Court Opinion

ID: 9372050
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-17 18:00:36.445764+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:31.978705
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
          FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JANE SULLIVAN; P. POES, 1-75;              No. 22-35338
Individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated,                       D.C. No. 2:22-
                                          cv-00204-RAJ
               Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.                                           OPINION

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON,
a Washington public corporation;
ELIZA SAUNDERS, Director of
Public Records and Open Public
Meetings, University of Washington,

               Defendants-Appellees,

v.

PEOPLE FOR THE ETHICAL
TREATMENT OF ANIMALS, INC.,

               Intervenor-Defendant-
               Appellant.

       Appeal from the United States District Court
         for the Western District of Washington
        Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding
2             SULLIVAN V. UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

          Argued and Submitted November 7, 2022
                   Seattle, Washington

                     Filed February 17, 2023

    Before: Sandra S. Ikuta and Daniel P. Collins, Circuit
      Judges, and Sidney A. Fitzwater,* District Judge.

                   Opinion by Judge Ikuta;
                Concurrence by Judge Fitzwater

                          SUMMARY **

                           Civil Rights

    In an action brought in part pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
the panel reversed the district court’s preliminary injunction
prohibiting the University of Washington from releasing, in
response to a public records request, letters appointing
plaintiffs to the University’s Institutional Animal Care and
Use Committee, whose purpose is to ensure that the
University’s research facility complies with the Animal
Welfare Act when using live animals in research, tests or
experiments.

*
  The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for
the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
**
   This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
            SULLIVAN V. UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON            3

    Plaintiffs, who are current, alternate or former members
of the committee, alleged that the disclosure of such letters,
which contained their personal identifying information,
would violate their First Amendment right of expressive
association.
    The panel first summarized the Supreme Court’s
expressive-association jurisprudence, which applies when
individuals have associated to advance shared views, or
engage in collective effort on behalf of shared goals, that
would be protected by the First Amendment if pursued
individually.
    The panel next determined that here, the letters of
appointment existed (and were part of the University’s
public records) only because the committee members were
appointed by the University according to statutory and
regulatory criteria to ensure diverse representation. Their
group association as committee members was not intended
to enhance effective advocacy of their views or to pursue
their lawful private interests, but rather to fulfill federal
requirements. Because, in performing their work on the
committee, the members were not engaged in an association
deemed to be “expressive” under Supreme Court or this
Circuit’s precedent, the First Amendment right of expressive
association did not protect them from the University’s
disclosure of personal identifying information contained in
their letters of appointment.
    The panel further stated that the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence governing public employee speech pointed to
the same conclusion as its jurisprudence governing
expressive association. The committee members were
analogous to government volunteers or contractors because
they were appointed by the University to serve its public
4           SULLIVAN V. UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

function. And because an individual member’s committee
work (such as the preparation and issuance of inspection
certification reports) fell within the scope of the member’s
official duties, that work was unprotected public employee
speech. Because the committee members’ work was
unprotected by the First Amendment on an individual basis,
their collective work on the committee was likewise
unprotected. Accordingly, the University’s disclosure of the
committee members’ letters of appointment pursuant to
Washington’s Public Records Act would not impermissibly
burden any First Amendment right of expressive association.
    Concurring, Judge Fitzwater joined the panel opinion
and wrote separately to highlight what the panel did not
hold. Nothing in the panel opinion held that the State of
Washington was obligated through its Public Records Act to
require disclosures of personal information that may subject
committee members and their families and pets to threats to
their personal safety. The State of Washington retained the
authority to adopt other exemptions aimed at curbing
required disclosures of personal information that could place
at risk members of committees such as this one, or their
families or property.
           SULLIVAN V. UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON         5

                       COUNSEL

Peter D. Hawkes (argued), Angeli Law Group LLC,
Portland, Oregon, for Intervenor-Defendant-Appellant.
Darwin P. Roberts (argued), Goldfarb & Huck Roth Riojas
PLLC, Seattle, Washington, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Jessica L. Creighton and Nancy S. Garland, Assistant
Attorneys General; Robert W. Ferguson, Attorney General;
Washington Attorney General's Office, University of
Washington Division, Seattle, Washington; for Defendants-
Appellees.
Ashley Ridgway and Christopher Berry, Animal Legal
Defense Fund, Cotati, California, for Amicus Curiae Animal
Legal Defense Fund.
Katie B. Townsend, Adam A. Marshall, and Gunita Singh,
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Washington,
D.C., for Amici Curiae Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press and 16 Media Organizations.
6           SULLIVAN V. UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

                          OPINION

IKUTA, Circuit Judge:

    Appointees to a university committee created to satisfy
federal legal requirements sought to enjoin the university
from releasing the letters appointing them to the official
committee. The appointees claimed that the disclosure of
such letters, which contain their personal identifying
information, would violate their First Amendment right of
expressive association. The district court held that there was
a serious question on the merits of that argument and
preliminarily enjoined the disclosure. We disagree. The
committee members’ performance of their official duties is
not protected by the First Amendment right of expressive
association, and so the disclosure of public records that relate
to performance of such duties does not impinge on that right.
                               I
    Under the Animal Welfare Act (AWA), as amended by
the Food Security Act in 1985, 7 U.S.C. § 2143; Pub. L. 99-
198, 99 Stat 1354, certain research facilities that use live
animals in research, tests, or experiments must maintain an
Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee. 7 U.S.C.
§§ 2132(e), (n), 2143(b)(1). 1 The committee’s purpose is to
ensure that the research facility is in compliance with the
AWA. Id. § 2143(b)(3).
    Under the AWA, the chief executive officer of the
research facility must appoint to the committee at least three
individuals who meet certain criteria. Id. § 2143(b)(1). The

1
 Similar committee requirements are also mandated by the Health
Research Extension Act, 42 U.S.C. § 289d.
            SULLIVAN V. UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON            7

committee members must “possess sufficient ability to
assess animal care, treatment, and practices in experimental
research as determined by the needs of the research facility”
and “represent society’s concerns regarding the welfare of
animal subjects used at such facility.” Id. Of the members,
at least one must be a doctor of veterinary medicine, id.
§ 2143(b)(1)(A), and at least one must be a person
unaffiliated with the facility, id. § 2143(b)(1)(B). If the
committee has more than three members, no more than three
members may work at the same administrative unit of the
research facility. Id. § 2143(b)(1)(C). The committee must
inspect the research facility at least twice a year and review
“practices involving pain to animals, and . . . the condition
of animals.” Id. § 2143(b)(3). After each inspection, the
committee must file an inspection certification report
including specified information. Id. § 2143(b)(4)(A). The
report must be signed by a majority of the committee
members and include information about any violations of
facility standards as well as any minority views. Id.
    The University of Washington is a research facility
required to comply with the AWA. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2132(e),
(n), 2143(b)(1). A vice provost of the University (as the
delegatee for the University president) appoints the members
of the University’s Committee. The Committee holds
monthly meetings that are open to the public. It makes both
its meeting minutes and semi-annual reports publicly
available on its website. The chair of the Committee, Jane
Sullivan, and the lead veterinarian have made their identities
known to the public. The other members of the Committee
prefer to remain anonymous because of concerns about their
personal safety and the safety of their families and pets if
their names are released. Therefore, the Committee
8           SULLIVAN V. UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

members who prefer to remain anonymous are identified in
the minutes and reports only by their initials.
   People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), an
organization opposed to the use of animals in research, filed
a public records request with the University pursuant to
Washington’s Public Records Act (PRA).
    The PRA requires government agencies, including the
University, to “make available for public inspection and
copying all public records, unless the record falls within the
specific exemptions” listed in the statute or in another
“statute which exempts or prohibits disclosure.” Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. § 42.56.070(1); see also Wash. Pub. Emps. Ass’n
v. Wash. State Ctr. for Childhood Deafness & Hearing Loss,
194 Wash. 2d 484, 491 (2019). The disclosure requirements
are subject to a wide range of statutory exemptions. See
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 42.56.070(1); Resident Action
Council v. Seattle Hous. Auth., 177 Wash. 2d 417, 434
(2013), as amended on denial of reh’g (Jan. 10, 2014); Lyft,
Inc. v. City of Seattle, 190 Wash. 2d 769, 780 (2018). In
addition, the Washington Supreme Court has “recognized
that the PRA must give way to constitutional mandates.”
Freedom Found. v. Gregoire, 178 Wash. 2d 686, 695 (2013);
see also Seattle Times Co. v. Serko, 170 Wash. 2d 581, 595
(2010) (approving the withholding of public records where
disclosure would violate an individual’s constitutional
rights, even though “[t]here is no specific exemption under
the PRA” that protects such rights).
    PETA requested the letters appointing the Committee
members, which include personal identifying information,
such as names, email addresses, office addresses, and work
affiliations. After receiving PETA’s information request,
Eliza Saunders (the University official responsible for
              SULLIVAN V. UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON                   9

responding to PETA’s request) notified 55 individuals who
were current, alternate, or former Committee members that
the University would release their letters of appointment
unless it received “a court order restricting the University
from releasing the records.” 2
     In response, Sullivan, along with a current Committee
member and a proposed class of 73 individuals who were
members, alternate members, or former members of the
Committee, filed a purported class action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and the PRA against the University and Saunders in
her official capacity. The complaint alleged (among other
things) that the disclosure would violate the Committee
members’ right of expressive association under the federal
and state constitutions because the members’ “affiliation
with each other, and with the [Committee], is a form of free
association and expression protected under the Constitutions
of Washington and the United States.” In addition, the
complaint sought an injunction and declaratory judgment on
the grounds that the letters of appointment are exempt from
disclosure under the PRA because their disclosure would
violate the federal and state constitutions. The members also
sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunctive relief to prevent the University from releasing the
letters of appointment. The University did not oppose the
TRO or preliminary injunction. 3

2
 Sullivan believes that more than 55 current, alternate, and former
members would be impacted by the disclosure.
3
 On appeal, the University does not defend disclosure of the letters of
appointment. The University has also waived sovereign immunity for
purposes of the preliminary injunction.
10            SULLIVAN V. UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

    After granting the Committee members’ motion for a
TRO, the district court granted PETA’s motion to intervene,
and, over PETA’s opposition, granted the Committee
members’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The district
court determined that the Committee members raised a
serious question as to whether disclosure would violate their
First Amendment right of expressive association, which
would allow them to claim an exception to the disclosure
requirements of the PRA. 4          PETA filed a timely
interlocutory appeal.
                                  II
    We have jurisdiction to review the district court’s grant
of a preliminary injunction. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
Reviewing the grant for abuse of discretion, Perfect 10, Inc.
v. Google, Inc., 653 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 2011), we
evaluate the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and
factual findings for clear error, Shell Offshore, Inc. v.
Greenpeace, Inc., 709 F.3d 1281, 1286 (9th Cir. 2013).
    On appeal, PETA challenges the district court’s
determination that there were serious questions on the merits
as to whether disclosure of the members’ letters of
appointment would violate their right of expressive
association under the First Amendment. PETA argues that
the district court erred in holding that this First Amendment
right might exempt the University from the PRA’s
requirement to disclose the requested letters. We begin by
considering the scope of this constitutional protection.

4
  The district court also concluded that the other factors relevant to
issuing injunctive relief weighed in the members’ favor. See Winter v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
            SULLIVAN V. UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON           11

                              A
    The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. Although the
constitutional text does not explicitly address associational
rights, the Supreme Court has ruled that the First
Amendment includes a right of expressive association. The
Court has recognized that “[a]n individual’s freedom to
speak, to worship, and to petition the government for the
redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected from
interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to
engage in group effort toward those ends were not also
guaranteed.” Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622
(1984). Therefore, the First Amendment necessarily
protects the right of those who join together to advance
shared beliefs, goals, and ideas, which, if pursued
individually, would be protected by the First Amendment.
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976); see also
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460
(1958). This constitutional right of expressive association
may be infringed by compelled “disclosure of the fact of
membership in a group seeking anonymity,” Jaycees, 468
U.S. at 622–23, because the “[i]nviolability of privacy in
group association may in many circumstances be
indispensable to preservation of freedom of association,
particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs,”
Patterson, 357 U.S. at 462.
   Not all groups, however, are entitled to this First
Amendment protection; it can be invoked only by those
groups actually engaged in expressive association. See Boy
12          SULLIVAN V. UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000); see also
City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24 (1989)
(recognizing that not every group is engaged in “the sort of
‘expressive association’ that the First Amendment has been
held to protect”).        Individuals engage in expressive
association when they join with others to pursue “a wide
variety of political, religious, cultural, or social purposes,”
Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 630, including the advocacy of both
public and private points of view, the advancement of beliefs
and ideas, and the transmission of “a system of values,” Boy
Scouts of Am., 530 U.S. at 650. Members involved in such
endeavors are generally protected in expressing the “views
that brought them together.” Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 623. In
this vein, the Supreme Court has recognized the expressive
association rights of members of organizations that advocate
for political, social, and cultural issues, including the
NAACP, see, e.g., Patterson, 357 U.S. at 462; Louisiana ex
rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); Gibson v.
Fla. Legis. Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963),
political parties and organizations, see, e.g., Kusper v.
Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 57 (1973); Brown v. Socialist
Workers 74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 91–92
(1982), unions, see, e.g., Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia
ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 8 (1964), and myriad non-
profit organizations, see, e.g., Ams. for Prosperity Found. v.
Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2383 (2021); Boy Scouts of Am., 530
U.S. at 656; Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 612; Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary
Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); N.Y.
State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 11–13
(1988). And though groups need not engage in political
advocacy in order to be protected, see Boy Scouts of Am.,
530 U.S. at 648, the right of expressive association
“presupposes that a group has an official policy” or “official
            SULLIVAN V. UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON          13

stance on a subject,” In re Grand Jury Subpoena, No. 16-03-
217, 875 F.3d 1179, 1184 n.3 (9th Cir. 2017).
    By contrast, strangers who are merely “patrons of the
same business establishment” and have not joined together
to express shared beliefs do not engage in expressive
association. Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 24–25 (holding that
dance-hall patrons who “com[e] together to engage in
recreational dancing” are not engaged in expressive
association); see also IDK, Inc. v. Clark County, 836 F.2d
1185, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that commercial
associations between an escort service, its employees, and
its clients is not expressive association). Likewise, “[a]
couple out on the town is not an overtly expressive
association when compared to political parties, civil rights
organizations, publishers, churches, lobbyists, labor unions,
and other special interest groups.” IDK, Inc., 836 F.2d at
1195.
    In sum, the “Supreme Court’s expressive-association
jurisprudence” applies when individuals “have associated to
advance shared views,” or engaged in “collective effort on
behalf of shared goals,” that would be protected by the First
Amendment if pursued individually. In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, 875 F.3d at 1184 (citation and emphasis omitted);
see also Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460 (stating that it is the
“freedom to engage in association for the advancement of
beliefs and ideas” that is protected by the First Amendment
right of expressive association).
                             B
   The facts of this case preclude the Committee members’
argument that disclosure of their letters of appointment
pursuant to the PRA impermissibly impinges on the sort of
expressive association that the First Amendment protects.
14           SULLIVAN V. UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

The letters of appointment exist (and are part of the
University’s public records) only because the Committee
members were appointed by the University according to
statutory and regulatory criteria to ensure diverse
representation. See 7 U.S.C. § 2143(b)(1); 42 U.S.C.
§ 289d(b)(2); 9 C.F.R. §§ 1.1, 2.31(b). Their “group
association” as Committee members is not intended to
enhance effective advocacy of their views or “to pursue their
lawful private interests,” Patterson, 357 U.S. at 466, but
rather to fulfill federal requirements, see 7 U.S.C.
§ 2143(b)(3) (stating that the committee’s purpose is to
ensure compliance with federal law); 42 U.S.C. § 289d(b)(1)
(same); 9 C.F.R. § 1.1 (same). The Committee is not akin to
a private association where members choose their own
purposes and decide how to advance them; here, federal law
prescribes both the Committee’s purpose and its functions.
See 7 U.S.C. § 2143(b)(4); 42 U.S.C. § 289d(b); 9 C.F.R. §
2.31(b). Because, in performing their work on the
Committee, the members are not engaged in an association
deemed to be “expressive” under Supreme Court or our
precedent, the First Amendment right of expressive
association does not protect them from the University’s
disclosure of personal identifying information contained in
their letters of appointment. 5
    Our conclusion that a committee formed by the
government to discharge an official purpose is not engaged
in expressive association is consistent with cases holding
that the First Amendment does not protect the speech of

5
  The addition of alternate and former members of the Committee as
plaintiffs does not change this analysis, because their letters of
appointment are likewise “public records” under the PRA due to their
appointment to an official committee.
            SULLIVAN V. UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON            15

public employees speaking “pursuant to their official
duties.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421–22 (2006).
Under Garcetti, only “when an employee speaks as a citizen
addressing a matter of public concern” do the Supreme
Court’s “cases indicate that the First Amendment may be
implicated.” Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 142 S. Ct.
2407, 2423 (2022) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
The rationale behind this approach is that the government
“may impose certain restraints on the speech of its
employees” that would be “unconstitutional if applied to the
general public,” City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80
(2004) (per curiam), because “[t]he government’s interest in
achieving its goals as effectively and efficiently as possible
is elevated from a relatively subordinate interest when it acts
as sovereign to a significant one when it acts as employer,”
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, Wabaunsee Cnty. v. Umbehr, 518
U.S. 668, 676 (1996) (alteration in original) (citation
omitted).
    This framework applies not only in the context of public
employment, but wherever “the relationship between the
parties is analogous to that between an employer and
employee” and “the rationale for balancing the
government’s interests in efficient performance of public
services against public employees’ speech rights applies.”
Clairmont v. Sound Mental Health, 632 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th
Cir. 2011). Thus, the rules governing public employee
speech also apply to government volunteers, see, e.g.,
Hyland v. Wonder, 972 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1992), as well as
independent government contractors, see, e.g., Umbehr, 518
U.S. at 673, and business vendors, see, e.g., Alpha Energy
Savers, Inc. v. Hansen, 381 F.3d 917, 923 (9th Cir. 2004).
   Here, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence governing
public employee speech points to the same conclusion as its
16            SULLIVAN V. UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

jurisprudence governing expressive association. The right
of expressive association protects the sort of collective
efforts that would be protected by the First Amendment if
pursued on an individual basis. But here the Committee
members are analogous to government volunteers or
contractors because they were appointed by the University
to serve its public function. And because an individual
member’s committee work (such as the preparation and
issuance of inspection certification reports) falls within the
scope of the member’s official duties, see 7 U.S.C.
§ 2143(b)(4), that work is unprotected public employee
speech, see Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421–22. Therefore,
because the Committee members’ work is unprotected by the
First Amendment on an individual basis, their collective
work on the Committee is likewise unprotected.
    Accordingly, because the Committee members’
association is pursuant to their official duties and not any
private expressive activities, it is not protected by the First
Amendment right of expressive association. The Committee
members may be engaged as individuals in other activities
that are expressive in nature. But the letters of appointment
relate to the Committee members’ service on an official
committee, and such an activity is not protected by the right
of expressive association. 6 Therefore, the University’s

6
  The Committee members argue that the First Amendment doctrines
governing public employee speech do not apply “to teaching and
academic writing that are performed pursuant to the official duties of a
teacher and professor,” Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402, 412 (9th Cir.
2014) (quotation marks omitted), and therefore their work for a
university is entitled to First Amendment protection. We reject this
argument. Demers is inapplicable here because, in performing the
official work of the Committee, the members are not thereby engaged in
“teaching and academic writing.” Id.
              SULLIVAN V. UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON                     17

disclosure of the Committee members’ letters of
appointment pursuant to the PRA would not impermissibly
burden any First Amendment right of expressive association.
Because the district court made a legal error in concluding
that, by serving on the Committee, the members were
thereby engaged in that First Amendment protected activity,
it abused its discretion. 7
    REVERSED and REMANDED.

FITZWATER, District Judge, concurring:

   I join the panel opinion and write separately to highlight
what the panel does not hold.
    The panel opinion does not address PETA’s arguments
about whether there is a reasonable probability that
Committee members will be subject to constitutionally
significant threats or harassment if their identities become
known, because the opinion correctly concludes that the
members’ association is not protected by the First
Amendment right to expressive association. But as the panel
opinion also recognizes, except for the Committee chair and

7
  Because we conclude that the members’ association is not protected by
the First Amendment right to expressive association, we do not address
PETA’s arguments as to whether there is a reasonable probability that the
Committee members will be subject to constitutionally significant
threats or harassment if their identities become known. And because we
conclude that the district court erred in determining that the members
showed a serious question on the merits of their First Amendment claim,
we do not consider PETA’s arguments concerning the other factors for
preliminary injunctive relief. See Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc.,
869 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 2017).
18          SULLIVAN V. UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

the lead veterinarian, who have made their identities known,
all other Committee members “prefer to remain anonymous
because of concerns about their personal safety and the
safety of their families and pets if their names are released.”
When it comes to organizations like PETA, these concerns
may be well-founded. See, e.g., Richard L. Cupp, Jr.,
Considering the Private Animal and Damages, 98 Wash. U.
L. Rev. 1313, 1340 (2021) (PETA “is open about using
‘controversial tactics’ to gain media attention”). Nothing in
the panel opinion, however, holds that the State of
Washington is obligated through its Public Records Act to
require disclosures of personal information that may subject
Committee members and their families and pets to threats to
their personal safety. As the panel opinion notes, the Act’s
disclosure requirements are already subject to a wide range
of statutory exemptions. The State of Washington retains the
authority to adopt other exemptions aimed at curbing
required disclosures of personal information that could place
at risk members of committees such as this one, or their
families or property. Nothing in the panel opinion holds to
the contrary.