Court Opinion

ID: 9902105
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 22:09:19.472764+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:45.543247
License: Public Domain

11/22/2023
        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                          AT JACKSON
                         Assigned on Briefs November 7, 2023

                DETRICK TURNER v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

                  Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County
                      No. 14-03220       Lee V. Coffee, Judge
                      ___________________________________

                           No. W2022-01494-CCA-R3-PC
                       ___________________________________

Petitioner, Detrick Turner, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that
the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of
counsel. He argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to communicate and
failing to raise additional issues on appeal. Following our review of the entire record,
including the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the
post-conviction court.

 Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

JILL BARTEE AYERS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CAMILLE R.
MCMULLEN, P.J., and JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR., J., joined.

Detrick Turner, Nashville, Tennessee, pro se (on appeal); Shae Atkinson, Memphis,
Tennessee (at post-conviction).

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Lacy E. Wilber, Senior Assistant
Attorney General; Steven J. Mulroy, District Attorney General; and Leslie Byrd, Assistant
District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

                                        OPINION

                           Facts and Procedural Background

        On July 3, 2014, Petitioner was indicted for the first degree murder of his wife. The
indictment alleged that during the early morning hours of February 21, 2014, Petitioner
killed his wife, Sharice Turner, by shooting her in her face with his .40 caliber handgun.
At trial, Ms. Paula Cowan, Petitioner’s neighbor, testified that she and her boyfriend were
awakened by their outdoor motion detector, and they saw Petitioner walking through their
yard. State v. Turner, No. W2018-00726-CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 1783487, *1 (Tenn.
Crim. App. April 23, 2019). When Ms. Cowan met Petitioner outside he appeared calm,
and he told her that there was nothing wrong, but he “can’t get Shari up.” Id. Ms. Cowan
walked with Petitioner from her driveway to his home. Id. Because Petitioner did not want
his children to see the victim, Ms. Cowan took the children to her home to stay with her
boyfriend. Id. When Ms. Cowan returned to Petitioner’s home, he was on his cell phone
and she heard him say, “Bro, call me back. Me and Shari got into it, and the handgun went
off and hit her upside the head.” Id. Petitioner then called 911 and remained on the line
until the police officers arrived. Id. Ms. Cowan entered the den where the victim was
reclined in a chair under a blanket and appeared to be asleep. Id. However, Ms. Cowan
noticed blood coming from the victim’s mouth and determined that she did not have a
pulse. Id. Ms. Cowen testified that at that point, Petitioner appeared to “panic,” and
grabbed the victim telling her to get up. Id. Ms. Cowan noticed a handgun on the couch
and placed it in a box on top of the garbage can. Id. Petitioner moved the handgun back
because he “wanted the police officers to see where the handgun was located.” Id.

       Memphis Police Department (“MPD”) officer Andrew Hurst interviewed Petitioner
after his arrest. Id. at *2. Petitioner stated that the victim had the handgun in her hand
when he arrived home that night and he did not want her to have the handgun because there
was not a safety mechanism on it. Id. Petitioner said that he grabbed the handgun by the
barrel and a struggle ensued, during which the handgun went off twice, with the second
shot hitting the victim in the face. Id. Officer Hurst testified that he did not think
Petitioner’s version of events to be possible because the handgun would not be able to fire
twice if the barrel was being held. Id.

       A forensic toxicology expert testified that the victim had substantial amounts of
alcohol and diphenhydramine, commonly used in sleeping aids, in her system which would
have “affected her muscular coordination and her judgment and would have caused her to
be lethargic and likely pass out.” Id.

       MPD officers obtained a search warrant for the home and during the search, they
observed a possible bullet hole in the couch and recovered a number of items including a
.40 caliber handgun found near the victim and a spent .40 caliber bullet underneath the
couch. Id.

       On November 17, 2017, a jury convicted Petitioner of the lesser included offense of
second degree murder. On February 28, 2018, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to
twenty-two years of confinement. On March 22, 2018, the trial court heard and denied
Petitioner’s motion for new trial, which included an argument that the search warrant
executed in the case was invalid. The sole issue Petitioner raised on direct appeal was that
                                           -2-
his sentence was excessive. Id. at *1. On April 23, 2019, this court affirmed Petitioner’s
sentence. Id. at *5. Petitioner did not file a Rule 11 application to appeal to the Tennessee
Supreme Court.

Motion to Suppress

        Prior to trial, on April 7, 2017, trial counsel filed a motion to suppress the evidence
seized pursuant to the search warrant, arguing that the warrant was invalid because “the
affidavit in support of the warrant was altered after its issuance and execution,” “the
supporting affidavit failed to state the name of [Petitioner],” and “the search warrant . . .
states an unknown person as being in possession of the listed property[.]”

        At the suppression hearing, MPD Sergeant Terrell Hunt testified that as part of the
homicide investigation, he was tasked with obtaining a search warrant for Petitioner’s
home. He filled out a search warrant template which was a one-page document with the
affidavit in support of the search warrant at the top of the page and the search warrant at
the bottom of that same page. He swore to the affidavit before a judicial commissioner
who found probable cause and issued the search warrant. According to MPD’s “Felony
Response Supplement,” the search warrant was assigned warrant number 6355. Prior to
execution of the warrant, an officer took a photo of the search warrant at the scene, as
sworn and issued. Sergeant Hunt testified that after he executed the warrant and left the
scene, he realized that “there was a big mistake in [the warrant]. I had the wrong name in
it, and the date of birth – I mean, the age. I had somebody else’s name in it by mistake.”
He “white[d] it out, wrote the correct name in, and the correct age” to correct his “honest
mistake.” Petitioner’s name and correct address were used throughout the body of the
affidavit. The search warrant stated:

       Proof by affidavit having been made before m[e] by Sgt. T. Hunt . . . that
       there is probable cause for believing that the unknown black female is in
       possession of the following described property . . . you are therefore
       commanded to make immediate search of the person and premises herein
       above described . . . .”

Sergeant Hunt explained that the “unknown black female” was Petitioner’s neighbor, Paula
Cowen. A copy of the search warrant was exhibited to Sergeant Hunt’s testimony.

       The trial court found that the incorrect name in the affidavit was a “clerical mistake,”
and denied the motion to suppress stating that Petitioner’s name was incorrect in one spot,
but correct in “four or five other spots” and that “should not invalidate a lawfully, legally
issued warrant or affidavit.” The trial court relied on State v. Davidson, in which the
Tennessee Supreme Court:
                                             -3-
        adopt[ed] a good-faith exception for the admission of evidence when a law
        enforcement officer has reasonably and in good faith conducted a search
        within the scope of a warrant the officer believes to be valid, but is later
        determined to be invalid solely because of a good faith failure to comply with
        the affidavit requirement[s.]

509 S.W.3d 156, 185-86 (Tenn. 2016). Further, the trial court noted that this court’s
opinion in State v. Szabo was “squarely on point with this case.” See State v. Szabo, No.
W2015-02264-CCA-R9-CD, 2016 WL 5851923 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 6, 2016) (holding
that one instance of the incorrect name in the affidavit is clerical error and does not
invalidate a search warrant). Finally, the trial court found that the “‘unknown black female’
is information that was not changed in this template.” The trial court also noted that
“Sergeant Hunt did not have to do anything, under current Tennessee law, to correct the
mistake, once he realized the mistake that [the judicial commissioner] did not realize. He
did not have to do anything at all. He could have just left it as it was.”

Post-Conviction Hearing

       On July 23, 2019, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. Post-
conviction counsel was appointed and filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief
on July 27, 2021. Petitioner alleged that trial counsel was ineffective because she did not
subpoena witnesses from the clerk’s office to show that the search warrant for his home
was never returned and she did not conduct adequate pre-trial investigation and interview
potential prosecution witnesses.1 Petitioner alleged that appellate counsel was ineffective
because he did not communicate with Petitioner and did not raise “significant and obvious
issues on appeal.” Specifically, Petitioner alleged that appellate counsel was ineffective
for not appealing the trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s motion to suppress all evidence
obtained from the search warrant. As an exhibit to his post-conviction petition, Petitioner
included a copy of a letter he received from appellate counsel advising Petitioner that
appellate counsel had received a thirty-day suspension from the practice of law in
Tennessee.

        At the post-conviction hearing, Jacqueline Watkins, a Shelby County general
sessions clerk, described the typical process of an officer’s return of a search warrant and
explained that when a warrant is returned, “it’s supposed to be stamped and dated and
filed[,]” and then the warrant is given a number for tracking. Ms. Watkins testified that in

        1
          On appeal, Petitioner challenges the post-conviction court’s ruling only as it relates to appellate
counsel; thus our opinion will address trial counsel’s testimony and performance solely in the context of
the search warrant that is the subject of Petitioner’s claims regarding appellate counsel.
                                                   -4-
Petitioner’s case, there was no time or date stamp on the search warrant. She also stated
that warrant number 6355 was in their books, but it was not the warrant in Petitioner’s case;
another name was entered under that number.

       Christina Max, a Shelby County criminal court clerk, testified that when a case is
moved from general sessions to criminal court, a general sessions clerk “normally walks
their paperwork up to us for our grand jury section” and any documents from general
sessions would be placed in the criminal court file. Shelby County criminal court had no
warrant number 6355; the criminal clerk warrant book “goes from 6099 and then it jumped
over to 7,000. There are no numbers in between.”

        Trial counsel testified that after she was appointed to represent Petitioner, while
reviewing discovery, she found a photograph of the search warrant as executed, and she
observed that it bore a name different than Petitioner’s. She had a copy of the returned
warrant and noted that the name on the warrant had been changed and that there were no
time stamps. Trial counsel began an investigation which included speaking to multiple
people in the general sessions and criminal court clerks’ offices to “try to establish the trail
of the warrant.” She knew the warrant had been signed by a commissioner, but she was
unable to locate the warrant in either of the clerks’ offices. Trial counsel spoke with
Sergeant Hunt about the warrant and he could not explain the missing time and date stamps,
but he maintained that he had properly returned the search warrant to the clerk’s office.
Trial counsel explained that she believed that “[e]ven if some clerk didn’t stamp it, the fact
that it was in my hands in an altered condition provided to me by the State in our discovery
packet was a good indicator to me that it had been turned back in[.]” Based on her
investigation, trial counsel filed a motion to suppress the items obtained as a result of the
execution of the warrant.

       On cross-examination, trial counsel agreed that “even though [the warrant itself]
doesn’t list [Petitioner], it does reference back . . . to the preceding paragraph, where it
does list all of those facts relating to [Petitioner] and the address and the victim of the
case[.]” Trial counsel’s argument was that Sergeant Hunt’s error was more substantial than
a clerical error, but after the adoption of the good faith exception in Tennessee law, she
“didn’t really have a whole lot of ground to stand on as far as that argument went[.]”

       Appellate counsel testified that he had practiced law for over forty years and had
handled more than thirty criminal appeals. He did not have “any vivid recollection” of
communicating with Petitioner about the issues that would be presented on appeal but he
“took what [he] thought were the appealable issues from the motion for new trial.”
Appellate counsel acknowledged that Petitioner wanted additional issues raised on appeal,
but after he reviewed the record, he was “kind of constricted by rules unless it’s some type

                                             -5-
of plain error.” When asked specifically why he did not raise the suppression issue,
appellate counsel explained:

       I seem to remember I thought - - I thought it had been addressed earlier. And
       I didn’t think the Court [of Criminal Appeals] would take cognizance of it.

       ...

       I do not [remember how it had already been addressed]. I think in the regular
       course of the business motion in court, but I just don’t know. I couldn’t
       answer that for you right now.

On cross examination, appellate counsel explained that he thought “the most mature way
of handling an appeal is to try to hit the [issues] that matter and may result in some
favorable opinion.” When asked to describe how he would decide whether to appeal an
adverse ruling on a suppression issue that was based “specifically [on] adverse law that’s
not in your favor[,]” appellate counsel explained:

       I am duty bound, as an appellate advocate, to bring up the adverse law, say
       well, Judge, this is against me, but what about this, where I can distinguish
       it.

       But if you can’t distinguish it, I think it’s better not to - - not to argue
       something that you just - - the law is just totally against you on. Because at
       that stage, [the appellate court] . . . can’t change the law anyway. It would
       have to be a Supreme Court issue for actually changing the law.

Finally, appellate counsel agreed that if there had been a suppression issue addressed and
preserved at trial, he would have reviewed the record and raised the issue if he thought
there was a meritorious argument to be made.

       Petitioner testified that trial counsel informed him that his name had been changed
on the warrant, but until after trial, he was unaware of other issues with the search warrant.
Petitioner testified that he would have wanted trial counsel to address additional issues that
he had identified with the search warrant.2 Regarding appellate counsel, Petitioner stated
“I received a letter saying that he was my appellate attorney. I never heard from him after
that.” Petitioner identified three letters that he sent to the Clerk of the Appellate Courts
asking for updates on his case and providing his new incarceration location “[b]ecause [he]

       2
         Again, because Petitioner has not raised trial counsel’s performance on appeal, we will not
expound on this portion of his testimony.
                                               -6-
didn’t have any contact with [appellate counsel].” Petitioner testified that had he been able
to communicate with appellate counsel, he would have wanted additional issues to be
raised, including the suppression issue based on his understanding of deficiencies with the
search warrant.

        On cross-examination, Petitioner agreed that the inventory listed on the evidence
receipt matched the list of items on the search warrant. He also admitted that at trial, the
State introduced a crime scene sketch of Petitioner’s home that showed the locations of all
the items that were seized pursuant to the warrant.

       At the end of his testimony, Petitioner indicated that he had additional information
to give to the post-conviction court. He had prepared a written statement. Rather than
having Petitioner read the statement, the post-conviction court reviewed the twenty-one-
page statement and entered it as an exhibit to the hearing. As relating to appellate counsel,
Petitioner asserted that appellate counsel was “deficient for failing to consult and inform
[him] of any issues relating to [his] direct appeal.”

       After hearing the evidence and arguments of the parties, the post-conviction court
made oral findings and denied Petitioner’s petition. On February 21, 2023, the post-
conviction court entered a comprehensive written order with findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and denied Petitioner post-conviction relief. Regarding appellate
counsel’s performance, the post-conviction court accredited appellate counsel’s testimony,
finding that appellate counsel’s decision to raise only the one issue of excessive sentencing
was “a proper tactical decision - - one that this [c]ourt will not second guess.” The post-
conviction court also found that Petitioner had not shown that he was prejudiced by
appellate counsel’s failure to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress because he did
not identify any grounds that may have reversed the trial court’s decision.

        On October 21, 2022, Petitioner filed a premature pro se notice of appeal. By order
of this court, the action was stayed until the post-conviction court entered a final judgment.
The stay was lifted on March 10, 2023. Post-conviction appellate counsel filed a motion
to withdraw due to a change in employment. This court granted that motion and remanded
Petitioner’s case to the trial court for appointment of substitute counsel. Petitioner
subsequently filed a motion to proceed pro se. After remand to the trial court to address
Petitioner’s motion, the trial court found that Petitioner had “knowingly and intelligently
waive[d] his right to counsel on appeal.” Petitioner’s pro se appeal of the denial of post-
conviction relief is now properly before this court.

                                            -7-
                                          Analysis

       On appeal, Petitioner raises two issues: “Whether appellate attorney was ineffective
for failing to communicate and raise significant and obvious issues on appeal?” and
“Whether the post-conviction court erred when it referenced the affidavit to cure the
insufficient search warrant in the finding of the court?”

       Regarding the first issue, Petitioner argues that appellate counsel did not fulfill his
ethical duty to communicate with Petitioner which prevented Petitioner from
“participat[ing] intelligently” in his appeal. Petitioner claims that appellate counsel was
ineffective for raising the “uninformed issue” of an excessive sentence and that he was
prejudiced because appellate counsel should have appealed the denial of the motion to
suppress, which he asserts was more likely to have been successful on appeal. The State
argues that Petitioner has not shown that the suppression issue would have been successful
on appeal, regardless of appellate counsel’s alleged lack of communication.

       While Petitioner’s second issue on appeal is difficult to decipher, we interpret this
issue as a claim that the post-conviction court erred in its analysis of the validity of the
search warrant in its order denying post-conviction relief. Because this argument relates
to whether the suppression issue would have been successful on appeal, we will address
both of Petitioner’s issues together.

        The right to the effective assistance of counsel is safeguarded by both the
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of Tennessee; therefore, it is
cognizable under the Post-Conviction Relief Act. U.S. Const. amend VI; Tenn. Const. art.
I, § 9; T.C.A. § 40-30-103 (“Relief under this part shall be granted when the conviction or
sentence is void or voidable because of the abridgment of any right guaranteed by the
Constitution of Tennessee or the Constitution of the United States.”). A petitioner alleging
the ineffective assistance of counsel “shall have the burden of proving the allegations of
fact by clear and convincing evidence.” T.C.A. § 40-30-110(f); Dellinger v. State, 279
S.W.3d 282, 291 (Tenn. 2009). Whether a petitioner asserts ineffective assistance of trial
or appellate counsel, he bears the burden of showing that (1) counsel’s performance was
deficient and (2) the deficiency was prejudicial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687 (1984); Butler v. State, 789 S.W.2d 898, 899 (Tenn. 1990). Failure to satisfy either
prong is sufficient to deny relief. Carpenter v. State, 126 S.W.3d 879, 886 (Tenn. 2004);
Finch v. State, 226 S.W.3d 307, 316 (Tenn. 2007) (“[I]f this Court determines that either
prong is not met, we may forego consideration of the other prong.”).

       A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of law and
fact. Pylant v. State, 263 S.W.3d 854, 867 (Tenn. 2008) (citing Finch, 226 S.W.3d at 315).
Thus, an appellate court is bound by the factual findings of the post-conviction court unless
                                            -8-
the evidence in the record preponderates against those findings; but the post-conviction
court’s application of law to those factual findings is reviewed de novo with no
presumption of correctness. Grindstaff v. State, 297 S.W.3d 208, 216 (Tenn. 2009) (citing
Dellinger, 279 S.W.3d at 293); State v. Fields, 40 S.W.3d 450,457-58 (Tenn. 2001)).

       The test for ineffective assistance of counsel is the same for both trial and appellate
counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Campbell v. State, 904 S.W.2d 594, 596-97 (Tenn.
1995). Namely, a petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must prove
both that appellate counsel was deficient in failing to adequately pursue or preserve a
particular issue on appeal and that, absent counsel’s deficient performance, there was a
reasonable probability that the issue “would have affected the result of the appeal.”
Campbell, 904 S.W.2d at 597; see also Carpenter, 126 S.W.3d at 886-88.

        The determination of which issues to raise on appeal is within the discretion of
appellate counsel and “[a]ppellate counsel is not required to raise all issues that a defendant
desires to raise on appeal.” Howard v. State, 604 S.W.3d 53, 62 (Tenn. 2020); Cooper,
849 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tenn. 1993). In fact, “experienced advocates have long emphasized
the importance of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on one central
issue if possible[.]” Cooper, 847 S.W.2d at 747 (quoting Jones v. Barnes, 466 U.S. 745,
751 (1983)). When a petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel based on the
failure to raise an issue on appeal, the appellate court must determine the merits of the
unraised issue. Carpenter, 126 S.W.3d at 887; see also Mapes v. Coyle, 171 F.3d 408, 413
(6th Cir. 1999) (stating that counsel’s performance cannot be deficient for failing to raise
a meritless issue). To determine the merits, the appellate court should consider the
following non-exhaustive list of questions:

   1) Were the omitted issues “significant and obvious”?

   2) Was there arguably contrary authority on the omitted issues?

   3) Were the omitted issues clearly stronger than those presented?

   4) Were the omitted issues objected to at trial?

   5) Were the trial court’s rulings subject to a deference on appeal?

   6) Did appellate counsel testify in a collateral proceeding as to his appeal
      strategy and, if so, were the justifications reasonable?

   7) What was appellate counsel’s level of experience and expertise?

                                             -9-
   8) Did the petitioner and appellate counsel meet and go over possible issues?

   9) Is there evidence that counsel reviewed all the facts?

   10) Were the omitted issues dealt with in other assignments of error?

   11) Was the decision to omit an issue an unreasonable one which only an
      incompetent attorney would adopt?

Carpenter, 126 S.W.3d at 888 (quoting Mapes, 171 F.3d at 427-28). This court has held
that the best way to convince the post-conviction court and the appellate court that an
omitted issue had merit is to present a legal argument for the omitted issue. McNutt v.
State, No. W2016-01086-CCA-R3-PC, 2017 WL 4004172, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept.
8, 2017).

       Petitioner alleges that appellate counsel’s failure to communicate with him was the
reason appellate counsel did not appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. While we
note that the record includes appellate counsel’s letter to Petitioner advising him that he
had incurred a thirty-day suspension from the practice of law, the record does not include
any information regarding the reason for the suspension. Further, as we conclude below,
even if there had been a lack of communication between Petitioner and appellate counsel,
the inclusion of the suppression issue would not have changed the outcome of Petitioner’s
appeal. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

       Petitioner asserts that the suppression issue was “significant and obvious,” and
“clearly stronger” than the sentencing issue. He argues that the sentencing issue was
“readily recognizable as devoid of merit” because the trial court imposed a within-range
sentence for a Range One standard offender, but that the suppression issue would have led
to the dismissal of his conviction. The State argues that the trial court was correct in
applying the good faith exception to Petitioner’s challenges to the search warrant and
denying the motion to suppress. The State further argues that the post-conviction court
correctly found that an appeal of the denial of the motion to suppress would not have
changed the outcome of Petitioner’s direct appeal.

       In considering the Carpenter factors, appellate counsel testified at the post-
conviction proceeding that he had over forty years of experience in criminal law, including
criminal appeals. He reviewed the record and testified that in his experience, the sentencing
issue was clearly stronger than the suppression issue. He did not raise the suppression issue
on appeal because there was contrary authority on the issue. Appellate counsel testified
that he could not ethically differentiate Petitioner’s arguments from the adverse law.

                                           - 10 -
        As noted by the trial court, Petitioner’s case is substantially similar to the Szabo
case, which is contrary to Petitioner’s arguments. In Szabo, the State appealed the trial
court’s granting of the defendant’s motion to suppress on the basis that the wrong
individual was named in the affidavit for search warrant. Szabo, 2016 WL 5851923, at *2.
The officer testified that he had used the format of a prior search warrant application and
had unintentionally forgotten to replace the name in the affidavit for search warrant. Id.
This court reversed the trial court’s suppression of evidence found pursuant to the search
warrant, holding that “one instance of an inconsistent name in the affidavit when there are
five other correct references to the [d]efendant by name does not void the search warrant.”
Id. at *4. Similarly, in the present case Sergeant Hunt testified that he had used a pre-
formatted affidavit for the search warrant and unintentionally forgot to change the name to
Petitioner’s and to correct the reference to the “unknown black female.” However,
throughout the affidavit, Petitioner’s name and other identifying information was correctly
identified; thus “a common sense evaluation of the document would indicate an error based
upon these facts.” Id.

       Additionally, prior to the suppression hearing, our supreme court carved out a good-
faith exception to the warrant requirement in State v. Davidson, 509 S.W.3d 156 (Tenn.
2016), holding that “[w]hen an officer has complied with constitutional requirements to
obtain a warrant, but in good faith failed to comply with the state statutory and rule affidavit
requirements, societal interests are not advanced when the exclusionary rule applies to
exclude evidence obtained from the search warrant.” Id. at 186. In its order denying relief,
the post-conviction court relied on Davidson in finding that Sergeant Hunt had made a
good faith mistake on the affidavit and that Petitioner would not have been successful in
the appeal of the motion to suppress. Appellate counsel testified that he had reviewed the
record, including the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress, and could not
differentiate Petitioner’s case from adverse law. The evidence does not preponderate
against the post-conviction court’s factual finding that appellate counsel raised the only
issue he thought was legitimate. See Carpenter, 126 S.W.3d at 893 n.11 (“Counsel must
refuse to raise frivolous arguments that his or her client urges to be raised.”).

       Petitioner also claims that appellate counsel should have included other challenges
to the search warrant on appeal. He argues that the search warrant did not particularly
describe Petitioner or his address and that the post-conviction court erred in referring to the
narrative in the affidavit to show that the warrant was for Petitioner’s and his home.
Petitioner also complains that the affidavit for search warrant included only “conclusory
statements” which did not provide sufficient basis for a finding of probable cause.

        The record supports the post-conviction court’s finding that the Petitioner “has
failed to identify any grounds upon which the Tennessee Supreme Court may have reversed
the decision of the trial court[.]” Petitioner cannot show that he would have succeeded on
                                             - 11 -
appeal had the suppression issue been raised. His argument that the suppression issue was
more significant and obvious than the sentencing issue is without merit. There was no
question the crimes occurred in the house Petitioner shared with his wife and their two
children and that he shot and killed his wife. Petitioner reached out to his neighbors and
involved the police by dialing 911. Accordingly, probable cause was not an issue in the
suppression motion or at trial. Indeed, Petitioner advances no authority for overcoming
this factual hurdle on post-conviction. Likewise, he has advanced no argument that he and
his home should have been described with particularity where his name and address were
correctly stated several times in the affidavit before and after Sergeant Hunt recognized his
mistake.

       Thus, after weighing the Carpenter factors, we conclude that Petitioner has failed
to prove that appellate counsel’s omission of the suppression issue on direct appeal “fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness” to satisfy the deficient performance prong
of the Strickland test. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; see also Mapes, 171 F.3d at 413
(“Counsel could not be unconstitutionally ineffective for failing to raise these meritless
arguments.”). Petitioner is not entitled to relief.

                                        Conclusion

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

                                              ____________________________________
                                              JILL BARTEE AYERS, JUDGE

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