Court Opinion

ID: 9838909
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-08 18:00:41.912462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:44.579029
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30245      Document: 00516887928         Page: 1    Date Filed: 09/08/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                   United States Court of Appeals
                                 ____________                                    Fifth Circuit

                                                                               FILED
                                                                       September 8, 2023
                                  No. 22-30245
                                 ____________                             Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                               Clerk
   David M. Phillips,

                                                            Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                       versus

   L. Brands Service Company, L.L.C., incorrectly identified as L
   Brands Direct Fulfillment, LLC; Aidan Duffy, Originally
   named as Aiden Duffy; Shawn David Tolbert,

                                            Defendants—Appellees.
                   ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                            USDC No. 2:21-CV-844
                  ______________________________

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and King and Higginson, Circuit
   Judges.
   Stephen A. Higginson, Circuit Judge:
          Plaintiff-Appellant David M. Phillips contracted with Dicom
   Transportation Group to work as a delivery driver. In this position, he would
   handle deliveries for Defendant L Brands Service Company, LLC, which
   serviced the retail locations of both Bath and Body Works and Victoria’s
   Secret. In 2017, after experiencing significant shrinkage at locations serviced
   by Phillips, Defendant-Appellee Shawn Tolbert, a logistics asset protection
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   manager at L Brands, and Defendant-Appellee Aidan Duffy, the regional
   asset protection manager at L Brands, conducted a driver observation of
   Phillips. After discovering several indicators of fraud and interviewing
   Phillips, Tolbert and Duffy concluded that Phillips had been attempting to
   steal product. The two reported their findings to both Dicom, who
   terminated Phillips’s contract, and local law enforcement, who later obtained
   a warrant and arrested Phillips on a charge of felony theft. No formal charge
   was filed against Phillips.
          Phillips subsequently filed suit against L Brands, Tolbert, and Duffy
   (collectively, “Defendants”) for claims of defamation, false arrest, malicious
   prosecution, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
   The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants and
   dismissed the case with prejudice. Phillips appeals. We AFFIRM.
                                          I.
          In 2017, Defendant-Appellee L Brands Service Company, LLC
   (“L Brands”) contracted with Dicom Transportation Group (“Dicom”), a
   warehousing and delivery company. Dicom was to help facilitate distribution
   of L Brands products—specifically, merchandise for the Bath and Body
   Works (“BBW”) and Victoria’s Secret (“VS”) brands—in the Baton
   Rouge, Louisiana region. Under the contract, L Brands would ship its
   product from its distribution center in Columbus, Ohio to Dicom’s
   warehouse in St. Rose, Louisiana. Dicom, in turn, would contract with
   delivery drivers to pick up the product from the warehouse and deliver it to
   individual stores within the area. Plaintiff-Appellant David Phillips worked
   as a delivery driver for Dicom.
          In the spring and early summer of 2017, the BBW and VS stores in the
   Mall of Louisiana in Baton Rouge experienced some of the highest shrink
   (loss of product) rates in the country. Defendant-Appellee Shawn Tolbert,

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   then working as a logistics asset protection manager for L Brands, received
   notices of specific items missing from deliveries made to the Mall of
   Louisiana VS store on March 2, March 9, April 21, and May 11, 2017. At the
   same time, Defendant-Appellee Aidan Duffy, a regional asset protection
   manager for L Brands, reported seeing VS products for sale on various social
   media platforms. These products appeared to be in the original distribution
   center packaging, indicating that the product may have been stolen during
   the warehousing or delivery process. Moreover, scanned records for the store
   showed that all cartons of merchandise were delivered.
           To keep track of its product, L Brands, working with Dicom, had
   implemented a tracking and scanning system using unique labels affixed to
   each carton with a barcode and identification number. This tracking system
   accounts for duplicate cartons.1 The labels were scanned at each point in the
   distribution process—including when the cartons were placed on a delivery
   driver’s truck and when they were delivered to the store.
           Dicom warehouse staff would scan and load cartons onto a delivery
   driver’s truck overnight. A single delivery to one store could consist of
   several hundred cartons of product. Although the truck was supposed to be
   packed with the day’s first deliveries easily accessible in the front and the
   day’s last deliveries in the back, with the labels facing outwards, sometimes
   the truck would be improperly loaded. Before heading out for delivery,
   drivers would be provided with paperwork reflecting the identification

           _____________________
           1
              So-called “duplicate cartons” (cartons with identical labels) could enter the
   system by mistake, if the distribution center improperly affixed identical copies of the same
   label on two different cartons, or if two identical cartons were produced. The computer
   system would account for this duplication by labeling the second carton with the original
   identification number along with “-1” affixed to the end. So, for instance, if two cartons
   had the label “9999,” the system would show the existence of both a carton 9999 and a
   carton 9999-1 at each step of the distribution process.

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   number of each carton on their truck and a handheld scanner preloaded with
   a digital version of that information.
          At the store, drivers would scan a barcode located on the back door of
   a specific location to “open” the delivery. The driver would then bring the
   scanner into the store, where it was supposed to remain during the unloading
   process, and hand it over to a store employee. For delivery drivers,
   possessing the scanner while unloading the truck was grounds for automatic
   termination. Cartons were supposed to be scanned, marking them as
   “delivered” in the system, as the drivers brought them inside the store.
          The scan history would indicate whether and when a given carton was
   delivered. The scanner would also note any overages, underages, or
   duplicates. Drivers were required to immediately call the warehouse to report
   any such discrepancy. Store employees were also to note any overages or
   underages recorded in the scanned total when signing for the delivery.2
          Because the scanned records for the Mall of Louisiana stores indicated
   that all cartons were delivered for the days on which there was shrinkage, and
   because of the social media sales of VS products in distribution packaging,
   Tolbert and Duffy came to suspect that the delivery driver for that location—
   Phillips—might be involved with the possible theft. Accordingly, Tolbert and
   Duffy conducted a driver observation of Phillips on June 26, 2017. Although
   Phillips timely completed his deliveries, Tolbert and Duffy observed him
   spend an “unusual” amount of time in his truck between deliveries, which
   they viewed as a sign of potential fraud. Additionally, Phillips did not call to
   report any overage, underages, duplicates, or other discrepancies over the
   course of his deliveries that day.

          _____________________
          2
             Given the large number of cartons in a delivery, store employees were not
   required to physically count the cartons received before signing off on a delivery.

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           At the final stop, Tolbert and Duffy approached Phillips, who had not
   yet finished unloading his last delivery, and explained that they were going to
   conduct an audit of his truck.3 Before searching the truck, Tolbert asked
   Phillips if there had been any issues with the delivery that day. Phillips said
   no. Tolbert and Duffy then searched the truck and, in the back, found six
   cartons off to the side. These cartons appeared to have been tampered with—
   Tolbert and Duffy noticed that product from small cartons appeared to have
   been consolidated into larger cartons, and the cartons also contained
   products from both VS and BBW.4
           Furthermore, the scanner and paperwork both showed that these
   cartons had been scanned as delivered to stores at the Mall of Louisiana
   earlier in the day. There was no record in the system of any duplicates to
   explain the discrepancy,5 nor had Phillips reported any issue. Tolbert also
   observed discrepancies in the time stamps for the cartons in question that fit
   a pattern of fraud. In particular, while the remainder of the delivered cartons
   were scanned in quick succession, sometimes within the same second,
   Tolbert noticed a delay of several minutes both before and after these six
   cartons were scanned. Tolbert explained that this delay could be accounted
   for by Phillips returning to his truck to scan the six cartons before returning
   to scan the remaining (properly delivered) cartons.
           Tolbert and Duffy proceeded to question Phillips about the six
   cartons. Phillips claimed that the cartons must have been duplicates that were
   misloaded on the truck and that his regular practice was to return the
           _____________________
           3
               All delivery agents were subject to inspection by L Brands.
           4
           Although mistakes at the distribution center sometimes resulted in the
   intermingling of differently branded products, such mistakes were very rare.
           5
            For instance, there was a record showing the existence of the original carton (i.e.,
   carton xxxx) but no record showing the existence of any duplicate (i.e., carton xxxx-1).

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   overages to the Dicom warehouse at the end of the day. Tolbert also called
   Brad Hambleton, a Dicom manager, to notify him of their findings and to ask
   if there was any reason why the six cartons would be in Phillips’s possession.
   Hambleton did not offer any viable explanation. At this point, Tolbert and
   Duffy concluded that the most likely explanation for the presence of the six
   cartons was that Phillips had been attempting to steal product.
          Following company policy, Tolbert and Duffy reported their findings
   to both Dicom and local law enforcement. Phillips, who insisted that he was
   not trying to steal anything, waited with Tolbert and Duffy for the police.
   Officers from the Livingston Parish Sheriff’s Office6 (“LPSO”) arrived on
   the scene but concluded that they did not have jurisdiction because the
   cartons had been intended for a store in another parish. The LPSO officers
   contacted the Baton Rouge Police Department (“BRPD”) to inform them of
   the situation.
          In response, a BRPD officer working security at the Mall of Louisiana
   went to the BBW to see if they were missing any product. The store
   employees indicated that they were unaware of anything missing, which
   Tolbert stated was not surprising, given that the system would show that all
   the cartons had scanned as delivered. When Tolbert and Duffy returned the
   missing product to the intended stores, store employees confirmed that
   Phillips had taken the scanner out to the truck.
          Meanwhile, Phillips was released and left the scene. The next day,
   Tolbert and Duffy shared their findings with Hambleton and David Pippen,
   another manager at Dicom. During that conversation, Tolbert and Duffy
   requested that Phillips be removed from the L Brands account. Dicom later

          _____________________
          6
              Phillip’s last stop was in Livingston Parish.

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   ended its relationship with Phillips. Tolbert and Duffy also spoke with a
   detective with the BRPD and provided a full account of their findings.
          On July 5, 2017, the BRPD prepared and obtained judicial
   authorization for an arrest warrant for Phillips. On October 26, 2017, officers
   from the New Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”) pulled Phillips over
   for a traffic violation. After the NOPD officers discovered the outstanding
   warrant, they arrested Phillips. Several days later, on November 1, 2017,
   Phillips was transferred to East Baton Rouge Parish Prison. Phillips was later
   released on bail. On April 23, 2018, the District Attorney made a provisional
   determination not to file formal charges against Phillips.
          Soon after, on June 8, 2018, Phillips filed suit in Civil District Court
   for the Parish of Orleans against Dicom and Pippen, a Dicom manager,
   asserting claims for (1) defamation, (2) false arrest, (3) malicious prosecution,
   (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”), and (5) intentional
   infliction of emotional distress. Phillips later amended his complaint twice,
   each time adding more defendants. Later, in March 2021, Phillips voluntarily
   dismissed his claims against all defendants except L Brands, Tolbert, and
   Duffy (collectively, “Defendants”), who subsequently removed the case to
   federal court, invoking diversity jurisdiction. The district court granted
   summary judgment in favor of Defendants as to all claims. Phillips appeals.
                                          II.
          This court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
   novo, applying the same standards as the district court. EEOC v. Agro Distrib.,
   LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 469 (5th Cir. 2009). Summary judgment is proper when
   the moving party can demonstrate that, viewing the evidence in the light
   most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no issue of material fact and
   that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see
   also LifeCare Mgmt. Servs. LLC v. Ins. Mgmt. Adm’rs Inc., 703 F.3d 835, 840-

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   41 (5th Cir. 2013). “A genuine dispute as to a material fact exists ‘if the
   evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
   nonmoving party.’” Rogers v. Bromac Title Servs., LLC, 755 F.3d 347, 350
   (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
   (1986)). A panel may affirm on “any ground supported by the record, even if
   it is different from that relied on by the district court.” Reed v. Neopost USA,
   Inc., 701 F.3d 434, 438 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
           On appeal, Phillips contends that the district court erred in granting
   summary judgment as to his claims for (1) defamation, (2) malicious
   prosecution, and (3) negligent infliction of emotional distress.7 We address
   each in turn.
                                                  A.
           We begin with Phillips’s defamation claim. His claim is premised
   upon two separate communications by Tolbert and Duffy (and by extension,
   L Brands): first, when they contacted local police to report the alleged theft
   and second, when they reported the results of their investigation to
   Hambleton and Pippen, managers at Dicom, and requested that Phillips be
   removed from the L Brands account.
           Under Louisiana law, which we apply in this diversity case, Seacor
   Holdings, Inc. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 635 F.3d 675, 680 (5th Cir. 2011), a
   plaintiff must establish four elements to bring a defamation claim: “(1) a false
   and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) an unprivileged

           _____________________
           7
              In his opening brief, Phillips fails to address the district court’s grant of summary
   judgment as to both his false arrest claim and intentional infliction of emotional distress
   claim and, in his reply brief, did not contest that he has abandoned these claims. See Crose
   v. Humana Ins. Co., 823 F.3d 344, 351 n.5 (5th Cir. 2016) (“We have consistently held that
   failure to brief an issue in the opening brief abandons that issue on appeal . . . . regardless of
   whether the claims are intertwined or related.” (citation omitted)).

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   publication to a third party; (3) fault (negligence or greater) on the part of the
   publisher; and (4) resulting injury.” Johnson v. Purpera, 320 So. 3d 374, 386-
   87 (La. 2021). The Louisiana Supreme Court has explained that the “fault
   requirement is often set forth in the jurisprudence as malice, actual or
   implied.” Costello v. Hardy, 864 So. 2d 129, 139 (La. 2004). “Thus, in order
   to prevail on a defamation claim, a plaintiff must prove ‘that the defendant,
   with actual malice or other fault, published a false statement with defamatory
   words which caused plaintiff damages.’” Id. at 139-40 (quoting Trentecosta v.
   Beck, 703 So. 2d 552, 559 (La. 1997)).
          At least with respect to communications with Dicom, Defendants
   argue that Phillips fails to establish the first element: the existence of a
   defamatory statement.8 According to Defendants, the record reflects that
   Tolbert and Duffy merely reported the results of their investigation—none
   of these statements, on their own, was either false or accusatory. Yet we need
   not parse the exact wording of each statement. Considered together and
   taken in the context of their request for Phillips to be removed from the L
   Brands account, Tolbert and Duffy were accusing Phillips of criminal
   conduct. See id. at 140 (“Words which expressly or implicitly accuse another
   of criminal conduct, or which by their very nature tend to injure one’s
   personal or professional reputation, even without considering extrinsic facts
   or surrounding circumstances, are considered defamatory per se.” (citations
   omitted)).
          Regardless of whether the statements were defamatory, Defendants
   contend that these statements are protected by the conditional privilege. “In
   Louisiana, privilege is a defense to a defamation action.” Kennedy v. Sheriff

          _____________________
          8
             Defendants do not dispute that the communications to the police, in which
   Tolbert and Duffy reported Phillips for theft, would be defamatory per se.

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   of E. Baton Rouge, 935 So. 2d 669, 681 (La. 2006) (citing Costello, 864 So. 2d
   at 141). This privilege can be either absolute or conditional, see id.; here,
   Defendants assert only the conditional privilege.9
           The conditional privilege operates by shifting the burden from the
   defendant to rebut the plaintiff’s allegation of fault to the plaintiff to establish
   an abuse of the privilege. Id. at 687. In other words, determining the
   application of the conditional privilege involves two steps: first, the court
   must determine whether the circumstances occasion the assertion of the
   privilege and second, the court must decide whether the privilege was
   abused. Hakim v. O’Donnell, 144 So. 3d 1179, 1188 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2014).
           The first step involves a determination as to whether, as a matter of
   law, the “circumstances in which a communication was made satisfy the legal
   requirements for invoking the conditional privilege.” Cook v. Am. Gateway
   Bank, 49 So. 3d 23, 33 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2010) (citing Smith v. Our Lady of the
   Lake Hosp., Inc., 639 So. 2d 730, 745 (La. 1994)). In determining the
   boundaries of this privilege, courts consider the purpose of the conditional
   privilege, which seeks to recognize
           the social necessity of permitting full and unrestricted
           communication concerning a matter in which the parties have
           an interest or duty, without inhibiting free communication in
           such instances by the fear that the communicating party will be
           held liable in damages if the good faith communication later
           turns out to be inaccurate.
   Kennedy, 935 So. 2d at 681-82 (quotation omitted).

           _____________________
           9
              Nor could Defendants successfully assert an absolute privilege, which applies to
   a limited number of circumstances—such as statements by judges in judicial proceedings
   or legislators in legislative proceedings—not present here. Kennedy, 935 So. 2d at 681.

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          Accordingly, although there is no “precise formula” to calculate the
   scope of the conditional privilege, its elements “have been described as good
   faith, an interest to be upheld and a statement limited in scope to this
   purpose, a proper occasion, and publication in the proper manner and to
   proper parties only.” Id. at 681 (quotation and citations omitted).
          There is no meaningful dispute that Tolbert and Duffy’s statements
   were made to proper parties. First, as to their report to local law enforcement,
   Louisiana courts have consistently recognized that good faith reports to law
   enforcement as to suspected criminal activity are covered by the conditional
   privilege. See, e.g., id. at 683; see also Bradford v. Judson, 12 So. 3d 974, 980
   (La. App. 2 Cir. 2009) (explaining that Kennedy established that “there is no
   civil liability imposed on a citizen for inaccurately reporting criminal
   misconduct with no intent to mislead”); Cook, 49 So. 3d at 33 (“A good faith
   report to law enforcement officers of suspected criminal activity may
   appropriately be characterized as speech on a matter of public concern.”).
   Indeed, Phillips himself acknowledges that the conditional privilege applies
   in such circumstances.
          Second, as to Tolbert and Duffy’s statements to Dicom management,
   courts have extended the conditional privilege to good faith reports of
   suspected wrongdoing made where the parties share a common business or
   financial interest. See, e.g., Bradford, 12 So. 3d at 982 (concluding conditional
   privilege covered communications between a university president’s wife and
   an alumna about the president of the alumni association on the basis that both
   women shared an interest in the welfare of the school); Roux v. Pflueger, 16
   So. 3d 590, 596 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2009) (affirming summary judgment to the
   defendants on the grounds that the conditional privilege applied to
   statements between members of a church’s finance council and the vicar
   general of their archdiocese about discrepancies in the church’s financial
   records and missing church property). And here, the parties do not dispute

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   that L Brands had an ongoing business relationship with Dicom, its
   distributor, and Tolbert and Duffy’s statements directly related to that
   relationship—namely, L Brands’ control over who worked on their account.
           Rather than engage with these facts, Phillips suggests that the
   conditional privilege does not apply because Tolbert and Duffy made
   defamatory statements to other, improper, third parties—namely, other
   drivers and Phillips’s family. Nothing in the record, however, supports these
   allegations. For example, although Phillips highlights the affidavit of Mizel
   Henry, another third-party contractor, to show that other drivers were told
   Phillips had stolen from L Brands, this affidavit contains no factual indication
   that Tolbert, Duffy, or anyone else from L Brands made such a statement.
   Instead, Henry’s affidavit states that Pippen, a manager at Dicom, spoke with
   him about Phillips’s alleged theft.10 Similarly, although Phillips alleges that L
   Brands made defamatory statements to members of his family, he fails to
   provide any citation to the record to support this contention.11
           Perhaps recognizing the weakness in this position, Phillips primarily
   argues that Defendants fail on the second step of the conditional privilege
   analysis—that is, he argues that Defendants have abused the privilege. To
   demonstrate abuse of the privilege, the plaintiff must show that the
   “defendant’s remarks [were] made with malice or without good faith or for
   a purpose outside of the scope of the privilege.” Kennedy, 935 So. 2d at 683-
   84. In defamation cases, “‘good faith’ is synonymous with ‘without malice,’
           _____________________
           10
                Neither Dicom nor any of its employees is currently a defendant in this action.
           11
              At most, Phillips can point to a line in the next steps section of the “Investigation
   Recap” Tolbert prepared for L Brands the day after the truck search, which stated that
   Tolbert and Duffy would “continu[e] to review and investigate two relatives of Phillips
   who also deliver to L [B]rands for Dicom.” Nothing in this presentation, however,
   indicates that Tolbert and Duffy contacted Phillips’s relatives. In fact, Tolbert testified that
   neither he nor Duffy conducted any further investigation of Phillips’s relatives.

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   and means having reasonable grounds for believing the statement is correct.”
   Id. at 684. Thus, Louisiana courts have explained that “[t]he conditional
   privilege is abused if the publisher (a) knows the matter to be false; or (b) acts
   in reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity.” Cook, 49 So. 3d at 34 (citing
   Kennedy, 935 So. 2d at 684).
          Under this standard, “[m]ere negligence as to falsity is not sufficient
   to amount [to] abuse of a conditional or qualified privilege.” Kennedy, 935 So.
   2d at 689 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 600 cmt. b.).
   Instead, the plaintiff “must prove that the publication was deliberately
   falsified, published despite the defendant’s awareness of probable falsity, or
   the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his
   publication.” Jalou II, Inc. v. Liner, 43 So. 3d 1023, 1037 (La. App. 1 Cir.
   2010) (citing Kennedy, 935 So. 2d at 688).
          Although “the second step of determining abuse of a conditional or
   qualified privilege or malice is generally a fact question unless only one
   conclusion can be drawn from the evidence,” Hakim, 144 So. 3d at 1188,
   “because of the chilling effect on the exercise of free speech, defamation
   actions have been found particularly susceptible to summary judgment,”
   Kennedy, 935 So. 2d at 686 (determining that the conditional privilege applied
   and affirming a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant on that
   basis). In practice, because the bar for establishing abuse of the conditional
   privilege is so high, the application of the conditional privilege is often
   decided at the summary judgment stage. See, e.g., Barber v. Willis Commc’ns,
   Inc., 241 So. 3d 471, 477-78 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2017) (affirming a grant of
   summary judgment to the defendant after finding that the defendant’s
   communications were covered by the conditional privilege and that the
   plaintiff had failed to present evidence that the defendant was “highly aware
   that the statement . . . was probably false”); Bindom v. Kirby, 276 So. 3d 550,
   557 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2019) (similar); compare Bradford, 12 So. 3d at 983

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   (concluding that a genuine dispute of fact existed as to whether the
   conditional privilege was abused where the defendant had sent an email
   accusing the plaintiff of theft in regards to a “business dispute which had
   lasted, at that time, a few short weeks”).
          Here, not only does the record fail to show that Tolbert and Duffy
   either knew that their statement that Phillips had stolen merchandise to be
   false or acted in reckless disregard as to its falsity, but it also contains ample
   evidence supporting Tolbert and Duffy’s assertions that they were justified
   in believing their statements to be accurate. The following facts support the
   reasonableness of Tolbert and Duffy’s conclusion that Phillips had engaged
   in wrongdoing: (1) the context of the investigation, particularly the shrinkage
   at the Mall of Louisiana locations and the existence of online sale postings in
   the area for product that appeared to be in delivery packaging, which
   suggested potential misconduct on the part of the delivery driver; (2) their
   own observation that Phillips appeared to spend an unusual amount of time
   in the back of his truck during his deliveries; (3) the presence of six cartons
   that had been scanned as having been delivered earlier in the day in the back
   of Phillips’s truck after he was audited at his last stop; (4) the scan history,
   which showed irregular time gaps between the time when those six cartons
   were scanned relative to the other cartons; (5) the lack of any record in either
   the paper bill of lading or the scan history to corroborate Phillips’s claim that
   the cartons must have been duplicates; (6) the state of the six cartons, in
   which the BBW and VS products had been consolidated into the larger
   cartons; and (7) the inability of Phillips’s supervisor, Hambleton, to provide
   a plausible explanation for the presence of the six cartons in the back of the
   truck. Considered together, these facts support a good-faith suspicion that
   Phillips was involved in the theft of L Brands merchandise.
          Nonetheless, Phillips contends that Tolbert and Duffy’s failure to
   take further investigative steps raises a triable issue of fact as to whether they

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   acted with malice (or without good faith). This argument, however, is
   expressly foreclosed by precedent. In Kennedy v. Sheriff of East Baton Rouge,
   the Louisiana Supreme Court explained that a “failure to investigate does not
   present a jury question on whether a statement was published with reckless
   disregard for the truth.” 935 So. 2d at 689.
           In fact, Phillips’s argument is essentially the same that was at issue in
   Kennedy itself. There, the plaintiff brought a claim for defamation after
   employees at a fast-food restaurant called the police to report their suspicion
   that he had attempted to purchase food with a counterfeit bill. Id. at 688. The
   district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, finding that
   the record lacked any showing of malice to support a defamation claim. Id. at
   674. The intermediate court reversed, finding that because there was no
   showing that the restaurant employees had been trained in the detection of
   counterfeit money, the defendants failed to show that the employees had
   acted reasonably or without reckless disregard when calling in a report based
   on the unusual appearance of the bill.12 Id. at 674, 688-89.
           The Louisiana Supreme Court firmly rejected this approach, which it
   described as hinging on the employees’ “fail[ure] to take reasonable
   measures to verify the authenticity of the bill before reporting their
   suspicions to police.” Id. at 689. While acknowledging that it might have been
   “more reasonable” for the restaurant to have provided employees with such
   training, the Louisiana Supreme Court emphasized that a plaintiff “cannot
   show reckless disregard for the truth by demonstrating only that the
   defendant acted negligently and failed to investigate fully before contacting
   police.” Id. Rather, the Court clarified, “reckless disregard is typically found
           _____________________
           12
              The affidavits of the two Sheriff’s deputies who responded to the call supported
   that the bill in question, a 1974 series one-hundred-dollar bill being offered for use in 2001,
   looked “suspicious.” See id. at 689.

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                                    No. 22-30245

   where a story is fabricated by the defendant, is the product of his imagination,
   or is so inherently improbable that only a reckless man would have put it in
   circulation.” Id. As was the case in Kennedy, Phillips points to nothing in the
   record to demonstrate such conduct on the part of Tolbert and Duffy and
   thus fails to demonstrate any abuse of the conditional privilege.
          In sum, the statements at issue were limited communications that
   were made in good faith and only to interested parties. Accordingly, the
   conditional privilege applies such that Phillips cannot prevail on his
   defamation claim. We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s grant of
   summary judgment on the defamation claim.
                                         B.
          We now turn to Phillips’s malicious prosecution claim. To bring a
   claim for malicious prosecution under Louisiana law, a plaintiff must
   establish six elements:
          (1) the commencement or continuance of an original criminal
          or civil judicial proceeding; (2) its legal causation by the
          present defendant in the original proceeding; (3) its bona fide
          termination in favor of the present plaintiff; (4) the absence of
          probable cause for such proceeding; (5) the presence of malice
          therein; and (6) damage conforming to legal standards
          resulting to plaintiff.
   Lemoine v. Wolfe, 168 So. 3d 362, 367 (La. 2015) (quoting Jones v. Soileau, 448
   So. 2d 1268, 1271 (La. 1984)); see also Smith v. City Bank & Trust Co., 271 So.
   3d 263, 267 (La. 2016) (“The plaintiff ordinarily bears the burden of proof on
   all the elements of the malicious prosecution action.” (citation omitted)).
   “Strict compliance with all essential elements is required” for a malicious

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                                           No. 22-30245

   prosecution claim.13 Gentry v. Spillers, 325 So. 3d 398, 406 (La. App. 1 Cir.
   2021).
            Here, Phillips’s malicious prosecution claim is coterminous with his
   defamation claim, resting on Tolbert and Duffy’s report to law enforcement
   about the suspected theft. It must therefore fail for the same reason as his
   defamation claim—his failure to show the existence of malice. In a malicious
   prosecution action, malice “exists when a charge is made with knowledge
   that it is false or with reckless disregard for the truth.” Kelly v. W. Cash &
   Carry Bldg. Mat. Store, 745 So. 2d 743, 761 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1999). The
   Louisiana Supreme Court has elaborated that “[m]alice is found when the
   defendant uses the prosecution for the purpose of obtaining any private
   advantage,” including for purposes of extortion, to force performance of a
   contract, to intimidate a witness, or “as an experiment to discover who might
   have committed the crime.” Miller v. E. Baton Rouge Par. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 511
   So. 2d 446, 453 (La. 1987).
            As discussed above, Defendants provided evidence supporting their
   position that they reported their findings with the honest and reasonable
   belief that Phillips had attempted to steal cartons of L Brands merchandise.
   As with his defamation claim, Phillips provides no evidence to dispute this

            _____________________
            13
             We briefly note that, in addition to arguing that Phillips is unable to satisfy the
   second, fourth, and fifth prongs of a malicious prosecution claim, Defendants contend that
   the conditional privilege should be extended to bar both Phillips’s malicious prosecution
   and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. So far, only one state intermediate
   court, seemingly in dicta, has endorsed such an expansion of the conditional privilege, see
   Adams v. Harrah’s Bossier City Investment Co., LLC, 948 So. 2d 317, 320 (La. App. 2 Cir.
   2007), and at least one federal district court has straightforwardly rejected it, see Johnson v.
   Regions Bank, No. 20-533, 2020 WL 3606267 at *6 (E.D. La. July 1, 2020). As we may
   decide this claim on alternative grounds, we decline to wade into what appears to be a still
   unsettled and important question of Louisiana state law.

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                                      No. 22-30245

   contention. Finally, to the extent that Phillips asserts that the existence of
   malice is necessarily an issue of fact to be decided by the jury, Louisiana
   courts routinely determine the malice question at the summary judgment
   stage. See, e.g., Keppard v. AFC Enters., Inc., 802 So. 2d 959, 965-66 (La. App.
   4 Cir. 2001); Gaspard v. Provensal, 195 So. 3d 1287, 1290 (La. App. 4 Cir.
   2016).
            Because Phillips is unable to establish the fifth element of a malicious
   prosecution claim, we need not reach the other elements. We AFFIRM the
   district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants.
                                           C.
            Last, we address Phillips’s negligent infliction of emotional distress
   claim (NIED) claim. To bring an NIED claim, a plaintiff must prove five
   separate elements, a negative answer as to any of which results in a
   determination of no liability. Covington v. Howard, 146 So. 3d 933, 937 (La.
   App. 2 Cir. 2014) (citing Mathieu v. Imperial Toy Corp., 646 So. 2d 318, 322
   (La. 1994)). Importantly, Louisiana does not recognize NIED as an
   independent tort. Simmons v. State, 255 So. 3d 701, 705 (La. App. 4 Cir.
   2018); see also Kelly, 745 So. 2d at 760 (explaining that a plaintiff’s claims for
   emotional distress “would have been as an element of damage arising out of
   her claims for false imprisonment and arrest, defamation and malicious
   prosecution” and therefore, because those claims failed, it did not give rise
   to a separate cause of action). Here, because Phillips’s NIED claim is
   derivative of his defamation and malicious prosecution claims, it must fail for
   the same reasons.14

            _____________________
            14
           Notably, in briefing this claim, Phillips simply repeats his argument that
   Defendants are liable because they failed to conduct further investigation.

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          Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary
   judgment as to Phillips’s negligent infliction of emotional distress claim.

                                        III.
          For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is
   AFFIRMED.

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