Court Opinion

ID: 9627450
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:43:50.472999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:45.891291
License: Public Domain

BYE, Circuit Judge,
concurring, in part, dissenting, in part.
I respectfully dissent from the portion of the majority’s decision, affirming the district court’s application of the obstruction of justice enhancement and its denial of an acceptance of responsibility reduction. Additionally, although I reluctantly agree the district court did not err in applying a role enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.l(c), I write separately to express the basis for my decision.
I
This Circuit has not always been consistent in describing the standards governing our review of a district court’s decision to impose an obstruction of justice enhancement. Compare United States v. McMannus, 496 F.3d 846, 850 (8th Cir.2007) (“We review de novo a sentencing court’s determination that section 3C1.1 applies-to specific conduct, but we review for clear error the court’s factual findings.... The district court accepted the factual basis ...
*843but determined that § 3C1.1 did not apply to this specific conduct. Therefore, our review is de novo.”) (citations omitted); United States v. Minnis, 489 F.3d 325, 333 (8th Cir.2007) (“[W]e review the interpretation and application of [U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1] de novo.”); with United States v. Red Elk, 368 F.3d 1047, 1052 (8th Cir.2004) (“Perjury at trial is an appropriate basis for the [obstruction of justice] enhancement.... Whether Red Elk committed perjury is a factual finding that we review for clear error.”) (citations omitted); United States v. Kessler, 321 F.3d 699, 702-03 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Whether Kessler committed perjury and in so doing obstructed justice is a factual finding, and thus we will reverse the district court’s imposition of a sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 only upon a showing of clear error.”) (citation omitted). The majority recognizes the inconsistency, acknowledging both that “the interpretation and application of the sentencing guidelines” is subject to de novo review, Minnis, 489 F.3d 325, 333 (8th Cir.2007), and that the application of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 is subject to clear error review, Kessler, 321 F.3d 699, 702-03 (8th Cir.2003). Ante at 839, n. 4. But, rather than seeking to reconcile these seemingly conflicting cases and determine the standard of review appropriate to the particular issue before us, the majority, without any kind of analysis, simply concludes Brown’s challenge is subject to review “for clear error, giving great deference to the sentencing court’s determination.” Id. at 839 (citing United States v. Whiting, 522 F.3d 845, 849 (8th Cir.2008)). Because I find that conclusion far from self-evident and because I believe we must be guided by principled reasoning, rather than by arbitrary application of general statements of law, I cannot agree.
A
An appellate court must “give due deference to the district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e).7 In Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996), the Supreme Court held § 3742(e)’s “due deference” standard is not fixed, but operates on a “sliding scale”:
The deference that is due depends on the nature of the question presented. The district court may be owed no deference, for instance, when the claim on appeal is that it made some sort of mathematical error in applying the Guidelines; under these circumstances, the appellate court will be in as good a position to consider the question as the district court was in the first instance.
Id. at 98, 116 S.Ct. 2035. Subsequent cases have identified a number of factors for determining where on the “sliding scale” a particular determination falls. *844Those factors include: (1) whether the question turns on issues district courts may have comparatively greater expertise or be better suited to address, and (2) whether the question primarily involves a legal interpretation of a guidelines provision (suggesting de novo review), or instead involves the application of a clearly-established, well-understood legal standard or principle to a detailed fact pattern (indicating “clear error” review). Buford v. United States, 532 U.S. 59, 65-66, 121 S.Ct. 1276,149 L.Ed.2d 197 (2001). “Clear error” review is particularly appropriate in the latter type of cases because “the fact-bound nature of the decision limits the value of appellate court precedent.” Id.
Applying those factors to the issue here, it is clear we should give little deference to the district court’s determination. Brown does not dispute the court’s factual findings. He admits his statements about Shoo Boo were false. He does not dispute the court’s conclusion these false statements, if believed, could have affected the court’s view of Mario Williams’ credibility. Rather, Brown argues these findings are insufficient to establish his false statements were material. The district court is in no better position to address this issue than is an appellate court. Brown’s argument raises an issue about the scope of the materiality requirement. While the question is not purely a question of law, it is more akin to a question of legal interpretation than to a question of fact. While the facts of the case are important to the ultimate determination, the question before us does not turn on the credibility of any witnesses or the inferences to be drawn from particular facts. Here, unlike in Buford, the facts are secondary to the legal issue. The question here is more akin to the question “whether, based on the totality of the circumstances, [the defendant] was entitled to the two-level acceptance-of-responsibility reduction as a result of his guilty pleas to the grouped drug offenses,” which this Court reviewed de novo. United States v. Wattree, 431 F.3d 618, 623 (8th Cir.2005).
Accordingly, although I accept the court’s relevant findings of fact and the inferences it draws from those facts, I give little deference to the court’s ultimate conclusion those facts established Brown’s statements were material.
B
Turning to the merits of Brown’s argument, under the Guidelines, a sentencing court is required to adjust a defendant’s offense level upward if “the defendant willfully ... attempted to obstruct or impede[] the administration of justice with respect to the ... sentencing ... of the instant offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. This adjustment applies when a defendant has provided “materially false information to a judge or magistrate.” Id. cmt. n. 4(f). Information is “material” when, “if believed, [it] would tend to influence or affect the issue under determination.” Id. cmt. n. 6.
According to the majority, Brown’s false statements were material because they “could have influenced [the district court’s] view of the credibility of the other witnesses at sentencing and its understanding of facts relevant to an appropriate sentence for his case.” Ante at 840 (emphasis added). But, this is nothing more than a conclusory statement. The majority provides no explanation as to how the district court’s view of the credibility of other witnesses would affect Brown’s sentence, nor does it identify any facts relevant to an appropriate sentence, which the district court might not understand. That is because it cannot.
While perhaps Brown’s false statements, if believed, would have influenced the dis*845trict court’s view of the other witnesses at sentencing, this, standing alone, is insufficient to establish the materiality of the false statements. The circumstances of a particular case must show the evidence presented by the particular witnesses’ testimony was relevant, in some way, to resolution of one of the disputed issues. Only then can it be said that the false statements, if believed, “would tend to influence or affect the issue under determination.” No such showing can be made in this case.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court found Brown’s false statements, if believed, would have affected its view of the credibility of one witness: Mario Williams. Williams testified in support of one of the government’s theories for application of the obstruction enhancement. Prior to sentencing, the government recommended Brown’s PSR include a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice. The government provided two theories for application of the obstruction enhancement. First, the government argued the enhancement was appropriate because during one of his proffer interviews Brown falsely denied his involvement in Boo Man’s shooting and falsely denied possessing a firearm on the night of the shooting. Second, the government argued the enhancement was appropriate because Brown had attempted to persuade Williams to provide false information to federal investigators regarding Boo Man’s shooting. Williams’ testimony related to only the latter argument.
In identifying the issues for determination and, in ruling on those issues at the sentencing hearing, the district court did not address this latter argument, on the merits or otherwise. Specifically, in announcing its rulings and relevant findings “on the issues that [were] litigated,” the district court provided the following summary of the issues under determination related to the obstruction enhancement:
On the obstruction of justice, again, the government’s argument is obstruction of justice' should be imposed because [Brown] lied at his proffer, denying his involvement in the Cedar Rapids shooting and denying possessing a firearm the night of the shooting. After Mr. Brown decided to take the stand, the government now argues also that obstruction is appropriate because he committed perjury, in other words, lied under oath to the Court.
Sent. Tr. at 170. Nothing elicited from Williams related to either of these issues. This conclusion is further bolstered by the district court’s ruling on the obstruction enhancement issue:
In this particular case, the Court is unable to reach a decision as to whether or not Mr. Darnell Brown lied at his proffer about his involvement with the shooting in Cedar Rapids and denied possessing the firearm the night of the shooting.8 The Court also seriously questions whether or not, even if those had been established, whether it would be appropriate to enhance for obstruction of justice.
Id. at 170-71. The district court, for whatever reason, simply did not view the government’s argument that Brown tried to persuade Williams to provide the government false information as an “issue under *846determination” at Brown’s sentencing. Because this was the only subject about which Williams testified, it necessarily follows that any negative affect Brown’s testimony, if believed, would have had on the district court’s view of Williams’ credibility, it could not have, and, as a matter of fact, did not have, any affect on the obstruction enhancement issue or any other issue under determination. Therefore, the district court could not base the materiality of Brown’s false statements on the potential affect on witness credibility.
The only other basis the majority identifies, which the district court did not itself mention, is the potential Brown’s false statements, if believed, would have had to influence the district court’s “understanding of facts relevant to an appropriate sentence for his case.” Ante at 840. I am not sure exactly what this means, but, regardless, I fail to see any way Brown’s false statements, if believed, would have affected the district court’s understanding of the relevant facts. Whether Brown knew Shoo Boo is so far removed from the relevant issues of this case, the district court even noted that “one would think that’s kind of a — sort of beside the point.” The offense for which Brown was being sentenced was conspiracy to distribute marijuana and cocaine base. The conspiracy, which included Brown, Clark, Hopkins, and Roundtree, took place in April 2005. No one alleges Shoo Boo was linked in any way to this conspiracy. Further, other than Brown, it does not appear the other members of the conspiracy even knew of Shoo Boo.
Moreover, the majority states Brown asked Williams to falsely implicate Shoo Boo in Boo Man’s shooting “with the hope of obtaining a sentencing decrease.” Ante at 839. This is simply incorrect. While Williams provided several different accounts of what false information Brown had asked Williams to provide the government,9 Williams never suggested Brown wanted to implicate Shoo Boo in Boo Man’s shooting. Williams testified Brown asked him to implicate Deonte Williams in Boo Man’s shooting, which would somehow lead to Shoo Boo’s arrest.
More importantly, even if Brown had asked Williams to implicate Shoo Boo in Boo Man’s shooting, Boo Man’s shooting in November 2004 is in no way related to the April 2005 conspiracy to distribute drugs, which was the offense to which Brown pleaded guilty and for which Brown was being sentenced. According to the government, because Count 2 of the Indictment charged Brown with being a felon in possession of a firearms and one of the firearms listed in the Indictment was the firearm used to shoot Boo Man, the fact that Brown was a suspect in Boo Man’s shooting is relevant conduct. But, as Agent Moyle testimony shows, no matter how you spin the facts, it strains credibility to suggest Boo Man’s shooting is part of Brown’s relevant conduct in this case:
Q. Regarding the shooting in November 2004, I guess I’m not clear how that is part of this investigation that is concerning a conspiracy to distribute cocaine that was involving Shauntella Hopkins, Darnell Brown, Michael Clark, and Ms. Roundtree. How is it part of that conspiracy?
A. In the proffer interview we wanted to clear up that issue and his in*847volvement in the shooting, and thus the reason we asked him some questions about that, and I’m not sure if those are very credible answers.
Q. But the shooting itself isn’t related to Mr. Brown’s activities in connection with the conspiracy to distribute cocaine in April of 2005, is it?
A. Not to my knowledge. I know that — I know that drug dealers as a whole will get involved in altercations and disturbances and stuff, so maybe — maybe the underlying theme regarding the shooting may have been narcotics related. I’m not sure.
Q. But you don’t know for sure—
A. Correct—
Q. —still trying to figure that out?
A. —for sure....
Q. Okay. Do you know if you or anyone on the task force has interviewed Mr. Corbett [Boo Man] about who was the shooter, who did he see?
A. You know, I can’t recall what information he may have given.
Q. Clearly, he has not definitely identified Mr. Brown as the shooter or charges would have been filed, wouldn’t you agree?
A. There would be a lot of different reasons why charges may or may not have been filed. I’m not sure what — he was able to identify him or not.
Q. Would you agree though that if he had definitely been able to identify Mr. Brown as the shooter, that would be a pretty important piece of evidence?
A. It would be important, however — I mean as you know, you have to corroborate it by several different ways to be able to charge accordingly-
Q. And so far no charges have been filed for that shooting?
A. Correct.
Sent. Tr. at 89-90, 90-91.
In the end, Brown’s sentence has been enhanced by almost 100 months because he lied about knowing Shoo Boo; an individual whose only link to this case is Williams’ testimony Brown asked him to implicate Deonte Williams in the unrelated shooting of Boo Man, which would somehow lead to Shoo Boo’s arrest. Today’s decision reads the materiality requirement out of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. n. 6, and provides a district court with authority to use even the most irrelevant false statement as a basis for a two-level obstruction of justice enhancement (and, usually a denial of a two- or three-level acceptance of responsibility reduction) by simply stating the false statement could maybe affect the court’s view of the credibility of other witnesses. I simply cannot concur in such a result.
II
The district court denied Brown an acceptance of responsibility reduction based on its determination Brown obstructed justice. Because such determination was erroneous, the district court could not rely on it to deny Brown an acceptance of responsibility reduction. See United States v. Thurmon, 278 F.3d 790, 793 (8th Cir.2002) (“Based on the record and our finding that Thurmon did not obstruct justice, we find that the district court erred by refusing to reduce Thurmon’s sentence for acceptance of responsibility.”).
III
The district court also increased Brown’s offense level under U.S.S.G.
*848§ 3Bl.l(c), after concluding Brown “led, managed, or supervised” co-conspirator Michael Clark. At the sentencing hearing Clark testified that, several weeks prior to Brown’s arrest for the instant offense, he had met with Brown in Chicago and followed him to Cedar Rapids, where he, along with Brown, stayed at Brown’s “baby mama’s” (the mother of his child) apartment. Clark testified he “drove [Brown] around” to sell crack maybe “five, six times.” When asked what he was “getting” for his assistance to Brown, Clark testified “[w]e would drink, smoke weed, buy something to eat.” Based on Clark’s testimony, the court found Brown ran a drug trafficking operation, brought Clark to Cedar Rapids from Chicago, and had Clark drive him to drug transactions in exchange for nominal remuneration. The district court concluded this evidence was sufficient to establish Brown “led, managed, or supervised” co-conspirator Clark.
On appeal Brown argues the district court’s factual findings are insufficient to qualify him as a “leader, manager, or supervisor.” According to Brown, “it appears that Clark may have been using Brown” for a place to stay, and for food, alcohol, and drugs. Thus, he contends “[t]he fact that he and Brown went out together a few times to deliver Brown’s crack cocaine, and Clark happened to be the driver, does not categorically place Clark in the position of being “controlled” by Brown.”
Brown may well be correct such evidence would not, as a matter of law, suffice to establish a defendant’s role as a supervisor or manager. The problem, however, is his view of the evidence, as recited above, differs markedly from the district court’s view. “Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the district court’s choice between the two cannot be clearly erroneous.” United States v. Plancarte-Vazquez, 450 F.3d 848, 854 (8th Cir.2006). Although, after reviewing the sentencing transcript, I find the district court’s view of Clark’s testimony, both on direct examination and on cross, to be a real stretch, I cannot say it is clearly impermissible. Thus, I must determine whether Brown was a supervisor or manager based on the district court’s view of the evidence, rather than Brown’s view.
Under our precedent, although it is a very close call, I cannot say the district court’s determination — Brown was a supervisor based on his use of Clark to drive him to drug transactions, in exchange for food, drink, shelter, and marijuana — was incorrect. See United States v. Maejia, 928 F.2d 810, 815 (8th Cir.1991) (holding that defendant may be considered to have a leadership role when he hired one driver and recruited another); United States v. Alexander, 982 F.2d 262, 267 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that a defendant may be seen as supervising the four drivers he used in his criminal activities). Therefore, I concur in the majority’s holding, affirming the role in the offense enhancement.
rv
Because Brown’s false testimony he did not know Shoo Boo was not material to any issue at sentencing, the district court erred in enhancing his sentence under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 and in denying him an acceptance of responsibility reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.1, therefore, respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision.

. While Booker excised the portion of § 3742(e) that directed courts of appeals to apply the de novo standard to a district court’s departure from the Guidelines range it left intact the remaining portions of § 3742(e), including the portion requiring appellate courts to "give due deference to the district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts.” As Justice Stevens noted in his concurrence in Rita v. United States,-U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007): "By leaving those portions of the statute intact while severing the portion mandating a de novo standard of review, Booker restored the abuse-of-discretion standard identified” in Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996), and other earlier Supreme Court cases. Id. at 2471 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1003 (8th Cir.2005) ("In determining the appropriate guidelines sentencing range to be considered as a factor under § 3553(a), we see nothing in Booker that would require the court to determine the sentence in any manner other than the way the sentence would have been determined pr e-Booker.”).

. To the extent the government had intended Williams' testimony to establish Brown lied at his proffer interview, by corroborating the testimony of Agent Moyle, it was clearly unsuccessful and not because Brown lied about knowing Shoo Boo. Williams testified Brown asked him to falsely implicate Deonte Williams in Boo Man’s shooting. Agent Moyle, on the other hand, testified at the proffer interview, Brown stated Brandon Sykes shot Boo Man.

. It is surprising to me the district court would suggest the truth about whether Brown knew Shoo Boo would affect its view of Williams’ credibility. If there was a reason to question Williams’ credibility one would think it would be that he could not get his story straight on the more pertinent subject what false information Brown asked Williams to provide the government.