Court Opinion

ID: 9860239
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:15:43.95187+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:19:36.285084
License: Public Domain

GIVAN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. In the first place, the opinion of the Court of Appeals, reported at 616 N.E.2d 47, is correct. In the case at bar, the charging information was defective in that it was duplicitous. However, as pointed out by the Court of Appeals and the majority opinion, the faulty information was not challenged by a motion to dismiss by appellant. Had such a motion been made, the trial court would have been correct in dismissing the charge or in sustaining a motion to quash the information. If such a motion had been sustained, the State would have had the ability to recharge appellant by information which did not violate the statute for duplicity. State v. Taylor (1956), 235 Ind. 632, 137 N.E.2d 537. The Taylor case does not stand alone for this proposition. 'This is an oft-repeated statement by this Court. See also State v. Carrier (1955), 235 Ind. 456, 134 N.E.2d 688.
I further would observe that the majority opinion's final statement that "the trial court is instructed to discharge the defendant" is erroneous to the extent it precludes a retrial. Under the present situation, the State should *732be free to proceed against appellant in a proper fashion.
The issue of duplicity having been waived there was no error in going to trial on the information and as in all situations where there are two named victims, there is no error where the defendant is convicted as to one victim and acquitted as to the other. Evidence may cure a defect in an information. Helwig v. State (1958), 238 Ind. 559, 153 N.E.2d 437. Here the jury was convinced the evidence showed appellant to be guilty of molesting one child but not the other. The instructions when taken as a whole clearly permitted this result.
The majority opinion's discussion of double jeopardy is misplaced.