Court Opinion

ID: 9959383
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-11 17:00:53.00045+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:29.039564
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                     ____________________
No. 23-1615
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                   Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                 v.

HAROLD U. MCGHEE,
                                               Defendant-Appellant.
                     ____________________

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the
                      Central District of Illinois.
         No. 1:22-cr-10007-001 — Michael M. Mihm, Judge.
                     ____________________

    ARGUED FEBRUARY 21, 2024 — DECIDED APRIL 11, 2024
                ____________________

   Before EASTERBROOK, BRENNAN, and KIRSCH, Circuit
Judges.
    BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Harold McGhee challenges many
of the proceedings that led to his convictions and sentence for
drug traﬃcking. His arguments are without merit or waived,
so we aﬃrm the district court in full.
2                                                  No. 23-1615

                               I
    In August 2021, a confidential source informed law en-
forcement that a drug dealer was distributing large amounts
of cocaine in Peoria, Illinois. The source said the dealer drove
a Chevy Malibu and supplied cocaine to a house on West
Millman Street. With this information, details from other in-
formants, and a tracking warrant obtained in state court, the
police learned that McGhee lived on LaSalle Street, drove a
Chevy Malibu, and delivered cocaine. From this, they reason-
ably suspected that the drug dealer was McGhee.
   Law enforcement investigated McGhee further. Between
August and December 2021, they conducted three controlled
buys. At the third buy, performed near the LaSalle Street
house and recorded on video, a confidential source met with
McGhee directly and purchased 8.5 grams of cocaine.
   Two months later, agents conducted a trash pull at the
LaSalle Street house. Two large garbage cans were set out for
that day’s collection in the alley fifty feet behind the house
and outside its fenced-in yard. The garbage and garbage cans
were covered in snow. Three kitchen size bags were sitting in
the cans on top of the snow. Officers opened the bags and
found rubber gloves and baggies with a white powdery resi-
due, which tested positive for cocaine.
     Based on all of this evidence, law enforcement obtained a
search warrant for the LaSalle Street house, the Chevy
Malibu, McGhee’s person, and his electronic devices. The af-
fidavit supporting the warrant recounted details of the inves-
tigation and included statements by confidential sources,
McGhee’s history of drug trafficking convictions, and his af-
filiation with the LaSalle Street house. The affidavit described
No. 23-1615                                                    3

that house as the “SUBJECT PREMISES” and did not use that
phrase for any other building. When the warrant was exe-
cuted, police discovered nearly a kilogram of various drugs,
including methamphetamine, heroin, fentanyl, marijuana,
and cocaine (powder and crack). Law enforcement also recov-
ered a handgun and other paraphernalia related to drug traf-
ficking. McGhee was later charged with five drug-related
counts and three firearm counts.
    McGhee sought to suppress the evidence recovered at the
LaSalle Street house and moved for a hearing to challenge the
validity of the search warrant under Franks v. Delaware, 438
U.S. 154 (1978). He argued the affidavit’s use of “SUBJECT
PREMISES,” in reference to both the LaSalle Street house and
the Millman Street house, was impermissibly ambiguous. The
district court denied the motion. McGhee’s appointed counsel
then withdrew, and McGhee pursued his defense pro se until
this appeal.
    McGhee later renewed his motion to suppress, raising
only a new argument that the trash pull was constitutionally
unreasonable because it was executed without a warrant. To
him, this constitutional infirmity poisoned the evidence re-
covered during execution of the federal search warrant. Based
in part on testimony from law enforcement about the location
of the trash bags, the court denied McGhee’s motion.
    The government sought a number of pretrial rulings. Two
are relevant here. First, it asked the district court to prohibit
McGhee from challenging the lawfulness of the searches or
seizures or asking witnesses to identify the confidential
sources. Second, the government requested a pretrial ruling
that McGhee had three prior convictions qualifying him for a
mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years under the
4                                                           No. 23-1615

Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). McGhee ob-
jected to the second motion, asserting that one of the underly-
ing convictions—which he committed as a minor—did not
qualify as a “violent felony.” But, he also acknowledged that
the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit the use of the juve-
nile conviction to enhance his sentence. The court granted
both motions.
   Jury trial commenced. Despite the court’s instruction that
the controlled buys were oﬀ-limits, McGhee repeatedly at-
tempted to establish that he did not engage in them. So, the
government requested permission to show the jury a video
capturing the third controlled buy. The court granted that re-
quest and denied McGhee’s request to call the confidential
source (heard in the video’s audio) to the stand, as the video
was played only to show that the buy occurred. The govern-
ment introduced the video through the testimony of Oﬃcer
David Logan. McGhee stated, “No objection,” when the video
was admitted into evidence.
    On recross-examination of Logan, McGhee asked why the
cocaine from the third controlled buy was not in court with
the rest of the evidence. Logan responded it was still being
tested.1 During a sidebar, McGhee asked for the cocaine to be
admitted into evidence. The court directed the government to
attempt to retrieve it from the drug lab. The next day the
government produced the cocaine, and it was received into
evidence. After further recross, McGhee again insisted at a
sidebar that the confidential source testify and persisted in his
attempts to prove that the controlled buy never happened.

    1 McGhee was not charged with anything arising out of that specific

buy, so that cocaine was not originally brought to trial.
No. 23-1615                                                   5

   On the fifth and final day of trial, the jury found McGhee
guilty on all counts.
    About three months later, McGhee moved for a new trial,
arguing that the cocaine from the third controlled buy was
fabricated and that the buy never occurred. McGhee
contended that he learned from a call with the laboratory re-
sponsible for testing the cocaine that (1) the laboratory only
received evidence from 2022, not from 2021 when the con-
trolled buy occurred, and (2) the cocaine would have included
a sticker with information pertinent to its testing. He asserted
the evidence submitted at trial had no date and no time on it.
The cocaine then, he argued, was fabricated. The district court
denied McGhee’s motion.
    The court sentenced McGhee to 420 months’ imprison-
ment. This sentence was within the Guidelines range and
included the ACCA enhancement requested by the govern-
ment. In pronouncing McGhee’s sentence, the court discussed
the required 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and heard McGhee’s
objections to the presentence report. McGhee did not raise a
constitutional objection to the application of the ACCA en-
hancement.
                               II
    On appeal, McGhee raises ten challenges to the criminal
proceedings resulting in his convictions and sentence. We
consider some of his arguments on the merits and resolve oth-
ers on procedural grounds.
                               A
   Four of McGhee’s contentions have been properly ap-
pealed.
6                                                  No. 23-1615

    1. Franks determination. McGhee asserts the district court
erred by permitting the government to respond during a
hearing on his Franks motion without permitting cross-exam-
ination and by denying the motion. This court reviews a dis-
trict court’s decision denying a Franks hearing for clear error.
United States v. McMurtrey, 704 F.3d 502, 508 (7th Cir. 2013).
The district court’s factual findings receive deference, and its
legal determinations are reviewed de novo. United States v.
Taylor, 63 F.4th 637, 650 (7th Cir. 2023).
    Under Franks, a defendant must make a “substantial pre-
liminary showing” that the affidavit supporting a search war-
rant is problematic. 438 U.S. at 170, 171. The court may, at its
discretion, hold a hearing “to determine whether the prelimi-
nary showing could be met.” United States v. Sanford, 35 F.4th
595, 598 (7th Cir. 2022). In making that showing, a defendant
“need not disprove” “reasonable explanations for the omis-
sion of the information … before the Franks hearing itself.”
United States v. Glover, 755 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2014).
Though the government is entitled to respond to a defend-
ant’s Franks motion, the district court must not—should it
elect to hold a hearing on that motion—permit the govern-
ment to bolster the affidavit without giving the defendant “a
full opportunity to challenge or rebut that evidence.”
McMurtrey, 704 F.3d at 509.
   The district court did not procedurally err by allowing the
government to respond to McGhee’s Franks motion. The gov-
ernment did not introduce new evidence or call witnesses.
And the district court restricted its analysis to McGhee’s at-
tempted showing and the proof he offered that the affidavit
contained false statements, without weighing possible alter-
natives.
No. 23-1615                                                      7

    The court correctly denied McGhee’s motion for a Franks
hearing. A defendant must make three substantial prelimi-
nary showings to earn such a hearing: “(1) the warrant affida-
vit contained false statements, (2) these false statements were
made intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth,
and (3) the false statements were material to the finding of
probable cause.” Sanford, 35 F.4th at 597 (quotation marks
omitted). The second showing requires “an offer of proof.”
Franks, 438 U.S. at 171.
    McGhee asserts he met his burden by showing that the af-
fidavit contained two false statements, both of which were
necessary for the probable cause determination. First, he says
the state tracker warrants were falsified because they were
never filed with the state clerk’s office. Second, he says the
federal search warrant contradicts the state tracker warrant
because it is ambiguous as to whether a November 16, 2021
controlled buy occurred at the Milmann Street or LaSalle
Street house.
    These assertions are not enough. The fact that the tracker
warrants were never filed is not proof that they were falsified.
McGhee’s conclusory statement does not follow from his offer
of proof. See United States v. Johnson, 580 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir.
2009) (concluding that defendant failed to meet burden to
show falsity of warrant where he “provide[d] no evidentiary
basis” for that assertion).
    McGhee’s second assertion fares no better. He alleges the
search warrant confused the address the state tracker war-
rants targeted with the one the affidavit sought to search. The
tracker warrants mention only the Millman Street house,
whereas the search warrant identified the LaSalle Street
House—the “SUBJECT PREMISES”—as the “Property to Be
8                                                     No. 23-1615

Searched.” McGhee argues that two uses of “SUBJECT
PREMISES” in the affidavit refer to the Millman Street house,
not the LaSalle Street house, and thus constitute a falsehood.
    These two uses are not problematic. The best McGhee can
say is the federal warrant is ambiguous. But this is a factual
determination, to which we defer to the district court. Taylor,
63 F.4th at 650. And as that court put it, ambiguity does not
mean falsity. We conclude that the district court did not
clearly err in denying McGhee a Franks hearing.
    2. Motion to suppress. We review a district court’s denial of
a motion to suppress de novo as to legal conclusions and for
clear error as to factual findings. United States v. Correa, 908
F.3d 208, 214 (7th Cir. 2018).
    A person does not possess a “reasonable expectation of
privacy in the inculpatory items that [he] discarded” in “plas-
tic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street.” Cali-
fornia v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40, 41 (1988). That principle
rings truer when the bags are left in this manner for trash
pickup. Id. In that case, the person leaves the bags “for the
express purpose” of having strangers take and “sort[]
through” the items within. Id. at 40. As to homes more gener-
ally, the lack of a warrant prevents the physical occupation of
“private property for the purpose of obtaining information.”
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012). But the shield of
the Fourth Amendment ends at the boundary of a home’s cur-
tilage. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5–6 (2013).
   The evidence McGhee seeks to suppress was recovered
from garbage bags, found in garbage cans, sitting in an alley
outside the curtilage of the LaSalle house, awaiting trash
pickup. Therefore, the search occurred outside the reach of
No. 23-1615                                                    9

McGhee’s reasonable expectation of privacy and comported
with Greenwood. “What a person knowingly exposes to the
public … is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). The search com-
plied with the Fourth Amendment, so McGhee’s motion to
suppress was properly denied.
    3. Confrontation of confidential source. We review eviden-
tiary rulings affecting a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights
de novo. United States v. Foster, 701 F.3d 1142, 1150 (7th Cir.
2012). McGhee asserts these rights were violated when the
district court denied his request for the confidential source,
whose voice is heard during the controlled buy video, to tes-
tify at trial.
    The Confrontation Clause “does not bar the use of testi-
monial statements for purposes other than establishing the
truth of the matter asserted.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36, 59 n.9 (2004). “[S]tatements providing context for other ad-
missible statements … are not offered for their truth.” United
States v. Van Sach, 458 F.3d 694, 701 (7th Cir. 2006). Therefore,
“[t]he admission of recorded conversations between inform-
ants and defendants is permissible where an informant’s
statements provide context for the defendant’s own admis-
sions.” Foster, 701 F.3d at 1150.
    The district court did not violate McGhee’s Confrontation
Clause right. The court permitted the playing of the video
only as proof that the controlled buy occurred because
McGhee’s own questioning had opened the door. Whether
the source’s statements are true “is … immaterial.” Id. at 1151.
McGhee had no right to confront the confidential source.
10                                                    No. 23-1615

    4. McGhee’s sentence. McGhee argues his within-Guide-
lines sentence of 420 months’ imprisonment was unreasona-
ble because of three facts he did not raise with the sentencing
court: (a) he was convicted of a nonviolent crime; (b) he did
not use or threaten to use a firearm; and (c) his age.
   A challenge to the substantive reasonableness of a sen-
tence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v.
Williams, 85 F.4th 844, 847 (7th Cir. 2023). When a district court
imposes a within-Guidelines sentence, our “deference is at its
peak.” Id. When challenging such a sentence, the defendant
must “demonstrat[e] that his … sentence is unreasonable
when measured against the factors set forth in § 3553(a).”
United States v. Vallar, 635 F.3d 271, 279 (7th Cir. 2011) (cleaned
up). If a district court offers an “adequate statement of its rea-
sons,” the sentence is reasonable. United States v. Annoreno,
713 F.3d 352, 359 (7th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up).
    The district court considered the § 3553(a) factors at the
sentencing hearing and in its statement of reasons. The court
noted the sheer amount of drugs at issue; McGhee’s aware-
ness of the harm those drugs could cause and his decision to
sell them; his prior offenses; his parents’ absence during child-
hood and his decision to join a gang; his epilepsy and past
drug abuse issues; his desire to receive a GED; and the fact
that he was not a good candidate for rehabilitation. These rea-
sons track several of the § 3553(a) factors, including the nature
and circumstance of the offense, McGhee’s history and char-
acteristics, his educational and vocational training, and his
medical care. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(D). The record
shows that the district court was also cognizant of the need to
impose a sentence that “reflects the seriousness of the offense,
promotes respect for the law, provides just punishment …
No. 23-1615                                                                 11

[and] adequate deterrence, and takes note” of the applicable
Guidelines. See id. §§ 3553(a)(2)(A), (a)(4).
    The facts McGhee points to do not persuade us that the
district court abused its discretion. His arguments amount to
an objection to how the court weighed the § 3553(a) factors.
But that does not mean his sentence is unreasonable. McGhee
cannot overcome the presumption that his within-Guidelines
sentence is reasonable by contesting the district court’s
weighing decision. See United States v. Melendez, 819 F.3d 1006,
1013 (7th Cir. 2016) (noting that district courts enjoy “discre-
tion in assigning weights to the § 3553(a) factors” and affirm-
ing within-Guidelines sentence.) McGhee’s within-Guide-
lines sentence was reasonable.
                                      B
    Problems arise for McGhee’s six remaining arguments. He
waived them, they are moot, he failed to comply with the ap-
plicable circuit and procedural rules in briefing them, or some
combination of these obstacles dispose of these challenges.
    1. McGhee failed to make two arguments in the district court, so
he waived them. A defendant can waive arguments in proceed-
ings before the district court. “Waiver occurs when a party in-
tentionally relinquishes a known right,” and it “extinguishes
error and precludes appellate review.” United States v. Flores,
929 F.3d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 2019).2 We ask “whether the de-
fendant’s decision not to object was knowing and inten-
tional,” which is “often” the case “where the defendant
chose—as a matter of strategy—not to present” an argument.

    2 “Before issuing” Flores, the panel “circulated it to all judges in active

service under Circuit Rule 40(e). No judge voted to hear [the] case en banc.”
929 F.3d at 450 n.1.
12                                                    No. 23-1615

Id. at 448. Similarly, a defendant can waive an argument by
affirmatively disclaiming an objection at trial. United States v.
Ridley, 826 F.3d 437, 443 n.1 (7th Cir. 2016).
   McGhee argues on appeal that the court violated the
Eighth Amendment by applying the ACCA enhancement
based in part on a juvenile predicate oﬀense. In response to
the government’s motion in limine in the district court,
McGhee expressly acknowledged that his Eighth Amend-
ment argument was foreclosed by caselaw. See United States v.
Salahuddin, 509 F.3d 858, 864 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that the
Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the use of a juvenile
conviction to support application of the ACCA enhancement).
And at sentencing, McGhee lodged six objections to the PSR,
but none referenced the Eighth Amendment or Salahuddin.
    McGhee also asserts the district court erred by playing the
unauthenticated video of the third controlled buy. But before
the video was admitted and played, McGhee aﬃrmatively
stated “No objection.” Each of these knowing and strategic
choices constitute waiver. Flores, 929 F.3d at 447–48.
    2. McGhee failed to develop three more arguments on appeal, so
he waived them. Even when arguments are properly preserved,
a defendant can waive them on appeal. “[P]erfunctory and
undeveloped arguments, and arguments that are unsup-
ported by pertinent authority, are waived (even where those
arguments raise constitutional issues).” Crespo v. Colvin, 824
F.3d 667, 674 (7th Cir. 2016). It is not this court’s responsibility
to do the work of researching and constructing legal argu-
ments for parties, particularly those with counsel. Nelson v.
Napolitano, 657 F.3d 586, 590 (7th Cir. 2011).
No. 23-1615                                                              13

    Relatedly, under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
28(a)(8)(A), the argument section of an appellant’s brief must
include “citations to the authorities and parts of the record”
on which he relies. “Litigants must bear in mind that the fail-
ure to properly argue their contentions may well result in a
finding of abandonment.” 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3974.1 (5th ed. Apr. 2023 update). That result applies in our
circuit. United States v. Hamzeh, 986 F.3d 1048, 1052 n.4 (7th
Cir. 2021).
    McGhee asserts: (1) the Second Amendment required the
dismissal of his charge under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g); (2) the testi-
mony of Logan regarding the controlled buy video was inad-
missible hearsay; and (3) his motion for a new trial should
have been granted because there was new evidence that some
of the cocaine presented at trial was fabricated. On each of
these arguments, McGhee cites little or no caselaw, provides
only conclusory statements, and gives few or no record cita-
tions.3 They are “perfunctory and undeveloped” and thus
waived. Crespo, 824 F.3d at 674.
    3. McGhee’s argument to dismiss the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) charge
is moot. McGhee claims that the charge against him for violat-
ing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), which prohibits the use, carrying,
or possession of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking

    3 McGhee’s new trial argument can also be rejected as untimely. A

motion for new trial must be filed within fourteen days, unless it alleges
new evidence. FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(b)(1), (2). McGhee waited more than
three months before filing this motion, and neither it nor his appeal
contend that he has any new evidence. He submits only that the evidence
presented at trial was “fabricated” and trial exhibits contained “irregular-
ities.” But he does not share the new evidence he supposedly discovered.
14                                                 No. 23-1615

crime, should have been dismissed because he did not “use”
the firearm. McGhee was charged and convicted under the
possession prong only. And the second superseding—and
controlling—indictment dropped any mention of the carry
and use prongs. So, this argument is moot.
                               C
    One last matter. Rules govern the appendix accompany-
ing an appellant’s brief. “The appellant must prepare and file
an appendix” containing “relevant docket entries” from the
proceeding in the district court. FED. R. APP. P. 30(a)(1)(A).
Our court is more specific: “The appellant shall submit,
bound with the main brief, an appendix containing the judg-
ment or order under review and any opinion, memorandum
of decision, findings of fact and conclusions of law, or oral
statement of reasons delivered by the trial court.” CIR. R.
30(a). We also require the appellant to certify that he has pro-
vided those materials. CIR. R. 30(d). There are consequences
for failing to comply with Rule 30. See 16AA WRIGHT &
MILLER § 3976.2 (describing actions courts may take against
appellants for noncompliance, including sanctions against
counsel, summary affirmance, or refusal to address argu-
ments). In criminal cases, the appropriate penalty for non-
compliance is a fine imposed on counsel. United States v.
Evans, 131 F.3d 1192, 1194 (7th Cir. 1997).
    McGhee failed to observe these rules. His appendix con-
tains only his notice of appeal and the district court’s judg-
ment. Absent are the relevant docket entries and the district
court’s rulings and reasons (written or transcribed) necessary
to review nearly all of McGhee’s appellate arguments. Never-
theless, counsel certified “that all the materials required by
Circuit Rule 30(a), (b) and (d) are contained” in the appendix.
No. 23-1615                                               15

We decline to impose a fine here, but we admonish McGhee’s
counsel, and remind the bar, to adhere to Federal Rule of Ap-
pellate Procedure 30 and Circuit Rule 30.
                          *   *   *
   We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court in all re-
spects.