Court Opinion

ID: 9864789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:11:42.17319+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:53.462867
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Hilliard,
dissenting.
I cannot agree with the court’s interpretation of the sections of the workmen’s compensation statutes here involved.
Section 52, chapter 210, Session Laws, 1919, prescribes who shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent, which is the only office of the section. So far as the wife is concerned it reads: “For the purposes of this act the following described persons shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent: (a) Wife, unless it be shown that she was voluntarily separated and living apart from the husband at the time of his injury or death *174and was not dependent in whole or in part on him for support.” It fixes the degree of dependency, not the identity of dependents. The question as to the latter is answered by section 9, chapter 201, Session Laws, 1923, amending section 57, Session Laws, 1919, and not elsewhere in the act. That section reads: ‘‘ * * * The question as to who constitute dependents and the extent of their dependency shall be determined as of the date of the accident to the injured employe and the right to death benefits shall become fixed as of said date irrespective of any subsequent change in conditions and such death benefits shall be directly payable to the dependent or dependents entitled thereto or to such person legally entitled thereto as the Commission may designate.” There is nothing in the act that in any manner conflicts with the unmistakable language of this section. The court gravely calls attention to the amendment, in 1931,. of section 53 of the act (section 1, chapter 174, Session Laws, 1931), as if the legislature had amended section 57 (§9, c. 201, S. L. ’23). Had there been legislative purpose'to change section 57, power was at hand. Section 53 was amended only to the extent of adding “grandchild” and “grandson” to the list of those who may be dependents. The term “wife” was not in the original section 53, nor is it in the amended section. Still, the court insists that said section 53, which never had and does not now have application to a wife, is, because of the 1931 amendment to include grandchild and grandson, an amendment of amended section 57, and thereby changes the status of a wife.
The court says that “Had the legislature intended to-exclude a post-injury wife, words were just as available,” etc. That is not the question. Without the statute there would be no dependents, in the sense of the compensation act. Necessarily, therefore, a wife seeking to qualify as a dependent must show that she is included, not that the legislature failed to exclude her.
Finally the court says that because, subsequent to the *175marriage, there had been a lnmp snm award, “it is to be distinguished from compensation,” and can be recovered by the wife “as a person legally entitled thereto.” Perhaps so. I am not advised. Suffice to say this proceeding was not of that nature.
Mr. Justice Bouck concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.