Court Opinion

ID: 9697125
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:06:49.899343+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:50.721599
License: Public Domain

LEDERBERG, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Article 1, Section 5, of the Rhode Island Constitution provides that “Every person within this state ought to find a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which may be received in one’s person.” The right to seek legal remedy of an injury is of course restricted by statutes of limitations that are intended to “prevent the unexpected enforcement of stale claims concerning which persons interested have been thrown off their guard for want of seasonable prosecution.” Wilkinson v. Harrington, 104 R.I. 224, 236, 243 A.2d 745, 752 (R.I.1968). This Court has long recognized, however, that this purpose is not defeated by providing a “reasonable opportunity to become cognizant of an injury and its cause before the statute of limitations begins to run” and that “in certain eases and circumstances in the past, [this Court has] rejected the general rule that a cause of action accrues at the time of the injury.” Anthony v. Abbott Laboratories, 490 A.2d 43, 45 (R.I. 1985).
In Wilkinson, this Court adopted the discovery rule for medical-malpractice claims, reasoning that
“[t]o construe the statute [of limitations] narrowly so as to preclude a person from obtaining a remedy simply because the wrong of which he was the victim did not manifest itself for at least two years from the time of the negligent conduct, is clearly inconsistent with the concept of fundamental justice. To require a man to seek a remedy before he knows of his rights, is palpably unjust.”9 104 R.I. at 238, 243 A.2d at 753.
Because injuries resulting from medical malpractice may go undetected for some time, this Court concluded that it would “prefer to follow the discovery rule in medical malpractice cases because in our opinion the theory behind it is eminently fair and perfectly consistent with the function and nature of limitation acts.” Id. at 239, 243 A.2d at 753.
The discovery rule was subsequently applied to a product-liability claim in Anthony, when this Court weighed “the policy of eliminating the unexpected enforcement of stale claims with the opportunity of a person to have her day in court to vindicate those rights that have been violated but have remained undiscovered.” 490 A.2d at 46. The Anthony court determined that the defendant drug companies would not be unduly prejudiced by application of the discovery rule because
“[i]t should be foreseeable to the drug companies that if they put a product on the market that has harmful consequences, its effects will take some time to manifest themselves. They should also be aware that there may be an additional period of time before the injured person learns that her injury was the result of wrongful conduct on the part of the manufacturer.” Id. at 47.
This Court concluded that public policy would be served by application of the discovery rule, because it would “encourage manufacturers to be more thorough in their testing before a product is placed on the market.” Id. at 48.
It is clear that if a child victim of sexual abuse alleges repressed recollection of the abuse, and the trial justice finds the repressed-recollection allegation to be valid, the tolling provisions, if applicable, of G.L. 1956 § 9-1-19 would trigger in against the nonperpetrator defendant. In such an event, the child victim’s claim could be brought against the nonperpetrator within three years of the recall of sexual abuse and within *885seven years against the actual perpetrator pursuant to § 9-l-51(a). Notwithstanding this tolling provision, however, our holdings in Anthony and in Wilkinson provide ample precedent for applying the discovery rule to certain nonperpetrator defendants. While a disability under § 9-1-19 would likely address the circumstances of most cases, I would apply the discovery rule to § 9-1-14(b) without the necessity of invoking a disability. Moreover, if the requirements of § 9 — 1—14(b) are met in accordance with State v. Wheeler, 496 A.2d 1382 (R.I.1985), the distinction may not be apparent in a given case.
As one of the plaintiffs cogently argued: “Pedophiles are notoriously difficult to deter. The institutions that employ them, however, are highly sensitive to questions of legal liability. These institutions are likely to do whatever will minimize their liability and insure their institutional survival.”
According to plaintiffs, the nonperpetrator defendants were alleged to have been “directly and actively involved in [the perpetrators’] sexual predations” insofar as they “knew what was going on, yet * * * neglected to limit [the perpetrators’] authority over children” and, in some eases, “actively assigned [them] specifically to work with * * * youth, their knowledge notwithstanding,” and repeatedly transferred the perpetrators to “hush up” scandals when they arose. Application of the discovery rule in such cases can help to deter institutional behavior in which concern for self-preservation outweighs concern for the children placed under the supervision or authority of institutions, whether in child-care, educational, religious, cultural, or social settings. Clearly, such deterrence constitutes a persuasive policy consideration that supports application of the discovery rule to suits against nonperpetrator defendants.
Given the common delay between sexual abuse and a victim’s realization of its resulting injury, sound public policy would permit application of the discovery rule against non-perpetrator defendants. As a result, institutions entrusted with the care of children would be more likely to screen their employees and would act promptly to protect children in their custody at the time evidence of abuse is presented. There is no meaningful distinction between the institutional non-perpetrator defendants in the cases before us and hospitals that have been subject to liability under the discovery rule for medical malpractice committed by physicians in their employ. See, e.g., Johnson v. St. Patrick’s Hospital, 148 Mont. 125, 417 P.2d 469 (1966) (discovery rule applied in malpractice action against doctor and hospital), cited in Wilkinson, 104 R.I. at 231, 234, 243 A.2d at 750, 751; Brown v. Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hospital, 117 N.H. 739, 378 A.2d 1138 (1977) (same).
Statutes of limitations are “predicated on the reasonable and fair presumption that valid claims which are of value are not usually left to gather dust or remain dormant for long periods of time.” Wilkinson, 104 R.I. at 236, 243 A.2d at 752 (citing Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Insurance Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 386, 19 L.Ed. 257 (1868)). In cases of childhood sexual abuse, in which resulting injury may go unrealized for many years, this “reasonable and fair presumption” is neither valid nor just. The General Assembly’s incorporation of the discovery rule into § 9-1-51(a) evinces its clear recognition of the fact that the delay between early sexual abuse and the discovery of resulting harm should not be construed against the victims of such abuse. Victims of sexual abuse are entitled, under § 9-l-51(a), to bring an action against their abusers within seven years of discovering the resulting injuries. Clearly, those same victims should be entitled to discover their injuries before the general, three-year statute of limitations tolls an action against a nonperpetrator.
As between innocent victims who could not reasonably be expected to discover the effects of sexual abuse within the prescribed statute-of-limitations period and institutions that had knowledge of their employees’ abusive behavior but took no action to remedy or prevent the abuse, equity is served by adopting a rule most favorable to those victims.

. In 1971, the General Assembly increased the limitations period prescribed by G.L.1956 § 9-1-14 from two years to three years. P.L.1971, ch. 200.