Court Opinion

ID: 9470283
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:01:23.947457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:49.174638
License: Public Domain

KEARSE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
With all due respect for the majority’s views, I cannot concur in its judgment. In my view, the complaint could not properly be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); the nature of the defendant’s opposition to the claim raised issues of fact and made inappropriate, on the present record, a summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 56; and these factors plus proceedings in a related case demonstrate that appellant’s claim could not properly be dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1976).
A. Inappropriateness of Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissal
Plaintiff-appellant Fred M. Anderson is appealing from a judgment of the United *47States District Court for the Northern District of New York dismissing his complaint pursuant to defendant’s motion under Rule 12(b)(6). The complaint, filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), is succinct. It alleges that on May 21, 1981, Anderson, a prisoner at the Great Meadow Correctional Facility (“Great Meadow”) was confined to his cell (a process known as “keeplock”) by the action of defendant Thomas Coughlin, Commissioner of the New York State Department of Corrections (“Department”), without any reason and in violation of Anderson’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
Judge Winter finds the complaint insufficient on its face, apparently because Anderson does not allege that he was “singled out” for the action alleged to have been irrational.1 In my view if the keeplock was imposed for no reason, as alleged, the prisoner would have an arguable constitutional claim, whether he were the only prisoner so confined, or one of 22,000 so confined (as Coughlin originally ordered, see Part C infra), or one of some intermediate number so confined, as was actually the case.
I therefore agree with Judge Cardamone that one cannot conclude, looking solely at the complaint, that it is “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief,” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), and agree that Anderson’s complaint could not properly be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972).
B. Inappropriateness of Summary Judgment
Although Coughlin’s motion to dismiss was styled a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and the court stated that it granted the motion, it appears to me that what the district court did in substance was to grant summary judgment against Anderson. Coughlin’s motion relied on facts that did not appear in the complaint but rather were raised in an affidavit of Coughlin’s counsel. Thus, while the complaint alleged that there was no reason for the keeplock, the affidavit suggested that there were reasons: “non-punitive, administrative reasons occasioned by the temporary lack of sufficient correctional personnel to staff the facility on that day.” (Affidavit of Mary E. Bisantz, sworn to July 17, 1981, If 3 (“Bisantz Aff.”).)
The United States Magistrate to whom the matter was referred accepted Coughlin’s representation, found that “the keep-lock was a one-time occurrance [sic] that was prompted by the guards attending a funeral service ...,” and concluded that “a sufficient justification existed for the administrative decision of this limited keep-lock.”2 Magistrate’s Report dated Sept. *4818, 1981, at 2. The magistrate recommended that Coughlin’s motion be granted.
The district court, after reviewing “all of the papers” in the record,. District Court Order dated Oct. 19, 1981, at 1 (“Order”), approved the Magistrate’s Report and dismissed the complaint, id. at 2. Thus, it clearly appears that the grounds for the dismissal were not found within the four corners of the complaint, and that the court instead rejected on the merits Anderson’s contention that there was no reason for the keeplock, because it accepted Coughlin’s assertion that he had a valid reason, namely a shortage of guards.
Given the state of the record, this was an inappropriate use of the summary judgment device. As a general matter, issues as to the motive and intent with which actions were taken are not appropriate for determination on summary judgment. E.g., EEOC v. Home Insurance Co., 672 F.2d 252, 257 (2d Cir.1982); Schmidt v. McKay, 555 F.2d 30, 37 (2d Cir.1977). While complaints charging public officials with violation of a plaintiff’s civil rights have been made more amenable than others to a summary and early determination where a defense of absolute or qualified (“good faith”) immunity is available, see Harlow v. Fitzgerald,U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2737-39, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507-08, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2911-2912, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978),3 this hardly means that such a plaintiff should be denied all discovery, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra, 102 S.Ct. at 2740 (Brennan, J., concurring). A plaintiff normally should at least be permitted to obtain disclosure as to, for example, the existence vel non of the facts that the defendants claim motivated them.
In the present case, so far as appears from the record before us, the court did not inform Anderson, pursuant to Rule 12(b), that it would treat Coughlin’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion as one for summary judgment,4 and I see no basis for believing that Anderson was given a reasonable opportunity to counter Coughlin’s proffered reasons for the keeplock. The affidavit on which the dismissal was based asserted that there was a shortage of guards, but it did not state any facts as to the number of guards normally on duty at Great Meadow or the number available on May 21. Even leaving aside questions as to Coughlin’s bona fides,5 *49therefore, at a minimum Anderson should have been given an opportunity to discover whether there was, as Coughlin asserted, a shortage of guards at Great Meadow on May 21.6 Instead, Anderson was afforded no discovery whatever. The district court dismissed the complaint and simultaneously dismissed as moot all of Anderson’s pending motions, Order at 2, apparently including an October 8,1981 motion to compel Coughlin to answer interrogatories previously served.7
On the present record, therefore, the district court could not properly grant summary judgment.
C. Inappropriateness of a Finding of Frivolity
Judge Cardamone imputes to the district court not an intention to grant summary judgment, but rather an intention to dismiss Anderson’s complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). Section 1915(d) provides that in a proceeding in forma pauperis, such as the present action, the court “may dismiss the case ... if satisfied that the action is frivolous.” Even if I believed the imputation were correct, I would not hold the dismissal sustainable on this basis.
First, I take issue with Judge Cardamone’s conception of the nature of frivolity, it seems very nearly to equate frivolity with lack of merit.8 Thus, he states, ante at 41, that “[a]t whatever point it is clear that merit is lacking, the [in forma pauper-is] action should be dismissed as frivolous under § 1915(d).” I would suppose that every claim that was successfully defended could be said to have lacked merit; but that hardly means that it was frivolous. A claimant may ultimately lose, for example, on a claim on which he had previously won a preliminary injunction. Or he may successfully oppose a motion for a directed verdict although the trial judge confidently and accurately predicts that the jury will find against him. Or his claim may be rejected solely because of an affirmative defense such as the statute of limitations. While at some' point it has become clear that the claimant’s case lacked merit, it hardly seems appropriate to characterize *50the claim as “frivolous.” In Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), the Supreme Court made clear that frivolity and lack of merit are not coextensive. There, the Court disapproved a state appellate procedure permitting an assigned attorney to withdraw from the appeal on the basis of his statement that the appeal would be without merit, but approved a withdrawal procedure that would be based on the attorney’s statement that the appeal would be wholly frivolous. The Court stated that “legal points arguable on their merits” are “therefore not frivolous.” Id. at 744, 87 S.Ct. at 1400.
Second, although I would agree with Judge Cardamone that there are cases in which the complaint is sufficiently well drafted to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, but in which a lack of factual support will later transpire and make appropriate a dismissal without lengthy discovery or trial, I believe the latter part of that construct does not yet apply to this case. For the reasons stated in Part B above, I do not view the present record as delineating a case ripe for a determination on its merits, much less a determination that it is so devoid of arguable merit as to be considered frivolous.
Finally, while I express no opinion as to the likelihood that Anderson would have succeeded on the merits, I view the proceedings in the related case of Flaherty v. Coughlin, 81 Civ. 3077 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 1981), as demonstrating that claims within the ambit of Anderson’s complaint raise legal points that are arguable on their merits.
The events leading to the keeplock began on or about May 16, 1981, with the slaying of Donna Payant, a guard at the Green Haven Correctional Facility. On May 20, Coughlin issued a directive that on May 21, the day of the funeral, all prisoners in all major state correctional facilities (totaling some 22,000 inmates) would be confined to their cells for 12-15 hours (in addition to the normal 10-hour confinement to their cells for sleeping purposes), and that all guards who so desired would be given the day off with pay so that they could attend the funeral. Flaherty v. Coughlin was commenced on May 20 by an inmate at the Clinton Correctional Facility on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, seeking a temporary restraining order against implementation of the keeplock directive.
Flaherty, like Anderson in the present case, see note 5 supra, suggested that Coughlin’s directive was not in fact responsive to an anticipated shortage of guards but rather was the cause of any anticipated shortage. Flaherty also contended that even with Coughlin’s guarantee of pay for guards who took the day off to attend the funeral, Coughlin did not know how many guards would take advantage of the guarantee, and hence could not know that at any particular institution there would be a shortage of guards and a need for a keep-lock.
During the hearing on the motion, Judge Sweet suggested that Coughlin rescind his across-the-board order and instead assess the need for a keeplock on an institution-by-institution basis. Coughlin, through his counsel, opposed the suggestion. The court also suggested that Coughlin might rescind the directive insofar as it promised pay to absent guards, on the ground that the guarantee of pay would tend to encourage the guards’ absence. Coughlin rejected the suggestion on the ground that, with the correctional officers’ emotions running so high, it would be counterproductive to withdraw his promise of pay. Coughlin’s counsel argued that the keeplock was not intended to punish the 22,000 inmates for Mrs. Payant’s death, but the court found that “it certainly has that implication.” (May 20, 1981 hearing at 20.) The court suggested that Coughlin might be carrying out the collective intent of the correction officers to punish the inmates. (Id.)
Litigation arising out of Coughlin’s order of the May 21 keeplock thus encompasses a fundamental question as to whether the Commissioner of Corrections has the unfettered discretion to punish all inmates at all of New York’s major prisons by a one-day *51keeplock for the murder, by a person or persons unknown, of a guard at one of the institutions.9 I am unable to conclude, with my colleagues, that this is not even an arguable legal question.
Ultimately, in Flaherty v. Coughlin, Judge Sweet granted a limited injunction. Having found, inter alia, that a keeplock without reason would deprive the prisoners of their rights (id. at 13)10 and that there were substantial questions going to the merits (id.; id. at 24), the court granted the following injunctive order:
That the Commissioner is enjoined from instituting a keeplock except on an institution-by-institution basis arising out of emergency conditions or jeopardy to the safety or security of the institution; and further, he is directed to take all necessary action to minimize any conditions which might result in the imposition of a keeplock.
(Id. at 26.) Coughlin’s counsel’s immediate response was, “I can tell you that this is not acceptable to the Department .... ” (Id. at 27.)
Notwithstanding his initial opposition, Coughlin apparently did make some sort of an institution-by-institution decision, with Great Meadow being one of three institutions in which the keeplock was imposed.. It may well be demonstrable that the keep-lock at Great Meadow was for nonpunitive reasons and was occasioned by the lack of security personnel, as Coughlin’s counsel’s affidavit in the present case has asserted. Or it may be that the punitive “implication” seen by Judge Sweet would be borne out if, for example, Coughlin failed to provide any facts to substantiate his assertion that there was a shortage of guards at Great Meadow. But in any event, it seems to me that Anderson’s claim that the keeplock at Great Meadow was unreasonable presents arguable issues and hence cannot be considered frivolous.
I would reverse the judgment dismissing Anderson’s complaint and remand for appropriate further proceedings.

. Judge Winter also views the complaint’s alie-' gation that there was “no reason” for the keep-lock as impermissibly conclusory and suggests that the complaint should have been dismissed but with leave to amend. I disagree.
[T]he function of a pleading in federal practice is to inform a party of the nature of the claims and defenses being asserted against him and the relief demanded by his adversary. The rules reflect a realization that the supposed effectiveness of pleadings in narrowing and defining the issues is largely a myth, this function being more effectively performed by discovery, summary judgment, and pretrial conferences, 15
15 ... Von Mailath v. Order of Daughters of Divine Redeemer, D.C.Pa.1950, 10 F.R.D. 420 (development of facts should be accomplished through discovery and the like, and not by the exercise of discretion requiring additional pleadings).
5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1182, at 12 (1969) (other footnote omitted). Here Anderson’s conclusory pleading that there was “no reason” for the keeplock was adequate to give Coughlin notice of the claim against him. The rules do not require a plaintiff to elaborate on such a negative by setting up and knocking down in his pleading particular reasons that may be asserted by the defendant.

. The magistrate relied on Johnson v. Coughlin, 81 Civ. 901 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 1981), dismissing a § 1983 complaint by other inmates of Great Meadow that challenged the same keep-lock and alleged that the reason for the keep-lock was to allow guards to attend the funeral of a fellow guard. Judge Foley dismissed the Johnson complaint on the ground that it did not state a claim that rose to a constitutional level.

. The majority’s discussions of the defense of qualified immunity, opinion of Cardamone, J., ante at 44-45, and the bona fides of prison officials’ decisions to improve the morale of the prison guards, opinion of Winter, J., ante at 45-46, are premature. “Qualified or ‘good faith’ immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by a defendant official,” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra, 102 S.Ct. at 2737, and the burden of establishing this affirmative defense is on the defendant, see id. at 2739; cf. id. at 2735-36. Coughlin has not filed an answer, and the conclusory assertion in his counsel’s affidavit on the Rule 12(b)(6) motion would hardly suffice to sustain his burden of proof.
I also find premature the majority’s reliance on Gilliard v. Oswald, 552 F.2d 456 (2d Cir. 1977), for the proposition that the one-day keep-lock at issue here does not give rise to a constitutional claim. Gilliard involved an initial prisonwide keeplock, followed by the keep-lock of some 140 prisoners, in the course of an investigation into repeated assaults by prison inmates on other inmates. Whatever the views of the Gilliard majority as to the appropriate scope of prison officials’ discretion to order a keeplock in those circumstances, and whatever the applicability of those views to the broader but shorter keeplock imposed here, it must at least be recognized that Gilliard was decided after a trial. There was no suggestion that the case should have been dismissed on summary judgment or as “frivolous” at some early stage.

. Rule 12(b) provides in part as follows:
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.

. Questions have been raised as to Coughlin’s good faith, both in this and in related litigation. Here Anderson contends in his brief on appeal, as he did in a memorandum filed in the district court, that in fact there was no emergency shortage of guards until Coughlin himself instigated the shortage by means of a statewide directive, see Part C infra, that prompted guards to take the day of May 21 off with full pay to attend the funeral of a slain fellow *49guard. In the related case of Flaherty v. Coughlin, 81 Civ. 3077 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 1981), Flaherty raised this and other arguments, and at the hearing on Flaherty’s motion for injunctive relief, Judge Sweet stated that Coughlin’s directive carried the implication of a punitive intent. (May 20, 1981 hearing at 20.)
In a later hearing in Flaherty, Coughlin’s counsel argued that as a matter of law Coughlin’s actions were within the scope of his discretion, but even he described them as “perhaps questionable actions.” (Jan. 13, 1982 hearing at 4.) At that hearing Judge Brieant stated, “Now, maybe this case is amenable to summary judgment, maybe. I doubt it.” (Id at 17.)

. The majority states that
[t]he facts reveal that a substantial number of guards intended to be absent from duty on the day of the funeral. Consequently, defendant was faced with balancing the potential for danger due to insufficient staffing at the Great Meadow facility____
Opinion of Cardamone, J., ante at 44. I have found in the record no evidence as to the number of guards who “intended” to be absent from Great Meadow, the number who were absent, or the number normally on duty.
I think the context of the events preceding the May 21 keeplock should lead the court to exercise more, not less, than its usual amount of caution in dealing with conclusory allegations such as those advanced here by Coughlin’s counsel. As discussed in Part C infra, Coughlin originally had ordered the one-day keeplock of all prisoners in all major penal institutions in the state. After he was enjoined in Flaherty v. Coughlin, supra, to make his decision on an institution-by-institution basis to avoid keeplocks that were unnecessary (an injunction to which he vigorously objected), it apparently turned out that at at least twelve of those fifteen institutions there was not such a shortage of guards as to warrant the keeplock. The court should at least require disclosure of the facts as to whether or not there was such, a shortage at Great Meadow.

. The interrogatories apparently included questions as to why the keeplock was imposed and how the decision to impose it was reached.

. I also find unsound the suggestion that because § 1915(d) governs in forma pauperis litigation it calls for “more stringent pleading standards than those contained in the Federal Rules.” Opinion of Cardamone, J., ante at 43 (emphasis added). When an in forma pauperis litigant proceeds pro se, as Anderson does here, his pleading must be given the benefit of the doubt. Haines v. Kerner, supra.

. Coughlin’s counsel’s affidavit in support of the motion to dismiss the complaint in the present case argued that “[e]ven punitive segregation for merely one day would not be a violation of an inmate’s constitutional rights” (Bisantz Aff. [| 3), relying on McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087, 98 S.Ct. 1282, 55 L.Ed.2d 792 (1978). McKinnon hardly answers the ques-tion posed here, however, since the punitive keeplock in McKinnon was imposed on prisoners whose own conduct arguably merited punishment.

. Coughlin’s counsel concurred in this view:
THE COURT: ... [T]he placing of keep-lock, the deprivation of normal routine, prison routines, does constitute a deprivation of a right.
You don’t really argue with that? Let’s assume it was totally irrational, it would be a deprivation, don’t you agree?
MR. RYAN [Attorney for Coughlin]: Yes, Your Honor.

(Id.)