Court Opinion

ID: 9458910
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:05:09.472891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:56.270360
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON REHEARING
WILKEY, Circuit Judge:
Appellant has requested that our decision of 6 September 1972 in this case be reconsidered and has suggested that the case be reheard en banc. The first four grounds advanced by appellant in his petition for rehearing were fully dealt with in our original opinion and require *936no further comment. As his fifth and final reason for reconsideration, appellant alleged that “[t]he Court erred in ruling that the damages aspect of this case was properly referred to the D. C. Court of General Sessions.”
The trial court had originally ordered the damages count submitted to the Court of General Sessions because the amount in controversy was not sufficient to support federal jurisdiction. We affirmed this action in our original opinion, and do here, with a slight clarification in the phrasing cf the opinion. Appellant now contends that this was error because the ease was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343, which provides for jurisdiction'in the District Court without regard to the amount in controversy.
It is indisputable that the two statutes provide for federal jurisdiction regardless of the amount in controversy,1 and that Long did plead these two statutes in his original complaint. We do not, however, believe that we either should or must amend our opinion to the extent suggested — to do so would be both unwise and unnecessary.
Altering our initial disposition of the case at this time would reward appellant for his indifference and encourage judicial inefficiency. An examination of the transcript indicates that the District Judge thought Long’s damages plea was based on a simple tort theory,2 in which case the jurisdictional amount would have been $10,000. This misapprehension was repeated by the District Court in its memorandum and order:
Plaintiff’s counsel stated that the plaintiff suffered no physical injury. And the record shows that he was only detained for a few moments. The Court is of the opinion that, if there were any judgment for unlawful arrest in this case it would not exceed $10,000.00. This case is, therefore, certified to the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions, pursuant to 11 D.C.Code, § 962 (1967).
This misapprehension was accepted and restated by the Government in its brief.3 Despite all of these opportunities to correct this misapprehension, appellant made no attempt to disabuse the trial court, the opposing counsel, or this court of the misunderstanding until after our opinion had issued. To grant appellant’s request at this point would encourage the piecemeal arguing of cases and would result in increased work for the court.
Our action here should not be taken as a statement that the District Court was correct when it transferred the damages issue to the Court of General Sessions. If the lower court’s error had been pointed out, we would have of course corrected it on appeal. We deny appellant’s request solely because he remained indifferent to an obvious misunderstanding and did nothing to correct the situation even though he was in a position to do so. To amend our decision as appellant suggests would place the burden of developing and perfecting a party’s case on the judiciary rather than on the adversary parties.
We would be obligated to correct our opinion if it contained an erroneous statement of the law that might confuse future litigants. On the issue belatedly raised by appellant, however, our opinion is entirely correct. As our opinion now stands, it contains no language that would suggest to a future party that § 1983 was involved in the case. *937We, like the District Court, dealt with the damages issue on the assumption that it was based on a simple tort theory and under this assumption our opinion is correct.
Appellant’s last minute plea might be stronger if our decision made it impossible for him to vindicate his rights under § 1983. State courts do, however, have concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983 civil actions,4 and for our purposes the D.C. courts are the equivalent of a state system. Our decision will not prevent appellant from arguing his case under § 1983.
Finally, it should be noted that we are clearly not required to take notice of appellant’s argument at this time. He is not pointing out a jurisdictional defect but rather an affirmative argument in favor of jurisdiction. It is, of course, within the discretion of a court to ignore such claims if they are not timely made.
For the reasons given above, the petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en borne is
Denied.

. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 63 S.Ct. 877, 87 L.Ed. 1324 (1943).

. In the colloquy between the trial judge and appellant’s counsel (Record at 3-7) the trial judge repeatedly referred to the action as being essentially one for unlawful arrest.

. Government’s brief at 8.

. Congress has generally chosen to grant concurrent jurisdiction in private civil actions. If the statute contains no express provision to the contrary, such a grant of concurrent jurisdiction may be presumed. See Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 25-27, 5 L.Ed. 19 (1820).