Court Opinion

ID: 9810835
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:01:00.488703+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:40:15.872272
License: Public Domain

Clark, C. J.,
dissenting: The defendant was indicted and convicted for “soliciting orders for intoxicating liquors contrary to section 3370, Consolidated Statutes.” The following is the evidence:
J. S. Braswell, chief of police at Hamlet, testified that the defendant, representing Garrett & Company, was in Hamlet soliciting sales for his goods. That he found the defendant at Terry’s Grocery Store, a retail grocery, with these samples (pointing to them), and asked him if he was not Garrett’s man. The defendant said he was. He then told the defendant that he was violating the prohibition law, and he would have to take him to his office. The witness said, “We discussed the sale of this stuff right freely, and the amount of alcohol it contained, and the defendant told me that this peach and banana extract contained about 40 per cent alcohol; that he delivered it to the merchants in pint pack*630ages. I said it would be a good driiik and would make a man drunk. He said that was tbe merchant’s lookout, and be bad nothing to do witb that. I tested it, poured some of the contents of tbe “peach extract” on tbe paper, struck a match to it, and it caught fire and burned up. This other stuff, “Virginia Dare extract,” contains 40 per cent alcohol. It has a very delicious smell; they drink it freely. Tes; I have seen some drunk on that. They had some of these bottles along and were drunk and in jail on it, and paid fines for drinking it. It is intoxicating. This other bottle is a sample of Garrett’s imitation grape extract, labeled “Garrett & Company, imitation grape extract, alcohol, 40 per cent”; this bottle is “Garrett’s imitation of apricot brandy”; this is “Garrett’s imitation of rum extract”; .that other is “Garrett & Company’s imitation of apple extract.” This is “peach extract.” That tastes good — is a right good drink. That next is “Garrett’s imitation of banana extract.” I have seen them drunk on this “Virginia Dare Vanilla.” “The last man that was drunk on it was a barber at Hamlet.” The State introduced tbe bottles of extracts testified to above.
Tbe chief of police then went on to say, “Tbe defendant said he was there for the purpose of taking orders and selling it. He bad orders for these extracts for sale at other places, but this (Terry’s) was the only place I saw him. He showed me bis order book; it was full. I was about to take bis order book from him, but he said be had been taking orders, and I let him take it hack. Yes; he was offering these as flavoring extracts. As I stated, he and Mr. Terry were discussing it. Mr. Terry said they Were discussing whether it was legal or not for him to sell that stuff. When I stated that I had seen some one drunk off that vanilla extract, that was before I saw Mr. Barksdale. When that man was arrested and told me he was drunk on it, I went to the merchant that sold it and told him not to sell any more.”
Tbe defendant testified that, “This was not my first visit in Hamlet. On this occasion I was trying to sell my extracts. I went to four or five stores and every store I went in they told me (answer objected to). I did not make any sales. I was offering these extracts for flavoring purposes. I had my samples full — from three of a pint on up to a pint. . . . Yes; I was soliciting his order.”
Dr. B. H. Smith, witness for the defendant, testified that be lives in Brooklyn, N. Y., and is in the employ of Garrett & Company. He further testified that he had been with Garrett & Company about two years. “They have on hand in Brooklyn some wine — a large quantity, comparatively speaking. The company does extract the alcohol from this wine, but I do not have charge of that.” In corroboration of this, it was published in New York papers 29 March, 1921, and broadcast over the country by the Associated Press, that the Garrett Company had *631a quarter of a million dollars worth, of liquor seized in Brooklyn on 28 March by the Government authorities. The witness further stated, pointing to a bottle, “That is a half pint. I do not know whether a man would have to drink all that to get drunk. "Whiskey is 45 per cent alcohol. This is about as strong as the average whiskey. I do not know that a man could drink half of that bottle and be drunk. I am not an expert on that proposition.” He further said, speaking of Garrett & Company, “We use the alcohol that has been taken from the wine. As to the brandy, it is an imitation extract of brandy. ' . . . Garrett & Company sent me down here to testify from Brooklyn. We are doing business in every State in the Union. . . . We do not want to be cut off from our sales down here. We would go to considerable expense to keep it running. Yes; Garrett & Company are deeply interested in the outcome of this case for the effect on their business in this county, at any rate. I had no instructions to do everything-in the world to have this man acquitted. I had no instructions of any sort. Mr. Travis wired me to come down and bring the permit. He is attorney for the company. I did not confer with the manager. Mr. Garrett is head of the business. I did not confer with him. Mr. Travis had conferred with him a week or 10 days ago, and he understood what I was coming for.” Dr. Smith further testified, in answer to a question by the court, “Can extracts be preserved with less than 40 per cent alcohol ?” replied, “Yes; 15 per cent or 16 per cent will preserve any vegetable product.”
There was other evidence, but this is the substance of the testimony directly affecting the matter before the court.
The court charged the jury: “The defendant is indicted for soliciting orders for intoxicating liquors. He has pleaded not guilty, and the law raises a presumption of innocence in his favor, which presumption continues throughout the trial until you convict him, if you do convict him. The burden of proof is upon the State, in order to convict him, to prove every essential ingredient, under the law, beyond a reasonable doubt. The law would be doing a vain thing to have the presumption of innocence in favor of the defendant and then to cast the burden of proof upon him to prove his innocence. The burden of proof required of the State is: 'Beyond a reasonable doubt’; that is, a doubt harder to define than the words imply. It means to fully satisfy you beyond a moral certainty as to the truth of the evidence you have heard introduced here before you. The court charges you that the only thing you have to consider in this case is the truth of the State’s evidence, and by reason of the defendant’s plea he denies the truth of the State’s evidence, and says by his plea, which the law authorizes him to make, that all the State has offered is not true. So, gentlemen, if you have no reasonable doubt as to the truth of the State’s evidence offered in this case, and have no *632doubt, that is, no reasonable doubt, as to the truth of what the witnesses have sworn to for the State, and you believe their testimony beyond a reasonable doubt, then the court directs you to return a verdict of guilty. In addition to what the court has already charged you, it will add that if you believe all the testimony for the State, as it has instructed you, and including that of the defendant, that you will return a verdict of guilty.” The jury found the defendant guilty.
The statute under which the defendant was indicted, Laws 1908, ch. 118, sec. 1, now C. S., 3370, reads as follows: “Unlawful to solicit orders for liquor. It is unlawful for any person, for himself or as agent or traveling salesman, for any person, firm, or corporation, to solicit orders or proposals of purchase of intoxicating liquors by the jug or bottle or otherwise in the State of North Carolina”; and Laws 1908, ch. 71, sec. 2, now C. S., 3368, defines intoxicating liquors as follows: “All liquors, or mixtures thereof by whatever name called, that will produce intoxication shall be construed and held to be intoxicating liquors within the meaning of this article.” “This article” is article 1. There is a proviso thereto which excepts only medicinal preparations manufactured according to prescribed formula. The defendant admitted that he solicited orders for his preparations, and that they might produce intoxication. The chief of police testified that he “had seen men drunk on this preparation,” and Dr. Smith, witness for the defendant, testified that “whiskey is about 45 per cent alcohol. This is about as strong as the average whishey,” and added that he did not know personally that a man could drink half of that half-pint bottle and be drunk. He further testified that the alcohol in these preparations had been taken from wine.
The charge of the judge to the jurors that “If they believed the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant was guilty,” was correct under the statute, O. S., 3368, which provides that “liquor which will intoxicate is intoxicating liquor.” Besides, this is a self-evident fact. The jury could not possibly have returned any other verdict, and the judge could not have charged correctly in any other way than he did. The only suggestion to the contrary is that in another article (2) of that chapter, in regard to “the sale of near-beer and other specified drinks,” sec. 3375 provides: “This article (2) shall not be construed to forbid” the sale of certain articles named, principally medicinal, or “the sale of flavoring extracts or essences when sold as such,” the sale of medical preparations, etc., and it is contended by the defendant that the words “as such” in article 2, to which alone this section, 3375, refers, shall be transported into section 3868, which applied to all the sections in article 1, and therefore the sale of flavoring extracts, it is argued, is valid notwithstanding they will make men drunk and contain admittedly 40 per cent alcohol, which every man knows will intoxicate.
*633An English statesman once declared in Parliament that be could “drive a coach and six through any act of Parliament,” but if the words “as such” have such a powerful effect that they authorize the sale of any liquor that will intoxicate notwithstanding the provisions in the act of 1908, which was ratified by the people of this State on a referendum, this will vitiate the Eighteenth Amendment, which was put into the United States Constitution by the authority of the 105 millions of people of the whole Union, and the Yolstead Act, enacted in pursuance thereof. It is not a mere “coach and six,” but T. N. T., or that more powerful preparation recently invented, for it has blown up and destroyed absolutely the practical enforcement of the prohibition of liquor by the State Government, and has destroyed the Eighteenth Amendment so far as this State is concerned. It has left not a fragment behind.
It is not reasonable to suppose that the Legislature intended to give such a tremendous import to the words “as such,” especially as it limited its meaning to article 2, and it does not apply at all to article 1, under which the defendant was indicted. Why not follow the limitation imposed by the Legislature ?
But if the Legislature did pass C. S., 3315, knowingly with intent thereby to destroy efficient prohibition legislation in the State, then the words “as such” have since been stricken out of the statute by the Eighteenth Amendment, as to which the U. S. Supreme Court held, Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253 U. S., 386, that it strikes down any and every provision in a state constitution or statute which authorizes, or sanctions, what the Eighteenth Amendment forbids, saying: “It is operative throughout the territorial limits of the United States, binds all legislative bodies, courts, public officials, and individuals within those limits and of its own force invalidates every legislative act — whether by Congress, by state legislatures, or by territorial assemblies,” and even if the words “as such” had been intended to repeal the provisions of the act of 1908 which made all liquor that would intoxicate, intoxicating liquor, which any one was indictable for offering to sell, then the Eighteenth Amendment has now stricken “as such” out of the statute.
As to the Nineteenth Amendment, we know that of its own force and vigor it struck out of every state constitution the word “male,” and that women are entitled to vote and hold office in North Carolina notwithstanding the word “male” has not been taken out of our Constitution by any act of its people.
The usual method of selling flavoring extracts is in very small bottles, 1 ounce or 2 ounces, and it is bought by the ladies of the household. The testimony here is that this article carrying 40 per cent alcohol, and, in the language of the defendant’s witness, “as strong as the average whiskey," was sold in pint bottles and even in quarts and gallon con*634tainers, and in the nature of things it was not sold “as sucb,” even if those words had any effect. The defendant’s witness, Dr. Smith, could not say that a half-pint bottle of this so-called extract did not intoxicate.
If, however, the words “as such” have authorized the sale of “grape extract,” “apricot brandy,” “rum extract,” Virginia Dare vanilla extract,” containing 40 per cent alcohol, and their “apple extract” and the like, then every saloon keeper may well resurrect himself and his place of business. All that is necessary to be done is to stretch a banner across the front of his resurrected saloon and advertise, “Brandy and other extracts, all carrying 40 per cent alcohol or more, called flavoring extracts,” and add that' the sale is guaranteed from interference by the words “as such,” and sell in pint bottles or any other quantity, as desired. As this 40 per cent alcoholic mixture makes men drunk in Hamlet, it will surely do so in Raleigh, and men will be found lying drunk about the streets of Raleigh as they were in Hamlet, and the same results will happen throughout the State.
It will be useless for the courts to try men for violation of the law in .selling whiskey which may be 45 per cent alcohol or less when without risk they can buy it as “flavoring extracts” if sold as such, containing 40 per cent, or why not 50 per cent, and be immune.
It will no longer be necessary for the bootlegger to take his customer up a dark alley or make his sale in the back room of some brothel or other place of evil repute when he can boldly reopen his saloon on Fayetteville street in Raleigh, or on the main street of any city in the State, and sell brandies and other decoctions all carrying 40 per cent alcohol, and be protected from liability by selling them as “flavoring extracts.”
Dr. Smith, witness for the defendant, testified that he was in the employ of Garrett & Company, and that they had a large quantity of wines on hand from which they derived the alcohol of which he put 40 per cent into these extracts. It was useless for them to allow the seizure of their quarter million dollars of their wines by the Government when they could have been shipped off to North Carolina and sold at will by their traveling agents, as in this case, by virtue of these magical words “as such” in a legislative statute.
Recently three outlaws, carrying a truck load of intoxicating liquors, shot down in the streets of Greensboro, McCuiston, one of the best policemen of that city, leaving his wife and several children to mourn his loss. That act was entirely useless even for the purposes of the outlaws, since all they had to do was to bring over the truck from Danville loaded down with “brandy extract,” “apricot brandy,” and other brands carrying 40 per cent alcohol, “equal,” in the language of the defendant’s witness, “to the average whiskey in strength,” and place a placard on the truck *635that they were protected becáuse they were selling flavoring extracts “as such,” for neither McCuiston nor any other policeman would have dared interfere if this was lawful.
This is not the question whether the defendant was selling his 40 per cent alcohol in good faith as a flavoring extract. No doubt it was an efficient flavoring extract, and the defendant did not deny that it would make a man drunk, but said that was “a matter for the merchant to whom he sold it.” It is not a question of the good faith of the defendant, but whether he was violating that law which the people of this Union and of this State have found necessary to enact for the protection of the public. Our prohibition statute, which was ratified by the people at the ballot box on a referendum, and which is therefore in effect of the dignity of a constitutional amendment, provides: “All liquors or mixtures thereof by whatever name called that will produce intoxication shall be construed and held to be intoxicating liquors within the medning of this article." That is now C. S., 3368; and 3370, in the same article, provides that it is unlawful for the defendant or any one else “to solicit orders or proposals of purchase of intoxicating liquors by the jug or bottle or otherwise within the State of North Carolina.” The defendant, by his own admission and by the testimony of his witness, Dr. Smith, has proven that he did this very thing. It is not a question of his good faith in believing that he was selling a good flavoring extract. But it was also intoxicating liquor upon his own evidence, and he was violating the laws of this State and of the United States. '
The basis of government in every free country is the popular will, formulated into constitutions and statutes, and the welfare of the people depends upon the orderly, faithful execution of those laws unless repealed by the same power that created them.
So clear and overwhelming is the public opinion as to the corruption, the poverty, the crime, and other evils produced by the use of intoxicating liquor that in spite of the enormous power and resistance of the aggregated wealth invested in great breweries and distilleries of all kinds, and the incalculable profits of the innumerable saloons engaged in the retail business, an amendment to the United States Constitution was passed by two-thirds of both Houses of Congress and ratified by 45 state legislatures out of the 48, and this is now the supreme law of the land, which forbids the manufacture, sale, and transportation of intoxicating liquors, and of 'all traffic therein. This had been previously enacted in this State in 1908, and was ratified by the people by over 40,000 majority. In spite of the overwhelming necessity which in the opinion of the public required this prohibition, the counsel for the defendant contends that the words “as such” inserted in another section, in another chapter, whose application is restricted by its terms to that chapter, *636permits Him to sell a mixture, by 21 different names, which, the defendant’s witness, Hr. Smith, testified “is as strong as the average whiskey,” simply by selling it, not as whiskey — openly and frankly — but by calling it “flavoring extracts.”
Upon the testimony of the defendant’s witnesses alone, if believed, he was guilty, and the charge of Judge Ray was correct. The real trouble which in the language of the defendant’s witness made “Garrett & Company deeply interested in the outcome of this case for the effect on their business,” is that the judge pujfc their man on the roads instead of imposing a fine which this millionaire corporation would have promptly paid.
It is well known that for years firms and corporations outside the State have shipped into this State, and through their agents have sold large quantities of intoxicating liquor in violation of law and as long as the courts imposed only fines, usually small ones, the custom has been for these outside violators of the liquor law to pay the fees of counsel, and pay all fines and cost laid upon their agents, which aggregate very much less than the license fees would have come to under the former system of open saloons. It is not suggested that Garrett & Company have done this, though they are defending this case.
The German Ambassador at Buenos Aires recommended his government to sink neutral ships, spurlos versenlct, that is, “leaving no trace,” and as long as that could be done with impunity, the German undersea boats followed this advice, but when the Allies invented the “depth bomb” and U. S. put in the North Sea barrage and began to destroy these outlaws of the sea so that the sailors therein did not return to 'Wilhelms-haven or Kiel, the intended crews of other submarines mutinied and the war came to an end. As long as the agents of these outside companies can violate the law and sell their 40 per cent alcohol or other “mixtures, by whatever name called, that will intoxicate,” and shall only have to pay occasional fines, this warfare against the will of the people, as expressed in the Eighteenth Amendment and in our own statutes, will go on, but when the courts, as in this case, begin to impose road sentences from which those companies cannot relieve their agents, they will find it difficult to get agents to face sentences which must be paid by the agents in person. Therefore, this strenuous contention has been made by the eminent and able counsel of this great corporation that the words “as such” used in article 2 of chapter 66, and which on the face is restricted to the sections in that article, shall apply to all the sections in article 1, and render null the provision therein that “all liquors or mixtures thereof, by whatever name called, that will produce intoxication shall be construed and held to be intoxicating liquors within the meaning of this article.” C. S., 3368. It is an astounding proposition advanced by the eminent counsel for the defendant that the words “as such” in *637another article have repealed and rendered powerless this provision in this article which is the original act adopted by the referendum to the people in 1908. If so, it has also repealed the Eighteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and so far as that amendment is concerned, North Carolina will have practically seceded from the Union.
Liquor-selling companies will continue to pay cheerfully the fines and costs imposed upon their agents in the few cases in which they happen to be convicted, and thus “keep their business going,” but the example of this practical judge from the mountains in sentencing this agent to work out 6 months of a road sentence will embarrass them, hence this strenuous defense. The imposition of a few fines upon their “agents,” and the sentencing to the roads of a few “poor whites and niggers,” will not concern these nonresident establishments, but when road sentences are put upon pleasant-faced, nicely-dressed agents of nonresident corpora-, tions who are making vast sums by violation of both State and Federal laws in selling alcoholic mixtures it will cut down the profits of their business.
The plain, common-sense meaning of the statutes, construed together, is that flavoring extracts can be sold when bona fide they are such, provided, that “such mixture, by whatever named called,” will not intoxicate. This construction repeals neither section, and is consonant to the settled rules of construction of statutes. The defendant and his witness admitted this mixture had 40 per cent alcohol, and did not deny that it would intoxicate. The chief of police testified, and he is not contradicted, that men did get drunk on the defendant’s “vanilla extract,” and were put in jail. That is the whole case. 'Why should Congress or the courts worry about 2.75 per cent beer if it is lawful to sell 40 per cent extracts ?
The act of 1908 (ratified on a referendum) forbade making, selling, etc., intoxicating liquor, and provided, “any mixture, by whatever name called, that will intoxicate is intoxicating liquor within the meaning of this act.”
The act of 1911 in regard to “near beer,” enacted to further restrict and not to enlarge such traffic, provided, that that act “shall not forbid the sale of flavoring extracts, sold as such.”
If the major purpose of this prohibition legislation is to permit the sale of flavoring extracts, then the two provisions, read together, mean, “the sale of intoxicating liquor is illegal, but this shall not forbid the sale of flavoring extracts though they will intoxicate.”
If the major purpose of the Eighteenth Amendment and of Federal and State legislation is to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquor, then the meaning is that flavoring extracts may be sold, as such, provided they do not intoxicate.”
*638"Which is the chief purpose, and which is subordinate? Upon one or the other of these two standpoints the construction must be made.
Upon the evidence of the defendant’s witness, taken alone, and upon the clear, unmistakable language of the statute, the defendant is guilty. The object of the defendant is doubtless to get a new trial, so that before another judge he may beg off with a fine, which his employers will cheerfully pay, for in the language of their own witness and employee, Dr. Smith, “They will go to considerable expense to keep the business going.” Of course.
The defendant and his witness testified that he was offering 21 different mixtures “as flavoring extracts,” bearing 40 per cent alcohol, and different names. If these can be sold, where is the limit ? Suppose, in fact, mixtures carrying 50 per cent or 60 per cent alcohol are offered as “flavoring extracts.” Dr. Smith said that these extracts were “as strong as the average whiskey.” Any other manufacturer can sell flavoring extracts, bearing different names and possibly a higher per cent of alcohol, and "as such” shops can spring up all over North Carolina in place of the old “bar rooms,” “saloons,” and “corner groceries.”
The Eighteenth Amendment is a constitutional provision, and if there were any conflict between it and our constitutional provision for trial by jury, the Eighteenth Amendment is of the higher dignity. But there is no conflict between them. The Eighteenth Amendment forbids the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquor. When, therefore, the defendant and his witnesses testified that this mixture was 40 per cent alcohol — and as. strong as the average whiskey — and the State’s witness testified that it had made several men drunk who were put in jail for it, the judge could do no less than tell the jury if they believed the evidence for the State and the defense to find the defendant guilty. S. v. Fore (Allen, J., for a unanimous Court), 180 N. C., 744; S. v. Reed, ante, 508; S. v. Pearson (top of page), ante, 589.