Court Opinion

ID: 9859993
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:06:21.631256+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:10:15.916267
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE REID, dissenting: I dissent. I do not believe Blue received a fair trial because the trial court refused to place the defendant’s self-defense claim before the jury. “A defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case if there is some foundation for the instruction in the evidence. If there is such evidence, it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to so instruct the jury.” People v. Santos, 333 Ill. App. 3d 1, 7 (2002) , citing People v. Crane, 145 Ill. 2d 520, 526 (1991). The majority correctly recites the rule that “an instruction on self-defense must be given where the defendant presents some evidence of each of the following elements: (1) force had been threatened against the defendant; (2) defendant was not the aggressor; (3) the danger of harm to the defendant was imminent; (4) the force threatened to the defendant was unlawful; (5) the defendant actually believed that a danger existed, that force was necessary to avert the danger, and that the amount of force used by the defendant was necessary; and (6) all of defendant’s beliefs were reasonable.” 343 Ill. App. 3d at 935, citing People v. Huddleston, 243 Ill. App. 3d 1012, 1018 (1993). The majority also correctly explains the doctrine of transferred intent. The transferred intent doctrine teaches that a defendant can be convicted of attempted murder of an unintended victim if he shoots at one person with the intent to kill, but injures another; defendant’s intent to kill the intended victim is transferred to the unintended victim. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 936, citing People v. Conley, 306 Ill. App. 3d 1, 7 (1999); People v. Burrage, 269 Ill. App. 3d 67, 76 (1994). In the context of self-defense, the Conley court explains that the doctrine of transferred intent also applies. Conley, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 7, citing People v. Smith, 94 Ill. App. 3d 969, 973-74 (1981). “ ‘In deciding whether to instruct on a certain theory, the court’s role is to determine whether there is some evidence supporting that theory; it is not the court’s role to weigh the evidence.’ ” People v. Jones, 175 Ill. 2d 126, 132 (1997), quoting People v. Jones, 276 Ill. App. 3d 1006, 1012 (1995) (Cook, P.J., dissenting); see also People v. Lyda, 190 Ill. App. 3d 540, 544 (1989). In assessing the merit of a claim of self-defense, “a defendant is entitled to the benefit of any defense shown by the entire evidence, even if the facts on which the defense is based are inconsistent with a defendant’s own testimony.” (Emphasis in original.) Lyda, 190 Ill. App. 3d at 544, citing People v. Janik, 127 Ill. 2d 390, 398 (1989). The defendant is similarly entitled to present his theory of innocence “even if the trial court believes that evidence offered in the support of that defense is inconsistent or of doubtful credibility.” Lyda, 190 Ill. App. 3d at 545, citing People v. Rodriguez, 96 Ill. App. 3d 431, 436 (1981). Bearing in mind that the quantum of evidence necessary to justify the granting of a particular jury instruction is quite small (People v. Bratcher, 63 Ill. 2d 534, 540 (1976)), Blue pointed to the testimony of Michael Campbell. According to Campbell, who heard gunshots, he described armed men shooting in the direction of his brother’s building. While it is true that other witnesses disputed Campbell’s story, claiming he told them nothing about the three men, it is for the trier of fact to weigh it. The jury should not only be free to hear the defendant’s theory of innocence, it should be free to accept or reject it. The trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on self-defense and transferred intent denied Blue a fair trial. He should have been able to put his theory of transferred intent before the jury. As a result, this matter should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.