Court Opinion

ID: 9909493
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-13 17:00:35.89201+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:29.995629
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-2003     Document: 010110967944        Date Filed: 12/13/2023     Page: 1
                                                                                     FILED
                                                                         United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                            Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                          December 13, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                            Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                                Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                            No. 23-2003
                                                     (D.C. No. 2:22-CR-01367-MIS -1)
  LINO DOMINGUEZ-BARRADAS,                                       (D.N.M.)

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, PHILLIPS, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
                    _________________________________

        Lino Dominguez-Barradas (“Mr. Dominguez”) pleaded guilty to illegal reentry

 into the United States. The district court sentenced him to 36 months’ imprisonment,

 varying upward from the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range of 15 to 21 months.

 Mr. Dominguez appeals, arguing that his sentence was substantively unreasonable.

 Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

        *
          This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
 law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
 persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and
 Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.

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                                I.       BACKGROUND

        Mr. Dominguez, a citizen of Mexico, was convicted of Second Degree Criminal

 Sexual Conduct in Minnesota in 2008 for the abuse of one of his stepdaughters and

 sentenced to 48 months’ incarceration, ten years of conditional release, and lifetime

 registration as a sex offender. The victim alleged Mr. Dominguez had sexually abused

 her several times and had sexually abused her sister two years earlier. Mr. Dominguez

 was released from custody on July 1, 2010, and removed from the United States on July

 9, 2010, returning to Mexico. On May 31, 2022, United States Border Patrol agents

 arrested Mr. Dominguez in New Mexico. Mr. Dominguez admitted to being a citizen of

 Mexico without legal authorization to enter or remain in the United States. Federal

 authorities charged Mr. Dominguez with re-entering the United States after having

 previously been removed, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b), and

 Mr. Dominguez pleaded guilty to the offenses.

        A Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) summarized the facts of his 2008

 charges and conviction and set his offense level at 13 and criminal history category at II.

 His Guidelines sentencing range was therefore 15 to 21 months. The PSR stated that “no

 information [was] identified concerning the offense or [Mr. Dominguez] which would

 warrant a variance from the advisory [G]uideline[s] range.” ROA Vol. 2 at 12. Although

 Mr. Dominguez’s only prior criminal conviction was the 2008 sexual abuse offense,

 described above, he was arrested for First Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct in 2007, but

 no charges were filed. He was also accused of rape by a coworker in 2006; again, no

 charges were filed.

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        In an addendum to the PSR, the probation officer stated that, in an evaluation

 completed by the state of Minnesota, presumably when he was convicted of sexual

 assault, Mr. Dominguez indicated a low risk of recidivism relative to other adult male sex

 offenders. However, the addendum also explained that “the available investigative

 information suggested that the defendant’s formal record of arrests and convictions likely

 represents an underestimate of his actual history of sexual offending,” and that

 accordingly, the Minnesota evaluation “likely represents an underestimate of his risk for

 future offending.” ROA Vol. 2 at 14.

        Prior to sentencing, the district court notified the parties that it was considering an

 upward variance in Mr. Dominguez’s case. In response, Mr. Dominguez filed a pleading

 styled as a “sentencing request,” asking the court for a within-Guidelines sentence. In

 support of his request, Mr. Dominguez provided numerous letters of support from his

 friends, family, and members of his community.

        During the sentencing hearing, the district court reemphasized that it was

 “considering an upward variance in this case, based on [Mr. Dominguez’s] [2008]

 conviction for molesting his stepdaughter.” 1 ROA Vol. 3 at 23. The Government stated it

 was “fine with a sentence at the high end of the Guideline[s] range in this case,” noting

        1
          The district court refers to Mr. Dominguez’s “2007” conviction for sexual
 assault. According to the PSR, however, Mr. Dominguez was arrested in 2007 and
 convicted in 2008. We refer to the conviction as occurring in 2008 throughout this
 decision for consistency with the PSR and distinction from the 2007 allegations of sexual
 assault made by another stepdaughter, but not charged.

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 that Mr. Dominguez served 48 months in custody after his 2008 conviction, had no

 convictions since his release from custody, and is in poor health. Id. at 23‒24.

        Mr. Dominguez reasserted his request for a sentence within the Guidelines

 sentencing range. He claimed he was “extremely remorseful” for his conduct leading to

 his 2008 conviction for criminal sexual conduct. Id. at 25. He also explained he had been

 drinking alcohol “substantially” at the time of his prior offense but had stopped drinking

 since returning to Mexico. Id. Additionally, Mr. Dominguez informed the district court he

 had been recently diagnosed with a tumor in his testicle. 2

        The district court listed in detail the facts it was considering in fashioning an

 appropriate sentence for Mr. Dominguez, including the parties’ filings, the PSR, the

 length of Mr. Dominguez’s sentence for his prior criminal sexual conduct conviction, the

 nonviolent nature of the reentry offense, the lack of criminal charges in Mexico, letters of

 support filed on his behalf, his strong family relationships, and the sentencing disparity

 that could result from an upward variance.

        The court further announced that it was “considering all of the [§] 3553(a) factors,

 including the history of the defendant and the nature and circumstances of the offense” as

 well as “the need for the sentence imposed to provide just punishment, respect for the

 law, adequate deterrence, to protect the public, and provide the defendant with

 treatment.” Id. at 33–34. This consideration included a review of the offense conduct

 underlying Mr. Dominguez’s 2008 criminal sexual conduct conviction. The court also

        2
            The district court amended the PSR to reflect Mr. Dominguez’s change in health.

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 considered “the kind of sentences available, the sentencing range, and all United States

 Sentencing Guideline[s] policies,” and “the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing

 disparities.” Id. at 35‒36. But the court explicitly did not consider the 2007 allegations of

 sexual assault concerning another stepdaughter or the 2006 allegations of rape because

 Mr. Dominguez never faced charges for that alleged conduct.

        Applying the facts of the case to the § 3553(a) factors, the district court concluded

 that a Guidelines sentence would be “too low, given the serious nature of

 [Mr. Dominguez’s] history.” Id. at 35. The court reasoned that a Guidelines sentence

 would not “adequately deter [Mr. Dominguez]” because his prior sex offense conviction

 and sentence did not deter him from unlawfully entering the United States. Id. The court

 further found that a Guidelines sentence would not adequately protect the public from

 Mr. Dominguez, considering evidence that Mr. Dominguez is at risk for recidivism given

 the circumstances of his criminal sexual conduct conviction and the results of an

 evaluation indicating that, as it concerns his past criminal sexual conduct, “he minimized

 his culpability and continued to victimize the victim and saw himself as the victim.” Id.

 The court noted that “just punishment and respect for the law requires the Court give a

 higher sentence because [Mr. Dominguez] reentered the country illegally after

 committing such a serious sex crime.” Id. The court also stated that Mr. Dominguez’s

 time-served of 48 months for his criminal sexual conviction “does not fully capture the

 seriousness of the prior conviction.” Id. at 36. Finally, while the court stated that in its

 view there is no sentencing disparity in this case, if such disparity does exist, the court

 concluded it is “warranted by the particular circumstances of this case.” Id.

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        The district court concluded that an upward variance was warranted and sentenced

 Mr. Dominguez to 36 months’ imprisonment, constituting a 15-month upward variance

 from his Guidelines sentence range. Mr. Dominguez appealed, challenging his sentence

 as substantively unreasonable.

                                     II.     DISCUSSION

                                A.         Standard of Review

        “When reviewing criminal sentences, we apply a standard of reasonableness,

 which involves both substantial and procedural components.” United States v. Farley, 36

 F.4th 1245, 1249 (10th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review the

 reasonableness of sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. United States v. Peña, 963

 F.3d 1016, 1024 (10th Cir. 2020). This standard applies “[r]egardless of whether the

 sentence imposed is inside or outside the Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, 552

 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In conducting this review, we consider “whether the length of the

 sentence is reasonable given all the circumstances of the case in light of the factors set

 forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Williams, 10 F.4th 965, 977 (10th Cir.

 2021) (quotation marks omitted). “We do not reweigh the sentencing factors but instead

 ask whether the sentence fell within the range of rationally available choices that facts

 and the law at issue can fairly support.” United States v. Blair, 933 F.3d 1271, 1274 (10th

 Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Thus, as long as the balance struck by the

 district court among the factors set out in § 3553(a) is not arbitrary, capricious, or

 manifestly unreasonable, we must defer to that decision even if we would not have struck

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 the same balance in the first instance.” United States v. Sells, 541 F.3d 1227, 1239 (10th

 Cir. 2008).

        When a district court “decides that an outside-Guidelines sentence is warranted,

 [it] must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is

 sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. “A

 ‘major’ variance should have ‘a more significant justification than a minor one.’” United

 States v. Lente, 759 F.3d 1149, 1158 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50).

 However, while we may “take the degree of variance into account” in reviewing the

 reasonableness of a sentence outside the Guidelines range, we may not “use[] the

 percentage of a departure as the standard for determining the strength of the justifications

 required” or create a “presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside the

 Guidelines range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 47. In fact, we will “uphold even substantial

 variances when the district court properly weighs the § 3553(a) factors and offers valid

 reasons for the chosen sentence.” United States v. Gross, 44 F.4th 1298, 1304 (10th Cir.

 2022) (quotation marks omitted). “Still, we do not just provide a rubber stamp of approval

 and therefore must determine if the district court’s proffered rationale, on aggregate,

 justifies the magnitude of the sentence.” United States v. Walker, 74 F.4th 1163, 1202

 (10th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted).

                           B.      Substantive Unreasonableness

        Mr. Dominguez asserts only a claim of substantive unreasonableness on appeal.

 Therefore, we will review his sentence only to determine whether the district court’s

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 imposition of a 15-month upward variance was an abuse of discretion, considering all the

 circumstances of the case. See Williams, 10 F.4th at 977.

 1.     Rationale for Upward Variance

        Mr. Dominguez argues the district court abused its discretion by relying solely on

 the severity of his prior conviction as justification for imposing an upward variance. He

 claims the district court wrongfully gave dispositive weight to a single factor in its

 § 3553(a) analysis—his prior criminal sexual conduct conviction. He also asserts the

 district court gave undue weight to the nature of his prior sex offense, because his prior

 offense was already accounted for as an element of his conviction under 8 U.S.C.

 § 1326(b)(2) and as a factor in determining his Guidelines sentencing range.

        When imposing sentences, district courts are required to “engage in a holistic

 inquiry of the § 3553(a) factors,” Lente, 759 F.3d at 1174 (quotation marks omitted), and

 to “consider every convicted person as an individual,” Gall, 552 U.S. at 52 (internal

 quotation marks omitted). A district court should not rely solely on one § 3553(a) factor

 without addressing other relevant factors. See United States v. Walker, 844 F.3d 1253,

 1259 (10th Cir. 2017). Still, “the district court need not afford equal weight to each

 § 3553(a) factor, and we will defer on substantive-reasonableness review not only to a

 district court’s factual findings but also to its determinations of the weight to be afforded

 to such findings.” United States v. Cookson, 922 F.3d 1079, 1094 (10th Cir. 2019)

 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Where a district court decides to vary, it

 “properly engages in [the § 3553(a)] inquiry when it bases its decision on specific,

 articulable facts supporting the variance and does not employ an impermissible

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 methodology or rely on facts that would make the decision out of bounds.” United States

 v. Barnes, 890 F.3d 910, 916 (10th Cir. 2018).

        Here, the district court properly relied on specific, articulable facts and engaged in

 a proper balancing of the § 3553(a) factors when imposing an upward variance, even

 though it heavily weighed Mr. Dominguez’s prior criminal sexual conduct conviction.

 The nature of Mr. Dominguez’s prior offense necessarily informed the district court’s

 assessment of several § 3553(a) factors, including “the nature and circumstances of the

 offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant” and “the need for the

 sentence imposed . . . to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct . . . [and] to

 protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The district

 court specifically noted that the serious nature of Mr. Dominguez’s prior offense, his

 decision to nevertheless reenter the United States illegally, and his risk of recidivism all

 informed its evaluation of the § 3553(a) factors and weighed in favor of an upward

 variance.

        Although “[a] district court should not rely solely on one § 3553(a) factor without

 addressing other relevant factors . . . the district court need not afford equal weight to

 each § 3553(a) factor.” Walker, 74 F.4th at 1203 (internal quotation marks omitted); see

 also Barnes, 890 F.3d at 916 (“We look to the record to determine whether the district

 court satisfactorily engaged and examined the factors in a holistic fashion. But the court

 need not rely on every single factor.”). The district court did not abuse its discretion by

 considering Mr. Dominguez’s prior offense in analyzing multiple factors, nor by placing

 significant weight on the serious nature of that prior offense.

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         Indeed, the Guidelines themselves anticipate that past criminal conduct may

  justify a sentence above the Guidelines range. Under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2), where a

  defendant engaged in criminal conduct resulting in a felony conviction prior to his first

  order of deportation or removal, his offense level for illegal reentry will increase by an

  amount calculated based on the length of the sentence imposed for the prior felony

  conviction. However, comment six to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 further explains “[t]here may be

  cases in which the offense level provided by an enhancement in subsection (b)(2)

  . . . substantially understates or overstates the seriousness of the conduct underlying the

  prior offense.” When “the length of the sentence imposed does not reflect the seriousness

  of the prior offense,” “a departure may be warranted.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. 6.

         Here, Mr. Dominguez received a sentence of 48 months’ imprisonment for his

  2008 criminal sexual conduct conviction. Thus, he would have the same Guidelines

  sentencing range of 15 to 21 months, as any other defendant who was sentenced to 48

  months’ imprisonment for a felony, regardless of the underlying conviction. U.S.S.G.

  § 2L1.2(b)(2)(B). The Guidelines for illegal reentry, however, allowed the district court

  to look to the nature of a past offense and the prior sentence in determining whether it

  reflected the seriousness of that prior conviction. Where it did not, the Guidelines allow

  the district court to include that information in its assessment of whether the Guidelines

  sentencing range, based in part on that prior sentence, is appropriate.

         Mr. Dominguez further argues that “because, by definition, every single defendant

  who violates 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) has committed an aggravated felony and then

  committed the subsequent criminal act of re-entering the United States,” the fact that a

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  reentry offender has a prior aggravated felony is not a rational justification for imposing

  an upward variance in sentencing. Appellant’s Br. at 19. But “[d]istrict courts have broad

  discretion to consider particular facts in fashioning a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),

  even when those facts are already accounted for in the advisory [G]uidelines range.”

  Barnes, 890 F.3d at 921 (first alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted); see also

  Gross, 44 F.4th at 1304 (holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in considering

  the defendant’s offense conduct when imposing an upward variance, even though a four-

  level Guidelines enhancement already accounted for the offense conduct); United States

  v. Smart, 518 F.3d 800, 808 (10th Cir. 2008) (“To perform their individualizing role,

  district courts are now allowed to contextually evaluate each § 3553(a) factor, including

  those factors the relevant [G]uideline(s) already purport to take into account . . . .”). Thus,

  it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to impose an upward variance based

  upon Mr. Dominguez’s criminal history. See, e.g., Lente, 759 F.3d at 1166–67 (holding

  that the district court did not err in considering the facts leading to the defendant’s

  multiple arrests in imposing an upward variance, even though the defendant was not

  assessed any criminal history points).

         Indeed, for purposes of sentencing, “[n]o limitation should be placed on the

  information [a court may consider] concerning the background, character, and conduct of

  a person.” United States v. Mateo, 471 F.3d 1162, 1167 (10th Cir. 2006) (first alteration

  in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Outside of the conviction itself, we

  require sentencing courts to “carefully consider the facts contained in the [presentence

  report] when evaluating the § 3553(a) sentencing factors,” including the underlying facts

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  of prior arrests and convictions. Id.; see also Gross, 44 F.4th at 1305. The Guidelines

  explicitly consider the possibility of upward variances when “reliable information

  indicates that the defendant’s criminal history category substantially under-represents the

  seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will

  commit other crimes.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(1). Here, the district court had information

  that both Mr. Dominguez’s criminal history and his risk of recidivism may have been

  understated.

         The Government filed two Rule 28(j) letters pointing us to two cases we recently

  decided involving claims of substantive unreasonableness in sentencing an illegal reentry

  defendant. In the first case, United States v. Malla-Calle, we affirmed an upward variance

  in an illegal reentry case when the defendant had a prior conviction for sexual assault of a

  minor and the district court explained “that although it was accounting for Malla-Calle’s

  ‘past behavior in imposing a sentenc[e] that will deter [criminal conduct] and protect the

  public,’ it was ‘sentencing [him] only for th[e] crime’ of unlawful reentry.” No. 22-2074,

  2023 WL 4446426, at *5 (10th Cir. July 11, 2023). As the Government notes, the district

  court here made a similar statement that, “[t]o be clear, I’m sentencing the defendant only

  for this crime, but I am considering his past behavior in imposing a sentence, pursuant to

  the 3553(a) factors.” ROA Vol. 3 at 36. In a Rule 28(j) letter filed in response to the

  Government on July 21, 2023, Mr. Dominguez argued Malla-Calle is distinguishable

  because, there, the defendant had likely violated the conditions of his sex offense

  probation, he had questioned whether the conduct underlying his sex offense was wrong,

  and the district court had tied its concerns about the offense into a comprehensive review

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  of the § 3553(a) factors. We are not convinced the cases are dissimilar. Like in Malla-

  Calle, the district court here evaluated Mr. Dominguez’s past conduct under all the

  applicable § 3553(a) factors and we may not reweigh those factors in reviewing his

  sentence. See Blair, 933 F.3d at 1274.

         The Government also points to United States v. Caivinagua-Sanchez, in which we

  held the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a substantial upward

  variance for an illegal reentry offense based on the defendant’s prior misdemeanor

  conviction related to sexual abuse of a minor. There, like here, the district court asserted

  that “the [G]uidelines under-represented the seriousness of [the defendant’s] prior

  offense.” No. 22-2128, 2023 WL 4560222, at *6 (10th Cir. July 17, 2023). We concluded

  that a district court does not abuse its discretion by varying upward when it believes that

  the Guidelines underrepresent the seriousness of a prior offense, so long as the court

  explains its reasons. Id. at *4, *6. Finally, we emphasized in Caivinagua-Sanchez, as we

  do here, that we are not permitted to simply reweigh the § 3553(a) factors on appeal. Id.

  at *5. Mr. Dominguez has offered no convincing reason to depart from the reasoning of

  Caivinagua-Sanchez and Malla-Calle here.

         Mr. Dominguez also relies on a Fourth Circuit case, United States v. Tucker, to

  support his assertion that upward variances must be supported by “compelling reasons.”

  473 F.3d 556, 557 (4th Cir. 2007). But this is not the rule in the Tenth Circuit, and this

  approach was rejected by the Supreme Court in a separate case mere months after

  Tucker’s publication. Gall, 552 U.S. at 47 (“We reject . . . an appellate rule that requires

  ‘extraordinary’ circumstances to justify a sentence outside the Guidelines range.”). In this

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  circuit, “although a district court must provide reasoning sufficient to support the chosen

  variance, it need not necessarily provide ‘extraordinary’ facts to justify any statutorily

  permissible sentencing variance, even one as large as the 100% variance in Gall.” Smart,

  518 F.3d at 807. We have since expressly rejected Mr. Dominguez’s argument, stating,

  “[t]o the extent that [the appellant] is arguing that we must find ‘compelling reasons’ to

  support so large a variance, this approach is no longer permissible” after Gall and Smart.

  United States v. Pinson, 542 F.3d 822, 837 (10th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). There is

  no “mathematical formula that uses the percentage of a departure as the standard for

  determining the strength of the justifications required for a specific sentence.” Gall, 552

  U.S. at 47. Therefore, Mr. Dominguez’s argument that his sentence is substantively

  unreasonable because the district court failed to provide “compelling reasons” for the

  variance is without merit.

         The district court properly considered the seriousness of the 2008 criminal sexual

  conduct conviction in determining an appropriate sentence for Mr. Dominguez’s illegal

  reentry. And the court acted within its discretion to assess that factor despite it being

  accounted for in calculating the Guidelines sentencing range.

  2.     Consideration of Mitigating Factors

         Mr. Dominguez further argues that the upward variance imposed by the district

  court is substantively unreasonable because it fails to consider “substantial mitigating

  evidence” presented during his sentencing hearing, and therefore “does not reflect a

  consideration of multiple relevant sentencing factors.” Appellant’s Br. at 20–21.

  Specifically, Mr. Dominguez argues that, considering significant mitigating factors, the

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  sentence does not adequately reflect (1) the nature and circumstances of his offense,

  (2) his history and characteristics, and (3) the unwarranted sentence disparity resulting

  from the upward variance. However, the district court explicitly analyzed all three of

  these factors:

         I’m considering all of [Mr. Dominguez’s] arguments, including but not
         limited to . . . that [Mr. Dominguez] was coming back to the United States
         to seek a better life for himself and his family, as he was having economic
         problems in Mexico and fleeing violence; that [Mr. Dominguez’s] reentry
         case did not involve violence or drugs; . . . [and] that [Mr. Dominguez] has
         remained out of the country for 12 years since his last deportation . . . .

  ROA Vol. 3 at 32. The court reasoned that these mitigating factors were nevertheless

  outweighed by other relevant § 3553(a) factors, such as Mr. Dominguez’s history and

  characteristics and the need to deter criminal conduct and to protect the public.

         Mr. Dominguez next argues that his sentence “fails to reflect [his] personal history

  and characteristics.” Appellant’s Br. at 22. With respect to this factor, Mr. Dominguez

  notes that he “had been diagnosed with a tumor in his testicle” at the time of sentencing,

  received significant support from his family and community in the form of letters

  speaking to his character, was the sole financial support for his family, “lived in Mexico

  for nearly twelve years without committing any additional crimes, and [had] successfully

  abstained from the substance use that had contributed to his original offense.” Id. at 22‒

  23.

         Again, the district court expressly analyzed Mr. Dominguez’s personal history and

  characteristics and considered each of the mitigating facts presented by Mr. Dominguez.

  The court stated:

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         I’m considering that [Mr. Dominguez] has remained out of the country for
         12 years since his last deportation, and there’s evidence he’s not had any
         contact with the criminal system in Mexico since that time. I’m considering
         [Mr. Dominguez] has now remarried and has two stepchildren and a new
         son. I’m considering [Mr. Dominguez] has stopped consuming alcohol and
         that that may decrease the chance of him committing further sexual
         assaults. . . . [Mr. Dominguez] works in Mexico and has the respect of
         many members of his community and family . . . The Court has considered
         the argument that [Mr. Dominguez’s] family is suffering in his absence,
         especially his children.

  ROA Vol. 3 at 32‒33.

         While acknowledging these mitigating factors, the court noted that

  Mr. Dominguez’s “history includes the [2008] conviction . . . of sexual assault against his

  underaged stepdaughter.” Id. at 33‒34. Considering both mitigating and aggravating

  factors, the court concluded that Mr. Dominguez’s history and characteristics weighed in

  favor of imposing an upward variance. Thus, the district court properly considered the

  mitigating factors presented by Mr. Dominguez and did not abuse its discretion by

  nevertheless varying upward.

  3.     Sentencing Disparity

         Finally, Mr. Dominguez argues that his sentence “creates an unwarranted disparity

  with those of other similarly situated offenders,” invoking § 3553(a)(6) and its role in the

  district court’s sentencing determination. Appellant’s Br. at 24. Mr. Dominguez cites data

  from the U. S. Sentencing Commission’s Judiciary Sentencing Information (“JSIN”) to

  support the proposition that most offenders with a final offense level of 13 and a criminal

  history category of II receive an average of 12 months imprisonment, meaning they

  “receive a downward variance or departure, not an upward variance.” Id. As the

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  Government correctly points out, though, the JSIN statistics cited by Mr. Dominguez are

  not probative of the question whether the upward variance in his case creates an

  unwarranted disparity. “[The § 3553(a)(6)] sentencing factor, after all, specifically directs

  the district court to avoid disparities ‘among defendants with similar records who have

  been found guilty of similar conduct.’” Malla-Calle, 2023 WL 4446426, at *4 (quoting

  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6)). Recall that the Guidelines range for unlawful reentry is based on

  the length of the sentence received for the prior offense, rather than the conduct

  underlying the conviction. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2). Thus, district courts must look at

  the underlying conduct of the prior convictions to properly analyze whether there is an

  unwarranted sentencing disparity among those found guilty of similar conduct. See 18

  U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6); U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2) cmt. 6.

         The district court explained that, even if there was a sentencing disparity as to

  other reentry defendants with a prior felony conviction, such disparity was warranted by

  the seriousness of Mr. Dominguez’s prior conviction. “Our sentencing scheme seeks to

  eliminate not all sentencing disparities, but only ‘unwarranted’ disparities.” Lente, 759

  F.3d at 1169 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]here is no ‘mathematical formula

  that uses the percentage of a [variance] as the standard for determining the strength of the

  justifications required for a specific sentence.’” Barnes, 890 F.3d at 921 (quoting Gall,

  552 U.S. at 47). Where the data cited by Mr. Dominguez was not comprised of reentry

  defendants with prior sexual felonies, he has not established an unwarranted disparity.

         In further support of his argument, Mr. Dominguez seeks to distinguish his case

  from three cases in which we upheld substantial upward variances (Worku, Gantt, and

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  Pinson) and two Tenth Circuit criminal reentry cases in which we upheld upward

  variances (Caballero-Anaya and Marquez-Pineda). United States v. Worku, 800 F.3d

  1195, 1208 (10th Cir. 2015); United States v. Gantt, 679 F.3d 1240, 1250‒51 (10th Cir.

  2012); Pinson, 542 F.3d at 836; United States v. Caballero-Anaya, 807 F. App’x 837,

  843–45 (10th Cir. 2020) (unpublished); United States v. Marquez-Pineda, 318 F. App’x

  673, 674–76 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished). Mr. Dominguez argues that, because these

  cases involved aggravating factors that are not present in his case, they demonstrate that

  the district court’s justification for an upward variance here is inadequate. But the district

  court was required to consider the facts and circumstances of Mr. Dominguez’s case

  individually. The absence of a factor present in another defendant’s criminal history is

  simply not relevant to the district court’s exercise of its discretion in sentencing

  Mr. Dominguez.

         Further, Worku, Gantt, and Pinson involved upward variances that were

  substantially longer than the 15-month variance imposed in Mr. Dominguez’s case.

  Worku, 800 F.3d at 1198, 1207 (high end of the Guidelines range was 36 months; district

  court imposed 264-month sentence); Gantt, 679 F.3d at 1243–44 (Guidelines sentence

  was 84 months, the statutory minimum sentence; district court imposed 240-month

  sentence); Pinson, 542 F.3d at 833 (high end of the Guidelines range was 105 months;

  district court imposed 240-month sentence). Marquez-Pineda and Caballero-Anaya also

  involved more significant upward variances than the sentence here. Caballero-Anaya,

  807 F. App’x at 840 (high-end of the Guidelines range was 21 months; district court

  imposed 48-month sentence); Marquez-Pineda, 318 F. App’x at 674 (high-end of the

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  Guidelines range was 30 months; district court imposed 60-month sentence). “We find it

  uncontroversial that a major departure should be supported by a more significant

  justification than a minor one.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. Where these upward variances were

  more significant than the 15-month upward variance in Mr. Dominguez’s case, as the

  Government states, it is “unsurprising[], then, if [Mr. Dominguez] could point to

  aggravating facts present in those cases that are absent here.” Appellee’s Br. at 20.

         The district court properly explained its decision to vary upward and based that

  decision on appropriate consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. Its weighing of those

  factors and resulting sentencing decision was substantively reasonable.

                                   III.    CONCLUSION

         Because we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion, we AFFIRM.

                                                Entered for the Court

                                                Carolyn B. McHugh
                                                Circuit Judge

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