Court Opinion

ID: 9797888
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:31:27.050173+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:59:20.163263
License: Public Domain

CAROL M. HANSEN, Judge,
dissenting:
¶ 1 I must respectfully dissent from that part of the majority’s opinion which holds 85 O.S. § 11(B)(5) was applicable here. In my view, the Workers’ Compensation Court correctly found § 11(B)(5) inapplicable. That subsection was not the law at the definitive time here, that is, “the early to mid 1990’s”, the time the Workers’ Compensation Court found Claimant first became aware his injuries were employment related.
¶2 The majority’s rationale for holding § 11(B)(5) applicable, and imposing the sole burden of liability on CUST-O-FAB, is that [1] CUST-O-FAB was Claimant’s Employer during a period of more than ninety days when Claimant was last injuriously exposed, and [2] because cumulative trauma injuries are now governed by the date of the last trauma or hazardous exposure, rather than the “awareness doctrine”, citing Celestica, Inc., v. Hines, 2004 OK CIV APP 22, 86 P.3d 1095.
¶ 3 My reasoning for dissent is set out more fully in my dissents in Keco, Inc. v. Hayward, 2005 OK CIV APP 53, 123 P.3d 50 and Anderson Mechanical, Inc. v. Spiegel, 2005 OK CIV APP 60, 119 P.3d 1287, both cited by the majority. In summary, I believe Celestica, Inc. v. Hines is both distinguishable on the facts and based on a faulty premise. The date of the claimant’s awareness there was after the effective date of § 11(B)(5). Applying the awareness doctrine would not have changed the outcome under the facts in that case. Secondly, the Hines Court did not fully examine the impropriety of giving § 11(B)(5) retroactive effect.
¶ 4 It is well established in our Workers’ Compensation jurisprudence that the law in effect on the date of injury “forms a portion of the contract of employment and determines the substantive rights and obligations of the parties.” Cole v. Silverado Foods, Inc., 2003 OK 81, 78 P.3d 542. Section 11(B)(5) was inapplicable to determine liability here because it was not in effect in the 1990’s, when Claimant became aware of his work-related hearing loss and therefore the date of his injury.
¶ 5 The real question is whether retroactive application of § 11(B)(5) passes constitutional muster under the specific mandates of the Oklahoma Constitution. I believe it does not. In Cole v. Silverado Foods, 78 P.8d at 548, the Supreme Court stated:
The terms of Art. 5 § 54, Okl. Const., protect from legislative extinguishment by retroactive enactments “accrued” rights acquired or “proceedings begun” under a repealed or amended statute.
¶ 6 In King Manufacturing v. Meadows, 2005 OK 78, 127 P.3d 584, the Oklahoma Supreme Court recently reiterated its holding in Cole that the substantive rights and obligations of the parties are set at the time of injury. The Court held an award of permanent disability for a change in condition is governed by the statutory language in effect *839at the time of the initial injury and that 85 O.S. Supp.1995 § 22(7) could not be applied retroactively to affect the amount of recoverable compensation, a substantive right. Similarly, under the law then in effect, the rights and obligations of the parties were established at the time Claimant became aware of his employment related hearing loss. As the majority notes, at that time apportionment between successive employers was proper.
¶ 7 I would hold that § 11(B)(5) may not be applied where, as here, the claimant’s date of awareness predates the effective date of the statute. I would sustain the Workers’ Compensation Court’s order apportioning liability.