Court Opinion

ID: 9941917
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-19 11:09:42.397904+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:23.209600
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________
          No. 02-23-00073-CV
     ___________________________

    VECENTIE MORALES, Appellant

                      V.

            A. D. W., Appellee

  On Appeal from the 233rd District Court
          Tarrant County, Texas
      Trial Court No. 233-719643-22

  Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Walker, JJ.
  Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Vecentie Morales, acting pro se, appeals from a lifetime protective order

rendered against him pursuant to Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal

Procedure. We will affirm.

                                 I. BACKGROUND

       Pursuant to Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the Tarrant

County Criminal District Attorney’s Office filed an application on behalf of A.D.W.1

for a lifetime protective order against Morales. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.

art. 7B.001(a)(1), (3). Morales, who is currently incarcerated, was served via the Texas

Department of Criminal Justice law library for his assigned prison unit. The citation

provided Morales notice that a hearing on the application would be held on April 12,

2023, but despite receiving this notice, Morales did not appear at the hearing.

       At the April 12, 2023 hearing, the State introduced certified copies of (1) an

indictment alleging that Morales had, among other things, sexually assaulted A.D.W.2

in Tarrant County and (2) a judgment reflecting that Morales had been convicted of

the sexual assault.

       1
         To protect the identity of the victim in this case, we will refer to her by her
initials. Cf. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.9.
       2
        The indictment referred to the sexual-assault victim as “A.D.W.” At the
hearing, the trial court took judicial notice of the State’s application, which confirmed
that the applicant was the same A.D.W. referenced in the indictment.

                                           2
       At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted A.D.W. a lifetime

protective order against Morales as required by Article 7B.003(b) of the Texas Code

of Criminal Procedure. Morales appeals from that order.

                                   II. DISCUSSION

       Morales argues3 that (1) his due process rights were violated because he was not

present at the hearing on the application for protective order, (2) he was improperly

denied his right to a jury trial, (3) the trial court lacked jurisdiction, (4) he was harmed

by an unspecified form of corruption between the Tarrant County Criminal District

Attorney’s Office and other judicial system officials, (5) the State improperly brought

the application on A.D.W.’s behalf without her consent, and (6) the protective order

is null and void because Morales has not been finally convicted of family violence.4

We will address these issues—all of which are meritless or forfeited—in turn below.5

       3
        We granted Morales leave to file an amended brief to address a specific issue.
But Morales’s “amended” brief only addresses some—but not all—of the issues
raised in his original brief. In the interests of justice, we have interpreted Morales’s
“amended” brief as a supplemental brief. See Brumley v. McDuff, 616 S.W.3d 826, 833
(Tex. 2021) (stressing that courts should acknowledge the substance of the relief
sought despite the formal styling of the pleading); State Bar of Tex. v. Heard,
603 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex. 1980) (“We look to the substance of a plea for relief to
determine the nature of the pleading, not merely at the form of title given to it.”).
       4
        Only the first two of these issues are explicitly enumerated in the “Errors”
section of Morales’s brief. However, because we liberally construe briefs and because
Morales raises the additional complaints set forth above in the other sections of his
brief, we will address them in the interest of ensuring completeness. See Tex. R. App.
P. 38.1(f) (“The statement of an issue or point will be treated as covering every
subsidiary question that is fairly included.”); Perry v. Cohen, 272 S.W.3d 585, 587–88
(Tex. 2008) (“[W]e liberally construe issues presented to obtain a just, fair, and

                                             3
           A. MORALES’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE NOT VIOLATED

       In his first issue, Morales argues that his due process rights were violated

because he was not present at the April 12, 2023 hearing. Specifically, Morales

contends that the trial court erred by “not allowing [him] to be at the court hearing”

even though Morales “was in the Tarrant County Jail on the very day of the hearing.”

This argument is meritless.

equitable adjudication of the rights of the litigants.”); In re F.F., No. 10-12-00462-CV,
2013 WL 2639217, at *7 n.3 (Tex. App.—Waco June 6, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(addressing issues as argued in “argument” section of brief rather than in “issues
presented” when sections conflicted); see also Carr v. Jaffe Aircraft Corp., 884 S.W.2d
797, 803 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994, no writ) (addressing issue in the interest of
completeness).
       5
        As the State points out, Morales’s brief lacks record citations. Thus, he has
arguably forfeited all of his appellate issues. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (providing that
an appellant’s brief “must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions
made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record” (emphasis added)); Fredonia
State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex. 1994) (observing that
error may be waived by inadequate briefing); see also Amir-Sharif v. Mason, 243 S.W.3d
854, 856 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (“A pro se litigant is held to the same
standards as licensed attorneys and must comply with applicable laws and rules of
procedure.” (first citing Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex.
1978); and then citing Strange v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 126 S.W.3d 676, 677 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2004, pet. denied))). But despite Morales’s inadequate briefing, we will address
the merits of his appeal to the extent reasonably possible. See Eco Planet, LLC v. ANT
Trading, No. 05-19-00239-CV, 2020 WL 6707561, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 16,
2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (Osborne, J., concurring) (“Appellate courts have the
discretion to waive issues for inadequate briefing.” (first citing Fredonia State Bank,
881 S.W.2d at 284; and then citing Horton v. Stovall, 591 S.W.3d 567, 569–70 (Tex.
2019)); cf. Perry, 272 S.W.3d at 587 (“[A]ppellate courts should reach the merits of an
appeal whenever reasonably possible.”).

                                              4
      An inmate does not have an absolute right to appear in person at every court

proceeding. In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d 163, 165 (Tex. 2003). Rather, if an inmate

wishes to appear at a hearing in a civil proceeding, he must file a request for a bench

warrant providing sufficient information to allow the trial court to balance the

inmate’s need to appear at the hearing against the need to protect the correctional

system’s integrity. See id. (setting forth factors courts should consider in deciding

whether to grant a bench warrant). Thus, the burden is on the inmate to establish his

right to relief, and if he fails to present sufficient information to the trial court, the

trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying the request. Ringer v. Kimball,

274 S.W.3d 865, 868 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.) (citing Z.L.T.,

124 S.W.3d at 166).

      Here, the record contains no evidence demonstrating that Morales requested a

bench warrant or that he otherwise sought and was denied access to the trial court by

motion, objection, or other complaint. Indeed, rather than seeking to appear at the

April 12, 2023 hearing, Morales filed numerous procedural challenges to the

application. Because Morales failed to request a bench warrant or to otherwise seek

access to the court at the trial level, he has not preserved his complaint for our review.

See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Smith v. Tex. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, No. 02-02-00035-CV,

2003 WL 22724996, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 20, 2003, no pet.) (mem.

op.) (holding that appellant waived his complaint concerning his right of access to

                                            5
court when he did not request a bench warrant or otherwise seek access to the court

at the trial level).

       Further, under Title 4 of the Texas Family Code, which applies to protective

orders entered under Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, see Tex.

Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 7B.008, a trial court may enter a default protective order

“that is binding on a respondent who does not attend a hearing if: (1) the respondent

received service of the application and notice of hearing; and (2) proof of service was

filed with the court before the hearing,” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 85.006(a). The

record reflects that Morales received service of the application and notice of the

April 12, 2023 hearing and that proof of service was filed with the trial court prior to

the hearing. Thus, the trial court was statutorily authorized to enter the protective

order against Morales even though he did not attend the hearing. See id.; Dix v. Foster,

No. 06-22-00040-CV, 2022 WL 7208630, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Oct. 13,

2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that issuance of default protective order under

Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure did not violate incarcerated

appellant’s due process rights because he had been properly served and had received

adequate notice of the hearing).

       Because Morales failed to preserve his complaint regarding access to the court

and because the trial court had authority to enter the protective order in Morales’s

absence, we overrule Morales’s first issue.

                                              6
                  B. MORALES HAD NO RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL

      In his second issue, Morales argues that he was improperly deprived of his right

to a jury trial. However, Morales had no right to a jury trial at the protective-order

hearing. See Williams v. Williams, 19 S.W.3d 544, 546–48 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

2000, pet. denied); Winsett v. Edgar, 22 S.W.3d 510, 512 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000,

pet. denied). Accordingly, we overrule his second issue.

                     C. THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION

      Morales claims that neither he nor A.D.W. reside in Tarrant County and that,

therefore, the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction. This argument lacks merit.

      The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that an application for a

Chapter 7B protective order may be filed in a district court in (A) the county in which

the applicant resides, (B) the county in which the alleged offender resides, or (C) any

county in which an element of the alleged offense occurred. Tex. Code Crim. Proc.

Ann. art. 7B.001(b)(1). The State’s application—of which the trial court took judicial

notice—alleged that Morales resides in Tarrant County and that the offense occurred

in Tarrant County. Further, at the hearing on the application, the trial court admitted

into evidence certified copies of an indictment alleging that Morales had sexually

assaulted A.D.W. in Tarrant County and a judgment reflecting that Morales had been

convicted of that offense.

      To support his argument that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction,

Morales asserts—without citing any evidence in the record—that neither he nor

                                           7
A.D.W. resides in Tarrant County. But Morales does not contest the fact that the

sexual assault occurred in Tarrant County. See id. art. 7B.001(b)(1)(C). Because the

record contains uncontested evidence showing that the sexual assault occurred in

Tarrant County, Morales’s naked assertion that both A.D.W. and he reside

elsewhere—even if true—is not sufficient to show that the trial court lacked personal

jurisdiction. See id. Therefore, we overrule Morales’s jurisdictional complaint.

   D. MORALES’S CORRUPTION CLAIM IS UNSUPPORTED AND UNPRESERVED

      Morales alleges that he was harmed by an unspecified form of corruption

between the Tarrant County Criminal District Attorney’s Office and other judicial

system officials. However, Morales offers nothing more than vague allegations to

support his corruption claim; he provides no detailed facts, citations to the record, or

substantive argument. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(g)–(i). Thus, Morales has forfeited his

complaint due to inadequate briefing. See id.; Fredonia State Bank, 881 S.W.2d at 284;

McKinnon v. Wallin, No. 03-17-00592-CV, 2018 WL 3849399, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—

Austin Aug. 14, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that pro se appellant had

waived his issues by inadequate briefing). Moreover, even if Morales had adequately

briefed the issue, because he did not properly raise his corruption claim in the trial

court, he has failed to preserve it for appellate review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1;

Franklin v. City of Fort Worth, No. 02-12-00456-CV, 2014 WL 3696092, at *1 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth July 24, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (addressing preservation).

                                           8
           E. THE STATE HAD AUTHORITY TO FILE THE APPLICATION

       Morales asserts that the State lacked authority to file the protective order

application because it has “no signed paper” or “notarized affidavit” from A.D.W.

asking for a protective order. However, no such written authorization is required.

The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure expressly authorizes—and indeed, requires—

the State to file an application for a protective order on behalf of a sexual assault

victim promptly after the offender’s conviction unless the victim requests that the

application not be filed. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 7B.001(a)(3), (a-1), (a-2).

There is nothing in the record to suggest that A.D.W. instructed the State not to seek

a protective order; thus, the State was statutorily authorized to file the application. See

id. Accordingly, we overrule Morales’s complaint.

               F. FAMILY VIOLENCE CONVICTION IS NOT REQUIRED

       Morales asserts that the protective order is “null and void” because he “does

not have a final conviction of family violence.”            However, a family violence

conviction is not a prerequisite to the entry of a Chapter 7B protective order. See id.

art. 7B.003. Rather, the statute (1) requires a trial court to issue a protective order if it

finds that “there are reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant is the victim of

sexual assault or abuse, stalking, or trafficking” and (2) provides that an offender’s

conviction for sexual assault constitutes “reasonable grounds.” Id. art. 7B.003(b)–(c).

Thus, having found that Morales had been convicted of sexually assaulting A.D.W.,

the trial court was statutorily required to issue the protective order.              See id.

                                             9
Accordingly, we overrule Morales’s complaint that the protective order is null and

void because he has not been convicted of family violence.

                               III. CONCLUSION

      Having overruled all of Morales’s issues, we affirm the protective order.

                                                     /s/ Brian Walker

                                                     Brian Walker
                                                     Justice

Delivered: February 8, 2024

                                         10