Court Opinion

ID: 9756814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:01:54.899876+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:31.161256
License: Public Domain

Weintraub, J.
(concurring). The characterization as directory of a statute which does not purport to confer discretion does not mean that the officials chargeable thereunder are free to ignore it. On the contrary, so far as the officials are concerned, the statute is mandatory. 3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3d ed. 1943), sec. 5801, p. 76; In re Smock, 5 N. J. Super. 495, 501 (Law Div. 1949). It is with respect to the impact of a violation upon the result *192of the trial that the characterization “directory” is judicially (sometimes legislatively) applied, and then merely as a succinct statement that the violation in question did not infect the verdict.
I hesitate to subscribe to a blanket rule that all provisions relating to the selection of a jury are directory in the sense stated, or that absent an affirmative showing of prejudice there can never be a reversal except to vindicate a principle. Despite the breadth of language frequently used, the authorities, if measured in terms of results reached, do not go that far. See 3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3d ed. 1943), sec. 5825, p. 122; 1 Thompson, Trials (2d ed. 1912), secs. 33-4, pp. 37-41; Abbott, Civil Jury Trials (5th ed. 1935), sec. 65, p. 137; Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice (4th ed. 1939), secs. 182-3, pp. 331-338; Busch, Law and Tactics in Jury Trials (1949), secs. 87-8, pp. 133-7; 50 C. J. S., Juries, § 164, p. 890; 31 Am. Jur., Jury, sec. 77, p. 611. Rather, it seems to me that where the objection is timely made the test is whether the violation goes to the essence of the selection system, which usually means whether what was done or omitted operated to remove or to cast grave doubt upon the intended assurance of a fair and impartial jury. If it does, the violation may well be deemed to be prejudicial per se, especially if in the nature of things it is impossible to establish or exclude more specific prejudice, on an inquiry into the subject would necessarily lead to the kind of exploration of a juror’s mental operations which is proscribed for greater reasons of public policy. State v. Kociolek, 20 N. J. 92 (1955). Perhaps the expressions in this area would be less divergent than superficially appears if all started with a common conception of what constitutes a showing of prejudice.
I agree the violation here involved should not lead to a reversal, but I would reach that result on the test suggested above.
Mr. Justice Burling has authorized me to state that he concurs in the views expressed herein.
Burling and Weintraub, JJ., concurring in result.
*193For affirmance — Chief Justice Vanderbilt, and Justices Wachenfeld, Burling, Jacobs and Weintraub — 5.
For reversal — Justices Heher and Oliphant — 2.