Court Opinion

ID: 9847659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:04:15.292796+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:25.542488
License: Public Domain

BERNES, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I fully concur in Divisions 1 and 3 of the majority opinion, I respectfully dissent from Division 2 because I do not believe that Jefferson’s two statements to the juvenile court rose to the level of criminal contempt.
OCGA § 15-11-5 (a) provides that the juvenile court “may punish a person for contempt of court for willfully disobeying an order of the *882court or for obstructing or interfering with the proceedings of the court or the enforcement of its orders, subject to the law relating to the procedures therefor and the limitations thereon.” Citing to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Wood v. Georgia, 370 U. S. 375 (82 SC 1364, 8 LE2d 569) (1962), our Supreme Court has held that “[t]he test applied to determine whether a statement is contemptuous is whether [the statement represents] a clear and present danger to [the] orderly administration of justice.” Garland v. State, 253 Ga. 789, 790 (2) (325 SE2d 131) (1985).
There is no bright line test for determining when conduct poses such a clear and present danger, because such an assessment “can be made only after taking into account the setting in which the statement is made.” Garland, 253 Ga. at 791 (2). To be considered criminal contempt, however, the conduct must include acts that interfere with a litigant’s ability to receive a fair trial or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice. See id.; McDaniel v. State, 202 Ga. App. 409 (414 SE2d 536) (1992). Furthermore, “criminal contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense and the evidence of the contempt must be beyond a reasonable doubt. Contempt is a drastic remedy which ought not to deprive one of [his] liberty unless it rests upon a firm and proper basis.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Salter v. Greene, 226 Ga. App. 384, 385 (1) (486 SE2d 650) (1997). See also Hartman v. Lyng, 884 F2d 1103, 1106 (8th Cir. 1989) (“Because the contempt power is a substantial one, it should be used sparingly and not be lightly invoked.”); In re Spruell, 221 Ga. App. 324, 325 (1) (489 SE2d 48) (1997).
The need for caution before finding criminal contempt is particularly necessary “in the case of an attorney who is attempting to be heard on behalf of his client.” Calhoun v. Findley, 168 Ga. App. 634, 638 (309 SE2d 907) (1983). In this respect, this Court has previously held as a matter of law:
“The arguments of a lawyer in presenting his client’s case strenuously and persistently cannot amount to a contempt of court so long as the lawyer does not in some way create an obstruction which blocks the judge in the performance of his judicial dutyf.]. . . While we appreciate the necessity for a judge to have the power to protect himself from actual obstruction in the courtroom, or even from conduct so near to the court as actually to obstruct justice, it is also essential to a fair administration of justice that lawyers be able to make honest good-faith efforts to present their clients’ cases.” In [re]McConnell, 370 U. S. 230, 236 (82 SC 1288, 8 LE2d 434) *883(1962). Accord In re Brookins, 153 Ga. App. 82 (264 SE2d 560) (1980). See also In [re] Little, 404 U. S. 553 (92 SC 659, 30 LE2d 708) (1972).
(Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 638. See also In re Bryant, 188 Ga. App. 383, 384-386 (2) (373 SE2d 74) (1988). Jefferson’s two statements must be examined in light of these principles.
(a) Jefferson was found in contempt for stating, “[T]hat‘s a gross interference with the way that I can represent my client, your Honor” in response to the juvenile court’s ruling that she could not question the investigating officer about the shooter’s statement before first calling the shooter himself to the stand. In making the statement, Jefferson was articulating the basis for her objection to the trial court’s ruling, albeit in a strenuous manner. But, as pointed out above, vigorous argument made as part of articulating an objection, in and of itself, cannot serve as the basis for a finding of contempt, even if the objection was ultimately ill-founded. See, e.g., In re Bryant, 188 Ga. App. at 384-386 (2); Calhoun, 168 Ga. App. at 637-638. Rather, in order to be contemptuous, the argument must “in some way create an obstruction which blocks the judge in the performance of his judicial duty.” In re McConnell, 370 U. S. at 236.
The record reflects no such obstruction in the present case. There is no allegation that Jefferson violated a previous court order in making the statement, or that the statement was made after Jefferson had already been warned by the trial court based on prior improper statements. Compare Garland v. State of Ga., 101 Ga. App. 395 (114 SE2d 176) (1960). Furthermore, the statement occurred in a bench trial rather than before a jury; the statement was made as part of the argument regarding the order and admissibility of evidence; the juvenile court hearing the contempt matter expressly found that there was no evidence that Jefferson had ever addressed the court in a disrespectful tone or with an improper demeanor during the bench trial; the trial proceeded after the statement with Jefferson abiding by the court’s ruling; and there is no indication in the record that the statement otherwise disrupted or delayed the proceedings in any manner. Under these circumstances, Jefferson’s statement did not create an actual or potential obstruction that blocked the juvenile court from performing its duties.
While the majority relies upon White v. State of Ga., 218 Ga. 290 (127 SE2d 668) (1962) to support its position, the trial court in that case specifically found that the attorney had made the statements at issue, as well as other remarks throughout the proceedings, in a disrespectful and discourteous manner. Id. at 293 (2) (b). The juvenile court hearing the contempt action in the present case found the exact opposite.
*884(b) Jefferson also was found in contempt for stating “I just want the record to reflect with much respect, Your Honor,... I just find the Court is biased in its view. You say that you’re not prejudging the case but it seems to me like you’ve made up your mind and any and everything I do to effectively defend my client I’m being rebutted.” While the transcript of the delinquency hearing does not support a finding of bias, the fact that Jefferson was substantively wrong on this issue does not in itself render her allegation of bias contemptuous. See Holt v. Virginia, 381 U. S. 131, 136-138 (85 SC 1375, 14 LE2d 290) (1965); In re McLarty, 152 Ga. App. 399, 400-401 (2) (263 SE2d 194) (1979).
Notably, the United States Supreme Court in In re Little, 404 U. S. at 555-556, overturned the criminal contempt conviction of a party who protested that the trial court “was biased and had prejudged the case” in open court during a jury trial. The Supreme Court explained:
There is no indication, and the State does not argue, that petitioner’s statements were uttered in a boisterous tone or in any wise actually disrupted the court proceeding. Therefore, the vehemence of the language used is not alone the measure of the power to punish for contempt. The fires which it kindles must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice. The danger must not be remote or even probable; it must immediately imperil. The law of contempt is not made for the protection of judges who maybe sensitive to the winds of public opinion. Judges are supposed to be men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate. Trial courts must be on guard against confusing offenses to their sensibilities with obstruction to the administration of justice.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 555. The Supreme Court went on to note that the reversal of the contempt conviction was “necessarily required” under its prior holding in Holt v. Virginia, 381 U. S. at 136-138, where the Court had held that an attorney could not be held in contempt merely for filing a motion to recuse a trial judge on the grounds of partiality and bias. In re Little, 404 U. S. at 556.
The present case is squarely controlled by In re Little. As in that case, in arguing that the juvenile court was biased, Jefferson did not use any derogatory language or epithets, and, as previously noted, there is no evidence in the record that Jefferson had a disrespectful tone or demeanor. Furthermore, the statement in the present case carried even less potential of disrupting the proceedings than the statement in In re Little, since the statement in that case occurred *885during a jury trial, whereas the statement here occurred in a bench trial before a juvenile court that was closed to the public.
Decided March 30, 2007
Reconsideration denied April 11, 2007
Sherri J. Jefferson, pro se.
Finally, Jefferson’s statement appears in part to have been responsive to the juvenile court’s sua sponte statements, made several times during the course of the case, that he was not going to prejudge the matter. Jefferson’s protest must be read in this context.
For these reasons, as well as the other attendant facts and circumstances discussed above in subsection (a), I believe that the juvenile court erred in finding Jefferson in criminal contempt based on her statement that the court was biased. See In re Little, 404 U. S. at 555-556; Holt, 381 U. S. at 136-138; In re McLarty, 152 Ga. App. at 400-401 (2).1
In closing, I believe that Jefferson’s two statements offended the precept that “[c]ivility and courtesy should be hallmarks of the legal profession.” Garland, 253 Ga. at 792. The issue before this Court, however, is “the narrow issue of criminal contempt and its even narrower limitation of clear and present danger.” Id. Applying the relevant law, I cannot find that these statements constituted criminal contempt.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Barnes and Judge Miller join in this opinion.

 The majority appears to suggest that the finding of contempt could be based in part on a finding that Jefferson improperly continued to argue with the juvenile court after it had ruled on the issue at hand. However, the juvenile court hearing the contempt action expressly found that a finding of contempt could not be predicated on the allegation that Jefferson continued arguing with the court after it made its rulings, noting especially that there was no evidence in the record that Jefferson “was put on notice such continued advocacy was deemed contemptuous.” Neither party challenges this finding on appeal.