedly used by the Restaurants are so materially
        different from the federal procedures that the second amended
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        20                         Opinion of the Court                       22-11330

        complaint fails to plausibly allege that Sysco violated federal law,
        thereby rendering the Restaurants’ claims preempted.

               For a state requirement to be preempted by the PPIA, it
        must satisfy two conditions: (1) it must be a requirement for
        “labeling” or “packaging,” and (2) it must impose a labeling or
        packaging requirement that is “in addition to, or different than,
        those made under” the PPIA. See 21 U.S.C. § 467e; see also Bates,
        544 U.S. at 444 (analyzing FIFRA’s preemption provision).

               If Sysco’s poultry packages are not underweight when
        evaluated according to federal regulations, any state law claim that
        the packages are nonetheless underweight—and thus the label
        misleading—is preempted because it would impermissibly impose
        weight—and thus labeling—requirements on Sysco that are “in
        addition to, or different than” those imposed by federal law. Thus,
        while we do not agree fully with the district court’s reasoning, 6 we
        agree with the district court insofar as it concluded that the

        6 We disagree with the district court to the extent it concluded that the

        Restaurants failed to adequately allege random sampling, in light of the
        Handbook’s permitting “[s]hortcuts . . . to speed the process of detecting
        possible net content violations, including “selecting samples without
        collecting a random sample.” See NIST Handbook 133, supra, at Ch. 1.3, page
        4. Additionally, we disagree with the district court to the extent it concluded
        that the Restaurants failed to adequately allege testing beyond the retail level,
        given that the Handbook lauds retail-level testing as an “easily accessible,
        practical means for State, county and city jurisdictions to monitor packaging
        procedures and to detect present or potential problems.” See id. at Ch. 1.1,
        page 1.
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        22-11330               Opinion of the Court                        21

        Restaurants had to allege sufficient facts to permit the reasonable
        inference that Sysco delivered packaged poultry that was
        underweight by federal standards.

                After carefully considering the Restaurants’ arguments
        raised in their opening brief on appeal, the Restaurants have not
        persuaded us that the district court erred in concluding that they
        failed to plausibly allege the poultry packages were underweight
        by federal standards. The district court identified multiple
        purported deficiencies in the operative complaint that, according
        to the district court, operated as barriers to the plausibility of the
        Restaurants’ claim, including the Restaurants’ failure to allege the
        total number of poultry packages received from Sysco during the
        relevant period or the packages’ average weights—information
        known or knowable to the Restaurants. But the Restaurants do
        not explain, let alone persuasively so, why their claim is plausible
        (and not preempted) notwithstanding these deficiencies, partic-
        ularly the Handbook’s admonition that accuracy of content labels
        must be “applied to the average net contents of the packages in the
        lot,” NIST Handbook 133, supra, at Ch. 1.2, page 2.

               In their reply brief, the Restaurants argued that they
        established that Sysco’s poultry packages “exceeded the applicable
        MAV,” citing as an example the second amended complaint’s
        allegation that on one occasion, one of the Restaurants received a
        package weighing approximately 35.4 pounds, “resulting in an
        overcharge of 4.6 pounds—a stunning 11.5% of the total order.”
        And at oral argument, the Restaurants argued that “all [they] [had]
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        22                     Opinion of the Court                  22-11330

        to plead is that these individual packages were beyond the
        Maximum Allowable Variation, MAV,” an argument that was also
        advanced by the Amicus. However, neither of these arguments
        appears in the Restaurants’ opening brief.

                “[W]e do not consider arguments ‘not raised in a party’s
        initial brief and made for the first time at oral argument.’” Holland
        v. Gee, 677 F.3d 1047, 1066 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting APA Excelsior
        III L.P. v. Premiere Techs., Inc., 476 F.3d 1261, 1269 (11th Cir.
        2007)). “Issues not raised in an initial brief are deemed forfeited
        and will not be addressed absent extraordinary circumstances.”
        Anthony v. Georgia, 69 F.4th 796, 807 (11th Cir. 2023) (citing
        United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir.) (en banc),
        cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 95 (2022)). Extraordinary circumstances
        may exist when:

              (1) the issue involves a pure question of law and
              refusal to consider it would result in a miscarriage of
              justice; (2) the party lacked an opportunity to raise the
              issue at the district court level; (3) the interest of
              substantial justice is at stake; (4) the proper resolution
              is beyond any doubt; or (5) the issue presents
              significant questions of general impact or of great
              public concern.

        Campbell, 26 F.4th at 873. If we conclude that one of these
        circumstances applies, we must “then decide whether the issue is
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        22-11330               Opinion of the Court                       23

        extraordinary enough for us to exercise our discretion and excuse
        the forfeiture.” Id. at 875.

                The Restaurants’ MAV arguments appear compelling.
        According to the Handbook, food package content labels must
        meet two separate requirements to be considered “accurate.”
        NIST Handbook 133, supra, at Ch. 1.2, page 2. First, accuracy must
        be “applied to the average net contents of the packages in the lot.”
        Id. “The second requirement is applied to negative errors in in-
        dividual packages.” Id. The Handbook further states that “[t]hese
        requirements apply simultaneously to the inspection of all lots of
        packages except as specified in ‘Exceptions to the Average and
        Individual Package Requirements,’” which are not applicable here.
        Id. Concerning the individual package requirement, the Hand-
        book states: “[P]ackages that are underfilled by more than the
        Maximum Allowable Variation specified for the package are
        considered unreasonable errors. Unreasonable shortages are not
        generally permitted, even when overages in other packages in the
        same lot, shipment or delivery compensate for such shortage.” Id.
        at 2–3.

              For 40-pound boxes of poultry, the MAV is 1% of the labeled
        weight, or 0.4 pounds. Id. at tbl. 2-9, page A-11. And the applicable
        sampling plans allow only a small number of packages to be
        underweight beyond the MAV. The Handbook does not allow for
        any packages to be underweight beyond the MAV until the lot size
        exceeds 3,200 and the sample size is 48. Id. at tbl. 2-1, page A-2.
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        24                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11330

        Even then, the lot fails if more than one package is underweight
        beyond the MAV. Id.

                 Unfortunately for the Restaurants, however, they forfeited
        any argument that they only had to allege that individual packages
        are underweight by more than the MAV because they did not raise
        it in their opening brief. Their opening brief contains a single
        reference to the MAV: a quote of the second amended complaint’s
        allegation that their weighing process “considered the maximum .
        . . allowable variations of weight for the type of Packaged Food.”
        Although “briefs should be read liberally to ascertain the issues
        raised on appeal,” Regions Bank v. Legal Outsource PA, 936 F.3d
        1184, 1200 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Swann, 27
        F.3d 1539, 1542 (11th Cir. 1994)), a liberal reading of the
        Restaurants’ opening brief does not transform their passing
        reference to the MAV into an argument that they can avoid
        preemption solely with MAV-based allegations. And although the
        Restaurants’ belated argument may appear compelling, we lack the
        benefit of full briefing by both sides addressing the meaning of the
        Handbook’s MAV-related provisions. And adherence to the party
        presentation principle is one important reason why we generally
        decline to decide issues not (timely) raised on appeal. See
        Campbell, 26 F.4th at 872; id. at 893–94, 897 (Newsom and Jordan,
        J.J., dissenting).

              Additionally, no exceptional circumstances apply here,
        “because a refusal to consider the issue would not result in a
        miscarriage of justice, the issue is not one of substantial justice, the
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        22-11330              Opinion of the Court                      25

        proper resolution is not beyond any doubt, and the issue does not
        present significant questions of general impact or of great public
        concern.” See Anthony, 69 F.4th at 808 (citing Campbell, 26 F.4th
        at 873). Moreover, the issue is not “extraordinary enough for us to
        exercise our discretion and excuse the forfeiture.” See Campbell,
        26 F.4th at 875. Consequently, on this record, the Restaurants have
        failed to show that the district court erred in dismissing their
        FDUTPA claim as preempted.

                                       IV.

               For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the dismissal of the
        FDUTPA claim, REVERSE the dismissal of the breach of contract
        claim, and REMAND for further proceedings.