Court Opinion

ID: 9660520
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:15:01.798075+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:20.176236
License: Public Domain

ROBSON, Chief District Judge
(dissenting).
For the reasons stated in my prior dissent,1 I am in agreement with the majority’s conclusion that the driver’s licenses and vehicle registrations of the class plaintiffs were revoked in a constitutionally impermissible manner, and that these rights must be immediately reinstated by the defendants. However, I cannot join in the majority’s belated attempt to reconstrue the challenged statutory scheme in a strained manner designed to save its constitutionality.
In its original opinion filed November 25, 1970, the majority ruled that the Illinois Financial Responsibility Law provides for hearings subsequent to revocation of driver’s licenses and vehicle registrations under the challenged provisions. The majority further ruled that the challenged provisions operate independently of considerations of fault or potential liability. In the face of these findings, the majority concluded that such a revocation procedure was constitutionally permissible. Pollion v. Lewis, 320 F.Supp. 1343, 1353 (N.D.Ill.1970). The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the majority’s original conclusion in a case involving a challenge to a similar statutory scheme. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542-543, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971). There, the Supreme Court held that before a driver’s license or vehicle registration could be revoked, due process required that the person affected be afforded a prior hearing to consider the reasonable likelihood of a judgment being entered against him. The Supreme Court thereafter vacated the majority’s judgment and remanded this ease “for reconsideration in light of Bell v. Burson.” Pollion v. Lewis, 403 U.S. 902, 91 S.Ct. 2212, 29 L.Ed.2d 678 (1971).
None of the parties before this three-judge court has ever advanced the contention that the challenged provisions of the Illinois Financial Responsibility Law authorize either (a) hearings prior to revocation of driver’s licenses and vehicle registrations, or (b) consideration of fault or potential liability in connection with an automobile accident as a basis for determining the applicability of the punitive provisions of the Act. Both the majority and dissenting opinions originally filed in this case construed the statutory scheme as excluding both of these requirements set forth in Bell v. Burson, supra. Indeed, the clear, unambiguous language of the statute itself dictates such an interpretation.
Section 7-101 of the Act, the provision upon which the majority based its original finding that the statute authorizes hearings subsequent to the issuance of revocation orders, provides “for hearings upon request of persons aggrieved by orders or acts” of the defendants. Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 95% § 7-101. Reasonable interpretation of this provision compels the conclusion that hearings are to take place after the issuance of suspension or revocation orders when requested by persons adversely affected by those orders. Furthermore, Section 7-205 of the Act directs the defendant Secretary of State to suspend “the li*781cense of each driver in any manner involved” in an accident within 30 days after he has determined that a security deposit is required under Section 7-201.2 It is therefore an inescapable conclusion that the Illinois General Assembly intended this statutory scheme to apply to all uninsured motorists involved in any manner in automobile accidents, and the statutory language directs the Secretary of State to so apply the Act. There is no statutory grant,of discretionary authority upon any state officer to apply the punitive provisions of the Act in the manner now invisioned by the majority. By reconstruing this statutory scheme to authorize prior hearings on the issue of potential liability, contrary to the explicit language of the Act itself, the majority has usurped a purely legislative function in order to salvage an otherwise unconstitutional statute.
It is significant that none of the parties appealed the majority’s original construction of the statute, and the interpretation given the challenged provisions by all involved in this litigation was not an issue before the Supreme Court.3 Rather, these class plaintiffs appealed the majority’s conclusion that a prior hearing with respect to potential liability was not constitutionally required before revocation of driver’s licenses and vehicle registrations. Instead of re-examining this conclusion in light of Bell v. Burson, supra, the majority has elected to justify its original conclusion by merely altering its underlying findings with respect to construction of the statute itself. Under these circumstances, I am of the opinion that the majority’s reinterpretation of the statute is untimely, improper, and unreasonable.

. Pollion v. Lewis, 329 F.Supp. 1343, 1354 (N.D.Ill.1970).

. Section 7-201 repeats the directive that the financial responsibility provisions be applied to pei'sons involved in any manner in an accident if none of the exemptions provided in Section 7-202 apply. None of the exemptions provided in this statutory scheme relate to considerations of fault or potential liability of uninsured motorists involved in any manner in accidents, even if such persons are the victims of another’s negligence.

. While the defendants in Bell v. Burson, supra, did interpret Georgia’s statutory scheme to authorize a prior hearing, this construction was not an issue before the Supreme Court.