Court Opinion

ID: 9747364
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:12:57.557853+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:33.175951
License: Public Domain

McEWEN, Judge:
Appellant-wife, in this appeal from a final decree in divorce, contends that the trial court erred in finding that appellee-husband, a citizen of India, was a bona fide resident of Pennsylvania for purposes of divorce jurisdiction. Appellant also argues, as an alternative ground for vacating the decree of divorce, that she and her husband had not lived separate and apart for three years as required by Section 201(d) of the Divorce Code, 23 Pa.C.S. § 201(d). We affirm the final decree entered by the now deceased, distinguished jurist of cherished memory, Judge Joseph W. deFuria, following dismissal of appellant’s exceptions to the report of the master.
The parties were married on March 11, 1974, in Patna Bihar, India. Appellee traveled to the United States in August of 1976 on a student visa to pursue a master’s degree in city and regional planning at Rutgers University. Appellant was unable, due to her inability to obtain a visa, to visit or join her husband in the United States. The parties did, however, regularly correspond until mid-1979 when appellee instituted an action in divorce in New Jersey. This action was discontinued by appellee when he moved from New Jersey to Pennsylvania.
Appellee was offered employment with the Delaware County Planning Department and applied for an H-l' (temporary worker) classification 1 under the Immigration Laws. *443The application was granted and the H-l classification was issued on April 3, 1980. Six months later appellee instituted the present action in divorce in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County. Appellee alleged in his complaint that he had been a bona fide resident of Pennsylvania for more than six months, that the parties had been living separate and apart for a period in excess of three years and that the marriage was “irretrievably broken”. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 201(d). A general master was appointed and evidence presented on the issue of the dissolution of the marriage as well as on the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania courts. The master concluded (a) that the courts of Pennsylvania were possessed of jurisdiction to entertain the divorce action and (b) that appellee was entitled to a decree in divorce! Appellant’s exceptions to the master’s report were dismissed following a hearing and a final decree of divorce duly entered.
Appellant argues that since appellee was permitted to enter the United States pursuant to a temporary non-immigrant visa, his H-l immigration classification required him to maintain, at all relevant times, a permanent residence abroad “which he has no intention of abandoning.” Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H). Appellant asserts that appellee’s permanent residence and domicile, as a matter of federal law, was India. Thus, she argues, the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, bound, under the Supremacy Clause, by the provisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, was without jurisdiction to entertain the action for divorce.
*444The Pennsylvania Divorce Code provides that an action in divorce may not be commenced unless one of the parties to the marriage has been a bona fide resident of the Commonwealth for at least six months prior to the institution of the action. 23 Pa.C.S. § 302. This residency requirement has been interpreted by this Court to require actual residence coupled with domiciliary intent. Zinn v. Zinn, 327 Pa.Super. 128, 475 A.2d 132 (1984). See also McKenna v. McKenna, 282 Pa.Super. 45, 422 A.2d 668 (1980); Smith v. Smith, 206 Pa.Super. 310, 213 A.2d 94 (1965). Appellant argues that appellee cannot satisfy both the domiciliary intent requirements of the federal immigration laws and the domiciliary intent requirements of the Pennsylvania Divorce Code, i.e., he cannot intend to maintain his permanent residence in India and also intend to be a permanent, bona fide resident of Pennsylvania. We are not persuaded by this argument. The status of appellee as a nonimmigrant alien with an H-l classification is not necessarily inconsistent with an actual conditional intent to establish, if possible, permanent residency in the United States by the legal means provided by the “Adjustment of Status” section2 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act *445of 1952, Ch. 477, § 245, 66 Stat. 217 (1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255, a provision which permits aliens already in the United States to apply for permanent resident status. See Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 667, 98 S.Ct. 1338, 1350, 55 L.Ed.2d 614, 629 (1978)3. Bustamante v. Bustamante, 645 P.2d 40, 42 (Utah, 1982).
Even if appellant’s alleged intent to establish permanent residency in Pennsylvania is inconsistent with the terms of his right of entry into the United States, he is not automatically precluded from becoming a domiciliary of the Commonwealth. As stated in Williams v. Williams, 328 F.Supp. 1380, 1383 (D.C.V.I., 1971):
Even assuming the least favorable situation, where an alien has misrepresented his true intent at the time he was granted entry to the country, the fact that he may be illegally in the country and deportable would not preclude him from forming an actual intent to make his home here. I see no reason to erect from the immigration laws an insuperable barrier of “constructive” intent in divorce litigation that cannot be overcome even by proof of a person’s actual intent. The enforcement of immigration laws properly remains with those to whom it is entrusted by law and does not need in aid of enforcement the judicially created civil disability of exclusion from our divorce courts. There is no rational ground for intermin*446gling these two distinct areas of law — immigration and divorce.
Accord Nagaraja v. Commissioner of Revenue, 352 N.W.2d 373, 378 (Minn.1984); Nicolas v. Nicolas, 444 So.2d 1118, 1120 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A.1984); Bustamante v. Bustamante, supra at 42; Pirouzkar v. Pirouzkar, 51 Or.App. 519, 524-25, 626 P.2d 380, 383 (1981); Cocron v. Cocron, 84 Misc.2d 335, 343-44, 375 N.Y.S.2d 797, 809 (1975); Gosschalk v. Gosschalk, 48 N.J.Super. 566, 575-77, 138 A.2d 774, 780 (1958). “A visa is a document of entry required of aliens by the United States Government and is a matter under the control of the government. It has little relevance to the question of domicile.” Alves v. Alves, 262 A.2d 111, 115 (D.C.App., 1970).
We conclude that federal law does not prevent the establishment of domicile for purposes of state court jurisdiction by a non-immigrant alien such as appellant.
The final argument of appellee arises from the statutory provision under which the complaint in divorce was filed:
It shall be lawful for the court to grant a divorce where a party has filed a complaint and an affidavit alleging that the parties have lived separate and apart for a period of at least three years, and that the marriage is irretrievably broken. 23 Pa.C.S. 201(d)(1)
The phrase “separate and apart” is defined as “complete cessation of any and all cohabitation” 23 Pa.C.S. § 104. Appellant cannot, by reason of the span of continents between the parties since 1976, question that their separation meets absolutely this statutory definition of “separate and apart” since more than four years intervened between the departure of appellant from India in 1976 and the initiation of the instant action in divorce in Pennsylvania in 1980. Appellant proceeds to assert that the parties had not, however, been estranged “for a period of at least three years”. “In the review of a divorce case, it is the responsibility of this court to make a de novo evaluation of the record and to decide independently of the master and the *447lower court whether a legal cause of action in divorce exists.” Jones v. Jones, 311 Pa.Super. 407, 409-11, 457 A.2d 951, 952 (1983). Accord Thomas v. Thomas, 335 Pa.Super. 41, 45, 483 A.2d 945, 946 (1984); Remick v. Remick, 310 Pa.Super. 23, 28-29, 456 A.2d 163, 166 (1983). While it is true that the initial separation was occasioned by the departure of appellant from India to the United States, our examination of the record leads us to conclude that the marriage has been “irretrievably broken” for a period in excess of three years.
Our eminent colleague in a quite compelling concurring and dissenting opinion would require that a marital breakdown precede the three year separation of the parties so that there will have been an irretrievable breakdown for three years prior to the filing of a complaint under 201(d). We need not, however, here address that issue since, as we have noted, the record demonstrates there had been an irretrievable breakdown in this marriage for a period of at least three years prior to the filing of the complaint.
The final decree in divorce is, therefore, affirmed.
SPAETH, President Judge, files a concurring opinion.
TAMILIA, J., files a concurring and dissenting opinion.

. An H-l classification is known as a temporary worker status. Immigration and Nationality Act of June 27, 1952, Pub.L. No. 82-144, as amended, § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1101:
*443(H) an alien having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning (i) who is of distinguished merit and ability and who is coming temporarily to the United States to perform services of an exceptional nature requiring such merit and ability; or (ii) who is coming temporarily to the United States to perform temporary services or labor, if unemployed persons capable of performing such service or labor cannot be found in this country; or (iii) who is coming temporarily to the United States as a trainee; and the alien spouse and minor children of any such alien specified in this paragraph if accompanying him or following to join him.

. IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY § 1255. Adjustment of status of nonimmigrant to that of person admitted for permanent residence
(a) The status of an alien who was inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States may be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his discretion and under such regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if (1) the alien makes an application for such adjustment, (2) the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence, and (3) an immigrant visa is immediately available to him at the time his application is filed.
(b) Upon the approval of an application for adjustment made under subsection (a), the Attorney General shall record the alien’s lawful admission for permanent residence as of the date the order of the Attorney General approving the application for the adjustment of status is made, and the Secretary of State shall reduce by one the number of the preference or nonpreference visas authorized to be issued under sections 202(e) or 203(a) [8 USCS §§ 1152(e) or 1153(a) ] within the class to which the alien is chargeable for the fiscal year then current.
(c) The provisions of this section shall not be applicable to (1) an alien crewman; (2) an alien (other than an immediate relative as *445defined in section 201(b) [8 USCS § 1151(b) ] ) who hereafter continues in or accepts unauthorized employment prior to filing an application for adjustment of status; or (3) any alien admitted in transit without visa under section 212(d)(4)(C) [8 USCS § 1182(d)(4)(C)]. (June 27, 1952, ch. 477, Title II, subch. 5, § 245, 66 Stat. 217; Aug. 21, 1958, P.L. 85-700, § 1, 72 Stat. 699; July 14, 1960, P.L. 86-468, § 10, 74 Stat. 505; Oct. 3, 1965, P.L. 89-236, § 13, 79 Stat. 918; Oct. 20, 1976, P.L. 94-571, § 6, 90 Stat. 2705.)

. In Elkins, the Supreme Court held that federal law does not prevent the establishment of a domicile in this country by nonimmigrant aliens with a G-4 status whose visas do not require them to maintain a permanent foreign residence. The Court specifically did not decide the question of whether H-l nonimmigrant aliens whose visas do require permanent foreign residences to be maintained may establish a domicile in this country.