Court Opinion

ID: 9962883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-23 22:10:56.359214+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:29.711443
License: Public Domain

04/23/2024
        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                         AT NASHVILLE
                            Assigned on Briefs April 2, 2024

         STATE OF TENNESSEE v. TANDREA LAQUISE SANDERS

              Appeal from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County
             No. 63CC1-2022-CR-1232      Adrienne Gilliam Fry, Judge
                     ___________________________________

                           No. M2023-01148-CCA-R3-CD
                       ___________________________________

The Defendant, Tandrea Laquise Sanders, pled guilty to assault and contributing to the
delinquency of a minor. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed concurrent
sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days. The sentences were suspended to
probation after service of six months in custody. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the
trial court abused its discretion in ordering a sentence of split confinement and failed to
properly fix a percentage of the sentence to be served before consideration of rehabilitative
programs. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the trial court’s judgments.

                         Tenn. R. App. 3 Appeal as of Right;
                       Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed

TOM GREENHOLTZ, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT W.
WEDEMEYER and KYLE A. HIXSON, JJ., joined.

Chase T. Smith, Clarksville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Tandrea Laquise Sanders.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Katherine Orr, Assistant Attorney
General; Robert J. Nash, District Attorney General; and Jeffrey P. Watts, Assistant District
Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

                                        OPINION

                              FACTUAL BACKGROUND

      On the afternoon of April 21, 2022, the Defendant arrived at Glenellen Elementary
School to confront her son’s teacher about a remark the teacher made to her child. The
school’s principal spoke with the Defendant about the incident, telling the Defendant that
the teacher would be investigated. The Defendant became upset with the principal and
directed her son, a fourth grader, to go into the classroom and hit the teacher. The child
did not do so, but the Defendant soon after punched the principal, striking her in the face.
The Defendant then left the premises.

        A Montgomery County grand jury charged the Defendant with assault and
contributing to the delinquency of a minor. On March 3, 2023, the Defendant pled guilty
to both charges, reserving sentencing issues and the possibility of judicial diversion to the
trial court. The trial court held a sentencing hearing on July 7, 2023.

       At the sentencing hearing, the principal testified that, as a result of being punched
by the Defendant, she suffered a mild concussion, whiplash, and emotional trauma
requiring anxiety medication. She said that security footage of the incident was posted on
social media, where it received comments from the public and caused the victim to be
afraid while interacting with the parents of other students. The principal further stated that
the publicity “kind of clouds the reputation of the school.” After the principal’s testimony,
the Defendant apologized for her actions, but insisted that her son was “getting bullied and
nothing was happening.”

       The State argued that the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion should be denied
and that she should serve a minimum of forty-eight hours of jail time with supervised
probation for the remainder of her sentence. The Defendant argued that the trial court
should grant her judicial diversion or, alternatively, impose a sentence of full probation.

       After a brief recess, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for judicial
diversion and explained its sentencing considerations on the record. In so doing, the court
addressed the Defendant’s amenability to correction. The court credited the absence of a
criminal history, but noted that the Defendant appeared to lack remorse in her unsworn
statement. It further found that because no evidence supported the factors relating to social
history or physical or mental health, these factors had little weight. Next, the court weighed
heavily the circumstances of the offense, which included an assault at an elementary school
in front of “several staff members, children, [and] other individuals.” Finally, the court
gave great weight to the interests of the public and to the need to provide an effective
deterrent, particularly because of the publicity surrounding the event.

       The court then discussed possible mitigating and enhancement factors, reviewing
each statutory factor individually. It found that no mitigating factors applied. However,
the court found that enhancement factor (15), that the Defendant committed the offense on
the grounds of an institute of learning while minors were present, applied to the case.

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       Considering all the factors, the court sentenced the Defendant to a term of eleven
months and twenty-nine days for each count. Both sentences were suspended to probation,
though the court ordered that the Defendant first serve six months in custody for the assault
conviction. The judgments for each sentence, which were filed by the court clerk on July
13, 2023, ordered that the sentences would be served at 75% before the application of any
rehabilitative credits.

       The trial court initially ordered that the sentences be served consecutively. After
the Defendant filed a motion to reconsider the sentences, the court ordered that they be
served concurrently but declined to fully suspend them. The Defendant filed a timely
notice of appeal on August 11, 2023, and the trial court permitted the Defendant to remain
on bond pending this appeal.

                       STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW

       Our supreme court has recognized that “the first question for a reviewing court on
any issue is ‘what is the appropriate standard of review?’” State v. Enix, 653 S.W.3d 692,
698 (Tenn. 2022). The Defendant appeals only the portion of the trial court’s order
imposing confinement for her assault conviction, arguing that the trial court should have
instead imposed a sentence of full probation. This court has applied the standard of
appellate review set forth in State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682 (Tenn. 2012) to review
misdemeanor sentences. See, e.g., State v. Shults, No. E2023-00221-CCA-R3-CD, 2024
WL 335776, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 30, 2024), no perm. app. filed.

       Under the Bise standard, we review a trial court’s sentencing determinations for an
abuse of discretion, “granting a presumption of reasonableness to within-range sentencing
decisions that reflect a proper application of the purposes and principles of our Sentencing
Act.” Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 707. As such, we will uphold a sentence “so long as it is within
the appropriate range and the record demonstrates that the sentence is otherwise in
compliance with the purposes and principles listed by statute.” Id. at 709-10. This standard
of review also applies to “questions related to probation or any other alternative sentence.”
State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273, 278-79 (Tenn. 2012).

       In this case, the trial court imposed a within-range sentence for both Class A
misdemeanor offenses. It also expressly considered the purposes and principles of
sentencing, the common-law factors applicable to alternative sentencing determinations,
and possible enhancement and mitigating factors. As such, we accord a presumption of
reasonableness to the trial court’s sentencing decision and review that decision for an abuse
of discretion.

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                                        ANALYSIS

       The Defendant argues that her split-confinement sentence is excessive and the jail
term is longer than needed to achieve the purposes of punishment. See Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-35-103(4). She also contends that the judgment forms were completed before
the sentencing hearing and that the trial court failed to consider the percentage of the
sentence she must serve before being eligible for rehabilitative programs. The State
responds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a sentence of split
confinement or fixing the service percentage at seventy-five percent. We agree with the
State.

        Trial courts have “great flexibility in fashioning a misdemeanor sentence.” State v.
Webb, 130 S.W.3d 799, 834 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003). When a trial court imposes a
sentence for a misdemeanor, the court shall impose “a specific number of months, days or
hours” to be served by a defendant, and the court shall also “fix a percentage of the sentence
that the defendant shall serve.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-302 (b), (d). Unlike a felony
case, no presumptive minimum sentence exists for a misdemeanor conviction. State v.
Cooper, 335 S.W.3d 522, 524 (Tenn. 2011). Also, defendants convicted of a misdemeanor
are not presumed to be eligible for alternative sentencing. State v. Troutman, 979 S.W.2d
271, 273 (Tenn. 1998). Instead, the defendant “has the burden of establishing that [she] is
suitable for probation by demonstrating that probation will subserve the ends of justice and
the best interest of both the public and the defendant.” State v. Smith, No. M2022-00646-
CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 3221092, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 3, 2023) (citing State v.
Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335, 347 (Tenn. 2008) and internal quotation marks omitted), no perm.
app. filed.

       A.     ALTERNATIVE SENTENCE OF SPLIT-CONFINEMENT

        The Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering a
split confinement sentence involving six months to be served in custody. Our supreme
court has recognized that “[t]he [Sentencing] Act requires a case-by-case approach to
sentencing, and authorizes, indeed encourages, trial judges to be innovative in devising
appropriate sentences.” Ray v. Madison County, 536 S.W.3d 824, 833 (Tenn. 2017)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Any sentence that does not involve
complete confinement is an alternative sentence.” State v. Crabtree, No. M2021-01154-
CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 2133831, at *19 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2023) (citation
omitted), no perm. app. filed. Although “[t]here is no bright line rule for determining when
probation should be granted,” State v. Bingham, 910 S.W.2d 448, 456 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1995), overruled on other grounds, State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tenn. 2000),

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“individualized punishment is the essence of alternative sentencing,” State v. Dowdy, 894
S.W.2d 301, 305 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

       To that end, a defendant’s sentence must be based on “the nature of the offense and
the totality of the circumstances in which it was committed, including the defendant’s
background.” State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Tenn. 1991); see also State v. Trotter,
201 S.W.3d 651, 653 (Tenn. 2006). Nevertheless, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated
section 40-35-103(1), sentences involving confinement may be ordered if they are based
on one or more of the following considerations:

       (A)    whether “[c]onfinement is necessary to protect society by restraining
              a defendant who has a long history of criminal conduct”;

       (B)    whether “[c]onfinement is necessary to avoid depreciating the
              seriousness of the offense[,] or confinement is particularly suited to
              provide an effective deterrence to others likely to commit similar
              offenses”; or

       (C)    whether “[m]easures less restrictive than confinement have frequently
              or recently been applied unsuccessfully to the defendant.”

        Our supreme court has also recognized that “[t]he guidelines applicable in
determining whether to impose probation are the same factors applicable in determining
whether to impose judicial diversion.” State v. Trent, 533 S.W.3d 282, 291 (Tenn. 2017)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To that end, “[w]hen considering
probation, the trial court should consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the
defendant’s criminal record, the defendant’s background and social history, the defendant’s
present condition, including physical and mental condition, the deterrent effect on the
defendant, and the best interests of the defendant and the public.” State v. Wilbourn, No.
W2022-01199-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 4229352, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 28, 2023)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted), no perm. app. filed. And, of course, the
trial court must consider the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation in determining whether
to impose an alternative sentence. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(5).

       In this case, the trial court carefully reviewed the Trent factors as part of its decision
on the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion, and these factors were also relevant to its
consideration of alternative sentencing. Trent, 533 S.W.3d at 291. Although the Defendant
had no criminal record, the trial court found that the Defendant lacked remorse, which is
relevant to the Defendant’s amenability to rehabilitation. See State v. Brown, No. E2019-

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00223-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 3456737, at *19 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 25, 2020) (“Lack
of remorse relates to Defendant’s amenability to correction.”), perm. app. denied (Tenn.
Dec. 10, 2020).

       The trial court also carefully considered the nature and circumstances of the offense.
Referring to the Defendant’s actions as being a “sucker punch,” the court recognized that
the assault occurred in a workplace and was without provocation. It noted that the
Defendant’s assault occurred “in front of what appeared to be several staff members,
children, and other individuals.” The court further observed that “in addition to assaulting
the [p]rincipal, the [Defendant] also encouraged her fourth-grader to attack the teacher.”
Summarizing these concerns, the court stated that

       [i]nstitutions of learning should be bastions where children go to feel safe; to
       feel secure; to feel that they are not in any immediate threat by parents or
       other individuals. And teachers, and staff members, and others in those
       institutions should feel the same way.

The record supports the trial court’s consideration of this factor.

       Further, the trial court emphasized the need for the sentence to deter the Defendant
and others from similar crimes. Our supreme court has recognized that a sentence of
incarceration may be “particularly suited” for deterrence when “the defendant’s crime was
the result of intentional [or] knowing” conduct and when the case received “substantial
publicity beyond that normally expected in the typical case.” Hooper, 29 S.W.3d at 11,
12. Apart from the intentional nature of the assault, the court observed that “[t]his was a
very, very publicized case” and that “social media certainly surrounded it.” The record
supports the trial court’s consideration of this factor as well.

       In our view, the trial court’s decision was carefully considered. It weighed the
applicable sentencing factors and imposed a sentence consistent with the purposes and
principles of sentencing. We recognize that the custodial sentence is significant. However,
we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion to impose a split confinement
sentence. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this ground.

       B.     PERCENTAGE OF SERVICE BEFORE CONSIDERATION OF
              REHABILITATIVE PROGRAMS

       The Defendant next argues that the court failed to properly fix a percentage of the
sentence to be served in custody before consideration of rehabilitative programs. She
claims that the judgment forms must have been completed before the sentencing hearing

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because the judgment for the fully suspended sentence in Count 2 contains a percentage of
service. From this premise, she asserts that the court did not properly consider the
percentage of service and that this percentage should therefore be set at zero percent.

        Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-302(d) provides that “[i]n imposing a
misdemeanor sentence, the court shall fix a percentage of the sentence that the defendant
shall serve” before being eligible for “consideration for work release, furlough, trusty status
and related rehabilitative programs.” If the judgment does not express a percentage of
service, “the percentage shall be considered zero percent (0%),” meaning that the defendant
is immediately eligible for rehabilitative programs. Id.

        In determining a percentage of service, “the court shall consider the purposes of this
chapter, the principles of sentencing and the enhancement and mitigating factors set forth
in this chapter and shall not impose such percentages arbitrarily.” Id. Importantly, “there
is no strict requirement that the trial court make findings on the record regarding the
percentage of the defendant’s sentence to be served in confinement[.]” State v. Wilson,
No. M2012-02126-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 3345908, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 28,
2013), no perm. app. filed. Instead, the supreme court has recognized that

       while the better practice is to make findings on the record when fixing a
       percentage of a defendant’s sentence to be served in incarceration, a trial
       court need only consider the principles of sentencing and enhancement and
       mitigating factors in order to comply with the legislative mandates of the
       misdemeanor sentencing statute.

Troutman, 979 S.W.2d at 274 (footnote omitted); State v. Flatt, 227 S.W.3d 615, 621
(Tenn. Crim. App. 2006) (“[W]hen imposing a sentence for conviction of a misdemeanor,
a trial court is not required to make findings of fact on the record in determining the
percentage to be served in confinement.”).

       The plain language of section 40-35-302(d) requires the trial court to fix a
percentage of the sentence that the defendant shall serve in all misdemeanor cases. Ray,
536 S.W.3d at 835 (recognizing that Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-302(d) “specifically
authorizes, indeed obligates, trial courts” to fix the percentage of service in misdemeanor
cases). Because “[s]ection 40-35-302 contemplates that trial courts will treat separately
the issues of ‘percentage’ and probation,” the trial court’s duty to fix the percentage of
service applies irrespective of whether the misdemeanor sentence is ultimately ordered to
be served or suspended. State v. Wyatt, No. M1998-00470-CCA-R3-CD, 1999 WL
1266338, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 29, 1999), perm. app. denied (Tenn. July 31, 2000).
Indeed, even if the court fully suspends the sentence and places the defendant on probation,
the percentage of service will later become relevant if the sentence is executed as a result

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of a probation violation. See State v. Colvin, No. E2000-00701-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL
434875, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 30, 2001) (recognizing that the trial court may fix a
percentage of service on a fully suspended sentence and that the probationer will serve that
percentage upon revocation of the suspended sentence), no perm. app. filed. Contrary to
the Defendant’s argument, it was entirely proper for the trial court to consider and fix a
percentage of service even on a fully suspended misdemeanor sentence.

        We see no evidence in the record that the judgment forms were somehow completed
before the sentencing hearing, as the Defendant argues. Instead, the record shows that the
trial court carefully considered the purposes and principles of sentencing on the record, and
it reviewed each and every statutory enhancement and mitigating factor as part of its
analysis. As such, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion to fix the
percentage of the sentence that the Defendant must serve at seventy-five percent. The
Defendant is not entitled to relief on this ground.

                                     CONCLUSION

        In summary, we hold that the trial court acted within its discretion in imposing a
split-confinement sentence and fixing the percentage to be served in confinement at
seventy-five percent. Accordingly, we respectfully affirm the trial court’s judgments.

                                          ____________________________________
                                                TOM GREENHOLTZ, JUDGE

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