Court Opinion

ID: 9828103
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:06:06.041315+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:43.584341
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[5] In the motion for rehearing appellant insists that the fact that he had no pleading which would have authorized him to make the defense which he set up in his motion for ■ new trial ought not to be considered in determining the case, for the reason “that he had an absolute right to file an amended pleading at any time before announcing ready for trial,” and it would have been reversible error for the trial court to deny him the right to amend and set up this defense. We do not understand this proposition to be a correct statement of the law. Lipscomb v. Perry, 100 Tex. 122, 96 S. W. 1069; Braxton v. Voyles (Tex. Civ. App.) 189 S. W. 965; Houston Oil Co. v. Reese-Corriher Lumber Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 181 S. W. 745. Under the circumstances of the case, the trial court would probably have had the right to deny permission to defendant to file an amended answer bringing in this new matter on the morning of the day set.for trial of the case. However this may be, there was no request for amendment. It was not stated in the motion for new trial that defendant would have requested leave to file pleading for the purpose of setting up such defense. These facts may have been properly considered by the trial court in arriving at a conclusion on all the facts and circumstances before him as to whether an injustice had resulted from a trial of the case, in the absence of defendant’s attorney. Each case of this kind depends largely on its own facts, and we are not convinced that the trial court abused his discretion in refusing to set aside the judgment herein.
The motion for rehearing presents as fundamental error two propositions not presented in the original brief. These are: (1) That the lease was forfeited by declaration of the plaintiff in September, 1920, and that, notwithstanding the forfeiture, recovery of subsequently accruing rents under the contract was allowed by the judgment; (2) that the judgment is not final,- in that it did not dispose of plaintiff’s prayer for cancellation of the lease. We will consider these propositions ⅛ the order stated.
The contract fixed the term of the lease for one year from February 1, 1920, but provided for payment of rentals monthly in advance, and that, in default of such payments, lessor might “declare the lease forfeited at his discretion and his agent or attorney shall have the right, without further notice or demand, to re-enter * * * or his agent or attorney may resume possession of the premises and relet the same for the remainder of the term * * * for account of the lessee, who shall make good any deficiency.” The original petition was filed in the case on September 1, 1920, and alleged that default had been made in the payment of several installments of monthly rentals preceding the filing of the petition. The petition also referred to the foregoing provision for forfeiture, and in this connection contained this allegation:
“That by reason of the failure of said defendant to pay said rental contracts as above provided for, said contracts have now been forfeited and this plaintiff here now declares the same to be forfeited.”
The prayer was that plaintiff have judgment for the rentals due and for cancellation of said rental contracts. On November 29, 1920, plaintiff filed a first amended petition, and on January 15, 1921, a second amended petition. These petitions were in substance the same as the original petition, except that they each prayed for rentals accruing up to the dates of the respective filings thereof. *282These amended petitions appear in the transcript, though they were not offered in evidence.
[6] The particular proposition now called to the attention of this court for the first time was not mentioned in the motion for new trial. A pleading, when it is amended, ceases to he a part of the record. If the adverse party desires to establish any fact from the recitals therein, or use it in any way as a part of the record, he should offer the pleading in evidence, and the party against whom it is offered has the right to explain the statements therein made. Kimmons v. Abraham (Tex. Civ. App.) 158 S. W. 256; Daniels v. Stewart, 68 Tex. Civ. App. 447, 132 S. W. 967. Therefore we do not thinlc that the appellant is in position to avail himself of the statements in these abandoned pleadings for the purpose of sustaining his claim of fundamental error now made. Furthermore, we doubt whether the defendant might have made this defense even in the trial court under a- general denial. But, even if the abandoned pleadings are a part of the record, and should be considered as evidence, and the defendant was in position to avail himself under his pleading of this defense, we are not fully convinced that the tenancy should be held to have terminated upon the filing of the petition on September 1, 1920. At common law a provision for forfeiture, such as was contained in this lease contract, was made effectual only by re-entry.
“ ‘Where,’ to quote Baron Parke, ‘the terms of a lease provide that it shall be avoided by re-entry,, either in the case of a freehold lease 'or a chattel interest, an entry, or what is tantamount thereto, is indispensable.’ ” Bowman v. Foot, 29 Conn. 340; Guffy v. Hukill, 34 W. Va. 49, 11 S. E. 754, 8 L. R. A. 759, 26 Am. St. Rep. 901; Jones on Landlord & Tenant, § 481; Underhill on Landlord & Tenant, § 394.
The filing of an action of ejectment was at common law the equivalent of entry.
“The conduct of the landlord in bringing ejectment is from the tenant’s point of view an eviction and' from the landlord’s point of view the acceptance of a surrender.” Underhill, § 404.
It seems to have been questioned in the English courts whether the bringing of any other character of' suit for possession would have the effect of terminating the tenancy. Underhill, § 404, note 70. "It is said that some of the authorities in this country hold “that an actual entry is not necessary and that a clear assertion by word or act of the landlord’s intention that the tenancy shall come to an end is sufficient.” Tiffany on Landlord and Tenant, pp. 1402, 1403. While in this case the plaintiff does, in his petition, state that the lease is here and now declared to be forfeited, he took no action to repossess the premises, and did not even pray for judgment for possession, but asked for judgment of declaration of the forfeiture. We doubt whether the petition as a whole indicates the clear intention on the part of the lessor to himself put an end, by his own declaration, to the tenancy. It rather appears that the plaintiff was merely seeking to have the court declare the forfeiture by its judgment and that the forfeiture was to take effect from such time.
The trial was had on February 18, 1921. The term of the lease had, by the express stipulations of the contract, come to an end. There was, therefore, no necessity at such-time for a judgment canceling the lease, and, since this issue was no longer in the case, there was no error on the part of the court in not disposing of it in the judgment.
The motion for rehearing will be overruled.