Court Opinion

ID: 9712825
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:00:40.617659+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:14.666135
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING JUSTICE STAMOS delivered the opinion of the court: The points raised in plaintiff’s petition for rehearing prompt us to clarify two portions of our original opinion.  First, we shall expand on our view of the nature of the right to “refund or replacement” created by section 104(a)(4) of the Act. That section sets forth the minimum standards which must be met by any full warranty offered in connection with the sale of consumer goods. Although plaintiff contends that this section, read together with the authorization of an action for “equitable relief” contained in section 110(d), authorizes the grant of a mandatory injunction requiring the replacement or refund of the purchase price of a defective product covered by a warranty regardless of whether the remedy at law is inadequate or the harm is irreparable, we do not agree. We view section 104(a)(4) as creating a contractual right on the part of consumers for the replacement of or refund of the purchase price of defective products which are covered by a full warranty. The warrantor’s failure to allow the consumer to elect replacement or refund gives rise to an action at law for breach of warranty in which the consumer must prove only that a defect in the product exists which the warrantor was unable to repair after a reasonable number of attempts. Thus, the elements of the consumer’s action for breach of warranty are defined by the contractual rights which are created by this section. In the instant case, plaintiff’s complaint, though styled as a complaint for a mandatory injunction, is better viewed as a complaint for specific performance of the “refund or replacement” provision of her warranty. The existence of this contractual right, however, does not mean that the right is specifically enforceable without reference to the traditional prerequisites of equitable relief.1   Therefore, we view Congress’ authorization of an action for equitable relief in section 110(d) as authorizing private actions by consumers to enforce the contractual rights created by the Act to the same extent as they would be able to enforce contractual rights at common law. As was noted in our original opinion, other provisions of the Act make the maintenance of an action under the Act significantly easier and financially more feasible than the maintenance of similar actions at common law.  Plaintiff also points out that although our original opinion indicates that no statute authorizes the issuance of a statutory injunction between private parties seeking to enforce private rights, title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e et seq. (1976)) authorizes the issuance of an injunction in actions between private parties after the plaintiff has shown that unlawful and discriminatory employment practices have taken place. (See 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e — 5(g) (1976).) However, injunctive relief is available to private party plaintiffs under that statute only when the plaintiff has exhausted all administrative remedies; when administrative action is still pending, the plaintiff must prove that irreparable harm will result if an injunction is not issued. (See Middleton-Keirn v. Stone (5th Cir. 1981), 655 F.2d 609, 611-12.) The plaintiff in such a situation can be seen as acting not only on his own behalf, but also in the stead of an administrative agency which has declined to take action. Additionally, the willingness of the Federal courts to presume the existence of irreparable harm in such cases is a reflection of the gravity of the evil which title VII seeks to remedy: “Whenever a qualified Negro employee is discriminatorily denied a chance to fill a position for which he is qualified and has the seniority to obtain, he suffers irreparable injury and so does the labor force of the country as a whole.” United States v. Hayes International Corp. (5th Cir. 1969), 415 F.2d 1038, 1045. We are unable to say that the provisions of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act require the same type of sweeping pronouncement of public policy as the provisions of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and we can see no reason why the presence of irreparable harm should be presumed whenever the terms of a warranty of a consumer product are breached. For the reasons stated herein, plaintiff’s petition for rehearing is denied. Denied. DOWNING, RJ., and PERLIN, J., concur.  In this connection, we note that it is by no means certain that the parties to a contract may make the provisions of the contract specifically enforceable by expressly providing that the contract shall be enforceable by specific performance. A grant of specific performance may still be precluded by the presence of an adequate remedy at law and an absence of irreparable harm. See Dobbs, Remedies sec. 12.5, at 825 (1973); MacNeil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 Cornell L.Q. 495, 520-23 (1962).