Court Opinion

ID: 9591506
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:04:39.380541+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:21:17.873688
License: Public Domain

Carley, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur with the reversal of the trial court’s grant of total summary judgment in favor of appellee CAS and I agree with the basic analysis — but not all of the terminology — contained in both divisions of the majority opinion. I write only to state my understanding of what we have really held and the resulting posture the case will assume upon return to the trial court. In Division 1, the majority concludes by stating “the trial court did not err by granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment.” (Emphasis supplied.) In Division 2, the majority finds genuine issues of material fact and reverses as to “appellant’s tort claim.” (Emphasis supplied.) Actually, the plaintiffs entire suit sounds in tort and initially was based upon two theories. One of these theories — respondeat superior — seeks to impose vicarious liability and based upon Allen Kane’s Major Dodge v. Barnes, 243 Ga. 776 (257 SE2d 186) (1979), we have found that there is no viable basis for imputation of liability against appellee solely because Hayles was an employee of CAS.
The other theory of the same tort action — which theory espouses more direct liability — is based upon the act of appellee in providing alcohol to a minor. See Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194 (327 SE2d 716) (1985). Therefore, in effect, we are affirming the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment in favor of appellee as to appellant’s cause of action based upon the theory of respondeat superior. We are reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee as to appellant’s cause of action to the extent that the same is predicated upon averments that the injuries of appellant caused by the negligence of the minor resulted from the tortious conduct of appellee in providing alcohol to that minor. Sutter v. Hutch-ings, supra.