Court Opinion

ID: 9556951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-20 13:00:33.8023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:42.569706
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 22-1005      Doc: 43         Filed: 08/18/2023    Pg: 1 of 3

                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 22-1005

        EILEEN CHOLLET; DENNIS MA, on behalf of C.M., their minor child;
        MERYEM GHAZAL; RICHARD GHAZAL, on behalf of P.G., their minor child;
        GUADALUPE WILLIAMSON; TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON, on behalf of T.W.,
        their minor child,

                            Plaintiffs - Appellants,

                     v.

        DR. SCOTT BRABRAND, in his role as Superintendent, Fairfax County Public
        Schools,

                            Defendant - Appellee.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
        Alexandria. Anthony John Trenga, Senior District Judge. (1:21-cv-00987-AJT-JFA)

        Submitted: February 21, 2023                                      Decided: August 18, 2023

        Before WYNN, HARRIS, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.

        Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: George M. Clarke, BAKER & MCKENZIE LLP, Washington, D.C., for
        Appellants. John F. Cafferky, Ian J. McElhaney, BLANKINGSHIP & KEITH, PC,
        Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1005       Doc: 43          Filed: 08/18/2023      Pg: 2 of 3

        PER CURIAM:

               Plaintiffs are the parents of minor children with special needs who attend the Fairfax

        County Public Schools (“FCPS”) in Virginia. Pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities

        Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., FCPS provides the plaintiffs’ children

        with special education services based on Individualized Education Programs (“IEPs”).

        Between March 2020 and February 2021, FCPS – like many school districts – responded

        to the COVID-19 pandemic by switching to a virtual learning model. The plaintiffs believe

        that FCPS’s use of remote instruction was inconsistent with their children’s individualized

        needs and “caused them to fall behind the progress envisioned in their IEPs.” J.A. 19

        (internal quotation marks omitted). But rather than addressing these concerns through the

        IDEA’s prescribed administrative channels, the plaintiffs filed suit directly in district court,

        alleging an unconstitutional “taking” of their children’s purported Fifth Amendment

        property interest in a public education.

               The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust state administrative

        remedies under the IDEA. Chollet v. Brabrand, No. 1:21-cv-00987-AJT-JFA, 2021 WL

        6333049, at *3 (E.D. Va. Nov. 29, 2021). Generally speaking, the IDEA “requires

        exhaustion when the gravamen of a complaint seeks redress for a school’s failure to provide

        a [free appropriate public education]” to a disabled child, even if the complaint is framed

        differently or brought under another statute. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S. 154,

        170 (2017). And here, the district court observed, the gravamen of the complaint rested

        squarely on FCPS’s alleged failure to provide the plaintiffs’ children appropriate special

        education services, as required by their IEPs, during the pandemic. Chollet, 2021 WL

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USCA4 Appeal: 22-1005       Doc: 43         Filed: 08/18/2023      Pg: 3 of 3

        6333049, at *3–4. Under a straightforward application of Fry, then, the court held that

        exhaustion was required and dismissed the case. Id. 1

               After this appeal had been fully briefed, however, the Supreme Court recognized an

        additional prerequisite to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement. See Luna Perez v. Sturgis

        Pub. Schs., 143 S. Ct. 859 (2023). In Luna Perez, the Court held that even when a

        plaintiff’s suit is “admittedly premised on the past denial of a free and appropriate

        education,” administrative exhaustion is not required “if the remedy a plaintiff seeks is not

        one [the] IDEA provides.” Id. at 865 (emphasis added). The parties now dispute, in light

        of Luna Perez, whether and to what extent the plaintiffs seek a remedy also available under

        the IDEA. But this question was not briefed before the district court or this court on appeal,

        and as is customary, we decline to address it in the first instance. See Graham v. Gagnon,

        831 F.3d 176, 189 (4th Cir. 2016). Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order

        dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint and remand for further proceedings. 2

                                                                      VACATED AND REMANDED

               1
                  The court believed this failure to exhaust deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction
        and therefore dismissed the action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). After
        the district court’s ruling, however, this court held that “the IDEA’s exhaustion
        requirement is not a jurisdictional requirement but a claims-processing rule,” K.I. v.
        Durham Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ., 54 F.4th 779, 792 (4th Cir. 2022), which means that
        failure to exhaust generally cannot be asserted by way of a Rule 12(b)(1) motion. See Z.W.
        v. Horry Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 21-1596, 2023 WL 3666904, at *2–3 (4th Cir. May 26,
        2023). The plaintiffs here have not argued for reversal on this ground, and any such
        argument is thus forfeited. See id. But going forward, the district court will have the
        benefit of our ruling in K.I. and may proceed accordingly.
               2
                 We also decline the defendant’s request to affirm on the alternative ground that
        the switch to remote learning during the pandemic did not effectuate a “taking” of private
        property cognizable under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. That argument, too,
        we leave to the district court to address in the first instance.
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