Court Opinion

ID: 9770733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:20:06.652734+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:20.111134
License: Public Domain

ANDELL, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The trial court’s judgments are flawed on their face because neither one orders or directs Rivera to pay child support. The divorce decree contains the following paragraph concerning Rivera’s child support obligation:
The Court finds that the parties have entered into a written agreement respecting conservatorship and support of the child, a copy of which is filed in this proceeding, and that the agreement is in the best interest of the child and should be made a part of the order of the court.
This paragraph is followed by a decretal paragraph in which the trial court declares it is “ordered, adjudged, and decreed” that Edelia be the managing conservator and Rivera be the possessoiy conservator. This de-cretal language, however, addresses only the matter of conservatorship. There are neither details (such as the amount to be paid, the timing of payments, the method of payment, or the length of the obligation) nor any decretal language in regard to child support in the judgment.
The 1980 “Order Sustaining Motion for Contempt and Agreed Order” adjudged Rivera to be in contempt and ordered him to pay back child support and attorney’s fees. It also provides:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that such aforementioned order be incorporated in an agreement between the parties to this action, such agreement to comprise the following:
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Respondent is to continue to support the children of the marriage by following the original order of the court by monthly payments of TWO HUNDRED AND NO/ 100 ($200.00) DOLLARS to be paid in one installment of $200 on the 1st of each and every month until the children attain the age of eighteen (18) years.
Despite the addition of these details concerning payment, this order bears the same defect as the original divorce decree: it contains no decretal language ordering Rivera to pay child support. I consider this to be a critical deficiency. We determine the legal obligations of a party based upon the decre-tal portion of the judgment.
Recitations preceding the decretal portion of a written instrument, albeit proper inclusions, form no part of the decree. Stevens v. Cain, 735 S.W.2d 694, 695 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1987, orig. proceeding). In Stevens, the relator sought to have the appellate court vacate “the portion of the judgment that declared an elective office vacant.” Id. In the judgment, the trial court decreed that a new election be held. Although it found that the office had been vacant for some months, it did not “decree” the office was vacant. Because it did not decree the office was vacant, the appellate court denied relief. Id.;see also Ex parte Duncan, 462 S.W.2d 336, 337-38 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1970, orig. proceeding) (because no language in judgment “ordering, decreeing, adjudging or otherwise directing” relator to make installment payments, his obligation to pay rested entirely in contract); cf. Goode v. Avis Rent-A-Car, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 202, 203 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (validity of summary judgment does not *286rest in recitals; only decretal portion of judgment operates to adjudicate cause); Ellis v. Mortgage & Trust, Inc., 751 S.W.2d 721, 724 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1988, no writ) (reference to constructive trust occurred before decretal portion of default judgment, thus was not part of decree).
An action to reduce unpaid support to judgment is a remedy for nonpayment. It does not impose a legal obligation to support a child — that obligation is fixed by the divorce decree, not by the remedy. In re Dickinson, 829 S.W.2d 919, 921 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1992, no writ). The majority sidesteps this issue by terming the judgments “agreed” and “consent” judgments. Without decretal language, however, the trial court simply memorialized the couple’s agreement without imposing a legal obligation to pay. Parties are free to create agreements, but they are not free to create “agreed orders.” Only a court of competent jurisdiction may “order” a couple to abide by their agreement. Moreover, the remedies for breaching an agreement are different from the remedies for breaching a court order.
The Corpus Christi court of appeals examined a divorce decree virtually identical to the one before us. See Ex parte Harris, 649 S.W.2d 389, 390 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ). The decree incorporated a written agreement about support into the decree, but, as here, lacked either details or a decretal paragraph. Id. The court was able to review the detailed written agreement between the parties, which we cannot do because that agreement has apparently been lost.
In holding that the decree was not enforceable by contempt, the court noted:
An inspection of the divorce decree reveals that the trial court failed to order or command Relator to make any child support payments whatsoever. Even though the decree did “incorporate into the divorce” the agreement of the parties which contained provisions of support of the child, such a decree cannot be enforced by contempt absent language ordering, decreeing, adjudging or otherwise directing that Relator make the child support payments.
Id. at 391. Here, as in Harris, the divorce decree contained no language ordering or otherwise directing Rivera to make the child support payments. In Marichal v. Marichal, 768 S.W.2d 383, 384 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied), the court held a divorce decree was “ambiguous, indefinite, and uncertain” because it recognized the need for support payments but did not actually order the husband to make them. The court held it was error for the trial court to reduce the unpaid child support arrearage to judgment because the divorce decree lacked language ordering the husband to pay support. Id.
A contempt order based on an unenforceable decree is void, not merely voidable. Ex parte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Tex.1967) (orig.prodeeding). A void judgment has no legal effect and cannot serve as the basis for a valid plea of res judicata or for any other plea. Lawrence Systems, Inc. v. Superior Feeders, Inc. 880 S.W.2d 203, 211 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1994, writ denied); accord Maxwell v. Campbell, 282 S.W.2d 957, 958 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1955, writ refd). Therefore, a void judgment cannot be considered a “valid and final judgment” as contemplated by the definition of collateral estoppel.
Based on the reasoning in Harris and Marichal, I would hold Rivera was never properly ordered to pay child support and the attorney general could not bring suit on Edelia’s behalf to reduce the unpaid support to judgment. I would further hold Rivera is not collaterally estopped from attacking the validity of the child support portion of the divorce decree.
Without decretal language, the couple’s agreement may have been an “agreed judgment” but cannot be an “agreed order.” Accordingly, Edelia’s remedy is to sue on the contract, if its terms so permit. However, while Edelia may sue on the contract, I would hold that the attorney general could not bring an action on her behalf to reduce the unpaid arrears to judgment because there was never a valid order of support rendered by the trial court.
I would sustain point of error two.
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court, vacate the order reducing the unpaid *287child support to judgment, and dismiss the attorney general’s suit.
HEDGES, J., joins this dissent.