Court Opinion

ID: 9899461
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-16 19:03:48.036948+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:28.145316
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/16/23 Brooks v. One Miracle Property CA2/6
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

BRENT BROOKS,                                                  2d Civ. No. B324231
                                                             (Super. Ct. No. 56-2019-
     Plaintiff and Appellant,                                00527617-CU-PO-VTA)
                                                                (Ventura County)
v.

ONE MIRACLE PROPERTY,
LLC,

     Defendant and Respondent.

      An independent contractor was hired to clean solar panels
on the roof of a commercial building. A worker employed by the
independent contractor was injured when he tripped and fell
through a skylight. The worker sued the building owner alleging,
among other causes of action, the failure to warn of a concealed
hazard. The trial court granted summary judgment to the
building owner on the ground that a landowner is not liable for
injuries to an employee of an independent contractor. The court
concluded that no exception to the rule applied. We affirm.
                               FACTS
      One Miracle Property, LLC (One Miracle) owns multiple
properties, including a commercial building in Oxnard (Oxnard
building). One Miracle purchased the land in 1997 and built the
Oxnard building in 2004. The Oxnard building’s roof has
skylights, solar panels, and electrical conduits for the solar
panels.
      For more than a decade, West Hills Construction, Inc.
(West Hills), a licensed general contractor, has performed
construction work for One Miracle, including work on the Oxnard
building. One of West Hills’ ongoing tasks is to maintain and
oversee the solar panels and skylights on the roof of the Oxnard
building. West Hills inspects the roof several times a year.
Should any repairs or maintenance be required, West Hills
performs the work or hires a subcontractor. Prior to July 18,
2018, West Hills marked certain skylights on the Oxnard
building for replacement, not because the skylights were
defective, but because a different model was preferred. At all
times West Hills was an independent contractor for One Miracle.
      On or about July 19, 2018, West Hills subcontracted with
KCM Landscaping Services, Inc. (KCM), an independent
contractor, to clean the solar panels on the Oxnard building’s
roof. West Hills did not supervise KCM’s work and no one from
One Miracle was present while KCM was working.
      On July 19, 2018, Brent Brooks was employed by KCM,
assisting in cleaning the solar panels on the Oxnard building’s
roof. He tripped on a conduit, fell through a skylight, and landed
on cardboard boxes below. Although Brooks landed on cardboard
boxes, he suffered significant injuries.

                                2
       Brooks admitted that he knew there were skylights on the
roof and that he could distinguish what was a skylight. He
testified that due to the location of the Oxnard building next to a
factory, the skylights were covered with a dusty film.
                            DISCUSSION
                        I. Standard of Review
       Summary judgment is properly granted only if all papers
submitted show there is no triable issue as to any material fact
and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) The trial court must
draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence set forth in the
papers except where such inferences are contradicted by other
inferences or evidence that raise a triable issue of fact. (Ibid.) In
examining the supporting and opposing papers, the moving
party’s affidavits or declarations are strictly construed and those
of the opponent liberally construed, and doubts as to the
propriety of granting the motion should be resolved in favor of
the party opposing the motion. (Szadolci v. Hollywood Park
Operating Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 16, 19.)
       The moving party has the initial burden of showing that
one or more elements of a cause of action cannot be established.
(Saelzer v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768.)
Where the moving party has carried that burden, the burden
shifts to the opposing party to show a triable issue of material
fact. (Id. at p. 767.)
       On summary judgment, once the defendant establishes that
the Privette presumption of non-liability pursuant to Privette v.
Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689 (Privette) , applies, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact as to
whether one of the exceptions applies. (Miller v. Roseville Lodge

                                 3
No. 1293 (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 825, 834.) Our review of the trial
court’s grant of the motion is de novo. (Saelzer v. Advanced
Group 400, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 767.)
                         II. Rules of Liability
       In Privette, supra, (1993) 5 Cal.4th, our Supreme Court
held that a property owner hiring an independent contractor is
not liable for work-related injuries suffered by an employee of the
independent contractor. (Id. at p. 702.) The employee’s remedy
is in workers’ compensation. (Ibid.)
       Brooks relies on an exception to the Privette rule stated in
Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, holding that a
landowner may be liable to an independent contractor’s employee
for a concealed hazardous condition on the property. The
landowner’s liability under this exception applies only where: 1)
the landowner knew, or should have known, of a pre-existing
latent or concealed hazardous condition on its property; 2) the
contractor did not know and could not have reasonably discovered
the hazardous condition; and 3) the landowner failed to warn the
contractor about the condition. (Id. at p. 664.)
                             III. Evidence
       One Miracle has established by uncontradicted evidence
that both West Hills and Brooks’ employer KCM were
independent contractors. Thus, One Miracle established that the
Privette presumption of non-liability applies. (See Miller v.
Roseville Lodge No. 1293, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 834.)
       Brooks relies on the declaration of William Dexter. Dexter
is the former director of the Center for Construction Education at
California Polytechnic State University San Luis Obispo. Dexter
declared in part:

                                4
      “The evidence submitted by [One Miracle] in support of the
summary judgment motion, . . . , shows that [One Miracle] built
the [Oxnard] building in 2004; with no other evidence, I can only
assume that the skylights were installed at that time. The
injuries sustained by Mr. Brooks were the result of two factors,
namely failure by [One Miracle] to install the required fall
restraint guards above or below the skylights during the original
construction and failure to periodically replace the skylight
domes after extended periods of exposure to the known harmful
and deleterious effects of the [ultraviolet (UV)] spectrum of
sunlight.
      “The relevant provision of the Code of California
Regulations is [title 8, section 3212]: Floor Openings, Floor Holes,
Skylights and Roofs. As amended with an operative date of
November 8, 1993, this section of the code states in pertinent
part as follows:
      “(e) Any employee approaching within 6 feet of any skylight
shall be protected from falling through the skylight or skylight
opening by any one of the following methods: [¶] (1) Skylight
screens installed above the skylight . . . . [¶] (2) Skylight screens
installed below the skylight . . . .
      “When the [Oxnard] building was constructed in 2004,
therefore, it was subject to the laws mandating skylight screens,
installed above or below the skylights. The description of the fall
presented in the evidence shows no indication that any screen
was ever present, and, the evidence submitted by the movant
includes no reference to any screen ever having been installed. If
such screens had been present, the fifteen-to-twenty-foot fall
described by Mr. Brooks . . . would have been stopped much
earlier.

                                  5
       “The absence of the legally required skylight screens made
the skylight at issue significantly more dangerous than a skylight
with the legally required screen.
       “Because the law requiring screens was in effect at the time
the [Oxnard] building was constructed, it would be reasonable to
assume that such screens were installed on the skylights at issue
here. It would be reasonable for the people on the skylights to
assume that the screens were installed below the skylights since
no above-skylight screens were visible. I found nothing in the
evidence submitted in support of the motion indicating that
either One Miracle Property LLC or West Hills Construction, Inc.
ever told anyone that the skylights at issue did not include the
legally required screens.
       “The declarations of both [One Miracle and West Hills
employees] state that West Hills only inspected the roof. Neither
such an inspection nor merely working on the roof (as plaintiff
Brooks did) would disclose that the legally required safety screen
had not been installed below the skylight. There is no way for a
‘rooftop’ observer to visually verify that a safety screen had been
installed beneath the skylight since the skylight dome is
translucent white. The only method of inspection would be to go
into the area beneath the skylight and look up at dome. It would
be obvious if the screens were installed. This would be part of a
reasonable inspection to determine the presence or absence of
any dangerous conditions.
       “In addition, [California Code of Regulations, title 8, section
1632, subdivision (b)(3)], specifies in pertinent part that any
‘[c]overs’ on a skylight or other roof opening ‘shall be capable of
safely supporting the greater of 400 pounds or twice the weight of

                                  6
the employees, equipment and materials that may be imposed on
any one square foot area of the cover at any time . . . .’
       “Mr. Brooks’s deposition reflects, at page 63, that he
weighed 230 pounds; the polymer dome should have prevented
the fall. That he fell through the dome is due to the fact that
[UV] spectrum of sun light causes deterioration of the dome over
time.
       “[A photograph] shows the damage to the skylight from Mr.
Brooks falling against it. Exposure to [UV] radiation causes
significant degradation of many polymer plastic materials. UV
radiation causes degradation by promoting oxidation which
results in breaking of the polymer chains and reduces the
molecule weight, causing deterioration of the mechanical
strength.
       “[A photograph] shows that the dome over the skylight at
issue was so eroded that there was no elasticity left so it
shattered like a cracker.
       “A reasonable inspection of skylights would require more
than a check for safety screens by looking up from the area below
the skylight. Such an inspection would also require a close look
at the polymer domes over the skylights to check for the micro-
cracking and other signs of fatigue. If the skylights had been
reasonably inspected at any time within five (5) years before the
accident, the absence of safety screens should have been
discovered; the existence of fatigue or micro-cracking should also
have been discovered. It is remotely possible that the existence of
fatigue or micro-cracking may not have been discovered unless a
reasonable inspection occurred within a year prior to the
accident.

                                7
       “This deterioration gives a polymer plastic skylight dome a
serviceable life expectancy of between five and fifteen years,
depending upon the weather and temperature of the skylight’s
location. The deterioration also represents an expected
performance limitation of polymer plastic products and frequent
and repeated injuries involving skylights. Photooxidation of
organic materials is a major cause of irreversible deterioration for
a large number of substances. It is responsible not only for the
loss of physical properties of plastics and rubber but has
contributed to the high incidence of skylight fractures that
precipitated the Cal/OSHA requirements for safety features such
as screens, guard [rails] or safety netting installed in skylights.
       “That the [Oxnard] building was constructed (and skylights
installed) in 2004 means that the dome at issue has been
deteriorating since 2004; as of the date of the accident at issue,
the dome over the skylight at issue was also at the end of its
serviceable life. Separately and independently of the absence of
skylight screens, the deteriorated condition of the polymer dome
would make the skylight significantly more dangerous than a
skylight with the polymer dome intact. These dangers
(deterioration, like the absence of a safety screen below the
skylight), would not be visible to someone merely working (or
visually inspecting) the roof.” (Paragraph numbering omitted.)
       Dexter’s six page declaration was met by One Miracle with
80 pages of pro forma objections, none of which referenced any
particular portion of the declaration. Such “blunderbuss
objections” were condemned by our Supreme Court. (Reid v.
Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 532.) The trial court warned
that parties raising such objections may face informal

                                 8
reprimands or formal sanctions for engaging in abusive practices.
(Ibid.) Here the court sustained all of the objections.
       Brooks relies on Serri v. Santa Clara University (2014) 226
Cal.App.4th 830 (Serri), for the proposition that the trial court
abused its discretion in giving a blanket ruling sustaining all of
One Miracle’s objections. In Serri, the defendant moved for
summary judgment. The plaintiff presented evidence in
opposition to the motion. The defendant objected to the plaintiff’s
evidence. The court issued a blanket ruling sustaining all of
defendant’s objections. The Court of Appeal stated, “This blanket
ruling was ‘hardly a ruling,’ provided no basis for review and
could be treated as a failure to rule.” (Id. at p. 857.) The Court of
Appeal held that given the number of objections and that some
were sustained in error, the trial court abused its discretion by
issuing a blanket ruling. (Ibid.) Nevertheless, the Court of
Appeal concluded that the error was harmless because there was
no reasonable probability a result more favorable to the appellant
would have been reached in the absence of the error. (Ibid.)
       Here we do not blame the trial court for not ruling
individually on One Miracle’s 80 pages of objections. The court
would have been well within its discretion to have imposed
monetary sanctions and ordered One Miracle to limit its
objections to a specific number of pages. We assume the court did
not do so in this case because the defects in Dexter’s declaration
are obvious. If the court abused its discretion by issuing a
blanket ruling sustaining all of One Miracle’s objections, the
error was not prejudicial.
       First, much of Dexter’s declaration relies on alleged
violations of safety regulations contained in California Code of
Regulations, title 8. But those regulations apply to duties

                                 9
employers owe to their employees. Brooks was employed by
KCM, not One Miracle.
       Second, Dexter declares that the life expectancy of a
skylight is five to 15 years, but admits he does not know the age
of the skylight through which Brooks fell. Dexter declares, “I can
only assume” the skylights were installed in 2004 when the
Oxnard building was constructed, 14 years prior to the accident.
Based on this assumption – without testing or even personal
inspection – Dexter concludes that the skylight material had
become defective through time and exposure to the elements.
Dexter’s opinion is inadmissible as based on assumptions and
conjecture. (Mitchell v. United National Insurance Co. (2005) 127
Cal.App.4th 457, 478.)
       Finally, even if Dexter’s declaration were admitted, the
result would be the same. Ultimately it was KCM’s duty to
protect its employees from workplace injuries. California Code of
Regulations, title 8, section 3212(e), requires that employees
working within six feet of a skylight shall be protected with a
screen either above or below the skylight. It would have been
obvious there was no screen above the skylight. At a minimum
California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 3212(e), would
mandate KCM to inquire whether there was any screen below
before allowing its employees to work within six feet of a skylight.
KCM should have reasonably known that there were no screens
on the skylights. There is simply no evidence that One Miracle
concealed anything from KCM.
       Moreover, the uncontradicted evidence is that West Hills
had the ongoing task to maintain and oversee the skylights on
the roof. It inspected the roof several times a year. Should any
repairs or maintenance be required, West Hills would perform

                                10
the work or hire a subcontractor. West Hills marked some of the
skylights for replacement because a better model was preferred,
not because they were defective. Brooks points to nothing that
One Miracle knew or should have known about the skylights that
made them dangerous. Even Dexter declared that the dangerous
condition would not be apparent to someone visually inspecting
the roof.
                         DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Costs are awarded to the
respondent.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                   GILBERT, P. J.

We concur:

             BALTODANO, J.

             CODY, J.

                              11
                    Benjamin F. Coats, Judge

               Superior Court County of Ventura

                ______________________________

       Law Office of Ball and Yorke, Esther R. Sorkin and Allen R.
Ball for Plaintiff and Appellant.
       Law Offices of Beth M. Henderson and Ann C. Hall for
Defendant and Respondent.