Court Opinion

ID: 995009
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 00:31:18.037058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:20.420262
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                    No. 97-4731

BRIAN ROGERS,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.
James R. Spencer, District Judge.
(CR-97-106)

Submitted: May 5, 1998

Decided: May 21, 1998

Before HAMILTON, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Robert P. Geary, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Helen F. Fahey,
United States Attorney, Stephen W. Miller, Assistant United States
Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Brian Rogers entered a guilty plea to possession with intent to dis-
tribute crack cocaine, conditioned upon his motion to suppress on the
grounds that he was improperly seized under the Fourth Amendment
prior to discovery of the crack cocaine. On appeal, Rogers contends
that the district court clearly erred in denying his motion to suppress.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

A district court's finding that a Fourth Amendment seizure has or
has not occurred is a question of fact only reversed if clearly errone-
ous. See United States v. Gray, 883 F.2d 320, 322 (4th Cir. 1989). A
person has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
"only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave."
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991) (citation omitted).
"[E]ven when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular indi-
vidual, they may generally ask questions of that individual [without
triggering a Fourth Amendment seizure] . . . as long as the police do
not convey a message that compliance with their requests is required."
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1991) (citations omitted).

Based upon testimony presented at the suppression hearing, the dis-
trict court made the following findings. Rogers was parked in a car
on the side of a road talking to another motorist who had stopped next
to Rogers' car and was impeding the flow of traffic. After a marked
police car had stopped behind the car in the road, that car moved out
of the way. As the officer walked up to Rogers,* he observed him
seated in the driver's seat of the vehicle looking nervously toward his
right and then back at the officer several times. As the officer neared,
Rogers hurriedly exited the vehicle and locked the door. The officer
thought this was suspicious as the windows remained open so he
approached the passenger side of the vehicle and noticed in plain
view a tied bag with white chunks in it which he thought was crack
_________________________________________________________________
*The transcript of the hearing reveals that the officer, who recognized
Rogers, said, "How are you doing, Brian?" To which Rogers replied,
"Okay." (J.A. at 35).

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cocaine. Thereafter, Rogers was handcuffed and arrested. Although
Rogers testified that he was handcuffed prior to the crack being
found, we do not find the district court clearly erred in crediting the
officer's testimony over Rogers and thus finding that he was not
seized, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, prior to the crack
cocaine being discovered in the vehicle. See Gray, 883 F.2d at 322.
Indeed, Rogers clearly believed he was free to leave, because he
exited his vehicle as the officer approached. See Hodari D., 499 U.S.
at 628. Accordingly, we affirm.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-
tions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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