Court Opinion

ID: 9751329
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:21:04.578054+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:42.881186
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY
STRASSBURGER, J.:
I agree with the majority’s disposition of Appellant’s claims (3) through (6). However, as I would hold that Appellant has pled sufficient facts to warrant a hearing on his claims (1) and (2), I respectfully dissent.
As to Appellant’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to seek suppression of the marijuana removed by the police from Appellant’s pocket upon Appellant’s return to the victim’s house on the night of the incident, I agree with the majority and the PCRA court that, if Appellant was going to *Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court, be arrested, the marijuana would be admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Van Winkle, 880 A.2d 1280, 1285 (Pa.Super.2005) (holding that evidence obtained after officer exceeded permissible scope of weapons frisk was admissible because it fell within the inevitable discovery exception); Commonwealth v. Garcia, 443 Pa.Super. 414, 661 A.2d 1388 (1995) (holding that the defendant was not entitled to suppression of drugs in his pocket because they inevitably would have been discovered in search incident to arrest). However, I would hold that the PCRA court’s determination that Appellant was inevitably going to be arrested at that time is not supported by the record.
The only evidence presently of record on this subject is the trial testimony of Exeter Police Officer Karen Lincoln. Officer Lincoln testified that she and two other officers went to the victim’s residence on June 22, 2008, to investigate a “possible sexual assault.” N.T., 3/16/2009, at 47. When Appellant returned to the home, Officer Lincoln observed Officer Harley pat down Appellant to make sure he did not bring a weapon with him. Id. at 49. During the protective frisk, Officer Harley pulled a plastic baggie with marijuana residue from Appellant’s front pants pocket. Id. No officer testified that Appellant would have been arrested at that time had they not discovered the marijuana.
As such, I would hold that Appellant’s claim is not patently frivolous based upon on the present record, and that the PCRA court erred in denying Appellant the opportunity to prove his claim at a hearing. See, e.g., Walls, 993 A.2d at 299 (“Certainly, the issue cannot be deemed patently frivolous and without any support in the record or from other evidence, which is the standard for dismissing a PCRA petition without a hearing.”).
In his second claim, Appellant alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call character witnesses. Appellant alleges that the 14 witnesses listed in his PCRA petition, of whom trial counsel knew or should have known, would have testified at a hearing that they were available to testify at trial as to Appellant’s character as a truthful and law-abiding person. Appellant’s Brief at 13. Appellant claims *1142that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to call any of these witnesses. Id.
The majority holds that dismissal of this claim was proper because Appellant failed to offer proof of the existence of the witnesses and did not attach affidavits from them concerning their proposed testimony. The PCRA court did not cite this pleading defect as a reason for dismissing the claim.1 Rather than affirm dismissal on this basis, therefore, the appropriate remedy would be to remand to allow Appellant’s counsel to rectify the deficiency. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 526-527 (2001) (remanding case because the appellant was not put on notice of the need to amend the petition to cure a pleading defect); Pa.R.Crim.P. 905(B) (“When a petition for post-conviction collateral relief is defective as originally filed, the judge shall order amendment of the petition, indicate the nature of the defects, and specify the time within which the amended petition shall be filed.”).
“In a case such as this, where there are only two direct witnesses involved, credibility of the witnesses is of paramount importance, and character evidence is critical to the jury’s determination of credibility.” Commonwealth v. Hull, 982 A.2d 1020, 1025 (Pa.Super.2009) (quoting Commonwealth v. Weiss, 530 Pa. 1, 606 A.2d 439, 442 (1992)). As we stated long ago,
[ejvidence of good character is substantive and positive evidence, not a mere make-weight to be considered in a doubtful case, and, according to all our authorities, is an independent factor which may of itself engender a reasonable doubt or produce a conclusion of innocence. To be sure, it is to be considered with all the other evidence in the case. But it is not to be measured with or by other evidence. Its probative value, its power of persuasion, does not depend upon, and is not to be measured by, or appraised according to, the might or the infirmity in the Commonwealth’s case. Even though, under all the other evidence a jury could reach a conclusion of guilt, still if the character evidence creates a reasonable doubt or establishes innocence a verdict of acquittal must be rendered.
Commonwealth v. Padden, 160 Pa.Super. 269, 50 A.2d 722, 725 (1947) (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted) (cited with approval in Commonwealth v. Wood, 432 Pa.Super. 183, 637 A.2d 1335, 1352 (1994)). As such, when character evidence is offered, “[a] criminal defendant must receive a jury charge that evidence of good character (reputation) may, in and of itself, (by itself or alone) create a reasonable doubt of guilt and, thus, require a verdict of not guilty.” Commonwealth v. Neely, 522 Pa. 236, 561 A.2d 1, 3 (1989) (emphasis added).
Thus, the PCRA court’s dismissive rejection of Appellant’s second claim upon noting that “[rjeputation is an idle and most false imposition; oft got without merit ... [,]” Order and Notice of Intent to Dismiss, 6/30/2011, at 6, is contrary to the well-established principles of this Commonwealth, and particularly onerous in a he-said, she-said case such as the one before us. Therefore, I would hold that Appellant’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to present character witnesses is not patently frivolous, and that a hearing *1143is required to determine whether Appellant is entitled to relief based upon the evidence the proposed character witnesses would have offered, whether counsel knew or should have known of the witnesses, and counsel’s basis for not calling them.
“Pennsylvania courts have recognized expressly that every post-conviction litigant is entitled to at least one meaningful opportunity to have ... issues reviewed, at least in the context of an ineffectiveness claim.” Commonwealth v. Hampton, 718 A.2d 1250, 1252 (Pa.Super.1998) (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis in original). I believe the majority’s affirmance of the dismissal, without a hearing, of Appellant’s above-referenced claims in his first PCRA petition -fails to provide Appellant the meaningful opportunity to have his issues reviewed to which he is entitled.

. The PCRA petition does include a "Certification of Witnesses” which offers the name and address of each witness and indicates that each would testify fo Appellant’s character as a law-abiding person. In this instance, where the PCRA court failed to note any defect in this procedure and the testimony at issue relates to character evidence, I would hold that Appellant's petition is sufficiently compliant with the rules to allow us to address the issue on the merits.