Court Opinion

ID: 9756570
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:38:41.592099+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:26.049797
License: Public Domain

RAKER J.,
dissenting, in which BELL, C.J., and GREENE, J. join:
I would reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court and grant petitioner a new trial on both liability and damages. As did the Court of Special Appeals, I believe it was error for the trial court to permit questioning of petitioner’s expert, Dr. David Schretlen, about his role in the notorious sniper case of Lee Boyd Malvo and that the danger of unfair prejudice warrants a new trial on both liability and damages.1
It is well recognized that cross-examination is the principal safeguard against errant expert testimony. Common areas for probing are bias, partisanship, and financial interest of an expert witness. See Maryland Rule 5-616(a)(4). Ordinarily, the scope of cross-examination is within the discretion of the trial judge and is limited by the concept of relevancy. It is very common for courts to permit the cross-examiner to try to create an inference of bias in the witness’ testimony by showing that the expert witness is a “professional witness” *131and is for “hire.” This bias is often shown by adverting to the witness’ frequency of employment by a particular party or attorney. The amount of compensation the expert has received for his participation in the particular case, or even from testifying as an expert on an annual basis, is another area often permitted to elicit bias. Some courts have permitted also cross-examination on the number and frequency of referrals the doctor has received from a particular attorney.
An attempt to show that an expert is a “paid minimizer” is something else, and in my view, is not permissible. It is particularly inappropriate to refer to the Malvo case.2 First, it is not permissible to cross-examine an expert’s opinion in *132other eases that have no relation to the litigation. The Malvo/sniper case had no relation to the case at bar other than to elicit prejudice in the minds of the jurors. Second, when the cross-examiner tries to show that the expert “minimizes” the injury, either for a fee or routinely, there is no way that the party calling the expert can show that the accusation is not true other than to have a trial within a trial, and to introduce purely collateral matters to rebut the inference or suggestion. It obviously creates enormous problems to inject another lawsuit into the trial. See, e.g., Pappas v. Fronczak, 249 Ill.App.3d 42, 188 Ill.Dec. 308, 618 N.E.2d 878 (1993).
The majority characterizes the “paid minimizer” question as merely “suggesting that Dr. Schretlen might testify in accordance with the position of the person by whom he was paid” and that the question is within the penumbra of allowable questions. Maj. op. at 22. As I have indicated, if the question was to show that Dr. Schretlen was testifying in accordance with the side who retained him, I agree that it would be permissible. But, the question was designed to show that he minimized the injuries in other cases, and therefore, he was minimizing the injuries, or damages, in the instant case.
The Court of Special Appeals reasoned as follows:
“We recognize the general rule that ‘[wjhether to order a mistrial rests in the discretion of the trial judge, and appellate review of the denial of the motion is limited to whether there has been an abuse of discretion.’ Medical Mutual Liab. Ins. Soc’y of Md. v. Evans, 330 Md. 1, 19, 622 A.2d 103 (1993). The facts of that case, however, persuade us that (1) Dr. Schretlen should not have been asked any questions about his role in the Malvo case, and (2) the danger of unfair prejudice against Dr. Schretlen that resulted from those questions entitle appellant to a new trial on the issue of damages.”
Goldberg v. Boone, 167 Md.App. 410, 434, 893 A.2d 625, 639 (2006). My only disagreement with the Court of Special *133Appeals reasoning is to the remedy. I believe that petitioner is entitled to a new trial on both liability and damages.
Chief Judge BELL and Judge GREENE have authorized me to state that they join in this dissenting opinion.

. The Court of Special Appeals found that petitioner’s motion for a mistrial was timely made and preserved for appellate review. Goldberg v. Boone, 167 Md.App. 410, 893 A.2d 625 (2006). I agree.

. The record shows that appellant offered Dr. Schretlen as an expert in the field of neuropsychology, and that the following transpired during the voir dire of this witness:
“Q: Okay. I mean, you are hired here basically as a minimizer, aren't you?
[Appellant’s Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor.
The Court: Overruled.
A: I certainly didn’t see myself as being hired as a minimizer. I saw myself being hired as a neuropsychologist.
Q: Now, the case before that [referring to a case where the doctor had previously been called as an expert witness], that you testified in court, was a criminal case, right?
A: I’m not sure.
Q: Okay. Well, you testified a young man, about 18 years old, and you did a daylong battery of tests on him and he tested abnormal in one or two tests, right?
A: Oh yes. I know who you are speaking of.
Q: Okay. He was only abnormal in one or two tests?
A: That’s right.
Q: Okay. And that young man, you were willing to come into court
and testify that he might have been brainwashed into murdering 10 people in the sniper thing, isn't that true?
[Appellant’s counsel]: Objection, Your Honor.
A: That is absolutely incorrect and outrageous.
The Court: Sustained.
Q: Well let’s talk about it for a minute.
A: Yes.
Q: The young man’s name—
[Appellant’s counsel]: May we approach, Your Honor?”
At the bench, the court sustained the objection, stating that the court was "not going to allow [respondent's counsel] to get into this area.”