Court Opinion

ID: 9626319
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:08:22.098566+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:25.606439
License: Public Domain

Ringold, J.
(dissenting) — I respectfully disagree with the majority's refusal to apply the holding of State v. Ringer, 100 Wn.2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983) to the case sub judice. The majority overemphasizes federal case law. Instead, we should consider prior state law, the effects of retroactivity on the administration of justice, and the importance of treating litigants fairly and equally.
The majority correctly states that the retroactivity issue should be analyzed under United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 73 L. Ed. 2d 202, 102 S. Ct. 2579 (1982). Ringer may be considered as a "category 2" case because it breaks with prior precedent. The next step, however, is not denial of the applicability of Ringer, but careful consideration of the following factors:
(1) The purpose of the new rule and whether retroactive application of the rule would effectively serve that purpose; (2) whether and to what extent law enforcement agencies, including courts, justifiably relied upon the preexisting rule; and (3) the effect of retroactive application upon the administration of justice including . . . the availability of remedies to correct the deficiencies aimed at by the new rule . . .
Brumley v. Charles R. Denney Juvenile Ctr., 77 Wn.2d 702, 707, 466 P.2d 481 (1970). See also Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199, 87 S. Ct. 1967 (1967).
Although Ringer may be a "break with precedent," the sharpness of that break is blunted by earlier cases stating that article 1, section 7 of our constitution is more protective of individual rights than is the Fourth Amendment. *548The majority's reliance on State v. Callahan, 31 Wn. App. 710, 644 P.2d 735 (1982) is misplaced. State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170, 177-78, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980) stated in part:
The language of the search and seizure provision of our state constitution, Const, art. 1, § 7, differs significantly from the fourth amendment. . .
Historical evidence reveals that the framers of the Washington Constitution intended to establish a search and seizure provision that varied from the federal provision. . . .
. . . there is precedent for interpreting this particular language in a state constitution as conferring upon a defendant a higher degree of protection than is provided by the federal constitution. Const, art. 1, § 7 differs from the Fourth Amendment in that it clearly recognizes an individual's right to privacy with no express limitations.
The court went on to find that article 1, section 7 gives automatic standing to defendants charged with an offense that has possession as an element, in contradiction to standing for Fourth Amendment purposes. Simpson, at 182. The analysis in Simpson, and in State v. Michaels, 60 Wn.2d 638, 374 P.2d 989 (1962), limits the extent to which law enforcement officials could have relied on our state courts' automatic acceptance of federal Fourth Amendment cases. Additionally, Ringer itself classified its decision as a return to the correct interpretation of article 1, section 7, rather than an entirely new rule. Ringer, at 699.
This is a factor to weigh in the balancing process. Another factor is "the effect of retroactive application upon the administration of justice ..." Brumley, at 707. In re Sauve, 103 Wn.2d 322, 692 P.2d 818 (1985), cited by the majority, is not determinative because the situation here is far different than that in Sauve. We are not presented here with a collateral attack on a conviction, but with a case still in the pipeline of appeal. As noted in Sauve, "the retroactive application of a new constitutional principle will depend on whether the case is on direct appeal or collateral *549review." Sauve, at 328. The majority concludes that investigation and retrial of all the cases decided under New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981) "would be difficult and time consuming." I agree. Such is not, however, the issue presented here. Jordan's case is still in the pipeline of appeal. Granting limited retroactivity to cases still on appeal when Ringer was decided does not put an undue burden on the administrative and judicial processes, especially when considered in light of the high importance placed on Fourth Amendment rights, and the absence of any other remedy for this violation of those rights.
Refusal to grant even limited retroactivity may violate the judicial responsibility " 'to do justice to each litigant on the merits of his own case.'" State v. Pam, 98 Wn.2d 748, 757, 659 P.2d 454 (1983). Similarly situated defendants are not treated alike when retroactivity is denied. Allowing the decision to apply to all cases still on direct appeal when the decision is handed down, "provides a principle of decision-making consonant with the reasoning that all newly declared constitutional rules of criminal procedure should apply retrospectively to all convictions not yet final when the rule was established." Pam, at 757. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Johnson, retroactivity should not be denied simply because the rule had not yet been announced at the time of the defendant's arrest: the rule was not announced at the time of Ringer's arrest either, yet it applied to Ringer. Johnson, at 541.
Because Ringer represents a change in precedent, full retroactivity is not appropriate. Allowing retroactivity to cases still in the pipeline of appeal vindicates the rights of those whose convictions are not yet final without undue disruption of the "administration of justice," and without unduly disrupting the legitimate expectations of law enforcement officers. Balancing the three factors leads to *550the conclusion that Ringer should apply to those cases not yet final when Ringer was decided. I would reverse.
Reconsideration denied February 11, 1985.
Review by Supreme Court pending July 1, 1985.