Court Opinion

ID: 9724235
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:49:24.021591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:58.201379
License: Public Domain

O’Hara, J.
(dissenting). It seems to me there is an irreconcilable ■ conflict between Michigan Supreme Court precedent which has both implicitly and explicitly excused the prosecution from calling an accomplice, though an eyewitness, and the obligation of the people to call all eyewitnesses to a given transaction unless the number is so great as to make the testimony merely cumulative. In the present case, Michael McGuire was an eyewitness and also an accomplice.
Thus it appears that on the one hand the prosecution was obligated to endorse McGuire as a res gestae witness and call him to the stand so that he would be subject to cross-examination by the defense.
On the other hand the prosecutor was excused from calling him under the so-called "accomplice exception” rule.
Such a situation is intolerable. It is prejudicing the rights of persons accused of crimes and it is placing the prosecution in the position of not knowing what its legal obligation is.
The question is squarely before us because the prosecuting attorney relied on the accomplice exception rule and the trial judge sustained him on that basis. The prosecuting attorney has. a virtual litany of law to support him. I certainly agree with Judge Bronson as to the frequency with which the problem arises. As late as 1971 this Court held:
"Although the prosecutor is under a general obliga*367tion to indorse and call as witnesses all noncumulative res gestae witnesses, this duty does not extend to the calling of accomplices. People v Brown, 15 Mich App 600; 167 NW2d 107 (1969); People v Chaney, 21 Mich App 120; 174 NW2d 919 (1970); People v Morgan, 24 Mich App 660; 180 NW2d 842 (1970); People v Sanders, 28 Mich App 510; 184 NW2d 487 (1970); People v Moore, 29 Mich App 597; 185 NW2d 834 (1971). No error resulted from the failure of the prosecutor to indorse and call the two accomplices.” People v Toneff, 37 Mich App 221, 222; 194 NW2d 390, 391 (1971).
I am perfectly willing to concede that the accomplice exception rule may be bad law, but it remains the law. As Judge Bronson correctly points out we cannot change it. We need a court rule, a statute, or a decision by the Supreme Court to do it. I am voting to affirm because there is Supreme Court precedent which supports the position of the trial judge and I find no indication of a miscarriage of justice.1
I join with my colleagues in the respectful hope that for the benefit of the trial bench and the bar the Supreme Court will take the case in the event the prosecution seeks leave to appeal. Hopefully, too, the Court will settle the profoundly disturbing question of precisely what an accomplice is within the meaning of the rule and to what extent if any an accomplice remains an accomplice in relation to the prosecution of another.
In the case at bar the prosecutor addressed the court as follows:
"He’s an accomplice. * * * We didn’t have [the] obligation to produce him as an accomplice even though the case [against him] has been dismissed. He still remains an accomplice.”
For the reasons herein stated, I vote to affirm.

 MCLA 769.26; MSA 28.1096.