Court Opinion

ID: 9755081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:24:15.595591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:02.400848
License: Public Domain

Justice CAPPY,
dissenting.
This case involves the difficult question of when multiple convictions arising from the same criminal episode should merge for the purpose of sentencing. The lead opinion finds that a merger analysis is not necessary in this case as there *55were two distinct criminal acts. Because I do not believe that there was a break in the action sufficient to support a finding that two different sets of facts underlie the convictions for corrupting the morals of a minor and statutory sexual assault, I am compelled to dissent.
As the lead opinion correctly notes, the central inquiry of a merger analysis is whether the crimes are greater and lesser included offenses. To answer this inquiry we look at the elements of each offense. If all the elements of the lesser offense are within the elements of the greater, and the greater offense includes at least one additional element, which is different, then the sentences merge. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 538 Pa. 574, 650 A.2d 20 (1994). This inquiry is not conducted in a vacuum; by necessity it requires consideration of the factual context culminating in the convictions at issue, since sentences will only merge where the convictions arise from the same factual predicate. Commonwealth v. Belsar, 544 Pa. 346, 676 A.2d 632 (1996).
A merger analysis begins with an examination of the crimes subject to sentence. The elements of the offenses at issue are set forth within the following relevant excerpts:
Corruption of minors; “Whoever, being of the age 18 years and upwards, by any act corrupts or tends to corrupt the morals of any minor less than 18 years of age.... ” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1).
Statutory sexual assault; “[A] person commits a felony of the second degree when that person engages in sexual intercourse with a complainant under the age of 16 years and that person is four or more years older than the complainant and the complainant and the person are not married to each other.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3122.1.
A conviction for corruption of minors is established when a defendant over the age of 18 years commits an act that corrupts or tends to corrupt a victim under the age of 18. Statutory sexual assault is established by proof of sexual intercourse between two unmarried persons where one party *56is under the age of 16 and the other party is at least four years older.
In this case, to meet the necessary elements to support a conviction for corruption of minors and statutory sexual assault, the Commonwealth established, beyond a reasonable doubt, the following facts. In October of 1996, the defendant called the victim to his basement room and told her to lie face down on the sofa. The defendant climbed on top of the victim and began to grind his pelvis against her buttocks. The defendant proceeded to turn the victim face up, pull down, first her pants and then his own, and engage in sexual intercourse. The entire incident was conducted within a time span of four to five minutes. The defendant was 27 years of age when he had sexual intercourse with the victim, who was eleven years of age.
The lead opinion does not look at the elements of the two offenses as it finds no merger analysis should take place given the factual circumstances at bar. The lead opinion dissects the facts set forth into two distinct pieces as follows: the initial grinding constitutes one criminal act followed by a break in the action; whereupon the defendant formed a different intent demonstrated by turning the victim to face him, and then committed a second criminal act, by engaging in sexual intercourse. I cannot accept the lead opinion’s highly speculative analysis of the defendant’s intent in order to conclude that a break in the action occurred. As I pointed out in my dissent in Belsar, a break indicates that action ceased and then was resumed. Id. at 638 (Cappy, J. dissenting).1 To conclude that such a break occurred on the facts of this case stretches that concept to a meaningless conclusion.
Rather, I would find that the merger doctrine does and should apply to the convictions in this case. Based on the facts of this case, all of the elements.of corruption of a minor, *57the age of the parties and the proof of an act (sexual intercourse) that corrupted, are contained within the greater offense of statutory sexual assault, as that crime requires proof of a four-year age disparity, sexual intercourse, and that the parties are not married to one another. All the elements of the lesser offense are included within the greater offense and the greater offense requires proof of one element that is different. Thus, the two convictions merge for purposes of sentencing.
Accordingly, as I would affirm the decision of the Superior Court, I must dissent.
Mr. Justice NIGRO joins this dissenting opinion.

. Insofar as I discussed the concept of the intent of the accused within a merger analysis, I was using that as a reference point to further explicate the concept of a definitive break in the action. I in no fashion meant that merger could be avoided merely be positing that the defendant’s intent changed in the midst of an unbroken, continuous criminal act.