Court Opinion

ID: 9592234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:11:50.253188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:01.811685
License: Public Domain

Fontron, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part: In my judgment, the trial court erred in refusing to admit evidence to show the business practices and habits of the decedent, Dean Park, and the normal procedure of disposing of salt water in eastern Kansas. The rule set out in 1 Jones, Evidence, (5th ed.) § 154, p. 275, and approved by us in In re Estate of Curtis, 193 Kan. 431, 394 P. 2d 59, is correctly stated in the majority opinion, but it is then ignored.
One of the central issues at the trial was whether the decedent had signed the alleged agreement. The evidence as to this was in sharp conflict, one expert testifying that the signature of Park was genuine, and two experts testifying it was not. There was also undisputed evidence that no copy of the alleged agreement was found among Park’s papers, and that plaintiff never mentioned such an agreement to the administratrix of Park’s estate until nearly two years after Park’s death despite the fact that, in the meantime, he had offered to share with the administratrix the cost of drilling another input well on Park’s lease.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, I believe that the decedent’s business habits and methods were relevant and possessed probative value. The admissibility of a person’s habit, usage or custom as evidence that he did or did not do a questioned act is said to be generally conceded. (1 Wigmore, Evidence, (3rd ed.) §93, p. 520.)
*273K. S. A. 60-449 is, in effect, a statutory affirmation of this general rule of law. It reads:
“Evidence of habit or custom is relevant to an issue of behavior on a specific occasion, but is admissible on that issue only as tending to prove that the behavior on such occasion conformed to the habit or custom.”
Here, the rejected evidence was offered by defendant to provide an inference that Park did not sign the agreement in question because, on the specific occasion alleged, he would have conformed to his usual and customary practice of preparing his own contracts for his signature. Under our statute, I believe the proffered testimony was admissible for that purpose. Judge Gard commenting on this statute in his work, Kansas Code of Civil Procedure, annotated, says:
“. . . It is quite obvious that evidence of a well established habit has considerable probative value, and that it should not yield readily to the objection that it involves inquiry into collateral matters.” (p. 440.)
The foregoing view accords with the statement set out in 2 Wig-more, Evidence, (3rd ed.) § 376, p. 306:
“That a negative habit may be shown, and not merely an affirmative one, seems unquestionable, i. e. that a person systematically omits to do a certain thing; separate instances suffice to persuade us on such matters in everyday life, and they should be received as probative in courts of justice. . . .”
Similar considerations apply to the testimony proffered to show the normal procedure for disposing of salt water in the eastern Kansas oil fields. Such evidence would have had probative value, as I see it, as tending to show there was no need for an input well, and thus no motivation for entering into an agreement for one.
I concur in that portion of the majority opinion reversing the judgment as to the allowances of interest. However, I would return the cause for a new trial generally.