Court Opinion

ID: 9892912
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-25 15:04:56.438445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:48:28.395445
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                       Opinion filed October 25, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D22-1316
                       Lower Tribunal No. 21-24025
                          ________________

            Greater Miami Expressway Agency, et al.,
                                 Appellants,

                                     vs.

       Miami-Dade County Expressway Authority, et al.,
                                 Appellees.

     An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Alan Fine,
Judge.

      Lawson Huck Gonzalez, PLLC, and Alan Lawson, Jason Gonzalez,
Amber Stoner Nunnally, Jessica Slatten, and Taylor Greene (Tallahassee),
for appellants.

      Stearns Weaver Miller Weissler Alhadeff & Sitterson, P.A., and Eugene
E. Stearns, Glenn Burhans, Jr., and Melanie R. Leitman (Tallahassee); and
DeLeon & DeLeon, and Kirk D. DeLeon, for appellee Miami-Dade
Expressway Authority; Geraldine Bonzon-Keenan, Miami-Dade County
Attorney, and Michael B. Valdes and Miguel A. Gonzalez, Assistant County
Attorneys, for appellee Miami-Dade County.
      Ryan Newman, General Counsel, and Andrew King, Deputy General
Counsel, and Meredith L. Pardo, Assistant General Counsel (Tallahassee),
for Governor Ron DeSantis; David Axelman, General Counsel
(Tallahassee), for The Florida House of Representatives; Carlos Rey,
General Counsel, and Kyle E. Gray, Deputy General Counsel (Tallahassee),
for The Florida Senate, as amici curiae.

Before FERNANDEZ, HENDON, and LOBREE, JJ.

      HENDON, J.

      The Greater Miami Expressway Authority (“GMX”) and several

individuals sued in their capacities as directors and/or board members of

GMX (collectively, “Defendants”) appeal the order granting Miami-Dade

Expressway Authority’s (“MDX”) amended motion for summary judgment

and the final judgment entered in favor of MDX as to MDX’s counts for

declaratory relief and to quiet title. For the reasons that follow, we reverse

the order granting summary judgment and the final judgment on review.

      In October 2021, MDX filed a complaint against the Defendants,

seeking declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and to quiet title. MDX asserted

that the in rem action concerns rights to the roadways and assets located in

Miami-Dade County that are owned and operated by MDX, which assets

were either purchased by MDX from the Florida Department of

Transportation (“FDOT”) pursuant to a Transfer Agreement executed in

December 1996, or were acquired by MDX following the execution of the

Transfer Agreement. The recorded 1996 Transfer Agreement was attached

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to the complaint and provides in relevant part as follows:

            WHEREAS, [MDX] was established by Ordinance No. 94-
     215, adopted on December 13, 1994, by the Board of County
     Commissioners of Dade County, pursuant to the [Florida
     Expressway Authority] Act [Part I of Chapter 348, Florida
     Statutes, as amended]; and
            WHEREAS, the Act sets forth [MDX’s] purposes and
     powers, which include the power to: (1) acquire, hold, construct,
     improve, maintain, operate, own, and lease the expressway
     system located in Dade County and identified more particularly
     in Exhibit A hereto (the “System”)[1]; (2) fix, alter, change,
     establish, and collect tolls, rates, fees, rentals, and other charges
     for the services and facilities of the System; and (3) utilize surplus
     revenues to finance or refinance the planning, design,
     acquisition, construction, maintenance or improvement of a
     public transportation facility or transportation facilities located in
     Dade County or any programs or projects that will improve the
     levels of service on the System; and
            WHEREAS, [FDOT] and [MDX] have agreed to a transfer
     of operational and financial control of the System from [FDOT] to
     [MDX] on the date hereof upon the terms and conditions here set

1
  Exhibit A of the Transfer Agreement reflects that the Dade County
Expressway System, which is now known as MDX, includes the Airport
Expressway (SR 112), the East-West (Dolphin) Expressway (SR 836),
South Dade (Don Shula) Expressway (SR 874), Snapper Creek
Expressway (SR 878), Gratigny Parkway (SR 924), and “the Non-
Roadway Assets identified on Exhibit B to the Transfer Agreement and
the fund balances in Exhibit C to the Transfer Agreement.” Moreover,
Exhibit B provides:

     Upon execution of this agreement, [FDOT] shall transfer
     ownership of all property, with the exception of the infrastructure,
     located at the Dade County Expressway System listed in Exhibit
     A to [MDX]. The transfer of property includes, buildings, toll
     booths, toll equipment and other property (both over and under
     $500) detailed on the following pages.            In addition, all
     miscellaneous items such as supplies and small equipment,
     such as staplers, etc., shall become the property of [MDX].

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     forth; and
            WHEREAS, the duties of all parties in implementing the
     transfer of operational and financial control of the System from
     [FDOT] to [MDX] are set forth in this Agreement; and
            WHEREAS, the System is currently financed with bonds of
     the State of Florida denominated Full Faith and Credit Dade
     County Road Refunding Bonds, Series 1993 (the “State Bonds”)
     in the aggregate outstanding principal amount of $91,300,000
     supported by revenues of the System; and
            WHEREAS, the System cannot be transferred until
     provision is made for the defeasance of the State Bonds and the
     simultaneous termination of the 1989 Lease-Purchase
     Agreement Covering Dade County Projects dated as of April 5,
     1989 (the “Lease-Purchase Agreement”) among [FDOT], the
     Division of Bond Finance of the State Board of Administration of
     Florida (formerly known as the Division of Bond Finance of the
     Department of General Services of the State of Florida) (the
     “Division”) and Dade County, Florida (the “County”); and
            ....

     NOW, THEREFORE, the parties . . . agree as follows:

           ....

           3.     Transfer of the System.

                 (a) [FDOT] shall promptly record this Agreement
     showing transfer of operational and financial control of the
     System pursuant to this Agreement . . . . [FDOT] and [MDX]
     acknowledge that, upon such recordation, conveyance and
     transfer, [MDX] shall have acquired full jurisdiction and control
     over the operation, maintenance and finances of the System in
     perpetuity, including, including, without limitation, all right to
     regulate, establish, collect and receive tolls thereon. . . .

     The Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to join an

indispensable party—FDOT.      In arguing that FDOT is an indispensable

party, the Defendants asserted that, following the execution of the Transfer

                                     4
Agreement, FDOT still owned the relevant expressway system in Miami-

Dade County, and therefore, MDX cannot quiet title to the expressway

system unless FDOT is a party to the underlying action.

      The trial court denied the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint.

Thereafter, the Defendants filed an answer and affirmative defenses,

asserting that FDOT is an indispensable party which MDX failed to join.

      MDX filed an amended motion for summary judgment. In opposing the

motion for summary judgment, the Defendants renewed their motion to

dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party. In support, the Defendants

filed the affidavit of FDOT’s District Six Secretary, which explained, in part:

              4. When the County created MDX in 1994, FDOT owned
      the expressways within the geographic boundaries and
      jurisdiction of the County. To date, FDOT still owns the original
      rights of way of the System.
             5. In 1996, FDOT and MDX entered into a “transfer
      agreement” that transferred “operational and financial control” of
      five expressways (“System”) to MDX. The transfer agreement
      transferred only “operational and financial control” of the System.
      FDOT granted to MDX the right to collect toll revenue generated
      from the System in return for $91 million of that toll revenue.
      Ownership of the System was never transferred to MDX.”

      Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order granting MDX’s

motion for summary judgment, and thereafter, entered a final judgment in

favor of MDX and against the Defendants. The final judgment provides, in

part, that “the Transfer Agreement conveyed to MDX exclusive, irrevocable,

                                       5
and non-transferrable interests in perpetuity in the real and personal property

interest contemplated therein[.]” Based on this determination, the trial court,

among other things, quieted title to the expressway system in Miami-Dade

County in favor of MDX. The Defendants’ appeal followed.

      The Defendants contend the trial court erred by denying their motion

to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party—FDOT. We agree.

      “An indispensable party is one whose interest in the controversy makes

it impossible to completely adjudicate the matter without affecting either that

party’s interest or the interests of another party in the action.” Fla. Dep’t of

Revenue v. Cummings, 930 So. 2d 604, 607 (Fla. 2006) (citations omitted);

see also Diaz v. Impex of Doral, Inc., 7 So. 3d 591, 594 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).

Pertinent to the issue of whether FDOT is an indispensable party to the

underlying action is the effect of the Transfer Agreement executed by FDOT

and MDX in 1996.

      In the final judgment, the trial court found that “the Transfer Agreement

conveyed to MDX exclusive, irrevocable, and non-transferrable interest in

perpetuity in the real and personal property interests contemplated therein.”

MDX argues that this determination is supported by the language in the

Transfer Agreement because FDOT transferred to MDX all of its rights

relating to the pertinent expressway system, including ownership of the

                                       6
expressway system. The Defendants, however, challenge the trial court’s

determination. The Defendants assert that the Transfer Agreement did not

transfer the ownership of the expressway system to MDX. More specifically,

as averred by FDOT’s District Six Secretary, the “[T]ransfer [A]greement

transferred only ‘operational and financial control’ of the System. FDOT

granted to MDX the right to collect toll revenue generated from the System

in return for $91 million of that toll revenue.” (italics in original). We agree

with the Defendants. As only the “operational and financial control” of the

expressway system, not the ownership of the expressway system itself, was

transferred to MDX, FDOT is an indispensable party to the underlying action

seeking to quiet title to the expressway system itself. As such, the trial court

erred by denying the Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to join an

indispensable party. Accordingly, we reverse the order granting MDX’s

motion for summary judgment and the final judgment in favor of MDX and

against the Defendants, and remand with instructions for the trial court to

enter an order granting the Defendants’ motion to dismiss without prejudice.

See Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, ex. rel A.L. v. S.B., 124 So. 3d 377, 378 (Fla. 2d

DCA 2013) (“A dismissal for failing to join an indispensable party should be

without prejudice, unless the pleader refuses to amend to add a party

necessary for a determination on the merits.”).

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     Based on our disposition of the above issue, we do not need to address

the remaining arguments raised by the Defendants. Further, we take no

position as to those arguments.

     Reversed and remanded.

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