Court Opinion

ID: 9645734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:33:54.377744+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:30.932376
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Justice,
dissenting.
The seventh point of error contends the trial judge erred in admitting appellant’s electronically recorded oral statement. Specifically, appellant contends the statement was not admissible because he was not provided with a copy of the statement. Tex. Code Crim.Proc. art. 38.22, § 3(a)(5) provides:
Sec. 3(a) No oral or sign language statement of an accused made as a result of custodial interrogation shall be admissible against the accused in a criminal proceeding unless:
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(5) not later than the 20th day before the date of the proceeding, the attorney representing the defendant is provided with a true, complete, and accurate copy of all recordings of the defendant made under this article.1
After a protracted analysis, the plurality ultimately holds the Legislature’s use of the word provide is ambiguous. Ante, 933 S.W.2d at 514. Relying upon Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), the plurality looks to extratextual sources and concludes art. 38.22, § 3(a)(5) is satisfied so long as the statement was available to appellant. Ante, 933 S.W.2d at 514. I cannot agree.
In Boykin, we recognized our constitutional function to effectuate the collective intent or purpose of the legislators who enacted the legislation in question. Id., 818 S.W.2d at 785 (citing, Camacho v. State, 765 S.W.2d 431 (Tex.Cr.App.1989)). To effectuate their intent, we apply the literal text of the statute. We do so because it is the only definitive evidence of what the legislators had in mind when the statute was enacted. Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 785. And, because the “Legislature is constitutionally entitled to expect that the Judiciary will faithfully follow the specific text that was adopted.” Ibid. Only *522when the literal text would lead to absurd results, or when the text is not plain but ambiguous, is it constitutionally permissible for a eourt to consider extratextua! factors. Id., 818 S.W.2d at 785-786.
In my opinion, no person of ordinary and common intelligence reading art. 38.22, § 3(a)(5) would find “provide” to be ambiguous. Indeed, only after looking beyond the statute to The Random, House Dictionary of the English Language does the plurality find support for its conclusion that “provide” is capable of two meanings. Id., 933 S.W.2d at 514. By beginning its analysis by searching for an ambiguity, the plurality performs an incorrect Boykin analysis.2 The plurality’s approach is untenable because virtually every word in the English language has more than one definition. In other words, if the judiciary is looking for an ambiguity, it need look no further than a dictionary. And once such an ambiguity is found, the judiciary is free to rewrite the statute using its preferred definition even when the record is clear the Legislature did not intend such an interpretation.
In the instant case, the Legislature, in using “provide,” intended for the defendant to be given a copy of the statement. Senator Washington, who sponsored this statute, stated on the Senate Floor:
... [The Statute] requires that, twenty days prior to trial, that [the State] give the other side a copy of any recordings they made, which is to create a level playing field. So, if you’re going to make the recording, give the guy’s lawyer a copy of it, and you can probably settle a lot of these eases if they know that.
The plurality concedes this statement supports appellant’s argument, but concludes the statement is “not conclusive” on this issue of whether the Legislature used “provide” to mean “give” (as is suggested by Senator Washington), or “make available.” Ante, 933 S.W.2d at 514.
The plurality’s holding is contradicted by binding precedent. In Dillehey v. State, 815 S.W.2d 623 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), we relied on excerpts from the Senate Floor discussions to determine whether a defendant could appeal from a deferred adjudication probation. In relying on that extratextual source the Court noted: “we have long honored, as binding evidence of legislative intent ... floor debate.” Id., 815 S.W.2d at 625 (citing Studer v. State, 799 S.W.2d 263, 269-270 (Tex.Cr.App.1990)). Following our discussion of the floor debate, we stated: ‘Where intent is clear, there is no room for further construction.” Dillehey, 815 S.W.2d at 625. In fight of Dillehey, “provide” means what Senator Washington said it meant: to give. Most notably, we relied on floor debate when we were last called upon to interpret this statute. Tigner v. State, 928 S.W.2d 540, 541 (Tex.Cr.App.1996) (Relying on floor debate to determine what the Legislature meant by the term “copy.”). The plurality provides no principled reason to ignore our precedent or the method previously employed to interpret this statute. In fight of this controlling authority, we should hold that under art. 38.22, § 3(a)(5) the State was required to give appellant a copy of his electronically recorded oral statement. Because the plurality does not so hold, I dissent.

. All emphasis is supplied unless otherwise indicated.

. The plurality contends I took the same approach in Moosani v. State, 914 S.W.2d 569 (Tex.Cr.App.1995) (Baird, J., dissenting). Ante, at 515, n. 12. The plurality’s argument evinces a careless reading of my dissent. I resorted to the dictionary because, as we noted a century ago in Bain v. State, 38 Tex.Crim. 635, 44 S.W. 518 (App.1898), "traveling” is ambiguous.