Court Opinion

ID: 9598053
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:04:42.762071+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:40.565152
License: Public Domain

KAUFMAN, J., Concurring.
I have joined in the opinion authored for the court by Justice Eagleson but, nevertheless, write separately to point out two rather fundamental misconceptions which underlie Justice Broussard’s *914concurring and dissenting opinion and which also at least partially underlie Justice Mosk’s concurring and dissenting opinion.
First, it is not true, except in a very limited sense, that the function of the trial court when deciding the automatic motion for modification is to make an independent determination of the appropriateness of imposing the death penalty. Second, even when the trial judge has died, if the ruling on the automatic motion for reduction of penalty is so defective it cannot be upheld, the remedy is not a new penalty trial, but, rather, a remand to the trial court for a new hearing on the automatic motion by a substitute judge.
Under the 1977 death penalty law, Penal Code section 190.4, subdivision (e)1 read in pertinent part: “In every case in which the trier of fact has returned a verdict or finding imposing the death penalty, the defendant shall be deemed to have made an application for modification of such verdict or finding pursuant to subdivision (7) of Section 1181. In ruling on the application the judge shall review the evidence, consider, take into account, and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in Section 190.3, and shall make an independent determination as to whether the weight of the evidence supports the jury’s findings and verdicts. He shall state on the record the reason [sic] for his findings.” (Stats. 1977, ch. 316, § 12, p. 1261, italics added.)
In accordance with the plain meaning of the 1977 language, the court was required in ruling on the automatic motion to make an “independent determination” of the “weight of the evidence.” (People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 193, fn. 7 [158 Cal.Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587] [conc. opn. of Mosk, J.]; see also People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 793 [230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113].)
Justice Mosk’s concurring opinion in Frierson carefully and accurately explained the trial court’s function in ruling on the automatic motion: “[0]n the automatic motion for modification of the verdict provided by subdivision (e) of section 190.4, the stated function of the trial court is not to choose the appropriate penalty as a matter of first impression but simply to exercise its independent judgment ‘as to whether the weight of the evidence supports the jury’s findings and verdicts.’ This, of course, is no more than the long-settled standard for reviewing any jury verdict on a motion for new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence. (People v. Love (1961) 56 Cal.2d 720, 728 [16 Cal.Rptr. 777, 17 Cal.Rptr. 481, 366 P.2d 33, 809], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Morse (1964) 60 Cal.2d 631, 637, *915fn. 2 [36 Cal.Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33, 12 A.L.R.3d 810].)” (People v. Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d 142, 193, fn. 7, original italics.)
The 1978 death penalty law did not enlarge the trial court’s function in ruling on the automatic motion for modification under section 190.4, subdivision (e). In fact, the only significant change in language in that regard was the deletion of the word “independent" preceding the word “determination” so that the pertinent provision reads: “In ruling on the application, the judge shall review the evidence, consider, take into account, and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in Section 190.3, and shall make a determination as to whether the jury’s findings and verdicts that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances are contrary to law or the evidence presented. The judge shall state on the record the reasons for his findings." (§ 190.4, subd. (e).)
The question that arose as a result of the language change was not whether the trial court’s function was thereby intended to be enlarged but, rather, whether the change was intended to diminish the trial court’s function. (See People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d 730, 793.) This court resolved that question in the negative, stating: “We think that the present version of section 190.4, subdivision (e), like the 1977 version, requires that the trial judge make an independent determination whether imposition of the death penalty upon the defendant is proper in light of the relevant evidence and the applicable law. One reason for this interpretation is that it harmonizes section 190.4, subdivision (e), with section 1181, subdivision 7, to which subdivision (e) refers. Subdivision 7 of section 1181 was adopted in 1951. In ruling on motions under that subdivision for modification of verdicts that called for the death penalty under former sections 190 and 190.1, which were in effect up to 1972, ‘the trial judge ha[d] the duty to review the evidence to determine whether in his independent judgment the weight of the evidence supported] the jury's verdict, and if he decide[d] it d[id] not, he ha[d] the power to reduce the penalty to life imprisonment.’ (In re Anderson (1968) 69 Cal.2d 613, 623 [73 Cal.Rptr. 21, 447 P.2d 117].) Moreover, in determining whether in his or her independent judgment the weight of the evidence supported the verdict, the judge was required to assess the credibility of the witnesses, determine the probative force of the testimony, and weigh the evidence. (People v. Love (1961) 56 Cal.2d 720, 728 [16 Cal.Rptr. 777, 366 P.2d 33].) By providing for automatic review of a death verdict under section 1181, subdivision 7, section 190.4, subdivision (e), must have intended that the trial judge exercise the responsibilities for independent review imposed by subdivision 7, notwithstanding the omission of the word ‘independent’ that appeared in the 1977 version of section 190.4, subdivision (e).” (People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d 730, 793-794, italics added.)
*916Although the Rodriguez court used the somewhat ambiguous expression “requires that the trial judge make an independent determination whether imposition of the death penalty upon the defendant is proper in light of the relevant evidence and the applicable law,” it is clear from other language in the same paragraph (italicized above), the history of the language change made in the 1978 version, and the statutory language “make a determination as to whether the jury’s findings and verdicts, . . . are contrary to law or the evidence presented,” that the independent determination to be made by the trial court is as to the weight of the evidence, not a de novo determination of the propriety of the death penalty otherwise.
So, Justice Mosk’s explanation in Frierson of the trial court’s function in ruling on the automatic motion under section 190.4 was and is correct; it “is no more than the long-settled standard for reviewing any jury verdict on a motion for new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence.” (People v. Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d 142, 193, fn. 7 [conc. opn. of Mosk, J.].)
It is well settled, of course, that where error invalidates a ruling on a motion for new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence, the proper remedy is to remand the case to the trial court for a redetermination of the motion. (People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d 730, 794; People v. Love (1961) 56 Cal.2d 720, 729 [16 Cal.Rptr. 777, 366 P.2d 33] [disapproved on other grounds in People v. Morse (1964) 60 Cal.2d 631, 637, fn. 2 (36 Cal.Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33, 12 A.L.R.3d 810)].) It is also well settled that if the trial judge is unavailable, the motion is properly redetermined by another judge of the court. (People v. Holzer (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 456, 463-464 [102 Cal.Rptr. 11]; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 661; Beck v. Superior Court (1942) 20 Cal.2d 77, 81 [124 P.2d 9]; Lacey v. Bertone (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 107, 111 [240 P.2d 395].) Thus, as this court noted in People v. Brown (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1247, 1264, footnote 7 [248 Cal.Rptr. 817, 756 P.2d 204]: “This case was tried in 1980 before Judge J. William Mortland of the Riverside County Superior Court. Judge Mortland still sits on that court, and he personally should consider the modification motion. This is the correct procedure wherever possible, but practical difficulties arise when the trial judge dies or becomes unavailable before the section 190.4(e) motion has been decided. By analogy to other similar situations, the modification motion may in such event be heard and determined by any other judge of the same court. (§ 1053 [completion of trial]; Code Civ. Proc., § 661 [new trial motion]; People v. Holzer (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 456, 463-464 [102 Cal.Rptr. 11] [same].)”
Panelli, J., concurred.

 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.