Court Opinion

ID: 9854814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:14:34.168354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:26.682397
License: Public Domain

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.
¶ 76. (dissenting). I cannot join the majority's opinion because in examining the insurance contract as a whole, the majority completely ignores the unambiguous UIM reducing clause. I would affirm the court of appeals' decision because when the unambiguous UIM reducing clause is read together with thé rest of the policy, I conclude that the reducing clause is not susceptible to more than one interpretation. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.1
*94¶ 77. In one breath the majority concludes that the UIM reducing clause here is unambiguous and not contrary to public policy since it complies with Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i). Majority op. at ¶ 61. In the next breath, however, the majority concludes that, although unambiguous, the reducing clause is unenforceable because it creates illusory coverage in the context of the entire policy. Id. at ¶ 72. I cannot join the majority's analysis because when examining the policy as a whole, it completely ignores the unambiguous UIM reducing clause. The majority draws its conclusion based on several other portions of the policy, interpreted separately and independently from the unambiguous UIM reducing clause at issue. To me, the majority's approach is contrary to Dowhower v. West Bend Mutual Ins. Co., 2000 WI 73, 236 Wis. 2d 113, 613 N.W.2d 557, and Taylor v. Greatway Ins. Co., 2001 WI 93, 245 Wis. 2d 134, 628 N.W.2d 916, and violates our rules of contract, including insurance contract, interpretation.
¶ 78. Beginning at paragraph 62, the majority opinion goes to great length to discuss various pages of the policy as either not referencing UIM coverage, see majority op. at ¶¶ 62-63, or characterizing UIM coverage in a manner that the majority finds "organizationally complex," "plainly contradictory" and "not user-friendly." Id. at ¶¶ 64-65, 72. The majority, however, never analyzes those sections together with, or in relationship to, the unambiguous UIM reducing clause. Furthermore, the majority simply concludes that the discussed provisions render an otherwise unambiguous *95reducing clause unenforceable, see id. at ¶ 72, but fails to explain how the whole contract is ambiguous or susceptible to more than one construction.
¶ 79. I agree with the majority that Dowhower and Taylor recognized that language in an insurance policy can be ambiguous within the context of the whole policy. Those cases do not, however, hold — or even suggest — that when examining the insurance policy as a whole, the unambiguous UIM reducing clause should be completely ignored. To the contrary, in Taylor, we examined the policy as a whole in relation to the definition of underinsured vehicle. See 2001 WI 93, ¶ 27 (comparing the definition to other policy provisions and concluding that "nothing in the rest of [the] policy [ ] obscures the unambiguous definition of underinsured vehicle").
¶ 80. Moreover, focusing on the unambiguous UIM reducing clause when examining the context of the insurance policy is consistent with our rules of contract interpretation. The unambiguous UIM reducing clause should be read together with the rest of the policy, to determine if the reducing clause is susceptible of more than one construction. See Estate of Dorschner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2001 WI App 117, ¶ 12, 244 Wis. 2d 261, 628 N.W.2d 414 ("Nor do we find that the antistacking clause, when read together with the rest of the policy, is susceptible to more than one construction."). In addition, "[W]hen the terms of an insurance policy are plain on their face, the policy must not be rewritten by construction." Smith v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 155 Wis. 2d 808, 811, 456 N.W.2d 597 (1990).
¶ 81. Applying the above analysis here, I conclude that the unambiguous reducing clause remains unambiguous, or as the majority requires "understandable and clear." See majority op. at ¶ 49. Granted, like many *96insurance contracts, the American Merchants policy issued to Schmitz is long and complex with many clauses and endorsements. Contrary to the majority's conclusion, however, complexity alone does not render the policy ambiguous. See Heater v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 30 Wis. 2d 561, 565, 141 N.W2.d 178 (1966); Hause v. Bresina, 2002 WI App 188, 256 Wis.2d 664, 649 N.W.2d 736; Hinrichs v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2001 WI App 114, ¶ 15, 244 Wis. 2d 191, 629 N.W.2d 44.
¶ 82. In concluding that the UIM reducing clause is unenforceable, the majority finds five areas of the policy where the explanation of UIM coverage could be clearer, see majority op. at ¶¶ 62-70, but seems to base its conclusion largely on the document entitled "Availability of Underinsured Motorists Coverage— Wisconsin." Id. at ¶ 61. The majority concludes that the definition of UIM coverage in this notice is the "most readily understandable definition of UIM coverage in the policy," and that this definition apparently creates confusion for a reasonable insured because it differs from the actual UIM coverage in the policy. Id. at ¶ 70. The majority seems to hold that by stating in the notice that "[UIM] coverage will pay the remainder of the bodily injury damages up to the limit of liability the person selects," the UIM reducing clause is rendered ambiguous.
¶ 83. I disagree. When the availability of UIM coverage notice is read together with the unambiguous UIM reducing clause, it is clear that UIM coverage is reduced by all sums paid by or on behalf of persons or organizations legally responsible. The policy unambiguously states that UIM coverage is only coverage up to the limit of liability the person selects. When examined together, therefore, the unambiguous UIM reducing *97clause remains unambiguous, nor does the notice provision render the UIM coverage illusory. The American Merchants policy follows the statutory language in Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i), and comports with Dowhower because it "clearly sets forth that the insured is purchasing a fixed level of UIM recovery that will be arrived at by combining payments made from all sources." 2000 WI 73, ¶ 33.1 conclude that the UIM reducing clause is unambiguous on its face, as well as in the context of the entire policy. The majority errs by rewriting the policy through judicial construction.
¶ 84. Finally, I find it necessary to comment on the majority's summation that 'Dowhower [ ] creates a quandary for the judiciary because it does not provide a bright line rule for courts to apply." Majority op. at ¶ 74. The majority further writes, "As a practical matter, every automobile insurance policy with an underin-sured motorists reducing clause becomes a potential battleground over contextual ambiguity." Id. Rather, I believe the majority opinion has created exactly what it has criticized here — a quandary. The majority has searched for, and subsequently has created, ambiguity in a policy where it otherwise did not exist. It has done so by ignoring the unambiguous UIM reducing clause at issue. As a practical matter, the majority has created confusion for insurers, consumers, and the courts of this state, because now a clear and unambiguous UIM reducing clause has been wholly ignored in order to conclude that such clause is ambiguous in the context of the policy as a whole. I cannot join in this analysis; therefore, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 85. I am authorized to state that Justices JONE WILCOX and DIANE S. SYKES join this dissent.

 The majority apparently, but not explicitly, overrules the holding in Sukala v. Heritage Mutual Insurance Co., 2000 WI App 266, ¶ 20, 240 Wis. 2d 65, 622 N.W.2d 457, that "[o]nce we have concluded that the UIM provisions of a policy are unambiguous ... then our inquiry is at an end." See also Estate of *94Dorschner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2001 WI App 117, ¶ 12, 244 Wis. 2d 261, 628 N.W.2d 414. If the majority intends to overrule or withdraw language from Sukala, it should do so explicitly, or appropriately distinguish Sukala so as not to create confusion.