Court Opinion

ID: 9632362
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:11:57.337499+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:13.678609
License: Public Domain

RICHARD H. EDELMAN, Justice,
dissenting.
Anthony Randolph Ferrel appeals a conviction for aggravated assault on the grounds that the trial court erred by refusing his requests for jury instructions on self-defense, apparent danger, and the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor assault. For the following reasons, I would affirm.
Background
During an altercation, appellant struck the complainant in the mouth with a beer bottle. The complainant fell to the ground, hit his head on the floor, and died from the resulting injuries. Appellant was charged with aggravated assault, found guilty by a jury, and sentenced by the jury to six years confinement and a $2500 fíne.
Lesser-Included Offense Instruction
A defendant is entitled to a charge on a lesser-included offense if: (1) proof of the charged offense includes the proof required to establish the lesser-included offense; 1 and (2) there is some evidence in the record that if the defendant is guilty, he is guilty of only the lesser-included offense. See Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 403-04 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).
A person commits the offense of misdemeanor assault if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another. See Tex. Pen.Code Ann § 22.01(a)(1) (Vernon 1994). A person commits the offense of aggravated assault if he commits misdemeanor assault and either: (1) causes serious bodily injury to another, or (2) uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during commission of the assault. See id. § 22.02(a).
In this case, appellant’s indictment alleged that he both caused serious bodily injury to the complainant and that he did so by striking him with a deadly weapon, namely a bottle. Therefore, for appellant to have been entitled to an instruction on the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor assault, there must have been some evidence both that the complainant did not suffer a serious bodily injury (or, if he did, appellant did not cause it) and that appellant did not use or exhibit a deadly weapon *868because the existence of either would mean that appellant was not guilty of only the lesser offense.2

Unassigned Error

The majority opinion concludes that appellant was entitled to an instruction on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor assault, in part, because the evidence raised an issue whether striking the complainant with the bottle constituted the use of a deadly weapon. However, whether or not the evidence actually raised any such issue (which is also discussed below), the portion of appellant’s brief concerning the lesser included offense charge addresses only whether the complainant suffered a serious bodily injury and not whether hitting the complainant with a beer bottle constituted the use of a deadly weapon:

SECOND POINT OF ERROR (RESTATED)

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT APPELLANT’S REQUESTED CHARGE ON A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE, NAMELY MISDEMEANOR ASSAULT

BRIEF OF THE ARGUMENT UNDER THE SECOND POINT OF ERROR

The charge submitted to the jury included the following:
A person commits the offense of assault if he intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another.
A person commits the offense of aggravated assault if he commits assault, as defined above, and the person:
(1) caused serious bodily injury to another; or
(2) uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault.
Appellant timely and properly requested an issue on misdemeanor assault. The trial court denied the request.
A charge on a lesser included offense is required when there is evidence that the defendant, if guilty, is only guilty of the lesser offense. The jury charge defined both “bodily injury” and “serious bodily injury.” It is conceivable that the jury could have found Appellant guilty of only misdemeanor assault if they found that the victim, Mr. McManus, suffered only bodily injury and not serious bodily injury. The medical examiner’s testimony described injuries to the mouth suffered by Mr. McManus. While she testified that the base of the beer bottle can sometimes cause death or serious bodily injury, she testified she did not know that Mr. McManus had been hit in the mouth with a beer bottle. A defense expert testified that getting hit in the mouth with a beer bottle would not cause a “... significant head injury or lethal head injury.” [3] Thus, it is conceivable that the jury could have found Appellant guilty only [of] the lesser included offense of misdemeanor assault. Appellant properly preserved error by timely requesting the inclusion of misdemeanor assault in the charge. The trial court’s error was clearly harmful to Appellant. Appellant is entitled to a new trial.
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Although appellate courts must uphold trial courts’ decisions if they are correct under any theory of law applicable to the *869case,4 we may not reverse decisions under any applicable theory of the law, hut must confíne the grounds for reversal to those presented by the appellant. In this case, because appellant’s brief asserted only that there was evidence of no serious bodily injury and not that there was also evidence that appellant did not use or exhibit a deadly weapon, it failed to establish that appellant was entitled to a charge on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor assault. By reversing the trial court’s judgment on a ground it has constructed rather than one presented in appellant’s brief, the majority opinion has abandoned the court’s position of impartiality in this case.

Evidence of Guilt of Only the Lesser Offense

To find evidence that appellant was entitled to the lesser-included offense instruction, the majority opinion states:
The record shows appellant’s expert testified the complainant did not in fact suffer a serious bodily injury by the blow from the bottle. The expert opined complainant died as a result of hitting his head on the floor, his heavy alcohol consumption, and other factors. To the inquiry whether the bottle, in the manner of its use, was capable of causing serious bodily injury, the expert opined, “you cannot get enough force, and it’s in the wrong place to generate a significant head injury or lethal head injury.” Appellant too testified he did not intend to kill complainant or cause him serious injury and that he only hit complainant with the bottle to “get him away from me.”
Serious Injury and Causation
Appellant’s expert was a medical examiner who had reviewed the complainant’s autopsy report. When asked by defense counsel why he believed the complainant had not died as a result of the injuries to his mouth, the expert first stated his understanding that the complainant had been struck on the mouth with a beer bottle, then stated, “ You can’t get enough force, and it’s in the wrong place to generate a significant head injury or lethal head injury.”
It is undisputed in this case that the complainant suffered a serious injury when his head hit the floor after he was struck by the bottle and fell. On appeal, however, appellant and the majority opinion seek to confine the scope of the relevant injury to that suffered by the complainant solely from the immediate impact of the bottle, excluding that from striking his head on the floor.
Regardless whether conduct, such as an assault, causes a particular result, such as an injury, directly or indirectly, a person is nevertheless criminally responsible for the result if it would not have occurred but for his conduct, operating either alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the actor was clearly insufficient. See Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 6.04(a) (Vernon 1994). In this case, the jury charge did not include an instruction under section 6.04(a), and appellant does not assign error to any such omission. Thus, regardless whether being struck in the mouth with the bottle was a direct or only indirect cause of the injuries suffered when the complainant hit his head on the floor, the jury was not authorized to determine that appellant was not criminally responsible for those injuries under section 6.04(a). Therefore, we are not at liberty to reverse the conviction on the basis that the scope of the injury suffered for purposes of satisfying the aggravating element of the offense is limited to that sustained by the complainant solely from the immediate impact of the bottle and not that suffered from striking his head on the floor.
*870Deadly Weapon.
A “deadly weapon” includes “anything that in the manner of its [actual] use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.” See Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(B) (Vernon 1994). “Serious bodily injury” includes any injury that “causes ... serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(46). Combining these two definitions, a deadly weapon includes, among other things, any object that is capable of causing permanent disfigurement or loss or impairment of the function of any body part. Thus, for there to be evidence that the bottle in this case was not a deadly weapon, there must have been evidence that neither its actual nor intended use was capable of causing disfigurement or impairment.
As to intended use, appellant testified that he did not intend to kill or seriously injure the complainant. With regard to the actual use of the bottle, the majority opinion relies on the previously referenced testimony of appellant’s expert medical examiner that a blow to the mouth with a beer bottle lacks sufficient force and is in the wrong place to generate a lethal or significant head injury.
Although this testimony is some evidence that being struck with a beer bottle in the mouth cannot cause a fatal or serious head (ie., brain) injury, it does not address whether such a blow to the mouth could cause permanent disfigurement or impairment, such as in the form of a jaw or dental injury or facial disfigurement. In addition, the expert’s testimony does not address whether being struck with a beer bottle in another portion of the head could cause a fatal or sérious head injury. Although appellant’s blow with the bottle happened to strike the complainant in the mouth, such an altercation could have also resulted, even unintentionally, in striking the complainant in the temple, eye, other area of the head that could have produced a fatal or serious brain or eye injury. The fact that it did not happen to do so in this case is not evidence that the bottle, in the manner of its actual use, was not capable of producing a serious bodily injury or thus that the bottle was not used as a deadly weapon.5
Having failed to offer evidence either that the bottle was not used as a deadly weapon or that the complainant did not suffer a serious bodily injury from the assault, appellant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor assault. Therefore, his second point of error should be overruled.
Self-defense and Apparent Danger Instruction
Appellant’s first and third points of error contend that the trial court erred in refusing his request for a jury instruction on self-defense and apparent danger because the evidence raised fact questions on those issues.
A defendant is entitled to an instruction on any properly requested defensive issue raised by the evidence, regardless whether the evidence is weak or strong, unim-peached or contradicted, or credible or not credible. See Granger v. State, 3 S.W.3d 36, 38 (Tex.Crim.App.1999); Hamel v. State, 916 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). The defendant’s own testimony alone is sufficient to raise a defensive theory requiring a charge. See Hamel, 916 S.W.2d at 493.
A person is justified in using non-deadly force against another when and to the degree he reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful force. See Tex. Pen.Code Ann. *871§ 9.31 (Vernon Supp.2000). However, the use of force against another is not justified in response to verbal provocation alone. See id.
A person is justified in using deadly force against another if he would be justified in using force under Section 9.31, if a reasonable person in the actor’s situation would not have retreated, and to the degree he reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 9.32(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000). In order for a defendant to be entitled to an instruction on the use of deadly force, there must be some evidence to show that the defendant reasonably believed his use of deadly force was immediately necessary to protect himself against the use or attempted use of deadly force. See Dyson v. State, 672 S.W.2d 460, 463 (Tex.Crim.App.1984).6
Whether a defendant was actually attacked is immaterial; a person has a right to defend against apparent danger to the same extent as he would had the danger been real, provided that he acted upon a reasonable apprehension of danger as it appeared to him at the time. See Hamel, 916 S.W.2d at 493. Therefore, where evidence raises the issue of apparent danger, the court, in instructing the jury on the law of self-defense, should also instruct it that a person has a right to defend himself from apparent danger to the same extent as he would had the danger been real, provided that he acted upon a reasonable apprehension of danger as it appeared to him from his standpoint at the time. See Jones v. State, 544 S.W.2d 139, 142 (Tex. Crim.App.1976).
In this case, neither appellant nor the majority opinion contend that appellant was threatened with either real or apparent deadly force in this case.7 Rather, the majority concludes that appellant was entitled to an instruction on ordinary self-defense, i.e., using non-deadly force, because it determines that there was evidence that appellant didn’t use deadly force8 and thus did not need justification for the use of any deadly force. This conclusion is, in turn, based on the majority’s assessment, discussed in the preceding sections, that there was evidence that being struck in the mouth by the bottle could not and did not cause a fatal or serious head injury to the complainant. The ma*872jority thus concludes that appellant was entitled to instructions on the defenses of ordinary self-defense and apparent danger in the event that the jury would find him guilty of only misdemeanor assault pursuant to the lesser included offense instruction to which it determines that appellant was also entitled.
On the contrary, because appellant was not entitled to an instruction on misdemeanor assault, as discussed above, because ordinary self-defense and apparent danger are not defenses to aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and because there was no evidence that appellant was threatened by real or apparent deadly force, he was not entitled to instructions on self-defense or apparent danger. Therefore, appellant’s first and third points of error should be overruled, and the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

. It is undisputed in this case that misdemeanor assault is a lesser included offense of aggravated assault.

. Appellant’s brief does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to show either that he seriously injured the complainant or that he used a deadly weapon to do so, but only whether he was entitled to additional jury instructions

. Although in another context this statement could also support an argument that the bot-tie was not a deadly weapon, its context in appellant’s brief demonstrates that it is being asserted only to support the contention that the complainant did not suffer a serious bodily injury.

. See, e.g., Prystash v. State, 3 S.W.3d 522, 527 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). This is true even if the trial judge failed to give a reason or gave a wrong reason for the ruling. See id.

. Appellant’s expert made no assessment of the extent or magnitude of the injuries to the complainant’s mouth. Therefore, even if the relevant injury were confined to that solely resulting from the impact of the bottle, the expert provided no evidence that the complainant had not suffered serious injury in the form of disfigurement or impairment.

. See also Hamel v. State, 916 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where appellant was aware of the decedent’s violent history, decedent had a gun in his car and appellant used force only after decedent had made an attempt to approach his car); Riddle v. State, 888 S.W.2d 1, 6-7 (Tex.Crim. App.1994) (holding that instruction on use of deadly force was not required where there was no evidence that: decedent had attempted to assault appellant, appellant could not retreat, or that decedent was armed); Hayes v. State, 728 S.W.2d 804, 808 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) (holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where complainant was armed with a coke bottle).

. Testimony established that the complainant was intoxicated and had been obnoxious and loud during the evening. There was an exchange of words between appellant and the complainant. Appellant testified that the complainant was approaching him and, because of various obstacles, appellant was unable to retreat. As the complainant's friend approached them, appellant feared that both men were going to jump him. The complainant then stated, "why don’t we just take this outside.” Appellant responded, "no we don’t have to" and struck complainant with the bottle. Other than appellant’s claims that he felt frightened, there is no evidence to support a reasonable belief he was in immediate danger of a use of force or deadly force by the complainant. There is no evidence suggesting that complainant was armed or made any violent motions towards the appellant. Appellant testified that complainant did not raise his hands towards appellant. Nor is there evidence indicating that the complainant’s companion attempted to interject himself into the confrontation. If anything, complainant’s remark "let’s take this outside,” indicates that if complainant intended to hit appellant at all, it would not be inside the bar.

.Again, only the majority opinion, and not appellant’s brief, raises whether the use of the bottle made it a deadly weapon.