Court Opinion

ID: 9639614
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:41:48.366049+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:03.552181
License: Public Domain

MOORMAN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I cannot concur. The plaintiff’s evidence in my opinion shows that the sudden stopping of the train was caused by an application of the brakes by the engineer or fireman. Only two witnesses testified to the cause of its stopping: Ruggles, the head brakeman, said, as stated in the majority opinion, that the air went on suddenly, and that it “broke the train line,” that is, a “cross-over pipe” on the twentieth car from the caboose; and Smith, the plaintiff, said that a break in the train line twenty ears from the caboose would cause a reasonable stop on the rear end, and that the only thing that could have caused the sudden stop on this occasion was an “emergency application” of the brakes by the engineer. So, while I recognize the full force and effect of Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Gotschall, 244 U. S. 66, 37 S. Ct. 598, 61 L. Ed. 995, it is my opinion that plaintiff’s evidence negatived the theory that there was any causal connection between the broken train line and the -injury, and hence I think it was error to submit that question to the jury.
Nor can I agree to the opinion’s application of res ipsa loquitur. The petition alleged that the injury resulted from the sudden and violent stopping of the train, and it set forth three specific grounds of causal negligence: (1) The application of the brakes by those in charge of the engine; (2) a defective air line that had not sufficient strength to retain the pressure of the air; and (3) failure properly to inspect, test, and repair the air line. The third ground was not submitted to the jury, and it is not suggested that it should have been. The second, the defective air line, was submitted—as stated, I think improperly. Thus the evidence, in my opinion, excluded every cause save that of the application of the brakes by those in charge of the engine. The jar of the train was of course hut an incident of this causative act—not the cause itself. The case, therefore, is one, it seems to me-, in which a brakeman of ten years’ experience received an injury from the sudden stopping of his train, sued his employer, Alleging among other things that the stopping was caused by the engineer’s negligent appliea*115tion of the brakes, proved that it was caused by his application of the brakes in emergency, but offered no proof as to his reason or lack of reason for applying them. I do not think res ipsa loquitur can be relied upon to take such a case to the jury.
The rule of the res is one of necessity, and arises where the thing complained of does not ordinarily happen in the absence of breach of duty, and where the cause of its happening, whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to the defendant, but is inaccessible to the injured person. Ross v. Cotton Mills, 140 N. C. 115, 52 S. E. 121, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 298; annotations to Gray v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 59 A. L. R. 461, also reported in (C. C. A.) 24 F.(2d) 671. Where reason and necessity for the rule are lacking, it manifestly cannot be resorted to to piece out a ease. Some of the authorities hold that it has no application as between master and servant, or, at least, that it is so limited in its application that it may be invoked only where the cause of the injury is not susceptible of direct and positive proof. Klebe v. Parker Distilling Co., 207 Mo. 480, 105 S. W. 1057, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 140. That it has frequently been applied in actions by passengers against carriers, and quite properly so, cannot be questioned. Paducah Traction Co. v. Baker, 130 Ky. 360, 113 S. W. 449, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1185; Walters v. Seattle R. Co., 48 Wash. 233, 93 F. 419, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 788; Lee Line Steamers v. Robinson, 218 F.559, L. R. A. 1916C, 358 (6 C. C. A.); Penn Co. v. Clark, 266 F. 182 (6 C. C. A.). It has also been applied in many cases where the injured person was neither an employee nor a passenger. San Juan Light Co. v. Requena, 224 U. S. 89, 32 S. Ct. 399, 56 L. Ed. 680; Inland & Sea Board Coasting Co. v. Tolson, 139 U. S. 551, 11 S. Ct. 653, 35 L. Ed. 270; Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S. 233, 33 S. Ct. 416, 418, 57 L. Ed. 815, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 905; Jacob Doll & Sons v. Ribetti (C. C. A.) 203 F. 593; Howser v. Cumberland & P. R. Co., 80 Md. 146, 30 A. 906, 27 L. R. A. 154, 45 Am. St. Rep. 332.
In Cincinnati Ry. Co. v. South Pork Coal Company, 139 F. 528, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 533 (6 C. C. A.)—a nonemployee ease—Judge Lurton pointed out that it had been held that there was no presumption of negligence in favor of the employee in an action against an employer, citing, among other eases, T. & P. R. Co. v. Barrett, 166 U. S. 617, 17 S. Ct. 707, 41 L. Ed. 1136, and Patton v. T. & P. R. Co., 179 U. S. 658, 21 S. Ct. 275, 277, 45 L. Ed. 361. In the Patton Case Mr. Justice Brewer said: “While, in the ease of a passenger the fact of an accident carries with it a presumption of negligence on the part of the carrier, a presumption which, in the absence of some explanation or proof to the contrary, is sufficient to sustain a verdict against hint, * * * a different rule obtains as to an employee”—as to whom the fact of accident carries no such presumption. Cf. Southern Ry. Co. v. Bennett, 233 U. S. 80, 34 S. Ct. 566, 58 L. Ed. 860, and Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Mullins, 249 U. S. 531, 39 S. Ct. 368, 63 L. Ed. 754. If it is true, and I do not say it is not, that the doctrine may be invoked in a proper case by an employee, there is nevertheless much authority and sound reason for the view that it is not so readily available to an employee as to those to whom there is owing a higher degree of care and who are more restricted in their means for ascertaining the cause. See Loudoun v. Eighth Avenue R. Co., 162 N. Y. 380, 56 N. E. 988, and Plumb v. Richmond Light & R. Co., 233 N. Y. 285, 135 N. E. 504, 25 A. L. R. 685. Pacts more favorable to the suing employee than those in the present case have been held in many eases not to fall within the doctrine—among them Henson, v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 194 N. Y. 205, 87 N. E. 85, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 790, Klebe v. Parker Distilling Co., and Gray v. B. & O. R. R. Co., supra. .In the Gray Case it was said that the doctrine was inapplicable because the cause of the accident, the running of the train into an open switch, was known to the plaintiff, and whether the engineer who ran it into the switch was negligent was in no way to be presumed from the fact that the accident happened. In the ease at bar the plaintiff likewise knew the cause, alleged and proved it— the emergency application of the brakes by the engineer; and certainly it ought not to be presumed, it seems to me, from that fact, something that a brakeman may encounter at any time in the course of his work, that the engineer was negligent. In Sweeney v. Erving, supra, Mr. Justice Pitney, in approving Kay v. Metropolitan Street Railway Co., 163 N. Y. 447, 57 N. E. 751, quoted from the opinion to the effect that, where the legal presumption arises (referring to res ipsa loquitur), if the defendant’s proof operates to rebut it or leaves “the essential fact of negligence in doubt and uncertainty, the party who made the allegation should suffer, and not her adversary.” It would seem unnecessary to say that, where it is the plaintiff’s proofs that leave the question in doubt, he must also fail.
*116There is nothing, in my opinion, in Cochran v. Pittsburg, etc., Co. (D. C.) 31 F.(2d) 769, 772, to justify the view that the legislation enacted for the benefit of employees of interstate carriers has materially changed the applicability of the doctrine to the eases 'of such employees. There is still left to the carrier under those acts the defense” of assumed risk of injury not resulting from certain defective appliances, and there is also left the defense of contributory negligence in mitigation of damages. Judge Westenhaver stated in the Cochran Case that, in order to bring the doctrine into effect, it was necessary, among other things, that the circumstances as proved “did not leave 'outstanding another existing and equally probable cause of the accident, not depending on the master’s negligence, and for which he would not be liable.” Accepting that statement as in harmony with what was said in the Sweeney Case, and looking to the reason and necessity for the rule, I cannot agree to its application in this case.. The cause of the injury, the sudden application of the brakes in emergency by the engineer, was known to the plaintiff. It was alleged in his petition. It is common knowledge among trainmen, and also among all travelers on railroad trains, that air brakes are applied in emergency, not frequently, but yet commonly enough.to be an incident of freight train operation. Trainmen must expect the occasional necessity for such applications. When they are made in order'to protect the train or to protect life, it is a performance of duty. Groves v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 96 S. W. 439, 29 Ky. Law Rep. 725. No proof was introduced by the plaintiff ten'ding to show why the brakes were applied by the engineer or fireman on this occasion. It is quite as probable that it was done in the exercise of commendable care for life' or property as that it was negligently done. The plaintiff called one -of his crew as a witness, the head brakeman. No reason is given by him for not calling the other members. The. case therefore is not one in which the means for discovering negligence, if there was negligence, were not open to the injured party. The plaintiff knew the cause, and, if the engineer was negligent, as alleged in the petition, it was just as susceptible of proof by plaintiff as was nonnegligence by defendant. There being a probable nonnegligent cause, the ease is controlled, in my opinion, by the concession made in the majority opinion that, if it is as probable that the injury resulted from non-negligence as negligence, it is error to submit the case to the jury.