Court Opinion

ID: 9578718
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:47:47.402224+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:26.354076
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE ERICKSON
dissenting:
I join Justice Quinn in his dissent.
The exclusionary rule was made applicable to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). The exclusionary rule was created to serve two purposes: (1) the factual basis is to deter police misconduct; and (2) the normative function is to avoid the evil of the judiciary sanctioning illegal police conduct. Experience has established that the exclusionary rule has not fully met either of its intended purposes. See Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 667 (1970).
I strongly favor an alternative to the exclusionary rule to prevent illegal police conduct,1 and believe that the focus of any trial should be on the guilt or innocence of the accused. The narrowing of Fourth Amendment rights by the sophisticated legal vehicle of standing was as much a creature of the Supreme Court of the United States as the exclusionary rule itself. The Supreme Court of the United States, by limiting an aggrieved person from asserting that police conduct violated rights of privacy, denies Fourth Amendment protections on an overly technical property law concept. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980).
In my view, we should not accept Salvucci and Rawlings as a sound approach for interpreting the Colorado Constitution. The constitutional rights guaranteed by the Colo. Const., art. II, § 7, should be protected. Until a better means is proposed, I am not willing to see the constitutional rights of Colorado citizens sacrificed under the guise of lack of standing. The purposes for the exclusionary rule are dissipated and ignored by the *448elimination of the automatic standing rights formerly guaranteed by Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960).
Accordingly, I join Justice Quinn in the dissent.

 “The Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force suggested that the exclusionary rule be at least modified and favored alternative methods as deterrents to illegal police activity. The Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force, 74 F.R.D. 159 (1976). Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint for the Justice System in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277 (1978); Erickson, New Directions in the Administration of Justice: Responses to The Pound Conference, 64 A.B.A.J. 48 (Jan. 1978); and Bell, Responses of the Justice Department, 48 A.B.A.J. 53 (1978) highlight many of the recommendations made by the FollowUp Task Force and point to many decisions that question the efficacy and wisdom of excluding reliable evidence. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). The Task Force has called for increased efforts to develop ways to protect constitutional rights, while at the same time allowing trial courts to focus on their proper subject — the guilt or innocence of the accused. See Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence? 62 Judicature 214 (1978).” Erickson, Pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court Relating to the Criminal Law Field 1978-1979, 5 Nat’l. J. Crim. Defense 1, 7 (Spring 1979).