Court Opinion

ID: 9898112
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:28:32.723123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:10.656584
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                     OCTOBER 31, 2023
                                                                In the Office of the Clerk of Court
                                                               WA State Court of Appeals Division III

            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                               DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,                          )
                                              )         No. 38982-1-III
                     Respondent,              )
                                              )
       v.                                     )         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
                                              )
THUNDER RAY DANZUKA,                          )
                                              )
                     Appellant.               )

       FEARING, C.J. — Thunder Danzuka appeals from convictions on three counts of

child rape. He seeks reversal on the basis that the trial court commented on the evidence

when including the victim’s date of birth in jury instructions. We agree that the trial

court impermissibly commented on the evidence, but conclude the error to be harmless.

                                          FACTS

       Because of the issue on appeal, we abbreviate the facts. Victim J.G. was born on

August 2, 2001. Appellant Thunder Danzuka raped J.G. numerous times between 2010

and 2013 either in J.G.’s bedroom or Danzuka’s car. During the extended contact, J.G.

was nine to thirteen years old. The last rape occurred after J.G. began menstruation.
No. 38982-1-III
State v. Danzuka

                                       PROCEDURE

       The State of Washington charged Thunder Danzuka with two counts of first

degree rape of a child and one count of second degree rape of a child, with J.G. being the

victim in each count. Danzuka’s first trial ended with a deadlocked jury and a mistrial.

       At the second trial, J.G. testified that her date of birth was August 2, 2001. J.G.,

J.G.’s sister, and J.G.’s mother all testified that J.G. was twenty years old at the time of

trial in 2022.

       On cross-examination, Thunder Danzuka’s attorney questioned J.G. about her ages

at the critical times. Defense counsel referenced a prior police interview:

               Q. [Danzuka’s defense attorney:] So you’re saying that you didn’t
       respond to him [Detective Grant, a police interviewer] when he asked if the
       first time is the Christmas Eve one when you were ten years old? Would
       you like to review this again?
               A. [By J.G.] Sure. I thought I was eleven.
               Q. So that Christmas Eve, you were eleven.
               A. I would have been ten because I said ‘“Almost eleven.’”
               Q. Did you indicate to Detective Grant that the first time was
       Christmas Eve?
               A. Well, it was the first time that I was talking about with him
       because I had talked to him about a couple of them, and he referred to it as
       “‘the Christmas one,’” the first one that I was telling him about.
               Q. Okay. And the last time was in July when you were about
       twelve, thirteen?
               A. Yes.

Report of Proceedings (RP) at 582.

       The to-convict instructions for each rape charge required the jury to find that

Thunder Danzuka “had sexual intercourse with J.G., DOB: 08/02/2001.” Clerk’s Papers

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State v. Danzuka

(CP) at 65, 66, 68. The charging period for the two first degree rape charges extended

from August 2, 2010 to August 2, 2013. The charging period for the second degree rape

charge extended from August 2, 2013 to August 2, 2015. Danzuka’s attorney did not

object to the to-convict jury instructions.

       In closing argument, the prosecuting attorney commented, with regard to the first

charge, for first degree rape:

              We know how old [J.G.] was. She told you. She was born August
       2nd, 2001. She was nine years old, turning ten, turning eleven, during that
       time period.
              ....
              . . . [J.G.] was less than twelve at the time of the sexual intercourse.
       We know it. She said it. She was young. It’s Christmas.
              ....
              . . . [J.G.] was at these twenty-four months younger than the
       defendant. During his interview, he told you his date of birth: July 21st,
       1978. He graduated with [J.G.]’s mother from high school. He is well
       more than twenty-four months older.

RP at 868-870. The State’s attorney argued, with regard to the second first degree rape

charge, that J.G.’s testimony established that she had been repeatedly raped after the

Christmas rape. The prosecutor remarked, with regard to the third charge, for second

degree rape:

             And then the last time, the Rape of a Child in the Second Degree.
       The only difference for that is the age, that [J.G.] was then over thirteen.
       She had started her period. So she’s between twelve and fourteen.

RP at 871.

       Defense counsel’s closing arguments referenced J.G. being ten-years-old when the

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No. 38982-1-III
State v. Danzuka

alleged rapes occurred.

       The jury returned guilty verdicts on each charge.

                                  LAW AND ANALYSIS

       On appeal, Thunder Danzuka argues that the trial court impermissibly commented

on the evidence by including a date for J.G.’s birth on the jury instructions. The State

concedes that the trial court erred by including J.G.’s date of birth on the jury instructions

but contends the error was harmless. We agree with the State.

       Washington’s Constitution prohibits a judge from commenting on matters of fact

when submitting a case to a jury. WASH. CONST. art. IV, sec. 16. A court that violates

this principle may relieve the State of its burden to prove all elements of a criminal

charge. State v. Becker, 132 Wn.2d 54, 65, 935 P.2d 1321 (1997). Because judicial

commentary on the evidence implicates a constitutional right, Thunder Danzuka may

raise the issue for the first time on appeal. State v. Levy, 156 Wn.2d 709, 719-20, 132

P.3d 1076 (2006).

       We agree with Thunder Danzuka that the trial court’s inclusion of J.G.’s date of

birth on the jury instructions constituted an improper judicial comment on the evidence.

The inclusion of a victim’s birth date in jury instructions, when the victim’s age is an

element of a charged crime, constitutes an impermissible judicial comment on the

evidence because the jury may infer that the date of birth has been proven by the State.

State v. Jackman, 156 Wn.2d 736, 743-44, 132 P.3d 136 (2006). Under the first degree

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No. 38982-1-III
State v. Danzuka

child rape statute, the jury was required to find (1) that J.G. was less than twelve years

old and (2) that Danzuka was at least twenty-four months older than the victim.

RCW 9A.44.073. Under the second degree rape statute, the jury was required to find (1)

that J.G. was at least twelve years old but less than fourteen years old and (2) that

Danzuka was at least thirty-six months older than the victim. RCW 9A.44.076.

       We still must determine whether the inclusion of the birth date caused harm. A

judicial comment in a jury instruction is presumed to be prejudicial, and the State carries

the burden to show that the defendant was not prejudiced, unless the record affirmatively

shows that no prejudice could have resulted. State v. Levy, 156 Wn.2d 709, 725 (2006).

       Our Supreme Court found reversible error in State v. Jackman, 156 Wn.2d 736

(2006), wherein the trial court listed victim birthdates in jury instructions. A jury

convicted Ryan Jackman, twenty years old at the time, on charges stemming from sexual

acts performed in Jackman’s apartment with four boys aged sixteen or seventeen. The

crimes involved Jackman’s filming of himself and some of the boys masturbating and

Jackman’s unsuccessful solicitation of oral sex from one of the boys. The Supreme Court

concluded that the trial court committed constitutional error. The high court then

determined that the inclusion of the birth dates harmed Jackman despite each boy having

testified about their correct birth dates and the State having presented corroborating

evidence of those dates. Jackman had not disputed the boys’ underage statuses at trial,

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No. 38982-1-III
State v. Danzuka

but had argued that he attempted to ascertain their ages before performing the sex acts.

In a footnote, the Supreme Court reasoned:

              The credibility of the victims was an issue at trial because [two of
       the boys] testified they had lied to Jackman about their ages at the time of
       the offenses. Thus, the jury could have chosen not to believe their
       testimony as to their correct birth dates at the time of the events.

State v. Jackman, 156 Wn.2d 736, 744 n.7 (2006). Because prejudice could have resulted

to Jackman from the jury instruction’s inclusion of the birth dates, the Supreme Court

reversed the convictions.

       Jackman suggests that the State faces a high burden to demonstrate that improper

inclusion of a birth date in a jury instruction formed harmless error. But the bulk of this

court’s decisions addressing inclusion of birthdates in jury instructions have found

harmless error by contrasting individual circumstances with the facts in Jackman.

       This court first addressed the question of harmless error in State v. Zimmerman,

135 Wn. App. 970, 146 P.3d 1224 (2006). Based on the similarities between the cases,

the Supreme Court remanded Zimmerman to this court for review in light of the Jackman

decision. Stoney Zimmerman was convicted of first degree child molestation, but his

jury instructions contained the child victim’s birth date. Contrasting the case with

Jackman, this court reasoned:

              [W]hile including J.C.’s birth date in the jury instruction here was an
       improper judicial comment, the record affirmatively shows the error was
       not prejudicial. No jury could reasonably conclude that J.C. was over the
       age of 12 when she and Zimmerman stayed at Harvey’s home at the time of

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No. 38982-1-III
State v. Danzuka

      the alleged offense. Critical to our conclusion is the fact that Zimmerman
      is J.C.’s biological father and, even though he denied molesting her, he
      knew and never disputed knowing her age. Moreover, J.C. testified that her
      date of birth was July 8, 1990; J.C.’s mother testified that J.C. was born
      shortly after her 16th birthday which was in June 1990; and defense witness
      Harvey testified that she believed J.C. turned 10 during the summer of the
      alleged molestation.
              Finally, unlike Jackman, there was no dispute regarding J.C.’s age or
      date of birth at any point during the proceedings. The jury was required to
      find that the alleged sexual contact occurred between June 1 and July 31,
      2001, and that J.C. was less than 12 at the time of the alleged sexual
      contact. We conclude that even though the jury instructions stated J.C.’s
      birth date, the record affirmatively demonstrates that no prejudice occurred
      as a result because no jury could reasonably conclude J.C. was over 12
      during the charging period. Therefore, we affirm our decision that the trial
      court’s instructional comment on the evidence was harmless and that
      Zimmerman is not entitled to a reversal of his conviction.

State v. Zimmerman, 135 Wn. App. 970, 975-76 (2006) (footnote omitted).

      The circumstances within the prosecution of Thunder Danzuka echo the facts in

State v. Zimmerman. Danzuka never disputed J.G.’s ages at the times of the rapes. In

closing argument, Danzuka’s counsel acknowledged that J.G. was ten-years-old when the

rapes allegedly began. Unlike in Jackman, no evidence suggested that J.G. ever lied

about her age. Nothing in the record would have permitted the jury to reasonably

conclude that J.G. was an age other than the one advanced in the jury instructions.

                                     CONCLUSION

      The reference to the date of birth in the jury instructions constituted harmless

error. We affirm the convictions of Thunder Danzuka.

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No. 38982-1-III
State v. Danzuka

      A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW

2.06.040.

                                            _________________________________
                                            Fearing, C.J.

WE CONCUR:

______________________________
Staab, J.

______________________________
Cooney, J.

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