Court Opinion

ID: 9774625
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:27:19.38125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:51:33.173150
License: Public Domain

GLICKMAN, Associate Judge,
dissenting in part:
Instead of affirming appellant’s conviction for attempting to possess an unregistered handgun at a time when the District unconstitutionally refused to register handguns, I would follow the procedure we adopted in Plummer v. United States,1 and remand for a hearing on whether it was unconstitutional to apply the firearms registration statute to appellant.2 In my view, it should not make a difference that appellant, unlike Mr. Plummer, raised his Second Amendment challenge for the first time on appeal.
Appellant was tried and convicted before the Supreme Court decided, in District of Columbia v. Heller, that the District’s ban on handgun possession in the home violated the Second Amendment, and that the District henceforth must permit persons to register handguns for possession in the home unless they are disqualified from exercising • their Second Amendment rights.3 In response to Heller, this court in Plummer subsequently held it impermissible to convict someone of possessing an unregistered handgun in the home at a time when the District’s unconstitutional ban precluded registration, unless the person was disqualified from registering for reasons other than the ban. Because the record in Plummer did not establish whether the defendant in that case would have been able (but for the ban) to satisfy the constitutionally valid statutory prerequisites for registration, we remanded for a hearing on that issue.4 On a record devoid of the requisite inquiry and determination, the conviction in Plummer was tainted by its potential unconstitutionality and could not be affirmed.
Appellant’s conviction suffers from the same defect as Plummer’s, and his Second Amendment challenge to that conviction is the same one Plummer raised. While the defect was not plain at the time of appellant’s trial, it is plain now, in the wake of Heller and Plummer. Under Johnson v. United States,5 appellant therefore is entitled on appeal to present the same Second Amendment claim of error that Plummer presented, even though appellant did not raise it at trial the way Plummer did. And if appellant can satisfy the other requirements of plain error analysis, he therefore is entitled to the same relief on appeal as Plummer received.
In particular, it should not matter that appellant did not claim at trial that he could have met the valid requirements for registration, and that the record consequently does not conclusively show he could have done so. The appellant in Plummer never made such a claim either, *1179and the record on appeal in that case was similarly silent. That did not stop us from granting a remand in that case. Prior to Plummer, no one foresaw that we would require a defendant to make a record at trial of his ability to satisfy the valid registration requirements in order to prevail on his Second Amendment claim. And if a defendant in appellant’s shoes had, with preternatural foresight, tried to make the necessary record at a pre-Heller trial, the court almost certainly would not have allowed him to do so, on the ground that the evidence of his ability to comply with the valid requirements for registration was not relevant.
In point of fact, moreover, the record in this case is not entirely silent on the subject at issue, and if anything it suggests appellant may well have been able to meet the constitutionally valid requirements for registering a handgun. It is clear from the record that appellant was not disqualified by reason of his age — the record shows he was over 21 years old.6 He likewise was not disqualified by reason of prior criminal convictions — the government acknowledged on the record that he had none.7 While there were other requirements, which the record does not address, they were not onerous ones.8 It seems to me probable that most adults without a criminal record in the District of Columbia could have met those other requirements. We have no reason to suppose appellant could not have done so.
Absent any apparent reason why appellant would have been disqualified from exercising his Second Amendment rights, there exists a reasonable probability that his conviction was unconstitutional. And such a conviction undoubtedly calls into serious question the fairness, integrity and public reputation of the judicial proceeding. That satisfies the remaining requirements of plain error review.9

. 983 A.2d 323 (D.C.2009) (as amended May 20, 2010).

. I agree with my colleagues, for the reasons they state, that the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress his statement.

. -U.S.-, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2821-22, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008).

. Plummer, 983 A.2d at 342.

. 520 U.S. 461, 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997).

.See Thomas, 914 A.2d at 8, 21-22.

. See D.C.Code § 7-2502.03(a)(l).

. See id. § 7-2502.03(a)(2)-(4) (2001).

. The principal other statutory requirements were that the applicant for registration must not have a disqualifying mental health problem, addiction to drugs or alcohol, "physical defect," or vision impairment, or been adjudicated negligent in a serious "firearm mishap”; and that the applicant must pass a test demonstrating his or her knowledge of the District’s firearms laws and the safe and responsible use of firearms. See id. §§ 7-2502.03(a)(5) — (11); 22-4503(a)(l) (2001).