Court Opinion

ID: 9575241
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:12:33.096828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:05.851614
License: Public Domain

*391Pope, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent to the opinion of the majority holding that the substantive decision of the full board granting or denying a request for a change in physicians is appealable to the superior court. Examination of the statute at issue and relevant case law leads me to an opposite result. OCGA § 34-9-200 (d), the statute authorizing such decision by the full board, provides in pertinent part: “Upon the request of an employee or an employer, the board may in its judgment, after giving notice in writing of the request to all interested parties and allowing any interested party ten days from the date of said notice to file in writing its objections to the request, order a change of physician or treatment and designate other treatment or another physician. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) It is clear from the plain, unambiguous language of the statute that the actual decision of the full board on a request for a change of physicians is wholly discretionary. There is, thus, nothing for the superior court to review in this regard. The exclusive grounds for appeal from the full board to the superior court are set forth in OCGA § 34-9-105 (c, d). The decision made in the full board’s discretion granting or denying a request for a change in physicians simply does not fit into any of these categories.
Although it was decided pursuant to a different statute (see Ga. L. 1963, pp. 141, 154), a predecessor to OCGA § 34-9-200 (d), after applying a different rationale, I reach the same conclusion as that of the opinion in Travelers Ins. Co. v. Sams, supra. “The board’s order in the case sub judice is not such an order as is contemplated by [OCGA § 34-9-105] which provides for appeals to the superior court.” Id. at 532.1 do not believe this conclusion to have been altered by the amendment to former Code Ann. § 114-501, now OCGA § 34-9-200 (d), providing for notice and the opportunity to file objections to a request for a change in physicians. Ga. L. 1975, pp. 190, 196. While it is apparent that appeal may be taken from the full board’s decision when the procedural mandates of OCGA § 34-9-200 (d) are not followed (see Georgia Power Co. v. Brown, 169 Ga. App. 45 (3) (311 SE2d 236) (1983); City of Acworth v. Williams, 162 Ga. App. 694 (293 SE2d 352) (1982); Insurance Co. of N. A. v. Lovinggood, 145 Ga. App. 690 (244 SE2d 628) (1978)), I find no basis for allowing appeal of the full board’s substantive decision where such procedural requirements have been met. Further, I find no different result demanded by the opinion in Lovinggood, supra. It is apparent that the issue there was whether medical expenses already incurred by the claimant for treatment by a different physician were authorized. The court reversed because the full board failed to comply with the provisions for notice and filing of objections, not because it abused its discretion in deciding as it did. The case was further remanded for determination of whether an emergency existed necessitating treatment without com*392plying with the procedural requirements of the statute. See OCGA § 34-9-200 (f).
Relying upon the absence of statutory language in OCGA § 34-9-200 (d) restricting appeal to the superior court, the majority finds an absence of clear legislative intent to limit review of the full board’s substantive decision to grant or deny a request for a change in physicians. In the same vein but applying converse reasoning, an examination of OCGA § 34-9-200 reveals that the subsection preceding that which is at issue here expressly provides for appeal to the superior court pursuant to OCGA § 34-9-105 of the board’s decision to grant or deny additional medical or vocational rehabilitation benefits under OCGA § 34-9-200 (a, b). See OCGA § 34-9-200 (c). This language permitting appellate review is missing in OCGA § 34-9-200 (d). Obviously the full board’s decision regarding additional benefits under OCGA § 34-9-200 (c) either grants or denies compensation, in the form of these medical benefits. “The [Act] makes no provision for an appeal to the superior court from a decision of the full board other than one which grants or denies compensation.” Garner v. Owens-Ill. Glass Container, 134 Ga. App. 917 (2) (216 SE2d 709) (1975). Although the decision to grant or deny a request for a change in physicians is not precisely the interlocutory order at issue in Garner, supra, because there appears to be no limit to the number of times such request may be brought, I find it analogous. Additionally, I find no grant or denial of compensation in the decision under OCGA § 34-9-200 (d).
A goal of the Workers’ Compensation Act is the speedy resolution and disposition of claims. This would, in my opinion, be contravened by allowing appeal to the superior court from the full board’s substantive decision to grant or deny a request for a change in physicians. In the present appeal, Request I was decided by the full board two months after it was filed and the decision on Request II took eight months. The superior court’s order on Request I came one year and seven months after the full board’s order. Request II took ten months for review in the superior court.
Based upon the foregoing reasons, I would hold that the substance of the full board’s order under OCGA § 34-9-200 (d) is not appealable to the superior court. It follows that the superior court was without jurisdiction to rule on either Request I or Request II. The pendency of the appeal of Request I, therefore, had no bearing upon the filing of Request II as the superior court was without jurisdiction. Since Request II was filed on April 1, 1983 after the full board’s disposition of Request I on January 12, 1983, Request II was valid and properly within the jurisdiction of the ALJ and ultimately the full board. The ALJ’s denial of Request II was superseded by the decision of the full board on October 24, 1983 reversing the ALJ and granting *393Request II. See generally Carter v. Kansas City Fire &c. Ins. Co., 138 Ga. App. 601, 604 (226 SE2d 755) (1976). I would hold that the superior court erred in reversing and vacating the decision of the full board granting Request II as it was a valid and proper ruling.
Decided July 10, 1985.
William G. Boyd, James B. Hiers, Jr., Mark J. Goodman, for appellants.
Paul Kilpatrick, Jr., Alex Byars, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Birdsong and Judge Sognier join in this dissent.