Court Opinion

ID: 9416879
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 19:57:40.585953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:55.034975
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice MILLER
(with whom concurred Justices FIELD and HUNT), dissenting.
The principles announced in the case of the tax on the ton of freight, and the argument by which those principles are supported, meet my. full approval. They lie at the foundation of our present Federal Constitution. The burdens which States, possessed of safe and commodious harbors, imposed by way of taxes cabled imposts upon the transit of merchandise through those ports to their destination for consumption in other States, were the cause as much as any one class of grievances of the formation of that Constitution; and the reluctance of the little State of Rhode Island to give up the tax which she thus levied on the commerce of her sister States through the harbor of Newport, then the largest importing place in the Union, was the reason that she refused for nearly two years to ratify that instrument.
The clauses of the Constitution which forbid the States to levy duties on imports, and which gave to Congress the right to regulate commerce, were designed to remedy that evil, and have always been supposed to be sufficient for that purpose. The one is the complement of the other, and. something more. The first forbids the States to levy the tax on goods imported from abroad. The second places the entire control of commerce, with the exception of such as may be begun and completed within a single State, under the control of Congress. That commerce which is carried on with foreigners, or with the Indian tribes, or between citizens of different States, is under the jurisdiction of the General Government.
The opinion which affirms the tax of so much per ton on *298freight carried from one State to another to be a tax upon transportation, and therefore a regulation of the commerce among the several States forbidden by the Constitution, receives the approbation of all the members of this court except two. And it is there declared that any tax upon the freight so transported, or upon the carrier on account of such transportation, is within the prohibition.
Is the tax in the present case also within the evil intended to be remedied by the commerce clause of the Constitution ?
It seems to me that to hold that .the tax on freight is within it, and that on gross receipts arising from such transportation is not, is “ to keep the word of promise to the ear and break it to the hope.” If the State of Pennsylvania, availing herself of her central position across the great line of necessary commercial intercourse between the east and the west, and of the fact that all the ways of land and water carriage must go through her territory, is determined to support her government and pay off her débt by a tax on this commerce, it is of small moment that we say she cannot tax the goods so transported, but may tax every dollar paid for such transportation. Her tax bj' the ton being declared void, she has only to effect her purpose by increasing correspondingly her tax on gross receipts. In either event the tax is one for the privilege of transportation within her borders; in either case the tax is one on transportation.
That the tax on gross receipts comes not only ultimately, and in some remote way, but directly out of the freight transported, it is hardly worth while to argue. The railroad company makes precisely the same calculation in making its business profitable in. relation to the cost and expenses of transportation, and the price to be demanded for it, in regard to this tax, that it does in reference to the tax on the ton of freight, and it imposes this additional burden for the benefit of the State in fixing the price of transportation.
The tax does not depend on the profits of the companies. It is the same whether the profits or the losses preponderate in a given year. A road may do a large carrying trade at a loss, but the State says, nevertheless^4 for every dollar that *299you receive for transportation I claim one cent or half a cent.”
It is conceded that railroads may be taxed as other corporations are taxed on their capital stock, on their property, real and personal, and in any other way that does not impose necessarily a burden on transportation between one State and- another. But a railroad or canal company differs from corporations for banking, insurance, or manufacturing purposes in this, that while their business is only remotely, or incidentally, connected with commerce, the business of roads and canals, namely, transportation of ¡persons and property, is itself commerce. So much of said commerce as is exclusively within the State is subject to'its regulations by taxation or otherwise, but that which carries goods from or to another State is exempted by the Constitution from its control.
I lay down the broad proposition that by no device or evasion, by no form of statutory words, can a State compel citizens of other States to pay to it a tax, contribution, or loll, for the privilege of having their goods transported through that State by the ordinary channels of commerce. And that this was the purpose of the frahiers of our Constitution I have no doubt; and I have just as little doubt that the full recognition of this principle is essential to the harmonious future of this country now, as it was then. The internal commerce of that day was of small importance, and the foreign was considered as of great consequence. But both were placed beyond the power of the States to control. The interstate commerce to-day far exceeds in value that which is foreign, and it is of immense importance that it should not be shackled by restrictions imposed.by any State in order to place on others the burden of supporting its own government, as was done in the days of the helpless Confederation.
I think the tax on gross'receipts is a violation of the Federal Constitution, and therefore void.