Court Opinion

ID: 9588700
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:37:10.655492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:41:22.311093
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellant Lang contends this court erred in concluding that the state had proved trafficking in at least 100 pounds of marijuana and that the destruction of the contraband without notice to the defendant was therefore harmless (see Division 4 of opinion). Appellant directs our attention to OCGA § 16-13-32 (former Code Ann. § 79A-811.1) for the proposition that not merely the stalks, but “certain seeds, fiber and oil from the plant should not be included in the weight”; and since there was no testimony as to how much of the marijuana, excluding stalk, consisted of other parts which cannot be considered contraband, the state could not establish trafficking in 100 pounds.
We do not find that OCGA § 16-13-32 (Code Ann. § 79A-811.1) excludes “certain seeds, fiber and oil from the plant” as contraband. However, OCGA § 16-13-21 (16) (Code Ann. § 79A-802) provides: “ ‘Marijuana’ means all parts of the plant of the genus Cannabis, whether growing or not, the seeds thereof, the resin extracted from any part of such plant, and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds, or resin; but shall not include samples as described in subparagraph (3)(P) of Code Section 16-13-25 (Code Ann. § 79A-806) (chemically extracted and synthetically derived THC, Aycock v. State, 146 Ga. App. 489 (246 SE2d 489)) and shall not include the mature stalks of such plant, fiber produced from such stalks, oil, or cake (see Aycock, supra, pp. 491-493), or the completely sterilized samples of seeds of the plant which are incapable of germination.” The evidence shows that the forensic expert and officers cut the approximately 1,000 plants at the base of the stalks and placed these plants in boxes. The boxes contained “leafy materials,” that is, only plants, two-thirds of which was estimated to be stalk. There was no evidence that any processed material such as “oil or cake, or the completely sterilized samples of seeds of the plant which are incapable of germination,” was placed in the boxes. Only cut leafy plants were placed in the boxes; the total weight of these was 726 pounds, two-thirds of which was stalks, leaving 242 pounds of leafy material identified as marijuana. Moreover, in addition to this 242 pounds of leafy material (cut plants) were fifteen plastic bags and boxes containing already processed marijuana and some undetermined amount of trash and debris, and weighing 144 pounds, which we did not include in our determination that the state had proved beyond a reasonable doubt the offense of trafficking in excess of 100 pounds of marijuana (OCGA *582§ 16-13-31 (c) (Code Ann. § 79A-811)). We do not think any remotely reasonable doubt exists in this case that there was proved at least 100 pounds of chargeable marijuana, excluding chemically extracted or synthetically derived THC (Aycock v. State, supra) and “the mature stalk of such plant, fiber from the stalks, oil or cake or the completely sterilized seeds of the plant incapable of germination.” See Aycock, supra.
Appellant further contends we erred in our holding in Division 5 of the opinion, in refusing to find he was denied a full and fair motion to suppress hearing upon a proper indictment. The full motion to suppress hearing was held notwithstanding the fact that the indictment under which appellant was charged, had just been quashed. Appellant contends the trial court was then without jurisdiction to proceed with the motion to suppress. Appellant concedes that his point, that the trial court which quashed the first indictment did not have jurisdiction to hear the motion to suppress, and hence the motion to suppress hearing was a nullity, is an issue of first impression. OCGA § 17-5-30 (c) (Code Ann. § 27-313) provides: “The motion [to suppress] shall be made only before a court with jurisdiction to try the offense. If a criminal accusation is filed or if an indictment or special presentment is returned by a grand jury, the motion shall be made only before the court in which the accusation, indictment, or special presentment is filed and pending.” The code section means simply that the ruling of “another judge in another jurisdiction on another motion to suppress” the same evidence will not be controlling in a subsequent prosecution of the offense. Aikens v. State, 143 Ga. App. 891 (240 SE2d 117).
Section 17-5-30 (Code Ann. § 27-313) merely provides “If a criminal accusation is filed or if an indictment or special presentment is returned by a grand jury, the motion shall be made only before the court in which the accusation, indictment or special presentment is filed and pending” — i. e., the motion to suppress cannot be filed in another court (emphasis supplied). In Cook v. State, 141 Ga. App. 241 (233 SE2d 60), we held that evidence once suppressed cannot be reintroduced as to a second indictment; obviously the evidence in that case was suppressed before the second indictment was “filed and pending,” but the suppression was still valid for the obvious reason that if the evidence is wrongly obtained, it is not rendered admissible by a reindictment. The same reasoning should apply where the motion to suppress is denied, for the state as well as the defendant ought to be entitled to the finality of a ruling on the propriety of a search. If the search and seizure is valid for one indictment, it is valid for all. As to a reindictment or second indictment, it makes no substantive difference if the evidence was ruled admissible when a *583first indictment was void, or was merely later dismissed. If we followed appellant’s reasoning — that the subject indictment must be pending and valid when the motion to suppress is heard — a motion to suppress ruling would be without force where the defendant, or other persons, are later indicted for other crimes arising out of the same conduct and provable by the same evidence. In that case a ruling on a motion to suppress would never be final. Every indictment or prosecution, for every co-defendant, would require a new hearing on a new motion to suppress the same evidence. On a subsequent indictment or reindictment, there is no reason of substance to challenge the previous ruling on the question of evidence, merely because the instant indictment was not pending when the ruling was made. The appellant does not have a constitutional right to what he claims, but only to be protected from wrongful search and seizure; and the procedure in this case did not violate that right. Appellant would have us elevate procedure over substance. Appellant appeared before the instant court answering an indictment alleging a felony. He does not contend the court lacked jurisdiction over the person or offense, at least until the indictment was quashed for a procedural deficiency. Had the trial court ruled on all appellant’s other motions prior to ruling on the motion to quash, Lang could hardly argue that the court did not have before it an indictment for a crime and a person accused thereof. We will conclude that the statutory provisions were satisfied in that the motion to suppress was presented to a court which had before it an indictment and jurisdiction to try the offense. The grant of the quashing motion did not deprive the court of jurisdiction, but simply placed the burden upon the state to perfect the indictment or suffer dismissal.
The reasoning of what we say can be most easily illustrated in this case, where the appellant is unable to show any harm or prejudice or error by the fact that the motion to suppress hearing was held after the defective indictment was quashed and before a valid indictment was filed against him. If any real harm is shown in a case such as this, we will not hesitate to correct the error; but this evidence in this case being properly admissible, it would do violence to justice to exclude it merely for breach of procedure.

Motion for rehearing denied.