Court Opinion

ID: 9955096
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-27 17:01:37.088727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:15.644941
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAR 27 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSEFINA ARAMBULA-BRAVO,                        No. 21-826
                                                Agency No.
             Petitioner,                        A093-374-921
 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                            Submitted March 25, 2024**
                               Pasadena, California

Before: GRABER, GOULD, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

      Petitioner Josefina Arambula-Bravo is a native and citizen of Mexico. In

2010, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) served her with a Notice to

Appear (NTA) that did not contain a date or time for her initial removal hearing.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Petitioner moved to terminate proceedings; when her motion was denied, she

applied for cancellation of removal and adjustment of status. An immigration

judge (IJ) denied Petitioner relief, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)

remanded for further fact-finding regarding the date of Petitioner’s last entry. On

remand, the IJ again denied relief and ordered Petitioner removed to Mexico.

Petitioner now seeks review of the BIA’s decision dismissing her appeal of that

denial. We deny the petition.

      Where, as here, the BIA adopts the IJ’s reasoning, we review the decisions

of both the BIA and the IJ. Hernandez v. Garland, 47 F.4th 908, 912 (9th Cir.

2022). We review de novo the BIA’s determinations on questions of law.

Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc).

We review for substantial evidence the BIA’s factual findings, including credibility

determinations. Dong v. Garland, 50 F.4th 1291, 1296 (9th Cir. 2022). “Under

this standard, findings of facts are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator

would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id. (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted).

      1. Petitioner argues that the IJ lacked jurisdiction over her removal

proceedings because the NTA did not contain the date or time of her initial

removal proceeding. That argument is foreclosed by United States v. Bastide-

Hernandez, 39 F.4th 1187, 1190–91 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc), cert. denied, 143 S.

                                        2                                     21-826
Ct. 755 (Jan. 23, 2023) (holding that the failure of an NTA to include date and time

information does not deprive the immigration court of jurisdiction).

      2. Next, Petitioner argues that the BIA erred in two ways when it held that

she was inadmissible as charged. First, she asserts that she was issued a V visa and

that this constituted a lawful admission. But the record contains no evidence that

Petitioner was granted a V visa. Second, Petitioner disputes the agency’s adverse

credibility finding regarding her testimony about the date of her last entry into the

United States and whether it was pursuant to parole. Substantial evidence,

including discrepancies between Petitioner’s testimony and documents in the

record, supports the BIA’s holding.

      3. Petitioner also asserts that the BIA erred in finding her statutorily

ineligible for cancellation of removal, arguing that her criminal conviction for

unlawful transportation of noncitizens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii)

does not qualify as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(N). But we

held in United States v. Galindo-Gallegos, 244 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. 2001), that a

conviction for unlawfully transporting noncitizens is categorically an aggravated

felony. Id. at 733–34; see 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) (noncitizens convicted of an

aggravated felony are statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal).

      4. Petitioner contests the BIA’s determination that she is ineligible for

adjustment of status. As explained above, Petitioner is inadmissible, and therefore

                                         3                                       21-826
ineligible for adjustment of status, because she was neither admitted nor paroled

into the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (noncitizen must be inspected and

admitted or paroled into the United States to be eligible for adjustment of status).

Additionally, Petitioner is inadmissible, and therefore ineligible for adjustment of

status, because she unlawfully reentered the United States after her prior removals

in 1997 and 2000. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i), (C)(i)(II).

      5. Finally, the IJ did not abuse her discretion in denying Petitioner’s request

for a continuance. See Ahmed v. Holder, 569 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2009)

(stating standard). Petitioner did not establish good cause for a continuance

because she had sufficient time to complete her application for adjustment of

status. Moreover, for the reasons explained above, a continuance to allow

Petitioner to complete her application would have been futile because no additional

facts could have overcome her statutory ineligibility for adjustment of status.

      PETITION DENIED.

                                         4                                    21-826