Court Opinion

ID: 9712928
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:03:12.600498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:18.371457
License: Public Domain

STATON, Judge,
concurring in result.
While I concur in the result reached by the majority, I write separately to clarify the function of the trial court when the question presented involves notice. The majority states, "The issue of compliance with notice requirements is generally not a question of fact for the jury but is rather a procedural precedent to be determined pri- or to trial by the court." At 971. This is a *972correct statement of the law only when the notice requirements are provided by statute. See Holland v. King (1986), Ind.App., 500 N.E.2d 1229, 1238, reh'g denied (statutory notice of tax sale proceedings); Board of Aviation Commissioners of St. Joseph County v. Hestor (1985), Ind.App., 473 N.E.2d 151, 153 (Tort Claims Act notice); City of Indianapolis v. Satz (1978), 268 Ind. 581, 377 N.E.2d 623, 625 (Tort Claims Act notice). Moreover, even though statutory notice is a question of law, summary judgment may not be proper at a given stage of the proceedings if the trial court does not have sufficient facts before it to make the determination. Hestor, supra. In such a case, an evidentiary hearing may be required to supply additional facts. Id.
When the notice requirements are provided by the parties through contract, however, the trial court finds itself in a different posture. In a case involving the notice provisions of an insurance contract, our supreme court stated:
Where the facts are not in dispute, or when they have been ascertained by the proper tribunal for that purpose, it becomes a question of law for the court to determine whether, under the facts and circumstances of a given case, the notice was reasonable. Where the facts tending to show an excuse for the delay are in dispute, or where it is a disputed question whether the delay was occasioned by certain facts, it is for the jury to ascertain the facts, and the cause and effect of the delay, and, under proper instrue-tions from the court, as to the force and effect of the facts found, determine whether or not, under all the circumstances, reasonable notice of the loss was given. [Citations]
This rule properly applied does not, in any event, leave it to the jury to determine what facts in law constitute a reasonable notice. This is the function of the court, to be discharged by properly instructing the jury as to the legal value of the facts, as they may be found from the evidence.
Insurance Company of North America v. Brim (1087), 111 Ind. 281, 286, 12 N.E. 315. Accord Andrews v. Minter Coal and Coke (1929), 90 Ind.App. 320, 328, 168 N.E. 869 (insurance policy).
The purpose for this distinction between statutory and contractual notice is clear-the courts are to ascertain the intent of the legislature, while the trier of fact is to determine the intent of the parties to a contract. The notice provisions here spring from the mortgage, not from statute. Their interpretation is therefore normally a question for the trier of fact. However, as it appears that there is no serious dispute about any material fact, summary judgment is properly granted to the Cobbums.