Court Opinion

ID: 9353362
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-11 17:09:40.484556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:07:26.082249
License: Public Domain

J-S35001-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    SHANE S. BARKER                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 189 MDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 30, 2021
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-22-CR-0000983-2015

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                         FILED JANUARY 11, 2023

        Appellant, Shane S. Barker, appeals from the post-conviction court’s

December 30, 2021 order dismissing his first, timely petition filed pursuant to

the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. In addition,

Appellant’s court-appointed counsel, Fawn E. Kehler, Esq., has filed a petition

to withdraw and accompanying brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386

U.S. 738 (1967).1 After review, we affirm the PCRA court’s order and grant

Attorney Kehler’s petition to withdraw.

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 When counsel seeks to withdraw on appeal from the denial of PCRA relief,
counsel should file a Turner/Finley letter or brief, instead of an Anders brief.
See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth
v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). However, “[b]ecause
an Anders brief provides greater protection to a defendant, this Court may
accept an Anders brief in lieu of a Turner/Finley letter.” Commonwealth
v. Widgins, 29 A.3d 816, 817 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted).
J-S35001-22

       The PCRA court set forth the background of Appellant’s offense, trial,

and direct appeal, as follows:

                TRIAL AND DIRECT APPELLATE PROCEDURE

       Following a jury trial commencing on August 22, 2016, and
       concluding on August 26, 2016, [Appellant] was found guilty of …
       murder of the third degree.1 [Appellant] was sentenced to a
       period of incarceration of not less than 18 years (216 months) nor
       more than 36 years (432 months). [Appellant] filed a timely post-
       sentence motion on November 18, 2016, and the Commonwealth
       filed a response on December 22, 2016. This Court denied the
       post-sentence motion on January 12, 2017. [Appellant] filed a
       timely notice of appeal on February 10, 2017. The Superior Court
       affirmed the judgment of sentence on November 22, 2017.
       [Commonwealth v. Barker, 181 A.3d 442 (Pa. Super. 2017)
       (unpublished memorandum)]. [Appellant] subsequently filed a
       Petition for Allowance of Appeal with the Supreme Court, and said
       [p]etition was denied on May 2, 2018. [Commonwealth v.
       Barker, 185 A.3d 275 (Pa. 2018)].
          118 Pa.C.S.[] § 2502. Appellant was also charged with first
          degree murder.

                              FACTUAL BACKGROUND

       Testimony presented by the Commonwealth at trial established
       that[,] in the early morning hours of October 18, 2014, an incident
       occurred at a nightclub called Queenies[,] which led to a dispute
       between [Appellant] and Jerome Buckner (hereinafter[,]
       “victim”). The dispute carried out into the street, ultimately
       leading to [Appellant’s] firing several shots toward the victim as
       he was running away. Some of the shots struck the victim,
       causing his death.[2] The testimony of multiple eyewitness[es],
       medical experts, and ballistic experts implicated [Appellant] as the
       shooter. Moreover, [Appellant] admitted in one of his police
       interviews that he had shot the victim and said that he was sorry
       for doing so.

____________________________________________

2Witnesses at trial testified that they observed Appellant stomp on the victim’s
body after he was shot. N.T. Trial, 8/22/16-8/26/16, at 266-68, 317-18.

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        [Appellant], who testified on his own behalf at trial, offered his
        own version of events. He stated that he had left the nightclub
        and gone to his car alone when the victim came out of nowhere
        and struck him on the face several times, knocking him to the
        ground outside [of] his car. At some point while on the ground,
        [Appellant] claimed that he felt the victim pulling on his clothes.
        [Appellant] stated that he then retrieved his gun from under the
        driver’s seat of his car and fired the gun at the victim. In essence,
        [Appellant] claimed that he was defending himself when he fired
        the shots.

PCRA Court Opinion (“PCO”), 12/30/21, at 1-2 (emphasis and capitalization in

original; footnote omitted).

        On March 29, 2019, Appellant filed a timely, pro se PCRA petition, his

first. On April 2, 2019, the PCRA court appointed Attorney Kehler to represent

him. Attorney Kehler filed an amended petition on Appellant’s behalf on April

6, 2020. Therein, Appellant raised three claims: first, ineffective assistance

of trial counsel for “failing to call a key eye-witness, Leonard Lemon, to

develop testimony that [Appellant] was not the individual who killed the victim

and that it was [Appellant’s] nephew, Zindell Mckiver, aka ‘Murda[,]’ who was

the shooter”; second, ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing “to

present the 911 caller as a witness at trial to disprove the Commonwealth’s

theory of the case”3; and third, newly-discovered evidence in that Appellant

____________________________________________

3   For context, Appellant explained that:
        At trial, the 911 call was entered into evidence by the
        Commonwealth over no objection by [Appellant’s] trial counsel.
        The 911 caller identifies the shooter and stomper as a heavy set,
        black male, with [dreadlocks]. It was also testified to by Detective
        [Jarrett] Ferrari that the police had never spoken to nor
        interviewed the 911 caller, despite having her address and her
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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“received notification from his family members that the witness, Zindell

Mckiver, aka ‘Murda[,]’ … has bragged to several individuals (newly[-

]discovered [W]itness #1 and [W]itness #2) that he was the shooter and the

one who killed the victim.” Amended Petition at ¶¶ 10, 14.4

       The Commonwealth filed an answer to Appellant’s amended petition on

April 27, 2020. Upon consideration of Appellant’s amended petition and the

Commonwealth’s answer thereto, the PCRA court held a PCRA hearing on April

20, 2021. There, Appellant, and his trial attorneys — Elizabeth Ruby, Esq.

and Jessica Bush, Esq. — testified. Due to witness availability, the hearing

was ultimately continued until September 22, 2021. At the September 22,

2021 hearing, Mr. Lemon testified. None of the witnesses or family members

in connection with Appellant’s third, newly-discovered evidence claim testified

at the PCRA hearings, rendering that claim abandoned. See PCO at 6.

____________________________________________

       telephone number. Had the 911 caller been interviewed and
       testified at trial[,] she could have provided additional information
       regarding her statement that the shooter had [dreadlocks] (which
       eliminates [Appellant] as the shooter and stomper) and
       confirmed, in person, by looking at [Appellant] at trial, that
       [Appellant] was not the individual that she observed shoot the
       victim that early morning.

Amended Petition, 4/6/20, at ¶ 12 (original brackets omitted).

4  With respect to the third, newly-discovered evidence claim, Appellant
elaborated in his petition that Witness #1 was murdered, and that he was
having difficulty obtaining the name of and speaking to Witness #2, as Witness
#2 was also incarcerated. Amended Petition at ¶¶ 16, 17. Appellant also
represented that his family members that received the newly-discovered
information do not wish to get involved and are fearful of their safety. Id. at
¶ 17.

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      On December 30, 2021, the PCRA court filed a memorandum opinion

and order, in which it dismissed Appellant’s petition. Thereafter, Appellant

filed a timely notice of appeal. The PCRA court directed Appellant to file a

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.

Attorney Kehler subsequently filed a timely statement of intent to file an

Anders brief pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4). Because of the filing of a Rule

1925(c)(4) statement, the PCRA court elected not to file a Rule 1925(a)

opinion.

      On July 27, 2022, Attorney Kehler filed a petition to withdraw and an

Anders brief with this Court. See footnote 1, supra (explaining that counsel

should have filed a Turner/Finley letter or brief, but that this Court may

accept an Anders brief instead). In the Anders brief, Attorney Kehler lists

the following two issues that Appellant seeks to have reviewed:
      1. Whether trial counsel was ineffective when they failed to call
      eye-witness Leonard Lemon as a witness at trial when his
      testimony would have established that Appellant was not the
      shooter and that two other individuals shot and killed the victim?

      2. Whether trial counsel was ineffective when they failed to
      present the 911 caller as a witness at trial?

Anders Brief at 7 (unnecessary emphasis and capitalization omitted).

      We begin our review by determining whether Attorney Kehler has

satisfied the prerequisites of withdrawal.
      Counsel petitioning to withdraw from PCRA representation must
      proceed … under … Turner, and … Finley, and … must review the
      case zealously. Turner/Finley counsel must then submit a “no-
      merit” letter to the trial court, or brief on appeal to this Court,
      detailing the nature and extent of counsel’s diligent review of the
      case, listing the issues which petitioner wants to have reviewed,

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       explaining why and how those issues lack merit, and requesting
       permission to withdraw.

          Counsel must also send to the petitioner: (1) a copy of the
          “no merit” letter/brief; (2) a copy of counsel’s petition to
          withdraw; and (3) a statement advising petitioner of the
          right to proceed pro se or by new counsel.

                                           ***

          Where counsel submits a petition and no-merit letter that …
          satisfy the technical demands of Turner/Finley, the court
          — trial court or this Court — must then conduct its own
          review of the merits of the case. If the court agrees with
          counsel that the claims are without merit, the court will
          permit counsel to withdraw and deny relief.

Commonwealth v. Muzzy, 141 A.3d 509, 510-11 (Pa. Super. 2016)

(citations omitted).

       Attorney Kehler has substantially complied with these requirements.

Though not mentioned in the Anders brief, Attorney Kehler represents in her

petition to withdraw that she thoroughly reviewed the record, as well as all

applicable law. See Petition to Withdraw, 7/27/22, at ¶ 6. In addition, in the

Anders brief, Attorney Kehler lists the issues which Appellant wants to have

reviewed, and explains why and how those issues lack merit.          She also

requested permission to withdraw via her petition filed with this Court.

Moreover, Attorney Kehler has attached a letter written to Appellant as an

exhibit to the Anders brief, in which she informs him that he may proceed

pro se or by new counsel.5 The certificates of service on both the petition to

withdraw and the Anders brief show that Appellant was served with them via

____________________________________________

5 This exhibit does not appear in the paper copy of the Anders brief filed with
this Court. However, it is included in the electronically-filed Anders brief.

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first class mail.6,   7   Thus, we will now conduct an independent review of

Appellant’s claims.

        At the outset of our review, we recognize that:
        In reviewing the propriety of an order granting or denying PCRA
        relief, an appellate court is limited to ascertaining whether the
        record supports the determination of the PCRA court and whether
        the ruling is free of legal error. We pay great deference to the
        findings of the PCRA court, but its legal determinations are subject
        to our plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Matias, 63 A.3d 807, 810 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc)

(cleaned up).      Further, where the petitioner asserts that he received the

ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court has explained:
        To be eligible for relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance
        of counsel, a PCRA petitioner must demonstrate, by a
        preponderance of the evidence, that (1) the underlying claim is of
        arguable merit; (2) no reasonable basis existed for counsel’s
        action or omission; and (3) there is a reasonable probability that
        the result of the proceeding would have been different absent such
        error. With regard to the second, i.e., the “reasonable basis”
        prong, this Court will conclude that counsel’s chosen strategy
        lacked a reasonable basis only if the appellant proves that an
        alternative not chosen offered a potential for success substantially
        greater than the course actually pursued. To establish the third
        prong, i.e., prejudice, the appellant must show that there is a
        reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would
        have been different, but for counsel’s action or inaction.

        In reviewing this determination, we are cognizant that

           when raising a claim of ineffectiveness for the failure to call
           a potential witness, a petitioner satisfies the performance
____________________________________________

6 See also Petition to Withdraw at ¶ 7 (Attorney Kehler’s representing that,
“[o]n July 27, 2022, a letter to Appellant outlining his rights, the Motion to
Withdraw as Counsel, and a copy of the Anders brief were forwarded by
undersigned counsel to [Appellant], via first class mail”).

7   As of the date of this writing, Appellant has not filed a response.

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         and prejudice requirements of the Strickland v.
         Washington, 466 U.S. 668 … (1984) test by establishing
         that: (1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available
         to testify for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or should
         have known of, the existence of the witness; (4) the witness
         was willing to testify for the defense; and (5) the absence
         of the testimony of the witness was so prejudicial as to have
         denied the defendant a fair trial….

      To demonstrate Strickland prejudice, a petitioner must show how
      the uncalled witnesses’ testimony would have been beneficial
      under the circumstances of the case. Counsel will not be found
      ineffective for failing to call a witness unless the petitioner can
      show that the witness’s testimony would have been helpful to the
      defense. A failure to call a witness is not per se ineffective
      assistance of counsel for such decision usually involves matters of
      trial strategy.

Matias, 63 A.3d at 810-11 (cleaned up).

      In the first issue, Appellant advances that his trial attorneys were

ineffective when they failed to call eyewitness Leonard Lemon as a witness at

trial, when his testimony would have established that Appellant was not the

shooter and that two other individuals shot and killed the victim. Anders

Brief at 7. Here, in disposing of this issue, the PCRA court aptly explained:
      At the PCRA hearing held on September 22, 2021, [Mr.] Lemon
      testified that he was in his vehicle in the vicinity of the nightclub
      when he saw two individuals other than [Appellant] “run up on”
      the victim and shoot the victim. He said that he knew these
      individuals were not [Appellant] because they did not match the
      physical characteristics of [Appellant].      [Mr.] Lemon further
      testified that [Appellant] was not in the vicinity of the area when
      this happened.

      Considering [Mr.] Lemon’s testimony at the PCRA hearing, we find
      that trial counsel had a completely reasonable basis for refraining
      from calling [Mr.] Lemon to testify at the trial. At trial, the
      Commonwealth presented the testimony of multiple witnesses
      tending to establish that [Appellant] shot at the victim on the night
      in question. Moreover, [Appellant] admitted in one of his police
      interviews that he had shot the victim and said that he was sorry

                                      -8-
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      for doing so. Given the overwhelming evidence establishing that
      [Appellant] was the shooter, [Appellant], in testifying on his own
      behalf, admitted that he shot at the victim, but he claimed that he
      was doing so to protect himself. However, [Mr.] Lemon testified
      at the PCRA hearing that [Appellant] was not involved in the
      shooting and was not even in the vicinity at the time the shooting
      occurred. If such testimony had been presented at trial, it would
      have completely undermined and discredited [Appellant’s] self-
      defense theory and would have been directly contradictory to
      virtually all the other evidence presented in the case. Moreover,
      [Mr.] Lemon had a crimen falsi conviction within 10 years of the
      trial date, and this could have been used to impeach [Mr.] Lemon
      as a witness. In sum, [Appellant] cannot establish that calling
      [Mr.] Lemon as a witness offered a potential for success
      substantially greater than the course pursued, and, therefore, trial
      counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to call [Mr.]
      Lemon. Moreover, considering the overwhelming evidence of guilt
      established by the remaining evidence presented at trial, including
      [Appellant’s] own testimony, [Appellant] cannot establish that he
      was prejudiced by counsel’s decision not to call [Mr.] Lemon as a
      defense witness.

PCO at 4-5 (internal citations omitted).

      Based on our independent review of the record, we agree with the PCRA

court’s analysis that this issue lacks merit.       Appellant cannot establish

ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to call Mr. Lemon as a witness at

trial, given the overwhelming evidence that Appellant was in fact the shooter.

No relief is due on this basis.

      In the second issue, Appellant claims that his trial attorneys were

ineffective when they failed to present the 911 caller as a witness at trial.

Anders Brief at 7. As mentioned supra, Appellant averred below that:
      At trial, the 911 call was entered into evidence by the
      Commonwealth over no objection by [Appellant’s] trial counsel.
      The 911 caller identifies the shooter and stomper as a heavy set,
      black male, with [dreadlocks]. It was also testified to by Detective
      Ferrari that the police had never spoken to nor interviewed the

                                      -9-
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      911 caller, despite having her address and her telephone number.
      Had the 911 caller been interviewed and testified at trial[,] she
      could have provided additional information regarding her
      statement that the shooter had [dreadlocks] (which eliminates
      [Appellant] as the shooter and stomper) and confirmed, in person,
      by looking at [Appellant] at trial, that [Appellant] was not the
      individual that she observed shoot the victim that early morning.

Amended Petition at ¶ 12 (original brackets omitted).

      With respect to this claim, the PCRA court observed that the fact that

the 911 caller’s description of the shooter did not exactly match Appellant’s

physical characteristics was elicited at trial. PCO at 5; see also N.T. Trial at

249-50, 255, 381-82, 632-634. As such, the PCRA court opined that “it is

difficult to fathom how the 911 caller’s testimony could have provided

information that was more beneficial to [Appellant] than the information that

was already presented at trial.” PCO at 5. It also observed that Appellant

“claims that the person who called 911 to report the incident would have

identified the shooter as someone other than [Appellant], but he provides no

information to suggest how the caller could have made that identification or

provided any information that was not already elicited at trial.” Id. Thus, the

PCRA court concluded that Appellant “cannot establish that trial counsel did

not have a reasonable basis for refraining from presenting the 911 caller’s

testimony, and he cannot establish that he was prejudiced by this alleged

nonaction.” Id.

      Once again, we agree with the PCRA court’s analysis.         Further, we

observe that, at the PCRA hearing, Appellant’s trial counsel testified that they

interviewed the 911 caller and determined that her testimony at trial would

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not benefit Appellant. Specifically, at the interview, trial counsel said that the

911 caller identified the person standing over the victim and stomping his

body as a person with dreadlocks, but identified Appellant as the actual

shooter. N.T. Hearing, 4/20/21, at 29-34, 42-44. In addition, we reiterate

that Appellant argued self-defense at trial, which would make any hypothetical

testimony from the 911 caller pointing to someone else as the shooter

confusing and unproductive to his defense. Accordingly, Appellant has not

established that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present the 911

caller as a witness at trial. This issue is meritless as well.

      In conclusion, based on the foregoing, we affirm the PCRA court’s order

dismissing Appellant’s petition.    Because his claims are meritless, we also

grant Attorney Kehler’s petition to withdraw.

      Order affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/11/2023

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