Court Opinion

ID: 9947006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-01 21:01:02.209846+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:44.891350
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 23-4428

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        DANNY LAMORE FORD,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
        Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, District Judge. (1:14-cr-00273-TDS-1)

        Submitted: February 27, 2024                                 Decided: February 29, 2024

        Before WILKINSON, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Sophia L. Harvey, LIAO HARVEY PC, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for
        Appellant. Philip A. Taylor, Special Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
        UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               In 2014, Danny Lamore Ford pled guilty to possession of a firearm in furtherance

        of a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The district court

        sentenced Ford to 60 months’ imprisonment, followed by five years’ supervised release.

        Shortly after Ford began his term of supervision, he was charged with new offenses in state

        court. At the hearing on Ford’s probation officer’s petition for revocation of his supervised

        release, Ford did not contest the charged violations. The district court revoked Ford’s

        supervised release and sentenced Ford to 48 months’ imprisonment, to run consecutively

        to any sentence for the state charges, followed by 12 months’ supervised release. Ford now

        appeals.

               On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

        (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether

        the district court abused its discretion in revoking Ford’s supervised release and whether

        the sentence is plainly unreasonable. Ford has filed a pro se supplemental brief raising

        additional issues. ∗ We affirm.

               The district court may revoke supervised release if it “finds by a preponderance of

        the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release.” 18 U.S.C.

        § 3583(e)(3). We review a district court’s revocation decision for abuse of discretion and

        its factual findings underlying the revocation for clear error. United States v. Padgett, 788

               ∗
                 We have considered the issues raised in Ford’s supplemental brief and conclude
        they lack merit.

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        F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015). We conclude that there was no error in the district court’s

        decision to revoke Ford’s supervised release.

               With respect to Ford’s sentence “[a] district court has broad discretion when

        imposing a sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States v. Webb, 738

        F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). Thus, we will “affirm a revocation sentence so long as it is

        within the prescribed statutory range and is not plainly unreasonable.” United States v.

        Coston, 964 F.3d 289, 296 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). When

        reviewing whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first determine

        “whether the sentence is unreasonable at all.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

               “A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately

        explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding

        Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors,” id. at 297

        (internal quotation marks omitted), and the explanation indicates “that the court considered

        any potentially meritorious arguments raised by the parties,” United States v. Patterson,

        957 F.3d 426, 436-37 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A court need

        not be as detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when

        imposing a post-conviction sentence, but it still must provide a statement of reasons for the

        sentence imposed.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal

        quotation marks omitted). “A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if, in light

        of the totality of the circumstances, the court states an appropriate basis for concluding that

        the defendant should receive the sentence imposed.” Coston, 964 F.3d at 297 (internal

        quotation marks omitted).

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               We conclude that Ford’s revocation sentence is both procedurally and substantively

        reasonable. When imposing its sentence, the district court correctly calculated the policy

        statement range, considered the relevant statutory factors, imposed a sentence within the

        statutory maximum, gave sufficiently detailed reasons for its decision, and addressed

        Ford’s arguments for a lesser sentence.

               In imposing a variant sentence above the policy statement range, the court explained

        that Ford’s violations of his supervised release conditions were serious, and involved his

        possession of drugs while on supervision and while incarcerated on the new state drug

        charges. The court also cited the fact that Ford had only been on supervision for eight

        months before he incurred the first set of new charges, concluding that the sentence needed

        to deter Ford from committing crimes. Based on the factors identified by the district court,

        the variant sentence is not plainly unreasonable.

               In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have

        found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.

        This court requires that counsel inform Ford, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme

        Court of the United States for further review. If Ford requests that a petition be filed, but

        counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this

        court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy

        thereof was served on Ford.

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              We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

        adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

        decisional process.

                                                                                  AFFIRMED

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