Court Opinion

ID: 9458313
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:48:38.396442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:43.087671
License: Public Domain

CAMPBELL, Senior District Judge
(dissenting).
Respectfully, I dissent.
I would join in the opinion of my distinguished brethren were it not for my disagreement with the underlying assumption pervading their entire decision. The majority accepts without question that the action of the defendants in completely suspending the operation of the University was reasonable. Thus, in characterizing the plaintiffs’ claim of constitutional deprivation the majority states: “It is this deprivation —the suspension of the normal educational activities they have described— which plaintiffs maintain is equivalent to a violation of their rights of free speech and assembly, equal protection and due process.”
The plaintiffs’ complaint, however, clearly charges that the defendants deprived them of their constitutional rights of speech and assembly by arbitrarily denying them the opportunity to pursue their normal educational activities. It is further alleged that the plaintiffs had been granted the right to use the facilities of the University, that, (as the majority concedes) their rights of speech and assembly were intertwined with the use of these facilities, and finally that these constitutional rights were deprived them by the defendants’ causing or acquiescing in the wholesale misuse of these facilities, arbitrarily cancelling classroom sessions and by coercing those plaintiffs who sought merely to exercise these ordinary rights.
When the complaint is viewed in what I consider to be its proper light, I can only conclude that it states a proper federal claim under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. There can be no dispute that the constitutional assurances of speech and assembly are intertwined with and involved in the educational process. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629; Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731. It therefore follows that the arbitrary denial of the opportunity to exercise such constitutional guarantees suffices to state a claim for relief under Section 1983. If a dissident student has a constitutionally protected right to wear, in nondisruptive circumstances, a black armband into a classroom as a peaceful expression of his anti-war views, then students who wish merely to pursue their customary educational opportunities also possess a constitutional right to enter the classroom and express their ideas of normal educational pursuit, free from arbitrary interference by school officials. See Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731.
In my judgment to acknowledge this constitutional protection would not, as the majority suggests, have the effect of elevating a particular educational forum or a specific curricular form to constitutional significance. I feel that once a forum for expression and assembly has been provided by a University in the first instance, then it may not be capriciously and arbitrarily eliminated. This, of course, leaves the initial selection of the particular forum to the discretion of University officials where it rightfully belongs.
It seems to me unfair, to say the least, that the Federal Courts which seem to welcome — almost solicit — every *897possible type of student rights case, from hair styles to the destruction of school property, for approval as proper forms of student protest should here close their doors to a group of students who seek merely their civil and contractual rights to pursue peacefully their studies without the violent interference of a well organized disruptive mob allegedly, supported by the University. See, Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034, 1036 (7th Cir. 1969); Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1972); Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970); Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971). I would reverse the judgment of the District Court and would also permit the plaintiffs to file their amended complaint. The question of the reasonableness of the defendants’ actions could thus be placed in issue by way of a properly pleaded defense.