Court Opinion

ID: 9738812
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:03:33.889358+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:08.639695
License: Public Domain

*43Concurring and Dissenting.
DeBruler, C. J.
I concur in affirming the conviction on Count 2, charging Appellant with unlawful possession of narcotics, but I dissent from the majority opinion wherein it affirms the conviction on Count 1, charging Appellant with entering a Hooks Drugstore with intent to commit theft.
The statute alleged to have been violated in Count 2 states in part:
“Whoever enters any . . . business house . . . with the intent to commit a felony therein. . . .” (Emphasis added.) Burns’ Ind. Stat. Ann. § 10-704.
The facts showed that Appellant entered the Hooks Drugstore between 8:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m., during which time the drugstore was open to the public for business. At 10:00 p.m. the manager closed the store after checking to see that everyone had left. There was sufficient evidence to show that sometime between Appellant’s entry and 11:48, when the burglar alarm sounded, the Appellant initiated and completed a plan to conceal himself in the storeroom of the drugstore, to wait until everyone had left the store and then to break into the narcotics drawer. The police caught the Appellant in the store in possession of the narcotics he had taken from the drawer.
I agree with Appellant’s contention that there was no evidence to support an inference that he entered the drugstore with the intent to commit a theft. Undoubtedly Appellant is guilty of theft and trespass besides unlawful possession of narcotics. However, the fact that the Appellant perpetrated a scheme to conceal himself in the storeroom and committed a theft is not evidence that at the time he entered the store he had the intent to commit a theft. One to two hours prior to closing time Appellant entered the drugstore which was open for business to the public and also contained a pay telephone for public use. There is no evidence of when Appel*44lant formed the plan to steal the drugs. Under the statute the entry and the intent to commit a theft must be concurrent. In Goodloe v. State (1967), 11 Ind. Dec. 164, 248 Ind. 411, 229 N. E. 2d 626, this Court said:
“. . . There is no evidence showing exactly when the Appellant entered the building or the Heart Association office, and there is no evidence from which it can be inferred that he entered at a time other than when the building and office were open to the general public.
“. . . it is well settled that the felonious intent must exist at the time of the entry if there is to be a conviction.” 11 Ind. Dec. at 168.
fn full accord see: People v. Kelley (1916), 274 Ill. 556, 113 N. E. 926; Conrad v. State (1950), 154 Tex. Crim. R. 624, 230 S. W. 2d 225; State v. Moore (1841), 12 N. H. 43; Hall, J., Principles of Criminal Law 185-190 (2d Ed.).
The judgment on Count 1 should be reversed.
Note.—Reported in 245 N. E. 2d 149.