Court Opinion

ID: 9760182
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:42:25.783852+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:08.957668
License: Public Domain

CLARK, Judge,
concurring in result.
The majority opinion notes the absence of any reported Missouri cas^s confirming the authority of a trial court to condition the taking of a deposition at a distant location on advance payment of an opponent’s expenses. The opinion then proceeds to hold, by analogy to a comparable federal rule and cases applying and construing the rule, that Missouri courts have like authority. In my view, recourse to federal rules and decisions is unnecessary and may be counter-productive because, as in most situations of judicial discretion, the facts and circumstances of each case are paramount. The language of Rule 56.01(c) granting the trial court authority to enter protective orders in discovery matters for the purpose of guarding against undue burden or expense is sufficiently plain that judicial affirmance of the power in this case is unnecessary.
The sole issue in this or any other like case is whether the authority of the trial court has been abusively exercised. The determination of that question depends on the facts of the case, having in view the presumption of right action by the trial court and the burden upon the opponent to show otherwise. State ex rel. Eggers v. Enright, 609 S.W.2d 381, 382 (Mo.banc 1980); State ex rel. Thomasville Wood *418Products, Inc. v. Buford, 512 S.W.2d 220, 221 (Mo.App.1974).
As the majority opinion correctly notes, Vanderpool, the moving party in the cause, has alleged only that defendant judge has exceeded his authority by indicating his intention to order payment of expenses for attendance at depositions in Tulsa and Dallas. No record whatever has been provided upon which this court may review the discretionary action of the trial judge, much less interfere with his conduct of the case. It is therefore unnecessary to indulge here any discussion or debate upon the authority of trial judges generally to impose conditions under Rule 56.01(c) where evidentiary depositions are scheduled at locations removed from the point of trial. That discussion should await a case with an adequate factual record. The present case is more appropriately decided on the ground that Vanderpool has failed to carry its burden.1
The dissenting opinion would solve the factual hiatus by coming to the aid of Van-derpool and ordering a transcript of the proceedings before the trial court. Apart from the absence of precedent for this procedure in a case of an extraordinary remedy, the assumption that such a record exists or could be produced finds no support in the material now before this court. The trial judge’s docket sheet exhibited with the petition shows only the filing of the motion for protective order with suggestions, the appearance of respective counsel for argument and the court's finding based on the arguments and the record. Common experience is that arguments on motions of this type are seldom reported, much less transcribed, and even were we to have a record of the argument, such would be of dubious value in review of discretionary action.
In my opinion, this case should be ruled by order based on the failure of Vanderpool to demonstrate that the trial judge had exceeded his jurisdiction in entering the Rule 56.01(c) protective order. It is beyond the scope of this record to decide when and under what circumstances attendance expenses and fees may be ordered paid to an opponent before a deposition may be scheduled at a location removed from the situs of trial.
I concur in quashal of the preliminary rule but on this limited ground.

. In this connection, it is significant to note that counsel for Vanderpool failed to appear at oral argument and was thus unavailable to respond to inquiry as to briefing assertions that its prior suit on the same subject matter was dismissed on the eve of trial after deposition expenses had been fruitlessly incurred.