Court Opinion

ID: 9617013
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:51:23.503686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:04.633850
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Chief Justice:
(concurring with comments).
I agree with the main opinion in holding that the actions of Officer Rapich were justified on the basis of taking an inventory both from the standpoint of discharging his duties in a businesslike manner, and as a matter of due caution under the circumstances. However, inasmuch as defendant’s contention is that he was denied his constitutional protection from unreasonable searches and seizures, I add some comments thereon.
The real question to be addressed is whether the search was unreasonable under the circumstances.1 The standard which should be applied is whether reasonable and fairminded persons, having in mind the protections which the law should afford persons from unreasonable intrusions into their private affairs, and also the necessity of efficient investigation and enforcement of the law to protect the public from crime, would judge the search to have been unreasonable. In the performance of his duties, a police officer is not required to meet any such standard as absolute accuracy of judgment before he may act.2 The question is one of fact to be determined by the trial court,3 which should not be disturbed unless there is no reasonable basis in the evidence to support that determination.4
There is no claim nor even suspicion that Officer Rapich was anything but open and aboveboard in examining the contents of the suitcase in the presence of the defendant. This could be well-advised for the purpose of exercising precautions against explosives, or perishables, or possible later claims of items missing therefrom.
It is submitted that there is ample basis in the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that there was no unreasonable search. Indeed, I go further and assert with firm conviction that, upon fair analysis of the situation the officer was confronted with, there is no basis upon which fairmind-ed persons could believe otherwise than that the search made by the officer was in no way censurable as being highhanded, oppressive or unreasonable, but was consistent with his duties in investigating crime and enforcing the law.
In my judgment, this is but another one of the all too frequently occurring situations where a defendant, reeking with guilt, seeks to avoid his conviction because of some alleged, far-fetched claim of impropriety in his being brought to account before the law. I think it would be a lamentable shame upon the face of justice if he were allowed to succeed.

. See express wording of Amdt. IV, U.S. Const. and Art. I, Sec. 14, Utah Const.

. See State v. Eastmond, 28 Utah 129, 499 P.2d 276 (1972), citing Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959), and other authorities.

. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); State v. Allred, 16 Utah 2d 41, 395 P.2d 535 (1964).

. See discussion in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963), cited in State v. Louden, 15 Utah 2d 64, 387 P.2d 240 (1963).