Court Opinion

ID: 9392607
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-05 17:01:20.61232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:47.035042
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 20-11526   Document: 62-1    Date Filed: 05/05/2023   Page: 1 of 17

                                              [DO NOT PUBLISH]

                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 20-11526
                         ____________________

        SOUTHERN-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY,
                                                    Plaintiff-Appellee,
        versus
        MARONDA HOMES, INC. OF FLORIDA,
        JROD PLASTERING, LLC,

                                               Defendants-Appellants,

        JOSEPH MANALANSAN, et al.,

                                                          Defendants.
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        2                          Opinion of the Court                       20-11526

                                ____________________

                    Appeals from the United States District Court
                         for the Middle District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 3:18-cv-01305-TJC-MCR
                              ____________________

        Before BRANCH, GRANT, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
        BRANCH, Circuit Judge:
              Maronda Homes, Inc. of Florida, and JROD Plastering, LLC,
        appeal from the district court’s dismissal of their motions for
        attorneys’ fees under Fla. Stat. § 627.428. 1 The district court
        concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain
        Maronda’s and JROD’s motions because it already had dismissed
        the underlying action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In
        doing so, the district court disagreed with the reasoning of Prime
        Insurance Syndicate, Inc. v. Soil Tech Distributors, Inc., 270
        F. App’x 962 (11th Cir. 2008), an unpublished opinion of this Court.
                In Prime, we held that awards of attorneys’ fees under Fla.
        Stat. § 627.428 are collateral issues to the merits of a case and are
        therefore “within the court’s jurisdiction, even after the court [has]
        determined it lack[s] subject matter jurisdiction over the
        underlying suit.” Id. at 965. But in a published opinion twenty-

        1 Fla. Stat. § 627.428 was repealed by the Florida legislature in March 2023.   See
        2023 Fla. Laws ch. 2023-15, § 11.
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        20-11526               Opinion of the Court                        3

        four years earlier, we held that awards of attorneys’ fees under Fla.
        Stat. § 627.428 are integral to the merits, Certain British
        Underwriters at Lloyds of London v. Jet Charter Serv., Inc., 739
        F.2d 534, 535 (11th Cir. 1984), which means that a district court
        would lack subject-matter jurisdiction to award such fees if it has
        already dismissed the underlying action for lack of subject-matter
        jurisdiction. Because we are bound by our published opinion in Jet
        Charter, we affirm.
                                I.     Background
                On August 23, 2013, Maronda sold a house to Joseph and
        Chamroeun Manalansan. A few weeks later, the Manalansans sent
        Maronda a notice of construction defects related to the house’s
        stucco installation. Maronda had hired JROD to perform the
        stucco installation, and JROD maintained a commercial general
        liability insurance policy with Southern-Owners that listed
        Maronda as an “additional insured.” Maronda thus requested that
        Southern-Owners defend or indemnify it under JROD’s policy.
                Southern-Owners sued Maronda and JROD in the U.S.
        District Court for the Middle District of Florida, seeking a
        declaration that its policy did not cover the stucco damage. The
        district court dismissed Southern-Owners’s complaint for lack of
        subject-matter jurisdiction because Southern-Owners failed to
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        4                            Opinion of the Court                        20-11526

        meet the amount-in-controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 2
        Southern-Owners did not appeal that ruling.
                Maronda and JROD then filed motions for attorneys’ fees
        under Fla. Stat. § 627.428. 3 Southern-Owners responded that the
        district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain the
        motions because it already had dismissed the underlying action for
        lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

        2 Southern-Owners invoked 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity jurisdiction) as the
        basis for the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Section 1332 imposes
        a $75,000 “amount-in-controversy” requirement. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (“The
        district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
        matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 . . . .”).
        3   Fla. Stat. § 627.428 (1982), which governs this case, provides:
                  (1) Upon the rendition of a judgment or decree by any of the
                  courts of this state against an insurer and in favor of any named
                  or omnibus insured or the named beneficiary under a policy or
                  contract executed by the insurer, the trial court or, in the event
                  of an appeal in which the insured or beneficiary prevails, the
                  appellate court shall adjudge or decree against the insurer and
                  in favor of the insured or beneficiary a reasonable sum as fees
                  or compensation for the insured’s or beneficiary’s attorney
                  prosecuting the suit in which the recovery is had.
                  (2) As to suits based on claims arising under life insurance
                  policies or annuity contracts, no such attorney’s fee shall be
                  allowed if such suit was commenced prior to expiration of 60
                  days after proof of the claim was duly filed with the insurer.
                  (3) When so awarded, compensation or fees of the attorney
                  shall be included in the judgment or decree rendered in the
                  case.
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        20-11526                  Opinion of the Court                               5

              The district court agreed with Southern-Owners and
        dismissed Maronda’s and JROD’s motions. It concluded that
        awards of attorneys’ fees under Fla. Stat. § 627.428 are integral to
        the merits and that it thus lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to
        consider Maronda’s and JROD’s motions. Maronda and JROD
        timely appealed.
                                      II.     Analysis
               The district court properly concluded that it lacked subject-
        matter jurisdiction to consider Maronda’s and JROD’s motions
        after it already had dismissed the underlying action for lack of
        subject-matter jurisdiction because awards of attorneys’ fees under
        Fla. Stat. § 627.428 are integral to the merits. 4 See Jet Charter, 739
        F.2d at 536.
               “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” and “[i]t is
        to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction,”
        unless the party asserting jurisdiction proves otherwise. Kokkonen
        v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Maronda
        and JROD argue that the district court had jurisdiction to consider
        their motions, even though it already had dismissed the underlying

        4 “We review questions of subject-matter jurisdiction de novo.”   City of Miami
        Gardens v. Wells Fargo & Co., 931 F.3d 1274, 1282 (11th Cir. 2019). Subject-
        matter jurisdiction is the court’s “statutory or constitutional power to
        adjudicate the case.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89
        (1998) (emphasis omitted). A federal court must have subject-matter
        jurisdiction to “proceed at all in any cause.” Id. at 94 (quoting Ex parte
        McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868)).
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        6                        Opinion of the Court                    20-11526

        action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, because awards of
        attorneys’ fees under Fla. Stat. § 627.428 are “collateral issues.” See
        Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395 (1990) (“[A]
        federal court may consider collateral issues after an action is no
        longer pending.”).
               A court may consider collateral issues after it has dismissed
        an action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because “the
        determination of a collateral issue” is not “a judgment on the
        merits of an action,” and “does not raise the issue of a district court
        adjudicating the merits of a ‘case or controversy’ over which it
        lacks jurisdiction.” 5 Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 138 (1992)
        (quotation omitted); see id. (“Such an order implicates no
        constitutional concern because it does not signify a district court’s
        assessment of the legal merits of the complaint.” (quotation
        omitted)). In Willy, the Supreme Court held that sanctions under
        Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 are collateral issues that a
        federal court may address after it has dismissed a case for lack of
        subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 137–38.
               Under Florida law, “attorney’s fees recovera[bl]e by statute
        are to be regarded as ‘costs’ only when made so by statute.
        Otherwise, they are to be treated as an element of damages.” Jet
        Charter, 739 F.2d at 536 (quoting Prudential Ins. Co v. Lamm, 218
        So. 2d 219, 219 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)); see also Smith v. Sitomer, 550

        5 For example, “a federal court always has jurisdiction to determine its own
        jurisdiction.” United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002).
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        20-11526                  Opinion of the Court                               7

        So. 2d 461, 462 (Fla. 1989); Spiegel v. Williams, 545 So. 2d 1360,
        1362 (Fla. 1989). Thus, in Jet Charter, we concluded that the
        attorneys’ fees provided for in Fla. Stat. § 627.428 are “an element
        of damages” and “an integral part of the merits,” because such fees
        are not designated as costs. See 739 F.2d at 535–36 (quotation
        omitted); see also Fla. Stat. § 627.428(3) (1982) (providing that
        “[w]hen so awarded, compensation or fees of the attorney shall be
        included in the judgment or decree rendered in the case”). Because
        an award of attorneys’ fees under Fla. Stat. § 627.428 is not a
        collateral issue, the district court correctly determined that it
        lacked jurisdiction to consider Maronda’s and JROD’s motions
        after it had dismissed the underlying action for lack of subject-
        matter jurisdiction. See Stanley v. CIA, 639 F.2d 1146, 1157 (5th
        Cir. Unit B 1981) (“When a court must dismiss a case for lack of
        jurisdiction, the court should not adjudicate the merits of the
        claim.”).6
               Maronda and JROD argue that Prime compels a different
        result. In Prime, we cited Willy to hold that a district court’s
        “award of attorney’s fees [under Fla. Stat. § 627.428] was collateral
        to the merits of the case and was therefore within the court’s
        jurisdiction, even after the court determined it lacked subject

        6In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),
        this Court adopted as precedent the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit
        handed down prior to October 1, 1981.
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        8                          Opinion of the Court                        20-11526

        matter jurisdiction over the underlying suit.” 7 270 F. App’x at 965.
        But Prime is an unpublished opinion that is “not binding
        precedent.” United States v. Izurieta, 710 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir.
        2013); see also 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not
        considered binding precedent . . . .”). And in Jet Charter, which
        was published, we held that “an award of attorney’s fees under [Fla.
        Stat. §] 627.428 is ‘an integral part of the merits’ and must be part
        of any final judgment.” 739 F.2d at 536. Even if Prime were a
        published opinion, “when there are conflicting prior panel
        decisions, the oldest one controls.” Monaghan v. Worldpay US,
        Inc., 955 F.3d 855, 862 (11th Cir. 2020). Thus, we are bound to
        apply Jet Charter and must conclude that an award of attorneys’
        fees under Fla. Stat. § 627.428 is integral to the merits. 8

        7 Prime also cited Moore v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc., 981 F.2d 443 (9th

        Cir. 1992), and Morand v. Stoneburner, 516 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987).
        Prime, 270 F. App’x at 965. These two cases are easily distinguishable. Moore
        involved a fee award under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), not Fla. Stat. § 627.428. 981
        F.2d at 445. And Morand involved the subject-matter jurisdiction of Florida
        state courts, not the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal courts. 516 So. 2d at
        271.
                 In an unrelated case, the Eighth Circuit declined to follow Prime,
        finding it to be “unpersuasive, as it relied on cases involving a court’s
        jurisdiction to award sanctions under Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).”
        Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. v. Schieffer, 715 F.3d 712, 713 n.2 (8th Cir. 2013).
        8 Asa general rule, “a prior panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent panels
        unless and until it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by
        the Supreme Court or this court sitting en banc.” United States v. Archer, 531
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        20-11526                   Opinion of the Court                                9

        F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008). But, for our precedents that interpret state
        law, “a panel [is] free to reinterpret state law” when subsequent decisions from
        the state’s courts have “cast doubt on our interpretation.” Venn v. St. Paul
        Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 1058, 1066 (11th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added
        and quotations omitted). In Venn, we revisited our decision because “Florida
        Supreme Court decisions” had “significantly changed the law” and “thus cast
        doubt on [our precedent].” Id.
                 We recognize that Jet Charter is our Circuit’s interpretation of Florida
        law and, as appellants note in their briefs, there are subsequently decided
        Florida cases that indicate, under the facts in those cases, that attorneys’ fees
        are a collateral issue. See generally Finkelstein v. N. Broward Hosp. Dist., 484
        So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 1986); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Hutchins, 489 So. 2d 208 (Fla.
        2d DCA 1986); Advanced Chiropractic & Rehab. Ctr. v. United Auto Ins. Co.,
        140 So. 3d 529 (Fla. 2014). We decline to invoke our discretionary authority
        to revisit Jet Charter at this time, however, because these cases are
        distinguishable on factual and procedural grounds, so we are not convinced
        that Florida courts have significantly “changed the law.” Venn, 99 F.3d at
        1066. We start with the Florida Supreme Court cases. First, as the district
        court recognized, Finkelstein is distinguishable, inter alia, because it
        “examine[d] the [attorneys’ fees provision in the] medical malpractice statute,
        not § 627.428 [which Jet Charter interpreted].” See 484 So. 2d at 1243. Second,
        we do not read Advanced to clearly change the law because it stems from a
        distinct procedural posture (writ proceedings) and the court expressly limited
        its reach: “the amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded in such circumstances
        . . . .” 140 So. 3d at 537 (emphasis added). Digging further, we look to
        Travelers—decided by the Second District Court of Appeal of Florida. 489 So.
        2d at 208. To start, Travelers did consider the same statute as Jet Charter, but
        for two independent reasons we do not find it to be a significant change in law
        that motivates us to exercise our discretionary power to rewrite our Circuit’s
        precedent. First, while we are not limited to state supreme court decisions
        when determining if there has been a change in law, our precedents have
        routinely looked to the states’ high courts for direction. See generally United
        States v. Clarke, 822 F.3d 1213, 1215 (11th Cir. 2016) (looking to decisions from
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        10                         Opinion of the Court                       20-11526

                AFFIRMED. 9

        “Florida’s highest court” when determining whether to revisit our
        interpretation of Florida state law); Venn, 99 F.3d at 1066 (same). Second,
        because Travelers merely imputed the logic from Finkelstein without
        grappling with the important distinctions between the dissimilar operative
        statutes that undergird each case, we decline to reconstruct our Circuit’s 24-
        year-old precedent on such a tenuous foundation.
                 All in all, while some Florida courts have reached a different result
        than we did in Jet Charter, these decisions are too varied to constitute a
        definitive change in law. See Venn, 99 F.3d at 1066. As such, we decline to
        exercise our discretionary power to rewrite our Circuit’s precedent which
        means that we are bound to follow Jet Charter. Archer, 531 F.3d at 1352.
        9 My concurring colleague suggests that this opinion should be published. My
        dissenting colleague and I disagree given this Court’s express policy that: “The
        unlimited proliferation of published opinions is undesirable because it tends to
        impair the development of the cohesive body of law.” 11th Cir. R. 36-2, I.O.P.
        5. First, the statute at issue (Fla. Stat. § 627.428) has been repealed. As such,
        outside of deciding the instant case, the lasting utility of our dueling opinions
        is dubious—at best. Of course, if our three opinions offered instructional
        guidance or clarified our body of law in a meaningful way, the statute’s repeal
        could be overlooked. But that brings us to our second point: our three
        opinions are so fractured that they would provide no actionable guidance and
        further complicate our law. See 11th Cir. R. 36-2, I.O.P. 6 (“Opinions that the
        panel believes to have no precedential value are not published.”).
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        20-11526           TJOFLAT, J., Concurring Specially                       1

        TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge, concurring specially:
               I agree that we should affirm the District Court’s dismissal
        of Maronda Homes, Inc. of Florida and JROD Plastering, LLC’s
        motions for attorneys’ fees under Fla. Stat. § 627.428, but I arrive
        at this conclusion by a different road than my colleagues. At
        bottom, I do not believe the attorneys’ fee provision of Fla. Stat.
        § 627.428 applies to the procedural posture in which we find the
        instant case. Consequently, we are not bound by Certain British
        Underwriters at Lloyds of London v. Jet Charter Serv., Inc., 739
        F.2d 534 (11th Cir. 1984) in any meaningful way as the Lead
        opinion suggests. Further, if Jet Charter is inapplicable, there is no
        need to revisit that precedent in light of intervening Florida court
        decisions as the Dissent suggests.
               An insurer sued its insured “seeking a declaration that its
        policy did not cover the stucco damage.” Lead Op. at 3. That
        means the insurer, Southern-Owners, began the process inherent
        in a civil suit by filing a complaint. Maronda Homes, an insured,
        responded by filing a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to
        Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), rather than by filing an
        answer. 1 In that motion, Maronda argued that the District Court
        lacked subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because
        the amount in controversy failed to clear the required $75,000

        1 JROD Plastering followed later with a motion to dismiss for lack of subject
        matter jurisdiction asserting the same two general grounds.
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        2                  TJOFLAT, J., Concurring Specially               20-11526

        threshold. 2 The District Court agreed and dismissed the
        complaint. The significance of this ground for dismissal: the
        defendant insureds never argued the merits of the claim under the
        insurance policy, nor did the District Court decide its merits. The
        defendants did not file an answer responding to Southern-Owners’s
        substantive claims. They did not file a counter claim. They only
        asserted that this matter was not properly before the District Court
        for adjudication. Therefore, in the words of Jet Charter, there were
        no merits for an assessment of attorneys’ fees to be “an integral part
        of.” 739 F.2d at 535. The lawsuit stalled on the runway.
              “Maronda and JROD then filed motions for attorneys’ fees
        under Fla. Stat. § 627.428.” Lead Op. at 4. Relevantly, that statute
        once provided,
               Upon the rendition of a judgment or decree by any of
               the courts of this state against an insurer and in favor
               of any named or omnibus insured or the named
               beneficiary under a policy or contract executed by the
               insurer, the trial court . . . shall adjudge or decree
               against the insurer and in favor of the insured . . . a
               reasonable sum as fees or compensation for the
               insured’s or beneficiary’s attorney prosecuting the
               suit in which the recovery is had.
        Fla. Stat. § 627.428(1) (1982) (emphasis added).

        2 Alternatively, Maronda argued the District Court should decline jurisdiction
        due to Southern-Owners’s pending parallel state court claims seeking the same
        relief.
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        20-11526         TJOFLAT, J., Concurring Specially                  3

               The defendant insureds (a) did not have a recovery and (b)
        did not receive a judgment or decree “under a policy or contract.”
        Rather, they successfully secured the dismissal of an action against
        them as not properly before the District Court. The District Court
        did not decide anything about the insurance policy; the defendants
        did not even present arguments to assist with any such decision.
        All that is to say, the District Court does not have subject matter
        jurisdiction to consider attorneys’ fees because this case never
        triggered the now-defunct Florida attorneys’ fee provision.
                This is a matter of first principles because we are bound by
        neither Jet Charter nor Prime Insurance Syndicate, Inc. v. Soil Tech
        Distributors, Inc., 270 F. App’x 962 (11th Cir. 2008). It goes without
        saying, but our unpublished opinions such as Prime do not bind
        this Court in later decisions. Jet Charter, on the other hand, is
        inapposite on the issue we now consider. As just discussed, the
        District Court here did not decide—and the defendant insureds did
        not argue—the merits of an insurance policy, only subject matter
        jurisdiction. The district court in Jet Charter, however, did. The
        underlying suit in Jet Charter ended in summary judgment on the
        merits of the claims presented, not a motion to dismiss. 739 F.2d
        at 534. A quick look at the district court’s docket sheet in that case
        also reveals that, unlike here, not only did the defendant insured
        file an answer to the insurer’s complaint, but also a counterclaim.
        See Answer, Certain British Underwriters at Lloyds, London v.
        Aero Serv. Int’l, Inc., No. 83-0647 (S.D. Fla. filed Apr. 13, 1983).
        Therefore, any holding from Jet Charter about how tied up the
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        4                 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring Specially          20-11526

        merits of a case and attorneys’ fees are with each other has nothing
        to say about this case, where there was no decision on the merits.
        The District Court concluded it lacked subject matter jurisdiction,
        so the case’s dismissal at this stage and on this ground is as if
        Southern-Owners’s case had never been filed in the first instance.
        While the Jet Charter litigation may not have reached its intended
        final destination—a declaratory judgment in favor of the insurer—
        the lawsuit at least made it into the air. Because Jet Charter is not
        on point here, there is also no reason to revisit it in light of
        intervening Florida case law, as the Dissent suggests.
               Finally, though I recognize that these three opinions are
        unpublished, I think that they should have been published for two
        reasons. One, in my book, substantial disagreement among panel
        members almost always warrants publication. Here, each of the
        three panel judges have written separately, thus evidencing
        disagreement about the issues presented by this appeal. Two, the
        Florida legislature’s repeal of Fla. Stat. § 627.428 neither overturns
        Jet Charter nor makes our discussion of it purely academic. As the
        Lead Opinion points out, litigants can and do argue about statutes
        through analogy to other, similar statutes and provisions. Lead
        Op. at 8 n.7, 9 n.8. Prime cites Moore v. Permanente Medical
        Group, Inc., 981 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1992) (interpreting 28 U.S.C.
        § 1447(c)), to interpret Fla. Stat. § 627.428. Likewise, the appellants
        here cite Finkelstein v. North Broward Hospital District, 484 So. 2d
        1241 (Fla. 1986) (interpreting Florida’s medical malpractice
        statute), for the same reason. Similarly, future advocates and
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        20-11526         TJOFLAT, J., Concurring Specially                 5

        judges might continue to use Jet Charter to interpret attorneys’ fees
        provisions in other laws.
                                   *     *      *
               For the reasons discussed in my opinion, I think it necessary
        to publish these opinions to show when such use is inappropriate,
        rather than assuming Jet Charter is a functionally dead letter now
        that the underlying statute is.
                                   *     *      *
              I would affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the attorneys’
        fees motions on the grounds described above.
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        20-11526              GRANT, J., Dissenting                      1

        GRANT, Circuit Judge, concurring in footnote nine of the majority
        opinion but otherwise dissenting:
              Jet Charter interpreted attorneys’ fees under Fla. Stat.
        § 627.428 to be “an integral part of the merits of the case” that
        “must be part of any final judgment.” Certain British Underwriters
        at Lloyds of London v. Jet Charter Serv., Inc., 739 F.2d 534, 535
        (11th Cir. 1984), abrogated on other grounds by Budinich v. Becton
        Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 202–03 (1988). But subsequent
        decisions of the Florida courts cast doubt on that characterization
        of § 627.428. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Hutchins, 489 So. 2d 208,
        209–10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (directly rejecting Jet Charter’s
        reading of § 627.428); see also generally Advanced Chiropractic &
        Rehab. Ctr. v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 140 So. 3d 529 (Fla. 2014);
        Finkelstein v. N. Broward Hosp. Dist., 484 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 1986).
               When “subsequent decisions of ‘the Florida courts cast
        doubt on our prior interpretations of state law,’ we should
        ‘reinterpret state law in light of the new precedents.’” Pincus v.
        Am. Traffic Sols., Inc., 986 F.3d 1305, 1311 (11th Cir. 2021)
        (alterations adopted) (quoting Venn v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
        Co., 99 F.3d 1058, 1066 (11th Cir. 1996)). Considering Travelers,
        Advanced Chiropractic, and Finkelstein, Florida courts have “cast
        doubt” on Jet Charter to the extent that it does not bind us.
               Ordinarily, this question may warrant certification to the
        Florida Supreme Court. But the Florida legislature recently
        repealed § 627.428. 2023 Fla. Laws ch. 2023-15, § 11. Rather than
        request the Florida Supreme Court’s view on a now-repealed law,
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        2                      GRANT, J., Dissenting               20-11526

        I would simply hold that attorney’s fees under § 627.428 are a
        collateral issue and reverse the district court. Because the lead
        opinion’s approach seems to heighten our standard for
        reconsidering past interpretations of state law and perpetuates Jet
        Charter’s doubtful interpretation of § 627.428, I respectfully
        dissent. As for the specially concurring opinion’s discussion about
        whether § 627.428 applies at all, my view is that such an analysis is
        more properly understood as a merits question relating to the
        parties’ attorney’s fees claims, and does not determine the district
        court’s jurisdiction to consider those claims in the first place.