Court Opinion

ID: 9946477
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 19:10:25.609171+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:28.570680
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re A.S., 2024-Ohio-731.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                          EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                            COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE A.S.                                     :
                                               :           No. 112748
A Minor Child                                  :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 29, 2024

             Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                    Juvenile Division
                                  Case No. DL22100174

                                       Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Chadwick Cleveland, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellant.

                 Carmen Naso, for appellant.

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J.:

                   Defendant-appellant A.S. appeals     from his    adjudication of

delinquency related to various gun-related offenses. For the reasons that follow, we

affirm.

Factual and Procedural History

                   On January 7, 2022, A.S., d.o.b. 4/15/2008, was charged in a six-

count complaint in the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court related to a shooting that
occurred at the Arbor Park apartment complex in Cleveland, Ohio that took place

on December 30, 2021. A.S. was alleged to have engaged in conduct which, if he

were an adult, would constitute one count of improperly discharging a firearm at or

into a habitation in violation of R.C. 2923.161(A)(1); two counts of felonious assault

in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) against Arbor Park security officers; one count of

discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises, in violation of R.C.

2923.162(A)(3); and two counts of improper handling of a firearm in a motor

vehicle, in violation of R.C. 2923.16(A) and 2923.16(B). Five of the counts included

one-year, three-year, and five-year firearm specifications.

              On August 29, 2022, the case proceeded to an adjudicatory hearing.

              Ashley Norwood (“Norwood”) testified that on December 30, 2021,

she and her five children lived in a townhome on the corner of East 39th Street and

Longwood Avenue in the Arbor Park apartment complex. She testified that she was

at home on December 30, 2021, and at some point in the evening, she heard

gunshots. Norwood explained that the shots initially sounded like they were a

distance away, north of her house in the direction of Bivens Avenue, but the

gunshots progressively got closer to her house. Norwood testified that as the shots

got closer to her home, she began panicking, getting on the floor and screaming at

her children to do the same. Norwood testified that she heard gunshots hit her

home, and after the shooting, she saw two bullet holes in the wall of her house.

Norwood called 911, and police responded to Norwood’s home. The state introduced
body camera footage from a responding officer showing Norwood pointing out the

bullet holes to the police.

               Alexander Hamrick (“Hamrick”) testified that he worked as a security

officer at the Arbor Park apartments. Hamrick testified that he was working on

December 30, 2021, and around 3 or 4 p.m., a group started to congregate in the

area near East 37th Street and Longwood Avenue. Hamrick testified that security

tends to pay attention to large groups “because it’s usually nonsense that goes on,

and in this case the group continued to get bigger and bigger.” Hamrick testified

that the group appeared to be filming a rap video. When the state introduced a still

frame from state’s exhibit No. 2, the rap video, Hamrick identified himself and

another security officer in the background of the video; Hamrick testified that he

was unaware that he was being filmed himself but knew that the group was filming

something.

               Hamrick testified that several days later, an employee in Arbor Park’s

leasing office informed him of the existence of a rap video posted online. Hamrick

subsequently viewed the video in its entirety and then contacted the Arbor Park

property manager and Cleveland police.

               The state played the video in its entirety at the adjudicatory hearing,

over A.S.’s counsel’s objection. The video begins with an aerial shot of the Arbor

Park apartment complex and then proceeds to show a large crowd of people of all

ages dancing, rapping, drinking, and smoking marijuana in the streets of Arbor

Park. The individual identified as A.S. was a central figure in the video, and he was
shown brandishing multiple firearms, including an assault rifle and handguns with

drum magazines. At some points, A.S. had a gun in each hand; he repeatedly aimed

the guns directly into the camera. A.S. is not the only individual shown brandishing

a firearm; a common thread throughout the video is the participants’ cavalier

attitude to an excess of guns.

               Hamrick also testified that approximately an hour or two after the

scene depicted in the rap video, he was patrolling Arbor Park with another security

officer, Anthony Rocco (“Rocco”), in Rocco’s personal vehicle, a white SUV. While

patrolling, Hamrick and Rocco heard gunshots and proceeded north on East 37th

Street in the direction from which they believed the shots were fired. Hamrick

testified that they observed a black SUV make a U-turn on Bivens Avenue. Hamrick

testified that he and Rocco “then engaged full because the driving was very erratic,

and then we witnessed individuals holding guns out the window and shooting.”

Hamrick testified that the black SUV then made a right turn onto Longwood Avenue

and continued to drive at a high rate of speed onto East 35th Street, ultimately

leaving the Arbor Park property; Hamrick and Rocco eventually stopped following

them. Hamrick testified that while they were in pursuit of the black SUV, he could

not get a good look at the individuals he observed hanging out of the vehicle and

holding their guns outside, but after viewing Arbor Park security footage, he was

“able to observe who had done what.”

               The state introduced surveillance footage from various vantage points

around the Arbor Park property showing the black SUV. The state also introduced
Hamrick’s body camera footage depicting Hamrick and Rocco’s pursuit of the black

SUV. In one surveillance video, a black SUV can be seen pulling over on Bivens

Avenue. Three individuals exit the vehicle and run into a dark area between two

buildings; the driver remains in the vehicle. One of the individuals appears to be

wearing a black and white athletic jacket. Another individual appears to be wearing

a reddish-brown hoodie and pants. A short time later, the individuals return to the

vehicle, the driver makes a U-turn, and the vehicle speeds off out of frame. Several

seconds later, a white SUV is shown driving down Bivens, following the path of the

black SUV.

              Hamrick testified that after the failed pursuit of the SUV, he and

Rocco drove around the property to assess damage and determine if there had been

any victims of the recent gunfire. Hamrick subsequently contacted police, viewed

security footage, and turned security footage over to police. Finally, Hamrick

testified that a detective administered a photo array to him, and Hamrick identified

A.S. as an individual he observed discharge a firearm out of the black SUV around

Bivens and Longwood Avenue on December 30, 2021.

              Detective Kyle Schinke (“Schinke”) of the Cleveland Division of Police

testified that he conducted the investigation in this case. Schinke testified that at

some point following the incident, he received a report titled “Shooting Into a

Habitation” and subsequently went to Norwood’s home to discuss the incident with

her. Schinke testified that he observed what appeared to be bullet defects in the side

of the house and on an interior wall of the house. Schinke then reached out to Arbor
Park security and obtained surveillance footage of the area. Schinke testified that

he inspected the area on Bivens where the three individuals were observed exiting

the black SUV and running into a dark area between buildings; Schinke recovered a

spent 9 mm shell casing from that area.

               Schinke testified that he viewed state’s exhibit No. 2, the rap video,

and observed a group of people in the Arbor Park complex. Schinke testified that

the video was posted on YouTube and on a public Instagram page, so he was able to

access the video from his own Instagram account. Specifically, Schinke testified that

the video depicted a male wearing a black and white jumpsuit that matched one of

the suspects who was seen exiting and reentering the black SUV; Schinke identified

this individual as A.S. Throughout the video, this individual is shown brandishing

multiple weapons.1 The video also showed another individual behind A.S., wearing

a brown hoodie and reddish-brown pants; Schinke testified that he believed this

individual was A.S.’s older brother. Schinke testified that he prepared a photo array,

which a blind administrator presented to Hamrick.

               When the state rested, defense counsel renewed its objection to state’s

exhibit No. 2, the rap video, arguing that the probative value of the video was

outweighed by the danger of prejudice. In response, the state argued that the video

      1 The video begins with a written disclaimer stating: “All Items Used In the Video

Are Props Used For The Inhancement [sic] Of This Film[.]” In response to a question
from the court as to whether the firearms visible in the video were real firearms or props,
Schinke testified that they were real, stating, “Well, through my training. Most of these
Instagram videos do say they are prop guns, but we’ve came to know that they are live
guns, live rounds, live guns.”
was highly probative with respect to the identification of the alleged delinquent, and

the footage in the video occurred within an hour or two of the incident giving rise to

this case.

              The court ultimately stated that it would accept the video into

evidence “for the limited purpose of what was observed as how he appeared, what

he was wearing, so on and so forth.”

              A.S.’s counsel made an oral motion for acquittal pursuant to Juv.R.

29. With respect to Count 1, counsel did not dispute that Norwood’s home was hit

by gunfire but argued that the evidence did not show A.S. shooting into Norwood’s

home. With respect to Counts 2 and 3, counsel argued that no evidence was

presented that whoever was shooting out of the vehicle was shooting at Rocco or

Hamrick, and moreover, neither Rocco nor Hamrick testified to that effect. With

respect to the remaining counts, counsel conceded that the state could meet its

burden of showing that there was at least one firearm in the suspect vehicle. With

respect to the five-year drive-by shooting specification, counsel argued that there

was no evidence presented that A.S. purposely or knowingly caused or attempted to

cause death or physical harm by shooting out of a vehicle.

              The court granted A.S.’s motion with respect to Counts 2 and 3,

felonious assault, and proceeded with the remaining counts and specifications. A.S.

rested his case subject to the admission of exhibits. The court heard closing

arguments.
              On February 1, 2023, the court found A.S. delinquent as to Count 4,

discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises, with a one- and three-year

firearm specification; and Count 6, improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle.

The remaining counts were dismissed.

              On March 2, 2023, a magistrate held a dispositional hearing. The

investigating probation officer’s report was read into the record; the report

recommended that A.S. be given a suspended commitment to the Ohio Department

of Youth Services (“ODYS”) and referred to probation, complete community service,

and complete a gun safety and education class. The state requested that A.S. be

committed to ODYS.       A.S.’s counsel agreed with the recommendation of the

probation officer.

              The magistrate found that because it had found A.S. delinquent of

one- and three-year firearm specifications, A.S. was subject to a mandatory

commitment to ODYS. The court ordered A.S. to be committed to ODYS for 12

months on Count 4 and six months on Count 6, to be served consecutively.

              On March 20, 2023, A.S. filed objections to the magistrate’s decision.

On April 20, 2023, the court overruled A.S.’s objections and adopted the

magistrate’s decision.

              On May 22, 2023, A.S. filed a notice of appeal. A.S. presents two

assignments of error for our review:

      I. The evidence at trial was legally insufficient to sustain a finding of
      delinquency to the charge of discharging a firearm on or near
      prohibited premises with a one- and three-year firearm specification.
      II. The trial court erred in admitting state’s exhibit No. 2, the rap video,
      in violation of Evid.R. 403(A).

Legal Analysis

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

               A.S. contends that the evidence presented at trial was not sufficient to

support an adjudication of delinquency as to Count 4, discharging a firearm on or

near prohibited premises. Specifically, he argues that the state did not present

evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that A.S. himself physically discharged a

firearm from the suspect motor vehicle. Moreover, A.S. argues that it is difficult to

juxtapose a finding of delinquency on Count 4 for discharging a firearm on or near

prohibited premises with a finding that A.S. was not delinquent of Count 5,

improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle in violation of R.C. 2923.16(A).2

               A juvenile court may adjudicate a juvenile to be a delinquent child

when the evidence demonstrates, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the child

committed an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult. R.C.

2151.35(A); Juv.R. 29(E)(4); In re R.S., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99562, 2013-Ohio-

5576, ¶ 26; In re Williams, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-10-64, 2011-Ohio-4338, ¶ 18. Due

      2 The juvenile court found A.S. not delinquent of Count 5, improperly handling

firearms in a motor vehicle in violation of R.C. 2923.16(A), which provides that no person
shall knowingly discharge a firearm while in or on a motor vehicle. The juvenile court
also found A.S. delinquent of Count 6, improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle in
violation of R.C. 2923.16(B), which provides that no person shall knowingly transport or
have a loaded firearm in a motor vehicle in such a manner that the firearm is accessible
to the operator or any passenger without leaving the vehicle. A.S. does not challenge the
sufficiency of the adjudication with respect to Count 6, and we will therefore not include
Count 6 in our analysis. To the extent that we refer to improper handling of a firearm in
a motor vehicle in this analysis section, it will be in reference to Count 5.
to the “‘inherently criminal aspects’” of delinquency proceedings, claims involving

the sufficiency of the evidence and the manifest weight of the evidence in

delinquency appeals are subject to the same standards of review applicable to

criminal convictions. In re T.J., 9th Dist. Summit No. 27269, 2014-Ohio-4919, ¶ 19,

quoting In re R.D.U., 9th Dist. Summit No. 24225, 2008-Ohi0-6131, ¶ 6; In re R.S.

at ¶ 26, citing In re Watson, 47 Ohio St.3d 86, 91, 548 N.E.2d 210 (1989); see also

In re S.H., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100529, 2014-Ohio-2770, ¶ 17, 25.

              In his first assignment of error, A.S. argues that there was not

sufficient evidence to support an adjudication of delinquency. The standard of

review for issues involving sufficiency of the evidence in delinquency adjudications

is the same as the standard for adults; the evidence is viewed in the light most

favorable to the state to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In re M.P.,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111608, 2023-Ohio-925, ¶ 37, citing In re T.N.R., 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 111367, 2023-Ohio-85, ¶ 38, citing In re D.C., 2018-Ohio-163, 104

N.E.3d 121, ¶ 3 (8th Dist.), citing In re Washington, 81 Ohio St.3d 337, 339, 691

N.E.2d 285 (1988).

              A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction

requires a determination of whether the state has met its burden of production at

trial. State v. Hunter, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86048, 2006-Ohio-20, ¶ 41, citing

State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 390, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). Whether the

evidence is legally sufficient to support a verdict is a question of law. Thompkins at
386. We do not assess whether the state’s evidence is to be believed; we assess

whether the evidence admitted at trial, if believed, supported the adjudication.

Thompkins at 390 (Cook, J., concurring).

              In other words, we assume the state’s witnesses testified truthfully

and determine whether that testimony, along with any other evidence presented,

satisfies each element of the offense. In re D.R.S., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103584,

2016-Ohio-3262, ¶ 23. The elements of an offense may be proven by direct evidence,

circumstantial evidence, or both. See, e.g., State v. Wells, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

109787, 2021-Ohio-2585, ¶ 25, citing State v. Durr, 58 Ohio St.3d 86, 568 N.E.2d

674 (1991). “Direct evidence exists when ‘a witness testifies about a matter within

the witness’s personal knowledge such that the trier of fact is not required to draw

an inference from the evidence to the proposition that it is offered to establish.’”

Wells at ¶ 25, quoting State v. Cassano, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97228, 2012-Ohio-

4047, ¶ 13. Circumstantial evidence is “evidence that requires ‘the drawing of

inferences that are reasonably permitted by the evidence.’” Wells at ¶ 25, quoting

Cassano at ¶ 13; see also State v. Hartman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90284, 2008-

Ohio-3683, ¶ 37 (“[C]ircumstantial evidence is the proof of facts by direct evidence

from which the trier of fact may infer or derive by reasoning other facts in

accordance with the common experience of mankind.”). Circumstantial evidence

and direct evidence have “equal evidentiary value.” Wells at ¶ 26, citing State v.

Santiago, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95333, 2011-Ohio-1691, ¶ 12.
              The juvenile court found A.S. delinquent of one count of discharge of

a firearm on or near prohibited premises in violation of R.C. 2923.162(A)(3), with a

one- and three-year firearm specification. R.C. 2923.162(A)(3) provides in relevant

part that “no person shall * * * discharge a firearm upon or over a public road or

highway.”

              Here, Hamrick testified that he heard gunshots, saw a black SUV

make a U-turn, and “witnessed individuals holding guns out the window and

shooting.” While Hamrick testified that at the time he was unable to tell what the

individuals looked like, he was “able to observe who had done what” after watching

security footage of the incident. Hamrick also testified that subsequently, when he

was shown a photo lineup of suspects, he was able to identify A.S. as one of the

individuals who had been shooting out of the car.

              This testimony is sufficient to establish that A.S. discharged a firearm

over a public road. In reviewing a sufficiency challenge, we do not consider whether

the evidence should be believed; instead, we consider whether, if the evidence is

believed, it is legally sufficient to support an adjudication. Thus, regardless of the

unlikelihood that Hamrick was able to discern who was shooting out of the suspect

vehicle, the evidence shows that after viewing surveillance footage, he was able to

identify A.S. one of the shooters. Based on this evidence, any rational trier of fact

could have found that A.S. discharged a firearm over a public road.

              With respect to the juxtaposition of the court’s finding that A.S. was

delinquent of Count 4 but not delinquent of Count 5, we are not persuaded that these
verdicts have any bearing on the sufficiency of the evidence supporting A.S.’s

delinquency adjudication. Count 4, discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited

premises, provides that no person shall discharge a firearm upon or over a public

road or highway. R.C. 2923.162(A)(3). Count 5, improperly handling a firearm in a

motor vehicle, provides that no person shall knowingly discharge a firearm while in

or on a motor vehicle. While these counts deal with similar forms of conduct, Count

5 includes the element that the offender acted “knowingly.” While A.S. argues that

it is “clear” that the reason A.S. was found not guilty of Count 5 was because he was

not the identified as the perpetrator of Count 5, and not because he was identified

but lacked the requisite mens rea, we cannot reach the same conclusion. We can

only conclude that the trial court determined that A.S. was delinquent of Count 4, a

strict liability offense, and not delinquent of Count 5, an offense that required a

different mens rea.

               For these reasons, A.S.’s first assignment of error is overruled.

II. Admission of State’s Exhibit No. 2

               In his second assignment of error, A.S. argues that the trial court

erred when it admitted state’s exhibit No. 2, the rap video, into evidence, in violation

of Evid.R. 403(A).

               The admission or exclusion of evidence is left to the sound discretion

of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. In re M.P.,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111608, 2023-Ohio-925, ¶ 24, citing State v. Simmons, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98613, 2013-Ohio-1789, ¶ 18, citing State v. Frazier, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 97178, 2012-Ohio-1198, ¶ 17. An abuse of discretion occurs when a

court exercises its judgment in an unwarranted way regarding a matter over which

it has discretionary authority. Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-

3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35.

              “‘The admissibility of other-acts evidence under Evid.R. 404(B) is a

question of law’ that we review de novo.” State v. Grimes, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

110925, 2022-Ohio-4526, ¶ 27, quoting State v. Hartman, 161 Ohio St.3d 214, 2020-

Ohio-4440, 161 N.E.3d 651, ¶ 22. “However, ‘the trial court’s weighing of the

probative value of admissible evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice to the

defendant under Evid.R. 403(A) involves an exercise of judgment.’” Id., quoting

State v. Kamer, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-20-084, 2022-Ohio-2070, ¶ 132, citing

State v. Worley, 164 Ohio St.3d 589, 2021-Ohio-2207, 174 N.E.3d 754, ¶ 117.

Therefore, we review that decision for an abuse of discretion. Id. The term abuse of

discretion implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or

unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140

(1983); Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463.

              Evid.R. 404(B) provides that

      [e]vidence of any other crime, wrong or act is not admissible to prove
      the person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the
      person acted in accordance with the character.

      This evidence may, be admissible for another purpose, such as proving
      motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
      absence of mistake, or lack of accident.
Further, Evid.R. 403(A) provides that, although relevant, evidence is not admissible

if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,

of confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury.

               The Ohio Supreme Court has set forth a three-step analysis for

determining whether other acts evidence is admissible:

      The first step is to consider whether the other acts evidence is relevant
      to making any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
      action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
      Evid.R. 401. The next step is to consider whether evidence of the other
      crimes, wrongs, or acts is presented to prove the character of the
      accused in order to show activity in conformity therewith or whether
      the other acts evidence is presented for a legitimate purpose, such as
      those stated in Evid.R. 404(B). The third step is to consider whether
      the probative value of the other acts evidence is substantially
      outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Evid.R. 403.

State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 521, 2012-Ohio-5695, 983 N.E.2d 1278, ¶ 20.

               With respect to the first step of the Williams analysis, we note that

the rap video makes several consequential facts more or less probable than they

would be without the video. First, the video, taken together with witness testimony,

places A.S. in the Arbor Park complex within hours of the shooting. Further, it is

highly relevant to the identification of A.S. as one of the suspects in the black SUV.

A.S.’s clothing in the video, and the clothing of at least one individual in the

background of the video, appear to be the same as the clothing of two of the

individuals who exited and reentered the black SUV. While the surveillance footage

alone would have made it difficult to identify any of the suspects, that footage

together with the rap video were critical in determining A.S.’s identity.
               With respect to the second step of the Williams analysis, we begin by

noting that the trial court heard A.S.’s arguments as to the highly prejudicial nature

of the video and stated that it would consider the video for a limited purpose —

specifically, for identifying A.S. The video was not shown to a jury, but rather to an

experienced juvenile court judge. Further, “we presume that ‘the court considered

only the relevant, material, and competent evidence in arriving at its judgment

unless it affirmatively appears to the contrary.’” State v. Robbins, 1st Dist. Hamilton

No. C-120107, 2013-Ohio-612, ¶ 14, quoting State v. White, 15 Ohio St.2d 146, 151,

239 N.E.2d 65 (1968).

               Finally, with respect to the third step, we agree with the trial court

that the probative value of the video was not substantially outweighed by the danger

of unfair prejudice. The rap video made the identification of A.S. more probable

than it would have been without the evidence, and the evidence was necessary for

the legitimate purpose of establishing A.S.’s identity. State v. Woods, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga Nos. 112579 and 112580, 2024-Ohio-467, ¶ 33.

               The video at issue set the stage for the shooting that very closely

followed the filming, and its probative value far outweighed its prejudice. In light of

the foregoing, we cannot conclude that the admission of the rap video was an abuse

of discretion. Therefore, A.S.’s second assignment of error is overruled.

               Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, PRESIDING JUDGE

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR