Court Opinion

ID: 9678530
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:22:06.050862+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:05.267962
License: Public Domain

Carr, J.
(concurring). I am in accord with Justice Smith’s conclusion that under the facts established by the record before us plaintiff is not entitled to benefits under the Michigan employment security act. The conclusion of the appeal hoard that he was properly discharged for misconduct connected with his work is supported by the proofs. Such finding was not repugnant to the great weight of the evidence and the circuit judge was correct in so holding.
Bearing in mind the nature of his employment plaintiff’s conduct in permitting himself to sleep or doze while on the job was negligence of such nature as not only to endanger the safety of the employer’s property but, likewise, the safety of other employees. He must have realized that it was his duty to be alert. If his physical condition was such as to interfere with the observance of such duty, he *655should have informed the employer accordingly at the time he was hired. Failure to do so must he regarded as negligence on his part and, likewise, the concealment of a material fact that might properly have prevented his being assigned to employment in the boiler room of the employer’s establishment.
As Justice Smith has noted, counsel for appellant relies on language found in 48 Am Jur, Social Security, Unemployment Insurance, and Retirement Funds, § 38, pp 541, 542, as follows:
“Misconduct within the meaning of an unemployment compensation act excluding from its benefits an employee discharged for misconduct must be an act of wanton or wilful disregard of the employer’s interest, a deliberate violation of the employer’s rules, a disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his employee, or negligence in such degree or recurrence as to manifest culpability, wrongful intent, or evil design, or show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer’s interest or of the employee’s duties and obligations to the employer.”
The above language was quoted in Cassar v. Employment Security Commission, 343 Mich 380, 405. Apparently counsel would emphasize the initial clauses of the excerpt quoted to the exclusion of other statements found therein. The writer of the text obviously sought to cover various decisions of the courts indicating the nature of conduct on the part of an employee that may be regarded as “misconduct.” In the case at bar there was clearly “intentional and substantial disregard of the employer’s interest or of the employee’s duties and obligations to the employer.”
Cassar v. Employment Security Commission, supra, involved a factual situation of different nature than that in the case at bar. For that reason the decision may not be regarded as in point, and *656like comment may be made with, reference to Linski v. Employment Security Commission, 358 Mich 239. Each case of this nature must be determined in accordance with the facts involved.
Dethmers, C. J., and Kelly, J., concurred with Cars, J.