Court Opinion

ID: 9681037
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:42:51.05886+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:31.909520
License: Public Domain

ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
Appellant contends in his first point of error that this court erred in holding that the affidavit of Inspector Foresman setting forth that he ordered appellee’s commanding officer to give appellee the notice of contemplated charges is “insufficient to controvert appellee’s testimony of no notice.”
The Inspector’s affidavit avers on personal knowledge that he gave the order to appellee’s commanding officer to give the required notice to appellee. Appellant asserts that there is a presumption that a public officer will discharge and has discharged his duty. While appellant is correct in this assertion, it should be noted that this presumption exists only where there is no evidence to the contrary. See Morris v. Rousos, 397 S.W.2d 504, 506 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1965, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Glen Falls Insurance Co. v. Peters, 379 S.W.2d 946 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1964, no writ). Appellant recognizes that appellee’s evidence of non-notification negated the presumption of notification but relies upon Crow v. City of San Antonio, 294 S.W.2d 899 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1956) rev’d on other grounds, 157 Tex. 250, 301 S.W.2d 628 (1957), for the proposition that “the evidence upon which it [the presumption] was based does not disappear, the evidence remains to be weighed by the trier of facts .... ” Id. at 901-02. Appellant concludes that a fact issue based upon, the evidence which gave rise to the presumption of notification precludes the trial court’s rendition of a summary judgment.
Appellant’s reliance on Crow is misplaced. The legal presumption in Grow was “that a letter properly addressed, postage prepaid, and placed in the United States Mail will be received by the person to whom it is addressed in due course.” Id. at 901. The testimony of the addressee that he did not receive the letter negated the legal presumption of receipt, but the evidence which established the legal presumption of receipt remained “to be weighed by the trier of facts.” Id. at 901-02.
The distinction in Crow is that there were facts (i.e., testimony that a letter was mailed with appropriate postage and correct address) which could be weighed by the trier of facts. In the case at bar, appellant presented no evidence to controvert appel-lee’s affidavit which stated that he received no notice. Absent the presumption that the officer did his duty, the inspector’s affidavit simply stated that he told someone to give notice. There was no evidence to establish personal knowledge of the giving of notice to appellee and no evidence to be weighed by the trier of facts. Since Tex.R.Civ.P. 166-A provides that “[a] summary judgment may be based on uncontroverted testimonial evidence of an interested witness” we have determined that appellee has set forth positive evidence to rebut the presumption that the officer did his duty. Therefore, we were correct in stating that the inspector’s affidavit was “insufficient to controvert appellee’s testimony of no notice.”
We have considered appellant’s second and third points of error and have determined that we correctly decided these points. The motion for rehearing is overruled.