Court Opinion

ID: 9631497
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:40:12.301014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:25.670130
License: Public Domain

WATT, J,
with whom SUMMERS, V.C.J., SIMMS, and HARGRAVE, JJ., join, dissenting.
I must recede from the Court’s pronouncement today that the subject appeal was timely filed. Clearly, until today extant jurisprudence and the clear language of 12 O.S.Supp. 1996, § 990A would have dictated the dismissal of this appeal as untimely. Today’s decision creates yet another loophole and another exception to a statute which is clear on its face and has stood the test of time in the appellate process. Under today’s ruling and the facts of this case, twenty (20) days does not equal twenty (20) days anymore. It can now mean twenty-one (21) days and the Court’s order today effectively legislates an amendment to an otherwise unambiguous statute and appears to do away completely with the certified mail requirements which presently exist in the statute.
The Court, by its sua sponte consideration of this most important jurisdictional issue, attempts to solve a problem which does not exist. If there is a problem at all it is the fact that practitioners procrastinate and wait until the eleventh hour when the statutory time requirements could easily be met by timely attention to appellate matters. If indeed, this “problem” existed, it is one for the legislature to resolve and not this Court. For the foregoing reasons, I must respectfully dissent.
SUMMERS, V.C.J., dissenting, joined by SIMMS, HARGRAVE, and WATT, JJ.
¶ 1 To qualify for the “mailing rule” the Legislature has written into law the requirement of sending the petition “by certified mail return receipt requested”. 12 O.S.1997 Supp. § 990A(B). The amendments referred in the opinion in no way confuse or lessen that requirement. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, and does not appear to be facially unconstitutional, I would give effect to its words as written.