Court Opinion

ID: 9649495
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:56:29.221474+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:53:32.154518
License: Public Domain

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
GARIBALDI, J.
In May 1997, a jury convicted defendant Jesse Timmendequas of the capital murder of Megan Kanka, committed in the course of a kidnapping and sexual assault. Following a penalty-phase proceeding on the capital-murder conviction, the court sentenced defendant to death. He appeals directly to this Court as of right. See R. 2:2 — 1(a)(3). We affirm defendant’s conviction for murder and his sentence of death.
I.

Procedural History

On October 19, 1994, Jesse Timmendequas was charged with: knowing or purposeful murder of Megan Kanka by his own conduct, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-3a(l) or (2) (count one); felony murder, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-3a(3) (counts two and four); first degree kidnapping, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:13-lb (count three); and first degree aggravated assault, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2a(l) (counts five, six, seven and eight).
On November 18, 1994, the Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office filed a Notice of Aggravating Factors. The aggravating factors were: (1) the murder was committed to escape detection, apprehension, trial, punishment or confinement for the aggravated sexual assault and/or kidnapping of the victim, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(f); and (2) the murder was committed in the course of the commission of an aggravated sexual assault and/or kidnapping of the victim, N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-3c(4)(g).
*535On June 29, 1995, defendant moved to change the trial venue from Mercer County. On October 20,1995, the trial court granted the motion, setting venue in Camden County. On December 15, 1995, the State moved for reconsideration, asking the court either to empanel a foreign jury or change the venue to a county contiguous to Mercer. On December 21, 1995, the court granted the State’s motion, holding that a foreign jury would be empaneled from Camden County. The court then invited the parties to submit briefs on the option of empaneling a foreign jury from a contiguous county. On January 29, 1996, the court chose Hunter-don County as the source of the foreign jury.
Pre-trial hearings also were held on various evidentiary issues. Defendant’s motion to employ a struck jury system and to permit attorney participation in voir dire was granted. The court ruled that all of defendant’s statements to police were admissible. The court also dismissed defendant’s motions: to suppress evidence obtained during a consent search and a search authorized by warrant; to dismiss the indictment due to prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury; to select a fourteen-person jury; and to consolidate all murder offenses.
The court further denied defendant’s motion to exclude from the jury pool all jurors with knowledge of “Megan’s Law,” holding that the court would advise prospective jurors of defendant’s prior record. That record included convictions for the aggravated sexual assault of a young girl in 1982, sexual assault and attempted aggravated assault in 1982, and theft of a vehicle in 1980. Defendant sought interlocutory relief from the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division declined to intervene, but directed the trial court not to advise jurors of defendant’s prior convictions. It also ordered the court to prepare in writing the questions it intended to ask potential jury members. A subsequent application for interlocutory relief based on the trial court’s prepared questions was denied by the Appellate Division. Defendant’s motion with this Court for leave to appeal also was denied.
Jury selection for the trial began in Hunterdon County on January 13, 1997. On April 15, 1997, defendant moved for recon*536sideration of the change of venue decision and requested that jury selection be moved to Camden County. That motion was denied. A jury was selected on April 21, 1997, following individual interviews of 331 prospective jurors. Defendant subsequently renewed his change of venue motion; again, it was denied.
The guilt phase was held from May 5 to May 30, 1997. Defendant was convicted on all counts. The penalty phase was held from June 9 to June 20, 1997. Defendant alleged as mitigating factors: that he was under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-3c(5)(a); that his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly impaired as a result of mental disease or defect, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-3c(5)(d); and twenty-two circumstances of his upbringing under the “catch-all” mitigating factor, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(h).
The jury concluded that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors. “By virtue of the verdict,” the court sentenced defendant to death. On July 30, 1997, defendant was sentenced on the non-capital counts of the indictment. The felony murder convictions, counts two and four, were merged into murder (count one). Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment on that count, in the event that his death sentence was vacated. Counts five through eight, the aggravated sexual assault convictions, were merged with the kidnapping conviction (count three). Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment on the kidnapping charge, with 25 years of parole ineligibility, to run consecutive to count one. Defendant was also required to pay a Violent Crimes Compensation Board penalty of $100. Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal.
II.

The Trial

A. Guilt Phase
The victim, Megan Kanka, lived at 32 Barbara Lee Drive in Hamilton Township with her parents, Maureen and Richard Kan-*537ka, and her two siblings. Defendant lived diagonally across the street at 27 Barbara Lee Drive with Brian Jenin, Joseph Cifelli and Cifelli’s mother.
Megan’s mother was the first witness for the State. She testified about the events on July 29, 1994, the night of Megan’s disappearance. Mrs. Kanka testified that she laid down to relax at approximately 6:30 p.m. While she was resting, Megan went down the street to visit a friend. When Mrs. Kanka got up, she could not find Megan. The Kankas asked neighbors if they had seen Megan. A number of the neighbors, including defendant, told Mrs. Kanka that they had seen Megan in the neighborhood earlier that day. Defendant also told the Kankas he had seen Megan before dinner when she and her friend Courtney stopped to talk to him about his new boat, which was on the street in front of his house.
Shortly after Megan’s disappearance, Mrs. Kanka called the police. When they arrived at Barbara Lee Drive, she gave them a photograph of her daughter and a description of the clothing Megan was wearing. She also gave the police a pair of shorts resembling those that Megan was wearing when she disappeared.
Hamilton Township Patrol Officer Paul Seitz testified that he and Officer Mike Smith arrived at the Kanka’s residence at 8:49 p.m. After searching the Kanka’s house and property, and questioning some of the Kankas’ neighbors, Seitz spoke with defendant. Defendant told the officer that he had seen Megan riding her bicycle at 2:30 p.m. that day. When asked if he had seen Megan at any other time (because his statement conflicted with what other neighbors had said and what he had said earlier), defendant stated that he had seen Megan riding her bicycle in front of her house between 5:30 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. Defendant also told Seitz that his roommates, Cifelli and Jenin, were out shopping between 5:30 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. and would not have seen Megan.
Officer Nelson then testified that at approximately 10 p.m., he and three other officers approached 27 Barbara Lee Lane to *538obtain consent to search the house. Mr. Cifelli, the owner, agreed to let them search the house, yard and boat for Megan. They did not find her. During the course of the search, Officer Nelson noticed heavy brown blankets being washed in the washing machine. Although he found it to be unusual, none of the residents at 27 Barbara Lee Lane was a suspect at the time of this first search.
At approximately 12:30 a.m., Detectives O’Dwyer and Kieffer and Detective Sergeant Stanley obtained a signed consent from' owner Cifelli to search the home again. Jenin, Cifelli and defendant also were questioned individually at that time.
During the search, O’Dwyer found “what appeared to be four pairs of women’s underwear,” one having a teddy-bear pattern, under the bed in Cifelli’s room. The officer read Cifelli his Miranda rights and Cifelli waived his rights. Cifelli explained that the underwear belonged to an ex-girlfriend. O’Dwyer soon realized that the underwear was adult-sized and did not believe it was connected to Megan’s disappearance. Cifelli gave officers an alibi and receipts proving he and Jenin were not at home at the time of Megan’s disappearance.
The officers then interviewed Brian Jenin. They did not administer Miranda rights since, according to O’Dwyer, the search of Jenin’s room disclosed nothing suspicious and the police were just trying to obtain information. Jenin’s account was consistent with Cifelli’s.
After questioning Cifelli and Jenin, the officers then called defendant into the room. They did not read defendant his Miranda rights because nothing suspicious had been found in his room and the police were just seeking information. Defendant related that he had gone out that day with Jenin and Cifelli to purchase a boat, and then washed it in front of his home. He spoke to Megan, who he knew as a “neighborhood child,” and her friend Courtney between 5:00-5:30 that day while he was washing the boat. Jenin and Cifelli were out running errands at the time.
*539O’Dwyer testified that defendant was shaking and perspiring heavily throughout the course of the interview. When Kieffer sat down next to defendant, defendant crossed his arms and legs and turned away. Based on defendant’s account, his nervousness, and his'assertion that he was alone at the time of Megan’s disappearance, the officers thought defendant should be re-interviewed at headquarters. Defendant agreed to accompany the officers, but wanted to drive himself. The officers followed behind in their vehicle. The officers felt no need to speak with Cifelli or Jenin again.
When they arrived at the station at approximately 2:50 a.m., Defendant was read his Miranda warnings. He signed a form stating that he understood and waived his rights. He never asked for a lawyer or said that he did not want to talk. He said he would help in any way that he could.
Defendant gave police a written statement documenting his whereabouts on the 29th. The statement conflicted with previous accounts defendant had given to the officers. In particular, defendant wrote that he had seen the victim a second time on the 29th, at 6:30 p.m. He had previously told Kieffer that he had seen her only once, earlier in the afternoon by his boat.
At approximately 4:00 a.m., defendant signed a form consenting to a search of his vehicle. Detective O’Dwyer, while looking for latent fingerprints, found a brown toy chest and a piece of black felt in the back of defendant’s pickup truck. Defendant, who was present during the search, volunteered that he recently had cut his hand on the curtain rod that hung in front of the glass separating the passenger and cap portions of the truck. Defendant had an injury on the palm of his hand, but O’Dwyer found no blood or skin on the curtain rod. At 4:00 a.m., after the search, defendant left headquarters, promising to return the next day for more questioning.
Detective Martin Ingebrandt testified that he was called into headquarters at approximately 5:30 a.m. to help with the Kanka investigation. At approximately 7:00 a.m., Ingebrandt was sent to *540defendant’s house to obtain consent to search the boat in the yard. Cifelli signed the consent and the officers began to search the boat for prints.
Detective Ingebrandt testified that when they walked over to the boat, there was no garbage on the curb at 27 Barbara Lee Drive. During the course of the search, Ingebrandt noticed someone, whom he later learned was defendant, walking a puppy down Barbara Lee Lane. A few minutes later, Ingebrandt noticed three garbage cans between the curb and the side of the boat that had not been there before. The officers obtained Cifelli’s consent to search the garbage. At about 9:15 a.m., the officers returned to headquarters with the garbage. Nothing was confiscated from the boat.
Upon searching the garbage, the officers found a rope with some knots tied in it and a substance that appeared to be dried blood on it, the waistband of a small pair of pants appearing tó be for a child, and a piece of material that matched the waistband. Unsuspicious items were found as well.
At approximately 10:00 a.m., Ingebrandt and Butera brought the articles of clothing to the Kankas for identification. Mrs. Kanka confirmed that the articles of clothing were Megan’s. The Kankas then went to police headquarters to make a statement.
At 12:17 pm. on the 30th, Pukenas and McDonough interviewed defendant. They read defendant his Miranda rights. Defendant signed a form stipulating that he understood his rights and waived them. After questioning defendant, Pukenas asked him to write a statement detailing his activities on the 29th, which defendant did while Pukenas and McDonough waited outside. Pukenas noticed differences between defendant’s first and second written statements. Pukenas also noted that defendant kept focusing on the 6:00 to 6:30 p.m. time frame, mentioning it three or four times, even though the detectives had not asked him to highlight that period. After detectives reviewed defendant’s statement with him, questioning continued. At that point, Pukenas showed defendant either the clothes or the photographs of the clothes. Defen*541dant identified them as rags from his job and continued to deny any involvement in Megan’s disappearance.
Pukenas and McDonough questioned defendant until approximately 6:35 p.m., allowing him two twenty to twenty-five minute breaks, though he remained in the conference room throughout. Towards the end of this period of questioning, at approximately 6:20 p.m., Pukenas’ notes indicate that defendant asked to speak to his roommate, Jenin. Jenin was brought into the interview room, accompanied by Kieffer. Jenin spoke first saying to defendant, “They got you, they got you, they got you. You’re going to need a friend on the outside, I’ll be that friend.” In response, defendant put his head down and then looked up and said, “She’s in Mercer County Park.” He then proceeded to tell the detectives that Megan was dead and that he had put a bag over her head. He agreed to show the police where she was. Pukenas denied that Jenin was told to ask defendant where the body was or what to say.
Police drove defendant to the park. Once inside, defendant brought the detectives directly to the body. The victim was lying in tall weeds concealed from view, with a plastic bag over her head. On the car ride back to headquarters, defendant, at the officers’ request, recounted what happened.
Defendant made a written statement at Pukenas’s request back at headquarters. It was approximately 7:30 p.m. In this statement, which was read to the jury, defendant relayed the following: on the 29th, the victim wanting to see defendant’s puppy came over to defendant’s house while his roommates were out; defendant brought Megan into the bedroom and started to touch her; the victim screamed and tried to get away; afraid that she would tell her mother, defendant grabbed the victim, ripping her shorts; defendant then grabbed a belt and put it around the victim’s neck, pulling her back in the room; she fell and started to bleed; to stop the bleeding and to prevent the blood from getting on the carpet, defendant placed a plastic bag over her head; he used a second plastic bag to tie off the first; at this point, Cifelli and Jenin *542arrived home; thinking the victim was dead, defendant put her in a large toy box, which he had converted to a tool box, and carried her downstairs; as defendant put the box in the van, he thought he heard the victim cough.
Defendant wrote that he was going to dump the body near the power lines, but saw a police car there. Instead, he took the victim to Mercer County Park. As defendant was pulling her out of the box, he placed his fingers in her vagina, “played with her a little” and then dumped her in the weeds. He left the park and went to WaWa, where he bought cigarettes and a paper. He then returned home. Upon arriving home, defendant ripped up the victim’s shorts that were in his bedroom and went outside. Mrs. Kanka asked defendant if he had seen the victim. Defendant said that he had seen her by the neighbor’s driveway. Defendant then helped look for the victim by handing out fliers.
After writing out his statement, defendant’s clothes were removed and he was fingerprinted. At 4:00 a.m., while taking consensual nail clipping from defendant, Officer Wilkins noticed what appeared to be a bite mark on defendant’s hand. He took photographs of the mark and measured it with defendant’s consent. Dr. Haskell Askin, a forensic odontologist, performed a bite-mark analysis of defendant’s hand. He determined that the victim had bitten defendant, leaving the mark.
Dr. Raafat Ahmad, the Mercer County Medical Examiner, performed an autopsy on the victim’s body. Dr. Ahmad testified that he found, among other things, petechial hemorrhages in both eyes, a telltale sign of death by strangulation. He found a ligature mark on the neck that was consistent with the leather belt found in defendant’s room. The victim had bruising and contusions under her chin, consistent with an object or hand placed on the neck. The victim received a blunt trauma to the eye, caused either by a fist or by striking the head against an object. There was also bruising on the back, arms and legs, indicating the victim had been grabbed and held on her back with someone on top of her. Some of the abrasions could have been caused by rubbing against the carpet.
*543Internally, the victim had bruises on her colon and right kidney, probably caused by separate blows and/or someone’s weight on top of her. There was a tear in the hymenal margin and penetration of the vagina caused by a finger or penis. Additionally, there were two tears in the mucosa covering the anus, indicating penetration by a penis. Severe hemorrhaging was caused by three separate blows to the head with a blunt object.
Dr. Ahmad concluded that the cause of death was mechanical strangulation with the leather belt, constricting oxygen to the brain, causing brain death within three to four minutes. The plastic bags hastened, but were not the cause of death.
Upon reviewing the autopsy, Detective Stanley reread Miranda rights to defendant. Again, defendant waived his rights. Stanley told defendant that based on the autopsy reports, he knew defendant was not telling them everything. Stanley said he knew about the sexual assault and blunt trauma to the head. Defendant then admitted to sexually assaulting Megan.
. Officer Stanley administered Miranda rights again and obtained another waiver. Stanley then took defendant’s formal statement, which was read to the jury at trial. The substance of that statement, as it differed from his first formal statement, is as follows: when Megan tried to leave defendant’s room, a struggle ensued; as she fell to the floor, the victim hit her head on the door frame and her face on the dresser; defendant then slapped her face, causing her mouth to bleed; he pulled her pants down and tried, unsuccessfully, to penetrate her vaginally with his penis; he penetrated her with his finger instead. Defendant denied trying to penetrate the victim anally, but “may have slipped” while trying to penetrate her vaginally. During this time, the victim was unconscious but breathing. She was still breathing after he put the bags over her head. Stanley added that after signing this last statement, defendant, in a “flat and unemotional” tone, said he felt he had been “slipping for a while,” meaning “getting those feelings for little girls ... for a couple of weeks or a couple of months.”
*544Forensic analysis of the evidence found the following:' the tool box in defendant’s truck contained an Allen wrench set similar to the wrenches found near Megan’s body; an investigator from the FBI DNA Analysis Unit who performed DQ Alpha polymarker testing on rug cuttings from defendant’s room concluded that Megan’s markers were consistent with two of the rug samples; blood stains found on defendant’s belt were consistent with Megan’s DNA markers; over 99% of the Caucasian population could be excluded from the possibility of matching Megan’s DNA markers; there was insufficient seminal fluid to perform a DNA test on the anal swabs.
A forensic chemist and a forensic scientist analyzed the trace evidence. They concluded that the shorts found in the garbage contained fibers chemically and physically consistent with fibers found on defendant’s bedroom rug, the sleeping bag, and in the lint trap of defendant’s dryer. Fibers found on the sweat pants matched those taken from Megan’s blouse. Over thirty hairs found near defendant’s bed, on a dishcloth, on the carpet, and in the black felt cloth had the same physical and microscopic qualities as Megan’s. There were four head hairs on Megan’s blouse that were consistent with defendant’s hair and inconsistent with Cifelli’s and Jenin’s. A pubic hair on Megan’s blouse compared favorably to defendant’s. The forensic chemist examining fluid evidence found blood on defendant’s bed sheets, the black belt, swabs taken from defendant’s bedroom door, oral and anal swabs taken from the victim, and on her blouse and earring.
Defendant did not testify or present witnesses in the guilt phase. His defense was presented through cross-examination and by argument. The jury found defendant guilty on all counts.
B. Penalty Phase
1. Defendant’s Case
In the penalty phase, defendant presented two witnesses who testified to mitigating factors: Carol Krych, a forensic social *545worker; and Dr. John Podboy, a clinical and forensic psychologist. Defendant also exercised his right of allocution.
The first witness, Ms. Krych, holds a master’s degree in counseling, an international certification in drug and alcohol counsel-ling, and has worked as a forensic social worker for nineteen years. Her testimony was based on over two years of investigation into defendant’s social history, from birth to the age of seventeen. According to Krych, defendant clearly had a dysfunctional family life. His mother Doris was a promiscuous alcoholic who had a total of ten children by seven men. Several of her children had been placed for adoption or foster care. Doris was not certain when all of her children were born or who their fathers were. An evaluation of Doris by the United Family and Children’s Society prepared in 1955 described her as “quite limited mentally and emotionally,” “promiscuous,” “amoral,” and from a “deprived background.”
In 1960, while living with one William Neill, an excessive drinker who had a criminal record and “abused” Doris, she began a relationship with a man named Skip. Jesse was born to Skip and Doris on April 15,1961. Although Doris was pregnant with Jesse, she accompanied Skip around the country, as he was “basically running from the law.” She drank throughout the pregnancy, although she did “cut down.” Doris became pregnant with Paul, Jesse’s brother, shortly after Jesse’s birth.
Doris told Krych that she and Skip lived with her parents on their return to New Jersey. Thereafter they lived in a series of homes, one of which was a “shack.” They obtained clothing from “rummage sales,” the electricity was frequently off, and the children were cold, dirty and hungry. Although Skip was a painter, Doris said he was “basically ... a con man” who did not work full-time. The evidence also established that he was a drinker with a criminal record and a tendency toward violence.
Krych’s testimony and report drew heavily on school records. Although acknowledging that “conflicting materials” exist, Krych testified that defendant had been diagnosed with emotional prob*546lems and was classified as “educably retarded” by a child study team. He had multiple social, emotional and academic problems. He was never given follow-up counseling or psychological evaluation in the school system. Krych further asserted that Jesse lacked adequate medical care as a child, based on the fact that Doris had no memory of a family physician and included no medical records in the documents she gave to Krych.
Krych conducted extensive interviews with Paul as well. Two of those interviews were taped with Paul’s consent and shown to the jury. Paul acknowledged that he had a history of “severe” alcohol and drug addiction, which he attributed to “having such terrible memories.” Krych testified that Paul and “other sources” told her that Skip had sexually molested Jesse and Paul several times each week for many years. Paul stated that Skip had drowned a pet dog to scare the boys, forced them to eat a pet rabbit, and cut the head off a cat. Paul also related that when Jesse was eight or nine years of age, the two saw Skip rape a 7-year-old girl in his truck. Skip threatened them and ordered them not to tell anyone.
Krych acknowledged that Paul was “now” saying that Jesse “should be put to death.” She noted that this apparent change of heart occurred after Paul discovered that Skip was alive. Paul had told a friend of Skip’s, whom Krych had contacted, that “the person that had done this to him could come after and get him.”
Dr. Podboy, relying on Krych’s report to form the basis of his testimony (he never evaluated defendant), testified that defendant suffers from pedophilia, along with disorders of reading, math, and written expression. Podboy found “probable generalized anxiety, perhaps including post-traumatic stress disorder” and “schizoid personality disorder in defendant.” The expert also noted borderline retardation and fetal alcohol effect. He concluded that support from defendant’s family was inadequate and that his overall functioning level was 50/100. Podboy testified that if a child’s mother drinks and neglects her child between the ages of birth and 5-7, the child will experience difficulties with trust, sex roles *547and self-control. If a child 5-7 years old is sexually abused, the child’s moral development can be substantially impaired.
Dr. Podboy testified that at the time of the crime, defendant was under “extreme emotional disturbance” and was “unraveling psychologically.” Defendant’s “capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct” was “very much impaired,” as was his ability to “conform his conduct ... to the requirements of the law.” Defendant had strong urges to be with underage females. His reckless conduct resulted from his desire to satisfy those urges.
Podboy concluded that although defendant demonstrated an ability to engage in knowing and purposeful behavior, his level of functioning was “pretty primitive.” Defendant’s powerful compulsion resulted from being abused. Low IQ and genetic defects also may play a role. The doctor went on to state that the results of a “SPECT” evaluation, measuring blood flow in regions of the brain, showed a possible serious problem with defendant’s brain that could reflect a “vascular insult,” “congenital abnormality,” or a “post-traumatic insult.”
Finally, Podboy testified that defendant’s sexual intent towards the victim was separate from her death. Her death was caused by a reflexive response to the panic defendant felt when the victim attempted to flee.
2. The State’s Case
The State relied on evidence presented in the guilt phase to support the aggravating factors. To rebut defendant’s mitigating evidence, the State cross-examined defendant’s witnesses and presented four rebuttal witnesses of its own — Dr. Sadoff, a forensic psychologist, and three law enforcement officers. Mr. Kanka also read a victim impact statement to the jury.
On cross-examination, Kryeh acknowledged that no one outside the family ever had corroborated the stories of sexual and physical abuse told to her by family members. Krych also conceded that *548there was no evidence in the record supporting the contention that defendant set fires, was cruel to animals, behaved inappropriately or exposed himself to girls. She further acknowledged that she had not incorporated academic progress reports in her findings, including a 1969 school report that concluded that defendant was making exceptional progress, and that there were records showing defendant had a family doctor, a family dentist, and had received all his vaccinations.
Dr. Sadoff testified that there was no support for the mitigating factors of extreme emotional disturbance or mental disease or defect. Defendant’s statements about his conduct during the murder revealed that he acted in a logical manner to prevent detection and was in control of the situation. The doctor added that defendant’s IQ was borderline, but not so low as to render him unable to function or appreciate the nature of his conduct.
Detectives Raymond and Cowen of the Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office stated that Krych’s claims that defendant’s mother was drunk all the time were disputed by people who knew the family during defendant’s childhood. Similarly, witnesses interviewed by the detective disputed claims that defendant’s house and clothes were disheveled.
Raymond also testified about the eight meetings he had with Paul Timmendequas. Raymond reported that during their first meeting, Paul said that he thought defendant should die and wanted to “pull the switch.” He also told Raymond that everything he said to the defense had been “twisted around.” In one meeting, Paul told Raymond that he and defendant had been physically abused by Skip and that Doris had broken defendant’s arm when defendant was seventeen. Paul later denied the physical abuse and said that he had been drunk when he made the video tapes with Krych.
The jury unanimously found that the State had proven both aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. With respect to the mitigating factors, four jurors found that defendant was under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, two jurors found *549that he suffered from mental disease or defect, and varying numbers of jurors found ten of the twenty-one catch-all mitigating factors. 1 They were as follows: defendant (1) did not plan in advance to kill or seriously injure the victim (twelve jurors); (2) felt remorse (six jurors); (3) was subjected to years of sexual and physical abuse by his father, including but not limited to fondling, forced oral sex, anal penetration, and beatings by his father’s hand or a strap (three jurors); (4) was exposed to domestic violence between his mother and several of her paramours (twelve jurors); (5) was bom to a father who had a history of incarceration, drank excessively and totally disregarded the needs of his family and *550even their lives (eleven jurors); (6) was born to a promiscuous mother who had ten children by seven different men and gave up or had to relinquish seven of these children to the State (twelve jurors); (7) was raised in an atmosphere that did not provide him with stability, having moved twenty-one times by the time he was seventeen years old (twelve jurors); (8) was born to a mother who was emotionally unfit and unable to meet his physical and emotional needs and caused him to suffer from fetal alcohol effect due to her drinking throughout her pregnancy (four jurors); (9) suffered traumatic loss when his stepfather, the only father figure who did not abuse him, died (seven jurors).
The jury also found its own mitigating catch-all factor, 25(a), on which they unanimously agreed: “Jesse Timmendequas’ childhood and adolescence were characterized by exposure to domestic violence, criminal activity, substance abuse, instability of the home, emotional and physical neglect and possible physical and sexual abuse. His parents did not serve as role models of normal behavior and treated him poorly. Also, the family was poor and received public assistance.”
The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors, both individually and collectively, outweighed the mitigating factors, thereby fixing defendant’s sentence as death. This appeal followed.
III.

Pretrial Issues

A. Change of Venue Motion
Defendant moved for a change of venue because of the extensive publicity surrounding this ease. In the motion he cited 437 separate articles2 from the Trentonian and the Trenton Times, Mercer County’s two leading newspapers. He claimed those *551articles prevented him from receiving a fair trial in Mercer County.
The pretrial publicity in this case was constant, prolonged and horrendous. The Trentonian, a Mercer County newspaper, referred to defendant as “scum,” a “predator,” a “piece of trash,” an “animal,” a “pervert,” a “dirtball,” a “sicko,” a “monster,” and a “bottom-feeder.” The articles often assumed defendant’s guilt and disclosed defendant’s prior sex offense convictions, including the fact that he had refused psychological treatment while serving a previous sentence. The Trentonian frequently stressed that defendant had confessed to the crime, and many articles called for his execution. The case also received nationwide publicity as a result of the activity associated with Megan’s Law.
A criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to trial by a fair and impartial jury. State v. Harris, 156 N.J. 122, 142, 716 A.2d 458 (1998). U.S. Const, amend. XIV; N.J. Const, art. I, ¶ 10. The concept of impartiality requires that “the jury’s verdict be based on evidence received in open court, not from outside sources.” Harris, supra, 156 N.J. at 140-43, 716 A.2d 458. A trial court, therefore, must take “significant precautions to minimize adverse pretrial and mid trial publicity that is capable of affecting juror perception of the case.” State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 50, 716 A.2d 395 (1998).
In determining whether to grant the motion for change of venue, the trial court analyzed the publicity in accordance with five factors laid out in State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 271, 548 A.2d 939 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1017, 109 S.Ct. 813, 102 L. Ed.2d 803 (1989) (Koedatich I). The court held that first, the extent of the coverage was “significant.” Though not comparable to the “‘stream of invective’ and ‘vengeance seeking crusade’ found by the trial court in State vs. Harris ...,” the court nevertheless found that “the totality of the coverage and its nature” had “been constant and prolonged____” Even State officials had commented on the case in various media sources. The court further observed that this case is different from Harris, *552supra, in that “the parents of Megan Kanka have worked with singular purpose towards the goal of generating passage of legislation that would require registration of sex offenders, together with community notification.” Second, the court noted that the nature and gravity of the offense cannot be more serious than in a death penalty case. Third, the trial court recognized that the size of the Mercer County community and its potential exposure to media coverage regarding the case were serious concerns. Fourth, the court considered the respective standing of the deceased and the accused. Megan Kanka had become a national figure after her death. As a result, defendant “has a high profile,” especially in Mercer County. Finally, with respect to community hostility, the court observed that although there had not yet been crowds or major protests in the courtroom, “that does not mean that the community ... and surrounding municipalities do not feel and harbor a silent rage against the defendant.”
Based on its findings, the trial court properly recognized that the media coverage created a realistic likelihood of prejudice to defendant. See Harris, supra, 156 N.J. at 142-46, 716 A.2d 458; State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 32-35, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (Biegenwald II). Accordingly, the trial court ordered a change of venue to Camden County pursuant to Rule 3:14-2.
B. Reconsideration of Change of Venue Order
At the conclusion of the change of venue motion, the State requested a hearing on the location chosen by the court. It had not yet presented evidence on demographics and wanted the opportunity to provide information about other counties as potential locations. The court signed the order changing venue to Camden, but permitted the State to submit a motion for reconsideration of the place of venue.
On November 21,1995, the State filed for reconsideration of the Order changing venue to Camden. The State requested that the court empanel a foreign jury from Camden in lieu of changing trial venue. In the alternative, the State asked the court to move the *553trial to a county more convenient to the victim’s family (suggesting Burlington, Middlesex or Hunterdon Counties).
The State argued that the court should reconsider its holding in light of the constitutional rights of the victim’s parents. The Victim’s Rights Amendment, the State argued, required the court to take into account the “extreme hardship” that would result if the Kankas had to travel to Camden County daily to watch defendant’s trial. The State submitted affidavits from Mr. and Mrs. Kanka stressing the emotional and financial burdens that would be placed on the couple if the trial were moved to Camden. The State originally had not argued that point in response to defendant’s motion.
The court granted the State’s motion and ordered that a foreign jury be empaneled in Mercer County from Camden County. Although still concluding that “[tjhere is a realistic likelihood of prejudice from pretrial publicity in Mercer County[,]” the court recognized the importance of protecting the victims’ rights. Changing venue would violate the Victim’s Rights Amendment of the N.J. Const., art. I, ¶ 22, as it would impose great hardship on the victim’s parents. The court further observed that the neighborhood in which the Camden County courthouse sits is dangerous, thereby taking a greater toll on the victim’s family and other members of the public who wished to attend the trial. The savings in time and costs also would be significant. Finally, the court stressed the competency of the staff and security at the Mercer County courthouse, noting that the administrators’ experience in handling the Hams trial would ensure that the proceedings would be adequately safeguarded. The court did “not see any diminishment of the defendant’s rights” resulting from a reversal of the decision to change venue.
Defendant now asserts that the trial court’s decision to reconsider the change of venue motion was incorrect because: (1) interlocutory motions of reconsideration in criminal matters are not allowed; and (2) the Victim’s Rights Amendment does not apply to the question of whether there should be a change of *554venue or an empanelment of a foreign jury. Defendant claims those errors violated due process and his constitutional right to a fair trial.
1. Interlocutory Motion to Reconsider
Rule 1:7 — 4 provides that “[u]pon motion made not later than 10 days after service of the final order or judgment ..., the court may grant a rehearing....”3 However, Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 3 on Rule 1:7 — 4[1] (1995) states:
It is also important to note that the 10-day provision of both this rule and R. 4:49-2 apply only to final orders and judgments. Reconsideration of interlocutory orders, up to the time of final judgment is entered, is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court to be exercised in the interests of justice, (emphasis added).4
Defendant relies on dicta in State v. Fitzsimmons, 286 N.J.Super. 141, 147, 668 A.2d 453 (App.Div.1995), rev’d o.g., 143 N.J. 482, 672 A.2d 1165 (1996) to argue that reconsideration motions are inapplicable to criminal matters. In that case, the Appellate Division stated that “[tjhere is no corollary rule [governing motions for reconsideration] applicable to practice in the criminal courts.” Ibid. We disagree. This Court has never questioned the appropriateness of interlocutory motions to reconsider in criminal matters. A motion to reconsider an interlocutory order, such as a change of venue, may be filed in the court’s discretion up to the time the final judgment is entered.
2. Victim’s Right Amendment
Defendant also contends that the trial court improperly considered the impact changing venue to Camden County would have on the victim’s family, both financially and emotionally. The Victim’s Rights Amendment was approved by New Jersey voters in 1991. That Amendment provides that:
*555A victim of a crime shall be treated with fairness, compassion and respect by the criminal justice system. A victim of a crime shall not be denied the right to be present at public judicial proceedings except when ... the victim is properly sequestered in accordance with the law____ A victim of a crime shall be entitled to those rights and remedies as may be provided by the Legislature.
[N.J. Const., art I, ¶ 22.]
Defendant urges the Court to hold that the amendment merely allows victims to attend a trial and no more.
Defendant views the Legislature’s commitment to victim’s rights too narrowly. Over the past decade, both nationwide and in New Jersey, a significant amount of legislation has been passed implementing increased levels of protection for victims of crime. State of New Jersey in the Interest of J.G., N.S. and J.T., 151 N.J. 565, 581-82, 701 A.2d 1260 (1997); State v. Muhammad, 145 N.J. 23, 33-34, 678 A.2d 164 (1996). Specifically, in New Jersey, the Legislature enacted the “Crime Victim’s Bill of Rights,” N.J.S.A. 52:4B-34 to -38. Muhammad, supra, 145 N.J. at 33, 678 A.2d 164. That amendment marked the culmination of the Legislature’s efforts to increase the participation of crime victims in the criminal justice system. Ibid.
The purpose of the Victim’s Rights Amendment was to “enhance and protect the necessary role of crime victims and witnesses in the criminal justice process. In furtherance of [that goal], the improved treatment of these persons should be assured through the establishment of specific rights.”5 N.J.S.A. 52:4B-35 (1985). One of the enumerated rights guaranteed for victims is “[t]o have inconveniences associated with participation in the criminal justice process minimized to the fullest extent possible.” N.J.S.A. 52:4B-36(d).
Giving those words their ordinary meaning, we find that the Crime Victim’s Bill of Rights was aimed at preventing the types of hardship argued by the State on behalf of the victim’s family. The hardships documented in the Kankas’ affidavits are *556significant. The trip to Camden would add two hours a day to the already substantial period of time spent away from their two young surviving children. The emotional toll of the trial and the financial expense of traveling would greatly add to that burden. Considerations of “fairness” and “respect,” supra, justify the trial court’s decision to balance the very real harms the Kanskas would suffer if venue were changed to Camden.
We recognize that the trial court also must give due respect to the Constitutional rights of defendant. In reversing the change of venue order, the trial court stated that “[t]he court does not see any diminishment of the defendant’s rights ...” resulting from the decision to empanel a foreign jury. The court explicitly stated that it was not favoring the rights of the victims over those of defendant. Rather, it was simply taking their concerns into consideration, as it had not done previously. Taking the concerns of the victim’s family into account does not constitute error, provided that the constitutional rights of the defendant are not denied or infringed on by that decision. As we find no infringement upon defendant’s constitutional rights, we reject this argument.
C. Option of Empaneling Foreign Jury
In State v. Harris, supra, 156 N.J. at 146, 716 A.2d 458, we held that it was not reversible error to empanel a foreign jury rather than to change venue. Similar to here, Harris involved a capital murder ease in which pretrial publicity created a realistic likelihood of prejudice to the defendant. We refused to reverse because the court had “used one of the trial management techniques specifically approved to ensure that a defendant’s right to an impartial jury is not compromised.” Ibid. We observed that the empanelment of foreign jurors was the first trial management technique suggested in State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39, 67, 459 A.2d 641 (1983) (Williams I). Other “[ajvailable options include a change of venue, selection of a foreign jury, and augmentation of the jury pool.” Feaster, supra, 156 N.J. at 50, 716 A.2d 395. *557Nonetheless, we noted that “[i]n future capital cases a court should change the venue of a capital trial when there is a realistic likelihood that presumptively prejudicial publicity will continue during the conduct of a trial.” Harris, supra, 156 N.J. at 147, 716 A.2d 458.
This trial was held before we decided Harris. Hence, when defendant was tried, “every intendment of our law was that the empanelment of a foreign jury be an adequate response to the realistic likelihood that the jury would be subjected to adverse trial publicity.” Ibid. We adhere to our observation that the necessity of requiring a change of venue because of a “barrage of inflammatory reporting” imposes an added expense and inconvenience on the State and the victims of the crime. Id. at 147-48, 716 A.2d 458. In capital cases, we caution newspapers to refrain from the inflammatory reporting demonstrated by the Trentonian and the Trenton Times in this case and in Harris. However, we decline to reverse on this ground given the state of the law at the time of defendant’s trial.
1. Empaneling a Jury from Hunterdon County
After having decided to empanel a jury from Camden County, the trial court agreed to hear subsequent argument from the State in favor of empaneling a jury from Hunterdon County. On January 29,1996, the court granted the State’s motion to empanel a jury from Hunterdon. Defendant argues that Camden County was the proper jury pool.
Rule 3:14-2 authorizes a change of venue or trial by a foreign jury “if the court finds that a fair and impartial jury cannot otherwise be had.” However, that Rule does not offer any guidelines in selecting the county for venue or the source of a foreign jury. The Appellate Division, in State v. Harris, 282 N.J.Super. 409, 421, 660 A.2d 539 (App.Div.1995), appeal after remand, 156 N.J. 122, 716 A.2d 458 (1997), relying on the American Bar Association guidelines for venue and jury selection in choosing Hunterdon County, applied the following factors:
*558(1) The nature and extent of pretrial publicity, if any, in the proposed venue;
(2) The relative burdens on the respective courts in changing to the proposed venue;
(3) The hardships to prospective jurors in traveling from their home county to the site of the trial and the burden imposed upon the court in transporting the jurors; 6
(4) The racial, ethnic, religious and other relevant demographic characteristics of the proposed venue, insofar as they may affect the likelihood of a fair trial by an impartial jury;
(5) Any other factor which may be required by the interests of justice.
[Id. at 421, 660 A.2d 539, (quoting Criminal Justice Standards: Trial by Jury, ABA Crim. Just. Sec. Standard 15-1.4 (Sd, ed. 1993)).]
We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in empaneling a jury from Hunterdon County. The trial court applied the Hams factors in determining that Hunterdon County was the appropriate source for the foreign jury. The court first considered the nature and extent of pretrial publicity in the proposed counties. The Trentonian and, to a lesser extent, the Trenton Times, were the main sources of objectionable publicity about defendant. The circulation of the Trentonian and the Trenton Times in Mercer, Hunterdon, and Camden Counties was as follows:
Trentonian Circulation 1991
Mercer Hunterdon Camden Circulation 51,810 1,342 110
Times Circulation 1992
Mercer Hunterdon Camden Circulation 60,215 1,796 under 25
In other cases we have upheld the empanelment of a jury from a county with a far greater circulation disparity than that present here. In Harris, the combined newspaper circulation figures were as follows: approximately 20,000 in Burlington County; *5593,000 in Hunterdon County; and 250 in Camden County. We approved the empanelment of a Burlington County jury because “the net effect was not significantly different than if the jury had been from Camden County.” Id. at 150, 716 A.2d 458. Similarly, in Feaster, supra, 156 N.J. at 51, 716 A.2d 395, we allowed the empanelment of a Salem County jury even though it had a higher level of publicity than the proposed county. (Observing Salem County “was by no means inundated with publicity about the murders.”)
In this case, the combined circulation rates of the two papers for Mercer County were 34.3 percent; for Hunterdon County, 2.8 percent; and for Camden County, .03 percent.7 Given the assumptions implicit in determining the extent of pretrial publicity, we disagree with the dissent’s assertion that this factor weighs heavily in defendant’s favor. Post at 661-62, 737 A.2d at 135-36 (Handler, J., dissenting). The circulation rates for Hunterdon County were significantly lower than those of Mercer County. Although Camden County had the lowest circulation rates, the net effect of a two percent disparity indicates that Hunterdon County also was clearly outside the circulation range of the Trenton newspapers. Hams, supra, 156 N.J. at 148-50, 716 A.2d 458 (noting defendant’s argument that most effective method of minimizing potential prejudice is to pick jury from county where Trenton newspapers are not ubiquitous).
With regard to Factor 2, the court properly determined that empaneling a Hunterdon County jury would disrupt the judicial system in Hunterdon County far less than it would disrupt the Camden County judicial system. The trial court contacted Hun-terdon County court officials and was assured that jury selection would not disrupt their caseload. Hunterdon County had no *560capital murder cases pending. By contrast, Camden County had five pending capital murder cases. Moreover, Camden County had 2,057 criminal cases pending indictment as of September 1995, while Hunterdon County had Í47. Camden had 4,551 post-indictment cases pending, and Hunterdon County had 180. Clearly, the relative hardships imposed on the prospective courts favored Hunterdon County.
Factor 3, the relative burdens on the parties and other interested parties, also favored Hunterdon County. Traveling between Camden and Trenton takes about one hour. By contrast, a trip between Flemington, in Hunterdon County, and Trenton takes about 35 minutes. Obviously, those travel times would affect how long the trial could last each day. Moreover, the area in Camden where the jurors would be dropped off was relatively desolate. A local law enforcement officer described it as a dangerous area after hours. Given those circumstances, the court properly determined that the hardship would be less onerous for Hunterdon County jurors.
Concerning factor 4, defendant argues that the demographic characteristics of Camden County are more similar to those of Mercer County. As of 1990, Mercer County had a population of 325,824. Hunterdon’s population was 107,776 and Camden’s was 502.824. 1991-1995 New Jersey Municipal Data Book (hereinafter, “Data Book ”). Females comprised 52.6 percent of Mercer County, 50.1 percent of Hunterdon, and 51.9 percent of Camden counties. In 1989, the per capita income in Mercer was $18,936, $23,236 in Hunterdon and $15,733 in Camden. Data Book at 584-85, 578. The percentage of college graduates was 19.4 percent in Mercer, 23.4 percent in Hunterdon, and 13.4 percent in Camden. Ibid. Thus, in many demographic respects, Hunterdon County was more comparable to Mercer than Camden.
With regard to racial demographics, however, there was a disparity between the counties — Mercer had an 18.89 percent african-american population, Hunterdon had a 2.06 percent afri-can-american population, and Camden had a 16.2 percent african-*561american population. Defendant’s jury pool in Hunterdon County contained only fifteen minority jurors in a pool of 715, substantially less than the african-american representation of 18.8 percent in Mercer County. Defendant argues that the court should have empaneled jurors from Camden County since it more closely reflected the racial composition of Mercer County. Failure to do so, he contends, violated his constitutional rights.
This Court has emphasized that a defendant has the “right to trial by an impartial jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community.” State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508, 523, 511 A.2d 1150 (1986). Under Rule 3:14-2, a court must consider racial demographics in deciding whether to change the venue of a criminal trial or to empanel a foreign jury. Harris, supra, 282 N.J.Super. at 417, 660 A.2d 539. However, racial demographics should not be the sole factor in that decision. In selecting the county from which to draw a foreign jury, the court “should ... consider racial demographics together with all other pertinent factors!,]” especially the ABA factors. Id. at 419, 660 A.2d 539. “Racial demographics should be a particularly weighing factor in selecting the source of a foreign jury when the victim and the defendant belong to different races.” Id. at 419-20, 660 A.2d 539. In this case, defendant and the victim were of the same race.
The Constitution does not guarantee a defendant a jury of any specific racial composition. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538, 95 S.Ct. 692, 702, 42 L.Ed.2d 690, 703 (1975). What the Constitution guarantees is that every defendant will be tried by an impartial jury whose members are selected pursuant to “nondiscriminatory criteria.” Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-86, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1717, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, 80 (1986) (challenging prosecutor’s use of peremptory strikes in discriminatory manner); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480-81, 110 S.Ct. 803, 807, 107 L.Ed.2d 905, 916-17, reh’g den. 494 U.S. 1050, 110 S.Ct. 1514, 108 L.Ed.2d 650 (1990).
*562To establish an Equal Protection violation, defendant must show purposeful discrimination in the decisionmaking process, Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550, 87 S.Ct. 643, 646, 17 L.Ed.2d 599, 603-04 (1967), that had a discriminatory effect on the outcome. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 1531, 84 L.Ed.2d 547, 556 (1985). Purposeful discrimination implies that the decisionmaker selected a particular course of action “at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of its adverse effects ...” Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2296, 60 L.Ed.2d 870, 887-88 (1979). Thus, to prevail on this claim, defendant would have to show that the trial court’s decision to empanel a jury from Hunterdon was motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose or because the court anticipated a racially discriminatory effect. Defendant has not proven such intent or effect.
The record is devoid of evidence remotely hinting that the trial court’s decision to empanel a jury from Hunterdon County was animated by a discriminatory purpose. The court changed venue to ensure that the victim’s family could exercise their State Constitutional right to be present at the trial. It also considered the fact that Hunterdon County is closer in proximity to Mercer County. That would mean more time for trial each day and less time that the jurors would have to travel. The court also took into account the juror’s personal security. Jurors drawn from Camden would be dropped off in a dangerous area. Given the trial court’s focus on relevant considerations, we find that the empanelment of a Hunterdon jury did not deprive defendant of equal protection.
Defendant also has failed to show he was deprived of rights under the Sixth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment, in pertinent part, provides that “the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed____” U.S. Const. amend. VI. “The fair cross-section venire requirement is obviously not explicit in this text, but is derived from the traditional understanding of how an ‘impartial jury’ is assembled.” Hol*563land, supra, 493 U.S. at 480, 110 S.Ct. at 807, 107 L.Ed.2d at 916. The Constitution does not require that petit juries actually mirror the community or reflect the various groups in the population. Holland, 493 U.S. at 483, 110 S.Ct. at 808, 107 L.Ed.2d at 918; Taylor, supra, 419 U.S. at 538, 95 S.Ct. at 702, 42 L.Ed.2d at 703. It does not guarantee that every discrete group will be represented proportionally in the jury venire or on the petit jury. Gilmore, supra, 103 N.J. at 525, 511 A.2d 1150. The purpose of the cross-section requirement is to assure that defendant is tried before an impartial jury, which the Constitution demands. Holland, supra, 493 U.S. at 480, 110 S.Ct. at 807, 107 L.Ed.2d at 916.
There is no evidence that the racial composition of the jury venire affected the jury’s ability to be impartial. This ease does not involve any racial issue but rather involves human concerns that touch the hearts and minds of all people, regardless of their race, religion or gender. Given the overwhelming evidence against defendant, it is highly doubtful that a jury from Camden would have reached a different verdict or sentence. Moreover, there is no assurance that the composition of the jury pool would have been radically different in Camden County. Because the case received basically the same amounts of press coverage in both Camden and Hunterdon Counties, and the victim and the defendant were of the same race, the trial court properly decided that the disparate racial composition of the counties was an important, but not the critical factor. Absent a showing of illegal discrimination, defendant had no constitutional right to a jury from Camden County simply because it might have increased his chances of having more minorities on his jury.
We find little merit in the dissent’s assertion that racial demographics outweigh the other demographic characteristics enumerated in Harris factor four. Post at 663-64, 737 A.2d at 137 (Handler, J., dissenting); see Harris, supra, 282 N.J.Super. at 421, 660 A.2d 539. “[WJhere ... race is the demographic charac teristic at issue, the change of venue must be to a county having the same racial demographics____” Pressler, Current N.J. Court *564Rules, comment on R.3:14-2 (1998) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Unlike Harris, race is not the demographic characteristic at issue. In Harris, the defendant, a black man, was charged with the capital murder and rape of a young white girl. Id. at 411, 660 A.2d 539. In this ease, defendant and the victim were of the same race.
The dissent also asserts that the failure to empanel a jury from Camden constitutes a Sixth Amendment violation of such magnitude that it cannot be considered under the harmless error analysis. Post at 666-67, 737 A.2d at 138-39 (Handler, J., dissenting). In State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 45, 94, 95, 548 A.2d 846 (1988) (Bey I), we held that in capital cases “we shall continue to determine the reversibility on the basis of a qualitative determination that considers, in the context of the entire case, whether the error was clearly capable of affecting either the verdict or the sentence.” We noted, however, that the only exception where harmless error analysis would not apply involves “constitutional violations ... [that] by their very nature cast so much doubt on the fairness of the trial process that, as a matter of law, they can never be considered harmless.” (quoting Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 108 S.Ct. 1792, 1792, 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988)).8
We find that the alleged error of not having jurors empaneled from Camden was not clearly capable “by its nature of affecting either [defendant’s] verdict or the sentence.” As we stated in Harris, “The principal risk of jury contamination in this case arose in Mercer county and not in the home counties of the jurors. It made little difference whether the jurors were from Burlington or Camden Counties.” Ibid. Once the initial taint is dispelled by the empanelling of a foreign jury, the source of that jury does not “by its very nature” render the trial process so fundamentally unfair as to require automatic reversal.
*5652. Effect on Jury
Moreover, defendant offers no evidence showing that any jury member actually was prejudiced by the trial being held in Mercer County. To the contrary, the evidence indicates that jury members remained untouched by press coverage throughout the trial.
Central to the court’s decision to empanel a foreign jury was the fact that the Mercer County court administrators had substantial experience in the procedures necessary to protect jurors from trial-related publicity, gained while “host[ing]” the Harris trial. Jurors were picked up each morning and transported to Mercer County. Prior to trial, a special area on the fifth floor of the Mercer County Courthouse was designated for the jurors’ use. The court repeatedly admonished jurors that it was vital for them to avoid any publicity about the case and to avoid discussing the matter with anyone.
When trial began on May 5, 1997, the trial court told the jurors to eat lunch inside the courthouse and to avoid any contact with outsiders. The court then asked if anyone had been subjected to accounts of the case. All jurors answered in the negative. The court told jurors to inform the court if any information about the case came to their attention during the trial. The court also told jury members to “have somebody screen [all media sources] for them.” Every single day of the trial the court asked the jurors whether they had seen, heard, or read anything about the case. Every day, the answer was no.
Although defendant brought inflammatory news stories about the trial to the court’s attention on an ongoing basis, there is no evidence that any of the jury members ever saw any inflammatory publicity. The court took great precautions to ensure that jurors remained isolated. For example, immediately before the penalty phase, the defense moved to terminate the trial and sentence defendant as a non-capital offender because of the Trentonian’s unprecedented coverage of the verdict. To see whether any juror was adversely affected by publicity and whether the jurors could *566remain impartial during the penalty phase, the court individually questioned each juror. At the conclusion of the individual voir dire, the court determined that all jurors remained fair and impartial. The court continued to question jurors about their exposure to publicity throughout the penalty phase. The jurors each time indicated they had not viewed or read any information about the ease.
It would have been preferable if the trial court had not reversed its decision to change venue. Nevertheless, because of the precautions taken by the trial court, the fact that empanelment of a foreign jury was a valid management technique at the time of the trial to avoid the effect of prejudicial pretrial publicity, and the lack of evidence indicating actual jury taint resulted from the trial being held in Mercer County, defendant’s constitutional rights were not infringed upon. The court’s decision to reverse its prior determination to change venue and to empanel a foreign jury was not reversible error.
The record reveals that the trial court took more than adequate measures to “minimize the danger that prejudice would infiltrate the adjudicatory process.” Harris, supra, 156 N.J. at 149, 716 A.2d 458. The trial court carefully weighed the Hams factors in selecting a jury from Hunterdon. There is no evidence of purposeful discrimination or actual bias. Empaneling a jury from Hunterdon County did not infringe on or deny defendant’s constitutional rights. Accordingly, the trial court’s decision to change its original venue order is not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion and is not reversible error.
IV.

Jurors’ Knowledge or Suspicion of Defendant’s Prior Criminal History As A Sex Offender

The court and counsel voir dired three hundred and thirty-two prospective jurors. Of that pool, only five stated they were unaware of defendant’s prior convictions. Over defendant’s objec*567tions, the court qualified sixty-six jurors who announced they could decide the case solely on the evidence adduced at trial and the court’s instructions. Only two jurors on the deliberating panel did not suspect that defendant had a prior record. Nine deliberating jurors suspected that defendant previously had been convicted of a sex offense. One juror knew about the convictions.
At the conclusion of voir dire, defendant asked the court to dismiss the jurors and reconvene in Camden County. He argued that despite what jurors said, they really would not be able to set aside their knowledge of defendant’s prior record. Defendant now claims he was denied a fair trial because the jurors who deliberated knew or suspected he had a prior record. We disagree.
A. The Law
This Court in Williams I, supra, held that the trial court’s responsibility to preserve the integrity of the jury “under both the federal and state constitutions ... is at its peak in cases involving the death penalty.” 93 N.J. at 63, 459 A.2d 641; see also State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 324, 524 A.2d 188 (1987), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 947, 113 S.Ct. 2433, 124 L.Ed.2d 653 (1993). A “trial by an impartial jury ... goes to the very essence of a fair trial.” Williams I, supra, 93 N.J. at 60, 459 A.2d 641. However, a jury with knowledge about a case still can be impartial. The right to an impartial jury does not require that jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved in a given case. State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 77, 586 A.2d 85 (1991) cert. denied, 507 U.S. 929, 113 S.Ct. 1306, 122 L.Ed.2d 694 (1993), (Marshall I); Koedatich I, supra, 112 N.J. at 268, 548 A.2d 939; State v. Sugar, 84 N.J. 1, 23, 417 A.2d 474 (1980). Indeed, “it is difficult to imagine how an intelligent venireman could be completely uninformed of significant events in his community.” United States v. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d 1168, 1178 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 835, 113 S.Ct. 107, 121 L.Ed.2d 65 (1992). It is sufficient “if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.” State v. Williams, 113 N.J. 393, *568429, 550 A.2d 1172 (1988) (Williams II) (quoting Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 302, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2303, 53 L.Ed.2d 344, 362 (1977)).
The Supreme Court has concluded that pretrial exposure to a defendant’s prior conviction in the initial trial does not create an irrebuttable presumption of juror prejudice. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1035, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2891, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984). Properly motivated and carefully instructed jurors can, and have, exercised the discipline to disregard such information. Cf. United States v. McVeigh, 918 F.Supp. 1467, 1473 (W.D.Okla.1996), aff'd, 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir., 1998). We therefore reject a per se rule that presumes a juror is incapable of remaining impartial if he knows or suspects that a defendant has prior'convictions.
“[T]o distinguish potential jurors who are able to put their opinions or prior knowledge aside from those who are unable to serve in an impartial fashion, the trial court must conduct a probing voir dire of [the] jurors.” Williams II, supra, 113 N.J. at 429, 550 A.2d 1172. In determining whether a juror is predisposed to bias or prejudice, the trial court has a duty to evaluate the juror’s entire response. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 257, 524 A.2d 188. Appellate courts should not disturb a trial court’s determination of whether a jury can render an impartial verdict without careful consideration. Williams II, supra, 113 N.J. at 410, 550 A.2d 1172. “[T]his Court is ‘perhaps too far removed’ from the realities of the voir dire to appreciate the nuances concealed by a ‘bloodless record’; therefore, deference to the trial court is usually prudent.” Williams II, supra, 113 N.J. at 411, 550 A.2d 1172.
The question we must address is whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the seated jurors could disregard their suspicions and knowledge of defendant’s prior convictions and render an impartial verdict. We reiterate that the Constitution does not require ignorant jurors, but only jurors who can lay aside any preconceived notions and judge the *569defendant impartially. Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 430, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 1906, 114 L.Ed.2d 493, 509 (1991); Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 77, 86-87, 586 A.2d 85. A trial court’s finding of impartiality must be given deference, and overturned only when manifestly erroneous. Id. 123 N.J. at 87, 586 A.2d 85.
B. Analysis
Knowledge of Megan’s Law and defendant’s role in its enactment was widespread. However, the record supports our finding that defendant was afforded an impartial jury that decided the ease on the evidence presented in court, rather than on information gained from publicity.
The victim’s parents led a nationwide crusade to secure passage of sex offender notification laws. Their efforts culminated on May 7, 1996, when the United States Senate passed a law requiring each state to implement a sex offender notification system. Newspapers all over the State, from the Trenton Times to the New York Times to USA Today, carried the story. Many of the articles mentioned that defendant was the inspiration for the law and some explicitly referred to defendant’s two prior sex offense convictions.
Prior to the commencement of voir dire on January 13, 1997, defendant preemptively moved to strike for cause all jurors who had knowledge of Megan’s Law. Defendant argued that anyone with this knowledge would, at some point, make the connection between defendant and Megan’s Law. From there, he or she could deduce that defendant had a prior record as a sex offender. Probing questioning to determine the extent of a jurors’ knowledge, defendant argued, would not eliminate the problem and would most likely exacerbate it.
The court rejected defendant’s motion, finding that the only way to ensure juror impartiality and to avoid the prospect that jurors made the forbidden connection mid-trial was to question the jurors extensively on their knowledge of Megan’s Law and defendant’s *570prior history.9 In his colloquy explaining the decision, the court stated,
The gross prejudice that would be visited on the defendant, should this connection occur during the deliberation process, or at some other earlier point, and not disclosed, would certainly have the clear capacity to produce an unjust result. The potential for such a circumstance is real, and must be confronted in a forthright manner.
So, on the first day of jury selection, the trial court provided the pool of prospective jurors with an overview of the case, including the fact that it involved the murder and sexual assault of seven-year-old Megan Kanka.
The trial court then conducted an extensive and careful voir dire of each juror, taking approximately three months. Each juror was asked to fill out a lengthy questionnaire containing questions ranging from: their professional life; to the newspapers they read; to their knowledge and opinion of both the case and Megan’s Law; to their thoughts on the criminal justice system and the death penalty; to their ability to remain fair and impartial.
Specifically, Question # 81 asked: “Do you believe or suspect that defendant ... has a criminal record?” If the juror answered “yes,” she had to detail the sources of the belief or suspicion and answer whether she could put that belief aside and follow the court’s instructions. Each juror also had to provide detailed information on the sources from which she received her news and whether she regularly read either of the Trenton papers. Each juror also was asked whether she had formed an opinion concerning defendant’s guilt or innocence.
Next, the court and the attorneys engaged in an extremely detailed oral questioning of each potential juror, specifically probing any questionnaire answer that signaled potential bias. De*571fense counsel was allowed to conduct additional questioning. Throughout the process, the court focused on the jurors’ knowledge of defendant, the crime against Megan Kanka, Megan’s Law, and their feelings and thoughts about each. On the basis of voir dire, the court qualified seventy-one jurors who either had no knowledge of defendant’s prior convictions (five jurors) or who knew about the prior convictions but said they could be impartial (sixty-six jurors). The jury then was selected.
Throughout the trial, the court repeatedly expressed to the jury the importance of evaluating the case only on the evidence presented at trial. The court strenuously warned the jury to “insulate [themselves] from discussing the case, even with fellow jurors” and to insulate themselves “from radio, from television, sound bytes as well as from the newspaper and other media accounts____” At various points, the court admonished the jury to remember that “[n]ewspaper accounts, media accounts are not evidence ... They [are] often based upon second or third hand reports, on hearsay.” Such evidence “simply is unreliable.” The jury’s “obligation is to decide this case on the basis of evidence that comes before you during the course of this trial ----”
In charging the jury, the court again explained the importance of using only the evidence presented at trial: “As you know, your obligation is to decide this case on the basis of evidence that comes before you during the course of this trial____” “You’re judges, judges of the facts. Your sole interest is to ascertain the truth from the evidence presented____”
You must decide the case on the basis of the evidence without bias, without prejudice, without sympathy. We all have our predispositions, our prejudices, our sympathies, but they may not influence legal rulings in this courtroom, they may not influence the jury verdict. These things, bias, prejudice, sympathy, have no place in the jury deliberation room.
Again on May 30 the court reminded the jury to
remain the kind of jury that you have been throughout these proceedings, following the instructions, paying close attention, deciding this case on the basis of the evidence that comes before you, not on the basis of opinion pieces, editorials, whatever it may be.
*572Based on our examination of the record, we conclude that defendant was tried by a fair and impartial jury at both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. The voir dire process was carried out meticulously and thoughtfully to ensure that the jurors ultimately empaneled could render a fair and impartial verdict and sentence based solely on the evidence presented at trial. Many potential jurors admittedly could not set aside their knowledge of defendant’s prior convictions. Those jurors were dismissed. The jurors who sat on the jury were subjected to painstaking questioning. Their answers convinced the court they could disregard defendant’s prior record or their suspicion of that record and decide the case solely on the facts introduced into evidence at the proceeding. We will not overturn the court’s decision merely because the jury might have known of defendant’s prior convictions. There is no evidence that such information corrupted their deliberations. We will presume that the jury adhered to the court’s instructions. Muhammad, supra, 145 N.J. at 52, 678 A.2d 164; State v. Manley, 54 N.J. 259, 270, 255 A.2d 193 (1969).
In Koedatich I, supra, 112 N.J. at 285, 548 A.2d 939, the defendant also moved to excuse for cause any juror who read or heard about the case. In denying that request we stated: “[i]m-plicit in defendant’s contention that the trial court should have excluded for cause any juror who read or heard about the case is the notion that voir dire is an ineffective means of determining juror prejudice under such circumstances.” Ibid. We declined “to adopt such a rule for which we find no support in this or any other jurisdiction. In fact, such a rule would be inconsistent with long-established precedent holding that acceptable jurors need not be entirely ignorant of the matter at hand.” Ibid, (citing Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799-800, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 2035-36, 44 L.Ed.2d 589, 594-95 (1975)).
We further disagree with defendant’s assertion that State v. Brunson, 132 N.J. 377, 625 A.2d 1085 (1993) is applicable. In Brunson, we held that the State could offer into evidence only the number, degree, and date of defendant’s prior convictions when *573defendant had prior convictions for the offenses that were the same or similar to the offense charged. The State could not specify the offense. Id. at 391, 625 A.2d 1085. There is a difference, however, between allowing evidence of a prior conviction to impeach a defendant’s testimony and allowing jurors who suspect or have knowledge of a defendant’s prior conviction to serve on a jury.
Even where the jury has learned of defendant’s prior convictions, we have refused to reverse when evidence of a defendant’s guilt was overwhelming. In Harris, supra, 156 N.J. at 160, 716 A.2d 458, we held that “[t]he trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to empanel two juries before trial” even though some or all of Harris’ long list of prior convictions might have been brought to jurors attention during trial. See also State v. Pennington, 119 N.J. 547, 575 A.2d 816 (1990) (holding that prior murder convictions could be admitted into evidence to impeach testifying defendant in his capital murder trial). In Pennington, the jury learned of the defendant’s prior murder conviction. Id. at 573, 575 A.2d 816. We refused to reverse because of “the practical recognition that in the context of the cumulative weight of [the defendant’s] inculpatory statement, admission of that evidence would not have affected the jury’s determination concerning [his] responsibility for the victim’s death, ...” Brunson, supra, 132 N.J. at 392, 625 A.2d 1085 (explaining holding in Pennington, supra). Similarly, in State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454, 489, 548 A.2d 1058 (1988), due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt, we held that it was not reversible error to admit evidence in the guilt phase of defendant’s past conduct. Id. at 508, 548 A.2d 1058 (reversing death sentence where court failed to give careful and precise limiting instruction).
Unlike Harris, Pennington, and Rose, defendant’s prior convictions and “bad acts” were never admitted into evidence, nor mentioned by defense counsel or the State during trial or summation. The State did not even offer evidence of defendant’s prior convictions in the penalty phase to rebut defendant’s claim of *574“remorse.” Defendant also never requested that the case be tried by two juries. Given defendant’s confession and the overwhelming evidence against him, suspicion or knowledge of defendant’s prior convictions would not have affected the jury’s determination of whether he killed Megan or the outcome of the penalty phase.
Moreover, in the absence of defense counsel’s request for limiting instructions on the use of defendant’s prior convictions, we do not find that the trial court should have given such instructions sua sponte in either the guilt or penalty phase. Defendant’s prior convictions were brought to the jurors’ attention only during voir dire as a screening mechanism to eliminate jurors who would be unable to decide the case based only on the evidence presented at trial. Defendant’s prior convictions were never introduced into the record or confirmed by the court. Indeed, the trial court redacted as inadmissible all references in defendant’s confession to his prior convictions. The court also repeatedly admonished jurors to consider only the evidence in the record. In light of those circumstances, compelling the trial court to issue instructions sua sponte would have marked an unwarranted intrusion into defense counsel’s strategy and would have been damaging to defendant.
The court was faced with an unusual problem in this case. There was national and state-wide publicity regarding Megan’s Law. Jurors knew about the law and defendant’s role in its enactment. Under those circumstances, the court needed to screen jurors to ensure they could carry out their task of impartially judging defendant’s guilt. Inquiring into jurors’ knowledge about Megan’s Law and defendant’s prior criminal history was a reasonable way to deal with that problem and not an abuse of discretion.
We therefore conclude that allowing jurors to serve on the jury, despite suspicions that defendant previously had been convicted of sexual offenses, was not reversible error. We further conclude that to give limiting instructions sua sponte would have been inappropriate and would not have changed the outcome of the *575penalty phase. There were sufficient indicia that the jury relied only on the evidence presented, and not on their suspicions of defendant’s prior convictions in reaching their decisions.
V.

Prosecutorial Misconduct

Defendant also maintains that numerous instances of prosecuto-rial misconduct, in both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial, constitute reversible error.
The standard for reversal based upon prosecutorial misconduct is well-settled in the law. It requires an evaluation of the severity of the misconduct and its prejudicial effect on the defendant’s right to a fair trial. We long have held that,prosecutorial misconduct is not grounds for reversal of a criminal conviction unless the conduct was so egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial. State v. Chew, 150 N.J. 30, 84, 695 A.2d 1301 (1997) (Chew I); State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208, 219, 680 A.2d 634, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1021, 117 S.Ct. 540, 136 L.Ed.2d 424 (1996); Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 322, 524 A.2d 188. The “fair trial” test applies to alleged prosecutorial misconduct in both the guilt, Koedatich I, supra, 112 N.J. at 320-25, 548 A.2d 939, and penalty phases of a capital trial. Pennington, supra, 119 N.J. at 565, 575 A.2d 816; Rose, supra, 112 N.J. at 509-11, 548 A.2d 1058.
To justify reversal, the prosecutor’s conduct must have been “clearly and unmistakably improper,” and must have substantially prejudiced defendant’s fundamental right to have a jury fairly evaluate the merits of his defense. Roach, supra, 146 N.J. at 219, 680 A.2d 634; State v. Hightower, 120 N.J. 378, 411, 577 A.2d 99 (1990); Williams II, supra, 113 N.J. at 452, 550 A.2d 1172. In determining whether the prosecutor’s comments were sufficiently egregious to deny defendant a fair trial, we consider the tenor of the trial and the responsiveness of counsel and the court to the improprieties when they occurred. State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J.Super. 363, 433, 694 A.2d 196 (App.Div.1997). Specifical*576ly, the Court should consider “whether defense counsel made a timely and proper objection, whether the remark was withdrawn promptly, and whether the court ordered the remarks stricken from the record and instructed the jury to disregard them.” Ramseur; supra, 106 N.J. at 322-23, 524 A.2d 188; Chew I, supra, 150 N.J. at 84, 695 A.2d 1301.
Generally, if no objection was made to the improper remarks, the remarks will not be deemed prejudicial. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 323, 524 A.2d 188. Failure to make a timely objection indicates that defense counsel did not believe the remarks were prejudicial at the time they were made. State v. Irving, 114 N.J. 427, 444, 555 A.2d 575 (1989). Failure to object also deprives the court of the opportunity to take curative action. Ibid.
Even if defense counsel fails to object,
[a] prosecutor’s remarks and actions must at all times be consistent with his or her duty to ensure that justice is achieved. Absolute adherence to this duty is stringently compelled in capital eases where the penalty is death.
[State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 483, 575 A.2d 435 (1990) (citations omitted).]
A. Guilt Phase
Defendant alleges numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct in the guilt phase. Specifically, defendant alleges errors in the prosecutor’s opening and closing statements, in her examination of witnesses and in comments denigrating the defense. The State claims, as a general defense, that the prosecutors’ statements were based upon inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence presented and therefore, were proper.
Because defense counsel did not object to any of the prosecutor’s opening remarks, or to many other remarks now claimed to constitute prosecutorial misconduct, defendant must demonstrate plain error to prevail. State v. Irving, supra, 114 N.J. at 444, 555 A.2d 575. Plain error is “error possessing a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result and which substantially prejudiced the defendant’s fundamental right to have the jury *577fairly evaluate the merits of his defense.” Ibid, (citations omitted).
1. Opening Statement
Defendant argues that the prosecutor introduced two themes in her opening statement that she returned to throughout the trial, which constituted error: defendant’s sexual perversion before the crimes; and his lack of emotion after the crimes.
In her opening statement, the prosecutor described defendant’s interest in Megan in the following way:
This was not the first time that the defendant had noticed Megan. To the contrary, you will learn that that man, the defendant, had been watching that little girl for months. He had had his eye on Megan, his thoughts anything but pure. And so Megan walked into that house. She couldn’t know that about the defendant. So when she walked, her head was filled with vision of a puppy. One can only imagine the visions that filled the defendant’s head.
The prosecutor also described defendant’s lack of emotion following the murder by: pointing out that defendant denied to the victim’s mother that he had seen the victim; describing how defendant calmly and caleulatingly placed the victim’s body in a toy chest for disposal; and contrasting defendant’s demeanor following the crime with the relatively emotional response of the investigating officers.
A prosecutor in her opening statement may state only those facts that she intends to prove in good faith. She also may argue all inferences that properly may be drawn from those facts. Chew, supra, 150 N.J. at 84, 695 A.2d 1301. As all damaging evidence is inherently prejudicial, the court affords the prosecutor considerable leeway in making her opening. Ibid. However, the court must patrol the boundaries of propriety to ensure that defendant’s right to a fair trial is not compromised.
Evaluating the prosecutor’s guilt phase opening statement in its entirety along with the trial court’s curative instructions, we are unable to conclude that the statement, although at times improper, was so prejudicial as to deny defendant the right *578to a fair trial. Most of the statements in the State’s opening were a fair comment on the evidence actually produced at trial. The prosecutor commented on defendant’s motive in kidnapping, sexually assaulting and murdering the victim. Although such information was highly prejudicial and inflammatory, it was excerpted from defendant’s own confessions that were admitted into evidence. As we previously have recognized, admissions are always prejudicial. State v. Kuske, 109 N.J.Super. 575, 588, 264 A.2d 227 (App.Div.) certif. denied, 56 N.J. 246, 265 A.2d 701 (1970). Nonetheless, they are admissible evidence. N.J.R.E. 803(e)(25); State v. Rechtschaffer, 70 N.J. 395, 413-14, 360 A.2d 362 (1976). Therefore, we conclude that reference to an admissible portion of a defendant’s confession in an opening statement is not reversible misconduct, even if prejudicial to the defense.
Moreover, the court’s instructions mitigated the likelihood of error. The trial court clearly advised the jury that opening statements are not evidence. “Opening statements are a means to alert ... [jurors to] what the case is all about ... it’s somewhat like a road map to tell you where ... the state is going to go, perhaps indicating the witnesses and the order of witnesses, what witnesses are expected to testify to. But those are expectations. That’s not evidence____” We presume that the jury followed the court’s specific admonitions regarding the role of opening statements. Feaster, supra, 156 N.J. at 65, 716 A.2d 395. Therefore, we find no evidence that the prosecutors remarks substantially prejudiced defendant’s right to a fair trial.
2. Elicitation of Testimony Regarding Defendant’s Demeanor
Throughout its examination of witnesses, the prosecution inquired into defendant’s emotional state following the crime. Specifically, defendant objects to a number of remarks elicited from Detective Pukenas and Sergeant O’Dwyer.
Detective Pukenas testified that defendant recounted the murder to the accompanying officers in a “normal tone of voice.” The Detective also stated that “I think he was the only one not crying.”
*579Although this questioning may have crossed the bounds of propriety, the court issued the following curative instruction:
That part, I think, the jury should be instructed to disregard. His emotional state at the time is relevant for you to understand, evaluate all of the testimony. His reaction is not, in my judgment. Please disregard the last statement. Go ahead.
The prosecutor then continued:
Q. Detective, did he ever in the car on the way back say that it was an accident?
A. He never said that.
Q. Did he ever say that he didn’t mean to kill her?
A. He never indicated that at all.
Q. Did he ever say he was sorry that he lolled her?
A. He never said that.
Q. Did he ever say any words whatsoever that indicated remorse?
A. Nothing like that at all.
On redirect, noted that at one point during the interrogation defendant was “talking a little bit more than he had prior to that ... [b]ut not in any tone of voice that would indicate remorse.” The court sustained defense counsel’s objection to the conclusory statement about remorse and told the jury to disregard it.
On direct examination of Sergeant O’Dwyer, the prosecutor elicited testimony regarding defendant’s emotional state during the writing of the first confession. When the prosecutor asked whether there was any “point in time when [defendant] cried during this statement?” The trial court sustained the objection and stated “Please disregard that, ladies and gentlemen. Ms. Flicker, there was no reason for that question whatsoever.”
The prosecutor then asked Sergeant O’Dwyer to read defendant’s statement to the jury. While doing so, O’Dwyer broke down in tears. Beside himself, O’Dwyer accepted the court’s invitation to take a break and continue his testimony the next day. The trial court assured defense counsel that if O’Dwyer continued to cry, someone else would read the statement. Defense counsel, noting that other officers also had become emotional while on the stand, suggested to the court that such testimony was a “farce.” The trial court disagreed. The court then stated on the record that an “emotional moment” such as O’Dwyer’s was to be expected *580from time to time and admonished the jurors to set aside any emotional response to O’Dwyer’s breakdown. The court reminded them to rely solely on the evidence.
The next morning, the court reminded jurors that O’Dwyer’s response was not evidence and that they should rely solely on the evidence. The judge then asked if any juror had been affected. No juror responded.
Defendant alleges that the prosecutor’s line of questioning improperly emphasized defendant’s lack of remorse. He suggests that the prosecutor’s primary purpose was to engender contempt for defendant. That is an improper motive. However, because defendant’s confessions were critical to the State’s case, we find that defendant’s emotional state and state of mind when he confessed are relevant. They demonstrate that defendant’s confessions were made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. They show that he was in full command of his faculties and not overcome by emotion. Moreover, the prosecutor’s questions were based on evidence in the record, and each objection was supplemented with a curative instruction. For all those reasons, we do not find that the prosecutor’s questions concerning defendant’s demeanor and emotional state constitute plain error.
With respect to O’Dwyer’s breakdown, we further find that any potential prejudice was ameliorated by the curative instructions given both immediately after and on the morning after the incident. The court also received affirmance from the jurors that they were not affected by emotional outbursts. At most, minimal prejudice resulted from that line of questioning.
3. Repeated Reference to Defendant’s Concern Over His Hand and Related Anger Towards Victim
During the crime, the victim bit defendant’s hand. At the police station, defendant stated at least three times that he was in considerable pain and blamed the victim for inflicting the wound. *581Dr. Askin, a forensic dentist, examined defendant’s hand at the station and performed bite-mark identification and analysis.
At trial, Sergeant Stanley testified about those events at the police station. He was asked:
Q: Was there any further mention of the hand?
A: Yes. He continued to complain about his hand being hurt and, again, he felt that Megan was responsible and he blamed her for that injury.
We reject defendant’s argument that this line of questioning was prejudicial. Questions regarding defendant’s hand constituted relevant evidence of how the crime occurred. The evidence also corroborates the forensic determination that the bite on defendant’s hand was made by the victim.
4. Repeated Reference to Dr. Askin’s Removal of Victim’s Lower Jaw
Dr. Askin testified that he had removed the victim’s lower jaw during the autopsy to make a model of her teeth. The prosecutor repeatedly referred to that fact throughout the questioning. The trial court called counsel to sidebar, where he reprimanded the prosecutor:
Let me tell you something I have a bigger problem with, and that’s four times now you’ve asked questions that resulted in the responses, with the removal of the lower jaw. I asked you very specifically, was it relevant as to where the lower jaw was used for making the impressions. You said it was. It wasn’t. I think that’s inflammatory stuff.
The prosecutor’s repeated reference to the fact that Dr. Askin removed the victim’s lower jaw during an autopsy should not have been repeated. The trial court recognized as much and harshly reprimanded the prosecutor. The prosecutor promptly conformed his questioning to the court’s instruction. We, therefore, conclude that at most, minimal prejudice resulted from this line of questioning.
5. Reference to Defendant’s Sexual Perversion
The prosecutor asked Sergeant O’Dwyer to read portions of defendant’s statement to the jury. Defendant argues that the *582excerpts should have been excluded, as they portrayed him as a pedophile or sexual pervert. Specifically, defendant objects to the elicitation of the following portion:
Q: What was your intention of bringing her into the house?
A: My intentions were just to feel her up and kiss her and try to get her not to say anything. I didn’t want to hurt her physically, but I knew I was hurting her mentally by what I was doing.
Q: What do you mean by feel her up?
A: Rub my hands up and down her legs and feel her butt. I learned that my main attraction to younger girls was the softness of their skin.....
The statements clearly suggest that defendant was attracted to young girls and acted on those feelings. However harmful to defendant, we find the statements properly were admitted. The prosecution is allowed to vigorously and forcefully present the State’s case. Rose, supra, 112 N.J. at 509, 548 A.2d 1058. Even if the statements were inflammatory, the prosecutor did not mis-characterize the evidence. The statements were defendant’s own words and established his motive in committing the crime. Moreover, they were made knowingly and voluntarily.
We also reject defendant’s argument that the statements improperly referred to uncharged misconduct. The court redacted all inadmissible portions of defendant’s statement, i.e., those that referred to his prior convictions. The admitted portions did not specifically inform the jury of defendant’s prior crimes and went only to the evidence in this ease. Introduction of this relevant evidence was not error.
6. Elicitation of Testimony Regarding Prints of “Smaller Person” Found in Defendant’s Bedroom
The defendant also cites Officer Shaw’s testimony regarding fingerprint evidence taken from defendant’s bedroom as proof that the prosecution was “smearing defendant.” Officer Shaw testified that he found a latent fingerprint on the dresser mirror during an authorized search of defendant’s bedroom. Shaw described the evidence as “just a small portion of a print, as if it could have been made by a smaller person.” Defense counsel *583objected, but the court overruled his objection and allowed Shaw to explain that the fingerprint did not match the victim’s.
In defendant’s view, “[t]he implication of this testimony was clear: it suggested that defendant had had another child in his bedroom at some time.” Thus, the testimony “implfied] that defendant had been guilty of other, similar misconduct.” Defendant contends this deprived him of a fair trial.
We find that any prejudice resulting from this comment was minimal. Shaw’s statement regarding the “smaller person” was contained in his police report detailing his investigation. It came out during that testimony and was not specifically elicited by the prosecution. Moreover, the prosecutor immediately dropped the inquiry, neither pressing Shaw nor returning to the subject thereafter. Because the comment was brief and was not pressed by the prosecution, it could not have produced an improper result given the overwhelming evidence against defendant.
7. Other Alleged Incidents of Misconduct
Defendant argues that the prosecution improperly: addressed defendant’s change of appearance between the time of the crime and trial to depict defendant as the “village pervert”; used gloves when touching defendant’s clothes but not the victims; elicited testimony that the victim’s mother cried while talking to police; and disparaged defense counsel by questioning his investigative technique. The State maintains that questions regarding defendant’s appearance established that defendant accurately was identified as the perpetrator of the crime.
Although the State’s argument that identification was at issue in this case is not convincing, we find nothing overly suggestive in the prosecutor’s questioning. Nor do we find that the fact that the prosecutor wore plastic gloves while handling defendant’s clothes but not while handling the victim’s clothes, had the capacity to deprive defendant of a fair trial. Neither was it improper for the prosecutor to elicit the fact that the victim’s mother cried when she was shown pieces of her daughter’s clothing. The *584testimony simply explained police conduct. Moreover, any error resulting from this line of questioning was cured when the court promptly sustained defendant’s objection. Finally, although defendant correctly objected to the prosecutor’s suggestion that the defense had an obligation to examine the casts and photographs prepared by Dr. Askin, the trial court cured any prejudice in this regard with a prompt, accurate, and clear statement of the law.
8. Guilt Phase Summation
Defendant characterizes the guilt phase summation as “a moveable feast of prosecutorial misconduct.” The inappropriateness of the summation, defendant claims, is by itself sufficient to warrant reversal of his conviction. He claims the following soliloquy both slanders his character and inflames the jury:
What kind of man could do such awful deeds? What kind of man could commit such evil acts? The kind of man who could cavalierly dump a child’s body and make his next stop a WAWA. The kind of man who could, after executing her daughter, look Maureen Kanka in the eye, within minutes, and not flinch. The kind of man who had the unmitigated gall to offer to hand out fliers for the child whose life he had just snuffed out. The kind of man who, over the course of two days, could talk about the rape and murder and the brutalizing of a child and never show a shred of emotion. The kind of man who could talk about Megan’s death and blame her because his hand hurt. The kind of man like the Defendant.
The Defendant killed to protect his own self interest. He killed, he claims to protect himself, because he didn’t want Megan to get loose. He didn’t want Megan to tell on him. He didn’t kill in a rage. He didn’t kill in a panic. He didn’t kill by accident. This killing was so cold and so calculating that it is chilling in the extreme.
Defendant further claims the following statement was an allegation of uncharged misconduct:
He had been lusting for this child for weeks or months, as he told Sergeant Stanley on Sunday. He had been watching little girls for weeks and months, and getting those feelings for them. It is an image that is so appalling that it is hard to put into words. He had been lusting after this child.
Defendant also objects to the prosecutor’s reference to the fact that defendant did not call to the stand individuals that he claimed actually committed the murders. The prosecutor stated, “based upon all you saw, and all you heard and all you know about his *585activities, and all you know about his behavior, is there one bit of testimony to suggest [he was covering up for Jenin or Cifelli]?”
Finally, defendant objects to the prosecutor’s finale:
Members of the jury, sexual violation in the park. Is there any image more despicable? Is there any act more depraved than that one? After all that he had done to that child, and he had to violate her one more time. He didn’t rip the bags off her head to try to save her. He stuck his finger in her vagina. Can there by any question of his intent?
He dumps her, and then he drives off. This was a man who wanted to kill, intended to kill, meant to kill, chose to kill, and did kill purposely or knowingly by his own conduct.
In those statements, did you once, even once, hear him mention anything about Megan or concern for what she had suffered? Megan would never laugh and never smile again, and he was upset that his hand hurt. Megan lay dead and he blamed her for the wound on his hand. Megan was on a morgue table, and he wanted a band-aid.
A child playing with a dog. Is there any image that does more to evoke childhood than that one? It brings to mind all that childhood is, innocence, happiness, laughter, trust.
At this point defense counsel objected. The court expressed some concern about the “childhood” language but, noting no reaction from the jury when the language was spoken, overruled defense counsel’s objection. The prosecutor continued:
Whenever you see such a scene again, in your mind’s eye you will see Megan. You will see her laugh, you will see her smile, and you will think—
Defense counsel objected again; the trial court overruled his objection. The prosecutor continued and eventually concluded with:
There is only one word that can begin to do justice, and that one word must come from you. And that word is guilty. Guilty as to purposeful or knowing murder by his own conduct. Guilty as to every single count in the indictment.
Through your verdicts, I ask you to announce that the Defendant kidnaped, raped, sodomized and murdered Megan. Thank you.
*586Following summation, the trial court spoke to the jury. He said the summations on both sides were understandably emotional “because this is an emotional case.” However, the- prosecutor’s last comments were “too emotional in nature.” The court specifically told the jurors to disregard the portion of the summation asking “why, why, what Megan may be thinking of, things of that nature____”
After the jurors left the courtroom, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, noting that while she hated “to interrupt somebody’s summation or somebody’s opening,” she wondered if she “was doing the right thing by sitting there and not objecting,” given the “inflammatory” remarks of the prosecution.
The court denied the mistrial motion. He found that, overall, the prosecutor’s comments were based on the facts in evidence and were not overly-inflammatory given the circumstances of the case. The trial court further noted that he had watched the jurors and had not observed any adverse affects.
When court reconvened the following day, the trial court admonished the jury that they were not to accept the comments made on summation as evidence. Rather, the court clarified, “if the recollection of the attorney with regard to evidence, the testimony presented before you does not coincide with yours, you are under a duty to disregard those comments and to rely on your own recollection ... because you are the sole judges of the facts.” The trial court continued:
But my instruction to you at this time is direct, and it’s this: Please separate and completely disregard as you see fit, emotional words, words or phrases or images that have a tendency to inflame from descriptive language that has come before you that moves the argument of counsel forward, that is relevant to a discussion of the evidence and the inferences that may flow from the evidence. Language that goes to an understanding of that is certainly acceptable. Language that would inflame and serve no purpose, other than to generate sympathy or passion, has no place in the jury room, has no place in any decision that [you] make. So things such as bias, prejudice, sympathy must be excluded, and I instruct you to use your very good judgment when you are considering the summations of counsel in this regai-d.
*587Prosecutors in criminal cases are expected to make vigorous and forceful closing arguments to juries. We afford prosecutors considerable leeway in closing arguments so long as their comments are reasonably related to the scope of the evidence presented. State v. Harris, 141 N.J. 525, 559, 662 A.2d 333 (1995). Ibid. As Justice Clifford recognized in his dissent in State v. DiPaglia, 64 N.J. 288, 305, 315 A.2d 385 (1974):
Criminal trials are emotionally charged proceedings. A prosecutor is not expected to conduct himself in a manner appropriate to a lecture hall. He is entitled to be forceful and graphic in his summation to the jury, so long as he confines himself to fair comments on the evidence presented.
[citations omitted.]
Nevertheless, the primary duty of a prosecutor is not to obtain convictions but to see that justice is done. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 320, 524 A.2d 188. “It is as much hisiduty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.” State v. Farrell, 61 N.J. 99, 105, 293 A.2d 176 (1972) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633, 79 L.Ed. 1314, 1321 (1935)).
We agree that some portions of the prosecutor’s summation were improper.
Any capital trial will necessarily involve testimony and physical evidence pertaining to the victim. This evidence, though admissible, cannot be used in a manner calculated to so confuse or impassion the jury that it inappropriately intertwines irrelevant emotional considerations with relevant evidence. There are occasions when evidence relating to the victim’s character and personality may be probative of critical aspects of the trial, e.g., defendant’s assertion of self-defense or provocation. Where, however, as in the matter before us, the victim’s character has no bearing on the substantive issue of guilt or the penalty to be imposed, the prosecution may not comment on the evidence in a manner that selves only to highlight the victim’s virtues in order to inflame the jury.
[Williams II, supra, 113 N.J. at 451-52, 550 A.2d 1172.]
As in Williams II, the prosecutor’s remarks in this ease contrasted the victim’s life and dreams with the terror she felt at the moment of her death. And, as in Williams II, this prosecutor depicted the victim as an angel at the mercy of a defendant who was amoral, e.g., by eliciting testimony at trial regarding defen*588dant’s stoic demeanor following the crime and concern over his hand. See Pennington, supra, 119 N.J. at 566-567, 575 A.2d 816 (objecting to prosecutor using references to victim to inflame jury and divert its attention from material facts); Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 161, 586 A.2d 85 (same).
In Williams II, the Court concluded that “[t]he prosecutor’s remarks were clearly improper and should have been stricken from the record and the jury properly instructed to disregard them.” 113 N.J. at 452, 550 A.2d 1172. As inappropri ate as the prosecutor’s comments were in this case, however, we are not persuaded that in the context of the entire trial the prosecutor’s misconduct had the capacity to deprive defendant of a fair trial. First, unlike in Williams II, much of the prosecutor’s comments were based on evidence at trial or were in response to defense counsel’s summation, i.e., statement that “[Defendant] had been lusting for this child for weeks or months” was based on evidence in record; statement that events leading up to victim’s death were “so repulsive, so disturbing ... that it permeates your very soul” merely depicted the State’s evidence “graphically and forcefully”; statements regarding toy box, belt, and plastic bag placed over victim’s head were proper reconstruction of murder and demonstration of defendant’s intent to kill based on evidence in record; other statements reconstructing the murder were proper demonstration of defendant’s intent to kill and based on evidence in record. The prosecutor’s reference to defendant’s failure to call Brian Jenin or Joseph Cifelli was in response to defense counsel’s summation implying that Jenin and Cifelli were actually guilty of the crime.
Second, despite the flagrant misconduct in this case, the trial court was effective in diminishing its prejudicial effect. In most instances of misconduct, the court sustained proper objections by defense counsel and offered curative instructions. The court also reminded the jury in post-summation instructions that this was an emotional case and therefore, the summations were understand*589ably emotional as well. The court admonished the jury to determine guilt based on the evidence in the record.
Most importantly, evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming. The State’s case was based primarily on the inculpatory statements made by defendant after the murder. Those statements were corroborated by other evidence and witnesses. In view of the overwhelming evidence against defendant, we find that the prosecutor’s conduct in the guilt phase was not clearly capable of producing an unjust result. It was not so prejudicial as to deprive defendant of a fair trial. We, therefore, refuse to reverse on this ground.
B. Penalty Phase
The standards that govern prosecutorial conduct at the guilt phase also apply at the penalty phase of a capital trial. Pennington, supra, 119 N.J. at 565, 575 A.2d 816. Because defense counsel did not object to many of the comments, we must evaluate the contentions under a plain error standard. Again, our task is to determine whether the prosecutor’s misconduct was so egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial.
Defendant contends that the prosecutor’s “overriding theme” during the penalty phase was disparagement of defense counsel and defense strategy. He specifically objects to four portions of the testimony: the opening statements; the cross examination of the defense experts; the direct examination of Sergeant Raymond; and the summation. The State responds that the challenged remarks merely reminded the jury that it was responsible for weighing the evidence presented.
1. Opening Statement
Defendant objects to the following comments in the prosecutor’s opening statement:
We are confident that when the smoke clears, much of defendant’s evidence will be suspect in your eyes. When evaluating the reliability of the evidence that supports the mitigating factors, it’s essential to take a couple of things into consideration. *590First of all, one, when was the information reported? Was it in anticipation of this penalty phase or reported to an authority prior to the penalty phase being anticipated?
Defendant complains that the statement “misleads” the jurors by suggesting that defendant had some obligation to provide evidence regarding mitigating factors. He also argues that the phrase “when the smoke clears” suggests that the defense was deceptive and trying to hide the truth. The State counters that the remarks must be placed in the proper context. The prosecutor was asking the jury to consider the origin of the mitigation evidence presented by the defense.
We find nothing objectionable about the statements. It is not improper to ask the jury to consider the timing of evidence production. Documentary evidence in existence before defendant’s prosecution would be more credible than evidence gathered in anticipation of the penalty phase of a capital murder case. The bias and interest of the person providing the information also is relevant.
The trial court advised the jury that the opening statements were not evidence. We further observe that defense counsel did not object to those statements. Placing the statements in context, the prosecutor’s conduct does not require reversal of defendant’s death sentence.
2. Cross-examination ofKrych and Podboy
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor’s cross-examination of defense mitigation expert, Carol Krych, and the defense psychologist, Dr. Podboy, was highly improper. We disagree.
Krych’s testimony was evasive and the prosecutor sought to bring that out on cross-examination. The prosecutor also sought to demonstrate Krych’s bias. Although the prosecutor’s comment during Dr. Podboy’s examination regarding defense strategy was improper, that comment was stricken. Therefore, no prejudice resulted from that incident. Inquiry into the circumstances of Podboy’s diagnosis was otherwise proper.
*591The above instances do not warrant reversal of defendant’s death sentence. The trial court sustained defense counsel’s objections to improper cross-examination of Krych and Podboy and offered a curative instruction in each case. Accordingly, we find no prejudice capable of producing an unjust result.
3. Direct Examination of Sergeant Raymond,
Sergeant Raymond was assigned by the Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office to investigate defendant’s background. Sergeant Raymond met with Paul Timmendequas, defendant’s brother, eight times during his investigation. For the first time on appeal, defendant objects to the following testimony of Sergeant Raymond, taken from the interviews with Paul:
A. I quote, “I’m through doing anything for the defense.” And I asked him, well, why are you through doing anything with the defense? And he said, “I’ve caught them in so many lies, I’m sick of them.”
Q. Did he make comments about Lois and Carol [defense mitigation experts] being two-faced and willing to do anything to win this case?
MR. GREENMAN: Objection, Judge. Leading.
THE COURT: Objection sustained.
Defendant argues that that testimony discredited the defense team and suggested the defense was being deceptive. The State contends that Paul’s statements about Krych and Nardone were relevant to the jury’s consideration of the weight to be given to the expert’s testimony. We agree. Sergeant Raymond provided evidence that was important for the jury to hear in determining whether defense witnesses were credible. See N.J.R.E. 607.
Defendant further argues that other excerpts from Raymond’s testimony implied that the defense was concealing evidence. We find no merit to those contentions.
4. Penalty Phase Summation
Finally, defendant claims that the prosecutor’s penalty phase summation was “an unmitigated assault” upon the character of defense counsel and the defense witnesses. Defendant argues *592that the following passages imply that defense counsel was dishonest and trying to mislead the jury:
Have you seen any of those photographs showing the residences, showing the family, showing the family gatherings? Do you think that those photographs documented that things were not as the defense would have you believe? Do you think that if those photos showed shacks and rags and squalor, don’t you know you would have seen them? They would have been in here poster size. But you didn’t see any of them. In fact, you didn’t hear about those albums and that they existed and that Carol Krych had them until I brought it up on cross-examination.
Again, members of the jury, think about what hasn’t been given to you, what hasn’t been revealed to you when you assess the integrity of the defense presentation.
Defendant claims those statements improperly suggest the defense was withholding unfavorable evidence.
The trial court directed the prosecutor not to comment on who the defense chose to call as experts. The trial court instructed the prosecutor to comment only on “the qualifications of experts and what they have said, and things of that nature.” The court also instructed the jury that “[t]he defense decision-making as to who to obtain as experts, how to defend, how to structure the defense, those types of things are not for consideration for the jury and you should exclude any type of reference or any inference that could be made with regard to that____” Defendant nevertheless contends that a stronger instruction was needed.
Defendant also challenges the prosecutor’s discussion of witness Krych’s testimony. The prosecutor stated:
On direct examination she told you that she was a forensic social worker, and her job was to present you this fair and balanced picture of the defendant’s background and childhood. What you didn’t learn until cross-examination was that Ms. Krych was a capital mitigation specialist, and one who was handsomely paid for her role in this case. And ironically, if you will recall, she would not admit that she was a capital mitigation specialist until I confronted her with her own notes where she described herself that way.
If the defense is so proud of that, then why did she take such pains to deny it under oath until I confronted her with it?
Her role, her job in this case, I suggest to you, was to present a picture of the defendant as sympathetic as possible. It didn’t matter if the truth had to be stretched. It didn’t matter if information was left out or omitted. Truth became irrelevant.
*593Lastly, defendant challenges the prosecutor’s discussion of Paul Timmendequas’ statements. The prosecutor stated:
You have also heard that [Paul] now believes that his brother should die for what he did. The defendant’s own brother thinks he should die for what he did. This is very compelling, I would suggest.
While conceding that evidence of Paul’s change of opinion was fair game, defendant argues that the prosecutor went too far. The prosecutor was “essentially arguing that, if the defendant’s own brother thought execution was appropriate, who was the jury to argue.” Such an argument, he claims, is grounds for reversal.
Defendant also contends that the cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s misconduct is so egregious that it mandates reversal of the death sentence. See State v. Baker, 310 N.J.Super. 128, 139-40, 708 A.2d 429 (App.Div.1998). In response, the State argues that the comments were grounded in evidence contained in the record. The State claims that the prosecutor was merely “commentpng] about gaps in the defense presentation and the interest and bias of certain witness [sic]” — comments, arguably, which are “totally proper.”
We find that much of the prosecutor’s questioning was proper. The prosecutor asked the jury to “look at the mitigating, the entire presentation by the defense, and evaluate the quality of the information that was presented____” The prosecutor asked the jury to consider the evidence that was elicited from defense witnesses on direct and cross-examination, and on rebuttal. The State’s questioning revealed gaps in the defense’s case. The State offered evidence calling into question the credibility of defense witnesses. It is not improper for the prosecution to suggest that the defense’s presentation was imbalanced and incomplete.
Defendant’s complaints regarding the prosecutor’s comments about Carol Krych similarly are without merit. The prosecutor’s comments regarding Krych were grounded in the record. Krych identified herself on direct examination as a forensic social worker. *594On cross-examination, when confronted with documents in her own writing, she finally conceded that she was a capital mitigation specialist. Witnesses that she referred to in her report insisted they had been misquoted, and documents that contradicted the defense theory of defendant’s background were not presented in the defense’s case. The jury was entitled to know that information in determining the weight to give Ms. Krych’s testimony.
The prosecutor’s questions provided a basis for the jury to infer that Krych was biased and was presenting a picture of a defendant that was not completely accurate, albeit sympathetic. It does not denigrate the defense, as the State points out, to “speak frankly about what is manifest in the record.” When deciding how much worth to give to the defense case, the jury clearly could consider whether it was receiving a full picture, as interest and bias are always relevant. N.J.R.E. 607; State v. Gorrell, 297 N.J.Super. 142, 149, 687 A.2d 1016 (App.Div.1996) (citation omitted). Because the prosecutor’s comments were based on evidence in the record, and the reasonable inferences that could be drawn from that evidence, the prosecutor acted properly. Harris, supra, 156 N.J. at 194, 716 A.2d 458.
Lastly, the prosecutor’s reference to the fact that Paul Timmendequas had changed his mind and wanted his brother to die was, at most, harmless error. The jury had been shown two tapes of interviews with Paul. The tapes discussed the boys’ childhood and history of abuse. Based upon those tapes, the defense argued in summation that “if there’s any doubt in your mind that Paul Timmedequas was telling the truth about the sexual abuse, I ask you to watch those tapes again.” “Don’t forget [what] Paul said with all the abuse.... ” ‘What reason would Paul have now to recant what he said on the tapes?”
The prosecution emphasized Paul’s change of mind to establish that the presentation of defendant’s background had been exaggerated. That is evidenced by the fact the prosecutor launched into a review of Paul’s version of the boys’ childhood immediately after pointing out that Paul had changed his mind. The statement *595contradicted the picture of abuse painted by the defense, challenged the defense theory and rebutted the defense’s evidence. It was drawn from evidence in the record. At most, the comment was harmless, since the jury knew from the tape that Paul had changed his mind and wanted defendant to die.
We disagree also that the prosecutor denigrated the defense by pointing out what evidence was not presented. In Rose, we held that the cumulative effect of prosecutorial misconduct warranted reversal. Rose, supra, 112 N.J. at 524, 548 A.2d 1058. Denigration of defense counsel was one ground for that decision. Id. at 518-19, 548 A.2d 1058. The Rose prosecutor implied that counsel told the experts what to say so that defendant would “beat the penalty.” Ibid. We objected to the statement because it implied “that the expert’s testimony was fabricated or contrived, with the assistance of defense counsel.” Ibid. The prosecutor in that case also repeatedly referred to facts outside the record, referred to inadmissible evidence, and improperly asserted that the law “mandated the death penalty for [the] defendant.” Id. at 514-24, 548 A.2d 1058. Such conduct, we concluded, clearly was outside the bounds of propriety.
Prosecutors must argue based on facts in the record. State v. Moore, 122 N.J. 420, 462, 585 A.2d 864 (1991). In Moore, comments to the effect that a defense expert was a “professional bleeding heart who was indeed duped by the defendant,]” were deemed improper. Id. at 461-62, 585 A.2d 864. Comments “that the defense realized that the defense of insanity was merit-less” also were improper expressions of the prosecutor’s own conclusions. Ibid. While overruling the conviction on other grounds, we cautioned prosecutors not to denigrate defense counsel or witnesses based on their own feelings. Ibid. Similarly, in State v. Bey, 129 N.J. 557, 622, 610 A.2d 814 (1992) (Bey III), we found it “unprofessional” for a prosecutor to argue that a defense expert had “a theory first and he [was] going to pick and choose facts to make the theory work”. We did not, however, find it to be harmful error because it went to the weight to be given to the expert’s testimony. Ibid.
*596We are satisfied that the prosecutor’s comments in this case do not constitute reversible error. The prosecutor’s comments are less prejudicial than those made in Rose, supra, 112 N.J. at 510-14, 548 A.2d 1058. The prosecutor here argued facts contained in the record. She urged the jury to carefully evaluate the mitigating evidence and its origins. She focused on the inconsistencies in the evidence and pointed out the flaws in the defense’s theory. Although we strongly disapprove of attacks on the integrity of defense counsel, we do not think that is what occurred here.
The prosecutor sought to establish bias and interest. Under the New Jersey Rules of Evidence, a party can challenge credibility by introducing extrinsic evidence, i.e. proof by others that material facts are other than as testified to by the witness under attack. State v. Silva, 131 N.J. 438, 444, 621 A.2d 17 (1993). Indeed, it is essential for the jury to have such information when making credibility determinations. Accordingly, we find that the methods used by the prosecutor were entirely proper. N.J.R.E. 607.
After carefully examining the record and recognizing that some of the prosecutor’s remarks were improper, nonetheless, we are fully satisfied “that it was the weight of the evidence, particularly the damning statements uttered by defendant himself, that led to this capital murder conviction rather than the prosecutor’s improper comments____” Feaster, supra, 156 N.J. at 63-64, 716 A.2d 395. We conclude that the alleged misconduct was not “so egregious as to deny defendant a fair trial.” Moore, supra, 122 N.J. at 462, 585 A.2d 864 (stating test for evaluating allegations of prosecutorial misconduct).
YI.

Other Trial Evidence

A. Voir Dire Re: Victim’s Age
Defendant, for the first time on appeal, claims that the trial court committed plain error and his trial counsel rendered *597ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to determine whether the age of the victim would adversely impact a potential juror’s ability to deliberate fairly. We disagree. The lengthy jury questionnaire and the individual voir dire provided the court and counsel with more than enough information to determine whether the victim’s age would cause potential jurors automatically to impose the death penalty or refuse to consider the mitigating factors presented by the defense.
1. The Facts
During juror orientation, the trial court informed each panel that the ease involved the murder and sexual assault of a seven-year-old girl. Next, the court and the attorneys questioned 331 potential jurors in a lengthy voir dire based upon their review of an in-depth questionnaire filled out by each person. The process lasted from January 13 until April 21.
The oral and written voir dire was designed to weed out jurors who expressed any doubt about their ability to remain impartial. Question number seven of the jury questionnaire asked whether the juror had any children or stepchildren. If the juror answered yes, question eight followed up by inquiring about the age, sex, education and employment status of the child, and whether the child lived with the prospective juror. Question ten asked whether the juror had any grandchildren, and if so, their ages, sexes, education, employment status and whether they lived with the prospective juror. Question nine asked if the potential juror, or anyone close to her, had suffered the loss of a child, and if so, to describe how the loss occurred.
An entire section was devoted to the jurors’ knowledge of Megan’s Law. Jurors specifically were asked if their knowledge or suspicion that Megan’s Law was an outgrowth of the case would prevent them from judging the case impartially. Questions 107 through 110 addressed whether the juror, or anyone she knew, had been a victim of child abuse or molestation, and whether the juror knew anyone who had ever been accused of committing child *598abuse or molestation. The juror also was asked if she had attended any class on or had studied child sexual abuse. Questions 128 through 130 dealt with the possible admission of victim impact evidence. Jurors were asked if they could listen to such evidence and still fairly consider the mitigating evidence presented by the defense under the guidelines set forth by the court. Question 131 asked how the juror felt about the possibility that she might be shown disturbing photographs of the victim. Question 132 asked if there was anything not covered by the questionnaire that the juror felt might affect her ability to be fair and impartial.
Of those jurors questioned by the court, thirty-four were excused after indicating they would have problems being impartial because the case involved a child. The court specifically asked seventy-four of the remaining ninety-seven qualified jurors about their abihty to remain impartial, given that the victim was seven years old. Nine of those jurors deliberated on the case. Defense counsel did not object to the court’s voir dire about the juror’s abihty to remain impartial given that the victim was a child. Nor did counsel exercise any of the peremptory challenges allotted for defendant in jury selection.
2. The Law
To state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, paragraph 10, of the New Jersey Constitution, a defendant must first establish that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 67, 519 A.2d 336 (1987), (referencing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984)). Second, he must show a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different but for counsel’s deficiencies. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 691-96, 104 S.Ct. at 2066-69, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695-98. The reasonableness of counsel’s *599performance should be evaluated in light of all relevant circumstances at the time the alleged error occurred. Id. at 689-90, 104 S.Ct. at 2067-68, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694-95. The inquiry must include the possibility that counsel’s decisions were based on sound trial strategy rather than incompetence or deficiency. Id. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695-96. Defendant bears the burden of proving that counsel’s performance was unreasonable under the prevailing professional norms. Id. at 687-91, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-66, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693-95.
The purpose of voir dire is to ensure an impartial jury and a fair trial. State v. Martini (Martini I), 131 N.J. 176, 210, 619 A.2d 1208 (1993). In a capital case, the voir dire should probe the minds of prospective jurors to ascertain whether the jurors entertain any biases that would interfere with their ability to decide the case fairly and impartially. State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 129, 594 A.2d 232 (1991). The questions also should deter mine whether the circumstances of the crime would prevent the prospective juror from considering relevant mitigating evidence. Martini I, supra, 131 N.J. at 211, 619 A.2d 1208; State v. Biegenwald, 126 N.J. 1, 30-31, 594 A.2d 172 (1991) (Biegenwald IV). A defendant’s sentence should be affirmed if the voir dire was adequate to ensure that a fair and impartial jury was empaneled. Id. at 34-35, 524 A.2d 130.
In Moore, supra, 122 N.J. at 451, 585 A.2d 864, the Court stressed the importance of open-ended questions in voir dire regarding the status of the victims as it relates to any prejudice affecting the juror’s ability to consider mitigating evidence. At issue was the trial court’s refusal to allow defense counsel to probe prospective jurors on whether they would be unable to remain fair and impartial given that one of the victims was six months pregnant and the other was an infant. We refused to reverse, finding that the court’s questioning otherwise had been probing enough to weed out prospective jurors who might have been biased by the facts of the case. Id. at 451-54, 585 A.2d 864.
*600Defects of the type in Moore, supra, can be cured “if the voir dire was otherwise so thorough and probing as to ensure that the jurors empaneled had the ‘capacity to credit the evidence in mitigation,’ State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 154, 548 A.2d 887 (1988) (Bey II), and the ability to perform their duties in accordance with the court’s instructions and their oaths ...” Biegenwald IV, supra, 126 N.J. at 34-35, 594 A.2d 172. The Court also has resisted reversing convictions due to inadequate voir dire with regard to victim status when it can be said that defense counsel had a strategic reason for not delving into the nature of the victim. Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 93, 586 A.2d 85 (finding no abuse of discretion given that defense counsel requested that questions regarding death-qualification be limited as part of “well-considered strategic attempt to limit juror exposure to questions concerning capital punishment”).
There is no merit to defendant’s claim that counsel did not adequately delve into the impact the victim’s age might have on jurors. Both the court and defense counsel extensively questioned the jurors regarding the fact the victim was a child. Only two jurors were not questioned extensively on that issue, Delventhal and Livecehi. Nothing in either jurors’ statement raise questions about their ability to remain impartial.
In the first instance, Delventhal was asked if he could properly consider victim impact and mitigating evidence as instructed by the court. He answered that he could. Although defense counsel did not follow up and question Delventhal regarding his feelings on children, counsel probed whether the juror would consider mitigating evidence about the defendant and, if so, what type. Undoubtedly, counsel made a strategic decision not to go further with those questions because there was no indication from Delven-thal that he would be unfriendly to the defense. In fact, Delven-thal used to be a criminal defense attorney. More importantly, Delventhal was the only juror at that point who did not know of defendant’s prior criminal record. Those facts presumably played *601a role in defense counsel’s decision not to object to Delventhal’s qualification as a juror.
In Livecchi’s case, there also was no evidence that she would have a problem remaining impartial. Although the court did not ask Livecchi the same in-depth questions regarding the victim’s age as it had asked the other jurors, defense counsel probed the issue. Counsel questioned whether the Kankas’ victim impact evidence would be overwhelmingly emotional for Livecchi. She answered “no.” When pressed, she insisted that she would consider the mitigating evidence as carefully and as equally as she considered the family’s impact statements. Based on Livecchi’s oral and written answers, defense counsel and the court had no reason to believe the victim’s age would interfere with Livecchi’s ability to remain impartial. Defense counsel’s failure to object to Livecchi’s qualification likely was a strategic decision.
We conclude that the court adequately questioned the jurors regarding the possible bias that might result from their knowledge that the victim was seven years old. The court posed open-ended questions based on the answers the juror had given in the questionnaire. Defense counsel displayed.no reluctance to question jurors extensively on the subject, indicating that counsel had strategic reasons for the omission in instances when it did not probe further. Every juror who said anything that would indicate bias was excused from the panel. In light of those facts, we find that no error was committed by the trial court.
Defendant’s claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel also is without merit. Counsel failed to elaborate on the court’s questioning regarding the victim in only one instance, and there is a clear indication that that decision was strategic. Moreover, defendant offers no evidence to support the contention that but for counsel’s deficiencies (if the Court were to find that there were any), the result of the proceeding would have been different. Defendant’s claims, therefore, are rejected.
*602B. Defendant’s Motion for a Stay to Further Investigate and Challenge the Randomness of the Hunterdon County Jury Pool Selection Process
1. The Facts
On April 18, 1997, defendant challenged the Hunterdon County’s jury pool selection process on the ground that it was not random, as required by N.J.S.A. 2B:20-1. He asked for a stay in the proceedings pending further investigation and hearings on the matter.
In support of his motion, defendant relied solely on materials prepared by social psychologist John Lamberth, Ph.D. for a similar motion filed in the pending capital case of State v. Robert Simon.10 Dr. Lamberth’s statistical analysis of the jury pool in Simon revealed that, given the population of Hunterdon County, an extraordinary number of jurors were drawn from the same families. Lamberth offered no independent analysis of the jury pool in defendant’s case. Defendant requested a stay so the defense expert could further investigate the County’s compliance with statutory guidelines for jury pool selection under N.J.S.A. 2B:20-2, 20-3 and 20-4.
The trial court denied defendant’s motion. The trial court observed that, pursuant to Rule 1:8-5, jury lists were made available to both parties on January 13, 1997, twenty days before voir dire commenced. One hundred and sixteen days had passed since that date. Moreover, defendant’s motion offered no indication that defendant had attempted to view the information on Hunterdon County’s jury selection procedures, as allowed by N.J.S.A. 2B:20-4(e)(2). Defendant’s motion was based on a speculative certification challenging a jury in another case. Because defendant had failed to make out a prima facie case for a violation, the court concluded that relaxing the rules would indulge *603a fishing expedition: “There’s nothing before me to suggest that random selection of the jury pool based upon electronic means was insufficient, was prejudicial, was not satisfactory.” The court denied the motion, ruling that defendant had failed to show good cause to excuse the delay in filing.
2. The Law
Capital appeals require special attention to procedural fairness. Williams I, supra, 93 N.J. at 63, 459 A.2d 641.
[J]ury selection is an integral part of the fair process to which every criminal defendant is entitled. It is vital that juries be selected in a manner free from taint and suspicion. To that end the pertinent practice safeguards in the statute must be carefully observed. In capital cases, this responsibility is of the deepest concern.
[Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 230, 524 A.2d 188 (citations omitted).]
N.J.S.A. 2B:20-4d guarantees an impartial jury panel by requiring that “[b]oth the drawing of names and the assignment of selected names to [jury] panels shall be public and random.” Section 4e provides that
[t]he Assignment Judge may provide for the random selection of jurors, and their assignment to panels, by the use of electronic devices, if ... (2) the specification of the method and any programs and procedures used to implement the method, including any computer programs which are utilized, are available for public inspection upon request.
Any party can challenge the jury array on the ground that the jurors were not “selected, drawn or summoned according to law.” R. 1:8-3 (b).
In State v. Long, 204 N.J.Super. 469, 482, 499 A.2d 264 (Law Div.1985), the court held that a defendant must challenge the petit jury within thirty days of entering an initial plea, (reading R. 1:8-3 and R. 3:10-2 in pari materia). The court may enlarge the time period if good cause is shown. Id. at 483, 499 A.2d 264. If the defendant makes a prima facie showing of actual prejudice to his right to a fair and impartial jury, the court can relax the time period. State v. Butler, 155 N.J.Super. 270, 271, 382 A.2d 696 (App.Div.1978). Challenges asserting constitutional rights, however, “must be shown to rest on fact. Mere conclusions are inade*604quate.” State v. Robinson, 128 N.J.Super. 525, 530, 320 A.2d 533 (Law Div.1974) (holding that defendant had not made out prima facie ease for non-randomness in grand and petit jury selection process given that no figures or information regarding source of selection process were presented).
Where a defendant has ample opportunity to investigate improper jury pooling, courts likely will reject challenges to the jury array made in an untimely manner. State v. McClain, 263 N.J.Super. 488, 496-97, 623 A.2d 280 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 134 N.J. 477, 634 A.2d 524 (1993); Robinson, supra, 128 N.J.Super. at 529, 320 A.2d 533 (holding that because defense had many months to investigate jury pool selection procedures, challenge to array was properly denied). Time limitations on these challenges are strictly enforced to foster judicial efficiency. Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. at 128, 549 A.2d 792. Although a trial court does not abuse its discretion by granting untimely challenges to jury randomness, “acceptance of such eleventh hour claims is by no means constitutionally compelled.” Long, supra, 198 N.J.Super. at 37, 486 A.2d 351.
Given the strict rules regarding jury pool sampling challenges, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a stay. Defendant failed to show good cause entitling him to an extension of time and he did not make a prima facie showing of prejudice. Defendant was given the panel list within the applicable twenty day period. Despite “ample opportunity” to challenge the array, the defense took few steps to investigate. Defendant never attempted to get information regarding the process Hunterdon County used in selecting its jury, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2B:20-4e. Although he did present the analysis that Lamberth had conducted for the Simon case, showing that many members of the jury pool had the same last name, Lamberth did not analyze the data over time. Nor did Lamberth analyze the process used in defendant’s ease. In short, defendant’s argument was based on speculation. He simply did not make out a prima facie case for non-randomness. Cf. Long, *605supra, 198 N.J. Super, at 37, 486 A.2d 351 (allowing stay while noting that it had no obligation to accept untimely challenges). Therefore, the court was within its discretion in denying defendant’s application for a stay.
C. Admissibility of Defendant’s Statements
1. Defendant’s Claims
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress his confessions. Defendant argues that the statements fail to satisfy the basic criterion of voluntariness and were not the product of a valid waiver, given his mental limitations. With regard to his initial statement in Cifelli’s bedroom, defendant argues that the officers were engaging in custodial interrogation. Therefore, the officers should have administered Miranda warnings. Defendant further asserts that, although he was read his rights at the police station, the second statement made there was tainted by the earlier statement made in Cifelli’s bedroom. Accordingly, those statements must be suppressed as well.
Next, defendant contends the statement made when Brian Jenin entered the interrogation room should be suppressed on the ground that Jenin was acting as an agent for the State. Defendant also claims his request to speak with Jenin was tantamount to a request to end interrogation. Defendant asks the court to reverse the trial court’s decision not to suppress all subsequent confessions as “poisonous fruit” derived from the tainted confession he made in response to Jenin’s comment, “They got you, they got you, they got you.”
Finally, defendant makes a “totality of the circumstances” argument. He contends that the statements cannot be considered voluntary in light of the long time period over which the interrogations took place, the late hours of the questioning, the fact he had little, if any, sleep, and his mental deficiencies. In addition to the physical deprivations suffered by defendant, he argues that the nature of the questioning was coercive and manipulative, and the use of the polygraph test exacerbated that coerciveness.
*6062. The Facts
Defendant’s statements to the police, made over a three-day period beginning on the day of the victim’s disappearance, were important to the State’s case. At the N.J.R.E. 104 suppression hearing, state witnesses described the circumstances under which defendant made his statements. On the night of the victim’s disappearance, Hamilton Township detectives O’Dwyer, Kieffer and their supervisor, Stanley, arrived at defendant’s residence, 27 Barbara Lee Drive. Patrol officers conducting interviews in the area had information that a released sex offender, Joseph Cifelli, lived at 27 Barbara Lee Drive. After Cifelli signed a consent to search form, the three detectives searched the house in which defendant, Cifelli, Jenin, and Cifelli’s mother lived.
Police initially considered Cifelli to be a suspect. They read him his Miranda rights and questioned him in his bedroom. Cifelli gave detectives an alibi and receipts to corroborate his account. He then informed the officers that defendant once had molested a seven-year-old girl.
Jenin was called into the bedroom next. The detectives testified that they did not administer Miranda warnings because Jenin was not considered a suspect at that time. The police were just gathering information. Jenin corroborated Cifelli’s story.
Detectives then called defendant into the bedroom. Kieffer testified that at that time, defendant was no more a suspect than anyone else in the neighborhood. Therefore, the detectives did not administer Miranda warnings. Defendant was not told he was free to leave the room, but O’Dwyer testified that the questioning was “non-eustodial.”
According to O’Dwyer, defendant appeared very nervous and defensive and was perspiring heavily. When the detectives showed defendant a picture of the victim, defendant just stared at it. Detectives then asked defendant where he had been that day and when was the last time he had seen the victim. Defendant told the detectives that Megan stopped by his house with two *607friends while he was outside washing his boat. They had a brief conversation and the girls left.
Defendant also was asked about his prior record. He told Kieffer that he had pushed a girl off a bike. When pressed by detectives, defendant admitted that he had tried to sniff her underwear. Defendant was asked if he would submit to a polygraph test. Defendant replied that, based on past experience, the machine did not work on him.
At approximately 1:45 a.m., the detectives asked defendant if they could question him further at headquarters. He agreed, but insisted on driving his own car. Defendant was permitted to drive himself to headquarters, followed “closely behind” by the detectives. Kieffer wrote in his report that defendant was asked to come to headquarters for further questioning “[d]ue to [his] demeanor [and] physical actions ... visible from the outset.” It was not until the end of that initial questioning that police considered him a suspect.
At 2:30 a.m., upon arriving at headquarters, O’Dwyer read defendant his Miranda rights. O’Dwyer placed a copy of the form in front of defendant so he could read along. The detectives read defendant his rights because they “knew that there was something more involved,” based on defendant’s nervousness and “physical behavior.” Defendant said that he understood his rights and signed a form to indicate such. Police also read him a waiver form. Defendant signed it, agreeing that he waived his rights. O’Dwyer and Kieffer witnessed his signature. The detectives testified that defendant did not ask any questions and expressed a desire to help. He was alert and did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. The detectives made no threats or promises to induce defendant to sign the waiver.
Detectives resumed questioning at approximately 2:40 a.m. They asked defendant about his day and the last time he had seen the victim. Defendant then was asked to write down this account, which he was left alone to do. Defendant finished writing the statement at 3:50 a.m. The statement basically was consistent with *608his oral statements. Defendant then consented to a search of his truck.
Defendant had been with O’Dwyer since 1:15 a.m. Although the detective had not seen him sleep at all during that time, O’Dwyer submitted that defendant was alert and understood all that was going on. Defendant never asked for an attorney at any point during the questioning. No promises or threats were made. He was not told that he would be treated more favorably if he cooperated. At 4:00 a.m., after detectives completed the search, defendant was permitted to leave headquarters with the understanding he would return later that day for a polygraph test.
The next day, July 30, at about 10:40 a.m., Kieffer, O’Dwyer and Stanley went to 27 Barbara Lane and asked Cifelli, Jenin and defendant to come to headquarters for more questioning. The three agreed to go and were transported in police vehicles. Cifelli and Jenin were questioned in separate rooms and defendant was placed in a room with two polygraph operators, Detectives Puke-nas and McDonough, Pukenas testified that he filled out a polygraph Miranda form, which contained an authorization to disclose information resulting from the test. Pukenas read the form aloud and explained it to defendant. Pukenas described defendant as awake, calm, and alert. Pukenas maintained that defendant understood this was a non-stipulated polygraph test and could not be admitted at trial. At 12:24 p.m., defendant signed the form.
Pukenas first performed a background test on defendant to determine if he was mentally and physically suitable for the polygraph. Defendant responded that he had taken a polygraph test before. He stated that he never had been treated for a nervous condition, but he had received some psychological treatment at Avenel between 1979 and 1988. Defendant also stated that he was “a little tight” from “nerves,” but had no other apparent physical ailments. Defendant told Pukenas that he had two-and-one-half to three hours of sleep the day before but had slept “real good for an hour.” Defendant described himself as “a little bit” tired but “okay.” When asked if he had eaten anything, *609defendant said no and claimed lie was not hungry. He accepted a Pepsi at 12:37 p.m. In response to questions regarding his educational background, defendant told the detective he had dropped out of 11th grade and obtained a GED.
After this preliminary questioning, Pukenas explained the polygraph test to defendant. Pukenas testified that defendant had no problems understanding and did not hesitate to take the test. Pukenas then asked defendant to write his account of the previous day’s events and left the room.
When defendant completed his statement, Pukenas read it back to defendant. The two discussed it to make sure defendant had left nothing out. Although the statement contained a number of spelling and grammatical mistakes, the detectives testified that it was comprehensible. Nothing in the statement was explicitly inculpatory.
Pukenas then asked defendant a number of standard behavioral observation questions. Pukenas testified that these questions were not related, “on the whole,” to the polygraph, but rather to “the whole day,” or the “overall investigation.” They then took a short break, during which time defendant used the bathroom. Pukenas then read defendant the questions he would ask during the polygraph test and advised him that they were the only questions he would ask. Defendant was still cooperative and showed no hesitation.
The test was administered three times, concluding at 2:25 p.m. Defendant’s answers were consistent with his prior responses. Defendant then signed the polygraph charts. Shortly after 3:00 p.m., Pukenas informed defendant that he had failed the test. Pukenas explained that failure to pass meant that defendant was not being completely truthful. Defendant continued to deny involvement in the victim’s disappearance.
Defendant used the bathroom at 4:12 p.m. and Pukenas brought him pizza and soda at 4:39 p.m. From 4:50 to 5:20 p.m., Detective Schwartz from Middlesex Borough, whom defendant knew from a *610prior arrest, was alone with defendant. Pukenas asserted that Schwartz was “probably” questioning defendant during that time to elicit an admission.
Beginning at about 5:30 p.m., Pukenas and McDonough met with defendant alone. They told him that “certain things didn’t look good in his favor.” When asked if he would like to speak to a Mend, like Jenin, defendant answered, “Sure, bring him in.” The detectives went to find Jenin, while Schwartz came in to sit with defendant.
Pukenas and McDonough told Jenin they believed defendant had something to do with the victim’s disappearance. Pukenas asked Jenin if he would like to speak to defendant, telling him that defendant wanted to speak to him. Pukenas testified that Jenin’s talking to defendant was either Pukenas’ or McDonough’s idea, adding that he did not know what Jenin would say to defendant, nor did any of the detectives tell him what to say. Jenin told Pukenas he believed defendant was “probably guilty.”
Jenin was brought into the room with defendant at 6:29 p.m. According to Pukenas, Jenin initiated the conversation with defendant, immediately saying defendant would “need a friend on the outside.” He then said, “they got you, they got you, they got you.” At that point, defendant made his first admission. Defendant told Jenin, “[s]he’s in Mercer County Park.” Pukenas testified that neither Jenin nor the detectives said, “Tell [me] ... where the body is.”
Pukenas asked defendant if there was a possibility that Megan was still alive. Defendant answered, “[n]o, she’s dead. I put a plastic bag over her head.” Defendant then agreed to accompany the officers to the park. Pukenas testified that defendant was not asked any questions in the car, nor was he threatened. Defendant volunteered that he had been able to take the victim to the park, go to a WaWa and return home in 15 minutes.
At the park, defendant led the officers directly to the victim’s body. In the car on the way back from the park, the detectives *611asked defendant what had occurred. Defendant then gave his account of the events on the day of the incident. Again, Pukenas testified that they made no threats and used no coercion.
Back at headquarters, Pukenas asked defendant to write a statement about the events that occurred on the day the victim disappeared. The detective did not administer Miranda warnings at that time. Pukenas testified that defendant still appeared awake, alert, and not confused. Defendant wrote out his statement. At the same time, Pukenas went to the detective bureau and wrote a report detailing defendant’s oral statements in the car. In the car, defendant admitted to sexually touching Megan, killing her when she tried to get away, carrying her body outside the house in a toy box, and bringing her to the park. Pukenas testified that defendant appeared sufficiently awake to give a formal statement. Defendant never asked for an attorney or if he could stop talking. Defendant never complained about how police treated him the entire time he was in custody.
After reading defendant’s written statement, O’Dwyer went to speak with defendant. Defendant was given the opportunity to use the restroom and smoke. He was asked if he wanted food. He accepted only a soda. O’Dwyer testified that defendant was alert, seemed to have no difficulty understanding the questions posed to him, and exhibited no hesitation in answering. O’Dwyer observed that defendant appeared less nervous than before— almost relieved. Defendant was offered breaks during the session but did not ask to eat or use the bathroom.
At 8:25 p.m., O’Dwyer read defendant his rights. O’Dwyer testified that defendant had no questions; he felt that defendant “knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights and agreed to speak____” Defendant’s oral responses were then typed into the computer.
After the final statement was printed, O’Dwyer showed it to defendant, read him his rights again, and asked if he understood them. Defendant initialed the line on the form reading, “do you wish to give a statement at this time[]” The statement was *612marked “concluded” at 9:55 p.m. Defendant was asked to read the statement and make any changes he wanted. Defendant initialed the bottom of each page, making no changes and asking no questions. Shortly after midnight, defendant was arrested on a complaint sworn out by Kieffer. Defendant was then placed in a cell and presented with charges. He was fingerprinted at 1:30 a.m., and was asked for his consent to take fingernail clippings at 4:00 a.m.
At 4:00 p.m. on the following day, defendant consented to and was examined by Dr. Haskell Askins, a forensic dentist. Defendant agreed to have his teeth and right hand photographed. This took about 45-60 minutes, during which time Kieffer observed that defendant was awake, alert and cooperative.
At 4:55 p.m. defendant gave yet another statement. This statement was prompted by the discovery of evidence at Megan’s autopsy that contradicted defendant’s previous accounts. Kieffer handed defendant a rights form and told him to read it to himself. Defendant appeared to be awake and paying attention, according to the detective. Kieffer was convinced that defendant understood his rights and waived them voluntarily.
After Kieffer told defendant of the autopsy findings, defendant stated that he had not been entirely truthful the day before but that he would be. The detectives questioned defendant for thirty minutes. Defendant gave a complete account of the incident, admitting to hitting the victim and attempting to have sexual intercourse with her.
Kieffer then re-read defendant his rights. Defendant signed a waiver form and made another formal statement. He asked the officers no questions. When the statement was printed, defendant read it over and initialed each page. He then made a few other assertions about the incident and stated, “I feel better after telling you the rest of the truth about what happened.”
At the suppression hearing, the trial court held that all of defendant’s statements were admissible. First, the court found *613that defendant was competent to waive his constitutional rights. He had a GED, could read and write, and “understood all that occurred about him.” Defendant’s actions also demonstrated his cleverness and ability to deal with the police.
With regard to the questioning at defendant’s home, the court held that the setting was not custodial. The questioning was brief and non-coercive; defendant could have ended the encounter at any point. Miranda warnings, therefore, were not required and subsequent statements were not tainted by the failure to Miran-dize defendant.
With regard to defendant’s formal statements, the court found that adequate warnings were administered and defendant voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. The court found the police witnesses to be “credible” and believable. There was no evidence that the police intimidated, threatened, deceived or coerced defendant or overbore defendant’s will. The court also rejected the claim that the statements should be suppressed because of defendant’s lack of sleep, delay in arraignment, and lack of warning of potential death penalty charges. Defendant’s motion was denied in its entirety.
3. The Law
Confessions obtained by police during custodial interrogation are barred from evidence unless the defendant has been advised of his constitutional rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 707 (1966); State v. Cooper, 151 N.J. 326, 354, 700 A.2d 306 (1997); Chew I, supra, 150 N.J. at 60-61, 695 A.2d 1301. A waiver of rights is valid only if it is made “voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706-07; State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631, 657, 628 A.2d 735 (1993).
In order to survive a suppression challenge, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary and not the product of official misconduct. Galloway, supra, 133 N.J. at 654, 628 A.2d 735. The court must look at the *614totality of the circumstances, including the characteristics of the defendant and the circumstances of the interrogation. Cooper, supra, 151 N.J. at 356, 700 A.2d 306; Galloway, supra, 133 N.J. at 654, 628 A.2d 735. Among the factors to consider in determining voluntariness are the suspect’s age, education, intelligence, previous encounters with law enforcement, advice received about his or her constitutional rights, the length of detention, the period of time between administration of the warnings and the volunteered statement, and whether the questioning was repeated and prolonged in nature or involved physical or mental abuse. Galloway, supra, 133 N.J. at 654, 628 A.2d 735; State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392, 402, 388 A.2d 218 (1978); State v. J.G., 261 N.J.Super. 409, 424, 619 A.2d 232 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 133 N.J. 436, 627 A.2d 1142 (1993). The court must be satisfied that the statement was made of the defendant’s own rational, free and unconstrained choice. United States v. Bethancourt, 65 F.3d 1074, 1078 (3d Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1153, 116 S.Ct. 1032, 134 L.Ed.2d 109 (1996); see also State v. DiFrisco, 118 N.J. 253, 257, 571 A.2d 914 (1990) (DiFrisco I). Confessions are not voluntary if derived from “very substantial” coercive tactics that overbear the suspect’s will. Galloway, supra, 133 N.J. at 654-56, 628 A.2d 735.
4. Defendant’s Statement in Cifelli’s Room
The Miranda requirement is triggered by “custodial interrogation,” i.e., questioning by law enforcement officers after a suspect has been deprived of freedom of action in a significant way. Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706; State v. Smith, 307 N.J.Super. 1, 8-9, 704 A.2d 73 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 216, 708 A.2d 67 (1998); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 102-03, 703 A.2d 901 (1997). In determining whether the defendant would have felt free to leave, the court should consider the nature and degree of pressure applied to detain the suspect, the duration of the questioning, the physical surroundings, and the language used by police. Smith, supra, 307 N.J.Super. at 9, 704 A.2d 73. If the questioning is simply part of an investigation and is not targeted at the individual *615because she or he is a suspect, the rights provided by Miranda are not implicated. State v. Pierson, 223 N.J.Super. 62, 67, 537 A.2d 1340 (App.Div.1988).
In this case, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the oral statements made by defendant in Cifelli’s room did not involve custodial interrogation and were admissible. The police questioned defendant and other neighbors in connection with the early stages of a missing-child investigation. Because the questioning took place in defendant’s house, not in a police station, the location of the questioning was not inherently intimidating. The interview was not lengthy in duration and defendant was not restrained in any way. The fact that defendant was permitted to drive his own car to the police station supports the finding that defendant was free to leave. Moreover, the fact that defendant witnessed both Jenin and Cifelli emerge from questioning should have indicated he was free to leave. There is no evidence that detectives considered defendant a suspect at that point, sought to detain him, or pressured him in any fashion. Accordingly, we also conclude that the initial statements could not, and did not, “taint” subsequent statements made pursuant to a valid Miranda waiver.
5. Defendant’s Agreement to See Jenin
Defendant asserts that his request to see Jenin was tantamount to an invocation of his right to remain silent and to end all questioning. A request to end interrogation, however ambiguous, must be scrupulously honored by the authorities. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103-04, 96 S.Ct. 321, 326, 46 L.Ed.2d 313, 321-22 (1975); State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 45, 64, 548 A.2d 846 (1988) (Bey I); State v. Harvey, 121 N.J. 407, 415, 581 A.2d 483 (1990)(Harvey I), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 931, 111 S.Ct. 1336, 113 L. Ed.2d 268 (1991).
In Harvey, supra, the defendant requested to speak with his father. Id. at 417, 581 A.2d 483. At the conclusion of their meeting, which lasted over three hours, the defendant made a statement to police. Ibid. The police did not issue new Miranda *616warnings until after the statement was recorded. Immediately after his rights were read, the defendant requested an attorney. Ibid. The Court held that the defendant’s request to speak with his father constituted a request to terminate the interrogation. Id. at 419-20, 581 A.2d 483. The defendant had maintained that he did not want “to talk about” the murder throughout the three days of questioning. Ibid. The Court reasoned that defendant would have invoked his rights earlier, had the police read them. Ibid.
This case is different. Defendant had been given an opportunity to invoke his rights several times prior to seeing Jenin. He never once invoked them. The meeting with Jenin was not in private, it occurred in the presence of officers. Defendant never requested to be alone with Jenin. The meeting was brief (only a few minutes), because it took defendant very little time to confess. Jenin was not called into the room on defendant’s initiative. The meeting was arranged by the detectives. Defendant merely responded in the affirmative to the officers’ suggestion that he talk to Jenin. In short, we find no evidence that defendant had any intention of invoking his constitutional right to silence or to terminate interrogation by agreeing to speak with Jenin.
We also see little merit in defendant’s assertion that Jenin was acting as a police agent, and therefore the failure to readminister Miranda warnings prior to Jenin’s involvement violated defendant’s right to counsel. There is no evidence that Jenin was acting as a government agent. The police did not direct Jenin to elicit any information from defendant. Jenin’s outburst and defendant’s response were unexpected. Moreover, the rule regarding the use of government agents to elicit incriminating statements applies only when a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been triggered by indictment and he is represented by counsel. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 169-74, 106 S.Ct. 477, 483-86, 88 L.Ed.2d 481, 491-95 (1985); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204-06, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 1202-03, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964). State v. Bey, 258 N.J.Super. 451, 466, 610 *617A.2d 403 (App.Div.1992), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 19, 611 A.2d 657 (1992); State v. Leopardi, 305 N.J.Super. 70, 76, 701 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997) certif. denied, 153 N.J. 48, 707 A.2d 152 (1998). Neither of those factors was present here.
6. Totality of Circumstances
Defendant argues that the circumstances under which he was questioned — over a period of 44 hours with little sleep— rendered his statements involuntary because his will was overborne by the detectives.
The questioning began on the evening of June 29, 1994, shortly before midnight, and continued until 4:00 a.m. the following morning. Defendant was back at headquarters at 10:45 a.m. after only a few hours of sleep. He was engaged in a lengthy period of questioning, lasting until 6:25 p.m. when he confessed. Defendant was taken directly to the park to locate the victim’s body, returned to custody immediately afterwards, and questioned in the car on the way back. Defendant was then placed in a cell, where he was disturbed several times. The questioning resumed at 3:00 p.m. the following day.
Although repeated questioning by the authorities when a defendant has had little sleep, combined with statements intimating that the defendant was not being truthful and the police had evidence against him, in certain circumstances, could render the defendant’s statements involuntary, the record in this case does not support that conclusion. First, the questioning was not “around the clock” or continuous. Defendant was allowed to go home. During the periods he was at the station, the officers offered him many breaks. Moreover, defendant never indicated to officers that he was too tired or hungry to continue. His demeanor, appearance, and responses indicated to the officers that he was alert and in control.
There is also ample evidence indicating that defendant’s confessions were the product of his own free will. The officers administered Miranda warnings to defendant several times and he waived *618them each time. He never requested counsel or asked to terminate the interviews. He sat with police and went over his statements with them. He was allowed to make any corrections, but made none. The officers never threatened defendant or physically coerced him to cooperate or confess. In fact, defendant repeatedly stated his desire to cooperate in finding the victim. In short, there is no evidence that police used coercive tactics in obtaining any of the confessions.
Nor is there any evidence indicating that defendant was so mentally deficient as to be incapable of comprehending his constitutional warnings. Defendant went to high school through the eleventh grade and obtained a GED. No one testified, and defendant presented no evidence, to support his claim that he was incapable of understanding the police warnings. We therefore agree with the trial court that defendant was competent to waive his constitutional rights
Based on the totality of the circumstances, we find that defendant understood his rights and intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily waived those rights over and over again. The record reveals a defendant who was alert and responsive and who confessed by his own free will. Accordingly, defendant’s statements were properly admitted into evidence.
D. The Exclusion of Jenin’s Statement
Defendant contends that the trial court improperly excluded a statement made to police by defendant’s housemate Brian Jenin. Defendant contends the statement was against Jenin’s penal interest in that it strongly indicated that Jenin knew of the victim’s death before defendant confessed to the crime. Defendant argues that the exclusion violated his Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution, and his corresponding rights under the New Jersey Constitution, necessitating reversal of his conviction.
*6191. The Facts
On July 29, 1994, Jenin gave a formal statement to the police regarding his whereabouts on the day of the victim’s disappearance. Jenin gave an informal statement to police on July 30. Immediately following that statement, Jenin was brought into the conference room where defendant was being questioned to speak with defendant. Following a brief exchange between the two, defendant confessed and told police where the victim’s body was located.
On August 3,1994, four days later, Jenin made a second formal statement to police. In that statement, Jenin recounted a conversation he and defendant had prior to July 29, i.e. before Jenin spoke to the police:
I asked him where the girls’ (sic) body was. He just looked at me and said “The girls’ (sic) in the Park.”
Defendant sought to admit Jenin’s August 3 statement at trial to impeach Detective Pukenas’ trial testimony. Defendant argued that Jenin’s statement conflicted with Pukenas’ account and also was against Jenin’s penal interest. In rebuttal at the pre-trial hearing, the State presented testimony by Cifelli’s brother-in-law, Gregory Sandusky, who stated that Jenin told him about going to see defendant at the police station. Sandusky testified that Jenin told him he said “Jesse, it’s all over,” and defendant confessed. Although conceding it had admitted Jenin’s statement as a statement against penal interest at the suppression hearing, the court concluded that Pukenas’s testimony was credible and that Jenin’s formal statement was unreliable and untrustworthy. The trial court rejected defendant’s request to admit Jenin’s second formal statement into evidence.
At trial, Pukenas testified that upon entering the conference room on August 3, Jenin stated, “They got you, they got you, they got you.” Pukenas stated that Jenin told defendant he would need a friend on the outside and Jenin would be that friend. Defendant then confessed. On cross, Pukenas denied that Jenin said to defendant, “Tell him where the body is.” The court *620instructed the jury that this testimony was hearsay and could be considered only for a limited purpose. The statement was offered “so that there would be some context in [their] evaluation of all the facts and circumstances that existed at the time____” It was not substantive evidence.
2. The Law
A defendant has the right to “advance in his defense any evidence which may rationally tend to refute his guilt or buttress his innocence of the charge made.” State v. Garfole, 76 N.J. 445, 453, 388 A.2d 587 (1978). An accused also has a constitutional right to introduce probative evidence tending to establish third party guilt. Koedatich, supra, 112 N.J. at 297, 548 A.2d 939. To be admissible, evidence indicating third-party guilt must have “a rational tendency to engender a reasonable doubt with respect to an essential feature of the State’s case.” Loftin I, supra, 146 N.J. at 345, 680 A.2d 677; State v. Millett, 272 N.J.Super. 68, 98, 639 A.2d 352 (App.Div.1994). In other words, there must be specific evidence linking the third-person to the crime. Loftin I, supra, 146 N.J. at 345-46, 680 A.2d 677.
In cases in which courts have held that the evidence was improperly excluded, some link was demonstrated between the third party and the victim or crime ... [In] cases in which courts have held that third-party evidence was properly excluded, the proffer of evidence did no more than “prove some hostile event and [left] its connection with the case to mere conjecture.”
[Koedatich, supra, 112 N.J. at 300-01, 548 A.2d 939 (citation omitted); see also Loftin I, supra, 146 N.J. at 345, 680 A.2d 677 (finding testimony concerning third-party guilt not admissible unless there is evidence linking third party to crime) ].
Whether a trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of third-party guilt involves an extremely fact sensitive inquiry. Loftin I, supra, 146 N.J. at 345, 680 A.2d 677.
The trial court was within its discretion in excluding Jenin’s statement, given defendant’s failure to submit any actual evidence linking Jenin to the crime itself. Nothing in Jenin’s statement was against Jenin’s penal, social or proprietary interest. It did not “subject [him] to civil or criminal liability.” See *621N.J.R.E. 803(c)(25).11 He did not place himself at the scene of the crime, nor did it implicate him in any part of the crime. Defendant’s attempt to create a case around Jenin’s alleged culpability is without adequate foundation in the evidence. Therefore, we find that the trial court correctly concluded that Jenin’s statement was not admissible.
E. Accomplice Liability Charge
Defendant asserts that the trial court’s refusal to charge the jury on accomplice liability violated his right to a fair charge under the eight and fourteenth amendments to the United States and New Jersey Constitutions. Specifically, defendant asserts that the gaps in the physical evidence, the authorities’ unwillingness to follow-up on leads regarding Jenin and Cifelli, and the fact that Jenin and Cifelli were in the house at the same time as the victim are enough to support an accomplice liability charge.
In the capital context, a charge on accomplice liability often can mean the difference between life and death. Chew, supra, 150 N.J. at 72, 695 A.2d 1301. The standard for charging accomplice liability is whether the record contains sufficient evidence from which the jury could have inferred that someone else killed the victim. Biegenwald IV, 126 N.J. at 18-19, 594 A.2d 172. The trial court, however, has no duty to charge a possible offense unless the facts clearly indicate the charge is appropriate. Chew, supra, 150 N.J. at 75, 695 A.2d 1301.
In denying defendant’s request for an accomplice liability charge, the court found that defendant had not generated enough evidence to justify the charge. There was no evidence that Jenin *622or Cifelli were involved in the murder. Defendant’s own statements inculpated only himself. The DNA, fiber, and bite-mark analyses linked only defendant to the crime. In short, defendant was relying on mere speculation rather than the facts of the case to support his request.
Although we recognize that the standard for an accomplice liability charge is minimal, defendant fails to meet even that low threshold. There was an overwhelming amount of evidence against defendant and none implicating anyone else. Defendant repeatedly confessed to the crime; those confessions mentioned no other participants. The forensic evidence also unequivocally pointed to defendant. Defendant offered no alibi. Cifelli and Jenin’s alibis were corroborated by independent evidence. Given the dearth of evidence implicating anyone else, we find that the trial court’s refusal to give an accomplice liability charge was correct.
F. Admission of Bite-Mark Evidence
The State’s forensic odontologist, Dr. Haskell Askin, testified that the wound to defendant’s right hand was, “to a reasonable medical certainty,” inflicted by the victim. Defendant asserts that admitting this testimony constituted plain error due to the scientific unreliability of bite mark analysis. He claims that the admission of such evidence violated his Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution, as well as his corresponding rights under the New Jersey Constitution (Art. I, ¶ 10), and necessitates reversal or remand for a hearing regarding the evidence’s admissibility, pursuant to N.J.R.E. 104. Finally, defendant argues that counsel’s failure to request a hearing to challenge the admissibility of the evidence or to voir dire the witness regarding the evidence, amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel and mandates reversal.
1. The Facts
Dr. Askin is board certified by the American Board of Forensic Odontology. At the time of trial, he had performed dozens of bite-*623mark comparisons and had qualified as an expert witness in four previous trials. Dr. Askin had been asked by the Chief Medical Examiner of Mercer County to examine the bite-mark on defendant’s hand to determine if the wound was consistent with a human bite-mark. If it was, Dr. Askin was to evaluate the teeth and jaws of the victim in preparation for a bite-mark comparison.
Dr. Askin examined the victim’s teeth and jaws. From this, he noted several unique characteristics. He then removed the lower jaw and photographed both the upper and lower jaw. He also made casts of the victim’s teeth. Next, Askin went to Hamilton Township Police Headquarters and examined the mark on defendant’s hand. He also examined defendant’s mouth and teeth. Upon returning to his office, Askin used the models of the victim’s teeth to make “test bites.” He compared those marks to the marks on defendant’s hand.
Askin testified that his examination established, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that: (1) the injury on defendant’s hand was inflicted by a human bite; (2) given the positioning of the teeth, the bite was not self-inflicted; and (3) given the open, red, inflamed nature of the wound, the bite-mark appeared to have been inflicted recently. Based on the positioning and the angulation of the teeth, Askin further concluded that the bite-mark was inflicted by the victim. Defendant did not object to Asian’s testimony regarding his procedures or findings.
2. The Law
N.J.R.E. 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the tiler of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
In State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 169, 699 A.2d 596 (1997) (Harvey II), we interpreted Rule 702 to mean the following:
(1) the intended testimony must concern a subject matter that is beyond the ken of the average juror; (2) the subject of the testimony must be at a state of the art *624such that an expert’s testimony could be sufficiently reliable; and (3) the witness must have sufficient expertise to explain the intended testimony.
[Id, at 169, 699 A.2d 596 (citing State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 208, 478 A.2d 364 (1984)).]
Defendant contests only the second factor, i.e. that bite-mark analysis is not at such a state of the art that the testimony could be deemed reliable. Because defendant did not challenge the admissibility of the evidence at trial, Askin was not asked whether the relevant scientific community, dentistry, generally accepts bite-mark evidence as reliable.
Judicial opinion from other jurisdictions establish that bite-mark analysis has gained general acceptance and therefore is reliable. Harvey, supra, 151 N.J. at 170, 699 A.2d 596 (stating test for general acceptance). Over thirty states considering such evidence have found it admissible and no state has rejected bite-mark evidence as unreliable. Howard v. State, 701 So.2d 274, 292-93 (Miss.1997)(Smith, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Cifizzari, 397 Mass. 560, 492 N.E.2d 357 (Ma.1986); State v. Armstrong, 179 W.Va. 435, 369 S.E.2d 870, 877 (1988); People v. Shaw, 278 Ill.App.3d 939, 215 Ill.Dec. 700, 664 N.E.2d 97 (1 Dist.), appeal denied, 168 Ill.2d 618, 219 Ill.Dec. 574, 671 N.E.2d 741 (1996); People v. Bethune, 105 A.D.2d 262, 484 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1984). Moreover, bite-mark analysis is not a novel form of testing, per se. Verdict v. State, 315 Ark. 436, 868 S.W.2d 443, 447 (1993). Accordingly, the evidence was well within the trial court’s discretion to admit. Defendant’s claim fails under a plain error standard of review.
Even if defendant were correct and the bite-mark evidence was admitted improperly, any error was harmless. Detective Stanley testified that defendant admitted being bitten by the victim. In conjunction with the staggering amount and nature of the evidence against defendant, there is no possibility that admitting this evidence produced an unjust result.
*625G. Defendant’s Mitigating Factors
1. The Facts
Prior to the penalty phase, the trial court held that it would not submit the following five of defendant’s proposed “catch-all” mitigating factors to the jury: (1) defendant did not act alone in causing the death of Megan Kanka; (2) the conduct of defendant was substantially influenced by another person or other persons more intellectually mature than defendant; (3) defendant offered to plead guilty in exchange for a life sentence; (4) defendant will not be a danger to young girls in the future since it is virtually certain that he will spend the rest of his life in jail; and (5) defendant waived any ex post facto objections to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(3) (“Joan’s Law”), ensuring that he would be sentenced to life without parole if the jury returned a non-death sentence.
The trial court concluded that those proposed mitigating factors had no evidential support or were not valid mitigating factors.
2. The Law
N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-3c(5) provides that:
The mitigating factors which may be found by the jury or the court are:
* * * *
(h) Any other factor which is relevant to the defendant’s character or record or to the circumstances of the offense.
[Emphasis added.]
N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-3c(2)(b) provides:
The defendant may offer, without regard to the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials, reliable evidence relevant to any of the mitigating factors.
[Emphasis added.]
N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-3c(2)(a) further provides that a defendant need produce only some evidence that a mitigating factor exists to bring it into play and that he “shall not have a burden with regard to the establishment of a mitigating factor.” The jury in a capital case must not be precluded from considering “any aspect of a defen*626dant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death,” pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(h). State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295, 368, 680 A.2d 677 (1996) (Loftin I) (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2964, 57 L.Ed.2d 973, 990 (1978)).
Although the “catch-all” factor has been interpreted broadly in New Jersey, Loftin I, supra, 146 N.J. at 368, 680 A.2d 677, the scope of that factor is not unlimited. State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40, 103, 549 A.2d 792 (1988). Only mitigating evidence that is relevant to a defendant’s character, record, or to the circumstances of the offense may be considered. Loftin I, supra, 146 N.J. at 368, 680 A.2d 677 (citing Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. at 103, 549 A.2d 792; State v. Davis, 96 N.J. 611, 618, 477 A.2d 308 (1984); accord Lockett, supra, 438 U.S. at 604, 98 S.Ct. at 2964, 57 L.Ed.2d at 990). “Character” has been defined by this Court as embracing those qualities that distinguish a specific person. Davis, supra, 96 N.J. at 618, 477 A.2d 308. The “circumstances of the offense” refer to the “circumstances of the commission of the crime itself[,]” such as the level of defendant’s participation in the crime and the egregiousness of the act. Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. at 104, 549 A.2d 792.
3. Analysis
The trial court properly refused to submit the proposed mitigating factors to the jury. Defendant offered no support that his roommates participated in or were responsible for the crime. Moreover, nothing in the records supports the notion that defendant was unduly influenced by Jenin or by anyone else. In the absence of reliable evidence establishing those facts, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to submit those mitigating factors to the jury.
Similarly, the fact that defendant offered to plead guilty in exchange for a life sentence also was properly rejected by the court. Defendant offered no evidence establishing that the offer *627to plead guilty related to defendant’s character or the circumstances of the offense. More importantly, there was simply no evidence that a plea offer ever was made. The defense was unwilling to waive attorney-client privilege to present evidence that defendant offered to plead guilty in exchange for a non-death sentence, and the State would not stipulate to that fact. The defense offered to have Krych testify that defendant told her he was willing to plead guilty to certain crimes that would subject him to a life sentence. Because Krych had no knowledge that defendant actually made an offer to the State, her testimony would have been irrelevant. Because defendant had no relevant, reliable evidence to support the submission of that mitigating factor to the jury, the trial court’s decision was proper.
The fact that defendant would spend his life in jail, would be ineligible for parole, and therefore would not be a continuing danger to young girls, also was properly excluded from the jury’s consideration. In Biegenwald IV, supra, 126 N.J. at 49, 594 A.2d 172, we concluded that the fact that a defendant is serving a life sentence and will never be eligible for parole is not, by itself, a mitigating factor. Moreover, in State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383, 466, 715 A.2d 228 (1998), we held that it was error to allow the defendant to submit evidence of parole ineligibility as mitigation. Parole ineligibility is not a mitigating factor. Ibid. It does not relate to defendant’s character or the circumstances of the crime. It merely constitutes the passage of time over which the defendant has no control. State v. Nelson, 155 N.J. 487, 504, 715 A.2d 281 (1998) cert. den. — U.S. —, 119 S.Ct. 890, 142 L.Ed.2d 788, 67 USLW 3322 (1999) (holding that juries should be told that they are not to consider defendant’s alternative sentence as an aggravating or mitigating factor); Cooper, supra, 151 N.J. at 404-05, 700 A.2d 306 (finding parole ineligibility not mitigating factor, as it would lead to incongruous result that “the more crimes a defendant committed, the more mitigating evidence he or she would be able to submit”).
*628The fact that defendant would not be a continuing danger to little girls also is not mitigating evidence. That argument is based on the premise that defendant will be incarcerated for life and will have no contact with children. This court has repeatedly rejected the notion that the length of a defendant’s potential non-death sentence is a mitigating factor. Cooper, supra, 151 N.J. at 404-05, 700 A.2d 306. Defendant cannot circumvent that conclu sion by couching the same argument in different terms.
In sum, we agree with the trial court’s determination that defendant’s potential threat to young girls and alternative life sentence were not proper mitigating factors. Even if the court should have submitted to the jury the fact that defendant waived challenges to Joan’s Law, we conclude that any error was harmless. The court’s instructions prior to the penalty phase deliberations informed jurors that defendant waived his right to challenge Joan’s Law. The court’s penalty phase instruction also apprised jurors that defendant would receive a life sentence if not given the death penalty. Because the jury was aware of that information, further evidence about defendant’s alternative sentence would not have changed the outcome of the jury’s deliberations.
H. Refusal to Admit Krych’s Report Into Evidence
During the penalty phase, defendant sought to introduce into evidence a report prepared by Carol Krych, the forensic social worker retained by the defense to investigate defendant’s background for mitigation purposes. Krych compiled approximately 450 pages of documentation and notes pertaining to defendant’s childhood and social history, based on interviews with family members, teachers, friends, psychologists and social workers. Her findings were summarized in a 32-page Report (the “Report”).
During direct examination, Krych testified to the interviews she had conducted, using the Report as a guide. The defense introduced into evidence fifty-seven exhibits, including defendant’s father’s arrest and conviction records and defendant’s school *629records. On cross-examination, the State produced contradictory documents and other evidence that called into question the reliability of the Report and of Krych’s testimony.
Defendant moved the Report into evidence, arguing that the jury should be allowed to examine the Report and assess its reliability for itself. The State argued that it was Kryeh’s credibility, and not that of the Report, that was at issue. Moreover, the State argued, the report was no different than a police report that ordinarily would not be admitted into evidence when the recording officer is present at trial and is subject to cross-examination. Because Krych had the opportunity to testify before the jury, the State argued that her Report was unnecessary.
The trial court excluded the Report, finding it had no probative force because Krych had testified about its contents and some of the witnesses she interviewed also had testified. The court noted that the 57 exhibits forming the basis for the Report had been submitted to the jury as evidence. Those exhibits would serve the same purpose as the Report. Moreover, the trial court agreed that Krych’s Report was similar to a police report. Since a police officer’s investigative report is not ordinarily submitted into evidence when the officer testifies, Krych’s report also should not be submitted. The Report ran the risk of confusing the jury. Based on those factors, the court found the report to be cumulative and, hence, unnecessary evidence.
On its second day of deliberations, at 9:49 a.m., the jury sent the court a note stating, “[W]e are unable to locate Carol Kryeh’s 32-page report. Please provide a copy.” The court informed the jury they had all the documents required for their consideration.
At that point, defendant reiterated his request that the Report be admitted into evidence and submitted to the jury, especially since the jury was now requesting it. Defendant added that the Report, by itself, was probative of the catch-all mitigating factors on which the jury would be deliberating. It also formed the basis for conclusions made by defense mitigation witness Dr. Podboy. Submitting the Report also would save jurors time by allowing *630them to find the important details of Krych’s investigation without having to go through 450 pages of exhibits.
Interpreting the jury’s note as an indication that the jury erroneously believed they were supposed to have the Report, rather than a request for the Report of the jury’s own accord, the court refused defendant’s request. The court simply did not believe that submitting the report would increase the jury’s ability to determine the reliability issues. The court stated, “Why should the report go before them, but no other written documentation which counters or challenges the report?”
1. The Law
N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-3(c)(2)(b) provides, in relevant part:
The defendant may offer, without regard to the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials, reliable evidence relevant to any of the mitigating factors. If the defendant produces evidence in mitigation which would not be admissible under the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal trials, the State may rebut that evidence without regal’d to the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials.
We have held that when there is any doubt about admissibility of mitigating evidence, that doubt should be resolved in the defendant’s favor. Bey III, supra, 129 N.J. at 587, 610 A.2d 814; State v. Savage 120 N.J. 594, 638, 577 A.2d 455 (1990). Evidence that fails the admissibility test under the strict rules of evidence should be admitted if relevant, and the shortcomings go to the weight of the testimony, “properly relegating to the adversarial process the task of ‘separating the wheat from the chaff.’ ” Davis, supra, 96 N.J. at 623, 477 A.2d 308 (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 889 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3398 n. 7, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090, 1109 n. 7 (1983)). The trial court ultimately retains discretion to exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its speculative nature and the risk of confusion. Id. at 623, 477 A.2d 308; State v. Pitts, 116 N.J. 580, 633, 562 A.2d 1320 (1989).
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the Report was not admissible because it was merely cumula-*631five evidence and would confuse the jury is a close call. Based on this Court’s tolerant standard governing the admissibility of mitigating evidence, the jury’s inquiry about the Report, and the fact that the Report furnished the factual basis for Dr. Podboy’s expert testimony, we believe the better result would have been for the trial court to admit the evidence. Nonetheless, the trial court’s refusal to admit the Report into evidence was harmless error.
The only “prejudice” defendant cites is that the jury unanimously rejected, under catch-all factor c(5)(h), mitigating factors eight and twenty-four. Factor eight stated:
Jesse Timmendequas’ childhood and adolescence were characterized by exposure to domestic violence, criminal activity, substance abuse, instability of the home, emotional and physical neglect, and severe physical and sexual abuse. His life was void of any normalcy. His parents did not serve as role models of normal behavior and treated him terribly. Also, the family was extremely poor and primarily existed on public assistance, especially during the time period that [Defendant’s father] was in the home.
Although not all the jury members found factor eight to be present, they unanimously agreed on the following factor 25(a):
Jesse Timmendequas’ childhood and adolescence were characterized by exposure to domestic violence, criminal activity, substance abuse, instability of the home, emotional and physical neglect, and possible physical and sexual abuse. His parents did not serve as role models of normal behavior and treated him poorly. Also, the family was poor and received public assistance.
Factor eight and Factor 25(a) are identical, except for the sentence “His life was void of any normalcy.” The minimal difference between these two catch-all factors could not have changed the result of defendant’s penalty phase.
Factor 24 stated:
Despite being evaluated and classified as mentally retarded with emotional problems by the public school’s child study team, none of the professionals provided follow-up services such as counseling or further psychological evaluation for Jesse Timmendequas.
Kryeh specifically testified twice to the fact that defendant did not receive follow-up counseling in school. Thus, the jurors had the information necessary to find factor 24 — the Report would not have supplemented that information. As to factor 24, the trial *632court was correct in concluding that the evidence merely would have been cumulative.
We emphasize that this is not a case where the jury did not have the relevant evidence before it. The 450 documents that formed the basis for the report were placed into evidence for the jury to read. Kryeh testified for three days about the findings of her investigation. Defendant essentially alleges that the evidence could have been presented in an easier manner for the jury to review. Nevertheless, no evidence was concealed from the jury. We, therefore, conclude that defendant cannot show any prejudice resulting from the decision not to admit the Report into evidence. Even if the failure to admit the Report was error, it constituted harmless error since the jury had the information prior to its deliberations.
I. Victim-Impact Evidence
Defendant, for the first time on appeal, asserts that the trial court’s instructions on victim-impact testimony did not comport with the procedure outlined in State v. Muhammad, supra, 145 N.J. at 32, 678 A.2d 164, for weighing aggravating and mitigating factors under N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-3c(6) and (5)(h). The trial court instructed jurors as follows:
[I]f you as a juroi- have not found to be present mitigating factor (h) or mitigating factors in addition to those listed, meaning if you haven’t found affirmatively as to factors number 3 through 25, if no one found any of those, you then must not give any consideration to this evidence regarding the victim’s character or the impact of the murder on survivors. And that is so, because it only may be used in terms of balancing or in terms of assessing the weight to be given to the evidence concerning the defendant’s character or the circumstances of the offense.
Defendant now complains that the above instruction did not clearly inform jurors they could consider victim-impact evidence only if they first found mitigating factor c(5)(h). Defendant argues that the instruction confused jurors and suggested they could consider victim impact evidence in determining the existence of a specific mitigating factor. Defendant further asserts that the penalty verdict sheet misled the jury. Finally, defendant contends that neither the court nor the verdict sheet apprised jurors that *633they were not required to use the victim impact evidence to lessen the weight of any mitigating c(5)(h) factor. We disagree.
The Court in Muhammad, supra, explained the proper use of victim-impact evidence, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-3c(6), the “Victim Impact Statute”:
The victim impact statute provides that if the defendant presents evidence of his character or record pursuant to section 5(h), the State may present evidence of the murder victim’s character and background and of the impact of the murder on the victim’s survivors. That statute then directs the trial court to inform the jury that if the jury finds that the State has proven at least one aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt and the jury finds evidence of a mitigating catch-all factor, then the jury may consider the victim impact evidence presented by the State in determining the appropriate weight to give the catch-all factor.
[145 N.J. at 36, 678 A.2d 164.]
The trial court’s charge in this case comported with the procedures outlined in Muhammad. The jury specifically was instructed that they could not consider the victim-impact evidence unless they found at least one of the catch-all circumstances, listed on the verdict sheet as # 3 through # 25. The court repeatedly spoke of “factors 3 through 25” to ensure the jury understood it was required to consider each of those factors before considering the victim-impact evidence. The instruction also made clear that jurors could not consider the victim-impact evidence in determining whether other mitigating factors existed. Because the instruction was repeated numerous times, it is improbable that the jury misconstrued their duty and used the victim-impact evidence in determining the existence, rather than the weight of the factors.
The prosecutor in her summation also addressed the proper use of victim impact testimony. The prosecutor stated, “[i]f you gave credit to any of the defendant’s character evidence ... we refer to that as Factor H mitigation, you are then to weigh it against whatever weight you determine is appropriate for victim impact.” “Although arguments of counsel can by no means serve as a substitute for instructions by the court, Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 488-89, 98 S.Ct. 1930, 1936-37, 56 L.Ed.2d 468, 477 (1978), the prejudicial effect ... must be evaluated ‘in light of the totality of the cireumstances-including all the instructions to the *634jury, [and] the arguments of counsel----Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 145, 586 A.2d 85 (citations omitted).
Reviewing the charge in conjunction with the prosecutor’s comments in summation, defendant cannot demonstrate that the jury instruction regarding victim-impact evidence constituted plain error. The trial court clearly and properly explained the limited role the victim-impact evidence could play in the jury’s deliberation. The prosecutor expounded on its appropriate use in summation. The court explained the procedure again when handing out the penalty verdict sheet. The use of the word “may” clearly conveyed to jurors that they were under no obligation to use the victim-impact evidence in their deliberations. State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 272, 619 A.2d 1208 (1993), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1063, 117 S.Ct. 699, 136 L.Ed.2d 621 (1997) (Martini I).
When the court’s instruction is reviewed as a whole, it is clear that the jury understood how to utilize the victim-impact evidence. Moreover, there is no evidence that jury members used victim-impact evidence incorrectly in their deliberations. In the context of the entire record, we have no doubt that the jury understood and properly applied such evidence.
J. Jury Instruction on Parole Ineligibility
Defendant asserts for the first time on appeal that the trial court improperly instructed the jury not to consider the fact that defendant never would be eligible for parole in determining the appropriate penalty. Defendant contends the instruction misled the jury into believing it should not consider the consequences of its sentence in determining the appropriate penalty. Therefore, he argues, the instruction violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial, his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and his corresponding rights under the New Jersey Constitution.
N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-3b(3) mandates a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for defendants convicted of mur*635dering a child in the course of a sexual attack. Although the provision was passed after the date of the offenses in this case, defendant waived all ex post facto challenges to the law. After discussion, the trial court and counsel agreed that the jury should be told the possible sentences defendant would face. The court relayed the information to the jury by administering the following instruction:
Now, you are entitled to know the sentencing considerations under the law. This knowledge, particularly that the defendant will never be eligible for parole, should not influence your decision regarding the appropriateness of a sentence on Count 1, the knowing or purposeful murder charge. Your decision must be based only upon the aggravating and mitigating factors presented by the evidence in this penalty phase.
1. The Law
We continuously have stressed the importance of the balancing process that jury members must engage in throughout the penalty phase. This process has been defined not as a “fact-finding” mission, Biegenwald II, supra, 106 N.J. at 62, 524 A.2d 130, or a “numbers game,” Moore, supra, 122 N.J. at 473, 585 A.2d 864, but rather as a “judgmental determination by the jury, based on conflicting values, of whether defendant should live or die.” Biegenwald II, supra, 106 N.J. at 62, 524 A.2d 130. To conduct this balance fairly, penalty-phase jurors in a capital case must be told the sentencing options and understand the consequences of their decision prior to deliberation. Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 162-65, 548 A.2d 887; Nelson, supra, 155 N.J. at 502-03, 715 A.2d 281.
N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3f provides:
Prior to the jury’s sentencing deliberations, the trial court shall inform the jury of the sentences which may be imposed pursuant to subsection b. of this section on the defendant if defendant is not sentenced to death.
In Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 311, 524 A.2d 188, we stated:
The entire system of capital punishment depends on the belief that a jury representing the conscience of the community will responsibly exercise its guided discretion in deciding who shall live and who shall die. To hide from the jury the full range of its sentencing options, thus permitting its decision to be based on *636uninformed and possibly inaccurate speculation, is to mock the goals of rationality and consistency required by modem death penalty jurisprudence.
[Id, at 311, 524 A.2d 188.]
To secure this constitutional guarantee, we previously have held that the trial court must instruct the jury on the sentencing options available on the non-capital counts in cases where the defendant is to be sentenced contemporaneously for both capital and non-capital convictions. Martini I, supra, 131 N.J. at 313, 619 A.2d 1208. We further have held that when a defendant is already serving time, and the court believes there is a “realistic likelihood” that defendant will be sentenced consecutively if the jury returns a non-death sentence, the jury should be informed that a non-death sentence may be imposed consecutively rather than concurrently. Loftin I, supra, 146 N.J. at 372, 680 A.2d 677.
Most recently, in Nelson, supra, 155 N.J. at 505, 715 A.2d 281, we determined that when the jury is choosing between life and death, the jury should not be prevented from considering the likelihood that a defendant would spend his remaining life in prison. Such an instruction would conflict with our holding in Ramseur and impermissibly “hide from the jury the full range of its sentencing options----” Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 311, 524 A.2d 188. Therefore, we concluded:
In future cases, courts should explain to jurors what we mean when we say that the length of the possible sentences other than death should not influence the jury’s determination concerning the appropriateness of a death sentence on a murder count. Something along these lines (as refined by the Trial Judges’ Committee on Capital Causes) would suffice:
What I intend to convey when I tell you that your determination of the appropriateness of a death sentence should not be influenced by the sentences that I may impose on other convictions, or in the event you determine that death is not an appropriate punishment for this defendant, is simply that a capital defendant is not more worthy of life because he or she may face a longer confinement in prison than another. A defendant’s worthiness for life should depend' only on the circumstances of the' offense and the aggravating and mitigating factors that have been presented. I have informed you of the potential non-capital sentences only so that you may be fully informed of the effect of your decision.
[Nelson, supra, 155 N.J. at 505, 715 A.2d 281.]
*637Although the Nelson decision had not yet been issued at the time of defendant’s trial, the trial court’s instruction complied with Nelson’s dictates precisely. After informing the jury of defendant’s parole ineligibility, the trial court instructed jurors they could not use the information to find defendant more or less worthy of death on the capital count. Rather, the court explained, jurors should make that determination based on the weighing of the mitigating and aggravating factors.
Such an instruction strikes the appropriate balance between the kind of “uninformed and possibly inaccurate” speculation by the jury about the alternatives to death, Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 311, 524 A.2d 188, and the need to limit the penalty phase deliberation to considerations of the aggravating and mitigating factors. The instruction clarifies the jury’s task and makes it clear that their decision is ultimately a choice between life without parole and death. See Nelson, supra, 155 N.J. at 505, 715 A.2d 281. We find that the trial court’s instructions on what the jury-should consider in reaching its sentencing decision were correct.
K. Defendant’s Provisional Sentence Of Life Without Parole
When imposing the sentence on the purposeful murder charge, the trial court stated, “In the event the sentence of death is vacated by our Supreme Court, this Court provisionally imposes the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.” Defendant argues that portion of the trial court’s judgment should be vacated.
Defendant’s argument is meritless. Defendant waived any ex post facto challenge to the imposition of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b(3)(a)(b), which mandates an automatic sentence of life without parole for any defendant convicted of murdering a child while in the course of committing sexual assault. Because the court has no discretion regarding an alternative sentence to death for defendant, defendant was in no way prejudiced by the trial court’s statement.
*638L. Defendant Was Denied Equal Protection And Due Process When He Was Charged With A Crime Without Grand Jury Action On The Existence Or Non-Existence Of Aggravating Factors
1. The Facts
In a motion argued on June 9,1995, defense counsel argued that the aggravating factors presented by the State in the penalty phase were elements of the capital murder crime and should have been presented to the grand jury. Failure to do so, defendant contended, violated his State and federal constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. That motion was denied on the basis of this Court’s decision in Martini I, supra, 131 N.J. at 222-228, 619 A.2d 1208, which concluded that the grand jury in death penalty prosecutions need not be given the opportunity to consider evidence going to the existence or non-existence of aggravating factors.
For the reasons we stated in Martini I, we reaffirm that it is not necessary to present aggravating factors to the grand jury under the New Jersey Constitution. Ibid. For the same reasons, we also find no violation of the federal Constitution. See Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 156, 106 S.Ct. 1749, 1755, 90 L.Ed.2d 123, 132 (1986), (cited in Martini I, supra, 131 N.J. at 225, 619 A.2d 1208) (finding that aggravating circumstances are not separate penalties, but are merely standards to help guide jury in deciding between life or death verdict).
M. The New Jersey Death Penalty Statute Does Not Violate Customary International Law
Defendant asserts that the New Jersey death penalty statute violates customary international law. We held in Nelson, supra, 155 N.J. at 512, 715 A.2d 281, that “international law does not require the invalidation of New Jersey’s death penaltyf,]” since the United States has not adopted any international human rights conventions invalidating the death penalty. We reject defendant’s argument for the reasons stated in Nelson.
*639N. Constitutionality of the Act
Defendant asserts that the New Jersey Death Penalty Statute violates the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. This Court previously has held that the New Jersey Statute is constitutional. Cooper, supra, 151 N.J. at 379, 700 A.2d 306; Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 166-211, 524 A.2d 188. Thus, we reject defendant’s claim.

O. Cumulative Effect of Errors

Defendant argues that if we find, as we do, that none of the trial errors standing alone warrant reversal of his death sentence, then the sentence cannot withstand their cumulative weight. Defendant argues that the trial court errors, together, contributed to his death sentence and make it constitutionally unreliable. See State v. Orecchio, 16 N.J. 125, 129, 106 A.2d 541 (1954) (noting that where “legal errors ... in their aggregate have rendered the trial unfair, our fundamental constitutional concepts dictate the granting of a new trial before an impartial jury”).
As we noted in Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 169, 586 A.2d 85,
The fact that capital cases are vigorously contested, protracted, and consistently implicate subtle and difficult legal issues virtually assures that in the course of each taial some errors and imperfections will be apparent. Trial judges, unlike appellate judges, make their rulings in the heat of nial, without the opportunity for deliberattve review, and not even the most experienced and conscientious trial judges can be perfect.
“A defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one.” Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619, 73 S.Ct. 481, 490, 97 L.Ed. 593, 605 (1953). That is true even in capital cases, where we “ ‘subject the record to intense scrutiny,’ recognizing that a defendant’s very life is at stake.” Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 170, 586 A.2d 85 (quoting Bey I, supra, 112 N.J. at 92-93, 548 A.2d 846).
We have carefully reviewed each of the errors identified in the course of this opinion. We are satisfied, in the context of a trial that produced overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt, that the *640combined effect of those errors was not clearly capable of affecting either defendant’s convictions or his sentences.
P. Proportionality Review
As authorized by the Capital Punishment Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3e, defendant has requested that we determine whether his “sentence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.” Review of defendant’s sentence shall be undertaken pursuant to a briefing and argument schedule to be established by the Clerk of the Court after consultation with counsel.
VII

Conclusion

In summary, defendant’s conviction for murder and his sentence of death are affirmed. In addition, defendant’s convictions for the related offenses are affirmed.
Finally, defendant’s request for proportionality review is acknowledged and the matter will proceed according to a briefing and argument schedule to be established by the Clerk of this Court.

 Those catch-all factors not found by any of the jury members are: defendant (1) had a willingness to cooperate with law enforcement authorities, demonstrating a recognition and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct; (2) did not purposefully cause the victim’s death; (3) was influenced by panic in causing the death of the victim; (4) had a childhood and adolescence characterized by exposure to domestic violence, criminal activity, substance abuse, instability of the home, emotional and physical neglect and severe physical abuse; had a life void of any normalcy; had parents who did not serve as role models of normal behavior and treated him terribly; lived in a family that was extremely poor and primarily existed on public assistance, especially during the time that Charles Hall was in the home; (5) witnessed his father brutally abuse his brother and mother, both sexually and physically; (6) witnessed his father brutally rape a neighborhood girl when defendant was approximately eight years old, and was threatened not to tell about it; (7) witnessed his father torture and kill several of his pets in an effort to silence him; was told by his father that his father would kill him or his mother if he ever told anyone about the sexual abuse; (8) was subjected to physical abuse at the hands of his mother whose instability and inability to control her temper resulted in her beating him regularly, breaking his arm on one occasion; (9) was actively rejected by his mother and siblings because of his resemblance to his father; (10) was forced to assume the role of care giver due to his mother’s inability and unwillingness to properly care for her children; (11) suffered several head injuries resulting from two car accidents; (12) never had his basic physiological and psychological needs met by his parents, including housing, food, clothing, hygiene, educational and medical needs; received no love, no emotionally healthy male or female role models and no support or guidance; had his basic needs completely ignored by his mother and father; (13) despite being evaluated and classified as mentally retarded with emotional problems by the public school's child study team, received no follow-up services such as counseling or further psychological evaluation.

 "Articles” includes stories, columns, cartoons, advertisements, letters to the editor, etc.

 R. 1:7 — 4(b) was amended, effective September 1, 1998. The new rule extends the time period to move for a rehearing from ten to twenty days.

 This quotation can be found in Comment 2 of the 1999 rules.

 N.J.S.A. 52:4B-37 defines victim as "the nearest relative of the victim of a criminal homicide." The Kankas clearly qualify as victims in this case.

 This factor was inserted by the Appellate Division in lieu of the following third ABA factor: "[T]he relative hardships imposed on the parties, witnesses, and other interested persons with regard to the proposed venue;''

 The Court and dissent arrive at different percentages because the dissent uses the number of households in each county as the divisor. Post at 657, 737 A.2d at 133 (Handler, J., dissenting). Because jurors are selected on an individual basis, and not as household entities, the Court uses as the divisor, the number of people in each county.

 Although Satterwhite involved a Sixth Amendment violation of a defendant's right to counsel, the Supreme Court applied a harmless error analysis in determining whether the defendant's capital conviction should be reversed.

 On April 15, 1997, defendant renewed his motion to strike all jurors who had a belief or suspicion that defendant had prior criminal record, arguing that 95 percent of the people filling out the questionnaires that had been reviewed thus far knew or suspected that defendant had a prior record. That motion was denied.

 State v. Simon was argued on appeal as of right before this Court on September 29, 1998.

 N.J.R.E. 803(c)(25) states:
A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary, proprietary, or social interest, or so far tended to subject declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid declarant’s claim against another, that a reasonable person in declarant's position would not have made the statement unless the person believed it to be true.