Court Opinion

ID: 9596630
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:51:52.907865+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:39:30.799383
License: Public Domain

Fletcher, Presiding Justice,
dissenting.
In Robinson v. State,1 we held that a trial court must give a charge on the law of circumstantial evidence when the state’s case depends in whole or part on circumstantial evidence and the defendant requests the charge. I would adopt the same rule in this case where the defendant failed to request the charge.
1. We adopted the bright-line rule in Robinson because of the difficulty in determining whether the jury relied solely on direct evidence or based part of its verdict on circumstantial evidence.2 For the same reason, I would make the charge mandatory in every case, whether the defendant requests it or not. Requiring the charge, even when there is no request, promotes judicial economy. It eliminates the need for the trial court to determine whether the state’s case consists solely of circumstantial evidence, thus necessitating a charge on that issue. It eliminates the need for the appellate courts to decide the confusing issue of what is direct and what is circumstantial evidence.3 And it avoids the claim that a defendant’s attorney was ineffective for failing to request a circumstantial evidence charge.
The majority opinion perpetuates these problems for no good reason. It applies two different rules when the defendant fails to request a circumstantial evidence charge, one when the state relies on both direct and circumstantial evidence and a second when the state’s case is solely circumstantial. As a result, trial courts must now give the charge in every situation except when the state presents both direct and circumstantial evidence and the defendant fails to request a circumstantial evidence charge. I would eliminate that exception.
2. Moreover, I would change the circumstantial evidence charge so that it no longer relies on the language in OCGA § 24-4-6. As former Chief Justice Hunt noted, the pattern charge is misleading because it suggests that direct evidence requires a lesser standard of proof than circumstantial evidence. He proposed the following substitute: “You would be authorized to convict only if the evidence proves the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt and the evidence excludes all reasonable theories of innocence. It is the state’s burden *790to produce such evidence.”4 His proposed charge correctly states the rule that to convict a defendant the state must prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, whether the evidence is direct, circumstantial, or both.
Decided September 11, 1995 —
Reconsideration denied October 27, 1995.
Lenzer & Lenzer, Robert W. Lenzer, Thomas P. Lenzer, George L. Kimel, for appellant.
Daniel J. Porter, District Attorney, George F. Hutchinson III, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

 See id. at 274 (Hunt, Chief Justice, concurring).

 261 Ga. 698, 699 (410 SE2d 116) (1991).

 See id.; Mims v. State, 264 Ga. 271, 272 (443 SE2d 845) (1994).

 See Mims, 264 Ga. at 273, n. 5 (Hunt, Chief Justice, concurring).