Court Opinion

ID: 9518598
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:56:58.431462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:28:33.870439
License: Public Domain

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.
¶ 22. (dissenting). In affirming the circuit court's order revoking Lenny Keding's supervised release, the majority concludes that the court considered whether there were any alternatives to revocation. I conclude that the circuit court's inquiry here was meaningless because no alternatives exist.
¶ 23. The majority states: "the record reflects that the court inquired about alternatives to revocation, and was advised that there were none." Majority op. at ¶ 18. Here is what the record reflects. First, the circuit court inquired as follows:
THE COURT: Is there an alternative to returning him to the Resource Center which the State considers appropriate or is that the only option which is available?
The State began to respond, but then deferred to Keding's probation agent. She explained as follows:
I had talked to Matt Kaesermann from the Depart*344ment of Health & Family Services because he and I actually batted around the idea of — because we figured that it would come up at the hearing.
We both agree — he has no knowledge of any place that would be — that would be an alternative, because if it was a regular revocation, we could look at minimum security camps and things like that. Since this is not a revocation of the probation, he said that there really isn't any place. And since there were so many difficulties trying to get him placed in an appropriate residence, he said that, you know, he has no knowledge of anything — any living situation that would be an appropriate alternative.
¶ 24. The reason that "there were none" is because the State has failed to provide for necessary alternatives. No one in the community is willing to take a Wis. Stat. ch. 980 respondent. See State v. Sprosty, 227 Wis. 2d 316, 322, 595 N.W.2d 692 (1999); State v. Krueger, 2001 WI App 76, ¶ 2, 242 Wis. 2d 793, 626 N.W.2d 83; State v. Castillo, 205 Wis. 2d 599, 556 N.W.2d 425 (Ct. App. 1996); see also State v. Rachel, 2002 WI 81, ¶ 76, 254 Wis., 2d 215, 647 N.W.2d 762 (Bradley, J. dissenting).
¶ 25. Keding was on both ch. 980 supervised release status and probation status. It is clear from the record that had his probation status been revoked, an alternative would have been available: "minimum security camps and things like that." However, the court was unable to consider alternatives to revocation of ch. 980 supervised release because none existed.
¶ 26. Just as there were no alternatives available at the time of Keding's revocation, there were no alternatives available when he first became eligible for supervised release. At that time, a community placement was attempted in Wood County, but no suitable housing could be found. Next, another placement was *345attempted in a group home in Richland County, but the group home decided against it because of concern about the community's reaction. Yet another placement was attempted, this time in a group home in Jefferson County, but the group home ultimately rejected Keding because of friction with the county sheriff. Still other placements also failed.1
¶ 27. Ultimately, and despite the fact that the record shows that Keding has an IQ of 72, the placement provided for his supervised release was an empty duplex in which he lived alone, subject to electronic monitoring. Even that placement was proving to be unacceptable at the time that he became subject to revocation.2 . .
¶ 28. It is hardly surprising, given the nature of Keding's placement, that he committed some minor violations of the rules attached to his supervised release. As a result, he was confined indefinitely to the Wisconsin Resource Center.
¶ 29. To my mind, the question this case raises is why did this ch. 980 respondent, who the circuit court deemed a proper candidate for supervised release, ultimately end up back in a secure facility? The answer is not because he broke some rules. The answer is because *346the State failed to devote the necessary resources to provide a viable alternative in order to properly effectuate supervised release.
¶ 30. The constitutionality of ch. 980 hinges in part upon its provisions for supervised release. I conclude that these provisions require a circuit court to consider alternatives to revocation before revoking supervised release under ch. 980. Just as the State failed to provide a viable community placement at the time of Keding's supervised release, it failed to provide any viable alternative to revocation.
¶ 31. If, as here, the State fails to ensure that viable alternatives exist, then the necessary inquiry into alternatives to revocation is fanciful, and so is the constitutionality of ch. 980 as applied to Keding. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 32. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, joins this opinion.

 Upon questioning at oral argument, the State acknowledged the unavailability of the placements in Wood, Richland, and Jefferson Counties, then added: 'You forgot La Crosse and Dane Counties."

 When the landlord at the duplex informed the State that someone was about to move into the other unit in the duplex, the staff of the agency with which the State contracted to provide monitoring did not think the duplex placement would continue to be a good idea.