Court Opinion

ID: 9785436
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 21:43:42.463778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:24.143249
License: Public Domain

CHIN, J., Concurring.
I reluctantly concur in the majority opinion. While the majority’s conclusion adheres to a strict parsing of Code of Civil Procedure section 631, subdivision (d) (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 959-960),* 1 I write separately to urge the Legislature to enact legislation expressly authorizing predispute jury waivers. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.)
As the majority acknowledges, our decision is out of step with the authority in other state and federal jurisdictions, most of which have permitted predispute jury waivers. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 965-966.) The Texas Supreme Court recently observed that “nearly every state court that has considered the issue has held that parties may agree to waive their right to trial by jury in certain future disputes, including the supreme courts in Alabama, Connecticut, Missouri, Nevada, and Rhode Island. The same is true of federal courts.” (In re Prudential Ins. of America (Tex. 2004) 148 S.W.3d 124, 132-133 [47 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1104], fns. omitted (In re Prudential).) Only the Supreme Court of Georgia (Bank South, N.A. v. Howard (Ga. 1994) 264 Ga. 339 [444 S.E.2d 799]), and now our court, have reached a different conclusion.
Section 631, subdivision (d)(1) through (6), currently provides the only means by which parties may waive jury trial in a civil case. Although our state Constitution declares that the right to a jury trial is “inviolate” (Cal. Const., art L, § 16), and we have described such right as “sacred in its character” (Exline v. Smith (1855) 5 Cal. 112, 113), the Legislature has prescribed methods by which a party may impliedly waive, i.e., forfeit, the right to a jury trial by failing to undertake certain actions, such as depositing necessary fees. (See § 631, subd. (d)(1), (4), (5), (6).) As real party PriceWaterhouseCoopers L.L.P. argues, it makes little sense to authorize such forfeitures, and yet categorically prohibit knowing and voluntary jury trial waivers simply because they are made before any dispute arises.
Although the Court of Appeal here concluded that section 631, subdivision (d)(2) does not authorize predispute jury waivers, it nonetheless described such waivers as offering an “attractive middle ground” between jury trials and arbitration; agreements between parties to resolve future disputes by *969court trial would minimize fears of excessive jury awards while affording greater procedural safeguards than those available in arbitration. The Texas Supreme Court explained the appeal of a predispute jury waiver this way: “[I]f parties are willing to agree to a non-jury trial, we think it preferable to enforce that agreement rather than leave them with arbitration as their only enforceable option. By agreeing to arbitration, parties waive not only their right to trial by jury but their right to appeal, whereas by agreeing to waive only the former right, they take advantage of the reduced expense and delay of a bench trial, avoid the expense of arbitration, and retain their right to appeal. The parties obtain dispute resolution of their own choosing in a manner already afforded to litigants in their courts. Their rights, and the orderly development of the law, are further protected by appeal. And even if the option appeals only to a few, some of the tide away from the civil justice system to alternate dispute resolution is stemmed.” (In re Prudential, supra, 148 S.W.3d at p. 132.)
As the majority emphasizes (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 956, 958), we long ago evinced the belief that any “ambiguity” in section 631 “should be resolved in favor of according to a litigant a jury trial.” (Loranger v. Nadeau (1932) 215 Cal. 362, 368 [10 P.2d 63], overruled on other grounds in Reich v. Purcell (1967) 67 Cal.2d 551, 555 [63 Cal.Rptr. 31, 432 P.2d 727].) This should not, however, sound the death knell for predispute jury waivers. “While the public policy favoring jury trials subjects jury waiver agreements to strict construction, the application of that policy will not void every such agreement.” (Mall, Inc. v. Robbins (Ala. 1982) 412 So.2d 1197, 1199.)
Indeed, we should join other jurisdictions in recognizing that “there is no abstract public policy against contractual waivers of the right to civil jury trial.” (Okura & Co. (America), Inc. v. Careau Group (C.D.Cal. 1991) 783 F.Supp. 482, 488 (Okura) [citing Moore’s federal practice treatise]; Telum, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton Credit Corp. (10th Cir. 1988) 859 F.2d 835, 837 [“Agreements waiving the right to trial by jury are neither illegal nor contrary to public policy”]; see also In re Prudential, supra, 148 S.W.3d at p. 131 [“Public policy that permits parties to waive trial altogether surely does not forbid waiver of trial by jury”].) As a practical matter, in a diversity action, a federal court will routinely enforce a knowing and voluntary predispute jury waiver as a matter of federal law. (See, e.g., Okura, supra, 783 F.Supp. at p. 488.) Our decision today would prohibit the same knowing and voluntary waiver if parties filed their action in state court.
*970Finally, numerous amici curiae argue that barring predispute jury waivers will have far-reaching negative consequences. I agree that the Legislature, and not this court, is the appropriate body to address and evaluate these concerns. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 966-967.) If amici curiae’s concerns are valid, however, the Legislature has yet more reason to adopt the majority rule that predispute jury waivers are enforceable.

All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted.