Court Opinion

ID: 9379916
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-16 17:08:24.786578+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:05.988606
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Piterangelo v. Hudson, 2023-Ohio-820.]

                              COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JAMES E. PIETRANGELO, II,                         :

                Plaintiff-Appellant,              :
                                                              No. 111805
                v.                                :

CORRINNE HUDSON,                                  :

                Defendant-Appellee.               :

                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 16, 2023

            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                Case No. CV-17-884279

                                           Appearances:

                James E. Pietrangelo, II, pro se, and The Henry Law Firm
                and Eric W. Henry, for appellant.

                Collins, Roche, Utley & Garner, LLC, Beverly A. Adams,
                and Kurt D. Anderson, for appellee.

MARY J. BOYLE, J.:

                  This appeal involves a motor vehicle accident with plaintiff-appellant,

James E. Pietrangelo, II (“Pietrangelo”), pro se, and defendant-appellee, Corrinne

Hudson (“Hudson”). Pietrangelo brought a pro se negligence action against Hudson
alleging that she caused injury to his head, neck, and back.1 After a long procedural

history, the matter proceeded to trial, where the court granted Hudson’s motion for

directed verdict. Pietrangelo appeals the trial court’s directed verdict in favor of

Hudson and the denial of his motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set

forth below, we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

               In August 2015, Hudson rear-ended Pietrangelo. Hudson conceded

her negligence in causing the accident. The dispute is the nature and proximate

cause of Pietrangelo’s alleged injuries. In his complaint, Pietrangelo alleged that as

a result of the accident, he “suffered injury, shock, pain, and suffering” to his back

and that he has continued to experience “significant and debilitating pain” from the

injury. (Complaint, Aug. 9, 2017.) He further alleged permanent injuries from the

incident and requested compensatory damages for his past, present, and future

damages.

               On January 18, 2018, the trial court issued a case management

conference order setting the discovery deadline for April 20, 2018, in accordance

with Loc.R. 21.1 of the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, General

Division. It also set the deadline for Pietrangelo’s expert report on April 20, 2018,

and Hudson’s expert report on June 4, 2018.

      1 Pietrangelo was an attorney licensed to practice law in Ohio at the time of the
accident.
              Pietrangelo contested Hudson’s investigation into his injuries. He

acknowledged prior head, neck, and back injuries, but he refused to disclose his

prior medical history, claiming HIPAA privilege.        Hudson sought to compel

production of Pietrangelo’s prior medical records in May 2018. The trial court

ordered that Pietrangelo sign the standard medical authorizations by June 22, 2018,

otherwise it would dismiss the case. Pietrangelo appealed from this order to our

court in Pietrangelo v. Hudson, 2019-Ohio-1988, 136 N.E.3d 867 (8th Dist.).

              On appeal, we affirmed the trial court’s order, finding that Pietrangelo

merely refused to sign the authorizations rather than seeking a protection order or

requesting an in camera inspection of any documents. Id. at ¶ 23. Pietrangelo

appealed the decision to the Ohio Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court, both

of which declined jurisdiction. See Pietrangelo v. Hudson, 158 Ohio St.3d 1422,

2020-Ohio-647, 140 N.E.3d 753; Pietrangelo v. Hudson, ___U.S.___, 141 S.Ct.

254, 208 L.Ed.2d 27 (Oct. 5, 2020).

              On remand, Pietrangelo filed a motion for protective order and in

camera review and a motion for reconsideration of prior order and consideration of

medical authorizations at issue. The trial court granted these motions in part and

denied them in part. The court ordered the modification of the five medical

authorizations Hudson submitted and ordered Pietrangelo to complete the

authorizations within seven days after they were received. The court further ordered

that
      5. By permitting discovery of such records the court is not ruling on
      their admissibility at trial. Following production, [Pietrangelo] may file
      a motion in limine seeking to have certain records or information
      excluded or redacted at trial. Any such motion shall sufficiently
      identify the record or information sought to be protected, and the
      record itself shall be submitted for in camera review.

      ***

      The court finds that the authorizations were sufficiently identified for
      [Pietrangelo’s] compliance and that neither the authorizations nor this
      court’s order violated HIPAA, as HIPAA expressly allows production of
      records by court order.

      Finally, [Pietrangelo] did not and still has not submitted records for
      review nor supplied any affidavit or other evidence establishing the
      substance and nature of the information he claims to be irrelevant and
      privileged, and thus, this court has neither any duty nor any ability to
      craft a protective order.

      [Pietrangelo] shall sign and deliver the authorizations as ordered
      above, within 10 days of the date of this order, or the case will be
      dismissed with prejudice at [Pietrangelo’s] costs.

(Judgment Entry, Mar. 11, 2021.)

              Pietrangelo filed a second appeal contesting this order in Pietrangelo

v. Hudson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110365. Hudson withdrew her demand for the

HIPAA authorizations, and subsequently, we granted Hudson’s motion to dismiss

the appeal as moot. Pietrangelo sought reconsideration and en banc review, which

we denied.

              While this appeal was pending, Pietrangelo filed a motion for

summary judgment in April 2021, as to the nature of his injuries and proximate

cause, “leaving only the amount of damages to be determined by a jury.” In support

of his motion, Pietrangelo submitted his own affidavit alleging his injuries and
symptoms, including immediate excruciating pain in his low back that was caused

by the impact.     He averred that none of his medical providers were able to

successfully treat or heal those injuries, the medication had no effect on his pain,

and the pain had profound effect on his sleep and caused depression.

               Hudson opposed Pietrangelo’s motion, arguing that Pietrangelo’s

refusal to produce prior medical records and his acknowledgment of prior head,

neck, and back injuries created questions of fact as to proximate cause. Hudson also

argued that Pietrangelo’s claims of depression and pain required expert testimony

as to proximate cause, and his affidavit, which was his sole evidence, relied on his

personal credibility, which is a question of fact for a jury to decide. The trial court

denied Pietrangelo’s motion for summary judgment, and the matter proceeded to a

jury trial in July 2022.

               Prior to trial, in June 2022, Hudson filed five separate motions in

limine seeking to preclude certain evidence. The trial court ruled on these motions

on the day of trial. In the first motion, Hudson sought to preclude Pietrangelo’s

brother, Dr. Lee A. Pietrangelo, M.D., as a witness because Pietrangelo never

disclosed his brother as a witness during discovery. The trial court granted the

motion, stating that Dr. Lee Pietrangelo is not authorized to be called as a witness

because of Pietrangelo’s failure to comply with the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure and

the court’s local rules.

               In the second motion, Hudson sought to preclude Pietrangelo or his

witnesses from introducing into evidence any testimony, records, or statements
concerning insurance available to Pietrangelo because it is irrelevant to the

proximate causation issue.     In the third motion, Hudson sought to preclude

Pietrangelo from presenting any evidence regarding lost time, wages, or income as

a result of the accident because he stated in his answers to interrogatories that he is

not seeking compensation for lost time, wages, or income and he did not provide

any verification of any lost time, wages, or income. In the fourth motion, Hudson

sought to preclude evidence of any medical bill for which a corresponding medical

record was not produced and any medical record or bill not produced in discovery.

The trial court granted these three motions.

               In the fifth motion, Hudson sought to preclude the amounts accepted

as full payment by Pietrangelo’s medical providers for medical bills. The trial court

granted this motion in part, noting that the case will be submitted to the jury based

on original amounts billed. If the jury verdict is favorable to Pietrangelo, the court

ordered that additional questions will be presented as to whether the medical bills

should be reduced to the amount accepted in the insurance payments.

               At trial, Pietrangelo advised in his opening statement that (1) his

witnesses would be himself and Hudson; (2) he “will testify that from the moment

of impact until this day, this very day and continuing, I have been in continuous pain

at a level of 1 to 2. * * * [E]very second of every minute, of every hour of every day,

of every month, of every year for the last seven years you’ll hear me testify to that

that I have been in continuous pain. It feels like there’s something, like a fork is

stuck in my spine. * * * The pain and injury has never subsided for one second”; (3)
for two and a half months, the pain in his lower back was so bad that he could not

could barely walk and was bedridden for most of that two and a half months; (4) the

spinal injury dramatically impaired his life and the worst part about his life now is

that he can no longer get a good night’s sleep; (5) he is in a constant mental fog and

cannot concentrate; and (6) he has been in a depression because of this spinal injury.

(July 18, 2022, tr. 99, 104-106, 109.)

               Following opening statements, Hudson moved for a directed verdict,

arguing that both the alleged nature and permanency of Pietrangelo’s injuries were

not obvious or within the common knowledge of jurors and required expert

testimony. In opposition, Pietrangelo argued that in certain instances, expert

medical testimony is not necessary and that “the jury can easily see and can

understand whiplash and the nature of a continuous back injury therefrom.” (July

18, 2022, tr. 118-119.) The court, however, noted that whiplash is a motion of the

head and neck and normally causes cervical symptoms, “not the lower back.” (July

18, 2022, tr. 125.) Pietrangelo admitted he did not know whether whiplash was

“normally in the cervical area.” (July 18, 2022, tr. 124.)

               In granting the motion for directed verdict, the court found that

Pietrangelo did not present evidence in compliance with the rules in order to present

his claims to the jury. The court further noted that Pietrangelo made

      the decision to not prepare the case with appropriate experts in
      discovery in that regard. * * *

      So, any consequences are ruled from your decision, not mine. And
      you’ve been requested for years, years to do this. And throughout the
      course of these proceedings in this case, you have not taken the orders
      of this Court which are normal orders, and you had gone off the deep
      end, and then you have filed appeals on matters that are common to
      the litigation of traffic accident cases.

      I don’t know why that happened, but we tried to get you to comply with
      the reasonable orders of the Court and you’ve always refused to do so.
      That explanation is within you, not me.

(July 18, 2022, tr. 130.) The trial court then entered judgment for Hudson and

dismissed Pietrangelo’s claims with prejudice.

              Pietrangelo now appeals, for the third time, raising the following two

assignments of error for review:

      Assignment of Error One: The trial court erred and/or abused its
      discretion to the prejudice of [Pietrangelo] in denying [Pietrangelo’s]
      motion for summary judgment before trial.

      Assignment of Error Two: The trial court erred and/or abused its
      discretion to the prejudice of [Pietrangelo] in granting [Hudson’s]
      motion for directed verdict (including in concluding that [Pietrangelo]
      injuries as described in his opening statement were abnormal for a
      rear-end accident and therefore required expert testimony to prove
      proximate causation) and consequently dismissing [Pietrangelo’s] case
      with prejudice, assessing court costs against [Pietrangelo], and
      entering judgment in [Hudson’s] favor in the case.

II. Law and Analysis

      A. Summary Judgment

      1. Standard of Review

              An appellate court reviews the grant or denial of summary judgment

de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996).

In a de novo review, this court affords no deference to the trial court’s decision and

independently reviews the record to determine whether the denial of summary
judgment is appropriate. Hollins v. Shaffer, 182 Ohio App.3d 282, 2009-Ohio-2136,

912 N.E.2d 637, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.).

               Summary judgment is appropriate if (1) no genuine issue of any

material fact remains; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one

conclusion, and construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving

party, that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary

judgment is made. Id., citing State ex rel. Cassels v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of

Edn., 69 Ohio St.3d 217, 631 N.E.2d 150 (1994).

               The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of

demonstrating that no material issues of fact exist for trial. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio

St.3d 280, 292-293, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). The moving party has the initial

responsibility of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and identifying

those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact on the essential elements of the nonmoving party’s claims. Id. After

the moving party has satisfied this initial burden, the nonmoving party has a

reciprocal duty to set forth specific facts by the means listed in Civ.R. 56(C) showing

that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Id.

      2. The Trial Court Properly Denied Pietrangelo’s Motion for
      Summary Judgment

               Pietrangelo argues that he was entitled to summary judgment on

“everything in his negligence claims against Hudson but the amount of damages the
jury was going to award him.” (Emphasis sic.) He claims that his evidentiary

materials were sufficient by themselves without expert evidence to prove his

proximate injuries.

               Under Ohio law, a negligence claim requires proof of “(1) the

existence of a legal duty, (2) the defendant’s breach of that duty, and (3) injury that

is the proximate cause of the defendant’s breach.” Wallace v. Ohio DOC, 96 Ohio

St.3d 266, 2002-Ohio-4210, 773 N.E.2d 1018, ¶ 22, citing Mussivand v. David, 45

Ohio St.3d 314, 318, 544 N.E.2d 265 (1989).

               In the instant case, the record reveals that Pietrangelo acknowledged

prior neck and back injuries, yet failed to obtain expert testimony as to the

proximate cause of his injuries and failed to provide any records for the preexisting

injuries. According to the court’s case management conference order, Pietrangelo

was to complete discovery and submit his expert report by April 20, 2018. Loc.R.

21.1 of the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, General Division requires

the parties to “submit expert reports in accord with the time schedule established at

the Case Management Conference.” The rule also provides that “[s]ince Ohio Civil

Rule 16 authorizes the Court to require counsel to exchange the reports of medical

and expert witnesses expected to be called by each party, each counsel shall

exchange with all other counsel written reports of medical * * * expert witnesses

expected to testify in advance of the trial.” Id.

               In March 2021, the court found that the medical authorizations were

sufficiently identified for Pietrangelo’s compliance and that the authorizations do
not violate HIPAA because HIPAA expressly allows production of records by court

order. Pietrangelo, however, still failed to comply with the court’s orders and local

rules and never submitted an expert report or medical records relating to his

preexisting injuries.

               “In order to establish proximate cause, there must be evidence that a

direct or proximate causal relationship existed between the accident and the injury

or disability complained of.” Jacobs v. Gateway Property Mgt., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 84973, 2005-Ohio-1983, ¶ 12, citing Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Vassar, 1st Dist.

Hamilton No. C-800007, 1981 Ohio App. LEXIS 13780 (Feb. 18, 1981). Pietrangelo

failed to provide expert testimony and treatment records to clarify the history of the

prior injuries. As a result, he did not meet his burden of establishing a direct and

proximate causal relationship between the claimed injury and the motor vehicle

accident.

               Pietrangelo further failed to meet his burden of establishing

proximate cause by not supporting his injuries with expert testimony. In his

affidavit attached to his motion for summary judgment, Pietrangelo described his

injuries as “soft tissue damage” injury consisting of back strain with instantaneous

excruciating pain and significant interference with sleep and daily activities for

years, resulting in significant depression.    We have noted that while in some

instances the causal nexus between an accident and the alleged injury is so clear as

to obviate the need for expert testimony in a personal injury claim, “[i]t is when the

internal complexities of the body are at issue, that we generally initiate the
metamorphosis in the evidential progression where medical testimony moves from

the pale of common knowledge matters and within layman competency where

expert testimony is not required, to those areas where such testimony is more

appropriate and indeed most necessary for the trier of fact to understand the nature

and cause of the injuries alleged.” Wood v. Estate of Batta, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

90430, 2008-Ohio-1400, ¶ 24, citing Wright v. Columbus, 10th Dist. Franklin No.

05AP-432, 2006-Ohio-759. Soft tissue injuries such as neck, back, and shoulders

pain, are not so apparent as to be a matter of common knowledge. Id. at ¶ 25, citing

Langford v. Dean, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 74854, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 4668

(Sept. 30, 1999). See also Hodge v. King, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 72823, 1998 Ohio

App. LEXIS 3303 (July 16, 1998); Davis v. D&T Limousine Serv., Inc., 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 65683, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 2615 (June 16, 1994); Dolly v.

Daugherty, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 40021, 1979 Ohio App. LEXIS 11205 (Nov. 15,

1979). Thus, expert medical testimony was required to establish proximate cause of

Pietrangelo’s current injuries.

               Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court properly denied

Pietrangelo’s motion for summary judgment because Pietrangelo failed to

demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. Expert medical

testimony was required to establish proximate cause of his alleged injuries and

Pietrangelo failed to meet his burden by not including expert medical testimony with

respect to this issue.

               Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled.
      B. Motion for Directed Verdict

      1. Standard of Review

              Appellate review of the trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion

for a directed verdict under Civ.R. 50(A)(4) is a question of law that we review de

novo. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 95 Ohio St.3d 512,

2002-Ohio-2842, 769 N.E.2d 835, ¶ 4.

      2. The Trial Court Properly Granted Hudson’s Motion for Directed
      Verdict

              Civ.R. 50(A)(4) provides that a motion for directed verdict can be

granted when, after construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the party

against whom the motion is directed, “reasonable minds could come to but one

conclusion upon the evidence submitted and that conclusion is adverse to such

party.” The “reasonable minds” test mandated by Civ.R. 50(A)(4) requires the court

to discern only whether there exists any evidence of substantive probative value that

favors the position of the nonmoving party. Civ.R. 50(A)(4); Ruta v. Breckenridge-

Remy Co., 69 Ohio St.2d 66, 69, 430 N.E.2d 935 (1982), citing Hamden Lodge v.

Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 127 Ohio St. 469, 189 N.E.2d 246 (1934).

              The Ohio Supreme Court has found that when ruling on a motion for

directed verdict after an opening statement, trial court may grant the motion “only

if the opening statement shows that a party is completely unable to sustain a cause

of action should the court take the case away from the jury by directing a verdict.”

Parrish v. Jones, 138 Ohio St.3d 23, 2013-Ohio-5224, 3 N.E.3d 155, ¶ 32. The
Parrish Court explained that when it is unclear from the opening statement whether

the party against whom the motion is made can proceed with its case, the trial court

       must determine whether that party has otherwise set forth a cause of
       action or defense. It is at this point that the court may choose to consult
       the pleadings to determine whether ‘all the facts expected to be proved,
       and those that have been stated, do not constitute a cause of action or
       a defense,’ pursuant to [Brinkmoeller v. Wilson, 41 Ohio St.2d 223, 325
       N.E.2d 233 (1975)]. In short, the court must give the party against
       whom the motion is made the benefit of the doubt.

Id. at ¶ 33.

               Pietrangelo, relying on Parrish, argues that motions for directed

verdict made following an opening statement are granted only in rare

circumstances. He further argues the court erred by concluding that the injuries he

described in his opening statement were abnormal for a rear-end accident, and

therefore, required expert testimony to prove proximate causation. Hudson argues

that the trial court’s directed verdict was proper because Pietrangelo’s alleged

injuries were not objectively obvious or the cause so apparent as to be a matter of

common knowledge.

               A review of Pietrangelo’s opening statement reveals that he spoke to

the jury about (1) who he would be calling as witnesses, which consisted only of

himself and Hudson; (2) the continuous pain he has suffered for the past seven

years, including the severe pain he felt for two and a half months; (3) the spinal

injury dramatically impairing his life; (4) his constant mental fog; and (5) his

depression. (July 18, 2022, tr. 99, 104-106, 109.) Hudson moved for a directed

verdict, arguing that Pietrangelo could not prove causation. The trial court then
recessed to research the matter. Upon resuming the next day, the court ultimately

concluded that Pietrangelo had not presented evidence in compliance with the rules

in order to present his claims to the jury and granted Hudson’s motion for directed

verdict.

               We note that in personal injury actions, proximate cause is a

determinative issue. It is well-established that expert testimony is essential to prove

the proximate cause of a personal injury, unless the cause is a matter of common

knowledge. Darnell v. Eastman, 23 Ohio St.2d 13, 261 N.E.2d 114 (1970), syllabus.

In Darnell, the Ohio Supreme Court stated:

       Except as to questions of cause and effect which are so apparent as to
       be matters of common knowledge, the issue of causal connection
       between an injury and a specific subsequent physical disability involves
       a scientific inquiry and must be established by the opinion of medical
       witnesses competent to express such opinion. In the absence of such
       medical opinion, it is error to refuse to withdraw that issue from the
       consideration of the jury.

Id. at syllabus.

               Here, Pietrangelo’s alleged injuries were low-back strain, seven years

of daily pain, mental fog, and depression. Pietrangelo advised the jury that the pain

and injury from the incidence “has never subsided for one second” and he has been

in continuous pain for the past seven years. He further advised the jury that his back

injury dramatically impaired his life — he can no longer get a good night’s sleep; he

is in a constant mental fog and cannot concentrate; and he has been depressed.

None of these injuries, however, are “so apparent as to be matters of common

knowledge.”
                As we stated above, “the causal connection between soft tissue

injuries incurred in motor vehicle accidents and alleged subsequent physical

disability is not so apparent as to be a matter of common knowledge, where the

alleged injuries involved strains to the neck and back area.” Wood, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 90430, 2008-0hio-1400 at ¶ 25, citing Langford; Hodge; Davis;

Dolly. Whiplash and other “soft tissue” injuries from a motor vehicle accident

involve the internal complexities of the body, thereby initiating a change in the

evidential progression where medical testimony moves from matters within

common knowledge and within layman competency to those areas where expert

testimony is more appropriate and necessary for the trier of fact to understand the

nature and cause of the injuries alleged. Id. at ¶ 24, citing Wright.

                Moreover, the trial court gave Pietrangelo several opportunities to

comply with the court’s case management orders and rules, yet Pietrangelo failed to

comply. In ruling on Pietrangelo’s motion for protective order and in camera review

and a motion for reconsideration of prior order and consideration of medical

authorizations at issue, the court noted that after he produced the documents, he

could file a motion in limine seeking to have certain records or information excluded

or redacted at trial.    However, Pietrangelo never submitted the documents.

Subsequently, the trial court granted Hudson’s five motions in limine that were filed

before trial.

                The court found that Pietrangelo’s brother, Dr. Lee A. Pietrangelo,

could not testify as a witness because Pietrangelo’s failure to comply with the Ohio
Rules of Civil Procedure and the court’s local rules. With regard to the amounts

accepted as full payment by Pietrangelo’s medical providers for medical bills, the

court noted that the case will be submitted to jury based on original amounts billed.

If the jury verdict was favorable to Pietrangelo, the court ordered that additional

questions would be presented as to whether the medical bills should be reduced to

the amount accepted in the insurance payments.           The court also precluded

Pietrangelo from introducing: (1) any testimony, records, or statements concerning

insurance available; (2) evidence regarding lost time, wages, or income as a result of

the accident; and (3) evidence of any medical bill for which a corresponding medical

record was not produced and any medical record or bill not produced in discovery.

              Because Pietrangelo’s injuries are not sufficiently observable,

understandable, and comprehensible by the trier of fact, expert medical testimony

was required to establish proximate cause of the alleged injuries in this instance.

Moreover, expert testimony was necessary so the jury did not speculate as to what

injuries resulted from the accident separately from his preexisting injuries. See Rice

v. Johnson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 63648, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 4109, 8-9 (Aug.

26, 1993) (“‘Expert testimony is required so that the trier of fact does not have to

speculate on the standard of care, particularly in a complex case involving [“soft

tissue” injuries] which are normally not within the realm of understanding of the

layman.’” Id., quoting Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 61 Ohio App.3d 506,

512, 573 N.E.2d 159 (10th Dist. 1989). Pietrangelo could not present any expert

medical testimony with respect to this issue, and therefore, he was unable to sustain
his negligence cause of action. As a result, we find that the trial court properly

granted directed verdict in Hudson’s favor.

              Accordingly, the second assignment of error is overruled.

III. Conclusion

              The trial court properly denied Pietrangelo’s motion for summary

judgment because disputed facts, including prior injuries, precluded summary

judgment, and Pietrangelo failed to support his claim with any expert opinions. The

trial court’s granting of Hudson’s motion for directed verdict was also proper.

Pietrangelo failed to comply with the trial court’s local rules and the rules of civil

procedure. In addition, Pietrangelo was unable to sustain his negligence action

because his injuries required expert testimony to show proximate cause and he

could not present any expert medical testimony with respect to this issue.

              Judgment is affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment

into execution.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

_________________________
MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE

ANITA LASTER MAYS, A.J., and
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR