Court Opinion

ID: 9412092
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-28 20:04:57.883274+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:27.637663
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
            in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                          2023 IL App (3d) 220305-U

                                   Order filed July 28, 2023
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                    IN THE

                                     APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                              THIRD DISTRICT

                                                      2023

      DENISE KITCHEN and                     )     Appeal from the Circuit Court
      MICHELLE ATCHISON,                     )     of the 13th Judicial Circuit,
                                             )     La Salle County, Illinois,
            Plaintiffs-Appellants,           )
                                             )     Appeal No. 3-22-0305
            v.                               )     Circuit No. 19-CH-68
                                             )
                                             )     Honorable
      LINDA VOLKMAN,                         )     Joseph P. Hettel,
                                             )     Judge, Presiding.
            Defendant-Appellee.              )
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE ALBRECHT delivered the judgment of the court.
            Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justice Davenport concurred in the judgment.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                   ORDER

¶1          Held: The circuit court did not err in its rulings regarding petitioners’ breach of
                  fiduciary duty claims or in refusing to award attorney fees or punitive damages;
                  petitioners were not prejudiced by the court’s actions and waived any argument
                  regarding any wrongful interference with inheritance claim.

¶2          Petitioners, Denise Kitchen and Michelle Atchison, appeal the circuit court’s rulings after

     a bench trial, arguing that the court’s actions were prejudicial, and that it made several errors
     deciding petitioners’ breach of fiduciary duty and wrongful interference with inheritance claims.

     We affirm.

¶3                                              I. BACKGROUND

¶4          On January 28, 2019, Kitchen filed a petition for power of attorney agent termination and

     accounting. Kitchen alleged that she and respondent, Linda Volkman, were both daughters of

     Joyce VeZain, who was an interested person under the Power of Attorney Act. 755 ILCS 45/1-1

     et seq. (West 2018). Respondent acted as VeZain’s power of attorney agent for both health care

     and property. The petition alleged that during the time respondent acted as VeZain’s agent, she

     restricted Kitchen’s access to information regarding VeZain’s medical condition, refused to

     provide Kitchen with a copy of the property power of attorney, and otherwise acted in bad faith.

     The petition was later amended to include claims of breach of fiduciary duty, conversion,

     wrongful interference with inheritance, and statutory financial exploitation, all alleging that

     respondent enriched herself and her children while acting as agent over VeZain’s property,

     resulting in a diminution of her estate.

¶5          Kitchen also alleged that respondent violated the Power of Attorney Act by: (1)

     establishing an account solely in her name funded by VeZain; (2) not timely paying VeZain’s

     bills when sufficient funds were available; (3) allowing checks to bounce; and (4) loaning money

     to herself, her children, and brother-in-law. Id. Kitchen argued that the loans to family members

     were presumed fraudulent and requested respondent rebut that presumption. She also requested

     an accounting on all VeZain’s accounts. Shortly after proceedings commenced, Atchison,

     another sibling, joined Kitchen in the petition.

                                                        2
¶6            In response to the petition, respondent filed a motion to dismiss and various other

       motions to strike certain aspects of the petition. She also engaged a CPA firm to prepare an

       accounting in her defense.

¶7            After receiving the accounting and supplemental updates, petitioners alleged there were

       multiple discrepancies regarding the loan amounts given to respondent’s children. Additionally,

       the “seed books” used to document loans from VeZain listed checks that borrowers testified they

       did not receive or were in a different amount. Loan ledgers from the bank also showed different

       numbers than those in the seed books. At trial, respondent testified that she kept records of her

       transactions as agent to the best of her ability. She testified that she wrote the checks documented

       in the seed books, balanced her mother’s bank statements, and was in contact with VeZain’s

       financial advisor. She acknowledged that one loan recorded in the seed book was recorded as

       being $10,000 less than the actual loan given and stated she must have made a mistake in

       recording it.

¶8            Petitioners also questioned the cash kept in VeZain’s home safe and how that money was

       spent. Respondent testified that at least $10,000 was kept in VeZain’s home safe. She created a

       cash-on-hand ledger for the accounting but admitted that it was largely from memory because

       she did not take receipts or make notes on how the cash was used. The ledger showed negative

       $12,000 balance, and at one point the balance was listed as being in a $21,000 deficit.

¶9            Petitioners also alleged that the accounting indicated there were several undocumented

       retirement and social security checks. Respondent testified that she cashed some of those checks

       to be able to continue making loans with the cash on hand.

¶ 10          When asked about VeZain’s bank accounts, respondent testified that she did not

       comingle her funds with her mother’s. When petitioners’ attorney pointed out that she was listed

                                                        3
       as a joint owner to a bank account, she stated that she did not realize what that meant and that

       she knew the bank was aware she was VeZain’s agent and could access the accounts. The only

       time she moved money from her mother’s account to one of her own would be to pay her

       mother’s bills.

¶ 11          Kitchen testified at trial that she did not object to the loans given to respondent’s

       children. She stated she took issue with respondent’s unsatisfactory recordkeeping. She also

       testified that she spent approximately 600 hours looking through all the records provided in

       discovery trying to find discrepancies. When asked how much money was unaccounted for based

       on her review, she offered amounts that respondent’s attorney later argued went to a jeweler to

       pay for VeZain’s watch repair.

¶ 12          Testimony at trial also revealed that whenever a borrower requested a loan from VeZain,

       respondent would be present. VeZain would ask respondent if she had enough money to cover

       the loan. Once respondent confirmed she had the money, VeZain would approve the loan and ask

       respondent to execute it.

¶ 13          At the end of trial, the court stated that it found respondent to be somewhat credible in

       that while she may not have performed well as her mother’s fiduciary, it did not believe she

       acted in bad faith. The court further told respondent:

                                “If [VeZain] wants to let it fly out the window with penalties and having

                         things shut off, it’s her money and if she’s capable or competent, she can do it.

                         She can take the dollar bills and set them on fire if she wanted to, but as a

                         fiduciary you do have a higher responsibility, and is a negligent finding or a

                         finding of negligence in that responsibility or recklessness even enough to justify

                         fees? Those in my mind are the issues.

                                                           4
                              I don’t think that you stole any money. I don’t think there’s evidence

                      sufficient to say that you stole money, and I know that means a lot to the two of

                      you obviously, but just because there’s not evidence to show that you stole

                      money, is there evidence that you took actions to hide the use of money just so

                      you couldn’t stop the other side or the other side couldn’t stop you from getting

                      the money to your children, and that bit of a cat and mouse game, the fact that it

                      can be argued that it caused all of this should you be responsible for the cost of it

                      and then if the answer to that is yes, what is the cost of it ultimately.”

¶ 14          The court then ordered a briefing schedule for final arguments and set the matter for

       closing arguments, which occurred on June 1, 2022. Before allowing the parties to argue, the

       court informed them that it had been unable to review their written arguments the day before but

       believed it was prepared to hear arguments. It stated that each parties’ argument would be timed.

       After petitioners’ attorney informed the court that he had prepared for longer than what the court

       allotted to him, the court allowed him to finish his argument in the time originally planned. After

       arguments, the court again stated that it did not believe respondent stole money from her mother

       or that her actions were motivated by an “intent to take advantage of her mother or her siblings

       and their finances.” The court determined that respondent’s testimony that she did not steal

       anything from her mother and was only trying to carry out her mother’s wishes was enough to

       rebut any presumption of fraud against her actions. It stated that even with this finding, it did not

       believe petitioners made a mistake in filing their claim against respondent. When addressing

       petitioners’ request for attorney fees, the court stated:

                              “Is it statutorily supported, that’s what I’m going to have to determine

                      here, and the papers I think will suggest that it is statutorily supported so at a

                                                          5
                      minimum there’s going to be attorney fees ordered, probably at a maximum

                      frankly. I don’t know how I can determine – I know the argument, *** is why

                      shouldn’t she be punished and how is it going to prevent from other people from

                      not. All right, judge. You believe she didn’t steal. What’s going to prevent the

                      thief from stealing when the courts won’t make you accountable and if you’re not

                      accountable make you pay? I don’t know.

                              I don’t know if a general deterrence is going to be – it’s certainly not

                      going to be part of my ruling in this case, and the criminal suggestions that you

                      have made are not going to be my finding, but negligent accounting, one thing.

                      Intentionally misleading accounting another, and that’s what I saw here justified

                      by that’s what mom wanted, and that’s what I’m going to do. I’m going to follow

                      my duty of loyalty to my mother and to do what she wanted, not the same duty of

                      loyalty that’s necessarily talked about here.

                              So now we have another step in this case, and that next step is going to be

                      what are reasonable attorney fees and what is appropriate?

                                                      ***

                              I want to look with more scrutiny at my notes and your papers as I talked

                      about before, but it is my inclination right now that there’s going to be attorney

                      fees awarded.

                              There’s not going to be a finding that there has been money taken.”

¶ 15          The court requested the attorneys submit their records for attorney fees and set the matter

       for hearing on those fees. At the hearing on June 28, 2022, the court asked petitioners what gave

       it the authority to award attorney fees. Petitioners argued that section 2-7 of the Power of

                                                        6
       Attorney Act allowed for attorney fees to be awarded against respondent. 755 ILCS 45/2-7 (West

       2018). Respondent argued that the court could only award attorney fees if there were damages to

       the estate.

¶ 16           The court then made the following findings:

                                 “The first thing, this lawsuit being brought by [petitioners], it had merit.

                      There is no question that what was discovered upon the discovery process and

                      after bringing this action was that the agent in this case was not doing her job in

                      compliance with the statute. I want that finding to be on the record.

                                 On the flip side of that, after having heard the evidence – and I’m

                      paraphrasing, and I’ll defer to what I said after the trial – I found that her report as

                      to what happened with her mother’s estate, property of her mother’s estate was

                      accounted for and that she did not take any of the money for her own gain or for

                      the gain of her children.

                                 Specifically, while her actions were not authorized by the act, she carried

                      out a plan that was demonstrated. Specifically, her mother, throughout her life,

                      had loaned money to her, to her sister and continued that on to younger family

                      members or children and grandchildren regarding college and weddings, and she

                      continued to do that. How she did that was inappropriate and how she responded

                      to the requests that were made to account was also inappropriate.

                                                               ***

                                 It seems wrong to me that I cannot find justification to grant an award of

                      attorney’s fees without a showing of damage, without a showing of loss to the

                      estate.”

                                                           7
¶ 17          Thus, the court found that there was merit to petitioners’ cause of action and found that

       respondent violated the Power of Attorney Act in that she failed to keep proper records.

       However, because there was no diminution in the estate, the court determined that the respondent

       did not owe any funds to the estate as a result of her actions. It further found that respondent

       owed the estate $11,825 for funds taken to pay her own attorney fees and that no fees were owed

       for petitioners’ attorney fees. The petitioners appealed.

¶ 18                                              II. ANALYSIS

¶ 19          On appeal, petitioners make various arguments that the court erred in its findings.

       Specifically, petitioners contend this court should reverse the circuit court’s ruling that

       petitioners did not prove a breach of fiduciary duty. In doing so, petitioners argue that the court

       improperly applied the presumption of fraud, was incorrect in finding no diminution of the

       estate, and erred in refusing to award attorney fees or punitive damages. Petitioners also argue

       that they sufficiently proved their claim of wrongful interference with inheritance and that

       generally the court’s actions were prejudicial.

¶ 20                                       A. Prejudice by the Court

¶ 21          Petitioners begin their argument by asserting that they were prejudiced by the

       appointment of the trial judge to our court. They argue the appointment “fast-tracked” the case,

       causing it to receive less time and attention than it should have. Petitioners point to closing

       arguments as an example. They argue that the court allotted two hours for the argument then

       shortened that time on the day of the hearing, informed the parties that it had not read the written

       arguments prior to arguments, and in the petitioners’ opinion, had “made [its] mind up on

       material issues prior to hearing.” They contend that these actions caused them to be prejudiced

       by the court.

                                                         8
¶ 22           This court fails to see how a six-day trial, briefing schedule for closing arguments, and

       separate hearing dates for closing arguments and attorney fees were inadequate to sufficiently

       resolve the matter. Further, while arguing they did not receive adequate consideration for their

       closing argument and accompanying briefs, petitioners omit several important facts. First, when

       asserting that the court shortened their allotted time for argument, petitioners failed to mention

       that when counsel told the court that he had planned and prepared for thirty minutes to argue, the

       court allowed counsel thirty minutes for his argument. Further, no statements were made to the

       court that either party was unable to fully argue or present evidence in the proceedings. There is

       nothing in the record that indicates any part of the trial or argument was cut short or that material

       evidence could not have been presented due to any time restraints. The circuit court made every

       effort to accommodate the parties and to allow each to make any arguments they wished to

       make.

¶ 23           Petitioners also argue that the court had already made up its mind prior to final oral

       argument; however, the record demonstrates that the court went off the record several times in

       order to review the law and engaged in a thorough discussion of its findings with the parties.

       Finally, petitioners argue that they were prejudiced because the court had an “incorrect

       orientation” of the case. However, they do not explain this argument or provide any precedent to

       indicate such an accusation. Rather, petitioners make assumptions regarding the court’s thought

       process and ask this court to make the same assumptions without any evidence to corroborate

       them. We choose not to do this, and instead turn to the substantive issues raised in the appeal.

¶ 24                                      B. Breach of Fiduciary Duty

¶ 25           Petitioners’ first substantive argument is that they proved all elements of their breach of

       fiduciary duty claims, and the circuit court erred in not finding in their favor. Within this

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       argument, petitioners also allege that the circuit court failed to properly apply the presumption of

       fraud and erred in finding that there was no diminution of the estate. They request this court

       reverse these findings, as well as the circuit court’s decisions denying an award of attorney fees

       and punitive damages.

¶ 26            To prove a breach of fiduciary duty, petitioners were required to establish a fiduciary

       relationship existed, respondent breached her duties as fiduciary, and damages resulted from that

       breach. Lawlor v. North American Corp. of Illinois, 2012 IL 112530, ¶ 69. The question of

       whether respondent breached her fiduciary duty is a question of fact. Thompson v. Gordon, 241

       Ill. 2d 428, 438-39 (2011). We will not disturb the circuit court’s ruling on a question of fact

       unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Veco Corp. v. Babcock, 243 Ill. App. 3d

       153, 160 (1993). A ruling is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if an opposite

       conclusion is clearly evident. Id.

¶ 27            While the parties disagree on when respondent became a fiduciary, there is no doubt that

       a fiduciary relationship existed, and that respondent owed a duty to her mother while she acted as

       her agent. For the purposes of this appeal, petitioners have established this element of their

       claim.

¶ 28            The next element petitioners must prove is that respondent breached her fiduciary duty to

       her mother. Petitioners argue several different breaches occurred. First, they argue that

       respondent did not make complete and accurate records. The court found in petitioners favor on

       this issue. It found that respondent violated the Power of Attorney Act by failing to maintain

       complete financial records and for failure to provide petitioners with an accounting when they

       initially requested it. 755 ILCS 45/2-7(c) (West 2018).

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¶ 29          Petitioners also argue that they proved breaches related to the loans respondent gave to

       her children, unaccounted for cash amounts and retirement checks, and commingling of funds in

       the form of joint accounts. A presumption of fraud arises regarding these alleged breaches, which

       petitioners argue was not properly applied by the circuit court.

¶ 30          The Power of Attorney Act recognizes that it is the agent’s exercise of power pursuant to

       the authorizing document which triggers the agent’s duty to the principal. See 755 ILCS 45/2-

       7(a) (“Whenever a power is exercised, the agent shall act in good faith for the benefit of the

       principal using due care, competence, and diligence in accordance with the terms of the

       agency”). When a person is designated as an agent through a power of attorney, she has a

       fiduciary duty to the person giving the designation. Id. The existence of this relationship

       prohibits the agent from seeking or obtaining any selfish benefits. Clark v. Clark, 398 Ill. 592,

       601-02 (1947). If the agent does create such a benefit, the transaction is presumed to be

       fraudulent. Id. This presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the

       contrary, either by the agent showing that she acted in good faith or that she did not betray the

       confidence placed in her. Id. at 601 (“If a conveyance was not procured through improper means

       attended with circumstances of oppression or overreaching but was entered into by the grantor

       with full knowledge of its nature and effect and because of his or her deliberate, voluntary and

       intelligent desire, the existence of a fiduciary relation does not invalidate the transaction.”). Here,

       it is the respondent’s burden to rebut the presumption, and if she fails to do so, the transaction at

       issue must be set aside. 755 ILCS 45/2-7(a), (f); Clark, 398 Ill. at 601. The circuit court’s

       determination that the presumption of fraud has been overcome is entitled to deference and will

       not be reversed on appeal unless the decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

       Clark, 398 at 601.

                                                         11
¶ 31           Petitioners argue that the presumption of fraud is triggered because respondent benefited

       from the loans given to her children and her access to VeZain’s cash on hand and retirement

       checks. Because the transactions in question are presumed fraudulent, respondent must

       demonstrate either the language of the power of attorney itself authorized the act or by some

       other evidence, VeZain intended, without undue influence, to authorize respondent to so act. The

       court found that respondent successfully rebutted the presumption of fraud with a showing that

       she used the same method of giving loans to family members as her mother had done for years

       prior, as well as the testimony of her children regarding how loans were given to them while

       respondent acted as agent, successfully rebutted any presumption against her. The court also

       found that respondent was not intending to benefit from any of her actions and that she was

       merely following the course of conduct her mother took when she was capable of making

       financial decisions on her own. We also note that Kitchen testified that she took no issue with the

       loans, as her mother had made it a practice of loaning family money; it was merely the

       recordkeeping that Kitchen saw as insufficient. Having reviewed the evidence in this case, we

       find that the circuit court’s determination that respondent met her burden to rebut the

       presumption of fraud was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 32           Finally, petitioners were required to prove damages as it related to the breaches that they

       successfully proved. Petitioners must prove damages to a reasonable degree of certainty. In re

       Estate of Halas, 209 Ill. App. 3d 333, 349 (1991). They may not rely on evidence that is

       speculative or uncertain. Id. While the circuit court here acknowledged that respondent’s actions

       were insufficient as an agent and did indeed find that she violated the Power of Attorney Act, it

       found that no damages would be awarded because there was no proof that there was a diminution

       of value in the estate.

                                                        12
¶ 33             Petitioners argue that they sufficiently proved damages in this case; however, when asked

       to quantify damages, petitioners have been unable to do so. Petitioners argue that “[respondent]

       was required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that any transfers to herself and her

       family, or unexplained funds that were not accounted for, did not result in damage to VeZain.”

       Petitioners repeatedly argue that the burden was on respondent to overcome the presumption of

       fraud and that this burden is somehow connected to proving damages. While petitioners are

       correct that the respondent must overcome the presumption of fraud, this does not create a

       burden on her to prove or disprove damages. Petitioners misunderstand the presumption of fraud

       and what burden respondent has in overcoming that presumption.

¶ 34             The burden on respondent to rebut any presumption of fraud is to show that the

       transaction was not fraudulent, not that there was no damage to the estate. See Clark, 398 Ill. at

       601. “ ‘[T]he presence of a presumption in a case only has the effect of shifting to the party

       against whom it operates the burden of going forward and introducing evidence to meet the

       presumption. If evidence is introduced which is contrary to the presumption, the presumption

       will cease to operate.’ ” Franciscan Sisters Health Care Corp. v. Dean, 95 Ill. 2d 452, 462

       (1983) (quoting McElroy v. Force, 38 Ill. 2d 528, 533 (1967)). Here, the court found that

       respondent introduced evidence to successfully rebut the presumption of fraud. Thus, the

       presumption was no longer a factor, and petitioners were required to prove the rest of their

       claims.

¶ 35             Petitioners failed to provide any evidence of damages and blame respondent for not

       presenting the CPA who performed the accounting at trial to testify that there was no damage to

       the estate. Petitioners have no explanation for why they did not present an accountant to testify

       on their behalf or why they did not subpoena respondent’s CPA themselves. Instead, petitioners

                                                        13
       provide “suggestions” and “estimated” amounts that they believed respondent should pay toward

       the estate. This is not proof of damages. Petitioners have been unable to give this court any real

       answer as to what damages the estate incurred. Instead, they have provided more estimates,

       suggestions, and ranges without any proof to support those numbers. Notably, the amount of

       “suggested” damages has changed from trial, closing arguments, appellate briefs, and oral

       arguments. Petitioners have been unable to pinpoint any actual damages to the estate. We simply

       cannot assess damages in the vacuum of petitioner’s making.

¶ 36          Absent any clear assessment of damages, we conclude that it is not against the manifest

       weight of the evidence for the circuit court to have found there was no actual loss to the estate.

       Further, because petitioners failed to prove damages, they also failed to prove their claims of

       breach of fiduciary duty.

¶ 37          Also related to their breach of fiduciary duty claims, petitioners argue that the court erred

       in not awarding them attorney fees or punitive damages. The general rule regarding attorney fees

       is that all parties are responsible for their own. Myers v. Popp Enterprises, Inc., 216 Ill. App. 3d

       830, 838 (1991). A court may award attorney fees against a party if it is authorized to do so,

       either by statute or agreement of the parties. In re Marriage of Magnuson, 156 Ill. App. 3d 691,

       700 (1987). The relevant statute, 755 ILCS 45/2-7(f), reads as follows:

                      “An agent that violates this Act is liable to the principal or the principal’s

                      successors in interest for the amount required (i) to restore the value of the

                      principal’s property to what it would have been had the violation not occurred,

                      and (ii) to reimburse the principal or the principal’s successors in interest for the

                      attorney’s fees and costs paid on the agent’s behalf. This subsection does not limit

                                                        14
                      any other applicable legal or equitable remedies.” 755 ILCS 45/2-7(f) (West

                      2018).

¶ 38          The legislative intent behind this statute is to award attorney fees whenever a violation of

       the Act is proven in order to make the principal’s estate whole. Collins v. Noltensmeier, 2018 IL

       App (4th) 170443, ¶ 39. The court’s decision in awarding attorney fees will not be reversed

       absent an abuse of discretion. Blakenship v. Dialist International Corp., 209 Ill. App. 3d 920,

       927 (1991).

¶ 39          A plain reading of the statute indicates that if a violation of the Act is found, respondent

       is liable to both make the estate whole by paying back any loss she caused and to pay back any

       attorney fees paid on the agent’s behalf. 755 ILCS 45/2-7(f) (West 2018). This last phrase leads

       to the conclusion that one can only recover attorney fees under this statute if the fees were to pay

       for the agent’s defense, not for the fees incurred by the principal’s other children. This

       interpretation aligns with the stated purpose of awarding such fees to make the estate whole

       again. See Collins, 2018 IL App (4th) 170443, ¶ 39.

¶ 40          The court here found that, although respondent violated the Act by not keeping proper

       records, it could not award attorney fees because there was no diminution of the estate. While the

       court’s interpretation of the statute appears incorrect, the end result is still the same. Under the

       statute, petitioners are not entitled to attorney fees because those fees were not paid for by the

       estate on respondent’s behalf, and the court did not err in refusing to award such fees. We do

       note, however, that it correctly ordered respondent to reimburse the estate for the portion of

       attorney fees that was paid out of it for her representation in the matter.

¶ 41                               C. Wrongful Interference with Inheritance

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¶ 42          Lastly, petitioners also argue that the court did not consider their claim that respondent

       violated the Criminal Code under the statute for wrongful interference with inheritance. 720

       ILCS 5/17-56 (West 2018). They argue that under section 17-56 of the Code, treble damages

       should have been awarded. Id.

¶ 43          Petitioners’ argument in their brief consists of two paragraphs and a cursory statement

       that they are entitled to relief under the statute. However, their brief is completely void of any

       argument, reference to the record, or caselaw or other authority to support their position.

       Appellants are required to provide this court with a cohesive argument, with supporting

       authority, for this court to properly review. Maday v. Township High School District 211, 2018

       IL App (1st) 180294, ¶ 50. Without having any of these requirements met, we are unable to

       review this argument. Petitioners assert that any unaccounted-for retirement checks should be

       considered misappropriated funds but provide absolutely no citations or evidence in the record to

       support such a conclusion. Thus, because petitioners have failed to comply with Illinois Supreme

       Court Rule 341, their argument as to any wrongful interference with inheritance is deemed

       waived. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020); Maday, 2018 IL App (1st) 180294, ¶ 50.

       Moreover, as the court found that there was no viable wrongful interference with inheritance

       claim and petitioners have failed to provide this court with a proper legal argument on this issue,

       their argument that they are entitled to attorney fees under this statute also fails.

¶ 44                                            III. CONCLUSION

¶ 45          For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the circuit court of La Salle County is

       affirmed.

¶ 46          Affirmed.

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