Court Opinion

ID: 9667808
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:55:26.901155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:40.615445
License: Public Domain

M. J. Kelly, J.
(dissenting). I agree with the majority opinion on the effective date of People v McCoy, 392 Mich 231; 220 NW2d 456 (1974), being the date of publication in the Advance Sheets of *126Michigan Reports. I think however this conviction should be reversed for improper cross-examination and for impeachment on prior misdemeanor convictions. The point made in the majority opinion as to two-year misdemeanors is well taken, but it is inapplicable to the facts of this case. I think the cross-examination which was allowed, over objection, bringing out the two misdemeanor convictions and a violation of probation, was a clear violation of the rule announced in People v Renno, 392 Mich 45; 219 NW2d 422 (1974). I do not believe that her revelation about being incarcerated during the first check cashing episode opened the door for the prosecution to bypass the Renno rule. I think it is pure speculation on the part of the majority to talk about larceny from a building or larceny over $100, and I think it is even farther afield to talk about soliciting an athlete or patients for a dentist. Accosting and soliciting was the offense she was talking about beyond peradventure.
After the people’s case rested, the factual testimony supporting the alibi was presented by defendant and her witnesses. The prosecution’s case was weakened somewhat when it was shown that on May 19, 1973, two checks from this same account made payable to this same defendant were feloniously cashed during a time when it would have been impossible for the defendant to have been criminally responsible since she was incarcerated. This was probably the single most damaging bit of evidence to the prosecution’s case, and the defense asserts that the prosecution thereafter became an assault on her character rather than a trial of the facts; that she was thereby denied a fair trial. The prosecution began its cross-examination with the following questions:
*127"Q. [By Mr. Colley:] How old are you, Mrs. McMillan?
"A. Twenty-nine.
"Q. You testified you had six children?
’A. Yes.
”Q. You are divorced?
'A. Yes.
“Q. How long have you been divorced?
'A. About four years.
"Q. You testified you are not employed?
"A. No.
"Q. No, you are not employed or yes, you are employed?
'A. No, I am not employed.
"Q. Okay. Have you been employed since your divorce? Let’s see, are you receiving any support from your ex-husband?
’A. No.
"Q. Then you are receiving ADC?
'A. Yes.
"Q. How long have you been receiving this?
’A. About seven years or so.
"Q. And, during this time, you have been divorced from your husband have you been employed?
’A. No.
"Q. You haven’t been employed any time since your divorce?
’A. No.
"Mr. Bankson: I will object to the question. It is irrelevant and immaterial.
"The Court: She may answer.

"Mr. Cooley [Continuing]:

"Q. You have never worked or been employed?
"A. No.
"Q. Isn’t it true you worked out at the Hideaway Bar?
"Mr. Bankson: Objection, your Honor. Irrelevant and immaterial and a little bit prejudicial.
"Mr. Cooley: She testified she hasn’t worked in the last four years.
"The Court: She may answer.

*128
"Mr. Cooley [Continuing]:

"Q. You worked at the Hideaway Bar?
"A. Yes.
"Q. What capacity was that?
"A. Waitress.
"Q. Have you worked other places?
"A. No, I haven’t.
"Q. Have you worked at Capac?
"A. Part-time, about two years ago.
"Q. What capacity there?
"A. Waitress, bar maid.
"Q. What bar was that?
"A. Stonewall Lounge.
"Q. Are both of these bars topless bars?
"Mr. Bankson: I object, your Honor, and at this time ask for a mistrial. I see no relevancy or significance to this trial of that question, and I strong [sic] object.
"Mr. Cooley: Your Honor, first I asked whether she had been employed and she denied it. They have a right to know the credibility of this witness.
"Mr. Bankson: I don’t see what that has to do with credibility.
"Mr. Cooley: As to what a person does for a living and so on, they have a right to know.
"The Court: You may proceed.

"By Mr. Cooley [Continuing]:

"Q. Have you ever reported any of these earnings to the ADC?
"A. Yes.
"Mr. Bankson: I will object, your Honor. This is irrelevant.
"The Court: You may proceed.

"By Mr. Cooley [Continuing]:

"Q. You have?
"A. Yes.”
While the scope of cross-examination lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, that discretion should be exercised "in such a way that a *129defendant is not cross-examined, under the guise of testing credibility, merely to prejudice the jury”. People v Eddington, 387 Mich 551, 567; 198 NW2d 297 (1972). The similarity between the line of questioning the prosecution pursued here and the questioning found offensive in People v Johnson, 393 Mich 488; 227 NW2d 523 (1975), is remarkable. Furthermore, it cannot be said here, as urged by the dissent in Johnson, that whether poor or not, the defendant was clearly guilty. The jury agonized considerably over this case before reaching a verdict. All the testimony of the three main prosecution witnesses was reread to the jury; all of defendant’s testimony was reread. Several other requests were made by the jury before a verdict was returned. I would hold that the failure of the trial court, over repeated objection of defense counsel, to restrain the prosecutor from going into immaterial aspects of defendant’s life and background, deprived defendant of the right to a fair trial.
I would reverse.