Court Opinion

ID: 9755236
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:31:10.862327+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:05.505407
License: Public Domain

CLIFFORD, Justice,
with whom GLASSMAN, Justice, joins, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Although I agree with the court that there was no clear error at the outset in the trial court’s finding the child competent and in allowing her to testify, I conclude that the State should not have been allowed to persist in its questioning of the child and that contradictions in the child’s testimony create a reasonable doubt as to Murray’s guilt.
On direct examination, the child repeatedly stated that she could not remember anything bad that happened between the defendant and her, and denied that the defendant had molested her. Despite the clearly and repeatedly stated inability of the child to recall incidents of abuse, and her denial of such abuse, the State, over the objections of Murray, was allowed to continue to question the child about sexual abuse of her by Murray. The child testified about sexual abuse by Murray only after relentless questioning and constant reminders of what would happen to her if she did not tell the truth. The State was allowed to go well beyond what would have been permissible in the questioning of an adult witness who repeatedly professed no memory of and denied the occurrence of an incident. Although we have recognized that a trial court has broad discretion in allowing examination of a child witness, I would conclude that the persistent questioning of this child witness after she repeatedly and clearly stated that she did not remember any abuse, and denied that any abuse had occurred, taken together with reminders of bad things that would happen to her if she did not tell the truth, resulted in an improper coercion of the witness; its allowance constituted an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. ■
Moreover, the child, on cross-examination, related incidents of sexual abuse by her mother’s former husband strikingly similar to those she related involving Murray. Because of those unexplained similarities, and the contradictions between her descriptions of abuse by Murray and, at the same trial, her repeated and clear statements that she could not recall any such abuse or that there was no abuse, I would conclude that a jury would have to entertain reasonable doubt as to Murray’s guilt. State v. Sanders, 460 A.2d 591, 593 (Me.1983).
I would vacate the judgment and remand for entry of a judgment of acquittal.