Court Opinion

ID: 9792696
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:34:47.763582+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:44.716702
License: Public Domain

Judge TURSI
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority opinion which sets aside in part the final order of the Industrial Claims Appeals Panel.
Decisions of the Panel may be set aside only upon the following grounds; that it acted without or in excess of its powers; that the decision was procured by fraud; that the findings of fact do not support the decision; or that the decision is erroneous as a matter of law. See § 8-74-107(6), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 3B).
My review of the record leads me to agree with the Panel’s final order, in which it stated:
The hearing officer’s findings of fact are not contrary to the weight of the evidence in the record, so we must uphold them. See Federico v. Brannan Sand & Gravel Co., 788 P.2d 1268 (Colo.1990). Carpet Exchange is in the business of selling floor coverings, and it contracted with Cliff Akins and others to perform installation services for its customers. Installers obtain work by appearing at Carpet Exchange premises, where job assignments are offered each day. The hearing officer found that the installers sign agreements with Carpet Exchange which contain ‘specific instructions.’ Among other things, the agreements provide that installers must appear for jobs and not inconvenience customers; set forth timeliness requirements for performing repairs; require that installations be performed pursuant to diagrams provided by Carpet Exchange; set forth expectations for dress and requirements for the disposal of scraps; and prohibit children under the age of fourteen from being on the job site.
The hearing officer further found that Carpet Exchange generally establishes the amount that will be paid for installation work, although the amount may be subject to some negotiation. The hearing officer found that the customers pay Carpet Exchange for the services upon completion of the work, and that Carpet Exchange then pays the installers on the first and fifteenth day of each month. The hearing officer found that the installers generally identify themselves as working for Carpet Exchange, and that any complaints about the installation work are directed to Carpet Exchange, which then requires the installer to make repairs or corrections. Carpet Exchange guarantees the installation for one year, and the installers are required to pay a retainer fee, which may used by Carpet Exchange to offset the costs of any repairs or corrections. The hearing officer found that Carpet Exchange has the right to inspect the installation work, and has called customers in the past to determine if the installation was satisfactory.
The hearing officer further found that several of the installers use business names, but do not have separate business accounts and are paid in their own names. Many of the installers testified that they do not advertise their services, and that they perform all or substantially all of their installation services for Carpet Exchange.
Section 8 — 70—115(1)[, C.R.S. (1992 Cum. Supp.)] provides that service performed by an individual for another is deemed to be employment unless it is shown that the individual is free from control and direction in the performance of the service and that he is customarily engaged in an independent trade, occupation, profession, or business related to the service. The hearing officer concluded that the evidence failed to establish that either requirement was satisfied here, and we perceive no error in this determination.
*284In our view, the aforementioned findings and the evidence establish Carpet Exchange’s general right to control the performance of installation services, see Allen Company, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 762 P.2d 677 (Colo.1988), and support the hearing officer’s conclusion that the first requirement of the statute has not been satisfied....
Further, I agree with the Panel that findings supported the conclusion that the individuals involved were not customarily engaged in a related trade or business independent of their performance or service for Carpet Exchange and that, though some of the installers performed some installation work for others, it does not compel a determination that they were customarily engaged in an independent trade or business. See Locke v. Longacre, 772 P.2d 685 (Colo.App.1989).
Accordingly, since the Panel was not acting without or in excess of its authority, since its decision was not procured by fraud, and since there were findings of fact in support of its decision, I cannot conclude that the decision is erroneous as a matter of law. Therefore, I would affirm the order in its entirety.