Court Opinion

ID: 9907681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 20:02:43.870728+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:59:00.416123
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/6/23 Cluney v. Sorour DMD PC CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

CHEYANNE CLUNEY,                                           B316208

         Plaintiff and Appellant,                          (Los Angeles County
                                                           Super. Ct. No. BC652583)
         v.

SOROUR DMD PC, et al.,

     Defendants and
Respondents.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Jon R. Takasugi, Thomas D. Long and Audra M.
Mori, Judges. Affirmed.

         Brian J. Jacobs for Plaintiff and Appellant.

      Brian P. Kamel & Associates, Brian P. Kamel and Yee Lam
for Defendants and Respondents.
      Plaintiff and appellant Cheyanne Cluney (plaintiff) appeals
from an August 21, 2021 order vacating the default and setting
aside the default judgment entered against defendants and
respondents Sorour DMD PC (the corporation), Selvana Sorour
(Selvana), and Tharwat Sorour (Tharwat),1 and recalling and
quashing a writ of execution issued against defendants. We
affirm the trial court’s order.

                          BACKGROUND
       Plaintiff commenced this action against defendants for
professional negligence on March 10, 2017. Nearly a year and a
half later, on August 27, 2018, plaintiff filed proofs of service of
the summons and complaint on each of the defendants. The
proofs of service indicate that the summons, complaint,
statement of damages, and related documents were served on
August 16, 2018, by substituted service on “Jane Doe
(receptionist)” at a business address in Hawthorne, California.
Copies were also mailed to defendants at the Hawthorne address
that same day.
       A declaration of diligence states that the process server
went to the Hawthorne address on three consecutive days in
August 2018. On the first day, August 14, 2018, the process
server noted, “Subject not in per receptionist who advised they
have not been here for a whiel [sic] and that they have other
locations.” The process server returned to the Hawthorne
address the next two days, on August 15 and 16, 2018 and noted

1      Because Selvana and Tharwat share the same surname we
refer to them individually by their first names and collectively as
the individual defendants. We refer to Selvana, Tharwat, and
the corporation collectively as defendants.

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“Subject not in receptionist.” The proofs of service do not indicate
that any other attempts were made to locate or serve defendants
at any of their other locations.
       The superior court clerk entered default against defendants
on October 16, 2018. On February 9, 2021, the trial court entered
default judgment against defendants in the amount of
$81,731.04. A writ of execution was issued on March 30, 2021.
       Defendants first learned of the judgment when they
received a notice of bank levy in June 2021. On July 26, 2021,
defendants filed a motion for an order to set aside or vacate the
default and default judgment and to recall and quash the writ of
execution, claiming the substitute service was invalid, and they
had no actual notice of plaintiff’s lawsuit pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure section 473.5.2 Defendants further claimed they
were entitled to discretionary relief under section 473.
       Defendants argued the substitute service at the Hawthorne
address was improper because the receptionist at that location
had informed the process server during the first unsuccessful
attempted service on August 14, 2018, that defendants “have not
been here for a while and they have other locations.” (Boldface
and underscoring omitted.) Defendants pointed out that their
other locations were publicly available on the California Dental
Board Web site and on their own publicly available Web page.
       In opposition, plaintiff argued defendants’ motion was
untimely. Plaintiff claimed the substitute service on the
individual defendants was valid because her attorney had
justifiably relied on information obtained from the Dental Board

2    All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

                                 3
of California listing the Hawthorne address as the “address of
record” for Selvana and Tharwat. Plaintiff further claimed the
substitute service on the corporation was valid because an
individual named “Sam” Sorour contacted plaintiff’s counsel after
receiving the notice of levy; the notice of levy did not identify
plaintiff’s counsel or contain counsel’s contact information; and
Sorour could not have obtained counsel’s information if he had
not received a copy of the summons and complaint.
       After hearing argument from the parties and taking the
matter under submission, the trial court issued a written ruling
on August 20, 2021, granting defendants’ motion in its entirety.
The trial court found that defendants’ motion was timely under
section 473, subdivision (d), because it was filed within 180 days
of entry of the default judgment. The trial court further found
that the proof of service on the corporation on its face showed
lack of proper service, as it did not identify any individual
specified in section 416.10 who was served on behalf of the
corporation, and plaintiff had failed to show substantial
compliance with the statutory service requirements. The trial
court therefore concluded that the default judgment entered
against the corporation was void.
       As to the individual defendants, the trial court found
plaintiff failed to sustain her burden of demonstrating reasonable
diligence in her efforts to personally serve Selvana and Tharwart.
After the receptionist informed the process server on August 14,
2018, that Selvana and Tharwart had not been at the Hawthorne
address “for a while” and that they had other office locations,
efforts should have been made to locate the correct office rather
than immediately resorting to substitute service.

                                4
      The trial court set aside the default judgment entered
against each of the defendants and recalled and quashed the writ
of execution on that basis. This appeal followed.

                          DISCUSSION
I.     Timeliness
       Section 473, subdivision (d) authorizes a court to set aside a
void judgment. A default judgment entered against a defendant
without service of process in a manner prescribed by statute is
void. (Ellard v. Conway (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 540, 544 (Ellard).)
A motion to set aside a judgment void on its face may be brought
at any time. (Pittman v. Beck Park Apartments Ltd. (2018) 20
Cal.App.5th 1009, 1021 (Pittman).) A motion to set aside a
default judgment valid on its face but void because of improper
service is governed by the limitation periods set forth in section
473.5. (Rogers v. Silverman (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1114, 1124
(Rogers).) Under section 473.5, subdivision (a) a party that has
not received actual notice of an action due to improper service
may move to set aside a default or default judgment within “the
earlier of: (i) two years after entry of a default judgment against
him or her; or (ii) 180 days after service on him or her of a written
notice that the default or default judgment has been entered.”
       Plaintiff contends defendants’ motion to set aside the
judgment was untimely because it was not filed within 180 days
after entry of default. That argument was previously rejected in
Rogers, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d 1114, a case on which plaintiff
relies but that undermines rather than supports her position.
The court in Rogers stated “the time in which to file a motion to
vacate a default judgment valid on its face but void due to
improper service commences upon the entry of judgment.” (Id. at

                                 5
p. 1126.) The Rogers court reasoned that “[i]n such a case no
omission on the moving party’s part resulted in the clerk’s entry
of the default” and “[a]ccordingly, it would be manifestly unfair to
commence the period for moving for relief from that time.” (Ibid.)
That reasoning applies here.
       The trial court did not err by ruling that defendants’
motion to set aside the default judgment was timely.
II.    Validity of service of process
       “‘[C]ompliance with the statutory procedures for service of
process is essential to establish personal jurisdiction. [Citation.]
[A] default judgment entered against a defendant who was not
served with a summons in the manner prescribed by statute is
void.’” (Ellard, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 544.) Whether a
judgment is void for lack of proper service is a question of law
that an appellate court reviews de novo. (Calvert v. Al Binali
(2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 954, 961-962.)
       A.    Service on corporation
       Section 416.10 permits service on a corporation that is not
a bank by serving an individual or entity designated as an agent
for service of process (§ 416.10, subd. (a)); serving one of the 11
officers or managers of the corporation specified in section 416.10,
subdivision (b); serving a person authorized by the corporation to
receive service (§ 416.10, subd. (c)); or service in a manner
authorized by the Corporations Code (Code Civ. Proc., § 416.10,
subd. (d)). Plaintiff does not claim to have effected service on the
corporation pursuant to section 416.10.
       Section 415.20 permits substitute service on a person
specified in section 416.10 by leaving the summons and complaint
“in his or her office . . . with the person who is apparently in
charge thereof.” (§ 415.20, subd. (a).) If the proof of service fails

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to identify any such person, however, it is defective. (Dill v.
Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1435-1436
(Dill).)
       Plaintiff’s proof of substitute service on the corporation is
defective on its face. It does not identify any of the 11 persons
specified in section 416.10, subdivision (b)—officers or managers
of the corporation—as the person served. No individual is
identified on the proof of service; rather, the only person
identified on the proof of service is the corporation itself. The
proof of service states that a copy of the summons and complaint
was thereafter mailed, not to any individual, but to the
corporation at the Hawthorne address. It does not state that
service was on the designated agent for service of process or any
person authorized to receive service for the corporation. Plaintiff
does not contend that service was accomplished in a manner
authorized by the Corporations Code. Because the face of
plaintiff’s proof of service fails to identify any individual specified
in section 416.10, subdivision (b) who was served on behalf of the
corporation, the proof of service and the judgment roll show that
the judgment is void on its face for lack of proper service. (Ramos
v. Homeward Residential, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1442
(Ramos).)
       A judgment “is considered void on its face only when the
invalidity is apparent from an inspection of the judgment roll or
court record without consideration of extrinsic evidence.”3
(Pittman, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 1021.) When a default

3      If the invalidity can be shown only through consideration of
extrinsic evidence, such as declarations or testimony, the
judgment is not void on its face. (Pittman, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1021.)

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judgment has been taken, the judgment roll consists of “the
summons, with the affidavit or proof of service; the complaint;
the request for entry of default . . . , and a copy of the judgment.”
(§ 670, subd. (a).) Because the proof of service and judgment roll
were facially defective, plaintiff bore the burden of showing
substantial compliance with the statutory requirements for
service of process on the corporation. (Ramos, supra, 223
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1440-1441; Dill, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1437.)
      Substantial compliance with the statutory service of
process requirements occurs when the person to be served,
although not properly identified in a proof of service, actually
received the summons. (Dill, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at p. 1437.)
“[W]hen the defendant is a corporation, the ‘person to be served’
is one of the individuals specified in section 416.10. Therefore,
[plaintiff] could be held to have substantially complied with the
statute if, despite [her] failure to address the mail to one of the
persons to be served on behalf of the defendants, the summons
was actually received by one of the persons to be served.” (Ibid.)
Mere receipt of the summons by an unknown employee of the
corporation who is not a person specified in section 416.10 does
not establish substantial compliance. (Dill, at pp. 1438-1439.)
Evidence that shows the name of the person who received the
summons and complaint as well as the person’s title or capacity
is required by statute. (§ 417.10.) Without such evidence, “a trial
court need not infer that a person specified in section 416.10
actually received the summons and complaint.” (Ramos, supra,
223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1443.)
      Plaintiff did not provide the trial court with evidence
identifying the person to whom the summons and complaint was

                                 8
delivered or any other evidence from which the court could infer
that a person specified in section 416.10 actually received the
documents. Plaintiff’s assertion that an individual named Sam
Sorour may have been authorized to accept service on behalf of
the corporation is speculative at best. The record does not show
that anyone specified in section 416.10 or otherwise authorized to
receive service on behalf of the corporation had actual notice of
the summons and complaint. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that plaintiff failed to meet her burden of
showing substantial compliance with sections 416.10 and 415.20
or by vacating the default and default judgment entered against
the corporation. (Ramos, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1441.)
       B.    Service on individual defendants
       Section 415.20, subdivision (b) authorizes substitute service
in lieu of personal delivery on an individual “[i]f a copy of the
summons and complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be
personally delivered to the person to be served.”4 In such cases,

4      Section 415.20, subdivision (b) provides in relevant part:
“If a copy of the summons and complaint cannot with reasonable
diligence be personally delivered to the person to be served, as
specified in Section 416.60, 416.70, 416.80, or 416.90, a summons
may be served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint
at the person’s . . . usual place of business, or usual mailing
address other than a United States Postal Service post office box,
in the presence of . . . a person apparently in charge of his or her
office, place of business, or usual mailing address other than a
United States Postal Service post office box, at least 18 years of
age, who shall be informed of the contents thereof, and by
thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint by
first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the
place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left.”

                                 9
the summons may be served by leaving a copy of the summons
and complaint at the person’s usual place of business, in the
presence of a person at least 18 years of age and apparently in
charge of the place of business, and by thereafter mailing a copy
of the summons and of the complaint to the person to be served at
the place where the summons and complaint were left. (Ibid.)
       The “reasonable diligence” requirement of section 415.20,
subdivision (b), means “an individual may be served by substitute
service only after a good faith effort at personal service has first
been made . . . . Two or three attempts to personally serve a
defendant at a proper place ordinarily qualifies as ‘“reasonable
diligence.”’” (American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011)
199 Cal.App.4th 383, 389.)
       Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
plaintiff failed to comply with the statutory requirements for
substitute service on Selvana and Tharwat because they were not
served at their usual place of business and reasonable diligence
was not undertaken to do so. (See Stafford v. Mach (1998) 64
Cal.App.4th 1174, 1182 [trial court’s finding on validity of service
reviewed for substantial evidence].) The Hawthorne address was
not a proper place at which to serve Selvana and Tharwat. The
declarations of diligence attached to the proofs of service state
that the receptionist at the Hawthorne address informed the
process server during the first unsuccessful attempted service on
August 14, 2018, that the individual defendants had not been at
that location “for a while,” and that they had other locations.
Nothing in the record indicates that plaintiff or her counsel
attempted to find any of these other locations. Subsequent
unsuccessful attempts to serve the individual defendants at the

                                10
Hawthorne address did not satisfy the reasonable diligence
requirement.
      The trial court did not err in finding that plaintiff failed to
properly serve Selvana and Tharwat or in vacating the default
and default judgment entered against them. (Ramos, supra, 223
Cal.App.4th at p. 1441.)
III. No error in recalling and quashing writ of execution
      “A default judgment that has been set aside will not
support a writ of execution . . . .” (Bedi v. McMullan (1984) 160
Cal.App.3d 272, 275.) The trial court had the authority to recall
and quash the writ of execution based on the invalid judgment
and did not err by doing so here. (Jones v. World Life Research
Institute (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 836, 840.)

                         DISPOSITION
       The order vacating the default, setting aside the default
judgment, and recalling and quashing the writ of execution
issued against defendants is affirmed. Defendants shall recover
their costs on appeal.

                                      ________________________
                                      CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

________________________
LUI, P. J.

________________________
ASHMANN-GERST, J.

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