Court Opinion

ID: 9811281
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:15:18.276603+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:24.288201
License: Public Domain

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of a *927settlement agreement, the defendant Concetta Petrucci appeals, as limited by her brief, (1) from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Brandveen, J.), entered August 8, 2012, as directed a hearing on her motion for summary judgment, in effect, determining that this action is one involving public petition and participation within the meaning of Civil Rights Law § 76-a, dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against her, and on her counterclaim pursuant to Civil Rights Law § 70-a, and (2) from so much of an order of the same court entered March 11, 2013, as, upon reargument, vacated so much of the order entered August 8, 2012, as directed a hearing on her motion for summary judgment, and thereupon, in effect, denied her motion, and the plaintiffs cross-appeal, as limited by their brief, (1) from so much of the order entered August 8, 2012, as directed a hearing on the defendant Concetta Petrucci’s motion for summary judgment, and (2) from so much of the order entered March 11, 2013, as, in effect, denied that branch of their motion which was, in effect, for summary judgment determining that this action is not one involving public petition and participation within the meaning of Civil Rights Law § 76-a.
Ordered that the appeal and cross appeal from the order entered August 8, 2012, are dismissed as academic, without costs or disbursements, in light of the subsequent vacatur of the portions of that order appealed and cross-appealed from in the order entered March 11, 2013, and our determination of the appeal and cross appeal therefrom; and it is further,
Ordered that the order entered March 11, 2013, is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof, upon reargument, in effect, denying that branch of the defendant Concetta Petrucci’s motion which was for summary judgment, in effect, determining that this action is one involving public petition and participation within the meaning of Civil Rights Law § 76-a, and substituting therefor a provision, upon reargument, granting that branch of the motion; as so modified, the order entered March 11, 2013, is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, upon reargument, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the motion of the defendant Concetta Petrucci (hereinafter Petrucci) which was for summary judgment, in effect, determining that this action is one involving public petition and participation within the meaning of Civil Rights Law § 76-a, commonly known as a strategic lawsuit against public participation, or SLAPP suit.
Civil Rights Law § 76-a (1) provides, in relevant part:
*928“(a) An ‘action involving public petition and participation’ is an action, claim, cross claim or counterclaim for damages that is brought by a public applicant or permittee, and is materially related to any efforts of the defendant to report on, comment on, rule on, challenge or oppose such application or permission.
“(b) ‘Public applicant or permittee’ shall mean any person who has applied for or obtained a permit, zoning change, lease, license, certificate or other entitlement for use or permission to act from any government body, or any person with an interest, connection or affiliation with such person that is materially related to such application or permission.”
Here, the plaintiffs are “public permittees” within the meaning of the statute, since that term encompasses those who have obtained a lease from a government body, and the plaintiffs have obtained concessionary leases from the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (hereinafter the Port Authority). Moreover, those causes of action specifically asserted against Petrucci in the complaint are “materially related” to her efforts to report on those leases, since they are premised upon her statements to the Port Authority’s Office of the Inspector General (hereinafter the OIG) regarding whether the plaintiffs, inter alia, intentionally underreported their revenues and thus paid less rent than was owed under the leases. Inasmuch as the complaint alleges that Petrucci affirmatively instigated the subject investigations by the OIG in a calculated attempt to undermine the plaintiffs’ leases with the Port Authority, and that she made her statements directly to the governing body responsible for the leases (cf. Silvercorp Metals Inc. v Anthion Mgt. LLC, 36 Misc. 3d 660 [Sup Ct, NY County 2012]), Petrucci demonstrated her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law determining that this action is a SLAPP suit, and the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition. Accordingly, this action is properly characterized as a SLAPP suit (see generally National Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp. v Push Buffalo [People United for Sustainable Hous.], 104 AD3d 1307 [2013]; Goldstein v Held, 93 AD3d 689 [2012]; Novosiadlyi v James, 70 AD3d 793 [2010]; Singh v Sukhram, 56 AD3d 187 [2008]; Matter of Related Props., Inc. v Town Bd. of Town / Vil. of Harrison, 22 AD3d 587 [2005]).
However, Petrucci was not entitled to summary judgment dismissing those causes of action specifically asserted against her in the complaint, or on her counterclaim pursuant to Civil Rights Law § 70-a: While we share the dissent’s concern for safeguarding the rights of citizens to comment on matters of public concern, and we acknowledge that “Civil Rights Law *929§ 76-a was enacted to provide special protection for defendants in actions arising from the exercise of their rights of public petition and participation by deterring SLAPP actions” (Novosiadlyi v James, 70 AD3d at 794; see Allan & Allan Arts v Rosenblum, 201 AD2d 136, 143-144 [1994]), we conclude that the plaintiffs sustained their statutory burdens in opposition to the motion by demonstrating that the action “has a substantial basis in fact and law” (CPLR 3212 [h]; see Giorgio v Pilla, 100 AD3d 826 [2012]; Matter of Related Props., Inc. v Town Bd. of Town / Vil. of Harrison, 22 AD3d 587 [2005]). Indeed, the plaintiffs came forward with allegations and supporting evidence indicating that Petrucci, despite knowing or having reason to know that revenues were not intentionally under-reported and that rent was properly paid, falsely and maliciously advised Port Authority investigators that the plaintiffs were intentionally underreporting revenues from the leasehold premises and underpaying rent, and that she did so out of personal enmity and to disrupt the existing and prospective contractual and business relations between the plaintiffs and the Port Authority as well as to undermine the terms of a settlement agreement entered into between the plaintiffs and Petrucci’s father in 2007 (see generally Guard-Life Corp. v Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., 50 NY2d 183, 194 [1980]; Kevin Spence & Sons v Boar’s Head Provisions Co., 5 AD3d 352, 354 [2004]). Additionally, the plaintiffs submitted evidence demonstrating that the ensuing investigation resulted in a finding that they committed no wrongdoing. Moreover, while the truth or falsity of Petrucci’s statements was material to the causes of action asserted against her, the plaintiffs made an adequate showing that Petrucci’s statements to investigators were false and were known by her to be false or were made with reckless disregard of whether they were false (see Civil Rights Law § 76-a [2]; Singh v Sukhram, 56 AD3d 187 [2008]; cf. Goldstein v Held, 93 AD3d 689 [2012]; Novosiadlyi v James, 70 AD3d 793 [2010]). Accordingly, at this pre-discovery phase of the litigation, the plaintiffs’ submissions were sufficient to withstand Petrucci’s motion for summary judgment, and further proceedings are necessary to resolve the issues raised by the parties.
Petrucci’s contention regarding the holding of an immediate hearing to determine factual issues is unpersuasive (see CPLR 3212 [h]), and her contention regarding the statute of limitations, raised for the first time on appeal, is not properly before this Court (see Whitehead v City of New York, 79 AD3d 858 [2010]). The plaintiffs’ remaining contentions are without merit.
Mastro, J.P., Sgroi and Cohen, JJ., concur.