Court Opinion

ID: 9925752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-22 21:14:09.827259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:31.340062
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 STATE OF WASHINGTON,
                                                   No. 84776-7-I
                      Respondent,
                                                   DIVISION ONE
               v.
                                                   UNPUBLISHED OPINION
 CONNOR WILLIAM DANIELS,

                      Appellant.

       CHUNG, J. — Connor Daniels pleaded guilty to several sex offenses. At

sentencing, the trial court denied his request for a special sex offender

sentencing alternative (SSOSA). He alleged ineffective assistance of counsel

because his attorney failed to move for recusal of the sentencing judge after the

judge disclosed that she had represented the victim’s mother more than six years

earlier on a civil matter. He also raises errors in his sentence, which the State

concedes.

       Because Daniels does not establish either deficient performance or

prejudice, we deny the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and affirm his

convictions and sentence. However, we remand to the sentencing court to

amend his judgment and sentence to reduce his term of community custody and

strike the Victim Penalty Assessment.
No. 84776-7-I/2

                                      FACTS

       Daniels pleaded guilty to three counts of rape of a child in the third degree

and one count of indecent liberties. He agreed to an offender score of 13,

resulting in a standard sentencing range of 87 to 116 months of incarceration. At

the time of the plea, the State reserved its sentencing recommendations pending

the outcome of a presentence investigation report and additional information from

Daniels. The State specified that if it agreed to a SSOSA, the recommendation

would be 12 months in full custody, and if it opposed a SSOSA, the

recommendation would be a standard range of 87 to 116 months in custody.

       During the plea hearing, the judge told the parties that when preparing for

the proceedings, she became aware that she had previously represented the

victim’s mother. She disclosed that while in private practice, more than six years

before, she had represented the mother in a civil matter. The judge elaborated,

“It was a limited form of representation. Obviously it wasn’t regarding any of

these allegations which happened later, and I certainly have no concern about

my ability to be fair and impartial.” When asked, both parties stated they had no

concerns about the information disclosed.

       At sentencing, the State asked the court to impose the low end of the

standard range sentence, 87 months, rather than a SSOSA. The State’s first

reason for this recommendation was that the victim did not support the

alternative sentence, and “under the SSOSA statute, . . . the Court should give

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No. 84776-7-I/3

great weight to that.” 1 Additionally, the State did not believe a SSOSA would

serve a purpose because the treatment provider assessed Daniels as low risk to

reoffend and recommended only 12 to 18 months of treatment: “if he’s not a risk

to the community and needs very little treatment, I see no reason for a SSOSA.”

The State argued, “[W]hen I look at this evaluation and the DOC

recommendation, I see a very low-risk offender who is only engaging in this

because of his high offender score.” The State explained that Daniels had a high

offender score due to four prior convictions for second degree burglary. In

formulating a sentencing recommendation, the State considered that Daniels

“obtained a very favorable recommendation on that first case, and he reaped the

benefits of a very low sentence on that. He served four months in custody and

then did four months on community service.” The State noted that Daniels

committed the offenses at issue while undergoing adjudication on the burglaries.

According to the State, this history “shows he doesn’t take the court system or

the law seriously.”

        After the State made its recommendation, the victim and several friends

and family members made statements about the impact of Daniels’ actions. The

victim gave her opinion on the possibility of a SSOSA: “Connor Daniels is

seeking a shortened confinement by participating in Washington State’s Special

        1 The court must “consider the victim’s opinion whether the offender should receive a

treatment disposition under this section. The court shall give great weight to the victim’s opinion
whether the offender should receive a treatment disposition under this section.” RCW
9.94A.670(4). In fact, if a SSOSA is imposed contrary to the victim’s opinion, the court must enter
written findings stating its reasons for imposing the treatment alternative. RCW 9.94A.670(4).

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No. 84776-7-I/4

Sex Offender Sentencing Alternative Program. I would like the Court to deny his

request because the sentence would not be commensurate with the magnitude

of his crimes.” The victim’s mother explained that she “unknowingly led the

monster to my daughter” and failed to protect her. She told the court that

Daniels’s actions had created a distance in the family that they were looking to

the court to rectify. She concluded with an anecdote,

       [Daniels] once told me that he doesn’t feel things the same way that
       other people do. Though I was taken aback at the time, I thought
       that he meant only that he was out of touch with his own feelings.
       Now, however, I understand that he meant it exactly as he said it:
       that he does not feel things.

       The defense followed these statements with a request for a SSOSA with

12 months in custody and 75 months of community supervision. Daniels noted

the 18 community support letters submitted on his behalf and explained that

“contrast” from the community members “doesn’t change that he committed the

offenses. It doesn’t change the harm that he caused. But it changes whether the

person before you today is appropriate for a . . . special sex offender sentencing

alternative compared to the person who, three years ago, committed the

offense.” Daniels also had friends and family speak on his behalf.

       The court acknowledged that Daniels qualified for a SSOSA. The court

weighed various factors in determining the sentence, including the consistency in

sentencing, protecting the public, community benefit from the alternative

sentence, Daniels’s youth, and his risk to reoffend. Additionally, as required by

statute, the court considered the victim’s strong opposition to the SSOSA. The

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No. 84776-7-I/5

court found that 12 months was too lenient “in light of the extensive

circumstances of the offense.” The court admitted, “This is a very difficult

calculation in my mind because the Court’s options are rather extreme in terms of

12 months versus 87 to 106 months,” but “[a]fter great consideration and frankly

with a heavy mind,” the court declined the SSOSA. The court imposed 87 months

of incarceration, the low end of the standard range, and 36 months of community

custody.

       Daniels appeals.

                                   DISCUSSION

       I.     Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

       Daniels alleges ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel

failed to move for recusal after the sentencing judge disclosed her prior

representation of the victim’s mother. According to Daniels, “given the court’s

own admission that the decision to deny the SSOSA was a difficult one, an

impartial observer would conclude that the judge’s implicit bias played a

dominant role in her decision.” We disagree.

       “Courts engage in a strong presumption counsel’s representation was

effective.” State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 335, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). To

prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1)

deficient performance and (2) prejudice. State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 77-

78, 917 P.2d 563 (1996). Prejudice requires that “there is a reasonable

probability that except for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

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No. 84776-7-I/6

proceeding would have been different.” McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 334-35.

When ineffective assistance of counsel is premised on failure to make a motion,

defendant must show that the motion likely would have been granted. In re Pers.

Restraint of Davis, 152 Wn.2d 647, 711, 101 P.3d 1 (2004). We need not

consider both deficiency and prejudice if a petitioner fails to prove one. In re

Pers. Restraint of Crace, 174 Wn.2d 835, 847, 280 P.3d 1102 (2012).

       Defendants have a constitutional right to be tried and sentenced by an

impartial court. State v. Solis-Diaz, 187 Wn.2d 535, 539, 387 P.3d 703 (2017);

U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Wash. Const. art. I, § 22. Under the appearance of

fairness doctrine, a judicial proceeding is valid if a reasonably prudent,

disinterested observer would conclude that the parties received a fair, impartial,

and neutral hearing. Solis-Diaz, 187 Wn.2d at 540. “The law requires more than

an impartial judge; it requires that the judge also appear impartial.” Id. Judges

should disqualify themselves when their impartiality might be reasonably

questioned. State v. Chamberlin,161 Wn.2d 30, 41, 162 P.3d 389 (2007); see

also CJC 2.11(A). A judge must disqualify if they have “a personal bias or

prejudice concerning a party or a party’s lawyer.” CJC 2.11(A)(1).

       “A judge is presumed to perform [their] functions regularly and properly,

without bias or prejudice.” State v. Leon, 133 Wn. App. 810, 813, 138 P.3d 159

(2006). A party asserting violation of the appearance of fairness must show a

judge’s actual or potential bias. Solis-Diaz, 187 Wn.2d at 540. Whether a judge’s

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No. 84776-7-I/7

impartiality might be questioned is an objective test and assumes a reasonable

observer knows and understands all the relevant facts. Id.

       While Daniels asserts “it is clear that the victim’s mother is requesting that

the judge, her former attorney, help heal her family by denying Daniels’ request,”

he has not provided any reason to suggest the judge could not act with the

required impartiality. The judge disclosed that prior representation of the victim’s

mother occurred more than six years before and was “a limited form of

representation” on a civil matter. The judge explicitly stated that she had “no

concern” about her ability to be fair and impartial. Given the remoteness in time

and the limited representation on a different subject matter, the judge’s

disclosure does not raise issues as to the appearance of fairness. See State v.

Gamble, 168 Wn.2d 161, 188-89, 225 P.3d 973 (2010) (no appearance of

fairness concern where the trial judge for new charges, brought by the State

against a defendant after original convictions were vacated, had represented

defendant’s ex-wife in her dissolution action fourteen years prior, while the

original murder charges were pending). Given the lack of evidence of bias or the

judge’s inability to act impartially, Daniels’s counsel was not deficient for failing to

move for recusal.

       Moreover, Daniels has not shown any evidence of bias during sentencing.

Any concerns that the victim’s mother’s emotional request might influence the

sentence were specifically addressed by the trial court. The court stated, “for as

much emotion as I very much understand there is in this room and for everyone

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No. 84776-7-I/8

involved, the Court and I am required to take that emotion out of it.” And further,

“I don’t -- and I can’t -- consider emotion or any sort of desire to send a message.

That’s certainly not appropriate for me to consider.” The court then went on to

provide extensive detail regarding the general factors courts consider in

sentencing, as well as the specific factors for a SSOSA. 2 The court then

explained these factors as they related to Daniels. In considering Daniels’s risk to

reoffend, the court noted his use of “cognitive distortions to reduce [his] personal

culpability,” and blaming the victim. The court also considered Daniels’s age and

impulsivity but concluded, “this wasn’t just one event that involved impulsivity.

This was many events over a period of time, and I think that’s a distinguishing

factor in my mind when we think about impulsivity in young adults.” Finally, the

court gave great weight to the victim’s opposition to the sentencing alternative.

Weighing all these factors, the court concluded that “upon considering all the

circumstances here, I do find that 12 months is too lenient in light of the

extensive circumstances of the offense.” The court then exercised its discretion

to impose the low end of the standard range sentence.

        Daniels has not demonstrated that a different judge would have granted

his request for a SSOSA, given that the victim’s opposition and Daniels’s high

offender score and short SSOSA recommendation would have remained

        2 In sentencing, the court considers “promoting respect for the law, providing punishment

that is just, ensuring that punishment for a criminal offense is proportionate to the seriousness of
the offense and . . . criminal history.” The court also tries to ensure consistency in sentences for
similar offenses, as well as protection of the public, opportunities for individual improvement, and
reduction of the risk of reoffending.

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No. 84776-7-I/9

substantial factors consideration. As a result, Daniels cannot establish prejudice

from his counsel’s failure to move for the judge’s recusal as required for a

successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

       II.    Errors in the Judgment and Sentence

       Daniels alleges two errors in his judgment and sentence require remand.

The State concedes both errors. We accept the concessions.

       First, the imposition of 36 months of community custody extends Daniels’s

sentence beyond the statutory maximum. Indecent liberties is a class B felony

with a statutory maximum of 120 months of confinement. RCW 9A. 44.100(2)(a);

RCW 9A.20.021(1)(b). The trial court imposed 87 months of incarceration and 36

months of community custody, amounting to 123 months and exceeding the

statutory maximum for Daniels’s crime. “[W]henever an offender’s standard

range term of confinement in combination with the term of community custody

exceeds the statutory maximum for the crime” the court must reduce the term of

community custody. RCW 9.94A.701(10). Because trial court did not reduce the

community custody term at sentencing, the case must be remanded to amend

the judgment and sentence to remove the excess three months of community

custody.

       The second conceded error is the imposition of the $500 Victim Penalty

Assessment (VPA). While this case was pending on appeal, the legislature

enacted RCW 7.68.035(4) which prohibits the court form imposing the VPA “if the

court finds that the defendant, at the time of sentencing, is indigent.” Here, the

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No. 84776-7-I/10

court found Daniels indigent, and the State agrees that RCW 7.68.035(4) applies.

On remand, the trial court must strike the VPA from the judgment and sentence.

      We affirm the conviction but remand to amend the judgment and sentence

in a manner consistent with this opinion.

WE CONCUR:

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