Court Opinion

ID: 9927524
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-28 19:38:16.113151+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:16.553724
License: Public Domain

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT                                          Reporter of Decisions
Decision:  2023 ME 59
Docket:    Cum-22-394
Argued:    July 6, 2023
Decided:   August 29, 2023

Panel:        STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HORTON, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ.

                                ALAN R. ATKINS et al.

                                            v.

                                MARIE F. ADAMS et al.

CONNORS, J.

         [¶1] Alan R. Atkins and Gail P. Atkins appeal from a summary judgment

entered by the Superior Court (Cumberland County, McKeon, J.) in favor of

Marie F. Adams and Peter T. Adams. The Atkinses argue that the court erred in

declaring that “the Adamses have a right to trim, cut or remove branches or

limbs” of the Atkinses’ oak tree that encroach onto the Adamses’ property

because the court failed to impose a duty upon the Adamses to exercise

reasonable care. We affirm, holding that, under the common law, property

owners have the right to cut any part of a non-boundary tree that encroaches

onto their property, regardless of how their actions affect the tree.
2

                                          I. BACKGROUND

        [¶2] The following facts are drawn from the summary judgment record

and, unless noted otherwise, are not disputed by the parties. Dussault v. RRE

Coach Lantern Holdings, LLC, 2014 ME 8, ¶ 2, 86 A.3d 52.

        [¶3] The Atkinses and the Adamses are abutting property owners in

Cape Elizabeth. At issue is an eighty-foot, 100-year-old red oak tree that is

located near the boundary separating the two properties. The trunk of the oak

tree is located on the Atkinses’ property, but its “leader,”1 branches, and limbs

extend over the boundary and onto the Adamses’ property.

        [¶4] In September 2020, Mrs. Adams noticed that an employee of a tree

service company was trimming trees on a neighbor’s property across the street.

She asked the employee for a consultation regarding the removal of several

trees located in the Adamses’ yard.                Mrs. Adams and the employee also

discussed the oak tree’s branches and whether they posed a risk to people or

property.

        [¶5]    The Atkinses were inside their home during Mrs. Adams’s

conversation with the employee. At some point, Mr. Atkins exited his home and

    1A leader is a portion of a tree that serves as its main branch. See Leader, New Oxford American
Dictionary (3d ed. 2010); Leader, American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed.
2016).
                                                                             3

conversed with Mrs. Adams and the employee, apparently hoping to dissuade

them from taking any action regarding the oak tree.2 Over the next few days,

Mr. Atkins sent letters to the Adamses about the oak tree. Mr. Atkins and

Mr. Adams also had a conversation about the Adamses’ intent with respect to

the oak tree. Specifically, Mr. Adams told Mr. Atkins that they were not going

to touch it.

      [¶6] Later that month, Mr. Atkins filed a complaint in the Superior Court

asserting common law trespass (Count 1) and requesting a permanent

injunction (Count 2).          Accompanying his complaint was a motion for a

temporary restraining order to enjoin the Adamses from entering the Atkinses’

property and from “touching, damaging, removing, severing, or cutting down”

any portion of the oak tree. The court (MG Kennedy, J.) granted the motion.

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Atkins filed an amended complaint adding a request for

a declaratory judgment (Count 3), i.e., seeking a declaration that the Adamses

have “no right to touch, damage, remove, sever, or cut down any part or portion

of the Oak Tree.” On October 26, 2020, the Adamses answered and filed a

counterclaim against the Atkinses, requesting a declaratory judgment stating

  2 The parties dispute what was said during this interaction.
4

the opposite, i.e., that they do have the “right to trim, cut, or remove branches,

limbs, and trunks” that extend onto their property.3

        [¶7] In August 2021, the parties each moved for summary judgment.

Specifically, the Atkinses requested summary judgment in their favor on the

Adamses’ counterclaim. The Adamses sought summary judgment in their favor

on their counterclaim and Counts 1 through 3 of Mr. Atkins’s amended

complaint. The Adamses also requested that the temporary restraining order

be dissolved.

        [¶8]    By written order entered on November 1, 2021, the court

(McKeon, J.) ruled on both parties’ motions. The court denied the Atkinses’

motion for summary judgment as to the Adamses’ counterclaim and ruled in

favor of the Adamses with respect to their counterclaim and Count 3 of

Mr. Atkins’s amended complaint, declaring that “the Adamses have a right to

trim, cut or remove branches or limbs of the [Oak] Tree that are located on their

property.” The court also granted summary judgment in favor of the Adamses

on Mr. Atkins’s request for injunctive relief because the Adamses had prevailed

on the “central issue in this case,” i.e., their rights with respect to the oak tree,

    3Originally, the Adamses filed their counterclaim only against Mr. Atkins. The court (McKeon, J.)
granted the Adamses’ request to amend their complaint to add Mrs. Atkins in June 2021. Mrs. Atkins
is only a counterclaim defendant; she is not a plaintiff.
                                                                                             5

so Mr. Atkins could not satisfy the elements necessary to obtain a permanent

injunction. As such, the court dissolved the temporary restraining order.

Finally, the court denied the Adamses’ motion for summary judgment as to

Mr. Atkins’s trespass claim against Mr. Adams but granted as to Mr. Atkins’s

trespass claim against Mrs. Adams.4

       [¶9] A bench trial was held on Mr. Atkins’s trespass claim against

Mr. Adams on November 22, 2022. The court found in favor of Mr. Adams, after

which the Atkinses filed a timely notice of appeal. See M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1);

14 M.R.S. § 1851 (2023).

                                         II. DISCUSSION

       [¶10]     The Atkinses challenge only the court’s entry of summary

judgment in favor of the Adamses on both parties’ declaratory judgment counts

and Mr. Atkins’s injunctive relief count.

       [¶11] “We review a ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment

de novo, reviewing the trial court’s decision for errors of law and considering

the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment

has been granted in order to determine whether there is a genuine issue of

  4  On November 8, 2021, the Atkinses appealed the court’s entry of summary judgment. We
dismissed the Atkinses’ appeal as interlocutory because of the remaining trespass count against
Mr. Adams. Atkins v. Adams, Mem-22-62 (July 12, 2022).
6

material fact.” InfoBridge, LLC v. Chimani, Inc., 2020 ME 41, ¶ 12, 228 A.3d 721

(quotation marks omitted). “Summary judgment is appropriate only when the

record reflects that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Scott v. Fall Line Condo. Ass’n,

2019 ME 50, ¶ 5, 206 A.3d 307 (quotation marks omitted). A material fact is

one that could potentially affect the outcome of the suit; a genuine issue of

material fact “exists when the evidence requires a fact-finder to choose

between competing versions of the truth.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Each

party has the burden of showing that the elements of their claim are established

without dispute as to material fact within the summary judgment record.

Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC v. Guiliani, 2011 ME 135, ¶ 9, 32 A.3d 1055.

        [¶12] The Atkinses contend that the court erred as a matter of law in

declaring, without qualification, that the Adamses have a right to trim, cut, or

remove branches or limbs of the Atkinses’ non-boundary5 oak tree that are

located on the Adamses’ property because that declaration fails to recognize a

duty of reasonable care that the Atkinses claim the Adamses owe to them. The

    5 The common law distinguishes between boundary and non-boundary trees. A boundary tree
sits “on the division line between adjoining proprietors, such that the line passes through the trunk
or body of the tree above the surface of the soil” and “is the common property of both proprietors as
tenants in common.” Alvarez v. Katz, 124 A.3d 839, 842 (Vt. 2015) (quotation marks omitted).
Non-boundary trees, however, are not commonly owned; the owner of a non-boundary tree is
determined by where the trunk of the tree stands. Levine v. Black, 44 N.E.2d 774, 775 (Mass. 1942);
see Alvarez, 124 A.3d at 843.
                                                                                                        7

Atkinses further argue that, had the court acknowledged this duty of care,

summary judgment was inappropriate because there is a genuine dispute of

material fact as to whether it is reasonable for the Adamses to cut the leader of

the oak tree when doing so would likely kill it. The Adamses counter that the

court correctly determined that they have an absolute right to trim vegetation

that encroaches onto their property, and that the court properly declined to

reach the issue of whether the Adamses owe the Atkinses a duty of care because

this is not a tort case.6

   6 The argument that whether the Adamses owe the Atkinses a duty of care with respect to the oak

tree cannot be decided in this action because “this is not a tort case” lacks merit. See Horton &
McGehee, Maine Civil Remedies § 3-1(c) at 33 (4th ed. 2004) (explaining that “the very purpose of the
Declaratory Judgments Act is to spare the parties the necessity of doing or suffering wrong before
their legal rights can be construed judicially”).

    Of more substance is whether there is a ripe case or controversy regarding whether the Adamses
can cut the leader. The Atkinses’ argument rests on the apparently undisputed fact that cutting the
leader would kill the oak tree. There has been some suggestion that the question of reasonableness
is not before us because the record lacks evidence that the Adamses intend to cut the leader. The
record is, in fact, equivocal on this front. During oral argument, the Adamses’ counsel admitted that
the Adamses read the declaratory judgment as allowing them to cut the leader and that they want to
maintain that right—while at the same time asserting that they have no intent to cut the leader. Given
the Adamses’ representation to this Court that they have no intent to cut the leader, we could dispose
of this appeal by limiting the declaration to exclude the leader, concluding that there is no genuine
controversy. See Blanchard v. Town of Bar Harbor, 2019 ME 168, ¶¶ 20-22, 221 A.3d 554. Given,
however, that the Adamses believe that the judgment declares that they have the right to cut any part
of the tree on their side of the property; that this matter is on its second appeal and rounding into its
third year of life; that there is evidence in the record, albeit disputed, that at some point Mrs. Adams
did in fact express an intent to cut the leader; and that a change in the Adamses’ intent could result
in the destruction of the oak tree prior to identifying their legal right to do so; we conclude that there
is a ripe controversy, and we address the scope of the Adamses’ common law right vis-à-vis the parts
of the oak tree that encroach onto their property, whatever the resulting harm to the tree.
8

A.    The common law provides that a property owner may remove
      vegetation encroaching onto the owner’s property.

      [¶13] A property owner’s common law right to remove encroaching

vegetation is founded on the maxim “cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum et

ad inferos (to whomsoever the soil belongs, he owns also to the sky and to the

depths),” Harding v. Bethesda Reg’l Cancer Treatment Ctr., 551 So. 2d 299, 302

(Ala. 1989) (quotation marks omitted), which can be traced back at least as

early as the seventeenth century jurist Sir Edward Coke, see John G. Sprankling,

Owning the Center of the Earth, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 979, 984 (2008); see also Smith

v. Grant, 56 Me. 255, 259 (1868) (recognizing the maxim); Paul G. Creteau,

Maine Real Estate Law 2 (1969) (same). “[F]rom ‘ancient times’ it has been the

accepted rule that a landowner has the exclusive right to possess and use all of

the landowner’s property, including the air space above the ground . . . .” Lane

v. W.J. Curry & Sons, 92 S.W.3d 355, 360 (Tenn. 2002). Although this maxim

“may have been qualified insofar as air flight and oil and gas law is concerned[,]

. . . it still extends to air space that can be occupied by limbs of trees.” Harding,

551 So. 2d at 302; see United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260-62, 264 (1946)

(“We have said that the airspace is a public highway. Yet it is obvious that if the

landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control

of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. Otherwise buildings
                                                                                                      9

could not be erected, trees could not be planted, and even fences could not be

run.    The principle is recognized when the law gives a remedy in case

overhanging structures are erected on adjoining land.”).

       [¶14] That the ad coelum principle incorporates the right of a property

owner to cut encroaching vegetation7 by way of self-help is also entrenched in

the common law.8

   7 A property owner engaging in self-help may not enter the adjoining property to trim vegetation

encroaching onto the owner’s property without consent of the owner of the adjoining property. See
Robert Roy, Annotation, Encroachment of Trees, Shrubbery, or Other Vegetation Across Boundary Line,
65 A.L.R. 4th 603 § 16[d] (1988).

   8  See, e.g., Harding v. Bethesda Reg’l Cancer Treatment Ctr., 551 So. 2d 299, 301-02 (Ala. 1989);
Cannon v. Dunn, 700 P.2d 502, 503-04 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); Bonde v. Bishop, 245 P.2d 617, 620-21
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952); Sterling v. Weinstein, 75 A.2d 144, 145-48 (D.C. 1950); Gallo v. Heller, 512
So. 2d 215, 216 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Whitesell v. Houlton, 632 P.2d 1077, 1079 (Haw. Ct. App.
1981); Toledo, St. L. & K. C. R. Co. v. Loop, 39 N.E. 306, 307 (Ind. 1894); Harndon v. Stultz, 100 N.W.
329, 330 (Iowa 1904); Pierce v. Casady, 711 P.2d 766, 767-68 (Kan. Ct. App. 1985); Commonwealth v.
Sexton, 256 S.W.3d 29, 35 n.13 (Ky. 2008); Melnick v. C.S.X. Corp., 540 A.2d 1133, 1135-38 & n.3
(Md. 1988); Michalson v. Nutting, 175 N.E. 490, 490-91 (Mass. 1931); Holmberg v. Bergin, 172 N.W.2d
739, 744 (Minn. 1969); Buckingham v. Elliott, 62 Miss. 296, 300-01 (1884); Scannavino v. Walsh, 136
A.3d 948, 954 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016); Abbinett v. Fox, 703 P.2d 177, 181 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985);
Herring v. Lisbon Partners Credit Fund, Ltd. P’ship, 823 N.W.2d 493, 498, 502 (N.D. 2012); Rababy v.
Metter, 30 N.E.3d 1018, 1024 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015); Jones v. Wagner, 624 A.2d 166, 167-68 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1993); Rosa v. Oliveira, 342 A.2d 601, 605 (R.I. 1975); Lane v. W.J. Curry & Sons, 92 S.W.3d 355,
364 (Tenn. 2002); Fancher v. Fagella, 650 S.E.2d 519, 522 (Va. 2007); Alvarez, 124 A.3d at 843-45;
Gostina v. Ryland, 199 P. 298, 300-01 (Wash. 1921).

    As noted by the Tennessee Supreme Court, although jurisdictions “uniformly agree that self-help
is an appropriate remedy,” beyond that, jurisdictions differ as to whether self-help is the only remedy.
Lane, 92 S.W.3d at 360. Because the parties seek relief only as to the Adamses’ ability to engage in
self-help, we have no occasion to determine whether the remedy is limited to self-help in Maine.
10

B.       The view of most courts is that, under the common law, a property
         owner may remove encroaching non-boundary tree limbs or roots
         by way of self-help regardless of the effect of the removal on the
         health of the tree.

         [¶15] The Atkinses acknowledge the general rule that a property owner

has the right to remove encroaching vegetation by way of self-help. They assert,

however, that a duty of care limits this right when the removal of such

vegetation would injure the tree.9

         [¶16] A few courts have identified such a limitation. See, e.g., Booska v.

Patel, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 241, 244-45 (Ct. App. 1994); Fliegman v. Rubin, 781 N.Y.S.

2d 624, 624 (App. Div. 2003) (unpublished table decision); Balzer v. Ryan, 263

So. 3d 189, 191 & n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018). As the Court of Appeals of

Washington noted, however, these decisions appear to be “outliers.” Mustoe v.

Xiaoye Ma, 371 P.3d 544, 547 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016). A majority of jurisdictions

allow a property owner to remove non-boundary tree branches and roots

extending onto their property regardless of any damage that may occur to the

tree. See, e.g., Alvarez v. Katz, 124 A.3d 839, 843 (Vt. 2015) (“The right to cut

encroaching trees where they enter the land of another, without regard to the

impact on the encroaching tree by such cutting, is well-established under

     9The Atkinses’ expert opined that cutting the leader would substantially harm the oak tree and
likely kill it.
                                                                              11

Vermont law.”); Harding, 551 So. 2d at 302 (“The owner of property has no duty

to refrain from cutting roots of a tree that intrude upon his property.”); Levine

v. Black, 44 N.E.2d 774, 775 (Mass. 1942) (“Where the trunk of a tree stands

wholly on the land of one proprietor, he has been deemed the owner of the

entire tree, though there is no doubt of the right of the adjoining proprietor to

cut off limbs and roots which invade his premises.” (citations omitted)); Mustoe,

371 P.3d at 547 (agreeing with Alvarez that a property owner may cut

encroaching trees without regard to the impact on the tree).

C.    We agree with the majority view that a property owner may remove
      encroaching non-boundary tree branches or roots even if the
      removal damages the tree.

      [¶17] We have not previously addressed the specific question whether a

property owner’s right to remove encroaching non-boundary tree limbs and

roots is limited when such removal will harm the tree. But nothing in our

precedent suggests deviation from the majority view. To the contrary, an

authority on which we have relied, see e.g., Mabee v. Nordic Aquafarms Inc.,

2023 ME 15, ¶ 47, 290 A.3d 79; Lloyd v. Est. of Robbins, 2010 ME 59, ¶¶ 16-17,

19-20, 997 A.2d 733, notes the following:

      Sometimes trees grow so close to the property line that their
      branches extend beyond it and over the land of the adjoining
      owner. Although such trees belong entirely to the owner of the
      land on which the trunk stands, the adjoining owner may cut the
12

      overhanging limbs and encroaching roots without any liability for
      resulting damage to the tree.

Creteau, Maine Real Estate Law 3 (emphasis added).

      [¶18] The common law may evolve to meet modern circumstances.

See McGarvey v. Whittredge, 2011 ME 97, ¶ 9, 28 A.3d 620. For instance, in

Causby, the Supreme Court opined that the ad coelum doctrine “has no place in

the modern world,” at least as to the part of the sky above the “immediate

reaches of the enveloping atmosphere.”        328 U.S. at 260-61, 264.     Such

reasoning makes sense in the modern world in which, with the technology of

flight, the sky has become a public highway. See id. at 264.

      [¶19] But no such technological advances detract from the continuing

vitality of the ad coelum principle as to the useable portion of property. As

noted above, under the common law, jurisdictions, such as Vermont, authorize

a property owner to engage in self-help regardless of the impact that any

trimming may have on the health of a tree, see Alvarez, 124 A.3d at 843, and the

Atkinses have not persuaded us to depart from the common law.

      [¶20] Perhaps most importantly, many of the rights embodied in the Bill

of Rights and our Declaration of Rights evolved from the common law.

See Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478 (1888) (“The interpretation of the

constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its
                                                                                  13

provisions are framed in the language of the English common law, and are to be

read in the light of its history.”); Marshall J. Tinkle, The Maine State Constitution

61 (2d ed. 2013) (noting that the just compensation requirement in article 1,

section 21 of the Maine Constitution finds its roots in the Magna Carta); Cordova

v. City of Albuquerque, 816 F.3d 645, 665 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,

concurring) (“Neither can it come as a surprise that existing state common law

courts will usually supply a sound and sufficient remedy when claims

(possibly) of constitutional dimension are at stake: the whole point of the

common law as it evolved in England and this country through the centuries

was to vindicate the rights thought fundamental to the enjoyment of life, liberty,

and property.”).

      [¶21] A primary touchstone of property rights, whether under article 1,

section 21 of the Maine Constitution or the Fifth Amendment of the

U.S. Constitution, remains the protection against physical invasion onto private

property. See Causby, 328 U.S. at 262; Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct.

2063, 2074 (2021); Wellman v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 574 A.2d 879, 885

(Me. 1990); Tinkle, The Maine State Constitution at 61 (“Any permanent

physical occupation of private property, or any interference with the right to
14

exclude trespassers, constitutes a taking.” (citing Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d

168, 177-79 (Me. 1989))).

      [¶22]    Encroaching vegetation is a physical invasion onto private

property. The longstanding constitutional protection of private property from

uncompensated physical invasions reinforces the conclusion that the common

law allows a property owner to remove such physical invasions. We would

essentially be forcing the Adamses to suffer a continuing physical occupation

were we to limit their right to engage in self-help.

      [¶23] Finally, we agree with the Supreme Court of Vermont with respect

to the need for maintaining a bright line rule in this area of the law. See Alvarez,

124 A.3d at 845 (“We would be hard-pressed to create a workable rule which

would serve to limit encroachments in number, extent, or distance that a

property owner must tolerate from neighboring trees before allowing the

property owner to exercise self-help.”).

      [¶24] For all these reasons, the court properly rejected Mr. Atkins’s

request for injunctive and declaratory relief, and the Adamses were entitled to

a judgment declaring that they may remove any part of the Atkinses’
                                                                                                   15

non-boundary oak tree that encroaches onto the Adamses’ property, regardless

of how any trimming impacts the health of the tree.10

                                       III. CONCLUSION

       [¶25] As Lord Chancellor Herschell commented in 1895, “It may be, and

probably is, generally a very unneighbourly act to cut down the branches of

overhanging trees unless they are really doing some substantial harm to the

neighbour.” Lemmon v. Webb [1895] LXXI LT 647 HL at 648 (Eng.). Although

our opinion defines with finality the parties’ legal rights with respect to the oak

tree, it is now the parties’ prerogative to define their neighborly relations.

       The entry is:

                       Judgment affirmed.

   10 The Legislature can abrogate, modify, or supplement the common law by statute. See Myshrall

v. Key Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 2002 ME 118, 802 A.2d 419, 422-23. Maine’s timber trespass statute prohibits
a person from cutting down, destroying, damaging, or carrying away “any forest product, ornamental
or fruit tree, . . . or property of any kind from land not that person’s own.” 14 M.R.S. § 7552(2)(A)
(2023). Section 7552(3) governs the measurement of damages resulting from a violation. The
Atkinses did not seek relief based on this statute, and we take no position whether relief would be
obtainable under the statute or whether the statute applies at all in this context. See Rubin v.
Josephson, 478 A.2d 665, 671 (Me. 1984) (explaining that “we will not interpret a statute as modifying
the common law in the absence of clear and explicit language showing such modification or
abrogation was intended”).
16

Andrew W. Sparks, Esq., and William J. Kennedy, Esq. (orally), Drummond &
Drummond, LLP, Portland, for appellants Alan R. Atkins and Gail P. Atkins

Daniel P. Keenan, Esq. (orally), Keenan Law, LLC, South Portland, for appellees
Marie F. Adams and Peter T. Adams

Cumberland County Superior Court docket number RE-2020-723
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY