Court Opinion

ID: 9414587
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 06:11:46.566987+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:52.791091
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Opinion Filed July 31, 2023

                                                  In The
                                   Court of Appeals
                            Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                         No. 05-21-00245-CV

                                 STEVEN JORDAN, Appellant
                                           V.
                                 MELANIE AARON, Appellee

                     On Appeal from the 160th Judicial District Court
                                  Dallas County, Texas
                          Trial Court Cause No. DC-18-03928

                              MEMORANDUM OPINION
                       Before Justices Molberg, Reichek, and Breedlove
                                 Opinion by Justice Molberg
         In this breach of fiduciary duty case involving a disputed real estate

transaction, appellant Steven Jordan challenges the trial court’s judgment, following

a bench trial, in favor of appellee Melanie Aaron, the plaintiff in this action, who

sued Jordan on behalf of herself and as the independent executrix of the Estate of

Melvin Carl Aaron, deceased.1 Among other things, the judgment canceled a deed

dated September 6, 2017, from Melvin to Jordan on property located at 3930 Kiest

Valley, Dallas, County, Texas, and ordered that Aaron recover from Jordan $18,000

   1
       For clarity, we refer to appellee as Aaron and to her father, Melvin Carl Aaron, as Melvin.
as attorney’s fees through the date of the judgment. The trial court issued findings

of fact and conclusions of law that included, in part, findings that Jordan used a

power of attorney to transfer ownership of the subject real property from Melvin to

himself and that Jordan had a fiduciary duty to Melvin at the time of the transfer.

On appeal, Jordan, representing himself without an attorney, argues, in essence, that

the trial court erred in concluding a fiduciary relationship existed and in entering

judgment in Aaron’s favor based on what Jordan describes as insufficient evidence.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment in this memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 47.4.

      Jordan raises the following four issues in his appellate brief:

      1. Did [Jordan] use the Power of Attorney to transfer [Melvin’s] house
         to himself. [Aaron] used a copy of the Power of Attorney as Exhibit
         A. And used a copy of the Warranty Deed as Exhibit B. These two
         documents are the only pieces of evidence entered during trial.
      2. Did [Jordan] ever have a fiduciary duty or relationship to ever
         breach.
      3. Did the trial court err with the lack of facts and insufficient legal
         evidence to support the judgment or [Aaron’s] claims.
      4. Does [Jordan] have a right to the property based on agreement he
         had with [Melvin] and contract laws.

      A party appealing an adverse judgment has the burden to show reversible

error. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a). We review the trial court’s conclusions of law

de novo and its findings of fact for sufficiency of the evidence. Hegar v. Am. Multi-

Cinema, Inc., 605 S.W.3d 35, 40 (Tex. 2020). We construe Jordan’s first, third, and

                                         –2–
fourth issues as challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and his second issue as

a challenge to the trial court’s conclusions of law.2

        Our record on appeal consists of the clerk’s record only. Because Jordan

failed to request the reporter’s record, we ordered the appeal submitted without it,

after first giving him notice and a reasonable opportunity to cure. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 37.3(c)(1). “When confronted with an incomplete record, we presume the omitted

portions are relevant to the appeal and the evidence contained within the omitted

portions of the record support the trial court’s judgment.” Imagine Auto. Grp. v.

Boardwalk Motor Cars, Ltd., 430 S.W.3d 620, 632 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet.

denied). Without a reporter’s record, it is impossible for Jordan to prevail on his

sufficiency challenges in his first, third, and fourth issues because we must presume

the evidence supports the trial court’s judgment. See id.; Davis v. Kaufman Cty.,

195 S.W.3d 847, 851 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.); Sam Houston Hotel, L.P.

v. Mockingbird Rest., Inc., 191 S.W.3d 720, 721 (Tex. App.—Hous. [14th Dist.]

2006, no pet.); see also Gonzalez v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, No. 05-09-01322-CV,

2011 WL 1549558, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 26, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(stating appellant’s “evidentiary complaints without a reporter’s record present

    2
      We construe Jordan’s fourth issue as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, and not a mixed
question of law and fact, based on Jordan’s pleading—which included only a general denial, and thus did
not include any affirmative request for an award based on contract—and based on our understanding of
Jordan’s arguments on appeal. As we understand Jordan’s arguments, he challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the trial court’s finding of fact I.C., in which the trial court found that Jordan “used the
[p]ower of [a]ttorney to transfer ownership of the subject real property from [Melvin] to himself.”
                                                     –3–
nothing for our review”). Absent a reporter’s record, our review is limited to

complaints concerning errors of law, erroneous pleadings or rulings thereon, an

erroneous jury charge, irreconcilable jury findings, summary judgment, and

fundamental error. See Krasniqi v. Dallas Cty. Child Protective Servs., 809 S.W.2d

927, 933 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, writ denied). Jordan raises no issue concerning

such matters, other than his second issue, which is a question of law.3 We cannot

conclude the trial court erred in its legal conclusion that Jordan owed Melvin a

fiduciary duty at the time of the property transfer, as Jordan’s appellate brief states

Melvin signed a general power of attorney to Jordan on September 6, 2017, the same

date as the property transfer. See Bombardier Aerospace Corp. v. SPEP Aircraft

Holdings, LLC, 572 S.W.3d 213, 231 (Tex. 2019) (“An agreement creating a power

of attorney creates a fiduciary relationship.”).

       Based on the record before us, we conclude Jordan has not demonstrated any

reversible error in connection with his appeal. We overrule Jordan’s four issues and

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                   /Ken Molberg/
                                                   KEN MOLBERG
210245f.p05                                        JUSTICE

   3
     See Nat’l Plan Adm’rs, Inc. v. Nat’l Health Ins. Co., 235 S.W.3d 695, 700 (Tex. 2007); Kiger v.
Balestri, 376 S.W.3d 287, 290 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied).
                                               –4–
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                   JUDGMENT

STEVEN JORDAN, Appellant                       On Appeal from the 160th Judicial
                                               District Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-21-00245-CV           V.                Trial Court Cause No. DC-18-03928.
                                               Opinion delivered by Justice
MELANIE AARON, Appellee                        Molberg. Justices Reichek and
                                               Breedlove participating.

       In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is AFFIRMED.

      It is ORDERED that appellee MELANIE AARON recover her costs of this
appeal from appellant STEVEN JORDAN.

Judgment entered this 31st day of July, 2023.

                                         –5–