Court Opinion

ID: 9514552
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:50:26.172197+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:18.811657
License: Public Domain

KONENKAMP, Justice
(concurring in part and concurring in result).
[¶ 37.] Although I agree with the majority opinion on the jurisdiction question, I write specially on Issue II because both the majority and the dissent misemploy our review standards and consequently fail to give appropriate deference to the trial court’s decision to enforce the parties’ settlement.
[¶ 38.] Settlements made in open court are generally binding, especially when entered on the record. In re Estate of Eberle, 505 N.W.2d 767, 770 (S.D.1993). Trial courts possess inherent or equitable power to summarily enforce agreements to settle pending cases. See, e.g., Murchison v. Grand Cypress Hotel Corp., 13 F.3d 1483, 1486 (11th Cir.1994); United States v. Hardage, 982 F.2d 1491, 1496 (10th Cir.1993); Brock v. Scheuner Corp., 841 F.2d 151, 154 (6th Cir. 1988); Collie v. Near, 829 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir.1987); Mid-South Towing Co. v. Har-Win, Inc., 733 F.2d 386, 389-90 (5th Cir. 1984); Ozyagcilar v. Davis, 701 F.2d 306, 308 (4th Cir.1983); Antera v. Robinson, 419 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir.1969); Ballato v. General Electric, 147 F.R.D. 95, 97 (E.D.Pa.1993). Power to enforce a settlement is founded in the policy favoring amicable resolution of disputes and avoiding costly, time-consuming trials. See generally Erickson v. Webber, 58 S.D. 446, 237 N.W. 558 (1931); cf. Pugh v. Super Fresh Food Markets, Inc., 640 F.Supp. 1306, 1307 (E.D.Pa.1986) (citations omitted).
[¶ 39.] So long as there is a clear offer and acceptance of the compromise and a meeting of the minds on the essential terms of the agreement, oral settlement agreements made in the presence of the trial court are enforceable as binding contracts. Eberle, 505 N.W.2d at 770; Spercel v. Sterling Indus., Inc., 31 Ohio St.2d 36, 285 N.E.2d 324, 326 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917, 93 S.Ct. 1550, 36 L.Ed.2d 309. “Minor points implementing the agreement, though not listed, can be implied as necessary to carry out the terms of the agreement.” Eberle, 505 N.W.2d at 770. Even mutual mistakes in making a compromise will not necessarily vitiate a settlement agreement. Fada v. Information Sys. & Networks Corp., 98 Ohio App.3d 785, 792, 649 N.E.2d 904, 908 (1994). We recently stated:
For a contract to be enforceable, it must be possible to ascertain the full meaning with reasonable certainty. An agreement must be sufficiently definite to enable a court to give it an exact meaning. Deadwood Lodge No. 508 Benev. and Protective Order of Elks of U.S. of America v. Albert, 319 N.W.2d 823 (S.D.1982). However, absolute certainty is not required; only reasonable certainty is necessary. 17A Am-Jur2d Contracts § 196 (1991).
Eberle, 505 N.W.2d at 770. “While an attorney’s authority to settle must be expressly conferred, the existence of the attorney of record’s authority to settle in open court is presumed unless rebutted by affirmative evidence that authority is lacking.” Szymkowski v. Szymkowski, 104 Ill.App.3d 630, 60 Ill.Dec. 310, 312, 432 N.E.2d 1209, 1211 (1982)(citing cases). See also Eberle, 505 N.W.2d at 770. Once counsel agree on the necessary terms for a binding settlement in court with authority from their clients, “a contract is formed even though they intend to adopt a formal document with additional terms at a later date.” Capek v. Mendelson, 821 F.Supp. 351, 357 (E.D.Pa.1993)(quoting Courier Times, Inc. v. United Feature Syndicate, Inc., 300 Pa.Super. 40, 445 A.2d 1288, 1295 (1982)). The “four corners” of the transcript may reveal the parties in fact reached a complete, binding agreement in resolution of their lawsuit. Hyde Park Union Church v. Curry, 942 F.Supp. 360, 364 (N.D.Ill.1996).
[¶40.] Under our settled rules of construction, “a court should, if possible, ascertain and enforce the mutual intention of the parties as set forth in their agreement.” Steffens v. Peterson, 503 N.W.2d 254, 258 (S.D.1993). Even when parties change their minds between the time of oral agreement in court and when it is to be reduced to writing, *215the settlement is nonetheless binding. Gross, 396 FSupp at 375. Voluntary settlements and stipulations “entered into cannot be repudiated by either party and will be summarily enforced....” Cummins Diesel Michigan, Inc. v. The Falcon, 305 F.2d 721, 723 (7th Cir.1962)(eollecting Illinois cases); see also Schneider v. Dumbarton Developers, Inc., 767 F.2d 1007, 1015 (D.C. Cir.1985); Autera, 419 F.2d at 1201 n. 17. Trial courts may enforce only completed settlement agreements, however. Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d 1180, 1189 (8th Cir. 1984); Ozyagcilar, 701 F.2d at 308. “Whether the court may summarily enforce such an agreement or should conduct an evidentiary hearing on the disputed issues depends upon the nature of the dispute.” Dankese v. Defense Logistics Agency, 693 F.2d 13, 15-16 (1st Cir.1982). Summary enforcement of a settlement agreement is improper if substantial factual disputes exist over the terms of the settlement. See Kukla v. Nat’l Distillers Prod. Co., 483 F.2d 619, 622 (6th Cir.1973). On the other hand, an evidentiary hearing may be unnecessary if the trial court was present to hear the parties’ agreement when it was made. Wilson v. Wilson, 46 F.3d 660, 665 (7th Cir.1995).
[¶41.] In this ease, was there a binding settlement between the parties in open court? Though both the majority, and dissent scour the transcript in their ⅛ novo examination of this question, at least part of our review should employ the abuse of discretion standard. Fully acquainted with this litigation and the many issues it involved, the trial judge was in a far better position than we to decide what the parties intended, especially since some of their comments though contradictory were not necessarily irreconcilable.
To the extent the court’s power to enforce a settlement agreement falls within the court’s role as supervisor of litigation, then, as noted by the Supreme Court in Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 n. 1, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 2546 n. 1, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988), this is precisely the type of determination that normally receives a deferential, abuse of discretion review. See also 1 Steven Alan Childress & Martha S. Davis, Standards of Review § 4.01A, at 4-2 (1986)(stating that a district judge’s supervision of litigation is a judgment entailing on-the-scene presence and therefore entitled to deference). Therefore, we join with these other circuits and hold that the abuse of discretion standard is the proper guide for our review of a district court’s decision to enforce a settlement agreement.
Id. at 664.
[¶ 42.] We can focus on inconsistent remarks from the transcript or we may appropriately defer to the trial court’s firsthand assessment of what the parties agreed. Not only did the court hear and receive the settlement, but it also participated to the extent of asking numerous questions to tidy up possible loose ends. At many points, the parties were virtually negotiating their settlement in open court as they recited their lengthy oral stipulation. Nonetheless, at the end of their stipulation, the court stated, with the obvious assent of everyone present, “The agreement has been made right now today.” It was only suggested after this point that the court could force a transfer if the two sisters refused to give their consent. What the court apparently concluded was that Marvin’s effort to obtain Cheryl’s and Diane’s future interests in the 200 acres of trust property was merely ancillary to the settlement. Marvin had no lawful claim to his sisters’ property; indeed, during the pendency of this case he never made any claim to it. He knew he needed their consent to accomplish a transfer. True, the judge commented after the parties’ stipulation that to make this part of the agreement work, Cheryl’s and Diane’s consent was needed, but at no point in the eighty-six pages of transcript in which the agreement is recited did anj,party suggest that the deal was contingent on Marvin obtaining his sisters’ interest in the trust acreage.
[¶ 43.] Of course, contract interpretation is reviewed de novo, but sorting out what was agreed from multiple representations and enforcing those essential terms falls under the trial court’s supervisory powers and thus should be reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. With that standard, how *216can we say it was against reason and evidence to refuse to negate a complex and extensive settlement because an appurtenant transaction could not be consummated?
A litigant who enters the judicial process through the agency of freely chosen counsel always assumes a certain risk that the result achieved will not be satisfactory. Defeated expectations do not, therefore, entitle the litigant to repudiate commitments made to opposing parties or to the court.
Petty v. Timken Corp., 849 F.2d 130, 133 (4th Cir.1988)(uphoIding summary enforcement of settlement agreement).