Court Opinion

ID: 9519840
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:25:53.397541+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:41:16.718180
License: Public Domain

Boring, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
The provision of M. S. A. 169.21, subd. 5, of the highway traffic regulation act, that “Pedestrians when walking along a roadway shall walk near the left side of the roadway giving way to oncoming traffic,” was enacted to require pedestrians, for their own safety, to walk so that they face and can see the traffic approaching them along the lane in which they are walking and to give way to it. By this statute, the use of public highways by pedestrians is restricted. They are no longer, as before the statute, free to use such part of the highway as they may choose without encountering the prima facie presumption of lack of care. By the use of the phrase “giving way to oncoming traffic,” the statute cannot be interpreted otherwise than as requiring pedestrians to step out of the way of such traffic, and that would not mean stepping into the middle of the roadway or in any other direction than to the outer edge of the highway or completely off the roadway if practicable. Wojtowicz v. Belden, 211 Minn. 461, 463, 1 N. W. (2d) 409, 410, states:
“* * * Important is the requirement that the pedestrian shall not only walk near the left side but also give way to oncoming traffic.”
In Wisconsin, while its supreme court has not “interpreted” modifications into its statute as we have done, the supreme court of that state in Panzer v. Hesse, 249 Wis. 340, 346, 24 N. W. (2d) 613, 616, said of a similar statute:
“* * * The statute is a very important safety measure. It is designed to compel a pedestrian to face the traffic most likely to en*153danger Mm, thus increasing Ms opportunities for lookout and the likelihood.that approaching traffic will he seen and avoided(Italics supplied.)
In speaking of a pedestrian on the wrong side of the highway, that court said in the same case (249 Wis. 347, 24 N. W. [2d] 616):
“* * * Plaintiff was walking on the wrong side of the highway. He took no observation to the rear and he was struck. As a matter of law, he was negligent, both as to lookout and position on the highway, and at least in combination these defaults were causal.”
Plaintiff here was prima facie guilty of negligence in using the right side of the roadway just before he was hit. He could only rebut the prima facie case against him by presenting some justification for being on the wrong side. Failing in that, he was conclusively negligent. Wojtowicz v. Belden, 211 Minn. 461-463, 1 N. W. (2d) 409-410. Even if there was a justifiable reason for not walking on the left side, as the majority hold, the rest of the statute was still in force, and plaintiff was- required, in the interest of his own safety, to give way to traffic on the side on which he was walking. To do so, he would have had to be alert to its approach. Ordinary care on his part would require a degree of vigilance commensurate with the peril of walking in a lane where traffic was approaching from behind him — a degree of care that would be an adequate substitute for his failure to be facing approaching traffic. In Maine, where apparently they have no statute or had none in 1948, the supreme court of that state said in Barlow v. Lowery, 143 Me. 214, 218, 59 A. (2d) 702, 705:
“* * Ordinary care may sometimes require that he walk on the left-hand side, in order to’ better see and avoid approaching cars. He must indeed be vigilant for his own safety when he is walking on, or even too near, the right-hand travelled portion of a way with his back to oncoming vehicles.”
Realizing the requirement of care commensurate with the peril, how can we excuse or justify plaintiff for not looking to see defendant’s car when defendant announced his approach from plaintiff’s *154rear before plaintiff stepped in front of defendant’s car ? This was not “giving way” to oncoming traffic, but was a clear violation of that part of the statute which still applied to him while on the right side of the highway. The only possible compliance with the statute would have been to walk as far as possible to the right when he became aware of defendant’s approach. This he did not do. As quoted in the majority opinion, he said, when asked what he did on hearing defendant’s horn:
“Well, I can’t tell you that, either. I suppose I tried to get across, maybe I stepped up, and that’s the time he hit me, see?
“* * * I stepped out going to try to go across.”
Defendant might well have swung to the left, as he was attempting to do, and passed plaintiff, if plaintiff had but looked before he tried “to go across,” or even if he had stepped to the right as far as possible. No circumstance could better illustrate the wisdom of the old adage to “look before you leap” than the one at bar. Defendant, out of an abundance of caution, sounded his horn to let plaintiff know of his approach so that plaintiff might move to the edge of the pavement in compliance with the statute.
In my opinion, reasonable minds functioning judicially could not find plaintiff in the exercise of ordinary care when he failed to look back, in response to defendant’s announcement of his approach, and when instead he stepped blindly to the left and toward the middle of the road. Had he followed the requirement of the statute or the dictates of common sense, he would not have been hurt.
Almost universally, if a pedestrian continues to do just what he is doing upon the approach of a vehicle, the driver will avoid hitting him. Making a sudden movement in changing course is the most dangerous thing a pedestrian can do, unless he first looks to see if such movement can be made in safety. Here, being on the right-hand side of the road, it was his duty to be on the alert for the approach of traffic from the rear and to give way to it by stepping to the right. He did not do so, but, without looking, jumped in front *155of it. In my view, he was negligent as a matter of law, and that negligence was, in reality, the sole cause of his injury.
Certainly, plaintiff should not be accorded any relaxation of ordinary care because of his age. If on that account his movements were more leisurely, his vigilance should have been the greater.