Court Opinion

ID: 9913306
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-27 17:03:15.86086+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:08:30.537456
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                 Dec 27 2023, 8:59 am

                                                                                     CLERK
                                                                                 Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                    Court of Appeals
                                                                                      and Tax Court

      ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
      Timothy F. Devereux                                       Angela J. Della Rocco
      Wagner Reese, LLP                                         Amy K. Fisher
      Carmel, Indiana                                           McCarter & English, LLP
                                                                Carmel, Indiana

                                                  IN THE
          COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

      Kiera Isgrig,                                             December 27, 2023
      Appellant-Plaintiff,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                                23A-CT-1332
              v.                                                Appeal from the Monroe Circuit
                                                                Court
      Trustees of Indiana University,                           The Honorable Geoffrey J.
      Appellees-Defendants.                                     Bradley, Judge
                                                                Trial Court Cause No.
                                                                53C01-2004-CT-723

                                        Opinion by Judge Tavitas
                                      Judges Pyle and Foley concur.

      Tavitas, Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   Kiera Isgrig was studying in a building at Indiana University Bloomington

      when a window fell out of the wall, striking and injuring her. Isgrig filed a

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1332 | December 27, 2023                      Page 1 of 16
      negligence claim against Indiana University and the Trustees of Indiana

      University (collectively “the University”) 1 based on the theory of res ipsa

      loquitur. The University moved for summary judgment, which the trial court

      granted. Isgrig appeals and argues that the trial court erred by concluding as a

      matter of law that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable to the facts

      here. We agree and, accordingly, reverse and remand.

      Issues
[2]   Isgrig presents one issue for our review, which we restate as whether the trial

      court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of the University based

      on its conclusion that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable to Isgrig’s

      negligence claim.

      Facts
[3]   The facts here are relatively undisputed. On April 28, 2018, Isgrig was a

      student at the University and studying for final exams with her friends in Room

      138 of Francis Morgan Swain Hall (“Swain Hall”)—a building on the

      Bloomington campus. Isgrig sat at a table with her friends with her back to the

      wall. Mounted in the wall was an exterior window. As Isgrig sat with her

      1
        Isgrig’s complaint named both Indiana University and the Trustees of Indiana University as defendants.
      The trial court subsequently granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss Indiana University as a defendant.
      See Ind. Code § 21-27-4-2 (providing that the Board of Trustees of Indiana University may sue and be sued);
      see also Clemons v. Trustees of Indiana Univ., 2020 WL 2039752, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 28, 2020) (noting that,
      although defendant named “Indianapolis [sic] University Law School” as a defendant, the proper suable
      entity was the “Trustees of Indiana University.”). Thus, only the Trustees of Indiana University remain as
      defendants.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1332 | December 27, 2023                               Page 2 of 16
      friends, the window fell out of the wall and landed on Isgrig’s head. The glass

      in the window shattered, leaving glass shards over Isgrig and the table at which

      she was sitting. No one in Isgrig’s group of friends tampered with the window

      before it fell. Isgrig’s friends pulled the heavy window off Isgrig, and Isgrig

      went to the restroom to attempt to clean herself off. Isgrig’s friends, however,

      soon drove her to the emergency room.

[4]   The window, after it had fallen, and the area in which Isgrig had been sitting

      were captured in the following photo:

      Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 99.

[5]   After the window fell, Kevin Ashley, a carpenter employed by the University,

      was dispatched to the room. Ashley noted that the window had a metal frame

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1332 | December 27, 2023     Page 3 of 16
      with adjustable blinds between two glass panes. When in its casing, the bottom

      panel of the window could be raised vertically to partially open the window.

      Ashley noted that two of the window’s four sash springs were broken, but he

      also later explained that broken sash springs should not cause a window to fall

      out of its casing with no warning. Ashley found no other damage to the

      window that would explain why it came out of its casing, absent human

      involvement at some point previously.

[6]   Further investigation revealed that the University conducted only reactive

      maintenance on its windows and did not perform any preventive maintenance.

      That is, windows are not serviced unless a work order regarding a problem with

      the window was submitted. The last time the University had repaired the

      window in question was in March 2017 in response to a work order stating that

      the blinds would not raise. Repairing the blinds would have required the

      maintenance staff to remove the window from its casing, at which time any

      other faults, such as broken sash springs, would have been repaired.

[7]   On April 23, 2020, Isgrig filed a complaint against the University alleging

      negligence and relying on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The University filed

      its answer on May 20, 2020. On June 27, 2022, the University moved for

      summary judgment along with its designated evidence in support of its motion.

      The University argued that it had neither actual nor constructive knowledge

      regarding any issue with the window, that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not

      relieve Isgrig of proving that the University had either actual or constructive

      knowledge of an issue with the window, and that the University did not have

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1332 | December 27, 2023     Page 4 of 16
      exclusive control of the window, thereby rendering res ipsa loquitur inapplicable.

      After successfully seeking an extension of time, Isgrig filed a reply to the

      University’s motion for summary judgment on January 19, 2023, along with

      her designated evidence in opposition to summary judgment. Isgrig argued that

      the window was under the exclusive control or management of the University

      and that, under the facts of this case, res ipsa loquitur allows an inference of

      negligence on the part of the University.

[8]   The trial court held a summary judgment hearing on April 14, 2023, and, on

      May 24, 2023, entered an order granting the University’s motion for summary

      judgment. Isgrig now appeals.

      Discussion and Decision
[9]   On appeal, Isgrig argues that the trial court erred by granting summary

      judgment in favor of the University because the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur

      applies to fixtures in premises liability cases and that, given the broad definition

      of “exclusive control,” there is at least a genuine issue of material fact as to

      whether the window was under the exclusive control and management of the

      University at the time it fell on Isgrig. The University responds that the trial

      court properly granted summary judgment in its favor because: (1) Isgrig cannot

      make a prima facie case of negligence under a premises liability standard, (2) res

      ipsa loquitur cannot apply if a plaintiff cannot also establish the elements of

      premises liability, and (3) res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable under the facts of the

      present case.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1332 | December 27, 2023        Page 5 of 16
       A. Standard of Review

[10]   When this Court reviews a grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment,

       we stand in the shoes of the trial court. Serbon v. City of E. Chicago, 194 N.E.3d

       84, 91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing Minser v. DeKalb Cnty. Plan Comm’n, 170

       N.E.3d 1093, 1098 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)). “Summary judgment is appropriate

       only ‘if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as

       to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

       matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Minser, 170 N.E.3d at 1098; citing Ind. Trial Rule

       56(C)). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of making a

       prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is

       entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. (citing Minser, 170 N.E.3d at 1098).

       Only if the moving party meets this prima facie burden does the burden then

       shift to the nonmoving party to show the existence of a genuine issue of

       material fact. Id. (citing Minser, 170 N.E.3d at 1098).

       B. Premises Liability and Res Ipsa Loquitur

[11]   In general, to prevail on a claim of negligence, the plaintiff must show: (1) a

       duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant; (2) a breach of duty by allowing

       conduct to fall below the applicable standard of care; and (3) compensable

       injury proximately caused by the defendant’s breach of duty. Goodwin v.

       Yeakle’s Sports Bar and Grill, Inc., 62 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2016). Isgrig seeks to

       demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact by applying the doctrine of res ipsa

       loquitur to provide an inference that the University breached its duty and was

       negligent. The University, however, argues that res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1332 | December 27, 2023      Page 6 of 16
       unless a plaintiff also establishes that a defendant would be liable under a

       theory of premises liability. Accordingly, we must analyze the intersection of

       the doctrines of res ipsa loquitur and premises liability.

       1. Premises Liability

[12]   In Burrell v. Meads, 569 N.E.2d 637 (Ind. 1991), our Supreme Court adopted the

       following language from the Restatement (Second) of Torts regarding the

       liability of a premises owner when an invitee is injured by a condition on the

       premises owner’s property:

               A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused
               to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he

                    (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover
                    the condition, and should realize that it involves an
                    unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and

                    (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the
                    danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and

                    (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the
                    danger.

       Id. at 639-40 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (1965)).

       2. Res Ipsa Loquitur

[13]   As for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, our Supreme Court has summarized the

       law as follows:

               Res ipsa loquitur is translated from Latin as “the thing speaks for
               itself.” The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur recognizes that in some

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1332 | December 27, 2023        Page 7 of 16
               situations, an occurrence is so unusual, that absent reasonable
               justification, the person in control of the situation should be held
               responsible. The central question in res ipsa loquitur cases is
               whether the incident probably resulted from the defendant’s
               negligence rather than from some other cause. To establish this
               inference of negligence, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that the
               injuring instrumentality was within the exclusive management
               and control of the defendant, and (2) the accident is of the type
               that ordinarily does not happen if those who have management
               or control exercise proper care. Whether the doctrine of res ipsa
               loquitur applies in any given negligence case is a mixed question
               of law and fact.

       Griffin v. Menard, Inc., 175 N.E.3d 811, 814-15 (Ind. 2021) (citations omitted).

[14]   “The exclusive control requirement of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine requires that

       the plaintiff demonstrate that the defendant had exclusive control over the

       instrumentality at the time of the alleged negligent act.” Rector v. Oliver, 809

       N.E.2d 887, 892 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Deming Hotel Co. v. Prox, 142 Ind.

       App. 603, 235 N.E.2d 613 (1968)); see also Whetstine v. Menard, Inc., 161 N.E.3d

       1274, 1284 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (“To invoke res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff must

       demonstrate that the defendant had exclusive control of the injuring

       instrumentality at the time of injury.”), trans. denied. Moreover, “[e]xclusive

       control is an expansive concept which focuses upon who has the right or power

       of control and the opportunity to exercise it.” Whetstine, 161 N.E.3d at 1284

       (citing Shull v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 477 N.E.2d 924, 926 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985),

       trans. denied).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1332 | December 27, 2023       Page 8 of 16
[15]   The ultimate determination of whether res ipsa loquitur applies in any given

       negligence case is a mixed question of law and fact, but the question of whether

       the plaintiff’s evidence includes all the elements of res ipsa loquitur is a question

       of law. St. Mary’s Ohio Valley Heart Care, LLC v. Smith, 112 N.E.3d 1144, 1150

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (citing Syfu v. Quinn, 826 N.E.2d 699, 703 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2005)). Thus, if a plaintiff fails to present evidence that could establish one

       element (or more than one element) of res ipsa loquitur, then application of the

       doctrine fails as a matter of law. See id.

       3. Applicability of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Premises Liability Cases

[16]   Isgrig contends that she designated evidence sufficient to permit her to proceed

       to trial on a theory of res ipsa loquitur, i.e., that the window was under the

       exclusive control or management of the University and that windows do not

       ordinarily fall out of walls if those who have management or control have

       exercised proper care. Citing our Supreme Court’s opinion in Griffin, the

       University argues that Isgrig cannot succeed under a theory of res ipsa loquitur

       unless Isgrig can first establish that the University is liable under a theory of

       premises liability. To address the parties’ arguments requires us to review

       several cases that have addressed the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa

       loquitur in which the plaintiff was on the premises as an invitee of the defendant.

[17]   In Cergnul v. Heritage Inn of Ind., Inc., 785 N.E.2d 328 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans.

       denied, the plaintiff fell and was injured when a handrail came out of the wall at

       the hotel in which she was staying. The plaintiff sued the hotel and sought a

       jury instruction on res ipsa loquitur, but the trial court granted judgment on the
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1332 | December 27, 2023        Page 9 of 16
       evidence in favor of the hotel. On appeal, this Court affirmed, concluding that,

       even if the hotel was in exclusive control of the handrail, there were reasons

       other than negligence that the handrail could have come lose, such as

       vandalization by another patron. Id. at 330. Accordingly, we affirmed the trial

       court. Id.

[18]   Two years later, another panel of this Court addressed a slightly different

       situation. In Rector v. Oliver, 809 N.E.2d 887 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied,

       the plaintiff was injured when a light fixture fell from the ceiling in a video

       store. On appeal from the grant of summary judgment to the defendant, we

       held that there was evidence that the defendant was in exclusive control of the

       light at the time of the injury: “[t]he negligent act could have been the

       installation of the light fixture, but the jury could also reasonably infer that the

       negligence was the failure to reasonably inspect and maintain the premises.”

       809 N.E.2d at 892. We also could not find as a matter of law that the defect in

       the light could not have been discovered by reasonable maintenance and

       inspection. Id. at 895.

[19]   Although the defendant in Rector claimed that the negligent act was the

       installation of the light fixture, we emphasized that the plaintiff was not

       required to prove that the defendant had installed the light fixture, stating:

               [I]t is not necessary for a plaintiff to exclude every other
               possibility other than the defendant’s negligence as a cause. Nor
               is it required that the plaintiff present direct evidence of the cause
               of the accident, for this . . . begs the question. The doctrine of res

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1332 | December 27, 2023       Page 10 of 16
               ipsa loquitur allows an inference of negligence to be drawn when
               direct evidence is lacking.

       Id. at 891 (citing K-Mart Corp. v. Gibson, 563 N.E.2d 667, 671 (Ind. Ct. App.

       1990), trans. denied). Under the facts of that case, the Rector Court held that

       there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the negligent act was

       the installation of the light fixture or the failure to reasonably inspect and

       maintain the premises: “[r]egardless of who installed the light fixture, we

       cannot say that a light fixture falling from the ceiling of a business is the sort of

       event which ordinarily happens if those who have the management and control

       exercise proper care.” Id. at 892. Thus, it was for the trier of fact to determine

       whether res ipsa loquitur applied. Id. Ultimately, we reversed the grant of

       summary judgment in favor of the defendant and remanded for trial. Id. at 895.

[20]   Several years after Rector, our Supreme Court addressed the applicability of res

       ipsa loquitur in premises liability cases. In Griffin, the plaintiff was injured when

       he removed a box containing a sink from a store shelf and the bottom of the box

       collapsed, causing the sink to fall out and strike the plaintiff. On appeal from

       the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant store, our

       Supreme Court first concluded that the plaintiff had not successfully rebutted

       the defendant’s prima facie showing that the defendant was not liable under a

       theory of premises liability. 175 N.E.3d at 813-14. Specifically, the Court held

       that the plaintiff had not rebutted the defendant’s showing that the defendant

       had no actual or constructive knowledge that the box was defective. Id. at 814.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1332 | December 27, 2023      Page 11 of 16
[21]   The Court then addressed the plaintiff’s claim that he could proceed on a theory

       of res ipsa loquitur. Id. at 814-15. The Griffin Court noted that the Rector Court

       had “called into question the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in a

       premises liability action.” Griffin, 175 N.E.3d at 815 (citing Rector, 809 N.E.2d

       at 895). In Rector, we had noted:

                [T]he position adopted from the Restatement (Second) of Torts
                in Burrell, supra, states that a possessor of land is subject to
                liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition
                on the land if, but only if, the conditions listed therein are met.
                To say that a premises owner may be liable under the doctrine of
                res ipsa loquitur when they could not be liable under the premises
                liability standard would seem to fly in the face of the standard
                adopted in Burrell.

       809 N.E.2d at 895 (quoted in Griffin, 175 N.E.3d at 815).

[22]   Our Supreme Court held that, although Rector did not “completely forclose[]

       the application of res ipsa to a premises liability action,” Rector made clear that

       “if there’s no liability under a premises liability standard, res ipsa cannot apply.”

       Griffin, 175 N.E.3d at 815 (citing Rector, 809 N.E.2d at 895). 2 “As such,

       determining the res ipsa issue is necessarily dependent on whether a defendant

       can be liable under premises liability in the first place.” Id. Accordingly, the

       2
        We believe this reads too much into our opinion in Rector. In Rector, we did not suggest that the doctrines
       of res ipsa loquitur and premises liability were incompatible; rather, we held that, despite any seeming
       conflicts, the two doctrines could be harmonized. Indeed, we ultimately held that the trial court improperly
       granted summary judgment because the jury could find that the defendant was negligent based on the
       doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and that this did not conflict with premises liability principles. 809 N.E.2d at 895-
       96.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1332 | December 27, 2023                                Page 12 of 16
       Griffin Court held that the plaintiff’s res ipsa loquitur claim did not preclude

       summary judgment for the defendant. Id.

[23]   Even if res ipsa loquitur could apply in that case, the Griffin Court held that the

       plaintiffs did not show that the injuring instrumentality was within the exclusive

       management and control of the defendant because the store’s customers had

       access to the sink box. Id. Thus, the Court held that “it seems like speculation

       that the only way the sink could have fallen out of the box was because Menard

       was negligent when the box could have been handled/tampered with by

       another customer.” Id. at 816. In so holding, the Court noted that “the

       showing of exclusive control is difficult when the injuring instrumentality is

       accessible to customers. It’s also a high bar to show that an occurrence is ‘so

       unusual’ that it would not ordinarily happen in the absence of someone’s

       negligence.” Id. (citing Johnson v. Blue Chip Casino, LLC, 110 N.E.3d 375, 378

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied).

[24]   Although this might seem to sound the death knell for the application of res ipsa

       loquitur in premises liability cases, the Griffin Court noted that res ipsa loquitur

       might still apply under some circumstances, writing:

               [W]e decline to hold that res ipsa can never apply to a premises
               liability case. If an injury results from a fixture or other
               component that customers did not or could not disturb—such as
               a chandelier suspended from the ceiling, or a set of shelves bolted
               to the wall—and the incident would not normally occur absent
               negligence, res ipsa could be appropriate.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1332 | December 27, 2023        Page 13 of 16
       Id. (emphasis added).

[25]   To be sure, Griffin could be read to hold, as argued by the University, that a

       plaintiff in a premises liability case must first establish all the elements of

       premises liability before res ipsa loquitur can apply. See 175 N.E.3d at 815. But

       to adopt such a strict reading seems, to us, illogical. Indeed, if a plaintiff can

       establish the elements of premises liability, there would simply be no need to

       also establish the elements of res ipsa loquitur. Instead, we read Griffin, as a

       whole, to instruct that res ipsa loquitur can apply in a premises liability case, but

       only if the injury “results from a fixture or other component that customers did

       not or could not disturb—such as a chandelier suspended from the ceiling, or a

       set of shelves bolted to the wall—and the incident would not normally occur

       absent negligence.” 3 Id. at 816.

       C. Isgrig May Proceed on a Theory of Res Ipsa Loquitur

[26]   Griffin narrowed the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in premises

       liability cases to situations where the injury results from a “fixture or other

       component that customers did not or could not disturb[.]” 175 N.E.3d at 816.

       Thus, the question becomes whether the falling window is more like the falling

       3
         This conclusion/reading does not conflict with the premises liability doctrine as adopted in Burrell. If a trier
       of fact finds the defendant liable under a theory of res ipsa loquitur, it would follow that the defendant would
       also be liable under a theory of premises liability, i.e., that the defendant knew or should have known about
       the condition on the premises and realized that it involved an unreasonable risk of harm to invitees, that the
       defendant should have expected that the invitee will not discover or realize the danger or would fail to protect
       themselves against it, and that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care to protect the invitee against
       the danger.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1332 | December 27, 2023                               Page 14 of 16
       ceiling light in Rector or more like the falling handrail in Cergnul and the sink

       box in Griffin. Based on the designated evidence, we conclude that the falling

       window is more like the falling ceiling light. Indeed, like the light in Rector, the

       window was a fixture of the building. As for whether the window could have

       been “disturbed” by others, there was evidence that the University exercised

       exclusive control and management over the window at the time it fell out of the

       wall. See Whetstine, 161 N.E.3d at 1284. The University had the right or power

       to control the window. See id.

[27]   We also cannot say that a window suddenly falling out of a wall—with no one

       interacting with it—is the sort of thing that can occur absent negligence. We

       acknowledge that the window was in a position such that others could access it

       by raising and lowering the windowpanes or the internal window blinds. But a

       trier of fact could reasonably conclude that this should not cause a window to

       fall out of a wall absent negligence.

[28]   Accordingly, we conclude that the designated evidence, including the fact that

       the University performed no preventive maintenance on the windows, creates a

       genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the University can be liable for

       the injuries caused by the window inexplicably falling from the wall and hitting

       Isgrig. See 62 Am. Jur. 2d Premises Liability § 60 (Oct 2023 Update) (noting

       that res ipsa loquitur “doctrine has also been held applicable when a trapdoor

       gave way, a door came off its hinge, and in cases involving injuries that were

       caused by overhead doors, elevator doors, sliding doors, or glass falling from

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1332 | December 27, 2023     Page 15 of 16
       doors or windows) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). The trial court, thus,

       erred by granting summary judgment to the University.

       Conclusion
[29]   We conclude that the trial court erred by granting the University’s motion for

       summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary

       judgment in favor of the University and remand for proceedings consistent with

       this opinion.

[30]   Reversed and remanded.

       Pyle, J., and Foley, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1332 | December 27, 2023   Page 16 of 16