Court Opinion

ID: 9742445
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:14:07.072297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:08:45.250271
License: Public Domain

DAVID T. PROSSER, J.
¶ 65. (dissenting). This case interprets Milwaukee County's power to regulate ground transportation at General Mitchell International Airport. Although I might seek changes to Milwaukee County's Ordinance 4.05 if I were a member of the Milwaukee County Board, this court should not force changes to the ordinance unless there is very clear proof that the ordinance is invalid. Because I am not persuaded that the petitioners have satisfied their burden to establish invalidity, I respectfully dissent.
I
¶ 66. The Wisconsin Legislature has given local governments broad powers to "construct, improve, equip, maintain and operate" an airport. Wis. Stat. § 114.14(1). "The governing body of a city, village, town or county may adopt regulations, and establish fees or charges for the use of such airport." Id.
*167¶ 67. Pursuant to the authority granted to Milwaukee County by this statute, the County Board adopted Milwaukee County Ordinance 4.05. The ordinance provides in part:
(1) Purpose. The purpose and intent of this section is to regulate all commercial ground transportation including prereserved (reservation) service, by the issuance of permit(s) to both those owning or operating a commercial ground transportation service and those driving commercial ground transportation vehicles at General Mitchell International Airport. Prereserved (reservation) service means ground transportation that is contracted for prior to the actual time passengers are picked up.
(3) Taxicabs.
(a) Definition. "Taxicab" under this section is a motor vehicle regularly engaged in the business of carrying passengers for hire, with heating and air conditioning, be in good operating condition, metered, and not operated on an affixed route.
(b) License, permits, fees.
(1) An owner or operator of a taxicab shall not do business or attempt to do business on General Mitchell International Airport unless such owner or operator has been licensed as owner or operator of a taxicab business by any city, village or town consistent with Wis. Stats. § 349.24, and unless such license remains in full force and effect.
(3) (a) On and after September 1, 1990, taxicab *168owner permits will be issued only to those owners whose vehicle(s) have been permitted during the period October 1, 1989, through July 5, 1990. Taxicab owner permits must be renewed and remain in full force and effect on a continuous basis, in accordance with sub-paragraph (b) below. In the event an owner does not renew the taxicab owner permit prior to the annual dates prescribed herein below, that owner shall forfeit his/her privilege to operate at the airport. At such time that the total number of taxicab permits issued decreases below fifty (50), additional permits, to maintain the total issued at fifty (50), will be issued to those taxicab owners who are on the waiting list. Permits will be issued based upon date of request on the waiting list. In the event of extraordinary circumstances, i.e. large conventions, inclement weather or inability of the permitted taxicab fleet to meet immediate passenger demand, the airport director or his/her designated representative is authorized to request temporary taxicab service from local providers in order to meet such extraordinary demand. Additional taxicabs will follow all policies, rules and regulations pertaining to the operation of taxicabs at General Mitchell International Airport.
(5) Any person who is not in possession of the necessary permits required under this section and who operates a taxicab at General Mitchell International Airport in such a manner as to constitute doing business, or who attempts to do business thereon shall, without limitation because of enumeration, be deemed to be in violation of chapter 4 of the Code. A taxicab driver entering upon General Mitchell International Airport for the sole purpose of discharging a taxicab patron at said airport shall not be deemed to be doing business thereon if, after discharging said passenger, he/she shall immediately leave the airport premises.
*169Milwaukee County, WI, Code of General Ordinances, ch. 4 (2006) (emphasis added).
¶ 68. Persons challenging this ordinance have a heavy burden. The police power of the state, exercised by municipalities under the authority of the legislature, extends to the public safety, health, morals, and general welfare. Highway 100 Auto Wreckers, Inc. v. City of West Allis, 6 Wis. 2d 637, 643, 96 N.W.2d 85 (1959), rehearing denied, 6 Wis. 2d 637, 97 N.W.2d 423 (1959). The police power embraces regulations designed to promote the public convenience or general prosperity. Courtesy Cab Co. v. Johnson, 10 Wis. 2d 426, 432, 103 N.W.2d 17 (1960). "This court has often recognized the principle that the court will not interfere with the exercise of police power by a municipality unless the illegality of the exercise is clear." Highway 100 Auto Wreckers, 6 Wis. 2d at 643. "If there are any reasons which can fairly have weight, the reasons for a given ordinance are for the legislative body and not for the courts." Courtesy Cab, 10 Wis. 2d at 432.
¶ 69. The county "does not have the burden of proving the validity of its ordinance.... Rather, [a challenger] has the burden of showing its invalidity." State ex rel. B'nai B'rith Found. v. Walworth County Bd. of Adjustment, 59 Wis. 2d 296, 307, 208 N.W.2d 113 (1973). "[WJhere a municipal body enacts regulations pursuant to authority expressly granted, all presumptions are in favor of its validity, and any person attacking it must make the fact of its invalidity clearly appear." State ex rel. Newman v. Pagels, 212 Wis. 475, 250 N.W. 430 (1933).
¶ 70. The majority opinion carefully explains the history and purpose of the County ordinance. See majority op., ¶¶ 7, 8, 9, 11, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, and 37. This is summarized well in the following sentences:
*170Since the adoption of Ordinance 4.05, the problems of the open system have abated. The time that taxis must wait for fares has decreased, and the time that passengers must wait for curbside taxi service has decreased. The cap on taxi permits has reduced the congestion problems, and taxis no longer spill into the Airport roadway to create a hazard for other Airport traffic.
Id., ¶ 11.
¶ 71. Surprisingly, the majority invalidates the ordinance in part in spite of this success.
II
¶ 72. To support their attack on Ordinance 4.05, petitioners point to Wis. Stat. § 114.14(3)(b)l.: "(b) The exercise of authority by the airport commission under par. (a) shall be subject to all of the following conditions: 1. The public may in no case be deprived of equal and uniform use of the airport." (Emphasis added.) They contend that Ordinance 4.05(3)(b)(5), prohibiting the operation of a taxicab at General Mitchell International Airport without a permit, violates the statutory rule on "equal and uniform use of the airport" if the taxicab merely picks up passengers on a "prearranged" or "prereserved" basis. They argue that it is not within the County's authority to treat taxis without permits differently from luxury limousines (which are not required to have airport permits) with respect to providing prearranged service at the Airport. See majority op., ¶ 19.
¶ 73. They also argue that it is not within the County's authority to require taxis to have one of a limited number (50) of Airport permits to do business at the Airport. Id. According to petitioners, "[fjorbidding the provision of [prereserved] service [by taxis without *171permits] serves only to protect the favored 50 Milwaukee taxis and the providers of more expensive prere-served services from competition."
¶ 74. Before responding to these arguments, it is helpful to understand the history of the language at issue. The present sentence, "The public may in no case be deprived of equal and uniform use of the airport," Wis. Stat. § 114.14(3)(b)l., first appeared in our statutes in slightly different form in 1943. See § 15, ch. 269, Laws of 1943. Newly created § 114.14(3) gave airport commissions certain powers, including the power to "contract with private parties for the operation of the airport, including all necessary arrangements for the improvement and equipment and successful operation thereof! Provided, that in no case shall the public be deprived of equal and uniform use of the airport." Wis. Stat. § 114.14(3) (1943).
¶ 75. Legislative Reference Bureau drafting records for 1943 S.B. 123, the source of Chapter 269, do not explain this proviso. Although the drafting records are incomplete, they show that the bill went through significant drafting changes before introduction. At some point, the bill drafter appears to have borrowed language from the Uniform Airports Act, promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1935.
¶ 76. For instance, Section 5 of the Uniform Airports Act reads in part:
Section 5. Authority to Equip, Improve, Establish Fees and Charges and Lease. — Counties, municipalities, or other political subdivisions of this state which have established or may hereafter establish airports or landing fields, or which acquire, lease, or set apart real property for such purpose or purposes, are hereby authorized:
*172(a) to construct, equip, improve, maintain, and operate the same, or to vest authority for the construction, equipment, improvement, maintenance, and operation thereof, in an officer, board or body of such political subdivision....
(c) to lease for a term not exceeding [ ] years such airports or landing fields to private parties for operation, or to lease or assign for a term not exceeding [ ] years to private parties for operation space, area, improvements, and equipment on such airports or landing fields, provided in each case that in so doing the public is not deprived of its rightful, equal and uniform use thereof.
Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and Proceedings of the Forty-Fifth Annual Conference, Uniform Airports Act 216-17 (1935) (emphasis added).1 The underscored words were substantially incorporated into Wis. Stat. § 114.14(3) (1943).
¶ 77. Admittedly, the language of our statute is somewhat broader than the language of the uniform law. This helps to explain the comment in Wussow v. Gaida, 251 Wis. 328, 331, 29 N.W.2d 42 (1947), that "no distinction between private or personal and commercial use can be read into the clear words of the statute." Yet, the Wussow decision — which is vital to petitioners' argument —was influenced by more than the language of the statute. Both the statute and Wussow were influenced by contemporary practices.
¶ 78. In a 1941 article, John M. Hunter, Jr., an attorney for the Civil Aeronautics Administration of the United States Department of Commerce, wrote:
*173The principal legal developments of interest in the field of airport operation during the last year [1940] were with regard to the leasing of municipal airports or airport facilities to private persons and the grant by cities of airport operating privileges. These developments included the adoption of several city resolutions authorizing airport leases and grants of privileges and concessions ....
In addition to these developments, there have been three cases in which informal complaint has been made to the Civil Aeronautics Authority of violation of the exclusive right provision of Section 303 of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, which reads: "There shall be no exclusive right for the use of any landing area or air navigation facility upon which Federal funds have been expended." In all of these cases the complaint was that the city in question had granted a private operator an exclusive right to conduct commercial flying activities at the municipal airport, including operation of a flying school and a charter flying service.
John M. Hunter, Jr., Airport Legal Developments of Interest to Municipalities — 1940, The Journal of Air Law and Commerce 153 (Vol. XII, 1941) (citation omitted).
¶ 79. Hunter's article was prescient, for it anticipated the very facts of the Wussow case. Wussow entered into a lease to operate the Shawano Municipal Airport and to "have sole charge of said airport." Wussow, 251 Wis. at 329-30. Gaida, who owned an aircraft sales company on adjacent land and had regularly used the airport for landing and taking off, continued to use the airport to give "flying instructions and taxi service" (likely meaning air charter service). Id. at 330. Wussow sought an injunction to bar such use, claiming that Gaida was forceably taking Wussow's rights under the contract and causing him "great loss in profits and *174earnings." Id. This court reversed the circuit court and denied the injunction. It cited the procedural posture of the case as well as the language of the statute, then added: "The final answer to the immediate question must be arrived at in the light of this determination that [Wussow's] right to equitable relief does not exist. We do not decide whether a cause of action at law may exist." Id. at 331 (emphasis added).
¶ 80. Thus, close examination of the Wussow case suggests that petitioners may be reading too much into it. A 1958 opinion of the Wisconsin Attorney General presents a more balanced discussion of the law on airport contracts. The Attorney General concluded in summary:
Where the county is the owner and operator of an airport it can lawfully lease space in its terminal building to a car rental agency upon the condition that it will not lease space to any other car rental agency, but it is doubtful whether it can lawfully exclude other rental agencies from soliciting business in the airport or terminal unless such regulation can be shown to be necessary for the convenience of the flying public or the efficiency of the operation of the airport.
47 Op. Att'y Gen. 29 (1958).
¶ 81. An annotation at 40 A.L.R.2d 1060 (1955) ("Validity, construction, and operation of airport operator's grant of exclusive or discriminatory privilege or concession") cites several cases upholding exclusive ground transportation service contracts at public airports. Thus, it is difficult to believe that the Wisconsin Legislature intended to hamstring the operation of Wisconsin airports by prohibiting the reasonable regulation of competition.
¶ 82. This background has a direct relationship to petitioners' argument that a 50-permit limit on taxicabs at the Airport violates Wis. Stat. § 114.14(3)(b)l. If *175Milwaukee County may not limit the number of taxicab permits at its Airport, it is hard to see how it can limit the number of other service providers and vendors by regulation or contract.
¶ 83. Clearly, Quality Cab, which employs Williams and Hegney, is not the only taxicab company in the region that may wish to conduct a prereserved pick up and return business if an Airport permit is not required. Hence, the majority opinion appears to be forcing Milwaukee County to return to an open system. This would be a substitution of judicial policy for county regulation.
¶ 84. Milwaukee County Ordinance 4.05 is a comprehensive, detailed ordinance. It governs taxicabs (subsection 3), in-county shuttle service (subsection 4), out-of-county shuttle service (subsection 5), luxury limousines (subsection 6), courtesy cars (subsection 7), and buses (subsection 8), as well as car and truck rentals (subsection 9). The ordinance addresses prere-served service for taxicabs (4.05(3)(f)(7)), out-of-county shuttle service (4.05(5)(a)), and luxury limousines (4.05(6)(a)(2)).
¶ 85. The kind of prereserved taxicab service, without permit, contemplated by the majority will be in direct competition against (1) taxicabs with permits; (2) in-county shuttle service under negotiated contract and permit; and (3) Out-of-county shuttle services that have paid for permits. Traffic congestion, fairness to permit holders, reliable service to the public, and revenue to the County all factor into the present regulatory scheme.
¶ 86. Unaccountably, the majority opinion faults the County for not anticipating and countering every argument the majority adduces in favor of open competition for prereserved taxicab service. See, e.g., majority op., ¶ 39. After all, the County does not have the *176burden of proving the validity of its ordinance. The majority's assumption that there will be no longer wait time if non-permitted taxis are able to retrieve prearranged fares at the Airport is, frankly, unrealistic. Passengers get out of their taxicabs when the cabs arrive at the Airport. Passengers get into their taxicabs after their planes arrive at the Airport and after they have picked up any luggage. No extra wait time? Even the residents of Lake Wobegon would smile at the suggestion that planes are never late and luggage is never delayed or lost at General Mitchell International Airport.
¶ 87. As for arbitrary discrimination, petitioners make much of the fact that luxury limousines are not required to have permits. This distinction appears to be based upon federal law, which prohibits local governments from requiring a license or fee for certain motor vehicles providing prearranged ground transportation service. See 49 U.S.C. § 14501(d).2 Complying with federal law is not being arbitrary.
*177¶ 88. Milwaukee County Ordinance 4.05(3) is defensible as applied in these citations. Because the majority holds otherwise, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 89. I am authorized to state that Justice LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., joins this opinion.

 49 U.S.C. § 14501(d) (1955), reads as follows:
(d) Pre-arranged ground transportation.—
(1) In general. — No State or political subdivision thereof and no interstate agency, or other political agency of 2 or more States shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard or other provision having the force and effect of law requiring a license or fee on account of the fact that a motor vehicle is providing pre-arranged ground transportation service if the motor carrier providing such service—
(A) meets all applicable registration requirements under chapter 139 for the interstate transportation of passengers;
(B) meets all applicable vehicle and intrastate passenger licensing requirements of the State or States in which the motor carrier is domiciled or registered to do business; and
(C) is providing such service pursuant to a contract for—
*177(i) transportation by the motor carrier from one State, including intermediate stops, to a destination in another State; or
(ii) transportation by the motor carrier from one State, including intermediate stops in another State, to a destination in the original State.