Court Opinion

ID: 9850191
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:53:14.118736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:32.907836
License: Public Domain

Rosellini, J.
(dissenting) — The majority characterizes seniority rights and benefits as tenure, and then concludes that they are not protected from subsequent modification by the contract clause, Const, art. 1, § 23. Because I disagree with this conclusion as well as the majority's decision to abandon several decades of law regarding the Governor's power to selectively veto legislative enactments, I dissent.
I
The contract clause states that no law impairing the *548obligations of contract shall ever be passed. Const, art. 1, § 23. A court faced with a challenge to a legislative enactment under this clause must address two questions. First, does the legislation impair a benefit of state employment? Second, is that benefit a contract right or is it a condition of employment freely modified by the legislation? In the present case, the first question is answered quite readily. As we have said in the past, "A contract is impaired by a statute which alters its terms, imposes new conditions or lessens its value ..." Ketcham v. King Cy. Med. Serv. Corp., 81 Wn.2d 565, 576, 502 P.2d 1197 (1972). No one can doubt that the terms of the new legislation governing state personnel devalues the benefit of holding state employment. Seniority rights, in particular, represent significant benefits in harsh economic climates such as those last few years. And, as also demonstrated by recent history, the State is peculiarly susceptible to severe cuts in employment budgets in such climates. Under the previous law, the risk of losing one's job was ameliorated by the right to return to that job as soon as funding returned for the position. The new legislation, on the other hand, substantially dilutes that right by making laid-off workers compete for their former positions, positions which they lost, by the way, through no fault of their own.
Consequently, state employees now face not only the uncertainty of unstable funding but also the uncertainty of reemployment when funding returns. This change significantly dilutes the value of seniority to state employees.
Having concluded that this legislation does dilute a benefit of state employment, the only remaining issue is whether that benefit is a contract right.
The majority approaches this issue by first classifying the benefit (as either a pension right or a tenure question) and then limiting the contract clause protection of state workers to pension benefits. This conclusory analysis ignores the underlying controversy. Was there a contractual obligation on the part of the State which could not be modified?
To answer that question, one must understand some *549basic contract principles. The term "obligation of contract" means that the law binds parties to perform their undertaking. Ketcham, at 570. A contract is formed when parties exchange promises to act or refrain from acting in a certain manner. See generally Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 1 (1981). Generally, a promise is a manifestation of the promisor's intent to act in a certain way so made as to justify the person receiving the promise in understanding that a commitment has been made. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 2 (1981).
Here, appellants argue persuasively that the statutory scheme governing state employment was a promise which they were justified in relying upon. In return for the State's promise, the appellants note that the employees provide continuing consideration by remaining in State service and forbearing more lucrative opportunities in the private sector. Furthermore, this consideration benefits the State significantly. By inducing employees to remain in state employment, the State assures itself of a highly qualified, experienced pool of workers to fill its vacancies.
Finally, this court has recognized the proposition that state employment statutes create statutory contracts. See Horowitz v. Department of Retirement Sys., 96 Wn.2d 468, 472, 635 P.2d 1078 (1981).
The majority ignores these basic contract principles and seeks to limit the statutory contract analysis to pension cases. The majority's arbitrary distinction between pension benefits and other employment benefits vitiates the contract clause protections granted state employees under our previous law. With this result, I cannot agree.
Appellants also offered an alternative theory to establish a contract right to these benefits. That theory, ignored by and large by the majority, is based on the concept of promissory estoppel.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1) (1981) defines promissory estoppel:
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the *550promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.
See also Klinke v. Famous Recipe Fried Chicken, Inc., 94 Wn.2d 255, 616 P.2d 644 (1980). Appellants urge that under this doctrine the employees' expectations in the benefits granted by the previous statutes should be enforced because they are reasonable and induced action (remaining in state employment) from the state employees. I agree.
The purpose of these statutory provisions was to induce continued state employment. Consequently, equitable contract principles, embodied in the Restatement, section 90, require that we give full effect to the expectations of state employees.
II
I also disagree with the majority's decision to abandon the distinction between affirmative and negative vetoes. We reaffirmed and explained this distinction in Washington Ass'n of Apartment Ass'ns, Inc. v. Evans, 88 Wn.2d 563, 565-66, 564 P.2d 788 (1977). There, we noted:
[T]he veto power may be exercised only in a negative way, and not in an affirmative way. That is to say, the Governor may use the veto power to prevent some act or part of an act of the legislature from becoming law. Likewise, the Governor may not use the veto power to reach a new or different result from what the legislature intended. Spokane Grain & Fuel Co. v. Lyttaker, 59 Wash. 76, 109 P. 316 (1910). In other words, the veto power must be exercised in a destructive and not a creative manner.
The majority abandons this distinction on the theory that it has outlived its usefulness. I disagree. Although it may be said that a governor acts as a legislature when exercising veto power, there are clear limits to that power. Two of the checks previously recognized on this power were the affirmative-negative veto distinction and the item veto prohibition. See Apartment Ass'ns, at 565. By abandoning the first of these limitations, the majority skews the balance *551of power between the Executive and the Legislature. An affirmative veto allows the State's chief executive to fashion legislation with only one-third of the votes of the Legislature. The Legislature, on the other hand, must enact legislation by majority vote. Thus, under the scheme approved today, the Governor becomes both chief executive and a super legislator. This result cannot be tolerated under our constitutional scheme.
The majority's decision to abandon this distinction stems in large part from the fact that the Governor's veto here was clearly affirmative in nature. Although the majority asserts that this is not the case, it offers no reasons to support its view. Moreover, as the trial judge found, this veto modified, extensively, this legislation.
Section 30 of the bill, the part vetoed by Governor Spell-man, required that the directors of the Department of Personnel and the Higher Education Personnel Board submit proposed regulations for implementing the performance evaluation process to the Legislature for its approval. That the Legislature viewed this provision as essential to the bill cannot be doubted, for the bill specifically provided that the rules and regulations could not become effective until after approval (in the form of a concurrent resolution) by the Legislature. If the Legislature failed to adopt the resolution, sections 6 through 9, 11 through 13, 18, 20 through 22, 25 through 29 would be null and void. Substitute House Bill 1226, § 30, 47th Legislature (1982). By vetoing section 30, the Governor altered the legislative scheme from one in which the Legislature reserved to itself the final decision to implement the act, to one in which the executive branch suddenly had that power. Vetoes of this nature remove limitations on the effectiveness of the legislation and are invalid under the rule enumerated in Apartment Ass'ns. As Judge Alexander explained:
[T]he Governor's veto clearly affects the character of this legislation. It eliminates a condition that the legislature erected as a precedent to the effectiveness of portions of this act. In other words, it has the effect of making a *552portion of the statute extant which might otherwise never have become law. This removal of a limitation on the effectiveness of the act broadens it considerably and under the authority and reasoning set forth in the Apartment Ass'n Inc., case, supra, renders the veto void as an affirmative veto.
Memorandum Opinion, Clerk's Papers, at 177.
Conclusion
Because this veto shifted the power of final approval of the regulations from the Legislature to the executive branch, I believe it represents a clear example of affirmative vetoes. Our case law has prohibited affirmative vetoes because they violate basic principles inherent in the doctrine of separation of powers.
For this reason, and because I believe important contract rights have been violated, I dissent.
Williams, C.J., and Dore, J., concur with Rosellini, J.