Court Opinion

ID: 9911474
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-19 22:01:57.732641+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:16.356699
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/19/23 P. v. Nazareta CA1/4
        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                            FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,
      Plaintiff and
 Respondent,                                                  A162377

 v.                                                           (Contra Costa County
 SAM ELLIOTT NAZARETA,                                        Super. Ct. No. 51820497)
      Defendant and
 Appellant.

          Sam Elliott Nazareta appeals after a jury convicted him of
first degree murder. He contends the prosecution violated
Batson-Wheeler by using a peremptory challenge to dismiss a
juror because of the juror’s race or ethnicity.1 We agree and will
reverse the judgment.2
                                        BACKGROUND
          The prosecution charged Nazareta, along with co-defendant
Christova Topete, with murdering Joseph W. The prosecutor also

          1 Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79; People v. Wheeler

(1978) 22 Cal.3d 258.
          2 As the Attorney General did not timely file a respondent’s

brief, we decide this appeal based on Nazareta’s opening brief.

                                                      1
charged Topete with a special allegation of personal use of a
firearm and firearm-related offenses. After a month-long trial in
August and September 2020, the jury found the special allegation
was true and both defendants guilty as charged. The trial court
sentenced Nazareta to 25 years to life in prison and Topete to 50
years to life in prison.
      The trial court conducted jury voir dire between August 5
and August 14, 2020. The trial court did not use a jury
questionnaire because of concerns about transmission of COVID-
19. It chose instead to give the parties twice as much time during
voir dire to examine the jurors. After reviewing for hardships,
each day the court asked a panel of 20 jurors some preliminary
questions for about an hour or an hour and a half, and then
turned over the rest of each day to allow the parties to question
the panel.
      During the trial court’s voir dire of juror A., A. stated that
he was an IT analyst for UCSF and his spouse was a data
manager for Contra Costa County.3 He had two sons, ages 20
and 21, both of whom were students. He had never been on a
jury before. Neither A. nor anyone close to him had been
involved in a criminal matter, and he did not have any close
family or friends in law enforcement. He did not have any strong
feelings about guns or any of the concepts the trial court had

      3 The reporter’s transcript generally refers to jurors by last

name. In the interests of protecting their privacy, we refer to
them by their last initial. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(10).)

                                  2
explained, such as the presumption of innocence, the burden of
proof, or the jury’s role.
      Topete asked A. what his children were studying, and A.
responded, “Computer science and undeclared.” A. clarified that
his spouse’s data management work for the county did not
involve the court. Topete then asked, “And I wrote down that
you’re an IT analyst. Who are you analyzing? Other employees
or data? Or what are you doing?” A. replied, “Both data and
desktop support.” A. later affirmed to Topete that he could follow
the rule that a jury cannot consider the fact that a defendant
chooses not to testify.
      During the prosecutor’s questioning, A. said that he had
lived in Contra Costa County for five years and in Alameda
County before that. He did not have any problems with the
concepts of aiding and abetting, two examples of which the
prosecutor had provided. A. had no problem with needing to use
circumstantial evidence to figure out what someone was thinking.
He would evaluate a witness with a different lifestyle, such as
one who used drugs or had a criminal history, just like all other
witnesses.
      The prosecutor then asked, “Anything else in your
background?” A. replied, “Nothing else.”
      During his portion of voir dire, Nazareta asked whether A.
would commit to applying the judge’s rules critically and
dispassionately, despite the fact that the case involved someone’s
death. A. said, “I will. Happy to serve.” A. also said he could
apply circumstantial evidence to determine whether the mental

                                 3
state of an aider and abettor had been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. He committed to voting accordingly if the
circumstantial evidence had a reasonable conclusion that pointed
to not guilty.
      Following voir dire, the prosecutor used her first
peremptory challenge on juror D., her eighth on juror L., and her
fifteenth on A.
      After the prosecutor excused A., Nazareta objected based
on Batson-Wheeler. His counsel stated that Nazareta is Filipino,
as are D., L., and A., making A. the third challenge to a Filipino
juror. Nazareta argued that A. did not give any answers that
indicated a bias for either side. Given the number of challenges
to jurors of the same race and ethnicity as himself and the
circumstances of A.’s answers, Nazareta urged the court to draw
an inference of discrimination. Topete joined the challenge.
      The court stated that it did not know Nazareta was Filipino
and could not tell from the jurors’ names whether they were
Hispanic or Filipino. When the court asked the prosecutor
whether there was anything she wanted to say about whether
Nazareta had shown a prima facie case of discrimination, the
prosecutor likewise said she did not know the three jurors were
Filipino. Speaking without her notes, the prosecutor then briefly
stated her reasons for challenging the three jurors. As to A., she
said that she knew very little about him, he was not forthcoming
with his answers, and he worked alone and not in a group. She
said given the number of unknowns about A., the other jurors

                                 4
coming up, and the number of peremptory challenges she had,
she chose not to roll the dice on someone she knew little about.
      The court told the prosecutor to get her notes. When she
returned, the court said that it accepted Nazareta’s
representation that the three jurors were Filipino and would, for
the purposes of the hearing, find that Nazareta had made a
prima facie showing. The court then invited the prosecutor to
finish her presentation with regard to the three jurors.
      The prosecutor gave more detailed explanations of her
reasons for excusing each of the three jurors at issue. As to A.,
the prosecutor said that he had lived in the county for five years
and in Alameda County before that. She said A. worked in San
Francisco as an analyst and worked alone and not in a group of
people. The prosecutor described A. as “very, very vague in his
answers” and said she knew “very, very little about him.” She
excused him because he was vague and did not have a group
mentality.
      Nazareta noted that he had not objected to the excusal of D.
and L., but he argued that A. being the third Filipino juror
showed a pattern and the prosecutor’s reasons for excusing A.
were vague and did not point to specific answers that A. gave.
Topete added that A. was forthcoming and not vague, and the
facts that his “profession was data and he works alone” were not
sufficient to rebut the prima facie showing.
      The court accepted the prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons for
challenging D. and L. The court then turned to consider whether
the challenge to A. was the beginning of a pattern or established

                                 5
a pattern. The court commented that there was not very much
information about him, in contrast to other jurors with whom the
parties spent more time. The court noted that A. had no prior
jury service, he had no family or friends in law enforcement, no
one close to him was involved in a criminal matter, and he had
two children who were 20 and 21 years old. The court said the
parties and court knew his occupation and how long he had been
doing it. The trial court mentioned that A. was happy to serve.
The court then concluded, “On this record, based on the Court’s
information, I believe that -- or the Court will accept the
prosecutor’s representations that this juror was excluded for a
race-neutral reason, probably won’t accept this reason any more
for a challenge to a Filipino juror.” The court noted that the jury
at that point included two jurors with last names that could have
been Hispanic or Filipino. The court therefore denied the
defendants’ objection to the excusal of A. However, the
prosecutor later excused one of the additional jurors the court
had named.
                          DISCUSSION
      “ ‘Peremptory challenges may not be used to exclude
prospective jurors based on group membership such as race or
gender.’ [Citations.] ‘Excluding even a single prospective juror
for reasons impermissible under Batson and Wheeler requires
reversal.’ [Citation.] When a party opposing a peremptory strike
makes a prima facie case that the strike was motivated by
impermissible discrimination (step 1), the proponent of the strike
must offer a nondiscriminatory reason for that challenge (step 2).

                                 6
[Citation.] The question then becomes (step 3) whether the
opponent of the peremptory challenge has shown it ‘ “more likely
than not that the challenge was improperly motivated.” ’ ”
(People v. Baker (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1044, 1071 (Baker).) Because
the trial court found Nazareta established a prima facie case of
discrimination and the prosecutor stated her reasons for striking
A., our review of the trial court’s ruling begins with the third
Batson-Wheeler step. (People v. Smith (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1134,
1147 [when trial court makes a prima facie finding of group bias
and evaluates prosecutor’s reasons for challenge, “the adequacy
of the prima facie showing becomes moot”].)
      “ ‘The existence or nonexistence of purposeful racial
discrimination is a question of fact.’ [Citation.] [¶] The answer to
this factual question will ordinarily depend ‘on the subjective
genuineness of the race-neutral reasons given for the peremptory
challenge.’ [Citation.] A justification based on a
mischaracterization of the record could reveal a discriminatory
motive [citation], but might reflect a mere error of recollection
[citations]. Likewise, a justification that is ‘implausible or
fantastic . . . may (and probably will) be found to be pretext[ual],’
yet even a ‘silly or superstitious’ reason may be sincerely held.
[Citations.] Of course, the factual basis for, and analytical
strength of, a justification may shed significant light on the
genuineness of that justification — and, thus, on the ultimate
question of discrimination. [Citation.] But the force of the
justification is significant only to the extent that it informs
analysis of the ultimate question of discriminatory motivation.”

                                  7
(Baker, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 1076–1077.) “A prosecutor’s
positing of multiple reasons, some of which, upon examination,
prove implausible or unsupported by the facts, can in some
circumstances fatally impair the prosecutor’s credibility.” (People
v. Smith, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 1157–1158.) The credibility of a
prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation can also be measured by
the prosecutor’s demeanor and whether the prosecutor’s rationale
is grounded in accepted trial strategy. (People v. Miles (2020)
9 Cal.5th 513, 539.)
      Given the subjective nature of the third step Batson-
Wheeler inquiry, “ ‘[w]hen the trial court makes a sincere and
reasoned effort to evaluate the [proffered] reasons, the reviewing
court defers to its conclusions on appeal, and examines only
whether substantial evidence supports them.’ ” (Baker, supra,
10 Cal.5th at p. 1077.) But “[w]hen ‘the proffered reasons lack[ ]
inherent plausibility or [are] contradicted by the record,’ the
court’s failure to probe, or to explain, may eliminate the basis for
deference.” (Id. at p. 1078.) “Deference may also be
inappropriate when the court evinces a misunderstanding of the
legal inquiry.” (Ibid.) Even when review is deferential, “that
review remains a meaningful one.” (People v. Lenix (2008)
44 Cal.4th 602, 621.) “When reasons are given for the exercise of
challenges, an advocate must ‘stand or fall on the plausibility of
the reasons he gives.’ [Citation.] The plausibility of those
reasons will be reviewed, but not reweighed, in light of the entire
record.” (Ibid.)

                                 8
      Nazareta argues the prosecution dismissed A. because he is
Filipino.4 This case is somewhat unusual in that there is no
evidence that A. is Filipino beyond Nazareta’s assertion to that
effect. However, the record is nonetheless sufficient to support
Nazareta’s Batson-Wheeler challenge. A party raising Baston-
Wheeler need only make “ ‘as complete a record of the
circumstances as is feasible’ ” and need not establish the race of a
juror by direct question and answer. (People v. Motton (1985)
39 Cal.3d 596, 603–604.) Additionally, a Batson-Wheeler
challenge to the dismissal of Hispanic jurors can be based on the
last names of jurors where the last names indicate Spanish
ancestry and there is no other information available. (People v.
Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1087.) We apply the same
principle to Nazareta’s allegation that D., L., and A. are Filipino.
It makes no difference that the jurors’ last names could be
consistent with either Hispanic or Filipino ancestry, as striking
them for being Hispanic or Filipino would be equally
impermissible.
I.   Misunderstanding of legal inquiry
      The prosecutor offered three reasons for striking A.: he
worked alone, he was vague or not forthcoming in his answers,
and the prosecutor knew little about him. Before examining each

      4 Nazareta also argues on appeal that the prosecution’s

peremptory challenges to D. and L. were discriminatory. Because
we agree with Nazareta as to A., we need not consider whether
the challenges to D. and L. were also discriminatory. (Baker,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 1071 [“ ‘Excluding even a single
prospective juror for reasons impermissible under Batson and
Wheeler requires reversal’ ”].)

                                 9
of these reasons and the trial court’s ruling, we note at the outset
that the trial court misstated the nature of the legal inquiry. At
the beginning of its ruling, the trial court said, “So to start with, I
mean, looking at the first two jurors for which the defense claims
that the pattern began, the Court cannot find that the pattern
began with these jurors because there’s abundant reasons” to
excuse them both. The trial court proceeded to explain why it
believed the prosecutor had excused D. and L. for race-neutral
reasons. The court concluded that it did not believe those two
peremptory challenges “began a pattern.” The court then turned
to “really consider whether or not the challenge to [A.] is the
beginning of a pattern or establishes a pattern.”
      Nazareta relied in part on the pattern of excluding D., L.,
and A. to make his prima facie showing. The trial court’s initial
focus on whether the peremptory challenges to D. and L.
demonstrated a pattern is therefore understandable. But the
trial court’s continued focus on the existence of a pattern when it
proceeded to the third step of evaluating the prosecutor’s reasons
for excusing A. was error. “[T]he ultimate issue to be addressed
on a Wheeler-Batson motion ‘is not whether there is a pattern of
systematic exclusion; rather, the issue is whether a particular
prospective juror has been challenged because of group bias.’ ”
(People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 598, fn. 3, disapproved on
other grounds by People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 686,
fn. 13; accord, Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 169,
fn. 5 [Batson “declined to require proof of a pattern or practice”
for a prima facie showing “because ‘ “[a] single invidiously

                                  10
discriminatory governmental act” is not “immunized by the
absence of such discrimination in the making of other comparable
decisions” ’ ”].) It may be difficult to make a prima facie showing
of discrimination without evidence of a pattern. (Bell, at p. 598,
fn. 3.) And because the ultimate burden of persuasion as to
discrimination remains with the defendant (Johnson, at pp. 170–
171), evidence of a pattern could remain relevant at the third
Batson-Wheeler step. But the question to be answered is still
whether the prosecution impermissibly excused a juror based on
membership in a cognizable group, which can be shown without
proof of a pattern. The trial court’s framing of the issue as
whether the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge to A. began or
established a pattern of discrimination was therefore incorrect.
      People v. Arellano (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1139
demonstrates that the trial court could have sustained Nazareta’s
Batson-Wheeler objection to A. even without proof of a pattern.
The trial court there found a prima facie showing of
discrimination where the prosecutor excused all three African-
American female jurors, but the trial court believed the
prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons and denied the defendant’s
Batson-Wheeler motions. (Id. at pp. 1152–1156.) The Court of
Appeal agreed that the dismissal of the first two jurors was for
race-neutral reasons but nonetheless reversed because the record
did not support the prosecutor’s stated rationale for dismissing
the third juror. (Id. at pp. 1168–1169.) Likewise here, even after
finding that the challenges to D. and L. were legitimate, the trial
court could have granted Nazareta’s Batson-Wheeler motion if the

                                 11
dismissal of A. was not race-neutral (as we conclude, post, it was
not). The trial court’s continued search for proof of a pattern
demonstrates a misunderstanding of the legal inquiry, so
deference to its ruling is not appropriate. (Baker, supra,
10 Cal.5th at p. 1078.)
      With this in mind, we turn to the prosecutor’s reasons and
the trial court’s ruling.
II.   Working alone
      The prosecutor’s first rationale, that A. worked alone, has a
basis in accepted trial strategy. A juror accustomed to working
alone could be less willing to work together with the other
members of a jury. But, as Nazareta points out, the record does
not support the prosecutor’s statement that A. worked alone. The
prosecutor asked many other jurors about group work but never
raised the topic with A. A.’s only statements during voir dire that
could bear on this issue came in response to Topete’s question,
“And I wrote down that you’re an IT analyst. Who are you
analyzing? Other employees or data? Or what are you doing?”
A. responded, “Both data and desktop support.” This response to
Topete’s compound question indicates at most that he did not
analyze employees. It does not establish that A. did not work
with other employees. A.’s work analyzing data and desktop
support indicates nothing about whether he worked alone or as
part of a team, as data analysis and desktop support could both
involve collaboration or frequent interactions with others.
      Misstatements like this can impair a prosecutor’s
credibility and support an inference of discrimination. (Baker,

                                12
 supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 1076 [“A justification based on a
 mischaracterization of the record could reveal a discriminatory
 motive”]; People v. Smith, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 1157–1158.)
 However, we will not draw such an inference here because the
 prosecutor was not the only one who made the mistake. Topete
 also noted that A. worked alone. If Nazareta’s co-defendant also
 believed that A. worked alone, it makes it more likely that A.’s
 answer was simply hard to follow in the thick of voir dire and the
 prosecutor did not invent the issue as a pretext. The prosecutor’s
 misstatement is therefore equivocal and not necessarily
 indicative of bias. The prosecutor’s failure to question A. about
 his work is likewise not necessarily indicative of bias, since the
 prosecutor could have omitted the questions about group work
 because she believed Topete had already covered the subject with
 his questioning. As our Supreme Court has repeatedly held, a
 mischaracterization of the record, even when the trial court did
 not identify it as such, can be a simple mistake and not an
 indication of a discriminatory motive. (Baker, at p. 1076 [citing
 cases].)
III.   Vague or not forthcoming
       The prosecutor’s second rationale, that A. was vague or not
 forthcoming, also lacks support in the transcript of voir dire.
 Most of the questions asked of A. were yes or no questions or
 called for similarly short responses. A.’s answers, unsurprisingly,
 were brief and to the point, consisting of short phrases or
 sentences without elaboration. Since neither the court nor any of
 the parties asked A. questions that called for more detail or

                                  13
pressed him to flesh out any of his answers, the brevity of A.’s
answers does not mean he was vague or not forthcoming. We
recognize that unlike the prosecutor’s statement that A. worked
alone, her impression of A. as being not forthcoming could have
been based on observations of A.’s demeanor, which would not be
reflected in the record on appeal. Had the trial court credited
such a reason, this might have been sufficient, even though the
trial court did not explicitly remark on anything unusual in A.’s
demeanor during its summary of A.’s responses. (People v.
Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 926.) However, the trial court did
not rely on A. being vague or not forthcoming when it denied
Nazareta’s motion, so this rationale is not sufficient to support
the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge.
IV.   Lack of information
      The trial court credited the prosecutor’s third reason, that
she knew little about A., and this reason finds more support in
the record. We will assume for the sake of argument that this
rationale has a basis in accepted trial strategy, although we have
discovered only one case that mentions a party excusing a juror
for this reason. (Unzueta v. Akopyan (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 67,
74 [party in civil case excused juror in part because he “ ‘was
completely unknown to me compared to the other jurors’ ”].) This
rationale nonetheless requires reversal.
      The trial court, Topete, and Nazareta followed the same
approach in questioning A. as they had for the other jurors,
asking about his occupation, his spouse’s occupation, his
children’s studies, prior jury service, close friends or family in law

                                 14
enforcement or involved in criminal matters, ability to follow the
jury’s role, ability to apply the concepts of circumstantial
evidence and aiding and abetting, and strong feelings about guns,
the role of a jury, or a defendant’s right not to testify. The
prosecutor likewise asked A. most of the same questions she did
of the other jurors, concerning his length of residence in Contra
Costa County, ability to follow the concepts of aiding and abetting
and circumstantial evidence, and willingness to believe witnesses
who might have a criminal history or use drugs, but not his group
work. A.’s responses to these various questions did not raise any
obvious concerns, so there was no apparent reason for anyone to
follow up with him to obtain more detail. As a result, if A.
provided less material from which the prosecutor could evaluate
him, that was because the prosecutor did not ask for more
information from him and had no reason to.
      The prosecution’s decision to excuse A. for lack of
information is therefore concerning. A prosecutor does not have
the luxury of unlimited time to spend on each juror and must
instead evaluate scores of jurors in a short period. But if the
prosecutor wanted to learn more about A., she could have easily
asked him more questions. Additional questioning would have
been particularly appropriate given that the trial court opted not
to use a jury questionnaire and instead gave the parties twice as
much time to conduct voir dire as it normally would have. Given
her failure to examine A. in more detail, the prosecutor’s claim
that she excused A. because she knew little about him is hard to
credit and supports Nazareta’s contention that she was acting

                                 15
based on a hidden bias. (Baker, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 1083
[“ ‘[u]nder certain circumstances perfunctory voir dire can be
indicative of hidden bias’ [citation], particularly when there is a
dearth of questioning ‘on a subject a party asserts it is concerned
about’ ”]; cf. id. at p. 1085 [lack of additional questioning not
illuminating where potential jurors filled out lengthy
questionnaire and each side had only a few minutes to question
jurors individually].)
      The trial court did not ask the prosecutor why she did not
question A. further or point out the disconnect between her
questioning and her claimed concern over a lack of information.
This alone would be enough to eliminate the basis for deference
to its ruling. (Baker, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 1078 [“When ‘the
proffered reasons lack[ ] inherent plausibility or [are]
contradicted by the record,’ the court’s failure to probe, or to
explain, may eliminate the basis for deference”].) But the trial
court’s expression of doubt about the prosecutor’s stated
rationale, combined with its failure to probe the prosecutor’s
explanation, undermines all confidence in the trial court’s ruling.
After the trial court agreed with the prosecutor’s assessment that
there was not much information about A., it went on to remark
that it “probably won’t accept this reason any more for a
challenge to a Filipino juror.” Nazareta cogently points out that
if the trial court was unwilling to accept the stated reason again,
it calls into serious question why the court accepted it as genuine
even as to A. Considering the trial court’s reservations, it is

                                  16
unclear why it did not ask further questions of the prosecutor and
delve further into her rationale.
      Finally and most significantly, the trial court’s statement
about not accepting the prosecutor’s rationale for another Filipino
juror tips the scales towards reversal when considered in light of
its earlier comment that it was considering whether the
peremptory challenge to A. began or established a pattern.
Taken together, these comments indicate the trial court did not
believe the prosecutor’s stated rationale but denied Nazareta’s
Batson-Wheeler motion anyway because the challenges to D. and
L. were race-neutral and the challenge to A. was insufficient on
its own to demonstrate a pattern. This is improper. “Excluding
by peremptory challenge even ‘a single juror on the basis of race
or ethnicity is an error of constitutional magnitude.’ ” (People v.
Gutierrez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1150, 1172.) The trial court erred in
holding Nazareta to a higher standard of needing to demonstrate
a pattern of discrimination, and the trial court’s evident lack of
belief in the prosecutor’s reason should have resulted in the
granting of Nazareta’s Batson-Wheeler motion.5
                          DISPOSITION
      The judgment is reversed.

                                           BROWN, P. J.

      5 In light of this conclusion, we need not consider

Nazareta’s additional argument that a comparative analysis of A.
with seated non-Filipino jurors supports his contention that the
prosecutor acted discriminatorily.

                                 17
WE CONCUR:

STREETER, J.
GOLDMAN, J.

People v. Nazareta (A162377)

                               18