Court Opinion

ID: 9422616
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:03:34.704275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:37.946860
License: Public Domain

The Chief Justice,
concurring in the Court’s result, suggests two further distinctions between On Lee and the instant case: first, that Agent Davis, in carrying a concealed recording device, was legitimately seeking to protect his reputation as an honest public servant; and second, that in the instant case, unlike On Lee, electronically obtained evidence was not used so as to circumvent the production of the key government witness. I admit these are differences, but I do not see how they bear upon. the problem of the case before us, which is the admissibility in a federal criminal trial of the fruits of surreptitious electronic surveillance. Whether a federal tax. agent, in order to convince his superiors that he was indeed offered the bribe and did not solicit it, ought to be permitted to carry a Minifon on his person is' a separate question from whether the recording made by the Minifon is constitutionally permissible evidence in a federal criminal trial; I take it Lopez would.have no standing to chal.lenge the use of such recordings save in a prosecution or other proceeding against him. And whether it is unfair for the Government to introduce electronic evidence without putting the human agent of transmission on the stand seems to me to implicate considerations which have' nothing to do with the principle of individual freedom enshrined in the Fourth Amendment. On Lee’s trial may well have been less fair ’than Lopez’ because of the withholding of the government informer as a witness. But the invasion of freedom was in both cases the same: the secret electronic transmission or recording of private communications, Lopez’ to Davis and On Lee’s to the undercover agent.
*452II.
If On Lee and the instant case are in principle indistinguishable, the question of the continued validity of the. Court’s position in' On Lee is inescapably before us. But we cannot approach the question properly without first clearing away another bit of underbrush: the suggestion that the right of privacy is lost not by the speaker’s giving verbal form to his secret thoughts, but by the auditor’s consenting to an electronic transcription of the speaker’s words. The suggestion is an open invitation to law enforcement officers to use cat’s-paws and decoys in conjunction with electronic equipment, as in On Lee. More important, it invokes a Active sense of waiver wholly incompatible with any meaningful concept of liberty of communication. If a person must always be on his guard against his auditor’s having authorized a secret recording of their conversation, he will be no less reluctant to speak freely than if his risk is that a third party is doing the recording. Surely high government officials are not the only persons who find it essential to be able to say things “off the record.” I believe that there is a grave danger of chilling all private, free, and unconstrained communication if secret recordings, turned over to law enforcement officers by one party to a conversation, are competent evidence of any self-incriminating statements the-speaker may have made. In a free society, people ought not to have to watch their every word so carefully.
Nothing in Rathbun v. United States, 355 U. S. 107, is to the contrary. We held in that case that evidence obtained by police officers’ listening in to a telephone conversation on an existing extension with the consent of one of the parties, who was also' the subscriber to the extension, did not violate the federal wiretapping Act, 47 U, S. C. § 605. The decision was a narrow one. The grant of certiorari was limited to the question of statutory *453construction, and neither the majority nor dissenting opinion discusses any other possible basis for excluding the evidence. Furthermore, as the Court was careful to emphasize, extension phones are in common use, so common that it is a normal risk of telephoning that more than one person may be listening in at the receiver’s end. The extension telephone by means of which Rathbun’s statements were heard had not been specially installed for law enforcement purposes, and no attempt was made to transcribe the phone conversation electronically. Thus in the Court’s view wiretapping in the conventional sense was not involved and § 605 had no application. It should also be pointed out that while it is a very serious inconvenience to be inhibited from speaking freely over the telephone, it perhaps is a far graver danger to a free society if a person is inhibited from speaking out in his home or office.2
III.
The question before us comes down to whether there is a legal basis, either in the Fourth Amendment or in thé supervisory power,3 for excluding from federal criminal *454trials the fruits of surreptitious electronic surveillance by federal agents.
History and the text of the Constitution point the true path to the answer. In the celebrated case of Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029 (C. P. 1765), Lord Camden laid down two distinct principles: that general search warrants are. unlawful because of their uncertainty; and that searches - for evidence are unlawful because they infringe the privilege against self-incrimination.4 Lord Camden’s double focus was carried over into the structure of the Fourth Amendment. See Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (1937), 103; Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 361, 366 (1921).5 The two clauses of the Amendment are in the conjunctive, and plainly have distinct functions. The Warrant Clause was aimed specifically, at the evil of the general warrant, often regarded as the single immediate cause of the American Revolution.6 But the first clause *455embodies a more encompassing principle. It is, in light of the Entick. decision, that- government ought not to have the untrammeled right to extract evidence from people. Thus viewed, the Fourth Amendment is complementary to the Fifth. Feldman v. United States, 322 U. S. 487, 489-490. The informing principle of both Amendments is nothing less than a comprehensive right.of personal liberty, in the face of governmental intrusion.
And so this Court held in Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, “a case that will be remembered as long as civil liberty lives in the United States” (Brandeis, J., dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 474):
“The principles laid down in this opinion [Entick v. Carrington] affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form of the case then before the court, with its adventitious circumstances ; they apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employes of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offence, — it is the invasion of. this sacred right which underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden’s judgment. Breaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers are circumstances of aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man’s own testimony or of his private papers to be used *456as evidence to convict him of. crime or to forfeit his •goods, is within the condemnation of that judgment. In this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other.” 116 U. S., at 630.
The Court in Boyd set its face against a narrowly literal conception of “search and seizure,” instead reading the Fourth and Fifth Amendments together as creating a broad right'to inviolate personality. Boyd itself was not a search and seizure case in the conventional sense, but involved an order to compel production of documents,in the nature of a subpoena duces tecum. And Boyd had been preceded by Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, 735, in which the Court had clearly intimated that a statute permitting government officials to open letters in the mail would violate the Fourth Amendment. See also Hoover v. McChesney, 81 F. 472 (Cir. Ct. D. Ky. 1897).
The authority of the Boyd décision has never been impeached. Its basic principle, that the Fourth and Fifth' Amendments interact to create a comprehensive right of privacy, of individual freedom, has been repeatedly approved in the decisions of this Court.7 Thus we have held that the gist of the Fourth Amendment is “[t]he security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 27; Btefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S. 117, 119; Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. *457360, 362. Only two Terms ago, in reaffirming that the Fourth Amendment’s “right to privacy” is a “basic constitutional right,” Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 656, we remarked the “ ‘intimate relation’ ” between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Id., at 657. So also, the Court’s insistence that the Fourth Amendment is to be liberally construed, e. g., Byars v. United States, 273 U. S. 28, 32; United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 464; Grau v. United States, 287 U. S. 124, that searches for and seizures of mere evidence as opposed to the fruits or instrumentalities of crime are impermissible under any circumstances, e. g., United States v. Lefkowitz, supra, at 464-466; Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145, 154; Abel v. United States, 362 U. S. 217, 237-238, and that the Fourth Amendment is violated whether the .search or seizure is accomplished by force, by subterfuge, Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 306; see, e. g., Gatewood v. United States, 209 F. 2d 789; Fraternal Order of Eagles v. United States, 57 F. 2d 93; United States v. General Pharmacol Co., 205 F. Supp. 692; United States v. Bush, 172 F. Supp. 818; United States v. Reckis, 119 F. Supp. 687; United States v. Mitchneck, 2 F. Supp. 225; but see United States v. Bush, 283 F. 2d 51, reversing 172 F. Supp. 818, by an invalid subpoena, see, e. g. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 76; Federal Trade Comm’n v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298; Brown v. United States, 276 U. S. 134, or otherwise, see e. g., Wakkuri v. United States, 67 F. 2d 844, is confirmation that the purpose of the Amendment is to protect individual liberty in the broadest sense from governmental intrusion. And see Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 549-552 (dissenting opinion).
It is against this background that we must appraise Olmstead v. United States, supra, where the Court, over the dissents of Justices Holmes, Brandéis, Stone, and Butler, held that the fruits of wiretapping by federal officers were admissible as evidence in federal criminal trials. The *458Court’s holding, which is fully pertinent here,8 rested on the propositions that there had been no search because no trespass had been committed against the petitioners and ho seizure because no physical evidence had been obtained, thus making the Fourth Amendment inapplicable; and that evidence was not inadmissible in federal criminal trials merely because obtained by federal officers by methods violative of state law or otherwise unethical.
When the Court first confronted the problem of electronic surveillance apart from wiretapping, Olmstead was deemed to control, five members of the Court declining to reexamine the soundness of that decision. Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129. In turn, Olmstead and Goldman were deemed to compel the result in On Lee. But cf. note 10, infra. The instant case, too,-hinges on the soundness and continued authority of the Olmstead decision. I think it is demonstrable that Olmstead was erroneously decided, that its authority has been steadily *459sapped by subsequent decisions of the Court, and that it and the cases following it are sports in our jurisprudence which ought to be eliminated.
(1) Olmstead’& illiberal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as limited to the tangible fruits of actual trespasses was a departure from the Court’s previous decisions, notably Boyd, and a misreading of the history and purpose of the Amendment. Such a limitation cannot be squared with a meaningful right to inviolate personal liberty. It cannot even be justified as a “literal” reading of the Fourth Amendment. “In every-day talk, as of 1789 or now, a man ‘searches’ when he looks or listens. Thus we find reférences in the Bible to ‘searching’ the Scriptures (John V, 39); in literature to a man ‘searching’ his heart or conscience; in the law books to ‘searching’ a public record. None of these acts requires a manual rummaging for concealed objects. . . . [J]ust as looking around a room is searching, listening to the sounds in a room is searching. Seeing and hearing are both reactions of a human being to the physical environment around him — to light waves in one instance, to sound waves in the other. And, accordingly, using a mechanical aid to either seeing or hearing is also a form of searching. The camera and the dictaphone both do the work of the end-organs of an individual human searcher — more accurately.” United States v. On Lee, 193 F. 2d 306, 313 (Frank, J., dissenting).
(2) As constitutional exposition, moreover, the Olm-stead decision is insupportable. The Constitution would be an utterly impractical instrument of contemporary government if it were deemed to reach only problems familiar to the technology of the eighteenth century; yet the Court in Olmstead refused to apply the Fourth Amendment to wiretapping seemingly because the Framers of the Constitution had not been farsighted enough to foresee the invention of the telephone.
*460(3) The Court’s illiberal approach in Olmstead was a deviant in the law of the Fourth Amendment and not a harbinger of decisional revolution. The Court has not only continued to reiterate its adherence to the principles of the Boyd decision, see, e. g., Mapp v. Ohio, supra, but to require that subpoenas duces tecum, comply with the Fourth Amendment, see United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U. S. 707, 727-728; Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186; McPhaul v. United States, 364 U. S. 372, 382-383—a requirement patently inconsistent with a grudging, narrow conception of “searches and seizures.”
(4) Specifically, the Court in the years since Olmstead has severed both supports for that decision’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. We have held that the fruits of electronic surveillance, though intangible, nevertheless are within the reach of the Amendment. Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128; Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505;9 Lanza v. New York, 370 U. S. 139, 142. Indeed, only the other day we reaffirmed that verbal fruits, equally with physical, are within the Fourth. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 485-486. So too, the Court has refused to crowd the Fourth Améndment into the mold of local property law, Chapman v. United States, 365 U. S. 610, 617; Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, 266; United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48; McDonald *461v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 454, and has expressly-held, in a case very close on its facts to that at bar, that an actual trespass need not be shown in order to support a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Silverman v. United States, supra, at 511.10
(5) Insofar as Olmstead rests on the notion that the federal courts may not exclude evidence, no matter how *462obtained, unless its admission is specifically made illegal by federal statute or by the Constitution, the decision is manifestly inconsistent with what has come to be regarded as the scope of the supervisory power over federal law enforcement. See, e. g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332; Upshaw v. United States, 335 U. S. 410; Rea v. United States, 350 U. S. 214; Mallory v. United States, 354 U. S. 449; Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 481, 537 (1946). We are empowered to fashion rules of evidence for federal criminal trials in conformity with “the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted ... in the light of reason and experience." Rule 26, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Even if electronic surveillance as here involved does not violate the letter of the Fourth Amendment,.which I do not concede, it violates its spirit, and we ought to devise an appropriate prophylactic rule. The Court’s suggestion that-the supervisory power may'never be invoked to create an exclusionary rule of evidence unless there has been a violation of a Specific federal law or rule of procedure is, to me, a gratuitous attempt to cripple that power. And I do not see how it can be reconciled with our mandate 'to fashion rules conformable to evolving common law principles.
(6) The Olmstead décision caused such widespread dissatisfaction that Congress in effect overruled it by enacting § 605 of the Federal Communications Act, which made wiretapping a federal crime. We have consistently.given § 605 a generous construction, see Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S. 379; Weiss v. United States, 308 U. S. 321; Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338; Benanti v. United States, 355 U. S. 96, recognizing that Congress had been concerned to prevent “resort to- methods deemed inconsistent with ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty.” Nardone (I), supra, at 383; see Goldstein v. United States, 316 U. S. 114, 120. To be sure, *463§ 605, being directed to the specific practice sanctioned by Olmstead, wiretapping, does not of its own force forbid the admission in evidence of the fruits of other techniques of electronic surveillance. But a congressional enactment is a source of judicial policy as well as a specific mandate to be enforced, and the same “broad considerations of morality and public well-being,” Nardone (II), at 340, which 'make wiretap evidence inadmissible in the federal courts equally justify a court-made rule excluding the fruits of such devices as the Minifon. It is anomalous that the federal courts, while enforcing the right to privacy with respect to telephone communications, recognize no such right with respect to communications wholly within the sanctuaries of home and office.
IV.
If we want to understand why the Court, in Olmstead, Goldman, and On Lee, carved such seemingly anomalous exceptions to the general principles which haye- guided the Court in enforcing the Fourth Amendment, we must consider two factors not often articulated in the decisions. The first is the pervasive fear that if electronic surveillance were deemed to be within the reach of the Fourth Amendment, a useful technique of law enforcement would be wholly destroyed, because an electronic “search” could never be reasonable within the meaning of the Amendment. See Note, The Supreme Court,. 1960 Term, 75 Harv. L. Rev." 40, 187 (1961). For. one thing, electronic surveillance is almost inherently indiscriminate, so that compliance with the requirement of particularity in the Fourth Amendment u7ould be difficult; for another, words, which are the objects of an electronic seizure, are ordinarily mere evidence and not the fruits or instrumentalities of crime, and so they are impermissible objects of lawful searches under any circumstances, see pp. 456-457, supra; finally, the usefulness of electronic surveillance depends on lack of notice to the suspect.
*464But the argument is unconvincing. If in fact no warrant could be devised for electronic searches, that would be a compelling reason for forbidding them altogether. The requirements of the Fourth Amendment are not technical or unreasonably stringent; they are the bedrock rules without which there would be no effective protection of the right to personal liberty. A search for mere evidence offends the fundamental principle against self-incrimination, as Lord Camden clearly recognized; a merely exploratory search revives the evils of the general warrant, so bitterly opposed by the American Revolutionaries; and without some form of notice, police searches became intolerable intrusions into the privacy of home or office. Electronic searches cannot be tolerated in the name of law enforcement if they are inherently unconstitutional.
But in any event, it is premature to conclude that no warrant for an electronic search can possibly be devised. The requirements of the Fourth Amendment are not inflexible, or obtusely unyielding to the legitimate needs of law enforcement. It is at least clear that “the procedure of antecedent justification before a magistrate that is central to the Fourth Amendment,” Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U. S. 263, 272 (separate opinion) ; see McDonald v. United States, 336 U. S. 451, 455; Abel v. United States, 362 U. S. 217, 251-252 (dissenting opinion), could be made a precondition of lawful electronic surveillance. And there have been numerous suggestions of ways in which electronic searches could be made to comply with the other requirements of the Fourth Amendment.11
*465This is not to say that a warrant that will pass muster can actually be devised. It is not the business of this Court to pass upon hypothetical questions, and the question of the constitutionality of warrants for electronic surveillance is at this stage purely hypothetical. But it is important that the question is still an open one. Until the Court holds inadmissible the fruits of an electronic search made, as in the instant case, with no attempt whatever to comply with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, there will be no incentive to seek an imaginative solution whereby the rights of individual liberty and the needs of law enforcement are fairly accommodated.
The second factor that may be a significant though unarticulated premise of Olmstead and the cases following it is well expressed by the Government in the instant case: “if the agent's relatively innocuous conduct here is found offensive, a fortiori, the whole gamut of investigatorial techniques involving more serious deception must also be condemned. Police officers could then no longer employ confidential informants, act as undercover agents, or even wear ‘plain clothes.' ” But this argument misses the point. It is not Agent Davis’ deception that offends constitutional principles, but his use of an electronic device to probe and record words spoken in the privacy of a man’s office. For there is a qualitative difference between electronic surveillance, whether the.agents conceal the devices oh their persons or in walls or under beds, and conventional police stratagems such as eavesdropping and disguise. , The latter do not so seriously intrude upon the right of privacy. The risk of being overheard by an eavesdropper or betrayed by an informer or deceived as to the identity of one with whom one deals is probably inherent in the conditions of human society. It is the kind of risk we necessarily assume whenever we speak. But as soon as electronic surveillance comes into play, the *466risk changes crucially. There is no security from that kind of eavesdropping, no way of mitigating the risk, and so not even a residuum of true privacy. See pp. 449-451, supra.12.
Furthermore, the fact that the police traditionally engage in some rather disreputable practices of law enforcement is no argument for their extension: Eavesdropping was indictable at common law13 and most of us would still agree that it is an unsavory practice. The limitations of human hearing, however, diminish its potentiality for harm. Electronic aids add a wholly new dimension to eavesdropping. They make it more penetrating, more indiscriminate, more truly obnoxious to a free society. Electronic surveillance, in fact, makes the police omniscient ; and police omniscience is one of the most effective tools of tyranny.
V.
The foregoing analysis discloses no adequate justification for excepting electronic searches and seizures from the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. But to state the case thus is to state it too negatively. It is to ignore the positive reasons for bringing electronic-surveillance under judicial regulation. Not only has the *467problem grown enormously in recent years, see, e. g., Todisco v. United States, 298 F. 2d 208; United States v. Kabot, 295 F. 2d 848, but its true dimensions have only recently become apparent from empirical studies not available when Olmstead, Goldman, and On Lee were decided. The comprehensive study by' Samuel Dash and his associates as well as a number of legislative inquiries 14 reveals these truly terrifying facts: (1) Electronic eavesdropping by means of concealed microphones and recording devices of various kinds has become as large a problem as wiretapping, and is pervasively employed by private detectives, police, labor spies, employers and others for a variety of purposes, some downright disreputable.15- (2) These devices go far beyond simple *468“bugging,” and permit a degree of invasion of privacy that can only be described as frightening.16 (3) Far from providing unimpeachable evidence, the devices lend themselves to diabolical fakery.17 (4) A number *469of States have been impelled to enact regulatory legislation.18 (5) The legitimate law enforcement need for such techniques is not clear,19 and it surely has not been established that a stiff warrant requirement for eléctronic surveillance would destroy effective law enforcement.
But even without empirical studies, it múst be plain that electronic surveillance imports a -peculiarly severe danger to the liberties of the person. To be secure against police officers’ breaking and entering to search for physical objects is worth very little if there is no security against the officers’ using secret recording devices to purloin words spoken in confidence within the four walls of home or office. Our possessions are of little value compared to our personalities. And we must bear in mind that *470historically the search and seizure power' was used to suppress freedom of speech and of the press, see Lasson, supra, at 33, 37-50; Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717, 724-729; Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360, 376 (dissenting opinion), and that today, also, the liberties of the person are indivisible. "Under Hitler, when it. became known that the secret police planted dictaphones in houses, members of families often gathered in bathrooms to conduct whispered discussions of intimate- affairs, hoping thus to escape the reach of the sending apparatus.” United States v. On Lee, 193 F. 2d 306, 317 (dissenting opinion). Electronic surveillance strikes deeper than at the ancient feeling that a man's home is his castle; it strikes at freedom of communication, a'postulate of our kind of society. Lopez’ words to Agent Davis captured by the Minifon were not constitutionally privileged by force of the First Amendment. But freedom of speech is undermined where people fear to speak unconstrainedly in what they suppose to be the privacy of home and office. King, Wire Tapping and Electronic Surveillance: A Neglected Constitutional Consideration, 66 Dick. L. Rev. 17, 25-30 (1961). If electronic surveillance by government becomes sufficiently widespread, and there is little in prospect for checking it, the hazard that as a people we may become hagridden and furtive is not fantasy.
The right tó privacy is the obverse of freedom of speech in another sense. This Court has lately recognized that the First Amendment freedoms may include the right, under certain circumstances, to anonymity. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449; Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516; Talley v. California, 362 U. S. 60; Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U. S. 293; Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U. S. 539. The passive and the quiet, equally with the active and the aggressive, are entitled to protection when engaged in the precious activity of expressing ideas *471or beliefs. Electronic surveillance destroys all anonymity and all privacy; it makes government privy to everything that goes on.
In light of these circumstances I think it is an intolerable anomaly that while conventional searches and seizures are regulated by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and wiretapping is prohibited by federal statute, electronic surveillance as involved in the instant case, which poses the greatest danger to the right of private freedom, is wholly beyond the pale of. federal law.20
This Court has by and large steadfastly enforced the Fourth Amendment against physical intrusions into person, home, and property by law enforcement officers. But our course of decisions, it now seems, has been outflanked by the technological advances of the very recent past. I cannot but believe that if we continue to condone electronic surveillance by federal agents by permitting the fruits to be used in evidence in the federal courts, we shall be contributing to a climate of official lawlessness and conceding the helplessness of the Constitution and this Court to protect rights “fundamental to a free society.” Frank v. Maryland, supra, at 362.21

 If anything, Rathbun supports the position that the' right of privacy is-not forfeited merely because the auditor authorizes electronic eavesdropping. The Court might have grounded its decision in the fact that the receiver had consented to the police officers’ listening in; since §605 proscribes only unauthorized interceptions of telephonic communications, the Court could have held that the listening in was authorized, but it did not,. turning the case entirely on the absence of interception within the meaning of the statute, and carefully differentiating between use of an existing extension phone and other modes of listening in. Thus the concession in Rathbun which the Court today quotes was pure dictum. •

 The failure of Lopez or his counsel to raise or argue the supervisory-power point does not bar us from considering it. For the interest secured by the exercise of the power is that of the federal courts themselves, not of the parties. “[T]he objection that the plaintiff comes with unclean hands will be taken by the court itself. It will be taken despite the wish to the contrary of all the parties to the *454litigation. The court protects itself.” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). (Footnote omitted.)

 “It is. very certain, 'that the law obligeth no man to accuse himself; because the necessary means of compelling self-accusation, falling upon the innocent as well as the guilty, would be both cruel and unjust; and it should seem, that search for evidence is disallowed upon the same principle.” 19 Howell’s State Trials, at 1073.

 The text of the Fourth Amendment is as follows: “The right of the people to be secure in their “persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable' searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

 “Historically we are dealing with a provision of the Constitution which sought to guard against an abuse that more than anjf one single factor gave rise to American independence. John Adams surely is a competent witness on the causes of the American Revolution. And he -it was who said of Otis’ argument against search by the police . . . , ‘American independence was then and there born.’ 10 *455Adams, Works 247.” Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145, 159 (dissenting opinion).
Of course, the Warrant Clause not only outlaws general warrants, but also establishes the root principle of judicial superintendence of searches and seizures. See p. 464, infra.

 E. q., Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532, 543-544; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 71; Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383; Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 306; Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313; Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 33-34; McGuire v. United States, 273 U. S. 95, 99; United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 467; Feldman v. United States, supra, at 489-490; Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582, 587; Zap v. United States, 328 U. S. 624, 628.
The Court’s liberal construction of the Fourth is paralleled by its • similarly liberal construction of the Fifth. See, e. g., Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 562.

 In part, the Court rested its decision on considerations thought peculiar to wiretapping, i. e., the interception of telephonic communications. “The language of the Amendment can not be extended and expanded to include telephone wires reaching to the whole world from the defendant's house or office. The intervening wires are not part of his house or office any more than are the highways along which they are stretched.” 277 U. S., at 465. “The reasonable view is that one who installs in his house a telephone instrument with connecting wires intends to project his voice to those quite outside, and that the wires beyond his house and messages while passing over them are not within the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Here those who intercepted the projectéd voices were not in the house of either party to the conversation.” Id., at 466.
The disingenuous artificiality of this analysis is surely plain. Although, arguably, face-to-face conversations in home or office are more intimately a part of the right to privacy than are telephonic conversations, see pp. 452-453, supra, any attempt to draw a constitutional distinction would ignore the plain realities of modern life, in which the telephone has assumed an indispensable role in free human communication.

 In Irvine v. California, supra, though the conduct of the police was held to violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the fruits were deemeá admissible under the rule of Wolf v. Colorado, supra, overruled in Mapp v. Ohio, supra. It might be noted that the holdings in Irvine and Silverman, insofar-as they brought verbal fruits within the Fourth Amendment, were implicit in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, 392, where it was held that all fruits of an unconstitutional search must be excluded from the federal-courts, so as not to “reduce . . . the Fourth Amendment to a form of words.” Cf. McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451; Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 73 App. D. C. 85, 115 F. 2d 690.

 Silverman. involved the penetration of a “spike mike” several inches into the party wall of the house occupied by the petitioners. The mike touched a heating duct which acted as a' conductor of sounds within the house, thus enabling their transmission by the mike to federal officers on the other side of the wall. On its facts the case was very close to Goldman, which had involved a detectaphone placed against and touching (but not penetrating) the outside.of a wall. Since the Court in Silverman declined to distinguish the cases on the ground that Silverman did, and Goldman did not, involve an actual trespass, it would seem that the authority of Goldman was severely impaired — and so also, it would seem, that of On Lee and Olmstead.
Actually, the instant case and On Lee, compared with Goldman and Silverman, are a fortiori for applying the Fourth Amendment:
“This Court has held genérally that, in a federal criminal trial, a federal officer may testify to what he sees or hears take place within a house or room which he has no warrant or permission to enter, provided he sees or hears it outside of those premises. . . . This holds true even where the officer supplements his hearing with a hearing aid, detectaphone or other device outside the premises. ... He and his hearing aid pick up the sounds outside of, rather than within, the protected premises.
“In the. instant case [On Lee] . . . Lee’s' overhearing of petitioner’s statements was accomplished through Chin Poy’s surreptitious introduction, within petitioner’s laundry, of Lee’s concealed radio transmitter which, without petitioner’s knowledge or consent, there picked up petitioner’s conversation and transmitted it to Lee outside the premises. The presence of the transmitter, for this purpose, was the presence of Lee’s ear. ... In this ease the words were picked up without warrant or consent within the constitutionally inviolate ‘house’ of a person entitled to protection there against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” On Lee v. United States, 343 U. S. 747, 766-767 (Burton, J., dissenting).

 See, e. g., Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129, 140, n. 6 (Murphy, J., dissenting); cf. 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961), § 2184b (3), at 59; Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: An Analysis and a Legislative Proposal, 52 Col. L. Rev. 165, 200-208 (1952).

 This is not to say that the Fourth'Amendment must necessarily embrace every situation involving electronic recording aids to law enforcement. For example, a distinction might be drawn between surveillance of home or office on the one hand, and surveillance of ' public places, streets, and so forth, on the other hand. Compare McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, with Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57.

 “Eaves-droppers, or such as listen under walls or windows or the eaves of a house, to hearken after discourse, and thereupon to frame slanderous and mischievous tales, are a common nusance and presentable at the court-leet: or are indictable at the sessions, and punishable by fine and finding sureties for their good behaviour.” . 4 Blackstone Commentaries 168. See Ga. Code Ann. § 26-2001; N. D. Cent. Code § 12-42-05; S. C. Code § 16-554.

 Dash, Schwartz, and Knowlton, The Eavesdroppers (1959); Hearings on S. Res. No. 234 before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 'passim, (1958) ¡'Report of the California Seriate-Judiciary Committee on the Interception of Messages by the Use of Electronic and Other Devices (1957); Report of the New York Joint Legislative Committee to Study Illegal Interception of Communications, N. Y. Sess. Laws (1956).

 See Dash, supra, note 14, at 76 (“bugging” by police of interrogation rooms, j'ail cells, and interview rooms in jails), 96 (monitoring of employees’ conversations by means of microphones concealed in pen sets), 136 (use of microphones by law enforcement officers termed “universal” in New Orleans and Baton Rouge), 175 (in California, “[bjugging is much more frequently and openly engaged in by police than wiretapping”), 180 (again in California: “Literally, whenever the police suspected an individual of being connected with the commission of á crime, and the case was worth it, trained police technicians, or private specialists employed by the police, would pry open windows, pick locks, or by some ruse gain entry to the home or business place of the suspected individual and plant a microphone for the purpose of overhearing his conversations. By means of a leased wire from the telephone company, these planted microphones .could be connected to telephone lines which would be drawn in to a single listening post where a great number of conversations in different parts of the city could be monitored at one time and in one place”), 190 (use of con*468cealed microphone for purposes of blackmail), 196 (bugging conversations between husbands and wives in jails), 212 (“tables have been bugged in a restaurant for the purpose, according to the proprietor, of permitting him to. know what his customers actually think of his food and to detect discourtesy among his waitresses”), 229-230 (use of bugging to obtain evidence for divorce proceedings), 269-271 (wiretapping and bugging of labor controversies in Philadelphia), 280-281 (in Las Vegas: “A bug is put in a visiting hoodlum’s hotel room as a matter of course, to see what he is up to”). These are, of course, only a few isolated examples of the practice; see, e. g., The Wall Street Journal, April 9, 1963, p. 1, col. 4;' p. 22, col. 3.

 Dash suggests that a parabolic microphone (which concentrates sound much as a curved mirror focuses light) might pick up a conversation at a distance of 100 feet. P. 350. Such a microphone can be made virtually impossible to detect, p. 353, but .even the ordinary concealed microphone in the home may be impossible to detect, at least without a mine detector. P. 342. Dash also suggests that a microwave-beam device may have been developed with a range of 1,000 feet or more and ability to penetrate through virtually any obstacle. Pp. 357-358. Such a device, if it exists, is not readily obtainable; but the parabolic microphone and a variety of other such devices are. Thus a current advertisement'in a national magazine for “The Snooper” describes this device as follows: “This is literally an electronic marvel that’s a direct result of the space age. Incredible as it may seem, it does amplify sound 1,000,000 times. Sensitive 18" disk reflector will pick up normal conversations at a distance (500 ft.) where you can’t even see lips moving. Just think of the ways you can use this. Portable; complete with tripod and stethescopic earphones. The best part — a regular tape recorder can be plugged into the back to take everything down. Have fun!” The advertised price is $18.95.

 “In a carefully controlled experiment, Samuel Dash made a sample political speech on tape. A sound studio specializing in tape editing for one of the large broadcasting studios then took this tape and edited it in such a way as completely to reverse its meaning. Finally, a third recording was made, this time of Mr. Dash reading the new, distorted version of the speech. The three recordings were *469compared by ear and by oscilloscope to see whether or not the editing was detectable. By ear it was noticeable only in one place where the editor had been hurried in his work. The oscilloscope could not reveal even this much because of the rapidly changing patterns on the screen. It was decided that the only way to examine the waveforms for purposes of comparison was to record them on motion-picture film; accordingly, equipment was set up for doing this. Although it was expected that the build-up or decay of sounds would be altered by cutting, so skilful, had been the editorial manipulation that nothing of the kind was observed. Even after hours of studying the films, no sure clue revealing an editing job could be found.” Dash, at 368.

 Cal. Penal Code §§ 653h, 653i; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., c. 272, § 99; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.650; N. Y. Penal Law, § 738.

 In the nature of things, wiretapping is only useful in the investigation of crimes of a continuing nature, which are typically not major crimes, “[T]he wiretapping done by pláinclothesmen is still in large part aimed at bookmakers’ operations and prostitution. As a matter of fact, more wiretapping by police is done in gambling cases than in any other kind of case. In gambling and in vice matters generally, there is steady pressure on the pláinclothesmen to maintain a certain arrest record. Continuous wiretap surveillance, without court order, enables pláinclothesmen to maintain this record.” Dash, at 66. The same principles apply to electronic surveillance generally.

 Senator Hennings has termed electronic eavesdropping more 'insidious and more prevalent than wiretapping. The Wiretapping-'Eavesdropping Problem: A Legislator’s View, 44 Minn. L. Rev. 813, 815 (1960). Another observer has called the problem “far graver” than wiretapping. Williams, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Defense Counsel’s View, 44 Minn. L. Rev. 855, 862 (1960).

 Viewing the instant case as I do, I find no occasion to consider the petitioner’s defense of entrapment.