Court Opinion

ID: 9776245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:28:30.978437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:36.268409
License: Public Domain

DONNELLY, Judge,
dissenting.
As the principal opinion indicates, recovery is authorized under § 287.780, RSMo 1978, only if an exclusive causal relationship is demonstrated between plaintiff’s actions and defendant’s actions. This means that if the evidence demonstrates that the employer had cause for terminating the employment other than for the employee’s exercise of his rights under the Workers’ Compensation Law, the employee cannot recover. Arie v. Intertherm, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 142, 149 (Mo.App.1983). The reason for this is that Workers’ Compensation Laws are intended only to compensate employees for job-related injuries; they are not intended to insure job security. Davis v. Richmond Special Road Dist., 649 S.W.2d 252, 255-56 (Mo.App.1983); Rodriguez v. Civil Service Commission, 582 S.W.2d 354, 356 (Mo.App.1979).
In this case, the employer’s termination letter of October 17, 1977, was sent three days before Hansome filed his Workers’ Compensation claim on October 20, 1977. Hansome received full benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Law, and nothing in the record suggests that Great Lakes did anything to discourage, thwart, or hamper him in the pursuit of his rights. His employer’s explanation for the discharge was its need for a full complement of employees due to the workload, and its inability to assess his job performance at the end of his sixty working day probationary period because he had only worked one week during that time. It was willing to rehire him as a probationary employee to give him a second opportunity to demonstrate his ability, and to provide itself time to evaluate his performance. Under these facts, the jury could not reasonably conclude that Han-some’s exercise of his rights under the Workers’ Compensation Law constituted the exclusive cause of his termination by Great Lakes.
In requiring that an injured employee must be insured his subsequent return to work, the principal opinion puts employers in an untenable position. See Davis, 649 S.W.2d at 255-56. This was not the intent of the Workers’ Compensation Law.
I respectfully dissent.