Court Opinion

ID: 9939673
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-12 14:12:17.11293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:46.644401
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

William Mayo,                             :
                          Appellant       :   CASES CONSOLIDATED
                                          :
             v.                           :
                                          :
John Doe, John Bager, John                :   Nos. 1415 C.D. 2022
Garnett, John Martin, and                 :        122 C.D. 2023
Jamie Sorber                              :   Submitted: December 4, 2023

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM                                                 FILED: February 9, 2024

             In these consolidated matters, William Mayo (Mayo), pro se, appeals
from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County (trial court)
sustaining a preliminary objection on the basis of improper service and directing
Mayo to effectuate service. Mayo also appeals from an order of the trial court
dismissing his complaint with prejudice. John Doe, John Bager, John Garnett, John
Martin, and Jamie Sorber (Sorber) (collectively, Appellees) also filed an application
to revoke Mayo’s in forma pauperis status. Upon review, we quash Mayo’s appeal
from the trial court’s interlocutory order sustaining the preliminary objection, grant
the application to revoke Mayo’s in forma pauperis status, vacate the order of the
trial court dismissing Mayo’s complaint and remand the matter to the trial court to
afford Mayo the opportunity to pay the requisite filing fees and costs.
                                           I. Background
                  In August 2022, Mayo filed a complaint against Appellees, requesting
damages and declaratory relief on the basis of the following allegations. Original
Record (O.R.) at 4. Mayo claimed that following his transfer to another prison in
January 2021, the receiving prison failed to return two pairs of boots. Id. at 10-11.
Mayo also asserted that in February 2021, a correctional officer left Mayo’s tablet
outside his cell overnight after syncing it “to the unit’s kiosk,” thereby causing the
battery to be “circumvented” and ruining the tablet. Id. at 12. Lastly, Mayo
contended that in June 2021, two prison employees slammed him to the ground after
he complained about a delay in receiving his shower. Id. at 12-13. The trial court
granted Mayo permission to proceed in forma pauperis.1 Id. at 1.
                  In September 2022, Sorber2 filed preliminary objections, asserting that
Mayo failed to serve process on the Attorney General of Pennsylvania (Attorney
General) in accordance with Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 422(a)3 and

        1
            Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 240 provides, in relevant part:

                  (f) A party permitted to proceed in forma pauperis shall not be
                  required to

                      (1) pay any cost or fee imposed or authorized by Act of
                      Assembly or general rule which is payable to any court or
                      prothonotary or any public officer or employee, or

                      (2) post bond or other security for costs as a condition for
                      commencing an action or proceeding or taking an appeal.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 240(f).
        2
            Sorber is the superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Phoenix. Sorber’s Br.
at 6 n.2.
        3
            Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 422(a) provides that

                                                    2
Section 8523(b) of the Judicial Code,4 42 Pa.C.S. § 8523(b),5 and demurring to
Mayo’s claims. O.R. at 87-96. Mayo thereafter filed a motion for sanctions pursuant
to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1023.2, Pa.R.Civ.P. 1023.2. Id. at 2 & 168.
On November 23, 2022, the trial court sustained the preliminary objection based on
improper service, deemed the remaining objections moot, and ordered Mayo to
complete service. Id. Mayo did not serve the complaint upon the Attorney General,
but instead filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s order. See Notice of Appeal,
12/9/22.
                Sorber also filed a motion to dismiss Mayo’s complaint on the basis
that Mayo has “three strikes” for purposes of Section 6602(f) of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA),6 42 Pa.C.S. § 6602(f).7 O.R. at 2 & 187-92. On January 6,

                [s]ervice of original process upon the Commonwealth or an officer
                of the Commonwealth, or a department, board, commission or
                instrumentality of the Commonwealth, or a member thereof, shall
                be made at the office of the defendant and the office of the attorney
                general by handing a copy to the person in charge thereof.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 422(a).
       4
           42 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-9913.
       5
        Section 8523(b) of the Judicial Code provides that “[s]ervice of process in the case of an
action against the Commonwealth shall be made at the principal or local office of the
Commonwealth agency that is being sued and at the office of the Attorney General.” 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 8523(b).
       6
           42 Pa.C.S. § 6601-6608.
       7
           This Court has explained previously that

                Section 6602(f)(1) of the PLRA[, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6602(f)(1)], entitled
                “Abusive litigation,” and commonly referred to as the “three strikes”
                rule, authorizes a trial court to dismiss “prison conditions litigation”
                filed by a “frequent filer” prisoner if: (1) that prisoner has filed prior
                “prison conditions litigation;” and (2) three or more of those actions

                                                    3
2023, the trial court granted Sorber’s motion and dismissed Mayo’s complaint with
prejudice on the basis of the “three strikes” rule. Id. at 2 & 336; Trial Ct. Op.,
4/14/23 at 6. Several days later, the trial court denied Mayo’s motion for sanctions.
Id. at 337. Mayo filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s order. See Notice of
Appeal, 2/3/23. This Court consolidated Mayo’s two appeals.8 Cmwlth. Ct. Order,
4/6/23.
               In February 2023, Appellees filed an application to quash Mayo’s
appeal from the trial court’s November 2022 order sustaining the preliminary
objection on the basis of improper service and directing Mayo to effectuate service,
asserting that the order was interlocutory and, therefore, non-appealable.
Application to Quash at 2, ¶¶ 7-8 (citing Pa.R.A.P. 341; May v. Doe, 269 A.3d 1286,
1289, 1288-89 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 283 A.3d 173 (Pa. 2022); Gerg v.
Township of Fox, 107 A.3d 849, 852-53 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015); Ross v. Cousin’s

               have been dismissed under Section 6602(e)(2) of the PLRA[, 42
               Pa.C.S. § 6602(e)(2),] for being “frivolous or malicious or fail[ing]
               to state a claim upon which relief may be granted[.]”

Pew v. Mechling, 929 A.2d 1214, 1217 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).
       8
           In the section of his appellate brief titled “Order(s) That Appellant Is Appealing,” Mayo
identified the November 23, 2022 order of the trial court sustaining Sorber’s preliminary objection
on the basis of improper service and ordering Mayo to effectuate service, the January 6, 2023 order
granting Sorber’s motion to dismiss and dismissing Mayo’s suit with prejudice, and the January
11, 2023 order denying Mayo’s motion for sanctions. See Mayo’s Br. at 4-5. Mayo’s mention of
the trial court’s “final order” presumably refers to the court’s January 6, 2023 order dismissing his
complaint with prejudice. See id. Further, we note that Mayo did not file a notice of appeal from
the January 11, 2023 order. Moreover, Mayo’s appellate brief contains no argument with respect
to this order; accordingly, it is waived. See Pa.R.A.P 2119(a) (stating that the argument section of
the brief shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued, followed by such
discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985
A.2d 915, 924 (Pa. 2009) (stating, “where an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a
claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful
fashion capable of review, that claim is waived”).

                                                 4
Supermarkets (Pa. Super., No. 883 EDA 2019, filed December 31, 2019), slip op. at
1 & 5-6).9 We issued an order stating that Appellees’ application to quash would be
decided with the merits. Cmwlth. Ct. Order, 4/12/23. In April 2023, Appellees filed
an application to revoke Mayo’s in forma pauperis status on the basis that Mayo has
“three strikes” for purposes of Section 6602(f)(1) of the PLRA, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6602(f)(1).
Appl. to Revoke IFP Status, 4/7/23 at 2-4, ¶¶ 5-10 (citing Brown v. Pa. Dep’t of
Corr., 58 A.3d 118, 121 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012)). Thus, Appellees requested that this
Court direct Mayo to pay applicable filing fees and costs in order to proceed with
his appeal. Id. at 4, ¶ 10 (citing Lopez v. Haywood, 41 A.3d 184, 187 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2012)).      Mayo thereafter filed an answer requesting that this Court deny the
application to revoke his in forma pauperis status, insisting that he “[does not] have
any strikes,” as he merely “lost” the cases cited by Appellees. Answer, 4/18/23 at
4-5. We issued an order stating that Appellees’ application to revoke Mayo’s in
forma pauperis status would also be decided with the merits. Cmwlth. Ct. Order,
4/25/23.

       9
           Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 126(b) provides:

                (1) As used in this rule, “non-precedential decision” refers to an
                unpublished non-precedential memorandum decision of the
                Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019 or an unreported
                memorandum opinion of the Commonwealth Court filed after
                January 15, 2008.

                (2) Non-precedential decisions as defined in (b)(1) may be cited for
                their persuasive value.

Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)(1), (2).

                                                 5
                                            II. Issues
               On appeal,10 Mayo argues that the trial court improperly “focus[ed]” on
his “error” in “mistakenly fail[ing] to adhere to Pa.R.Civ.P. 422[] in an attempt to
elude the fact that a[n] abuse of arbitrary discretion was manifested[.]” Mayo’s Br.
at 14. Further, Mayo renews his contention that although Sorber’s motion to dismiss
“mak[es him] appear to be a serial litigator that has three [] strikes,” he in fact does
not “have any strikes,” as the cases cited by Sorber are merely ones which he “lost.”
Id. at 14-15.        Moreover, Mayo asserts that his “access to the [C]ourt is
constitutionally protected conduct that’s govern[ed] by the scales of justice and not
[Sorber’s] misinterpretation of the three [] strike[s] provision[.]” Id. at 15. Mayo
also maintains that this Court should “construe the filing of unrepresented parties
liberally.” Id. at 14. Thus, Mayo asks this Court to “overrule[]” the trial court’s
“final order” and remand this matter “with appropriate instructions.” Id. at 15.
               Sorber counters that the trial court did not err in sustaining his
preliminary objection based on improper service, because Mayo failed to serve a
copy of the complaint on the Attorney General. Sorber’s Br. at 15 (citing Section
8523(b) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8523(b); Pa.R.Civ.P. 422(a)). Further,
Sorber notes Mayo’s admission in his appellate brief that he “failed to adhere to
[Pa.R.Civ.P.] 422.” Id. at 16 (quoting Mayo’s Br. at 14). Regardless, Sorber
contends that because Mayo failed to effectuate service within the applicable

       10
           Our review of the trial court’s decision is limited to a determination of whether
constitutional rights were violated, or whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an
error of law. Lopez v. Haywood, 41 A.3d 184, 186 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (citation and quotation
marks omitted).

                                                 6
limitations period, his action is now time barred.11 Id. at 17 (citing Lamp v. Heyman,
366 A.2d 882, 885 (Pa. 1976); Devine v. Hutt, 863 A.2d 1160, 1168 (Pa. Super.
2004); Cahill v. Schults, 643 A.2d 121, 123 (Pa. Super. 1994)).
               Sorber also asserts that Mayo may not proceed in forma pauperis, as he
has already incurred the following “three strikes” under Section 6602(f) of the
PLRA, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6602(f): Mayo v. Haines (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 448 C.D. 2018,
filed Feb. 7, 2019), and Mayo v. Cowden (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 640 C.D. 2018, filed
April 5, 2019), which were dismissed as frivolous, and Mayo v. SCI Greene’s
Administered Staff (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1192 C.D. 2018, filed May 13, 2020), which
was deemed barred pursuant to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Sorber’s Br. at
12-13.12    Sorber concedes that the trial court should have afforded Mayo the
opportunity to pay the requisite filing fees and costs before dismissing his complaint.
Id. at 19-20 (citing Lopez, 41 A.3d at 188; Jae v. Good, 946 A.2d 802, 809 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2008)). However, Sorber maintains that “this Court need not reach this
issue at all,” as Mayo has not served the Attorney General and the relevant
limitations period for his claims has since lapsed. Id. at 21. Sorber, therefore,
contends that this Court should affirm the trial court’s dismissal on the alternative
       11
          Sorber contends that Mayo “characterized” his first two claims as the negligent handling
of personal property, and that these claims are governed by a two-year statute of limitations.
Sorber’s Br. at 18 (citing Section 5524(3), (7) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(3), (7)).
Thus, Sorber asserts that the limitations period for Mayo’s personal property claims has expired,
as the purported incidents giving rise to those claims occurred in January and February of 2021.
Id. Moreover, Sorber maintains that the limitations period for Mayo’s assault and battery claim
was set to expire on June 16, 2023, several days after the filing of Sorber’s appellate brief on June
12. Id. (citing Section 5524(a) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(1)).
       12
            Sorber acknowledges that he did not cite Cowden and SCI Greene as “strikes” for
purposes of Section 6602(f) of the PLRA, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6602(f), before the trial court, but maintains
that this inconsistency “is of no moment.” Sorber’s Br. at 18 & n.8 (citing Brown v. James, 822
A.2d 128, 130-31 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (holding that “four alternative cases cited by [the
r]espondent” for the first time on appeal were “sufficient to establish that [the inmate] . . . violated
the ‘three strikes’ rule”).
                                                   7
basis that Mayo’s claims are time barred. Id. (citing Brown v. Beard, 11 A.3d 578,
580 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010)).

                                   III. Discussion
                              A. Application to Quash
             We agree with Sorber that the trial court’s November 2022 order
sustaining the preliminary objection relating to service constituted a non-appealable
interlocutory order. “Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 341(b),
a final order is defined as one that disposes of all claims and of all parties, is
expressly defined as a final order by statute or is entered as a final order pursuant to
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 341(c).” Gerg v. Twp. of Fox, 107 A.3d
849, 852-53 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (citing Pa.R.A.P. 341). Here, through its November
2022 order, the trial court merely sustained Sorber’s preliminary objection asserting
improper service and directed Mayo to serve the Attorney General in accordance
with Pa.R.Civ.P. 422(a) and Section 8523 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8523.
Rather than comply with the trial court’s directive, Mayo elected instead to appeal.
However, the order did not “dispose[] of all claims and of all parties.” Pa.R.A.P.
341(b)(1). We, therefore, grant the request to quash Mayo’s appeal from the trial
court’s non-final order. See also Ross v. Cousin’s Supermarkets (Pa. Super., No.
883 E.D.A. 2019, filed December 31, 2019), slip op. at 1 & 5-6 (holding that the
trial court’s order sustaining a preliminary objection due to the plaintiff’s failure to
effectuate service and dismissing the complaint without prejudice constituted a non-
final order and quashing the plaintiff’s appeal therefrom, explaining that “[f]or
finality to occur, the trial court must dismiss with prejudice the complaint in full”)
(citation omitted); see also May v. Doe, 269 A.3d 1286, 1288-89 (Pa. Cmwlth.

                                           8
2022), appeal denied, 283 A.3d 173 (Pa. 2022) (quashing appeal from interlocutory
order sustaining demurrer and dismissing suit with leave to file amended complaint,
holding that “[a]n order that sustains preliminary objections, but with leave to file
an amended complaint, is generally considered to be interlocutory and not a final,
appealable decree”) (citation omitted).

                            B. Dismissal of Mayo’s Complaint
               Mayo asserts that the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint,
because he does not have any “strikes” for purposes of Section 6602(e)(2) of the
PLRA, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6602(e)(2). See Mayo’s Br. at 14-15. We disagree.
               Section 6602(e) of the PLRA provides:

               (e) Dismissal of litigation.–Notwithstanding any filing
               fee which has been paid, the court shall dismiss prison
               conditions litigation[13] at any time, including prior to
               service on the defendant, if the court determines any of the
               following:

                   (1) The allegation of indigency is untrue.

                   (2) The prison conditions litigation is frivolous or
                   malicious or fails to state a claim upon which relief
                   may be granted or the defendant is entitled to
                   assert a valid affirmative defense, including
                   immunity, which, if asserted, would preclude the
                   relief.

       13
           Section 6601 of the PLRA defines “Prison conditions litigation” as “[a] civil proceeding
arising in whole or in part under Federal or State law with respect to the conditions of confinement
or the effects of actions by a government party on the life of an individual confined in prison,”
further specifying that “[t]he term includes an appeal,” but “does not include criminal proceedings
or habeas corpus proceedings challenging the fact or duration of confinement in prison.” 42
Pa.C.S. § 6601.

                                                 9
42 Pa.C.S. § 6602(e)(2). Section 6602(f) of the PLRA, in turn, states:

             (f) Abusive litigation.–If the prisoner has previously filed
             prison conditions litigation and:

                 (1) three or more of these prior civil actions have
                 been dismissed pursuant to subsection (e)(2);

             ....

             the court may dismiss the action. . . .

42 Pa.C.S. § 6602(f)(1).
             Here, Sorber identified Haines, Cowden and SCI Greene’s as prior
prison conditions litigation qualifying as Mayo’s “three strikes.”          Contrary to
Mayo’s assertion that he merely “lost” these cases, each was in fact either dismissed
as frivolous or deemed barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. In Haines,
this Court affirmed the trial court’s determination that Mayo’s complaint requesting
a writ of mandamus to direct a correctional officer to cease chewing tobacco while
serving food trays warranted dismissal as frivolous under Section 6602(e)(2) of the
PLRA, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6602(e)(2). See Haines, slip op. at 1-6. In Cowden, we affirmed
the trial court’s dismissal of Mayo’s constitutional claims as frivolous under the
same provision, where Mayo challenged the correctional institution’s restriction of
tomatoes, peppers and spices from his diet, when he had requested the exclusion of
onions only. See Cowden, slip op. at 1-8. In SCI Greene, we affirmed the trial
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of state correctional institution
employees on the basis of sovereign immunity in an action initiated by Mayo seeking
the return or replacement of blood-stained sneakers, which were confiscated and
destroyed after Mayo stabbed a correctional officer. See SCI Greene, slip op. at 3 &

                                          10
22-23. Thus, because Mayo has “three strikes” for purposes of Section 6602(f)(1)
of the PLRA, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6602(f)(1), he is not entitled to proceed in forma pauperis.
See McCool v. Dep’t of Corr., 984 A.2d 565, 572 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (explaining
that “the consequences of the ‘three strikes rule’ deprive the prisoner of the ability
to pursue his claim in forma pauperis”).
             Moreover, Mayo’s invocation of the constitutional right of access to the
courts does not secure in forma pauperis status. See Jae, 946 A.2d at 808-09 (citing
United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 450 (1972) (rejecting an inmate’s challenge to
the constitutionality of the “three strikes” rule, explaining that “the right of access to
courts is not absolute,” that “requiring a prisoner to pay the filing fees that are
imposed on all litigants in a civil case does not, standing alone, violate that prisoner’s
right of meaningful access to the courts,” and, further, that “there is no fundamental
right to proceed in court in forma pauperis”)).
             Sorber concedes that, rather than dismiss Mayo’s complaint, the trial
court should have revoked his in forma pauperis status and afforded him the
opportunity to pay applicable filing fees and costs. See Sorber’s Br. at 19-20. We
agree. See Brown v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 58 A.3d 118, 121 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012)
(explaining that “[w]hen a plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status is revoked [under
Section 6602(f)(1) of the PLRA, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6602(f)(1)], a court may dismiss the
plaintiff’s complaint if the plaintiff thereafter fails to pay the filing fees and costs
associated with the litigation”); Lopez, 41 A.3d at 187 (explaining that a prisoner
deprived of in forma pauperis status by application of the “three strikes” rule “could
. . . proceed by paying costs”) (quoting McCool, 984 A.2d at 572); see also Jae, 946
A.2d at 809 (stating that the “three strikes” rule “does not prevent prisoners from

                                           11
filing any number of civil actions challenging prison conditions [but] only restricts
their ability to pursue such actions in forma pauperis”).
               Nevertheless, Sorber maintains for the first time before this Court that
Mayo’s failure to toll the relevant limitations periods by effectuating service on the
Attorney General renders his action time barred. See Sorber’s Br. at 17-18 & 20.
However, as noted above, the trial court’s November 2022 order directing service
on the Attorney General constituted an unappealable interlocutory order; thus, the
issue of whether Sorber failed to toll the applicable limitations periods is not
properly before us. We, therefore, grant Sorber’s application to revoke Mayo’s in
forma pauperis status pursuant to Section 6602(f) of the PLRA, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6602(f),
vacate the trial court’s January 6, 2023 order dismissing Mayo’s complaint under
the same subsection and remand the matter to the trial court to permit Mayo the
opportunity to pay the requisite filings fees and costs. See Brown, 58 A.3d at 124-
25 (affirming the portion of the trial court’s order revoking the inmate’s in forma
pauperis status under Section 6602(f) of the PLRA, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6602(f), vacating
the trial court’s order insofar as it dismissed the inmate’s complaint under the same
provision and remanding the matter to the trial court to afford the inmate the
opportunity to pay filing fees and litigation costs); Lopez, 41 A.3d at 189-90
(same).14

       14
            Should Mayo pay the requisite filings fees and litigation costs, the trial court may
evaluate whether Mayo’s action is nevertheless vulnerable to dismissal under Section 6602(e)(2)
of the PLRA. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6602(e)(2) (providing that, “[n]otwithstanding any filing fee which
has been paid, the court shall dismiss prison conditions litigation at any time, including prior to
service on the defendant, if the court determines” that “[t]he prison conditions litigation is frivolous
or malicious or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or the defendant is entitled
to assert a valid affirmative defense, including immunity, which, if asserted, would preclude the
relief”); see also Konya v. Dist. Att’y of Northampton Cnty., 669 A.2d 890, 892 (Pa. 1995) (stating
that “[w]hether a court may disregard a litigant’s defective service of process or violation of its
order is vested within the sound discretion of that court”).
                                                  12
                                   IV. Conclusion
             For the foregoing reasons, we quash Mayo’s appeal from the November
23, 2022 interlocutory order of the trial court sustaining the preliminary objection,
grant Appellees’ application to revoke Mayo’s in forma pauperis status, vacate the
January 6, 2023 order of the trial court dismissing Mayo’s complaint and remand the
matter to the trial court to order the Prothonotary to compile a list of filing fees and
costs associated with this matter that Mayo is required to pay absent in forma
pauperis status. The Prothonotary of the trial court shall provide that information to
Mayo within 20 days of this Court’s order, and the trial court shall order Mayo to
pay those fees and costs within 60 days of his receipt of the information from the
Prothonotary.

                                          13
           IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

William Mayo,                               :
                             Appellant      :   CASES CONSOLIDATED
                                            :
               v.                           :
                                            :
John Doe, John Bager, John                  :   Nos. 1415 C.D. 2022
Garnett, John Martin, and                   :         122 C.D. 2023
Jamie Sorber                                :

PER CURIAM
                                         ORDER

               AND NOW, this 9th day of February, 2024, the appeal of William Mayo
(Mayo) from the November 23, 2022 order of the Court of Common Pleas of
Montgomery County (trial court) sustaining the preliminary objection filed by Jamie
Sorber on the basis of improper service and directing Mayo to effectuate service is
QUASHED.            The application to revoke Mayo’s in forma pauperis status is
GRANTED. The January 6, 2023 order of the trial court dismissing Mayo’s
complaint with prejudice is VACATED, and this matter is remanded to the trial court
to order the Prothonotary to compile a list of filing fees and costs associated with
this matter that Mayo is required to pay absent in forma pauperis status. The trial
court shall provide that information to Mayo within 20 days of this Court’s order
and shall order Mayo to pay those fees and costs within 60 days of his receipt of the
information from the Prothonotary. The Prothonotary of this Court shall forward
copies of this opinion and order to the trial court judge and the prothonotary of the
trial court.

               Jurisdiction relinquished.