Court Opinion

ID: 6419601
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-06-25 11:58:44.573999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:51:43.750510
License: Public Domain

Ames, J.
The instructions to the jury were sufficiently favorable to the defendant, and were all that the case required. It was ruled that, in order to recover in this action, the plaintiff must prove that the bull had such propensities, known to the defendant; as caused him to be a dangerous animal when led by one person only, in the day-time, upon the streets of a city, in the manner described in the evidence reported in the bill of exceptions ; and also that it must be proved that, in thus leading the bull, the defendant’s servant was negligent, in view of the propensities of the bull known to the defendant, or of the known, ordinary and usual disposition and propensities of such animals. It might well be that, previously to the injury, the defendant had had no trouble in managing the animal, and no knowledge of anything specially or peculiarly vicious in his habits or inclinations. But the jury may have believed that he knew, what is a matter of common knowledge, that a bull is an excitable and powerful animal, and that, if from any accidental or unexpected cause he should become excited while led or driven through a public street, he might be dangerous. Hudson v. Roberts, 6 Exch. 697. It is impossible to say, upon the evidence reported, that the jury would not be justified in finding that the knowledge, which by the ruling of the court was necessary to the maintenance of the action, was satisfactorily proved. There was testimony to the effect that the defendant had said that it was careless so to lead the bull through the streets, and that he ought to have been tied behind a wagon, as he had been once before. The jury, if they believed this evidence, might well have considered it as an admission that he knew that the animal needed to be kept under control, and also that he knew that the control which his servant had applied for the purpose of leading him through the streets was insufficient. In Lyons v. Merrick, 105 Mass. 71, it was *511held that the owner or keeper of animals of a vicious disposition or mischievous habits, of which the owner had previous actual or implied notice, is bound at his peril to keep them at all times and in all places properly secured, and is responsible to any one who, without fault on his own part, is injured by them. The case of Hewes v. McNamara, 106 Mass. 281, is to the same effect. If the jury were satisfied that the defendant knew, or ought to have known, that the bull had dangerous propensities, it is unnecessary to prove that on any previous occasion he had actually endangered the life or limb of any person. Worth v. Gilling, L. R. 2 C. P. 1. There is certainly some evidence of a scienter in this case, and the question of its weight is not before us. Applebee v. Percy, L. R. 9 C. P. 647.
A question was raised at the trial as to contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff; and it was contended that he was not in the exercise of reasonable care in approaching so near to the bull as he did; and that the calls of humanity would be no excuse.. But the question whether the plaintiff’s conduct on the occasion of the injury was wanting in reasonable prudence and caution, in view of all the circumstances, was submitted to the jury, as a question peculiarly for them to decide. They were to consider all the circumstances, and, among other things,' that the life of a fellow-creature was in extreme danger; but they must have understood that reasonable prudence and caution were elements in the case which the plaintiff must prove. It does not follow, as a matter of law, that in encountering the danger he was necessarily guilty of a want of due and reasonable care. The emergency was sudden, allowing but little time for deliberation. Some allowance might well be made for the confusion of the moment. Buel v. New York Central Railroad, 31 N. Y. 314. In Eckert v. Long Island Railroad, 43 N. Y. 502, a case of the rescue of a child from being run over by an approaching train, the court say that “ the law has so high a regard for human life that it will not impute negligence to an- effort to preserve it, unless made under such circumstances as to constitute rashness in the judgment of prudent persons.” The law does not require cowardice or absolute inaction in such a state of things. Neither does it require in such an emergency that the plaintiff should have acted with entire self-possession, or that he should *512have taken the wisest and most prudent course, with a view to his own self-preservation, that could have been taken. He certainly may take some risk upon himself, short of mere rashness and recklessness. Mayo v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 104 Mass. 137. The evidence reported does not conclusively show a want of due care and prudence on his part, and it was therefore properly left to the jury. Lane v. Atlantic Works, 107 Mass. 104. What is ordinary care is usually to be settled by the judgment and experience of the jury, and not of the judge. Gaynor v. Old Colony Railroad, 100 Mass. 208.

Exceptions overruled.