Court Opinion

ID: 9496782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:35:11.443838+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:47.606540
License: Public Domain

BEA, Circuit Judge,
with whom Circuit Judge TALLMAN joins,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc:
I join Judge Callahan in her dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc. Additionally, I also respectfully dissent from the order denying rehearing en banc with the following comments:
First, the majority errs in finding that the trial court did not properly characterize Belmontes’ evidence as “mitigating.”
The trial judge refused to read the most important part of the requested instruction, which stated: ‘[Y]ou should not limit your consideration of mitigating circumstances to these specific factors. You may also consider any other circumstances ... as reasons for not imposing the death sentence.’ The jury was not informed that it should consider mitigating evidence bearing on Belmontes’ probable future conduct if sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.... Rather than instruct the jurors that it was their duty to consider and, if appropriate, give effect to, all of the mitigating evidence presented by the defendant....
335 F.3d at 1040.
By this language, the majority determines that Belmontes’ testimony and that of his witnesses constituted “mitigating evidence.” A trial court cannot so instruct a jury.
The proposed instruction would have constituted a comment by the trial judge that he considered Belmontes’ proffered evidence to be mitigating evidence. Judges are not supposed to make such comments about the evidence. The jury is the sole and exclusive judge of the credibility and weight of the evidence.1 To instruct the jury as the majority says should have been done would have constituted a charge that Belmontes’ proffered evidence constituted mitigating evidence. Only where reasonable persons must accept the credibility of the evidence and its weight would such a characterization be proper. Such an instruction would amount to a directed verdict on an issue.
Such instruction also would have been argumentative. A trial judge should not pick and choose from the evidence and tell the jury what evidence to consider on an issue. That is the function of counsel.
Second, the majority repeatedly misquotes and mischaracterizes the language of “factor (k)” to narrow its application only to factors preceding the commission of the crime. The actual language of factor (k) is much broader; it allows consideration of evidence that predicts Belmontes’ actions in jail.
The majority correctly quotes the language of “factor (k)” to allow the jury to consider “[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even *1087though it is not a legal excuse for the crime,” but then interprets that language to mean “petitioner’s culpability for the crime he committed.” 335 F.3d at 1061-62. “Most naturally read, this instruction allows the jury to consider evidence that bears upon the commission of the crime by the defendant and excuses or mitigates his culpability for the offense.... By its plain language, however, the instruction does not encompass events or considerations that are unrelated to the defendant’s culpability.” Id. at 1064.
By changing the language of the instruction from “extenuates the gravity of the crime ...” to “culpability for the crime,” the majority shrinks the focus to factors which must have occurred before or at the time of the commission of the crime. But that is not an accurate reading of the phrase “extenuates the gravity of the crime.” “Extenuate” means: “To lessen, to diminish; to weaken.... To lessen or seem to lessen the seriousness (of an offense, guilt, etc.) by giving excuses or serving as an excuse.” Webster’s UnaBRiDGED Dictionary (2d ed.1979) (emphasis added).
Indeed, “extenuate” is given a much broader meaning by factor (k) than by the dictionary: it includes something that can lessen guilt but does not constitute a legal excuse. For example, as I read factor (k), it would include restitution paid to the victim by a thief after he was caught.
I would suggest that the language “gravity of the crime” focuses not only on the culpability of the criminal, but includes the effect on society in general. To the extent that the criminal taunts or gloats after his crime, the gravity of the crime is enhanced. To the extent that the criminal shows remorse, repents or rehabilitates himself, -the gravity of the crime is diminished.
The majority does not agree, but it disagrees only after changing the language of factor (k), as noted above: “Moreover, unlike in Boyde, ‘society” has not had a ‘long held view’ that a defendant’s likely future conduct can serve to mitigate or excuse his commission of a serious crime. Rather, the doctrine is a legal concept peculiar to capital punishment cases.” 335 F.3d at 1064.
The majority is again talking about the commission of a crime, not the gravity of the crime. All mitigation for the commission of a crime must precede its execution; the circumstances that extenuate the gravity of a crime do not necessarily precede its execution.
Practically all that has to be said is said quite well by Judge O’Scannlain:
Likewise, because factor (k) allows the jury to consider Belmontes’s character and background, there is no reason to think that the jury would have thought it was foreclosed from using such information to consider his future potential if sentenced to life in prison. As the Supreme Court has noted, “Consideration of a defendant’s past conduct as indicative of his probable future behavior is an inevitable and not undesirable element of criminal sentencing.” Skipper, 476 U.S. at 5, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d l(emphasis added); see Boyde, 494 U.S. at 382, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (“Petitioner had an opportunity through factor (k) to argue that his background and character ‘extenuated’ or ‘excused’ the seriousness of the crime, and we see no reason to believe that reasonable jurors would resist the view, ‘long held by society,’ that in an appropriate case such evidence would counsel imposition of a sentence less than death.”); cf. Johnson, 509 U.S. at 370, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290.
335 F.3d at 1073.
The majority has taken a defense argument (good pre-trial conduct establishes *1088hope for good future conduct) and elevated it into a required instruction. Nothing in the law requires or allows that.

. The majority's proposed instruction is directly contrary to the jury instruction given triers of fact daily in California trial courts:
You are the sole and exclusive judges of the believability of the witnesses and the weight to be given the testimony of each witness. In determining the believability of a witness you may consider any matter that has a tendency reasonably to prove or disprove the truthfulness of the testimony of the witness, including but not limited to the following:
The demeanor and manner of the witness while testifying; The character and quality of that testimony; ... The existence or non existence of a bias, interest, or other motive; A statement previously made by the witness that is [consistent] [or] [inconsistent] with the testimony of the witness; ...
Cal. BAJI 2.20.