Court Opinion

ID: 9739195
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:10:25.338083+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:10.627811
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
Under the ruling of the trial court, first-degree manslaughter can NEVER pass the legal test as a lesser included offense of first-degree murder. As stated by Justice Amundson in his dissent, that simply is not the law in South Dakota. The majority author recognizes what the trial court held but seems to dance around that holding, playing freely with rhetorical applications of the word “necessarily” and coupling this with what is evidently a legal determination that the factual test could have been met at trial. In my view, the majority author recognizes, and tacitly admits, the frailty of his argument when, in the last paragraph of the opinion, he pleads with trial judges to give “a common sense review of the facts.” Justice Wuest’s special writing most appropriately attacks the legal and intellectual weaknesses of that suggestion. “Ignore the law, but apply some common sense” seems to be the majority author’s advice — I simply cannot buy it.
Although it may promote judicial economy “by permitting appellate courts to decide whether jury instructions were wrongly refused without reviewing the entire evi-dentiary record for nuances of inference,” Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 721, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 1452-53, 103 L.Ed.2d 734, 749 (1989), it is reversible error to fail to apply the factual test in a murder trial since such a failure results in the conclusion that first-degree manslaughter can NEVER be a lesser included offense of first-degree murder.
I respectfully suggest that Justice Henderson’s special writing goes even further than the majority writing when it ignores the legal test and instead applies the factual test which the trial judge never applied. I am of the opinion that the record simply does not support Justice Henderson’s assertions that
the trial judge mulled the factual background of this case and the instructions that should be rightfully given. To express that the trial judge did not consider the facts at all, belies the record.
I respectfully suggest it is this language which “belies the record.” The trial transcript, at page 834, reveals that the trial court, in making its ruling, specifically stated:
... I’m not going to rule .on the factual basis on this matter. I want this test to remain solely, in my determination, on the legal portion thereof, and that therefore, manslaughter, even though our Court has not addressed it directly, is not a lesser includable offense of first degree murder. (Emphasis added.)
The most that can be said about the trial proceedings is that “the trial court did listen to arguments concerning the facts and the application of the factual basis test.” (Henderson, J., supra).
Justice Henderson correctly notes that “the trial court does not have to instruct on matters not supported or warranted by the evidence.” Woods, 374 N.W.2d at 96 (emphasis added); Scholten, 445 N.W.2d at 32. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has also stated recently that “it is well settled that a defendant is entitled to an instruction on any lesser included offense if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and to acquit him of the greater offense.” United States v. One Star, 979 *386F.2d 1319, 1320 (8th Cir.1992) (emphasis added). This court has also stated that “[wjhere a request has been made to charge the jury on a lesser-included offense, the duty of the trial judge is determined by the evidence.” State v. Tapio, 459 N.W.2d 406, 408 (S.D.1990) (emphasis added). I am convinced the trial judge did not meet his duty. It is clear that though he may have listened to trial counsel’s arguments concerning the facts, the trial judge intentionally and purposefully failed to consider the factual test in his decision.
I adhere to the legal principal espoused “that if the trial court reaches the correct result, even if for the wrong reason, its decision will still be affirmed on appeal.” (Henderson, J., supra). However, as Justice Henderson notes: “Essentially, under this set of facts, the trial judge refused to instruct the jury on the elements of first degree manslaughter.” (Emphasis mine.) We both conclude that this refusal to apply the factual test in this murder case is error. However, I believe this failure by Judge Bogue is reversible error.
Lastly, I must make clear that I agree with Justice Henderson’s recitation that “it is simply no longer the law in this state that a trial court, in all murder trials, must automatically instruct a jury as to all lesser degrees of homicide.” My writing today says nothing to the contrary. But, in a murder trial, the trial judge must give the defendant the benefit of both the legal and factual tests for lesser included offenses. See Tapio, 459 N.W.2d 406; Schmuck, 489 U.S. 705, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 103 L.Ed.2d 734. We must not sit as "super judges,” making decisions in the absence of a trial court’s prior holdings.
It is crucial to observe that an analysis of the writings in this case makes it evident that a majority of this court (and arguably, the entirety of this court) believes the trial judge misapplied the legal test and erroneously failed to apply the factual test. Had the trial court applied the factual test, and therefore put this court in a position to reach the factual test, I could join Justice Henderson’s writing. The trial court should have applied the factual test, but did not; because the trial court did not, this court should not.