Court Opinion

ID: 9485777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:29:16.628553+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:20.583159
License: Public Domain

WIDENER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I should say that I do not have occasion to disagree with any of the majority’s opinion except Part III-A. Because I believe that the error was preserved and that the prosecution attempted to set up its own witness as a straw man whom it could impeach by the use of inadmissible hearsay, I would reverse *1438the conviction and remand for a new trial. I respectfully dissent.
I
The majority finds that the defense did not preserve its error because its objection was not clear from the context or otherwise. However, the defense’s objections were made each time the prosecution attempted either to question Miss Scott about her hearsay statement to the United States Marshal or to have her comment on whether Brewer was a drug dealer. In fact, the transcript the majority quotes makes clear that the government did not begin by asking her whether Brewer was a drug dealer and then proceed to question her about the statement, but instead began its questioning by asking about what she had told the marshal. Op. at 1434. The prosecutor also knew that Miss Scott would deny that her fiance, Brewer, was drug dealer. This is shown from the fact that the government asked to treat Miss Scott as a hostile witness, which the majority notes in its opinion. Op. at 1434. There is no doubt that the prosecutor wanted the statement admitted, and this was the prosecutor’s intent from the outset.
Of relevance both to the merits of this case and as to whether the objection was clear is our decision in United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183 (4th Cir.1975), in which we stated that “it has never been the rule that a party may call a witness where his testimony is known to be adverse for the purpose of impeaching him. To so hold would permit the government, in the name of impeachment, to present testimony to the jury by indirection which would not otherwise be admissible.” 531 F.2d at 189. We further stated, “Despite the fact that impeachment of one’s own witness may be permitted, this does not go so far as to permit the use of the rule as a subterfuge to get to the jury evidence otherwise inadmissible.” 531 F.2d at 190. The government engaged in such subterfuge in this case. Miss Scott’s testimony was of no value other than the attempt to get into evidence her prior hearsay statement that Brewer’s occupation was drug dealing, which as the majority notes, was testimony of doubtful admissibility under Rule 404(b) in the first place. Op. at 1435. The government knew she would deny her statement, which is evident from its asking at the outset for permission to treat her as a hostile witness. Thus, we have exactly the situation in Morlang, and I would hold that the error was preserved. The government has known, at least since our decision in 1975, that such tactics are impermissible, and the rule is so well-settled that it can be said without hesitation that the objection was clear from the context.
II
Because I believe the error was preserved, I also would reach the issue of whether the error was prejudicial to Brewer. I would find that it was prejudicial to admit Marshal Flynn’s testimony and reverse for a new trial.1
Flynn’s testimony about Miss Scott’s statement was rank hearsay and should not have been admitted. The fact that the testimony was offered to impeach Miss Scott does not, under the facts of this case, exempt the statement from the usual rule that the prior unsworn statement of a witness cannot be admitted. See Morlang, 531 F.2d at 190 (rioting, under similar facts, that juries often cannot distinguish between impeachment and substantive evidence and that such evidence therefore should be excluded); see also Martin v. United States, 528 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir.1975) (finding that prior statements used for impeachment purposes may not be used as substantive evidence).
The substance of the impeaching testimony was that Miss Scott had told the marshal that Brewer was a drug dealer. It clearly *1439was offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and as such, may only create the impression that the government’s charges must, of course, be correct. Cf. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) (prohibiting character evidence used to show that accused acted in conformity therewith on occasion in question). I see no reason to distinguish the impeachment evidence offered here from the evidence offered in Morlang. In Morlang the witness had given a statement to one Raymond Crist that implicated the defendant in the crime being tried, but he denied the defendant’s involvement in interviews with the government and on the witness stand. The government apparently knew he would deny the defendant’s involvement on the stand and had Crist standing ready to offer the impeaching statement. Even though the jury was given a limiting instruction, we reversed, based upon the government’s apparent subterfuge in calling the first witness solely for the purpose of having the witness’s otherwise inadmissible statement admitted as impeachment evidence. In finding that the statement was damaging, we reasoned: “To permit the government in this case to supply testimony which was a naked conclusion as to [the defendant’s] guilt in the name of impeachment would be tantamount to permitting the use of hearsay and would seriously undermine the important policies underlying Justice Douglas’ opinion in Bridges [v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 65 S.Ct. 1443, 89 L.Ed. 2103 (1945)].”2 531 F.2d at 190.
I would find that Flynn’s testimony about Miss Scott’s prior statement was just as damaging to Brewer as Crist’s was to the defendant in Morlang. Although Miss Scott’s statement may not have expressly referred to the guilt of Brewer in the particular drug transactions with which Brewer was charged, the jury obviously would have believed that if his fiancee said he was a drug dealer, it must be so. This adds the additional concern that he was being convicted of being a drug dealer without regard to whether he committed the offenses charged. I think there is ample prejudice here.
Ill
The government simply should not be allowed to employ tactics of overkill that fly in the face of direct circuit precedent that has been established for more than fifteen years. Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

. The majority does not address this point because it found that Brewer had not preserved his objection to the use of Miss Scott as a straw man through whom it could bring in the impeaching hearsay. See op. at 1435 n. 5. However, my views on this point are not a comment on the majority’s view in Part III-B that Brewer may have been entitled to a limiting instruction only if he asked for it or if the failure to give the instruction amounted to plain error. Op. at 1435. It was the admission of the testimony that gave rise to the error in the first place, so I would not reach the limiting instruction issue.

. In Morlang we relied upon the Bridges decision in weighing the value to the truth-finding process of impeachment testimony that is hearsay. We reasoned that although witnesses occasionally may not testify as counsel had expected, which leads to the desire to have the jury consider prior statements, the principle that an accused should not be convicted on the basis of an unsworn statement outweighs the value which any hearsay impeachment testimony might have. Morlang, 531 F.2d at 190.