Court Opinion

ID: 9367599
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-01 15:00:37.444298+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:01.585430
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13103     Document: 25-1       Date Filed: 02/01/2023   Page: 1 of 9

                                                     [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                      In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-13103
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                         Plaintiff-Appellee,
       versus
       ROBERT WELLS,
       a.k.a. Jared Anthony Chaliz,

                                                     Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                 D.C. Docket No. 6:19-cr-00010-WWB-DCI-1
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       2                       Opinion of the Court                 22-13103

                            ____________________

       Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Robert Wells appeals his 12-month sentence imposed upon
       revocation of his supervised release. He argues that the district
       court erred by considering rehabilitation when imposing the prison
       sentence, in violation of Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011).
       He also contends that the district court erroneously believed it
       could shorten his prison term at a later time. We agree that plain
       Tapia error occurred, so we vacate and remand for resentencing.
                                         I.
              In 2018, Wells was convicted of unlawfully possessing a fire-
       arm after a felony conviction, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and sen-
       tence to eighteen months in prison followed by three years of su-
       pervised release. He began his term of supervision in February
       2021. In November 2021, the district court modified his conditions
       of supervision to include participation in mental health and sub-
       stance abuse treatment.
              In July 2022, a probation officer filed a superseding petition
       to revoke Wells’s supervised release, alleging three violations:
       (1) using marijuana; (2) failing to submit to urinalysis; and (3) being
       convicted of driving with a canceled or suspended license. Accord-
       ing to the probation officer’s supporting memorandum, during a
       urinalysis appointment in May 2022, Wells admitted using
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       22-13103               Opinion of the Court                       3

       marijuana to cope with marital, financial, and other stressors.
       Later at that same appointment, he admitted to adding water to
       dilute his urine sample. Wells gave a urine sample the following
       day under supervision, which was negative for illegal substances.
       A couple weeks later, Wells was pulled over for speeding and hav-
       ing an expired temporary tag. He told the officer he had no license,
       and a record check showed he had two prior convictions for driving
       with a suspended license. He was convicted and sentenced to 31
       days in jail, with credit for time served.
              Wells admitted the violations, and the district court adjudi-
       cated him guilty and revoked his supervised release. The court
       then calculated a guideline imprisonment range of 12 to 18 months,
       with a statutory maximum of two years.
              Wells’s counsel explained that it was the parties’ joint rec-
       ommendation for the district court to “vary from the guidelines”
       and “put Mr. Wells into a six-month Salvation Army program” for
       inpatient substance-abuse treatment while on the two-year maxi-
       mum term of supervised release. Defense counsel urged the court
       to allow Wells “to get treatment,” because he suffered from alco-
       hol abuse and mental-health disorders, including anxiety, depres-
       sion, and bipolar, and he was self-medicating with alcohol and ma-
       rijuana to cope with the stressors of providing for eight children.
             The government stated that it had agreed to the treatment
       proposal because it “get[s] at the heart of the issue, underlying
       both” his prior criminal conduct and the violations, which was
       “substance abuse.” While the program was “not the same” as
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                  22-13103

       incarceration, the government explained, it was restrictive enough
       that Wells was “not going to be out and about doing whatever or
       making bad choices for at least six months.”
              The district court disagreed with the joint recommendation,
       however, concluding that there “should be a punitive aspect to the
       violation as well to promote respect for the law.” The court noted
       that Wells disrespected the court and the law by attempting to
       cheat a urine test and committing a new criminal offense, which
       was conduct “altogether different than . . . simply smoking some
       pot or drinking alcohol.” So while the court exhorted Wells to fol-
       low through on making positive changes in his life, it determined
       that a prison term of 12 months was appropriate to account for his
       refusal to conform his behavior to the law despite being “given
       multiple opportunities.”
               Still, the district court emphasized its desire for Wells to re-
       ceive treatment. It stated that it would recommend him for the
       Bureau of Prisons’ residential drug-treatment program. It also
       wanted him to join the Salvation Army program upon his release
       “if there’s bed space available” and it was still recommended at that
       time, and to participate in “mental health treatment, either outpa-
       tient or inpatient.”
             The district court then proposed, “if it’s allowed,” permit-
       ting Wells to move to the Salvation Army program after serving
       six months in BOP custody if there was a bed available and he was
       “not getting any treatment in the BOP.” The court made clear it
       would, if it could, “sign that motion” permitting the transfer at six
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       22-13103               Opinion of the Court                         5

       months. But after defense counsel suggested there was no legal
       way for the sentence “to terminate early,” the court seemingly
       abandoned the idea, stating, “All right. I find the sentence is suffi-
       cient but not greater than necessary to comply with the statutory
       purposes of sentencing.” Wells made a sweeping objection that the
       sentence was “procedurally and substantively unreasonable.” He
       now appeals.
                                        II.
               Wells argues that the district court procedurally erred by
       considering his need for rehabilitation as a sentencing factor, in vi-
       olation of Tapia. Because Wells did not make an objection along
       these lines below, we review for plain error only. See United States
       v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014) (reviewing a
       Tapia argument for plain error); United States v. Carpenter, 803
       F.3d 1224, 1238 (11th Cir. 2015) (“A sweeping, general objection is
       insufficient to preserve specific sentencing issues for review.”).
              Under the plain-error standard, we may not reverse a sen-
       tence unless the district court committed an error that was plain or
       obvious and affected both the defendant’s substantial rights and the
       integrity and standing of the judiciary. United States v. Alberts, 859
       F.3d 979, 985 (11th Cir. 2017). An error does not affect a defend-
       ant’s substantial rights unless there is a “reasonable probability” of
       a different sentence absent the error. United States v. Rodriguez,
       398 F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2005).
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                22-13103

               In Tapia, the Supreme Court held the Sentencing Reform
       Act of 1984 prohibits federal courts from “imposing or lengthening
       a prison term in order to promote a criminal defendant’s rehabili-
       tation.” 564 U.S. at 321; see 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (stating that “im-
       prisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction
       and rehabilitation”). We have interpreted Tapia to mean that a
       district court errs whenever it “considers rehabilitation when craft-
       ing a sentence of imprisonment,” including a revocation sentence.
       Vandergrift, 754 F.3d at 1310. But the court is not wholly pre-
       vented from considering rehabilitation at sentencing. It may dis-
       cuss “opportunities for rehabilitation” in prison or recommend a
       defendant for a particular facility or drug-treatment program, so
       long as it does not rely on rehabilitative needs when crafting the
       prison sentence. Tapia, 564 U.S. at 334. It may also “consider a
       defendant’s rehabilitative needs when imposing sentences of pro-
       bation or supervised release.” Alberts, 859 F.3d at 986 n.3.
              Here, the district court’s comments were, for the most part,
       entirely consistent with Tapia. The court was permitted to recog-
       nize Wells’s need for treatment, to discuss treatment opportunities
       in prison and recommend him for a BOP program, and to consider
       his rehabilitative needs on supervised release by requiring him to
       complete a drug-treatment program if indicated at that time. See
       Tapia, 564 U.S. at 334; Alberts, 859 F.3d at 986 n.3. “So the sen-
       tencing court here did nothing wrong—and probably something
       very right—in trying to get [Wells] into an effective drug treatment
       program.” Tapia, 564 U.S. at 334.
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       22-13103                  Opinion of the Court                               7

               Nor did the district court rely on Wells’s rehabilitative needs
       when explaining its reasons for imposing the 12-month sentence.
       Despite believing that Wells “need[ed] some treatment,” the court
       rejected the parties’ treatment-only proposal because it concluded
       that there “should be a punitive aspect to the violation as well to
       promote respect for the law.” 1 It explained that a prison term was
       appropriate because of Wells’s refusal to conform his behavior to
       the law despite “multiple opportunities.” Wells’s rehabilitative
       needs were nothing more than an “ancillary concern” in the court’s
       explanation of its sentence, so they ordinarily would not be enough
       to establish plain error. See Alberts, 859 F.3d at 986 (“A defendant
       cannot show that his substantial rights were impacted if his reha-
       bilitative needs clearly constituted only a minor fragment of the
       court’s reasoning.” (quotation marks omitted)).
              But when we view the district court’s explanation in light of
       its ensuing comments, we are left with grave doubt whether the
       explanation applies to the whole prison term or just part of it. After
       imposing the 12-month sentence, the court opined that it would, if
       it could, allow Wells to transfer from BOP custody to the Salvation
       Army for drug treatment if he had “served at least six months of

       1 Ina passing footnote, Wells asserts that the district court made an “arguable
       error” when it considered the need for a “punitive aspect” to the sentence un-
       der 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). Wells did not adequately raise this issue on ap-
       peal, and he does not establish plain error, in any case. See Vandergrift, 754
       F.3d at 1308–09 (holding that it was not plainly erroneous to consider
       § 3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking supervised release because circuits were split
       and neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has resolved the issue).
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       8                          Opinion of the Court                     22-13103

       [his] sentence,” a bed was available, and he was “not getting any
       treatment in the BOP.” 2 The proposal, in other words, appears to
       have tied the last six months of his prison term to whether he was
       receiving treatment in prison. And under it, he would serve more
       time in prison if his rehabilitative needs were being met.
               The district court’s proposal, though ultimately abandoned,
       casts substantial doubt on its justification for the last six months of
       the sentence. After all, the court indicated its willingness to termi-
       nate or transfer custody at six months so that Wells could receive
       effective drug treatment outside the BOP, effectively making the
       12-month term half-prison and half-treatment. But if the purposes
       of sentencing apart from rehabilitation did not justify confining
       him after six months in that instance, it’s hard to see what purposes
       the court thought did justify confining him at all after six months,
       apart from his rehabilitative needs. That leaves the substantial pos-
       sibility that the court instead based the remainder of the sentence
       on Wells’s rehabilitative needs. 3

       2 The district court phrased its alternative proposal as Wells “serving six
       months of his [12-month] term in Salvation Army.” But the court did not
       identify a mechanism for Wells to serve a prison term outside of BOP custody.
       Rather, it appears, as the government suggested at sentencing, that the parties
       and the probation office contemplated the Salvation Army program as a con-
       dition of a new term of supervised release imposed on revocation.
       3 Notably, the probation officer indicated that the
                                                     BOP’s residential drug treat-
       ment program (“RDAP”) was “at least a yearlong program.”
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       22-13103               Opinion of the Court                         9

              Because the record indicates that the district court based the
       length of Wells’s sentence in part on his rehabilitative needs, which
       Tapia and Vandergrift plainly forbid, Wells has established the first
       two prongs of plain error. The third prong is also satisfied because
       there is a reasonable probability of a different result absent the er-
       ror. See Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1299. Far from a “minor fragment”
       of the court’s reasoning, the record shows that Wells’s rehabilita-
       tive needs may have been the dominant factor justifying the last six
       months of his prison sentence, given the court’s willingness to ter-
       minate or transfer custody of Wells to receive effective drug treat-
       ment after six months. Cf. Alberts, 859 F.3d at 986. And unlike
       Alberts, in which the district court’s Tapia error did not affect the
       defendant’s substantial rights because the court, before announc-
       ing the sentence, reemphasized—and without mentioning rehabil-
       itation—that its “primary concerns” were the seriousness of the of-
       fense, the need for punishment and deterrence, and the need to
       protect society, the district court in this case did not reemphasize
       the “punitive aspect” of Wells’s sentence. Finally, we elect to use
       our discretion to correct the error because it may well undermine
       judicial proceedings by causing “an unnecessary deprivation of lib-
       erty.” See United States v. Moore, 22 F.4th 1258, 1265 (11th Cir.
       2022) (quotation marks omitted).
             For these reasons, we vacate Wells’s 12-month revocation
       sentence and remand for resentencing.
              VACATED AND REMANDED.