Court Opinion

ID: 9353797
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-12 20:02:08.568536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:12:05.408439
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/12/23 P. v. Jimenez CA2/6

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

 THE PEOPLE,                                                   2d Crim. No. B316995
                                                            (Super. Ct. No. 2016041618)
      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                  (Ventura County)

 v.

 MIGUEL ANGEL JIMENEZ,

      Defendant and Appellant.

      A jury convicted Miguel Angel Jimenez on two counts of
identity theft. (Pen. Code, § 530.5, subd. (a).)1 The trial court
reclassified the convictions as misdemeanor shoplifting and
sentenced Jimenez to 360 days in county jail with credit for time
served. Jimenez did not challenge his conviction or sentence.
The People, however, appealed the reclassification ruling. We
affirmed the sentence in a prior opinion. (People v. Jimenez
(2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1282.) The Supreme Court reversed and
instructed this Court to remand the case for resentencing based

       All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
         1

unless otherwise stated.
on the identity theft convictions rather than shoplifting. (People
v. Jimenez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 53, 72.)
      The trial court resentenced Jimenez to five years and four
months in prison. He appeals, arguing the trial court abused its
discretion by: (1) denying his request to reduce his convictions to
misdemeanors under section 17, subdivision (b); and (2) denying
his motion to strike a prior serious or violent felony under section
1385 and People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497
(Romero). We affirm the judgment.
        FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
      On two different occasions, Jimenez entered Loan Plus, a
commercial check-cashing business, and cashed a check from
Outer Wall, Inc., made payable to himself. The checks were
valued at $632.47 and $596.60, respectively. Outer Wall later
confirmed it did not issue them to Jimenez.
      The People filed an information charging Jimenez with two
felony violations of section 530.5, subdivision (a), unauthorized
use of the personal identifying information of another.3 They
further alleged Jimenez had a prior strike conviction in 2015 for
assault with a deadly weapon plus a prison prior.

      2The facts are recited in significant parts from our prior
opinion (People v. Jimenez, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th 1282), of which
we take judicial notice on our own motion.

      3Section 530.5, subdivision (a) provides, in relevant part:
“Every person who willfully obtains personal identifying
information, as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 530.55, of
another person, and uses that information for any unlawful
purpose, including to obtain, or attempt to obtain, credit, goods,
services, real property, or medical information without the
consent of that person, is guilty of a public offense . . . .”

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      Jimenez admitted the special allegations after a jury
convicted him of both counts. He also moved to reduce the
convictions to misdemeanors pursuant to Proposition 47
(§ 1170.18, subds. (d)-(g)) and People v. Gonzales (2017) 2 Cal.5th
858 (Gonzales). Jimenez asserted his conduct constituted
misdemeanor shoplifting under section 459.5, subdivision (a), as
interpreted by our Supreme Court in Gonzales. The trial court
granted Jimenez’s motion over the People’s objection. Following
reclassification of the convictions as misdemeanors, the trial
court sentenced Jimenez to two consecutive six-month terms. It
awarded Jimenez presentence credit and deemed his sentence
served. In our prior opinion, we upheld the trial court’s
determination based on then-existing precedent.
      The Supreme Court granted review and concluded that a
felony conviction for misusing identifying information was not
subject to reclassification as misdemeanor shoplifting under
Gonzales. It instructed this Court to remand the case for
resentencing based on the identity theft convictions. Following
remittitur, appellant again requested the trial court reduce his
offenses to misdemeanors but now based his motion on section
17, subdivision (b). He also moved to strike his 2015 conviction in
furtherance of justice under Romero. The trial court denied both
motions and sentenced him to five years and four months in
prison.4 It denied appellant’s motion for reconsideration. He
appealed.

      4This included a midterm sentence of two years on count
one plus a consecutive term of eight months on count two, both
doubled under the Three Strikes law. The trial court granted
appellant’s motion to strike the prior prison term enhancement.
It awarded him a total of 1,038 days of presentence credit.

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                             DISCUSSION
          A. Motion to Reduce Convictions to Misdemeanors
                   Under Section 17, subdivision (b)
       Section 17, subdivision (b), provides: “When a crime is
punishable, in the discretion of the court, either by imprisonment
in the state prison or imprisonment in a county jail under the
provisions of subdivision (h) of Section 1170, or by fine or
imprisonment in the county jail, it is a misdemeanor for all
purposes under the following circumstances: [¶] . . . [¶] (3) When
the court grants probation to a defendant [without imposition of
sentence] and at the time of granting probation, or on application
of the defendant or probation officer thereafter, the court declares
the offense to be a misdemeanor.”
       Trial courts possess broad discretion in determining
whether to reduce a “wobbler” to a misdemeanor pursuant to
section 17, subdivision (b). (People v. Bonilla (2018) 29
Cal.App.5th 649, 660-661.) “[T]he court in question must
consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his
present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony
convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and
prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s
spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though
he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious
and/or violent felonies.” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th
148, 161.) The factors relevant to this inquiry “may include those
relevant to sentencing decisions, such as the circumstances of the
offense, the defendant’s appreciation of and attitude toward the
offense, and the defendant’s character as evidenced by the
defendant’s behavior and demeanor at the trial.” (People v.
Mullins (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 594, 611.) A trial court abuses its
discretion “if it relies upon circumstances that are not relevant to
the decision or that otherwise constitute an improper basis for

                                 4
decision.” (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847.)
Appellant bears the burden of showing the court’s decision was
irrational or arbitrary, and in the absence of such a showing the
decision will not be disturbed on appeal. (Bonilla, at p. 661.)
       Appellant contends he falls “outside the spirit of the Three
Strikes Law” because he is an older offender (age 39 at the time
of resentencing) whose mostly non-violent criminal record tracks
his struggle with drug addiction. The trial court had reason to
question this narrative. Appellant continued to have contact
with law enforcement after his latest conviction, violated the
terms of probation, and repeatedly failed to appear in court on
unrelated charges. The court noted that appellant’s drug
addiction was not raised at trial or his initial sentencing. We find
no abuse of discretion denying the motion to reduce the
convictions where the underlying conduct was clearly felonious
and appellant’s post-conviction conduct pointed so clearly toward
recidivism.
         B. Motion to Strike 2015 Conviction Under Romero
       A trial court deciding a Romero motion must “‘consider
whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present
felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and
the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the
defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or
in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not
previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent
felonies.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367,
377.) We review Romero rulings for abuse of discretion. (Id. at
p. 376.)
       A jury convicted appellant in 2015 for pistol-whipping a
neighbor in his own driveway after refusing to give appellant
money. He contends the trial court should have granted his
Romero motion for the same reasons it should have reduced his

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identity theft charges to misdemeanors. We again find no abuse
of discretion. The nature of the assault and appellant’s ongoing
criminal conduct provided ample grounds for the trial court to
conclude appellant fell within the scope of the Three Strikes laws.
                          DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                    CODY, J.*

We concur:

      GILBERT, P.J.

      BALTODANO, J.

      *Judge of the Superior Court of Ventura County, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

                                6
                 Manuel J. Covarrubias, Judge
               Superior Court County of Ventura
                ______________________________

      Richard B. Lennon, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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