Court Opinion

ID: 9861809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:36:37.720892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:29:07.278540
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HUTCHINSON, specially concurring: I concur in the majority’s judgment. I agree a genuine issue of material fact exists in the form of whether Winnebago requested a release from defendant. However, because I believe the majority does not sufficiently delineate what plaintiffs must prove to be entitled to equitable relief, I write separately to provide the trial court with guidance upon remand. Initially, the reasonableness of any reliance or expectation forming the basis for equitable relief must be determined in light of section 4.1 of the Interest Act. The majority determined that section 4.1 clearly and unambiguously prevented Winnebago from requesting a release of the Bartholomew lien. The fact that the action out of which arises Winnebago’s need to seek equitable relief is beyond the title company’s legal authority militates strongly against a finding of reasonableness. How may a party reasonably rely, or reasonably expect something in return, on the basis of an action the law does not permit the party to take? Assuming this hurdle can be cleared, any equitable theory potentially forming the basis of a ruling in favor of plaintiffs should not be premised exclusively on evidence that Winnebago sent defendant what the title company alleges was a "payoff” check on the revolving credit line. Such evidence does not, standing alone, establish that (1) Winnebago reasonably expected a release of defendant’s lien; (2) defendant reasonably should have known Winnebago expected a release; (3) Winnebago’s reliance was reasonable; (4) Winnebago reasonably expected its lien to take priority over defendant’s lien; (5) defendant reasonably should have known Winnebago expected its lien to take priority over defendant’s lien; and (6) Winnebago paid down the revolving credit line "involuntarily.” Basing any of the preceding findings exclusively on the paying down of the Bartholomew revolving credit line would require defendant to act as Winnebago’s attorney—and, failing this, to be prescient. Defendant should not be required to divine the reasons for and consequences of actions undertaken by Winnebago. Sophisticated business entities engaged in arm’s-length transactions should not be duty bound to decipher and discern the motivations for business decisions made by other sophisticated business entities whose personnel fail to acquaint themselves with the clear and unambiguous meaning of the law. On remand, if the trial court discovers only that the parties exchanged paperwork under the impression that the revolving credit line was a traditional mortgage—i.e., neither party understood that a revolving credit line is governed by different legal principles—I believe that the trial court should find Winnebago’s reliance, its expectation of a release of defendant’s lien, and the expectation of gaining first priority over this lien unreasonable. This will be a difficult case on remand. One of these parties will be burdened with $40,000 of apparently uncollectible debt. Such an outcome creates a powerful and just incentive for sophisticated lending institutions and their associated entities to read and abide by the law. Persons are presumed to know the law and ignorance of the same is no excuse. See In re Cheronis, 114 Ill. 2d 527, 535 (1986) (stating that attorney’s commingling of client funds is not excused because attorney was unaware such conduct was prohibited); Pyle v. Ferrell, 12 Ill. 2d 547, 554-55 (1958) (stating that party’s failure to take remedial action is not excused because he did not understand his mineral rights could be sold to satisfy delinquent taxes without sale of attendant land); Singh v. Department of Professional Regulation, 252 Ill. App. 3d 859, 868 (1993) (stating that pharmacist’s lack of compliance with controlled substances reporting requirements not excused because he was unaware of such requirements); In re Estate of Winters, 239 Ill. App. 3d 730, 736 (1993) (stating that party is presumed aware of statutory probate claim period), quoting In re Estate of Malone, 198 Ill. App. 3d 960, 964 (1990) (same); Kampen v. Department of Transportation, 150 Ill. App. 3d 578, 581 (1986) (stating that party transporting corrosive liquids is presumed aware of regulations governing this activity), citing United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563, 29 L. Ed. 2d 178, 182, 91 S. Ct. 1697, 1701-02 (1971). This fundamental notion must apply equally to mammoth corporations as it does to the common man. Equity is not a palliative for a party’s folly, nor does a harsh result convert the ignorance of one party into an injustice by another. I note, in further passing, plaintiffs did not raise the question of unjust enrichment in their briefs. Therefore, I believe it is unnecessary to discuss this equitable doctrine.