Court Opinion

ID: 9754612
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:07:43.803471+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:55.746195
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge FRIEDMAN.
I respectfully dissent. The majority holds that, because Curtis Bowman (Petitioner) did not pursue federal administrative remedies to receive credit on his federal sentence for pre-sentence confinement in state prison, Petitioner should not be “rewarded” with credit for that time on his original state sentence. (Majority op. at 606.) However, under Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 115 S.Ct. 2021, 132 L.Ed.2d 46 (1995), a federal prisoner is not entitled to credit for pre-sentence confinement in state prison; thus, it would have been futile for Petitioner to pursue federal administrative remedies. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court did not rule on the propriety of the administrative remedies until March 24, 1992, in United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 112 S.Ct. 1351, 117 L.Ed.2d 593 (1992), and, by then, Petitioner already had received his sentence in federal court.
I. Reno
Under the federal law governing sentence credit, a defendant is entitled to credit for time spent in “official detention.” 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).
(b) CREDIT FOR PRIOR CUSTODY. — A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences — (1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or (2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was arrested after the commission of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; that has not been credited against another sentence.
18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (emphasis added).
The question presented in Reno was whether a federal prisoner is entitled to sentence credit under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) for time spent at a treatment center during release on bail, i.e., whether such time constitutes “official detention.” The Court first examined the phrase “official detention facility” in 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a) and concluded that it refers to a correctional facility designated by the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) for the service of federal sentences. The Court then stated that the words “official detention” should bear the same meaning in sections 3585(a) and 3585(b). Thus, the Court held that “credit for time spent in ‘official detention’ under § 3585(b) is available only to those defendants who were detained in a ‘penal or correctional facility’ and who were subject to BOP’s control.” Reno, 515 U.S. at 58, 115 S.Ct. 2021 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
*607Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, pointing out that, under the Court’s interpretation, section 3585(b) “does not authorize any credit for time spent in state custody....” Reno, 515 U.S. at 67, 115 S.Ct. 2021 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). In an apparent response, the Court stated that “we need not and do not rule here on the propriety of BOP’s decision to grant credit under § 3585(b) to a defendant who is ... held in the custody of state authorities. Thus, the dissent is simply wrong [regarding the extent of our holding].” Id. at 63 n. 5, 115 S.Ct. 2021. In reply, Justice Stevens stated that the majority cannot have it both ways. If “official detention” refers to facilities under the control of the BOP, then it cannot refer to state custody. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Reno is binding on this court with respect to the meaning of “official detention” in 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). As Justice Stevens stated, if “official detention” refers to facilities under the control of the BOP, then “official detention” cannot refer to state custody. Thus, Petitioner would not have been entitled to credit under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) for time spent in state custody, and it would have been futile for him to pursue administrative remedies in order to obtain such credit.1
II. Wilson
When Petitioner was sentenced on March 2, 1992, Wilson was pending in the U.S. Supreme Court. The question in Wilson was whether the District Court or the Attorney General, through the BOP, is responsible for sentence credit decisions under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). On March 24, 1992, the Court held that the Attorney General, through the BOP, was responsible for sentence credit decisions. The Court also held in Wilson that BOP administrative procedures promulgated under an earlier statutory provision applied to afford prisoners review of their sentence credit. Until the Court ruled on these matters, Petitioner had no clear administrative remedy.
Thus, although the majority would not “reward” Petitioner for failing to pursue federal administrative remedies, I would not penalize Petitioner for failing to pursue administrative remedies that were, at the time of his sentencing, not true remedies.
Accordingly, I would reverse and remand. I also would direct the Board on remand to give Petitioner credit against his original state sentence for time spent in state custody that was not credited to his federal sentence.

. Although a federal prisoner is not entitled to credit for state confinement under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), a federal prisoner does receive credit for state confinement if the BOP has designated a state prison as the place of confinement under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (stating the BOP shall designate the place of confinement). Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476 (3d Cir.1990).