Court Opinion

ID: 9856706
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:55:49.577814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:25.171019
License: Public Domain

Worrill, J.,
dissenting. Counsel for the defendant in the trial court devote the major part of their briefs in this court in arguing that, under the allegations of the petition, properly construed, the plaintiff was not, as stated in the petition, a servant of the defendant, but was an independent contractor in the engagement in question, and, therefore, not entitled to recover. If, however, the characterization as servant be erroneous, this would not of itself militate against recovery, because the plaintiff, even as an independent contractor, would be an invitee and entitled to protection under the Code, § 105-401, which provides as follows: “Where the owner or occupier of land, by express or implied invitation, induces or leads others to come upon his premises for any lawful purpose, he is liable in damages to such persons for injuries occasioned by his failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe.” It could not reasonably be urged that the plaintiff was not in fact an invitee and, moreover, an express invitee, because it is affirmatively shown that he was engaged by the defendant to come upon *856the premises in a matter of mutual interest, namely, the repairing of a gutter attached to the defendant’s roof at compensation to the plaintiff on an hourly basis. It is alleged that in the prosecution of his work it became necessary to provide for his safety by holding onto a banister rail with his left hand while using his right hand in repairing the gutter. This rail was about 20 inches from the edge of the tin roof, as described in the petition. It is alleged that this was the only way he could execute his work, and that, if a ladder were used, the weight of it and himself would crush the gutter. While so holding on to the banister rail, which later inspection showed to have a rotten interior, and which he could not at the time detect because it was covered by a heavy coat of white lead paint, the rail broke as a result of such defective condition, and the plaintiff was thereby thrown to the paved walkway below with resulting injuries.
The right of an invitee and the duty of an owner or occupier of land towards him, especially with relation to the use of a portion of the premises not expressly named in the invitation, are set forth in Georgia Power Co. v. Sheats, 58 Ga. App. 730, 737 (199 S. E. 582), as follows: “Construing this section [§ 105-401], it was held in Fulton Ice & Coal Co. v. Pece, 29 Ga. App. 507 (116 S. E. 57): ‘This section places upon such owner or occupier of land the duty to exercise ordinary care, for the safety of his invitees, in discovering defects or dangers in the premises or instrumentalities thereon, and imposes a liability for injuries resulting from such defects as a reasonable inspection would disclose. Such owner or occupier of land is liable for a failure to warn his invitees of dangers or defects in such premises or instrumentalities, of which he knew or of which it was his duty to know in the exercise of ordinary care.’ See also Coffer v. Bradshaw, 46 Ga. App. 143 (167 S. E. 119); Tybee Amusement Co. v. Odum, 51 Ga. App. 1 (179 S. E. 415). In the Coffer case it was said: ‘ . . The duty to keep premises safe for invitees extends to all portions of the premises which are included within the invitation and which it is necessary or convenient for the invitee to visit or use in the course of the business for which the invitation was extended, and at which his presence should therefore reasonably be anticipated, *857or to which he is allowed to go. . . If the invitee does not go beyond that part of the premises to which, as the situation reasonably appears to him, the invitation extends, he can not be held to have become a mere licensee because, as a matter of fact, the purposes of the invitation could have been fulfilled without going on such part of the premises.’ (Italics ours.) . . In Smith v. Jewell Cotton Mills Co., supra [29 Ga. App. 461, 116 S. E. 17], it was held: Such invitation may cover the right as an invitee to be protected by the ordinary care of the owner not only upon such portions of the premises as may be necessary for mere ingress and egress, but upon those parts which are necessary or incidental to the mutual business or purposes of the invitation.’ ” See also Rothberg v. Bradley, 85 Ga. App. 477 (69 S. E. 2d, 293). The duty of the owner or occupier of premises to warn his invitee of dangers or defects of which he knew or in the exercise of ordinary care it was his duty to know applies to a latent peril as well as to a patent one. Huey v. City of Atlanta, 8 Ga. App. 597 (2) (70 S. E. 71); Monahan v. National Realty Co., 4 Ga. App. 680 (6) (62 S. E. 127); Hickman v. Toole, 35 Ga. App. 697 (3) (134 S. E. 635); Coffer v. Bradshaw, 46 Ga. App. 143 (167 S. E. 119); Fulton Ice & Coal Co. v. Pece, 29 Ga. App. 507 (116 S. E. 57).
It is contended by the defendant in the trial court that the plaintiff should not be entitled to recover because he was injured in the same area of the gutter which he was engaged to repair. Several Kentucky cases are cited to support the argument. However, these are cases where the plaintiff was injured by the very thing which he was called upon to repair and where he assumed the risk of any defect therein. Cases to this effect in our own State might have been cited. See, among others, Dartmouth Spinning Co. v. Achord, 84 Ga. 14 (10 S. E. 449); Southern Ry. Co. v. Coleman, 42 Ga. App. 649 (157 S. E. 239). In the present case, the plaintiff was injured by reason of a defective banister railing, and not by the gutter which he was engaged in repairing. If it could be said that in holding the banister rail for support he was exceeding the purview of the invitation of the owner of the premises, he would, under the authorities above mentioned, be barred from recovery. However, a jury could very properly find that it was a reasonable con *858elusion on his part that the invitation included the use of the banister railing, under the circumstances of his engagement, where otherwise the prosecution of his work upon the gutter would invite disaster. It would be straining credulity to say that the owner of the premises, knowing that there was only a ledge of about 20 inches adjacent to the gutter, and upon which no prudent workman would hazard his safety in the act of stooping to repair the gutter, would not expect such workman to avail himself of the banister railing for his own protection. In the Fulton Ice & Coal Co. case, supra, there was an injury because of an explosion of a drum upon the premises, due to a latent defect, and near which the plaintiff was sitting. Relative to the duty of the proprietor it was there said by Judge Bell, speaking for the court (at p. 515): “It is the duty of the proprietor in such a case to use ordinary care to see that his premises are in a safe condition for those whom he invites thereon for any lawful purpose, either expressly or by implication. If he does not know the condition of his premises, it is his duty, in the exercise of ordinary care, to find out their condition, and he will be liable for such defects as a reasonable inspection would have disclosed. [Citing.] . . If there were defects in the drum or tank as alleged, they may be treated as defects of the premises, since this affected the safety of the premises within the range of danger from the explosion. . . If this ordinary care required an inspection and warning, the defendant would be liable for a failure in these respects."
But, says the plaintiff in error, it would work an undue hardship to require the owner, and especially an invalid as might sometimes happen, to go upon a roof to inspect it before permitting a laborer thereon. There was no allegation that the roof was defective or that it was to be repaired. The subject matter of the repairs was the gutter, and the question of recovery turns on whether or not the use of the banister railing was within the extent of the invitation. I think that a jury would be authorized so to find. As stated in the Fulton Ice & Coal Co. case, supra, the duty here owed is analagous to that owed by a master to his servant, and it was further said, at p. 519, in that well-considered opinion (affirmed by the Supreme Court, 157 Ga. 105, 120 S. E. 636): “In this class of cases it has *859been held that where facts are pleaded which disclose the relation from which such duty of the master arises, a general allegation that the master knew, or ought in the exercise of ordinary care to have known, of defects resulting in injury to the servant is not objectionable and is sufficient to charge a liability upon the master for such defects.” It was then held that that case— involving a proprietor and a servant of an independent contractor—came within the same principle and that an averment, as in the present case, that the “defendant knew or ought to have known of the defects from which the injury resulted is sufficient to set forth a cause of action in this particular respect.” It was also held that the plaintiff did not “assume the risk of defects in the appliances which are independent of those which he is called upon to repair, and of which he could not have known in the exercise of ordinary care.” The allegations of the present petition bring the defendant within the principle just announced. If, as suggested by the defendant, the proprietor or owner is not able personally to make an inspection, he should not be relieved of his duty to know the condition of his premises, bécause the way is open to him to have it inspected by another. An expert might determine the condition of the railing by sounding or in other ways, and, as it was said of the drum in the Pece case, supra, it can not be held as a matter of law that an inspection would be so impractical that in ordinary diligence detection of the defective condition could not be accomplished.
In my opinion this case is distinguished from those where a person can not recover when injuréd by a defect in the very thing he is called upon to repair, and falls within the principle of law embodied in the statute (Code, § 105-401), fixing upon the owner or occupier of land the duty to keep his premises and approaches safe, in the exercise of ordinary care, for an invitee. The plaintiff here was injured by an instrumentality separate and distinct from the gutter which he was engaged to repair; and, as an invitee, whether he be called servant or independent contractor, he was, in my opinion, entitled to recover upon proof of the allegations of the petition. As stated by Judge Powell in Huey v. City of Atlanta, 8 Ga. App. 597 (70 S. E. 71), the old English case, regarded as the leading one, Indermaur v. Dames, L. R. 1 C. P. 274, laying down the doctrine embodied *860in our Code, “goes on to say that the common case in which this doctrine is involved is that of a customer in a shop, but that this is only one of a general class, that it includes all persons who go on others’ premises, not as mere volunteers, or licensees, but upon business which concerns the occupier, and upon his invitation, express or implied.” He further states (at p. 604): “The petition in the present case, as against general demurrer, presents an instance of a person who, being lawfully upon another’s premises for a designated purpose, and who, having occupied the position on these premises naturally and normally to be' anticipated by the proprietor of the premises, has been injured by a dangerous condition, existing thereon of which the proprietor of the premises had knowledge and of which the visitor did not have knowledge, actual or constructive. In such a case the duty to warn exists, and it exists independently of any contract raising the duty; it is one of those duties imposed by the social compact defining man’s elementary duties and liabilities to his every fellow man—a duty recognized as a corollary to or an extension of the maxim ‘Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas’.” In the case referred to, there was actual knowledge of the defect or danger, but, as hereinabove pointed out, where the relationship of owner or occupier of land and invitee is shown, an allegation that the occupier knew or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known of the defect is sufficient.
For the reasons above stated, I am of the opinion that the petition set forth a cause of a'ction, and that the court did not err in overruling the general demurrer.