Court Opinion

ID: 9776850
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:46:32.448442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:43.409936
License: Public Domain

GEORGE M. FLANIGAN,
Special Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
I disagree with the majority opinion’s disposition of defendant’s second point. In my view, the trial court clearly abused its discretion in overruling defendant’s challenge for cause to Mary Steffens, a member of the venire. I do not disagree with the principles set forth in the majority opinion’s treatment of defendant’s second point but, in my view, the majority opinion misapplies those principles to the peculiar facts which the record discloses.
It is rare for the testimony of a defendant in a burglary case to be in direct conflict with the testimony of the victim, but here there was such a conflict. The three victims gave their version of the incident, which included finding defendant in Brett Harrison’s closet. Defendant testified that he and the three Harrisons entered the house together.
The majority opinion has set forth in full the voir dire examination of Mary Steffens. When the veniremen were asked if any member would “have trouble sitting,” Mrs. Steffens volunteered that she had talked to the Harrisons since the burglary and that in the conversation the facts of the case had been brought up. Asked later if she knew “specifically anything about this matter we are talking about here,” she responded: “As I said earlier, the case had been discussed at my home.” These answers show that in Steffens’ conversation at her home with all three Harrisons concerning the burglary she was told something specific about the burglary. In my view, these answers required sustention of a challenge for cause despite her statements that she thought she could give the state and the defendant a fair trial and that she did not think her relationship with Brett Harrison would influence her, and that it would not influence her.
At the conclusion of voir dire, Mr. Magee challenged Mrs. Steffens for cause. In denying the challenge, the court said: “She did say she thought she could be fair.” The defendant used one of his peremptory challenges to eliminate Mrs. Steffens.
A defendant is entitled to a full panel of qualified jurors before being required to make peremptory challenges, and the failure to sustain a meritorious challenge for cause is prejudicial error. State v. Wacaser, 794 S.W.2d 190 (Mo. banc 1990). To qualify as a juror, the venireman must be able to enter upon that service with an open mind, free from bias and prejudice. State v. Wheat, 775 S.W.2d 155, 158[3] (Mo. banc 1989). “Mindful of the trial court’s unique opportunity to observe the venireman during voir dire, an appellate court will not disturb a ruling on a challenge for cause unless it constitutes a clear abuse of discretion and a real probability of injury to the complaining party.” Id. Here there was such abuse and such probability.
Section 546.150, which was in effect at the time of the instant trial and was repealed in 1989,1 read:
*381“It shall be a good cause of challenge to a juror that he has formed or delivered an opinion on the issue, or any material fact to be tried, but if it appear that such opinion is founded only on rumor and newspaper reports, and not such as to prejudice or bias the mind of the juror, he may be sworn.”
In State v. DeClue, 400 S.W.2d 50, 56 (Mo.1966), the Court said: “[§ 546.150] is not all inclusive, and the fact that the statute enumerates certain grounds of disqualification does not exclude other grounds of incompetency.” See also State v. Miller, 156 Mo. 76, 56 S.W. 907, 909[2] (1900); State v. West, 69 Mo. 401, 402-403 (1879). In Murphy v. Cole, 338 Mo. 13, 88 S.W.2d 1023, 1024 (1935), the Court said:
“If for any reason, whether statutory or not, a prospective juror is not in a position to enter the jury box with an open mind, free from bias or prejudice in favor of or against either party to the cause, and decide the case upon the evidence adduced and the law as contained in the court’s instructions, he is not a competent juror.”
“The question of the qualification of a juror is a question to be decided by the court, and not one to be decided by a juror himself.” State v. White, 326 Mo. 1000, 34 S.W.2d 79, 81 (1930). “[Ejrrors in the exclusion of potential jurors should always be on the side of caution.” State v. Draper, 675 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Mo. banc 1984).
In State v. Foley, 144 Mo. 600, 46 S.W. 733, 736 (1898), the Court said:
“Certain rules of practice in the selection of jurors have long prevailed in this state, and have received the sanction of the courts and approbation of the bar. If a person has formed or expressed an opinion upon his own knowledge of the facts in the case, or from conversing with the witnesses, or read the sworn evidence taken before the coroner on preliminary examination in the case, or if his opinion has been engendered by hearing the witnesses testify under oath in a former trial of the same case, the uniform practice has been to reject such a person as incompetent to serve as a juror. An opinion formed under either of the conditions just named disqualifies him to act as impartial juror, however much he may asseverate his ability to render an impartial verdict. The law will not, under such circumstances, permit him to judge of his own disinterestedness. An opinion thus formed does not fall within the exception to the statute [§ 546.150 RSMo 1986] as one based merely upon rumor or newspaper reports, but is strictly within the rule of exclusion prescribed by the statute, which declares it good cause of challenge if he has formed or expressed an opinion on the issue or any material fact to be tried. Men who have thus formed opinions are just as ready to declare their ability to discard them, and render a verdict solely upon the evidence, as those who have read only newspaper reports; but experience has taught the danger of confiding to them the issues of life or liberty." (Emphasis added.)
See also State v. Hultz, 106 Mo. 41, 16 S.W. 940, 942-943 (1891); The State v. Walton, 74 Mo. 270, 284 (1881).
Although it is distinguishable, State v. Dudley, 245 Mo. 177, 149 S.W. 449 (1912), merits mention. There defendant was found guilty of stealing a buggy from one Vardell. On voir dire, one of the veniremen stated that he had talked to Vardell about the arrest of the defendant, that nothing was said about the facts in the case, and that he had formed no opinion and had thought no more about it. The trial court overruled defendant’s challenge for cause. At 450 of 149 S.W. the Court said: “The challenged juror was not incompetent. He had talked with the prosecuting witness about the arrest of the defendant, but had heard none of the facts as to *382his guilt or innocence, and had formed no opinion.” (Emphasis added.)
Unlike the situation in Dudley, Mrs. Steffens discussed with the Harrisons the facts of the case. It is true that the content of that discussion, other than what has been stated, was not spelled out. Any follow-up examination of Mrs. Steffens, at that time, concerning the particulars of the discussion could have tainted the entire ve-nire, for the other members would have heard, through one of their colleagues, extrajudicial statements of the Harrisons concerning the incident on trial. Perhaps defense counsel felt he had already demonstrated, as I believe he had, that Mrs. Stef-fens should be disqualified for cause and therefore did not request a follow-up examination outside the hearing of the other veniremen.
Under the circumstances here, it is of no moment that Mrs. Steffens was not asked whether she had formed an opinion. Her somewhat equivocal statements that she could be fair, and her ultimate remark that her relationship with Brett Harrison would not influence her, were doubtless made in good faith. Nothing in the record indicates otherwise. Indeed, her candor is commendable. She was, however, not the judge of her own qualifications.
The inconvenience of obtaining another person as a qualified venireman is a small premium to pay to avoid the risk of denying either side a fair trial. In my view the fact that a venireman had a conversation with the victim concerning the facts of the offense on trial disqualifies the venireman from serving as a juror.
The principal opinion cites no Missouri or outstate case which upholds a trial court’s denial of a challenge for cause in a factual situation similar to that at bar. So far as I can determine, the majority opinion is the first so holding. I think the reason is that trial judges throughout the nation confronted with such a situation would routinely sustain a challenge for cause and there would be no appeal from that ruling.
In my view, the defendant was deprived of a fair trial and is entitled to a new one.

. The new statute dealing with challenges for cause is § 494.470. Its provisions include:
"1. ... [N]o person who has formed or expressed an opinion concerning the matter or any material fact in controversy in any case that may influence the judgment of such *381person ... shall be sworn as a juror in the same cause.
4. A prospective juror may be challenged for cause for any reason mentioned in this section and also for any causes authorized by the law.”