Court Opinion

ID: 9377755
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-08 17:06:59.16947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:16.413238
License: Public Domain

J-S45045-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    CHRISTOPHER LEE ROBINSON                   :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1144 EDA 2022

              Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 24, 2022
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County
                  Criminal Division at CP-45-CR-0002139-2013

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                                FILED MARCH 8, 2023

        Christopher Lee Robinson (Appellant) appeals from the order denying

his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 We affirm.

        This Court previously explained:

              Following a traffic stop, Appellant was arrested and charged
        with possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver
        (“PWID”), possession of a controlled substance, and possession of
        drug paraphernalia. [See 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), (16), (32)].
        On April 10, 2014, a jury found Appellant guilty of possession of
        a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. The
        jury, however, was unable to come to a decision on the PWID
        charge and the trial court thus declared a mistrial as to that
        charge. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 131 A.3d 81 (Pa.
        Super. 2015) (unpublished memorandum) at 1-4; Trial Court
        Order, 4/10/14, at 1. On June 24, 2014, the trial court sentenced
        Appellant to serve an aggregate term of one to two years in prison
        for his convictions and, on August 4, 2015, this Court affirmed
        Appellant’s judgment of sentence.            Commonwealth v.
____________________________________________

1   42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
J-S45045-22

      Robinson, 131 A.3d 81             (Pa.   Super.   2015)    (unpublished
      memorandum) at 1-20.

             The Commonwealth then re-listed the PWID charge for trial.
      Following an October 12, 2017 trial, the jury again deadlocked on
      the PWID charge and, again, a mistrial was ordered on that
      charge. The Commonwealth re-listed the PWID charge for a third
      trial and, after a November 22, 2017 jury trial, Appellant was
      found guilty of PWID. On January 24, 2018, the trial court
      sentenced Appellant to serve a term of 33 to 84 months in prison
      for his PWID conviction, with credit for 314 days of time served
      “to reflect [the] time [Appellant] served both for the lesser
      included offense of possession of a controlled substance, as well
      as for periods when he was incarcerated pending trial.” Trial Court
      Order, 1/24/18, at 1-2; Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration of
      Sentence, 2/5/18, at 1. On February 9, 2018, the trial court
      granted Appellant’s motion for reconsideration of sentence and
      declared that Appellant was entitled to 28 additional days of credit
      for time served. Trial Court Order, 2/9/18, at 1.

Commonwealth        v.      Robinson,   237    A.2d     1076    (Pa.   Super.   2020)

(unpublished memorandum at 1-3).

      Procedural issues arose after the trial court entered Appellant’s

judgment of sentence. Relevantly, Appellant filed a notice of appeal, and on

June 23, 2020, this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence.                See id.

(unpublished memorandum at 8). Appellant did not petition for allowance of

appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

      On June 18, 2021, Appellant timely filed the instant PCRA petition pro

se. Appellant subsequently obtained counsel, who filed an amended PCRA

petition on October 21, 2021. The PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing on

March 21, 2022, and thereafter entered the order denying relief. Appellant

filed this timely appeal.

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J-S45045-22

      On May 18, 2022, Appellant filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

concise statement. However, Appellant did not request the transcript from

the PCRA hearing until the next day. The PCRA court ordered the transcript

on May 20, 2022. The docket reflects transmittal of the record to this Court

on June 1, 2022. Appellant filed the transcript from the PCRA hearing with

this Court on June 28, 2022.

      Appellant presents two questions for review:

      1. Whether or not the trial court erred as a matter of law and
         abused its discretion in failing to find counsel was ineffective at
         trial for failing to include an authentication and hearsay claim
         in the [Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)] statement[?]

      2. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its
         discretion in failing to find counsel was ineffective for failing to
         request the transcription of the notes of testimony from the
         November 27, 2017, trial in order to prosecute the appeal filed
         on behalf of the Appellant to the Superior Court docketed to
         814 EDA 2018, inasmuch that the Superior Court could not
         adjudicate the appeal without the trial record, which resulted
         in the Superior Court affirming the decision[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 6.

      “The standard of review of an order dismissing a PCRA petition is

whether that determination is supported by the evidence of record and is free

of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Weimer, 167 A.3d 78, 81 (Pa. Super.

2017). “The PCRA court’s factual findings are binding if the record supports

them, and we review the court’s legal conclusions de novo.” Commonwealth

v. Prater, 256 A.3d 1274, 1282 (Pa. Super. 2021).

      With respect to Appellant’s assertion of counsel’s ineffectiveness:

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      It is well-established that to succeed on a claim asserting the
      ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must plead and
      prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, three elements: (1)
      the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel had no
      reasonable basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) the
      petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s action or
      inaction. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 975–76 (Pa.
      1987). If a petitioner fails to satisfy any of the three prongs of
      the ineffectiveness inquiry, his claim fails. Commonwealth v.
      Brown, 196 A.3d 130, 150–51 (Pa. 2018).

Commonwealth v. Parrish, 273 A.3d 989, 1003 n.11 (Pa. 2022).

      Appellant’s issues are related. In his first issue, Appellant argues his

direct appeal counsel, Robert       Saurman, Esquire      (Counsel), rendered

ineffective assistance by failing to preserve a challenge to the admissibility of

text messages. Appellant’s Brief at 16. Appellant asserts Counsel failed to

raise the issue in the Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement filed in his direct

appeal. Appellant further states:

      Upon appeal, there was no transcript of the proceedings available
      to the Superior Court to evaluate the issue of the text messages
      being introduced at trial over objection. This failure to include
      said issue along with the means for the Superior Court to analyze
      same and resulting waiver was not the “result of any rational,
      strategic, or tactical decision by counsel.” Thus this claim may be
      raised in a PCRA petition. 42 Pa.C.S.A. section 9543(a)(4).

Appellant’s Brief at 16.

      Appellant specifically challenges the trial court’s admission of the text

messages to support the Commonwealth’s claim that Appellant was selling

drugs. Id. at 19. Appellant claims the texts were “tempor[al]ly unrelated

and referred to marijuana.” Id. According to Appellant, it was

                                      -4-
J-S45045-22

      improper to admit the substance of these text[s] or any
      interpretation thereof[,] as the Commonwealth would not at trial
      have been able to authenticate these messages and even if they
      could, the content of the messages is hearsay without exception,
      and therefore the admission of the text messages in connection
      with the law enforcement officer’s interpretation of the texts would
      violate the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence….

Id. at 19-20; see also id. at 20, 22 (claiming Counsel failed to challenge the

lack of authentication under Pa.R.E. 901).

      Importantly, Appellant acknowledges:

      Due to the Superior Court not having a transcript available
      … [the Court] found that it could not address [Appellant’s]
      appeal as to the introduction at his third trial of the irrelevant
      hearsay which also clearly violated Pa.R.E. 404(b) [(precluding
      prior bad acts evidence)].

Appellant’s Brief at 32 (emphasis added, some capitalization modified).

      In his second issue, Appellant implies that Counsel is to blame for the

lack of the trial transcript. Appellant states:

      Due to the Superior Court not having a transcript available to it,
      [the Court] found that it could not address petitioner’s appeal as
      to the introduction at his third trial of irrelevant hearsay which
      also clearly violated Pa.R.E. 404(b).

Id.   Appellant concedes that “effective [a]ppellate review can only be

conducted by an [a]ppellate [c]ourt when it is adequately informed of the

rulings of the lower court with supporting explanation.” Id. at 33.

      The PCRA court found Appellant’s issues waived due to his failure to

timely file the transcript from the PCRA hearing. The PCRA court explained:

           We placed the reasons for our decision on the record at the
      Conclusion of the March 21, 2022 hearing. [Appellant] did not
      request the transcript of that proceeding until he filed his

                                      -5-
J-S45045-22

     Statement pursuant to [Pa.R.A.P.] 1925(b) on May 19, 2022. In
     fact, [Appellant’s] request for transcript was filed on the day his
     1925(b) was due and 29 days after the filing of his Notice of
     Appeal. [The PCRA court] delayed the preparation of [its opinion]
     with the hope that the transcript would be quickly filed. [The PCRA
     court is] unable to wait any longer. Because [Appellant] failed to
     timely request the transcript of [the PCRA] proceeding, [the court
     is] unable to address the merits of the errors [Appellant] contends
     th[e] court made in its March 21, 2022 order any further. We
     submit that the alleged errors are waived.

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/9/22, at 1.

     As noted, Appellant filed the PCRA hearing transcript on June 28, 2022.

Thus, we decline to deem Appellant’s issues waived, as we are able to review

them on the record. See Prater, 256 A.3d at 1285 n.3 (recognizing this Court

may affirm the PCRA court’s ruling for any reason supported by the record).

     Our review discloses that at the PCRA hearing, Appellant confirmed he

was represented at trial by privately-retained Counsel. N.T., 3/21/22, at 16.

Following trial, sentencing, and the disposition of Appellant’s post-sentence

motion, Counsel sought to withdraw from representation.       See Motion to

Withdraw, 2/16/18, at 1-2. The trial court denied Counsel’s request

     without prejudice[,] as a result of counsel’s failure to provide a
     written fee agreement in conformity with the Pennsylvania Rules
     of Professional Conduct.

           Counsel is directed to communicate in writing with
     [Appellant] in an effort to attempt to agree upon a written fee
     agreement. In the event [C]ounsel and [Appellant] are unable to
     arrive at a written fee agreement within 45 days, [C]ounsel may
     re-petition the [c]ourt for leave to withdraw….

Order, 5/29/18.

                                    -6-
J-S45045-22

     Because Appellant had filed a notice of appeal pro se, the trial court

directed Counsel to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement for Appellant.

See id.    The trial court also ordered the trial transcript.         Order for

Transcription, 5/29/18. On May 31, 2018, the Clerk of Courts filed a Notice

of Completion of the Transcript, with a $45.00 invoice. Notice of Completion,

5/31/18.

     Appellant’s counsel then filed an advocate’s brief in this
     Court. However, after counsel filed his brief, the trial court
     entered an order permitting counsel to withdraw. See Docket
     Entry at 5/6/19; but see Commonwealth v. Grazier, 552 Pa.
     9, 713 A.2d 81, 82 (Pa. 1998) (“[the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
     has] held … that when an appellant requests pro se status after
     his counsel has filed an appellate brief, the request is untimely”).
     Because of this development, we remanded the case to the trial
     court to determine whether Appellant desired to waive his right to
     counsel. See Judgment Order, 7/19/19, at 1-3.              Following
     a Grazier hearing, the trial court found that Appellant knowingly
     and voluntarily decided to proceed pro se for the remainder of the
     proceedings. See Trial Court Order, 1/9/20, at 1.

Commonwealth       v.   Robinson,    237    A.3d   1076    (Pa.   Super.   2020)

(unpublished memorandum at 2-3) (some citations and footnote omitted).

     Thereafter, Appellant proceeded with his appeal pro se, but did not

supplement the record with the trial transcript.       In affirming Appellant’s

judgment of sentence, we explained:

     Appellant did not include the trial transcript in the certified record
     and, as the trial court concluded, Appellant “never paid for the
     trial transcript in this matter, and none was transcribed or
     produced.” Trial Court Opinion, at 4. Since Appellant has not
     been granted in forma pauperis status in this case, Appellant has
     waived his claim of trial court error, as we do not have any ability
     to read the transcript or analyze this claim of error.

                                     -7-
J-S45045-22

Id. (unpublished memorandum at 6) (citation omitted).

      Appellant claims Counsel’s ineffectiveness caused waiver on direct

appeal, but ignores that he chose to proceed pro se. The law is well-settled:

      [An] appellant is not entitled to any particular advantage because
      []he lacks legal training. As our Supreme Court has explained,
      any layperson choosing to represent [himself] in a legal
      proceeding must, to some reasonable extent, assume the risk that
      [his] lack of expertise and legal training will prove [his] undoing.

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 685 A.2d 1011, 1013 (Pa. Super. 1996) (citation

omitted, capitalization modified); see also Commonwealth v. Blakeny, 108

A.3d 739, 766 (Pa. 2014) (“Although courts may liberally construe materials

filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status confers no special benefit upon a

litigant, and a court cannot be expected to become a litigant’s counsel[.]”).

      On appeal, it is the appellant’s “responsibility to ensure that this Court

has   the   complete   record   necessary   to   properly   review   a   claim.”

Commonwealth v. Tucker, 143 A.3d 955, 963 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2016). The

Rules of Appellate Procedure require an appellant to order and pay for any

transcript necessary for resolution of issues raised on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P.

1911(a). Here, we reiterate that Appellant did not seek in forma pauperis

status on direct appeal.     Robinson, 237 A.3d 1076 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(unpublished memorandum at 6). Appellant failed to file the trial transcript

or request a continuance to secure the transcript. See N.T., 3/21/21, at 58

(PCRA court observing Appellant “could have requested additional time to file

the transcript.”). The PCRA court stated:

                                     -8-
J-S45045-22

      I do believe [Appellant] was verbally apprised of his -- of how to
      go about getting the transcript, what it would entail, and that he
      was given his rights on how to go about doing that.

Id. at 59. Accordingly, Appellant’s claim that Counsel’s ineffectiveness caused

waiver in his direct appeal is not supported in the record and lacks arguable

merit. See Spotz, 84 A.3d at 311-12.

      Finally, Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim based on Counsel’s deficient

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement does not merit relief. The PCRA requires

a petitioner to plead and prove that his claim has not been previously litigated

or waived. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3). The record confirms Appellant waived

his evidentiary issue concerning the text messages when he failed to file the

trial transcript. Robinson, 237 A.3d 1076 (Pa. Super. 2020) (unpublished

memorandum at 6). Thus, this claim not merit relief.

      Discerning no error or abuse of discretion, we affirm the PCRA court’s

order denying relief.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/08/2023

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