Court Opinion

ID: 7098241
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-24 12:13:11.481913+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:13:19.424837
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING.
Beck, Ch. J.
Upon petition of appellant a rehearing was-granted in this ease, and it has again been submitted to us u|>on a re-argument.
It will be observed that plaintiff claims that he is entitled to recover for all money or property paid by him into or for the firm, for the reason that, being induced to enter into the contract by fraud, he has the right to rescind it, and a decree should be entered setting it aside. Our former opinion holds that the relief sought — the rescission of this contract — cannot be granted, for the reason that the fraud upon which plaintiff bases his right to this relief was discovered more than five years before this action was commenced, and the relief by a. *337decree rescinding the contract is, therefore, barred by the statute of limitations.
Upon a re-examination of the case, on the petition for rehearing, we discovered that the statement of fact as to the time of the discovery of the fraud is incorrect, and that the relief was not, therefore, barred by the statute. Thereupon we ordered a rehearing.
After a careful reconsideration of this case we are satisfied that the conclusion we reached in the foregoing opinion is correct, though not based upon the true reason.
4 rescission. The fraud complained of by plaintiff was discovered as early as 1872, according to the admission in the argument of his counsel. This action was commenced in 1875. After the discovery of the fraud, andbefore the insti-
tution of the suit, plaintiff gave to the defendants no notice of his intention to rescind the contract, or that he regarded it as rescinded, and that he considered himself not bound by it, but on the contrary, recognized its validity by offers to defendants to surrender all he had paid upon the contract, in consideration that they would release him therefrom. Upon this state of facts plaintiff is not entitled to a rescission of the contract. His right to such relief was lost by delay in pursuing his remedy. The law required him, upon discovering the fraud, to announce and adhere to his purpose of rescinding the contract. This announcement should have been made, certainly, within a reasonable time. A delay of two or three years, and acts and declarations inconsistent with such intention, would raise the legal presumption that he ratified the contract and waived all rights to rescind it. Rawson v. Harger, 48 Iowa, 269; Grymes v. Sanders et al., 93 U. S., 3 Otto, 55; 2 Parsons on Contracts, 278.
We find no grounds, upon our re-examination of the case, which will support a doubt of the correctness of the conclusions announced in the foregoing opinion upon other branches of the case. We adhere to our former opinion, and the judgment heretofore entered will stand undisturbed.