Court Opinion

ID: 9829000
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:54:47.676612+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:52.372895
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
In subdivision 8 of the original opinion filed in this cause, attention was called to the failure of appellant the casualty company to comply with rule 30, in that three propositions urged in the concluding part of its brief were not set out as points or propositions on which its appeal was predicated, and for that reason were not adjudicated.
In its motion for rehearing, the casualty . company, among other things, insists that, one of these propositions — that is, the one that involves its complaint that the judgment rendered in favor of the city of Wolfe City *533was in excess of the amount sued for, and that the aggregate of the judgments in favor of the city, the bank, and Humphrey exceeded the amount of its liability ($5,000) as fixed in the bond — presented fundamental error and should have been considered by this court, although not presented as one of the propositions on which the appeal was predicated.
After reconsidering this phase of the subject, we are inclined to agree with appellant that the proposition does present a matter which, if error, is fundamental and should be adjudicated. Appellant’s contention in regard to this matter is fairly reflected in the following excerpt from its motion for rehearing:
“The city of Wolfe City, in its pleading (Second Amended Original Petition, Tr. p. 13), asked for judgment against the defendants for the sum of $1,222.80.
“The court rendered judgment in its favor against the defendants (appellants here) for the sum of $2,842.75. (Tr. pp. 140, 141). The court then proceeded to credit the amount for which it had rendered judgment in favor of the city with, the $3,800 which the city had on deposit with the First State Bank, and Judge Looney says: ‘The net result being that no judgment was rendered for the city and no execution authorized in its favor.’
“The court in rendering judgment, as above stated, applied this $3,800 to the liquidation of the judgment for $2,842.75 which it had rendered against the defendants in favor of the city. This left a balance of $957.25 to apply as a credit on the judgment of $3,800 with interest which it rendered in favor of the First State Bank against the defendants, leaving a judgment in favor of the bank against the defendants of $2,842.75.
“Had the court rendered judgment in accordance with the prayer of the plaintiff for $1,222.80, and then applied the $3,800 to the satisfaction of the same, it would have left a balance of $2,577.20 to be applied as a credit upon the $3,800 with interest which it rendered judgment for in favor of the First State Bank, .which would have left a net judgment in favor of the bank against these defendants of $1,222.-80, instead of $2,842.75 — a difference of $1,(122.35 against the appellants in this case.
“Furthermore, by what judicial sleight of hand the district court reached out its arm and appropriated the $3,800 belonging to the city on deposit in the bank for any purpose we do not understand. This $3,800 was not before the court. It had no jurisdiction over the same. The city of Wolf.e City had not brought it before the court arid prayed for judgment for that amount against the bank. The bank had not brought it before the court, admitting the same to be due the city, and paying the same into the registry of the court for such use as the court might adjudge.”
Unless we have entirely misconceived the record in this case, a complete answer to appellant’s position is that the fund $3,800, disposed of by the court, belonged to neither Bradshaw nor to his surety, the casualty company, but was money the city of Wolfe City had on deposit with the bank.
The court made findings to the effect that, if Bradshaw had performed his contract obligations, the work would have cost the city only $12,790. 25, whereas, because of his dereliction, it would cost $15,633, and in this way the conclusion was reached that the city was damaged, and entitled to recover, the sum of $2,842.75. It is true this sum is in excess of the amount sued for by the city; but, as we view the matter, this is a finding rather than an adjudication. Whatever error was committed was rendered harmless, so far as appellant is concerned, by the direction that the city’s money on deposit with the bank be used to satisfy the sum found in favor of the city. Thus appellant was relieved from the payment of any sum whatever to the city, also the balance of this fund, to wit, $957.25, was applied as a credit on the amount found in favor of the bank, thus reducing its judgment to $2,842.75, whereas, but for this credit, it would have been rendered against appellant for the sum of $3,800.
If Bradshaw or the casualty company had owned or possessed the right to have this money applied to the satisfaction of the claim of the city, they would have the right to object to its use for the payment of any amount in excess of the sum for which the city, under its pleadings, could have obtained judgment, to wit, the sum of $1,222.80. But, as neither owned the fund, nor asserted any right to control its distribution, they are in no position to complain of the action of the court, certainly in view of the fact that when the “court reached its arm and appropriated the $3,800 belonging to the city on deposit in the bank” appellant’s liability was thereby materially reduced.
The court was under no compulsion, so far as the record discloses, to disturb or dispose.of this fund in any manner, but, moved evidently by a sense of justice developed from the evidence, did in fact assume the authority to direct its application. If this.had not been done, in view of the ascertained facts of the case, judgment would have gone against appellant for the full amount of the bond, to' wit, $5,000, instead of for $2,842.75 in favor of the bank, and $95.55 in favor of A. A. Humphrey.
The only parties who could have complained, to wit, the city and the bank, make no complaint, and appellants the beneficiaries of the order of court are in no position to complain.
Having duly considered the motions filed by appellants for rehearing, and finding no reason to disturb the judgment heretofore rendered, they are overruled.
Overruled.