Court Opinion

ID: 9747312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:10:04.21276+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:22.698798
License: Public Domain

*140O’HERN, J.,
dissenting.
New subjects divide the members of the Court as does a dispute about the relationship between the liability and immunity provisions of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to :12-3. See Weiss v. New Jersey Transit, 128 N.J. 376, 380, 608 A.2d 254 (1992) (reciting a series of cases in which the Court was “frequently divided” in analyzing the cause of the injury).
I can agree with the majority that the housing authority, as landlord, might owe a duty (subject to N.J.S.A. 59:4-2) to provide a safe means of passage, free of snow or ice, on its interior walkways. I do not agree with the opinion of the majority insofar as it holds that the public driveways and parking areas of the housing authority do not share the weather immunity granted to the streets and highways of public entities under N.J.S.A. 59:4-7.
The Municipal Land Use Law, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -129, states that street, when shown on a plat, means any “drive or other way,” as well as the “curbs, sidewalks, parking areas and other areas within the street lines.” N.J.S.A. 40:55D-7 (emphasis added). Were “street” construed otherwise, the access drives and parking areas of every public building and every public park, of every municipality, and of every public authority would lose the weather immunity granted under N.J.S.A. 59:4-7. I do not believe that the Legislature intended to impose on public entities liability for weather-induced conditions in such public areas.
The majority views the housing authority as a landlord with the duty to provide its occupants with a safe place to live, at least in the common areas. As a consequence, the majority causes the statutory immunity to yield to a common-law duty.
This may be a beneficent policy choice but not one that courts are free to make. We have had to sustain these statutory immunities in the most painful of circumstances. See Weiss v. New Jersey Transit, supra, 128 N.J. 376, 608 A.2d 254; Kol*141itch v. Lindedahl, 100 N.J. 485, 497 A.2d 183 (1985). We are obliged to do so here. I would reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division.
For affirmance and remandment — Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices HANDLER, POLLOCK, GARIBALDI and STEIN — 5.
For reversal — Justices CLIFFORD and O’HERN — 2.