Court Opinion

ID: 9552073
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:04:28.237109+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:25:33.928147
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
While I concur in the affirmance of the district court’s denial of the petition for habeas corpus, nevertheless, I disagree with much that is said in the majority opinion. The petition is the handwritten type prepared by the inmate himself. Hence, I agree it must be construed liberally. Nevertheless, such rule does not require this or the lower court to read anything into the petition which is just not there even inferentially. The petition states “on or about the 28th day of March, 1973, I, Terry Burl Calkins, went to court here at maximum security complex at the Idaho State Penitentiary.” He relates that he was “found guilty of active participation and aggravated assault in the March 7, 1973, riot” and that he received “time in maximum security.” His only stated complaints are “I didn’t have a lawyer present. Was never informed of my rights, never given a chance to get a lawyer. Mr. Crowl, the complaining officer against me was also the judge of the court that found me guilty, * * * ”
In short, there was nothing before the district court and there is nothing before this Court relating to any complaint of being deprived of “good time.” Even assuming that the majority opinion is correct in its interpretation of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), for all we know the petitioner did have advance written notice of the charges, the factfinders did prepare a written statement, the petitioner was allowed to call witnesses and present evidence and the inmate did have assistance from a fellow inmate or from the staff. See, Living Guide and Regulations of the Idaho State Correctional Institution (1975).
I must further disagree with the majority’s application of Wolff to this case albeit it was held not to be controlling because of the time framework. Wolff clearly, as recognized by the majority, was not for relief by way of habeas corpus, but rather for damages and injunctive relief under the Federal Civil Rights statute. The court in Wolff was dealing with censorship of attorney-prisoner mail, the inmate legal assistance program and a demand for the restoration of forfeited good time credit. While the court in Wolff purports to fashion relief on the basis of the due process clause under the Fourteenth Amendment, a close reading of the case indicates otherwise. The court in Wolff rejected the argument that the same type of “due process” laid down by the court in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1973) and in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973), were applicable to the situation in Wolff. “Rights” usually held to be incorporated in the due process clause such as the right to counsel or the right of confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses were not encompassed in the Wolff *406type of due process. The court held that the inmate has no right to be heard before persons other than those who were officers in the prison complex. In fact, by my reading Wolff requires only that the inmate be given written notice of charges and that a record of the reasons for his forfeiture of good time be made. In Wolff the court avoided even holding clearly that an inmate has a right to call witnesses or present evidence. My best reading of Wolff leads me to the conclusion that we no longer have a due process concept in the orthodox sense of certain procedural requirements which attain constitutional dimension. Rather, we now have a strange type of “floating” due process in which nothing is certain but which depends on the circumstances, place and status of the defendant. In some circumstances certain orthodox procedures are required, in other circumstances they are not or may not depending on exigency or balancing of relative interests.
Perhaps it is all best expressed in the words of the court itself in Wolff:
“Perhaps as the problems of penal institutions change and correctional goals are reshaped, the balance of interests involved will require otherwise. But in the current environment, where prison disruption remains a serious concern to administrators, we cannot ignore the desire and effort of many States, including Nebraska and the Federal Government, to avoid situations that may trigger deep emotions and that may scuttle the disciplinary process as a rehabilitation vehicle. To some extent, the American adversary trial presumes contestants who are able to cope with the pressures and aftermath of the battle, and such may not generally be the case of those in prisons of this country. At least, the Constitution, as we interpret it today, does not require the contrary assumption. Within the limits set forth in this opinion we are content for now to leave the continuing development of measures to review adverse actions effecting inmates to the sound discretion of corrections officials administering the scope of such inquiries."
Reluctantly I point out that while Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Wolff, did discuss and treat the question of a change in prisoner status to “solitary confinement,” as indicated above, no issue of change of status existed in the Wolff circumstances and the only language contained in the majority opinion in Wolff was that of a parenthetical footnote which is quoted in the majority herein. At best such language is unnecessary, at worst it was pure dicta.
Hence, I would affirm the district court’s denial of the writ of habeas corpus for the reason that even if taken as true, the allegations of the petition do not allege violations of the due process clause as interpreted by the latest decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.