Court Opinion

ID: 9758961
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:57:36.784999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:02:41.313735
License: Public Domain

HUTCHINSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. FELA cases brought in state courts are subject to state procedure, but the governing substantive law is federal. St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co. v. Dickerson, 470 U.S. 409, 105 S.Ct. 1347, 84 L.Ed.2d 303 (1985). The majority correctly states that the measure of damages in these cases is a matter of federal substantive law, Norfolk and Western Railway Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 100 S.Ct. 755, 62 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980); Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485, 36 S.Ct. 630, 60 L.Ed. 1117 (1916). Under longstanding federal precedent those damages must be discounted to present value. Id. Though *100the United States Supreme Court has not established a particular method for discounting damages to present value, it has given us guidance on the selection of a method. In Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer,1 462 U.S. 523, 103 S.Ct. 2541, 76 L.Ed.2d 768 (1983), the court held that the judge is not bound to follow state law on discounting to present value and, indeed, may not blindly follow the state procedure.2 Id. at 550-53, 103 S.Ct. at 2557-58.
In Pfeifer, the judge blindly applied the total offset method we adopted in Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 491 Pa. 561, 421 A.2d 1027 (1980). This record shows that the trial judge did the same thing.
[H]owever, we have reached the decision not to give the present-worth charge; and the basis for the Court’s decision is the Bolubase [sic] Decision and the opinion of Justice Nix.
As we read his [Chief Justice Nix] language [in Bolubasz ], it appears to me that what he is doing is establishing, really, a procedural method for calculating an award for loss of future earnings; and that if you look at his opinion as being procedural, then it seems to me that it would be applicable.
The other reason that compels the Court is that there is dicta in a number of these cases to the effect that until there has been some clear decision in FELA cases by the United States Supreme Court, the law of form [sic] should apply.
The third reason [is] [a]fter years of listening to that charge on present worth that is given to juries, I think it is a charade. I don’t think the jury understands what you are saying. I am not sure the judge understands, him or herself, what is being said. It just doesn’t mean anything.
*101... I don’t think that that is the way that you calculate damages.
And, I guess, the fourth reason would be that I view this recent decision ... the Liepelt case that we had been looking at ... as an attempt to put reality into the calculations of damages____
It is the Court’s feeling that the reduction to present worth has occurred by the next method; and we have to move on; so that the decision has been made.
Reproduced Record at 68a-70a.
Judge Finkelhor’s comments reveal that she did not consider other methods, but blindly followed our teaching in Bolubasz, and that she disagrees with the concept of discounting to present value required by federal law. In addition, her reliance on Liepelt seems misplaced in light of the subsequent decisions in Dickerson and Pfeifer. A state judge is not free to consider the discounting question procedural in FELA cases because the United States Supreme Court has held it is substantive. Liepelt, supra; Kelly, supra. The damages found by the jury were not reduced to present value as required by federal law.3
Likewise, I believe that the trial court’s award of delay damages under Pa.R.C.P. 288 conflicts with federal law. Though state procedure generally applies in FELA cases brought in state courts, “so called” procedural rules which interfere with federal substantive law do not. Brown v. Western Railroad of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 70 S.Ct. 105, 94 L.Ed. 100 (1949). Damages, of course, are a matter of federal substantive law. The majority states that Rule 238 is nothing more than a procedural device used to encourage negotiation and settlement and lighten court dockets. This is pure sophistry. Any rule which increases a damage *102award by twenty-five percent has an undeniably material effect on damages. Application of our so-called procedural rule not only interferes with governing federal substantive law but undermines the national uniformity FELA was designed to achieve. See Liepelt, supra at 493 n. 5, 100 S.Ct. at 757 n. 5. Appellee's entitlement to delay damages or pre-judgment interest should be determined under federal substantive law not Pennsylvania procedure.
In addition, for the reasons contained in my concurring opinion in Craig v. Magee Memorial Rehabilitation Center, 512 Pa. 60, 515 A.2d 1350 (1986), I do not believe that delay damages are under any circumstances a matter to be handled by a procedural rule.
Therefore, I would reverse Superior Court and remand for a new trial on damages.
McDERMOTT and ZAPPALA, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.

. As the majority notes, Pfeifer arose under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950; however, the same federal law on damages applies.

. We may label discounting as procedural for our own purposes. Nevertheless, it retains its substance for FELA purposes.

. The United States Supreme Court does not clearly state in Pfeifer and Dickerson who should determine the method to be used to discount damages to present value. Since it is the jury’s task to determine damages and discount them to present value, I believe that the jury should choose the method. Expert testimony on the various methods should be presented to aid the jury, and the judge should instruct the jury on all methods advanced by the parties.