Court Opinion

ID: 9961440
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-18 18:02:27.262293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:46.241250
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-1402     Document: 010111034400        Date Filed: 04/18/2024     Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                            April 18, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                           Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                               Clerk of Court
  ERIK M. UNDERWOOD, a Colorado
  citizen; MY24HOURNEWS.COM, INC.,
  a Colorado corporation,

        Plaintiffs - Appellants,

  v.                                                          No. 22-1402
                                                  (D.C. No. 1:18-CV-02329-RM-MEH)
  BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION,                                 (D. Colo.)
  a Delaware corporation,

        Defendant - Appellee.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before BACHARACH, McHUGH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

       Erik Underwood and My24HourNews.com, Inc. (collectively, plaintiffs)

 appeal the district court’s order granting summary judgment to defendant Bank of

 America (BofA) on their trademark-infringement claim for the service mark

 “E.R.I.C.A.” Because plaintiffs fail to establish any triable issue of fact about

 whether the service mark clearly distinguished the services offered, they cannot show

 a protectable interest in their unregistered mark, and we affirm.

       *
         This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
 of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But it may be cited for its
 persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
Appellate Case: 22-1402    Document: 010111034400        Date Filed: 04/18/2024      Page: 2

                                      Background

       In October 2010, Underwood obtained a Georgia state trademark registration

 for the mark “E.R.I.C.A.” Plaintiffs later launched the website www.my24erica.com,

 which allows users to search for movies and actors in its online database.1

       In October 2016, BofA filed an intent-to-use application for the mark

 “ERICA” with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). After the

 USPTO approved the application, BofA launched ERICA as a virtual financial

 assistant in its mobile banking application, and the USPTO formally issued the

 ERICA registration to BofA in July 2018.

       Plaintiffs then filed this action, asserting as relevant here that BofA was

 infringing on their trademark. The district court granted BofA’s motion to cancel

 plaintiffs’ Georgia trademark registration and its motion for summary judgment.

       Plaintiffs appealed, and we affirmed the trademark cancellation and much of

 the summary-judgment order, but we vacated and remanded on a single issue—

 whether plaintiffs had established protectable trademark rights through a theory of

 actual use of the E.R.I.C.A. mark in commerce. See Underwood v. Bank of Am.

 Corp., 996 F.3d 1038, 1059 (10th Cir. 2021). Setting out the correct legal framework

 for assessing “actual use,” we remanded for the district court to determine whether

 plaintiffs could establish that: (1) www.my24erica.com was publicly accessible

       1
         The parties dispute the date on which this website became publicly
 accessible: plaintiffs assert it was in March 2015; BofA contends it was not until June
 2018. As we later explain, this dispute is not material to our decision; for purposes of
 this appeal, we accept plaintiffs’ alleged date of publication.
                                            2
Appellate Case: 22-1402     Document: 010111034400        Date Filed: 04/18/2024    Page: 3

 before October 2016; (2) search-engine and personal-assistant services on the website

 “were ‘rendered to others’ before October 2016”; and (3) “the E.R.I.C.A. mark

 ‘clearly identif[ied] and distinguish[ed]’ the services offered ‘on the website.’” Id. at

 1057 (alterations in original) (first quoting Morningside Grp. Ltd. v. Morningside

 Cap. Grp., L.L.C., 182 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 1999), and then quoting 2 J. Thomas

 McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 16:32.70 (5th ed.

 Mar. 2021 update)).

       On remand, the district court again granted summary judgment for BofA,

 finding that (1) even assuming the website was publicly accessible before October

 2016, plaintiffs failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to (2) whether

 plaintiffs rendered search-engine and personal-assistant services to others and

 (3) whether the mark clearly identified and distinguished the services offered by

 www.my24erica.com. It later denied plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration.

       Plaintiffs appeal.

                                         Analysis

       Plaintiffs challenge summary judgment for BofA on their trademark-

 infringement claim. We review a summary-judgment order de novo and apply the

 same legal standard as the district court. GeoMetWatch Corp. v. Behunin, 38 F.4th

 1183, 1200 (10th Cir. 2022). Summary judgment is proper when there is “no genuine

 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

 law,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), meaning that a reasonable jury could not return a verdict

 for the nonmoving party, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

                                             3
Appellate Case: 22-1402    Document: 010111034400         Date Filed: 04/18/2024       Page: 4

 (1986). On summary judgment, we view all facts and inferences in the light most

 favorable to the nonmoving party. GeoMetWatch, 38 F.4th at 1200.

       As we explained in our prior decision in this case, “[t]he principle underlying

 trademark protection is that distinctive marks—words, names, symbols, and the

 like—can help distinguish a particular artisan’s goods from those of others.”

 Underwood, 996 F.3d at 1045 (quoting B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc.,

 575 U.S. 138, 142 (2015)). And the overarching “rule of trademark ownership in the

 United States is priority of use,” established by using a symbol or word to identify

 and distinguish the source of goods of services. Id. (quoting 2 J. Thomas McCarthy,

 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 16:1 (5th ed. Mar. 2021

 update)). To establish a claim for trademark infringement under federal law, “a

 plaintiff must show ‘(1) that the plaintiff has a protectable interest in the mark;

 (2) that the defendant has used an identical or similar mark in commerce; and (3) that

 the defendant’s use is likely to confuse customers.’” Id. (quoting 1-800 Contacts, Inc.

 v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1238 (10th Cir. 2013). For purposes of this appeal,

 we assume that the last two elements are established. So at issue here, as in the prior

 appeal, is only the first element: a protectable interest. See id. at 1052–53.

       A plaintiff can establish a protectable interest in an unregistered service mark

 through “actual use in the market.” Id. at 1053 (quoting Allard Enters., Inc. v.

 Advanced Programming Res., Inc., 146 F.3d 350, 354 (6th Cir. 1998)). To do so, a

 “plaintiff must show use of the mark as a service mark, which means use ‘to identify

 and distinguish the services of one person . . . from the services of others and to

                                             4
Appellate Case: 22-1402     Document: 010111034400         Date Filed: 04/18/2024     Page: 5

 indicate the source of the services, even if that source is unknown.’” Id. (quoting 15

 U.S.C. § 1127). And actual use must take place in commerce, meaning that it consists

 of “attempt[s] to complete genuine commercial transactions,” as opposed to uses

 merely intended “to reserve a mark for later use.” Id. at 1053–54 (alteration in

 original) (quoting Allard Enters., 146 F.3d at 359). As particularly relevant here, use

 of a mark on a website “may constitute a bona fide use in commerce,” but “the

 website must ‘identify [the] goods or services . . . provided through or in connection

 with the website.’” Id. at 1054 (alteration in original) (quoting Specht v. Google, Inc.,

 747 F.3d 929, 934 (7th Cir. 2014)).

        Here, as to actual use in commerce, recall that the district court assumed

 plaintiffs’ website was publicly accessible before October 2016 but concluded both

 that plaintiffs did not render search-engine and personal-assistant services to others

 and that plaintiffs’ use of the mark did not clearly identify and distinguish the

 services they provided. We will similarly assume public accessibility and will go one

 step further and assume that plaintiffs did render services to others.

        Turning our focus to whether plaintiffs’ use of the mark clearly identified and

 distinguished their services, we first note that the district court’s analysis on this

 point lacked detail. It simply stated that plaintiffs’ use did not meet this standard and

 offered as an “example” that “[p]laintiffs point[ed] to no evidence that any

 individuals who visited its website during that timeframe associated the mark with

 the website’s services.” App. vol. 7, 1658.

        Taking off from this example, plaintiffs argue on appeal that the district court

                                               5
Appellate Case: 22-1402    Document: 010111034400        Date Filed: 04/18/2024       Page: 6

 “erred by requiring proof that a particular individual subjectively associated the

 ERICA mark with the website’s services.”2 Aplt. Br. 19 (emphasis added). But as

 defendant identifies, the phrase “for example” indicates that the district court did not

 require such subjective proof; rather, it merely noted the absence of such proof when

 concluding that the use of the mark on the website did not clearly identify and

 distinguish the services provided. And it is not clear that doing so was erroneous:

 even plaintiffs acknowledge that this inquiry turns on the totality of the

 circumstances and thus could include the possibility of subjective proof. See

 Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1195–96 (11th Cir.

 2001) (explaining that courts look at totality of circumstances to determine use in

 commerce, including “evidence that members of the targeted public actually

 associated the mark . . . with the [good or service] to which it was affixed”). In any

 event, we need not definitively resolve whether the district court erred by discussing

 the lack of subjective evidence in this case. We must simply assess, on de novo

 review, whether plaintiffs can show a genuine issue of material fact on actual use in

 commerce based on the totality of the circumstances.

       2
          Plaintiffs also argue that the district court erred by providing inadequate
 notice of the basis for its ruling. But our prior decision included significant detail
 about the three issues to be decided on remand, and the district court ordered the
 parties to file supplemental briefing addressing those issues. Then, the district court
 issued its summary-judgment ruling based on those three issues. So we reject
 plaintiffs’ notice argument. Cf. Oldham v. O.K. Farms, Inc., 871 F.3d 1147, 1150–51
 (10th Cir. 2017) (finding plaintiff was prejudiced by district court’s grant of
 summary judgment on ground not raised or addressed by either party and instead
 raised sua sponte by court during hearing).
                                            6
Appellate Case: 22-1402    Document: 010111034400         Date Filed: 04/18/2024     Page: 7

       Seeking to do so, plaintiffs point to the About ERICA and Terms of Service

 sections of the website, which both mention either “E.R.I.C.A.” or “ERICA.” As an

 initial matter, to reach either of these webpages, a website visitor must scroll to the

 bottom of the information-heavy homepage and locate and click on a link in small-

 point, all-lowercase font in the bottom right corner.3 Such an obscure use of the mark

 is unlikely to “‘clearly identif[y] and distinguish’ the services offered ‘on the

 website.’” Underwood, 996 F.3d at 1057 (quoting 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy

 on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 16:32.70 (5th ed. Mar. 2021 update)); see

 also In re Osterberg, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1220, at *3 (T.T.A.B. 2007) (finding no

 connection between use of mark and goods where “viewers of the webpage will have

 to search through the descriptive text even to find the purported mark”); In re Azteca

 Systems, Inc., 102 U.S.P.Q.2d 1955, at *1–3 (T.T.A.B. 2012) (finding no connection

 between use of mark and goods where “the mark [wa]s distant from the description of

 the software, . . . separated from the description by more than fifteen lines of text

 concerning marginally[ ]related topics,” and located “in the lower[,] left-hand,

 bottom corner of the first webpage”).

       Moreover, even if a website visitor manages to reach these linked webpages,

 these pages still do not establish “E.R.I.C.A.” as a protectable service mark. The use

 of a service mark must allow for a “direct association” between the mark and the

 services offered. In re Vicki Roberts, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d 1474, at *3 (T.T.A.B. 2008)

       3
        For reference, we attach an image of the homepage as an appendix to this
 Order and Judgment. See App. vol. 6, 1443–45.
                                             7
Appellate Case: 22-1402     Document: 010111034400         Date Filed: 04/18/2024     Page: 8

 (quoting In re N.V. Organon, 79 U.S.P.Q2d 1639, 1649 (T.T.A.B. 2006)). And it is

 not “enough that the mark and a reference to the services both appear in the same”

 location. In re Osmotica Holdings Corp., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d 1666, at *3 (T.T.A.B. 2010).

        Here, the webpages at issue do not allow for a direct association between the

 mark and the services offered. The About ERICA webpage states that “[t]he acronym

 E.R.I.C.A[.] stands for Electronic Repetitious Informational Clone Application” and

 describes “ERICA” as “an artificial intelligence mobile search engine that infuses

 software and holographic digital technology seamlessly together[,] to create an

 environment where your digital device is alive and interactive with the consciousness

 of E.R.I.C.A.,” as well as “the first artificial intelligence to have a personality and a

 real image.” App. vol. 1, 238. The Terms of Service webpage, under the heading

 “Description of Website Services Offered,” states that “ERICA” is “a talking . . .

 [a]rtificial [i]ntelligence[] interactive search engine.” Id. at 221. These summaries

 merely describe a technology and do not directly connect to the search services

 provided in a traditional search box on the homepage of www.my24erica.com. For

 one thing, the alleged service mark itself has two, indiscriminately used iterations:

 “E.R.I.C.A.” and “ERICA.” And perhaps more importantly, the alleged service

 described on these webpages is aspirational, not definitive. The “About ERICA” page

 specifically states that the application is “[c]urrently . . . in further development to

 implement the full vision on mobile and search engines to verbally tell you

 information and deliver entertainment news, restaurant reviews, financial updates,

 and so much more.” Id. at 238. These descriptions do not indicate the source of any

                                              8
Appellate Case: 22-1402     Document: 010111034400         Date Filed: 04/18/2024     Page: 9

 offered search-engine or personal-assistant services; they simply describe the idea

 behind an application still “in development.” Id.

        Plaintiffs further argue that the use of the service mark on the website

 established its use in commerce because at the top of the homepage, there is a line of

 text just below a search bar that reads “ERICA’S CURRENT MOVIE PICKS”;

 plaintiffs say this “demonstrat[es] [E.R.I.C.A.’s] ability to provide the customer with

 recommendations.” App. vol. 7, 1557. But this phrase does not clearly identify or

 distinguish search-engine or personal-assistant services. Indeed, the word “ERICA”

 in this title appears in the same font, size, and style as the other descriptive terms. See

 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 3:4 (5th

 ed. Mar. 2024 update) (“Some of the common markers of whether a word, phrase[,]

 or picture is being used as a trademark are: larger-sized print, all capital letters or

 initial capitals, distinctive or different print style, color, and prominent position on

 label or in advertising.”); see also In re Post Properties, Inc., 227 U.S.P.Q. 334, at *2

 (T.T.A.B. 1985) (finding “use in the manner of a service mark” in part because mark

 was “set off distinctively from the text of the ad copy in an extremely large typeface”

 and was “not an ordinary informational statement”); Jaymo’s Sauces LLC v. Wendy’s

 Co., No. 19-cv-01026, 2021 WL 4712685, at *7 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 8, 2021)

 (unpublished) (“[T]he nonprivileged placement and emphasis on other terms coupled

 with the comparatively small, plain font of the term fail to adequately demonstrate it

 is being used as a source indicator on the bottle labels.”). If anything, the phrase

 “ERICA’S CURRENT MOVIE PICKS”, in matching text, implies that a person

                                              9
Appellate Case: 22-1402    Document: 010111034400        Date Filed: 04/18/2024      Page: 10

  named Erica is curating suggestions and not that the mark clearly identifies the

  source of any services. See 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and

  Unfair Competition § 13:2 (5th ed. Mar. 2024 update) (personal names are subject to

  trademark protection only if their use “acquire[s] distinctiveness and secondary

  meaning”).

        In a final attempt to demonstrate actual use in commerce, plaintiffs highlight

  evidence showing, in their view, that visitors to the website associated the E.R.I.C.A.

  mark with the services being offered. In support, plaintiffs discuss references to “an

  E.R.I.C.A. search engine” in an affidavit from Kim Opler, Underwood’s former

  roommate, App. vol. 5, 1211, and to “E.R.I.C.A. search results” in testimony from

  Todd Olson, Underwood’s business colleague, App. vol. 3, 509. But neither of these

  statements mention the placement of the word “ERICA” on the website, nor do they

  suggest “that any such placement clearly identified and distinguished the services

  offered on the website.” Aplee. Br. 33. And what matters here is whether the mark

  was actually used in commerce, meaning that it “identif[ied] [the] goods or services

  . . . provided through or in connection with the website.” Underwood, 996 F.3d at

  1054 (quoting Specht, 747 F.3d at 934). Without testimony about the placement of

  the mark, we cannot determine if Opler and Olson naturally associated the mark with

  the services or if they relied on prior knowledge.

        In sum, we agree with the district court that plaintiffs presented no evidence

  that the E.R.I.C.A. mark, as used on the website, clearly distinguishes the source of

  the services offered by www.my24erica.com. Plaintiffs therefore fail to show actual

                                            10
Appellate Case: 22-1402    Document: 010111034400        Date Filed: 04/18/2024    Page: 11

  use in commerce of their mark, meaning that they cannot establish a protectable

  interest in their mark as required for their trademark-infringement claim.4

                                       Conclusion

        We affirm summary judgment for BofA on plaintiffs’ trademark-infringement

  claim because plaintiffs cannot establish actual use of their mark prior to BofA’s

  priority date of October 2016.

                                             Entered for the Court

                                             Nancy L. Moritz
                                             Circuit Judge

        4
           Because we conclude that the district court correctly awarded summary
  judgment to BofA, we need not separately address plaintiffs’ argument that the
  district court later erred in denying their motion for reconsideration.
                                            11
Appellate Case: 22-1402   Document: 010111034400   Date Filed: 04/18/2024   Page: 12

                                    Appendix
Appellate Case: 22-1402   Document: 010111034400   Date Filed: 04/18/2024   Page: 13
Appellate Case: 22-1402       Document: 010111034400   Date Filed: 04/18/2024   Page: 14

  See App. vol. 6, 1443–45.