Court Opinion

ID: 9519775
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:24:44.710981+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:53.463921
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CARMAN, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. The majority finds the 1995 amendment to the Auditing Act constitutional by limiting the authority of the Auditor General to audit only those public funds of the state “ ‘appropriated or otherwise authorized by the General Assembly following the Governor’s preparation and submission of the State budget.’ ” 206 Ill. 2d at 490-91, quoting Chicago Bar Ass’n, 183 Ill. App. 3d at 719. This limitation is unduly restrictive. To the contrary, I conclude that article VIII of the Illinois Constitution and the Auditing Act set forth a comprehensive scheme for the control, management, and audit of state finances. The amendment to the Auditing Act does not contravene the Illinois Constitution and must be interpreted in a manner to assure that the expenditure of the public’s money is given appropriate scrutiny. The Auditing Act implements article VIII, section 3, of the Illinois Constitution (30 ILCS 5/1 — 2(a) (West 1996)) and places the Auditor General under the control and direction of the General Assembly (30 ILCS 5/1— 2(c) (West 1996)). The Auditor General is expressly recognized as a legislative officer of the State of Illinois under our constitution. 30 ILCS 5/1 — 2(c) (West 1996). The Auditing Act “is intended to provide a comprehensive and thorough post audit of the obligation, expenditure, receipt and use of public funds of the State under the direction and control of the Auditor General, to the end that the government of the State of Illinois will be accountable to the General Assembly and the citizens and taxpayers, and to the end that the constitutional and statutory requirements governing state fiscal and financial operations will be enforced.” 30 ILCS 5/1 — 2(b) (West 1996). Through the 1995 amendment to the Auditing Act, the legislature explicitly directs the Auditor General to undertake an audit of the airports that “shall include, but not be limited to, an examination of revenues, expenses, and transfers of funds; purchasing and contracting policies and practices; staffing levels; and hiring practices and procedures.” 30 ILCS 5/3 — 1 (West 2000). We should construe the statute so that no word or phrase is rendered superfluous or meaningless. Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990). The plain language of the 1995 amendment with respect to the airports demonstrates that the General Assembly’s directive to the Auditor General contemplates an audit beyond a narrow category of state funds limited to only those public funds of the state directly dispersed to the airports and totaling only $45,000. The essential question we are called upon to determine in this case is what funds constitute “public funds of the State.” We must determine whether the legislature intended the 1995 amendment to the Auditing Act to require the Auditor General to audit all public funds of the state, or only those state funds passed to the City and airports through appropriation, grant, or some other form of direct dispersal. The Auditing Act states that the phrase “Public funds of the State” has “the meaning ascribed to that term in Article VIII of the Constitution.” 30 ILCS 5/1 — 18 (West 1996). However, the term “public funds” is not defined in the Illinois Constitution. Therefore, we must attempt to assign a meaning to the term as it is used in the constitution. The best guide to interpreting the Illinois Constitution is the document’s own plain language. Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Chapman, 181 Ill. 2d 65, 77 (1998). Interpretation of a constitutional provision begins with the language of the provision. Graham v. Illinois State Toll Highway Authority, 182 Ill. 2d 287, 301 (1998). Article VIII, section 1(a), of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 states that “[p]ublic funds, property or credit shall be used only for public purposes.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VIII, § 1(a). Article VIII, section 3, reads as follows: “§ 3. State Audit and Auditor General (a) The General Assembly shall provide by law for the audit of the obligation, receipt and use of public funds of the State. The General Assembly, by a vote of three-fifths of the members elected to each house, shall appoint an Auditor General and may remove him for cause by a similar vote. The Auditor General shall serve for a term of ten years. His compensation shall be established by law and shall not be diminished, but may be increased, to take effect during his term. (b) The Auditor General shall conduct the audit of public funds of the State. He shall make additional reports and investigations as directed by the General Assembly. He shall report his findings and recommendations to the General Assembly and to the Governor.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VIII, §§ 3(a), (b). In addition to the plain language of section 3 of article VIII, it is important to note that section 4 does not distinguish between state and local funds. Section 4 provides: “§ 4. Systems of Accounting, Auditing and Reporting The General Assembly by law shall provide systems of accounting, auditing and reporting of the obligation, receipt and use of public funds. These systems shall be used by all units of local government and school districts.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VIII, § 4. This section is evidence of the General Assembly’s constitutional authority to ensure adequate and responsible accounting and reporting of public funds at the local level. Moreover, section 4 reflects the General Assembly’s responsibility to ensure that all units of local government are properly utilizing public funds. For example, the General Assembly also permits, or in some instances mandates, the Auditor General to audit other political subdivisions in section 3 — 1. 30 ILCS 5/3 — 1 (West 1996). The majority relies on the appellate court’s holding in Chicago Bar Ass’n v. Cronson for the proposition that “ ‘the role of the Auditor General is to conduct audits with respect to all funds appropriated or otherwise authorized by the General Assembly following the Governor’s preparation and submission of the State budget.’ ” 206 Ill. 2d at 490-91, quoting Chicago Bar Ass’n, 183 Ill. App. 3d at 719. While Chicago Bar Ass’n is instructive as to the general background of the Auditor General’s inception and duties, as well as the types and manner of execution of audits that may be conducted by the Auditor General, the facts of this case are distinguishable from Chicago Bar Ass’n. The audit in Chicago Bar Ass’n related to a regulatory agency charged with the regulation of, and admission to, the practice of law in Illinois. It is well settled that this power is an exclusive function of the Illinois Supreme Court and is within this court’s inherent judicial power. People ex rel. Brazen v. Finley, 119 Ill. 2d 485, 492-93 (1988). Chicago Bar Ass’n did not deal with specific legislation passed by the General Assembly mandating that the Auditor General conduct a specific audit. The audit in Chicago Bar Ass’n was not initiated at the direction of the General Assembly, but by the Auditor General himself. Chicago Bar Ass’n, 183 Ill. App. 3d at 714. It is also clear that the passage from Chicago Bar Ass’n relied upon by the majority is not compatible with the Illinois Constitution. In addition to the plain language of article VIII, article II, section 2, states that “[t]he enumeration in this Constitution of specified powers and functions shall not be construed as a limitation of powers of state government.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, § 2. In People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass’n v. State Board of Elections, 136 Ill. 2d 513, 525 (1990), and Graham, 182 Ill. 2d at 301, we stated that it “is well accepted in this State that the constitution is not regarded as a grant of powers to the legislature but is a limitation upon its authority; the legislature may enact any legislation not expressly prohibited by the constitution.” See also Kluk v. Lang, 125 Ill. 2d 306, 324 (1988). The General Assembly has the constitutional authority to direct the Auditor General to conduct a wide-ranging audit of the airports and the Auditor General should not be barred from conducting a legislatively directed audit of public funds of the state simply because those funds were not first submitted to the Governor for approval or because the funds have become an inseparable part of a larger whole that also contains funds from other sources. The Illinois Constitution clearly evinces both a scheme and a desire for citizens and taxpayers to be assured that the constitutional and statutory requirements governing state fiscal and financial operations will be enforced. In so doing, it does not limit the Auditor General’s authority to “all public funds of the state that can be clearly identified in the General Assembly’s line-item budget” or “all public funds of the state that can be characterized as direct grants or appropriations from an executive agency of the government of the State of Illinois.” It simply states that the General Assembly shall provide by law for the audit of the obligation, receipt, and use of “public funds of the state.” The City received no less than $4 billion in public funds of the state during the years of 1995 through 1998. Were we to adopt the majority’s limited definition of public funds of the state, the majority of these public funds would not be subject to the legislatively mandated audit. The record indicates that the operations of the airports are funded from a number of different sources, including self-generated funds, state funds, and federal funds. Each airport is financed and operated on a standalone basis, separate from the City’s other operations. The revenue and expenses of O’Hare and Midway are accounted for and audited separately from those of other City departments and agencies. Because the operating budget of Meigs is small in comparison with the other two airports, it is accounted for within the City’s general corporate fund budget. The Auditor General introduced evidence that the City receives hundreds of millions of dollars in state funding annually. Relying on the City’s own financial reports for 1995 through 1998, the Auditor General contends that the City received a total of approximately $1,922 billion in state funding from a combination of the state income tax, the state sales tax, and state auto and hotel taxes. In addition, the City’s financial statements show that it received annually what were characterized as “Federal/State Grants.” According to the Auditor General, the City refused requests to disclose its breakdown of the grants into state and federal portions. The total for these grants for the years through 1998 was $2,269 billion. I agree with the majority that federal grant funds directed without condition to the City or airports by the federal government via the State of Illinois as receiving agent are not public funds of the state and are not subject to audit. The use and audit of these funds is governed by federal law. However, to the extent that such federal funds have been commingled with public funds of the state and cannot be separated, the Auditor General should also be permitted to examine such funds to the extent necessary to produce a meaningful and adequate audit. When conducting an audit, the Auditor General examines proper management of resources and seeks to identify inefficient or uneconomical practices to ensure that public funds are being used to maximum efficiency. To hold that billions of dollars gathered from the taxpayers and citizens of Illinois are no longer subject to inspection and are beyond the reach of the constitutional officer charged with ensuring that they are used efficiently and only for public purposes, simply because the funds have been commingled with funds from other nonstate sources, or because the funds were not a specific grant or appropriation, would frustrate the purpose of the Illinois Constitution and the Auditing Act. “Public funds of the state” includes those funds appropriated by the General Assembly to the airports. In addition, the plain textual meaning of the term must also include those funds generated due to actions or policies of the state such as sales tax, income tax, or grants. Therefore, I would find that the 1995 amendment to the Auditing Act directs the Auditor General to conduct an audit of the City of Chicago and any other entity regarding the operation of O’Hare International Airport, Midway Airport, and Merrill C. Meigs Field, and that the audit should not be limited to only those state funds directly dispersed to the City through grant or appropriation. Furthermore, the Illinois Constitution does not prohibit the General Assembly from directing the Auditor General to conduct such an audit, as it sets forth a comprehensive scheme for the control, management, and audit of state finances. Accordingly, the finding of summary judgment by the circuit court of Cook County in favor of the City should be reversed and the cause should be remanded for further proceedings. JUSTICE THOMAS joins in this dissent.