Court Opinion

ID: 9532975
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:26:48.793823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:52.926189
License: Public Domain

ALEXANDER, J.,
with whom CLIFFORD, J., joins, dissenting.
[¶ 37] I concur with the Court that the termination hearing judge properly considered the findings and conclusions entered by other judges at earlier stages of this proceeding. I also concur with the Court that the termination hearing judge erred in interpreting 22 M.R.S.A. § 4055 to require that: “The best interest factor takes precedence over the fault factors .... ” However, I do not agree with the Court that, in this case, the trial court’s misallo-cation of the order of factfinding requires that the termination decision be vacated. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 38] Based on the findings made by the trial court regarding the parental unfitness prerequisites for termination, which were supported by clear and convincing evidence, there is no way that we can conclude that the trial court’s result was “inconsistent with substantial justice” under the civil standard, M.R. Civ. P. 61, or that the trial court’s misordering of the findings affected “substantial rights” under the criminal standard. M.R.Crim.P. 52(a).
[¶ 39] Our precedent applying the harmless error standard in both civil and criminal cases is not significantly different. For civil cases, error is harmless if it is highly probable that the error did not affect the judgment. Lawton v. Richmond, 1997 ME 34, ¶ 14, 690 A.2d 953, 956; Midland Fiberglass, Inc. v. L.M. Smith Corp., 581 A.2d 402, 403 (Me.1990). For criminal cases, “error is harmless when it is highly probable that it did not affect the jury’s verdict.” State v. DeMass, 2000 ME 4, ¶ 17, 743 A.2d 233, 237. We have also said that error is not harmless if a “substantial right” of the party is affected. State v. Phillipo, 623 A.2d 1265, 1268 (Me.1993). To determine if error is harmless, we review the whole record of the case. See State v. York, 1997 ME 156, ¶ 11, 705 A.2d 692, 695.
[¶ 40] The termination hearing judge’s misallocation of the order of factfinding, an allocation invited by the order for findings set in section 4055 itself, must be examined in the context of the whole record of this case and the termination hearing judge’s extensive decision. The entire paragraph of the decision, where the trial court *1156opined that “the best interest factor takes precedence,” reads as follows:
The best interest factor takes precedence over the fault factors under existing law as amended a few years ago. Obviously the court must find that in addition to the best interests factor, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the parent or parents are unwilling or unable to protect the child from jeopardy within a reasonable time that meets the children’s needs or that the parent or parents are unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the child within a time which is reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs; or the parent has failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with the child pursuant to section 4041 of T22.
[¶ 41] From this paragraph, it is apparent that, despite stating that best interest “takes precedence,” the trial court acknowledged that, as a prerequisite to termination of parental rights, the trial court was required to find parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence. With the necessity for finding parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence acknowledged, the trial court then proceeded to find the mother an unfit parent. The Court agrees that this finding was appropriate with regard to the mother and not a basis to vacate, even if the order of findings was misplaced.
[¶ 42] Regarding the father’s fitness, the trial court, after addressing best interests, made the following findings:
This court further concludes that [the father] is both unwilling and unable to protect his child from jeopardy even to this day. The evidence is clear and convincing concerning this conclusion as well. The Department has provided an abundance of services to [the father] as it did with [the mother] in an effort to reunify and rehabilitate [the father]. He has not complied with the services by refusing to accept the fact and conclusion that [the mother] cannot care for her children without the implementation of extensive and long term services. The child Kaleb cannot wait for his father to come around and become realistic. He still insists that [the mother] can parent his child. Time is of the essence.
This is a finding of parental unfitness consistent with the terms of 22 M.R.S.A. § 4055(l)(B)(2)(b)(i).
[¶ 43] The record developed from the Department’s year and a half involvement with the parents, including findings by another judge at an earlier stage of the proceeding,19 provides virtually undisputed support20 for the trial judge’s findings. From the Department’s initial involvement with the family in April 1999, significant efforts were made through many caseworkers and counselors to get the father to realistically understand the mother’s problems and to take leadership in parenting the children and protecting them from the mother. Despite all of these efforts, over eighteen months, the father continually refused to take a leadership role, to acknowledge and address the mother’s significant problems, or to assure that the children would be protected from the mother. No caseworker, no counselor, no one who had had significant involvement with the case indicated that, with this rec*1157ord, they believed that the father was likely to soon change direction and become willing and able to protect Scott and/or Kaleb from jeopardy or that the father’s obdurate refusals to recognize and address the mother’s problems were likely to change within a time which was reasonably calculated to meet Scott or Kaleb’s needs. The trial court’s finding of parental unfitness pursuant to section 4055(l)(B)(2)(b)(i) was not effected by its error in referencing best interests — beyond any doubt.
[¶ 44] Because of the court’s finding that the father “still insists that [the mother] can parent his child,” it is also evident that the court could have found, had it addressed the issue, that the father was “unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the child within a time which is reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.” 22 M.R.S.A. § 4055(l)(B)(2)(b)(ii). This also appears established, without dispute, from the parents’ eighteen-month track record prior to the termination order.
[¶ 45] This is not a case where a trial court, or a jury, did not make an essential finding. Cf. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 85 (1999); State v. Griffin, 487 A.2d 247, 249 (Me.1984). Although, even such a failure to find an essential fact may be harmless error. Neder, 527 U.S. at 18-20, 119 S.Ct. 1827. Here, the trial court found all the essential facts. It applied the proper standard of proof, and its findings are fully supported by the record. Its only error is its rhetorical reference to the primacy of the best interest issue.
[¶ 46] Last year in In re William S., 2000 ME 34, 745 A.2d 991, we recognized that “[c]hild protection cases are unique. Everyone involved in the case must act in an expeditious manner for the best interest of the child.” Id. at ¶ 13, 745 A.2d at 996. We also observed that “[a]ny delay potentially harms a child who has already endured significant trauma and is in dire need of permanency.” Id.21
[¶ 47] To remand the case now only delays what the factual history suggests is the inevitable. As the court found last year: “The child Kaleb cannot wait for his father to come around and become realistic.... Time is of the essence.” We ignore those findings if we now vacate and remand to the trial court for what will have to be a reopened testimonial hearing, since the facts testified to by every person who had significant involvement with the case point to the result reached by the trial court. The trial court may have erred in stating that the best interest factor “takes precedence” over the parental fitness factors. But the trial court then proceeded to address the parental fitness factors with findings adverse to the parents by clear and convincing evidence.
[¶ 48] In reaching its findings, the trial court followed the order suggested by the statute. There is nothing in the trial court’s opinion to suggest that the “best interest” findings led to, or controlled, the unfitness findings. The Court’s opinion does not and could not suggest that the evidence is insufficient to support the independent findings of parental unfitness which the trial court reached by clear and convincing evidence. Because those findings are independent and adequately supported by the record, any error which the court made in rhetorically discussing the best interest standard is, without any doubt, harmless. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.

. The findings in the jeopardy order dated November 1, 1999, compared with the trial court’s finding nearly a year later, October 5, 2000, indicate little change and little progress in the father’s situation in the intervening year.

. Fairly read, the testimony offered to support the parents by members of their church reflected some problems seen, even in the narrow context in which they were familiar with the parents’ home life and parenting skills.

. In William S., a child protective case, we found error, but affirmed applying an "obvious error” analysis.