Court Opinion

ID: 9955349
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 14:07:57.406233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:34.648972
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1460-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ALBERTO SCABONE, a/k/a
ALBERTO ESCABONE,
and ALBERTO ROMERO,

     Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________

                   Submitted February 5, 2024 – Decided March 28, 2024

                   Before Judges Gilson and DeAlmeida.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 80-08-4225.

                   Alberto Scabone, appellant pro se.

                   Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex County
                   Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Frank J. Ducoat,
                   Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant
                   Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      In 1993, a jury convicted defendant Alberto Scabone of two counts of

first-degree murder for killing his mother-in-law and sister-in-law, N.J.S.A.

2C:11-3, one count of second-degree passion/provocation manslaughter for

killing his wife, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(2), and one count of second-degree arson,

N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(a)(2). Defendant had committed the crimes in 1981 but then

fled the country. Twelve years later, he was arrested in Central America and

brought to the United States to stand trial. The evidence at trial established that

defendant stabbed each of the victims multiple times and, thereafter, set the

apartment on fire to cover up the crimes. Representing himself, defendant

appeals from a December 7, 2022 order denying his motion to correct an alleged

illegal sentence. Defendant's sentence was not illegal, and we affirm.

      In January 1994, defendant was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of

eighty years, with forty years of parole ineligibility. On each of the murder

convictions, he was sentenced to thirty years in prison, with fifteen years of

parole ineligibility.   On the manslaughter and arson convictions, he was

sentenced on each to ten years in prison, with five years of parole ineligibility.

All those sentences were run consecutively.

      Defendant filed a direct appeal challenging his convictions and sentence

as excessive. We rejected those arguments and affirmed the convictions and

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sentence. State v. Scabone, No. A-3498-93 (App. Div. Nov. 14, 1995). The

Supreme Court denied certification. State v. Scabone, 143 N.J. 330 (1996).

      Thereafter, defendant filed two petitions for post-conviction relief (PCR).

Both petitions were denied, and we affirmed those denials. State v. Scabone,

No. A-1491-96 (App. Div. May 7, 1998); State v. Scabone, No. A-2539-11

(App. Div. Feb. 27, 2014).       The Supreme Court denied certification on

defendant's appeal from the denial of his first petition for PCR.       State v.

Scabone, 156 N.J. 410 (1998). Defendant did not file for certification to appeal

the denial of his second petition for PCR.

      Defendant also sought habeas corpus relief in the federal courts. That

request was denied at all levels of review. See Scabone v. Hendricks, 535 U.S.

1085 (2002).

      Meanwhile, defendant filed four motions, alleging that his sentence was

illegal. The first two motions were filed in 2004 and 2005. When those motions

were denied, defendant appealed, and we affirmed both orders denying the

motions. State v. Scabone, No. A-2992-04 (App. Div. Mar. 8, 2006). The

Supreme Court denied certification. State v. Scabone, 188 N.J. 491 (2006).

      Defendant filed a third motion in 2018, again alleging that his sentence

was illegal because the sentencing court erred by imposing four maximum and

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consecutive sentences. That motion was denied by the trial court in an order

and letter opinion issued on June 25, 2018. Defendant did not appeal from that

order.

         In November 2022, defendant filed his fourth motion to correct an alleged

illegal sentence. Defendant claimed his sentence constituted cruel and unusual

punishment and that his sentence "[was] illegal because there was no 'overall

fairness' assessment conducted before the imposition of four maximum

consecutive sentences. In addition, no explicit statement was provided on [the]

record concerning the 'overall fairness' of the aggravated sentence." The trial

court denied that motion in an order dated December 7, 2022.

         Defendant now appeals from the December 7, 2022 order denying his

fourth motion to correct an alleged illegal sentence. He contends:

               THE    [TRIAL]  COURT'S    DENIAL  OF
               DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CORRECT AN
               ILLEGAL SENTENCE IS NOT SUPPORTED BY
               SUFFICIENT, CREDIBLE, EVIDENCE IN THE
               RECORD THEREFORE, THE SENTENCE SHOULD
               BE VACATED AND A RESENTENCING HEARING
               SHOULD BE ORDERED.

         This argument is without sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion

in a written opinion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(2). Accordingly, we briefly summarize

why defendant's argument lacks merit.

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      Defendant's sentence is not illegal. All four of the sentences were in

accordance with the criminal code in effect at the time defendant committed his

crimes. See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b) (1995); N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(a)(2) (specifying

that the court shall fix a term between five and ten years for second-degree

crimes).   The code also permitted, and continues to permit, consecutive

sentences. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5.

      Defendant has made no showing and cited no law supporting his

contention that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment under

either the United States or New Jersey Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. VIII;

N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 12; see State v. Johnson, 206 N.J. Super. 341, 344-349 (App.

Div. 1985) (rejecting the defendant's argument that the thirty-year statutory

minimum sentence without parole eligibility for felony murder was violative of

the federal or State constitution).

      Defendant's real argument is that his sentence was excessive because his

sentences were run consecutively. He cites to State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246

(2021), and contends that he is entitled to resentencing because the sentencing

court failed to consider the overall fairness of the consecutive sentences. We

reject this argument for several reasons.

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         First, on direct appeal, and in our review of the denials of his prior motions

to correct the alleged illegal sentence, we have held that defendant's sentence

was legal and imposed in accordance with the law. State v. Scabone, No. A-

3498-93 (App. Div. Nov. 14, 1995); State v. Scabone, No. A-2992-04 (App.

Div. Mar. 8, 2006).

         Second, Torres did not create a new rule of law requiring retroactive

application to this matter where defendant was sentenced twenty-seven years

before Torres was issued. The Torres Court explained that its intention was "to

underscore" and "promote" the "concepts of uniformity, predictability, and

proportionality" that underlie the Yarbough factors. Torres, 246 N.J. at 252-53;

see State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985). Therefore, because Torres did not

announce a new rule of law, it is not applied retroactively. See State v. Feal,

194 N.J. 293, 307 (2008); State v. Burstein, 85 N.J. 394, 403 (1981) (explaining

"retroactivity can arise only where there has been a departure from existing

law").

         Finally, our review of the record convinces us that the sentencing court

considered the appropriate Yarbough factors and the overall fairness of the

sentence it imposed.        When sentencing defendant, the court stated that it

"reviewed the sentencing guidelines of Yarbough, 100 N.J. at 643-44" and

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would be "sentencing [defendant] in accordance with" them.               (Citation

reformatted). After discussing those guidelines, the court summarized that

defendant had committed four separate crimes and that the two murders and the

manslaughter involved "separate and distinct acts of violence." The sentencing

court then explained:

            What is clear is the crimes committed were
            predominantly independent of one another and they
            involved separate acts of violence. And it was likewise
            apparent from the trial proofs that all [three] victims
            were fully clothed and stabbed to death individually at
            different times as they entered the apartment. The fire
            was then set after all of the deaths had been completed
            to conceal the evidence and to assist [defendant] in
            making his [getaway].

      The sentencing court also explained why it was imposing the consecutive

sentences, thereby demonstrating that it understood the real-time consequences

of the sentence and was assessing the overall fairness of the sentence. In that

regard, the sentencing court stated that:

            The primary criteri[on] for the severity of punishment
            obviously is the gravity of . . . defendant's crimes here.
            They don't come any higher. We have, with the loss of
            [three] human people, their lives, all their careers,
            everything that they had going for them. . . . My
            primary rule is as the extent of [defendant's] brutality
            and violence rises, obviously so too should the number
            of years that [defendant] is locked up so he can't do [any
            more] damage to the community.

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                    So, it is therefore the intent of this Court by these
             consecutive sentences with parole ineligibility terms
             that [defendant] be sentenced to the maximum possible
             sentence allowed by the law and this is the only way
             that society can be protected and justice can be served.

       Finally, defendant takes issue with the procedure under which his fourth

motion to correct an alleged illegal sentence was handled. He complains that

the trial court denied the motion without hearing oral argument, without

assigning him counsel, without holding an evidentiary hearing, and without

issuing a written opinion explaining the rulings. While it would have been a

better practice for the trial court to have issued a written opinion with legal

citations, we discern no reason to remand this matter. 1 We have detailed the

procedural history, including defendant's two prior PCR petitions and three prior

motions to correct an alleged illegal sentence. Given that history, defendant was

not entitled to oral argument, assignment of counsel, or an evidentiary hearing.

The record establishes that defendant has been accorded all the process he is

due.

       Affirmed.

1
  The trial court's December 7, 2022 order was accompanied by a letter signed
by the judge's law clerk. The letter should have been signed by the judge and
should have contained a more detailed analysis with legal citations.
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