Court Opinion

ID: 9845031
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:14:00.453703+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:50.544356
License: Public Domain

TAYLOR, Chief Justice,
with whom SMITH, J., concurs (dissenting).
I find no evidence in the record to sustain the inferential finding of the jury that the crossing was an extra-hazardous one. It was error to submit the question to the jury as to whether the crossing was extra-hazardous, thus allowing the jury to impose on appellant the more onerous duties of care and caution associated with an extra-hazardous crossing.
It was error to instruct the jury on the presumption of due care on the part of respondent. Although she was unable to remember events immediately preceding the collision, and there was no other eyewitness, there is no mystery about how the accident occurred. The presumption is applicable only in cases when the want of eyewitnesses, or equivalent circumstantial evidence, leaves the conduct of the injured party, immediately preceding the accident, in doubt, so that the question as to what such party did or omitted to do for his own safety cannot be resolved without resort to speculation. Here the circumstantial evidence establishes beyond peradventure that plaintiff drove her car up to the crossing at such speed that she was unable to stop in time to avoid the collision, after her lights revealed the presence of the cars on the crossing. The evidence leaves no room for doubt or speculation as to how the accident occurred. The instruction advised the jury that plaintiff was presumed to have been *553“obeying the law” and “that she war exercising ordinary care” and that the “presumption is in itself evidence” and “shall prevail and control unless overcome by satisfactory evidence,” and unless “adequately and sufficiently controverted,” the jury must find that plaintiff “was obeying the law and was exercising ordinary care” and “was not negligent,” and that the presumption “is evidence in the case and is sufficient in and of itself to support a verdict or finding that the plaintiff was careful at the time and place of the accident.” Such instruction when added to the one placing the burden of proof of contributory negligence on the defendants, could not but create an impression in the minds of the jurors that contributory negligence could not be found upon a mere preponderance of the evidence. The instruction on the burden of proof of contributory negligence was entirely sufficient in this case, without compounding it, and confusing the issue with the presumption of due care.
The record conclusively establishes contributory negligence on the part of the respondent, as a matter of law. The accident occurred in the nighttime and it was dark; the weather was clear and dry; there was no smoke or dust to obscure vision; and a flashing yellow light hung over the tracks about 15 feet above the roadway. This light could be seen by respondent for a distance of at least one-half mile from the crossing and the road through the course of that half mile was straight, level, and without any obstruction to respondent’s view of the crossing. Respondent testified that she was familiar with the road; had driven over the crossing at least twice before; that she knew the road crossed the railroad tracks at the sugar factory; she had on previous occasions seen the flashing yellow light and knew that the light was “right at it, where the tracks are.” Her car left 105 feet of skid marks, the first 39' 7" of which were intermittent, and the remaining 65' 5" heavily marked.
Thus, the uncontradicted proof is that the respondent knew she was approaching the railroad crossing marked by the caution light; but, nevertheless, she did not operate her car at such speed or in such manner as to be able to stop within the radius of her lights, which it was her duty to do in view of her knowledge that she was approaching a point of danger.
“ * * * Generally it is negligence as a matter of law, or at least strong evidence of negligence, for a motorist to operate his automobile on a highway at such a speed that the automobile cannot be stopped within the distance within which objects can be seen ahead of the automobile. (Citation) This court has placed its approval upon the doctrine that one driving at nighttime must proceed at such rate of speed that he may be able ordinarily to stop short of an object appearing in the radius of his lights.” Maier v. Minidoka County Motor Co., 61 Idaho 642, at 650, 105 P.2d 1076, 1079.
*554Had plaintiff handled her car as an ordinarily prudent person would have done under the circumstances and with the knowledge she possessed of the danger ahead, there would have been no collision. Ralph v. Union Pac. Railroad Co., 82 Idaho 240, 351 P.2d 464; Stowers v. Union Pac. R. Co., 72 Idaho 87, 237 P.2d 1041; Rowe v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 52 Idaho 649, 17 P.2d 352; I.C. §§ 49-701 (a, c), 49-821. See also Yearout v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R. Co., 82 Idaho 466, 354 P.2d 759; Smith v. Sharp, 82 Idaho 420, 354 P.2d 172; Ineas v. Union Pac. R. Co., 72 Idaho 390, 241 P.2d 1178; Whiffin v. Union Pac. R. Co., 60 Idaho 141, 89 P.2d 540; Smith v. Oregon Short Line R. R. Co., 47 Idaho 604, 277 P. 570.