Court Opinion

ID: 9385471
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-06 20:00:37.13314+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:02.220229
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-12960    Document: 40-1     Date Filed: 04/06/2023   Page: 1 of 7

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 21-12960
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       TYRONE KEVIN SMITH,
                                                   Petitioner-Appellant,
       versus
       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                                  Respondent-Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 9:20-cv-81291-RLR
                          ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                21-12960

       Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Tyrone Smith appeals the district court’s denial of his mo-
       tion to vacate his conviction based on his contention that his 18
       U.S.C. § 924(o) conviction is unconstitutional. Specifically, Smith
       contends that he was convicted under the unconstitutional residual
       clause of Section 924(c)(3) and that his conviction for attempted
       armed bank robbery is not a “crime of violence” under the still-
       constitutional elements clause of Section 924(c)(3). We disagree
       and affirm.
              Smith and his brothers were caught by the FBI while plan-
       ning to rob a bank at gunpoint. In 2015, Smith pleaded guilty to
       three crimes arising from this arrest: conspiracy to commit armed
       bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, attempted armed bank
       robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and 2113(d), and con-
       spiracy to carry and use a firearm during a crime of violence in vi-
       olation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(o). This appeal is about the third convic-
       tion—conspiracy to carry or use a firearm during a crime of vio-
       lence.
               Section 924(o) makes it a crime to conspire to commit an
       offense under Section 924(c), which itself makes it a crime to carry
       or use a firearm “during and in relation to any crime of violence or
       drug trafficking crime.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The statute de-
       fines a “crime of violence” by reference to two clauses. Under what
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       21-12960                Opinion of the Court                         3

       we call the “elements clause,” the statute says that a crime of vio-
       lence is a felony that “(A) has as an element the use, attempted use,
       or threatened use of physical force against the person or property
       of another.” Id. § 924(c)(3)(A). Under the “residual clause,” the stat-
       ute provides that a crime of violence is a felony “(B) that by its na-
       ture, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the per-
       son or property of another may be used in the course of commit-
       ting the offense.” Id. § 924(c)(3)(B).
              Turning back to Smith’s case, the record does not reflect
       why the parties and district court believed that Smith’s underlying
       offense—attempted bank robbery—was a “crime of violence.” No
       one discussed this definitional issue during his guilty plea proceed-
       ings or his sentencing proceedings. Likewise, the parties’ written
       plea agreement did not address why they believed attempted bank
       robbery was a crime of violence. Instead, the parties and court
       simply assumed that Smith’s conviction for attempted bank rob-
       bery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and 2113(d) was a crime of violence
       that could support a conviction under Section 924(o).
              After Smith’s conviction became final, the Supreme Court
       held that the statute’s residual clause—Section 924(c)(3)(B)—is un-
       constitutionally vague in United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. ___, 139
       S. Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019). Davis announced a new substantive rule
       that applies retroactively to convictions that are already final. In re
       Hammoud, 931 F.3d 1032, 1038–39 (11th Cir. 2019).
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                21-12960

             Based on Davis, Smith filed a motion to vacate his long-final
       Section 924(o) conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court
       denied Smith’s motion, and this is his appeal.
              We have held that a movant like Smith—who argues that
       his conviction is unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s hold-
       ing in Davis—must “bear the burden of showing that he is actually
       entitled to relief on his Davis claim, meaning he will have to show
       that his § 924(c) [or § 924(o)] conviction resulted from application
       of solely the [now-unconstitutional] residual clause.” Hammoud,
       931 F.3d at 1041; see also Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215,
       1221–25 (11th Cir. 2017). Sometimes, this kind of question can be
       resolved by a “finding of historical fact”—in other words, there
       may be record evidence that the unconstitutional clause did or did
       not lead to a conviction or sentence. Williams v. United States, 985
       F.3d 813, 816 (11th Cir. 2021). Sometimes, the question must be
       resolved “by reference to legal principles alone”—that is, parsing
       the state of the law to determine whether the residual clause af-
       fected the conviction or sentence. Id. In any event, we have been
       clear that a district court should deny a Section 2255 motion if the
       movant cannot meet his burden to establish that his conviction was
       based on the now-unconstitutional residual clause. Id.
             The government argues that Smith cannot establish that his
       conviction was based on the residual clause. We agree. There is no
       record evidence that suggests the now-unconstitutional residual
       clause was the basis for Smith’s conviction. And Smith has not
       pointed to any legal principles or caselaw at the time of this
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       21-12960                Opinion of the Court                          5

       conviction that would suggest the residual clause was the basis for
       his conviction. The bank robbery statute under which Smith
       pleaded guilty punishes someone who, “in committing, or in at-
       tempting to commit” bank robbery “assaults any person, or puts in
       jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon
       or device.” 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d). Given these elements and the lack
       of caselaw saying otherwise, it is just as likely that the parties and
       court concluded that Smith’s crime was a crime of violence under
       the elements clause as the residual clause. See, e.g., United States
       v. Lockley, 632 F.3d 1238, 1245 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that at-
       tempted robbery under Florida law satisfied the Sentencing Guide-
       lines’ similar, but not identical, elements clause).
              Smith contends that he should not be required to establish
       that his conviction was based on the now-unconstitutional residual
       clause to get relief under Davis. He makes two arguments on this
       front, but neither is persuasive.
               First, Smith argues that the government has waived the is-
       sue of his inability to satisfy this burden because it previously joined
       him in moving this court to reverse the district court’s decision.
       We denied that motion. We are not required to accept the govern-
       ment’s concession of error “when the law and record do not justify
       it.” United States v. Linville, 228 F.3d 1330, 1331 n.2 (11th Cir.
       2000). And we have held that a concession of law is not binding on
       us. United States v. Colston, 4 F.4th 1179, 1187 (11th Cir. 2021).
       After we denied the parties’ joint motion, the government filed a
       brief that argued that we should affirm because Smith had not met
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 21-12960

       his burden to establish that the residual clause affected his convic-
       tion. That issue has, therefore, not been waived.
              Second, Smith argues that we should consider the state of
       the law today to determine whether his conviction was based on
       the residual clause. And he says today’s caselaw—particularly
       United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022)—establishes that he
       could not have been convicted under the elements clause because
       (he says) attempted bank robbery would not count as a crime of
       violence under today’s caselaw. Therefore, he reasons, he must
       have been convicted under the residual clause.
              Smith’s argument is inconsistent with our precedents. In
       Hammoud, we specifically held that a movant in Smith’s position
       must “show that his § 924(c) [or § 924(o)] conviction resulted from
       application of solely the residual clause.” 931 F.3d at 1041. We cited
       our decision in Beeman for that proposition. Id. And, in Beeman,
       we held that a movant could not satisfy his burden when “there is
       nothing in the record suggesting that the district court relied on
       only the residual clause,” and he “pointed to no precedent in 2009
       holding, or otherwise making obvious, that [his underlying crime]
       qualified as a violent felony only under the residual clause.” Bee-
       man, 871 F.3d at 1224. We “note[d] that Beeman has likewise
       pointed to no precedent since 2009 so holding.” Id. at 1224 n.5. But
       we explained that “even if such precedent had been announced
       since Beeman's sentencing hearing, it would not answer the ques-
       tion before us” because a court’s “decision today that [the underly-
       ing crime] no longer qualifies under present law as a violent felony
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       21-12960                Opinion of the Court                         7

       under the elements clause (and thus could now qualify only under
       the defunct residual clause) would be a decision that casts very little
       light, if any, on the key question of historical fact here: whether in
       2009 Beeman was, in fact, sentenced under the residual clause
       only.” Id.
               Smith points out that we considered the current state of the
       law in answering a similar question in Alvarado-Linares v. United
       States, 44 F.4th 1334, 1341 (11th Cir. 2022). But we did so only be-
       cause “the parties d[id] not distinguish between the state of the law
       at the time of the conviction and the state of the law today.” Id. We
       explained that we were considering recent judicial decisions only
       to “decide this appeal as the parties have litigated it.” Id. Unlike in
       Alvarado-Linares, the government here has asked us to distinguish
       between the state of the law at the time of Smith’s conviction in
       2015 and the state of the law today. Our precedents compel us to
       do so.
               Smith cannot meet his burden of showing that he was more
       likely than not convicted solely under the residual clause.
              AFFIRMED.