Court Opinion

ID: 9764151
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:12:31.31365+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:54.219642
License: Public Domain

Steele Hays, Justice, dissenting. In Durham, v. Durham, 289 Ark. 3, 708 S.W.2d 620 (1986), we affirmed the chancellor’s refusal to award Mrs. Durham an interest in whatever military pension Major Durham may be entitled to receive upon retirement. We distinguished Day v. Day, 281 Ark. 261, 663 S.W.2d 719 (1984), on the basis that Major Durham had no vested right that might be recognized as marital property because Congress could change his retirement plan at any time or abolish it outright. I find it difficult to reconcile our case or to square the Day and Durham decisions. I recognize that there is a theoretical difference between Dr. Day’s retirement plan and Major Durham’s but not in practical terms. Congress could, of course, terminate military retirement by a single act, but the likelihood of that happening is remote in the extreme and I am persuaded that for the purposes of marital property the two situations are without a practical difference. Besides, the chancellor’s award to Mrs. Burns is conditioned on Major Burns actually receiving retirement benefits and is limited to a pro rata share determined by the length of the marriage. We have said that chancellors are given broad powers under Ark. Code Ann. §9-12-315 (Supp. 1991) to distribute property in divorce, Williford v. Williford, 280 Ark. 77, 655 S.W.2d 398 (1983), and implicit in Day is the principle that the legislative purpose behind § 9-12-315 should not be frustrated by drawing controlling differences on technical grounds. I believe we should overrule Durham v. Durham, supra, bring our cases into alignment and apply Day uniformly. I would affirm the decree. Brown, J., joins in this dissent.