Court Opinion

ID: 9496292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:22:38.811146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:28.781341
License: Public Domain

HEANEY, Circuit Judge,
with whom McMILLIAN, MURPHY, and BYE, Circuit Judges, join dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Assuming a habitual residence determination raises mixed questions of law and fact, the result reached by the majority is inconsistent with Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir.2001), a case upon which the majority heavily relies. It is well settled that where the primary issue is whether the parents intended to abandon a prior habitual residence, great deference must be given to the factual findings of the district court. Here, the district court unequivocally found that, based on the entirety of the evidence, Robert and Julie Silverman did not have a mutual, settled intent to abandon the United States as their children’s primary residence. The district court found their habitual residence remained the United States, and this finding is not clearly erroneous. Thus, the district court must be affirmed.
Even if one agrees with the holding of the majority that Israel is the habitual residence of the Silverman children, Samuel and Jacob, the Hague Convention dictates that it is still necessary to remand the case to the district court for a determination of whether Samuel should return to Israel in view of his strongly stated desire to remain in the United States with his mother. If it finds that Samuel’s views are sufficiently mature to require acquiescence by the district court, that should end the matter. If not, the court must still consider the psychological harm he may suffer from being ordered to return to Israel. Moreover, the district court must also consider Jacob’s views on the matter. If Jacob’s views are not sufficiently mature to be controlling, the district court must still consider whether he would be psychologically harmed by being removed from his family in the United States.21
I. BACKGROUND
At the outset, it is important that we set straight the background facts recited in the majority’s opinion. Although the majority quotes Julie as testifying that she was always the one pushing to move to Israel, (Tr. 8), it neglects to point out that Julie subsequently testified, “I couldn’t imagine making a permanent move so far away from my family and my home if my marriage was going to not work.” (Tr. 89.) Robert seconded this view of Julie’s intentions. He testified that he had examined e-mails sent to Julie by her current husband: “It was never [Julie’s] intention to leave and be [with me] in Israel, but to be with this gentleman.” (Tr. 42.)
The majority states that Robert and Julie lived with relatives in Israel from July 1999 to November 1999, when they signed a one-year lease for an apartment. Notably, it concedes that Robert would not have allowed Julie to leave Israel with the children at any point between October 1999 and June 2000. In fact, Robert’s testimony was that he would not have permitted the children to leave Israel as early as September of 1999. (Tr. 59.) Thus, even by Robert’s own testimony, Julie re*903mained in Israel of her own free will for only one month, hardly a sufficient period of time to establish a joint intention that Israel would be the habitual residence of Samuel and Jacob. See, e.g., In re Application of Ponath, 829 F.Supp. 363, 367 (D.Utah 1993) (finding no habitual residence where mother and child detained for months by means of coercion).
Sometime in January 2000, Robert and Julie returned to Minnesota to complete bankruptcy proceedings. At that time both stated that their permanent address was Plymouth, Minnesota. (Tr. 57.) While living in Israel in April 2000, Robert and Julie signed and filed a joint United States income tax form for 1999, listing their address as Plymouth, Minnesota. (Tr. 58.) They made these declarations either under oath or under penalty of perjury. The majority gives little weight to these factors, suggesting this could only mean that both Robert and Julie lied when they claimed Minnesota as their address. The fact is that Julie considered the United States to be her habitual residence and that of Samuel and Jacob at all times during these proceedings, a position adopted by the district court. Julie’s position as to residency has been consistent throughout; it is only Robert who has claimed different residences-first Minnesota for tax and bankruptcy proceedings, then Israel for family law proceedings-to suit his needs. In my view, the district court properly considered the documents indicating the Silvermans were Minnesota residents as adding to the weight of the evidence that the couple never shared a intention to make Israel their habitual residence.
Julie contends that Robert engaged in threats, physical abuse, and coercion to force her to remain in Israel. In footnote six of its opinion, the majority concurred with the district court that there was physical violence against Julie by Robert, but went on to state: “[W]e do find it prudent to note that Julie also engaged in physical violence towards Robert.” Ante at 890, n. 6. Julie’s testimony about the incident paints a different picture:
[Robert] picked me up from the airport after I had stayed a few extra days for the bankruptcy. He started screaming at me that I had been with Steve. He pushed my head against the window, so I flung back this way. I hit him in the mouth, on this corner, and I made him bleed.
And at that point, he leaned over and opened the car door while he was driving. He couldn’t get the seat belt undone.
(Tr. 96-97.) In response to the question, “How did you interpret when he leaned over to open the car door?” Julie answered, “That he was going to push me out of the car.” (Tr. 97.) Julie also testified that at other times Robert would “hold me up against the wall and bang me. There were stone walls in our apartment. And he would ask me to tell him that I didn’t love Steve.” When asked if she was physically injured as a result, she responded, “I was not injured. I was hurt. I mean he was slamming me against the wall.” Id.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Habitual Residence of the Children
I begin my analysis by considering the applicable standard of review. The majority overstates the matter, leaving one with the impression that we should essentially impose our own view of habitual residence, giving no deference to the district court’s superior position in assessing the circumstances. The Second Circuit recently stated the applicable standard of review in cases arising under the Hague Convention. *904See Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153 (2d Cir.2001). The district court’s factual determinations are reviewed for clear error, while the district court’s legal analysis is subject to de novo review. Blondin, 238 F.3d at 158 (citing Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir.2000); Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 214 (1st Cir.2000); Shalit v. Coppe, 182 F.3d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir.1999); Lops v. Lops, 140 F.3d 927, 935 (11th Cir.1998); and Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1064 (6th Cir.1996)). Stated another way, the interpretation and application of treaty language is reviewed de novo, but the underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Blondin, 238 F.3d at 158 (citing Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 222 n. 9 (3d Cir.1995); and Cree v. Flores, 157 F.3d 762, 768 (9th Cir.1998)). Accepting this analysis, we review the district court’s factual findings, including its finding that there was no settled intent to abandon the United States, for clear error. Accord Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Whether there is a settled intention to abandon a prior habitual residence is a question of fact as to which we defer to the district court.”)
The majority’s reliance on Mozes to support its position that we review the district court’s habitual residence determination de novo standard is specious. A close reading of Mozes reveals that it is indeed a slender reed upon which to base the conclusion reached by the majority. Mozes clearly stands for the proposition that the intent of the parties to abandon a prior habitual residence is an issue of fact to be determined by the district court, to which we owe great deference. Here, the district court unequivocally found that the Silver-mans had not abandoned their habitual residence in the United States.
In Mozes, Arnon and Michal were Israeli citizens who married in 1982. They had four children ranging in age from seven to sixteen years old. In April 1997, with Arnon’s consent, Michal and the children moved to Los Angeles, where she leased a home, purchased an automobile, and enrolled the children in school. Arnon remained in Israel, but he paid for both the house and the car used by the family, and stayed with them during his visits to Los Angeles. One year after Michal and the children arrived in the United States, she filed an action in California state court seeking a dissolution of the marriage and custody of the children. The court granted temporary custody to Michal and entered a temporary restraining order enjoining Arnon from removing the children from southern California. Less than one month later, Arnon filed a petition in federal district court seeking to have the children returned to Israel under the Hague Convention. The oldest child elected to return to Israel and did so by mutual agreement. The district court denied the petition of the father with respect to the other three children, one age nine and two age five, and the husband appealed to the Ninth Circuit.22
In a lengthy opinion, the appellate court stated that the first question to be answered is whether there was a settled intention to abandon the family’s prior habitual residence. Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1075-76. The court emphasized that this was a question of fact, to which we defer to the district court. Id. at 1076. “[T]he intention or purpose which has to be taken *905into account is that of the person or persons entitled to fix the place of a child’s residence,” id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), which in this case would be both parents. Where the parents disagree, the courts must determine from all available evidence whether the parent petitioning for the return of the child has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the habitual residence is the place where petitioner claims it to be. 42 U.S.C. § 11608(e)(1); see Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1083 (stating petitioner bears burden of showing “brute facts” that point unequivocally to conclusion that parents jointly intended to alter habitual residence). Where the evidence is conflicting, the finding of the district court is entitled to great deference. Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1077-78.23
The majority errs in this regard by focusing only on Robert’s intent and disregarding the intentions of Julie. The district court found:
[T]he habitual residence of Sam and Jacob never changed from the United States to Israel and therefore, Julie’s retention of the children in the United States since June 2000 was not wrongful. With the exception of the eleven months spent in Israel, Sam and Jacob have spent their entire lives in the United States. The evidence also indicates that their time in Israel would have been much shorter had Julie not been prevented from leaving Israel with the children from [September] 1999 until June of 2000.
Silverman v. Silverman, No. 00-2274, 2002 WL 971808, at *6 (D.Minn. May 9, 2002). Where the intent to abandon a prior habitual -residence is a critical issue, as it is here, the district court’s findings effectively control the decision as to the habitual residence of the children. Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1072-73. These are obviously factual findings, entitled to great deference, and we are obligated to accept them unless they are clearly erroneous. In my view, they are not.
Contrary to the impression left by the majority, the court in Mozes did not find that the parents had a settled intent to abandon Israel as their habitual residence. In fact, it did not decide that issue. It rather remanded the matter to the district court to make that determination, reaffirming that the burden of proof rested with the petitioner.24 In this case, the district court has already made those findings, and concluded that the children’s habitual residence remained the United States .because the Silvermans did not have a shared intention to abandon the United States.
The district court here did precisely what was required of it under the Hague Convention-it examined all of the circumstances and determined that the Silver-mans did not have a mutual, settled intent to abandon the United States as the habitual residence of their children. Its *906decision is fully supported by the record evidence in this case. The majority selectively emphasizes a few facts that might have led the district court to a contrary conclusion, particularly that the Silver-mans had sold their house and moved their belongings to Israel. However, by training its focus so intently on these few facts, the majority glosses over those that weaken its position: the family was only away from the United States for a short time (even shorter when one considers that ten of the eleven months Julie and the children spent there were under duress); they never bought real property while in Israel; and, perhaps most importantly, they maintained that Minnesota was their home in two separate proceedings, both of which occurred while they were living in Israel. In light of the complete record, it is clear that the district court was well within its discretion in finding that Robert did not carry his burden. I would affirm the district court’s habitual residency determination.
B. Affirmative Defenses to Removal
I next come to the question of whether Samuel and Jacob should be returned to Israel if it is their habitual residence. Article 13 of the Hague Convention provides:
[T]he judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that—
there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical of psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.
The judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, art. 13, 19 I.L.M. 1501,1502-03 (1980).
Here, the district court held that even if it had determined that Israel was the habitual residence of Samuel and Jacob, it found in the alternative “that their return to Israel would pose a grave risk of physical harm or otherwise place them in an intolerable situation.” Silverman, 2002 WL 971808, at *8. The district court noted that in Freier v. Freier, 969 F.Supp. 436 (E.D.Mich.1996), evidence of unrest in Israel was insufficient to establish the grave risk defense. The district court went on to say that it did not agree with Freier’s conclusion in this case because:
Significant differences exist between the violence occurring at the time Freier [sic] was decided and the violence occurring in Israel today. Unlike before, the violence has permeated areas that were previously unaffected by the conflict. Furthermore, the type of violence, through suicide bombings, has placed civilians, including children, at much greater risk. The level and intensity of violence occurring in Israel today thus goes well beyond “some unrest” described in Freier. In the Court’s view, the current situation in Israel meets the “zone of war” standard contemplated by the Sixth Circuit in Friedrich.25
Silverman, 2002 WL 971808, at *10.
The majority rejects these findings, and instead resolves that Israel is not a zone of war as meant by the Convention. While I agree with this conclusion, neither the district court nor this court have answered the question of whether returning the dul-*907dren to Israel, given its current conditions, may cause them to suffer psychological harm. In my view, the fact that the specific area in which Samuel and Jacob would live is not a zone of war, still does not answer the question of whether they will be psychologically harmed because of the situation that currently exists in Israel.26 Moreover, it would clearly be harmful for the children to be removed from the United States and their mother, or each other, after spending the great majority of their lives here. Therefore, I believe we have no alternative but to remand to the district court to determine whether Samuel and Jacob will be subjected to psychological harm if they are separately or collectively removed from their mother’s home in the United States and forced to return to Israel27.
Additionally, the majority does not consider the finding of the district court that Samuel objects to returning to Israel and that he is mature and old enough for the court to consider his views.28 The district court notes:
The evidence presented at the hearing reveal[s] that Sam is a very bright and intelligent individual. He is a gifted child, which means he is in a class that is on par with his academics. He reads newspapers each day to follow events in Israel. The Court is particularly impressed by his behavior in learning of the upcoming legal proceedings and his desire to express his views in a letter and have them considered by the Court. The Court witnessed Sam’s maturity firsthand in discussions with him in chambers after the hearing. In both the Court’s private discussions with Sam and in the presence of counsel, the Court was impressed by the level of maturity exhibited by Sam. It was evident that he understood the purpose and significance of these proceedings.... Finally, the Court finds that Sam, at age 10, is sufficiently old enough to have his views considered.
Silverman, 2002 WL 971808, at *10.
I agree with the district court that Samuel is mature enough to make his own decisions on this matter, and he clearly articulates the reasons he does not want to return to Israel. His decision on that matter should be respected. Blondín, 238 F.3d at 165-66. Because Article 13 gives courts authority to refuse to return children where 1) the child, of sufficient age and maturity, objects to returning to his habitual residence, or 2) there is evidence that returning the child will expose the child to psychological harm, the district court, on remand, should strongly consider *908these exceptions for Samuel, in light of his letter and other evidence.
This leaves the question of Jacob’s fate. Jacob will be eight years old in July of 2003. He has not yet expressed his views to the court on this matter, nor has the district court determined if he is sufficiently mature to bring Article 13 into play. If Jacob now wishes to be heard, the district court should allow him to state his feelings. If his views are sufficiently mature and he wants to stay in the United States, that would end the matter. However, in light of Samuel’s stated wishes, even if Jacob does not make his views known, the district court must still assess the psychological harm that would result if Jacob were returned to Israel and likely separated from his older brother.
CONCLUSION
I agree with the district court that this case should be settled by the parties rather than by the court. There is no good reason why Robert and Julie should not be able to agree on a plan which would permit both parents to share custody of the children. Failing an agreement between the parents, we have no alternative but to affirm the district court. The Ninth Circuit, the font of many decided cases in this difficult area of law, makes it crystal clear that the question of whether the parents of minor children have a joint, settled intention to abandon a habitual residence is a question of fact. This must, of course, be determined by the district court and reviewed by our court on the clearly erroneous standard. Having found no reported cases to the contrary, I would affirm the district court’s well-supported decision.

. I do not disagree with the majority's view with respect to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

. In Mozes, the children had lived in Israel their entire lives and were taken by their mother, Michal, to Los Angeles where they remained for one year before Michal began an action to obtain custody of the children. Here, we have the reverse situation. The children lived in the United States their entire lives, were taken to Israel, and remained there voluntarily for only one month.

. In Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217 (3d Cir.1995), the Third Circuit recognized that a determination of the habitual residence necessitates consideration of the shared intention of the parents, id. at 224, and that where parents disagree the question is whether the petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the habitual residence is where petitioner claims it to be, id. at 222. The Feder court did not discuss the important question decided in Mozes, i.e., whether the determination of the parents’ settled intent to alter their habitual residence is a factual finding.

. The appellate court stated that ''the appropriate inquiry under the Convention is whether the United States had supplanted Israel as the locus of the children’s family and social development. As the district court did not answer this question, we must remand and allow it to do so.” Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1084.

. Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060 (6th cir. 1996).

. On this point, I believe it particularly relevant to reference a lengthy letter written by Samuel to the district court. In it, he expressed his concern about returning to Israel, and made clear that he was worried about his own and his brother's safety if they were forced back. (Appellant’s App. at 286-87.) As this is direct evidence of the psychological harm Samuel would suffer if returned, I believe it proper for the district court to consider the letter for that purpose.

. Of course, Julie would bear the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the children would be harmed psychologically by removal. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(A).

.As mentioned in footnote six of this dissent, Samuel wrote a lengthy letter to the district court in which he made clear his wishes. He stated that he was writing to inform the court that he wanted to live in the United States, largely because of his familial, social, and educational ties. He also noted that while he misses his father and some friends in Israel, he would not want to live ' there in large part because he believes it to be a dangerous place for him and his brother. The majority opinion makes no mention of Samuel’s letter. I agree with the district court that it is relevant and helpful to our decision.