Court Opinion

ID: 9710572
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:12:07.002527+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:57.874217
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the affirmance of the denial of Breitweiser’s motion to suppress. In doing so, however, I would make two additional observations.
In the context of our criminal law, I.C. 35-48-1-19 defines marijuana as “any part of the plant ... [but] does not include the mature stalks of the plant”.
The -word “stem” is most commonly defined as “the main central part (usually above the ground) of a tree or shrub or plant.” OxfoRd American Dictionary 670 (1980). The word “stalk” is defined almost identically as “the main stem of a plant.” Id. at 665. The similarity of these definitions is not new. Webster’s International Dictionary 2453, 2468 (2d ed.1943) defines “stem” as “[t]he main axis, trunk, or body of a tree or other plant” and “stalk” as “[t]he stem or main axis of a plant.” The words are therefore synonymous.
In the instant case, Dean Marks, crime scene technician for the Indiana State Police, testified that police found “plant fragments” in a search of the defendant’s trash on February 17, 1997. 704 N.E.2d at 497-498. It appears that the fragments mentioned were “numerous stems.” Id. Thus, the defendant could have argued on appeal that the trial court improperly based its probable cause finding upon the discovery by police of plant material which did not legally constitute marijuana.
Be that as it may, appellant made no argument to this effect, and it is therefore not a factor which invalidates the issuance of the search warrant at issue. Furthermore, it could be argued that discovery of a part of a marijuana plant which is itself not marijuana might nevertheless permit a reasonable court *502to conclude that probable cause exists to believe that marijuana itself will be found at the site where the stalk was found.
With regard to the standard of review in such matters, it is appropriate to set forth the “deference test” set forth in Houser v. State (1997) Ind., 678 N.E.2d 95, 99. Here, as in Houser, the first reviewing court affirmed the issuance of the warrant. Upon review, therefore, we also give deference to the original probable cause determination.
It' may well be quite different if the first review results in the grant of a motion to suppress and therefore effectively invalidates the issuance of the warrant. In this latter instance, we may well be required to afford a degree of deference to the conclusions reached by the reviewing court. However, that issue is for another day.
I concur in the affirmance of the trial court’s suppression ruling and in the affir-mance of the conviction.