Court Opinion

ID: 9531239
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:09:04.232054+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:22.847335
License: Public Domain

*347DISSENTING OPINION
Jasper, C. J.
I dissent to the transfer of this cause of action to this court.
Appellee, as an agent of the State of Indiana, was employed to represent the state as Clerk of the Works for the construction of the State Board of Health Building.
Appellee, being employed by the State of Indiana, then agreed to submit daily reports to appellant, who was the architect and engineer in charge of construction. Six hundred and seventy-nine reports were submitted to appellant. Appellee contended that he was entitled to be paid by the architect for the reports submitted.
The Appellate Court found that the employment by the architect and engineer was against public policy. This court has held that an agent cannot serve two masters whose business transactions may be antagonistic. Cheney v. Unroe (1906), 166 Ind. 550, 77 N. E. 1041; Noble v. Davison (1912), 177 Ind. 19, 96 N. E. 325. It is unquestioned that a Clerk of the Works is a direct representative of the State of Indiana acting through the Director of the Division of Public Works and Supply. It is his duty to see that the plans and specifications are carried out to the letter, to check the material, and to see that no materials are substituted. He is required to check and certify the correctness of all invoices submitted by the architect. He can stop construction if the plans and specifications are not being carried out.
There can be no question but what his interests are adverse and antagonistic to that of the architect. Any agreement to be paid by the architect would cause the appellee to be serving two masters. As was said in *348Noble v. Davison, supra (pp. 28, 29 of 177 Ind., pp. 329, 330 of 96 N. E.) :
“The test of the validity of such agreements is the tendency to public injury, regardless of the actual intent of the parties, and regardless of actual results. ...
“In Cheney v. Unroe, supra, this court quoted with approval the following from 1 Dillon, Mun. Corp. (4th ed.) §444: Tt is a well-established and salutary doctrine, that he who is intrusted with the business of others cannot be allowed to make such business an object of pecuniary profit to himself. This rule does not depend on reasoning technical in its character, and is not local in its application. It is based on principles of reason, of morality, and of public policy. It has its foundation in the very constitution of our nature, for it has authoritatively been declared that a man cannot serve two masters, and is recognized and enforced wherever a well regulated system of jurisprudence prevails.’
“In Waymire v Powell (1886), 105 Ind. 328, 4 N. E. 900, this court, in holding void a contract between a board of county commissioners and one of its members, said: ‘The law will not permit public servants to place themselves in a situation where they may be tempted to do wrong, and this it accomplishes by holding all such employments, whether made directly or indirectly, utterly void.’ ”
In Cheney v. Unroe, supra (pp. 552, 553 of 166 Ind., pp. 1042, 1043 of 77 N. E.), this court said:
“There is a class of contracts, entered into by officers and agents of the public, which naturally intends to induce the officer, or agent, to become remiss in his duty to the public, that the courts unhesitatingly pronounces as illegal and void as being contrary to public policy.
“As indicating the State’s disapproval of kindred contracts, the legislature has provided as follows: ‘Any . . . county commissioner, ... or their appointees or agents, . . . who shall, during the time he may occupy such office ... be interested, directly *349or indirectly, in any contract for the construction of . . . work of any kind erected or built for the use of the . . . township, . . . shall be fined . . . and imprisoned in the state prison,’ etc. §2136 Burns’ 1901, §2049 R. S. 1881. All contracts entered into in contravention of the statute are utterly void. Wingate v. Harrison School Tp. (1877), 59 Ind. 520; Case v. Johnson (1883), 91 Ind. 477; Benton v. Hamilton (1887), 110 Ind. 294.
“It remains to be seen whether the contract sued on falls within the general class referred to above. . . . The principle is stated in 1 Clark & Skyles, Agency, §39 (e), as follows: ‘Any contract of agency by a public officer by which he binds himself to violate his duty to the public, or which places him in a position which is inconsistent with his duty to the public and has a tendency to induce him to violate such duty, is clearly illegal and void.’ Greenhood, Public Policy, p. 337, states the doctrine thus: ‘Any contract by one acting in a public capacity, which restricts the free exercise of a discretion vested in him for the public good, is void.’ See, also, page 337 quoted approvingly in Brown v. First Nat. Bank (1894), 137 Ind. 655, 667, 24 L. R. A. 206.”
Under the facts of this case, I feel that this court should have denied the petition to transfer this cause, and that the implied promise to pay for the reasonable value of the services rendered by appellee is against public policy.
Note.—Reported in 108 N. E. 2d 621.