Court Opinion

ID: 9657379
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:23:50.520291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:44.377249
License: Public Domain

*558GARTZKE, P.J.
(dissenting). Tatum's motion sought an evidentiary hearing on his request for an order vacating the judgments of conviction and granting him a new trial. He claims that his trial counsel ineffectively represented him by failing to arrange for his witness, Kevin Stevens, to testify in street clothes and without shackles.
When denying the motion, the trial court said, "Other than alleging in general conclusory terms that the defendant was prejudiced by this action [the appearance of Stevens in a jail uniform and shackles], there is no factual basis for it. Any prejudice alleged is speculative at best and without basis in fact or law." We should affirm the court's ruling.
When a postconviction motion raises an ineffective-assistance claim, the matter is ordinarily set for an evidentiary hearing. State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 804, 285 N.W.2d 905, 908 (Ct. App. 1979). However, the court to whom the motion is made may rule on it without a hearing if the motion fails to make specific factual allegations requiring resolution by an evidentiary hearing. State v. Washington, 176 Wis. 2d 205, 216, 500 N.W.2d 331, 336 (Ct. App. 1993).
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that (1) his counsel's performance was deficient and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced him. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
A defendant must "affirmatively prove prejudice" and establish that counsel's deficient performance "actually had an adverse effect on the defense." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. When deciding an ineffective-assistance claim, a court
must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury. Some of the factual findings will have *559been unaffected by the errors, and factual findings that were affected will have been affected in different ways. Some errors will have had a pervasive effect on the inferences to be drawn from the evidence, altering the entire evidentiary picture, and some will have had an isolated, trivial effect.
Id. at 695-96.
Thus, the Strickland court recognized that the determination whether prejudice occurred may require drawing factual inferences from the historical facts. Factual inferences regarding prejudice must be made when, as in Tatum's case, the claimed prejudice is to the defendant's credibility and the credibility of his witness. This is because credibility has to do with the fact finder's mental processes. When the court denied Tatum's motion for an evidentiary hearing, it predicated its ruling on the absence of facts from which prejudice — an improper effect on credibility — could be inferred; Tatum failed to allege facts not already of record, and the court impliedly inferred from the record that Stevens's testifying in a jail uniform and shackles had not affected the jury's assessment of Stevens's and Tatum's credibility.
Our review of a factual inference drawn by the trial court is limited. We must affirm the court's choice if multiple inferences may reasonably be drawn from the record. State v. Friday, 147 Wis. 2d 359, 370-71, 434 N.W.2d 85, 89 (1989).
Stevens's testimony is relevant to a single charge in the information: on May 7, 1992, Tatum violated a condition in his bail bond of that same date that he have no contact, directly or indirectly by telephone or through another individual, with Delphine Patrick. I therefore examine the totality of the record pertinent to that charge.
*560Patrick testified that Tatum called her in the morning on May 7. She heard someone in the background tell Tatum, "[Y]ou better not be calling home because you have a no contact. . .According to Patrick, Tatum then said to her, ”[0]h yeah,... you better drop that [the no-contact condition in the bail bond], too."
Patrick also testified that Tatum's friend Stevens telephoned her that afternoon and told her Tatum wanted to know whether she was going to drop the no-contact condition. She could hear Tatum in the background talking to Stevens. About one hour later, she received a telephone call from Tatum. During that call, he told her to drop the no-contact condition. Her neighbor, Sharon Morine, was present during the call. Morine testified that she was present in Patrick's apartment when Tatum called. Patrick put the telephone receiver up to Morine's ear so she could hear Tatum's voice. Later that day, Patrick received another call, and although the voice was muffled, she knew it was Tatum's.
Stevens testified that on May 7 he was in court, as was Tatum. Both had been in jail. He and Tatum left the courthouse that afternoon, each on a signature bond. They made no telephone calls between the time they left the courthouse and the time they went to Stevens's motel room. After they arrived at the room, Stevens called Patrick to obtain a telephone number. Tatum stayed with Stevens into the evening hours. Tatum made no telephone calls while Stevens was present. Stevens was not always in the room.
John Newbury testified that on May 7 he met Tatum in Stevens’s motel room. Two other men were present. Tatum did not call Patrick while Newbury was *561present. Newbury was absent from the room a couple of times.
Tatum testified that during the afternoon of May 7 he was taken from the jail to court and was released on a bail bond. Stevens was with him. They went to Stevens's room where they stayed and talked for three or four hours. Tatum made no telephone calls while he was in Stevens's room. He admitted that he had been convicted of crimes on two prior occasions.
A police officer testified that he spoke to Stevens at Tatum's request. Stevens told the officer that he made calls for Tatum to Patrick.
Given the totality of the evidence pertinent to the bail-jumping charge, it was reasonable for the trial court to infer that Stevens's testifying in a jail uniform and shackles did not prejudice the jury's assessment of his or Tatum's credibility. The credibility of each was seriously damaged by other testimony. Tatum's credibility was damaged by (1) his admission of two prior convictions, (2) the testimony of Patrick and her neighbor, and (3) the statement Stevens made to the police officer that he called Patrick for Tatum. Stevens's credibility was damaged by (1) the testimony of Patrick and her neighbor, and (2) the testimony of the police officer.