Court Opinion

ID: 9490809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:55:21.09639+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:19.918767
License: Public Domain

LEWIS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act makes it unlawful to “discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). Like other employment discrimination claims, claims under the ADEA can be established either by the presentation of direct evidence of discrimination under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989), or of evidence that creates an inference of discrimination under the framework of McDonnell Douglas-Burdine.
The sum of Keller’s argument on appeal is that there is sufficient evidence in this case to withstand a motion for summary judgment under either approach. The majority disagrees, finding that while that may be the sum, it carries little substance. Instead, the majority concludes that the evidence is insufficient to convince a reasonable factfinder that Credit Alliance discriminated against Keller based on his age. For the reasons which follow, I respectfully dissent.
I. MIXED MOTIVE. UNDER PRICE WATERHOUSE
As we have said, when an employee presents evidence supporting a reasonable inference that a decisionmaker relied upon an illegitimate criterion, summary judgment for the employer is not appropriate. Weldon v. Kraft, 896 F.2d 793, 797 (3d Cir.1990); Hankins v. Temple University, 829 F.2d 437, 440 (3d Cir.1987).
A plaintiff who makes such a case in resisting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment does not need the help of McDonnell Douglas to resist the motion. He walks as it were without crutches. For he has presented enough evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment under the general test for the grant of such a motion....
Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 402 (7th Cir.1990). We have recognized that “[w]hen direct evidence is available, problems of proof are no different than in other civil cases.” Goodman v. Lukens Steel Company, 777 F.2d 113, 130 (3d Cir.1985) (citation omitted). The issue becomes whether the employer did in fact rely upon the illegitimate criterion, which “is precisely the sort of question which must be left to the jury.” Siegel v. Alpha Wire Corp., 894 F.2d 50, 55 (3d Cir.1990).
In my view, Keller provided evidence which reflects a discriminatory animus on the part of a person involved in the decisionmak-ing process. As the majority notes, Keller testified that during the first meeting in which he was ever criticized about his job performance, Ryan specifically stated, “If you are getting too old for the job, maybe you should hire one or two young bankers.”6
*1116I believe that Ryan’s statement is sufficient evidence of a discriminatory animus under Price Waterhouse. First, as CEO of the company, Ryan is clearly a decisionmaker, and in this case has admitted that he was the principal decisionmaker in firing Keller. Second, it seems rather obvious that Ryan’s suggestion that Keller may be getting too old to perform his job properly and that he hire younger bankers could reflect a discriminatory animus on 'the basis of age. Such a comment, if true, is by no means shrouded in ambiguity, and there is no evidence to suggest that it was stated facetiously. In addition, the comment was made during a conversation about Keller’s performance. According to Keller, the comment was made at the meeting in which he was first informed that his performance was considered unsatisfactory. I believe, therefore, that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the comment was related to the decisionmaking process itself. As the majority notes, Ryan was critical of Keller’s performance at the time this alleged comment was made. Majority Opinion at 1109-1110. Since Ryan decided to fire Keller only a few months later, the age-related comment is probative of the factors considered in Ryan’s decision to terminate Keller. See Robinson v. PPG Indus. Inc., 23 F.3d 1159, 1165 (7th Cir.1994) (holding that comments about the company not keeping employees on until they reached sixty-five could not be considered stray remarks for the purposes of summary judgment); Shager, 913 F.2d at 400-02 (holding that comments including “These older people don’t much like or much care for us baby boomers, but there isn’t much they can do about it,” constituted direct evidence at the summary judgment phase).
I do not consider this comment a stray remark, insufficient as direct evidence of discrimination, simply because it was the only age-related remark Keller could recall. Just as there are “no talismanie expressions which must be invoked as a condition-precedent to the application of laws designed to protect against discrimination,” there is also no specific frequency with which discriminatory remarks must be expressed before our protective laws are triggered. Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corporation, 85 F.3d 1074, 1083 (3d Cir.1996). The key inquiry is not the number of times a comment is made but the context in which it is made.
If the single comment is made by a de-cisionmaker and reflects a discriminatory animus toward the plaintiff in the decision-making process, it might well constitute direct evidence of discrimination. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241, 109 S.Ct. at 1785 (“The critical inquiry ... is whether[the illegitimate criterion] was a factor in the employment decision----”). Unlike hostile environment claims, Price Water-house considers only the nature and probative value of the alleged discriminatory comment, and not the frequency with which it was stated, because an employer’s “[r]eliance on [illegal] factors is exactly what the threat of Title VII liability was meant to deter.” Id. at 265, 109 S.Ct. at 1798 (O’Connor, J., concurring). As discussed above, the alleged age-related remark in this case was made by the principal decisionmaker during his critique of Keller’s work performance, and could be interpreted as reflecting a negative attitude toward his age. See Robinson, 23 F.3d at 1165 (holding that potentially age-related comments made by the supervisor who decided to terminate the plaintiff were sufficient direct evidence of discrimination to survive summary judgment).
As we have stated, since “discriminatory comments by an executive connected with the decisionmaking process will often be the plaintiffs strongest circumstantial evidence of discrimination, they are highly rele-vant____” Abrams v. Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1215 (3d Cir.1995). Since Keller presented evidence which could allow a fact-finder to conclude that Ryan relied on an illegitimate criterion in making his employment decision, I believe that summary judgment was inappropriate. Given this evidence, Credit Alliance’s proffered legitimate reason for discharging Keller simply creates *1117a material issue of fact, rather than demonstrating the absence of one.
II. PRETEXT UNDER McDONNELL DO UGLAS-B URDINE
Since the majority assumes that Keller has presented a prima facie case, I will next address whether the evidence presented is sufficient to survive summary judgment under Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir.1994).
A. Evidence Supporting An Inference of Discrimination
Under the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework, I believe Keller has offered sufficient evidence which could support a finding that Credit Alliance’s proffered explanation is pretext and therefore creates a material issue of fact as to the credibility of that explanation.
1. Evidence of Discrimination
We have consistently held that a plaintiff who has made out a prima facie case can defeat a motion for summary judgment by “adducing evidence, whether circumstantial or direct, that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the adverse employment action.” Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764. Evidence of age-based comments made by a supervisor, therefore, could support an inference that the termination decision was made because of the plaintiffs age. Abrams, 50 F.3d at 1214; Torre v. Casio, Inc., 42 F.3d 825, 834 (3d Cir.1994); Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 783 (3d Cir.1994).
Indeed, we have held that discriminatory comments by nondecisionmakers, or statements temporally remote from the decision at issue, may properly be used to build a circumstantial case of discrimination. [See ] Roebuck v. Drexel University, 852 F.2d 715, 733 (3d Cir.1988) (upholding admissibility of discriminatory comment by decisionmaker made five years before denial of tenure).
Abrams, 50 F.3d at 1214 (citation omitted). When combined with Keller’s prima facie case, Ryan’s suggestion that perhaps Keller was getting “too old” for the job, and that he should hire some “young bankers” could clearly support an inference of discrimination.
This conclusion is supported by our prior decisions. In Roebuck, we concluded that the comment that “in terms of comparable white faculty members ... blacks would cost Drexel more money to hire those black faculty members,” could give rise to an inference of discrimination even when made five years before the decision in question. 852 F.2d at 733. Similarly, in Waldron v. SL Industries, Inc., we found that when combined with the plaintiffs prima facie case, a comment that he should lose some weight because it would make him healthier and look younger, made five months before the termination, could support the conclusion that age was more likely than not a determinative factor. 56 F.3d 491, 502 (3d Cir.1995). Likewise, an inference of discrimination was evident in Abrams, given comments like “things would hum around here when we got rid of the old fogies,” and the fact that two older employees were referred to as “a dinosaur” and “the old men.” 50 F.3d at 1214. Finally, in Torre, we found that the remark “did you forget or are you getting too old, you senile bastard?” could reasonably lead to an inference of age-based discrimination. 42 F.3d at 834. See also Robinson, 23 F.3d at 1165; Shager, 913 F.2d at 402-03.
I must note that the fact Keller was replaced by an individual roughly five years his junior should not and does not impair Keller’s ability to maintain a claim under the ADEA. Whether the age gap is five years or twenty-five years is irrelevant. See O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corporation, 517 U.S. 878, -, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 1310, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996) (holding that a plaintiff need not be replaced by someone outside the protected class to maintain a claim under the ADEA). The district court thus erred in holding that Keller had to present evidence that he was “replaced by someone significantly younger to permit an inference of age discrimination.” Majority Opinion at 1107 (quoting District Court Opinion at 8). I recognize that the majority’s opinion does not affirm this particular holding of the district court, but I am troubled that it also does not explicitly disavow the holding. Because of the importance of this point, and for pur*1118poses of clarity in future eases, the inclusion of such a disclaimer in the majority’s opinion would have been appropriate, as I will explain below.
The Supreme Court has held that there is no particular age difference that must be shown to maintain a claim of age discrimination. See O’Connor, 517 U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 1310; see also Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 729 (3d Cir.1995). In other words, “[tjhere is no magical formula to measure a particular age gap and determine if it is sufficiently wide to give rise to an inference of discrimination.” Barber v. CSX Distribution Servs., 68 F.3d 694, 699 (3d Cir.1995). As we have noted, “[djifferent courts have held, for instance, that a five year difference can be sufficient but that a one year difference cannot.” Sempier, 45 F.3d at 729 (citing Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 533 (9th Cir.1981) and Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1087 (3d Cir.1992)). See also Corbin v. Southland Int’l Trucks, 25 F.3d 1545, 1550 (11th Cir.1994) (finding evidence of pretext when a 53 year-old was treated more favorably than a 58 year-old employee). In, order to survive summary judgment, the evidence need only provide a basis for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that a discriminatory animus was at play in the employer’s decision. O’Connor, 517 U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 1310. Accordingly, the “replacement by even an older employee will not necessarily foreclose ... proof if other direct or circumstantial evidence supports an inference of discrimination.” Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 533 (9th Cir.1981) (emphasis added). In fact, the Tenth Circuit, in Greene v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 554, 557 (10th Cir.1996), reversed a grant of summary judgment as to an ADEA claim even though the replacement was five years older than the plaintiff.
Beyond the context of age discrimination, other courts of appeal have been cognizant of the fact that an employer can act with a discriminatory animus even when replacing a discharged employee with a member of the same protected class. In Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 82 F.3d 157 (7th Cir.1996), the district court had concluded that the fact that Carson, who was white, was replaced by a white employee prevented her from establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. The court of appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected this conclusion, observing that,
[The Supreme Court’s opinion in] O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996), shows that this understanding of a prima facie ease is erroneous. The Court held in O’Connor that the plaintiff in an age discrimination suit need not show that he was replaced by a person outside the protected class. Laws against discrimination protect persons, not classes, the Court remarked, an observation with equal force in a case under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Id. at 158.
The court then illustrated the point with the following hypothetical:
Suppose an employer evaluates its staff yearly and retains black workers who are in the top quarter of its labor force, but keeps any white in the top half. A black employee ranked in the 60th percentile of the staff according to supervisors’ evaluations is let go, while all white employees similarly situated are retained. This is race discrimination, which the employer cannot purge by hiring another person of the same race later.

Id.

In the same vein, another court has noted that replacement with a protected class member does not negate a discriminatory animus if the employer is “less tolerant of indiscretions committed by black employees than of those committed by whites.” Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1186 n. 1 (11th Cir.1984) (citing McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Company, 427 U.S. 273, 282-83, 96 S.Ct. 2574, 2579-80, 49 L.Ed.2d 493 (1976)). Significantly, the Nix court also noted that replacement with another member of the same class may serve as “a pretextual device, specifically designed by [the employer] to disguise its act of discrimination toward [the discharged employee.]” 738 F.2d at 1186 n. 1 (quoting Jones v. Western Geophysical Co. Of America, 669 F.2d 280, 284 (5th Cir.1982)). In fact, in the racial context, replacement with another member of the protected *1119class often enables an employer to mask discriminatory motives while realizing racist ideals and stereotypes. The replacement of darker-skinned black employees with lighter-skinned black employees occurs every day in this country in the hope of making white eoworkers and customers more “comfortable.” Similarly, we all know that the replacement of one woman with another who more closely resembles a traditional conception of the so-called “feminine ideal,” in terms of physical appearance, demeanor, (lack of) assertiveness, etc., is not some abstract theory; it is reality, and it happens every day, in business, in the media, and even in our esteemed profession.
In all of these cases, a discriminatory animus can be present even though the replacement is of the same protected class as the discharged employee. The majority declines to acknowledge that a replacement’s “race, sex, or age may help to raise an inference of discrimination, but it is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition.” Carson, 82 F.3d at 159 (citations omitted); see also Nieto v. L 6 H Packing Company, 108 F.3d 621, 624 n. 7 (5th Cir.1997) (fact that Hispanic employee’s replacement was also Hispanic does not preclude “possibility that the discharge was motivated [by] discriminatory reasons”); Monette v. Electronic Data Systems Corporation, 90 F.3d 1173, 1185 n. 11 (6th Cir.1996) (disabled employee need not show replacement is non-disabled to present prima facie case of discrimination). But as the Supreme Court has emphasized, “[t]he fact that one person in the protected class has lost out to another person in the protected class is irrelevant, so long as he has lost out because of[an illegal criterion].” O’Connor, 517 U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 1310. An employer does not have “license to discriminate against some employees on the basis of race or sex [or age] merely because he favorably treats other members of the employees’ group.” Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 455, 102 S.Ct. 2525, 2535, 73 L.Ed.2d 130 (1982).
We have already recognized instances of age discrimination in the absence of a considerable age gap between the discharged employee and the replacement. In Sempier, for example, we found that the plaintiff had presented evidence from which a factfinder could “reasonably conclude that [an] employment decision was made on the basis of age” even though the replacement was only four years younger. 45 F.3d at 729. Without deciding whether four years alone was enough, we concluded that the four year difference, combined with the fact that the plaintiffs functions were also temporarily transferred to someone well over ten years younger, were sufficient to support an inference of age discrimination. Id. at 730.
I believe that the approximate five year age difference between Keller and his replacement, particularly when combined with Ryan’s age-based comment, is sufficient to establish an inference that Keller’s age was a motivating factor in Credit Alliance’s decision. Given Keller’s experience, and the fact that the age difference spans chronological decades, so to speak (Keller was in his “fifties” while his replacement was in his “forties”), a factfinder could reasonably conclude age was a determinative factor in the decision to fire Keller. See Pace v. Southern Ry. System, 701 F.2d 1383, 1387 (11th Cir.1983) (“Seldom will a sixty year-old be replaced by a person in the twenties. Rather the sixty-year-old will be replaced by a fifty-five year-old, who, in turn, is succeeded by someone in the forties, who also will be replaced by a younger person.”). The precise gap in age between Keller and his replacement is less relevant than the overall impression presented by the evidence that Credit Alliance used age as a determinative factor in making its decision. See O’Connor, 517 U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 1310 (stating “irrelevant factors]” should not take precedence over “evidence adequate to create an inference that an employment decision was based on a[n] [illegal] discriminatory criterion”). Since Keller produced evidence which could support the conclusion that age was more likely than not a motivating factor in Ryan’s decision to terminate him, Credit Alliance’s proffered reason merely creates a material issue of fact.
In sum, while I agree with the majority that the narrowness of the age gap between Keller and his replacement is a factor a reasonable factfinder would have to consider, *1120I do not agree that “the gap” does not permit a reasonable inference of discrimination.
2. Evidence That the Employer’s Proffered Reason Is Not Worthy Of Credence
A plaintiff in an employment discrimination case may also defeat a motion for summary judgment by presenting evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the defendant’s proffered justifications are not worthy of credence. Torre, 42 F.3d at 832; Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764 (legal principle reaffirmed in Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1067 (3d Cir.1996) (en banc)). Credit Alliance’s proffered reason for terminating Keller was his failure to make adequate progress toward achieving their financing goal. Credit Alliance argues, and the majority concludes, that Keller’s evidence is aimed at simply demonstrating that this decision was wrong because, according to Keller, it was impossible to reach the goal. Majority Opinion at 1109-1110. This conclusion misinterprets both the evidence and Keller’s argument.
Keller is not arguing that the proffered reason is pretextual because it is wrong. He is arguing that Credit Alliance was aware of the outside factors that hindered his ability to obtain funding, and that they did not fault him for the results of his efforts.
While pretext is not demonstrated by showing that the employer was mistaken, Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 531 (3d Cir.1992), it can be established by “evidence of inconsistencies or anomalies that could support an inference that the employer did not act for its stated reason.” Sempier, 45 F.3d at 731 (citing Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 638 (3d Cir.1993)) (emphasis added). The thrust of the evidence and Keller’s argument is that Credit Alliance was not dissatisfied with his performance, because it knew that efforts to obtain outside fundrais-ing were impeded by various market forces.
Keller relies upon evidence which could establish: (1) that Credit Alliance’s disappointing progress was due to forces beyond his control; (2) that Credit Alliance recognized that fact; and (3) that it knew that this poor showing was not attributable to him. Seen in the light most favorable to Keller, I think it is clear that a reasonable jury could consider Credit Alliance’s explanation that Keller was fired for “poor performance” pre-textual. See Sorba v. Pennsylvania Drilling Co., 821 F.2d 200, 205 (3d Cir.1987) (reversing summary judgment when the plaintiff proffered evidence “that his supervisors realized that the poor results were not his fault [and that the] testimony of the movant’s witnesses was inconsistent regarding whether they believed [plaintiff]’s performance caused the unsatisfactory job results”). See also Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 996 (5th Cir.1996) (en banc) (holding that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of discrimination when the plaintiff demonstrated that the employer’s proffered explanation of poor performance was pretex-tual because his poor results were due to the company’s prices and a poor customer base); Johnson v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 994 F.2d 543, 546 (8th Cir.1993) (report stating that morale problems caused by other factors created factual issue regarding plaintiffs performance); Mastrangelo v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 722 F.Supp. 1126, 1134 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (finding sufficient evidence showing defendant’s criticism of plaintiff’s performance was pretextual where problems of his department were attributable, at least in part, to matters beyond his control).
Furthermore, unlike the majority, I believe the absence of any criticism of Keller’s performance would permit a reasonable factfin-der to disbelieve Credit Alliance’s proffered explanation. The majority unnecessarily complicates the analysis by requiring Keller to show that “other comparable employees” received evaluations of their work. Majority Opinion at 1111. Regardless of Credit Alliance’s general evaluative practices, I find it difficult to conceive of an employee’s work being so inadequate as to warrant termination but not so poor as to warrant some criticism before the point of termination. Indeed, we have generally confined our analysis to an employer’s evaluation of the discharged employee, not an employer’s general practice of assessing employee performance. In Sempier, for example, we concluded that a genuine issue existed as to pretext because of the plaintiffs own testimony of satisfactory performance combined with evidence that he *1121was not criticized while still employed. 45 F.3d at 731-32.
To justify firing Keller, the only evidence offered by Credit Alliance is the post-hoc deposition testimony of some of the members of the board of directors who ratified the decision to fire Keller. With the exception of Ryan’s testimony and a purported comment made after Ryan decided to fire Keller, much of the evidence is ambiguous as to whether the statement represented criticism. For the most part, Credit Alliance asks us to infer that questions about the progress of the fundraising were criticisms of Keller’s performance. For example, Credit Alliance points to the fact that one of its outside directors suggested that Keller be relieved of his duties as Chief Credit Officer so he could concentrate on raising funds, and asks that we consider this suggestion a “criticism” of Keller’s performance. However, we cannot draw such an unwarranted inference at the summary judgment phase, particularly in view of the fact that Keller offered evidence that when questioned about the progress, the board accepted his explanation that difficulties in the U.S. and Japanese economies made it difficult to secure funding on terms more favorable than the terms provided by their current source.
Finally, the majority improperly relies on events which occurred after Keller was fired. The majority suggests that Credit Alliance’s ability to raise nearly $500 million using asset-backed securitization, the technique eschewed by Keller, indicates that its dissatisfaction with Keller’s work was sincere. Majority Opinion at 1109-1110. However, this tactic did not prove successful until after Keller’s discharge so it should not have any bearing on the determination of whether Credit Alliance acted with a discriminatory animus. “The employer could not have been motivated by knowledge it did not have, and [therefore] it cannot ... claim that the employee was fired for the nondis-eriminatory reason.” McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352, 360, 115 S.Ct. 879, 885, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995).
It is also true that Keller’s performance subsequent to Ryan’s decision to terminate him is relevant for establishing pretext. Ryan testified that if Keller had come up with a plan and demonstrated some success in achieving it, he (Ryan) might have changed his mind. Keller provided evidence to demonstrate that he had done the preliminary work on some, if not all, of the means of financing that later proved to be successful. In particular, Keller points to evidence that he formulated a plan to achieve Credit Alliance’s financing goal. In deposition testimony, Ryan admitted that the steps outlined in the plan provided by Keller were the ones followed by Credit Alliance in successfully raising funds in 1993 and 1994. Also, Keller successfully secured the $100 million private placement that was the first step in improving Credit Alliance’s credit rating. Despite Keller’s plan and demonstration of success, however, Ryan terminated him. A jury could conclude that Keller played a significant role in Credit Alliance’s subsequent attainment of its funding goal, and that Credit Alliance’s claim of poor performance, therefore, was pretextual.
Given this evidence, there is a material issue of fact as to whether Credit Alliance recognized the economic problems associated with the fundraising and therefore whether Keller’s performance was the reason for his discharge. If a factfinder were to accept Keller’s evidence and interpretation of that evidence, it could reasonably conclude that Credit Alliance did not in fact fire him based upon any dissatisfaction with his ability to raise financing. The factfinder could then further conclude that Keller was terminated because of his age. Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764. As material issues of fact remain in dispute, summary judgment in favor of Credit Alliance is inappropriate.
III. FAILURE TO PROMOTE
Credit Alliance argues that Keller has not demonstrated that he was qualified for the position of Chief Operating Officer, did not apply for the position, and that he is es-topped from asserting a discrimination claim because as a member of the board of directors he voted for Copper’s appointment. I believe that there is sufficient evidence in the record for Keller’s failure to promote claim to survive summary judgment. First, Keller clearly established that he was quali-*1122fled for the position of Chief Operating Officer. In reviewing qualifications, we must only look to objective criteria, such as Keller’s education and experience. See Weldon, 896 F.2d at 798. Second, Keller correctly argues that he was not required to apply for the position. See Carmichael v. Birmingham Saw Works, 738 F.2d 1126, 1133 (11th Cir.1984) (holding plaintiff can maintain claim of discrimination, without having applied for job, if employer “had some reason or duty to consider him for the post”). Keller’s senior management position, his prior consideration for the position of President of Credit Alliance, and Ryan’s knowledge that Keller was interested in the Chief Operating Officer position are sufficient to establish a prima facie ease as to this claim.
I do not believe that Credit Alliance’s proffered justification for refusing to consider or promote Keller entitles it to summary judgment. According to Ryan, the position of Chief Operating Officer required line experience and a thorough understanding of the company’s business, which he claims Keller lacked. Yet, as discussed above, Ryan’s alleged statement that Keller may be too old to do his job, made only weeks before the promotion decision, is evidence from which a jury could infer discrimination. Furthermore, Keller points to evidence from the Chair of Credit Alliance’s predecessor company that he did, in fact, have a thorough understanding of the business and was considered a candidate for president of the company at the time Ryan was ultimately selected. In light of this evidence, a factfinder could conclude that Credit Alliance’s claim that Keller was not qualified is pretextual. Consequently, there is sufficient direct, as well as indirect, evidence from which a fact-finder could also conclude that Keller was not promoted because of his age.
CONCLUSION
To summarize, I believe that there is sufficient direct and indirect evidence of discrimination for Keller’s ADEA and NJLAD claims to survive summary judgment. I would, accordingly, reverse the district court’s judgment in its entirety and remand for further proceedings.
Joined by Judges Mansmann and McKee.

. The majority concludes that the "too old” comment is insufficient proof of age-based animus because it occurred "four or five months” prior to the discharge decision and only pertained to one aspect of Keller’s duties. Majority Opinion at 1111-12. While this is certainly a powerful argument, it is an interpretation which goes to the weight of the evidence, and is a question for *1116dle finder of fact. Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 402 (7th Cir.1990) ("[T]he task of disambiguating ambiguous utterances is for trial, not for summary judgment. On a motion for summary judgment the ambiguities in a witness's testimony must be resolved against the moving party.").