Court Opinion

ID: 9955941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 19:02:25.778468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:41.289197
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/29/24 In re M.D. CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION THREE

In re M.D., a Person Coming                                   B326420
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
                                                              Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                            Super. Ct. No.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN                                        22CCJP04338A
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

J.D.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Donald A. Buddle, Jr., Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed
in part.
      Sean Angele Burleigh, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Sarah Vesecky, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                        _________________________
      Father challenges the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding
that he failed to protect his daughter M.D. (born January 2011)
from mother’s substance abuse.1 He also challenges the court’s
dispositional orders that he participate in individual counseling
and random, on-demand drug testing. Substantial evidence
supports the court’s jurisdictional finding, which we affirm.
We also conclude the court reasonably exercised its discretion
in ordering father to participate in individual counseling. We
agree with father, however, that there is no basis in the record
to require him to undergo random and on-demand drug testing.
Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the court’s dispositional
order and remand the matter for further proceedings.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1.    Investigation
      In late October 2022, the Los Angeles County Department
of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a report that
mother had tested positive for marijuana and amphetamine
when she gave birth to O.S. (M.D.’s half-brother) the day before.
Mother admitted consuming “edibles” for insomnia and bone pain
but denied knowingly consuming amphetamines. James, who is
not a party to this appeal, is the father of O.S. and mother’s then-
one-year-old child N.S. Each of mother’s three other children
has a different father: S.B. (then age two), I.G. (then age 17),
and M.D. (then age 11). The children, except for I.G., lived with

1     Mother also appealed. This court dismissed mother’s
appeal after her appellate counsel filed a brief under
In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835.

                                 2
mother and maternal grandmother.2 Only M.D. is the subject
of this appeal.
       A social worker interviewed mother at the hospital.
Mother said father was “not active in” M.D.’s life, and “his
whereabouts are unknown.” She said the only drug she ever
had used was marijuana, and she had been using it for about
15 years. Mother did not inhale marijuana—she consumed
edibles “laced with marijuana.” Mother believed an edible she
had a week earlier may also have been laced with amphetamines,
leading to her positive test. James also disclosed marijuana use.
He had no knowledge of mother using any drug other than
marijuana.3
       They both signed a safety plan, agreeing mother and the
children would stay with maternal grandmother, and agreed to
drug test on demand. Maternal grandmother agreed to supervise
the children. She had no concerns about how mother cared for
them. She also denied any knowledge of substance abuse by
mother or James.
       The social worker also spoke to M.D. M.D. stated she
had been living with mother but began living with paternal
grandmother in August 2022 due to mother’s “high risk”
pregnancy. M.D. felt safe with paternal grandmother. She
maintained regular contact, and had good relationships, with

2    I.G. lived with his father. DCFS did not initiate
dependency proceedings with respect to him.
3      Although mother and James denied being married or
living together, during the investigation DCFS learned they
had married in February 2021.

                                3
mother, her half-siblings, and maternal grandmother. Father
did not live with paternal grandmother. M.D. said “she had
not seen or talked with him for a long time.” M.D. denied ever
having seen mother smoke anything. She believed mother took
good care of her and her siblings.
      Paternal grandmother told the social worker she “always”
had been in M.D.’s life, “since birth.” She had no concerns with
how mother cared for M.D. Mother had arranged for M.D. to
stay with her so mother could “deal with her pregnancy and have
better control of her other children.” As M.D. had started school
near paternal grandmother, mother let M.D. continue to stay
with her. M.D. was doing well in school. Paternal grandmother
was tending to M.D.’s medical, dental, and educational needs.
Paternal grandmother also did not know where father was and
confirmed he was not active in M.D.’s life. She was interested in
having M.D. placed with her if M.D. were detained from mother.
      On October 31, 2022, DCFS obtained and served a
removal order for M.D. and her three younger siblings. Initially,
M.D. was allowed to remain with paternal grandmother. She
ultimately was placed with a maternal cousin along with S.B.4
      Mother’s on-demand drug test from October 31, 2022
came back positive for marijuana but no other substances.
2.    Petition and detention
      On November 2, 2022, DCFS filed a petition under Welfare
and Institutions Code5 section 300 on behalf of M.D. and

4     DCFS had learned paternal grandmother had a criminal
history that required a waiver.
5       Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.

                                  4
her younger siblings, alleging they were at risk of harm due
to mother’s 15-year history of substance abuse and current
amphetamine, methamphetamine, and marijuana use. The
petition also alleged mother had mental and emotional problems.
       At the detention hearing, the court found a prima facie
case the children are persons described by section 300. The court
found father, who was not present, to be the presumed father
of M.D. The court ordered DCFS to initiate a due diligence
search to provide father with notice. The children were detained
from their respective parents.
3.     Jurisdiction/disposition report
       DCFS filed a jurisdiction/disposition report with the court
on December 14, 2022. By that time, DCFS had received O.S.’s
meconium test results, which were positive for cannabinoids
and Carboxy THC but negative for amphetamines and other
substances. DCFS also had located father. He was living in
Bakersfield. DCFS was in the process of filing a first amended
petition to add allegations that father knew of mother’s substance
abuse and failed to protect M.D., endangering her health and
safety, and placing her at substantial risk of serious harm.
       a.    Background information
       The report noted the children had no dependency history,
but DCFS had received prior reports of neglect. As to M.D.,
in October 2011—when M.D. was less than a year old—DCFS
received a call alleging mother had been using marijuana in front
of M.D. and I.G. and had left the marijuana bag and an alcohol
bottle on a potentially accessible counter. The allegations were
deemed “unfounded.” In October 2016, DCFS received a call
about M.D.’s acting out in school, including “aggressive/sexual
behavior.” The caller was concerned M.D. may have viewed

                                5
age-inappropriate material at home. Again, the allegations were
“unfounded.” And, in June 2020, mother was reported as having
tested positive for marijuana before S.B.’s birth. In June 2019,
mother had tested positive for amphetamine and cannabinoids.
Mother denied having taken amphetamines. The allegations
did not meet the criteria for abuse or neglect—DCFS referred
the family for services.
       DCFS also reported on parents’ criminal history. James
had been convicted of felony possession/purchase for sale of
narcotics or a controlled substance and three other convictions.
He also had several arrests. DCFS described father as having
“an extensive criminal history, including numerous arrests as
a minor.” As an adult, he had been convicted of a felony burglary
in June 2019 and a misdemeanor for “[o]bstructing a [p]ublic
[o]fficer” in February 2016. He had “multiple prior arrests” for
obstructing a public officer, “[d]isorderly [c]onduct: [i]ntoxicated
[d]rugs/[a]lcohol,” and in May 2022, carrying a concealed
weapon.6 Mother had a few misdemeanor convictions from
2008 and 2009.
       b.     Investigation of allegations against mother
       The DCFS dependency investigator (DI) interviewed
parents, M.D., and other relatives. Mother said she’d “ ‘never
done drugs.’ ” She got her medical marijuana card as a teenager
and began smoking regularly when she was about 22 years old.
(Mother was 33 years old.) She also consumed edibles and used

6     DCFS did not report the date of father’s arrests for
obstruction and disorderly conduct. As for the May 2022 firearm
arrest, father explained the firearm belonged to his friend. The
case had been dismissed.

                                 6
oils with “a combination of CBD and THC.” Mother insisted
her marijuana use “has never affected her ability to parent her
children.” She said she used marijuana when her children were
sleeping or at their grandparents, not during the day. At most,
she used marijuana about three times a week. If she smoked
marijuana, she did so outside or at a friend’s home. She stored
her marijuana in a lock box that she kept in a cabinet. James
confirmed mother used marijuana but no other drugs. He told
the DI someone else always was present with the children if
mother decided to have an edible.
      Mother denied ever having used methamphetamine;
she had “ ‘never taken any hard drug.’ ” Mother did not
know why she tested positive for amphetamine at O.S.’s birth.
Mother suffered from chronic back pain for which she had been
prescribed tramadol and Norco. Mother also told the DI she
suffered from severe anxiety, depression, and “ ‘social phobia.’ ”
She had been prescribed several medications for those conditions,
including lorazepam for anxiety and trazodone for insomnia,
both of which she took daily. She used to take Xanax and Prozac.
She now claimed the positive test must have come from one
of her medications. Mother agreed to give the DI a list of her
medications but refused to drug test on demand until DCFS
had the complete list. As of the date of the report, mother
had not done so.7

7      Mother ultimately gave DCFS documentation concerning
her medications shortly before the January 13, 2023 adjudication
hearing. At that hearing, DCFS’s counsel asserted nothing on
the list would have screened positive for amphetamine.

                                7
        As for her relationship with father, mother said they had
met in 2010 and were together for about five and a half years.
She had no concerns about father’s or James’s ability to care
for their respective children.
        The DI reviewed the substance abuse allegations against
mother with father. He responded, “ ‘That sounds like her.’ ”
Father said mother “has ‘always’ used drugs.” He knew about
“mother’s ongoing drug use because he sees her ‘around the
wrong people[,]’ and he hears about her from other people.”
Father was “ ‘quite sure’ . . . mother uses methamphetamine,
cocaine, marijuana and ‘party drugs.’ ” Father described mother
as a “ ‘party person’ ” and said mother would use “ ‘any type of
pills’ and any drug she [could] access that would get her high.”
According to father, mother had “ ‘always been like that.’ ”
She was using drugs “years ago” when they still were together.
He said he had “witnessed her using various drugs, including
methamphetamine and cocaine.” Father added, “ ‘That’s one
of the reasons the relationship fell apart.’ ”
        Father believed “mother’s drug use in itself [did] not affect
her parenting.” He said “ ‘it’s her environment that’s bad.’ ”
Father stated, “ ‘It’s not what you do, is [sic] how you’re doing
it.’ ” He thought mother did not maintain stability for her
children—they had been “ ‘house to house.’ ” Father also
reported mother was “ ‘quick to drop her kids off’ and ‘send them
to somebody while she’s doing what she do.’ ” He complained
mother would never send M.D. to stay with him for “fear that it
would ‘make her look bad.’ ” Instead, she “frequently sent” M.D.
to stay with paternal grandmother, whom father said “provide[d]
the child with no discipline.” Father was aware mother had
anxiety and a history of depression but didn’t believe it affected

                                  8
her parenting. Father believed mother never intentionally would
place her children in harm’s way. He was concerned, however,
“that no one has been providing supervision to [M.D.] so, ‘she’s
raising herself and probably taking care of her siblings too.’ ”
       The DI met with M.D. M.D. said she went to stay with
paternal grandmother when mother was pregnant with N.S.
(born June 2021). Because M.D. had started school there, mother
thought it was best for M.D. to finish the school year living with
paternal grandmother. M.D. told the DI she decided to stay with
paternal grandmother the following (current) school year. She
remained there until she was detained. M.D. said she still saw
her mother almost every day during the time she lived with
paternal grandmother. M.D. enjoyed spending time with mother
and said they had “ ‘a good bond.’ ”
       M.D. told the DI mother did not use drugs, and she never
had had a reason to suspect that mother (or James) did. M.D.
said mother occasionally drank alcohol on special occasions
but was not an alcoholic. M.D. never had seen mother drunk.
The DI asked M.D. about her knowledge of the allegations
against mother. She replied, “ ‘I know my mom’s story’ and
‘I don’t know if she’s trying to protect me by not telling me the
truth or if she is telling the truth.’ ” M.D. knew mother had
tested positive for amphetamine and that amphetamine is
an ingredient in some prescriptions. She at first said she saw
mother smoke marijuana “ ‘like once,’ ” but then wasn’t sure if
it had been more than one time. M.D. also denied that mother
appeared mentally or emotionally unstable. M.D. wanted to
participate in counseling.
       The DI met with James’s sister (aunt), with whom N.S.
and newborn O.S. were placed. The children were doing well,

                                9
but O.S. initially had experienced withdrawal symptoms.
In 2020—before N.S. and O.S. were born and S.B. was a baby—
James, mother, and mother’s children had lived with aunt.
According to aunt, mother seemed “ ‘detached’ ” from her children
during that time. She said M.D. cared “for the younger children,
more so than . . . mother.” Aunt thought M.D. had “been exposed
to things” inappropriate for a child. She said mother did not
properly supervise M.D.: when M.D. was about seven years old,
mother allowed M.D. to use the stove without supervision; M.D.
wandered into aunt’s room and found aunt’s “private belongings”;
and M.D. “rarely” went to school because mother “did not
require her to do so.” M.D. spent most of her time in paternal
grandmother’s care.
      When asked about substance abuse, aunt said she did
not suspect drug use by mother at first. After aunt moved
out, however, mother “started displaying bizarre behaviors.”
Nevertheless, aunt never had seen mother use drugs. She
had seen mother and James drink “ ‘hard alcohol’ every night,”
however. Aunt also believed mother was “mentally unstable.”
      Maternal cousin, who was caring for M.D. and S.B.,
confirmed M.D. had been living with paternal grandmother
for the past two years “off and on.” She told the DI she had
suspected mother used drugs but “never had any proof.” She
knew mother used marijuana to relieve “severe back pain.”
She also was aware mother “ ‘battled depression.’ ”
      c.     Information about father
      Paternal grandmother raised father. Father said he spent
a significant part of his childhood in juvenile hall. He wasn’t
involved in a gang but lived “that lifestyle” and “ ‘was into guns
and stuff like that.’ ” Father denied having a history of drug-

                               10
or alcohol-related arrests. He said his most recent arrest was
the one for possession of a firearm.
       Father (born 1993) met mother when he was 17, shortly
after he was released from a correctional camp in 2010. She
quickly became pregnant with M.D. Father said they were
together for about a year and a half. He said his relationship
with mother ended because she got romantically involved with
some of his friends and was using drugs.8 When M.D. was
younger, she lived with father for five months—mother
“ ‘disappeared’ during that time.” Father explained that a
“few years ago” he tried to seek full custody of M.D., but he filled
out the paperwork incorrectly, and his request was “ ‘denied.’ ”
M.D. had been in his care for a few months, but he had had to
return her to mother upon mother’s repeated requests. M.D.
also lived with father about three years earlier when he moved
to Bakersfield. Father sent M.D. back to mother, however,
because he and his live-in girlfriend C.H. had separated.
       Father and C.H. had since resumed their relationship.
They met in 2015 and had been together for the past seven years.
Father said that, due to mother, he rarely had been able to see
M.D. since beginning his relationship with C.H. Mother didn’t
let him see his daughter “ ‘at all.’ ” Rather, mother and paternal
grandmother called him when M.D. needed something or “got
in trouble.” They expected him to reprimand M.D. about her
behavior but would not allow him to spend time with her.

8     Mother said the relationship ended because father—who
was a few years younger than mother and 17 when M.D. was
born—wasn’t mature enough.

                                 11
       Father denied any medical or mental health issues. In
July 2022, however, he suffered two gunshot wounds but had
recovered.9 (A man who had broken into father’s house, and
with whom father later got into an altercation, had shot at father
outside father’s friend’s house, striking him twice.) Father said
he “smokes marijuana daily, approximately three times a day, at
‘breakfast, lunch, and dinner.’ ” He had been smoking marijuana
“off and on” since he was a teenager. Father said he does not
smoke marijuana in his children’s presence.10 He smokes it in
his garage. Sometimes when the children are asleep, he and C.H.
will smoke in their bedroom. Father said he stores his marijuana
in a box in his closet where the children do not go. He denied
having used any other drugs and said he drank alcoholic
beverages “occasionally”—a beer every other day and “ ‘hard
liquor’ ” about twice a month.
       Father stated he loved his children and spending time
with them. He described himself as a “ ‘fun stepdad and dad.’ ”
He said he attends sports practices for his stepchildren and
provides his “children/stepchildren with structure and routine.”
He told the DI he “needs to be involved in [M.D.’s] life, and
not just to provide financially and to discipline her.” Father
explained he only had been able to take M.D. on outings the
last few times he had seen her. He wanted to be able to have
extended weekend and summer visits with M.D. at his home.

9     According to paternal grandmother, father last was seen
a few weeks before this incident.
10    C.H. had children. Father referred to them as his
stepchildren or children.

                               12
He did not want to take M.D. from mother but wanted to share
physical custody. He did not mind M.D. staying with paternal
grandmother or maternal cousin but wanted to approve where
M.D. lived. He wanted what was “ ‘best for’ ” her. Mother was
open to joint custody but only if M.D.’s primary residence was
with her.
       Father thought one reason M.D. did not want to live
with him was because there was “discipline and structure
in his home.” He said mother and paternal grandmother let
M.D. “do whatever she wants.” He thought M.D. had been
“ ‘brainwashed’ to feel a certain way about him and [C.H.].”
M.D. also got overwhelmed around C.H.’s six children. Father
was interested in full custody of M.D. but would “take ‘whatever
[amount of custody/visitation that he] can get’ because he just
wants to have a relationship with the child.” (Alteration in
original.) Although he did not want to take M.D. away from
mother, he did not believe she should have custody of M.D.
right now “if she is not ‘in the right space.’ ” Father thought
M.D. should stay with him for a while, as he was in a better
place than mother.
       M.D. told the DI, “ ‘I know [father] loves me’ and ‘we have
a good bond.’ ” But M.D. had concerns. She didn’t think father
communicated well and said he “ ‘doesn’t hear [her] voice.’ ”
(Alteration in original.) M.D. mentioned father having been
shot recently and said C.H.’s son, about M.D.’s age, also recently
was shot. M.D. thought “these incidents happened due to father
trusting the wrong people.” She was afraid she could have been
shot had she been with father at that time. She also thought
C.H. and her children treated her “badly.” M.D. loved father

                                13
but did not want to live with him. She was open to having visits
with him but not at his home in Bakersfield.
       Maternal cousin knew father loved M.D. and believed
he would protect her and would not cause her any harm. She
knew M.D. did not want to live with him, however, and hoped
he wouldn’t force her to do so.
       DCFS concluded father “knew of the mother’s ongoing
substance abuse and reported concerns regarding the mother’s
instability; however, he failed to take actions to protect [M.D.].
Further, [father] is a frequent user of marijuana, he has
a substantial criminal history[,] and [M.D.] has expressed
an unwillingness to reside in the father’s home.” DCFS
recommended the court sustain the petition’s allegations
and declare the children dependents. It recommended father
participate in parent education, individual counseling to address
protective parenting, past trauma, and any other case-related
issues, and conjoint counseling with M.D.; and comply with
random and on-demand drug and alcohol testing.
       On December 20, 2022, DCFS filed its first amended
petition adding allegations that father knew about mother’s
substance abuse and failed to protect M.D. Father was appointed
counsel on December 21, 2022.
       The juvenile court held an adjudication hearing on
January 13, 2023. The children’s counsel asked the court to
sustain the substance abuse allegations against mother and the
failure to protect allegations against father and James. Mother’s
counsel, joined by James’s counsel, asked the court to dismiss
the petition in its entirety.
       Father’s counsel asked the court to strike the failure to
protect allegations against him. Counsel argued father was open

                               14
and honest about mother’s drug use, ended his relationship with
her due to her drug use, and had attempted to gain custody of
M.D. Counsel argued father had tried to be protective: he made
it clear he did not condone mother’s drug use, removed himself
from the relationship, and had taken care of M.D. for “long
periods of time when mother [was] unable to.” Counsel also
argued mother had “not exactly been letting [father] see . . .
[M.D.] at all.” Counsel concluded, “So, if anything, we would ask
the court to amend the petition to conform to proof to say that
father was unable to protect as opposed to a failure to protect.”
       Counsel for DCFS asked the court to sustain the petition
as pleaded. As to the allegations of father’s failure to protect,
counsel argued, “[T]his isn’t about blaming him. However, it’s
clear that he was fully aware that mother was an active, ongoing
abuser of drugs including methamphetamine.” Addressing
the idea father was “ ‘unable to protect’ ” M.D., DCFS argued
“[it] would be one thing if he went to family court and followed
through and attempted to convince the judge and was denied.”
Instead, counsel argued, father “put in paperwork one time, it got
rejected for being improper, and that seems to be the totality of
his efforts over a number of years.” Counsel was hopeful father
would be able to reunify with M.D. but believed he had failed
to protect her.
       The court sustained the substance abuse count as alleged,
including father’s failure to protect M.D. The court dismissed
the second count as to mother’s mental health. The court
immediately moved to the disposition.
       Father’s counsel asked the court to grant DCFS discretion
to release M.D. to him and for a written visitation schedule.
Counsel objected to the inclusion of drug testing in father’s case

                               15
plan. Counsel asked that father be required to test “only upon
reasonable suspicion,” as marijuana use was legal in California
and father was noncustodial. Father submitted to the ordered
parenting classes and family therapy but objected to individual
therapy. Counsel argued it wasn’t “exactly warranted in this
case to father,” noting he denied mental health issues.
       In response, DCFS’s counsel asserted father “also has
a lengthy criminal history that includes multiple arrests for
possession of narcotics” and had been absent from M.D.’s life
“for quite a period of time.”11 Counsel argued that, if father
was seeking to reunify with M.D., “his sobriety would need
to be established today.” As to individual counseling, counsel
noted father had not acted in a protective capacity as a parent
in a number of years.
       At the end of argument, the court declared M.D. and the
other children dependents of the juvenile court under section 300,
subdivision (b), removed them from parental custody, and
ordered DCFS to provide parents with reunification services.
The court granted DCFS authority to release the children to
mother after she had completed four negative drug tests. The
court also signed father’s case plan “as is.” Father appealed.
                           DISCUSSION
       “ ‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the jurisdictional findings and disposition, we
determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,
supports them. . . . “[W]e draw all reasonable inferences from

11    Counsel appears to have confused James’s criminal record
with father’s.

                                 16
the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency
court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the
court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and
credibility are the province of the trial court.” [Citation.] “We
do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment,
but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the
findings of the trial court. [Citations.] ‘ “[T]he [appellate] court
must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the
judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence . . . such that a reasonable trier of fact could find [that
the order is appropriate].” ’ ” ’ ” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766,
773 (I.J.).) “ ‘The parent has the burden on appeal of showing
there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s
order.’ ” (In re L.B. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 402, 412 (L.B.).)
1.    The court’s jurisdictional finding based on father’s
      failure to protect M.D. from mother’s substance abuse
      The juvenile court sustained the following allegations
against father as pleaded in the amended petition:
              “The child [M.D.’s] father . . . knew of the
              mother’s substance abuse and failed to protect
              the child. . . . The mother’s substance abuse
              and [M.D.’s] . . . father’s failure to protect the
              child[ ] endangers the child[’s] physical health
              and safety, placing the child[ ] at substantial
              risk of serious physical harm, damage,
              danger[,] and failure to protect.” (Boldface
              omitted.)
Father challenges this jurisdictional finding—that he failed to
protect M.D. from the risk of harm mother’s substance abuse

                                 17
posed to her.12 He contends DCFS failed to satisfy its burden
to prove “a sufficient nexus between any inaction by [f]ather
and the substantial risk of serious physical harm posed to [M.D.]
by [m]other” due to her substance abuse.
       a.     Applicable law
       DCFS had the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that M.D. is a dependent of the juvenile court under
section 300. (§ 355, subd. (a); I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.)
Section 300, subdivision (b)(1) authorizes the juvenile court to
assume jurisdiction when “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm
or illness, as a result of”—as relevant here—“[t]he failure or
inability of the child’s parent . . . to adequately supervise or
protect the child” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(A)); or “[t]he willful or
negligent failure of the child’s parent . . . to adequately supervise

12     Father does not challenge the court’s jurisdictional findings
based on mother’s substance abuse. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(D)
[providing dependency jurisdiction for a child who has suffered,
or is at substantial risk of suffering, serious physical harm due to
parent’s inability “to provide regular care for the child due to the
parent’s . . . substance abuse”].) The outcome of father’s appeal
thus will not change M.D.’s dependency status. (In re D.P. (2023)
14 Cal.5th 266, 283 [“ ‘ “[a]s long as there is one unassailable
jurisdictional finding, it is immaterial that another might be
inappropriate” ’ ”].) Nevertheless, father’s appeal is not moot—
nor does DCFS contend that it is—because the jurisdictional
finding against him arguably formed the basis of the court’s
dispositional orders that father also challenges. (Id. at pp. 277–
278 [“a case is not moot where a jurisdictional finding . . . ‘has
resulted in [dispositional] orders which continue to adversely
affect’ a parent”].)

                                 18
or protect the child from the conduct of the custodian with whom
the child has been left” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(B)). “A jurisdiction
finding under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), requires [DCFS]
to prove three elements: (1) the parent’s . . . neglectful conduct
or failure or inability to protect the child; (2) causation; and
(3) serious physical harm or illness or a substantial risk of
serious physical harm or illness.” (In re Cole L. (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 591, 601.)
       The statute permits jurisdiction under this subdivision
“only so long as is necessary to protect the child from risk of
suffering serious physical harm or illness.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(3).)
Thus, “[t]he relevant inquiry . . . is whether circumstances at
the time of the jurisdictional hearing ‘ “subject the minor to the
defined risk of harm.” ’ ” (L.B., supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 411.)
In enacting section 300, however, the Legislature intended to
protect children who are currently being abused or neglected and
“to ensure the safety, protection, and physical and emotional
well-being of children who are at risk of that harm.” (§ 300.2.)
Accordingly, “the court need not wait until a child is seriously
abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary
to protect the child. [Citation.] The court may consider past
events in deciding whether a child presently needs the court’s
protection. [Citation.] A parent’s ‘ “[p]ast conduct may be
probative of current conditions” if there is reason to believe
that the conduct will continue.’ ” (In re Christopher R. (2014)
225 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1215–1216, disapproved on another
ground in In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 560, fn. 18 (N.R.);
see also In re J.N. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 767, 775 [Department
“must establish a nexus between the parent’s past conduct
and the current risk of harm”].)

                                19
      b.     The failure to protect finding was not based on
             father’s failure to seek custody of M.D. alone
       Father first contends DCFS impermissibly based its
allegation that he failed to protect M.D. on his failure to seek
a court order for custody of M.D. We reject this contention.
       Section 300, subdivision (b)(2)(B) directs that “[a] child
shall not be found to be a person described by this subdivision
solely due to . . . [t]he failure of the child’s parent or alleged
parent to seek court orders for custody of the child.” (Italics
added.) Thus, the court did not err in considering the fact
father never tried to correct his rejected paperwork and re-file
for custody of M.D. in determining father failed to protect her,
as long as it was not the sole basis for the court’s jurisdictional
finding. The legislative history, on which both father and DCFS
rely, supports this construction. As discussed in L.B., the author
of the relevant assembly bill was quoted as follows:
             “ ‘ “A parent is not unfit solely because they
             are not litigious, lacking the money or
             sophistication or time to seek legal redress
             of family issues in court actions. Likewise,
             a parent is not unfit solely because they try to
             work out issues with another parent informally
             and collaboratively, without seeking formal
             court orders. Even so, in rare but not
             uncommon cases, child welfare agencies will
             allege that a parent has failed to protect a child
             under WIC 300 solely on the single ground that
             the parent did not initiate child-protecting
             litigation against another parent. Such
             allegations penalize and seek to rupture

                                20
             families based on either their poverty, lack
             of legal sophistication, or efforts informally to
             resolve family issues. Inspired by current law’s
             treatment of lack [of] emergency shelter, which,
             too, cannot all by itself be the basis of a Section
             300 allegation [citation], [this bill] narrowly
             addresses this problem simply by saying that
             an alleged failure to seek protection for a child
             by initiating litigation, while permitted as one
             of the factors in weighing whether a parent
             has adequately protected a child, cannot all
             by itself serve as the basis of a WIC section 300
             allegation.” ’ ” (L.B., supra, 88 Cal.App.5th
             at p. 414, quoting Assem. Com. on Human
             Services, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 841
             (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 23,
             2021, p. 3; italics added by court.)13
       Based on our review of the record, we can infer the trial
court did not base its failure to protect finding on father’s failure
to seek custody of M.D. alone. As we discuss more fully below,
the record demonstrates, as DCFS notes, father did not take
any measures to protect M.D. during the years before or after he
filed the rejected custody documents. Not only did father never
attempt to re-file the documents to establish custody of M.D.,
by all accounts he was not involved in M.D.’s life. When DCFS

13    Father omits the author’s statement that a court still is
able to consider a parent’s failure to initiate custody proceedings
in weighing whether the parent adequately protected a child.

                                 21
first investigated the matter, no one knew where father was,
and M.D. had neither seen nor talked to him “for a long time.”
2.     Substantial evidence supports the court’s
       jurisdictional finding as to father
       Father alternatively contends DCFS failed to prove
his conduct was neglectful. Father challenges the petition’s
allegation that he “ ‘knew of mother’s substance abuse,’ ”
arguing for the first time on appeal that his knowledge of
mother’s current drug use was based only on “hearsay accounts
from other people.” He argues he had “no personal knowledge of
her drug use since they broke up 11 years prior.” The evidence
shows otherwise.
       Father concedes he knew mother abused drugs in the past,
and the evidence supports the court’s implicit finding that he
was aware of—or should have been aware of—mother’s current
substance abuse. As DCFS reported, father wasn’t surprised
by the petition’s allegations that mother had a positive drug test
for amphetamine and marijuana at M.D.’s half-sibling’s birth.
Father said mother had “ ‘always’ used drugs,” including
methamphetamine, cocaine, and “ ‘any type of pills’ ” she
could access. According to the jurisdiction/disposition report,
father told the DI “he is ‘quite sure’ that the mother uses
methamphetamine, cocaine, marijuana and ‘party drugs.’ ”
(Italics added.) Father revealed he knew about mother’s “ongoing
drug use because he sees her ‘around the wrong people[,]’ and he
hears about her from other people because ‘Lancaster is small’
and many people know him.” (Italics added.) Accordingly,
father’s knowledge about mother’s current drug use was not
limited to “hearsay” as he contends. Moreover, the court could
interpret father’s statements to the DI as his having inferred

                               22
mother continued to use drugs based on his personal knowledge
about the people with whom he knew mother was associating.
       Father argues that, even if he knew about mother’s
substance abuse, that knowledge was insufficient to support
a finding that he was neglectful in failing to protect M.D. Father
argues he knew mother left M.D. in paternal grandmother’s and
others’ care and had no “knowledge of a single instance that
[M.D.] was harmed or placed at a substantial risk of serious
physical harm as a result of [m]other’s ‘substance abuse.’ ”
Father relies on N.R., where our high court recently held the
meaning of “substance abuse,” as used in section 300, subdivision
(b)(1)(D), means “the excessive use of drugs or alcohol.” (N.R.,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 531.) In so holding, the court cautioned
“that for dependency jurisdiction to exist due to substance abuse
pursuant to section 300(b)(1)(D), this abuse must render a parent
or guardian unable to provide regular care for a child and either
cause the child to suffer serious physical harm or illness or place
the child at substantial risk of suffering such harm or illness.”
(Ibid.)14

14     The N.R. court also rejected the “tender years
presumption.” (N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 531–532 [holding
the age of the child “may bear upon whether substance abuse
renders a parent . . . unable to provide that child with regular
care, and whether the child is thereby placed at substantial
risk of serious physical harm or illness,” but courts may not
“treat a showing of substance abuse as always being sufficient
on its own to establish these other requirements for dependency
jurisdiction”].) The N.R. opinion was filed on December 14, 2023,
before DCFS filed its respondent’s brief.

                                23
       Father argues that, similarly, a finding that he failed to
protect M.D. under section 300, subdivision(b)(1)(A) or (b)(1)(B)
cannot be based solely on his knowledge that mother was abusing
substances. Father thus contends that, while he may have
known mother was using drugs, he “did not know that she was
unable to provide regular care to [M.D.] and that this inability
had placed [M.D.] at a substantial risk of serious physical harm.”
Father argues DCFS suggests father “had a duty to presume
harm based on [m]other’s ‘substance abuse’ alone.”15
       We disagree. Father may not have had a sufficient basis,
as father seems to argue, to challenge mother’s custodial rights
or to report mother to the police, as he had no information that
mother actually had cared for M.D. while impaired from drug
use. Nevertheless, father could not simply put his head in the
sand as to the risk mother’s substance abuse posed to his preteen
daughter and then claim to have been unaware of any risk.
(See Jonathan L. v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1074,
1104 [“ ‘The purpose of dependency proceedings is to prevent risk,
not ignore it.’ ”].)
       Rather, the court reasonably could infer from the evidence
—viewed in the light most favorable to its findings—that father

15    As we said, father does not challenge the evidentiary bases
for the jurisdictional findings based on mother’s substance abuse.
And, as we dismissed mother’s appeal after her counsel found
no appealable issues—and mother filed nothing in writing
containing any contentions she believed we should consider—
we presume substantial evidence supports the court’s finding
that mother’s inability to provide regular care for M.D. due to
her substance abuse placed M.D. at risk of serious physical harm.

                               24
not only knew mother abused substances but also had a reason
to believe mother was unable to provide regular supervision for
M.D., placing her at substantial risk of harm. Father believed
mother’s “ ‘environment [was] bad’ ”—presumably as a result
of her substance abuse. He told the DI mother did not provide
stability for the children, which included M.D. And father’s
concerns were significant enough to prompt him to seek custody
of M.D., but, as we discussed, he never tried to re-file his
paperwork after it was rejected.
       Father argues he did not believe mother’s drug use
placed M.D. at risk of physical harm because he believed others
—primarily paternal grandmother—cared for M.D. when
mother was under the influence. In father’s words, mother
sent her children “ ‘to somebody while she’s doing what she do.’ ”
Even with paternal grandmother’s involvement in M.D.’s care,
however, father was concerned that “no one” was supervising
M.D., and she was “ ‘raising herself.’ ” The court reasonably
could find father at least should have known such lack
of supervision placed M.D.—an impressionable preteen—
at substantial risk of harm.
       Moreover, mother’s substance abuse was severe enough to
have contributed to the demise of father’s relationship with her.
Yet, based on the record, father took no steps to ensure M.D. was
protected from it. As DCFS notes, paternal grandmother—with
whom M.D. had been living “off and on” for the past two years—
was unaware of mother’s substance abuse issues. The court thus
could infer father never told paternal grandmother that mother
used drugs or that she should ensure mother was not under
the influence before releasing M.D. to her. Indeed, paternal
grandmother hadn’t seen father since before he was shot in

                                25
May 2022. Nor had M.D. seen or heard from father in a “long
time.” Father thus had not even checked on M.D.’s well-being
for many months despite his knowledge of mother’s “ongoing”
substance abuse and concerns his daughter lacked appropriate
supervision.
       Accordingly, the court reasonably could find father’s failure
to take any protective action placed M.D. at substantial risk of
harm, as she continued to spend time with mother almost daily,
even while living with paternal grandmother. (See § 300.2,
subd. (a) [“The provision of a home environment free from the
negative effects of substance abuse is a necessary condition for
the safety, protection and physical and emotional well-being
of the child.”].)
       Finally, it would be reasonable for the juvenile court to
find father still unable to protect M.D. adequately by the time of
the jurisdictional hearing despite his plans to play a greater role
in her life. The court could find father still had not demonstrated
he could protect M.D., as the evidence showed he minimized
the risk mother’s substance abuse posed to the child: he told
DCFS he didn’t believe it affected her parenting, despite having
acknowledged mother was in a bad environment and believing
he was “in a better place than . . . mother.” (See, e.g., In re
Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197 [“One cannot correct
a problem one fails to acknowledge.”].) Moreover, as there
was no evidence M.D. would continue to live with paternal
grandmother (or maternal cousin) after the school year ended
given mother no longer was pregnant—the impetus for M.D.’s
stay with paternal grandmother—father also could not rely on
her to monitor the situation for him. In any event, the court
could infer from the record that father and paternal grandmother

                                26
did not have much of a relationship and his past lack of
communication with her would continue.
       We recognize this is a close case. With the exception
of James’s sister, the witnesses DCFS interviewed, including
paternal grandmother and maternal cousin, had no concerns
about mother’s care of M.D. Nor did M.D. have any concerns
about mother using drugs. Moreover, M.D. was doing well in
school, and paternal grandmother was providing for her medical,
dental, and education needs. Yet, it is not our place to reweigh
the evidence nor exercise our independent judgment. Viewing
the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s
determinations—and drawing all reasonable inferences from the
evidence to support the court’s orders—we conclude substantial
evidence supports the court’s implied finding that father’s failure
to protect M.D. from mother’s substance abuse placed M.D. at
a substantial risk of physical harm.
3.     The court’s disposition orders
       Father argues the court abused its discretion by requiring
him to participate in on-demand, random drug testing and
individual counseling as part of his case plan.
       “We review the juvenile court’s disposition case plan for an
abuse of discretion. ‘The juvenile court has broad discretion to
determine what would best serve and protect the child’s interests
and to fashion a dispositional order accordingly. On appeal,
this determination cannot be reversed absent a clear abuse of
discretion.’ ” (In re D.P. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1071 (D.P.).)
“A court exceeds the limits of legal discretion if its determination
is arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd. The appropriate test
is whether the court exceeded the bounds of reason.” (In re L.W.
(2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840, 851.)

                                27
       “Section 362, subdivision (d) authorizes the juvenile court
to ‘direct any reasonable orders to the parents’ of a dependent
child as the court deems necessary and proper to ensure
appropriate care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance,
and support of the child.” (D.P., supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 1071;
see also § 362, subd. (a).) “The order may include ‘a direction
to participate in a counseling or education program,’ provided
that the ‘program in which a parent or guardian is required to
participate shall be designed to eliminate those conditions that
led to the court’s finding that the child is a person described by
Section 300.’ ” (D.P., at p. 1071, quoting § 362, subd. (d).)
       “The problem that the juvenile court seeks to address need
not be described in the sustained section 300 petition. [Citation.]
In fact, there need not be a jurisdictional finding as to the
particular parent upon whom the court imposes a dispositional
order.” (In re Briana V. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 297, 311.) Thus,
“the juvenile court is not limited to the content of the sustained
petition when it considers what dispositional orders would be
in the best interests of the children. [Citations.] Instead,
the court may consider the evidence as a whole.” (Ibid.)
       Nevertheless, “the court cannot arbitrarily order services
that are ‘not reasonably designed’ to eliminate the behavior or
circumstances that led to the court taking jurisdiction of the
child.” (In re M.R. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 412, 424 (M.R.).)
       a.    Drug testing
       Father objected to DCFS’s recommendation that his case
plan include random and on-demand drug and alcohol testing.
His counsel asked that father be required to drug test only upon
a reasonable suspicion given marijuana is legal in California, and
father was the noncustodial parent. In response, DCFS’s counsel

                                28
“note[d]”—incorrectly—“father also has a lengthy criminal
history that includes multiple arrests for possession of narcotics,”
and argued father’s “sobriety would need to be established today”
if he were seeking to reunify with M.D. The court signed father’s
case plan “as is.” The final, court-ordered case plan states that
“[i]f any test is missed (unexcused) or positive, DCFS may walk
the matter on calendar for further orders.”
       We agree with father that, based on the evidence as
a whole, the random, on-demand drug testing component of
his case plan was not reasonably designed to eliminate the
circumstances that led to M.D.’s dependency. First, although
father admitted using marijuana daily, DCFS presented
no evidence father ever used marijuana in M.D.’s or his
“stepchildren’s” presence, or was impaired by marijuana,16
alcohol, or any other drug while caring for M.D. or the other
children. Nor did DCFS present evidence father used or abused
any other drugs or that drug use was a factor in his failure to
protect M.D.
       DCFS nevertheless argues father’s minimization of
mother’s substance abuse, his arrest for “[d]isorderly [c]onduct:
[i]ntoxicated [d]rugs/[a]lcohol,” and his failure to protect M.D.
from mother’s substance abuse “provided a reasonable basis for

16     As father notes, section 328.2, effective January 1, 2023—
before the jurisdiction/disposition hearing in this case—provides
for the update of all regulations and instructions relating to
investigations under section 300 “to ensure that, when a social
worker is investigating an alleged case of child abuse or neglect,
a parent’s or guardian’s use or possession of cannabis is treated
in the same manner as a parent’s or guardian’s use or possession
of alcohol and legally prescribed medication.” (§ 328.2.)

                                 29
the court to ensure there was not an underlying substance abuse
problem with unknown substances that caused or contributed to
father’s neglectful conduct.” In essence, DCFS argues random,
on-demand drug testing was reasonable in case father had an
underlying substance abuse problem that it didn’t know about.
      Nor can we ignore DCFS’s counsel’s mistaken
representation to the court that father had “multiple” arrests
for narcotics possession, which counsel argued supported the
random, on-demand drug testing requirement. Had father had
a history of arrests or convictions for possession of narcotics,
the court may have had a reasonable basis for ordering the
random, on-demand drug testing. But it was James, not father,
who had been convicted of narcotics possession. Father had a
criminal history but no narcotics-based arrests or convictions.
Nor does the evidence show father had been convicted of or
arrested for driving under the influence. DCFS mentions father’s
arrest for disorderly conduct, which was based on intoxication,
but there is no evidence as to how long ago that arrest occurred,
any associated conviction, or whether father was intoxicated
due to alcohol, marijuana, or some other drug.
      Although the court was not limited to its jurisdictional
findings in determining what disposition orders would be
in M.D.’s best interests, the court’s discretion did not extend
to imposing a requirement designed to alleviate a problem
DCFS only could speculate about. (See, e.g., M.R., supra,
48 Cal.App.5th at p. 427, fn. 7 [“a case plan cannot include a
substance abuse component before there is evidence the parent
has a substance abuse problem”].) On remand, the court, in its
discretion, may hold further proceedings to determine whether
the current circumstances necessitate the entry of a new order,

                               30
for example, requiring father to test on suspicion of drug use.
Moreover, if evidence has arisen during the pendency of this
appeal—or subsequently arises—demonstrating father has a
substance abuse problem, the juvenile court “ ‘can modify the
reunification plan accordingly and order additional services.’ ”
(Ibid.)
       b.     Individual Counseling
       We agree with DCFS, however, that the juvenile court’s
order requiring father to participate in “[i]ndividual counseling
to address protective parenting, past trauma, [and] case related
issues” was a reasonable exercise of its discretion. As DCFS’s
counsel noted at the hearing, father hadn’t “acted in a protective
capacity as a parent in a number of years.” As we have concluded
the record supports the court’s finding that father failed to
protect M.D., requiring father to undergo counseling to address
how he can protect M.D. is more than reasonable, especially
given father minimized the risk mother’s substance abuse posed
to M.D. Moreover, the evidence shows M.D. did not want to stay
with father in part because of his poor communication skills. She
felt unheard by father and mistreated by his live-in girlfriend
and her six children. If father wanted to reunify with M.D.—
as he said he did—learning effective communication skills would
be imperative and something the court reasonably could find was
in M.D.’s best interests and father should address in individual
counseling before participating in conjoint therapy with M.D.
4.     Father’s other purported challenges
       We need not consider father’s other purported challenges.
The conclusion to father’s opening brief includes a “prayer
for relief.” In it, father argues that, should we reverse the
jurisdictional finding against him, we also should instruct the

                               31
trial court to reconsider whether removal of M.D. is warranted.
Father also argues the trial court should be instructed “to
ensure” he and M.D. “receive an adequate period of reunification
even if this period extends beyond the 18-month date.” As we
have found substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional finding against father, father’s requests are moot.
In any event, father has forfeited them.
       As DCFS notes, father never asked the juvenile court
to release M.D. to his custody—only that the court grant DCFS
discretion to do so. He thus has forfeited any challenge to the
removal order on appeal. (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287,
1293, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in
In re S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953, 964 [dependency matters
are not exempt from rule that “a reviewing court ordinarily will
not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have
been but was not made in the trial court”].)
       Father also has forfeited any contention that he be
provided with more than 18 months of reunification services.
Father cited no legal authority to support his request. (In re A.C.
(2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 661, 672 [“ ‘When an appellant fails to
raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned
argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as
waived.’ ”].) In any event, the issue of the adequacy of father’s
reunification services is not before us on his appeal from the
court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders.

                                32
                           DISPOSITION
       We affirm the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding as
to father. We reverse the portion of the court’s disposition order
requiring father to submit to random and on-demand drug/
alcohol testing. We affirm the disposition order in all other
respects. On remand, the court may hold further proceedings
in its discretion to determine if the current circumstances
warrant a different or new order with respect to drug/alcohol
testing for father.

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                     EGERTON, J.

We concur:

             EDMON, P. J.

             ADAMS, J.

                                33