Court Opinion

ID: 9788728
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:16:46.59839+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:16.340982
License: Public Domain

CARPENETI, Justice,
dissenting.
Because the finding that a marriage is valid is not inconsistent with the imposition of a constructive trust, I dissent from today's Opinion. A comparison of the legal requirements of a valid marriage with the legal requirements of a constructive trust shows why there is no inconsistency in the superior court's decision and why it should be affirmed. Moreover, AS 18.06.015 authorizes the superior court's imposition of a constructive trust; the Opinion errs in concluding that the equitable remedy was "displaced" by the statutes governing marriages and accrual of allowance and share. Finally, other states have imposed constructive trusts in situations similar to the one before the court, and a leading treatise specifically approves the procedure.
Legal requirements for valid marriage and constructive trust
There are only limited cireumstances in which a marriage may be declared void. The legislature has provided that a marriage may be declared void only if, at the time of the marriage, a party was under the age of consent, a party was of unsound mind, force or fraud was used in obtaining consent, or there was failure to consummate the marriage.1 Moreover, in order for the marriage to be invalidated, the disability or undue influence must exist at the moment that a person enters into the marriage.2 These requirements narrowly confine the situations in which one's consent to marry is not considered valid.
*857In contrast to the well-defined, limited circumstances in which a marriage may be declared void, a constructive trust may be imposed in a broad range of circumstances. In imposing a constructive trust, there is no requirement that the unjust or unconscionable conduct occur at the moment that title transfers or that a statutory right attaches, only that the defendant holds the property in cireumstances that are unjust. As we said in McKnight v. Rice, Hoppner, Brown & Brunner, quoting from a leading treatise, a constructive trust is "a [device] used by chancery to compel one who unfairly holds a property interest to convey that interest to another to whom it justly belongs." 3
The Opinion quotes McKmight to this ef-fect,4 but it mistakenly assigns dispositive significance to the superior court's finding of a valid marriage, holding that this finding "ruled out the existence of an element necessary to ... a constructive trust: a finding that the portion of Lillie's estate passing to Riddell "justly to the estate."5 The finding of a valid marriage, and the subsequent passing of a portion of Lillie's estate to Riddell through allowances and shares, merely sets the stage for the determination of whether there are grounds for application of the constructive trust doctrine: "It is then [after the property passes under the will or by intestacy] that the equitable principle as to unjust enrichment becomes applicable." 6
The Opinion's discussion of "the second prerequisite" for a constructive trust is even farther off the mark. Although it quotes McKnight to the effect that a finding that one obtained property "by reason of unjust, unconscionable, or unlawful means"7 will justify imposition of a constructive trust, it reads "unjust" and "unconscionable" completely out of the quotation and focuses only on "unlawful." That is error; our use of "or" in McKnight makes clear that Riddell's use of either "unjust" means or "unconscionable" means to acquire an interest gives the court a sufficient basis to impose a constructive trust. The superior court in the present case did exactly that, using a constructive trust as an equitable remedy to take Riddell's unjust, ly acquired interest in the estate and vest it in the rightful8 beneficiaries of the estate.
Because Riddell's marriage was not unlawful-in the Opinion's phrase, because it was "valid despite Riddell's unconscionable premarital conduct" 9-the Opinion ignores that his conduct in procuring the marriage was undoubtedly "unjust" and, indeed, "unconscionable."
Thus it is clear that, despite the Opinion's claim, there is no "absence of a causal link between Riddell's unconscionable conduct and his right to receive the statutory benefits of marriage."10 Quite to the contrary, the conduct that the Opinion twice describes as "unconscionable" 11-what the *858superior court described, with the apparent agreement of the Opinion,12 as "fraudulent conduct toward Lillie," "bullying ... and physical{[ ] intimidat{ion of] friends [and] family," finding that Riddell "abused [Lillie] physically"-while it did not invalidate the marriage, is precisely the type of conduct that supports the superior court's finding that Riddell's "legal title to property has been obtained through actual fraud, concealment, by taking advantage, or, under cireum-stances rendering it unconscilonable] for" him to retain the interest. Indeed, the Opinion notes that the superior court found that Riddell had induced Lillie to marry him " 'for the purpose[ ] of obtaining her assets' and that his wife had suffered from dementia for the majority of their relationship." 13 As the superior court carefully explained, it upheld the validity of the marriage despite those findings and although "even immediately afterward, [Lillie] didn't remember that she had married Mr. Riddell," because the superior court "cannot say that at the time she applied for the marriage license or when she actually participated in the ceremony she did not understand that she was getting married." In other words, the superior court made no finding that Riddell's unconscionable conduct did not lead to the marriage. To the contrary, it effectively found that Riddell had fraudulently induced the marriage. The superior court found only that, at the moment she applied for the license and at the moment she was married, it could not say that she was unaware of what she was doing.
Alaska Statute 18.06.015
The legislature has made it clear that, in deciding claims arising under the probate code, a court may exercise its equitable powers unless explicitly forbidden to do so: Alaska Statute 13.06.015 provides that "fulnless displaced by the particular provisions of AS 18.06 AS 18.36, the principles of law and equity supplement those provisions." No part of any of the "particular provisions" of the probate code dealing with allowances and share displace the principle of equity; they merely establish Alaska's positive statutory law on those subjects. Without citation to authority, the Opinion mistakenly looks outside of the probate code, to provisions of the statutes dealing with divorce and dissolution,14 to reach its conclusion that AS 13.06.015 does not apply: "the 'particular provisions' of statutory law governing void and voidable marriages and accrual of allowances and share fully covered this situation and affirmatively 'displaced' the equitable remedy of constructive trust." 15 But the test under AS 18.06.015 is not whether Alaska law "fully covered" the situation. It is whether any particular provisions of the probate code should be read as displacing the superior court's authority to invoke the equitable doctrine of constructive trust. Given that AS 18.06.015 so unambiguously states that principles of equity apply "[ulnless displaced by particular provisions of AS 13.06-AS 18.86," today's holding that a finding of a - valid marriage is inconsistent with the equitable doctrine of constructive trust adopts an unduly restrictive view of our law.
In support of its conclusion, the Opinion cites Pacific Scene, Inc. v. Penasquitos, *859Inc.16 for the proposition that a court acting in equity generally "cannot [intrude] in matters that are plain and fully covered by [al statute." 17 While the proposition is unexceptionable,18 Pacific Scene lends no support to the Opinion's conclusion, for that case dealt with a statutory scheme that is far different from the Alaska probate code see-tions that are before us in this case. In Pacific Scene, the California legislature had enacted a "comprehensive statutory revision" that "comprise[d] a broad and detailed scheme regulating virtually every aspect of corporate dissolution." 19 The court described such legislation as covering the situation where "course of conduct, parties, things affected, limitations and exceptions are minutely described, indicat{ing] a legislative intent that the statute should totally supersede and replace the common law dealing with the subject matter." 20 That is a completely different situation than the one before us now.
The statutes before us now are garden-variety probate laws that establish allowances and shares, and in no way suggest that they are intended to preclude the court's use of general principles of equity. They do not specifically "displace" the equitable power of the superior court to give an unjustly-inherited share back to the estate through constructive trust.
Nor does the superior court's decision "do indirectly what the law or its clearly defined policy forbids to be done directly," as the Opinion claims.21 The legislature did not forbid the superior court from imposing a constructive trust after allowing Riddell to inherit from the estate. The legislature did require that the superior court recognize the validity of the marriage, and the court did so. The superior court did not invalidate the marriage or ignore the statutory mandate to give Riddell his share of the estate. Riddell was allowed to inherit his statutorily-prescribed share. After fulfilling the statutory directive, the superior court used the equitable powers specifically envisioned by AS 13.06.015 to carry out the legislature's statutory scheme, creating a constructive trust to take back Riddell's unjustly-acquired gains.
The superior court complied with all applicable statutes, and did not do indirectly what the law forbade it to do directly. The Opinion's argument-that onee the law of voidable and void marriages is applied, Riddell's allowances and share are established and a constructive trust may not be imposed-is wrong, as is shown by this discussion from Scott on Trusts:
Where the Statute of Wills and the statute of distributions make no provision as to the effect of murder of the decedent by the legatee or heir, the property passes under the will or by intestacy to him. It is then that the equitable principle as to unjust enrichment becomes applicable. That principle is as applicable where the title to property is acquired by murder as it is where the title is acquired by fraud, duress, or undue influence. By imposing a constructive trust upon the murderer, the court is not making an exception to the provisions of the statutes but is merely compelling the murderer to surrender the profits of his erime and thus preventing unjust enrichment.[22]
Thus, "where the title is acquired by fraud, duress, or undue influence," a constructive trust is imposed on the property after it has already devolved to the spouse. The trust is then imposed on the property for the benefit of the estate. Scour on Trusts makes clear that this is proper.
The Opinion's approach would allow one spouse, who murders the other, to retain his *860-862or her share of the estate in the absence of positive legislation to the contrary.23 Alaska lacked such legislation until 1996, when AS 13.12.8038 24 was enacted.25 Under the majority's rigid interpretation of the inheritance and marriage statutes, Alaska courts before that time would have been forced to uphold the murderer's elective share, as the " (particular provisions' of statutory law governing void and voidable marriages and accrual of allowances and share" 26 cover that situation to the same extent they cover this case. Yet courts in several states have found that equity demands imposing a constructive trust on the murderer's share, even in the absence of a statute like AS 13.12.803.27 Likewise, the Alaska legislature meant for the inheritance and marriage statutes to be read in conjunction with AS 18.06.015, allowing the possibility for courts to impose a constructive trust to prevent injustice in limited cireumstances. As Scorr on Trusts definitively states, the equitable principle of unjust enrichment, which allows the imposition of a constructive trust, "is as applicable where the title to property is acquired by murder as it is where the title is acquired by fraud, duress, or undue influence." 28
Judge Weeks was well within the law in imposing a constructive trust to reclaim the property that he found-and that this court today affirms on "compelling evidence" 29-was gained by Riddell's "fraudulent conduct toward Lillie,"30 "bullying family and friends,31 "* "physicall ] intimidatfion - of] friends, family, lawyers and caregivers," 32 and because he "abused [Lillie] physically." 33 This is a case in which equity fairly demands that a constructive trust be imposed, and Judge Weeks was correct in imposing one.
For all of the above reasons, I would affirm the decision of the superior court imposing a constructive trust on Riddell's statutory homestead allowance, family allowance, and elective share. I therefore respectfully dissent.

. AS 25.24.030.

. Id. After quoting the superior court to the effect that "[plersons suffering from dementia have fluctuating periods of more contact with reality," the Opinion notes that "Lillie was competent and understood the consequences of her actions at the time that she married Riddell.... [The evidence did not convincingly prove Lillie's incompetence when she entered into the marriage." Opinion at 850 (emphasis added).

. McKnight v. Rice, Hoppner, Brown & Brunner, 678 P.2d 1330, 1335 (Alaska 1984) (quoting G. Bogret, Trusts anp Trustees § 471, at 3 (rev.2d ed.1978)).

. Opinion at 853.

. Id.

. . Austin Wakeman Scott & FrankuiN FratcHEr, Tus Law or Trusts § 492, at 440 (4th ed.1989).

. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Bocert, supra note 3, § 471 at 3).

. The Opinion strains to find a requirement that the equitable beneficiary have a "legal interest" in the property, Opinion at 852, and then concludes that because title vested in Riddell upon Lillie's death, the superior court's "order validating the marriage ruled out the existence of an element necessary to support the court's subsequent decision to impose a constructive trust: a finding that the portion of Lillie's estate passing to Riddell justly belong[ed]' to the estate." Opinion at 853. But the constructive trust doctrine, a creature of equity, contains no requirement of a "legal interest" as the Opinion narrowly defines it. Rather, the constructive trust doctrine looks to whether there is an equitable interest in the property: "A constructive trust is imposed upon a person in order to prevent his unjust enrichment. To prevent such unjust enrichment an equitable duty to convey the property to another is imposed upon him." Restate ment or Restrrurion § 160 cmt. c (1937).

. Opinion at 853 (emphasis on "unconscionable" added; emphasis on "despite" deleted).

. - Id. at 854.

. Id. at 853-854. While conceding that Rid-dell's conduct was unconscionable both before the marriage ("'Riddell's unconscionable premarital conduct," Opinion at 854) and after the mar*858riage ("Riddell's unconscionable postmarital conduct," Opinion at 854), the Opinion seeks to avoid the unescapable conclusion that there is therefore a clear causal link between Riddell's unconscionable conduct and his receipt of the statutory benefits of marriage. The Opinion seeks to distinguish this case from cases imposing constructive trusts against murderers by pointing to the "absence of a causal link between. Riddell's unconscionable postmarital conduct and his right to receive the statutory benefits of marriage." (Opinion at 854, emphasis added.) But in conceding that Riddell's conduct was unconscionable both before and after the marriage, the Opinion concedes that the causal link it denies actually does exist.

. The Opinion refers to the "compelling evidence" of Riddell's misconduct. Opinion at 850.

. Opinion at 849.

. The Opinion refers to the provisions of law governing void and voidable marriages, which are found in the statutes dealing with divorce and dissolution, AS 25.24.020-.030. Opinion at 854. - Besides being inapplicable to AS 13.06.015, which refers specifically to AS 13.06-AS 13.36, the statutes dealing with divorce and dissolution make no mention of specifically displacing any principles of equity, much less the doctrine of constructive trust.

. Opinion at 855.

. 46 Cal.3d 407, 250 Cal.Rptr. 651, 758 P.2d 1182 (1988).

. Opinion at 854 [bracketed material is as inserted in the Opinion].

. With the possible exception that the California court said "positive" statute, 250 Cal.Rptr. 651, 758 P.2d at 1186, not "[a]" statute, Opinion at 854, suggesting that a positive-that is, a clear and strong-declaration of law limiting the court's equitable powers is required before such powers may be limited.

. 250 Cal.Rptr. 651, 758 P.2d at 1184.

. Id. 250 Cal.Rptr. 651, 758 P.2d at 1183 (citation and internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).

. Opinion at 855 (citations and internal quotations omitted).

22. Austin Wakeman Scott & Wirtiam FRANKLIN Fratcuer, Tue Law or Trusts § 492, at 440 (4th ed.1989) (emphasis added).

. The Opinion attempts to distinguish the present case from the case of a murdering spouse by pointing to the "absence of a causal link between. Riddell's unconscionable postmarital conduct and his right to receive the statutory benefits of marriage." Opinion at 854. As shown above, there is a causal link in this case between Rid-dell's unconscionable conduct-which occurred both before and after the marriage-and his receipt of benefits: Riddell fraudulently induced Lillie to marry him in order to obtain her assets.

. AS 13.12.803(a) provides, in relevant part:
An individual who feloniously kills the decedent forfeits all benefits ... with respect to the decedent's estate, including an intestate share, an elective share, an omitted spouse's or child's share, a homestead allowance, exempt property, and a family allowance.

. Ch. 75, § 3, SLA 1996.

. Opinion at 855-856.

. See, e.g., In re Estate of Danforth, 705 S.W.2d 609, 611-12 (Mo.App.1986) (holding that wife not allowed to profit by inheriting from husband's estate when she committed fraud in procuring marriage and conspiracy in murdering husband); Garwols v. Bankers' Trust Co., 251 Mich. 420, 232 N.W. 239, 242 (1930) (using common law to supplement statutory scheme to prevent son from inheriting from estate of his mother whom he murdered).

. Scott & Fratcher, supra note 6, § 492, at 440.

. Opinion at 850.

. Id.

. Id.

. Id.

. Id.