Court Opinion

ID: 9895093
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-04 06:15:20.037677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:58.641836
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed November 2, 2023

                                       In The

        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                    __________

                                 No. 11-22-00035-CV
                                     __________

     IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ROBBIE CHRIS
                 BRISTOW, DECEASED

                    On Appeal from the 259th District Court
                            Jones County, Texas
                        Trial Court Cause No. 025056

                     MEMORANDUM OPINION
      Robbie Chris Bristow (Decedent) executed two different wills in the year prior
to his death. Appellant, Rebecca Bristow, is Decedent’s wife. Appellant filed this
appeal challenging probate of the latter will per the trial court’s Order Probating Will
and Authorizing Letters Testamentary.         The will was submitted for probate
following Decedent’s death and Appellant contested the probate, claiming, as she
does on appeal, that the will was invalid because (1) Decedent lacked testamentary
capacity, and (2) Decedent was unduly influenced at the time the will was made.
Appellant additionally claims on appeal that the trial court erred in its determination
of proper venue and in finding that the will was valid. We affirm the order of the
trial court.
                                 Factual and Procedural History
        Decedent’s first of two wills was signed on December 13, 2019, (December
Will) and the second was signed on May 27, 2020 (May Will). The May Will was
submitted for probate in August 2020. At the time of the drafting/signing of the May
Will, Decedent was in the midst of a divorce proceeding with Appellant. But a final
divorce decree was not signed prior to Decedent’s death. During their approximately
13-year marriage, Decedent and Appellant had a son, L.B. L.B. was born into the
marriage and was legally Decedent’s son.1 Decedent had two other children: a son—
who was disinherited in both wills and is not part of this lawsuit—and a daughter,
Tisha Westbrook, the Appellee in this case. 2
        After Appellant filed for divorce in January 2020, Decedent was moved to
Tisha’s home to live with her. Decedent suffered from liver disease, diabetes, and—
sometime prior to the relevant events in the case—had a lower-leg amputation.
There was testimony that Decedent was dependent upon others for transportation
and other necessities related to his care. At the time Decedent executed the May
Will, his attorney had no concerns about his mental capacities. Tisha, with whom
Decedent continued to live until his death, similarly testified that she had no
concerns about his mental capacity on the day he signed the May Will.
        Decedent died on August 5, 2020, and his May Will was submitted for probate
two days later. Appellant filed a will contest one week later. In October 2021, there

        1
          There was a paternity question raised in the counterpetition for divorce, but no DNA test was done
prior to his second will and Decedent’s death.
        2
          Tisha is an adult and was adopted by her paternal grandparents at some point, making her
Decedent’s biological daughter, but also legally his sister. She is referred to as his sister in the May Will.
Tisha testified that she always referred to Decedent as “dad.” We refer to her as the Decedent’s daughter
in this opinion.
                                                     2
was a final hearing on the will contest. Three witnesses testified. Two for the
applicant: Decedent’s attorney and Decedent’s daughter Tisha; and one for the
contestant: Appellant, Decedent’s wife. Following the hearing, the trial court
ordered the May Will probated.
      Appellant raises one issue for review on appeal: Decedent’s will should not
have been admitted into probate. Appellant claims that four arguments support her
sole issue.   First, Decedent was unduly influenced; second, Decedent lacked
testamentary capacity; third, evidence was improperly excluded by the trial court;
and fourth, venue was improper. We first address the fourth argument regarding
venue, then the first and second arguments that relate to the validity of the will, then
the third argument as to evidence excluded by the trial court.
                 The Motion to Transfer Venue was not timely filed.
      Appellant argues that the proceedings should have been transferred from
Jones County to Taylor County. Although Decedent lived with Tisha in Jones
County in the months before he died, Appellant argues that he was still a resident of
Taylor County at the time of his death. Under Section 33.001(a) of the Texas Estates
Code, if the decedent had a domicile or fixed place of residence, venue for probate
proceedings is in the county where the decedent resided. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN.
§ 33.001(a)(1) (West 2020). If the decedent did not have a domicile or fixed place
of residence, venue for probate proceedings is in the county where the decedent’s
principal estate was located at the time of death or the county where the decedent
died. See id. § 33.001(a)(2)(A). Appellant argued in the motion to transfer venue
that Decedent’s residence was in Taylor County at the time of his death and that
filing for probate in Jones County was improper. The probated will similarly states
that Decedent was a resident of Taylor County at the time it was created/signed on
May 27, 2020. Tisha argues that Appellant failed to file the motion to transfer venue
in a timely manner.
                                           3
        We agree that the motion to transfer venue was untimely. A motion to transfer
venue was filed approximately five months after the application to probate the will
was filed. Appellant filed a “Contest of a Will” on August 14, 2020. The motion to
transfer venue was filed on January 4, 2021—and denied by the trial court on
March 17, 2021.
        Rule 86 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a motion to
transfer for venue purposes is waived if it is made after any written motion is
filed (other than a special appearance)—this includes the original answer. See
TEX. R. CIV. P. 86(1). Appellant attempts to distinguish filings in the county court
versus the district court, claiming that the motion to transfer venue was the first
substantive motion filed after the case was transferred to the district court.3 This
argument is unpersuasive. The venue rule makes no distinction between county and
district courts when a case is transferred from one to the other. See TEX. R. CIV. P.
86. Therefore, when Appellant filed the will contest in the county court, that was
the first written motion filed in the case. The case did not become a new case once
it was transferred to the district court—it was simply a continuation of the case that
was originally filed in county court.
        The record shows that Appellant did not file the motion to transfer venue
concurrently or before she completed her first filing. Because the will contest was
filed long before the motion to transfer venue was filed, Appellant failed to comply
with the requirements of Rule 86 and as a result, has waived any venue complaint.
See Estate of Neuman, No. 09-13-00570-CV, 2015 WL 2255563, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont May 14, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (where the motion to transfer venue
was untimely, the appellate court held the movant waived his claim that the
decedent’s domicile changed before his death); see also Jarvis v. Field, 327 S.W.3d

        3
         A motion to substitute counsel was filed prior to the motion to transfer venue and after the case
was transferred to the district court.
                                                    4
918, 925 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2010, no pet.) (where venue claims
were waived when no written objection on improper venue grounds was made to the
county court—but was first raised on appeal).
        Because Appellant untimely filed her motion to transfer venue, we overrule
Appellant’s fourth argument that venue was improper in Jones County.
                                      Validity of the May Will
        Appellant argues that the May Will is not valid because there is evidence that
Decedent was unduly influenced by Tisha and that Decedent lacked testamentary
capacity due to his illnesses.4 Appellant contends that Tisha unduly influenced
Decedent to change his will because he was dependent upon her for care and
transportation, and because she was present when the May Will was signed.
Appellant also claims that it was unnatural for Decedent to both question the
paternity of L.B. and to disinherit L.B., particularly as he was still attempting to
contact his son for visitation after the May Will was executed.
                                         Standard of Review
        When we review a trial court’s factual determinations, we apply the same
standards of review that we use in reviewing the evidence in support of a jury’s
findings. In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d 249, 253 (Tex. 2000) (“When the trial court acts
primarily as a factfinder, appellate courts normally review its determinations under
the legal and factual sufficiency standards.” (citing Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d
295, 297 (Tex. 1994))); see also Burt v. Francis, 528 S.W.3d 549, 553 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2016, no pet.). Under either standard, the trial judge is the sole judge of

        4
         In her brief filed before this court, Appellant first challenges the validity of the May Will due to
“undue influence” exerted upon testator, and then, Appellant challenges testamentary capacity. As a matter
of law, undue influence implies the existence of testamentary capacity. Rothermel v. Duncan, 369 S.W.2d
917, 922 (Tex. 1963). Thus, a testator must first have testamentary capacity before they may be unduly
influenced. While analytically it may make more sense to address testamentary capacity first, we will
address the issues in the order presented for our review by Appellant.
                                                      5
the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. See Golden
Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003); In re Estate of
Scott, 601 S.W.3d 77, 88 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, no pet.).
      To analyze a legal sufficiency challenge, we must determine whether the
evidence presented would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to make the
finding under review. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005).
We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, crediting any
favorable evidence if a reasonable factfinder could and disregarding any contrary
evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Id. at 821–22, 827. If conflicting
evidence can be resolved either way, we must presume the factfinder did so in favor
of the prevailing party and disregard the conflicting evidence. Id. at 821.
      When an appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting
an adverse finding on an issue for which the appellant did not bear the burden of
proof, we sustain that challenge “if our review of the evidence demonstrates a
complete absence of a vital fact, or if the evidence offered is no more than a
scintilla.” Burbage v. Burbage, 447 S.W.3d 249, 259 (Tex. 2014). “More than a
scintilla exists when the evidence would enable reasonable and fair-minded people
to reach different conclusions.” Id. (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d
598, 601 (Tex. 2004)). However, “if the evidence is so weak that it only creates a
mere surmise or suspicion,” then that is legally equivalent to “no evidence.” Waste
Mgmt. of Tex., Inc. v. Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc., 434 S.W.3d 142, 156 (Tex.
2014). When, on the other hand, an appellant attacks the legal sufficiency of an
adverse finding on an issue for which the appellant bore the burden of proof, the
appellant “must demonstrate on appeal that the evidence establishes, as a matter of
law, all vital facts in support of the issue.” Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d
237, 241 (Tex. 2001).

                                          6
      When reviewing a factual sufficiency challenge, we “must consider and weigh
all of the evidence,” not just the evidence that supports the trial court’s finding. Mar.
Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 406–07 (Tex. 1998). We must review the
evidence in a neutral light. Woods v. Kenner, 501 S.W.3d 185, 196 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.). When we set aside a judgment on the basis of
factually insufficient evidence to support a vital finding, we must detail the evidence
relevant to the issue and specify how the contrary evidence greatly outweighs the
evidence in support of the finding. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635
(Tex. 1986).     No such explanation is required when we affirm a judgment.
Thomas v. Uzoka, 290 S.W.3d 437, 453 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet.
denied) (citing Ellis, 971 S.W.2d at 407).
      When a party attacks the factual sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue
for which it had the burden of proof, it must demonstrate on appeal “that the adverse
finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.” Dow Chem.
Co., 46 S.W.3d at 242 (citing Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex.
1983)). When a party challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting
a trial court’s finding on an issue for which it did not have the burden of proof, we
will set aside the finding only if the evidence in support of the finding is so weak or
the finding is so contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as
to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Cowan v. Worrell, 638 S.W.3d 244, 253
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, no pet.); see Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 635; In re Estate of
Hemsley, 460 S.W.3d 629, 637 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, pet. denied).
                            Applicable Law and Analysis
      1.     Undue influence in execution of the May Will was not proven
      Undue influence implies the existence of a testamentary capacity subjected to
and controlled by a dominant influence or power. Rothermel v. Duncan, 369 S.W.2d
917, 922 (Tex. 1963). To establish undue influence, the contestant must prove:
                                             7
(1) the existence and exertion of an influence (2) that subverted or overpowered the
testator’s mind when he executed the will, (3) such that he executed a will that he
would not have otherwise executed but for the influence. Id. Not every influence
amounts to undue influence. Id. The presence of undue influence is usually subtle
and may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Id. The circumstances relied on to
establish undue influence must be of a reasonably satisfactory and convincing
character, and they must not be equally consistent with the absence of such influence.
In re Kam, 484 S.W.3d 642, 652 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, pet. denied). The
burden of proving undue influence is upon the party contesting its execution.
Rothermel, 369 S.W.2d at 922. It is, therefore, necessary for the contestant to
introduce some tangible and satisfactory proof of the existence of each of the above
stated elements of undue influence. Id.
      We consider ten non-exhaustive factors when determining whether undue
influence exists. See Rothermel, 369 S.W.2d at 923. The first five factors concern
whether the proponent exerted any influence over the testator, considering:
      (1) the nature and type of relationship between the testator, contestant,
          and proponent;
      (2) the opportunities existing for the exertion of the type of influence
          or deception possessed or employed;
      (3) the circumstances surrounding the drafting and execution of the
          will;
      (4) the existence of a fraudulent motive; and
      (5) whether there has been habitual subjection of the testator to the
          control of another.
Id. The next four factors are used to determine whether the testator’s will was
subverted or overpowered by any influence exerted by the proponent, considering:
      (6) the state of the testator’s mind at the time he executed the will;

                                          8
      (7) the testator’s mental or physical incapacity to resist such influence
          or the susceptibility of the testator’s mind to the type and extent of
          influence exerted;
      (8) the words and acts of the testator; and
      (9) the testator’s weakness of mind and body, whether a result of age,
          disease, or otherwise.
Id. Finally, the tenth factor is relevant to determining whether the will would have
been executed in the absence of the influence exerted by the proponent, considering:
      (10) whether the will executed is unnatural in its disposition of the
         testator’s property. Id.
Appellant, as the contestant of the May Will, had the burden of proving undue
influence. Id. at 922. No two suits alleging undue influence are the same. Id. at
921. The outcome of each case depends on its own unique facts. See In re Estate of
Luce, No. 02-17-00097-CV, 2018 WL 5993577, at *14 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
Nov. 15, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). The distinction between evidence that is
sufficient to show undue influence and that which is merely suspicious defies
articulation; it essentially is a matter of degree. Id. (citing Boyer v. Pool, 280 S.W.2d
564, 566 (1955)).     Appellant points to Estate of Russey as authority for the
consideration of five possible facts, which can together support undue influence:
(1) the need for money by the influencer; (2) the testator’s dependence on the
influence for care and transportation; (3) the influencer’s reinterpretation of
historical events in a negative light about testator’s children; (4) the influencer’s
presence when the will was signed and the lack of presence of any family members;
and (5) an unnatural disposition—such as the disinheritance of a child. See Estate
of Russey, No. 12-18-00079-CV, 2019 WL 968421, at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler Feb.
28, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).
      Appellant claims that there is evidence of the same type facts from Russey,
which support that Decedent was unduly influenced when he executed the May Will.
                                           9
Specifically, Appellant argues that Decedent was dependent upon Tisha as his
caretaker, that Tisha reinterpreted the relationship between L.B. and Decedent to be
negative, that Tisha was present when Decedent signed the May Will, and that
disinheriting L.B. and giving Tisha more in the May Will than in the December Will
provided an unnatural disposition. Appellant also claims that Tisha prevented
Decedent from communicating with L.B. Appellant further argues that a broken
Rule 11 Agreement made by the parties in the divorce case—that the December Will
would be in effect until the divorce was finalized—is further evidence of undue
influence exerted upon Decedent. In addition, Appellant argues that, because the
December Will only included a small bequest to Tisha, the shift to her receiving
Decedent’s entire estate in the May Will was illustrative of Tisha’s influence.
Appellant testified that the health ailments Decedent suffered made him susceptible
to being influenced, which in turn caused him to create the May Will.
      Tisha testified that it was not unusual for Decedent to disinherit a son, as he
had another son whom he completely disinherited in both wills. Tisha also testified
that she became the caretaker for Decedent after he came to live with her and that
she and Decedent always had a close relationship. Further, even Appellant testified
that Decedent and Tisha were “very close . . . they had a lot in common and were
probably best friends.” Tisha and Decedent’s attorney both testified that Decedent
lived with Tisha and was dependent on Tisha for his care and transportation, and that
Tisha was present in the attorney’s office—but not in the same room—when the will
was signed. Despite her presence in the attorney’s office, Tisha maintained that she
never read one of Decedent’s wills prior to his death, and that she never discussed
the wills with him. Tisha testified that she did not know Decedent would leave “it
all” to her. There was no evidence presented that Tisha had any need for money,
and Tisha testified that she did not speak with Decedent’s attorney about the will
before, during, or after the signing of the will.
                                           10
      As to the legal sufficiency, Appellant needed to “demonstrate on appeal that
the evidence establishe[d], as a matter of law, all vital facts in support of the issue.”
Dow Chem. Co, 46 S.W.3d at 241. Appellant, as the contestant of the May Will,
had the burden of proving undue influence. Rothermel, 369 S.W.2d at 922. Undue
influence requires (1) the existence and exertion of an influence (2) that subverted
or overpowered the testator’s mind when he executed the will, (3) such that he
executed a will that he would not have otherwise executed but for the influence. Id.
      As to the first requirement, that there be an existence and exertion of
influence, there was only evidence related to two of the five factors: (1) the nature
and type of relationship between the testator, contestant, and proponent and (2) the
opportunities existing for the exertion of the type of influence or deception possessed
or employed. See id. at 923. Ultimately, Appellant failed to provide any evidence
other than the opportunity for influence by a person in a caregiver role. However,
the existence of a caregiver relationship alone is not enough to establish undue
influence. See Neal v. Neal, No. 01-19-00427-CV, 2021 WL 1031975, at *9 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 18, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (opportunity alone is
not enough to infer the exertion of undue influence); see also Estate of Scott, 601
S.W.3d 77, 90 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, no pet.) (explaining that “the fact that an
individual had the opportunity to influence the testator, such as by being the
testator’s caregiver, is insufficient to establish undue influence”). Indeed, “having
an opportunity to exert such influence due to being in a position of caring for the
person upon whom the influence is supposed to be exerted is equally consistent with
the theory of innocence as it is with the theory of wrongdoing.” Rothermel, 369
S.W.2d at 923.
      There is likewise no evidence to support that this “opportunity” actually
subverted or overpowered Decedent’s mind when he made the May Will. See id. at
922. There was testimony from Decedent’s attorney that Tisha was not present in
                                           11
the discussions related to the May Will, or any discussions related to Decedent’s
estate. Further, both Tisha and Decedent’s attorney testified that—despite any
physical ailments—Decedent appeared to be in his “right mind” at the time the May
Will was executed.     There was likewise a hearing in the divorce proceeding
approximately two weeks before the May Will was signed. No party—including
Decedent’s attorney, Appellant or her attorney—raised any concerns about
Decedent’s mental capacity at the time of the hearing.
      Appellant has failed to show that the evidence established the existence and
exertion of an undue influence as a matter of law.       Having the burden of proof,
Appellant was required to demonstrate on appeal “that the adverse finding is against
the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.” Dow Chem. Co., 46 S.W.3d
at 242. As we have noted above, Appellant failed to demonstrate more than a mere
opportunity for Appellee to exert an influence over Decedent. Thus, the trial court
could not have found that there was undue influence. See Rothermel, 369 S.W.2d at
923; Neal, 2021 WL 1031975, at *9. The trial court’s determination, as the finder
of fact, that there was no undue influence is not against the great weight and
preponderance of the evidence; indeed, a finding that Tisha even exerted an undue
influence over Decedent—absent any questions of whether Decedent succumbed to
any such influence or whether the result was a will that would not have existed but
for the influence—has no support in the record.
      Further, Appellant failed to establish evidence to support the third element
necessary for undue influence: that the resulting will would not have been executed
but for the influence. See Rothermel, 369 S.W.2d at 922. Decedent had raised
concerns about the paternity of L.B., who he disinherited by the May Will, but
Decedent had also, in this and the previous will, disinherited another child whose
paternity was not questioned by the parties. Appellant argues that Decedent loved
L.B., and that the May Will “provided an unnatural disposition” in regards to L.B.
                                         12
However, that alone does not indicate that disinheriting a child who does not live
with a decedent in the face of questioned paternity is unnatural or was unusual for
Decedent. Decedent moved in with Tisha after Appellant filed for divorce and
during the midst of those legal proceedings, changed his will to devise his assets to
the person with whom he was living at the time. We cannot say that loyalty and
blood paternity are undue bases for a decedent to weigh in devising his assets. A
change of heirs alone, particularly where unresolved familial issues exist, does not
provide evidence or support the notion that such a disposition was a product of undue
influence in light of all the facts.
       The evidence is legally and factually sufficient to prove that the May Will was
executed without undue influence. As result, we overrule Appellant’s first argument
that the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate, notwithstanding the trial court’s
finding, that Decedent was unduly influenced in executing the May Will.
       2.     Lack of testamentary capacity is not shown
       Before a will is admitted to probate, the will proponent bears the burden of
proving proper execution by a testator with testamentary capacity at the time of its
execution. Estate of Hogan, No. 11-20-00170-CV, 2022 WL 2070331, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Eastland June 9, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). A self-proving will is sufficient
to establish a prima facie case. Id.; see also EST. § 251.101 (Defining self-proved
as a will “(1) to which a self-proving affidavit subscribed and sworn to by the testator
and witnesses is attached or annexed; or (2) that is simultaneously executed, attested,
and made self-proved as provided by Section 251.1045”). A prima facie case is one
that presents sufficient evidence as a matter of law to establish a given fact, such as
proper execution and/or testamentary capacity, if it is not evidentiarily rebutted or
contradicted. In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 590 (Tex. 2015). After a prima facie
case is established, the burden shifts to the contestant to negate testamentary capacity

                                          13
of the testator. Hogan, 2022 WL 2070331, at *3. The burden of persuasion always
remains with the proponent of the will. Id.
      A testator has testamentary capacity when the testator is able to understand
that he or she is making a will, the effect of making the will, and the general nature
and extent of his or her property. Estate of Luce, 2018 WL 5993577, at *8. The
testator must also possess sufficient memory to know the elements of the business
transacted and to form a reasonable judgment about them. Hogan, 2022 WL
2070331, at *3. The key inquiry is whether the testator had testamentary capacity
at the time the will was executed. Id. This may be inferred from the testimony of
lay and expert witnesses regarding the behavior and conduct of the testator prior or
subsequent to the execution of the will. Neal, 2021 WL 1031975, at *4. If there is
evidence of incompetence—and evidence such incompetence persisted or had the
probability to persist at the time of the will’s making—such evidence may also be
used to demonstrate testamentary incapacity. Id.
      Appellant challenged the May Will before it was admitted to probate, placing
the burden of proof on Tisha to prove that Decedent had testamentary capacity at the
time the will was executed. See Hogan, 2022 WL 2070331, at *3. Here, the May
Will was a self-proving will because it was simultaneously executed as required by
the guidelines set out in Section 251.1045(a). See EST. §§ 251.101, 251.1045(a). As
a result, the burden of production shifted to Appellant to show Decedent did not have
testamentary capacity at the time the May Will was executed. See Hogan, 2022 WL
2070331, at *3. The burden of persuasion remained with Tisha as the proponent of
the will. Id.
      Appellant attempted to satisfy the burden of production through her own
testimony. Appellant argued to the trial court that Decedent lacked testamentary
capacity because he lacked the sufficient mental ability at the time the May Will was
created.   The evidence of testamentary incapacity Appellant cites is: (1) that
                                         14
Decedent doubted that L.B. was his biological child; and (2) that Decedent was
chronically ill from diabetes and liver failure which caused him to have high
ammonia levels.5           Decedent signed the May Will on May 27, 2020, and
subsequently, in June 2020, during communication with L.B., Decedent told L.B.
that he loved him. Appellant testified that she does not know why Decedent would
have continued to attempt to contact L.B. if Decedent believed he was not L.B.’s
father after he signed the May Will.
        Despite this testimony, evidence was also submitted that, as of April 20, 2020,
Appellant had not spoken to Decedent since February 6, 2020. Appellant likewise
did not remember Decedent attending a virtual hearing on May 13, 2020, even
though Decedent’s attorney testified that Decedent attended the hearing and there
were no concerns by any party as to his mental capacity and ability to participate in
the hearing. The only testimony Appellant provided close to the time of the
execution of the May Will was how Decedent appeared during a hearing on June 18,
2020. Appellant stated that Decedent was not making sense and that he appeared
weak and not well groomed.
        Appellee cites the counterpetition in the divorce proceeding as evidence that
Decedent did not lack testamentary capacity. The counterpetition was filed on
March 24, 2020, denied that Decedent was L.B.’s biological father, and requested
genetic testing. This occurred approximately two months before the May Will was
executed on May 27, 2020. Further, in response to Appellant’s argument that
Decedent did not have testamentary capacity because he disinherited his son,

        5
          The significance of high ammonia levels is unclear from the trial record. At one point, Appellant
testified that high ammonia levels could cause Decedent to be agitated, and at another point she testified
that even if the ammonia levels were “high on paper,” if Decedent was coherent, no action to adjust his
medication would be taken. Appellant stated that the ammonia levels were “adjusted with medication per
the doctor . . . he told us how to adjust it.” However, no medical expert testimony or authoritative sources
were offered to support Appellant’s testimony as a lay witness regarding her perception of the physiological
effect of the alleged ammonia levels. Likewise, there is no testimony regarding the level of Decedent’s
alleged agitation during or close in time to the execution of the May Will.
                                                     15
Appellee correctly points out that the May Will disinherited another biological child
of Decedent, implying nothing inconsistent in the disinheritance of L.B. as
Decedent’s disputed child. Accordingly, Appellant’s disinheritance of L.B. does not
provide evidence of a lack of testamentary capacity. At the hearing, Appellee relied
on testimony from Decedent’s attorney that Decedent knew what he was doing and
personally requested a new will be drawn up.
      As to legal sufficiency, although the self-proving will alone is not enough to
meet this threshold, the details surrounding the self-proved will are significant. See
Hogan, 2022 WL 2070331, at *3. Here, the May Will was prepared by Decedent’s
attorney, witnessed by the attorney and a woman who worked in the building and
commonly serves as a witness, and was properly notarized and authenticated.
Decedent’s attorney testified that he prepared the will according to the terms and
conditions requested by Decedent, and that Decedent was given time to review the
will prior to signing it. As Appellant provided no evidence showing otherwise, the
May Will’s self-proving execution is sufficient as a matter of law to establish that
the will was properly executed—including that Decedent possessed the necessary
testamentary capacity. See Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 590. As such, we hold that the
evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Decedent had
testamentary capacity when he executed the May Will.
      When conducting a factual sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence
in a neutral light. Dow Chem. Co., 46 S.W.3d at 242. Appellant was unable to
provide some evidence to contradict or negate the existence of testamentary
capacity. Appellant had limited contact with Decedent in the months prior to the
execution of the May Will and, aside from testimony that on June 18—after the May
Will was signed—he appeared unkempt and weak, Appellant presented no testimony
about his mental capacity at the time the will was executed. See Hogan, 2022 WL
2070331, at *3. Instead, the only testimony about Decedent’s mental capacity at the
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time the will was executed indicated that Decedent did know that he was executing
a new will, and that he understood the implications of such. Further, Decedent
questioned the paternity of L.B. in March, nearly two months before the execution
of a new will. There was a hearing for the divorce proceeding in May, approximately
two weeks before the May Will was signed. At that hearing, no concerns were raised
about Decedent’s ability to comprehend or participate in the proceeding. Moreover,
Appellant discussed a video call between Decedent and L.B. on June 6, 2020.
Appellant gave no testimony either way about Decedent’s mental capacity or
abilities during the call on June 6. Accordingly, we cannot say that the evidence
supporting the trial court’s finding of testamentary capacity was contrary to the
overwhelming weight of the evidence, nor so contrary to be clearly wrong and
manifestly unjust. We hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the
trial court’s finding that Decedent had testamentary capacity when the May Will was
executed.
      The evidence is legally and factually sufficient to affirm that Decedent
possessed proper testamentary capacity when the May Will was executed. As result,
we overrule Appellant’s second argument that Decedent lacked testamentary
capacity at the time he executed the May Will.
            Claimed Error Regarding Excluded Evidence Not Preserved
      Appellant argues on appeal that the trial court erred in excluding video and
photographic evidence offered to rebut statements made about Decedent’s
relationship with L.B. Following the trial court’s ruling to exclude this evidence,
Appellant did not make any offers of proof. Appellee argues that this failure
constitutes a waiver on appeal. We agree.
      “To preserve error concerning the exclusion of evidence, the complaining
party must actually offer the evidence and secure an adverse ruling from the court.”
Bobbora v. Unitrin Ins. Servs., 255 S.W.3d 331, 334–35 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008,
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no pet.). The court on appeal may be able to discern from the record the nature of
the evidence and the ruling of the trial court, but without an offer of proof, there can
be no determination of harm. Id. at 335. The proponent of the excluded evidence
must preserve the evidence in the record to complain on appeal that the exclusion
was error. Id.; see TEX. R. EVID. 103(a). Further, when no offer of proof is made,
the party must introduce the excluded evidence in a bill of exception. Bobbora, 255
S.W.3d at 335. When the proponent of the evidence fails to demonstrate the
substance of the excluded evidence, the complaint is waived on appeal. Id.
      Here, Appellant made no adequate offer of proof. Appellant told the trial
court that the video shows an “interaction between a father and a son” and that the
photographs show L.B. and Decedent interacting. Both statements provide no
details about the evidence or descriptions that would allow a harm analysis to be
properly completed. There is likewise no bill of exception in the record. As a result,
Appellant failed to demonstrate the substance of the excluded evidence, waiving this
complaint for appellate review.
      In any event, if the complaint had not been waived, we conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by excluding this evidence because Appellant did
not disclose it in discovery. We review a trial court’s decision to either admit or
exclude evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d
570, 575 (Tex. 2005). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts without regard
to any guiding rules or principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701
S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985). We must uphold the trial court’s evidentiary
ruling if there is any legitimate basis for it. Owens–Corning Fiberglas Corp. v.
Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 43 (Tex. 1998).
      Rule 193.6 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure states:
      A party who fails to make, amend, or supplement a discovery response,
      including a required disclosure, in a timely manner may not introduce
      in evidence the material or information that was not timely disclosed,
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      or offer the testimony of a witness (other than a named party) who was
      not timely identified, unless the court finds that: (1) there was good
      cause for the failure to timely make, amend, or supplement the
      discovery response; or (2) the failure to timely make, amend, or
      supplement the discovery response will not unfairly surprise or unfairly
      prejudice the other parties.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.6(a). Appellant attempted to introduce a video and photographs
as rebuttal evidence. The evidence would purportedly have demonstrated the bond
between L.B. and Decedent. Appellee objected to the admission of these items of
evidence because Appellant did not identify or produce them during discovery. The
trial court sustained Appellee’s objections, indicating twice that Appellant could not
attempt to create their entire case solely as rebuttal evidence to Tisha’s statements
that Decedent and L.B. did not have a normal and loving father-son relationship.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding this evidence. We overrule
Appellant’s third argument regarding excluded evidence.
                                   This Court’s Ruling
      Having overruled all four arguments presented by Appellant, we overrule
Appellant’s sole issue on appeal that the May Will should not have been entered into
probate. We affirm the order of the trial court.

                                                W. BRUCE WILLIAMS
                                                JUSTICE

November 2, 2023
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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