Court Opinion

ID: 9681034
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:42:50.392539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:30.965302
License: Public Domain

HILL, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I cannot concur in either the reasoning or the conclusion and order of the majority of the Court in this cause. I think that the rule nisi should be issued in each case.
It is obvious that the majority opinion is based upon the premise, and the opinion so states, that a finding by this Court of an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge is a sine qua non to the issuance of the rule in cases where the rulings sought to be reviewed arise under the pre-trial deposition statute (Title 7, § 474(1) et seq., Code of Alabama Recompiled). Their opinion states: “In such cases” (where the rulings sought to be reviewed are under the deposition statute) “we think that the issuance of the writ is limited to those where an abuse of discretion is shown.” In other words, unless an abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent trial judge appears, the writ cannot issue; and, they have denied the writ because there is no averment nor evidence of an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in his rulings on the several questions involved in this case. Their decision is not consonant or consistent with the law of Alabama today.
The general rule, in Alabama as in most of the states, is that the writ will issue to compel the exercise of judicial discretion, but not to compel its exercise in any particular way. It appears that this Court has through the years recognized two exceptions to this rule:
That the writ will issue:
(1) to prevent an abuse of discretion or to correct an arbitrary action outside of the exercise of a reasonable discretion. Foshee v. State ex rel. Messer, 210 Ala. 155, 97 So. 565; Ex parte Green, 221 Ala. 415, 129 So. 69; and,
(2) to correct errors of inferior tribunals in order to prevent a failure of justice, where such errors are not reviewable on appeal. Ex Parte Tower Manufacturing Co. et al., 103 Ala. 415, 15 So. 836; Ex Parte Weissinger, 247 Ala. 113, 22 So.2d 510,
Attention is directed to the notes appearing in the annotations under the heading “Mandamus” under § 1072 of Title 7 of the Code of Alabama Recompiled (Vol. 3 p. 1050), wherein the codifier recognizes the two exceptions to the general rule:
“In general. — As a general rule a writ of mandamus will not issue to review an exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial discretion, and this rule applies to the approval of official bond. Payne v. Spragins, 207 Ala. 264, 92 So. 466; Mobile Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cleveland, 76 Ala. 321; Ex parte Harris, 52 Ala. 87, 23 Am.Rep. 559. This rule, however, has an exception in this jurisdiction, for in some cases the writ of mandamus has been employed to correct errors of inferior tribunals, and to prevent a failure of justice where there is a clear right and there is an absence of any other adequate remedy, and it has also been employed to prevent an abuse of discretion, or to correct an arbitrary action outside of the exercise of a reasonable discretion. 26 Cyc. 189; Wilson v. Duncan, 114 Ala. 659, 21 So. 1017; Ex parte Tower Mfg. Co., 103 Ala. 415, 15 So. 836; Ex parte Dowe, 54 Ala. 258; Foshee v. State, 210 Ala. 155, 156, 97 So. 565.”
*594The bellwether case on this point in Alabama seems to be Ex Parte Tower Manufacturing Co. et al., 103 Ala. 415, 15 So. 836, in which case the eminent and revered Chief Justice Brickell said:
“2. The writ of mandamus, it may be, has been employed by this court more liberally as a remedy for the correction of the errors of inferior tribunals than would seem consistent with the principles of the common law. If this is true, it is in some degree attributable to the existence of peculiar statutory proceedings, in which errors may intervene, incapable of correction by appeal or other revisory remedy. In other cases, to prevent a failure of justice, or irreparable injury, when there was a clear legal right, and an absence of any other adequate remedy, there has been resort to mandamus. The recent cases of Ex parte Barnes, 84 Ala. 540, 4 South. 769, and Reynolds v. Crook, 95 Ala. 570, 11 South. 412, are illustrative. * * * If an order or judgment or decree is made or rendered, which is not the subject of revision by appeal or other revisory remedy, and yet is erroneous, working injury to the party complaining, and there be no other legal remedy, adequate to the correction of the error and the prevention of the injury, mandamus will be awarded.”
In Wilson v. Duncan, 114 Ala. 659, 672, 21 So. 1017, 1019, this Court, in discussing the function of the writ of mandamus, said:
“Generally, the function of a writ of mandamus is to compel a subordinate court to hear and decide a controversy of which it has jurisdiction; or, if the case has been heard, to render a judgment or enter a decree in the cause; but not to direct what particular judgment shall be rendered, or to correct errors, not to control, but compel judicial action; and the writ will not be granted, where full and adequate relief can be had by appeal, writ of error or otherwise. State, [ex rel. Pinney] v. Williams, 69 Ala. 311; Ex parte State Bar Ass’n, 92 Ala. [113] 116, 8 South. 768 [12 L.R.A. 134].
“But, this is not the limit of the office of that writ. It is sometimes employed to correct the errors of inferior tribunals, and to prevent a failure of justice, or irreparable injury, when there is a clear legal right, and there is absence of any other adequate remedy. We have recently gone over this subject very fully, in the case of Ex parte Tower Manuf’g Co., 103 Ala. 415, 15 South. 836, and it is unnecessary to here repeat what was there said. As illustrative of the application of the remedy to such ends, we refer to Ex parte Robbins, 29 Ala. 71; Ex parte Morgan, 30 Ala. 51; Ex parte Haralson, 75 Ala. 543; Ex parte Barnes, 84 Ala. 540, 4 South. 769; Reynolds v. Crook, 95 Ala. 570, 11 South. 412. In Ex parte Morgan, for instance, to which case reference has already been made,— a case identical in principle with the one before us, — this court held the security not to be in fulfillment of statutory requirements, and a rule nisi for mandamus to correct that ruling was awarded.”
The latest case of this Court enunciating and recognizing the enlargement of the field of operation of the writ in Alabama is Ex Parte Laurie, 277 Ala. 137, 140, 167 So.2d 705, 707, wherein this Court said:
“ * * * This Court in Ex Parte Weissinger, 247 Ala. 113, 22 So.2d 510, clearly enunciated the pertinent rule:
'Originally, the function of the writ was to compel judicial action but not to correct errors or direct what particular judgment or decree should be rendered. Wilson v. Duncan, 114 Ala. 659, 672, 21 So. 1017. But this court has permitted a liberal enlargement of the use of the writ so that, “if an order, or judgment, or decree, is made or rendered, which is not the subject of revision by appeal, or other revisory remedy and yet is erroneous, working injury to the party complaining, and *595there be no other legal remedy, adequate to the correction of the error and the prevention of the injury, mandamus will be awarded.” Ex parte Woodruff, 123 Ala. 99, 100, 26 So. 509; Ex parte Tower Mfg. Co., 103 Ala. 415, 418, 15 So. 836.’
“It results from these considerations that a writ of mandamus should issue forthwith to the learned trial court as prayed for in the petition. So ordered.”
The majority of the Court in their opinion, in an effort to support their ruling that, in cases arising under the pre-trial discovery statute (Title 7 § 474(1) et seq., Code of Alabama Recompiled, commonly known as Act 375), the writ is available and should be issued only in cases where an abuse of discretion by the trial court is shown, cite as their only authority for such ruling a brief excerpt taken from the case of Ex Parte Cypress, 275 Ala. 563, 156 So.2d 916:
“However, even under a liberal interpretation of our deposition-discovery statute, we are unwilling to say that the court abused its discretion in the above ruling.”
While this gratuitous observation was contained in said opinion, it was not the basis for the ultimate decision of the case; on the contrary, a further examination of that case will show that the court in that case issued the writ as prayed, not because of an abuse of discretion of the trial judge, but because it found that the trial court “was in error in its rulings as to these remaining questions.” This Court found in the Cypress case, supra, after the rule nisi had issued, and the respondent trial judge had filed his answer, and the cause was at issue on the full record, that:
“On examination of the questions, other than the one above written to, and which the respondent ruled need not be answered, leads us to the conclusion that they sought evidence relevant to the subject matter involved in the suit and might reasonably be considered calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. * * * To the extent indicated the writ of mandamus will issue as prayed.”
The case of Ex Parte Thackston, 275 Ala. 424, 155 So.2d 526, arose under and out of the pre-trial deposition statute. In that case this Court isssued, upon petition for mandamus, a rule nisi to Judge Walter B. Jones, Judge of the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama, directing him to vacate an order he had made granting a motion to compel an attorney to furnish plaintiff, petitioner, certain statements of witnesses, or show cause why it should not be vacated. Respondent Judge Jones demurred to and answered the rule nisi. There was no contention or averment of an abuse of discretion by Judge Jones. This Court quoted from Ex Parte Weissinger, supra:
“The test, as to whether mandamus will be issued, now seems to depend on whether the remedy by appeal is adequate to prevent undue injury rather than the availability merely of remedy by appeal. Ex parte Watters, 180 Ala. 523, 61 So. 904.”
This Court went on to hold that the order complained of was not a final judgment and an appeal will not lie from it, concluding:
“We are clear to the conclusion that the learned trial judge was in error, and the writ prayed for will issue, commanding him to vacate and set aside his order of January 18, 1962. Writ of mandamus awarded.”
Thus it is apparent and obvious that, in cases involving the pre-trial discovery statute, the rule as to the issuance of the writ is the same as in other cases where mandamus is sought — that is to say, that, while an abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent trial judge may be the basis for issuance of the writ, it is not a condition *596precedent to the issuance of the writ; and, further, that, where error is shown in the ruling of the respondent trial judge upon questions propounded in pre-trial discovery depositions, same not being otherwise reviewable by appeal or other revisable remedy, and working injury to the party complaining, mandamus will be awarded irrespective of whether an abuse of discretion appears. The case at bar is just such a case.
It is this writer’s opinion that, under all the relevant Alabama authorities, finding •of an abuse of discretion by the trial court is not in Alabama a prerequisite to the award of the rule, and that the lack of such an abuse of discretion in the pending case should not, and does not, preclude the Issuance of the rule nisi in this case. I would add that, if this were not the rule in Alabama, and if an abuse of discretion were a prerequisite to a review of the Supreme Court in pre-trial discovery cases, this requirement would in effect nullify and eliminate all right of review in such cases, for a finding of an abuse of discretion on the part of our trial courts is seldom encountered. In not one case, within this writer’s knowledge, involving a review of rulings by the trial court in pre-trial discovery depositions, as in this case, has an abuse of discretion been shown to exist.
It has long been recognized in Alabama that, if the application for the writ shows a prima facie right, the rule nisi should issue, without more. Board of Education of Jefferson County v. State, 222 Ala. 70, 131 So. 239; Bryce v. Burke, 172 Ala. 219, 55 So. 635; Edge v. Bonner, 257 Ala. 385, 59 So.2d 683. So that we come now to the question: “Do the petitions, both of which are properly verified, establish a prima facie right to the issuance of the rule?” The order of the respondent here is not the subject of review or revision by appeal, and yet is, at least in part, erroneous, injurious to the parties complaining, and no other legal remedy is available to correct the error and prevent the injury. Thus the test as prescribed in Ex Parte Tower Manufacturing Co., supra, is fully met. A prima facie right to the issuance of the rule, as prayed by each of the petitions, is clear and obvious; and, the rule nisi should issue in each case.
Pretermitting a discussion of the several questions propounded to the plaintiff and the witness Reese, and the rulings of the trial court on each of them, an examination of the ruling of the court on questions 1 and 2, and then on question 8, clearly demonstrates error on one or the other. Questions 1 and 2 called for an answer by the plaintiff as to the basis of his cause of action against Alabama Power Company. Question 8 called for the same information in slightly different words. The trial court directed plaintiff to answer question 8, and relieved him of the duty to answer questions 1 and 2. Obviously the ruling on 8, or the ruling on 1 and 2, was erroneous, for they were inconsistent. The respondent is entitled to give his reasons and explanation for such apparent inconsistency in his rulings, and opportunity to do so would be afforded him by issuance of the rule nisi, as prayed in both petitions.
The majority, after concluding that the rule nisi should not issue, nevertheless proceeded to pass upon the correctness of the trial court’s ruling upon the several questions propounded to the plaintiff and the witness Reese; though they had before them only the verified petitions with the exhibits thereto and the order of the trial court. Their conclusions as to error vel non of the trial court were reached through speculation and conjecture:
“The trial court apparently interpreted questions 4, 5, 8, 9 and 10 as inquiring for relevant facts, rather than contentions and opinions.” (emphasis added)
And again:
‘‘If questions 6 and 7 are intended to ask if the plaintiff himself paid the Alabama Power Company for the damage done to the pole, the answer could reason*597ably lead to relevant evidence.” (emphasis added)
This speculation and conjecture could have so readily been eliminated, and the reasons for the trial court’s ruling on each of the questions made certain, by giving the trial court the occasion or opportunity to file an answer, explaining his reasons for so ruling in each case.
I am of the opinion that the ends of justice would be served, not only as to the parties to the original action but, also, as to the respondent trial judge, if the rule nisi were issued and he files his answer, and this Court is given the opportunity to pass upon the propriety or correctness of the trial court’s ruling upon each of the questions, having before the Court the full knowledge and information that the entire record, including respondent’s answer, would disclose, rather than to undertake to pass upon süch rulings with only the verified petition and the order of the respondent constituting the record before the Court. I believe that in such event this Court could better, and w'ith much higher degree of accuracy, determine whether the questions propounded to the witness Reese and the plaintiff could be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; and, that the conjecture and speculation with which the majority’s conclusions are infected would, in such event, be completely eradicated.
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority.