Court Opinion

ID: 9390840
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 18:02:44.186507+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:37.491291
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/28/23 Birrueta v. UMA Enterprises CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                        DIVISION TWO

 LEONIDES BIRRUETA,                                                    B316309
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                       (Los Angeles County
           v.                                                          Super. Ct. No.
                                                                       20STCV35816)
 UMA ENTERPRISES, INC.
           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Michael P. Linfield, Judge. Affirmed.
     CDF Labor Law, Todd R. Wulffson, Nancy N. Lubrano and
Brian E. Cole II for Defendant and Appellant.
     Employee Justice Legal Group, Kaveh S. Elihu and Sylvia
V. Panosian for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                     _____________________________________
       Leonides Birrueta (plaintiff) sued his former employer for
wrongful termination-related claims. The employer filed two
motions to compel arbitration, which the trial court denied. The
employer appealed from the order denying the second motion to
compel arbitration. We affirm.
        FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.     Facts
       A.    Hiring, Employment and Termination
       UMA Enterprises, Inc. (UMA), is a nationwide wholesaler
and distributor of imported goods. In April 2001, UMA hired
plaintiff as a maintenance worker. Plaintiff’s sole language is
Spanish.
       In September 2018, UMA fired plaintiff five days after he
suffered a stroke while on the job and was hospitalized. At the
time, plaintiff was 75 years old. He was allegedly terminated for
failing to request medical leave three days before his
hospitalization.
       B.    Arbitration Agreements
       The arbitration agreement at issue is a four-page document
written in English. The last page is signed “Leonides Birrueta”
and is dated August 29, 2014. Immediately above the signature
lines, the agreement reads: “BY SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT,
YOU ACKNOWLEDGE THAT YOU HAVE CAREFULLY READ
THIS AGREEMENT, THAT YOU UNDERSTAND ITS TERMS,
AND THAT YOU HAVE ENTERED INTO THIS AGREEMENT
VOLUNTARILY AND NOT IN RELIANCE ON ANY PROMISES
OR REPRESENTATION BY THE COMPANY OTHER THAN
THOSE CONTAINED IN THIS AGREEMENT.”

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II.    Procedural Background
       A.     Complaint
       In September 2020, plaintiff sued UMA for wrongful
termination in violation of public policy, denial of sick leave, and
discrimination based on the use of sick leave (Lab. Code, §§ 233,
234, 246.5), retaliation for disclosing violations of law (Lab. Code,
§§ 1102.5, 1102.6), and retaliation (Lab. Code, § 98.6). Plaintiff
requested a jury trial.
       B.     First Motion to Compel Arbitration
       On December 15, 2020, UMA moved to compel arbitration
under the arbitration agreement. Attached to the motion were
the arbitration agreement and an unidentified document that
apparently was the Spanish version of the agreement. UMA
neither referred to nor explained the Spanish version in its
motion or accompanying exhibits. Plaintiff opposed the motion.
       UMA and plaintiff disputed whether a valid arbitration
agreement existed. Supported by the declaration of Larry Woods,
its chief financial officer, UMA contended that plaintiff signed—
and thereby agreed to—the agreement on August 29, 2014.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, contended there was no evidence he
signed the agreement and, as a Spanish speaker, understood its
terms. Nor did UMA show he received and agreed to the Spanish
version, which was unsigned and undated. And unlike the
English version, it did not include an opt-out provision.
       Following full briefing, the trial court held a hearing on the
motion. The court excluded Woods’s statements authenticating
the arbitration agreement as lacking personal knowledge and
plaintiff’s declaration in its entirety as unreliable.1

      1The trial court sustained UMA’s objection there was no
evidence that plaintiff (who did not speak English) knew the

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       At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied the
motion to compel. The court found Woods failed to sufficiently
authenticate the English version as having been signed by
plaintiff, and the Spanish version was not signed, dated, or
certified as being identical to the English version by a qualified
Spanish interpreter. Moreover, “a casual perusal” revealed the
two versions were not identical, the English version has one more
numbered section than the Spanish version. Woods also failed to
attest to having personal knowledge of “the identity and mode of
preparation” of documents in plaintiff’s personnel file.
       The court ruled UMA “failed to prove by any admissible
evidence, let alone a preponderance of the evidence, that there
exists an enforceable signed arbitration agreement between the
parties.”
       C.    Second Motion to Compel Arbitration
       On September 23, 2021, UMA again moved to compel
arbitration, resurrecting the dispute whether a valid arbitration
agreement existed. Plaintiff opposed the motion.
       UMA argued it cured the defects in the authentication of
the arbitration agreement because plaintiff admitted to having
signed the agreement in his August 24, 2021 deposition. UMA
also submitted a more detailed Woods’s declaration. The motion
did not include the Spanish version as an exhibit. In opposition,
plaintiff argued UMA still failed to authenticate the agreement.
Nor was there mutual consent given plaintiff’s deposition
testimony and declaration that he neither speaks English nor
understands any documents shown to him in English.

contents of the declaration he was signing because it was in
English.

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      Following another round of full briefing and a hearing on
October 20, 2021, the trial court denied the second motion to
compel. The court excluded most of Woods’s declaration as
lacking foundation2 and admitted plaintiff’s declaration in its
entirety3 before adopting its prior order. The court found the
grounds for the two motions to compel were “virtually the same,”
such that “the principles underlying res judicata apply-equally
well here,” even though the doctrine per se would not apply. The
court further found that even if UMA’s motion were meritorious,
ordering arbitration after nine months of ongoing discovery
would result in an inordinate delay.
      D.     Appeal
      UMA timely appealed from the trial court’s order.4
                          DISCUSSION
I.    Applicable Law and Standard of Review
      A motion to compel arbitration is essentially an equitable
proceeding to require specific performance of a contract.
(Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14

      2 Specifically, the trial court sustained plaintiff’s objections
to Woods’s declaration that employees were presented with the
arbitration agreement and asked to return a signed copy if they
wished, plaintiff returned a signed copy, which was placed in his
personnel file, and plaintiff never revoked, opted-out, or
requested a copy of the agreement.

      3This time plaintiff’s declaration was translated from
English to Spanish for his review, and plaintiff confirmed the
accuracy of the translation and its contents.

      4Code of Civil Procedure section 1294, subdivision (a)
authorizes an immediate appeal.

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Cal.4th 394, 411.) The trial court must determine whether an
agreement to arbitrate exists. (Caballero v. Premier Care Simi
Valley LLC (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 512, 517.) General contract
law applies to determine whether the parties formed an
enforceable agreement to arbitrate. (Avery v. Integrated
Healthcare Holdings, Inc. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 50, 59;
Chambers v. Crown Asset Management, LLC (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 583, 591 [same rules of contract construction apply
to arbitration agreements].)
       Where, as here, the trial court’s ruling turns on questions
of fact, the substantial evidence standard applies, including
deferring to the court’s credibility findings. (Gamboa v.
Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 166;
Laswell v. AG Seal Beach, LLC (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1399,
1406.) And where, as here, the court finds the moving party
failed to carry its burden of proof, the question for the reviewing
court is whether those findings are “erroneous as a matter of
law.” (Fabian v. Renovate America, Inc. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th
1062, 1066.)
II.    UMA Failed to Establish the Existence of an
       Arbitration Agreement
       Preliminarily, we note while the trial court first ruled, and
later confirmed, that UMA failed to produce admissible evidence
of an enforceable arbitration agreement, it did not state the rule
of contract construction or legal theory the missing evidence was
necessary to prove. In any event, “ ‘ “[w]e review the trial court’s
order, not its reasoning, and affirm an order if it is correct on any
theory apparent from the record.” ’ ” (Ramos v. Westlake Services
LLC (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 674, 686; accord, Adajar v. RWR
Homes, Inc. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 563, 571, fn. 3; Davey v.

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Southern Pacific Co. (1897) 116 Cal. 325, 329.) Implicit in the
court’s ruling is UMA’s failure to show plaintiff understood and
consented to the arbitration agreement. We conclude substantial
evidence supports the denial of the motion because UMA failed to
establish the existence of mutual consent.
       A.     Mutual Consent
       An enforceable contract requires the parties’ consent.
(Caballero v. Premier Care Simi Valley LLC, supra, 69
Cal.App.5th at p. 518.) Such consent must be mutual, freely
given, and communicated by each party to the other. (Civ. Code,
§ 1565.) For the consent to be mutual, the parties must “all agree
upon the same thing in the same sense.” (Civ. Code, §1580.) In
determining whether there was mutual consent to contract, the
trial court does not consider the parties’ subjective intention or
states of mind. To determine whether there was mutual consent
for a contract, the court does not consider the parties’ subjective
intentions or unexpressed understandings. (Bustamante v.
Intuit, Inc. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 199, 208.) Rather, the court
applies an objective standard based on the parties’ outward
manifestations or expressions, i.e., “ ‘the reasonable meaning of
their words and acts.’ ” (Ibid.) When there is no evidence
establishing mutual consent to contract, no contract has been
formed. (Ibid.)
       “ ‘No law requires that parties dealing at arm’s length have
a duty to explain to each other the terms of a written contract.’ ”
(Brookwood v. Bank of America (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1667,
1674.) Ordinarily, a party who signs a document, which on its
face is a contract, is deemed to assent to all its terms. (Marin
Storage & Trucking, Inc. v. Benco Contracting & Engineering,
Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1049.) In other words, a party’s

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signature is an objective manifestation of express consent.
(Caballero v. Premier Care Simi Valley LLC, supra, 69
Cal.App.5th at p. 518; Rodriguez v. Oto (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th
1020, 1027.) Further, a party cannot avoid the terms of a
contract on the ground that he or she failed to read it before
signing. (Ramos v. Westlake Services LLC, supra, 242
Cal.App.4th at p. 686.) A party who cannot read the contract
should have it read or explained to him or her. (Ibid.)
       However, there is a relevant exception: “[I]f the one who
signs the instrument is unaware of the contractual provisions, he
cannot be said to have agreed to them. Thus, ‘[a]n exception to
[the] general rule exists when the writing does not appear to be a
contract and the terms are not called to the attention of the
recipient. In such a case, no contract is formed with respect to
the undisclosed term.’ ” (Metters v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2008)
161 Cal.App.4th 696, 702.)
       B.    UMA Failed to Carry Its Burden to Establish
             Mutual Consent
       Here, UMA failed to show as a matter of law that plaintiff
consented to the arbitration agreement, having made no showing
that plaintiff received the arbitration agreement. UMA
introduced no (admissible) evidence that anyone handed or
mailed the arbitration agreement to plaintiff, explained what the
document was, and gave plaintiff the opportunity to review the
document, ask any questions or consult an attorney before
signing it.
       Further, in his declaration, plaintiff averred he did not
recall seeing or signing the arbitration agreement, and he never
received any UMA paperwork to take home for review. Nor did
he understand what an arbitration agreement was or was able to

                                8
consult an attorney about any UMA documents. Plaintiff averred
“sometimes” his supervisors would give him “documents in
English” that he “was required to sign.” When plaintiff asked
“what the documents mean,” his supervisors would “always”
respond that “ ‘it’s nothing’ ” and that “ ‘it will not harm or
damage you’ or comments to that effect.” (Fleming v. Oliphant
Financial, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 13, 23, 25 [holding the
defendant could not show consent to arbitrate where the evidence
did not show defendant provided plaintiff the arbitration
agreement]; Chambers v. Crown Asset Management, LLC, supra,
71 Cal.App.5th at p. 602 [same].)
       UMA’s chief counterargument is because plaintiff
acknowledged signing the last page of the agreement he is
deemed to have consented to its terms. Of course, this argument
rests on the assumption the agreement was provided to plaintiff.
       As discussed, ordinarily, plaintiff’s signature on the
arbitration agreement would constitute an objective
manifestation of his intent to enter into an agreement, despite
his inability to understand English and his failure to have
someone translate the document for him. In this case, however,
it is uncontroverted that UMA knew plaintiff could not read,
write, or speak English during his employment. Nor did plaintiff
have a reasonable opportunity to obtain a translation or have an
attorney explain the document. While UMA was not required to
translate the terms of the agreement for plaintiff, once UMA
knew plaintiff did not understand the agreement, UMA could not
reasonably rely on his signature alone as a manifestation of
assent to its terms. Notably, UMA did not furnish plaintiff a
copy of the agreement for his own records, which would have

                               9
allowed him to obtain a translation and subsequently withdraw
his consent.
      Interestingly, UMA does not mention plaintiff’s inability to
speak English until its reply brief. UMA relies on Randas v.
YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 158 to
argue plaintiff’s lack of English proficiency does not enable him to
claim he did not consent to an agreement he signed. However,
that case is distinguishable. In Randas, the Court of Appeal
enforced a liability waiver that the plaintiff had signed, even
though she could not read English. (Id. at p. 160.) The court
noted the release stated she had read it, and the other
contracting party had no reason to suspect the plaintiff did not or
could not read the release that she signed. (Id. at p. 163.) In
contrast, in the case before us, the evidence established UMA
knew plaintiff’s sole language was Spanish. UMA cannot
credibly claim that plaintiff’s signature manifested his consent to
the terms of the agreement, when UMA was fully aware plaintiff
did not understand what he was signing.
      In sum, the trial court did not err in denying UMA’s second
motion to compel. Because there was no mutual consent, there
was no arbitration agreement to enforce.

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                        DISPOSITION
      The order denying the motion to compel arbitration is
affirmed. Respondent Leonides Birrueta is awarded his costs on
appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                   LUI, P. J.
We concur:

     CHAVEZ, J.

     HOFFSTADT, J.

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