Court Opinion

ID: 9638692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:50:55.901504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:08.913356
License: Public Domain

John A. Fogleman, Chief Justice, dissenting. The question of the propriety of expense allowances without requiring any itemization or accounting is not for the courts. However unwise we may think such a provision to be, the matter is one for legislative determination. Apparently we have considered the legislative discretion to be absolute in such cases, except where the allowance has been used to evade constitutional limitations on the amount of compensation to be paid a public official. No such limitation is involved here. Tedford v. Mears, 258 Ark. 450, 526 S.W. 2d 1, is a case where such a limitation was involved. The acts involved were held to be unconstitutional as applied and administered in Pulaski County. They were held to be constitutional as adopted. Thus, Tedford clearly falls into that category of cases controlled by the existence of constitutional • salary limitations. It is not authority for permitting a chancery action by a taxpayer when, as here, there was an adequate remedy by appeal. Arkansas Association of County Judges v. Green, 232 Ark. 438, 338 S.W. 2d 672, does not afford that authority. In that case, we considered the action as one for declaratory judgment. The closing paragraph of the opinion shows clearly that the decision was only prospective. We said: Since, as before stated, we treat the petition as one for a declaratory judgment, and in view of what we have already said, it was not appropriate for the Chancellor to enjoin the Association from filing claims and the Judge from allowing the same. These are matters involving judicial procedure and should be decided on the peculiar facts of each case. The trial court did have authority to enter a declaratory decree, and it should have done so, in accordance with this opinion, thereby setting at rest the present controversy. Therefore the case is remanded for the entry of such a declaratory decree. This case cannot be converted into a declaratory judgment action. Chancery court jurisdiction in Mackey v. McDonald, 255 Ark. 978, 504 S.W. 2d 726, was sustained on the basis of prevention of misapplication of funds. Again, we treated the action as one for declaratory judgment. Ward v. Farrell, 221 Ark. 363, 253 S.W. 2d 353, is readily distinguishable. For the most part the action involved injunctive relief. The chancellor dismissed the action for recovery of certain payments in the guise of “expenses” which enabled him to draw more than his authorized salary. The county judge claimed that he had drawn expenses as Ex-officio Road Commissioner of Greene County, as authorized by a legislative act. No appropriation for these expenses had been made in 1947 and 1948, as required by the act. Appropriations were made for the subsequent years involved. Reference to Art. 16, § 13 of the constitution was made only in answer to the contention that the exclusive authority to bring the action was vested in the State Auditorial Department. This court sustained the chancery court action as to years prior to 1948 because recovery was barred by the three-year statute of limitations. We sustained the chancery court as to these expenses for years after 1948 because there had been an appropriation for each of those years by the quorum court. No injunctive relief was called for as to the expense allowance. The case was remanded, insofar as the claimed expenses were concerned, only to give the county judge an opportunity to justify his acceptance of expenses as Ex-officio Road Commissioner in 1948, for which no appropriation had been made. It was pointed out in the opinion that a county judge could not pass on his own claim, except where his salary was fixed by law and his actions involved no exercise of discretion. The chancellor made a clear and distinct finding in this case that there was no fraud. His findings include the following: It is contended that defendant was guilty of fraud, both actual and constructive. Certainly defendant was a poor record keeper. Some reference will be made to his bank accounts hereinafter. In addition there appears no logical excuse for this, considering his training, official position and office help. After studying the very thorough briefs, reading authorities and pondering the law and evidence this court can not find by the greater weight of the evidence that defendant is guilty of fraud. The carelessness and inefficient record keeping revealed by the evidence is not sufficient to justify a finding of fraud — actual or constructive. *** In the absence of fraud or the requirement that a showing be made that the expenses were not collected as a subterfuge to evade constitutional salary limitations, the chancery court simply had no jurisdiction to order the repayment of the $335.70 which had been paid after allowance by the County Court of Pulaski County from which no appeal had been taken, simply because after the passage of many months appellant could not justify the particular expenditures due to lack of recollection. Perhaps appellant should suffer some penalty for mingling his expense allowances with his personal funds and for sloppy procedures. Even if he was not called upon to account for the legislative allowances, the relationship of actual expenses to those allowances would certainly be pertinent in legislative determination of their adequacy. But it is not the function of the courts to render judgments in such a case for negligence, imprudence, or even recklessness'. In spite of my reservations about the lack of a requirement for an accounting, I would reverse the decree and dismiss the action. Perhaps, because it is an equity case, appellant should bear the costs.