Court Opinion

ID: 9535262
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:47:29.448141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:12.495401
License: Public Domain

Fromme, J.,
dissenting: The result reached in the majority opinion appears unjust and unreasonable. The appellee, Alliance Mutual Casualty Company, is now denied the fruits of its previous appeal (Casebeer v. Casebeer, 199 Kan. 806, 433 P. 2d 399) and this court now nullifies the judgment it reached therein. The claimant becomes entitled to the amount of the original district court award which we reduced by $2,633.10 in Casebeer. As stated by this court in Ratzlaff v. Friedeman Service Store, 200 Kan. 430, 436 P. 2d 389:
All that the law intends is just compensation — no more, no less— and neither side should be penalized where it can be avoided. . . (p. 435.)
This court determined the amount of just compensation in Casebeer and the amount was tendered to and accepted by claimant.
The majority opinion states, “Alliance takes the position that it can with impunity refuse to pay compensation after the statutory demand matured.” This statement is not supported by the record. In view of the holding in Tompkins v. Rinner Construction Co., 196 Kan. 244, 409 P. 2d 1001, there can be no recovery back of payments made pending appeal if an award is eventually denied to claimant. Our holding in Rinner places the respondent in an unenviable position when he is convinced no award of compensation is due claimant.
The majority hold the payment of compensation pending appeal *438to this court is a prerequisite of the right to appeal. I cannot agree. K. S. A. 44-556 provides in pertinent part:
“. . . The compensation payable under the decision of the district court shall not be stayed pending such appeal to the supreme court.”
The Workmen’s Compensation Act contains no provision for supersedeas bond pending appeal to this court. The provision quoted was designed to emphasize this fact. It was not designed to provide a penalty such as dismissal of an appeal. The penalty for failing to pay compensation pending appeal is found in K. S. A. 44-512a.
If payment of compensation is made a prerequisite to the right of appeal the parties’ rights of appeal are not equal. The failure to pay compensation will result in dismissal of the employer’s appeal but not the claimant’s.
In Neufeld v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co., 193 Kan. 131, 391 P. 2d 1009, it is said:
“Where a workman brings an action for a lump sum judgment on a workmen’s compensation award and after receiving an adverse judgment in that action accepts payment of all past due and current monthly awards, his acquiescence in the judgment precludes an appeal therefrom.” (Syl.)
Therefore, acquiescence in a judgment can preclude further pursuit of an increased award, although the cases generally hold acceptance of compensation under a director’s award will not constitute acquiescence. The acquiescence in the present case was in our judgment.
The compensation award due claimant was properly determined by this court in Casebeer v. Casebeer, supra. The claimant participated in those proceedings. The appellee tendered the amount due after the determination was made. The claimant had a clear choice at that time. He could refuse the decreased award and continue to pursue his lump sum action under K. S. A. 44-512a or he could accept the amount determined by this court and thereby waive his right to pursue the 512a action. He knowingly accepted the tendered amount and acquiesced in the judgment.
The majority opinion states:
“. . . [T]he compensation judgment formed the basis of the plaintiff’s action and was consumed by or implanted into that cause of action, hence, there was no judgment in the compensation case in which the plaintiff could acquiesce. . . .” (p. 14.)
*439I neither understand nor agree with that statement. The claimant acquiesced in the judgment of this court and the 512a action was properly dismissed by the district court. I would affirm the judgment.
Schroeder, J., joins in the foregoing dissent.