Court Opinion

ID: 9830868
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:34:32.970093+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:27.866572
License: Public Domain

On Appellants’ Motion for Rehearing.
Upon re-examination of appellants’ pleadings in the trial court we have concluded that, though not brought as a suit to construe said will, the relief sought, and the allegations on which such relief was predicated, necessarily involved the construction of such will. That is, a determination of what property was intended by the testatrix to be included as her “home place.” Except as to this issue, all other matters were subject to the jurisdiction of the Probate Court. As to this issue the District Court had jurisdiction; but its judgment as to that must be reversed, because a fact issue for jury determination was presented by the evidence, some of which was admitted, and some of which was excluded.
It is well settled that the District Court has original jurisdiction of suits to construe wills. 44 Tex.Jur., § 195, p. 764. While there was no ambiguity in said will as to the devisees named and of the estates devised, the facts presented did raise a latent ambiguity as to what property was intended to be included in the language “my home place.”
Mrs. Amelia Harsch and husband originally acquired in the town of Flatonia a rectangular tract of about 1 acre fronting north on a highway, on which was located a complete set of improvements, and which they moved into and occupied as a home continuously thereafter. Some time later they purchased a tract of about 3 acres adjoining their original home on the south on which also was situated another set of improvements. A fence was built between the two places and they were kept continuously separated. The trial court held that both places were included within the devise of “my home place” to Herman Harsch. The evidence showed that Amelia Harsch continuously used and occupied as her home the place originally purchased, and rented out the 3-acre tract and improvements last purchased as a separate tract. Manifestly, therefore, a latent ambiguity arose as to whether in devising to Herman Harsch “my home place” she intended both places to be included. The cardinal rule of construction is, of course, to ascertain the intent of the testatrix; and where an ambiguity arises as to the identification of the property devised, extrinsic evidence is admissible to show what property was included. 44 Tex.Jur., § 189, p. 758, and cases cited. And what was intended to be devised, where such ambiguity exists, “is regarded as a mixed question of law and fact, which may properly be submitted to the jury.” 44 Tex.Jur., § 200, p. 768; Haupt v. Michaelis, Tex.Com.App., 231 S.W. 706.
Without undertaking to set out or discuss here the evidence excluded by the trial court, suffice it to say that any extrinsic facts or circumstances which will aid in determining the testator’s intent are admissible. Hunt v. White, 24 Tex. 643; Haupt v. Michaelis, supra; Federal Land Bank v. Little, 130 Tex. 173, 107 S.W.2d 374, 377. It appears settled, however, that oral declarations of the testatrix, whether made before, at the time of, or subsequent to the execution of said will would not be admissible for the purpose of showing intent. Schelb v. Sparenberg, 133 Tex. 17, 124 S.W.2d 322, 326.
Insofar, therefore, as the appellants’ pleadings and the trial court’s judgment involve a construction of said will as to what lands, designated therein as “my home place,” were included within the devise made to Herman Harsch, the case is reversed and remanded for another trial; and our former judgment is modified accordingly. In all other respects the motion for rehearing is overruled.
Granted in part and in part overruled.