Court Opinion

ID: 9763711
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:53:06.875258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:48.980904
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority opinion is right in what it says, but it comes to the wrong result by not saying enough.
The common element identified in Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 90 S.Ct. 774, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970) and United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972) and restated in Marshall v. Barlow’s Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978) — “a long tradition of close governmental supervision” — is but one in the full formulation. Finding it dispenses with the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 9 of our Bill of Rights, at least with respect to “the stock of such an enterprise.” 1 But that is not the end of the analysis, only the beginning.
The Supreme Court then determines whether the statute that authorizes “a regulatory inspection system” is to advance a legislative objective of major importance and “inspection is a crucial part of the regulatory scheme,” Biswell, 406 U.S. at 315, 92 S.Ct. at 1596. It is at this point that the majority starts to choke up. Cursory reading of the Texas Pawnshop Act reveals that its regulatory scheme is directed towards objectives other than detering theft and minimizing its consequences. Indeed, the Act never even hints that such is its purpose; certainly an exploratory “inspection” to ferret out information possibly leading officers to stolen property is not “a crucial part” of the statutory scheme.2 But there is still more.
*514Though the warrant requirement be justifiably waived by legislative action, still the “reasonableness” requisite of the constitutional mandates remain, for the pawnbroker, like the firearms and liquor dealers, retains his “justifiable expectations of privacy,” Biswell, id., at 316, 92 S.Ct. at 1596. But here the pawnbroker, quite unlike the firearms dealer,3 is “left to wonder about the purposes of the inspector [and] the limits of his task,” ibid., when the “inspector” is a peace officer whose mission necessarily requires that he be tightlipped about his quest.4 Thus, though it might be said the pawnbroker “in effect consents to restrictions placed upon him,” they must still be “reasonable” within the meaning of the constitutional protections. Biswell, ibid.
Whatever occurred in earlier transactions with other peace officers aside,5 the information in this case focuses on the later encounter initiated by Detective Grubbs. It alleges only that “during a reasonable time” appellant did fail and refuse to allow Grubbs “to examine and make copies of the books ... and records of the defendant’s place of business...” Grubbs testified that when he arrived at the pawnshop other officers were there, and the first thing he did: “I approached the defendant in this case, I identified myself as a police officer, and told him we wanted to inspect the records of the pawn shop, pawn shop tickets.” Later asked about the “type of records” he was seeking to examine, Grubbs was still no more definite than to say “pawntickets themselves and the stubs that go with them.” As the majority notes, upon his refusal6 appellant was then immediately arrested, and the inspection of the tickets was thereafter made by an employee of the shop without success.7 In these circumstances, we too should “decline to read [the statute] as giving carte blanche for warrantless invasions of privacy,” G. M. Leasing, supra, 429 U.S. at 358, 97 S.Ct. at 631.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent, but my view must not be misunderstood. I am doubtful that there is “a long tradition of close governmental supervision” of the business of operating a pawnshop, although I concede that provisions regulating its loans are not new; 8 but even if there is and if we are further to ascribe to the Legislature an intention to open the books and records of a pawnshop to “inspection” by any peace officer who demands that, then I would require the “inspector” to articulate his business so *515that the pawnbroker is not “left to wonder about the purposes of the inspector [and] the limits of his task.”
ONION, P.J., joins.

. In context, Justice White writing for the Court in Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 1820, 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978) pointed out:
“The Secretary urges that an exception from the search warrant requirement has been recognized for ‘pervasively regulated business[es],’ United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 [92 S.Ct. 1593, 1596, 32 L.Ed.2d 87] (1972), and for ‘closely regulated’ industries ‘long subject to close supervision and inspection.’ Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 74, 77 [90 S.Ct. 774, 775, 777, 25 L.Ed.2d 60] (1970). These cases are indeed exceptions, but they represent responses to relative unique circumstances. Certain industries have such a history of government oversight that no reasonable expectation of privacy, see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-352 [88 S.Ct. 507, 511, 512, 19 L.Ed.2d 576] (1967), could exist for a proprietor over the stock of such an enterprise."
(All emphasis is mine unless otherwise indicated.)

. G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 97 S.Ct. 619, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977) makes clear that because business records and premises are still protected by the Fourth Amendment, id., at 352-359, 97 S.Ct. at 628-632, even “the normal enforcement of the tax laws” does not justify an intrusion into the privacy of a businessman id., 354, 97 S.Ct. 629, *514and the Supreme Court is “unwilling to hold that the mere interest in the collection of taxes is sufficient to justify a statute declaring per se exempt from the warrant requirement every intrusion into privacy in furtherance of any tax seizure,” id., 358, 97 S.Ct. 631.

. “Each licensee is annually furnished with a revised compilation of ordinances that describe his obligations and define the inspector’s authority. * * * The dealer is not left to wonder about the purposes of the inspector or the limits of his task.”

. Officer Allen Rockwell had been three years with the pawnshop detail, accompanied by Officer W. H. Elliott of the fence detail, left no doubt about the vagueness of his request, viz:
“Q: [By defense counsel]: So you asked then for the pawn tickets when you went in? A: No, sir.
Q: You didn’t?
A: No, sir.
Q: What did you ask for?
A: I asked to check the records, sir.”
It was a refusal to that request that brought about the call to and response by Detective T. T. Grubbs, and set the stage for the instant offense.

. The majority does not mention that when Officers Rockwell and Elliott went to enter the front door of the pawnshop they found that it was closed and locked. Submitting to trappings of authority, an employee obliged their request and unlocked the door and admitted them.

. In voicing his refusal to Grubbs, ironically appellant said the officer “could not come behind the counter without a search warrant.”

. As Detective Grubbs recounted this development, “I inquired into the tickets that we were looking for and the employee that was in charge was looking through the boxes and was unable to find any of the pawnshop tickets that were in question.”

. See the former Article 5069-3.17, V.A.C.S., enacted in 1967 and amended in 1969 as a part of the Consumer Credit — Consumer Protection Act.