Court Opinion

ID: 9584426
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:48:11.054332+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:48.248717
License: Public Domain

Bowles, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case. When the opinion of this court in Presbyterian Church in the U. S. v. Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church, 224 Ga. 61 (159 SE2d 690) (1968), was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States (393 U. S. 440 . (89 SC 601, 21 LE2d 658) (I960)), this court, reconsidering the matter in the light of the mandate from that court and consistent with its opinion, held: "1. The Supreme Court of the United States having stricken a portion of Georgia’s implied trust theory, the remainder falls also, and there is no implied trust on the local church property in favor of the general church. 2. Since legal title to the property is in the local churches, the judgments sustaining their claims to such property are affirmed.” (Emphasis supplied.) See: Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church, 225 Ga. 259 (167 SE2d 658) (1969).
I think I am safe in saying that it was then the consensus of the bench and bar in Georgia that there no longer existed an implied trust theory regarding church properties. However, in the body of that opinion this court said, "Therefore, a part of the rule having been stricken, the remainder falls with it, and there is no implied trust on the property in controversy. There was no other basis for a trust in favor of the general church, none being created by the deeds on the property, implied under the statutes of this state (Code Ann. §§ 108-106, 108-107), or required by the constitution of the general church. It will be remembered that the general church put no funds into this property.”
Later, this court decided in Carnes v. Smith, 236 Ga. 30, 36 (222 SE2d 322) (1976), and by a narrow 4 to 3 majority adopted a portion of the language of the opinion in Presbyterian Church v. Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church, supra, saying (in reference to that case), "This court, therefore, left open the possibility of an implied trust in favor of a general church where factors other than *349mere connectional relationship between a local and general church were present.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The decision goes on to point out that the deed to the church in that case was made in the year 1852 to the "trustees of the Methodist Episcopal Church at Mount Pleasant Academy ” (Emphasis supplied.) The decision also indicates that the church had been a connectional church from its inception in 1852 and was thus subject to the book of discipline and the constitution of the United Methodist Church (formerly known as Methodist Episcopal Church). The discipline of the church made clear that church property was held by local trustees for the benefit of the general church. In Carnes, the deed itself indicated that it was for the benefit of the general church, and there may have been an implied trust for the general church because at the time the deed of entrustment was executed in 1852, the discipline of both the local church and the connectional church provided that all properties were to be held for the benefit of the general church. Thus, we reintroduced an implied trust theory which Carnes, supra, held was based on "neutral principles of law.”
It is extremely difficult to differentiate those principles of church discipline which regulate conduct, some of which required refraining from the use of tobacco in this instance, and those which apply merely to property rights. It seems the requirement that all properties be held for unity of purpose by the common body is as much theological in its purpose and scope, in promoting church doctrine and a plan of salvation, as other doctrines which require adherence to creeds, tenets of faith or acts of omission nr commission on the part of the church members.
But assuming for the sake of discussion the church discipline that requires all properties to be owned by the general church is not doctrinal but is purely a "neutral principle of law” we note that this "neutral principle of law” existed at the time the deed of entrustment was made in the Carnes case in 1852 and, therefore, the so-called "implied trust” was created if at all by the execution and delivery of the deed in that case. But times change, judges change, and the doctrine of stare decisis seems to be less viable year by year. (See, Hall v. Hopper, *350234 Ga. 625, at 630 et seq.)
Now the majority goes one step further. When the deed in the present case was made in the year 1927, there was no church discipline local or connectional, which required church properties be owned by the general church. When the trustor, here a Mr. McKinnon, decided to make his deed of entrustment he made the same for the benefit of a church that had no such discipline. The entrustment clause said, "This deed is made to Franklin Tabernacle of the Holiness Baptist Church in Coffee County, Georgia, and to the deacons of said church, to be held in trust by them and their successors for said church.” (Emphasis supplied.) Upon the execution, delivery and acceptance of this deed, the trust to this property was created for the local church. There was no implied trust in favor of the general or connectional church and no discipline on which to rely as a neutral principle of law to make the beneficiary of the trust the general or connectional church. For 26 years the trustees of the local church held title to the local property for the benefit of the local congregation.
We unanimously approved the same theory as recently as last year in the case of Jones v. Wolfe, 241 Ga. 208, p. 211 (243 SE2d 860) (1978), where we said: "This case is distinguishable from Carnes, in which this court found an implied trust in favor of the general church, the United Methodist Church, because its book of discipline provided that 'title to all real property now owned or hereafter acquired by an unincorporated local church . .. shall be held by and/or conveyed to its duly elected trustees. . .and their successors in office,. . .in trust, nevertheless, for the use and benefit of such local church and the United Methodist Church.’ No language of similar import is to be found in the Presbyterian Book of Church Order contained in the stipulations of the parties in the present case. The trial court found that the Vineville Presbyterian Church had been a connectional church within the Augusta-Macon Presbytery and the Presbyterian Church in the United States but correctly held that rmore than a mere connectional relationship between the local and general church must exist’ to give rise to property rights in the general church.” (Emphasis *351supplied.)
In the.case now under consideration, after twenty-six years passed, the association’s discipline, not the local church’s discipline, was changed for the first time to read, "the association shall hold all church property, regardless if all members vote to change the church to some other faith.” Did the title by way of entrustment then and there change? Did the trust documents, and the trust beneficiaries change, ipso facto, from the local church to the connectional church? How then did title, legal or beneficial, get transferred from the local church to the connectional church? It was not done in the original deed of entrustment as we last year held in Jones v. Wolfe, supra, and there was no present transfer of title by any mesne conveyance. The majority opinion studiously avoids this question and suggests that the trustees of the local church held the property subject to that disciplinary rule for a period of 301 years and failed to contest its validity. The majority say that because of this and because it failed to contest the discipline of the association and because it accepted the benefits flowing from that relationship, "it cannot now deny the existence of a trust for the benefit of the general church.”
Without using the term, this language implies estoppel. Other states may have lax rules regarding the transfer of title to real estate by estoppel, but the law in Georgia in that regard is clear and there is no plausible way that a theory of estoppel can be relied upon to reach the result which four members of the court have reached in this case. See: Bennett v. Davis, 201 Ga. 58 (39 SE2d 3) (1946), and cits., and Jackson v. Lipham, 158 Ga. 557 (3) (123 SE 887) (1924).
In Coles v. Wilburn, 241 Ga. 322 (245 SE2d 273) (1978), we unanimously rejected a theory of estoppel even though in that case the connectional church had urged that an implied trust had arisen from the long *352relationship of over 50 years between the local church and the connectional church. There the associational by-laws required the local church to "incorporate legally” and to "deed their property as required” as set forth in the book of discipline. Nevertheless, we held unanimously that the local church had not deeded its property as required by the rules, and although we can assume the local church gained all the benefits from its long relationship over a 50 year period, no actual deed was made, the local church was not estopped, and no connectional relationship was established.2
What is left? Did the beneficiaries here enlarge their own entrustment without the consent of the trustor? As at common law, the trustees in Georgia hold title to the trust property. Kerr v. White, 52 Ga. 362 (1874). The record is void of any proof that any trustee has participated in or consented to any change if in fact a trustee could legally do so.3
"It may be stated as a general rule that a deed or other instrument creating a trust not subject to alteration or amendment by its terms, and entered into understandingly by the parties, cannot be modified or amended except with the consent of all the parties.” 52 ALR 686, citing Vason v. Gilbert, 99 Ga. 220 (25 SE 409) (1896). Also see, Watkins v. Watkins, 64 Ga. App. 344, 347 (13 SE2d 100) (1941).
Without specific authority to do so, the trust *353beneficiaries cannot modify the terms of a trust and they cannot revise provisions of the trust instrument to suit their own desires. Bogart on Trusts (5th Ed.) § 45; 89 CJS 892, Trusts, § 87(d) and cits.
The clear words of the McKinnon deed created, not an implied trust, but an express trust. The express trust was to the "local church.” The intention of the trustor is clear, the trustees are identifiable, the res is certain, and the cestui que trust was determined by the trust instrument. I know of no theory of the law that beneficiaries of a trust indenture, without specific authority, can change the entrustment and make it for the benefit of another.
The wishes and intent of the original trustor should be carried out and should not be modified by any unauthorized act of the trustees, the beneficiaries or the courts. This can be done without deciding whether the action of the beneficiaries made the local church a connectional church or whether it remains, congregational. All entrustments do not fall in one or the other of these categories. The right of the trustor to create such a property interest was clearly recognized in the early case of Watson v. Jones, 80 U. S. (13 Wall.) 666.
A bare majority of this court prevails. A majority of the members of the local church lose all their property. Incredible!
I am authorized to state that Justice Jordan joins in this dissent.

The facts indicated plaintiffs were chartered in 1953. There was evidence that an association may have adopted the by-laws in 1947 or 20 years after the trust deed.

If estoppel is not the premise, are we to accept the theory, that were a local church a member of an association of churches and the association adopts a bylaw making all church properties connectional, title to local church property then and there divests?

Although there is clear legal distinction and purpose in the significance and identity of the trustor, the trustees and the cestui que trust, no attempt has been made to separate their actions, duties and responsibilities in this case. The opinion uses unclear expressions such as "But the contest is between the original parties, both participated in creation of the trust through the passage of church discipline.” (Emphasis supplied.)