Court Opinion

ID: 9913154
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-26 22:01:47.40516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:07:31.022042
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/26/23 Brooks v. Diggs CA2/1
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                           SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                          DIVISION ONE

 MEHCAD BROOKS,                                                      B322575

           Plaintiff and Appellant,                                  (Los Angeles County
                                                                     Super. Ct. No. 20STCV40105)
           v.

 RODNEY DIGGS et al.,

           Defendants and Respondents.

     Appeal from order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Holly J. Fujie, Judge. Affirmed.
     Schneider & Branch, David K. Schneider; Williams Iagmin
and Jon R. Williams for Plaintiff and Appellant.
     Wood Smith Henning & Berman, Stephen M. Caine, Frances
M. O’Meara and Holly M. Teel for Defendants and Respondents.

                             ______________________________
       In 2017, Mehcad Brooks (Brooks), an actor and writer, hired
Rodney Diggs and his law firm, Ivie McNeill Wyatt Purcell & Diggs,
A Professional Law Corporation (collectively, Diggs) to represent
him in an arbitration against his former talent agency.
       Brooks contends that Diggs performed negligently,
including by failing to timely designate expert witnesses and
by agreeing to incomplete exhibit and witness lists for use at
the arbitration hearing. Brooks therefore fired Diggs, obtained
a continuance of the scheduled November 2017 hearing date, and
retained replacement counsel to represent him in the arbitration
proceedings.
       Notwithstanding the efforts of Brooks’s replacement
attorneys, the arbitrator ruled against Brooks in a June 3, 2019
award. The superior court confirmed the award on February 28,
2020.
       Approximately eight months later, on October 20, 2020,
Brooks filed a malpractice action against Diggs. Diggs moved
for judgment on the pleadings under Code of Civil Procedure
section 438,1 arguing that Brooks’s claims were untimely pursuant
to section 340.6, subdivision (a). That subdivision establishes a
one-year limitations period for malpractice claims, but also provides
that such claims are tolled until a plaintiff has “sustained actual
injury.” (§ 340.6, subd. (a)(1).) Brooks opposed the motion on the
ground that he did not sustain actual injury until the superior court

      1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
      Section 438 provides, in relevant part, that a defendant may
move for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that a plaintiff ’s
complaint “does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action against that defendant.” (§ 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii).)

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issued the February 28, 2020 order confirming the arbitration
award.
       The trial court granted Diggs’s motion, concluding that
Brooks had “suffered actionable harm causing the statute of
limitations to accrue when the arbitrator issued the award on
June 3, 2019”—i.e., more than one year before Brooks filed his
malpractice action. (Capitalization omitted.) The court then issued
an order dismissing Brooks’s complaint with prejudice.
       Brooks now asks us to reverse the trial court’s order
dismissing his complaint, urging he did not sustain actual injury—
and thus his claims did not accrue—until the superior court
confirmed the arbitration award on February 28, 2020.
Alternatively, he contends that even if he suffered actual injury
on June 3, 2019, the date of the arbitrator’s award, an emergency
tolling rule adopted by the Judicial Council in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic renders his complaint timely.
       We conclude, however, that Brooks sustained actual
injury no later than September 2018, when he incurred fees
from his replacement attorneys in their efforts to correct or
mitigate Diggs’s alleged errors. (See Pointe San Diego Residential
Community, L.P. v. Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, LLP
(2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 265, 275–276 (Pointe San Diego) [“a
plaintiff sustains ‘actual injury’ when he or she incurs attorney
fees to rectify the problem caused by the prior attorney’s alleged
negligence”].) Because Brooks’s claims accrued more than one
year before he filed his malpractice action against Diggs, his
claims are untimely. We therefore affirm.

                                    3
   FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
       Brooks is an actor and writer. In the mid-2000s, he selected
Innovative Artists Talent & Literary Agency, Inc. (Innovative) to
represent him. Brooks contends that, as his agent, Innovative had
a duty to use all reasonable efforts to procure employment for him
as a writer.
       In 2010, Brooks began developing an idea for a television
project based on the Salem witch trials. He contends that he shared
his idea with Innovative’s president, who expressed interest in the
project. Rather than aiding Brooks in developing and marketing
his Salem project, however, Innovative allegedly encouraged
another of its clients “to develop and pursue a Salem television
project ‘remarkably’ and not so coincidentally similar to Brooks’[s]
idea.” The competing Salem project “was sold to FOX 21, ran for
several seasons, and generated in excess of $1.5 million in revenue
to [Innovative’s other client].” Brooks discovered the competing
Salem project shortly before the show’s second season when he saw
a billboard advertising the program using the phrase “witch among
us”—a tagline Brooks contends he developed. (Capitalization
omitted.)
       In September 2016, Brooks filed a claim against Innovative in
arbitration based on the agency’s alleged wrongdoing in promoting

      2 We summarize here only the facts and procedural history
relevant to our resolution of this appeal. We draw many of the
facts in this summary from the allegations of Brooks’s complaint.
(See Pointe San Diego, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 269 [“[b]ecause
[the court was] reviewing a judgment on the pleadings . . . , [it]
base[d] [the] factual description on the allegations of the complaint
and documents that were properly the subject of judicial notice”].)
We express no view, however, concerning the veracity of the
complaint’s allegations.

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the competing Salem project. He asserted causes of action for
breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraudulent
concealment and constructive fraud.
       On April 28, 2017, approximately seven months after filing
the arbitration claim, Brooks retained Diggs to represent him
in the proceedings. Brooks contends that Diggs “oftentimes was
distracted by other pleasures in life,” and that his “performance
[therefore] fell well below the standard of care that one would
expect an attorney to provide to his client.”
       Brooks alleges, for example, that Diggs “would sometimes
be noticeably intoxicated” during case-related calls. In addition,
“Diggs’[s] [alleged] failure to timely and adequately retain
and prepare expert witnesses—including a damage expert—
led directly to their disqualification and exclusion during the
arbitration.” (Capitalization omitted.) Diggs also purportedly
neglected to prepare Brooks himself adequately for deposition,
“fail[ing] to meet with Brooks as promised,” and instead “merely
provid[ing] a general outline of how depositions work.” Finally,
Diggs allegedly attempted to withdraw from the arbitration on
the eve of the originally scheduled November 2017 hearing date
in a manner suggesting that Diggs “believed that Brooks’[s] lawsuit
against [Innovative] was without good cause.”
       Brooks contends further that “[d]espite filing a motion to
withdraw, Diggs astoundingly failed to also request a continuance
of the arbitration hearing” and related deadlines. “Instead, Diggs
brazenly . . . continued to act as Brooks’[s] counsel for the following
two weeks, filing and agreeing with [Innovative] on witness lists,
exhibit lists, and expert designations,” and improperly excluding
from the lists “experts that Brooks had previously named.”
       Soon thereafter, Brooks fired Diggs and obtained a
continuance of the arbitration hearing to August 2018. The

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arbitrator ruled, however, “that because Diggs had already filed
witness and exhibit[ ] lists, Brooks would be unable to amend
those filings once he obtained new counsel.” Brooks contends
that “Diggs’[s] failure to immediately seek a continuance of the
arbitration hearing and filing deadlines upon moving to withdraw
[thus] put [him] at a disadvantage for the rest of the case as his new
counsel was ultimately unable to rework or renegotiate the witness
list and exhibit list.”
       The six-day arbitration hearing commenced on August 24,
2018, and concluded on September 29, 2018. On June 3, 2019,
the arbitrator issued his award, ruling against Brooks and
granting $170,550.97 in sanctions to Innovative based on the
“ ‘unwarranted delays of Brooks and his previous counsel.’ ”
(Boldface & capitalization omitted.) The superior court eliminated
the sanctions imposed against Brooks, but otherwise confirmed
the arbitrator’s award in a February 28, 2020 order.
       On October 20, 2020, Brooks filed a complaint against Diggs
asserting causes of action for professional negligence, breach of
fiduciary duty, and breach of contract. In response, Diggs moved
for judgment on the pleadings on statute of limitations grounds.
       The trial court granted the motion without leave to amend,
explaining “[Brooks] suffered actionable harm causing the [one-
year] statute of limitations to accrue when the arbitrator issued
the award on June 3, 2019. [Brooks] did not file the complaint until
over one year later, on October 20, 2020. As such, [Brooks’s] legal
malpractice claim is barred by the statute of limitations.”3

      3 Brooks did not raise before the trial court any argument
concerning the Judicial Council’s COVID-19 emergency tolling
rules.

                                     6
(Capitalization omitted.) The court then issued an order dismissing
Brooks’s complaint with prejudice.
      Brooks timely appealed.

                            DISCUSSION
      A.    Standard of Review
       “ ‘ “The standard of review for a motion for judgment on
the pleadings is the same as that for a general demurrer: We
treat the pleadings as admitting all of the material facts properly
pleaded, but not any contentions, deductions or conclusions
of fact or law contained therein. . . . We review the complaint
de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state
a cause of action under any theory.” ’ [Citation.]” (Tarin v. Lind
(2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 395, 403–404.)

      B.    Law Governing Limitations Period for Legal
            Malpractice Claims
      “The statute of limitations for legal malpractice actions
is contained in . . . section 340.6, subdivision (a).[4] Under this

      4 Section 340.6, subdivision (a) provides, in relevant part:
“[a]n action against an attorney for a wrongful act or omission,
other than for actual fraud, arising in the performance of
professional services shall be commenced within one year after
the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence
should have discovered, the facts constituting the wrongful act
or omission, or four years from the date of the wrongful act or
omission, whichever occurs first. . . . Except for a claim for which
the plaintiff is required to establish the plaintiff ’s factual innocence,
the time for commencement of legal action shall not exceed four
years except that the period shall be tolled during the time that . . .
the following exist[s]: [¶] (1) the plaintiff has not sustained actual
injury.” (§ 340.6, subd. (a)(1).)

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statute, the one-year limitations period generally commences
when the plaintiff actually or constructively discovers the facts
of the wrongful act or omission . . . . [Citations.] However, this
limitations period is tolled until the plaintiff suffers actual loss
or damage resulting from the allegedly negligent actions.” (Pointe
San Diego, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 275.) “For purposes of
the tolling rule, the ‘test for actual injury under section 340.6 . . .
is whether the plaintiff has sustained any damages compensable in
an action.’ ” (Pointe San Diego, supra, at p. 275, quoting Jordache
Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th
739, 751 (Jordache), italics added.)
       The determination of actual injury does not “depend on
facile, ‘bright line’ rules. [Citations.] Instead, the particular
facts of each case must be examined in light of the wrongful act
or omission the plaintiff alleges against the attorney.” (Jordache,
supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 764.) In performing this inquiry, “ ‘the
fact of damage, rather than the amount, is the critical factor.’
[Citation.] Thus, a plaintiff sustains ‘actual injury’ when he or
she incurs attorney fees to rectify the problem caused by the prior
attorney’s alleged negligence. [Citation.] Further, actual injury
may occur even if the loss is contingent on an appeal or other final
adjudication. [Citations.] The analysis ‘concerns whether “events
have developed to a point where plaintiff is entitled to a legal
remedy, not merely a symbolic judgment such as an award of
nominal damages.” [Citation.] However, once the plaintiff suffers
actual harm, neither difficulty in proving damages nor uncertainty
as to their amount tolls the limitations period.’ [Citation.]”
(Pointe San Diego, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at pp. 275–276.)
       “Although it is well settled that ‘determining when actual
injury occurred is predominantly a factual inquiry[,] [citations]
[w]hen the material facts are undisputed, the trial court can resolve

                                      8
the matter as a question of law.’ ” (Truong v. Glasser (2009) 181
Cal.App.4th 102, 111 (Truong).)

      C.    The Trial Court Properly Granted Judgment on
            the Pleadings in Favor of Diggs
       Brooks does not dispute he was contemporaneously aware
of Diggs’s alleged negligence in 2017, nearly three years before
he filed his malpractice complaint. He nonetheless contends his
claims are timely because he did not sustain actual injury within
the meaning of section 340.6 until the superior court confirmed the
arbitration award on February 28, 2020. Alternatively, he argues
that even if he sustained actual injury at the time of the arbitrator’s
June 3, 2019 award, the tolling provided due to the COVID-19
pandemic under California Rules of Court, emergency rule 9
renders his claims timely.5
       We agree with Diggs, however, that Brooks’s claims are
time-barred because the face of the complaint discloses that Brooks
suffered actual injury no later than the conclusion of the arbitration
hearing in September 2018. Brooks concedes that he incurred
fees for replacement counsel’s services at the time of the 2018
arbitration. He also acknowledges the many cases recognizing the
established principle that fees incurred as a result of an attorney’s
effort to correct another attorney’s alleged malpractice constitute
actual injury for purposes of section 340.6. (See Jordache, supra,
18 Cal.4th at p. 751 [“attorney fees incurred as a direct result of
another’s tort are recoverable damages”]; Callahan v. Gibson, Dunn

      5 California Rules of Court, emergency rule 9 provides,
in relevant part: “Notwithstanding any other law, the statutes
of limitations and repose for civil causes of action that exceed
180 days are tolled from April 6, 2020, until October 1, 2020.”
(Cal. Rules of Court, emergency rule 9(a).)

                                      9
& Crutcher LLP (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 557, 575 [plaintiffs
“suffered actual injury when . . . [they] were required to incur
attorney fees to respond to [a] claim” resulting from their former
attorneys’ alleged negligence]; Pointe San Diego, supra, 195
Cal.App.4th at pp. 275–276 [“a plaintiff sustains ‘actual injury’
when he or she incurs attorney fees to rectify the problem caused
by the prior attorney’s alleged negligence”]; Truong, supra, 181
Cal.App.4th at p. 114 [“[p]laintiffs first sustained actual injury
when they were required to obtain and pay new counsel to file
a lawsuit seeking to escape the consequences of . . . signing [a]
lease and lease addendum, which were among the actual damages
plaintiffs suffered as a result of [their former attorney’s] alleged
malpractice,” capitalization omitted].)
       Brooks contends, however, that these cases are
distinguishable because they involve fees incurred “in litigation
arising because of the malpractice.” He urges that here, in contrast,
he “elected to pursue arbitration proceedings against his former
talent agency well before Diggs had provided legal representation or
committed any malpractice.” Thus, Brooks insists, “the meter was
running on legal fees, independent of any malpractice by Diggs.”
Brooks argues further that, once the alleged malpractice occurred,
he necessarily had to pay either Diggs or replacement counsel to
correct or mitigate Diggs’s errors. And because discovery might
reveal that Diggs would have charged more than replacement
counsel to do so, Brooks insists that we cannot determine at
the pleading stage whether he suffered any injury as a result
of retaining replacement counsel.
       But in assessing actual injury, “ ‘the fact of damage, rather
than the amount, is the critical factor.’ ” (Pointe San Diego, supra,
195 Cal.App.4th at p. 275.) “ ‘[O]nce the plaintiff suffers actual
harm, neither difficulty in proving damages nor uncertainty as to

                                    10
their amount tolls the limitations period.’ ” (Id. at p. 276.)
Here, the face of Brooks’s complaint discloses that at least some
portion of his replacement counsel’s fees resulted from efforts
to correct Diggs’s alleged errors. Brooks alleges, for example,
that replacement counsel “was ultimately unable to rework or
renegotiate the witness list and exhibit list” for the arbitration
hearing and “could not unring the proverbial bell Diggs had
rung about his doubts in Brooks and the case.” In addition, the
complaint seeks as damages the entirety of the $323,000 charged
by Brooks’s replacement counsel in connection with the arbitration.
The complaint thus alleges that Brooks incurred at least some
of replacement counsel’s fees only because of Diggs’s alleged
malpractice. We therefore are not persuaded by Brooks’s attempts
to distinguish the authorities on which Diggs relies.
       Accordingly, we conclude that Brooks suffered actual injury
no later than September 2018. Brooks therefore filed his October
2020 complaint outside the operative one-year limitations period,
and the trial court properly granted judgment on the pleadings for
Diggs.6

      6 Although the trial court reached its ruling through
reasoning different from that we employ here, we affirm an
order granting judgment on the pleadings if it “is correct upon
any theory of law applicable to the case.” (Tukes v. Richard
(2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1, 19.)

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                         DISPOSITION
       The June 9, 2022 order is affirmed. Respondents are awarded
their costs on appeal.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                        ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

                 CHANEY, J.

                 WEINGART, J.

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