Court Opinion

ID: 9953991
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 14:07:33.742934+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:57.879310
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-1221

                              ADOPTION OF ISLA. 1

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

        After a trial, a Bristol Juvenile Court judge issued a

 decree that, among other things, terminated the father's

 parental rights with respect to his child pursuant to G. L.

 c. 119, § 26.     The father appeals, arguing that the judge

 committed clear error and abused his discretion in reaching his

 findings and conclusions.        We affirm.

        Background.    We summarize the relevant facts from the

 judge's findings as follows.

        1.   The father's incidents with the mother's two older

 children.     The mother has two older children, Keesha and Declan. 2

 On February 12, 2018, a report was filed pursuant to G. L.

 c. 119, § 51A (§ 51A report), alleging physical abuse of the

 mother's four and one-half year old daughter Keesha by the

 mother's boyfriend.       Although the mother denied having a

 1   A pseudonym.
 2   The older children's names are pseudonyms.
boyfriend during the ensuing investigation pursuant to G. L.

c. 119, § 51B (§ 51B investigation) and presented other reasons

for the injuries to Keesha, Keesha's paternal grandmother and

her partner expressed concerns, stating that the mother was in a

relationship with an individual named "Freak."      At the

conclusion of the investigation, the allegations of physical

abuse were substantiated.

     On August 14, 2019, another 51A report was filed, this one

alleging physical abuse of the mother's three year old child,

Declan. 3   This report mentions two separate instances where

Declan was brought to the hospital:      July 13, 2019, due to scalp

lacerations, and August 13, 2019, due to an unexplained injury

to his abdomen, which was filled with blood.

     When asked by a detective about the injury Declan sustained

on July 13, 2019, the mother stated that they had been in

Providence at a park when Declan told her he had a cut and she

took him to the hospital.    She told the detective she did not

know how Declan had been harmed.       When asked about the injuries

sustained in August, 2019, the mother stated that she had no

idea what could have happened and no one had ever hit Declan.

3 There was also a 51A report filed on August 13, 2019, alleging
neglect of Keesha. Nothing in the record before us indicates
that this report relates to the father.

                                   2
Declan's doctors believed his life-threatening, abdominal

injuries were consistent with significant trauma.

     The detective asked if the mother knew a male named

"Freak," and the mother stated that she did not know anyone

named "Freak," but believed social workers had asked her about

an individual she had previously dated whom she had not seen for

one and one-half to two years.   When asked for the name of the

person she had dated, she gave the detective a first name, which

the police later learned was the same first name as the father.

It was also later determined that the father was in the car with

the mother when Declan was brought to the hospital in July,

2019.   Although the mother continued to deny that she was in a

relationship with any individual known as "Freak," the judge did

not credit the mother's denial, and the Department of Children

and Families (department) identified "Freak" as the father.

     As part of the department's investigation, a response

worker and social worker talked to Keesha, who stated that she

was living with her mother, Declan, and "Freak."    Keesha told

them that the mother was pregnant and that "Freak" was the

father.   Keesha stated that she was afraid of her mother and

"Freak," did not feel safe, her mother and "Freak" take "white

stuff" and "put the white powdered stuff in their mouths[,]"

which made them "act like monster[s]," and that they cook the

white stuff in the house.   She also reported that "Freak" made

                                 3
her mother act different, "Freak" made her mother hit Declan

hard on his buttocks, and that "Freak" hit her and Declan and

had almost "cracked [Declan]'s head with a toy."    She said that

"Freak" hits her on the buttocks, the face, and the hand, and

that her mother also hits her.    The response worker noticed a

large scar on Keesha's leg, which Keesha told her was from

"Freak" burning her with a heater.    At the end of this

interview, the department assumed emergency custody of Keesha.

While at the department's office shortly thereafter, Keesha saw

a picture of the father and stated that he was "Freak."

     The maternal stepgrandfather of Keesha and Declan also

confirmed that the mother's boyfriend, whom he referred to as

"Free," had burned Keesha's leg on a heater and had hit Declan

on the head with a toy.   He also said he believed Declan's

injuries were caused by "Free."    He also had seen the mother

with black eyes and bruises before.    At the conclusion of the

51B investigation, the allegations of physical abuse by the

father and neglect by the mother were supported and incorporated

into the open care and protection case that had been filed on

behalf of Keesha and Declan.

     On January 31, 2020, a new 51A report was filed after

Declan told a department worker who was bringing Declan to visit

his surgeon that "Freak" hurts him and punched him in the

stomach a lot.   During a forensic interview as part of a 51B

                                  4
investigation, both Declan and Keesha disclosed extensive

physical abuse by the father.

     On February 21, 2020, and again, on February 26, 2020, the

father was charged with assault and battery on a child with

injury and reckless endangerment of a child.    On November 17,

2020, these charges were nolle prossed, and on the same day, the

father was indicted on charges of reckless endangerment of a

child, assault and battery on a child with injury, and assault

by means of a dangerous weapon.    Following his arrest in

February of 2020, the father was held at the Bristol County

house of correction on these charges and was awaiting trial on

them at the time of Isla's care and protection trial.

     2.   Isla's history.   Isla was born on December 27, 2019.

The day after Isla's birth, a 51A report was filed alleging

neglect of her.   The department filed a care and protection

petition pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 24, and received temporary

custody of Isla after her emergency removal from the mother's

care on December 30, 2019.    The court approved the department's

permanency plan for adoption at a hearing on February 15, 2022.

     The father contacted the department only once around

January 2020 from an anonymous telephone number.    During this

phone call, the father denied the allegations of abuse

concerning the mother's other children and denied that he was

the father of Isla.   Shortly after Isla's birth, the father

                                  5
became incarcerated, and since that time, he has continued to

refuse to engage with the department and has expressed no

interest in visiting with Isla or in establishing a

relationship.

     In or around November 2020, despite repeatedly denying

knowing who the biological father of Isla was, the mother told a

social worker at the department that the father was, in fact,

the father of Isla.   The social worker then mailed the father at

least two service plans at the house of correction, which

included the department's contact information, but never heard

from the father at any point.    The father filed a paternity

action in January of 2021. 4

     Despite not hearing from the father, the department

developed an action plan for the father after taking custody of

Isla, and mailed it to him.    The only initial task on the

father's action plan was to meet with the department so they

could conduct an assessment.    This initial assessment never

occurred because the father refused to meet with the department

and refused to engage in an assessment or any services.

4 Although we do not have a copy of any complaint alleging
paternity, the father and the department have agreed that such a
complaint was filed. Based on the transcript below, it appears
that father wanted a paternity test to be performed. Nothing in
the record indicates the father retracted his original denial of
his paternity until after his paternity results were finalized.

                                  6
     About a week or two before the trial was scheduled to

commence, the social worker learned that genetic testing had

confirmed that the father was the other biological parent of

Isla.   Those results were sent directly to the father.   The

father's action plan was updated to include the requirements to

engage in monthly meetings with the department, remain in

communication with the department, sign necessary releases,

refrain from illicit substance use, and engage in parenting

classes.   The updated action plan still included an initial

assessment so the department might better identify areas of

need.   Again, the father did not respond to any requests by the

department, and did not complete the initial assessment.

     The social worker assigned to this case at no point visited

the father, who was in custody at the house of correction from

shortly after Isla's birth through trial.    Although the house of

correction did not allow in-person visits during the pandemic,

this policy ended in May of 2022.    The social worker did not

attempt to visit the father when in-person visits were allowed

again nor did she investigate whether they might speak over Zoom

either before or after the COVID-19 policy ended.    Nor did the

social worker take the opportunity to meet with the father when

he appeared in court for hearings in this case.

     After exploring the paternal grandfather as a potential

placement option to no avail, Isla was placed with a family

                                 7
whose home overall met the physical and safety standards set

forth by the department.     The goal for Isla was then changed to

permanency through adoption on May 28, 2020.       At the time of

trial, Isla was two and one-half years old, was seemingly doing

well living with this family, and had never met the father.

     3.    Trial.   The father was present at trial but did not

testify.    Given the criminal charges that were pending against

the father involving alleged child abuse, the judge drew a

negative inference from the father's failure to testify.       The

father has two other children, and at the time of trial, there

was an open department case involving allegations of domestic

violence against those children.       The judge did not seem to rely

on these allegations, and instead relied heavily on the criminal

charges relating to the father's abuse of Declan and Keesha. 5

     The judge found that the department had used "appropriate

efforts to contact Father and try to develop an action plan for

Father."    In making this finding, the judge noted that the

department could have done more.       The judge also found that

5 While considering the factors under G. L. c. 210, § 3 (c), the
judge incorrectly noted that factor xiii was applicable. See
G. L. c. 210, § 3 (c) (xiii) (requiring consideration of
parent's conviction of felony of such nature that child will be
deprived of stable home for period of years.). We take this
opportunity to note that this factor requires a conviction,
which father did not have. The rest of the judge's discussion
in relation to this factor, however, makes clear that the judge
understood that father had not yet been convicted of abusing
Declan or Keesha.

                                   8
although the father's pretrial incarceration limited his ability

to engage in any services with the department, it did not

preclude him from cooperating with the department or attempting

some level of involvement or contact with Isla.    The judge found

both the mother and the father unfit and that their unfitness

was likely to continue for the indefinite future.    The judge

terminated their parental rights, approved the department's plan

of adoption, and declined to order posttermination visitation

between the father and Isla.

     Discussion.   "In deciding whether to terminate a parent's

rights, a judge must determine whether there is clear and

convincing evidence that the parent is unfit and, if the parent

is unfit, whether the child's best interests will be served by

terminating the legal relation between parent and child."

Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. 53, 59 (2011).   The father makes

three arguments on appeal:   1) the judge's determination that

the department made reasonable efforts was clear error; 2) the

judge failed to consider the father's efforts to establish his

paternity when determining whether he was a permanently unfit

parent; and 3) the father should have been given additional time

after his paternity was established to work with the department

prior to the termination of his paternal rights.    We discuss

each argument in turn, giving "substantial deference to the

judge's findings of fact and decision, and . . . revers[ing]

                                 9
only 'where the findings of fact are clearly erroneous or where

there is a clear error of law or abuse of discretion.'"

Adoption of Luc, 484 Mass. 139, 144 (2020), quoting Adoption of

Ilona, supra.

     1.   Department's reasonable efforts.    "When a child is

removed from his or her home and placed into the custody of the

[department], the department is required by statute to make

ongoing 'reasonable efforts to make it possible for the child to

return safely to his [or her] parent or guardian.'"     Care &

Protection of Rashida, 488 Mass. 217, 218 (2021), quoting G. L.

c. 119, § 29C.   This general obligation also requires the

department "to 'encourage the use by [the father] of all

available resources' to promote the 'strengthening and

encouragement of family life for the protection and care of

[the] children.'"    Care & Protection of Elaine, 54 Mass. App.

Ct. 266, 274 (2002), citing G. L. c. 119, § 29C.     "What

constitutes reasonable efforts . . . must be evaluated in the

context of each individual case, considering any exigent

circumstances that might exist."      Care & Protection of Walt, 478

Mass. 212, 227 (2017).    "A judge's determination that the

department made reasonable efforts will not be reversed unless

clearly erroneous.    Adoption of West, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 238, 242

(2020), citing Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. at 61-62.     On this

                                 10
record, we do not see any clear error in the judge's

determinations.

     Before terminating parental rights, the judge must consider

the factors listed in G. L. c. 210, § 3 (c), see Adoption of

Gregory, 434 Mass. 117, 126 (2001), several of which relate to

whether the department provided reasonable services and whether

the parent utilized said services.    See G. L. c. 210, § 3 (c).

The father argues that although the judge considered these

factors, the record does not support his conclusion that the

department had made reasonable efforts.    Essentially, the father

argues that the department's limited efforts to contact him

while he was incarcerated fell short of the requirement to

provide reasonable efforts. 6   We disagree.

     The judge acknowledged that the social worker did not meet

with the father or inquire about Zoom visits and noted that she

should have.   Despite those acknowledged shortcomings, however,

the judge ultimately concluded that, while more could have been

done, the social worker's attempts to contact the father by

letter were sufficient given the father's lack of efforts to

6 To the extent that the department contends that the father's
arguments are waived because they were not properly raised
below, see Adoption of Gregory, 434 Mass. at 129, we address the
merits of the father's argument because the order denying his
December 6, 2021, motion for a determination that the department
failed to provide reasonable efforts was sufficient to preserve
the issue on appeal.

                                 11
"reach out to the Department, to pursue visitation, or engage in

any services."    In fact, in this case, the father initially

reached out to the department denying paternity of Isla and did

not provide an address or telephone number for the department to

contact him.    It was only when he was incarcerated that the

department was able to contact the father, which they did via

mail.   Although the judge noted that the paternity testing took

over two years, the judge also noted that the father, due to his

detention, could not receive services.    The judge concluded that

in light of these circumstances, the department's efforts were

reasonable.    We agree.

     Although the father cites the department's internal

policies regarding the appropriate frequency of visits by social

workers in most cases, the father has presented no facts or law

that would make us question the judge's ultimate determination.

We agree with the judge that more could have been done, but the

law does not require that the department do everything it can,

only that it make reasonable efforts in the context of the

parent's individual circumstances.    See Care & Protection of

Walt, 478 Mass. at 227.    Although the father disagrees, we

conclude that his lack of effort to remain in contact with the

department and seek services are among the many factors that the

judge may consider when determining whether the department's

efforts, in the context of the entire case, were reasonable.

                                 12
See, e.g., Adoption of Yalena, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 542, 554

(2021) ("The department's obligation to make reasonable efforts

to reunify the child with the mother is contingent upon her

obligation to substantially fulfill her parental

responsibilities [including seeking and using appropriate

services]").

     The father also asserts that the department had an

obligation to arrange visitation with Isla.   The social worker

testified that the father was not offered any visitation because

his paternity had not been established, and the father never

requested any visits.   The father is correct that, absent a

finding that visits would be harmful to the child or the public

interest, parents have a right to visit their child.   See G. L.

c. 119, § 35.   However, the father cites no authority that

suggests that the department is required to proactively offer

visitation when, as here, the father denied being the biological

father.   The father even acknowledges that "the Department is

not obligated to provide visits to a non-adjudicated parent."

Finally, we note that nothing in the record indicates that, even

in the short time period that paternity tests confirmed that he

was Isla's father, the father ever asked to visit Isla or to

have Isla visit him prior to trial.

     The father similarly argues that, even if not legally

obligated, it would have been appropriate for the department to

                                13
offer him visits with Isla.   That, however, is not our standard,

and the department's failure to proactively organize visitation

between the father and Isla absent any determination that he was

the father or any request by the father does not constitute an

inherent failure to make reasonable efforts.

     The father also argues that the judge's determination that

he failed to engage in any services was error given that he was

unable to do so due to his incarceration.   Although the father

is correct that the department was required to create an action

plan for the father specifically tailored to his particular

circumstances, it is unclear what more could have been done to

tailor an action plan for him where he could not utilize any

services.   The action plan initially required the father to do

one task:   stay in contact with the department.   He failed to do

this.

     In sum, the judge's analysis reveals a careful

consideration of all of the relevant circumstances as to Isla's

best interests and we see no error in this consideration.   See

Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. at 61-62.   See also G. L. c. 119,

§ 29C.   Accordingly, the judge's finding that the department's

efforts were reasonable was not clearly erroneous in light of

the father's inability to receive services due to his ongoing

incarceration related to allegations of child abuse and given

his lack of efforts to remain in contact with the department.

                                14
     2.   Father's efforts.   The father next argues that the

judge was inappropriately silent as to his efforts to obtain

paternity testing and that the judge overemphasized the fact he

was unable to undergo paternity testing until the eve of trial.

While we agree that "[t]roublesome facts . . . are to be faced

rather than ignored" (citation omitted), Adoption of Stuart, 39

Mass. App. Ct. 380, 382 (1995), we believe that the judge's

findings accurately describe the father's efforts and the

timeline of events concerning the paternity testing.    The judge

noted that the father refused to "work to address the issue of

establishing paternity while this case was initially pending,"

which is accurate.   Although the judge did not explicitly state

the specific date on which the father began to seek paternity

testing by filing a paternity action, the judge did acknowledge

that the father attempted to establish paternity by observing

that he "wanted to know paternity" before working with the

department.   While the father's eventual efforts to establish

paternity might minimally weigh in his favor, the judge's

minimal discussion of those efforts in the larger context of his

lack of efforts to be involved with Isla's life was appropriate.

     Additionally, the judge's description that "[p]aternity was

not established until April or May 2022, two years since the

child entered care," and that the "[f]ather was adjudicated the

biological father of [Isla] on the day of trial," was an

                                 15
accurate description of the timeline of paternity testing.

Nothing in the judge's findings leads us to believe that this

finding weighed against the father.    While the judge did note

that the "[f]ather bears some responsibility to be involved,"

this seems to be a critique of his lack of effort to be involved

with Isla, not that he was responsible for the delay in testing

after it was sought several months prior to trial.    Accordingly,

we see no clear error of law or abuse of discretion in the

judge's analysis of the timeline of the paternity testing.

     3.   Additional time.   The father's final argument on appeal

is that termination of his parental rights was premature, as he

should have been given additional time to work with the

department after his paternity was adjudicated and to establish

a relationship with Isla.    He cites no authority that would have

required the judge to give him additional time to engage in

services and only cites cases that state that a court may choose

not to terminate parental rights even where the court finds the

parent temporarily unfit.    See, e.g., Adoption of Carlos, 413

Mass. 339, 350 (1992) ("it is appropriate for a judge to

consider whether, on the basis of credible evidence, there is a

reasonable likelihood that the parent's unfitness at the time of

trial may be only temporary.").    Even where the father's

unavailability and his inability to engage in services due to

his incarceration might have been temporary, the judge had ample

                                  16
reason to conclude that his unfitness as a parent was not

temporary.    Accordingly, we see no clear error in the judge's

determination that the father's parental unfitness was not

temporary.    We also find no support in the law for the

proposition that a parent is entitled to additional time to

engage in services after the judge has appropriately concluded

that the parent's unfitness is not temporary.    We therefore see

no abuse of discretion in the judge's decision not to provide

the father with additional time to engage in services.

                                      Decree affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Green, C.J.,
                                        Walsh & Smyth, JJ. 7),

                                      Assistant Clerk

Entered:    March 25, 2024.

7   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                 17