Court Opinion

ID: 9392393
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-04 18:00:40.30373+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:45.721998
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                          FILED
                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         MAY 4 2023
                                                                    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                      U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALAA GHASSOUB OBEID,                           No. 21-865
                                               Agency No. A095-282-938
             Petitioner,

 v.                                            MEMORANDUM*

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                   On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                       Board of Immigration Appeals

                     Argued and Submitted April 19, 2023
                              Phoenix, Arizona

Before: TALLMAN, OWENS, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
Dissent by Judge OWENS.

      Alaa Ghassoub Obeid, a native and citizen of Lebanon, petitions for review

of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of his motion to reopen

removal proceedings. Although Obeid’s motion to reopen was both time and

number barred, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), he

argues that those limitations should have been equitably tolled because his prior

immigration counsel was ineffective. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252

      *
        This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
and review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.

Hernandez-Ortiz v. Garland, 32 F.4th 794, 800 (9th Cir. 2022). “Under this

standard of review, we must uphold the agency’s decision unless it is ‘arbitrary,

irrational, or contrary to law.’” Id. (quoting Agonafer v. Sessions, 859 F.3d 1198,

1203 (9th Cir. 2017)). We deny the petition.

      Obeid came to the United States on a student visa in 2001 and married a

U.S. citizen in 2002. In 2003, Obeid was indicted for conspiracy to commit

money laundering and fell out of legal status because he failed to maintain the

full course of study required by the visa. DHS initiated removal proceedings and

an immigration judge (“IJ”) ordered Obeid removed in 2005. By 2006, Obeid

had been without legal status in the United States for more than one year.

      Obeid appealed to the BIA and our court, and also sought an adjustment of

status based on his marriage. In the course of Obeid’s appeals, the indictment

was dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement and his wife divorced him. In 2016,

we remanded for the BIA to determine whether Obeid’s divorce invalided his

application for an adjustment of status. Obeid v. Lynch, 658 F. App’x 300, 301

(9th Cir. 2016). Before the BIA, Obeid moved for remand to the IJ. In 2017, the

BIA denied the motion and held Obeid was ineligible to adjust his status but gave

him 60 days to voluntarily depart the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1).

Obeid failed to depart.

      Obeid argues he was prejudiced by his former counsel’s failure to properly

address the voluntary departure order, as his failure to depart resulted in the

                                        2                                    21-865
imposition of a ten-year bar to adjustment of status.             See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229c(d)(1)(B). A claim of ineffective assistance requires a showing that

counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance caused

prejudice.1 Singh v. Holder, 658 F.3d 879, 885 (9th Cir. 2011). Prejudice exists

when “counsel’s performance was so inadequate that the outcome of ‘the

proceeding may have been affected by the alleged violation.’” Hernandez-Ortiz,

32 F.4th at 801 (quoting Grigoryan v. Barr, 959 F.3d 1233, 1240 (9th Cir. 2020)).

The converse is equally true: prejudice does not exist “when the alien lacks

plausible grounds for relief.” Singh, 658 F.3d at 887. Here, the BIA did not abuse

its discretion in declining to reopen Obeid’s case because Obeid cannot show he

was prejudiced by former counsel’s performance.

      Obeid cites Singh, 658 F.3d at 886, for the proposition that former counsel

should have sought to stay the voluntary departure period. The BIA has no

authority to stay or toll the voluntary departure period.          See 8 C.F.R.

§ 1240.26(e)(1); Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 19 (2008). Our decision in Singh

rested on our equitable authority to stay the voluntary departure period. See 658

F.3d at 879. But the adoption of 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(i) in 2008 abrogated that

authority. Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504, 524–25 (9th Cir. 2012)

1
  Obeid argues the BIA erred by finding that he failed to substantially comply
with the procedural requirements for an ineffective assistance claim set out in
Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988). But even assuming that Obeid
substantially complied with Lozada, he must still establish the substantive
elements of ineffective assistance, Hernandez-Ortiz, 32 F.4th at 801, which
requires a showing of prejudice.

                                        3                                   21-865
(en banc). When the BIA denied Obeid’s motion in 2017, it was no longer

possible to seek a stay of the voluntary departure period.

      Former counsel could have withdrawn Obeid’s request for voluntary

departure, filed a motion to reopen, or filed an appeal, but doing so would have

automatically terminated the grant of voluntary departure and exposed Obeid to

immediate removal. Dada, 554 U.S. at 20–21; 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(e)(1), (i).

Obeid then would have been subject to a different ten-year bar on adjustment of

status under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii). Alternatively, if former counsel had

advised Obeid to comply with the voluntary departure order and leave the

country, Obeid would have been subject to a ten-year bar on adjustment of status

because he had accrued more than a year of unlawful presence. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). Counsel’s performance was not prejudicial given that any

action he took would have left Obeid “in substantially the same position that [he]

is in today.” See Hernandez-Ortiz, 32 F.4th at 804.2

      Finally, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Obeid’s instant

motion to reopen because ineffective assistance is not grounds for lifting the

voluntary departure bar unless an alien’s failure to depart was not “voluntary.”

See Granados-Oseguera v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2008); Singh,

2
  Obeid also was not prejudiced by prior counsel’s failure to submit evidence
about Obeid’s remarriage to his former wife. Obeid has failed to identify any
evidence former counsel could have introduced regarding the bona fides of his
marriage that existed at the time of his motion. That evidence did not become
available until later when an approved Form I-130 was issued.

                                        4                                   21-865
658 F.3d at 887. The voluntariness exception is “narrow[]” and does not apply

unless an alien “is unaware of the voluntary departure order or is physically

unable to depart.” Singh, 658 F.3d at 887 (quoting In re Zmijewska, 24 I. & N.

Dec. 87, 94 (BIA 2007)). Unlike the petitioner in Singh, Obeid was indisputably

aware of the voluntary departure order: his affidavit states that he “received a

copy of the Board’s 2017 decision in the mail” and “read through it.” Obeid

argues his failure to depart was not voluntary “because former counsel

misadvised him about the voluntary departure order.” But a failure to depart is

voluntary if the “petitioner was fully aware of the voluntary departure order but

remained in the United States in reliance on counsel’s erroneous advice.” See id.

at 887 n.10 (citing Granados-Oseguera, 546 F.3d at 1015–16).

      Obeid and the dissent argue we should remand because the BIA’s decision

failed to address the voluntary departure issue. However, where the result on

remand is “necessary and certain” we “need not remand for the agency to reach

that same conclusion because to do so ‘would be an idle and useless formality.’”

Gutierrez-Zavala v. Garland, 32 F.4th 806, 810 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting NLRB

v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 766 n.6 (1969)). We will not remand when

our precedents and the record establish that the BIA cannot afford Obeid any

relief from the voluntary departure bar and that Obeid would have been subject

to a ten-year bar regardless of whether he had departed.

      DENIED.

                                        5                                  21-865
                                                                          FILED
Obeid v. Garland, No. 21-865
                                                                           MAY 4 2023
OWENS, Circuit Judge, dissenting:                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                        U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

      I respectfully dissent. The BIA abused its discretion because it failed to

address Obeid’s argument that his attorney prejudiced him by ignoring the

voluntary departure deadline and thereby creating a bar to adjustment of status.

See Singh v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 1006, 1015 (9th Cir. 2005). Specifically, the

agency did not analyze whether the attorney’s conduct created an avoidable bar to

relief or whether Obeid is still eligible for relief. The necessary conclusion of

these analyses is not that Obeid cannot show prejudice. As such, remand is not

futile, and I would remand for the BIA to analyze whether the attorney’s failure to

consider the voluntary departure deadline prejudiced Obeid.