Court Opinion

ID: 9588376
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:33:41.807425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:40.727725
License: Public Domain

Justice Lake
dissenting.
I should affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It reversed the judgment of the District Court of Forsyth County, thereby restoring to full force and effect the judgment of the Georgia Court concerning the custody of these two little girls.
To put this case in proper perspective it is necessary first to see exactly what the Georgia Court did and what it did not do. It must be remembered that, at the time the Georgia Court acted, the children and both parents were residents of Georgia. All parties to the present North Carolina action were before the Georgia Court, represented by counsel. All of them, through their counsel, “approved and consented to” the Georgia j udgment. It was not, however, a mere perfunctory approval by the court of an agreement of the parties. It recites that it was entered “upon consideration of this case upon evidence submitted as provided by law.” Counsel for the maternal grandparents, who obviously were aligned in interest with her, was her uncle. He participated in drafting the judgment.
The Georgia judgment contains no finding of fact. As the majority opinion of this Court now notes, this was, no doubt, the result of a purposeful attempt to spare the innocent children and the innocent grandparents embarrassment. Be that as it may, it has not been contended before this Court that the Georgia judgment was deficient in any respect under the law of Georgia. As such, it must be given full faith and credit by the courts of North Carolina as a determination of the then rights of the parties. Constitution of the United States, Art. IV, § 1; Allman v. Register, 264 N.C. 561, 64 S.E. 2d 861. It would, of course, be subject to modification by the courts of North Carolina on the same basis as in Georgia. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 67 S.Ct. 903, 91 L.Ed. 1133; Dees v. McKenna, 261 N.C. 373, 134 S.E. 2d 644.
The record before us does not leave in doubt the Georgia Court’s reason for taking the children from the custody of their mother. In a subsequent order, entered August 23, 1971, adjudging the maternal grandparents in contempt for willful violation of its judgment, the same Georgia Court said:
“The prior misconduct and unfitness of Susan Spence to have unsupervised visitation of the children was the im*692pelling reason for the court’s approval of the parties agreement, without which such approval would not have been entered. It was restrictive and intended by the court to be restrictive so as to prevent the mother from instilling tendencies toward sexual aberrations.”
The Georgia judgment, after granting an absolute divorce and in addition to detailed provisions about the property rights of the husband and wife and their debts and obligations, not pertinent to this appeal, made these provisions (summarized) concerning the custody of the two little girls, then aged 7 and 5 years:
1. The paternal grandparents (residents of Georgia) were given full custody during June, July and August of each year;
2. The maternal grandparents (residents of North Carolina) were given full custody during the school months, September through May, of each year;
3. The maternal grandparents were given the right to have the children visit them in their own home one weekend in each of the summer months;
4. The paternal grandparents were given the right to have the children visit them in their own home during school holidays — Thanksgiving, Christmas, Easter, etc.
5. The father was given the right, without restriction, to visit the children in the home of the paternal grandparents but he was forbidden to remove them therefrom and the paternal grandparents were ordered to prevent him from doing so;
6. The mother was given the right, without restriction, to visit the children in the home of the maternal grandparents but she was forbidden to remove them therefrom and the maternal grandparents were ordered to prevent her from doing so;
7. The paternal grandparents were to pay all expenses of the children while they had the custody and the maternal grandparents were to pay all the expenses of the children, including private school expense, while' they had the custody;
*693.8. Both the father and the mother were relieved of all obligation to support the children or to reimburse either set of grandparents for any expense incurred by them;
9. Inasmuch as the maternal grandparents resided in North Carolina, and so would remove the children from Georgia periodically, they were required to give a bond in the amount of $10,000, conditioned upon their complying with the judgment and “submitting themselves and said minor children to the jurisdiction of this court for such further hearings and orders as may be heard and passed * * * as if said grandparents and said children were physically within the jurisdiction of this [Georgia] court.”
It will readily be observed that the Georgia judgment did not reflect any prejudice against the North Carolina grandparents. The requirement that they post a bond was reasonable. It was designed solely to assure that the children would be returned to Georgia periodically.
It will also be observed that the Georgia judgment did not deprive the mother of the companionship of and the physical care of the children. It permitted her to be with them at will in the home of her own parents. There she could play with them, minister to them, cook for them, teach them, live with them nine months of each year and this she did for substantial periods prior to instituting the present action. The sole restriction was that she could not remove them from the general supervision of her own parents. This was by no means a harsh judgment. The testimony of the plaintiff, herself, in the present record shows there was ample justification for the Georgia Court’s conclusion that this restriction was necessary to guard the children against the then clear and present danger of corrupt moral teaching, by example, by the mother and her chosen associates.
The wisdom of the Georgia Court’s provision for the custody, care,' training ánd maintenance of the two little girls is attested, inadvertently no doubt, by the finding of the District Court that, after the prescribed arrangement had been followed for two years, the children had “established excellent associations and records in school.” Nothing whatsoever in the record suggests any deficiency in their care, training or support while in the home of either set of grandparents.
, The majority of this Court, and probably the District Court as well, appears to have been led astray by two red herrings *694skillfully drawn through the record: (1) The clearly established unfitness of the father to have the custody of any child, and (2) the order of the Georgia Court directing the proceeds of the. forfeited compliance bond to be paid to the paternal grandparents.
Neither of these has the slightest bearing upon the question before üs, which is the validity of the judgment of the Court of Appeals reinstating the Georgia judgment.
To affirm the Court of Appeals and thus restore full effect to the Georgia judgment clearly precludes the unworthy father from having custody of these children at any time. The Georgia judgment permits him to visit the children at the home of his parents. It expressly provides that he is “prohibited from removing the children from the home and said grandparents shall prevent the same.” Nothing whatever in the record suggests that in' the more than six months during which the paternal grandparents had custody of the girls they ever once failed to comply with this provision of the judgment, or that they would now do so.
It is not for us to review the Georgia Court’s order finding the maternal grandparents in contempt for their failure to be equally obedient to the judgment. Nothing suggests any denial of due process of law or any departure from the applicable law of Georgia in this decree, even if we could properly review it. While it is not in accordance with our practice to punish for contempt by levying a fine or forfeiture payable to the litigant who has been injured by the contemptuous conduct (See, In Re Rhodes, 65 N.C. 518; Morris v. Whitehead, 65 N.C. 637), such practice has long been followed in the federal courts and in the majority of the states. See: Cary Mfg. Co. v. Acme Flexible Clasp Co., 108 F. 875, app. dism., 187 U.S. 427; French v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 79 Ill. App. 110; Bush v. Chenault, 13 Ky. L. 249; Chapel v. Hull, 60 Mich. 167, 26 N.W. 874; Archer V. Hesse, 164 App. Div. 493, 150 N.Y.S. 296; Lorick v. Motley, 69 S.C. 567, 48 S.E. 614; Robins v. Frazier, 5 Heisk. (Tenn.) 100; My Laundry v. Schmeling, 129 Wis. 597, 109 N.W. 540.
It is not for us to refuse to give effect to other judgments of courts of a sister state merely because we think their practice in reference to punishment for contempt is not as wise as our own! ’ Certainly, a court of North Carolina should not be permitted by us to change the custody of two little girls, .who have *695been admirably cared for by their Georgia grandparents, in reprisal for an order of forfeiture which to us may seem harsh and unwise. Nor is the amount of the forfeiture shocking. Ten thousand dollars is surely not an excessive award when the wrong done is the taking of two cherished granddaughters and the placing of them in the permanent custody of a person morally unfit to rear them.
At the time of the Georgia judgment these were Georgia children, wards of the Georgia Court. The Georgia Court was under no obligation to permit them to be brought to North Carolina. It did so in reliance upon the solemn undertaking of the maternal grandparents, “approved and consented to” by the mother, to bring them back at the appointed time. What the District Court has done, now approved by the majority opinion, invites reprisals by the courts of Georgia, and other courts, against custody decrees of North Carolina courts in comparable cases. Inevitably, it will also make courts of other states reluctant to permit a custodian of children to bring them into this state to visit relatives or for any other purpose.
It is true, as the majority opinion states, that the courts of North Carolina are not without jurisdiction to inquire- into the present needs of children within this State and to make appropriate orders concerning their present and future custody. G.S. 50-13.5. North Carolina courts have such power even though the children came here from another state whose courts have previously entered a then valid judgment as to their custody. The most elementary principles of comity, however, dictate that the courts of this State be at least as cautious about modifying the valid judgment of another state’s court as they áre about modifying a like decree of another North Carolina court. To do otherwise invites parties dissatisfied with the other state’s judgment in a custody case to bring the children here for the fraudulent purpose of evading their obligations under it and seeking sanctuary. The Georgia Court’s action against the maternal grandparents on their bond was clearly due to its belief that this is what they had done. The record lends support to that view. It shows clearly that the mother, herself, intended from the beginning so to nullify the Georgia judgment.
The guiding principle in custody cases in this State, as in Georgia, is that the welfare of the children — the wards of the court — takes precedence over all else. Shepherd v. Shepherd, 273 N.C. 71, 159 S.E. 2d 357; Brake v. Mills, 270 N.C. 441, 154 S.E. *6962d 526; Wilson v. Wilson, 269 N.C. 676, 153 S.E. 2d 349; Lee, North Carolina Family Law, § 224. It takes precedence over the welfare of the mother, over her desire to have her children in her own home, over her resentment against her own parents’ court-given power to veto her wishes concerning the children, over her hostility to the paternal grandparents, over the love and concern of either set of grandparents.
When, however, a court of competent jurisdiction in this or another state has adjudged these matters, the District Court of Forsyth County is not authorized to change that adjudication merely because it would originally have entered a different decree. The custody plan previously decreed by the Georgia Court can lawfully be changed by a court of this State only for a substantial change in conditions, not because the North Carolina judge has different sociological or philosophic views from those of the Georgia Court, or because he is more sympathetic to the claimant who resides in his jurisdiction. Shepherd v. Shepherd, supra; Stanback v. Stanback, 266 N.C. 72, 145 S.E. 2d 332. There is no such change of condition as will justify a change in the former judgment, unless it can reasonably be believed that, had the present condition existed at the earlier date, the former decree would not have been entered by the court in which it was entered. See: Neighbors v. Neighbors, 236 N.C. 531, 73 S.E. 2d 153; Lee, North Carolina Family Law, § 226; 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation, § 819; Annot., 9 A.L.R. 2d 629, § 3.
It thus becomes necessary to inquire into the conditions prevailing at the time of the Georgia judgment which caused the Georgia Court to reach the drastic conclusion that these two exceptionally promising little girls must never again be in the custody of either their father or their mother. Those conditions were known to the Georgia Court through “evidence submitted as provided by law.” They were known to both sets of grandparents and, of course, both the father and the mother. Both parents and all four grandparents “approved and consented to” the determination of the Georgia Court that the mother (like the father) was not a person into whose hands the care and training of young girls could be entrusted, in whose home the girls could be left to reside. The same Georgia Court in 1971 said its reason for its custody order was “the prior misconduct and unfitness of Susan Spence” showing danger that the mother would instill tendencies toward “sexual aberrations” in the girls. *697Obviously, the District Court’s statement to the contrary notwithstanding, the fact that the children are now 11 and 9 years of age, instead of 7 and 5, as they were then, has not lessened the danger.
The majority opinion says, quite appropriately, that the admissions of each of these parents, and corroborative evidence, establish the existence of “a situation in their home * * * which was beyond the pale of the most permissive society.” The majority opinion then says: “We proceed on the assumption that the Georgia Court was of the opinion that both [the father] and [the mother] were emotionally disturbed and unstable and * * * [w]e can think of no other reason for the judgment the court entered.” (Emphasis added.)
This is not correct. The record shows the Georgia Court’s drastic order, approved by the plaintiff’s parents, was not entered because she was “emotionally disturbed and unstable.” It was entered because she was deemed morally unfit to be entrusted with the custody of two little girls. There is a great difference between these two conditions which ought not to be obscured by the use of euphemistic terms. Emotional disturbance and instability are not the same thing as moral depravity or utter lack of moral perception and principle. It is a mistake for courts to equate the two and to proceed on the assumption that absence of moral character is a mere sickness curable by psychiatric consultations and treatments.
We are dealing in this case with a subject matter unsurpassed in importance by that of any litigation coming before this Court — the right of children to be reared in a home conducive to the development of their own character. It should not be befogged by euphemisms. It is not desirable to set out in the report of this decision all of the sordid details of the evidence supporting the Georgia judgment. However, in order to determine whether there has been a showing of a change of the crucial condition on which that judgment was based, we must state frankly, not euphemistically, what the condition was. It is the plaintiff mother who makes this necessary by instituting this proceeding for the purpose of nullifying the judgment to which she gave her consent and approval, however lacking in good faith that consent may now appear to have been.
There is an abundance of evidence in the record before us to show that for a substantial period of time prior to and culminating in the Georgia judgment:
*6981. The father habitually committed adultery, maintaining his mistress, a teenage girl, in the home where he and the mother lived with these children;
2. The mother consented to, condoned, encouraged, aided and abetted in this conduct, going so far as to turn over and go to sleep without protest when awakened by the father and his mistress engaging in sexual intercourse while in the same bed with her, and thereafter serving them breakfast in bed; and
3. The mother made homosexual advances to various teenage girls visiting in her home, sometimes in the presence of her two daughters, then mere infants, the general course of these actions being with the knowledge and consent of the father, her husband.
An especially pertinent and revealing statement by the plaintiff mother in her testimony before the District Court, and therefore bearing upon her present ideals and principles, was that she could not throw her husband’s mistress out • of the house because she tried to treat the mistress “as a daughter” and. so the situation, in her mind, was “the same as if he had an affair with Dianne [one of the little girls],” in which case she- “wouldn’t want to throw anybody out.” When, to illustrate her continuing affection for her husband’s mistress, the plaintiff testifies that she could not force anyone to leave'her home in ord.er to break up an incestuous affair with her own little girl, it can hardly be said that there is substantial evidence of a change in the condition on which the Georgia judgment rests.
At the conclusion of the plaintiff’s evidence the appellants moved for dismissal on two grounds: (1) The evidence showed no change of condition since the Georgia judgment; (2) this action is the culmination of a fraud on the Georgia Court. The District Court should have allowed the motion on both grounds.
The plaintiff’s evidence shows beyond question that at the time she and the maternal grandparents approved and. consented to the Georgia judgment and gave the bond to secure their compliance with it, it was the plaintiff’s purpose and intent to get the children to North Carolina by this device and to institute an action here, in what she believed would be a more favorable judicial climate, to gain their custody. While the maternal grandparents complied with the provisions of the Geor*699gia judgment prior to the institution of this action in the District Court of Forsyth County, the testimony of the maternal grandmother shows clearly her own sympathy with this fraudulent purpose of the plaintiff. A court of this State may not properly lend itself to the perpetration of such a fraud upon the court of a sister state.
The plaintiff’s evidence shows no change in the condition on which the Georgia Court properly rested its judgment. Her testimony in this action is not that she no longer has homosexual tendencies. Her testimony is that she never had them. This is not evidence of a change in condition.
Her psychiatric expert witness testified on the basis of a single one-hour consultation, conducted after this action was instituted, not for treatment but solely to enable him to testify as to her present “fitness as a mother.” He did not mention, and obviously could not know, her condition at the time of the Georgia judgment. The plaintiff’s testimony shows she had psychological consultations not long prior to the Georgia judgment, but, for reasons not disclosed, the Georgia psychologist was not called to testify. This is not evidence of a change of condition.
The plaintiff’s psychiatric expert witness gave the startling testimony that in his opinion homosexual tendencies in the plaintiff would have no bearing on her “fitness as a mother” to have the sole custody of two little girls. Passing over other appropriate characterizations of this “expert opinion,” it suffices, for the present, to observe that it has no tendency to show any change of condition. Furthermore, the question of the plaintiff’s “fitness as a mother” to have sole custody of these children is not a matter for expert opinion testimony. That is the ultimate question to be determined by the court. The Georgia Court determined it adversely to the plaintiff. Its determination is binding on the courts of this State in absence of a clear showing of a change in the condition on which its judgment was based. The Full Faith and Credit Clause, Art. IV, § 1, of the Constitution of the United States requires more than lip service by the courts of North Carolina when' called upon to disregard and change a judgment rendered by a Georgia court which had jurisdiction both over the subject matter and over the parties.
The District Court’s findings of fact, assuming adequate support therefor in the evidence, do not support its judgment *700because they do not show any change in condition. Let us examine them, summarized and renumbered:
(1) The plaintiff is a member of the Methodist Church, participates in its activities, sings in the choir and takes the children regularly to Sunday school.
These are, per se, laudable, but they do not, per se, show she subscribes to or complies with those principles of sexual morality which, notwithstanding her psychiatric expert’s contrary opinion, society generally still deems essential to the custodian of little girls. More significant for our purposes, this finding shows no change in condition, for the plaintiff, herself, testified in the District Court that while living in Georgia, prior to and at the time of the Georgia judgment, she was a member of the Methodist Church and was as active in its assemblies as the then age of her children permitted.
(2) The plaintiff keeps the children clean and neat, well fed, supplied with proper toys, in a “nice neighborhood,” sees them across the street to and from school and spends time with them.
These too are laudable, per se, but do not, per se, show she subscribes to and complies with the above mentioned principles of morality. Again, these too are not findings of a change of condition, for the plaintiff’s own testimony, not challenged by the appellants, is clear and explicit to the effect that all these things she did in Georgia before and at the time of the Georgia judgment.
(3) The plaintiff is a well educated woman.
So she is and so she was in Georgia. She had a Master’s degree when living with her husband and his mistress.
(4) The plaintiff has professional competence, is well respected by her profession as a competent speech therapist and is financially successful in her practice.
So she is and so she was in Georgia while living with her husband and his mistress, according to her own testimony.
The Georgia Court rendered its judgment on the basis of an opinion, apparently not shared by the plaintiff’s psychiatric expert witness, that good persona] moral standards are indispen;able in a fit custodian for small girls and that professional *701competence, superior education, financial success, a residence in a “nice neighborhood,” personal cleanliness, a neat apartment and active participation in church work do not guarantee such moral standards. This Court also has recognized the greater importance of intangible attributes of character as compared with material comforts in awarding custody of children to a relative in preference to either parent. Brake v. Mills, supra.
This conclusion of the Georgia Court was with the “approval and consent” of all parties before it. Its soundness is a matter of common knowledge and so an appropriate subject of judicial notice. The judgment based thereon is binding on the courts of this State until there is a clear showing of a change in condition. There is no such showing here.
It is not a light thing to take children from the custody of a mother — or of a father. The Georgia Court did not so regard it. It has been customary, when children are small, to regard the mother as the more natural custodian when divorce disrupts the home. In part this is tradition, stemming from the fact that the father is normally the provider of support and so is unable to spend as much time at home, and from the usually greater tenderness of a woman’s nature. It is due in part to the ingrained habits of chivalry and to the resulting sheltered protection of women from contact with degrading influences. Now, however, a permissive' society has “liberated” women, if so inclined, to inquire into, discuss, experiment with, condone and practice all of the vices which the most depraved of men have practiced since the days of Abraham. Consequently, courts of the present day must put into practice in custody cases the realism on which current society prides itself. In awarding the custody of children we must remember that the process of giving birth does not automatically transform a woman into an exemplification of the 31st Chapter of Proverbs. This is not to negate the great truth of reformation of character, nor is it to equate isolated instances of misconduct, even gross, with lack of moral character, but in absence of evidence of a change in this fundamental condition on which the Georgia Court based its judgment the courts of this State may not properly set it aside.
The District Court, in addition to its findings of fact mentioned above, also included in its judgment the following statements which it denominated findings of fact:
*702“6. Susan Durham Spence * * * is in all respects a fit and proper person to have the custody of her two minor children * * *;
“7. The best interest of these two minor children shall be served by their custody being awarded to their mother ¡J; ¡|c ¡fc >
“8. The maternal grandparents Durham and the paternal grandparents Spence are all fit persons to have the custody of Fay and Dianne. All four grandparents however are of such age that the best interest of the two children will be served by awarding primary custody to their mother. * * *
“10. * * * [T]here have been substantial changes in conditions since June 2, 1969 * * * including * * *:
“a. * * * Susan Durham Spence is now a fit and proper person to have the custody of her children;
“b. Today Susan Durham Spence is a well adjusted emotionally stable individual fully capable of caring for and rearing Fay and Dianne; * * *
“d. * * * The grandparents Spence and Durham are not as able to respond to the daily needs of two small girls as they were on June 2, 1969. * * *”
Under the caption, “Conclusions of Law,” the District Court repeated the statements:
“Susan Durham Spence is a fit and proper person to have the exclusive custody of her two minor children * * *;
“The best interest of Fay and Dianne dictate that their custody be awarded to their mother.”
I have found absolutely no evidence in the record to support the finding that the Spence and Durham grandparents are no longer able by reason of age, health, financial condition or any other circumstance “to respond to the daily needs of these little girls.” The Spence grandparents, at least, are begging to be allowed to do so. There is no evidence as to their age or health. The only evidence as to Mr. Durham’s health is that he was unable to attend the hearing in the' District Court due to a temporary illness. Both couples appear to be in as good financial condition as when they all “approved and consented to” the *703Georgia judgment. At the time of the Georgia judgment the little girls were 7 and 5 years of age. Now they are 11 and 9. The physical demands and strains of caring for a 5-year-old are immeasurably greater than those of fulfilling the “daily needs” of a 9-year-old. The needs of the maturing child are more in the realm of counselling and less in the realm of physical care and play and physical policing. There is obvious inconsistency in the-District Court’s saying in one breath that the grandparents are all “fit persons to have the custody” and in the next that they are too old to be permitted to have it. This is a crucial “finding,” if it be a finding. As a finding, it lacks support in the evidence. As a conclusion, it is patently erroneous for, of necessity, in view of the absence of evidence bearing thereon, it is a conclusion that no grandparents are as competent custodians as is every mother. We cannot determine to what extent the District Court rested its decree upon this wholly arbitrary and unsupported declaration. For this reason alone, if there were no other, the Court of Appeals was within its authority in reversing the judgment of the District Court.
The declarations “fit and proper person to have the custody,” “best interest of these minor children” and “fully capable of caring for and rearing Fay and Dianne” are not findings of fact. As Justice Parker, later Chief Justice, said in the case of Thomas v. Thomas, 259 N.C. 461, 130 S.E. 2d 871, and Justice Denny, later Chief Justice, said in the case of In Re Kimel, 253 N.C. 508, 512, 117 S.E. 2d 409, these are conclusions of the trial judge upon the ultimate issue. There is no accepted standard of “fitness” to have custody of children. There is no accepted standard for determining the “best interest” of a child with reference to his or her custodian. These are not matters which can be “found.” These are matters calling for the exercise of the subjective judgment of the court. Its conclusions thereon are subject to review by the appellate court.
To say, as the majority opinion seems to intimate, that these conclusions on the ultimate, crucial question in the case are findings of fact and, therefore, not subject to review on appeal if there be the slightest competent evidence in the record to support them, makes any District Judge in North Carolina the absolute Czar in determining the custody of children. No more important litigation can come before the courts and, obviously, it is in the District Court that pressures of local social and political influences are strongest.
*704Furthermore, to say that, if there is any competent evidence to support the District Court’s “finding” of good character and fitness, no appellate court can reverse a custody award based thereon is not sound in law or in policy. It is inconceivable that there will arise any contested custody case in which there will not be some testimony of good character and fitness of each claimant. The claimant, by his or her own testimony, can supply it and few men or women are so depraved as to be completely lacking in attractive attributes or as to be unable to find some relative or acquaintance who will testify to good character and behavior. Testimony as to character is competent in custody hearings, and so is the claimant’s own denial of charges of misconduct, but neither is sufficient to put the District Court’s conclusion as to “fitness” as custodian of children beyond the reach of an appellate court on review.
Custody hearings are equitable in nature, the child being the ward of the court, even though the procedure is now regulated to some degree by statute. In Re Custody of Sauls, 270 N.C. 180, 186, 154 S.E. 2d 327. Lee, North Carolina Family Law, § 226; Clark, Law of Domestic Relations, § 17.1; Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, § 1307; 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation, § 772. While, in the exercise of this equitable, jurisdiction, the trial court has broad discretion and its determinations are not lightly to be set aside on appeal, the appellate court in equity has, and traditionally exercises, much more extensive powers of review than does the appellate court in law over determinations of fact. This greater power of review of the appellate court in equity extends to custody cases and to the determination therein of the fitness of claimants and the best interest of children. See: In Re Kimel, supra; In Re Turner, 151 N.C. 479, 66 S.E. 431; Lee, North Carolina Family Law, § 224; McClintock, Handbook on the Principles of Equity, 2d Ed, § 54; Nelson, Divorce and Annulment, 2d Ed, §§ 15.50 and 30.10; 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation, § 779.
In its so-called Finding of Fact Number 10, purporting to show changes in condition since the Georgia judgment, the District Court injected many conclusions. The actual findings of fact therein are either not supported by the evidence or are unrelated to the condition which was the basis for the Georgia judgment. Thus, the so-called Finding of Fact Number 10 does not constitute a proper finding of a change of condition and does not afford a proper basis for the order of the District Court.
*705The plaintiff, by virtue of the District Court’s interlocutory order awarding her the custody of the children until the hearing, had them in her custody for five months prior to the hearing. The District Court relied heavily on absence of a showing that this five-month period produced a deterimental effect on the children. The plaintiff is quite obviously a woman of intelligence, highly educated, especially adept in the field of psychological tests and measurements. She, far more than the average person, could succeed in making a favorable showing on the tests given by her psychiatric expert witness during his one-hour interview with her. It is hardly surprising that during the five-month test period given her by the District Court, awaiting the hearing of her case and knowing the nature of the charges likely to be made against her, the plaintiff complied with the customary standards of society and of motherhood. Good behavior for so short an interval with so much at stake is not sufficient evidence on which to predicate a finding of a change in moral principles. To take these little girls from the homes of grandparents under whose affectionate and watchful care they have done exceptionally well and to give them into the sole custody of this plaintiff, in view of her established record of behavior, is an abuse of the discretion vested in the District Court even if its conclusions could properly be deemed findings of fact.
We should, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.