Court Opinion

ID: 9828312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:17:10.116696+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:47.091506
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
[1] In holding that the error pointed out in the fourth assignment of error was immaterial, we assumed that the evidence showed Gafford’s residence to be about three-quarters of a mile from the stores and post office. In this we erred, for there is a conflict in the testimony. Mrs. Gafford testified that their residence was about 2% miles southwest of Cottonwood. This testimony, if believed by the jury, would establish that Will Fabian on June 20, 1913, was not at Cottonwood after about 4 or 5 o’clock p. m. At one place in his testimony we found the statement that he left Cottonwood that evening and went out a little piece from town, he supposed “somewhere about 4 or 5 o’clock.” At another place he fixes the time at about 4 o’clock. Again he testified it was “somewhere late in the afternoon, about 4 o’clock.” If the telegram could not have been delivered to him at Cottonwood, appellant is not liable under the pleadings. The special charge authorized the jury to find for plaintiff if it could have been delivered near Cottonwood, that is, at Gafford’s, even though it was 2 y2 miles from Cottonwood. This was submitting to the jury an issue not made by the pleadings, and undoubtedly was error under the decisions cited in the former opinion. The verdict was probably returned under this charge, for Mrs. Gafford’s testimony as to the distance she resided from the stores and post office would be much more apt to be believéd than that of Will Fabian, the plaintiff,'who was a visitor to that section, and whose recollection with regard to other matters appears not to have been good. We stated in oúr former opinion that the trial court must' have assumed that Gafford’s *1011place was at Cottonwood. We based tbis upon the fact that he assumed that plaintiff left Cottonwood on the evening of June 20, 1913. We based our theory upon the fact that plaintiff testified he left there at 4 o’clock, which, if true, would conclusively show that the telegram could not have been delivered to him at Cottonwood before his departure. We find, as above shown, that plaintiff’s testimony on this point left it uncertain whether he left at 4 or 5 o’clock. He described the time once as in the “evening” about 4 or 5 o’clock, and again as being late in the afternoon at about 4 o’clock. The court may have concluded that from this testimony the jury could find that the message could have reached Cottonwood and been delivered prior to such departure. It was delivered to appellant’s agent, as testified by Norris Fabian, between 4:20 and 4:30 on the afternoon of June 20th. The court said:
“If you believe that the message could not have been delivered to the plaintiff, Will Fabian, at Cottonwood before the said Will Fabian left Cottonwood on the evening of June 20,1913, and •by the exercise of ordinary care on the part of the defendant company, you should find for the defendant.”
Again the court said:
“If you believe from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant company was guilty of negligence in not transmitting the message to Cross Plains in time for it to be sent from there to Cottonwood before the plaintiff had left Cottonwood, and believe that but for such negligence, if you find the company was negligent, the message could have been delivered to plaintiff at Cottonwood in time for Mm to have attended the funeral, then you will find for the plaintiff and assess his damages at such sum as in your sound judgment will compensate him for the mental distress that he suffered by reason of the failure to be present at the funeral of his father.”
While the court assumes that plaintiff left Cottonwood on the evening of June 20th, this expression in itself cannot be taken to mean the departure from Gafford’s at about sundown, testified to by Mrs. Gafford; for plaintiff himself in testifying used the expression that he left Cottonwood, meaning the stores and post office, in the evening. In addition it was a disputed issue whether plaintiff left Gafford’s at all that afternoon or night, and the court would not undertake to assume as a fact that he did leave at sundown. The court undoubtedly sought in his main charge to leave it to the jury whether the message could have been delivered to plaintiff at 'Cottonwood on June 20th. Under this charge the jury could weigh all the evidence, and, if they found that Gafford resided at Cottonwood, could have found for plaintiff if the message could have been delivered to him there on June 20th. If they decided that Gafford did not live at Cottonwood, and that the message could not have been delivered before plaintiff left the stores, it was their duty under this charge to return a verdict for defendant.
[2] We are also of the opinion that, no contract having been alleged to telephone the message from Cottonwood to Gafford’s, it was immaterial whether or not Gafford was connected by telephone with the exchange at Cottonwood. Telegraph Co. v. Byrd, 34 Tex. Civ. App. 594, 79 S. W. 40; Stewart v. Tel. Co., 158 S. W. 1034. We conclude thht we were in error in holding the special charge harmless, and that the fourth assignment of error should be sustained.
In view of the fact that the above conclusions render unnecessary the intimation in our former opinion that as a matter of law a man living three-quarters of a mile from the stores and post office would be said to live in the town, the same is withdrawn. This would generally be a question for the jury.
The motion for rehearing is granted, the former judgment of this court set aside, and judgment entered reversing the judgment of the trial court and remanding the cause for another trial.