Court Opinion

ID: 9908691
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-11 17:09:41.415795+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:26.880902
License: Public Domain

J-S31034-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  KAR'RON JAMAL SMITH                          :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2661 EDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 17, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-15-CR-0004282-2017

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                       FILED DECEMBER 11, 2023

       Kar’ron Jamal Smith appeals from the judgment of sentence following

his open guilty plea to one count of burglary and three counts of robbery.1

Smith challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. We affirm.

       A prior panel of this Court summarized the facts as follows:

       [O]n or about November 2[,] 2016[,] in the County of Chester,
       Uwchlan Township[,] [Smith], armed with a deadly weapon and
       along with another, did enter an occupied structure adapted for
       overnight accommodation with the residents present and asleep.
       He entered with the intent to commit a theft within the residence,
       and while inside, [Smith] and another did use physical force to
       restrain several members of the family in the course of taking their
       belongings. Using zip ties[, Smith] and another . . . bound Luke
       Wallace, Carter McFadden, Donna [McFadden,] and David
       McFadden, pistol-whipping Carter McFadden when she was too
       slow to comply. [Smith] and another moved all the residents into
       one room to control them, then separated Carter McFadden, took
       her to another area of the house and stole property; took David

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3502(a)(1) and 3701(a)(1)(ii), respectively.
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      McFadden to another area of the house and stole property[;] and
      then ransacked the home.

      During the course of the robbery, [Smith] and another stated to
      the parents, [“]Which child[”] or [“W]hich one do you like
      better[?”] while brandishing a firearm at Luke Wallace and Carter
      McFadden. [Smith and his co-conspirator] also informed the
      victims that[,] if they left and they stepped outside, that they
      would be sniped. DNA evidence placed [Smith] within the confines
      of the home at the time of the robbery.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 276 A.3d 208 (Table), No. 1996 EDA 2020, 2022

WL 611018, at *1 (Pa.Super. filed Mar. 2, 2022) (unpublished mem.) (citing

N.T. Guilty Plea Hearing, 12/9/19, at 3-4) (alterations in Smith).

      Smith entered an open guilty plea to one count of burglary and three

counts of robbery. He was sentenced on the burglary count to six to 12 years’

incarceration, on each of the first two counts of robbery to seven to 14 years’

incarceration, and on the last count of robbery to five years of probation. The

sentences were ordered to run consecutively for an aggregate term of 20 to

40 years’ incarceration. The parties had agreed to cap the minimum at 20

years.

      Smith appealed, and this Court vacated his judgment of sentence and

remanded for resentencing. See id. We found that the trial court had

erroneously attributed the pistol-whipping of Carter McFadden to Smith when

Smith did not admit to the pistol-whipping nor plead guilty to conspiracy or to

any crime involving the infliction of bodily injury. Id. at *7. We concluded:

      While the pistol-whipping was not the sole basis for the sentence
      imposed, the record reflects that it was clearly a significant
      sentencing factor relied upon [by] the trial court. Although the
      court later conceded at the hearing on Smith’s motion to modify

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      sentence that Smith never admitted to the pistol-whipping, the
      court’s ex post facto clarification does not negate the fact that, at
      the time of sentencing, it relied, in part, on an impermissible
      consideration. Accordingly, we are constrained to vacate Smith’s
      judgment of sentence and remand to the trial court for
      resentencing in accordance with the dictates of this memorandum.

Id. We further emphasized that although we vacated the judgment of

sentence, we did not “express any opinion as to the reasonableness of the

trial court’s sentence.” Id. at *7 n.10.

      Upon remand, the trial court held a hearing and resentenced Smith to

five to ten years’ incarceration on the burglary count and to 14 to 28 years’

incarceration followed by five years’ probation on the robbery counts, for an

aggregate term of 19 to 38 years’ incarceration. In doing so, the court

acknowledged that it did not consider in Smith’s resentence the allegation that

Smith pistol-whipped one of the victims. See Trial Court’s Supplemental

Opinion Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), filed 3/7/23, at 5 (“Supp. 1925(a)

Op.”). Smith filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, which was denied. This

appeal followed.

      Smith raises the following issues:

      1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing [Smith] in
         the aggravated range on Robbery Count Three and Robbery
         Count Four without placing reasoning for sentencing in the
         aggravated range on these counts?

      2. In light of the significantly lower guidelines and the directive
         from the Superior Court that this [c]ourt not consider the pistol
         whipping of C.M., (a very significant ground relied upon for the
         original twenty (20) to forty (40) year aggregate sentence), did
         the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to consider the
         substantially lower applicable sentencing guidelines imposing a

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         substantially similar aggregate sentence to that originally
         imposed?

      3. Did the trial court err in that there is a discrepancy between
         the [c]ourt’s stated intention on the record, the filed “Guideline
         Sentence Forms”, and the sentences imposed on Counts 3
         through 5?

Smith’s Br. at 2.

      Smith challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. “The right

to appellate review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence is not absolute,

and must be considered a petition for permission to appeal.” Commonwealth

v. Conte, 198 A.3d 1169, 1173 (Pa.Super. 2018). Before reviewing the merits

of Smith’s claim, we must determine whether: “(1) the appeal is timely; (2)

the appellant has preserved his issue; (3) his brief includes a concise

statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of an appeal with respect

to the discretionary aspects of his sentence; and (4) the concise statement

raises a substantial question whether the sentence is inappropriate under the

Sentencing Code.” Commonwealth v. Green, 204 A.3d 469, 488 (Pa.Super.

2019); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) (stating that an appellant who challenges

the discretionary aspects of a sentence “shall set forth in a separate section

of the brief a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of

appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of a sentence”).

      Here, Smith filed a timely notice of appeal, included a Rule 2119(f)

statement    in     his   brief,   and   raised   a   substantial   question.   See

Commonwealth v. Bromley, 862 A.2d 598, 604 (Pa.Super. 2004) (finding

substantial question where appellant claimed the sentencing court sentenced

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him in the aggravated range without placing adequate reasons on the record);

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 759 (Pa.Super. 2014)

(concluding claim that court imposed sentence outside the standard range

without stating adequate reasons presents a substantial question). However,

Smith failed to preserve his issues by failing to raise them in his post-sentence

motion or at resentencing.

      A challenge “to a court’s sentencing discretion must be raised during

sentencing or in a post-sentence motion in order for this Court to consider

granting allowance of appeal.” Commonwealth v. Rush, 959 A.2d 945, 949

(Pa.Super. 2008). “Absent such efforts, an objection to a discretionary aspect

of sentence is waived.” Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1042

(Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc) (citation omitted). This failure cannot be cured by

submitting the claim in a Rule 1925(b) statement. Commonwealth v.

Watson, 835 A.2d 786, 791 (Pa.Super. 2003).

      Smith’s post-sentence motion was limited to the following:

      After the Superior Court ordered resentencing, [Smith] received,
      largely the same sentence with one (1) to two (2) years “credit”
      for good behavior, rather than taking into consideration the
      considerably lower guidelines of the appropriate deadly weapons
      possessed enhancement and going forth to sentencing without
      considering the alleged pistol whipping.

      Thus, no consideration was made to address the erroneous use of
      the deadly weapon used enhancement, nor the aggravating
      circumstance of the alleged pistol whipping, for which [Smith] did
      not plead. In essence, this Honorable Court merely applied the
      same sentence without uttering the words “deadly weapon used”
      or referencing the alleged pistol whipping, both of which were
      justifications given during the first sentencing for the initial twenty
      (20) to forty (40) year punishment.

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Smith’s Motion to Reconsider, filed 8/23/22, at ¶¶ 4, 5.

      Further, at resentencing, Smith argued that the deadly weapon

“possessed” enhancement, as opposed to the “used” enhancement, applied,

and asked the court to impose concurrent, rather than consecutive, sentences

on the robbery counts. See N.T. Resentencing Hearing, 8/17/22, at 33. Smith

also objected to the court’s failure to state its reasons on the record when it

imposed an aggravated sentence on his burglary conviction but made such no

objection with respect to his robbery convictions. See id. at 46.

      Notably, Smith failed to raise any of his three issues on appeal in his

post-sentence motion or at resentencing. Rather, he first raised the issues in

his Rule 1925(b) and supplemental Rule 1925(b) statements. Accordingly,

Smith’s issues are waived. See Watson, 835 A.2d at 791.

      Even if Smith had preserved his arguments, he would not be entitled to

relief. “Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing

judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse

of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 194 A.3d 625, 637 (Pa.Super.

2018) (citation omitted). An abuse of discretion occurs where “the sentencing

court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable

decision.” Id. (citation omitted). In imposing a sentence, the sentencing court

must consider “the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it

relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the

rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b).

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      Where the court has the benefit of a presentence investigative (“PSI”)

report, we presume the court was aware of all appropriate sentencing factors

and considerations and we consider the requirement that the court place its

reasoning on the record to be satisfied. Commonwealth v. Johnson-

Daniels, 167 A.3d 17, 26 (Pa.Super. 2017). In conducting appellate review,

we may not reweigh the sentencing factors and impose our own judgment in

place of that of the trial court. See Commonwealth v. Macias, 968 A.2d

773, 778 (Pa.Super. 2009).

      Smith contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing

him in the aggravated range on two robbery counts without placing its reasons

for sentencing in the aggravated range on the record. Smith’s Br. at 26. Smith

argues that in resentencing him, the court erroneously “relied on the same

exact information” as at the original sentencing hearing. Id. at 27.

      “[W]hen a sentence is vacated and the case is remanded to the

sentencing court for resentencing, the sentencing judge should start afresh.”

Commonwealth v. Caple, 121 A.3d 511, 522 (Pa.Super. 2015) (citation

omitted). The judge at the resentencing hearing “should reassess the penalty

to be imposed on the defendant – especially where defense counsel comes

forward with relevant evidence which was not previously available.” Id. at 523

(citation omitted). Therefore, appellant’s “conduct since the prior sentencing

hearing is relevant at resentencing.” Id. (citation omitted).

      Here, the sentencing judge did take note of new evidence at Smith’s

resentencing hearing. First, the court acknowledged its previous sentencing

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error and its obligation to comply with this Court’s directive upon remand. N.T.

Resentencing Hearing at 4; see also Supp. 1925(a) Op. at 5. The court also

considered the fact that Smith had no disciplinary write-ups since being

incarcerated for approximately two years and had shown a willingness for

rehabilitation and engagement in the prison’s programs. N.T. Resentencing

Hearing at 28-29, 43-44. The court further stated that it had reviewed Smith’s

sentencing memorandum prior to the resentencing hearing, wherein Smith

accepted responsibility for the crime and expressed an eagerness to be a

better father to his young son. Id. at 43; Smith’s Sentencing Memorandum,

filed, 8/16/22, at 1, 5 (unpaginated). The court also permitted Smith to speak

on his own behalf, and he apologized to the victims. N.T. Resentencing

Hearing at 38. The court also acknowledged that seven of Smith’s family

members were present at the resentencing hearing in support of him. Id. at

37.

      The court further indicated that it reviewed its notes from the initial

sentencing hearing and recalled the victims’ testimony. Id. at 6. The court

considered the serious nature of the crime and the long-lasting impact of the

crime on the victims. It also had the benefit of a PSI.

      After a review of the record, we conclude that the sentencing court did

not abuse its discretion when it resentenced Smith and it adequately stated

on the record its reasons for Smith’s resentence. It is evident that the trial

court considered all relevant factors in fashioning Smith’s resentence. Thus,

no relief is due.

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         Smith’s second issue largely repeats the same arguments as in his first

issue. For the reasons previously stated, we find no merit in Smith’s claim. To

the extent Smith argues that the court failed to employ the applicable

sentencing guidelines on the deadly weapon enhancement, the court did, in

fact, apply the deadly weapon “possessed” enhancement, as Smith requested,

and not the “used” enhancement. See Supp. 1925(a) Op. at 5 (citing N.T.

Resentencing Hearing at 33).

         Smith’s final claim is that the “Guideline Sentence Forms” filed on the

robbery counts are “incorrect and do not reflect the [sentencing c]ourt’s stated

intent at sentencing.” Smith’s Br. at 35. Smith contends that the forms

improperly indicated that the “used” deadly weapon enhancement was applied

when the court stated at the resentencing hearing that it applied the

“possessed” enhancement. Id. at 33-34.

         The sentencing court addressed this issue as follows:

         According to [Smith], the Sentence Guideline Forms improperly
         contain the term “used” in the “Enhancement” portion of the
         Sentence Guideline Forms as it pertains to the [r]obbery charges.
         Although the trial court does not directly complete such forms, to
         the extent that the Sentence Guideline Forms are inconsistent
         with the sentence imposed by the trial court as reflected in the
         record, the trial court’s sentence as announced and imposed
         would control.

Supp. 1925(a) Op. at 6.

         The court adequately addressed the alleged discrepancy. We find no

error.

         Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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     Judge Stabile joins the memorandum.

     Judge Olson concurs in the result.

Date: 12/11/2023

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