Court Opinion

ID: 9720630
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:37:57.275952+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:20.173703
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, J.
I respectfully dissent.
The following facts are undisputed. This case was not brought to trial within three years after the remittitur was filed because the superior court clerk lost plaintiff’s at-issue memorandum and, therefore, never processed the case toward trial. Plaintiff monitored the trial setting process in this case and, when he did not receive notice of a trial setting conference nine months after filing the at-issue memorandum, he questioned the court clerk about the status of the case. It was that inquiry which revealed the at-issue memorandum had been lost. If the at-issue memorandum had not been lost, the case would have been set for trial in the early summer of 1988, well within the three-year limit based on the finding the remittitur was filed on September 9, 1985.
Despite this evidence of impossibility and reasonable if not perfect diligence, I was about to sign the majority opinion denying appellant relief from the mandatory three-year dismissal rule. Then I reread for perhaps the 30th or 40th time the stock language acknowledging the statutory preference for the policy of trying a plaintiff’s claim “on the merits” over the *997policy of denying the plaintiff a trial because of insufficient diligence in the prosecution of the claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 583.130.) Almost always, as here, this acknowledgement is followed by a finding that somehow the disfavored policy overrides the favored policy in the particular case because of the plaintiff’s lack of diligence. I hasten to confess I have authored opinions in the past which followed this very pattern and have concurred in many others which did the same. Nevertheless, something in the instant case awakened a concern that this court and other appellate courts have only been paying lip service to the Legislature’s clearly stated policy on behalf of the people of California that a trial on the merits is preferred over dismissal for lack of diligent prosecution. For this reason, I decided it would be worthwhile to take another look at the history and authority behind this policy.
When a defendant seeks dismissal of the plaintiff’s suit for lack of prosecution two important, conflicting legal policies collide. On one hand, “a defendant is entitled to the weight of the policy underlying the dismissal statute, which seeks to prevent unreasonable delays in litigation. . . .” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566 [86 Cal.Rptr. 65, 468 P.2d 193].) On the other hand, the plaintiff is entitled to the weight of the policy “which seeks to dispose of litigation on the merits rather than on procedural grounds.” (Ibid.) For most of this century the right to choose which policy would take precedence belonged to the courts. As a result, each policy held sway for a time.
“From around 1900 until the 1920’s the dismissal statutes were strictly enforced. Between the 1920’s and the 1960’s there was a process of liberalization of the statutes to create exceptions and excuses. Beginning in the late 1960’s the courts were strict in requiring dismissal. ... In 1970 the courts brought an abrupt halt to strict construction of dismissal statutes and began an era of liberal allowance of excuses . . . .” (Revised Recommendation Relating to Dismissal for Lack of Prosecution (June 1983) 17 Cal.Law Revision Com. Rep. (1984) pp. 910-911.) (Fns. omitted; hereafter cited as (LRC).)
In 1984, the Legislature took this policy choice away from the courts and decided “the policy favoring trial . . . of an action on the merits [is] generally to be preferred over the policy that requires dismissal for failure to proceed with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of an action . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 583.1301, added by Stats. 1984, ch. 1705, § 5.) Judging from recent opinions, however, trial and appellate courts have not gotten the message the debate is over, the question is decided. They have unilater*998ally swung the pendulum back to the era of strict enforcement of the dismissal statutes. Many courts seem to assume section 583.130 is just an empty platitude designed to placate trial lawyers or that the exigencies caused by overcrowded court dockets justify mere lip service to the statute before they dismiss the action. Both assumptions are wrong.
The legislative history of section 583.130 demonstrates the Legislature was fully aware of the judicial record in applying the dismissal statutes, knew it was being asked to make a policy choice and deliberately included its policy choice favoring trial over dismissal when it revised the dismissal statutes in 1984.
The Legislature repealed the statutes governing dismissal for lack of prosecution in 1984 and replaced them with a new set of statutes whose purpose was “to clarify ambiguities in the law, to bring the statutes into conformity with case law interpreting them, and to reconcile discrepancies in the statutes and cases.” (Sen. Com. Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1366, p. 2.) The genesis of the revised dismissal law was the proposed legislation drafted by the California Law Revision Commission. (LRC at pp. 920-940.) In its recommendations published June 1983, the commission noted, “The [existing] statutes do not accurately state the exceptions, excuses, and existence of court discretion. The interrelation of the statutes is confusing. The state of the law is generally unsatisfactory, requiring frequent appellate decisions for clarification.” (LRC at p. 910.) The commission undertook to rewrite the law on dismissal for failure to prosecute to remedy the defects it found in the existing statutory scheme. (Ibid.) The commission’s proposal was introduced as Senate Bill No. 1366 by Senator Keene, Chair of the Senate Committee on Judiciary. Senate Bill No. 1366 tracked the commission’s proposed legislation and was enacted with little change.
One innovation recommended by the commission was a statement of legislative policy on the subject of dismissal for lack of prosecution. The commission found a need for such a policy statement because: “Fluctuations in basic procedural policy are undesirable. Every policy shift generates additional litigation to establish the bounds of the law. The policy of the state towards dismissal for lack of prosecution should be fixed and codified, and the dismissal statutes should be construed consistently with this policy. ” (LRC at p. 911, italics added.) In support of its recommendation for a fixed and codified policy, the commission cited the fluctuations in the courts’ attitudes toward the policy of dismissal for lack of prosecution versus the policy of trials on the merits. (See discussion, ante, p. 997.)
Having explained the need for a consistent policy, the commission recommended a policy that favored trial on the merits over dismissal on procedural grounds.
*999“The Law Revision Commission believes that the current preference for trial on the merits over dismissal on procedural grounds is sound and should be preserved by statute. The proposed legislation contains a statement of this basic public policy.” (LRC at p. 911.)
The commission’s statement of policy, with minor change, became section 583.130 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In its comment accompanying proposed section 583.130 the commission noted, “Section 583.130 is new. It is consistent with statements in the cases of the preference for trial on the merits. See, e.g., [Hocharian v. Superior Court (1981) 28 Cal.3d 714, 621 P.2d 829, 170 Cal.Rptr. 790 . .; General Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 449, 541 P.2d 289, 124 Cal.Rptr. 745 . . ; Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 468 P.2d 193, 86 Cal.Rptr. 65 . .; Weeks v. Roberts (1968) 68 Cal.2d 802, 442 P.2d 361, 69 Cal.Rptr. 305. . . .”] (LRC at p. 929, italics added.)
The report on Senate Bill No. 1366 prepared for the Senate Judiciary Committee also made clear the legislation would put the state on record as favoring trials on the merits over dismissals for failure to prosecute.
“This bill would state the public policy in favor of reasonable diligence in prosecution of an action, but would also assert that the policy favoring disposition on the merits is to be preferred over dismissal on procedural grounds.” (Sen. Com. Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1366, supra, at p. 3.) A similar analysis was prepared for the Assembly Judiciary Committee.
“[T]his bill would declare that it is the policy of this state that a plaintiff must proceed with reasonable diligence but that all parties must cooperate in bringing an action to trial and also that the policy favoring trial or disposition of an action on its merits is preferred over dismissing an action for failure to proceed with reasonable diligence in prosecution of an action.” (Assem. Com. Rep. on Senate Bill No. 1366, p. 2.)
Clearly, the statement that California, as a matter of public policy, favors a trial on the merits over dismissal for failure to prosecute with reasonable diligence is not a mere platitude or just boilerplate language to be included in appellate court opinions. Judicial opinions scoffing at the policy favoring trial on the merits as a “trite truism” no longer reflect the will of the people, if they ever did. (See e.g., Dunsmuir Masonic Temple v. Superior Court (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 17, 22 [90 Cal.Rptr. 405].) On the contrary, as the legislative history amply shows, the lawmakers were fully aware they were making a policy choice binding on the state courts favoring trial on the merits over dismissals for lack of prosecution. This policy choice was made clear in the committee reports on the bill. Furthermore, it is well-recognized *1000that when legislation is adopted substantially without change from the Law Revision Commission’s proposal the commission’s report reflects the Legislature’s intent. (Kizer v. Hanna (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1, 12 [255 Cal.Rptr. 412, 767 P.2d 679]; and see Sierra Nevada Memorial-Miners Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 464, 469 [266 Cal.Rptr. 50] (adopting commission comment on § 583.340, another provision of Sen. Bill No. 1366.)
Why then has it proved so difficult to convince courts section 583.130 means what it says? It may be because we are so caught up in the problem of trial court delay and attempts to reduce it, such as the so-called “Fast Track” program, the chance to strike a case from the docket is almost irresistible. Indeed I fully sympathize with the typical ’’Fast Track” judge and his or her case docket of up to a thousand cases as well as with the judges and administrators facing the overwhelming caseloads the rest of the court system is asked to bear.2 But, the minute we allow our decisions to be controlled by statistics instead of statutes we abandon our role as judges and become bureaucrats in black robes.3 Justice Black could have been writing about California’s Fast Track program when he wrote this dissent in Link v. Wabash Railroad Co. (1962) 370 U.S. 626, 648-649 [8 L.Ed.2d 734, 748, 82 S.Ct. 1386]: “The Court seems to find some reason for holding that this plaintiff can be penalized without notice because of a program certain courts have adopted to end congestion on their dockets by setting down long-pending cases for trial. It is of course desirable that the congestion on court dockets be reduced in every way possible consistent with the fair administration of justice. But that laudable objective should not be sought in a way which undercuts the very purposes for which courts were created—that is, to try cases on their merits and render judgments in accordance with the substantial rights of the parties. Where a case has so little merit that it is not being prosecuted, a trial court can of course properly dispose of it under fair constitutional procedures. . . . When we allow the desire to reduce court congestion to justify the sacrifice of substantial rights of the *1001litigants in cases like this, we attempt to promote speed in administration, which is desirable, at the expense of justice, which is indispensable to any court system worthy of its name.”
What is it about this particular case that caused me to recoil from concurring in yet another dismissal and to seek an understanding of the statutory preference embodied in section 583.130? In one sense, it was for the very reason this case is so typical of the dismissals we have been upholding in recent years. It was the final straw. Yet, in another sense, this case piqued my interest because it dramatically illustrates just how far we have come in swinging the pendulum toward strict enforcement of the dismissal statutes.
The majority begins its discussion by treating this appeal as a review of trial court discretion. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 990-991.) It is not. Plaintiff’s action was dismissed under the mandatory dismissal provisions of sections 583.320, subdivision (a)(3) and 583.360, subdivision (a), not under the discretionary dismissal provision of section 583.420, subdivision (a)(3)(c). Therefore, the question is whether the time period for bringing the action to trial should have been tolled for impossibility, impracticability, or futility. Accordingly, the standard for review of trial court discretion is inapplicable. (See Gray v. Firthe (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 202, 210-211 [239 Cal.Rptr. 389].)
It is true, as the majority opinion points out, Mesler moved to specially set the case for trial and such motions are committed to the discretion of the trial court. (Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 342, 345-346 [228 Cal.Rptr. 504, 721 P.2d 590].) But the majority opinion ignores the fact that if the court clerk had not lost Mesler’s at-issue memorandum the case would have been set for trial within the three-year period and there would have been no need for a special setting. Furthermore, court congestion, the ground cited by the majority as justifying denial of the motion to specially set, is not a valid reason for denying plaintiff his day in court. (Weeks v. Roberts (1968) 68 Cal.2d 802, 807 [69 Cal.Rptr. 305, 442 P.2d 361]; Biondi, Fleming & Gonzales v. Braham (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 842 [267 Cal.Rptr. 365].)
Mesler is correct in his contention it was impossible for him to bring his action to trial within the three-year period because the court clerk lost his at-issue memorandum and never put the case into the calendaring system. The undisputed evidence shows Mesler filed an at-issue memorandum in October 1987; the at-issue memorandum was lost by the clerk’s office; but, “had the [at-issue memorandum] not been lost or mis-filed by this Court, the plaintiff would have had a Trial Setting Conference and a Trial Date as *1002early as the early summer, 1988,” well within the three-year period even using September 5, 1985, as the filing date of the remittitur.
The majority not only ignores this undisputed evidence of impossibility, it criticizes Mesler for pointing the finger of blame at the clerk’s office. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 993.) According to the majority, the error by the clerk’s office must be disregarded because in August 1986 Mesler took off calendar a motion to reinstate an earlier at-issue memorandum and allowed a year and a month to elapse “before filing his current motion to reinstate his ‘lost’ at-issue memorandum.” (Ibid.) Instead of viewing the “total picture” (Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra, 42 Cal.3d 342, 346), the majority is nitpicking. The facts show defendant did not answer Mesler’s amended complaint until October 20, 1987. The very next day Mesler refiled his at-issue memorandum.
Mesler acted diligently under the circumstances in filing his at-issue memorandum the day after defendant filed an answer to the amended complaint and in following up on that at-issue memorandum. When he had not received notice of a status conference by July 1988, nine months after he filed his at-issue memorandum, he contacted the court clerk to find out the status of the case and, at that time, discovered the at-issue memorandum had been lost. Even before that, on July 29, 1988, Mesler moved to specially set the case for trial. Given the trial setting practices of the Los Angeles Superior Court, waiting nine months before inquiring about a status conference was not unreasonable. (Cf. Nail v. Osterholm (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 682, 687-688 [91 Cal.Rptr. 908] [failure to make inquiry for 11 months not unreasonable in Stanislaus County 20 years ago].)
This is not to say Mesler’s lawyer displayed perfect diligence. In hindsight, it is always possible to identify some step a plaintiff could have taken which he did not take which might have allowed him to get to trial earlier. Indeed I doubt there are very many cases prosecuted in the Los Angeles trial courts where the lawyers are perfectly diligent at every stage of the proceedings—and that includes those which reach trial in a timely fashion.
But perfect diligence is not the standard. In fact, the degree of diligence required is the variable most affected by the statutory preference for trials on the merits. Because of that statutory preference the degree of diligence which is to be found reasonable and sufficient is less than what would be required were there no such preference. Otherwise the statutory preference would have no practical effect. The Legislature clearly intended to adopt a policy which would insure a higher percentage of cases were tried on the merits. The only way that happens is if judges apply a more lenient standard of diligence in considering dismissal motions.
*1003By any reasonable standard of diligence, Mesler’s behavior during this litigation justified relief from the dismissal statute. Indeed any lack of diligence on his part pales by comparison with the lack of diligence demonstrated by the clerk’s office in losing his “at-issue” memorandum. This is one of those “there but for the grace of God go I” kind of cases. The only difference between Mesler and thousands of other plaintiffs who did manage to get to trial in recent years is not that these others were more diligent. The explanation is that in these cases the clerk’s office did not lose the plaintiffs’ at-issue memoranda.
I submit it is not just plaintiffs—or the parties in general—who have a stake in allowing disputes to be resolved on the merits. The courts and our entire system of justice share that stake. And when the courts—after all, clerk’s offices are part of the courts—foul up, they should not shift the blame and the cost to the parties.
Viewing the total picture of this case in light of the policy favoring trial on the merits over dismissal for failure to proceed with reasonable diligence, it was error to dismiss this action. Today’s decision may satisfy the trial court’s need to clear its docket; it does not satisfy society’s need for justice.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied July 11, 1990. Mosk, J., and Broussard, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

 Unless otherwise indicated all future references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

 The monthly workload summary of the Los Angeles County Superior Court shows an average of 700 Fast Track cases per judge as of April 1, 1990.

 Professor Judith Resnik, a noted authority on trial court procedure, has warned that “in the rush to conquer the mountain of work,” the “managerial movement” in the courts “may be teaching judges to value their statistics, such as the number of case dispositions, more than they value the quality of their dispositions.” (Resnik, Managerial Judges (1982) 96 Harv. L.Rev. 376, 380.) “[T]he claim that ‘the more dispositions the better,’ raises difficult valuation tasks; decisionmaking must be assessed not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively." (Id. at p. 422.) Professor Resnik has expressed concern over the development of a “ ‘bureaucratic’ judiciary” (id. at p. 437), noting “the rhetoric of judging has shifted from discussions of the difficulties of adjudication to the need to increase case dispositions. . . . The volume of case dispositions (rather than the substantive law in general, the merits of a particular case, improved techniques for factfinding) has become the be-all and end-all. . . .” (Resnik, Failing Faith; Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline (1986) 53 U. Chi. L.Rev. 494, 534-535.)