Court Opinion

ID: 2964698
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:29:50.413313+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:59.882218
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 96-1298

                                    UNITED STATES,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                JULIO RAMIREZ-BURGOS,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                    [Hon. Raymond L. Acosta, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                 Cyr, Stahl and Lynch,
                                   Circuit Judges.
                                   ______________

                                 ____________________

            Julio Ramirez-Burgos on brief pro se.
            ____________________
            Guillermo  Gil,   United  States   Attorney,  Nelson   Perez-Sosa,
            ______________                                ___________________
        Assistant United States Attorney, and Jose A. Quilles-Espinosa, Senior
                                              ________________________
        Litigation Counsel, on brief for appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                     MAY 21, 1997
                                 ____________________

                      Per  Curiam.   Defendant  Julio  Ramirez-Burgos was
                      ___________

            convicted  by  a jury  of aiding  and  abetting in  two armed

            carjackings in violation of 18 U.S.C.   2119, and 18 U.S.C.  

            2, and  of using a weapon during  the commission of a violent

            crime in violation of 18 U.S.C.    924(c).  He was  sentenced

            to a term of 35 years' imprisonment. 

                      On   appeal,  defendant   seeks  to   overturn  his

            conviction on the grounds  that (1) the prosecution allegedly

            presented  perjured  testimony,  to  wit,  the  testimony  of

            defendant's  accomplice, (2)  the court  erred in  failing to

            suppress the two  victims' identifications of  defendant, (3)

            the  evidence   was  otherwise  insufficient  to  prove  that

            defendant participated in the crimes, and (4) the court erred

            in  admitting evidence of a  rape he committed  during one of

            the carjackings.  He also asserts multiple challenges  to the

            computation of his sentence.

                      Background 
                      Background
                      __________

                      Viewed in the light  most favorable to the verdict,

            the  evidence  at  trial   showed  that  by   prearrangement,

            defendant   and   his   accomplice,    Daniel   Montanez-Rosa

            ("Daniel"), were each carrying  a revolver when they accosted

            their   first   carjacking   victim,  Nancy   Rosada-Santiago

            ("Nancy").  Brandishing a weapon, one of the men forced Nancy

            to cede control of her Pontiac Sunbird.

                                         -2-

                      The pair then drove around in Nancy's car searching

            for  a second victim --  all the while  holding Nancy against

            her will,  guns pressed against her.   She was forced  to lie

            low in the front  passenger seat, facing the door,  while the

            men questioned her about her  family and personal life, stole

            her cash,  jewelry and  telephone beeper, and  threatened her

            children and her life.

                      Spying  a second  likely victim,  Kassandra Rivera-

            Boujoven  ("Kassandra"),  the  men  rammed  Nancy's car  into

            Kassandra's Mitsubishi.  Again brandishing a gun, Daniel took

            over the  Mitsubishi, forcing  Kassandra to lie  down on  the

            passenger seat of her car, face toward the door.  

                      Now in  control of two cars and  two women victims,

            the carjackers continued on their journey toward a site where

            they could sell the stolen jewelry and buy drugs.   Along the

            way, defendant  stopped Nancy's  car, forced her  to undress,

            and forcibly raped her.

                      During the  rape the  car's interior light  was on,

            allowing Nancy to see  the defendant's face.  She  also could

            hear  Daniel yelling  from  a distance,  urging defendant  to

            "hurry up."  With  a final instruction to Nancy  to remain at

            the  site or her family would "pay" for it, "especially [her]

            little girl,"  defendant exited the Pontiac  and climbed into

            the back  seat of the  Mitsubishi --  leaving Nancy  kneeling

                                         -3-

            against the passenger seat of her car, traumatized, hurt, and

            suffering from vaginal bleeding.

                      Together again and driving about in the Mitsubishi,

            the  two  men  now   turned  their  attention  to  Kassandra.

            Pressing a gun  to her  ribs, they questioned  her about  her

            personal life,  rifled through her purse,  stole her jewelry,

            threatened her life, and  argued between themselves about how

            to drug her and kill her. 

                      At one  point they  stopped the  car  at a  housing

            project in order to buy drugs, and again at a  gas station to

            get  water  with which  to  mix  the  drugs.   As  they  were

            injecting themselves with the drugs, a police car approached,

            lights  flashing.   In the light,  Kassandra clearly  saw the

            defendant's face, and his  gun.  Threatening to shoot  her if

            she did not turn away, defendant also ordered Daniel to "take

            off."  A high speed chase ensued which ended with a crash.  

                      The  two  men  were  arrested at  the  crash  site.

            Kassandra was  discovered in the wreckage  wedged beneath the

            glove  compartment.    She  was  pried from  the  car,  semi-

            conscious, hysterical, and unable to walk.   

                      Defendant  testified that  he was  not involved  in

            either of  the carjackings, but had  unwittingly climbed into

            the back seat of Kassandra's Mitsubishi, unarmed, just before

            the police  chase.  By  "sheer happenstance," he  claims, the

            real carjackers (Daniel and  an unidentified second man) must

                                         -4-

            have interrupted their crime spree at the same time and place

            (the  housing project) where defendant had gone to buy drugs.

            Allegedly  without  any  knowledge  of the  crimes,  nor  the

            existence  of the  presumed real second  carjacker, defendant

            must have  unwittingly switched  places with the  real second

            carjacker --  joining Daniel in  the Mitsubishi for  the sole

            purpose of shooting-up drugs.  

                      Defendant  theorizes that Daniel's  testimony was a

            fabrication designed  to inculpate defendant in  a rape which

            Daniel himself had perpetrated -- and that both Kassandra and

            Nancy were mistaken in their identifications of defendant.   

                      (1)  Alleged Perjury
                      (1)  Alleged Perjury
                           _______________

                      Defendant asks  this court  to infer  that Daniel's

            testimony was perjured -- and that the prosecution knew it --

            as shown by  inconsistencies between  Daniel's testimony  and

            that  of  the  complaining  witnesses;  Daniel's   own  prior

            inconsistent statements,  confessed lies in  other cases, and

            prior  criminal  convictions.    A  knowing  presentation  of

            perjured testimony  by the prosecution violates a defendant's

            right to due process.  See United States  v. Tavares, 93 F.3d
                                   ___ _____________     _______

            10, 14 (1st Cir.)  (citations), cert. denied, 117 S.  Ct. 373
                                            ____________

            (1996). 

                      However,   "it   is  axiomatic   that  inconsistent

            testimony  is not per se perjurious."  United States v. Gary,
                                                   _____________    ____

            74 F.3d  304, 314 (1st Cir.),  cert. denied, 116 S.  Ct. 2567
                                           ____________

                                         -5-

            (1996); see  also United States  v. Lebon, 4  F.3d 1,  2 (1st
                    _________ _____________     _____

            Cir. 1993).  Nor is perjury conclusively shown here by adding

            to  the  mix the  circumstantial  evidence  that Daniel  lied

            before and engaged in other acts of dishonesty.

                      Defendant did  not ask  the trial  court to  make a

            finding of perjury.   "We decline his invitation that  we now

            find wilful  intent to  provide false  testimony based on  no

            more than  . .  . inconsistenc[ies]" and  character evidence.

            Tavares, 93 F.3d at 14. 
            _______

                      (2)  Motion to Suppress the Identifications
                      (2)  Motion to Suppress the Identifications
                           ______________________________________

                      Defendant  challenges the  denial of his  motion to

            suppress the complaining  witnesses' line-up  identifications

            of him,  and presumably the admissibility of  their later in-

            court  identifications, as  tainted  by a  prior show-up  and

            suggestive conditions at the line-up. Identifications made in

            circumstances that are so impermissibly suggestive as to give

            rise  to  "a  very  substantial  likelihood  of   irreparable

            misidentification" are  not admissible  in  keeping with  due

            process.   Bouthot v. United States, 878 F.2d 1506, 1514 (1st
                       _______    _____________

            Cir. 1989) (quoting  Simmons v. United States, 390  U.S. 377,
                                 _______    _____________

            384 (1968)).  

                       Defendant    claims     that    (1)    Kassandra's

            identification  was  impermissibly tainted  because Kassandra

            saw the  defendant  being  taken  by his  keepers  through  a

            hallway  at the police station  to the line-up  room; and (2)

                                         -6-

            both  of the  complaining witnesses'  line-up identifications

            were  tainted  because  defendant  was  distinctively clothed

            (allegedly in a  tee shirt and blue jeans), and  his face was

            swollen, bruised and  bleeding.  His  version of the  line-up

            was  supported   by  his   wife,  Sonia  Maria   Vazquez-Rosa

            ("Sonia"),  who testified that she was  in the police station

            hallway and there saw her husband being led past Kassandra on

            his way to the line-up, tee shirted and battered. 

                      Other testimony about the line-up, however,  was to

            the contrary.   Kassandra denied that  the alleged accidental

            show-up  had   occurred,  as  did  the   police  officer  who

            accompanied Kassandra  before and  during the line-up.   They

            denied  seeing  any swelling,  bleeding  or  bruising on  the

            defendant's face.  His clothing, they said, was substantially

            the  same as  that  of the  other participants,  including an

            identical  over-the-trousers collared  shirt supplied  to all

            participants  by   the   police.     Contemporaneous   police

            photographs corroborated this version of the line-up. 

                      The district judge found, as fact, that the alleged

            accidental  show-up had  not occurred;  and that  defendant's

            face  was   not  impermissibly  marked  nor   his  appearance

            otherwise  suggestive.   The  findings reflect  a "reasonable

            view   of   the   evidence,"   and   incorporate  credibility

            determinations  which  are  necessarily entitled  to  special

            deference  by an  appellate tribunal.   United  States  v. De
                                                    ______________     __

                                         -7-

            Jesus-Rios,  990  F.2d 672,  676  (1st Cir.  1993);  see also
            __________                                           ________

            Bouthot, 878 F.2d at 1513-14 n.8.
            _______

                      Seeing no ground for disturbing the court's factual

            determination  that  the  identification  procedure  was  not

            impermissibly suggestive, we need  not reach the second prong

            of   the  due   process  issue,   i.e.,  the   likelihood  of

            misidentification.   See United States v.  Guzman-Rivera, 990
                                 ___ _____________     _____________

            F.2d 681, 682 (1st  Cir. 1993).  In  any event, as  discussed

            below and  in the  margin, the victims'  identifications were

            reliable in light of the relevant second-prong factors.1     
                                                                   1

                      (3)  Sufficiency of the Evidence
                      (3)  Sufficiency of the Evidence
                           ___________________________

                      Defendant  argues  that   there  was   insufficient

            evidence to identify him  as a participant in the  crimes, at

            least  in  the  absence   of  Daniel's  (allegedly  perjured)

            testimony.  The argument is faulty for two reasons.

                      First, Daniel's testimony,  though inconsistent  in

            part  with the other  eyewitnesses, was not  incredible.  His

            credibility was subjected  to sustained and  searching cross-

            examination.  The jury  was instructed on the  possibility of

                                
            ____________________

               1As  applied in  this case,  the second-prong  factors set
               1
            forth in  De Jesus-Rios, 990  F.2d at 677, show:  (1) Each of
                      _____________
            the complaining witnesses had an opportunity during the crime
            to view the defendant at close range, (2) both testified that
            their gazes were fixed on defendant during those moments, (3)
            their descriptions  to the  police, while vague  and omitting
            defendant's  moustache,  were  consistent   with  defendant's
            appearance, (4) both identified the defendant with certainty,
            and (5) the  line-up was  held within 24-36  hours after  the
            crime. 

                                         -8-

            problems with testimony of this type.  The choice was for the

            jury,  not for  this  court.   See  United States  v.  Laboy-
                                           ___  _____________      ______

            Delgado, 84 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 1996).
            _______

                      Second,  and in any event, defendant was positively

            identified in court  by both of the  complaining witnesses as

            an armed and violent participant in the carjackings.  Despite

            gaps  in each witness's ability  to see during the respective

            crimes, each identification had a  substantial foundation and

            was corroborated by other evidence.   

                      Nancy testified  that she first  saw the  defendant

            only briefly, as he entered  her car.  She then saw  his face

            clearly in the car light for several minutes as he raped her.

            A  piece of paper found in Nancy's purse, which was retrieved

            after  the   crime  from   her  car,  bore   the  defendant's

            fingerprint.

                      Nancy's    testimony    also    corroborated    the

            identification  of defendant  as  the back-seat  carjacker of

            Kassandra's vehicle.  As defendant drove away in another car,

            Nancy testified, he reminded  her of his threats  against her

            child, and told her to call him on the telephone beeper which

            he  had stolen from her.   Substantially the  same words were

            overheard by Kassandra,  shouted from her  car window by  the

            second of her car's invaders (whom she could not yet see). 

                      Kassandra then heard  this second carjacker's voice

            continuously, enabling her to  testify with certainty that it

                                         -9-

            was  he who had initially climbed over her crouched body into

            the back seat  of her car, held  a gun to her  ribs, and then

            exited  and reentered  the  vehicle at  the housing  project.

            During  this stop,  she  said, too,  the back-seat  carjacker

            stood right next  to the  car, his body  continuously in  her

            line of sight.   True,  she first saw  defendant's face,  and

            gun, only when the  police chase began.  But  defendant spoke

            then, too, and she  saw the face connected  to this voice  at

            close range, in good lighting, and with fixed attention.  

                      To be sure, cross-examination revealed that each of

            the complaining witnesses was extremely frightened during the

            crime, and  still upset at  the time of the  line-ups.  Their

            respective  opportunities  to  see the  carjackers  had  been

            limited by  darkness and the  twisted postures they  had been

            forced to assume on the passenger seats of their automobiles.

            In  addition, each  gave only  a general  description  of the

            culprits when  first questioned, and each  testified that the

            first  carjacker to approach her  car was partly  masked by a

            tee shirt  pulled up  over his  mouth and  nose.  Nancy  even

            admitted that she  never saw the first carjacker's  face, and

            was not at all able to identify Daniel. 

                      These were  good arguments, offered to  the jury in

            an attempt to cast  doubt on the credibility of  the victims'

            identifications.    In  addition,  defendant  challenged  the

            scientific  evidence,  pointing  out  that  much  of  it  was

                                         -10-

            inconclusive, and someone else might have wrongly transported

            his  fingerprint to Nancy's car.  And he elicited substantial

            testimony which tended to impeach Daniel's credibility. 

                      Having   heard  all   of  the   evidence,  however,

            including defendant's own testimony,  the jury convicted  the

            defendant.    Viewed  in  the  light  most  favorable to  the

            verdict, there  was more  than ample  reliable identification

            evidence  which "would  allow  a rational  jury to  determine

            beyond a  reasonable doubt that the defendant [was] guilty as

            charged."  United States  v. Sullivan, 85 F.3d 743,  747 (1st
                       _____________     ________

            Cir.  1996) (quoting  United  States v.  Mena-Robles, 4  F.3d
                                  ______________     ___________

            1026,  1031 (1st Cir. 1993)),  cert. denied, 114  S. Ct. 1550
                                           ____________

            (1994); see also Guzman-Rivera, 990 F.2d at 682-83. 
                    ________ _____________

                      (4)  Evidence of the Rape
                      (4)  Evidence of the Rape
                           ____________________

                      Defendant also assigns  as error  the rejection  of

            his motion to exclude evidence of the rape; arguing that rape

            is not an  "element" of  the offense, but  only a  sentencing

            enhancement issue.  We  have travelled this road before,  and

            rejected similar  arguments under  this statute.   See United
                                                               ___ ______

            States  v. Cruz-Kuilan,  75 F.3d  59,  60-61 (1st  Cir. 1996)
            ______     ___________

            (finding proof of victim's death  admissible to show a taking

            by  force and  violence); United  States v.  Rivera-Gomez, 67
                                      ______________     ____________

            F.3d  993,  995  (1st  Cir. 1995)  (finding  proof  of  death

            admissible to show use of force and violence,  although death

            is  not an independent element  of offense); United States v.
                                                         _____________

                                         -11-

            Rivera,  83   F.3d  542,  545  (1st   Cir.  1996)  (upholding
            ______

            admissibility of  evidence of rape which  provided a "crucial

            chapter"  in  narrative  of  events  and  critical  proof  of

            possession of a weapon).

                      Of  course,  in and  of itself,  a  rape is  not an

            essential element  of the crime  of carjacking as  defined in

            the Anti  Car  Theft Act,  18  U.S.C.    2119  (1992).2   See
                                                                  2   ___

            Rivera-Gomez, 67 F.3d  at 996 (defining statutory  elements).
            ____________

            However, if a carjacker chooses rape as the means of "force,"

            "violence," or "intimidation" by which to  seize control of a

            vehicle, it amounts to the same thing. 

                      In this  case the  prosecution showed that  Nancy's

            car was  first taken from her by intimidation with a gun, not

                                
            ____________________

               2  The 1992 statute provides:
               2

                 Whoever, possessing a firearm as defined in section
                 921  of this title, takes  a motor vehicle that has
                 been . . . in interstate or foreign commerce from .
                 .  .  the person  of .  .  . another  by  force and
                 violence or by intimidation,  or attempts to do so,
                 shall --
                      (1) be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than
                 15 years or both
                      (2) if  serious bodily  injury (as defined  in
                 section 1365 of this title) results, be fined under
                 this title or imprisoned not more than 25 years, or
                 both . . . . 

                 The statute  has since been amended.   In 1994, Congress
            substituted  "with intent  to cause  death or  serious bodily
            harm" for "possessing  a firearm as defined  in section 921."
            In  October,  1996,  Congress  clarified  subsection  (2)  by
            expressly  providing   that  "serious  bodily   injury"  also
            includes  sexual assaults  violative  of 18  U.S.C.     2241,
            2242.

                                         -12-

            by  rape.   The  later  rape, nonetheless,  accompanied  by a

            veiled  threat to  do the  same  to her  daughter, terrorized

            Nancy into complying with the carjackers' command that she --

            with her  car -- remain stationery for  some time at the spot

            where  the carjackers  left them.   Thus  the rape,  like the

            earlier brandishing of the  gun, provided the intimidation by

            which the carjackers extended their control of the victim and

            her automobile.    Compare Rivera,  83 F.3d  at 545  (holding
                               _______ ______

            evidence  of  a  rape admissible  on  other  issues,  but not

            essential to prove  a taking by  "force and violence,"  where

            the  rape was not instrumental in the taking nor retention of
                          ___

            the car).  

                      Evidence of the rape  was of critical relevance, in

            any   event,  to   the   jury's   understanding  of   Nancy's

            identification of the defendant.  And it provided  a "crucial

            chapter" in the  narrative that linked  the defendant to  the

            second  carjacking.  Rivera-Gomez, 67 F.3d at 997.  Given the
                                 ____________

            value of  this evidence as directly probative of two elements

            of  the offense, the court did not abuse its discretion under

            Fed. R. Evid. 403 in admitting it, despite any risk of unfair

            prejudice.   Id. at 996.   "Though lurid, it is  part of what
                         ___

            old-fashioned  lawyers might  call the res  gestae."   Id. at
                                                                   ___

            998. 

                      Sentencing
                      Sentencing
                      __________

                                         -13-

                      The   court  sentenced  defendant  to  420  months'

            imprisonment:     360  months   (concurrent  terms)  for  the

            carjackings charged  in Counts One  and Two, and  a mandatory

            consecutive  60-month term for the firearms violation charged

            in Count  Three.  The concurrent  carjacking sentences exceed

            the statutory maximum.

                      Under the guidelines, the carjacking sentences were

            calculated  as follows.   The base offense  level, under USSG

             2B3.1,  for each  carjacking  count was  20.   Six  sets  of

            enhancements were  added to each count,  bringing the offense

            level for Count  One to 35, and  for Count Two to  33.  Since

            these were "non-groupable offenses," applying USSG  3D1.4(a),

            the  court  added  two  levels,  bringing  defendant's  total

            offense level for the two carjackings to 37.  With a Category

            I  criminal history, this produced a  guideline range for the

            carjackings  of  210-262 months.    The  court then  departed

            upward under  USSG   5K2.3, and  Application note  2 to  USSG

             2K2.4, arriving at the 360-month (concurrent) sentence.   

                      However, as  the government concedes on appeal, the

            statutory maximum term for  the Count One carjacking (Nancy's

            car) is  300 months.  See 18 U.S.C.   2119(2).  On Count Two,
                                  ___

            (Kassandra's  car), the maximum is 180 months.  See 18 U.S.C.
                                                            ___

              2119(1).  Concurrent terms for the carjackings were clearly

            intended by the court,  and so specified.  Thus  the sentence

            on  Counts One  and  Two  should  have  been  capped  at  the

                                         -14-

            statutory maximum for the highest count of conviction, or 300

            months.    See  USSG    5G1.2(b)(c).    Adding  the  60-month
                       ___

            mandatory  consecutive sentence  under  18 U.S.C.    924(c)),

            produces a total allowable term of imprisonment for all three

            counts of 360 months.  

                      We reject defendant's other assignments of error at

            sentencing for the following reasons. 

                      (1)  Two-level Enhancement for Perjury:   There was
                      (1)  Two-level Enhancement for Perjury
                           _________________________________

            no  clear  error  in   the  court's  finding  that  defendant

            intentionally   attempted  to  obstruct  justice  by  falsely

            denying  any involvement in the two carjackings and the rape.

            See USSG  3C1.1;  United States  v. Tracy, 36  F.3d 199,  201
            ___               _____________     _____

            (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1031 (1994). 
                        ____________

                        Defendant  theorizes that  his testimony  may not

            have  been deliberately false but, since he is a drug addict,

            the   product  of  confusion,   mistake,  or  faulty  memory.

            However,  at trial  he unequivocally  testified to  an alibi,

            claiming  to remember  even  the television  programs he  was

            watching  in  his  home at  the  time  of  the  crimes.    He

            reiterated  the  alibi in  his  post-trial  statement to  the

            probation  officer.    Given  the  several  eyewitnesses  who

            instead  placed him  at  the crime  scenes,  as well  as  the

            fingerprint evidence, there was ample factual support for the

            district court's finding.  See United States v. Dunnigan, 507
                                       ___ _____________    ________

            U.S. 87, 95 (1993). 

                                         -15-

                      (2) Two Level Enhancement for Reckless Endangerment
                      (2) Two Level Enhancement for Reckless Endangerment
                          _______________________________________________

            During  Flight:   There  was no  clear  error in  the court's
            During  Flight
            ______________

            finding  that  the high  speed  chase,  along crowded  roads,

            created  a  substantial risk  of  death or  bodily  injury to

            others, and actually resulted  in bodily injury to Kassandra.

            See USSG  3C1.2.
            ___

                      Defendant argues  that as a back-seat  occupant, he

            was not in control  of the vehicle.  However, there was ample

            support for the court's finding that defendant ordered Daniel

            to  "take  off,"  and  otherwise  aided  and  abetted  Daniel

            throughout the chase.

                      (3)  Loss Exceeding  $10,000:   There  is no  clear
                      (3)  Loss Exceeding  $10,000
                           _______________________

            error in the court's  findings that the loss to  each victim,

            including the value of their respective automobiles, exceeded

            $10,000.    Defendant's   challenges  in   this  regard   are

            frivolous.  See USSG  2B1.1, comment. (n.2). 
                        ___

                      (4)   Serious   Bodily   Injury:      The   court's
                      (4)   Serious   Bodily   Injury:
                            _________________________

            determination that Nancy suffered "serious bodily injury" due

            to a protracted impairment  of her mental faculties triggered

            the twenty-five  year maximum  term of imprisonment  on Count

            One.  See 18  U.S.C.   2119(2).3  In  calculating defendant's
                                           3
                  ___

                                
            ____________________

               3  The  statute incorporates  the  definition of  "serious
               3
            bodily injury," found in 18 U.S.C.   1365(g)(3), i.e., injury
            involving "(A) a substantial risk of death; (B)       extreme
            physical  pain; (C) protracted  and obvious disfigurement; or
            (D) protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily
            member, organ or mental faculty . . . ."

                                         -16-

            guideline   sentence,  the   court   imposed   a   four-level

            enhancement   for   "serious   bodily   injury"   under  USSG

             2B3.1(b)(3), and departed upward under USSG  5K2.3.

                      The decision to  apply the statutory  penalty range

            provided  in 18  U.S.C.    2119(2),  was  amply supported  by

            evidence  adduced at  the  sentencing  hearing.   Psychiatric

            reports  showed that  as  a result  of  the crime  Nancy  was

            diagnosed  with  post-traumatic  stress  disorder  and  major

            depression.  Due to the mental trauma inflicted by the crime,

            she  attempted  suicide  at  least  twice,  suffered auditory

            hallucinations,   and   was   hospitalized  for   psychiatric

            treatment.  She was  forced to  discontinue her  career as  a

            pharmacist, had become emotionally distant from her children,

            and dependent on her  mother.  The medical prognosis  is that

            she will require additional  psychotherapy, hospitalizations,

            and medical intervention for the rest of her life.

                      Defendant  misplaces reliance  on United  States v.
                                                        ______________

            Rivera, 83 F.3d 542 (1st Cir.  1996).  In Rivera there was no
            ______                                    ______

            finding of  protracted mental injury, and inadequate evidence

            to  sustain a finding  that the victim  had suffered "extreme

            physical pain," as  defined by the statute.  Id.  at 547.  By
                                                         ___

            contrast here, the court found that  as a result of the crime

            Nancy  will  suffer  a  lifetime  impairment  of  her  mental

                                
            ____________________

                        

                  

                                         -17-

            faculties.  See 18 U.S.C.   1365(g)(3)(D).  It should also be
                        ___

            noted that  subsequent to  the Rivera case,  Congress enacted
                                           ______

            the  Carjacking Correction  Act  of 1996,  which amended  the

            definition  of "serious  bodily injury"  to include  rape and

            sexual abuse.

                      The court's factual finding  was amply supported by

            evidence in the PSR and medical reports.  There was no  abuse

            in  the  refusal  to  require live  testimony.    "Sentencing

            hearings  are not meant to be mini-trials."  United States v.
                                                         _____________

            Robles-Torres,  109 F.3d  83,  86 (1st  Cir. 1997)  (citation
            _____________

            omitted).  

                      As to the guidelines calculation, the court did not

            exhaust  its enhancement  power under   2B3.1, by  imposing a

            four  level increase  for Nancy's  "serious bodily  injury."4
                                                                        4

            The  finding that  Nancy  will suffer  a  lifetime of  mental

            illness  could have been factored into the sentence as a six-

            level enhancement for   "permanent" bodily injury.5  Instead,
                                                              5

            factoring  in  the  permanency of  the  injury  as  an upward

                                
            ____________________

               4"Serious bodily  injury"  is defined  in  the  sentencing
               4
            guidelines to  mean "extreme physical pain  or the impairment
            of a function of a bodily member, organ or mental faculty; or
            requiring    medical    intervention    such   as    surgery,
            hospitalization,  or physical  rehabilitation."   USSG  1B1.1
            comment. (n.1(j)).

               5"Permanent  or  life-threatening bodily  injury" includes
               5
            "loss or substantial  impairment of the  function of a .  . .
            mental  faculty that is likely  to be permanent."   USSG  1B1
            comment. (n.1(h)).

                                         -18-

            departure under USSG  5K2.3, p.s., did  not amount to "double

            counting."  

                      Defendant also fails to demonstrate that the  court

            abused its  discretion in deciding that a  lifetime of mental

            illness is a  "much more serious" injury  than that "normally

            resulting  from commission  of the  offense" of  carjacking.6
                                                                        6

            USSG  5K2.3,  p.s.    The court  was not  required to  obtain

            extrinsic  "proof"  of  a  comparatively  "normal"  level  of

            carjacking  victims' injuries,  but was  entitled to  rely on

            other  Guidelines cases  and  its superior  knowledge of  the

            facts.  Koon v. United States,  116 S. Ct. 2035, 2038 (1996);
                    ____    _____________

            United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 952 (1st Cir. 1993).
            _____________    ______

                      (5)  Upward Departure  Under USSG   2K2.4, comment.
                      (5)  Upward Departure  Under USSG   2K2.4, comment.
                           ______________________________________________

            (n.2)
            (n.2)
            _____

                      Defendant argues that  the court erred in  applying

            Application note 2  to USSG  2K2.4,  which permits an  upward

            departure to compensate for  the possible anomalous result of

            an offender  receiving a  lighter guidelines sentence  for an

            underlying offense (carjacking) when  he is also convicted of

            a firearms offense under    924(c), than if he  was convicted

            solely of the underlying offense.   

                                
            ____________________

               6Defendant mistakenly assumes  that the court  should have
               6
            compared  the  victim's  mental  trauma  to  that  "normally"
            experienced  by victims  of rape.   The  offense charged  was
            carjacking;  the  use  of rape  as  a  means  to control  and
            terrorize  the victim  contributed to  the unusual  degree of
            mental  injury inflicted  on the  victim as  a result  of the
            charged offense.

                                         -19-

                      Defendant   misapprehends   the   guideline.     In

            calculating the  sentencing  range for  the carjackings,  the

            court  properly   refrained  from  assessing   a  five  level

            enhancement  for  the brandishing  of  a  firearm during  the

            offense.  See  United States  v. McCarthy, 77  F.3d 522,  536
                      ___  _____________     ________

            (1st  Cir. 1996), cert. denied,  117 S. Ct.  479, 771 (1997).
                              ____________

            This resulted  in a  guideline range  for the carjackings  of

            210-262 months.   Adding the  mandatory 60-month  consecutive

            sentence  for the violation of 18 U.S.C.   924(c), produced a

            total  sentence of only 322  months.  By  contrast, had there

            been  no  separate count  of  conviction  under  18 U.S.C.   

            924(c), the enhancement for brandishing the weapon would have

            increased   the  guidelines  calculation  of  the  carjacking

            sentence alone  to a level of 42, (360 months to life).  This

            computational  anomaly  justified   an  upward  departure  --

            subject,  of  course,  to  an adjustment  for  the  statutory

            maximum.

                      Defendant's opposite reading of Application note 2,

            as  requiring  a  decrease in  the  maximum  penalty for  the

            carjackings to  offset the 60-month consecutive  sentence for

            the  firearms  offense,7  also   ignores  the  court's  broad
                                   7

                                
            ____________________

               7This   interpretation  may   be  rooted  in   a  mistaken
               7
            understanding of the double jeopardy clause.  While defendant
            does  not directly argue the point here, in a previous appeal
            he    argued that  the  firearms charge  should  be dismissed
            before  trial because  it  violated  the prohibition  against
            multiple  punishment.   The earlier  appeal was  dismissed on
            jurisdictional grounds. United  States v. Ramirez-Burgos,  44
                                    ______________    ______________

                                         -20-

            discretion.  That  a district court  may consider lowering  a
                                                 ___

            guidelines sentence to offset a consecutive statutory minimum

            in some circumstances does not mean that it is required to do

            so.  United States v. Webster, 54 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1995).
                 _____________    _______

                      In sum, there was no abuse of discretion in the two

            upward departures.  Both were well explained and  grounded in

            record  facts.  See  United States v.  Twitty, 104 F.3d  1, 2
                            ___  _____________     ______

            (1st  Cir. 1997); United States v. Quinones, 26 F.3d 213 (1st
                              _____________    ________

            Cir. 1994).  While  the court did not separately  specify the

            extent  of each,  the oversight  was harmless.   But  for the

            statutory  maximum, a five-level increase was warranted under

            the Application  note to   2K2.4 alone, bringing  the penalty

            range to 360 months to life. 

                                
            ____________________

            F.3d 17 (1st Cir.  1995); see also United States  v. Stoller,
                                      ________ _____________     _______
            78   F.3d  710,  715  &   n.2  (1st  Cir.  1996)  (indicating
            uncertainty   about    the   continued   vitality    of   the
            jurisdictional  ruling),  cert.  dismissed, 117  S.  Ct.  378
                                      ________________
            (1996).

                 Double    jeopardy's   prohibition    against   multiple
            punishments,  however,  only  prevents  the imposition  of  a
            stiffer  sentence than  the  legislature  intended.    United
                                                                   ______
            States v.  Page, 84 F.3d  38, 41  (1st Cir. 1996).   Congress
            ______     ____
            clearly intended that  a term of incarceration under   924(c)
            should be in addition to the punishment provided in 18 U.S.C.
              2119.  See United States v. Centeno-Torres, 50 F.3d 84,  85
                     ___ _____________    ______________
            n.2 (1st  Cir.) (citing additional cases),  cert. denied, 116
                                                        ____________
            S.  Ct. 208 (1995); cf.  United States v.  Gonzales, 513 U.S.
                                ___  _____________     ________
            132, --- (1997) (observing that  Congress "has made clear its
            desire  to run     924(c) enhancements  consecutively to  all
            other prison  terms, [even]  regardless of whether  they were
            imposed  under firearms  enhancement  statutes similar  to   
            924(c)."). 

                                         -21-

                      However,   since  the  statutory  maximum  for  the

            highest count of conviction on the carjackings is 300 months,

            we must vacate  so much of the sentence as  reflects a higher

            concurrent  term for  Counts  One  and  Two.   The  mandatory

            consecutive 60-month sentence for the firearms offense brings

            the permissible  total sentence for  all three counts  to 360

            months. 

                      The  judgment  of  conviction  is  affirmed.    The
                                                         ________

            sentence on Counts One and Two is vacated and remanded to the
                                              _______

            district  court  with  directions  that  the  court  enter  a

            sentence  in accordance  with this  decision.   In  all other

            respects, the sentence is affirmed.
                                      ________

                                         -22-