Court Opinion

ID: 9860063
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:08:46.556944+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:17:28.198560
License: Public Domain

LeGRAND, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent from Division I-B of the court’s opinion and from the result reached there. I believe the writ should be annulled.
As recently as 1980, we approved EC-2-27 as part of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It provides in part:
The basic responsibility for providing legal services for those unable to pay ultimately rests upon the individual lawyer, and personal involvement in the problems of the disadvantaged can be one of the most rewarding experiences in the life of a lawyer. Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, should find time to participate in serving the disadvantaged. The rendition of free legal services to those unable to pay reasonable fees continues to be an obligation of each lawyer, but the efforts of individual lawyers are often not enough to meet the need. Thus it has been necessary for the profession to institute additional programs to provide legal services.
Until today lawyers representing indigents have done so at personal financial sacrifice in recognition of the professional obligation they had assumed. In recent times this has been discussed in a number of decisions, including Soldat v. District Court, 283 N.W.2d 497 (Iowa 1979); Parrish v. Denato, 262 N.W.2d 281 (Iowa 1978); Furey v. Crawford County, 208 N.W.2d 15 (Iowa 1973); Woodbury County v. Anderson, 164 N.W.2d 129 (Iowa 1969). These cases were all decided under our law as it was prior to January 1, 1978, when section 815.7 became part of the criminal code. Now we must say what that statute means in directing that reasonable attorney fees for those appointed to represent indigent defendants shall be “the ordinary and customary charges for like services in the community.”
The majority says the statute entitles lawyers to “full compensation” based on fees charged when privately employed by non-indigent clients in criminal matters. Thus history, tradition, personal obligation, and professional duty have all taken flight in the face of this provision. I disagree. I can find no legislative intent to make such Sweeping, dramatic, and revolutionary changes. Neither the language of the statute nor the majority’s rationale vindicates the result reached.
*715I believe section 815.7 is simply a clear-cut and simple answer to a problem we recognized in Soldat, Parrish, and Furey: The desirability of making fees uniform and fair to all those rendering services under court appointment.
In the last analysis, the resolution of this case depends on our construction of the term “like services” as used in the statute. I agree with the trial court that the language means services rendered to indigent defendants pursuant to court appointment.
Several circumstances point to this conclusion. First, it is difficult to believe the legislature intended, in such cursory fashion, to cast aside the long tradition and history of our profession and the obligation which every lawyer still assumes upon his or her admission to the bar. Next, the overwhelming majority of criminal cases are defended by court appointed attorneys. It is impossible to establish a standard of “ordinary and customary” charges from the isolated cases taken on private employment.
In Parrish we said:
We urge trial courts to take a fresh look at the problem of fixing compensation for attorneys for services rendered in representing indigents in criminal matters. This court is aware of the problem facing trial judges in this respect and of the possibility of claims being made for hours spent by an attorney in achieving an education in criminal law at public expense. Nevertheless, there should be some uniformity throughout the state of the amount of compensation paid at public expense to attorneys of like ability for services performed under the same or similar circumstances in representing indigent defendants in criminal matters.
262 N.W.2d at 287.
Later in Soldat, this appears in 283 N.W.2d at 499:
The court has broad discretion in fixing fees. Parrish v. Denato, 262 N.W.2d at 284. This poses both advantages and dangers. On this subject we quote from the ABA Standard Relating to Providing Defense Services, commentary to § 2.4(a) at 31 (1967):
The advantage in giving freedom to the court to set the fee is the opportunity this provides for recognition of the variation in the true value of the services rendered according to the complexity and intricacy of each particular case. On the other hand, the greater such freedom, the greater is the risk of inequalities in the compensation of different lawyers who provide essentially the same services. It is most important to the vitality of the system that the public be confident that its resources are not being distributed with excessive liberality.
We noted this need for uniformity in Parrish v. Denato, 262 N.W.2d at 287, and, earlier, in Furey v. Crawford County, 208 N.W.2d at 18, we suggested a procedure designed to avoid inequality in fee allowances.
As shown by the above quotation from Soldat, this has been a matter of enough significance that it warranted attention by the American Bar Association in adopting standards relating to defense services. It also compelled our attention in several of the cases already mentioned. The majority dismisses this by saying it was “already the law.” Not so. It was suggested as the proper standard; but, needle’ss to say, our suggestions are not invariably followed.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in considering a statute almost identical to ours, reached what I believe is the correct result in State v. Sidney, 66 Wis.2d 602, 225 N.W.2d 438, 442 (1975).
There the court said:
[We have] previously approved as a general policy that all legal work performed for indigent criminal defendants should be at a figure per hour that is generally one-third below the prevailing rate charged for services to nonindigent clients. This is based on the fact of certainty of payment from the public treasury plus the further fact that legal work of this nature is part of the general obligation on the part of all lawyers to see that justice is done in our criminal courts.
*716This statement represents a fair and just resolution of a difficult problem. All lawyers know that few defendants can pay any fee. Nevertheless lawyers are obligated to represent them. Payment by the county represents the only hope of payment. Thus the certainty of payment by the county is an important factor. Closely related is the continuing obligation of lawyers to represent the poor and the indigent as part of their duty to assist in the administration of justice. The majority minimizes this by the gratuitous statement that lawyers should be fully compensated just like “all other persons who provide services to indigents at public expense.” Whether or not this is true — and there is nothing in this record to support it — , it settles nothing. We should be concerned only with the professional standards of our profession, not those of others.
It is unfortunate the majority interprets the statute as repudiating the long and honored tradition of the profession by relieving lawyers of any financial obligation in rendering assistance to those accused of a crime. It is ironic, too, that the majority exhorts more lawyers to accept the “burden” of representing indigents. What burden? Representing indigents will now be simply another piece of profitable law business.
HARRIS and McGIVERIN, JJ., join this dissent.