Court Opinion

ID: 9620021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:37:14.366836+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:46.101875
License: Public Domain

Karen R. Barer, Judge, dissenting. The majority interprets the phrase “if the court neither grants nor denies the motion within 30 days of the date on which it is filed or treated as filed, it shall be deemed denied as of the 30th day” to require a trial court to memorialize its action in writing and file an order of record or lose its jurisdiction. This language appears in Rule 52(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure addressing the amendment of findings and the judgment and in Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure-Civil 4(b)(1) regarding the extension of time for filing a notice of appeal. The plain language of the rule merely provides that if the trial court fails to act, the motion will be deemed denied for purposes of determining the timeliness of an appeal. The provision contains no restriction regarding the method or means by which the court may act. The majority’s interpretation restricts the trial court’s inherent authority to protect the integrity of the proceedings and to safeguard the rights of the litigants before it. In this case, the record contains no written order granting the Rule 52(b) motion; however, the court held a hearing forty days after the written motion was filed and modified the original order. No party objected to the trial court’s jurisdiction at either the trial level or on appeal. Two principles lead me to the conclusion that the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the amended order. Each of these principles is premised upon the trial court’s inherent authority to protect the integrity of the proceedings and to safeguard the rights of the litigants before it. Reid v. Frazee, 72 Ark. App. 474, 41 S.W.3d 397 (2001); City of Fayetteville v. Edmark, 304 Ark. 179, 801 S.W.2d 275 (1990). First, as an appellate court, we are required to presume that a trial court’s findings are correct in the absence of a record to the contrary. See, e.g., Turner v. Brandt, 100 Ark. App. 350, 268 S.W.3d 924 (2007); Argo v. Buck, 59 Ark. App. 182, 954 S.W.2d 949 (1997). In cases falling within the usual powers of the court the rule is that, where the record is silent with respect to any fact necessary to give the court jurisdiction, it will be presumed that the court acted within its jurisdiction. Oliver v. Routh, 184 S.W. 843 (1916) (distinguishing usual from special powers in probate court). Furthermore, when the record is silent regarding the trial judge’s findings, the appellate court presumes that the trial judge made all the findings necessary to support the action taken. Coon v. State, 76 Ark. App. 250, 65 S.W.3d 889 (2001). When applying this presumption, we should be mindful of the inherent authority of the trial court to control court records. Ward v. State, 369 Ark. 313, 253 S.W.3d 927 (2007). Neither Rule 52(b) nor Rule 4 limits the trial court’s ability to act by requiring the court’s action be in writing or that a written memorialization of the action be filed with the clerk. Applying our general deference to the trial court’s inherent authority, we should presume that it acted within its jurisdiction absent evidence to the contrary. In the case before us, the record is silent as to when the trial court granted the Rule 52(b) motion. Accordingly, we should presume that the trial court acted within its jurisdiction when it granted the motion and when it held the hearing. Second, once the trial court reasserted its active contemplation of the case, the “deemed denied” provision of Rule 4(b)(1) can no longer be applicable. See First Nat’l Bank of Lewisville v. Mayberry, 366 Ark. 39, 233 S.W.3d 152 (2006) (holding that because the motion to vacate was not filed within ten days of the order appealed from it did not fall within the “deemed denied” provision of Rule 4(b)(1); accordingly the motion was still pending and, with no Rule 54(b) certification, the court had no jurisdiction to entertain appeal until there was a final, appealable order). Once the trial court granted the Rule 52(b) motion, the deemed denied provisions of either rule could no longer be applied to the motion. Furthermore, once the trial court asserted its jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 52(b), its jurisdiction continues. Nothing in Rule 52(b) limits the court’s jurisdiction once it reasserts it by granting the motion. Any limitation is inconsistent with the trial court’s inherent authority. We must presume that the trial court in this case granted the Rule 52(b) motion because the trial court held a hearing pursuant to the motion and nothing in the record demonstrates that the trial court granted the motion outside of the thirty days. This case is unlike cases where a trial court granted or denied a new trial after the thirty days and the grant or denial in the record was itself evidence that the trial court acted outside of its jurisdiction. See McCoy v. Moore, 338 Ark. 740, 1 S.W.3d 11 (1999); Ark. State Highway Comm’n v. Ayres, 311 Ark. 212, 842 S.W.2d 853 (1992). The majority’s interpretation essentially rewrites Rule 52(b) to require that the court enter a written order granting the motion within thirty days of the filing of the motion or forfeit its jurisdiction. It is inappropriate for us to interpret Rule 52(b) as limiting the trial court’s inherent authority without a clear expression of that intent within the rule itself or by the supreme court. Accordingly, I would find that the trial court had jurisdiction to enter its modified order and reach the merits of the case.