Court Opinion

ID: 9382526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-27 21:03:56.299886+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:39.889496
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
            in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                         2023 IL App (3d) 210594-U

                                  Order filed March 27, 2023
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                    IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                              THIRD DISTRICT

                                                     2023

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                        )       Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                         )       of the 9th Judicial Circuit,
                                                        )       Warren County, Illinois,
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                        )
                                                        )       Appeal No. 3-21-0594
             v.                                         )       Circuit No. 19-CF-82
                                                        )
      CESAR CARILLO-CRUZ,                               )       Honorable
                                                        )       Richard H. Gambrell,
             Defendant-Appellant.                       )       Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE PETERSON delivered the judgment of the court.
            Justice Davenport concurred in the judgment.
            Justice McDade specially concurred.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                  ORDER

¶1          Held: (1) The State proved defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of predatory
                  criminal sexual assault of a child, (2) defendant received effective assistance of
                  counsel, (3) the court did not err in admitting the People’s exhibit Nos. 1A and
                  1B, and (4) defendant forfeited plain error review of his excessive sentence
                  argument.

¶2          Defendant, Cesar Carillo-Cruz, appeals his conviction for predatory criminal sexual

     assault of a child. Defendant argues: (1) the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable
     doubt, (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel, (3) the court erred in admitting the

     People’s exhibit Nos. 1A and 1B, and (4) his sentence is excessive. We affirm.

¶3                                            I. BACKGROUND

¶4          The State charged defendant with predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS

     5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2018)). The complaint alleged:

                            “[t]hat between January 1, 2014, and December 31, 2017, in Warren

                    County, Illinois, [defendant] committed the offense of predatory criminal sexual

                    assault of a child in that the said defendant, who was 17 years of age or older

                    when the act was committed (d.o.b. 08/13/84), knowingly committed an act of

                    contact, however slight, between the sex organ of one person and the part of the

                    body of another, V.P. (d.o.b. 03/05/08), who was under 13 years of age when the

                    act was committed, in that the defendant placed his penis on her V.P.’s vagina, for

                    the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal.”

     Defendant retained private counsel. Defense counsel did not demand a bill of particulars.

¶5          Prior to trial, the State filed a motion to admit statements pursuant to section 115-10 of

     the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/115-10 (West 2018)). The State

     sought to admit statements made by V.P. to forensic interviewer Samantha Wike. Following a

     hearing and the parties’ submission of written arguments, the court granted the State’s motion.

     The matter proceeded to a bench trial.

¶6          Officer Lindsey Kenney testified that on June 16, 2019, he received a complaint of a

     sexual assault that had occurred approximately two years prior. Rachel Z. disclosed that she had

     recently learned that on multiple occasions defendant inappropriately touched her daughter, V.P.

     V.P. told Rachel that on more than one occasion defendant touched her vaginal area and forced

                                                      2
       her to touch his penis. V.P. told Kenney that she thought the sexual abuse occurred more than

       five times.

¶7            Rachel testified that V.P. was born on March 5, 2008. Rachel married defendant in June

       2015. She filed for divorce in 2018 and it was finalized in June 2019. She had obtained an order

       of protection (OP) against defendant in November 2017 because defendant physically abused

       her. Defendant violated the OP. He stalked Rachel at work, and on one occasion broke into her

       home and strangled her in front of her children.

¶8            After the divorce was finalized, V.P. informed Rachel that defendant had previously

       abused her. V.P. explained that defendant had sexually abused her when Rachel was working

       evenings in Burlington, Iowa in 2017. Rachel and V.P. reported the abuse to the police.

¶9            On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited testimony regarding Rachel’s relationship

       with her ex-husband, Adolfo P. Rachel testified that she divorced Adolfo because he was too

       strict with her children. Rachel stated there was a domestic violence incident in 2017. Defense

       counsel asked “[i]s that the incident where you slapped [defendant] and cut him above his eye?”

       Rachel did not recall that happening. Rachel clarified that was a separate incident. Rachel

       testified that defendant was required to pay child support and was late on his payments. She

       never attempted to collect the late payments from Adolfo. Defense counsel again asked whether

       she attempted to force Adolfo to make the late payments, and the State objected on relevance

       grounds. Defense counsel said “Judge, our whole theory is that [Rachel’s] motivation for having

       [V.P.] make these allegations. Child support is another fact in that.”

¶ 10          On re-direct, Rachel testified that defendant was born in 1984. She did not direct V.P. to

       make the allegations against defendant. Defendant had injured Rachel’s finger while trying to

                                                          3
       take the house keys. Defendant attempted to force Rachel to have sexual intercourse in front of

       her young children.

¶ 11          Investigator Terry Hepner testified that Officer Kenney referred a report of sexual assault

       against a child to him. Hepner scheduled an interview with V.P. on June 18, 2019. Wike

       conducted the interview. Hepner observed the interview from another room. On cross-

       examination, Hepner testified that he did not interview defendant. Hepner did not verify Rachel’s

       work schedule through her employer.

¶ 12          V.P. testified that she was born on March 5, 2008. V.P. was 13 years old at the time she

       testified. Rachel is her mother and defendant was her stepfather. At some point, V.P. lived with

       Rachel and defendant in Monmouth. V.P. identified defendant in court. On more than one

       occasion when Rachel worked late, defendant grabbed V.P. from her bedroom and brought her to

       his bedroom where he removed their clothes. Defendant then touched V.P.’s body and forced her

       to touch his body. Defendant forced V.P. to touch his penis. Defendant touched V.P.’s buttocks

       and vagina with his penis. V.P. testified that defendant scared and frightened her. No one

       witnessed defendant’s inappropriate touching of V.P. V.P. did not remember whether

       defendant’s penis was erect when he touched her. V.P. stated that she testified truthfully, and that

       Rachel did not tell her what to say.

¶ 13          On cross-examination, V.P. testified that defendant touched her buttocks with his penis.

       Defendant did not have sexual intercourse with V.P. Defendant inappropriately touched V.P.

       several times over the years. V.P. did not inform Rachel of the inappropriate touching.

¶ 14          On redirect, V.P. testified that most of the incidents happened when defendant lived with

       her, but one incident occurred after he had moved out. No one witnessed the incidents and V.P.

       did not tell her siblings or Rachel. Eventually, V.P. felt comfortable enough to tell Rachel.

                                                        4
¶ 15           Former Children’s Advocacy Center (CAC) forensic interviewer Wike testified that she

       interviewed V.P. Wike testified that V.P. recalled answers and answered questions consistent

       with the ability of other children her age. Wike identified in court People’s exhibit Nos. 1A and

       1B. Wike used exhibit Nos. 1A and 1B when she interviewed V.P. Exhibit No. 1A showed an

       anatomical drawing of a male with blue circles around the penis and hand. Exhibit No. 1B

       showed an anatomical drawing of a female with blue circles around the vagina, buttocks, and

       breasts. Both exhibits included red and blue markings. Wike had drawn the markings in red and

       V.P. had drawn the markings in blue. The court admitted both exhibits into evidence.

       Additionally, the court admitted the CAC interview into evidence and it was played for the court.

¶ 16           In the interview, Wike and V.P. discuss body parts. Wike brings out an anatomical

       drawing of a female. Wike labels each body part with a red marker based on the name V.P.

       provides for each part. V.P. states that she is being interviewed because she was inappropriately

       touched. V.P. circles with a blue marker the parts of her body that were inappropriately touched.

       V.P. circles the vagina, breasts, and buttocks. V.P. states that defendant touched her. She did not

       tell anyone until recently, when she told Rachel. It happened several times. Defendant touched

       V.P. under her clothes. Defendant touched V.P. with his hands and grabbed her hand and placed

       it on his private part.

¶ 17           Wike sets up an anatomical drawing of a male. V.P. circles in blue the male’s penis as the

       private part defendant made her touch. V.P. states that defendant made her touch his private part

       under his clothes. Defendant grabbed her at night when Rachel was at work and brought her to

       his bedroom. V.P. attempted to escape. V.P. states she lay on the bed and defendant mostly

       touched her vagina.

                                                        5
¶ 18          V.P. states these incidents happened from second through fourth grade. Defendant

       touched her with his penis, and it touched her vagina. V.P. states that several times defendant

       would lie on top of her and hold himself up while he touched her with his penis and his penis

       touched her vagina. She did not remember whether defendant placed his penis inside of her.

       These incidents would last several minutes. Afterward, defendant would return V.P. to her

       bedroom.

¶ 19          The State rested, and the defense called defendant to testify. Defendant testified that he

       met Rachel through Facebook in 2011. Rachel told him she was separated from her husband and

       had one child. In 2012, defendant learned Rachel had three children when they met in person. At

       that time, they started dating. They married on June 29, 2015. Defendant worked in

       Marshalltown, Iowa in 2015. He lived in Marshalltown during the week and returned to

       Monmouth on the weekends. Defendant stopped working in Marshalltown in December 2015

       and found employment in Monmouth. After approximately four to five months, he started work

       in Burlington. Defendant and Rachel carpooled to work. After approximately eight months,

       defendant gained new employment in Mount Pleasant, Iowa. He lived with Rachel and the

       children in Monmouth until they separated at the end of 2017.

¶ 20          Defendant treated Rachel’s children as if they were his own. Defendant attended school

       activities, played with the children at the park, and brought the children to restaurants. Defendant

       traveled with the children to California to see their biological father. Defendant was allowed

       visitation after the separation after he had taken “some classes.” V.P. visited her siblings at

       defendant’s house after the separation. She did not appear frightened by defendant. Defense

       counsel asked, “And between January 1st of 2014, and December 31st of 2017, did you ever

       place your penis on [V.P.’s] vagina?” Defendant answered “No.”

                                                         6
¶ 21   Following closing arguments, the court ruled:

              “the State has to establish beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant, within

              the jurisdiction of the Court, at a time when the defendant was seventeen years of

              age or older, had contact between the sex organ and a body part of a person who

              was under thirteen years of age at that time for the purpose of sexual gratification

              or arousal. And as both [parties] have acknowledged, that is often proved by

              circumstantial evidence or inferred by the actions of a defendant. And there was

              no other purpose that was put forward by way of evidence to establish that this

              was some sort of nonsexual behavior. ***

                     *** [A]ll the State has to prove is that the alleged offense occurred within

              the statute of limitations. And for purposes of establishing the ages of the parties

              there was sufficient evidence that the offense very likely could have occurred in

              2017, up until the point when the evidence was that the Defendant left the marital

              residence.

                     So the other elements boil down to the credibility of the alleged victim.

              And the evidence that I heard was that the alleged victim didn’t come forward

              with the allegations until after the parties were divorced and it wasn’t the result,

              as I heard the evidence, of any sort of coaching or incentive. There didn’t seem to

              be any reason when she came forward in 2019, to make up these allegations. And

              I’m not really sure why things like work schedules and an interview perhaps of

              [Rachel’s boyfriend] who apparently was there when the initial allegations were

              made and could have explained maybe the circumstances or corroborated, I don’t

              know why none of that information was [not] presented or why it wasn’t gathered

                                                7
                         over the last couple of years. But that doesn’t mean that the allegations that she

                         made were not credible. It just means that some corroboration that was available

                         wasn’t collected. And in 2019, I’m seeing the CAC interview and there was no

                         indication in 2019 that she had an incentive to fabricate the story. As is often the

                         case, there are some differences in her testimony which is two years after the

                         CAC interview and that’s to be understood. But again, I don’t think that that

                         affects her credibility. The fact that she was reticent to testify or to give the CAC

                         interview doesn’t mean that she was fabricating. So I believe that the State has

                         established the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. It doesn’t have

                         to be beyond all doubt. And I would have to completely discount the victim’s

                         testimony and CAC interview in order to find there was a reasonable doubt that

                         this had not occurred. So for those reasons I find that the State has proved the

                         allegations in the Information beyond a reasonable doubt. I find the defendant

                         guilty.”

       Defendant filed an amended motion to reconsider the court’s finding of guilt. 1

¶ 22          The presentence investigation report contained a victim impact statement completed by

       Rachel and signed by Rachel and V.P. The statement said that “[V.P.] has nightmares almost

       every night since she told me this in June 2019, she won’t sleep alone, she won’t play sports

       anymore, she will [shut] down, she feels triggered by everyone and everything, she blames

       herself [and] thinks no one will ever like her anymore.” V.P. started counseling in July 2019.

       When V.P. saw defendant in town, it terrified her.

              1
                  Defendant’s initial motion to reconsider is not in the record.

                                                              8
¶ 23          At the sentencing hearing, the court denied the amended motion to reconsider. The court

       admitted a letter written by V.P. into evidence. The letter read:

                              “I was sexually abused by [defendant] from about age 7-8 until I was 10

                      years old. This has affected me by ruining my childhood. During my childhood I

                      could have been playing and doing other things kids did, but most of the time I

                      was worried [defendant] would want to do something to me. Over the two years

                      he was not in jail I feared I would see him if I went anywhere in Monmouth.

                      When [defendant] was found guilty on September 21st, I felt relieved and like I

                      could breathe again.”

       In aggravation, the court found that defendant’s conduct caused serious psychological harm,

       defendant had a prior criminal history, the sentence was necessary to deter others, and defendant

       held a position of trust and supervision at the time of the offense. In mitigation, the court found

       that defendant’s conduct did not cause serious physical harm to the victim. The court noted “that

       the mother wasn’t there, that little girl was going to bed wondering if you were going to come in

       and pick her up and carry her into the other room. *** So, I consider the fact that that little girl

       was facing fear and apprehension every night when she went to bed, and she’s going to be facing

       the consequences of your actions for probably the rest of her life.” The court sentenced defendant

       to 20 years’ imprisonment. Defense counsel did not file a motion to reconsider sentence.

       Defendant appeals.

¶ 24                                              II. ANALYSIS

¶ 25          Defendant raises four main arguments on appeal: (1) the State did not prove his guilt

       beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel, (3) the court erred

                                                         9
       in admitting the People’s exhibit Nos. 1A and 1B, and (4) his sentence is excessive. We address

       each argument in turn.

¶ 26                                     A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 27          Defendant argues the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of

       predatory criminal sexual assault of a child because the evidence presented did not prove the

       element of sexual gratification, and V.P.’s testimony was uncorroborated and not credible.

¶ 28          When a defendant makes a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “ ‘the relevant

       question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

       any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

       reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985)

       (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). “Under this standard, a reviewing court

       will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on issues of the weight of evidence or

       the credibility of witnesses.” People v. Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d 419, 431, (2000). “[T]he reviewing

       court must allow all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the prosecution.” People v.

       Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004). “A conviction will be reversed only where the

       evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that it justifies a reasonable doubt of

       the defendant’s guilt.” People v. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 67. “This same standard of review

       applies regardless of whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial [citation], and regardless of

       whether the defendant receives a bench or jury trial.” Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d at 431.

¶ 29          “A person commits predatory criminal sexual assault of a child if that person is 17 years

       of age or older, and commits an act of contact, however slight, between the sex organ or anus of

       one person and the part of the body of another for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal

       of the victim or the accused, or an act of sexual penetration, and *** the victim is under 13 years

                                                         10
       of age.” 720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2018). Sexual gratification can be established by

       circumstantial evidence, and the trier of fact may infer a defendant’s intent from his conduct.

       People v. Burton, 399 Ill. App. 3d 809, 813 (2010). Additionally, sexual gratification can be

       inferred solely from the nature of the act. Id.

¶ 30           Here, V.P. indicated that defendant inappropriately touched her on her vagina, breasts,

       and buttocks. Defendant forced her to touch his penis. Defendant touched V.P.’s buttocks and

       vagina with his penis. In its ruling, the court noted that sexual gratification is “often proved by

       circumstantial evidence or inferred by the actions of a defendant.” Supra ¶ 21. Additionally, the

       court determined that “there was no other purpose that was put forward by way of evidence to

       establish that this was some sort of nonsexual behavior.” Supra ¶ 21. The court’s findings are not

       unreasonable since the only reasonable inference from the evidence presented is that defendant

       placed his penis on V.P.’s vagina for sexual gratification.

¶ 31           Defendant also argues that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt

       because V.P.’s testimony was uncorroborated and not credible. However, “the testimony of a

       single witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to convict, even though it is contradicted by

       the defendant.” People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 228 (2009). Additionally, we must not

       substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact on the credibility of witnesses. Cooper, 194

       Ill. 2d at 431.

¶ 32           Here, the court found V.P.’s testimony credible. Defendant provides no argument as to

       why V.P.’s testimony is not credible other than it is not corroborated and is contradicted by

       defendant. Accordingly, we find that the State proved defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

       doubt of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. See Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d at 228 (a

                                                         11
       reviewing court will not reverse a conviction simply because the evidence is contradicted by the

       defendant or because defendant claims a witness is not credible).

¶ 33                                    B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶ 34           Defendant raises several ineffective assistance of counsel claims, including counsel failed

       to: (1) file a motion to reconsider sentence, (2) object to hearsay evidence that was not permitted

       by section 115-10 of the Code or another hearsay exception, (3) object to the State’s elicitation

       of improper other crimes evidence, (4) object to several leading questions, and (5) demand a bill

       of particulars.

¶ 35           The sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel.

       U.S. Const., amend. VI. “To prevail on an ineffective-assistance claim, a defendant must show

       that: (1) counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the

       defendant such that he was deprived of a fair trial.” People v. Patterson, 217 Ill. 2d 407, 438

       (2005). “[A] defendant must overcome the strong presumption that the challenged action or

       inaction of counsel was the product of sound trial strategy and not of incompetence.” People v.

       Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 397 (1998). To establish prejudice, defendant must “show that there is

       a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

       would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). “A reasonable

       probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. Failure to

       satisfy either prong is fatal to the claim. Id. at 697.

¶ 36                                     1. Motion to Reconsider Sentence

¶ 37           Defendant argues that counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion

       to reconsider sentence. Defendant claims counsel’s representation prejudiced him by failing to

       preserve any sentencing issues for appeal. However, “general failure to file a motion to

                                                          12
       reconsider sentence does not per se amount to ineffective assistance of counsel, as some basis

       must exist to make the motion.” People v. Bailey, 364 Ill. App. 3d 404, 408 (2006). Defendant

       does not explicitly argue a basis for the motion to reconsider sentence. But, in a separate section

       of his brief, defendant argues this court should reduce his sentence because the circuit court

       committed plain error when it considered in aggravation evidence of V.P.’s psychological harm,

       and that its use of psychological harm as an aggravating factor constituted a double

       enhancement.

                      “A reviewing court is entitled to have issues clearly defined with pertinent

                      authority cited and cohesive arguments presented; this court is not a repository

                      into which an appellant may foist the burden of argument and research; it is

                      neither the function nor the obligation of this court to act as an advocate or search

                      the record for error.” People v. Edwards, 2012 IL App (1st) 091651, ¶ 29.

       Accordingly, defendant’s claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a

       motion to reconsider sentence fails because defendant does not argue a basis for the motion. See

       Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. Assuming, arguendo, that defendant intended the plain error

       argument as the basis for the motion to reconsider sentence, we also find that defendant’s

       argument lacks merit.

¶ 38          “Generally, a factor implicit in the offense for which the defendant has been convicted

       cannot be used as an aggravating factor in sentencing for that offense.” People v. Phelps, 211 Ill.

       2d 1, 11 (2004). “Such dual use of a single factor is often referred to as a ‘double

       enhancement.’ ” Id. at 12 (quoting People v. Gonzalez, 151 Ill. 2d 79, 85 (1992)). While

       defendant concedes that “psychological harm inflicted upon a child victim of a sex crime is a

       proper factor to consider in aggravation” (People v. Bunning, 2018 IL App (5th) 150114, ¶ 18),

                                                        13
       he argues courts may only consider evidence of psychological harm beyond that implicit in the

       offense. Defendant claims there is no evidence of psychological harm occurring. This argument

       is without merit as the victim impact statement stated that after defendant’s sexual assault V.P.

       suffered from nightmares and refused to sleep alone. Additionally, V.P. stated in her letter that

       defendant’s abuse ruined her childhood because she constantly worried defendant would decide

       to abuse her. She felt “like [she] could breathe again” when she learned “defendant was found

       guilty.”

¶ 39          Therefore, the circuit court properly considered that defendant’s conduct caused

       psychological harm when it sentenced defendant. Accordingly, defendant suffered no prejudice

       from defense counsel’s failure to file a motion to reconsider sentence as a motion to reconsider

       sentence would not have changed defendant’s sentence. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

¶ 40                          2. Hearsay Statements and Other-Crimes Evidence

¶ 41          Defendant argues that counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to

       hearsay evidence.

¶ 42          Decisions about what matters to object to and when to object are generally matters of trial

       strategy. People v. Graham, 206 Ill. 2d 465, 478-79 (2003). “[A] reviewing court will be highly

       deferential to trial counsel on matters of trial strategy, making every effort to evaluate counsel’s

       performance from his perspective at the time, rather than through the lens of hindsight.” People

       v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 344 (2007). “A defense counsel’s decision not to object to the

       admission of purported hearsay testimony involves a matter of trial strategy and, typically, will

       not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” People v. Theis, 2011 IL App (2d)

       091080, ¶ 40. Illinois Rule of Evidence 402 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) provides that all relevant evidence

       is admissible at trial. However, “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while

                                                        14
       testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted” is

       generally inadmissible hearsay at trial. Ill. R. Evid. 801 (eff. Oct. 15, 2015), R. 802 (eff. Jan. 1,

       2011).

¶ 43            Here, the alleged hearsay evidence includes testimony regarding what V.P. told Rachel,

       Investigator Hepner, and Officer Kenney. This evidence was not offered for the truth of the

       matter asserted, but for the limited purpose of how the sexual abuse came to light and the

       investigation transpired. Additionally, “[a] trial judge sitting as trier of fact is presumed to have

       considered only admissible evidence in making his decision.” People v. Jackson, 409 Ill. App. 3d

       631, 647 (2011). “This presumption can be rebutted through affirmative evidence in the record.”

       Id.

¶ 44            Defendant does not provide affirmative evidence in the record to rebut this presumption.

       The record shows that the court did not consider the alleged hearsay evidence. Instead, the

       court’s ruling establishes that it relied on V.P.’s testimony and the CAC interview. Based on the

       record, defendant cannot show that the result of the proceeding would have been different had

       defendant objected, and the evidence not been admitted. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

¶ 45            Defendant also argues that counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to

       other-crimes evidence. The other-crimes evidence includes Rachel’s testimony regarding alleged

       domestic abuse by defendant.

¶ 46            Illinois Rule of Evidence 404(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) prohibits

                       “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts *** to prove the character of a person

                       in order to show action in conformity therewith except as provided by section

                       115-7.3 *** of the Code ***. Such evidence may also be admissible for other

                                                         15
                       purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

                       knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”

       Section 115-7.3 of the Code allows the State to admit evidence of other crimes if defendant is

       accused of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, and the State discloses the evidence prior

       to trial or the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown. 725 ILCS 5/115-7.3 (West

       2018).

¶ 47            While the State improperly elicited testimony of other-crimes evidence, defense

       counsel’s failure to object was sound trial strategy. The record shows that defense counsel’s

       “whole theory” of the case was that numerous factors motivated Rachel to pressure V.P. to make

       the allegations against defendant. Defense counsel allowed the admission of defendant’s other-

       crimes because it supported his theory that Rachel sought retribution against defendant through

       this prosecution. Attacking Rachel’s credibility and providing a motive for V.P. to make the

       allegations against defendant were sound trial strategy, and defense counsel was not deficient.

       See Theis, 2011 IL App (2d) 091080, ¶ 40. Additionally, defendant had a bench trial, and

       nothing in the record indicates that the court relied on this testimony. Supra ¶ 47.

¶ 48                                          3. Leading Questions

¶ 49            Defendant argues that counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to

       several leading questions. Defendant argues that the majority of V.P.’s responses to the leading

       questions provided the factual basis for defendant’s conviction.

¶ 50            “ ‘As a general rule, trial strategy encompasses decisions such as what matters to object

       to and when to object.’ ” People v. Ramsey, 2017 IL App (1st) 160977, ¶ 36 (quoting People v.

       Pecoraro, 144 Ill. 2d 1, 13 (1991)). Counsel is not ineffective for failing to object to leading

                                                        16
       questions absent a showing of prejudice. People v. C.H., 237 Ill. App. 3d 462, 475 (1992).

       Moreover, “leading questions may be asked of a child witness.” Id. at 474-75.

¶ 51          Prior to trial, the State filed a motion to admit statements pursuant to section 115-10 of

       the Code (725 ILCS 5/115-10 (West 2018)). Section 115-10 of the Code permits the admission

       of hearsay testimony of young children who have been sexually abused. Id. The State

       specifically sought to admit the CAC interview. Following a hearing, the court granted the

       State’s motion. At trial, the court admitted the CAC interview into evidence. The CAC interview

       contained V.P.’s description of the offense. Thus, defendant suffered no prejudice from defense

       counsel’s failure to object since V.P.’s trial testimony was arguably cumulative. See Strickland,

       466 U.S. at 694.

¶ 52                                          4. Bill of Particulars

¶ 53          Defendant argues that counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to demand a bill

       of particulars narrowing the time frame of the charge. Defendant claims counsel’s failure

       deprived him of an opportunity to defend himself. However, “[t]he date of the offense is not an

       essential factor in child sex offense cases.” People v. Guerrero, 356 Ill. App. 3d 22, 27 (2005).

       “As long as the crime occurred within the statute of limitations and prior to the return of the

       charging instrument, the State need only provide the defendant with the best information it has as

       to when the offenses occurred.” Id. Accordingly, flexibility is permitted regarding the date of

       alleged sexual abuse of a child. See, e.g., People v. Burton, 201 Ill. App. 3d 116, 123 (1990) (a

       range of two years and nine months held to be the best information possible where young

       children were the victims of sexual abuse); Guerrero, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 27 (considering

       children’s young age and the fact that the acts occurred over a three-year period, dates were as

       definite as possible).

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¶ 54           Here, the charge alleged that the offense occurred between January 1, 2014, and

       December 31, 2017. V.P. testified that defendant inappropriately touched her several times over

       the period stated in the charging instrument. In the CAC interview, V.P. stated that these

       incidents occurred from second through fourth grade. Given V.P.’s young age at the time of the

       incidents and the fact that they happened over a long period of time, the dates provided in the

       indictment were as definite as possible. Accordingly, defense counsel was not ineffective for

       failing to demand a bill of particulars because “[t]he date of the offense is not an essential factor

       in child sex offense cases.” Guerrero, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 27.

¶ 55           Regardless, defense counsel’s failure to demand a bill of particulars did not prejudice

       defendant. Defendant testified that he never placed his penis on V.P.’s vagina between January 1,

       2014, and December 31, 2017. Defendant’s response applies to a narrowed time frame.

       Accordingly, if counsel demanded a bill of particulars, the outcome at trial would be the same.

       See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694

¶ 56                                  C. People’s Exhibit Nos. 1A and 1B

¶ 57           Defendant argues the court erred in admitting People’s exhibit Nos. 1A and 1B. At the

       outset, we note that defendant does not cite to any authority for this argument.

¶ 58           Defendant acknowledges that he forfeited review of this issue, but he argues it is a

       reversible plain error. The plain error rule permits a reviewing court to consider a forfeited error

       when:

                      “(1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that

                      the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant,

                      regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred

                      and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and

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                      challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the

                      evidence.” People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007).

       Defendant bears the burden of persuasion to show both that a clear and obvious error exists, and

       that reversal is warranted under one of the prongs of the plain error rule. People v. Sargent, 239

       Ill. 2d 166, 190 (2010).

¶ 59          A trial court’s decision to admit documentary evidence will not be reversed absent an

       abuse of discretion. People v. Downin, 357 Ill. App. 3d 193, 202 (2005). An adequate foundation

       is laid when a document is identified and authenticated. Anderson v. Human Rights Comm’n, 314

       Ill. App. 3d 35, 42 (2000). To “authenticate a document, evidence must be presented to

       demonstrate that the document is what its proponent claims.” Gardner v. Navistar International

       Transportation Corp., 213 Ill. App. 3d 242, 247-48 (1991).

¶ 60          Here, forensic interviewer Wike identified People’s exhibit Nos. 1A and 1B as the

       anatomical drawings that her and V.P. drew on together. Supra ¶ 15. Additionally, the CAC

       interview, admitted prior to trial, shows Wike and V.P. drawing on People’s exhibit Nos. 1A and

       1B. Supra ¶¶ 16-17. Accordingly, the court did not error in admitting People’s exhibit Nos. 1A

       and 1B.

¶ 61          Additionally, defendant’s plain error argument states that the drawings were prejudicial

       to him, and that “such drawings definitely had a very serious effect on the fairness of

       [defendant’s] trial.” Defendant neither argues that the evidence was closely balanced nor

       explains why the error is so serious that it affected the fairness of defendant’s trial and

       challenged the integrity of the judicial process. See Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565. Therefore,

       defendant forfeited plain error review when he failed to present an argument for either prong of

       the plain error doctrine. Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d at 190.

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¶ 62                                         D. Excessive Sentence

¶ 63          As noted above, defendant argues this court should reduce his sentence because the

       circuit court committed plain error when it considered in aggravation evidence of V.P.’s

       psychological harm, and that its use of psychological harm as an aggravating factor constituted a

       double enhancement. Supra ¶ 37. However, defendant does not argue either prong of the plain

       error doctrine. Accordingly, defendant has forfeited plain error review. See People v. Hillier, 237

       Ill. 2d 539, 545-46 (2010).

¶ 64                                           III. CONCLUSION

¶ 65          The judgment of the circuit court of Warren County is affirmed.

¶ 66          Affirmed.

¶ 67          JUSTICE McDADE, specially concurring:

¶ 68          The majority affirms the conviction of defendant, Cesar Carillo-Cruz, for predatory

       criminal sexual assault of a child. I agree with that decision.

¶ 69          I write separately to comment on the analysis of the fourth of the contentions raised by

       defendant in challenging the effectiveness of his counsel’s representation—the failure to request

       a bill of particulars. Supra ¶¶ 52-55. The majority finds that defendant ultimately suffered no

       prejudice and therefore counsel’s decision not to make the request did not satisfy the second

       prong of the Strickland standard and did not constitute ineffective assistance. I do not disagree

       with that conclusion and have, therefore, concurred. I do, however, take issue with two

       arguments made by the majority in support of the conclusion because, while correct, they are not

       relevant to defendant’s argument and are therefore inapposite and misleading.

¶ 70          First, the majority states that “ ‘[t]he date of the offense is not an essential factor in child

       sex offense cases.’ ” Supra ¶¶ 53, 54. That statement is true and applicable to the State and its

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burden of proof. But, for practical purposes, the bill of particulars is an important tool for the

defense, providing it with more specific information about the charges to assist in structuring a

defense. The fact that the State does not have to prove a specific date does not obviate the benefit

to the defense of being able to show that defendant could not possibly have committed the crime

on one or more of the specific dates claimed. Second, and similarly, defendant’s blanket denial

of all the alleged acts would obviously be enhanced if, again, he could completely absolve

himself of one or more specific claims. The ultimate absence of prejudice in this case comes not

from the inability of specific information to help defendant’s defense, but rather from the fact

that V.P. made no contemporaneous reports and she was too young to be able, or reasonably

expected, to reliably recall particular dates at a time so remote from the events.

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