Court Opinion

ID: 9930211
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-06 16:02:45.624319+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:11:20.117097
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-5126     Document: 010110995585          Date Filed: 02/06/2024       Page: 1
                                                                                       FILED
                                                                           United States Court of Appeals
                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                             Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                              February 6, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                               Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                                   Clerk of Court
  MICHAEL DEWAYNE BELL,

        Petitioner - Appellant,

  v.                                                             No. 23-5126
                                                    (D.C. Nos. 4:20-CV-00343-GKF-JFJ &
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                                4:06-CR-00140-GKF-1)
                                                                 (N.D. Okla.)
        Respondent - Appellee.
                       _________________________________

             ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
                    _________________________________

 Before TYMKOVICH, EBEL, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

        Relying on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), Michael Dewayne Bell filed

 a motion seeking relief from the judgment that denied his earlier postconviction motion

 under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court denied the purported Rule 60(b) motion in

 part and dismissed it in part. Mr. Bell now applies for a certificate of appealability to

 appeal the district court’s order. 1 We deny his application and dismiss this matter.

        *
          This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case,
 res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
 consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

        Mr. Bell represents himself, so we construe his filings liberally. See Hall v.
        1

 Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
Appellate Case: 23-5126     Document: 010110995585          Date Filed: 02/06/2024    Page: 2

                                        Background

        Mr. Bell is serving two life sentences for crimes related to a 2006 bank robbery.

 The life sentences were mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1), colloquially known as a

 three-strikes law. The three-strikes law prescribes a life sentence for anyone convicted of

 a serious violent felony who has two prior convictions for serious violent felonies. See

 § 3559(c)(1)(A)(i). Mr. Bell had two prior state robbery convictions used as predicate

 convictions for the three-strikes law. See United States v. Bell, 290 F. App’x 178, 184

 (10th Cir. 2008).

        A few years ago we authorized Mr. Bell to file a second or successive § 2255

 motion to challenge his convictions and sentence. The motion argued in part that his two

 robbery convictions do not qualify as predicate convictions for the three-strikes law. The

 district court dismissed the motion, and we denied a certificate of appealability.

        Mr. Bell then filed the motion underlying these proceedings, citing Rule 60(b). He

 made two arguments:

    • He claimed that a defect occurred in the § 2255 proceedings because the
      government did not respond to his argument that his state robbery convictions
      could not serve as predicate convictions for the three-strikes law. The district
      court concluded that this was a true Rule 60(b) argument. But the court denied it
      on the merits after concluding that, contrary to Mr. Bell’s claim, the government
      had in fact responded to his § 2255 argument.

    • He argued that his state robbery convictions could not serve as predicate
      convictions for the three-strikes law. The district court concluded that this
      argument amounted to an unauthorized second or successive § 2255 claim that
      should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

                                              2
Appellate Case: 23-5126     Document: 010110995585          Date Filed: 02/06/2024        Page: 3

 And so the district court denied Mr. Bell’s motion in part and dismissed it in part. 2

                                          Discussion

        Mr. Bell cannot appeal unless we grant a certificate of appealability. See

 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). The district court resolved Mr. Bell’s motion on procedural

 grounds. And so we can grant a certificate of appealability only if Mr. Bell shows that

 reasonable jurists would find it debatable whether the district court’s procedural rulings

 were correct. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000). 3

        Mr. Bell has not met that standard. He appears to argue that the district court

 violated the principle of party presentation—that is, the principle that courts should

 normally decide only those questions presented by the parties, see Greenlaw v. United

 States, 554 U.S. 237, 243–44 (2008). But that principle has no bearing here because the

 district court addressed the issues raised in Mr. Bell’s motion and nothing more.

        Beyond Mr. Bell’s misplaced reliance on the principle of party presentation, we

 discern no coherent challenge to the district court’s analysis. He does not explain why

        2
          In addition to filing the purported Rule 60(b) motion itself, Mr. Bell filed two
 motions to supplement it. The district court decided that the motions to supplement
 related to Mr. Bell’s claim attacking his sentence on the merits. And because the district
 court had dismissed that claim for lack of jurisdiction, it concluded that the motions to
 supplement were moot. Mr. Bell makes no argument against the district court’s ruling on
 the motions to supplement, so he has waived any such argument. See Toevs v. Reid,
 685 F.3d 903, 911 (10th Cir. 2012).
        3
          Before we could grant a certificate of appealability, Mr. Bell would also have to
 show that reasonable jurists could debate whether he stated a “valid claim of the denial of
 a constitutional right.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 478. We need not address the constitutional
 issue, however, because he fails to show that the district court’s procedural rulings are
 debatable. See id. at 485.
                                               3
Appellate Case: 23-5126     Document: 010110995585          Date Filed: 02/06/2024      Page: 4

 the district court erred when it concluded that the government had in fact addressed his

 § 2255 claim in earlier proceedings. Nor does he dispute that his substantive attack

 against his sentence was an unauthorized second or successive § 2255 claim that the

 district court lacked jurisdiction to hear. See In re Cline, 531 F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th Cir.

 2008). In short, he has failed to show that reasonable jurists could debate the district

 court’s rulings.

                                         Disposition

        We deny Mr. Bell’s application for a certificate of appealability. We dismiss this

 matter.

                                               Entered for the Court

                                               CHRISTOPHER M. WOLPERT, Clerk

                                               4