Court Opinion

ID: 9620766
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:47:16.989961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:54.070997
License: Public Domain

CARTER, Justice,
concurring.
Because I agree with the lead opinion that the failure to instruct the jury concerning prior verbal threats was reversible error, I concur in that part of the lead opinion and in the judgment remanding the case for a new trial. However, I disagree with the analysis regarding the application of the rule of optional completeness.
It is important to place the conversations of John Arlin Walters in the proper sequence to understand the context of the issue. Sean English received his first call from Walters (at which time he only knew it was a male voice from Walters’ residence) at 2:08 p.m. This call simply informed English that “[a] man had been shot at the ... church.” This call was recorded and played in its entirety for the jury. At 2:25 p.m., English then called Walters’ residence and had conversed with Walters. These are the only two conversations that have any relevance to the *789issue of the admissibility of Walters’ statements to English. The lead opinion states that Rule 107 was implicated when English testified that he asked Walters if he wanted to talk about what happened. It must be noted that the State did not attempt to introduce any statements of Walters from this conversation other than Walters’ statement that he would “be right out.” Likewise, the State never sought to introduce the tape-recorded conversation from this telephone call. In fact, there was no reference made that such a recording even existed until counsel for Walters cross-examined English. Clearly, the tape-recorded conversation itself was inadmissible as the State had not attempted to offer any portion of it into evidence. See Washington v. State, 856 S.W.2d 184, 186 (Tex. Crim.App.1998).
The testimony of English about the conversation with Walters included only the statement from Walters that he would “be right out.” It is proper to introduce a conversation when specific statements made during the conversation which, taken out of context, could have created the possibility of the jury receiving a false impression from hearing only a part of the conversation. Sauceda v. State, 129 S.W.3d 116, 123 (Tex.Crim.App.2004). But here, the State did not introduce any specific statement from that conversation that could mislead the jury. The suggestion is that English’s general statement that he asked Walters if he wanted to talk about what happened is somehow misleading the jury or allowing the jury to receive a false impression from hearing only that question. I disagree that any testimony of English regarding this call to Walters had any tendency to mislead, confuse, or leave a false impression with the jury. Therefore, that justification for admitting this hearsay testimony of Walters’ comments to English is not present.
Further, the optional completeness rule requires that, when part of a conversation or recorded statement is given in evidence by one party, the whole on the same subject may be inquired into which is necessary to make it fully understood or to explain the same. Tex.R. Evid. 107. Only parts or items of evidence germane to the part or item offered (“on the same subject”) become admissible. Arebalo v. State, 143 S.W.3d 402, 408 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. ref'd). Was the evidence proffered by Walters on the same subject as that presented by the State? I do not believe that it was. The subject introduced by the State concerned the desire of the police officers for Walters to peacefully surrender. In response, Walters sought to introduce his statements concerning threats Russell Walters made to him. The purpose of the rule of optional completeness is to “reduce the possibility of the fact finder receiving a false impression from hearing the evidence of only part of an act.” See Kinnamon v. State, 791 S.W.2d 84, 101 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (citing Evans v. State, 643 S.W.2d 157, 161 (Tex.App.1982)), overruled on other grounds by Cook v. State, 884 S.W.2d 485, 491 (Tex.Crim.App.1994). This rationale explains why it is necessary for the proffered testimony to address the same subject matter as that introduced by the other party. The State did not attempt to offer any evidence that could be regarded as inquiring into whether Walters was justified in killing his brother. Consequently, it was not proper to allow Walters to offer hearsay testimony on that subject. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has explained that the evidence must be relevant to the issue originally placed before the court. Jernigan v. State, 589 S.W.2d 681, 694—95 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1979).
In similar situations, courts have approved limitations placed on the scope of testimony. In Goldberg v. State, 95 *790S.W.3d 345, 387 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd), an officer testified about his conversation with the defendant and said that he discussed with him his “activities of the day” and the defendant told him he had been playing football and gave the officer names of people who had been playing football with him. Thereafter, the defendant sought to inquire of the officer everything the defendant told the officer about the “activities of the day.” The trial court, properly, allowed Goldberg to question Sampson about the same subject, i.e., Sampson’s conversation with Goldberg regarding the football game. It did not, however, allow Goldberg to present, through the state’s witness, his entire version of the events of the day of the murder. The court reasoned that the evidence sought to be introduced was not on the same subject and would have been self-serving hearsay by Goldberg and that it was not necessary to correct a false or incorrect impression created by the officer’s testimony. See Jones v. State, 963 S.W.2d 177, 182 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet. ref'd) (stating Rule 107 permits self-serving hearsay statements by defendant only when necessary to correct false impression created by hearing only part of statement).
Here, the evidence presented by the State that an officer called Walters’ home and talked with him contains no conversation that requires or authorizes the introduction of hearsay evidence to correct. The only reference to a statement by Walters was that “he’d be right out.” The statements made to the officer by Walters concerning his justification for shooting Russell are not germane to any issue placed before the court and jury by the State. Consequently, I do not believe the rule of optional completeness applies in this situation. The court properly sustained a hearsay objection to the evidence.
Similarly, the call to Walters’ residence is not a continuation of the prior conversation that would require admission to complete the cycle of conversations. The telephone calls stand independently, and one is not needed to understand the other. Walters argues that it was necessary to introduce his statement to English concerning Russell’s threats because the State had urged that Walters’ demeanor was calm, not excited. However, a close examination of the record reveals that the evidence concerning Walters’ demeanor referred only to the 9-1-1 call Walters made reporting that “[a] man had been shot at the ... church.” The entire passage quoted in the lead opinion concerning the demeanor issue refers to the 2:08 p.m. call that Walters apparently made to the 9-1-1 operator and does not involve the later call English made to Walters. The State made it clear in questioning the officer about the demeanor of Walters, that it was referring to the earlier 9-1-1 call, not the call English later made to the residence. English explained that the caller (who he did not know was Walters when the call occurred) was not emotional, but was calm. He further stated that this was extraordinary and that he would have expected the caller to be more excited. However, it cannot be argued that the jury was uninformed as to Walters’ demeanor during the 2:08 p.m. call, as this entire telephone conversation was played for the jury, and the jurors could evaluate Walters’ tone and demeanor just as English did. The State did not attempt to introduce any evidence of Walters’ demeanor during the conversation, which occurred when English called Walters’ residence. The two telephone calls are not intertwined, and they are not continuations of a single conversation. Indeed, as previously pointed out, the final call by the deputy to the home of Walters was not a continuation of the prior call, but an attempt to ensure that Walters was not *791about to shoot the officers who were then converging on Walters’ residence. Essentially, the lead opinion holds that, since English testified that Walters sounded calm during his first call (which was played to the jury), Walters should be allowed to introduce the content of the unrelated second conversation, presumably to show he was not calm during the second conversation. Since the State did not present any evidence concerning Walters’ demeanor during the 2:25 p.m. call, there was no justification for allowing the hearsay testimony as rebuttal of demeanor evidence.
We review the admission and exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion, and we do not reverse the decision absent a clear abuse of discretion. See Apolinar v. State, 155 S.W.3d 184, 186 (Tex.Crim.App.2005). A court abuses its discretion when its ruling is outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id.; see Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 102 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (op. on reh’g). In this instance, I do not believe that the trial court was outside the zone of reasonable disagreement in excluding the proffered testimony. I do not believe an abuse of discretion has been shown, and I would affirm this portion of the ease.
I concur in the judgment of the court.
Chief Justice MORRISS joins in this concurring opinion.