Court Opinion

ID: 9638669
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:49:56.781631+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:08.524983
License: Public Domain

RONNIE L. WHITE, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Respondent voluntarily acquiesced to a valid and lawful DCSE order for child support, and she is estopped from claiming that the order is void.
A “court order” is defined in section 454.460(2) as “any judgment, decree, or order of any court which orders payment of a set or determinable amount of support money.” A “child support order” means a support order for a child, including a child who has attained the age of majority under the law of the issuing state.1 The original and the amended dissolution decree signed by the trial judge both state: “IT IS FURTHER ORDERED by the Court that both parties be required to support the minor children.” The companion order, a formatted “Docket Entry,” signed and issued along with the original decree, and unchanged when the decree was amended, has a check fist and fill-in-the-blank form. Not only did the judge leave the amount of any ordered child support completely blank, but he also left the check box blank that indicates the existence of an order for child support.
Contrary to the principal opinion’s construction, the trial court’s dissolution decree, as substantiated by its companion order, did not order a child support payment of a “set and determinable amount of support money.” The order stating that the parties “are required to support the minor children,” in conjunction with a blank form, does not provide any set or determinable amount of support money. Nor is there any indication in this order that would obligate the parties to contribute equally to the support of the children.
*34The trial court not ordering child support payments is not the same as entering a valid court order requiring that nothing bp paid for support, and the only order in the record stating that the parties are required to support the children, while alluding to an amount more than zero, does not indicate any set or determinable amount. Simply put, there exists nothing in this case’s legal file that could qualify as a “court order” under the definition provided in section 454.460(2).2
Finding no valid order for child support in the trial court’s dissolution decree ordering payment of a set or determinable amount of support money, DCSE had authority to pursue child support from Respondent through an administrative action under sections 454.470 and 454.475. This Court has previously held that a DCSE order has the full force and effect of a court order because judicial review is available at the time of entry of the order.3 In this instance, Respondent did not challenge the DCSE’s notice and. finding of financial responsibility, and consequently, DCSE issued a default order of support.4 Respondent further voluntarily acquiesced to the order and complied with, it for three and half years, and she is estopped from now claiming that the order is void.5
DCSE had the authority to administratively enter a child support order against Respondent. Consequently, I would reverse the trial court’s judgment against Mr. Kubley and DCSE and find that no restitution is required.

. Section 454.850.2. All statutory references are to RSMo 2000 unless otherwise noted.

.To adopt the principal opinion's interpretation that this deficient order implicitly means zero child support has been ordered creates considerable uncertainty in the law. Future parties in dissolution actions when confronted with such orders will simply be able to deny support to their children. Because the principal opinion finds this to be a valid court order by implication, the parent with primary custody will also have been cut off from obtaining no-cost relief through DCSE. Consequently, the custodial parent, struggling with support- ' ing the children, will also be faced with the high cost of litigating a modification action and may effectively be economically barred from obtaining relief. The unintended consequences of today's holding could have a devastating impact on children who must already cope with the separation of their parents.

. Hilburn v. Staeden, 91 S.W.3d 607, 609-10 (Mo. banc 2002).

. A second default order was issued modifying the amount of child support, and again this order was not challenged judicially.

. State ex rel. York v. Daugherty, 969 S.W.2d 223, 225 (Mo. banc 1998); State, Dept. of Social Services v. Houston, 989 S.W.2d 950, 952 (Mo. banc 1999).