Court Opinion

ID: 9530026
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:56:26.669023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:58.826203
License: Public Domain

O’Connell, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent.
The present case is on all fours1 with the “plain feel” exception to the search warrant requirement annunciated in Minnesota v Dickerson, 508 US 366; 113 S Ct 2130; 124 L Ed 2d 334 (1993). The majority’s energy would have been better spent applying this legal principle, as adopted by our Supreme Court in People v Champion, 452 Mich 92; 549 NW2d 849 (1996), to the facts of the present case rather than attempting to distinguish factually the present case from Champion.
The Supreme Court remanded this case to our Court in light of their recent decision in Champion. *63In Champion, supra, pp 105-106, the Court stated as follows:
[A]n object felt during an authorized patdown search may be seized without a warrant if the item’s incriminating character is immediately apparent, i.e., if the officer develops probable cause to believe that the item felt is contraband before going beyond the legitimate scope of the patdown search.
The majority iterates this rule of law, but then misconstrues “immediately apparent” to mean something akin to “a degree of suspicion that approaches near certainty.” Unfortunately, numerous courts have made this same error. See Champion, supra, p 106. A police officer does not have to be one hundred percent certain that the item is contraband. “Immediately apparent” does not mean “near certainty,” it means having probable cause without further search. By effectively applying the “near certainty” test, the majority makes the same error that this Court made in People v Champion, 205 Mich App 623; 518 NW2d 518 (1994), rev’d 452 Mich 92; 549 NW2d 849 (1996).
In my previous dissent in this case, I stated the following:
Officer Jackson conducted a patdown search for his safety. The patdown search was justified and is not challenged on appeal. Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968). The patdown did not go beyond the outer clothing in a search for weapons. The officer felt a hard ball-shaped object with pieces broken off, which, in his experience, he believed to be cocaine. Officer Jackson testified “that he felt something that to him felt like some narcotics.” In other words, it was “immediately apparent” to Officer Jackson that defendant was in possession of narcotics.
*64The fact that the police officer had to remove the item from defendant’s jacket to confirm his initial impression does not affect its identify as being “immediately apparent.” “Immediately apparent” means having probable cause without further search. [215 Mich App 644-645.]
A review of the entire record, using the “totality of the circumstances” test as required by Champion, indicates that the trial court did not err in finding that Officer Jackson had “probable cause” to search the defendant.
The following hypothetical illustrates the majority’s misapplication of the facts and its misunderstanding of the term “immediately apparent.”
The police conduct a lawful patdown search of a suspect and feel a gun. The police officer believes he has probable cause to remove the gun from the suspect’s coat. He removes the gun and his suspicions are confirmed. At the suppression hearing, the following hypothetical testimony occurs.
Q. When you conducted the patdown search, did you know it was a .45 automatic?
A. No.
Q. Was it a .22 caliber gun?
A. No.
Q. Were you certain it was not a toy gun?
A. No.
Q. You were not certain, were you?
A. No.
By isolating a portion of the lower court testimony, applying the “certainty test,” and applying the majority’s flawed reasoning, a court would be required to suppress the gun. Champion does not require a “certainty test,” nor this absurd result.
*65The plain feel doctrine requires probable cause without further search. Stated another way, “immediately apparent” means the officer must have probable cause to believe that the item is contraband before going beyond the legitimate scope of the patdown search. Champion, supra, p 106.
In the present case, the majority dissects the transcript and locates language to indicate that Officer Jackson was not one hundred percent certain that the object felt was cocaine. In this regard, the officer should be applauded for his honesty. However, this does not diminish the fact that the trial court determined that on the basis of the totality of the circumstances, not just a portion of the transcript, there existed probable cause to search.
In the present case, the trial court stated:
Here we have a situation where the police stopped, and it appears rightfully patted down, and the officer here, Officer Jackson, said he felt something that to him felt like some narcotics. He said he felt a bulge and then he felt what felt like some crumbs and to him that felt like narcotics, and based on his experience he assumed that it was narcotics.
As I stated in my prior dissent:
A trial court’s ruling with regard to a motion to suppress evidence is entitled to deference unless there is clear error on the part of the trial court. People v Burrell, 417 Mich 439, 448; 339 NW2d 403 (1983). Because the trial court’s decision was not clearly erroneous, I would affirm the trial court’s decision. [215 Mich App 643.]
I reaffirm my original dissent.2

 By “all fours” I mean that, factually, this case is the poster case for the plain feel exception. The only clearer example of the necessity for a plain feel exception to the search warrant requirement would be a situation involving an officer’s seizure of a firearm. However, so clear would this example be that it would not generate the discussion, and disagreement, that the present case, Minnesota v Dickerson, 508 US 366; 113 S Ct 2130; 124 L Ed 2d 334 (1993), and People v Champion, 452 Mich 92; 549 NW2d 849 (1996), have inspired.

 The Supreme Court in Champion, supra, pp 106-107, n 8, cited with approval the original dissent in the present case.