Court Opinion

ID: 9418540
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:30:22.972835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:05.221185
License: Public Domain

Mr. Chief Justice Taft,
after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the Court.
The constitutional and statutory provisions involved in this case include the Fourth Amendment and the National Prohibition Act.
The Fourth Amendment is in part as follows:
“ The right of the people to bé secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person, or things to' be seized..”
Section 25, Title II, of the National Prohibition Act, c. 85, 41 Stat. 305, 315, passed to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment, makes it unlawful to have or possess any liquor intended for use in violating the Act, or which has been so used, and provides that no property rights shall exist in such liquor. A search warrant may issue and such liquor, with the containers thereof, may be seized under the warrant and be ultimately destroyed. The section further provides:
“ No search warrant shall issue to search any private dwelling occupied as such unless it is being used for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor, or unless it is in part used for some business purpose such as a store, shop, saloon, restaurant, hotel, or boarding house. The term ‘ private dwelling ’ shall be construed to include the room or rooms used and occupied not transiently but solely as *144a residence in an apartment house, hotel, or boarding house.”
Section 26, Title II, under which the seizure herein was made, provides in part as follows:
“ When the commissioner, his assistants, inspectors, or any officer of the law shall discover any person in the act of transporting in violation of the law, intoxicating liquors in any wagon, buggy, automobile, water or air craft, or other vehicle, it shall be his duty to seize any and all intoxicating liquors found therein being transported contrary to law. Whenever intoxicating liquors transported or possessed illegally shall be seized by an officer he shall take possession of the vehicle and team or automobile, boat, air or water craft, or any other conveyance, and shall arrest any person in charge thereof.”
The section then provides that the court upon conviction of the person so arrested shall order the liquor destroyed, and except for good cause shown shall order a sale by public auction of the other property seized, and that the proceeds shall be paid into the Treasury of the United States.
By Section 6 of an Act supplemental to the National Prohibition Act, c. 134, 42 Stat. 222, 223, it is provided that if any officer or agent or employee of the United States engaged in the enforcement of the Prohibition Act or this Amendment, “ shall search any private dwelling,” as defined in that Act, “ without a warrant directing such search,” or “ shall without a search warrant maliciously and without reasonable cause search, any other building or property,” he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to finq or imprisonment or both.
In the passage of the supplemental Act through the Senate, Amendment No. 32, known ,as the Stanley Amendment, was adopted, the relevant part of which was as follows:
“ Section 6. That any officer, agent or employee of the United States engaged in the enforcement of this Act or *145the National Prohibition Act, or any other law of the United States, who shall search or attempt to' search the property or premises of any person without previously securing a search, warrant, as provided by law, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not to exceed $1000, or imprisoned not to exceed one year, or both so fined and imprisoned in the discretion of the Court.”
This Amendment was objected to in the House, and the Judiciary Committee, to whom it was referred, reported to the House of Representatives the following as a substitute.
“ Sec. 6. That no officer, agent or employee of the United States, while engaged in the enforcement of this Act, the National Prohibition Act, or any law in reference to the manufacture or taxation of, or traffic in, intoxicating liquor, shall search any private dwelling without a warrant directing'such search, and no such warrant shall issue unless there is reason to believe such dwelling is used as a place in which liquor is manufactured for sale or sold. The term ‘ private dwelling ’ shall be construed to include the room or rooms occupied not transiently, but solely as a residence in an apartment house, hotel, or boarding house. Any violation of any proyision of this paragraph shall be punished by a fine of not to exceed $1000 or imprisonment not to exceed one year, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.” •
In its report the Committee spoke in part as follows:
“ It. appeared to the committee that the effect of, the Senate amendment No. 32, if agreed to by the House, would greatly cripple the enforcement of ¡ the national •prohibition act and would otherwise seriously interfere with the Government in the enforcement of many other laws, as its scope is not limited to the prohibition law *146but applies equally to all laws where prompt action is necessary. There are on the statute books of the United' States a number of laws authorizing search without a search warrant. Under the common law and agreeably to the Constitution search may in many cases be legally made without a warrant. The Constitution does not forbid search, as some parties contend, but it does forbid unreasonable search. This provision in regard to search is as a rule contained in the various State constitutions, but. notwithstanding that fact search without á warrant is permitted in many cases, and especially is that true in the enforcement of liquor legislation. '
“ The Senate amendment prohibits all search or attempt to search any property or premises without a search warrant. The effect .of that would necessarily be to prohibit all search, as no search can take place if it is not on some property or premises.
“ Not only does this amendment prohibit search of any lands but it prohibits the search of all property. It will prevent the search of the common bootlegger and his stock in trade though caught and arrested in the act of violating the law. But what is perhaps more serious, it will make it impossible to stop the rum running automobiles engaged in like illegal traffic. It would take from the officers the power that 'they absolutely must have to be of any service, for if they can not search for liquor without a warrant they might as well be discharged. It is impossible to- get a warrant to stop an automobile. Before a warrant could be secured the automobile would be beyond the reach of the officer with its load of illegal liquor disposed of.”
The conference report resulted, so far as the difference between the two Houses was concerned, in providing for the punishment of any officer, agent or employee of the Government who searches a “ private dwelling ” without a warrant, and for the punishment of any such officer, *147etc., who searches any “ other building or property ” where, and only where, he makes the search without a warrant “maliciously and without probable cause.” In other words, it left the way open for searching an automobile, or vehicle of transportation, without a warrant, if the search was not malicious or without probable cause.
The intent of Congress to make a distinction between the necessity for a search warrant in the searching of private dwellings and in that of automobiles and other road vehicles is the- enforcement of the Prohibition Act is thus clearly established by the legislative history of the Stanley Amendment. Is such a distinction consistent with the Fourth Amendment? We think' that it is. The Fourth Amendment does not denounce all searches or seizures, but only such as are. unreasonable.
The leading case on the subject of search and seizure is Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616. An Act of Congress of June 22, 1874, authorized a court of the United States, in revenue cases, on motion of the government attorney, to require the defendant to produce in court his private books, invoices and papers on pain in case of refusal of having the allegations of the attorney in his motion taken as confessed. This was held to be unconstitutional and void as applied to suits, for penalties or to establish a forfeiture of goods, on the ground that under the Fourth Amendment the compulsory production of invoices to furnish evidence‘for forfeiture of goods constituted an unreasonable search even where made upon a search warrant, and that it was also a violation of the Fifth Amendment, in that it compelled the defendant in á criminal casé to produce evidence' against himself or be in the attitude of confessing his guilt.
In Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, it was held .that a court in a criminal prosecution could not retain letters of the accused seized in his house, in his absence and without his authority, by a United States marshal *148holding no warrant for his -arrest and none for the search of his premises, to be used as evidence against him, the accused having made timely application to the court for an order for the return of the letters.
In Silverthorne Lumber Company v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, a writ of error was brought to reverse a Judgment of contempt of the District Court, fining the company and imprisoning one Silverthorne, its president, until he should purge himself of contempt in not producing books and documents of the company before the grand jury to prove violation of the statutes of the United States by the company and Silverthorne. Silverthorne had been arrested and while under arrest the marshal had gone to the. office of the company without a warrant and made a clean sweep of all books, papers and documents found there and had taken copies and photographs of the papers. The District Court ordered ■ the return of the originals, but impounded the photographs and copies. This was held to be an unreasonable search of the property and possessions of the corporation and a violation of the Fourth Amendment and the judgment for contempt was reversed.
In Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, the obtaining through stealth by a representative of .the Government, from the office of one suspected of defrauding the Government, .of a paper which had-no pectmiary value in itself but was only to be used a§ evidence against its owner, was held to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment. It was further held that when the paper was offered in evidence and duly objected to it must be ruled inadmissible because obtained through; an .unreasonable-search and seizure, and also in violation of the Fifth Amendment because working compulsory incrimination.
In Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313, it was held that where concealed liquor was found by government officers without a search warrant in the home of the de*149fendant, in, his absence, and after a demand made upon his wife, it was inadmissible as evidence against the defendant, because acquired by an unreasonable seizure.
In none of the cases cited is there any ruling as to the validity under the Fourth Amendment of a seizure without a warrant of contraband goods in the course of transportation and subject to forfeiture or destruction.
On reason and authority the true rule is that if the search and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid. The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in,a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens.
In Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, as already said, the decision did not turn on whether a. reasonable search might be made without a warrant; but for the purpose of showing the principle on which the Fourth Amendment proceeds, and to avoid any misapprehension of what was decided, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Bradley, used language which is of particular significance and applicability here. It was there said (page 623):
“ The search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or goods liable to duties and concealed to avoid the payment thereof, are totally different things from a search for and seizure of a man’s private books and papers for the purpose of obtaining information therein contained, or of using them as evidence against him. The two things -differ toto coelo■. In the one case, the government is enti-. tied to the possession of the property; in the other it is not. The seizure of stolen goods is authorized by the *150common law; and the seizure of goods forfeited for a breach of the revenue laws, or concealed to avoid the duties payable on them, has been authorized by English statutes for at least two centuries past; and the like seizures have been authorized -by our own revenue acts from the commencement of the government. The first statute passed by Congress to regulate the collection of duties, the act of July 31, 1789, 1 Stat. 29, 43, contains provisions to this effect. As this act was passed by the same Congress which proposed for adoption the original amendments to the Constitution, it is clear that the members of that body did not regard searches and seizures of this kind as ‘ unreasonable,’ and they are not embraced within the prohibition of the amendment. So, also, the supervision authorized to be exercised by officers of the revenue over the manufacture or custody of excisable articles, and the entries thereof in books required by law to be kept for their inspection, are necessarily excepted out of- the category of unreasonable searches and seizures. So, also, the laws which provide for the search and seizure of articles and things which it is unlawful for a person to have in his possession for the purpose of issue or ’ disposition, such as counterfeit coin, lottery tickets, implements of gambling, &c., are not within this category. Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Met. (Mass.) 329. Many other things of this character might be enumerated.”
It is noteworthy that the twenty-fourth section of the Act of 1789 to which the Court there refers provides:
“ That every collector, naval officer and surveyor, or other person specially appointed by either of them for that purpose, shall have full power and authority, to enter any ship, or vessel, in which they shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares or merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed; and therein to search for, seize, and secure any such goods, wares or merchandise; and if they shall have cause to suspect a concealment thereof, in any *151particular dwelling-house, store, building, or other place, they or^ either of them shall, upon application on oath or affirmation to any justice of the peace, be entitled to a warrant to enter such house, store, or other place (in the day time only) and there to search, for such goods, and if any shall be found, to seize and secure the same for trial; and all such goods, wares, and merchandise, on which the duties shall not have been paid or secured, shall be forfeited.”
Like provisions were contained in the Act of August 4, 1790, c. 35, Sections 48-51, 1 Stat. 145, 170; in Section 27 of the Act of February 18, 1793, c. .8, 1 Stat. 305, 315, and in Sections 68-71 of the Act of March 2, 1799, c. 22, 1 Stat. 627, 677, 678.
Thus contemporaneously with the adoption of the Fourth Amendment we find in the first Congress, and in the following Second and Fourth Congresses, a difference made as to the necessity for a search 'warrant between goods subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a dwelling house or similar place, and like goods in course of transportation and concealed in a movable vessel where they readily could be put out of reach.of a search warrant. Compare Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57.
Again, by the second section of the Act of March 3,. 1815, 3' Stat. 231, 232, it was made lawful for customs' officers not only to board and search vessels within their own and adjoining districts, but also to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or .person on which or whom they should suspect there was merchandise which was subject to duty or had been introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to law, whether by the person in charge of the vehicle or beast or otherwise, and if they should find any goods, wares or merchandise .thereon, which they had probable cause to believe had been so unlawfully brought into the country, to seize and secure the same, and the vehicle or beast as well, for trial *152and forfeiture. This Act was renewed April 27, 1816, 3 Stat. 315, for a year and expired. The Act of February 28, 1865, revived Section 2 of the Act of 1815, above described, c. 67, 13 Stat. 441. The substance of this section was reenacted in the third section of the Act of July 18, 1866, c. 201, 14 Stat. 178, and was thereafter embodied in the Revised Statutes as Section 3061. Neither Section 3061 nor any of its earlier counterparts has ever been attacked as unconstitutional. Indeed that section was referred to and treated as operative by this Court in Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U. S. 215, 219. See also United States v. One Black Horse, 129 Fed. 167.
Again by Section 2140 of the Revised Statutes any Indian ¿gent, sub-agent or commander of a military post in the Indian Country, having reason to suspect or being informed that any white person or Indian is about to introduce, or has introduced, any spirituous liquor or wine into the Indian Country, in violation of law, may cause the boats, stores, packages, wagons, sleds and places of deposit of such person to be searched, and if any liquor is found therein, then it, together with the vehicles, shall be seized and proceeded against by libel in the proper court and forfeited. Section 2140'was the outgrowth of ,the Act of May‘6, 1822, c. 58, 3 Stat. 682, authorizing Indian agents to cause the goods of traders in the Indian Country to be searched upon suspicion or information that ardent spirits were being introduced into the Indian Country, to be seized and forfeited if found; and of the Act of June 30, 1834, Section 20, c. 161, 4 Stat. 729, 732, enabling an Indian agent having reason to suspect any person of having introduced or being about to introduce liquors into the Indian Country to cause the boats, stores or places of deposit of such person to be searched ,and the liquor found forfeited. This Cpurt recognized the statute of 1822 as justifying such a search and seizure in American Fur Co. v. United States, 2 Pet. 358. By the Indian *153Appropriation Act of March 2, 1917, c. 146, 39 Stat. 969, 970, automobiles used in' introducing' or attempting to introduce intoxicants into the* Indian Territory may be seized, libeled and forfeited as provided in the Revised Statutes, Section 2140.
And again, in Alaska, by Section 174 of the Act of March 3, 1899, c. 429, 30 Stat. 1253, 1280, it is provided that collectors and deputy collectors, or any person authorized by them in writing, shall be given power to arrest persons and seize vessels and merchandise in Alaska liable to fine, penalties or forfeiture under the Act and to keep and deliver the same; and the Attorney General, in con-, struing the Act, advised the Government: “ If your agents reasonably suspect that a violation of law has occurred, in my opinion they have power to search any vessel within the 3-mile limit according to the practice of customs officers when acting uñder Section 3059 of the. Revised Statutes, and to seize such .vessels.” 26 Opinions Attorneys General 243.
We have made a somewhat extended reference to these statutes to show that the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth Amend-ment has been construed, practically since the beginning of the Government, as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant' readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for.contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the yehicle can be quickly moved out of. the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
Haying thus established that contraband goods com cealed and illegally transported in aruautomobile or other-vehicle may be searched for without a warrant, we come now to consider under what circumstances such search may be made. It would be intolerable and unreasonable *154if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search. Travellers may be' so stopped in crossing an international boundary be-' chuse of national self protection reasonably requiring one. entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may. be lawfully brought in.- But those lawfully within the country, entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free passage without interruption or search unless there is known to a competent .official authorized to search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise. Section 26, Title II, of the National Prohibition Act, like the second, section of the Act of 1789, for the searching of vessels, like the provisions of the Act of 1815, and Section 3061, Revised Statutes, for searching vehicles for smuggled goods, and like the Act of 1822, and that of 1834 and Section 2140, R. S., and the Act of 1917 for the search of vehicles and automobiles for liquor smuggled into the Indian Country,. was enacted primarily to accomplish the seizure and destruction of. contraband goods; secondly, the automobile was to’ be'forfeited; and thirdly, the driver was to be arrested, Under Section 29, Title II, of the Act the latter might be punished by not more than $500 fine for the first offense, not more than $1,000 fine or 90 days’ imprisonment for. the second offense, and- by a fine of $500 or more and by not more than 2 years’ imprisonment for the third offense. Thus he is to be arrested for a misde- ■ meanor for his first and second offenses and for a felony if he offends the third time. The main .'purpose of the Act obviously was to deal with the liquor and its transportation and to destroy it. The mere manufacture of liquor can do little to defeat the policy of the Eighteenth Amendment and-..the Prohibition Act, unless The for-. *155bidden product can be distributed for illegal sale and use. Section 26 was intendéd to reach and-destroy the. for-., bidden liquor in transportation and the. provisions for forfeiture of the vehicle and the- arrest\of the transporter' were incidental. The rule for determining what may.be required before a seizure may be made by a competent seizing official, is not to .be determined by the character, of the penalty to which the,, transporter may be Subjected. Under Section 28, Title II, of the Prohibition . Act the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, his.assistants, agents and inspectors are to have the power and protection in the enforcement of the Act conferred by the • existing laws relating to the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors. Officers who seize under Section 26 of the Prohibition Act are therefore protected by Section 970 of the Revised Statutes, providing .that:
“When, in any prosecution commenced on account of the seizure of any. vessel, goods, wares, or merchandise, made by any collector or other officer, under any Act of Congress authorizing such seizure, judgment is rendered for the claimant, but it appears to the court that there was reasonable cause of seizure, the court shall cause a proper certificate thereof to be entered, and the claimant. shall not, in such case, be entitled to costs, nor shall the person who made the seizure,,nor the.prosecutor, be liable to suit or judgment on account of such suit or prosecution: Provided; That the vessel, goods, wares, or merchandise be, after judgment, forthwith returned to such-claimant or his agent.”
It follows from this that if an officer seizes an automobile or the liquor in it without a warrant and the facts as subsequently developed do not justify a judgment of condemnation and forfeiture, the officer may escape costs or a suit for damages by a, showing that he had reasonable or 'probable cause' for the seizure. Stacey v. Emery, 97 U. S. 642. The méasure of legality of such a seizure is, *156therefore, that the seizing officer shall have reasonable or probable cause for believing that the automobile which he stops and seizes has contraband liquor therein which is being illegally transported.
We here find the line of distinction between legal and illegal seizures of liquor in transport in vehicles. It is certainly a reasonable distinction. It gives the owner of an automobile or other vehicle seized under Section 26, in absence of probable cause, a right to have restored to him the automobile, it protects him under the Weeks and Amos cases from use of the liquor as evidence against him, and it subjects the officer making the seizures to damages. On the other hand, in a case showing probable cause, the Government and its officials are given the opportunity which they should have, to make the investigation necessary to trace reasonably suspected contraband goods and to seize them.
Such a rule fulfills the guaranty of the Fourth Amendment. In cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used, and when properly supported by affidavit and issued after judicial approval protects the seizing officer against a suit for damages. In cases where seizure is impossible except without warrant, the seizing officer acts unlawfully and at his peril unless he can show the court probable cause. United States v. Kaplan, 286 Fed. 963, 972.
But we are pressed with the argument that if the search of the automobile discloses the presence of liquor and leads under the statute to the arrest of the person in charge of the automobile, the right of seizure should be limited by the common law rule as to the circumstances justifying an arrest without warrant for a misdemeanor. The usual rule is that a pólice officer may arrest without warrant one believed by the officer upon reasonable cause to have been guilty of a felony, and that he may .only arrest without a warrant one guilty of a misdemeañor if committed *157in his presence. Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U. S. 487; Elk v. United States, 177 U. S. 529. The rule is sometimes expressed as follows:
. “ In cases of misdemeanor, a peace officer like a private person has at common law no power of arresting without a warrant except when a breach of the peace has been committed in his presence or there is reasonable ground for supposing that a breach of peace is about to be committed or renewed in his presence.” Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 9, part III, 612. ,
The reason for arrest for misdemeanors without warrant at common law was promptly to suppress breaches of the peace, 1 Stephen, History of Criminal Law, 193, while the reason for arrest without warrant on a reliable report of a felony was because the public safety and the due apprehension of criminals charged with heinous offenses required that such arrests should be made at once without warrant. Rohan v. Sawin, 5 Cush. 281. The argument for defendants is that as the misdemeanor to justify arrest without warrant must be committed in the presence of the police, officer, the offense, is not'committed in his. presence unless he can by his senses detect that the liquor'is being transported, no matter how reliable his previous information by which he can identify the automobile as loaded with it. Elrod v. Moss, 278 Fed. 123; Hughes v. State, 145 Tenn. 544.
So it is that under the rule contended for by defendants the liquor if carried by one who has been already twice convicted of the same offense may be seized on information other than the senses, while if he has been only once conyicted it may not be seized unless the presence of the liquor is detected by the senses as the automobile concealing-it rushés by. This is certainly a very unsatisfactory line of difference-' when the main object of the section is to forfeit and suppress the liquor, the arrest of the individual being only incidental as shown by the light*158ness of the penalty. See Commonwealth v. Street, 3 Pa. Dist. & Co. Reports, 783. In England at the common law the difference in punishment between felonies and misdemeanors was very great. Under our present federal statutes, it is much less important and Congress may exercise a relatively wide discretion in classing particular offenses as felonies or misdemeanors. As the main purpose of Section 26 was seizure and forfeiture,’ it is not so much the owner as the property that offends. Agnew v. Haymes, 141 Fed. 631, 641. The language of the section provides for seizure when the officer of the law “ discovers.” any one in the act of transporting the liquor by automobile or other vehicle. Certainly it is a very narrow and technical construction of this word which would limit it to what the officer sees, hears or smells as the automobile rolls by and exclude therefrom, when he identifies the car, the convincing information that he may previously have received as to the use being made of it.
We do not think such a nice distinction is applicable in the present case. When a man is legally arrested for an offense, whatever is found upon his person or in his control which it is unlawful for him to have and which may be used to prove the offense may be seized and held as evidence in the prosecution!. Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 392; Dillon v. O’Brien and Davis, 16 Cox. C. C. 245; Getchell v. Page, 103 Me. 387; Kneeland v. Connolly, 70 Ga. 424; 1 Bishop, Criminal-Procedure, Sec. 211; 1 Wharton, Criminal Procedure (10th edition), Sec. 97.- The argument of defendants is based on the theory that th.e seizure in this case can only be thus justified. If their theory were, sound, their conclusion would be. The validity of the seizure then-would turn wholly on the validity of the arrest without a seizure. But the theory is unsound. The right to search and'the validity of the seizure are not dependent on the right .to, arrest. They are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer *159has for belief that the contents of the automobile offend against the law. The seizure in such a proceeding comes before the arrest as Section 26 indicates. It is true that Section 26, Title II, provides for-immediate proceedings against the person arrested and that upon conviction the liquor is to be destroyed and the automobile or other vehicle is to be, sold, with the .saving of the interest of a lienor who doesmot know of its unlawful üse; but it is evident that if the person arrested is ignorant , of the contents of the. vehicle, or if he escapes, proceedings can be had against the liquor for destruction or other disposition under Section 25 of the same title. The character of the offense for which, after the contraband liquor is found and -seized; the driver can be prosecuted does not affect the validity of the seizure.
This conclusion is in keeping with the requirements of ■the Fourth Amendment and the principles of search and seizureof contraband forfeitable property;, and it is a wise ope because it leaves the rule one which is easily applied and understood and is uniform. Houck v. State, 106 Ohio St. 195, accords with this conclusion. Ash v. United States, 299 Fed. 277 and Milam v. United States, 296 Fed. 629, decisions by the Circuit' Court of. Appeals for the fourth circuit, take -the same view. The Ash case is very similar in its facts to the case at bar and both were by the' same court which decided Snyder v. United States, 285 Fed. 1, cited ior the defendants. See also Park v. United States (1st C. C. A.) 294 Fed. 776, 783, and Lambert v. United States, (9th C. C. A.) 282 Fed. 413.
Finally, was there probable cause? In The Apollon, 9 Wheat. 362, the question was whether the seizure of a French vessel at a particular place w.as upon probable cause that she was there for the purpose of smuggling. In- this discussion Mr. Justice Story, who delivered the judgment-of the Court, said (page 374):
“ It has been very justly observed at the bar, that the 'Court is bound to' take notice of public facts, and geo*160graphical positions; and that this remote.part of the country' has been infested, at different periods, by smugglers, is a matter of general notoriety, and may be gathered from the public documents of the. government.”
We.know in this way that Grand Rapids is about 162 miles from Detroit and that Detroit and its neighborhood along the Detroit River, which is the International Boundary, is one of the most active centers for. introducing illegally into this country spirituous liquors for distribution into the interior. It is obvious from the evidence that the prohibition agents were engaged in a regular patrol along the important highways from Detroit to Grand Rapids to stop and seize liquor • carried in automobiles. They knew or had convincing evidence to make them believe that the Carroll boys, as they called them, were so-called “ bootleggers ” in Grand Rapids, i. e., that they were engaged in plying the Unlawful trade of selling such liquor in that city. The officers had soon after noted their going from Grand Rapid's halfway to Detroit and atteitipted to follow them to that city to see where they went, but they escaped observation. Two months later these officers suddenly met the same men on their way westward presumably from Detroit. The partners in .the original combination to sell liquor in Grand Rapids were together in the same automobile they had been in the night when they tried to furnish 'the whisky to the officers which was thus identified as part of the firm equipment. They were coming from the direction of the great source of supply for their stock to Grand Rapids where they plied their trade. That the officers when they saw the defendants believed that they were carrying liquor we can have no doubt, and we think it is equally clear that they had reasonable cause for thinking so. Emphasis is put by defendants’ counsel on the statement made by one of the officers that they were not looking for defendants at the particular time when they appeared. We do not perceive that it has any weight. As soon as they did appear, *161the officers were entitled to use their reasoning faculties upon all the facts of which they had previous knowledge in respect to the defendants.
The necessity for probable cause in justifying seizures on land or sea, in making árrests without warrant for past felonies, and in malicious prosecution and false imprisonment cases has led to frequent definition of the phrase. In Stacey v. Emery, 97 U. S. 642, 645, a suit for damages for seizure by a collector, this Court defined probable cause as follows:
“ If the facts and circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant ,a- man of prudence and caution in believing that the offense has been committed, it is sufficient.” Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch, 339; The George, 1 Mason, 24; The Thompson, 3 Wall. 155. It was laid down by Chief Justice Shaw, in Commonwealth v. Carey, 12 Cush. 246, 251 that “ if a constable or other peace officer arrest a person without a warrant, he is not bound to show in his justification a felony actually committed, to render the arrest lawful; but if he suspects one on his own knowledge of facts, or on facts communicated to him by others, and thereupon he has' reasonable ground to believe that the accused has been guilty of felony, the arrest is not unlawful.” Commonwealth v. Phelps, 209 Mass. 396; Rohan v. Sawin, 5 Cush. 281, 285. In McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. St. 63, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania sums up the definition of probable cause in this way (page 69):
“ The substance of all the definitions is a reasonable ground for belief in guilt.” ..
. In the case of the Director General v. Kastenbaum, 263 U. S. 25, which was a-suit for false imprisonment, it was said by this Court (page 28):
“But, as we' have seen, good faith is not enough to constitute probable cause. That faith must be grounded on facts within knowledge of the Director General’s agent, *162which in the judgment of the court would make his faith reasonable.” See also Munn v. De Nemours, 3 Wash. C. C. 37.
In the light of these authorities, and what is shown by this record, it is clear the officers here had justification for the search and seizure. This is to say that the facts and\circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient in thémseíves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that intoxicating liquor was being transported in the automobile which they stopped and searched.
Counsel finally argue that the defendants should be permitted to escape the effect of the conviction because the court refused on motion to deliver them the liquor when, as they say, the evidence adduced on the motion was much less than that shown on the trial, and did not show probable cause. The record does not make it clear what evidence was produced in support of or against the motion. But, apart from this, we think the point is without substance here. If the evidence given on the trial was sufficient, as we think it was,.to sustain the introduction of the liquor as evidence, it is immaterial that there was an inadequacy of evidence when application was made for its return. A conviction on adequate and admissible evidence should not be set 'aside on such a'ground. The whole matter was gone into at the trial, so no right of the defendants was infringed.
. Counsel for the Government contend that Kiro, the defendant who did not own the autDmobilé, could'not complain of the violation of the Fourth Amendment in the use of the liquor as evidence against him, whatever the view taken as to Carroll’s rights. Our conclusion as to the wtolé case makes it unnecessary for us to discuss this aspect of it.
The judgment is

Affirmed.

*163Mr. Justice McKenna, before his retirement, concurred in this opinion.