Court Opinion

ID: 9494506
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:38:59.979063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:26.485867
License: Public Domain

GOULD, Circuit Judge,
with whom FERNANDEZ and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges, join, Concurring in part and Dissenting in part:
I concur in part in the majority opinion’s analysis concerning error in comment on post-arrest, pre-Miranda, silence. In my view, this analysis is correct as applied to the questions whether the accused said anything (Q: “Did he say anything?” A: “No”) or denied anything (Q: “Did he deny knowledge?” A: “No”). I agree that these questions and their answers offered into evidence violated the Fifth Amendment rights of the accused. I also fully agree that there was no waiver arising from the subsequent waiver of Miranda rights.
Nonetheless, I respectfully dissent from the opinion’s application of the Fifth Amendment prohibition against comment on silence to what I consider the demeanor evidence (Q: ‘What was his response when you told him there was marijuana found in the vehicle?” A: “There was no response. He didn’t look surprised or upset or whatever.” Q: “So he just sat there?” A: “Yes.”). And I respectfully dissent as well from the majority opinion’s harmless error analysis. I would affirm the judgment of the district court, thinking the error committed was smaller in scope than is presented by the majority opinion, and in any event concluding that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Evidence of demeanor is different than evidence of mere silence. Demeanor evidence should normally be admissible because it is non-testimonial. Justice Holmes wrote of a comparable distinction almost a century ago:
[T]he prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material. The objection in principle would forbid a jury to look at a prisoner and compare his features with a photograph in proof.
Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53, 31 S.Ct. 2, 54 L.Ed. 1021 (1910) (quoted in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966)).
I write to explain my views on the distinction between evidence of silence and evidence of demeanor. Although the majority opinion in this case does not accept this distinction for constitutional purposes, I rather think this distinction is required here by controlling precedent. Asking, “what did he do,” differs from asking, “what did he say?” The former does not relate to a communicative response and does not violate the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights. Demeanor is not a proxy for silence. For demeanor relates to a defendant’s physical characteristics, says more than silence, and is something other than silence.
I
I have noted above the questions that I consider proscribed comments on silence, as compared to the questions that are inquiries on demeanor, which I think were permissible. I agree with the majority opinion’s view that Fifth Amendment rights were offended by the questions about whether Velarde-Gomez said anything or denied anything when confronted with discovery of contraband almost completely filling his gas tank. But I consider it different to inquire whether there was *1038any response; whether Velarde-Gomez was surprised or upset; and whether he just sat there. In my view, questions about the accused’s response and exhibited mental state are not the same as questions about silence. The district court’s decision to admit evidence of the defendant’s demeanor was correct. My views are in accord with those of the original panel’s opinion:1
[EJvidence of one’s fingerprints, handwriting, vocal characteristics, stance, stride, gestures, or blood characteristics ... as well as evidence of an intoxicated person’s “slurring of speech and other evidence of lack of muscular coordination” does not violate the Fifth Amendment ... Thus, evidence of one’s physical characteristics is nontestimonial....
.... Like admissible evidence of gestures or muscular coordination, evidence of demeanor relates to physical characteristics, not efforts at communication. It describes one’s mood rather than one’s answers to questions.... Pursuant to Schmerber and its progeny, evidence of Velarde-Gomez’s physical reactions and emotional state is evidence of his physical characteristics rather than communicative evidence.... [S]uch evidence is not testimonial and thus its admission into evidence does not violate Velarde-Gomez’s Fifth Amendment rights.
United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 224 F.3d 1062, 1070-71 (9th Cir.2000) (citations omitted), rev’d en banc, 269 F.3d 1023, 2001 WL 1262610 (9th Cir.2001). Evidence of demeanor is not communicative or testimonial because it is evidence of a physical response, and not the defendant’s “knowledge of facts relating him to the offense ... [or] his thoughts and beliefs [about the offense].” Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 213, 108 S.Ct. 2341, 101 L.Ed.2d 184 (1988).
I can understand why the majority’s reasoned opinion has difficulty in this case making the distinction between questions about the physical response of demeanor and questions about silence. For in this case, the questions about demeanor are parceled together in a series with improper questions about what the defendant said or denied. Perhaps just as people may be known by their associates, so too questions may be known by company they keep, and given a meaning in context that they would not have alone. Thus questions here that address demeanor are thought by the majority to address silence. The majority’s proscription of demeanor evidence in this case is understandable in this peculiar context but it fails to appreciate the subtle but important distinction between conduct intended as an assertion and demeanor. For example, in discussing Whitehead, the majority treats the impermissible comments about what the defendant said as identical to comments made about how Velarde-Gomez acted. Respecting that the difference is important, I would prefer still to follow Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), or if needed to extend it,2 to make clear that neither Miranda nor the Fifth Amendment prevents inquiry about post-arrest demeanor before Miranda warnings are given. This approach might have the benefit of giving law enforcement a clearer *1039guide for permissible action. For example, what if the only question asked here of the accused and related to the jury was “What was his response when you told him there was marijuana found in the vehicle?” If this question was not side-by-side with questions about what the defendant said, does the rule announced by the majority opinion permit it? Does the word response convey a verbal response? And if this question about “response” is still too close to a question on silence, then what if the only questions asked about the confrontation with the contraband evidence were questions such as “was he upset?” or “was he angry?” or “was he nervous?” I see these inquiries as calling for physical evidence, asking about physical response, inquiring about exhibited emotional state, and I do not see any way in which Miranda or the Fifth Amendment would outlaw such questions under existing precedent any more than testimony that a suspect began to tremble or to sweat profusely would be outlawed.
The distinction between admissible evidence of conduct or physical response and inadmissable evidence of silence is made clear when we consider how the law treats flight. “Evidence of flight is generally admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt and of guilt itself.” United States v. Harris, 792 F.2d 866, 869 (9th Cir.1986). Evidence of demeanor is similar to evidence of flight because both are physical responses and both are non-testimonial. If, after a stop or arrest, an officer questions a suspect and the suspect flees, then evidence of such conduct is surely admissible under Harris because it shows guilt. The majority opinion rule excluding demeanor evidence is inconsistent with this principle. Whether a suspect has demean- or that is cool or excited when questioned, whether his jaw drops open or he breaks out in a sweat, that conduct should be admissible and the trier of fact may give the demeanor evidence such weight as is appropriate. The majority position incorrectly may be read in a pre-Miranda warnings context to outlaw the use of evidence of demeanor. But for me, unless wholly altered by context, evidence of demeanor is more in the nature of conduct than testimony. Demeanor, like flight, is a physical response that has probative value for a jury. As here, the demeanor of non-response may include the idea that an accused person was silent. But it is not for that reason alone a comment on silence. In fact, the demeanor inquiries here asked for and received other information that may have been relevant to a jury. Was defendant showing surprise? Did defendant look upset? Was he angry? Was he cool and collected? This information goes well beyond silence and is properly viewed in the realm of physical response. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 590-600, 110 S.Ct. 2688, 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (distinguishing between permissible evidence of how a DUI suspect spoke, his slurred speech, from impermissible testimony concerning the content of his speech, what he communicated). So long as there is no inquiry about silence, explicitly or implicitly as a result of context, it is for the jury to weigh demeanor evidence. This properly includes evidence of visage, composure, surprise or anger, or any other evidence of how the defendant acted except for a proscribed comment on silence. The Fifth Amendment should not be held to prohibit or screen out evidence of an accused person’s composure, temperament, or demonstrated emotions when under pressure of events.3
*1040II
Even if, as the majority opinion concludes, the district court erred in admitting the evidence of the defendant’s demeanor, this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); United States v. Newman, 943 F.2d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir.1991).
In deciding whether the district court’s error was harmless, the majority looks at the Newman factors: (1) the extent of the challenged comments; (2) whether an inference of guilt from silence was stressed in argument to the jury; and (3) an evaluation of other evidence of guilt. Assuming that in this case demeanor equates with silence, I would have little quarrel with the majority’s discussion on the first of the Newman factors. The related series of questions was extensive. The weight to be given the second factor is not entirely clear. In closing argument the prosecution stressed the questions that I call demeanor questions and did not mention the testimony of questions and answers about lack of statement or denial. Notwithstanding, if for this harmless error analysis I assume the majority correct to equate demeanor with silence, then I view the majority’s discussion of the second factor as fair. But the majority gives inadequate weight to the dispositive third factor, other and unmistakable evidence of guilt.
We are trying to decide if we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have decided on guilt the same way absent the constitutional error. And the way in which we are to apply this standard is clear:
[A] court must approach [the Chapman reasonable-doubt standard] by asking whether the force of the evidence presumably considered by the jury ... is so overwhelming as to leave it beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict resting on that evidence would have been the same in the absence of [the trial error],
Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 405, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991), overruled on other grounds, Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 73 n. 4, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991).
Here, a consideration of the more than ample evidence of Velar de-Gomez’s guilt and a recognition that his asserted tale of innocence is wholly preposterous, weigh heavily towards a conclusion that the district court’s error was harmless. In light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt, I do not believe for a moment that any reasonable jury would have decided this case any other way even if the, prosecution’s silence and demeanor questions had never been asked, answered and ■relayed to the jury.
The evidence before the district court showed unmistakably that the defendant was the driver, sole occupant, and owner of an automobile containing in its gas tank, sixty-three pounds of marijuana and less than two gallons of gas. The defendant also made many inconsistent statements about his visit to Mexico, his activity while there, and the length of time his car was out of his possession. These inconsistent statements and the sole possession in his car of a large tank filled with marijuana are much more than enough for a jury to convict the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. This was not a thin case but an extremely strong one in which the defendant’s only hope was to try to capitalize on prosecutorial error. Not for a moment should we as judges on this record think *1041that Velarde-Gomez could have been innocent.
As I see it, the defendant must have known about the marijuana in the gas tank. Because of the sixty-three pounds of marijuana, his gas tank could not even hold two gallons of gas. It is improbable beyond a reasonable doubt that a drug smuggler would put sixty-three pounds of marijuana in the gas tank of someone else’s car without the driver being aware, knowing that this duped driver could run out of gas and jeopardize the transport of drugs valued at more than $50,000.
Perhaps, the argument goes, someone could have put marijuana in the defendant’s gas tank while he was away from his vehicle, with plans to follow him across the border, waiting for him to run out of gas. Next, the argument runs, after the car entered the United States, this guilty drug smuggler could approach the innocent driver’s ear and somehow secure the 63 pounds of drugs from the duped driver. This argument is fanciful and wholly unpersuasive. Could a drug smuggler really have inserted 63 pounds of marijuana in the defendant’s gas tank without first making some mechanical alterations to the car? Is it really possible that the drugs were placed in the gas tank while defendant innocently and temporarily ate, caroused, or slept? It seems to me inescapable that the drugs came on board with the consent and complicity of Velarde-Gomez. An innocent explanation is remote and does not raise reasonable doubt of guilt. Also remote is the idea that the smuggler would proceed in this manner without a knowing accomplice. There is no way that someone smuggling drugs could know for certain that a duped driver would drive straight across the border with less than two gallons of gas without going somewhere else first, perhaps to a gas station, where an obstruction in the gas tank would be immediately discoverable. Indeed, it seems highly unlikely for drug smugglers to entrust their contraband cargo in a stranger’s gas tank, not knowing when the driver would head for the border, or if he would head for the border at all. Even if the guilty smuggler knew the innocent driver was planning to go straight to the United States, the innocent driver, driving on a near empty gas tank, would soon run out of gas after crossing the border, thereby inviting complications such as routine help from Good Samaritans or even police, help that drug traffickers likely would not want to encounter.
This entire conveniently-constructed argument is too flimsy a straw to warrant disregard of the jury’s solemn and fair conclusion of guilt of a man caught red-handed at the border with his car filled with illicit drugs. The evidence unmistakably shows that the defendant was a knowing participant in drug smuggling. I cannot see how a jury could have credited the defendant’s unbelievable tale, regardless of the challenged testimony, nor should we credit this tale in rejecting the sound theory of harmless error.4
III
The district court correctly concluded that evidence of post-arrest, pre-Miranda *1042warning demeanor is admissible. And even if the admission of this evidence was error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. I would affirm the district court.

. Although the original panel opinion is no longer precedent because of our en banc process, I adopt its reasoning as persuasive.

. I read the United States Supreme Court's decision in Schmerber to require us to make the important distinction between demeanor and silence. Thus I would follow Schmerber. But if Schmerber were read more narrowly, then I would extend it to demeanor as a matter of our circuit law.

. I would leave open whether in a particular case such inquiry about demeanor in context offends due process. But I do not think this is such a case. Indeed, even if I thought this *1040were such a case, I would still write separately to clarify that demeanor questions, at least when not in immediate context of silence questions, do not offend Miranda.

. The United States Supreme Court has cautioned us not to set the test for harmless error so high that it can never be met:
To set [the harmless error] barrier so high that it could never be surmounted would justify the very criticism that spawned the harmless-error doctrine in the first place: "Reversal for error, regardless of its effect on the judgment, encourages litigants to abuse the judicial process and bestirs the public to ridicule it.”
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (quoting R. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 50 (1970)).