Court Opinion

ID: 9696113
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:36:49.713299+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:18.705024
License: Public Domain

Garrett, J.
(dissenting) — I respectfully dissent, being prompted to do so by my opinion that the instruction 10-A was prejudicial to plaintiff and deprived him of a fair trial.
This instruction applied the fusee statute and is in part: “10-A. Vou are instructed that it is the law of this state that whenever a motor truck is stopped upon the main traveled por*1110tion of a highway, or immediately adjacent to the main traveled portion of a highway at any time from a half hour after sunset to a half hour before sunrise, then the driver or other person in charge of such vehicle shall cause a lighted fusee to be immediately placed on the roadway at the traffic side of such vehicle. In this connection you are instructed that if you ftnd that plaintiff’s truck was stopped upon or immediately adjacent to the main traveled portion of the highway at the time and place of accident, and that plaintiff failed to canse a lighted fusee to he immediately placed on the roadway at the traffic side of such vehicle, then this would constitute negligence upon the part of plaintiff, and if you further find that such negligence, if any, of plaintiff contributed to the injuries and damage to plaintiff, then he would not be entitled to recover, and your verdict should be for the defendant. You are instructed that the word ‘immediately’ as used in the statute with respect to the placing of a lighted fusee, means without delay; straightway, but does not necessarily exclude all interval of time.” (Emphasis supplied.)
It is true that the truck operated by plaintiff did stop, prior to the accident, with the right half or more thereof on the shoulder and that no flares or fusees were placed as mentioned in the statute, but that situation has no application to this case in view of the fact that, at all times involved herein, the truck was moving forward. In Engle v. Nelson, 220 Iowa 771, 776, 263 N. W. 505, 508, this court said:
“Then too, under the record here, the deceased had completed his work and was ready to move, and even though he had placed a ‘flare’ he would not be expected to leave it in the highway, and would necessarily put it out and put it back in his vehicle prior to the time that he started away. There would necessarily be an interim of time when one would be justified in not leaving a flare in the highway; * *
Section 321.448, Code of 1958, provides for fusees. It has reference only to vehicles which are “stopped upon or immediately adjacent to” the traveled portion of the highway. In this case the truck had previously been stopped but it was traveling forward at all times involved in this accident. When the defend*1111ant reached a position where he could, see the truck it was moving, slowly, perhaps, but moving, and it went on from the scene of the accident to a point some distance up the hill before stopping. Fusees are not required of moving vehicles, and when the court instructed the jury that “if you find that plaintiff’s truck was stopped upon or immediately adjacent to the main traveled portion of the highway at the time and place of accident” without fusees then this would constitute negligence upon the part of the plaintiff, such an instruction is as prejudicial as though when the accident occurred the offending truck were traveling at reasonable speed a mile from the place where it had stopped.
The majority opinion strives to construe the evidence ingeniously so as to generate a jury question as to whether the truck was stopped at the time in question. The construction is ingenious but it is neither fair nor sound.
Appellant testified: “It looked like about 40, 50 feet when I first seen he was coming toward the truck. At this time I was still facing the truck with the shovel full of sand and the truck was moving slowly up the hill. * * * -I would say that the semi had moved about 20 feet. * * * Q. How fast was it moving ? A. I don’t imagine it was moving fast enough to even move the speedometer on it. Q. * * * Just so there will be no possible misunderstanding about it, what is the fact as to whether or not at all times from the time that you first saw the lights of what turned out to be the Hanson ear, from that time until after the accident had happened and you had been struck, whether or not that truck of yours was in motion moving up the hill? A. Yes, we were moving.”
The appellee testified: “As soon as I came around the curve where I could see downhill I saw the headlights, recognized that it was a truck. * * * I don’t leUeve-1 ever said I recognized that the truck was stopped. Apparently the truck was moving slowly or was stopped. * * * Apparently it was moving slowly. * * * Q. So, so far as you could tell you want the jury to understand that after you came around the curve and saw the truck, recognized that it was a truck, that you felt that it was operating in a normal fashion, is that correctf A. That is correct.”
*1112On cross-examination, the purpose of which was to elicit the truth, the defendant said he wanted the jury to understand that he felt the truck was operating in the ordinary manner. It is true that Gary Yerwers, a guest in appellee’s car when it struck appellant, testified the truck was not moving, but his testimony, given three years after the accident, was vague and uncertain in all respects. He could not recall whether the truck was on or partially off the pavement. The third man in the car was John E. Janss, 27 years old and a graduate student at the state university at the time of the accident. He said, “I can’t honestly say I recall seeing it before we reached the front of the truck.” He expressed no opinion as to whether the truck was moving when they passed it.
The final, positive statement of appellee, that the truck was moving was the equivalent of a stipulation which he agreed to be bound by because it was true. On direct examination he waivered in favor of what seemed advantageous, but when pressed for the facts he said when he first saw the truck he felt it was operating in the normal manner. To minimize this testimony, which is no less binding upon appellee than an admission of the fact in a pleading or a stipulation filed in the case that the truck was moving in the normal manner, is to say that the trial court would be justified in ignoring what is tantamount to a stipulation by the appellee in favor of a witness whose memory, after three years, was not too trustworthy.
The testimony of the three occupants of the Plymouth car was that they had been drinking beer for some time before they decided at ten o’clock p. m. that they would drive to Cedar Rapids to visit one of Hanson’s friends whom Yerwers and Janss did not even know. Further it may be noted that it was snowing and the pavement was in a somewhat hazardous condition.
There was not the least claim or suggestion that fusees or flares would have been of any assistance to the driver of the car.
There being, then, no evidence which a court or jury should consider to the effect that the truck was not moving, there was no place for an instruction regarding fusees and it was prejudicial error to give instruction 10-A as bearing upon the issue of *1113contributory negligence. It opened up for consideration and possible speculation by tbe jury a question that to all practical purposes was not in the case. The factual situation in this case brings it within the rules laid down in Engle v. Nelson, supra, where we said at pages 775, 776, 777 of 220 Iowa:
“The only purpose of placing the so-called ‘flare’ near such a vehicle would necessarily be to warn the travelers upon the highway of the presence of such vehicle. * * * Moreover, if the defendant in this case had full knowledge of all of the facts and circumstances, then it stands to reason that the absence of a ‘flare’, even if there was such absence, would be immaterial and would not warrant a finding or holding that the person in charge of the stationary vehicle was guilty of actionable negligence or contributory negligence. * * * It is elementary, and we have frequently held, that a violation of a statutory requirement is immaterial if such violation was not a direct or contributing cause of the injury.”
For the reasons stated it was error for the court to give the instruction regarding fusees. — I would reverse.
Hats, J., joins in this dissent.