Court Opinion

ID: 2964681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:29:27.021198+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:08.672957
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

          No. 96-1120

                                    UNITED STATES,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                             HONORIO GONZALEZ-MALDONADO,
                        a/k/a NORI, a/k/a JOHN DOE 94 CR360-3,
                           a/k/a ONORIO GONZALEZ-MALDANDO,

                                Defendant - Appellant.

                                 ____________________

          No. 96-1296

                                    UNITED STATES,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                             GERMAN MONTALVO, a/k/a ITO,
                              a/k/a JOHN DOE 94 CR360-2,

                                Defendant - Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                    [Hon. H ctor M. Laffitte, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                            Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                              and Selya, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                _____________________

               Jos  A. Pag n-Nieves, by appointment of the Court, with whom
               ____________________
          Jos   A. Pag n  Nieves Law  Offices, was  on brief  for appellant
          ___________________________________
          Honorio Gonz lez-Maldonado.
               Judith H.  Mizner, with whom Ricardo  R. Pesquera-Annexy was
               _________________            ___________________________
          on brief for appellant Germ n Montalvo.
               Lena  Watkins, Attorney,  with whom  John C.  Keeney, Acting
               _____________                        _______________
          Assistant  Attorney  General,  Theresa  M.B.  Van  Vliet,  Chief,
                                         _________________________
          Criminal  Division, Narcotic  and  Dangerous  Drug Section,  U.S.
          Department of  Justice, and  Guillermo Gil, Acting  United States
                                       _____________
          Attorney, were on brief for appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                     May 30, 1997
                                 ____________________

                                         -2-

                    TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.   Appellants Honorio  Gonz lez-
                    TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.
                               ___________

          Maldonado ("Gonz lez-Maldonado") and German Montalvo ("Montalvo")

          appeal  their  convictions  on  charges of  money  laundering  in

          violation    of   18   U.S.C.         2,   1956(a)(1)(A)(i)   and

          1956(a)(1)(B)(i)  and  conspiracy  to  possess  with  intent   to

          distribute  five or more kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21

          U.S.C.    846.   For the  reasons stated herein  we vacate  their
                                                              ______

          convictions and remand to the district court.

                    On appeal from a conviction, we review the facts in the

          light  most favorable  to  the verdict.    See United  States  v.
                                                     ___ ______________

          Staula, 80 F.3d 596, 599 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 156
          ______                               ____________

          (1996).  On  that basis, the jury could  have found the following

          facts.

                    In the spring of 1993, the FBI began a money laundering

          investigation.  An undercover FBI agent, Agent Mart n Su rez, and

          an  informant infiltrated  a money  laundering organization  that

          worked under  the direction of  a man known as  "Honcho."  Honcho

          communicated to Agent Su rez and the informant that they would be

          contacted through their pager, by a person using the code "Romero

          55."    On May 24, 1994, Agent Su rez received a page from Romero

          55 and contacted  him by phone.  Agent Su rez, the informant, and

          Romero 55   -- who  was later identified  as Julio  Robles-Torres

          ("Robles") -- arranged to  meet the following day, at  which time

          Romero 55  delivered approximately  $600,000 to Agent  Su rez and

          the informant.  The  conversation that took place at  the meeting

                                         -3-

          was  recorded,  although there  were  periods  when the  recorder

          malfunctioned.

                    At  trial,  the court  admitted the  taped conversation

          into  evidence  over the  objection  of defense  counsel.   Agent

          Su rez testified that during the interrupted portion of the tape,

          Robles indicated that he  had started an individual named  "Papo"

          in  "this business" and that  Papo had made  six million dollars.

          Agent  Su rez testified that, in the context of the conversation,

          he  interpreted "this business" to  mean the drug  business.  The

          exchange  between Agent  Su rez  and government  counsel went  as

          follows:

                      Agent  Su rez:    I  recall  that  he had
                      mentioned that  he  had started  Papo  in
                      this  business.  He had -- also mentioned
                      that Papo was in the car repair business.

                      Government:  Okay.  When  you say that he
                      started --  he, Robles, had  started Papo
                      in that  business,  what business  is  he
                      talking about?

                      Agent Su rez:  In the drug business.

          Tr. 2 at 278.

                    During the taped conversation, Robles also stated  that

          he had  given a lottery  ticket in  the amount of  $250,000 to  a

          friend of Papo.   Agent Su rez testified that drug  smugglers buy

          winning lottery tickets in order to launder  money.  There was no

          mention  of  Montalvo  or  Gonz lez-Maldonado  during  the  taped

          conversation.

                    Based on the delivery  of $600,000 and the conversation

          between  Agent Su rez and Robles, the government obtained a court

                                         -4-

          order authorizing  the interception of communications  on Robles'

          cellular phone.   At trial,  the government introduced  more than

          sixty  of these intercepted calls.  The government states that in

          fifteen of those calls,  appellant Montalvo, identified as "Ito,"

          spoke  with   Robles;  and  in   ten  calls,  Gonz lez-Maldonado,

          identified as "Nori," spoke with Robles.

                    On  June 27,  1994, FBI  Special Agent  Daniel Gonz lez

          intercepted  a conversation between Robles and Papo.  During that

          conversation,  Robles  and Papo  referred  to  "tickets."   Agent

          Gonz lez,  over  objection,  testified  that  the  word  "ticket"

          referred  to money.   Neither  appellant participated  in or  was

          mentioned during the call.

                    On June 28, 1994, six conversations were intercepted by

          police.   The jury  could have concluded  that appellant Montalvo

          participated  in one  of  these calls.    The first  call  was to

          appellant   Gonz lez-Maldonado   at  his   store,   Mazda  Fever.

          Gonz lez-Maldonado indicated that he had four tickets, and Robles

          said that they could combine their tickets.

                    Based  on  these  calls,  another  FBI  Special  Agent,

          Michael Plichta, set up surveillance at Mazda Fever.  He observed

          Robles arrive in a gray Volvo  around 4:00 p.m., on June 28, meet

          briefly with an  unidentified male, and  then drive around  back,

          where  he remained, out  of sight, for  twenty minutes.   At 4:20

          p.m., an individual identified only as "Chepe" called Robles, who

          stated that he was picking up the tickets at that moment and that

          he would proceed to  deliver them.  When Robles  departed, he was

                                         -5-

          followed to a Ponderosa restaurant, where he met briefly with two

          men.   Shortly thereafter, the two men were detained and $715,309

          was  seized from a  suitcase and a  cardboard box  found in their

          car.      The following day, Papo  and Robles had three telephone

          conversations about  the seizure,  including the question  of who

          would assume responsibility for the lost money.

                    In  recorded conversations  on  July  8,  1994,  Robles

          confirmed with Montalvo and an individual identified as "Gurucho"

          that Gonz lez-Maldonado had all the tickets.  In his conversation

          with  Gurucho,  Robles  indicated  that  Gurucho  should  contact

          Gonz lez-Maldonado  about a delivery.   Gonz lez  informed Robles

          that  Gurucho  had  directed  them  to  make  a  delivery  to  an

          individual identified as "Nina" at the Condado Plaza Hotel.

                    On July  9, 1994,  the FBI established  surveillance at

          the  Condado  Plaza  Hotel.    FBI  Special  Agent  Jane  Peltier

          testified  that  Robles  went to  Mazda  Fever  around 8:30  a.m.

          Shortly after, he left  Mazda Fever and proceeded to  the Condado

          Plaza Hotel parking garage, arriving around 9:00 a.m.  Carrying a

          gray bag,  he went to the  eighth floor, and then  left the hotel

          empty-handed.  FBI agents entered room 825 and recovered the gray

          bag and seized $243,600 from the safe in the room.

                    At the time of  Montalvo's arrest, police seized, among

          other things, a  photocopy of  a Puerto Rico  lottery check,  two

          pagers, and two notebooks.  In addition to Montalvo and Gonz lez-

          Maldonado,  the police  arrested Robles.   The  three were  to be

                                         -6-

          tried together until, in March 1995, Robles was found incompetent

          to stand trial and the case against him was severed.

                    Appellants assert  several claims  on appeal.   We find

          some  of   those  claims   valid,  warranting  reversal   of  the

          convictions.   In order to give  as much guidance as  possible to

          the district court, we also discuss some of the other claims that

          are likely to resurface if there is a new trial.

                   I.  The Psychiatric Testimony of Dr. Jos  Fumero
                   I.  The Psychiatric Testimony of Dr. Jos  Fumero

                    Appellants  argue  that  the district  court  erred  in

          excluding the testimony of Dr. Fumero, the psychiatrist who  had,

          at   the  court's  direction,   initially  examined   Robles  for

          competency.  This claim includes two distinct arguments.   First,

          appellants  claim that the court  erred in excluding Dr. Fumero's

          testimony after defense counsel had  relied on an earlier  ruling

          that the testimony would  be allowed.  Second, appellants  assert

          that the court's decision to exclude Fumero's testimony was based

          on the mistaken  belief that  the testimony was  offered only  to

          address the issue of Robles' competency as a witness.  Appellants

          contend that the testimony was actually offered to:

                      provide  information  concerning  Robles'
                      medical   history   and   his   diagnosed
                      schizophrenia,    and     the    possible
                      ramifications  of   Robles'  illness  for
                      evaluation   of   the   evidence  to   be
                      introduced   at   trial  --   to  provide
                      information  relevant  to  whether, as  a
                      result  of his  mental disease  or defect
                      Robles  was  unable  to   appreciate  the
                      nature and quality or wrongfulness of his
                      acts  in  May-June,   1994;  or   whether
                      aspects of  his illness were  relevant to
                      assessing the reliability and  meaning of
                      Robles' statements.

                                         -7-

          Brief  of Appellant Montalvo, at 17.   We deal with each claim in

          turn.

                    A.  Opening Statements
                    A.  Opening Statements

                    Prior to  trial, defense  counsel met with  Dr. Fumero,

          who had conducted the competency  examination of Robles.   Fumero

          opined that Robles was suffering froma mental illness at the time

          of  the  offenses  and that  his  mental  illness  resulted in  a

          tendency  to exaggerate.  Defense counsel informed the court that

          he  intended  to  have  Fumero testify  at  trial,  arguing  that

          Fumero's testimony  should be  admitted  so that  the jury  could

          determine the weight to be given to the taped conversations.  Tr.

          1 at 7.  The court stated  that it would "let Dr. Fumero  testify

          and then let that go to the jury."1  Tr. 1 at 21.

                    During opening statements, counsel for  both defendants

          made reference  to Robles' mental  state.  Counsel  for Gonz lez-

          Maldonado promised the jury that he  would produce a psychiatrist

          who   would  testify   that   a  person   in  Robles'   condition

          "exaggerates,  and  that  everything   that  he  talks  about  is

          greater."   Tr. 1 at 163.   Counsel for Montalvo,  in his opening

          statement, stated:

                      The  expert  selected   by  this   Court,
                      Dr. Fumero, selected by this  Court, will
                      come   here,  will  sit  there  and  will
                      testify that during this conspiracy . . .
                      Mr. Julio   Robles-Torres  was   mentally
                      insane.  Therefore, you cannot trust him.

                              
          ____________________

          1  Following opening statements, the court reiterated  its intent
          to allow Dr. Fumero to testify.  "I said I would allow Dr. Fumero
          to testify at trial."  Tr. 1 at 189.

                                         -8-

                      You  cannot  put much  attention  to what
                      he's saying because he exaggerates.

          Tr. 1 at 169.

                    During the  presentation of defendants' case, the court

          reconsidered  its earlier  decision and  decided that  Dr. Fumero

          would  not be allowed to testify because the testimony would only

          go to  the issue of Robles'  competency as a witness,  which is a

          question for the court, and that evidence of a mental defect does

          not render testimony inadmissible.  See Tr. 8 at 1506.
                                              ___

                    Appellants  argue that  even if Fumero's  testimony was

          properly excluded, the court  committed reversible error by first

          ruling that it would permit Fumero to testify and then, after the

          close of the  government's case, ruling that his  testimony would

          be excluded.

                    In  Anderson v.  Butler, 858 F.2d  16 (1st  Cir. 1988),
                        ________     ______

          defense counsel, in his opening, told the jury that he would call

          a  psychiatrist and a psychologist to show that the defendant had

          no appreciation of what he had done.  Counsel subsequently rested

          his case without calling the promised doctors, although they were

          available.  On appeal, this  court held that the failure to  call

          these witnesses amounted  to ineffective  assistance of  counsel,

          stating that "little  is more  damaging than to  fail to  produce

          important evidence that had been promised in an opening."  Id. at
                                                                     ___

          17.  "The  first thing the  ultimately disappointed jurors  would

          believe,  in the absence of some other explanation, would be that

          the doctors were  unwilling, viz.,  unable, to live  up to  their

          billing.   This they  would not  forget."   Id.   "[T]he  jurors'
                                                      ___

                                         -9-

          conclusion  would  remain  that  impartial experts  --  the  most

          qualified witnesses -- would not testify as counsel had said they

          would; in effect a contradiction of the favorable  lay witnesses,

          much worse than if  he had not mentioned the  doctors initially."

          Id.   Furthermore, "to promise  even a condensed  recital of such
          ___

          powerful  evidence,  and  then  not  produce  it,  could  not  be

          disregarded as harmless.  We  find it prejudicial as a  matter of

          law."  Id. at 19.
                 ___

                    The case at  bar raises similar concerns.   The opening

          statements for the  defense included a promise to the jury that a

          psychiatrist would testify to  the effect that Robles exaggerates

          as a  result of his mental  illness.  Unlike in  Anderson, it was
                                                           ________

          the district court that prevented the defense from fulfilling its

          promise to the jury.  Having obtained the  assurance of the court

          that Dr.  Fumero would  be allowed  to  testify, defense  counsel

          stated as much  to the jury.   When the  court later changed  its

          mind and ruled that the expert would not be permitted to testify,

          defendants were unable to produce the promised testimony.

                    Like  the jury in Anderson,  the jury in  this case was
                                      ________

          likely to infer from defense counsel's failure to call Dr. Fumero

          that he  was unwilling to testify  for the defense.   Nor was the

          jury informed of the fact that it  was the court's ruling, rather

          than the  defendants'  decision, that  kept  Dr. Fumero  off  the

          stand. Although Anderson  concerned an ineffective assistance  of
                          ________

          counsel  claim, the  principle  behind Anderson  applies in  this
                                                 ________

          case.   A defendant's opening statement prepares the jury to hear

                                         -10-

          his  case.   If  the defense  fails  to produce  promised  expert

          testimony  that is  critical to  the defense  strategy, a  danger

          arises that the jury will presume that the expert is unwilling to

          testify and the  defense is  flawed.  That  the defendant  should

          suffer  this presumption because he  relied on a  prior ruling of

          the trial court that  the same court later reversed,  rather than

          because of  poor judgment on the  part of his own  counsel, in no

          way changes the fact that the  presumption formed in the minds of

          the jury  is prejudicial.   As we did  in Anderson, we  find that
                                                    ________

          promising to admit  this important evidence  and then failing  to

          produce it is prejudicial as a matter of law in the circumstances

          of this  case.    Following  Anderson, therefore,  we  find  that
                                       ________

          denying defendants the opportunity to have Dr. Fumero testify, in

          light  of the fact  that the court's  decision on  the matter led

          defense  counsel,  in  their  opening  remarks,  to  promise  the

          expert's testimony to the jury, was reversible error.

                    B.   The Admissibility of Dr. Fumero's Testimony
                    B.   The Admissibility of Dr. Fumero's Testimony

                    Appellants also  challenge the district  court's ruling

          that  Dr.  Fumero's  testimony  is inadmissible.    On  appellate

          review, "[a] district court's decision to admit or exclude expert

          testimony  is entitled  to  great deference."   United  States v.
                                                          ______________

          Shay,  57 F.3d  126, 132 (1st  Cir. 1995).   We  will reverse the
          ____

          trial court's decision on this question only if "(1) the district

          court based the decision  on an incorrect legal standard,  or (2)

          we  have a 'definite  and firm conviction  that the  court made a

                                         -11-

          clear error of  judgment in the conclusion it  reached based on a

          weighing of the relevant factors.'"  Id. (citations omitted).
                                               ___

                    Defendants' argument proceeds  as follows.  Dr.  Fumero

          was a qualified  witness within  the meaning of  Federal Rule  of

          Evidence 702, as the court  agreed.  Tr. 8 at 1483.  He proffered

          to  the  court  that the  symptoms  of  Robles'  mental condition

          include "verbosity;" "grandeza" ("[h]e  has to feel important and

          the  center of  attention as  part of  his .  . .  fragmented ego

          needs"), Tr.  8 at  1497; and  exaggeration.   Because defendants

          faced criminal charges  based largely  on recorded  conversations

          involving Robles,  and because the government  claimed that these

          conversations demonstrated  the existence of  a drug  conspiracy,

          the  weight placed on the taped conversations  by the jury was of

          paramount importance.   Indeed, the defendants'  case was founded

          on the view that  the recorded conversations were discussions  of

          legitimate business dealings.   If  the jury  could be  convinced

          that  Robles' testimony was  unreliable because he  had a medical

          condition that  led him to exaggerate, it would be more likely to

          believe  the  defense theory  that  they were  involved  in legal

          business activity.

                    The  district court ruled that Dr.  Fumero would not be

          allowed to testify on the ground that "the fact that a person may

          suffer a mental defect  or problem does not render  his testimony

          inadmissible."  Tr.  8 at  1459.  The  court stated further  that

          "[y]ou  cannot bring a  witness and  say, well,  this man  is not

          telling the truth  or he can't tell  the truth."  Tr.  8 at 1465.

                                         -12-

          The court appears to have understood Dr. Fumero's testimony to be

          related to the competency of  Robles:  "What I suggest to  you is

          that we give to the jury a stipulation that Julio Robles had been

          held not competent  to stand trial  at this time  but that he  is

          being evaluated further."  Tr. 8 at 1466.

                    It is well established that a witness' mental state can

          be relevant to  the issue  of the witness'  credibility.   United
                                                                     ______

          States v.  Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 82 (1st Cir. 1992).  The competency
          ______     ____

          of a  witness to  testify is  a determination to  be made  by the

          trial judge, but issues of credibility are for the trier of fact.

          See United States v. Carroll, 105 F.3d  740, 743 (1st Cir. 1997);
          ___ _____________    _______

          United States v. Hyson, 721 F.2d 856, 864 (1st Cir. 1983).
          _____________    _____

                    The ability of parties to offer expert testimony on the

          question  of  credibility  is  not, however,  unlimited.    "[A]n

          expert's  opinion that  another witness  is lying or  telling the

          truth is ordinarily inadmissible pursuant to Rule 702 because the

          opinion exceeds  the scope of the  expert's specialized knowledge

          and  therefore merely  informs the  jury that  it should  reach a

          particular conclusion."   Shay,  57 F.3d  at 131.   On  the other
                                    ____

          hand,  "no constitutional  provision, law,  or rule  requires the

          exclusion  of  expert  testimony  simply because  it  concerns  a

          credibility  question."  Id.  To be admissible under Federal Rule
                                   ___

          of  Evidence 702,  a  proposed  expert  witness  must:    (1)  be

          qualified  to   testify  as  an  expert   by  "knowledge,  skill,

          experience, training, or education,"  Fed. R. Evid. 702;  (2) the

          testimony  must   concern   "scientific,  technical,   or   other

                                         -13-

          specialized knowledge,"  Fed. R. Evid. 702; and (3) the testimony

          must  "assist the trier of fact to  understand the evidence or to

          determine a fact in issue."  Fed. R. Evid. 702.  Shay, 57 F.3d at
                                                           ____

          132.

                    In  Shay, the  defendant,  Shay Jr.,  was convicted  of
                        ____

          "conspiracy and aiding  and abetting  an attempt to  blow up  his

          father's car."  Shay, 57 F.3d at 128.  Shortly after the bombing,
                          ____

          he told a police officer  that "he was sorry about it  and wished

          he  could turn  back the  hands of  time."   Id.   The government
                                                       ___

          argued that this  statement was evidence of Shay Jr.'s guilt.  As

          part of his  defense, Shay  Jr. sought  to call  Dr. Phillips,  a

          psychiatrist, to  testify that Shay  Jr. suffered  from a  mental

          disorder known  as "pseudolog a fant stica."   The expert witness

          was to testify  that this  illness caused Shay  Jr. to  fabricate

          self-aggrandizing lies  that would  place him  at  the center  of

          attention.   Id.  at 129-30.   The  district court  excluded this
                       ___

          testimony  on the ground that the jury was capable of determining

          the reliability of Shay Jr.'s statements.

                    The Shay  panel held that  expert psychiatric testimony
                        ____

          can  be  admitted in  appropriate  circumstances  to establish  a

          witness' "character for truthfulness."  Id. at 131.  The  instant
                                                  ___

          case  is governed  by  Shay, and  our  analysis follows  the  one
                                 ____

          adopted there.

                    Neither party challenges Dr. Fumero's qualifications as

          an expert.  The proffered testimony  concerned the mental illness

          of  Robles and  its impact  on his behavior  -- implying  that it

                                         -14-

          concerned "scientific, technical or  specialized knowledge."  The

          remaining question is whether it would have assisted the trier of

          fact to understand the evidence or to determine  a fact in issue.

          The  question that a court  must answer in  determining whether a

          proposed expert's  testimony  will assist  the trier  of fact  is

          "whether  the untrained  layman would  be qualified  to determine

          intelligently  and  to  the  best degree,  the  particular  issue

          without enlightenment  from those having a  special understanding

          of  the subject matter involved."  Id. at 132 (internal quotation
                                             ___

          marks  omitted).   Dr. Fumero's  testimony  would  have discussed

          Robles' mental  illness.   Dr. Fumero  would have  testified that

          Robles, as a result of his illness, was prone to exaggeration.

                    Moreover, this  case has  a unique dimension.   Because

          Robles  was incompetent  to testify,  the jury  did not  have the

          usual chance to evaluate his demeanor.  Yet, the tapes containing

          his statements were  introduced, and  they were  damaging to  the

          defense.   In light of  the fact that  the government's  case was

          heavily dependent  on  Robles' taped  conversations,  we  believe

          that,  in these unusual circumstance, the testimony that he had a

          mental   illness  that   led  to  "verbosity,"   "grandeza,"  and

          exaggeration  was highly  relevant and  that an  untrained layman

          would not  be qualified  to determine  intelligently, and to  the

          best degree the weight to  place on Robles's recorded  statements

          without enlightenment from Dr. Fumero.

                    The  government  argues  that  Dr.  Fumero's  testimony

          should  be disallowed  because  the taped  conversations featured

                                         -15-

          current actions  which were largely corroborated.   To the extent

          that Robles did suffer from the mental illness at issue, however,

          Dr. Fumero's  testimony could be  relevant to the  credibility of

          current  statements.     The   defense  theory  is   that  Robles

          exaggerated his situation in  statements that he made --  a claim

          for which Dr. Fumero's testimony  is clearly relevant.  That  the

          statements  were,  in the  view of  the government,  accurate, is

          something for the jury to consider in its deliberations.  It goes

          to the weight to be given to  the evidence and is not a reason to

          exclude Dr. Fumero's testimony.

                    We conclude,  therefore, that the  district court erred

          in refusing to allow Dr. Fumero to testify.2

                     II.  The Use of the Government's Transcripts
                     II.  The Use of the Government's Transcripts

                    A.  The Transcripts
                    A.  The Transcripts

                    Defendants also claim that  transcripts provided by the

          government and used by  the jury should not have  been permitted.

          The government provided transcripts of the taped conversations to

          the jury so that when the tape was played, the  jury could follow

          along  on the  transcripts.   The transcripts  included quotation

          marks around certain words that the government claimed  were code

          words used to  conceal the illegal  nature of the  conversations.

          For  example, quotation marks  were placed  around words  such as

          "ticket,"  which the  government claimed  referred to  money, and
                              
          ____________________

          2   We need not engage in a harmless error analysis at this point
          because we  are  reversing and  remanding  on other  grounds,  as
          discussed in the preceding section of this opinion.

                                         -16-

          "accident,"  which allegedly  referred  to  arrest.   Defendants'

          objection to these transcripts was overruled.

                    This circuit  allows the use  of transcripts as  a jury

          aid  to tape recording playback.   See United  States v. Carbone,
                                             ___ ______________    _______

          798 F.2d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 1986).  Where transcripts are used, the

          judge should,  as was done  here, "make clear [to  the jury] that

          the tapes, not the transcript, constitute  evidence in the case."

          United  States v.  Richman, 600  F.2d 286,  295 (1st  Cir. 1979).
          ______________     _______

          Furthermore, we have stated that:

                      Even if transcripts  are not admitted  in
                      evidence, in the sense of being marked as
                      exhibits, they are read and relied  on by
                      the jury  to follow  the playback.   They
                      should,  therefore,  be  as  accurate  as
                      possible.

          Carbone, 798 F.2d at 27.
          _______

                    The  quotation marks used  in the transcripts submitted

          to the jury in this case  reflect the government's theory of  the

          case.  The  government does not claim  that there is any  audible

          emphasis or  other vocal  inflection placed  on the marked  words

          that is discernible when  listening to the tape and  failed, both

          at trial and on  appeal, to offer any legitimate  explanation for

          the  quotation marks.   We  hold that  the trial  court committed

          erred when  it  allowed the  use  of transcripts  that  contained

          quotation marks around certain words.  It is not  enough that the

          court  instructed the  jury  that only  the  tapes, and  not  the

          transcripts,  were evidence.  Nor is it enough for the government

          to subsequently present evidence that the words were  code words.

                                         -17-

          The government should not  be allowed to bolster its  argument by

          customizing the transcript to reflect its own theory of the case.

                    B.  The Agents' Interpretation of the Transcript
                    B.  The Agents' Interpretation of the Transcript

                    The next claim advanced by appellants is that the court

          erred  when  it  allowed  FBI agents  to  interpret  the recorded

          conversations.     Appellants'  briefs  fail  to  offer  detailed

          descriptions  of the  incidents  to which  they object,  although

          Gonz lez-Maldonado's brief cites to  seventeen incidents that are

          generally  alleged to  represent occasions  on which  the agents'

          interpretations  went  beyond   interpretation  of  code   words.

          Although appellants objected on certain occasions, they failed to

          object  on many  of the  instances cited  in Gonz lez-Maldonado's

          brief.

                    Although  expert  testimony  is permitted  in  order to

          assist  the jury  in understanding  "code-like" conversations  in

          tape recordings,  interpretations of clear conversations  are not

          admissible.  See  United States  v. Montas, 41  F.3d 775,  783-84
                       ___  _____________     ______

          (1st  Cir. 1994); United States v. Lamattina, 889 F.2d 1191, 1194
                            _____________    _________

          (1st Cir. 1989).

                      Expert testimony  on  a subject  that  is
                      well   within  the  bounds  of  a  jury's
                      ordinary experience  generally has little
                      probative value.  On the other  hand, the
                      risk  of unfair  prejudice is  real.   By
                      appearing  to put  the expert's  stamp of
                      approval on the government's theory, such
                      testimony  might   unduly  influence  the
                      jury's  own  assessment of  the inference
                      that is being urged.

          Montas, 41 F.3d at 784.
          ______

                                         -18-

                    We are conscious of the fact that the interpretation of

          alleged  code-words used by the defendants in a complex case such

          as  this  may require  the expert  to  make statements  about the

          context  in which those words  are being used.   Nevertheless, we

          find that in some of the instances cited by appellants, the court

          erred  by allowing  FBI  agents to  comment  on clear  statements

          contained  on the  tapes.   Because  we  are reversing  on  other

          grounds, we need not review each alleged transgression.  Instead,

          we offer an example, in the  hope that such errors can be avoided

          if there is another trial.

                    At one  point Agent  Plichta observed, in  reference to

          one of  the recordings, that  the participants in  a conversation

          "appeared  relieved when they -- when they -- when they discussed

          the fact that apparently they'd been able to make the delivery of

          money  and nothing  happened.   They  were  both relieved  and  I

          believe one  of them even chuckles a  bit about that."   Tr. 5 at

          848.  That the speakers  on the tape were, or were  not, relieved

          is for the jury to determine, and the testimony of the agent does

          not assist them in this effort.

                    III.  Spanish Definitions in Jury Instructions
                    III.  Spanish Definitions in Jury Instructions

                    Appellant Montalvo claims that the district court erred

          in its instructions to  the jury.  Specifically, he  alleges that

          the  court included in its  definition of the  term "willfully" a

          Spanish translation that is inaccurate.

                    In  delivering its instructions,  the court  stated the

          following:

                                         -19-

                         The word "knowingly," as that term has
                      been  used from  time  to time  in  these
                      instructions, means that the act was done
                      voluntarily  and  intentionally  and  not
                      because of mistake or accident.  That is,
                      "knowingly" means in Spanish a sabiendas.
                                                   ___________

                       The   word   "willfully"   --  that   is
                      voluntariamente  in  Spanish  -- as  that
                      _______________
                      term has  been used from time  to time in
                      these  instructions,  means that  the act
                      was  committed voluntarily  and purposely
                      with  the specific intent to do something
                      the law forbids; that is to say, with bad
                      purpose  either  to disobey  or disregard
                      the law . . . .

                         Now,   unlawfully    --   in   Spanish
                      ilegalmente -- means contrary to law.
                      ___________

          Tr. 9 at 1704-05.

                    Montalvo  argues  that   the  term  voluntariamente  is
                                                        _______________

          equivalent  to  the  English  term  "voluntary"  and,  therefore,

          represents  only  one  aspect  of willfulness.    As  the English

          definition suggests,  willfulness also  requires that the  act be

          committed  purposely and with the intent to do something that the

          law forbids.  See United States v. Yefsky, 994 F.2d 885, 899 (1st
                        ___ _____________    ______

          Cir.  1993).   We  conclude  that  Montalvo  is  correct  in  his

          assertion that  the term voluntariamente means  "voluntary."  See
                                   _______________                      ___

          The  Collins Spanish-English  English-Spanish Dictionary  (2d ed.

          1988).  It follows that the  use of this term in order  to assist

          jurors,   whose  predominant   language   may   be  Spanish,   in

          understanding the term "willfully" was ill-advised.   We need not

          inquire into  the question  of whether  it  is reversible  error,

          however, as we are reversing the judgment on other grounds.

                                         -20-

                    We add the following  note of caution.  Although  we do

          not believe that there should be an absolute rule prohibiting the

          use of non-English words when instructing the jury, we do believe

          that this practice is inadvisable and should be discouraged.  The

          English  meaning  of  the   word  "willfully,"  for  example,  is

          adequately covered by an instruction such as those that have been

          approved by this court in the past.  See, e.g.,  United States v.
                                               ___  ____   _____________

          Shadduck,  Nos. 95-1395, 95-1396,  96-1342, __  F.3d __,  1997 WL
          ________

          191877, at  *4 (April 24,  1997); Yefsky, 994  F.2d at 899.3   We
                                            ______

          therefore instruct  the district courts to  frame instructions in

          English.

                            IV.  The Admission of Evidence
                            IV.  The Admission of Evidence

                    A.   The Lottery Check
                    A.   The Lottery Check

                    At  trial, the  government  admitted  into  evidence  a

          photocopy of a  1992 lottery  check seized from  Montalvo at  the

          time of his  arrest.  The  check was in  the amount of  $250,000.

          The government introduced the evidence because Robles revealed to

          the undercover team that he had provided a winning lottery ticket

          in the amount of $250,000 to a friend of Papo who, the government

          claimed,  was in the drug  business.  That  appellant possessed a

          check for the exact amount was, the government  argued, probative

                              
          ____________________

          3  Reasonable proficiency  in teh English language is  a required
          qualification  for a  juror.  See  28 U.S.C.    1865(b)(2) & (3);
                                        ___
          United  States v.  Aponte-Su rez,  905 F.2d  483,  492 (1st  Cir.
          ______________     _____________
          1990). That juries  understand English is also  a practical need.
          The use of English is necessary for the  creation of an appellate
          record  which will  be read by  appellate judges  who may  not be
          versant in other languages, and who do not have the benefit of an
          official translator as is available in district courts.

                                         -21-

          of his  involvement in the alleged conspiracy.   Furthermore, the

          government  claims that  the fact  that the  check was  dated two

          years before the events  described does not change the  fact that

          it  was relevant because Papo  had worked with  Robles for a long

          time and the check was offered  to demonstrate the existence of a

          conspiracy long before the events of May through July 1994.

                    Appellant  Montalvo  claims   that  the  check   lacked

          relevance to the  case.  He claims that "[t]here  was no evidence

          to  show  that the  ticket  had come  from  Robles,  that it  was

          purchased  with  the proceeds  of  drug transactions  or  that it

          evidenced Montalvo's involvement with Robles in drug distribution

          at some earlier  time."  Brief of Appellant Montalvo,  at 32.  In

          essence, appellant  contends that  there was nothing  to indicate

          that  the  check  was evidence  of  any  element  of any  charged

          offense.

                    We add that, at sentencing, the  judge stated, "I don't

          find  a  reasonable  connection  for  this  case  to  find  by  a

          preponderance of  the evidence  that the $250,000  lottery ticket

          that was purchased is part of this conspiracy, and therefore I am

          excluding it."  Transcript of Sentencing, at 10.

                    We  review  this  evidentiary   ruling  for  abuse   of

          discretion.  United States  v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409,  443-44 (1st
                       _____________     _______

          Cir. 1994).

                    Our  review  of  the  testimony  fails  to  reveal  any

          demonstrated connection  between the  photocopy of the  check and

          the charges  brought  against defendants.    The check  was  from

                                         -22-

          before the  dates at issue in  this case and no  evidence was put

          forward to  suggest that it  was connected to  drug transactions,

          except the  general claim by  the government that  lottery checks

          were  used to  launder money.   The  government argued  at trial,

          however, that the check was relevant to demonstrate the existence

          of  the conspiracy  prior  to the  dates  at  issue.   Given  our

          deferential standard of review, we, therefore,  do not find abuse

          of   discretion  in  this  case.    Although  we  might  conclude

          differently if our  review were de  novo, we do not  believe that
                                          ________

          the court abused its discretion in accepting this argument.4

                    B.  The Notebook Seized During Montalvo's Arrest
                    B.  The Notebook Seized During Montalvo's Arrest

                    Appellant Montalvo  also objects to the  admission of a

          notebook  seized at  his home  at the  time of  his arrest.   The

          government's  expert witness,  FBI Agent  Carl  Jensen, testified

          that  "[t]he submitted documents are in a format of records which

          could  be   maintained  in   connection  with  an   illicit  drug

          distribution  business."  Tr. 7  at 1203.   Appellant argues that

          the  notebook  had  no  probative  value  because  there  was  no

          indication as  to when or  by whom  the notations had  been made,

          there were no initials  or names, no dollar signs  or terminology

          attached  to the numbers, and no  correlation between the numbers

          in the notebook and the amounts involved in the offenses charged.

                    Our  review is, once  again, on an  abuse of discretion

          standard and  we do  not find  such abuse  here.  The  government
                              
          ____________________

          4  Our failure to find abuse of discretion, of course, should not
          be  taken as determinative of whether the lottery check should be
          admitted in a future trial.

                                         -23-

          advanced the testimony  of an expert  witness who testified  that

          the  notebook appeared to be  a record of  drug transactions; and

          that it "lack[ed] the class characteristics [one] would expect to

          find with  legitimate type  business records,"  Tr. 228 at  1203-

          1204;  and  that  the  apparent  prices  in   the  notebook  were

          consistent with the prices  of kilogram quantities of cocaine  in

          central Florida,  where appellant Montalvo lived  during the time

          frame of these events.

                    Based  on this testimony, we do not find that the court

          abused its  discretion in  admitting the notebook  into evidence.

          The trial  court was in a much better position than this court to

          assess the relevance of the notebook.  The decision to admit  the

          notebook was within the sound discretion of the district court.

                    C.  Notebook Seized from Robles
                    C.  Notebook Seized from Robles

                    Appellant Montalvo  next claims error in  the admission

          of a notebook seized from Robles' home on the ground  that it was

          not  adequately authenticated  as  required by  Federal Rules  of

          Evidence 901.5  We review for abuse of discretion.  United States
                                                              _____________

          v. Echeverri, 982 F.2d 675, 679 (1st Cir. 1993).
             _________

                              
          ____________________

          5  Rule 901 provides, in part:

                      The  requirement   of  authentication  or
                      identification  as a  condition precedent
                      to admissibility is satisfied by evidence
                      sufficient to support a finding  that the
                      matter in question is what its proponents
                      claim.

          Fed. R. Evid. 901(a).

                                         -24-

                    We   must  determine   whether  "there   is  sufficient

          threshold proof that the document is what its proponent claims it

          to be."   Id.  at  679.   The Federal  Rules of  Evidence take  a
                    ___

          flexible approach to this issue.  The document's authenticity may

          be  confirmed  by  "[a]ppearance,  contents,  substance, internal

          patterns,   or  other   distinctive  characteristics,   taken  in

          conjunction with circumstances."   Id.   The notebook was  found,
                                             ___

          along with Robles' identification card, in a briefcase in Robles'

          room.   Such  circumstantial evidence  is permitted  in order  to

          authenticate the item.   Id. at  680.   We do not  find that  the
                                   ___

          district court  abused its discretion in  admitting this document

          into evidence.6

                        V.  Sufficiency of the Evidence Claims
                        V.  Sufficiency of the Evidence Claims

                    Appellants seek  to have their convictions reversed and

          the  case dismissed  on the  grounds that there  was insufficient

          evidence, as a matter of law, to convict them.  In reviewing such

          a claim, we must  determine if, "after assaying all  the evidence

          in  the  light most  amiable to  the  government, and  taking all

          reasonable inferences  in its favor, a  rational factfinder could

          find,   beyond   a  reasonable   doubt,   that  the   prosecution

          successfully proved the essential elements of the case."   United
                                                                     ______

          States v.  O'Brien, 14 F.3d 703,  706 (1st Cir. 1994).   "[W]e do
          ______     _______

          not pass on the  credibility of the  witnesses, nor do we  demand

          that the government disprove every hypothesis consistent with the
                              
          ____________________

          6  We repeat our earlier statement that our conclusion that there
          was no abuse of discretion should not be taken as a ruling on the
          admissibility of the evidence on remand.

                                         -25-

          defendant's innocence."   United States v. Spinney,  65 F.3d 231,
                                    _____________    _______

          234 (1st Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).

                    In order to prove the conspiracy charge, the government

          was required to prove that appellants:

                      intended to agree and that  they intended
                      to   commit   the  substantive   criminal
                      offense  [distribution of  cocaine] which
                      was   the   object   of  their   unlawful
                      agreement.  Due to the clandestine nature
                      of   criminal   conspiracies,   the   law
                      recognizes that the illegal agreement may
                      be either  'express or tacit'  and that a
                      'common purpose and  plan may be inferred
                      from
                         a
                         development
                                   and
                                     collocation
                                               of
                                                circumstances.'

          United  States  v. S nchez,  917 F.2d  607,  610 (1st  Cir. 1990)
          ______________     _______

          (internal citations omitted).

                    To prove  the money  laundering charge,  the government

          had to demonstrate that defendants:

                      (a)(1) knowing that the property involved
                      in a  financial transaction represent[ed]
                      the proceeds  of  some form  of  unlawful
                      activity,  conduct[ed] or  attempt[ed] to
                      conduct  such   a  financial  transaction
                      which  in fact  involves the  proceeds of
                      specified unlawful activity

                         (A)(i) with the  intent to  promote
                         the   carrying   on  of   specified
                         unlawful activity; or
                         . . . .
                         (B)knowing that  the transaction is
                         designed  in whole  or  in part  to
                         conceal or disguise the nature, the
                         location,    the    source,     the
                         ownership,  or  the control  of the
                         proceeds   of  specified   unlawful
                         activity.

          18 U.S.C.   1956(a)(1).

                    The convictions  in this  case rested  on conversations

          between  appellants and  Robles, as  well as  other conversations

                                         -26-

          involving Robles.  It was for the jury to determine whether these

          conversations related to legitimate  business dealings or illegal

          drug transactions.    Viewing  the  evidence in  the  light  most

          amiable to  the government,  we conclude  that a reasonable  jury

          could  have  concluded  that   the  conversations  in  the  tapes

          concerned drug  related transactions.  With  respect to Montalvo,

          the  jury could also have  inferred guilt from  the notebooks and

          the lottery check put  into evidence.  With respect  to Gonz lez-

          Maldonado, evidence was presented that transactions took place at

          his  place of business and a reasonable jury could have concluded

          that the taped conversations  demonstrated his involvement in the

          conspiracy and  the money laundering.   These conversations could

          be interpreted to have  dealt with cocaine that had  been damaged

          in shipment, cocaine stored at his place of business, and cocaine

          to be imported in  the future.  Such inferences  were permissible

          and,  therefore, we find the sufficiency of the evidence claim to

          be without merit.

                                   VI.  Sentencing
                                   VI.  Sentencing

                    Finally, appellant  Montalvo claims error  in both  the

          court's  calculation of the quantity of drugs for which he should

          be   held  responsible   and   the  court's   role-in-the-offense

          determination.  Because we  are remanding  the case, we  need not

          reach this  issue.  In the  event of a new  trial, with different

          testimony and different arguments,  the trial court will be  in a

          better  position than we are  today to determine  the quantity of

          drugs  for  which  appellants,   if  convicted,  should  be  held

                                         -27-

          responsible, and to make an evaluation of defendants' role in the

          offense.

                                   VII.  Conclusion
                                   VII.  Conclusion

                    For  the reasons stated  herein, we  vacate appellants'
                                                         vacate
                                                         ______

          convictions and remand the case to the district court for further
                          remand
                          ______

          proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                         -28-