Court Opinion

ID: 9550378
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:34:37.163301+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:28.153902
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, J.,
dissenting.
I am unable to join in the Court’s decision to dismiss the appeal as untimely filed— thereby terminating the action without reaching the merits of the appeal now, or ever. As we noted in Bunn v. Bunn, 99 Idaho 710, 587 P.2d 1245 (1978), the history of jurisprudence in Idaho, both before and after the advent of the “federal” rules of civil procedure, displays judicial policy of long standing in Idaho that controversial litigation be determined and disposed of each on its own particular facts, and it is no less so that there be a determination of appeals on their merits, not on technicalities. This rule was followed in Neal v. Harris, 100 Idaho 348, 597 P.2d 234 (1979) and in Northwest Health Care, Inc. v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, 99 Idaho 843, 590 P.2d 99 (1979).
There are now in the Idaho Reports a number of cases which should serve to illustrate that the Court is firmly committed to a stringent application of Rule 54(b), I.R. C.P., and piecemeal appeals are being regularly dismissed for noncompliance therewith.1 The policy reasons were well stated *454in Merchants, Inc. v. Intermountain Industries, Inc., 97 Idaho 890, 556 P.2d 366 (1976).
It should now be abundantly clear that, even where that certification has been obtained, this Court is not obsequiously obligated to entertain the appeal, but may conclude that the certification was improvidently granted for which reason it will be set aside and the appeal dismissed. Pichon v. L. J. Broekemeier, 99 Idaho 598, 586 P.2d 1042 (1978); Christensen v. Potratz, 100 Idaho 352, 597 P.2d 595 (1979).
In Pichón the Court pointedly stated that certification in accordance with Rule 54(b) is not a matter of courtesy from court to counsel, not a matter of mere accommodation. The Court there speaking through Chief Justice Shepard, quoted Judge Hastie of the Third Circuit Court of .Appeals in Panichella v. Pennsylvania R.R., 252 F.2d 452, 455 (3d Cir. 1958):
“[OJrdinarily an application for a Rule 54(b) order requires the trial judge to exercise considered discretion, weighing the overall policy against piecemeal appeals against whatever exigencies the case at hand may present. Indeed, the draftsmen of this Rule have made explicit their thought that it would serve only to authorize ‘the exercise of a discretionary power to afford a remedy in the infrequent harsh case . . .’ 28 U.S.C.A., Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 118-119 note. It follows that 54(b) orders should not be entered routinely or as a courtesy or accommodation to counsel. The power which the Rule confers upon the trial judge should be used only ‘in the infrequent harsh case’ as an instrument for the improved administration of justice and the more satisfactory disposition of litigation in the light of the public policy indicated by statute and rule.” 99 Idaho at 602, 586 P.2d at 1046.
The court went on to add that the record in Pinchón did not reflect any hardship or injustice that would be suffered if a Rule 54(b) certification were not made.
Significantly, Panichella was steadfastly adhered to by the Third Circuit Court seventeen years later in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 521 F.2d 360 (1975), cited and relied upon by this Court in Merchants, Inc., supra, at p. 892 of 97 Idaho, 556 P.2d 366. In Allis-Chalmers, although the appeal was dismissed, the Circuit Court also directed the vacating of the order of certification — thus depriving the summary judgment of any degree of finality — in marked contrast to the Court’s action today.
In Potratz the Court carefully explained that there may be, and were in that case, cogent reasons .for not putting the final stamp of finality on a summary judgment. Dawson v. Mead, 98 Idaho 1, 557 P.2d 595 (1976) serves as a “laboratory experiment” illustrating that same point. There the trial court granted a summary judgment on one issue of a multiple-issue, multiple-party lawsuit, but thereafter, on hearing all the evidence, a final judgment of the entire controversy was entered which in essence nullified or reversed the summary judgment. The rule contemplates that such may happen.
In Merchants, Inc. v. Intermountain Industries, supra, in dismissing for lack of certification, we observed that neither party had requested certification and that one “might have done so in order to activate the running of appeal,” and the other might have so done “in order to lay a foundation for its appeal.” 97 Idaho at 892, 556 P.2d at 368. In discussing policy reasons for requiring adherence to the rule, we mentioned that the improper appeal in that case relegated the rights of fifteen parties on four other claims to lie in limbo for 18 months. “Had the underlying case been permitted to go forward, by now the issue before us might well have become moot.” Of singular importance to our case sub judice, we *455followed with the statement prophetic to Pichón that:
“It is for this reason that some courts not only require that the conclusory language of 54(b) be met, but also insist on a reasoned statement substantiating the lower court’s certification, so that this decision, too, can be reviewed for abuse of discretion. Gummer v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., Inc., 516 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1975); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 521 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1975). See also, ‘Entry of Final Judgment under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: the Third Circuit Imposes a Requirement of a Statement of Reasons,’ 56 B.U.L.Rev. 579-599.”
Merchants, Inc. v. Intermountain Industries, Inc., 97 Idaho at 892, 556 P.2d at 368.
In Pichón the Court sua sponte made a review of the order of certification and found an abuse of discretion. In that case the Court was put to the task of making an independent review of the entire record, not an easy task, and one which would not have been necessary had there been the reasoned statement substantiating the certification mentioned in Merchants, Inc. This is not to suggest that the district courts should bear the entire brunt of coming forth with a reasoned statement. That should also be the responsibility of counsel — not just the counsel who seeks certification, but all counsel for all involved parties. Certification is not a mere ministerial act, but may be and most often is a matter of some moment. As pointed out in Merchants, Inc., one party may desire it so that his adversary is put under the gun, i. e., required to take his appeal, or lose his right of appeal. However, the adversary may be possessed of cogent reasons for not wanting to be precipitated into an appeal. Certain it is that the adversary may very well want to be heard on the issue of granting certification. Equally certain, notions of due process and fundamental fairness require that there at least be afforded an opportunity to be heard. The very recent opinion of this Court in Christensen v. Potratz, supra, serves well to illustrate the prejudice to which a party may be exposed where certification is cordially granted at the ex parte request of one litigant without any notice to or opportunity to be heard in the other. Certification is not a mere ministerial function, but is judicial in nature and it is obtainable by order of the court. A court “orders” only responsive to a motion or petition. A motion for certification should not be entertained by the trial court without a record showing notice to adverse counsel and the presentation of an opportunity to be heard. In such manner will the trial court be given the benefit of argument by counsel, by reason of which the court will be better able to give a reasoned statement substantiating the decision to certify.
The trial court, rather than merely endorsing a certificate in the conclusory language of the rule, by the very process of setting forth the reasons which persuade him to grant the request, may the better comprehend the various factors, pro and con, which have been advanced by counsel or which independently appear to the court. An order granting certification would certainly be subject to motion for reconsideration should either party desire to point out fallacies in the court’s reasoning. Secondly, as pointed out in Merchants, Inc., and evidenced in real life in Pichón and Christensen, this Court on appeal can only then readily review the reasons which motivated the court to believe that the issue determined by the summary judgment is ripe for appeal, with compelling reasons why it should be moved on ahead of the remainder of the action.
Here, of course, we have the flip side of the coin. Today the Court does not dismiss for failure of certification, as has so often been the case, but dismisses because there has been certification, and it is said that too much time has gone by from the time of certification until the taking of the appeal. The opinion of the Court, taken together with the special concurrence, sets forth that which has taken place and that which must be examined with an eye to requirements of due process and fundamental fairness, and our long standing judicial policy of reaching *456the merits where possible, as reiterated in Bunn v. Bunn, supra.
The Court’s opinion states that “the judgment provides, among other things, both a finding of no just reason for delay and an order that judgment be entered.” The special concurrence points out, however, that such “was not in the form of a certificate. Neither was it placed in the final paragraph of the summary judgment . . . as is generally the case but rather in the introductory paragraph. Furthermore, it was not mentioned in the judge’s memorandum decision . . . granting the summary judgment and no motion for certification was made by either party.”
The opinion of the Court correctly states that prior to the hearing of oral argument, the motion to dismiss — which today is granted — was earlier denied. The special concurrence adds that the certification “was easily overlooked when this Court first considered the motion to dismiss.” The Court’s opinion says, however, “it is appropriate to re-examine the issue of the timeliness of the appeal,” and easily disposes of the Court’s previous order denying the motion to dismiss by declaring it “withdrawn.” To the foregoing should be added only that the certification, if it may be truly called that, is not by order of the trial court, but appears in what is generally the “recitals” paragraph of the judgment, a singularly unusual place indeed in which to find it, and where it was not initially found by five members of this Court replete with staff in first denying the motion to dismiss, and only discovered by the present panel after the hearing on oral argument when the respondent continued to press the motion notwithstanding that it had been ruled on, and there not being any motion for reconsideration from the time of denial on September 27, 1978, until March 13, 1979.
On such a state of the record — no motion for certification, no hearing on the issue, and there being no reasoned statement why certification was proper or any indication that the trial court realized his obligation “to exercise considered discretion”2 and it appearing more likely than not that the trial court in signing the judgment, having no reason to do so, did not closely read the recitals paragraph of the judgment — the Court today, in the interests of justice and fair play, should follow the precedent of Pichon v. L. J. Broekemeier, 99 Idaho 598, 586 P.2d 1042 (1978) and Christensen v. Potratz, 100 Idaho 352, 597 P.2d 595 (1979), and vacate that much of the judgment which purports to be in compliance with Rule 54(b), but which falls way short of the mark.
This Court in Pichón approved wholeheartedly the Third Circuit Court’s practices relative to Rule 54(b) certifications. There is no valid reason for not continuing to do so.
“For lack of a competent Rule 54(b) certification, and therefore, for lack of finality, the appeal will be dismissed with a direction to the district court that it vacate so much of its July 19, 1974, order as entered judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b). The case will be remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Each party to bear its own costs.”
Allis-Chalmers v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 521 F.2d 360, 367 (3d Cir. 1975).

. Gleason v. Lavaterra, No. 12669, dismissed by order on June 4, 1979; Long v. Goodyear, 100 Idaho 183, 595 P.2d 717 (1979); Pichon v. L. J. Broekemeier, 99 Idaho 598, 586 P.2d 1042 (1978); Farber v. State, 98 Idaho 928, 576 P.2d 209 (1978); Athletic Round Table, Inc. v. Merrill, 98 Idaho 852, 574 P.2d 540 (1978); Baker v. Pendy, 98 Idaho 745, 572 P.2d 179 (1977); Rogers v. State, 98 Idaho 742, 572 P.2d 176 (1977); Silver Sage Ranch, Inc. v. Lawson, 98 Idaho 707, 571 P.2d 768 (1977); Twin Falls County v. Knievel, 98 Idaho 321, 563 P.2d 45 (1977); Dawson v. Mead, 98 Idaho 1, 557 P.2d 595 (1976); John Deere Co. v. Kunzler, 97 Idaho 921, 557 P.2d 199 (1976); Merchants, Inc. v. Intermountain *454Industries, Inc., 97 Idaho 890, 556 P.2d 366 (1976); Soderman v. Kackley, 97 Idaho 850, 555 P.2d 390 (1976); Sangster v. Spangler, 97 Idaho 186, 541 P.2d 610 (1975); Southland Produce Company v. Belson, 96 Idaho 776, 536 P.2d 1126 (1975); Viani v. Aetna Insurance Company, 95 Idaho 22, 501 P.2d 706 (1972); Rawlings v. Layne and Bowler Pump Co., 93 Idaho 496, 465 P.2d 107 (1970); and Gerry v. Johnston, 85 Idaho 226, 378 P.2d 198 (1963).

. The judgment in this case was entered prior to Pichón.