Court Opinion

ID: 9373496
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:05:28.127299+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:41.994148
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     STEVEN S. SUCHAK,                               DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        DA-0841-16-0017-I-2

                  v.

     OFFICE OF PERSONNEL                             DATE: August 11, 2022
       MANAGEMENT,
                   Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL *

           Brad Harris, Esquire and Leah Bachmeyer Kille, Esquire, Lexington,
             Kentucky, for the appellant.

           Carla Robinson, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     affirmed the decision of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to terminate
     his disability annuity. OPM has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot

     *
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
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     because it has retroactively reinstated the appellant’s annuity. For the reasons set
     forth below, we VACATE the initial decision without deciding the issues raised
     in the appellant’s petition for review and REMAND the case to the Western
     Regional Office for further development of the record regarding the potential
     mootness of this appeal and, if necessary, further adjudication.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2           The relevant background information is not in material dispute. According
     to the appellant, he was separated from a civilian position with the Department of
     the Air Force on March 29, 2013, as a result of his medical inability to perform
     the essential job duties of his Information Technology position. Suchak v. Office
     of Personnel Management, MSPB Docket No. DA-0841-16-0017-I-1, Initial
     Appeal File (IAF), Tab 21 at 4-5.       In March 2014, he applied for disability
     retirement benefits under the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS). Id.
     at 5.    Thereafter, he applied for, and accepted, an appointment with the
     Department of the Navy as an Electronic Engineer. Id. The appointment was
     effective June 2, 2014. Id. at 30-31. On January 5, 2015, OPM approved the
     appellant’s request for a FERS disability annuity.            Id. at 32-35.      On
     August 28, 2015, however, OPM found that he was administratively recovered
     based on his employment with the Navy, and it terminated his disability annuity
     effective June 2, 2014. IAF, Tab 2.
¶3           The appellant then filed this appeal with the Board.       IAF, Tab 1.   The
     administrative judge issued an initial decision finding that the appellant failed to
     establish his eligibility for the FERS disability benefits sought and affirming
     OPM’s decision to deny the appellant those benefits.           Suchak v. Office of
     Personnel Management, MSPB Docket No. DA-0841-16-0017-I-2, Refiled
     Appeal File, Tab 32, Initial Decision (ID) at 2, 14.
¶4           The appellant has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR)
     File, Tab 1. On July 5, 2017, OPM was ordered to respond to an argument raised
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     by the appellant. PFR File, Tab 3. OPM instead filed a motion to dismiss the
     appeal as moot, asserting that it reinstated the appellant’s annuity retroactive to
     June 2, 2014. PFR File, Tab 5 at 4. The appellant filed an opposition to OPM’s
     motion, and OPM filed a reply. PFR File, Tabs 6-7.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶5        A case is moot when the issues presented are no longer “live ,” or the parties
     lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of the case. Wrighten v. Office
     of Personnel Management, 89 M.S.P.R. 163, ¶ 5 (2001). For an appeal to be
     dismissed as moot, an appellant must have received all of the relief that he could
     have received if the matter had been adjudicated and he had prevailed. Alexis v.
     Office of Personnel Management, 106 M.S.P.R. 315, ¶ 6 (2007).
¶6        In its July 25, 2017 motion to dismiss, OPM asserts the following: (1) it
     has reinstated the appellant’s disability annuity retroactive to June 2, 2014;
     (2) effective August 1, 2017, he would begin receiving recurring monthly annuity
     payments; and (3) within 5 to 7 business days, he would receive a one -time,
     lump-sum payment for the annuity, which he was owed for the period from
     June 2, 2014, through June 30, 2017.       PFR File, Tab 5 at 4, 8.      OPM has
     submitted what appear to be screenshots reflecting that it made these changes
     within its computer system, id. at 6-7, as well as calculations reflecting how it
     arrived at some of the amounts relevant to the appellant’s annuity, id. at 9-10. In
     a letter to the appellant attached to its motion, OPM stated that it was deducting
     his optional life insurance and the Federal tax due from his retroactive annuity
     payment.    Id. at 8.   OPM further informed the appellant that, while he is
     reemployed, his employing agency will deduct his basic life and health insurance
     premiums from his salary, and OPM will deduct his optional life insurance from
     his monthly annuity payment. Id.
¶7        The appellant requests that the Board not dismiss his appeal as moot until
     OPM provides an itemized list of deductions that it made from the retroactive
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     annuity payment, and he can determine that it made the correct withholdings.
     PFR File, Tab 6 at 6. Specifically, he asserts that deductions for his enrollment in
     Federal Employees Group Life Insurance (FEGLI) already have been made
     through his “employed pay” and that OPM need not have made duplicative
     deductions from the retroactive annuity payment. Id.
¶8        In its response, OPM neither confirms nor denies whether it has made such
     deductions from its retroactive annuity payment to the appellant.        PFR File,
     Tab 7. OPM instead asserts that the question of whether it correctly deducted the
     appellant’s FEGLI premiums from his annuity is beyond the Board’s jurisdiction.
     Id. at 5 (citing Miller v. Office of Personnel Management, 449 F.3d 1374,
     1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
¶9        However, although claims concerning FEGLI are generally beyond the
     Board’s jurisdiction, the Board has recognized several exceptions to this rule.
     Chamblin v. Office of Personnel Management, 112 M.S.P.R. 266, ¶¶ 7, 11-14
     (2009). For instance, in determining whether OPM has complied with a Board
     order to award an appellant retroactive disability retirement, the Boa rd has
     required OPM to explain satisfactorily why it deducted life insurance premiums
     from a retroactive payment.         Lua v. Office of Personnel Management,
     100 M.S.P.R. 431, ¶¶ 3-4, 14-15 (2005). Significant to the Board’s finding in
     Lua was the fact that the matter before it was an issue of compliance from its
     final decision granting the appellant’s disability retirement annuity. Lua v. Office
     of Personnel Management, 102 M.S.P.R. 108, ¶ 8 (2006). Although the instant
     case does not involve a petition for enforcement, we may not dismiss the appeal
     as moot until the appellant has received all of the relief that he could have
     received if the matter had been adjudicated and he had prevailed.       See Alexis,
     106 M.S.P.R. 315, ¶ 6. We find that OPM must submit additional evidence and
     argument supporting its reduction of the lump-sum payment for life insurance
     premiums before it can be determined that the appellant has received all
     appropriate relief. See Lua, 100 M.S.P.R. 431, ¶¶ 14-15.
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¶10        Additionally, regardless of whether OPM properly deducted the appellant’s
      FEGLI premiums from its retroactive annuity payment, we find that the current
      record is insufficiently developed to dismiss this appeal as moot.          OPM’s
      assertion that it has reinstated the appellant’s annuity does not establish that his
      annuity payment has been calculated correctly and that he has received all of the
      relief to which he is entitled.      See Fernandez v. Department of Justice,
      105 M.S.P.R. 443, ¶ 10 (2007). The appellant has the right to the information
      relied upon by OPM to calculate its annuity determinations, and as OPM has sole
      access to that information, the Board expects OPM to provide it.        Harlston v.
      Office of Personnel Management, 109 M.S.P.R. 148, ¶ 4 (2008). Because OPM
      has so far declined to provide such information, we find it appropriate to remand
      this appeal for the administrative judge to determine whether the appellant has
      received all of the relief that he could have received if the matter had been
      adjudicated and he had prevailed. See Sanders v. Equal Employment Opportunity
      Commission, 45 M.S.P.R. 229, 233-34 (1990).
¶11        We find unpersuasive the appellant’s remaining arguments in opposition to
      the motion to dismiss. The appellant requests that the Board confirm his right to
      receive the disability annuity to ensure that OPM will not terminate his annuity in
      the future. PFR File, Tab 6 at 4-6. He asserts that his request is in line with
      Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216, 222 (2000) and United States
      v. Concentrated Phospate Export Association, Inc., 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968). In
      Adarand Constructors, the Court held that “[v]oluntary cessation of challenged
      conduct moots a case only if it is ‘absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful
      behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.’” 528 U.S. at 222 (quoting
      Concentrated Phosphate, 393 U.S. at 203) (emphasis omitted).          We find this
      doctrine inapplicable to the circumstances of this appeal.     In Already, LLC v.
      Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013), the Court explained that the purpose of this
      “voluntary cessation” doctrine is to prevent a defendant from only temporarily
      ceasing his unlawful conduct “when sued to have the case declared moot, then
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      pick up where he left off, repeating this cycle until he achieves all his unlawful
      ends.” We see no risk of OPM acting in this manner here.
¶12         Moreover, the issue in this appeal is OPM’s decision to terminate the
      appellant’s annuity.     Although the appellant requests that the Board verify his
      eligibility for restoration of his annuity, or his eligibility to a new annuity, in the
      event that he is separated from the Navy, PFR File, Tab 6 at 5, the Board is not
      authorized to issue a declaratory order or an advisory opinion in these
      circumstances.     See 5 U.S.C. § 1204(h); Blaha v. Office of Personnel
      Management, 108 M.S.P.R. 21, ¶ 11 (2007).                Accordingly, we deny the
      appellant’s request.
¶13         Finally, the appellant argues that the appeal should not be dismissed as
      moot when he has not been provided attorney fees. PFR File, Tab 6 at 7-8. We
      find that any outstanding issue regarding attorney fees does not prevent this
      appeal from being dismissed as moot.          See Koerner v. Office of Personnel
      Management, 51 M.S.P.R. 365, 367 (1991).

                                              ORDER
¶14         For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Western
      Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.
      Because we remand the appeal to determine whether the appeal is moot, we do
      not reach the question of whether the initial decision was correctly decided. If
      the administrative judge determines on remand that the appellant has not received
      all of the relief that he could have received if the matter had been adj udicated and
      he   had    prevailed,     then   the   administrative    judge    should    issue   a
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new initial decision determining whether the appellant has established his
entitlement to the benefits sought.

FOR THE BOARD:                        /s/ for
                                      Jennifer Everling
                                      Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.