Court Opinion

ID: 9752083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 17:33:40.791538+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:51:51.002788
License: Public Domain

POLLOCK, J.,
concurring.
I agree with the majority that an employer does not violate a clear mandate of public policy by firing a safety-sensitive employee who fails a random drug test. I also agree that both article 1, paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution, ante at 92-93, and the common-law right of privacy, ante at 98-99, may be sources of such a mandate under Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980). Finally, I agree that regulation of drug testing in the workplace is better achieved by legislation or labor-management agreements. Ante at 107.
I write separately because I believe that the common law provides the only clear mandate of public policy to support a claim for wrongful discharge based on an invasion of privacy. Although the majority recognizes that the common-law right of privacy supports such a mandate, ante at 94-95, it also relies on the right of privacy in article 1, paragraph 1 as an alternative source. The disagreement, although seemingly esoteric, re*109veals a basic difference in our respective perceptions of the role of the judiciary.
-I-
Established jurisprudential principles counsel that a court should not decide a case on a constitutional basis when a non-constitutional basis is available. “[Tjhere is the sound, oft-expressed principle that constitutional questions should not be reached and resolved unless absolutely imperative in the disposition of the litigation. While the adjudicative process admits of few unyielding rules, this maxim comes as close as any to being an absolute.” State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 229, 381 A.2d 333 (1977) (Clifford, J., dissenting). Accord Donadio v. Cunningham, 58 N.J. 309, 325-26, 277 A.2d 375 (1971); Ahto v. Weaver, 39 N.J. 418, 428, 189 A.2d 27 (1963); State v. Salerno, 27 N.J. 289, 296, 142 A.2d 636 (1958); Grant v. Wright, 222 N.J.Super. 191, 197-98, 536 A.2d 319 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 562, 546 A.2d 493 (1988); State v. Corson, 67 N.J.L. 178, 187, 50 A. 780 (Sup.Ct.1901).
The majority tries to avoid a constitutional basis for its decision by stating that “we do not decide today whether random urine testing violates either common-law or constitutional privacy rights.” Ante at 96-97. It then proceeds, however, to recognize a constitutional right. To say as the majority says that article 1, paragraph 1 provides a clear mandate of public policy, ibid., while simultaneously saying that “we are not finding in this opinion a constitutional right to privacy that governs the conduct of private actors,” ante at 98, is to draw too fine a distinction. Either the New Jersey Constitution supports a right of privacy that protects a private employee from random drug testing or it does not. If, as the majority finds, the State Constitution recognizes such a right, then the right should be enforceable. I would avoid the dilemma by not reaching the constitutional issue.
*110Instead of resorting to a quasi-constitutional right, the Court need look only to the common law for a clear mandate of public policy. We have recognized that the common law is better suited than constitutional law to transport notions of fairness and justice into judicial decisions. For example, we have written that “[although constitutional considerations have dominated defamation law in recent years, the common law provides an alternative, and potentially more stable, framework for analyzing statements about matters of public interest.” Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Pub. Co., 104 N.J. 125, 139, 516 A.2d 220 (1986).
Historically, the right of privacy was conceived not as a constitutional, but as a common-law, concept. The right traces its origins in civil law to a law review article written over a century ago by Professors Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandéis, which discusses privacy only as a common-law concept. The Right of Privacy, 4 Harv.L.Rev. 193 (1890). As with defamation law, the common-law right of privacy has been first adopted, then absorbed by a parallel constitutional right. Courts have transformed the right, which was initially conceived as a means for courts to resolve differences between private parties, into a vehicle to protect individuals from state action.
Not finding any specific textual reference to support the right, the United States Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 1681, 14 L.Ed.2d 510, 514 (1965), placed it in “a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion.” Justice Black dissented, stating:
Observing that “the right of privacy * * * presses for recognition here,” today this Court, which I did not understand to have power to sit as a court of common law, now appears to be exalting a phrase which Warren and Brandéis used in discussing grounds for tort relief, to the level of a constitutional rule which prevents state legislatures from passing any law deemed by this Court to interfere with “privacy.”
[Id. at 510 n. 1, 85 S.Ct. at 1695 n. 1, 14 L.Ed.2d at 530-31 n. 1.]
*111Federal courts create common law only in exceptional circumstances not applicable here. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliffe Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641, 101 S.Ct. 2061, 2067, 68 L.Ed.2d 500, 509 (1981) (“absent some congressional authorization to formulate substantive rules of decision, federal common law exists only in such narrow areas as those concerned with the rights and obligations of the United States, interstate and international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of States or our relations with foreign nations, and admiralty cases”) (footnotes omitted). Compare Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 822, 82 L.Ed. 1188, 1194 (1938) (“There is no federal general common law.”) with Hinderlider v. La Plata Co., 304 US. 92, 110, 58 S.Ct. 803, 822, 82 L.Ed. 1202, 1212 (1938) (“whether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned between the two States is a question of ‘federal common law’ ”). By comparison, state courts for centuries have resorted to the common law to resolve disputes between private parties. As courts of limited jurisdiction, U.S. Const. art. Ill, § 2, federal courts understandably may be confined to constitutional decisionmaking. Less understandable is why that tendency of federal courts should persuade this court to ignore its common-law birthright.
-II-
The public policy supporting the right of privacy differs from the public policies recognized in other wrongful-discharge cases. A major difference is that neither the New Jersey Constitution nor any legislation expressly recognizes the right. The wrongfulness of a discharge that infringes on a privacy interest, therefore, is not as apparent as a discharge that violates a more explicit right. More manifest, for example, is the wrongfulness of a discharge that violates a statutory mandate, such as a discharge in retaliation for filing a claim under the workers’ compensation law, Lally v. Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981), or for investigating a claim under *112laws preventing employment discrimination, Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189, 586 A.2d 237 (1988).
Compounding the problem is the limited role of courts in declaring public policy on so sensitive a subject. As the majority recognizes, “the complex issues of drug-testing in the workplace are better addressed in the contexts of legislative action or labor-relations agreement.” Ante at 107. These considerations counsel a judicial response that accords latitude to employers, employees, and the Legislature in addressing the problem. A response based on the common-law right of privacy provides greater latitude than one that is constitutionally based. Such a response, moreover, naturally flows from state courts as the custodians of the common law.
From the perspective of the parties, the issue is the extent to which an employer may inquire about an employee’s conduct when the inquiry involves aspects of the employee’s life that would otherwise remain private. Some aspects of an employee’s life should be protected from the unwelcome inquiry of an employer; others are more amenable to review.
Traditional constitutional analysis of the right of privacy identifies two privacy interests.
One is concerned with autonomy, “the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.” Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599, 97 S.Ct. 869, 876, 51 L.Ed.2d 64, 73 (1977). The other interest is one of confidentiality, “the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.” Id. at 598-99, 97 S.Ct. at 876, 51 L.Ed.2d at 73. The protection of autonomy is limited to a few “fundamental” areas, including marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.
[Snyder v. Mekhjian, 125 N.J. 328, 342, 593 A.2d 318 (Pollock, J., concurring) (citations omitted).]
The privacy right of autonomy, although not expressly mentioned, is fairly implicit in article 1, paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution. C. Willard Heckel, The Bill of Rights, in II Constitutional Convention of 1947 1336, 1339 (1951). Accordingly, we have found:
The right of privacy has been found to extend to a variety of areas, including sexual conduct between consenting adults; the right to sterilization; and even *113the right to terminate life itself. These cases establish that “under some circumstances, an individual’s personal right to control her own body and life overrides the State’s general interest in preserving life.”
[Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 303, 450 A.2d 925 (1982) (citations omitted).]
Cf. State v. Lair, 62 N.J. 388, 398, 301 A.2d 748 (1973) (Weintraub, C.J. concurring) (expressing doubts about legitimacy of statute criminalizing consensual homosexual sex); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 59, 227 A.2d 689 (1967) (Weintraub, C.J., concurring) (considering legitimacy of statute criminalizing abortion in light of woman’s right to bodily integrity); Smith v. Board of Examiners, 85 N.J.L. 46, 53-55, 88 A. 963 (Sup.Ct. 1913) (setting aside order for sterilization of epileptic on federal equal protection grounds).
The evolution of “the right to die” demonstrates the Court’s appreciation that it is more judicious to predicate the right of privacy on a common-law, rather than a constitutional, basis. In the first such case, In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922, 97 S.Ct. 319, 50 L.Ed. 2d 289 (1976), the Court predicated the right to remove the patient’s respirator on the rights of privacy under the New Jersey and federal constitutions. Id. at 38-40, 355 A.2d 647. Later we shifted the basis of our decisions to the common-law right of self-determination or autonomy. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 346-48, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985). Even more recently, we have recognized that the right is based “primarily”on the common law. In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 348, 529 A.2d 404 (1987). That evolution reflects the traditional judicial preference for basing decisions on the common law. It also reflects this Court’s awareness that a common-law basis smooths the path for legislative action. Conversely, when a court bases its decisions on the constitutional right of privacy, it places an undefined area of decision-making beyond legislative control.
Evaluation of the issue of random drug testing inevitably compels balancing the interests of the employee and the employer. From an employer’s perspective, an employee’s use of illegal drugs presents multiple problems. For example, the use *114of illegal drugs can affect an employee’s performance, see Craig Zwerling, et al., The Efficacy of Preemployment Drug Screening for Marijuana and Cocaine in Predicting Employment Outcome, 264 JAMA 2639 (1990) (positive pre-employment drug tests for marijuana or cocaine associated with adverse employment outcomes), endanger co-workers, and increase health-care costs.
Random drug testing through urine samples, however, impinges on an employee’s privacy interests in two ways. One arises from the process of taking the urine specimen; the other from intruding into areas of the employee’s life that would otherwise remain unknown to the employer. Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, 963 F.2d 611, 622-23 (3d Cir.1992). Appropriate steps can reduce the intrusiveness of the method of collection. Ante at 107. For example, at least three federal agencies have determined that the integrity of urine specimens may be maintained without the type of direct observation employed in this case. See 49 C.F.R. § 40.25 (Department of Transportation); 46 C.F.R. § 16.310 (Coast Guard); 10 C.F.R. pt. 26, app. A § 2.4 (Nuclear Regulatory Commission).
Acquiring otherwise-private information about an employee is more troublesome. Disclosure of such information, however, implicates only the employee’s interest in confidentiality, see Johnson v. Carpenter Technology Corp., 723 F.Supp. 180, 186 (D.Conn.1989), an interest that has not fared as well as autonomy, Snyder, supra, 125 N.J. at 342, 593 A.2d 318 (Pollock, J., concurring). As the majority acknowledges, this interest, when invoked by an employee in a safety-sensitive position, is weak. Ante at 102. Remaining open is the question of the extent to which the confidentiality of that interest strengthens as the employee’s responsibilities become less safety-sensitive. A confidentiality interest is not a fundamental right, but one that is assayed “in a balancing test weighing the personal nature of the information and the extent of the disclosure against the need for the information and the safeguards against undue *115disclosure.” Snyder, supra, 125 N.J. at 343, 593 A.2d 318 (Pollock, J., concurring).
Rather than speculate about the implications of the characteristics of the confidentiality interest in random drug testing, I would avoid the constitutional question altogether. The common law provides an adequate answer. As defined by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977), “one who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”
Application of that test involves a balance of competing interests. As the Third Circuit recently observed, “determining whether an alleged invasion of privacy is substantial and highly offensive to the reasonable person necessitates the use of a balancing test.” Borse, supra, 963 F.2d at 627. With random drug testing by a private employer, the test will implicate both the employee’s privacy interests and the need of the employer for the test results.
Consistent with that premise, the majority
strongly recommendfs] that employers formulate and implement measures designed to minimize the intrusiveness of the testing process. Those measures should include a testing procedure that allows as much privacy and dignity as possible; and notice, close in time to the beginning of a testing program but sufficient to provide adequate advance warning, that announces the program, details the method for selecting employees to be tested, warns employees of the lingering effect of certain drugs in the system, explains how the sample will be analyzed, and notifies employees of the consequences of testing positive or refusing to take the test. Furthermore, employers may conduct only those tests necessary to determine the presence of drugs in the urine, and are under an obligation not to disclose information obtained as a result of testing.
[Ante at 106-07.]
Although the majority does not indicate whether its test would apply if the common law were the sole source of public policy, the tort of intrusion would involve the kind of balancing suggested by that test. See Earp v. City of Detroit, 16 Mich.App. 271, 167 N.W.2d 841, 845-46 (1969) (fact-sensitive *116balancing between privacy interest of employee and business interest of employer).
Missing from the majority’s calculus is the public policy against the illegal use of drugs. The Legislature has found that “the unlawful use, manufacture and distribution of controlled dangerous substances continues to pose a serious and pervasive threat to the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of this State.” N.J.S.A. 2C:35-l.l(b). Recently, Governor Jim Florio announced the formation of a non-profit corporation, the Governor’s Council for a Drug Free Workplace. The Council’s purpose is “to rid offices and factories of illegal drugs and develop a uniform drug-testing policy for use by businesses.” Robert Schwaenberg, Drugs in the Workplace: Chamber of Commerce, State Join to Chart Test Policy, The Star-Ledger, July 11, 1992, at 1. Thus, the public policy of this state is to deter the use of illegal drugs. So clear a mandate should doubtless be included among the interests to be balanced in determining whether random drug testing supports an action for wrongful discharge. The majority has not only ignored this important aspect of public policy, but by postulating a constitutional right of privacy, has complicated the task of the legislative and executive branches in defining the limits of drug testing in the workplace.
Recognition of a common-law privacy right that limits an employer’s right to test for drugs does not foreclose all such testing. A plaintiff asserting a cause of action based on the tort of intrusion must clear a high threshold. To maintain the action, the plaintiff must establish that “the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Restatement, supra, § 652B. Although we have not yet considered torts of intrusion, the Appellate Division in Figured v. Paralegal Technical Servs., 231 N.J.Super. 251, 555 A.2d 663 (1989), certif. dismissed, 121 N.J. 666, 583 A.2d 350 (1990), the Law Division in N.O.C., Inc. v. Schaefer, 197 N.J.Super. 249, 484 A.2d 729 (1984), and the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey in Tellado v. Time-Life Books, Inc., 643 F.Supp. *117904 (1986), have considered them. All three resulted in summary judgments for the defendants.
In Pierce, we expressly recognized the common law as a source of public policy that would support an action in tort or contract for wrongful discharge. 85 N.J. at 72, 417 A.2d 505. To find a source of public policy, the Court need not survey the boundaries of an uncharted constitutional right. It need only stake out an existing tort action. By relying solely on common-law principles, the majority can avoid entanglement with a constitutional issue.
Regard for the common law is essential if state courts are to discharge their responsibilities as partners in the federalist judicial system. In the future, cases that state courts formerly might have resolved on a federal constitutional basis may be resolved on an independent state ground. The common law can provide such a ground. To the extent that state courts resort to the common law, they can avoid a state constitutional question. Thus, the common law is integral to the evolving role of state courts in the federalist system.
In sum, the common-law tort of invasion of privacy provides a more satisfactory source of public policy than does article 1, paragraph 1 of the State Constitution to determine whether random testing by a private employer would give rise to a wrongful-discharge action. I would affirm because plaintiff has failed to identify a clear mandate of public policy prohibiting the discharge of a safety-sensitive employee who fails a urine test for illegal drugs.
For affirmance — Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN — 7.
Opposed — none.