Court Opinion

ID: 9956128
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-01 08:10:50.459429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:34.631483
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________
          No. 02-23-00105-CV
     ___________________________

     AMBREYA PLAYER, Appellant

                   V.

  MANSIONS OF MANSFIELD, Appellee

 On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 1
          Tarrant County, Texas
      Trial Court No. 2022-002363-1

   Before Kerr, Womack, and Walker, JJ.
   Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

       In four issues, Ambreya Player appeals from the county court at law’s final

judgment granting Appellee Mansions of Mansfield’s no-evidence summary-judgment

motion on Player’s claims, ordering that Player take nothing, and awarding attorney’s

fees to Mansions of Mansfield. We will affirm.

                                     I. Background

       In October 2019, Player executed an apartment lease agreement with Mansions

of Mansfield. According to Player’s appellate brief, see Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(g), after

Mansions at Mansfield sued to evict her, a dispute arose during the eviction

proceeding over Mansions at Mansfield’s allegedly locking her out of her apartment

and Player’s obtaining a writ of re-entry to gain access to her apartment. In January

2022, Player, proceeding pro se, sued Mansions of Mansfield in justice court for

“personal property,” “pain and suffering,” and “emotional distress.” Player sought

$20,000 in damages, plus court costs. Mansions of Mansfield answered and pleaded

for the recovery of its attorney’s fees under the lease agreement’s terms.

       The parties appeared and announced ready for trial. “After fully hearing the

pleadings, evidence, and argument of parties,” the justice court found for Mansions of

Mansfield, and ordered that Player take nothing. Player timely appealed to county

court at law for a trial de novo. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 506.1(a), 506.3.

       On June 27, 2022, the county court at law ordered the parties to mediate the

case by September 30, 2022. The mediator filed a status report with the county court

                                             2
on October 3, 2022, stating that the case was closed due to inactivity. The county

court then set the case for trial for the week of February 6, 2023. Mansions of

Mansfield successfully moved to continue the trial, and before the new trial setting, it

moved for summary judgment on no-evidence grounds on all of Player’s claims.

Player filed no response to the motion.

      The county court heard the motion on March 10, 2023. Three days later,

Mansions of Mansfield filed an affidavit supporting its claim for attorney’s fees under

the lease agreement’s terms. Player did not respond.

      On March 31, 2023, the county court signed a final judgment granting

Mansions at Mansfield’s summary-judgment motion, ordering that Player take nothing

on her claims, and awarding Mansions at Mansfield $5,271 in trial attorney’s fees, plus

conditional appellate attorney’s fees. Player timely appealed.

                         II. Player’s Issues and Arguments

      We construe briefs liberally. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.9. But a pro se litigant is

held to the same standards as a licensed attorney and must comply with applicable

laws and procedural rules. Flores v. Off. Depot, Inc., No. 02-10-00311-CV,

2011 WL 2611140, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 30, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.);

Strange v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 126 S.W.3d 676, 677 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied).

On appeal, a pro se appellant must properly present her case. Flores,

2011 WL 2611140, at *2; Strange, 126 S.W.3d at 678. To do so, her brief must contain,

                                            3
among other things, “a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with

appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i).

       Here, Player raises four appellate issues: (1) the county court erred “by leaning

[its] judgment on familiarity and not the facts presented”; (2) the county court erred

“by [excluding] the fact of the [w]rit of [r]eentry showing [that she] still [had] access to

the unit”; (3) the county court decided the case “based on the previous eviction

judgment instead of seeing [her] as a victim of agony”; and (4) the county court

“believe[d] that [she] wanted to seek relief due to the eviction.”

       In support of these issues, Player argues that the county court erred by granting

Mansion at Mansfield’s no-evidence summary judgment because although she had

“emailed the defendant all evidence on March 10, 2023,” she was unaware that she

had to “send the evidence through the courts.” She complains that she “did not have

the chance to let the judge know that [she] had sent the evidence to the defendant’s

lawyer because [the judge] was so adamant about closing the case” and that if “the

judge would have let [her] speak, then he could have corrected the error informing

[her of] the proper way to send evidence, and [she] would have done so.” According

to Player, if she had not been “ambushed to mediation” at the summary-judgment

hearing, she would have had “the proper time to go over everything that [she] had

sent the defendant in regards to [its] no[-]evidence claims.” Player further complains

the judge would not let her “provide the facts to this case,” “cut [her] off and did not

                                             4
let [her] finish presenting the case,” and “did not take time to listen to the weight of

the evidence.”

      We have carefully reviewed Player’s brief. While “[w]e are mindful of the

difficulties that pro se litigants face,” we cannot make Player’s arguments for her.

Thiessen v. Fid. Bank, No. 02-17-00321-CV, 2018 WL 5993316, at * 3 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth Nov. 15, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.). And we have no duty to independently

review the record and applicable law to determine whether the error complained of

occurred. Flores, 2011 WL 2611140, at *2. Construing Player’s brief liberally, as we

must, we interpret her issues as challenging the trial court’s granting Mansions at

Mansfield’s no-evidence summary-judgment motion. 1

                                     III. Analysis

      After an adequate time for discovery, the party without the burden of proof

may, without presenting evidence, move for summary judgment on the ground that

no evidence supports an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim or defense. Tex.

R. Civ. P. 166a(i). The trial court must grant the motion unless the nonmovant

produces summary-judgment evidence that raises a genuine, material fact issue. See

Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i) & 1997 cmt.; B.C. v. Steak N Shake Operations, Inc., 598 S.W.3d

256, 259 (Tex. 2020). If a nonmovant wants to assert that, based on the record

evidence, a fact issue exists to defeat a no-evidence motion for summary judgment,

      1
       Player does not address—and thus has not challenged—the trial court’s
awarding attorney’s fees to Mansions of Mansfield.

                                           5
the nonmovant must timely file a response to the motion raising this issue. See Tex. R.

Civ. P. 166a(i); Judge David Hittner et al., Summary Judgments in Texas: State and Federal

Practice, 62 S. Tex. L. Rev. 99, 213 (2022). Absent a timely response, a trial court must

grant a no-evidence motion for summary judgment that meets the requirements of

Rule 166a(i). See Polecat Hill, LLC v. City of Longview, 648 S.W.3d 315, 334 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2021, no pet.).

       Player failed to file with the trial court any response to Mansions at Mansfield’s

no-evidence motion.2 When, as here, “the nonmovant fails to file a response and

produce evidence, the nonmovant ‘is restricted to arguing on appeal that the no-

evidence summary judgment is insufficient as a matter of law.’” Hittner, supra, at

213 (quoting Viasana v. Ward Cnty., 296 S.W.3d 652, 654–55 (Tex. App.—El Paso

2009, no pet.)); see Roventini v. Ocular Scis., Inc., 111 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). A no-evidence motion is legally insufficient if it is

conclusory or fails to specifically challenge an essential element of a cause of action

for which the nonmovant would have the burden of proof at trial. Dean v. Aurora

       2
         Player states that she sent her response to Mansions at Mansfield’s counsel but
suggests that she did not know that she was required to file her response with the trial
court. She states that if the trial court had informed her at the hearing of “the proper
way to send evidence,” she would have done so. But, as noted, even though Player is a
pro se litigant, she is held to the same standards as a licensed attorney and is thus
responsible for knowing and complying with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See
Flores, 2011 WL 2611140, at *2; see also Bolling v. Farmers Branch ISD, 315 S.W.3d 893,
895 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.) (stating that “[t]he right of self-representation
(or being what is commonly called a pro se litigant), carries with it the responsibility to
adhere to our rules of evidence and procedure”).

                                            6
Bank, FSB, No. 01-15-00827-CV, 2016 WL 7368057, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] Dec. 20, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.); see Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306,

310 (Tex. 2009) (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i) & 1997 cmt.) Player has made no

argument that Mansions at Mansfield’s no-evidence motion was legally insufficient.

      For these reasons, we overrule Player’s four issues.

                                    IV. Conclusion

      Having overruled Player’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                       /s/ Elizabeth Kerr
                                                       Elizabeth Kerr
                                                       Justice

Delivered: March 28, 2024

                                            7