Court Opinion

ID: 8575792
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-23 15:15:01.833597+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:54:02.142666
License: Public Domain

Duncan, Judge
(concurring in the result):
My difference of opinion from Judge Quinn’s view of the defense of obedience to orders is narrow. The issue of obedience to orders was raised in defense by the evidence. Contrary to Judge Quinn, I do not consider that a presumption arose that the appellant knew he could not kill the people involved. The Government, as I see it, is not entitled to a presumption of what the appellant knew of the illegality of an order. It is a matter for the factfinders under proper instructions.
Paragraph 216, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969 (Rev), provides for special defenses: excuse because of accident or misadventure; self-defense; entrapment; coercion or duress; physical or financial inability; and obedience to apparently lawful orders. Subparagraph d of paragraph 216 is as follows:
An order requiring the performance of a military duty may be inferred to be legal. An act performed manifestly beyond the scope of authority, or pursuant to an order that a man of ordi*545nary sense and understanding would know to be illegal, or in a wanton manner in the discharge of a lawful duty, is not excusable.
The military judge clearly instructed the members pursuant to this provision of the Manual. The heart of the issue is whether, under the circumstances of this case, he should have abandoned the Manual standard and fashioned another. The defense urges a purely subjective standard; the dissent herein yet another. I suggest that there are important general as well as certain specific considerations which convince me that the standard should not be abandoned. The process of promulgating Manual provisions is geared to produce requirements for the system only after most serious reflection by knowledgeable and concerned personnel. 2 These persons have full regard for the needs of the armed forces and genuine concern for the plight of one accused. Those who prepared the Manual provision and the President of the United States, the Commander-in-Chief, who approved and made the provision a part of our law,3 were aware that disobedience to orders is the anathema to an efficient military force. Judge Quinn points out that this Court has established as precedent the applicability of the special defense upon proof adduced pursuant to the Manual standard. These are important general reasons for not aborting a standard that has been long in existence and often used.
It is urged that in using the Manual test of "a man of ordinary sense and understanding” those persons at the lowest end of the scale of intelligence and experience in the services may suffer conviction while those more intelligent and experienced would possess faculties which would cause them to abjure the order with impunity. Such an argument has some attraction but in my view falls short of that which should impel a court to replace that which is provided to us as law.
It appears to me that all tests which measure an accused’s conduct by an objective standard — whether it is the test of "palpable illegality to the commonest understanding” or whether the test establishes a set of profile considerations by which to measure the accused’s ability to assess the legality of the order— are less than perfect, and they have a certain potential for injustice to the member having the slowest wit and quickest obedience. Obviously the higher the standard, the likelihood is that fewer persons will be able to measure up to it. Knowledge of the fact that there are other standards that are arguably more fair does not convince me that the standard used herein is unfair, on its face, or as applied to Lieutenant Calley.
Perhaps a new standard, such as the dissent suggests, has merit; however, I would leave that for the legislative authority or for the cause where the record demonstrates harm from the instructions given. I perceive none in this case. The general verdict in this case implies that the jury believed a man of ordinary sense and understanding would have known the order in question to be illegal.4 Even conceding arguendo that this issue should have been resolved under instructions requiring a finding that almost every member of the armed forces would have immediately recognized that the order was unlawful, as well as a finding that as a consequence of his age, grade, intelligence, experience, and training, Lieutenant Calley should have recognized the order’s illegality, I do not believe the result in this case would have been different.
*546I believe the trial judge to have been correct in his denial of the motion to dismiss the charges for the reason that pretrial publicity made it impossible for the Government to accord the accused a fair trial.
Both the principal opinion . and the analysis of the Court of Military Review state that in the enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice Congress has, in effect, codified the requirement of malice aforethought by defining murder as the unlawful killing of a human being, without justification or excuse. Article 118, UCMJ, 10 USC § 918. It should also be noted that in the case at bar the members of the panel were charged that a finding that the homicides were without justification or excuse was necessary to convict for premeditated murder. Furthermore, I cannot say that the evidence lacks sufficiency to convict in respect to any of the charges.

The draft of the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, its predecessor, was prepared through the cooperation of the Judge Advocates General of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the General Counsel, Office of the Secretary of Defense. The draft was then approved by the Secretary of Defense. The draft was further reviewed by the Office of the Attorney General and the Director of the Archives. After study by the Executive Office of the President, it was promulgated as Executive Order 10214 on February 8, 1951. See Legal and Legislative Basis, MCM, 1951.

 See Article 36, UCMJ, 10 USC § 836; United States v Smith, 13 USCMA 105, 32 CMR 105 (1962).

 This assumes that the jury found that the order the appellant contends he obeyed was given.