Court Opinion

ID: 9928217
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 01:00:42.382121+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:51:18.482244
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-30040    Document: 00517050352       Page: 1    Date Filed: 01/30/2024

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit                             United States Court of Appeals
                                                                          Fifth Circuit

                              ____________                              FILED
                                                                 January 30, 2024
                               No. 23-30040                        Lyle W. Cayce
                              ____________                              Clerk

   In the Matter of German Pellets Louisiana, L.L.C.;
   Louisiana Pellets, Incorporated,

                                                                    Debtors,

   Raymond James & Associates, Incorporated; George
   Longo; Danyal Sattar,

                                                                 Appellants,

                                    versus

   Craig Jalbert,

                                                                   Appellee.
                 ______________________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Western District of Louisiana
                          USDC No. 6:22-CV-5050
                 ______________________________

   Before King, Willett, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   Dana M. Douglas, Circuit Judge:
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                                      No. 23-30040

          Louisiana Pellets (LAP)1 built a wood processing facility with hopes
   of mass-producing fuel pellets. Hope turned to disappointment when
   financial challenges caused the entity to close shop and file for bankruptcy
   just months after its manufacturing began. LAP’s bankruptcy process
   culminated in a Chapter 11 confirmation plan that transferred its remaining
   assets into a liquidation trust managed by the appointed trustee, Craig Jalbert.
   A year after the trust’s creation, third parties assigned certain legal claims to
   the trust that Jalbert pursued in state court. The claims involved
   misstatements made by another party, Raymond James & Associates, as it
   helped raise funds to construct LAP’s facility.
          In response to Jalbert’s filing, Raymond James asserted affirmative
   defenses, citing a pre-bankruptcy indemnity agreement it made with LAP.
   The issue in this case is whether Raymond James may maintain those
   defenses against the assigned claims. The answer, in short, is no: The express
   language of the confirmation plan enjoined Raymond James’s defensive
   maneuver. And, in any event, the post-confirmation trust is the wrong entity
   against whom to invoke LAP’s indemnity obligation. On these grounds, we
   AFFIRM the bankruptcy court’s ruling.
                                             I
          The Constitution gives Congress the power to establish “uniform
   Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” U.S.
   Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. With that authority, Congress created the
   Bankruptcy Code, which provides a framework for debtors to “reorder their
   affairs, make peace with their creditors, and enjoy ‘a new opportunity in life

          _____________________
          1
           Though this case involves several parties, including LAP’s affiliated entity,
   German Pellets, this opinion refers to the Appellees as “LAP” and the Appellants as
   “Raymond James” for clarity.

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   with a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and
   discouragement of preexisting debt.’” Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286
   (1991) (quoting Loc. Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)). To achieve
   those objectives, the Code establishes formal debt-discharging procedures,
   organized in Chapters that include the provisions, case administration
   processes, and categorization of relevant parties and entities involved in
   bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532.
          Some Chapters are specific to the type of debtor seeking bankruptcy.
   Chapter 11, for example, is “intended primarily for the use of business
   debtors,” Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 166 (1991), and is the Chapter at
   issue in this case. Chapter 11 proceedings usually begin with a petition filed
   in bankruptcy court. 11 U.S.C. § 301(a). One perk of filing the petition is the
   “automatic stay” that insulates the debtor from a range of headaches, like
   lawsuits filed by creditors seeking to recover debts. Id. § 362. With outside
   litigation on pause, stakeholders take part in creating a Chapter 11 plan—a
   fundamental feature of Chapter 11 bankruptcies. See id. §§ 1121–29. The plan
   “govern[s] the distribution of valuable assets from the debtor’s estate and
   often keep[s] the business operating as a going concern.” Czyzewski v. Jevic
   Holding Corp., 580 U.S. 451, 455 (2017). Creditors have a say in the plan’s
   development, as they typically seek to maximize the order and amount of
   payment they receive. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123.
          A plan is accepted when creditors “hold[ing] at least two-thirds in
   amount and more than one-half in number of the allowed claims of such
   class” vote in its favor. See id. § 1126(c). After a successful vote, the plan is
   then passed to the bankruptcy judge for “confirmation”—the final step in
   the approval process. Id. § 1129. The judge, for her part, ensures that the plan
   meets several requirements outlined in the Bankruptcy Code, and then signs
   a confirmation order—essentially a judgment that binds all interested parties
   to the plan’s terms. See id. §§ 524, 1129, 1141.

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          While these plans often provide a roadmap that helps companies
   continue business operations, not all entities come out of Chapter 11 intact.
   In those cases, a liquidating trust is often created to pool the debtor’s
   remaining assets and administer those assets as provided for by the plan. Id.
   § 1123(b)(4) (“[A] plan may . . . provide for the sale of all or substantially all
   of the property of the estate, and the distribution of the proceeds of such sale
   among holders of claims or interests.”). Those who manage these liquidation
   trusts (trustees) may pursue litigation, asserting the residual rights from the
   debtor’s former estate. Id. § 1123(b)(3)(B) (explaining that residual claims
   from the defunct estate may be enforced “by the debtor, by the trustee, or by
   a representative of the estate appointed for such purpose”). Any recovery
   from these lawsuits is usually placed back in the trust and distributed to the
   trust’s beneficiaries according to the plan’s terms. See id. § 1141.
                                                II
          With these fundamentals in mind, we now turn to the facts giving rise
   to the bankruptcy at issue.
                                                A
          In a rural north Louisiana town, LAP sought to build a multi-million-
   dollar wood processing facility capable of refining raw wood into specialized
   fuel pellets. Constructing the facility required substantial capital, and to fund
   the enterprise, LAP sold 300 million dollars in bonds through a public
   financing authority.2 Perhaps encouraged by the plant’s potential, Raymond
   James purchased those bonds and resold them to other investors.
   Accompanying the sales were bond-offering memoranda, detailing the
   project’s financial viability. To protect its representations in these

          _____________________
          2
              This entity was the Louisiana Public Facility Authority.

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   memoranda, Raymond James entered into bond-issuing agreements with
   LAP, requiring LAP to indemnify Raymond James for loss resulting from
   “any untrue statement or misleading statement of material fact” within the
   memoranda.
          Though bond sales provided the necessary funds to build the project,
   LAP quickly encountered financial problems, demanding the abrupt
   cessation of its facility’s operations. Bond default soon followed, and the
   resulting monetary strains caused LAP to pursue Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
          After more than a year of undergoing the bankruptcy process, a
   bankruptcy judge confirmed a Chapter 11 plan and a corresponding
   liquidating trust agreement. Under the agreement, LAP transferred its
   remaining assets and causes of actions to the trust. It did so with the
   understanding that, if there were recoveries, the appointed trustee, Craig
   Jalbert, would distribute them to the trust’s beneficiaries.
          Meanwhile, Raymond James observed these Chapter 11 proceedings
   from afar; it “monitored the docket” and even communicated with LAP’s
   counsel throughout the process. Despite its knowledge of the proceedings,
   however, it never participated in LAP’s bankruptcy.
                                          B
          Unsurprisingly, some of the biggest losers in LAP’s bankruptcy were
   the bondholders who purchased the millions of dollars’ worth of bonds from
   Raymond James. Yet despite their lost investment, they had at least one
   unaffected means of legal recourse: The bondholders could file suit against
   Raymond James for its alleged misstatements regarding the bond sales. But
   rather than file multiple actions independently, the bondholders assigned
   “all claims, demands, and causes of action” stemming from misstatements
   in the bond-offering memoranda to Jalbert’s post-confirmation trust more
   than a year after its creation.

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           With these assignments in hand, Jalbert filed suit against Raymond
   James in Louisiana state court, alleging violations of state securities laws. In
   response, Raymond James filed a counterclaim against Jalbert. Citing the
   indemnity clause in the bond-issuing agreement it made with LAP, Raymond
   James argued it was entitled “to [c]ompensation . . . recoupment[,] and
   setoff.”3
           But Jalbert believed that Raymond James was prohibited from
   asserting those defenses. For one thing, Jalbert said that doing so conflicted
   with the express language in the bankruptcy confirmation order, which was
   binding in his view. By its terms, the order “permanently enjoined” “all
   persons who have held . . . a debt, Claim or Interest . . . from . . . asserting
   any setoff, right of subrogation, surcharge, or recoupment of any kind against
   any obligation due the Debtors.” Additionally, Jalbert said that the trust and
   LAP were separate entities. And even though the trust subsumed LAP’s
   legal claims, Jalbert reasoned that the trust did not subsume LAP’s liabilities.
   According to Jalbert, this meant that the trust was the wrong party against
   whom to raise LAP’s indemnity obligation. Noting these issues, Jalbert filed
   an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court and moved for declaratory relief
   through summary judgment.
           Raymond James opposed that motion and filed two of its own—one
   for summary judgment and one for relief from the confirmation order under
   Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). It argued that the provisions of the
   confirmation order did not apply under these specific circumstances and that
   the bankruptcy plan was either invalid, inequitable, or both. According to

           _____________________
           3
              A setoff is “[a] defendant’s counterdemand against a plaintiff, arising out of a
   transaction independent of a plaintiff’s claim” or “[a] debtor’s right to reduce the amount
   of a debt by any sum the creditor owes the debtor.” Setoff, Black’s Law Dictionary
   1581 (10th ed. 2014).

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   Raymond James, it never would have known that the bondholders would
   assign their claims to the post-confirmation trust, so it believed the plan’s
   relevant terms were unenforceable. It further argued that it had a right to
   assert defenses to limit or reduce any recovery based on the bond sales.
          After conducting a hearing, the bankruptcy court agreed with Jalbert.
   To that end, the court enforced the confirmation order against Raymond
   James as written, refused to allow Raymond James to invoke affirmative
   defenses against Jalbert based on LAP’s indemnity obligation, and declined
   amending the confirmation order under Rule 60(b). Following this ruling,
   Raymond James appealed to the district court, but to no avail: The district
   judge affirmed the bankruptcy court’s conclusions in all respects. Raymond
   James again appeals.
                                        III
          Under the bankruptcy appeals process, we are the second level of
   appellate review, though we perform the same task as the district court. In re
   U.S. Abatement Corp., 79 F.3d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, we
   review the bankruptcy court’s summary judgment ruling de novo. In re
   Shcolnik, 670 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 2012). Granting summary judgment is
   appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
   any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
   law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
          Determining whether the confirmation plan prevents Raymond James
   from asserting its defenses requires us to consider two legal questions. As a
   threshold matter, we must first address whether the confirmation plan
   applies to Raymond James. If it does, the next question asks whether the plan
   discharges the defenses Raymond James is attempting to assert against
   Jalbert.

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                                          A
          We start by asking whether the plan applies to Raymond James. In
   Raymond James’s view, the answer is no. It contends that it never received
   notice when LAP filed its petition in bankruptcy court. And without such
   notice, Raymond James says that it is not subject to the plan’s terms.
          It is true that the debtor has a general obligation to list its creditors
   when first filing a bankruptcy petition; the debtor’s failure to do so typically
   means the unlisted creditor’s claims are exempt from discharge. 11 U.S.C.
   § 523(a)(3). There is, however, a catch: If an interested party has “notice or
   actual knowledge” of the bankruptcy, that party must “come forward and
   protect their enhanced rights . . . or else lose their rights through the
   sweeping discharge of Chapter 11.” In re Christopher, 28 F.3d 512, 515, 519
   (5th Cir. 1994). In this context, the “notice requirement is satisfied when the
   creditor has actual knowledge of the case in time to permit [it] to take steps
   to protect [its] rights.” In re Sam, 894 F.2d 778, 781 (5th Cir. 1990).
          Here, no one disputes that LAP failed to list Raymond James as a
   creditor when it filed its bankruptcy petition. Although such an omission
   would usually preserve Raymond James’s pre-bankruptcy indemnity rights,
   11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3), Raymond James had “actual knowledge” of the
   bankruptcy case: It monitored the case’s progression from its
   commencement and even communicated with LAP’s counsel. Under our
   precedent, that knowledge obligated Raymond James to come forward with
   its indemnity claim. See In re Christopher, 28 F.3d at 518. But it never did;
   Raymond James chose not to assert any rights it had against LAP during the
   company’s bankruptcy proceedings. Nor did Raymond James object to the
   plan’s provisions that threatened to extinguish its pre-petition rights.
          Raymond James explains that it never could have known that the
   bondholders would have assigned their rights to Jalbert. In essence, its theory

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   is this: The indemnity rights against LAP are defensive and dependent upon
   the bondholders filing suit; thus, they were contingent and unliquidated
   when LAP filed for bankruptcy. Raymond James reasons that it could not
   have predicted that the bondholders would assign their claims to the post-
   confirmation trust after the bankruptcy was complete. And because the
   bondholders never filed suit before or during the pendency of LAP’s
   bankruptcy, Raymond James says that it was unaware that filing proof of
   claim was required. In its view, enforcing the plan with the benefit of
   hindsight is inequitable and unjust.
          But as the bankruptcy court observed, Raymond James’s “indemnity
   claims did not spring into existence only when the Bondholders assigned
   their own claims to the Liquidating Trustee”; “[t]hey arose pre-petition, and
   any reasonable party . . . should have acted to protect its claims once the
   Debtors filed for bankruptcy.” Raymond James, the court continued, is a
   sophisticated financial service firm and was aware of its litigation risks upon
   the filing of LAP’s bankruptcy and the “potential exposure to liability
   resulting from its assistance in the issuance and sale of bonds that later
   become illiquid.”
          We agree, and on these grounds and those above, resolve the first
   dispute with relative ease: Even though LAP failed to list Raymond James as
   a creditor when it filed for bankruptcy, Raymond James is nevertheless
   subject to the confirmation plan because of its actual knowledge of the
   underlying proceedings.
                                          B
          Having concluded that the confirmation plan applies, our next
   question is whether its provisions discharge the types of pre-petition claims
   Raymond James is asserting against Jalbert. The plan, by its terms,
   permanently enjoins “all persons who have held, currently hold or may hold

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   a debt” from “asserting any setoff, right of subrogation, surcharge, or
   recoupment of any kind against any obligation due the Debtors, the
   Reorganized Debtors, the Purchaser, their successors, heirs, executors,
   administrators, or assigns or their respective properties.”
          In its response to Jalbert’s lawsuit in state court, Raymond James
   expressly sought “recoupment and setoff” based on LAP’s pre-bankruptcy
   indemnity obligations. Those are the types of claims the confirmation plan
   expressly prohibits, and several bankruptcy courts have concluded that such
   bars are binding and enforceable when included in a confirmation plan. See,
   e.g., In re Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 217 B.R. 304, 311 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997)
   (“[I]n accordance with the provisions of the confirmed Plan, the
   Government is precluded from asserting its setoff rights.”); Daewoo Int’l
   (Am.) Corp. Creditor Tr. v. SSTS Am. Corp., No. 02 CIV. 9629 (NRB), 2003
   WL 21355214, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2003) (enforcing a “confirmed plan
   of reorganization” that “included a specific prohibition on the assertion of
   setoff or recoupment claims.”); In re SunCruz Casinos LLC, 342 B.R. 370,
   381 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006) (“[T]he Plan expressly prohibits the assertion of
   any setoff or recoupment rights, [and] the Court finds that such a provision
   is binding on creditors and parties in interest to the case . . . .”).
          Raymond James, for its part, does not point to any divergent authority.
   And absent any reason suggesting otherwise, we are unpersuaded that we
   should (or could) make an exception to the plan’s express prohibitions.
                                           IV
          But Raymond James argues that even if the plan is enforceable, the
   bankruptcy court abused its discretion by refusing to modify the plan under
   Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). This Rule permits a court to relieve a
   party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
   in certain situations or for any “reason that justifies relief.” Id. When

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   reviewing such rulings, we defer “to the sound discretion of the [bankruptcy
   court],” and set aside denials for “abuse of . . . discretion.” Seven Elves, Inc.
   v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 402 (5th Cir. 1981).
          In seeking relief below, Raymond James cited 11 U.S.C. § 1127(b),
   which provides, in part,
          The proponent of a plan or the reorganized debtor may modify
          such plan at any time after confirmation of such plan and before
          substantial consummation of such plan, but may not modify
          such plan so that such plan as modified fails to meet the
          requirements of sections 1122 and 1123 of this title.
          Raymond James argued that, while § 1127 does not specifically
   provide for modification after substantial consummation (which occurred
   here), nothing in § 1127 expressly prohibits a party from seeking relief from a
   confirmation order under Rule 60(b). According to Raymond James, that is
   why Rule 60(b) is the appropriate vehicle to seek a rewrite of the confirmation
   plan. As noted above, Raymond James says it could not have anticipated that
   Jalbert would obtain the bondholders’ assignments. So even if it is subject to
   the plan and it terms apply, it asked the court to make an exception in the
   interests of fairness.
          After the bankruptcy court’s “own study of § 1127’s plain language,”
   however, it declined to modify the confirmation plan. It concluded that
   Raymond James is “likely barred from seeking [such] relief under Rule
   60(b).” And even if it could, the court believed granting the Rule 60(b)
   motion was inappropriate. In reaching its conclusion, the court focused on
   Raymond James’s actual knowledge of the bankruptcy proceedings. As
   explained, Raymond James was “fully aware of the bankruptcy case but failed
   to participate.” The bankruptcy judge, for that reason, refused to “roll back
   the clock” and allow Raymond James a second bite at the apple. Such a
   conclusion is not “unwarranted” for the reasons expressed by the

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   bankruptcy court and those discussed above. We thus conclude the
   bankruptcy judge did not abuse its discretion in denying Raymond James’s
   Rule 60(b) motion.
                                             V
          Raymond James alternatively asserts that the plan’s language is
   invalid based on a litany of theories rooted in the Bankruptcy Code. But
   addressing these arguments would be a futile exercise, as Raymond James
   cannot overcome one legal obstacle precluding its desired result: Even if
   Raymond James could show that the terms of the confirmation plan were
   invalid, the trust is not the appropriate party against whom to raise its setoff
   defenses. As explained, the claims Jalbert lodged against Raymond James
   were not residual causes of action transferred from LAP’s estate; Jalbert’s
   right to assert these claims arose solely from the third-party assignments
   post-confirmation. Raymond James’s setoff defense, by contrast, only
   existed vis-à-vis LAP. Raymond James is thus invoking a defunct debtor’s
   obligation to defend against third-party allegations. Such a maneuver in most
   other cases would be barred.4 And had the bondholders independently
   litigated their claims pre-bankruptcy, it is doubtful Raymond James could
   respond with the affirmative defenses it attempts to invoke now.
          Raymond James counters that the situation here is unique, claiming
   that the post-confirmation trust “stands in the shoes” of LAP’s estate.
   Raymond James reasons that co-mingling the assets of LAP’s former estate

          _____________________
          4
              As the district court observed, Raymond James readily acknowledges that it
   “would not have rights of setoff against the bondholders if the bondholders had sued
   directly and had the assignment of the bondholders’ claims against Raymond James to the
   Liquidating Trustee not occurred. . . . And such would remain to be the case even if
   Raymond James’ indemnity rights against the Debtors had not been discharged by the
   Bankruptcy Plan . . . .”

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   with the bondholder’s assigned claims creates a situation where the trust is
   acting in the place of the defunct debtor. It goes on to explain that LAP’s
   indemnity obligations and the sales of the bonds are part of the same
   transaction for purposes of its recoupment. For that reason, Raymond James
   believes that this court should allow it to raise these claims in a defensive
   posture.
          Raymond James’s argument has a few flaws. To begin with, the
   express language of the agreement that created Jalbert’s post-confirmation
   trust stated that the “Liquidating Trust shall have a separate existence from
   the Debtors”; it was not created to serve as “successor-in-interest of the
   Debtors for any purpose” except as provided in the plan. Beyond this clear
   intent to keep the trust and the defunct debtor separate, Raymond James
   faces another legal impediment: our binding precedent.
          We have held in other cases that post-confirmation entities and the
   debtor’s estate are distinct. We made this principle clear in In re United
   Operating, LLC, 540 F.3d 351, 356 (5th Cir. 2008), a case involving a
   bankrupt company that similarly liquidated its assets under Chapter 11. After
   confirmation in United Operating, the post-confirmation entity brought an
   action against a creditor and several other defendants, arguing that they
   mismanaged the company’s properties during bankruptcy. But because these
   causes of action were not preserved in the plan, we reasoned that the post-
   confirmation entity had “no standing.” Id. In so holding, we explained that
   the debtor’s estate “ceased to exist” upon confirmation. Id. at 355. Such an
   outcome, we believed, underscored the logical consequence of bankruptcy:
   securing the “prompt, effective administration and settlement of all debtor’s
   assets and liabilities within a limited time.” Id. (quoting In re Kroh Bros. Dev.
   Co., 100 B.R. 487, 495 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.1989)); see also In re Palmaz Sci.,
   Inc., No. 16-50552-CAG, 2018 WL 3343597, at *11 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. June 4,

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   2018) (“[T]he United Operating opinion recognizes that the debtor, debtor in
   possession, and the post-confirmation entity are all separate entities.”).
          Raymond James acknowledges that authority and the language
   establishing Jalbert’s trust but argues that applying both in this case results
   in a fundamentally unfair outcome—one the United States Supreme Court
   sought to prevent in Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. of New York,
   406 U.S. 416 (1972). Caplin concerned whether an appointed bankruptcy
   trustee could pursue claims belonging to creditors on behalf of a bankruptcy
   estate transferred by a judge. The Supreme Court held that the trustee was
   unable to do so, citing three reasons for its conclusion. Id. at 428–34; see also
   Grede v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 598 F.3d 899, 901–02 (7th Cir. 2010) (analyzing
   these three reasons in detail). First, it reasoned that statutory authority
   delineated the bankruptcy trustee’s powers and lacked provisions allowing
   bankruptcy judges to transfer third-party claims to trustees. See Caplin, 406
   U.S. at 428–29. Second, the Court was concerned that, by pursuing third-
   party claims without assignment, any recovery may create a right of
   subrogation for anything the trustee recovered. See id. at 429–31. And finally,
   the Caplin Court was worried about double recoveries for the claims “placed
   in the trustee’s hands by the judge rather than by the claims’ owners.” Grede,
   598 F.3d at 902; see Caplin, 406 U.S. at 431–34.
          By receiving and pursuing creditors’ claims post-confirmation,
   Raymond James contends that Jalbert circumvented Caplin with a procedural
   sleight-of-hand. Permitting such a ploy, Raymond James believes, is not only
   unjust but contrary to law.
          Yet, no matter how Raymond James frames it, “Caplin does not apply
   to the activities of a liquidating trust created by a plan of reorganization.”
   Grede, 598 F.3d at 903. Importantly, the bondholders here voluntarily
   assigned their claims to Jalbert. And unlike those in Caplin, LAP’s

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   bankruptcy proceedings concluded before the trust lodged the assigned
   claims against Raymond James. Id. Most importantly of all, this case presents
   none of the concerns the Caplin court raised. Here, for instance, the trust
   agreement, rather than the Bankruptcy Code, governs Jalbert’s duties and
   powers; no one raises the issue of subrogation; and there is no possibility of a
   double recovery, for Jalbert holds the exclusive right to pursue the assigned
   claims.
          This is all to say that Caplin does not prevent Jalbert from asserting
   the bondholder’s assigned claims against Raymond James. If Raymond James
   had objections to Jalbert’s ability to accept third-party assignments, it could
   have raised those concerns as LAP developed its bankruptcy plan; raising
   them now, several years post-confirmation, is too little too late.
                                         VI
          In sum, we refuse to rewrite the confirmation plan, which applies to
   Raymond James and bars the defenses it is attempting to invoke in state court
   against Jalbert. Even if Raymond James was not subject to the plan, LAP no
   longer exists, and neither the bondholders nor post-confirmation entity are
   its successors-in-interest. On these facts, Jalbert need not shoulder LAP’s
   liabilities and Raymond James is precluded from invoking them defensively.
          AFFIRMED

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