Court Opinion

ID: 9692408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:53:31.244041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:27:56.436930
License: Public Domain

BELL, Chief Judge,
Concurring:
The majority holds that Maryland Code (1973, 1998 Repl. Vol.) § 9-105 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article1 codifies a confidential marital communications privilege, under which a spouse, or former spouse may not disclose, or be compelled to disclose, over objection and absent a waiver, any confidential marital communications. 359 Md. 180, 201, 753 A.2d 84, 95 (2000). It holds, nevertheless, that the “privilege” was not waived in this case and, thus, reverses the petitioner’s conviction. I agree with that result. Accordingly, I concur in the result. We have arrived at the same result by different routes, however; indeed, in reaching my conclusion, I embrace a rationale that the majority expressly rejects: § 9-105 is a competency statute, rather than one setting forth a privilege. Whether I or the majority is correct involves statutory interpretation.
Section 9-105 is broadly, but clearly, written. It is well settled that the interpretative process, the purpose of which is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature, Parri-son v. State, 335 Md. 554, 559, 644 A.2d 537, 539 (1994), begins, and, when the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, according to their ordinary and commonly understood meaning, see Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. of Maryland v. Director of Finance for Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 343 Md. 567, 578, 683 A.2d 512, 517 *208(1996); Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995); Montgomery County v. Buckman, 333 Md. 516, 523, 636 A.2d 448, 451 (1994), ordinarily ends, with the words of the statute. Farris v. State, 351 Md. 24, 29, 716 A.2d 237, 240 (1998). It is true, of course, that the legislative history of the enactment may be taken into account, but only to confirm, not to contradict, the result derived from according the words of the statute their commonly understood meaning. See Coleman v. State, 281 Md. 538, 546, 380 A.2d 49, 54 (1977).
Headed “Testimony by Spouses—Confidential communications occurring during marriage,” § 9-105 provides that, “One spouse is not competent to disclose any confidential communications between the spouses occurring during their marriage.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1596 (7 th ed.1999) defines a “competent witness” as “a witness who is legally qualified to testify,” and, by extension, based on the definition of “incompetency”— “the lack of legal ability in some respect, especially to testify,” id. at 768, an incompetent witness is one legally disqualified to testify. Section 9-105 thus clearly and unambiguously declares one spouse unable to testify against the other as to confidential marital communications.2 The words used leave no doubt as to the Legislature’s intention; they provide no basis for construing the statute to mean that a spouse has a privilege not to testify as to confidential marital discussions, a privilege that may be waived.
The logic of this interpretation is underscored and confirmed when § 9-105 is contrasted with § 9-106.3 That latter section provides:
*209“(a) The spouse of a person on trial for a crime may not be compelled to testify as an adverse witness unless the charge involves:
“(1) The abuse of a child under 18; or
“(2) Assault in any degree in which the spouse is a victim if:
“(i) The person on trial was previously charged with assault in any degree or assault and battery of the spouse;
“(ii) The spouse was sworn to testify at the previous trial; and
“(iii) The spouse refused to testify at the previous trial on the basis of the provisions of this section.”
Unlike § 9-105, this section speaks in terms of “compellability,” suggesting that it addresses a privilege. It clearly and unambiguously prohibits the spouse of a defendant on trial from being compelled to testify as an adverse witness except in certain enumerated and well defined circumstances. Thus, the statute allows the witness spouse to elect, but not be compelled, to testify as an adverse witness. The “privilege” not to testify belongs to the witness spouse, who is not disqualified, by the terms of the statute, from testifying against his or her spouse. This comparison demonstrates that § 9-106 is clearly not a competency statute and that § 9-105 is clearly not a privilege statute. As the petitioner points out, “section 9-105 addresses when a spouse is a competent witness, and section 9-106 addresses when a spouse is a compellable witness.” The comparison also demonstrates that the Legislature knows the difference between such statutes. I think that it is most significant that both statutes are found in the subtitle headed “Competence, Compellability, and Privi*210lege” and that, although using absolute language in both, the Legislature used “competent” in one and “compelled” in the other. I am also struck by the fact that the first four sections of the subtitle, including § 9-105,4 involve the qualification of a witness to testify, either in general or in a particular instance, see § 9-101 (competency in general);5 § 9-103 (child testimony in a criminal case);6 § 9-104 (convicted perjurer);7 § 9-105 (spouse testimony confidential communications), and that, with one exception, § 9-113 (adverse party witness),8 the remaining sections address privilege or when a particular witness may be compelled to testify. See § 9-107 (defendant as a witness);9 § 9-108 (attorney-client privilege);10 § 9-109 *211(patient/psychiatrist or psychologist privilege); § 9-110 (accountant privilege); § 9-111 (clergy privilege);11 § 9-112 (news media); § 9-121 (licensed social worker/client privilege); § 9-123 (witness immunity for compulsory testimony).
I am not persuaded by the majority’s reliance on dicta in Coleman v. State, 281 Md. 538, 380 A.2d 49 (1977), and State v. Enriquez, 327 Md. 365, 609 A.2d 343 (1992), the historical analysis or cases from other jurisdictions to support the conclusion that § 9-105 is a privilege statute. In neither Coleman nor Enriquez was the issue in this case, the nature of § 9-105, presented. Thus, the characterization we gave the statute sheds absolutely no light on the Legislative intent in enacting it. The historical analysis and the cases from other jurisdictions overlook or, at least, undervalue the plain language and clarity of the statute. It is the legislative intent that is sought to be determined. That is best determined by reference to the words that body used in enacting it. As this is a case of first impression in this Court, it simply is inappropriate to ascribe a legislative intent contrary to the statute’s plain, clear and unambiguous language, no matter how tight the logic or persuasive the reasoning may appear to be. See, Farris v. State, 351 Md. 24, 28, 716 A.2d 237, 240 (1998); Briggs v. State, 348 Md. 470, 477, 704 A.2d 904, 908 (1998); Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 435, 639 A.2d 675, 678 (1994); Williams v. State, 329 Md. 1, 616 A.2d 1275 (1992); Dickerson v. State, 324 Md. 163, 170-71, 596 A.2d 648, 651 (1991); State v. Bricker, 321 Md. 86, 92, 581 A.2d 9, 12 (1990); Kaczorowski v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513, 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987); Jones v. State, 304 Md. 216, 220, 498 *212A.2d 622, 624 (1985); Coleman v. State, 281 Md. 538, 546, 380 A.2d 49, 54 (1977).
Treating § 9-105 as a competency statute is consistent with the purpose of shielding confidential marital communications from disclosure. That purpose was stated in Coleman, 281 Md. at 541, 380 A.2d at 51-52 (citing 8 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2332 (McNaughton rev.1961) and McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 86 (2d ed.1972)):
“[Confidential communications between husband and wife ... (1) ... originate in confidence, (2) the confidence is essential to the relation, (3) the relation is a proper object of encouragement by the law, and (4) the injury that would inure to it by the disclosure is probably greater than the benefit that would result in the judicial investigation of truth. The essence of the privilege is to protect confidences „ only ... and thereby encourage such communications free from, fear of compulsory disclosure, thus promoting marital harmony.”
As the petitioner points out, “[t]he important institution of marriage is served by a ‘bright-line’ rule that legally ensures that confidential marital communication shall remain confidential marital communication.”
The General Assembly has considered, and rejected, amendments to § 9-105 nine times since its enactment in 1973. It certainly will be able, if it believes that we have misconstrued its intent, to amend the statute. But it ought to be the General Assembly, not this Court that makes that determination; it is not the Court’s intention or what the Court believes to be the best policy or approach that is at issue.

. Although § 9-106 is not at issue in this case, Judge Cathell would hold that it, and not § 9-105, is the competency statute. As will become apparent, I see this differently as well, and for the same reason essentially that I part company with the majority with respect to the interpretation of § 9-105, the plain language of § 9-106 belies the interpretation Judge Cathell gives it.

. Judge Cathell recognizes that the language used is inconsistent with privilege:
“But for the continuing viability of the “spousal incompetency” concept by statute, the plain language of this statute might infer that section 9-105 is a statute based on competency. The history of the statutes [§§ 9-105 and 9-106], however, as I have indicated, is otherwise.”
359 Md. at 234, 753 A.2d at 113 (Cathell, J., concurring).

. There is no inconsistency between the two statutes. Section 9-105 makes explicit the incompetence of a spouse to testify concerning *209confidential marital communications, while § 9-106 addresses a completely different subject, the spouse’s compellabilty as a witness. In any event, we are required to interpret the statutes as to give effect to both, but without doing violence to the meaning of either. See Blitz v. Beth Isaac Adas Israel Congregation, 352 Md. 31, 40, 720 A.2d 912, 916 (1998), and cases cited therein.

. Maryland Code (1973, 1998 Repl.Vol.) § 9-102 and § 9-103.1 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, pertaining, respectively, to the testimony of child abuse victims by closed circuit television and the admissibility of the out of court statements of child abuse victims, were transferred, by Acts 1996, c. 585, § 5, eff. Oct. 1, 1996, to Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl.Vol.) Article 27, §§ 774 and 775, respectively. This legislative action buttresses my argument; by moving these sections from the subtitle and, in particular the first section of it, the Legislature left intact the scheme contemplated by the heading.

. Section 9-101 provides:
"Unless otherwise provided in this subtitle:
"(1) A person shall not be excluded from testifying in a proceeding because of incapacity from crime or interest in the matter in question.
"(2) Litigants and their spouses are competent and compellable to give evidence.”

. Section 9-103 provides:
"In a criminal trial, the age of a child may not be the reason for precluding a child from testifying.”

. Section 9-104 provides:
"A person convicted of perjury may not testify.”

. Section 9-113 provides that "[I]n a civil case, a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a corporation, partnership, or association may be called by the adverse party and interrogated as on cross-examination.”

. Section 9-107 provides:
"A person may not be compelled to testify in violation of his privilege against self-incrimination. The failure of a defendant to testify in a *211criminal proceeding on this basis does not create any presumption against him.”

. I think it significant that in stating the privilege, the Legislature declared that "[a] person may not be compelled to testify in violation” of the privilege.

. In stating the privilege, the Legislature again chose to use the "not be compelled to testify” language.