Court Opinion

ID: 9847296
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:57:21.802776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:06.488160
License: Public Domain

Kelsey, J.,
dissenting.
This case illustrates well Justice Frankfurter’s aphorism that “the right answer usually depends on putting the right question.” Estate of Rogers v. Helvering, 320 U.S. 410, 413, 64 S.Ct. 172, 174, 88 L.Ed. 134 (1943). I respectfully disagree that “we need not address whether appellant’s statement to Chief Marr that broke the period of silence ‘reinitiated’ a *70dialogue” with Chief Marr. Ante at 68, 654 S.E.2d at 338. That seems to me the very question this case must answer. And the answer given by the trial judge, who heard from both Ferguson and Chief Marr on this subject, was that Ferguson—after about 20 minutes of total silence—reinitiated the dialogue. I agree with the trial court and would affirm its denial of Ferguson’s suppression motion.
I.
To begin with, Ferguson does not argue (and I would not accept it if he did) that Chief Marr’s unbroken silence was the functional equivalent of an interrogation. It would take a remarkably potent—and, to date, unprecedented—legal fiction to deem an utterly mute police officer as the functional equivalent of an interrogator. Police officers, after all, “do not interrogate a suspect simply by hoping that he will incriminate himself.” Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 529, 107 S.Ct. 1931, 1937, 95 L.Ed.2d 458 (1987); see also Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 453, 423 S.E.2d 360, 365 (1992). Nor is the “subtle compulsion” of being confined to an “interview room,” by itself, the functional equivalent of a Miranda interrogation. Gates v. Commonwealth, 30 Va.App. 352, 356, 516 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1999). “ ‘Interrogation,’ as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300, 303, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1690, 1691, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) (rejecting an interpretation of Miranda “equating ‘subtle compulsion’ with interrogation”); see also United States v. Kimbrough, 477 F.3d 144, 149-50 (4th Cir.2007).
To his credit, Ferguson advances his argument on appeal along a far narrower path. Ferguson admits he “did speak first” and thereby broke the long silence. See Appellant’s Br. at 10.14 He does not claim his remark was in reply to *71something Investigator Hagerman may have said prior to leaving the room. Instead, Ferguson contends only that his silence-breaking remark was simply not “a request to waive his rights or to be interrogated.” Id. My response to Ferguson’s argument is equally simple: It does not have to be.
The prophylactic bar on further interrogation lifts away when “the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Medley v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 19, 31, 602 S.E.2d 411, 416 (2004) (en banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. Gregory, 263 Va. 134, 146-47, 557 S.E.2d 715, 722 (2002), in turn quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1885, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981)). The reinitiating remark by the suspect need not itself be an express waiver of the suspect’s rights. It is enough that the remark evinces “a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion” about the investigation. Giles v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 527, 535, 507 S.E.2d 102, 107 (1998) (quoting Foster v. Commonwealth, 8 Va.App. 167, 174, 380 S.E.2d 12, 16 (1989), in turn quoting Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-46, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2835, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983)).
Under this standard, “a request for a drink of water or a request to use a telephone” would not qualify as a reinitiating remark. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045, 103 S.Ct. at 2835. But any other kind of remark would qualify if it could be “fairly said to represent a desire on the part of an accused to open up a more generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation.” Id. So, an uninvited statement like “Well what is going to happen to me now?” constitutes a reinitiating remark. Id. at 1042, 103 S.Ct. at 2833. Similarly, a suspect’s mere inquiry into “what was going to happen to him” would be enough to reinitiate a dialogue with police officers. Harrison v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 576, 582-83, 423 S.E.2d 160, 164 (1992). When police officers hear such remarks, they have every right to confirm the suspect’s true intentions and to *72inquire whether he “has changed his mind about speaking to them without an attorney.” Giles, 28 Va.App. at 535, 507 S.E.2d at 107 (quoting Foster, 8 Va.App. at 174, 380 S.E.2d at 16).
In short, Ferguson’s argument on appeal—that his silence-breaking remark did not constitute a “request to waive his rights or to be interrogated,” Appellant’s Br. at 10—assumes too much. Under settled principles, a reinitiating remark need not go that far. It need only express “a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion” about the investigation. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045-46, 103 S.Ct. at 2835. Ferguson’s uninvited remark, breaking a complete silence of about 20 minutes, fully satisfied this standard.
I also find no relevance in the assertion that Investigator Hagerman, prior to leaving Ferguson alone with Chief Marr, continued to question Ferguson after he invoked his Miranda right to counsel. Ante at 62-64, 67-69, 654 S.E.2d at 335, 337-338. The trial court suppressed all of Ferguson’s answers to these questions. The trial court’s suppression order fully remedied any ostensible violation of Ferguson’s Miranda rights by Hagerman.15 Nothing in Miranda or any variant of the tainted-fruit doctrine requires the suppression of Ferguson’s later confession given after he reinitiated a dialogue with Chief Marr and after he expressly waived his Miranda rights.16
*73Sitting en banc, we have reaffirmed that “the Miranda case, though requiring suppression of admissions unlawfully obtained, does not require that subsequent statements or their fruits be discarded as inherently tainted.” Mundy v. Commonwealth, 11 Va.App. 461, 473, 390 S.E.2d 525, 531, aff'd on reh’g en banc, 11 Va.App. 461, 399 S.E.2d 29 (1990) (adopting en banc “the reasons stated in the panel’s majority opinion”). Instead, Mundy explained, “the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made.” Id. at 474, 390 S.E.2d at 532 (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1293, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985)). Thus, even in situations where an “officer’s question during processing was improper interrogation,” the fact that the suspect “initiated the later police contact eliminates any taint that might have arisen from the earlier questioning.” Savino v. Murray, 82 F.3d 593, 599-600 (4th Cir.1996) (rejecting habeas collateral attack of conviction upheld by Savino v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 534, 391 S.E.2d 276 (1990)); see also Height v. State, 281 Ga. 727, 642 S.E.2d 812, 814 (2007).
II.
Properly framed, then, the issue we face “is whether a statement made in violation of Edwards taints a subsequent confession not made in violation of Edwards.” See Howard v. Moore, 131 F.3d 399, 414 n. 16 (4th Cir.1997). Absent some evidence that the subsequent confession was truly involuntary—and none is alleged here—the answer is no.

. This fact alone distinguishes Hines v. Commonwealth, 19 Va.App. 218, 221, 450 S.E.2d 403, 404 (1994), which involved an Edwards *71violation followed by a conversation “initiated by the police officer’s further inquiry” directed to the suspect.

. I assume arguendo that Ferguson was in custody to the degree required by Miranda, that his request for counsel was clear and unequivocal, and that some (but not all) of Investigator Hagerman’s questions after the invocation of counsel could be characterized as continued interrogation.

. Reinitiation by a suspect can take place after an Edwards violation, even by a suspect held continuously in custody. See Height v. State, 281 Ga. 727, 642 S.E.2d 812, 814 (2007) (holding that any " ‘taint’ of the prior Edwards violation” was overcome when the accused “initiated the further discussions with police leading to the statement in question, was re-apprised of his Miranda rights in full, and signed a written waiver prior to giving his statement”); People v. Bradford, 14 Cal.4th 1005, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544, 565 (1997) ("if the statement made after an Edwards violation is voluntary, 'the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made’ ” citation omitted). A reinitiated *73interrogation by the police, following an Edwards violation, cannot take place absent a break in custody. Cf. Ante at 63-64, 654 S.E.2d at 335 (indirectly quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 2208, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991)).