Court Opinion

ID: 9691355
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:27:02.563587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:17.512556
License: Public Domain

HEFFERNAN, CHIEF JUSTICE
(dissenting). A properly drafted curfew ordinance is constitutional and will serve the societal protectionary purposes for which it is intended. The Milwaukee ordinance is not such an ordinance.
The ordinance in question purported to prohibit late night "loitering” by children. It, however, was *51used to arrest and take into custody black youngsters who were attending a social affair, sponsored by an accredited university student group, which had as its purpose the encouragement of post-high-school education. An ordinance drawn in such a manner as to be subject to a construction that permits such a result is not just unconstitutional. It is malignantly outrageous. Because the majority errs in finding constitutional what is clearly unconstitutional, I dissent.
The issue in this case is not whether Milwaukee may have a juvenile curfew ordinance. It is rather obvious it may have, but that question is not at issue. The issue in this case is rather the degree of precision that such an ordinance requires. The correct result in this case would be to find this ordinance unconstitutional, as it surely is, and to allow the City of Milwaukee to draft, as it can, a better one.
The ordinance here is challenged on two grounds — vagueness and overbreadth. It fails both challenges. Even if I were to accept the majority’s finding on the question of standing, the ordinance is vague for several reasons.
To begin with, as the majority correctly states, one test for vagueness is whether one "'bent on obedience’” to the law can discern what behavior is prohibited. At 33. In this case, however, it is clear that K.F. and D.A., the defendants here, could not discern what behavior was prohibited. This is because, as the facts of this case show, the ordinance does not give notice of the prohibited behavior.
According to the findings of the trial court, K.F. and D.A. have unblemished records. They come from responsible families, and there is not the slightest indication that they have ever been involved with any gangs or in any misconduct.
*52These two juveniles, along with 400 others, apparently all black youths, decided to attend a dance which was being promoted over radio, and by word of mouth in area high schools. This dance was sponsored by the Black Student Union of the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, a recognized student organization in good standing there.1 The purpose of the dance was to reach out to black high school students to persuade them of the benefits of a higher education and to encourage them to go to college.
Given the educational purposes of the dance, it is reasonable to conclude that many juveniles with excellent backgrounds similar to K.F.’s and D.A.’s also chose to attend. Unfortunately, none of these juveniles could know that earlier that day, in a location over five miles distant from the War Memorial Center, police were called to investigate suspected gang activity and that, at that time, an unnamed citizen informer had led police to believe that there might be gang-related activities at this beneficial, educational dance. Relying in all probability on the sponsored and public nature of the dance, on its favorable location in a neighborhood not normally beset with gang activity, and on its beneficent purpose, the juveniles in this case went there, stayed at the dance past Milwaukee’s 11:00 P.M. juvenile curfew, and ended the evening with a new acquisition — a juvenile record.
*53Were this all that occurred, this would be a tale of simple misfortune, an example of ignorance of the law which leads to unfortunate results. The reason this unfortunate scenario rises to the level of an unconstitutional denial of procedural due process is because, even had these juveniles consulted Milwaukee Ordinance 106-23 carefully before they left for the evening, they would not, with any assurance, have been able to conform their behavior to the requirements of law. This problem arises because the ordinance was enforced in a way which was not spelled out in the ordinance itself, but instead was enforced in a way which comported with the way the police on the scene thought it ought to be enforced on an ad hoc basis.
The test for vagueness is broader than that quoted by the majority. At 32-33. While it is true that the test is whether either one bent on obedience or a trier of fact could reasonably ascertain what the rule proscribes, this court has consistently also recognized another factor which must be considered, and that is the entity or agency charged with enforcing the rule. Thus, in City of Milwaukee v. Wilson, 96 Wis. 2d 11, 16, 291 N.W.2d 452 (1980), this court stated:
"A statute of ordinance is unconstitutionally vague if it fails to afford proper notice of the conduct it seeks to proscribe or if it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions. The test to determine vagueness is whether the statute or ordinance is so obscure that men of ordinary intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its applicability. In order to withstand a vagueness challenge ... [the law] must be sufficiently definite so that ... those who are charged either with enforcing or applying it are not relegated to creating their own standards of culpa*54bility instead of applying the standards prescribed in the law.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, under this standard, a question which the majority has left unanswered is whether one who wishes to "enforce or apply” the law is "relegated to creating their own standards of culpability instead of applying the standards prescribed in the law.” Id. Recourse to the facts of this case demonstrates that the police here did, in fact, "create their own standards of culpability.”
As the majority correctly states, the juveniles who were ultimately arrested were "congregating” at the War Memorial Center in downtown Milwaukee. At 35. As the majority also further correctly states, a police officer testified that "youths whose parents had arrived to pick them up at the War Memorial Center were permitted to leave without the issuance of citations...." At 30.
This means that some youths who were congregating were issued citations, while others, who were equally guilty of congregating, were not charged because, after they had been forcibly prevented by police seeking "gang members”2 from further "congregating,” their parents "arrived” to pick them up. Because, as the majority also states, the police,did not arrive on the scene until after 11:15 PM (at 30, n. 1), the parents who arrived must necessarily have arrived after this time, which means that the parents *55were not on hand for some time after the 11:00 PM curfew had already passed.3
These facts are significant because of the heavy reliance placed in the opinion upon the term "accompany.” According to the majority holding, the juveniles in the hall were not "accompanied” by adults, as required by the ordinance, because, although there were undisputably adults present, these adults were not those to whom the ordinance referred when it exempted from the reach of the ordinance those juveniles who are "accompanied” by an adult having their "care, custody and control.” This is because, again according to the majority, the term "accompany” "unambiguously refers to individualized supervision." At 38.
Yet, according to the fact as laid out by the majority, juveniles whose parents "arrived” were allowed to leave without citations. These parents could not have been exercising "care, custody and control” if they did not even arrive on the scene until after the police did. Even if these parents were waiting outside, they could not have been exercising "care, custody and control” of an individualized nature *56because the juveniles were inside and the parents outside. Thus, it is clear that the police made a judgment call in allowing certain juveniles, but not others, to leave without citations. Further, it is clear that this court, in accepting such behavior as unremarkable, is also making a judgment call concerning the correct way the ordinance ought to be applied.4 Yet these types of spur-of-the-moment judgment calls are exactly what this court has previously forbidden. Here, "those who are charged either with enforcing or applying [the law] are ... relegated to creating their own standards of culpability instead of applying the standards prescribed in the law.” Wilson at 16.
The law, according to the majority "unambiguously refers to individualized supervision,” yet, despite this, because the police, and this court, have decided that those juveniles whose parents arrived after the fact of post-curfew-time congregation could go free despite no provision in the ordinance for such exceptions, it follows that the ordinance does not contain a "standard prescribed in the law.” The standard being applied here is instead that of the police and this court’s own standard of culpability. The ordinance is unconstitutionally vague.
There is still another ground on which the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague. The majority, as stated above, places heavy reliance on the word "accompany” and cites Webster’s Third New International Dictionary for the proposition that the word "unambiguously refers to individualized supervision.” At 38. However, the standard for consulting the *57dictionary is not only what Webster’s has to say, but instead what "a recognized dictionary” has to say. Id,., citing State v. McCoy, 143 Wis. 2d 274, 421 N.W.2d 107 (1988).
In this regard, it is instructive to note that Funk and Wagnall’s New Standard Dictionary of the English Language, 1940, defines "accompany” as: "[t]o go with, or be associated with, as a companion, an attendant, or a retinue; escort or convoy ...” Similarly, the just published Random House Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged, Second Edition (1987), gives as the primary and secondary definitions: "1: to go along or in company with; to join in action;... 2: to be or exist in association or company with.” Unlike the definition quoted in the opinion, neither of these definitions compels any conclusion that the word at issue "unambiguously refers to individualized supervision.” In fact, given such terms as "escort,” "attendant,” and such phrases as "to go along with,” it is apparent that the word "accompany” has many more shades of meaning than a one-to-one relationship, and thus accepted dictionary definitions are themselves vague when applied in the context of this ordinance.
Given that this is so, it is further apparent that the ordinance is vague because it does not make clear what proportion of adults to juveniles there must be before the necessary ratio for "accompaniment” has been achieved. In this context, it becomes apparent that the ordinance, as applied to these individuals is unconstitutionally vague, because it is undisputed that there were many adults present at the dance, and a reasonable juvenile could well have believed that they were in the "accompaniment” of an adult and, hence, were under the exception for such accompaniment made by the ordinance. Such an impression was, *58no doubt, reinforced by the sponsored nature of the dance and by the extensive publicity which accompanied it.
There is yet another ground on which the ordinance is vague. As the majority correctly notes, the ordinance prohibits congregation in a "public building." At 35. This raises the issue of whether the War Memorial Center qualifies for this appellation. There is no doubt that the War Memorial is a public building in the sense that the public may have access to it under certain circumstances, and it is a publicly owned municipal building. However, it is not as clear whether this makes it a "public building” when a private affair is being conducted there.
In this case, the executive director of the War Memorial Center testified that the regulations of the War Memorial Center do not allow public dances and that the dance was, in his opinion, as well as in the opinion of the dance organizers, a private one. Hence, the question is whether, even when rented for a private dance, the War Memorial retained its identity as a "public building” such that the reach of the ordinance extended to it.
. Inasmuch as this is a question of law, the opinion of the director that the building is "'public’ by 'any definition'" (at 35) is neither helpful nor dispositive.5
*59When a group rents a "public building” for a private function, they do not expect that others will consider them to still be "in public.” Thus, one who rents a hotel room expects that he will be able to enjoy the privacy he expects in his own home. Cf. United States v. Kwitek, 433 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1970) (hotel room treated same as home for search-and-seizure purposes). Yet a hotel room is clearly within the definition of sec. 101.01(2)(g) as a lodging in a public building. Secure in this expectation of privacy, he will engage in the most private behavior imaginable, while still within a building that, for other purposes, is considered "public.” Similarly, a business group holding a meeting in a rented public hall does not expect that, because the hall is a "public” one, its confidential communications concerning business projections, patents, formulas, manufacturing processes, etc., will thereby become public. Consistent with these examples, a group renting a public hall for a dance targeted at youth, with the purpose of indoctrinating these youth into the benefits of higher education may well *60be said to have the same expectations of private use of the hall as a business group or an individual. And if the use is "private” in this manner, the fact that it takes place in a public building is irrelevant. The purpose of the Milwaukee Juvenile Curfew Ordinance, as indicated by its title, is to prevent "loitering,” and it is to this end that juveniles are controlled when they are on public premises. Because attendance at a private dance in a public hall is not "loitering,” so the ordinance’s use of the term "public building” cannot be said to embrace the dance at issue here.
The point to be made with this example is that, because the ordinance does not undertake to define "public building,” it must fall for vagueness. The fact that this court is divided on the issues of whether the War Memorial Center, when rented for a private dance, is a "public building” demonstrates that the language here is anything but unambiguous. The mere fact that this court is divided on this matter of law, makes clear that juveniles intent on conforming their behavior to the mandate of the law will be unable to do so. Thus, as in the case of what is meant by "accompany,” the ordinance does not carry on its face or within it a "standard prescribed in the law.” Wilson at 16. For this reason, also, the ordinance must fall for vagueness.
Basically, the majority here avoids meaningful discussion of vagueness inherent in this poorly worded statute by declaring that the appellants have no standing to raise the issue. I do not address the issue of whether the majority is correct or incorrect on this matter, but this court has the inherent power to review questions of great public importance even when the parties would not ordinarily have the standing to raise the issues. Town of Germantown v. *61Village of Germantown, 70 Wis. 2d 704, 710, 235 N.W.2d 486 (1975). Under this public policy standard, I would review the balance of the ordinance at issue.
This ordinance prohibits such activities as "strolling,” "wandering,” and "standing.” It is claimed by the city and the majority that these prohibitions do not extend to prohibit "walking” or "waiting for a bus.” However, these self-generated contentions again demonstrate that the ordinance is vague. At what point does the prohibited "strolling” become the supposedly permissible '’walking”? At what point does the supposedly permissible "waiting for a bus” become the impermissible "standing”? These questions again illustrate the vague nature of the ordinance, and demonstrate that one bent on compliance would not know how to conform his behavior, while those charged with enforcement are "relegated to creating their own standards” because no standard is "prescribed in the law.” Wilson at 16.
Given the foregoing, the ordinance should fall for vagueness, and this is true whether one accepts the majority’s holding on the juvenile’s standing to challenge the ordinance for vagueness or not. Under any theory of standing, the ordinance must fall. However, vagueness is not the only flaw inherent and facially apparent in this ordinance. The statute also suffers from impermissible overbreadth.
As the majority correctly states, juveniles, like adults, have the right to freedom of movement and travel, as well as freedom of association, assembly, speech, expression and religion. At 40-43. However, as the majority also correctly states, in the case of juveniles, these rights are counterbalanced by the state's police power, as well as the state's parens patriae power. At *6244-46. Thus, in terms of overbreadth, the question at issue is whether the ordinance reflects a proper balance between the state's power on the one hand, and the juvenile's rights on the other. The resolution of this question, in turn, depends to a large measure on the level of scrutiny adopted for the review of the state's interests.
In this case, the majority declines to specify which is the appropriate level of scrutiny, but instead concludes that, even if the most stringent level of scrutiny is adopted — that the state’s interests are examined to determine if these interests are "compelling,” rather than merely "significant” — the ordinance here passes muster. At 46. Adopting the basic approach of the majority, I conclude that, even if the state’s interest need only be "significant” rather than "compelling,” the ordinance is unconstitutional.
As stated above, this ordinance is directed at preventing "loitering.” The majority defines this as an intent to prevent "undirected or aimless activity of minors during the curfew hours." At 48. The parties agree, and this dissent agrees, that juvenile ordinances are designed to (1) reduce juvenile crime, (2) protect children from nocturnal dangers, and (3) reinforce parental authority. The quickest proof that this ordinance is overbroad is to. recognize that the juveniles here were not engaged in loitering or other undirected or aimless activity. Instead, these juveniles were attending a dance with an indisputably beneficial and socially desirable educational purpose. Given that purpose, it is reasonable to say that the dance itself was designed to reduce juvenile crime, because a better educated populace is presumably one less attracted to crime by either need or inclination. Thus, the fact that the ordinance can reach these juveniles in an educational and socially desirable setting makes *63the ordinance ipso facto overbroad and its enforcement here absurd. The ordinance was not being enforced here to effectuate its purposes, nor was it effective in reaching the purported targeted behavior.
An analysis of prior holdings also compels the conclusion that the ordinance here was overbroad. Two of the leading cases in this field which span the gamut of results, as well as the range of sophistication of ordinances at issue, are Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975) and Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1981).
Bykofsky involved a juvenile ordinance which passed constitutional scrutiny. The ordinance there was narrowly drawn compared to the one at bar here. For example, that ordinance made specific exceptions for juveniles who were "exercising first amendment rights,” "in a case of reasonable necessity,” when "the minor is on the sidewalk [in front] of his residence,” when "the minor carries a certified card of employment,” when "the minor is returning home by a direct route from, and within thirty minutes of the termination of, a school activity or an activity of a religious or other voluntary association.” Many of these exceptions, but not all, required that the minor have previously given notice to the mayor of his intention to utilize the specific exemption which applied to his situation.
In the face of an overbreadth challenge, the court upheld this ordinance as constitutional, with only such minor deletions as "normal nighttime activities,” which phrases were considered too vague to gain court approval. The court reasoned that this ordinance was sufficiently specific to pass muster under the over-breadth challenge because it was not written so *64broadly that it impinged on constitutional rights. This carefully thought out case illustrates what an essentially acceptable juvenile ordinance provides.6
The Milwaukee ordinance does not approach this degree of specificity. Nevertheless, in itself, this observation does not mean that, simply because the Milwaukee ordinance is not as specific as the one which passed muster in Bykofsky, the Milwaukee ordinance is overbroad.
The clearly dispositive case is Johnson v. City of Opelousas. In that case, the fifth circuit court of appeals held unconstitutional an ordinance which is remarkably similar to the Milwaukee ordinance. Milwaukee’s ordinance and the Opelousas ordinance both forbade such activity as "traveling, loitering, wandering, strolling and playing.” The parental exemption was for "parents, tutor or other responsible adult.” Also as in Milwaukee’s ordinance, the purposes asserted to underlie the Opelousas ordinance were the protection of youths from nighttime dangers, reducing nocturnal juvenile crime, and enforcing parental control and responsibility for their children. The court wrote:
"In Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633-39 ... (1979), four of the eight justices joining in the majority holding set out three reasons explaining why some situations justify the placement of restraints on minors which would be unconstitutional if placed on adults: 'the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing.’ *65... If the statute, regulation, or ordinance under question is based on any of these factors, 'we would be required to determine the strength of the support provided, its relation to the [enactment] as a whole, and the extent, if any, to which it might serve to justify any special restraints on the ... rights of minors.’ ... We need not conduct such an inquiry ... since none of the three factors ... apply to the overly broad restrictions with which we are concerned.” Id. at 1073.
The court then went on to explain that, because the statute simply cut off the juveniles’ rights of free association, travel, and first amendment expression, the statute was overbroad and, hence, unconstitutional.
A comparison of Bykofsky’s ordinance with that found in Opelousas, and a comparison of both of those ordinances with Milwaukee’s, demonstrates that Milwaukee’s ordinance is very similar to the Opelousas ordinance which was found unconstitutional, and very different from the Bykofsky ordinance which received approval. Thus, federal constitutional law, as well as simple logic, both dictate a holding that Milwaukee’s ordinance is overbroad.
I conclude that the ordinance at issue here is unconstitutional, because it is both vague and overly broad. I dissent from the majority opinion.
I am authorized to state that JUSTICE ABRA-HAMSON and JUSTICE WILLIAM A. BABLITCH join in this dissent.

 The Black Student Union’s good reputation is further indicated by the fact that they were allowed to use the War Memorial Center in the first place. According to the executive director of the center, the center is only available to "qualified organizations,” such as veterans groups, and "civil educational organizations.” Further proof of the union’s good standing is the fact that this dance was not the first they had sponsored at the War Memorial.

 interestingly, despite the apparently great fear the police had of gang activity, and despite the predictions of gang activity they seem to have found at or near the War Memorial Center, no arrests for any type of gang activity were made in that immediate area on the night in question. The only arrests relevant to the instant situation were made for violation of the curfew ordinance.

 It appears from the record that starting at 10:50 P.M., ten minutes before curfew time, the security staff of the student organization refused to allow juveniles to use the telephones to call their parents, nor were juveniles allowed to leave the premises. K.F. and D.A. both testified that they wished to leave the scene at 10:50 P.M., but were not allowed to do so. One also testified that she wished to call her aunt to fetch her. Had K.F. and D.A. been able to accomplish either of these goals, they would have been well away before the curfew. If, as the majority states at 47-48, juveniles who are walking straight home or who are waiting for a bus are not subject to the curfew (a matter which is discussed infra at 43), then these two juveniles would never have been in any trouble at all.

 This is made even clearer by recourse to footnote 11. At 48. There, the court cites a police officer’s testimony to demonstrate that the ordinance, as an individual police officer would apply it, would not result in a "broad interpretation.”

 It is also neither helpful nor dispositive to know how sec. 101.01(2)(g), Stats., defines public building. At 36. This is because sec. 101.01(2)(g) appears in the chapter on Industry, Labor and Human Relations in respect to the safe place statute and safety regulations in the workplace. As such, it is of no relevance in construing the term "public building” in a criminal or quasi-criminal context such as a juvenile ordinance.
As this court recently indicated in State v. Crowley, 143 Wis. 2d 324, 342-44, 422 N.W.2d 847 (1988), because one statute *59embodies a similar nomenclature as another, it does not follow that the definition adopted in the context of one statute can or should be uncritically adopted in the context of the second statute. Thus, in Crowley we specifically rejected the argument that, because a man was not "handicapped” under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act, secs. 111.31 to 111.395, Stats., he was not "disabled” for the purposes of a battery statute, sec. 940.19(3).
Similarly, in this case we should reject incorporation into the quasi-criminal or criminal setting presented here of the purely civil statute definition of "public building” contained in sec. 101.01(2)(g), which definition is intended to aid in regulating such matters as pilot lights on stoves, flushing devices for urinals, and smoke detectors, to name but a few. Because the purposes of the two laws are so completely different, the definitions in these very different contexts should be independently arrived at also.

 The ordinance covers eight closely typeset pages. This is in contrast to Milwaukees, which covers not quite two typewritten pages.