Court Opinion

ID: 9772224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:10:50.801826+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:42.699016
License: Public Domain

DOUGLAS, Judge
(dissenting).
Article 1.14, V.A.C.C.P., provides that a defendant in a criminal prosecution for any offense may waive any rights secured to him by law except the right of trial by jury in a capital case where the State seeks the death penalty. Many cases hold that an accused may waive a right to trial by jury, the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to counsel including the right to counsel at sentencing. The majority opinion states that his presence is jurisdictional.
Even though the court was without jurisdiction of the person of the accused, it appears to be the law in most jurisdictions that the defendant may waive his right to be present. See 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 161, page 416.
In the present case the appellant had executed a written sworn waiver of his right to be present which was approved by his counsel. Such waiver was filed among the papers of the cause. He was sentenced while his counsel was present.
The matter was not raised by ground of error and no complaint is made by the appellant or the State concerning the right or lack of right to waive presence at the time sentence was pronounced.
The majority goes out of its way to dismiss an appeal which will no doubt cause many delays in future cases. Such a holding will also work a hardship upon those accused who have to travel long distances to be present at the ministerial function of pronouncing sentence even in misdemeanor cases when the actual punishment assessed is only a fine. When it is deemed necessary, a trial court may require the presence of a defendant for sentencing.
For the above reasons, the appeal should not be dismissed.
MORRISON, J., joins in this dissent.