Court Opinion

ID: 9580276
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:03:42.743244+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:10.752077
License: Public Domain

Andrews, Judge,
dissenting.
For the reasons expressed herein, I would dismiss these appeals without prejudice and remand them to the trial court to determine whether they have been abandoned.
Since these appellants elected to proceed pro se, and there is no claim that any of them was deprived of the right to be effectively represented by counsel on appeal, neither the holding nor the spirit of *491Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U. S. 387 (105 SC 830, 83 LE2d 821) (1985), requires that they be heard on the merits.1 In Evitts v. Lucey the U. S. Supreme Court found that the due process clause guarantees a criminal defendant effective assistance of counsel on the first appeal as of right. Even though there is no federal or state constitutional right to an appeal (see Thomas v. State, 260 Ga. 262, 263 (392 SE2d 520) (1990)), where the State elects to create an appellate system as an integral part of adjudicating a defendant’s guilt or innocence, the procedures used in the appeals process must comply with the demands of due process. Evitts v. Lucey, supra at 393. A criminal defendant’s constitutional right to receive effective assistance of counsel is an essential means to ensuring that appeals procedures comport with due process by providing defendants with legal representation necessary to afford them adequate and effective access to the first appeal as of right. Pennsyluania v. Finley, 481 U. S. 551, 558 (107 SC 1990, 95 LE2d 539) (1987); Evitts v. Lucey, supra. Under Evitts v. Lucey, the State may not cut off a defendant’s access to the appeals system because his lawyer provided ineffective assistance by failing to follow mandatory appellate rules. However, Evitts v. Lucey, clearly did not require that an appellate court ignore violation of its procedures, and attempt to decide every case on the merits regardless of its posture before the court. “If instead a state court chooses to dismiss an appeal when an incompetent attorney has violated local rules, it may do so if such action does not intrude upon the client’s due process rights.” Evitts v. Lucey, supra at 399 (discussing remedies which preserve fair access to the appeals system, which may be made available to a defendant whose appeal was not considered on the merits because of ineffective appellate counsel). Since the present appeals were brought pro se, and raise no issue of ineffective assistance by appellate counsel, the due process discussion in Evitts v. Lucey has no direct application, although it has had a persuasive influence on this Court’s consideration of procedurally defaulted pro se appeals.
This Court’s holding in Allen v. State, 192 Ga. App. 320 (385 SE2d 29) (1989) dealt with procedural defaults caused by ineffective assistance of counsel, and has no direct application to these pro se appeals. Nevertheless, to the extent Allen continued a policy that this Court attempt to render a decision on the merits of all procedurally defaulted cases regardless of their posture before the Court, it should be disapproved. As I read Conyers v. State, 183 Ga. App. 591 (359 SE2d 454) (1987), and DeBroux v. State, 176 Ga. App. 81 (335 SE2d 170) (1985), both of which declined to dismiss pro se appeals after the *492appellants failed to file enumerations of error and briefs, neither case holds that Evitts v. Lucey required that this Court render a decision on the merits. Rather, both cases appear to rely on Evitts v. Lucey as persuasive authority for the decision to “make every effort to render a decision on the merits of the case.” Conyers supra at 591. In my view, the reliance of Conyers and DeBroux on the persuasive authority of Evitts v. Lucey and other cases based on the same rationale, demonstrates a misplaced concern that defendants who err while representing themselves on appeal should not have their appeals dismissed, while we refuse to dismiss appeals for the same errors committed by appellate counsel on behalf of their clients. The difference is that where “the procedural default is the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment itself requires that responsibility for the default be imputed to the State ...” which may not conduct the appeals process without ensuring the defendant has effective legal assistance. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478, 488 (106 SC 2639, 91 LE2d 397) (1986). No such State responsibility is imputed where a defendant, properly advised of the right to appellate counsel, elects to proceed pro se. For those represented by ineffective counsel, a procedural default has due process implications flowing from the denial of meaningful access to the appeals process. For those who waive the right to be represented by an attorney and elect to proceed pro se, the same procedural default has no such due process implications. Accordingly, I believe the holdings in Conyers and DeBroux requiring that this Court “make every effort to render a decision on the merits” in such pro se cases are based on the erroneous assumption that the same due process concerns are present in procedurally defaulted pro se cases that exist in cases where the appellant is represented by an attorney. Such an assumption cannot be justified by reliance on Evitts v. Lucey or any other authority cited. By requiring an effort to reach the merits in all such cases, both Conyers and DeBroux simply assume that due process will be violated by a dismissal, and foreclose this Court’s exercise of discretion under Court of Appeals Rule 14. For these reasons Conyers and DeBroux should be overruled.
In my view, for this Court to adopt the position that it will attempt to render an immediate decision on the merits of every procedurally defaulted case, whether the appellant is pro se or represented by counsel, is unworkable. As Evitts v. Lucey made clear in the context of a represented appellant, the task is not to necessarily decide every case on the merits, but to ensure that every criminal defendant is provided due process of law by having adequate and effective access to the state created appeals system. When an appellant has failed to provide this Court with any enumerations of error or brief, to consider the merits we are forced in effect to assume the role of counsel for the appellant, and undertake the burdensome task of reviewing *493the entire record for possible error. The same dilemma created by this policy was rejected by the Georgia Supreme Court in Huguley v. State, 253 Ga. 709, 710 (324 SE2d 729) (1985), when the Court finally concluded it would no longer accept Anders’ motions which forced it to review the record, without assistance of counsel, for any colorable claim of error, implicitly recognizing that “an appellate court looking at a cold record” is no substitute for effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 710.
This Court laid the basis for a workable policy with respect to these defaulted appeals in Rule 14 which gives the Court the discretion to consider their disposition on a case by case basis. The Court should now undertake a consistently applied policy of exercising its discretion under Rule 14 with respect to both pro se and represented cases. Where no enumerations of error or brief has been filed despite court order to do so, if the Court is able to determine, as a matter of fact, that the appeal has been abandoned, it should be dismissed. If there is some reason to believe that the appeal has not been abandoned and should be considered on the merits, the appeal should be dismissed without prejudice and remanded to the trial court with instructions to conduct a hearing to determine whether or not the appeal has been abandoned. If the appeal has not been abandoned, the trial court should enter an order so finding, and renew instructions, if necessary, on the right to counsel, appointed counsel, or the right to proceed pro se, and make appropriate appointments or replacements of counsel. If the trial court determines the defendant has abandoned the appeal, an order should be entered making this determination, supported by the court’s findings of fact. In the former situation, the defendant should be given 30 days from entry of the trial court’s order in which to file an out-of-time appeal with respect to any of the trial court’s determinations on remand, and any claim of error which could have been made in the original appeal.2 This suggested remand procedure is consistent with the concern expressed in Evitts v. Lucey that if the appellate court chooses not to immediately consider the procedurally defaulted appeal on the merits, some alternative procedure be provided to ensure fair access to the appeals system.
Accordingly, I would dismiss these appeals, and remand the cases pursuant to the above.
*494Decided March 20, 1992.
Jesse Lee, pro se.
Gaylen Keys, pro se.
Richard Benson, pro se.
Joseph Wright, pro se.
James L. Webb, Solicitor, for appellee.

 We do not deal here with jurisdictional prerequisites which this Court has determined are not governed by the holding in Evitts v. Lucey, supra. Sharpe v. State, 198 Ga. App. 381, 382 (401 SE2d 586) (1991); Snelson v. State, 190 Ga. App. 320 (378 SE2d 723) (1989).

 Dismissal and remand with leave to file a subsequent out-of-time appeal is consistent with the manner in which this Court has handled the need for factual determinations in the trial court on issues of ineffective assistance of counsel, and determinations of indigency and appointments of appellate counsel. Wallace v. State, 199 Ga. App. 817 (406 SE2d 140) (1991); Mapp v. State, 199 Ga. App. 47, 48 (403 SE2d 833) (1991); Jacobs v. State, 184 Ga. App. 869 (363 SE2d 155) (1987); Chapman v. State, 183 Ga. App. 376, 377 (359 SE2d 14) (1987).