Court Opinion

ID: 9718655
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:29:10.468291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:01.069589
License: Public Domain

WIENER, J.
I concur in the judgment of the majority that the California court has personal jurisdiction over Mr. Lontos with reference to child and spousal support. I feel it is necessaiy, however, both for the guidance of the trial court and the parties concerned, to discuss the practical effect of our decision. Undoubtedly, now that the academic *73question of jurisdiction has been answered, Mrs. Lontos will seek a writ of execution to obtain the funds due for support under the court orders. For the reasons which I will discuss, I believe enforcement of the child and spousal support provisions of both the interlocutory judgment of dissolution and the order of September 14, 1976, should be stayed until the trial court can properly exercise its discretion under Civil Code section 4380.1
An order for either accrued spousal or child support does not issue as a matter of right, for the trial court has discretion to determine whether execution is an appropriate remedy in a particular case. (6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1974) Husband and Wife, Execution, § 172, p. 5042.) Whether a court should exercise its discretion may turn on many considerations. (See, e.g., Parker v. Parker (1928) 203 Cal. 787, 793-794 [266 P. 283]; Messenger v. Messenger (1956) 46 Cal.2d 619, 630 [297 P.2d 988]; Kaminski v. Kaminski (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 563 [87 Cal.Rptr. 453].) It is necessary that the trial court have all relevant information affecting the cause before the exercise of discretion. To determine what may be relevant in the case at bench, a review of the procedural background is necessary.
Mrs. Lontos filed her petition for dissolution in California on January 16, 1970. Her husband was personally served on January 19, 1970, and her request to enter his default was filed April 15, 1970. On April 30, 1970, Mrs. Lontos obtained an interlocutory judgment of dissolution which provided for child support for each child in the sum of $100 monthly and spousal support in the same amount for a total of $400 monthly. Mr. Lontos was in the military service and did not appear in the action.2
Mr. Lontos filed two actions for divorce in New Mexico.- The first, filed January 9, 1970, was dismissed; the second action was filed March 12, *741970. Mrs. Lontos appeared through her attorneys on May 15, 1970, and permitted judgment to be entered on April 16, 1971. The judgments which her counsel approved as to form expressly stated there was no alimony and provided for total child support in the sum of $200 monthly. Her answer to the New Mexico action, filed after the entry of the California judgment, made no reference to the California judgment.
The New Mexico judgment may have considerable significance for, as a general rule, where two successive actions involving the same issue are filed in courts of concurrent jurisdiction, the first final judgment is conclusive. (4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1970) Judgment, § 166, pp. 3308-3309.) However, the res judicata effect of the first final judgment may be lost if a party having the opportunity to do so fails to raise it as a bar in the other action. (See Harley v. Superior Court (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 432, 436 [38 Cal.Rptr. 72].) It appears from this record the New Mexico judgment has become final and there is no reason to deny it full faith and credit. Whether the foreign judgment is valid or whether it has any effect on the California judgment are questions which cannot be resolved by this court at this stage of the proceedings; nevertheless, the existence of the foreign judgment should be drawn to the attention of the trial court to permit a judicial determination as to the legal effect of the foreign judgment on the California orders.
Lawyers practicing family law and judges who are called upon to sign the countless writs of execution for accrued support are keenly aware of the need for candor in the applications which accompany requests for the issuance of writs of execution. As officers of the court, lawyers may “never . . . seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (d).) Any type of deceit by an attorney is reprehensible misconduct whether or not harm results and regardless of the existence of any motive for personal gain. (See Sullins v. State Bar (1975) 15 Cal.3d 609, 622 [125 Cal.Rptr. 471, 542 P.2d 631].) It is imperative that lawyers, particularly in ex parte matters, perform their role in the administration of justice.
I agree with the majority that Mr. Lontos’ connection with the State of California was not too attenuated under the standards of reasonableness and fairness to require him to conduct any defense that he may have had in California. I do not agree, however, with the conclusion that his acts were done with his full awareness of the harm that would be effected in California. The issue of marital discord and the cause of Mrs. Lontos’ leaving New Mexico were raised in the respective declarations filed by *75the parties. Findings on the issue of abandonment were neither essential to the trial court judgment nor were they made. Consequently, on this record, I am unable to join with the majority on the cause and effect basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the California court.

Civil Code section 4380 provides: “Any judgment, order, or decree of the court made or entered pursuant to this part may be enforced by the court by execution, the appointment of a receiver, contempt, or by such other order or orders as the court in its discretion may from time to time deem necessary.”

The procedure used in obtaining the default judgment against Mr. Lontos was not in compliance with the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Relief Act of 1940 as amended. (50 U.S.C.A. § 501 et seq.) Neither an affidavit (declaration) was filed showing Mr. Lontos not to be in the service nor was an attorney appointed on his behalf. (50 U.S.C.A. Appen., § 520.) Although the ‘failure to appoint an attorney does not render the judgment void, only voidable (Allen v. Allen (1947) 30 Cal.2d 433, 435-436 [182 P.2d 551]), it is difficult to ignore the effect of the statute when use of the court’s processes are being considered. There was also failure to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 1286. Notice of his default was not mailed to Mr. Lontos at his known address. The notice furnished was to his attorney of record in his New Mexico action for divorce.