Court Opinion

ID: 9532871
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:25:45.441944+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:51.697512
License: Public Domain

LEESON, J.,
dissenting.
The majority concludes that State Trooper Allori conducted a search without probable cause when he delivered a citation for a lane violation to defendant. According to the majority, Allori “inserted his head” into defendant’s *278truck, 151 Or App at 273, 274, or “stuck his head into the truck,” id. at 273, in violation of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. Further, the majority contends, this case is analogous to State v. Rhodes, 315 Or 191, 843 P2d 927 (1992), and very similar to State v. Hicks, 89 Or App 540, 749 P2d 1221 (1988). Consequently, it concludes, the results of the field sobriety tests that Allori conducted after smelling a strong odor of alcohol on defendant’s breath must be suppressed. I disagree with the majority’s characterization of the facts and its reliance on Rhodes and Hicks, and I respectfully dissent.
Allori stopped defendant for a lane violation after defendant’s 1986 Chevrolet truck passed Allori while driving at a high rate of speed. Allori decided to issue defendant a citation. ORS 811.420(1). Allori testified that when he delivered the citation to defendant, he “leaned into” the open driver-side window of defendant’s truck because the wind was blowing, and he did not want the papers to blow away. While Allori was explaining the citation to defendant, he smelled a strong odor of alcohol on defendant’s breath and, after investigating his suspicions, Allori arrested defendant for driving under the influence of intoxicants.
The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress. It found “persuasive” Allori’s testimony that he leaned into the open driver-side window of defendant’s truck to hand defendant the citation for a lane violation and to explain the citation to him. The issue is whether Allori’s actions constituted a “governmental intrusion into a person’s protected privacy interest,” State v. Nagle, 320 Or 24, 29, 880 P2d 451 (1994), or whether instead his detection of the strong odor of alcohol on defendant’s breath was an unaided observation from a lawful vantage point. State v. Ainsworth, 310 Or 613, 622, 801 P2d 749 (1990). The test to determine whether Allori violated defendant’s privacy is “whether the practice, if engaged in wholly at the discretion of the government, will significantly impair The people’s’ freedom from scrutiny.” State v. Campbell, 306 Or 157,171, 759 P2d 1040 (1988); see also Nagle, 320 Or at 29.
I first disagree with the majority’s assertion that Allori “inserted his head” into defendant’s truck or that he *279“stuck his head into the truck.” The evidence in the record is that Allori leaned into the driver-side window to explain to defendant the citation for the traffic infraction. In my view, Allori did not exceed the bounds of ordinary social intercourse or concepts of privacy.
I also disagree with the majority’s contention that the facts of this case are like those in Rhodes. In that case, Officer Hughes suspected that the driver might be under the influence of intoxicants when he saw the defendant slumped over in the seat of his pickup truck, which was parked on a city street with its engine running. He went up to the truck and opened further the driver-side door that already was slightly ajar. The Supreme Court held that when Hughes physically grasped the door of the truck and moved it, exposing the passenger compartment to a visual inspection that could not have been made without opening the door, his actions were an “intrusion.” It held that “Hughes’ action in fully opening the vehicle’s door was a 'search’ under Article I, section 9 "Rhodes, 315 Or at 197.
Hughes’ actions in Rhodes were intrusive in a way that Allori’s actions in this case were not. Hughes opened a car door and looked inside. Allori, by contrast, inclined his head through the plane of the driver-side window to block a stiff wind and to deliver and explain the citation to defendant. Allori’s actions did not significantly impair defendant’s freedom from scrutiny. “Breaking the plane” of a vehicle’s window to deliver and explain a traffic citation is not an intrusion into a person’s protected privacy interest.
The majority believes that the facts in Hicks are “[ejven more to the point.” 151 Or App at 276.1 disagree. In that case, Officer Galick stopped the defendant for two traffic infractions. The defendant did not have identification or car registration. Galick told the defendant to look in the glove compartment for the vehicle registration. As the defendant leaned across the front seat to do so, Galick testified that he “bent down” and “duck[edj down” until “[he] was definitely in the car.” In fact, Galick’s head was far enough inside the car to see an athletic bag amid crumpled newspapers on the floor of the back seat compartment. We rejected Galick’s claim that he was entitled to insert his head into the defendant’s car *280because a glove box “is a good place to have a weapon” and he was concerned for his safety. Hicks, 89 Or App at 544. We held that, lacking a valid officer safety rationale, Galick's intrusion violated the defendant’s interests protected by Article I, section 9. Id. at 544-45.
The evidence in this case is that Allori leaned into the window to deliver a traffic citation to defendant and explain it to him. As I understand the majority, Allori “erred” by inclining his head in a way that allowed him to explain the citation to defendant. In my view, Allori did not exceed the bounds of ordinary social intercourse or concepts of privacy when he did so. He was at a lawful vantage point when he smelled the strong odor of alcohol on defendant’s breath.
I respectfully dissent.