Court Opinion

ID: 9471900
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:43:37.578482+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:37.875891
License: Public Domain

GEE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Conceding that Kelly Springfield did not actually know of the explosion hazard in its Ventrijet dust collection systems and that the hazard was not known in the tire industry, the majority nevertheless holds that the explosion potential of the dust collection systems was a recognized hazard, imposing liability on Kelly Springfield under the general duty clause. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1976). Because this seems to me an unwarranted and unfortunate expansion of the definition of recognized hazard, I respectfully dissent.
To establish a violation of the general duty clause, the Secretary must show that the employer failed to render its workplace free of a recognized hazard that caused or was likely to cause death or serious physical harm. Georgia Electric Co. v. Marshall, 595 F.2d 309, 320-21 (5th Cir.1979). To constitute a recognized hazard, the dangerous potential of a condition or activity must actually be known either to the particular employer or generally in the industry. Id. at 321; Pratt & Whitney Aircraft v. Secretary of Labor, 649 F.2d 96, 100 (2d Cir.1981).
Here, it is undisputed that Kelly Springfield did not know of the explosion hazard in its dust collection system. Moreover, there is no evidence that anyone in the tire industry knew of the hazard. The majority states, however, that a finding of industry knowledge does not require direct evidence of the subjective beliefs of those working in the relevant industry. Citing Tri-State Roofing v. OSHRC, 685 F.2d 878, 880 (4th Cir.1982), they note that when a hazard is obvious and glaring, the Commission may determine that the hazard was recognized without reference to industry knowledge. Although this rule is sound, it does not apply to our case. Here, the hazard was not so obvious that the industry must have known about it. Indeed, the record contained no evidence of any other explosion in a Ventrijet system, either at Kelly Springfield’s plant or at any other tire-making plant.
Thus, the majority discerns a recognized hazard where there is no evidence that any tire-making employer knew of the hazard and where the hazard was not so obvious that the employers should have known of it. To reach its decision, the majority relies on dicta to be found in a footnote in a D.C. Circuit opinion stating that a recognized hazard can be found if the hazard is within “the common knowledge of safety experts who are familiar with the circumstances of the industry or activity in question.” National Realty & Construction Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1265 n. 32 (D.C.Cir. *3261973) (emphasis added). Applying this standard, the majority imputes knowledge of the explosion hazard to the tire industry through the testimony of a chemical engineer specializing in air pollution abatement systems (with no experience in the tire industry), to the effect that Kelly Springfield’s operation of the Yentrijet systems constituted a hazard.
Our Circuit has never adopted this standard and it is a mistake to do so here. This test equates recognition of hazards with foreseeability of hazards: what hazards are reasonably foreseeable by safety experts? It is clear, however, that “there is a vast difference between what is known or recognized and what is reasonably foreseeable.” Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, 649 F.2d at 101. Congress did not intend the general duty clause to cover every “plausible, theoretical possibility that a condition or activity could cause an employee to incur serious injury.” Id. Rather, the general duty clause was intended to cover “the most flagrant of situations and for which the Secretary had not promulgated appropriate regulations.” Anning-Johnson Co. v. OSHRC, 516 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir.1975). Such flagrant situations occur where the employer knew of the hazard, or should have known of it, because other employers in the industry had recognized the hazard or because the danger of the hazard should have been obvious to anyone. That an independent safety expert can postulate the theoretical possibility of a hazardous condition does not mean that an employer should have recognized it as such.
Moreover, the majority’s rule will require employers to hire safety experts to search their plants for any possibility of an unsafe condition, whether or not the employer has any reason to believe that a hazardous condition exists. While this will, of course, result in safer working conditions, it is unreasonable to believe that Congress intended to impose upon employers — especially small business ones — the financial burden of hiring such experts when there is no hint that any hazard is present.
The new test espoused by the majority expands the concept of recognized hazard to include hazards that employers do not and have no reason to know about. Because this is not supported by any case in our Circuit or by the intent of Congress, and because it seems to me unwise and unfair, I must respectfully dissent.