Court Opinion

ID: 9854762
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:13:42.001456+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:21.419374
License: Public Domain

Felton, C. J.,
dissenting. I think that the court erred in excluding testimony to the effect that the couplers on the car in question coupled at least twice on impact just prior to the injuries, and as to the good condition of the couplers four days after the injuries when they were inspected. The testimony was relevant on the question whether the knuckles were properly set for coupling. There is no liability for a failure of couplers to couple on impact unless at least one of the knuckles on one of the two cars sought to be coupled together is open. Affolder v. N. Y. C. & St. L. R. Co., 339 U. S. 96 (70 Sup. Ct. 509, 94 L. ed. 683). The statement in Carter v. Atlanta &c. R. Co., 338 U. S. 430, that “The fact that the coupler functioned properly on other occasions is immaterial,” does not mean what the majority of this court has ruled that it means. The question in that case was not whether the couplers were properly set or not. But that is the question we have in this case. If it be conceded that couplers are properly set and cars fail to couple one time on impact, it then is immaterial that the cars coupled properly at other times, but that is a far cry from saying that a railroad is precluded from disproving its liability by showing by circumstantial evidence which can be found by the jury to be inconsistent with sworn testimony of witnesses showing the contrary. I concede that, if the drawbar was out of line and caused the *809car to fail to couple on impact on a curve, or the cars came uncoupled after coupling, the railroad would be liable, but these concessions still do not preclude the railroad from proving that it was not liable for the reason that there was a failure of the cars to couple upon impact, and that such failure was due to the failure of the plaintiff to open one of the knuckles. If the jury believed this to be true, it could have found that the car did not couple in the first instance and therefore did not later uncouple because the car on which plaintiff was riding was being pushed and it did not require a coupling to push it. The type of evidence here involved is clearly admissible under numerous authorities, among which are: 20 Am. Jur. 284, § 306, Notes 5, 6 and 7; Wigmore on Evidence, Yol. II, p. 413, § 437; McCormick on Evidence, p. 351, § 167 (1), 32 L. R. A. (NS) 1084; City of Columbus v. Anglin, 120 Ga. 785 (7) (48 S. E. 318); Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Keating, 45 Ga. App. 811 (4) (165 S. E. 873), and cases cited. See also: Union Pac. R. Co. v. Edmondson, 77 Neb. 682 (110 N. W. 650); Woods v. Long Island R. Co., 42 N. Y. S. 140 (2), affirmed 159 N. Y. 546 (54 N. E. 1095); Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Gillison, 173 Ill. 264 (50 N. E. 657, 64 Am. St. R. 117).