Court Opinion

ID: 9411541
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-26 23:03:32.572213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:07.149704
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/26/23 P. v. Gayles CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                    B324514

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                            (Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No. BA076121)
           v.

 MILTON DEAN GAYLES,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ronald S. Coen, Judge. Affirmed.
      Law Offices of Sarah A. Stockwell and Sarah A. Stockwell
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Blythe Leszkay and David A. Voet, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                       ________________________
      In 1993, defendant Milton Dean Gayles was convicted of
lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor 14 or 15 years old when
he was at least 10 years older than the child. (Pen. Code,1 § 288,
subd. (c)(1) (section 288(c)(1)).) Such a conviction requires
lifetime registration as a sex offender. (§ 290, subd. (d)(3)(c)(ix).)
Gayles challenges this lifetime registration requirement on equal
protection grounds, arguing he is similarly situated to persons
convicted of other offenses that require lesser registration
periods. We find those other offenses sufficiently dissimilar that
we reject his constitutional challenge.
           FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
       Gayles was convicted of two counts of violating section
288(c)(1) and sentenced to a prison term of two years. The record
does not contain facts regarding the offense conduct, and they are
not relevant to the issue presented by this appeal. Gayles was
also convicted in 2014 for failing to register as a sex offender.
       In 2017, Senate Bill No. 384 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)
amended section 290 and established a three-tiered registry for
sex offenders convicted in adult court. (Stats. 2017, ch. 541; see
§ 290.) Tier 1 provides for a minimum 10-year term of
registration, Tier 2 provides for a minimum 20-year term, and
Tier 3 provides for mandatory lifetime registration. (§ 290,
subd. (d).) In 2021, the amended, tiered version of section 290
became operative. Under both the old system and the one
currently in effect, a person convicted of lewd and lascivious
conduct with a 14- or 15-year-old child where the defendant is at

      1 All subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

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least 10 years older than the minor victim in violation of section
288(c)(1) must register for life. (§ 290, subd. (d)(3)(C)(ix).)
       Under section 290.5, a defendant may petition the court for
termination from the sex offender registry. (People v. Thai (2023)
90 Cal.App.5th 427, 432.) On April 11, 2022, Gayles filed a
petition to terminate his lifetime registration as a sex offender.
He argued the Tier 3 classification of his section 288(c)(1) offense
violated the constitutional guarantee of equal protection because
he was similarly situated to persons convicted of certain offenses
assigned to Tier 1 and Tier 2, there was no rational basis for his
unequal treatment, and if treated as a Tier 1 or 2 offender he was
eligible for relief because he had served the minimum mandatory
registration period and posed a low risk of re-offense. The trial
court disagreed with the equal protection argument, and denied
the petition finding that Gayles was ineligible as a Tier 3
offender for termination of registration.
       This appeal followed. We review de novo the trial court’s
determination that the applicable registration requirement does
not violate Gayles’s right to equal protection. (People v. Gray
(2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 285, 289-290.)
                          DISCUSSION
      Gayles argues that he is similarly situated to persons
convicted of section 288, subdivision (a) (section 288(a)) which is a
Tier 2 offense, and to persons convicted of certain Tier 1 offenses:
section 286, subdivision (b)(2); section 287, subdivision (b)(2); and
section 289, subdivision (i). We discuss first the law applicable to
these equal protection claims before analyzing the allegedly
analogous statutes.

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A.     Equal Protection Principles
       “The United States and California Constitutions prohibit
denial of equal protection of the laws.” (Legg v. Department of
Justice (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 504, 510 (Legg).) “The concept of
equal treatment under the laws means that persons similarly
situated regarding the legitimate purpose of the law should
receive like treatment. [Citation.] ‘ “The first prerequisite to a
meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing
that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or
more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.”
[Citations.] This initial inquiry is not whether persons are
similarly situated for all purposes, but “whether they are
similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.” ’
[Citations.]” (People v. Morales (2016) 63 Cal.4th 399, 408.) “ ‘If
persons are not similarly situated for purposes of the law, an
equal protection claim fails at the threshold.’ [Citation.]” (People
v. Keister (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 442, 450.)
       If persons are similarly situated but treated differently, we
then analyze the justification for that difference. The parties
here agree, and we concur, that the rational basis test applies to
our analysis of any differential treatment. (See Legg, supra, 81
Cal.App.5th at p. 511 [“[b]ecause sex offender registration does
not implicate a suspect class or a fundamental right, rational
basis review applies”].) “Under rational basis review, even where
the state treats two similarly situated groups differently, there is
no constitutional violation unless there is [not] ‘a rational
relationship between the disparity of treatment and some
legitimate governmental purpose.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Heller v. Doe
(1993) 509 U.S. 312, 320 [113 S.Ct. 2637, 25 L.Ed.2d 257].) The
burden is on Gayles to negate every conceivable basis that might

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support section 288(c)(1)’s omission from Tiers 1 and 2. (Johnson
v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 882.)
B.    Gayles Is Not Similarly Situated to Persons
      Convicted of Violating Section 288(a), and a Rational
      Basis Exists for Any Differential Treatment
      Legg recently rejected Gayles’s claim that individuals
convicted of violating section 288(c)(1) are similarly situated to
those who violate section 288(a). (Legg, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th
504.) As relevant here, section 288(a) criminalizes “willfully and
lewdly commit[ting] any lewd or lascivious act . . . upon or with
the body, or any part or member thereof, of a child who is under
the age of 14 years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or
gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person or
the child.” Section 288(a) is a Tier 2 offense requiring a
minimum 20-year registration term. (§ 290, subd. (d)(2)(A).)
Section 288(c)(1), a Tier 3 offense, criminalizes the same act as
section 288(a), but adds the requirement that “the victim is a
child of 14 or 15 years, and [the defendant] is at least 10 years
older than the child.” (§ 288(c)(1).)
      Like Gayles, the defendant in Legg argued that an offender
who was over 40 years old2 when convicted under section
288(c)(1) is similarly situated to someone over 40 years old
convicted under section 288(a) because both statutes prohibit
willful lewd or lascivious acts by such an adult on a child. (Legg,
supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 511-512.) Legg disagreed, holding
that while “the offenses proscribed by section 288[(a) and section
288](c)(1) are generally similar to each other in that they both
prohibit a person from willfully and lewdly committing any lewd

      2 Gayles was born in 1951 and convicted in 1993.

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or lascivious act upon or with any part of the body of a child,” “a
defendant’s age can provide a meaningful distinction between
offense categories for equal protection purposes.” (Id. at p. 512.)
Section 288(a) “requires that the victim be 13 years old or
younger, and it does not require that the offender be any specific
age. On the other hand, section 288[(c)(1)] requires that the
victim be 14 or 15 years old and that the defendant be at least 10
years older than the victim.” (Legg, supra, at p. 512.) Thus,
while the two sections “share similarities in the prohibited
conduct and intent, the age differential required by [section
288](c)(1) is a meaningful distinction demonstrating that persons
violating the two statutes are not similarly situated.” (Ibid.)3
       Gayles fails to cite or discuss Legg, whose reasoning we find
persuasive. Regardless of the defendant’s actual age, section
288(a) contains no age requirement for the defendant; section
288(c)(1) mandates an age differential between the defendant and
the victim. As in Legg, Gayles’s “equal protection challenge fails
because he has not established that he, as an individual required
to register as a sex offender for life due to his conviction under
section 288[(c)(1)], is subjected to unequal treatment as compared
to a similarly situated group.” (Legg, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at
p. 514.)

      3 Legg noted “the legislative background of section
288[(c)(1)] indicates an intent to protect 14- and 15-year-old
children from ‘predatory older adults[,]’ [citation] . . . [and] ‘[t]he
inclusion of the decade age difference in the subdivision reflects a
recognition that a “sexually naïve” [citation] child of 14 or 15
could fall victim to a more experienced adult, a vice the
Legislature was attuned to and took action to prevent.’ ” (Legg,
supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 514.)

                                   6
       Even if we look past the differences in statutory definition
and posit Gayles is similarly situated to some individuals who
violate section 288(a), we further agree with Legg that a rational
basis exists for categorizing section 288(c)(1) as a Tier 3 offense
and section 288(a) as a Tier 2 offense. As Legg states, “The
Legislature could have reasonably determined that the
challenged statutory disparity is warranted to serve the
legitimate governmental purpose of protecting the public from
considerably older adults who have preyed on young and
vulnerable children. [Citation.] The legislative concern giving
rise to the enactment of [section 288(c)(1)]—sexual exploitation of
young, vulnerable children by significantly older predatory adults
[citation]—is not always present when a person violates [section
288(a)], since a violation of that provision can involve consensual
sexual relations between minors or teenagers in a romantic
relationship. [Citation.] Thus, although those convicted of
offenses under section 288[(a)] are subject to harsher penalties
(three, six, or eight years of imprisonment; convictions classified
as a ‘super strike’ (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(III)) than those
convicted under [section 288](c)(1) (one, two, or three years’
imprisonment; offenses may be prosecuted as a misdemeanor or a
felony), the Legislature reasonably could have determined that
section 288[(a)] offenses could be committed by younger offenders
with more potential to rehabilitate—despite the severity of the
offense—than their subdivision (c)(1) counterparts, who are
necessarily older and more predatory, even if their conduct occurs
with an older victim.” (Legg, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th p. 515, fn.
omitted.) “In short, because here a plausible basis does exist for
the challenged statutory disparity, [the] equal protection claim
fails.” (Id. at p. 516.)

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C.     Gayles Is Not Similarly Situated to the Tier 1
       Offenders He Identifies
       Gayles also argues he is similarly situated to defendants
convicted of the following Tier 1 violations of sections 286, 287,
and 289: section 286, subdivision (b)(2) [sodomy by a person over
21 years old with a person under 16]; section 287, subdivision
(b)(2) [oral copulation by a person over 21 years old with a person
under 16]; and section 289, subdivision (i) [sexual penetration by
a person over 21 years old with a person under 16]. However,
each of those statutory provisions explicitly start by stating,
“Except as provided in [s]ection 288 . . . .” (§§ 286, subd. (b)(2),
287, subd. (b)(2), 289, subd. (i).) Thus, these Tier 1 violations
expressly exclude situations where section 288(c)(1) applies,
namely where the victim was 14 or 15 years old and the
defendant was more than 10 years older than the victim. As in
Legg, while these Tier 1 offenses and section 288(c)(1) “share
similarities in the prohibited conduct and intent, the
[contrasting] age differential required by [section 288](c)(1) is a
meaningful distinction.” (Legg, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 512).
Gayles is thus not similarly situated to persons convicted of these
Tier 1 violations.
       Gayles argues that we should ignore the prefatory language
preempting these Tier 1 statutes when section 288 applies
because prosecutors do not adhere to it, and the People retain
charging discretion over any particular set of facts. Even if we
accept as true this argument that prosecutors ignore the relevant
statutory language, “the existence of two statutes covering the
same criminal conduct but carrying different penalties does not
violate either equal protection or due process principles, even
though a prosecutor may be influenced by the different penalties

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available upon conviction in determining under which statute to
charge a defendant.” (People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821,
841 & fn.7, citing United States v. Batchelder (1979) 442 U.S.
114, 123-125 [99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755].) Because Gayles is
not similarly situated to individuals convicted of the Tier 1
offenses he has identified, we need not address the justification
for any differential treatment between persons convicted of those
Tier 1 offenses versus individuals convicted of violating section
288(c)(1). (People v. Rhodes (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1374, 1384.)
                          DISPOSITION
      The order denying the petition to terminate sex offender
registration is affirmed.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                         WEINGART, J.

We concur:

             CHANEY, J.

             BENDIX, Acting P.J.

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