Court Opinion

ID: 9378669
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-11 21:00:22.479007+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:37.171197
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 21-2418

        JULIO ABRAHAM SOSA UVALLE,

                            Petitioner,

                     v.

        MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

                            Respondent.

        On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

        Argued: December 7, 2022                                          Decided: March 10, 2023

        Before WILKINSON and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge

        Dismissed in part, granted in part, and remanded by unpublished opinion. Senior Judge
        Floyd wrote the opinion in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Rushing joined.

        ARGUED: Jay S. Marks, LAW OFFICES OF JAY S. MARKS, LLC, Silver Spring,
        Maryland, for Petitioner. Amber Ashley Arthur, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
        JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: Nicole Littell Diop, LAW
        OFFICES OF JAY S. MARKS, LLC, Silver Spring, Maryland, for Petitioner. Brian
        Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Nancy E. Friedman, Senior
        Litigation Counsel, Brooke M. Maurer, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division,
        UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge:

                Petitioner Julio Abraham Sosa Uvalle—a citizen of Mexico—asks this Court to

        review a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal of an

        immigration judge’s (IJ) order of removal. As relevant here, Uvalle contends that the IJ

        and the BIA erred (1) by denying his application for cancellation of removal as a

        discretionary matter, and (2) by concluding that his conviction for identity theft under

        Maryland Criminal Code § 8-301(c) constituted a categorical crime of moral turpitude such

        that he required a waiver of inadmissibility to pursue adjustment of status. For the reasons

        that follow, we dismiss the petition in part and grant the petition in part, remanding for the

        BIA to consider whether identity theft under Maryland Criminal Code § 8-301(c)

        categorically constitutes a crime of moral turpitude for purposes of adjustment-of-status

        eligibility.

                                                      I.

                Julio Abraham Sosa Uvalle is a native and citizen of Mexico. In 1987, he entered

        the United States with his mother and sister. Since that time, he has not left the country,

        he married an American citizen, and the two had a son. In August 2019, the Department

        of Homeland Security (DHS) detained Uvalle, charging him with being present in the

        United States without inspection and admission, or parole, in violation of Immigration and

        Nationality Act (INA) § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Uvalle contended

        that he was properly admitted with a border-crossing card, and he applied for cancellation

        of removal under INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).             An IJ pretermitted his
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        application for cancellation, holding that he was convicted of a crime involving moral

        turpitude (CIMT) based on a 2009 conviction for identity fraud to avoid prosecution, in

        violation of Maryland Criminal Code § 8-301(c)(1). Uvalle filed an application to adjust

        status under INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), also seeking a waiver of grounds of

        inadmissibility under § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). The IJ denied him relief.

               Uvalle appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA, and the DHS filed an additional charge

        of inadmissibility, amending the charge of removability to INA § 237(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C.

        § 1227(a)(1)(B), which provides for removal when a noncitizen is present in violation of a

        law of the United States. The BIA remanded for the IJ to consider the new charge. The

        BIA’s remand order provided that “[f]urther consideration of [Uvalle’s] claims to relief is

        not warranted upon remand unless he establishes that such claims should be ‘reopened.’”

        Administrative Record (“A.R.”) 755.

               Uvalle moved to reopen, seeking relief based on an intervening CIMT-related

        decision of this Court, Nunez-Vasquez v. Barr, 965 F.3d 272 (4th Cir. 2020). Nunez-

        Vasquez held than an identity theft conviction under Virginia Code § 18.2–186.3(B1) “does

        not [categorically] require morally reprehensible conduct,” and thus “is not a CIMT.”

        Nunez-Vasquez, 965 F.3d at 286. According to Uvalle, his Maryland statute of conviction

        likewise does not categorically punish CIMTs, and thus does not render him ineligible for

        cancellation or inadmissible such that a waiver would be needed to adjust his status. He

        also sought reopening based on new and ongoing familial hardships. The IJ denied his

        motion, concluding in relevant part that the Virginia statute at issue in Nunez-Vasquez was

        distinguishable from the Maryland statute of conviction here. The IJ further declined to
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        waive his inadmissibility as a discretionary matter. Finally, the IJ noted that Uvalle failed

        to offer any new evidence of familial hardship.

               Uvalle appealed to the BIA. The BIA found the IJ’s decision to be insufficient for

        appellate review and remanded for the IJ to issue a new decision incorporating past legal

        conclusions and factual findings. Accordingly, the IJ issued a new decision in July 2021

        incorporating prior analysis. The decision was returned to the BIA and it affirmed,

        dismissing Uvalle’s appeal. The BIA concluded that Uvalle was removeable, did not merit

        a waiver of inadmissibility for the purpose of adjustment of status, and did not merit

        discretionary cancellation of removal. Notably, it did not reach the CIMT issue because

        (1) with respect to adjustment of status, it concluded that Uvalle did not merit a

        discretionary waiver, and (2) with respect to cancellation, “even if [Uvalle] had not been

        convicted of a CIMT, he has not met his burden of proof to show he would merit a favorable

        exercise of discretion for cancellation of removal.” A.R. 7.

               Uvalle now petitions this Court to review the decision not to adjust his status or

        cancel his removal. He argues that the IJ erred as a matter of law by concluding that his

        conviction for identity fraud was a CIMT, and, assuming that it was not a CIMT, by failing

        to fully address his eligibility to adjust status in that novel context. He further argues that

        the BIA erred by declining to reach the CIMT issue in affirming the IJ’s order. As relevant

        here, the U.S. Attorney General (the “government”) responds that we should remand to the

        BIA so that it may address whether Uvalle’s conviction is categorically a CIMT for

        purposes of adjustment of status.

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               This panel requested supplemental briefing on two questions: (1) whether identity

        theft under Maryland Criminal Code § 8-301(c) is categorically a crime involving moral

        turpitude; and (2) whether this Court may review the BIA’s denial of cancellation of

        removal independent of the CIMT issue.

               In supplemental briefing, Uvalle argues that the conviction is not categorically a

        CIMT, and that this Court may review the BIA’s denial of cancellation of removal

        independent of the CIMT issue. The government argues that remand is still the most

        appropriate path forward on the CIMT issue to provide the BIA with an adequate

        opportunity to consider it in the first instance. The government further argues that the

        conviction at issue here is a CIMT, and that this Court cannot review the purely

        discretionary denial of cancellation of removal affirmed by the BIA.

                                                      II.

                                                      A.

               We first address cancellation of removal. Under the INA, a noncitizen “who is

        present in the United States in violation of this chapter or any other law of the United States

        . . . is deportable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B). The government may cancel removal when

        an applicant meets four statutory criteria:

                      1) that the applicant has been physically present in the United States
                      for at least ten continuous years, 2) that the applicant had been a
                      person of “good moral character” during that ten-year period, 3) that
                      the applicant had not committed certain enumerated offenses, and 4)
                      that the applicant “establishes that removal would result in
                      exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the applicant’s citizen
                      or lawful permanent resident spouse, parent, or children.”
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        Gonzalez Galvan v. Garland, 6 F.4th 552, 557 (4th Cir. 2021) (simplified); see also 8

        U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A)–(D). Notably, under the third statutory criterion, an applicant

        convicted of a CIMT is ineligible for cancellation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C); 8 U.S.C.

        § 1182(a)(2)(A).   Even if an applicant satisfies the four statutory requirements, the

        government “still retains the discretion to deny an application for cancellation of removal.”

        Gonzalez Galvan, 6 F.4th at 557 (citations omitted).

               Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), federal courts lack jurisdiction to review the

        government’s denial of discretionary relief. “The statute specifically strips federal courts

        of jurisdiction to review the denial of cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.”

        Gonzalez Galvan, 6 F.4th at 558. However, § 1252(a)(2)(D) “provides that this limitation

        on judicial review shall not ‘be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or

        questions of law.’” Id. (simplified). The Supreme Court recently held that “questions of

        law” include those concerning “the application of a legal standard to undisputed or

        established facts.” Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1067 (2020).

               This Court recently applied the Supreme Court’s holding in Guerrero-Lasprilla in

        the context of cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b)(1)(D). See Gonzalez Galvan, 6

        F.4th at 557–60. There, we held that “an IJ’s determination [of] whether an applicant has

        satisfied the statutory requirement of ‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ to

        establish eligibility for cancellation of removal presents a mixed question of law and fact

        subject to judicial review,” but we cannot review an IJ’s “ultimate discretionary

        determination [of] whether to grant or deny an application . . . after an applicant meets the

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        four statutory eligibility requirements.” Id. at 560, 562. The Supreme Court has since

        clarified that any review under § 1252(a)(2)(B) must defer to factual determinations made

        by the IJ and the BIA. Patel v. Garland, 142 S. Ct. 1614, 1627 (2022).

               Here, Uvalle conceded his removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B). A.R. 4.

        The IJ then pretermitted Uvalle’s application for cancellation of removal, concluding that

        he did not merit relief. The IJ first reasoned that Uvalle’s Maryland conviction constituted

        a CIMT, rendering him ineligible for cancellation. A.R. 185–88. It then proceeded to

        conclude in the alternative that, even if it erred in its CIMT analysis, Uvalle failed to prove

        the statutory requirement of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship, particularly given

        its conclusion that he failed to prove the less demanding requirement of “extreme hardship”

        in the course of his tangential pursuit of an adjustment-of-status waiver. A.R. 188. Finally,

        the IJ explained that Uvalle was not entitled to discretionary relief—also noting that Uvalle

        failed to argue why discretionary relief was warranted, as was his burden. Id. The BIA

        affirmed, declining to reach the CIMT issue given the IJ’s alternative grounds for denial of

        cancellation—the statutory hardship element and its own discretionary determination.

               Uvalle now seeks our review of the denial of cancellation of removal on the sole

        ground that his Maryland conviction is not a CIMT. But, critically, he fails to address the

        alternative bases on which the IJ and BIA declined to cancel his removal. Absent any

        argument regarding his burden to demonstrate exceptional and extremely unusual

        circumstances, we decline to consider this mixed question of law and fact under Guerrero-

        Lasprilla and Gonzalez Galvan. Even if Uvalle challenged the remaining discretionary

        basis for denial of cancellation, we are without jurisdiction to review such a challenge. 8
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        U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B). Consequently, we dismiss Uvalle’s petition for lack of jurisdiction

        to the extent that it challenges the BIA’s discretionary determination that he is not entitled

        to cancellation of removal.

                                                     B.

               We next turn to adjustment of status. Under the INA, the government may adjust

        the status of a noncitizen if “(1) the [noncitizen] makes an application for such adjustment,

        (2) the [noncitizen] is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United

        States for permanent residence, and (3) an immigrant visa is immediately available to him

        at the time his application is filed.” 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). Adjustment of status is a

        discretionary form of relief. Id. Notably, a noncitizen convicted of a CIMT is inadmissible,

        and therefore ineligible to apply for adjustment of status. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A).

        However, an ineligible noncitizen may seek a waiver of inadmissibility.             8 U.S.C.

        § 1182(h). Such a waiver is discretionarily granted. Id. As relevant here, a waiver may

        be warranted if an applicant demonstrates that their denial of admission would inflict

        extreme hardship on a United States citizen spouse, parent, son, or daughter.              Id.

        § 1182(h)(1)(B).

               Here, the IJ determined that Uvalle was ineligible for adjustment of status given its

        finding that his Maryland conviction was a CIMT. A.R. 1037. Consequently, it concluded

        that he required a waiver of inadmissibility before it could consider adjusting his status.

        Id. The IJ then denied him a waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) as a discretionary matter

        and because he failed to demonstrate extreme hardship to an immediate family member.
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        A.R. 1043. The BIA “affirm[ed] the [IJ’s] determination that [Uvalle] does not merit

        discretionary relief for a waiver of inadmissibility under [8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)].” A.R. 5.

               Uvalle now seeks our review of the IJ’s determination that a waiver of

        inadmissibility was necessary. 1    Both the IJ and the BIA couched their denials of

        adjustment exclusively in terms of waiver eligibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)—and not in

        terms of broader adjustment eligibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)—given the IJ’s position

        that the Maryland conviction was a CIMT. Perplexingly, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial

        of a waiver while simultaneously declining to reach the CIMT question—a question that,

        in this context, presupposes whether a waiver is even necessary for adjustment eligibility.

               The government now argues that, even if the Maryland conviction is not a CIMT,

        the BIA’s eligibility conclusion would be the same under § 1255(a) as it was under

        § 1182(h)’s waiver provision—particularly given the discretionary nature of relief under

        both provisions. But “when a BIA order does not demonstrate that the agency has

        considered an issue, the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the

        agency for additional investigation or explanation.” Oliva v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 53, 61 (4th

        Cir. 2015) (simplified); see also Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 517 (2009) (“When the

        BIA has not spoken on ‘a matter that statutes place primarily in agency hands,’ our ordinary

        rule is to remand to ‘give the BIA the opportunity to address the matter in the first instance

        in light of its own expertise.” (simplified)); Li Fang Lin v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 685, 693–94

               1
                  Whether Uvalle’s Maryland conviction categorically constitutes a CIMT such that
        it triggers the 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) waiver requirement is a question of law that soundly fits
        within this Court’s appellate jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).
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        (4th Cir. 2008) (explaining that, when the BIA has not spoken on an issue, “[w]e would

        run the risk of violating fundamental separation-of-powers principles if we attempted to

        divine the BIA’s thoughts on [the] matter and tried to build a legal conclusion in a veritable

        vacuum where BIA interpretation should always first exist”). Consequently, we decline to

        determine whether Uvalle’s conviction was a CIMT given that the BIA has not considered

        the issue in the first instance. We likewise decline to engage in what would effectively be

        a harmless-error analysis—concluding that the BIA’s discretionary conclusion under

        § 1255(a) would mirror its analysis under § 1182(h)—when the agency has likewise not

        considered this question in the first instance. 2

               Thus, we grant Uvalle’s petition in part, remanding for the BIA to decide in the first

        instance whether a violation of Maryland Criminal Code § 8-301(c) categorically

        constitutes a CIMT. If the BIA concludes that such a violation is not a CIMT, it must

        reevaluate Uvalle’s eligibility for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).

                                   DISMISSED IN PART, GRANTED IN PART, AND REMANDED

               2
                Notably, the government has maintained throughout the pendency of this appeal
        that remand on the CIMT issue and derivative relief eligibility would be appropriate.
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