Court Opinion

ID: 9609772
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:31:25.379501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:28:50.708489
License: Public Domain

Stolz, Judge.
The judgment of the Fulton Superior Court and that of the Board of Trustees of the Employees’ Retirement System of Georgia, must be affirmed. The case is a most difficult one, involving a conscientious employee who desires to continue to work rather than being *446involuntarily retired due to disability, as thought best by his employer. In an age when so many able-bodied persons seem to prefer not to work if money can be had any other way, cases such as this impose difficult and unpleasant responsibilities upon those required to apply the rules of law. The resolution of this case turns on a matter of law. The factual issue has already been determined by the Board of Trustees of the Employees’ Retirement System of Georgia. This court cannot substitute its judgment for theirs on questions and issues of fact.
1. It is urged that Cantrell v. State of Ga. 129 Ga. App. 465 (2) (200 SE2d 163), aff. 231 Ga. 704 (203 SE2d 493), established the law of the case for the case before us. We disagree; the present case is not the same case as that presented in Cantrell, supra. In the prior case, Cantrell sought relief through the State Personnel Board from a decision by the Board of Trustees of the Retirement System thát he was disabled. This court ruled that Mr. Cantrell was improperly retired because he was not given a personal physical examination. The Board of Trustees of the Employees’ Retirement System of Georgia was not a party to that case. Following the decision in Cantrell, supra, Mr. Cantrell was reinstated to his job, paid back wages, and then this case began with another application to retire the employee, this time using the guidelines from the first case that he be given a personal examination. The "law of the case rule” can only apply to the same case and is not applicable in the case sub judice. See Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Suttles, 201 Ga. 84, 97 (38 SE2d 786) and cits.
Moreover, we disapprove the language of the first sentence in Division 2 of Mr. Cantrell’s first appeal to the court (Cantrell v. State, 129 Ga. App. 465, 467, supra) to the effect that, "Plaintiff could have appealed from the State Retirement Board’s adverse ruling by certiorari to the superior court...” This statement is pure dictum. The "State Retirement Board” was not a party to that case. Further, the dictum quoted is erroneous, as will be shown in Division 2 hereof. The cases cited in support of the dictum do not support the statement made. Scott v. Undercofler, 108 Ga. App. 460 (133 SE2d 444), Schaefer v. Clark, 112 Ga. App. 806 (146 SE2d 318) and Gunther v. *447Gillis, 114 Ga. App. 54 (150 SE2d 309), all involve writs of certiorari from the State Personnel Board to the superior court involving the discharge of an employee. The State Personnel Board and the Board of Trustees are not the same. See Code Ann. § 40-3509 (Ga. L. 1972, pp. 1015, 1024) (State Personnel Board); Code Ann. § 40-3507 (Ga. L. 1972, pp. 1015, 1023) (Employees’ Retirement System). The State Personnel Board is specifically excluded from the Administrative Procedure Act (Code Ann. § 3A-102 (a); Ga. L. 1964, pp. 338, 340; 1965, pp. 283, 284-286) while that subsection of the Act defines "agency” as "each State board, bureau, commission, department, activity or officer authorized by law expressly to make rules and regulations or to determine contested cases except . . .” Code Ann, § 40-2506 (Ga. L. 1949, pp. 138, 150, as amended) defines the general duties, organization and composition of the Board of Trustees of the Employees’ Retirement System of Georgia. Code Ann. § 40-2523 (Ga. L. 1953, pp. 323, 324, as amended) gives the board of trustees authority to adopt tables and rates including rules and regulations. Code Ann. § 40-2505 (3) (b) (Ga. L. 1949, pp. 138, 146, as amended) provides for disability retirement of an employee in application to the board of trustees.
The "law of the case” rule is simply inapplicable to the case sub judice.
2. The writ of certiorari to the superior court does not lie from action by the Employees’ Retirement System of Georgia. Art. VI, Sec. IV, Par. V of the Constitution of Georgia (Code Ann. § 2-3905) provides that the superior courts "shall have power to correct errors in inferior judicatories by writ of certiorari, which shall only issue on the sanction of the Judge, and said courts, and the judges thereof shall have power to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, scire facias, and all other writs that may be necessary for carrying their powers fully into effect, and shall have such other powers as are, or may be conferred on them by law.”
Based on the foregoing constitutional provision, Code § 19-101 provides, "The writ of certiorari shall lie for the correction of errors committed by justices of the peace, corporation courts or councils, or any inferior judicatory, *448exercising judicial powers, including the ordinary, except in cases touching the probate of wills, granting letters testamentary and of administration; . . .”
The question then becomes: Is the Board of Trustees of the Employees’ Retirement System of Georgia such a body as referred to in Code § 19-101? We hold that it is not.
"In determining whether or not a proceeding be judicial in character, the question hinges not on whether the parties at interest were in fact given opportunity to be heard, since an officer cannot clothe himself with unauthorized judicial powers by mere voluntary compliance with the forms of judicial procedure, but the test is whether the parties at interest had a right under the law to demand a trial in accordance with judicial procedure.
"If a person or tribunal has the right under proper delegated authority to act in a judicial capacity, the character of such a judicial procedure, when had as prescribed, is not impaired because under the law such tribunal might have had the alternative right to act ex parte without a trial, but refused to exercise such right... [Cits.]” South View Cemetery Assn. v. Hailey, 199 Ga. 478, 481 (34 SE2d 863).
In Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 181 Ga. 75 (181 SE 834), the Court of Appeals certified a question to the Supreme Court, the essence of which is: Does the writ of certiorari lie from a decision by the Public Service Commission revoking and canceling a certificate of public convenience issued to a motor common carrier because, in the opinion of the commission, the evidence adduced before the commission at a hearing showed that the carrier had abandoned passenger services along the route in question? In resolving this issue and answering the question, the Supreme Court, in a comprehensive opinion, stated: "From the question propounded by the Court of Appeals we understand that the answer sought, as to the applicability of the writ, is as to a proceeding wherein the Public-Service Commission has revoked a certificate of public convenience and necessity because, in the opinion of the commission, a motor common carrier has abandoned passenger service along a certain highway. If, therefore, *449in the hearing, pursuant to which the certificate was revoked, the commission was 'exercising judicial powers,’ it would seem that it would lie. But if the Public-Service Commission, in the circumstances suggested, was not exercising judicial powers, certiorari would not lie to review the finding of the commission. 'The writ of certiorari lies to correct errors or restrain excesses of jurisdiction of inferior courts and officers acting judicially only. It will, therefore, not be issued to officers whose functions and duties are ministerial, executive, or legislative, and not judicial.’ Mechem on Public Offices and Officers, p. 666, § 1001. 'The fact that a public agent exercises judgment or discretion in the performance of his duty does not make his action or his functions judicial.’ Id. 668, § 1005. See also Daniels v. Commissioners, 147 Ga. 295 (93 SE 887); City of Atlanta v. Blackman Health Resort, 153 Ga. 499 (113 SE 545); Bryant v. Board of Education Colquitt County, 156 Ga. 688 (119 SE 601). It is well settled that, in determining the nature of the action of public agents, the organic law and the constitutional divisions of authority, legislative, executive, and judicial, must be kept in mind . . . We address ourselves to the applicability of the writ of certiorari. If in a given case the commission should act beyond its powers or capriciously or fraudulently, that is another matter. The courts of equity, as stated in the Degge case, supra, are always open for the redress of wrongs upon a proper occasion, but what we here announce is that we will not by construction broaden the scope of the writ of certiorari, and especially in those circumstances where it is sought to review the finding of a tribunal acting, not in a judicial capacity, but as a proper and lawful medium for safeguarding and protecting what is the paramount object of its creation, the interest and welfare of the public in the use and maintenance of its highways. In such a consideration the benefit to a particular licensee is only incidental, and the certificate is expressly declared by the statute itself to confer no vested right. The investigation by the commission was to determine, in the paramount interest of the public in the use and enjoyment of its highways, whether or not the holder of the certificate had abandoned the passenger service it had promised to operate and *450whether its certificate should be revoked. There was no trial of the holder of the certificate. The investigation was not, as a trial is usually declared to be, in its ordinary and accepted meaning, 'the judicial investigation and determination of issues between parties.’ 7 Words and Phrases (3rd Series), 622. No vested right of the holder was being tried. No contest between parties was being heard. Under all of the definitions of judicial power hereinbefore set forth, we construe the revocation of the certificate under the circumstances as not involving the exercise of judicial powers. The grant of the certificate was the exercise of administrative or legislative power, and the revocation of the certificate was the exercise of a power of the same character. Therefore the question certified by the Court of Appeals is answered in the negative.” Southeastern Greyhound, supra, pp. 76-77, 89-90.
In the case sub judice, there has been no trial of Mr. Cantrell by the Board of Trustees of the Employees’ Retirement System of Georgia. The investigation as to Mr. Cantrell’s capacity or disability was not a judicial determination of issues between the parties; the employer (Georgia Forestry Commission) was not represented in any way. The fact that the Board of Trustees allowed counsel for the employee to be present on behalf of the employee, does not convert a ministerial function into a judicial one. See South View Cemetery Assn., supra, p. 482 (5).
A case most similar in principle to the case before us, is City of Macon v. Herrington, 198 Ga. 576 (32 SE2d 517). In Herrington, one of the issues was whether the board of trustees of the pension fund for firemen and policemen for the City of Macon, acted in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity in refusing petitioner’s claim to the fund. The Supreme Court held that the action was plainly ministerial and administrative and that the writ of certiorari did not lie for a review of the decision. See City of Macon v. Herrington, supra, p. 590 (3) and cits.
Within the past year, this court applied the principle set out in Herrington, supra, in Burkhead v. Trustees, Firemen’s Pension Fund, 133 Ga. App. 41, 43 (209 SE2d 651), when it stated, "The appellee relies upon several *451cases which concern certiorari situations. These cases are not in point as the lower court certiorari method of appeal is not applicable as this is not an appeal from an inferior judicial or quasi-judicial body but from a purely ministerial or administrative body.” Here we note that in Burkhead, the statute upon which the proceeding in that case was based, specifically provides for an appeal to the superior court by either party. SeeBurkhead, supra, p. 42. That factual situation is not present in the case sub judice.
Argued February 11, 1975
Decided June 23, 1975
Rehearing denied July 16, 1975
Harrison & Garner, G. Hughel Harrison, for appellant.
Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, Eleanor H. Ridley, Staff Assistant Attorney General, Carl C. Jones, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
The judgment of the Superior Court of Fulton County decided the case on the merits and dismissed the petition for writ of certiorari (R. 115-118). That judgment was correct. The superior court did not dismiss the petition for certiorari on the grounds stated above. However, that issue was raised (R. 87-88) and argued (R. 89-101) in the superior court. "A judgment right for any reason will be affirmed by the appellate courts.” Hill v. Willis, 224 Ga. 263, 267 (161 SE2d 281).

Judgment affirmed.

Bell, C. J., Quillian, Webb and Marshall, JJ., concur. Clark, J., concurs specially. Pannell, P. J., Deen, P. J., and Evans, J., dissent.