Court Opinion

ID: 9547319
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:45:27.256742+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:36.125964
License: Public Domain

Cox, J.
Tommie Granville, n/k/a Wynn, appeals the trial court’s visitation award to Jenifer and Gary Troxel, the paternal grandparents of her daughters Natalie and Isabelle. Wynn argues that the grandparents lack standing to petition for two reasons. First, there was no pending custody proceeding at the time of the grandparents’ petition. Second, her husband Kelly Wynn adopted both girls.
*133Wynn also challenges evidentiary rulings by the trial court, contends it applied the wrong standard in making its decision, and maintains the findings and conclusions are inadequate. Moreover, she challenges the constitutionality of the visitation statute. Because the Troxels had no standing to petition for visitation in the absence of a pending custody proceeding, we reverse.
Brad Troxel and Tommie Wynn had a relationship that ended in June 1991. Natalie and Isabelle are their daughters and the granddaughters of Jenifer and Gary Troxel. After the separation, Brad lived with the Troxels and regularly brought Natalie and Isabelle to the Troxels’ house for weekend visitation. Brad committed suicide in May 1993. After Brad’s death, the Troxels saw Natalie and Isabelle regularly, though the girls did not stay overnight at the Troxel residence. In October 1993, Wynn informed the Troxels that she wished to limit visitation to one short visit per month. The Troxels declined Wynn’s offer. Between October and December 1993, they did not see Natalie and Isabelle. They did not resume regular visitation with the girls until April 1994, when a court commissioner entered a temporary visitation order.
In December 1993, Jenifer and Gary Troxel commenced this action, seeking court-ordered visitation with their granddaughters. At the time of trial in December 1994, Natalie and Isabelle were five and almost three years old, respectively.
At trial, the Troxels requested two weekends of overnight visitation per month and two weeks of visitation during the summer. Based on the recommendation of her counselor, Dr. Nora Young, Wynn asked the court to order one day of visitation each month with no overnight stay. Dr. Young also suggested that the grandparents participate in the Wynns’ holiday celebrations. The court heard testimony from the Troxels, their son-in-law, and two expert witnesses that Wynn hired. Based on the evidence, the trial court issued its oral ruling and entered a visitation decree ordering visitation of one weekend per *134month, one week in the summer, and four hours on the birthday of each of the Troxels.
Wynn sought review. We remanded the case for entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We later directed the parties to file additional briefs.
Standing
Wynn argues that the Troxels lack standing to petition for visitation. The Troxels counter that the plain meaning of RCW 26.10.160(3) allows them to so petition. We hold that the Troxels lack standing because no child custody proceeding was pending when the Troxels commenced this action.
At issue is the meaning of RCW 26.10.160(3). Statutory construction is a question of law that we review de novo.1 The primary objective of statutory construction is to carry out the intent of the Legislature by examining the language of the statute.2 We give words their plain meaning unless a contrary intent appears.3 We also must construe statutes "as a whole in order to ascertain legislative purpose, and thus avoid unlikely, strained or absurd consequences which could result from a literal reading.”4
RCW 26.10.160(3) provides:
Any person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time including, but not limited to, custody proceedings. The court may order visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve the best interest of the child whether or not there has been any change of circumstances.[5]
*135A literal reading of this statute could lead to the sort of absurd result that our canons of statutory construction forbid. Does "any person” have standing to petition "at any time” for visitation with a child? For example, could a member of the state Legislature who has displeased a constituent find herself faced with the considerable expenditure of time, money, and emotional energy to oppose a wholly frivolous petition by that constituent? Should this occur without any showing that the parent was unfit or that the family was unstable or that the child was otherwise facing any threat to its well-being? Our Legislature could not have intended such an absurd and potentially pernicious result from so broad a reading of the statute.
This court stated in dicta in In re Custody of B.S.Z.-S.6 that the third-party visitation provision in RCW 26.10.160(3) applies only in the context of actions for child custody and questions of visitation that arise in custody actions. RCW 26.10.030(1) provides that a petitioner may commence a third-party child custody proceeding only when a child is not in the custody of one of its parents or if the petition alleges parental unfitness. That limitation is consistent with the constitutional restrictions on state interference with parents’ fundamental liberty interest in the "care, custody, and management” of their children.7 The Legislature could not have intended to open the door to "any” person petitioning for visitation "at any time,” having created such strict standing requirements for third-party custody proceedings.
RCW 26.10 is entitled "Nonparental Actions for Child Custody.” The Legislature’s statement of intent declares that it enacted RCW 26.10 to "reenact and continue the law relating to third-party actions involving custody of *136minor children.”8 That statement of intent is also consistent with restricting petitions for visitation to custody-proceedings, rather than allowing petitioners to commence new proceedings when no custody or other action is pending.
Our reading of the limitations of RCW 26.10.160(3) finds further support in the statutory history of this statute and RCW 26.09.240, a parallel provision. In 1987, the Legislature reenacted and continued the law relating to third party actions involving custody of minor children in order to distinguish it from the 1987 parenting act amendments. The 1987 version of RCW 26.09.240 provided, in part, that "[a]ny person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time.” Similarly, RCW 26.10.160, as originally enacted in 1987, provided, in part, that "[a]ny person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time including, but not limited to, custody proceedings.”
Aside from some renumbering,9 the portion of RCW 26.10.160(3) that is relevant to this matter has remained unchanged since enactment. In 1989, the Legislature substituted "a person other than a parent” for "any person” in RCW 26.09.240,10 but the relevant language remained otherwise unchanged until last year.
In its 1996 session, the Legislature amended RCW 26.09.240 to limit the circumstances under which a non-parent may petition for visitation rights. First, a "person other than a parent may not petition for visitation under this section unless the child’s parent or parents have commenced an action under this chapter.”11 Second, even where such an action is pending, a court must dismiss a visitation petition unless the petitioner "can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that a significant relation*137ship exists with the child with whom visitation is sought.”12 If the court dismisses the petition on that basis, the petitioner must pay reasonable attorney fees and costs to the respondent.13
In 1987, the Legislature enacted virtually identical provisions that have subsequently proceeded on parallel tracks. We can see no plausible reason why the Legislature would amend RCW 26.09.240 and not RCW 26.10.160(3). Therefore, we must assume that the Legislature’s failure to similarly amend the latter statute was the result of an unintentional oversight.
For all of the reasons discussed above, whether or not the Legislature overlooked amending RCW 26.10.160(3) when it amended RCW 26.09.240, we believe it did intend that a custody proceeding be in effect before third parties could petition for visitation.
Accordingly, we hold that a petition for visitation under RCW 26.10.160(3) must be contemporaneous with a proceeding for child custody.14 There was no such proceeding when the Troxels filed their petition. The Troxels did not have standing to bring their petition for visitation.
The Troxels argue that they have standing under RCW 26.09.240(1) because of a proceeding in 1992 under the Uniform Parentage Act15 that resulted in a parenting plan for these children. No such decree is in the record in this case. In any event, Division III of this court has properly rejected the contention that RCW 26.26.130(6) effectively invokes the dissolution statute: "[T]he reference to RCW 26.09 is merely the direction to apply the same procedures and criteria as those used in the Parenting Act of 1987, *138Laws of 1987, ch. 460, in formulating a paternity parenting plan.”16 The Troxels’ argument is unpersuasive.
Wynn makes several other challenges to the visitation decree. She argues that her husband’s adoption of both girls eliminates the Troxels’ right to petition for visitation. She also claims that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to follow the recommendations of her expert witnesses. In addition, Wynn argues that the visitation statute impermissibly interferes with parents’ constitutionally protected interest in child-rearing. She also claims that, in determining the best interests of the child in a nonparental visitation proceeding, a court’s inquiry should be whether failure to order visitation would be detrimental to the child’s development. Alternatively, she suggests that a court should apply the standards of the recently revised statute governing nonparental visitation in dissolution proceedings to the question of the child’s best interests. Finally, she argues that, under either test, the findings of fact and conclusions of law in this case were inadequate to support the award. We do not reach these questions because of our disposition based on a lack of standing.
We reverse the visitation decree and dismiss the Troxels’ petition for visitation.

Our Lady of Lourdes Hosp. v. Franklin County, 120 Wn.2d 439, 443, 842 P.2d 956 (1993).

Stone v. Chelan County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 110 Wn.2d 806, 809, 756 P.2d 736 (1988).

In re Estate of Little, 106 Wn.2d 269, 283, 721 P.2d 950 (1986).

Alderwood Water Dist. v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 62 Wn.2d 319, 321, 382 P.2d 639 (1963).

(Emphasis added.)

 74 Wn. App. 727, 731, 875 P.2d 693 (1994).

See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982).

RCW 26.10.010.

Laws of 1996, ch. 303, § 2, p. 1636; Laws of 1994, ch. 267, § 2, p. 1698; Laws of 1989, ch. 326, § 2, p. 1605.

Laws of 1989, ch. 375, § 13, p. 1969.

RCW 26.09.240(1).

RCW 26.09.240(3).

RCW 26.09.240(3).

In re Visitation of Wolcott, 85 Wn. App. 468, 933 P.2d 1066 (1997).

RCW 26.26.

In re Custody of Brown, 77 Wn. App. 350, 355, 890 P.2d 1080 (1995).