Court Opinion

ID: 9910135
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-14 20:09:56.556457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:51:01.127861
License: Public Domain

J-A23011-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 IN THE INTEREST OF: E.D.A., III, A   :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
                                      :
 APPEAL OF: E.D.A., JR., FATHER       :
                                      :
                                      :
                                      :
                                      :   No. 683 MDA 2022

              Appeal from the Decree Entered April 20, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):
                              2022-0007a,
                        2022-0008a, 2022-0009a,
                        2022-0010a, 2022-0019a

 IN THE INTEREST OF: E.J.A., A        :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
                                      :
 APPEAL OF: E.A., JR., FATHER         :
                                      :
                                      :
                                      :
                                      :   No. 684 MDA 2022

              Appeal from the Decree Entered April 20, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):
                              2022-0009a

 IN THE INT. OF: R.M.A., A MINOR      :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
 APPEAL OF: E.A., JR., FATHER         :
                                      :
                                      :
                                      :
                                      :
                                      :   No. 685 MDA 2022

              Appeal from the Decree Entered April 20, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):
                              2022-0010a
J-A23011-22

  IN THE INT. OF: A.B.A., A MINOR              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: E.A., JR., FATHER                 :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 686 MDA 2022

               Appeal from the Decree Entered April 20, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):
                               2022-0019a

  IN THE INTEREST OF: B.W., A                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: E.A., JR., FATHER                 :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 687 MDA 2022

               Appeal from the Decree Entered April 20, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):
                               2022-0007a

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                             FILED DECEMBER 14, 2023

       E.A., Jr. (“Father”), appeals from the decrees entered on April 20, 2022,

which terminated involuntarily his parental rights to B.W., born in May 2014;

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

                                           -2-
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Ed.A., born in June 2015; R.A., born in June 2018; El.A., born in August 2019;

and A.A., born in June 2021.1 We affirm.

       The York County Office of Children, Youth, and Families (“CYF”) first

became involved with the family in 2019 due to concerns with substance abuse

by Mother and Father. A referral was made to CYF in August 2020 based on

an allegation that they were abusing drugs and not properly disciplining or

supervising the four oldest children. Those children were placed into care and

adjudicated dependent on September 16, 2020. After A.A. was born, he was

likewise placed into care and adjudicated dependent.2

____________________________________________

1 We have adjusted the abbreviations used within this writing to align with
those used by this Court in several related cases presently or recently before
this Court. To wit, with respect to termination, T.W.A. (“Mother”), El.A., and
R.A., have also appealed, and those appeals are docketed at 755-759 MDA
2022, 740 MDA 2022, and 741 MDA 2022, respectively. Additionally, Father
and Mother also appealed the goal change from reunification to adoption,
docketed at 201-205 MDA 2022 and 295-299 MDA 2022, respectively. Finally,
Father and Mother appealed from an order finding them both perpetrators of
abuse as to B.W. and El.A. This Court stayed all matters, including the instant
termination appeal, pending resolution of the abuse appeals. Ultimately, we
affirmed the findings of abuse. See Int. of B.W., 2023 WL 5526687
(Pa.Super. 2023) (non-precedential decision) (affirming the finding of abuse
as to Father); Int. of B.W., 290 A.3d 702, 2022 WL 17973239 (Pa.Super.
2022) (non-precedential decision) (affirming the finding of abuse as to
Mother). Although the stay has been lifted in the termination matters, it
remains active on the goal change appeals. Regrettably, the cumulative effect
has been the tragic prolongation of several Children’s Fast Track cases for this
family, which are, by nature, meant to be resolved quickly by this Court for
the benefit of the impacted children.

2 All five children were eventually placed in the same pre-adoptive resource

home along with an older half-sibling, where they remained at the time of the
termination hearing.

                                           -3-
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      As a result of the dependency adjudications, Father was ordered to, inter

alia, cooperate with both announced and unannounced home visits by CYF;

complete a mental health evaluation and follow treatment recommendations;

actively participate in services; obtain employment and provide proof of

income to CYF; maintain safe, clean, and appropriate housing; submit to

random drug testing; and continue his drug and alcohol treatment and

participation in the methadone program. See Family Service Plan, 10/2/20,

at 14, 16-18; see also Family Service Plan, 3/12/21, at 14 (adding, among

other things, that Father notify CYF of any change in household members,

attend medical appointments for the children, and adhere to the conditions of

his probation); Family Service Plan, 8/9/21 (same, issued following A.A.’s

birth and adjudication of dependency).

      Meanwhile, in the companion dependency matters, allegations of

physical abuse were made against Father and Mother in December 2020 and

January 2021, as to B.W. and El.A., leading to an abuse investigation. The

report included allegations that the parents slapped the children with an open

hand, including when El.A. was less than one month old, and struck the

children with a belt.

      This Court recounted the testimony offered at the March 10, 2022

finding of abuse hearing as follows:

      The [Child Advocacy Center] forensic interviewer . . . testified:
      “B.W. disclosed being beat — his words — that El.A. was slapped
      with a belt,” Father beat R.A. and El.A., Mother slapped B.W., and
      B.W. observed potential drug use. B.W. further reported El.A.
      suffered injuries, including bleeding from the mouth.

                                       -4-
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      CYF Caseworker [Kristen] Marshall, who observed the interview,
      testified:

            B.W. disclosed that he and his siblings were being
            punished with a black belt with little spikes on it. He
            reported that it was hurtful. B.W. actually stated it
            hurt more than a gun. He stated the spikes were
            sharp and caused him to bleed. He stated he would
            cry and he was hit over and over. The very red marks
            like — were left like it was bleeding, but it wasn’t. And
            he stated that both parents would hit him.

      CYF additionally entered into evidence the forensic interview
      summary and a DVD video of the forensic interview. Ms. Marshall
      sought, but did not receive, medical records that might show
      physical injury to B.W. She also attempted multiple times to
      schedule an interview with Mother and Father, but was
      unsuccessful.

      With respect to El.A., Ms. Marshall testified that B.W. stated
      Mother and Father sometimes slapped El.A., so there was blood
      under his tongue, and that El.A. would cry a lot and neighbors
      would hear. As stated above, B.W.’s statements led to a referral
      as to El.A. An investigation revealed El.A. was taken to the York
      Hospital emergency room for bleeding from the mouth in August
      2019 when he was less than a month old.

Int. of B.W., 290 A.3d 702, 2022 WL 17973239, at *2-3 (Pa.Super. 2022)

(non-precedential   decision)    (cleaned   up).      Following    a    prolonged

investigation, partially due to the parents’ refusal to submit to police

interviews, the court found both Mother and Father to be perpetrators of abuse

against B.W. and El.A. As noted, this Court affirmed those findings.

      On January 19, 2022, CYF filed petitions to terminate Father’s rights to

all five children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (5). As to the

four oldest children, B.W., Ed.A., R.A., and El.A., CYF also sought termination

pursuant to § 2511(a)(8).

                                      -5-
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       The court held hearings on the petitions on April 1 and 18, 2022.3 With

respect to Father, CYF presented the testimony of caseworker Kristen

Marshall, Father’s probation officer and methadone counselor, and the family

advocate and family therapist from Pressley Ridge. Through their testimony,

it was relayed that Father had been consistent with his visits with the children

and had made significant progress resolving his substance abuse. However,

as of the first day of the hearing, CYF remained concerned because Father had

not alleviated the environmental concerns at the house, made progress in his

mental health treatment, or established financial stability. Additionally, visits

had not progressed beyond supervised, and Father recently tested positive for

alcohol, which particularly concerned CYF given his addiction issues and

because one of the positive results was recorded immediately before a visit.

       At the second hearing, over two weeks later, Father and Mother

testified. Mother attempted to demonstrate that the house had since been

made appropriate for reunification. For his part, Father recounted his work

history and explained that he had scheduled an appointment to recommence

his mental health treatment the following day.       Finally, Father presented

testimony from another CYF caseworker regarding Ms. Marshall’s alleged bias.

       The children’s GAL argued that termination was in the best interests of

each child. Specifically, the GAL was concerned that the physical abuse had
____________________________________________

3 At the termination hearing, each child had their own attorney representing

their respective legal interests.       David Worley, Esquire, collectively
represented the best interests of all five children as their guardian ad litem
(“GAL”).

                                           -6-
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been unaddressed and was wary of the last-minute efforts by the parents to

finally re-initiate mental health treatment and attempt to make the home

environment appropriate. Through legal counsel, the children expressed the

following: B.W. wanted to return to his parents; Ed.A. wished to remain in

the foster home and not return to his parent’s home;4 El.A., despite the finding

of abuse, had a strong bond with his parents and would oppose termination;

R.A. also had a strong bond with her parents and would oppose termination;

and A.A., given his young age, could not express a legal position different

from that expressed by the GAL.

       At the conclusion of the hearing, adopting the GAL’s concerns, the

orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights as to all five children, and

issued separate orders changing each child’s permanency goal to adoption.

Father timely filed a notice of appeal and concise statement pursuant to

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2). The orphans’ court complied with Rule 1925(a).

       Father now presents a single question for this Court’s review: “Did the

[orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of law and/or

exercise manifestly unreasonable judgment in changing the goal from

reunification with a parent to adoption as the Agency failed to meet its burden

based upon the evidence and testimony presented?”          Father’s brief at 5

____________________________________________

4 Given the bond between Ed.A. and his parents, Ed.A.’s attorney interpreted

his wish not to return to his parents’ home as a request for more time for
Mother and Father to continue to make progress and not as a request for
termination of their parental rights.

                                           -7-
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(cleaned up).5 In other words, he assails the orphans’ court’s findings that

CYF satisfied its burden as to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).

See id. at 28-29 (summarizing Father’s arguments                  challenging the

termination decrees).

       Mindful of the history set forth above, we begin with the relevant legal

principles.    Our standard of review for appeals from orders involuntarily

terminating parental rights is well-settled:

       In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights,
       appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the
       decree of the termination court is supported by competent
       evidence. This standard of review corresponds to the standard
       employed in dependency cases, and requires appellate courts to
       accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the
       trial court if they are supported by the record, but it does not
       require the appellate court to accept the lower court’s inferences
       or conclusions of law. That is, if the factual findings are supported,
       we must determine whether the trial court made an error of law
       or abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion does not result
       merely because the reviewing court might have reached a
       different conclusion; we reverse for an abuse of discretion only
       upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality,
       prejudice, bias, or ill will. Thus, absent an abuse of discretion, an
       error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s
       decision, the decree must stand. We have previously emphasized
       our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
       observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings. However,
       we must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record in
       order to determine whether the trial court’s decision is supported
       by competent evidence.

____________________________________________

5 The GAL for all five children, CYF, and legal counsel for B.W. and Ed.A.,
respectively, filed a single, collective brief in support of affirming the orphans’
court’s decrees.

                                           -8-
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In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358–59 (Pa. 2021) (cleaned up).

“The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented

and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts

in the evidence.” In re M.G. & J.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004)

(citation omitted). “[I]f competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings,

we will affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result.” In

re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation

omitted).

      Termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of the Adoption

Act and requires a bifurcated analysis of the grounds for termination followed

by the needs and welfare of the child.

      Our case law has made clear that under [§] 2511, the court must
      engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental rights.
      Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
      seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
      that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds
      for termination delineated in [§] 2511(a). Only if the court
      determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
      or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
      the analysis pursuant to [§] 2511(b): determination of the needs
      and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the
      child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
      concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
      parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
      of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We have

defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct,

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear

                                      -9-
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conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re

C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc) (cleaned up).

       Termination is proper when the moving party proves grounds for

termination under any subsection of § 2511(a), as well as § 2511(b). T.B.B.,

supra at 395.        Father asserts that CYF failed to establish by clear and

convincing evidence the statutory grounds for termination of her parental

rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). To affirm

the termination of parental rights, this Court need only agree with the

orphans’    court    as    to   any    one     subsection   of §   2511(a),   as   well

as § 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en

banc). We focus our analysis for all five children on § 2511(a)(5)6 and (b),

which provide as follows:

____________________________________________

6 We cannot countenance the dissent’s conclusion that because A.A. was
placed into care following his birth, he was never in Father’s care and
therefore, because he was not “removed” from Father’s care, § (a)(5) cannot
apply. See Dissent at 19. Our Court has held that § (a)(5) does not apply
when a child is removed while the parent is incarcerated. See In re C.S.,
761 A.2d 1197, 1200 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc). In such a scenario, the
parent could not have exercised custody, regardless of whether they were
otherwise capable. Respectfully, that is not the case here. Father was not
incarcerated at the time of A.A.’s birth such that it was impossible for him to
have custody of A.A. Both Father and Mother were available to take custody
of A.A. and would have, in fact, been in custody of A.A. but for his removal
by CYF at the hospital. In other words, despite A.A. not being removed from
the home of Father and Mother, he was clearly removed from their care at the
time of his birth. That is consistent with both the statutory language and our
case law. See e.g., In re Adoption of J.J., 515 A.2d 883, 889-890 (Pa.
1986) (affirming termination pursuant to § (a)(5) where child had been under
the care of the agency since his birth and where the father had “never had
custody of, nor provided support for, [the] child”). Accordingly, we find no
impediment to applying § (a)(5) as to A.A.

                                          - 10 -
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     (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
     be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
     grounds:

                  ....

           (5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
           by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency
           for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led
           to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist,
           the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within
           a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance
           reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy
           the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the
           child within a reasonable period of time and termination of
           the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare
           of the child.

           ....

     (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
     of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
     physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
     of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
     environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
     income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
     control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
     to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
     efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
     which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
     filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.

     Pursuant to this framework, we first address whether the orphans’ court

abused its discretion by terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to

§ 2511(a)(5). Termination under this subsection requires that the moving

party prove the following elements:

     (1) the child has been removed from parental care for at least six
     months; (2) the conditions which led to the child’s removal or

                                      - 11 -
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      placement continue to exist; (3) the parents cannot or will not
      remedy the conditions which led to removal or placement within
      a reasonable period time; (4) the services reasonably available to
      the parents are unlikely to remedy the conditions which led to
      removal or placement within a reasonable period of time; and (5)
      termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and
      welfare of the child.

In re B.C., 36 A.3d 601, 607 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation omitted).

      Father argues that the sole reason for adjudication was the parents’

drug issues, and he has adequately addressed those concerns. See Father’s

brief at 39-40. As to CYF’s concerns about abuse, Father denies any abuse

and contends that, in any event, CYF failed to offer any services to address

potential abuse. Id. at 41-42. He maintains that he “did what he was asked

to do and the improvements he made in his parenting were testified to by the

team.” Id. at 42. Finally, he challenges the court’s conclusions that there

remained concerns regarding environmental issues and stability. Id. at 42-

43. He claims that he has resided in the same home, which a team member

deemed appropriate in January 2022; provided financial documentation to the

team; and consistently visited with the children. Id at 43.

      While Father urges us to accept the testimony that favored his assertion

that the environmental issues had been resolved, it was wholly within the

province of the orphans’ court to make credibility determinations regarding

the testimony offered. Those credibility determinations are supported by the

record and must therefore remain undisturbed. See M.G., supra at 73-74;

T.B.B., supra at 394. Accepting these credibility determinations, our review

of the certified record indicates that it was not solely the inability to provide

                                     - 12 -
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financial documentation that supported termination. Rather, it was the failure

to demonstrate the ability to provide safe and stable care for the children, as

evidenced by the housing concerns, Father’s declining to take seriously the

mental health treatment, and lack of evidence of a stable income to support

five children.

      Ms. Marshall, who had been assigned to the case since October 2020,

testified that Father’s primary concerns at adjudication were substance abuse,

environmental issues in the home, mental health, and drug testing. See N.T.

Hearing, 4/1/22, at 197. With regard to the environmental issues, as noted

hereinabove, Father’s goals included complying with unannounced and

announced home visits by CYF, maintaining safe appropriate housing, and

performing routine housekeeping.

      During Ms. Marshall’s tenure, she attempted to make eight home visits.

In November 2020, there were lice issues, the heavy smell of animal feces

and urine smell, and problems with the toilet, stairwell railing, and one of the

bedroom floors. At the next two visits, both in December 2020, the toilet and

railing issues had been repaired. In January 2021, she was unable to enter

the house due to COVID-19 concerns and lice. In July 2021, a proxy visited

the house but was not permitted inside. Nonetheless, the proxy noted that it

smelled like garbage outside and the front porch was messy. In August 2021,

Ms. Marshall was denied entry into the house but noted a strong smell of

animal feces when the door was opened. Again, in January 2022, she was not

                                     - 13 -
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allowed into the house to conduct a home visit. Her last visit was conducted

on March 24, 2022. See N.T. Hearing, 4/18/22, at 46-47.

      During the last visit, which was unannounced, Mother was away from

the home, but returned when called and was inside for a few minutes before

admitting Ms. Marshall and her supervisor into the home. There was a potent

smell of animal feces and urine, feces in the kitchen trash, a dog peeing

sporadically in the house, space heaters throughout the home, including one

on top of a laundry basket filled with clothes, no sink in the only bathroom,

concerns with water damage in the parents’ bedroom, and animal feces in one

of the children’s rooms. See N.T. Hearing, 4/1/22, at 200-203.

      Turning to the elements of § 2511(a)(5), Father does not contest that

all five children were removed from his care for a period exceeding six months.

Therefore, the first element is satisfied. As to the second, third, and fourth

elements, the initial placement was based upon concerns about Father’s drug

use, inappropriate parenting, unstable employment, unsafe housing, and the

need for mental health treatment. Once there were allegations and findings

of abuse, that naturally became part of the concerns as to Father’s parenting

and ability to provide a safe home environment. The orphan’s court concluded

that while Father had made progress with regard to his drug treatment and

the methadone program, “he could not remedy the remaining conditions

within a   reasonable   time[,]”   particularly   as   he   “had services   close

unsuccessfully or declined [services.]” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/6/22, at 27.

                                     - 14 -
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     As the record shows, the children were removed from Father and
     Mother for more than parent’s drug use or Father’s overdose. CYF
     received a referral several days prior to Father’s overdose. CYF
     had prior history with the family and feared Mother would revoke
     the safety plan implemented for the children’s welfare. From the
     outset, the revised safety plan, dated 10/02/2020, provided
     objectives that are not beyond the control of the parent related to
     . . . cooperating with agency services, financial stability, providing
     proof of income, securing appropriate housing and sleeping
     quarters for the children, routine housekeeping, and Methadone
     treatment, etc.

     Furthermore, the finding of abuse raises safety concerns
     regarding the children. The parent’s consistent denials that
     anything happened regarding the finding of abuse is concerning.
     During the period that the children have been out of the home,
     Father started probation for fighting. Mother reported that an
     argument escalated to the point that her mother threatened to file
     a protection from abuse order against her. A service provider
     closed out services and recommended anger management
     because Father was inappropriate, and a permanency review
     report noted reports of Father and Mother fighting inside and
     outside of the home.

     The children were removed from the home for more than six
     months. They have been removed for almost twenty months at
     this time. Parents certainly made progress with regard to the
     Methadone program as required by the family service plan cited.
     The parents could not remedy the remaining conditions within a
     reasonable time. Given that Father has had services close
     unsuccessfully or declined, it is not likely that available services
     will remedy the remaining conditions that led to the removal or
     placement of the children. . . . [T]he court believes termination
     serves the best interests of the children who require permanency.

     There was testimony that the children enjoy their visits with their
     parents and are bonded to them. Despite this the court believes
     termination is in the children’s best interests. The safety and well-
     being of the children is of paramount concern to the court. The
     children are all together in a safe environment with [their foster
     mother], whom they call “mom-mom,” and they are receiving
     therapy. The children have exhibited troubling behaviors, which
     suggests trauma. R.A., as young as she is, has been observed
     placing her finger in her anus. B.W. has expressed suicidal

                                    - 15 -
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      ideation and anxiety. B.W. and Ed.A. have been observed trying
      to bite each other on the buttocks and on their penises. Ed.A. has
      also engaged in fecal smearing. A.A. was born with a club foot
      that requires special care and appointments.

Id. at 26-28 (cleaned up).

      Although   Father   addressed    his     drug   addiction   and   should   be

commended for that, significant concerns remained as to whether Father could

readily provide care for any of the children given the condition of the home,

his failure to prove a stable income, and disengagement with mental health

treatment, particularly in light of the findings of abuse.

      [T]he statute implicitly recognizes that a child’s life cannot be held
      in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity
      necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot
      and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence
      and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the
      future.

In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa.Super. 2006). Therefore,

we conclude that the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion in finding

statutory support for termination pursuant to § 2511(a)(5) as to B.W., Ed.A.,

R.A., El.A., and A.A.

      Turning to § 2511(b), we again set forth the guiding principles.

      [C]ourts should consider the matter from the child’s perspective,
      placing her developmental, physical, and emotional needs and
      welfare above concerns for the parent.

      Accordingly, the determination of the child’s particular
      developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare must
      be made on a case-by-case basis. We have observed the law
      regarding termination of parental rights should not be applied
      mechanically but instead always with an eye to the best interests
      and the needs and welfare of the particular children involved.
      Thus, the court must determine each child’s specific needs.

                                      - 16 -
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      Moreover, the child’s emotional needs and welfare include
      intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability. As
      further guidance, we have identified factors, i.e., specific needs
      and aspects of the child’s welfare, that trial courts must always
      consider. The court must consider whether the children are in a
      pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster
      parents. And, if the child has any bond with the biological parent,
      the court must conduct an analysis of that bond, which is not
      always an easy task.

Int. of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1105–06 (Pa. 2023) (cleaned up).

      This Court has emphasized that “the extent of the bond-effect analysis

necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case.”            In re

Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa.Super. 2010) (cleaned up).               In

weighing the bond considerations pursuant to § 2511(b), “courts must keep

the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 269

(Pa. 2013). “Children are young for a scant number of years, and we have an

obligation to see to their healthy development quickly.              When courts

fail . . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.

A court cannot “toll the well-being and permanency” of a child indefinitely in

the hope that a parent “will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities

of parenting.” In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1007 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc)

(citation omitted).

      The certified record supports the orphans’ court’s conclusion that

termination was in the best interests of all five children as it relates to Father.

Notably, the GAL for all five children advocated in favor of termination as being

in their best interests. See Appellees’ brief at 27-28 (arguing that termination

is in the best interests of the children). The court acknowledged the bond

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between the children and Father, and that Father has made progress towards

some of his goals.    However, the court held that it “cannot and will not

subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a

parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.” Orphans’ Court Opinion,

6/6/22, at 29 (quoting R.J.S., supra at 513). As the children are together,

safe, and bonded with their foster mother, the court concluded that it was in

their best interests to terminate Father’s parental rights so that the children

could achieve permanency. Id.

      As detailed hereinabove, the facts as found by the orphans’ court are

supported by clear and convincing evidence. Its conclusions are free from

legal error and, in our review, are not manifestly unreasonable, or the subject

of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. See C.M., supra at 359. In light of

our deferential standard of review, we find no abuse of discretion, and affirm

the decrees terminating Father’s parental rights as to B.W., Ed.A., R.A., El.A.,

and A.A.

      Decrees affirmed.

      P.J.E. Stevens joins this Memorandum.

      Judge McCaffery files a Dissenting Memorandum.

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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 12/14/2023

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