Court Opinion

ID: 9690595
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:25:11.744452+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:00.018166
License: Public Domain

COOPER, Dissenting Justice.
Relief by way of prohibition or mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and we have always been cautious and conservative both in entertaining petitions for and in granting such relief. This careful approach is necessary to prevent short-circuiting normal appeal procedure and to limit so far as possible interference with the proper and efficient operation of our circuit and other courts. If this avenue of relief were open to all who considered themselves aggrieved by an interlocutory court order, we would face an impossible burden of nonappellate matters.
Bender v. Eaton, 343 S.W.2d 799, 800 (Ky. 1961). Whether to issue a writ has always been within the sound discretion of the appellate court in which the' petition is filed. Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Ky.2004). “[Wjhether to grant or deny a petition for a writ is within the appellate court’s discretion. And, appellate review of that decision is limited to an abuse-of-discretion inquiry, except for issues of law which are reviewed de novo.” Rehm v. Clayton, 132 S.W.3d 864, 866 (Ky.2004) (citations and quotations omitted). Less than four months ago, the author of today’s majority opinion accurately wrote:
A petitioner must make a significant showing for a writ even to be available iíi a given case because extraordinary writs inherently intrude into the workings of the lower courts and bypass the normal appellate process. Even in those rare cases when a writ is available as a remedy, the court originally hearing the petition retains its discretion to grant or deny the writ after examining the merits.
Powell v. Graham, 185 S.W.3d 624, 627 (Ky.2006). Yet, the majority of this Court today concludes that the Jefferson Circuit Court abused its discretion in denying the Commonwealth’s petition for a writ to prohibit a bench trial of this petty offense, despite finding:
(1) The case is not one that is required to be tried by a jury, ante, at 282;
(2) There exists no explicit agreement, ante, at 279 n. 2, no clear acknowledgment, ante, at 285, and certainly no proof that Davis ever requested a jury trial; and
(3) The Commonwealth will not suffer great injustice and irreparable injury if the case is tried without a jury, ante, at 281.
The district court record reflects only that on September 3, 2002, the district judge set the case for trial by jury to be held on November 27, 2002; that on November 19, 2002, Davis’s counsel made a motion for a bench trial, i. e., waived his right to trial by jury, see, e.g., Jackson v. Commonwealth, 113 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Ky. 2003) (“It is now well settled that an accused, in the exercise of a voluntary and intelligent choice, may waive his right to a jury trial .... ” (Citation and quotation omitted.)); and that the district judge then set the case for a bench trial on January 25, 2003. Forty-seven days later and just *287two days before trial, the Commonwealth filed this petition for a writ to prohibit the trial court from conducting a bench trial. This is precisely the kind of interference with trial dockets that we have held warrants the denial of a writ.
Now, the majority of this Court holds that, while the Court of Appeals’ legal analysis is correct, “there is sufficient reason to believe that at his initial appearance Davis requested a jury trial,” and “the clear implication is that Davis offered his motion for a bench trial after reconsidering the wisdom of his decision to proceed before a jury.” In fact, there is no reason to assume that the trial court did not sua sponte set the case for trial by jury on the assumption that a criminal defendant would always prefer a trial by jury over a trial by judge. Absent proof, I do not believe that “sufficient reason to believe” and “clear implication” suffices to prove that the Jefferson Circuit Court abused its discretion in denying the writ.
But even if that were not so, KRS 29A.270(1) gives the defendant the discretion as to whether a petty. offense with which he or she is charged shall be tried by judge or jury. Because, as the majority opinion holds, RCr 9.26(1) does not apply to petty offenses, the Commonwealth simply is without standing to preclude the defendant from waiving his right to trial by jury or the trial court from permitting him to do so. Compare Commonwealth v. Johnson, 910 S.W.2d 229, 230-31 (Ky.1995) (Commonwealth has the right to demand trial by jury of sentencing phase of capital trial).
Accordingly, I dissent and would affirm the Jefferson Circuit Court and the Court of Appeals in all respects.