Court Opinion

ID: 9542651
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:36:58.401069+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:08:33.047281
License: Public Domain

HAYS, Justice
(specially concurring in the result) :
I know of no decision of the United States Supreme Court which mandates the application of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), to probation revocation proceedings. I need look no further than the majority opinion for cases which emphasize that a probation revocation hearing is not a criminal proceeding. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). The purpose of a revocation hearing is for the trial judge to ascertain if continued probation is merited in the best interests of the probationer and society. State v. Bates, 111 Ariz. 202, 526 P.2d 1054 (1974). As long as the use of the confession is properly restricted to the issue of probation revocation, it is detrimental to the concept of probation to turn a revocation hearing into a criminal proceeding when by intent the revocation hearing should serve a purpose similar to that of a presentence report. In this context, I note that even hearsay is permitted in determining whether probation should be revoked. Rule 27.7, Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The majority opinion defeats the rehabilitative purpose for which probation as a concept was established and constructs an additional procedural barrier to individual therapy.
I concur in the result.