Court Opinion

ID: 9364215
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-18 19:00:21.409739+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:36.667572
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60539         Document: 00516614175            Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/18/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit

                                       No. 22-60539                                   FILED
                                     Summary Calendar                          January 18, 2023
                                                                                 Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                      Clerk
   Linda P. Knight,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                             versus

   Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social
   Security,

                                                                   Defendant—Appellee.

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Northern District of Mississippi
                                USDC No. 4:21-cv-152

   Before Davis, Smith, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Plaintiff-Appellant Linda Knight, a fifty-five-year-old woman, appeals
   pro se the district court’s order affirming the Social Security Commissioner’s
   final administrative decision denying her application for disability insurance
   benefits. We AFFIRM.

          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-60539           Document: 00516614175              Page: 2   Date Filed: 01/18/2023

                                             No. 22-60539

                                                      I.
           In March 2020, Knight applied for disability insurance benefits under
   Title II of the Social Security Act. Knight alleged that she had been disabled
   since March 6, 2020, due to degenerative bone disease, hearing loss, high
   blood pressure, heart problems, carpal tunnel syndrome, and back problems.
   The Social Security Commissioner (“Commissioner”) denied Knight’s
   application initially and on reconsideration. After these initial denials,
   Knight requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).
   After a hearing held on March 9, 2021, the ALJ denied Knight’s claim. On
   September 15, 2021, the Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s
   decision. Knight next appealed to the district court, and consented to have
   the case decided before a magistrate judge. The magistrate judge affirmed
   the ALJ’s final decision. Knight timely appealed.
                                                      II.
           “This court reviews a Commissioner’s denial of social security
   disability benefits only to ascertain whether (1) the final decision is supported
   by substantial evidence and (2) whether the Commissioner used the proper
   legal standards to evaluate the evidence.” 1 “Substantial evidence” is that
   which is “merely enough that a reasonable mind could arrive at the same
   decision.” 2
           The regulations establish a five-step sequential evaluation process to
   evaluate whether a claimant is disabled. 3 In employing this process, the ALJ
   considers whether the claimant: (1) is “currently engaged in substantial

           1
             Webster v. Kijazaki, 19 F.4th 715, 718 (5th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks
   and citation omitted).
           2
               Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
           3
               20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).

                                                  2
Case: 22-60539         Document: 00516614175                Page: 3     Date Filed: 01/18/2023

                                          No. 22-60539

   gainful activity;” (2) has a “severe impairment;” (3) has an impairment that
   “meets the severity of an impairment enumerated in the relevant
   regulations;” (4) is unable to perform “past relevant work;” and (5) is unable
   to perform “any relevant work.” 4 If a claimant gets past the first four stages,
   then the burden shifts to the Commissioner at the fifth step to prove the
   claimant’s employability. 5
                                                     III.
           In this case, the ALJ determined that Knight was not disabled during
   the relevant period because she could perform her past relevant work as
   either a court clerk or receptionist. In evaluating Knight’s residual functional
   capacity (“RFC”), the ALJ found that she had the ability to perform light
   exertion work with the following caveats: “no climbing ladders, ropes, or
   scaffolds; occasional crawling; only frequent handling and fingering; and
   should perform no job when noise level would interfere with hearing normal
   human speech.”
           In the “Statement of the Issues” section of Knight’s opening brief,
   she lists fifteen ways in which she asserts the ALJ erred at various steps in the
   analysis. However, of these fifteen issues, Knight only briefs seven errors.
   “Although we liberally construe pro se briefs, such litigants must still brief
   contentions in order to preserve them.” 6 Given that Knight has failed to
   provide any record citations or reasons for the errors listed solely in her

           4
            Keel v. Saul, 986 F.3d 551, 555 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Garcia v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d
   700, 704 (5th Cir. 2018)).
           5
               Id.
           6
            Longoria v. Dretke, 507 F.3d 898, 901 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Yohey v. Collins, 985
   F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993)).

                                                 3
Case: 22-60539           Document: 00516614175              Page: 4        Date Filed: 01/18/2023

                                            No. 22-60539

   Statement of Issues, these arguments have not been preserved on appeal.
   Accordingly, we will only address the seven errors that Knight briefed. 7
           First, Knight argues that the ALJ erred at step two by not listing her
   tinnitus as a severe impairment. At step two, the ALJ found that Knight
   suffers from the following severe impairments: hearing loss, carpal tunnel
   syndrome, osteoarthritis of the knee, and obesity.                      Although Knight’s
   tinnitus was not categorized as a severe impairment, the ALJ did recognize it
   as a component of her hearing loss, and addressed it in evaluating her RFC.
   Given that the ALJ considered Knight’s tinnitus in his assessment of her
   disability, we conclude that any error at step two was harmless and
   “irrelevant to the disposition of [her] case.” 8
           Second, Knight argues that the ALJ’s RFC assessment did not
   properly consider her reported symptoms and limitations, and failed to
   discuss her medication’s side effects. As part of the RFC assessment, the
   ALJ must assess a claimant’s reported symptoms, but a claimant’s
   “subjective complaints must be corroborated at least in part by objective
   medical testimony.” 9

           7
             See Haase v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 748 F.3d 624, 629 (5th Cir. 2014)
   (“We will attempt to address the issues where the [appellants’] have at ‘least argued some
   error on the part of the district court.” (quoting Grant v. Cuellar, 59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir.
   1995))).
           8
            Chaparro v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 1008, 1011 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); see also Jones
   v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 524, 526 n.1 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (rejecting plaintiff’s “rather
   disingenuous argument that the [ALJ] applied the incorrect legal standard in determining
   the severity of his impairments,” because even though the ALJ concluded plaintiff’s
   symptom was not a severe impairment, “he proceeded through the sequential evaluation
   to conclude at the fourth and fifth levels that appellant could perform past relevant work”).
           9
               Houston v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1989).

                                                  4
Case: 22-60539        Document: 00516614175              Page: 5       Date Filed: 01/18/2023

                                         No. 22-60539

           There is no basis for Knight’s assertion that the ALJ did not
   adequately consider her alleged symptoms and side effects from medication.
   The ALJ’s decision acknowledged Knight’s “statements about the intensity,
   persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms,” but concluded that her
   statements were “not entirely consistent with the medical evidence.” In
   support of this finding, the ALJ cited to the following evidence in Knight’s
   medical records: physical examination notes, diagnostic medical images and
   tests, and Knight’s own inconsistent reports of her symptoms and pain. It is
   the role of the ALJ, not this Court, to weigh conflicting evidence. 10 Although
   Knight disagrees with the ALJ’s conclusion, she has not shown that the ALJ
   applied an improper legal standard or that the ALJ’s decision was not
   supported by substantial evidence. Further, Knight does not identify any
   alleged side effects from her medication, or point to any evidence in the
   record of such side effects. We therefore conclude that the ALJ committed
   no reversible error.
           Third, Knight contends that the ALJ’s hypothetical questioning of the
   vocational expert was inadequate because the ALJ did not mention the
   severity of her hearing loss or tinnitus. “A hypothetical posed to a vocational
   expert by an ALJ need only ‘reasonably incorporate’ the disabilities and
   limitations recognized by the ALJ.” 11 At the hearing, the ALJ asked the
   vocational expert whether a hypothetical person with certain characteristics,

           10
              See Garcia, 880 F.3d at 704 (noting that “in the event of evidentiary conflict or
   uncertainty,” we will not “substitute our judgment for the Commissioner’s, even if we
   believe the evidence weighs against the Commissioner’s decision” (citation omitted)
   (internal quotation marks omitted)).
           11
              Dise v. Colvin, 630 F. App’x 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished)
   (quoting Bowling v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 431, 435-36 (5th Cir. 1994)). Unpublished opinions
   issued in or after 1996 are “not controlling precedent” except in limited circumstances, but
   they “may be persuasive authority.” Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 401 n.7 (5th Cir.
   2006).

                                                5
Case: 22-60539        Document: 00516614175              Page: 6       Date Filed: 01/18/2023

                                         No. 22-60539

   including the inability to perform a job “with a noise level that would
   interfere with hearing normal human speech,” could perform Knight’s
   previous work as a court clerk or receptionist. The ALJ’s hypothetical
   question “tracked his residual functional capacity assessment” that Knight
   could not perform a job where the noise level would interfere with hearing
   normal human speech. We therefore find that the ALJ’s hypothetical
   question properly accounted for Knight’s alleged hearing loss and tinnitus. 12
           Fourth, Knight asserts that the ALJ failed to adequately develop the
   record in violation of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(e) by not recontacting her
   physician to resolve an inconsistency in the evidence. 13                  However, as
   correctly noted by the Commissioner, the regulation mandating that the
   agency recontact physicians was repealed as of March 26, 2012. 14 We
   therefore find no reversable error.
           Fifth, Knight alleges that the ALJ did not comply with Social Security
   Ruling (“SSR”) 82-62 15 by failing to analyze the specific demands of her past

           12
             See id. (concluding that an ALJ’s hypothetical question properly accounted for
   the claimant’s impairments and “tracked his residual functional capacity assessment”).
           13
              Knight appears to be referring to a letter from Dr. Parvez Karlm in which he
   stated that she is “unable to perform any gainful employment.” However, this letter was
   not timely submitted to the ALJ, and does not contain a medical opinion for purposes of
   the regulation. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(c)(3)(i) (noting that “[s]tatements that you are
   or are not disabled, blind, able to work, or able to perform regular or continuing work” is
   evidence the agency considers “neither valuable nor persuasive” and therefore “will not
   provide any analysis about how we considered such evidence”).
           14
             How We Collect and Consider Evidence of Disability, 70 Fed. Reg. 10,651 (Feb. 23,
   2012) (codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404 and 416) (noting that as of March 26, 2012, the agency
   is “modifying the requirement to recontact your medical source(s) first when we need to
   resolve an inconsistency or insufficiency in the evidence he or she has provided”).
           15
              SSR 82-62 sets forth the facts that must be considered by an ALJ in determining
   that a claimant has the capacity to perform a past relevant job. SSR 82-62, 1982 WL 31386,
   at *4 (S.S.A. Jan. 1, 1982).

                                                6
Case: 22-60539         Document: 00516614175              Page: 7       Date Filed: 01/18/2023

                                          No. 22-60539

   relevant work. Under the relevant regulations, an ALJ determines the
   physical and mental demands of a claimant’s past work based on information
   provided by the claimant, and may also consider information from a
   vocational expert. 16 Here, the ALJ acknowledged the physical and mental
   demands of Knight’s past work as a court clerk based on Knight’s own
   testimony, as well as the vocational expert’s testimony. We therefore reject
   Knight’s assertion that the ALJ failed to comply with SSR 82-62.
           Sixth, Knight contends the ALJ’s decision included a “significant . . .
   misstatement” of the record by stating that Knight testified she experienced
   reduced functioning of her left hand. Both parties agree that the ALJ
   misstated Knight’s testimony that she experienced reduced functioning in
   both hands, but especially in her right hand. Because Knight does not explain
   how the ALJ’s statement of left instead of right produced a different outcome
   in her case, she has failed to overcome the harmless error rule. 17
           Seventh, Knight finally asserts that the ALJ and Appeals Council erred
   by not considering her submissions of additional evidence. Under 20 C.F.R.
   § 404.935(a), if a claimant wishes to have written evidence considered at the
   hearing, the claimant must submit or inform the ALJ about the evidence at
   least five business days before the hearing. If a claimant misses this deadline,
   the ALJ “may decline to consider or obtain the evidence,” unless the
   evidence is submitted before a hearing decision is issued, and one of the
   following circumstances is applicable: (1) the agency mislead the claimant,

           16
              See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(2) (“We will ask you for information about work
   you have done in the past . . . . We may use the services of vocational experts or vocational
   specialists . . . [who] may offer relevant evidence within his or her expertise or knowledge
   concerning the physical and mental demands of a claimant’s past relevant work.”).
           17
            See Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009) (noting that “the burden of
   showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s
   determination.”).

                                                7
Case: 22-60539           Document: 00516614175               Page: 8   Date Filed: 01/18/2023

                                              No. 22-60539

   (2) the claimant had physical, mental, educational, or linguistic limitations
   that precluded earlier submission, or (3) some unusual, unexpected, or
   unavoidable circumstance prevented the claimant from timely submitting the
   evidence. 18       The Appeals Council is permitted to consider additional
   evidence that is “new, material, and relates to the period on or before the
   date of the hearing decision.” 19
           At her hearing, Knight and her representative informed the ALJ that
   some of her medical records were still pending, and the ALJ held open the
   record for an additional twenty days to obtain those records. Knight’s
   outstanding records were submitted and incorporated into the record on
   March 29, 2021. On April 27, 2021, Knight submitted additional records, but
   they were not considered in the ALJ’s decision that was issued the next day.
   Knight now asserts that the ALJ erred by not considering her records
   submitted on April 27. We disagree. As noted by the district court, Knight’s
   April 27 submission provided no explanation for her failure to submit these
   records in a timely manner. “[T]he settled law of our Circuit [is] that new
   evidence is not the requisite good cause for . . . a remand unless a proper
   explanation is given of why it was not submitted earlier.” 20 We thus find no
   error in the ALJ’s failure to consider Knight’s additional evidence.
           Knight subsequently sought review of the ALJ’s determination by the
   Appeals Council, and submitted the following additional evidence: Progress
   notes, two letters from physicians, a “Physical Medical Source Statement,”
   and a prescription for a cane. The Appeals Council did not consider this

           18
                20 C.F.R. § 404.935(a)-(b).
           19
                20 C.F.R. § 404.970(a).
           20
             Geyen v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 850 F.2d 263, 264 (5th Cir. 1988) (per
   curiam) (citing Chaney v. Schweiker, 659 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1981)).

                                                   8
Case: 22-60539        Document: 00516614175              Page: 9      Date Filed: 01/18/2023

                                         No. 22-60539

   evidence because it concluded the Progress notes were already in the record,
   the letters and medical source statement did not show a reasonable
   probability of changing the outcome of the decision, and the prescription did
   not relate to the relevant time period. We agree. Accordingly, because
   Knight has failed to show how the above evidence would have a reasonable
   probability of changing the outcome of her case, we find no basis for
   reversal. 21
           For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.

           21
              See Jones v. Astrue, 691 F.3d 730, 734-35 (5th Cir. 2012) (noting that a “mere
   allegation that additional beneficial evidence might have been gathered” is insufficient to
   meet a claimant’s burden of establishing “that any error was harmful”).

                                               9