Court Opinion

ID: 9522467
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:26:26.684746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:52.376974
License: Public Domain

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

Achor, J.
Appellees assert two grounds for rehearing.
First, appellees insist that the present record is insufficient because it does not contain a transcript of the entire record in the primary case formerly appealed to the Appellate Court and presented to this court on petition to transfer. See Gilkison et al. v. Darlington (1952), 123 Ind. App. 28, 106 N. E. 2d 473, transfer denied. In support of this contention, appellees reassert *545that the entire record in the former appeal is necessary to a decision upon the subject of attorneys’ fees since nearly all the services for which appellees seek compensation are evidenced by that record.
In particular, appellees challenge the propriety of the following statement contained in the opinion of this court in City of Hammond v. Darlington (1959), 241 Ind. 536, 162 N. E. 2d 619, 621 :
“. . . However, in ancillary or subsequent appeals the court may take judicial notice of the record in the former appeal, even though the current appeal involves a new or limited phase of the former appeal. . .
Because of the apparent complexity which the above statement poses in the minds of the appellees, it seems appropriate for this court to clarify its position by further saying that the rule of procedure quoted is not intended to apply to the evidence in the former case.
In the case before us (assuming that the purported saving to the city had been accomplished), there is ample evidence in the record as to the nature, extent and value of. the services of attorneys in their efforts to relieve the City of Hammond of the liability of the judgments taken against it. The record previously made in this litigation was not required, nor was it introduced as part of the record in this aspect of the case. Therefore, m> error could be predicated upon failure to incorporate such previous record in this proceedings.
’ However, it became necessary for the Appellate Court in this appeal (and this court on transfer, 241 Ind. 536, 162 N. E. 2d 619 supra) to take judicial notice of the record in the original appeal because of the fact that the opinion in that appeal affirmed *546Conclusion No. 9 of the trial court, relative to the allowance of appellants’ fees by member only, without setting forth the conclusion in its full context. For this reason it was necessary and proper that the Appellate Court and this court go to the record or “take judicial knowledge” of such Conclusion No. 9, as contained in the record, for the purpose of construing the opinion. The authorities cited in the earlier opinion of this court clearly sustain this position.
Secondly, appellees maintain that the .record in this appeal discloses that the conditions of the opinion of the Appellate Court have been complied with and therefore appellees are entitled to their fees. Appellees cite the fact that pursuant to the remand of the case in said appeal the Porter Circuit Court entered an order setting aside the judgments in the Lake Superior Courts and that this action constituted a final disposition of such original causes of action in which judgments had been taken against the City of Hammond. Apparently appellees do. not comprehend the significance of the proceedings as prescribed in the former opinion. This further statement is written in an attempt to clarify the situation and bring an end to this litigation.
A decree in the Porter Circuit Court that the judgments in the Lake Superior Courts be set aside does not in spontaneum constitute a final disposition of the causes of action in which the judgments were taken. Rather, upon compliance of the mandate of the Porter Circuit Court by the Lake Superior Courts, the several causes of action thereby return to the status which they held prior to the entering of the judgments in the first instance. Said causes of action are not thereby finally adjudicated.
*547As stated in the opinion of the Appellate Court (123 Ind. App. 28), it appeared that some of the bondholders in the several causes may have had valid claims against the City of Hammond. The savings to the city cannot be determined until the causes of action involving these claims are set aside and finally readjudicated by dismissal or by trial.
As previously stated in City of Hammond v. Darlington, supra, 241 Ind. 536, 162 N. E. 2d 619, 622:
“. . . As such taxpayer-attorney appellee (Dar-lington) is entitled to be paid for his legal services according to the nature and extent of such services and according to the measure that they have financially benefited the city. ...”
Under the circumstances here presented, the savings to the City of Hammond cannot be determined with certainty until it is determined that the several causes of action in the Superior Courts of Lake County are actually set aside according to the remand in the opinion of the Appellate Court and readjudicated. Accordingly, this court heretofore issued the following mandate:
“For the reason herein given, the judgment of the lower court is ordered set aside and the cause is ordered continued for the submission of further evidence pertaining to the final determination of the judgments in each of the 124 cases which are the primary subjects of this litigation, and the trial court in this cause is directed to fix a reasonable attorney’s fee in those cases which have been finally determined and as the remainder are finally determined.” City of Hammond v. Darlington, supra, 241 Ind. 536, 162 N. E. 2d 619 at 622.
Upon final disposition of said cases in the court below, it is directed to readjudicate the amount of fees to which appellees are entitled and to order the same paid.
*548Petition for rehearing is accordingly denied.
Bobbitt, C. J., Arterburn and Landis, JJ., concur.
Jackson, J., concurs in the result.
Note. — Reported in 162 N. E. 2d 619. Rehearing denied 173 N. E. 2d 662.