Court Opinion

ID: 9901547
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 23:03:15.669556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:34.346421
License: Public Domain

IN THE

  Indiana Supreme Court
             Supreme Court Case No. 23S‐PL‐60                             FILED
                                                                      Nov 21 2023, 4:14 pm

                  Keller J. Mellowitz,                                    CLERK
                                                                      Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                         Court of Appeals
                           Appellant,                                      and Tax Court

                              –v–

Ball State University and Board of Trustees of
             Ball State University,
                           Appellees,
                              and

                    State of Indiana,
                      Appellee‐Intervenor.

     Argued: April 11, 2023 | Decided: November 21, 2023

     Interlocutory Appeal from the Marion Superior Court
                   No. 49D01‐2005‐PL‐15026
       The Honorable Matthew C. Kincaid, Special Judge

   On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals
                        No. 22A‐PL‐337

                     Opinion by Justice Molter
 Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa, Slaughter, and Goff concur.
Molter, Justice.

   After Ball State University switched to providing only online
instruction for the 2020 spring semester due to the COVID‐19 pandemic,
Plaintiff Keller Mellowitz sued the university for breach of contract and
unjust enrichment. He seeks to recover tuition and fees for in‐person
instruction and services he alleges the university promised him. Critical
here, he wants to litigate his claims as a class action, representing similarly
situated students to recover their tuition and fees too. But after he sued,
the General Assembly passed, and Governor Holcomb signed, Public Law
No. 166‐2021, which, retroactive to March 1, 2020, prohibits class action
lawsuits against postsecondary educational institutions for contract or
unjust enrichment claims to recover losses stemming from COVID‐19.

   Based on that law, the trial court entered an order directing that while
Mellowitz may pursue his claims against Ball State on his own behalf, he
may not pursue a class action on behalf of other students. Through an
interlocutory appeal of that order, the Court of Appeals reversed, agreeing
with Mellowitz that the class action restriction was unconstitutional. We
granted transfer, vacating the Court of Appeals opinion, and we now
affirm the trial court’s order.

    First, we conclude the law does not violate the constitutional separation
of powers because its limited scope (applying only to a narrow category of
claims arising from COVID‐19 against a defined group of defendants
during a narrow period of time) reflects that it predominantly furthers a
public policy objective—reducing postsecondary educational institutions’
litigation exposure for their emergency responses to the pandemic—rather
than a judicial administration objective. Second, the law does not
unconstitutionally take Mellowitz’s property without just compensation
because he has no property right to sue on behalf of others through a class
action. And finally, the law does not unconstitutionally impair
Mellowitz’s contract with Ball State because the General Assembly did not
relieve Ball State of any of its contractual obligations to Mellowitz, which
is why the trial court is permitting him to pursue his individual claims
against the university.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S‐PL‐60 | November 21, 2023       Page 2 of 22
Facts and Procedural History
   In the spring of 2020, Mellowitz was a student at Ball State University
who had paid tuition along with mandatory fees for student services,
university technology, student recreation, student health, and student
transportation. About midway through the semester, on March 6,
Governor Holcomb issued Executive Order 20‐02 declaring that the rapid
COVID‐19 spread was a public health emergency. The pandemic response
at all levels of government quickly ratcheted up, and just a few weeks
later, the Governor issued Executive Order 20‐08, which, among many
other things, ordered individuals to remain at home with limited
exceptions and ordered non‐essential businesses to close. Educational
institutions like Ball State were permitted to continue educating students,
but only through distance education. Ball State complied with the
Governor’s order by canceling all in‐person classes, closing campus
facilities, and sending students home.

   As the spring semester concluded, Mellowitz sued Ball State and its
board of trustees on May 1, claiming they breached a contract to provide
him in‐person rather than online instruction, and even if they did not
breach a contract, they were at least unjustly enriched by retaining tuition
and fees for services they stopped providing. He requested “recovery of
tuition and fees,” and he sought to represent a class of similarly situated
students. App. at 22.

   Roughly a year later, on April 29, 2021, the Governor signed Public Law
No. 166‐2021, which was retroactive to March 1, 2020. One provision in
that law, codified as Indiana Code section 34‐12‐5‐7 (“Section 7”),
prohibits class actions against covered entities, like Ball State, for breach of
contract or unjust enrichment claims for losses arising from COVID‐19.
Ind. Code §§ 34‐12‐5‐5, ‐7. Based on this new law, Ball State sought to
preclude Mellowitz from suing on behalf of other students by filing a
motion under Indiana Trial Rule 23(D)(4), which authorizes courts to enter
an order “requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom
allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that the action
proceed accordingly.”

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S‐PL‐60 | November 21, 2023        Page 3 of 22
   Mellowitz argued the trial court should deny the motion because
Section 7 is unconstitutional either because it is a procedural law
improperly usurping the judicial power, it takes his property without just
compensation, or it impairs his contract with Ball State. The Attorney
General intervened to defend the constitutionality of the statute, and after
a hearing, the trial court granted Ball State’s motion, rejecting Mellowitz’s
arguments. The court ordered Mellowitz to file an amended complaint
removing any allegations related to other class members, and it denied
class certification. Mellowitz then moved to certify the trial court’s ruling
for interlocutory appeal, which the court granted.

   Mellowitz appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s
order, agreeing with Mellowitz that Section 7 was a procedural statute
conflicting with Trial Rule 23 and therefore a nullity. Mellowitz v. Ball State
Univ., 196 N.E.3d 1256, 1257–58 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). Ball State and the
State then separately petitioned for transfer, which we granted, 205 N.E.3d
196 (Ind. 2023), thus vacating the Court of Appeals opinion, Ind. Appellate
Rule 58(A).1

Appellate Jurisdiction
   Before turning to the issues on appeal, we begin by clarifying the basis
for our appellate jurisdiction. Appellate Rule 14(C) provides a procedure
for interlocutory review of orders granting or denying class certification.
But Mellowitz never moved for class certification and the trial court’s
order was a Trial Rule 23(D)(4) order to amend the complaint to remove
class allegations, so the parties were unsure of the proper procedural
route for interlocutory review, and there is no case law from our Court or
the Court of Appeals providing guidance.

    Given the uncertainty, Mellowitz prudently covered all the bases by
filing a Notice of Appeal for an Appellate Rule 14(A)(2) interlocutory

1We held oral argument at the University of Indianapolis. We thank the university for its
outstanding hospitality, the attorneys for their excellent advocacy, and the students and other
guests for their courtesy and insightful questions following the argument.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S‐PL‐60 | November 21, 2023                      Page 4 of 22
appeal as of right from an order compelling the execution of a document
(i.e., signing the amended complaint pursuant to Trial Rule 11(A)); by
requesting trial court certification and Court of Appeals acceptance of an
Appellate Rule 14(B) discretionary interlocutory appeal; and by
requesting that the Court of Appeals accept an Appellate Rule 14(C)
interlocutory appeal from an order denying class certification. The Court
of Appeals then entered an order concluding Appellate Rule 14(A)(2) does
not apply because the trial court order did not carry financial or legal
consequences akin to a final judgment, but either Appellate Rule 14(B) or
14(C) would suffice for appellate jurisdiction.

   Because the trial court certified its order for interlocutory review, it
makes no difference in this case, but the distinction between Appellate
Rule 14(B) and Appellate Rule 14(C) can be critical—Appellate Rule 14(B)
requires trial court certification for interlocutory review and Appellate
Rule 14(C) does not. We therefore clarify that because a Trial Rule 23(D)(4)
order to amend a complaint to remove class allegations is the functional
equivalent of an order denying class certification, Appellate Rule 14(C),
which provides for interlocutory review of orders granting or denying
class certification, is the appropriate avenue for interlocutory review. Cf.
Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 582 U.S. 23, 34 n.7 (2017) (“An order striking class
allegations is functionally equivalent to an order denying class
certification and therefore appealable under Rule 23(f).” (cleaned up)).

Standard of Review
   This appeal concerns only the interpretation and constitutionality of a
statute, which are questions we consider de novo. State v. S.T., 82 N.E.3d
257, 259 (Ind. 2017) (constitutionality of statutes); State v. Int’l Bus.
Machines Corp., 964 N.E.2d 206, 209 (Ind. 2012) (interpretation of statutes).

Discussion and Decision
   Mellowitz raises three issues on appeal. First, he argues Section 7 runs
afoul of the constitutional separation of powers because it limits class
actions, which he contends is the prerogative of the judiciary, not the
legislature. As we explain below, our recent decision in Church v. State, 189

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S‐PL‐60 | November 21, 2023      Page 5 of 22
N.E.3d 580, 590 (Ind. 2022), forecloses this argument because the statute
predominantly furthers a public policy objective rather than a judicial
administration objective.

   Second, Mellowitz argues that retroactively applying the statute to his
claim has the effect of taking his property without just compensation in
violation of the state and federal constitutions because the statute
eliminates his cause of action. We conclude the trial court was correct to
reject this argument because Mellowitz’s cause of action is for breach of
contract and unjust enrichment, and the trial court is permitting him to
continue pursuing those claims. Mellowitz has no property right to sue on
behalf of others through a class action.

   Third, Mellowitz argues the statute impairs his contract with Ball State,
again in violation of the state and federal constitutions. This argument
fairs no better because the General Assembly did not relieve Ball State of
any contractual obligations to Mellowitz, and, again, the trial court is
permitting Mellowitz to pursue his individual claims against the
university.

  Because the trial court correctly concluded the statute is constitutional
and precludes a class action in this case, we affirm.

I. Shielding postsecondary educational institutions
   from pandemic‐related class action claims is
   within the General Assembly’s legislative
   authority.
   Although Mellowitz can sue Ball State to recoup his own tuition and
fees, the trial court concluded Section 7 bars him from maintaining a class
action to recover tuition and fees on behalf of other students. Section 7
says: “A claimant may not bring, and a court may not certify, a class
action lawsuit against a covered entity for loss or damages arising from
COVID‐19 in a contract, implied contract, quasi‐contract, or unjust
enrichment claim.” I.C. § 34‐12‐5‐7. Mellowitz concedes the statute fits this
case because Ball State is a covered entity and he is suing for breach of
contract and unjust enrichment to recover damages arising from COVID‐

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S‐PL‐60 | November 21, 2023      Page 6 of 22
19.2 But he argues the trial court should have disregarded the statute
because he contends it is unconstitutional. As he sees it, our Court
promulgated Trial Rule 23 to govern which lawsuits may proceed as class
actions, and Section 7 forbids even class actions that satisfy the rule’s
requirements. Because promulgating rules governing procedure in trial
courts is within our domain, Mellowitz argues the legislature
unconstitutionally usurped our judicial power when it enacted Section 7.

   We instead share the trial court’s view that the statute is constitutional.
Without running afoul of our Indiana Constitution’s separation of powers,
our judiciary may accommodate statutes altering judicial processes when
the statutes predominantly further public policy objectives rather than
judicial administration objectives, so long as the statutes do not
undermine the truth‐seeking function of litigation, and they do not
otherwise interfere with the judiciary’s ability to fulfill its constitutional
obligations. Recently, in Church, 189 N.E.3d at 590, we announced a new
framework for this analysis of whether a statute reflects a valid legislative
enactment or the usurpation of judicial power. And under that
framework, we conclude Section 7 is a valid legislative enactment.

    A. Our Constitution generally precludes the legislature
       from micromanaging court procedures.
   The Indiana Constitution vests the General Assembly with the
“[l]egislative authority,” Ind. Const. art. 4, § 1, vests our state courts with
the “judicial power,” id. art. 7, § 1, and instructs that neither independent
branch “shall exercise any of the functions” of the other. Id. art. 3, § 1.
Enacting laws to protect Hoosiers’ “‘peace, safety, and well‐being’” is a
legislative function. Whittington v. State, 669 N.E.2d 1363, 1369 n.6 (Ind.
1996) (quoting Ind. Const. art. 1, § 1). And promulgating procedural rules
for litigating disputes about those laws is part of the judicial function.

2“Covered entity” is a statutorily defined term that includes “an approved postsecondary
educational institution,” Ind. Code § 34‐12‐5‐5(2), and “arising from COVID‐19” is a defined
term that includes “the implementation of policies and procedures to . . . prevent or minimize
the spread of COVID‐19,” id. § 34‐6‐2‐10.4(c)(1)(A); see also id. § 34‐12‐5‐3.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S‐PL‐60 | November 21, 2023                     Page 7 of 22
State ex rel. Bicanic v. Lake Cir. Ct., 260 Ind. 73, 76, 292 N.E.2d 596, 598
(1973) (“The Supreme Court has the inherent power to create rules of
procedure and [that] right has been recognized by the Indiana General
Assembly.”).

   Generally speaking, laws which establish rights and responsibilities are
substantive (the legislative prerogative), and laws which “merely
prescribe the manner in which such rights and responsibilities may be
exercised and enforced” are procedural (the judicial prerogative). Church,
189 N.E.3d at 588 (quotations omitted). So under our separation of
powers, if a “statute is a substantive law, then it supersedes our Trial
Rules, but if such statute merely establishes a rule of procedure, then our
Trial Rules would supersede the statute.” Id. (cleaned up).

   That seems clear enough at first blush, but substance and procedure
coalesce when the General Assembly concludes there are circumstances
when procedures are causing substantive harm—collateral damage that is
unnecessary to resolving a legal dispute between parties. A good example
is anti‐SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) laws,
which Indiana has adopted along with thirty‐one other states that
similarly divide power between their legislative and judicial branches.3
SLAPP suits are baseless suits intended to stifle constitutionally protected
speech by burying—or threatening to bury—those expressing opposing
viewpoints under crushing litigation expense and burdens. See Gresk for
Est. of VanWinkle v. Demetris, 96 N.E.3d 564, 568 (Ind. 2018) (explaining
that anti‐SLAPP lawsuits reflect the understanding that “since at least the
1970s, ordinary individuals were being sued for simply speaking out
politically,” and the “defining goal of these lawsuits was not to win, but to
silence opposition with delay, expense and distraction.” (quotations
omitted)).

3 See Austin Vining & Sarah Matthews, Overview of Anti‐SLAPP Laws, Reps. Comm. for

Freedom of the Press, https://www.rcfp.org/introduction‐anti‐slapp‐guide/
[https://perma.cc/8TML‐B7R7] (last visited Nov. 20, 2023) (“As of April 2022, 32 states and the
District of Columbia have anti‐SLAPP laws . . . .”); F. Scott Boyd, Looking Glass Law: Legislation
by Reference in the States, 68 La. L. Rev. 1201, 1251 n.214 (2008) (surveying state constitutional
separation‐of‐powers limitations around the country).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S‐PL‐60 | November 21, 2023                        Page 8 of 22
   Like most state legislatures, our General Assembly responded to this
concern with an anti‐SLAPP law. To invoke the law, a defendant files a
motion to dismiss explaining the lawsuit is based on constitutionally
protected speech, I.C. § 34‐7‐7‐5, which the defendant must identify with
specificity, id. § 34‐7‐7‐9(b). Discovery is then stayed except as necessary to
respond to the issues in the motion to dismiss. Id. §§ 34‐7‐7‐6, ‐9(a)(3). And
the trial court treats the motion to dismiss as a summary judgment
motion, deciding it on an expedited basis. Id. § 34‐7‐7‐9(a)(1).

    The General Assembly was addressing a substantive concern: a chill on
citizens’ free speech rights. It was not trying to micromanage the courts.
But because the source of the substantive harm is procedural—the abuse
of court procedures—so too is the remedy of altering motion practice,
shortening deadlines, resequencing discovery, and expediting a ruling.
Gresk, 96 N.E.3d at 568 (“Anti–SLAPP statutes establish key procedural tools
to safeguard First Amendment rights.” (emphasis added)). While we do
not foreclose the possibility that in an appropriate case we could conclude
aspects of the anti‐SLAPP law encroach on the judicial power, the law
illustrates that “except at the extremes, the terms substance and procedure
precisely describe very little except a dichotomy, and what they mean in a
particular context is largely determined by the purposes for which the
dichotomy is drawn.” Church, 189 N.E.3d at 589 (cleaned up).

   B. Our judiciary may accommodate statutes altering
      procedures if the statutes predominantly further public
      policy objectives and do not interfere with the orderly
      dispatch of judicial business.
   Because substance and procedure sometimes coalesce, we have said
that “the power to make rules of procedure in Indiana is neither
exclusively legislative nor judicial.” State ex rel. Blood v. Gibson Cir. Ct., 239
Ind. 394, 399, 157 N.E.2d 475, 477 (1959). And when the legislature enacts
laws with procedural means to achieve substantive policy objectives
beyond the orderly dispatch of judicial business, we strive to work in a
“spirit of cooperation between the otherwise independent branches of our
government.” Church, 189 N.E.3d at 598 (Goff, J., concurring) (quotations
omitted).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S‐PL‐60 | November 21, 2023          Page 9 of 22
    That means doing what we can to accommodate legislation that
predominantly furthers public policy objectives, so long as the legislature
is not usurping the judicial prerogative of managing the courts. For
example, we do not yield to statutes that we conclude interfere with
litigation’s truth‐seeking function or with our ability to fulfill our
constitutional obligations, including our obligations to ensure that all
litigants are treated equally, that “[a]ll courts shall be open,” that every
person “shall have remedy by due course of law” for any injury, and that
justice is administered “speedily.” Ind. Const. art. 1, § 12; see also Church,
189 N.E.3d at 589 (discussing procedural rules that “foster accuracy in
fact‐finding” or allow the courts to “function efficiently” (quotations
omitted)); Carlson v. State ex rel. Stodola, 247 Ind. 631, 638, 220 N.E.2d 532,
536 (1966) (“The courts are under a constitutional mandate to administer
justice freely and without any restraint coming from any other
governmental authority.”). The Indiana Constitution designates our Court
as “the final arbiter in case any conflict arises as a result of legislation.”
McCormick v. Vigo Cnty. High Sch. Bldg. Corp., 248 Ind. 263, 266, 226 N.E.2d
328, 330 (1967).

   Sometimes we cooperate with the General Assembly by expressly
incorporating legislative accommodations into our rules. As examples, our
Trial Rules defer to statutes specifying what form to use when initiating
certain cases,4 how to maintain confidentiality in cases presenting safety
concerns,5 how to serve parties,6 which cases courts should prioritize,7 and
when courts should issue written findings and conclusions supporting a

4Ind. Trial Rule 3 (“A civil action is commenced by filing with the court a complaint or such
equivalent pleading or document as may be specified by statute . . . .”).
5T.R. 3.1(A)(8) (providing that in cases involving protective orders, the “initiating party may
use the Attorney General Address Confidentiality program established by statute”).
6T.R. 4.17 (“Rules 4 through 4.16 shall not replace the manner of serving summons or giving
notice as specially provided by statute or rule in proceedings involving, without limitation,
the administration of decedent’s estates, guardianships, receiverships, or assignments for the
benefit of creditors.”).
7T.R. 40 (“Precedence shall be given to actions entitled thereto by any statute of the state,
including hearings upon temporary restraining orders, injunctions and receiverships.”).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S‐PL‐60 | November 21, 2023                       Page 10 of 22
judgment.8 Our Appellate Rules likewise defer to statutes establishing
when to initiate an appeal in certain circumstances,9 which appeals to
prioritize,10 and how to request relief outside of motion practice.11 Our
cooperation is not a blank check though, and just as often we cannot
accommodate the legislature, with some of our rules instead saying they
govern over conflicting statutes.12

8T.R. 52(A)(3) (requiring findings and conclusions “in any other case[s] provided by these
rules or by statute”).
9 Ind. Appellate Rule 14(A)(9) (governing the interlocutory appeal of an order “[i]ssued by an

Administrative Agency that by statute is expressly required to be appealed as a mandatory
interlocutory appeal”); App. R. 14(D) (providing that “[o]ther interlocutory appeals may be
taken only as provided by statute”).
10App. R. 21(A) (“The court shall give expedited consideration to interlocutory appeals and
appeals involving issues of child custody, support, visitation, adoption, paternity,
determination that a child is in need of services, termination of parental rights, and all other
appeals entitled to priority by rule or statute.”).
11App. R. 34(A) (“Unless a statute or these Rules provide another form of application, a
request for an order or for other relief shall be made by filing a motion.”).
12T.R. 69(E) (“Notwithstanding any other statute to the contrary, proceedings supplemental to
execution may be enforced by verified motion or with affidavits in the court where the judgment
is rendered . . . .”); T.R. 75(D) (“Any provision of these rules and any special or general statute
relating to venue, the place of trial or the authority of the court to hear the case shall be subject to
this rule, and the provisions of any statute fixing more stringent rules thereon shall be ineffective.
No statute or rule fixing the place of trial shall be deemed a requirement of jurisdiction.”); App. R.
5(A) (“Except as provided in Rule 4, the Court of Appeals shall have jurisdiction in all appeals
from Final Judgments of Circuit, Superior, Probate, and County Courts, notwithstanding any law,
statute or rule providing for appeal directly to the Supreme Court of Indiana. See Rule 2(H).”);
App. R. 5(C)(2) (“No party shall file an assignment of errors in the Court of Appeals
notwithstanding any law, statute, or rule to the contrary. All issues and grounds for appeal
appropriately preserved before an Administrative Agency may be initially addressed in the
appellate brief.”); App. R. 9(A)(3) (“A judicial review proceeding taken directly to the Court of
Appeals from an order, ruling, or decision of an Administrative Agency is commenced by filing a
Notice of Appeal with the Clerk within thirty (30) days after the date of the order, ruling or
decision, notwithstanding any statute to the contrary.”); App. R. 9(I) (“In Administrative Agency
appeals, the Notice of Appeal shall include the same contents and be handled in the same manner
as an appeal from a Final Judgment in a civil case, notwithstanding any statute to the contrary.”);
App. R. 13 (“In cases taken directly to the Court of Appeals from the final orders, rulings or
decisions and certified questions of an Administrative Agency, the preparation, contents, and
transmittal of the Record on Appeal, to the extent possible pursuant to Rules 10, 11 and 12, shall
be governed by the same provisions applicable to appeals from Final Judgments in civil cases,
including all applicable time periods, notwithstanding any statute to the contrary.”).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S‐PL‐60 | November 21, 2023                           Page 11 of 22
   When we have not anticipated legislation in our own rules, we have
sometimes still expressed our “assent” to a statute while resolving a case.
Humbert v. Smith, 664 N.E.2d 356, 356 (Ind. 1996). In Humbert, we
considered a paternity statute requiring courts to admit into evidence
blood test results in circumstances where our Rules of Evidence required
excluding the results. Id. at 356–57. We concluded the statute was
procedural and conflicted with our Rules of Evidence, which would
usually mean the rule governed instead of the statute. Id. at 357. But
because the statute was “consistent with the special care Indiana’s courts
have taken toward the expeditious resolution of questions of paternity,
custody, and support of children,” we decided “we should assent to” the
statute by treating it as an exception to the Rules of Evidence. Id.

   We have also evaluated statutes and concluded the procedural
elements are means to public policy ends, so the statutes are valid
legislative enactments. Just a few months before the Court of Appeals
issued its decision in this case, our Court decided Church, which
established a new framework for evaluating whether a statute is, overall, a
substantive law or a procedural law for purposes of deciding whether the
law is a valid legislative exercise. We explained this is not “a mechanical
test that simply stops when it finds a process.” Church, 189 N.E.3d at 590.
Instead, we evaluate the statute’s “predominant purpose.” Id. at 589. “If
the statute predominantly furthers judicial administration objectives, the
statute is procedural. But if the statute predominantly furthers public
policy objectives involving matters other than the orderly dispatch of
judicial business, it is substantive.” Id. at 590 (quotations omitted).

   At issue in Church was a statute limiting depositions of child sex crime
victims even if the depositions are otherwise permitted under Trial Rule
26 (discovery scope and methods) and Trial Rule 30 (depositions).
Depositions are procedural devices for obtaining testimony, and many of
the statute’s directives are procedural in nature: A defendant must first
contact the prosecutor about deposing the child; if there is no agreement,
the defendant must petition the court to authorize the deposition; and
after a hearing, the court can only authorize the deposition if it finds there
is a reasonable likelihood the child will be unavailable for trial and the
deposition is necessary to preserve the testimony, or the deposition is

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S‐PL‐60 | November 21, 2023      Page 12 of 22
necessary and in the interests of justice due to other extraordinary
circumstances. I.C. § 35‐40‐5‐11.5.

   But even with these procedural elements, we concluded the statute “is
substantive because it predominantly furthers public policy objectives.”
Church, 189 N.E.3d at 590. We agreed with the State that the statute
“creates substantive protections for child victims of sex crimes that guard
against needless trauma inflicted through compelled discovery
depositions by declining to grant defendants in this limited set of
circumstances the substantive right to take discovery depositions.” Id. at
590–91 (cleaned up). And while depositions are an important litigation
tool, we concluded that limiting depositions in these circumstances would
not interfere with the judiciary’s truth‐seeking function nor undermine the
defendant’s constitutional rights. Id. at 597. Instead, we noted the Trial
Rules already gave trial courts discretion to limit discovery rights,
including limiting depositions. Id. at 586.

    As with the anti‐SLAPP law, procedure was the source of the harm, so
the remedy was too, but the objective was substantive—the legislature
was trying to protect children, not micromanage the orderly dispatch of
litigation.

   C. Section 7 does not encroach on the judicial power.
    Likewise, we conclude Section 7 is a valid legislative enactment. To be
sure, just as depositions are “procedural devices,” Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495, 505 (1947), so too are class actions, State ex rel. Firestone v. Parke
Cir. Ct., 621 N.E.2d 1113, 1114 (Ind. 1993) (discussing “the procedural
device of class actions”). But like in Church, everything about Section 7
and the context of its enactment conveys the General Assembly was
tweaking a procedural rule to predominantly further a public policy
objective—which here, both sides agree is to limit the university’s
litigation exposure for pandemic‐related contract claims during a global
crisis.

   Section 7 does that in two related ways. The first is by limiting any
potential payouts to only students who sue the university; there is no
recovery for members of a putative class who do not assert a claim.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S‐PL‐60 | November 21, 2023         Page 13 of 22
    The second is by removing the potential for excessive settlement
pressure. Sometimes class certification “can coerce the defendant into
settling on highly disadvantageous terms, regardless of the merits of the
suit,” because litigating on a class‐wide basis greatly increases “the
magnitude of the potential damages.” Creative Montessori Learning Ctrs. v.
Ashford Gear LLC, 662 F.3d 913, 915 (7th Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted). To
illustrate this magnitude, the University of Notre Dame’s amicus brief
reports that a federal putative class action against Notre Dame asserting
similar pandemic‐related claims converts an individual thirty‐thousand
dollar claim into a class claim for over one hundred million dollars.
Another amicus brief reports that members of the Independent Colleges of
Indiana face class claims exceeding their total endowments.

    No party contends that when the General Assembly reconvened with
its first opportunity to respond to the pandemic, it passed Section 7 as a
reform measure with “judicial administration objectives” to improve or
change “the orderly dispatch of judicial business.” Church, 189 N.E.3d at
590 (quotations omitted). Instead, Section 7 reflects an attempt to
minimize postsecondary educational institutions’ litigation exposure for
rapid, difficult decisions they had to make when confronting a historic
disaster and complying with government directives. Most telling in this
regard is that Section 7 was part of a broader bill establishing a number of
pandemic legal protections, including protecting health care workers from
professional discipline and tort liability, declaring that pandemic‐related
emergency orders did not create new causes of action, shielding other
government entities from pandemic‐related class actions for contract
claims, and establishing immunity from tort claims for governmental
entities and employees acting within the scope of their employment for
COVID‐19‐related damages. See generally Pub. L. No. 166‐2021, 2021 Ind.
Acts 2253. The legislature also greatly limited the scope of the class action
bar at issue here—Section 7 carves out a narrow category of claims
(contract law claims arising from COVID‐19)13 against a defined group of
defendants (government entities and postsecondary educational

13   I.C. § 34‐12‐5‐7.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S‐PL‐60 | November 21, 2023     Page 14 of 22
institutions)14 for a narrow period of time (state of disaster emergency
declared between February 29, 2020 and April 1, 2022).15

   As in Church, Section 7 reflects “a careful legislative balancing of policy
considerations.” 189 N.E.3d at 591 (quotations omitted). Mellowitz argues
the balance is unfair because Ball State received substantial federal
pandemic relief funds, and he contends that precluding class actions has
the practical effect of shifting the COVID‐19 financial burden onto
students who did not receive that sort of relief in an era when students
already shoulder substantial student‐loan debt. But those are policy
arguments that must be resolved by our General Assembly. “In
determining whether legislation is violative of constitutional restraints the
courts will confine themselves to the question, not of legislative policy, but
of legislative power.” Dep’t of Fin. Insts. v. Holt, 231 Ind. 293, 301–02, 108
N.E.2d 629, 634 (1952).

    Mellowitz further emphasizes that when explaining the test we
announced in Church, we cited cases that in turn cited a Michigan Law
Review Article, and that article says that whether to permit a class action
is a matter of “judicial procedure” which court rules should cover. Charles
W. Joiner & Oscar J. Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of
Judicial Rule Making, 55 Mich. L. Rev. 623, 648 (1957). That is true, as far as
it goes. Class actions are quintessentially procedural devices, just as
depositions, bifurcated discovery, motions to dismiss, and summary
judgment motions are procedural devices. So the analysis here might be
different if the legislature were banning class actions altogether, see, e.g.,
Budden v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs of City of Indianapolis, 698 N.E.2d 1157, 1162
(Ind. 1998) (acknowledging that sometimes class actions are “essential to
the assertion of any claim at all”), just as the analysis in Church may have
been different if the legislature were banning depositions altogether, and
the analysis in the anti‐SLAPP context might be different if the legislature

14   I.C. § 34‐12‐5‐5.
15   I.C. § 34‐12‐5‐2(a).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S‐PL‐60 | November 21, 2023      Page 15 of 22
were superseding the pleading, discovery, and motion rules more
broadly.

   But in this context too, the legislature adopted a much narrower
approach, and the Church test presupposes we are confronting a statute
that arguably entails both substantive and procedural components. We are
then required to assess whether the predominant purpose is substantive
or procedural, which is consistent with the explanation in the Michigan
Law Review article that “there are areas in which it is not clear whether
the legislature or the judiciary should establish the necessary rules,” and
“theory must give way to reality.” Joiner & Miller, supra, at 629. Here, the
reality is that the legislature’s predominant purpose was substantive.

    Further illustrating the point, this is not the first time the General
Assembly has altered class action procedures to address substantive
concerns, and the class action prohibition here is the inverse of the Public
Lawsuit Statute, which requires class treatment. I.C. § 34‐13‐5‐2. That
statute reflects a legislative acknowledgment that “litigation can be
deployed to delay and sometimes even defeat public projects, and can be
driven by a variety of motivations, some of which may have little to do
with the merits of the project from the perspective of the general public.”
Bonney v. Ind. Fin. Auth., 849 N.E.2d 473, 478 (Ind. 2006). Even if the
litigation does not defeat the project, the delays still can “add millions of
dollars in increased construction costs.” Huber v. Franklin Cnty. Cmty. Sch.
Corp. Bd. of Trustees, 507 N.E.2d 233, 236 (Ind. 1987).

   Responding to these public policy concerns, the “statute imposes a
number of procedural rules governing public lawsuits, including provisions
that are designed to consolidate all litigation in one forum and the
requirement that a bond be posted.” Bonney, 849 N.E.2d at 479 (emphasis
added). To save public projects from needless delay and death by a
thousand litigation cuts, the statute directs that a public lawsuit “is a class
suit (whether captioned as such or not).” I.C. § 34‐13‐5‐2(b); see also Huber,
507 N.E.2d at 236 (explaining that the Public Lawsuit Statute’s “goal is to
require those attacking governmental decisions to bring their suits as class
actions and to put a stop to serial litigation”). The requirement “to bring a
public lawsuit as a class action neither confers new rights on the litigants

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S‐PL‐60 | November 21, 2023      Page 16 of 22
nor affords them new remedies.” Dible v. City of Lafayette, 713 N.E.2d 269,
275 (Ind. 1999).

   But just like the anti‐SLAPP law and the child deposition statute in
Church, even though the Public Lawsuit Statute does not alter the parties’
underlying substantive legal rights and remedies, its procedural
requirements are in service of public policy objectives that have nothing to
do with judicial administration concerns. While the Public Lawsuit Statute
requires class treatment, and Section 7 prohibits it, in both instances the
General Assembly has defined a narrow set of circumstances involving a
particular group of parties and regulated the availability of the class
action procedural device to achieve public policy objectives.

   Because Section 7 predominantly furthers public policy objectives
rather than judicial administrative objectives, and because it does not
undermine the truth‐seeking function of litigation or the courts’
constitutional obligations, the trial court was correct to conclude it is a
valid legislative enactment.

II. Section 7 is not an unconstitutional taking.
   Mellowitz next argues that retroactively16 prohibiting him from
maintaining a class action on behalf of similarly situated students
constitutes an unconstitutional taking. Both the state and federal
constitutions prohibit the government from taking property without just
compensation, and “[i]t has long been recognized that an accrued cause of
action may be a property right.” Cheatham v. Pohle, 789 N.E.2d 467, 473
(Ind. 2003); see also Ind. Const. art. 1, § 21; U.S. Const. amend. V. Mellowitz
contends that by taking away his ability to maintain his suit as a class
action, the State has taken away an accrued cause of action. The trial court

16 Ball State argues the trial court did not apply the statute retroactively because even though

the statute became effective after Mellowitz filed his complaint with class action allegations, it
was nevertheless effective before he filed a motion asking the trial court to certify a class. We
need not decide the question of whether the trial court’s application of the statute was
retroactive because Mellowitz’s takings claim fails either way for the reason that he has no
property right to maintain a class action.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S‐PL‐60 | November 21, 2023                       Page 17 of 22
rejected this argument, explaining that “[a] class action is not a vested
property right capable of being taken,” App. at 20, and we agree.

   Mellowitz conflates the class action device with its underlying cause of
action, but they are not the same. A “cause of action” is “[a] group of
operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for suing,” “a factual
situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in court from another
person,” or “[a] legal theory of a lawsuit.” Cause of Action, Black’s Law
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). A “class action” is “[a] lawsuit in which the
court authorizes a single person or a small group of people to represent
the interests of a larger group.” Class Action, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th
ed. 2019). In this case, Mellowitz has a cause of action for his contract and
unjust enrichment claims, but the class action is just one potential means
of pursuing his cause of action. A class action is not itself a cause of action,
which is why if there is no underlying individual cause of action, there is
no class action. See Bd. of Rev. of Assessments for Lake Cnty. v. Kranz, 224 Ind.
358, 360, 66 N.E.2d 896, 897 (1946) (“It is filed as a class action, but if the
named plaintiffs, hereinafter called appellees, have no cause of action,
neither has the class of which they are a part and for whom they sue.”)

   Even so, Mellowitz also argues that precluding the class action at least
has the effect of eliminating his underlying cause of action, just as
shortening a statute of limitations might. He reasons that “Section 7
removes the only effective remedy for redress for Mellowitz and his
fellow students” because the cost and difficulty of pursuing individual
claims may make them uneconomical. Resp. to Trans. at 21. But this
argument fails on the facts and law.

   As to the facts, there is no support in the record for the assertion that
the only way it is worthwhile for students to pursue pandemic‐related
claims to recover tuition and fees is through a class action. Mellowitz does
not tell us the amount of his claim, but Notre Dame reports that a similar
claim by one of its students is for roughly thirty thousand dollars. Even
setting aside the difference in public and private school tuition, our state
courts routinely handle individual claims for amounts in this ballpark.
And we have no way of knowing how many students have sued and why
others have not—e.g., whether other students have foregone lawsuits
because individual suits are not worth it, or instead because the distance

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S‐PL‐60 | November 21, 2023        Page 18 of 22
learning and other services their schools provided led them to conclude
they do not have a valid claim. We cannot simply assume that Section 7
has the practical effect of foreclosing students from pursuing their claims
because “every statute stands before us clothed with the presumption of
constitutionality unless clearly overcome by a contrary showing,” and it is
“the party challenging the statute’s constitutionality” that bears that
burden, with all doubts resolved in favor of upholding the statute. KS&E
Sports v. Runnels, 72 N.E.3d 892, 905–06 (Ind. 2017) (quotations omitted).

   As to the law, Mellowitz presents a novel takings argument, pointing to
Guthrie v. Wilson, 240 Ind. 188, 162 N.E.2d 79 (1959), as his best case from
our Court in support. That was a case in which a minor’s medical
malpractice cause of action accrued before the enactment of a statute
shortening the statute of limitations, and our Court interpreted the statute
to apply prospectively, rather than retroactively, because “any legislative
attempt to take away immediately and completely all legal means for the
enforcement of [a vested] right . . . would amount to a subversion of the
right itself.” Id. at 82. But here the General Assembly has not “take[n]
away immediately and completely all legal means” for Mellowitz to
pursue his contract claims. Id. Just the opposite, the General Assembly
preserved Mellowitz’s right to sue Ball State on his own behalf, which the
trial court is permitting him to do.

   Because Mellowitz has no property right to maintain a class action, his
takings claim fails.

III. The statute does not unconstitutionally impair
     Ball State’s contract obligations to Mellowitz.
   Finally, Mellowitz argues that Section 7 violates the Contract Clauses in
the state and federal constitutions. Article 1, section 24 of the Indiana
Constitution prohibits any “law impairing the obligation of contracts,”
and Article 1, section 10 of the United States Constitution provides the
same protection. See Bruck v. State ex rel. Money, 228 Ind. 189, 197, 91
N.E.2d 349, 352 (1950) (“The obligations of a valid contract are protected
by both the State and Federal Constitutions.”). The underlying concern of
these provisions “is that a legislature or court will render invalid the

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S‐PL‐60 | November 21, 2023    Page 19 of 22
rights and obligations which the parties agreed to in their contract.”
Evansville‐Vanderburgh Sch. Corp. v. Moll, 264 Ind. 356, 370, 344 N.E.2d 831,
841 (1976).

   A plaintiff can only prevail on a Contract Clause claim if the law
operates as “a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship,” with
“the severity of [the] impairment . . . measured by factors that reflect the
high value the Framers placed on the protection of private contracts.”
Clem v. Christole, Inc., 582 N.E.2d 780, 783–84 (Ind. 1991) (quotations
omitted). The Framers understood that “[c]ontracts enable individuals to
order their personal and business affairs according to their particular
needs and interests.” Id. at 784 (quotations omitted). And “[o]nce
arranged, those rights and obligations are binding under the law, and the
parties are entitled to rely on them.” Id. (quotations omitted).17

   The trial court rejected Mellowitz’s Contract Clause argument because
his “individual claim for breach of implied contract (alternatively unjust
enrichment) remains and has not been impaired by the statute.” App. at
20. Again, we agree. Section 7 does not alter the contractual relationship
between Mellowitz and Ball State at all, and the trial court has permitted
Mellowitz to litigate his breach of contract claim against the university.

   Section 7 only prohibits Mellowitz from seeking to enforce other
students’ alleged contracts, but he does not point to any agreement he had
with Ball State that guaranteed he could enforce other students’ rights,
and it is not enough to simply point out that Trial Rule 23 was part of the
background law when Mellowitz and the university entered a contract.
Bryson v. McCrary, 102 Ind. 1, 10, 1 N.E. 55, 60 (1885) (explaining “there are
no vested rights in the law generally”). Mellowitz argues that precluding
him from representing a class deprives him of his only effective remedy to
enforce his own individual rights under his alleged contract with the
university. But we must reject that argument for the same reason we

17Even if a statute substantially impairs a contract, it may nevertheless remain constitutional
as a valid exercise of the State’s police power if the statute is “necessary to meet an important
general social problem.” Clem v. Christole, Inc., 582 N.E.2d 780, 784 (Ind. 1991) (quotations
omitted).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S‐PL‐60 | November 21, 2023                       Page 20 of 22
rejected it in the takings context—we cannot accept the invitation to
simply assume Mellowitz is without an effective contract remedy because
Section 7 is presumed constitutional unless Mellowitz demonstrates
otherwise, and he has not demonstrated that his suit against Ball State to
recover his own tuition and fees is an inadequate means for enforcing his
alleged contract rights.

Conclusion
   For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Eric S. Pavlack
Colin E. Flora
Pavlack Law, LLC
Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Brian J. Paul
Jane Dall Wilson
Paul A. Wolfla
Jason M. Rauch
Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE‐INTERVENOR
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana

Benjamin M. L. Jones
Assistant Section Chief, Civil Appeals

James A. Barta
Deputy Solicitor General

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S‐PL‐60 | November 21, 2023   Page 21 of 22
Abigail R. Recker
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR AMICI CURIAE INDIANA UNIVERSITY,
PURDUE UNIVERSITY, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME DU LAC,
AND INDEPENDENT COLLEGES OF INDIANA
Brian E. Casey
Sarah E. Brown
Barnes & Thornburg LLP
South Bend, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR AMICUS CURIAE INDEPENDENT COLLEGES OF
INDIANA
Jodie Ferise
Independent Colleges of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE INDIANA LEGAL
FOUNDATION
Maggie L. Smith
Darren A. Craig
Frost Brown Todd LLC
Indianapolis, Indiana

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S‐PL‐60 | November 21, 2023   Page 22 of 22