Court Opinion

ID: 9558662
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:15:01.605404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:30.446900
License: Public Domain

Justice KIDWELL,
dissenting in part III.
Whether the trial court abused its legal discretion in this situation is arguable. However, after a review of the facts and applicable case law, I am persuaded that the benefit of the doubt must be given to the defendant. A fair trial is the necessary end result. To exclude a defense witness in a criminal case is an extreme measure that should only be used after a careful weighing of the potential prejudice to the litigants. The weighing analysis here was insufficient. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority view. I believe the Court of Appeals correctly analyzed the criteria to be utilized for sanctions, particularly when excluding a defense witness in a criminal case.
Although defense witness Durant was undisclosed until six days before trial, the record shows that “as soon as the decision was made to call Durant as a witness, defense counsel filed an immediate supplemental response notifying the prosecutor that Durant would testify.” This would seem to comply with the defense’s duty under I.C.R. 16(i) to “promptly notify” the State of a new witness.
Assuming that disclosure of Durant six days before trial was actually a discovery violation, the trial court abused its discretion *459in excluding Ms testimony. When Durant attempted to testify, the State asserted that he was a surprise witness, even though it is undisputed that he had been revealed as a witness six days before trial. The State then contended that it was prejudiced because Officer Burke, the State’s witness who would have been able to rebut the testimony, had left the jurisdiction due to the defense agreeing to his departure. Thus, the State’s showing of prejudice was based upon (1) the false assertion that Durant had not been revealed as a witness, and (2) the prosecution’s own action in releasing its witness, to which the defense acquiesced. As'the Court of Appeals noted, “The prosecution’s failure to review its own file prior to trial should not factor into its claim of prejudice to deny the testimony of a late-disclosed witness.” Moreover, it was not the defense’s responsibility to remind the State that Officer Burke could be useful in rebutting defense witnesses. Therefore, the record shows no “prejudice” to the State that resulted from the defense’s action.
In State v. Harris, 132 Idaho 843, 979 P.2d 1201 (1999), the trial court refused to allow a defense witness to testify when the defense had never disclosed the witness. Id. at 845, 979 P.2d at 1203. This Court found an abuse of discretion because the trial court did not evaluate the prejudice to the State against Harris’s right to a fair trial. Id. at 847, 979 P.2d at 1205. Likewise, in State v. Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630, 945 P.2d 1 (1997), the trial court refused to allow a defense witness to testify who was disclosed to the State five days before trial, concluding that the disclosure was too late. Id. at 631, 945 P.2d at 2. This Court held that the trial court exceeded the bounds of its discretion in not allowing the witness to testify, because “the State did not show any prejudice, but simply stated an objection to the witness on the basis of late disclosure.” Id. at 633, 945 P.2d at 4. In the instant case, although the State asserted prejudice, it failed to show any prejudice based on the disclosure of the witness six days before trial. Instead, its showing was based on the erroneous proposition that Durant had been sprung on the State after the State rested its case. Because the trial court based its decision on an erroneous showing of prejudice, no weighing on the merits took place. Therefore, in my opinion, the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing Durant to testify.