Court Opinion

ID: 9378444
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-10 15:07:33.022377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:21.260625
License: Public Domain

[Cite as OTARMA v. Miami Twp., 2023-Ohio-733.]

                            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                               SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                  MONTGOMERY COUNTY

 OTARMA, et al.                                  :
                                                 :
      Appellees                                  :   C.A. No. 29570
                                                 :
 v.                                              :   Trial Court Case No. 2017 CV 04749
                                                 :
 MIAMI TOWNSHIP, OHIO, et al.                    :   (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas
                                                 :   Court)
      Appellants                                 :
                                                 :

                                            ...........

                                            OPINION

                                   Rendered on March 10, 2023

                                            ...........

ROBERT J. GEHRING, BRIAN R. REDDEN, SABA ALAM, and EDDIE MCHALE,
Attorneys for Appellees

TERENCE L. FAGUE and ZACHARY B. WHITE, Attorneys for Appellant

                                          .............

TUCKER, J.

       {¶ 1} Miami Township appeals from the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in

favor of plaintiff-appellee OTARMA and from the trial court’s overruling of Miami

Township’s cross motion in this declaratory-judgment action resolving OTARMA’s duty to
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defend and indemnify in a federal lawsuit arising under 42 U.S.C. 1983.1

       {¶ 2} Miami Township contends the trial court erred in holding that OTARMA had

no duty to defend or indemnify in the federal lawsuit. Miami Township also claims the trial

court erred in overruling a motion to compel discovery.

       {¶ 3} For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that OTARMA had no duty to

defend Miami Township on eight of the nine causes of action alleged in the underlying

lawsuit. However, the lawsuit included a cause of action for infliction of emotional distress

that potentially or arguably fell within the scope of coverage provided by OTARMA.

Therefore, OTARMA had a duty to defend until the emotional-distress claim was

dismissed from the federal lawsuit in September 2020. After that point, OTARMA had no

remaining duty to defend or indemnify. Finally, we see no abuse of discretion in the trial

court’s overruling of the motion to compel discovery. Accordingly, the trial court’s

judgment will be affirmed in part and reversed in part.

                                      I. Background

       {¶ 4} OTARMA is a political-subdivision risk pool providing liability coverage to

Ohio townships. In 2013, Roger Gillispie sued Miami Township in federal district court.

His lawsuit included claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law. Gillispie alleged that he

had been wrongfully arrested, prosecuted, and convicted in 1991 for a series of sexual

assaults. He filed the lawsuit after his release from prison following a successful petition

1  The defendants-appellants are Miami Township, the Miami Township Board of
Trustees, and Miami Township employees or former employees Matthew Scott Moore,
Tim Wilson, Marvin Scothorn, John DiPetro, and Stephen Gray (deceased). For ease of
reference and except when necessary to do otherwise, we will refer to the defendants-
appellants collectively in the singular as “Miami Township.”
                                                                                         -3-

for a writ of habeas corpus. Miami Township tendered defense of the federal litigation to

OTARMA, which accepted the defense under a reservation of rights.

       {¶ 5} While the federal lawsuit remained pending, OTARMA filed this declaratory-

judgment action in October 2017. OTARMA sought a determination that it had no duty to

defend or indemnify Miami Township. In May 2022, OTARMA filed a renewed motion for

summary judgment on its complaint. Following briefing, the trial court sustained

OTARMA’s motion and overruled a competing summary-judgment motion filed by Miami

Township. In a July 2022 decision and entry, the trial court noted that the remaining claims

and parties in the federal lawsuit had been narrowed substantially. At the time of the trial

court’s ruling, the only remaining claims were counts one through five, which alleged

violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 by former Miami Township detective Matthew Scott Moore.

Count one alleged that Moore had suppressed exculpatory evidence. Count two alleged

that he had participated in a suggestive eyewitness identification. Count three alleged

that he had fabricated evidence. Count four alleged malicious prosecution. Count five

alleged destruction of exculpatory evidence. The trial court noted that all other claims and

parties had been dismissed.

       {¶ 6} With regard to the five remaining claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the trial court

reviewed the OTARMA policy and found that it was “occurrence” based, meaning that

Gillispie’s claims accrued when Moore’s allegedly wrongful acts took place. The trial court

determined that “[a]ll of the acts constituting the critical elements” of the section 1983

claims “took place prior to Gillispie’s conviction in 1991,” and certainly “sometime before

1994[.]” Therefore, the trial court held that OTARMA’s contract with Miami Township was
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not applicable, and OTARMA had no duty to defend or indemnify in the federal litigation.

Shortly after the trial court’s decision, it filed a separate entry and order adding Civ.R.

54(B) certification. This appeal by Miami Township followed.

                                         II. Analysis

       {¶ 7} Under Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment may be granted when the moving

party demonstrates that (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one

conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for

summary judgment is made. State ex rel. Grady v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 78 Ohio

St.3d 181, 183, 677 N.E.2d 343 (1997). Appellate review of summary judgment is de

novo. Helton v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 123 Ohio App.3d 158, 162, 703 N.E.2d 841

(4th Dist.1997). “We review the judgment independently and without deference to the trial

court's decision.” (Citation omitted.) Id.

                      A. OTARMA’s Duty to Defend and Indemnify

       {¶ 8} In the first of two assignments of error, Miami Township contends the trial

court erred in sustaining OTARMA’s renewed summary-judgment motion, overruling its

cross motion, and finding that OTARMA had no duty to defend or indemnify in the federal

litigation. Miami Township raises three related issues. It contends the trial court erred in

finding no genuine issue of material fact as to whether probable cause for Gillispie’s

continued incarceration dissolved while an OTARMA policy was in effect. Miami Township

also claims the trial court erred in interpreting plain policy language to find no coverage.

Finally, Miami Township contends the trial court erred in failing to find that repeated or
                                                                                            -5-

continuing misconduct “may constitute multiple and/or continuous coverage triggers.”

         {¶ 9} We begin our analysis with a review of the OTARMA policy language and the

allegations in Gillispie’s federal lawsuit. “The scope of the allegations in the complaint

against the insured determines whether an insurance company has a duty to defend the

insured.” Ohio Govt. Risk Mgt. Plan v. Harrison, 115 Ohio St.3d 241, 2007-Ohio-4948,

874 N.E.2d 1155, ¶ 19. “The insurer must defend the insured in an action when the

allegations state a claim that potentially or arguably falls within the liability insurance

coverage.” No duty to defend exists “[w]hen all the claims are clearly and indisputably

outside the contracted coverage.” Id. In other words, “the insurer need not provide a

defense if there is no set of facts alleged in the complaint that, if proved true, would invoke

coverage for any claim.” Granger v. Auto-Owners Ins., 144 Ohio St.3d 57, 2015-Ohio-

3279, 40 N.E.3d 1110, ¶ 21. Given that an insurer’s duty to defend is broader than its

duty to indemnify, the absence of a duty to defend necessarily means there is no duty to

indemnify. AIX Specialty Ins. Co. v. Big Limo, Inc., 547 F.Supp.3d 757, 762 (S.D. Ohio

2021).

         {¶ 10} Two OTARMA liability-coverage policies are at issue here. One is identified

as the “Governmental Liability Coverage” (GLC) agreement, and the other is identified as

the Legal Defense and Claim Payment Agreement (“LDCPA”). The GLC policy was in

effect from July 24, 1996, to July 24, 1998. The LDCPA policy was in effect from July 24,

1998, through the filing of Gillispie’s federal lawsuit.

         {¶ 11} On appeal, Miami Township cites the GLC policy’s “Law Enforcement

Liability Coverage Part.” Among other things, it provided coverage for damages resulting
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from “personal injury” caused by an “occurrence” that took place during the policy period.

The Law Enforcement Liability Coverage Part defined “personal injury” to include non-

bodily injury arising out of, inter alia, improper detention, false arrest, malicious

prosecution, and violations of rights protected by civil-rights statutes. It defined an

“occurrence” as “an incident brought about by law enforcement action committed or

alleged to have been committed by the ‘Member’ or by anyone acting under the

‘Member’s’ direction or control.”

       {¶ 12} Miami Township also relies on the LDCPA policy, which similarly provided

coverage for damages resulting from an “injury” caused by an “occurrence” that took

place during the policy period. The LDCPA policy defined “injury” to include harm arising

out of, inter alia, improper detention, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and violations of

rights protected by civil-rights statutes. The LDCPA policy defined an “occurrence” as “an

accident including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general

harmful conditions, event, happening or a commission of a wrongful act.” The policy

defined a “wrongful act” as “any actual or alleged error, misstatement, act of omission,

neglect or breach of duty, including malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance, but

excluding willful misconduct, criminal conduct, fraud or malicious acts.”

       {¶ 13} Having identified the controlling language in the GLC and LDCPA policies,

we turn now to the allegations in Roger Gillispie’s amended complaint in federal court.2

The amended complaint included detailed factual allegations about Miami Township

2 The relevant allegations are found in Gillispie’s first amended complaint, which was filed
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio on January 17, 2014
in case number 3:13-cv-416.
                                                                                           -7-

employees and others engaging in conduct that resulted in Gillispie’s 1991 wrongful

conviction and imprisonment for raping three women. Although the majority of the factual

allegations involved acts that predated Gillispie’s conviction, paragraph 73 of the

amended complaint alleged: “Accordingly, even after the conviction, Defendant Moore

and other Defendant Officers have continued to work to keep Mr. Gillispie behind bars by

repeating their lies and misrepresentations in post-conviction proceedings and through

efforts to conceal their own misconduct, thereby causing Mr. Gillispie further damage.”

       {¶ 14} Gillispie’s amended complaint contained nine substantive counts. Counts

one through five set forth claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 predicated on suppression of

exculpatory   material,    suggestive    identification,   fabricated   evidence,   malicious

prosecution, and destruction of exculpatory evidence. Count six through eight set forth

state-law claims for malicious prosecution, infliction of emotional distress, and spoliation

of evidence. Finally, count nine alleged that Miami Township had a statutory duty under

Ohio law to indemnify its employees and former employees for any judgment entered

against them personally.

       {¶ 15} The federal district court significantly narrowed the issues and parties in

Gillispie’s lawsuit in September 2020. As a result of summary-judgment rulings, the only

remaining claims were counts one through five alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 by

Matthew Scott Moore. All claims against all other defendants were dismissed. Thereafter,

Gillispie and Moore filed a November 17, 2022 stipulation in the federal lawsuit. They

stipulated to the voluntary dismissal of counts three, four and five, which alleged violations

of 42 U.S.C. 1983 predicated on fabricated evidence, malicious prosecution, and
                                                                                          -8-

destruction of exculpatory evidence. Following the stipulation, Gillispie’s two remaining

section 1983 claims against Moore (suppression of exculpatory material and suggestive

identification) proceeded to a late November 2022 jury trial in federal district court. We

take judicial notice that the jury returned a verdict for Gillispie on both counts.3

       {¶ 16} As noted above, resolution of OTARMA’s duty to defend in the federal-court

litigation requires us to examine the allegations in Gillispie’s complaint to determine

whether they potentially fall within the liability coverage of either OTARMA policy. With

the exception of paragraph 73 of the amended complaint quoted above, the factual

allegations preceding the substantive counts of Gillispie’s complaint appear to us to

predate his 1991 conviction and incarceration. In addition, all but one of the substantive

counts necessarily allege wrongful acts and misconduct that occurred prior to the effective

date of either OTARMA policy.

       {¶ 17} Count one, which pleads a section 1983 claim for “Suppression of

Exculpatory Material,” alleges that Moore and others “destroyed, failed to disclose, and

otherwise withheld and/or suppressed exculpatory information and material from the

prosecution and, thus, from Plaintiff.” It alleges that “[a]s a result of these violations,

Plaintiff was deprived of his right to a fair trial and was falsely convicted for a crime of

which he was innocent.” In other words, count one alleges that wrongful acts caused

Gillispie to have an unfair trial and to be convicted unfairly. Thus, the acts necessarily

3 The jury awarded Gillispie damages of $45 million against Moore personally. In
response to interrogatories, the jury answered “no” when asked whether it had been
proven that Moore had not acted in good faith or that he had acted outside the scope of
his employment. These responses appear to be relevant to the township’s potential
obligation under R.C. 2744.07 to indemnify Moore for the $45 million judgment against
him.
                                                                                             -9-

occurred before the trial and conviction.

       {¶ 18} Count two, which pleads a section 1983 claim for “Suggestive

Identification,” alleges that Moore and others “used improper and suggestive procedures

to cause Plaintiff to be misidentified as the perpetrator.” It further alleges that “[t]his

misconduct tainted the pretrial identifications of Mr. Gillispie, which were offered against

him at trial, and the in-court identifications during his trial.” Count two alleges that “[a]s a

result of these violations, Plaintiff was deprived of his right to a fair trial and was falsely

convicted for a crime of which he was innocent.” Once again, count two alleges pretrial

conduct that deprived Gillispie of a fair trial and resulted in a wrongful conviction.

       {¶ 19} Count three, which pleads a section 1983 claim for “Fabricated Evidence,”

alleges that Moore and others “fabricated evidence, including without limitation, false

police reports, fabricated statements attributed to witnesses, and their own fabricated

testimony offered at both trials.”4 Count three alleges that “[a]s a result of these violations,

Plaintiff was deprived of his right to a fair trial and was falsely convicted for a crime of

which he was innocent.” Count three makes clear that the fabrications at issue were used

to secure Gillispie’s conviction. Therefore, they necessarily predated the trial.

       {¶ 20} Count four, which pleads a section 1983 claim for “Malicious Prosecution,”

alleges that Moore and others “instigated and continued the prosecution of Plaintiff

without probable cause and acting out of malice.” It further alleges that “[a]s a result of

4 Although counts three through nine were dismissed in the federal-court proceedings,
they remain relevant insofar as OTARMA may have had a duty to defend against them
prior to their dismissal. Given the dismissal of counts three through nine, the only counts
relevant to OTARMA’s duty to indemnify are counts one and two, on which the jury
returned its $45 million verdict against Moore.
                                                                                            -10-

the malicious prosecution, Plaintiff was falsely convicted for a crime of which he was

innocent.” Once again, if the “malicious prosecution” resulted in a false conviction it

necessarily had to occur before the conviction.

       {¶ 21} Count five, which pleads a section 1983 claim for “Destruction of

Exculpatory Evidence,” alleges that Moore and others “suppressed, destroyed, or caused

to be destroyed exculpatory and materially-favorable evidence, including but not limited

to police reports, audio recordings, alibi evidence, and crime-scene evidence containing

genetic material.” Count five also alleges that certain crime-lab employees “destroyed

exculpatory evidence and materially-favorable evidence, including but not limited to crime

scene evidence containing genetic material.” It further alleges that “[a]s a result of these

violations, Plaintiff was deprived of his right to a fair trial and was falsely convicted for a

crime of which he was innocent.” Once again, the wrongful acts necessarily predated trial

if they resulted in an unfair trial and a false conviction.

       {¶ 22} Count six, which pleads a state-law claim for “Malicious Prosecution,”

alleges that Moore and others “instigated and continued the prosecution of Plaintiff

without probable cause and acting out of malice.” It alleges that “[a]s a result of the

malicious prosecution, Plaintiff was falsely convicted for a crime of which he was

innocent.” As noted above, if the “malicious prosecution” resulted in a false conviction it

necessarily had to precede the conviction.

       {¶ 23} Count seven, which pleads a state-law claim for “Infliction of Emotional

Distress,” alleges that Moore and others “intentionally and/or recklessly engaged in

extreme and outrageous conduct that caused Plaintiff severe emotional distress and also
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bodily harm from his distress.” It further alleges that “Plaintiff suffered actual damages,

pain and suffering, lost wages, and other damages as a direct and proximate result.”

Unlike the prior counts, which allege that specified misconduct occurred and that it

resulted in an unfair trial and a wrongful conviction, count seven does not identify the

distress-causing acts or make clear when they occurred. That being so, count seven may

be read as alleging acts of post-conviction infliction of emotional distress that occurred

during one of the OTARMA policy periods.

       {¶ 24} Count eight, which pleads a state-law claim for “Spoliation of Evidence,”

alleges that Moore and others “willfully destroyed evidence in a manner that disrupted

Plaintiff’s criminal proceedings, knowing that there was pending or probable litigation that

would involve this evidence.” It further alleges that “[a]s a result of the absence of this

evidence, Plaintiff was falsely convicted for a crime of which he was innocent.” If the

absence of the evidence resulted in the false conviction, the act of destroying the

evidence necessarily must have occurred before the conviction.

       {¶ 25} Finally, count nine pleads a state-law claim for indemnification. It raises an

issue of law regarding a potential statutory obligation of Miami Township to indemnify its

current or former employees for any judgment rendered against them personally.5 But

any statutory duty to indemnify that Miami Township may owe to its employees or former

employees is distinct from OTARMA’s contractual duty to defend and indemnify Miami

Township in Gillispie’s federal litigation. Moreover, the Ohio Supreme Court has made

5 Count nine of Gillispie’s amended complaint cites R.C. 1729.031. In its September 21,
2020 summary-judgment ruling, the federal district court noted Gillispie’s concession that
this citation is a typographical error and that the indemnification statute is R.C. 2744.07.
                                                                                           -12-

clear that the statutory right to indemnification is a personal right held by the employee,

not a judgment creditor. For that reason, a judgment creditor such as Gillispie may not

assert an employee’s indemnification right in an action directly against a political

subdivision. Ayers v. Cleveland, 160 Ohio St.3d 288, 2020-Ohio-1047, 156 N.E.3d 848.

Finally, count nine, which addresses indemnification rights between Miami Township and

the individual defendants, does not itself allege any wrongful act that resulted in an injury.

Therefore, count nine of Gillispie’s amended complaint does not come within the scope

of either OTARMA policy.

       {¶ 26} Having examined the causes of action in Gillispie’s amended complaint, we

conclude that count seven, which states a claim for infliction of emotional distress,

potentially or arguably alleges wrongful acts that occurred during one of the OTARMA

policy periods. Therefore, with respect to count seven, OTARMA had a duty to defend

Miami Township until September 2020, when count seven was dismissed in connection

with the federal district court’s summary-judgment rulings. See Ward v. United Foundries,

Inc., 129 Ohio St.3d 292, 2011-Ohio-3176, 951 N.E.2d 770, ¶ 19 (“If the allegations state

a claim that potentially or arguably falls within the liability insurance coverage, then the

insurer must defend the insured in the action.”).

       {¶ 27} As for all other claims in Gillispie’s federal lawsuit, they necessarily allege

wrongful acts that occurred prior to or at the time of his trial and conviction, which was

before the effective date of the OTARMA policies. As noted above, both OTARMA policies

only provide coverage for damages resulting from an injury caused by an act, or

“occurrence,” that takes place during the policy period. Given that the wrongful acts
                                                                                         -13-

mentioned in every other count of Gillispie’s federal lawsuit were alleged to have occurred

before the effective dates of the OTARMA policies, we conclude that OTARMA had no

duty to defend or indemnify.

       {¶ 28} In reaching our conclusion, we again acknowledge the existence of

paragraph 73 of Gillispie’s amended complaint. Paragraph 73 does allege that Moore and

others “continued to work to keep Mr. Gillispie behind bars by repeating their lies and

misrepresentations in post-conviction proceedings and through efforts to conceal their

own misconduct.” Although this language—along with the rest of the complaint’s factual

background—was incorporated by reference into each cause of action that followed, it

does not correspond to the specific allegations supporting any of Gillispie’s substantive

claims. Other than count seven, the substantive causes of action allege that certain

wrongful acts occurred and that they resulted in Gillispie’s receiving an unfair trial and

being wrongfully convicted. They do not allege or depend on any post-conviction

misconduct by any of the defendants. Therefore, we are unpersuaded by Miami

Township’s reliance on paragraph 73 to bring Gillispie’s actual claims within the scope of

OTARMA’s policies.

       {¶ 29} We have reached our conclusion solely by examining the OTARMA policies

and the allegations in Gillispie’s complaint. We note, however, that the federal district

court’s jury instructions on the two surviving section 1983 claims shed additional light on

the acts underpinning them. Addressing the two claims together, Instruction 20 advised

the jury:

              * * * Plaintiff Gillispie claims that Defendant Moore violated his right
                                                                                               -14-

       to a fair trial in one or more of the following ways:

              First, that Defendant Moore violated his right to a fair trial through

       unreliable identifications that were used as evidence against him in the

       criminal case; and

              Second, that Defendant Moore violated his right to a fair trial by

       suppressing material evidence.

(Emphasis added.)

       {¶ 30} With regard to the elements of the section 1983 claim predicated on

suppressing evidence, the district court then instructed the jury that Gillispie was required

to prove:

        1. Moore knowingly or recklessly concealed from the prosecutor readily

       apparent exculpatory and/or impeachment evidence during the criminal

       case and/or during Gillispie’s appeal.

       2. The evidence was material; and

       3. Gillispie was injured as a result.

(Emphasis added.)

       {¶ 31} With regard to the section 1983 claim predicated on a suggestive

identification, the district court instructed the jury that Gillispie was required to prove:

       1. Moore knowingly or recklessly used unnecessarily suggestive

       identification procedures that resulted in one or more unreliable

       identifications;

       2. Evidence of the one or more unreliable identifications was offered into

       evidence in the criminal case; and
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       3. Gillispie was injured as a result.

(Emphasis added.)

       {¶ 32} The foregoing claims are the only two on which indemnification remains an

issue, and the district court’s jury instructions are consistent with our determination that

OTARMA has no duty to indemnify Miami Township. Like Gillispie’s amended complaint

in federal court, the jury instructions also demonstrate that his section 1983 claims are

predicated on wrongful acts that predate the OTARMA policies.6

       {¶ 33} Relying primarily on paragraph 73 of Gillispie’s amended complaint, Miami

6  If we assume, arguendo, that Gillispie’s section 1983 claims also allege post-conviction
suppression of evidence and related misconduct during the OTARMA policy periods, a
potential issue arises as to whether a post-conviction constitutional right to exculpatory
evidence even exists. Gillispie’s section 1983 claims are predicated largely on violations
of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). In District
Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 129 S.Ct. 2308,
174 L.Ed.2d 38 (2009), the United States Supreme Court recognized that Brady involves
a defendant’s due-process right to the disclosure of material exculpatory evidence before
trial. Id. at 68. Osborne characterized Brady as “the wrong framework” for assessing
disclosure obligations after a defendant is convicted and a case is closed. Id. at 68-69;
see also Haughey v. County of Putnam, No. 18-CV-2861, 2020 WL 1503513, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2020) (recognizing that “several courts—and possibly the Supreme
Court—have held that there is no post-conviction constitutional right to exculpatory
evidence”); Gavitt v. Born, 835 F.3d 623, 647-648 (6th Cir.2016) (relying on Osborne to
uphold the dismissal of a wrongfully-convicted plaintiff’s section 1983 claim predicated on
law enforcement withholding exculpatory evidence “at the time of his trial” and also
“throughout the period of his imprisonment, in violation of his due process rights”). We
recognize that Osborne is distinguishable in some ways from the present case. Perhaps
most significantly, Osborne involved evidence discovered after trial, whereas Miami
Township contends Gillispie’s lawsuit involves evidence known before trial that continued
to be suppressed after his conviction. Whether this distinction makes a difference is
subject to dispute. In the portion of Gavitt cited above, the federal Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals appears to have found that it does not. In any event, we need not resolve what
have been characterized as “thorny questions about the existence and scope of a
constitutional right to post-conviction disclosure of exculpatory evidence.” Haughey at
*10. We do not read the section 1983 claims in Gillispie’s lawsuit as relying on any post-
conviction non-disclosure of exculpatory evidence.
                                                                                        -16-

Township does suggest that he alleges the commission of additional wrongful acts

committed during the OTARMA policy periods by continuing to suppress exculpatory

evidence, engaging in lies, and concealing prior misconduct. In our view, however, any

post-conviction ongoing suppression of evidence or related wrongdoing that may be

gleaned from the complaint was merely a continuation of alleged Brady violations

committed earlier. Although an ethical obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence may

continue after trial, the continuing obligation stems from an earlier completed act of non-

disclosure. Here Gillispie’s federal-court complaint makes clear that any act of failing to

disclose exculpatory evidence occurred prior to the effective date of the OTARMA

policies. We reject the notion that continued suppression of evidence during post-

conviction proceedings constituted one or more new acts that occurred within the

OTARMA policy periods.7 Travelers Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 925 F.3d 236, 245, fn.

4 (5th Cir.2019) (“The estates do allege that Forrest County officials committed additional

wrongful acts during Travelers’ and Scottsdale’s policy periods by failing to come forward

with exculpatory evidence or admit their civil rights violations. But other courts have

rejected this argument, holding that failure to admit past unconstitutional acts does not

retrigger an act-based policy.”).8

7 It is worth noting too that Miami Township’s argument about multiple or continuous acts
or “triggers” occurring post-conviction during the OTARMA policy periods is largely
academic in light of our determination above that Gillispie’s section 1983 claims do not
allege or depend on any post-conviction wrongdoing by Moore or others.
8 Miami Township itself cites Travelers Indemnity for the proposition that insurance
coverage need not “be triggered by a single moment of wrongful conduct[.]” Travelers
Indemnity at 246. But that statement was true in Travelers Indemnity because the policies
at issue were injury-based policies, not act-based policies. Coverage existed for injuries
occurring during the applicable policy periods regardless of when the wrongful causal act
                                                                                         -17-

       {¶ 34} “In wrongful conviction cases, the wrongful act is the one that causes the

wrongful conviction; thus, act-based policies are usually triggered on or around the time

of conviction.” Id. at 245. We note too that “Ohio, like the majority of states, applies the

‘cause test’ when determining the number of occurrences under an insurance policy.” Big

Lots Stores, Inc. v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 240 F. Supp.3d 725, 732 (S.D. Ohio

2017), citing Parker Hannifin Corp. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 445 F.Supp.2d 827 (N.D. Ohio

2006). “Under the cause test, the court considers ‘if there was but one proximate,

uninterrupted, and continuing cause which resulted in all of the injuries and damages.’ ”

(Citation omitted.) Id. If so, “then there is a single occurrence under an insurance

contract.” Id.; see also Indian Harbor Ins. Co. v. City of Waukegan, 392 Ill. Dec. 812, 33

N.E.3d 613, ¶ 44 (Ill. App. 2015) (“Applying the cause theory * * * to the present case

clearly establishes that this case presented a single cause and therefore a single

occurrence. The alleged Brady violations that contributed to Rivera’s arrest and

convictions might have had an ongoing effect over a period of time, but Rivera’s injury

resulted from the ‘same conditions and was inflicted as part of an unbroken and

uninterrupted continuum.’ ”) 9 Here the section 1983 claims in Gillispie’s amended

occurred. Id. at 241. Travelers Indemnity does not help Miami Township because
OTARMA’s policies are “occurrence” policies with act-based triggers, not injury-based
triggers. For the same reason, we are unpersuaded by Miami Township’s citation to
Ferguson v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. 597 S.W.3d 249 (Mo. App. 2019), and St.
Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. City of Newport, 804 Fed. Appx. 379 (6th Cir. 2020), which as
Miami Township acknowledges both involved injury-based policies providing coverage if
an injury occurred during the policy period.
9 In Ferguson, 597 S.W.3d 249, 258, a Missouri court of appeals criticized Indian Harbor
for applying “act-based” or “occurrence-based” principles to an “injury-based” policy. That
criticism does not apply here because OTARMA’s policies are “act-based” or “occurrence-
based.”
                                                                                            -18-

complaint allege the commission of wrongful acts that predate the OTARMA policies.

Those completed acts were the single cause of Gillispie’s “injury” of wrongful conviction

and his lengthy imprisonment.

       {¶ 35} On appeal, Miami Township discusses whether we should apply (1) the

“arrest-conviction rule,” which it describes as providing “that coverage is triggered only

under a policy in effect on the date of the arrest and/or conviction”; (2) the “exoneration

rule,” which it characterizes as providing “that coverage is triggered only under the policy

in effect on the date of exoneration”; or (3) the “continuous trigger rule” or “multiple trigger

rule,” which it describes as providing “that coverage is triggered under all applicable

policies in effect between arrest through exoneration.” See Appellants’ Merit Brief at 17.

Miami Township asserts that the “arrest-conviction rule” represents the majority view but

that the proper approach remains an open question in Ohio.

       {¶ 36} For purposes of our analysis herein, we need not “adopt” any of the

foregoing rules. In evaluating OTARMA’s duty to defendant and indemnify, we simply

have applied the pertinent policy language to the allegations in Gillispie’s complaint. As

explained above, both OTARMA policies provide coverage for damages resulting from an

injury caused by an act, or “occurrence,” that takes place during the policy period.

Therefore, the applicable “rule” in the present case is this: coverage is triggered only if a

wrongful act occurs during the policy period and causes an injury. With the exception of

count seven, the injury-causing acts alleged in Gillispie’s complaint necessarily did not

occur during either OTARMA policy period.

       {¶ 37} Miami Township also stresses the absence of a “deemer” clause in the
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OTARMA policies. It contends such a clause explicitly would deem all injuries arising out

of continuous or repeated exposure to the same or substantially the same general

conditions to be “one occurrence.” See Appellants’ Merit Brief at 15. In response, we note

that the LDCPA policy comes close to containing such a clause insofar as it defines an

“occurrence” as “an accident including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially

the same general harmful conditions, event, happening or a commission of a wrongful

act.” Regardless, the presence of a so-called “deemer” clause might make resolution of

a coverage dispute easier, but we do not view the absence of such a clause as dispositive.

       {¶ 38} Finally, we turn to Miami Township’s argument that probable cause for

Gillispie’s continued incarceration dissolved while the OTARMA polices were in effect.

See Appellants’ Merit Brief at 10-12. This argument appears to relate to Gillispie’s

malicious-prosecution claims under section 1983 and/or state law. Miami Township

suggests that probable cause may have disappeared while an OTARMA policy was in

effect and that the disappearance of probable cause would result in the accrual of a

malicious-prosecution claim.

       {¶ 39} We find Miami Township’s argument unpersuasive for at least two reasons.

First, with regard to OTARMA’s duty to defend, counts four and six of Gillispie’s complaint

set forth factually identical malicious-prosecution claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state

law. As noted above, they alleged that Moore and others “instigated and continued the

prosecution of Plaintiff without probable cause and acting out of malice.” They further

alleged that “[a]s a result of the malicious prosecution, Plaintiff was falsely convicted for

a crime of which he was innocent.”
                                                                                        -20-

       {¶ 40} For present purposes, we find it notable that the malicious-prosecution

claims alleged instigation of the prosecution without probable cause. This allegation is

indicative of a claim by Gillispie that probable cause never existed, not that it initially

existed and later evaporated. In addition, if the malicious prosecution resulted in a false

conviction, it necessarily had to occur before the conviction. Therefore, as plead in

Gillispie’s complaint, the malicious-prosecution claims did not involve acts occurring

during the OTARMA policy periods. Second, with regard to OTARMA’s duty to indemnify,

the state-law malicious-prosecution claim was dismissed in conjunction with the federal

district court’s September 2020 summary-judgment rulings. Gillispie later voluntarily

dismissed his section 1983 malicious-prosecution claim before trial. Therefore, OTARMA

cannot have a duty to indemnify on either claim.

       {¶ 41} Based on the reasoning set forth above, we find that OTARMA had a duty

to defend Miami Township on count seven of Gillispie’s amended complaint in federal

district court. That duty to defend continued until September 2020, when count seven was

dismissed. OTARMA had no duty to defend or indemnify Miami Township with respect to

any other causes of action in Gillispie’s federal lawsuit.

       {¶ 42} Miami Township’s first assignment of error is sustained insofar as the trial

court erred in entering summary judgment for OTARMA regarding its duty to defend on

count seven. Given the absence of any factual dispute, the trial court should have entered

summary judgment in favor of Miami Township on its cross motion with respect to

OTARMA’s duty to defend on count seven until September 2020. In all other respects,

Miami Township’s first assignment of error is overruled.
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                            B. Motion to Compel Discovery

       {¶ 43} In its second assignment of error, Miami Township contends the trial court

abused its discretion in overruling a November 21, 2018 motion to compel discovery. In

its motion, Miami Township sought to compel OTARMA to respond to and comply with

interrogatories and requests for document production. Miami Township maintained that it

was entitled to know who made the no-coverage decision, why it was made, and whether

the applicable process was followed. The trial court overruled the motion on January 28,

2019. The trial court later denied reconsideration, reasoning that the requested discovery

was unnecessary, unduly burdensome, and unlikely to lead to the discovery of relevant,

admissible evidence.

       {¶ 44} Upon review, we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s discovery

ruling. By Miami Township’s own admission, the discovery dispute concerned OTARMA’s

claims-handling and decision-making process and its decision to seek declaratory

judgment regarding its duty to defend and indemnify. In its reply brief, Miami Township

also asserts that the requested discovery was relevant to a potential bad-faith claim.

       {¶ 45} In our analysis herein, however, we have reviewed the terms of OTARMA’s

policies and the allegations of Gillispie’s complaint and fully resolved the issues raised in

this declaratory-judgment action. The facts are not in dispute, and there is no

disagreement as to the underlying coverage documents. We are unpersuaded that

discovery regarding OTARMA’s claims-handling or decision-making was necessary.

Moreover, in light of our present ruling, Miami Township has no potential bad-faith claim.

OTARMA provided a defense in the federal-court litigation, and OTARMA has no duty to
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indemnify. Accordingly, Miami Township’s second assignment of error is overruled.

                                        III. Conclusion

       {¶ 46} The trial court’s entry of summary judgment in this declaratory-judgment

action is reversed insofar as it declared that OTARMA had no duty to defend Miami

Township on count seven of Gillispie’s amended complaint. The trial court erred in

entering summary judgment in favor of OTARMA on that issue. The trial court should

have sustained Miami Township’s cross motion for summary judgment to the extent that

OTARMA did have a duty to defend on count seven until it was dismissed in September

2020.10 The trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of OTARMA is affirmed in all

other respects. As a matter of law, OTARMA had no duty to defend or indemnify Miami

Township on any other cause of action. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in overruling Miami Township’s motion to compel discovery.

                                        .............

EPLEY, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.

10 Although the denial of summary judgment ordinarily is not appealable, an exception
exists in declaratory-judgment actions where there are no genuine issues of material fact
and a trial court fully sets forth the rights and responsibilities of the parties. In such a case,
a denial of summary judgment may be appealable. See, e.g., Algren v. Algren, 183 Ohio
App.3d 114, 2009-Ohio-3009, 916 N.E.2d 491, ¶ 34, fn. 4 (2d Dist.), citing Hoop v.
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19686, 2003-Ohio-3772, ¶ 2, fn.
1. We find that to be the case here. We note too that Miami Township did appeal from
both the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of OTARMA and from its
overruling of Miami Township’s cross motion.