Court Opinion

ID: 9792952
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:39:56.245761+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:02.021524
License: Public Domain

GOLDEN, Chief Justice,
dissenting, with whom TAYLOR, J., joins.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision on the issues presented by the prosecutor’s comment upon silence and the officer’s vouching for the credibility of the alleged victim.
Controlling precedent with respect to the first issue clearly holds that an accused’s right to remain silent under Art. 1, § 11 of the Wyoming Constitution does not depend upon the accused’s being advised of that right, but exists by virtue of the constitutional language. This rule of law is, of course, from Westmark and Clenin. Summers was not a majority opinion but only a two-justice plurality and is not controlling law. We, therefore, must look to Westmark and Clenin for our applicable rule.
As our law is based upon the more stringent protections of our own state constitution and having carefully read Summers, West-mark, Clenin, Brewster, Cheatham, Richter, et al, I believe this court would do well to remember the views of Justices Rooney and Raper who, in their specially concurring opinion in Summers, said:
The constitutional right to silence exists at all times — before arrest, at arrest and after arrest; before a Miranda warning and after it. If there is a presumption relative to the exercise of the right, it should be in favor of its exercise and not to the contrary. An impermissible comment on the exercise of the right is error, the only question being whether or not the comment is reversible error — i.e., whether or not it is harmless error.
Summers v. State, 725 P.2d 1033, 1050 (Wyo.1986). Justices Rooney and Raper advocated a harmless error rule; their position did not prevail and has not prevailed.
In my view, the rule from Westmark and Clenin is that prosecutorial comment upon either pre-arrest or post-arrest silence is reversible error.1 However, having carefully read the pertinent portions of the record relating to Tortolito’s encounter with the police at the bus station, I believe the majority not only erred in determining that Summers controlled in this case, it erred in determining that Tortolito was not under arrest and his freedom of movement was not restrained in a significant way.
The record shows Tortolito was temporarily detained when one police officer answered the call at the bus station that night, knew Tortolito was the subject of the call and restrained Tortolito upon his arrival as Tor-tolito attempted to walk away when he spotted the officer. While holding Tortolito up against the wall, the officer asked the bus driver what had happened and was told that Christian had accused Tortolito of taking Christian’s money. The officer asked Tortol-ito if he had taken the money and testified that Tortolito did not respond.
The officer then described how Christian was brought outside and also accused Tortol-ito of taking money from him. The officer’s actions and even his question to Tortolito are proper investigatory conduct during temporary detention and required no Miranda warning. However, the prosecutor’s question to elicit the response about Tortolito’s silence is factually similar to what occurred in Parkhurst. Because it was the only reference by the Parkhurst prosecutor, we held no error had been committed. Parkhurst v. State, 628 P.2d 1369, 1382 (Wyo.1982). In Tortolito’s trial, however, the prosecutor had already referred to the silence in his opening statement. The defense objected, but was overruled. Unfortunately, Tortolito’s prose*874cutor proceeded to use Tortolito’s silence as proof of guilt, intentionally and flagrantly.
After Christian’s accusation, another officer (second) arrived on the scene, positioned himself on the other side of Tortolito and helped to hold him up against the wall. The first officer informed the second that “Stevie had taken money from a person inside.” The second officer testified that the first officer continued to question Tortolito for a couple of minutes, and after receiving no understandable response from Tortolito, both officers decided to search his pockets. There is little question that this was custodial interrogation followed by an arrest and search incident to arrest. Apparently, the officers also believed that Tortolito was not free to leave, since Tortolito tried to leave, was seized, injured, and then handcuffed.
Understanding that Tortolito’s detention rapidly became custodial interrogation followed by an arrest and search before any magical words of “you are under arrest” were uttered is critical in analyzing the prosecutor’s use of Tortolito’s silences. The record shows that during the second officer’s testimony of how Tortolito came to be arrested, the prosecutor asked, “Did Mr. Tortolito respond in any way to Officer Pederson telling you about Mr. Tortolito taking the money?” The second officer responded that “he didn’t say a word.” The defense objected, was overruled and the prosecutor immediately asked “Mr. Tortolito didn’t say a word in response to ‘he took money from a passenger inside, a fifty and a twenty’?” and again received the desired answer of “No, sir, he just stood there.” After the second officer testified that the first officer continued to question Tortolito, he testified that Tortolito was searched and money was found. Con-
tinuing, the officer testified that the officers again asked Tortolito “where did you get this?” and the prosecutor again asked “And did Mr. Tortolito respond?” to which the officer responded, “No.”
The prosecutor’s questions of just this police officer, second on the scene, elicited four answers that Tortolito was silent in the face of accusations. The prosecutor repeated these questions to the first officer and received five answers that Tortolito was silent in the face of accusations. The prosecutor mentioned this silence once in his opening statement. The prosecutor mentioned this silence in his closing argument and characterized it as an admission.2 Tortolito’s silences were used as a major part of the prosecution’s substantive evidence of guilt and constituted impermissible comment upon silence.
In the face of this court’s controlling precedent, the majority opinion seeks to justify its position by considering the comment-on-silence issue in the context of Tortolito’s admission of guilt made to the bus driver (or bus depot agent) before the police arrived. That piece of evidence somehow magically erases from our consideration the prosecutor’s egregious impermissible comment on Tortolito’s silence.
Without citation of authority, the majority boldly declares that, because of Tortolito’s earlier admission to an ordinary citizen, the prosecution’s quite substantial impermissible comments on Tortolito’s silence in the face of a barrage of police accusations which followed the admission to the ordinary citizen, lose both their edge and significance. Without citation of authority, the majority then announces a new rule: once the accused makes a lawful affirmative admission to an *875ordinary citizen, the Westmarkr-Clenin rule is not applicable. The majority does not explain why this should be so. I strongly disagree with such a rule. That is not and should not be the rule of this court if fairness, justice and due process of law are to mean anything to our citizens. The majority by this sleight of hand has, without explanation, changed the landscape; it has swiftly killed the reversible error rule and given birth to the harmless error rule contrary to our established precedent.
I must- also dissent to the majority’s holding that no error occurred during the testimony of a veteran police detective called by the defense. This detective had been assigned to investigate the police officer’s report of the incident. The day after the incident, the detective called Christian and interviewed him. The answers the detective received from Christian were different from Christian’s testimony, and the detective was called by the defense to testify about those discrepancies. On cross-examination, the prosecutor elicited responses designed to show that Christian’s discrepancies occurred for the reasons that the detective had not conducted a detailed interview, the detective believed the trauma of the incident had left Christian “confused,” and the detective’s purpose was only to obtain a general overview of the incident. The prosecutor and detective succeeded in accomplishing those objectives in the exchange quoted by the majority.
However, the detective then exceeded the scope of the question with a response well beyond simply summarizing the facts of his investigation. He provided the jury this ultimate conclusion:
[He] knew at that particular time that what he told me generally did match what the officers had put in their reports, and what a couple of witnesses said. So I did know the crime occurred.
As defense counsel pointed out, the detective was called as a defense witness to “cast doubt on Mr. Christian’s testimony.” Given the entire line of questioning by both parties, it would be clear to an experienced3 detective that his expansive answer had the purpose of endorsing the complaining witness’ credibility. This answer vouched for Christian’s credibility in violation of Whiteplume v. State, 841 P.2d 1332, 1341 (Wyo.1992); Bennett v. State, 794 P.2d 879, 881 (Wyo.1990); Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 68 (Wyo.1989).
I agree that this case can be distinguished from Bennett and Whiteplume,4 but find the detective’s departure from testifying about the facts of his investigation to voluntarily offering a helpful conclusion to the jury was unwarranted and constituted error per se. Bennett, 794 P.2d at 882.

. Before the doubt injected by Summers, our law could be summarized as “the right to remain silent is always with you.” In Clenin, we stated that advice of the right to remain silent only serves the purpose of expanding its protection by assuring that the accused person is aware of it. This language coupled with Clenin’s holding clearly establishes that it is unnecessary to distinguish between pre-arrest silence and post-arrest silence once this court concludes there has been a comment upon an accused’s exercise of his right of silence. Westmark involved instances of prosecutorial comment on both pre-arrest and post-arrest silence and declared comments on either to he impermissible. Westmark, 693 P.2d 220, 221, 225 (Wyo.1984). Despite Summers, our decisions clarify that Wyo. Const, art. 1, § 11 is self-executing.

. As part of his closing argument, the prosecutor wrote out "five factors.” Those factors were motive, opportunity, physical evidence, admissions, and alibi. When discussing admissions, the prosecutor described Tortolito's silence in the face of accusations by the bus driver and victim and finally the police:
And in the face of that, how is Mr. Tortolito, what does he say? Nothing. He doesn't say, "That’s my money.”
Officer Hill arrives. * * * "Stevie did you take this man's money?” He didn’t say anything.
The officers search him and find the money. Officer Pederson takes the money, puts it in Stevie's face. "Stevie, did you take this man’s money?" And what does he do then? He swings out, trying to grab for the money. That's when the scuffle with Officer Hill then started, into the wall and down on the ground.
Admissions. All of those admissions. "Yeah, I took it, and I'm not giving it back.” And the silence in the face of the very clear accusation.

. The police officer was assigned to the detective division and had been an officer since October of 1981.

. In Bennett, we determined that a police officer's statement that the defendant was a drug dealer was an opinion the defendant was guilty. Concluding it was impossible to determine the prejudicial effect of the statement, we found the testimony error per se and reversed the conviction. Bennett 794 P.2d at 882-83. In Whiteplume, this court determined that an experienced police officer's statement that his interview of the complaining witness caused him to conclude the crime had occurred was reversible error because of its prejudicial impact upon the jury. That determination was made after examining all circumstances surrounding the dynamics of the trial where the complaining witness’ credibility was at issue, and there was little physical evidence or other witness testimony.