Court Opinion

ID: 9963172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-24 17:05:47.719331+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:41.570085
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                   No. 24-0284
                               Filed April 24, 2024

IN THE INTEREST OF K.B.,
Minor Child,

K.R., Mother,
       Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

       Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, Virginia Cobb, Judge.

       A mother appeals the order terminating her parental rights. AFFIRMED.

       Karen A. Taylor of Taylor Law Offices, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant

mother.

       Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

       Gina Burress of Carr Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, attorney and guardian

ad litem for minor child.

       Considered by Schumacher, P.J., and Ahlers and Badding, JJ.
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AHLERS, Judge.

         The juvenile court terminated a mother’s and father’s parental rights to their

child, who was less than two years old at the time of the termination hearing. Only

the mother appeals. She contends the State failed to prove a statutory ground for

termination, the court should have applied a statutory exception to termination, and

the court should have established a guardianship with a relative instead of

terminating her rights. Our review is de novo; we give weight to the juvenile court’s

fact findings, but we are not bound by them. In re Z.K., 973 N.W.2d 27, 32 (Iowa

2022).

         Termination-of-parental-rights proceedings follow a three-step process of

determining (1) if a statutory ground for termination has been established,

(2) whether termination is in the child’s best interest, and (3) whether any

permissive exception to termination should be applied. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d

467, 472–73 (Iowa 2018). Then we address any additional claims raised by the

parent. In re A.D., No. 23-1695, 2024 WL 111259, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 10,

2024).

         We start our discussion of the mother’s challenge to the statutory grounds

authorizing termination of her rights by noting that “[w]hen the juvenile court

terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we may affirm the

juvenile court’s order on any ground we find supported by the record.” In re A.B.,

815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012). Of the two grounds for termination found by

the juvenile court, we choose to focus on section 232.116(1)(e), and we find that

statutory ground for termination satisfied.
                                          3

       Termination under section 232.116(1)(e) requires proof that (1) the child

has been adjudicated in need of assistance, (2) the child has been removed from

the mother’s physical custody for six consecutive months or more, and (3) the

mother has not maintained significant and meaningful contact with the child during

the previous six consecutive months.          “Significant and meaningful contact”

requires, at a minimum, “affirmative assumption . . . of the duties encompassed by

the role of being a parent.” Iowa Code § 232.116(e)(3). The State proved the

mother failed to maintain significant and meaningful contact with the child. The

mother has been in drug treatment or jail for nearly all the child’s life. The extent

to which she has failed to assume parental duties is summed up by her testimony,

“I believe he knows who I am.”       If, as the statute requires, the mother had

affirmatively assumed her parental duties, there would be no question the child

knows who she is. We reject the mother’s challenge to the statutory grounds for

termination.

       Ordinarily, we would next consider whether termination is in the child’s best

interests. However, the mother failed to develop any best-interests argument for

our consideration, so we consider that issue waived. See In re B.D., No. 23-0105,

2023 WL 2671958, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2023) (finding waiver of an issue

due to failure to properly present and develop it).

       We turn to the mother’s claim that a statutory exception to termination

should be applied. The mother combines this claim with her contention that a

guardianship should be established in lieu of termination of her rights, so we

address the two claims in tandem.
                                            4

       Application of a statutory exception to termination is permissive, not

mandatory, and it is the parent’s burden to prove that the exception should be

applied. A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 475–76. The mother relies on the exception in

section 232.116(3)(a), which permits the court to deny termination of rights when

“[a] relative has legal custody of the child.” There is no question that a relative has

legal custody of the child, as the child is in the custody of the mother’s sister. As

a result, denial of termination under section 232.116(3)(a) is permitted. But we do

not apply the exception just because a child is in a relative’s custody. Id. at 476.

We still look to the child’s best interests, both in terms of applying the exception in

section 232.116(3)(a) and determining whether to establish a guardianship in lieu

of termination.      Id.; see also Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(d)(2) (providing a

permanency option of establishing a guardianship for a child if it is determined that

terminating a parent’s rights is not in the child’s best interests).

       Here, the fact that the child’s maternal aunt has custody of the child does

not justify denial of the petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights. The

mother has struggled with substance-use and mental-health issues throughout this

child’s life, as well as during the life of this child’s older half-sibling, which resulted

in termination of the mother’s rights to the half-sibling about three months before

the termination hearing in this case. The mother has been in and out of drug

treatment the child’s entire life, never successfully completing a program. When

she is not in the structured environment of a treatment facility, she tends to relapse

and commit crimes, resulting in regular incarceration throughout the child’s life.

The circumstances here weigh heavily in favor of terminating the mother’s rights,

and the fact that a relative has stepped up to fulfill the parenting role the mother
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has been unable to fulfill in no way diminishes the need to terminate the mother’s

rights for the child’s benefit. See A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 475 (noting that a decision

to terminate parental rights should not “be countermanded by the ability and

willingness of a family relative to take the child”).

          For the same reasons, we agree with the juvenile court that a guardianship

is not a better alternative to termination of the mother’s rights. Once grounds for

termination have been established, a guardianship is not a preferred option to

termination. Id. at 477. This is especially true given the child’s young age, the fact

that the child had been out of the mother’s custody for about one year at the time

of the termination hearing, and the child’s need for a more permanent fix than a

guardianship would provide. See id. As a result, we reject the mother’s claim that

a guardianship should have been set up for the child rather than terminating her

rights.

          AFFIRMED.