Court Opinion

ID: 9671435
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:36:34.180584+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:09.840388
License: Public Domain

HOLSTEIN, Chief Justice,
dissenting in part and concurring in part.
The majority fails to mention the full range of rights protected by the Missouri Constitution, article I, sec. 2. It provides: “[T]hat all persons have a natural right to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness and the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry.” Taken together, these provisions give persons in this state a fundamental right to lawfully acquire, hold, enjoy and dispose of property. Stone v. City of Jefferson, 317 Mo. 1, 293 S.W. 780, 782 (1927). A necessary adjunct of that right is the right to pursue any lawful business, calling, or profession. Indeed, a citizen’s right to pursue a business, calling, or profession is both a liberty and property right to be guarded as zealously as any other fundamental right. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 1411, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959); Downey v. United Weatherproofing, 363 Mo. 852, 253 S.W.2d 976, 982 (1953). In an analogous situation, this Court has held that the negligent construction of a highway so as to flood a farmer’s land was a taking of property for which the State was obliged to pay just compensation. Heins Implement Co. v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 859 S.W.2d 681 (Mo.banc 1993). Given these principles, it necessarily follows that the negligent taking by the State of one’s fundamental, constitutionally protected liberty and property right to engage in lawful employment is prohibited absent payment of just compensation or other due process of law.
Even the principal opinion’s narrow view of Missouri Constitution article I, sec. 2, proves too much. As I understand the opinion, it holds that the right to “the enjoyment of the gains of [one’s] own industry” only prohibits involuntary servitude or interfering with a person’s right to keep or dispose of property acquired through employment. Accepting that as true, I believe the State’s imposition of a disabling injury upon a plaintiff is a form of compulsory servitude from which the plaintiff cannot escape. Moreover, plaintiff will be deprived of previously acquired earnings and whatever meager income she may now be capable of producing by being forced to pay medical and rehabilitation expenses thrust upon her by the culpable conduct of the State’s agents. She is thereby deprived by the State of the right to enjoy the gains of her own industry.
It is possible the State may limit its liability. In this case, plaintiff seeks only economic damages in excess of that authorized by sec. 537.610. Just compensation and due process require at least the payment of plaintiffs actual economic loss attributable to the State or its agents.
As noted in my separate opinion in Richardson v. State Highway & Transportation Commission, 863 S.W.2d 876, 882-84 (Mo. banc 1993)(Holstein, J., concurring in result), the doctrine of sovereign immunity is of questionable common law origin and is not supported by sound reason. When the doctrine comes into direct conflict with fundamental constitutional rights, it is the doctrine that should give way, not the constitution.
For the above reasons, I respectfully dissent as to Part I. I concur in Parts II and III of the principal opinion.