Court Opinion

ID: 9848880
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:29:13.12407+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:51.671563
License: Public Domain

Andrews, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent in Case No. A99A2012, because there was no compliance by William Harris with the ante litem notice requirements of OCGA § 50-21-26 (a).
Compliance by a plaintiff with the ante litem provisions of the statute is a question of subject matter jurisdiction. OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (3) (“the courts shall have no jurisdiction . . . unless and until a written notice of claim has been timely presented to the state as provided in this subsection”) (emphasis supplied).
The trial court concluded that the Federal Express delivery initiated by attorney Bailey and mailing a copy by regular mail to Georgia Ports Authority’s Thompson satisfied the Georgia Tort Claims Act.
OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) provides that:
No person . . . having a tort claim against the state under this article shall bring any action against the state upon such claim without first giving notice of the claim as follows: ... (2) Notice of a claim shall be given in writing and shall be mailed by certified mail, return receipt requested, or delivered personally to and a receipt obtained from the Risk Management Division of the Department of Administrative Services. In addition, a copy shall be delivered personally to or mailed by first-class mail to the state government entity [involved].
(Emphasis supplied.)
Since Harris did not opt to use the certified mail, return receipt method of giving notice, compliance with the GTCA must be found in delivery by a private delivery company, Federal Express, to DOAS. The “receipt” required by the statute can only, under the facts of this case, be the Federal Express air bill filled out by attorney Bailey or the recipient’s copy of the air bill left with DOAS. Bailey testified that Harris’ Exhibit 43 was his copy of the air bill, prepared in and maintained by his office, and Harris’ Exhibit 42 was the recipient’s copy which was left with DOAS by Federal Express. Harris’ Exhibit 41A is a copy of Bailey’s notice letter, marked received by DOAS Fiscal Division and provided by DOAS to Harris during discovery. This, apparently, is the linchpin upon which the majority would hang compliance with the ante litem provision, since the evidence does not reflect that anything was obtained by the Federal Express delivery *517person from DOAS and returned to Bailey. The only proof that Bailey had that, in fact, the letter had been delivered to DOAS was a notation on his bill from Federal Express, indicating the “person or entity that it was addressed to and . . . the date that it was received.” Bailey acknowledged that he no longer had a copy of the Federal Express bill reflecting delivery of the Harris notice and that he had received nothing from DOAS indicating receipt of the notice.
It is unclear from what portion of the GTCA the majority has divined that the purpose of the ante litem notice requirement of a receipt from DOAS is to protect the claimant, since the notice provisions are also for the benefit of the State.8
In Norris v. Dept. of Transp., 268 Ga. 192 (486 SE2d 826) (1997), the Supreme Court noted that:
The stated intent of the Act is to balance strict application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which may produce “inherently unfair and inequitable results,” against the need for limited “exposure of the state treasury to tort liability.” OCGA § 50-21-21 (a). The legislature expressly declared as “the public policy of this state that the state shall only be liable in tort actions within the limitations of [the Act] and in accordance with the fair and uniform principles established” therein. OCGA § 50-21-21 (a).
Norris also emphasized that:
The plain language of OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (2) provides two alternative methods of transmitting written notice — mailing or personal delivery. As the Code section specifies, notice “shall be mailed by certified mail, return receipt requested, or delivered personally to and a receipt obtained from the Risk Management Division of the Department of Administrative Services. . . .
(Emphasis in original and supplied.) Id. at 192-193.
In Norris, while notice had been sent certified mail, return receipt requested, one of the two methods provided by OCGA § 50-21-26 (a), the notice had not been received by DOAS within the year, a requirement which had been read into the statute by the courts based on a comparable, but different, federal statute. The Supreme Court held that mailing by the method set out in the statute *518“presented” notice to the State under the statute.
Based on the majority’s reasoning here, mailing of the notice no longer has to be by certified mail, return receipt requested, because, if a claimant can show that DOAS had notice, by whatever method obtained, that would suffice, in contravention of Norris, supra.
Such a conclusion ignores the well-established canon of statutory construction, inclusio unius, exclusio alterius, i.e., the inclusion of one implies the exclusion of others. See, e.g., O’Melveny & Myers v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 512 U. S. 79, 86 (114 SC 2048, 129 LE2d 67) (1994); Blackwell v. State, 237 Ga. App. 896, 897 (516 SE2d 787) (1999). Here, the legislature specified two specific methods of delivering notice, thereby impliedly excluding others.
Here, even assuming without deciding that the use of a private delivery service such as Federal Express might be deemed “personal delivery” under that option, a further conjunctive and, I believe, contemporaneous requirement is contained in the statute, i.e., the obtaining of a receipt “from the Risk Management Division of the Department of Administrative Services.”
As repeatedly held, “the Georgia Tort Claims Act will be strictly construed. [Cits.]” Williams v. Dept. of Human Resources, 234 Ga. App. 638, 640 (507 SE2d 230) (1998), cert. granted, Case No. S99G0178 (issued October 13, 1999). Substantial compliance with the requirements of the GTCA’s provisions will not suffice. Kim v. Dept. of Transp., 235 Ga. App. 480 (510 SE2d 50) (1998).
Harris argues that showing that DOAS did receive the notice should suffice, based on the presence of DOAS’ receipt stamp on the copy of the Bailey letter attached to the complaint. That, however, does not satisfy the requirement that, if personal delivery is used, a receipt must be obtained “from” the department. To hold otherwise would amount to a finding that substantial compliance will suffice. As set out above, until Harris obtained from DOAS the copy of the notice stamped “received,” he had NOTHING from DOAS indicating receipt of the notice, only the documents prepared by Federal Express.
The majority’s rationale would also seem to imply that any time a litigant has actual notice of a lawsuit, the courts should find that the requisites of valid personal service are present, even if the requirements of numerous statutes have not been met. See, e.g., Joyner v. Schiess, 236 Ga. App. 316 (512 SE2d 62) (1999) (OCGA § 9-11-4 (d) (7)); Ameribank, N.A. v. Quattlebaum, 220 Ga. App. 345, 347 (2) (469 SE2d 462) (1996) (OCGA § 44-14-161 (c)); Five Star Steel Contractors v. Colonial Credit Union, 208 Ga. App. 694, 695 (431 SE2d 712) (1993) (OCGA § 18-4-62 (a)).
Alternatives for notification within the act are the purview of the *519legislature, not this Court. State Ethics Commr. v. Moore, 214 Ga. App. 236, 239 (447 SE2d 687) (1994).
Decided March 30, 2000
Reconsideration denied April 13, 2000
Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Daniel M. Formby, Kathleen M. Pacious, Deputy Attorneys General, R. O. Lerer, Senior Assistant Attorney General, George S. Zier, Assistant Attorney General, Ranitz, Mahoney, Coolidge & Mahoney, Thomas J. Mahoney, Jr., Thomas J. Mahoney III, Mary Kathryn Hogan, for appellant.
Jones, Boykin, Stacy & Associates, Noble L. Boykin, Jr., for appellees.

 Such a conclusion is bolstered by the fact that DOAS receives, by all methods, 40,000 to 50,000 documents a week and they are dealt with differently depending on the method of their delivery.