Court Opinion

ID: 9365607
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-24 17:07:49.787514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:46.335963
License: Public Domain

J-S31018-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    ELSA MERTIRA                               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    CAMELBACK LODGE AND INDOOR                 :   No. 1193 EDA 2022
    WATERPARK AND CMBK RESORT                  :
    OPERATIONS, LLC                            :

                 Appeal from the Order Entered March 31, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Civil Division at No(s):
                               002031-CV-2021

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

CONCURRING MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                  FILED JANUARY 24, 2023

        I am constrained to concur in the Majority’s holding pursuant to the well-

entrenched line of cases in which “the appellate courts of this Commonwealth

have already applied the doctrine of hills and ridges to situations in which

business invitees have fallen on ice[-]covered private parking areas or walks.”

Wentz v. Pennswood Apartments, 518 A.2d 314, 316 (Pa.Super. 1986);

see also Wilson v. Howard Johnson Restaurant, 219 A.2d 676, 678 (Pa.

1966) (precluding liability where business invitee slipped and fell on an icy

sidewalk in the “parking area” of a restaurant operating during freezing rain

storm); Morin v. Traveler’s Rest Motel, Inc., 704 A.2d 1085, 1087

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S31018-22

(Pa.Super. 1997) (holding summary judgment warranted against business

invitee who slipped and fell in the ice-covered parking lot of a hotel despite

evidence that business noticed the slippery conditions and unsuccessfully

attempted to treat the property with salt); Roland v. Kravoc, Inc., 513 A.2d

1029, 1032 (Pa.Super. 1986) (upholding summary judgment awarded against

business invitee who slipped and fell in shopping center parking lot since

“there were no ridges and elevations of ice that caused [defendant] to fall”).

       To my mind, the result here is largely compelled by the uncontroverted

meteorological evidence in the certified record.1 See Amended Exhibit I to

Motion for Summary Judgment, 3/3/22, at 1-12. An expert report submitted

by Appellees indicates that, throughout the community, “[f]reezing rain fell

from approximately 3:30 PM through 8:00 PM EST with occasional freezing

rain, freezing drizzle and/or sleet falling from approximately 8:00 PM EST

through the end of the day.” Id. at 5. This conclusion is corroborated by the

depositions of Appellant, her family members, and Appellees’ representative,

which uniformly indicated that precipitation was still falling at the time of

Appellant’s unfortunate accident.              See Motion for Summary Judgment,

____________________________________________

1 The fact that this case concerns conditions produced by natural precipitation
precludes application of several exceptions to the doctrine. Cf. Tonik v. Apex
Garages, Inc., 275 A.2d 296, 298 (Pa. 1971) (“Where . . . a specific, localized
patch of ice exists on a sidewalk otherwise free of ice and snow, the existence
of ‘hills and ridges’ need not be established.”); Harmotta v. Bender, 601
A.2d 837, 842 (Pa.Super. 1992) (“Nor is proof of hills and ridges required
where an icy condition is caused by the defendant’s neglect, as where a city
maintains a defective hydrant, water pipe, drain, or spigot.” (cleaned up)).

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2/14/22, at Exhibit F at 28 (deposition of Appellant); id. at Exhibit G at 27

(deposition of Appellant’s daughter Edita Mertira); id. at Exhibit H at 33

(deposition of Appellant’s daughter Alba Mertira); see also Response in

Opposition to Summary Judgment, 3/15/22, at Exhibit G at 30 (deposition of

Appellees’ representative Shawn Hilbert).

      As the Majority has aptly noted, “a landowner has no duty to correct or

take reasonable measures with regard to storm-created snowy or icy

conditions until a reasonable time after the storm has passed.” Collins

v. Philadelphia Suburban Dev. Corp., 179 A.3d 69, 76 (Pa.Super. 2018)

(emphasis added); see also Biernacki v. Presque Isle Condominiums

Unit Owners Ass’n, Inc., 828 A.2d 1114, 1117 (Pa.Super. 2003) (holding it

was unreasonable to expect a landlord to clear a parking lot of accumulated

snow by the “early morning” after an overnight storm).              Since natural

precipitation was still falling at the time of Appellant’s accident, Appellees were

not yet under a duty to address the slippery conditions.

      Furthermore, while I generally disapprove of summary judgment

entered before the completion of all relevant discovery, Appellees’ arguable

practices in clearing snow and ice on their property are of no moment pursuant

to Morin, supra. Therein, a hotel was operating during a period of “freezing

precipitation” and took notice of “the icy and slippery condition of the parking

lot.” Id. at 1086-87. The hotel voluntarily treated certain areas of the ice-

slicked property with salt and sand, while leaving other portions of the parking

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lot unmitigated. Ultimately, the plaintiff slipped, fell, and injured herself on

an untreated patch. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of

the hotel based upon the hills and ridges doctrine.      This Court upheld the

ruling and concluded that a business that “voluntarily undertakes to salt and

sand an icy area where no duty exists” does not create a duty merely by doing

an incomplete job. Id. at 1088-89. Pursuant to Morin, any supplemental

evidence regarding Appellees’ regular practices in treating surfaces on its

property for ice and snow would not create a material issue of fact as a matter

of law.2 Id.; see also Collins, supra at 76 (indicating no duty upon property

owners to clear snow and ice produced by an ongoing storm).

       Nonetheless, I must express my concern regarding the continued

application of this doctrine to business invitees like Appellant. Indeed, my

review of relevant case law has revealed a persistent uneasiness with respect

to this specific issue amongst my fellow appellate jurists. See Wilson, supra

at 679 (Roberts, J.; concurring) (declining to approve extension of the “ridged

ice rule” to business invitees); Morin, supra at 1089-90 (Olszewski, J.;

concurring) (objecting to the continue application of the doctrine to business

____________________________________________

2   The alacrity with which Appellees were able to respond to Appellant’s
accident and treat the surrounding surfaces to permit an ambulance to access
the scene seems fairly definitive regarding Appellees’ ability to rapidly respond
to problematic winter weather on its property. See Response in Opposition
to Summary Judgment, 3/15/22, at Exhibit G at 67-70. Indeed, Appellees’
representative reported observing such treatments taking place “at all hours
of the day and night” on the grounds of the resort. Id. at 51.

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invitees, noting:    “I see no reason to shield private business owners from

liability where an injured business invitee proves a business owner’s failure to

exercise reasonable care.”).

      As Judge Olszewski aptly wrote, the doctrine of hills and ridges was

originally devised “to protect municipalities from unreasonable exposure to

liability for injuries caused by climactic conditions.” Morin, supra at 1089

(citing Kohler v. Penn. Tp., 157 A. 681 (Pa. 1931)). Due to the “practical

difficulty of maintaining vast areas of public land, it is sound policy to limit the

liability of those responsible for the maintenance of such land.” Id. However,

“[i]n contrast, private business owners do not encounter the same practical

difficulty maintaining their land.” Id. (emphasis added).

      Furthermore, private property owners typically owe a maximal duty of

care to invitees. As this Court recently reiterated, “[t]he duty of care owed to

a business invitee . . . is the highest duty owed to any entrant upon land. The

landowner must protect an invitee not only against known dangers, but also

against   those     which   might   be    discovered    with   reasonable    care.”

Shellenberger v. Kreider Farms, ___ A.3d ___, 2023 WL 29338 at *6

(Pa.Super. Jan. 4, 2023) (cleaned up). Moreover, such individuals enter a

landowner’s premises “with implied assurance of preparation and reasonable

care for [her] protection and safety while [she] is there.”        Treadyway v.

Ebert Motor Co., 436 A.2d 994, 999 (Pa.Super. 1981). Finally, it is also well-

established that “[i]n determining the extent of preparation to which an invitee

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is entitled to expect to be made for his protection, the nature of the land and

the purposes for which it is used are of great importance.” Id.

       From the certified record, it seems undisputed that Appellees operate a

private business that is particularly susceptible to, and largely dependent

upon, inclement winter weather occurring upon its property. Thus, it would

seem reasonable and prudent to expect them to take some additional,

affirmative effort to shield its patrons from such foreseeable hazards. Instead,

application of the instant doctrine has evolved to such a point that our

precedent incentivizes property owners like Appellees to take no action to

protect their patrons until compelled to do so by necessity.3

       Overall, private businesses in Pennsylvania are empowered to remain

open for business to all potential invitees irrespective of potentially dangerous

winter weather conditions. During such inclement time periods, businesses

are not required to take any ameliorative actions until a “reasonable” time

after natural precipitation ends.        See Collins, supra at 76. Furthermore,

businesses may not be held liable for incomplete or lacking attempts at

____________________________________________

3 Indeed, current Pennsylvania law provides that private property owners who
choose to respond quickly to accumulations of snow and ice upon their
property may interfere with natural processes of precipitation and freezing,
thereby exempting them from the protections of the hills and ridges doctrine.
See Harvey v. Rouse Chamberlin, Ltd., 901 A.2d 523, 527 (Pa.Super.
2006) (concluding that the doctrine was inapplicable where formation of black
ice on a roadway was “influenced by human intervention,” i.e., early-morning
snow plowing undertaken in response to an overnight snow). Thus, private
property owners are not only exempted from swift action in this specific
context, they are arguably encouraged to rest upon their laurels.

                                           -6-
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treating slick surfaces during the same period of time. See Morin, supra at

1088-89.    Despite the axiomatic, heightened duty of care applicable to

business invitees, when the snow begins to fall, Pennsylvania law largely

leaves such individuals out in the cold.     While I join my past brethren in

questioning the continued wisdom of this legal paradigm, I am constrained to

agree that it controls the result of the instant case.

      Based on the foregoing, I reluctantly concur.

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