Court Opinion

ID: 9671459
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:36:58.620908+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:45:11.029827
License: Public Domain

GREEN, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority, but I respectfully disagree with the discussion of mental anguish damages presented in the majority opinion. It is unnecessary to the decision in the case, and worse, it perpetuates an outmoded and discounted view of the law of mental anguish damages.
The supreme court has recently sought to clarify the standard to be met when seeking the recovery of mental anguish damages. See generally Parkway Co. v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434 (Tex.1995) and Saenz v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, 925 S.W.2d 607 (Tex.1996). Among several reasons for addressing the issue was the “convoluted and complex” history of mental anguish damages that allowed a potential for double recoveries. See Parkway, 901 S.W.2d at 442-43. The court held that plaintiffs cannot be awarded mental anguish damages without either “direct evidence of the nature, duration, or severity of their mental anguish, thus establishing a substantial disruption in the plaintiffs’ daily routine”, or other evidence of “ ‘a high degree of mental pain and distress’ that is ‘more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger.’ ” Id. at 444.
The evidence shows that Mario is in constant pain and is unable to perform tasks at home or at work; he is unable to enjoy leisure activities, participate in sports, or help his children with then* 4-H projects; he is no longer able to pick up his son; and he is irritable and frustrated, resulting in family problems. The majority concludes this evidence is adequate to support a recovery for mental anguish damages, but the effect of that holding gives Mario a double recovery.
*954Damages for physical and mental injuries are separate and distinct. Quite obviously, an injury that seriously impairs the physical activities of a person can also cause a “substantial disruption in the [person’s] daily routine”, but that does not automatically entitle the injured party to mental anguish damages. Mario’s inability to perform tasks, participate in sports, or pick up his child is a consequence of his physical pain and impairment resulting from injury. He is entitled to recover damages for these physical injuries, and presumably they are reflected in the jury award. The evidence of physical injury, however, cannot also be the basis for a mental anguish recovery; otherwise, there is a potential for a double recovery. And it is precisely this result that was sought to be avoided by the supreme court.
The only other evidence purporting to support Mario’s mental anguish damages is that of his irritability and frustration, which caused family problems. Although physical injuries may lead to emotional distress, Parkway and Saenz make it clear that a recovery for mental injuries requires more than a showing of the usual and ordinary emotional consequences of physical injury. The fact that Mario was understandably irritable and frustrated because of his injury does not establish a degree of distress that was more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation or anger and does not rise to the level of compensable mental anguish. See Saenz, 925 S.W.2d at 614 (“Plaintiffs proved worry, anxiety, vexation and anger, but failed to prove that their distress involved more than these emotions.”)
I also disagree with the majority’s suggestion that mental anguish damages can be inferred from mere inactivity and pain. The authority cited for this proposition is Transit Mgt. Co. of Laredo v. Sanchez, 886 S.W.2d 823 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1994, no writ); however, Sanchez pre-dates Parkway and Saenz, and to the extent it may support such a holding, it has been implicitly overruled.
Although, in my opinion, the appellees failed to prove mental anguish damages, there is at least some evidence in the record to support the other claimed damages. And while there is certainly room for reasonable minds to differ over whether this record supports a broad form jury verdict in the amount of $239,000, I cannot conclude that the verdict is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is manifestly unjust. Therefore, I concur in the result.