Court Opinion

ID: 9669019
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:37:05.325385+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:51.386468
License: Public Domain

JON E WILCOX, J.
¶ 152. (concurring). The court today goes much further than it needs to in order to decide this case. I would only find it necessary to assess the circuit court's initial determination to exclude the McMorris evidence. Still, because I would find the circuit court's decision in that respect clearly erroneous, I would come to the same result as the majority, and remand the case for a new trial.
¶ 153. The question of whether or not to admit evidence is a decision left to the discretion of the circuit court. State v. Cardenas-Hernandez, 219 Wis. 2d 516, 525, 579 N.W.2d 678 (1998). We will sustain a discretionary act of the circuit court if it assessed the relevant facts, applied the proper standard of law, and reached a reasonable conclusion based on the facts and the law. Lane v. Sharp Packaging Sys., 2002 WI 28, ¶ 19, 251 Wis. 2d 68, 640 N.W.2d 788. Whether the circuit court *263used the proper legal standard, however, is a question of law we review independently of the circuit court, benefiting from its analysis. Id.
¶ 154. In this case, I would conclude that the circuit court erred in its application of the legal standard of whether or not to allow Debra Head to present McMorris evidence. As the majority notes, the State has conceded the point that McMorris evidence may be used by a defendant to establish a factual basis to support a self-defense claim. Majority op. at ¶ 121. I agree with this concession. Under Wis. Stat. § 901.04(1) (1997-98),1
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the judge .... In making the determination the judge is bound by the rules of evidence only with respect to privileges and as provided in s. 901.05.2
Thus, in making an admissibility determination, the judge is not limited to evidence that would be admissible at trial. In this sense, the present case is not unlike the situation in Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987), where the United States Supreme Court ruled that, when deciding the admissibility of hearsay evidence as a statement of a co-conspirator, the trial court, when making the preliminary finding of the existence of a conspiracy, can consider the hearsay statements themselves.
¶ 155. Here, the court did not properly consider the rule of Wis. Stat. § 901.04(1) when making its *264admissibility determination. For reasons similar to those we articulated in State v. Felton, 110 Wis. 2d 485, 509-10, 329 N.W.2d 161 (1983), and State v. Hoyt, 21 Wis. 2d 284, 301-03, 128 N.W.2d 645 (1964), Debra's offer of proof about her husband's past acts does inform the court's decision of whether the threshold standard for at least imperfect self-defense is met. See Wis. Stat. § 940.01(2)(b). However, the court in this case expressly limited its consideration to the facts contemporaneous to the shooting, rather than consider all relevant, non-privileged evidence as required by the statute. As a result of this limitation, Debra was not allowed to present McMorris evidence at trial. See majority op. at ¶¶ 48-49. This explicit failure to consider the other evidence was a misapplication of the proper standard of law, and the circuit court's decision to exclude the McMorris evidence from trial was, therefore, clearly erroneous. Furthermore, the error was clearly prejudicial to Debra Head.
¶ 156. Because I would find that the circuit court erred in not considering the McMorris evidence itself in its determination of whether to allow Debra Head to present a claim of perfect or imperfect self-defense, I would remand the case to the circuit court for a new trial, allowing the introduction of McMorris evidence.
¶ 157. Finally, on a separate issue, I briefly note that I agree with the majority's articulation of the harmless error rule. Majority op. at ¶ 44.
¶ 158. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.
¶ 159. I am authorized to state that Justice N. PATRICK CROOKS joins this opinion.

 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1997-98 version.

 Wis. Stat. § 901.05 governs the admissibility of certain medical test results.