Court Opinion

ID: 9531218
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:08:46.143464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:22.290313
License: Public Domain

STATON, Judge.
Donald and Jacqueline Rice ("the Rices") appeal the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of T. Russell Strunk, Jr., Thomas Gallmeyer, and the law firm of Rothberg, Gallmeyer, Fruechtenicht & Logan ("Rothberg firm"). The Rices raise one issue for our review, which we divide into two and restate as follows:
I. Whether the Rices' claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
II. Whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the Rices' claim for legal malpractice.
We affirm.
Donald Rice, Steven Cobin, and Harold Belkin formed a general partnership in 1985 which existed for the purpose of owning and managing the Oaklawn Courts Apartments in Fort Wayne, Indiana ("Oaklawn Courts Partnership"). Cobin and Belkin were also partners in two other apartment complex partnerships, Casselwood Partnership and McMillen Park Partnership. Rice was only a general partner in the Oaklawn Courts apartments. In addition, he and his wife, Jacqueline, were employed to manage all three of the apartment complexes held by the partnerships.
The Rothberg firm provided legal services to the three partnerships at all times pertinent to this case. The Rothberg firm also acted as legal counsel to the Rices for various personal and business matters unrelated to the partnership during 1984 and 1985. In September of 1985, however, Rice wrote to Thomas Gallimeyer ("Gallmeyer"), a partner *1153at the Rothberg firm, requesting the return of his records and files. Thereafter, Rice hired independent counsel to represent him in his personal affairs.
In late 1986, Rice, Cobin and Belkin decided to refinance the Oaklawn Court Apartment complex. The closing for the refinancing was scheduled for March 24, 1987. Meanwhile, in February of 1987, Cobin and Belkin approached T. Russell Strunk ("Strunk"), an attorney at the Rothberg firm, to determine if Strunk would be interested in replacing Rice as the manager of all three apartment complexes. Strunk accepted the offer and on March 18, 1987, Strunk told the Rothberg firm he was leaving. Cobin and Belkin told Strunk and Gallmeyer not to tell Rice that his management contracts were about to be terminated, and he was going to be replaced with Strunk.
Rice and Strunk were the only representatives of the Oaklawn Court Partnership that were present at the closing on March 24, 1987. Each of the partners, including Rice, were required to personally guarantee the loan. Too, the bank required Rice to subordinate his management contract in consideration for the refinancing. Strunk reviewed each of the closing documents with Rice, including the personal guaranty and subordination agreement, and Strunk signed some documents .as "Attorney in Fact" on behalf of all the partners.
On May 21, 1987, Belkin and Cobin advised Rice that they considered his three management contracts to be in breach and they were consequently being terminated. In their amended complaint, the Rices asserted the following claims against Strunk, Gallmeyer, and the Rothberg firm (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Attorneys"): fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, legal malpractice, and conspiracy to commit actual and constructive fraud. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Attorneys and this appeal ensued.
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind.Trial Rule 56(C). The burden is on the moving party to prove there are no genuine issues of material fact and he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Once the movant has sustained this burden, the opponent must respond by setting forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial; he may not simply rest on the allegations of his pleadings. Stephenson v. Ledbetter (1992), Ind., 596 N.E.2d 1369, 1371. At the time of filing the motion or response, a party shall designate to the court all parts of pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, matters of judicial notice, and any other matters on which it relies for purposes of the motion. TR. 56(C).
When reviewing an entry of summary judgment, we stand in the shoes of the trial court. We do not weigh the evidence but will consider the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Collins v. Covenant Mut. Ins. Co. (1992), Ind.App., 604 N.E.2d 1190, 1194. We may sustain a summary judgment upon any theory supported by the designated materials. T.R. 56(C).
I.
Statute of Limitations
The Attorneys contend that all of the Riceg' claims are subsumed within their allegation of legal malpractice and are, thus, subject to a two year statute of limitations. See IND.CODE 34-1-2-2 (1988); Shideler v. Dwyer (1981), 275 Ind. 270, 417 N.E.2d 281. It is well settled that the substance of the cause of action, rather than the form, determines the applicability of the statute of limitations. Shideler, supra, at 285.
In Shideler, the plaintiff sought damages against an attorney who negligently drafted a will in which the plaintiff was named a beneficiary. When a clause in the will was deemed void, thereby precluding the plaintiff from recovering, an action was brought against the attorney alleging she was lable under the following theories: (1) breach of contract; (2) negligence; (8) fraud; (4) constructive fraud; and (5) breach of fiduciary duty. Our supreme court opined that "(wiith respect to the Complaint herein, the number and variety of Plaintiffs technical pleading labels and theories of recovery cannot disguise the obvious fact-apparent even to a *1154layman-that this is a malpractice case, and hence is governed by the statute of limitations applicable to such actions." Id. at 286.
We find Shideler controlling and conclude that the Riceg' claims are governed by the two year statute of limitations applicable to legal malpractice claims.1 Nevertheless, we conclude the Rices' claims are not barred by the statute of limitations,.
Although the alleged misconduct occurred at the closing on March 24, 1987, the Rices did not learn of their alleged injury until May 21, 1987, when they discovered that the management contracts had been terminated. As noted in this court's recent opinion in Habig v. Bruning (1993), Ind.App., 613 N.E.2d 61, trans. denied, a cause of action under IC 384-1-2-2 accrues when the resultant damage is ascertainable, or through the exercise of due diligence, could be ascertained. Id. at 64; see also Groen v. Elkins (1990), Ind.App., 551 N.E.2d 876, 880, trans. denied. Because their cause of action accrued on May 21, 1987 and the Rices filed their complaint on May 18, 1989, the two year statute of limitations does not preclude their claim.
IL.
Legal Malpractice
Notwithstanding our conclusion that the Rices' cause of action is not barred by the statute of limitations, the Rices cannot prevail on the gravamen of their claim.
 The essential elements of a cause of action for legal malpractice are as follows: (1) the employment of the attorney (the duty); (2) the failure of the attorney to exercise ordinary skill and knowledge (the breach); (8) negligence which was the proximate cause (causation); and (4) damage to the plaintiff (damages). Fiddler v. Hobbs (1985), Ind.App., 475 N.E.2d 1172, 1173, trans. denied. The Attorneys contend they are not liable to the Rices because they owed no duty to Rice as an individual; rather, they were employed by the partnership and, thus, owed a fiduciary duty to the partnership only. The Rices respond that the firm's fiduciary obligation to the partnership extends to each of the general partners therein. We are, therefore, confronted with the following issue of first impression in Indiana: whether an attorney representing a general partnership has an attorney-client relationship with each of the general partners.
Though our Rules of Professional Conduct do not specifically address the obligation owed by an attorney in the context of a partnership, Prof.Cond.R. 1.13 provides in pertinent part: "(a) A lawyer employed or *1155retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents."
We conclude that representing a partnership and a corporation presents analogous potentials for conflict and, thus, justifies applying similar parameters to the attorney client relationship.2 We recognize that in doing so we are declining to follow decisions from other jurisdictions which hold that counsel for a partnership is engaged in an attorney-client relationship with each and every partner therein:3 However, we believe this imposes unrealistic obligations on attorneys that endeavor to represent partnerships.
The implications are illustrated by the case at bar. If the Attorneys in the present cause had acted in contravention of Cobin and Bel-kin's instructions by revealing to Rice the plan to terminate his management contracts, Cobin and Rice undoubtedly would have pursued a malpractice action of their own. Inasmuch as the independent interests of individual partners are often incongruent, we conclude that counsel for a partnership has only that entity for a client.
While we believe the wisest course of action would have been for Strunk to advise Rice to seek independent counsel for the closing, we decline to impose civil lability upon Strunk for his failure to do so. The trial court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of the Attorneys.
Affirmed.
GARRARD, J., concurs.
SULLIVAN, J., concurs and files separate opinion.

. The Rices urge us to follow Seevers v. Arkenberg (S.D.Ind.1989), 726 F.Supp. 1159, wherein the court held the client's action against her attorney was governed by the six year statute of limitations applicable to actions for fraud. However, Seevers is distinguishable from the instant case because the evidence therein revealed that the attorney misrepresented to the plaintiff that he was representing her interests, as well as her husband's, in the divorce proceeding. In fact, the attorney only represented the husband's interest in the divorce. Because the gravamen of plaintiff's case most closely resembled an action for fraud, the court applied the six year limitation period. Id. at 1170.
We reject the Rices' contention that the gravamen of the case at bar is similarly an action for fraud. The elements of actual fraud are as follows:
(1) a material misrepresentation of a past or existing fact by the party to be charged which
(2) was false,
(3) was made with knowledge or in reckless ignorance of the falsity,
(4) was relied upon by the complaining party, and
(5) proximately caused the complaining party injury.
Pugh's IGA v. Super Food Services, Inc. (1988), Ind.App., 531 N.E.2d 1194, 1197, trans. denied. Here, there is no evidence that Strunk, or any of the Attorneys, made a material misrepresentation to the Rices before, during or after the March 24 closing.
The Rices contend that Strunk's approval for signature by the partners of a closing document that stated there were no material changes in the business, provided the basis for a claim of fraud. We do not agree. First, the statement could not have been a misrepresentation of a past or existing fact because at the time of the closing, the Rices' management contracts had not been terminated. Too, the document at issue was a closing certificate wherein Cobin, Rice, Belkin and Belkin's wife made certain representations to the mortgage corporation; it cannot be construed as containing representations by the Attorneys to Rice personally. The Rices' action for fraud has no merit.

. See Quintel Corp., N.V. v. Citibank, N.A. (S.D.N.Y.1984), 589 F.Supp. 1235 (Analogized with rule regarding representation of a corporation and held that the partnership's attorney had no attorney-client relationship with the partner); Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, 2 Legal Malpractice, 3d Ed. (1989), section 20.7, p. 260 ("A partnership is usually a singular legal entity and is the client. A lawyer who represents the partnership does not thereby become counsel for the partners. The principal accords with codified ethical rules which require that an attorney for an entity owes a loyalty only to that client and not to its owners or investors.")

. See eg., Pucci v. Santi (N.D.IIl.1989), 711 F.Supp. 916; Wortham & Van Liew v. Superior Court (1987), 188 Cal.App.3d 927, 233 Cal.Rptr. 725, review denied; Roberts v. Heim (N.D.Cal.1988), 123 F.R.D. 614.