Court Opinion

ID: 9796121
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:49:31.430207+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:47:57.817847
License: Public Domain

Justice EID,
dissenting.
Because I would find that a district court's denial of a complaint for revocation of probation-a ruling akin to the dismissal of criminal charges-is a final appealable order, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. In my view, the majority's decision to the contrary unnecessarily prevents the People from challenging the district court's ruling: namely, that prior to the completion of direct review Guatney cannot be required, as a condition of probation, to participate in a sex offender treatment program during *1053which he would discuss his sex offenses, because such a requirement would violate the Fifth Amendment.
The Colorado Appellate Rules permit appeal from a final judgment, C.A.R. 1, but neither the rules nor any statutory provision explicitly defines "final judgment." Although the General Assembly has "designated certain classes of orders as final," maj. op. at 1051 (citing § 16-12-102(1), C.R.S. (2008) ), these designations are not exhaustive. Seq eg., Bye v. Dist. Court, 701 P.2d 56, 61 (Colo.1985) (finding order regarding attorney fees in criminal case to be final appealable order even though such an order is not listed in section 16-12-102(1) ). In light of the non-exhaustive nature of section 16-12-102(1), we have developed a definition of final judgment, defining it as "leaving nothing further for the court pronouncing it to do in order to completely determine the rights of the parties involved in the proceeding." Bye, 701 P.2d at 61 (citing D.H. v. People, 192 Colo. 542, 544, 561 P.2d 5, 6 (1977)).
Here, the district court's denial of a complaint for revocation of probation, alleging that CGuatney had refused to participate in sex offender treatment, left "nothing further for the court ... to do in order to completely determine the rights of the parties involved in the proceeding." See Byes, 701 P.2d at 61. The district court held that the treatment program violated Guatney's rights under the Fifth Amendment, and that therefore he could not be required to participate in it as a condition of probation while his conviction was on direct appeal. This determination was conclusive as to whether Guatney's probation could be revoked due to lack of participation in treatment; in the view of the trial court, probation could not be revoked on those grounds. In other words, this was not a "wait and see" decision where the parties could return to the court once a period of time had passed in order to re-assess Guat-ney's compliance. Instead, this was a final determination that permitted Guatney to remain on probation without participating in the treatment program.
Furthermore, the denial of a petition for revocation of probation is akin to the dismissal of criminal charges, which is a statutorily enumerated final order. See § 16-12-102(1), C.R.S. (2008) ("Any order of a court that either dismisses one or more counts of a charging document prior to trial or grants a new trial after the entry of a verdict or judgment shall constitute a final order that shall be immediately appealable. ..."). Like the dismissal of charges, the denial of a complaint to revoke probation "disposes of the opportunity to try [the] defendant on that particular charge." See People v. Jefferson, 748 P.2d 1223, 1225 (Colo.1988). Here, onee the court determined that failure to comply with the treatment program could not provide a basis for revocation of probation, the People could no longer seek revocation on those grounds. Thus, like an order dismissing charges, an order denying a petition for revocation of probation is final and subject to appeal.
Finally, the General Assembly explicitly authorizes the People to appeal "any decision of a court in a eriminal case upon any question of law." § 16-12-102(1) (emphasis added). Here, the trial court found that the condition of probation violated Guatney's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. An appeal in this case would not review the trial court's judgment about the adequacy or degree of Guatney's compliance with his probation. Instead, it would examine whether the conditions of probation violated his Fifth Amendment rights-a pure question of law appealable under section 16-12-102(1).
The district court's ruling permitted Guat-ney, a convicted sex offender, to remain on probation for roughly three years-that is, the time it took to complete his direct appeals-without participating in any sex offender treatment. In my view, today's decision unnecessarily prevents the People from challenging that ruling. I therefore respectfully dissent from its decision.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice MULLARKEY joins in this dissent.