Court Opinion

ID: 9381863
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-24 05:04:37.109958+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:35.122054
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     March 23, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

V                                                                    No. 359514
                                                                     Charlevoix Circuit Court
JONATHAN MICHAEL MULLEN,                                             LC No. 2021-018514-FH

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: GLEICHER, C.J., and O’BRIEN and MALDONADO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Defendant appeals as of right his jury-trial convictions of possession with intent to deliver
less than 50 grams of a controlled substance, second offense, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), two counts
of felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, use of a firearm during the commission of a
felony, second offense, MCL 750.227f, possession of ammunition by a felon, MCL 750.224f(6),
possession of a dangerous weapon, MCL 750.224(1)(a), and two counts of resisting a police
officer, MCL 750.81d(1). We affirm.

                                       I. BACKGROUND

        Defendant’s convictions stem from a search of defendant’s girlfriend’s apartment (where
defendant was staying while in the area) and a vehicle outside of the apartment in which an officer
observed defendant place two duffel bags. When officers arrived at the apartment, they observed
defendant rush into the bathroom and leave the bathroom soon after. During the ensuing search
of the bathroom, an officer recovered bags of a substance, later confirmed to be heroin, from the
toilet. The search of a bedroom in the apartment uncovered a Springfield XD pistol, and the search
of the vehicle outside the apartment uncovered an AR-15 gun in one of the duffel bags in the
vehicle. Testimony and pictures established that both guns belonged to defendant. Ammunition,
gun accessories, and drug paraphernalia were also found in both the apartment and vehicle.

                                                -1-
        Before trial, defendant sought to suppress evidence gathered during the search on grounds
that the warrant authorizing the search was insufficient.1 Defendant also objected to the
prosecution’s request to admit evidence of defendant’s past drug sales and gun possession as other-
acts evidence, arguing that the evidence was inadmissible under MRE 404(b) and was otherwise
unfairly prejudicial under MRE 403. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress the
evidence obtained during the search, and overruled defendant’s objection to the prosecution’s
other-acts evidence.

       At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted defendant as stated. This appeal followed.

                                   II. MOTION TO SUPPRESS

         Defendant first challenges the trial court’s ruling on his motion to suppress. This Court
reviews for clear error a trial court’s factual findings to support a motion to suppress evidence, but
the trial court’s ultimate ruling on whether to suppress the evidence is reviewed de novo. People
v Gingrich, 307 Mich App 656, 661; 862 NW2d 432 (2014).

        Both the United States and Michigan Constitutions protect individuals from unreasonable
searches and seizures. US Const, Ams IV and XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11; People v Slaughter,
489 Mich 302, 310-311; 803 NW2d 171 (2011). A search is unreasonable if it was conducted
without a warrant and no exception to the warrant requirement applied, or if it was conducted
pursuant to an invalid warrant. People v Kazmierczak, 461 Mich 411, 418; 605 NW2d 667 (2000).
Defendant argues that the search in this case was unreasonable for the latter reason—because it
was conducted pursuant to an allegedly invalid warrant. For a warrant to be valid, it must be
supported by probable cause. Id. at 417. See also US Const, Am IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11; MCL
780.651(1). “It is settled law that probable cause to search must exist at the time the search warrant
is issued, and that probable cause exists when a person of reasonable caution would be justified in
concluding that evidence of criminal conduct is in the stated place to be searched.” People v Russo,
439 Mich 584, 606-607; 487 NW2d 698 (1992) (citations omitted).

        The affidavit for the search warrant in this case was submitted by Charlevoix County
Sheriff Detective Michael Patrick, who wrote that he and another detective met with a confidential
informant who “has been proven to be reliable and credible in their information” in the past.
According to Patrick, the informant identified defendant as a drug trafficker, and named the
girlfriend with whom defendant stayed after traveling. The informant told Patrick that defendant
had brought “back large amounts of illegal drugs”—the informant had witnessed defendant with
two ounces of methamphetamine and 40 ounces of heroin. Patrick attested that the informant
further advised that, at 8:00 p.m. the night before the affidavit was submitted, the informant
witnessed defendant packaging a “ball of heroin,” which, based on the informant’s report, Patrick
estimated was a quarter of an ounce. The informant additionally told Patrick that defendant kept
the drugs in a “steel colored lock box” that he kept with him. The informant also provided, and
Patrick confirmed, that defendant had recently been arrested for driving under the influence of

1
 Defendant also argued that the search of the vehicle exceeded the scope of the warrant, but he
does not renew that objection to the search on appeal.

                                                 -2-
drugs in the county. Patrick added that defendant had “multiple arrests for felony weapons
offenses,” and that defendant’s girlfriend had two handguns.

         Defendant first contends that the warrant was invalid because the informant’s report of a
single “drug sighting” was insufficient to establish probable cause to believe that drugs would be
in the residence. In support of his argument, defendant cites People v David, 119 Mich App 289,
295; 326 NW2d 485 (1982), in which this Court stated in pertinent part, “We are not convinced
that a controlled buy alone is enough to establish probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant.” Although we are not strictly bound by David because it was decided before 1990, see
MCR 7.215(J)(1), we need not address whether David was rightly decided because it is
distinguishable from this case. Here, the affidavit contained more information than merely one
sighting of defendant with drugs at the residence. It discussed that defendant was in possession of
drugs very recently, and otherwise displayed an awareness of defendant’s general involvement in
the drug trade, with specificity about attendant amounts, storage, and travel patterns. The affidavit
also reported an additional “drug sighting,” along with specific information about defendant’s
romantic relations and legal history, and included a general statement about the informant’s
reliability. In David, 119 Mich App at 295, this Court stated that, in addition to the controlled buy,
“[t]here must be some indication of the reliability of the buyer-informant so that a conclusion that
a purchase actually took place may be legitimately drawn.” In this case, the magistrate was
presented with evidence of the informant’s credibility, along with additional evidence such as the
recent drug possession and specific knowledge of several other aspects of defendant’s drug-related
activities, thereby distinguishing this case from David.2

         Defendant persists that the affidavit did not establish the informant’s credibility or the
reliability of the information pursuant to the requirements of MCL 780.653. That statute requires
that an affidavit with information from a confidential informant contain “affirmative allegations
from which the judge or district magistrate may conclude that [1] the person spoke with personal
knowledge of the information and [2] either that the unnamed person is credible or that the
information is reliable.” MCL 780.653. It follows that among a magistrate’s considerations are
“the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information.” People v
Keller, 479 Mich 467, 475; 739 NW2d 505 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

        Personal knowledge of an informant “can be inferred from the stated facts” of the affidavit.
People v Stumpf, 196 Mich App 218, 223; 492 NW2d 795 (1992). Additionally, “the specificity
of the details provided by the informant” may be “substantial indicia to support a finding that the
informant spoke from personal knowledge.” Id. The affidavit in this case stated that the informant
had seen defendant with a significant amount of heroin the evening before the trial court issued
the warrant. The informant’s having very recently viewed defendant with drugs implied that the
informant had personal knowledge that there were drugs in the residence where defendant was
located. The affidavit also provided other specific information that demonstrated the informant’s

2
  Defendant cites other cases in support of his argument that a single “drug sighting” is not
sufficient to establish probable cause, but all those cases are distinguishable for the reasons just
discussed. Namely, that probable cause in this case was established by substantially more than a
single “drug sighting.”

                                                 -3-
personal knowledge, such as having seen defendant with large amounts of narcotics in the past that
he had transported to the area, knowledge of who defendant’s girlfriend was, where he stayed
when in the area, what container defendant used to store drugs, and where to find that container.
That the informant described not only defendant’s drug-trafficking activities, but also personal
details about him, could have reasonably persuaded the magistrate that the informant had extensive
personal knowledge of defendant and his involvement with narcotics, including that he probably
was in possession of them at his girlfriend’s apartment at the relevant time. Accordingly, there
was a substantial basis for the magistrate to conclude that the informant spoke with personal
knowledge, satisfying the first prong of MCL 780.653.

        As to whether the informant was credible and reliable, “the fact that the police previously
had utilized information provided by [an] informant in other warrant requests with successful
results” can provide the necessary support “for the magistrate to conclude that the informant was
credible and reliable.” Stumpf, 196 Mich App at 223. The affiant in this case attested that the
informant had been “proven to be reliable and credible in their information,” and that the affiant
had independently verified other information provided by the informant, such as the fact that
defendant had recently been arrested for driving under the influence of drugs in the county. This
provided a substantial basis from which the magistrate could conclude that the informant was both
credible and reliable, thus satisfying the second prong of MCL 780.653.

        In summary, taking all of these facts into account and evaluating the affidavit in a
commonsense and realistic manner, as well as deferring to the decision of the magistrate, we
conclude that a reasonably cautious person could have concluded that there was a substantial basis
for finding probable cause that evidence of defendant’s drug trafficking would be found in the
residence at which he was staying. Keller, 479 Mich at 475 (explaining that the magistrate’s
responsibility in considering a search warrant is “simply to make a practical, common-sense
decision . . . given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit”); Mullen, 282 Mich App at 21
(“A reviewing court must give great deference to a magistrate’s finding of probable cause to issue
a search warrant.”); People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 243; 749 NW2d 272 (2008) (explaining
that the reviewing court evaluates “whether a reasonably cautious person could have concluded
that there was a substantial basis for the finding of probable cause”).3

                                III. OTHER-ACTS EVIDENCE

       Defendant next challenges that trial court’s decision to allow the prosecution to present
other-acts evidence over defendant’s objection. Generally, a trial court’s decision on an
evidentiary issue will be reversed on appeal only when there has been an abuse of discretion.
People v Holtzman, 234 Mich App 166, 190; 593 NW2d 617 (1999). An abuse of discretion occurs
when a trial court’s decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. People
v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003).

3
 At various points throughout his brief, defendant correctly observes that a warrant cannot be
based on stale information, see Russo, 439 Mich at 605, but he never asserts that the information
underlying the warrant in this case should have been considered stale.

                                                -4-
       MRE 404(b)(1) provides:
                Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
       character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
       however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
       intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or
       absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other
       crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the
       conduct at issue in the case.

As our Supreme Court has explained, this rule is not one of exclusion but “of inclusion that
contains a nonexclusive list of ‘noncharacter’ grounds on which evidence may be admitted.”
People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 496; 577 NW2d 673 (1998). Stated differently, the rule only
precludes the use of other-acts evidence as impermissible character evidence; it does not preclude
the use of such evidence for a proper, non-propensity purpose. People v Sabin, 463 Mich 43, 56;
614 NW2d 888 (2000).

         To protect against other-acts evidence being used for an impermissible purpose, our
Supreme Court “has established a procedural safeguard in the form of a four-pronged standard that
a trial court must insure is satisfied before admission of other acts evidence.” Starr, 457 Mich at
496.

       First, the prosecutor must offer the prior bad acts evidence under something other
       than a character or propensity theory. Second, the evidence must be relevant under
       MRE 402, as enforced through MRE 104(b). Third, the probative value of the
       evidence must not be substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under MRE 403.
       Finally, the trial court, upon request, may provide a limiting instruction under MRE
       105. [People v Knox, 469 Mich 502, 509; 674 NW2d 366 (2004) (quotation marks,
       citations, and alterations omitted).]

A proper purpose is one other than establishing the defendant’s character to show his or her
propensity to commit the crime. People v Johnigan, 265 Mich App 463, 465; 696 NW2d 725
(2005). Not all prior misconduct requires application of MRE 404(b), however. If evidence of
past misconduct is “directly relevant” to a charged offense and does “not involve an intermediate
inference of character, MRE 404(b) is not implicated.” People v Houston, 261 Mich App 463,
468-469; 683 NW2d 192 (2004).

        In this case, Sheriff Sergeant William Church analyzed the contents of one of defendant’s
cell phones, and extracted several text conversations. Church described pictures of guns, cash,
baggies, and a scale, although he could not provide the dates when the images were taken.
Detective Cody Wheat also examined the text messages extracted from defendant’s phone. Wheat
read for the jury one message sent to defendant discussing heroin and methamphetamine for sale,
and defendant’s response discouraging discussions about drug sales by text while encouraging the
use of code words. Another text exchange occurred close in time to defendant’s arrest, when
defendant was in Charlevoix County, discussing defendant’s obtaining a ride so that he could
purchase “$2,000 for the four” in Flint. Wheat also detailed text messages discussing a scope and
flash muzzle for defendant’s AR-15 rifle, and defendant’s purchasing heroin. Wheat reviewed

                                               -5-
texts between defendant and his girlfriend discussing defendant’s trying to obtain a ride to travel
to her near the time of his arrest, but experiencing financial difficulties and wanting money for
heroin, and also purchasing drugs and trading guns. Wheat further described images from
defendant’s phone of guns, including those seized at the apartment, and of a baggie of white
powder on a digital scale.

        Wheat testified that he also obtained records from defendant’s Facebook account, which
contained multiple images of three handguns seized from the apartment, images of defendant
holding the AR-15 with a request to sight-in the gun, a request from an individual for “a gram or
two” of heroin along with some other drugs, a request from another individual for up to a gram of
an unspecified drug with payment by “cash app,” lists of suspected informants, and more requests
for heroin and methamphetamine. Wheat continued that the prospective buyer was a resident of
Charlevoix County who was attempting to purchase something for $2,000, and that defendant
demanded $1,000 by 5:00 p.m. or he would sell “the bag” of drugs. Wheat added that heroin
commanded higher prices in Charlevoix County than it did downstate, and that defendant was
communicating with his girlfriend on Facebook about how much to charge for drugs.

                                    A. GUN PHOTOGRAPHS

       Defendant argues that the images from his phone depicting guns were admitted for the
improper purpose of demonstrating his character as “the kind of person who would knowingly
possess . . . guns” because he had used guns in the past.

        To the extent that this argument relates to the images of defendant possessing the AR-15
and Springfield XD handgun, the argument fails because those images were not subject to MRE
404(b). Defendant was facing a number of charges stemming from his possession of the AR-15
and Springfield XD handgun. To prove those charges, the prosecution had to establish that
defendant, in fact, possessed those firearms. Obviously, evidence that defendant possessed the
AR-15 and Springfield XD handgun is directly relevant to establishing that defendant possessed
those firearms without any intermediate inference. Accordingly, MRE 404(b) is not implicated.
See Houston, 261 Mich App at 468-469.4

       With regard to images of guns other than the AR-15 and Springfield XD handgun, the trial
court allowed their admission for the purposes of demonstrating a scheme, plan, system,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, reasoning that the images were evidence of
defendant’s “modus operandi, this is what he does, he possesses firearms,” and “to identify him as
the owner and possessor of these firearms as opposed to” other persons in the apartment.

4
  Even assuming MRE 404(b) applied to the photos of the AR-15 and Springfield XD handgun,
the trial court clearly did not abuse its discretion by allowing the evidence to be admitted at trial.
The photos were admissible for the non-propensity purpose of identifying defendant as at least a
joint possessor of the firearms, despite that they were not on his person when found. Identifying
defendant as a possessor of the firearms was clearly relevant to the charges against defendant.
Lastly, evidence identifying defendant as a possessor of the firearms was highly probative, and
that probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of any unfair prejudice.

                                                 -6-
        It is a close question, under the abuse-of-discretion standard, whether the trial court erred
by admitting the images of other guns under MRE 404(b). The prosecution offered proper non-
propensity reasons for admitting the evidence, and the trial court accepted those reasons as
demonstrated by its ruling, thereby satisfying the first prong of the standard for admissibility under
MRE 404(b). As to the second prong—relevance—the bar is minimal. Evidence is relevant if it
has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” MRE 401
(emphasis added). But, as explained by our Supreme Court:

       In the context of prior acts evidence . . . MRE 404(b) stands as a sentinel at the gate:
       the proffered evidence truly must be probative of something other than the
       defendant’s propensity to commit the crime. If the prosecutor fails to weave a
       logical thread linking the prior act to the ultimate inference, the evidence must be
       excluded, notwithstanding its logical relevance to character. [People v Crawford,
       458 Mich 376, 390; 582 NW2d 785 (1998).]

It is questionable whether the prosecution satisfied this burden in this case.5 We need not resolve
this close question, however, because even if images of the other guns were improperly admitted,
defendant is not entitled to appellate relief.

          A preserved evidentiary error does not merit reversal in a criminal case unless it appears
that it is “more probable than not that the error was outcome determinative.” People v Lukity, 460

5
  For instance, the prosecution contends that the images of defendant possessing other guns and
drugs demonstrates defendant’s “scheme” of “using his guns to protect his possession and sale of
drugs.” Yet it is unclear how the photos themselves demonstrate this. The photos depict only
defendant possessing guns. While the guns are sometimes next to drugs, nothing about the photos
suggest a “scheme” to use the “guns to protect [defendant’s] possession and sale of” the drugs.
        The prosecution alternatively contends that the images of defendant possessing other guns
established defendant’s knowledge and intent to possess the guns found in this case by invoking
the doctrine of chances; the prosecution asserts that “the evidence of other guns admitted here
demonstrates an objective improbability that [defendant] unknowingly possessed the AR-15 and
the Springfield XD” handgun. Our Supreme Court, however, has cautioned against the use of the
doctrine of chances because “the theory is prone to abuse and may result in the admission of
character evidence in disguise[.]” Crawford, 458 Mich at 394. To avoid such abuse, the doctrine
should be invoked only after the prosecution persuasively shows “that each uncharged incident is
similar to the charged offense and that the accused has been involved in such incidents more
frequently than the typical person.” Id. (quotation makes and citation omitted). It is questionable
whether the prosecution made such a showing in this case. Moreover, given that the prosecution’s
argument for similarity is that the images of the other guns “depicted the same conduct as the
charged offenses—gun possession,” it could be reasonably argued that the prosecution’s
invocation of the doctrine of chances is nothing more than an attempt to admit “character evidence
in disguise[.]” Id. That is, it could be reasonably argued that the prosecution sought to admit
evidence of defendant’s past possession of guns because, if he possessed guns in the past, it made
it more likely that he possessed the guns found in this case.

                                                 -7-
Mich 484, 495-496; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). See also MCL 769.26. Assuming that the images of
other guns from defendant’s phone were improperly admitted, the non-tainted evidence still
overwhelmingly demonstrated that defendant possessed the AR-15 and Springfield XD handgun
that were found in the search. A friend in the apartment testified that she knew that defendant’s
AR-15 and handgun were in the apartment. Defendant’s girlfriend testified that defendant had an
AR-15 at the residence, which she had packed into a bag. A police officer testified that he observed
defendant put a bag into a vehicle, and later searched the bag to find the AR-15. Defendant’s
girlfriend stated that defendant had a second gun, a Springfield XD handgun, in the back bedroom,
and ammunition in the apartment. A police officer testified that he discovered the Springfield XD
handgun, and an AR-15 magazine, in a closet in the back bedroom, and also two loaded AR-15
magazines in defendant’s backpack. Finally, two witnesses testified that defendant told them, in
the days following the search, that he had been caught with an AR-15. Accordingly, we conclude
that, assuming the images of the other guns from defendant’s phone were improperly admitted, the
error was not outcome determinative and did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

                         B. EVIDENCE OF OTHER DRUG TRANSACTIONS

        Defendant next argues that his text messages and Facebook messages were admitted for
the improper purpose of demonstrating his character as “the kind of person who would knowingly
possess drugs . . . and intend to deliver large amounts of drugs” because he had been around drugs
in the past.

         We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the admission of
evidence of drug transactions found on defendant’s phone and Facebook messages. Again, Wheat
testified about text messages on defendant’s phone that discussed defendant’s buying and selling
heroin and methamphetamine, including in a different part of the state, and also about messages
from defendant’s Facebook account regarding individuals, including one from Charlevoix, who
asked to purchase heroin, methamphetamine, and other drugs from defendant.

        As to the first prong of the standard for admissibility under MRE 404(b), the trial court
properly concluded that the evidence was offered for the non-propensity purpose of demonstrating
defendant’s intent to distribute the narcotics found during the search. As to the second prong,
evidence of past drug transactions may be relevant to whether a defendant intended to distribute
drugs. See, e.g., People v Williams, 240 Mich App 316, 324; 614 NW2d 647 (2000). Here,
evidence of defendant’s participation in the acquisition and sale of narcotics, including evidence
that he had recently sold drugs in Charlevoix County as demonstrated in the messages, gave rise
to a reasonable inference that defendant intended to distribute the narcotics he possessed. Thus,
the evidence of defendant negotiating and planning drug transactions in the challenged messages
was relevant to the charged crime of possession with intent to distribute.

        Defendant argues that evidence that he sold drugs in the past was not relevant because it
does not negate the possibility that he intended to use the drugs found during the search for
personal consumption, and did not intend to distribute the drugs. While defendant is of course
correct, evidence need not conclusively establish the existence of a fact in question in order to be
relevant. Rather, evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence.” MRE 401 (emphasis added). Evidence of defendant’s participation in

                                                -8-
the sale of narcotics made it more likely that defendant intended to sell the drugs found in his
possession during the search for the reasons explained.

        Turning to the third prong of the standard for admissibility under MRE 404(b), we conclude
that the risk of unfair prejudice was not substantially outweighed by the significant probative value
of the challenged evidence regarding defendant’s intent. See MRE 403. The evidence was highly
probative—it demonstrated the likelihood that defendant intended to distribute the controlled
substances found during the search. In contrast, the danger of unfair prejudice was minimal. While
the evidence was, like most relevant evidence, damaging to defendant, “ ‘[u]nfair prejudice’ does
not mean ‘damaging.’ ” Lewis v Legrow, 258 Mich App 175, 199; 670 NW2d 675 (2003). Rather,
evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it goes beyond the merits of the case to inject issues broader than
the defendant’s guilt or innocence, such as “bias, sympathy, anger, or shock.” People v McGhee,
268 Mich App 600, 614; 709 NW2d 595 (2005). The evidence depicting defendant’s activities
with narcotics did not inject issues beyond defendant’s guilt or innocence into the case. While
defendant argues that evidence he sold drugs in the past implied to the jury that defendant “is a
drug dealer,” the trial court instructed the jury that the evidence was only to be used for limited
non-propensity purposes, and not to infer that defendant was a bad person. Juries are presumed to
follow their instructions. Unger, 278 Mich App at 237.

        For these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of drug
activity as displayed in defendant’s text messages and social media.

       Affirmed.

                                                               /s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
                                                               /s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
                                                               /s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado

                                                 -9-