Court Opinion

ID: 9764298
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:18:28.086439+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:55.645293
License: Public Domain

NIX, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority vacates the judgment of sentence because it reaches an issue which was not included in the written post-verdict motions filed by appellant on March 4, 1975. This was more than a month after this Court made it crystal clear in Commonwealth v. Blair, 460 Pa. 31, 331 A.2d 213 (1975), that after the date of that case, January 27, 1975,* a *454defendant could preserve issues for appellate review only by complying with the requirement of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1123 that all grounds of objection to the verdict be included in written post-verdict motions. The mandate of Blair could not have been plainer when we said:
The practice in some judicial districts of ignoring the requirements of Rule 1123(a) is condemned. Henceforth, issues not presented in compliance with the rule will not be considered by our trial and appellate courts. Id. 460 Pa. at 33, n. 1, 331 A.2d at 214, n. 1.
Since Blair, this Court has repeatedly emphasized the need to include issues in written motions in order to preserve them for review. In Commonwealth v. Terry, 462 Pa. 595, 602, n. 3, 342 A.2d 92, 96, n. 3 (1975), we said, “We again stress that the written post-trial motions filed subsequent to our decision in Commonwealth v. Blair, 460 Pa. 31, 331 A.2d 213 (1975), will be conclusive on the issues to be considered by the court en banc and reviewable by appellate tribunals.” The unanimous per curiam opinion in Commonwealth v. May, 466 Pa. 524, 526, n. 3, 353 A.2d 815, 816, n. 3 (1975), with all seven justices participating, states, “In Blair we held that, thenceforth, nothing less than strict compliance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 1123(a), 19 P.S. Appendix, requiring written post-trial motions, would act to preserve issues raised therein for appellate review.” See also, Commonwealth v. Fortune, 464 Pa. 367, 371, n. 4, 346 A.2d 783, 785, n. 4 (1975).
Despite the fact that the entire Court in Commonwealth v. May, supra, read Blair as holding that only strict compliance would suffice to preserve issues for review, the majority is now willing to consider issues even when Rule 1123(a) has not been complied with so long as the issues are presented in a written memorandum to the trial court, and the trial court considers the issues even though they were not *455presented in accordance with Rule 1123. The ignoring of Rule 1123 by both trial attorneys and trial courts was precisely what we tried to stop with Blair, by an absolute and unequivocal assertion that henceforth non-compliance with Rule 1123 would not be tolerated. The majority’s willingness to tolerate non-compliance, after we have repeatedly stated that we will not, renders Blair meaningless and enforcement of Rule 1123 impossible.
The exception to Blair which was created in Commonwealth v. Grace, 473 Pa. 542, 375 A.2d 721 (1977), and is applied as “controlling” in this case, not only permits but actually fosters violations of Rule 1123. A trial court which has objections to a verdict presented to it by way of a written memorandum on the day of argument, rather than by written motion within the time limits specified by the rule, knows that it may safely engage in the practice condemned by Blair by proceeding to consider such objections on the merits. Under the majority’s reasoning, the violation of Rule 1123 by both trial attorney and trial court not only results in no sanctions, but also assures the offending party of full appellate review.
After Blair, there can be no excuse for non-compliance with Rule 1123. No new rule was announced in Blair; we merely announced that from that day forward the rule already in existence would be strictly enforced. In an effort to be completely fair, we did not insist on strict enforcement of the rule in cases where the relevant events took place preBlair, because some courts had a long-standing practice of condoning non-compliance which tended to mislead counsel into relying on that practice, Commonwealth v. Bailey, 463 Pa. 354, 358, 344 A.2d 869, 871 (1975). But after the clear, unmistakable warning set forth in Blair, there can be no claim of unfairness.
The contradictions and difficulties to which post-Blair exceptions will lead are apparent in Commonwealth v. Grace, supra, 473 Pa. at 546, 375 A.2d at 723, where the four-member majority opinion, immediately after stating it would consider the appellant’s claims preserved for review *456even though not presented in written post-verdict motions, went on to say, “But we again remind counsel that written post-verdict motions must be filed and these motions must include every assignment of error which counsel wishes to preserve for appellate review.” Such warnings will never be taken seriously when they come in the same breath with an assertion that the Court does not intend to enforce Rule 1123, even when violations occur after a specific warning that further violations would not be tolerated.
In Grace, the application of the Blair exception was not essential to the result, because the judgments of sentence were affirmed, just as they would have been had Grace’s claims been deemed waived. The majority today seriously compounds the error in Grace by applying this exception to reach an issue which does determine the outcome. Because I believe that this post-Blair exception can only lead to confusion among trial attorneys and lower courts, disrespect for the pronouncements of this Court, and further violations of our procedural rules, I dissent.