Court Opinion

ID: 9681149
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:44:36.708562+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:21.113027
License: Public Domain

Tom Glaze, Justice, dissenting in part; concurring in part. I agree with the majority court that this court is mandated to affirm the dismissal of the appellant’s case, but I am firmly convinced this court should change its speedy trial rule so future criminal charges cannot be dismissed unless a defendant, at the very least, requests a trial and can show some prejudice. In this respect, I fully agree with Justice Hickman, and indeed, joined his dissent addressing this issue in Asher v. State, 300 Ark. 57, 776 S.W.2d 816 (1989). Justice Hickman’s dissent in Asher states my views, so I need not reiterate them here. Suffice it to say, this court, in adopting its Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1976, simply went too far (or perhaps failed to go far enough) when it promulgated a speedy trial rule that omitted reference to two of four factors the Supreme Court said were necessary when considering whether a defendant has been denied a speedy trial. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). Those two factors were that a defendant must assert his right to a speedy trial and be prejudiced by having been denied one. I join with the majority here because the speedy trial standard and this court’s cases interpreting it have been in place for thirteen years, and defendants, trial bench and the bar should be apprised if this court intends to change its view on this important subject. Aside from when changes in Rule 28 should take effect, when we abolished Criminal Procedure Rule 37 and its post-conviction remedies, we allowed persons convicted and sentenced during Rule 37’s existence to proceed under that Rule. To do so merely recognizes an accused’s right to rely on the Rule and case precedents interpreting it until that law was abolished. See Whitmore v. State, 299 Ark. 55, 771 S.W.2d 266 (1989). The same situation exists here. If the court chose to modify its Speedy Trial Rule, A.R.Cr.P. Rule 28, the defendants (including the. appellant here), who have relied on Rule 28 as it was previously worded, would be entitled to its benefits. In conclusion, it is my opinion that common sense and logic warrant a change in our Speedy Trial Rule, and one’s sense of justice — when considering the rights of both the accused and the people of this state — demands it. For these and the other reasons given in Justice Hickman’s dissent in Asher, my stance in future cases will be that a defendant must assert his speedy trial right and show prejudice before his or her case can be dismissed. My hope is that my colleagues, who do not now agree to changing Rule 28 at this time, will reconsider and change their views in the near future. In the present case, I would add that appellant’s counsel informed the deputy prosecutor in this case that counsel was ready to go forward with the trial, as scheduled, on November 4, 1988.1 At least, in this case, the defendant did appear to pursue his right to a speedy trial, but was denied it. For whatever reason not made clear in the record in this appeal, the deputy prosecutor misrepresented to the trial judge that the defendant’s counsel joined in a continuance of the November 4, 1988, trial. In addition, the deputy prosecutor apparently made no effort to obtain a continuance on other grounds. In any event, whatever delay that occurred in this case seems attributable solely to the state and not the defendant. Defendant asserted his right to trial and failed to receive it. The trial court’s decision must be affirmed.2  Hays and Glaze, JJ., join in the dissent. Law Offices Compton, Preweit, Thomas & Hickey, P. A. P.O. DRAWER 1917 423 NORTH WASHINGTON El Dorado, Arkansas 71731 (501)862-3478 Robert C. Compton Wm.I.Prewett Floyd M. Thomas Jr. JcsethHickey October 28, 1988 CarolCraftov Anthony Cathlezn V. Compton H.Y. Rowe-ofcounsix Jerri L. Agertos-paralegai Telecopier No. (501) 162.7228 HAND DELIVERED John Lightfoot Prosecuting Attorney's Office Union County Courthouse El Dorado, Arkansas 71730 Re: State of Arkansas v. Gary D. Tipton Union Circuit No. CR-88-9 John: I have your letter of October 27 with the proposed Motion for Continuance. John, I cannot join with you in this Motion at this time. First, in my ongoing trial in Judge Harris' United States District Court, all parties are now contemplating that the matter will be submitted to the jury by Thursday, November 3. Of course, this might not happen. However, X would then be able to try this case on Friday, November 4, as presently scheduled. Also, I have great problems with the week of Monday, November 14. I have rescheduled complex CPA discovery depositions for Tuesday and Wednesday, November 15 and 16, and it would be extremely difficult to reschedule these depositions again. Since we last talked, I have had depositions scheduled in a medical malpractice case, now scheduled for trial in Conway in December, for Thursday, November 17. Also, since we last talked, I have had a hearing set in the United States District Court for Friday, November 18. I am not unmindful that it might very well be to the advantage of my client for Dr. Bennett Preston not to appear and testify. [[Image here]] Compton. Prewett, Thomas & Hickey, Pía. Mr. John Lightfoot October 28, 1988 Page 2 Also, when we last talked, you indicated that the State might entertain a plea agreement other than the previous offer. Taking all of the facts and circumstances of this case into consideration, and particularly because of the evidence that will be presented against my client (this type plea has a name arising from some particular case but I can’t remember it), Mr. Tipton would agree to enter a plea to manslaughter with a sentence of five years probation. Due to the time element, I am causing this letter to be hand delivered and I believe that I will be out of Court early this afternoon in the event that you wish to talk further about this matter. Take care. [[Image here]] RCC/kr pc: Gary D. Tipton   Counsel’s letter, which sets out the events and counsel’s communication with the deputy prosecutor is attached.    The majority court dismisses this appeal without discussing the merits of the speedy trial issues. I differ with the court. I would resolve the arguments in the appeal but affirm the lower court based upon the reasons stated in my opinion.