Court Opinion

ID: 9399329
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-02 17:02:07.879386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:04.804604
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12478   Document: 15-1    Date Filed: 06/02/2023   Page: 1 of 5

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 22-12478
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       TINA MARIE BARBUTO,
                                                   Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       MIAMI HERALD MEDIA COMPANY,

                                                 Defendant-Appellee,

       DAVID J. NEAL,

                                                          Defendant.

                         ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-12478      Document: 15-1       Date Filed: 06/02/2023     Page: 2 of 5

       2                       Opinion of the Court                  22-12478

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                      D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-20608-BB
                           ____________________

       Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              In 2019, the Miami Herald Media Company published in
       the Miami Herald newspaper two articles, written by reporter Da-
       vid J. Neal, about appellant Tina Marie Barbuto. The articles re-
       ported on Barbuto’s role in a healthcare fraud scheme.
               Barbuto sued Neal and Miami Herald in federal district
       court. In the ﬁrst amended complaint, Barbuto alleged that Neal
       and Miami Herald were liable under Florida law for defamation
       by implication because the articles suggested that Barbuto was
       one of the masterminds of the fraud scheme when she was no
       more than a minor participant. Barbuto served each defendant
       with a summons and a copy of the ﬁrst amended complaint.
       When Miami Herald failed to respond to the ﬁrst amended com-
       plaint, the clerk entered default against it. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
             In the meantime, Neal moved to dismiss the ﬁrst amended
       complaint. The district court granted the motion. It dismissed
       Barbuto’s claim against Neal based on the ﬁrst article with preju-
       dice because the claim was time-barred, as Barbuto waited more
       than two years to bring the claim. The court dismissed Barbuto’s
       claim against Neal based on the second article without prejudice
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       22-12478                  Opinion of the Court                         3

       because she failed to comply with a Florida statute requiring a
       plaintiﬀ to provide notice before bringing a defamation claim
       based on the publication of a newspaper article. See Fla. Stat.
       § 770.01. The district court explained that if Barbuto provided the
       required notice, she could ﬁle a second amended complaint bring-
       ing a defamation claim based on the second article.
              After Barbuto provided Neal the required notice, she ﬁled a
       second amended complaint. The second amended complaint stat-
       ed that it was “directed at . . . Neal only because a Clerk’s Default”
       had been entered against Miami Herald. Doc. 34 at 1 n.1. 1
              Neal moved to dismiss the second amended complaint. He
       argued that the pleading was due to be dismissed for several rea-
       sons, including because Florida law aﬀorded a qualiﬁed privilege
       to the news media when it engaged in disinterested and neutral
       reporting on matters of public concern. According to Neal, the
       outcome of the government’s investigation into, and prosecution
       of, a multi-million-dollar healthcare fraud scheme was a matter of
       public concern, and he engaged in disinterested, factual reporting
       that used government documents, including Barbuto’s plea
       agreement and factual proﬀer, as sources.
             The district court granted the motion and dismissed the
       claims against Neal with prejudice. It concluded that Neal was
       “protected by the fair and neutral reporting privilege[]” because it
       was “obvious from the face of the articles that Neal was engaging

       1 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12478

       in disinterested and neutral reporting about a matter of public
       concern—healthcare care fraud in South Florida.” Doc. 49 at 9–
       10. Although the court acknowledged that Neal raised this privi-
       lege only in connection with the second article, the court found
       that its conclusion “applie[d] with equal force to both articles.” Id.
       at 9 n.7.
               After the district court disposed of the claims against Neal,
       Barbuto moved for entry of a default judgment against Miami
       Herald. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). She argued that the allegations in
       the ﬁrst amended complaint established that Miami Herald was
       liable for defamation based on its publication of the ﬁrst article.
       She asked the district court to enter a default judgment on liabil-
       ity, require Miami Herald to remove the article from its website,
       and set a hearing on damages.
              The district court denied the motion on two alternative
       grounds. The court began by explaining that an action may have
       only one operative complaint at a time. As a result, when Barbuto
       ﬁled the second amended complaint, it “superseded and replaced”
       the ﬁrst amended complaint and thus “moot[ed] the entry of de-
       fault based on [the] previous pleading.” Doc. 60 at 3.
              But the district court did not stop there. It rejected Bar-
       buto’s motion for a default judgment on a second ground, stating,
       “[i]n any event”—meaning even if the ﬁrst amended complaint
       had not been superseded—the court would deny the motion for
       default judgment nonetheless. Id. at 4. The court explained that
       default judgments were ordinarily disfavored and that the ques-
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       22-12478               Opinion of the Court                         5

       tion whether to grant default judgment in a particular case was
       within a court’s discretion. It stated that it was declining to exer-
       cise its discretion because “[b]ased upon the record in this case,
       default judgment is not warranted.” Id. at 5.
             This is Barbuto’s appeal.
              When a district court’s ruling rests on two or more inde-
       pendent, alternative grounds, the “appellant must convince us
       that every stated ground for the judgment against [her] is incor-
       rect.” Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th
       Cir. 2014). “When an appellant fails to challenge properly on ap-
       peal one of the grounds on which the district court based its
       judgment, [s]he is deemed to have abandoned any challenge of
       that ground, and it follows that the judgment is due to be
       aﬃrmed.” Id.
              Here, Barbuto argues on appeal that the district court erred
       in concluding that the second amended complaint superseded the
       ﬁrst amended complaint and mooted the entry of default against
       Miami Herald. But she fails to address the district court’s second
       ground for denying the motion for a default judgment. That is,
       she does not advance any argument why it was an abuse of discre-
       tion for the district court, after dismissing the claims against Neal
       based on the statute of limitations and Florida’s fair and neutral
       reporting privilege, to decide that a default judgment against Mi-
       ami Herald was not warranted. Given Barbuto’s failure to chal-
       lenge this alternative ground, we aﬃrm. Id.
             AFFIRMED.