Court Opinion

ID: 9960430
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-16 14:08:02.79742+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:27.732221
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0955-23

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JAMARI HALL and
OREN BURZYNSKI,

     Defendants-Respondents.
___________________________

                   Argued March 19, 2024 – Decided April 16, 2024

                   Before Judges Mayer and Paganelli.

                   On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior
                   Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County,
                   Indictment Nos. 23-03-0540 and 23-03-0541.

                   Frank J. Ducoat, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause
                   for appellant (Theodore N. Stephens II, Essex County
                   Prosecutor, attorney; Frank J. Ducoat, of counsel and
                   on the briefs).

                   Margaret Ruth McLane, Assistant Deputy Public
                   Defender, argued the cause for respondent Jamari Hall
                   (Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney;
                   Margaret Ruth McLane, of counsel and on the brief).
               Prosper Andrew Bellizia argued the cause for
               respondent Oren Burzynski.

PER CURIAM

      By leave granted, the State appeals from an October 20, 2023 order

suppressing the warrantless seizure of physical evidence. For the reasons that

follow, we vacate the judge's suppression order and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

      We recite the facts from the August 25, 2023 suppression motion hearing,

the September 13, 2023 and October 10, 2023 evidentiary hearings related to the

motion to suppress, and the judge's October 20, 2023 written decision.

      On December 31, 2022, police officers with the Newark Police

Department responded to a call of persons possessing weapons at an apartment

on Spruce Street. The caller, Tanisha Williamson, told the police she received

a text message from Michael Williams, the father of Williamson's young

daughter. The child was spending an overnight with her father. The text

message instructed Williamson to pick up the child and bring the police because

two men forced their way inside Williams's apartment. Williams texted he and

the child were sleeping when two men entered his bedroom, brandishing a gun

and a knife.

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      Upon arrival, the police entered the apartment and found Williams and his

roommate, Marcelles Curtis, as well as four other individuals, including

defendants Jamari Hall and Oren Burzynski. Williamson retrieved her daughter

from the apartment and the police escorted Williamson, the child, and Williams

outside. The other individuals were ushered outside the apartment while the

police investigated the situation.

      Williams told the officers he had lived in the apartment for two months.

According to Williams, defendants and the two other men forced their way into

the apartment. Williams said defendants pointed weapons at him and the child

and demanded he vacate the residence. Williams identified Hall as the person

who brandished the gun and Burzynski as the person who brandished the knife.

      Upon identifying Williams and Curtis as the apartment's residents,

Captain Baseem Zaghloum of the Newark Police Department asked Williams

and Curtis for consent to search the apartment for weapons. Both men consented

to the search. While searching the living room, the police found a handgun in a

large garbage can and a knife in a garbage bag adjacent to the garbage can.

Williams identified the gun and the knife as the same weapons defendants

pointed at him.

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       The police then arrested and charged defendants with aggravated assault,

weapons possession, and related offenses. After his arrest, and without being

questioned by the police, Hall stated several times that he did not live in the

apartment.

       Prior to trial, Hall filed a motion to suppress the gun and knife recovered

from the search of the apartment. During oral argument on the suppression

motion, the parties raised the following legal issues: whether Hall had standing

to file the suppression motion; whether Hall abandoned the weapons;1 and

whether the police had valid consent to search the apartment.

       On the standing issue, the judge concluded Hall had "automatic standing"

to file the suppression motion. She accepted Hall's position that "he was invited

into the apartment by someone else" who Hall believed had "ties to that

apartment." Because Hall was invited into the apartment, the judge determined

Hall "established . . . standing to file [the] motion."

       On the validity of Williams's consent to search the apartment, Hall argued

Williams's consent was invalid because Williams illegally lived in the apartment

as a "squatter." Since Williams occupied the apartment without the owner's

permission, Hall claimed Williams could not consent to search the apartment

1
    The weapons abandonment argument is not an issue on appeal.
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and, therefore, the physical evidence found as a result of that search should be

suppressed.

      In response, the State argued there was valid consent to search the

apartment because the officers reasonably believed Williams had apparent

authority to consent.

      After hearing legal arguments on the validity of Williams's consent to

search the apartment, the judge concluded the issue warranted an evidentiary

hearing. In explaining the reason for a hearing, the judge stated "there [were]

material facts in dispute with respect to the consent that was given [by Williams]

for the officers to go in the apartment for the search."

      The State then requested a clarification on the parameters of the

evidentiary hearing. The judge explained the hearing would address "whether

or not the consent that was given by [Williams], at the time [Williams] gave the

consent," made it "reasonable[] for the officers to believe that [Williams] had

the right to give them the consent." The judge stated that was the "only issue"

that would be the focus of the evidentiary hearing. The judge also identified the

factual disputes she believed warranted the evidentiary hearing. According to

the judge:

              . . . [T]he State [took] the position, how everything
              played out, was [Williams] just realized that day, when

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            all of this was going on, that he didn't belong in the
            apartment.
                   Versus how . . . the defense [was] making the
            argument that, [Williams] knew he didn't belong there,
            he made clear to the officers that he didn't belong there.
            And the officers knew that, and still pressed him to get
            the consent.

      The judge held a two-day evidentiary hearing on the suppression motion.

At the start of the hearing, the State reconfirmed "the hearing was granted for

the limited issue of whether it was reasonable for the officers to believe

[Williams] had the ability to consent to the search of the apartment."

      The State called Captain Zaghloum to testify and moved to admit his

body-worn camera footage of the incident. The judge admitted the footage, and

the State played a limited portion of the video during the evidentiary hearing.

The portion of the video played by the State was offered to demonstrate the

police officers reasonably believed Williams and Curtis had apparent authority

to consent to the search.

      Williams explained how he came to occupy the apartment. He told the

officers he lived in the apartment for two months. When the four men showed

up to remove Williams from the apartment, he first suspected the apartment

belonged to someone who had not given him permission to live there. Williams

told the police someone must have illegally rented the apartment to him even

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though he had a handwritten document, purporting to be a lease, allowing him

to live there. Williams explained to the police that he received the lease from a

woman. Williams also identified for the police which individual brandished the

gun and the knife.

      Based on his discussion with Williams, Captain Zaghloum believed

Williams and Curtis lived in the apartment. As a result, the Captain asked, "you

guys live here, occupy this place, you guys give us permission to search for the

gun that was used against you?" In response, Williams and Curtis granted

permission to search the apartment. Williams and Curtis also signed consent to

search forms, which were admitted as evidence during the evidentiary hearing.

      According to Captain Zaghloum, defendants told the police they did not

live in the apartment. Additionally, Captain Zaghloum confirmed the person

defendants claimed owned the apartment was not present at the scene.

      At the conclusion of Captain Zaghloum's testimony, defense counsel

requested an adjournment of the hearing to subpoena Officer Ramon Cruz, an

officer with the Newark Police Department who was at the scene. The judge

granted defense counsel's request based on the defense "position that there was

information provided at the location that questioned whether or not [Williams]

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was the appropriate person to give consent" and Officer Cruz, as "one of the first

officers to arrive at the scene, . . . may have had different information."

      The evidentiary hearing on the suppression motion resumed three weeks

later. The judge advised that since the date of the last hearing, co-defendant

Burzynski "joined in the motion to suppress."

      Officer Cruz testified in response to defendants' subpoena. He identified

his body-worn camera footage of the incident and the judge admitted this video

as evidence.    Officer Cruz's brief testimony was consistent with Captain

Zaghloum's testimony. At the conclusion of the testimony, the judge allowed

counsel to present additional arguments in support of their legal positions.

      Based on the body-worn camera videos, defense counsel argued

Williamson told the officers "that someone . . . rented the apartment to

[Williams] wrongfully." Further, defense counsel highlighted the portion of the

video where Williams told the officers "somebody wrongfully rented [him] th[e]

apartment." Defense counsel also argued Williams's statements on the video

were not credible because he gave conflicting information to the police about

the attire worn by the person who pointed the gun and differing descriptions of

the gun. Because Williams's statements to the police lacked credibility, defense

counsel asserted the police should have sought a search warrant.

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        Additionally, since Williams told the police he was in the apartment

"wrongfully," defense counsel asserted the officers should have questioned

whether Williams could validly consent to a search.       Defense counsel also

challenged the validity of Williams's consent to search because the police never

advised Williams that he had a right to refuse to consent to the search.

        Although not identified as a legal issue to be addressed during the

evidentiary hearing, defense counsel noted an officer participating in the search

commented he "[did]n't even know whose stuff he was looking through."

Relying on the video evidence, defense counsel argued one of the four intruders

told Officer Cruz the apartment belonged to the lawful renter's brother and

Williams and Curtis had to leave. According to defense counsel, at the request

of the person who owned the apartment, Hall had the right to be in the apartment

and the "stuff" in the apartment belonged to Hall.

        There was no testimony establishing Hall lacked permission to enter the

apartment at the owner's request. Nor was there any evidence contradicting

defense counsel's legal argument that the "stuff" in the apartment belonged to

Hall.

        The State contended Williams lived in the apartment, possessed the

apartment, and "had a sufficient relationship to the apartment to be able to

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consent." Based on the videos, the State argued the men who entered the

apartment admitted they did not live the apartment.          While the four men

mentioned a fifth person who rented the apartment, the State noted that person

was not present at the scene. Additionally, the State asserted the officers could

not "get on the phone with somebody who claim[ed] to be the renter" and take

the word of an unknown individual over Williams because it was Williams who

reported armed intruders in the apartment.

      Regarding defendant's argument the officers failed to advise Williams he

had the right to refuse to consent to the search, the State explained Williams

texted the child's mother, directed her to call the police, and told her to tell the

police there were armed men in the apartment. The State argued Williams thus

invited the police to enter the apartment and his invitation indicated an

understanding he had the right to refuse to consent.

      The State also asserted the police asked Williams twice, by way of a "yes"

or "no" question, whether he consented to a search of the apartment. Both times,

Williams responded "yes." Under the circumstances, the State argued it was

"completely reasonable to ask [Williams] for the consent to the search, which

[was] why [the police did not] need a search warrant."           Further, because

defendants conceded Williams lived in the apartment, the State argued the police

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had more than sufficient reason to believe Williams had authority to consent to

the search.

      The judge issued an October 20, 2023 written decision on defendants'

suppression motion. The judge found the testimony provided by the officers

"believable," "credible," and "truthful," and "[t]heir recollection . . . candid,

reasonable, and . . . not evasive in any way."

      Based on the testimony and body-worn camera footage, the judge

concluded Williams and Curtis had the authority to consent to the search of the

apartment. The judge explained the officers reasonably believed Williams and

Curtis had apparent authority to consent. As the judge wrote:

              Even if there was a question as to whether [Williams
              and Curtis] were subleasing the apartment legally, it
              was reasonable for the police officers to believe that
              both victims lived in the apartment and had the
              authority to provide consent to search the apartment.
              There [was] no dispute that defendants were not living
              there prior to the date of the incident. In fact, . . . Hall
              stated several times in the presence of the police
              officers that he did not live there.

                    ....

              The court recognized that there may have been issues
              regarding the rental of the apartment. However, there
              is no dispute that the two victims were living in the
              apartment prior to [the date of the incident] for a period
              [of] one month[]-two months. The court need not
              address whether the victims had a valid lease to rent the

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                                         11
            apartment as the applicable standard here is whether the
            police officers' belief that the victims had apparent
            authority to consent was reasonable, even if incorrect.

      Based on her review of the evidence and testimony, the judge found "the

police officers' belief that Williams and his roommate had apparent authority to

consent to search the apartment was reasonable." The judge further found "their

consent was given freely and voluntarily."

      The judge rejected defendants' argument the consent to search the

apartment was invalid because Williams and Curtis were never told they had the

right to refuse to consent. Relying on testimony from the evidentiary hearing,

the judge found "the victims' consent to search was valid as they were implicitly

informed of their right to refuse." The judge concluded Williams and Curtis

were aware they had a choice regarding the consent to search based on the "yes"

or "no" questions presented by the police officers. Moreover, the judge noted

Williams and Curtis signed forms consenting to the search even though the

forms were signed after the search concluded.

      After rendering these findings, the judge sua sponte determined "the knife

and gun must be suppressed as the location where these items were located went

beyond the authority either roommate had to provide consent." The judge found

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"[n]one of the police officers confirmed with either victim[] if the items in the

living room[] belonged to either one of them." The judge explained:

             [t]he police officers did not ask either of the victims
             prior to searching if the concealed items in the living
             room belonged to either of them. It would not have
             been reasonable to presume that all the concealed items
             in the living room[,] including the garbage bag and
             garbage can where the weapons were located[,]
             belonged to the victims.

      Because the judge concluded the officers "knew there was an issue about

who lived in the apartment," "viewing the living room as is with no couch, coffee

table, television, chairs, no furniture at all," the judge found the officers "should

have established that [the garbage can and garbage bag] belonged to one of the

victims that gave consent, and they did not." The judge found "the police

officers were obligated to ascertain additional information regarding ownership

of the concealed items in the living room prior to opening [the] bag[] and

garbage can[]." Although the judge acknowledged the State "satisfied its burden

with respect to the consent given by the victims to search the apartment," the

judge determined "that consent did not extend to the personal concealed effects

located in the living room that was searched." However, defense counsel and

the State never indicated this was an issue to be resolved by the judge as part of

the suppression motion.

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      On appeal, the State argues the judge erred in granting defendants'

suppression motion. It also contends defendants were trespassers and therefore

lacked standing to challenge the search. Additionally, the State argues Williams

gave valid consent to search the items in the living room.

      Our standard of review on a motion to suppress is deferential. State v.

Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384, 398 (2022). We "must uphold the factual findings

underlying the trial court's decision so long as those findings are supported by

sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592, 609

(2021) (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007)). We will intervene

only if the trial court's findings are "so clearly mistaken that the interests of

justice demand intervention and correction." State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 425

(2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Elders, 192 N.J. at 244). We

review de novo a trial court's legal conclusions and the trial court's view of "the

consequences that flow from established facts." State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249,

263 (2015).

      The State argues the judge mistakenly granted the suppression motion on

an issue not raised by the parties. The State asserts it was deprived of an

opportunity to present evidence and legal arguments on the scope of the search

which formed the basis for the judge's ruling in favor of defendants. We agree.

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      The State had the right to presume the sole issue to be determined at the

evidentiary hearing on defendants' suppression motion, as stated by the judge,

was whether it was reasonable for the police officers to believe Williams and

Curtis had apparent authority to consent to the search of the apartment. In her

written decision, the judge resolved that issue, finding the officers reasonably

believed Williams and Curtis had apparent authority to consent. Defendants did

not argue the victims' consent excluded the personal property, specifically the

garbage can and garbage bag, in the apartment.

      "Parties must make known their positions at the suppression hearing so

that the trial court can rule on the issues before it." State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409,

419 (2015). As our Supreme Court held in Witt, it "would be unfair, and

contrary to our established rules, to decide [an issue] when the State was

deprived of the opportunity to establish a record that might have resolved the

issue." Ibid. In Witt, the Court noted the mere filing of a suppression motion

did not require the State to justify every aspect of the warrantless search. Id. at

418. As the Court stated, "[r]equiring the State to disprove shadow issues

[would] needlessly lengthen suppression hearings and result in an enormous

waste of judicial resources." Ibid. "A prosecutor should not have to possess

telepathic powers to understand what is at issue in a suppression hearing." Ibid.

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      Here, prior to the start of the evidentiary hearing, the State confirmed the

scope of the hearing. At no time during the hearing did the judge inform the

State of any concern related to the scope of the apartment search or whether the

garbage can and garbage bag belonged to Williams or Curtis. If the judge had

done so, the State could have presented evidence and witnesses on the scope of

the search and created a factual record regarding that issue. By failing to

identify the scope of the search as an issue, the judge deprived the State of "the

benefit of a robust record within which the claim could be considered." State v.

Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 21 (2009).

      Having reviewed the record, we are satisfied the State was denied the

opportunity to develop a record regarding the scope of the search. Thus, we

remand to the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing, allowing the State

and defendants to present evidence on the scope of the search and whether

Williams and Curtis had authority to consent to a search of the garbage bag and

garbage can. We express no opinion on the outcome of the suppression motion

after the hearing.

      We next consider the State's argument that the judge erred in finding

defendants had automatic standing to file a suppression motion. The State

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contends defendants were trespassers and, therefore, lacked standing to suppress

the evidence. We reject this argument.

        "[T]he New Jersey Constitution's prohibition against unreasonable

searches and seizures affords New Jersey citizens greater protection than that

provided by the United States Constitution," including in matters of standing.

State v. Randolph, 228 N.J. 566, 582 (2017). To demonstrate a defendant lacks

standing to challenge an allegedly unconstitutional search, "the State bears the

burden of showing [the] defendant has no proprietary, possessory, or

participatory interest in either the place searched or the property seized." Ibid.

        "[A] trespasser, by definition, does not have a possessory or proprietary

interest in property where . . . he does not have permission or consent to be." Id.

at 586 (quoting State v. Brown, 216 N.J. 508, 535 (2014)). A defendant "will

not have standing to challenge a search of . . . property on which he was

trespassing." Id. at 585. However, the State must establish a defendant was a

trespasser "to strip a defendant of automatic standing to challenge a search."

Ibid.

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      In her August 25, 2023 oral decision, based on the transcript of the

recorded discussion between Hall and the police officers, 2 the judge found Hall

was invited to enter the apartment, purportedly by the apartment owner or the

owner's relative, in order to remove people who did not belong in the apartment.

The State bore the burden of presenting evidence that Hall lacked permission to

be in the apartment but failed to do so.

      Moreover, the judge distinguished the facts in this matter from the facts

before the court in State v. Arias, 283 N.J. Super. 269 (Law Div. 1992). Here,

the judge found Hall told the officers someone Hall believed had ties to the

apartment invited him to enter the apartment. Based on those facts, unlike the

facts in Arias, the judge concluded Hall had automatic standing to challenge the

apartment search.    The State failed to present any evidence to support its

contention that Hall was a trespasser.

      We defer to the judge's factual findings as supported by credible evidence

in the record. The judge found defendants had automatic standing to file a

suppression motion based on the audio transcript from the police officers' body-

worn camera footage. In the recording, Hall explained he was invited by

2
  The judge did not have the body-worn camera footage from the police officers
at the first hearing on Hall's motion to suppress.
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someone associated with the owner of the apartment to enter the apartment and

evict Williams and Curtis. On these facts, we discern no reason to disturb the

judge's determination regarding defendants' standing to file a suppression

motion.

      Affirmed as to defendants' standing to file a suppression motion. Vacated

and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion as to the scope of the

consent to search the apartment. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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