Court Opinion

ID: 9629701
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:47:29.68764+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:57.618839
License: Public Domain

ROSE, Justice,
specially concurring, with whom McCLINTOCK, Justice, joins.
I agree with the result reached by the majority, but I cannot subscribe to the lack of judicial analysis in this case. We have, indeed, traveled a difficult path in this area, but we must not divest ourselves of the problems of the vehicular-homicide-involuntary-manslaughter controversy without good cause. The question addressed by the majority is virtually identical to the issue raised in State v. Cantrell, 64 Wyo. 132, 186 P.2d 539 (1947). In Cantrell, this court reached a decision directly opposite that which is issued today. If we are to overrule past precedent, then we should at least endeavor to say why we were previously in error. Only in this way can the court’s process of reasoning continue to be a shield against arbitrary decision-making.
In Thomas v. State, Wyo., 562 P.2d 1287 (1977), we held that the “culpable neglect or criminal carelessness” portion of the manslaughter statute had been impliedly repealed by the vehicular-homicide statute. In Bartlett v. State, Wyo., 569 P.2d 1235 (1977), we went a step further and held that the “unlawful act” portion of the manslaughter statute, as applied to a charge of involuntary manslaughter arising from the operation of a motor vehicle in excess of the posted speed limit, had also been impliedly repealed. In the Bartlett case, the State urged that State v. Cantrell, supra, had already decided the question. We found, however, that Cantrell dealt only with a particular factual circumstance under which some courts had found no legislative intent of an implied repeal. That circumstance had to do with unlawful acts commonly characterized as mala in se, or wrong in and of themselves. Driving while under the influence of intoxicants traditionally fell within that category. Now that we are able to reconsider the proper placement of such acts within the vehicular-homicide-manslaughter scheme, it is my opinion that the legislature could not have intended that a prosecution for a vehicular death should be based on the malum in se — malum pro-hibitum distinction.
The error in the reasoning implicit in State v. Cantrell, supra, is the assumption that since there need be no proof of criminal intent, where vehicular homicides occur in the commission of an unlawful act mala in se, a manslaughter prosecution is proper. The obverse of this assumption was carried *161forward in Bartlett v. State, supra, to illustrate that in cases, involving acts malum prohibitum, where proof of criminal negligence is necessary, the distinctions between manslaughter and vehicular homicide disappear. Now that we can directly confront the only remaining possibility of overlap between the two statutes, that being unlawful acts mala in se, it is apparent that there is likewise no distinction. Within the category of unlawful acts mala in se, at least within the motor vehicle context, it is presupposed that there is proof of the basic elements of negligence and reckless disregard for the safety of others. Bartlett v. State, supra. Whether an additional showing amounting to criminal negligence is required, as is true with unlawful acts, malum prohibitum, or whether criminal negligence is presupposed from the mere commission of an unlawful act mala in se, the end result is the same. See, State v. Gibson, 4 Md.App. 236, 242 A.2d 575, 581, affirmed 254 Md. 399, 254 A.2d 691 (1968); and Blackwell v. State, 34 Md.App. 547, 369 A.2d 153 (1977). The result in both instances is a conviction for an offense essentially based on a reckless disregard for the safety of others. In Wyoming, that offense is vehicular homicide. See Thomas v. State, supra; and Bartlett v. State, supra. When the legislature enacted the vehicular homicide statute, it must, therefore, have intended to deal with the entire subject matter of unintended homicides resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle. If the legislature wishes to recognize graduations within the vehicular homicide statutes, there are means by which this goal can be achieved. See, generally, Note, 13 Land & Water L.Rev. 595, 609-611 (1978). It is not the function of this court, however, to enter a field so fraught with policy decisions.