Court Opinion

ID: 9963849
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 14:05:30.749741+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:02.352746
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: APRIL 19, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                          TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                             NO. 2023-CA-0458-MR

ISAAC W. BERNHEIM
FOUNDATION                                                         APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM BULLITT CIRCUIT COURT
v.           HONORABLE RODNEY DARREL BURRESS, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 19-CI-00762

LOUISVILLE GAS AND ELECTRIC
COMPANY; EAST KENTUCKY
POWER COOPERATIVE, INC.; AND
KENTUCKY HERITAGE LAND
CONSERVATION FUND BOARD                                             APPELLEES

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                 ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; COMBS AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

MCNEILL, JUDGE: Isaac W. Bernheim Foundation (“Bernheim”) appeals from

an interlocutory judgment finding Louisville Gas and Electric Company (“LG&E”)

has the right to condemn Bernheim’s property for a natural gas pipeline. Finding

no error, we affirm.
                LG&E is a public utility that provides natural gas service in Bullitt

County, Kentucky. To increase supply and facilitate expansion, LG&E is

constructing an underground natural gas pipeline. Part of the pipeline runs through

property owned by Bernheim, 494 acres of land known as the Cedar Grove

Wildlife Corridor (“Simon Tracts”). LG&E attempted to purchase an easement

from Bernheim but when negotiations were unsuccessful, initiated a condemnation

proceeding under the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky (KRS1 278.502).

                Bernheim owns a nature preserve in Bullitt and Nelson Counties. In

2018, Bernheim purchased the Simon Tracts with grant money from the Kentucky

Heritage Land Conservation Fund (“Fund”).2 As a condition of the grant,

Bernheim was required to convey to the Commonwealth “a conservation easement

in perpetuity over all land acquired, in whole or in part, with fund proceeds.” 418

KAR3 1:050 § 6(1). Another stipulation was that the land must be maintained for

the conservation purpose for which it was acquired. 418 KAR 1:050 § 6(1)(b);

KRS 146.560(2).

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.
2
 The grant from the Kentucky Heritage Land Conservation Fund provided half the purchase
price and a grant from the Imperiled Bat Conservation Fund, administered by the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service, supplied the balance.
3
    Kentucky Administrative Regulations.

                                              -2-
              In the condemnation action, Bernheim challenged LG&E’s right to

take, arguing it lacked authority to condemn property that is statutorily dedicated to

public conservation use and encumbered by a government-held conservation

easement.4 Following an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court found in LG&E’s

favor, granting it an interlocutory judgment pursuant to KRS 416.610. This appeal

followed.

              “Since this case was tried before the circuit court without a jury, we

review the trial court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the

legal issues de novo.” God’s Center Foundation, Inc. v. Lexington Fayette Urban

Cnty. Government, 125 S.W.3d 295, 300 (Ky. App. 2002). On appeal, Bernheim

does not raise the standard challenges to a condemnor’s right to take, such as

necessity, public use, and reasonable compensation, but instead makes several

arguments concerning LG&E’s right to take based upon the existence of the

Commonwealth’s conservation easement. Specifically, Bernheim argues: (1)

LG&E cannot condemn property that has been put to a prior public use; (2)

LG&E’s power to condemn is limited to private property; (3) the previous Court of

Appeals’ decision did not determine the issues on appeal; and (4) KRS 382.850(2)

4
 Bernheim made other challenges to LG&E’s right to take below, but does not raise them on
appeal; therefore, we do not recite them here.

                                            -3-
does not make a government conservation easement pursuant to KRS Chapter 146

a legal fiction.

              As alluded to above, this is the second time this case has been on

appeal. In Kentucky Heritage Land Conservation Fund Board v. Louisville Gas

and Electric Company, 648 S.W.3d 76, 78 (Ky. App. 2022), discretionary review

denied (Aug. 10, 2022), a panel of this Court held that sovereign immunity did not

preclude LG&E from condemning property subject to a state-owned easement. In

that appeal, the Kentucky Heritage Land Conservation Fund Board (“Board”) was

the appellant, and Bernheim filed a brief in support of the Board’s position. The

Board made essentially the same arguments Bernheim now makes, and our Court

considered and rejected them. We believe Kentucky Heritage is dispositive of the

issues in this appeal; nevertheless, to be thorough, we address Bernheim’s

arguments individually.

              Bernheim first argues condemnation is prohibited by the prior public

use doctrine. It cites the general rule that “land devoted to one public use cannot

be taken for another public use in the absence of express legislative authority for

the taking.” Jefferson Cnty. By and Through Hollenbach v. South Central Bell Tel.

Co., 555 S.W.2d 629, 632 (Ky. App. 1977). Bernheim claims the Simon Tracts are

already devoted to public use because they were purchased with public funds and

must be maintained for public conservation purposes. Thus, LG&E cannot

                                         -4-
condemn the property for another public use because it lacks express legislative

authority. Bernheim acknowledges we previously “rejected the argument . . . that

LG&E lacked the power of condemnation under the ‘prior public use’ doctrine[.]”

In the prior appeal, we held that “the plain language of KRS 382.850(2) authorizes

a statutory right of eminent domain to prevail over a conservation easement

because a conservation easement is assumed not to exist upon the exercise of a

statutory right of eminent domain. If it is assumed that the Board’s conservation

easement does not exist, then there is no prior public use to impede the exercise of

LG&E’s right of eminent domain.” Kentucky Heritage, 648 S.W.3d at 89.

             Nevertheless, it claims we “misapprehended th[e] significant

distinction” that the prior public use arises not from KRS 382.850(2), but from

KRS 146.560 and 146.570. Bernheim seeks to avoid our prior holding by

sidestepping KRS 382.850(2). Its argument goes like this: KRS Chapter 146

requires property acquired with Fund monies to be maintained in perpetuity for

public conservation purposes – a public use. However, the statute does not

reference KRS Chapter 382 or require that this be done through a conservation

easement. Because KRS Chapter 146 was enacted after KRS Chapter 382, this

omission must be intentional. The public use arising under KRS Chapter 146 is

different than the one arising under a conservation easement. Thus, KRS Chapter

382 is simply not relevant. Since KRS Chapter 146 does not explicitly allow

                                         -5-
condemnation of land or property interests acquired under its provisions, LG&E

lacks express legislative authority for the taking.

              Though creative, we find its argument unconvincing. The simple fact

is the conservation easement exists; thus KRS 382.850(2), which governs

conservation easements, applies. The General Assembly mandated the Board

administer the Fund and gave them authority to promulgate regulations to

accomplish its purpose.5 Pursuant to 418 KAR 1:050 § 6(1), Bernheim conveyed

to the Commonwealth a conservation easement when it purchased the Simon

Tracts with Fund proceeds. The regulation explicitly states “[t]he conservation

easement shall meet the requirements of KRS 382.800 through 382.860 and ensure

that lands acquired shall be maintained in perpetuity for the purposes established

in KRS 146.560.” 418 KAR 1:050 § 6(1)(b).

              As much as Bernheim would like to distance KRS Chapter 146 from

KRS Chapter 382, the regulation explicitly links the two. The land LG&E seeks to

condemn is burdened by a conservation easement and KRS 382.850(2) is

applicable. “Under KRS 382.850(2), a conservation easement ‘shall not operate to

impair or restrict any right or power of eminent domain created by statute, and all

such rights and powers shall be exercisable as if the conservation easement did not

5
 Technically, KRS 146.560 states the Energy and Environmental Cabinet “may promulgate
upon recommendation of the board in accordance with the provisions of KRS Chapter 13A
administrative regulations as are deemed necessary . . . .” KRS 146.560(2) (emphasis added).

                                              -6-
exist.’” Kentucky Heritage, 648 S.W.3d at 85-86. “If it is assumed that the

Board’s conservation easement does not exist, then there is no prior public use to

impede the exercise of LG&E’s right of eminent domain.” Id. at 89.

             Bernheim next asserts LG&E’s power to condemn is limited to private

property. It notes LG&E’s authority to condemn comes from KRS 278.502 and

KRS 416.540-416.680, the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky. The Act

specifically defines “condemn” as to “to take private property for a public use

under the right of eminent domain[.]” KRS 416.540(1) (emphasis added).

Bernheim further argues KRS 382.850(2) does not enlarge the power of eminent

domain. Therefore, because the Act limits condemnation to private property and

KRS 382.850(2) does not expand that power, Bernheim claims LG&E lacks

statutory authority to condemn a publicly held conservation easement.

             We considered and rejected this argument in Kentucky Heritage.

There, we held

             [w]hile LG&E may not have the general power to
             condemn public property under KRS 278.502 and KRS
             416.540(1), KRS 382.850(2) expresses the Legislature’s
             intention that a conservation easement cannot be used to
             impede the exercise of any statutory power of eminent
             domain that the Legislature has otherwise conferred by
             statute. If the existence of the conservation easement is
             disregarded, as KRS 382.850(2) instructs, then LG&E
             would undoubtedly have the power to condemn the
             property at issue.

                                        -7-
Kentucky Heritage, 648 S.W.3d at 88. If the conservation easement is disregarded,

the Simon Tracts are simply private property – any public property interest

disappears.

              Bernheim next maintains Kentucky Heritage did not determine the

issues in this appeal. It rightly notes Kentucky Heritage was limited to whether

sovereign immunity precludes “commencement of condemnation proceedings

against the holder of a conservation easement.” Kentucky Heritage, 648 S.W.3d at

78-79. But it then reads too much into that language. Focusing on the word

“commencement[,]” it contends KRS 382.850(2) allows “commencement of an

action for condemnation as against [a] government-held easement but is

insufficient to allow [the] taking of that interest absent some statutory

authorization.”

              Although we did not reach the issue of LG&E’s right to take in

Kentucky Heritage, we interpreted KRS 382.850(2) as subjecting “a conservation

easement held by a governmental entity . . . [to] eminent domain.” Id. at 86. KRS

382.850(2) provides “[a] conservation easement . . . shall not operate to impair or

restrict any right or power of eminent domain . . . and all such rights and powers

shall be exercisable as if the conservation easement did not exist.” The statute

authorizes the exercise of “all . . . rights and powers [of eminent domain].” Id. It

does not limit exercise to just the commencement of condemnation proceedings.

                                          -8-
In sum, while Kentucky Heritage did not specifically address the relevant issue in

this appeal – whether LG&E has the right to take Bernheim’s property – its

interpretation of KRS 382.850(2) foreclosed Bernheim’s argument that a

government-held easement cannot be condemned.

             Relatedly, Bernheim contends Kentucky Heritage is not the law of the

case concerning LG&E’s right to condemn the conservation easement. “The law

of the case doctrine means issues decided in earlier appeals should not be revisited

in subsequent ones.” Armstrong v. Estate of Elmore, 647 S.W.3d 214, 217 (Ky.

2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It “designates the principle

that if an appellate court has passed on a legal question . . . the legal questions thus

determined by the appellate court will not be differently determined on a

subsequent appeal in the same case.” Inman v. Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847, 849 (Ky.

1982).

             Again, while we agree Kentucky Heritage did not determine LG&E’s

right to take Bernheim’s property, its statutory interpretation of KRS 382.850(2)

settled the legal arguments Bernheim advances on appeal. Thus, while our

previous opinion is not the law of the case as to LG&E’s right to take, its analysis

of KRS 382.850(2) is. We note that even if Kentucky Heritage’s statutory

interpretation were not the law of the case, we would be persuaded by its reasoning

and analysis. Regardless, as it pertains to Bernheim’s arguments on appeal, we

                                          -9-
hold that KRS 382.850(2) removes any “issue of the Commonwealth’s ownership

interest in the conservation easement . . . as an obstacle to the pursuit of

condemnation proceedings by a party with a statutory right of eminent domain.”

Kentucky Heritage, 648 S.W.3d at 86.

             Finally, Bernheim argues KRS 382.850(2) does not make a

government conservation easement under KRS Chapter 146 a legal fiction. Again,

Bernheim disagrees with this Court’s interpretation of KRS 382.850(2) in

Kentucky Heritage that “[b]y employing the legal fiction that a conservation

easement does not exist upon the exercise of a statutory power of eminent domain,

the General Assembly expressed its intention that a conservation easement held by

a governmental entity is subject to the exercise of any statutory power of eminent

domain.” Kentucky Heritage, 648 S.W.3d at 86. Because the sole issue on appeal

was sovereign immunity, it argues this Court “did not delve into the thorny

constitutional questions raised by a suggestion that the General Assembly could,

by legislative fiat, actually extinguish a conservation easement held by the

Commonwealth of Kentucky.” Bernheim suggests that KRS 382.850(2) should

instead be read as a savings clause, doing “nothing more than ordering the

relationship of eminent domain powers to the existence of such an easement.”

             The Board made a similar argument in Kentucky Heritage, claiming

“KRS 382.850(2) merely preserves the right of eminent domain and subjects

                                          -10-
conservation easements to the right of eminent domain[.]” 648 S.W.3d at 86. But

as we noted there, such an interpretation “does not give full effect to the provision

in KRS 382.850(2) that any statutory right of eminent domain ‘shall be exercisable

as if the conservation easement did not exist.’” Id. “[A] statute should be

construed, if possible, so that no part of its provisions are rendered meaningless.”

Bob Hook Chevrolet Isuzu, Inc. v. Commonwealth Transp. Cabinet, 983 S.W.2d

488, 492 (Ky. 1998) (citation omitted).

             We believe our analysis in that appeal is conclusive:

             In KRS 382.850(2), the use of the phrase, “all such rights
             and powers shall be exercisable as if the conservation
             easement did not exist[,]” appears to be a unique
             modification of the Uniform Conservation Easement Act
             (UCEA). The text of the UCEA does not address the
             issue of whether a conservation easement can be
             condemned through eminent domain. However, the
             preface to the 2007 version provides that “the Act neither
             limits nor enlarges the power of eminent domain[,]”
             instead leaving “the scope of that power” to “the
             adopting state’s eminent domain code and related
             statutes.” See Nat’l Conf. of Comm’rs on Unif. State L.,
             Prefatory Note at 4 to Uniform Conservation Easement
             Act (1981) (amended 2007). Unlike other jurisdictions,
             the Kentucky General Assembly did not adopt any
             language from the preface to the UCEA concerning the
             enlargement of eminent domain. . . .

                    This Court cannot endorse an interpretation that
             simply ignores a portion of the statutory text. . . . [T]he
             General Assembly specifically added these words to the
             statute contrary to the language set out in the preface and
             text of the Uniform Conservation Easement Act and
             comparable statutes enacted by other jurisdictions. The

                                          -11-
            Legislature is presumed to be aware of existing laws
            when enacting a new statute. Pearce v. University of
            Louisville, by and through its Bd. of Trustees, 448
            S.W.3d 746, 760 (Ky. 2014).

Kentucky Heritage, 648 S.W.3d at 86-87.

            Finally, Bernheim submits that if we hold LG&E does not have the

right to take the conservation easement, we should hold “[LG&E] has no good

faith basis to take the underlying property encumbered by the conservation

easement, as the conservation easement specifically prevents the development of

gas pipelines on the subject property.” Because we hold the circuit court did not

commit any error in granting the interlocutory judgment, we need not address this

argument.

            Based upon the foregoing, Bullitt Circuit Court’s interlocutory

judgment is affirmed.

            ALL CONCUR.

                                       -12-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
                          LOUISVILLE GAS AND ELECTRIC
Randal A. Strobo          COMPANY:
David A. Spenard
Julia D. Taylor           Monica H. Braun
Louisville, Kentucky      Steven B. Loy
                          Mary Ellen Wimberly
Tom FitzGerald            Lexington, Kentucky
Ashley Wilmes
Frankfort, Kentucky

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