Court Opinion

ID: 9694948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:01:27.224805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:43.657224
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       AUG 25 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MELANIE D. MANCE,                               No.    22-35697

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 1:21-cv-00028-KLD

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security,

                Defendant-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the District of Montana
               Kathleen Louise DeSoto, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

                           Submitted August 23, 2023**
                               Portland, Oregon

Before: BENNETT, VANDYKE, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

      Melanie Mance appeals the district court’s order affirming an Administrative

Law Judge’s (ALJ) denial of her claim for Social Security disability benefits. We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district court’s decision

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
de novo and may only overturn the ALJ’s decision if it is not supported by

substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Luther v. Berryhill, 891 F.3d 872,

875 (9th Cir. 2018).

      1. The ALJ did not err by not evaluating the frequency of Mance’s medical

appointments from June 2018 to August 2020 in assessing Mance’s residual

functional capacity. Mance was “ultimately responsible for providing the evidence

to be used in making the [residual functional capacity] finding.” Widmark v.

Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2006); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a),

404.1545(a)(3). But she provided no evidence that the frequency, scheduling, or

duration of her medical appointments inhibited her ability to work on a regular and

continuing basis. The record does not show, for example, that her appointments

lasted entire workdays or her medical providers were concerned that she would

miss work. Cf. Brewes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th

Cir. 2012) (considering medical providers’ opinion that claimant “would likely

miss multiple days [of work] each month”). On the record before us, the ALJ had

no duty to help Mance develop such evidence. See Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141,

1156 (9th Cir. 2020) (explaining that an “ALJ’s duty to develop the record further

is triggered only when there is ambiguous evidence or when the record is

inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence” (quoting Mayes v.

Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459–60 (9th Cir. 2001)).

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      2. Mance’s remaining arguments are forfeited, so we do not address them.

See Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003)

(explaining that the “bare assertion of an issue” is insufficient to preserve it

(citation omitted)).

      AFFIRMED.

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