Court Opinion

ID: 9701216
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:11:08.671487+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:21.005268
License: Public Domain

MICHAEL A. WOLFF, Judge,
dissenting.
Legal procedure, including “burden of proof’, may not seem that interesting to most people. But to Ernest Johnson, how the Court allocates the burden of proof is the difference between life and death.
This Court in Johnson v. State, 102 S.W.3d 535 (Mo. banc 2003) (Johnson III), determined that Johnson would not be subject to the death penalty if he could prove by a preponderance of evidence at a new sentencing phase trial that he is mentally retarded. The defendant in Johnson III did not raise the issue of allocation of the burden of proof in his points relied on, nor did the state address it. The alloca*166tion of the burden of proof to the defendant was made by this court in the absence of statutory mandate and without considering the constitutional question presented here. I therefore consider the question of allocating the burden of proof to be open for full consideration in this appeal.
The Court’s decision in Johnson III was intended to implement the principle established in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), which held that it is unconstitutional for a mentally retarded person to be executed. In so holding, the Supreme Court of the United States in Atkins left “to the Statefs] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon their execution of sentences.” 536 U.S. at 317, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416-417,106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986)). This passage from Atkins is in a paragraph of the opinion that deals with how “mental retardation” is defined.1 Nowhere in the opinion is there a discussion of which party should bear the burden of proving mental retardation or by what standard it should be proved.
Some states include the burden of proof in the statute that supplies the definition.2 Missouri’s statute, section 565.030.63, does not. Another subdivision, section 565.030.4(1), does provide that life imprisonment shall be assessed “[i]f the trier finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is mentally retarded.” The statute does not specify whether the state or the defendant has the burden of proof on the issue.
Missouri’s definition of “mental retardation” — enacted before Atkins but consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision to leave the definition to the states — says “mental retardation” is “[a] condition involving substantial limitations in general functioning characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning with continual extensive related deficits and limitations in two or more adaptive behaviors such as communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure and work, which conditions are manifested and documented before eighteen years of age.” Section 565.030.6.
Johnson’s counsel argues that the state should have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Johnson is not retarded in order for him to be subject to *167the death penalty. Johnson’s argument is based on Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), in which the Court said that when the state “makes an increase in a defendant’s authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact ... must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” 536 U.S. at 602, 122 S.Ct. 2428.
The principal opinion in this case takes the position that the absence of mental retardation is not an element for the purpose of showing eligibility for the death penalty under Ring. Under this interpretation the state is not, therefore, required to prove the defendant’s lack of mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt. While the principal opinion’s decision is consistent with the views of some other states 4, it seems inconsistent with Ring.
A Matter of Life or Death
Allocating the burden to the defendant to prove that he is mentally retarded makes the decision — whether Johnson should receive the death penalty — seem capricious. The facts of this case show that the result — life or death — may well depend on which party has the burden of proof.
The evidence favoring Johnson’s position is as follows: Johnson received three intelligence test scores indicating subaverage intellectual functioning. At the age of 12, Johnson received a score of 63 on the WISC test, a standard intelligence test for children. Two of the I.Q. tests Johnson took as an adult indicated that he had a full scale I.Q. of 67. Under the guidelines set forth in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV, a person with an I.Q. score below 70 has significantly subaverage intellectual functioning. The defense presented evidence that, as a child, Johnson was placed in special education classes, a placement consistent with a diagnosis of life-long mental retardation. Defense experts also testified that Johnson had deficits in many of the adaptive behaviors described in section 565.030.6, including communication, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics and leisure and work.
On the other hand, the state’s evidence tending to show a lack of mental retardation is: Johnson received four I.Q. scores indicating an absence of mental retardation, including scores of 77 in 1968, 95 in 1979, 78 in 1994, and 84 in 1995. Dr. Heisler, the state’s expert who administered one of the intelligence tests, testified that he believed Johnson’s adult score of 67 was the result of malingering and not actual mental retardation. The state also contended that Johnson’s functioning both in prison and prior to his incarceration indicate that he does not have adaptive behavior deficiencies.
The evidence in this case will support either conclusion. A reasonable jury, considering all the evidence, may be in equipoise. Johnson thus presents precisely the kind of case where the burden of proof is important, even determinative.
With the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence allocated to Johnson, as it is by the principal opinion, the jury’s determination that Johnson is not mentally retarded is supported by evidence. If the burden were placed upon the state to show that Johnson is not *168mentally retarded, the jurors may well have found the state’s evidence insufficient to carry that burden over the evidence to the contrary. This may be so regardless of whether the burden is beyond a reasonable doubt, as in Ring, or by a preponderance of the evidence, as in section 565.030.4(1).
The Rule of Lenity
The majority opinion contends that the language of section 565.030.4(1) “necessarily implies that it is defendant’s burden, not the State’s, to prove to a jury that he is mentally retarded.” As noted, section 565.030.4(1) states that life imprisonment shall be assessed “[i]f the trier finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is mentally retarded.”
The statute does not say whether the burden is on the state or on the defendant and is, therefore, ambiguous. Where there is ambiguity, the rule of lenity requires that the court strictly construe a criminal statute against the state. State v. Hobokin, 768 S.W.2d 76, 77 (Mo. banc 1989). Under the rule of lenity, criminal statutes may not be extended by judicial interpretation so as to embrace persons and acts not specifically and unambiguously brought within their terms. State v. Salazar, 236 S.W.3d 644, 645 (Mo. banc 2007) (citing State v. Lloyd, 320 Mo. 236, 7 S.W.2d 344, 346 (Mo.1928)). The rule of lenity is applicable to Johnson’s case. Because section 565.030.4(1) does not specify which party must bear the burden of proving mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence, the court must not infer, under the rule of lenity, that the law “necessarily implies” something that is not written in the statute. The ambiguity in the statute must be construed against the state. As such, the court should interpret the statute as placing the burden on the state.
Whether Johnson is subject to the death penalty or not — that is, whether he is mentally retarded or not — is almost certainly dependent upon where the burden of proof is allocated. Ring speaks of the state’s burden to prove each fact upon which the defendant’s punishment depends. Logically that would include the state’s burden to show that Johnson is not retarded, in response to evidence that would indicate that he may be retarded. In other words, the evidence favoring Johnson establishes at least prima facie that he is retarded. Where that is the case, the burden should be on the state to prove that he is subject to the death penalty by bearing the burden of proving that he is not retarded. This would not oblige the state to prove lack of retardation in every death penalty case, but only in those cases in which the defendant introduces evidence that, if believed, would support a finding that he is mentally retarded. This is such a case.
Conclusion
In the absence of controlling Supreme Court authority to the contrary, this Court should read Atkins — which set a substantive constitutional standard — with Ring, which established a constitutionally based procedural standard. When the constitution provides a substantive right, the state should not take away or diminish that right by its choice of procedure.
Johnson is entitled to a new penalty phase trial in which the state has the burden of proving that Johnson is not retarded and, thus, subject to the death penalty.
I respectfully dissent.

.The paragraph reads, "[t]o the extent there is serious disagreement about the execution of mentally retarded offenders, it is in determining which offenders are in fact retarded. In this case, for instance, the Commonwealth of Virginia disputes that Atkins suffers from mental retardation. Not all people who claim to be mentally retarded will be so impaired as to fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus. As was our approach in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986), with regard to insanity, 'we leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.’ Id., at 405, 416-417, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335.” Atkins at 317, 122 S.Ct. 2242.

. For example, the Illinois statute provides, "[t]he issue of the defendant’s mental retardation shall be determined in a pretrial hearing. The court shall be the fact finder on the issue of the defendant’s mental retardation and shall determine the issue by a preponderance of evidence in which the moving party has the burden of proof. The court may appoint an expert in the field of mental retardation. The defendant and the State may offer experts from the field of mental retardation. The court shall determine admissibility of evidence and qualification as an expert.” 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/114 — 15(b) (2003).

. All statutory references are to RSMo 2000.

. Russell v. State, 849 So.2d 95, 148 (Miss.2003); State v. Lott, 97 Ohio St.3d 303, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (2002); Murphy v. State, 54 P.3d 556, 568 (Okla.Crim.App.2002); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 576 Pa. 258, 839 A.2d 202, 211 (2003); Franklin v. Maynard, 356 S.C. 276, 588 S.E.2d 604, 606 (2003); Ex Parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex.Crim.App.2004); Bowling v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 361, 382 (Ky.2005).