Court Opinion

ID: 9679490
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:54:09.047305+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:14.031324
License: Public Domain

Sarah J. Heffley, Judge, concurring. I agree that the trial • court’s order must be reversed. However, my reasoning differs slightly from the view expressed in the prevailing opinion. The appellant in this case is not contesting the entry of a default judgment against him. Instead, he is challenging the relief granted by the trial court upon his default, which was that he was ordered to execute a quitclaim deed to appellees, and failing that, for the Clerk of the Court to issue a deed to them. Appellant’s failure to file a timely answer to the complaint does not prevent him from challenging the remedy ordered by the trial court. A default judgment establishes liability but not the amount of damages. Young v. Barbera, 366 Ark. 120, 233 S.W.3d 651 (2006). While a defaulting defendant cannot introduce evidence to defeat the plaintiffs cause of action, the defendant retains the right to cross examine the plaintiffs witnesses, to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, and to introduce evidence in mitigation of damages. Id. Here, appellant’s failure to file a timely answer established that he was in default on the note and mortgage. However, he was and remains well within his rights to contest the relief flowing from his failure to pay the amounts due under the note and mortgage. Even in a default situation, a plaintiff cannot exact a remedy to which he is not entitled. Thus, contrary to appellees’ argument, appellant’s contention that appellees were not entitled to a return of the property is not a defense meant to defeat their cause of action. Nor is appellant raising this issue for the first time on appeal, as it was raised in his response to the motion for a default judgment and in his motion for reconsideration. The trial court’s order in this case worked a forfeiture. Forfeiture clauses contained in executory contracts for the sale of land are considered valid under Arkansas law. White v. Page, 216 Ark. 632, 226 S.W.2d 973 (1950); Friar v. Baldridge, 91 Ark. 133, 120 S.W. 989 (1909); Abshire v. Hyde, 13 Ark. App. 33, 679 S.W.2d 214 (1984). The problem here is that the “Mortgage with Power of Sale” did not contain a forfeiture clause. Both it and the note provided that, upon default, the property would be sold at public auction with the proceeds to be applied first to the expenses of sale, then toward payment of the remaining debt, with appellant receiving any surplus. Unquestionably, appellees were not entitled to an outright return of the property with the result being that appellant forfeit all the monies he had paid. For these reasons, I concur in the decision to reverse the trial court’s order.