Court Opinion

ID: 9370376
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-13 09:10:12.128065+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:21.074916
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
    ___________________________

         No. 02-22-00029-CR
    ___________________________

    BRIAN JOE WADJUN, Appellant

                   V.

        THE STATE OF TEXAS

  On Appeal from the 89th District Court
        Wichita County, Texas
       Trial Court No. 59,566-C

   Before Kerr, Bassel, and Womack, JJ.
  Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel
                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                   I. Introduction

      A jury found Appellant Brian Joe Wadjun guilty of the second-degree felony

offense of possession of a controlled substance of less than 200 grams but more than

four grams, found the alleged enhancements to be true, and assessed his punishment

at fifty years’ imprisonment. In four issues, Wadjun argues that the trial court abused

its discretion by admitting evidence of his four prior felony convictions during the

guilt–innocence phase and by admitting a Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS)

lab report, that the trial court erred by imposing court costs without conducting an

ability-to-pay inquiry during sentencing, and that the evidence is insufficient to

support the assessment of court costs against him. Because the record reveals that

Wadjun opened the door to his prior felony convictions by mentioning them during

his direct testimony and that Wadjun did not object to the forensic scientist’s

testimony about the DPS lab report, we hold that Wadjun has forfeited his arguments

as to the admission of such evidence. Further, because the record reveals that the trial

court signed an order waiving the court costs that were previously assessed against

Wadjun, we hold that his court-cost arguments are moot. Accordingly, we affirm the

trial court’s judgment.

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                                  II. Background1

      Officer Ralph Burdick, formerly with the Wichita County Sheriff’s Office, was

on patrol on the night of November 26, 2016. At 8:53 p.m., he saw a gray 2006

Toyota Corolla pull up to a residence, and then a passenger got out of the vehicle and

handed something to someone in the front yard. The vehicle left the scene as Officer

Burdick approached in his patrol car. Officer Burdick conducted a registration check,

and the registration showed that it was expired.

      Officer Burdick initiated a traffic stop. After the driver stopped the vehicle,

Officer Burdick approached him, and the driver identified himself as Wadjun. As

Officer Burdick explained the reason for the stop, he noticed the strong odor of

marijuana coming from the vehicle. Wadjun admitted to smoking marijuana in the

vehicle. Officer Burdick asked the occupants 2 to step out of the vehicle.

      Officer Burdick then conducted a probable-cause search of the vehicle.

Underneath the emergency brake compartment, Officer Burdick found “one Ziploc

plastic bag with a blue stripe, two Ziploc bags and a small plastic Ziploc bag. All

[four] bags contained a clear crystalline substance that [he] recognized through

      1
        Because Wadjun does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support
his conviction, we set forth only a brief background here. Additional testimony,
which is pertinent to the issues that he raises on appeal, is set forth within the
discussion of those issues.
      2
       The backseat passenger was never identified; he got out of the car at the
residence before the traffic stop. The front passenger identified himself as Spencer
David Sanderson, but Officer Burdick later learned that the passenger was Wesley
Sanderson.

                                           3
training and experience as methamphetamine.” Officer Burdick also found a black

backpack in the trunk, and Wadjun claimed ownership of the backpack. Inside the

backpack, Officer Burdick found clothes, 3 some syringes, and a black scale that had

on it a clear crystalline residue, which Officer Burdick recognized as

methamphetamine residue. Officer Burdick weighed the Ziploc bags (which had an

aggregate weight of 18.32 grams), collected all the items of evidence, and ultimately

placed them in an evidence locker.

      While Officer Burdick was sitting in the patrol car with Wadjun, Officer

Burdick read Wadjun his Miranda 4 warnings and told him about the

methamphetamine. Wadjun initially said that the methamphetamine was not his but

then admitted that it was. Wadjun talked openly and freely about his drug addiction.

Wadjun said that he used two or three grams of methamphetamine per day and had

used methamphetamine that morning.

      Officer Burdick testified that even without Wadjun’s admission that the

methamphetamine was his, there was still reason to believe that he was in possession

of the drugs because they were in the vehicle, which he was driving and which he

claimed to own. Officer Burdick thus arrested Wadjun and booked him into Wichita

County Jail.

      3
       Wadjun also specifically claimed ownership of the clothes.
      4
       Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1630 (1966).

                                          4
      After hearing additional testimony, the jury found Wadjun guilty of possession

of a controlled substance in Penalty Group I in an amount of four or more grams but

less than 200 grams.      After hearing sentencing testimony, the jury found the

indictment’s two enhancement allegations to be true and assessed Wadjun’s

punishment at fifty years’ confinement.        The trial court sentenced Wadjun in

accordance with the jury’s punishment assessment.

       III. Forfeited Challenge to Admission of Prior Felony Convictions

      In his first issue, Wadjun argues that the trial court abused its discretion by

admitting evidence of his four prior felony convictions during the guilt–innocence

phase. The record, however, demonstrates that Wadjun forfeited this complaint by

testifying on direct examination during his case in chief about his prior convictions.

      A.     What the Record Shows

      During the defense’s case in chief, Sanderson testified. Sanderson, who was in

prison for various drug charges that included manufacture and delivery, testified that

as best as he could remember, the methamphetamine that was found in the car on

November 26, 2016, was not his. Sanderson admitted that prior to his current

incarceration, he had three or four theft charges and had been convicted of aggravated

assault and family violence.        When Sanderson was asked again about the

methamphetamine in question, he said, “I don’t remember . . . just that whole time

period. I know every time I got pulled over, I had drugs on me, you know what I

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mean? I had them on me. . . . I’ve got the record to prove that. Can I remember that

period of time? I can’t . . . .”

       Wadjun also took the stand. His counsel questioned him about his prior

criminal history as follows:

       Q. All right. Now, you [have] . . . some criminal history, don’t ya?

              A. Yes, sir, I do.

              Q. You’ve been convicted of felony drug charges in the past?

              A. Yes, sir.

              Q. You did your time on those?

              A. Yes, sir.

             Q. You’ve been convicted of burglary of a habitation? You’ve
       been convicted of evading in a vehicle?

              A. Yes, sir.

              Q. And on those charges, did you go to trial?

              A. No, sir, I didn’t.

              Q. What was your plea to those charges?

              A. Guilty.

              Q. Why . . . did you plead guilty?

              A. Because I was actually guilty of them.

              Q. You [pleaded] not guilty in this trial.

              A. Because I’m not guilty.

                                            6
       After this testimony about his prior convictions, Wadjun testified that on the

night of the offense, Sanderson told him that the drugs were his and that he was

“gonna take care of it,” which Wadjun interpreted to mean that Sanderson was going

to admit that the drugs were his. Wadjun heard Officer Burdick testify that Wadjun

had confessed that the methamphetamine was his, but Wadjun claimed that Officer

Burdick had pressured him into saying that; Wadjun did not know why he had made

that admission.

       On cross-examination, Wadjun said that he could have told Officer Burdick

that the drugs belonged to Sanderson but that he did not do that. He then explained

that if he had told Officer Burdick that the drugs were Sanderson’s, “then something

bad would have happened to me and my family.” Wadjun said that if he had not been

arrested, his next methamphetamine hit probably would have come from Sanderson’s

bag.

       After Wadjun was excused, the defense sought to admit exhibits showing

Sanderson’s prior convictions in order to impeach his testimony claiming that the

drugs were not his. The State objected to the admission of Sanderson’s convictions

on a variety of bases and also asked to be allowed to admit Wadjun’s prior convictions

if the trial court decided to admit Sanderson’s.     After taking the matter under

advisement, the trial court ruled, “The way I see it, the admission of these work both

ways, so I’m going to admit them.”       The State offered four of Wadjun’s prior

                                          7
convictions,5 as well as his judicial confessions related to those convictions—all of

which were admitted over Wadjun’s objection.

          B.    Standard of Review and the Law Specific to Defendant Testimony

          The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has set forth the standard of review

applicable to evidentiary rulings and the consequences that can flow from a

defendant’s decision to testify:

          A trial judge’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed under an abuse-of-
          discretion standard. If the trial judge was correct under any theory of
          law applicable to the case, we will uphold the judge’s decision. We do
          this even if the trial judge failed to give any reason or used the wrong
          reason for the ruling.

                 . . . We have held that “[a] defendant who takes the witness stand
          may be cross-examined and impeached in the same manner as any other
          witness.” A defendant may be “contradicted, impeached, discredited,
          attacked, sustained, bolstered, made to give evidence against himself,
          cross-examined as to new matters, and treated in every respect as any
          other witness . . . .” And we have observed that a party who “opens the
          door” to otherwise inadmissible evidence risks the adverse effect of
          having that evidence admitted.

Bowley v. State, 310 S.W.3d 431, 434–35 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (footnotes omitted).

          Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has spoken to the type of issue

presented here in which a defendant introduces evidence of his prior convictions

during his direct testimony and then attempts to complain about such evidence on

appeal. See Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 760, 120 S. Ct. 1851, 1855 (2000). The

Texarkana court summarized the holding from Ohler as follows:

          Three of the convictions were for felony possession, and one was for evading
          5

arrest.

                                             8
      [T]he United States Supreme Court . . . concluded that “a defendant who
      preemptively introduces evidence of a prior conviction on direct
      examination may not on appeal claim that the admission of such
      evidence was error.” . . . [T]he consequence of introducing the evidence
      on direct examination is that the defendant waives any appellate
      complaint regarding the admission of the evidence.

Williamson v. State, 589 S.W.3d 292, 295–96 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, pet. ref’d)

(quoting and citing Ohler, 529 U.S. at 760, 120 S. Ct. at 1855).

      C.     Analysis

      Wadjun’s argument on appeal ignores the fact that he opened the door to his

prior convictions by specifically mentioning them in his direct testimony. The law is

clear that by deciding to introduce such evidence on direct examination, Wadjun

forfeited any appellate complaint about the later admission of judgments and judicial

confessions for the same convictions that he had preemptively introduced. See id.

(holding that because appellant testified about his prior convictions on direct

examination, he forfeited his complaint regarding their admissibility); Roderick v. State,

494 S.W.3d 868, 881 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (same); cf.

Williams v. State, 301 S.W.3d 675, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (assuming that evidence

of extraneous murders was inadmissible under Rule 404(b), and holding that trial

court did not abuse its discretion because appellant opened the door by deliberately

                                            9
choosing to question a witness about them). 6 We therefore overrule Wadjun’s first

issue.

IV. Forfeited Challenge to DPS Lab Report by Failing to Object to Testimony
                    Regarding the Contents of the Report

         In his second issue, Wadjun argues that the trial court abused its discretion by

admitting into evidence a DPS lab report that constituted hearsay. Although Wadjun

objected to the admission of the report, he failed to object to testimony about the

contents of the report both before and after the report was admitted, thus forfeiting

his complaint.

         A.    What the Record Shows

         During the trial, the State called Herman Carroll, a forensic scientist with the

DPS’s Abilene Crime Lab, to testify. Carroll cataloged his education and training, as

well as the classes he had taken as part of his continuing education. He explained that

his duties as a forensic scientist include analyzing evidence to determine if it contains

a controlled substance and testifying “in court on that analysis.” Carroll told the jury

about the tests that he performs and the instruments that he uses, including a gas

chromatograph mass spectrometer (GC/MS), to determine whether an unknown

substance contains a controlled substance.

       Furthermore, the trial court gave a limiting instruction that properly restricted
         6

the jury’s consideration of Wadjun’s prior convictions, and “[w]e generally presume
the jury follow[ed] the trial court’s instructions in the manner presented.” See
Manrrique v. State, No. 02-19-00458-CR, 2021 WL 4205011, at *12 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Sept. 16, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (quoting
Colburn v. State, 966 S.W.2d 511, 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)).

                                            10
      Carroll was asked if he recognized what had been marked as State’s Exhibit 1,

and he explained that it had his initials and the date on which he had resealed the

evidence after his analysis. He also went over the chain-of-custody procedure used by

the lab for retrieving and storing evidence, including the procedure he had used for “a

heat-sealed plastic bag” that was contained inside the envelope labeled as State’s

Exhibit 1. For the crystal substance in the plastic bag,7 Carroll testified that he

determined the net weight of the substance without the packaging (which was 6.19

grams, plus or minus 0.04 grams, including adulterants or dilutants) and began his

analysis of the substance by performing two color tests and the test on the GC/MS.

Carroll said that both color tests of the substance in this case indicated that there was

a possibility of methamphetamine. Carroll explained that he then conducted an

analysis using the GC/MS, which showed that the substance “did indeed contain

methamphetamine.”       Carroll said that the GC/MS is capable of distinguishing

methamphetamine from all other chemicals and that it is scientifically accepted. The

State then offered, without objection, State’s Exhibit 1—the methamphetamine.

      The State asked Carroll if he had prepared a report of his findings in this case,

and he answered affirmatively. Carroll identified State’s Exhibit 5 as a copy of the lab

report that he had produced and noted that the laboratory case number matched the

      7
        Carroll testified that he analyzed only one of the four bags containing the
crystal substance and did not weigh or test the remaining bags because “[f]or
efficiency,” he tests “to the highest penalty.” He further explained, “So in this case,
over 4 grams and less than 200 grams would fill a penalty group. If I analyzed the
other bags, it still wouldn’t take it over, say, 200 grams.”

                                           11
one on the envelope in State’s Exhibit 1. When the State offered Exhibit 5 into

evidence, Wadjun’s counsel objected based on hearsay.8 The trial court overruled the

objection and admitted State’s Exhibit 5.

       The State then asked Carroll various questions about the net weight of 6.19

grams that he had recorded in his report. Wadjun did not object to the State’s

questioning Carroll about the report. After the State questioned Carroll about his

report, the State passed the witness.

       B.     Preservation Rule Specific to this Scenario

       In a prior opinion, we set forth the preservation rule applicable to this type of

situation:

       [T]he preservation rule requires a party to object each time objectionable
       evidence is offered unless the party has obtained a running objection or
       has requested a hearing outside the presence of the jury. Geuder v. State,
       115 S.W.3d 11, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); see also Leday v. State, 983
       S.W.2d 713, 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (explaining that Texas applies
       the “futility rule,” meaning that despite a trial court’s ruling that evidence
       is admissible, a party must keep making futile objections on pain of
       waiver). Unobjected-to testimony about objected-to evidence results in
       forfeiture of the objection. See Clay v. State, 361 S.W.3d 762, 767 (Tex.
       App.—Fort Worth 2012, no pet.) (“[B]ecause [a probation department
       employee] provided testimony about the Louisiana records without
       objection before and after appellant’s objection to the admission of the
       records and because appellant failed to obtain a running objection, we
       conclude that he forfeited his objection to the records’ admission.”
       (footnote omitted)); see also Jones v. State, No. 06-15-00119-CR, 2016 WL
       3197397, at *5 (Tex. App.—Texarkana June 9, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.,
       not designated for publication) (“[The forensic analyst who prepared the

       8
         Wadjun’s counsel’s specific objection is as follows: “Your Honor, I’d object as
to hearsay. It’s prepared for the purposes of litigation. In addition, he’s here
testifying as to the facts of the case as he remembers them[,] and this is just hearsay.”

                                            12
       DNA report] testified about the results of the DNA laboratory report.
       Therefore, we find that [appellant] waived his . . . complaints regarding
       the admission of the DNA report.”).

Walker v. State, No. 02-16-00418-CR, 2018 WL 1096060, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth Mar. 1, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

       C.     Analysis

       Here, as detailed above, Wadjun objected to the admission of the DPS lab

report when it was offered into evidence, but he did not object to Carroll’s testimony

that preceded the report’s admission into evidence.          Prior to the report being

admitted, Carroll testified about various facts that also appear in his report. The State

included in its brief a list of facts that were included in both Carroll’s testimony and in

his report:

       •      Carroll has a degree in chemistry from the University of Texas at San

       Antonio and has completed training in controlled-substance analysis.

       •      He has been trained on how to use a GC/MS.

       •      He has significant courtroom experience in testifying as an expert

       witness.

       •      When he received the substances at issue, he assigned a unique case

       number.

       •      Inside a heat-sealed plastic bag, he found four plastic baggies with

       crystals.

                                            13
      •      He tested a substance from only one of the baggies, determined that the

      substance contained methamphetamine, and weighed it at 6.19 grams (plus or

      minus .04 grams).

Wadjun’s brief is silent regarding the fact that all of this testimony came in without

objection prior to the admission of the DPS lab report. Additionally, after the lab

report was in evidence, the State questioned Carroll about the net weight shown in the

report, and Wadjun did not object.

      Thus, any error in admitting the DPS lab report was forfeited when the same

evidence came in without objection through the direct examination of Carroll. See

Carrillo v. State, No. 05-17-00672-CR, 2018 WL 3387364, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas

July 12, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that any

error in admitting crash-data-retrieval reports was forfeited when the same evidence

came in through the examination of the police officer without objection); Walker,

2018 WL 1096060, at *4 (holding that appellant forfeited his objections to the

admission of the toxicology report because he objected only to the admission of the

report and failed to object to testimony describing the contents of the report); Clay,

361 S.W.3d at 767. See generally Stevenson v. State, 304 S.W.3d 603, 618 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2010, no pet.) (“A trial court’s erroneous admission of evidence will not

require reversal when other such evidence was received without objection, either

before or after the complained-of ruling.” (citing Leday, 983 S.W.2d at 718)).

Accordingly, we overrule Wadjun’s second issue.

                                         14
          V. Challenges to Court Costs Mooted by Subsequent Order

      In his third and fourth issues, Wadjun argues that the trial court erred by

imposing court costs of $983.70 without conducting an ability-to-pay inquiry during

sentencing and that the evidence is insufficient to support the assessment of court

costs against him. After Wadjun filed his brief in this court, the State filed an

unopposed motion to abate this appeal so that the State could file a motion for the

trial court to waive the court costs. This court issued an abatement order, and the

State filed its unopposed motion for the waiver of court costs. The trial court

thereafter signed an order waiving the court costs. The record containing the order

waiving court costs was filed with this court, and the appeal was automatically

reinstated. Based on the record before us, we overrule Wadjun’s third and fourth

issues as moot. See Mayhew v. State, No. 07-21-00075-CR, 2021 WL 5127521, at *1

(Tex. App.—Amarillo Nov. 4, 2021, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated

for publication) (“The aforementioned remedial acts by the trial court [including

issuing multiple judgments nunc pro tunc to delete certain contested fees] appear to

have rendered moot the concerns voiced by appellant.”); Schexnayder v. State, Nos. 01-

20-00052-CR, 01-20-00053-CR, 2021 WL 4897828, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] Oct. 21, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that

appellant’s complaints regarding the assessment of court costs and Crime Stopper’s

fee against him were rendered moot when, upon a motion by the State, the trial court

issued a judgment nunc pro tunc eliminating the complained-of fees).

                                          15
                                 VI. Conclusion

      Having overruled Wadjun’s four issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                    /s/ Dabney Bassel

                                                    Dabney Bassel
                                                    Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: February 9, 2023

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