Court Opinion

ID: 9536372
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:58:35.164168+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:54:22.535308
License: Public Domain

On Petition for Rehearing.
In the petition for rehearing it is pointed out that in addition to the two cases cited in the opinion by this court, that in Jones v. State, 69 Okla. Cr. 244, 101 P. 2d 860, the instruction on circumstantial evidence as given by the trial court in the within case was specifically approved, and that it was pointed out therein as having been in the past recommended to the courts.
That is true, but this is the first time, so far as we can find, that the instruction has been attacked in respect as in the within case, except as might be gleaned from Judge Matson’s statement in Jackson v. State, 22 Okla. Cr. 338, 354, 211 P. 1066, that it might be couched in more positive language.
It will be noted from an examination of the great number of decisions of this court since statehood, where the instruction now complained of was given, that in many of them the court has stated in substantially this language:
“Where circumstantial evidence is relied upon for conviction, the circumstances proved must not only be consistent with each other, but consistent with the defendant’s guilt and inconsistent with any other reasonable hypothesis.” Hicks v. State, 70 Okla. Cr. 284, 106 P. 2d 136, 139; Brady v. State, 57 Okla. Cr. 203, 46 P. 2d 963; Star v. State, 9 Okla. Cr. 210, 131 P. 542. And see Inklebarger v. State, 8 Okla. Cr. 316, 127 P. 707.
*207Keeping in mind that the burden of proof in criminal cases rests on the state, and that the circumstances must be such as to exclude every other hypothesis except the defendant’s guilt, and considering that “must” is defined in Webster’s New International Dictionary as “Necessary to a result”, and is positive, we conclude, after consulting law dictionaries and references, that this word is more consistent with the spirit of the other wording of the instruction in question than is the word “should”.
Counsel earnestly insist, on the strength of Jackson v. State, supra, and Knight v. State, 73 Okla. Cr. 107, 118 P. 2d 255, 256, that this case should be reversed by reason of the giving of instruction No. 5. In the Jackson case, the defendant did not testify, and the court rejected certain offered evidence on behalf of defendant, but received certain evidence on behalf of the state that defendant complained of. This exclusion, in connection with evidence received on behalf of the state, plus the instruction given which in some respects was similar to the instruction here complained of, resulted in the reversal of the case. The court in the body of the opinion said:
“The fact that defendant did not testify in his own behalf would lead the jury to believe from the wording of the instruction that defendant had offered no explanation of his possession of the car, and that therefore his possession remained entirely unexplained, and that such circumstances should be weighed against him.”
In the Knight case, the instruction indicated that there was no explanation of defendant’s possession of recently stolen calves, and tended to emphasize that defendant did not testify. However, defendant had told a deputy at the time of his arrest that the calves were *208purchased by his brother Robert from a man by the name of J. J. Parker, and that accused had assisted in loading the calves. There was no other evidence of accused’s possession. The evidence was wholly circumstantial, but the court failed to give an instruction on circumstantial evidence. This court held that the instruction given misled the jury by instructing them that the possession of defendant had been unexplained, and that where the evidence was wholly circumstantial, that it was error for the trial court to fail to give an instruction on that subject, whether the defendant had so requested or not.
While in the instant case instruction No. 5 complained of and quoted in our opinion could have been improved by the elimination of the word “unexplained”, and adding after the words “alleged , to have stolen the same,” the words “may be explained, but such possession [continuing] is a circumstance”, etc., yet the jury did hear from the defendant personally and from his witnesses, an explanation of defendant’s possession, and it appears to this court, well understood from the instruction given in connection with the other instructions, that if the possession was satisfactorily explained, they must find the defendant not guilty.
The petition is denied.
BRETT, P. J., and JONES, J., concur.