Court Opinion

ID: 9906006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 19:02:18.503953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:03.852094
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

                       STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

                                        v.

                     SHARALYN M. STURA, Appellant.

                             No. 1 CA-CR 22-0602
                                FILED 11-30-2023

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
                        No. P1300CR201800955
               The Honorable Krista M. Carman, Judge

                                  AFFIRMED

                                   COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Alice Jones
Counsel for Appellee

Law Offices of Stephen L. Duncan PLC, Scottsdale
By Stephen L. Duncan
Counsel for Appellant
                             STATE v. STURA
                            Decision of the Court

                        MEMORANDUM DECISION

Chief Judge David B. Gass delivered the decision of the court, in which
Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Judge Andrew M. Jacobs joined.

G A S S, Chief Judge:

                        MEMORANDUM DECISION

¶1             Sharalyn M. Stura filed this appeal in accordance with Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969).
Stura’s counsel searched the record and identified no arguable, non-
frivolous question of law. Counsel asks this court to review the record for
fundamental error. This court allowed Stura to file a supplemental brief in
propria persona. She has not. Finding no error in the record, we affirm Stura’s
convictions and sentences.

               FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2             This court views the facts in the light most favorable to
sustaining the jury’s verdict and resolves all reasonable inferences against
Stura. See State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230 ¶ 2 (App. 1998).

¶3             A uniformed state trooper responded to a vehicle blocking
traffic. Upon arrival, the trooper discovered Stura in the driver’s seat, tied
to the steering wheel. Stura told the trooper a home invader kidnapped her
from her house. She expressed concerns about the victim, who she said also
was at the house during the home invasion. The trooper called the dispatch
center, and the center sent an officer to Stura’s house for a welfare check.
Another officer took Stura to the hospital.

¶4            Meanwhile, at the residence, yet another officer discovered
the victim’s body in a bed. The victim had a gunshot wound to his left
temple. That officer also found a pair of belts looped together and a
bloodied knife near the bed.

¶5            After the hospital cleared Stura to leave, she went to the police
station with a different officer so she could answer more questions. From
then on, several officers began interacting with Stura. One officer gave Stura
food and water. At which point, the officers left Stura alone in the
interrogation room for about two hours and forty minutes. A detective

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                             STATE v. STURA
                            Decision of the Court

returned to the room and asked Stura about the kidnapping and home
invasion. By then, Stura had spent ten hours in the presence of various
police officers. Stura repeated the story she told at the hospital, and after
thirty minutes of further questioning, the detective read Stura her Miranda
rights. The detective continued to interrogate Stura for about two more
hours, when Stura altered her account and confessed to having shot the
victim.

¶6          A grand jury indicted Stura on three counts: first-degree
murder, tampering with physical evidence, and false reporting. Stura
moved to suppress her confession at the police station, arguing her
statements were involuntary and unlawfully obtained.

¶7           After an evidentiary hearing, the superior court denied
Stura’s motion to suppress. The superior court said, under the totality of
the circumstances, the police did not coerce Stura’s statements.

¶8            The jury found Stura guilty on all three counts. The superior
court sentenced Stura to natural life in prison for first-degree murder, one
year for tampering with physical evidence, and six months for false
reporting. The court imposed consecutive sentences for each count and
gave Stura 1,635 days of presentence incarceration credit.

¶9             This court has jurisdiction over Stura’s timely appeal under
article VI, section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 13-4031 and
13-4033.A.1.

                                 ANALYSIS

¶10            This court has read and considered counsel’s brief, fully
reviewed the record for reversible error, and identified none. See Leon, 104
Ariz. at 300; State v. Flores, 227 Ariz. 509, 512 ¶ 12 (App. 2011). The superior
court conducted all the proceedings in compliance with the Arizona Rules
of Criminal Procedure.

¶11            Stura was present for, and represented by counsel at, all
critical stages of the proceedings. See State v. Bohn, 116 Ariz. 500, 503 (1977);
State v. Conner, 163 Ariz. 97, 104 (1990). The superior court properly
impaneled fourteen jurors: twelve plus two alternates. See A.R.S.
§§ 21-102.A, 13-752.M. The record shows no evidence of jury misconduct.
The superior court properly instructed the jury on the elements of each
charged offense, the State’s burden of proof, and Stura’s presumed
innocence. The jury returned a unanimous verdict, which the superior court
confirmed by polling the jury. Additionally, the superior court allowed

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                             STATE v. STURA
                            Decision of the Court

Stura to speak at sentencing, and the sentence imposed was within the
statutory guidelines. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 26.9, 26.10(c)(1); A.R.S. §§ 13-
702, -752.A.

I.     Denial of Motion to Suppress

¶12            When reviewing the superior court’s decision to deny Stura’s
motion to suppress, we noted the delay in advising Stura of her Miranda
rights after she was at the police station, and perhaps while in custody. The
police are required to provide a Miranda warning to individuals in custody.
See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977). To determine whether
someone is in custody when questioned by a law enforcement officer,
courts consider the totality of circumstances. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S.
318, 322 (1994). At bottom a court must determine “whether there was a
formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated
with a formal arrest.” Id. (cleaned up). And, whether a reasonable
individual would perceive themselves as being under a level of police
custody associated with a formal arrest. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,
442 (1984).

¶13            Stura may have been in custody when she arrived at the
police station and the police locked her in an interrogation room. The police
restricted her from making calls and completely isolated her from her
family and friends. Also, the focus of police questioning shifted from
kidnapping to Stura’s relationship with the victim. The police questioned
Stura for ten hours before reading her the Miranda rights.

¶14           In the pursuit of justice, the better practice is for interrogating
officers to administer Miranda warnings sooner rather than later. Cf.
McClure v. State, 803 N.E.2d 210, 214 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (noting, despite
holding that Miranda warnings were not a prerequisite to the admission of
a statement the defendant made in the back of a police car, it would be “best
practice” in a similar situation “to advise the defendant of the Miranda
warnings when he is initially placed in custody.”); State v. Schultz, 212 P.3d
150, 155–56 (Kan. 2009) (explaining that “the wisest course” for officers
taking the defendant into custody would have been to read Miranda
warnings as soon as they restricted his free movement and before they
began to ask questions). That said, the officers’ testimony here suggests they
perceived Stura as a victim rather than as a suspect for most of the ten
hours. And it is unclear precisely when they began to perceive Stura as a
suspect.

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                             STATE v. STURA
                            Decision of the Court

¶15            The purpose of the Miranda warning is to protect the privilege
against self-incrimination. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Here,
the officers learned of the victim’s murder as soon as they arrived at Stura’s
house. They concealed their knowledge of the murder from Stura as they
questioned her for ten hours. Further, the officers continuously questioned
Stura until she changed her story. In the pursuit of justice, hindsight
supports as preferable the practice of administering the Miranda warning to
Stura at an earlier stage. That simple act would have ensured Stura
understood her rights during the interrogation.

¶16          Though the ten-hour delay drew our attention, we conclude
the superior court did not abuse its discretion in finding her statements
admissible.

                               CONCLUSION

¶17           We affirm Stura’s convictions and sentences.

¶18          Defense counsel’s obligations pertaining to Stura’s
representation in this appeal have ended. Unless counsel finds an issue
appropriate for submission to the Arizona Supreme Court in a petition for
review, defense counsel need only inform Stura of the outcome of this
appeal and her future options. See State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584–85
(1984).

¶19            Stura has 30 days from the date of this decision to proceed, if
she wishes, with an in propria persona petition for review. See Ariz. R. Crim.
P. 31.21(b)(2)(A). This court, on its own motion, also grants Stura 30 days
from the date of this decision to file an in propria persona motion for
reconsideration. See id.

                          AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                          FILED: AA

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