Court Opinion

ID: 9885267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 07:12:14.466987+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:40:00.306790
License: Public Domain

In The

                               Court of Appeals

                    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                             __________________

                             NO. 09-21-00404-CV
                             __________________

                          KYLE KILWAY, Appellant

                                        V.

             TAYLOR MORRISON OF TEXAS, INC., Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

               On Appeal from the 457th District Court
                     Montgomery County, Texas
                   Trial Cause No. 19-08-11919-CV
__________________________________________________________________

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      The underlying litigation arises from Appellant Kyle Kilway’s slip and fall

accident. In five issues, Kilway complains the trial court erred by granting summary

judgment in favor of Appellee Taylor Morrison of Texas, Inc. (“Taylor Morrison”).

For the reasons explained below, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                BACKGROUND

      Kilway filed suit against Taylor Morrison, alleging that he suffered injuries

when he slipped and fell at a model home on Taylor Morrison’s premises, he was

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authorized to be on the premises, and Taylor Morrison owed him a duty to use

ordinary care, including the duty to protect and safeguard him from unreasonably

dangerous conditions on the premises or to ward off their existence. Kilway alleged

that Taylor Morrison knew or should have known of the unreasonably dangerous

condition and failed to correct or warn him about the condition. Kilway further

alleged that Taylor Morrison was in control of the premises when he sustained his

injuries, and that Taylor Morrison’s acts or omissions were a direct and proximate

cause of his damages.

      Taylor Morrison denied Kilway’s allegations and asserted several defenses.

Taylor Morrison filed a Traditional and No-Evidence Motion for Summary

Judgment, arguing that Kilway’s claims should be dismissed for the following

reasons: (1) the undisputed evidence established that it did not owe Kilway a duty

of care because his alleged slip and fall occurred on a public street, which was

outside of its control; (2) it did not breach any duty owed to a trespasser or licensee,

Kilway was not an “invitee” because the home was not open to the public, and

Kilway presented no evidence that it had actual or constructive knowledge of the

alleged condition; and (3) Kilway was unable to establish the proximate cause of his

injuries without expert testimony. Taylor Morrison argued that the evidence

indisputably established that the home was locked and not open to the public and the

“slime” Kilway slipped on was exclusively in the public street “right at the edge of

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the property.” Taylor Morrison argued that Kilway’s claims are limited to a premises

liability analysis and that it did not owe Kilway a duty to keep him safe while

walking on a public street. Taylor Morrison also argued that Kilway was not an

invitee or licensee but a trespasser when he was injured because there was no

evidence that he entered Taylor Morrison’s premises with Taylor Morrison’s express

or implied consent. Taylor Morrison maintained that even if Kilway had been an

invitee, there was no evidence that it knew of the condition and failed to exercise

ordinary care to protect Kilway from the danger.

      Taylor Morrison attached the following summary judgment evidence to its

motion: the Declaration of Shannon Taylor, its Community Sales Manager;

Kilway’s written statement; photographs of Kilway and the “slime” in the street;

excerpts from Kilway’s deposition; Plat and Subdivision where the model home is

located; Declaration of Toff Rasmussen; Plaintiff’s Responses to Defendant’s

Request for Disclosures; and Plaintiff’s Answers and Objections to Defendant’s First

Set of Interrogatories.

      Kilway filed a Response to Defendant’s Traditional and No-Evidence Motion

for Summary Judgment, arguing that Taylor Morrison’s Motions should be denied

since he presented competent summary judgment evidence that he entered the

premises while acting as a realtor, which would result in the mutual pecuniary

benefit to both parties and making him an invitee on Taylor Morrison’s premises.

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Kilway argued that there was no indication the home was closed to the public, and

the home had a glass “business type” door instead of a garage door and an

“Available” sign in the yard that was an invitation to enter the premises. Kilway

maintained that he created a fact issue regarding Taylor Morrison’s allegation that

he was a trespasser.

      Kilway also argued that even though Taylor Morrison did not own or control

the property on which he slipped and fell, it breached a duty of care by creating an

unreasonably dangerous condition and allowing it to remain on the ground. Kilway

argued that Taylor Morrison’s negligence created a dangerous condition when it

placed the sprinkler on its premises and allowed a narrow band of water to enter the

public street immediately adjacent to the curb and create “slime” that caused his

injuries. Kilway asserted that he satisfied the notice requirement that Taylor

Morrison knew of the “slime” because its sprinkler placed the water on the ground,

it takes days or weeks for “slime” to form, and Taylor Morrison had a reasonable

opportunity to discover and remove the “slime” or warn about the dangerous

condition. Kilway maintained that he presented competent summary judgment

evidence establishing a causal connection between the incident and his injuries.

Kilway argued that his affidavit states that the slip and fall caused his injuries and

that non-expert evidence alone is sufficient to support a finding of causation under

the circumstances in which his injury occurred. Kilway attached the following

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summary judgment evidence to the response he filed opposing Taylor Morrison’s

combined traditional and no-evidence motion for summary judgment: Kilway’s

affidavit; Plaintiff’s Designation of Expert Witnesses; and Plaintiff’s First

Supplemental Designation of Expert Witnesses.

      Taylor Morrison filed a Reply in Support of its Motions, arguing it is

undisputed that when the incident occurred, the home was not open to the public, the

door on the home was locked, and there is no presumption that members of the public

are invitees when they enter a business’s premises when it is closed. Taylor Morrison

argued that Kilway was not an invitee, but was a licensee, so he cannot show Taylor

Morrison breached its duty to a licensee because there is no evidence that it was

aware of the dangerous condition. Taylor Morrison further argued that it did not owe

a duty to repair or warn of hazards on an adjacent public street even if it created the

hazard because it does not control the public street.

      The trial court granted Taylor Morrison’s Traditional and No-Evidence

Motion for Summary Judgment Motion for Summary Judgment. Kilway filed a

Motion for New Trial, which was overruled by operation of law, and then appealed.

                                    ANALYSIS

      In five issues, Kilway argues the trial court erred by granting summary

judgment in favor of Taylor Morrison because Kilway was an invitee on Taylor

Morrison’s premises; Taylor Morrison owed him a duty; Taylor Morrison created a

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dangerous condition; and he established a causal connection between the incident

and his injuries.

      We review a trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo. See

Shell Oil Co. v. Writt, 464 S.W.3d 650, 654 (Tex. 2015) (citation omitted). We view

the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Id. (citing City of Keller

v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 824 (Tex. 2005)). In doing so, we indulge every

reasonable inference and resolve any doubts against the motion. See City of Keller,

168 S.W.3d at 824. “Undisputed evidence may be conclusive of the absence of a

material fact issue, but only if reasonable people could not differ in their conclusions

as to that evidence.” Buck v. Palmer, 381 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. 2012) (citation

omitted). When, as in this case, the trial court’s order granting summary judgment

does not specify the basis for the ruling, we must affirm the trial court’s judgment if

any of the theories advanced are meritorious. Western Invs., Inc. v. Urena, 162

S.W.3d 547, 550 (Tex. 2005). In resolving Kilway’s issues, we consider the ruling

on the no-evidence part of Taylor Morrison’s motion for summary judgment before

considering the ruling on the traditional portion of its motion. See Ford Motor Co.

v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004).

      A party who seeks a no-evidence summary judgment asserts that there is no

evidence of one or more elements of a claim on which the other party has the burden

of proof at trial. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). If the nonmovant produces more than a

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scintilla of evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact as to the challenged

element, summary judgment is improper. See id.; King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118

S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003). If reasonable, fair-minded people could differ in their

conclusions, there is more than a scintilla of probative evidence. Chapman, 118

S.W.3d at 751 (citation omitted). “When the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is

so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of its existence,

the evidence is no more than a scintilla and, in legal effect, is no evidence.” Kindred

v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983) (citations omitted). “If the non-

movant fails to meet its burden under the no-evidence motion, there is no need to

address the challenge to the traditional motion as it necessarily fails.” First United

Pentecostal Church of Beaumont v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214, 219 (Tex. 2017)

(citation omitted).

      To prevail on a traditional motion for summary judgment, the movant has the

burden to show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Mann Frankfort Stein &

Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). A defendant who

moves for traditional summary judgment must conclusively negate at least one

essential element of each of the plaintiff’s causes of action or establish an affirmative

defense as a matter of law. Frost Nat’l Bank v. Fernandez, 315 S.W.3d 494, 508

(Tex. 2010) (citation omitted); Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197

                                           7
(Tex. 1995). Evidence is conclusive only if reasonable minds could not differ in their

conclusions. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 816. If the defendant establishes his right

to summary judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present

evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact. See Siegler, 899 S.W.2d at 197.

We take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, and we indulge every

reasonable inference and resolve all doubts in favor of the nonmovant. Id.; see also

Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003).

      In issue one, Kilway complains the trial court erred by granting Taylor

Morrison’s Traditional and No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment Motion,

and in issue two he argues the trial court erred by failing to find that he was an invitee

on Taylor Morrison’s premises. In issue three, Kilway complains the trial court erred

by failing to find that Taylor Morrison owed him a duty because as a premises

occupier, it created a dangerous condition on the adjacent public street that caused

his accident. Kilway argues that he satisfied the actual or constructive notice

requirement by showing that Taylor Morrison’s sprinkler placed the water on the

ground that caused the “slime,” which takes days or weeks to form, giving Taylor

Morrison a reasonable opportunity to discover it and warn Kilway. Taylor Morrison

argues that it did not owe Kilway a duty under the defendant created danger doctrine

because it did not exercise de facto control over the public street, Kilway did not

allege active negligence, and the doctrine does not apply on public roadways unless

                                            8
the defendant is actively negligent or exercises de facto control over the premises.

We discuss issues one through three together.

      “To prevail on a premises-liability claim, ‘a plaintiff must prove that the

defendant possessed–that is, owned, occupied, or controlled–the premises where

[the] injury occurred.’” Holland v. Memorial Hermann Health Sys., 570 S.W.3d 887,

897 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (quoting Wilson v. Tex. Parks &

Wildlife Dep’t, 8 S.W.3d 634, 635 (Tex. 1999)). Kilway does not dispute that Taylor

Morrison did not own or possess the premises at issue but argues that it owed him a

duty of care because its sprinkler created a dangerous condition on the adjacent

public street. “Generally, an owner or occupier of land has no duty to ensure the

safety of others on adjacent property that is not within its control.” Id. (citations

omitted); see Jones v. Wright, 667 S.W.3d 444, 449–50 (Tex. App.—Beaumont

2023, no pet.). However, Texas courts have recognized certain “‘assumed duty’

exceptions to the general rule that there is no duty to prevent accidents on an adjacent

property that a person neither owns nor occupies.” Holland, 570 S.W.3d at 887

(quoting Hirabayashi v. N. Main Bar-B-Q, Inc., 977 S.W.2d 704, 707 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied)). One exception states that a person who created a

dangerous condition may be liable even though not in control of the premises when

the injury occurred, which Kilway argues is the applicable exception. See id. (citing

City of Denton v. Page, 701 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Tex. 1996)). Thus, if Taylor Morrison,

                                           9
while exercising a lawful right without negligence, obstructed the public road with

a foreign substance, i.e., “slime,” it is bound to warn of the danger created thereby.

See Vasquez v. Legend Nat. Gas III, LP, 492 S.W.3d 448, 454 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio 2016, pet. denied) (citing Buchanan v. Rose, 159 S.W.2d 109, 110 (Tex.

1942)) (citations omitted).

      However, in a premises-liability action, the duty an owner or occupier of

property owes to a person on the property depends on that person’s status. Catholic

Diocese of El Paso v. Porter, 622 S.W.3d 824, 829 (Tex. 2021) (citation omitted).

The duty owed to an invitee is “‘to exercise reasonable care to protect against danger

from a condition on the land that creates an unreasonable risk of harm of which the

owner or occupier knew or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover.’” Scott

& White Mem’l Hosp. v. Fair, 310 S.W.3d 411, 412 (Tex. 2010) (quoting CMH

Homes, Inc. v. Daenen, 15 S.W.3d 97, 101 (Tex. 2000)). “A lesser duty is owed a

licensee: to ‘use ordinary care either to warn a licensee of, or to make reasonably

safe, a dangerous condition of which the owner is aware and the licensee is not.’”

Porter, 622 S.W.3d at 829 (quoting Sampson v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 500 S.W.3d

380, 385 (Tex. 2016)). In general, a premises-liability plaintiff’s status is a question

of law, but it can be a jury question when facts relevant to the legal standard are in

dispute. Id. (citations omitted). We first consider whether Kilway presented

                                          10
competent summary judgment evidence showing Taylor Morrison owed him a duty

as an invitee. See Porter, 622 S.W.3d at 829.

      “An invitee is ‘one who enters the property of another with the owner’s

knowledge and for the mutual benefit of both.’” Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 465

S.W.3d 193, 202 (Tex. 2015) (quoting Motel 6 G.P., Inc. v. Lopez, 929 S.W.2d 1, 3

(1996)). To be an invitee, the visitor’s business must be one of at least potential

pecuniary profit to the owner. Porter, 622 S.W.3d at 830 (citation omitted). A

licensee is one who goes on the premises of another by express or implied permission

and not by any express or implied invitation. Id. at 829 (citation omitted). The

complaining party’s status is determined based on the circumstances existing when

and where the injury occurred. Mayer v. Willowbrook Plaza Ltd. P’ship, 278 S.W.3d

901, 915 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (citation omitted).

       To succeed on a premises liability claim an invitee must prove the following

elements: (1) actual or constructive knowledge of a condition on the premises by the

owner or occupier; (2) that the condition posed an unreasonable risk of harm; (3)

that the owner or occupier did not exercise reasonable care to reduce or eliminate

the risk; and (4) that the owner or occupier’s failure to use such care proximately

caused the plaintiff’s injury. Horton v. Walden Marina, No. 09-15-00491-CV, 2017

WL 4296436, at *3, 6 (Tex. App.—Beaumont, Sept. 28, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).

(citation omitted). “Actual knowledge requires knowledge that the dangerous

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condition existed at the time of the accident, as opposed to constructive knowledge

which can be established by facts or inferences that a dangerous condition could

develop over time.” Id. at *3 (quoting City of Corsicana v. Stewart, 249 S.W.3d 412,

414–15 (Tex. 2008)). For actual knowledge, courts generally consider whether the

premises owner had received reports of prior injuries or reports of the potential

danger presented by the condition. Id. (citation omitted).

         Taylor Morrison argued that since Kilway presented no evidence showing it

had actual knowledge of the alleged condition that caused his injuries, he must

establish that he was an invitee or his claims fail as a matter of law. See State Dep’t

of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex. 1992) (stating

licensee must prove actual knowledge); see also Strandberg v. Spectrum Office

Bldg., 293 S.W.3d 736, 739 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, no pet.) (stating invitee

must prove actual or constructive knowledge). Even if we assumed Kilway was an

invitee when the incident occurred, Kilway cannot succeed on a premises liability

claim.

         Kilway presented no evidence showing that Taylor Morrison had actual

knowledge of the “slime” on the public road. Therefore, we consider whether he

presented evidence showing that Taylor Morrison had constructive notice of a

dangerous condition. See Del Toro v. Pay & Save, Inc., 444 S.W.3d 293, 297 (Tex.

App.—El Paso 2014, pet. denied). In his Response to Taylor Morrison’s Motions,

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Kilway argued that he established notice by presenting evidence that it was more

likely than not the condition existed long enough to give Taylor Morrison a

reasonable opportunity to discover it. Kilway asserted that he satisfied the notice

requirement that Taylor Morrison knew of the “slime” because its sprinkler placed

the water on the ground, “[c]ommon sense tells us that green slime takes days or

even weeks to form, which would give Defendant a reasonable opportunity to

discover and remove the green slime or give warning to Plaintiff.” To support his

contention that he satisfied the notice requirement, Kilway offered his Affidavit, in

which he averred that on the day of the incident, he met with Taylor Morrison’s

employee, Shannon Taylor, who went to the spot where he fell and “admitted to me

that water had come from the sprinkler on the premises and that it was not good.”

Kilway stated that “the water had been allowed to remain on the curb where I fell

for so long that it turned to green slime[,]” and there were no warnings advising him

of the “slime” or other dangers.

      Taylor Morrison argues that there is no evidence showing it had constructive

knowledge of the alleged condition and that Kilway’s conjecture that “slime” takes

days or weeks to form is not competent summary judgment evidence. “The question

of constructive notice requires analyzing the combination of proximity, conspicuity,

and longevity.” Id. (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Spates, 186 S.W.3d 566, 567

(Tex. 2006)). “A plaintiff must present some proof of how long the hazard existed

                                         13
before liability can be imposed on the premises owner for failing to discover and

rectify, or warn of, the dangerous condition.” Id. (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.

Reece, 81 S.W.3d 812, 816 (Tex. 2002)). Kilway presented no evidence that any of

Taylor Morrison’s employees were within close proximity of the “slime[,]” and even

if the evidence had shown such, the Texas Supreme Court has held that with no

evidence indicating how long the hazard was there, there is no showing that a

premises owner reasonably should have discovered the hazard, but merely indicates

that it was possible for the premises owner to have discovered the condition. Id. at

297–98 (citing Reece, 81 S.W.3d at 816). When circumstantial evidence is relied

upon to prove constructive notice, the evidence must establish that it is more likely

than not that the dangerous condition existed long enough to give the premises owner

a reasonable opportunity to discover the condition, and circumstantial evidence

which supports only the possibility that the dangerous condition existed long enough

to give a premises owner a reasonable opportunity to discover it, is not sufficient to

establish constructive notice. Id. at 298. “Without some temporal evidence, there is

no basis upon which the factfinder can reasonably assess the opportunity the

premises owner had to discover the dangerous condition.” Reece, 81 S.W.3d at 816.

Moreover, Kilway’s contention that “common sense tells us that green slime takes

days or even weeks to form” is not probative evidence that Taylor Morrison had

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constructive notice of the “slime.” See Robledo v. Kroger Co., 597 S.W.2d 560, 561

(Tex. App.—Eastland 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

      Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Kilway, we conclude

there was no evidence showing that Taylor Morrison had actual or constructive

notice of the “slime.” See Robledo, 597 S.W.2d at 560–61. Since Taylor Morrison

did not have actual or constructive notice of the “slime,” it owed no duty to Kilway.

See Motel 6 G.P., Inc., 929 S.W.2d at 4; Donnan v. Kimco Realty Corp., No. 13-15-

00072-CV, 2015 WL 5655731, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg, Sept.

24, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). Accordingly, we further conclude that the trial court

properly granted summary judgment in favor of Taylor Morrison. See Motel 6 G.P.,

Inc., 929 S.W.2d at 4; Del Toro, 444 S.W.3d at 298; Robledo, 597 S.W.2d at 561.

We overrule issues one, two and three. We need not address issues four and five. See

Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s granting of Taylor

Morrison’s Traditional and No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment Motion for

Summary Judgment.

      AFFIRMED.
                                                         W. SCOTT GOLEMON
                                                             Chief Justice
Submitted on June 27, 2023
Opinion Delivered October 5, 2023

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.

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