Court Opinion

ID: 9373500
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:05:29.64717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:42.102021
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     KONSTANTINA TATSIS,                                DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                            CB-7121-16-0003-V-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND                          DATE: August 9, 2022
       URBAN DEVELOPMENT,
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Rushab Sanghvi, Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the appellant.

           Lawrence E. McDermott, Esquire, and Patricia McGarvey Knebels,
             Esquire, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for the agency.

                                               BEFORE

                                Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                 Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                  Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                               ORDER

¶1         Pursuant to the Board’s instructions in this arbitration review matter,
     the administrative judge issued a September 25, 2017 recommended decision
     finding   that    the   appellant   did    not   prove   her   affirmative   defense   of

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                          2

     discrimination and   that   the   agency   proved     its   charge   of   unacceptable
     performance. Tatsis v. Department of Housing & Urban Development, MSPB
     Docket    No.   CB-7121-16-0003-H-1,       Referral   Proceeding     File, Tab    104,
     Recommended Decision (RD). For the reasons set forth below, we FORWARD
     the case to the Northeastern Regional Office for further adjudication in
     accordance with this Order and Santos v. National Aeronautics & Space
     Administration, 990 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2021).

                                       BACKGROUND
¶2        The agency removed the appellant, effective October 1, 2014, for failure to
     demonstrate acceptable performance in a critical element of her p osition during a
     90-day performance improvement plan (PIP) period.            Tatsis v. Department of
     Housing & Urban Development, MSPB Docket No. CB-7121-16-0003-V-1,
     Request for Review (RFR) File, Tab 6 at 491-99, Tab 7 at 75-81. The appellant
     filed a grievance challenging her removal, and thereafter her union invoked
     arbitration.    RFR File, Tab 6 at 24.       Following a hearing, the arbitrator
     denied the grievance, finding that the agency met its burden of proof in a
     performance-based action under 5 U.S.C. chapter 43, that the appellant failed to
     establish that the agency violated the applicable collective bargaining agreement,
     and that the appellant failed to establish that she had requested a reasonable
     accommodation. RFR File, Tab 6 at 22-33. The appellant filed a request for
     review of the arbitration decision, in which she challenged, among other things,
     the arbitrator’s failure to consider a reasonable accommodation request
     she alleges was ignored by the agency, the arbitrator’s rulings regarding the
     admissibility of certain evidence, and the arbitrator’s finding that the agency
     afforded her a reasonable opportunity to improve her performance. Id. at 4-18.
     The agency opposed the appellant’s request for review. RFR File, Tab 10.
¶3        In a June 16, 2016 Order, the Board held that the arbitrator erred
     in analyzing the appellant’s affirmative defense of discrimination because:
                                                                                      3

     (1) he discounted the appellant’s testimony that she requested a reasonable
     accommodation during a January 2013 telephone conversation because it was not
     corroborated by documentary evidence; (2) he failed to set forth a legal standard
     or analytical framework for adjudicating the discrimination claim; (3) he failed
     to consider whether the appellant was raising not only a cl aim of disability
     discrimination on the basis of the agency’s failure to accommodate her disability
     but also a claim of disparate treatment on the basis of sex under the Pregnancy
     Discrimination Act (PDA); and (4) he failed to make findings regarding the
     appellant’s claim that she had made a second request for accommodation in
     September 2014.     Tatsis v. Department of Housing & Urban Development,
     MSPB Docket No. CB-7121-16-0003-V-1, Order, ¶¶ 11-16 (June 16, 2016). The
     Board also concluded that the arbitrator erred in ruling that three emails between
     the appellant’s supervisor and an employee relations specialist were protected by
     the Freedom of Information Act’s deliberative process privilege and excluding
     the emails from evidence. Id., ¶¶ 21-24. Finally, the Board determined that the
     appellant’s other arguments did not provide a basis to reverse the arbitrator’s
     findings, but the Board also concluded that it could not sustain the arbitrator’s
     finding that the agency proved the charge of unacceptab le performance until the
     evidentiary and discrimination analysis errors were addressed. Id., ¶¶ 28-29.
¶4        The Board vacated the arbitration decision, reversed the arbitrator’s
     evidentiary ruling excluding the three emails, and forwarded the matter to the
     Northeastern Regional Office for further adjudication of the appellant’s
     discrimination claim and the merits of the charge of unacceptable performance.
     Id., ¶¶ 1, 16, 24, 30-31. The Board directed the administrative judge to notify
     the appellant of the elements and burdens of proof to establish her discrimination
     claim, clarify whether the appellant was raising a claim of discrimination on the
     basis of sex or disability, or both, and allow the parties to further develop the
     record on the discrimination claim. Id., ¶¶ 17-18. The Board also ordered the
     administrative judge to make credibility determinations regarding the appellant’s
                                                                                      4

     testimony about the alleged January 2013 reasonable accommodation request,
     analyze the effect of the PDA on the case, and make findings regarding the
     appellant’s allegation that she made a second accommodation request in
     September 2014.     Id., ¶¶ 18-20.   Next, the Board directed the administrative
     judge to admit the three emails at issue into evidence and allow the parties to
     further develop the record regarding the emails. Id., ¶ 24. The Board further
     opined that the administrative judge could adopt the arbitrator’s findings
     regarding the merits of the charge of unacceptable performance if he found that
     the appellant failed to prove her affirmative defense of discrimination and the
     findings were supported by the record, as supplemented by the three emails. Id.,
     ¶ 30.
¶5           Following a supplemental hearing, the administrative judge issued a
     recommended decision finding that the appellant had failed to establish her
     affirmative defense of discrimination and adopting the arbitrator’s findings
     sustaining the agency’s removal for unacceptable performance.           RD.    The
     administrative judge found that the appellant elected not to raise a claim of sex
     discrimination on the basis of the PDA or any other theory. RD at 9. As to the
     appellant’s claim of disability discrimination, the administrative judge found that
     the appellant was an individual with a disability. RD at 10 -12. However, based
     on his credibility assessment of the testimony of the appellant and other
     witnesses, he deemed it implausible that the appellant had asked her supervisor
     for an accommodation for her disability in January 2013, and, even if, as
     she testified, she had spoken with her supervisor, her statements were
     insufficient to place her supervisor on notice that she was requesting
     an accommodation.      RD at 12-15.      In addition, the administrative judge
     determined that there was some confusion as to whether the appellant and her
     union representative asserted in their September 2014 responses to the proposed
     removal that the appellant’s supervisor had failed to engage in the interactive
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     process 2 upon receiving the appellant’s alleged request for accommodation in
     January 2013 or whether their responses requested that the reasonable
     accommodation      process   begin    anew.      RD    at   15-19.     Nevertheless,
     the administrative judge concluded that the deciding official reasonably
     requested medical documentation to support the appellant’s assertions, but that
     none was provided, and thus it seemed that the appellant had failed to continue
     to engage in the interactive process.          RD at 17-19.       According to the
     administrative judge, even if the agency had failed to engage in the interactive
     process, it did not result in the failure to provide a reasonable accommodation,
     as the record did not reflect that the appellant’s requests for ac commodation
     were reasonable. RD at 19-20. In sum, the administrative judge found that the
     appellant did not prove her affirmative defense of disability discrimination and
     recommended rejecting the affirmative defense. RD at 19-20.
¶6        Regarding the merits of the removal action, the administrative judge stated
     that, to sustain a performance-based removal, the agency must show by
     substantial evidence that: (1) the Office of Personnel Management approved its
     performance appraisal system; (2) the appellant’s performance standards and
     critical elements of her position were communicated to her; (3) the appellant’s
     performance standards were valid under the statute; (4) the agency warned the
     appellant of the inadequacies of her performance during the appraisal pe riod and
     gave her a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate acceptable performance; and
     (5) the appellant’s performance remained unacceptable in one or more of the
     critical elements for which she was provided an opportunity to demonstrate
     acceptable performance. RD at 5 (citing Towne v. Department of the Air Force,

     2
       The interactive process is the activity that happens between an employee and the
     agency after the employee requests reasonable accommodation and is the process for
     determining the nature of the accommodation. Brown v. Department of the Interior,
     121 M.S.P.R. 205, ¶ 21 (2014); 29 C.F.R. part 1630 app. (“The appropriate reasonable
     accommodation is best determined through a flexible, interactive process that involves
     both the employer and the individual with a disability.”).
                                                                                         6

     120 M.S.P.R. 239, ¶ 6 (2013), and Lee v. Environmental Protection Agency, 115
     M.S.P.R. 533, ¶ 5 (2010)). The administrative judge did not find persuasive the
     appellant’s allegation that she did not have a reasonable opportunity to
     demonstrate acceptable performance during the performance improvement
     period.     RD at 20-21.     The administrative judge found that the appellant’s
     testimony on this issue was contradicted by the record and credible witness
     testimony, and the three newly admitted emails did not show that her proposed
     removal was predetermined.        RD at 21-25.     Accordingly, the administrative
     judge found that the appellant had a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate
     improved performance and recommended affirming the arbitrator’s decision.
     RD at 25.
¶7        The administrative judge’s recommended decision informed the parties that
     the recommended decision would be forwarded back to the Board and that the
     parties could file exceptions to the recommended decision within 20 days of the
     date of the recommended decision. RD at 26. Neither party filed exceptions to
     the recommended decision.

                                          ANALYSIS
     With the exception of his recommendation that we affirm the arbitrator’s
     decision, we adopt the administrative judge’s findings in the recommended
     decision.
¶8        Absent exceptions to the administrative judge’s recommended decision, and
     based on our review of the decision, with the exception of his ultimate
     recommendation that we affirm the arbitrator’s decision—which we cannot
     presently adopt for reasons stated below—we adopt the administrative judge’s
     findings therein.     Cf. Special Counsel v. Goewert, 64 M.S.P.R. 320, 321-22
     (1994) (adopting an administrative law judge’s recommended decision in
     an Office of Special Counsel disciplinary action case when no exceptions were
     filed).     As   to   the   appellant’s   affirmative   defense   of   discrimination,
     the administrative judge properly found that the appellant did not elect to raise a
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     claim of sex discrimination. RD at 9. In finding that the appellant did not prove
     by   preponderant     evidence        her   claim        of    disability   discrimination,     the
     administrative     judge      analyzed      the     appellant’s         alleged     requests    for
     accommodation in January 2013 and September 2014, made detailed credibility
     findings, and considered the record evidence as a whole.                          RD at 9-20; see
     Clemens v. Department of the Army, 120 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶¶ 12-17 (2014)
     (determining that the agency did not fail to provide a reasonable accommodation
     because the appellant neither requested accommodation nor adequately provided
     information      concerning     his     ability     to        return   to   his    position    with
     an accommodation); see also Clay v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 245,
     ¶ 6 (2016) (finding that the Board will not disturb an administrative judge’s
     findings when she considered the evidence as a whole, drew appropriate
     inferences, and made reasoned conclusions on issues of credi bility).
¶9        The administrative judge also properly analyzed the record evidence and
     determined that the agency proved by substantial evidence that the agency
     provided the appellant with a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate acceptable
     performance and ultimately concluded that the agency proved its charge of
     unacceptable performance. RD at 20-25; see Goodwin v. Department of the Air
     Force, 75 M.S.P.R. 204, 206-09 (1997) (concluding that the agency afforded the
     appellant a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate acceptable performance when
     it provided the appellant with a detailed performance improvement plan and
     abundant written feedback during the plan, and her supervisor made herself
     available to provide assistance, but the appellant did not req uest assistance).
     Accordingly, we discern no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s findings
     and, pending the outcome of the additional proceedings discussed below, adopt
     them as findings of the Board. See Clay, 123 M.S.P.R. 245, ¶ 6.
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      This matter must be forwarded to the administrative judge to afford the parties
      an opportunity to submit evidence and argument regarding whether the appellant
      performed unacceptably prior to her placement on a PIP.
¶10        Although the appellant has identified no basis for us to disturb th e
      administrative judge’s findings in the recommended decision, we nonetheless
      must forward this appeal to the administrative judge for another reason. During
      the pendency of this case before the Board following the recommended decision ,
      the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) held in
      Santos, 990 F.3d at 1360-61, that in addition to the five elements required to
      sustain a performance-based removal set forth in the recommended decision, the
      agency also must justify the institution of a PIP by proving by substantial
      evidence that the employee’s performance was unacceptable prior to the PIP.
      The Federal Circuit’s decision in Santos applies to all pending cases, including
      this one, regardless of when the events took place.       Lee v. Department of
      Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 11, ¶ 16.       Although the record in this appeal
      already contains evidence suggesting that the appellant’s performance leading up
      to the PIP was indeed unacceptable, we forward the appeal to give the parties the
      opportunity to present argument and additional evidence on whether the
      appellant’s performance during the period leading up to the PIP was
      unacceptable in one or more critical elements. See id., ¶¶ 16-17. In adjudicating
      the forwarded appeal, the administrative judge shall accept argument and
      evidence on this issue and shall hold a supplemental hearing if appropriate. Id.,
      ¶ 17. The administrative judge shall then issue a new recommended decision
      consistent with Santos. Id. If the agency makes the additional showing required
      under Santos, the administrative judge may incorporate his prior findings on
      other elements of the agency’s case in the new recommended decision.           Id.
      Regardless of whether the agency meets its burden, if the argument or evidence
      developed in the new proceeding regarding the appellant’s pre-PIP performance
      affects the administrative judge’s findings on the other issues, he should address
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      such argument or evidence in the new recommended decision. Cf. Spithaler v.
      Office of Personnel Management, 1 M.S.P.R. 587, 589 (1980) (explaining that an
      initial decision must identify all material issues of fact and law, summarize the
      evidence, resolve issues of credibility, and include the administrative judge’s
      conclusions of law and his legal reasoning, as well as the authorities on which
      that reasoning rests).

                                         ORDER
¶11        For the reasons discussed above, we forward this case to the Northeastern
      Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Order. After the
      administrative judge issues the recommended decision, the case will be
      forwarded back to the Board.         The parties may file exceptions to the
      administrative judge’s recommended decision with the Clerk of the Board within
      20 days of the date of the recommended decision. The parties may respond to
      any submission by the other party within 15 days of the date of such submission.
      The Board will subsequently issue a final decision on the merits of the
      appellant’s request for review.

      FOR THE BOARD:                          /s/ for
                                              Jennifer Everling
                                              Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.