Court Opinion

ID: 9774726
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:31:50.394367+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:14.544145
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION
BY ALLEN, J.:
For the reasons that follow, I respectfully dissent.
Here, Paradise Distributing, Inc. (“Paradise”) sent over one million “blast faxes” to various recipients. In a class action lawsuit, the plaintiffs alleged that Paradise’s conduct violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227. This federal law grants citizens a privacy right to be free from unsolicited faxes. Park Univ. Enters., Inc. v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 442 F.3d 1239, 1249 (10th Cir.2006).
Brethren Mutual Insurance Company (“Brethren”) issued insurance policies to Paradise. These policies covered Paradise for liability that it incurred in connection with “oral or written publication of material that violates a person’s right of privacy.” Appendix A at 3.
As noted by the Majority, the jurisdictions are split as to whether an unsolicited advertisement falls within this particular “advertising injury” clause. Maj. Op. at 335-36.
Unlike the Majority, I am persuaded by those cases that have found in favor of coverage. See, e.g., Penzer v. Transp. Ins. Co., 29 So.3d 1000 (Fla.2010) (collecting cases). Like the Florida Supreme Court in Penzer, I believe that a plain meaning analysis compels this result:
Here, the policy language at issue is, “oral or written publication of material that violates a person’s right of privacy.” Three terms — “publication,” “material,” and “right of privacy” — are particularly relevant, and none are defined by the *338policy. Consequently, the first step towards discerning the plain meaning of the phrase is to consult references that are commonly relied upon to supply the accepted meaning of the words.
The first term, “publication” is defined as “communication (as of news or information) to the public: public announcement” or as “the act or process of issuing copies (as a book, photograph, or musical score) for general distribution to the public.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1836 (1981). The definition also refers the reader to the definition of “publish.” Id. To publish is “to place before the public (as through a mass medium): DISSEMINATE.” Id. at 1837. Here, sending 24,000 unsolicited blast-facsimile advertisements to Mr. Penzer and others is included in the broad definition of “publication” because it constitutes a communication of information disseminated to the public and it is “the act or process of issuing copies ... for general distribution to the public.”
“Material” has several definitions, two of which are “of, relating to, or consisting of matter,” and “something (as data, observations, perceptions, ideas) that may through intellectual operation be synthesized or further elaborated or otherwise reworked into a more finished form or a new form or that may serve as the basis for arriving at fresh interpretations or judgments or conclusions.” Id. at 1392. In this case, the faxed paper containing the unwanted advertisement meets the definition of “material” since a faxed advertisement “consist[s] of matter,” and “something that may ... be synthesized or further elaborated or ... may serve as the basis for arriving at fresh interpretations or judgments or conclusions.”
A “right” is “something to which one has a just claim” or “something that justly accrues or falls to one: something that one may properly claim: one’s due.” Id. at 1955. This plain meaning of “right” invokes the legal authority one must possess in order to assert a proper claim.
Because the policy provides coverage for a violation of a “right of privacy,” which can only arise from the law, it is not necessary to separately discern the plain meaning of “privacy.” If “privacy” was not preceded by “right of’ then the dictionary definition of “privacy” would be relevant under a plain meaning analysis. Stated another way, the plain meaning of “right of privacy” is the legal claim one may make for privacy, which is to be gleaned from federal or Florida law, rather than defined by a dictionary. In this case, the source of the right of privacy is the TCPA, which provides the privacy right to seclusion.
As stated previously, the policy provision provides coverage for a written publication of material that violates a person’s right of privacy. The facts of the instant case demonstrate that there was a written dissemination of 24,000 facsimiles that violated the TCPA. Comparing the policy’s language to [the facts of this case]: there was a written publication [dissemination] of material [of 24,-000 facsimiles] that violated a person’s right of privacy [that violated the TCPA]. Therefore, applying our plain meaning analysis, we hold that Transportation’s insurance policy provides coverage for sending unsolicited fax advertisements in violation of the TCPA.
Id. at 1005-07 (some citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Therefore, given the plain language of the advertising injury clause, I conclude that Brethren had a duty to defend the underlying action.
*339Alternatively, in my view, the varying interpretations endorsed by the courts supports the conclusion that the language at issue is ambiguous, being susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. As the Supreme Court of Massachusetts pronounced:
Although we are aware that an insurance policy is not ambiguous merely because two conflicting interpretations of it are suggested by the litigants, in evaluating the ambiguity of the phrase, we cannot ignore the body of national case law addressing the same or similar policy language and falling on both sides of this interpretive ledger. It is fair to say that even the most sophisticated and informed insurance consumer would be confused as to the boundaries of advertising injury coverage in light of the deep difference of opinion symbolized in these cases.
Terra Nova Ins. Co. v. Fray-Witzer, 449 Mass. 406, 869 N.E.2d 565, 578 (2007) (citation and footnote omitted); accord Penzer, 29 So.3d at 1008-09 (Pariente, J. concurring, joined by Canday, J.) (“The insurer in this case has contended that the wording of the policy provides coverage for situations where the content of the material — and not the act of sending it — violates a person’s right of privacy. While that is one reasonable interpretation of the policy, it is not the only reasonable interpretation.”); see Valley Forge Insurance Co. v. Swiderski Electronics, Inc., 223 Ill.2d 352, 307 Ill.Dec. 653, 860 N.E.2d 307, 317 (2006) (discussing definitions from Black’s Law Dictionary) (“These definitions confirm that ‘right of privacy1 connotes both an interest in seclusion and an interest in the secrecy of personal information.”) (emphasis supplied).
Therefore, at the very least, the advertising injury clause in this case is ambiguous. As a result, the contractual provision must be construed against Brethren, the drafter of the agreement, and coverage must be provided for the insured, Paradise. Mitsock v. Erie Ins. Exch., 909 A.2d 828, 831 (Pa.Super.2006) (“Where a provision of a policy is ambiguous, the policy provision is to be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer, the drafter of the agreement.”).
For the above-stated reasons, I dissent from the Majority’s conclusion that Brethren did not have a duty to defend Paradise in the underlying action. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s order and would remand for further proceedings.