Court Opinion

ID: 9713123
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:08:43.741708+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:16.843734
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE DOOLEY, also dissenting: There are compelling reasons which dictate against the conclusion reached here. First, the decision of the Industrial Commission was never corrected. This means there was but one viable decision from which review had to be sought. Secondly, it is an approved practice that, during the pendency of an appeal to the circuit court from the Industrial Commission, the circuit court — as was done here — may allow the Industrial Commission to withdraw its return to the writ of certiorari and make corrections in the recorded proceedings. Thirdly, section 19(f) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 48, par. 138.19(f)) is inapplicable to this situation, involving more than an error in computation. And, lastly, this construction of the statute would deprive the employer of a very substantial right, namely, that of review. There is but one decision of the Commission from which an appeal was taken. Under the statute in question, the decision of the Commission is “conclusive” unless review by a writ of certiorari to the circuit court is commenced within 20 days of the receipt of notice of the decision of the Commission. Section 19(f) permits clerical errors in the computation of the award of the arbitrator or the decision of the Commission to be corrected within 15 days after the receipt of the award or decision, whatever the case may be. And — this is important — “[w] here such correction is made the time for appeal or review herein specified shall begin to run from the date of the receipt of the corrected award or decision.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 48, par. 138.19(f). Here, on April 30, 1975, the employer was notified of the adverse decision of the Industrial Commission. Within 20 days it commenced a suit in the circuit court by certiorari to review that decision. During the pendency of the cause in the circuit court, on motion of the employer, the court entered an order releasing the transcript of proceedings so that it could be returned to the Commission to show that a substantial sum had been paid claimant through a nonoccupational group insurance plan. But on September 25, 1975, the Commission denied the employer’s petition to change the transcript so as to give it this particular credit. Obviously, the decision of the Commission was the same as that which the employer had received on April 30, 1975, and from which review had been timely sought. Accordingly, the clause in 19(f) — “[w] here such correction is made the time for appeal or review herein specified shall begin to run from the date of the receipt of the corrected award or decision” — has no application here. The statement, “[t] he employer’s May 19 petition for a writ of certiorari, filed prior to the Commission’s final determination, was premature” (71 Ill. 2d at 188), fails to recognize that unless the employer sued out the writ of certiorari on May 19, 1975, the award would have been “conclusive.” Since the Commission did not alter its original decision, there was no decision of the Industrial Commission to appeal from on September 25, 1975. The employer’s lawyer, in appealing from the decision received April 30, 1975, did what any careful practioner would do to obtain a review of this decision. The inherent error in the majority opinion, in my opinion, is the want of recognition that the proper practice during the pendency of an appeal from the Industrial Commission to the circuit court is for the circuit court to enter an order authorizing the Industrial Commission to withdraw its return to the writ of certiorari and to make corrections even in the report of proceedings before the Commission. In Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty Co. v. Industrial Com. (1922), 303 Ill. 364, the petitioner filed a motion to quash the writ of certiorari to the circuit court from the Industrial Commission. It was urged that the court lacked jurisdiction since the record returned to the writ did not contain the employer’s insurance policy and since no stenographic report, authenticated by the parties or the arbitrator, had been filed at the time of hearing on review. The employer moved the court for leave to withdraw the return to the writ of certiorari so that corrections and additions could be made to show a complete record of the proceedings before the arbitrator and the Industrial Commission. This motion was denied. The writ was quashed and the proceeding dismissed. In reversing the circuit court, this court stated: “A party seeking a review and acting in good faith complies with the law by filing a transcript within the time limited and cannot be prejudiced by the fact that there are disputes as to its correctness. When a record is returned to a writ of certiorari the court has power to authorize the withdrawal of the record to make additions and corrections so as to make it speak the truth, [citation] and having that power, should exercise it upon a showing that the return is incomplete or incorrect.” 303 Ill. 364, 369. To the same effect see Heckard v. Industrial Com. (1933), 353 Ill. 197, 200, and Lawrence Ice Cream Co. v. Industrial Com. (1921), 298 Ill. 175, 180. Section 19(f) is not relevant here. It deals with a clerical error or errors in computation. This is illustrated in the case law as failures to fix the time for commencement of payments (Franklin County Mining Co. v. Industrial Com. (1926), 323 Ill. 98, 107) or rendering an order for compensation for the loss of use of the wrong extremity (Centralia Coal Co. v. Industrial Com. (1920), 294 Ill. 325, 326). These would understandably be within the provision of section 19(f). Here there was no such error in computation. What the employer sought was to have the award reflect a credit of $3,576 representing the sum the claimant had received as a result of a nonoccupational group insurance plan. In allowing the employer’s motion to withdraw the transcript of proceedings to bring this matter before the Commission, the circuit court could well have acted under its powers spelled out in Heckard v. Industrial Com. (1933), 353 Ill. 197, Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Industrial Com. (1922), 303 Ill. 364, and Lawrence Ice Cream Co. v. Industrial Com. (1921), 298 Ill. 175. This is what occurred here. The jurisdiction of the circuit court was in nowise impaired. Lastly, I have noted that the statute, as construed, would mean that the employer had been deprived of a very substantial right, that of reviewing the decision of the Industrial Commission. And this, notwithstanding there was no corrected decision of the Industrial Commission which would make section 19(f) operative. It is well established that our function is to construe statutes so as to be applied in a practical and common sense manner. (People ex rel. Singer v. Illinois Central R.R. Co. (1940), 373 Ill. 523, 526; People ex rel. Schaefer v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis R.R. Co. (1933), 353 Ill. 518, 521.) Our duty is to divine the intent of the General Assembly and, in so doing, consider the purpose of the law and the object to be accomplished. (People v. McCoy (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 40, 45; People ex rel. Kucharski v. Adams (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 540, 543.) In accomplishing this obligation, each word, clause or sentence must be given effect wherever possible so that no such word, clause or sentence may be deemed superfluous or void. Consumers Co. v. Industrial Com. (1936), 364 Ill. 145, 149. It is obvious that the General Assembly intended this particular statute to cover situations where there was an error in computation, and where the writ of certiorari had not been sued out — not situations where an employer contends that he should receive a credit. The majority interprets the statute so as to deprive a party of the right of review. I do not believe the General Assembly intended that the path from the Industrial Commission to the circuit court should be an obstacle course. We should decide this case on the merits.