Court Opinion

ID: 9579194
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:52:21.180771+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:34:32.082435
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SCOTT
dissenting:
I agree with the majority that in following “concepts of statutory construction ... we must give effect to the intent of the lawmaking body.” Maj. op. at 1031. However, the “lawmaking body” in this case is the General Assembly and not the Public Utility Commission (PUC), whose “powers are not unlimited.” Consumer Counsel v. Mountain States Tel., 816 P.2d 278, 283 (Colo.1991). The legislative enactment, section 40-15-102(12), 17 C.R.S. (1993), limits the PUC’s authority. Therefore, in my view, the only proper venue to alter section 40-15-102(12) so as to strike out the “based on usage” clause from the definition, is the General Assembly and not the PUC or this court. Thus, I do not join the judgment of the majority.
While I share the majority’s view that the PUC was not required to conduct a rulemak-ing proceeding in order to resolve the issues raised by Avicomm, Inc., Mountain Solutions, Ltd., Inc., and Denver Direct Dial, LLC (Collectively, the “Providers”), I believe the Providers’ practice of “bridging” local exchange service areas does not constitute an offering of “interexchange telecommunications service” within the plain meaning of section 40-15-102(12). In addition, I would require the PUC to consider the effect of the resale provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 on the legality of U S West’s Exchange and Network Services Tariff.
Accordingly, I would reverse and remand this matter to the PUC for further proceedings.
I.
By using services purchased under the Exchange and Network Services Tariff to switch traffic that crosses local exchange area boundaries, the Providers avoid paying *1035access charges to U S West.1 However, the fact that the practice of “bridging” local exchange areas is obviously intended to allow the Providers to exploit a statutory loophole in order to circumvent the PUC’s access charge rules is not relevant to the resolution of this case.
In interpreting a statute, we attempt to determine what the General Assembly intended in adopting the statutory language under review. See City of Westminster v. Dogan Constr. Co., 930 P.2d 585, 590 (Colo. 1997). Where the terms used by the General Assembly are clear, though, consideration of extrinsic “indicia of legislative intent” is inappropriate, and the “[w]ords should be given effect according to their plain and ordinary meaning.” Id.
Our task is not to determine whether the General Assembly would have included the Providers’ services within the definition of “interexehange telecommunications services” established by section 40-15-102(12) if it had considered the possibility that such services might be offered on a flat-rate basis. Instead, we must decide whether the definition actually incorporated into the statute is broad enough to include the Providers’ services. I submit that the definition, which provides that “interexehange telecommunications services” are “priced based upon usage,” plainly does not include any service not priced based upon usage.
The majority avoids the plain meaning of the words in section 40-15-102(12) by resort to. the principle that statutes should not be construed in such a way as to produce “absurd” results. See maj. op. at 1031. The fact that a citizen can avoid the reach of the PUC’s regulatory authority, however, does not make the statutory meaning “absurd.” For example, individuals and businesses often structure their affairs in such a way as to avoid the obligation to pay assessments imposed by the tax code, but the courts do not rewrite the tax statutes in order to ensure that revenue collections meet assumed legislative expectations.2 These efforts are neither legally nor morally blameworthy. Yet, if a citizen’s actions permitted by the statute are inconsistent with the purpose of the legislation, the legislature, and not this court, must act to amend the tax laws. As Learned Hand observed half a century ago: “[Tjhere is nothing sinister in so arranging one’s affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everyone does so, rich or poor; and all do right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law demands: taxes are enforced exactions, not voluntary contributions. To demand more in the name of morals is mere cant.” Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir.1947).
Here, while it may be difficult to accept, the law and its reach are not necessarily coterminous with morality, or even the “logic of the PUC’s conclusion.” Maj. op. at 1032.
The majority contends that the plain meaning of the words used in section 40-15-102(12) is “inconsistent” with other definitions in the telecommunications statute. Section 40-15-102(11) defines “interexehange provider” as a “person who provides telecommunications services between exchange areas,” and section 40-15-102(29) says “telecommunications service” is “the electronic or optical transmission of information between separate ' points by prearranged means.” The majority reasons that under these definitions, the Providers are “interexehange providers of telecommunications service.”
I see two problems with this reasoning. First, if the meaning of the phrase “interex-change telecommunications services” can be inferred by reference to the definitions of “interexehange provider” and “telecommunications service,” then section 40-15-102(12) *1036is surplusage, a conclusion to be avoided under basic principles of statutory construction. See Bennett Bear Creek Farm Water and Sanitation Dist. v. City and County of Denver, 928 P.2d 1254, 1262 (Colo.1996). Second, the words and phrases used in statutes are often terms of art. We should not intervene to amend the statute by judicial fiat simply because the General Assembly has given a term a special — and perhaps even counterintuitive — definition.
In planning their business strategies, regulated business enterprises should be entitled to rely on the plain meaning of the words used in the statutes governing their activities. In light of the unambiguous definition established by section 40-15-102(12), I would hold that call transfer services are not “inter-exchange telecommunications services.”3
Unfortunately, by our judgment today, we require firms regulated by the PUC not only to comply with the plain meaning of the statute’s defined terms, but to anticipate the “logic of the PUC[]” without notice, even when, as here, that logic is not consistent with the plain language adopted by the General Assembly.4
II.
The majority observes that “the Providers are able to price their service at a flat rate only because they are violating the terms of the Exchange Tariff.” Maj. op at 1032. The majority, however, simply assumes that the restrictions in the tariff are valid while refusing to consider the implications of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-104,110 Stat 56 (1996).
Section 251(b)(1) of the Act provides that a local exchange carrier may not “prohibit ... [or] impose unreasonable or discriminatory conditions or limitations on ... the resale of its telecommunications services.” 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(1). On its face, this provision appears to prohibit U S West from forbidding resale of the services offered under its Exchange and Network Services Tariff. Under the 1996 Act, resale restrictions are presumptively unreasonable whether they are contained in a resale agreement or in a tariff filed with the PUC. See In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 96-98, First Report and Order, 11 FCC Red. 15499 at ¶ 939 (FCC Aug. 8, 1996); vacated sub nom. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir.1997), cert. granted, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 879, 139 L.Ed.2d 867 (1998).
It is by no means apparent to me that the duty imposed by section 251(b)(1) is limited to situations where a reseller seeks to provide only basic local services as opposed to competitive services, as U S West suggests. In any event, I think the PUC should examine this issue in the first instance. If the resale restrictions are allowed, the PUC should come forward with a principled legal basis for distinguishing legitimate limits allowed by the 1996 Act from unreasonable and discriminatory conditions forbidden by the statute. Otherwise, competitors who *1037seek to provide other types of telecommunications service may be frustrated in their efforts to resell tariffed offerings.
The PUC’s decision in this case was mailed on January 10, 1996, less than a month before the 1996 Act became law. Although the PUC was free to issue its decision without regard to the imminent enactment of a federal statute with potentially preemptive consequences, see Arapahoe County Public Airport Authority v. Centennial Express Airlines, Inc., No. 97SC123 slip op., 956 P.2d 587 (Colo.1998), I would re: mand for consideration of the effect of federal law in the context of further proceedings conducted for the purpose of applying what I see as the correct definition of “interex-ehange telecommunications services.”5
III.
Accordingly, because the plain language of the statute serves not only to give the regulated notice but also to limit the authority of the regulator, I respectfully dissent.

. These access charges are designed to allocate the costs associated with building, maintaining, and operating U S West's network between consumers who make calls within their own local exchange service area to consumers who place calls across local exchange area boundaries. The access charge regime is based on the assumption that calls within a single local exchange service area will be subject to flat-rate pricing while calls that cross local area boundaries will be priced on a per-use basis.

. The analogy to tax planning is closer than it may appear, because the access charges are in effect a "tax” on certain kinds of calls, i.e., calls that cross local exchange area boundaries, designed to subsidize others kinds of calls, i.e., calls within a single calling area.

. The cases cited by the majority to show that other states concur in its analysis, see maj. op. at 1028 n.3, are not on point. For example, in Idaho Local Exchange Companies v. Upper Valley Communications, Inc., Case No. GNR-T-94-1, Order No. 25885, 1995 WL 82345 (Idaho P.U.C. Feb. 3, 1995), the service provider charged customers for each call, putting the service within the statutory definition of interexchange service, which expressly included a “per-unit" pricing requirement. The other cases cited, US West Communications, Inc. v. Bridge Communications, Inc., Docket No. 93-049-20, 1994 WL 570650 (Utah P.S.C. Aug. 19, 1994), and In re U.S. Metro-link Carp., 103 P.U.R. 4th 194, 1989 WL 418657 (Wash.U.T.C.1989), do not appear to have interpreted any similar statutory definition.

. The PUC’s approach to interpreting section 40-15-102(12), is reminiscent of a famous colloquy on the meaning of language:
"When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.”
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean different things.”
"The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master — that’s all.... They’ve a temper, some of them — particularly verbs, they’re the proudest — adjectives, you can do anything with, but not verbs — however, I can manage the whole lot!”
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass 198 (Julian Messner 1982). In this case, PUC becomes the master of the statute, managing the whole lot in ways contrary to the plain language.

. The majority correctly notes that the 1996 Act has a purely prospective application, but the issue to be decided concerns ongoing, i.e., prospective, conduct by both the Providers and U S ' West.