Court Opinion

ID: 9926388
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-24 17:08:17.022556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:44.341104
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Taylor, 2024-Ohio-238.]

                                        COURT OF APPEALS
                                    MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO
                                    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 STATE OF OHIO                                  JUDGES:
                                                Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
         Plaintiff-Appellee                     Hon. John W. Wise, J.
                                                Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
 -vs-
                                                Case No. CT2023-0064
 KEITH TAYLOR

          Defendant-Appellant                   OPINION

 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS:                      Appeal from the Muskingum County Court
                                                of Common Pleas, Case No. CR2023-
                                                0218

 JUDGMENT:                                      Affirmed

 DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                        January 23, 2024

 APPEARANCES:

 For Plaintiff-Appellee                         For Defendant-Appellant

 RON WELCH, ESQ.                                CHRIS BRIGDON
 Prosecuting Attorney                           8138 Somerset Road
 Muskingum County, Ohio                         Thornville, Ohio 43076
 27 North Fifth Street
 P.O. Box 189
 Zanesville, Ohio 43702
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0064                                                   2

Hoffman, P.J.
        {¶1}     Defendant-appellant Keith Taylor appeals the judgment entered by the

Muskingum County Common Pleas Court convicting him following his pleas of guilty to

engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity with a firearm specification (R.C. 2923.32(A)(1),

2941.141), four counts of theft (R.C. 2913.02(A)), four counts of identity fraud (R.C.

2913.49(B)(1)), one count of felonious assault with a firearm specification (R.C.

2903.11(A)(1)), and one count of grand theft of a motor vehicle (R.C. 2913.02(A)(3)), and

sentencing him to an aggregate term of incarceration of twenty one to twenty-six and one-

half years.     Plaintiff-appellee is the state of Ohio.1

                                 STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

        {¶2}     On January 25, 2023, Appellant and his co-defendant, Juliana Washington,

smashed the windows of five cars parked at FlowFit Studios in Zanesville, Ohio. Appellant

and Washington stole purses and wallets from the vehicles, including checks, credit

cards, and driver’s licenses belonging to the owners of the vehicles. Appellant and

Washington then went to Zanesville Gymnastics and smashed a car window, stealing a

victim’s purse which contained credit cards and the victim’s driver’s license.

        {¶3}     The next day Appellant and Washington smashed another car window at a

gymnastics studio, stealing a victim’s checks and identification. Two of the checks stolen

from this vehicle were forged and cashed by Appellant and Washington, using driver’s

licenses stolen from the Flowfit thefts.

        {¶4}     On February 7, 2023, Appellant and Washington were introduced to B.K.,

who was homeless at the time, through a mutual friend. Appellant and Washington

1 The State has not filed a brief in the instant appeal.
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0064                                                    3

offered B.K. an opportunity to make some money. Appellant and Washington put B.K. in

a car with another woman, and instructed them to go through a bank drive-through in

Zanesville to cash one of the stolen checks using a stolen driver’s license. After turning

the money over to Appellant, B.K. indicated she did not want to be a part of what Appellant

was doing, and she wanted out of the car. Appellant drove B.K. to an area behind a strip

mall in Zanesville, where Appellant assaulted B.K., striking her with his fists and a

handgun until B.K. was unconscious. When she regained consciousness, she made her

way to a store in the strip mall, where the police were called. B.K. was taken to the

emergency room for treatment.

       {¶5}   After participating in several “smash and grabs” in the Twinsburg area,

Appellant and Washington returned to the Newark/Heath area, where, with the aid of

another woman, they attempted to cash several checks stolen from the vehicles in

Muskingum County. When the woman attempted to cash one of the stolen checks at a

bank branch in Zanesville, she was caught by the drive-through teller because the victim

to whom the check belonged was a former employee of the bank branch. The bank called

911, and a police officer stopped the vehicle. When the deputy approached the vehicle,

the woman sped away at the urging of Appellant and Washington, who were instructing

her via cell phone. A chase ensued on Interstate 70, reaching speeds of 115 mph. The

woman crashed the vehicle into a truck in the median, while still on the phone with

Appellant and Washington.

       {¶6}   Appellant was charged by the Muskingum County Grand Jury in a 45-count

indictment. Pursuant to a negotiated plea, Appellant pled guilty to engaging in a pattern

of corrupt activity with a firearm specification (R.C. 2923.32(A)(1), 2941.141), four counts
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0064                                                    4

of theft (R.C. 2913.02(A)), four counts of identity fraud (R.C. 2913.49(B)(1)), one count of

felonious assault with a firearm specification (R.C. 2903.11(A)(1)), and one count of grand

theft of a motor vehicle (R.C. 2913.02(A)(3)), and the remaining charges were dismissed.

Both parties reserved the right to argue for the sentence they felt was appropriate at the

sentencing hearing.

       {¶7}   The trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of incarceration of

21 to 26 ½ years. It is from the July 28, 2023 judgment of the trial court Appellant

prosecutes his appeal, assigning as error:

              I. SHOULD THIS COURT SHOULD [SIC] REVERSE THE TRIAL

       COURT’S DECISION TO IMPOSE A MAXIMUM SENTENCE ON COUNT

       1   AND     COUNT      28;   BECAUSE,        THE   SENTENCE        WAS     IN

       CONTRAVENTION OF THE SENTENCING STATUTES R.C. 2929.11

       AND R.C. 2929.12.

              II. SHOULD THIS COURT SHOULD [SIC] REVERSE THE TRIAL

       COURT’S DECISION TO IMPOSE AN AGGREGATE SENTENCE OF 21

       YEARS; BECAUSE, THE SENTENCE WAS IN CONTRAVENTION OF

       THE SENTENCING STATUTES R.C. 2929.11 AND 4.C. 2929.12

                                               I., II.

       {¶8}   We address both assignments of error together, as Appellant does in his

brief. Appellant argues the proportionality of the sentence was inconsistent with the
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0064                                                      5

principles set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the factors to be considered set forth in R.C.

2929.12.

       {¶9}   Appellant first argues the trial court impermissibly relied on advocacy from

the prosecution. Appellant argues ten days after Appellant’s arrest, the State made an

offer of a recommendation of a twelve-year sentence upon a plea to the same counts to

which Appellant pled in the instant case. However, after the co-defendant went to trial,

counsel for Appellant represented the State told Appellant if the co-defendant was

convicted, the offer was “going up.” Sent. Tr. 12. At the sentencing hearing, the State

argued for a sentence of 25 to 30 years.

       {¶10} The plea agreement signed by the parties set forth, “[T]he parties agree that

the State will make no recommendation as to sentencing at the time of the Defendant’s

plea herein. However, both the State and counsel for Defendant reserve the right to argue

for the sentence they feel is appropriate at the time of sentencing.” Nothing in the plea

agreement precluded the State from arguing for a sentence of more than the twelve years

previously offered. Further, the trial court did not accept either of the parties’ arguments

concerning sentencing, instead sentencing Appellant to more years than argued by

defense counsel, but less years than argued by the State. We find the State was not

bound by its previous offer to recommend a sentence of twelve years, and the trial court

did not impermissibly rely on the State’s advocacy in sentencing Appellant.

       {¶11} Appellant next argues in sentencing, the trial court considered dismissed

counts which would have merged in sentencing had Appellant been convicted of these

counts. Based on the record before this Court, it is not clear which, if any, of the dismissed

counts would have merged had Appellant been convicted of all counts. Appellant cites
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0064                                                     6

this Court to State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St. 3d 164, 473 N.E.2d 264 (1984), for the

proposition “where two or more aggravating circumstances arise from the same act or

indivisible course of conduct and are thus duplicative, the duplicative aggravating

circumstances will be merged for purposes of sentencing.” Id. at paragraph 5 of the

syllabus. However, Jenkins was a capital case, and the cited portion of the syllabus is

qualified by the phrase [i]n the penalty phase of a capital prosecution.” Id. We find

Jenkins inapplicable because the instant case is not a capital case. A sentencing court

may consider charges which have been dismissed or reduced pursuant to a plea

agreement. State v. Rush, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT12-0038, 2013-Ohio-2728, 996

N.E.2d 503, ¶ 13. We find the trial court did not err in considering counts dismissed

pursuant to the plea agreement in the instant case.

       {¶12} Appellant argues the record does not support the sentence when

considering the principles set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12.

       {¶13} We review felony sentences using the standard of review set forth in R.C.

2953.08. State v. Roberts, 5th Dist. Licking No. 2020 CA 0030, 2020-Ohio-6722, ¶13,

citing State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231. R.C.

2953.08(G)(2) provides we may either increase, reduce, modify, or vacate a sentence

and remand for sentencing where we clearly and convincingly find either the record does

not support the sentencing court's findings under R.C. 2929.13(B) or (D),

2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4), or 2929.20(l), or the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. Id.,

citing State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659.

       {¶14} When sentencing a defendant, the trial court must consider the purposes

and principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0064                                                      7

recidivism factors in R.C. 2929.12. State v. Hodges, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99511, 2013-

Ohio-5025, ¶ 7.

       {¶15} “The overriding purposes of felony sentencing are to protect the public from

future crime by the offender and others, to punish the offender, and to promote the

effective rehabilitation of the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court

determines accomplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state

or local government resources.” R.C. 2929.11(A). To achieve these purposes, the

sentencing court shall consider the need for incapacitating the offender, deterring the

offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution

to the victim of the offense, the public, or both. Id. Further, the sentence imposed shall be

“commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and

its impact on the victim, and consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes by

similar offenders.” R.C. 2929.11(B).

       {¶16} R.C. 2929.12 lists general factors which must be considered by the trial

court in determining the sentence to be imposed for a felony, and gives detailed criteria

which do not control the court's discretion, but which must be considered for or against

severity or leniency in a particular case. The trial court retains discretion to determine the

most effective way to comply with the purpose and principles of sentencing as set forth in

R.C. 2929.11. R.C. 2929.12.

       {¶17} Nothing in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) permits this Court to independently weigh

the evidence in the record and substitute our own judgment for that of the trial court to

determine a sentence which best reflects compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and R.C.
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0064                                                      8

2929.12. State v. Jones, 1163 Ohio St.3d 242, 69 N.E.3d 649, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 42.

Instead, we may only determine if the sentence is contrary to law.

       {¶18} A sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law where the trial

court “considers the principles and purposes of R.C. 2929.11, as well as the factors listed

in R.C. 2929.12, properly imposes post release control, and sentences the defendant

within the permissible statutory range.” State v. Pettorini, 5th Dist. Licking No. 2020 CA

00057, 2021-Ohio-1512, 2021 WL 1714216, ¶¶ 14-16 quoting State v. Dinka, 12th Dist.

Warren Nos. CA2019-03-022 & CA2019-03-026, 2019-Ohio-4209, ¶ 36.

       {¶19} The judgment entry states the trial court considered the principles and

purposes of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and balanced the seriousness and recidivism

factors under R.C. 2929.12. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court noted Appellant’s

record included seven separate felony cases in Florida and North Carolina, each of which

included numerous counts, dating back to 2006. The trial court further noted Appellant

was a fugitive in the State of Florida for six years. At the time of sentencing, Appellant

had two pending felony cases in Ohio, one in Medina County and one in Summit County.

We find the sentence in the instant case is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law.

       {¶20} Appellant argues generally the sentence in the instant case is

disproportionate to the offenses committed, based in part on the State’s original plea offer

of twelve years incarceration. Cases violating the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on

cruel and unusual punishment “are limited to those involving sanctions which under the

circumstances would be considered shocking to any reasonable person,” and “the penalty

must be so greatly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the sense of justice of the

community.” State v. Hairston, 118 Ohio St.3d 289, 2008-Ohio-2338, 888 N.E.2d 1073, ¶
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0064                                                 9

14, quoting McDougle v. Maxwell, 1 Ohio St.2d 68, 70, 30 O.O.2d 38, 203 N.E.2d 334

(1964). Proportionality review should focus on individual sentences, rather than on the

cumulative impact of multiple sentences imposed consecutively. Id. at ¶20. “Where none

of the individual sentences imposed on an offender are grossly disproportionate to their

respective offenses, an aggregate prison term resulting from consecutive imposition of

those sentences does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.” Id. As a general

rule, a sentence falling within the terms of a valid statute cannot amount to a cruel and

unusual punishment. Id. at ¶21.

      {¶21} Appellant does not argue any of his individual sentences are

disproportionate to the offenses committed. Each of the individual sentences was within

the statutory range, and the maximum sentence was imposed only as to two counts: the

felony which covered all of the enterprises Appellant was involved in, and the felonious

assault, which in the trial court’s opinion was a separate victim and was not “necessary

in this case to perform [the] criminal enterprise.” Sent. Tr. 23. We find the penalties

imposed in the instant case are not so greatly disproportionate to the offenses Appellant

committed as to shock the sense of justice of the community.
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0064                                           10

      {¶22} The first and second assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of

the Muskingum County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.

By: Hoffman, P.J.
Wise, J. and
Baldwin, J. concur