Court Opinion

ID: 9548117
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:57:45.730709+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:28.463495
License: Public Domain

THORNTON, J.,
concurring in part; dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority that the stop was valid and that the trial judge erred in ruling to the contrary. Likewise, I am in full accord with the objective test rule announced in the majority opinion.
*34I do not, however, agree with the majority’s conclusion that the arresting officer’s (Officer Miller) actions after the stop were unreasonable. The majority opinion disregards the fact that while the trial judge found the stop invalid, he nevertheless concluded that Officer Miller’s actions after tine stop were not unreasonable. In addition, the judge stated:
"Some claim has been made that they had to be advised of Miranda. I don’t think that is true. The case law is clear that under these situations they were not a focal suspect in custody and, therefore Miranda didn’t apply. So I would think there would be a valid consent if the stop had been proper. I recognize that is a reasonably close question. I just don’t think the officers either have to shut their eyes to what is in front of them.” (Emphasis supplied.)
I summarize my conclusions as follows:
Officer Miller was entitled to stop the automobile and request identification of the occupants, State v. Jackson, 27 Or App 879, 557 P2d 691 (1976), rev den (1977), and State v. Huss, 23 Or App 118, 541 P2d 498, rev den (1975); that having made a legal stop, he was justified by reason of the question over ownership of the automobile to make further inquiries related to ownership; that having observed that Dawson was "unsteady,” his speech "slurred” and his "eyes * * * bloodshot,” the officer was further justified in suspecting that he was under the influence of drugs, and that the vehicle might contain evidence thereof, State v. Cortez, 10 Or App 122, 497 P2d 1228, rev den (1972); that the temporary detention of defendants for the purpose of these inquiries was not an unreasonable detention under these circumstances, Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 US 106, 98 S Ct 330, 54 L Ed 2d 331 (1977); that the officer could properly ask defendants for permission to search the vehicle; that the discovery of the marihuana and pistol was the result of a consent search, State v. Douglas, 260 Or 60, 488 P2d 1366 (1971), cert den 406 US 974 (1972); State v. Sell, 9 Or App 299, 496 P2d 44, rev den (1972); and that the *35officer was not required to advise either defendant that he had a right to refuse to consent to the search, State v. Flores, 280 Or 273, 570 P2d 965 (1977).
Finally, I cannot agree that the rule in State v. Hickmann, 273 Or 358, 540 P2d 1406 (1975), which is referred to in the majority opinion, is applicable here.
In Hickmann our Supreme Court held inter alia that
"* * * a. question [whether the defendant consented to the search of his tepee] not raised and preserved in the trial court will not be considered upon appeal * * *.
"Since the State did not rely upon 'consent’ as a basis to justify the warrantless search at the trial court level or on appeal, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.” 273 Or at 360.
In my view Hickmann is inapposite for the following reasons: First, unlike in Hickmann, the question now before us, i.e., whether the search of the automobile was consented to, was raised both in the trial court and on appeal.
Second, here the trial judge ruled that the search was valid under all the facts and circumstances, although he ruled that the stop was invalid.
Third, the state in its brief on appeal emphasized that the trial judge had found the search to be authorized.
Fourth, the state had also pointed out in its brief on appeal that: "It should also be remembered that Dawson manifested symptoms of being under the influence of drugs or alcohol.”
As the majority opinion states:
"* * * [T]he fact that a police officer articulates his subjective reason for arresting or searching that happens to be invalid is irrelevant if a court later concludes that a reasonable person, viewing the facts objectively, would have had probable cause to arrest or search. [Citing cases.]” 34 Or App at 29.
I would therefore reverse and remand.