Court Opinion

ID: 2964246
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:22:42.161386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:52.938884
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

          July 12, 1996         [Not for Publication]
                                [Not for Publication]
                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-1654

                                    UNITED STATES,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                               VICTOR LAGUER-AVELLANET,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                    [Hon. Hector M. Laffitte, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Stahl, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________
                           Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________
                              and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                 ____________________

            Benito I. Rodriguez Masso for appellant.
            _________________________
            Jeanette Mercado-Rios, Assistant United States Attorney, with
            _____________________
        whom Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, and Jose A. Quiles-
             _____________                              _______________
        Espinosa, Senior Litigation Counsel, were on brief for appellee.
        ________

                                 ____________________

                                 ____________________

                      Stahl, J.  Defendant-appellant Victor Laguer-
                      Stahl, J
                      ________

            Avellanet pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to a

            drug trafficking conspiracy.  Despite the government's

            recommendation, made in accordance with that agreement, for a

            twelve-month imprisonment term, the district court imposed a

            fifteen-month term.  In this appeal, Laguer-Avellanet seeks

            to be resentenced to the recommended term but not to withdraw

            his plea.

                                          I.
                                          I.
                                          __

                        Pertinent Facts and Prior Proceedings
                        Pertinent Facts and Prior Proceedings
                        _____________________________________

                      In December 1994, a grand jury returned an

            indictment charging in count one that Laguer-Avellanet1 and

            ten codefendants conspired to distribute and to possess with

            intent to distribute cocaine.  In February 1995, Laguer-

            Avellanet entered into a plea agreement with the government

            whereby he agreed to plead guilty to that count.

                      The plea agreement set forth the parties'

            stipulations as to several sentencing guideline matters.2 

            It provided that the conduct relevant to the offense yielded

            an offense level of eighteen, pursuant to U.S.S.G.

              2D1.1(a)(3).  The parties also agreed to downward

                                
            ____________________

            1.  Laguer-Avellanet is also known as Ruben Sanchez-Irizarry.

            2.  The plea  agreement originally provided only  that it was
            entered into "pursuant to Rule 11(e)(3)" of the Federal Rules
            of Criminal Procedure.   The  parties agreed to  add to  that
            provision, "11(e)(1)(C)," which the court acknowledged at the
            change of plea hearing.

                                         -2-
                                          2

            adjustments for acceptance of responsibility, U.S.S.G.

              3E1.1(b), and for being a minor participant, U.S.S.G.

              3B1.2(b), for a total reduction of five levels, yielding a

            total offense level of thirteen.  The plea agreement also

            stated that "[t]he guideline sentencing range, then, is

            twelve (12) to eighteen (18) months," and thus, it reflected

            a presumed criminal history category of one.  See U.S.S.G.
                                                          ___

            Ch.5, Pt.A, Sentencing Table.

                      Further, the agreement provided:

                      The United States recommends a twelve
                      (12) month term of imprisonment.  No
                      agreement concerning the application of
                      any other sentencing guideline has been
                      entered into by the parties.  There is no
                      agreement between the parties concerning
                      the Defendant's criminal history
                      category.  All other aspects of the
                      sentence are left to the sound discretion
                      of the Court.

            The agreement did not explicitly state whether or not the

            court was bound by the sentence recommendation, or whether

            Laguer-Avellanet would have the right to withdraw his plea if

            the court imposed a higher-than-recommended sentence.

                      On February 14, 1995, the district court conducted

            a change of plea hearing, during which Laguer-Avellanet

            pleaded guilty with several of his codefendants who had

            signed identical plea agreements.  At that hearing, the court

            reiterated the plea agreement's provisions regarding

            sentencing.  The court elicited Laguer-Avellanet's

            acknowledgment (along with the other defendants') that the

                                         -3-
                                          3

            agreed sentencing range was twelve to eighteen months, and

            that the government was recommending a twelve-month term of

            imprisonment.3  The court ensured Laguer-Avellanet's

            understanding that there was no agreement concerning the

            criminal history category and that "all other aspects of the

            sentence are left to the sound discretion of the Court." 

            Finally, the court informed him that the sentence would be

            imposed "in accordance with the sentencing guidelines and

            policy statements."

                      At the end of the change of plea hearing, the court

            accepted Laguer-Avellanet's guilty plea and ordered a

            presentence report ("PSR").4  At no time did the court

            explicitly state that it was accepting, rejecting, or

            deferring decision on the plea agreement.  Further, at no

            time did the court expressly warn Laguer-Avellanet that it

            was not bound by the twelve-month recommendation and that it

            could and might impose a higher sentence.  Further, nothing

                                
            ____________________

            3.  The government confirmed its  twelve-month recommendation
            at  the  change  of   plea  hearing,  although  it   did  not
            affirmatively recommend it again  at the sentencing  hearing,
            stating only, "in keeping with the plea agreement, the United
            States  has  nothing  to  add."   Laguer-Avellanet  does  not
            suggest that the government breached the plea agreement.

            4.  Laguer-Avellanet  requested  to  "waive  the  presentence
            report"  so  that  he   could  begin  his  imprisonment  term
            immediately.   The court stated  that it would  "not accept a
            waiver  of  the  presentence  report,"  see U.S.S.G.    6A1.1
                                                    ___
            (prohibiting  such  waiver),  but allowed  Laguer-Avellanet's
            request to  begin his imprisonment term  before completion of
            the report and actual sentencing.

                                         -4-
                                          4

            whatsoever was stated as to whether or not Laguer-Avellanet

            could withdraw his guilty plea upon learning of the court's

            ultimate sentencing determination.

                      On May 25, 1995, the district court, after

            reviewing an amended PSR, conducted a sentencing hearing. 

            The PSR concluded that, due to two prior convictions, Laguer-

            Avellanet had a criminal history category of two instead of

            the previously presumed one, which increased the applicable

            guideline sentencing range from that indicated in the plea

            agreement (twelve to eighteen months) to fifteen to twenty-

            one months: a range in excess of the recommended twelve-month

            term.

                      Objecting to the PSR's criminal history

            calculation, Laguer-Avellanet's counsel asserted, "we entered

            into a plea agreement in this case for a 12-month sentence,

            and that's what we have been all the time -- let's call it

            offering [Laguer-Avellanet]."  He also argued that the prior

            convictions were not properly countable in the criminal

            history category and that, even if they were, they were

            minimal in nature and the court should depart downward to

            effect the recommended twelve-month sentence.  After

            repeating his request that "the 12-month sentence be

            recognized as the applicable sentence and the proper sentence

            for our client in his case," counsel entreated upon the court

            that Laguer-Avellanet was truly remorseful for his crime,

                                         -5-
                                          5

            that there would be no recidivism on his part, and concluded

            that "it would be only fair for us and for him to receive a

            twelve-month sentence if that's into [sic] the discretion of

            the Court."

                      The court rejected these arguments, stating that

            Laguer-Avellanet had "struck a very good deal" and that he

            would have probably been sentenced to "fifteen years at

            least" had he gone to trial and been found guilty.  The court

            acknowledged that the specific sentencing-guideline

            stipulations had been formed pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P.

            11(e)(1)(C), but, after reminding Laguer-Avellanet that he

            expressly had not stipulated to the criminal history

            category, it sentenced him to the lower end of the higher

            guideline range: fifteen months.  The court did not

            explicitly state whether or not it had accepted or rejected

            the plea agreement, nor did it offer Laguer-Avellanet an

            opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea.  At the conclusion

            of the hearing, Laguer-Avellanet did not object further,

            offer anything else to inform the proceedings, or request to

            withdraw his plea.5

                                
            ____________________

            5.  At oral argument before this  court, we asked counsel for
            Laguer-Avellanet whether or not, at that time, his client had
            completed  the fifteen-month  incarcerative  portion  of  his
            sentence.   We indicated that  if he had  been released, this
            case might be moot.  Neither counsel for Laguer-Avellanet nor
            the government's attorney  knew if he  was still in  custody.
            This court  has now  been informed that  Laguer-Avellanet was
            released from  custody into  a supervised release  program on
            March  29, 1996 (well before the date of oral argument before

                                         -6-
                                          6

                                         II.
                                         II.
                                         ___

                                      Discussion
                                      Discussion
                                      __________

                      Laguer-Avellanet now claims that the parties did

            not agree merely to a twelve-month recommendation, but
                                               ______________

            rather, that they firmly agreed that twelve months was the

            appropriate sentence for his crime.  He contends that because

            the district court effectively accepted the plea agreement,

            it was bound to impose the twelve-month term and was

            obligated to "enter whatever [sentencing] findings were

            necessary to reach the same."  We disagree.

                      The plain language of the plea agreement provided

            that, although the government would recommend a twelve month

            imprisonment term, other aspects of the sentence were

            entirely open to the district court's resolution, to wit: the

            application of sentencing guidelines to which the parties did

            not otherwise stipulate, calculation of the criminal history

            category, and "[a]ll other aspects of the sentence."  During

                                
            ____________________

            this court), having served the fifteen-month term.
                      Although Laguer-Avellanet challenges the  length of
            the  incarcerative  portion  of  his  sentence  and  not  his
            conviction, we find that  his appeal is not moot  despite his
            release from  prison because  the imposition of  the fifteen-
            month term instead  of a  twelve-month term could  lead to  a
            future "collateral consequence."   See U.S.S.G.   4A1.1 (a) &
                                               ___
            (b)  (mandating  three  criminal  history  points  for  prior
            sentences exceeding one year  and one month imprisonment, but
            only  two if  for a  lesser term  (of a  least sixty  days));
            United  States v.  Kassar, 47  F.3d 562,  565 (2d  Cir. 1995)
            ______________     ______
            (finding not moot a  sentence challenge despite completion of
            sentence because of possible future criminal history category
            calculation).

                                         -7-
                                          7

            the plea colloquy, the court reiterated these provisions

            individually and elicited the Laguer-Avellanet's

            acknowledgment of them.  Laguer-Avellanet's statements and

            arguments to the court at sentencing, while urging a twelve-

            month sentence, reveal his understanding that the imposition

            of that term was within the discretion of the court.

                      On appeal, Laguer-Avellanet emphasizes, in a

            talismanic fashion, the language of Fed. R. Crim. P.

            11(e)(1)(C) and (e)(3), the provisions under which the

            parties purported to enter into the plea agreement.  On its

            face, Rule 11(e)(1)(C) applies when the parties have agreed

            to a "specific sentence," which must then be embodied in the

            final judgment and sentence, per Rule 11(e)(3), if the court

            accepts the plea agreement.  Regardless of whether or not the

            parties' stipulation to the several sentencing-guideline

            matters comes within the meaning of "specific sentence," it

            is clear that the parties did not agree that twelve months
                                          ___

            was "the appropriate disposition of the case" within the

            meaning of Rule 11(e)(1)(C).  Rather, the parties

            unequivocally agreed that the government would only recommend

            that term and particularly that the appropriate criminal

            history category was an open question.

                      We need not conduct an exhaustive inquiry as to

            whether the parties' agreement was truly an "11(e)(1)(C)"

            agreement, or instead, effectively an "11(e)(1)(B)"

                                         -8-
                                          8

            agreement, or perhaps, a strange hybrid of the two.6 

            Because the parties simply did not agree to a firm twelve-

            month sentence, Laguer-Avellanet cannot seek "specific

            performance" of the plea agreement to reduce his imprisonment

            term.  Moreover, contrary to Laguer-Avellanet's assertion, a

            court could not be "forced" to make the requisite sentencing

            findings in order to give effect to a plea agreement

            specifying either a certain term or a recommendation.  See
                                             __                    ___

            U.S.S.G.   6B1.2(b) & (c) (allowing court to accept a

            sentence recommendation or agreement only when it is

            satisfied that the sentence falls within the applicable

            guideline range or the sentence reflects a justifiable

            departure from that range).

                      While we find an affirmance appropriate, we offer 

            some guidance for the handling of plea agreements involving

            sentencing promises.  Where, as here, the government agreed

            only to recommend a sentence, the district court should,

            during the change of plea hearing, specifically inform the

            defendant that it is not bound by that recommendation and

            that it might impose a sentence less favorable to the

            defendant.  The court should also clearly inform the

            defendant whether or not he will have the right to withdraw

                                
            ____________________

            6.  Rule  11(e)(1)(C) governs  plea agreements  in  which the
            parties agree  "that a  specific sentence is  the appropriate
            disposition   of  the   case,"   while  11(e)(1)(B)   governs
            agreements  in   which  the  parties  agree   only  that  the
            government will recommend a particular sentence.

                                         -9-
                                          9

            his guilty plea at some later time.7  Finally, the court

            should explicitly specify the status of the plea agreement: 

            whether it is accepted, rejected, or deferred pending

            consideration of the PSR.8  Here, the district court's

            procedures were much more summary and therefore subject to

            potential misunderstanding.

                      The possible remedy, however, for such shortcomings

            is not (as Laguer-Avellanet seeks here) "specific

            performance" of an agreement term to which both parties never

            agreed, but rather, the opportunity to withdraw the plea. 

            Because Laguer-Avellanet does not argue that he would have

            withdrawn his plea but for these plea colloquy deficiencies,

            he has not established prejudice from them.  At bottom,

            because Laguer-Avellanet is not entitled to the relief he

            seeks, we must affirm his sentence.

                                
            ____________________

            7.  If the  plea agreement was entered into  pursuant to Rule
            11(e)(1)(B),  the defendant  must be  advised that he  has no
            right to  withdraw his plea if the  court does not accept the
            sentence recommendation.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(2).  If,
                                      ___
            instead, the parties agreed  under 11(e)(1)(C), and the court
            rejects that agreement, the  court must "afford the defendant
            the opportunity  to then  withdraw the  plea, and advise  the
            defendant that if the defendant persists in a guilty plea . .
            . the disposition of  the case may  be less favorable to  the
            defendant  than  that contemplated  by  the plea  agreement."
            Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4).

            8.  We note  that under  U.S.S.G.   6B1.1(c), the  court must
            defer its decision to accept or reject a plea agreement until
            it has  the opportunity  to consider the  presentence report,
            unless that report is not required under U.S.S.G.   6A1.1.

                                         -10-
                                          10

                      Laguer-Avellanet's final challenge is to the

            calculation of his criminal history category.  He argues

            that, assuming the court did not err in accepting and

            implementing the plea agreement, it should have granted his

            request to depart downward from the criminal history category

            of two because it significantly overrepresented the

            seriousness of his criminal history.9  The law is well

            settled, however, that "no appeal lies from a discretionary

            refusal to depart."  United States v. Morrison, 46 F.3d 127,
                                 _____________    ________

            130 (1st Cir. 1995).  Thus, this challenge is wholly

            unavailing.

                                         III.
                                         III.
                                         ____

                                      Conclusion
                                      Conclusion
                                      __________

                      For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the

            district court is affirmed.
                              ________

                                
            ____________________

            9.  Laguer-Avellanet does  not,  in this  appeal, pursue  his
            argument  that the  two prior  convictions were  not properly
            countable for  purposes of calculating  the criminal  history
            category.

                                         -11-
                                          11