Court Opinion

ID: 9554436
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-08 22:00:46.57631+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:33:59.985304
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                     ____________________
No. 22-1239
STEVEN KAILIN, et al.,
                                                Plaintiffs-Appellants,
                                 v.

VILLAGE OF GURNEE and DELANTE GREER,
                                               Defendants-Appellees.
                     ____________________

           Appeal from the United States District Court for the
             Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
               No. 1:19-cv-05188 — Sara L. Ellis, Judge.
                     ____________________

    ARGUED DECEMBER 6, 2022 — DECIDED AUGUST 8, 2023
                ____________________

   Before ROVNER, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.
    ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Steven and Kim Kailin called the
Village of Gurnee Police Department to report that their
daughter, Taylor, had been the victim of possible criminal
conduct. Officer Delante Greer arrived at their house around
8 p.m. on July 26, 2019, to follow up on the report. Six seconds
after Kim opened the door, Officer Greer shot the Kailins’
dog, Timber, on their neighbor’s lawn. The Kailins sued Of-
ficer Greer and the Village of Gurnee, Illinois, naming
2                                                           No. 22-1239

multiple theories of liability, but the only surviving claims in
this court are the one for illegal seizure under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against Officer Greer,1 a claim of municipal liability under
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and a claim
for indemnification by the Village.2 The district court granted
the defendants’ joint motion for summary judgment.
    Ordinarily we would begin our de novo review of a grant
of a motion for summary judgment with a recitation of the
facts viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Smith
v. Crounse Corp., 72 F. 4th 799, 804 (7th Cir. 2023). In this case,
however, the lens through which the district court viewed the
facts was influenced both by procedural processes and by
summary judgment case law. Consequently, we will articu-
late the facts in more detail as we move through the proce-
dural and summary judgment terrain.

    1 The killing of a pet constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the

Fourth Amendment, and the use of deadly force against the pet is reason-
able only if the pet poses an immediate danger and the use of force is un-
avoidable. Viilo v. Eyre, 547 F.3d 707, 710 (7th Cir. 2008).
    2 The plaintiffs-appellants’ only discussion regarding indemnification

is one sentence at the end of their brief which states, “Likewise, summary
judgment on Plaintiffs’ indemnification count must also be reversed
where the unreasonable seizure and Monell claims are reversed.” Plain-
tiffs-Appellants’ Brief at 22. This argument likely has been waived, but in
any event, it is not necessary to resolve the issue given our conclusions
here. Johnson v. Advoc. Health & Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 898 (7th Cir.
2018) (“Arguments that consist of conclusory allegations that are not
properly developed are waived.”).
No. 22-1239                                                      3

A. The statement of undisputed material facts
     The district court judge in this case, Judge Ellis, has proce-
dural requirements regarding the submission of facts for sum-
mary judgment motions. She requires parties to confer and
then “file a joint statement of undisputed material facts that
the parties agree are not in dispute” separately from the mem-
oranda of law. Defendants-Appellees’ Short Appendix at 28
(emphasis omitted). Kailin argues that those procedures are
inconsistent with Local Rule 56.1 of the Northern District of
Illinois, and thus invalid. This court has previously reviewed
Judge Ellis’ requirement to file a joint motion of undisputed
facts and found her required procedures to be consistent with
both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) and the Northern
District of Illinois’ Local Rule 56.1. Chicago Studio Rental, Inc.
v. Ill. Dep’t of Com., 940 F.3d 971, 982 (7th Cir. 2019); Sweatt v.
Union Pac. RR. Co., 796 F.3d 701, 711–12 (7th Cir. 2015). Like
the previous panels to consider the issue, we find no fault in
those required processes. See Sweatt, 796 F.3d at 711–12.
    Our conclusion still leaves us with a factual knot to disen-
tangle. The district court’s procedural requirement states that
“the parties may not file—and the court will not consider—
separate documents of undisputed facts.” Defendants-Appel-
lees’ Short Appendix at 28–29. The other relevant portions of
the court’s procedural requirements are as follows:
       If the parties cannot agree whether proposed
       statements of fact are not in dispute, they may
       file a joint motion prior to filing the motion for
       summary judgment so the Court can determine
       whether there is a basis for the alleged disputes.
       … Parties should provide the Court with suﬃ-
       cient time to rule on factual disputes before
4                                                  No. 22-1239

       summary judgment motions are due. Failure to
       stipulate to an undisputed fact without a rea-
       sonable basis for doing so may result in the
       statement being admitted and/or the imposition
       of sanctions. …
       If the non-moving party wholly refuses to join
       in the joint statement of undisputed material
       facts, the moving party will nevertheless be per-
       mitted to file the motion for summary judg-
       ment, accompanied by a separate declaration of
       counsel explaining why a joint statement of the
       undisputed facts was not filed.
       The Local Rules and the Court’s procedures
       are not mere technicalities. Failure to abide by
       any of them, especially the joint statement re-
       quirement, will result in the Court striking
       briefs, disregarding statements of fact, deem-
       ing statements of facts admitted, denying sum-
       mary judgment, and/or imposing sanctions.
Id. (emphasis in original).
    The defendants were the first to run up against (and thus
to be reminded of) the district court’s procedures, when they
filed their summary judgment motion along with their own
separate statement of material facts. The district court judge
struck the filings for failing to comply with the court’s proce-
dures, and ordered the parties to meet and confer on a joint
statement of facts as required by those procedures. She then
set the due date for defendants’ motion for summary judg-
ment for Monday, August 9, 2021. Defendants’ counsel sent a
proposed “Joint Statement of Material Facts” to the Kailins’
No. 22-1239                                                    5

counsel on July 15, 2021. Between July 15 and the due date for
the statement, defendants’ counsel sent many emails implor-
ing the Kailins’ counsel to respond to the proposed statement
of material facts, all the while extending the requested re-
sponse date and beseeching opposing counsel to respond
quickly. On Thursday, August 5, defendants’ counsel emailed
plaintiffs’ counsel to say that with the Monday deadline loom-
ing, and no response to date, “there is not enough time to pre-
sent any points of disagreement to the Court. As such, I will
be filing a statement of material facts and providing a separate
declaration as to why we were unable to file a joint statement
of material facts to the Court as outlined in Judge Ellis’ stand-
ing orders.” R. 79-6 at 3. At noon on Friday—one business day
before the joint statement of material facts was due—the Kail-
ins’ counsel finally responded, inserting objections to most of
the defendants’ proposed facts. Defendants’ counsel replied
that the response had arrived too late for either negotiation or
to bring the disputes before the judge, and consequently, she
would be filing the defendants’ statement of material facts
with a declaration as described in the Thursday e-mail. This
is, in fact, how the defendants proceeded.
     Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, however,
mistakenly stated that “[t]o date, Plaintiffs’ counsel has made
no substantive response to Defendant’s correspondence or its
Joint Statement of Material Facts.” R. 77 at 2. This was not
true, as plaintiffs’ counsel had indeed responded, but had
done so just five hours before the close of business on the last
business day before the joint statement was due. The simulta-
neously-filed declaration was more accurate and clear, stat-
ing, “I did not receive a substance [sic] response from Plain-
tiffs’ counsel in time to properly negotiate the proposed Joint
Statement of Material Facts in this matter and the Kailin v
6                                                          No. 22-1239

Metcalf 19-cv-04703 matter.”3 R. 79 at 4. In the summary judg-
ment reply brief, defendants’ counsel stated that the language
in the opening summary judgment brief had been an over-
sight as she was simultaneously filing a similar statement for
the other case referenced in counsel’s declaration. Defend-
ants’ counsel explained that she had intended to say, “To
date, Plainttifs’ counsel has made no timely substantive re-
sponse to Defendants’ correspondence or their Joint State-
ment of Material Facts.” R. 86 at 2 (emphasis in original).
    In the opinion and order granting the defendants’ sum-
mary judgment motion, the district court commented on the
joint statement hullabaloo as follows:
        The Court derives the facts set forth in this sec-
        tion from Defendants’ Local Rule 56.1 State-
        ment of Undisputed Material Facts. Steven,
        Kim, and Taylor failed to participate in the
        drafting of a joint statement of undisputed facts,
        as required by the Court’s summary judgment
        procedures. Because the Court’s procedures are
        not advisory and Steven, Kim, and Taylor failed
        to abide by them, the Court finds it appropriate
        to treat Defendants’ facts as established. See
        N.D. Ill. LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) (“All material facts set
        forth in the statement required of the moving
        party will be deemed admitted unless contro-
        verted by the statement of the opposing
        party.”); Kreg Therapeutics, Inc. v. VitalGo, Inc.,

    3 The Kailins had two unrelated matters against the Village pending

before the same district court judge at the same time with the same filing
deadlines. See Kailin v. Metcalf, 19-cv-04703 (N.D. Ill.).
No. 22-1239                                                     7

       919 F.3d 405, 411 (7th Cir. 2019) (“According to
       well-established Seventh Circuit law, that non-
       compliance [with the court’s summary judg-
       ment procedures] meant that the district court
       could exercise its discretion to accept Kreg’s
       statements of fact as undisputed.”). As for Ste-
       ven, Kim, and Taylor’s additional facts, the
       Court considers them to the extent they actually
       create a disputed fact and are appropriately pre-
       sented and supported, disregarding any state-
       ments that rely solely on hearsay evidence. The
       Court takes the facts in the light most favorable
       to Steven, Kim, and Taylor, the non-movants.
R. 88 at 2 n.2; D. Ct. Op. at 2 n.2.
     It is not clear whether the district court missed the details
in the declaration and the correction in the reply brief, or
whether the judge considered plaintiffs’ eleventh-hour re-
sponse to be the equivalent of a failure to participate. After
all, even if plaintiffs’ counsel had overlooked the court’s rule
or had any misunderstanding about it at the get-go, on July
12, after the defendants’ gaffe, the court ordered both parties
“to meet and confer regarding the motion for summary judg-
ment and file a joint statement of facts.” R. 74. The Kailins had
not met and conferred with the defendants at all, and cer-
tainly not with enough time to submit factual disputes to the
court before the deadline, as required by the court’s proce-
dures. A district court would be well within reason to con-
strue plaintiffs’ response submitted five hours before the close
of business the day before the due date as a violation of that
order and the court’s procedures. We review a trial court’s
decisions regarding strict compliance with local rules for an
8                                                    No. 22-1239

abuse of discretion only. Curtis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 807
F.3d 215, 219 (7th Cir. 2015) (explaining that a district court
has discretion to strictly enforce local rules, including by
deeming a party’s facts admitted); Johnson v. Edward Orton, Jr.
Ceramic Found., 71 F.4th 601, 611 n.13 (7th Cir. 2023) (same).
     In the end, the district court judge did, at the least, take
note of the Kailins’ theory of the case, stating that the plain-
tiffs “argue that Timber never barked nor growled at Greer
and cite to their testimony in which they testified that Timber
was simply playing.” R. 88 at 9; D. Ct. Op. at 9. But, as we
discuss next, it did not matter which version of the facts the
district court accepted, because the court concluded that the
video from the body worn camera controlled and eliminated
any dispute of fact.
B. The role of the video evidence
    The district court anchored its conclusion about the video
evidence to the Supreme Court’s message in Scott v. Harris,
550 U.S. 372 (2007), that facts need only be taken in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party where there is a “gen-
uine” dispute as to those facts. Id. at 380. “When opposing
parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly con-
tradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could be-
lieve it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for
purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Id.
In the case of Scott, the Court found that a video showing the
plaintiff driving erratically during a high-speed chase pro-
vided irrefutable evidence that the plaintiff posed an immi-
nent threat to others. Id. at 380. Applying Scott, we have con-
cluded that “a video record of the events at issue can evapo-
rate any factual dispute that would otherwise exist.” United
States v. Norville, 43 F.4th 680, 682 (7th Cir. 2022). In light of
No. 22-1239                                                    9

Scott, the district court determined that the footage the body
worn camera governed the findings of fact in this case and
that no reasonable jury could therefore believe the Kailins’
version of events.
    Video evidence, however, can eviscerate a factual dispute
only when the video is so definitive that there could be no
reasonable disagreement about what the video depicts. Scott,
550 U.S. at 380. It is a “narrow, pragmatic exception allowing
appellants to contest the district court’s determination that
material facts are genuinely disputed,” but only where the
video “utterly discredit[s]” the non-movant’s version of the
facts. Gant v. Hartman, 924 F.3d 445, 449 (7th Cir. 2019). Gant
further explained that
       Scott does not hold that courts should reject a
       plaintiﬀ’s account on summary judgment
       whenever documentary evidence, such as a
       video, oﬀers some support for a governmental
       oﬃcer’s version of events. Instead, Scott holds
       that where the trial court’s determination that a
       fact is subject to reasonable dispute is blatantly
       and demonstrably false, a court of appeals may
       say so, even on interlocutory review.
Id. at 450 (internal citations omitted). It should be considered
a rare case where video evidence leaves no room for interpre-
tation by a fact finder. Id. (refusing to find that there was no
material dispute of fact where the video did not provide irref-
utable evidence of the movant’s version of the facts); see also
Eagan v. Dempsey, 987 F.3d 667, 692 n. 56 (7th Cir. 2021) (noting
that the Scott exception is a narrow and pragmatic one re-
served only in cases where there is clear and irrefutable video
evidence); Ferguson v. McDonough, 13 F.4th 574, 581 (7th Cir.
10                                                             No. 22-1239

2021) (declining to apply the Scott exception where the video
was open to interpretation and did not utterly discredit the
plaintiff’s version of the facts); Gupta v. Melloh, 19 F.4th 990,
998 (7th Cir. 2021) (reversing a grant of summary judgment
where reasonable jurors could have many different and op-
posing conclusions about what they saw in video evidence);
McCottrell v. White, 933 F.3d 651, 661 n.9 (7th Cir. 2019) (de-
clining to draw independent factual conclusions from a poor-
quality, black and white video lacking audio).4
    This is certainly not the rare case where the video defini-
tively demonstrates what occurred. As a primary matter,
there is no audio that could reveal whether Timber was
growling or barking as Officer Greer alleged.5 See, e.g., McCot-
trell, 933 F.3d at 661 n.9; Witt v. W. Va. State Police, Troop 2, 633

     4 Moreover, the use of video evidence to discredit factual disputes at

summary judgment should be rare because, as research has revealed,
video images are seldom as unambiguous as they may appear. See, e.g.,
Morgan A. Birck, Do You See What I See? Problems with Juror Bias in Viewing
Body-Camera Video Evidence, 24 Mich. J. Race & L. 153, 164 (2018); Naomi
Mezey, The Image Cannot Speak for Itself: Film, Summary Judgment, and Visual
Literacy, 48 Val. U. L. Rev. 1, 17 (2013); Adam Benforado, Frames of Injustice:
The Bias We Overlook, 85 Ind. L.J. 1333, 1334 (2010); David Kessler, Justices
in the Jury Box: Video Evidence and Summary Judgment in Scott v. Harris, 127
S. Ct. 1769 (2007), 31 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 423, 434 (2008).
    For an interesting interactive first-hand display of how body camera
video can be ambiguous, see Timothy Williams, et. al., Police Body Cameras:
What Do You See?” N.Y.Times, Updated Apr. 1, 2016. https://www.ny-
times.com/interactive/2016/04/01/us/police-bodycam-video.html?ac-
tion=click&module=RelatedCoverage&pgtype=Article&region=Footer
(archived at https://perma.cc/XSA4-5E7V)
     5 Officer Greer was disciplined for failing to turn on the audio portion

of his body camera as required. R. 83-4 at 16
No. 22-1239                                                                 11

F.3d 272, 277 (4th Cir. 2011) (finding that a soundless and
poor-quality video does not clearly or blatantly contradict
non-movant’s version of the events). Moreover, the entire
video of the critical event lasts a mere six seconds and it is
disputable whether the dog can be seen at any time in the
video until she has been shot. Kim Kailin begins to open the
door when the time stamp on the video reads 20:02:13 (from
this point forward, we will use only the seconds). At 14 sec-
onds the door is open wide and it does not seem as if there is
a dog visible in the frame. By 15 seconds, it is possible to see
what might be the blurry image of a dog coming from the
back part of the house, but it is difficult to tell, and a reasona-
ble juror might see different things in that inkblot of a blur.6
And because there is no audio during the critical portion of
the video, a jury could not tell if Timber was barking or growl-
ing. Immediately, within that same second (at 15 seconds), Of-
ficer Greer turns and begins to run, and so, because the cam-
era is mounted on his chest, the viewer can only see what is
in front of him, which is the garden and the grass. There is no
video of what the dog is doing, and, in fact, barring the possi-
ble blurry image of the dog in the back of the house for one
second at the 15-second mark, there is no video of the dog at
all until she has been shot and is on the ground at 19 sec-
onds—6 seconds from when Kim first opened the door. Jurors

    6 The authoring judge of this opinion watched the video numerous

times both in slow motion and stopping frame by frame, and the Judge’s
law clerk did the same while projected on a 65” television screen and nei-
ther was able to determine if a dog was visible in the frame before Officer
Greer turned and began running. Of course, such fact finding is not in an
appellate court judge’s province. Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475
U.S. 709, 713–14 (1986) (it is a mistake for appellate courts to engage in fact
finding).
12                                                             No. 22-1239

could interpret many things from what they see or do not see
in those six seconds. The video does not show barking or
growling; it does not show nipping or biting; it does not show
the dog jumping on Officer Greer; it does not show Officer
Greer’s alleged attempt to use his taser; it does not even show
the dog chasing Officer Greer.7
    Without unambiguous video evidence, we are left with
two conflicting versions of the facts. According to Officer
Greer and the Village, Timber charged out to chase Officer
Greer, barking and growling, and as she was running after
Officer Greer she was nipping and attempting to bite him. The
Kailins assert that their dog, who had no history of violence
or aggression, merely ran after Officer Greer as any dog might
do as part of play behavior once Officer Greer, due to his fear
of dogs, took off running across the lawn.8 According to their
version of the facts, as soon as Officer Greer saw the dog in
the house, he threw up his hands and said “oh shit, you have
a dog” and then suddenly turned and ran through a flower
bed in the Kailins’ yard into the neighboring yard where he
shot Timber. The Kailins also assert that had the Village

     7 The district court states, “the body worn camera also shows the ac-

tual chase.” R. 88 at 11 (D. Ct. Op. at 11). Although it appears from the
movement of the camera that Officer Greer is running, we do not see any
part of the dog chasing the officer. Of course, a jury could interpret the
video differently.
     8 Officer Greer testified at his deposition that he also shot and killed a

dog on January 3, 2019, while serving a citation in Round Lake, Illinois. R.
83-5 at 8–9. Prior to that, while employed as an officer in North Chicago,
Greer fired a warning shot from his service weapon into the ground to
scare off a charging dog. Id. at 4–5.
No. 22-1239                                                   13

offered proper training on interactions with dogs, Timber
would not have been killed.
   As we noted in Gupta,
       Where the material facts specifically averred by
       one party contradict the facts averred by a party
       moving for summary judgment, the motion
       must be denied. Lujan v. Natʹl Wildlife Fed’n, 497
       U.S. 871, 888 (1990). A court’s job on summary
       judgment is not to resolve swearing contests or
       decide which party’s facts are more likely true.
       Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003).
       These credibility disputes are for fact finders to
       resolve. Alexander v. Casino Queen, Inc., 739 F.3d
       972, 982 (7th Cir. 2014).
Gupta, 19 F.4th at 996.
    We hold therefore that it was error for the district court to
conclude that the video left no room for interpretation by a
fact finder. And without conclusive video evidence, we have
before us a textbook case of disputed facts. In short, the video
does nothing to blatantly contradict either side’s story.
    Resolution of the question of what Timber was doing and
how she was behaving is key to determining the reasonable-
ness of Officer Greer’s actions and therefore not only liability
on the Fourth Amendment claim, but also on the Monell and
indemnification claims. As a result, these issues also cannot
be resolved at this stage of the proceedings.
   We therefore REVERSE and REMAND for further pro-
ceedings.