Court Opinion

ID: 9794125
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:00:03.015949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:16.242203
License: Public Domain

OPALA, Justice,
dissenting.
The court assumes today its original jurisdiction to prohibit the respondent-judge from *945enforcing his November. 15, 1993 order, entered in Cause No. CJ-93-4842, District Court, Tulsa County, State of Oklahoma.1 The record entry here in issue orders Rameo Operating Company f/k/a Rameo Holding Corp. [Rameo] to produce data deemed indispensable in the United States Trust Company of New York’s [Trust] 'post-judgment quest to value Robert E. Yaw, II’s [Yaw] stock in Rameo, a privately held corporation. The nisi prius judge, respondent here, considered these data necessary to the certificated securities’ valuation in the context of a pre-execution sale of Yaw’s Rameo shares to Dynamic Energy Sources, Inc. [Dynamic]. Trust’s rights in Yaw’s shares rest both on a judgment creditor’s possessory lien2 and on its perfected security interest in the stock3. Were I to accede to the court’s reasoning in prohibiting the November 15 order’s enforcement, I would effectively deny Trust its right to conduct a legally safe (exposure-proof) pre-execution (private) sale4 and to use the proceeds to satisfy its judgment against Yaw. Today’s pronouncement, which I cannot countenance, means that Trust has no independent right to determine the value of Ram-eo’s stock but must instead look solely to Ramco’s representation of its stock’s worth.5
I
THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION
On August 10,1989 Yaw executed a pledge agreement giving Trust a security interest in his Rameo stock and placed his shares in Trust’s possession. After Yaw’s default Trust secured a money judgment against him in a New York Supreme Court and then domesticated it in Tulsa County on October 29, 1993 under the provisions of 12 O.S.1991 § 721.6 On October 3, 1994 Trust agreed to sell Yaw’s Rameo stock to Dynamic. Both a judgment creditor of Yaw and the holder of a security interest in his Rameo stock, Trust is in the process of selling the Yaw shares without the aid of the court’s execution process.'7 It is authorized so to do by the pledge agreement with Yaw.
To facilitate this transaction Trust undertook to acquire data from Rameo to aid itself and Dynamic [the prospective purchaser] in assessing the value of Yaw’s Rameo stock. Trust secured a subpoena duces tecum (from the Tulsa County District Court) calling upon Rameo to produce thirteen categories of data. Rameo initially produced all but six of the items sought.
In conjunction with the subpoena for the production of Ramco’s audited financial statements, a “protective order” was entered *946on October 25, 1994.8 On October 31, 1994 Dynamic gave Rameo a requested confidentiality agreement. Rameo then produced the requested financial statements that Trust sought.
On November 15, 1994 the court ordered Rameo to produce five more items of data.9 It was in response to the latter order that Rameo invoked this court’s original cognizance to prohibit the order’s enforcement.
II
TRUST, QUA JUDGMENT CREDITOR OF YAW, IS ENTITLED TO THE COURT’S AID IN ITS EFFORTS TO PROTECT THE RAMCO STOCK SALE AGAINST COMPLAINTS THAT IT WAS NOT AT A FAIR PRICE
Since Trust’s New York money judgment10 has been domesticated11 in Tulsa County, it is enforceable12 in Oklahoma. It confers on Trust the status, rights and remedies afforded by our law to any judgment creditor. Trust may avail itself not only of the court’s legal execution process but also of its equitable powers to aid in collecting its judgment.13
To assist the judgment creditor in discovering and identifying the judgment debtor’s assets, the legal system has long provided certain equitable redress.14 The remedies, available in “supplementary proceedings,”15 are now partially codified in 12 O.S.1991 § 848.16 They are clearly invocable to assist with discovery that would protect a creditor against future complaints that the sale was not at a fair price.
*947III
OUR LAW WILL NOT EXTEND TO TRUST A RIGHT TO SELL YAW’S RAMCO STOCK AND ALSO DENY IT A LEGALLY SAFE WAY TO VALUE THE SHARES OFFERED FOR SALE
Trust’s actions, questioned in today’s proceedings, essentially consist of efforts to satisfy its judgment by securing appraisement of stock antecedent to a sale of the judgment debtor’s assets in its possession. By a subpoena duces tecum Trust is not seeking to secure a shareholder’s broad right to inspect17 the corporation’s books and records. Rather, Trust presses for the disclosure of data which, under generally accepted accounting procedures, are relevant in determining the fair market value of Ramco’s privately held stock for which there is no established market value. It is within the nisi prius court’s equitable cognizance to grant the relief sought for the creditor’s protection against possible future complaints that the sale was not fair.18
IV
TRUST IS ALSO ENTITLED TO THE DATA IN RAMCO’S POSSESSION BECAUSE THEY ARE NECESSARY TO VALUE ITS RAMCO STOCK BY GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES
Qua judgment creditor, Trust also is entitled to secure the data items essential for pre-sale appraisement of Yaw’s Rameo shares. Trust seeks no more information than the very minimum it must have under generally accepted accounting standards. Its efforts bear no analogy to a shareholder’s statutory or common-law quest for inspection, i.e., assertion of a right to know the full sweep of corporate activity. Trust’s quest for disclosure is appropriately most narrowly focused.19
V
TRUST’S QUEST IS LIMITED TO DISCLOSURE OF DATA NECESSARY TO EFFECTUATE A LEGALLY SAFE SALE OF YAW’S RAMCO STOCK AND DOES NOT AMOUNT TO GENERAL DISCOVERY OF RAMCO’S BUSINESS RECORDS
The supplementary remedy that is available to a judgment creditor is ancillary to the original action in which the judgment was rendered.20 This principle accords with our extant jurisprudence21 and with its consistent teaching that § 848 is a trial procedure and does not amount to an impermissible general discovery by the judgment creditor. The respondent judge’s November 15 order does not give Trust a license to engage in a hunting expedition. It stands limited to specific items of information which, as the court has determined [after taking evidence 22J, are *948relevant to the valuation process of a debtor’s asset sought to be offered at a private sale, with the proceeds to be applied toward the judgment’s satisfaction.
VI
TODAY’S OPINION RESOLVES MOOTED ISSUES UNDER THE LIKELIHOOD-OF-RECURRENCE EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE
By their February 6, 1995 joint motion before this court Rameo and Trust seek this cause’s dismissal because the proceeding has been mooted by Trust’s completed sale of Yaw’s Rameo stock. Inasmuch as the important legal issue in dispute here is likely to recur, the court nonetheless proceeds to decide this no longer lively contest under an exception to the mootness doctrine.23 I concur in today’s effort to expand the body of extant jurisprudence.
VII
SUMMARY
Today’s writ denies a judgment creditor the opportunity to conduct a legally safe sale of a debtor’s stock in a privately held corporation. The court’s pronouncement is made sans opportunity to examine all of the comprehensive record of evidence presented to the respondent judge.
The respondent judge’s November 15 order, entered in a § 848 supplementary proceeding, should be left undisturbed. It compels disclosure of data absolutely necessary to appraise — in a legally safe manner — Ram-co’s stock by application of generally accepted accounting principles.24
I would subject Trust neither to the hazard of a debtor’s tort claim nor to a post-judgment dispute over the amount of credit rightly due the debtor as the sale’s proceeds. Because Trust is deprived today of a valuable protection against possible complaints that its sale was not at a fair price,25 I recede from today’s writ as well as from the court’s pronouncement.

. The November 15 order requires Rameo to produce: (1) all shareholder or board resolutions of Rameo and its subsidiaries [Companies]; (2) all board or shareholder consent actions for the Companies; (3) all minutes of board or shareholder meetings of the Companies; (4) copies of any reserve studies relating to the property owned or leased by the Companies; and (5) information regarding the accounts payable and accounts receivable of the Companies. For a general discussion of how the respondent judge formulated the categories of data ordered produced, see infra note 22.

. On October 15, 1993 Trust secured judgment against Yaw in the amount of $3,203,400.67 in United States Trust Company of New York v. Robert E. Yaw, Index No. 6462/92, Supreme Court of New York. This judgment was domesticated in Tulsa County on October 29, 1993 by compliance with the provisions of 12 O.S.1991 § 721 [see infra note 6].

. Yaw executed a pledge agreement dated August 10, 1989 by which he granted Trust a security interest in his Rameo stock. It is undisputed that Trust has possession of Yaw’s Rameo stock certificates. Yaw’s pledge provides that if his Rameo shares are sold, the sale proceeds should be applied toward satisfying his obligation. In selling Yaw’s stock Trust is neither an interloper nor an officious volunteer. See N.Y. [U.C.C.] §§ 9-203, 9-304, 9-305 (1994).

. Our jurisprudence recognizes a pledgee’s right to sell pledged property at a private sale. Ardmore State Bank v. Mason, 30 Okl. 568, 120 P. 1080, 1084 (1911); Dunbar v. Commercial Electrical Supply Co., 32 Okl. 634, 123 P. 417, 418 (1912).

. See my analysis, infra note 18.

. The pertinent terms of 12 O.S.1991 § 721 are:
“A copy of any foreign judgment authenticated in accordance with the applicable Act of Congress or of the statutes of this state may be filed in the office of the court clerk of any county of this state.... A judgment so filed has the same effect ... as a judgment of a district court of this state and may be enforced or satisfied in like manner...." [Emphasis added.]

. The pertinent provisions of 12 O.S.1991 § 731 provide:
"Executions shall be deemed process of the court, and shall be issued by the clerk, and directed to the sheriff of the county....”

. The court's order requires that Rameo ⅛ audited financial statements, furnished to Trust and Dynamic, be kept confidential. [Rameo claims that Dynamic was one of its competitors.]

. See supra note 1 for the November 15, 1993 nisi prius order's terms.

. See supra note 2 for the money judgment's terms.

. By the terms of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition Act, 12 O.S.1991 §§ 710 et seq., Trust’s money judgment against Yaw acquired domestic recognition and became entitled to local execution relief.

. Trust’s judgment is enforceable under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Acts, 12 O.S.1991 §§ 719 et seq.

. In 1988 the legislature effectively abolished the common-law requirement — that one must exhaust legal remedies before resorting to equity— when it amended 12 O.S.1991 § 735 [effective November 1, 1988], The amendment provides that, in addition to execution, issuance of a garnishment summons — an equitable remedy — will extend the period during which a judgment remains enforceable (and is kept from falling into dormancy).

. The law has long recognized "supplementary proceedings” — i.e., proceedings subsequent to judgment or execution — to aid judgment creditors in identifying and applying debtors’ assets to the judgments' satisfaction. See H. Oleck, Debt- or-Creditor Law § 17 at 66 (1962); J.W. Smith, The Equitable Remedies of Creditors §§ 200 et seq. (1899); A.C. Freeman, A Treatise on the Law of Judgments § 848 at 1795-98 (1925); see also Honce v. Schram, 73 Kan. 868, 85 P. 535, 537 (1906); Herrlich v. Kaufmann, 99 Cal. 271, 33 P. 857, 858 (Cal.1893). Proceedings of this nature are characterized as supplemental to the action in which the judgment was rendered. See J.W. Smith, supra § 4 at 11.

. Supplementary proceedings — while in the nature of a creditor’s bill — are in lieu of them and are matters of equitable cognizance. Historically they were used in aid of execution to reach beyond the limits of common-law process and compel that "which ought to have been done.” J.W. Smith, The Equitable Remedies of Creditors, supra note 14, § 4 at 11. The propriety of affording equitable relief lies within the discretion of the nisi prius court. Mid-America Corporation v. Geismar, Okl., 380 P.2d 85, 88 (1963). For a general discussion of creditors' bills and their use in discovering and identifying assets of the judgment debtor, see G. Bispham, The Principles of Equity: A Treatise on the System of Justice Administered in Courts of Chancery § 525 at 805 (J. McCoy, 10th ed. 1922).

. The pertinent terms of 12 O.S.1991 § 848 are:
"Witnesses may be required, upon the order of the judge, to appear and testify upon any proceedings herein provided in the same manner as upon the trial of an issue."

. With the enactment of Business Incorporation Act in 1947, a shareholder became entitled to inspect corporate records “for any proper purpose." Wolozyn v. Begarek, Okl., 378 P.2d 1007, 1010 (1963). Before the Act's passage shareholders had an unfettered statutory right to inspect corporate books and records irrespective of their motivation. Hoover v. Fox Rig & Lumber Co., Okl., 189 P.2d 929, 932-33 (1948).

. Equity imposes upon one selling pledged collateral the affirmative duty to obtain a fair and reasonable price. See Whitman v. Boston Terminal Refrigerating Co., 233 Mass. 386, 124 N.E. 43, 44 (1919); Dibertv. D’Arcy, 248 Mo. 617, 154 S.W. 1116, 1124(1913); German-American State Bank v. Spokane C.R.R. & Nav. Co., 49 Wash. 359, 95 P. 261, 262 (1908). The sale of collateral in which one possesses a perfected security interest in the Article 9 sense of the Commercial Code must be "commercially reasonable”. 12A O.S. 1991 § 9-504(3). For a description of disputes that may arise upon a complaint that the sale was not commercially reasonable, see the exhaustive opinion in Ruden v. Citizens Bank & Trust, 638 A.2d 1225 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.1994).

. See supra note 17 for the history of a shareholder’s right to inspect.

. See supra note 14, J.W. Smith, The Equitable Remedies of Creditors § 4 at 10.

. Stone v. Coleman, Okl., 557 P.2d 904, 905 (1976).

. Our paperwork reveals that the respondent judge heard testimony of what was required, under generally accepted accounting principles, to value the stock of a privately held corporation. See Exhibit “B” to Ramco's abstract of record in *948support of its application. It is obvious that merely a trickle of the entire testimony was incorporated into the materials tendered for our review in this original action.

.Our jurisprudence recognizes two “escape hatches” from the strictures of the mootness doctrine. These are (1) the public-interest and (2) the likelihood-of-recurrence exceptions. City of Oklahoma City v. Oklahoma Tax Com'n, Okl., 789 P.2d 1287, 1297 (1990) (Opala, J„ dissenting); Westinghouse Elec. v. Grand River Dam Auth., Okl., 720 P.2d 713, 720 (1986); Peppers Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, 198 Okl. 451, 179 P.2d 899, 901'(1947).

. The law’s general principles of fairness are applicable to all post-judgment judicial sales. The safeguards that govern judicial sales can be no less protective of the debtor than those imposed on contractually authorized private sales. Cate v. Archon Oil Co., Inc., Okl., 695 P.2d 1352, 1355 (1985). See also 12A O.S.1991 § 9-504(3).

. See Ruden, supra note 18 at 1225.