Court Opinion

ID: 9730046
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:58:40.537163+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:03.511764
License: Public Domain

CHRISTIAN, J.
I dissent.
It is true that the instruction'on willful misconduct delivered by the court was defective in failing to state that contributory negligence is not generally a defense to a claim based upon willful misconduct. (Williams v. Carr (1968) 68 Cal.2d 579 [68 Cal.Rptr. 305, 440 P.2d 505].) But in my view *203the failure correctly to explain the effect of willful misconduct was not prejudicial where the evidence would not have supported a verdict on that theory. Wanton or willful misconduct “implies the intentional doing of something either with knowledge, express or implied, that serious injury is a probable, as distinguished from a possible, result, or the intentional doing of an act with a wanton and reckless disregard of its consequences.” (Williams v. Carr, supra, at p. 584.) It has also been defined as “the doing of an act with a positive, active and absolute disregard of the consequences.” (Davis v. Nelson (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 62, 66 [34 Cal.Rptr. 201].) Such misconduct is a very serious breach of normal patterns of behavior: it has been said that “cases warranting instruction on willful or wanton misconduct will seldom arise. By its very definition, such misconduct is rare. ... It should but rarely be resorted to by the trial courts.” (Lovett v. Hitchcock (1961) 192 Cal.App.2d 806, 813 [14 Cal.Rptr. 117]; also see Palazzi v. Air Cargo Terminals, Inc. (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 190 [52 Cal.Rptr. 817].)
In the present case the evidence shows that respondent Rudolph allowed or directed appellant to step out of the plane some 6 feet from the revolving propeller and that Rudolph knew that appellant would attempt to remove chocks from an area somewhere in front of the plane. While such conduct on the part of respondents could well have been considered negligent,, the evidence also shows that appellant had been instructed regarding the danger inherent in a revolving propeller and that Rudolph expected appellant would remember such instruction and avoid the propeller. There is no evidence that Rudolph should have known that it was “highly probable” that appellant would be struck by the propeller. In short, there was insufficient evidence to support any instructions on willful, wanton or reckless misconduct, and respondents were entitled to a directed verdict on this count of the complaint. Therefore the failure to give correct instructions on willful misconduct could not have been prejudicial to appellant.
None of the other errors complained of by appellant requires reversal.
I would affirm the judgment.
A petition for a rehearing was denied February 26, 1970, and respondents’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied April 1, 1970. McComb, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.