Court Opinion

ID: 9928817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 22:10:58.238903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:54:51.152508
License: Public Domain

J-A28033-23

                                   2024 PA Super 14

  N.T., A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MARY JANE BARRETT, ESQUIRE,                  :        PENNSYLVANIA
  GUARDIAN OF THE ESTATE OF N.T.               :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :   No. 3015 EDA 2022
                                               :
  THE CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL OF                   :
  PHILADELPHIA, STEPHANIE MANN,                :
  M.D., MARK P. JOHNSON, M.D., THE             :
  HOSPITAL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF                :
  PENNSYLVANIA AND STEVEN C.                   :
  HORII, M.D.                                  :

             Appeal from the Order Entered November 10, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
                            No(s): 160301791

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and COLINS, J.*

OPINION BY COLINS, J.:                                FILED JANUARY 25, 2024

       Appellant, N.T. (Minor), by and through Mary Jane Barrett, Esquire,

guardian of her estate, appeals from an order of the Philadelphia County Court

of Common Pleas dismissing her medical malpractice action against the

Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia (CHOP) and CHOP physicians Drs.

Stephanie Mann and Mark P. Johnson (collectively, the CHOP defendants) and

the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania (HUP) and HUP radiologist Dr.

Steven C. Horii (collectively, the HUP defendants) on the ground that Minor’s

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A28033-23

claims are barred by judicial estoppel. For the reasons set forth below, we

affirm.

      This case is one of three cases filed on Minor’s behalf seeking damages

for the same injuries that she suffered in utero prior to her birth. In December

2007, when Minor’s mother (Mother) was pregnant with Minor and her twin

sister, Mother was diagnosed with twin-to-twin transfusion syndrome (TTTS)

by her treating physicians in North Carolina. Complaint ¶¶29-34. TTTS is a

condition where abnormal communicating blood vessels in the placenta allow

blood to circulate between the fetuses that a woman is carrying, jeopardizing

the survival of both fetuses. Id. ¶¶2-3. Mother’s treating physicians referred

her to CHOP for possible selective laser photocoagulation of communicating

vessels treatment (SLPCV), and Mother was seen at CHOP on January 2, 2008.

Id. ¶¶35-36.     The CHOP defendants concluded that Mother was not a

candidate for SLPCV, based on ultrasounds that were interpreted by the HUP

radiologist as showing an infection, and did not perform SLPCV on Mother. Id.

¶¶36-41. Mother then went to an Ohio physician, Dr. Timothy Crombleholme,

who performed SLPCV on Mother at Cincinnati Children’s Hospital in

Cincinnati, Ohio on January 14, 2008. Id. ¶¶9, 45-47. Minor was born in

April 2008 with severe neurological deficiencies and her twin sister was born

healthy with no neurological injury. Id. ¶¶10, 49-51.

      On January 26, 2011, an action docketed as Case No. 110103674 (the

2011 action) was brought on Minor’s behalf in the Philadelphia County Court

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of Common Pleas against CHOP, Dr. Mann, and Dr. Crombleholme. The 2011

action sought damages for severe and permanent neurological injuries

suffered by Minor, including cerebral palsy, microcephaly, optic atrophy,

immature retinas, blindness, bilateral brain hemorrhages, a seizure disorder,

and a near complete absence of a cerebellum, and alleged that Dr.

Crombleholme negligently performed the SLPCV and that his SLPCV caused

those injuries. 2011 Action Amended Complaint ¶¶8-9, 70-73, 76-77, 96-

104. The complaint in the 2011 action further alleged that CHOP was liable

for the injuries caused by Dr. Crombleholme because it allegedly inadequately

trained him when he was a physician at CHOP and that CHOP and Dr. Mann

were liable for Minor’s injuries because they allegedly misdiagnosed the

condition of the fetuses and negligently failed to treat the TTTS. 2011 Action

Amended Complaint ¶¶8-9, 52-53, 78-95.

      On December 21, 2012, the court dismissed Minor’s claims against Dr.

Crombleholme for lack of personal jurisdiction. The 2011 action continued

against CHOP and Dr. Mann and in December 2014, a second amended

complaint was filed adding Dr. Johnson as a defendant and alleging that the

CHOP defendants were liable for Minor’s injuries because they misdiagnosed

the condition of the fetuses and negligently failed to treat the TTTS. 2011

Action Second Amended Complaint ¶¶46-72. This amended complaint also

alleged that Dr. Crombleholme’s SLPCV did not properly treat Minor’s TTTS.

Id. ¶41.   On May 2, 2016, the trial court, over the CHOP defendants’

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objections, granted the plaintiff’s motion to discontinue the 2011 action

without prejudice.

      In 2013, while the 2011 action was pending, an action docketed as Case

No. 1:13-cv-230 (the Ohio action) was filed on Minor’s behalf against Dr.

Crombleholme and Cincinnati Children’s Hospital (the Ohio defendants) in

federal district court in Ohio.   The complaint in the Ohio action sought

damages for the same injuries to Minor as the 2011 action and alleged that

the Ohio defendants were liable for those injuries because Dr. Crombleholme

negligently performed the SLPCV and his SLPCV caused Minor’s injuries. Ohio

Action Complaint ¶¶3, 71-107. Counsel for Minor in the Ohio action was the

same counsel who represented Minor in the 2011 action.

      On March 18, 2016, this action, Case No. 160301791, was filed on

Minor’s behalf against the CHOP defendants and the HUP Defendants in the

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas.        The complaint in this action

sought damages for the same injuries to Minor as the 2011 action and the

Ohio action.   Complaint ¶¶50-51.     This complaint alleged that the CHOP

defendants were liable for Minor’s injuries because they misdiagnosed the

condition of the fetuses and negligently failed to treat the TTTS. Id. ¶¶52-

75. The complaint alleged that the HUP defendants were liable for Minor’s

injuries on the ground that they allegedly failed to properly interpret Mother’s

ultrasounds and that the CHOP defendants relied on the HUP defendants’

misinterpretation of the ultrasounds in their diagnoses and decision not to

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perform SLPCV. Id. ¶¶36-44, 76-91. Counsel for Minor in this action is the

same counsel who represented Minor in the Ohio action and the 2011 action.

      The Ohio action went to trial in October 2017. Shortly before trial, Minor

successfully moved to amend the Ohio complaint to add a claim for punitive

damages based on the claims that her injuries were caused by Dr.

Crombleholme’s “blind firing” of the laser in performing the SLPCV, rather than

directing it at vessels in the placenta at which it was supposed to be directed,

and that Dr. Crombleholme took efforts to conceal the fact that her injuries

were caused by his SLPCV. Ohio Action 9/28/17 Order at 1-3, 5-10. Minor

also sought to exclude all reference to the present action from the trial of the

Ohio action and the Ohio court ruled that the Ohio defendants could not

mention this action in their opening statements. Ohio Action N.T., 10/11/17,

at 5-11. At the trial of the Ohio action, Minor’s medical expert on causation

testified that Dr. Crombleholme caused Minor’s injuries by firing the laser at

healthy placenta tissue multiple times during the SLPCV and damaging 30%

of the placenta that was nourishing Minor and testified that Minor’s injuries

were caused by hypoxic injury from the placental damage and not by TTTS.

Ohio Action N.T. Trial, 10/16/17 a.m., at 113-15; Ohio Action N.T. Trial,

10/16/17 p.m., at 60-61, 65-66, 74, 77-78; Ohio Action N.T. Trial, 10/17/17

a.m., at 64. Minor’s expert further testified that Minor’s brain was normal and

uninjured until the SLPCV was performed, that the TTTS was a Stage 2 when

the SLPCV was performed, and that Minor’s development would have been

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normal and she would have had no brain damage if the SLPCV had been

properly performed when it was done on January 14, 2008. Ohio Action N.T.

Trial, 10/16/17 p.m., at 60-62, 64, 74; Ohio Action N.T. Trial, 10/17/17 a.m.,

at 63-64; Ohio Action N.T. Trial, 10/25/17, at 54. In addition, Minor’s counsel

argued to the jury that Minor had no brain injury when she came under Dr.

Crombleholme’s care, that she would have suffered no injury if he had

properly performed the SLPCV, and that her injury was caused by Dr.

Crombleholme damaging 30% of Minor’s placenta and was not caused by

TTTS.     Ohio Action N.T. Trial, 10/13/17, at 11; Ohio Action N.T. Trial,

10/26/17, at 15-18.

        While the jury was deliberating, Minor’s claims against the Ohio

defendants were settled for $7 million. Ohio Action Settlement and Release

Agreement at 1. This settlement agreement provided that it did not apply to

claims against the CHOP defendants and HUP defendants and that the plaintiff

agreed “to refrain from making disparaging or critical statements about the

care provided to [Minor] or [Mother]” by the Ohio defendants. Id. at 1, 5.

This settlement was approved by a probate court in Ohio.        Probate Court

Docket at 3.

        Following the settlement of the Ohio action, the CHOP defendants and

HUP defendants were permitted to file and filed amended answers in this

action pleading as new matter that Minor’s claims were barred by judicial

estoppel based on the Ohio action and settlement.          CHOP Defendants’

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Amended Answer and New Matter ¶¶106, 108; HUP Defendants’ Amended

Answer and New Matter ¶¶106, 108.                On August 24, 2022, the CHOP

defendants and the HUP defendants filed motions seeking dismissal of all

claims against them in this action on the grounds, inter alia, that Minor’s

claims were barred by judicial estoppel.1 On November 10, 2022, the trial

court granted both motions and dismissed the action on the grounds that it

was barred by judicial estoppel.          Trial Court Order, 11/10/22; Trial Court

Opinion, 11/10/22, at 4-7. This timely appeal followed.

       Appellant presents the following single issue for our review:

       Was it an error of law to dismiss the underlying action on judicial
       estoppel grounds?

Appellant’s Brief at 4. The CHOP defendants and HUP defendants argue both

that the trial court correctly concluded that this action was barred by judicial

estoppel and that the dismissal can also be affirmed on alternative grounds.

Whether an action is barred by judicial estoppel is a question of law. Widener

University v. Estate of Boettner, 726 A.2d 1059, 1061-62 (Pa. Super.

1999). Our standard of review of this issue is therefore de novo, and our

scope of review is plenary. Buffalo Township v. Jones, 813 A.2d 659, 664

n.4 (Pa. 2002).

____________________________________________

1 Prior motions seeking summary judgment had previously been denied by
another trial court judge. Appellant, however, did not raise the coordinate
jurisdiction rule as an issue in her brief and any claim that the dismissal of
this action violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule is therefore waived.
Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a); In re R.A.M.N., 230 A.3d 423, 431 (Pa. Super. 2020).

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      “Judicial estoppel is an equitable, judicially-created doctrine designed to

protect the integrity of the courts by preventing litigants from ‘playing fast

and loose’ with the judicial system by adopting whatever position suits the

moment.”     Sunbeam Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 781 A.2d

1189, 1192 (Pa. 2001) (quoting Gross v. City of Pittsburgh, 686 A.2d 864

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1996)). Judicial estoppel bars a party from asserting a position

in litigation that is inconsistent with a position that the party previously

successfully maintained with respect to the same legal and factual issue. In

re Adoption of S.A.J., 838 A.2d 616, 620 (Pa. 2003); Grabowski v.

Carelink Community Support Services, Inc., 230 A.3d 465, 472 (Pa.

Super. 2020); Black v. Labor Ready, Inc., 995 A.2d 875, 878 (Pa. Super.

2010).    “The purpose of judicial estoppel is ‘to uphold the integrity of the

courts by preventing parties from abusing the judicial process by changing

positions as the moment requires.’” Adoption of S.A.J., 838 A.2d at 621

(quoting Trowbridge v. Scranton Artificial Limb Co., 747 A.2d 862 (Pa.

2000)).

      Here, the position taken on Minor’s behalf in the Ohio action was

inconsistent and incompatible with the liability theories asserted against the

CHOP defendants and the HUP defendants in this action. In this action, Minor’s

claim was that the TTTS went from Stage 2 to a more serious Stage 3 at the

time that she was treated in Ohio and that the untreated TTTS during the 12-

day delay between Mother’s arrival at CHOP on January 2, 2008 and the

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performance of the SLPCV in Ohio on January 14, 2008 was a cause of her

brain damage. Appellant’s Brief at 5-7, 9; Kontopoulos Expert Report at 3;

Rotenberg Expert Report at 2; Yohay Expert Report at 3; Abrahams Expert

Report at 4; Reznick Expert Report at 2.      This is directly contrary to the

position taken on Minor’s behalf in the Ohio action that Minor suffered no brain

damage from the delay or from TTTS, that the TTTS was still Stage 2 when

Minor was seen in Ohio, and that the sole cause of Minor’s brain damage was

the damage to 30% of Minor’s placenta from the faulty SLPCV and resultant

hypoxia from that damage.      Ohio Action N.T. Trial, 10/13/17, at 11; Ohio

Action N.T. Trial, 10/16/17 a.m., at 113-15; Ohio Action N.T. Trial, 10/16/17

p.m., at 60-62, 64-66, 74, 77-78; Ohio Action N.T. Trial, 10/17/17 a.m., at

63-64; Ohio Action N.T. Trial, 10/25/17, at 54; Ohio Action N.T. Trial,

10/26/17, at 15-18. The inconsistent position was successfully maintained in

the Ohio action, as Minor received $7 million in that action as a result of the

claim that the SLPCV caused her brain injury.

      While there may be more than one cause of an injury, that cannot

reconcile the inconsistent positions here. Minor’s claims in this action were

not consistent with a claim that her injuries were caused by both Defendants’

conduct and by the Ohio SLPCV. None of Minor’s expert reports in this action

claimed that delay and TTTS were a contributing cause of Minor’s brain

damage in addition to or in conjunction with damage to the placenta from the

SLPCV.   None of the experts in this action opined that delay causes an

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increased difficulty or risk of errors or harm to healthy tissue in performing

SLPCV.    Moreover, Minor’s experts in this action specifically based their

opinions that the delay in treating the TTTS was a cause of Minor’s injuries on

the conclusion that the brain damage was caused by hypoxia and the absence

of another source of hypoxia and on the opinion that the SLPCV “was

completed uneventfully.” Rotenberg Expert Report at 2; Yohay Expert Report

at 2-3.

      Appellant argues that judicial estoppel cannot apply (1) because a

settlement, rather than a determination by a court or jury, allegedly cannot

satisfy the element of successful maintenance of the inconsistent position; (2)

because expert testimony and closing arguments at trial allegedly are not a

basis for judicial estoppel; and (3) because the plaintiffs in the Ohio action

and this action were allegedly not the same.        None of these arguments is

meritorious.

      With respect to the first of these arguments, the law is presently unclear

whether successful maintenance of the prior position is a mandatory element

of judicial estoppel or only a factor that favors application of judicial estoppel.

In Adoption of S.A.J., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that

“[w]hether successful maintenance of the prior inconsistent position of litigant

is strictly necessary to implicate judicial estoppel in every case, or whether

success should instead be treated as a factor favoring the doctrine’s

application, is the subject of some uncertainty” and did not decide the issue

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because successful maintenance was shown. 838 A.2d at 620-21 n.3. See

also Yoder v. McCarthy Construction, Inc., 291 A.3d 1, 15-16 n.19 (Pa.

Super. 2023) (noting that this question remains open).

      Assuming that successful maintenance is an essential element of judicial

estoppel, however, it is satisfied here. Judicial estoppel requires only that the

party successfully obtained a benefit by assertion of the position that she now

seeks to dispute and does not require that the issue have been actually

litigated to conclusion or determined by a court or other decision maker on

the merits. Adoption of S.A.J., 838 A.2d at 623 & n.4; Grabowski, 230

A.3d at 472.    See also Black, 995 A.2d at 876, 878-79 (defendant was

judicially estopped from claiming workers’ compensation immunity where it

obtained dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits

by a stipulation that another company was the employer); Widener, 726 A.2d

at 1062 (beneficiary’s acceptance of bequest from one estate that it received

based on factual predicate barred it from contesting that fact in second

estate).   In Adoption of S.A.J., the Supreme Court specifically held that

judicial estoppel does not require an adjudication and ruled that a party was

judicially estopped from claiming paternity where he had obtained the benefit

of not paying child support from his earlier denial of paternity by causing the

child’s mother to cease pursuing a child support action. 838 A.2d at 618, 622-

23 & n.4. Contrary to Appellant’s mischaracterization, there was no ruling by

a decision maker on the child support in Adoption of S.A.J.; rather, the

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proceedings were terminated by the opposing party’s withdrawal of the child

support complaint and a dismissal for lack of activity. Id. at 618.

      A settlement that results in a payment to the plaintiff can constitute

successful maintenance of a prior litigation position that supports judicial

estoppel. Yoder, 291 A.3d at 16-17; Grabowski, 230 A.3d at 473-74; Ligon

v. Middletown Area School District, 584 A.2d 376, 379-80 (Pa. Cmwlth.

1990). In Yoder and Grabowski, this Court held that plaintiffs who obtained

workers’ compensation benefits through a settlement, a compromise and

release agreement that was approved by a workers’ compensation judge,

were judicially estopped from disputing their employment status. Yoder, 291

A.3d at 16-17; Grabowski, 230 A.3d at 473-74.                 In Ligon, the

Commonwealth Court held that a plaintiff was barred by judicial estoppel from

asserting that a defendant with whom he had entered into a settlement at trial

was immune from suit. 584 A.2d at 379-80. Here, Minor received a $7 million

settlement that was approved by a probate court as a result of the assertions

in the Ohio action that Dr. Crombleholme’s SLPCV caused her brain injuries.

      Appellant argues that Associated Hospital Service of Philadelphia

v. Pustilnik, 439 A.2d 1149 (Pa. 1981); Marazas v. W.C.A.B. (Vitas

Healthcare Corp.), 97 A.3d 854 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014); and Philadelphia

Suburban Water Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 808

A.2d 1044 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (en banc), bar judicial estoppel based on a

settlement. We do not agree.

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      In Pustilnik, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held only that a

settlement did not constitute successful maintenance of a claim as to the

amount of a subrogee’s claim and therefore did not estop the settling plaintiff

from disputing the amount of the subrogee’s claim, 439 A.2d at 1151, not that

a settlement can never constitute successful maintenance of a position. Here,

in contrast to Pustilnik, the issue on which Minor was estopped was the cause

of her injuries, not the amount of her damages, and receiving $7 million is

clearly successful maintenance of the claim that Dr. Crombleholme’s SLPCV

caused those injuries. Even if the settlement is consistent with there being

more than one cause of Minor’s brain damage or with the contention that some

damage occurred before the SLPCV because the settlement was not for the

full damages claimed, the settlement is irreconcilably inconsistent with the

claim on which this action was based that the SLPCV did not cause Minor’s

brain damage.

      The language in Marazas and Philadelphia Suburban Water Co. that

settlement of a claim does not constitute successful maintenance of the prior

position, Marazas, 97 A.3d at 860; Philadelphia Suburban Water Co., 808

A.2d at 1161, is dicta. Neither Marazas nor Philadelphia Suburban Water

Co. involved a settlement. Marazas rejected judicial estoppel on the ground

that the opposing party’s inducing the plaintiff to drop a claim was insufficient

to support judicial estoppel. 97 A.3d at 860-61. That ruling is inconsistent

with the Supreme Court’s decision in Adoption of S.A.J. and is therefore not

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good law.2 In Philadelphia Suburban Water Co., judicial estoppel did not

apply because the subject matter of the two proceedings was different. 808

A.2d at 1161-62.

       Appellant’s second argument fails for two reasons. First, the contention

that expert testimony and closing arguments are not sufficient to support

judicial estoppel is incorrect. The purpose of judicial estoppel is to prevent

abuse of the judicial process by taking inconsistent positions before courts.

Adoption of S.A.J., 838 A.2d at 621; Sunbeam Corp., 781 A.2d at 1192;

Grabowski, 230 A.3d at 472. Such an abuse can occur by presenting sworn

expert testimony in court in support of a position or making factual arguments

in court.

       While there are statements in Commonwealth Court decisions that

estoppel requires verified or sworn statements, Nagle v. TrueBlue, Inc., 148

A.3d 946, 954 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016); Marazas, 97 A.3d at 860, those decisions

are not binding on this Court.           Riverview Carpet & Flooring, Inc. v.

Presbyterian SeniorCare, 299 A.3d 937, 977 n.29 (Pa. Super. 2023);

Beaston v. Ebersole, 986 A.2d 876, 881 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc).

Because the Commonwealth Court’s statements appear to confuse the

requirements for judicial estoppel with the requirements for judicial

admissions, we do not find those decisions persuasive. The cases concerning

____________________________________________

2 As discussed below, decisions of the Commonwealth Court are not binding

on this Court.

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expert testimony that Appellant cites, Millcreek Township School District

v. Erie County Board of Assessment Appeals, 140 A.3d 737 (Pa. Cmwlth.

2016), and Kirk v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 61 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1995),

address the issue of whether statements by experts are admissible as

admissions of the party that retained them or other exceptions to the hearsay

rule and do not involve judicial estoppel. The authority that Appellant cites

concerning closing arguments address whether arguments of counsel are

evidence or judicial admissions, not whether closing arguments can support

judicial estoppel.

      Our conclusion that the expert testimony and argument presented at

trial can constitute a basis for judicial estoppel is supported by a decision from

Illinois involving a situation very similar to this case, which we find persuasive.

In Smeilis v. Lipkis, 967 N.E.2d 892 (Ill. App. 2012), the court specifically

rejected the claim that judicial estoppel cannot be based on expert testimony

and found judicial estoppel where the plaintiffs obtained a substantial

settlement based on expert testimony that was inconsistent with their later

position. In Smeilis, the plaintiffs, in the first of two actions that they filed

for the same injury, submitted an expert opinion that the hospital that had

initially treated the patient was negligent in failing to diagnose the patient and

perform immediate surgery, that the patient would not have suffered most of

her neurological damage if the hospital performed the surgery while she was

under its care, and that surgery performed when the patient first came under

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a later physician’s care would not have altered the severity of the patient’s

neurological damage.       Id. at 895-97.        Following discovery, including the

deposition of this expert, plaintiffs settled their claims against the hospital for

$3 million. Id. at 896-97. The plaintiffs then filed a second suit against the

physician who had later treated the patient, basing that action on the opinion

of a different expert who opined that the hospital was not negligent and that

if surgery had been performed promptly when the patient came under the

later physician’s care, she would not have suffered as much neurological

damage. Id. at 897. The court held that these conflicting expert opinions

constituted the taking of inconsistent positions, that the $3 million settlement

constituted a successful outcome, and that the second action was barred by

judicial estoppel. Id. at 899-907.

      Appellant   argues    that    Smeilis      is   distinguishable   and that    the

inconsistent positions should be excused here because the two actions were

separated due to lack of jurisdiction over Dr. Crombleholme in Pennsylvania,

rather than a deliberate attempt to litigate the claims separately.                That

distinction is without merit.      The issue here is the asserting of conflicting

positions on the cause of Minor’s injuries, not the bringing of separate actions.

Minor could not have successfully introduced the contradictory testimony in a

single trial against the CHOP defendants, the HUP defendants, and the Ohio

defendants. Under Mudano v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 137 A. 104

(Pa. 1927), a plaintiff cannot introduce expert opinions from different medical

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experts that irreconcilably conflict with each other, and if such an

irreconcilable conflict exists, no verdict can be based on either expert, and the

plaintiff’s claim based on such expert testimony fails.    Mudano, 137 A. at

107-08; Brodowski v. Ryave, 885 A.2d 1045, 1060-63 (Pa. Super. 2005)

(en banc).

      In any event, even if submitting expert testimony and closing arguments

in court were not a sufficient basis for judicial estoppel by itself, Appellant’s

argument would fail for the second reason that the complaint in the Ohio

action would be a basis for estoppel. The complaint in the Ohio action pled

that Dr. Crombleholme’s SLPCV itself caused Minor’s injuries. Ohio Action

Complaint ¶¶3, 71-77, 87-95. That position is irreconcilably inconsistent with

Minor’s position in this case that Dr. Crombleholme’s SLPCV “was completed

uneventfully.” Rotenberg Expert Report at 2; Yohay Expert Report at 2.

      Appellant’s final argument, that the plaintiffs in the Ohio action and this

action are different is also without merit. Both this action and the Ohio action

were brought on behalf of Minor and name Minor as the plaintiff. The only

difference is that Minor was acting through different guardians in the two

cases. The plaintiff in this action is Minor “by and through” a guardian of

Minor’s estate who was appointed by a Pennsylvania court “for the purpose of

protecting the Minor’s interest in potential litigation.” Complaint at 1-2 & ¶11;

Philadelphia County Orphans’ Court Order, 8/19/15. The plaintiff in the Ohio

action at the time of trial and settlement was Minor “by and through” a

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different guardian of Minor’s estate who was appointed by an Ohio court with

his powers limited to the Ohio action. Ohio Action 9/28/17 Order at 1; Ohio

Probate Court 9/18/15 Order and Letters of Guardianship.3

       The fact that this action was brought by a different guardian for Minor

than the guardian who litigated and settled the Ohio action does not make the

parties different. Under both Pennsylvania and Ohio law, the minor, not the

guardian, is the plaintiff and real party in interest in an action brought on

behalf of a minor by a guardian.         Pa.R.Civ.P. 2027 (referring to minor as “a

party to the action”); Pa.R.Civ.P. 2028 (prescribing form of caption of “A, a

Minor, by B, Guardian” in “[a]n action in which a minor is plaintiff”);

Winterhalter v. West Penn Power Co., 512 A.2d 1187, 1188 n.1 (Pa.

Super. 1986) (although represented by guardians, minor “is the real party to

this action”); Lanzalaco v. Lanzalaco, 976 N.E.2d 309, 313 (Ohio App.

2012) (where guardian brings suit on behalf of a minor, the minor, not the

guardian, is the plaintiff and real party in interest); Slusher v. Ohio Valley

Propane Services, 896 N.E.2d 715, 721 (Ohio App. 2008) (same).                 The

language of Pa.R.Civ.P. 2026 defining “guardian” as “the party representing

the interest of a minor party in any action” does not suggest that the guardian,

____________________________________________

3 Minor is not a resident of either Pennsylvania or Ohio; rather, she is a North

Carolina resident. Complaint ¶12. The plaintiff in the 2011 action and the
original plaintiff in the Ohio action before the Ohio guardian was appointed
were identical; both actions were brought by Mother on behalf of Minor. 2011
Action Amended Complaint at 1 & ¶12; Ohio Action Complaint at 1 & ¶5.

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rather than the minor, is the plaintiff or real party in interest. Rather, the use

of the word “party” in Rule 2026 with respect to the guardian merely

designates the person acting on behalf of the minor and refers to the minor

as the “minor party.”

       Appellant’s argument concerning guardianship of a party’s estate being

distinct from guardianship of the person is irrelevant. Both guardians here

were guardians of the estate fulfilling the same function on behalf of Minor of

bringing and prosecuting litigation on Minor’s behalf.       Indeed, Appellant’s

attempt to characterize the plaintiffs in the two actions as different appears

to be the very type of gamesmanship that judicial estoppel is designed to

prevent, given that the same counsel represented Minor in both actions.

       Because the record shows that Minor’s claims in the Ohio action were

irreconcilably inconsistent with her claims for the same injuries in this action

and she recovered a settlement of $7 million based on her claims in the Ohio

action, the trial court did not err in dismissing this action based on judicial

estoppel.4 Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial court.

       Order affirmed.

____________________________________________

4 We therefore need not and do not address the alternative grounds for
affirmance argued by the CHOP defendants and HUP defendants.

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J-A28033-23

Date: 1/25/2024

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