Court Opinion

ID: 9785070
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 21:02:04.572206+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:04.622734
License: Public Domain

HARRELL, J., dissenting in which MURPHY, J., joins.
I dissent from the Majority Opinion’s holding that “the picture of Ms. Barber, coupled with her birth date and location, were not sufficient ‘distinctive characteristics’ on a My-Space profile to authenticate its [redacted] printout.... ” 419 Md. 343, 357, 19 A.3d 415, 424 (2011).
Maryland Rule 5-901 (“Requirement of authentication or identification”) derives from and is similar materially to Federal Rule of Evidence 901.1 See Washington v. State, 406 Md. *366642, 651, 961 A.2d 1110, 1115 (2008). Thus, federal cases construing the federal rule are almost direct authority impacting on our construction of a Maryland analog rule. See Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 543, 530 A.2d 724, 729 (1987) (“Maryland courts have traditionally relied on the federal courts’ interpretations of analogous rules as persuasive authority____”). In construing and applying Federal Rule 901, federal courts have held almost unanimously that “a document is properly authenticated if a reasonable juror could find in favor of authenticity.” United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 151 (2d Cir.2007) (emphasis added); see United States v. Twitty, 72 F.3d 228, 232 (1st Cir.1995); United States v. Rawlins, 606 F.3d 73, 82 (3d Cir.2010); United States v. Branch, 970 F.2d 1368, 1370 (4th Cir.1992); United States v. Logan, 949 F.2d 1370, 1377 n. 12 (5th Cir.1991); United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1150 n. 1 (6th Cir.1997); United States v. Dombrowski, 877 F.2d 520, 525 (7th Cir.1989); United States v. Tank, 200 F.3d 627, 630 (9th Cir.2000); United States v. Blackwell, 694 F.2d 1325, 1331 (D.C.Cir.1982). Although, to date, we have not enunciated such a standard, because I think that the “reasonable juror” standard is consistent with Maryland Rule 5-901—requiring only “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims” (emphasis added)—I would adopt it.2 See Dickens v. State, 175 Md.App. 231, 239, 927 A.2d 32, *36737 (2007) (citing United States v. Safavian, 435 F.Supp.2d 36, 38 (D.D.C.2006)) (stating that “the burden of proof for authentication is slight”).
Applying that standard to the present case, a reasonable juror could conclude, based on the presence on the MySpace profile of (1) a picture of a person appearing to Sergeant Cook to be Ms. Barber posing with the defendant, her boyfriend; (2) a birth date matching Ms. Barber’s; (3) a description of the purported creator of the MySpace profile as being a twenty-three year old from Port Deposit; and (4) references to freeing “Boozy” (a nickname for the defendant), that the redacted printed pages of the MySpace profile contained information posted by Ms. Barber.
I am not unmindful of the Majority Opinion’s analysis relating to the concern that someone other than Ms. Barber could access or create the account and post the threatening message. The record, however, suggests no motive to do so. The technological heebie jeebies3 discussed in the Majority Opinion go, in my opinion, however, not to the admissibility of the print-outs under Rule 5-901, but rather to the weight to be given the evidence by the trier of fact. See Hays v. State, 40 Md. 633, 648 (1874) (holding that where there was evidence that a paper was what it purported to be, it was not error for *368the trial court to instruct the jury that “if they were not satisfied of the identity of the paper ..., then they should not consider it all”); Lynn McLain, Maryland Evidence—State and Federal § 901:1 (2001) (stating that “authentication of an item is only the first step”).
It has been said that the “purpose of authentication is to ... filter untrustworthy evidence.” Phillip M. Adams & Assocs., L.L.C. v. Dell, Inc., 621 F.Supp.2d 1173, 1184 (D.Utah 2009). Like many filters that are unable to remove completely all impurities, Rule 5-901 does not act to disallow any and all evidence that may have “impurities” (i.e., in this case, evidence that could have come, conceivably, from a source other than the purported source). As long as a reasonable juror could conclude that the proffered evidence is what its proponent purports it to be, the evidence should be admitted. See Gerald v. State, 137 Md.App. 295, 304, 768 A.2d 140, 145 (2001) (stating that, after a trial court admits a document as being authenticated properly, “the ultimate question of authenticity is left to the jury”). The potentialities that are of concern to the Majority Opinion are fit subjects for cross-examination or rebuttal testimony and go properly to the weight the fact-finder may give the print-outs. Accordingly, I dissent.
Judge MURPHY authorizes me to state that he joins in the views expressed in this dissent.

. Federal Rule of Evidence 901 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) General provision. The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evi*366dence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.
(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the requirements of this rule:
(1) Testimony of witness with knowledge. Testimony that a matter is what it is claimed to be.
(4) Distinctive characteristics and the like. Appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances.

. Professor McLain explains:
The item will be properly authenticated if its proponent has offered foundation evidence that the judge finds would be sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable trier of fact that the item is what it *367is purported to be. Md. Rule 5-901(a), consistent with prior Maryland case law, establishes that the standard of proof is the same as is found in Md. Rule 5-104(b) for facts on which the relevance of an item is conditioned. In a jury trial, the judge need not be personally satisfied, by even a preponderance of the evidence, that the proffered item is authentic; the judge must find the authentication requirement met, if a reasonable jury could find the evidence to be what its proponent claims it to be.
Lynn McLain, Maryland Evidence—State and Federal § 901:1 (2001).

. "Heebie jeebies” is an idiom used to describe anxiety, apprehension, or jitters; attributed to William Morgan ("Billy”) De Beck, a cartoonist, in the 26 October 1923 edition of the New York American. See also Loras Armstrong & The Hot Five, Heebie Jeebies (Okeh Records 1926) ("Say, I've got the heebies, I mean the jeebies, talkin about the dance, the heebie jeebies.”).