Court Opinion

ID: 9732697
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:31:54.025243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:31.636581
License: Public Domain

Beilfuss, J.
On October 31, 1966, the plaintiff-respondent, E. Robert Taake, was granted an absolute divorce from the defendant-appellant, Barbara A. Taake, upon the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment. From the findings of fact and judgment on file and a part of the record on appeal, it appears the parties had been married about twelve years. They had three minor children— two of their own and an adopted child. The plaintiff-husband was and still is a physician and surgeon; the defendant-wife was a housewife. The parties resided in Beaver Dam. Pursuant to stipulation of the parties, the court awarded the custody of the children to the wife and required a support money payment of $550 per month by the plaintiff-husband. As a division of estate, the wife was awarded the home of the parties, the household goods, her personal effects and an automobile. In addition, she was awarded alimony in the amount of $200 per month.
On February 6, 1968, based upon a stipulation of the parties, the judgment was amended to provide that the *117husband have custody of the children, and. the provision for support money payments was deleted.
Shortly thereafter the defendant sold the house in Beaver Dam and moved to an apartment complex in Sun Prairie. She lived there for about a year and then moved to an apartment in Madison, where she lived until December, 1971. She worked intermittently as a personnel worker.
During the year 1971, the defendant Mrs. Taake, met Lyle Fink. Fink was divorced from his wife and was employed as a maintenance painter for the Madison school system. Fink was negotiating for the purchase of a home on School Road in Madison. For a period of four to five weeks prior to actual occupancy of the School Road home, Fink lived with Mrs. Taake in her Madison apartment.
In December of 1971 both Mr. Fink and Mrs. Taake moved into his newly purchased home on School Road and both were still living there at the time of the hearing in this matter in May of 1973.1 The arrangements were that she was to pay him $25 per month rent and pay for a part of the groceries, and do at least a part of the housework. She had a separate bedroom. Mrs. Taake has been unemployed a part of the time due to alleged emotional problems. Fink suffered an injury while at work, has received some workmen’s compensation benefits but is unemployed.
Mrs. Taake admits having occasional sexual relations with Fink and failing to correct persons when they refer to her as Mrs. Fink, although she has not affirmatively identified herself as Fink’s wife. Her name does appear as Barbara Fink in a city directory.
*118Pink testified he considered Mrs. Taake to be his wife but later changed his testimony to the effect that they were very, very good friends. Mrs. Taake and Mr. Fink have not married at any time.
In September of 1972, the respondent Robert Taake, ceased making the monthly $200 alimony payments and in May of 1978 petitioned the court for an order amending the judgment to terminate alimony.
As stated, the order amending the judgment expunged the alimony arrearages, terminated alimony and barred future alimony.
In a memorandum decision the trial court found that Mrs. Taake and Lyle Fink had a de facto marriage relationship and that Mrs. Taake had and was engaging in misconduct of such a nature so as to require a termination of her former husband’s obligation to pay her alimony.
The trial court concluded that Mrs. Taake should not be permitted to enjoy both the benefits of her de facto marriage relationship with Lyle Fink and the benefit of alimony from her former husband; and that to permit a divorced woman to do so might dissuade her from remarriage. The trial court also concluded that Mrs. Taake’s legal misconduct was the kind of misconduct which this court has heretofore recognized as warranting a change or elimination of alimony.2
An award of alimony is authorized by sec. 247.26, Stats. It provides, in part, as follows:
“Alimony, property division. Upon every judgment of divorce or legal separation, the court may, subject to s. 247.20, further adjudge for a limited period of time to either party such alimony out of the property or income of the other party for support and maintenance, except no alimony shall be granted to a party guilty of adultery not condoned, . . . The court may also finally divide and *119distribute the estate, both real and personal, of either party between the parties and divest and transfer the title of any thereof accordingly, after having given due regard to the legal and equitable rights of each party, the length of the marriage, the age and health of the parties, the liability of either party for debts or support of children, their respective abilities and estates, whether the property award is in lieu of or in addition to alimony, the character and situation of the parties and all the circumstances of the case; . . .”
Sec. 247.32, Stats., provides an award of alimony may be revised after a judgment. The section is, in part, as follows:
“Revision of judgment. After a judgment providing for alimony or other allowance for a spouse and children, or either of them, ... as aforesaid the court may, from time to time, on the petition of either of the parties and upon notice, to the family court commissioner, revise and alter such judgment respecting the amount of such alimony or allowance and the payment thereof, . . . and may make any judgment respecting any of the said matters which such court might have made in the original action, . . .”
Sec. 247.38, Stats., provides, in part, that an alimony award can be completely annulled upon remarriage:
“Judgment revoked on remarriage. . . . After a final judgment of divorce has been rendered, the court, upon the application of the party paying alimony, on notice to, and on proof of the marriage, after such final judgment, of the party receiving such alimony, shall by order modify such final judgment and any orders made with respect thereto, by annulling the provisions of such final judgment or orders, or of both, directing payment of such alimony.”
Two earlier Wisconsin cases, although perhaps dicta, have given consideration to revision of alimony based upon subsequent misconduct of the divorced spouse.3
*120In Weber v. Weber, supra, the court stated at page 138:
“. . . On the other hand, if the wife, without the fault of the husband and without any adequate excuse or palliation, deliberately chooses a life of shame and dishonor, has no other equitable claim upon property in the hands of the husband, and he is compelled by his daily toil to earn the money paid to her, the court may make the misconduct of the wife the ground for cutting off all alimony, or for reducing the same, as may in its discretion seem just and equitable under all the circumstances of the ease. Our statute, sec. 2369, Stats., prescribes no grounds upon which a judgment for alimony may be modified. It wisely leaves that to the judgment of the court. The considerations that may legitimately influence such judgment are so varied and complex that legislative and judicial wisdom alike refrain from any attempt to enumerate them. This much, however, may be said: the courts of our state do not permit vice to flaunt its banner before them unchallenged. When it appears, its nature and extent may be inquired into, and if justice so demands, it may be made the ground of equitable relief in the allowance of alimony.”
In Haritos v. Haritos, supra, the following statement appears at page 464:
“It will be noted that we have dealt only with the issues raised upon the record made in the court below. It is recognized that the statute denies alimony in a judgment for divorce to a wife guilty of adultery. Upon proof of adulterous conduct subsequent to the judgment of divorce, it is appropriate that the court take into consideration such conduct in continuing or disallowing alimony. If the defendant sees fit to make application for a modification of the judgment in this respect, or to prove adulterous conduct on the part of plaintiff as a reason for purging his contempt, he should be accorded that opportunity. The order appealed from will be affirmed accordingly without prejudice to the right of the defendant to interpose further defenses to the order to show cause.”
Counsel for Mrs. Taake contends that, because there is no remarriage here and Wisconsin does not recognize *121common-law marriages, there is no statutory authority to decrease or eliminate alimony based on misconduct subsequent to the divorce. He also argues that Weber and Haritos, supra, should not be followed because modern moral standards condone relationships such as those of Lyle Fink and Mrs. Taake. An obvious corollary of this argument that because a divorced woman has greater freedom and opportunity for self-employment courts should be hesitant in awarding alimony. Neither of these arguments furnish an adequate answer.
The general rule, often stated, is that a provision for alimony will not be changed except upon a positive showing of a change of circumstances and especially so when originally based upon agreement or stipulation of the parties.
Mrs. Taake contends the change of circumstances must relate only to change of the financial circumstances of the parties.
We acknowledge that a divorced wife owes no duty of sexual fidelity to her former husband. However, her cohabitation with another man can be acknowledged as a change of circumstances affecting her former husband’s responsibility to provide alimony for her support. The manner and extent of the cohabitation and circumstances should be considered in determining whether alimony payments are to be changed.
In this case there are several changed circumstances that can be considered. Mrs. Taake was given a substantial division of estate, including the home and household furniture of the parties for the obvious reason that it was going to be used as the home for the minor children. Further, because she was awarded the children, her opportunity for supporting herself was limited. She stipulated that the custody be transferred to the husband and sold the house. These were material changes in the circumstances that the court considered when the original *122award of alimony was made. Her cohabitation with Lyle Fink was not an occasional indiscretion but continuous cohabitation with arrangements for joint support.
We believe this change of circumstances was sufficient to permit the trial court to expunge the delinquencies in alimony payments and to amend the judgment to delete the provision for alimony. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in these respects and those parts of the order must be affirmed.
The order also barred any future alimony. This we think goes too far. If, at a subsequent hearing, it appears that Mrs. Taake is not married, is not cohabiting in the manner set forth above, and other circumstances warrant a resumption of alimony in some degree, the court should not be powerless to act. That part of the order barring future alimony must be reversed.
By the Court. — Order affirmed in part, reversed in part. No costs to be taxed.

 An affidavit filed after this appeal had been taken indicates Mrs. Taake, late in 1978, moved to the home of Mrs. W. A. Fink of Fond du Lac. This fact was not before the trial court, not a part of the record, and cannot be considered in this appeal.

 Weber v. Weber (1913), 153 Wis. 132, 140 N. W. 1052; Haritos v. Haritos (1925), 185 Wis. 459, 202 N. W. 181.

 Counsel for both parties cite several cases from other jurisdictions dealing with the problem. While these are instructive we are not persuaded by them because we are dealing with our statute.