Court Opinion

ID: 9553987
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:38:37.971727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:32:42.958775
License: Public Domain

STEWART, Associate Chief Justice,
dissenting: •
I agree with the majority opinion except with respect to one critical ruling: the right of an inmate to be represented by counsel at the original release hearing, which in most eases determines for practical matters the length of time a prisoner’s sentence will run. The majority holds that a prisoner has no such right. I firmly believe that a prisoner does have such a right.
In State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005 (Utah 1982), we stated, “Sentencing is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding at which a defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel.” Id. at 1007 (emphasis added); see also Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137, 88 S.Ct. 254, 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967). This Court has clearly recognized the essential similarities between the judicial sentencing proceeding and an original parole grant hearing before the Board of Pardons. In Foote v. Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991), we stated:
If the trial judge sends the defendant to prison, the judge does not determine the number of years the defendant will spend there. That is left to the unfettered discretion of the board of pardons, which performs a function analogous to that of the trial judge in jurisdictions that have a determinate sentencing scheme.
In Labrum v. State Board of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 910-11 (Utah 1993), we held that criminal parole grant hearings are legally different from other parole proceedings, that the original parole grant proceeding is essentially a sentencing proceeding, and that the state due process clause applies thereto. Although the issue presented in Labrum was not whether one who had been convicted of a crime and sentenced by a court was entitled to counsel in the original parole grant hearing, the issue before the Court was the analogous issue of whether an inmate was entitled to due process of law in an original parole grant hearing. The Court stated, “The reality of original release hearings [i.e., original parole grant hearings] is that they are analogous to sentencing hearings and require due process to the extent that the analogy holds.” Id. at 908.
A number of considerations strongly militate in favor of recognizing the right of a prisoner to counsel in an original parole grant hearing. One such factor is the necessity of avoiding factual errors in the Parole Board’s decisions. As Justice Durham wrote in Labrum:
Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court elaborated on the problem in the parole context in his dissent in Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, *1032442 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979): ■
In fact, researchers and courts have discovered many substantial inaccuracies in inmate files, and evidence in the instant ease revealed similar errors.... In this case, for example, the form notifying one inmate that parole had been denied indicated that the Board believed he should enlist in a self-improvement program at the prison. But in fact, the inmate was already participating in all such programs available_ Such errors in parole files are not unusual. E.g. Kohlman v. Norton, 380 F.Supp. 1073 (Conn.1974) (parole denied because file erroneously indicated that applicant had used gun in committing robbery); Leonard v. Mississippi State Probation and Parole Board, 373 F.Supp. 699 (N.D.Miss.1974), rev’d, 509 F.2d 820 (CA5), cert denied, 423 U.S. 998 [96 S.Ct. 428, 46 L.Ed.2d 373] (1975) (prisoner denied parole on basis of illegal disciplinary action); In re Rodriguez, 14 Cal.3d 639 [122 Cal.Rptr. 552], 537 P.2d 384 (1975) (factually incorrect material in file led parole officers to believe that prisoner had violent tendencies and that his “family reject[ed] him”); State v. Pohlabel, 61 N.J.Super. 242, 160 A.2d 647 (1960) (files erroneously showed that prisoner was under a life sentence in another jurisdiction); Hearings on H.R. 13118 et al. before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Judiciary Committee, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. VII-A, p. 451 (1972) (testimony of Dr. Willard Gaylin: “I have seen black men listed as white and Harvard graduates listed with borderline IQ’s”); S. Singer & D. Gottfredson, Development of Data Base for Parole Decision-Making 2-5 (NCCD Research Center, Supp. Report 1, 1973) (information provided by FBI often lists same charge six or seven times without showing a final disposition).
Id, 442 U.S. at 33 & n. 15, 99 S.Ct. at 2117 & n. 15 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Labrum, 870 P.2d at 909-10.
The Labrum opinion also refers to another factor that weighs heavily in favor of recognizing a right of counsel at original parole hearings:
Accuracy and fairness are essential in proceedings which impinge as directly on personal liberty as original parole grant hearings.
The interests of both society and criminal offenders are best served when fairness and accuracy are assured at all stages of the sentencing and correctional process. An offender’s perception of fairness in the criminal justice system is thought to promote rehabilitation. Accurate sentencing and parole decisions also further society’s interest in ensuring that offenders will be returned to society neither sooner nor later than is appropriate.
Finally, the criminal justice system as a whole values and protects accuracy and the appearance of fairness.... For the approximately ninety percent of all criminal defendants who plead guilty, ... sentencing and parole represent the primary basis for evaluating the fairness of the criminal justice system.
Note, A Proposal to Ensure Accuracy in Presentence Investigation Reports, 91 Yale L.J. 1225,1241-12 (1982).
Labrum, 870 P.2d at 910.
The majority opinion incorrectly indicates that by holding the due process clause of the Utah Constitution applicable to initial parole determination hearings, “we necessarily rejected the categorization of parole proceedings as ‘criminal proceedings’ to which other constitutional rights, including the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal prosecutions, might categorically attach.” That is simply not, in my view, correct. Of course, parole termination proceedings are, according to a long line of cases, civil in nature. The Court did, however, in Labrum, make quite clear that the original parole grant hearing in which a “parole release date” is set is “inherently a sentencing function.” Id. at 911. Furthermore, the Court’s rejection of plaintiffs position in this case on the ground that he had failed to show that the participation of counsel at the hearing “would have affected the accuracy of the information-considered by the court” begs the essential *1033question. It is the appearance of counsel that enables a convicted person to show inaccuracy or mistakes in the Board’s sentencing proceedings. The failure of this plaintiff, unaided by counsel, to do so is hardly an argument for not recognizing his right to such a fundamental aspect of a fair procedure.
In my view, an original parole grant hearing is part and parcel of the sentencing procedure in this state’s indeterminate sentencing scheme, and for that reason, plaintiff is constitutionally entitled to the effective assistance of counsel in those proceedings.
For that reason, I respectfully dissent.
DURHAM, J., concurs in Associate Chief Justice STEWART’s dissenting opinion.