Court Opinion

ID: 9398767
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-01 07:00:25.573151+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:36.283607
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     JAMES THOMAS RYAN,                              DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         DC-1221-16-0264-W-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,                          DATE: May 30, 2023
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           James Thomas Ryan, Bel Air, Maryland, pro se.

           Elizabeth E. Pavlick, Esquire, and Kevin Greenfield, Esquire, Washington,
             D.C., for the agency.

           Emilee Collier, Esquire, Washington, D.C., for amicus curiae, Office of
             Special Counsel

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision in this
     individual right of action (IRA) appeal, which denied his request for corrective

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been id entified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

     action.   Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following
     circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;
     the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
     or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
     judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision
     were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,
     and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material
     evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.          Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).             After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED by
     this Final Order to find that the appellant made protected disclosures, we
     AFFIRM the initial decision.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant, a Police Officer with the Pentagon Force Protection Agency,
     alleged in this IRA appeal that the agency improperly maintained several closed
     records of investigations (ROIs) involving him, which he claims represented a
     threat of discipline, in reprisal for several alleged protected disclosures, and in
     reprisal for activity protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i) and (b)(9)(C).
     Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tabs 1, 5, Tab 83 at 5. The administrative judge found
     jurisdiction over the appeal and, after holding a hearing, denied the appellant’s
     request for corrective action, finding, among other things, that the appellant failed
     to meet his burden to establish by preponderant evidence that h e made a protected
     disclosure. IAF, Tab 115, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 7-12.
¶3         Concerning those alleged protected disclosures, the administrative judge
     found that a reasonable person in the appellant’s position would not believe that
                                                                                       3

     any of the disclosures alleged here evidenced a violation of law, rule, or
     regulation, gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority,
     or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. ID at 7 -12. As
     iterated by the administrative judge, the appellant’s disclosures included: (1) his
     December 24, 2014 email that a coworker was sleeping on the job and that
     another coworker had threatened to stab that coworker in the eye, IAF, Tab 82
     at 7; (2) his December 24, 2014 email that a third coworker allegedly had failed
     to clear an alarm and his memorandum of the same day reporting that the same
     colleague had commented that “every time a law enforcement officer encounters
     an African-American, they kill him,” and that such a statement jeopardizes her
     security clearance and that she should not have access to sensitive security
     information, IAF, Tab 42 at 7-8; (3) his December 26, 2014 memorandum and
     subsequent email concerning his supervisor’s statement that the appellant
     reportedly was not performing all of his duties, IAF, Tab 14 at 77, 79; and (4) his
     January 6, 2015 email and memorandum complaining that a coworker had been
     discourteous to him, id. at 81, 116; ID at 3-5.
¶4         Although the administrative judge did find that the appellant established
     that he had engaged in activity protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i) and
     2302(b)(9)(C) by filing IRA appeals and complaints with the Office of Special
     Counsel (OSC), she went on to find that the appellant failed to show that this
     alleged protected activity contributed to any decision to retain the closed ROIs,
     citing testimony that such documents are usually retained indefinitely and the
     appellant’s failure to introduce any evidence to show that the individuals
     responsible for retaining such documents had any knowledge of his alleged
     protected activity. ID at 12-13. She also found that the agency’s decision to
     maintain the ROIs was not a personnel action under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A) and
     did not constitute a threat of reprisal, citing less-than-preponderant evidence that
     the ROIs either could or should have been destroyed and, as noted above, the lack
     of any connection between the appellant’s alleged protected activity and any
                                                                                         4

     possible decision concerning the retention of the ROIs.        ID at 15.   Thus, she
     found that the indirect risk of future discipline based on the content of the ROIs is
     not a threat of discipline that would exempt these circumstances from the general
     rule that an investigation, in and of itself, is not a personnel action under 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(a)(2)(A). Id.
¶5         In his petition for review, the appellant contests many of the administrative
     judge’s factual findings, for example, challenging her characterization of him as
     argumentative during one of the episodes at issue in this appeal and instead
     insisting that he had “merely informed” the acting floor supervisor that h e was
     following orders from his supervisor.      Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1
     at 5-8. He also challenges the administrative judge’s finding that his disclosure
     involving a coworker sleeping on duty and a purported stabbing threat was
     motivated by interpersonal squabbling, rather than a desire to disclose significant
     Government wrongdoing, and argues that his disclosure reasonably showed a
     violation of a rule. Id. at 8, 11-12, 16-17; ID at 8. He offers what he describes as
     new evidence regarding that disclosure, claiming that the evidence was not
     available before the hearing because the administrative judge never asked him
     about the full circumstances of the episodes and improperly restricted his hearing
     testimony. PFR File, Tab 1 at 11-15. The appellant argues that several agency
     witnesses made false statements, explains why he believes that the administrative
     judge should have considered whether his supervisor perceived him to be a
     whistleblower, and essentially reargues his case. Id. at 9-11, 15-24.
¶6         The agency responded in opposition to the appellant’s petition for review ,
     and the appellant filed a reply to the agency’s response. PFR File, Tabs 3 -4.
     Additionally, OSC filed a brief as amicus curiae, asserting that the administrative
     judge erred in considering the appellant’s motivation in making one of his
     disclosures. PFR File, Tab 5. OSC observes that under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(1)(C),
     “[a] disclosure shall not be excluded from subsection (b)(8) because . . . of the
     employee’s or applicant’s motive for making the disclosure,” and asks the Board
                                                                                          5

     to reaffirm that a whistleblower’s motive does not affect whether a disclosure is
     protected. Id. at 5-9.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶7         When reviewing the merits of an IRA appeal, 2 the Board must determine
     whether the appellant has established by preponderant evidence that he made a
     protected disclosure that was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take
     or fail to take a personnel action.     E.g., Aquino v. Department of Homeland
     Security, 121 M.S.P.R. 35, ¶ 10 (2014). A preponderance of the evidence is the
     degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable person, considering the record as a
     whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a contested fact is more likely to be
     true than untrue. Id.; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q). If the appellant meets that burden,
     the Board must order corrective action unless the agency can establish by clear
     and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel action in the
     absence of the disclosure. Aquino, 121 M.S.P.R. 35, ¶ 10.

     The appellant established that he made protected disclosure s.
¶8         The administrative judge found that the appellant’s disclosure s that he
     observed a coworker sleeping on duty and overheard another coworker
     threatening to stab the first coworker in the eye with a pen were not protected, in
     part because the appellant was motivated to get back at the coworkers involved
     for a perceived slight, rather than by whistleblowing. ID at 8. In its amicus brief,
     OSC correctly points out that the whistleblower statute specifically excludes
     considering the motivation of the individual making a disclosure.            5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(f)(1)(C); PFR File, Tab 5 at 5-6. Thus, the administrative judge erred in
     considering the appellant’s motivation, and we hereby modify that finding. See,
     e.g., Johnson v. Department of Defense, 87 M.S.P.R. 454, ¶ 10 (2000) (rejecting

     2
       The administrative judge found that the appellant established jurisdiction ove r this
     IRA appeal. ID at 1. Neither party challenges this finding in a petition for review or
     cross petition for review, and we discern no basis to disturb it.
                                                                                        6

     an administrative judge’s finding that an employee did not have a reasonable
     belief because her activity was motivated by troublemaking). We also agree with
     the appellant that a reasonable person in the appellant’s position would believe
     that his December 24, 2014 email concerning his observation of a coworker
     sleeping on duty evidenced a violation of a rule or regulation. PFR File, Tab 1 at
     16-17; see Horton v. Department of the Navy, 66 F.3d 279, 281-83 (Fed. Cir.
     1995) (finding protected a disclosure that employees were sleeping on the job),
     superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Day v. Department of
     Homeland Security, 119 M.S.P.R. 589, ¶¶ 14-18 (2013); 5 C.F.R. § 2635.705(a)
     (requiring Federal employees to use official time in an honest effort to perform
     official duties). The administrative judge erred in finding otherwise , and we find
     that this was a protected disclosure.
¶9         The administrative judge also found that the appellant failed to show that
     his disclosure that another coworker threatened to stab a coworker in the eye with
     a pen was protected.      The administrative judge observed that the appellant
     described the so-called threat as “apparent empty bragging” and that the appellant
     did not believe that the coworker was actually intending to stab the other
     coworker. The administrative judge concluded that a reasonable law enforcement
     officer in the appellant’s position could not have believed that the threat of
     violence constituted a criminal assault.   ID at 9.   Although the administrative
     judge correctly found that the appellant did not hold a reasonable belief that
     violence was imminent, we nonetheless find that this disclosure was protected.
     As the appellant stated in his petition for review, he thought it constituted
     “threatening behavior” toward another Federal employee and that such behavior
     constituted a violation of an agency rule. Although the Whistleblower Protection
     Act does not define “rule,” it includes established or authoritative standards for
     conduct or behavior. See Rusin v. Department of the Treasury, 92 M.S.P.R. 298,
     ¶¶ 15-17 (2002). Moreover, in making a disclosure involving a violation of law,
     rule, or regulation, there is no de minimis exception for disclosures falling within
                                                                                        7

      the scope of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(i). See Fisher v. Environmental Protection
      Agency, 108 M.S.P.R. 296, ¶ 9 (2008); PFR File, Tab 1 at 15. Under the facts and
      circumstances of this case, disclosing a threat of violence constituted a protec ted
      disclosure.
¶10         Concerning the appellant’s remaining alleged disclosures, we agree with the
      administrative judge that the appellant failed to establish that a reasonable person
      would believe that his December 24, 2014 disclosure concerning a coworker’s
      response to an alarm disclosed a violation of law, rule, or regulation, gross
      mismanagement, abuse of authority, or a gross waste of funds. ID at 10. The
      appellant identified no authority prescribing a particular rule or protocol, and,
      under these circumstances, we find that this is a dispute over policy and
      procedure rather than a protected disclosure.     See Webb v. Department of the
      Interior, 122 M.S.P.R. 248, ¶¶ 7-10 (2015) (holding that a disclosure of a policy
      disagreement that does not evidence the kind of misconduct listed in sec tion
      2302(b)(8) is not protected). We also agree with the administrative judge that the
      appellant’s email purportedly disclosing the same coworker’s opinion regarding
      law enforcement officers killing African-Americans was not a protected
      disclosure. ID at 10-11. The appellant’s conclusory assertion that his coworker’s
      opinion on the issue should jeopardize her security clearance is not a protected
      disclosure. Similarly, we agree that a reasonable person would not believe that
      the appellant’s purported disclosures of December 26, 2014, and January 6, 2015,
      which we find concern his personal interactions with his coworkers, represented a
      violation of law, rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement, abuse of authority, or
      a gross waste of funds. ID at 11-12.
¶11         Thus, we find the appellant made protected disclosures concerning his
      coworker sleeping on duty and a coworker threatening to stab another coworker
      in the eye with a pen, and we agree with the administrative judge’s finding that
      the appellant engaged in activity protected under 5 U.S.C. §§ 2302(b)(9)(A)(i)
                                                                                          8

      and (b)(9)(C) when he filed IRA appeals and OSC complaints that motivated
      some of the investigations at issue in this appeal. ID at 12-13 & n.14.

      The appellant failed to identify a personnel action that the agency took in reprisal
      for his protected activity.
¶12         As noted above, the administrative judge found that the appellant failed to
      show that his protected activity contributed to any personnel action as described
      in section 2302(a)(2)(A). ID at 13-15. Indeed, she found no agency actions other
      than the investigations themselves, which she properly noted are not generally
      found to be personnel actions. ID at 14; see Sistek v. Department of Veterans
      Affairs, 955 F.3d 948, 955 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Mattil v. Department of State,
      118 M.S.P.R. 662, ¶ 21 (2012).       Although it is proper to consider evidence
      regarding an investigation if it is so closely related to an alleged personnel action
      that it would have been a pretext for gathering information to retaliate for
      whistleblowing, see Skarada v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 17,
      ¶ 18 n.4; Mattil, 118 M.S.P.R. 662, ¶ 21, here, we agree with the administrative
      judge that the appellant failed to show by preponderant evidence that his
      protected whistleblowing activity was a contributing factor in the agency’s
      decision to take or fail to take any personnel action against him , ID at 14-16.
¶13         The appellant alleged here that the personnel action at issue is the agency’s
      maintenance of the ROIs and the threat of discipline he contends that they
      represent. IAF, Tabs 1, 5, Tab 83 at 5. There is no other personnel action for
      which the investigations could have been a pretext. Moreover, the record fails to
      establish with any specificity the contours of the agency’s policy on the retention
      of ROIs.   ID at 15.    Because there is nothing to indicate that the agency did
      anything inconsistent with its normal document retention protocol, the appellant
      failed to establish that the agency is improperly retaining the ROIs, much less
      that it is doing so in reprisal against him. Furthermore, the appellant established
      no connection between his protected activity and the officials in the agency’s
      Office of Professional Responsibility who retain authority over the ROIs. ID at
                                                                                          9

      15.   There is no evidence in the record to suggest that the agency’s decision
      regarding the retention of the ROIs was in any way affected by the appellant’s
      protected activity. We find that the appellant failed to establish that the agency
      took, or failed to take, a personnel action against him concerning the ROIs.
      Absent an underlying personnel action, we find that the appellant has not shown
      that the agency’s investigations were a pretext for retaliation and therefore he has
      not shown that the investigations themselves constituted personnel actions.
      Skarada, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 18 n.4. Because the appellant failed to establish that
      the agency took or failed to take a personnel action under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(a)(2)(A), he has failed to make a prima facie case, and we therefore agree
      with the administrative judge’s denial of the appellant’s request for corrective
      action.   E.g., Aquino, 121 M.S.P.R. 35, ¶ 10; see Wadhwa v. Department of
      Veterans Affairs, 111 M.S.P.R. 26, ¶ 9, aff’d, 353 F. App’x 434 (Fed. Cir. 2009),
      overruled on other grounds by Hau v. Department of Homeland Security,
      123 M.S.P.R. 620, ¶ 16 (2016), aff’d sub nom. Bryant v. Merit Systems Protection
      Board, 878 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
¶14         Lastly, the appellant argues that the administrative judge erroneously
      limited the issues adjudicated in the appeal. PFR File, Tab 1 at 21-24. Based on
      the appellant’s submissions, the administrative judge iterated the issues, as set
      forth above, in her prehearing conference summary.        IAF, Tab 83 at 5.      The
      appellant subsequently submitted a list of objections to the prehearing conference
      summary, and the administrative judge granted his motion to reconsider her
      denial of two of his witnesses, but he did not specifically contest the
      administrative judge’s summary of the issues. IAF, Tabs 87-88. An issue is not
      properly before the Board when it is not included in the administrative judge’s
      memorandum summarizing the prehearing conference, which states that no other
      issues will be considered, unless either party objects to the exclusion of that issue
      in the summary.     Crowe v. Small Business Administration, 53 M.S.P.R. 631,
      634-35 (1992). The administrative judge afforded the parties 5 days to lodge
                                                                                      10

      their objections to the prehearing conference summary, IAF, Tab 83 at 8, and the
      record reflects that the appellant failed to do so concerning the issues set forth
      therein.
¶15         The appellant also asserts that the administrative judge should have
      considered whether the agency perceived him as a whistleblower.          PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 22. In that regard, he also contends that the agency “failed to act on the
      evidence [he] presented in an effort to discredit [him] because they perceived the
      information as a protected disclosure.” Id. at 19. When an appellant argues that
      an agency perceived him as a whistleblower, the Board analyzes the question of
      whether the appellant made a protected disclosure in a different fashion, asking
      whether agency officials believed that the appellant made or inten ded to make a
      disclosure, not whether the appellant reasonably believed he made a protected
      disclosure. E.g., King v. Department of the Army, 116 M.S.P.R. 689, ¶ 8 (2011).
      In such a case, whether the appellant actually made a protected disclosure is
      immaterial, and the issue of whether the agency perceived him as a whistleblower
      essentially stands in for that portion of the analysis.   Id.   Nevertheless, such
      analysis has no effect on the other issues in the IRA appeal. Id., ¶ 9. Even if the
      appellant could establish that the agency perceived him as a whistleblower, it
      would not change our determination that he failed to establish that the agency
      took or failed to take a personnel action under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A) in
      reprisal for his protected activity. ID at 14-15.
¶16         Moreover, rather than identify the other issues that the administrative judge
      allegedly should have adjudicated, the appellant instead reargues the episode in
      which one of his coworkers threatened to stab the other with a pen. PFR File ,
      Tab 1 at 22-24. He contends that the administrative judge improperly limited his
      testimony on the issue and implies that she was biased against him. Id. at 22. We
      disagree.   Our review of the transcript indicates that the administrative judge
      instead sought to assist the appellant, who was pro se in this matter, with his
      direct testimony on the issue by asking him questions.          Hearing Transcript,
                                                                                           11

      Apr. 28, 2016, at 11-12, 18-22. In making a claim of bias or prejudice against an
      administrative judge, a party must overcome the presumption of honesty and
      integrity that accompanies administrative adjudicators. Oliver v. Department of
      Transportation, 1 M.S.P.R. 382, 386 (1980).           In addition, an administrative
      judge’s conduct during the course of a Board proceeding warrants a new
      adjudication only if the administrative judge’s comments or actions evidence “a
      deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment imp ossible.”
      Bieber v. Department of the Army, 287 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
      (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)). Here, the appellant
      fails to overcome the presumption, and the record does not indicate that any of
      the administrative judge’s actions evidence such favoritism.
¶17         Accordingly, we affirm the decision as modified herein.

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 3
            The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
      Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.      You may obtain
      review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
      your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
      forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
      summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
      provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation an d
      the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
      regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
      this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
      claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file

      3
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                      12

within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Fede ral Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
                                                                                 13

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC    review    of   cases   involving   a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.    5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discri mination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.         See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                                                                                     14

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 4   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

4
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                15

      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                            /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.