Court Opinion

ID: 9486973
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:05:09.429277+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:02.159157
License: Public Domain

K.K. HALL, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur fully in the majority opinion. I write separately only to express my view that, in civil suits for damages based on childhood sexual abuse where the plaintiff had, for a time, allegedly suppressed all memory of the supposed abuse, courts should not allow the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations absent corroborative evidence of both the abuse and the repression of memory of the abuse. Several courts have adopted this approach,1 as has at least one legislature.2
Corroboration of the act itself could be obtained anecdotally from siblings or other household members, from a documented medical history of childhood sexual abuse,3 or by the defendant’s admission,4 perhaps via a letter5 or diary. Evidence of a prior criminal conviction for the abuse at issue could suffice to corroborate, as could evidence that the defendant had sexually abused others— subject, of course, to the rules regarding proof of “other bad acts.”6 Evidence that the plaintiff had actually repressed the memory of the abuse should be provided only by a psychiatrist or psychologist, and then only after a thorough clinical evaluation.
Commentators and courts alike have characterized the judiciary’s struggle with repressed-memory lawsuits as an attempt to strike a balance between the legal and emotional needs of survivors of childhood sexual abuse and the public policy supporting statutes of limitations.7 Most appear to have *409overlooked that such balancing inheres in the statute itself, manifest in the time allotted by the legislature to bring a particular kind of suit. To the extent that the bar of such a statute may be perceived as unfair to a sexually abused plaintiff who has, through no fault of his or her own, continuously suppressed all memory of the abuse for a time beyond the limitations period, we must remember that the unfairness imposed on a person forced to defend a stale suit also increases as time passes.
It seems to me that if we are to adjust the balance that the legislature has already set, we ought to require a degree of certitude in the justice of our action. Requiring some corroboration of the plaintiffs account of the sexual abuse can help achieve that certitude. Conversely, allowing such lawsuits to proceed absent any evidence other than the alleged victim’s testimony based wholly upon newly recovered memories — the reliability of which is yet to be proven — can, in light of the stigma associated with even the accusation that an adult has sexually abused a child, be disastrous.8 We must proceed with caution.

. See, e.g., Meiers-Post v. Schafer, 170 Mich.App. 174, 427 N.W.2d 606 (1988); Nicolette v. Carey, 751 F.Supp. 695 (W.D. Mich.1990) (applying Schafer); L.C. v. A.K.D., No. 05-92-02867-CV, 1994 WL 59968 (Tex.Ct.App. Mar. 1, 1994) (pending release); Sanchez v. Archdiocese of San Antonio, 873 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. Ct.App. 1994); Olsen v. Hooley, 865 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1993). But see Lemmerman v. Fealk, 201 Mich.App. 544, 507 N.W.2d 226 (1993) (declining to follow Schafer). Several other courts have reached the same result, but their holdings have been superseded by legislative action. E.g., Tyson v. Tyson, 107 Wash.2d 72, 727 P.2d 226 (1986).

. Okla. Stat. tit. xii, § 95 (West 1994) (requiring “objective, verifiable” evidence in corroboration).

. L.C., 1994 WL 59968 at *7-*8.

. Schafer, 427 N.W.2d at 609.

. Nicolette, 751 F.Supp. at 699-700.

. Corroboration, though perhaps difficult or impossible in a particular case, is not the great impediment to prospective plaintiffs that some believe it to be. Harvard psychiatrist Judith Herman studied fifty-three women who reported suppressed memories of sexual abuse. Of these, thirty-nine obtained independent verification of the abuse, such as admissions by the abuser, pornographic pictures of themselves as children, or confirmation by family members. Sandra G. Boodman, The Professional Debate Over an Emotional Issue, Wash. Post, April 12, 1994, at Z13.

. See, e.g., Gary M. Ernsdorff & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Let Sleeping Memories Lie? Words of Caution About Tolling the Statute of Limitations in Cases of Memory Repression, 84 J.Crim. L. & Criminology 129, 140-41 (1993) (Suits based on childhood sexual abuse fulfill the survivor's needs to exert control, force accountability on the abuser, and free oneself of guilt or self-doubt, along with providing monetary compensation for *409possible social dysfunction and/or expensive counseling. Statutes of limitations exist to protect defendants from stale claims that present difficulties in obtaining evidence and mounting an effective defense, and to encourage plaintiffs to initiate actions promptly; L.C., 1994 WL 59968 at *5 (''[Providing defendants with a fair opportunity to defend against a lawsuit while witnesses are available and evidence is fresh in their minds ... [is] balanced ... against the injustice of cutting off people’s claims before those claims are known to them.”).

. See, e.g., Julie Tamaki, Abuse Case to Challenge New Law on Limitations, L.A. Times, May 15, 1994, at B1 (A California jury awards $500,000 to man, accused of sexual abuse by his daughter, in malpractice suit against two therapists who implanted false memories of the abuse in his daughter's mind. The accusations cost the plaintiff his marriage, his family, and his $400,000-a-year job.); Maggie Gallagher, The Travesty of "Memories", Newsday, March 7, 1994, at 38 (Sexual abuse plaintiff, as a result of his uncertainty regarding the accuracy of his suppressed memories, drops his civil suit against Cardinal Joseph Bernardin).