Court Opinion

ID: 9599973
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:22:33.323595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:03.248539
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J.
I dissent.
It is difficult to be objective about an employer that has consistently engaged in egregious unfair labor practices designed to prevent collective bargaining. But the duty of this court is to consider and be bound by relevant statutes. My colleagues have succumbed to the temptation to rewrite the Agricultural Labor Relations Act (ALRA) in order to take what they consider appropriate punitive action against this one farm employer. I resist that temptation.
We are guided in our application of the ALRA by well-settled tenets of statutory construction. First, “ ‘It is a settled principle in California law that “[w]hen statutory language is . . . clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, and courts should not indulge in it.” ’ [Citations.]” (In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 886 [210 Cal.Rptr. 631, 694 P.2d 744].) Section 1156 of the Labor Code provides that “Representatives designated or selected by a secret ballot for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the agricultural employees in the bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representatives . . . .” (Italics added.) Section 1156.3 details the procedures for union elections and Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB) certification following those elections. Section 1159 declares in part that “only labor organizations certified pursuant to this part shall be parties *253to a legally valid collective-bargaining agreement. ” It would be difficult to conceive of a clearer statutory scheme mandating secret ballot elections as the only method by which agricultural employees’ bargaining agents are to be selected.
The majority breach this longstanding principle of statutory construction and stretch the plain language of the ALRA for the purpose of justifying their punitive action against the employer. But even if we were to disregard the plain language of the statute, the majority’s holding would find no support. This is so because a second well-settled rule declares that “In construing constitutional and statutory provisions, whether enacted by the Legislature or by initiative, the intent of the enacting body is the paramount consideration. [Citations.]” (In re Lance W, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 889.) I need only borrow quotations from the majority opinion to demonstrate the straightforward intent of the proponents and of the legislators who enacted the ALRA: “[U]nder our Act, we only allow one way of recognition and that’s through a secret ballot election.” (Hg. before Sen. Industrial Relations Com., May 21, 1975, p. 51, comments of then Secretary of Agriculture and Services Bird.) “[T]here is a secret ballot [election] in all cases. ...” (Id., at p. 59, corns, of Sen. Dunlap.) “[A]bove all else, [the ALRA] requires secret ballot elections in every instance.” (Hg. before Assem. Com. on Labor Relations, May 12, 1975, p. 2, corns, of Assemblyman Berman.)
The majority leap over these absolute, unqualified statements by the AL-RA’s authors and major supporters and settle on a rule of construction they believe justifies their desired result. They urge that we must read the statute in a manner that will promote the purposes of the law, and cite to the act’s preamble and broad statement of policy. (Stats. 1975, Third Ex. Sess., ch. 1, § 1, p. 4013; Lab. Code, § 1140.2.) But these sections do not support their holding either, because a third settled rule decrees that specific statutes prevail over such general provisions. (Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 392, 420 [128 Cal.Rptr. 183, 546 P.2d 687].) Thus we come back, once again, to the unambiguous sections of the ALRA that specifically prescribe secret ballot elections as the exclusive means to obtain ALRB certification of a union. (Lab. Code, § 1156 et seq.)
The majority rely on NLRB v. Gissell Packing Co. (1969) 395 U.S. 575 [23 L.Ed.2d 547, 89 S.Ct. 1918]. However, Gissell is clearly inapposite because it involves the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), a statute different from the ALRA in a most fundamental respect. Section 9(a) of the NLRA provides that “Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit *254. . . shall be the exclusive representatives ... for the purposes of collective bargaining. ...” Because section 9(a) does not “ specify [] precisely how [the] representative is to be chosen, it was early recognized that an employer had a duty to bargain whenever the union representative presented ‘convincing evidence of majority support.’ ” (Gissell, supra, 395 U.S. at p. 596 [23 L.Ed.2d at p. 568].) In contrast, the ALRA clearly specifies how a representative is to be chosen—by a secret ballot election, and only by that means.
The majority attempt to rationalize away this fundamental distinction by explaining that the bargaining order in Gissell issued as a result of the employers’ unfair labor practices. Thus the bargaining order was a remedy, under NLRA section 8(a)(5), for the unfair labor practices, rather than a recognition decision under section 9. Similarly, urge the majority, the ALRB has broad authority to remedy unfair labor practices. Thus, they contend, the ALRB may issue a Gissell-type bargaining order as such a remedy.
This argument blithely overlooks the fact that it is because of the NLRA’s ambiguity as to the method of selecting bargaining representatives that the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) may issue bargaining orders as a remedy. “Since § 9(a) . . . refers to the representative as the one ‘designated or selected’ by a majority of the employees without specifying precisely how that representative is to be chosen, . . . [ajlmost from the inception of the Act... it was recognized that a union did not have to be certified as the winner of a Board election to invoke a bargaining obligation; it could establish majority status by other means under the unfair labor practice provision óf § 8(a)(5) . . . .” (Gissell, supra, 395 U.S. at pp. 596-597 [23 L.Ed.2d at p. 568].)
The disparity between the federal act and our own is thus readily apparent. Because the former provides no guidance on how a representative is to be chosen, the NLRB may designate a representative as a remedy for the employer’s unfair labor practices. The ALRA, however, clearly prohibits recognition of an organization as representative unless that organization has won a secret ballot election. It follows that the ALRB may not designate a representative.
The majority overlook the fact that Gissell was decided six years before the ALRA hearings. Thus the authors and supporters of the California statute were well aware of the federal remedy, and chose not to prescribe it.
However attractive it might appear to ignore the terms of a precise statute, we are not permitted to indulge in that fantasy. The late Chief Justice Wright *255often quoted A.P. Herbert on statutory interpretation: “If Parliament did not mean what it said, why did it not say so?”
I do not mean to condone the activities of employers who would undermine proper labor organizational activities. But we sit as a court, not as a legislative body, and we must adhere to statutory mandates no matter how tempting it may be to disregard our duty in order to reach an appealing result. The board’s order exceeded its jurisdiction and should be annulled.
Lucas, J., concurred.