Court Opinion

ID: 9528865
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:44:51.325597+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:24.837219
License: Public Domain

Sullivan, P.J.
(dissenting). I dissent.
The people of this state, through the legislation at issue, have spoken: "It is the policy of this state to prohibit the appropriation of public funds for the purpose of providing an abortion to a person who receives welfare benefits unless the abortion is necessary to save the life of the mother.” MCL 400.109a; MSA 16.490(19a).1
As stated in People v Bricker, 389 Mich 524, 529; 208 NW2d 172 (1973):
The public policy of this state is a mandate upon us. Our duty to enforce that mandate is as clear as is our duty to comply with decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing the Federal Constitution.
The public policy of this state is to be found in the declarations and deeds of its people. These find concrete expression in the constitution adopted by the people, the laws enacted by the Legislature, the acts of the Governor, the Attorney General, others exercising executive power, the decisions of our courts, and the vote of the people.
Bricker was decided on the heels of Roe v Wade, *536410 US 113; 93 S Ct 705; 35 L Ed 2d 147 (1973), reh den 410 US 959 (1973). The Bricker Court noted that the public policy of this state to proscribe abortion "must now be subordinated to Federal Constitutional requirements” as interpreted in Roe, because under the Supremacy Clause the Court is bound by the Roe decision. Bricker, supra, pp 527, 529.
Given the language in Bricker, I see no reason in this case to construe Const 1963, art 1, § 2, more broadly than the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Moreover, our state constitution is usually held to provide the same equal protection and due process rights as the federal constitution. Fox v Employment Security Comm, 379 Mich 579, 588; 153 NW2d 644 (1967); Palmer v Bloomfield Hills Bd of Ed, 164 Mich App 573, 576; 417 NW2d 505 (1987); Grieb v Alpine Ski Area, Inc, 155 Mich App 484, 487; 400 NW2d 653 (1986). I therefore rely to a great extent on the United States Supreme Court decision in Maher v Roe, 432 US 464; 97 S Ct 2376; 53 L Ed 2d 484 (1977), in concluding that, to my belief, the legislation at issue does not violate our state constitution.
In Maher, a majority of the Supreme Court held that a state regulation under which Medicaid recipients received payments for medical services incident to childbirth but not for medical services incident to nontherapeutic abortions, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. After deciding that the law at issue neither impinged on the fundamental right of a woman to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy nor discriminated against a suspect class, the majority applied the rational relationship test. Id., pp 474, 478. Applying that test, it recognized that the state has a strong and legitimate interest in encouraging normal childbirth and determined *537that the law at issue rationally furthered that interest. Id., p 478. Therefore, the law did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
A few years later, in Harris v McRae, 448 US 297, 318, 322; 100 S Ct 2671; 65 L Ed 2d 784 (1980), reh den 448 US 917 (1980), a majority of the Supreme Court held that the Hyde Amendment, which limited federal funds to only certain medically necessary abortions, did not impinge on the "due process liberty recognized in [Roe v] Wade” and did not violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. In reaching its decision, the majority in Harris relied extensively on its decision in Maher.
On the same day that the Court decided Harris, it also upheld a state statute which prohibited state medical assistance payments for all abortions not necessary to preserve the life of the woman seeking an abortion against a claim that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Williams v Zbaraz, 448 US 358; 100 S Ct 2694; 65 L Ed 2d 831 (1980). The Court held that the arguments of the parties challenging the validity of the statute were foreclosed by the majority decision in Harris.
My primary disagreement with the majority opinion is over whether the legislation at issue, § 109a, impinges on a woman’s fundamental right to choose to have an abortion. The majority concludes that it does and therefore determined whether the legislation is justified by a compelling state interest. I contend that it does not.
No one questions a woman’s right to choose to have an abortion without "unduly burdensome interference.” Maher, 432 US 473-474. I am not persuaded, though, that the state’s refusal to, pay for such a procedure impinges on the woman’s *538right, even if the state opts to pay medical expenses for childbirth.
The majority states: "Fundamentally, indigent pregnant women are burdened in the exercise of their constitutional right of procreative choice, because they are the only people unable to obtain the 'medically necessary’ therapeutic service of abortion under the Medicaid Program.” Supra, p 524. But nothing requires a state to pay for any medically necessary services. How is it, then, that § 109a is the barrier to a woman’s exercise of her right to have an abortion? It is a woman’s indigency itself which burdens her right. Section 109a places no obstacles in the way of a woman who chooses to have an abortion. Instead, it merely fails to remove an obstacle which is not of the state’s making: the woman’s indigency. See Maher, 432 US 474; Harris, 448 US 314.
There is no doubt that § 109a operates to encourage childbirth. This is permitted. A state is not precluded from favoring childbirth over abortion and from allocating public funds to favor childbirth. See Maher, 432 US 474. A distinction exists between a state’s interfering with a protected activity and its encouraging an alternative activity. See id., p 475, and, e.g., Jacobs v Headlee, 135 Mich App 167, 173-174; 352 NW2d 721 (1984), and Cornwell v Dep’t of Social Services, 111 Mich App 68, 74; 315 NW2d 150 (1981). Here, the legislation encourages an alternative activity to abortion without interfering with a woman’s right to have an abortion.
Nor do I believe that the classification created by the statute requires us to apply the strict scrutiny test. If the legislation at issue operated to disadvantage a suspect classification, then the Court must determine whether the classification is justified by a compelling state interest. Manistee *539Bank & Trust Co v McGowan, 394 Mich 655, 668; 232 NW2d 636 (1975); Grieb, supra, p 488. First, although the statute necessarily affects only women, it does so on the basis of a biological fact unique to women: only women can get pregnant. Equal treatment therefore is not required. People v McDonald, 409 Mich 110, 123; 293 NW2d 588 (1980); Fischer v Dep’t of Public Welfare, 509 Pa 293, 312-315; 502 A2d 114 (1985). Second, financial need does not constitute a suspect class. Maher, 432 US 470-471. Finally, the statute does not create a classification on the basis of race. Nor do plaintiffs allege that the statute, even if facially neutral, purposefully discriminates against African Americans. See, e.g., People v Ford, 417 Mich 66, 101-103; 331 NW2d 878 (1982), and Doster v Estes, 126 Mich App 497, 512; 337 NW2d 549 (1983).2
Because the legislation neither impinges on a fundamental right nor discriminates against a suspect classification, strict scrutiny is not appropriate. In other words, the state does not need to justify the legislation with a compelling state interest. Instead, the rational basis test is appropriate: whether the classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. Manistee *540Bank & Trust Co, supra, p 668; Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 613; 267 NW2d 72 (1978). Under this test, the party challenging the legislation must show that the classification is so arbitrary that it cannot be supported under any state of facts, either known or which could reasonably be assumed. Automatic Music & Vending Corp v Liquor Control Comm, 426 Mich 452, 459; 396 NW2d 204 (1986), app dis 481 US 1009 (1987); Grieb, supra, p 488.
Applying this test, I contend that the legislation at issue withstands scrutiny under our state constitution; the legislation bears a rational or reasonable relationship to a legitimate goal of the Legislature. Automatic Music & Vending Corp, supra, p 459; Shavers, supra, p 613. Protecting the potentiality of human life and encouraging childbirth are unquestionably strong and legitimate interests which have been repeatedly recognized by the United States Supreme Court. Harris, 448 US 325; Beal v Doe, 432 US 438; 97 S Ct 2366; 53 L Ed 2d 464 (1976). Even the Court in Roe v Wade recognized that there is "still another important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life.” 410 US 162. Paying for the medical expenses of childbirth for an indigent woman while not paying for the medical expenses of an abortion for an indigent woman creates an incentive which is rationally or reasonably related to the goal of protecting life. Harris, 448 US 325. Moreover, it is not irrational for the state to pay for medically necessary services generally, but not for abortions. As noted by the Supreme Court in Harris, "Abortion is inherently different from other medical procedures, because no other procedure involves the purposeful termination of a potential life.” Id.
Plaintiffs’ remaining constitutional claims can *541be easily resolved. Jane Doe further claims that the statute at issue violates the Equal Protection Clause because it is overbroad, that it violates her right to privacy, and that it violates her right to due process, Const 1963, art 1, § 17. The test used to determine a due process violation essentially is the same as the test applied above in an equal protection analysis: Whether the statute bears a reasonable relation to a permissible goal of the Legislature. See Shavers, supra, pp 612-613. The test for overbreadth is similar: Whether the state’s grouping of all individuals into one class is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1975 PA 227 (Questions 2-10), 396 Mich 465, 503; 242 NW2d 3 (1976). In light of my analysis above with regard to equal protection, I think it sufficient merely to state that these tests have been satisfied in this case. Nor does the statute violate a pregnant woman’s right to privacy. See Harris, 448 US 312-318.
The statute, which precludes Medicaid funds from being used to pay for abortions unless an abortion is necessary to save the life of the mother, does not violate our state constitution. The circuit court order granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition should therefore be affirmed.

 The prohibition on using public funds to pay for an abortion, unless the abortion is necessary to save the life of the mother, evolved by way of an initiative petition, a referendum petition and, then, general election. Const 1963, art 2, § 9.

 I also am unpersuaded that the statute violates what is referred to as the "Antidiscrimination Clause” of our state constitution. Const 1963, art 1, § 2 ("nor shall any person be denied the enjoyment of his civil or political rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of religion, race, color or national origin”). A panel of this Court recently held that an intent or purpose to discriminate need not be shown in a case brought under the Antidiscrimination Clause. NAACP v Dearborn, 173 Mich App 602, 615-617; 434 NW2d 444 (1988). Here, plaintiffs claim that the statute has a discriminatory effect on African Americans and, therefore, that it violates the Antidiscrimination Clause in our state constitution. However, that clause prevents discrimination in the exercise of a civil or political right. Again, though, the statute in this case does not affect a civil or political right. Instead, it affects the funding of abortion. Therefore, the statute does not discriminate against people in the exercise of a civil right.