Court Opinion

ID: 9468044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:02:44.235245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:39.008920
License: Public Domain

MISHLER, District Judge,
concurring:
I concur. However, my concurrence does not extend to the views expressed in the majority opinion on the Sixth Amendment violation claim.
Though DiLapi’s Sixth Amendment rights were clearly in effect at the time of the five minute recess, I am unconvinced that his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel precluded the trial judge from directing him not to discuss “the case” with anyone. The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” I find that the majority’s position — that the Sixth Amendment permits a defendant to “consult with his counsel during any recess so long as the orderly conduct of the trial is not impaired,” ante, at 148 (emphasis added), — is too broad.
Under the circumstances of this case, DiLapi’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not implicated by the trial court’s prohibition. The right to assistance of counsel during defendant’s cross-examination while the court is in session is limited to the defense counsel’s right, and obligation, to make objection to inappropriate questions and other irregularities which appear during cross-examination.1 The Sixth Amendment right does not encompass the right to consult counsel during cross-examination. *150Rather the defendant must rely on, and is amply protected by, the obligation of the court to conduct a fair trial, and its further obligation to preserve the integrity of the judicial process. Accordingly, I find that DiLapi’s right to consult with counsel rested exclusively on his right to a fair trial which is guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
In reaching this conclusion, I am guided by Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 47 L.Ed.2d 592 (1976), as well as an historical interpretation of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to counsel. In Geders, the prohibition against consulting with counsel was with respect to an overnight recess. The objection leveled against that direction at trial was based on the belief that defendant’s attorney “had a right to confer with his client about matters other than the imminent cross-examination .... ” Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. at 82, 96 S.Ct. at 1332. The Court did not hold that the Sixth Amendment necessarily afforded defendant the right to discuss his cross-examination with counsel during a trial recess. Rather, the Court determined that because of the variety of important matters relating to all aspects of the trial which are routinely discussed during overnight recesses, the trial judge’s attempt to secure “truth and fairness” in the trial process by prohibiting attorney-client consultations when there had been a perceived “risk of improper ‘coaching’ ” must give way to the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id. at 87-91, 96 S.Ct. at 1335-37. In suggesting one method for coping with “the problem of possible improper influence on testimony,” the Court alluded to the scope of the right to assistance of counsel during brief trial recesses as follows:
“[T]he trial judge, if he doubts that defense counsel will observe the ethical limits on guiding witnesses, may direct that the examination of the witness continue without interruption until completed. If the judge considers the risk high he may arrange the sequence of testimony so that direct and cross-examination of a witness will be completed without interruption. * # * Inconvenience to the parties, witnesses, counsel, and court personnel may occasionally result ... if a court continues in session several hours beyond the normal adjournment hour.... [However,] con-, venience occasionally must yield to concern for the integrity of the trial itself.” 425 U.S. at 90-91, 96 S.Ct. at 1336 (footnote omitted).
The trial judge’s power to continue trial without recess for the purpose of preventing an attorney’s improper coaching will not accommodate a construction of the Sixth Amendment which guarantees the defendant a right to consult counsel during cross-examination.
The scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has evolved over the years based on the Court’s perception of counsel’s importance in “guiding” the defendant through the trial process. See e. g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55; 64, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (a layman requires the “guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him” because of his lack of “skill and knowledge” in the law); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 225, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1931, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (the right to assistance of counsel at pretrial confrontations arises “whenever necessary to assure a meaningful ‘defence’ ”); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 308-09, 93 S.Ct. 2568, 2573, 37 L.Ed.2d 619 (1973) (the right derives in part from the “desire to minimize the imbalance in the adversary system”). However, conceding the fact that consultation with counsel by a defendant who is undergoing cross-examination is desirable, and may even be necessary, for the purpose of rendering credible testimony, we must also account for the function of cross-examination in the trial process in construing the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel.
The age-old tool for ferreting out truth in the trial process is the right to cross-examination. “For two centuries past, the policy of the Anglo-American system of evidence has been to regard the necessity of testing by cross-examination as a vital feature of *151the law.” 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1367 (Chadbourn rev. 1974). The importance of cross-examination to the English judicial system, and its continuing importance since the inception of our judicial system in testing the facts offered by the defendant on direct, see U.S.Const. Amend. VI (confrontation clause); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1068, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 1076, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965), suggests that the right to assistance of counsel did not include the right to have counsel’s advice on cross-examination.
The Court has consistently acknowledged the vital role of cross-examination in the search for truth. It has recognized that the defendant’s decision to take the stand, and to testify on his own behalf, places into question his credibility as a witness and that the prosecution has the right to test his credibility on cross-examination. See e. g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626-27, 100 S.Ct. 1912, 1916-17, 64 L.Ed.2d 559 (government must be permitted “proper and effective cross-examination. . .. ”), reh. denied, 446 U.S. 620, 101 S.Ct. 25, 65 L.Ed.2d 1172 (1980); Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154-55, 78 S.Ct. 622, 626, 2 L.Ed.2d 822, reh. denied, 356 U.S. 948, 78 S.Ct. 776, 2 L.Ed.2d 822 (1958). Once the defendant places himself at the very heart of the trial process, it only comports with basic fairness that the story presented on direct is measured for its accuracy and completeness by uninfluenced testimony on cross-examination. Cf. Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. at 154-55, 78 S.Ct. at 626, quoting, Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 315, 20 S.Ct. 944, 949, 44 L.Ed. 1078 (1900) (“[W]e know of no reason why an accused person who takes, the stand as a witness should not be subject to cross-examination as other witnesses.”).
The assistance which accrues to the defendant by virtue of counsel’s presence in the courtroom during defendant’s cross-examination needs no discussion here. Surely such assistance is consistent with the plain meaning of that term as it is used in the Sixth Amendment right to counsel clause— i. e., “the right of the accused to have counsel acting as his assistant,” United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. at 312, 93 S.Ct. at 2575, — and, I believe, in the context of the question before us, it adequately “assure[s] fairness in the adversary criminal process.” United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364, 101 S.Ct. 665, 667, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981). Accordingly, in light of the relevant history, I conclude that counsel’s presence in the courtroom during defendant’s cross-examination fully satisfies the Sixth Amendment mandate for the limited purpose indicated.
Having grounded DiLapi’s right to confer with counsel while undergoing cross-examination on the Fifth Amendment due process clause, only a showing of a clear abuse of the trial judge’s discretion would provide a basis for reversal. See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. at 86-87, 96 S.Ct. at 1334-35. The trial judge, not having abused his discretion, did not violate defendant’s right to due process. Accordingly, I find no error in the trial judge’s instruction.

. As the majority points out, United States v. Leighton, 386 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1025, 88 S.Ct. 1412, 20 L.Ed.2d 282 (1968), concerned a prohibition against attorney-client communications during a recess that occurred between the defendant’s direct and cross-examination. For the reasons set out in my concurrence, I would qualify the majority’s interpretation of Leighton in accordance with the view herein set forth.