Court Opinion

ID: 9409482
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-18 15:00:45.600259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:50.797591
License: Public Domain

21-1486-cr
    United States v. Davis

                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                    SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

           At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
    held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City
    of New York, on the 18th day of July, two thousand twenty-three.

    PRESENT:
                JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
                EUNICE C. LEE,
                BETH ROBINSON,
                      Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                              Appellee,

                       v.                                                        No. 21-1486

    KAREEM DAVIS,

                              Defendant-Appellant. *
1

    _____________________________________

    FOR APPELLEE:                                                        JORDAN ESTES
                                                                         (Christopher Clore,

    *   The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption accordingly.
                                                            Alexandra Rothman,
                                                            Stephen J. Ritchin, on the
                                                            brief), Assistant United
                                                            States Attorneys, for
                                                            Damian Williams,
                                                            United States Attorney
                                                            for the Southern District
                                                            of New York, New York,
                                                            NY.

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT:                                    RICHARD H. ROSENBERG,
                                                            New York, NY.

      Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York (Schofield, J.).

      UPON      DUE     CONSIDERATION,           IT    IS   HEREBY       ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the June 7, 2021 judgment of the district court

is AFFIRMED.

      Defendant-Appellant Kareem Davis appeals from a judgment of conviction

entered by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York

(Schofield, J.) after a jury found him guilty of racketeering conspiracy, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (Count One); murder in aid of racketeering, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1) (Count Two); and using a firearm during and in relation to

a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count Three). The charges

stemmed from Davis’s alleged membership in Killbrook, a gang that operated in

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and around the Mill Brook Houses housing project in the South Bronx, and his

participation (alongside his brother, Gary Davis, a Killbrook member) in the April

2011 murder of Bolivia Beck, the girlfriend of rival gang member Joey Colon, when

the bullet intended for Colon struck Beck.

      We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural

history of the case, and the issues on appeal. Davis’s appeal as it concerns his

Count Three conviction is addressed in an opinion filed concurrently with this

summary order.       We write separately here to address Davis’s remaining

arguments as to the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to Counts One and

Two, and the admissibility of certain witness testimony.

I.    Sufficiency of the Evidence

      Davis challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his convictions

for racketeering conspiracy (Count One) and murder in aid of racketeering (Count

Two). “We review preserved claims of insufficiency of the evidence de novo.”

United States v. Atilla, 966 F.3d 118, 128 (2d Cir. 2020). A defendant challenging his

conviction on sufficiency grounds “face[s] a heavy burden, as the standard of

review is exceedingly deferential to the jury’s apparent determinations.” United

States v. Flores, 945 F.3d 687, 710 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The court must uphold a jury’s verdict if, “credit[ing] every inference that could

                                          3
have been drawn in the government’s favor,” and “viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.

Ho, 984 F.3d 191, 199 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and alteration

omitted). Applying this standard, we find no basis to disturb Davis’s challenged

convictions.

      a. Racketeering Conspiracy (Count One)

      The conspiracy provision of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), “proscribes an agreement to

conduct or to participate in the conduct of [an] enterprise’s affairs through a

pattern of racketeering activity.” United States v. Pizzonia, 577 F.3d 455, 462 (2d Cir.

2009). “[T]he establishment of an enterprise is not an element of the RICO

conspiracy offense,” therefore the government “need only prove that the

defendant knew of, and agreed to, the general criminal objective of a jointly

undertaken scheme.” United States v. White, 7 F.4th 90, 98–99 (2d Cir. 2021)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Arrington, 941 F.3d 24,

36–37 (2d Cir. 2019).

      Davis argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Killbrook had

general criminal objectives or that he agreed to participate in them. But the

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evidence adduced at trial permitted the jury to find that Killbrook operated as a

violent, criminal gang and that Davis possessed the requisite awareness of and

agreed to “the general contours of the conspiracy.” White, 7 F.4th at 99 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

      Significant evidence established that Killbrook had general criminal

objectives. Gary Davis, Davis’s brother, testified that he committed murder,

“[s]hootings, cuttings, fights, [and] robberies” as a Killbrook member. App’x 79.

Testimony showed that members of Killbrook were involved in drug dealing and

that an objective of the gang was to sell “[w]eed and crack” in the “[d]own the

block” section of Mill Brook Houses. Id. at 107. Davis argues that the evidence

did not establish that Killbrook members’ drug dealing was connected to the gang

because the government did not prove that members shared drugs, supplies,

customers, or profits. But our law does not require such proof to establish a

general criminal objective of drug dealing. See United States v. Delgado, 972 F.3d

63, 79–80 (2d Cir. 2020), as amended (Sept. 1, 2020) (finding general criminal

objective of drug dealing when “[g]ang members worked together to distribute

drugs in their territory, organizing themselves into a loose hierarchy of roles and

responsibilities”). The evidence sufficiently established the cohesion of Killbrook

members’ drug dealing. See, e.g., App’x 107 (Killbrook did not sell drugs “up the

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block” because “that wasn’t [its] territory to sell,” where rival gang Mill Brook

Gangstas (“MBG”) operated).

      Gary Davis also testified to numerous armed robberies that he committed

with other Killbrook members, often in connection with the gang’s drug dealing.

Additionally, he testified that the murder of Beck, for which Davis was charged

and which we address below, resulted from Gary Davis’s plan to kill Colon, a

member of rival MBG, due to inter-gang conflict.           Further, trial testimony

established that committing crimes on behalf of Killbrook could increase

members’ status, such as by helping them become a “big K,” or “a high-ranking

member.” Id. at 89. This evidence was sufficient for any rational juror to conclude

that Killbrook members shared general criminal objectives “that included murder,

robbery, and the distribution of drugs.” Delgado, 972 F.3d at 80; see also White, 7

F.4th at 99 (evidence sufficient to establish MBG’s general criminal objective when

members “collectively engaged in violence, including fights and shootings”

against Killbrook); United States v. Applins, 637 F.3d 59, 77 (2d Cir. 2011) (evidence

sufficient to establish an enterprise when gang members shared purpose of selling

drugs, protecting gang’s drug market, and defending members through violence

within gang’s territory).

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      The government also adduced sufficient evidence that Davis knew of and

agreed to Killbrook’s criminal purpose. Three witnesses identified Davis as a

Killbrook member. Davis had a “KB” tattoo, and he publicized his affiliation with

the gang on his Facebook profile. Killbrook members testified that Davis sold

drugs in Killbrook’s “down the block” territory. Contrary to Davis’s argument,

the fact that he shared customers with MBG or sold drugs outside of Mill Brook

Houses does not necessarily suggest that his “down the block” dealing was not

conducted on behalf of Killbrook. See Applins, 637 F.3d at 77. Witnesses also

testified that Davis participated in armed robberies with Killbrook members.

Davis contends that these robberies were isolated and sporadic, but the

government introduced at trial a letter in which Gary Davis identified Davis as

part of the “team” of “people that [he] always rob[bed] people with.” App’x 107.

Finally, as we explain in the following section, the evidence established Davis’s

participation in the Killbrook-related murder of Beck.      All of this evidence,

considered “in conjunction, not in isolation,” Atilla, 966 F.3d at 128 (internal

quotation marks omitted), was sufficient for any rational juror to find that Davis

knowingly agreed to “the general contours” of Killbrook’s shared criminal scheme

so as to sustain his racketeering conspiracy conviction, White, 7 F.4th at 99. See

Delgado, 972 F.3d at 80 (finding that defendant knowingly agreed to join and

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facilitate racketeering scheme where evidence identified him as an active gang

member and showed his participation in selling drugs and fighting rival gangs). 1

       Davis argues that even if there was sufficient evidence of his knowing

agreement to participate in a racketeering conspiracy, the government did not

prove that his relevant conduct took place within the applicable limitations period.

The government correctly responds that Davis cannot raise his statute-of-

limitations defense for the first time on appeal. Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S.

237, 248 (2016) (“When a defendant does not press [a statute-of-limitations]

defense [in the district court], there is no error for an appellate court to correct—

and certainly no plain error.”). Davis’s attempt, in reply, to reframe his limitations

argument as a sufficiency challenge is not properly before this court because it was

not raised in his opening brief. Gross v. Rell, 585 F.3d 72, 95 (2d Cir. 2009). In any

event, we find the argument meritless, because the evidence supported that Davis

participated in racketeering activity within the preceding ten years. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 1961(5).

1 The government additionally argues that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Killbrook
operated as an association-in-fact enterprise, and thus “we need inquire only whether an alleged
conspirator knew what the other conspirators were up to or whether the situation would logically
lead an alleged conspirator to suspect he was part of the larger enterprise.” White, 7 F.4th at 99
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Because we find that the evidence was
sufficient to convict Davis of racketeering conspiracy even absent the establishment of an
enterprise, we do not reach this argument.
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      b. Murder of Bolivia Beck (Count Two)

      A “conviction for murder in aid of racketeering require[s] [a] finding[] of . . .

a general purpose to maintain or increase [one’s] position in the criminal

enterprise.” United States v. Velez, 170 F. App’x 146, 147 (2d Cir. 2006) (summary

order) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted); see 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a).

      Davis first argues that the government failed to prove that Beck’s murder

was committed for the purpose of maintaining or increasing his (or any

perpetrator’s) position in Killbrook. However, multiple witnesses testified that

the shooting that killed Beck was intended to target Colon as retribution for

Colon’s shooting a “down the block” associate, an event that ignited the MBG-

Killbrook rivalry. Although Gary Davis testified that Davis was already a “big K”

at the time of Beck’s murder, he also testified that Killbrook members could “get

recognition” for “shooting at people” and that he believed killing Colon would

“boost[]” his and Davis’s status in the gang. App’x 89, 103. This evidence was

sufficient to establish that the participants committed the murder at least in part

to maintain or advance their standing in Killbrook. See White, 7 F.4th at 103 (the

government need only prove “that a desire on [the defendant’s] part to maintain

or increase his status or membership in the gang was among his motives”

(emphasis added)).

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      Davis next argues that even if there was sufficient evidence to prove the

other elements of the murder in aid of racketeering charge, the evidence that he

was involved in the shooting that killed Beck “was simply incredible on its face.”

Appellant’s Br. 34. However, sufficient evidence established that Davis was a

participant in the shooting. Three witnesses, corroborated by each other and other

evidence, testified that Davis was the second shooter alongside his brother. Davis

contends that these witnesses offered incredible, inconsistent, or self-interested

testimony. But this court “will not attempt to second-guess a jury’s credibility

determination on a sufficiency challenge.” United States v. Florez, 447 F.3d 145, 156

(2d Cir. 2006). Davis “simply repeats facts and arguments already presented to

the jury,” id., and the court “must defer to the jury’s resolution of the weight of the

evidence and the credibility of the witnesses,” United States v. O’Connor, 650 F.3d

839, 855 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). It was well within the

province of the jury to resolve the evidence to find that Davis was a shooter in

Beck’s murder.

II.   Admission of Testimony of Lavena Beck

      Davis argues that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the

“hearsay” testimony of Beck’s sister, Lavena Beck, that Colon had told her several

weeks after Beck’s murder that Davis was the second shooter. “We review a

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district court’s evidentiary rulings under a deferential abuse of discretion

standard, and we will disturb an evidentiary ruling only where the decision to

admit or exclude evidence was manifestly erroneous.” United States v. McGinn,

787 F.3d 116, 127 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

      The district court’s admission of Lavena Beck’s testimony was permitted

under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B)(i), which provides that a witness’s

prior consistent statement is not hearsay when offered “to rebut an express or

implied charge that the declarant recently fabricated it or acted from a recent

improper influence or motive in so testifying.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B)(i). A

prior consistent statement “need not be proffered through the testimony of the

declarant but may be proffered through any witness who has firsthand knowledge

of the statement.” United States v. Caracappa, 614 F.3d 30, 39 (2d Cir. 2010).

      Here, Lavena Beck’s testimony that Colon identified Davis as a shooter in

2011 rebutted the defense’s implication, extensively developed during Colon’s

cross-examination, that Colon fabricated his identification of Davis in 2017 to

avoid additional jail time on new federal charges. The district court’s admission

of this testimony was a straightforward application of the Rule with which we find

no abuse of discretion. See id. at 39–40 (finding no abuse of discretion in admission

of prior consistent statement when defense had “expressly or impliedly suggested

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that [a witness’s] testimony was fabricated because of his desire to get out of

prison” and the statement was made before a motive to fabricate arose); United

States v. Burden, 600 F.3d 204, 229–30 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming admission of

witness’s prior identification of shooter where defense had suggested that trial

testimony was a recent fabrication due to earlier inconsistent statements). 2

       Davis also argues that the district court erred in applying Federal Rule of

Evidence 403 because the probative value of Lavena Beck’s statement was

substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice to Davis. See Fed. R.

Evid. 403. We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s weighing of the

probative value of and any potential unfair prejudice arising from this testimony.

See United States v. Monsalvatge, 850 F.3d 483, 493 (2d Cir. 2017) (“We review such

rulings deferentially, mindful of a district court’s superior position to assess

relevancy and to weigh the probative value of evidence against its potential for

unfair prejudice.” (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)).

       We have considered Davis’s other arguments and find them to be without

merit. For the reasons set forth herein and in the accompanying opinion filed

2In addition, Davis does not challenge the district court’s alternative basis for admitting Lavena
Beck’s testimony pursuant to Rule 801(d)(1)(C), as an identification of Davis “as someone [Colon]
perceived earlier.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(C). This unchallenged alternative basis for admitting
Lavena Beck’s testimony constitutes an independent basis for affirming the district court’s
decision to admit the testimony. See McCarthy v. S.E.C., 406 F.3d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 2005).
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concurrently with this summary order, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district

court.

                                   FOR THE COURT:
                                   Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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