Court Opinion

ID: 9562561
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:31:27.95122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:24.063450
License: Public Domain

EaRNHill, C. J.,
concurring: There is grave error appearing in tbe record. But it is error committed by tbe jury. No error was committed by tbe presiding judge unless it was error on bis part to decline to exercise bis discretionary power to grant tbe motion to set aside tbe verdict. Thus be could have saved tbe situation. In tbe absence of prejudicial error committed by him, we are without authority to disturb the verdict and judgment entered thereon.
When a nonowner-operator of a motor vehicle, by bis negligent operation thereof, injures tbe person or damages tbe property of another, G.S. 20-71.1 makes proof of tbe ownership of tbe vehicle prima facie evidence that tbe operator was, at tbe time, tbe agent or employee of tbe owner' and was about bis master’s business, so as to render tbe owner liable in damages under tbe doctrine of respondeat superior. This fact, which tbe jury may, but is not compelled to infer from tbe mere proof of ownership, is not an inference of fact which naturally and necessarily follows proof of’ ownership. It is a bare, artificial inference manufactured by statute.
*230In this case it is not supported by a single fact or circumstance appearing of record. On the contrary, all the testimony and every fact and circumstance disclosed by the record tend to show that the operator was on a mission of his own and was at the time operating the vehicle without the knowledge, consent, or approval — either express or implied — of the owner. There was no effort to attack the reputation or impeach the testimony of any one of the witnesses who so testified. We must, therefore, assume they are persons of character and integrity. Yet the jury adopted the bare, artificial inference of fact permitted by the statute and found that it was sufficient to override and outweigh all the positive evidence to the contrary. While we may grant new trials for errors of law committed by the trial judge, we are without authority to correct this error in the verdict. The jury was the final arbiter of the facts. Therefore we must affirm a judgment which compels the defendant to pay plaintiff-$18,000 which he should not be required to pay. This offends my every sense of justice and fair play. I can only say that it is most unfortunate that judicial officers should be placed in a position where they must deny relief against injustice in the name of the law. While we need some statute such as G-.S. 20-71.1, this Act should be so amended as to afford the Court an opportunity to grant relief in a ease of this kind.
Since the trial judge committed no error in the trial of the cause, I must, in compliance with my oath to administer the law as it is written, concede that the judgment entered must be affirmed. • In so doing, I make my assent as negative as language will permit.
WiNBORNE and Paekee, JJ., join in concurring opinion.