Court Opinion

ID: 9416822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 19:56:43.082386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:33.113606
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice BRADLEY,
concurring :
I concur in the opinion just read, and should feel that it was out of place to add anything further on the subject were it not for its great importance. Ou a constitutional question involving the powers of the government it is proper that every aspect of it, and every consideration bearing upon it, should he presented,'and that no member of the court should hesitate to express his views. I do not propose, however, to go into the subject at large, but only to make such additional observations as appear to me proper for consideration, at the risk,of some inadvertent repetition.
The Constitution of the United States established a gov*555ernmeut, and not a league, compact, or partnership. It. was constituted by the people. It is called a government. In the eighth section of Article I it is declared that Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this. Constitution in the government of the United Stales, or in any department or office thereof. As a government it was invested with all the attributes of sovereignty. It is'.expressly declared in Article VI that the Constitution, and the laws of .the United States made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land.
The doctrine so long contended-for, that the Federal Union was a mere compact of States, and that the States, if they chose, might annul or disregard the acts of the National legislature, or might secede from the Union at their pleasure, and that the General government had no power to coerce them into submission to the Constitution, should be regarded as definitely and forever overthrown. This has been finally effected by the National power, as it had often been before, by overwhelming argument.
. The United Statés is not ouly a government, but it is.a National government, and the only government in this country that has the character of nationality,. It is invested with power over all the foreign relations of the country, war, peace, and negotiations and intercourse witii other nations; all which are forbidden to the State governments. It has jurisdiction over all those general subjects of legislation and sovereignty which affect the interests of the whole people equally and alike, and which require uniformity of regulations and laws, such as the coinage, weights and measures, bankruptcies, the postal system, patent and copyright laws, the public lands, and interstate commerce; all which subjects are expressly or impliedly prohibited to the State governments. It- has power to suppress insurrections, as well as to repel invasions, and to organize, arm, discipline, and call into service the militia of the whole country. The Presi*556dent is .charged with the duty and invested with the power to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. The judiciary has jurisdiction to decide' controversies between the States, and between their respective citizens, as well as. questions of National concern; and- the government is clothed with power to guarantee to every State a republican form of government., and to protect, each of them against invasion and domestic violence. For the purpose of carrying into effect and executing these and the other powers conferred, and of providing for the common defence and general welfare, Congress is further invested with the taxing power in all its forms, except that of laying duties on exports, with the power to borrow mon-ey on the National credit, to punish crimes against the laws of the United States and of nations, to constitute courts, and to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the various powers vested in the government or any department or officer thereof.
Such being the character of the General government, it seems to be a self-evident propositi on that it is invested with all those inherent and implied powers which, at the time of adopting the Constitution,.were generally considered to belong to every government as such, and as being essential to the exercise of its functions. ' If this proposition be not true, it certainly is true that the government of the United .States has express authority, in the clause last quoted, to make all sucli laws (usually regarded as inherent and implied) as -miay be necessary and proper for carrying, on the government as constituted, and vindicating its authority and existence.
Another proposition equally clear is, that at the time the Constitution was adopted, it was, and had for a long time . been, the practice of most, if not all, civilized governments, to employ the public credit as a .means of anticipating the national revenues for the purpose of enabling them to exer cise their governmental functions, and to meet the various exigencies to-which all .nations are subject; and that the mode of employing the public credit was various in different' countries, and at different periods — sometimes by the agency *557of a national bank, sometimes by the issue of exchequer bills or bills of credit* and sometimes by pledges of the public domain. In this country, the habit had prevailed from the commencement of the eighteenth century, of issuing bills of credit; and the revolution of independence had just been achieved, in great degree, by the means of similar bills issued by the Continental Congress. These bills were generally made a legal teuder for the payment of all debts public and private, until, by the influence of English, merchants at home, Parliament prohibited the issue of bills with that quality. This prohibition was first exercised in 1751, against the New England colonies; and subsequently, in 1763, against all the colonies. It was one of the causes of discontent which finally culminated in the Devolution. Dr. Eranklin endeavored to obtain a repeal of the prohibitory acts, but only succeeded in obtaining from Parliament, in 1773, an act authorizing the colonies to make their bills receivable for taxes and debts due to the colony that issued them. At the breaking out of the Avar, the Continental Congress commenced the issue of bills of credit, and the Avar Avas carried on Avithout other resources for three or four years. It may be said with truth, that Ave owe our national independence to the use of this fiscal agency. Dr. Eranklin, in a letter to a friend, dated from Paris, in April, 1779, after deploring the depreciation Avhich the Continental currency had undergone, said: “The only consolation under the evil is, that the' public debt is proportionately diminished by the depreciation; and this by a kind of imperceptible tax, every one having paid a part of it in the fall of value that took place between the receiving and paying such sums as psjssed through his hands.” He adds: “ This effect of paper currency is not understood this side the Avater. And indeed the whole is a mystery even to the politicians, Iioav Ave have been able to continue a Avar four years without money, and how we could pay with paper, that had no previously fixed fund appropriated specially to redeem it. This currency, as Ave manage it* is a wonderful machine. It performs its office Avhen we issue it; it pays and clothes troops, and pro*558vides victuals and ammunition.”* In a subsequent letter,, of 9th October, 1780, ho says: “ They [the Congress] issued an immense quantity of paper bills, to pay, clothe, arm, and feed their troops, and fit out ships; and'with this paper, without taxes for the first three years, they fought and battled one of the most powerful nations of Europe.”† The Continental bills were not made legal tenders at first, but in January, 1777, the Congress passed resolutions declaring that they ought to pass current in all payments, and be deemed in value equal to the same nominal sums in Spanish dollars, and that any one refusing so to receive them ought to be deemed an enemy to the liberties of the United States; and recommending to the legislatures of the several States to pass laws to that effect.‡
Massachusetts and other colonies, on the breaking out of the war, disregarded the prohibition of Parliament, and agaiu conferred upon th.eir bills the quality of legal tender.§
■ These precedents are cited without reference to the policy ■or impolicy of the several measures in the particular cases; that is always a question for the legislative discretion. They establish the historical fact that when the Constitution was adopted, the employment of bills of credit was deemed a legitimate means, of meeting the exigencies of a regularly constituted government, aud that the affixing to them of the quality ot' a legal tender was regarded as entirely discretionary with the legislature. Such a quality was a mere incident that might or might not be annexed. The Continental Congress not being a regular government, and not having the power to make laws for the regulation of private transactions, referred the matter to the State legislatures. The framers of the Constitution w'ere familiar with all this history. They were familiar with the governments which had thus exercised the prerogative of issuing bills having the quality, and intended for the purposes referred to. They had first drawn their breath under these governments; they *559had helped to administer them, They had seen the important uses to which these securities might be applied.
In view, therefore, of all these facts when we find them establishing.the present government,' with all the power before rehearsed, giving to it, amongst other things, the sole control of the money of the' country and expressly prohibiting the States from issuing bills of credit and from making anything but gold and silver a legal tender, and imposing no such restriction upon the General government, how can we resist the conclusion that they intended to leave to it that power unimpaired, in case the future exigencies of the nation should require its exercise?
I am aware that according to the report of Mr. Madison-in the original draft of the Constitution, the clause relating to the borrowing of money read, “ to borrow money and emit bills on the credit of -the United States,” and that the words, “ and emit bills,” were, after some debate, struck out. But they were struck out with diverse views of members, some deeming them useless and others deeming them hurtful.. The result was that they chose- to adopt the Constitution as it now stands, without any words cither of grant or restriction of power, and it is-our duty to construe the instrument by its words, in the light of-history, of the general nature of government, and the incidents of sovereignty.
The same argument was employed against, the creation of a United States bank. A power to create corporations was .proposed in the Convention arid rejected. The power was proposed with a limited application to cases where -the public good might’require them and the authority of a siugle State might be incompetent. It' was still rejected.' It was ^then confined to the building of canals, but without effect. It was argued that such a power was unnecessary and might be dangerous. Yet Congress-has not only chartered two-United States banks, whose constitutionality has been sus- • taiued by this court, but several other institutions. As a means appropriate and conducive to the end of carrying into effect the other powers of the government, such as that of borrowing- money with promptness, and dispatch, and *560facilitating the fiscal operations of the government, it was deemed within the power of Congress to create such an institution under the general power given to pass all such laws as might be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the other powers granted. The views of particular members or the course of proceedings in the Convention cannot control the fair meaning and general scope of the Constitution as it was finally framed add now stands. It- is a finished document, complete in itself, and to be interpreted in -the light of history and of the circumstances of the period in which it was framed,
No one doubts at the present day nor has ever seriously doubted that the power of the government to emit bills exists. It has been exercised by the government without question for a large portion of its history. This being conceded, the incidental power of giving such bills the quality of legal tender follows almost as a matter of course.
I hold it to be the prerogative of every government not restrained by its Constitution to anticipate its resources by the issue of exchequer bills, bills of credit, bonds, stock, or a banking apparatus. Whether those issues shall or shall not be receivable in payment of private debts is an incidental matter in thediscretion of such government unless restrained by constitutional prohibition.
This-power is entirely distinct from that of coining money and regulating the value thereof. It is not only embraced in the power to make all necessary auxiliary laws, but it is incidental to the power of borrowing money. It is often a necessary means of anticipating and realizing promptly the national resources, when, perhaps, promptness is necessary to the national existence. It is not an attempt to coin money out of a valueless material, like the coinage of leather or ivory or kowrie shells. It is .a pledge of the national credit. It is a promise by the government to pay dollars; it is not an attempt to make dollars. The standard of value is not changed. The government simply demands that its credit shall be accepted and received by public and private creditors during the pending exigency. 'Every government *561has a right to demand this when its existence is at stake.. The interests of every citizen are bound up with the fate of the government. None can claim exemption. If they cannot trust their government in its time of trial they are not worthy to be its citizens.
But it is said, why not borrow money in the ordinary way? The answer is, the legislative department, being the natiou itself, speaking by its representatives, has a choice of methods, and is the master of its own discretion. One mode of borrowing, it is true, is to issue the government bonds, and to invite capitalists to purchase them. But this is not the only mode. It is often too tardy and inefficient. In time of war or public danger, Congress, representing the sovereign power, by its right of eminent domain, may authorize the President to take priváte property for'the public use and give government certificates therefor. This is largely done • on such occasions. It-is an indirect way of compelling the owner of property to lend to the government. He is forced to rely on the national credit.
Can the poor man’s cattle, and horses, and corn be thus taken by the government when the public exigency requires it, and cannot the rich man’s bonds and notes be in like manner taken to reach the same end? If the government enacts that the certificates of indebtedness which it gives to-the farmer for his cattle and provender shall be receivable-by the farmer’s creditors in payment of his bonds and notes,, -is it anything more than transferring the government loan from the hands of one man to the hands of another — perhaps far more able to advance it ? Is it anything more than, putting the securities of the capitalist on the same platform-as the farmer’s.stock?
No one supposes that these government certificates are never to be paid — that the day of specie.payments is never to return. And it matters not in what form they are issued.. The principle is still the same. Instead of certificates they may be treasury notes, or paper of any other form. And their payment.may not be made directly in coin, but they may be first convertible into government bonds, or other-*562government securities. Through whatever changes they pas's, their ultimate destiny is to be paid. But it is the prerogative of the legislative department to determine when the fit time for payment has come. It may be long delayed, perhaps many may think it too long after the exigency has passed. But the abuse of a power, if proven, is no argument against its existence. And the courts are not responsible therefor. Questions of political expediency belong to the legislative hails, not to the judicial forum. It might subserve the present good if we should declare the legal tender act unconstitutional, and a temporary public satisfaction might be the result. But what a miserable consideration would that be for a permanent loss of one of the just afni necessary powers of the government; a power which, had Congress failed to exercise it when it did, we might have had no court heye to-day to consider the question, nor a government or a country to make it important to do so.
Another ground of the power to- issue treasury notes or bills is the necessity of providing a proper currency for the country, and especially of providing for the failure or disappearance of the ordinary currency in times of financial pressure and threatened collapse of commercial credit. Currency is' a national necessity. The operations of the government, as well as private transactions, are wholly dependent upon it. The State governments are prohibited from making money or issuing bills. Uniformity of money was one of the objects of the Constitution. The coinage of money and regulation of its value is conferred upon the General government exclusively. That government has also the power to issue bills. It follows, as a matter of necessity, as a consequence of these various provisions, that, it is specially the duty of the General government to provide a National ■currency. The States cannot do it, except by the charter of local banks, and that remedy, if strictly legitimate and constitutional, is inadequate, fluctuating, uncertain, and insecure, and operates with all the partiality to local interests, which, it was the very object of the Constitution to avoid. ¡But regarded as a duty of the General government, it is *563strictly in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution, as well as in line with the national necessities.
It is absolutely essential to independent national existence that government should have a firm hold on the two great sovereign instrumentalities of the sword and the purse., and the right to wield them without restriction on occasions of national peril. In certain emergencies government must have at its command, not onlj? the personal services — the bodies and lives — of its citizens, but the lesser, though not less essential, power of absolute control over the resources of the country. Its armies must be filled,, and its navies manned, by the citizens in .person. Its material of war, its munitions, equipment, and commissary stores' must come from the industry of the country. This can only be stimu-. lated into activity by a proper financial system, especially as regards the currency.
A constitutional' government, notwithstanding the right of eminent domain, cannot take physical and forcible possession of all that it may heed to defend the country, and is reluctant to exercise such a power when it can be avoided. It must purchase, and by purchase command materials and supplies, products of manufacture, labor, service of every kind. The government cannot, by physical power, compel the workshops to turn out millions.of dollars’ worth of manufactures in leather, and cloth, and wood, aud iron, which are the very first conditions of military equipment. Tt must stimulate and set iu motion the industry of the country. In other words, it must purchase. But it cannot purchase with specie. That is soon exhausted, hidden, or exported. It must purchase by credit. It cannot force its citizens to take its bonds. It must be able to lay its hands' on the currency — that great instrument- of exchange by which the people transact all their own affairs with.each other; that thing which they must have, aud which lies at the foundation of all industrial effort and all business in the community. When the ordinary currency disappears, as it often does in time of war, when business begins to stagnate and general bankruptcy is imminent, then the government *564must have power at the same time to renovate its own resources and to revive the drooping energies of the nation by supplying it with a circulating medium. What that medium shall be, what its character and qualities, will depend upon the greatness of the exigency, and the degree of promptitude which it demands. These are legislative questions. The heart of the nation must not be crushed out. The people must be aided to pay their debts and meet their obligations. The debtor interest of the country represent its bone and sinew, and musí be encouraged to pursue its avocations. If relief were not afforded universal bankruptcy would ensue, and industry would be stopped, and government wowld he paralyzed in the paralysis of the people. It is an undoubted fact'that during the late civil war, the activity of the workshops and factories, mines and machinery, shipyards, railroads and canals of the loyal States, caused by the issue of the legal tender currency, constituted an inexhaustible fountain-of strength to the National cause.
These views are exhibited, not for the purpose of showing that the power is a desirable one, and therefore ought to be assumed; much less for the purpose of giving judgment on the expediency of its dxercise in any particular case; but for the purpose of showing that it is one of those vital and essential powers inhering in every national sovereignty and necessary to its self-preservation.
But 'the creditor interest will lose' some of its gold ! Is gold the one thing needful ? Is it worse for the creditor to' lose a little by depreciation than everything by the bankruptcy of his debtor? Nay, is it worse than to lose everything by the subversion of the government? What is it that protects him in the accumulation and possession of his wealth ? Is it not the government and its laws ? and can he not consent to trust that government for a brief-period until it shall have vindicated its right to exist?. All property and all rights, even those of liberty and life, are held subject to the fundamental condition of being liable to be impaired by providential calamities and national vicissitudes. Taxes impair my income or the value of my property. The con*565demnation of my homestead, or a valuable part of it for a public improvement, or public defence, will sometimes destroy its value to me; the conscription may deprive me of liberty and destroy my life. So with the power of government to borrow money, a power to be exercised by the consent of the lender, if possible, but to be exercised without his consent, if necessary. And when exercised in the form óf legal tender notes or bills of credit, it may operate for the time being to compel the creditor to receive the credit of the 'government in place of the gold which he expected to' receive from his debtor. All these are fundamental political conditions on which life, property, and money are respectively held and enjoyed under our system of government, nay, under any system of .government. There are times when the exigencies of the state rightly absorb-all subordinate considerations of private interest, convenience, or feeling ; and at such times, the temporary though compulsory acceptance by a private creditor of the government credit, in lieu of his debtor’s obligation to pay, is one oif the slightest forms in which the necessary burdens of society can be sustained. Instead of being a violation of such obligation, it merely subjects it to one of those conditions under which it is held and enjoyed.
Another consideration bearing upon this.objection is the fact that the power given to Congress to coin money and regulate the yalue thereof, includes the power to álter the metallic standard of coinage, as was done in 1884; whereby contracts made before the alteration, and payable thereafter, were satisfied by the payment of six per cent, less of pure gold than was contemplated wheu the contracts were made.'. This power and this consequence flowing from its exercise, were much discussed in the great ease of Mixed Moneys, in Sir John Davies’s Deports,* and it was there held to belong to the king’s ordinary prerogative over the coinage of money, without any sanction from Parliament. Subsequent acts of Parliament fixed the standard of purity and weight *566in the coinage of the realm, which has not been altered for a hundred and fifty years past. But the same authority which fixed it in the time of Queen Anne, is competent at any time to change it. Whether it shall be changed or not is a matter of mere legislative discretion. And such is undoubtedly the public law of this country. Therefore, the mere fact that the value of debts may be depreciated by legal tender laws, is not conclusive against their validity; for that is clearly the effect of other powers which may be exercised by Congress-in its discretion.
It follows as a corollary from these views, that it makes no difference in the principle of the thing, that the contract of the debtor is a specific engagement, iii terms, to pay gold or silver money, or to pay in specie. So long as the money of the country, in whatever terms described, is in contemplation of the parties, it is the object of the legal tender laws to make the credit of the government a lawful substitute therefor. If the contract is for the delivery of a chattel or a specific commodity or substance, the law does not appty. If it is bond fide for so many carats of diamonds or so many ounces of gold as bullion, the specific contract must be performed. But if terms which naturally import such a contract are' used by way of evasion,- and money only is intended, the law reaches the case. Not but that Congress might limit the operation of the law in any way it pleased. Tt might make an exception of cases where the contract expressly promises gold and silver money.. But if it has not done so; if the enactment is general in its terms, specific promises to pay the money in specie are just as much subject to the operation of the law as a mere promise to pay so many dollars* — for that, in contemplation of law, is a promise to pay money in specie.
Hence- Ldiffer from my brethren in the decision of one of the bases now before the court, to wit, the case of Tribilcock v. Wilson * in which the promise (made in June, 1861), was to pay, one year after date, the sum of nine hundred dollars *567with ten .per cent, interest from date, payable in specie. Of course this difference arises from the different construction given to the legal tender acts. I do not understand the majority of the court to decide that an act so drawn as to embrace, in terms, contracts payable in -specie, would not be constitutional. Such a decision would completely nullify the power claimed for the government. For it would be very easy, by the use of one or two additional words, to make all contracts payable in,specie'.
It follows as another corollary from the views which I have expressed that the power to make treasury notes a legal tender, whilst a mere incidental one to that of issuing the notes themselves, and to one of the forms of borrowing money, is nevertheless a power not to be resorted to except upon extraordinary and pressing occasions, such as-war or other public exigencies of great gravity and importance; and should be no longer exerted than all the circumstances' of the case demand.
I do not say that it is a war power, or that it is only to be called into exercise in- time of war; for other’public exigencies may arise in the history of a nation which may make it expedient and imperative to exercise it. But of the occasions when, and. of the times how long, it shall be exercised and in force, it is for the legislative department of the government to judge. Feeling sensibly the judgments and1 wishes of the people, that department cannot long.(if it is proper to suppose that within its sphere it ever can) misunderstand the business interests and j list rights of the community.
I deem it unnecessary to enter into a minute criticism of all the sayings, .wise or foolish, that have, from time to time, been uttered on this subject by statesmen, philosophers, or theorists. The writers on political economy are generally opposed to the exercise of the. power'. The considerations which they adduce are very proper to be urged upon the depositary of the power. The question whether the power exists in a national government, is a great practical questiqn relating to the national safety and independence, and states*568men are better judges of this question than economists can be, Their judgment is ascertained in the history and practice of governments, and in the silence as well as the words ' of our written Constitution. A parade of authorities would serve but little purpose after Chief Justice Marshall’s profound discussion of the powers of Congress in the great case of McCulloch v. The State of Maryland. If we speak not according to the spirit of the Constitution ana authorities, and the incontrovertible logic of events, elaborate extracts cannot add-weigbt to our decision.
Great stress ha!? been laid on the supposed fact that England in all its great wars and emergencies, has never made its .exchequerMils a legal tender. ■ This imports a eulogium on British conservatism in relation to contracts, which that nation would hardly regard as flattering. It is well known that for over twenty years, from 1797 to 1820, the most stringent paper money system that over existed prevailed in England, and lay at thq foundation of all her elasticity and endurance. It is true tljat the Bank of England notes, which the bank was required to issue until they reached an amouut then unprecedented, weife not technically made legal tenders, except for the purpose ,of relieving from arrest and imprisonment for debt; but worse than that, the bank was expressly forbidden to redeem its notes in specie, except for a certain small amount to answer the purpose of change. The people were obliged to receive them. The government had nothing else wherewith to pay its domestic creditors. The people themselves had no specie, for that was absorbed by the Bank of England, and husbanded for the uses of government in carrying on its foreign wars and paying its foreign subsidies. The country banks depended on the Bank of England for support, and of course they could not redeem their circulation- in specie. The result was that the nation was perforce obliged to treat the bank notes as a legal tender or suffer inevitable bankruptcy. In such a state of things it. went very hard with any man who demanded specie in •fulfilment of his contracts. A man by the name of Grigby tried it, and brought his case into court, and elieited from *569Lord Alvanley the energetic expression : “ Thank God, few such creditors as the present plaintiff have been found since the passing of the act.”* It is to be presumed that he was the last that ever showed himself in an English court.
It is well known that since the resumption of specie payments, the act of 1833, rechartering the bank, has expressly made the Bank of England notes a legal tender.
It is unnecessary to refer to other examples. France is a notable one. Her assignats, issued at the commencement and during the Revolution, performed the same office as our Continental bills; and enabled the nation to gather up its latent strength and call out its energies. Almost every nation of Europe, at one time or another, has found it necessary, or expedient, to resort to the same method of carrying on its operations or defending itself against aggression.
It would be sad, indeed, if this great nation wore now to be deprived Of a power so necessary to enable it to protect its own existence, and to cope with the oilier great powers of the world. No doubt foreign powers would rejoice if we should deny the po-wer. No doubt foreign creditors would rejoice. They have, from the first, taken a'deep interest in the question. But no true friend to our government, to its stability and its power to sustain itself under all vicissitudes, can be indifferent to the great wrong which it would sustain by a denial of the power in question — a power to be seldom exercised, certainly; but one, the possession of which is so'essential, and as it seemslo me, so undoubted.
Regarding the question of power as so important to the stability of the government, I eahnot acquiesce in the decision of Hepburn v. Griswold, I cannot consent that the government should be deprived of one of its just powers by a decision made at the time, and under the circumstances, in which that decision was made. On a question relating to the power of the government, where I am perfectly satisfied that it has the power, I can never consent to abide by a decision denying it, unless made with reasonable una*570nimity and acquiesced in by the country. Where the decision is recent, and is only made by.a bare majority of the court, and. during a time of public excitement on the subject, when the question has largely entered into the' political discussions of the day, I consider it our right and duty to subject it to a further examination, if a majority of the court are dissatisfied with the former decision. And in this case, with all deference and respect for the former judgment of' the court, I am so fully convinced'that it was erroneous, and prejudicial to the rights, interest, and safety of the general government; that I, for one, have no hesitation in reviewing and overruling it. It should be remembered, that this court, at the very term in which, and within a few weeks after, the decision in Hepburn v. Griswold was delivered, when the Vacancies on the bench were filled, determined to hear the question reargued. This fact must necessarily have had the effect of apprising the country that the decision was not fully acquiescod in, and of obviating any injurious conse-? quences to the business of the country by its reversal.
In my judgment the decrees in all the cases before us should be affirmed.

 Franklin’s Works, vol. 8, p. 329.

 Ib. p. 507.

 Journals of-Congress, vol. 3, p. 19-20; Pitkin’s History, vol. 2, p. 155

 Bancroft’s History, vol. 7, p. 324.

 Page 48.

 See infra, 687.

 2 Bosanquet & Puller, 528.