Court Opinion

ID: 9406984
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-05 15:05:30.313189+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:33.559069
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                          Opinion filed July 5, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D23-0384
                        Lower Tribunal No. 19-1538
                           ________________

                Atrium Medical Corporation, et al.,
                                 Petitioners,

                                     vs.

           MSP Recovery Claims, Series, LLC, et al.,
                               Respondents.

     A Case of Original Jurisdiction – Mandamus.

      Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, and Andrew R. Kruppa and Amanda
E. Preston, for petitioners.

     MSP Recovery Law Firm, and Aida M. Landa and Janpaul Portal , for
respondents.

Before HENDON, MILLER and BOKOR, JJ.

     BOKOR, J.
      Petitioners Atrium Medical Corporation and Maquet Cardiovascular US

Sales, LLC (the “Medical Providers”) seek a writ of mandamus to compel the

trial court to enter an appealable final judgment in an action for a pure bill of

discovery. The trial court entered summary judgment against the Medical

Providers and in favor of the MSP entities, the respondents here, disposing

of the sole issue in the case. Specifically, in the operative complaint, the

MSP entities sought a pure bill of discovery compelling the Medical Providers

to identify certain Medicare beneficiaries implanted with pelvic mesh

products sold by the Medical Providers and whose medical costs were

subsequently paid by a Medicare Advantage Organization. Neither the

summary judgment order nor the subsequent order denying the Medical

Providers’ motion for a final judgment explained the trial court’s reasoning

for granting the summary judgment and declining to render a final judgment.

Nonetheless, because the entry of summary judgment disposed of the sole

issue in the case, the Medical Providers possessed a clear legal right to entry

of final judgment. The trial court had a legal duty to enter such a final

judgment and, as explained below, the failure to enter the final judgment

leaves the Medical Providers with no other adequate remedy, rendering

mandamus relief appropriate.

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      We take no position on the merits of the summary judgment itself,

which may be reviewed by direct appeal. See Venezia Lakes Homeowners’

Ass’n, Inc. v. Precious Homes at Twin Lakes Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc., 34

So. 3d 755, 756 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (reviewing direct appeal of final

summary judgment granting pure bill of discovery). Nonetheless, entry of

summary judgment in favor of the MSP entities concludes the judicial labor

in this case, requiring the trial court to render an appealable final judgment.

“In order to be entitled to a writ of mandamus the petitioner must have a clear

legal right to the requested relief, the respondent must have an indisputable

legal duty to perform the requested action, and the petitioner must have no

other adequate remedy available.” Huffman v. State, 813 So. 2d 10, 11 (Fla.

2000). Absent entry of such a final, appealable order, the Medical Providers

are left in a limbo with no other adequate remedy, whereby the MSP entities

get the entirety of the relief they seek in the pure bill of discovery, but the

Medical Providers have no way to seek review. Under these circumstances,

mandamus lies. See Maddrie v. McDonough, 945 So. 2d 573, 574 (Fla. 1st

DCA 2006) (“Under appropriate circumstances, the remedy of mandamus is

available to compel a lower tribunal to render an appealable order.”); see

also State v. Sullivan, 640 So. 2d 77, 78 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (“If a trial court

fails or refuses to enter a written order that is needed for an appeal, counsel

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has the remedy of filing a motion or a petition for writ of mandamus with this

court to compel the trial court to enter such an order.”).

      Pursuant to Article V, Section 4(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution, a

district court entertains “appeals, that may be taken as a matter of right, from

final judgments or orders of trial courts.” “A final judgment is one which ends

the litigation between the parties and disposes of all issues involved such

that no further action by the court will be necessary.” Caufield v. Cantele,

837 So. 2d 371, 375 (Fla. 2002). Thus, “[a]n appeal from a final order is

appropriate when judicial labor has ended.” M.M. v. Fla. Dep’t of Child. &

Fams., 189 So. 3d 134, 137 (Fla. 2016); see also S.L.T. Warehouse Co. v.

Webb, 304 So. 2d 97, 99 (Fla. 1974) (“[T]he test employed by the appellate

court to determine finality of an order, judgment or decree is whether the

order in question constitutes an end to the judicial labor in the cause, and

nothing further remains to be done by the court to effectuate a termination of

the cause as between the parties directly affected.”); Santana v. Fla. Int’l

Univ., 922 So. 2d 242, 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (“That is, an appealable final

order disposes of all the issues in the case.”).         Moreover, it is well-

established that an order which merely grants summary judgment, without

more, is only appealable as a final order when no judicial labor remains to

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be done by the trial court. See, e.g., McQuaig v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 789

So. 2d 1215, 1216 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).

      Here, the MSP entities argue that mandamus is inappropriate because

a final judgment would be premature. The MSP entities assert that judicial

labor remains outstanding because the Medical Providers have not yet

provided the discovery encompassed by the pure bill (and ostensibly ordered

by the trial court in granting summary judgment in the MSP entities’ favor)

and the MSP entities may amend their complaint to assert new substantive

causes of action upon receipt of these records. However, a final judgment

“ends the litigation between the parties and disposes of all issues involved

such that no further action by the court will be necessary.” Caufield, 837 So.

2d at 375 (emphasis added). As more thoroughly explained below, a pure

bill of discovery isn’t a fishing expedition, and the only thing necessary is a

ruling on the issue at hand, that is, an order determining the scope and

substance of the discovery sought. So, the mere theoretical possibility of an

amendment or future cause of action isn’t a necessary part of a pure bill of

discovery, and doesn’t toll rendition of a required, timely final judgment.

      Further, an opinion of this court on a direct appeal of a final judgment

entered in a pure bill of discovery provides instruction. In Venezia Lakes,

this court reversed an amended final summary judgment entered after the

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trial court granted a pure bill of discovery in favor of the plaintiff and appellee,

Precious Homes. 34 So. 3d at 758. The trial court ordered production, but

this court stayed the deadline to produce pending appeal, and no documents

were produced before the trial court entered its appealable final judgment.

See id. at 758 n.1.        Venezia Lakes explained that Precious Homes

“possesses an adequate remedy at law, including, but not limited to, a claim

for declaratory relief or breach of contract. Parties, however, may not utilize

the trial courts' resources to go on a pre-suit ‘fishing expedition’ to

substantiate their claims or to determine the extent of their damages.” Id. at

759. We take no position on the merits of any possible appeal, as the facts

of each case stand on their own. However, at this stage, by failing to enter

final judgment, the trial court effectively precludes the type of review the court

engaged in Venezia Lakes.1

1
   Venezia Lakes concluded that the trial court “erred in entering final
judgment on the complaint for a pure bill of discovery where Precious Homes
seeks the contracts only to determine if it has a cause of action, and the
information contained in the sought-after contracts is relevant only to the
issue of potential damages.” Id. The error occurred because “it is well
established that a pure bill of discovery does not lie to see if a cause of action
exists, nor has it ever been available to aid a potential plaintiff in determining
the extent of its damages.” Id. By failing to enter final judgment, the trial
court here precludes this court from the ability to review the discovery
awarded to determine if it seeks “to identify potential defendants and theories
of liability and to obtain information necessary for meeting a condition
precedent to filing suit" or amounts to an inappropriate “fishing expedition to
see if causes of action exist” or impermissible “preview of discovery

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      Just as in Venezia Lakes, the entry of a pure bill (i.e., granting the relief

requested in a pure bill of discovery)—not the execution (i.e., the production

of the documents)—completes the trial court’s labor. Because the pure bill

was the only remedy sought in the MSP entities’ operative complaint, the

fact that the Medical Providers have not yet produced the documents doesn’t

impact the finality of the summary judgment order. The trial court was thus

required to render a final judgment within a “reasonable time” after entry of

the summary judgment order. See Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.215(f)

(“Every judge has a duty to rule upon and announce an order or judgment

on every matter submitted to that judge within a reasonable time.”).2

      Petition granted.

obtainable once suit is filed.” Id. at 758 (quoting in part Publix Supermarkets,
Inc. v. Frazier, 696 So. 2d 1369, 1371 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), and citing
Mendez v. Cochran, 700 So. 2d 46, 47 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)).
2
  While unnecessary for our decision here, we note that the recent
amendments to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(a) mandates that a trial
court “shall state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the
[summary judgment] motion.” (emphasis added). Thus, a summary
judgment order shall state “the reason for its decision with enough specificity
to provide useful guidance to the parties and, if necessary, to allow for
appellate review.” In re Amends. to Fla. Rule of Civ. Proc. 1.510, 317 So. 3d
72, 77 (Fla. 2021); see also Jones v. Ervolino, 339 So. 3d 473, 475 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2022) (“A mere pronouncement the court has granted or denied such
a motion fails to comply with [Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510] as it does not contain
reasons for granting or denying the motion.”).

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