Court Opinion

ID: 9402699
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-16 16:09:10.559381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:02.026459
License: Public Domain

J-S16021-23

    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    VINCENT A. CIRILLO, JR.                    :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1044 EDA 2022

               Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 13, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
                  Criminal Division at CP-46-CR-0006500-2015

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                                 FILED JUNE 16, 2023

        Vincent A. Cirillo, Jr., (Appellant), appeals from the order denying his

first petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 We affirm.

        The trial court previously recited the underlying facts:

        On August 3, 2015, A.U. arranged a meeting with [Appellant], her
        attorney, to discuss an upcoming court date in her ongoing
        custody cases. … The meeting was initially scheduled to take
        place at a restaurant; however, A.U. was running late and
        arranged, via text, to move the meeting to her home in West
        Norriton, Montgomery County. When A.U. and her boyfriend
        arrived at the home, [Appellant] was waiting for them in the
        parking lot. A.U. introduced her boyfriend, Paul Buckwalter, to
        [Appellant]; Mr. Buckwalter then returned to his own home to care
        for his children. [Appellant] and A.U. went inside her home to
        discuss the matters in which he was representing her.

        Approximately fifteen minutes later, A.U.’s father, Raymond, and
        his girlfriend, Stacey Julian, arrived at the home to visit with
____________________________________________

1   See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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     [Appellant]. A.U., her father, his girlfriend, and [Appellant] sat in
     A.U.’s kitchen socializing. [The four began drinking alcohol. A.U.
     drank one bottle of beer.] … At some point …, A.U.’s father and
     his girlfriend left to ride [his] motorcycle. [Appellant] and A.U.
     resumed their discussion of her pending custody matters.

     During the discussion, A.U. retrieved a bottle of vodka from the
     freezer. Her neighbor knocked on the door and asked for a drink.
     [A.U.] poured herself and her neighbor a glass of [] vodka and
     went outside to socialize with the neighbors. During the time she
     was outside, approximately thirty to sixty minutes, her neighbors
     noticed a drastic change in [A.U.’s] demeanor.

     When Raymond and his girlfriend arrived back at the home, A.U.
     was highly intoxicated and slurring her words. After failed
     attempts to get his daughter to go inside and an argument with
     Ms. Julian, Raymond began to leave. Ms. Julian intended to stay
     at A.U.’s home. A.U. followed her father to the parking lot and fell
     into the bushes.

     Her neighbor helped her up and walked her to her apartment ….
     Ms. Julian testified that she and [Appellant] helped A.U. up to her
     room. At this point, [Appellant] gave Ms. Julian $40 to secure
     drugs. Ms. Julian used A.U.’s phone and made several calls to her
     dealers between 10:02 p.m. and 10:14 p.m. When no one was
     able to come pick her up, she walked to the area of Chain and
     Lafayette Streets in Norristown, secured drugs[,] and went home.

     With Ms. Julian gone, [Appellant] and A.U. were now alone in her
     bedroom. [Appellant], by his own admission, then performed oral
     sex on A.U., after which he claims she fell asleep. At this point,
     he took out his phone to photograph her. During a period of
     approximately twenty-five minutes, beginning at 10:25 p.m. and
     ending at 10:50, [Appellant] took six photos of A.U., in which she
     is clearly unconscious. In the final picture, [Appellant’s] semen is
     visible on A.U.’s inner thigh and around her vagina. [Appellant]
     covered A.U. with a blanket and left the home.

     Meanwhile, when he returned to his home, Raymond contacted
     A.U.’s boyfriend to express concern over her condition. Mr.
     Buckwalter returned to A.U.’s home to check on her around 11:35-
     11:40 p.m. and found A.U. unconscious in her bedroom, half
     naked. He attempted to wake her[] but was unable to do so. At
     this point he called [Appellant] and asked him what happened.

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        [Appellant] assured him that nothing happened between the two
        of them. Mr. Buckwalter eventually carried A.U. into the shower
        in an attempt to wake her. During this time, he took four photos
        to document the state in which he found her. He dressed her and
        took her to the hospital. At the hospital, she was unable to
        consent to testing and was not examined for signs of sexual
        assault at this point. They returned to Mr. Buckwalter’s home.

        Upon waking the next day, A.U. had no memory of the previous
        evening. She spoke to her boyfriend and father [to] determine
        what happened the previous night. On August 5, 2015, she called
        [Appellant] and explained she couldn’t remember what happened
        and he told her “No memory is a good memory.” He also told her
        that they had sex, and that she seemed pretty drunk, and that he
        did not check to see if she was breathing before he left. The next
        day, she went to police. On August 7, 2015, A.U. went to the
        hospital and was examined by Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner
        [(SANE)] Carrie Bell [(Nurse Bell)].

Trial Court Opinion, 11/8/17, at 1-4 (citations omitted).

        On August 9, 2015, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with

numerous crimes related to his assault of A.U. On October 4, 2016, Appellant

entered an open guilty plea to one count of rape of an unconscious person. 2

On December 16, 2016, the scheduled sentencing date, Appellant orally

moved to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court granted Appellant’s motion

that day.

        On February 6, 2017, a jury convicted Appellant of rape of an

unconscious person, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse of an unconscious

person, sexual assault, and unsworn falsification.3 On April 8, 2017, the trial

____________________________________________

2   See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(3).

3   See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3123(a)(3), 3124.1, 4104.

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court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate 10 to 30 years in prison. This Court

affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence, and on August 27, 2019, the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. Commonwealth

v. Cirillo, 215 A.3d 641 (Pa. Super. 2019) (unpublished memorandum),

appeal denied, 217 A.3d 215 (Pa. 2019).

      Appellant filed a counseled PCRA petition on August 26, 2020.

      The Commonwealth filed an answer, to which [Appellant] replied.
      [The PCRA] court held a hearing on September 27, 2021, at which
      [Appellant] presented testimony from his trial counsel, Nino V.
      Tinari, Esquire [(trial counsel)]. At the conclusion of the hearing
      the parties were given an opportunity to file post-hearing briefs.
      In an order dated October 26, 2021, [the PCRA] court granted
      [Appellant] additional time to file a brief[] but noted that the
      record was closed.

             [Appellant] filed a supplemental brief on February 25, 2022,
      citing a recently obtained expert report. [The PCRA c]ourt denied
      the petition in an Order dated April 13, 2022, noting that it did not
      consider the untimely expert report….

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/23/22, at 2 (emphasis added). Thereafter, Appellant

filed the instant timely appeal. The PCRA court and Appellant have complied

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Appellant presents the following issues:

      A. [Whether] the trial court should have recused itself from the
         trial and PCRA proceedings[?]

      B. [Whether] trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
         Nurse Bell’s improper expert testimony[?]

      C. [Whether] trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
         the admission of [Appellant’s] extrajudicial statements based
         on the corpus delicti rule[?]

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       D. Should this Court review the “closely related crimes” exception
          to the corpus delicti rule and adopt the federal standard where
          the Commonwealth would be required to “introduce substantial
          independent evidence which would tend to establish the
          trustworthiness of the defendant’s statement”[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (capitalization modified).4

       Our review of a PCRA court’s decision

       is limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s findings of fact
       are supported by the record, and whether its conclusions of law
       are free from legal error. We view the findings of the PCRA court
       and the evidence of record in a light most favorable to the
       prevailing party. With respect to the PCRA court’s decision to
       deny a request for an evidentiary hearing, or to hold a limited
       evidentiary hearing, such a decision is within the discretion of the
       PCRA court and will not be overturned absent an abuse of
       discretion. The PCRA court’s credibility determinations, when
       supported by the record, are binding on this Court; however, we
       apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal
       conclusions.

Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601, 617 (Pa. 2015) (citations and

quotation marks omitted).

       In his first issue, Appellant argues trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance in not seeking recusal of the trial judge. Appellant’s Brief at 26-

27. Appellant argues his claim has arguable merit because the same judge

oversaw Appellant’s guilty plea and its withdrawal.       Id. at 26.   Appellant

asserts, without citing any evidence, that “the guilty plea loomed large in the

____________________________________________

4 We direct counsel’s attention to Pa.R.A.P. 2116 (Statement of Questions
Involved).

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trial judge’s mind as he presided over the trial, including [Appellant’s]

testimony in his own defense.” Id.

      Appellant also claims bias and that “the trial court’s wife’s significant

interest and work in representing and assisting alleged victims of sexual

assault should have warranted recusal.”        Id.   According to Appellant, the

professional work of the trial judge’s spouse “focuses largely on providing

services to alleged victims of acquaintance rape, and the effects of sexual

trauma.”   Id. at 27.    Appellant asserts that the Code of Judicial Conduct

demands recusal when a court’s spouse “has more than a de minimus interest

that could be substantially affected by the proceeding.” Id. at 26-27 (quoting

207 Pa. Code § 2.11(a)(2)). Appellant claims these issues “factored heavily

in the judge’s sentencing decisions.” Id. at 27.

      Appellant maintains trial counsel had no reasonable basis for not seeking

the trial judge’s recusal. Id. In support, Appellant relies on the above claims

of bias. Id. Appellant argues:

      If [trial] counsel were unsuccessful, [Appellant] would not have
      suffered any adverse consequences, as the trial court is presumed
      to harbor no ill will towards litigants for filing such a motion. There
      was thus no reasonable basis for counsel’s failure.

Id.   Appellant asserts “prejudice is presumed based on [trial] counsel’s

failure.” Id. Finally, Appellant claims:

      [A] party arguing for recusal need not prove that the judge’s ruling
      actually prejudiced him; it is enough to prove that the reasonable
      observer might question the judge’s impartiality.

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Id. (quoting Reilly v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 A.2d 973, 980

(Pa. Super. 1984) (Reilly I), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 489 A.2d 1291

(Pa. 1985) (Reilly II)).5

       We are cognizant that counsel is presumed to be effective, and “the

burden     of   demonstrating      ineffectiveness   rests   on   [the]   appellant.”

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 10 A.3d 1276, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2010).

       To satisfy this burden, an appellant must plead and prove by a
       preponderance of the evidence that: (1) his underlying claim is of
       arguable merit; (2) the particular course of conduct pursued by
       counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed to effectuate
       his interests; and, (3) but for counsel’s ineffectiveness, there is a
       reasonable probability that the outcome of the challenged
       proceeding would have been different. Failure to satisfy any
       prong of the test will result in rejection of the appellant’s
       ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Commonwealth v. Holt, 175 A.3d 1014, 1018 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations

and quotation marks omitted).

       Prejudice is established where the truth-determining process was so

undermined that “no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have

taken place.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii).

       This does not mean a different outcome would have been more
       likely than not; a reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
       to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding. Still,
       a speculative or attenuated possibility of a different outcome is
       insufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 210 A.3d 1014, 1019 (Pa. 2019).

____________________________________________

5Reilly II was overruled on other grounds in Drake v. Pa. Nat. Mut. Cas.
Ins. Co., 601 A.2d 797 (Pa. 1992).

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      Regarding Appellant’s underlying claim,

      [i]t is the burden of the party requesting recusal to produce
      evidence establishing bias, prejudice or unfairness which raises a
      substantial doubt as to the jurist’s ability to preside impartially.
      In considering a recusal request, the jurist must first make a
      conscientious determination of his or her ability to assess the case
      in an impartial manner, free of personal bias or interest in the
      outcome. The jurist must then consider whether his or her
      continued involvement in the case creates an appearance of
      impropriety and/or would tend to undermine public confidence in
      the judiciary. This is a personal and unreviewable decision that
      only the jurist can make. Where a jurist rules that he or she can
      hear and dispose of a case fairly and without prejudice, that
      decision will not be overruled on appeal but for an abuse of
      discretion. In reviewing a denial of a disqualification motion, we
      recognize that our judges are honorable, fair and competent.

Commonwealth v. Dip, 221 A.3d 201, 206 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation and

quotation marks omitted).

      Appellant is correct that to establish arguable merit in a recusal

motion, the appearance of impropriety is sufficient for the grant of new

proceedings. See Commonwealth v. McFall, 617 A.2d 707, 710 (Pa. 1992)

(“although actual prejudice was not found, appellant was entitled to

sentencing   by   a   judge   whose   impartiality   could   not   reasonably   be

questioned.”).    However, “arguable merit” is but one prong necessary to

successfully establish ineffective assistance of counsel under the PCRA. Holt,

175 A.3d at 1018 (Pa. Super. 2017) (recognizing that the “[f]ailure to satisfy

any prong of the test will result in rejection of the appellant’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claim.”). The PCRA requires a petitioner to plead and

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel’s ineffectiveness

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caused him prejudice. See id. Here, Appellant failed to plead and prove the

prejudice prong of his ineffectiveness claim or argue prejudice on appeal.

See Appellant’s Brief at 27-28 (arguing prejudice is not required for a

successful recusal motion). Thus, Appellant’s claim fails. See Holt, 175 A.3d

at 1018.

      Appellant also asserts the PCRA judge improperly denied his motion to

recuse from PCRA proceedings. Our review discloses that Appellant filed a

motion to the recuse the PCRA judge on August 8, 2020. Motion to Recuse,

8/8/20. Appellant sought recusal:

      1) because [of the PCRA judge’s] personal relationship and
      animosity toward both [Appellant] and his father; 2) because [the
      PCRA judge] presided over [Appellant’s] withdrawn guilty plea and
      was biased by that information at trial; 3) because [the PCRA
      judge’s wife’s] significant interest and work representing and
      assisting alleged victims of sexual assault should have warranted
      recusal; and 4) because one of the primary issues in [Appellant’s]
      Petition under the [PCRA] goes to trial counsel’s ineffectiveness
      for not seeking a recusal.

PCRA Court Opinion, 2/9/21, at 1 (quotation marks omitted). The PCRA court

denied Appellant’s motion for recusal as (a) waived; and (b) without merit.

Id. at 3-6.

      In reviewing a recusal issue, “[o]ur function ... is to determine

whether    the   proceedings   before   the   PCRA   court     were   fair   and

impartial.” Reilly II, 489 A.2d at 1300.      If the proceedings meet these

criteria, the alleged disqualifying factors become moot. Id.

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      “A party that seeks recusal of a judge bears the burden to produce

evidence establishing bias, prejudice, or unfairness which raises a substantial

doubt as to the jurist’s ability to preside impartially.” Commonwealth v.

Hutchinson, 25 A.3d 277, 319 (Pa. 2011) (citations and quotation marks

omitted). Notably, a judge’s participation in a PCRA petitioner’s underlying

criminal action is generally not grounds for recusal in PCRA proceedings:

      Pennsylvania law makes clear that it is generally preferable for
      the same judge who presided at trial to preside over the
      post-conviction proceedings. Familiarity with the case will
      likely assist the proper administration of justice. Only where it is
      adequately demonstrated that the interests of justice
      warrant recusal, should a matter be assigned to a different judge.

Commonwealth v. Lambert, 765 A.2d 306, 362 (Pa. Super. 2000)

(emphasis added, citations and quotation marks omitted); Hutchinson, 25

A.3d at 319.

      In denying Appellant’s recusal motion, the PCRA court deemed the issue

waived, explaining:

      Courts conduct a waiver analysis because,

         litigants cannot be permitted to hedge against the
         possibility of losing a case on the merits by delaying the
         production of arguable grounds for disqualification, or,
         worse, by digging up such grounds only after learning of
         an adverse order. To hold otherwise would encourage
         judge-shopping, would undermine the interests in the
         finality of judicial decisions, and would countenance
         extensive and unnecessary expenditures of judicial
         resources, which are avoidable by mere timely
         advancement of the challenge.        The courts of this
         Commonwealth cannot and do not approve of such
         gamesmanship.

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      [League of Women Voters, 179 A.3d 1080,] 1086 [(Pa. 2018);]
      Reilly [II], 489 A.2d [at] 1300 … (citation omitted) (stating,
      “[o]nce the trial is completed with the entry of a verdict, a party
      is deemed to have waived his right to have a judge disqualified,
      and if he has waived that issue, he cannot be heard to complain
      following an unfavorable result”)….

             [Appellant’s m]otion is untimely and, thus, waived. As to
      his first claim that the [c]ourt should recuse itself based on a
      purportedly contentious relationship with [Appellant] and his
      father, [Appellant] had knowledge of this well before his trial. In
      fact, in his affidavit, he cites a 2014 incident which he alleges
      shows th[e c]ourt was biased against him. He cites no specific
      incidents relating to his father. In fact, [the c]ourt holds [his
      father] in the highest regard and they always maintained a
      collegial and amicable relationship.      Thus, the alleged facts
      underlying this first ground for recusal were known to [Appellant]
      well before this matter commenced and failure to raise it earlier
      constitutes waiver.

PCRA Court Opinion, 2/9/21, at 2-3.

      The PCRA court further explained: “This [c]ourt presided over a jury

trial and was not the finder of fact in [Appellant’s] trial. Adverse rulings alone

are insufficient to show bias and warrant recusal.”            Id. at 4 (citing

Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 720 A.2d 79, 90 (Pa. 1998)).

      The PCRA court further explained:

     [Appellant] contends that this [c]ourt’s spouse’s work with
     survivors of sexual assault somehow warrants recusal. … [T]his
     claim is waived for failure to raise it in a timely manner. In his
     brief on direct appeal, [Appellant] referenced [the judge’s
     spouse’s] 2012 dissertation, which was written nearly four years
     before [Appellant’s] trial. This information could have been
     discovered through an exercise in due diligence. Even if this claim
     were not waived, it would not warrant recusal. This [c]ourt’s
     spouse had no interest in the outcome of this trial, did not counsel
     [A.U.] and has no input into th[e c]ourt’s judicial work.
     ,
PCRA Court Opinion, 2/9/21 at 4.

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        Finally, the PCRA court found:

        [E]ven if [Appellant] had timely raised the issue, there is no merit
        to any of his claims as to warrant recusal. … [Appellant] alleges
        no evidence of bias or prejudice. Instead, in his [m]otion and
        supporting [m]emorandum of [l]aw, he asserts only that [the
        c]ourt knew his father and was at times a political rival. This
        blanket statement does not specify any incident or a relationship
        that would require recusal. Likewise, he alleges [the c]ourt
        reprimanded him for tardy court appearances. Again, assuming
        this were true, as this [c]ourt has no recollection of the alleged
        exchange, this again shows no bias against [Appellant]. Likewise,
        this [c]ourt’s spouse’s occupation had no effect on this case, or
        any other case before this [c]ourt. Therefore, counsel cannot be
        ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim at an earlier stage
        of the proceedings….

Id. at 5-6.     The record supports the PCRA court’s findings and its legal

conclusions are sound. Thus, Appellant’s first issue does not merit relief. See

id. at 3-6.

        In his second issue, Appellant argues trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by not objecting to the “improper expert testimony” of Nurse Bell.

Appellant’s Brief at 28 (capitalization omitted). Appellant claims trial counsel

should have requested a Frye6 hearing “to challenge both Nurse Bell’s

qualifications and the general acceptance of any scientific basis for her

purported expert conclusions.” Id. at 31 (emphasis in original). According to

Appellant,

        the record is devoid of any reason to think [Nurse Bell’s] so-called
        expert testimony about traits that were “not uncommon for
        victims of sexual assault” to exhibit, was the product of any
        reasoned scientific methodology. Indeed the witness testified
____________________________________________

6   See Frye v. Unite States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

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        about her conclusions concerning “common” traits in sexual
        assault cases, and obliquely referenced multiple “studies” without
        providing any scientific methodology that she had employed.

Id. at 32 (citation omitted). Appellant asserts there is no reason to think a

“scientific consensus” exists about common traits for sexual assault victims.

Id. Further, “There is likely no general acceptance in the medical community

of what behavior a typical victim will exhibit.” Id. (emphasis in original).

        Appellant contends trial counsel had no reasonable basis for waiving a

Frye hearing.     Id.   Appellant asserts he suffered prejudice resulting from

Nurse Bell’s references to “official-sounding” studies and statistics about what

is “common in cases of sexual assault[,]” without presenting the methods or

findings of these studies. Id. at 33.

        Preliminarily, we examine whether Appellant preserved these claims as

prescribed by Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b).               See

Commonwealth v. Kearney, 92 A.3d 51, 59 (Pa. Super. 2014) (reaffirming

bright-line rule of Commonwealth v. Lord, 553 719 A.2d 306 (Pa. 1998),

and requiring appellants to comply with trial court’s order to file a Rule

1925(b) statement). “Any issues not raised in a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement

will be deemed waived.” Lord, 553 A.2d at 309.

        In his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement, Appellant stated, in relevant

part:

        3. Petitioner’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance
        because, regarding the testimony of the SANE nurse, he: i. failed
        to object to improper expert testimony; ii. [] stipulate[ed] to the
        admission of the testimony; iii. and failed to hire his own expert

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        on the same subject to           rebut   the   testimony    of   the
        Commonwealth’s SANE nurse.

        4. Should the PCRA Court have granted an evidentiary hearing on
        the above issues pertaining to the SANE nurse (see #3 supra) to
        learn why trial counsel did not object to the testimony, stipulated
        to the Commonwealth’s admission of the nurse’s testimony, or
        hired his own expert.

Concise Statement, 5/10/22, ¶¶ 3-4.

        The PCRA court determined Appellant waived his ineffectiveness claim

regarding Nurse Bell’s testimony:

        [Appellant] raised before this court several instances where he
        believes trial counsel allowed Nurse Bell to offer improper expert
        testimony. He does not identify with any specificity in his
        concise statement, however, what the alleged improper
        expert testimony was.          The issue in paragraph 3(i) of
        [Appellant’s] concise statement should be deemed waived.

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/23/22, at 6. We agree with the PCRA court.

        Our review discloses that in his PCRA petition, Appellant alleged multiple

instances where trial counsel should have objected to statements by Nurse

Bell.    For example, Appellant claimed trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by stipulating to Nurse Bell’s “expertise in the areas of anatomy

and sexual assault nurse examinations.”          PCRA Petition, 8/26/20, ¶ 16.

Appellant also claimed counsel should have objected to Nurse Bell’s report,

prepared after her examination of A.U. Id. ¶ 17. Appellant asserts counsel

should have objected to Nurse Bell’s testimony that

        the “victim was tearful … [it] is not uncommon for victims of
        sexual assault to come into the ER and be distraught or tearful or
        anxious.” Nurse Bell also said that the “victim did not have a
        memory of the events.”

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Id. ¶ 18 (citations omitted). According to Appellant, Nurse Bell improperly

testified, without objection,

      that her opinions about the lack of physical findings of sexual
      assault bearing on the veracity of a complaint were “consistent
      with [her] training and experience in conducting SANE
      examinations.”

Id. ¶ 19 (citation omitted). Appellant claimed counsel should have objected

to Nurse Bell’s opinion testimony that A.U. had

      come in too late for the damage to be discovered, was likely too
      young to display injuries, and that if she was “intoxicated at the
      time of incident, whether it be drug-facilitated or alcohol, that …
      has a relaxing effect on the muscles. And when you’re not fighting
      back, you oftentimes have less bodily injury.”

Id. ¶ 20.

      The record confirms the PCRA court’s determination that Appellant, in

his concise statement, failed to identify the testimony underlying his claim of

counsel’s ineffectiveness.      See PCRA Court Opinion, 6/23/22, at 6.      Thus,

Appellant waived his claims regarding trial counsel’s failure to object to

statements by Nurse Bell. See Kearney, 92 A.3d at 59.

      In the absence of waiver, Appellant’s argument would lack merit.

Appellant claims trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not

challenging Nurse Bell’s qualifications and testimony without a Frye hearing.

Appellant’s Brief at 31. In arguing a Frye hearing was necessary, Appellant

ignores the Legislature’s enactment of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9520, which governs

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expert testimony in criminal cases where the defendant is charged with sexual

offenses:

      Qualifications and use of experts.

      (1) In a criminal proceeding subject to this section, a witness may
      be qualified by the court as an expert if the witness has specialized
      knowledge beyond that possessed by the average layperson
      based on the witness’s experience with, or specialized training or
      education in, criminal justice, behavioral sciences or victim
      services issues, related to sexual violence, that will assist the trier
      of fact in understanding the dynamics of sexual violence, victim
      responses to sexual violence and the impact of sexual violence on
      victims during and after being assaulted.

      (2) If qualified as an expert, the witness may testify to facts and
      opinions regarding specific types of victim responses and victim
      behaviors.

      (3) The witness’s opinion regarding the credibility of any other
      witness, including the victim, shall not be admissible.

      (4) A witness qualified by the court as an expert under this section
      may be called by the attorney for the Commonwealth or the
      defendant to provide the expert testimony.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9520(b). Section 5920

      explicitly provides that a properly qualified expert may testify
      to facts and opinions regarding specific types of victim responses
      and behaviors in certain criminal proceedings involving sexual
      assaults, provided experts do not offer opinions regarding the
      credibility of any witness, including the victim.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 274 A.3d 722, 279 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation

omitted).   Appellant’s claim that trial counsel should have sought a Frye

hearing regarding Nurse Bell’s testimony lacks arguable merit, as it is negated

by Section 9520(b). See Holt, 175 A.3d at 1018.

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      Appellant also argues trial counsel should have objected to Nurse Bell’s

lack of expert qualifications on the basis that she had no continuing education

or scientific evidence to support her findings.         Appellant’s Brief at 37.

Appellant did not preserve this issue.

      In his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement, Appellant asserted trial

counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not objecting to “improper expert

testimony[,]” and for “stipulating to the admission of the testimony[.]”

Concise Statement, 5/10/22, ¶ 3(i)-(ii).         The PCRA court rejected the

assertion, stating: “Trial counsel did not stipulate to the admission of Nurse

Bell’s testimony; he stipulated to her qualifications. (N.T., 2/10/17, p. 6).”

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/23/22, at 7. Appellant now argues trial counsel was

ineffective for stipulating to Nurse Bell’s qualifications. Appellant’s Brief at 37.

Appellant waived this issue because he did not include it in his Rule 1925(b)

concise statement. See Kearney, 92 A.3d at 59.

      Regardless, the PCRA court recognized trial counsel

      raised several objections during [Nurse Bell’s] testimony and
      engaged in extensive cross-examination of Nurse Bell.      He
      testified at the PCRA hearing to a reasonable basis for this
      approach. (N.T., 9/27/21, pp. 5-9, 22-23)

      [Appellant], conversely, did not present evidence at the PCRA
      hearing demonstrating that an alternative approach to challenging
      Nurse Bell’s testimony would have been successful….

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/23/22, at 7. As Appellant failed to prove trial counsel

lacked a reasonable basis for his strategy and prejudice resulted, his

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ineffectiveness claim based on Nurse Bell’s expert testimony fails. See Holt,

175 A.3d at 1018.

      Appellant also argues trial counsel was ineffective for not rebutting

Nurse Bell’s testimony with an expert witness.         Appellant’s Brief at 37.

Appellant relies on an expert report from Tristan Ashly Wristen,           (Nurse

Wristen). Id. According to Appellant,

      had trial counsel engaged in competent representation, then not
      only would he have objected to Nurse Bell’s testimony, he would
      have thoroughly refuted it. Nurse Wristen’s contrary account
      would have been devastating to the Commonwealth’s case, and
      prevented the jury from improperly relying on Nurse Bell’s wholly
      unscientific claims. This error likely prejudiced [Appellant].

Id. at 38.

      The PCRA court explained its rejection of this issue:

      [Appellant] did not present evidence at the PCRA hearing proving
      trial counsel was ineffective for not retaining a rebuttal expert.
      [Appellant] had a full PCRA hearing, at which he presented only
      the testimony of trial counsel. While [Appellant] subsequently
      may have produced a purported expert report in February
      2022 as part of his post-hearing brief, this occurred months
      after the hearing and despite [the PCRA court] having
      made clear in the Order of October 26, 2021, that the
      record was closed. As such, [Appellant] did not carry his burden
      of proving trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance as it relates
      to Nurse Bell.

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/23/22, at 7 (emphasis added). The record supports

the PCRA court’s findings and we discern no error or abuse of discretion.

      Appellant argues next trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by

failing to object to the admission of Appellant’s confession and violating the

corpus delicti rule. Appellant’s Brief at 41-42. Appellant states:

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      Trial counsel never objected to the introduction of [Appellant’s]
      confession as lacking independent evidence that any crime had
      occurred, yet the corpus delicti rule should have precluded
      admission of his confession. Because this error caused prejudice,
      [Appellant] is entitled to a new trial[.]

Id. at 42.

      Appellant does not identify his confession. It appears he is challenging

A.U.’s testimony about Appellant’s statement to her the day after the assault.

A.U. testified she telephoned Appellant the next day and asked what had

happened the previous night. N.T., 2/7/17, at 249. A.U. stated that Appellant

told her “everything was good and that we had sex.” Id. at 250 (emphasis

added). Appellant did not object to this testimony. See id. In a recorded

interview with police, Appellant relayed that he had oral sex with A.U. See

N.T., 2/10/17, at 28-29, 141 (testimony of Montgomery County Police

Detective Christopher Kuklentz quoting Appellant’s recorded interview).

      Appellant argues there was no “independent evidence that a crime has

in fact been committed[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 42. Appellant acknowledges

that photographs from his phone could suggest criminal activity, but “hardly

prove” that a crime occurred.       Id.      Appellant also acknowledges the

photographs show A.U. in a state of undress, with semen on her thigh. Id.

However, he claims “[t]here is nothing inherently unlawful about such a

picture or about the conduct depicted in that photograph.”     Id. (emphasis

omitted).    Appellant posits that even if the photographs “cleared the

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Commonwealth’s initial burden of admissibility, the jury still would have been

required to consider the corpus delicti rule.” Id. at 43.

      Appellant asserts trial counsel had no reasonable basis for not objecting.

Id. He claims if trial counsel successfully objected, there would have been no

evidence of his penetration of A.U. Id. Appellant contends that counsel’s

omission prejudiced Appellant, because without proof of penetration, he would

not have been convicted of rape. Id.

      “The corpus delicti rule involves the admissibility of evidence, which we

review for an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Murray, 174 A.3d

1147, 1154 (Pa. Super. 2017).

      “The corpus [delicti] … rule places the burden on the
      prosecution to establish that a crime has actually occurred before
      a confession or admission of the accused connecting him to the
      crime can be admitted.” [Commonwealth v. Dupre, 866 A.2d
      1089, 1097 (Pa. Super. 2005)] (quoting Commonwealth v.
      Rivera, 828 A.2d 1094, 1103 (Pa. Super. 2003)). “The
      Commonwealth need not prove the existence of a crime beyond a
      reasonable doubt as an element in establishing the corpus
      delicti of a crime, but the evidence must be more consistent with
      a crime than with [an] accident.” Id. at 1098. The corpus delicti,
      or “body of the crime,” may be proven by circumstantial
      evidence. Commonwealth v. Hogans, 400 Pa. Super. 606, 584
      A.2d 347, 349 (Pa. Super. 1990).

Id.

      Further:

      Establishing the corpus delicti in Pennsylvania is a two-step
      process. The first step concerns the trial judge’s admission of the
      accused’s statements and the second step concerns the fact
      finder’s consideration of those statements. In order for the
      statement to be admitted, the Commonwealth must prove
      the corpus delicti by a preponderance of the evidence. In order

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      for the statement to be considered by the fact finder, the
      Commonwealth mut establish the corpus delicti beyond a
      reasonable doubt.

Id. at 1154 (quoting Commonwealth v. Young, 904 A.2d 947, 956 (Pa.

Super. 2006)).

      Our Supreme Court has recognized a “closely related crime” exception

to the corpus delicti rule:

      [W]here a defendant’s confession relates to two separate crimes
      with which he is charged, and where independent evidence
      establishes the corpus delicti of only one of those crimes, the
      confession may be admissible as evidence of the commission of
      the other crime. This will be the case only where the relationship
      between the two crimes is sufficiently close to ensure that the
      policies underlying the corpus delicti rule are not violated.

Commonwealth v. Fears, 836 A.2d 52, 67 (Pa. 2003).

      Pertinently, Appellant was charged with sexual assault, rape of an

unconscious person and IDSI. A person commits the crime of sexual assault

      when that person engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual
      intercourse with a complainant without the complainant’s consent.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3124.1. A person commits the crime of rape

      when the person engages in sexual intercourse with a complainant
      … [w]ho is unconscious or where the complainant is unaware that
      the sexual intercourse is occurring[.]

Id. § 3121(a)(3). A person commits the crime of IDSI

      when the person engages in deviate sexual intercourse with a
      complainant … who is unconscious or where the person knows that
      the complainant is unaware that the sexual intercourse is
      occurring[.]

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Id. § 3123(a)(3).       Deviate sexual intercourse is defined as “[s]exual

intercourse per os or per anus between human beings[.]” Id. § 3101.

      At trial, the Commonwealth first presented evidence of A.U.’s

intoxication the evening of August 4, 2015. N.T., 2/7/17, at 125-26, 129,

132. Neighbors, A.U.’s father, and her father’s girlfriend confirmed that A.U.

was highly intoxicated.    See N.T., 2/7/17, at 143-45, 191-93, 206; N.T.,

2/8/17, at 13-15, 22-26, 40-45, 98-100, 126-291.

      The Commonwealth also introduced photographs of A.U. taken by

Appellant that night.     This Court previously observed: “A.U. is clearly

unconscious in the photographs.” Cirillo, (unpublished memorandum at 27).

“In each of the photographs her head is in the same position, indicating that

she has not moved.” Id. “In the first two photographs [A.U.] is on her back

with her legs open.” Id. In one photograph, “semen is visible both on [A.U.’s]

thigh and around her vagina and on her G-string.” Id. at 28 (emphasis

added).

      The PCRA court found trial counsel had a reasonable basis for not

pursuing a corpus delicti rule violation:

      [T]he offenses [of] which Appellant was found guilty bear a close
      relationship and the policy underlying the exception was not
      offended by admission of his statements. As such, [Appellant]
      failed to demonstrate arguable merit in connection with his corpus
      delicti claim. Moreover, trial counsel testified credibly on direct
      examination at the PCRA hearing that he is familiar with the
      corpus delicti rule and that he did not believe it was an issue:

          A. [Trial counsel:] [T]here was sufficient evidence other
          than a slip of the tongue that it wasn’t just a naked

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         confession on his part.       It was there was delayed
         information that was garnered at the time and as a result
         of … [Appellant] taking pictures himself of the complainant.
         In my view, there was not a real issue concerning the
         corpus delicti argument.

      (N.T., 9/27/21, pp. 14-15)     [Trial counsel] further testified
      credibly on cross-examination:

         Q. I just want to talk about the corpus delicti claim that
         the defendant was raising. Is it fair to say that in
         determining not to raise a corpus delicti objection that you
         looked at the entirety of the evidence to determine
         whether that type of objection would have merit?

         A. [Trial counsel:] Yes, that’s correct. We went through all
         of the discovery and conversations with [Appellant]. The
         issue concerning corpus delicti really didn’t become one of
         major importance at this point.

      Id. at p. 21. This testimony makes clear that [Appellant’s]
      experienced trial counsel had a reasonable basis for not
      raising a corpus delicti challenge. As such, in addition to
      failing to prove his corpus delicti claim has arguable merit,
      [Appellant] also did not demonstrate trial counsel’s strategy
      lacked a reasonable basis…

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/23/22, at 11 (emphasis added).

      Because the PCRA court found counsel had a reasonable basis for not

pursuing a corpus delicti claim, and its finding is supported in the record, this

ineffectiveness claim merits no relief. See Holt, 175 A.3d at 1018; see also

Commonwealth v. Lesko, 15 A.3d 345, 380 (Pa. 2011) (“Generally, where

matters of strategy and tactics are concerned, counsel’s assistance is deemed

constitutionally effective if he chose a particular course that had some

reasonable    basis   designed    to    effectuate   his   client’s   interests.”);

Commonwealth v. Puksar, 951 A.2d 267, 277 (Pa. 2008) (“A claim of

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ineffectiveness cannot succeed through comparing, in hindsight, the trial

strategy employed with alternatives not pursued.”).

        Finally, Appellant asks this Court to revisit the closely related crime

exception to the corpus delicti rule. Appellant’s Brief at 44. Appellant argues

we should accept the federal corpus delicti standard. Id. As an intermediate

appellate court, we “generally lack[] the authority to determine that

[the Supreme] Court’s decisions are no longer controlling.” Walnut Street

Associates, Inc. v. Brokerage Concepts, Inc., 20 A.3d 468, 480 (Pa.

2011)     (citing Commonwealth       v.   Jones,   554    A.2d   50,   51   (Pa.

1989)). Instead, we “are duty bound to effectuate [the Supreme] Court’s

decisional law.” Id. Consequently, Appellant’s request does not merit relief.

        Order affirmed.

        Judge McCaffery concurs in the result.

        Judge Dubow did not participate in the consideration or decision of this

case.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/16/2023

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