Court Opinion

ID: 9724086
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:43:58.952295+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:55.262153
License: Public Domain

SCHUDSON, J.
(concurring). Although Aniton's guilty plea waived his right to appellate review of a Riverside violation, it is important to emphasize that a guilty plea does not preclude appellate discretion to review the reasonableness of a Riverside violation.
In its brief to this court the State writes:
On this record, the state must concede that the Ger-stein-Riverside forty-eight hour rule was violated. The state does not concede that there was an unreasonable delay in the conducting of Aniton's initial appearance.
*131The State goes on to note the considerable uncertainty surrounding the circumstances of Aniton's first appearance in court, and the reasons for delay in providing either a probable cause review or a formal initial appearance. Thus, the State explains, this court has no way to know whether the delay was reasonable.
As the State correctly argues, that uncertainty could have been erased had Aniton filed a motion challenging "defects in the institution of the proceedings," under § 971.31(2), STATS.,1 within ten days after arraignment, as required under § 971.31(5)(a), STATS.2 The trial court could have held a hearing to determine the length of delay and the reasons for delay. Then, within our discretion to review, see Mack v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 287, 296-297, 286 N.W.2d 563, 567 (1980), we could have considered any constitutional challenge Aniton might have made to the trial court's conclusion.
As the State implicitly acknowledges, under State ex rel. Van Ermen v. Burke, 30 Wis. 2d 324, 338, 140 N.W.2d 737, 744 (1966), the potential for "absolute discharge" has not been determined but may exist as the appropriate remedy "in order to prevent a pattern of police practice involving unreasonable lengths of detention." In my opinion, our decision in this case does not preclude that potential. Further, our decision does not preclude appellate evaluation of that issue merely *132because a defendant pleads guilty. We should not require a defendant, who otherwise would plead guilty, to go to trial in order to preserve a Riverside challenge.
Thus, I trust that our decision in this case will not vitiate the strength of Riverside. For what some day might prove to be an unreasonable delay resulting from negligent, intentional, malicious, or persistent police practice, our discretionary review may become critical. Indeed, to the extent that courts would restrict review of such alleged Riverside violations, they would increase the potential for just such police practices, particularly during times of jail-overcrowding and inádequate criminal justice resources.
Here, because Aniton failed to pursue and litigate the Riverside issue as required by §§ 971.31(2) and 971.31(5)(a), STATS., he denied the trial court the opportunity to effectively review his challenge. In my opinion, that, not his guilty plea, foreclosed our opportunity to review his constitutional challenge. Accordingly, I respectfully concur.

 Section 971.31(2), STATS., provides, in part:
[0]bjections based on defects in the institution of the proceedings ... shall be raised before trial by motion or be deemed waived.

 Section 971.31(5)(a), Stats., provides:
Motions before trial shall be served and filed within 10 days after the initial appearance of the defendant in a misdemeanor action or 10 days after arraignment in a felony action unless the court otherwise permits.