Court Opinion

ID: 9642315
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:54:34.33937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:52:33.027687
License: Public Domain

RENDLEN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. On August 26, 1982 the trial court entered judgment in this cause declaring that the phrase “total state revenues” employed in Article 10, § 18 of the “Hancock” Amendment (1980 Amendment of the Missouri Constitution) is defined in § 17, as including (1) general revenues (2) special revenues (3) licenses (4) fees [excluding federal funds] all as “defined in the budget message of the Governor for fiscal year 1980-1981.” (Emphasis added.) The court found from the evidence that the definition of “total state revenues” includes unspent monies from the preceding fiscal year or the opening balance. This finding is consonant with the traditional budget practices of including the opening balance (i.e. the balance in the State Treasury at the beginning of fiscal year) as a component of the “total state revenues” for the base year, hence, it is a part of the “total state revenues” as that phrase appears in § 18. It is well stated by Judge Gunn in his dissent “the constitution expressly states how the term is to be defined and could not be more explicit.” Ignoring the fact that the definitional section 17(1) expressly defines the broad phrase “total state revenues” the majority reach for other sources to redefine the term “revenue” in a manner not intended by the framers of the section nor the voters who set it in place.
The trial court found that the budget message for fiscal 1980-81 met the requirements of § 33.270 RSMo 1978, which prescribes the form for submission of the budget to the General Assembly. The Governor’s message for that fiscal year identified “total state revenues” as the sum of “Revenue Estimate” and “Fund [opening] balance.” In this connection the “budget summary” another of the pertinent documents supportive of the “message” also included “opening fund” as a part of the “total state revenues” for the fiscal year in question.
Items included in the budget message constituting revenue available for appropriation and thus part of “total state revenues” are possessed of common characteristics. They (1) must be deposited in the State Treasury and (2) may only be withdrawn by appropriation and the item “opening balance,” possessed of these common characteristics and contained in the budget message, was, as found by the trial court, brought within the definition of § 17(1) as a component of “total state revenues.”
In reversing the judgment and redefining the terms of § 17(1) the majority failed to follow fixed canons of construction. This Court, in Boone County Court v. State of Missouri, 631 S.W.2d 321, 324 (Mo.banc 1982), stated: “[r]ules applicable to constitutional construction are the same as those applied to statutory construction, except that the former are given a broader construction, due to their more permanent character. Where the language of a constitutional provision is plain and admits of but one meaning there is no room for reaching outside the provision to find other definitions. See Rathjen v. Reorganized School District R-II, 284 S.W.2d 516, 523 (Mo. banc 1955). Accordingly, under the scheme of the amendment the Governor’s budget message is designated as the vehicle to provide or “define” the components of “total state revenues.” As stated in State ex inf. Norman v. Ellis, 28 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. banc 1930),
[T]he people adopting a constitutional provision have a right to put an interpretation on the words they use which meets their intention. They can define their language as they please and, if they see fit, can give a common-law phrase or *616word a meaning entirely contrary to its ancient usage. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 367-68.
Similarly this Court in In the Matter of the Estate of Hough, 457 S.W.2d 687, 691 (Mo.1970), stated:
Further, the lawmaking body’s [here the people’s] own construction of its language by means of definition of the terms employed should be followed in the interpretation of the statute of which it relates and is intended to apply and supersedes the commonly accepted dictionary or judicial definition and is binding on the courts. (Emphasis added.)
The majority without regard for these canons plucks the term “revenue” from its place in the phrase “total state revenues” and defines it as though not a part of that phrase then compounds the problem by lifting the phrase from its position in § 17(1) and redefines the phrase as though not a part of the section. In so doing it disregards the findings of the trial court1 and warps the meaning of the entire section. With this I cannot agree.
The trial court also properly addressed the validity question and held that the “refund provisions” of Article 10, § 18(b) are violative of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. I submit that the trial court was correct in its judgment for indeed the enforcement provision Article 10, § 18(b), violates the due process and equal protection of laws guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, §§ 2 and 10 of the Missouri Constitution. This because the questioned section contemplates the refund of taxes only to a privileged class of taxpayers, while gathering such monies from all taxpaying citizens, including those less fortunate who pay substantial portions, if not all, of their earnings for the purchase of necessities. As noted in a dissent to Buchanan v. Kirkpatrick, 615 S.W.2d 6, 17 (Mo. banc 1981), “It requires little imagination to foresee that the principal opinion’s failure to deal with the problem will be interpreted as tacitly approving this invidiously discriminatory scheme, which requires dispensing of the refund monies of ‘sales taxpayers’ to another class of Missourians, ‘income tax payers,’ without the just compensation assured by Article I, § 10, Missouri Constitution.” Such was described in the dissent of Morgan, J. as “the glaring presence of an unconstitutional classification.” Id. at 28. The majority in the case at bar is again unwilling to deal with this problem of facial unconstitutionality because there is no imminent possibility of a refund under § 18(b). This in my view misses the point because the entire scheme is predicated upon the enforcement and refund provisions (18b) which are patently invalid and as such legitimately command our attention. The issue is ripe for decision. For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.

. The trial court noted that for present purposes the “Hancock Amendment” is the same as the “Michigan Headlee Amendment.” The Michigan Governor’s budget message showed that in Michigan “beginning balance” is included in the total state revenue, that this is persuasive evidence of the fact that “fund bal-anee” should be included in the total state revenues in Missouri. The court further noted that the definition of the term “fund balance” means the same as “prior appropriated funds which were unspent at the end of the fiscal year.”