Court Opinion

ID: 9737616
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:30:35.722606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:00.272458
License: Public Domain

MATHIAS, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Our supreme court has determined that "'the maximum possible sentences are generally most appropriate for the worst offenders'" Buchanan v. State 767 N.E.2d 967, 978 (Ind.2002) (quoting Evans v. State, 725 N.E.2d 850, 851 (Ind.2000)). As the majority noted, Shaw argues that she is not the "very worst offender" because of her lack of criminal history. Op. at 90.
Our General Assembly has determined that a defendant's prior or lack of eriminal history is so significant that trial courts "shall" consider it when determining what sentence to impose. See Ind.Code § 85-38-1-7.1l1(a) (Supp.2002); see also Hildebrandt v. State, 770 N.E.2d 355, 361-62 (2002). "The statute appropriately encourages leniency toward defendants who have not previously been through the criminal justice system." Biehl v. State, 738 N.E.2d 337, 389 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. *91denied. Our supreme court has also recognized that a lack of criminal history is significant in sentencing. Id. It has found the maximum sentence to be manifestly unreasonable in a number of cases, at least in part, due to the defendant's lack of a prior criminal history. Id. (citing Edgecomb v. State, 673 N.E.2d 1185 (Ind.1996); Mayberry v. State, 670 N.E.2d 1262 (Ind.1996); Willoughby v. State, 660 N.E.2d 570 (Ind.1996); Widener v. State, 659 N.E.2d 529 (Ind.1995) Walton v. State, 650 N.E.2d 1134 (Ind.1995); Harrington v. State, 584 N.E.2d 558 (Ind.1992)).
Perhaps Shaw should have been tried for murder. She was initially charged with attempted murder but seven months later, the State moved to amend the charging information to add a charge of murder. However, before the trial court could rule on the State's motion to amend, Shaw and the State agreed to the terms of a plea agreement on the attempted murder charge.
Plea agreements are a well-established part of our system of justice. They represent the best interests both of law enforcement, through the prosecuting attorney, and of the individual defendant involved. Most importantly, they are subject to review and approval by the judiciary. See Ind.Code § 35-85-8-8 (1998).
Judge Gilmore was charged with the difficult decision of reviewing Shaw's plea agreement. He chose to approve the agreement, when he could have chosen to reject it instead, especially in light of the State's pending motion to amend the charging information to add the charge of murder. But by approving the plea agreement, he established the possible sentence-ing range at a presumptive thirty years, with a minimum sentence of twenty years and a maximum sentence of fifty years. See Ind.Code § 35-50-2-4 (1998). In comparison, the possible sentencing range for murder would have been a presumptive sentence of fifty-five years, with a minimum sentence of forty-five years and a maximum sentence of sixty-five years. See Ind.Code § 35-50-2-8 (1998).
At the initial sentencing hearing, before the first appeal and remand, Judge Gilmore found the following valid aggravating circumstances: 1) Shaw's actions were but a part of a prolonged effort to harm Glu-mac; 2) Shaw was in a position of trust with Glumac and his family and Glumac was entirely dependent upon her help and care; 8) Glumac was seventy-three years old at the time the events took place; and 4) after Glumae was taken to the hospital upon ingesting the antifreeze, Shaw never offered any information to lumac's medical providers, which possibly could have saved his life. Appellant's App. pp. 81-82. In addition, the trial court found the following mitigating cireumstances: 1) Shaw pled guilty; 2) Shaw had no previous criminal history other than traffic-related matters; and 3) Shaw expressed remorse for her actions to Glumae's family.4 Id. at 82. Most importantly, however, in order to determine that Shaw's conduct warranted the maximum available sentence of fifty years, Judge Gilmore also incorrectly considered Mr. Glumae's death as an aggravating circumstance.
The death of Mr. Glumace obviously and understandably troubled Judge Gilmore at sentencing. However, as our court found in Shaw's first appeal, it was inappropriate to consider Mr. Glumac's death when sen*92tencing Shaw, and the case was remanded for re-sentencing on those grounds.
Upon re-sentencing, Judge Gilmore issued the following amended sentencing order: "[tlhe court has now engaged in the process of reweighing the valid aggravating circumstances and mitigating cireumstances and finds that the aggravating cireumstances outweigh the mitigating cireumstances. The Court further finds that the original sentence of fifty (50) years remains appropriate." Appellant's App. p. 107 (emphasis added).
The nature of Shaw's offense was a Class A felony, not murder. We should "consider the 'nature of the offense' in determining whether to revise the sentence imposed, as an indicator of a policy preference for imposition of the presumptive sentence." Bradley v. State, 770 N.E.2d 382, 388 n. 8 (2002) (citing Hildebrandt, 770 N.E.2d at 361). As we noted in Hildebrandt, "the presumptive sentence is meant to be the starting point for any court's consideration of the sentence which is appropriate for the crime committed." Hildebrandt, 770 N.E.2d at 361. In addition, part of our task upon review is to seek reasonable sentencing consistency statewide.
As the sentencing aggravators and mitigators disclose, the character of this offender clearly merits a sentence substantially in excess of the presumptive sentence. However, without the inappropriate aggravator of Mr. Glumac's death, and with the continued importance of the essentially mandatory mitigating cireum-stance of no significant prior eriminal history, Judge Gilmore's summary re-sentencing to the maximum available sentence of fifty years was manifestly unreasonable. I would therefore remand this case to the trial court with instruction to reduce Shaw's sentence to forty-five years.

. However, the trial court also noted that it was "somewhat troubled by the contents of letters written by the Defendant to another inmate at the LaPorte County Jail. The sincerity of the Defendant's expressed remorse is therefore questionable." Appellant's App. p. 82. ©