Court Opinion

ID: 9758344
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:23:02.018263+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:49.718066
License: Public Domain

NIX, Justice,
dissenting.
On August 25, 1975, Richard Bolden, appellant, and another individual were arrested and charged with the murder of one Robert (Tim) Indyk during the course of a robbery which had occurred on January 10, 1972. The cause was called for trial and the jury selection in the case against Bolden began on January 21, 1976. During the course of the trial, information was elicited which made' it necessary for defense counsel to seek to withdraw as counsel for Bolden to enable counsel to testify in response to certain accusations made by a Commonwealth witness. As a consequence of this unexpected development the defense counsel moved for a mistrial which was joined in by appellant.1 The motion was granted and the jury that had been sworn and empaneled was discharged. Prior to the commencement of the second trial, appellant presented an application for dismissal of the indictment asserting a violation of his right against being placed twice in jeopardy. The motion was denied and an appeal was lodged in this Court accompanied by a stay of proceedings, the latter being granted by a member of this Court. Thereupon, the Commonwealth filed a motion to quash the appeal.
*653Before reaching the merits of this appeal this Court is required to pass upon appellee’s motion to quash. Thus, the threshold issue presented is whether the denial of a pre-trial motion to quash an indictment on the grounds of a violation of double jeopardy is entitled to immediate appellate review. I think not and therefore dissent.
Under the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act of 1970, July 31, P.L. 673, No. 223, art. II, § 204, 17 P.S. § 211.-204 (Supp.1976-77), this Court is given exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from final orders of the Court of Common Pleas in felonious homicide cases. In this jurisdiction we have defined a final order, decree or judgment as being one which “terminate [s] the litigation between parties to the suit by precluding a party from further action in that court.” Middleberg v. Middleberg, 427 Pa. 114, 115, 233 A.2d 889, 890 (1967). See also, Commonwealth v. Ray, 448 Pa. 307, 312, 292 A.2d 410, 413 (1972).2 In criminal cases, we have held that this point of finality is reached only when the judgment of sentence has been entered on the verdict. Commonwealth v. Myers, 457 Pa. 317, 322 A.2d 131 (1974); Commonwealth v. Sites, 430 Pa. 115, 242 A.2d 220 (1968) ; Commonwealth v. Wright, 383 Pa. 532, 119 A.2d 492 (1956).3
The reasoning supporting the view that appeals should be taken only from final orders is not predicated upon *654whim but rather is founded upon the belief that truncated treatment of issues would be inefficient and time-consuming and more importantly would be likely to prejudice one or both parties to a controversy. Sullivan v. Philadelphia, 378 Pa. 648, 107 A.2d 854 (1954). To permit the interruption of an ongoing judicial proceeding prior to final judgment would invite an indefinite number of appeals, causing extensive delay and having a disruptive effect on the continuity of the action. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 60 S.Ct. 540, 84 L. Ed. 783 (1940).
*653“[i]n general, a ‘judgment’ or ‘decision’ is final for the purpose of appeal only ‘when it terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits of the case, and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined’ ”. Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 518, 76 S.Ct. 912, 916, 100 L.Ed. 1377, 1383 (1956).
*654Although commentators and jurists have occasionally questioned the wisdom of a blanket rule prohibiting all interlocutory appeals, this apprehension generally revolves around the applicability of the finality rule to civil matters. See “Right of Appeal in Criminal Cases”, 34 Mich.L.Rev. 937 (1936).4 It is moreover conceded that criminal cases must be particularly expedited in order to conform to constitutional guarantees. The United States Supreme Court in landmark case of Dibella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 82 S.Ct. 654, 7 L.Ed.2d 614, (1962) affirmed the contention that the denial of a pre-trial (pre-indictment) suppression motion was an interlocutory order and thereby quashed an appeal taken from it. The Court explained that “insistence on finality and the prohibition of piecemeal review discourage undue litigiousness and leaden-footed administration of justice, particularly damaging to the conduct of criminal cases.” 369 U.S. at 124, 82 S.Ct. at 656-657. See, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 525 F.2d 151 (3rd Cir. 1975). Even *655in the federal system, exceptions to the final judgment rule are aberrations constrained solely to civil matters:
“Despite these statutory exceptions to, and judicial construction of, the requirement of finality, ‘the final judgment rule is the dominant rule in federal appellate practice.’ 6 Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed. 1953), 113. Particularly is this true of criminal prosecutions. See, e. g., Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 518-521, 76 S.Ct. 912, 916-917, 100 L.Ed. 1377. Every statutory exception is addressed either in terms or by necessary operation solely to civil actions. Moreover, the delays and disruptions attendant upon intermediate appeal are especially inimical to the effective and fair administration of the criminal law. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a speedy trial. Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure counsels construction of the Rules ‘to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay’; Rules 39(d) and 50 assign preference to criminal cases on both trial and appellate dockets.” DiBella v. United States, supra, 369 U.S. at 126, 82 S.Ct. at 658.
See also, Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 88 S.Ct. 269, 19 L.Ed.2d 305 (1967).
The majority in attempting to bolster its position implicitly suggests that the protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment necessarily requires immediate appellate review. It is argued that “[o]nce a defendant is erroneously subjected to another prosecution, neither an acquittal nor appellate reversal of a conviction is sufficient to vindicate his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy.” This reasoning obfuscates the issue before us. If the question raised related to when the objection should properly be interposed this consideration would of course be compelling. However, the majority ignores that in this jurisdiction a motion to quash an indictment on the grounds of a double jeopardy viola*656tion is in fact a special plea in bar which must be decided prior to the commencement of the second trial.5 The question presented here is not whether the objection may be presented and decided prior to the subsequent trial, but rather it is whether the defendant is entitled to immediate appellate review of an adverse ruling upon such a request.
In this context it must be remembered that the United States Supreme Court has recognized that a State is not obliged to provide an appeal at all for criminal defendants. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 14 S.Ct. 913, 38 L.Ed. 867 (1894). See also, Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 606, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 2442, 41 L.Ed.2d 341, 348 (1974); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18, 21, 27, 76 S.Ct. 585, 590, 592, 594, 100 L.Ed. 891, 898, 900, 903 (1956); Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 175, 67 S.Ct. 216, 219, 91 L.Ed. 172, 175 (1946); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 627, 57 S.Ct. 660, 663, 81 L.Ed. 843, 847 (1937); Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155, 158, 20 S.Ct. 639, 640, 44 L.Ed. 711, 713 (1900); Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U.S. 272, 275, 15 S.Ct. 389, 391, 39 L.Ed. 422, 423 (1895). Although the Constitution of this Commonwealth provides an absolute right of appeal,6 the State nevertheless reserves the power to designate the time and the method by which that appeal shall be effectuated and the proscribed procedure will not be held offensive to Federal constitutional standards absent a showing of discriminatory application. Cf., *657Ross v. Moffitt, supra. It is therefore clear that there is no Federal constitutional mandate requiring the allowance of interlocutory review of an order denying an asserted double jeopardy violation.
Further, I am not persuaded that there are any compelling reasons why we should, under our supervisory power, deviate from the general rule limiting appeals to final judgments in this instance. It is significant that the cases relied upon by the majority to illustrate the “flexibility” of the final judgment rule in fact were instances where the Court refused to depart from the rule. See, Commonwealth v. Washington, 428 Pa. 131, 236 A.2d 772 (1968) (held that an order denying a defendant’s motion to suppress a statement was interlocutory and not an appealable order) ; Commonwealth v. Swanson, 424 Pa. 192, 225 A.2d 231 (1967) (quashed an appeal from an order denying a change of venue as being interlocutory) ; Commonwealth v. Bruno, 424 Pa. 96, 225 A.2d 241 (1967) (a pre-trial order appointing a sanity commission not appealable); Commonwealth v. Byrd, 421 Pa. 513, 219 A.2d 293 (1966) (a pre-trial order for a neuropsychiatric examination of a person who is under indictment for murder is a nonappealable interlocutory order).
To the contrary, the overwhelming precedent in this Commonwealth is in support of upholding the finality rule in this instance. This Court in Commonwealth v. Cole, 437 Pa. 288, 263 A.2d 339 (1970), held that in order denying a motion in arrest of judgment was not appealable where the trial court had awarded a new trial. Certainly, the reasons suggesting an exception in that case were at least as “compelling” as those argued by the majority in support of its position today. Nevertheless, the Court rejected the contention that the circumstances should be viewed as “exceptional” so as to allow an interlocutory appeal.
The majority’s decision is also difficult to reconcile in an opinion of this Court in Commonwealth v. Myers, su*658pra, where in an analogous situation we reached the opposite result. In Myers we rejected appellant’s arguments for a finding of “exceptional circumstances” and entered an order quashing the appeal. In reaching this result, we relied upon the test of whether “denial of immediate review would render impossible any review whatsoever of [the] individual’s claims”. United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533, 91 S.Ct. 1580, 1582, 29 L.Ed.2d 85, 89 (1971).7 In Myers the violation asserted was a denial of the accused’s right to a speedy trial. The arguments offered by the majority to support its present position are equally applicable to the protections afforded under the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. See e. g., Commonwealth v. Barber, 461 Pa. 738, 739-744, 337 A.2d 855, 855-58 (1975) (Dissenting Opinion Roberts, J., joined by Manderino, J.).
Finally, the majority attempts to dismiss in a footnote the decision of this Court in Commonwealth v. Warfield, 424 Pa. 555, 227 A.2d 177 (1967), where the precise issue that we are now considering was decided contrary to the majority’s position today. See Majority Opinion, ante at 95 n. 9.8 In announcing the decision of the Court, Mr. Justice O’BRIEN stated:
“Finally, we note that the defendant’s appeal is from an interlocutory order, which order is not appealable, *659unless expressly made so by statute. ‘It is likewise well estabished that as a general rule the defendant in a criminal case may appeal only from the judgment of sentence: . . .’ Com. v. Pollick, 420 Pa. 61, 215 A.2d 904 (1966); Com. v. Wright, 383 Pa. 532, 119 A.2d 492 (1956). While, as we pointed out in Com. v. Pollick, supra, ‘This rule is not inflexible and will yield in exceptional cases of great public interest to safeguard basic human rights.’, we are here, as there, not concerned with such ‘exceptional’ circumstances.”
Id. at 562, 227 A.2d at 181.9
Although not applicable to this appeal which was filed before the effective date, Rule 311 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure (eff. July 7, 1976) reaffirms the strict adherence to the finality rule in criminal cases. Subsection (a) only permits an appeal as of right from an interlocutory order where there is a specific *660statute or rule providing for such a remedy.10 Experience has demonstrated the wisdom of limiting appeals in criminal cases to final orders. In my judgment the arguments advanced by the majority carving out an exception in this factual situation are unpersuasive. I would quash the appeal as interlocutory.
O’BRIEN, J., joins this dissenting opinion.

. It is argued by appellant that the written motion requesting a mistrial was couched in such terms as it clearly preserved his right to object to a subsequent trial on Fifth Amendment grounds.

. Our definition of finality is in accord with that embraced by the federal system:

. A well-recognized exception to the general rule that an appeal may be taken in a criminal case only from a judgment of sentence is the Commonwealth’s highly circumscribed right of appeal where the question raised is purely one of law. Commonwealth v. Melton, 402 Pa. 628, 168 A.2d 328 (1961). See also, Commonwealth v. Gullett, 459 Pa. 431, 329 A.2d 513 (1974); Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 910, 84 S.Ct. 204, 11 L.Ed.2d 149 (1963).

. In civil cases the rule in this jurisdiction is that an interlocutory order or decree is not appealable unless expressly made so by statute. Sullivan v. Philadelphia, 378 Pa. at 649, 107 A.2d at 855 (1954); Epstein v. Kramer, 374 Pa. 112, 119, 96 A.2d 912, 914 (1953); Stadler v. Mt. Oliver Borough, 373 Pa. 316, 317-318, 95 A.2d 776, 777 (1953).

. “Former jeopardy must be specially pleaded in the trial court, and may not be raised under a plea of not guilty - entered prior to [a] second trial.” Commonwealth ex rel. Wallace v. Burke, 169 Pa.Super. 633, 636, 84 A.2d 254, 255 (1951).

. “There shall be a right of appeal in all cases to a court of record from a court not of record; and there shall also be a right of appeal from a court of record or from an administrative agency to a court of record or to an appellate court, the selection of such court to be as provided by law; and there shall be such other rights of appeal as may be provided by law.”

. In Commonwealth v. Myers, 457 Pa. 317, 322 A.2d 131 (1974), we indicated that this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Kilgallen, 379 Pa. 315, 108 A.2d 780 (1954), should be recognized as being sui generis. In that decision we varied from the finality rule because of the unique circumstances of the case.
“The Court in the Kilgallen case permitted the otherwise interlocutory appeal because the case involved extraordinary circumstances dealing with criminality among public officials, particularly a City Council President and therefore, the effect on the public interest from the nature of the charges made it imperative that the validity of the indictments be decided immediately.” Id. at 319-20, 322 A.2d at 132-33.

. The majority attempts to avoid the pronouncement of Warfield by characterizing the double jeopardy protection in Pennsylvania prior to Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L. Ed.2d 707 (1969) as a “highly circumscribed” right and suggesting *659that the effect of Benton has “significantly enhanced” that right. I suggest that while it is true that the Benton decision increased the area of applicability of this protection, the nature and quality of the right remained the same. It was the nature and quality of the right that this Court was referring to in Warfield when it stated that an asserted double jeopardy claim is interlocutory and should not be entertained until after the entry of a final judgment.
In a further attempt to derogate the authority provided by Warfield for the position I urge today, the majority states that Warfield was a plurality opinion and therefore possessed no precedential value. Again, I disagree. It must be remembered that in Warfield this Court was faced with cross-appeals. The mandate quashing the appeal with which we are concerned on the ground that it was interlocutory, was joined by five members of the Court. Thus, although other portions of the Warfield decision may not provide precedential authority, that portion upon which I rely unquestionably does.

. The majority also refers to the fact that several Circuit Courts of Appeal have held that a denial of a defendant’s double jeopardy claim is a “final decision” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1966). The persuasiveness of this precedent is questioned since these cases are interpreting a federal statute not applicable to this Commonwealth. Additionally, the majority failed to note that at least one Circuit Court holds a contrary view. United States v. Bailey, 512 F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1975).

. Subsection (b) of the Rule allows a defendant in a criminal case to file an appeal from an interlocutory order granting him a new trial where his claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence has been denied. See Commonwealth v. Liddick, 370 A.2d 729, 731 (filed March, 1977); Commonwealth v. Chenet, 237 Pa.Super. 226, 352 A.2d 502, 504 n. 1 (1976).