Court Opinion

ID: 9945839
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 17:10:54.96666+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:22:15.805944
License: Public Domain

No. 139                    February 28, 2024          193

           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                   STATE OF OREGON

                      STATE OF OREGON,
                       Plaintiff-Respondent,
                                 v.
                   ERVAN RONELL HERRING,
                      Defendant-Appellant.
                Multnomah County Circuit Court
                     18CR34525; A174188

   Benjamin N. Souede, Judge.
   Argued and submitted August 17, 2022.
   Zachary Lovett Mazer, Deputy Public Defender, argued
the cause for appellant. Also on the briefs was Ernest G.
Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office
of Public Defense Services.
   Patrick M. Ebbett, Assistant Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F.
Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General.
  Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Lagesen, Chief Judge,
and Powers, Judge.*
   ORTEGA, P. J.
   Reversed and remanded.

____________
   * Lagesen, C. J., vice Hellman, J.
194   State v. Herring
Cite as 331 Or App 193 (2024)                                           195

          ORTEGA, P. J.
         Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction
for attempted first-degree assault with a firearm, unlaw-
ful use of a weapon with a firearm, and felon in possession
of a firearm with a firearm in connection with a daytime
shooting outside a Portland hospital.1 On appeal, defendant
raises 11 assignments of error. The first eight challenge the
trial court’s rulings admitting evidence of his gang affilia-
tion under OEC 404(3), as relevant to showing his motive
for the charged acts; the ninth challenges the denial of his
motion for a new trial based on admission of the gang evi-
dence; the tenth challenges the trial court’s admission of
evidence found in his codefendant’s house; and the eleventh
challenges the court’s instruction to the jury that it could
convict defendant without reaching a unanimous verdict.
         We agree with defendant that the trial court erred
in admitting the state’s proffered evidence regarding his
gang affiliation, because the state failed to meet its burden
to establish that it was offering a theory of relevance for
the evidence that does not depend on propensity reasoning.
We further conclude that the error warrants reversal. Our
disposition obviates the need to address defendant’s second
through ninth and eleventh assignments of error. However,
because it is likely to arise on remand, we address defen-
dant’s tenth assignment and conclude that the trial court
did not err. We therefore reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
                       I. GANG EVIDENCE
A.   Standard of Review
         “OEC 404(3) is an inclusionary rule that allows
trial courts to admit other-acts evidence on any theory of
logical relevance that does not depend on propensity-based
reasoning.” State v. Morrow, 299 Or App 31, 33, 448 P3d
1176 (2019) (internal quotation and citations omitted). We
review a trial court’s ruling to admit evidence of uncharged
misconduct as relevant to a nonpropensity purpose under
OEC 404(3) for errors of law and in light of the record that
   1
     Defendant was jointly charged and tried with his brother, who waived jury
and was acquitted on all charges by the trial court.
196                                                        State v. Herring

was before the court at the time it made its decision. State v.
Taylor, 326 Or App 396, 398, 532 P3d 502, rev allowed, 371
Or 509 (2023).
B.    Procedural and Historical Facts
         The state filed a pretrial motion to “allow gang evi-
dence” under OEC 404(3) and asked the court to conduct an
OEC 104 hearing “to determine the admissibility of certain
gang evidence” against defendant.2 In its motion, the state
represented that defendant is a member of “a violent crimi-
nal gang” known as the Woodlawn Park Bloods and has been
associated with that gang for at least 20 years; that defen-
dant has criminal convictions related to his gang involve-
ment; that the Woodlawn Park Bloods have “a longstanding
violent feud with various Crip gang sets”; that the victim, S,
has a longtime association with Crip gang members; and that
S was convicted of killing defendant’s youngest brother, who
had been an associate of the Woodlawn Park Bloods. The state
further represented that, on the day of the shooting, defen-
dant’s family member and gang associate was at the hospi-
tal receiving treatment for gunshot wounds; that S’s grand-
mother was also at the hospital; that defendant attempted
to murder S as he walked into the hospital that afternoon;
and that the hospital surveillance footage showed that code-
fendant was wearing black and red, and that S was wearing
blue, color choices that reflected their gang affiliations.
         The state explained in its motion that it was “seek-
ing to admit defendant’s prior gang associations, prior crimes
against rival gangsters, and prior crimes committed by the
Woodlawn Park Blood gang and perpetrated against Crip
[g]ang members” as well as “the victim’s prior gang associa-
tions, prior crimes against rival gangsters, and prior crimes
committed by Crip [g]ang [m]embers against Woodlawn
Park Blood gang members and/or associates” to show defen-
dant’s motive for the charged act: “[D]efendant’s gang, the
Woodlawn Park Bloods, are at war with the intended vic-
tim’s gang, the Crips, and they are hostile towards this class

   2
     The state sought to admit gang evidence relating to both defendants, and
many of the defense arguments were made by codefendant’s counsel, which defen-
dant expressly joined. For simplicity, we refer to the evidence as relating to, and
arguments made by, defendant only.
Cite as 331 Or App 193 (2024)                                 197

of victims, in addition to this particular named victim.” The
state argued that, “[b]ecause the evidence is being presented
to show motive and not impermissible character evidence,
the defendants should not be allowed to insulate the trier of
fact from their gang membership, gang tendencies, and vio-
lence their gangs perpetrate.” Specifically, the state argued
that “the defendants’ gang association, the [codefendant’s]
prior attempt to kill the victim, and the victim’s prior mur-
der of the defendants’ gang associate and family member is
relevant to prove that they had a similar motive when they
attempted to murder [the victim].”
         The state proffered that Officer Charles Asheim
would “testify to the facts and circumstances of the defen-
dants’ gang associations and prior assaults by the defen-
dants and their gang,” which would be “coupled with the
fact that the defendants and their fellow gang members
were previously indicted and convicted with crimes related
to this attack.”
         Finally, the state argued that the probative value
of the gang evidence was not substantially outweighed
by unfair prejudice, because “without understanding the
defendants’ gang association, gang lifestyle and their hostile
motive toward this class of victims, the rival gang members,
the jury might be misled because understanding an act like
this will make no sense absent a full picture of modern gang
rivalry and warfare.” The state explained that its
   “purpose in offering this evidence is to prove why the defen-
   dants would attempt to gun down the victim in broad day-
   light as the victim walked into a hospital. A heinous event
   such as this is outside the norms of what a layperson can
   comprehend without attempting to understand the intrica-
   cies of modern gangs and gang warfare, specifically involv-
   ing the Crips and the Woodlawn Park Bloods.”
         At a hearing before Judge Roberts, the state reiter-
ated its intent to offer gang evidence through the testimony
of Asheim, “specifically to address the background with each
one of these defendants as far as what is their gang affilia-
tion, what does it mean to be a gang member, and then, more
particularly, how is it applicable to the events that occur on
[the date of the charged acts].” The state explained that the
198                                             State v. Herring

evidence was important to understanding the events on
the date of the charged acts, “in particular the rivalry, the
intense kind of reasons behind why an individual who is a
gang member would want to engage in this type of behavior,
and look at it from that—through that lens.”
          Defendant responded that it was “unclear” exactly
what evidence the state was seeking to introduce, but that
it appeared to be “a broad scope.” Defendant agreed that
evidence that the victim had been convicted of killing one
of his brothers was relevant and admissible motive evidence
but argued that “all the gang history and gang rivalry and
all this other speculation to it, is more propensity and paint-
ing the defendant in a bad light.” Defendant further argued
that, because of the specific motive evidence regarding the
victim’s murder of his youngest brother, the state’s need for
the additional gang evidence was low and that the evidence
was “extremely prejudicial” because “it really is propensity
evidence by another name.”
         The state replied that “motive is a huge factor
because understanding for the everyday juror why would
someone in daylight at a hospital start trying to shoot and
kill another person is a very important fact,” that “under-
standing the dynamics that go into gang warfare, modern
gang warfare, the rivalry that goes on with that, the long-
standing disputes, why that is so volatile and violent is the
motive that is behind this,” and that it “intends to bring in
this expert witness to provide the background information
that is necessary to understand that.”
        After confirming that the state was not offering the
evidence for propensity, the court ruled that the gang evi-
dence was relevant to motive:
       “A relevant purpose of evidence showing gang mem-
   bership, showing gang rivalry in general between the two
   gangs, and showing that that rivalry in the gang culture
   is expressed in terms of, ‘He shoots at us, we shoot at him,’
   that sort of thing.
      “That much seems to me relevant evidence to explain
   why—the State’s version of why this episode occurred, and
   why the defendants would be people who have a motive to
   engage in it.
Cite as 331 Or App 193 (2024)                               199

      “The fact that they have another personal motive,
   because [the victim killed] their brother, doesn’t make it
   not relevant.”
The court further ruled that the probative value of the
evidence outweighed the danger for unfair prejudice but
explained that it intended “that the evidence be tailored to
minimize any such unnecessary prejudice” once the state
submitted an offer of proof of Officer Asheim’s testimony at
an OEC 104 hearing. The court concluded that, “in general
for both sides, the evidence that I would admit is, first of all,
gang membership of the parties believed to be involved; the
existence of the rivalry between those gangs; gang culture;
[and] establishing the kind of way that rivalry is expressed
in terms of violence” but that it “would not allow specific bad
acts by individuals.”
         The case was later reassigned to Judge Souede, who
reviewed and expressly adopted Judge Roberts’s reasoning
and ruling on the record before the state put on an offer of
proof of Asheim’s expert testimony. The court then ruled on
the admissibility of specific elements of Asheim’s testimony
under OEC 404(3) and 403 in response to defendant’s addi-
tional objections and argument that the state was attempt-
ing to build a “gang profile.”
         At trial, the state presented largely circumstantial
evidence of the charged acts that consisted of testimony by
eyewitnesses and police experts, as well as hospital surveil-
lance footage. The surveillance footage did not capture the
shooting itself but clearly shows defendant, who was wear-
ing all black, and codefendant entering the hospital that
afternoon and returning to the parking lot minutes before
the shooting, as well as the victim running into the hospital
immediately after the shooting. A police detective compiled
footage from the parking lot and opined as to the movements
of defendant and three cars he believed were associated with
defendant, including a black Mercedes, before and after the
shooting.
         The victim, who was convicted in 2002 of first-
degree manslaughter for the 1997 killing of defendant’s
brother, initially confirmed that he ran inside the hospital
when he heard shooting and did not see who was shooting
200                                         State v. Herring

at him. He then testified that he did not hear gunshots but
rather heard what sounded like firecrackers and that he just
“heard noise and ran.” Three eyewitnesses described seeing
a Black man in dark clothes shoot at the victim, who ran
toward the hospital emergency room. One of those eyewit-
nesses, a paramedic, wrote down the license plate number
of the black Mercedes that he saw the shooter drive away
in and later reported it to police. A hospital employee heard
gunshots and saw two vehicles leave the parking lot and
shell casings in the area where those vehicles had been. No
witness identified defendant as the shooter.
         When police arrived, officers found six .40 caliber
shell casings in the parking lot and two bullet strikes on
the hospital building. Forensic analysis of the casings deter-
mined that they were all fired from the same gun, likely
a Glock. Three months after the shooting, police found a
Glock handgun, several Glock magazines of various sizes,
a Glock box, and .40 caliber ammunition in codefendant’s
home. The Glock handgun did not match the serial number
on the Glock box or the shell casings found at the hospital.
Police also found several red Washington Nationals hats in
the trunk of codefendant’s car and in defendant’s home.
         The day before the shooting, defendant’s wife had
obtained a loaner car from a Mercedes dealer with the same
license plate number the paramedic had reported to police.
Defendant had previously been convicted of a felony.
         Asheim, who has worked on gang enforcement
teams for eight-and-a-half years and has received training
about gang intelligence and enforcement at regional and
national conferences put on by professional associations,
the Oregon Department of Justice, and the United States
Department of Justice, testified to the following facts and
opinions at trial. Asheim builds intelligence about criminal
organizations in the City of Portland by sharing information
with other gang investigators, proactively patrolling areas
where gang crimes have been committed or gang mem-
bers congregate, and talking to people involved in gangs.
Asheim’s team has investigated more than 1,000 incidents
of gang violence, and well over 90 percent of those incidents
involve firearms.
Cite as 331 Or App 193 (2024)                             201

        According to Asheim, gangs are “street organi-
zations” or criminal organizations that are a subset of all
criminals. He opined that gangs hold different values than
people who are not involved in crimes and live by specific
codes and ethics, including showing allegiance to their
members and sharing common culture, symbolisms, and
alliances. Gang subsets or “sets” also have specific symbol-
isms, such as tattoos and baseball hats, that identify them
and their allegiance within the larger organization. Asheim
explained that gangs “preach” loyalty and respect to their
members and noted that, in his experience, gang members
usually do not cooperate with law enforcement and do not
want to be named in police reports, because people that have
been known to talk to police are later murdered for doing so.
         According to Asheim, all criminal gangs gain power
and notoriety through the willingness to do violence. Senior
ranking gang members, known as “Original Gangsters” or
“OGs,” are longtime members that have “survived,” continue
to show allegiance to the gang, and hold a position of author-
ity and respect. He explained that “gangsters” or “Gs” are
members who are willing to go out and “ride” for the gang,
that is, do violence and shootings for the gang, which gains
them power and respect within the gang and from allied
gangs. According Asheim, gang members commonly have a
“hood name” or “street name” that they go by within the
criminal organization. Such aliases have a lineage, begin-
ning with the “Big Homey” who started out with the name,
followed by others who follow under that lineage, who may
be called “Little,” “Baby,” and “Tiny.”
         Asheim explained that the Bloods and Crips are
gangs based in Los Angeles that have operated in Portland
since the 1980s. The Woodlawn Park Bloods and Kirby Blocc
Crips are local Portland gang sets within their respective
larger organizations and are rivals. They historically were
based around a geographical neighborhood but that has
changed with gentrification. The original rivalry between
the Woodlawn Park Bloods and Kirby Blocc Crips goes back
30 years, according to Asheim, and has involved homicides.
        Bloods wear red and Crips wear blue. Asheim noted
that the Woodlawn Park Bloods favor Washington Nationals
202                                                        State v. Herring

hats or “dub caps,” and Kirby Blocc Crips like Kansas City
Royals hats. Displaying “CK,” which stands for “Crip Killer,”
or “BK,” which stands for “Blood Killer,” shows that the person
has killed someone or is “about killing their enemy,” according
to Asheim, and therefore shows disrespect to an enemy gang
and promotes violence the person’s gang needs to gain power.
         Asheim opined that defendant and codefendant are
both members of the Woodlawn Park Bloods3 and that the
victim was a member of the Kirby Blocc Crips in the 1990s.
Defendant’s “hood name” is “Foxxy” or “Big Foxxy.” Asheim
described the significance of several of defendant’s tattoos:
“Original” is tattooed across his stomach, which shows that
he is an “OG” in the Woodlawn Park Bloods and takes pride
in that status; two “rest in peace” tattoos on defendant’s
left arm memorialize slain gang members, including his
brother; “Woodlawn” is tattooed from shoulder to shoulder
on defendant’s back, which shows the depth of his allegiance
to the gang; and “Foxxy” is tattooed on defendant’s right
arm above a grim reaper holding an hourglass.
        The jury found defendant guilty of attempted first-
degree assault with a firearm and unlawful use of a fire-
arm with a firearm. The trial court found him guilty of felon
in possession of a firearm with a firearm and later denied
defendant’s motion for a new trial. This appeal followed.
         In his first assignment of error, defendant chal-
lenges the trial court’s ruling admitting gang evidence to
prove motive. We understand that assignment to focus on
the court’s pretrial ruling admitting evidence of the parties’
gang membership, the existence of a violent rivalry between
defendant’s gang and the victim’s gang, and gang “culture.”
Because we agree that that ruling was in error, we do not
address defendant’s second through eighth assignments
that challenge particular aspects of Asheim’s testimony and
related exhibits, or his ninth assignment of error relating to
his motion for a new trial.

    3
      After Asheim’s testimony, defendant stipulated that he became a member
of the Woodlawn Park Bloods in 1998 at the age of 15 and remained a member
at the time of trial. He proposed that stipulation to forestall the state calling a
second police gang expert to provide testimony about defendant’s specific history
of gang activity.
Cite as 331 Or App 193 (2024)                            203

C. OEC 404(3) Framework
         Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the deter-
mination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence.” OEC 401. Relevant evi-
dence is generally admissible unless it is prohibited by law
or another provision in the Oregon Evidence Code. OEC
402. One such limitation is OEC 404(3), which provides that
“[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show that the
person acted in conformity therewith.”
         “In evidence law, ‘character’ means a person’s dis-
position or propensity to engage or not to engage in certain
types of behavior.” State v. Jackson, 368 Or 705, 716, 498 P3d
788 (2021) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Under OEC 404(3), uncharged misconduct evidence may not
be used “to argue that the defendant has either a general
propensity to engage in misconduct or a specific propen-
sity to engage in misconduct like the charged crime and,
therefore, it is more likely that the defendant committed the
charged crime.” State v. Skillicorn, 367 Or 464, 476, 479 P3d
254 (2021). Evidence of a person’s character is not prohibited
because character is irrelevant, but rather to “protect the
fairness of trials and the accuracy of verdicts,” because such
evidence “is unfairly prejudicial and likely to be overvalued”
by the finder of fact. Id. at 477-78.
          OEC 404(3) further provides, however, that
uncharged misconduct evidence “may * * * be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident.” “The proponent of the evidence ‘has the burden
of showing that the proffered evidence is relevant and proba-
tive of some noncharacter purpose.’ ” Jackson, 368 Or at 716
(quoting State v. Pitt, 352 Or 566, 576, 293 P3d 1002 (2012)).
In determining admissibility, the court must “focus on the
proponent’s theory of relevance that connects the evidence to
the fact of consequence.” Id. at 717. “Whether evidence has a
noncharacter purpose is not determined solely by assessing
whether the ultimate fact that the proponent seeks to prove
is a fact about a person’s character or propensity to commit
204                                            State v. Herring

crimes.” Id. at 716-17. Rather, “evidence may also be inad-
missible, regardless of the ultimate fact to be proved, when-
ever the chain of logical relevance connecting the evidence
to the fact it is proffered to prove relies on an inference relat-
ing to a person’s character or propensities.” Id. at 717 (inter-
nal quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted). Put
another way, OEC 404(3) precludes admission of evidence if
the proponent’s theory of relevance requires the factfinder to
employ “propensity reasoning,” which requires the factfinder
“to rely on an inference about the defendant’s bad character
and resultant propensity to commit criminal acts[ ] at any
link in the chain of logical relevance.” Id. (Emphasis added.);
see also Skillicorn, 367 Or at 482-83 (explaining that OEC
404(3) prohibits the admission of propensity evidence “even
if the proponent asserts that it is being offered to prove, for
example, ‘intent’ or ‘absence of mistake or accident’).
D. Motive Evidence
         Here, the state offered, and trial court admitted,
the gang evidence as relevant to prove defendant’s motive
in committing the charged acts. Motive is “a cause or rea-
son that moves the will and induces action, an inducement
which leads to or tempts the mind to commit an act.” State v.
Hampton, 317 Or 251, 257 n 12, 855 P2d 621 (1993) (citation
omitted). It is “a relevant circumstantial fact that refers to
why a defendant did what [they] did.” Id. Although motive
“generally need not be established by the prosecution to
prove guilt,” it is “often pertinent as the basis to infer that
the act was committed, or to prove the requisite mental
state, or to prove the identity of the actor.” Id.
         We have explained that motive evidence “includes
instances where the other-acts evidence directly supplies
the motive for the charged crime, amounting to a cause-and-
effect relationship,” as well as instances where “the other-
acts [evidence] and the charged crime are both explainable
as a result of the same motive.” State v. Tinoco-Camarena,
311 Or App 295, 302-03, 489 P3d 572, rev den, 368 Or 561
(2021) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
But “[n]o matter what sort of motive evidence is offered,
the proponent must be able to show that the other-acts evi-
dence furnishes or exemplifies the motive without relying
Cite as 331 Or App 193 (2024)                             205

on impermissible character inferences.” Id. at 303; see also
Hampton, 317 Or at 257 n 12 (“Of course, courts must be on
guard to prevent the motive label from being used to smug-
gle forbidden evidence of propensity to the jury.” (Internal
quotation marks and citation omitted.)); State v. Davis, 290
Or App 244, 252, 414 P3d 887 (2018) (“Courts must be cau-
tious in admitting evidence that is ostensibly for the purpose
of showing ‘motive,’ but that may, in reality, depend for its
relevance on an inference about the defendant’s character.”).
         We have acknowledged “how difficult it sometimes
is to distinguish between motive and character evidence,”
Morrow, 290 Or App at 43, and have noted that “most
admissible other-acts evidence will carry both a charac-
ter inference and a noncharacter inference,” Taylor, 326
Or App at 403 n 1. “[A] crucial difference between permissi-
ble motive-based reasoning and a character-based theory of
motive is that the former [permissible reasoning] assumes
that a motive might exist because any person might pos-
sess one under those specific circumstances” whereas the
latter impermissible reasoning “is based on inferred behav-
ioral disposition or propensities and it relies upon a chain of
inferences that employs the evidence to establish that the
person (1) is more inclined to act or think in a given way
than is typical, and (2) is therefore more likely to have acted
or thought that way on a particular occasion.” Davis, 290
Or App at 252-53 (emphasis in Davis; internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). Ultimately, “the state has the
burden of identifying a chain of logical relevance connect-
ing” the uncharged misconduct evidence to a motive to com-
mit the charged acts “without relying on inferences about
[the] defendant’s bad character and propensity to commit
criminal acts.” Jackson, 368 Or at 717.
E.   Discussion
         With those legal principles in mind, we first pause
to note what is not at issue on appeal: whether the fact that
the victim killed defendant’s youngest brother is relevant
and admissible to show defendant’s motive to commit the
charged acts. Although the state included that evidence
in its motion to admit gang evidence, defendant conceded
that that particular evidence was relevant and admissible
206                                                        State v. Herring

motive evidence, and the trial court’s ruling at issue on
appeal admitted different evidence (the parties are mem-
bers of rival gangs that express their rivalry through vio-
lence, and “gang culture”) to prove a different motive (the
state’s broader theory of “why the defendants would attempt
to gun down the victim in broad daylight as the victim
walked into a hospital”). That is clear from the trial court’s
express ruling that the gang evidence is relevant to motive
even if defendant has “another personal motive” as a result
of his brother’s killing.4
         Properly understood, the evidence of defendant’s
uncharged misconduct at issue on appeal is his membership
in the Woodlawn Park Bloods. The additional gang evidence
that the trial court admitted (evidence of the violent rivalry
between defendant’s gang and the victim’s gang and evi-
dence of “gang culture”) gives context and meaning to defen-
dant’s gang membership; thus, the relevance of defendant’s
gang membership also depends on the context and meaning
with which the additional evidence imbued it.5
         We turn to the state’s theory of relevance that the
trial court adopted in admitting the gang evidence and to
the parties’ arguments on appeal. The state offered the
gang evidence to show that defendant held a hostile motive
toward the class of victims to which the victim belongs, viz.,
a member of a rival gang. As noted, the trial court admitted
“evidence showing gang membership, showing gang rivalry
in general between the two gangs, and showing that that
rivalry in the gang culture is expressed in terms of, [vio-
lence]” to explain “the State’s version of why this episode

    4
      We also note that, while the state’s theory of relevance for that “personal
motive” evidence regarding the specific animosity between defendant and the
victim is ostensibly gang-related, its relevance does not necessarily depend on the
gang evidence: The victim killed defendant’s brother; defendant was motivated
to avenge his brother’s death; therefore, defendant was more likely to have com-
mitted the charged act and to have done so with the requisite mental state. We
express no opinion as to whether evidence of defendant’s gang membership may
be relevant and admissible under OEC 404(3) to show that motive because the
state’s theory of relevance was not limited to that motive.
    5
      Indeed, the state argues that “providing Asheim’s opinion that defendant
was a member of a gang at war with the victim’s gang would be virtually mean-
ingless without contextual information about the gangs, their violent rivalries,
and the hierarchies in which they operated.”
Cite as 331 Or App 193 (2024)                             207

occurred, and why the defendants would be people who have
a motive to engage in it.”
           On appeal, the state contends that “evidence of
the gang associations of the defendants and the victim,
the history of the violent rivalry, as well as the particular
circumstances of the shooting itself, allowed the inference
that defendant’s affiliation with the Woodlawn Park Bloods
showed a potential hostile motive to commit the charged
crimes” and that “[t]he inference that defendant’s actions
were motivated in part by the gang rivalry was * * * a log-
ical one on this record.” The state relies on cases holding
that evidence demonstrating a defendant’s hostility toward
a class of persons to which the victim belongs has “special
relevance to the issue of a hostile motive.” State v. Moen, 309
Or 45, 68, 786, P2d 111 (1990); see also State v. Tena, 362
Or 514, 521-23, 413 P3d 175 (2018) (holding that the logical
relevance of other-acts evidence under a hostile motive the-
ory that does not involve the same victim “requires proof
that the motive for committing the other acts was that the
other persons were members of the class to which the victim
belongs”); State v. Turnidge (S059155), 359 Or 364, 447-53,
374 P3d 853 (2016) (holding that evidence of the defendant’s
expression of anti-establishment and anti-law enforcement
views was logically relevant to demonstrate his motive to
plant a bomb that would result in killing law enforcement
officers).
          While that premise may be true, the state’s argu-
ment ends there, and it does not attempt to meet its bur-
den to articulate the logical chain of inferences required to
infer from defendant’s membership in the Woodlawn Park
Bloods his hostile motive toward Crips in general. That is,
the state fails to grapple with the legal standard articulated
in Skillicorn and reaffirmed in Jackson that “[w]hether evi-
dence has a noncharacter purpose is not determined solely
by assessing whether the ultimate fact that the proponent
seeks to prove is a fact about a person’s character or propen-
sity to commit crimes.” Jackson, 368 Or at 716-17; Skillicorn,
367 Or at 476 (“Evidence is barred by OEC 404(3) if the
chain of logical relevance connecting the evidence to the
fact it is proffered to prove relies on an inference relating
208                                         State v. Herring

to a person’s character or propensities” (internal quotation
marks, brackets, and citations omitted)). To the extent that
the state argues that uncharged misconduct evidence is
admissible under OEC 404(3) if it is relevant to prove an
ultimate nonpropensity purpose, such as motive, regardless
of whether the chain of intermediate inferences relies on
propensity reasoning, we reject that argument as irrecon-
cilable with Jackson and Skillicorn. OEC 404(3) precludes
character evidence, even if it is highly probative, because
it is unfairly prejudicial and likely to be overvalued by the
factfinder. Skillicorn, 367 Or at 477-82; see also Morrow, 299
Or App at 41 (“[C]haracter evidence is generally excluded
‘despite its admitted probative value,’ so as to ‘prevent
confusion of issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice.”
(Emphasis in Morrow) (quoting Michelson v. United States,
335 US 469, 475-76, 69 S Ct 213, 93 L Ed 168 (1948)).
         For his part, defendant primarily argues that the
state’s theory of relevance for the gang evidence relies on an
impermissible propensity inference: that defendant belongs
to a group of people (the Woodlawn Park Bloods) who behave
violently, and therefore defendant behaved violently on the
date of the charged acts. In support of his position, defen-
dant points to our decision in State v. Haugen, 274 Or App
127, 360 P3d 560 (2015), rev’d on other grounds, 361 Or 284,
392 P3d 306 (2017), which addressed the admissibility of the
defendant’s gang membership to prove motive. Because we
agree that Haugen is instructive, we turn to that case now.
         In Haugen, the defendant and another man, Rives,
assaulted the victim after Rives confirmed that the victim
knew a former member of the Vagos Motorcycle Club who
had become a “snitch” by testifying against other Vagos
members several years earlier. 274 Or App at 128 and
n 1. The defendant and Rives wore green attire that bore
assorted Vagos logos. Id. The defendant moved to exclude as
inadmissible character evidence two categories of evidence,
both consisting of Vagos-related images and paraphernalia:
(1) various Vagos gang imagery that the state had obtained
from the internet exemplifying the group’s beliefs, includ-
ing hostility toward “snitches” and loyalty to the group (the
internet evidence), and (2) photographs from Rives’s home
Cite as 331 Or App 193 (2024)                            209

depicting clothes with Vagos mottos and patches and a room
with green walls featuring a symbol signifying Rives’s gang
name (the Rives evidence). Id. at 132-33. The state argued
that the evidence was admissible to prove the defendant’s
motive because it showed the Vagos “belief system” or “creed”
that Vagos members “live by,” and that the defendant, a
self-identified and “patched” Vagos member, held that belief
system, including loyalty to the gang and hostility toward
“snitches.” Id. at 134-35. The trial court denied the motion,
explaining that the Vagos gang evidence showed that the
defendant was a Vagos member and had a motive for the
assault based on that membership, and that the state was
entitled to present evidence about the Vagos “lifestyle” and
“credo” regarding loyalty to the organization and its “anti-
snitch” philosophy. Id. at 135-36. The trial court concluded
that the evidence “is character evidence, but it’s relevant
character evidence.” Id. at 137.
         On appeal, the state offered the following theory of
relevance as to the defendant’s motive to assault the vic-
tim: “Vagos hate snitches and are loyal to one another, both
Rives and [the] defendant were Vagos members, Rives had
a problem with the victim because the victim was friends
with a snitch, and [the] defendant initiated the assault on
the victim out of loyalty to Rives.” Id. at 151-52. In other
words, the state “wanted the jury to infer from the fact that
[the] defendant had joined a group holding particular beliefs
that he held those beliefs himself,” which motivated him to
commit the charged assault. Id. at 152.
         Beginning with the internet evidence, we first con-
cluded that that evidence was relevant to the defendant’s
motive because it was “illustrative of the Vagos belief sys-
tem, including the importance of being loyal to gang ‘broth-
ers’ and taking violent action against ‘snitches’ ” and “thus
tends to explain why [the] defendant, a self-described Vagos
member, would have felt justified in assaulting the victim,
who was a friend of a ‘snitch.’ ” Id. at 153. In reaching that
conclusion, we rejected the defendant’s argument that the
internet evidence was irrelevant because the state had
failed to establish a connection between the proffered evi-
dence and the defendant. Id. at 151-52. We reasoned that “if
210                                                           State v. Herring

a person belongs to a defined group, evidence of that group’s
beliefs or tenets may be admissible to show that the per-
son acted in accordance with those beliefs or tenets, ‘even
without proof’ that the person has specifically or expressly
adopted them.” Id. at 152 (quoting United States v. Abel, 469
US 45, 52-53, 105 S Ct 465, 83 L Ed 2d 450 (1984)).6
        We then concluded that the internet evidence was
character evidence. We explained:
        “In offering evidence of the Vagos’ tenets, the state urged
    an inference that, because [the] defendant was a member
    of the Vagos, [the] defendant had personally adopted those
    tenets and lived by them. The state wanted the jury to con-
    clude that [the] defendant acted in accordance with those
    tenets in committing the assault. Because the state offered
    the internet evidence to convince the jury that [the] defen-
    dant’s behavior on a specific occasion conformed to a set of
    beliefs or values that [the] defendant held, that evidence
    was character evidence of [the] defendant’s motive.”
Id. at 155. In so concluding, we rejected the state’s argument
that, because the internet evidence was offered to prove that
the defendant acted out of loyalty to a particular person at
a particular time rather than to prove that he is a loyal per-
son in all varying situations in life, it was not character evi-
dence at all. Id. at 154 (“In our view, the state defines char-
acter evidence too narrowly.”).7 Finally, we concluded that
     6
       As defendant points out, Abel did not involve the admissibility of uncharged
misconduct evidence or of gang affiliation as substantive evidence of guilt, but
rather held that evidence of the defendant’s and a defense witness’s membership
in the same gang—and the tenets of the gang—were relevant and admissible to
prove the defense witness’s possible bias in favor of the defendant. 469 US at 52
(“A witness’ and a party’s common membership in an organization, even without
proof that the witness or party has personally adopted its tenets, is certainly
probative of bias.”); see also id. at 53 (“For purposes of the law of evidence the jury
may be permitted to draw an inference of subscription to the tenets of the organi-
zation from membership alone.”). We noted that Abel was “persuasive authority
for this court in applying the Oregon rules of evidence.” Haugen, 274 Or App at
152 n 9.
     7
       In Haugen, we ultimately concluded that the internet evidence was admis-
sible as propensity evidence under OEC 404(4) based on our reading of State v.
Williams, 357 Or 1, 24, 346 P3d 455 (2015), that OEC 404(4) “supersedes” OEC
404(3) in criminal cases. 274 Or App at 155-56. However, State v. Baughman,
361 Or 386, 403-04, 393 P3d 1132 (2017), later clarified that OEC 404(4) does
not entirely supersede OEC 404(3), but rather supersedes only the first sentence
in OEC 404(3). That is, Baughman clarified that in criminal cases OEC 404(4)
“makes other acts evidence admissible to prove a defendant’s character, subject to
Cite as 331 Or App 193 (2024)                                                211

the Rives evidence was irrelevant to the defendant’s motive
because, “even if we agree with the state’s theory as to why
evidence of the Vagos belief system was generally relevant to
explain [the] defendant’s motive,” the Rives evidence “indi-
cates only the strength of Rives’s own commitment; it tells
us nothing about [the] defendant’s commitment.” Id. at 158.8
         Although in Haugen we concluded that the inter-
net evidence was character evidence because it was offered
“to convince the jury that [the] defendant’s behavior on a
specific occasion conformed to a set of beliefs or values that
[the] defendant held,” we observe that another intermediate
inference in the logical chain of relevance also employed pro-
pensity reasoning: that a person’s membership in a defined
group may establish that the person acted in accordance
with the group’s beliefs or tenets, even absent evidence
that the person has specifically or expressly adopted them.
Both of those inferences relied on an inference about the
defendant’s character, that is, his “disposition or propensity
to engage or not engage in certain types of behavior”: his
gang membership meant that he had a disposition to adopt
his gang’s beliefs and tenets, and holding those beliefs and
tenets meant that he had a disposition to engage in violent
behavior toward certain people in loyalty to his gang.
         With that understanding of our holding in Haugen,
we conclude that, under the circumstances of this case,
the state’s theory of relevance for the gang evidence that
the trial court admitted to show defendant’s hostile motive
required the factfinder to employ impermissible propensity
reasoning. The state offered evidence that (1) defendant is
a longtime member of a particular group, the Woodlawn
Park Bloods, (2) the group is criminal organization that is
involved in a decades-long and ongoing violent rivalry with
another criminal organization, the Crips, a rivalry that the
state described as “modern gang warfare,” and (3) the gang’s

specified rules of evidence and the state and federal constitutions.” Id. (Emphasis
in original.) When the uncharged misconduct is not offered for a propensity pur-
pose, “analysis under OEC 404(4) is unnecessary; the evidence ‘may be admissi-
ble’ under the second sentence of OEC 404(3).” Id. at 404.
     8
       The Supreme Court later granted review and reversed our decision on a
separate legal issue about eyewitness identification. State v. Haugen, 361 Or 284,
392 P3d 306 (2017).
212                                                        State v. Herring

criminal “culture” consists of certain “tendencies,” “life-
style,” and the perpetration of violence out of loyalty to the
gang. To infer from that evidence that “defendant’s actions
were motivated in part by the gang rivalry,” requires two
intermediate inferences: (1) because defendant is a member
of the gang, defendant has personally adopted its criminal
tendencies and lifestyle, including the violent rivalry with
Crips members, and (2) because he has adopted his gang’s
tendencies and lifestyle, defendant has a propensity to
commit violent acts generally and against Crips members
in particular. The state wanted the factfinder to conclude
that defendant acted in accordance with his adherence
to his gang’s rivalry with the victim’s gang and to violent
gang “culture” in committing the charged acts. Notably, the
state’s theory of relevance did not assume that defendant’s
“tendency to have such a motive is simply human” but rather
assumed that defendant “is more inclined to act or think in
a given way than is typical” because he is a gang member.
Davis, 290 Or App at 252-53 (emphasis in Davis; internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
         The state thus offered the gang evidence to per-
suade the factfinder that “it is more likely that [ ] defendant
committed the charged crime” because defendant’s gang
membership means that he has both “a general propensity to
engage in misconduct” and “a specific propensity to engage
in misconduct like the charged crime.” Skillicorn, 367 Or at
476. We therefore conclude that the state’s theory of rele-
vance employed impermissible propensity-based reasoning,
because it required the factfinder “to rely on an inference
about the defendant’s bad character and resultant propen-
sity to commit criminal acts.” Jackson, 368 Or at 717.9 The
trial court erred in admitting the gang evidence.
         In this case, defendant asserts, and we agree, that
the admission of the evidence of defendant’s gang member-
ship, the history of the violent rivalry between defendant’s
    9
      Although we do not address the admissibility of the specific pieces of gang
evidence challenged in defendant’s second through eighth assignments of error,
we note that the same analysis would apply: If the state’s theory of relevance for
a piece of uncharged misconduct evidence relies on an inference that defendant is
a gang member and therefore acted in conformity with his disposition as a gang
member, it employs impermissible propensity reasoning and is not admissible
under OEC 404(3), regardless of the ultimate fact for which it is offered to prove.
Cite as 331 Or App 193 (2024)                               213

gang and the victim’s gang, and gang “culture” warrants
reversal. We may affirm despite error only if there is “lit-
tle likelihood that the particular error affected the verdict.”
State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 32, 77 P3d 1111 (2003). When a
defendant is convicted after a trial in which uncharged mis-
conduct evidence was admitted, we look to the trial record to
determine whether the error in admitting that evidence was
prejudicial. Morrow, 299 Or App at 40.
         The state emphasized defendant’s motive arising
from the “deep and bitter rivalry between long-term gangs
in Portland” and “historical gang violence” in its arguments
to the jury and used his gang membership as propensity
evidence. In its opening statement, the state explained that
Asheim would explain “what that rivalry is” and “what it
means” and that “[w]hen you have Woodlawn Park Blood
and Crips * * * what happens between them? It certainly isn’t
just gentle street boxing” but rather “lots of shootings * * *
between these groups” that “result in homicides.” In closing,
the state invited the jury to “see the commitment that [defen-
dant] has to the Woodlawn Blood gang” to infer his motive.
And the state’s final rebuttal argument urged the jury to
“stand up and * * * tell [defendant] his Blood vendetta, his
gang rivalry that he tried to play out in that parking lot at
our community hospital, that’s a crime. It’s unacceptable.
It’s unacceptable and a crime for him to continue this gang
rivalry by trying to gun down [the victim]. * * * Tell him all of
this with four words: Guilty, guilty, guilty, guilty.” Further,
the state presented Asheim as a gang expert, emphasizing
his unique training and experience that likely would have
given his testimony greater weight with the jury than lay
testimony. See State v. Norby, 218 Or App 609, 620, 180 P3d
752 (2008) (witness’s status as a “neutral professional” likely
gave her testimony “greater weigh in the jury’s eyes”).
          Although defendant waived jury on Count 5, the
state presented the same evidence to the court on that
count and relied on its arguments to the jury to establish
that defendant possessed a firearm. Further, the court’s
repeated limiting instruction did not cure the error, because
“[t]o instruct that other acts may be considered only for pur-
pose of motive * * * does not avoid the problem if propensity
214                                          State v. Herring

is the implicit link between” the other acts and the motive.
Tinoco-Camarena, 311 Or App at 307 n 11. We cannot con-
clude that the gang evidence had little likelihood to affect
the verdict, particularly given the circumstantial nature of
the state’s case. See State v. Hargrove, 327 Or App 437, 448,
536 P3d 612 (2023). For those reasons, we conclude that the
error warrants reversal on all counts.
II. EVIDENCE FOUND IN CODEFENDANT’S HOUSE
         Finally, because the issue is likely to arise on
remand, we address defendant’s tenth of assignment of error.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by admitting
evidence of a gun, a holster, an empty gun box, ammuni-
tion, and a magazine that were found in codefendant’s home
three months after the shooting. Alternatively, defendant
argues that if the evidence met the low relevancy threshold,
the trial court should have excluded it under OEC 403.
         Defendant argues that the evidence found in code-
fendant’s home is not relevant, because it is not reasonable to
infer from that evidence that defendant more likely engaged
in the shooting. The state contends that the evidence was
relevant to its theory that defendant shot at the victim
with a .40 caliber handgun he retrieved from the trunk of
codefendant’s car in the hospital parking lot, because it is
reasonable to infer that the empty gun box found in code-
fendant’s home had once held the .40 caliber gun used in
the shooting—a gun that was not recovered by the state. In
defendant’s view, the state’s theory that defendant retrieved
the gun from codefendant’s trunk is not supported by the
record, and the state’s theory that the gun box must have
belonged to a second Glock that defendant used in the shoot-
ing amounts to “sheer speculation.”
         “ ‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of conse-
quence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence.” OEC 401.
Under that provision, “[e]vidence is relevant so long as the
inference desired by the proponent is reasonable, even if the
evidence also could support a contradictory inference.” State
v. Titus, 328 Or 475, 481, 982 P2d 1133 (1999). We conclude
Cite as 331 Or App 193 (2024)                             215

that the evidence meets the “very low threshold” for rele-
vancy. State v. Gibson, 299 Or App 582, 588, 451 P3d 259
(2019), rev den, 366 Or 691 (2020).
          The state’s theory is that: (1) defendant retrieved a
.40 caliber Glock from codefendant’s trunk on the day of the
shooting; (2) the empty .40 caliber Glock gun box found in
codefendant’s house three months later did not match the .40
caliber Glock also found in codefendant’s house; and there-
fore (3) the empty gun box at one time held the .40 caliber
Glock defendant retrieved from codefendant’s trunk on the
day of the shooting. In support of its theory, the state repre-
sented that hospital surveillance videos showed defendant
and codefendant in the hospital together and also showed
defendant standing alone at codefendant’s car trunk in the
parking lot. The state also represented that an expert would
testify that shell casings from a .40 caliber handgun were
found at the scene, and that the gun box was manufactured
for a .40-caliber Glock and did not match the .40 caliber
Glock found in codefendant’s house. While the third step in
the logical chain does not necessarily follow from the first
two steps—indeed, it may not even be the most probable
inference—it possibly and plausibly follows. A reasonable
factfinder could therefore infer from that evidence that it
was more likely that defendant used codefendant’s gun in
the shooting.
        Defendant next contends that, even if the gun box
and related items are relevant, the trial court should have
excluded the evidence under OEC 403, because the evidence
had minimal probative value and was highly prejudicial
given “the inherently speculative nature of the necessary
inferences” to connect the evidence to the shooting.
         We conclude that the trial court did not err. The
court determined that the probative value of the evidence—
its relevance to the state’s theory that codefendant pro-
vided defendant with a gun—was not outweighed by unfair
prejudice, because the evidence was found in codefendant’s
home, not defendant’s, so the jury would not draw negative
inferences about defendant possessing gun paraphernalia
at home. Given our conclusion that the evidence is relevant
without resort to speculation, we are not persuaded that the
216                                         State v. Herring

trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence.
See Gibson, 299 Or App at 589 (“In evaluating a trial court’s
discretionary ruling under OEC 403, our role is to assess
whether the court’s decision falls within the range of legally
permissible choices.”).
        Reversed and remanded.