Court Opinion

ID: 9930426
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-06 21:00:58.735579+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:18:05.425714
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4418      Doc: 27         Filed: 02/05/2024     Pg: 1 of 3

                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 23-4418

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        MICHAEL JARRELL CHAPMAN, a/k/a Boo Bang,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
        Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (5:21-cr-00257-FL-1)

        Submitted: January 30, 2024                                       Decided: February 5, 2024

        Before KING, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

        Dismissed in part and remanded with instructions by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, Eric Joseph Brignac, Chief
        Appellate Attorney, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North
        Carolina, for Appellant. David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, Kristine L.
        Fritz, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
        ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

                  Michael Jarrell Chapman appeals the 151-month sentence imposed following his

        guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute quantities of

        heroin, fentanyl, and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); 846;

        and distribution of quantities of heroin and fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),

        (b)(1)(C). On appeal, Chapman asserts that the district court erred by failing to address

        each of his arguments for a lower sentence. The Government moves to dismiss this claim

        based on the appeal waiver provision in Chapman’s plea agreement. In response, Chapman

        contends that the waiver is invalid because the magistrate judge did not adequately explain

        its terms at the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing.

                  We review the validity of an appeal waiver de novo. United States v. Thornsbury,

        670 F.3d 532, 537 (4th Cir. 2012). An appeal waiver “preclude[s] a defendant from

        appealing a specific issue if the record establishes that the waiver is valid and the issue

        being appealed is within the scope of the waiver.” United States v. Archie, 771 F.3d 217,

        221 (4th Cir. 2014). A defendant validly waives his appeal rights if he agreed to the waiver

        “knowingly and intelligently.” United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir.

        2010). “Generally, if a district court questions a defendant regarding the waiver of

        appellate rights during the Rule 11 colloquy and the record indicates that the defendant

        understood the full significance of the waiver, the waiver is valid.” Thornsbury, 670 F.3d

        at 537.

                  Contrary to Chapman’s argument, we conclude that the magistrate judge sufficiently

        reviewed and confirmed Chapman’s understanding of the appeal waiver provision, the

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        terms of which broadly preclude him from appealing his sentence. Thus, we grant the

        Government’s motion to dismiss Chapman’s challenge to his custodial sentence. Finally,

        Chapman contends—and the Government agrees—that a limited remand is necessary to

        correct the written judgment, which is inconsistent with the court’s oral pronouncement. *

               Accordingly, we grant the Government’s motion, dismiss the appeal in part, and

        remand to the district court with instructions to correct the written judgment to conform to

        the court’s oral pronouncement that Chapman “support [his] child.” The rest of the written

        judgment shall remain undisturbed. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

        legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument

        would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                      DISMISSED IN PART,
                                                             REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

               *
                The oral pronouncement requires Chapman to support his “child” as a condition
        of supervised release, while the written judgment requires him to support his “dependent.”

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