Court Opinion

ID: 9743964
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:51:12.774993+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:45.978826
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE MILLER, concurring in part and dissenting in part: The present matter is before us on remand from the United Sates Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Hernandez v. New York (1991), 500 U.S. 352, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 111 S. Ct. 1859. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the defendant has established, under Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712, the prosecution’s purposeful discrimination against minority venire members during selection of the defendant’s jury. The majority opinion states, without explanation, that exceptional circumstances warrant the use in this case of a standard of review less deferential than the one that would normally govern our review. (147 Ill. 2d at 321.) The majority then compares the characteristics of black venire members whom the State peremptorily challenged with the characteristics of white venire members whom the State did not challenge. The majority summarily concludes that the prosecution’s stated reasons for challenging the minority members were pretextual and that the prosecution intentionally excluded members of the venire from jury service because of racial considerations. In the course of its discussion, the majority expressly reaffirms our earlier holding in People v. Hope (1990), 137 Ill. 2d 430, that the trial judge erred in failing to find the existence of a prima facie case of discrimination under Batson. (147 Ill. 2d at 320.) That ruling would normally be deemed moot, however, for in this case the prosecution went on to offer race-neutral explanations for the exercise of its peremptory challenges and the trial judge ruled on the ultimate issue, whether the State intentionally discriminated against any member of the venire on the basis of race. In Hernandez the Court explained: “Once a prosecutor has offered- a ráce-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot.” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 405, 111 S. Ct. at 1866. It is not clear from the majority opinion whether the court adopts a less deferential standard of review because of the trial judge’s erroneous ruling on the defendant’s prima facie showing, because of other comments made by the judge over the course of the Batson proceedings, or because of some other reason. In any event, even under the majority’s standard of review, I would uphold the trial judge’s ultimate determination. A claim of purposeful discrimination under Batson is one purely of fact, and resolution of the issue will turn largely on an assessment of credibility. (Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 409, 111 S. Ct. at 1869.) In Hope, this court carefully examined the trial judge’s comments at the hearings below and analyzed at length the sufficiency of the judge’s findings with respect to the challenged members of the venire. (Hope, 137 Ill. 2d at 466-72.) The court then upheld the judge’s determination that the prosecution had not intentionally discriminated against any prospective juror on the basis of race. For the reasons described in our earlier opinion, I would reject the defendant’s arguments here. On the victim impact issue, I agree with the majority that the introduction of this evidence at the defendant’s sentencing hearing was proper. I dissent, however, from the majority’s holding that the defendant is entitled to a new trial and sentencing hearing because of Batson error.