Court Opinion

ID: 9743710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:41:02.954496+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:42.914283
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MORAN, dissenting: The majority concludes the count charging armed violence properly states an offense. I disagree. Section 111—3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 requires that the charging instrument set forth “the nature and elements of the offense charged.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 111—3(3). See People v. Lutz (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 204.) Moreover, “an indictment or information must charge all the elements of the offense.” (People v. Sowrd (1938), 370 Ill. 140, 143.) As the majority notes, this applies equally to the elements of the predicate felony in a count charging armed violence. 96 Ill. 2d at 320. The predicate felony in the instant case, section 5 of the Cannabis Control Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 56½, par. 705), prohibits knowingly manufacturing, delivering, or possessing with intent to deliver or manufacture cannabis. To be a valid charge, the armed-violence count alleged here (count II) must specify which of these four alternative acts the defendant is accused of committing. (See People v. Heard (1970), 47 Ill. 2d 501, 504-05; People v. Miles (1981), 96 Ill. App. 3d 721.) However, count II merely recites essentially that defendant, while armed, violated section 5(e) of the Act. To cure the defect in count II, the majority suggests that the information should be read as a whole. Count I charges defendant with possession of cannabis with intent to deliver. The majority then states: “elements missing from one count of a multiple-count indictment or information may be supplied by another count.” (96 Ill. 2d at 320.) Based on this premise, it reasons the defendant should have presumed the People intended the element alleged in count I to apply as the element of the predicate felony violation alleged in the armed-violence count. I consider the majority’s premise unsound. “Each count in an indictment is regarded as if it was a separate indictment.” (Dunn v. United States (1932), 284 U.S. 390, 393, 76 L. Ed. 356, 358-59, 52 S. Ct. 189, 190. See Selvester v. United States (1898), 170 U.S. 262, 42 L. Ed. 1029, 18 S. Ct. 580.) Moreover, “[e]ach count must stand on its own, and cannot depend for its validity on the allegations of any other count not specifically incorporated.” (United States v. Fulcher (D.C. Cir. 1980), 626 F.2d 985, 988. See United States v. Winter (1st Cir. 1981), 663 F.2d 1120, 1138; United States v. Huff (5th Cir. 1975), 512 F.2d 66; People v. Berndt (1968), 101 Ill. App. 2d 29. See also People v. Nelson (1948), 399 Ill. 132. Accord People v. Moore (Colo. 1980), 615 P.2d 726.) Furthermore, what was said in Moore is applicable here: “The People argue that, if any defect is present in count two of the information, the defect is cured when counts one and two are read together. This argument is unsound. It has long been the general rule that each count of an information must be judged independently. See 41 Am. Jur., Informations and Indictments, sec. 221 (1968). Absent a clear and specific incorporation by reference, each count of an information ‘to be valid must be independent of the others, and in itself charge the defendant with a distinct and different offense.’ ” 615 P.2d 726, 729. While elements from one count may be incorporated into another count by reference, later counts cannot absorb the elements of prior counts by osmosis. (United States v. Fulcher (D.C. Cir. 1980), 626 F.2d 985, 988.) The armed-violence count in the instant case failed to set forth or incorporate by reference the nature and elements of the underlying felony. For this reason, it is void. I would affirm the judgment of the appellate court.