Court Opinion

ID: 9460464
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:50:54.678633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:37.615236
License: Public Domain

MOORE, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I cannot bring myself to subscribe to or accept a doctrine that “our nation’s crowded, high-speed highways makes involvement in collisions foreseeable to manufacturers as an inevitable consequence of normal use” of an automobile. *188The collision here was with such force as to cause the gas tank of the vehicle struck from the rear to burst into flames. Even assuming that there was a “defective condition” in that the gas tank’s top was a part of the floor of the ' car, to create liability it must have been “unreasonably dangerous.” Collisions foreseeable, yes, but collisions of the type before us, no. It would be hard to imagine any automotive vehicle, requiring gasoline for propulsion purposes, being so designed as to avoid the possibility of a tank fire or explosion when violently struck in collision. Even army tanks caught on fire after running over field mines with a resulting explosion. In short, I think some legal significance should be given to the adverb “unreasonably.” Nor can I reconcile “intended use” with collisions which “are not literally intended.”
I recognize two opposing and conflicting philosophies which have developed in this field which may be referred to respectively as Evans1 and Larsen2 Each has its own following (see cases cited in the majority opinion). What the highest court of Rhode Island would decide if confronted with a state of facts similar to those presented here, I do not know. I can only express my views that the Evans rationale to me is far more consistent with (1) the law in this field as it has developed over the years and (2) common sense as applied in a pragmatic way than Larsen. Nor do I find Ritter 3 conclusive although, of course, I must recognize that it has carried “foreseeability” well beyond previous Rhode Island decisions.
Despite my, of necessity, inconclusive views as to liability, I concur that there should be a new trial on the issue of damages. I differ only from my colleagues in believing that the method of determining damages, now having been codified in Rhode Island, Gen.Laws of R.I. § 10-7-1.1 (Supp. 1972) should be left to the discretion of the trial judge on remand both as to the evidence admitted and as to the instructions to the jury thereon. Since as the majority state: “The Rhode Island statute obviously requires a great deal of speculation.”, I would leave to the future trial judge the not-too-enviable task of endeavoring to reduce speculation to a minimum. In sum, except as necessary in the field of taxes, I would give the trial judge free rein without appellate comment to accept or reject such evidence as he may believe to be relevant to the damage issue.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
We granted Ford’s petition for rehearing on the final issue only: impact of the joint tortfeasor release. Upon consideration of supplemental briefs filed by both parties, we adhere to our original position.» However, we wish to clarify our holdings as follows:
No determination of negligence on the part of the Sullivans has yet been made. The settlement and release between the Sullivans and Turcotte were not disposi-tive of this issue. Therefore, they cannot at this time be considered joint tort-feasors within the meaning of Gen.Laws of R. I., § 10-6-2 (Supp. 1972). See Theobald v. Angelos, 44 N.J. 228, 208 A. 2d 129 (1965); Swigert v. Welk, 213 Md. 613, 133 A.2d 428 (1957); Davis v. Miller, 385 Pa. 348, 123 A.2d 422 (1956). While these cases concerned the right to bring into or keep in a tort litigation a putative joint tortfeasor who had given a release, their recognition of the importance to the defendant of retaining the opportunity to determine the culpability of the settling tortfeasor is also a recognition of the straits in which a defendant is placed if he allows settling tortfeasor to be absent. See Mazer v. Lipshutz, 360 *189F.2d 275 (3d Cir. 1966). While Pulvari v. Greyhound Corp., 287 F.Supp. 104 (D.D.C.1968) arguably takes a different view, we follow what we deem to be the preponderance of authority.
The cited cases indicate that despite the settlement and release the Sullivans could and probably should have been retained as parties in the original trial so that their legal liability, if any, could then have been established. Instead, Ford acquiesced in the dismissal of the Sullivans as parties. As we said in n. 22 of the original opinion, we leave it to the district court to determine if Ford is now barred from bringing a separate action against the Sullivans which might determine whether they were negligent and, if so, whether they were joint tort-feasors with respect to Gerard Tur-cotte’s death. Should these hurdles be surmounted, there will remain the question of the basis of apportioning damages. We leave this to the district court and another day.

. Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966), cert, denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1967).

. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).

. Ritter v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 109 R.I. 176, 283 A.2d 255 (1971).