Court Opinion

ID: 9567716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:57:05.968264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:20:31.467933
License: Public Domain

Hunt, Justice,
concurring.
I write separately because I disagree with the implication of the majority holding in Division 3 of the opinion. It implies that, based on Beaulieu of America v. L. T. Dennard &c., 253 Ga. 21 (315 SE2d 889) (1984), a trial court is unable to dispose of issues relating to equitable relief other than by a resolution of questions of fact. This arises because the reversal of summary judgment implies the existence of genuine fact issues. The question of whether to grant equitable relief, such as an injunction, is a matter to be resolved by the trial judge in the exercise of his or her discretion. Moreover, there are bars to the grant of equitable relief about which there may be no factual issue.
In Beaulieu, supra, the equitable defense was laches, and concerning its factual characteristics, this court said:
“ ‘. . . [Vjarious things are to be considered, notably the duration of the delay in asserting the claim, and the sufficiency of the excuse offered in extenuation thereof, whether during the delay the evidence of the matters in dispute had been lost or become obscure, whether plaintiff or defendant was in possession of the property in suit during the delay, whether the party charged with laches had an opportunity to have acted sooner, and whether the party charged with laches acted at the first possible opportunity. . . .’”
Laches is peculiarly a factual defense, the resolution of which will rest in the sound discretion of the trial judge. . . .
The bar asserted against the claim for equitable relief in this case, unlike Beaulieu, is not laches, but the availability of an adequate legal remedy. Following our resolution of City of Atlanta v. J. A. Jones Constr. Co., 260 Ga. 658 (398 SE2d 369) (1990), no fact issue remains as to what the legal remedy is. It is the return to the unsuc*699cessful and wronged bidder of its costs connected with the preparation of its bid. Likewise, there is no fact issue in this case concerning what the bidder seeks by way of equitable relief. To decide whether the legal remedy is indeed adequate is certainly a discretionary function to be exercised by the trial judge. It is not, however, a fact-finding function (or “substance”-finding!) as is suggested by the reversal of summary judgment in this division. Because the trial court did not have the benefit of the holding in the Jones case at the time it ruled, remand is necessary.10
Decided December 5, 1990 —
Reconsideration denied December 20, 1990.
Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, Charles T. Lester, Jr., Richard L. Robbins, William R. Wildman, for appellant.
Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Lawson & Dauis, G. Thomas Davis, King & Spalding, William A. Clineburg, Jr., Michael Eric Ross, for appellees.
Dow, Lohnes & Albertson, Terrence B. Adamson, Peter C. Can-field, Carolyn Y. Forrest, amici curiae.

 Assume this issue returns to us following the trial court’s decision on remand. Will we be confined to a consideration of whether the trial court abused its discretion or can we decide the remedy is either adequate or inadequate “as a matter of law?” I doubt we would be precluded from the latter.