Court Opinion

ID: 9927575
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-29 15:06:53.410565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:36.633512
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0406-23

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ASHON Q. MILLER &
TERRENCE M. MURRAY-LOACH,

     Defendants-Respondents.
_______________________________

                   Submitted January 23, 2024 – Decided January 29, 2024

                   Before Judges Haas and Natali.

                   On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior
                   Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Ocean County,
                   Indictment Nos. 22-05-0908 and 22-08-1535.

                   Bradley D. Billhimer, Ocean County Prosecutor,
                   attorney for appellant (Samuel J. Marzarella, Chief
                   Appellate Attorney, of counsel; William Kyle Meighan,
                   Supervising Assistant Prosecutor, on the briefs).

                   Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
                   respondent Terrence Murray-Loach (Alexander R.
                   Molloy, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel
                   and on the brief).
            Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
            respondent Ashon Miller, joins in the brief of
            respondent Terrence Murray-Loach.

PER CURIAM

      By leave granted, the State appeals from the Law Division's order granting

defendants' motion to suppress the evidence a police officer seized during a

search prompted by the officer detecting the smell of marijuana in the interior

of their car. Because we conclude that additional factfinding is necessary, we

reverse and remand.

                                       I.

      By way of background, the State attempted to justify its search under the

automobile exception to the general requirement that law enforcement officers

obtain a warrant before conducting a search of the person or private property of

an individual. State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 422 (2015). Under the automobile

exception, a police officer may conduct a warrantless search of a motor vehicle

during a lawful roadside stop "in situations where: (1) the police have probable

cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of a criminal offense; and (2) the

circumstances giving rise to probable cause are unforeseeable and spontaneous."

State v. Rodriguez, 459 N.J. Super. 13, 22 (App. Div. 2019) (citing Witt, 223

N.J. at 447-48).

                                                                           A-0406-23
                                       2
      At the time of the December 1, 2020 stop and search involved in this case,

"New Jersey courts . . . recognized that the smell of marijuana itself constitutes

probable cause that a criminal offense ha[s] been committed and that additional

contraband might be present."      State v. Walker, 213 N.J. 281, 290 (2013)

(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v.

Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 515-16 (2003)). Thus, upon detecting the smell of

marijuana, police were authorized "to conduct a warrantless search of the

persons in the immediate area from where the smell [had] emanated." Nishina,

175 N.J. at 516 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Vanderveer, 285 N.J.

Super. 475, 481 (App. Div. 1995)). 1

      Before CREAMMA, the permissible scope of a search was restricted to

areas "'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its

initiation permissible." State v. Patino, 83 N.J. 1, 11 (1980) (quoting Terry v.

1
   On February 22, 2021, the New Jersey Cannabis Regulatory Enforcement
Assistance and Marketplace Modernization Act ("CREAMMA") became
effective. As our Supreme Court recently explained, "CREAMMA . . . added a
new section in the Criminal Code stating that . . . 'the odor of cannabis or burnt
cannabis' . . . 'shall [not] constitute reasonable articulable suspicion of a crime'
except on school property or at a correctional facility. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10c."
State v. Cohen, 254 N.J. 308, 328 (2023). Thus, the Court confirmed that
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10c "has no bearing" on searches that "predated the passage of
CREAMMA[.]" Ibid.

                                                                              A-0406-23
                                         3
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)). The Supreme Court recently applied this principle

concerning the proper scope of an automobile search in Cohen.

      In that pre-CREAMMA case, the police stopped the defendant's car for a

motor vehicle violation. Cohen, 254 N.J. at 314. As they approached the car,

they detected the "general smell" of then-illegal raw marijuana, although they

could not pinpoint which area(s) within the car were the source(s) of that odor.

Id. at 325. The police also observed what appeared to be marijuana in the

driver's beard. Id. at 314. They searched the car's passenger compartment for

marijuana, but they found no drugs or contraband there. Id. at 315. At that

point, the police searched the car's trunk and under the engine hood and

discovered two guns under the hood. Ibid. The Court invalidated the search

that went beyond the passenger area of the car because the general smell of

marijuana was inadequate, in and of itself, to justify a further warrantless

intrusion outside the interior of the car. Id. at 327.

      The Court provided guidance for the resolution of other pre-CREAMMA

cases. As a general rule, the Court held that searches that extend beyond the

passenger compartment of a car must be justified by "facts indicating something

more than simply detecting the smell of marijuana from the interior of the car."

                                                                          A-0406-23
                                         4
Id. at 324. In other words, the smell of marijuana by itself can only provide

probable cause for a search of the interior of the car. The Court stated:

            This holding in no way suggests that areas within the
            interior of the car would require separate probable
            cause findings in order to conduct a warrantless search.
            We are not dividing up the interior of vehicles such that
            an officer would need to establish different or
            additional probable cause to search the front seat as
            opposed to the back seat, for example. Pursuant to the
            automobile exception, if an officer has probable cause
            to search the interior of the vehicle, that probable cause
            encompasses the entirety of the interior.

            [Id. at 327.]

      However, if the police wish to extend the search beyond the interior of the

car, they must be able to point to "unique facts" beyond the mere smell of

marijuana that establish probable cause to look into other areas of the vehicle.

Id. at 324. The Court explained:

            We are also not suggesting that the warrantless search
            of a trunk or engine compartment will always require
            separate probable cause findings. Instead, we reiterate
            that a warrantless search of a car "must be reasonable
            in scope" and "strictly tied to and justified by the
            circumstances     which     rendered   its    initiation
            permissible." Patino, 83 N.J. at 10-11. However, a
            generalized smell of raw marijuana does not justify a
            search of every compartment of an automobile.

            [Id. at 327-28.]

                                                                            A-0406-23
                                        5
                                        II.

      With the governing legal principles in mind, we return to the case at hand. 2

An Ocean County grand jury returned an indictment charging defendants Ashon

Miller and Terrence Murray-Loach with second-degree unlawful possession of

a firearm, fourth-degree possession of a large capacity ammunition magazine,

and fourth-degree unlawful possession of a prohibited weapon. In a fourth

count, the indictment charged Murray-Loach with second-degree certain person

not to possess a firearm. The charges were based upon a search of defendants'

car, which resulted in the seizure of a defaced handgun with a seventeen-round

capacity magazine and twenty cyclobenzaprine hydrochloride pills. Defendants

filed a motion to suppress the seized items.

      The trial judge conducted a one-day evidentiary hearing. Officer Austin

Spagnola was the State's only witness and defendants did not present any

testimony. Spagnola provided the following account of his search at the hearing.

      Around 12:30 a.m. on December 1, 2020, Spagnola observed a red Nissan

sedan with Pennsylvania license plates following a white Ford sedan too closely

in the left lane. Spagnola began to follow the two cars. As he did, he "detected

2
  The offenses involved in this case occurred on December 1, 2020. Therefore,
like Cohen, this matter is a pre-CREAMMA case.
                                                                             A-0406-23
                                        6
the odor of burnt marijuana" coming from the cars in front of him.3 Spagnola

followed the cars for about thirty blocks and then executed a motor vehicle stop

of the Nissan for the traffic violation of following too closely and because he

smelled marijuana emanating from it. 4

      Spagnola approached the Nissan and saw that the front windows were

down. He smelled burnt marijuana. Miller was driving the car and Murray-

Loach was in the passenger seat. Both men were cooperative. After reviewing

Miller's driver's license and registration, Spagnola called for a backup unit. It

arrived a few minutes later.

      Spagnola then asked defendants to exit the car.          They cooperated.

Spagnola searched the men "for weapons and contraband," but found nothing.

Spagnola continued to smell marijuana coming from the car. Based upon the

smell of marijuana, Spagnola began to search the interior of the vehicle.

      Spagnola started in the front passenger side of the car, including the glove

compartment. He then proceeded clockwise around the vehicle by moving next

3
  Spagnola had been "trained in the detection of the odors of [Controlled
Dangerous Substances], specifically . . . [b]urnt and raw marijuana."
4
   Spagnola radioed another officer to pull over the Ford sedan. The officer
stopped that car about two blocks further up the road. The officer found
marijuana in the Ford sedan.
                                                                            A-0406-23
                                         7
to the rear passenger side, to the rear driver's side, and then to the front driver's

side of the car. This search took approximately three minutes.

      Spagnola testified that he found nothing of evidentiary value in the front

of the car. However, in the back seat he found "two pairs of bolt cutters, a ski

mask and a pair of gloves, which [Spagnola] believed were commonly

associated with burglar tools." Spagnola testified he was not aware of any

reported burglaries in the area that evening.

      Spagnola could still smell marijuana.        Based only on that smell, he

searched the Nissan's trunk. Because there were a number of different items in

the trunk, this search took approximately six-and-a-half minutes to complete.

Spagnola found a prescription pill bottle and some suspected prescription pills

in the trunk. He did not find any marijuana.

      However, the marijuana smell persisted. Spagnola testified that because

he "hadn't found any marijuana yet and [he] could smell the marijuana[,]" he

returned to the front passenger seat area of the car to perform "another sweep."

      After he went into the passenger side front door with his flashlight,

Spagnola said he saw for the first time that the side panel of the center console 5

5
   Spagnola described the location of the panel as follows: "I observed on the
side of the center console on the passenger side, the panel, if you were sitting in

                                                                               A-0406-23
                                         8
had "tool marks" on it, which the officer described as "[d]ents and scratches on

the plastic [panel] itself." Spagnola testified that the panel "wasn't properly put

back, so there was a gap behind it . . . ." Spagnola testified that he had been

trained at the police academy to identify hidden compartments, which he called

"traps," that were used to hide contraband in cars. He could tell that the panel

had been "manipulated before." Based upon the dents and scratches on the

panel, the fact that the panel was separated from where it should have been, the

visible gap behind the panel, and the continued smell of marijuana inside the

car, Spagnola believed he had located a "trap."

      Spagnola testified that because of the gap behind the panel, he "just had

to pull it back a little bit, and [he] could see that there was a firearm behind

there." Spagnola testified that he put his fingers into the gap behind the panel

and pulled it back. He did not use any tools to accomplish this.

      After he removed the gun, Spagnola found that it was loaded, had a large

capacity magazine, and no serial numbers. Spagnola arrested both defendants.

      The entire search of the car from beginning to end had taken

approximately fifteen minutes. No marijuana was found.

the passenger side, the panel that would be touching your left leg, it had tool
marks on it and it wasn't properly put back on to the vehicle."
                                                                             A-0406-23
                                        9
      Spagnola's written report of the incident did not provide the details of the

search the officer related in his testimony at the hearing. Instead, the report

merely stated that "[a] full and complete search of the vehicle was completed."

There was no mention of the discovery of the panel, the tool marks on it, or the

gap behind it. Spagnola also did not describe in the report how he accessed the

handgun behind the panel. Although the report states that photographs of

defendants' vehicle were taken, the State did not introduce those photographs

into evidence at the hearing.

      Spagnola's patrol car was parked behind defendants' vehicle, and the

search was recorded on the car's dash camera. The State played the Mobile

Vehicle Recording (MVR) of the search at the hearing. We have reviewed the

MVR. It shows Spagnola going into defendants' car as he conducted his search,

opening and searching the trunk, and returning to the front passenger door. The

MVR does not depict anything that occurred inside the car.

      At some point during the incident, a sergeant arrived at the scene,

apparently to provide supervision. At approximately the thirty-minute, fifty-

second mark of the MVR, Spagnola tells someone off camera: "There was a

handgun in this car. It was underneath the plastic panel in the front of the car.

I popped it open because it was loose and there's a handgun under there."

                                                                            A-0406-23
                                      10
Spagnola and the sergeant then walk to the front passenger door of the car , and

look in. Spagnola tells the sergeant: "All the panels in the car are loose. I

popped this panel here."

       At the forty-four minute, thirty-nine second mark of the MVR, Spagnola

and the sergeant return to the front passenger door. Spagnola states:

             I searched the whole car, got into the trunk and seen all
             the stuff and the ski mask in the back seat. You know
             what, let me go pop that plastic off that panel in the
             front because it looked loose. And that's where I found
             it. You see that plastic that's gone here?

The sergeant replied, "I saw. Is that where it was, right there?" Spagnola told

the sergeant, "In that little cubby, yeah. And it had everything pushed up against

it."

       On cross-examination, defendant Miller's attorney played a portion of the

MVR that depicted Spagnola searching the front passenger side of the car. The

following colloquy occurred:

             Q:    Okay, you said you popped open the panel,
                   correct.

             A:    Correct.

             Q:    What do you mean by that? Is that when you
                   pulled it open?

             A:    I guess that's the motion I did use, yes.

                                                                            A-0406-23
                                       11
             Q:    Okay.

             A.    I pulled it open and I could see the gun there.

      At the fifty-one minute mark of the MVR, the officers are looking inside

the front driver's side door. They find wires that Spagnola states appear to have

been "spliced." The sergeant asks whether the car may have been "hotwired,"

while Spagnola presents a possible explanation that the wires may be associated

with a "trap." At no point on the MVR does Spagnola state that the panel where

the gun was found was a "trap."

      Thus, there are several inconsistencies between the statements Spagnola

made at the scene on December 1, 2020 and his testimony at the suppression

hearing. On the one hand, Spagnola stated during the incident that he saw that

the panel was loose and that he "popped" the plastic off the panel and found the

gun. At the suppression hearing, however, he stated he noticed tool marks on

the panel and saw "there was a gap behind it." From his training, he testified he

believed the panel was a "trap" containing the marijuana that he smelled.

Spagnola testified he "just had to pull [the panel] back a little bit, and [he] could

see that there was a firearm behind there." He did not testify that he "popped"

the panel off or removed it from the car.

                                                                               A-0406-23
                                        12
      Unfortunately, the trial judge did not clearly resolve these conflicting

statements in deciding to grant defendants' suppression motion and she did not

provide the same level of detail as we have set forth above. The judge began

her written decision by making very strong credibility findings in Spagnola's

favor. The judge stated:

            Upon review of the MVR footage and in consideration
            of the testimony provided, the court finds Spagnola's
            testimony credible. He maintained direct eye contact
            while being questioned. He was forthright in his
            answers on both direct and cross[-]examination, and he
            was not evasive in his answers. He was able to describe
            the area in which the stop took place, certain
            observations leading up to the stop of the subject
            vehicle, and his narrative was largely corroborated by
            video evidence.

      The trial judge ruled that because Spagnola searched the trunk of the car

based solely on the smell of marijuana coming from the car, the pills found there

had to be suppressed under Cohen. The State does not challenge that ruling on

appeal.

      However, the judge also suppressed the handgun found behind the console

panel. The judge ruled that Spagnola's

            search of the . . . "side panel" area exceeded the
            permissible constitutional scope authorized by the
            automobile exception, particularly in light of Officer
            Spagnola's manipulation of a panel in the vehicle that
            he acknowledges was not designed to be removed. Not

                                                                           A-0406-23
                                      13
           only did Officer Spagnola interfere with the structure
           of the passenger compartment when he "popped" the
           panel off, the officer's statement on the scene indicates
           that the "loose" appearance of the panel was consistent
           with other panels in the vehicle. Though the officer
           indicated that he observed "tool marks" on the panel,
           nothing in the record suggest to the court that the officer
           was acting on more than a hunch when expanding the
           search based on a generalized odor into closed
           compartments and even the internal structure of the
           vehicle.

     The State thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial

judge granted in order "to provide more specific reasoning under the recently

decided" Cohen case. After revisiting its prior decision, however, the judge

again suppressed the handgun. The judge stated that she could

           not find under the totality of the circumstances,
           including consideration given to testimony describing
           marks on the panel, that the State established sufficient
           probable cause by a preponderance of the evidence to
           expand the scope of the search by interfering with the
           structure of the passenger compartment in order to gain
           access to the internal structure of the vehicle. Probable
           cause to search the entirety of the interior or passenger
           compartment does not necessarily extend to whichever
           internal zones of the vehicle may be accessed by
           dismantling the vehicle components from therein.

     We subsequently granted the State's motion for leave to appeal.

                                                                         A-0406-23
                                      14
                                       III.

      On appeal, the State argues that the trial judge "erred in finding the search

of the panel in the interior of the vehicle concealing a secret compartment to be

beyond the scope of the automobile exception." However, we are unable to

address this contention because the trial judge did not adequately resolve the

factual discrepancies between Spagnola's remarks at the scene and his

subsequent suppression hearing testimony.

      Our review of a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress is limited.

State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009). In reviewing a motion to suppress

evidence, we must uphold the court's factual findings, "so long as those findings

are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Rockford,

213 N.J. 424, 440 (2013) (quoting Robinson, 200 N.J. at 15). Additionally, we

defer to findings that are "substantially influenced by [the trial judge's]

opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case, which

a reviewing court cannot enjoy."         Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting

Robinson, 200 N.J. at 15). We do not, however, defer to a trial court's legal

conclusions, which we review de novo. Ibid.

      However, "'where the focus of the dispute is . . . alleged error in the trial

judge's evaluation of the underlying facts and the implications to be drawn

                                                                             A-0406-23
                                       15
therefrom,' the traditional scope of review is expanded." N.J. Div. of Youth &

Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007) (quoting In re Guardianship of

J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188-89 (App. Div. 1993)). In those circumstances,

we must reverse a trial judge's determination where his or her findings go "so

wide of the mark that a mistake must have been made." Ibid. (quoting C.B.

Snyder Realty, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 233 N.J. Super. 65, 69 (App. Div.

1989)).

      Applying these standards, we are unable to reconcile the trial judge's

findings in this matter. As noted above, Spagnola testified that upon entering

the front passenger side door of the car for a second time, he noticed tool marks

on the side panel and an open gap behind it. Spagnola testified he believed this

might have been a "trap" designed to conceal contraband. He did not testify that

he "popped" the panel off or removed it. Instead, he explained that he pulled

the panel toward him with his fingers and saw the gun inside.

      Spagnola's statements at the scene did not contain this level of detail. He

did not mention the tool marks or the suspected "trap" on the passenger side

panel. He did not state that he pulled the panel toward him and saw the gun

before he retrieved it from behind the panel. In his comments to the sergeant,

Spagnola merely stated that all the panels in the car were "loose" and he

                                                                           A-0406-23
                                      16
"popped" off the plastic of the panel next to the front passenger seat and found

the gun. Thus, the narrow actions Spagnola described he took at the scene were

certainly more intrusive on their face than the more detailed steps Spagnola

recounted at the suppression hearing.

      To further cloud the issue, the only time that the parties addressed the

apparent discrepancies with Spagnola at the suppression hearing was during

cross-examination when defense counsel asked the officer what he meant by

saying he "popped open the panel." At that point, Spagnola explained that he

"pulled it open and [he] could see the gun there."

      From the statements made in her written decision, it appears the trial judge

relied more upon Spagnola's statements at the scene and rejected his explanation

of his actions at the suppression hearing. However, the judge found all of

Spagnola's testimony to be credible.         If Spagnola's suppression hearing

testimony was credible, he was concerned about a "trap" that his training taught

him would be evidenced by the tool marks he stated he saw on the panel and the

fact that the panel looked like it had previously been manipulated. The gap he

saw behind the panel allowed him to move the panel toward him with his fingers

and see the gun. Based on that testimony, if indeed it was credible, Spagnola's

search may have been permissible under our decision in State v. Nunez, 262 N.J.

                                                                            A-0406-23
                                        17
Super. 251 (App. Div. 1993) 6 and the Supreme Court's decision in Cohen.7

Conversely, a different result might be required if the judge specifically found

that Spagnola's claim that he suspected that the tool marks on, and the gap

behind the panel indicated it was a "trap" that could contain marijuana was not

credible, or that Spagnola saw the loose panel, did not peek behind it, and simply

yanked if off the car hoping to find contraband.

      In short, the trial judge's crediting of the entirety of Spagnola's testimony

cannot be harmonized with her conclusion that the officer was acting on no more

than "a hunch" when he either pulled back the panel with his fingers to look

6
  In Nunez, a trooper conducting a warrantless search pursuant to the automobile
exception noticed a half-inch gap under the rear window on the passenger side
of the defendant's car. Id. at 254. The trooper had training and experience that
had taught him to identify hidden compartments in vehicles, much like Spagnola
testified to having undergone at the police academy. Ibid. By forcing his fingers
and arm into the gap, the trooper in Nunez was able to retrieve a plastic shopping
bag that contained cashier checks totaling $31,000 and cocaine. Ibid. Under
the totality of these circumstances, we found that "as a result of the officer's
training and experience, the trooper had reason to believe that the vehicle
contained secret compartments." Id. at 256. Therefore, the search was justified
under the automobile exception despite any physical manipulation of the
structural interior of the car. Ibid.
7
   Spagnola's discovery of the "trap" might have also given him the extra
justification Cohen dictates is needed, beyond smelling marijuana, to look
behind the panel, pull it forward with his fingers, and find and seize the gun
hidden behind it, if indeed that is how the search actually occurred. Cohen, 254
N.J. at 324.
                                                                             A-0406-23
                                       18
inside, or "popped" it off from the car without already knowing there was a gun

behind it. The judge did not explain why she seemingly accepted only a portion

of Spagnola's "credible" testimony and she did not make detailed findings as to

how Spagnola actually retrieved the gun from behind the panel.

      Accordingly, a remand is required. Because we are concerned that the

judge would have a commitment to her previous view of the evidence, in fairness

to her and the parties, we direct that a new suppression hearing occur before a

different judge. Nothing within this opinion forecasts any views on the merits

of the State's suppression motion nor on the question of whether defendants may

be entitled to prevail on the issues once they are fully considered by the trial

court and adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law are made.

      Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

                                                                          A-0406-23
                                      19