Court Opinion

ID: 9717775
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:10:07.422233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:55.329296
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting: The defendant was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol and driving while license revoked. Our penal statute for driving while intoxicated states that, “A person shall not drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle while *** under the influence of alcohol.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95V2, par. 11 — 501(a)(2).) Similar language pertains to the offense of driving while license is revoked. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 951/2, par. 6— 303(a). In the instant case, the hapless defendant was convicted of violating those penal statutes when he was observed attempting to extricate his Cadillac from a ditch. The car was hopelessly stuck in the ditch and perpendicular to the roadway. Although the defendant was observed behind the wheel with the motor running and “rocking” the car, it would go nowhere. All that the defendant could accomplish was to bury his wheels deeper into the muck. A tow truck operator testified that the car could not be driven out of the ditch but would, in fact, require a tow. That the defendant was under the influence of alcohol does not seem to be in issue. Likewise, a nonissue is the fact that the defendant’s driving privileges had been revoked. The issue, rather, is whether the defendant was driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle. The record does not indicate how the car got into the ditch nor how long it was there. We do not know whether the defendant or some other person drove the car into the ditch. Hence, we are precluded from speculating that the defendant, while drunk, drove his car into the ditch. Convictions can only be predicated upon the evidence in the case. All that the evidence shows is that the defendant, while drunk, was observed while unsuccessfully attempting to drive his car out of the ditch. As already noted, this was a physical impossibility. Citing People v. Johnson (1976), 43 Ill. App. 3d 428, 356 N.E.2d 1373, defendant makes the ingenious argument that, being stuck, the Cadillac was no longer a vehicle. The majority quite correctly rejected that argument. The Cadillac did not cease being a vehicle merely because it was stuck. Since the Cadillac was not driveable, the defendant cannot be guilty of the “shall not drive” part of the statute. This leaves the clause “or be in actual physical control of a vehicle” as the only possible basis for a violation. On that basis, I would have to find the defendant not guilty. The statutes here, for whatever may be made of their language, are aimed at preventing drunks or persons with revoked licenses from driving cars. That is all. There is no prohibition at all from a drunk owning or possessing a car. Likewise as to a person with a revoked license. Rather, it is the immediate possibility of the car being driven while the operator is in a drunken condition or has no license that causes the problem. The statutory phrase, “or be in actual physical control,” has to include by inference the condition that the car is driveable and that the operator has physical control of the driving mechanism. Otherwise, we are dealing with absurd situations. A drunk sitting at his kitchen table with his car locked in his garage is, in one sense, in control of his car. He is not, however, guilty of driving while intoxicated. A drunk sitting on his front porch with his car jacked up on blocks in his front yard is in control of his car. Once again, however, he is not guilty of driving while intoxicated. Finally, the defendant in the instant case, while in control of his car as against all other persons, lacked the immediate capability of driving it and, hence, lacked actual physical control within the meaning of the statute. When the legislature passed the statutes in question they intended to prevent drunks from driving cars and persons with revoked licenses from driving cars. Since the defendant was not shown to have driven a car and since the evidence showed conclusively, in fact, that the car could not be driven, he was entitled to a finding of not guilty. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court. I, therefore, dissent from the majority decision in this case which affirms the conviction.