Court Opinion

ID: 9589912
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:50:11.962702+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:22.265289
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully concur in Divisions 1, 2, and 3 and dissent as to Division 4.
1. Before addressing Division 4, it is necessary to explain my concurrence in Division 3, which addresses the meaning of “borrow” in the AHM policies. The many definitions given the word “borrow” in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (unabridged) in *796almost all instances connote that the transfer of possession is primarily for the use and benefit of the borrower. Even definition number 1, part of which is used in the instant opinion, includes: “obtain the temporary use of <he returned the pen that he had borrowed from her>: specif: to receive . . . from a lending library for temporary use outside the library premises. . . .”
In the New York case of Broome County Co-operative Fire Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life &c. Co., 347 NYS2d 778, 784 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973), quoting an earlier New York case, a New York Supreme Court thought of “borrow” as connoting that the transfer of possession was for the use and benefit of the receiver. It also paraphrased the word in more general terms, in its own language, as being the “common everyday language.” In Broome, the friend was deemed not a borrower of the auto as a matter of law because she was just driving the disabled woman to the friend’s home in the disabled person’s car so they could visit at the friend’s home and then go together to an event. The auto was being “used primarily for [the disabled owner’s] benefit” and therefore the driver-friend was not a “borrower” so as to be included in the Aetna policy. Here AHM’s insureds had custody but not possession of the truck when the collision occurred; they had custody of it primarily for the benefit of the owner, Pounds. It is hard to say they “borrowed” it, but I can accept the reversal of summary judgment on this issue because, as even the New York court recognizes, the court will not supply words of limitation to an insurance contract where the insurers have not seen fit to do so. AHM did not say “borrow for own use” or words of similar import, but merely “borrow.”
This broad meaning might, then, also include bailments, such as when an auto is delivered to a parking attendant or garage mechanic, because the purpose of the temporary possession is regarded as irrelevant.
The Texas Supreme Court, in the 1977 case of Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Employers Ins. Co., 556 SW2d 242, 244 (Tx. 1977), also includes the purpose of the acquisition of temporary possession in its definition of “borrow,” thus giving the word a narrower meaning than the opinion in the instant case does. No authority is given, however, not even a dictionary; it apparently relies on what it regards as common use.
A 1984 Fifth Circuit case, Sturgeon v. Strachan Shipping Co., 731 F2d 255 (5th Cir. 1984), requires “use” and “possession” for the vehicle to be “borrowed.” AHM’s insureds had “dominion and control” of the truck at the time of the collision in the sense that they had custody of the truck from the owner, although they did not have physical possession at the time. Driver Wilson did. The Fifth Circuit views “borrow” as the correlative of “loan.” Under that view, it could be said that Pounds loaned the truck to Franklin for Pounds’ purposes.
*797Decided February 24, 1997.
Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Jonathan M. Engram, Victor J. Faenza, for State Farm Fire & Casualty Company.
Austin & Sparks, John B. Austin, for American Hardware Mutual Insurance Company and Russell Franklin et al.
Nevertheless, I agree with the broad definition of “borrow” in this case. I do not agree, however, that there are jury issues with regard to Wilson’s permission to use the truck. In the earlier appeal in this case, State Farm Mut. &c. Ins. Co. v. Seeba, 209 Ga. App. 328 (433 SE2d 414) (1993), we stated as an operative fact that Wilson “was driving the truck with Pounds’ express permission.” Id. at 328. This establishes the law of the case. Jebco Ventures v. City of Smyrna, 259 Ga. 599, 601-602 (1) (385 SE2d 397) (1989). Based on this and the record evidence, a jury could not find that Wilson was driving without Franklin’s permission also, as it was Franklin who asked Wilson to take the truck and trailer and instructed him about the keys.
2. With respect to Division 4,1 agree with the res judicata analyses, which lead to the conclusion that indemnification claims, whether the claim of Franklin, Franklin Tractor, Inc., or AHM, are not barred by the doctrine of res judicata. That being our ruling, there is no need to vacate the trial court’s order regarding its second paragraph and remand the case for clarification.
In Division 4 (b), we have held that if the court addressed the AHM’s indemnification claim, the trial court erred because fact issues exist as to whether Wilson was covered under AHM’s policy. We have also held that if the court intended to address Franklin and Franklin Tractor’s claims against Wilson and ultimately his insurer State Farm, it still erred as there are fact issues as to that, too. Because the trial court’s two possible rulings are both declared wrong, a clearer explanation of the order is not needed and the ingredient for another possible interlocutory appeal should not be created. The judgment should simply be reversed and the trial proceed for resolution of the issues of fact.