Court Opinion

ID: 9719234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:46:14.28283+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:05.363126
License: Public Domain

Hall, J.
(dissenting). While I agree with the dissenting opinions of Justices Eeancxs and Peoctoe, I would go further and hold the Eornicola lease to be void as did the Appellate Division. 65 N. J. Super. 104 (1961).
The majority appears to me to hold that a municipality like Asbury Park owning its beachfront and pavilions, stores and other buildings thereon, which are designed to remain in public ownership perpetually and to be rented for commercial operation continuously, may lease its properties in compliance with the applicable bidding statute, R. S. 40:61—36 et seq. in two ways. Eirst, it may specify the permissible use and invite bids for that purpose only. Considering the overall circumstances I see no legal objection to this method, provided the limitation is reasonable, consistent with a fair plan for proper development and use of the entire area in the highest public interest and the lease is, of course, awarded to the highest responsible bidder. Secondly, the majority says it is valid to advertise for open bids, as here, merely with the specification the use will be “suggested by the bidder, subject to the approval of City Council.” Implicit in the holding is that the governing body need not award the lease to the highest bidder for any use but only to the party naming the highest price for that offered use decided, after the bids are opened, to be the one which, will be accepted and exclusively permitted.
*18This conclusion, to me, affords the means of destroying the vitals of this court's prior decisions in the two cases of Asbury Park Press v. Gity of Asbury Park, 19 N. J. 183 (1955) and 23 N. J. 50 (1956). The first of these decisions held the legislative intent to require advertising for bids on uniform specifications and award to the highest bidder in the case of beachfront property, and the second, that municipal action in this regard must fairly comport with the purpose and spirit of the bidding laws. These conclusions are bottomed on the fundamental propositions that, where the Legislature so directs, municipalities may not deal with their real property as would a private owner, that favoritism and the possible image of favoritism are to be strictly safeguarded against and that the maximum revenue, consistent with the over-all public interest and purpose, shall be obtained. Entire good faith in a particular transaction affords no excuse to vary from the statutory mandate.
The method of bidding here sanctioned obviously does not conform to these principles, as the Appellate Division pointed out. I cannot conceive that the language in R. S. 40:61-37, permitting the governing body to specify “terms and conditions" of the leasing, was intended to allow the result here reached. The policy behind the strict legislation is a strong and salutary one. If it is thought not to be workable for practical business reasons, variation can only be permitted by the Legislature. Courts should not undertake to authorize departure from clear legislative policy and provisions.
I would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division.
For reversal—Chief Justice Weintraub, and Justices Jacobs, Schettino and Haneman—4.
For affirmance—Justices Erancis and Hall—2.
For modi'ficalio'nr—Justice Proctor—1.