Court Opinion

ID: 9956131
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-01 12:01:39.079994+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:07.634226
License: Public Domain

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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. BRANDON ROBERTS
               (AC 46906)
                          Elgo, Moll and Keller, Js.

                                   Syllabus

The defendant, who had been convicted, following a jury trial, of, inter alia,
     carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of statute ((Rev. to 2017)
     § 29-35 (a)), appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court
     denying his motion to dismiss and/or set aside the conviction. Although
     the defendant had grown up in Bridgeport, he claimed to be a resident
     of Ohio who was visiting his family in Connecticut when he shot and
     killed a woman he had been dating. He purchased the pistol he used
     to commit the murder in Ohio, and he never applied for or obtained a
     permit to carry the weapon in Connecticut. In his motion to dismiss,
     the defendant claimed that his conviction should be vacated in light of
     the United States Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle &
     Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen (597 U.S. 1), which was decided the day
     before his sentencing, because § 29-35 (a) violated his right to bear arms
     under the second amendment to the United States constitution and
     subjected him to disparate treatment as a nonresident of Connecticut
     in violation of the privileges and immunities clause of the United States
     constitution. The trial court denied the motion, and the defendant
     appealed, arguing that the conviction violated his second amendment
     rights because he could not have applied for or obtained a permit under
     the statute governing the issuance of permits to Connecticut residents,
     ((Rev. to 2017) § 29-28 (b)), as he was not a bona fide permanent resident
     of Connecticut, and he could not have applied for or obtained a permit
     pursuant to § 29-28 (f), as that subsection applied only to nonresidents
     who had a permit or license to carry a pistol or revolver issued by the
     authority of another state, and he did not have a permit from Ohio
     because he was not required to have one in that state. The defendant
     further argued that his conviction violated his rights under the privileges
     and immunities clause to the United States constitution because Con-
     necticut’s permitting process placed an additional burden on nonresi-
     dents by requiring them to obtain permits in their home states that were
     not otherwise required prior to obtaining a nonresident permit. Held:
1. It was not necessary for this court to address the merits of the state’s
     argument that, because the defendant did not apply for, and was never
     denied, a Connecticut nonresident permit, he lacked standing to chal-
     lenge the constitutionality of § 29-28 (f), this court having determined,
     under the first prong of the test set forth in State v. Golding (213 Conn.
     233), that the record was inadequate to establish whether § 29-28 (f)
     even applied to the defendant.
2. The defendant did not distinctly raise in the trial court the second amend-
     ment claim that he raised on appeal and, therefore, it was unpreserved:
     in his motion to dismiss, the defendant alleged only that, in light of
     Bruen, § 29-35 (a) appeared to create an unconstitutional restriction on
     his right to carry a pistol or a revolver outside of his home; moreover,
     the motion to dismiss was not predicated on the defendant’s claimed
     Ohio residency, it did not refer to § 29-28 (f) or reference the process
     that governed a nonresident’s application for and ability to obtain a
     permit to carry a pistol or revolver in Connecticut, and it made no
     mention of Ohio or its permit requirements, and defense counsel was
     silent on these matters during his argument to the trial court in support
     of the motion; accordingly, the trial court was not asked to decide, nor
     did it address, whether, in light of Bruen, § 29-28 (f) violated the second
     amendment.
3. The defendant could not prevail on either of his unpreserved constitutional
     claims under Golding because the record was inadequate to establish
     that his conviction for carrying a pistol without a permit violated his
     rights under the federal constitution:
    a. It was not clear whether, at the time of the murder, the defendant
    had a bona fide permanent residence in Connecticut sufficient for him
    to have obtained a permit pursuant to § 29-28 (b): when the trial court
  denied the motion to dismiss, it did not address this claim or make any
  factual findings regarding the defendant’s residency or his eligibility to
  apply for and obtain a pistol permit in Connecticut; moreover, contrary
  to the defendant’s claim, the record that existed arguably supported the
  conclusion that the defendant had plans to remain in Connecticut with
  some sense of permanency and, accordingly, belied the conclusion that
  he could not have applied for and obtained a Connecticut resident permit
  pursuant to § 29-28 (b); furthermore, there was no evidence in the record
  to explain how applications for permits were evaluated or what type of
  information was needed to satisfy any of the requirements under § 29-
  28 (b) or (f), as defense counsel did not cross-examine any of the state’s
  witnesses who were familiar with the permitting process in Connecticut
  nor did he call any witnesses or submit any documentary evidence to
  address and explain the permitting process during the hearing on the
  motion to dismiss; accordingly, even if this court, as a reviewing court,
  could determine whether the defendant had a bona fide permanent resi-
  dence in Connecticut at the time of the murder, there was no framework
  within which to assess the applicable evidence.
  b. It was unclear whether § 29-28 (f) was implicated in this case and,
  therefore, whether the defendant was required to undertake what he
  described as the additional burden of obtaining a permit in Ohio prior
  to applying for a permit in Connecticut: contrary to the defendant’s claim,
  even assuming that he was a resident of Ohio at the time of the murder,
  there was no evidence that he was not required to have a permit to carry
  his guns in that state, as a permit was required in Ohio for concealed
  carry and there was a dearth of evidence with respect to the manner in
  which the defendant carried his guns while in that state.
     Argued November 15, 2023—officially released April 2, 2024

                           Procedural History

   Substitute information charging the defendant with
the crimes of murder, felony murder, robbery in the
first degree, and carrying a pistol without a permit,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Fairfield, and tried to the jury before Hernandez, J.;
verdict of guilty; thereafter, the court, Hernandez, J.,
denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss and/or set
aside the conviction; subsequently, the court, Hernan-
dez, J., vacated the defendant’s conviction of felony
murder and rendered judgment of guilty of murder,
robbery in the first degree, and carrying a pistol without
a permit, and the defendant appealed. Affirmed.
  Lisa J. Steele, assigned counsel, for the appellant
(defendant).
  James A. Killen, senior assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, was Joseph T. Corradino,
state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
                          Opinion

   KELLER, J. The defendant, Brandon Roberts, appeals1
from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a
jury trial, of carrying a pistol without a permit in viola-
tion of General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 29-35 (a).2 The
defendant claims that his conviction for this offense
should be vacated ‘‘[i]n light of’’ the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle &
Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 142 S. Ct. 2111,
213 L. Ed. 2d 387 (2022).3 Specifically, he argues that
the firearm permitting laws in Connecticut place on
him an unconstitutional burden that violates his right
to bear arms under the second amendment to the United
States constitution4 and subject him to disparate treat-
ment as a non-Connecticut resident (nonresident), in
violation of the privileges and immunities clause set
forth in article four, § 2, clause 1 of the United States
constitution.5
   Both of the defendant’s claims find their genesis in
General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 29-28,6 which, as of
the date of the commission of the crime, set the parame-
ters for how and to whom a pistol permit required by
§ 29-35 (a) was to be issued. Section 29-28 (b) governs
how permits are issued to Connecticut residents,7 and
§ 29-28 (f) governs how permits are issued to nonresi-
dents.8 The defendant claims that he was a resident of
the state of Ohio in 2018 when he shot and killed the
twenty-five year old victim9 in Connecticut with a pistol
for which he did not have a Connecticut permit. He
claims, therefore, that he could not have applied for or
obtained a permit as a bona fide permanent Connecticut
resident pursuant to § 29-28 (b). He further claims that
he could not have applied for or obtained a permit
as a nonresident pursuant to § 29-28 (f) because that
section provides in relevant part that a nonresident
‘‘who has a permit or license to carry a pistol or revolver
issued by the authority of another state or subdivision
of the United States, may apply directly to the Commis-
sioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection for
a permit to carry a pistol or revolver in this state,’’ and
he did not have a permit from Ohio because he was
not required to have one there. Although he acknowl-
edges that Ohio did issue permits, and in fact required
them under some circumstances in 2018, he questions
why he should be required to obtain an ‘‘optional’’ or
‘‘otherwise unnecessary’’ permit from Ohio in order to
procure a nonresident permit in Connecticut. The defen-
dant argues that punishing him for carrying a pistol with-
out a permit under these circumstances infringes on his
federal constitutional rights.10 We affirm the judgment
of the trial court.
  The following facts, which the jury reasonably could
have found from the largely undisputed evidence admit-
ted at trial, and procedural history are relevant to our
review of the defendant’s claims. During the evening
hours of December 8, 2018, at a secluded portion of
a beach near 365 Seaview Avenue in Bridgeport, the
defendant11 took a Smith & Wesson semi-automatic pis-
tol from his waistband and shot the victim in the back
of her head, killing her. The defendant did not have a
permit to carry a pistol in Connecticut, nor had he ever
applied for one.
  The defendant grew up in Bridgeport, attended and
graduated from high school in Ansonia, and had
intended to go to college in Ohio, where he was living
with his father in 2018. On November 15, 2018, the
defendant purchased a Smith & Wesson semiautomatic
pistol from the Gold Star Pawn Shop, LLC, in Eastlake,
Ohio. He left from there and drove to Connecticut,
where he had plans to spend the upcoming Thanksgiv-
ing holiday with his family in the state. He had with
him both the Smith & Wesson pistol he had just pur-
chased and a .45 caliber semiautomatic Taurus pistol
he had purchased from the same shop in Ohio on
November 7, 2018, eight days earlier. The defendant
testified that he brought the Smith & Wesson pistol
with him ‘‘for protection to be out here . . . .’’ As he
explained in his statement to the police, he had once
been shot and injured in Bridgeport. He also testified
that he brought the Taurus pistol with him to sell in
Connecticut, which he ultimately did, ‘‘to somebody on
the street . . . .’’ In fact, the defendant admitted during
cross-examination that he ‘‘came to Connecticut with
the intention of committing a crime of selling a firearm
on the street.’’
   The defendant became acquainted with the victim
after he arrived in Connecticut. He connected with her
through an online dating application called ‘‘Plenty of
Fish.’’ They met in person for the first time on November
20, 2018, and started a relationship. After that meeting,
the victim sent the defendant a text message asking
him to ‘‘explain to me why you’re here if you actually
live here or if you’re visiting that’s all.’’ The defendant
responded: ‘‘And I told you this last night. I plan on
living here. I jus came out here.’’
   The victim’s mother testified that the victim ‘‘[fell]
hard’’ for the defendant and immediately considered
him her boyfriend. The victim gave the defendant
money when he asked for it, let him use her car, and
even tried to convince her mother to let him stay with
her in her bedroom at her parents’ house in Bethel,
where she lived with her parents and her brother. The
defendant and the victim had unprotected sexual rela-
tions on several occasions, and they discussed the pos-
sibility that the victim might have become pregnant.
  The defendant admitted that he was in constant need
of money and that the victim had been particularly
generous with hers.12 The victim routinely gave the
defendant money for gas and food. She also gave the
defendant money to repair his car, which, as he
explained to her in a text message, he ‘‘ha[d] to find a
way to get . . . up and ready so I can get a job! Delivery
jobs are everywhere.’’ After the defendant sent the vic-
tim a text message on December 6, 2018, asking for
‘‘help’’ with his car, as he had an interview the next
day, she gave him approximately $250.13 The victim also
shared with the defendant the PIN for her ATM card
and told him, in a December 6, 2018 text message, that
she had $1200 in her bank account.14
   During his testimony at trial, the defendant described
the brief relationship he had with the victim as an ‘‘iffy
situation, iffy as in one minute [the victim] wants to
continue the relationship, the next minute [the victim]
wants to break it off . . . .’’ The victim’s family did not
approve of the relationship and the victim felt ‘‘stuck.’’
The defendant ‘‘was getting tired of the iffy situation’’
and felt that the victim was ‘‘playing with [his] emo-
tions.’’ On December 7, 2018, he told her in a series of
text messages that a ‘‘hot moment has an cold ending’’
and that ‘‘you really push me to the point where I stop
giving chances.’’
   On December 8, 2018, the victim sent a text message
to the defendant stating that she and the defendant
should just be friends. The defendant sent a text mes-
sage in response asking if they could ‘‘hang one last
time?’’ He told her that he wanted the victim to meet
him so ‘‘we can discuss things in person and I can tell
you how I feel. We can park up by the sand and water
and discuss some real shit.’’ The victim agreed. They
met, as ‘‘per usual,’’ at the hotel in Stratford, where the
defendant had been staying with his uncle, Bradford
Belcher.15 They drove in the victim’s car to a Dunkin
Donuts and then, at the defendant’s suggestion, to the
beach by the boat ramp on Seaview Avenue in Bridge-
port. After they got out of the car and walked onto the
beach and up to the water, the defendant pulled his
Smith & Wesson pistol out of the waistband of his
pants and shot the victim in the back of her head. The
defendant then took the victim’s belongings, including
her cell phone and her ATM card, left in the victim’s
car, drove to a nearby ATM and withdrew $450 from
the victim’s bank account. He realized after doing so
that there was still money left in the victim’s account,
so he drove in the victim’s car to a nearby market that
had an ATM inside and withdrew an additional $50
from the victim’s bank account.16 The defendant then
discarded the victim’s cell phone on the side of the
highway and drove to a New York rest area where he
slept in the victim’s car.
  The following morning, the defendant drove the vic-
tim’s car back to the hotel in Stratford, left it there, and
picked up his own car. He then drove to his father’s
home in Ohio. A few days later, he went to a corner
store in Cleveland, Ohio, and sold the Smith & Wesson
pistol to someone there.17 Before he sold the murder
weapon, he had it with him ‘‘[i]n the car, in the apart-
ment, wherever [he] went.’’ The defendant was subse-
quently apprehended at his father’s home in Ohio and
brought back to Connecticut, where he was arrested
and charged with, among other things, carrying a pistol
without a permit in violation of § 29-35 (a). See footnote
2 of this opinion.
   During its case-in-chief at trial, the state presented
one witness who testified about the defendant’s pistol
purchases in Ohio and three witnesses who testified
about the defendant’s violation of § 29-35 (a). Anthony
Zaffiro was the owner of the Gold Star Pawn Shop,
LLC, in Eastlake, Ohio, where the defendant purchased
the two firearms he brought with him to Connecticut.
Zaffiro is also a licensed federal firearms dealer. He
explained the process applicable to the purchase of a
firearm from a licensed federal firearms dealer in Ohio
in 2018. First, the prospective purchaser was required
to present a valid identification from the state of Ohio
that had ‘‘the person’s name and local address on it.’’
The purchaser also had to fill out an application for a
federal background check. Next, the dealer was required
to enter the purchaser’s information into an online Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation (FBI) background checking
system and wait for a response. Zaffiro testified that
there were three possible directives the dealer could
receive from the FBI in response: ‘‘proceed,’’ which meant
the transaction could go forward and the purchaser
could immediately leave with the gun; ‘‘delay,’’ which
meant that the purchaser had to wait five business days
to receive a final decision as to whether he will be
allowed to make the purchase; and ‘‘den[y],’’ which
precluded the sale. When the defendant came to Zaf-
firo’s shop on November 7, 2018, to purchase the Taurus
pistol, and again on November 15, 2018, to purchase
the Smith & Wesson pistol, he provided an Ohio driver’s
license that reflected an Ohio address and filled out the
necessary applications. On both occasions, the dealer
submitted the defendant’s information to the FBI data-
base and was directed to ‘‘proceed’’ with the respective
transaction. Thus, the defendant was able to immedi-
ately purchase the Taurus pistol on November 7, 2018,
and the Smith & Wesson pistol on November 15, 2018.
   Detective Rachel Crosby of the Stratford Police
Department also testified. Her responsibilities included
maintaining the records of temporary permit applica-
tions by Stratford residents and the temporary permits
that the department had issued. Upon questioning by
the court, Crosby explained that the Connecticut per-
mitting process requires a resident applicant to first
apply for a temporary permit from his or her local police
department. The applicant would then have sixty days
after receiving his or her temporary permit to apply for
and secure a permanent permit from the Connecticut
State Police Department. Crosby reviewed the Stratford
Police Department’s records and confirmed that there
was no application by the defendant for a temporary
permit and no temporary permit issued to the defendant
on file there.
  Officer Devin Polite, a member of the Bridgeport
Police Department Permit Unit, which is the unit
involved in the permitting process for Bridgeport resi-
dents, also testified. Polite reviewed the records of the
Bridgeport Police Department and confirmed that there
was no application by the defendant for a temporary
permit and no temporary permit issued to the defendant
on file there.
   Trooper Gregory Sawicki of the Special Licensing and
Firearms Unit of the Connecticut State Police, which
is the unit responsible for issuing permanent pistol per-
mits in Connecticut, also testified. Sawicki confirmed
that his unit did not issue temporary permits but that
it did process and act on applications for permanent
pistol permits that were submitted with locally issued
temporary state permits. Sawicki reviewed the unit’s
records and confirmed that there was no application
by the defendant for a permanent permit and no such
permit was issued to the defendant.18
   Defense counsel did not cross-examine these wit-
nesses on the permitting process. The defense also did
not elicit testimony from the defendant when he testi-
fied, or from any of the other defense witnesses, that
addressed why the defendant never availed himself of
the Connecticut permitting process as either a resident
or nonresident pursuant to § 29-28 (b) or (f).19 Defense
counsel did not submit any documentary evidence that
addressed this issue either. The main focus of the defen-
dant’s case was his affirmative defense that he was
suffering from an extreme emotional disturbance when
he shot and killed the victim.20 During closing argument,
defense counsel argued that ‘‘much of this case is not
in dispute. Sadly, [the defendant] intentionally shot and
killed [the victim] with a gun for which he had no permit.
. . . The very narrow issues . . . in this case pertain
to [the defendant’s] mental and emotional state at the
time of the shooting.’’ He argued, therefore, that ‘‘the
right thing’’ for the jury to do would be to find the
defendant ‘‘guilty of manslaughter in the first degree,
guilty of carrying a pistol without a permit, and not
guilty of everything else.’’ (Emphasis added.)
  The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts,
including carrying a pistol without a permit. After
accepting the verdict, the court scheduled the defen-
dant’s sentencing for June 24, 2022.
   On the day of the defendant’s sentencing, his counsel
filed a ‘‘motion to dismiss and/or to set aside the convic-
tion pertaining to the count charging a violation of . . .
§ 29-35 (a).’’ Citing to the Connecticut rules of practice,
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in New York
State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, supra, 597
U.S. 1, which had been decided and released the day
prior, ‘‘and his rights under the second and fourteenth
amendments to the United States constitution and arti-
cle first, § 15, of the Connecticut constitution,’’21 the
defendant argued that ‘‘the count in the information
charging him with a violation of . . . [§] 29-35 (a)
[should] be dismissed and/or that the conviction on that
count be set aside.’’ In that motion, he claimed that,
‘‘[i]n light of Bruen,’’ ‘‘which held that a New York
statute requiring a permit to carry a handgun in public
was unconstitutional . . . [and] noted [that] ‘[n]othing
in the [s]econd [a]mendment’s text draws a home/public
distinction with respect to the right to keep and bear
arms’ . . . § 29-35 [a] appears to create an unconstitu-
tional restriction on one’s right to carry a pistol or
revolver outside of one’s home’’ and that, consequently,
his conviction could not stand.
  Before the court heard argument from defense coun-
sel regarding the motion to dismiss, the court accepted
a plea from the defendant in another pending criminal
matter.22 After the court accepted the defendant’s guilty
plea to that charge, his counsel made the following
argument in support of the defendant’s motion to dis-
miss: ‘‘In light of a United States Supreme Court opinion
rendered yesterday in . . . Bruen, I thought I would
be remiss if I did not raise that as an issue. And so, the
motion asks the court to either dismiss or set aside the
conviction of the count charging a violation of pistol
without a permit, § 29-35 (a) of the General Statutes.
   ‘‘I recognize—[the prosecutor] and I spoke about this
just before court started that in footnote 1 of the
Supreme Court’s opinion, there is reference made to
the Connecticut statute, but that’s not—whatever’s said
there is dicta.23 So, I just raise this now to preserve the
issue. The issue is whether the Supreme Court said in
its opinion that nothing in the second amendment’s
text draws a home/public distinction with respect to
the right to keep and bear arms. Under the Connecticut
statute, there is a—no requirement for a permit for a
gun that’s going to be kept in the home.24 And so, I just
apply the court’s reasoning from the Bruen case to this
case, and that’s the basis for the motion.’’ (Emphasis
added; footnotes added.) The prosecutor did not pre-
sent an argument in response.
   The court orally denied the defendant’s motion. It
explained: ‘‘I’ve read your motion. . . . I have not read
the entirety of [the Bruen] decision, but I was following
it as it wended its way. And my understanding of the
problem with the New York statute25 was that New
York, in addition to the application and permit process,
also required the applicant to show a need for carrying
a pistol. And I think the case turned on that.’’ (Footnote
added.) The court then imposed a total effective sen-
tence of sixty-five years of imprisonment. For carrying
a pistol without a permit, the court sentenced the defen-
dant to a term of incarceration of five years, with one
year being a mandatory term of imprisonment that can-
not be suspended.26 This appeal followed.
   In this appeal, the defendant advances two claims
predicated on alleged violations of his rights under the
United States constitution. First, the defendant argues
that his conviction of carrying a pistol without a permit
in violation of § 29-35 (a) violates his right to bear arms
under the second amendment because, as a ‘‘nonresi-
dent,’’ he could not apply for and obtain a permit in
Connecticut without a ‘‘ ‘permit or license to carry a
pistol’ ’’ from his home state of Ohio, and he did not
have a permit or license from Ohio because he claims
he was not required to have either to openly carry a
gun in that jurisdiction. He acknowledges that, in 2018,
Ohio required permits for carrying concealed handguns,
but he refers to those permits as ‘‘optional’’ as applied
to him. He argues, therefore, that his conviction of car-
rying a firearm without a Connecticut permit violated
his second amendment rights because he could not
apply for or obtain a Connecticut permit without first
securing an optional, unnecessary permit from Ohio
that was irrelevant to him. He further argues that his
motion to dismiss preserved this claim for appeal. To
the extent that it did not, he requests review under
State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823
(1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773,
781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).27
   Second, the defendant argues that his conviction also
violates his rights under the privileges and immunities
clause in article four, § 2, of the United States constitu-
tion. He claims that Connecticut’s firearm permitting
process places an ‘‘additional burden’’ on nonresidents
who are not otherwise required to have permits in their
home states to nonetheless secure permits from their home
states as a prerequisite to applying for and obtaining a
nonresident permit in Connecticut. For this reason, he
claims, the permitting process impermissibly treats
nonresidents differently from Connecticut residents,
rendering his conviction unconstitutional. He concedes
that he did not preserve this claim for appeal and thus
seeks review under Golding.28
   The state argues in response that neither the defen-
dant’s motion to dismiss nor his argument before the
trial court preserved the defendant’s claim on appeal
that his conviction violated his rights as a nonresident
of Connecticut under the second amendment to the
United States constitution. The state further maintains
that the defendant lacks standing to raise his claims.
It also avers that the record is inadequate to review
both unpreserved claims and, therefore, they both fail
under the first prong of Golding. We conclude that
the second amendment claim the defendant raises on
appeal was not distinctly raised in the trial court, and,
therefore, it is unpreserved. We further conclude that
the defendant cannot prevail on either claim under
Golding because he has failed to provide us with an
adequate record for review.29
                             I
  At the outset, we acknowledge that the state argues
that the factual record is inadequate with respect to
whether the defendant has standing to challenge the
constitutionality of § 29-28 (f) because he did not apply
for, and thus was never denied, a Connecticut nonresi-
dent permit and that, consequently, he has failed to
establish standing. In response to the state’s claim
regarding his standing, the defendant argues that, because
the underlying basis for his criminal conviction of car-
rying a pistol without a permit is his violation of the
requirements of § 29-28 (f), he has standing to challenge
the constitutionality of his conviction for violating § 29-
35 (a). He further argues that it would have been futile
to apply for a Connecticut nonresident permit because
he lacked the prerequisite of an Ohio permit.
   We recognize that ‘‘the issue of standing is not subject
to waiver and may be raised at any time’’; (internal
quotation marks omitted) State v. Gaston, 201 Conn.
App. 276, 280, 241 A.3d 209, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 981,
241 A.3d 705 (2020); and that we must address a claim of
lack of standing because it implicates a lack of subject
matter jurisdiction in the trial court to determine the
cause. Although before and after the Bruen decision
was promulgated, courts have determined that some-
one who has never applied for a permit lacks standing to
challenge the constitutionality of a state’s pistol permit
licensing statutes, the defendant arguably has standing
to seek to overturn a conviction for violation of a crimi-
nal statute when the underlying basis of the violation
is his lack of compliance with a permitting statute he
maintains is unconstitutional, thereby affecting the con-
stitutionality of the criminal law as applied to his cir-
cumstances. In fact, after noting that a criminal defen-
dant lacks standing to directly challenge the effects of
the state’s pistol permitting statutes, several courts have
nevertheless analyzed the merits of the defendant’s sec-
ond amendment claims because the appeal lies from a
criminal conviction that directly affects the defendant.
See United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 164 (2d
Cir. 2012) (‘‘[h]aving concluded that [the defendant] is
in no position to challenge the constitutionality of [18
U.S.C.] § 922 (a) (3) [2006] based on the asserted effects
of New York’s licensing scheme, we now consider [the
defendant’s] argument that [18 U.S.C.] § 922 (a) (3) is,
by its own terms, unconstitutional because it infringes
on the core [s]econd [a]mendment right of law-abiding
citizens to possess firearms for self-defense’’), cert.
denied, 568 U.S. 1092, 133 S. Ct. 838, 184 L. Ed. 2d 665
(2013); People v. Frazzini, Docket No. 70227-23/001,
2023 WL 3239952, *2 (N.Y. Sup. May 3, 2023) (decision
without published opinion, 187 N.Y.S.3d 581 (N.Y. Sup.
2023)) (‘‘[T]his [c]ourt has held [that] an individual who
has not applied for, or been denied, a pistol permit does
not have standing to challenge the New York [s]tate
pistol permit licensing statute . . . [but] [t]he defen-
dant is indicted and charged with [c]riminal [p]osses-
sion of a [w]eapon in the [s]econd [d]egree. Based on
the fact the defendant is directly affected by the [c]rimi-
nal [p]ossession of a [w]eapon statute, the [c]ourt will
consider the merits of the defendant’s challenge as it
relates to the constitutionality of the [c]riminal [p]osses-
sion of a [w]eapon statute.’’ (Footnote omitted.)). We
conclude, however, that, because we are deciding the
present case in favor of the state under the first prong
of Golding, due to the lack of an adequate record to
establish whether § 29-28 (f) was even applicable to
the defendant, we need not address the merits of the
standing issue raised by the state.30
                               II
   We first consider, therefore, whether the defendant’s
motion to dismiss preserved his second amendment
claim for review. ‘‘It is well known that this court is
not bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly
raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Gainty v. Infantino, 222
Conn. App. 785, 802, 306 A.3d 1171 (2023), cert. denied,
348 Conn. 948, 308 A.3d 36 (2024). ‘‘The requirement
that [a] claim be raised distinctly means that it must
be so stated as to bring to the attention of the court
the precise matter on which its decision is being asked.
. . . [It must] alert the trial court to the specific defi-
ciency now claimed on appeal.’’ (Emphasis in original;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ramon A.G.,
190 Conn. App. 483, 492–93, 211 A.3d 82 (2019), aff’d,
336 Conn. 386, 246 A.3d 481 (2020). ‘‘A claim briefly
suggested is not distinctly raised.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Gainty v. Infantino, supra, 803; see
also, e.g., State v. Hampton, 293 Conn. 435, 443–44,
988 A.2d 167 (2009) (motion to suppress that did not
articulate basis for constitutional challenge that defen-
dant raised on appeal did not preserve claim).
   In the present case, the defendant’s motion to dismiss
alleged only that, ‘‘[i]n light of Bruen . . . § 29-35 [a]
appears to create an unconstitutional restriction on
one’s right to carry a pistol or revolver outside of one’s
home.’’ The motion was in no way predicated on the
defendant’s claimed Ohio residency. It did not refer to
§ 29-28 (f) specifically, nor did it reference or take issue
with the process that governs a nonresident’s applica-
tion for and ability to obtain a permit to carry a pistol
or revolver in Connecticut generally. The motion also
made no mention of Ohio and its permit requirements.
  Defense counsel’s argument to the court in support of
the motion was equally silent in these regards. Counsel
stated only that he was seeking by his motion to ‘‘pre-
serve the issue’’ of ‘‘whether the Supreme Court said
in its opinion that nothing in the second amendment’s
text draws a home/public distinction with respect to
the right to keep and bear arms. Under the Connecticut
statute,31 there is a—no requirement for a permit for a
gun that’s going to be kept in the home. And so, I just
apply the court’s reasoning from the Bruen case to this
case, and that’s the basis for the motion.’’ (Footnote
added.)
   The United States Supreme Court held in Bruen that,
because New York issued public carry licenses only
when an applicant demonstrated a special need for self-
defense, the state’s licensing regime violated the United
States constitution. New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn.,
Inc. v. Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. 70–71. It reasoned that
New York’s ‘‘ ‘may issue’ ’’ firearms permitting regime,
which required citizens to show a special need for self-
defense and submit to a highly discretionary licensing
process in order to exercise their second amendment
right to bear arms; id., 12–14; was unconstitutional
because it prevented law abiding citizens with ordinary
self-defense needs from exercising their right to keep
and bear arms. Id., 71. In reaching this conclusion, the
court recognized that ‘‘the vast majority of [s]tates—
[forty-three] by our count—are ‘shall issue’ jurisdic-
tions, where authorities must issue concealed-carry
licenses whenever applicants satisfy certain threshold
requirements, without granting licensing officials dis-
cretion to deny licenses based on a perceived lack of
need or suitability.’’ Id., 13. In footnote 1 of that opinion,
the court identified those states by citing to their respec-
tive statutes and, in doing so, it described Connecticut
as one of three states that ‘‘have discretionary criteria
but appear to operate like ‘shall issue’ jurisdictions.’’
Id., 13–14 n.1, citing General Statutes (Rev. to 2021)
§ 29-28 (b).32 The court further stated that, ‘‘[a]lthough
Connecticut officials have discretion to deny a con-
cealed-carry permit to anyone who is not a suitable
person . . . the suitable person standard precludes
permits only to those individuals whose conduct has
shown them to be lacking the essential character of
temperament necessary to be entrusted with a weapon.
Dwyer v. Farrell, 193 Conn. 7, 12, [475 A.2d 257 (1984)]
. . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v.
Bruen, supra, 14 n.1, quoting in part General Statutes
(Rev. to 2021) § 29-28 (b). Indeed, as Justice Kavanaugh
observed in his concurrence, ‘‘the [c]ourt’s decision
[in Bruen] does not prohibit [s]tates from imposing
licensing requirements for carrying a handgun for self-
defense.’’ Id., 79 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). In light of
the pronouncement in the majority opinion that ‘‘these
shall-issue regimes, which often require applicants to
undergo a background check or pass a firearms safety
course, are designed to ensure only that those bearing
arms in the jurisdiction are, in fact, ‘law-abiding, respon-
sible citizens’ ’’; id., 38–39 n.9; Justice Kavanaugh fur-
ther opined that those ‘‘[s]tates that employ objective
shall-issue licensing regimes for carrying handguns for
self-defense may continue to do so.’’ Id., 80 (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring).
   This is the backdrop that informed the trial court’s
denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The trial
court addressed and rejected the argument the defen-
dant made, and his reliance on Bruen, by explaining
that the ‘‘problem’’ with the New York statute at issue
in Bruen was that it improperly required applicants to
demonstrate a need to carry a pistol as part of the
application process, and that rendered the statute
unconstitutional. See N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00 (2) (f)
(McKinney 2021); New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn.,
Inc. v. Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. 70–71. The trial court was
not asked to decide, nor did it address whether, ‘‘[i]n
light of Bruen,’’ § 29-28 (f) violated the second amend-
ment.33 The constitutional violation the defendant now
argues on appeal was not distinctly raised at trial, and,
therefore, it is not preserved.
                             III
  We now turn to the defendant’s request for Golding
review of both his constitutional claims. ‘‘Under Gold-
ing, a defendant can prevail on an unpreserved claim
only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the
record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error;
(2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging
the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged
constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived
the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless
error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harm-
lessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond
a reasonable doubt.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Christopher R., 222
Conn. App. 763, 771, 306 A.3d 1117 (2023), cert. denied,
348 Conn. 946, 308 A.3d 34 (2024). ‘‘The first two prongs
govern whether we may review the claim, [whereas]
the second two control whether the defendant may
prevail on his claim because there was constitutional
error that requires a new trial.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Johnson, 345 Conn. 174, 189,
283 A.3d 477 (2022). This court is ‘‘free to respond to
the defendant’s claim by focusing on whichever Golding
prong is most relevant. . . . [T]he inability to meet any
one prong requires a determination that the defendant’s
claim must fail.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Cane, 193 Conn. App. 95, 116, 218 A.3d 1073,
cert. denied, 334 Conn. 901, 219 A.3d 798 (2019).
  Our Supreme Court has explained that, ‘‘under Gold-
ing, an appellant may raise . . . a constitutional claim
on appeal, and the appellate tribunal will review it, but
only if the trial court record is adequate for appellate
review. The reason for this requirement demands no
great elaboration: in the absence of a sufficient record,
there is no way to know whether a violation of constitu-
tional magnitude in fact has occurred. Thus, as we
stated in Golding, we will not address an unpreserved
constitutional claim [i]f the facts revealed by the record
are insufficient, unclear or ambiguous as to whether a
constitutional violation has occurred . . . .’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) In re Aisjaha N., 343 Conn.
709, 719, 275 A.3d 1181 (2022). Moreover, for any Gold-
ing claim, ‘‘[i]t is incumbent upon the [defendant] to
take the necessary steps to sustain [his] burden of pro-
viding an adequate record for appellate review. . . .
Our role is not to guess at possibilities . . . but to
review claims based on a complete factual record devel-
oped by a trial court. . . . Without the necessary fac-
tual and legal conclusions furnished by the trial court
. . . any decision made by us respecting [the defen-
dant’s claims] would be entirely speculative.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brunetti, 279 Conn.
39, 63, 901 A.2d 1 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1212,
127 S. Ct. 1328, 167 L. Ed. 2d 85 (2007). ‘‘[W]e will not
attempt to supplement or reconstruct the record, or to
make factual determinations, in order to decide the
defendant’s claim.’’ State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn.
240. Moreover, ‘‘[t]he first prong of Golding was designed
to avoid remands for the purpose of supplementing the
record.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Torres, 230 Conn. 372, 378, 645 A.2d 529 (1994).
  Here, we first note that the record is inadequate to
establish that the defendant’s conviction for carrying a
pistol without a permit violated his rights under the
federal constitution because it is not clear whether the
defendant had a ‘‘bona fide permanent residence’’ in
Connecticut. General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 29-28 (b)
and (f). Stated another way, it is not clear on this record
that the defendant was a nonresident whose ability to
obtain a Connecticut pistol permit was governed by
§ 29-28 (f), the statute that forms the basis for both of
his unpreserved constitutional challenges on appeal.
   We further note that both of the defendant’s unpre-
served claims are predicated on the same core asser-
tions. Specifically, the defendant asserts that (1) he was
an Ohio resident in 2018 and therefore could not apply
for or obtain a Connecticut resident permit in accor-
dance with § 29-28 (b); (2) he did not have a license or
permit to carry a pistol in Ohio, so he could not apply
for and/or obtain a Connecticut nonresident permit in
accordance with § 29-28 (f); and (3) as he was not
required to have a permit to carry a pistol in Ohio in
2018, it would have been unduly burdensome for him
to apply for and obtain an Ohio permit as a prerequisite
for applying for and obtaining a nonresident permit in
Connecticut in accordance with § 29-28 (f).34
  There is no dispute, however, that when the trial
court denied the motion to dismiss, it was not asked
to address the claims now made for the first time on
appeal nor make any factual findings regarding the
defendant’s residency or his eligibility to apply for and
obtain a pistol permit in Connecticut. The state argues
that, as a result, the record does not support these
necessary factual predicates. In particular, the record
does not establish (1) that the defendant was an Ohio
resident who could not apply for a Connecticut resident
permit pursuant to § 29-28 (b), and (2) what the actual
requirements and procedures were with respect to
securing permits in both Connecticut and Ohio in 2018.
The defendant argues, in response, that the record is
adequate to establish his Ohio residency and that it was
not necessary for the trial court ‘‘to make findings or
hear evidence about Connecticut[’s] and Ohio’s licens-
ing systems’’ because ‘‘[t]his is a legal issue’’ and ‘‘Con-
necticut[’s] and Ohio’s statutes speak for themselves
. . . .’’ We agree with the state.
   In addressing whether the defendant’s claims satisfy
the first prong of Golding, we first observe that § 29-
28 (b) of the Connecticut firearm permitting law applies
to ‘‘any person having a bona fide permanent residence
within’’ Connecticut and that § 29-28 (f) applies to
‘‘[a]ny bona fide resident of the United States having
no bona fide permanent residence within’’ Connecticut.
Given that the defendant’s unpreserved constitutional
challenges are predicated on his claim that he could
not apply for and obtain a permit in accordance with
§ 29-28 (f), the focus of our inquiry is not whether the
record is adequate to establish the defendant’s Ohio
residency, as the defendant argues. Rather, the focus
of our inquiry is whether the record is adequate to
establish that the defendant had no bona fide permanent
residence within Connecticut. This is a significant dis-
tinction because there is no basis for assuming that the
defendant would have been ineligible to apply for a
permit as a bona fide permanent resident of Connecticut
at or around the time of the murder. Had he been eligible
to apply for a Connecticut resident permit, there would
be no basis for the constitutional challenges he now
raises. We simply cannot discern on this record that
the defendant had no bona fide permanent residence
within Connecticut in December, 2018.
  ‘‘It is well established . . . that [o]ne may have two
or more places of residence within a [s]tate, or in two
or more [s]tates . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Argent Mortgage Co., LLC v. Huertas, 288 Conn.
568, 578, 953 A.2d 868 (2008); see also Taylor v. Taylor,
168 Conn. 619, 621, 362 A.2d 795 (1975) (‘‘a person may
have simultaneously two or more residence addresses
but only one domicil at any one time’’). This court has
similarly observed that ‘‘[a] person’s residence . . . is
a place where the person intends to remain with some
sense of permanency, but continuous presence is not
required.’’ McCants v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,
157 Conn. App. 509, 514, 116 A.3d 844, cert. denied, 317
Conn. 923, 118 A.3d 549 (2015). A person’s intent in this
regard is a question of fact for the court to decide.
Adame v. Adame, 154 Conn. 389, 391, 225 A.2d 188
(1966); see also 25 Am. Jur. 2d 1023, Elections § 162
(2014) (‘‘[t]he definition of residence is rooted in tradi-
tional notions of domicil, and the determination of an
individual’s residence is dependent upon an individual’s
expressed intent and conduct’’ (footnote omitted)).
   Here, the defendant argues that evidence that he had
been living in Ohio with his father in 2018, that he had
an Ohio driver’s license that listed his Ohio address,
and that he purchased the two pistols he brought with
him to Connecticut from a federal arms dealer in Ohio,
is sufficient to establish his Ohio residency. Even if
this were true, however, this evidence does not also
demonstrate that the defendant was unable to establish
a bona fide permanent residence in Connecticut suffi-
cient to allow him to apply for a Connecticut resident
permit. Our careful review of the record reveals evi-
dence that the defendant grew up in Bridgeport, that
he graduated from high school in Ansonia, and that he
had been living in Ohio because he had intended to
attend college there, although the record does not
reflect that he actually enrolled in a college in Ohio.
The defendant also had several family members who
at all relevant times lived in Connecticut. Moreover, he
started a relationship with the victim as soon as he
returned to Connecticut from Ohio and he told her that
he ‘‘plan[ned] on living here.’’ In fact, he discussed with
the victim via text message their plans to ‘‘[get] a spot’’
together. He also was actively looking for a job in Con-
necticut.35 Thus, even if this court had the opportunity
to consider the legal claims that the defendant attempts
to raise on appeal, the record that does exist arguably
supports the conclusion that the defendant had plans
to ‘‘remain [in Connecticut] with some sense of perma-
nency’’; McCants v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,
supra, 157 Conn. App. 514; and, thus, belies the conclu-
sion that he could not have applied for and obtained
a Connecticut resident permit. Stated differently, this
evidence might have supported a determination that the
defendant did, in fact, have a bona fide permanent resi-
dence in Connecticut in 2018.
  It is not the function of this court to find facts, how-
ever, and, thus, any conclusion we could attempt to
draw in this regard would be improperly conjectural.
See State v. Rodriguez, 337 Conn. 175, 188, 252 A.3d 811
(2020); see also New Hartford v. Connecticut Resources
Recovery Authority, 291 Conn. 502, 510, 970 A.2d 578
(2009) (‘‘speculation and conjecture . . . have no
place in appellate review’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Although the state presented three witnesses
at trial who were familiar with the permitting process
in Connecticut, and one testified about the process in
general, defense counsel did not cross-examine the
state’s witnesses or call defense witnesses to address
this issue. Likewise, during the hearing on the motion
to dismiss prior to sentencing, counsel did not call any
witnesses or submit any documentary evidence to address
and explain the permitting process, generally or with
respect to residency requirements more particularly.
As such, there is no evidence in the record that explains
how applications were evaluated or what type of infor-
mation should satisfy any of the various requirements,
for either § 29-28 (b) or (f), let alone what information
would suffice to establish ‘‘a bona fide permanent resi-
dence’’ within Connecticut. General Statutes (Rev. to
2017) § 29-28 (b). There is not a framework, therefore,
within which to assess the evidence that suggests that
the defendant may have had a bona fide permanent
residence in Connecticut at or about the time of the mur-
der, even if we could make such an assessment as a
reviewing court.
   It simply is not clear based on this record that the
defendant could not have availed himself of the process
for Connecticut residents to apply for and obtain a
permit, as set forth in § 29-28 (b). It is equally unclear,
then, whether § 29-28 (f), which forms the basis for both
of the defendant’s unpreserved constitutional claims,
is even implicated. Again, if the defendant could have
established ‘‘a bona fide permanent residence’’ within
Connecticut in 2018, he would have been eligible to
apply for and possibly obtain (if approved), a permit
pursuant to § 29-28 (b), and he would not have needed
to undertake what he refers to as ‘‘the burden’’ of
obtaining an additional ‘‘optional’’ permit from Ohio
pursuant to § 29-28 (f). It is this extra step of first need-
ing to seek a permit in Ohio that he baldly claims is
burdensome and unconstitutional.
   To this end, we acknowledge that there is evidence
that the defendant had been living in Ohio before he
returned to Connecticut in November, 2018, and told
the victim that he planned to get a job and live here.
Even assuming that he only had a bona fide residence
in Ohio, there is no evidence that supports the conclu-
sion that the defendant was, as he claims, not required
to have a permit to carry his guns there. Although the
defendant carefully argues in his reply brief that he
did not need a permit ‘‘to purchase or openly carry a
handgun’’ in Ohio in 2018, the fact remains that he did
need an Ohio permit for concealed carry, and there is
a dearth of evidence with respect to the manner in
which the defendant carried his guns while in Ohio.
(Emphasis added.) We do know he purchased the Tau-
rus pistol in Ohio on November 7, 2018, and the Smith &
Wesson pistol in Ohio on November 15, 2018, and that
he had them with him in his car when he drove through
Ohio to Connecticut on that date. We do not know,
however, whether they were ‘‘open’’ or ‘‘concealed’’
during his time in Ohio. The record is thus inadequate
to presume that the defendant consistently carried his
guns openly throughout Ohio, thereby eliminating any
need for an Ohio permit, as the defendant urges. In the
absence of a record, it is just as logical to presume he,
at times, concealed them,36 which meant without an
Ohio permit he was violating Ohio law at the time.37
   ‘‘[I]t is incumbent upon the [defendant] to take the
necessary steps to sustain [his] burden of providing an
adequate record for appellate review.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) State v. Brunetti, supra, 279 Conn.
63. As such, the defendant was required to clarify the
record with respect to the factual predicates on which
both of his constitutional clams are based. Because the
facts revealed by the record are inadequate to establish
whether the alleged constitutional violations did, in fact,
occur, we conclude that both of the defendant’s claims
fail under the first prong of Golding and we decline to
review them.
      The judgment is affirmed.
      In this opinion the other judges concurred.
  1
     The defendant appealed from the judgment directly to our Supreme Court
pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 and our Supreme Court transferred
the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 65-1.
   2
     General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 29-35 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘No
person shall carry any pistol or revolver upon his or her person, except
when such person is within the dwelling house or place of business of such
person, without a permit to carry the same issued as provided in section
29-28. . . .’’
   All references herein to § 29-35 are to the 2017 revision unless other-
wise indicated.
   3
     The defendant also was charged with and convicted of murder in violation
of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), felony murder in violation of General
Statutes § 53a-54c, and robbery in the first degree in violation of General
Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (2). The court vacated his felony murder conviction
because it was cumulative of his murder conviction; see State v. Miranda,
317 Conn. 741, 749, 120 A.3d 490 (2015) (holding that vacatur is appropriate
remedy for cumulative conviction that violates double jeopardy protections);
State v. Kennibrew, 208 Conn. App. 568, 578, 264 A.3d 1127 (2021) (confirm-
ing that murder and felony murder are single crime for double jeopardy
purposes); and the defendant is not challenging in this appeal his conviction
as to the other two charges.
   4
     The second amendment to the United States constitution provides: ‘‘A
well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.’’ U.S.
Const., amend. II.
   5
     Article four, § 2, clause 1 of the United States constitution provides:
‘‘The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities
of Citizens in the several States.’’
   6
     Unless otherwise indicated, all references to § 29-28 in this opinion are
to the 2017 revision of the statute.
   7
     General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 29-28 (b) provides in relevant part:
‘‘Upon the application of any person having a bona fide permanent residence
within the jurisdiction of any such authority, such chief of police, warden
or selectman may issue a temporary state permit to such person to carry
a pistol or revolver within the state . . . . Upon issuance of a temporary
state permit to carry a pistol or revolver to the applicant, the local authority
shall forward the original application to the [C]ommissioner [of Emergency
Services and Public Protection]. Not later than sixty days after receiving a
temporary state permit, an applicant shall appear at a location designated
by the commissioner to receive the state permit. . . .’’
   8
     General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 29-28 (f) provides: ‘‘Any bona fide
resident of the United States having no bona fide permanent residence
within the jurisdiction of any local authority in the state, but who has a
permit or license to carry a pistol or revolver issued by the authority of
another state or subdivision of the United States, may apply directly to the
Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection for a permit
to carry a pistol or revolver in this state. All provisions of subsections (b),
(c), (d) and (e) of this section shall apply to applications for a permit
received by the commissioner under this subsection.’’
   9
     In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as
amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022,
Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person
protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective
order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through
whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
   10
      Although the defendant has appealed from the judgment of conviction
for his violation of § 29-35 (a), he is indirectly challenging the constitutional-
ity of § 29-28 (f) as it applied to his circumstances.
   11
      We note that the defendant testified at trial. The jury also viewed and
listened to the video recorded statement that the defendant gave to the
police at the time of his arrest.
   12
      The defendant was candid with the victim about his need for money.
When the victim sent him a text message on December 4, 2018, asking if
he had ‘‘like a semi-plan? Are you going back to Ohio?,’’ he sent a text
message in response indicating that that ‘‘[m]ight have to be the plan going
back idk yet. Either way I still need to get my hands into money.’’
   13
      It appears that the defendant was able to make that interview as a result.
On December 7, 2018, he sent a text message to the victim confirming that
he ‘‘went to do the app for the staffing agency today’’ and that ‘‘[t]hey set
up an interview for me on Monday.’’ Moreover, after the murder, when he
was interviewed by Connecticut police officers in Ohio, the defendant told
the police that if he was still in Connecticut, he ‘‘would’ve been working. I
had interviews and shit . . . [at] a staff agency in Seymour. And I had an
interview today, the second interview today, so I would have been working.’’
   14
      The defendant responded to the victim’s text message by saying ‘‘OK
hun, we don’t have to put down a deposit we can jus work on saving up
. . . . That way we won’t be going broke getting a spot you know.’’
   15
      The defendant’s uncle had been displaced from his home in Stratford
due to a plumbing incident.
   16
      There was $9.63 remaining in the victim’s account after this second
withdrawal.
   17
      During his interview with two Connecticut police officers on December
14, 2018, the defendant explained that he did not sell the Smith & Wesson
pistol back to the pawn shop where he purchased it because it was a murder
weapon and he was ‘‘not stupid . . . .’’
   18
      Both Crosby and Polite testified respectively about applications for
temporary permits in Stratford, where the defendant had been living with his
uncle, and Bridgeport, where the defendant grew up. They were, therefore,
describing the permitting process applicable to Connecticut residents, not
nonresidents. Compare General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 29-28 (b) (Connecti-
cut residents must submit application for temporary permit to their ‘‘local
authority’’ before they can apply to Commissioner of Emergency Services
and Public Protection for permanent permit), with General Statutes (Rev.
to 2017) § 29-28 (f) (nonresidents ‘‘apply directly to the Commissioner of
Emergency Services and Public Protection’’ for nonresident permits).
Defense counsel did not object to Crosby’s or Polite’s testimony as irrelevant.
Sawicki’s testimony, like Crosby’s and Polite’s, appears to describe the
permitting process for Connecticut residents, not nonresidents. Defense
counsel did not object to Sawicki’s testimony as irrelevant, nor did they
seek clarification by way of cross-examination.
   19
      At trial, the defense called the victim’s stepfather; Tiffany Teixeira, an
investigator with Public Defender Services; and the defendant as witnesses.
   20
      ‘‘Extreme emotional disturbance, an affirmative defense that reduces
the crime of murder to manslaughter, is set forth in the applicable statute
defining murder: [I]t shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant
committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emo-
tional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse,
the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a
person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the defendant
believed them to be, provided nothing contained in this subsection shall
constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, man-
slaughter in the first degree or any other crime.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Zachs v. Commissioner of Correction, 205 Conn. App. 243, 254
n.6, 257 A.3d 423, cert. denied, 338 Conn. 909, 258 A.3d 1279 (2021); see
also General Statutes § 53a-12 (b) (providing that, ‘‘[w]hen a defense declared
to be an affirmative defense is raised at a trial, the defendant shall have the
burden of establishing such defense by a preponderance of the evidence’’).
   21
      Article first, § 15, of the Connecticut constitution provides: ‘‘Every citi-
zen has a right to bear arms in defense of himself and the state.’’ The
defendant is not pursuing a claim under the Connecticut constitution on
appeal.
   22
      The defendant pleaded guilty to assault in the first degree in violation
of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1) in a separate matter arising from a June
6, 2017 incident in Bridgeport, wherein the defendant shot and injured
another victim.
   23
      See New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, supra, 597 U.S.
14 n.1; see also General Statutes (Rev. to 2021) § 29-28 (b).
   24
      See General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 29-35 (a).
   25
      N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00 (2) (f) (McKinney 2021).
   26
      The court also imposed a sentence of sixty years of incarceration for
the murder conviction, plus a consecutive five year enhancement pursuant
to General Statutes § 53-202k, and a sentence of fifteen years of incarceration
for the robbery conviction, plus a consecutive five year enhancement pursu-
ant to § 53-202k. All of the sentences are to run concurrently.
   27
      In Golding, our Supreme Court held that ‘‘a defendant can prevail on
a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following
conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim
of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation
of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists
and . . . deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless
error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged
constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ (Emphasis in original;
footnote omitted.) State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239–40; see also In
re Yasiel R., supra, 317 Conn. 780–81 (modifying third prong of Golding).
   28
      The defendant’s counsel also confirmed at oral argument before this
court that the defendant is not pursuing his argument that his conviction
violates the equal protection clause set forth in the fourteenth amendment
to the United States constitution.
   29
      We note that the state also addresses the merits of the defendant’s
constitutional claims and argues that he has failed to demonstrate the exis-
tence of a constitutional violation, as required under the third prong of
Golding. Because we conclude that the defendant has failed to satisfy the
first prong of Golding by providing us with an adequate record, we need
not consider that alternative contention. See, e.g., State v. Santana, 313
Conn. 461, 469–70, 97 A.3d 963 (2014) (appellate tribunal is free to respond
to defendant’s claim by focusing on whichever prong of Golding is most rele-
vant).
   30
      Even if we could discern from this record that § 29-28 (f) was applicable
to the defendant, we still would be unable to address his standing to challenge
the constitutionality thereof. It is undisputed that the defendant did not
apply for a nonresident permit pursuant to § 29-28 (f) and there is no evidence
in this record that supports his bald assertion that it would have been futile
for him to do so. See United States v. Decastro, supra, 682 F.3d 164 (‘‘[f]ailure
to apply for a license would not preclude [the defendant’s constitutional]
challenge if he made a substantial showing that submitting an application
would have been futile’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). For that matter,
there is no evidence that it would have been unduly burdensome for the
defendant to apply for and obtain an Ohio permit as a prerequisite to applying
for a nonresident permit pursuant to § 29-28 (f). In fact, as discussed subse-
quently in this opinion, there is evidence that suggests that the defendant
may have been legally obligated to have a permit from Ohio. As such, the
record is also inadequate in these regards.
   31
      General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 29-35 (a).
   32
      We note that, during his oral argument to the trial court in support of the
defendant’s motion, defense counsel dismissed the United States Supreme
Court’s reference to, and discussion of, ‘‘the Connecticut statute’’ in footnote
1 of Bruen as ‘‘dicta.’’ See New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v.
Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. 14 n.1.
   33
      In his principal appellate brief, the defendant agrees that ‘‘Connecticut
can require residents and nonresidents to have a Connecticut firearms permit
in order to carry a firearm outside the home . . . .’’ He therefore has con-
ceded that the argument he made in the trial court is incorrect.
   34
      The state argues that the defendant has ‘‘conflated the protections
afforded by the second amendment with those afforded under the privileges
and immunities clause’’ and that what he has presented as two constitutional
challenges on appeal is one challenge predicated on the privileges and
immunities clause. Because the two claims as the defendant has articulated
them arise from the same assertions, we assess them together and, because
we conclude that the core assertions are not adequately supported by the
record, we do not address this argument by the state.
   35
      We reiterate that the defendant told the victim he had an interview in
Connecticut on December 7, 2018, that he was involved with a staffing
agency here, and that ‘‘[t]hey set up an interview for [him]’’ on Monday,
December 10, 2018. After the murder, the defendant confirmed with the
Connecticut police officers who interviewed him in Ohio that, if he was still
in Connecticut, he ‘‘would’ve been working. I had interviews and shit . . .
[at] a staff agency in Seymour. And I had an interview today, the second
interview today, so I would have been working.’’
   36
      ‘‘The test for ‘concealment’ [in Ohio] is whether the weapon is so situated
as not to be discernible by ordinary observation. A partially concealed
weapon is a concealed weapon within the meaning of the statute. However,
where darkness alone obscures visibility, the weapon is not concealed. A
defendant in a room with his jacket containing the gun is carrying a concealed
weapon.’’ (Footnotes omitted.) L. Katz et al., Baldwin’s Ohio Practice Crimi-
nal Law § 106:2 (3d Ed. 2023).
   37
      Moreover, a reasonable inference from certain undisputed facts in the
record suggests that the defendant concealed his guns at least part of the
time he was in Connecticut in November and December, 2018, and there is
no evidence that he acted differently when he was in Ohio. For example,
the record indicates that the defendant was carrying the murder weapon
in the waistband of his pants before he shot the victim. The defendant
denied ordering the victim out of the car at gunpoint, and it seems probable
that the victim might not have been so cooperative and gone with the
defendant to the beach if his gun was openly visible to her.