Court Opinion

ID: 9953394
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 00:01:32.439517+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:46:05.000507
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-20178           Document: 75-1         Page: 1     Date Filed: 03/21/2024

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit                                          United States Court of Appeals
                                  ____________                                         Fifth Circuit

                                                                                     FILED
                                    No. 23-20178                                  March 21, 2024
                                  ____________                                    Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                       Clerk
Selva Kumar,

                                                                 Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                         versus

Panera Bread Company,

                                            Defendant—Appellee.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Texas
                           USDC No. 4:21-CV-3779
                  ______________________________

Before Wiener, Haynes, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
      Plaintiff-Appellant and steadfast vegetarian Selva Kumar, proceeding
pro se, alleges that Defendant-Appellee Panera Bread Company
misrepresented that its broccoli-cheddar soup was free of meat byproducts.
The district court granted Panera’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, we
AFFIRM in part, and VACATE and REMAND in part.

      _____________________
      *
          This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
 Case: 23-20178           Document: 75-1          Page: 2       Date Filed: 03/21/2024

                                       No. 23-20178

                          I. Facts and Procedural History
        Kumar is a “staunch and unfaltering follower of the Hinduism
religion.”1 Central to his faith is a commitment to vegetarianism. As such,
when he eats out at restaurants, Kumar asks whether the food that he orders
is vegetarian, including whether it is cooked in the same oil used for animal
products. He notes that “[a]ccidentally consuming meat for a vegetarian is
upsetting on many levels.”
        Kumar alleges that (1) on January 23, 2021, Kumar dined “as usual”
at a Panera location in Houston, Texas; (2) every time that he ordered the
broccoli-cheddar soup at Panera, he inquired whether it was made with
chicken broth; (3) “each time,” the answer was no; (4) those representations
were false; and (5) he was “fraudulently induced into purchasing [Panera’s]
products.”
        Kumar brought this suit in Texas state court, alleging negligence,
gross negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of
the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA). Panera removed the case
to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, then sought dismissal
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court
allowed Kumar to amend his complaint, which is now the operative pleading.
Panera then filed a second motion to dismiss, which the court granted.
Kumar appeals.
                                II. Standard of Review
        On appeal, a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss is reviewed
de novo, “accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and viewing those facts in
        _____________________
        1
          Because this case comes to this court on review of a motion to dismiss, all facts in
the operative complaint are assumed to be true. See Lampton v. Diaz, 639 F.3d 223, 225
(5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 122 (1997)).

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                                  No. 23-20178

the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.” Meador v. Apple, Inc., 911 F.3d 260,
264 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333,
338 (5th Cir. 2008)). A complaint survives a motion to dismiss under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) only if it “pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2008). Pro se
complaints are “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Nevertheless, they must “set forth
facts giving rise to a claim on which relief may be granted.” Johnson v. Atkins,
999 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1993).
                                III. Discussion
       Kumar challenges the merits, but before we address his arguments, we
examine the basis for our jurisdiction, as we are obligated to do. See In re
Yazoo Pipeline Co., L.P., 746 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 2014).
                        A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
       It is axiomatic that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.
Perez v. McCreary, Veselka, Bragg & Allen, P.C., 45 F.4th 816, 821 (5th Cir.
2022). As such, this court has an independent responsibility to address
questions of subject-matter jurisdiction, even when parties “overlook or elect
not to press” the issue. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428,
434 (2011); see also Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012) (“Subject-
matter jurisdiction can never be waived or forfeited.”). Although Kumar did
not raise the subject, on review of the pleadings we sua sponte observed that
Panera’s amended notice of removal does not properly allege diversity
jurisdiction.

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                                  No. 23-20178

       For a federal court to exercise diversity jurisdiction, there must be
complete diversity between the parties. Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d
912, 920 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332). Panera’s amended notice
of removal alleges that Kumar is a citizen of Texas, a fact which neither party
disputes. The notice then states that Panera is a “limited liability company
with its principal place of business in Missouri.” However, the citizenship
of an LLC is not determined by its principal place of business, but instead by
the citizenship of each of its members. Harvey v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., 542
F.3d 1077, 1080 (5th Cir. 2008). Without correct information as to Panera’s
citizenship, the district court could not properly exercise diversity
jurisdiction. See Stafford v. Mobil Oil Corp., 945 F.2d 803, 805 (5th Cir. 1991).
       This overlooked issue is not fatal to the instant appeal, however,
because 28 U.S.C. § 1653 provides a mechanism for amending the pleadings
to properly assert jurisdiction. Id. at 805–06. Parties may “cure technical
defects or failure to specifically allege the citizenship of a party in the
appellate courts, but only when the amendment would do nothing more than
state an alternative jurisdictional basis for recovery upon the facts previously
alleged.” Howery, 243 F.3d at 919 (internal quotation marks and alteration
omitted) (quoting Whitmire v. Victus Ltd., 212 F.3d 885, 888 (5th Cir. 2000)).
       The court requested that the parties file a letter addressing this
apparent failure to properly assert diversity jurisdiction. Panera admits that
it wrongly pleaded that it is an LLC rather than a corporation. It has attached
public records from Missouri and Delaware which establish that it is a
corporation with citizenship in each of these states. This court may take
judicial notice of “online state agency records” to resolve a jurisdictional
defect via amendment on appeal. See Swindol v. Aurora Flight Scis. Corp., 805
F.3d 516, 518–19 (5th Cir. 2015) (taking judicial notice of jurisdictional facts
from public agency filings as they are “not subject to reasonable dispute”);
MidCap Media Fin., L.L.C. v Pathway Data, Inc., 929 F.3d 310, 315 (5th Cir.

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                                 No. 23-20178

2019). Kumar opposes this amendment, claiming that Panera is indeed an
LLC, but cites no evidence for his assertions.
       Title 28 U.S.C. § 1653 is to be “broadly construed to avoid dismissals
of actions on purely ‘technical’ or ‘formal’ grounds.” Whitmire, 212 F.3d at
887. The purpose of the statute is to correct “formal mistakes,” which is
how we would characterize the error made by Panera in its amended notice
of removal. See Midcap Media, 929 F.3d at 316. We thus elect to take judicial
notice of the state agency records attached to Panera’s letter and to treat the
letter as a motion to amend its notice of removal. We hereby grant that
motion.   With this amendment, we are satisfied that federal diversity
jurisdiction existed at the time of removal and at the time of judgment. See
Howery, 243 F.3d at 921.
                                  B. Waiver
       In its responsive briefing, Panera argues that Kumar has waived every
issue on appeal because he did not adequately brief his arguments. Briefs
must “contain appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them.” Fed. R.
App. P. 28(a). As Panera points out, several of the cases that Kumar cites
are nonexistent, and those cited cases that do exist are largely irrelevant to
his claims. Further, Kumar fails to identify any error in the district court’s
analysis of at least one of his claims, simply re-urging the same points that he
urged below. See Shaw v. Norman, 389 F. App’x 408, 409 (5th Cir. 2010)
(per curiam) (“When an appellant does not identify error in the district
court’s analysis, it is the same as if the appellant had not appealed the
judgment.”). While we recognize the evident shortcomings in his briefing,
Kumar’s pro se status and impressive effort at self-representation leads us to
consider his appellate arguments on their merits. Cf. Goins v. Dir., Office of
Worker’s Comp. Programs, 436 F. App’x 366, 369 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam)
(describing the adequate briefing standard as a “low hurdle,” but finding

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                                       No. 23-20178

arguments waived when plaintiff’s brief had zero citations to the record or
legal authority).
                                     C. Tort Claims
        Kumar appeals the district court’s dismissal of his claims for
negligence, gross negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
We review each in turn.
        “To sustain a negligence action, the plaintiff must produce evidence
of a legal duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty,
and damages proximately caused by that breach.” Lee Lewis Constr., Inc. v.
Harrison, 70 S.W.3d 778, 782 (Tex. 2001).2                     In dismissing Kumar’s
negligence claim, the district court held that his complaint failed to allege any
facts supporting the elements of duty, breach, and damages.
        We agree with the district court that Kumar has failed to identify a
breach of duty owed to him by Panera. On appeal, Kumar discusses the
“reasonable expectations” test, suggesting that Panera acted negligently by
failing to warn him of the chicken broth despite knowing about his
vegetarianism. However, this test applies to premises liability claims, not
negligence claims. See Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 465 S.W.3d 193, 215–16
(Tex. 2015) (distinguishing between negligent-activity and premises-defect
claims). Although negligence and premises liability are related, Kumar’s
amended complaint alleges only that Panera breached a duty owed to him to
“act reasonably and perform their responsibilities in such a way as to protect
their patrons from injury.”             This “action-focused” claim sounds in
negligence, not premises liability, which instead concerns injuries resulting

        _____________________
        2
          As a federal court sitting in diversity, we apply the law of the forum state. James
v. Woods, 899 F.3d 404, 408 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,
78 (1938)).

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                                 No. 23-20178

from a “condition on the premises.” See Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 746 F.3d
191, 198 (5th Cir. 2014). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did
not err in dismissing Kumar’s claims for simple and gross negligence.
       Kumar’s complaint also brings a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. However, in his briefing before this court, Kumar
expressly abandons this claim, stating that he “agrees with the trial court
[that] Appellee did not cause Intentional Infliction of [E]motional Distress.”
He admits that Panera’s actions were not intentional, “but [were] still
reckless.” Although Kumar does not raise this argument, intentional
infliction of emotional distress can be established through merely reckless
conduct. See Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. 1993) (citing
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (Am. L. Inst. 1965)). But,
given Kumar’s decision to agree specifically with the district court’s holding,
we deem this claim abandoned. And, while Kumar may seek to pursue other
types of “emotional distress” claims, such as negligent infliction of
emotional distress, we are a “court of errors” and may not consider claims
that were not before the district court. See Miller v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co.,
391 F.3d 698, 701 (5th Cir. 2004).
       As the district court properly dismissed each of Kumar’s tort claims,
we turn now to the DTPA.
                               D. The DTPA
       The DTPA protects consumers from “[f]alse, misleading, or
deceptive acts or practices.” Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 17.46(a). To
state a claim under the DTPA, a plaintiff must establish that (1) he or she
was a consumer within the meaning of the Act, (2) the defendant violated a
specific provision of the Act, and (3) the violation caused the plaintiff’s
injury. Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 649 (Tex. 1996) (citing
Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 17.50(a)). Kumar alleges that Panera

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fraudulently misled him “regarding the meal ingredients,” causing him pain
and suffering.
       In federal court, a complaint alleging violations of the DTPA is
subject to the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which
requires that fraud be pleaded “with particularity.” See Lone Star Ladies Inv.
Club v. Schlotzsky’s Inc., 238 F.3d 363, 368 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Rule 9(b) applies
by its plain language to all averments of fraud, whether they are part of a claim
of fraud or not.”); see also Berry v. Indianapolis Life Ins. Co., 608 F. Supp. 2d
785, 800 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (noting that it is well settled that claims alleging
violations of the DTPA are subject to Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement).
A pleading satisfies “particularity” when it alleges the “time, place, and
contents of the false representations, as well as the identity of the person
making the misrepresentation and what he obtained thereby.” Wallace v.
Tesoro Corp., 796 F.3d 468, 480 (5th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). However,
Rule “9(b)’s ultimate meaning is context-specific.” IAS Servs. Grp., L.L.C.
v. Jim Buckley & Assocs., Inc., 900 F.3d 640, 647 (5th Cir. 2018). Likewise,
“we are mindful that Rule 9(b) does not supplant Rule 8(a)’s notice pleading,
which requires only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
       Here, the district court dismissed Kumar’s DTPA claim because his
complaint failed to allege the identity of the person who made the false
representations about the soup. However, given that he is a pro se litigant
and has represented in his brief that he is able to submit that name, we
conclude that the case should not have been dismissed solely on that basis.
Cf. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94–95 (2007) (per curiam) (relying, in
part, on later filings by a pro se plaintiff to conclude the complaint plausibly
alleged harm and explaining “a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded,
must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers” (citation omitted)). Importantly, his first attorney failed to file

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anything, so he was pro se. By the time that he found another attorney, he
was not given the necessary time to have that attorney represent him.
Moreover, while his complaint was not very clear on the issue of his alleged
injury, liberally construing it, he does plead the third element of a DTPA
claim: that Panera’s actions caused his alleged injury. See Metro Allied Ins.
Agency, Inc. v. Lin, 304 S.W.3d 830, 834 (Tex. 2009) (defining causation
under the DTPA as a “substantial factor in bringing about the injury,
without which the injury would not have occurred”); Amstadt, 919 S.W.2d
at 650 (“[T]he defendant’s deceptive trade act or practice is not actionable
under the DTPA unless it was committed in connection with the plaintiff’s
transaction in goods or services.”). Thus, upon remand, he should be
permitted to have his new attorney come in and amend his DTPA claim.
       Accordingly, we AFFIRM in part, and VACATE and REMAND
in part.

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