Court Opinion

ID: 9533078
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:28:12.372251+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:54.618287
License: Public Domain

*652AREND, Justice
(concurring).
I concur in the result reached in this case, but I am of the opinion that this court has no right to inject into the case the issue of intentional tort.1 The plaintiff did not plead an intentional tort, on the part of the defendant’s agent, but only ordinary negligence. Nor was the case tried on the issue of intentional tort, either by express or implied consent of the parties.2
If there had been any consent, express or implied, to try this case on the issue of intentional wrong or wanton negligence, it should be apparent somewhere in the instructions to the jury. I have searched those instructions at length and fail to find therein reference to any theory of tort or negligence other than that of ordinary negligence. The case was submitted to the jury solely on the issues of ordinary negligence and the defense of contributory negligence.
It may be that the defendant did not sustain his burden of proving contributory negligence and therefore an instruction on contributory negligence should not have been given. However, I do believe that the majority are wrong in saying that the instruction should not have been given because they find that the defendant’s agent was guilty of an aggravated kind of tort which was greater than ordinary negligence and to which contributory negligence cannot be pleaded as a defense. Even on the motion for a new trial, the plaintiff clung to his theory of ordinary negligence.
It is a rule of law that where a party relies in the trial court on a certain ground or theory of action or defense he is bound thereby and will not be allowed in the appellate court to assume or adopt any position or attitude which is inconsistent therewith, or to shift, change, or abandon his theory or contentions; 3 and the appellate court may not on its own motion create new issues.4 Thus it has been held, and I believe rightly so, that the ground of liability cannot be shifted on appeal or review from that of ordinary negligence to that of reckless or wanton negligence, nor from wanton to ordinary negligence.5

. The majority refer to the conduct of the defendant’s agent, which is claimed by the plaintiff to have caused his son Danny’s injury, as “intentional negligence.” Unless the majority mean by ' “intentional negligence” wanton negli- ' gence, their use of the term is inept, for there is a distinction between intent and negligence. See Prosser, Torts § 8, • at 30, § 30, at 120 (2d ed. 1955). There was no direct evidence in the record that the agent intended to injure Danny, though a trier of the. facts might have . inferred such intent from other evidence if intentional wrong had been made an issue in the case.

.Civ.R. 15(b) provides that “[w]hen issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.” However, Professor Moore points out that “it cannot be fairly said that there is any implied consent to try an issue where the parties do not squarely recognize it as an issue in the trial.” See 3 Moore, Federal Practice, para. 15.13, at 847 (2d ed. 1948).

. Edwards v. Hoevet, 185 Or. 284, 200 P.2d 955, 960-961, 6 A.L.R.2d 104 (1948).

. See Johnson v. Glassley, 118 Ind.App. 704, 83 N.E.2d 488, 490 (1949).

.. Santa Maria v. Trotto, 297 Mass. 442, 9 N.E.2d 540, 111 A.D.R. 1253 (1937); Consentino v. Heffelfinger, 360 Mo. 535, 229 S.W.2d 546, 550 (1950).