Court Opinion

ID: 9394785
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-16 14:14:03.426748+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:02.777615
License: Public Domain

2023 WI 38

                  SUPREME COURT            OF   WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:              2020AP2003

COMPLETE TITLE:        Wisconsin Justice Initiative, Inc., a Wisconsin
                       nonstock corporation, Jacqueline E. Boynton,
                       Jerome F. Buting, Craig R. Johnson and Fred A.
                       Risser,
                                  Plaintiffs-Respondents,
                            v.
                       Wisconsin Elections Commission, Ann S. Jacobs,
                       in her official capacity as Chair of the
                       Wisconsin Elections Commission, Douglas La
                       Follette, in his official capacity as Secretary
                       of State of Wisconsin, and Josh Kaul, in his
                       official capacity as Attorney General of
                       Wisconsin,
                                  Defendants-Appellants.

                          ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS

OPINION FILED:         May 16, 2023
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:         September 6, 2022

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
   COURT:              Circuit
   COUNTY:             Dane
   JUDGE:              Frank D. Remington

JUSTICES:
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY,
JJ., joined, and in which DALLET and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined with
respect to ¶¶58-59 and 61-65. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed
a concurring opinion in which ZIEGLER, C.J., and ROGGENSACK, J.,
joined. DALLET, J., filed a concurring opinion in which
KAROFSKY, J., joined, and in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., joined
with respect to ¶¶93-122. HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring
opinion in which DALLET, J., joined with respect to ¶¶137-150.
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:
       For the defendants-appellants, there were briefs filed by
Jody    J.   Schmelzer        and   Hannah       S.   Jurss,        assistant    attorneys
general, with whom on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney
general.      There     was    an    oral    argument          by    Hannah     S.   Jurss,
assistant attorney general.

       For the plaintiffs-respondents, there was a brief filed by
Dennis M. Grzezinski and the Law Office of Dennis M. Grzezinski,
Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by Dennis M. Grzezinski.

       An    amicus   curiae        brief   was       filed    by    Mike     Wittenwyler,
Kendall W. Harrizon, Maxted M. Lenz, and Godfrey & Kahn, S.C.,
Madison, for Marsy’s Law for Wisconsin, L.L.C., Mothers Against
Drunk        Driving,         Wisconsin          Victim/Witness             Professionals
Association, Wisconsin Chiefs of Police Association, Milwaukee
Police Association, Wisconsin Professional Police Association,
Bolton Refuge House, Inc., Golden House, Inc., Unidos Against
Domestic Violence, New Day Advocacy Center, and Eau Claire Area
Hmong Mutual Assistance Association, Inc.

       An amicus curiae brief was filed by Scott E. Rosenow and
WMC Litigation Center, Madison, for Wisconsin Manufacturers &
Commerce, Inc.

       An    amicus     curiae      brief    was       filed    by     Katie    R.   York,
appellate division director, with whom on the brief was Kelli S.
Thompson, state public defender, for the Wisconsin State Public
Defender.

       An amicus curiae brief was filed by Christine Donahoe, Mel
Barnes, Elizabeth M. Pierson, Jeffrey A. Mandell, Douglas M.
Poland, Pahoua Thao, and Stafford Rosenbaum LLP, Madison, for
the ACLU of Wisconsin and Law Forward, Inc.

                                             2
    An amicus curiae brief was filed by Erika Jacobs Petty,
Rachel E. Sattler, and Lotus Legal Clinic, Brookfield, for Lotus
Legal Clinic.

                               3
                                                                2023 WI 38
                                                        NOTICE
                                          This opinion is subject to further
                                          editing and modification.   The final
                                          version will appear in the bound
                                          volume of the official reports.
No.    2020AP2003
(L.C. No.   2019CV3485)

STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :            IN SUPREME COURT

Wisconsin Justice Initiative, Inc., a Wisconsin
nonstock corporation, Jacqueline E. Boynton,
Jerome F. Buting, Craig R. Johnson and Fred A.
Risser,

            Plaintiffs-Respondents,

      v.
                                                             FILED
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Ann S. Jacobs,          MAY 16, 2023
in her official capacity as Chair of the
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Douglas La                 Sheila T. Reiff
                                                        Clerk of Supreme Court
Follette, in his official capacity as Secretary
of State of Wisconsin, and Josh Kaul, in his
official capacity as Attorney General of
Wisconsin,

            Defendants-Appellants.

HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY,
JJ., joined, and in which DALLET and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined with
respect to ¶¶58-59 and 61-65. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed
a concurring opinion in which ZIEGLER, C.J., and ROGGENSACK, J.,
joined. DALLET, J., filed a concurring opinion in which
KAROFSKY, J., joined, and in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., joined
with respect to ¶¶93-122. HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring
opinion in which DALLET, J., joined with respect to ¶¶137-150.
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
                                                                      No.    2020AP2003

       APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the Circuit Court

for Dane County, Frank D. Remington, Judge.                 Reversed.

       ¶1      BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.         When the Wisconsin Constitution

was adopted in 1848, it included a process enabling amendments——

an act the people of Wisconsin have seen fit to do almost 150

times.      A proposed amendment must be approved by a majority of

both houses of the legislature in two successive legislative

sessions.       Wis. Const. art. XII, § 1.           Once it passes that test,

the proposed amendment is submitted to the people.                          Id.     If a

majority vote yes, it becomes part of our constitution.                           Id.     A

victim's rights amendment termed "Marsy's Law" by its sponsors

(a term we also use in this opinion) was ratified by the people

in April of 2020.           In this case, Wisconsin Justice Initiative,

Inc.     and    several     citizens     (collectively       "WJI")     argue       that

Marsy's Law was adopted in violation of the process spelled out

in the constitution.

       ¶2      When    considering     claims    grounded        in   the   Wisconsin
Constitution,         our   obligation    is    to   faithfully       interpret         and

apply its original meaning.              The relevant constitutional text

governing the claims here is found in Article XII, Section 1.

It provides that the legislature has a duty "to submit such

proposed amendment or amendments to the people in such manner

and at such time as the legislature shall prescribe."                               Wis.

Const. art. XII, § 1.             And, "if more than one amendment be

submitted,      they    shall   be   submitted       in   such    manner     that       the
people may vote for or against such amendments separately."                         Id.
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                                                                              No.     2020AP2003

       ¶3      The legislature has prescribed further guidelines via

statute       regarding      the     form     of        the        ballot    for       proposed

constitutional amendments.                Notably, Wis. Stat.                 § 5.64(2)(am)

(2021-22)1      requires         ballot   questions           to    contain       a    "concise

statement of each question."                  However, WJI has not raised a

challenge based upon this or any other statute.                             Therefore, this

case        concerns      only     the    requirements               of     the       Wisconsin

Constitution which, by their plain terms, give broad discretion

to the legislature to prescribe the manner of submission to the

people.

       ¶4      To that end, WJI argues that the ballot question for

Marsy's Law submitted to Wisconsin voters ran afoul of Article

XII,       Section   1.     WJI     asserts       the    ballot       question        fails   to

contain "every essential" of the proposed amendment, and that it

misled voters in several respects by neglecting the amendment's

impact on the rights of criminal defendants.                                WJI pulls this

supposed "every essential" requirement from language, although

not the holdings, in two of our prior cases.                              See State ex rel.
Ekern v. Zimmerman, 187 Wis. 180, 204 N.W. 803 (1925); State ex

rel. Thomson v. Zimmerman, 264 Wis. 644, 60 N.W.2d 416 (1953).

However,       not   a    single    constitutional            amendment       in      Wisconsin

history has ever undergone judicial review using this ostensible

test.

       All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
       1

the 2021-22 version unless otherwise indicated.

                                              2
                                                                      No.   2020AP2003

    ¶5      Examining     the    original        meaning     of    the      Wisconsin

Constitution, we discern no such requirement, and therefore we

decline the invitation to fashion a new, exacting constitutional

standard.     The    constitution        itself      requires      only     that      the

legislature "submit" the proposed amendment to the people.                            See

Wis. Const. art. XII,           § 1.     In 1953, we did strike down a

proposed amendment in Thomson——the only time we have done so on

this basis in Wisconsin history——when we concluded the question

submitted    to     the   people        described      the     amendment         in    a

fundamentally     counterfactual         way.        264    Wis. at      660.         The

proposed amendment was therefore not, in any meaningful way,

"submitted" to the people.             Id.    However, the extreme situation

in Thomson is not present here.               While WJI takes issue with the

wording, completeness, and implications of the ballot question,

we conclude the question was not fundamentally counterfactual

such that voters were not afforded the opportunity to approve

the actual amendment.

    ¶6      Additionally,       in     view     of   what    WJI   contends        were
modifications to the rights of criminal defendants and victims,

it argues Marsy's Law should have been submitted to voters as

multiple amendments, rather than as a single amendment.                         We have

summarized our interpretation of this portion of Article XII,

Section 1 as follows:

    It is within the discretion of the legislature to
    submit several distinct propositions as one amendment
    if they relate to the same subject matter and are
    designed to accomplish one general purpose.       The
    general purpose of an amendment may be deduced from
    the text of the amendment itself and from the

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                                                                No.    2020AP2003

    historical context in which the amendment was adopted.
    And all of the propositions must tend to effect or
    carry out that purpose.
McConkey v. Van Hollen, 2010 WI 57, ¶50, 326 Wis. 2d 1, 783

N.W.2d 855 (cleaned up).      Applying this test, we conclude all of

the provisions of Marsy's Law relate to expanding and defining

victim's rights and tend to effect and carry out this general

purpose.

    ¶7     We therefore hold that WJI's challenges to Marsy's Law

fail.    The ballot question was not submitted to the people in
violation of the process outlined in the Wisconsin Constitution.

Therefore, absent challenge on other grounds, the amendment has

been validly ratified and is part of the Wisconsin Constitution.

                              I.    BACKGROUND

    ¶8     In successive legislative sessions, both houses of the

legislature adopted a proposal to amend Article I, Section 9m of

the Wisconsin Constitution.             See 2017 Enrolled Joint Resolution

13; 2019 Enrolled Joint Resolution 3.               The proposed amendment

renumbered the existing Article 1 Section 9m to Section 9m(2)
(intro.)   and     modified        it     as   follows,   with        underlines

representing     additions    to        and    strikethroughs    representing

deletion of the then-existing text:

    [Article I] Section 9m (2) (intro.) This state shall
    treat crime victims, as defined by law, with fairness,
    dignity and respect for their privacy.      This state
    shall ensure that crime victims have all of the
    following privileges and protections as provided by
    law: In order to preserve and protect victims' rights
    to justice and due process throughout the criminal and
    juvenile justice process, victims shall be entitled to

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                                               No.   2020AP2003

all of the following rights, which shall vest at the
time of victimization and be protected by law in a
manner no less vigorous than the protections afforded
to the accused:

(a) To be treated with dignity,     respect,   courtesy,
sensitivity, and fairness.

(b) To privacy.

(c) To proceedings free from unreasonable delay.

(d) To timely disposition of the case; the opportunity
to attend court, free from unreasonable delay.

(e) Upon request, to attend all proceedings unless the
trial court finds sequestration is necessary to a fair
trial for the defendant; involving the case.

(f)   To  reasonable   protection   from  the   accused
throughout the criminal and juvenile justice process;.

(g)   Upon   request,   to    reasonable   and   timely
notification of court proceedings; the opportunity to.

(h) Upon request, to confer with the prosecution; the
opportunity to make a statement to the court at
disposition; attorney for the government.

(i) Upon request, to be heard in any proceeding during
which a right of the victim is implicated, including
release,   plea,   sentencing,   disposition,  parole,
revocation, expungement, or pardon.

(j) To have information pertaining to the economic,
physical, and psychological effect upon the victim of
the   offense   submitted   to   the   authority with
jurisdiction   over  the   case   and   to  have that
information considered by that authority.

(k) Upon request, to timely notice of any release or
escape of the accused or death of the accused if the
accused is in custody or on supervision at the time of
death.

(L) To refuse an interview, deposition, or other
discovery request made by the accused or any person
acting on behalf of the accused.

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                                                      No.    2020AP2003

    (m) To full restitution; from any person who has been
    ordered to pay restitution to the victim and to be
    provided with assistance collecting restitution.

    (n) To compensation; and as provided by law.

    (o) Upon request, to reasonable and timely information
    about the status of the investigation and the outcome
    of the case and the release of the accused.

    (p) To timely notice about all rights under this
    section   and  all  other   rights,  privileges,  or
    protections of the victim provided by law, including
    how such rights, privileges, or protections are
    enforced.

    (3) Except as provided under sub. (2) (n), all
    provisions of this section are self-executing.       The
    legislature   shall  provide   may  prescribe   further
    remedies for the violation of this section. Nothing in
    this section, or in any statute enacted pursuant to
    this section, shall limit any right of the accused
    which may be provided by law. and further procedures
    for compliance with and enforcement of this section.
2019 Enrolled Joint Resolution 3, § 1.

    ¶9   The   proposed   amendment      also   created     four   new

subsections:

    [Article I] Section 9m (1)(a) In this section,
    notwithstanding any statutory right, privilege, or
    protection, "victim" means any of the following:

    1. A person against whom an act is committed that
    would constitute a crime if committed by a competent
    adult.

    2. If the person under subd. 1. is deceased or is
    physically or emotionally unable to exercise his or
    her rights under this section, the person's spouse,
    parent or legal guardian, sibling, child, person who
    resided with the deceased at the time of death, or
    other lawful representative.

    3. If the person under subd. 1. is a minor, the
    person's parent, legal guardian or custodian, or other
    lawful representative.

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                                             No.   2020AP2003

4. If the person under subd.       1. is adjudicated
incompetent, the person's legal    guardian or other
lawful representative.

(b) "Victim" does not include the accused or a person
who the court finds would not act in the best
interests of a victim who is deceased, incompetent, a
minor, or physically or emotionally unable to exercise
his or her rights under this section.

. . .

[Article I] Section 9m (4)(a) In addition to any other
available enforcement of rights or remedy for a
violation of this section or of other rights,
privileges, or protections provided by law, the
victim,   the   victim's  attorney  or   other  lawful
representative, or the attorney for the government
upon request of the victim may assert and seek in any
circuit court or before any other authority of
competent jurisdiction, enforcement of the rights in
this section and any other right, privilege, or
protection afforded to the victim by law.    The court
or other authority with jurisdiction over the case
shall act promptly on such a request and afford a
remedy for the violation of any right of the victim.
The court or other authority with jurisdiction over
the case shall clearly state on the record the reasons
for any decision regarding the disposition of a
victim's right and shall provide those reasons to the
victim or the victim's attorney or other lawful
representative.

(b) Victims may obtain review of all adverse decisions
concerning their rights as victims by courts or other
authorities with jurisdiction under par. (a) by filing
petitions for supervisory writ in the court of appeals
and supreme court.

. . .

[Article I] Section 9m (5) This section does not
create any cause of action for damages against the
state; any political subdivision of the state; any
officer, employee, or agent of the state or a
political subdivision of the state acting in his or
her official capacity; or any officer, employee, or

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                                                            No.    2020AP2003

     agent of the courts acting in his or her official
     capacity.

         . . .

     [Article I] Section 9m (6) This section is not
     intended and may not be interpreted to supersede a
     defendant's federal constitutional rights or to afford
     party status in a proceeding to any victim.
Id., §§ 2-5.

     ¶10     The   legislature    directed     that     this      amendment,

informally known as "Marsy's Law," be submitted for ratification

at the April 7, 2020 election.          The legislature determined that

the ballot question should state as follows:

     Question 1:     "Additional rights of crime victims.
     Shall section 9m of article I of the constitution,
     which gives certain rights to crime victims, be
     amended to give crime victims additional rights, to
     require that the rights of crime victims be protected
     with equal force to the protections afforded the
     accused while leaving the federal constitutional
     rights of the accused intact, and to allow crime
     victims to enforce their rights in court?"
2019 Enrolled Joint Resolution 3.

     ¶11     Several months before the April election, WJI brought
suit against the Wisconsin Elections Commission (WEC) alleging

the ballot question failed to satisfy the requirements of the

Wisconsin Constitution.2    WJI sought declarations that the ballot

question    violated   Article   XII,    Section   1   of   the   Wisconsin

Constitution on various grounds, and requested both a permanent

injunction and a temporary injunction preventing submission of

     2 WJI also sued Dean Knudson, Douglas LaFollette, and Josh
Kaul in their official capacities as Chair of the WEC, Secretary
of State, and Attorney General, respectively.   We refer to all
the defendants collectively as WEC.

                                    8
                                                        No.   2020AP2003

the question to voters while the litigation was pending.            The

circuit court denied WJI's motion for a temporary injunction,

and Wisconsinites ratified the amendment at the April 7, 2020

election by a vote of 1,107,067 to 371,013.            Several months

later, the circuit court granted declaratory judgment in favor

of WJI, concluding the ballot question failed to meet all the

requirements with respect to content and form.            The circuit

court, on its own motion, stayed judgment pending appeal.           WEC

appealed, and the court of appeals certified the appeal to this

court, which we accepted.

                            II.    DISCUSSION

    ¶12    The Wisconsin Constitution provides two mechanisms by

which    the   people   may       change   their   founding   charter:

constitutional convention3 and constitutional amendment.           This

case concerns only the amendment process, which is spelled out

in Article XII, Section 1:

    Any amendment or amendments to this constitution may
    be proposed in either house of the legislature, and if
    the same shall be agreed to by a majority of the
    members elected to each of the two houses, such
    proposed amendment or amendments shall be entered on
    their journals, with the yeas and nays taken thereon,
    and referred to the legislature to be chosen at the
    next general election, and shall be published for
    three months previous to the time of holding such
    election; and if, in the legislature so next chosen,
    such proposed amendment or amendments shall be agreed
    to by a majority of all the members elected to each
    house, then it shall be the duty of the legislature to

    3   Wis. Const. art. XII, § 2.

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                                                                     No.    2020AP2003

      submit such proposed amendment or amendments to the
      people in such manner and at such time as the
      legislature shall prescribe; and if the people shall
      approve and ratify such amendment or amendments by a
      majority   of  the   electors    voting   thereon,  such
      amendment or amendments shall become part of the
      constitution;   provided,   that   if   more   than  one
      amendment be submitted, they shall be submitted in
      such manner that the people may vote for or against
      such amendments separately.
This section was adopted as part of our original constitution in

1848 and has never been amended.               Compare Wis. Const. art. XII,

§ 1 (1848) with Wis. Const. art. XII, § 1 (2021); Ray A. Brown,

The Making of the Wisconsin Constitution (Part II), 1952 Wis. L.

Rev. 23, 60.

      ¶13   WJI    argues    the     ballot       question     for    Marsy's     Law

violated two separate clauses of Article XII, Section 1.                      First,

it contends the proposed amendment was not, in effect, submitted

"to   the   people    in    such    manner       and    at   such    time    as   the

legislature shall prescribe."              Wis. Const. art. XII, § 1.             WJI

maintains that this provision requires a ballot question on a

proposed    amendment       to   disclose        "every      essential"      of   the

amendment and not be misleading.                 Separately, WJI asserts that

Marsy's Law constituted "more than one amendment" and therefore

voters should have been given the opportunity to "vote for or

against such amendments separately."              Id.

      ¶14   Analyzing these questions requires us to interpret the

Wisconsin    Constitution,       and      determine     if   the     amendment    was

ratified    in    conformance      with    the    constitutional       procedures——

questions of law we determine independently.                   Serv. Emps. Int'l
Union, Loca1 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶28, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946

                                          10
                                                                       No.     2020AP2003

N.W.2d 35; McConkey, 326 Wis. 2d 1, ¶12.                    We begin by reviewing

our approach to constitutional interpretation.

                    A.     Constitutional Interpretation

     ¶15    The Wisconsin Constitution begins, "We, the people of

Wisconsin, grateful to Almighty God for our freedom, in order to

secure its blessings, form a more perfect government, insure

domestic     tranquility        and    promote        the    general       welfare,     do

establish this constitution."             Wis. Const. pmbl.            This reflects

the foundational assumption of our system of government:                               all

authority resides with the people, and it is the people alone

who have the authority to establish the terms and methods by

which     they   will     be     governed.          The     constitution       is     that

foundational      charter       in    which     the       people    determine        their

fundamental law, and by which they consent to be governed.                             See

Wis. Const. art. I, § 1 (government derives its "just powers

from the consent of the governed").

     ¶16    This contrasts with the constitutional system of the
British from whom we declared independence.                        While our friends

in Great Britain speak of being governed by a "constitution," it

is   not    a    written       constitution.           Nikolas      Bowie,     Why     the

Constitution      Was    Written      Down,    71   Stan.     L.    Rev.     1397,    1400

(2019).    Rather, for them, it is a set of civic values and norms

accepted by the people through the years.                    Id.     But that is not

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                                                                        No.    2020AP2003

how we do it here.             Our constitutions——state and federal——are

written documents.           They are law and should be read as such.4

      ¶17     This     foundational       point     means        our    authority     to

interpret the constitution when deciding cases is not without

limits.         The        constitution    establishes           the    entities     and

institutions that the people have determined will order their

lives.       Each of our three branches of government——legislative,

executive,      and    judicial——is       created    by    the     constitution      and

subject to it.         Vos, 393 Wis. 2d 38, ¶31; League of Women Voters

of    Wis.    v.     Evers,    2019     WI 75,    ¶30,     387     Wis. 2d 511,      929

N.W.2d 209.        The constitution tells the judiciary, no less than

any other branch, what we can do, what we must do, and what we

cannot    do.        See    generally     Wis.    Const.    art.       VII    (providing

powers, obligations, and prohibitions of various kinds on the

judiciary).          We must be faithful to the charge we have been

given by the people, exercising only the authority entrusted to

us.    Vos, 393 Wis. 2d 38, ¶¶31-33; see also The Federalist No.

78, at 470 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (calling judges
the "faithful guardians of the Constitution").

      4See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (declaring the
federal Constitution "the supreme Law of the Land"); The
Attainment of Statehood 883 (Milo M. Quaife, ed. 1928)
(detailing that the president of the state constitutional
convention adjourned the convention in 1848 by remarking, "[t]he
result of our labors, if approved, becomes henceforth the
supreme law of our adopted land, and whether well or ill done it
stands forth as the record of our united opinions upon the form
of government best suited to the condition of our people");
Daniel R. Suhr, Interpreting the Wisconsin Constitution, 97
Marq. L. Rev. 93, 93 (2013) (stating the "Wisconsin Constitution
is the state's fundamental law").

                                           12
                                                                              No.      2020AP2003

       ¶18    The main power we have been given in the constitution

is the judicial power, which by necessity means the power to

interpret the law in appropriate cases.                              See Gabler v. Crime

Victims      Rts.    Bd.,        2017    WI 67,         ¶37,     376       Wis. 2d 147,      897

N.W.2d 384.         One     of    our     most         famous    early      cases,     Attorney

General ex rel. Bashford v. Barstow, presented a significant

challenge     to    this    court       at    a    time       when   many    questioned      our

authority to issue orders in a disputed gubernatorial contest.

4 Wis. 567 [*567] (1855).                    Chief Justice Whiton explained that

the legal rights at issue were "fixed by the constitution, and

the court, if it has jurisdiction of this proceeding, is the

mere instrument provided by the constitution to ascertain and

enforce their rights as fixed by that instrument."                                Id. at 672-

73   [*659].        Although       the       case       centered      on    who   the    lawful

occupant of the governor's office was, the court's role was "the

same as in all controversies between party and party; not to

create rights, but to ascertain and enforce them."                                  Id. at 673

[*659].      Thus, we have understood from early on that our role is
not to use the constitution to create new rights and protections

that are not there, but to ascertain and enforce the rights and

protections that are already there, fixed by the people in the

text of the constitution.               See Jacobs v. Major, 139 Wis. 2d 492,

512,   407    N.W.2d 832         (1987)       ("Courts        would    be    ill-advised      to

rewrite      history      and    plain,       clear       constitutional          language    to

create    some      new    rights       contrary         to    history.").          Where    our

constitution        needs       updating,         the    people       may    do   so    through

                                                  13
                                                                       No.     2020AP2003

constitutional     amendment         or     constitutional        convention;       that

authority has not been given to us.                See Wis. Const. art. XII.

      ¶19    This should not be surprising because that is exactly

how we have described our duty when interpreting other sources

of    law.     When     it    comes       to     statutory      interpretation,        we

understand that it is "a solemn obligation of the judiciary to

faithfully give effect to the laws enacted by the legislature,

and to do so requires a determination of statutory meaning."

State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44,

271   Wis. 2d 633,      681   N.W.2d 110.          This    is    why   the     focus    in

statutory interpretation is on the language of the statutory

text, read reasonably, along with relevant statutory context and

structure.       Id.,     ¶44-46.           The    whole       goal    "of    statutory

interpretation is to determine what the statute means so that it

may be given its full, proper, and intended effect."                         Id., ¶44.

      ¶20    Our obligation to be true to the law the people have

enacted      requires        the     same        kind     of     consideration          of

constitutional meaning as we give to statutory meaning.                                The
awesome responsibility entrusted to us by the people calls us to

have the humility and fortitude to say what the law is, not what

we may wish it to be.              We do not "update" statutes to fit with

the times.     We do not rewrite statutes to account for changing

moral norms.     We do not modify statutes so they better accord

with our sense of justice or good public policy.                             We do not

ignore or fail to interpret statutes to mean what they say when

critics are loud.        We have repeatedly said it is not our job to
judge the wisdom of the laws we interpret; rather, it is our job
                                            14
                                                                                   No.     2020AP2003

to interpret the law as we find it.                            See, e.g., Town of Wilson

v. City of Sheboygan, 2020 WI 16,                          ¶45, 390 Wis. 2d 266, 938

N.W.2d 493 ("The Town's argument that a petitioner should be

required to use one method of calculation over another is a

policy argument and has no support in the statutory language.");

Voters with Facts v. City of Eau Claire, 2018 WI 63, ¶40, 382

Wis. 2d 1, 913 N.W.2d 131 ("[A] court cannot issue a declaration

regarding the wisdom of a legislative determination."); Columbus

Park   Hous.       Corp.    v.   City     of   Kenosha,          2003     WI 143,          ¶34,    267

Wis. 2d 59,        671     N.W.2d 633     ("[W]e          must       apply    the        statute    as

written,      not    interpret      it    as    we       think       it   should         have     been

written."); Aicher v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶57,

237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849 ("It is not our role to determine

the wisdom or rationale underpinning a particular legislative

pronouncement."); Gottlieb v. City of Milwaukee, 33 Wis. 2d 408,

415,   147    N.W.2d 633         (1967)    ("We          are    not    concerned          with     the

wisdom of what the legislature has done.").

       ¶21    Just as the purpose of statutory interpretation is to
determine         what     the   statutory          text        means,       the     purpose        of

constitutional           interpretation             is     to        determine           what      the

constitutional text meant when it was written, commonly called

the original public meaning or original understanding.                                     Although

constitutional language is at times written with less precision,

that   fact       does     not   fundamentally            change       the    nature        of     our

charge.       We must similarly focus on the constitutional text,

reading      it    reasonably,      in    context,             and    with    a    view     of     the
provision's place within the constitutional structure.                                     Vos, 393
                                               15
                                                                               No.       2020AP2003

Wis. 2d 38,         ¶28.        Other      sources        such    as     the      debates      and

practices at the time of adoption, along with early legislative

enactments, may prove helpful aids to interpretation.                                    State v.

Halverson,     2021        WI 7,      ¶22,   395     Wis. 2d 385,           953    N.W.2d 847.

Just as we leave policy choices to the legislature in statutory

interpretation, we must leave policy choices to the people in

constitutional        interpretation.               See    Vos,   393       Wis. 2d 38,        ¶28

("The text of the constitution reflects the policy choices of

the       people,        and      therefore         constitutional             interpretation

similarly       focuses           primarily         on      the        language          of    the

constitution.");           Flynn      v.     DOA,     216    Wis. 2d 521,            529,      576

N.W.2d 245 (1998) ("It is for the legislature to make policy

choices, ours to judge them based not on our preference but on

legal principles and constitutional authority.").

      ¶22     Although we have not been entirely consistent in its

application,        we     have    consistently          described      our       task    as   one

focused on the meaning of the text.5                         For many years, we have

commonly      recited          that     when    interpreting            a      constitutional
provision, we look to "the plain meaning of the words in the

      5This  is   also   true  across  the   country.     "[T]he
supermajority of state supreme courts have expressly identified
originalism as the primary canon of state constitutional
interpretation."    Jeremy M. Christiansen, Originalism:     The
Primary Canon of State Constitutional Interpretation, 15 Geo. J.
L. & Pub. Pol'y 341, 344 (2017); see, e.g., Elliott v. State,
824 S.E.2d 265, 268-269 (Ga. 2019); People v. Tanner, 853
N.W.2d 653, 667 (Mich. 2014); Woonsocket Sch. Comm. v. Chafee,
89 A.3d 778, 787 (R.I. 2014); League of Educ. Voters v. State,
295 P.3d 743, 749 (Wash. 2013) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Rose,
81 A.3d 123, 127 (Pa. 2013); State v. Hernandez, 268 P.3d 822,
¶8 (Utah 2011).

                                               16
                                                            No.     2020AP2003

context used; the constitutional debates and the practices in

existence at the time of the writing of the constitution; and

the earliest interpretation of the provision by the legislature

as   manifested   in   the   first   law   passed   following     adoption."6

Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 680, 546 N.W.2d 123 (1996).

Notably, all of these are directed at the original meaning of

the constitution.

      ¶23   This court has doubled down on this approach in recent

years.7     In State v. Roberson, for example, we overruled our

      6We have——without controversy——embraced this formulation of
how we do constitutional interpretation for decades, just as
Kalal has taken root as the proper approach to statutory
interpretation.   See State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110; Daniel R.
Suhr, Interpreting Wisconsin Statutes, 100 Marq. L. Rev. 969,
970    (2017)    (explaining    "Kalal   transformed    statutory
interpretation in Wisconsin" by advancing "a uniform method" for
Wisconsin courts to use when interpreting statutes).        As a
result, the Wisconsin court system has a growing culture where
the meaning of the text reigns supreme. And for that, we should
be grateful.

     Justice Dallet's concurrence, on the other hand, suggests
we should depart from a methodology focused on the meaning of
the text we are interpreting in favor of a more eclectic and
"pluralistic" approach.   Justice Dallet concurrence, ¶94.  The
concurrence's open pining for the freedom to go beyond the
meaning of constitutional language must be and is rejected.
      7Justice Dallet's concurrence tries to marshal cases
challenging this. Justice Dallet's concurrence, ¶97. It points
to Becker v. Dane County, 2022 WI 63, ¶33, 403 Wis. 2d 424, 977
N.W.2d 390. But the constitutional analysis cited was joined by
only three justices and is not an opinion of the court. Justice
Dallet's concurrence also cites State v. Roundtree, 2021 WI 1,
395 Wis. 2d 94, 952 N.W.2d 765; State v. Christen, 2021 WI 39,
396 Wis. 2d 705, 958 N.W.2d 746; and Miller v. Carroll, 2020
WI 56, 392 Wis. 2d 49, 944 N.W.2d 542. But those cases involved
applying United States Supreme Court precedent on the Second
                                     17
                                                                          No.    2020AP2003

prior   decision      in   State      v.     Dubose,8      which    had     adopted     new

requirements       for          the        admissibility           of       out-of-court

identification evidence under the Wisconsin Constitution.                             State

v. Roberson, 2019 WI 102, ¶3, 389 Wis. 2d 190, 935 N.W.2d 813.

We did so, however, not based on the policies reflected in this

decision, but based on our assessment of the "original meaning

of the Wisconsin Constitution."                   Id., ¶44.        We recognized that

while   state   constitutions          may       provide    further      protection         to

citizens   than    the     federal     Constitution,         "the       question      for    a

state court is whether its state constitution actually affords

greater protection."            Id., ¶56.         Critically, we held, "A state

court   does    not      have    the       power    to     write     into       its   state

constitution additional protection that is not supported by its

text or historical meaning."               Id.

Amendment and Due Process Clauses of the federal Constitution.
The only other example it offers is State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127,
285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899, a single decision from 18 years
ago   that  remains   controversial   for   its  departure  from
traditional judicial reasoning and constitutional analysis. See
State v. Halverson, 2021 WI 7, ¶38, 395 Wis. 2d 385, 953
N.W.2d 847 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring) ("Because
the Knapp court's interpretation of Article I, Section 8 of the
Wisconsin Constitution lacks any mooring in text or history,
this court should restore the original meaning of this
constitutional provision."); Judge Diane S. Sykes, Reflections
on the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Hallows Lecture (March 7, 2006),
in Marquette Lawyer, Summer/Fall 2006, at 60 ("The court's
decision [in Knapp] rests not on the language or history of the
state constitution's self-incrimination clause but on the
court's own policy judgment flowing from an expansive view of
the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule.").
    8  State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699
N.W.2d 582, overruled by State v. Roberson, 2019 WI 102, 389
Wis. 2d 190, 935 N.W.2d 813.

                                            18
                                                                          No.     2020AP2003

       ¶24   In     Halverson,         a    criminal      defendant    asked        us   to

conclude under the Wisconsin Constitution that an incarcerated

individual is "in custody" for purposes of requiring Miranda

warnings, despite rejection of that principle under the federal

Constitution.          395 Wis. 2d 385, ¶¶2-4.             We unanimously rebuffed

that argument in part because the defendant provided no argument

rooted in the text or history of the Wisconsin Constitution.

Id., ¶¶26-28.           We did not view the request as a wide-ranging

invitation        to      make    new        judicial       policy     on        custodial

interrogations.          Rather, we emphasized that "any argument based

on the Wisconsin Constitution must actually be grounded in the

Wisconsin Constitution."           Id., ¶24

       ¶25   Likewise, in State ex rel. Kaul v. Prehn, the State

asked us to hold that the Governor should have similar removal

powers as the President does under the federal Constitution.

2022 WI 50, ¶2, 402 Wis. 2d 539, 976 N.W.2d 821.                            We rejected

the    State's      overreliance       on     federal     law   because     the    federal

cases    lent     "only      limited       support   to   structure,      meaning,       and
original     understanding         of       the    Wisconsin     Governor's        removal

power."      Id., ¶43.        We emphasized that "we focus on the language

of the adopted text" when interpreting the constitution, and

said    it    was      the    State's       obligation     to    present        historical

research and evidence of the Wisconsin Constitution's "original

meaning."       Id., ¶¶12, 44.          We went on to consult and discuss the

original understanding of the appointment powers of the Governor

by reference to the historical record, including records of the

                                              19
                                                                          No.    2020AP2003

constitutional       convention       and        early    legislative          enactments.

Id., ¶¶48-51.

      ¶26    In Johnson v. WEC, we examined the requirements under

the   Wisconsin           Constitution      as      it    related         to     redrawing

legislative        maps.       2021     WI 87,      ¶2,     399        Wis. 2d 623,    967

N.W.2d 469.        In doing so, we reviewed the text and history in

search of the "original meaning" of the relevant constitutional

provisions.        Id., ¶¶28, 33, 58.             We rejected, for example, the

notion      that    the     Wisconsin    Constitution         authorizes          judicial

consideration of partisanship because "[n]othing supports the

notion that Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution

was originally understood" this way.                 Id., ¶58.

      ¶27    When         considering       our      role         in      constitutional

interpretation, Justice Smith said it well in 1855.                            It is worth

quoting at length:

      Let us then look to that constitution, adopted by the
      people of Wisconsin, and endeavor to ascertain its
      true intent and meaning, the distribution of the
      powers of government which it has in fact made, and
      the agencies which it has provided, whereby those
      powers are to be executed.      And here, let it be
      remarked, that our conclusions must be guided and
      determined . . . by     the   plain,    simple,    but
      authoritative and mandatory provisions of our own
      constitution. We made it ourselves. We are bound to
      abide by it, until altered, amended or annulled, and
      we must construe it, and support it, not according to
      the   vague,   conjectural  hypothesis  of   volunteer
      expounders, resident in other states, having no care
      or interest in the government, and having no knowledge
      of the constitution of our state, but according to its
      plain letter and meaning, as the oath-bond of our
      safety——as the palladium of our rights and liberties——
      as the vital principle of our social and political
      organism.

                                            20
                                                                               No.     2020AP2003

Bashford, 4 Wis. at 785 [*757-58] (Smith, J.).

      ¶28    In        short,          our     solemn        duty   in     constitutional

interpretation          is        to     faithfully      discern         and         apply     the

constitution as it is written.9                      What the constitution says, it

says.     What it does not say, it does not say.                         Through careful,

humble, and courageous fidelity to the constitution, we allow

the   people      to    govern         themselves,      we    support     and        uphold    the

constitutional           rights          and     protections        the        people         have

established, and we ensure that the government the people have

authorized remains in their hands.

                             B.    Submitted to the People

      ¶29    We turn then to the first constitutional challenge WJI

poses:      Was the proposed amendment submitted to the people in

compliance with Article XII, Section 1?                        Before addressing WJI's

several     arguments        concerning         this    clause,     we    begin        with   the

original meaning of Article XII, Section 1.

      9Justice   Dallet's  concurrence   attempts  to   critique
originalism by raising some of the challenges that come with
understanding legal texts.     Reading the concurrence's near-
hopeless description of the interpretive task, one wonders why
we bother with a written constitution at all.       None of the
issues she identifies are unique to constitutional language,
however.    The same problems inhere in the interpretation of
statutes and other legal texts.        Laws written by people,
sometimes hundreds of years ago, can be difficult to interpret
and apply.    But this fact does not change the nature of our
duty.    Thus, the concurrence's broadside against originalism
"isn't an attack against originalism so much as it is an attack
on written law." Neil Gorsuch, A Republic, If You Can Keep It
113 (2019).

                                                21
                                                                  No.     2020AP2003

      1.    The Original Meaning of Article XII, Section 1 & Ekern

       ¶30    Our constitutional analysis begins with the text.                  As

relevant      to   this   dispute,    following     initial    adoption    in   the

legislature and other procedural requirements, the constitution

requires "the legislature to submit such proposed amendment or

amendments to the people in such manner and at such time as the

legislature shall prescribe."            Wis. Const. art. XII, § 1.             This

language commands only two things:            First, the amendment must be

"submitted" to the people; and second, it must be done in the

manner and at the time prescribed by the legislature.                     Id.    The

legislature has enacted Wis. Stat. § 5.64(2),10 which spells out

various instructions for submission such as giving a "concise

statement of each question."            However, WJI does not develop any

separate arguments under this statute.                 Therefore, we do not

address the statute further and focus our attention solely on

the    requirements       in   the   constitution    itself.     See    Vos,     393

Wis. 2d 38, ¶24 ("We do not step out of our neutral role to

       10   Wisconsin Stat. § 5.64(2)(am) states:

       There shall be a separate ballot when any proposed
       constitutional amendment or any other measure or
       question is submitted to a vote of the people, except
       as authorized in s. 5.655.    The ballot shall give a
       concise statement of each question in accordance with
       the act or resolution directing submission in the same
       form as prescribed by the commission under s.
       7.08(1)(a). The question may not be worded in such a
       manner as to require a negative vote to approve a
       proposition or an affirmative vote to disapprove a
       proposition.    Unless otherwise expressly provided,
       this ballot form shall be used at all elections when
       questions are submitted to a vote of the people.
                                         22
                                                                             No.    2020AP2003

develop or construct arguments for parties; it is up to them to

make their case.").

       ¶31    On its face, the constitutional requirement that an

amendment be "submitted" to the people does not contain any

explicit       obligations           regarding       form      or     substance.           The

legislature is granted substantial discretion and freedom in how

amendments can be submitted to the people.                                The text simply

requires that the people must have the opportunity to ratify or

reject a proposed amendment.

       ¶32    Moving          to     other       evidence           of      the     original

understanding, we are unaware of any ratification debates or

other        contemporaneous           evidence        from         the     constitutional

convention that bear on the meaning of this provision.                                      But

early legislative actions pursuant to this provision confirm our

reading of the text of Article XII, Section 1.                            We look to these

early        legislative           actions     not      to      conclusively          settle

constitutional          meaning,      but    because        they     can    reveal    how    a

constitutional provision was understood at the time of adoption.
See, e.g., Vos, 393 Wis. 2d 38, ¶67.                           In other words, early

legislatures attempting to amend the constitution are likely to

have     acted        consistent        with        their     understanding          of     its

requirements, and therefore proceed consistent with the original

public meaning of Article XII, Section 1.

       ¶33    In the early years after our constitution was adopted,

ballot questions were uniformly submitted as simple up or down

votes.        In      1854,    the    legislature           submitted      three     separate
amendments       to    the    voters    concerning:            (1)       2-year    terms    for
                                               23
                                                                     No.    2020AP2003

assemblymen, (2) 4-year terms for senators, and (3) biennial

legislative    sessions.       §§ 1-3,    ch.    89,    Laws    of     1854.      The

electors were given three ballots:

           "'For amendment to section               four'     or    'against
            amendment to section four'";

           "'for amendment to section five'                   or    'against
            amendment to section five'"; and

           "'for amendment to section eleven'                 or 'against
            amendment to section eleven.'"
§ 4, ch. 89, Laws of 1854.               This process confirms that the

constitutional command to submit the amendment to the people for

ratification      was   understood    not    to      demand     any        particular

substantive content.        It simply required that voters be afforded

a clear opportunity to ratify a proposed amendment.

    ¶34     The   pattern    continued.         In   1862,     the     legislature

submitted to voters an amendment to increase the governor's pay

to $2,500 per year.         § 1, ch. 202, Laws of 1862.               There again,

the question on the ballot was simply "for the amendment to the

constitution" or "against the amendment to the constitution."

§ 2, ch. 202, Laws of 1862.          In 1867, the people were asked to

amend the constitution to increase legislative pay to $350 per

year.   Ch. 25, Laws of 1867.            The question on the ballot once

again was "for amendment to the constitution" and "for amendment

to the constitution, no."         § 2, ch. 25, Laws of 1867.                   And in

1869, the legislature submitted two amendments to the people to

increase the salary of the governor to $5,000 per year and the
lieutenant governor to $1,000 per year.                Ch. 186, Laws of 1869.

                                     24
                                                             No.   2020AP2003

The legislature submitted both amendments in the same ballot

question:      "for    amendments   to   the    constitution"      and   "for

amendments to the constitution, no."             § 2, ch. 186, Laws of

1869.

      ¶35   Thus, no ballot question in the first 22 years after

the     constitution    was   adopted    contained     any      substantive

description of the amendment at all.           So far as we can tell, no

one questioned the validity of this process.             If in fact the

constitution requires the content of a proposed amendment to be

included in the ballot question, the inescapable conclusion is

that every one of these amendments was submitted to the people

in an unconstitutional manner——with no one batting an eye.               That

is highly unlikely.      The overwhelming, indeed, uniform teaching

of the text and history surrounding Article XII, Section 1 of

the Wisconsin Constitution is that an amendment only needs to be

submitted to the people for ratification.             It need not——as a

constitutional prerequisite——contain any kind of description of

the amendment's substance.11
      ¶36   This leads to two questions.          First, where does the

proposed "every essential" test come from, then?               And second,

are there circumstances under which a proposed amendment can be

       Justice Dallet's concurrence critiques our interpretive
      11

principles because, she argues, originalism is "almost always
fruitless."   Justice Dallet concurrence, ¶108.   But this case
stands in direct conflict with those assertions.    The original
meaning in this case is apparent, with text and history all
pointing in the same direction.    While some cases may involve
harder questions, here, as is often the case, a careful analysis
yields a relatively clear answer.

                                    25
                                                                     No.    2020AP2003

deemed not "submitted" to the people under Article XII, Section

1?   To provide the necessary context for these questions, we

continue    with    a   brief   survey         of   the    historical       practice,

legislative changes, and cases that led to the arguments before

us today.

     ¶37    Starting in 1870, the legislature changed its practice

and began adding a general subject area to the ballot question,

although still without explaining any of the content                          of the

proposed amendment.       Criminal defendants at that time had to be

presented    to    or   indicted     by    a     grand     jury    (absent    a   few

exceptions) before answering a criminal offense.                       Wis. Const.

art. 1, § 8 (1848).        In 1870, the legislature asked voters to

amend the constitution and remove the grand jury requirement.

Ch. 118, Laws of 1870.          Voters in favor of the amendment were

asked to cast a ballot "against the grand jury system" while

those who opposed the proposed amendment voted "for the grand

jury system."      § 2, ch. 118, Laws of 1870.              In 1871, voters were

asked to add Sections 31 (prohibiting special legislation and
private laws) and 32 (authorizing general laws on subject areas

prohibited under section 31) to Article IV.                       Ch. 122, Laws of

1871.      Those   in   favor   of   the       amendment    were    asked    to   vote

"against special legislation" and those opposed to the amendment

cast a ballot "for special legislation."                   § 2, ch. 122, Laws of

1871.   Along these lines, in 1872, the ballot question asked the

people to vote "for amending the constitution increasing the

number of justices of the supreme court" or "against amending

                                          26
                                                                     No.    2020AP2003

the    constitution        increasing    the   number     of     justices       of   the

supreme court."        § 2, ch. 111, Laws of 1872.

       ¶38    1874 saw a longer, more substantive question submitted

to    the    people,   immediately       followed    by     a   return     to    ballot

questions without subject matter.              The ballot language in 1874

was "for amending the constitution limiting bonded indebtedness

by counties, towns, cities and villages, to five per cent" and

"against       amending      the    constitution         limiting     the        bonded

indebtedness by counties, towns, cities and villages to five per

cent."       § 2, ch. 37, Laws of 1874.        Following this, however, the

legislature again began asking simple yes or no questions.                            In

1877 the voters were asked to increase the composition of the

supreme court again (the earlier proposal failed).                    Ch. 48, Laws

of 1877.        The ballot question presented this time was, "for

amendment       to   the    constitution"      or    "for       amendment       to   the

constitution, no."          § 2, ch. 48, Laws of 1877.             Also that year,

the    legislature      asked      the   people     to    amend     the     provision

regarding claims against the state.               Ch. 158, Laws of 1877.             The
ballot question simply asked:             "for the amendment" and "against

the amendment."         § 2, ch. 158, Laws of 1877.                 Other proposed

amendments proceeded similarly.12

       All ballot questions from 1881 until 1897 simply served
       12

to identify the section (or sections) amended.     See § 2, ch.
262, Laws of 1881 (amending Article IV, Sections 4, 5, 11, and
21); § 2, ch. 273, Laws of 1882 (amending Article III, Section
1); § 2, ch. 290, Laws of 1882 (amending Article VI, Section 4;
Article VII, Section 12; and Article XIII, Section 1); § 2, ch.
362, Laws of 1891 (amending Article IV, Section 31); § 2, ch.
69, Laws of 1897 (amending Article VII, Section 7).     Or they
                                         27
                                                                         No.   2020AP2003

    ¶39        Then,    just   before    the        turn    of     the   century,    the

legislature adopted a statute that required "a concise statement

of the nature" of a proposed amendment.                     Wis. Stat. ch. 5, § 39

(1898).       This mandate was moved in 1907 to the predecessor of

what later became today's Wis. Stat. § 5.64.                       § 2, ch. 583, Laws

of 1907 (creating § 38(7)).13                 And in 1908, ballot questions

began     to     include       substantive           descriptions        of    proposed

amendments.          That year, four amendments were submitted to the

people.       Voters were asked to vote yes or no to the following

questions:

              "For the amendment providing state aid in the
               construction or improvement of public highways."
               § 2, ch. 238, Laws of 1907.

              "For the amendments authorizing a graduated
               income tax." § 2, ch. 661, Laws of 1907.

              "For the amendment extending from three to six
               days the time allowed the governor in which to
               approve bills." Id.

              "For the amendment providing that after December
               1st, 1912, electors shall be citizens of the
               United States." Id.
And so the trend continued moving forward.

    ¶40        The     first   case     to        address    the     manner    of    the

legislature's submission to the people occurred in 1925.                             The

question before this court in Ekern was whether the legislature

asked if the voter was for or against an amendment.                            See § 2,
ch. 22, Laws of 1889 (amending Article VII, Section 4).
    13 See § 25, ch. 383, Laws of 1915 (renumbering § 38 to Wis.
Stat. § 6.23); § 1, ch. 666, Laws of 1965 (renumbering Wis.
Stat. § 6.23 to Wis. Stat. § 5.64).

                                             28
                                                                  No.   2020AP2003

complied with the constitution when it delegated the drafting of

a ballot question to the secretary of state.                187 Wis. at 196-

200.      We held that this was permissible.               Id. at 205.        The

constitution      requires     that     the   legislature        determine    the

"manner" of submission to the people, and we concluded this

language was broad enough to encompass directing the secretary

of state to determine the content of the ballot question.                     Id.

Although extraneous to the issue in the case, the court engaged

in an extended digression regarding the content and design of

ballot questions.        Id. at 200-02.       Because this language is the

genesis for the proposed "every essential" test we are asked to

breathe    life   into   in   this    case,   we   quote   the   discussion    at

length and in context:

       A constitutional amendment being designed to affect
       the fundamental law, the highest degree of care and
       foresight   which  the   legislature   is  capable  of
       exercising, in order that the proposed amendment may
       not fall by the wayside and thus result in thwarting
       the will of the people, should be exercised as an act
       of wisdom, and therefore, under the law as it now
       exists, it would appear to be highly desirable that
       the form of the question which should be submitted
       should be prescribed and set forth in the act
       directing its submission. Every legislature has among
       its members lawyers who have obtained distinction in
       their profession and who have made a special study of
       constitutional law, and ever since the adoption of the
       constitution   it  has  been   the   practice  of  the
       legislature to appoint such members on the judiciary
       committees of the two houses.           The knowledge,
       experience, and prudence of such members of the
       judiciary committee, when supplemented by the aid and
       advice of the legal department of the state, are
       liable to result in the production of a better form of
       submission than if the whole responsibility is rested
       upon an administrative officer, with the aid of the

                                        29
                                                             No.    2020AP2003

    attorney general alone.    But the question raised in
    the instant case is not one which involves the best
    method, the greatest wisdom, or the most comprehensive
    foresight, but whether the general statutes above
    referred   to  were   adequate   to  comply   with  the
    constitutional provisions; and this depends entirely
    upon the construction to be placed upon the provision
    of the fundamental law above quoted on the subject of
    amendments.    Had the framers of the constitution
    intended that the legislature should prescribe the
    form, it might easily have done so by using a few
    additional words, or it might have so worded the
    provision that the idea of form would have been
    necessarily included by implication.     This, however,
    was not the case, and it is highly probable that the
    framers had in mind the vital distinction existing
    between matters of substance and matters of mere form.
    Had the legislature in the instant case prescribed the
    form of submission in a manner which would have failed
    to present the real question, or had they by error or
    mistake presented an entirely different question, no
    claim could be made that the proposed amendment would
    have been validly enacted.     In other words, even if
    the form is prescribed by the legislature it must
    reasonably, intelligently, and fairly comprise or have
    reference to every essential of the amendment.     This
    demonstrates quite clearly the fact that the form of
    submission is after all a mere form, and that the
    principal and essential criterion consists in the
    submission of a question or a form which has for its
    object and purpose an intelligent and comprehensive
    submission to the people, so that the latter may be
    fully informed on the subject upon which they are
    required to exercise a franchise.
Id. (emphasis added).

    ¶41    Reviewing    this    discussion,      the    "every     essential"

language does not read as a separate test.             Rather, it comes as

an explanatory statement (phrased as "[i]n other words") for the

comment   that   the   real    question,   not   an     entirely   different

question, must be submitted to the people.             Therefore, an effort
to infuse constitutional significance into this language is not

                                    30
                                                                               No.   2020AP2003

an accurate reading of Ekern on its own terms.                                  The relevant

discussion in Ekern simply does not set forth a substantive,

explainable "every essential" test at all.                            And why would it?

The content of the ballot question was not challenged and was

not at issue.          There was no need to create, much less apply, a

new substantive constitutional test.

      ¶42      Therefore, we do not understand Ekern as adopting or

creating a new, undefined, and strict constitutional test for

detail        and     accuracy        in    constitutional            amendment         ballot

questions.          Rather, Ekern's discussion is best read as affirming

the   unremarkable        proposition         that       the   real    question        of    the

amendment must be submitted to the people.                            This is consistent

with the constitutional requirement that a proposed amendment

must be "submitted" in order to be validly ratified.                                   Where a

question is not the real question at all, such a proposal cannot

be said to be submitted to the people.

      ¶43      This    reading        of   Ekern    animated        our    decision      years

later    in     Thomson,        264    Wis. at      659–60.           Thomson        concerned
proposed       amendments        related       to        legislative           apportionment.

Id. at 650-51.           The amendments were challenged on the grounds

that they should have been submitted as separate amendments——an

issue    we    return     to    later——and         that    the   ballot         question     was

contrary to the amendment itself.                   Id. at 655, 657.

      ¶44      The     ballot     question         in     Thomson      stated        that,   if

approved,       "the    legislature         shall       apportion      senate        districts

along"      certain      municipal          lines——using         mandatory           language.
Id. at      660.        The     problem,      we        explained,        is    "the    actual
                                             31
                                                                          No.   2020AP2003

amendment . . . has no such mandate at all and under it the

legislature is uncontrolled except that the territory inclosed

shall be 'contiguous' and 'convenient.'"                          Id.      The question

given   to    the     voters    was   the     opposite      of    what    the   amendment

actually provided.            We concluded the question was misinformation

and not "in accord with the fact."                       Id.      We cited Ekern and

concluded      that     the    "question      as    actually      submitted      did    not

present the real question but by error or mistake presented an

entirely different one."              Id.     Accordingly, there was "no valid

submission to or ratification by the people."                       Id.    To this day,

Thomson      remains     the     only       case    in   state     history      where    a

constitutional amendment was deemed invalid because it was not

"submitted" to the people.

      ¶45     A final case we must address involved the court of

appeals' efforts to understand these two prior cases, and what

sort of requirement an "every essential" test is.                          The issue in

Metropolitan        Milwaukee     Ass'n       of    Commerce,      Inc.    v.    City    of

Milwaukee was the validity of a municipal ballot question——not a
constitutional amendment.               2011 WI App 45, ¶1, 332 Wis. 2d 459,

798   N.W.2d 287.         One     argument         raised   was    whether      municipal

ballot questions under Wis. Stat. § 9.20(6) were subject to the

"'every essential' element" test.                   Id., ¶¶10, 12.         The court of

appeals      answered    in    the    negative.          Id.,    ¶13.      It   began    by

discussing Ekern, and concluded that in context it was not clear

an every essential standard was even being proposed at all, an

observation we agree with.              Id., ¶22.        It then read our decision
in Thomson as adopting the "every essential" language into the
                                             32
                                                                            No.    2020AP2003

statutory        requirement         of    a   "concise    statement"——an         issue       not

before us here.14             Id., ¶23.        But, the court noted, Thomson never

had to apply the "every essential" language in its reasoning

because of its conclusion the ballot statement was inaccurate.

Id.      The court of appeals went on to address the municipal

ballot      issue,       ultimately        concluding      the   inclusion        of    "every

essential" of a proposal was not incorporated into municipal

ballot questions under the relevant statute.                      Id., ¶30.

                                          2.   Takeaways

       ¶46       So what principles of law can we derive from this

discussion?

       ¶47       First, Article XII, Section 1 does not require any

substantive discussion of the amendment in the ballot question

submitted         to    the     people.          No    explanation     or     summary         is

constitutionally commanded.

       ¶48       Second, the constitution requires that the amendment

be    "submitted"        to    the    people     for    ratification.         We       held   in
Thomson, borrowing language from Ekern, that an amendment has

not been "submitted" to the people when the ballot question

fails       to   present       the    real     question    or    is   contrary         to     the

amendment itself.             Thomson, 264 Wis. 2d at 660.             In other words,

voters      have       not   been    given      the    opportunity    to    vote       for    or

        We observe that our decision in State ex rel. Thomson v.
       14

Zimmerman never clarified or discussed the legal foundation for
an "every essential" analysis.      264 Wis. 644, 60 N.W.2d 416
(1953).    Therefore, we question whether Thomson held anything
regarding the statutory "concise statement" requirement.

                                                33
                                                                  No.    2020AP2003

against a proposal when the ballot question is fundamentally

counterfactual.        When a ballot question is factually inaccurate

in a fundamental way, it cannot be said that the amendment was

actually submitted to the people for ratification.                      But given

the unique facts of Thomson and the broad authority given to the

legislature in the constitution, this requirement is narrow and

will be triggered only in rare circumstances.

       ¶49    Third,   this    court    has    never,    in   a   single    case,

developed or applied an "every essential" test for review of

proposed constitutional amendments.              Nowhere in our two cases

that use this language have we established, defined, or utilized

such a test.

       ¶50    And finally, because it is our solemn obligation to

follow the original meaning of the constitution, we will not

design,      invent,   or    breathe    life   into     the   so-called    "every

essential" test without a constitutional command to do so.

       ¶51    Insofar as the content of a proposed ballot question

is concerned, the relevant constitutional question is whether
the proposed amendment was, at a basic level, submitted to the

people for ratification.          A ballot question could violate this

constitutional requirement only in the rare circumstance that

the question is fundamentally counterfactual such that voters

were    not    asked    to    approve    the   actual     amendment.        These

principles in hand, we examine WJI's argument that the ballot

question at issue here failed to satisfy this constitutional

requirement.

                                        34
                                                                          No.    2020AP2003

                                 3.     Applied Here

      ¶52    Once again, the ballot question submitted to voters

for Marsy's Law stated:

      Additional rights of crime victims.  Shall section 9m
      of article I of the constitution, which gives certain
      rights to crime victims, be amended to give crime
      victims additional rights, to require that the rights
      of crime victims be protected with equal force to the
      protections afforded the accused while leaving the
      federal constitutional rights of the accused intact,
      and to allow crime victims to enforce their rights in
      court?
2019 Enrolled Joint Resolution 3.                  WJI raises several objections

to this question.

      ¶53    First,      WJI    argues      that    the    ballot     question         fails

because     it    does    not     mention        the   new      section      creating     a

constitutional definition of a "victim."                         In an amendment of

this length and complexity, the legislature had to make choices

of   what   to    include       and   how    to    phrase       it.     We      must   give

significant deference to the legislature in making these choices

because     the   constitution        affords      the    legislature        substantial

discretion in submitting an amendment to the people.                            While the
legislature could have decided that more be said, WJI's legal

argument     depends       on     its       erroneous          contention       that     the

constitution demands a more exacting review of the legislature's

choices.     It does not.         A constitutional definition of "victim"

fits comfortably within the statement that crime victims are

given   certain     or    additional        rights,       as    the   ballot     question

states.     Nothing here is fundamentally counterfactual such that
voters were not asked to approve the actual amendment.

                                            35
                                                                  No.    2020AP2003

    ¶54     Second,    WJI   contends    the    ballot   question       failed    to

correctly capture how the rights of the accused would change.

It offers several arguments in this regard.                    WJI asserts the

ballot   question     is   misleading    because    it   requires       "that    the

rights of crime victims will be protected with equal force to

the protections afforded the accused," while the text of the

amendment says victim rights will "be protected by law in a

manner no less vigorous than the protections afforded to the

accused."     2019 Enrolled Joint Resolution 3 (emphasis added);

Wis. Const. art. I, § 9m(2) (emphasis added).               While the parties

debate the import of this wording choice, we again emphasize the

deference owed to the legislature in explaining the proposal to

the people.       Minor deficiencies in a summary (and all summaries

will, by necessity, be incomplete) do not give rise to the kind

of bait-and-switch we struck down in Thomson.                     This does not

rise to the level of a fundamentally counterfactual question

such that voters were not asked to approve the actual amendment.

    ¶55     WJI    additionally     suggests      the    ballot    question       is
misleading    because      the   amendment     reduces   the    rights    of     the

accused.     Prior to Marsy's Law, Article I, Section 9m stated,

"Nothing in this section, or in any statute enacted pursuant to

this section, shall limit any right of the accused which may be

provided by law."       Wis. Const. art. I, § 9m (2017).            Marsy's Law

struck this sentence and added:              "This section is not intended

and may not be interpreted to supersede a defendant's federal

constitutional rights or to afford party status in a proceeding
to any victim."         Wis. Const. art. I, § 9m(6); 2019 Enrolled
                                        36
                                                                   No.    2020AP2003

Joint Resolution 3, §§ 1, 5.           WJI says the ballot question was

misleading because this change in its view could reduce the

rights of the accused in some situations, yet voters were told

"the federal constitutional rights of the accused" would be left

intact.      We once again return to the relevant question:                       the

issue is not whether the amendment was explained, but whether it

was "submitted" to the people.               Nothing in the constitution

requires     that     all    components     be   presented    in     the    ballot

question.     The constitution leaves the level of detail required

to the legislature, which may impose more or less requirements

on itself.          The failure to raise an issue in a summary or

describe     it   with   precision    does   not   amount     to   the     kind    of

wholesale inaccuracy of Thomson or suggest the amendment was not

submitted to the people.             This as well does not rise to the

level   of    a     fundamentally    counterfactual     question         such   that

voters were not asked to approve the actual amendment.

    ¶56      Finally, WJI contends the ballot question is infirm

for failing to inform the people that victims can now obtain
review of adverse decisions by filing a supervisory writ in this

court   or    the    court   of   appeals.       See   Wis.   Const.       art.    I,

§ 9m(4)(b); 2019 Enrolled Joint Resolution 3, § 3.                  We leave the

substantive impact of this change for another day.                       But WJI's

argument again depends on the constitution requiring a level of

completeness in a proposed question that simply isn't there.

The right to file a supervisory writ is certainly encompassed by

the ballot question's statement that crime victims will be given

                                       37
                                                                                 No.        2020AP2003

certain rights.          Nothing about its absence renders the ballot

question even arguably inaccurate.

      ¶57     For these reasons, the challenges to the form of the

ballot question presented to the people of Wisconsin do not

succeed.      The question approved by voters was not fundamentally

counterfactual in any way.               The proposed amendment was submitted

to the people for ratification, and as far as the challenge

before   us    today     is     concerned,          that    is   all       the    constitution

requires.

                               C.    Multiple Amendments

      ¶58     Finally,        WJI    argues    that    the       amendment        should         have

been submitted as multiple amendments, rather than one.                                           The

relevant constitutional text governing this claim is also found

in Article XII, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution.                                           It

states, "if more than one amendment be submitted, they shall be

submitted in such manner that the people may vote for or against

such amendments separately."               Wis. Const. art. XII, § 1.
      ¶59     The   text,       plainly       read,        creates     a    straightforward

requirement:        multiple amendments must be submitted separately.

The   question      then       becomes,       what     constitutes          more        than      one

amendment?

      ¶60     Unlike the other claims in this case, this issue is

one the court has addressed on several occasions.                                       Our first

consideration       of   the        multiple    amendments         question            in    Article

XII, Section 1 occurred in State ex rel. Hudd v. Timme, 54
Wis. 318,      335,      11     N.W. 785       (1882).           There,          we     carefully
                                               38
                                                                               No.       2020AP2003

considered       the     text      and     relevant       history         to   determine         the

original understanding of this provision.15                             Id. at 335-38.

      ¶61       Focusing      on    the    language,          we    explained       that    there

could be only two constructions of this sentence.                                   Id. at 335.

"First, it may be construed . . . that every proposition in the

shape of an amendment to the constitution, which standing alone

changes or abolishes any of its present provisions, or adds any

new   provision         thereto,        shall      be    so    drawn       that     it    can     be

submitted separately, and must be so submitted."                                   Id.     Such a

reading did not make sense, however.                               Id.     It would "be so

narrow     as    to     render     it     practically         impossible       to    amend       the

constitution."          Id.

      ¶62       Instead,      we    adopted        the     second         construction,          and

concluded        that    the       relevant      language          must     mean     that       only

"amendments which have different objects and purposes in view"

must be submitted separately.                      Id. at 336.            We explained, "In

order to constitute more than one amendment, the propositions

submitted must relate to more than one subject, and have at
least two distinct and separate purposes not dependent upon or

connected with each other."                  Id.        The court then confirmed this

reading by considering the process utilized in the adoption of

earlier     amendments.            Id. at       337-38.            It    concluded       that    its

      15The court in State ex rel. Hudd v. Timme did not use the
terminology of originalism to explain its analysis, but that is
what it did. 54 Wis. 318, 11 N.W. 785 (1882). The court began
with the text, and then proceeded to consider the history to
determine how the language was understood when drafted. Id. at
335-38.

                                                39
                                                                             No.    2020AP2003

reading of the text was the understanding of nearly everyone

when earlier amendments were submitted to the people, without

objection.        Id. at 338.

       ¶63   We     therefore      held      that      the       multiple           amendment

requirement "must be construed to mean amendments which have

different objects and purposes in view."                         Id. at 336.          And in

"order to constitute more than one amendment, the propositions

submitted must relate to more than one subject, and have at

least two distinct and separate purposes not dependent upon or

connected    with     each     other."         Id.      Our       test       has     remained

substantially the same since.                See, e.g., Thomson, 264 Wis. at

656 (concluding "that a separate submission was required of the

amendment" because it failed to satisfy Hudd's test).

       ¶64   Our     most    recent     formulation         of     the       test    was    in

McConkey,    a     case     challenging      the     adoption      of    Article       XIII,

Section 13, governing marriage.                326 Wis. 2d 1, ¶1.                  There, we

articulated the test as follows:

       It is within the discretion of the legislature to
       submit several distinct propositions as one amendment
       if they relate to the same subject matter and are
       designed to accomplish one general purpose.        The
       general purpose of an amendment may be deduced from
       the text of the amendment itself and from the
       historical context in which the amendment was adopted.
       And all of the propositions must tend to effect or
       carry out that purpose.
Id.,   ¶50   (cleaned       up).      Applying       this    test,      we    concluded       a

single amendment was appropriate because "the general purpose of

the    marriage     amendment      is   to   preserve        the     legal         status   of
marriage in Wisconsin as between one man and one woman.                                    Both

                                          40
                                                                         No.    2020AP2003

propositions      in     the     marriage      amendment      relate      to    and     are

connected with this purpose."               Id., ¶56.

      ¶65    The parties do not dispute that this is the governing

test.       And   we   see      no    reason     to    question    the      textual     and

historical analysis done by Hudd and its progeny.                               Employing

this test, we have no difficulty concluding Marsy's Law did not

violate the constitutional prohibition on submitting multiple

amendments as one.             The amendment broadly protects and expands

crime victims' rights.               This is plain from the text and history

of its adoption.           In so doing, it amends only Section 9m of

Article I.        Even if WJI is correct that it will impact those

accused of crimes as well (an issue we need not decide), all of

the changes relate to the same, general purpose of expanding and

protecting the rights of crime victims.                    All of the propositions

are aimed at this goal, and tend to effect or carry this out.

We hold that WJI's challenge to Marsy's Law on the ground that

it   was    required     to     be    submitted       as   separate     constitutional

amendments fails.

                                     III.   CONCLUSION

      ¶66    Through      the    Wisconsin       Constitution,        the      people    of

Wisconsin     have       given       the    legislature       broad      authority       to

determine     how      proposed         constitutional        amendments         may     be

submitted to the people for ratification.                     WJI argues that the

ballot question for Marsy's Law was constitutionally deficient

under Article XII, Section 1 on multiple grounds.                         We disagree.
We   conclude     that    the     ballot     question       was   not    fundamentally
                                            41
                                                                    No.    2020AP2003

counterfactual        such    that    voters      were      not    afforded        the

opportunity to approve the actual amendment.                      Rather, Marsy's

Law   was   validly    submitted     to   and    ratified    by    the    people    of

Wisconsin, as the constitution requires.                    WJI further argues

Marsy's Law should have been split into more than one amendment,

each receiving a separate vote.                However, the constitution did

not require that here.         We conclude the amendment had the single

general purpose of expanding and protecting victims' rights, and

all provisions of the proposed amendment furthered this purpose.

For   these    reasons,      WJI's   constitutional         challenges      to     the

ratification of Marsy's Law do not succeed, and we reverse the

circuit court's judgment to the contrary.

      By the Court.—The judgment and order of the circuit court

is reversed.

                                          42
                                                                  No.    2020AP2003.rgb

      ¶67    REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.               (concurring).

      If the judicial power extended to every question under
      the [C]onstitution it would involve almost every
      subject   proper   for   legislative  discussion   and
      decision . . . .    The division of power . . . could
      exist no longer, and the other departments would be
      swallowed up by the judiciary.
John Marshall, Speech (Mar. 7, 1800), reprinted in 4 The Papers

of John Marshall 82, 95 (Charles T. Cullen ed., 1984).

      ¶68    Not    every    constitutional       question    falls       under        the

authority of the judiciary to answer:                     "Sometimes, . . . 'the

law is that the judicial department has no business entertaining

[a] claim of unlawfulness——because the question is entrusted to

one   of     the    political      branches      or    involves     no    judicially

enforceable rights.'"         Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2021 WI

87,   ¶40,    399   Wis. 2d 623,         967   N.W.2d 469    (quoting          Rucho    v.

Common     Cause,    588    U.S.    __,    139   S. Ct.     2484,       2494    (2019))

(ellipsis and modification in the original).                        "The judiciary

should not be drawn into deciding issues that are essentially

political in nature, exclusively committed by the constitution

to another branch of government and not susceptible to judicial

management or resolution."           Vincent v. Voight, 2000 WI 93, ¶192,

236         Wis. 2d 588,           614         N.W.2d 388         (Sykes,              J.,

concurring/dissenting).

      ¶69    I join the majority opinion and write separately to

explain why the "every essential" test is incompatible with the

political question doctrine.              As the majority holds, whether a

ballot question states "every essential" of a proposed amendment
is non-cognizable.          Nevertheless, three justices cast themselves

                                           1
                                                                  No.   2020AP2003.rgb

as   legal     writing    professors      with      the   power    to    grade    the

legislature's work.            Justice Rebecca Frank Dallet, joined by

Justice Jill J. Karofsky, writes in concurrence to give the

legislature's     work    a    passing    grade,     while    Justice     Ann    Walsh

Bradley, in dissent, gives the legislature an F.                         This court

lacks    the    authority      these     justices     would    usurp      from    the

legislature.      Cf. Johnson, 399 Wis. 2d 623, ¶45 ("Nothing in the

Wisconsin Constitution authorizes this court to recast itself as

a redistricting commission[.]").

     ¶70     The "every essential" test is incompatible with the

political question doctrine for at least two reasons.                           First,

Article XII, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution assigns the

legislature,     not     the   judiciary,     the    power    to    determine     the

manner by which a proposed amendment is submitted to the people.

See id. ¶51 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).

It states, in relevant part:

     [I]t shall be the duty of the legislature to submit
     such proposed amendment . . . to the people in such
     manner and at such time as the legislature shall
     prescribe; . . . provided, that if more than one
     amendment be submitted, they shall be submitted in
     such manner that the people may vote for or against
     such amendments separately.[1]
Wis. Const. art. XII, § 1.          Self-evidently, while this provision

requires the legislature to submit a proposed amendment to the

people, it also gives the legislature, not the judiciary, the

     1 The Wisconsin Constitution posted on the Wisconsin
Historical Society's website places a period before "provided"
and capitalizes the P.      Wis. Const. art. XI, § 1 (1848),
https://content.wisconsinhistory.org/digital/collection/tp/id/71
791.

                                          2
                                                                        No.    2020AP2003.rgb

power to determine how that submission occurs.                          The constitution

imposes      only         one    textually-expressed             limitation        on     the

legislature's power to determine the manner of submission:                                "if

more than one amendment be submitted," the people must be able

to vote on each separately.                   Id.     The judiciary does not have

the authority to compel the legislature to exercise its power

over the manner of submission in a particular way.                            As explained

more     thoroughly        below,      this    court        possesses    the      power    to

determine whether a proposed amendment was even submitted to the

people, but such a claim is distinguishable from a complaint

about an unartful manner of submission.

       ¶71    This case accordingly presents a separation of powers

issue.       As     one    amicus     curiae       explains,     "[i]f    affirmed,        the

circuit court's decision could force the [l]egislature to use

new     language     that       no    longer       expresses     the     [l]egislature's

desired meaning. . . .               [T]he [l]egislature presumptively chose

those    words      for    a    reason[.]"          Challenges     to    the     manner    of

submission are therefore "beyond the purview of judicial review"
because they present purely political questions.

       ¶72    The desire of Justices Ann Walsh Bradley, Dallet, and

Karofsky     to     entertain        these    political      questions        would   likely

spawn "defensive" ballot question drafting.                        Cf. Brief for the

Wisconsin Legislature as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,

Bartlett v. Evers, 2020 WI 68, 393 Wis. 2d 172, 945 N.W.2d 685

(No.    2019AP1376-OA),          2020    WL    811784       *1   ("Governors       of     this

[s]tate      have    regularly        misused       their    claimed     veto     power    to
rewrite appropriation laws, striking out sentence fragments to

                                               3
                                                                           No.   2020AP2003.rgb

create new provisions that the [l]egislature did not enact.                                   To

combat this gubernatorial lawmaking, the [l]egislature drafts

legislation defensively, removing descriptive language that the

[g]overnor         could       turn    into    operative     text,     revising       language

that would contribute to the clarity of law, changing every 'may

not' to 'cannot,' and so on.").                         The legislature could, for

example, quote the proposed amendment verbatim on the ballot,

perhaps        satisfying             the      values-based        concerns           of     the

aforementioned justices.                    The Wisconsin Constitution, however,

does not impose such a cumbersome requirement.

       ¶73     Second,          the     "every       essential"        test      is    not     a

"manageable standard[]" by which the judiciary could objectively

evaluate       the        manner       of      submission.           See      Johnson,       399

Wis. 2d 623, ¶39.               The judicial power vested in this court by

Article VII, Section 2 of the Wisconsin Constitution, like the

judicial power vested in the United States Supreme Court, "is

the    power       to    act    in    the     manner   traditional      for      English     and

American courts.               One of the most obvious limitations imposed by
that requirement is that judicial action must be governed by

standard, by rule."                  See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278

(2004)       (plurality).              These      standards      and       rules      must   be

"'principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions'

found in the . . . law[]."                     Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507 (quoting

Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278).                      Otherwise, "intervening courts——even

when     proceeding            with    best      intentions——would          risk      assuming

political, not legal, responsibility[.]"                          Id. 2498–99 (quoting
Vieth,       541        U.S. at       307     (Kennedy,    J.,     concurring          in    the

                                                 4
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judgment)).        Whether a particular characteristic of a proposed

amendment is "essential" sounds a lot like the "I know it when I

see it" test.       See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)

(Stewart, J., concurring).              The judiciary, however, must make

decisions based on reason, not instinct.

       ¶74    The lack of manageability can be gleaned by comparing

and   contrasting        Justice   Dallet's    concurrence    to     the   dissent.

Justice Dallet states:

       I   conclude   that  a   ballot  description,  if   the
       legislature chooses to provide one, must accurately
       summarize    the  significant   changes  the   proposed
       amendment would make to the [Wisconsin] Constitution.

       . . . .

       In this case, the legislature's summary was sufficient
       and . . . [the proposed amendment] was thus validly
       submitted to the people. Although . . . [the proposed
       amendment's challengers] point[] to some of the
       amendment's   particulars   that   weren't    described
       specifically in the ballot language, . . . a summary
       always leaves some details out.      The legislature's
       description   of . . . [the  proposed   amendment]   is
       accurate, and the expanded definition of "victim," and
       arguable changes to the state constitutional rights of
       the accused and this court's jurisdiction weren't so
       significant that they needed to be described on the
       ballot.
Justice Dallet's Concurrence,             ¶¶133, 135.        At no point does

Justice Dallet explain why an "expanded definition of 'victim'"

is    not    "so   significant."        She    also   does   not     explain       why

"arguable     changes      to   the   state   constitutional     rights       of   the

accused and this court's jurisdiction" are not "so significant."

Her    analysis     is    conclusory,    and    a   reasonable       person    could
certainly consider such changes to be significant.

                                          5
                                                                    No.   2020AP2003.rgb

    ¶75      Recognizing    the    inherent      vagueness          of    the     "every

essential" test, Justice Dallet "acknowledge[s] . . . that this

rule doesn't always provide clear answers."                         Id., ¶134.         In

actuality, the "every essential" test is incapable of providing

any answers whatsoever.       The test is based purely on subjective

perception,    not   objective     rule.        As    Justice       Dallet      reasons,

"[b]ecause a summary . . . will always be incomplete and isn't

meant to take the place of the text of a proposed amendment,

judgment will always be required.              But that is okay.                We trust

judges to make judgment calls all the time[.]"                        Id.       Her view

invites judicial overreach because it is based on the rule of

judges rather than the rule of law.

    ¶76      Embracing a standardless test would empower a single

circuit court judge in a single county to toss the results of a

statewide     election     based    on       little    more     than        subjective

predilections.       This court would become the final arbiter of

every   proposed     constitutional      amendment,         without       any    express

grant   of     constitutional       authority         to     second         guess      the
legislature's      work.     As    the   majority          notes,     only      once   in

Wisconsin's 175-year history has this court declared a proposed

amendment was not ratified based on a challenge to the wording

of a ballot question——despite the Wisconsin Constitution having

been amended nearly 150 times.                Majority op., ¶¶1, 5 (citing

State ex rel. Thomson v. Zimmerman, 264 Wis. 644, 60 N.W.2d 416

(1953)).

    ¶77      Justice Dallet is also wrong to suggest her approach
is "the only way to preserve both the legislature's authority to

                                         6
                                                                          No.   2020AP2003.rgb

specify the manner in which amendments are to be submitted to

the people and the right of the people to decide whether to

change     the     [Wisconsin]             Constitution."                Justice    Dallet's

Concurrence, ¶134.              Several steps must be followed before a

proposed    amendment          even      becomes      a     ballot   question,      and    the

people maintain control over the process at every step.                              Article

XII,    Section     1    of    the       Wisconsin         Constitution       specifies    the

amendment procedure.             As relevant to this case, "a majority of

the     members    elected          to    each       of    the     two    houses    [of    the

legislature]" must vote in favor of a proposed amendment.                                 Wis.

Const.      art.        XII,        § 1.             Thereafter,          "such     proposed

amendment . . . shall           be       entered      on    their    journals,     with    the

yeas and nays taken thereon, and referred to the legislature to

be chosen at the next general election, and shall be published

for     three     months       previous       to      the     time       of   holding     such

election[.]"       Id.     In the next legislative session, which occurs

after a legislative election, "a majority of all members elected

to each house" must vote in favor of the proposed amendment.
Id.     The legislature then has a "duty" to "submit" the proposed

amendment to the people, although the legislature has the power

to "prescribe" the "manner" and "time" of submission.                              Id.    If a

majority of people who vote on whether to adopt the proposed

amendment approve its adoption, the amendment is ratified.                                 Id.

An early treatise on the Wisconsin Constitution explains this

"gauntlet" decreases the chance "that a very unwise measure"

could     succeed.            See     A.O.    Wright,         An     Exposition      of    the
Constitution of the State of Wisconsin 153 (Revised & Improved

                                                 7
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ed. 1897).     "Ample opportunity is . . . given for discussion[.]"

Id.     The people, without judicial intervention, can "preserve"

their popular sovereignty.

      ¶78   Similar to Justice Dallet, Justice Ann Walsh Bradley

never    defines     an     "essential,"         instead    concluding            "[b]y   any

definition of the word" the ballot question in this case was

legally inadequate.              Dissent, ¶185.        The definition, however,

matters a great deal, largely because the difficulty in defining

the word demonstrates that judges should not be defining it in

the first place.

      ¶79   Illustrating the problem, the dissent declares, "I do

not argue . . . that all components of an amendment [need] be

presented in a ballot question.                  Our precedent establishes, and

I   would   maintain,       only     that   'every    essential'         is       required."

Id., ¶187.      Nothing in this judicially conceived test tells us

how to distinguish between a mere "component" of a proposed

amendment      and     an        "essential."         Nor       does     the        dissent.

Regardless, as the majority opinion explains, "our precedent"
requires no such thing.               In its certification of this appeal,

the court of appeals noted, "there is little case law examining

the   'every    essential'         test . . . and,         in   fact,        no    case   law

applying this test to a given ballot question."                                   Wis. Just.

Initiative,     Inc.        v.    Wis.    Elections    Comm'n,         No. 2020AP2003,

unpublished certification, at 3 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2021).

The     majority     explains       the     suspect    origins         of     the     "every

essential" test in a nuanced, scholarly manner; in contrast, the
dissent simply takes one sentence from a century-old case out of

                                             8
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context and runs with it.             "[I]t is tempting for a creative

court to reach a decision by extorting from precedents something

which they do not contain.            Once embarked on this path, it is

too easy for the court to extend [its] precedents, which were

themselves the extensions of others, till, by this accommodating

principle,    a    whole   system    of       law    is    built    up    without   the

authority    or    interference      of    the      [people]."        Bartlett,      393

Wis. 2d 172,        ¶202       (Kelly,           J.,        concurring/dissenting)

(modifications in the original) (citations and quotation marks

omitted).

      ¶80    Unlike the "every essential" test, the counterfactual

test this court adopts is consistent with the text of Article

XII, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution and is justiciable.

While the legislature has the power to decide the manner by

which   a   proposed     amendment    is      submitted       to    the   people,   the

legislature       has    the   "duty . . . to              submit    such     proposed

amendment[.]"      See Wis. Const. art. XII, § 1.                   That duty is not

fulfilled when the ballot question misidentifies the proposed
amendment with counterfactual information.                    A challenge alleging

the presence of counterfactual information takes issue not with

the   "manner"    of    submission    but      with       whether   submission      even

occurred.     See id.      Applying the counterfactual test therefore

does not usurp the legislature's authority but rather ensures

the legislature has fulfilled its constitutional duty.

      ¶81   The reasoning underlying Justice Dallet's defense of

the "every essential" test is difficult to discern and seemingly
contradictory.      For example, she states:                 "whether an amendment

                                          9
                                                                           No.    2020AP2003.rgb

was submitted to the people always requires courts to analyze

whether      the   manner     the    legislature        prescribed          for    submission

satisfied that constitutional requirement."                            Justice Dallet's

Concurrence, ¶134 n.9.              Justice Dallet seems to concede she is

in fact proposing judicial review of the manner of submission.

She fails to appreciate the fundamental distinction between what

the legislature submitted to the people and how the legislature

made a submission.           In conflating the two, Justice Dallet shows

little       respect    for     the    constitutional            prerogatives             of     a

coordinate branch.

       ¶82    The counterfactual test is straightforward and capable

of judicial review:             Did the ballot question contain clearly

false information?            Whether a statement is true or false is

simply a factual determination, and while factual determinations

are not always easy, they do not turn on personal beliefs.                                      A

factual      determination      is    difficult         only    to     the       extent    that

evidence is lacking or conflicting.                      In contrast, the "every

essential" test is largely indeterminate, even if the evidence
is   clear,      precisely     because     it    requires        a    judge        to   form    a

political opinion.

       ¶83    Justice Dallet responds that "the majority's approach

also     requires       judgment      to    determine           what        questions          are

'fundamentally counterfactual.'"                  Id., ¶134 (quoting majority

op.,     ¶51).         She    continues,        "[a]s     the        use     of     the    word

'fundamentally'         implies,      superficially            counterfactual             ballot

questions would pass the majority's test.                             But the majority
offers no principled way of distinguishing between superficially

                                           10
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counterfactual         and      'fundamentally'         counterfactual           ballot

questions."      Id.

       ¶84    As a preliminary matter, Justice Dallet misunderstands

the    word      "fundamentally."            The    word     merely        signals    a

presumption:         if a judge is unsure whether information in a

ballot question is counterfactual, the judge should assume it is

not.         This     presumption      respects      the     power     the       people

constitutionally           conferred   on    the   legislature       and    minimizes

indeterminacy.         As well as Justice Dallet's argument can be

understood, she seems to suggest that because the counterfactual

test has, as most legal tests do, a degree of indeterminacy when

the facts are unclear, any objection to the "every essential"

test grounded in that test's indeterminacy is equally applicable

to the counterfactual test.            Not so.

       ¶85    Justice Dallet commits the "fallacy of the beard."                     In

the    classic      book    Straight   and    Crooked      Thinking,       the   author

explained:

       [W]e may deny the reality of difference because there
       is continuous variation between the different things.
       A very old example illustrates this error.     One may
       throw doubt on the reality of a beard by a process
       beginning by asking whether a man with one hair on his
       chin has a beard.   The answer is clearly "No."   Then
       one may ask whether with two hairs on his chin a man
       has a beard. Again the answer must be "No." So again
       with "three," "four," etc.      At no point can our
       opponent say "Yes," for if he has answered "No" for,
       let us say, twenty-nine hairs and "Yes" for thirty, it
       is easy to pour scorn on the suggestion that the
       difference between twenty-nine and thirty hairs is the
       difference between not having and having a beard. Yet
       by this process of adding one hair at a time, we can
       reach a number of hairs which would undoubtedly make
       up a beard.    The trouble lies in the fact that the
       difference between a beard and no beard is like the
                                 11
                                                                         No.    2020AP2003.rgb

       difference between white and gray in the fact that one
       can pass by continuous steps from one to the other.

       In this argument, the fact of continuous variation has
       been used to undermine the reality of the difference.
       Because there is no sharp dividing line, it has been
       suggested that there is no difference.        This is
       clearly a piece of crooked argument[.]
Robert H. Thouless, Straight and Crooked Thinking 169–70 (2d

prtg. 1932).         Justice Dallet suggests that determining whether a

test    is    objective       is    itself     a    subjective      determination                and

therefore cannot be done properly.                       Obviously, subjectivity and

objectivity exist on a spectrum, just like the colors white and

grey.        Just as a reasonable person can look at a color and

determine whether it is white or grey, a reasonable person can

look at a legal test and determine whether it is subjective or

objective.      No one can seriously question the objectivity of the

counterfactual test, even if it may be difficult to apply in

some cases (although not in this one), or the subjectivity of

the "every essential" test.                 The former is indeterminate only to

the extent a factual determination is impossible, but the latter

is indeterminate even when the facts are undisputed.                                  Notably,
Justice      Dallet    never       argues    the    "every       essential"          test    will

constrain judges acting in good faith to the same extent as the

counterfactual test.

       ¶86    Justice     Dallet        mischaracterizes            my     view        of        the

counterfactual         test        as   "somehow          free   from      subjectivity."

Justice       Dallet's    Concurrence,             ¶134     n.10.        Justice           Dallet

struggles       to    understand        that       the     attributes          of    perfectly

subjective      and    perfectly        objective          are   opposite           ends    of    a
continuum.      A test can be deemed subjective or objective without
                                             12
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being perfectly so.        The counterfactual test is not perfectly

objective, nor is recognizing that a man has a beard.

    ¶87     Unlike the "every essential" test endorsed by three

justices,     the    counterfactual       test      safeguards        democracy         by

preserving the prerogatives of the people's representatives in

the legislature to decide political questions.                       Three justices

would    instead     supplant     the     legislature's         constitutionally

assigned     role,   arrogate     the     power     to    set   aside       the       not-

particularly-close results of a lawfully-conducted election, and

embrace a judicially invented test never before applied in the

history of Wisconsin.        None of these justices defines with any

particularity the test they propose to determine whether such an

undemocratic remedy is warranted, much less identify the source

of their authority to impose it.                   Without elaboration on the

"every   essential"    test,     judges      are    licensed    to    inject         their

political will into the analysis, potentially substituting their

will for the will of the people.

    ¶88     Ironically,     these       justices      suggest        that       if     the
judiciary is denied the power to discard election results at

will, democracy will suffer.            Their concerns arise from both a

misunderstanding      of   the   constitutional           purpose     of    a     ballot

question and a distrust of voters.                  For example, the dissent

complains,    "[t]hose     voters   who       do    not   research      a    proposed

amendment beforehand will see the ballot question and only the

ballot question prior to casting their votes."                       Dissent, ¶189.

The constitutional purpose of a ballot question, however, is not
to educate voters.         As indicated by the historical analysis

                                        13
                                                               No.   2020AP2003.rgb

discussed    in   the   majority    opinion,      a   ballot   question    merely

identifies    the    particular     proposed     amendment     the   voters   will

decide to ratify——or not.            Second, as the Wisconsin Elections

Commission          explains,       "[v]oters         are       expected        to

review . . . election notices and apprise themselves of public

debate, and educate themselves on the substance and implications

of a proposed amendment."           (Citation omitted.)          By analogy, a

ballot for President of the United States does not describe the

candidates or their platforms.                 Voters are trusted to inform

themselves.

    ¶89     Alexis      de    Tocqueville       observed,      "[s]carcely     any

political question arises in the United States which is not

resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question."                    1 Alexis

de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 357 (Francis Bowen ed.,

Henry Reeve trans., 1863).           If true, government by the people

would be replaced with judicial supremacy.                  Because this court

rightly refuses to entertain political questions in this case, I

respectfully concur.
    ¶90     I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE

KINGSLAND    ZIEGLER    and     Justice    PATIENCE    DRAKE   ROGGENSACK     join

this concurrence.

                                          14
                                                               No.   2020AP2003.rfd

    ¶91     REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.             (concurring).       I agree with

the majority that Marsy's Law was validly adopted because the

amendment complied with Article XII,                  Section 1's requirements

that proposed constitutional amendments be "submit[ted] to the

people" and not contain "more than one amendment."1                      See Wis.

Const.   art.     XII,   § 1.   Evaluating         whether    Marsy's    Law     was

submitted to the people requires us to balance two competing

interests    reflected     in   Article        XII,    Section 1:        (1)     the

legislature's authority to specify the time and manner in which

amendments are to be submitted, and (2) the people's right to

evaluate and vote on proposed constitutional amendments.                       Doing

so leads to the conclusion that Marsy's Law was submitted to the

people because the summary of the amendment that appeared on the

ballot    accurately      summarized       the    significant        changes     the

amendment would make to the constitution.

    ¶92     The     majority    uses       a     similar     interest-balancing

approach, but arrives at a rule that is too narrow.                   And it does

so only after a ten page digression extolling the virtues of
originalism, which it then tacitly abandons as futile.                    Because

I reject both originalism and the majority's narrow conception

of what it means for a proposed amendment to be submitted to the

people, I respectfully concur.

    1  Because I agree with the majority that WJI's second claim
should be rejected based on our longstanding precedent about
multiple amendments, I join ¶¶58-59 and 61-65 of the majority
opinion.

                                       1
                                                                   No.   2020AP2003.rfd

                                             I

       ¶93    The majority begins by reviewing what it claims to be

"our approach to constitutional interpretation," an approach it

says seeks "to determine what the constitutional text meant when

it was written, commonly called the original public meaning or

original understanding."              See majority op., ¶¶14, 21.           According

to the majority, we have "commonly recited" and "consistently

described" this as our approach over "many years."                           See id.,

¶22.     Thus, according to the majority, our singular approach to

constitutional interpretation is originalism and we must follow

it,    no    matter    where    it    leads.       See   id.   ¶¶21-28   (collecting

cases).

       ¶94    I disagree with these conclusions for three reasons.

First,      the    majority's    claim      that   originalism     is    somehow    our

settled approach to constitutional interpretation is incorrect.

In fact, many of our recent cases use a more inclusive approach

to constitutional interpretation that considers more than merely

text    and       history.      Second,     the    majority's    two     defenses    of

originalism——(1) that originalism is simply how we interpret any
written law, and (2) that originalism constrains judges to their

proper role by providing a basis for decisions different than a

judge's personal views——are both unconvincing.                      In my view, a

more pluralistic method is needed to interpret faithfully the

Wisconsin Constitution (or the United States Constitution for

that matter).         Under such an approach text and history of course

matter, but so do precedent, context, historical practice and
tradition.            And    third,    an    earlier     court's    choice     of   an

                                             2
                                                                        No.   2020AP2003.rfd

interpretive methodology like originalism does not bind later

courts to use that same methodology.

                                            A

    ¶95     Before addressing the majority's unconvincing defenses

of originalism and my competing view of how to interpret the

Wisconsin Constitution, it's useful first to lay out what the

majority means by "originalism," why it is wrong to claim that

originalism     is     our       consistent       approach         to     constitutional

interpretation,      and      its      arguments       for    why       originalism       is

required.

    ¶96     There    are      a     number      of     different         variations       on

originalism,     but       all      spring      from        "the    following         three

propositions:    (1)    the       meaning    of      the    constitutional         text   is

fixed at the time of ratification; (2) judges should give that

meaning a primary role in constitutional interpretation; and (3)

pragmatic modern concerns and consequences are not allowed to

trump   discoverable       original      meaning."           See    Eric      J.    Segall,

Originalism As Faith 8 (2018).               The majority agrees with each of
these   propositions.             It    says      that      "our    solemn         duty   in

constitutional interpretation is to faithfully discern and apply

the constitution as it is written."                   See majority op., ¶28.              To

do that, the majority explains we must identify the "original

public meaning or original understanding" of the constitutional

provision we are interpreting, and apply that original public

meaning no matter the consequences.                        See id., ¶21.           In this
respect, the majority agrees with most contemporary academic and

                                            3
                                                                    No.   2020AP2003.rfd

judicial originalists who, in a break from their predecessors,2

also       focus    on    identifying     and    applying    the    original      public

meaning.           See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser

Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 856 (1989).                          And although the

majority acknowledges that we have not always done so, it argues

that our cases have "consistently described our task as one

focused on the meaning of the text," and have recently "doubled

down on" an approach focused on the original public meaning.

See majority op., ¶¶22-23.

       ¶97     This claim, however,             is incorrect.        In fact, in a

number of recent cases the court has taken a more pluralistic

approach       to        constitutional    interpretation          that   takes    into

account more than just text and history.                      See Becker v. Dane

County, 2022 WI 63, ¶33, 403 Wis. 2d 424, 977 N.W.2d 390 (lead

op.) (rejecting plaintiffs' invitation to revisit our case law

regarding the separation of powers to fit better with their

account of the original public meaning); State v. Roundtree,

2021 WI 1, ¶¶20-52, 395 Wis. 2d 94, 952 N.W.2d 765 (analyzing
the    text        and    history   of    the    Second     Amendment     along    with

precedent and empirical evidence about the risks underlying the

prohibition on felons possessing firearms); Miller v. Carroll,

       Earlier originalists tended to focus on the intent of the
       2

framers.   See Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 13-14 (1971).       But this
approach was abandoned in the face of "serious problems"
identifying whose views counted, and how to discern intent when
the framers' views differed. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Worse Than
Nothing: The Dangerous Fallacy of Originalism 17 (2022) (noting,
for   example,   James   Madison's   and   Alexander  Hamilton's
disagreements about the authority of Congress and the executive
branch).

                                            4
                                                                    No.    2020AP2003.rfd

2020 WI 56, ¶¶21-35, 392 Wis. 2d 49, 944 N.W.2d 542 (applying

United States Supreme Court precedent to conclude that a judge's

acceptance of a Facebook friend request created a "serious risk

of actual bias" that violated a litigant's Due Process rights);

State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶¶60-63, 75-83, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700

N.W.2d 899 (refusing to interpret Article I, Section 8 of the

Wisconsin      Constitution       in    lockstep      with   the    Fifth     Amendment

based on the need to deter intentional Miranda3 violations).                         And

these decisions and others like them were criticized by some

justices       as    non-originalist,         or    at   least     not    sufficiently

originalist.             See, e.g., Becker, 403 Wis. 2d 424, ¶76 (Rebecca

Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) (contending that the original

public meaning of the Wisconsin Constitution contradicted the

lead opinion and the concurrence's interpretation); Roundtree,

395 Wis. 2d 94, at ¶67 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting)

(asserting that "the majority contravenes the original public

meaning of the Second Amendment"); State v. Christen, 2021 WI

39,    ¶65,        396     Wis. 2d 705,       958   N.W.2d 746      (Hagedorn,       J.,
concurring)              (criticizing     the        majority's          analysis     as

"insufficiently rooted in the original public meaning of the

Second Amendment");            State v. Halverson, 2021 WI 7, ¶45, 395

Wis. 2d 385, 953 N.W.2d 847 (Hagedorn, J., concurring) (arguing

that       Knapp    is    "non-textual"   and       "ahistorical");       Miller,    392

Wis. 2d 49, ¶104 (Hagedorn, J., dissenting) ("Today's decision

continues the march away from the original public meaning of our

Constitution.").               Thus,    the       majority   cannot        claim    that

       3   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

                                              5
                                                      No.   2020AP2003.rfd

originalism is somehow our consensus approach to constitutional

interpretation.

    ¶98   Setting      aside       its    claim    that     originalist

interpretation is our dominant approach, the majority offers a

simple account for why we should embrace its particular brand of

originalism.    The argument goes like this:        We have only the

judicial power, "the power to interpret the law in appropriate

cases."   See majority op., ¶18.         And that power is limited to

applying the law as it exists, not as we might want it to be.

See id.   Since the Wisconsin Constitution is written law, it

should be interpreted in the same way as other written law, "as

we find it."      Id., ¶20.     The way you do that is by trying to

ascertain the constitution's meaning from the text, reading it

reasonably, in context, in the way in which it would have been

understood by people when it was written.         Id., ¶21.      That is

what we have done in the past, see id., ¶¶22-26, and that is

what we should continue to do in order to ensure that we "leave

policy choices to the people."       Id., ¶21.
    ¶99   In sum, the majority's defense of originalism rests on

two related arguments.        First, originalism is simply what we do

whenever we read any text; we look at the words, figure out what

they meant to people at the time they were written, and apply

that meaning.     And second, originalism helps separate judicial

decisions from the policy views of individual judges and keeps

the authority to change the constitution where it belongs, with

the people acting through their elected representatives.

                                     6
                                                                No.   2020AP2003.rfd

                                        B

    ¶100 Both of the majority's arguments for originalism are

unconvincing.    Its argument that originalism flows directly from

the fact that our constitutions are written is circular and thus

doesn't   support    its     conclusion.          And     the   argument     about

constraining    judges     fails   because      originalism      does    not,   and

cannot, accomplish that goal.

                                        1

    ¶101 "Our     constitutions——state           and    federal——are       written

documents," and according to the majority they "should be read

as such."      Majority op., ¶16.            In the majority's view, that

means we must "ascertain and enforce the rights and protections

that are already there, fixed by the people in the text of the

constitution."      Id. ¶18.       In short, the Wisconsin Constitution

was written down, and because it was written down, we have to

look for its original public meaning because that's just what it

means to interpret written law.             See id.

    ¶102 Although this argument is somewhat common4 it suffers

from a fatal flaw:         it assumes its own conclusion.               It simply

defines     "interpretation"       as       "synonymous     with      originalist

interpretation" and then uses that definition as evidence that

only originalist interpretation is permissible.                 Andrew B. Coan,

    4  Indeed, many scholars have asserted that "'our commitment
to a written constitution' entails not only judicial review but
also an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation."
Andrew B. Coan, The Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional
Interpretation, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1025, 1027 (2010) (quoting
source).

                                        7
                                                                        No.    2020AP2003.rfd

The Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional Interpretation,

158     U.    Pa.     L.     Rev.      1025,     1030     (2010);      see     also    Erwin

Chemerinsky,         Worse     Than      Nothing:        The     Dangerous      Fallacy    of

Originalism         26     (2022)      ("[A]rguments           from   definition      aren't

arguments at all; they do not defend their conclusion but assume

it.").        The normative question of how we should interpret the

constitution thus remains unanswered.

      ¶103 The majority's only response is to complain that "one

wonders why we bother with a written constitution at all."                                 See

majority op., ¶28 n.9.              But there are all kinds of reasons why——

and none of them require us to be originalists.                               "For example,

one might be committed to a written constitution as a focal

point for legal coordination in the manner of the rules of the

road; as a flexible framework for common law elaboration; as a

locus    of    normative       discourse       in    a   flourishing      constitutional

culture;       or    as     one     of    many      legitimate        ingredients     in    a

pluralistic         practice      of     constitutional         adjudication."        Coan,

supra at 1047.           Each of these approaches honors and gives effect
to constitutional text.                  And the fact is, neither the United

States nor the Wisconsin constitutions tell us which one we

should choose.             See Cass R. Sunstein, There Is Nothing That

Interpretation Just Is, 30 Const. Commentary 193, 211-12 (2015).

(explaining that the Constitution does not "set out the rules

for its own interpretation.").

      ¶104 In making that choice, it's important to remember that

"[t]he meaning of the Constitution                       must be made rather than
found, not in the grand (and preposterous) sense that it is

                                               8
                                                                          No.       2020AP2003.rfd

entirely up for grabs, but in the more mundane sense that it

must be settled by an account of interpretation that it does not

itself contain."              Id. at 212.             In other words, the majority's

simplistic      description            of      constitutional           interpretation          as

"faithfully discern[ing] and apply[ing] the constitution as it

is   written"      is    worthless.              See    majority        op.,    ¶28.         Sure,

sometimes our constitution uses very clear language.                                  It doesn't

take   anything     beyond          the     constitution's         words       to     know,    for

example, that someone licensed to practice law in Wisconsin for

only four years can't serve as a member of this court.                                    See Wis.

Const. art. VII, § 24 (requiring a license to practice law in

Wisconsin    for        "5     years        immediately         prior     to     election       or

appointment").           But you don't need originalism to reach that

conclusion, just the text.

       ¶105 Most    of        our   constitution,          by    contrast,          was    written

broadly,     and        for     good        reasons.            Indeed,        the     Wisconsin

Constitution——now the sixth oldest in the nation, see Jack Stark

& Steve Miller,           The Wisconsin State Constitution                           11 (2d ed.
2019)——came about only after a prior, more specific proposed

constitution       was       rejected       by    the    people,    largely          because    it

tried to settle too many then-contemporary policy disputes.                                    See

Joseph A. Ranney, Wisconsin and the Shaping of American Law 46

(2017).      No    doubt       part       of     the    reason    our     constitution         has

endured so long is because its breadth gave the people of our

state the room needed to adapt to new problems.                                      See Ray A.

Brown, The Making of the Wisconsin Constitution (Part II), 1952
Wis. L. Rev. 23, 63 ("[T]he wisdom, conscious or unconscious, of

                                                  9
                                                                          No.    2020AP2003.rfd

the    founders       by    concentrating            on    fundamental          outlines      and

refraining in the main from details, provided the state with a

constitution, which . . . has permitted the government to grow

and adapt itself to new conditions and new concepts.").

       ¶106 The breadth and adaptability of our constitution is

evident       in    its    many   clauses         declaring       broad     principles         in

general       terms.        The     Wisconsin         Constitution          contains,         for

example, a guarantee of "a certain remedy in the law for all

injuries,      or    wrongs,"       a    prohibition        against    "control         of,    or

interference         with,        the        rights        of    conscience,"          and      a

pronouncement that "[t]he blessings of a free government can

only be maintained by a firm adherence to justice, moderation,

temperance, frugality and virtue, and by frequent recurrence to

fundamental principles."                See Wis. Const. art. I, §§ 9, 18, 22.

And    our    framers      recognized         that    by    writing    these       provisions

broadly it would be up to future judges and interpreters to

decide what they mean.              As the state constitutional convention's

president put it, the framers of our constitution sought to
declare "those great principles which characterize the age in

which we live, and which, under the protection of Heaven, will——

nay, must——guard the honor, promote the prosperity, and secure

the permanent welfare of our beloved country."                              The Attainment

of    Statehood      883    (Milo       M.   Quaife,       ed.   1928).         They   weren't

trying to write specific rules settling difficult questions for

all time.          Instead, they were——like the framers of the United

States       Constitution——trying            to   "provide       a   political         platform
wide    enough      to    allow   for        considerable        latitude       within     which

                                               10
                                                                             No.       2020AP2003.rfd

future generations could make their own decisions."                                     See Joseph

J.    Ellis,     The        Quartet:       Orchestrating             the     Second        American

Revolution,      1783-1789,          at     219    (2015);       see       also    Jack     Balkin,

Living    Originalism          27    (2011)        ("[C]onstitutional              framers        and

ratifiers very often use open-ended language that deliberately

delegates questions of application to future interpreters.").

Simply observing, as the majority does, that the constitution

was written down does not demonstrate that originalism is the

best way to make those decisions.

                                                  2

      ¶107 The majority's second defense of originalism——that it

constrains judges to their proper role by focusing them on the

text and history of the Wisconsin Constitution, which provide a

basis    for    judicial       decisions          that       differ    from       an    individual

judge's personal views——also falls flat.

      ¶108 The central problem with this argument is that the

search for original meaning is almost always fruitless.                                          "The

reality is that for most provisions, this single understanding
[of     the    original        public        meaning]          did     not     exist."            See

Chemerinsky, supra at 56.                    And this is just as true of the

Wisconsin       Constitution           as     it        is     of     the      United        States

Constitution, if not more so.                          To begin with, there are far

fewer    sources       to    draw     on     in       trying    to     determine          what   the

Wisconsin      Constitution          meant        to    the    people        who   drafted       and

adopted it.        There are only a handful of volumes collecting
sources       regarding      the     1846     and      1847-48        conventions          and    the

ratification debates.               See The Movement for Statehood, 1845-1846
                                                  11
                                                                           No.    2020AP2003.rfd

(Milo   M.    Quaife        ed.    1918);    The      Convention      of     1846       (Milo    M.

Quaife,      ed.    1919);        The    Struggle     Over   Ratification,              1846-1847

(Milo M. Quaife, ed. 1920); Attainment, supra.                             And there are a

couple of law review articles from the 1940s and 1950s as well,

but they review basically the same materials contained in the

print volumes.             See Ray A. Brown, The Making of the Wisconsin

Constitution (Part I), 1949 Wis. L. Rev. 648; Brown, The Making

of the Wisconsin Constitution (Part II), supra.

     ¶109 What            even    these    limited       sources     reveal       is     not    one

single,      universally          accepted       original        public    meaning        of    the

Wisconsin      Constitution.              Instead,        they    demonstrate           that    the

questions          that     consumed        the       drafters       of     the         Wisconsin

Constitution——whether the document would retain the failed 1846

constitution's            provisions        prohibiting           banking,       guaranteeing

property      rights        to    married        women,    and     creating        an    elected

judiciary, for example——tell us nothing about how to resolve

contemporary cases.                See Brown,         The Making of the Wisconsin

Constitution (Part II),                  supra at 26;        see also generally                 The
Attainment of Statehood, supra.                       They also show that, when it

came to the document's more open-ended provisions, the drafters

left little evidence of what they thought these clauses meant.

See Brown, The Making of the Wisconsin Constitution (Part I),

supra at 689 (noting that although some provisions of the 1846

constitution's bill of rights were "greatly altered before final

adoption, there was general agreement as to the provisions which

it   should        contain");           Brown,     The    Making      of     the        Wisconsin
Constitution (Part II), supra at 57 ("The committee in charge

                                                 12
                                                                       No.   2020AP2003.rfd

of" Article I, the Declaration of Rights, "adopted this article

[from the 1846 constitution] without material changes, and so

generally accepted were they, that no debate arose on" them).

The same is true of many of the constitution's more specific

provisions like the one about how to amend the constitution at

issue in this case, Article XII, Section 1.                            As the majority

acknowledges,       there    is     no   evidence         from   the     constitutional

convention or ratification debates that sheds any light on its

meaning.    See majority op., ¶32.

       ¶110 The     majority      suggests       that     when   these       sources    are

unclear or silent, early legislative actions can identify the

original public meaning of uncertain constitutional provisions.

See id.        But that too is inadequate.                   First, any effort to

identify     what    early     legislative         enactments      mean        about    the

constitution requires sifting through voluminous materials that

often conflict with one another.                  Compare Julian Davis Mortenson

& Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121 Colum. L.

Rev.    277,      332-66     (2021)      (reviewing         evidence         from      early
congresses      demonstrating        that        "[t]he    nondelegation         doctrine

simply was not an accepted feature of the constitutional fabric

at the time of ratification"), with Ilan Wurman, Nondelegation

at the Founding, 130 Yale L.J. 1490, 1494 (2021) (arguing that

"[a]lthough the history is messy," it supports a version of the

nondelegation doctrine).             Conflicting history means that early

legislative enactments are of little use in identifying what the

constitution means.           Worse yet, rather than acknowledge these
conflicts,      courts      often    cherry-pick          historical         examples     to

                                            13
                                                                         No.     2020AP2003.rfd

support     their          preordained           conclusions      instead,       a       practice

rightly derided as "law office history."                          See Chemerinsky, supra

at 66; see also, e.g., Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., 142

S.    Ct.   2228,      2324      (2022)      (Breyer,      Sotomayor,        &   Kagan,        JJ.,

dissenting) (noting that "early law in fact does provide some

support for abortion rights" and that the majority's citation to

laws adopted after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified was

"convenient       .    .    .    ,    but    it    is    window   dressing").            Second,

relying     on    early          legislative        inaction       as   evidence         of    the

constitution's             original          public       meaning       is       particularly

problematic.           There         are    all   kinds    of     reasons    why     an       early

legislature        might         not       have    acted     in     a   manner       that        is

nevertheless           constitutionally                 permissible      for         a        later

legislature.          See Leah M. Litman, Debunking Antinovelty, 66 Duke

L.J. 1407, 1427-29 (2017) (identifying some of these reasons

including        new       factual         and    legal     developments);           see       also

Chemerinsky, supra at 66 ("The absence of a specific practice at

a specific time does not mean that those then in power thought
the     practice           was       unconstitutional.").                Finally,             early

legislative enactments are "at best weak evidence of original

meaning."        Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 Va.

L. Rev. 327, 398 (2002).                    Although early legislative enactments

might reflect what legislators thought the constitution meant,

their interpretations might not have been widely held.                                   See id.

Moreover, legislators are not "disinterested observers;" they

are capable of misinterpreting the constitution or ignoring its
meaning entirely when it is politically expedient.                                   See id.;

                                                  14
                                                                    No.   2020AP2003.rfd

Chemerinsky, supra at 65 (explaining that it is "possible that

the Framers wrote the [relevant constitutional provision] in an

effort to outlaw the practice, but faced with the political

realities of governing they saw no alternative but to engage in

the    forbidden       behavior.").            Thus,    their       actions     cannot

meaningfully inform our interpretation of what the constitution

means.

       ¶111 In addition to the problems with identifying original

public meaning, "[o]ne of the largest difficulties in applying

originalism is choosing the level of abstraction at which the

original understanding is stated."                  Chemerinsky, supra at 67.

This issue is illustrated by the majority's discussion of early

historical practices regarding constitutional                      amendments.       As

the      majority       explains,         early        legislatures          submitted

constitutional        amendments    to    the     people    as     simple    yes-or-no

questions, for the amendment or against the amendment.                              See

majority op., ¶33-34.         Accordingly, the language that appeared

on the ballot regarding those early amendments didn't describe
the substance or intended effect of the proposed amendments at

all.      See   id.    ¶35.    The       legislature       moved    away    from   that

practice in fits and starts beginning in the 1870s, however,

directing that somewhat more descriptive language appear on the

ballot during that period.           See id. ¶¶37-38.              And that practice

eventually solidified into a statute requiring that a "concise

statement of the nature" of the proposed amendment appear on the

ballot.    See Wis. Stat. ch. 5, § 39 (1898); see also Wis. Stat.
§ 5.64 (2021-22).

                                          15
                                                                  No.      2020AP2003.rfd

      ¶112 From this history, the majority derives the principle

that "an amendment only needs to be submitted to the people for

ratification," no description required.                  See majority op., ¶35.

Fair enough, but at this level of abstraction the majority's

purported original public meaning tells us nothing.                         What about

when the legislature does describe an amendment's substance on

the   ballot?      Can     the    legislature       then     offer    an    incomplete

description?       An inaccurate one?               If the purported original

public meaning of Article XII, Section 1 doesn't answer those

questions for the majority then something else has to.

      ¶113 Whatever        that   something        is,   it's   not     originalism.

That is because, as the preceding discussion demonstrates, what

originalism      requires    judges     to     identify——a      single,       objective

original public meaning——is something we cannot know.                          And even

if we do somehow identify one original public meaning, like the

majority's      abstract    insight     about      Article    XII,    Section 1,       it

tells us nothing about how to resolve real cases.                          Without the

objective answers it promises, originalism is no constraint on
judges at all.      Constitutional interpretation is never as simple

as just "apply[ing] the constitution as it is written."                               See

majority op., ¶28.          That is because the constitution forces us

to choose between competing interests all the time, and value-

neutral judging is therefore impossible.                      Take, for example,

Article    I,    Section 11       of   the     Wisconsin     Constitution,        which

provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons,     houses,     papers,       and     effects      against     unreasonable
searches     and   seizures       shall      not    be     violated."          What   is

                                          16
                                                                           No.      2020AP2003.rfd

reasonable when it comes to drone surveillance or searching cell

phones   isn't        dictated       by    any     original       understanding.              There

could    never     be      an   "original         understanding"       on        these    topics

because they were unimaginable at the time our constitution was

written.              Moreover,           evaluating        whether        a        search      is

"unreasonable" always requires a value judgment, balancing the

interests of the government against an invasion of privacy.                                     So

too in deciding what it means for a constitutional amendment to

be "submit[ted] to the people."                    See Wis. Const. art. XII, § 1.

      ¶114 Finally, even if the original public meaning of many

provisions       of     the     Wisconsin         Constitution       were        discoverable,

applying it would lead to intolerable results.                              As one scholar

said,    "[t]he       only      kind       of     originalism       that       is    reasonably

determinate        leads        to   conclusions           that    practically           no    one

accepts."        David A. Strauss, Can Originalism Be Saved?, 92 B.U.

L. Rev. 1161, 1162 (2012).                  For example, Article I, Section 9 of

the   Wisconsin        Constitution             provides    that    "[e]very          person    is

entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries, or
wrongs     which      he      may    receive          in   his    person,        property,      or

character; he ought to obtain justice freely, and without being

obliged to purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly

and without delay, conformably to the laws."                                     There is no

escaping that, as the use of male pronouns demonstrates, the

original public meaning of this provision and many others in our

original constitution didn't include women.                            The delegates to

the constitutional convention were all men, and as mentioned
previously, part of the reason the proposed 1846 constitution

                                                 17
                                                                    No.    2020AP2003.rfd

was rejected was because it guaranteed a modicum of autonomy to

women    through      its    provisions          about    married     women         owning

property.     See Ranney, supra at 46-47.                 Yet we would never say

today    that,     because     the    original       public    meaning         of    this

provision didn't include women, women are therefore not entitled

to a "remedy in the laws."            Wis. Const. art. I, § 9.              And that's

not the only example.          Take Article I, Section 18's guarantee of

"[t]he right of every person to worship Almighty God according

to the dictates of conscience."                  At the 1847-48 convention, a

motion to strike the words "Almighty God" on the grounds that

the people had the right to worship whomever or whatever they

wanted was defeated as "too radical a doctrine for our God-

fearing forefathers."           See Brown, The Making of the Wisconsin

Constitution (Part II), supra at 57.                 Although this supports the

conclusion    that     the    original      public       meaning    of     Article     I,

Section 18's guarantee of religious liberty was inapplicable to

those who didn't share our founders' belief in "Almighty God,"

even those who claim to be originalists would not reach such a
repellent conclusion today.

                                           3

       ¶115 In summary, the majority's arguments fail to defend

originalism      as   a     theory    of        constitutional      interpretation.

Originalism      isn't       required      merely        because     the      Wisconsin

Constitution was written down.              Rather, there are many plausible

ways    of   interpreting       the     constitution       that     are     both     non-
originalist and true to the text.                    See Coan, supra at 1047.

And originalism doesn't constrain judges by providing objective
                                           18
                                                                              No.    2020AP2003.rfd

answers to difficult constitutional questions.                               See Chemerinsky,

supra at 166 ("Originalism fails on its own terms to provide a

constraint on judging.               It is only a fig leaf allowing a justice

to pretend to adhere to a neutral method.")                                   After all, the

search for an original public meaning is usually impossible, and

even     when     it's      not,     leads        to    useless          insights,        abhorrent

results, or both.

       ¶116 Many of originalism's most vocal proponents suggest

that rejecting it means embracing the rule of "philosopher-king

judges    [who]      swoop        down     from       their    marble       palace       to    ordain

answers rather than allow the people and their representatives

to     discuss,      debate,        and     resolve         them."          Neil        Gorsuch,     A

Republic, If You Can Keep It 113 (2020).                                 The majority takes a

similar tack, accusing me of "open[ly] pining for the freedom to

go beyond the meaning of constitutional language."                                  See majority

op.,    ¶22     n.6.        But     this    criticism          misses       the     point.         The

"constitutional language" alone doesn't resolve difficult cases.

Constitutional           adjudication            is     and     always        has       been     more
complicated       than      that.          And        for     that       reason,    no     theory——

originalism       or     any    other——can            provide       determinate         answers     to

difficult constitutional questions.

       ¶117 If       that      is       true,     then        how    should        we    go    about

interpreting our constitutions?                        In my view, we should use the

same kind of pluralistic approach I have identified previously.

See    State    v.     Hoyle,       2023    WI    24,       ¶109,     406    Wis. 2d 373,          987

N.W.2d 732       (Dallet,         J.,    dissenting).               We    should    analyze        the
United    States       or      Wisconsin         constitutions'             text    and       history

                                                  19
                                                                      No.    2020AP2003.rfd

carefully, but we should also be guided by precedent, context,

historical practice and tradition, and the need to balance "'the

majority's values against the values that should be protected

from society's majorities.'"                Id. (quoting Chemerinsky, supra at

207).

                                              C

       ¶118 In       closing    I    note    that    even   if   the    majority       were

correct       that     originalism          is     our   consensus          approach     to

interpreting         the    Wisconsin       Constitution,     that     approach     would

nevertheless not be binding in future cases.                      See majority op.,

¶¶22-26.       That is because reliance on a particular method of

interpretation in one case doesn't bind future courts to use

that same method in all future cases.

       ¶119 We       have    never   said     that    our   methodological        choices

bind us in future cases even though we have occasionally assumed

so in other contexts.                For example, State ex rel. Kalal v.

Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681

N.W.2d 110 and subsequent cases applying it appear to assume
that    its   statutory-interpretation               framework   is    binding.         See

Abbe     Gluck,        The     States        As      Laboratories       of      Statutory

Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Textualism,

119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1800-03 (2010) (noting that "most of [our]

court's disputes" about Kalal "are about how [its] framework

should be applied, not whether it controls.").                          But there are

good reasons to doubt that assumption.                      After all, the United
States Supreme Court doesn't treat prior methodological choices

as binding in either statutory or constitutional cases.                            Id. at
                                              20
                                                                               No.    2020AP2003.rfd

1823       ("The   U.S.       Supreme       Court       does    not    apply     methodological

stare      decisis       .    .   .   in    the    context       of    articulating          binding

statutory interpretation frameworks."); Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,

Constitutional Constraints, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 975, 1013 (2009)

("Although methodological disputes grow heated in some cases, it

is striking that in the domain of constitutional adjudication,

the justices have seldom exhibited much interest in attempting

to bind either themselves or each other, in advance, to the kind

of    general      interpretative            approaches          that    academic        theorists

champion.").

       ¶120 There are several likely reasons the Court does not do

so.         For    one       thing,        abstract,      general        methodologies             like

originalism (or Kalal, for that matter) are an awkward fit with

stare decisis, which aims to treat like cases alike.                                        See Chad

M.     Oldfather,            Methodological             Pluralism        and     Constitutional

Interpretation,              80   Brook.     L.    Rev.    1,     42-44      (2014).          If    the

choice of originalism in one constitutional case is treated as

binding       that   means        all      constitutional            cases     must    be    decided
using originalist methods.                    But this one-size-fits-all thinking

would       upend        existing          precedent           because       "[a]ny         form     of

originalist analysis with bite . . . would generate unpalatable

results when viewed from a contemporary perspective."                                         Id. at

45.         For    example,        Brown      v.    Board       of    Education,5        same       sex

       5   347 U.S. 483 (1954).

                                                   21
                                                                  No.   2020AP2003.rfd

marriage, virtually all rights of women6 and racial minorities,

and any number of other fundamental rights are difficult, if not

impossible, to justify on originalist grounds.                    See Chemerinsky,

supra at 92-114.          Because "the Court would be unlikely to find

all        substantive     conclusions         generated     by     a     particular

methodology palatable," avoiding those results would mean having

to    abandon    the     supposedly    settled     choice    of    methodology     or

twisting that method so much that it no longer really applied at

all.       See Oldfather, supra at 45-46.            Safer then not to adopt

any    binding    methodology,        except    perhaps     in    determining     the

application of an already settled constitutional interpretation.7

See id. at 39-42 (explaining that stare decisis can play a role

when it comes to "decision rules," that is, rules that help

implement an existing interpretation of the Constitution like

       Indeed, just last year, the United States Supreme Court
       6

concluded that "history and tradition" led to the "clear
answer . . . that the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect the
right to an abortion."   Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2248.    But as in
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), the history
on which the majority relied is contested.    See Dobbs, 142 S.
Ct. at 2324 (Breyer, Sotomayor, & Kagan, JJ., dissenting)
("[E]mbarrassingly for the majority . . . early law in fact does
provide some support for abortion rights."); see also Heller,
554 U.S. at 595 (arguing that the text and history of the Second
Amendment supported a constitutional right to possess a gun for
self-defense in the home); id. at 640 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(contending that text and history supported the opposite
result).

       For example, the United States Supreme Court's decision
       7

last year in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen,
142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022) explained that "text and history" are the
test for whether firearm regulations are permitted by the Second
Amendment. Id. at 2127. But in doing so, the Court never said
that "text and history" should be the sole test for interpreting
every provision of the United States Constitution.

                                         22
                                                                    No.    2020AP2003.rfd

the     tiered-scrutiny        framework      for     claims       under     the      Equal

Protection Clause).

      ¶121 For another thing, reasonable judges disagree about

the best way to interpret the constitution.                    If everyone agreed

about the appropriate method for interpreting the constitution,

or if there were a clear best method, there would be no need to

treat methodologies like originalism as binding in future cases—

—consensus would already accomplish that goal.                       But even self-

professed originalists disagree about how to do originalism, to

say nothing of those who believe non-originalist methods are

best.         See    Segall,   supra    at    123     (explaining         that     Justice

Scalia's       and     Justice     Thomas's         "ideologies       have         nuanced

differences such as their use of precedent, tradition, and what

evidence counts toward original meaning.").                    In the face of such

disagreements, labeling a particular method of constitutional

interpretation as binding precedent cannot force consensus.

      ¶122 Indeed,        disagreement        about    the     proper        method      of

interpreting the Wisconsin Constitution is almost as old as this
court.        In Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N.W. 209

(1911), two members of the court wrote at length to express

their     divergent       views    about      the     appropriate          methods       of

constitutional interpretation.               Chief Justice Winslow, writing

for the majority, favored the view that "the changed social,

economic,       and    governmental      conditions          and    ideals       of     the

time . . . must also logically . . . become influential factors

in      the     settlement        of    problems        of      construction           and
interpretation."           Id.     at   349-50.          But       Justice       Marshall

                                         23
                                                                                No.    2020AP2003.rfd

disagreed,     asserting        that       "[i]f         the        constitution              is     to

efficiently endure, the idea that it is capable of being re-

squared, from time to time, to fit new legislative or judicial

notions   of   necessities          in    præsenti         .    .     .    must       be     combated

whenever and wherever advanced."                         Id. at 375 (Marshall, J.,

concurring).       And    that       disagreement              continues          to     this      day.

Compare    Hoyle,     406       Wis. 2d 373,               ¶¶83-89              (Hagedorn,          J.,

concurring), with id., ¶¶106-09 (Dallet, J., dissenting).                                            We

should not pretend that these disagreements are settled merely

because four members of the court have, in a few cases, applied

a   particular    method       of    constitutional              interpretation.                   Such

decisions do not conclusively bind this court to originalism any

more than Chief Justice Winslow's opinion more than a century

ago compels us to reject it.

                                                    II

      ¶123 Turning       now    to       the    specific            issue        in    this     case,

Wisconsin Justice Initiative (WJI) argues that the way in which

Marsy's Law was submitted for ratification violated two aspects
of Article XII, Section 1, which governs the process by which

the   legislature        may    propose             amendments            to     the       Wisconsin

Constitution.        First,         WJI    asserts         that           the     language         that

appeared on the ballot describing the proposed amendment was

incomplete,      inaccurate,        or    perhaps        misleading,              and      thus     the

amendment wasn't truly "submit[ted] . . . to the people" for

ratification.       See    Wis.      Const.         art.       XII,       § 1.         And    second,
because Marsy's Law affects the rights of crime victims and the

accused in different ways, WJI concludes that it is "more than
                                               24
                                                                    No.   2020AP2003.rfd

one amendment," and thus should've been submitted to the people

separately.       See id.

       ¶124 I agree with the majority's analysis of why, based on

our    longstanding    precedent         about       multiple     amendments,    WJI's

second claim should be rejected.                    I therefore join ¶¶58-59 and

61-65 of the majority opinion.                  I disagree, however, with the

majority's explanation of why, despite the issues WJI identifies

with the language that appeared on the ballot, Marsy's Law was

nonetheless "submit[ted] to the people" as required by Article

XII, Section 1.

                                                A

       ¶125 Amendments       to    the        Wisconsin    Constitution        may    be

proposed by the legislature through the process set forth in

Article    XII,    Section    1.         It    provides     that    if    a   proposed

amendment is approved by a majority vote of two consecutive

legislatures, "entered on [the legislature's] journals, with the

yeas and nays taken thereon," and published for three months

prior to the next general election, "it shall be the duty of the
legislature to submit such proposed amendment or amendments to

the people in such manner and at such time as the legislature

shall prescribe."       Wis. Const. art. XII, § 1.                  "[I]f more than

one amendment [is] submitted" to the people for ratification,

each   amendment     "shall   be    submitted         in   such    manner     that   the

people may vote for or against such amendments separately."                          Id.

If a majority of voters approve of the amendment, it becomes
part of the constitution.          See id.

                                          25
                                                                             No.   2020AP2003.rfd

          ¶126 The constitution doesn't explain what it means for a

proposed amendment to be "submit[ted] . . . to the people."                                  Id.

All it says is that the amendment must be submitted "in such

manner and at such time as the legislature shall prescribe."

Id.

          ¶127 As discussed previously, for much of the state's early

history,         the     legislature         submitted            proposed     constitutional

amendments to the people through simple yes-or-no questions, for

the amendment or against the amendment.                            See majority op., ¶¶33-

34.        Accordingly,         the    language        that       appeared    on    the   ballot

regarding those early amendments didn't describe the substance

or intended effect of the proposed amendments at all.                                  See id.,

¶35.         But       over     time        the    legislature          moved      toward    the

contemporary           practice       of     providing        a     short     description     of

proposed         constitutional        amendments        on       the   ballot.       See    id.,

¶¶37-38.

          ¶128 That      move       raised    a   potential         problem.         Could   the

legislature direct that the ballot describe a proposed amendment
in    a    way    that    was       fundamentally        incomplete,          inaccurate,     or

deceptive?         Was such an amendment still "submit[ted] . . . to

the people?"           See Wis. Const. art. XII, § 1.                        In State ex rel.

Ekern v. Zimmerman, 187 Wis. 180, 200-02, 204 N.W. 803 (1925),

this      court    said       no.      We    explained        that      if   the   legislature

"prescribed the form of submission in a manner which would have

failed to present the real question, or had they by error or

mistake presented an entirely different question, no claim could
be made that the proposed amendment would have been validly

                                                  26
                                                                  No.   2020AP2003.rfd

enacted."       Id. at 201.         That makes sense.           If the legislature

misleads the people, intentionally or not, about what a proposed

constitutional amendment would do, then the question was never

truly submitted to them at all.

      ¶129 Ekern didn't stop there though.                 In the next sentence,

it said "[i]n other words, even if the form is prescribed by the

legislature       it   must       reasonably,      intelligently,       and     fairly

comprise or have reference to every essential of the amendment."

Id.   WJI seizes on this sentence, arguing that the language the

legislature directed appear on the April 2020 general election

ballot    regarding       Marsy's    Law    fell   short   of    that   mark.       The

ballot read:

      Question 1: "Additional rights of crime victims.
      Shall section 9m of article I of the constitution,
      which gives certain rights to crime victims, be
      amended to give crime victims additional rights, to
      require that the rights of crime victims be protected
      with equal force to the protections afforded the
      accused while leaving the federal constitutional
      rights of the accused intact, and to allow crime
      victims to enforce their rights in court?"
2019 Enrolled Joint Res. 3.                 According to WJI, this language

doesn't describe "every essential" of Marsy's Law because it

fails to mention that Marsy's Law expanded the definition of

"victim,"       altered     the     state    constitutional       rights      of    the

accused, and changed our court's jurisdiction.8

      ¶130 The     majority       disagrees      with   WJI's    view    that      Ekern

imposed     a    constitutional        requirement      that      ballot      language

contain "every essential" of a proposed amendment.                      See majority

      8I accept, for purposes of this opinion only, WJI's
characterizations of the substantive effects of Marsy's Law.

                                            27
                                                                              No.    2020AP2003.rfd

op.,     ¶49.             According        to     the        majority,          "the       relevant

constitutional question is whether the proposed amendment was,

at a basic level, submitted to the people for ratification."

Id., ¶51.          And the majority concludes that the only way in which

an amendment could flunk that test is "in the rare circumstance

that    the    question         is    fundamentally           counterfactual           such      that

voters were not asked to approve the actual amendment."                                           Id.

Because       the    ballot      language       about        Marsy's      Law      does    not    fit

within that narrow category, the majority concludes that the

amendment was validly adopted.

       ¶131 Before getting to why I think the majority's proposed

rule is too narrow, it's important to note one thing.                                      Despite

the     majority's          purported         allegiance            to    originalism,           this

analysis is anything but originalist.                             The text of Article XII,

Section 1 doesn't tell us what it means for an amendment to be

"submit[ted] to the people."                    Indeed, it's plausible to read the

text as allowing the legislature to do whatever it wants when it

comes    to    describing         constitutional             amendments       on     the    ballot.
And     knowing          that    early       legislatures           used      to     provide       no

descriptions on the ballot at all doesn't help us answer whether

an     amendment          submitted        with        a     misleading         or     incomplete

description is submitted to the people either.

       ¶132 Accordingly,             to    answer          that    question,        the    majority

engages       in    precisely        the   kind       of     interest      balancing        that    I

argued        earlier       is       a     necessary          part       of      constitutional

interpretation.             See      supra      Part       I.B.2.        Here,      the    relevant
interests          are    the    legislature's             authority,      explicit         in    the

                                                 28
                                                                            No.   2020AP2003.rfd

constitution, to specify the time and manner in which amendments

are to be submitted, and the people's right——also reflected in

the   constitution——fairly             to    evaluate         and    vote    on    a    proposed

constitutional amendment.               And we know that no matter what the

majority says, it has to be balancing these interests.                                   That is

because the text could plausibly mean that the legislature has

carte blanche when it comes to prescribing how constitutional

amendments are submitted to the people and all the history tells

us is that the legislature doesn't have to describe the contents

of    proposed       amendments    at       all.         So    without      saying      so,     the

majority tries to strike an appropriate balance between these

interests that preserves both the legislature's discretion and

the people's right to decide whether to amend the constitution.

       ¶133 The problem is that the new rule the majority derives

from Ekern and our other cases regarding the submission-to-the-

people requirement is still too narrow.                             Although the majority

is    certainly       correct     that       a     "fundamentally           counterfactual"

ballot question doesn't comply with the constitution, that's not
the only way to violate the requirement that an amendment be

submitted to the people.               See majority op., ¶51.                     An amendment

that is described in a way that is so incomplete as to be

misleading is also not submitted to the people.                             For example, if

the   legislature        had    described          Marsy's      Law    on    the       ballot    as

merely    "an    amendment        to    expand       the       definition         of    'victim'

contained       in     Article    I,        § 9m     of       the    Constitution,"           that

description          wouldn't     violate          the    majority's          rule.           This
statement is accurate, it's not fundamentally counterfactual.

                                              29
                                                                  No.    2020AP2003.rfd

But the description would also be misleading because Marsy's Law

made many more significant changes to Article I, Section 9m.

And if the people voted to adopt the amendment in reliance on

such a description, it can't be said that all of those more

significant      changes         were     submitted       to    the      people      for

ratification.      This, I think, is what Ekern was referring to

when it said the ballot must describe "every essential" of the

proposed   amendment.        See        Ekern,    187   Wis. at   201.         Thus,   I

conclude that a ballot description, if the legislature chooses

to   provide     one,     must    accurately       summarize      the    significant

changes the proposed amendment would make to the Constitution.

      ¶134 I     acknowledge,       of    course,       that   this     rule   doesn't

always provide clear answers.              Because a summary that appears on

the ballot will always be incomplete and isn't meant to take the

place of the text of a proposed amendment, judgment will always

be   required.      But    that     is    okay.     We    trust   judges       to   make

judgment calls all the time, and doing so in this context is the

only way to preserve both the legislature's authority to specify
the manner in which amendments are to be submitted to the people

and the right of the people to decide whether to change the

                                           30
                                                                      No.    2020AP2003.rfd

constitution.9             Indeed, the majority's approach also requires

judgment        to    determine        what        questions    are       "fundamentally

counterfactual."            See majority op., ¶51 (emphasis added).                      As

the   use   of       the    word     "fundamentally"       implies,         superficially

counterfactual ballot questions would pass the majority's test.

But   the   majority         offers    no    principled       way    of   distinguishing

between         superficially         counterfactual           and        "fundamentally"

counterfactual ballot questions.10

      ¶135 In this case, the legislature's summary was sufficient

and   Marsy's        Law    was    thus     validly    submitted      to     the    people.

Although WJI points to some of the amendment's particulars that

weren't described specifically in the ballot language, as I said

before,     a     summary         always    leaves     some    details       out.       The

      9Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's concurrence accuses me of
committing a logical fallacy while making one of her own.     See
Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's concurrence, ¶85. According to
her concurrence, the majority's approach is consistent with the
constitution because it identifies whether an amendment was
"submitted to the people," while mine is impermissible because
it focuses on "the manner of submission." See id. ¶¶69-70. But
this is a straw man. Both the majority and I are answering the
same question: whether Marsy's Law was "submitted to the
people." We just disagree on the meaning of that constitutional
requirement. Article XII, Section 1 says that "it shall be the
duty of the legislature to submit . . . proposed . . .
amendments to the people in such manner . . . as the legislature
may prescribe."    As this language makes clear, the manner of
submission   and    the  submission   itself   are   inextricably
intertwined. Thus, deciding whether an amendment was submitted
to the people always requires courts to analyze whether the
manner the legislature prescribed for submission satisfied that
constitutional requirement.

       For this reason, Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's
      10

concurrence is wrong to suggest that the "fundamentally
counterfactual" test is somehow free from subjectivity. See
Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's concurrence, ¶¶82-84.

                                              31
                                                         No.    2020AP2003.rfd

legislature's description of Marsy's Law is accurate, and the

expanded definition of "victim," and arguable changes to the

state   constitutional   rights   of    the   accused   and    this    court's

jurisdiction   weren't   so   significant     that   they     needed    to   be

described on the ballot.      In short, the legislature gave voters

the gist of Marsy's Law, and in an accurate way, and that is all

that is required.   Accordingly, I respectfully concur.

    ¶136 I am authorized to state that Justice JILL J. KAROFSKY

joins this concurrence, and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this

concurrence with respect to ¶¶93-122.

                                   32
                                                                                 No.    2020AP2003.bh

       ¶137 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.                   (concurring).                 A central feature

of   the     American       legal    system         is       the   idea     that   matters       once

decided should generally remain that way.                                 The default norm is

that when an appellate court takes up and decides an issue, its

legal       determination          remains       the          rule    for       that    court     and

authoritatively binds lower courts facing the same question.                                       We

call       this    "precedent,"         and    it       is    a    practice      that    goes    back

centuries.

       ¶138 But by necessity, judicial opinions touch on matters

beyond       the    issues    in    a    case.           They      might       describe    a    prior

opinion       or    legal    doctrine          tangential            to   an    issue,     but   not

necessary          for   resolution       of    the          case.        The   law     calls    this

"dicta."          This word comes from the Latin, obiter dictum, which

means "something said in passing."1                                So while the reason or

rationale for a decision (in Latin, ratio decidendi2) constitutes

precedent, the other things said by a court do not.                                         This is

true even when the court comments on the law.

       ¶139 In recent years, however, some discussion in Wisconsin
has minimized dicta and maximized the effect of the words in

judicial opinions.             This is problematic for many reasons.                                I

write separately to bring clarity to what this court has and has

not said about dicta, and to issue a clarion call to re-embrace

       Obiter Dictum, Black's Law Dictionary 569 (11th ed. 2019).
       1

Dicta is the plural of dictum.    Dictum, Black's Law Dictionary
569 (11th ed. 2019).
       2   Ratio Decidendi, Black's Law Dictionary 1514 (11th ed.
2019).

                                                    1
                                                                        No.    2020AP2003.bh

dicta's         crucial      role     in    understanding         our       case-deciding,

precedent-setting function.

       ¶140 Both we and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals largely

carry       out    our      case-deciding         work    through     written     judicial

opinions.         We distribute these opinions to the parties, make

them available to the public, and print them in reporters that

stretch         back   to    before      Wisconsin's          statehood.        While   the

Wisconsin Reports are filled with sound writing and compelling

legal analysis (and, to be sure, some of the other variety),

lawyers and lower courts need to know what from these opinions

constitutes a rule of decision governing the next case.                                   Is

every jot and tittle, stray statement, or tangential footnote

binding legal precedent that must be followed faithfully?

       ¶141 The          answer     to     this     question      almost      always     and

everywhere is no.            While debate continues over where to draw the

line       in   principle     and    from    case        to   case,   the    general    rule

remains that the holding of a case——that is, the legal rationale

underlying and necessary to a decision——constitutes precedent.
Other discussion, including discussion of legal matters, is non-

binding dicta.3

       See, e.g., Central Green Co. v. United States, 531
       3

U.S. 425, 431 (2001); M. Elaine Buccieri, et al., 21 C.J.S.
Courts, § 223 ("Dictum is a statement on a matter that is not
necessarily involved in the case and is not binding as
authority."); Ryan S. Killian, Dicta and the Rule of Law, 2013
Pepp. L. Rev. 1, 8 (2013); Judith M. Stinson, Why Dicta Becomes
Holding and Why It Matters, 76 Brook. L. Rev. 219, 223 (2010);
David Coale & Wendy Couture, Loud Rules, 34 Pepp. L. Rev. 715,
725 (2007); Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1997, 2000 (1994).

       Chief Justice Marshall explained the distinction this way:

                                              2
                                                                   No.   2020AP2003.bh

    ¶142 From our earliest days, this court acknowledged and

understood the important distinction between the holding of a

case and the non-binding dicta contained within it.                      See, e.g.,

Stucke v. Milwaukee & Mississippi R.R. Co., 9 Wis. 202, 211

(1859)    (explaining    a    doctrine       "rests   in    mere    obiter    dicta,

without a direct authority in its favor").                  We have repeated the

unremarkable rule that when we deliberately take up and decide

an issue central to the disposition of a case, it is considered

precedential.      See State v. Picotte, 2003 WI 42, ¶19 n.21, 261

Wis. 2d 249, 661 N.W.2d 381; State v. Kruse, 101 Wis. 2d 387,

392, 305 N.W.2d 85 (1981).           But where our opinions addressed

tangential matters not central to the question presented, we

labeled such statements dictum and recognized that "[t]his court

is not bound by its own dicta."                 Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v.

Shannon, 120 Wis. 2d 560, 565, 356 N.W.2d 175 (1984); see also

State    v.   Sartin,   200   Wis. 2d 47,       60,   546    N.W.2d 449      (1996);

State ex rel. Ekern v. Dammann, 215 Wis. 394, 403, 254 N.W. 759

    It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general
    expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in
    connection with the case in which those expressions
    are used.    If they go beyond the case, they may be
    respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a
    subsequent suit when the very point is presented for
    decision.   The reason of this maxim is obvious.   The
    question actually before the Court is investigated
    with care, and considered in its full extent.    Other
    principles which may serve to illustrate it, are
    considered in their relation to the case decided, but
    their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom
    completely investigated.

Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399-400 (1821).

                                         3
                                                                 No.    2020AP2003.bh

(1934).4   Put simply, not every statement in our opinion pages,

no matter how peripheral to the issues in the case, constitutes

a precedential opinion of the court.

      ¶143 This practice took a confusing turn in 2010, however.

In Zarder v. Humana Ins. Co., we addressed whether the court of

appeals may decline to follow a statement in a majority opinion

of this court on the grounds that it is dictum.                        2010 WI 35,

¶¶50-58, 324 Wis. 2d 325, 782 N.W.2d 682.                 The answer, somewhat

surprisingly, was no.       Id., ¶58.           This new approach directly

contradicted prior statements of this court.                In State v. Koput,

for example, we stated it was perfectly appropriate "for the

court of appeals or a circuit court to evaluate statements in

our opinions on the basis of whether they constitute dictum."

142 Wis. 2d 370, 386 n.12, 418 N.W.2d 804 (1988).                      The court of

appeals was wrong to think "it was required to give equal weight

to every statement in our opinions."                Id.         Nevertheless, in

Zarder we concluded that because the court of appeals could not

overrule itself (citing Cook v. Cook5), "the court of appeals may
not   dismiss   a   statement   from       an   opinion    by    this     court   by

concluding that it is dictum."         324 Wis. 2d 325, ¶58.

      4The Seventh Circuit acknowledged this as well.    Cole v.
Young, 817 F.2d 412, 418 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Wisconsin follows the
common law rule that dicta——statements of law going beyond the
particular facts of the case——do not constitute binding
precedent.").
      5In Cook v. Cook, we declared that the court of appeals
could not "overrule, modify or withdraw language from its prior
published decisions" even if it believed the prior decision "is
erroneous." 208 Wis. 2d 166, 189-90, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997).

                                       4
                                                                  No.   2020AP2003.bh

      ¶144 This portion of Zarder deserves reexamination.                         Its

reasoning was questionable, its foundation was weak, and its

consequences have undermined a proper conception of the judicial

role.     Just because we stated in Cook that the court of appeals

cannot    overrule   itself    does     not     mean   it   cannot        disregard

statements that were never binding in the first place.                      Indeed,

the traditional rule is that only the rationale for a decision

has precedential effect.        See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.

(6 Wheat.) 264, 399-400 (1821); Koput, 142 Wis. 2d at 386-87;

Lakeshore Com. Fin. Corp. v. Drobac, 107 Wis. 2d 445, 457-58,

319 N.W.2d 839 (1982).        Simply because the rule of decision in a

case cannot be ignored does not transform non-binding dictum

into binding precedent.        Logically, Zarder's conclusion does not

follow.

      ¶145 Furthermore, the Zarder rule itself distorts the law.

Let me give an example.        When I joined the court of appeals, one

of the very first questions that came across my desk was a

motion for leave to appeal.        Wisconsin Stat. § 808.03(2) spells
out   three   statutory   criteria      for    permissive     appeals:           "(a)

Materially advance the termination of the litigation or clarify

further     proceedings   in     the       litigation;      (b)     Protect       the

petitioner    from   substantial       or     irreparable    injury;        or    (c)

Clarify an issue of general importance in the administration of

justice."     But form orders from the court of appeals also cited

State v. Webb, 160 Wis. 2d 622, 632, 467 N.W.2d 108 (1991) and

stated, "Additionally, before leave to appeal will be granted,
the petitioner must show a substantial likelihood of success on

                                       5
                                                                            No.   2020AP2003.bh

the merits of the appeal."                      While the likelihood of success

would likely be relevant, I thought it odd that an additional

requirement not listed in the statutes was added to the draft

order.    So I searched for the answer.

       ¶146 In a discussion tangential to the issue in Webb, this

court    identified       the     three     statutory          criteria      governing         the

consideration of a motion for leave to appeal, and then said,

"The    defendant        must    also      show     a    substantial         likelihood         of

success on the merits."               160 Wis. 2d at 632.              In support of this

statement, the Webb court cited Wisconsin's Appellate Practice

and    Procedure    treatise.             Id.       That   treatise         does    not     list

"substantial likelihood of success" as a separate factor, but

notes that it is implicit in the enumerated criterion and is

likely to influence a decision by the court of appeals to take a

case.     See David L. Walther, Patricia L. Grove, & Michael S.

Heffernan, Appellate Practice and Procedure in Wisconsin, § 9.2

at 9–2 (1990).            Therefore, even though the statute does not

establish likelihood of success as a separate factor, the court
of     appeals    felt        bound   by    Webb's       offhand       remark.         It       is

disturbing       that     a     single      inartfully-phrased              sentence      on     a

peripheral       legal    matter      can    have       that    much    impact.        Zarder

effectively       transformed         a    stray    comment       in    a    supreme      court

opinion into a de facto statutory amendment——at least insofar as

the court of appeals was concerned.

       ¶147 Moreover, Zarder has led some in the legal community,

and even on this court, to suggest we no longer recognize a role
for dicta in our opinions.                 Every description or discussion, in

                                                6
                                                                      No.   2020AP2003.bh

this view, constitutes a precedential holding of this court.                           To

be sure, Zarder never says this.               In fact, Zarder recognizes and

describes two divergent definitions of dicta in our cases.                             See

324 Wis. 2d 325, ¶52 n.19.6         These two lines of cases discuss how

to define dicta, not whether our opinions contain dicta.                               Id.

As far as I am aware, this court has never held——in what would

be   a    dramatic      departure     from          basic     norms       of    American

jurisprudence——that the bench and bar must respect every word or

discussion in our opinions as precedent.

      ¶148 Yet    for      whatever    reason,         Zarder      seems        to   have

distorted how we think about our judicial work-product as well.

Perhaps   the    feeling    that    everything        we    do    and     say   must   be

followed is partially to blame for the increasing length of our

opinions.     Perhaps it contributes to the seeming itch to address

legal matters in our decisions beyond those necessary to resolve

a case.     Increasingly, we also find ourselves carefully parsing

which parts of opinions we "withdraw language" from and which we

do   not——a   practice     that    does       not    appear      common     around     the
country or at the United States Supreme Court.                        Furthermore, we

have ceased calling language in our own opinions dicta.                          Indeed,

since Zarder, I cannot find any time we explicitly concluded

that a portion of our own opinions was nonbinding dicta.                             Once

again, Zarder on its own terms doesn't demand this, nor does it

      6Zarder explains that our cases reflect two definitions of
dicta and those cases debate what, beyond the holding, has
binding effect on future courts. See Zarder v. Humana Ins. Co.,
2010 WI 35, ¶52 n.19, 324 Wis. 2d 325, 782 N.W.2d 682. I do not
attempt here to choose sides, but rather, to restart this
debate.

                                          7
                                                                       No.    2020AP2003.bh

call into question the existence of dicta as a general matter.

But its directional influence casts a long shadow.

       ¶149 This departure from judicial norms may also reflect an

over-inflated       sense     of      our     own   importance    and    role     in    the

constitutional order.              The judicial role is, at root, a case-

deciding function.          See Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 1 v. Vos,

2020 WI 67, ¶31, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35.                         And cases are

brought by parties whose legal rights and obligations must be

determined.       Id.   Treating the legal rationale for a decision as

precedential helps ensure consistency in the application of the

law to other parties with similar issues, and gives due respect

to the learned members of the judiciary who have come before.

But treating as precedential legal discussions or comments not

central     to     deciding       a    case    flips    this     on    its    head,     and

reimagines our opinions as akin to legislation.                         In effect, it

gives this court power to do far more than decide cases, and

therefore, makes us likely to transgress our own guardrails——

both constitutional and prudential.
       ¶150 Our opinions are not statutes, they interpret them.

Our opinions are not the constitution, they interpret it.                               Our

opinions are explanations of how and why we decided a case a

particular way.         They are meant to resolve the issue before us

and,   in   so     doing,   set       forth    a    legal   standard    that     will    be

applied in other cases.                But we don't know what we don't know.

We   make   mistakes        and       misdescribe      things    and    use     imprecise

language.        Perhaps a little judicial modesty is in order.                       Stray
statements or tangential discussions in opinions should not bind

                                               8
                                                                     No.   2020AP2003.bh

future courts or demand a stare decisis analysis.                          Recognizing

dicta serves as a check on the current court, and keeps us in

our proper case-deciding constitutional lane.                   We should embrace

it.     We should employ it.             And neither we nor lower courts

should feel compelled to bow before every prior pen-stroke in

our opinions.

       ¶151 So why raise this now?               Because these concepts would

be beneficial in cases like this.                 Here, the parties ask us to

breathe life into Ekern's statement that "even if the form is

prescribed by the legislature it must reasonably, intelligently,

and fairly comprise or have reference to every essential of the

amendment."          State ex rel. Ekern v. Zimmerman, 187 Wis. 180,

201, 204 N.W. 803 (1925).              But this statement in Ekern was not

necessary to the issue decided in that case, which was whether

the    content   of     a    ballot    question    may    be   delegated       to   the

secretary of state.           Id. at 196-200.           In other words, this is

classic dicta.         Unfortunately, the parties argued the case as if

we are obligated to do something with this language.                        But we are
not.    The premise is incorrect.                The tangential discussion in

Ekern    may   have     persuasive      value,    but    it    did    not    create   a

judicial test we are bound to apply forevermore.                     We should call

it    dicta    and    call    it   a   day,   leaving     us   to     focus    on   the

requirements found in Article XII, Section 1 of the Wisconsin

Constitution.         That approach is appropriate here, and will be

useful and appropriate in cases moving forward.

       ¶152 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA FRANK
DALLET joins this concurrence with respect to ¶¶137-150.

                                          9
                                                              No.    2020AP2003.awb

      ¶153 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.             (dissenting).        Ballot question

challenges have been few and far between in the history of our

state.    Such a challenge reached this court in State ex rel.

Ekern v. Zimmerman, 187 Wis. 180, 204 N.W. 803 (1925).                       There,

the court established a test for our review of a ballot question

challenge:       "it    must   reasonably,       intelligently,       and    fairly

comprise or have reference to every essential of the amendment."

Id. at 201 (emphasis added).

      ¶154 Yet rather than respecting the precedent of a nearly

century-old unanimous opinion, the majority charts a new course

not requested by either party.               Instead of applying the test

established in Ekern, the majority conjures its own test, never

before stated, much less applied.

      ¶155 Specifically, the majority sets forth that "[a] ballot

question could violate [the] constitutional requirement only in

the   rare     circumstance       that   the   question      is     fundamentally

counterfactual such that voters were not asked to approve the

actual amendment."         Majority op., ¶51.         In addition to being
created   by   the     majority   from   whole    cloth,   this     new     test   is

unnecessary for the simple reason that we already have a test

from Ekern.

      ¶156 The majority arrives at its newly discovered test by

tossing precedent to the wind and engaging in an unconvincing

search for the "original meaning" of the state constitution's

command that the legislature "submit" a proposed amendment to

the people.     As Justice Dallet's concurrence aptly explains, the

                                         1
                                                                            No.   2020AP2003.awb

endeavor of divining the "original meaning" of a constitutional

provision is largely a futile endeavor.1

     ¶157 But even setting this aside, the majority's analysis

rests on an infirm foundation.                         It erroneously dismisses the

Ekern test, and instead creates and applies a newly-minted test,

resulting in an overly permissive approach that risks giving the

legislature carte blanche in crafting ballot questions.

     ¶158 I      would     follow    our       precedent         set    forth       in   Ekern.

Applying       the    Ekern    framework,          I    determine      instead       that    the

ballot question here failed to convey "every essential" of the

amendment as is required.            From the ballot question only, voters

would have no idea that the proposed amendment diminishes the

rights    of    criminal       defendants      in       addition       to    bolstering      the

rights    of    crime     victims.        In       my    view,   the        diminution      of   a

defendant's rights previously protected by law, constitutes an

"essential"          element   of   the    amendment.              Because        the    ballot

question failed to accurately represent an essential element of

the law to the voters who approved it, I respectfully dissent.
                                               I

     ¶159 At the April 7, 2020 election, voters were presented

with a yes or no vote on an amendment to Article I, § 9m of the

Wisconsin       Constitution.2        This             section   of     the       constitution

addresses the rights of victims of crime, and the amendment

sought to expand the rights to which crime victims are entitled.

     1   I join part I of Justice Dallet's concurrence.
     2 As the majority observes, this amendment is informally
known as "Marsy's Law." Majority op., ¶10.

                                               2
                                                             No.    2020AP2003.awb

    ¶160 When the amendment was presented to voters, the ballot

question   gave   no   hint   that   a       defendant's   rights    were   being

diminished.   It stated:

    Shall section 9m of article I of the constitution,
    which gives certain rights to crime victims, be
    amended to give crime victims additional rights, to
    require that the rights of crime victims be protected
    with equal force to the protections afforded the
    accused while leaving the federal constitutional
    rights of the accused intact, and to allow crime
    victims to enforce their rights in court?
Majority op., ¶10.
    ¶161 The Wisconsin Justice Initiative (WJI) brought this

suit, asserting that the ballot question failed to satisfy the

requirements set forth in the state constitution for distilling

a constitutional amendment down to a ballot question that is

then presented to the voters.                Id., ¶11.     At the outset, it

should be emphasized that the substance of the amendment is not

at issue, except to the extent that the court must determine

whether the ballot question accurately represented the substance

of the law to the voters who approved it.

    ¶162 In the course of tackling the question that now comes

before us, the circuit court found several shortcomings with the

above language.    Among the shortcomings, it determined that "the

single question presented to the voters was insufficient because

                                         3
                                                                No.   2020AP2003.awb

it did not reference the effect on the existing constitutional

rights of the accused."3

       ¶163 The circuit court stayed its ruling pending appeal,

and the court of appeals certified WEC's appeal to this court.

Now, the majority reverses the circuit court.

       ¶164 Purportedly           grounding     its     determination     in    the

constitution's "original meaning," the majority turns its back

on     Ekern,    seeing     only    a     requirement    that   the    legislature

"submit" the proposed amendment to the people.                    Majority op.,

¶5.     Applying such an understanding, the majority concludes that

"the       question   was   not    fundamentally      counterfactual    such   that

voters were not afforded the opportunity to approve the actual

amendment" and was thus permissible.                  Id.   The upshot is that

"absent       challenge     on    other   grounds,    the   amendment    has   been

validly ratified and is part of the Wisconsin Constitution."

Id., ¶7.

       The circuit court additionally determined that the
       3

question "did not accurately correspond to the language in the
proposed amendments regarding the standard 'no less vigorous'"
and that the amendment required two ballot questions rather than
a single question "because the portion of the amendments that
affected the rights of the accused did not sufficiently relate
to the principal purpose behind the changes being driven by
Marsy's Law to create rights for crime victims."

     Because I determine the ballot question to fail the "every
essential" test, I need not address these additional bases for
the circuit court's decision.

                                            4
                                                                       No.    2020AP2003.awb

                                              II

       ¶165 I begin by setting forth the guiding principles in

reviewing      a     ballot     question.          Subsequently,        I     address     the

majority's errors.

       ¶166 It is true that the legislature has a fair amount of

discretion in constructing a ballot question.                           McConkey v. Van

Hollen, 2010 WI 57, ¶40, 326 Wis. 2d 1, 783 N.W.2d 855.                             Indeed,

this court has stated that the amount of discretion granted to

the legislature is "considerable."                     Id.

       ¶167 According to the state constitution, "it shall be the

duty of the legislature to submit such proposed amendment or

amendments to the people in such manner and at such time as the

legislature        shall       prescribe."         Wis.      Const.    art.     XII,      § 1.

"Article XII, sec. 1 expressly delegates to the legislature the

authority      to       determine       the       method     for      placing      proposed

constitutional amendments before the people."                              Milwaukee All.

Against Racist and Political Repression v. Elections Bd., 106

Wis.   2d     593,      603,    317   N.W.2d 420        (1982).        "The    inquiry     is
'whether the legislature in the formation of the question acted

reasonably and within their constitutional grant of authority

and    discretion.'"             McConkey,      326      Wis.   2d    1,     ¶40   (quoting

Milwaukee All., 106 Wis. 2d at 604).

       ¶168    The legislature's discretion is broad, but it is not

unlimited.         In accordance with the constitution ("in such manner

and at such time as the legislature shall prescribe"), statutory

constraints        on    the    legislature's          authority     indicate      that    the
ballot      question      "shall      include      a    complete      statement     of    the

                                              5
                                                       No.   2020AP2003.awb

referendum question upon which the voters shall be requested to

vote."      Wis. Stat. § 13.175.4       Wisconsin Stat. § 5.64(2)(am)

provides further guidance on what must be included in a ballot

question,    requiring   a   "concise   statement"   and   setting   forth

additional requirements:

     There shall be a separate ballot when any proposed
     constitutional amendment or any other measure or
     question is submitted to a vote of the people, except
     as authorized in s. 5.655.    The ballot shall give a
     concise statement of each question in accordance with
     the act or resolution directing submission in the same
     form as prescribed by the commission under s.
     7.08(1)(a). The question may not be worded in such a
     manner as to require a negative vote to approve a
     proposition or an affirmative vote to disapprove a
     proposition.    Unless otherwise expressly provided,
     this ballot form shall be used at all elections when
     questions are submitted to a vote of the people.
Wis. Stat. § 5.64(2)(am).

     ¶169 As stated, this court has also previously set forth a

test for reviewing a ballot question challenge, providing that a

ballot question violates the constitution when it "fail[s] to

present the real question" or "present[s] an entirely different

question."     Ekern, 187 Wis. at 201.       "In other words, even if

the form is prescribed by the Legislature, it must reasonably,

intelligently, and fairly comprise or have reference to every

essential of the amendment."      Id. (emphasis added).

     4 As the majority correctly observes, no argument was raised
here regarding the legislature's compliance with its statutory
obligations. See majority op., ¶3.

                                    6
                                                                        No.   2020AP2003.awb

                                              III

                                               A

       ¶170 The root of the majority's error lies in its hasty

dismissal of the Ekern test.

       ¶171 This court in Ekern set forth what the parties refer

to as the "every essential" test.                        It requires that a ballot

question "must reasonably, intelligently, and fairly comprise or

have reference to every essential of the amendment."                           Ekern, 187

Wis.       at   201.      As     the    court       of     appeals     observes    in    its

certification in the present case, this court has not expanded

on what it really means for a ballot question to include "every

essential" and this case presents an opportunity for the court

to explain and apply this court's statement in Ekern.                             See Wis.

Just.      Initiative      v.    Wis.       Elections       Comm'n,     No.   2020AP2003,

unpublished certification, at 3 (Dec. 21, 2021).

       ¶172 But instead of taking that opportunity, the majority

simply dispenses with Ekern.                 In the majority's view, the "every

essential"       test     is    no   test    at     all,    but   is   instead    just    an
"explanatory           statement."5           Majority        op.,     ¶41.       Such     a

       Justice Hagedorn's concurrence goes a step further,
       5

asserting that the "every essential" test is mere dicta.   Such
an approach runs counter to the thrust of our recent
jurisprudence. See Teigen v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2022 WI 64,
¶139 n.8, 403 Wis. 2d 607, 976 N.W.2d 519 (Rebecca Grassl
Bradley, J., concurring) (explaining that "[o]ur court does not
recognize the concept of dicta").

     This approach to dicta has been recognized to be simple and
clear. It does not require the reader to dissect an opinion to
determine, under whatever definition of dicta is embraced, what
is and is not "necessary" or "germane" to the holding.       See
Justice Hagedorn's concurrence, ¶147.

                                               7
                                                                     No.    2020AP2003.awb

characterization would be news to the court in State ex rel.

Thomson v. Zimmerman, 264 Wis. 644, 659, 60 N.W.2d 416 (1953),

who noted (although did not decide) a controversy over whether a

ballot     question       "fairly       comprised        every    essential        of   the

amendment."      And it most certainly is news to the parties here,

who     both    argued     their        positions    in     terms     of     the    "every

essential" framework Ekern set forth.

       ¶173 By dismissing the "every essential" test of Ekern, the

majority is able to avoid an exacting stare decisis analysis in

order    to    determine    if     it    should     be   overruled.         See    Johnson

Controls, Inc. v. Emps. Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶94, 264

Wis. 2d 60,      665     N.W.2d 257.         Instead      of     analyzing    whether     a

"special justification," see Hinrichs v. DOW Chem. Co., 2020 WI

2,    ¶¶67-68,    389    Wis. 2d 669,        937    N.W.2d 37,       is    present      that

would compel Ekern to be overruled, the majority relies on the

convenient       and      outcome-determinative             hypothesis        that      the

relevant language is not actually the "test" the parties think

it is.

     Such   an    approach   also    fosters   consistency    and
predictability.   "As the distinction between holding and dicta
becomes increasingly vague, past precedents can be increasingly
manipulated . . . [by]   offer[ing]   some   facially   plausible
argument for disregarding a statement in a prior case." Michael
Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 Stan. L. Rev.
953, 1024 (2005). Therefore, "loose and unpredictable standards
for determining whether a statement is dicta can undermine stare
decisis and the principles of judicial restraint."       Est. of
Genrich v. OHIC Ins. Co., 2009 WI 67, ¶83, 318 Wis. 2d 553, 769
N.W.2d 481 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).

                                             8
                                                                     No.      2020AP2003.awb

     ¶174 Of note is that no party here asked us to overrule

Ekern.6       See St. Augustine Sch. v. Taylor, 2021 WI 70, ¶37, 398

Wis. 2d 92, 961 N.W.2d 635 (observing that "no party asked us to

overrule either" of two cases and declining to "overrule or

revisit either case on our own initiative").                       Indeed, WEC argued

within the confines of Ekern that the ballot question at issue

provided "every essential" of the amendment.                       We have thus been

provided      no    special    justification         for   overruling         Ekern.       As

such,     I   would    maintain       the    Ekern   test.       Doing     so    not    only

respects the precedent established by the courts who came before

us, but in this case furthers the aims of democratic governance.

Making sure that a ballot question includes "every essential" of

an amendment ensures that the public is informed and can "vote

intelligently."         Ekern, 187 Wis. at 204.               This is critical to

maintaining a democracy.

     ¶175 The         result    of     the    majority's     error       is     an   overly

permissive         approach    that    risks      giving   the     legislature         carte

blanche       in   crafting    ballot        questions.      The    potential        for   a
ballot question to mislead the public leads me to believe that a

more exacting standard is necessary.                   Ekern's "every essential"

test provides more of a safeguard, enhancing the sacred right to

vote, than does the majority's proffered new test.

     ¶176 When a ballot question fails to accurately describe

"every essential" of a corresponding constitutional amendment,

the people have not spoken on the true question.                              Rather than

     6 WEC confirmed at oral argument that it was not asking for
this court to overturn "any of its prior decisions."

                                              9
                                                                                   No.    2020AP2003.awb

heralding that "the people have spoken" through their votes,

instead    the       people       are    misled          and     democracy          is     undermined.

Accordingly, I would maintain a test that provides more of a

safeguard against such an outcome.                             The established Ekern test

fits the bill.

                                                     B

      ¶177 Applying             the     Ekern      test     to       the    ballot        question      at

issue here, I determine that the ballot question fails to inform

voters of "every essential" of the amendment.

      ¶178 It        is    true       that     our       previous      cases        offer       precious

little guidance in what it means to inform voters of "every

essential."          Indeed, challenges to ballot questions are rare in

our jurisprudence, and when they are challenged the attack is

often    leveled          on    other     grounds.              See,       e.g.,     McConkey,         326

Wis. 2d 1,       ¶4       (addressing          a     challenge             under     the     "separate

amendment rule").

      ¶179 As        observed          above,       both       parties       here        framed    their

arguments       in    terms       of     the       Ekern    test,          and     their     arguments
provide    us    with          some    guideposts          as    to    the       contours         of   the

inquiry.     WEC proposes the following understanding:                                     "this Court

should hold that the 'every essential' standard requires that

the     Legislature            'fairly       express'          the     'clear       and      essential

purpose' of the proposed amendment in the ballot question."                                            For

support,    WEC       points       us    to     Minnesota            law    applying        a   similar

standard.        See Breza v. Kiffmeyer, 723 N.W.2d 633, 636 (Minn.

2006).

                                                    10
                                                                             No.   2020AP2003.awb

       ¶180 In contrast, WJI cites language in Ekern itself as

providing the operative standard:                      "It is clear and unambiguous,

so as to enable voters to vote intelligently."                               Ekern, 187 Wis.

at 204.         "[T]he principal and essential criterion consists in a

submission of a question or a form which has for its object and

purpose        an    intelligent         and    comprehensive           submission         to    the

people, so that the latter may be fully informed on the subject

upon which they are required to exercise a franchise."                                      Id. at

201-02; Thomson, 264 Wis. at 659.

       ¶181 Under          either      formulation,          the    ballot     question         here

fails.         I begin my analysis with the essential fact, recognized

by the circuit court, that the victim's rights amendment does

more   than         just   increase       the    rights       of    crime     victims.          The

majority fails to acknowledge this.                          Instead, it opines:                "all

of   the       provisions        of    Marsy's        Law    relate     to     expanding        and

defining victim's rights and tend to effect and carry out this

general purpose."            Majority op., ¶6.

       ¶182 Several          provisions          of    the     amendment       do,    in     fact,
decrease        the    rights         afforded    to        criminal    defendants.              For

example, the amendment limits the rights of criminal defendants

in the following ways:

               Where      the    previous        version          of   § 9m       stated       that

                "[n]othing in this section, or in any statute enacted

                pursuant to this section, shall limit any right of the

                accused which may be provided by law," the new version

                protects only the federal constitutional rights of the
                defendant,        not      the        broader       protection        of        "any

                                                 11
                                                                             No.      2020AP2003.awb

                 right . . . provided by law."                    The change            allows for

                 a     limitation         of    the     defendant's         rights       that      are

                 provided by statute, or by the Wisconsin Constitution,

                 which may afford greater protections than its federal

                 counterpart.         See State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶60, 245

                 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625.

                The       amendment        adversely         impacts       the        defendant's

                 ability        to    obtain         discovery,       giving          victims      the

                 constitutional             right       "[t]o     refuse         an      interview,

                 deposition,         or    other      discovery       request         made    by   the

                 accused        or    any      person     acting       on    behalf           of   the

                 accused."       Wis. Const. art. I, § 9m(2)(L).

                The    circuit       court's         ability    to    sequester          a    victim

                 witness where "sequestration is necessary to a fair

                 trial for the defendant" has been removed.

       ¶183 The new language that allows a victim to essentially

refuse interviews and discovery requests would certainly seem to

have    a       detrimental          effect      on     the     rights      of     the       accused.
Similarly,           the     previous          constitutional         language          allowed      a

circuit         court      to   sequester        a    victim     from    the       courtroom       to

preserve the fair trial right of the defendant.                                   This right is

now gone.

       ¶184 Shouldn't the voters be informed that a constitutional

amendment diminishes the rights of criminal defendants before

voting on it?            In light of these provisions, it is apparent that

the amendment serves dual "purposes," both expanding the rights
of victims and diminishing those of the accused.

                                                   12
                                                                   No.    2020AP2003.awb

       ¶185 By any definition of the word, such a change is an

"essential" aspect of an amendment.                 Accordingly, a voter would

need to be informed of the change before voting "intelligently."

Its lack of inclusion has the significant potential to mislead

voters as to the consequences of their votes.

       ¶186 The majority tersely disposes of this argument within

the span of a single paragraph.                See majority op., ¶55.            It does

so with a one-two punch, first setting up a false dichotomy

followed       closely   by    a    strawman.       To    explain,       the    majority

directs the reader not to the question of "whether the amendment

was explained, but whether it was 'submitted' to the people."

Id.     Yet according to the majority, if an amendment is not

properly explained (i.e., it is "fundamentally counterfactual"),

that    does    not   constitute      "submission."         In    other        words,   an

examination of the "explanation" offered is not irrelevant to

the "submission" question, but is instead part and parcel of

such a determination.

       ¶187 Next,      the    majority   advances        that   "[n]othing        in    the
constitution requires that all components be presented in the

ballot question."        Id.       This is a strawman.          I do not argue, and

I do not understand any of the parties to be arguing, that all

components of an amendment be presented in a ballot question.

Our    precedent      establishes,     and     I   maintain,     that     only    "every

essential" is required.

       ¶188 When an amendment to the state constitution is placed

before the voters for an up or down vote, it is imperative that
the voters know what they are voting on.                   It can be a difficult

                                          13
                                                                           No.    2020AP2003.awb

exercise to distill a complex and multifaceted constitutional

amendment down to a simple description that will fit on the

ballot,    yet    still    informs          voters    of    the     true    nature       of    the

question.

    ¶189 Nevertheless,               the    ballot     question       is    the        only    text

that all voters are guaranteed to see.                         See Craig M. Burnett &

Vladimir     Kogan,    When          Does     Ballot       Language        Influence          Voter

Choices?     Evidence from a Survey Experiment, 32 Pol. Commc'n

109, 112 (2015).          Those voters who do not research a proposed

amendment beforehand will see the ballot question, and only the

ballot question, prior to casting their vote.                               This gives the

framing provided by the ballot question considerable power in

shaping    how    voters       think        about    and    understand           the    question

presented.

    ¶190 That ballot question language possesses this power to

frame the issue in turn dictates that the language provide an

accurate    picture       of    the     measure       that     is    placed       before       the

voters.      To    this    end,        we    should     maintain       the       vitality       of
judicial    review    in       the    ballot        question      context,        rather      than

essentially surrendering our responsibility for judicial review

to the legislature.            Democracy works best when voters are fully

informed.        The majority opinion takes a step backward in this

endeavor.

    ¶191 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

                                               14
    No.   2020AP2003.awb

1