Court Opinion

ID: 9412046
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-28 18:11:33.394194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:24.102076
License: Public Domain

J-S10039-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                            :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                            :
              v.                            :
                                            :
                                            :
 TYRONE JEFFCOAT-PARKER                     :
                                            :
                     Appellant              :   No. 2764 EDA 2022

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 14, 2022
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
              Criminal Division at No: CP-46-CR-0000058-2017

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and STABILE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                                FILED JULY 27, 2023

      Appellant, Tyrone Jeffcoat-Parker, appeals from the order entered

September 14, 2022, in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County,

denying as untimely his amended petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction

Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. PCRA counsel alleged in the

petition that he himself was ineffective for failing to file a timely original PCRA

petition. The PCRA court dismissed the amended petition on the ground that

counsel could not allege his own ineffectiveness. Upon review, we vacate the

order and remand to the PCRA court for proceedings consistent with this

memorandum.

      The PCRA court summarized the relevant background as follows.

      A jury convicted [Appellant] of two counts of robbery and related
      offenses, and [the trial court] imposed an aggregate sentence of
      7 to 14 years in prison on January 2, 2018. [Appellant] appealed
      and the Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence.
      Commonwealth v. Jeffcoat-Parker, 615 EDA 2018 (Pa. Super.
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      July 17, 2019). Our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal
      on December 23, 2019, Commonwealth v. Jeffcoat-Parker,
      481 MAL 2019.

      [Appellant] filed a counseled PCRA petition on March 29, 2021,
      asserting trial counsel ineffectiveness.      The Commonwealth
      moved to dismiss the petition on the ground of untimeliness and
      [the PCRA court] gave [Appellant] notice of intent to dismiss.
      Appellant, through PCRA counsel, responded by claiming an
      exception to the PCRA’s limitations period – PCRA counsel’s
      alleged abandonment in not timely filing a request[ed] PCRA
      petition – and seeking leave to amend to add an additional claim
      of trial counsel ineffectiveness. [The PCRA court] granted leave
      to amend and [Appellant] filed an amended petition.           The
      Commonwealth again moved to dismiss, reiterating the
      untimeliness of the petition. [The PCRA court] gave [Appellant]
      notice of intent to dismiss, to which [Appellant] again responded
      that his petition was untimely due to counsel’s abandonment.
      [The PCRA court] dismissed the petition, as amended, on
      September 14, 2022, on the basis of untimeliness. [This appeal
      followed.]

PCRA Court Opinion, 11/14/22, at 1-2 (footnote omitted).

      The PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s amended petition as untimely,

reasoning:

      [Appellant] invoked the newly discovered fact exception codified
      at 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9545(b)(l)(ii), which permits consideration of
      an otherwise time-barred petition where “the facts upon which the
      claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not
      have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” . . . The
      new fact [Appellant] relies upon is PCRA counsel’s alleged
      abandonment in not filing a timely requested petition. The
      exception is not available to [Appellant] under the circumstances
      because PCRA counsel cannot assert his own ineffectiveness.

Id. at 3.

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      Appellant filed a timely appeal from the order of dismissal, and the PCRA

court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925 opinion without directing Appellant to file a

statement of matters complained of on appeal.

      Appellant raises a single issue in this appeal. “Did the [PCRA] court err

by dismissing the Appellant’s petition without an evidentiary hearing as there

was a material issue of fact as to whether or not [Appellant’s] PCRA counsel

abandoned him for the purposes of timeliness exception under 42 Pa. C.S.

§ 9545(b)(1)(ii)?” Appellant’s Brief at 2.

      When reviewing the propriety of an order pertaining to PCRA relief,

      we consider the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing
      party at the PCRA level. This Court is limited to determining
      whether the evidence of record supports the conclusions of the
      PCRA court and whether the ruling is free of legal error. We grant
      great deference to the PCRA court’s findings that are supported in
      the record and will not disturb them unless they have no support
      in the certified record. However, we afford no such deference to
      the post-conviction court’s legal conclusions. We thus apply a de
      novo standard of review to the PCRA [c]ourt’s legal conclusions.

Commonwealth v. Diaz, 183 A.3d 417, 421 (Pa. Super. 2018).

      All PCRA petitions, “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be

filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final” unless an

exception to timeliness exists. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). The one-year

time limitation can be overcome if a petitioner (1) alleges and proves one of

the three exceptions set forth in Section 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) of the PCRA, and

(2) files a petition raising this exception within one year of the date the claim

could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). One such exception

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is when “the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the

petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due

diligence.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). “The PCRA’s time restrictions are

jurisdictional in nature. Thus, if a PCRA petition is untimely, neither this Court

nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction over the petition. Without jurisdiction,

we simply do not have the legal authority to address the substantive claims.”

Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. 2006) (internal citations

and   quotation     marks   omitted)    (overruled    on   other    grounds    by

Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267 (Pa. 2020)).

      Our Supreme Court has held that counsel’s negligence per se in filing an

untimely PCRA petition constitutes adequate grounds to permit the filing of a

new PCRA petition under the newly discovered facts exception in Section

9545(b)(1)(ii).    Commonwealth v. Peterson, 192 A.3d 1123, 1125 (Pa.

2018). In Peterson, counsel (Attorney I) filed a PCRA petition one day too

late under the PCRA’s timeliness requirements. The PCRA court denied the

petition, and this Court quashed the petitioner’s appeal due to the petition’s

untimely filing.   Through new counsel (Attorney II), the petitioner filed a

second petition seeking reinstatement of his PCRA appellate rights nunc pro

tunc to challenge the PCRA court’s order dismissing his first petition based

upon Attorney I’s ineffectiveness in filing his first PCRA petition late. The PCRA

court held that the second petition was timely but denied relief on the merits.

This Court reversed, holding that the second petition was untimely.           The

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Supreme Court reversed, ruling that Attorney I’s untimely filing of the first

PCRA petition constituted ineffectiveness per se, “as it completely deprived

[the petitioner] of any consideration of his collateral claims under the PCRA.”

Id. at 1130. Attorney I’s ineffectiveness per se in connection with the first

PCRA petition was a newly discovered “fact” under Section 9545(b)(2)[(ii)],

as the PCRA court had made factual findings that the petitioner did not know

about the untimely filing and could not have ascertained this fact through the

exercise of due diligence. Id. at 1130-31. Given these factual findings, and

because Attorney I’s untimely filing of the first PCRA petition constituted

ineffectiveness per se by completely foreclosing the petitioner from obtaining

any collateral review, the Court concluded that the petitioner was entitled to

invoke Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) to permit the filing of his second PCRA petition

beyond the one-year time bar. Id. at 1132.

      Here, as in Peterson, the amended petition, accepted as true,

establishes that (1) the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Appellant’s

petition for allowance of direct appeal on December 23, 2019; (2) the one-

year limitation period began running on March 23, 2020, Appellant’s deadline

for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court;

(3) Appellant requested PCRA counsel to file a PCRA petition; (4) the limitation

period for filing a PCRA petition expired on March 23, 2021; and (5) counsel

did not file the original PCRA petition until March 29, 2021, six days after

expiration of the limitation period. These facts, if proven, establish that PCRA

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counsel was ineffective per se by failing to file the requested PCRA petition

within the limitation period, thus completely foreclosing Appellant from

obtaining any collateral review and entitling him to invoke Section

9545(b)(1)(ii) to permit the filing of his amended PCRA petition beyond the

one-year time bar.

       The PCRA court dismissed the amended PCRA petition on the ground

that Appellant’s counsel alleged therein that he himself was ineffective for

failing to file a timely original petition. Counsel, the PCRA court said, could

not assert his own ineffectiveness. PCRA Court Opinion, 11/14/22, at 3. We

disagree that dismissal was the appropriate remedy. When counsel raises his

own ineffectiveness, the proper remedy is for the court to appoint new counsel

unless counsel’s self-accusation is clearly meritorious or clearly meritless.

Commonwealth v. Bond, 819 A.2d 33, 39 n.2 (Pa. 2002).1 Here, counsel’s

self-accusation obviously is not clearly meritless. Nor is it clearly meritorious,

because an evidentiary hearing is necessary to establish (1) whether and

when Appellant requested counsel to file the original PCRA petition, (2)

____________________________________________

1 See also Commonwealth v. Betts, 240 A.3d 616 (Pa. 2020):

       Where [the right to counsel to assist in prosecuting a first PCRA
       petition] has been effectively denied by the action of court or
       counsel, the petitioner is entitled to remand to the PCRA court for
       appointment of counsel to prosecute the PCRA petition. The
       remand serves to give the petitioner the benefit of competent
       counsel at each stage of post-conviction review.

Id. at 624.

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whether Appellant was unaware of the status of his original PCRA petition, and

(3) whether Appellant could not have discovered counsel’s failure to file timely

petition earlier through exercise of due diligence. Under these circumstances,

it was necessary for the court to appoint new counsel to represent Appellant

in these PCRA proceedings and to conduct an evidentiary hearing on

Appellant’s claim of ineffectiveness. The PCRA court erred by failing to take

these steps.

      Accordingly, we vacate the order of the PCRA court and remand to the

court for the appointment of new counsel, or to allow Appellant to seek and

retain new private counsel, within 45 days of this memorandum. We further

direct the PCRA court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the ineffectiveness

claim, as asserted in Appellant’s amended PCRA petition.

      Order    vacated.   Remanded   for   proceedings   consistent   with   this

memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/27/2023

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