Court Opinion

ID: 9486941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:04:29.988655+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:01.330350
License: Public Domain

NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because the majority opinion vacates the consent decree on an issue waived by Defendants, because it misapplies Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992), because it fails to recognize that the present case involves substantive rather than merely procedural regulations, and because it usurps the district court’s discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this case, I respectfully dissent.
I.
The majority reasons that, because, under Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983), and Inmates of Orient Correctional Inst. v. Ohio State Adult Parole Auth., 929 F.2d 233 (6th Cir.1991), “procedural statutes and regulations governing parole do not create federal procedural due process rights,” it follows that no basis in federal law exists for the injunctive relief imposed in this ease. Ante at 1164-65. The majority opinion ignores the fact that Defendants raised this argument in 1984. At that time, the district court rejected Defendants’ argument on its merits, and Defendants voluntarily chose not to appeal. This constitutes a waiver of the issue, and I feel it is improper for the majority to consider it here. See Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 197, 200, 71 S.Ct. 209, 211, 212, 95 L.Ed. 207 (1950) (holding that Rule 60(b)(6) relief from allegedly erroneous judgment was unavailable for petitioner who made “voluntary, deliberate, free, untrammeled choice ... not to appeal”); Lorain NAACP v. Lorain Bd. of Educ., 979 F.2d 1141, 1151 (6th Cir.1992) (holding that when parties enter into consent decrees to avoid further litigation, the waiver of the right to litigate defenses must be respected), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2998, 125 L.Ed.2d 691 (1993); Epp v. Kerrey, 964 F.2d 754, 756 (8th Cir.1992) (declining to vacate a nine year old injunction against state officials in part because “the State slept on its rights when it failed to appeal the 1983 Injunction.”); Boyd v. Ford Motor Co., 948 F.2d 283, 284 (6th Cir.1991) (issues raised in lower court and not raised on appeal are considered abandoned and not reviewable), cert. denied, — U.S. ——, 112 S.Ct. 1481, 117 L.Ed.2d 624 (1992).
II.
The majority opinion misapplies Rufo in five different ways. First, in Rufo, the consent decree was before the Court on a Rule 60(b)(5) motion for relief from judgment. — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 756. However, in the present case the majority applies Rufo even though there is no Rule 60(b) motion pending, and even though the majority has taken no action to resurrect one of Defendants’ earlier Rule 60(b) motions that is no longer pending. Rule 60(b) allows a court to grant relief from judgment only upon motion of a party. It follows that “the issue is not before this court or ripe for us to decide.” Johnson v. Robinson, 987 F.2d 1043, 1050 (4th Cir.1993); see also Hook v. State of Arizona Dept. of Corrections, 972 F.2d 1012, 1017 (9th Cir.1992) (“[W]e refrain from addressing the Department’s Eleventh Amendment argument until it has been raised in a Rule 60(b)(5)-(6) motion. Our restraint is supported by policies favoring the finality and binding effect of judgments and *1170requiring the party seeking relief from a final judgment to bear the burden of modifying it.”).
Second, the majority opinion ignores the fact that Rufo is to be applied in the first instance by the district court rather than the reviewing court, and that our role is merely to review for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Rufo, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 765; id. (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Determining what is ‘equitable’ is necessarily a task that entails substantial discretion, particularly in a case like this one, where the District Court must make complex decisions requiring the sensitive balancing of a host of factors.... Our deference to the District Court’s exercise of its discretion is heightened where, as in this litigation, the District Court has effectively been overseeing a large public institution over a long period of time.”); Lorain NAACP, 979 F.2d at 1147-48 (6th Cir.1992) (“We review a district court’s modification of a consent decree under an abuse of discretion standard.”); Mackin v. City of Boston, 969 F.2d 1273, 1277-78 (1st Cir.1992) (stressing that district court enjoys “a significant measure of discretion” in exercising its equitable power to modify or dissolve a consent decree in institutional reform litigation), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1043, 122 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993); Epp, 964 F.2d at 756 (declining to vacate an injunction that was probably moot because “the district court should be the first to address its current vitality on an adequate record.”).1
Third, in Heath v. DeCourcy, 992 F.2d 630, 635 (6th Cir.1993), we stressed that the proper procedure in ruling on a motion to modify a consent decree under Rufo is to conduct a “complete hearing,” allowing both parties to present evidence relevant to a Rufo analysis. See also Johnson, 987 F.2d at 1050 (holding that before a court may modify a consent decree, the court must, at minimum, (1) provide specific notice that it is contemplating making the changes, (2) allow the parties an opportunity to present evidence on the need for the changes, and (3) issue specific findings that support a determination that modification is warranted) (citing United States v. Western Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 430, 435, 436 & 437 n. 12 (D.C.Cir.1990)). However, in the present case the majority vacates the consent decree on the basis of Rufo law without giving notice to Plaintiffs that it was contemplating such an action, without providing a hearing on whether Rufo applies, without requiring Defendants to present evidence in support of their position, and without providing an opportunity for the plaintiffs to contradict Defendants’ evidence.
Fourth, Rufo requires as a condition to modifying a consent decree that there be a significant change in circumstances warranting revision of the decree. — U.S. at — , 112 S.Ct. at 760. The majority opinion states that Olim and Inmates of Orient Correctional Institute — which together hold that “procedural statutes and regulations governing parole do not create federal procedural due process rights,” ante at 1164 (emphasis added) — constituted a significant change in the law governing this case for purposes of applying Rufo. Ante at 1166. However, Olim and Inmates did not so much change the relevant law as they merely clarified it.2 For example, in Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 12-14, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 2103, 2106-07, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979), the Court held that due process protection applies to parole only if state statutes and *1171regulations expressly limit the exercise of discretion such that an inmate qualified under state law has a “legitimate claim of entitlement” to parole. That Olim did not announce a significant change in the law is especially true in the Sixth Circuit, for Olim cites a Sixth Circuit ease in support of the proposition that “an expectation of receiving process is not, without more, a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.” 461 U.S. at 250 n. 12,103 S.Ct. at 1748 n. 12 (citing, inter alia, Bills v. Henderson, 631 F.2d 1287, 1298-99 (6th Cir.1980)). The Rufo Court flatly rejected the view that a mere clarification of the law would, “in and of itself, provide a basis for modifying a decree. ... To hold that a clarification in the law automatically opens the door for relit-igation of the merits of every affected consent decree would undermine the finality of such agreements and could serve as a disincentive to negotiation of settlements in institutional reform litigation.” — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 763. Rather, a clarification of the law will support modification only “if the parties had based their agreement on a misunderstanding of the governing law.” Id. In the present case, however, neither Defendants nor the majority offer any argument to the effect that the underlying agreement was based on a misunderstanding of the governing law, nor does the record indicate any such misunderstanding. Thus, the majority has no basis for concluding that Olim and Inmates constituted a significant change in the law sufficient under Rufo to invoke a modification of the consent decree.
Finally, contrary to the Rufo Court’s instructions, the majority is silent as to whether complete vacation is the only option, or whether some other less invasive modification might have been more “suitably tailored to the changed circumstances.” Rufo, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 763; id. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 764 (holding that “[a] proposed modification should not strive to rewrite a consent decree so that it conforms to the constitutional floor,” and that a consent decree “may be reopened only to the extent that equity requires.”).
III.
The majority opinion simply assumes that Plaintiffs seek only to enforce “purely procedural parole regulations.” Ante ,at 1166. However, the state regulations presently at issue require that parole candidates receive, inter alia: (1) access to files and disclosure of pertinent information; (2) uniform treatment under written guidelines; and (3) timely release once a favorable parole decision is made. These requirements are significantly more substantive than the rule pertaining to the mere composition of a committee that allegedly was violated in Olim. They are important in and of themselves, and not merely as part of the process leading to a determination of parole. Thus, it does not follow from Olim that there were no substantive liberty interests created by the regulations at issue in the present case.
In my opinion, Olim is indeed inapposite; the regulations presently at issue do give rise to liberty interests protected under the due process clause of the Constitution. After all, no one doubts that the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, created a substantive right of access to information; Michigan’s regulations pertaining to access to information for parole candidates are analogous.
Nevertheless, one does not need to agree with this proposition in order to recognize that the majority’s analysis is inadequate. One needs only to admit that the question is controversial or arguable. If so, then one cannot assume that the 1981 consent decree was based on a misunderstanding of the law. One cannot assume that Defendants would not enter into the same settlement agreement if the case had been brought,for the first time today. One cannot assume, before Plaintiffs have ever enjoyed even' one day in court on the merits of the ease, that Plaintiffs ultimately would not have won on the merits but for the consent judgment.
That the issue is controversial or arguable is obvious. Few distinctions in law are as murky as our distinction between substance and procedure. The Supreme Court has long acknowledged that “[t]he line between ‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ shifts as the legal context changes,” and that there is a wide range of “matters which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance and *1172procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either.” Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471, 472, 86 S.Ct. 1136, 1144, 1145, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965). Since Hanna, the Court has commented that: “the Court’s decisions in this area point up the impossibility of laying down a precise rule to distinguish ‘substance’ from ‘procedure,’ ” St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Dickerson, 470 U.S. 409, 411, 105 S.Ct. 1347, 1348, 84 L.Ed.2d 303 (1985) (quoting Brown v. Western R. of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 296, 70 S.Ct. 105, 106, 94 L.Ed. 100 (1949)); “the distinction between substance and procedure might sometimes prove elusive,” Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 433, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 2453, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987); and “we are loath to enter the logical morass of distinguishing between substantive and procedural rules,” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 392, 109 S.Ct. 647, 665, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989).
In light of the lack of precision of the distinction upon which the majority opinion is grounded, in light of this distinction’s dependence upon context, and in light of the broad ‘grey’ area that exists between the category of “pure substance” and that of “pure procedure,” in which the distinction is essentially meaningless, the majority’s presumption that the regulations at issue are purely procedural is inappropriate. Without this presumption, however, if it is merely questionable whether Plaintiffs could prevail on the merits if they had only been granted the opportunity to have a day in court, it follows that the consent decree ought to be left intact.
IV.
Also overlooked is the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction, formerly known as “pendent jurisdiction,” set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1367.3 The majority recognizes that the district court had original jurisdiction over the present case and that issues of state law remain. See ante at 1165. It is apparent that the issues of state law form part of the same case or controversy as the federal question, for both arise from Defendants’ failure to follow particular state regulations. See, e.g., White v. County of Newberry, 985 F.2d 168 (4th Cir.1993) (holding that, in order for state claim to be part of the same case or controversy as federal claim, “[t]he claims need only revolve around a central fact pattern.”). It follows that the district court has supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.
Under § 1367(c)(3), the district court has discretion to decide whether or not to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims. See also Noble v. White, 996 F.2d 797, 799 (5th Cir.1993) (“District courts enjoy wide discretion in determining whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction over a state claim once all federal claims are dismissed.... We do not lightly disturb a district court’s § 1367(c)(3) determination.”); Landefeld v. Marion General Hosp., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir.1993) (holding that district court’s decision to grant supplemental jurisdiction is discretionary, and that we “review only for abuse of discretion.”). The Practice Commentary to § 1367 notes that “if the dismissal of the main claim occurs late in the action, after there has been substantial expenditure in time, effort, and money in preparing the dependent claims, knocking them down with a belated rejection of supplemental jurisdiction may not be fair.” See also Landefeld, 994 F.2d at 1182 (“A district court should consider the interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation and balance those interests against needlessly deciding state law issues.”); Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County, 983 F.2d 1277, 1284 (3d Cir.1993) (“In making its determination [whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction], the district court should take into account generally accepted principles of ‘judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants.’ ”) (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1139, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966)); Imagineering, Inc. v. Kiewit Pacific Co., 976 F.2d 1303, 1309 (9th Cir. *11731992) (holding that, in deciding whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction after dismissal of federal claims, district courts should consider the factors of “economy, convenience, fairness, and comity”: “Our circuit frequently has upheld decisions to retain pendent claims on the basis that returning them to state court would be a waste of judicial resources.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1644, 123 L.Ed.2d 266 (1993).
Applying these considerations to the present case, in which the time, effort, and money expended in reaching, enforcing, or challenging the consent decree over the past 17 years has been substantial indeed, given the opportunity, the district court could exercise its supplemental jurisdiction and decide the fate of the consent decree on the basis of state law alone. Thus, but for the majority’s instruction to vacate, with which I disagree, the district court could have found that the state claims alone provide a sufficient basis for keeping the consent decree alive, or for modifying the decree in a way less invasive than vacating it altogether.
V.
For the most part, the foregoing discussion does not apply to Judge Contie’s concurring opinion. Because eight out of the sixteen judges on the en banc court conclude that the present case should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, I feel compelled to address the views of the concurring judges.
The concurring opinion reasons that (1) under Olirri, Michigan’s parole procedures do not create a federally protected liberty interest, and (2) without such an interest, there is no federal question in the present case. See concurring opinion ante at 1167. From these premises, it concludes that there is no federal subject matter jurisdiction over the present case.
Setting aside my disagreements with the two premises as stated earlier, the conclusion regarding subject matter jurisdiction simply does not follow. Federal subject matter jurisdiction lies so long as the complaint is drawn so as to seek recovery directly under the Constitution or laws of the United States, unless the federal claim “clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 70, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2628, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (“For purposes of determining whether jurisdiction exists under § 1331(a) .... the test is whether ‘the cause of action is so patently without merit as to justify the court’s dismissal without jurisdiction.’”) (quoting Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 542 — 43, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 1382, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974)); Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666, 94 S.Ct. 772, 777, 39 L.Ed.2d 73 (1974) (holding that the test is whether right claimed is “so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decision of this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.”). Thus, where a plaintiff claims that state laws give rise to a federally protected liberty interest and where the claim is not patently immaterial or wholly insubstantial or frivolous, even if upon analysis it turns out that the plaintiffs claim is incorrect, this does not imply that there was no subject matter jurisdiction in the first place. Rather, it implies that the plaintiff loses his case on the merits.
Applying Bell and its progeny to the present ease, it is clear that Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged the existence of a federally protected liberty interest. See J.A. at 41 (complaint). Thus, under Bell, the only way that subject matter jurisdiction would not lie in this case would be if Plaintiffs’ contention were patently immaterial or wholly insubstantial or frivolous. There can be no doubt that Plaintiffs’ contention exceeds at least this minimal threshold; even the concurring judges do not contend that Plaintiffs’ arguments were so insubstantial, implausible, or frivolous as to be patently without merit.
VI.
Because Defendants have waived the Olim “change of law” issue, because there is no Rule 60(b) motion pending, and because the district court does have subject matter juris*1174diction over this ease, I would leave the consent decree intact, and remand this matter to the original assigned panel to consider the propriety of the district court’s Orders of March 12 and April 12, 1992. Alternatively, given that the majority resurrects the Olim issue, I would remand the matter to allow the district court to apply the Rufo doctrine in the first instance. Alternatively, given that the majority opinion has the effect of invading the district court’s province with regard to applying Rufo, I would at least apply Rufo’s two-step test in the way that the Supreme Court intended, by first conducting a hearing to allow the parties to argue whether circumstances have so changed that, under Rufo, modification of the consent decree is appropriate, and then, if it were found that they had, by carefully tailoring the modification to the changed circumstances. Along the way, I would address Plaintiffs’ argument that Olim is inapposite insofar as the present case is based upon substantive rather than merely procedural law. Finally, if the court were to find that Plaintiffs’ federal claim is somehow lacking, a remand would be in order for the district court to consider whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. I acknowledge, of course, that courts of appeals have the inherent power to resolve issues insofar as their resolution has been raised and briefed by the parties, where doing so may materially assist in the advancement of the litigation upon remand. See Firestone v. Galbreath, 25 F.3d 323, 326 n. 6 (6th Cir.1994); Pinney Dock & Transport Co. v. Penn Central Corp., 838 F.2d 1445, 1461 (6th Cir.1988). However, it is well-settled that this power should be exercised only under exceptional circumstances that the majority does not attempt to invoke in the instant case. See Firestone, 25 F.3d at 326 n. 6; Pinney Dock & Transport Co., 838 F.2d at 1461. Moreover, in this case, the majority raises the Rufo issue sua sponte, and the parties have not had the opportunity to brief it.

. Although the majority characterizes Olim and Inmates as manifesting a change in the law, ante at 1166, this finding is belied by the majority’s own observation that these cases represent a mere clarification of the relevant law, see ante at 1164-1165.

. Section 1367(a) provides, in pertinent part: [I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. ...