Court Opinion

ID: 9546563
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:32:10.267922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:36.736479
License: Public Domain

SHAW, J. pro tern.
I dissent. It is contended, in behalf of the respondent court, that the ease is ruled by this provision of section 393 of the Code of Civil Procedure: “. . . the county in which the cause, or some part thereof, arose, is the proper county for the trial of the following actions: . . . (b) . . . Against a public officer . . . for an act done by him in virtue of his office. ...” The petitioner contends, on the other hand, that the following part of section 395 of the same code is the governing provision: “In all other cases, . . . the county in which the defendants, or some of them, reside at the commencement of the action, is the proper county for the trial of the action.” All of these provisions are made applicable to mandamus proceedings by section 1109, Code of Civil Procedure. There is no dispute about the fact that petitioner’s legal and actual residence is in the county of Sacramento. The answer of our problem depends, therefore, on the nature of the mandamus proceeding. If it was a proceeding *800against petitioner “for an act done by Mm in virtue of Ms office,” and if “the cause, or some part thereof” arose in the county of Los Angeles, that was the proper county; but, failing either of these conditions, the change of venue under the provision of section 395, Code of Civil Procedure, above quoted, should have been granted and a writ of prohibition should issue here.
The petition of Arden for a writ of mandate was doubtless framed with the decisions of the Supreme Court in Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors, (1939) 13 Cal.2d 75, 82 [87 P.2d 848]; Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Emp. Com., (1941) 17 Cal.2d 321, 329 [109 P.2d 935]; and Laisne v. California State Bd. of Optometry, (1942) 19 Cal.2d 831 [123 P.2d 457], in view, and its purpose was, as a reading of it discloses, to take advantage of the ruling of those cases that mandamus may be used to obtain a review of decisions of administrative boards and officers revoking licenses, and other similar acts, and to compel a reversal of those decisions. Insofar as this purpose is concerned, the proceeding initiated by the petition is one against a public officer for an act done by him in virtue of his office. (Bonestell Richardson & Co. v. Curry, (1908) 153 Cal. 418, 420 [95 P. 887].) But so viewing it the cause of action is founded on the act of the officer which is attacked and which the attacking party seeks to have reversed; that is, in this ease, the order revoking Arden’s license. This act was not done in the county of Los Angeles, but in the county of Sacramento, and hence the cause of action against it arose in the latter, not the former, county.
The Arden petition also asks for relief in the nature of an injunction to prevent the director from interfering with its continuing its business. It is said that in this aspect the proceeding is one against him for an act done by virtue of his office, that is, the act of making his order operative and enforcing it in the county of Los Angeles. But the petition was filed before the revocation of Arden’s license became effective, and hence this phase of it is prospective only, an effort to prevent future action by the director, and comes in the same category as the effort to enjoin future performance by public officers of a contract illegally awarded by them, which was the subject of decision in Bonestell, Richardson & Co. v. Curry, supra, (1908) 153 Cal. 418, 420. Of it the court said “the action is not one against public officers for an act done by them, but is an action . . . solely to prevent the doing of certain acts by such officers ... in the future.” On this *801point Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Public Service Commission, (1940) 111 Mont. 78 [107 P.2d 533], and some other out of state cases cited by respondent may express contrary views; but the California case last cited appears to me as a direct holding that the provision of section 393, Code of Civil Procedure, now under consideration does not apply to actions to restrain future acts, though they be but the sequel to acts already done, and it should be followed, in preference to authority elsewhere.
Petitioner’s application for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied September 20, 1943.