Court Opinion

ID: 9884001
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:30:25.008893+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:34.203517
License: Public Domain

CRIPPEN, Judge,
dissenting.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if it is inconsistent with rational hypotheses of innocence. State v. Berndt, 392 N.W.2d 876, 880-81 (Minn.1986).
The trial court first heard appellant’s contention on the insufficiency of the evidence in the case. Appellant argued that the reasoning in Berndt should prompt a reversal here. Appellant argued “there was just not enough circumstantial evidence” for a conviction. The trial court insisted that “each case must be taken individually,” and concluded that there was sufficient evidence for conviction. The record supports the trial court’s analysis of the case.
Evidence was sufficient in Berndt to show that a fire had an incendiary origin. Id. at 881. Here, it is undisputed we are dealing with an arson offense. Both cases require examining whether circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the person charged with starting the fire. Because the contentions here so closely resemble those in Berndt, and because that decision demonstrated the parameters of deference to the fact-finder, a studied consideration of the case is appropriate here.
There were unusual shortcomings in the state’s case in Berndt. The state failed to prove the defendant’s motive to commit the crime, a problem which was especially glaring in terms of the need to explain why he would cause the death of three children whom he loved and whose company he enjoyed. Id. In this case, there is evidence of a financial motive which is inconsistent with appellant’s claim of innocence. We cannot substitute our judgment for the jury’s in assessing the weight of this evidence.
In Berndt, the state’s evidence actually demonstrated that it was unlikely the defendant had the means and opportunity to start the fire in question. The evidence showed that at least five gallons of gasoline had been carefully deposited around defendant’s townhouse just before the fire, and in spite of the alleged involvement of the defendant in spreading this gasoline there was no evidence of any gas spilled on him or his clothing. Id. at 880-81. There is not a comparable defect in the state’s evidence in this case. In this regard the majority opinion discusses the evidence as to the time the fire may have been set and the evidence that there was no odor of gasoline on appellant’s person or clothing before the fire.
At about 5:45 p.m., appellant arrived at his neighbor’s home after leaving his house. The fire department arrived at appellant’s house at about 6:55 p.m. The fire marshall’s investigator said the fire had been burning for about one hour before the firefighters arrived. Even taking into account evidence as to accelerants, the jury’s decision was sufficiently supported by evidence that is inconsistent with defendant’s hypothesis of a fire set by someone else.
Appellant did not smell of gasoline. In this case, however, there is no evidence that a considerable quantity of accelerant was used, nor is there any evidence that it was likely applied immediately before the fire was set. Unlike the situation in Berndt, the lack of evidence of odor here is not inconsistent with the state's accusation.
Finally, in Berndt, the supreme court was prompted to reverse because the entire state’s case was “bottomed on mere speculation or upon hypothesized ‘facts’ not in evidence.” Id. at 881. Speculation was not required here to reach the conclusion that appellant had motive and opportunity *168accounting for a conclusion that he was the person who destroyed his house.
Based on examination of the facts of record, I do not harbor the same grave doubts expressed by the majority. There is sufficient evidence here to sustain the convictions. I respectfully dissent.