Court Opinion

ID: 9598830
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:12:21.65588+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:42.776514
License: Public Domain

Blackburn, Judge,
concurring specially.
I must concur specially with the majority as we are constrained to follow our precedent requiring plaintiff to establish an actual or constructive eviction under paramount outstanding title prior to an action for breach of warranty of title. See Akins v. Jones, 164 Ga. App. 705 (297 SE2d 341) (1982); McElmurray v. Marshall, 37 Ga. App. 725 (141 SE 670) (1927); Burns v. Vereen, 132 Ga. 349 (64 SE 113) (1909); McMullen v. Butler & Co., 117 Ga. 845 (45 SE 258) (1903); Reid v. McCune, 30 Ga. App. 49 (116 SE 554) (1923). Such a requirement is not contemplated by the statute which provides “[i]n actions for breach of warranty of title, the burden of proof is on the *481plaintiff except in cases where outstanding encumbrances have been paid off or possession has been yielded as a consequence of legal proceedings of which the warrantor had notice and an opportunity to defend.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 44-5-64. Furthermore, we have previously determined that “[a] breach of a covenant of warranty, if breached at all, is at least technically breached when the covenant is entered into and the damages are therefore to be assessed in accordance with the conditions as they existed at that time.” Teems v. City of Forest Park, 137 Ga. App. 733, 734 (225 SE2d 87) (1976). If the covenant is breached at the time it is entered, the additional element developed by the courts, i.e., constructive or actual eviction, is unnecessary and merely increases damages which may or may not be recoverable. See id.
Decided May 26, 1994
Reconsideration denied June 8, 1994
Joel D. Burns, for appellant.
D. Wayne Rogers, for appellees.