Court Opinion

ID: 9737242
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:19:56.542601+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:57.556282
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice ZAPPALA,
concurring.
I join the majority opinion. As the author of Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Jepsen, 567 Pa. 459, 787 A.2d 420 (2002), I write separately only to further differentiate that case from the instant matter. The majority opinion aptly notes that Jepsen is distinguishable because the issue there was whether our Court has the authority to disbar a judicial officer, and not whether the Court of Judicial Discipline *500possessed such power. Another fundamental distinction, however, exists. The Judicial Conduct Board sought Jepsen’s removal from office pursuant to a constitutional mandate applicable to disbarred members of the bar, rather than pursuant to any inherent authority possessed by that constitutionally created entity. Thus, Jepsen is not controlling here, where the disbarment was imposed by the Court of Judicial Discipline for judicial misconduct.
To illustrate this point, the procedural posture of the two cases must be examined. In this case, the Judicial Conduct Board filed a complaint against the judicial officer. The Court of Judicial Discipline proceeded to examine the misconduct engaged in by the judicial officer and concluded that the appropriate sanction included disbarment. That did not occur in Jepsen. The Judicial Conduct Board did not file a complaint against Jepsen. Instead, the Judicial Conduct Board filed in our Court an application to implement automatic forfeiture of the judicial office pursuant to Article V, Section 18(d)(3) of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which states
A justice of the peace convicted of misbehavior in office by a court, disbarred as a member of the bar of the Supreme Court or removed under this section shall forfeit automatically his judicial office and thereafter be ineligible for judicial office.
Pa. Const. Art V, § 18(d)(3) (emphasis added).
It is evident that the Judicial Conduct Board in Jepsen did not examine the alleged misconduct of the judicial officer. It was proceeding solely on the ground that she had been disbarred on consent by this Court and therefore was required to automatically forfeit her judicial office. Thus, the factual paradigm did not include the present scenario where the Court of Judicial Discipline examined misconduct of the judicial officer pursuant to its constitutionally conferred authority and determined that the judicial officer should be disbarred. Under these circumstances, Jepsen can not be interpreted as authorizing the Court of Judicial Discipline to remove a judicial officer’s license to practice. As the majority opinion recognizes, that authority is exclusively vested in this Court.