Court Opinion

ID: 9957083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 17:01:01.415716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:06.091840
License: Public Domain

FILED
                           NOT FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                             APR 3 2024
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HEATHER BAUMAN,                                  No. 22-35881

              Plaintiff-Appellant,               D.C. No. 4:20-cv-05228-JAG

 v.
                                                 MEMORANDUM*
MARTIN J. O’MALLEY, Commissioner
of Social Security,

              Defendant-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Eastern District of Washington
                   James A. Goeke, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

                            Submitted March 29, 2024**
                               Seattle, Washington

Before: W. FLETCHER, PARKER,*** and MILLER, Circuit Judges.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      ***
             The Honorable Barrington D. Parker, Jr., United States Circuit Judge
for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting by designation.
      Heather M. Bauman (“Bauman”) appeals the district court’s order affirming

an administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of her applications for Disability

Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). On

appeal, Bauman contends that the ALJ erred by (1) improperly invoking the

presumption of continuing non-disability and adopting the prior ALJ’s findings at

step two, step three and step five; (2) improperly rejecting Bauman’s subjective

complaints; (3) improperly evaluating medical opinion evidence; and (4) failing to

develop the record.

       We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a

district court’s decision to affirm the Social Security Administration’s

determination. Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir.

2002). We “will disturb the denial of benefits only if the decision contains legal

error or is not supported by substantial evidence.” Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266,

1270 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir.

2008)). We affirm the district court.

      The parties are familiar with the facts in this case, and we recount them only

as necessary to explain our decision.

      1. Bauman was denied disability benefits by an ALJ on February 1, 2017.

Bauman reapplied for DIB and SSI in January 2018. Pursuant to Chavez v. Bowen,

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844 F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir. 1988), and Acquiescence Ruling 97-4(9), a prior

adjudication creates a presumption of continuing non-disability for the period

under adjudication unless the claimant shows that there are “changed

circumstances.” The ALJ held that the Chavez presumption was “rebutted only in

a threshold sense by addition of some new non-severe impairments and non-

medically determinable impairments.” However, the ALJ found that Bauman had

not produced new and material evidence of worsened impairments. The ALJ

therefore adopted many of the prior ALJ’s findings in the subsequent five-step

sequential evaluation pursuant to Acquiescence Ruling 97-4(9).

      Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that there were not

material changes in Bauman’s condition since the prior adjudication. Bauman cites

updated medical evidence, but there is also evidence in record, discussed by the

ALJ, indicating that her condition did not materially changed since the prior

decision. “If the evidence ‘is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it

is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.’” Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154

(9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005));

Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The ALJ is responsible

for resolving conflicts in medical testimony[.]”). We therefore conclude that

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusions that there were no material

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changes in Bauman’s condition relevant to its analysis at step two, step three and

step five.

       2. The ALJ provided “specific, clear, and convincing” reasons for rejecting

Bauman’s subjective testimony. Lambert, 980 F.3d at 1277 (quoting

Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 488–89 (9th Cir. 2015)). After addressing

Bauman’s testimony in detail, the ALJ reasonably concluded that Bauman’s

subjective allegations were at odds with her clinical examinations and other

objective evidence in the record.

       3. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s assessment of Nurse Practitioner

Ashley Christensen’s letter. As the ALJ noted, Christensen’s brief statement

lacked any supportive objective explanation, indicated only short-term constraints,

and contradicted findings made by the State agency medical consultants.

       4. An ALJ’s obligation to develop the record “is triggered only when there

is ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for proper

evaluation of the evidence.” Ford, 950 F.3d at 1156 (quoting Mayes v. Massanari,

276 F.3d 453, 459–60 (9th Cir. 2001)). No such showing has been made.

Furthermore, Bauman’s attorney at the hearing never asked the ALJ to obtain

medical expert testimony, even though a medical expert was on standby to testify if

required.

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AFFIRMED.

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