Court Opinion

ID: 9604869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:27:37.755104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:24.223819
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting.
Lobdell v. State of Idaho, 89 Idaho 559, 407 P.2d 135 (1965), was an earlier inverse condemnation case much like the one under review, and for that reason the parties were asked to comment on its applicability, and have done so. Additionally, we have access to the record in that case, and also the briefs — all being available through the office of the Clerk.
Lobdell was filed in 1957, but not tried until June of 1962, on the issues raised by the Lobdells’ amended complaint and the *148state’s answer thereto filed ten days before trial. The Lobdells contended that the state’s project greatly impaired and destroyed access to their property. The state alleged that it had provided adequate access, and denied any liability for compensation. 89 Idaho at 562, 407 P.2d 135. A finding of the trial court was as follows:
6. At the trial of this action the defendant stipulated that the erection of the curb in 1957 as aforesaid, constituted a taking, within the meaning of the law of condemnation, and that the plaintiffs were entitled to damages therefor. Id. at 563, 407 P.2d at 137.
Counsel for the Idaho Transportation Board, having on hand its files and records in the Lobdell case has provided us with a portion of its trial brief (not part of this Court’s record on the appeal) which supplies the reason given by the Department at that time:
“To clarify another matter, which may or may not be of sufficient importance to require clarification, Defendant concedes a ‘taking’ because of inept approaches, not because of the erection of a curb before the property concerned. If the approaches constructed had provided satisfactory access to the property, then Defendant believes it would have incurred no liability because of the police power concept.” Appellant’s Supplemental Brief, p. 2.
That statement appears to have been offered up to the Lobdell trial court in the interests of saving face where the Highway Department’s inept approaches had for five years deprived the property owners of the use of their property. The approaches were “inept” because, as the property owner’s brief on file in this Court shows, the Highway Department constructed a 300 foot concrete barrier curb where none had previously existed, leaving one 40 foot cut about in the middle of the property and a cut of less than five feet on the property’s west end. The Lobdells’ property was mainly used as a truck stop operation, and they were forced out of business.
The real reason for the state’s concession of a taking is found in the state’s brief, also on file in this Court, where, at page 16, this statement is made:
While no clear cut rule existed in 1957 at the time respondents constructed the highway adjacent to appellants’ premises, nevertheless on several occasions since then this court has determined and declared that access rights are a property interest. See Hughes v. State, (1958), 80 Idaho 286; 328 P.2d 397. Clearly then when the state acquires existing access between privately owned real property and the public highway it comes into possession of a real property interest. This rule has been applied to some forms of impairment. See State ex rel Rich v. Fonburg, (1958), 80 Idaho 269; 328 P.2d 60, and Farris v. City of Twin Falls, (1958 [1959]), 81 Idaho 583; 347 P.2d 996.
That brief also could have cited the then even more recent case of Mabe v. State, 83 Idaho 222, 360 P.2d 799 (1961), which reaffirmed Hughes, and also discussed Farris and Fonburg, of which the Highway Department had to be well aware when it stipulated to a taking in the Lobdell case.
The importance of the Lobdell case is, then, that the state has recognized “that access rights are a property interest.” In Mabe this Court quoted from the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Winn v. United States, 272 F.2d 282 (9th Cir.1959), where that court had been cited to Hughes:
Here, we have before us allegations of destruction and impairment of access with resulting reduction in the value of appellants’ property, none of which are present in the Winn case.
Idaho is firmly committed to the rule that access to property from an existing highway is a property right. Village of Sandpoint v. Doyle, 14 Idaho 749, 95 P. 945, 17 L.R.A., N.S., 497; Continental Oil Co. v. City of Twin Falls, 49 Idaho 89, 286 P. 353; Independent School Dist. No. 1 of Twin Falls County v. Continental Oil Co., 49 Idaho 109, 286 P. 360. That the curtailment of, or interference with access to real property is to be considered as an element of damages in an action for condemnation has been *149recognized by this court in the following cases: State ex rel. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269, 328 P.2d 60; State ex rel. Rich v. Dunclick, Inc., 77 Idaho 45, 286 P.2d 1112. This court has further held interference with access to be, in itself, a taking of a property right, compensable in damages awarded by way of “inverse condemnation”, and not merely as an item of severance damages in a condemnation suit. Farris v. City of Twin Falls, 81 Idaho 583, 347 P.2d 996; Hughes v. State, 80 Idaho 286, 328 P.2d 397, 402. In the Hughes case this court stated:
“Our review of Idaho’s Constitution, statutes and decisions, clearly shows that the power of eminent domain extends to every kind of property taken for public use, including the right of access to public streets, such being an estate or interest in and appurtenant to real property; and since such right of access constitutes an interest in, by virtue of being an easement appurtenant to, a larger parcel, the court, jury or referee must ascertain and assess the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned by reason of the severance of the portion — the right of access — sought to be condemned, and the construction of the improvement, I.C. sec. 7-711.”
In Farris v. City of Twin Falls, supra (decided subsequent to Winn v. United States, supra), this court was confronted with the problem of evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint attacked by general demurrer. The Farris case, also an inverse condemnation action for damages for obstruction of the right of access to real property, held that the particular complaint stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. This court in reversing the trial court, pointed out that “Appellants have alleged, among other things, that respondent city caused to be constructed ■ an obstruction to the entrance of their property and that by reason thereof the reasonable market value of such property has been damaged and decreased, the complaint states a cause of action and it was reversible error to sustain the general demurrer.” Mabe, supra, 83 Idaho at 227-28, 360 P.2d at 801-02.
Johnston v. Boise City, 87 Idaho 44, 390 P.2d 291 (1964) — unlike Mabe, unlike Hughes, unlike Farris, and unlike Lobdell —was not an inverse condemnation action. It was, as the very first paragraph of the opinion tells the alert reader, an “action to enjoin respondent Boise City permanently, from proceeding with an order of the common council requiring the replacement of curb cuts adjacent to appellant’s two parcels of land.” Id. at 48, 390 P.2d at 292. Foster’s Inc. v. Boise City, 63 Idaho 201, 118 P.2d 721 (1941), was of the same ilk: “Suit by appellants to perpetually enjoin the City of Boise from enforcing Ordinances 1780 and 1793, relating to the installation, purchase, and use of parking meters on certain streets of the city. Judgment for defendants. Affirmed.” Id. at 203, 118 P.2d at 722. The underlying basis for the Johnston decision was largely upon the proposition that what the City hath given, yea, verily, so mayeth the City take back:
Under the provisions of Boise City Code § 14-209, a permit from the council is first required before a curb cut may be made, such permit to be granted after application and consideration by the council. This section of the Boise City Code also provides that the city retains the right to order replacement of the curb at the expense of the adjacent property owner, and provides the procedure for such replacement. The granting or denial of a permit, and the issuance or denial of an order for replacement are all discretionary with the council; it is inherent that this discretion will be reasonably, not arbitrarily or capriciously, exercised. In the instant action no issue was presented as to the validity of Boise City Code § 14-209, nor was any contention advanced that the initial curb cuts were not made pursuant to permit. Johnston, supra, 87 Idaho at 53-54, 390 P.2d at 296.
Moreover, the Court’s opinion went on to add:
*150The present curb cut opposite the Grove street property does not comply with City’s specification for curb cuts. The findings of the trial court to the effect that the curb cuts related to appellant’s premises were not in fact being used and were unnecessary is fully sustained by the evidence. It is our conclusion the record discloses no unreasonable exercise of discretion and the conclusions of law and decree based on the findings of fact are correct. Id. at 54, 390 P.2d at 296 (footnote omitted).
The majority opinion distorts prior case law by saying that “a few Idaho cases have ruled the state regulation of private access onto a pubic road is a taking,” and then adding that “in each case vehicular access to the property was destroyed” — citing only Weaver v. Village of Bancroft, 92 Idaho 189, 439 P.2d 697 (1968), and the Hughes case. All of the cases, however, do not so speak, but rather are couched in terms of obstructions to the right of access which impair or destroy it. In fact, the Bancroft case, citing Lobdell uses this exact language:
The measure of damages for the destruction or impairment of a right of access is the difference between the fair market value of the property immediately before the taking and the fair market value of the same property immediately after the destruction or impairment of such access. Weaver, supra, 92 Idaho at 193, 439 P.2d at 701.
In order to establish a taking, all that is required is that there be alleged and proven a government obstruction to access which diminishes the fair market value of the property. Under the Rueth decision that is in the first instance a matter which the trial court can decide, either with or without an advisory jury. The actual amount of compensation due the property owner, however, is for a jury to determine, if requested.
The majority opinion by sheer ipse dixit declares that: “The closing of an entrance to the alley was a government regulation as a matter of law____” I am unable to see where any authority is provided, or for that matter exists, to support that principle — and certainly not in this case where the alley once entered at the one end terminates in a cul de sac — which of itself might greatly depreciate the value of the land owner’s property from a fire safety perspective. Having not before seen a more clear example of a taking of the property right of access, I strongly dissent.