Court Opinion

ID: 9583060
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:34:31.164772+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:09.304034
License: Public Domain

JOSEPH, C. J.,
dissenting.
Although we are bound by a trial court’s findings of fact if there is any evidence to support them, we are not bound by the court’s conclusions of law. The officer had no authority to ask defendant to get out of his car in connection with a stop for a traffic violation. ORS 810.410(3). Regardless of what Officer Anderson told defendant, as a matter of law defendant was not “free to go” until he was back in his car. Until that point, defendant was wholly within the control of the officer and was not a free agent. What the trial court described as a “litany” could not change that fact. I continue to believe that there are limitations on the authority of the police to initiate “mere conversation.” What the officer did was engage in a *76course of interrogation for which there was no basis in fact and for which there was no authority. State v. Mesa, 110 Or App 261, 266, 822 P2d 143 (1991) (Joseph, C. J., dissenting); see State v. Porter, 312 Or 112, 817 P2d 1306 (1991); Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Or 97, 743 P2d 692 (1987). The trial court’s “shades of gray” test does not impress me. This officer unlawfully crossed a bright line when he initiated an unauthorized investigation.
Furthermore, the majority’s conclusion that the state met its burden to prove that defendant consented to the search of the suitcase has no basis in the record in this case. Instead, the majority relies on this proposition: “When a request to search contains no limitations and a defendant places no limitation on the search, the scope of the allowable search may be fairly [sic] broad.” 112 Or App at 74. That is a wonderful way of switching the burden from the state to the defendant. The majority gives lip service to the rule that the state has the burden to prove that defendant consented to the search of the suitcase but then invents a rule that all that the state had to prove was that defendant did not expressly forbid opening his suitcase. With all due respect, that is absurd.1
I dissent.

 Note 2 in the majority opinion, 112 Or App at 74 n 2, would, in fact, reflect my view of the law, if the whole search process here were not illegal. My authority is ORS 810.410 and the law of search and seizure under the Oregon and United States Constitutions — hard as that is for the majority to recognize.