Court Opinion

ID: 7700657
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-30 18:54:36.519374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:26:51.950285
License: Public Domain

I concur only in the result reached by the majority in its unpublished memorandum in this case. I do not agree with the majority's characterization of cross-examination as completely within the discretion of the trial judge. I do not believe that the law of evidence has deteriorated into a matter to be left to the court's discretion.
The scope of cross-examination is not merely a matter of the "sound discretion of the trial judge," as some cases seem to say, but is controlled by law. C. Gamble, McElroy's AlabamaEvidence, § 136.01 (4th ed. 1991). See Scott v. City ofGuntersville, 612 So.2d 1273 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992); and Hammock v.State, 612 So.2d 545 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992).
Section 12-21-137, Code of Alabama 1975, states, in pertinent part:
 "The right of cross-examination, thorough and sifting, belongs to every party as to the witnesses called against him." *Page 964
See also Ala. Const. 1901, Article I, § 6, which states:
 ". . . [T]he cross-examining party has the absolute right on cross-examination, not only to inquire as to matters relevant to the issues . . . but also to inquire into the conduct and circumstances of the witness which have measurable bearing upon his credibility. This right to a party to have thorough and sifting cross-examination is provided by statute."
C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 136.01 (4th ed. 1991).
Although I disagree with the above statement made by the majority, characterizing cross-examination as being solely within the discretion of the trial court, I agree with the result reached by the majority. Any error here that may have occurred was harmless.