Court Opinion

ID: 9955526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 17:14:22.407026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:04.166727
License: Public Domain

J-S43020-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
  ROBERTO LABOY                                :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :       No. 548 MDA 2023

              Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 10, 2023
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County
              Criminal Division at No(s): CP-38-CR-0000979-2006

BEFORE:      McLAUGHLIN, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                                 FILED MARCH 28, 2024

       Appellant, Roberto Laboy, appeals from the order entered in the

Lebanon County Court of Common Pleas, which denied as untimely his second

petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), at 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§

9541-9546. We affirm.

       This Court has previously set forth the relevant facts and procedural

history of this case as follows:

          On May 10, 2011, a jury found Appellant guilty of second-
          degree murder and related offenses. On July 27, 2011, the
          trial court sentenced him to a mandatory term of life
          imprisonment without the possibility of parole, and to a
          concurrent term of 10-20 years’ incarceration. During
          Appellant’s direct appeal from his judgment of sentence, this
          Court summarized the facts adduced at trial as follows:

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S43020-23

          In the early morning of January 21, 2006, Tina Garcia
          and her friend, David Kern, left a bar in Lebanon City
          as it closed for the evening. Shortly thereafter, Garcia
          noticed that two males, wearing parkas with fur
          hoods, had followed her and Kern into an alley.
          Ultimately, the two men accosted Garcia and Kern.
          Garcia heard one of the men asking Kern for his
          money.

          Kern and Garcia informed the men that they did not
          have any money and continued walking down the
          alley. The men pursued Garcia and Kern, and caught
          up to them near a garage. Kern told Garcia to get
          help as there was “gonna be a problem.” As she ran
          to knock on nearby doors, Garcia watched as the two
          men viciously beat Kern.      In particular, Garcia
          observed the taller of the males, whom she later
          identified as Appellant, punch Kern in the chest
          several times. Shortly thereafter, Kern slumped to
          the ground.

          The assailants promptly fled the scene of the attack.
          Garcia was able to summon the authorities, who
          arrived to find that Kern had died as a result of
          multiple stab wounds to his chest. After Garcia was
          shown a photo array and identified Appellant as an
          assailant, Appellant was arrested and charged with
          multiple crimes. Also charged was James Tee Hower
          as the second assailant.

          Shortly before the trial of his charges, Hower agreed
          to plead guilty to third[-]degree murder in exchange
          for his testimony at Appellant’s trial.

       Commonwealth v. Laboy, 60 A.3d 849, unpublished
       memorandum at 1-2 (Pa.Super. filed September 11,
       2012)[, appeal denied, 619 Pa. 701, 63 A.3d 1245 (2013)
       (“Laboy I”)].

       On direct appeal, Appellant argued, inter alia, that the
       Commonwealth violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,
       83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), by failing to disclose
       to the defense evidence of “a potential agreement between
       Garcia and prosecutors to provide Garcia a benefit during

                                   -2-
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        her sentencing on an unrelated crime in exchange for her
        testimony” against Appellant. [Laboy I, supra] at 5. This
        Court rejected that claim,1 as well as the other issues raised
        by Appellant. This Court then affirmed his judgment of
        sentence, and our Supreme Court ultimately denied further
        review [on March 14, 2013.] See [id.] Appellant filed his
        first PCRA petition on May 9, 2013. Following a hearing, the
        PCRA court denied the petition on November 20, 2014. This
        Court affirmed, and our Supreme Court denied further
        review. See Commonwealth v. Laboy, 134 A.3d 104
        (Pa.Super. 2015), appeal denied, 635 Pa. 741, 134 A.3d 55
        (2016) [(“Laboy II”)].

           1 In rejecting Appellant’s Brady claim, this Court
           reasoned that Appellant failed to offer any evidence of
           such an agreement, despite having had “the
           opportunity to call other witnesses to establish the
           existence of such an agreement.” Id.

        [Appellant filed his second pro se PCRA petition] on July 2,
        2018. The PCRA court conducted a hearing on November
        20, 2018, at which Garcia’s counsel (Andrew Morrow, Esq.)
        and the prosecutor (District Attorney David Arnold)2
        testified. The PCRA court subsequently denied the petition
        as untimely on April 24, 2019, at which time the court also
        issued an opinion explaining its reasoning.

           2 District Attorney Arnold prosecuted both Appellant’s

           murder trial and Garcia’s forgery charges. He agreed
           to dismiss Garcia’s forgery charges after Appellant
           was convicted.

        Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a timely, court-
        ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. …

Commonwealth v. Laboy, 230 A.3d 1134, 1136-37 (Pa.Super. 2020)

(“Laboy III”).

     On appeal from the denial of his second PCRA petition, this Court sua

sponte raised the PCRA court’s failure to appoint counsel for Appellant, or

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otherwise conduct a Grazier1 hearing, for purposes of the PCRA hearing held

on November 20, 2018. Thus, this Court vacated and remanded for further

proceedings. See Laboy III, supra.

       The PCRA court summarized the subsequent procedural history as

follows:

           We conducted a Grazier hearing on February 8, 2021. At
           the conclusion of the hearing, we issued an Order appointing
           PCRA counsel to represent [Appellant] in this matter. By
           Order of March 5, 2021, we granted [Appellant] the
           opportunity to file an amended PCRA Petition with the aid of
           counsel. After being informed that [Appellant] would not be
           filing an amended Petition, we scheduled another
           evidentiary hearing. After being continued, the hearing was
           conducted on August 8, 2022 with [Appellant] represented
           by counsel.

                                       *       *   *

           At the hearing, [Appellant] first called his trial attorney,
           Robert Daniels, Esquire. Daniels represented [Appellant]
           through his jury trial in May 2011. Daniels recalled that
           Garcia was a witness for the Commonwealth at the jury trial;
           however, he was unable to recall whether or not he knew of
           Garcia’s pending criminal charges. Daniels explained if
           there had been an agreement regarding Garcia’s testimony,
           he would have received that information from the District
           Attorney’s office. He would have looked at Garcia’s docket
           and would have asked her about the status of her charges
           on cross-examination. He acknowledged that he had not
           called Garcia’s attorney in her criminal matters to testify at
           [Appellant’s] jury trial and also recalled that he felt that his
           questioning of Garcia had been limited by the Court during
           the trial. On cross-examination, Daniels acknowledged
           Garcia’s importance as she was the sole eyewitness besides
____________________________________________

1 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 552 Pa. 9, 713 A.2d 81 (1998) (requiring on-

the-record determination of voluntariness of defendant’s waiver of right to
counsel during criminal proceedings).

                                           -4-
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       Hower. For this reason, he would have devoted a good
       amount of time to prepare for her cross-examination. He
       was unable to think of any questions he did not ask Garcia
       on cross-examination at the jury trial that he believed he
       should have asked.

       [Appellant] next called Andrew Morrow, Esquire, the
       attorney who was appointed to represent Garcia on her
       criminal charges in May of 2006 when he took the case over
       from Brian Deiderick, Esquire of the Public Defender’s Office.
       Morrow recalled that he filed approximately eight six-month
       continuances in Garcia’s case as she did not have a plea
       offer. Those Motions indicated that Garcia was a key
       witness for the Commonwealth in a homicide case. Morrow
       had no discussions with the District Attorney with regard to
       a plea offer for Garcia during that time, either formal or
       informal, and Morrow was not involved in any meetings
       between the District Attorney and Garcia in preparation for
       her testimony at [Appellant’s] trial. After the trial in this
       matter was over, the District Attorney contacted Morrow in
       June of 2011 and indicated that the Commonwealth would
       dismiss Garcia’s charges if she paid off the fines, costs, and
       restitution. That contact was the first time anyone from the
       District Attorney’s Office had proposed any resolution of
       Garcia’s case. After Garcia provided the funds to Morrow
       and those items were paid off, Morrow filed a Petition for
       Dismissal of Garcia’s charges pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 586.
       Morrow confirmed that he had not been subpoenaed for or
       called as a witness at [Appellant’s] jury trial.

       [Appellant] next called Robert McAteer, Esquire as a
       witness. McAteer was a former Assistant District Attorney
       and acted as co-counsel with District Attorney David Arnold
       at [Appellant’s] jury trial. Although he had no specific
       recollection of interviewing Garcia prior to [Appellant’s] trial,
       he believed that he would have met with her to prepare for
       her testimony. He did not know whether District Attorney
       Arnold had ever met with her.

       McAteer explained that during his tenure in the District
       Attorney’s Office, he would not have met with a witness who
       was cooperating in a case without his or her attorney being
       present if that witness had pending criminal charges.
       McAteer believed that he would have known if District

                                     -5-
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       Attorney Arnold had offered Garcia a negotiated plea
       agreement prior to [Appellant’s] trial. However, the District
       Attorney’s Office had a policy that negotiated pleas were not
       offered to witnesses prior to them providing testimony.
       McAteer was unaware that Garcia’s charges had been
       dismissed after [Appellant’s] jury trial.         On cross-
       examination, McAteer confirmed that he knew of his ethical
       obligation to disclose any agreement with Garcia to defense
       counsel prior to her providing testimony at [Appellant’s] jury
       trial. He further confirmed that if any offer had been
       extended to Garcia by himself or District Attorney Arnold, it
       would have been disclosed to [Appellant’s] trial counsel.

       [Appellant] next called Tina Louise Via, who formerly went
       by the name Tina Garcia, (“Garcia”) as a witness. Garcia
       explained that she was charged with felony forgery and
       misdemeanor theft in 2005 and that those charges were
       pending when she testified at [Appellant’s] trial. Prior to the
       trial [and before the murder at issue in Appellant’s case],
       she entered a guilty plea to her charges pursuant to a plea
       bargain that called for twenty-three months of probation,
       but she withdrew her guilty plea prior to sentencing. Shortly
       after she withdrew her guilty plea, the incident which
       resulted in the homicide charges against [Appellant]
       occurred.     Morrow was appointed to take over her
       representation on those charges after Kern’s homicide. She
       recalled that her case was continued multiple times, but
       could not remember the reason for the continuances. She
       did not have any agreement or understanding with the
       District Attorney regarding the disposition of her criminal
       charges prior to her testifying at [Appellant’s] jury trial. She
       spoke with her own attorney regarding her case, but did not
       discuss her pending charges with the District Attorney. She
       did meet with members of the District Attorney’s office and
       detectives two or three times prior to [Appellant’s] jury trial
       only to describe what happened in the incident which led to
       David Kern’s death. She could not recall Morrow being
       present at those meetings.

       Garcia explained that the charges against her were
       dismissed after she had paid her fines, but she did not have
       to serve any sentence involving incarceration, house arrest,
       probation or parole. She was never given any indication
       prior to giving her testimony at [Appellant’s] jury trial that

                                    -6-
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        her criminal charges would be dismissed.

        On cross-examination, Garcia confirmed that she had
        withdrawn her guilty plea several months prior to the
        homicide in this matter and that the withdrawal of her plea
        had nothing to do with this case. She was adamant that she
        testified truthfully at [Appellant’s] jury trial and that she was
        not promised anything prior to that trial by the District
        Attorney’s Office.

        At the conclusion of the hearing, both parties requested that
        we admit the transcript of the prior PCRA hearing in order
        to include the testimony of District Attorney David Arnold
        pursuant to Pa.R.E. 804 as Arnold had unfortunately passed
        away in the interim. We granted that request and the
        transcript from the November 20, 2018 PCRA hearing was
        admitted into evidence.

        In his testimony at the prior proceeding, District Attorney
        Arnold had acknowledged that he handled the prosecution
        of this case as well as the case involving Garcia’s forgery
        and theft charges. He explained that he was cognizant of
        his duty to disclose the existence of any agreement with
        Garcia to [Appellant] and his attorney and denied that any
        deal had been promised or made with Garcia prior to
        [Appellant’s] jury trial. He explained that the agreement for
        dismissal was only worked out after the trial was over.

        In his post-hearing Brief, [Appellant] claims that he was
        unaware of any information regarding Garcia’s plea
        agreement for twenty-three months’ probation on her
        forgery and theft charges or that the District Attorney
        intended to dismiss the charges once Garcia had provided
        her trial testimony. He alleges that it was incumbent upon
        the District Attorney to inform him that they intended to
        dismiss Garcia’s charges upon her cooperation in providing
        testimony and that this information was wrongfully withheld
        from him and his counsel. It is his contention that since
        these facts were unknown to him, his second PCRA Petition
        falls within the exceptions to the timeliness requirement of
        Section 9545(b)(1).

(PCRA Court Opinion, 3/10/23, at 6-12) (internal citations and footnotes

                                      -7-
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omitted).

      On March 10, 2023, the PCRA court denied relief. Appellant timely filed

a notice of appeal on Monday, April 10, 2023. On May 1, 2023, Appellant

voluntarily filed a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

      Appellant raises one issue for our review:

            Did the PCRA court err and/or abuse its discretion when it
            found Appellant’s PCRA petition to be untimely.

(Appellant’s Brief at 4).

      Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to disclose its intent to

dismiss the charges against Garcia following her testimony against Appellant

at trial.    Appellant claims that the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose a

potential agreement with Garcia deprived him of an opportunity to challenge

her credibility during cross-examination.          Appellant asserts that the

Commonwealth dismissed pending charges against Garcia only one month

after she testified at his trial, suggesting that the Commonwealth did so in

exchange for her testimony. Appellant emphasizes that it was the prosecutor

who had reached out to Garcia’s counsel and proposed dismissal of the

charges against her following Appellant’s trial. Appellant contends that the

fact that Garcia and her attorney may not have known about an intent to

dismiss charges did not absolve the Commonwealth from its obligation to

disclose the potential agreement to Appellant prior to trial.            Appellant

concludes that he satisfied the newly discovered facts exception to the PCRA

                                       -8-
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time-bar, and this Court must grant relief. We disagree.

      The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional requisite.

Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 148 A.3d 849 (Pa.Super. 2016).                  A PCRA

petition, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one

year of the date the underlying judgment of sentence becomes final.           42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence is final “at the conclusion of

direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the

United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of

time for seeking the review.”     42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).      The statutory

exceptions to the PCRA time-bar allow very limited circumstances to excuse

the late filing of a petition; a petitioner must also assert the exception within

the time allowed under the statute. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1) and (b)(2).

      To obtain merits review of a PCRA petition filed more than one year after

the judgment of sentence became final, the petitioner must allege and prove

at least one of the three timeliness exceptions:

         (i)      the failure to raise the claim previously was the
         result of interference by government officials with the
         presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or
         laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of
         the United States;

         (ii)     the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
         unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
         ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

         (iii)   the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
         recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or
         the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
         provided in this section and has been held by that court to

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         apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).

      This Court has explained:

         The timeliness exception set forth in Section 9545(b)(1)(ii),
         also known as the “newly-discovered fact” exception,
         requires a petitioner to plead and prove: (1) [he] did not
         know the fact(s) upon which [he] based [his] petition; and
         (2) [he] could not have learned those fact(s) earlier by the
         exercise of due diligence. Due diligence demands the
         petitioner to take reasonable steps to protect [his] own
         interests. … A petitioner must explain why [he] could not
         have learned the new fact earlier with the exercise of due
         diligence.

Commonwealth v. Shiloh, 170 A.3d 553, 557-58 (Pa.Super. 2017) (internal

citations and footnote omitted). Additionally, there is no longer a presumption

in Pennsylvania applicable to pro se incarcerated petitioners that information

of public record is not “unknown” for purposes of the Section 9545(b)(1)(i)

exception. Id. at 559. Nevertheless, “a pro se incarcerated petitioner is still

required to plead and prove the facts grounding [his] claim were unknown

to [him] and [he] could not have discovered those facts sooner with the

exercise of due diligence, which could require the court to evaluate [his]

reasonable access to public records.” Id. (emphasis in original).

      Instantly, the PCRA court evaluated Appellant’s claim as follows:

         [Appellant’s] judgment of sentence became final when the
         Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his Petition for
         Allowance of Appeal on March 14, 2013 and the ninety-day
         time period had elapsed for him to seek a writ of certiorari
         by the United States Supreme Court in June 2013. He had
         one year from that date to seek collateral relief.
         [Appellant’s] second, pro se Petition was not filed until July

                                      - 10 -
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       2, 2018, well over four years beyond the allowable time
       period. …

       Because the current Petition is facially untimely, we may
       address [Appellant’s] claims only if he is able to establish
       the applicability of one of the limited exceptions to the
       timeliness requirement. [Appellant] argues that this matter
       falls within the “newly discovered facts” exception of
       Subsection (b)(1)(ii).    In order to invoke the “newly
       discovered facts” exception, the court must determine
       whether the facts were unknown to the petitioner and, if so,
       whether the facts could have been ascertained in a timely
       manner through the exercise of due diligence, including an
       assessment of [Appellant’s] access to public records. …

                               *     *      *

       After a careful re-examination of the circumstances here,
       we believe that [Appellant] has failed to establish that his
       claims fall within the “newly discovered facts” exception of
       Section 9545(b)(1)(ii). …

                               *     *      *

       We remain convinced that [Appellant] was aware of the
       facts surrounding Garcia’s pending criminal charges and
       that he could have learned that her charges were dismissed
       prior to the expiration of the one-year period after his
       judgment of sentence became final had he attempted to do
       so.

                               *     *      *

       [T]he issue of a possible agreement between the
       Commonwealth and Garcia was identified at the jury trial
       and raised in [Appellant’s] Post-Sentence Motion and
       appeal. [Appellant] was represented by counsel on his Post-
       Sentence Motion, his appeal, and his first PCRA Petition.
       Since his suspicions had already been aroused, he should
       have requested counsel to conduct further investigation of
       the outcome of Garcia’s criminal case within one year of the
       time his judgment of sentence became final.

                               *     *      *

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          In our Opinion of April 24, 2019, we explained that we found
          [Appellant’s] present PCRA Petition to be untimely. The
          transcript of the jury trial reveals that trial counsel was well
          aware of Garcia’s pending charges and that he spent
          considerable time and effort during her cross-examination
          questioning her about those charges and any potential plea
          offer related to her testimony in the action against
          [Appellant]. We pointed out that information regarding the
          dismissal of Garcia’s charges was available at the time of
          [Appellant’s] Post Sentence Motion, his direct appeal, and
          his first PCRA Petition and that [Appellant] was represented
          by counsel throughout all of those proceedings. Since the
          resolution of Garcia’s criminal matter was a major issue in
          her cross-examination about which she was questioned at
          length, [Appellant] had reason to follow up with his counsel
          on the outcome of her charges. He obviously failed to do so
          and has failed to explain why no attempt to obtain this
          information was made in a timely manner. Based on these
          facts, we believe [Appellant] could have learned of the
          dismissal of Garcia’s charges in a timely manner through the
          exercise of due diligence.           Thus, we confirm that
          [Appellant’s] Petition is untimely and must be dismissed as
          we are without jurisdiction to rule on his claims.

(PCRA Court Opinion at 15-20) (internal citations and footnote omitted).

       We agree with the court’s jurisdictional analysis. At the outset, we note

that Appellant does not specify when he learned of the alleged new fact at

issue, namely the dismissal of Garcia’s charges, which occurred on June 30,

2011. This defect is critical because we cannot determine if Appellant filed his

petition within the requisite timeframe for asserting an exception to the time-

bar.   See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).2             Further, as the PCRA court noted,

____________________________________________

2 Appellant filed his second PCRA petition on July 2, 2018.
                                                        At that time, the
PCRA mandated that any petition invoking an exception to the time-bar be
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Appellant makes no attempt to explain why he could not have learned about

the dismissal of Garcia’s charges sooner with the exercise of due diligence.

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii); Shiloh, supra.           Given Appellant’s

knowledge that Garcia had pending criminal charges at the time she testified

against Appellant and defense counsel’s inquiry regarding the existence of a

plea deal at trial, we agree with the PCRA court that Appellant could have

inquired about disposition of Garcia’s charges long before he filed the current

PCRA petition in July 2018. See id. Therefore, Appellant’s current petition

remains time barred. Accordingly, we affirm.

       Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 03/28/2024

____________________________________________

filed within 60 days of when the claim could have been presented. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2) (effective until Dec. 23, 2018). Effective December
24, 2018, while Appellant’s petition was pending, this statute was amended
to enlarge the time to present a claimed exception from 60 days to one year,
for claims arising on December 24, 2017 or thereafter. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9545(b)(2) (effective Dec. 24, 2018). Regardless of which version applies
here, Appellant did not indicate when he discovered that Garcia’s charges were
dismissed, so we cannot confirm whether Appellant complied with this
subsection of the PCRA.

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