Court Opinion

ID: 9733190
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:57:05.535878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:39.201269
License: Public Domain

SCHOTTKY, J.
I dissent.
Applying, as we must, the familiar rules governing an apellate tribunal, I am convinced that the record supports the trial court’s finding of “unprofessional conduct.”
As I view this matter, it resolves itself into a question of whether or not a member of the faculty of a school is justified in having published in the public press letters containing statements which can only have the result of undermining the confidence of the public in the character, efficiency and integrity of the school administration.
The several letters are included in the majority opinion. For the purposes of this dissent I think it is only necessary to quote excerpts from certain of the letters published by appellant.
In the letter of March 4,1959, appellant wrote:
“To the Editor:
“The Lassen Union High School and Junior College administration and a part of the board of trustees have well illustrated a disease that is rapidly sinking American public education, California first, that of autocracy. These people have had and believe that they still have absolute and final authority over their ‘empire,’ the high school and junior college. That time is no more.
“They have created, mainly through ineptness and indifference, a mess obviously and primarily beneficial and desired only by themselves, if by anyone. They have created and permitted situations and conditions in those schools that does gross violence to the dignity and decency standards of many teachers and students. They have created and maintained a situation in which the possibility of reasonable education is seriously hampered. How can teachers teach and students learn under conditions distasteful and shameful to both?”
In the letter of March 18, 1959, appellant stated: “. . . If we don’t see and cure our problems the Russians quite probably soon will; they also will cure us of the ‘liberty’ habit,”
*164In the letter of May 13, 1959, appellant stated: “The school boards in this area have been guilty of a practice that would be more fitting in Russia than in the United States; that of permitting or placing unlimited and unsupervised authority in the hands of the administration. This practice has cost the people of Lassen County untold sums of money, many excellent teachers, and it has deprived our children in most cases of an adequate school system. The price has been very high!
“Boards have become little more than rubber stamps for administrators, their authority is simply being used. These administrators apparently use the board and its authority as they wish. ...”
The majority seeks to justify the letters of appellant upon the ground that while the language used was “somewhat intemperate,” appellant should not be precluded from joining in the great public debate on the subject of education. They state: “However, this is not to say that the phraseology of defendant’s letters can be looked upon as a model of scholarly clarity, nor that the somewhat intemperate language employed therein is commended to the teaching profession. But it is a matter of record that a great deal of public debate on the subject of education was occurring, both in California and nationwide, at the time of the Susanville public forums. It is not surprising that many of the arguments were not temperately phrased in terms of universal clarity, and that much of the logic employed was flavored by personal experience. Defendant, a father of school-age children, was not precluded from joining in this great public debate because of his status as a teacher.”
The above quotations are from only a few of a series of letters written by appellant in what can only be construed as a persistent campaign to undermine public confidence in the administrator and administration of the school in which he was a member of the faculty.
The majority appears to believe that the right of free speech and public debate is involved in this case, but, as I view the matter, the issue is not the right of freedom of speech but is rather whether the publication of such statements by a member of the school faculty was under the circumstances unprofessional conduct.
In 44 California Jurisprudence 2d 217, it is stated: “The fact that the provision authorizing dismissal of a permanent employee for unprofessional conduct does not define that phrase does not render it void for uncertainty. 'Unprofes*165sional conduct’ is a relative expression without technical meaning or arbitrary connotation. It is a phrase to be construed according to its commonly approved usage, having regard for the context in which the legislature uses it. It designates conduct that violates the rules or the ethical code of a profession or that is unbecoming a member of a profession in good standing.”
In Board of Education v. Swan, 41 Cal.2d 546 [261 P.2d 261], it is said at page 553: “The phrase ‘unprofessional conduct, ’ as used in the Education Code, is to be construed according to its common and approved usage, having regard for the context in which the Legislature used it. (Ed. Code, §10; 23 Cal.Jur., § 122, p. 745.) The word ‘unprofessional’ is a relative expression without technical meaning or arbitrary connotation. ‘Unprofessional conduct’ is defined in 66 Corpus Juris, p. 55, as ‘that which violates the rules or ethical code of a profession or such conduct which is unbecoming a member of a profession in good standing.’ ”
As stated in the majority opinion, the record indicates that approximately 102,000 of the 120,000 teachers in the state belong to the California Teachers Association which maintains a commission on personnel standards. As contemplated and authorized by section 13533.5 (now § 13417) of the Education Code the respondent board of trustees requested that this commission appoint a panel of the commission to report on the professional matters involved in appellant’s case. The panel was appointed, made a study, and submitted a report which was offered and received in evidence at the trial without objection. The report of the panel summarizes the facts of appellant’s case, in a manner substantially in agreement with the facts as subsequently found by the trial court, and then states the “considered professional judgment” of the panel as follows: “The panel does not consider it unethical or insubordinate to oppose the administration, even vigorously, during discussion preceding the adoption of policy. Neither would it be considered unethical to continue to utilize democratic procedures within professional channels in an effort to revise earlier decisions. However, pressing a personal viewpoint in an intemperate manner which manifests disregard or contempt for the opinion or status of a colleague, or which disrupts effective democratic procedures, is not acting in a professional manner.”
The report concludes as follows: “The panel’s summary conclusion is that Mr. Owens’ letters to the editor, published *166in the local paper, constitute a persistent breach of professional ethics, and represent unprofessional conduct.
“In addition, the nature of Mr. Owens’ criticisms concerning the educational system in his district and his method of airing them publicly have seriously alienated his colleagues, the Board of Trustees and the administration.
“The panel concludes that Mr. Owens’ continued employment in this district is untenable and would lead only to embarrassment to himself and the district. The antagonism created by his actions has caused a rift, which if continued, would undermine the educational program to a degree which could not be compensated for even by effectiveness as a classroom teacher.”
Section 13417 of the Education Code reads in part as follows: “Upon any such trial [such as the ease before us], the court or any party may call and examine expert witnesses to testify as to any matter of professional or personnel standards . . ., or other such professional matters as may be involved in the subject matter at issue. . . .

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“ [T]he court may also receive and consider as evidence any report . . . submitted by such expert witness . . ., or a panel . . ., maintained by a statewide professional and educational association ...”
It is clear, therefore, that the court was entitled to consider the written report of the panel in weighing and determining the issue of unprofessional conduct.
The trial of the instant ease lasted 14 days and the reporter’s transcript occupied 953 pages. It was tried before an able and experienced judge from an adjoining mountain county who filed an exhaustive “Decision, Findings and Conclusions” in which he reviewed the evidence. I am satisfied that the record amply supports the findings and conclusions of the trial court and particularly the following:
“The Court feels that there is nothing in the record to show any apparent deep concern, or concern of any kind, by the people of Lassen County over poor results of public education locally, or within the Lassen Union High School, wherein is located the junior college of which Mr. Owens is one of the teachers, because the record in this ease abounds with irrefutable evidence that the junior college and the high school are functioning in a proper manner, have been and are obtaining good results and have good rating as such, and as heretofore stated, are accredited to the higher institutions of learning *167in the State of California. And said statement would appear to the Court as being unfounded and unsupported by the evidence, unbecoming and unethical from a person engaged in the profession of teaching, and especially one who is a member of the faculty of the junior college in the Lassen Union High School District.

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“. . . If anything was materially wrong in the college or its operation, he knew the place to go for correction and the proper procedures to follow, to take, for any needed change that might or could be made for the good and benefit of the college. He knew the Board of Trustees was the executive and the administrative head of the school. They were ready and willing to listen to anyone or any committee desiring to present any matter of concern for the improvement or benefit of the college. The board changed its regular meeting time from daytime to evening, to make it more convenient for anyone who had a legitimate school matter to present, to afford them the opportunity to do so.
“Instead of going before the governing board in a proper manner for any needed changes or reform in the junior college, of which Mr. Owens was a teacher and thereby a part and parcel of the school system of the Lassen Union High School District, he, ignoring all codes of professional ethics and the proper legal and orderly channels and processes for handling and conducting our public schools in California, chose to criticize and publicly condemn, unjustly and unfairly, from the evidence in this case, the Board of Trustees, the administration, the superintendent and, in fact, all personnel connected with said junior college, of which he is and was a tenure teacher, which said letters so published, as heretofore referred to in said findings, constituted unprofessional conduct on the part of Mr. Jack Owens.’’
I believe the judgment is supported by the decision of our Supreme Court in Board of Education v. Swan, supra. The Swan case, like this case, involved an appeal from a judgment authorizing the dismissal of a permanent teacher under the tenure law. The trial court had found that, among other things, appellant had “made derogatory statements concerning the superintendent of schools and criticized the board of education for bringing him to Los Angeles’’ (p. 549) and during the course of a Parent Teachers Association meeting had “called the superintendent of schools and other *168school administrators ‘henchmen’ and the board of education office ‘The Little Kremlin.’ ” (P. 550.)
In affirming the judgment the Supreme Court answered the constitutional argument urged by appellant here as follows: “Nor can defendant prevail in her claim that affirmance of her dismissal infringes upon the constitutional guarantee of her freedom of speech, in that she thereby is denied the right to criticize her superiors upon pain of losing her position. (U. S. Const., amends. I and XIV; Cal. Const., art. 1, §9.) One employed in public service does not have a constitutional right to such employment and is subject to reasonable supervision and restriction by the authorized governmental body or officer to the end that proper discipline may be maintained, and that activities among the employees may not be allowed to disrupt or impair the public service. (Christal v. Police Com., 33 Cal.App.2d 564, 569 [92 P.2d 416] ; City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 94 Cal.App.2d 36, 48-49 [210 P.2d 305].) Because of this dominant public interest, the exercise of such control over the public employee is not only a right but is a duty, and in the discharge thereof a wide discretion is allowed, which will not be disturbed until the point of illegality is reached. (Hayman v. City of Los Angeles, 17 Cal.App.2d 674, 679 [62 P.2d 1047].)” (P.556.)
In the recent case of Pranger v. Break, 186 Cal.App.2d 551 [9 Cal.Rptr. 293], which involved dismissal of a civil service employee for “conduct unbecoming a public employee,” the court in discussing the claimed violation of the right of free speech said at page 555:
“The issue is not the right of freedom of speech, whether petitioner had the right to make such editorial statements, or whether such statements were of the nature which presented a clear and present danger, but the real issue is whether the publication of the statement, under the circumstances and in view of petitioner’s position as a public employee in a sensitive governmental office, was, ipso facto, conduct unbecoming a public employee. This question is fairly well treated in Hayman v. City of Los Angeles, 17 Cal.App.2d 674, 679 [62 P.2d 1047] (hearing denied by the Supreme Court) where it is said:
“ ‘The right which is involved here is not that which petitioner thinks has been denied him, but is the right of respondents to exercise a reasonable supervision over city employees, to the end that proper discipline may be main*169tained and that activities among employees be not allowed to disrupt or impair the public service. Such is not only the right but the duty of the city and its several departments. In the exercise of this duty, they must be allowed a wide discretion and their acts are not subject to review by the courts until they have reached the point of illegality. ... If petitioner’s activities had a tendency to create dissension and unrest among the city employees and to interfere with the enforcement of reasonable rules of conduct prescribed by the Board of Public Works, it is not for the courts to declare that a dismissal based upon these facts would be without cause and therefore without authority under the charter of the city.’ ”
Lassen County is a mountain county with a population of less than 14,000. The Lassen Advocate is published in Susan-ville, the county seat, with a population of approximately 5,000. As this court said in Cote v. Rogers, 201 Cal.App.2d 138, 145 [19 Cal.Rptr. 767] : “. . . It probably could be said that it is a matter of common knowledge that the smaller the community the greater the prominence and importance of newspaper stories which name or refer to persons residing in the area served.” We would be naive indeed not to assume that the letters written by appellant and published in the Advocate were not read by a great many people in Lassen County and that appellant intended that they should be read. As hereinbefore set forth, and as found by the trial court, the letters contained statements which were not merely “ somewhat intemperate,” as stated by the majority, and which reflected upon the character, efficiency and integrity of the school administration, but which were found by the court to have no proper foundation in fact. To hold that a teacher who is himself a member of the faculty of the school can carry on such a persistent campaign to undermine public confidence in the administrator and administration of the school and not be guilty of unprofessional conduct according to the ethics and standards of the teaching profession would, in my opinion, be detrimental to our educational system. The teachers of California have the benefit and protection of a good system of permanent tenure which amply protects them against unjust and improper dismissal, but it was never intended that tenure should excuse or justify conduct such as that of appellant in the instant case. A teacher who is a member of the faculty of a school district owes it to the school that is employing him to endeavor to advance the interest of *170the school and its students. Instead, appellant pursued a course of conduct that could not benefit either the. school or its students. As stated in the findings of the trial court, and amply supported by the record, “Instead of going before the governing board in a proper manner for any needed changes or reform in the junior college, of which Mr. Owens was a teacher and thereby a part and parcel of the school system of the Lassen Union High School District, he, ignoring all codes of professional ethics and the proper legal and orderly channels and processes for handling and conducting our public schools in California, chose to criticize and publicly condemn,, unjustly and unfairly, from the evidence in this ease, the Board of Trustees, the administration, the superintendent and, in fact, all personnel connected with said junior college, of which he is and was a tenure teacher, which said letters so published, as heretofore referred to in said findings, constituted unprofessional conduct on the part of Mr. Jack Owens. ’ ’
In view of the foregoing, it is my conclusion that the finding of the trial court that appellant was guilty of unprofessional conduct is supported by the evidence, the law, and sound public policy. I would affirm the judgment.
A petition for a rehearing was denied August 20, 1962. Schottky, J., was of the opinion that the petition should’ be granted. Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied September 26, 1962. Schauer, J., and Me Comb, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.