Court Opinion

ID: 9639335
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:12:48.056253+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:15.873536
License: Public Domain

*1006CHASE, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
We recently held in New Jersey Shipbuilding Co. v. The James McWilliams, 49 F.(2d) 1026 that no appeal will lie from an allowance of costs in admiralty made by the trial court in the exercise of its discretion, and dismissed the appeal, since we could not review such a discretionary ruling. This appeal presents an entirely different question. It is not whether the exercise of discretion as to costs is reviewable, but whether the court had the power to allow as costs, in an action at law, the premiums paid on the bond. An appeal such as this, which involves the power of, the court and not merely the propriety of the manner in which the court has exercised its discretion, will lie. Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co. of New York, 265 U. S. 78, 44 S. Ct. 481, 68 L. Ed. 909.
28 USC A § 830, provides for the taxation of costs. It does not mention such premiums as these. Before this law was enacted, the taxation of costs in federal courts was made to conform to the practice in the state in which the district was situated, and that has continued to be so except as to the specific items mentioned in the above section. Primrose v. Fenno (C. C.) 113 F. 375; National Surety Co. v. Lyons (C. C. A.) 16 F.(2d) 688. But the right to recover such costs as are allowed in the New York Courts rests on 28 USC A § 725, which reads: “The laws of the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law, in the courts of the United States, in eases where they apply.” Ethridge v. Jackson, 8 Fed. Cas. page 801, No. 4,541; Shreve v. Cheesman (C. C. A.) 69 F. 785. Then, too, the taxation of costs, where Congress has not enacted to the contrary, is to be governed by usage. Primrose v. Fenno, supra; Consolidated Gas Co. of New York v. Newton (D. C.) 291 F. 704. And the local practice in this circuit, in accordance, of course, with the statute, is the test of the right to costs rather than the state law. Chadbourne v. German-American Insurance Co. (C. C.) 31 F. 625; Clare v. National City Bank, 14 Blatchf. 445, Fed. Cas. No. 2,793. See, also, Henning v. Western Union Tel. Co. (C. C.) 40 F. 658. It is true that in removed eases contrary views have prevailed elsewhere. Trinidad Asphalt Paving Co. v. Robinson (C. C.) 52 F. 347; Cleaver v. Traders’ Ins. Co. (C. C.) 40 F. 863. Sawyer et al. v. Williams et al. (C. C.) 72 F. 296.
The opinion of the District Judge shows that counsel conceded that such premiums as these were not taxable under the state law; ánd, in the absence of any controlling rule or usage in the District Court, the Judge felt constrained to disallow them, although his disposition to have some provision made for the allowance of such costs is revealed.
There is nothing in the record to indicate any usage in the District Court as to taxing premiums on bonds given in discharge of attachments in actions at law, and the District Judge said there was none, but the books do sh.ow what has been the practice regarding analogous bonds, and it appears from the opinion in Consolidated Gas Co. of New York v. Newton, supra, that the custom has been the same in law, equity, or admiralty. In The Volund (C. C. A.) 181 F. 643, it was held that premiums paid to provide security for costs were taxable. And so it was as to premiums on a supersedeas bond in Edison v. American Mutoscope Co. (C. C.) 117 F. 192. Indeed, such a custom in the Second circuit was recognized and approved in Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co. of New York, 265 U. S. 78, 44 S. Ct. 481, 68 L. Ed. 909, and it should include premiums on a bond given in a removed suit at law to discharge an attachment of property, for the expense incurred for that purpose is quite as necessary as it is in respect to the other bonds mentioned. It can hardly be said that the giving of such a bond is, in a real sense, optional rather than necessary, when if it is not given it is necessary to let the property remain subject to the attachment. In Crowe v. Peaslee-Gaulbert Co. (C. C. A.) 37 F.(2d) 216, 217, premiums paid on a replevin bond were allowed as costs and The Governor Ames (C. C. A.) 187 F. 40, where premiums on a bond in discharge of an arrested vessel had been disallowed was distinguished on the theory that the replevin bond was necessary in that it was required by law, while the discharge bond was optional. I do not fhink however, that such premiums need be paid under circumstances making them indispensably necessary before they should be taxable as costs. If they are necessary in that they are reasonably required and paid to relieve property from attachment, they come within the reason for the custom which has grown up in the Second circuit as to taxing the premiums on other bonds necessarily given by parties to litigation to preserve their rights and comply with the requirements of law. The District Court might well let the taxation of such premiums become the usual *1007practice or provide for it by rule. See The Texas (C. C. A.) 226 F. 897, 905.
But we are about to go far beyond this and declare to be already established as a custom in the Southern district something at least so nebulous that an experienced District Judge says his own court has no such usage; and to do so simply because it is thought that there is no good reason why a custom should not include such premiums as these. When we are dealing with the existence of a custom we are talking, not about what ought to be, but about what is or is not. To be sure, it is customary to tax some expenses as costs, but not all; it is customary to tax some premiums paid on bonds, but it does by no means follow that, because some premiums are taxed, it is actually the custom to tax all. Warrant for the taxation of costs must be found in the law, and, when the law is amplified by custom, the custom cannot be created for others by mere desire to have them have one. To do that puts the cart before the horse, no matter how plausibly it may be done, and fails to give effect to the force of facts. In this case there is evidence conclusive upon us that there is at present no custom in the District Court to permit the taxation of these premiums, and we would do better, in my opinion, to be content to let that court control its own practice in this regard.
I would affirm the order.