Court Opinion

ID: 9353900
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 01:00:23.641134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:09:33.577407
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-60160          Document: 00516609257               Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/12/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                                Fifth Circuit

                                                                                              FILED
                                                                                       January 12, 2023
                                          No. 21-60160                                   Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                              Clerk

   Rafael Escobar-Verdecia,

                                                                                       Petitioner,

                                               versus

   Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,

                                                                                      Respondent.

                           Petition for Review of an Order of the
                               Board of Immigration Appeals
                                   BIA No. A213 160 308

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Elrod and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Rafael Escobar-Verdecia, a native and citizen of Cuba, seeks asylum,
   withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against
   Torture. Escobar-Verdecia complains of egregious treatment at the hands of
   the Cuban government. After both the Immigration Judge and the Board of
   Immigration Appeals denied relief, he filed a petition for review in this court.

          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                          No. 21-60160

   Because Escobar-Verdecia fails to show any reversible error by the BIA, we
   DENY in part and DISMISS in part the petition for review.
                                                I
           Escobar-Verdecia arrived in the United States in June 2019 and was
   shortly afterward detained by the Department of Homeland Security for
   illegal entry.     As Escobar-Verdecia tells it, he fled Cuba because the
   government had been targeting him for his anti-communist political
   commitments. For example, he alleges that in 1996, the Cuban government
   took away his teaching job because he would not participate in a pro-
   government march. As a result, he had to become a food processor and seller.
   He contends that the job came with persistent, arbitrary fines levied against
   him.
           Escobar-Verdecia also asserts that he was subjected to threats and
   physical violence by the Cuban government. He testified during his hearing
   before the IJ that he was detained and threatened with violence at least three
   times by the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, a branch of the
   government created to plant informants in Cuban communities.
           By his telling, the series of events giving rise to his seeking asylum in
   the United States began sometime between September and November of
   2018, when the Committees were drafting a bill for the new Cuban
   constitution. The President of the Committees and the Police Chief told
   Escobar-Verdecia that if he did not support the draft bill and vote in the
   February 2019 election, the Committees were going to “incriminate [him] as
   a worm and as a counterrevolutionary.” 1

           1
            In Cuba, ‘gusano’ (worm) is a derogatory term used widely to describe those
   perceived to be in opposition to the government, critical of revolutionary ideology, or spies
   of the USA.

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          Escobar-Verdecia    did   not       vote   in   the   February   election.
   Consequently, on the next day, the Committees President and the Police
   Chief took Escobar-Verdecia from his home and brought him to a
   Committees meeting. At the meeting, the Committees members accused
   him of being a counterrevolutionary. And when he still refused to support
   the new bill, saying that the Cuban constitution “was all based on a lie,” the
   Committees members handcuffed him and detained him in the police jail.
   During his detention, he contends that he was thrown to the floor, beaten, hit
   on the face until his lip split open, spit on, and prevented from sleeping by
   having cold water thrown at him. He testified that the Cuban police agreed
   to release him on the condition that if they found him involved in any other
   counterrevolutionary activities, they would jail him again or “make [him]
   disappear.” Upon release, he received hospital treatment for his injuries.
          Later, in March 2019, the Committees found counterrevolutionary
   posters painted throughout Escobar-Verdecia’s neighborhood. In response,
   the government officers conducted a search of his home and found talc
   powder, which can be mixed with water to make paint. Treating this as
   evidence that Escobar-Verdecia painted the counterrevolutionary posters,
   the police officers took him back to the same jail where he had been
   previously detained. They deprived him of food, sleep, and air conditioning,
   and they gave him water only once. The police questioned him “at all
   moments,” attempting to get him to confess to painting the posters, but he
   refused to confess. After two days, the police released him. They warned
   him that if any more posters appeared in the community, they would attribute
   the violation to him.
          Around two months later, Escobar-Verdecia fled Cuba while his wife
   and daughters remained. Escobar-Verdecia arrived in the United States
   illegally several weeks later.    Shortly after, he was detained by the
   Department of Homeland Security. The DHS served him with a Notice to

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   Appear before an IJ and charged him as removable. Escobar-Verdecia
   admitted to the factual allegations of his entrance into the United States and
   conceded his charge of removal. He subsequently submitted applications for
   asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention
   Against Torture.
             The IJ denied Escobar-Verdecia’s applications.          First, the IJ
   determined that Escobar-Verdecia was not credible, and thus was not entitled
   to the presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution. Next, the IJ
   determined that, credibility aside, Escobar-Verdecia failed to corroborate a
   well-founded fear because he failed to establish that he had either faced
   persecution in the past or was likely to experience such persecution in the
   future.
             After considering the available evidence, the IJ denied all three
   applications.    On the asylum claim, the IJ held that even though his
   “detention was unpleasant, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate he
   suffered brutal conditions during that detention” that could justify granting
   asylum. Regarding the fines, the IJ determined that “the evidence supports
   a finding [that] the respondent was repeatedly fined for various violations of
   law in Cuba,” rather than as a form of retaliation for his political beliefs or
   religion. The IJ dismissed the withholding of removal claim because Escobar-
   Verdecia “did not satisfy the lower burden of proof required for asylum,”
   and “failed to satisfy the clear probability standard of eligibility required for
   withholding of removal.” Finally, the IJ determined that because Escobar-
   Verdecia’s CAT claim was “identical to his claim for asylum,” and because
   the bar for showing probability of torture is even higher than for showing
   probability of persecution, his claim under CAT necessarily fails. Because
   the IJ rejected all three claims, the IJ ordered him to be removed from the
   United States to Cuba.

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          Escobar-Verdecia appealed to the BIA. While his appeal was pending,
   he also submitted a motion to remand to the IJ for consideration of new
   evidence, which included statements from his wife and copies of summonses
   issued by the Cuban police.          After considering Escobar-Verdecia’s
   arguments, the BIA dismissed the appeal and denied the motion. First, the
   BIA determined that the IJ was correct in holding that Escobar-Verdecia did
   not meet his burden of proof for asylum. The BIA held that having “at least
   two arrests and detentions, which included no serious physical injuries, did
   not rise to the level to constitute persecution.” On his alleged financial harm,
   the BIA held that it was proper for the IJ to find “that the numerous fines
   levied against the respondent were related to food safety violations by his
   business, and [were] not on account of his political opinion.” The BIA also
   held that it was not clearly erroneous for the IJ to find that Escobar-Verdecia
   “submitted insufficient evidence that he is being sought by Cuban
   authorities, or is under threat of arrest, because of any political animus
   against him.” And because the denial of withholding of removal under the
   statute “is governed by a more stringent burden of proof” than the asylum
   claim, the BIA summarily dismissed that part of the appeal as well.
          Next, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of relief under CAT because
   Escobar-Verdecia’s evidence of prior harm did not rise to the level of
   “torture” under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a) and because his evidence of future
   harm was merely “speculative.” Finally, the BIA denied Escobar-Verdecia’s
   motion to remand for consideration of new evidence because the evidence
   sought to be presented was previously available. He timely filed a petition for
   review to this court.
                                          II
          As a preliminary matter, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider issues
   that were not raised before the BIA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Omari v.

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   Holder, 562 F.3d 314, 318 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Petitioners fail to exhaust their
   administrative remedies as to an issue if they do not first raise the issue before
   the BIA . . . .”). And motions for reconsideration must be filed with the BIA
   if the BIA’s decision itself creates a new issue that it could address. Martinez-
   Guevara v. Garland, 27 F.4th 353, 360 (5th Cir. 2022). Escobar-Verdecia did
   not file any motions for reconsideration with the BIA.
          Thus, we lack jurisdiction to consider the following unexhausted
   issues: (1) whether the IJ’s opinion lacked sufficient legal and factual analysis
   to permit the BIA to review the propriety of the IJ’s decision; (2) whether
   the BIA erred by failing to address Escobar-Verdecia’s challenge to the IJ’s
   finding that he was not credible; and (3) whether the Cuban government has
   a “pattern or practice” of persecuting individuals similarly situated to him.
          Furthermore, we do not consider issues that have been either
   explicitly abandoned or abandoned through deficient briefing. See Soadjede
   v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830, 833 (5th Cir. 2003). The following issues are either
   explicitly abandoned or abandoned through lack of meaningful briefing: (1)
   whether Escobar-Verdecia is entitled to asylum based on his religion
   (explicitly abandoned on appeal to the BIA); (2) whether he is entitled to
   withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act
   (explicitly abandoned on appeal to the BIA and conceded at oral argument);
   (3) whether Escobar-Verdecia is entitled to relief under the regulations
   implementing the Convention Against Torture (abandoned through lack of
   meaningful briefing and conceded at oral argument); and (4) whether the BIA
   erred in denying Petitioner’s motion to remand to the IJ for consideration of
   new evidence (abandoned through lack of meaningful briefing).
          Thus, the only remaining issue is whether the BIA erred in denying
   Escobar-Verdecia’s political-asylum claim.           In considering Escobar-
   Verdecia’s appeal, the BIA noted the IJ’s finding that Escobar-Verdecia is

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   not credible. Nonetheless, the BIA analyzed the facts as “described by
   [Escobar-Verdecia]” and upheld the IJ’s determination that he is not entitled
   to political asylum. We do the same here.
                                         III
          The standard of review governing BIA denials of asylum is well estab-
   lished. “[T]his court has the authority to review only the BIA’s decision, not
   the IJ’s decision, unless the IJ’s decision has some impact on the BIA’s deci-
   sion.” Wang v. Holder, 569 F.3d 531, 536 (5th Cir. 2009). “However, this
   court may review the IJ’s findings and conclusions if the BIA adopts them.”
   Id. Factual findings are reviewed under the substantial-evidence standard,
   while legal questions are reviewed de novo. Zhu v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 588,
   594 (5th Cir. 2007). Under the substantial-evidence standard, reversal is im-
   proper unless this court decides “not only that the evidence supports a con-
   trary conclusion, but that the evidence compels it.” Zhao v. Gonzales, 404
   F.3d 295, 306 (5th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Escobar-Verdecia “must
   prove that the evidence is so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could
   reach a contrary conclusion.” Id. (citation omitted).
                                         IV
          Under the deferential substantial-evidence standard, we are unable to
   grant the petition for review of Escobar-Verdecia’s political-asylum claim
   because the record evidence does not “‘compel[]’ a conclusion contrary to
   the [BIA]’s determination.” Gjetani v. Barr, 968 F.3d 393, 396 (5th Cir.
   2020) (quoting Zhao, 404 F.3d at 306). “Asylum is available to a ‘refugee’
   at the discretion of the government.” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)). A
   refugee is “any person . . . who is unable or unwilling to return to . . . [his]
   country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
   account of [a protected ground].” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). Consequently,
   “[t]o establish eligibility for asylum, [the petitioner is] required to

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   demonstrate either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future
   persecution” on account of a protected ground. Gjetani, 968 F.3d at 396
   (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)).       Persecution “does not encompass all
   treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or
   unconstitutional.” Majd v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 590, 595 (5th Cir. 2006). To
   count as persecution, the mistreatment must “be ‘systemic, pervasive, or
   organized.’” Gjetani, 968 F.3d at 398 (quoting Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530,
   537 (3rd Cir. 2005)). Thus, “even those subject to brutal physical attack are
   not necessarily victims of ‘persecution.’ Courts have condemned all manner
   of egregious and even violent behavior while concluding they do not amount
   to persecution.” Id. (collecting cases).
          Escobar-Verdecia argues that the various mistreatments he suffered
   constitute past persecution and create a well-founded fear of future
   persecution. As support, he asserts that the fines levied by the Cuban
   government for his alleged violation of food safety law were mere pretense
   for punishing him for his political beliefs. He also points out that he suffered
   extensive abuse during his detention, including “severe beatings by police
   officers” and “being awakened with freezing cold water.”                 These
   “cumulative harms,” he argues, “rise[] to the level of persecution” because
   they were “systemic and sustained . . . over a span of several years.”
          But “even those subject to brutal physical attack are not necessarily
   victims of ‘persecution,’” id., because persecution requires “a sustained,
   systematic effort to target an individual,” id. at 397. To illustrate what
   constitutes persecution, consider Tamara-Gomez v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 343
   (5th Cir. 2006), where we held that the petitioner suffered persecution
   because he was systematically hunted down by a guerilla militia. In that case,
   Tamara-Gomez was confronted and threatened by a guerilla member because
   he assisted the Colombian National Police in a mission. Id. at 348. Within a
   short amount of time, the guerilla group had located him, obtained his cell

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   phone number, and identified the names of his wife and children. When
   Tamara-Gomez relocated out of fear, the group followed him. “[I]n addition
   to threatening calls, [his wife] received demands for money, death threats to
   her husband, and threats to kidnap her two sons . . . .” Id. at 346. And his
   new home was spray-painted with the militia’s symbols. Id. at 348.
           Unlike the facts in Tamara-Gomez, however, the facts presented here
   do not evince a “systemic, pervasive, or organized” kind of mistreatment.
   Gjetani, 968 F.3d at 398 (citation omitted). With regard to the fines levied by
   the Cuban government, the evidence does not compel reversal of the BIA’s
   decision that upheld the IJ’s finding “that the numerous fines levied against
   the respondent were related to food safety violations by his business, and
   [were] not on account of his political opinion.” And the several occasions on
   which    Escobar-Verdecia     was    detained    and      mistreated—although
   undoubtedly appalling—do not suggest a “sustained pursuit” that
   persecution requires. Id. Thus, the evidence warrants the IJ’s finding that
   Escobar-Verdecia “submitted insufficient evidence that he [was] being
   sought by Cuban authorities” because of his political views.
           As to his fear of future persecution, Escobar-Verdecia must
   demonstrate “a subjective fear of persecution, and that fear must also be
   objectively reasonable.” Eduard v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 182, 189 (5th Cir. 2004)
   (citation omitted). On this issue, the evidence does not compel reversal of
   the IJ’s finding that Escobar-Verdecia “has not provided sufficient evidence
   to show that anyone in Cuba is still looking for him or that he is under threat
   of arrest should he return to Cuba.” The Cuban government detained
   Escobar-Verdecia in connection with specific events: the election and the
   appearance of counterrevolutionary posters in his neighborhood.            He
   submitted no evidence suggesting that the Cuban authorities continued to
   target him after those events. Furthermore, “we have often taken note of
   when, as here, an alien has endured a threat or assault but has nevertheless

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   chosen to stay in his home country for a period of time—because the choice
   to stay tends to weaken the claim of persecution.” Gjetani, 968 F.3d at 399
   (collecting cases). Escobar-Verdecia stayed for two months after his last
   detention, and he did not provide any explanation in his brief as to why he
   chose to do so.
          Thus, under the deferential substantial-evidence standard, we are
   unable to grant the petition for review of Escobar-Verdecia’s political-asylum
   claim because the record evidence does not “‘compel[]’ a conclusion
   contrary to the [BIA]’s determination.” Id. at 396 (quoting Zhao, 404 F.3d
   at 306).
                                  *        *         *
          Accordingly, we DENY in part and DISMISS in part the petition
   for review.

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