Court Opinion

ID: 9663232
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:32:35.091635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:35:34.961593
License: Public Domain

Clinton, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent from the majority opinion for three reasons. First, a careful reading of Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980), reveals that its principles apply only to arrests made in the home without warrant after a nonconsensual entry. Second, I do not agree that the opinion in United States v. Johnson, 626 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1980), cited in the majority opinion, supports the broad proposition the court seems to adopt in its second syllabus, namely, that the use of the voice to convey a message of arrest constitutes either a seizure or an entry barred by the fourth amendment. If the cited case does in fact stand for that proposition, then I disagree with it. Third, the evidence supports the trial court’s determination and it is not the function of this court to find the facts anew.
The plain inference from the evidence in this case is that the entry into the home was consensual. The *796officer appeared at the door, announced his business, and was permitted to enter. The defendant does not contend that there was a forced or nonconsensual entry and there is no evidence that there was. In Payton the court held that the fourth amendment prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into the home for the purpose of making a routine felony arrest, i.e., one supported by probable cause but absent exigent circumstances. The evidence in that case shows that the police forced their way into the residence by the use of crowbars. A reading of the entire opinion indicates without a doubt that the court was concerned only with nonconsensual entries. It quotes and relies upon an opinion by Judge Leventhal in Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970): “‘[a] greater burden is placed ... on officials who enter a home or dwelling without consent.’” Id. at 587. Later the Supreme Court said at 598: “[W]e have found no direct authority supporting forcible entries into a home to make a routine arrest . . . .”
In United States v. Johnson, supra, the police appeared at the accused’s home and met him at the door with drawn weapons. The court said, “In these circumstances,” it is the location, etc. That is not this case. There is here no evidence of either force or show of force.
The majority opinion in the case before us cites no authority for the proposition that the fourth amendment may be violated by a vocal intrusion, that is, an announcement by an officer of his purpose to arrest. As far as I have been able to determine, this is an absolutely unique application of the fourth amendment unsupported by authority.
Lastly, as I have pointed out, this is an appellate court. It is not our function in law actions, which a criminal prosecution is, to decide the facts anew where the evidence clearly supports the trial court’s determinations. I would affirm the conviction and sentence.