Court Opinion

ID: 9376033
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-01 17:07:11.624428+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:03.881844
License: Public Domain

J-S04036-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    KEVIN JAVIER BAEZ-BENITEZ                  :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 738 EDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 1, 2021
       In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-39-CR-0002462-2020

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.:                            FILED MARCH 1, 2023

        Kevin Javier Baez-Benitez (Baez-Benitez) appeals from the judgment of

sentence imposed in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County (trial court)

pursuant to his jury conviction of firearms not to be carried without a license,

terroristic threats, recklessly endangering another person (REAP) and simple

assault by physical menace.1 He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence.

We affirm.

        We take the following factual background and procedural history from

the trial court’s April 27, 2022 opinion and our independent review of the

record.

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1   18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6106(a)(1), 2706(a)(1), 2705 and 2701(a)(3), respectively.
J-S04036-23

                                        I.

     The trial court aptly describes:

           On July 2, 2020, at approximately 4:00 a.m., members of
     the Allentown Police responded to the vicinity of 1030 Linden
     Street. The initial call was a disturbance, but an additional
     dispatch warned that the dispatcher during a 9-1-1 call heard a
     shot fired. Upon the officers’ arrival, a search of the parking lot
     revealed a bullet hole above a wheel-well of a white Toyota
     Camry. It was determined that a “bullet traveled through the
     front of the fender, hit a shock absorber, went through an inner
     fender and came out into the engine compartment.” (N.T. Trial
     10/13/21, at 113-17).        Two fragments of the bullet were
     recovered.     A further search located a 9mm shell casing
     approximately twenty (20) feet north of the Toyota Camry.

            The Toyota Camry belonged to Jalessa Nuez, the victim in
     this case. Ms. Nuez … testified that earlier in the evening she went
     to the home of her friend, Danielle Smith, who resided with [Baez-
     Benitez] at 1030 West Linden Street. Ms. Nuez did not know
     Baez-Benitez very well, having met him only twice. Before the
     night of this incident, there was no ill will between [Baez-Benitez]
     and Ms. Nuez.

           Ms. Nuez arrived at the residence, and after some stops and
     starts, [Baez-Benitez] drove Ms. Nuez and Ms. Smith to a local
     tavern named Greg’s. Everyone consumed alcohol, and in the
     words of Ms. Nuez, “everyone was chillin’, having a good time.”
     (N.T. Trial, 10/12/21, at 78). Unfortunately, she had a kerfuffle
     with a female patron at the tavern, and her group was asked to
     leave.

           The group went back to Ms. Smith’s apartment, [where]
     [Baez-Benitez], Ms. Nuez, Ms. Smith, and a Melvin Castillo [hung
     out]. Ms. Smith, who was very intoxicated, began crying about
     [Baez-Benitez] and his cheating ways. Ms. Nuez, at some point,
     went outside to smoke a cigarette, and Ms. Smith followed her.

          [Baez-Benitez] then began yelling out the window at Ms.
     Smith, and then came downstairs and continued the argument.
     He demanded Ms. Smith come back to the apartment, and when
     she declined, the argument became physical.

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           Ms. Nuez told [Baez-Benitez] to remove his hands from Ms.
     Smith, and offered Ms. Smith a place to stay until things “cooled
     down.” [Baez-Benitez] responded that Ms. Smith was “not going
     anywhere.” Ms. Nuez then went upstairs to grab her purse and
     keys, and as she was leaving … [Baez-Benitez] … put the gun in
     her face. (See N.T. Trial, 10/12/21, at 86). She then called 9-1-
     1.

            The 9-1-1 call reveals that Ms. Nuez told the 9-1-1
     dispatcher that she was being threatened, and that “he’s gonna
     blow my head off ….” (Exhibit 9A, Transcript of 911 Call). [Baez-
     Benitez] is heard saying, “Oh, I’ll hurt you now that’s what I do,
     I’ll hurt you, that’s what I do, that’s what I do I hurt people.”
     (Id.). The 9-1-1 dispatcher also learned from Ms. Nuez that
     “Kevin” fired a “shotgun” at her. Something was lost in the
     translation, because it was clarified that [Baez-Benitez] shot a
     gun, not a shotgun. Ms. Nuez, during her testimony, described a
     handgun. “It’s a gun that a police officer holds,” approximately
     seven or eight inches in length. (N.T. Trial, 10/12/21, at 86-87,
     102, 143-44).

           Ms. Nuez made her way out of the apartment building, and
     while still on the phone with the 9-1-1 dispatcher, a gunshot is
     heard. The shot was fired as Ms. Nuez was headed towards her
     vehicle. “As I was walking across the street, he shot fire.... He
     was on the opposite side of my car” when he discharged the
     firearm. (Id. at 97-98, 118-19). She was unsure if [Baez-
     Benitez] was pointing the firearm at her or her vehicle.

          A video corroborating Ms. Nuez’s testimony was retrieved
     from a video camera that was attached to the south wall of a
     vacant building. The video depicts an individual, identified as
     [Baez-Benitez], firing the firearm, and Ms. Nuez is seen in close
     proximity to that event.

            Baez-Benitez, after discharging the firearm, fled in his
     vehicle, but later returned to the apartment building while the
     police were present. He told the officers that Danielle Smith had
     called him, and then departed the building. He did not identify
     himself to the officers, and the officers, who were still sorting out
     the incident, did not ask him for identification. The investigation
     later pinpointed [Baez-Benitez], and he was arrested in Reading.

                                     -3-
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(Trial Court Opinion, 4/27/22, at 4-7) (footnotes omitted; record citations

added).

       On October 14, 2021, a jury convicted Baez-Benitez of the foregoing

charges.      The trial court ordered the preparation of a presentence

investigation (PSI) report and held a sentencing hearing on December 1,

2021, at which it sentenced him to a term of incarceration of not less than

forty-two nor more than eighty-four months on the firearms charge, with all

other sentences2 to run concurrently.            Baez-Benitez filed post-sentence

motions that the trial court denied. He timely appealed and filed a court-

ordered statement of errors complained of on appeal.               See Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b).3

____________________________________________

2 Specifically, the court sentenced [Baez-Benitez] to terms of not less than
eighteen nor more than thirty-six months for terroristic threats, not less than
twelve nor more than twenty-four months for REAP, and not less than twelve
nor more than twenty-four months for simple assault.

3 The trial court observes that Baez-Benitez’s sufficiency claims are waived
because his Rule 1925(b) statement contains boilerplate allegations of
insufficiency that lack specificity. (See Trial Ct. Op., at 7). It is well-settled
that, “[i]n order to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on
appeal, an appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement must state with specificity
the element or elements upon which the appellant alleges that the evidence
was insufficient[,]” and an appellant’s failure to do results in waiver.
Commonwealth v. Ellison, 213 A.3d 312, 320-21 (Pa. Super. 2019)
(brackets and citations omitted). Baez-Benitez’s Rule 1925(b) statement fails
to identify the element or elements upon which he alleges the evidence is
insufficient and merely states that “the evidence was insufficient as a matter
of law to sustain the verdict of guilty” on each charge. (Rule 1925(b)
Statement, at 1). Therefore, we deem his claims waived. Moreover, as
explained above, they do not merit relief.

                                           -4-
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        On appeal, Baez-Benitez complains that the evidence was insufficient4

to support his conviction of firearms not to be carried without a license,

terroristic threats, REAP or simple assault.5

____________________________________________

4   Our standard of review of this matter is well-settled:

               The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of
        the evidence is to determine whether, when viewed in a light most
        favorable to the verdict winner, the evidence at trial and all
        reasonable inferences therefrom is sufficient for the trier of fact to
        find that each element of the crimes charged is established beyond
        a reasonable doubt. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden
        of proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt by means of
        wholly circumstantial evidence.

               The facts and circumstances established by the
        Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence.
        Any doubt raised as to the accused’s guilt is to be resolved by the
        fact-finder. As an appellate court, we do not assess credibility nor
        do we assign weight to any of the testimony of record. Therefore,
        we will not disturb the verdict unless the evidence is so weak and
        inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
        drawn from the combined circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Vogelsong, 90 A.3d 717, 719 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(citations and quotation marks omitted).

5 The Commonwealth argues that Baez-Benitez’s arguments challenge Ms.
Nuez’s credibility and the weight that was afforded to her testimony, which is
not a proper sufficiency argument. (See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 7-9).
While we agree with the Commonwealth’s observation, because we can clearly
interpret his claims, we will review them under the proper sufficiency
standard, but decline Baez-Benitez’s invitation to re-weigh the evidence. See
Vogelsong, 90 A.3d at 719 (“As an appellate court, we do not assess
credibility nor do we assign weight to any of the testimony of record.”)
(citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Betz, 664 A.2d 600, 604 (Pa. Super.
1995) (sufficiency analysis does not permit re-examination of the credibility,
reliability or weight of the evidence).

                                           -5-
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                                               II.

                                               A.

       Baez-Benitez argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of

firearms not to be carried without a license because it failed to establish that

he possessed a firearm since Ms. Nuez was intoxicated6 and unable to see

clearly on the night in question and she provided multiple accounts of the

night’s events. (See Baez-Benitez’s Brief, at 14-15).

       Section 6106 of the Crimes Code provides, in pertinent part:

       [A]ny person who carries a firearm in any vehicle or any person
       who carries a firearm concealed on or about his person, except in
       his place of abode or fixed place of business, without a valid and
       lawfully issued license under this chapter commits a felony of the
       third degree.

____________________________________________

6 The trial court notes that Baez-Benitez “overstates [Ms. Nuez]’s level of
intoxication” in an attempt to discredit her. (Trial Ct. Op., at 10). Not only
does his claim challenge the weight of Ms. Nuez’s testimony, our review of the
record supports this observation. As the trial court observes:

       [Baez-Benitez]’s theory of misidentification is far-fetched. If Ms.
       Nuez, who was familiar with [him], was incorrect in her
       identification, then some gun-toting stranger threatened her, and
       for some unknown reason engaged in target practice with her
       vehicle. All of the events, which were corroborated, unfolded
       before her eyes. Her intoxication did not affect her identification
       of [Baez-Benitez.] …

(Id. at 11).

                                           -6-
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18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1).7 “In addition to proving the statutory elements of

the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt, the Commonwealth must also

establish the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes.”

Commonwealth v. Smyser, 195 A.3d 912, 915 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation

omitted).    “A victim’s in-court testimony, identifying the defendant as the

perpetrator of a crime, is by itself sufficient to establish the identity element

of that crime.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 180 A.3d 474, 478 (Pa. Super.

2018) (citations omitted). In fact, “[d]irect evidence of identity is, of course,

not necessary and a defendant may be convicted solely on circumstantial

evidence.” Smyser, 195 A.3d at 915 (citation omitted).

       Ms. Nuez and Baez-Benitez were acquainted prior to the night of the

incident. Ms. Nuez testified that she, Baez-Benitez and Ms. Smith returned to

Ms. Smith’s apartment after being out at a bar and that Ms. Smith and Baez-

Benitez began arguing. When Ms. Nuez and Ms. Smith went outside, Baez-

Benitez put his hands on Ms. Smith and Ms. Nuez told her she could stay with

her, and Baez-Benitez said, “[s]he’s not going anywhere.” (N.T., 10/12/21,

at 85); (see id. at 84). Ms. Nuez went back inside to get her belongings and,

as she is walking down the stairs of the building, she heard Ms. Smith scream

and running footsteps behind her. (See id. at 85-86). When Ms. Nuez turned,

____________________________________________

7  It is undisputed that Baez-Benitez was not licensed to carry a concealed
firearm. (See Baez-Benitez’s Brief, at 14).

                                           -7-
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she saw Baez-Benitez with the gun in his hand, which he pointed at her face.

(See id. at 86).

     Ms. Nuez called 9-1-1 and told the dispatcher that Baez-Benitez was

going to “blow [her] head off.” (Exhibit 9A, Transcript of 9-1-1 call). Baez-

Benitez could be heard in the background saying, “Oh, I’ll hurt you now that’s

what I do … that’s what I do I hurt people.” (Id.). Ms. Nuez left the building

while still on the telephone with the dispatcher, she said, “he shot fire … He

was on the opposite side of my car” when he discharged the gun.         (N.T.

Volume I, at 97-98, 118-19).

     Ms. Nuez testified that she is familiar with guns and that the one in

Baez-Benitez’s hand was a 9mm handgun like the ones that police officers

carry. (See id. at 86-87). A video attached to the wall of a building showed

an individual, identified as Baez-Benitez, firing the gun near Ms. Nuez. (Id.

at 111-12).

     Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth

as verdict winner, it was more than sufficient to establish that Baez-Benitez

unlawfully possessed a firearm. See Vogelsong, 90 A.3d at 719; 18 Pa.C.S.

§ 6106(a)(1).

                                     B.

     Baez-Benitez argues that his conviction for terroristic threats arose out

of his pointing a gun in Ms. Nuez’s face and, because there was no additional

                                    -8-
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evidence of an action or threat, the evidence was insufficient. (See Baez-

Benitez’s Brief, at 15-16).

      Section 2706 of the Crimes Code provides, in pertinent part that, “[a]

person commits the crime of terroristic threats if the person communicates,

either directly or indirectly, a threat to[] commit any crime of violence with

intent to terrorize another[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a)(1). “Accordingly, the

Commonwealth must prove that 1) the defendant made a threat to commit a

crime of violence, and 2) the threat was communicated with the intent to

terrorize another or with reckless disregard for the risk of causing terror.”

Commonwealth v. McCalman, 795 A.2d 412, 418 (Pa. Super. 2002), appeal

denied, 812 A.2d 1228 (Pa. 2002) (citation omitted). “[I]t is unnecessary for

the defendant to specifically articulate the crime of violence which he or she

intends to commit where the type of crime may be inferred from the nature

of the statement and the context and circumstances surrounding the utterance

of the statement.” In re Maloney, 636 A.2d 671, 675-76 (Pa. Super. 1994)

(citation and brackets omitted).

      Baez-Benitez argues that in McCalman, the court found that the

evidence was sufficient to support a charge of terroristic threats because the

defendant pointed a gun in the faces of the victims and said, “go the f— away”

to one of them, but that there was no evidence of an action or threat in this

case. (See Baez-Benitez’s Brief, at 15-16). This argument is not supported

by the record.

                                    -9-
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      Ms. Nuez testified that Baez-Benitez pointed a gun in her face and when

she called 9-1-1, she told the dispatcher that she was being threatened and

that “he’s gonna blow my head off.” (Exhibit 9A, Transcript of 9-1-1 Call). In

the background, Baez-Benitez could be heard saying, “Oh, I’ll hurt you now

that’s what I do … that’s what I do I hurt people.” (Id.).

      This evidence was sufficient to establish that Baez-Benitez threatened

to commit a crime of violence with the intent to terrorize another.       See

McCalman, 795 A.2d at 418; In re Maloney, 636 A.2d at 67-76; 18 Pa.C.S.

§ 2706(a)(1).

                                      C.

      Next, Baez-Benitez argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove

the charge of REAP for shooting at the vehicle because “the undisputed

evidence at trial established that [the] car was shot while no one was standing

near it[,] [and t]herefore … [he] did not create an actual present ability to

inflict harm to another person.” (Baez-Benitez’s Brief, at 17).

      “A person commits [REAP,] a misdemeanor of the second degree[,] if

he recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another person in

danger of death or serious bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705. The Crimes

Code defines “serious bodily injury” as “Bodily injury which creates a

substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement,

or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or

organ.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301. REAP “requires the creation of danger, so the

                                    - 10 -
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Commonwealth must prove the existence of an actual present ability to inflict

harm to another.” Commonwealth v. Shaw, 203 A.3d 281, 284 (Pa. Super.

2019), appeal denied, 215 A.3d 964 (Pa. 2019) (citation omitted). Although,

“the mere act of discharging a firearm does not on its own constitute recklessly

endangering another person[,]” a defendant’s shooting a handgun into the

porch ceiling with a witness “mere feet away” is sufficient to support REAP.

Id. at 284, 286 (citation omitted).

      Baez-Benitez pointed a loaded gun at Ms. Nuez’s face. She testified that

when she approached her car on the driver’s side of the vehicle, he fired a

shot from the passenger side. (N.T. Trial Volume I, at 97-98, 118-19). Video

from a camera on a nearby building depicted an individual identified as Baez-

Benitez shooting a gun with Ms. Nuez in close proximity. (N.T. Trial, Volume

I, at 111-12); (N.T. Trial Volume II, at 136-41).

      The foregoing evidence was sufficient to support Baez-Benitez’s

conviction of REAP where it established that he recklessly engaged in conduct

that put Ms. Nuez in danger of death or serious bodily injury. See Shaw, 203

A.3d at 286; 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705.

                                       D.

      Finally, Baez-Benitez challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to

support his simple assault conviction. He maintains that the evidence was

insufficient because “there was no one else in the parking lot” and “Ms. Nuez

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was clearly not fearful of imminent serious bodily injury.”    (Baez-Benitez’s

Brief, at 17-18).

      To prove simple assault by physical menace, the Commonwealth must

provide sufficient evidence that the accused “intentionally plac[ed] another in

fear of imminent serious bodily injury through the use of menacing or

frightening activity.” Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720, 726 (Pa.

Super. 2003) (citation omitted); see 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(3) (“[A] person is

guilty of [simple] assault if he … attempts by physical menace to put another

in fear of imminent serious bodily injury[.]”).    “Intent can be proven by

circumstantial evidence and may be inferred from the defendant’s conduct

under the circumstances.”    Reynolds, 835 A.2d at 726 (citation omitted).

“[T]he act of pointing a gun at another person [can] constitute simple assault

as an attempt by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious

bodily injury.” Id. (citation omitted).

      As stated elsewhere in this decision, the Commonwealth presented

evidence that Baez-Benitez pointed a gun in Ms. Nuez’s face. He threatened

her that he was going to hurt her because that is what he does, he hurts

people. Later, he shot the gun in her vicinity. This evidence was sufficient to

prove that Baez-Benitez intentionally placed Ms. Nuez in fear of imminent

serious bodily injury through the use of menacing or frightening activity. See

id.; 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(3). Baez-Benitez is due no relief.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/01/2023

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