Court Opinion

ID: 9736879
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:08:57.692991+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:54.887985
License: Public Domain

LESLIE, Judge
(dissenting).
The majority concludes that collateral es-toppel should not apply in the present case. I disagree. It is undisputed that the identical issue is involved in both actions. Additionally, the arbitration proceeding qualifies as a prior adjudication. The supreme court’s decision in Aufderhar v. Data Dispatch, Inc., 452 N.W.2d 648 (Minn.1990) clearly supports application of collateral es-toppel under similar circumstances. The court held in Aufderhar that a party who has litigated the issue of personal injury damage with his insurance carrier in an arbitration proceeding may be estopped from relitigating the same issue in a subsequent tort action. The court recognized that, “We have afforded to an arbitration award finality as to both facts and the law.” Aufderhar, 452 N.W.2d at 651 (citation omitted).
Arbitration is a procedure favored in the law. Ehlert v. Western National Mutual Insurance Co., 296 Minn. 195, 199, 207 N.W.2d 334, 336 (Minn.1973). The strong public policy in favor of arbitration is not served by permitting parties who participated in the arbitration proceeding, and who did not appeal the result, to attack the arbitrator’s decision in a later proceeding.
Here, Houlihan attempts to relitigate the precise issue determined in arbitration. She was notified of the arbitration and informed that the arbitration would address “the question of which party was more at fault in causing the accident.” Houlihan was represented by competent counsel; in fact she later retained the same attorney when he entered private practice. Houlihan attended the arbitration and testified on her own behalf. She had ample opportunity to present evidence. There is no allegation that the arbitration proceeding was flawed, or that the decision was based on incomplete evidence. The evidence presented at the hearing revealed that Houlihan approached Bloomington Avenue, a major thoroughfare, and failed to stop before entering the intersection, striking a school bus. Houlihan claimed that she could not see the stop sign blocked by a truck and that she was unfamiliar with the area. A driver in an unfamiliar area, however, should be especially cautious. After hearing all the evidence, the arbitrator determined that Houlihan was 100% at fault. There is no indication that the arbitrator erred.
Moreover, Houlihan did not appeal the result. While we can speculate as to possible reasons for her failure to appeal, the fact remains that she did not contest the arbitrator’s finding of 100% liability. Houl-ihan’s actions indicate that she acquiesced in the arbitration decision. See Art Goebel, Inc. v. Arkay Construction Co., 437 N.W.2d 117, 119 (Minn.Ct.App.1989) (collateral estoppel appropriate where party acquiesced in prior arbitration award).
The majority questions whether Houli-han was a party to the suit. Houlihan was an individual named party in both actions. Her participation in the arbitration proceeding went beyond a mere name on the documents. There is no evidence that her interest was not capably represented in the proceeding. While her interest in recovering for her own personal injury may have gone beyond the scope of her insurance coverage, on the crucial issue of her liability for the accident she and the insurance company shared the same objective of obtaining the minimal possible liability. Thus, even if Houlihan were not the real party in interest, she was in privity with the insurance company.
Additionally, I believe that Houlihan had a fair opportunity to be heard on the issue of her liability. Whether she used her opportunity wisely is not the issue here. Instead, the focus is on whether she had a fair chance to present her evidence. Houli-han was fully aware that the specific issue of liability would be determined at the hearing. She had the benefit of not only *639her appointed counsel, but her privately retained counsel as well. The fact that her counsel apparently advised her to bring a separate action later does not mean that Houlihan was denied the opportunity to be heard in the arbitration hearing. On the contrary, she attended and testified. Under these circumstances, I cannot agree that she did not have a sufficient opportunity to present her side of the case. In my view, both the law and the facts support the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. I see no justification for wasting scarce judicial time in a further consideration of this matter and would affirm.