Court Opinion

ID: 9575263
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:12:37.672573+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:45:42.479268
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Justice
(dissenting):
I dissent, based on two propositions. First, the so-called “Order of Expungement” is, in my opinion, squarely and incontestably contrary to Section 77-35-17, U.C.A.1953, upon which it expressly states it is based.
Second, and more important, the order ignores and violates the explicit mandate of Section 77-35-17.5, U.C.A.1953, which contains the only authorization for anything resembling the “expungement” which is ordered; and which statute provides that there must be five years of proper conduct before any such order may be entered.
The material portion of the court’s memorandum decision, dated August 6, 1974, states:
The court previously issued its order of expungement. The plaintiff State of Utah has now filed a motion for an order to stay execution of the expungement for a period of five years as provided in Section 77-35-17.5.
As previously stated in the court’s order, the basis for expungement was not on the basis of Section 77-35-17.5 but [A] was on the basis of the previous section not repealed, Section 77-35-17, [B] for the reason that the conviction in this case occurred prior to the enactment of 77-35-17.5, and the court feels that, therefore, Section 17-35-17 is the applicable statute and the five years would then not be in effect.
As to how the action was initiated into the court, upon whose motion, the court took notice of such motion and [C] on its own behalf made the order of ex-pungement. The court feels, therefore, that this is not an issue and denies the motion for a stay of expungement for the five year period under 77-35-17.5.
It is not without some discomfiture that I feel compelled to point out that the emphasized portions of the lower court’s memorandum decision as set forth above are patently in error. But in those emphasized parts, at which I have inserted [A], [B], and [C] for identification in the discussion below, there are misstatements of both law and fact.
The error at [A] is the statement that the expungement order is based on Section 77-35-17, whereas, that statute has no word, nor even a hint, about expungement or sealing records. It necessarily follows that the order recites any possible foundation it might have out from under itself.
The error at [B] is with the recital that the conviction occurred prior to the enactment of Section 77-35-17.5 1 to make it appear that the five-year waiting period does not apply. That section provides for a post-conviction procedure. It obviously can be invoked at any time after the conviction so long as its requirements are met. The trial court’s statement that the statute does not apply because it was enacted after the conviction cannot be other than an attempt to avoid the mandate of that section: that there must be a five-year period of right conduct before any such order can be entered.
The error at [C] is that the court’s statement that it “took notice of such motion and on its own behalf made the order of expungement” seems to be an attempt to change the complexion of the proceeding in a manner squarely inconsistent with the court’s recital in its order of July 8, 1974, issued just one month previously:
That the said Richard Arthur Chambers has now petitioned the court to allow him to withdraw his plea of guilty to said charges and dismiss the information in all of said complaints being Criminal Complaints numbered 1370 to 1379, pursuant to the provisions of Section 77-35-17 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and to expunge the record.
*881One wonders why, in addition to the other errors pointed out above, the trial court felt it necessary to attempt to make it appear that it was the court, and not Mr. Chambers, who initiated this so-called “ex-pungement” proceeding.
I suppose nearly everyone has experienced the ego comfort that comes from helping someone in trouble; and the pang that comes from the necessity of adversely affecting his fellowman. I also acknowledge that for anyone who has erred, it is commendable and desirable to extend sympathy, encouragement and rehabilitation in any wholesome and proper way.
Notwithstanding what I have just said, I think there are some fundamental and important considerations which impel the necessity of pointing out the unlawfulness of the procedure taken in this case. I observe that this is prompted by no concern about Mayor Chambers as an individual (of whom I know nothing except as revealed in this record). It may seem to some that such a procedure is quite all right for some eminent person who has erred. But our purpose should transcend concern about any individual. It should be about the pattern such a proceeding (and its approval by this court), sets for the multitude of ordinary citizens, and the effect it will have upon them; and upon all criminal procedures and criminal records generally.
The administration of justice entails the duty of being faithful and truthful in recording and preserving what is done in fulfilling that responsibility. The records and history are made up, not only of heroics and accomplishments, but of failures and follies, and out of the total experience come the lessons, hopefully, for minimizing wrongful and encouraging rightful conduct. It is my opinion that that desired objective cannot properly be served by official distortions to circumvent the law. There is no authority cited, and none can be found, to support the proposition that the trial court has any inherent power to obliterate its records. If it has any power to change the official records of conviction, it certainly cannot exist except as expressly authorized by statute.2
It was undoubtedly for the foregoing reasons that the legislature appears to have been quite circumspect in the allowance of this sealing or “expungement” of the record by including the precaution that it should be done only after the expiration of a period of five years of following the path of rectitude by one convicted of crime. This condition has not been complied with because the order appealed from is patently contrary to law as explained above, it should be set aside. (All emphasis added.)

. Took effect May 8,1973; see Ch. 198, S.L.U. 1973.

. Insofar as this writer is concerned, neither asking nor expecting anyone else to agree, I seriously question the wisdom of the application of such a statute except in rare and exigent circumstances; and particularly that portion thereof which purports to authorize a convicted and “expunged” person to lie, in denying that he has ever been convicted of crime. The mischief that may ramify from such falsifying should be obvious. Nevertheless, I bow to the legislative will as expressed in Section 77-35-17.5 that under proper circumstances after the lapse of five -years the court may act in accordance therewith.