Court Opinion

ID: 9649812
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:10:01.508898+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:15.158358
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Hoffman, J.:
Appellant, charged in a criminal complaint issued on January 21, 1974, was not tried until October 29, and October 30, 1974. He contends that he is, therefore, entitled to discharge under Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1100, 19 P.S. Appendix.
On January 20, 1974, two Philadelphia police officers observed the appellant walking west on Allegheny Avenue in Philadelphia. He was carrying a brown paper bag that looked like a lunch bag. As the officers approached Broad Street in their patrol car, they made a U-turn and proceeded west along Allegheny Avenue. Appellant began *514to run; then, as the officers pulled abreast to appellant, he slowed down to a trot. The officers noticed that appellant now had the bag wrapped tightly around whatever was in the bag and that “it showed the clear shape of a handgun.” The police stopped appellant; their investigation confirmed that the bag concealed a loaded .38 caliber six-shot revolver. Appellant was arrested and transported to the Northwest Detective Division. Subsequently, the police discovered that the .38 revolver had been used in a January 5, 1974 armed robbery.
On January 21, 1974, a criminal complaint was issued against appellant. Thereafter, on February 13, 1974, he was indicted for armed robbery and related offenses arising out of the January 5 incident, and for weapons violations arising out of the January 20 arrest. On April 9, 1974, appellant filed a motion to suppress the physical evidence. Despite attempts to try the case, no further proceedings took place until October 16,1974, when appellant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 1100. Subsequently, on October 22, 1974, the motion to suppress was heard and held under advisement by Judge Porter. The motion to dismiss, however, was heard on the same day by Judge Greenberg. Both motions were denied. On October 29, and October 30, 1974, the appellant was tried by a jury, Judge Porter presiding. Appellant was acquitted on the bills charging him with robbery and the related offenses, but was found guilty of the January 20 weapons offenses. On November 1, 1974, appellant filed motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial. On December 5, 1974, the motions were denied and appellant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of two and one-half to five years. This appeal followed.
The appellant raises four contentions. Because I believe that appellant should have been discharged under Rule 1100, I would not reach the remaining issues.
Initially, the Commonwealth contends that appellant has waived his Rule 1100 claim because he did not pursue the argument in post-trial motions.
*515The law is clear that an appellant must present an issue in post-trial motions in order to preserve the claim for purposes of appeal. Rule 1123 (a)1 provides, inter alia, that “[wjithin seven (7) days after a finding of guilt, the defendant shall have the right to file written motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment. Only those grounds may be considered which were raised in pre-trial proceedings or at trial. . . .” The Supreme Court has recently criticized trial counsels’ circumvention of Rule 1123: “Although counsel apparently made ... specific oral motions that were considered by the court, the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 1123 (a), 19 P.S. Appendix, requires written post-trial motions.
“The practice in some judicial districts of ignoring the requirements of Rule 1123 (a) is condemned. Henceforth, issues not presented in compliance with the rule will not be considered by our trial and appellate courts.” Commonwealth v. Blair, 460 Pa. 31, 33, n.1, 331 A. 2d 213, 214, n. 1 (1975). See also, Commonwealth v. Reid, 458 Pa. 357, 326 A. 2d 267 (1974); Commonwealth v. Watlington, 452 Pa. 524, 306 A. 2d 892 (1973); Commonwealth v. Agie, 449 Pa. 187, 296 A. 2d 741 (1972) .2
The function of post-trial motions is to permit the lower court to correct trial errors, thereby assuring the “swift and orderly administration of criminal justice....” Commonwealth v. Reid, supra at 358, 326 A. 2d at 267-68. *516Failure to preserve the issue properly results in a waiver. The waiver doctrine prohibits a litigant who sits on his rights from raising the issue on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Clair, 458 Pa. 418, 326 A. 2d 272 (1974). At the same time, prior to finding a waiver of a constitutional right, a court must find that the accused has made a deliberate and knowing bypass of that right. Commonwealth v. Coleman, 458 Pa. 324, 327 A. 2d 77 (1974).
In the instant case, the appellant filed the following reasons in support of his post-trial motions:
“1. The verdict is contrary to the evidence.
“2. The verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence.
“3. The verdict is contrary to the law.
“4. The trial of the case was not commenced within the 270 day period required by the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, #1100 (a) (1).”
Despite the explicit inclusion of appellant’s Rule 1100 claim in his post-trial motions, the Commonwealth nonetheless contends that the issue was waived. It is true that Judge Porter did not consider appellant’s fourth ground for relief. In a supplemental opinion, Judge Porter stated: “I have been requested to write a supplemental opinion as to the denial of [appellant’s] Motion for Dismissal under Pa. R. Crim. P. 1100. That matter was heard and disposed of before Honorable Stanley M. Greenberg on October 22, 1974. (See N.T. 9-21, October 22, 1974).
“Judge Greenberg is the Judge of our Court designated to hear and dispose of such motions.
“Because appellant merely presented post-trial motions pro forma and without brief or argument, this issue never really came before me.
“Therefore, upon this appeal it appears to me that the Superior Court should consider the Rule 1100 issue on the basis of the reasons expressed by Judge Greenberg, supra.”
*517Thus, appellant presented his Rule 1100 claim in writing, thereby conforming with Rule 1123, governing post-trial motions. He conformed with all the requirements of the rule — he raised the issue both at the pre- and post-trial phase of the proceedings; apparently, both counsel and the court treated the issue as preserved for appeal. The trial judge did not consider the issue, although properly before him, because he believed that Judge Greenberg had disposed of the issue. Under such circumstances, it is illogical and unfair to suggest that appellant waived his Rule 1100 claim.
Thus, this Court must reach the substance of appellant’s claim that he was not tried within 270 days of the issuance of the criminal complaint, thereby requiring his discharge. Rule 1100(a) (1> provides that “ [t] rial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the defendant after June 30, 1973 but before July 1, 1974 shall commence no later than two hundred seventy (270) days from the date on which the complaint is filed.” There is no dispute over the computation of the relevant number of days; nor does the Commonwealth argue that the delay was caused by the appellant. The only explanation of the delay appearing of record is a notation by Judge Greenberg after he heard the motion to dismiss: “Petition under Rule #1100 was denied. New expiration date — 11-13-74—(For 270 day Rule). Reason 6-18-74 & 7-15-74 no court room was available.’’ (Emphasis added). Thus, the issue is whether- an administrative backlog justifies a delay beyond the allotted time period.
In Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 449 Pa. 297, 308-309, 297 A.2d 127, 133 (1972)., the Supreme Court announced that “in order to more effectively protect the right of criminal defendants to a speedy trial and also to help eliminate the backlog in criminal cases in the courts of Pennsylvania we deem it expedient to formulate a rule of criminal procedure fixing a maximum time limit in which individuals accused of crime shall be brought to trial, in the future, in this Commonwealth.” The Supreme *518Court subsequently promulgated Rule 1100 “setting a time limit in which cases could be brought to trial, the violation of which would result in an immediate dismissal if the delay were not caused by the defendant himself.” Commonwealth v. Pearson, 230 Pa. Superior Ct. 304, 307, 327 A. 2d 167, 168 (1974) (Emphasis added).
Rule 1100 (c) provides for extensions of time: “ [a]t any time prior to the expiration of the period for commencement of trial, the attorney for the Commonwealth may apply to the court for an order extending the time from commencement of trial.” The rule provides no exception that would allow the courts to delay a trial for reasons of its inefficiency or inconvenience. The only alleged basis for the extension of time in the instant case is the unavailability of a court room. Such an occurrence may provide the appellant with a windfall discharge; but that was the very result contemplated by the Supreme Court. Under Rule 1100, it is the responsibility of those who administer the court system to guarantee that criminal trials take place within the proscribed time periods.3 Rule 1100 (f) makes clear that the proper remedy is to discharge the appellant: “Any order granting such application shall dismiss the charges with prejudice and discharge the defendant.” Cf., Commonwealth v. Cutillo, 235 Pa. Superior Ct. 131, 339 A.2d 123 (1975).
Therefore, I would reverse and order appellant discharged.
Cercone and Spaeth, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.

. Pa. R. Crim. P. 1128, 19 P.S. Appendix.

. But see, Commonwealth v. Irwin, 460 Pa. 296, 299, n. 3, 833 A. 2d 735, 737, n. 3 (1975): “The Commonwealth submits this assignment of error was not preserved in the trial court for appellate review, because it was not specifically asserted in the post trial motions, as required by the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. However, the opinion of the court en banc denying the motion for a new trial discussed this assignment of error evidencing it was raised before the trial court. We will, therefore, consider it as properly before us, but, at the same time, we urge the courts and counsel to adhere to Rule 1123, Pa.R.Crim.P., 19 P.S. Appendix. . . .”

. Cf., Commonwealth v. Hamilton, supra at 308, 297 A. 2d at 132-33: “An alternative to a balancing test is a stated time period within which accused persons must be either brought to trial or released from any threat of prosecution. The theory behind this type of rule is that it eliminates the inherent vagueness encompassed in any balancing process and it avoids the necessity of a court determining a violation of this constitutional right on a case-by-case basis. It is also felt that a mandatory time requirement will act as a stimulant to those entrusted with the responsibility of managing court calendars.” (Emphasis added.)