Court Opinion

ID: 9423197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:06:24.308391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:42.749487
License: Public Domain

*709Mb. Justice White,
with whom Mr. Justice Douglas and Mb. Justice Brennan join, dissenting.
Certain principles are undisputed in this case. The period of limitations for § 301 suits is to be determined by federal law; and, since Congress has made no express provision for any time limitation, this Court must fashion the governing rule. By adopting the statutes of the several States, the Court creates 50 or more different statutes of limitations1 rather than fashioning a uniform rule after consideration of relevant federal and state statutes.
The Court justifies its decision in part by reliance on cases decided under the Rules of Decisions Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1652 (1964 ed.), which interpreted “the silence of Congress ... to mean that it is federal policy to adopt the local law of limitation.” Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 395; see, e. g., Chattanooga Foundry v. Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390, 397; Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U. S. 610; McCluny v. Silliman, 3 Pet. 270, 277. But the cases also establish that the silence of Congress is not to be read as automatically putting an imprimatur on state law. Rather, state law is applied only because it supplements and fulfills federal policy, and the ultimate question is what federal policy requires. See Board of County Comm’rs v. United States, 308 U. S. 343, 350-352; Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 394-395; Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Corp., 348 U. S. 437, 463 (Reed, J., concurring).
*710More specifically, it is quite clear that with respect to § 301 suits congressional silence extends not just to the question of limitations but encompasses the entirety of the governing legal principles. Rather than inferring from congressional silence that state law was to govern, Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448, held that the federal courts were to “fashion from the policy of our national labor laws” general federal law applicable to suits on collective bargaining agreements. Id., at 456. Although Lincoln Mills recognized that “state law, if compatible with the purpose of § 301, may be resorted to in order to find the rule that will best effectuate the federal policy,” id., at 457, it did not intimate in any way that federal policy would be furthered by the adoption of 50 different state rules. To the contrary, subsequent decisions have recognized that “ [comprehensiveness is inherent in the process by which the law is to be formulated under the mandate of Lincoln Mills” and that, “[m]ore important, the subject matter of § 301 (a) ⅛ peculiarly one that calls for uniform law.' ” Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95, 103. There is, therefore, no sound basis for saying that Congress by its silence on the limitations matter intended the state laws to apply or for adopting diverse state laws simply because of a reluctance to supply what Congress omitted. The courts are expected to develop the law of labor contracts, and this case represents only another task in this process.
The Court reasons, however, that to devise a uniform time limitation would be too “bald a form of judicial innovation.” Ante, at p. 701. Cases defining a need for uniformity in § 301 suits are said to be limited to matters concerning which the possible application of varying systems of law “ ‘would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and administration of *711collective agreements.’ ” Ante, at pp. 701-702. Since, according to the majority, the lack of a uniform statute of limitations would generally not have that effect,2 the Court concludes that although such a uniform provision “might well constitute a desirable statutory addition, there is no justification for the drastic sort of judicial legislation that is urged upon us.” Ante, at pp. 702-703.
The Court is undoubtedly correct in stating that a uniform limitations period would be desirable. Suppose, for example, that the collective bargaining contract in dispute was one made in Detroit for a multi-state unit of truck drivers and that, as is true in this case, 100 of the covered employees were discharged without payment of accumulated vacation pay. Suppose further that some of the employees were hired in Chicago and discharged in Indiana while others were hired in St. Louis, Cleveland, and Terre Haute and were discharged in Illinois, Michigan, and Iowa (in whatever combinations are preferred). Suppose, finally, that some sue in Indiana, some in other States, some in federal court, and some in state court. Simple justice dictates in such a situation *712that the right of employees in different States to assert their federal claim should be equally available. Clearly there is no sense or justice in referring to 50 or more different statutes of limitations so that one employee may be barred after one year while another employee may sue any time within six years. Nor is there any reason why an employer operating under the contract in one State should be bothered with stale claims already barred as against other employers in other States.
Moreover, the Court’s decision creates unnecessary complexities and opportunities for vexatious litigation, some of which are reflected in the Court’s opinion. Thus the Court notes that in a situation involving multi-state contacts, such as the example given above, a federal court hearing the case would be required to decide whether to apply a federal, or the forum State’s, conflict of laws rules to select the State of governing law. If this Court ultimately holds that a federal conflict of laws rule is to govern in federal court suits, the additional question will be presented of whether the federal conflict of laws rule must also be applied by state courts or whether they may continue to apply their own conflict of laws rule. Whatever conflict of laws rule, state or federal, is selected, there will remain the difficult task of applying that rule to find the State whose limitations statute is to control. In cases not involving multi-state contacts, the court may have to choose between two or more state statutes; here the choice is between the limitations period for suits on written contracts and the period for suits on oral contracts. Under today’s decision, this choice is to be governed by the State’s characterization of the federal action (or a federal court’s Delphic opinion of what that characterization would be), “unless that characterization is unreasonable or otherwise inconsistent with national labor policy.” Ante, at p. 706. The gov*713erning state limitations statute, having finally been determined, is to be applied unless the period is “unusually short or long.” 3 Ante, at p. 707, n. 9. The problems we have indicated are merely illustrative of the complex questions that must be decided under the Court’s approach before it can be determined which of several competing state statutes is to be applied and whether such application is reasonable when tested by the federal labor policy; undoubtedly the fertile imagination of counsel will conceive additional intricacies. The desirability of a single, uniform, federal statute to further justice and to avoid such litigation-creating complexities was of course recognized by Congress in passing the statutes, to which the majority refers, that overruled in particular areas past refusals of this Court to fashion such a uniform rule.
The case for the Court’s decision thus ultimately comes down to the proposition that fashioning a uniform federal statute would involve too bald an exercise of judicial innovation. This is an argument I have difficulty in fathoming. Courts have not always been reluctant to “create” statutes of limitations, the common-law doctrine of prescription by which judgments are presumed to have been paid after the lapse of 20 years, see Gaines v. Miller, 111 U. ,S. 395, 399; McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312, 327, being just one example. In equity they have applied the doctrine of laches, see Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392. But here there is no dispute concerning whether a statute of limitations is to be fashioned — the choice is between one statute or 50. If the Court is to develop the substantive law of labor contracts, *714which it has undertaken to do with the blessing of Congress, it seems odd that the Court should balk at establishing a single limitations period, drawn from any of the sources available to it, including the relevant federal and state statutes. I undertake no such canvass here,4 but think the Court should do so. I therefore dissent.

 The Court’s approach adopts (and thereby creates as federal law) at least one limitations statute for each State and Territory. In many States it adopts a multitude of limitations provisions, each applicable to a particular type of § 301 suit. The Court’s opinion suggests, for example, that had the present suit been “exclusively based upon a written contract,” ante, at p. 706, the Indiana 20-year, rather than the six-year, statute would have governed.

 However, limitations questions will have an impact on the negotiation and administration of the collective agreement in many instances — for example, if the parties decide to limit by contract the period for bringing suit. The laws of the several States vary with respect to the enforceability of such contractual limitations periods, particularly when it is asserted that the agreed period is unreasonable, see Williston on Contracts § 183, at 711, n. 10 (Jaeger 3d ed. 1957); Note, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1177, 1181-1182 (1950). It may be assumed that, under the test advanced by the majority, uniform federal law will be fashioned to determine their validity, just as, at least in some circumstances, federal law will determine when the cause of action arose, see Cope v. Anderson, 331 U. S. 461; Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U. S. 96, and whether the running of limitations was tolled by fraudulent concealment, see Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392; Moviecolor Limited v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F. 2d 80 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1961).

 Unfortunately the Court provides no enlightenment concerning where we are to look for a limitations period should the state statute be held unreasonable. Perhaps in extremis even the Court’s approach will require the kind of innovation it now rejects.

 Nor do I intimate any opinion concerning the tolling question mooted in the Court’s opinion.