Court Opinion

ID: 9770540
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:08:39.031037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:18.161834
License: Public Domain

WUNTERSHEIMER, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the results achieved by the Majority Opinion, but I wish to state my reasons separately in regard to the approach that should be taken to DNA testing evidence.
The Majority Opinion emphasizes that it chooses to retain so much of Harris v. Commonwealth, Ky., 846 S.W.2d 678 (1992), that limits the determination of the admissibility of DNA evidence to a ease-by-ease basis. Although the majority claims to overrule the portion of Harris that conflicts with Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), continued reliance on a case-by-case analysis is unwarranted. The Majority Opinion does little more than eliminate the necessity for following the standard from California found to be acceptable in Harris. It is far better to adopt Daubert than to risk inconsistent results by adhering to an undefined case-by-case approach.
The earlier Frye standard only requires that generally accepted scientific reasoning and methodology underlie scientific evidence and not that the results be generally accepted. Daubert is a reasonable interpretation and extension of the Frye test. The proffered DNA evidence meets either standard, and this case should be affirmed under Frye as well as Daubert. This Court implicitly recognized the Daubert standard in Cecil v. Commonwealth, Ky., 888 S.W.2d 669 (1995).
As I noted in my concurring opinion in Harris, swpra, at least 38 states and several Federal jurisdictions have found that the scientific community has accepted DNA testing. There is no need to further burden the taxpayers by a superfluous inquiry when a valid standard currently exists. There is no need for further hearings as to the admissibility of DNA evidence, except in cases where the challenge is that proper testing methods were not utilized, although the weight and credibility of such evidence can still be challenged by cross-examination and opposing expert testimony.
LEIBSON, J., joins in this concurring opinion.