Court Opinion

ID: 9956277
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-01 17:11:07.9736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:16.353978
License: Public Domain

J-S01027-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  ANDRE DASHAWN FULLER                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 12 MDA 2023

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 13, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at
                            No(s): 2019-10973

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  ANDRE DASHAWN FULLER                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 521 MDA 2023

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 13, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-40-MD-0000329-2020

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                   FILED: APRIL 1, 2024

       In these consolidated appeals, Andre Dashawn Fuller appeals from the

order denying his “Motion to Reinstate Direct Appellate Rights Nunc Pro Tunc,

or Alternatively Motion for Post Conviction Relief.” The lower court treated

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S01027-24

this as Fuller’s first petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

      The pertinent facts and procedural history are as follows: In 2019, the

trial court entered a final Protection From Abuse (“PFA”) order against Fuller.

Thereafter, in January 2020, a complaint for Indirect Criminal Contempt

(“ICC”) was lodged, asserting that Fuller violated the PFA order.       The trial

court appointed counsel, and a hearing was held on February 13, 2020. At

that time, Fuller entered a guilty plea to indirect criminal contempt and the

trial court sentenced him to six months of incarceration, to be served

consecutively to any sentence he was then serving. Fuller did not file a post-

sentence motion or a direct appeal.

      On May 3, 2022, Fuller filed the motion to reinstate his appellate

rights/PCRA petition at issue. The PCRA court appointed counsel. On July

27, 2022, PCRA counsel filed a “no-merit” letter and a motion to withdraw,

pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). In

this letter, PCRA counsel asserted that, although Fuller’s PCRA petition was

facially untimely, Fuller asserted a “newly-discovered fact” that trial counsel

at the 2020 violation hearing wrongly informed him that he could not appeal

his six-month sentence until he actually began to serve it following the

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completion of the sentence he was then serving.1        PCRA counsel found no

merit to this claim because counsel believed it was belied by a review of the

record.

       Thereafter, Fuller filed a pro se motion for leave to file an amended PCRA

petition, an amended petition, as well as a pro se response to PCRA counsel’s

Turner/Finley letter. In these filings, Fuller asserted that PCRA counsel was

ineffective for failing to raise both time-bar exceptions he wanted to raise; the

“newly-discovered fact” (as raised by PCRA counsel), and the interference by

government officials. In support of this second exception, Fuller averred that,

during the COVID-19 epidemic he was denied access to the prison law library.

       On October 20, 2022, the PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing

regarding the timeliness of Fuller’s petition.       At the beginning of the

proceeding, PCRA counsel stated that he was withdrawing his Turner/Finley

letter, and was proceeding on the merits because he read Fuller’s pro se

____________________________________________

1 In its brief, the Commonwealth first argues that Fuller is ineligible for relief

under the PCRA because he did not meet his burden of proving he is still
serving his six-month sentence. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(1)(i)-(iii)
(providing that in order to be eligible for relief pursuant to the PCRA, the
petitioner must be currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation,
or parole for the crime” or “serving a sentence that must expire before the
person may commence serving the disputed sentence”). As evident from the
notes of testimony from the PCRA hearing, the PCRA court was aware of this
requirement and much discussion centered on whether Fuller had completed
the six-month sentence. The PCRA court did not rule on the timeliness of the
PCRA petition until it heard from the Department of Corrections. Although the
certified record indicates that this issue was “resolved,” the record does not
indicate how. Nonetheless, the PCRA court did not dismiss based on Fuller’s
ineligibility under the PCRA, and we decline to affirm on that basis.

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response and believed Fuller had raised meritorious issues.           PCRA counsel

contended that Fuller met the governmental interference exception based on

the denial of access to the prison law library. Counsel also argued Fuller met

the “newly-discovered fact” exception because, once Fuller did gain library

access in November 2021, he discovered that prior counsel gave him bad

advice about the time for filing a post-sentence motion and/or direct appeal.

       At the hearing, PCRA counsel called Fuller to testify regarding his ability

to access to the law library at the various institutions where he was

incarcerated. The Commonwealth then argued that Fuller did have access to

the courts because he submitted several pro se letters, and that he did not

present any testimony regarding newly-discovered facts.               PCRA counsel

countered by emphasizing Fuller’s claim that he did not have access to the

prison library until November 2021.            PCRA counsel also reiterated Fuller’s

claim regarding the bad advice from trial counsel.

       By order entered December 13, 2022, the PCRA court dismissed Fuller’s

petition as untimely filed.           These appeals followed, which we later

consolidated.2 The PCRA court did not require Pa.R.A.P. 1925 compliance.

       We first determine whether the PCRA court correctly concluded that

Fuller’s 2022 PCRA petition was untimely filed, and that he failed to establish

____________________________________________

2 PCRA counsel filed these appeals on Fuller’s behalf and later was permitted

to withdraw.      The PCRA court then appointed current counsel for Fuller’s
appeal.

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a time-bar exception.3          The timeliness of a post-conviction petition is

jurisdictional. Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super.

2013). Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or

subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment

becomes final unless the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that an

exception to the time for filing the petition is met.

       The three narrow statutory exceptions to the one-year time bar are as

follows: “(1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the

claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional

right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012)

(citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii)). In addition, exceptions to the PCRA’s

time bar must be pled in the petition and may not be raised for the first time

on appeal.     Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super.

2007); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the

lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).

Moreover, a PCRA petitioner must file his petition “within one year of the date

the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

       Finally, if a PCRA petition is untimely and the petitioner has not pled and

proven an exception “neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction

over the petition.      Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal

____________________________________________

3  Fuller’s Brief does not contain a statement of questions involved.
Nevertheless, it is clear that he challenges the PCRA court’s conclusion that
his petition was untimely. See infra.

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authority    to   address    the    substantive   claims.”   Commonwealth     v.

Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).

       Here, Fuller’s judgment of sentence became final on March 16, 2020,

thirty days after he failed to file an appeal to this Court. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9545(b)(3).4 Therefore, Fuller had until March 16, 2021, to file a timely PCRA

petition. As Fuller filed the petition at issue in 2022, it is patently untimely

unless he has satisfied his burden of pleading and proving that one of the

enumerated exceptions applies. See Hernandez, supra.

       In his amended PCRA petition, which the court considered even though

there is no indication that he was granted leave to file it, Fuller asserted that

he met both the time-bar exceptions involving interference by government

officials and newly-discovered facts. We address both.5

       Fuller first argues that he established interference by government

officials because he was denied access to the prison law library due to the

COVID-19 pandemic.          This Court has consistently held that pandemic-era

restrictions on access to prison law libraries do not satisfy the governmental
____________________________________________

4 Because the thirtieth day fell on a Saturday, Fuller had until the following

Monday to file a timely appeal. See generally, 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908.

5 PCRA counsel discusses only the governmental interference exception.      On
August 9, 2023, we received a handwritten letter from Fuller in which he states
that his prior PCRA counsel also raised the newly-discovered facts exception.
In his claim for relief, he asks this Court to appoint new counsel or direct
current counsel to amend his brief and raises this second exception. Because
we are able to address Fuller’s claim regarding the newly-discovered facts
exception based on the certified record, we deny his application for substitute
counsel.

                                           -6-
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interference exception. Commonwealth v. Hyman, 2024 WL 394628, *2

(Pa. Super. filed Feb. 2, 2024) (non-precedential decision); see also

Commonwealth v. Miller, 2023 WL 2489952, *6 (Pa. Super. filed Mar. 14,

2023) (non-precedential decision) (explaining “allegations of restrictions on

access to law libraries or legal resources which do not completely prevent an

inmate from preparing legal filings, do not satisfy the governmental

interference exception’”).

      Moreover, our review of the record supports the PCRA court’s conclusion

that Fuller had access to the county prison law library, and at other times,

following the imposition of his 2020 ICC violation sentence.     At the PCRA

hearing, the following exchanged occurred between prior PCRA counsel and

the PCRA court:

            THE COURT: Here’s the problem. [Fuller is] in jail since
      January at LCCF. He’s not sentenced by me until February 13 th.
      He sits there January, February, March, April, May. He’s not
      transferred to [SCI] Retreat until May 17th, almost six months
      since he’s been sitting at Luzerne County Correctional Facility.
      And he had a lawyer. And after his sentence, he was there for an
      additional three months.

                                     ***

             [PRIOR PCRA COUNSEL]: I know, Your Honor. But [Fuller]
      testified that his attorney told him she was filing the appeal, and
      he had to wait.

            THE COURT: Okay. But he had full access. There was no
      testimony he couldn’t go to the law library there. His appellate
      rights expired in 30 days. He had additional months where he
      could have accessed the law library where there’s no testimony of
      record that there was a constitutional violation that he did not.

                                     -7-
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                   And then [Fuller] goes to SCI Retreat. Granted, then
      it was his testimony that the restrictions were lifted in November.
      There’s no other testimony of record. But then November,
      December - - there’s another multitude of months that passes by
      where he did have access.

                  But he had - - the record is very clear. He sat at LCCF.
      He had counsel. [Fuller] says his lawyer said he can’t file an
      appeal [until he actually started serving the violation sentence].
      That’s a credibility determination.       And quite frankly, [trial
      counsel] appeared hundreds and hundreds of times before the
      [court]. And that may be the first time I’ve heard that allegation
      raised against her, and they file lots of appeals.

                   So regardless, there’s no testimony of record that
      [Fuller] couldn’t access the law library while he sat here for those
      additional months. His sentence was six months. He had access
      until May of [2020] based upon the testimony of record to the law
      library here.

N.T., 10/20/22, at 33-34.         Thus, Fuller’s attempt to establish the

governmental exception fails.

      As referenced in the above exchange, Fuller also argues that the denial

of access to the prison law libraries caused him to discover only recently that

trial counsel gave him bad advice about the timing in which to file an appeal.

According to Fuller, this assertion establishes the “newly-discovered fact”

exception to the PCRA’s time bar. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). We

disagree.

      Even if trial counsel allegedly gave the wrong advice about when he was

able to file an appeal, Fuller’s claim would be a challenge to her effectiveness.

“Our Supreme Court has made clear that the section 9545(b)1)(ii) exception

will not apply to alleged ineffective assistance of counsel claims, even if the

claims were not knowable until advised of their existence by present counsel.”

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Commonwealth v. Perrin, 947 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations

omitted). The same result applies to Fuller’s claim that he discovered the

alleged ineffectiveness only after he gained access to the prison law library.

Thus, Fuller cannot establish this exception either.

      In sum, Fuller’s PCRA petition is untimely, and he has failed to establish

a time-bar exception.    As such, both the PCRA court and this Court lack

jurisdiction to consider it. Derrickson, supra. We therefore affirm the PCRA

court’s order denying him post-conviction relief.

      Application for Substitute Counsel denied. Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/1/2024

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