Court Opinion

ID: 9488038
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:34:33.030208+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:39.017873
License: Public Domain

*1560JOHNSON, Senior Circuit Judge,
specially concurring:
I concur in the portions of Judge Hatchett’s opinion which concern the admissibility of the EEOC determination and the award of attorneys’ fees. ' I cannot, however, concur in Judge Hatchett’s holding that a plaintiff, after making a' showing- by substantial evidence that an employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory reasons are unworthy of credence, must offer additional indicia of mendacity to reach a jury on the issue of intentional discrimination. In my view, Judge Hatchett’s holding improperly heightens the burden of proof that a plaintiff must sustain to prevail on a disparate treatment claim under the framework developed in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and its progeny. Nonetheless, because I believe that there was insufficient evidence in this case for a reasonable person to find that the employer’s proffered reasons were unworthy of credence, I concur in-the result reached by Judge Hatchett and Judge Cox oh this issue.

Discussion

As Judge Hatchett explains, the framework articulated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas and Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) governs in disparate treatment cases brought under Title VII and the ADEA. Where an employee makes a prima facie case of discrimination, a presumption of discrimination arises. St Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, —— U.S.-, -, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2747, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). The intermediate burden of production then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation for the employment decision. Id. Where the employer meets his burden of articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, “the McDonnell Douglas framework — with its presumptions and burdens — is no longer relevant.” Hicks, — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 2749.
The presumption, having fulfilled its role of forcing the defendant to come forward with some response, simply drops out of the picture. The defendant’s production (whatever its persuasive effect) having been made, the trier of fact proceeds to decide the ultimate question: whether plaintiff has proven that the defendant intentionally discriminated against [him] because of an illegitimate reason.

Id.

It is uncontroverted that Appellant has made a prima facie case of employment discrimination and that NationsBank has proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for Appellant’s dismissal. Thus, the question in this case is whether the district court properly concluded that no reasonable person could find that NationsBank intentionally discriminated against Appellant. The answer to this question rests on two subsidiary issues: (1) whether Appellant’s evidence was sufficient for a reasonable juror to disbelieve that NationsBank’s proffered reasons motivated her termination — that is, whether there was sufficient evidence that the proffered reasons were pretextual — and (2) if there was sufficient evidence of pretext, whether disbelief of NationsBa2ik’s proffered reasons in combination with a prima facie case is sufficient evidence to create a jury, question on intentional discrimination.
In granting judgment as a matter of law to NationsBank, the district court found that “assuming that [the performance-related reasons proffered by NationsBank are] pretex-tual, you still have to have some evidence that age or gender had some bearing on the decision to terminate the employee.” The district court reasoned that, even if Nations-Bank lied when it offered its reasons for Appellant’s termination, the motivation behind the lie was equally likely to have been to conceal personal animosity as to conceal illicit discrimination. Judge Hatchett adopts the district court’s reasoning and, thus, never directly addresses whether Appellant has shown pretext.1
*1561A. Proof of Intentional Discrimination
As Judge Hatchett only focuses on the second issue, I begin my discussion there. Judge Hatchett implicitly holds that evidence of pretext in combination with a prima facie case is not sufficient evidence of discrimination to reach the jury. I believe that this holding is belied by the explicit statement in Hicks that upon rejection of defendant’s proffered reasons, “no additional proof of discrimination is required.” — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2749.
Prior to Hicks, federal circuit courts were divided about the effect of a finding that the employer’s explanation was false. In what was dubbed the “pretext-only” view, the majority of circuits held that a showing that the employer’s proffered explanation was false mandated judgment for the plaintiff. See Hicks, — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 2750 (cataloguing cases).2 In contrast, “pretext-plus” circuits held that to prevail, the plaintiff must offer evidence of discrimination in addition to pretext, such that if a plaintiff could do no more than show that the employer’s proffered reasons were unworthy of credence, judgment for the employer was mandated. Id.
Hicks presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to resolve this circuit split. At the conclusion of a bench trial, the district court in Hicks entered judgment in favor of the employer despite evidence offered by the plaintiff that the reasons proffered by the employer were not the basis for the plaintiffs dismissal. Hicks v. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 756 F.Supp. 1244, 1252 (E.D.Mo.1991). As in the case before us, the district court interposed its own explanation for Hicks’ dismissal, implicitly finding that the dismissal was the product of personal animus between Hicks and his employer. See Hicks, — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 2748 (citing 756 F.Supp. at 1252). Applying the pretext-only view, the Eighth Circuit reversed. Hicks v. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492-93 (8th Cir.1992), rev’d, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993).
In reversing the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court clearly rejected the pretext-only view. The Court held that where the plaintiff relies solely on evidence that the reasons proffered by the employer are false, the plaintiff retains the burden of persuading the factfinder that the false reasons proffered are a pretext for illegitimate discriminatory motives. Id. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2752. However, the Court also rejected the pretext-plus position. See Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1123-24 (7th Cir.1994) (explaining Hicks’ holding). The Hicks Court explained that:
The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant’s proffered reasons ivill permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination, and the Court of Appeals was correct when it noted that, upon such rejection, “[njo additional proof of discrimination is required.”
Hicks, — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 2749 (emphasis added). In this middle ground between the pretext-plus and pretext-only positions, Hicks leaves unresolved whether, where the plaintiff has supplied sufficient evidence for a jury to disbelieve the reasons proffered by the employer, a judge may find as a matter of law that the evidence is insufficient for a reasonable jury to infer discriminatory intent.
A review of cases decided after Hicks illustrates the uncertainty that Hicks has generated in the lower federal courts. For example, courts have divided over the propriety of granting summary judgment where there is a genuine issue of fact regarding the truth of the legitimate reasons proffered by the employer. Compare Smith v. Stratus Computer, Inc., 40 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir.1994) (though plaintiff created genuine issue of fact on question of whether employer’s proffered reasons were pretextual, summary judgment for employer appropriate where court finds that no reasonable juror could infer discrimi*1562natory intent from evidence of pretext), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1958, 131 L.Ed.2d 850 (1995),3 with Courtney v. Biosound, Inc., 42 F.3d 414, 424 n. 4 (7th Cir. 1994) (“implicit in [Hicks’] holding is that once the plaintiff has cast doubt on the employer’s proffered reasons, the issue of whether the employer had discriminated against the plaintiff is to be determined by the jury not the court”).4 See generally, Waldron v. SL Industries, Inc., 849 F.Supp. 996 n. 11 (D.N.J.1994) (discussing the circuit split).
In the context of summary judgment, this Circuit has adopted a narrow view of a court’s role in evaluating the inference to be drawn from evidence of pretext. Howard v. BP Oil Co., Inc., 32 F.3d 520 (11th Cir.1994); Batey v. Stone, 24 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir.1994). In Batey, this Court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendant-employer where there was sufficient evidence for the factfinder to disbelieve the legitimate reasons for the employment decision proffered by the employer. 24 F.3d at 1335-36. The Court noted that, under Hicks, evidence of pretext plus a prima facie case is sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact regarding intentional discrimination and, therefore, preclude summary judgment. Id. Similarly, in Howard, this Court found that evidence indicating that the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons were false precluded summary judgment because “the fact finder’s rejection of defendant’s proffered reasons is sufficient circumstantial evidence upon which to base a judgment for the plaintiff.” 32 F.3d at 527.
Thus, the proper inquiry in this case is whether Batey’s and Howard’s reasoning in the summary judgment context should be extended to limit the scope of a judge’s review of the sufficiency of the evidence in a jury trial.5 Although circumstances precluding summary judgment do not necessarily preclude judgment as a matter of law, see, e.g., American Sav. & Loan Assoc. of Florida, v. Pembroke Lakes Regional Ctr. Assocs., Ltd., 908 F.2d 885, 888 n. 5 (11th Cir.1990), Judge Hatchett never explains what warrants differential treatment of the plaintiffs burden in these two contexts. Contrary to the position adopted by Judge Hatchett, I believe that the reasoning underlying Batey and Howard apply with equal force in the context of Rule 50 motions.
Courts must, of course, make all “reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposed to the motion” when reviewing a motion for judgment as a matter of law. Walls v. Button Gwinnett Bancorp, Inc., 1 F.3d 1198, 1200 (11th Cir.1993). The crucial premise underlying our decisions in Batey and Howard is that it is reasonable for a factfinder to infer an improper discriminatory motive from the fact that an employer has proffered false reasons. Batey, 24 F.3d at 1334-36; Howard, 32 F.3d at 527. Accordingly, because such an inference is reasonable, the court, when considering a motion *1563for judgment as a matter of law in an employment discrimination ease, is bound to make that inference in favor of the party opposing the motion.
Because evidence of invidious discrimination will not generally be preserved in the files of the employer, determination of an employer’s mental process in making an employment decision will generally be difficult. United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1482, 76 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983). To facilitate the truth-seeking process, the employer has the exceedingly light burden of proffering reasons for its employment decision and, thereby, narrowing the inquiry. Id. If the employer fails to state truthfully the basis for its employment decision, one reasonable explanation is that the employer is attempting to hide an illegal reason. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949-50, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) (“[W]hen all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for the employer’s actions, it is more likely than not the employer, who we generally assume acts only with some reason, based his decision on an impermissible consideration such as race.”) (emphasis in original). See also Hawkins v. Ceco Corp., 883 F.2d 977, 981 (11th Cir.1989). Though the burden of proving discriminatory intent rests with the plaintiff, a plaintiff may satisfy this burden “either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095 (1981) (emphasis added).6
I do not believe that Hicks disturbs this precedent. — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2751-53. Rather, the better reading of Hicks is that it “clarified that the only effect of the employer’s nondiscriminatory explanation is to convert the inference of discrimination based upon the plaintiffs prima facie case from a mandatory one which the jury must draw, to a permissive one the jury may draw, provided that the jury finds the employer’s explanation unworthy’ of belief.” Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1083 (6th Cir.1994) (emphasis in original). See also Rhodes, 39 F.3d at 549-52 (Garza, J. dissenting). Thus, to reach a jury, a plaintiff need not supply “any additional proof of discrimination” where the factfinder rejects the employer’s proffered reasons, Hicks, — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 2749, because “rejection of the defendant’s proffered reasons is enough to sustain a finding of discrimination.” Id., — U.S. at-n. 4, 113 S.Ct at 2749 n. 4.
In this case, the district court and Judge Hatchett exceed their proper roles by deciding whether evidence of pretext supports an inference of intentional discrimination. Absent direct evidence of illegitimate bias, the source of an employer’s hostility toward an employee is inevitably opaque. Once the factfinder concludes that the employer’s proffered reason is false, it must determine whether the employer has lied to hide an illegal or merely an unsavory reason. Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 401 (7th Cir,1990). To make this determination, the factfinder must evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence. This task is peculiarly the province of the jury. See Castle v. Sangamo Weston, Inc., 837 F.2d 1550, 1559 (11th Cir.1988) (“[assessing the weight of the evidence and credibility of witnesses is reserved for the trier of fact”). See also Ethan Allen, 44 F.3d at 120 (the inference to be drawn from the finding that the employer’s proffered reason is unworthy of credence is “better left for the jury to resolve”). As Judge Posner has explained:
If the only reason an employer offers for firing an employee is a lie, the inference that the real reason was a forbidden one such as age, may rationally be drawn. This is the common sense behind the rule of McDonnell Douglas. It is important to understand however that the inference is not compelled. The trier of fact must decide after a trial whether to draw the inference. The lie may be concealing a reason that is shameful or stupid but not *1564proscribed, in which event there is no liability. The •point is only that if the inference of improper motive can be drawn, there must be a trial.
Shager, 913 F.2d at 401 (emphasis added).
Thus, a plaintiff, who has supplied sufficient evidence for a reasonable person to disbelieve the reasons proffered by an employer, is entitled to get a jury determination on the issue of discrimination. Accordingly, I believe that if Appellant provided sufficient evidence of pretext — a proposition which Judge Hatchett apparently assumes — then judgment as a matter of law in favor of the bank was error.
B. Proof of Pretext
There is, however, a threshold issue that neither the district court nor Judge Hatchett resolves: whether Appellant did in fact present sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that NationsBank’s proffered reasons were unworthy of credence. Because I believe that there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to reach this conclusion, I would affirm the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law on this ground.
A plaintiff, relying on evidence that the employer’s proffered reasons are unworthy of credence as the basis for an inference of intentional discrimination, will obviously only succeed if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable person to conclude that the employer’s proffered reasons were not the basis for the employment decision. Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764-65 (3rd Cir.1994); Manzer, 29 F.3d at 1083; Kralman v. Illinois Dep’t of Veterans’ Affairs, 23 F.3d 150, 156-57 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 359, 130 L.Ed.2d 313 (1994). To satisfy this threshold showing of pretext, a plaintiff may discredit the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons by showing (1) that the proffered reasons had no basis in fact, (2) that the proffered reasons did not actually motivate the employment decision, or (3) that they were insufficient to motivate the employment decision. Manzer, 29 F.3d at 1084; McNabola v. Chicago Transit Authority, 10 F.3d 501 (7th Cir.1993).
In this case, NationsBank proffered numerous performance-related reasons for its employment decision, including that Appellant failed to follow the directives of her supervisor, Eugenia Sefcik, and that she lied to Sefcik about having complied with those directives. In her effort to show that these two reasons are pretextual, Appellant relies solely on the first method described above— i.e., evidence tending to show that these reasons had no basis in fact.
Reliance on the first method, however, is problematic. See Kralman, 23 F.2d at 156 (there is “a fine line between evidence that appropriately challenges the employer’s proffered reasons as being unworthy of credence and evidence that merely shows that the employer made a mistake”). Evidence showing a false factual predicate underlying the employer’s proffered reason does not unequivocally prove that the employer did not rely on the reason in making the employment decision. Instead, it may merely indicate that the employer, acting in good faith, made the disputed employment decision on the basis of erroneous information. Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir.1991). See also Lenoir v. Roll Coater, Inc., 13 F.3d 1130, 1133-34 (7th Cir.1994) (although employee established that employer’s investigation of her conduct yielded an incorrect result, she did not show that the employer did not rely on that result in making its employment decision). It is obviously not a violation of federal employment discrimination laws for an employer to err in assessing the performance of an employee. Moore v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 683 F.2d 1321, 1323 n. 4 (11th Cir.1982). See also Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 68-69 (7th Cir.1995). Thus, establishing pretext is not merely demonstrating that the employer made a mistake, but that the employer did not give an honest account of its behavior.7 Elrod, 939 F.2d at 1470.
In the case before us, Appellant failed to adduce sufficient evidence for a reasonable *1565factfinder to conclude that NationsBank’s proffered reasons did not actually motivate the decision to terminate Appellant. As Judge Hatchett notes, Appellant offered sufficient evidence for a factfinder to conclude that she followed Sefcik’s directives. However, in my view, Appellant was unable to take the crucial next step. She failed to offer sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could infer that Sefcik did not genuinely believe that Appellant had disobeyed and lied to her. Cf. Elrod, 939 F.2d at 1470. Accordingly, because I believe Appellant presented insufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find pretext, I concur in the affir-mance of the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law for NationsBank.

. Although Judge Hatchett never actually states that Appellant presented sufficient evidence for a factfinder to disbelieve NationsBank's proffered reasons, I cannot discern any other way to understand his opinion. If it were otherwise, his discussion of the probative value of a factfinder's rejection of an employer's proffered reasons would- be entirely superfluous.

. See generally Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of ne "Pretext Plus” Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 Hastings L.J. 57, 71-97 (1991).

. See also Theard v. Glaxo, Inc., 47 F.3d 676, 680 (4th Cir.1995); Woods v. Friction Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255, 260 n. 3 (1st Cir.1994); Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus. Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 959 n. 8 (5th Cir.1993).

. See also Sempier v. Johnson & Higgens, 45 F.3d 724, 730-31 (3rd Cir.1995), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 2611, - L.Ed.2d - (1995); Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1124; Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir.1993).

. Other circuit courts have split on whether a plaintiff relying solely on evidence of pretext to prove discrimination has necessarily provided sufficient evidence to preclude granting a Rule 50 motion for the defendant. Compare Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1277 (D.C.Cir.1995) (a plaintiff presents sufficient evidence to support a verdict by establishing a prima facie case and introducing evidence sufficient to discredit the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons), and E.E.O.C. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 44 F.3d 116, 120 (2nd Cir.1994) ("a finding of pretextuality allows a juror to reject a defendant's proffered reasons for a challenged employment action and thus permits the ultimate inference of discrimination”), and Gaworski v. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 17 F.3d 1104, 1109 (8th Cir.) ("if (1) the elements of a prima facie case are present, and (2) there exists sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to reject the defendant's proffered reasons for its actions, then the evidence is sufficient to allow the jury to determine whether intentional discrimination has occurred”), cert. denied, U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 355, 130 L.Ed.2d 310 (1994); with Nelson v. Boatmen's Bancshares, Inc., 26 F.3d 796, 801 (8th Cir.1994) (“evidence discrediting an employer's nondiscriminatory explanation is not necessarily sufficient” for a jury to find discrimination), and Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 39 F.3d 537, 541-44 (5th Cir.1994) (same), reh’g en banc granted, 49 F.3d 127 (5th Cir.1995).

. Hicks clarified that, while this quoted passage from Burdine suggests the pretext-only view, the better reading of it is that disproof of the employer's reason is an auxiliary to direct evidence for proving unlawful intent. Hicks, - U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2752-53.

. A plaintiff may accomplish this in a variety of ways. For example, a plaintiff presenting evidence tending to show that the predicate facts underlying the proffered reason were false could also provide evidence that the employer knew them to be false at the time of his purported reliance, see, e.g., Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1563 (11th Cir.1987) (plain*1565tiff demonstrated pretext where she showed that she complied with work rule and that employer knew she had complied); or, where the employee's poor performance is proffered as the basis for dismissal, an employer’s contemporaneous reports of satisfactory performance will permit the factfinder to infer that the employer is lying, see, e.g., Sempier v. Johnson & Higgens, 45 F.3d 724, 731-32 (3rd Cir.1995), and Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Schs., 43 F.3d 1373, 1380 (10th Cir.1994); or, the proffered reason may involve a disputed fact of a kind that it is improbable that the employer could have been mistaken about it. See, e.g., Russell, 51 F.3d at 68-69 (conduct in dispute was of a type that it was not plausible that employer could have "honestly but mistakenly believed" that the job did not require it).