Court Opinion

ID: 9865290
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:30:35.679265+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:21.806989
License: Public Domain

Me. Justice Hilliaed, dissenting.
I am not in accord with the determination on error, and premise my dissent on the statement in the major opinion immediately to be quoted, and its record support. “The complaint alleged, and the jury by a special verdict found,” says the opinion, “that Healy was guilty of negligence consisting of a wanton or wilful disregard of the rights, feelings and safety of others and of Hewitt, the plaintiff.” The jury had in mind, of course, the evidence to the effect that the injury occurred about 1 o’clock at night, when, through a dense fog, defendant, intoxicated, accompanied by another, was driving an automobile at 35 miles per hour, as he said, or, as other witnesses said, up to 55 miles per hour, on the Colorado Springs highway from Denver to a resort south of Littleton called Blakeland. The opinion does not gainsay the sufficiency of the evidence on any point.
But, the court determines, instruction No. 19, quoted in the opinion, which was to the effect that where from a preponderance of the evidence the jury finds the injury was caused by the “wanton, wilful or reckless acts or conduct on the part of the defendant in operating his said automobile,” plaintiff’s contributory negligence will not preclude recovery, is erroneous. Considering the record, I think the instruction stated the law. In the first place, only a careless and heedless man, whatever of idleness prompting, intoxication here, with no mission *100other than to go to Blakeland in the middle of the night, would drive through a heavy fog at the speed indicated by the record. In my view, defendant’s acts were not only wanton and reckless, but amounted to criminality in the sense contemplated by the statute. S. L. 1931, c. 122, §72. Out of the sum of it all, I think defendant put himself in such position that the defense of contributory negligence should be denied him. 45 C. J. 676, §43. “It is not necessary that the wrongdoer should actually realize that he is invading’ the rights of another person. ’ ’ Id. “An act or omission may be wanton, although there is no actual or direct intent to inflict injury.” Id. §44. Putting the matter negatively, we have said: “If the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence, then plaintiff could not recover, unless the conduct of the defendant was wilfully and wantonly reckless.” Montgomery v. Colorado Co., 50 Colo. 210, 214, 114 Pac. 659. The same principle is recognized in Denver & R. G. R. R. Co. v. Buffehr, 30 Colo. 27, 69 Pac. 582; Denver & R. G. R. R. Co. v. Spencer, 25 Colo. 9, 52 Pac. 211. “Where willful or wanton conduct for which defendant is responsible is a proximate cause of the injuries complained of, contributory negligence does not bar recovery * * *. Thus the doctrine of contributory negligence has no application in actions founded * * * upon acts exhibiting an indifference to the rights of others and a reckless disregard of whether injury is done or not.” 45 C. J. 981, §533. “One who is willfully and wantonly negligent may not be intoxicated, but one who, sufficiently under the influence of liquor to impair his capacity as a driver, or who has just consumed intoxicants sufficient to speedily reduce him to incapacity, yet sufficiently sober to know he is undertaking a sober man’s job, puts himself at the wheel of an automobile and takes the road, is guilty of a willful and wanton disregard of the rights of all persons who ride with him or use the highway he travels.” Foster v. Redding, 97 Colo. 4, 7, 45 P. [2d] 940.
*101I think the safety of the public requires that the doctrine announced in instruction No. 19, should be upheld as against an automobile driver proceeding in the manner and under conditions obtaining here.
Mr. Chief Justice Burke concurs in this opinion.