Court Opinion

ID: 9396242
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-19 21:03:03.705507+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:15.427262
License: Public Domain

Rel: May 19, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

         SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
                             OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023

                                _________________________

                                      SC-2022-1061
                                _________________________

                         Ex parte MUSA Properties, LLC

                    PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

                            (In re: R.K. Allen Oil Co., Inc.

                                                  v.

                                MUSA Properties, LLC)

                    (Calhoun Circuit Court, CV-22-900138)

MENDHEIM, Justice.
SC-2022-1061

     MUSA Properties, LLC ("MUSA"), and R.K. Allen Oil Co., Inc.

("Allen Oil"), entered into a real-estate sales contract ("the sales

contract") in which MUSA agreed to purchase from Allen Oil a gasoline

service station and convenience store ("the property"). The terms of the

sales contract were not fulfilled, and the property was not transferred to

MUSA. Allen Oil filed a lawsuit in the Calhoun Circuit Court ("the

circuit court") against MUSA, alleging various causes of action based on

the sales contract; MUSA filed various counterclaims in response. MUSA

also filed in the Calhoun Probate Court ("the probate court") a notice of

lis pendens describing the property. In an interlocutory order, the circuit

court later determined that MUSA did not have a right to or interest in

the property, and, upon the motion of Allen Oil, the circuit court entered

an order expunging the lis pendens notice. MUSA now petitions this

Court for a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to vacate its

order expunging the lis pendens notice. We grant the petition and issue

the writ.

                      Facts and Procedural History

     Pursuant to the terms of the sales contract, MUSA agreed to

purchase the property from Allen Oil for $1,250,000 and to close on the

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sale on May 31, 2021; $50,000 of the purchase price was to be deposited

with the closing attorney as earnest money upon execution of the sales

contract, with the remainder of the purchase price due upon closing. The

sales contract includes the following relevant provisions:

           "[MUSA] shall be responsible for obtaining a title
     examination, survey of the property and purchasing title
     insurance, if desired. The cost of survey shall be paid by
     [MUSA]. If there are objections to title, environmental
     problems or defects in the improvements same will be
     communicated to [Allen Oil] promptly upon discovery. [Allen
     Oil] shall have at least thirty (30) days to cure said defects,
     but no more than sixty (60) days. The terms of this agreement
     shall be extended, if necessary, to accommodate this period of
     correction. This contract is contingent upon a satisfactory
     survey, environmental inspection and building inspection. In
     the event title defects or other problems cannot be cured, all
     earnest money shall be refunded to [MUSA] and this
     agreement shall become null and void. [MUSA] shall have the
     right to access the property to inspect it, but such inspection
     shall not change the purchase price.

           "….

           " This contract is contingent upon the following:

         "1. [MUSA's] satisfaction with the results of a title
     examination and survey.

          "2. [MUSA's] satisfaction with the results of any and all
     environmental inspections including but not limited to
     geological surveys, groundwater sampling, Phase I and
     Phase II environmental site assessments, etc.

           "….
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           "In the event [MUSA] fails to carry out and to perform
     the terms of this agreement, any funds paid by [MUSA] to
     [Allen Oil] shall be forfeited as liquidated damages at the
     option of [Allen Oil] (provided [Allen Oil] agrees to the
     cancellation of this contract). In the event [Allen Oil] fails to
     carry out and to perform the terms of this agreement or fails
     to cure any title defects within a reasonable time, [MUSA]
     may avail itself of one of the following remedies: (1) [MUSA]
     will receive a refund of earnest money plus reimbursement for
     any sums expended by [MUSA] in conjunction with this
     transaction including but not limited to expenses for title
     examination, attorney's fees, appraisal, credit reports, survey,
     environmental studies, etc. Upon payment by [Allen Oil] of
     such expenses, the contract will become void; or (2) [MUSA]
     may elect to proceed with specific performance."

The parties also entered into a lease agreement "in order to allow [MUSA]

to take possession of the [property], operate the business located thereon,

and to otherwise prepare for the purchase of [the property]."

     Subsequently, MUSA hired Karst Environmental to conduct a

"Phase II Environmental Site Assessment" of the property "to determine

whether the historical operation of the underground storage tanks

(gasoline and diesel) on the … property has adversely impacted the soil

and groundwater onsite."         Karst Environmental conducted its

assessment on April 21, 2021, and produced a report on April 30, 2021,

summarizing the findings of its assessment ("the report"). The report

noted that "[t]here is one previous petroleum incident reported for [the
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property] in the regulatory agency database. That incident, UST96-11-

05, was resolved with a No Further Action (NFA) in April, 1995. The

report stated, in pertinent part, as follows (there are some terms and

abbreviations used in the report that are not defined by the report):

            "The findings of this Phase II Environmental Site
     Assessment conclude that, 1) BTEX, MTBE, and Naphthalene
     concentrations in the soils exceeded the [Alabama
     Department of Environmental Management ('ADEM')] Initial
     Screening Limits, 2) BTEX, MTBE, and Naphthalene
     concentrations in the groundwater exceeded the ADEM
     Initial Screening Limit, 3) No liquid phase hydrocarbons
     (LPHs) were identified in either the soils or groundwater, and
     4) if current compliance is maintained, the facility is eligible
     for participation through the [Alabama Tank Trust Fund] (in
     the event of a future petroleum release).

          "The findings of this investigation should be discussed
     with … Allen Oil …. The release should be reported to the
     ADEM in a timely manner by forwarding this report to the
     ADEM Corrective Action Unit for review. The ADEM office in
     Montgomery, Alabama will determine whether further
     investigation will be required under the Alabama Tank Trust
     Fund …."

     On May 4, 2021, the report was submitted to the Alabama

Department of Environmental Management ("ADEM") for review. After

reviewing the report, ADEM sent a letter to Allen Oil on May 11, 2021,

stating that,

     "[b]ased on the previous release incident UST96-11-05 and
     the submitted report, [ADEM] has determined that no further
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     investigative or corrective actions will be required for [the
     property] at this time. [ADEM] is not making a determination
     as to contamination which may or may not exist at [the
     property] and will review any additional information that
     may warrant further consideration should it become
     available."

(Emphasis in original.)

     After receiving the report and ADEM's May 11, 2021, letter,

MUSA's trial attorney, Drew Senter, and Allen Oil's trial attorney,

Charles Gaines, communicated through emails and letters concerning

the sales contract and whether to proceed with the sale of the property.

On May 21, 2021, Senter sent Gaines the following email:

           "I suspect by now you have seen the … report and letter
     from ADEM. We seem to be at an impasse. The … report
     shows significant contamination. Our environmental folks
     believe that the contamination is active and have warned us
     about taking the property without a clean-up. In a first for me,
     ADEM has issued a very weak letter stating that 'no
     corrective action is required at this time.' They do state,
     however, that they are making no opinions about
     contamination at the site and will review additional
     information.

           "That letter provides us with no comfort, especially in
     light of the warnings from our environmental experts.

            "[MUSA] cannot buy the property without some
     remedial action. [Is Allen Oil] willing to go back to ADEM to
     see if we can get them to take a more serious look and require
     remediation in accordance with their plan? I know this all
     sounds counterintuitive for [Allen Oil], but [MUSA] is not in
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     a position to request any more from ADEM on a property
     [MUSA] does not own. If we cannot get the contamination
     cleaned in accordance with an ADEM remediation plan, I do
     not think [MUSA] will be able to go forward with the
     purchase."

     In response, on June 15, 2021, Gaines sent the following letter to

Senter:

           "I fear we may have a problem between our clients.
     [Allen Oil] has consulted an attorney/expert who specializes
     in the gasoline and motor fuel industry. He has advised that
     anyone who is in the industry for any length of time knows a
     no further action (NFA) letter from ADEM is its 'blessing' that
     no further investigative or remedial action on a site need be
     done. Even if remedial work is performed ADEM never issues
     a letter saying the property is 'clean' but instead, gets an NFA
     even after cleanup has been completed. Since that is the
     industry standard [Allen Oil] takes the position remedial
     action is not warranted or necessary and even if it did take
     place, it would only receive another NFA letter from ADEM.

           "In light of that we would like to move forward with the
     sale and I would like to discuss this with you further."

(Emphasis in original.)

     On June 21, 2021, Senter sent Gaines the following email: "Since

Allen Oil will not agree to clean up the property, [MUSA] must terminate

the [sales] contract and demand a release of its earnest money. [MUSA]

will also be vacating the [property] on the first day [it is] permitted to

under the lease." (Emphasis in original.)

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     At some point thereafter, Sameer Mousa, the president of MUSA,

apparently offered to purchase the property in "as is" condition if Allen

Oil would agree to a reduction in the price of $100,000. On October 11,

2021, Gaines sent Senter the following letter:

           "Mr. M[o]usa recently contacted [Allen Oil] and told
     them [MUSA] would close on the purchase of the property if
     [Allen Oil] would reduce the price by $100,000. That proposal
     certainly negates [MUSA's] excuse for termination of the
     [sales] contract which [Allen Oil] didn't think was legitimate
     anyway in light of what had been received from ADEM.

          "I have been instructed to proceed with filing a
     complaint for specific performance as I believe we can now
     show there was no legitimate basis for the termination notice.
     …

          "Please discuss this situation with [MUSA] and see if
     [MUSA] will reconsider [its] position. If not, [Allen Oil is]
     going to proceed with filing the complaint later this month. I
     would like to avoid doing so if possible and that is why I am
     reaching out to you at this time."

     On April 5, 2022, Allen Oil sued MUSA for specific performance of

the sales contract. The complaint states, in pertinent part:

           "11. In terminating the [sales] contract, [MUSA] stated
     that it was terminating the [sales] contract 'since Allen Oil
     will not agree to clean up the property.' Said excuse was a
     pretext for the purpose of trying to obtain a reduction in the
     purchase price as [MUSA] subsequently stated that [it] would
     close on the purchase for an offset of One Hundred Thousand
     Dollars and Zero Cents ($100,000.00).

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          "12. [Allen Oil] has fully performed its obligations under
     the sales contract and contends [MUSA's] refusal is
     unjustified and without any legitimate basis for doing so.

          "13. [Allen Oil] is ready, willing and able to [perform]
     under said contract.

           "WHEREFORE, [Allen Oil] request[s] that this
     honorable [court] enter an[] order for Specific Performance
     ordering [MUSA] … to specifically perform … [its] duties
     under the [sales] contract, pay damages, and grant such other
     relied as the court deems just and proper."

     On April 8, 2022, MUSA filed an answer to Allen Oil's complaint

and also asserted various counterclaims against Allen Oil. MUSA

asserted a declaratory-judgment counterclaim requesting that the circuit

court enter a judgment declaring the parties' rights under the sales

contract. Specifically, MUSA requested a judgment declaring that it had

the right to cancel the sales contract and that its right to cancel the sales

contract was "contingent, inter alia, on its satisfaction with the results of

a Phase II environmental site assessment." MUSA stated in its

counterclaim that it "elected not to proceed with concluding the sales

[contract]" and that "counsel for MUSA communicated to counsel for …

Allen [Oil] that MUSA was dissatisfied with the contents of the … report

and would not move forward with the purchase." MUSA also asserted

counterclaims alleging breach of the sales contract and seeking specific
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performance of the sales contract. Although MUSA did not plead its

breach-of-contract or specific-performance counterclaims with much

specificity, MUSA did state that Allen Oil "committed a default under the

terms of the sales [contract] by refusing to cure the contamination" noted

in the report. MUSA alleged that, as a result of Allen Oil's alleged breach

of the sales contract, MUSA is entitled to receive "reimbursement for any

sums expended by MUSA including but not limited to expenses for title

examination,    attorney's   fees,   appraisal,   credit   reports,   survey,

environmental studies, etc."

     Also on April 8, 2022, pursuant to § 35-4-131, Ala. Code 1975,

MUSA filed in the probate court a lis pendens notice describing the

property. MUSA stated that it "claims a right, title, interest or claim in

and to the … property." The probate court recorded the lis pendens notice

on the same day.

     On May 31, 2022, Allen Oil filed an amended complaint in which it

"specifically waive[d] and withdr[e]w[] its claim for 'specific performance'

…." Instead, Allen Oil asserted a breach-of-contract claim against MUSA

based on MUSA's failure to perform under the sales contract and

requested compensatory damages for "loss of sales, loss of income, and

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any other form of damage recoverable for the breach of the [sales]

contract …."

     On November 16, 2022, Allen Oil filed a "motion for summary

judgment, or in the alternative partial summary judgment …." In its

summary-judgment motion, Allen Oil argued that MUSA, in the June 21,

2021, email that Senter sent to Gaines, repudiated the sales contract. As

a result, Allen Oil argues, it was discharged from its duty to perform

under the sales contract and, thus, MUSA cannot prevail on any of its

counterclaims. On December 12, 2022, MUSA filed a response to Allen

Oil's summary-judgment motion. Among other things, MUSA argued

that Allen Oil, and not MUSA, repudiated the sales contract.

     On December 14, 2022, Allen Oil filed in the circuit court a motion

to expunge the lis pendens notice filed by MUSA in the probate court.

Allen Oil stated in its motion that it "is in active negotiations with a third

party to purchase the … property that is the subject of this litigation."

Allen Oil argued that MUSA cannot have a right to or interest in the

property based on MUSA's alleged repudiation of the sales contract.

Accordingly, Allen Oil requested that the circuit court enter an order

expunging the lis pendens notice filed by MUSA and allow Allen Oil to

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proceed with the sale of the property to the third party. On the same day,

MUSA filed a response to Allen Oil's motion to expunge the lis pendens

notice. MUSA argued that it holds equitable title to the property based

on its execution of the sales contract and, thus, is entitled to the lis

pendens notice throughout the pendency of this litigation.

     On December 20, 2022, the circuit court entered an order granting

Allen Oil's motion for a partial summary judgment. The circuit court

concluded that Senter's June 21, 2021, email to Gaines "specifically

terminated" the sales contract. The circuit court stated:

           "In sum, [MUSA's] breach of contract claim against
     [Allen Oil] has no merit because [MUSA], by its own
     admission, repudiated the contract. Likewise, since [MUSA]
     repudiated the sales contract, it cannot seek specific
     performance of the sale of the subject real property since
     specific performance cannot be enforced in favor of a party
     who has not fully and fairly performed all the conditions
     precedent on his part to the obligation of the other party.
     Stated another way, [MUSA] cannot maintain a claim to the
     subject real property under the terms of a contract that it has
     expressly repudiated."

As a result, the circuit court concluded:

           "1. [Allen Oil's] motion for partial summary judgment as
     to [MUSA's] breach of contract claim is hereby GRANTED;
     said breach of contract claim is hereby dismissed.

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           "2. [Allen Oil's] motion for partial summary judgment as
     to [MUSA's] specific performance claim is hereby GRANTED,
     said specific performance claim is hereby dismissed.

         "3. [Allen Oil's] motion for summary judgment as to
     [MUSA's] counterclaim for declaratory judgment is hereby
     DENIED."

The circuit court further stated that "the breach of contract claim

plead[ed] by [Allen Oil] as to damages suffered as a result of [MUSA's]

alleged breach of contract and [MUSA's] counterclaim for declaratory

judgment regarding the same remain[] in dispute between the parties."

     Also on December 20, 2022, the circuit court entered an order

granting Allen Oil's motion to expunge the lis pendens notice filed by

MUSA. The circuit court noted that, based on its order granting Allen

Oil's motion for a partial summary judgment, MUSA's only counterclaim

remaining against Allen Oil is its counterclaim requesting a declaratory

judgment as to the parties' rights under the sales contract. The circuit

court defined MUSA's declaratory-judgment counterclaim as requesting

whether MUSA "was within its rights to cancel the sales [contract]

because of its dissatisfaction with the … report …." As a result, the circuit

court stated that "[t]he declaratory judgment claim of [MUSA] is not

claiming 'a right, title, interest or claim in and to' the … property that is

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subject to this circuit court action" and, thus, expunged the lis pendens

notice. (Emphasis in original.)

     MUSA then petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing

the circuit court to vacate its December 20, 2022, order expunging the

lis pendens notice.

                            Standard of Review

                   " 'Mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary
             writ, to be issued only where there is (1) a clear
             legal right in the petitioner to the order sought;
             (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to
             perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the
             lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly
             invoked jurisdiction of the court.'

     "Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d 497, 499 (Ala. 1995)."

Ex parte State Dep't of Revenue, 886 So. 2d 817, 820 (Ala. Civ. App.

2003).

                                  Discussion

     The only issue properly raised in MUSA's mandamus petition is

whether the circuit court erred in expunging the lis pendens notice filed

by MUSA.1 A recitation of the principles underlying Alabama's doctrine

     1This Court has previously considered the propriety of a lis pendens
notice on mandamus review. See Ex parte Wallace & Wallace Chem. &
Oil Corp., 417 So. 2d 940, 944 (Ala. 1982) (conditionally granting the
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of lis pendens is helpful in analyzing the issue before us. Generally, "[t]he

doctrine of lis pendens is for the purpose of preserving the property

involved in the suit …." Willis v. Lewis, 25 Ala. App. 369, 370, 148 So.

330, 331 (1933). In Alabama, the majority of the common-law doctrine of

lis pendens applies, with one significant statutory change, as explained

in Jesse Evans's treatise on property law:

            "Under the common-law doctrine of lis pendens, the
     filing of an action respecting a right, title, interest in or claim
     to property placed the property in custodia legis, or in the
     custody of the court in which the action was commenced.
     Nothing else was required to be done to give notice of the
     pendency of the action other than the commencement of the
     action. … Under Alabama decisions, two things were required
     in order for the doctrine to have effect: the litigation must
     have been about specific property, and the property must be
     so pointed out in the proceedings as to warn the world of the
     pending litigation.

           "Once the action was filed the property became in
     custodia legis, purchasers pendente lite were bound by the
     result of the litigation as it affected the property, though they
     might never have been joined as parties to the action or have
     known of the existence of the litigation. This principle

petitioner's "application for writ of prohibition, or in the alternative, writ
of mandamus" seeking to have the at-issue lis pendens notice stricken
and determining that "there was simply no jurisdictional basis for [the
trial court's] order to the clerk to direct the Probate Judge to file a notice
of lis pendens"); see also Ex parte State Dep't of Revenue, 886 So. 2d 817,
823 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (in which the Court of Civil Appeals denied a
petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the striking of certain names
from a lis pendens notice).
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     operated not only during the pendency of the action but
     afterwards as well, that is, the result of the litigation bound
     subsequent purchasers.

           "The statutory doctrine of lis pendens, as it presently
     exists in Alabama, differs from the common-law doctrine only
     with respect to the requirement of the filing in the office of the
     judge of probate of a pendency of the action. The enactment of
     the lis pendens statute has been said to have substituted the
     statutory constructive notice requirements for the common-
     law doctrine, that is, the common-law doctrine remains in full
     force and effect, but only if the notice and filing requirements
     set out in the statute are complied with."

1 Jesse P. Evans III, Alabama Property Rights and Remedies § 5.13 (5th

ed. 2012) (footnotes omitted).

     Alabama's lis pendens statutes were originally adopted in 1915 and

are currently codified at § 35-4-130 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. This Court

has stated that

     "[t]he manifest purpose of the statute was to provide a means
     whereby one desiring to purchase land may ascertain if there
     is any pending suit which affects the title by examining the
     lis pendens record; that is, substitution of constructive notice
     rather than the rule of the common law as to pending suits."

Lee v. Macon Cnty. Bank, 233 Ala. 522, 528, 172 So. 662, 669 (1937). See

also Scott v. Hales, 575 So. 2d 1058, 1060 (Ala. 1991) ("The sole purpose

of a lis pendens notice is to afford notice to a bona fide purchaser who

might purchase the property during the pendency of the action."). This

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Court has also stated that "the doctrine of lis pendens is based on

considerations of public policy and convenience, which forbid a litigant to

give rights to others, pending the litigation, so as to affect the proceedings

of the court then progressing to enforce those rights." Reed v. Skeen, 591

So. 2d 51, 52 (Ala. 1991).

     Section 35-4-131(a), Ala. Code 1975, requires the filing of a

lis pendens notice and states:

     "When any civil action or proceeding shall be brought in any
     court to enforce any lien upon, right to or interest in, or to
     recover any land, or where an application has been made to
     the probate judge of any county for an order of condemnation
     of land, or any interest therein, the person, corporation, or
     governmental body commencing such action or proceeding or
     making such application shall file with the judge of probate of
     each county where the land or any part thereof is situated a
     notice containing the names of all of the parties to the action
     or proceeding, or the persons named as those having an
     interest in the land in the application for an order of
     condemnation, a description of the real estate and a brief
     statement of the nature of the lien, writ, application, or action
     sought to be enforced. The judge of probate shall immediately
     file and record the notice in the lis pendens record and note
     on it and in the record the hour and date of the filing and the
     place and date of recording."

Section 35-4-135, Ala. Code 1975, states that,

           "[i]f the notice required by [§] 35-4-131 … shall not be
     entered in the lis pendens record, the action, proceeding, or
     application shall not affect the rights of a bona fide purchaser,
     lessee, or mortgagee of any interest in such land or any person
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     then or thereafter asserting a lien against such land unless he
     or they have actual notice of the action, proceeding, levy, or
     application."

These statutes, being in derogation of the common law, must be strictly

construed. Stephens v. Huie, 37 So. 3d 776, 779 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009).

     Of course, a lis pendens notice need not last forever. In fact, this

Court has stated that "[t]he doctrine of lis pendens … is based upon the

necessity that there be an end of litigation." Willis, 25 Ala. App. at 370,

148 So. at 331. This Court, relying upon Evans's treatise, has stated that

          " '[g]enerally, the doctrine of lis pendens commences
     with the filing of an action and the contemporaneous
     recordation of a notice of lis pendens, and continues for the
     duration of the litigation until it is terminated by judgment
     and the expiration of any appropriate period for appeal, or
     appellate determination, if an appeal is taken.' "

Walden v. Hutchinson, 987 So. 2d 1109, 1121 (Ala. 2007) (quoting Jesse

P. Evans III, Alabama Property Rights and Remedies § 5.18 (3d ed.

2004)).

     With these principles in mind, we now turn to the facts and

arguments in the case at hand. As set forth above, MUSA and Allen Oil

entered into the sales contract, which, among other things, required

MUSA to pay to Allen Oil $1,250,000 in exchange for Allen Oil's

conveying the property to MUSA. Neither of those things occurred. As a
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result, Allen Oil sued MUSA for specific performance, requesting that the

circuit court require MUSA to perform on the sales contract. MUSA, in

turn, filed a counterclaim for specific performance, requesting that the

circuit court require Allen Oil to perform on the sales contract. As stated

in Ex parte State Department of Revenue, "[§] 35-4-131(a) requires a

notice of lis pendens to be filed with the probate judge in the county where

the real property lies in civil actions seeking 'to enforce any lien upon,

right to or interest in, or to recover any land' …." 886 So. 2d at 820. In

the present case, a civil action was commenced in which both parties

sought to enforce a "right to or interest in" the property. 2 § 35-4-131(a).

Accordingly, pursuant to § 35-4-131(a), a lis pendens notice was required

to be filed with the probate court, which MUSA did upon filing its

counterclaim against Allen Oil.     It appears that MUSA met all the

requirements of § 35-4-131(a) in drafting its lis pendens notice (there is

     2Allen   Oil later dismissed its specific-performance claim and
asserted a breach-of-contract claim seeking only money damages, see
Stephens v. Huie, 37 So. 3d 776, 779 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) ("The doctrine
of lis pendens has no application when the action involved seeks the
recovery of a money judgment. McCollum v. Burton, 220 Ala. 629, 127 So.
224 (1930) …."), but the fact remains that, at the outset of this
proceeding, both parties sought to enforce a right to or interest in the
property and MUSA has maintained its specific-performance claim, even
if Allen Oil has abandoned its own.
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no argument otherwise), and the probate court recorded the filed lis

pendens notice on April 8, 2022. The lis pendens notice was valid, and

the doctrine of lis pendens applies in this case. In other words, with the

commencement of the underlying action and the filing of the lis pendens

notice, the property was placed in the custody of the circuit court and

anyone who purchases the property during the course of this litigation

will be bound by the result of the litigation, including any disposition on

appeal, as it affects the property.

     The circuit court, however, expunged the lis pendens notice before

the conclusion of the litigation, thereby essentially removing the property

from the custody of the circuit court and allowing any future purchasers

to take the property free of the results of the current litigation. In its

order expunging the lis pendens notice, the circuit court reasoned that,

in its declaratory-judgment claim, MUSA "is not claiming 'a right, title,

interest or claim in and to' the … property that is subject to this …

action." (Emphasis omitted.) The circuit court further reasoned that it

had "previously entered an order granting [Allen Oil's] motion for partial

summary judgment that dismisses [MUSA's] claims of breach of contract

and specific performance that directly relate to the … property.

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Accordingly, [MUSA] does not have 'a right, title, interest or claim in and

to' the … property." (Emphasis omitted.) The circuit court concluded

that, because it had entered an interlocutory, partial summary judgment

in favor of Allen Oil disposing of MUSA's counterclaims for breach of

contract and specific performance -- a claim which clearly seeks to enforce

a right to or interest in the property -- there is no longer a need to hold

the property in its custody and to provide notice of the litigation to future

purchasers, essentially allowing a purchaser of the property to take the

property free of the results of this litigation during its pendency. We

disagree.

     As noted above, "the doctrine of lis pendens is based on

considerations of public policy and convenience, which forbid a litigant to

give rights to others, pending the litigation, so as to affect the proceedings

of the court then progressing to enforce those rights." Reed, 591 So. 2d

at 52. In filing its motion to have the lis pendens notice expunged, Allen

Oil stated that it "is in active negotiations with a third party to purchase

the … property that is the subject of this litigation." In other words, Allen

Oil is attempting "to give rights to others, pending the litigation." Id. By

expunging the lis pendens notice, it appears that the circuit court intends

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to allow that sale to go through. The problem, of course, is that MUSA

may appeal the circuit court's partial-summary-judgment order in favor

of Allen Oil once there is a final, appealable judgment entered in the case

below.   The circuit court may have concluded that MUSA's specific-

performance counterclaim has no merit, but that determination has not

yet been presented to this Court for review, and we cannot now consider

the circuit court's partial summary judgment in favor of Allen Oil on

mandamus review because an adequate remedy exists by way of appeal.

See Ex parte Griffin, 4 So. 3d 430, 435 (Ala. 2008). Until this litigation

" 'is terminated by judgment and the expiration of any appropriate period

for appeal, or appellate determination, if an appeal is taken,' " the

lis pendens notice must remain in effect. Walden, 987 So. 2d at 1121

(emphasis omitted). To conclude otherwise would subvert the purpose of

the doctrine of lis pendens. Therefore, we conclude that the circuit court

erred in granting Allen Oil's motion to expunge the lis pendens notice.

     We note that Allen Oil makes extensive argument concerning

whether MUSA repudiated the sales contract.          Allen Oil takes the

position that MUSA did not have a right to or interest in the property to

enforce because MUSA repudiated the sales contract. It follows, Allen

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Oil argues, that, if MUSA does not have a right to or interest in the

property based on its repudiation of the sales contract, MUSA is not

entitled to a lis pendens notice concerning the property. Allen Oil is

correct in noting that the circuit court's order expunging the lis pendens

notice is based on the circuit court's holding that MUSA no longer has a

right to or interest in the property based on its repudiation of the sales

contract. However, that particular holding was made by the circuit court

in granting Allen Oil's motion for a partial summary judgment on some

of MUSA's counterclaims. The circuit court specifically stated that its

order expunging the lis pendens notice was based on the fact that it had

"previously entered an order grating [Allen Oil's] motion for partial

summary judgment that dismisses [MUSA's] claims for breach of

contract and specific performance …."      (Emphasis added.)     In other

words, the circuit court's expungement order is expressly based on its

partial-summary-judgment order in which the circuit court held that

MUSA had repudiated the sales contract.        Therefore, any argument

pertaining to whether MUSA repudiated the sales contract is an

argument directed at the merits of the circuit court's partial-summary-

judgment order and cannot now be considered on mandamus review. The

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lis pendens notice must remain in effect for the duration of the litigation

until it is terminated by judgment and the expiration of any appropriate

period for appeal, or an appellate determination, if an appeal is taken.

Allen Oil's argument does not provide a convincing basis for this Court to

suspend application of the doctrine of lis pendens and deny MUSA's

mandamus petition.

     Allen Oil also argues that MUSA had another adequate remedy

besides filing a petition for a writ of mandamus. Allen Oil argues that

MUSA could have filed a postjudgment motion pursuant to Rule 59(e),

Ala. R. Civ. P., requesting that the circuit court alter, amend, or vacate

its order expunging the lis pendens notice.        Allen Oil is incorrect.

Rule 59(e) does not apply to interlocutory orders, such as the circuit

court's order expunging the lis pendens notice.       Ex parte Troutman

Sanders, LLP, 866 So. 2d 547, 549-50 (Ala. 2003) ("By its express terms,

Rule 59(e)[, Ala. R. App. P.,] applies only where there is a 'judgment.'

That term is specifically defined in Ala. R. Civ. P. 54(a), as 'a decree and

any order from which an appeal lies.' (Emphasis added.) Rule 59 does not

apply to interlocutory orders, because such orders remain 'within the

breast of the court.' Rheams v. Rheams, 378 So. 2d 1125, 1128 (Ala. Civ.

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App. 1979). A 'Rule 59 motion may be made only in reference to a final

judgment or order.' Malone v. Gainey, 726 So. 2d 725, 725 n.2 (Ala. Civ.

App. 1999); see also Anderson v. Deere & Co., 852 F.2d 1244, 1246 (10th

Cir. 1988); Momar, Inc. v. Schneider, 823 So. 2d 701, 704 (Ala. Civ. App.

2001) (a Rule 59(e) 'motion may be taken only from a final judgment').").

This Court alone may provide MUSA with its only adequate remedy by

granting its petition and issuing the requested writ.

                                Conclusion

     Based on the foregoing, we grant the petition and issue the writ of

mandamus directing the circuit court to vacate its order expunging the

lis pendens notice; the lis pendens notice is to be reinstated.

     PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

     Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Sellers, Stewart, Mitchell,

and Cook, JJ., concur.

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