Court Opinion

ID: 9391938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-03 18:08:53.484545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:43.669921
License: Public Domain

J-A06004-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    JASMINE SMITH                              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    DUANE CONFER, II                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1003 WDA 2022

                  Appeal from the Order Dated August 3, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County Civil Division at No(s):
                                No. 2013-1424

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                                   FILED: MAY 3, 2023

        Appellant, Duane Confer, II (“Father”), appeals from the order entered

on August 3, 2022, in the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County, that

modified an existing custody order.1 After careful review, we affirm.

        The record reveals that Mother lives in Roanoke, Texas with her

boyfriend, S.A. (“Boyfriend”). N.T., 7/18/2022, at 87-88. She has resided in

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1  H.C., a male born in March 2008, was the focus of the parties’ custody
litigation. Hereinafter, we shall refer to H.C. as “Child.” The trial court’s
August 3, 2022 order awarded primary physical custody of Child to Appellee,
Jasmine Smith (“Mother”). Father acquired partial physical custody of Child
under the August 3, 2022 order. Before entry of the August 3, 2022 order,
an existing custody arraignment provided for shared legal custody, with Father
exercising primary physical custody and Mother exercising partial physical
custody.
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Texas since October 2019 when she moved there for work. Id. She works

full-time as a sales manager. GAL Report, 3/22/2022, at 2.

        Father resides in Hermitage, Pennsylvania. N.T., 7/19/2022, at 8. He

is medically retired from the Marine Corps. Id. at 15. Father’s paramour

works as a caseworker for Children and Youth Services in Lawrence County.

N.T., 7/18/2022, at 205. She does not live with Father and Child but, on

occasion, stays overnight. Id. at 212.

        Mother initiated this matter when she filed a divorce complaint in May

2013.    At that time, Mother and Father (collectively, “Parents”) resided in

Hermitage, Pennsylvania. Thereafter, in August 2013, Mother filed a petition

for primary physical custody of Child, then five years old.

        Interim orders dated November 5, 2013, and February 13, 2014,

awarded Mother primary physical custody, Father partial physical custody, and

Parents shared legal custody. Subsequently, Father filed a petition to modify

custody in March 2015, and by stipulated order dated August 4, 2016, the trial

court awarded Parents shared legal and physical custody, inter alia.

Specifically, during the school year, the court awarded shared physical custody

pursuant to a two-two-three custody arrangement.              This arrangement

involves a two-week, repeating schedule wherein the child spends two days

with one parent, the next two days with the other parent, then three days

with the first parent. The schedule switches the following week and repeats

thereafter.

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      During the summer, the stipulated order awarded Father physical

custody every week from Monday at 7:30 a.m. until Thursday at 5:00 p.m.

Mother then exercised custody from Thursday at 5:00 p.m. until Friday

morning at 7:30 a.m. Father then had custody from Friday at 7:30 a.m. until

Mother’s workday concluded on Friday.      Finally, the order awarded Mother

custody from Friday after her workday concluded until the following Monday

at 7:30 a.m.

      On August 15, 2019, Mother filed a petition for modification, averring

that she was relocating to Dallas, Texas because of her job and requesting

that she be awarded partial physical custody. Specifically, Mother requested

custody during Child’s school breaks.     On August 22, 2019, Father filed a

petition for emergency relief requesting primary physical custody of Child.

After a custody conference, by order dated October 28, 2019, the court issued

an interim order awarding Father primary physical custody, and Mother partial

physical custody one weekend a month in Pennsylvania, Thanksgiving break,

and half of Christmas break. The order also provided that Mother was to file

a notice of relocation within ten days of the date of the order.

      Mother filed a notice of relocation and an amended petition to modify on

November 12, 2019, wherein she requested primary physical custody of Child.

Thereafter, by stipulated order dated March 13, 2020 (“existing custody

order”), the trial court awarded Parents shared legal custody, Father primary

physical custody, and Mother partial physical custody. Specifically, the court

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awarded Mother partial physical custody during Thanksgiving break, half of

the winter/Christmas break, spring break, during the summer from July 1 until

one week prior to the start of school, and one period per month of up to four

days if she is in the Mercer County area.

       On January 27, 2022, Mother filed a petition for modification of the

existing custody order, wherein she again requested primary physical custody.

Hearings occurred on July 18, 19, and 21, 2022.         Mother testified in her

case-in-chief and presented the testimony of Boyfriend. Father appeared pro

se. He testified in his case-in-chief, and presented the testimony of his

paramour, S.S. Finally, Mother testified on rebuttal, and she presented the

testimony of Autumn Johnson, Esquire, the guardian ad litem (“GAL”).

       The court conducted an in camera interview of Child in the presence of

the GAL. Child was fourteen years old and about to start eighth grade. N.T.,

7/18/2022, at 10. Child did not provide the court with a clear preference, but

he discussed his life in Pennsylvania and the many connections he has with

friends, the school system, and Boy Scouts.       Id. at 30-31.   Child further

testified that, while in Mother’s custody in Texas, he has attended a football

camp, an excursion camp,2 played laser tag, and lifted weights. Id. at 19-20.

       Child also stated that, in October 2021, he hurt his finger while playing

football, and it required surgery. Id. at 13. In addition, Child was on, as best

____________________________________________

2Child testified that the camp involves biking, canoeing, kayaking, swimming,
and participating in other sports. N.T., 7/18/2022, at 19.

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can be discerned, his school’s wrestling team. Child testified that, against his

surgeon’s instructions to not wrestle for the rest of the season, in February

2022, he and Father decided that his finger had adequately healed for him to

wrestle in “a couple of” tournaments. Id. at 13-15; Mother’s Exhibit 4, Letter

from Surgeon. Child also testified that Father tells him about the custody

litigation including, but not limited to, the GAL’s reports. N.T., 7/18/2022, at

21.

       The GAL filed two reports dated March 22, 2022, and July 12, 2022, in

which she changed her recommendations, as follows. In the March 22, 2022

report, the GAL recommended that primary physical custody remain with

Father.3    GAL Report, 3/22/2022, at 3.         However, after an April 7, 2022

pre-trial conference, the trial court ordered the GAL to obtain Child’s medical

records for the last five years. Thereafter, the GAL re-interviewed Mother,

Child, and Boyfriend on July 10, 2022. GAL Report, 7/12/2022, at 2. The GAL

stated that she learned Father allowed Child to wrestle despite not being

cleared by his surgeon and, further, Father encouraged Child to lie and say

that he was cleared to resume wrestling. Id. The GAL also stated that Father

allowed Child to read her March 22, 2022 report, as well as court filings by

Mother. Id. at 3. Finally, the GAL stated that she believes Child will have the

same opportunities for sports and academics in Texas as he has in

____________________________________________

3Prior to submitting this report, the GAL reviewed the case docket and spoke
with Mother, Father, Child, and Child’s former counselor, Stacey Durkin.

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Pennsylvania. Id. at 4. Accordingly, the GAL recommended that the court

award Mother primary physical custody. Id.

       By order entered August 3, 2022, which was accompanied by an opinion

dated August 5, 2022, the trial court awarded Mother primary physical

custody, and Father partial physical custody during Thanksgiving break, half

of Child’s winter break, and during the summer from the end of the school

year until July 22 every year. The order also provided Parents shared legal

custody. Thereafter, on September 1, 2022, Father, through counsel, timely

filed a notice of appeal.4       The trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion on

September 23, 2022.

       Father presents the following issues for review:

       1. Did the honorable trial court err and abuse its discretion by
          radically changing primary physical custody to Mother, contrary
          to the long held custody status quo and well-reasoned
          preference of [Child], who is by every objective indication from
          music, academics, friendships, and athletics, excelling and
          thriving while historically living with Father in Hermitage,
          Pennsylvania and attending Hickory School District?

____________________________________________

4 Father failed to concurrently file a concise statement of errors complained of
on appeal with his notice of appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(i) and (b).
See In Re K.T.E.L, 983 A.2d 745, 747 (Pa. Super. 2009) (holding that the
failure to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal with the
notice of appeal will result in a defective notice of appeal, to be disposed of
on a case-by-case basis). Approximately three weeks after filing the notice of
appeal, on September 22, 2022, Father filed the Rule 1925(b) statement.
Since the misstep was not prejudicial to any of the parties and did not impede
the trial court’s ability to issue a thorough opinion, the procedural error was
harmless. Cf. J.P. v. S.P., 991 A.2d 904 (Pa. Super. 2010) (appellant waived
all issues by failing to timely comply with the trial court’s direct order to file a
concise statement). We will, therefore, address Father’s issues.

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     2. Did the honorable trial court err and abuse its discretion by
        radically changing primary physical custody to Mother, contrary
        to the initial recommendation of the [GAL] made on March 22,
        2022 stating that Father should be primary physical custodian?

     3. Did the honorable trial court err and abuse its discretion by
        radically changing primary physical custody to Mother and
        failing to accurately apply 23 Pa.C.S.[A. §] 5328, the 16
        relevant custody factors, to the facts of this case? The court
        sent the minor child across the country against his preference
        and contrary to the status quo to live in North Richland Hills,
        Texas, away from his routines, family, Father, friends, activities
        and way of life.

Father’s Brief at 8-9 (suggested answer omitted).

     We review Father’s issues according to the following scope and standard

of review:

         [T]he appellate court is not bound by the deductions or
         inferences made by the trial court from its findings of fact,
         nor must the reviewing court accept a finding that has no
         competent evidence to support it. . . . However, this broad
         scope of review does not vest in the reviewing court the
         duty or the privilege of making its own independent
         determination. . . . Thus, an appellate court is empowered
         to determine whether the trial court’s incontrovertible
         factual findings support its factual conclusions, but it may
         not interfere with those conclusions unless they are
         unreasonable in view of the trial court’s factual findings;
         and thus, represent a gross abuse of discretion.

     R.M.G., Jr. v. F.M.G., 986 A.2d 1234, 1237 (Pa. Super. 2009),
     quoting Bovard v. Baker, 775 A.2d 835, 838 (Pa. Super. 2001).
     Moreover,

        [O]n issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we
        defer to the findings of the trial [court] who has had the
        opportunity to observe the proceedings and demeanor of
        the witnesses.

        The parties cannot dictate the amount of weight the trial
        court places on evidence. Rather, the paramount concern

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         of the trial court is the best interest of the child. Appellate
         interference is unwarranted if the trial court’s consideration
         of the best interest of the child was careful and thorough,
         and we are unable to find any abuse of discretion.

      R.M.G., Jr., supra at 1237 (internal citations omitted). The test
      is whether the evidence of record supports the trial court’s
      conclusions. Ketterer v. Seifert, 902 A.2d 533, 539 (Pa. Super.
      2006).

A.V. v. S.T., 87 A.3d 818, 820 (Pa. Super. 2014).

      The primary concern in custody cases is the best interests of the child.

“The best-interests standard, decided on a case-by-case basis, considers all

factors that legitimately have an effect upon the child’s physical, intellectual,

moral, and spiritual well[-]being.” Saintz v. Rinker, 902 A.2d 509, 512 (Pa.

Super. 2006), citing Arnold v. Arnold, 847 A.2d 674, 677 (Pa. Super. 2004).

      Child custody actions are governed by the Child Custody Act (“Act”), 23

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5321-5340. The trial court was required to consider the custody

factors set forth in the Act, as follows.

      § 5328. Factors to consider when awarding custody.

            (a) Factors. – In ordering any form of custody, the court
      shall determine the best interest of the child by considering all
      relevant factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors
      which affect the safety of the child, including the following:

             (1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit
           frequent and continuing contact between the child and
           another party.

             (2) The present and past abuse committed by a party or
           member of the party’s household, whether there is a
           continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party and
           which party can better provide adequate physical safeguards
           and supervision of the child.

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           (2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a)(1) and
         (2) (relating to consideration of child abuse and involvement
         with protective services).

           (3) The parental duties performed by each party on behalf
         of the child.

           (4) The need for stability and continuity in the child’s
         education, family life and community life.

           (5) The availability of extended family.

           (6) The child’s sibling relationships.

           (7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the
         child’s maturity and judgment.

           (8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against the
         other parent, except in cases of domestic violence where
         reasonable safety measures are necessary to protect the
         child from harm.

           (9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, stable,
         consistent and nurturing relationship with the child adequate
         for the child's emotional needs.

           (10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily
         physical, emotional, developmental, educational and special
         needs of the child.

           (11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.

           (12) Each party’s availability to care for the child or ability
         to make appropriate child-care arrangements.

           (13) The level of conflict between the parties and the
         willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate with one
         another. A party’s effort to protect a child from abuse by
         another party is not evidence of unwillingness or inability to
         cooperate with that party.

          (14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or
         member of a party’s household.

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             (15) The mental and physical condition of a party or
            member of a party’s household.

               (16) Any other relevant factor.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a).

       This Court has emphasized that the trial court, as the finder of fact,

determines “which factors are most salient and critical in each particular case.”

M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 339 (Pa. Super. 2013), citing A.D. v. M.A.B.,

989 A.2d 32, 35-36 (Pa. Super. 2010).              Further, we have explained that

Section 5323(d) of the Act “requires the trial court to set forth its mandatory

assessment of the [. . .] factors prior to the deadline by which a litigant must

file a notice of appeal.” A.V., 87 A.3d at 823 (citations omitted).5 This Court

has stated:

       In expressing the reasons for its decision, “there is no required
       amount of detail for the trial court’s explanation; all that is
       required is that the enumerated factors are considered and that
       the custody decision is based on those considerations.” M.J.M. v.
____________________________________________

5 We recognize that, because Mother was not again relocating and only Child
stood to move to a significantly distant location, the relocation provisions of
Section 5337 were not per se triggered. See D.K. v. S.P.K., 102 A.3d 467,
468 (Pa. Super. 2014). Nonetheless, this Court has held that trial courts “shall
consider the relevant factors set forth in section 5337(h) insofar as they
impact the final determination of the best interests” of the child. Id. Father
does not raise this issue in his statement of questions involved in his brief,
and so we do not address it. See In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa.
Super. 2017) (“[I]t is well-settled that issues not included in an appellant’s
statement of questions involved and concise statement of errors complained
of on appeal are waived.”). Moreover, the trial court in this case considered
Child’s best interests in light of the impact of his relocation, as discussed infra.
Under these circumstances, we are unable to conclude that the trial court
disregarded any obligation imposed under SPK, supra.

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      M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 336 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, [620
      Pa. 710], 68 A.3d 909 (2013). A court’s explanation of reasons
      for its decision, which adequately addresses the relevant factors,
      complies with Section 5323(d). Id.

A.V., 87 A.3d at 822-823.

      Instantly, the court weighed the following custody factors in Mother’s

favor: Section 5328(a)(1), (2), (8), (9), and (10). The court weighed factors

(4) and (5) in Father’s favor. The court also determined that factor (7) was

“neutral or very slightly favors [F]ather.” Trial Court Opinion, 8/5/2022, at

26-27. The court weighed neutrally between the parties factors (3), (6), (11),

(12), and (13) and found inapplicable factors (14), (15), and (16). Id. at 23-

32.

      Although the trial court found that factors (4) and (5) favored Father, it

gave determinative weight to factors (1), (2), (8), (9), and (10) based on the

undisputed fact that Father allowed Child to wrestle despite instructions from

his surgeon that he not yet resume this activity for the remainder of the

season. Id. at 30. The trial court emphasized that “[allowing Child] to wrestle

risked [] causing permanent injury to his dominant hand, overemphasized the

importance of sports versus health in a young child’s life, and required

[Father], and [Child] with Father’s permission, to lie . . . to Mother.” Id. at

30-31. The court also found it “completely inappropriate” for Father to allow

Child to read messages between Parents on the Our Family Wizard application,

as well as provide him with the GAL’s reports. Id. at 31. Finally, the trial

court stressed that “[t]he primary factor against such a move is the distance

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that will remove [Child] from [F]ather and his other family members as well

as [Child] switching from a school district he has attended his entire life.

However, the [c]ourt believes . . . [Child] will have no difficulty adjusting

quickly, excelling academically, and reestablishing himself in the various

extracurricular activities he has an interest in.” Id. at 32.

      Father presents three issues for this Court’s review, but merely provides

one argument section with no subheadings to indicate which issue he is

analyzing.    Father’s Brief at 24-35; see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)(“The

argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be

argued; and shall have at the head of each part — in distinctive type or in

type distinctively displayed — the particular point treated therein, followed by

such discussion and citation of the authorities as are deemed pertinent.”).

Additionally, Father baldly cites to various cases with little to no analysis on

how the cases apply to the instant matter. Id. As such, we consider Father’s

arguments the best we can discern them.

      Father’s arguments essentially contend that the trial court misapplied

the custody factors.    Father’s Brief at 9, 22-23.      Father states that “no

compelling evidence or substantial change in circumstances was presented to

justify” a change in custody. Id. at 22.

      Initially, contrary to Father’s contention,

      the essential issue in deciding whether to modify custody is not
      whether a petitioner has demonstrated a change of
      circumstances. See Karis v. Karis, 544 A.2d 1328 (1988) (“we
      hold that a petition for modification of a partial custody to shared

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      custody order requires the court to inquire into the best interest
      of the child regardless of whether a ‘substantial’ change in
      circumstances has been shown.”); see also Hutchinson v.
      Hutchinson, 379 Pa.Super. 247, 549 A.2d 999 (1988) (changed
      circumstances are no longer required for court to review child
      custody orders.).

K.D. v. E.D., 267 A.3d 1215, 1224 (Pa. Super. 2021). Accordingly, Mother

was not required to prove a substantial change in circumstances to justify a

change in custody.

      Additionally, Father’s argument that the trial court improperly applied

the custody factors is without merit. The law is well-settled that the trial court

determines which factors are most salient, weighs the evidence, and makes

credibility findings. M.J.M., 63 A.3d at 339, citing A.D., 989 A.2d at 35-36;

R.M.G., Jr., 986 A.2d at 1237. The trial court found Section 5328(a)(1), (2),

(8), (9), and (10) favored Mother and (4) and (5) favored Father. As the court

further determined that those factors in favor of Mother outweighed those in

favor of Father, the court found this “clearly dictates primary physical custody

[be] placed with [Mother].” Trial Court Opinion, 8/5/2022, at 23-32.

      Regarding Section 5328(a)(1), which considers the party who is more

likely to encourage and permit frequent and continuing contact between the

child and another party, the trial court stated that Mother credibly testified

that she primarily communicated with Child via text. Id. at 23. However,

“[a]ll parties agreed [Child] was grounded very frequently while at [Father’s]

house which included removal of the smart phone.           At no time was any

testimony presented regarding any behavioral difficulties of [Child] in any way

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much less substantiating such frequent grounding.” Id. The trial court also

emphasized that Father proposed limiting Mother’s summer visitation to two

weeks, and that Father told Child that Mother “will make him fat” in Texas and

that Child can only succeed with Father. Id.

      Mother testified that Child is often grounded at Father’s house, and it is

difficult to communicate with him. N.T., 7/18/2022, at 106-109. Child also

confirmed that he is frequently grounded.      Id. at 37-38.   Father similarly

testified that, when he grounded Child, he would take Child’s “electronics,”

although he alleged he was mindful of Child’s ability to communicate with

Mother. N.T., 7/19/2022, at 20-21. Mother stated that, prior to Child coming

to Texas for the summer in 2022, Father purchased Child a new phone to

ensure he and Child could communicate. N.T., 7/18/2022, at 108. Mother

also testified, on cross-examination, that Child said Father “tells [Child] he

won’t succeed in Texas because he’ll get fat, that [Mother] will make him fat,

that he won’t make friends,” and that Child will only succeed with Father.

N.T., 7/18/2022, at 145. Thus, the record aptly supports the court’s findings

with respect to Section 5328(a)(1).

      Concerning Section 5328(a)(2), (8), (9), and (10), the trial court

emphasized Father’s disregard for Child’s safety when he allowed Child to

wrestle in tournaments despite Child’s surgeon instructing against it.

Regarding factor (2), the present and past abuse committed by a party or

member of the party’s household, whether there is a continued risk of harm

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to the child or an abused party and which party can better provide adequate

physical safeguards and supervision of the child, the court indicated that the

factor favored Mother “particularly regarding physical safeguards.” Trial Court

Opinion, 8/5/2022, at 24. Father allowed Child to wrestle and told Mother his

finger was “all good.” Id.

      Mother specifically testified that Father sent her a message in February

2022 stating that Child’s finger was “good to go” and she traveled to watch

his wrestling tournament. N.T., 7/18/2022, at 126. Mother stated that she

did not know Child was not cleared to wrestle until after the pre-trial

conference that occurred in April 2022. Id. at 127. Mother stated that Child

told her that Father left the decision up to him and that if he wanted to lie, he

could. Id. at 130.

      On cross-examination, Father stated that “I don’t know anyone that’s

followed the doctor’s order 100 percent.”     N.T., 7/19/2022, at 50. Father

continued, “I don’t know [] better than the doctor, but I know my son’s body

better than the doctor.” Id. Ultimately, Father confirmed that he went against

the surgeon’s instruction:

      Q: Where in there does it say [Child] can wrestle this season?

      A: It doesn’t.

      Q: Okay. So you went against the doctor’s advice? It’s a simple
      yes or no question.

      A: Is it?

      Q: Did you go against the doctor’s advice?

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      A: Yeah, I did.

      Q: And you did that because you wanted [Child] to compete in
      sports?

      A: That is incorrect.

      Q: What medical opinion did you use to verify that he was safe to
      compete?

      A: So we did a lot of research after this finger incident because it
      was very concerning.

Id. at 52-53. He also confirmed that Child was aware that he had not been

cleared to wrestle for the remainder of the season. Id. at 87. Finally, on

cross-examination, Father stated that he did not tell Mother that Child was

not cleared to wrestle:

      Q: Did you talk to [Mother] at all about saying, hey, you know, I
      know the doctor says that he’s not cleared, but we’re going to still
      allow him to wrestle?

      A: Her and I? No.

      Q: You, in fact, told her that he was cleared, didn’t you?

      A: On February 16th, yes.

Id. at 96.

      In its analysis of Section 5328(a)(8), the attempts of a parent to turn

the child against the other parent, the court stated that Father encouraged

and assisted Child in lying to Mother regarding his finger. Trial Court Opinion,

8/5/2022, at 27. The court also emphasized that Father allowed Child to read

Our Family Wizard posts. Id. Regarding Section 5328(a)(9), which party is

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more likely to maintain a loving, stable, consistent and nurturing relationship

with the child adequate for the child’s emotional needs, the court stated that

allowing Child to wrestle despite his surgeon’s recommendation suggests that

Father lacks nurturing abilities.   Finally, the court concluded that Section

5328(a)(10), which party is more likely to attend to the daily physical,

emotional, developmental, educational, and special needs of the child, favors

Mother, and incorporated its analysis regarding factors (1), (2), (8), and (9).

Id. at 28.

      As it relates to the foregoing discussion, Child’s testimony demonstrated

that, contrary to his surgeon’s recommendation, in February 2022, he and

Father decided that his finger was adequately healed to wrestle, and he

participated in a couple of tournaments. During his in camera interview, Child

testified:

      The Court: So the reports I have is that Dr. Singh told you not to
      wrestle, but you wrestled anyway?

      A: Correct, sir.

      The Court: Tell me about that.

      A: So it was the end of the year for wrestling, and me and [Father]
      both agreed that we believed my hand was good enough to
      wrestle, and I felt that it was in good condition. So it was my
      decision, and I decided to wrestle in . . . [two] tournaments even
      though my paper didn’t discharge me.

                                         ...

      The Court: When your wrestling coach, or [Mother], or any other
      school people ask you whether you are allowed to wrestle or not,
      what did you tell them?

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      A: Nobody asked me.

      The Court: They didn’t know about your finger?

      A: They knew, but I guess they just assumed that I was cleared.
      I wasn’t questioned.

N.T., 7/18/2022, at 13-15. Child also testified that Father tells him about the

custody litigation and the GAL’s reports. Id. at 21.

      Father testified that Child told him about his conversations with the GAL.

N.T., 7/19/2022, at 36.     He also testified, on cross-examination, that he

allowed Child to read the GAL reports and some of Mother’s filings:

      Q: Okay. So with respect -- let me move on to another topic. So
      with communication with [Child], . . . you admit that you allowed
      [Child] to . . . read [the GAL] reports; correct?

      A: I did.

      Q: And you also agree that you allowed him to read any motions
      filed by [Mother]?

      A: No. Not always. Not everything, no.

                                      ...

      Q: Okay. Do you also admit that you added him to Our Family
      Wizard?

      A: Our Family wizards adds him. He’s already on there. I didn’t
      add him. No. So no.

      Q: Would you agree that you include him in messages on Our
      Family Wizard?

      A: At times. He’s never seen one message that he was included
      in. I did that, so she would not --

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                                           ...

       Q: Let’s go back to February 26, 2022. There was a long message
       written by you that said it was approved by him?

       A: What was approved by him?

       Q: A message that you sent to [Mother]?

       A: I didn’t say he’s never seen one message. She has said things.
       So the reason why I let him read these messages is because she
       lies to him. The only way that I can prove that it’s a lie, is
       sometimes he has to read these things.

       Q: So you feel like putting him [in the] middle of you two --

       A: I’m not putting him in the middle. If she didn’t lie, I wouldn’t
       have to.

Id.at 69-70.      Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion because the

record supports the trial court’s findings regarding Section 5328(a)(1), (2),

(8), (9), and (10).

       Father also assails the court for awarding primary physical custody to

Mother despite his status as primary physical custodian since August 2019,

and despite Child’s achievements in music,6 academics, friendships, and

athletics under Father’s care. Father’s Brief at 21. Father contends that such

a radical change severs the relationship between Child and his relatives;

destroys continuity in friendships, athletics, and school; creates instability;

and was not justified by the evidence presented. Id. at 29-31, 34. Father

____________________________________________

6 Child testified that he plays the cello in the school orchestra.           N.T.,
7/18/2022, at 10.

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further argues that the court’s decision is “extremely speculative” because the

court is assuming Child can recreate his life in Texas. Id. at 33.

      Father’s argument, again, merely questions the trial court’s judgment

regarding weighing the evidence and determining the most salient factors.

Essentially, Father’s contention is that the trial court did not give adequate

weight to Section 5328(a)(4), the need for stability and continuity in the

child’s education, family life, and community life, and (5), the availability of

extended family.

      Importantly, regarding (4), the court stated the following in a

memorandum accompanying its decision:

      The [c]ourt finds this factor strongly favors [F]ather. [Child] has
      lived in the Hermitage, Mercer County, Pennsylvania area his
      entire life. All of [C]hild’s family and relatives, other than
      [M]other, are located in the Mercer County area. [Child] is very
      active in [B]oy [S]couts, music lessons, and athletics through the
      school. [Child] has attended the Hermitage School District the
      entirety of his life. This [c]ourt finds this factor is mitigated by
      the fact [that Child] is entering 8th grade, is very outgoing and
      personable, and while on summer visits with [M]other has
      participated in camps involving canoeing, biking and the like as
      well as football camps. Further the other factors which favor
      [M]other outweigh the instant factor.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/5/2022, at 25-26. Similarly, regarding (5), the court

stated “[t]he [c]ourt finds this factor strongly favors [F]ather. Paragraph 4 is

incorporated herein.” Id. at 26. The court also stated that it “believes . . .

[Child] will have no difficulty adjusting quickly, excelling academically, and

reestablishing himself in the various extracurricular activities he has an

interest in.” Id. at 32.

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      Regarding Father’s argument that the court’s decision is speculative, the

court merely believed that Child will be able to recreate the life he has in

Pennsylvania, in Texas. During the in camera interview, Child testified that

he is very social and believes he would make friends if he moved to Texas.

N.T., 7/18/2022, at 30. Mother similarly testified that Child has participated

in camps in Texas and has no issues making friends. Id. at 99-100. Mother

also testified that Child would attend school at Byron Nelson High School in

Texas and used the “Greater Schools” website to ensure the school district is

at least equivalent to Hermitage, Pennsylvania. Id. at 93-95. Mother also

testified that she researched Child’s extracurricular activities, and she believes

the town in Texas has everything in which he currently participates. Id. at

96-97.    The court determined that Section 5328(a)(4) favored Father.

Nevertheless, based on Child’s personality traits as established during in

camera interviews and the record evidence showing Child’s capacity to form

new friendships, the court believed Child would have the same opportunities

in Texas. We discern no abuse of discretion.

      Moreover, in E.B. v. D.B., 209 A.3d 451, 466-67 (Pa. Super. 2019), in

the context of examining and declining to disturb a trial court’s interim order,

this Court stated, in part, “. . .[T]rial courts should be wary of upending the

status quo prematurely without substantial justification that the change was

warranted by a child’s best interest. . . .[T]he ultimate polestar is a child’s

best interest. . . .” Here, unlike in E.B., we are not dealing with an interim

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custody order.    Further, and more importantly, as discussed, the record

supports the trial court’s findings and analysis of the custody factors and

determinations as to Child’s best interests. See C.R.F. v. S.E.F., 45 A.3d

441, 443 (Pa. Super. 2012); see also E.R. v. J.N.B., 129 A.3d 521, 527 (Pa.

Super. 2015). Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion.

      Father also asserts that the change in primary physical custody is

contrary to Child’s long-held preference. Father’s Brief at 34. In addition,

Father argues that the GAL “strangely and inexplicably” submitted a

supplemental report reversing her initial determination that Father should

continue to have primary physical custody. Id. at 22. For the reasons that

follow, Father’s argument is misplaced.

      Regarding Section 5328(a)(7), the well-reasoned preference of the

child, the trial court found:

      This factor is neutral or very slightly favors [F]ather. [Child] has
      indicated to [M]other on several prior occasions his preference to
      relocate to live with her in Texas. [Child] has also stated on
      numerous occasions his desire to continue to live with [Father] in
      Mercer County. When [Child] met with the GAL prior to the GAL’s
      April 2022 report, he indicated a desire to remain in Hermitage.
      However, when [Child] met with the GAL in preparation for the
      July 2022 report, [Child] indicated he wished the court to make
      the decision. Meeting with this court [Child] indicated a strong,
      loving bond, and comfort with [Parents]. [Child] provided no
      testimony that distinguished one parent or the other. [Child] also
      indicated he believed both parents lied to him. It appears to the
      court the primary distinguishing factor in [Child’s] mind was his
      level of comfort with the coaches, teachers, and counselors at his
      current school, and their comfort with him. The [c]ourt believes
      [Child] will have no difficulty reestablishing such relationships in
      Texas.

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Trial Court Opinion, 8/5/2022, at 26-27.

      Contrary to Father’s assertion, Child did not provide his custody

preference. GAL Report, 7/12/2022, at 2. During his in camera testimony,

Child testified, as follows.

      Q: So I don’t want to keep asking. I want to make sure you have
      your chance. Do you have a preference?

      A: Do I have a preference? I’m going to tell you this. [Mother]
      believes I should let you decide. That’s what [Mother] believes.
      [Father] believes that I should stay with him because, you know,
      it’s what he wants. So both parents have given me their opinion
      on the matter.

N.T., 7/18/2022, at 30.        Additionally, in the supplemental report, the GAL

stated that Child wants the court to decide. GAL Report, 7/12/2022, at 2.

Even if Child had a preference, “the law is clear that a child’s preference is not

controlling.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/23/2022, at 5, citing E.A.L. v. L.J.W., 662

A.2d 1109 (Pa. Super. 1995).

      Furthermore, as stated supra, the trial court ordered the GAL to obtain

Child’s medical records after a pre-trial conference in April 2022. The GAL

changed her recommendation after it was revealed that Father disregarded

medical advice and allowed Child to wrestle risking further injury to his hand,

and that Father showed Child the GAL’s recommendation and court filings by

Mother. See GAL Report, 7/12/2022. The record confirms that the GAL was

provided new information, and provided a supplemental report that reflected

her findings. Accordingly, Father’s argument is without merit.

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     Based on the testimony, and our review of the certified record, we

conclude that the court reasonably weighed the Section 5328(a) factors. The

trial court’s consideration of the best interest of Child was careful and

thorough, and we discern no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the

order.

     Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/3/2023

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