Court Opinion

ID: 9602263
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:52:40.576651+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:01.778667
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
concurring specially.
1. It is contended in enumeration of error number two (considered by the majority here in division one) that the lower court erred in stating during the trial in the *84presence of the jury that the "standards we are trying to determine here is whether or not the standards of LaGrange, Georgia would let obscene material be sold here.” (Tr. pp. 14, 15).
The question of what standards are to be applied in determining whether alleged pornographic materials violate the statute is exceedingly difficult. The United States Supreme Court held in the case of Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184 (3) (84 SC 1676, 12 LE2d 793), that "national standards” are to be applied, and on that authority, this court reversed the State Court of Clarke County in the case of Feldschneider v. State, 127 Ga. App. 745 (195 SE2d 184), because local community standards had been applied in the trial court’s charge.
Since then, the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (93 SC 2607, 37 LE2d 419), has revised its thinking and has decided that "national standards” are not to be applied, and instead, has held (p. 33): "We hold the requirement that the jury evaluate the materials with reference to 'contemporary standards of the State of California’ serves this protective purpose and is constitutionally adequate.” The majority opinion in the present case interprets the above language to mean that each state shall constitute a polity or political unit and that the standards of each state shall apply to prosecutions within the confines of that particular state. I am not sure this is what the United States Supreme Court meant in Miller, supra, although I agree that the language is susceptible of that interpretation. If so, what a quagmire of confusion is set up! Little Rhode Island shall use its standards as to pornography; great Texas shall use its standards, and by and large there may be 50 different standards to apply throughout the United States. As book publishers and movies are not expected to publish books and make movies for each individual state, where does that leave them? And what of the situation where one large city lies partly in two states, which states have different standards? In our own State of Georgia, do we have one state-wide standard? Surely, if we apply the standards of Nahunta, Blowing Rock, Unadilla and Hiawassee to more liberal Atlanta, that could have an unusual impact on the *85situation in Atlanta. The writer is personally against pornography, and would not shed one tear if all, even borderline, businesses are forced to close, but are my standards to govern? I apprehend such is not the case.
It appears that the "local community standard” would perhaps offer the best solution to this almost insoluble problem, but even that would be far from perfect.
We are made to understand that the U. S. Supreme Court during 1974 will pass upon the case of Jenkins v. State, 230 Ga. 726 (199 SE2d 183), from Dougherty County, Georgia, in which case the Georgia Supreme Court has ruled the matter to be pornographic and a violation of law. Perhaps out of this decision will come some clarification, but we do not look forward to that result with great optimism, or enthusiasm.
2. I fully concur in Division 6 of this opinion wherein the majority reverses the trial court for refusing to allow the alleged improper arguments of the solicitor to be preserved in the record by means of the transcript. But I wish to add that it is quite apparent that the solicitor made highly prejudicial and inflammatory statements during his closing argument to the jury, and the trial judge overruled defendant’s objections thereto. At page 99 of the transcript the following is shown: "Mr. Solomon. I did not object to Mr. Ketsky’s [the solicitor’s] argument in its entirety until the end so that it would not break his — I object to any statements Mr. Ketsky made in his argument dealing with idea of — would you want your son or daughter to see or read this stuff, as explicitly stated in Circuit Court Case—USA v. Willis—it’s this Circuit case saying they will not put up with this type of argument any longer. We object on these grounds. The Court. I overrule the objection. Let the record show that I didn't permit the oral argument to be reported. Mr. Solomon objected to that fact.” (Emphasis supplied.) Obviously the trial court labored under mistaken impression that if the oral argument was not reported, no error could be successfully enumerated as to improper argument. But the trial judge did not disagree with defendant’s contention as to what State’s counsel had argued; and such failure is in effect an admission that he *86did make such argument. See Code § 38-409. If the trial judge had asserted that no such argument was made this would have ended the matter. But neither the trial judge, nor State’s counsel denied that the argument had been made as recited by defendant’s counsel, and no attempt to alleviate the harm was made. This was obviously reversible error. Counsel may not ask the jurors to substitute themselves for the party, or to take the party’s place and consider the case from that posture. This is often referred to as the "golden rule argument.” The jurors do not represent themselves, they are not allowed to try their own case; but they, as a group of 12 fair and impartial jurors, must consider the case with the utmost objectivity, and return a unanimous verdict as would be returned by impartial jurors. Earl v. Edwards, 117 Ga. App. 559 (3) (161 SE2d 438); Doe v. Moss, 120 Ga. App. 762, 767 (172 SE2d 321); 70 ALR2d 935.