Court Opinion

ID: 9695972
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:32:34.577018+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:17.703619
License: Public Domain

Hallows, C. J.
(dissenting). Since the “hearing agency” as used by the majority is a hearing officer and employee of the Department of Health & Social Services, he is not the most impartial person to decide whether the parolee may be represented by counsel. I would construe our Wisconsin Constitution as granting a parolee the right of representation at the administrative level. An attorney on certiorari comes too late.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Wilkie joins in this dissent.
Heffernan, J.
(dissenting). I would reverse. While the court’s opinion pays lip service to Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973), 411 U. S. 778, 93 Sup. Ct. 1756, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656, it ignores its rationale. A reasonable reading of Scarpelli demonstrates that the hearing may proceed without counsel only in those cases where the historical facts of the parole violation are undisputed.
Scarpelli emphasizes that the question of counsel in a revocation hearing is to be approached on a case-by-case *416basis. Scarpelli, page 790. Instances are referred to therein where not only is there the right to appear by retained counsel, but when there is a finding of indigency, the state must provide counsel.
“Presumptively, it may be said that counsel should be provided in cases where, after being informed of his right to request counsel, the probationer or parolee makes such a request, based on a timely and colorable claim (i) that he has not committed the alleged violation of the conditions upon which he is at liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter of public record or is uncontested, there are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate, and that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present. In passing on a request for the appointment of counsel, the responsible agency also should consider, especially in doubtful cases, whether the probationer appears to be capable of speaking effectively for himself. In every case in which a request for counsel at a preliminary or final hearing is refused, the grounds for refusal should be stated succinctly in the record.” Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, pages 790, 791.
The majority opinion finds that the examiner did not exercise discretion in denying the right of retained counsel to participate. The failure to exercise discretion when it is required, as it is by Scarpelli, is, under Wisconsin law, an abuse of discretion. McCleary v. State (1971), 49 Wis. 2d 263, 282, 182 N. W. 2d 512.
Cresci raised an issue which went to the fact-finding procedure, i.e., did he intentionally violate the conditions of his parole, or was the technical violation unknown to him and beyond his control. When this situation was posed, it was incumbent upon the examiner to exercise his administrative discretion and explain on the record his decision to deny counsel.
Contrary to the Scarpelli rule, Cresci was arbitrarily denied the right to counsel in a fact-finding procedure. Right to counsel is fully retroactive under the sixth *417amendment. (See Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), 372 U. S. 335, 83 Sup. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799, 93 A. L. R. 2d 733, and the right-of-counsel cases that follow.)
Where there is a constitutional right to counsel, a defendant is entitled to a fully retroactive application, even though here the examiner denying the right was not aware of the rule that he could not deny counsel without a demonstrated exercise of discretion.
The right to counsel is a constitutional one affecting the integrity of the fact-finding process. Neither this court, nor any other court, can “sunburst” the constitution. The effect of the constitution in respect to the right of counsel is fully retroactive, and Sewrpelli applies to this case. The judgment must be reversed.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Chief Justice Hallows and Mr. Justice Wilkie join in this dissent.