Court Opinion

ID: 9376859
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-04 11:08:23.236049+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:09.935274
License: Public Domain

NO. 12-22-00298-CR

                         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

              TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

                                    TYLER, TEXAS

                                                §      APPEAL FROM THE 369TH
EX PARTE:
                                                §      JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
ROBERT JAMES YOUNGKER
                                                §      CHEROKEE COUNTY, TEXAS

                                 MEMORANDUM OPINION
       Robert James Youngker appeals from the trial court’s denial of his application for writ of
habeas corpus seeking a bond reduction. We reverse and remand.

                                          BACKGROUND
       Appellant was arrested for the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child and bail was
set at $500,000. He is related to the ten-year-old who alleged that he sexually assaulted her. On
October 1, 2021,bond was reduced to a $100,000 surety bond with conditions, but the order
provided that if a grand jury indictment was not returned before October 7, bond shall be
modified to a $100,000 personal recognizance bond. Appellant was indicted on October 6, and
bond was set at $1,000,000 surety bond.
       On October 26, 2022, Appellant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus seeking a
bond reduction. At the hearing thereon, Appellant’s wife, Rebecca Fay Youngker, testified that
she worked and attempted to raise money but there was “no way … to raise up a million – for the
million dollars.” Rebecca testified that Appellant collected “five something a month” in Social
Security before his incarceration, which he no longer receives while in jail. She had $1,000 in
bank accounts, worked at Dollar General where she earned approximately $500 per week, and
paid $500 per month in rent.     She owns a 2003 F150, the value of which is approximately
$2,800, and which serves as her sole mode of transportation. She paid a monthly cellular
telephone bill of $35 per month and would possibly spend $200 per month on groceries if
Appellant was released. Rebecca testified that Appellant tried to work at Dollar Tree, but there
were problems because of his inability to read and write. Appellant’s mother, who resides with
Rebecca, draws a disability check of $841 and does not own a vehicle. Rebecca explained that
she, Appellant, and his mother, live off her income and the disability checks paid to Appellant
and his mother. She contacted a bondsman but testified that she would probably not be able to
pay the ten percent, i.e., $100,000, required by the bondsman. But if the trial court reduced the
bond to $50,000 or $75,000, she could probably save enough money to satisfy the ten percent.
       Rebecca testified that Appellant was born and raised in Jacksonville, Texas, and cannot
read or write well.    If released, Appellant would reside with Rebecca and his mother in
Rebecca’s home. No children reside at the home. She stated that Appellant would stay home
and do chores while she worked. Rebecca testified that she knows who the victim is but neither
she nor Appellant have had contact with the victim since Appellant’s incarceration. She believed
Appellant could follow bond conditions that required no contact with the victim or the victim’s
family. She likewise believed he could follow bond conditions requiring that he report to
Cherokee County for pretrial supervision. She did not believe Appellant would flee or avoid
prosecution if released and she believed she could bring him to court each time his presence was
required in court.
       Appellant asked the trial court to set bond at $50,000 with conditions.           The State
requested a reduction to $500,000 with conditions, in the event the trial court granted the writ.
The trial court denied Appellant’s application. This appeal followed.

                                         BOND AMOUNT
       In one issue, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to
reduce the amount of his bail bond.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
       The decision regarding a proper bail amount lies within the sound discretion of the trial
court. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.15 (West Supp. 2022). Accordingly, we review the
trial court’s denial of a request to reduce bail for an abuse of discretion. See Ex parte Rubac, 611
S.W.2d 848, 850 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Clemons v. State, 220 S.W.3d 176, 178 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2007, no pet.) (per curiam). In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion,
we do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d

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372, 379-80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). The purpose of our review is to determine whether the trial
court’s decision was made without reference to any guiding rules or principles of law, or in other
words, whether the decision was arbitrary or unreasonable. Id. at 380. An abuse of discretion
occurs when a trial court’s decision is so clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone of reasonable
disagreement. Id. at 391 (op. on reh’g). The burden of proof is on the petitioner for reduction
in bail to show that the bail set is excessive. Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849.
       The primary purpose of setting a pretrial bond should be to secure an appellant’s presence
at trial. See Ex parte Rodriguez, 595 S.W.2d 549, 550 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Ex
parte Rincon, Nos. 04-13-00715-CR—04-13-00718-CR, 2014 WL 2443870, at *1 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio May 28, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The amount of
the bond necessary to achieve that purpose is committed to the trial court’s sound discretion,
although its discretion is bounded and guided by constitutional and statutory provisions. See Ex
parte Estrada, 398 S.W.3d 723, 724 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2008, no pet.). The federal
constitution, our state constitution, and our state laws prohibit “excessive” bail. U.S. CONST.
Amend. VIII; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.09 (West 2005).
       Article 17.15 of the code of criminal procedure provides that “bail shall be sufficiently
high to give reasonable assurance that the undertaking will be complied with[;]” however, “[t]he
power to require bail is not to be so used as to make it an instrument of oppression.” TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.15(1), (2). Although a defendant’s ability to make bail must be
considered, it is not a controlling consideration. See id. art. 17.15(4); Rodriguez, 595 S.W.2d at
550. The primary considerations when assessing the reasonableness of bail are the punishments
that can be imposed and the nature of the offenses. Ex parte Ramirez-Hernandez, 642 S.W.3d
907, 917 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022, no pet.); Ex parte Melartin, 464 S.W.3d 789, 792
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.). Article 17.15 also requires the consideration of
the future safety of the victim of the alleged offense, law enforcement, and the community. TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.15 (5).
       Along with the factors in Article 17.15, courts have held there are seven additional
factors to be weighed in determining the amount of bond: (1) the accused’s work record; (2) the
accused’s family and community ties; (3) the accused’s length of residency; (4) the accused’s
prior criminal record; (5) the accused’s conformity with previous bond conditions; (6) the

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existence of other outstanding bonds, if any; and (7) aggravating circumstances alleged to have
been involved in the charged offense. See Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849–50.
The Evidence
       We begin by summarizing the evidence from the hearing regarding the primary
considerations, the nature of the offense and the potential punishments, as well as the other
applicable factors.
       Nature of Offense and Potential Punishment
       The nature of the offense and the potential punishment weigh in favor of a
high bail amount. If convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a child, Appellant faces twenty-five
years to life in prison, without the possibility of parole. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02
(h) (West Supp. 2022); see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.145(a)(2) (West Supp. 2022).
       Safety of Victim and Community
       The safety of the victim and the community also supports a high bail amount. See TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.15(a)(5) (West 2019). Appellant is charged with engaging in
sexual contact with a child younger than fourteen, including touching and penetration. Appellant
is relaed to the alleged victim. The victim told Officer Tony Smith of the Jacksonville Police
Department that Appellant sexually assaulted her five or ten times, told her not to mention it to
anyone, and offered her toys to reward her for remaining silent. The victim resided with
Appellant for a period of time during the applicable timeframe and as of the offense report’s
date, she no longer resided with Appellant but still resided in Cherokee County. According to
Rebecca’s son, he, Appellant, Rebecca, and the victim moved into the home in which Appellant
and Rebecca currently reside. The victim told Rebecca’s son that Appellant had been touching
her and the son told Rebecca, who did not believe the victim. The son claimed that Rebecca
confronted Appellant, who denied the allegations. He further claimed that Rebecca asked the
victim, in Appellant’s presence, whether the conduct was happening and the victim looked at
Appellant and replied “no.” During an interview, Rebecca acknowledged that her son “kind of
told her something,” but she did not believe it and did nothing about it. She did confront
Appellant, who denied the allegations.
       The record further indicates that Appellant intends to reside at Rebecca’s residence in a
Jacksonville neighborhood, also located in Cherokee County, if released on bond. Appellant
would stay home when Rebecca worked.

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       Financial Resources and Ability to Make Bail
       Rebecca testified that she has $1,000 in her bank accounts, earns approximately $500 per
week, owns a 2003 F150 worth approximately $2,800, and rents her home for $500 per month.
Her testimony reflects additional monthly expenses of approximately $235. Her mother-in-law
receives a monthly disability check in the amount of $841. Rebecca’s testimony suggests that
Appellant’s inability to read and write limited his ability to work. And since his incarceration,
Appellant no longer received his disability checks. Although Rebecca contacted a bondsman, she
claimed to be unable to pay the required ten percent for a $1,000,000 bond. She could probably
pay the ten percent for a $50,000 or $75,000 bond.
       Rubac Factors
       The record demonstrates that Appellant was born and raised in Jacksonville. He resided
with Rebecca before his arrest and would return to live with her and his disabled mother if
released. Rebecca’s testimony suggests that Appellant’s employment is limited by his inability
to read and write. According to Rebecca, neither she nor Appellant have had contact with the
victim. She believed Appellant could follow bond conditions that required no contact with the
victim or her family, as well as reporting requirements. She did not believe Appellant would flee
or avoid prosecution if released and represented that she could bring him to court when required.
The record further reflects that when an officer approached Appellant at home and asked him to
come to the police department, Appellant voluntarily did so the same day as asked.
Analysis
       Appellant argues that he has limited resources for making bail and that bail is
substantially higher than what he can realistically afford. He maintains there are no factors that
support a seven-figure bond. The State responds that the severity of the offense, potential
punishment range, and character of evidence support a higher bail amount. The State further
argues that Appellant poses a risk to the community.
       Our review of the evidence reflects that the bond is substantially higher than Appellant
can realistically financially afford. See Ramirez-Hernandez, 642 S.W.3d at 920 (defendant
should ordinarily offer evidence of his available resources and unsuccessful attempts to
post bail in current amount). However, a defendant’s inability to make bail does not
automatically render the amount excessive. Ex parte Mazuera, No. 01-21-00612-CR, 2022 WL
1110989, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 14, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not

                                                5
designated for publication); see also Ex parte Vance, 608 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Tex. Crim. App.
1980).    If a defendant’s ability to make bail controlled, the trial court’s role in
setting bail amounts would be eliminated and the defendant would be in the position to
determine the proper amount of bail, which is antithetical to the purpose of a bond. See Milner v.
State, 263 S.W.3d 146, 150 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). But bail set in an
amount that cannot be satisfied has the potential to displace the presumption of
innocence. Mazuera, 2022 WL 1110989, at *9; see also Ex parte Bogia, 56 S.W.3d 835, 840
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
         Appellant was arrested on June 24, 2021. His inability to make bail or post a bond since
that time is a factor to be considered. See Mazuera, 2022 WL 1110989, at *9; see also Rincon,
2014 WL 2443870, at *3. When bail is so high that a person cannot realistically pay for it, the
trial court essentially displaces the presumption of innocence. See Mazuera, 2022 WL 1110989,
at *10. Bail cannot be used as an instrument of oppression and bail set in a particular amount,
when     it   assumes   that   the   defendant   cannot   afford bail in   that   amount   becomes
oppressive. Id.; see also Ex parte Durst, 148 S.W.3d 496, 499 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2004, no pet.) (where bail amount set “solely to prevent [defendant] from getting out of jail,”
“bail [was] being used as an instrument of oppression”). Here, there is no direct evidence that the
trial court set Appellant’s bond at $1,000,000 for the express purpose of keeping Appellant
incarcerated. cf. Ex parte Harris, 733 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, no pet.) (trial
court stated, “[it would] rather see him in jail than to see someone’s life taken”). But the law only
requires bail be set in an amount high enough to give reasonable assurance that a defendant will
appear for trial. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.15(1). Bail amounts in excess of seven
figures are almost never required, even in capital cases. See Flores, 2021 WL 3922919, at
*4 (citing Ludwig v. State, 812 S.W.2d 323, 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)).
         Although the appropriate amount of bail is an individualized determination, a review of
other cases can be instructive. See id., at * 11. While courts traditionally set high bonds in cases
involving offenses against children, the right to a reasonable bail is a complement to and based
on the presumption of innocence. Id. The repellant nature of the accusation does not diminish the
presumption of the accused’s innocence and the provision in Article 17.15 providing “[t]he
power to require bail is not to be used as to make it an instrument of oppression” mandates

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that bail is not to be used to insure pre-conviction punishment. Id.; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 17.15(a)(2).
        The State refers this Court to Clemons in support of the trial court’s bond. In Clemons,
the defendant was charged with two cases of aggravated sexual assault of a child and two cases
of indecency with a child. Clemons, 220 S.W.3d at 177. Initially, total bail was set at
$600,000. Id. After a hearing, the trial court reduced total bail for all cases to $400,000 ($75,000
in each of the indecency cases and $150,000 and $100,000 in the aggravated sexual assault
cases). Id.   The Eastland Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at 179. However, in Clemons, the
defendant attempted to persuade his wife to flee to Mexico with him. See id. He also told several
persons that he would kill himself rather than go to prison. See id. There are no such
circumstances present in the instant case. Nor is there any direct evidence to suggest that
Appellant would flee if released on bail pending trial.
        In Ex parte Smith, No. 09-06-00104-CR, 2006 WL 1511480 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
May 31, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication), the defendant was charged
with aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child. Smith, 2006 WL 1511480,
at *1. The evidence showed that defendant had a good work record, no prior criminal history,
and significant ties to the prosecuting county. Id. at *2. The magistrate set bail at $250,000 in the
aggravated assault case and $200,000 in the indecency case. Id. at *1. After a hearing on the
defendant’s request for a bail reduction, the trial court set bail at $125,000 in the aggravated
sexual assault case and $75,000 in the indecency with a child case. Id. The court of appeals held
these amounts to be excessive and set bail at $50,000 and $25,000. Id. at *7. The record in this
case reflects a virtually nonexistent work record, but Appellant has no recent criminal history
and has ties to the prosecuting county.
        In Ex parte Bennett, No. 02-07-00175-CR, 2007 WL 3037908, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Oct. 18, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication), the defendant was
charged with multiple counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child. Bennett, 2007 WL
3037908, at *4. In upholding total bail of $600,000, the court noted the serious nature of the
offenses and defendant’s failure to maintain contact with his attorney when the bonds were
originally set at a lower amount. Id. In this case, there is no evidence Appellant failed to
maintain contact with his attorney. Like Bennett, Appellant was currently unemployed, but

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unlike Bennett who had minimal ties to the prosecuting county, Appellant resided in Jacksonville
for his entire life.
        In Ex parte Bratcher, Nos. 05-05-00634-CR, 05-05-00635-CR, 2005 WL 1634971, at *5
(Tex. App.—Dallas July 13, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication), the
defendant was charged with two aggravated sexual assault of a child offenses with total bonds of
$1,000,000. Bratcher, 2005 WL 1634971, at *5. In upholding the trial court’s denial of bond
reduction, the court noted the defendant had previously been tried and convicted of sexual
assault of the same victim and had three prior convictions for sexual assaults against
children. Id. The victims in those cases were students at a daycare that the defendant co-owned
with his mother who still operated the facility and with whom defendant was going to stay while
on bond. Id. Further, the work the defendant would be doing while on bond involved traveling,
which would make him a higher flight risk. Id. These facts led the court to find the trial court
struck the balance between the presumption of innocence and the State’s interest in assuring the
defendant’s presence at trial. Id. Here, Appellant does not have a criminal history of such a
nature. There is no suggestion in the record that he has a history of sexual assault or other
violence against children. Appellant was willing to submit to bond conditions, including a
condition that he refrain from contacting the victim or her family. There is no direct evidence
that Appellant would attempt to contact the victim if released on bond.
        In Ex parte Ramirez-Hernandez, the defendant was charged with three counts of
aggravated sexual assault of a child against one victim, his stepdaughter. Ramirez-Hernandez,
642 S.W.3d at 912. The bonds were set at $500,000 for one count and $250,000 on the other two
counts, for a combined $1,000,000 bond. Id. In that case, the state offered no evidence that the
appellant had any criminal history, and the appellant offered testimony that he was employed for
the past ten years and could return to his job if released on bond. Id. at 919. Despite not being a
citizen of the United States and having no legal status in the United States, the appellant resided
in the prosecuting county for the previous fourteen years. Id. The court of appeals determined
that the circumstances of the offense, possible sentence, and concerns that the appellant posed a
flight risk favored a higher bond, but when balanced, did not warrant a combined $1,000,000
bond amount. Id. at 925.
        In Ex parte Bordelon, No. 04-20-00364-CR, 2021 WL 1988259 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio May 19, 2021, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication), the appellant was

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awaiting trial on five felony offenses: one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child; one count
of aggravated sexual assault of a child; and three counts of aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon. Bordelon, 2021 WL 1988259, at *1. Bordelon involved extraordinary facts that do not
arise in this case. In Bordelon, the appellant was first indicted for continuous sexual abuse of a
child, D.B., on March 6, 2014, and while on trial for the offense, a second child, M.R., made an
outcry of sexual assault against Bordelon during the trial, which resulted in a mistrial. Id. On
November 15, 2015, Bordelon was re-indicted for continuous sexual abuse of D.B. and
additionally indicted for aggravated sexual assault of M.R., along with three counts of
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon for pointing a shotgun at D.B., his wife Priscilla, and
D.B.’s uncle Carl Riley. Id. at *1, *4. The total bonds were set at $1,000,000. Id. at *1. The
appellant filed a pretrial writ of habeas corpus seeking a bond reduction, which the trial court
denied. Id. at *1. At the hearing, the State offered into evidence the probable cause affidavits
supporting the arrest warrants. Id. at *3. The documentary evidence submitted into the record at
the hearing revealed that the appellant began touching his daughter’s vagina when she was seven
years old, penetrated her with his fingers and penis, and told her not to tell her mother,
Priscilla. Id. at *4. With respect to the aggravated assault charges, the affidavit shows that after
D.B. told Priscilla about the sexual abuse, the appellant expressed a desire to end his life and
pointed a gun at D.B., Priscilla, and Carl before fleeing in his truck. Id. The evidence also
showed that M.R. was preparing to testify for the defense when she outcried to the appellant’s
trial counsel that the appellant also sexually abused her by penetrating her with his finger when
she was six or seven years old. Id. Finally, one report entered into evidence at the hearing
reflected the existence of a potential third victim alleging sexual abuse at the appellant’s hands,
which was under investigation by law enforcement. Id. Ultimately, the appellate court held that
the appellant failed to meet his burden that, under the relevant factors, the trial court abused its
discretion considering the nature of the charges, the potential punishments, and the safety of the
victim. Id. at *8.
        Ex parte Greenwood, No. 09-17-00257-CR, 2017 WL 5179962 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
Nov. 8, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) is another case with exceptional
facts. In Greenwood, on September 21, 2016, the appellant was indicted for continuous sexual
abuse of a child, alleging that he perpetrated continuous sexual abuse of a child on or about
September 1, 2007 through June 14, 2011. Id. at 1. The indictment further alleged that the

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appellant had previously been convicted of murder. Id. The appellant bonded out on the charge
and was subsequently indicted on June 7, 2017 for indecency with a child, which allegedly
occurred on February 7, 2017, during the time the appellant was out on bond for the continuous
sexual abuse of a child charge. Id. The trial court set bail in the indecency case at
$2,500,000. Id. The appellant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus seeking a bond
reduction, which the trial court granted, reducing the bond to $1,000,000. Id. The trial court took
judicial notice of both charges and stated on the record that it considered the factors set forth
in Article 17.15, the nature of the offense and circumstances of both the continuous sexual abuse
case and the indecency with a child case, and the safety of the victims and the
community. Id.; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.15. On appeal, the court noted that the
appellant was previously convicted of two counts of murder by strangling two
females. Greenwood, 2017 WL 5179962, at *4. The court ultimately held that the appellant did
not meet his burden to show that the bond was excessive in light of the evidence that the
appellant had previously been convicted of murdering two women and committed the offense of
indecency with a child while on bond for the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child. Id.
       We agree with the State that the nature and severity of the offense favor a high bond. The
allegations contained in the incident report are very serious, and Appellant faces the possibility
of spending the rest of his life in prison. However, there is no evidence that Appellant plans to
flee if released on bond. Compare Clemons, 220 S.W.3d at 179 (defendant attempted to persuade
wife to flee to Mexico with him and told several persons he would kill himself rather than go to
prison). And, as previously discussed, there is no evidence that Appellant attempted to avoid
arrest. The only evidence in the record regarding Appellant’s intentions if released on bond is
Rebecca’s testimony that Appellant plans to return to her home and consent to bond conditions.
Moreover, Appellant is a lifelong resident of Jacksonville.
       Although there are factors in this case, namely the severity of the offense and the
potential punishment, that support a higher bail amount, we cannot agree that the evidence
supports a total bail amount of $1,000,000. Except for Bordelon, Bratcher, and Greenwood, in
which there were extreme aggravating circumstances that are not present in this case, we are
unaware of any cases supporting a bond of $1,000,000 or more based upon the evidence adduced
at the pretrial hearing and the relevant considerations. See, e.g., Ex parte Conklin, Nos. 12-22-
00209-CR, 12-22-00210-CR, 2022 WL 16568281, at *1, 9 (Tex. App.—Tyler Oct. 31, 2022, no

                                                10
pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (reversing bond amounts of $500,000 on
indecency charge and $1,000,000 on continuous sexual abuse charge); Ramirez-Hernandez, 642
S.W.3d at 925 ($1,000,000 bond excessive for three counts of aggravated sexual assault of child
despite fact that appellant was Mexican citizen without a legal status in United States); Ex parte
Williams, No. 12-21-00032-CR, 2021 WL 2816404, at *4 (Tex. App.—Tyler June 30, 2021, no
pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (reversing total bail of $600,000 for eight counts
of indecency with a child and sexual assault of a child when no proof appellant was flight
risk); Ex parte Turner, No. 12-20-00230-CR, 2021 WL 1916832, at *1 (Tex. App.—Tyler May
12, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (reversing total bail of $500,000 for
third degree felony of unlawful restraint involving young children); Ex parte Rean, No. 03-09-
00032-CR, 2009 WL 2902707, at *8 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 26, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (affirming bail of $250,000 in sexual assault case). As previously
discussed, bonds in excess of seven figures are almost never required, even in capital
cases. See Flores, 2021 WL 3922919, at *4.
         Accordingly, after reviewing the record in this case and considering the factors in Article
17.15, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s request for pre-
trial reduction of bond and hold the amount of Appellant’s bail is unsupported by the evidence
and therefore excessive. We sustain Appellant’s sole issue.

                                                  DISPOSITION
         Having sustained Appellant’s sole issue, we reverse and remand this case to the trial
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
                                                                JAMES T. WORTHEN
                                                                   Chief Justice

Opinion delivered February 28, 2023.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

                                             (DO NOT PUBLISH)

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                                  COURT OF APPEALS

      TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                                          JUDGMENT

                                        FEBRUARY 28, 2023

                                        NO. 12-22-00298-CR

                                ROBERT JAMES YOUNGKER,
                                        Appellant
                                           V.
                                  THE STATE OF TEXAS,
                                        Appellee

                               Appeal from the 369th District Court
                          of Cherokee County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 21921)

                   THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed
herein, and the same being considered, because it is the opinion of this Court that there was error
in judgment of the court below, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by this Court that
the judgment be reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in
accordance with the opinion of this Court; and that this decision be certified to the court below
for observance.
                   James T. Worthen, Chief Justice.
                   Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J. and Neeley, J.