Court Opinion

ID: 9549393
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:17:34.118336+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:14.365310
License: Public Domain

COMPTON, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the result reached in this decision, but disagree with its analysis. In particular, I am of the same opinion as my dissenting colleague, Justice Rabinowitz, that this court’s decision in Headlough v. Headlough, 639 P.2d 1010 (Alaska 1982), should not be interpreted as permitting the modification of only child support awards on the basis that a mistake was made by a party at the time of the award. I believe that Headlough should be interpreted as also permitting the modification of a spousal support award on the basis that a mistake was made by a party at the time of the award. As indicated by Justice Rabinowitz, the statute granting courts the authority to modify divorce and dissolution judgments (AS 09.55.220) makes no distinction between child support and spousal support awards. There simply is no statutory basis for assuming that the legislature intended different standards to be applied in the modification of spousal" and child support awards. 661 P.2d at 631-632 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
I nonetheless agree with the result reached in this decision, however, because I believe that what Mrs. Larson seeks is properly characterized as relief from a final judgment, governed by Alaska Civil Rule 60(b), rather than the modification of an award of spousal support under AS 09.55.-220. Civil Rule 60(b) provides in relevant part as follows:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect;
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(3) fraud ...
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2) and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken.
Mrs. Larson is seeking relief from a judgment more than one year after it became final on the basis of a mistake that was made at the time the judgment was entered. Her motion is accordingly untimely and cannot be considered.
The reason I believe Civil Rule 60(b), rather than AS 09.55.220, is controlling in this case is that I do not believe the portion of the judgment from which Mrs. Larson seeks relief can properly be characterized as an award of “spousal support.” In my opinion, it must instead be viewed as being in the nature of a property division, which is clearly governed by Civil Rule 60(b). O’Link v. O’Link, 632 P.2d 225, 228-31 (Alaska 1981).
Mr. and Mrs. Larson did not agree to the payment of spousal support or alimony as those terms are commonly understood or intended in AS 09.55.210 and AS 09.55.220. They agreed, instead, that Mr. Larson would contribute to the purchase by Mrs. Larson of an asset, which was a particular *630educational degree. Although we have previously labeled this type of agreement as an agreement for the payment of “rehabilitative alimony,” Bussell v. Bussell, 623 P.2d 1221, 1224 (Alaska 1981), it is not substantively alimony or spousal support at all. For example, if by agreement or judgment it were determined that a wife was to become the owner of a particular business, from which she would ultimately support herself, and that the husband was to provide in installments the down payment for the business, I do not believe we would characterize the arrangement as one for the provision of spousal support. In my opinion, this is very much akin to the arrangement agreed upon by Mr. and Mrs. Larson. The issue is addressed in Professor Clark’s treatise on domestic relations as follows:
Bearing in mind that one purpose of alimony is to ease the adjustment to single status for the wife, one must agree that in many instances that purpose is better served by a series of payments over a relatively short period which both parties may count on as fixed and unalterable than by conventional periodic alimony, lasting indefinitely and always open to increase or reduction with the parties' changing circumstances.... In short, the property-alimony distinction is a fictional device for compromising between the policies favoring modifiability and those favoring finality.
H. Clark, Law of Domestic Relations § 14.9, at 456 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
The agreement entered into by Mr. and Mrs. Larson was that she should receive payments from Mr. Larson for a definite and specified period, which payments were not to be subject to increase or reduction with the parties’ changing circumstances. Thus, the agreement should not be construed as being modifiable under AS 09.55.-220.
Presumably because of a mistake, the judgment setting forth the terms of the parties’ agreement did not and could not accomplish its intended purpose. Mrs. Larson is entitled to obtain relief from the judgment, but only pursuant to Civil Rule 60(b). In accordance with this rule, relief from a judgment based on a mistake must be requested within one year of when the judgment became final. Mrs. Larson did not seek relief within that time period and is accordingly now barred from so doing. The parties have the right to limit the extent of their liability to each other, as did Mr. and Mrs. Larson. Having done so, the jurisdiction of the superior court to grant relief from the judgment is extremely limited and circumstances under which relief could be granted at this time do not exist.
In accordance with my analysis, it is entirely unnecessary and misleading to analyze this case in terms of whether a material and substantial change in circumstances has occurred. I disagree with the decision of this court to the extent that it relies upon such an analysis.