Court Opinion

ID: 9657639
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:32:58.379306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:47.170853
License: Public Domain

MADDOX, Justice
(concurring specially)-
I agree with most of what the majority has said and concur in the result reached, but wish to point out some areas of the majority opinion with which I disagree.
As I view the facts as set out in the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, the California action was begun first. Custody of the children was part of the relief requested in that action. The California court had jurisdiction. The majority does not question the fact that the California court had jurisdiction, but holds that the prior pendency of the California suit does not bar the prosecution of the Alabama action. I agree with this. Consequently, I disagree with the Court of Civil Appeals that the Alabama action should have been dismissed. However, that does not mean that the Alabama action should not have been stayed. The Court of Civil Appeals found, as a fact, that there was no emergency involved which would have quickened the right of the Alabama court to proceed. The Court of Civil Appeals found:
“The able counsel for respondent argue that the Alabama order of June *69413 relating to temporary custody of the children is a valid exercise of the court’s power over minor children within its jurisdiction. This court is fully aware of what is often termed the ‘emergency doctrine,’ but we feel, in this instance, as seen from the facts below, that such emergency did not exist. We particularly note that the children were in California, one at school and one with a babysitter. Respondent was residing and employed in California at the time he removed the children to Alabama and still resides and is employed there, though he contends domicile in Alabama. If any emergency was present in Alabama it was brought about by the intentional removal of the children from California to Alabama by respondent and his subsequent return to California. If any emergency existed, it existed in California, not Alabama. The California court was . the competent court to grant any needed relief regarding the children. See Clements v. Barber, supra. Indeed, the California court might well have entered the same order which the Alabama court entered on June 13, 1973, had it- been so presented. Since the California court had acquired jurisdiction of the case only some ninety days before the Alabama court’s action, California was the proper forum in which to consider any questions concerning the custody of the children.”
Based upon this finding of “no emergency,” I believe the Court of Civil Appeals could have ordered the Tuscaloosa court to stay its proceedings until the California court could proceed to a judgment on the custody issue. Alabama cases seem to support my view that when proceedings involving child custody are pending both in Alabama and a foreign jurisdiction, the principle of comity should be applied. Moss v. Ingram, 246 Ala. 214, 20 So.2d 202 (1944); Little v. Little, 249 Ala. 144, 30 So.2d 386 (1947); State v. Black, 239 Ala. 644, 196 So. 713 (1940).
In Moss v. Ingram, this Court said, quoting from a Michigan case [Maclean v. Speed, 52 Mich. 257, 18 N.W. 396]:
“ ‘It is a familiar principle that when a court of competent jurisdiction has become possessed of a case its authority continues, subject only to appellate authority, until the matter is finally and completely disposed of, and no court of coordinate authority, is at liberty to interfere with its action. The principle is essential to the proper and orderly administration of the laws; and while its observation might be required on the grounds of judicial comity and courtesy, it does not rest upon such consideration exclusively, but is enforced to prevent unseemly, expensive, and dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction, and of process.’ [239 Ala. 644, 196 So. 715.]” [Emphasis added.]
The Court of Civil Appeals has reviewed the record in this case and determined that there was no emergency involved. If that finding is correct, I believe the spirit of our child custody cases is to the effect that even though Alabama courts have jurisdiction, they should refuse to exercise it, except in cases where an emergency exists, because “when a court of competent jurisdiction has become possessed of a case its authority continues and no court of co-ordinate authority, is at liberty to interfere with its action.” Moss v. Ingram.
I fully recognize that in the cases I cite there was an order granting custody. Here, the California court had not entered a decree awarding custody, but I do not believe the principle laid down in Moss v. Ingram is limited to cases where a custody decree is awarded. The rule of comity set down in Moss v. Ingram reads simply, “when a court of competent jurisdiction has become possessed of a case.” It does not say that a decree must be rendered.
*695Consequently, I would reverse and remand the cause to the Court of Civil Appeals with instructions to review the cause in the light of the rule of comity which I believe is appropriate.