Court Opinion

ID: 9470013
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:55:08.653558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:41.124124
License: Public Domain

SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III, Chief Judge,
concurring:
I join in Parts I and 11(A) of the court’s opinion, and in the result reached by the court in Part 11(B). In my view, the court’s analysis in the latter part does not utilize sufficiently an element vitally important in determining whether trial-court proceedings reveal “plain error.” I thus feel constrained to add my thoughts on that subject.
In bargaining and proceedings ancillary to the case at bar, the prosecutor agreed to dismiss the gun charge against Robinson in exchange for her guilty plea to another charge and the judge accepted Robinson’s forthcoming plea. During Blackwell’s trial, however, both the judge and the prosecutor *1344indicated plainly that the gun charge might not and probably would not be dropped if Robinson testified that she, not Blackwell, had brought the weapons into the motel room in which they were seized.1 Blackwell, arguably influenced by these statements,2 then decided not to call Robinson as a defense witness, but did not in any way claim possible violation of his constitutional right to present witnesses in his defense. I agree that he thus cannot press this claim on appeal unless the statements constituted “plain error” within the meaning of Federal Criminal Rule 52(b).3
Recognizing that the plain error rule should be invoked only in exceptional circumstances,4 the court today finds it inapplicable primarily because (a) the issue portended has yet to be resolved by any federal court, (b) none of the trial participants spotted the problem, and (c) Blackwell has not demonstrated a clear causal connection between his decision not to call Robinson and the purported misinformation communicated to him by the judge and the prosecutor with respect to dismissal of the gun charge against Robinson.5 While these grounds might furnish acceptable support for the court’s finding that the proceedings under review do not reveal plain error, I believe there is another buttressing factor that merits treatment at some length.
It is an elemental and well-settled proposition that courts will not consider an issue first raised on a criminal appeal when the record is incomplete or lacks sufficient data to ensure sound resolution of the issue.6 To do otherwise would not only undermine the fundamental interest in accurate decision-making but would also unfairly penalize the Government, which in such circumstances has no meaningful opportunity to augment the record favorably to its cause.
This principle obviously applies here, for Blackwell neglected at trial to raise the constitutional claim he now would have us entertain, and thereby effectively deprived the Government of a chance to assemble and present evidence relevant thereto. In light of the incomplete record resulting, then, we must decline to examine Blackwell’s constitutional claim on its merits.7 The Government’s ability to formulate and articulate a persuasive legal argument in opposition to Blackwell’s proposed construction and application of the Sixth Amendment may have been handicapped significantly by absence of occasion to amplify the record on this point. Moreover, this record deficiency interposes substantial obstacles to sound judicial decisionmaking.8 Not only have any impediments to the Government’s *1345capacity to counter Blackwell’s constitutional arguments deprived us of the full benefits of the adversary process, but the inadequacy of the record obscures the factual contours of the problem and blurs perception of its legal ramifications. Indeed, a well-developed record is essential to decision of any question, especially one constitutional and novel in character, and the defective record we now have leaves open the possibility that factors relevant to resolution of the constitutional issue may escape judicial attention.9 Accordingly, I think there are good reasons to adhere in this case to traditional doctrine militating against a finding of plain error on a materially incomplete record.
Additionally, even if the court’s disposition of Blackwell’s newly-raised constitutional objection10 reflects proper limits on judicial power to rescind acceptance of a plea bargain, we cannot be certain that the Government would not prevail under this interpretation if afforded the opportunity to adduce further evidence. The court acknowledges that the Government would defeat Blackwell’s claim if it can show that Robinson engaged in fraudulent or deceitful conduct during the plea discussions11 *1346While we have no proof of such conduct, we also lack proof that it did not occur; the record simply does not address this point directly. Because this silence is attributable to Blackwell, and because the Government might have been able to produce evidence of such conduct if provided the chance to do so,12 we cannot properly conclude that the District Court committed error, much less plain error, in this case.
The court recognizes that Blackwell’s failure to present his constitutional claim to the District Court robbed the Government of an opportunity to prove fraud,13 but it does not seem fully to appreciate the import of this circumstance, as it nevertheless determines that the judge ultimately lacked power to rescind her acceptance of the plea agreement in this case,14 which necessarily implies that the court also has made the factual determination that no fraud occurred here. This latter conclusion, I submit, is entirely bereft of any factual basis in the record. Nor could it be justified by holding the Government responsible for the absence of evidence on the point, for, as the court acknowledges, the constitutional question to which such evidence bears relevance was not tendered by Blackwell. Indeed, Blackwell barely managed to raise on appeal the question whether the statements by the judge and the prosecutor revealed their misapprehension of the Government’s and the District Court’s obligation to adhere to the plea agreement; the only reference to it that I can discover is a single sentence in his brief.15 Moreover, as the court’s opinion today apparently is the first decision by a federal court that attempts in any way to explicate the law on this subject, the Government could not heretofore even have been confident that any exception for fraud or deceit would be available. In short, it seems to me that the Govern*1347ment has hardly been apprised of the relevance of fraud, much less afforded any sort of meaningful opportunity to pursue the circumstances of Robinson’s plea bargain. Any suggestion or factual determination by this court that Robinson did not engage in fraudulent or deceitful conduct is both premature and unfounded, and we thus should not prejudge the merits of the fraud question adversely to the Government on a record made barren by Blackwell’s own failure to register his objection seasonably.16
So, even if the court’s partial resolution of the constitutional issue belatedly advanced by Blackwell is a correct explication of the law, there remains the insuperable obstacle that the record on appeal does not afford an adequate foundation upon which to determine whether the remarks of the judge and the prosecutor in this case bred error of any sort. Much less, then, is there basis for holding that the District Court proceedings disclose the “miscarriage of justice” required by the Supreme Court for a finding of plain error within the terms of Rule 52(b).17

. See Trial Transcript (Tr.) 63, 129-130, 133, 226-228, 261, 263.

. See Tr. 265-267.

. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b).

. See Majority Opinion (Maj. Op.), text at note 23.

. Id. at 34-37.

. See Washington v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 223, 225-226, 414 F.2d 1119, 1121— 1122 (1969); United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 665 (8th Cir.1976); Robinson v. United States, 327 F.2d 618, 623 (8th Cir.1964); Spahr v. United States, 409 F.2d 1303, 1306 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 840, 90 S.Ct. 102, 24 L.Ed.2d 91 (1969); United States v. Lepinski, 460 F.2d 234, 239 (10th Cir.1972).

. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b) provides that the court may “notice” error if it is plain and affects substantial rights. My colleagues find that the statements by the judge and the prosecutor do not amount to plain error, but they nevertheless seem to “notice” the statements as error when they determine that the judge went amiss by informing Robinson that the weapons charge likely would not be dismissed if Robinson testified to possession of the weapons. This, I submit, is not entirely faithful to the textual dictates of Rule 52(b).

. See generally Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., 334 U.S. 249, 257, 68 S.Ct. 1031, 1034, 92 L.Ed. 1347, 1351 (1948) (refusing to address important legal question because, “[wjhile we might be able, on the present [inadequate] record, to reach a conclusion that would decide the case, it might well be found later to be lacking in the thoroughness that should precede judgment of this importance and which it is the purpose of the judicial process to provide”); Lee v. Habib, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 403, 409, 424 F.2d 891, 897 (1970) (“[tjhere can never be effective appellate review if the reviewing court is not able to obtain a clear picture of the precise nature of the alleged errors in the court below”).

. Independently of Rule 52(b), courts traditionally have refused to decide constitutional questions on an incomplete or inadequate record. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 546, 96 S.Ct. 2285, 2295, 49 L.Ed.2d 34, 47-48 (1976) (holding that courts should not decide important constitutional questions on less than an “ ‘adequate and full-bodied record’ ”) (quoting Public Affairs Assocs. v. Rickover, 369 U.S. 111, 113, 82 S.Ct. 580, 582, 7 L.Ed.2d 604, 607 (1962)); Tennessee Publishing Co. v. American Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 18, 22, 57 S.Ct. 85, 87, 81 L.Ed. 13, 15 (1936) (“[i]t is a familiar rule that the court will not anticipate the decision of a constitutional question upon a record which does not appropriately present it”). See also Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402, 426-427, 94 S.Ct. 2274, 2288, 41 L.Ed.2d 159, 178 (1974); Alabama State Fed’n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461-462, 65 S.Ct. 1384, 1389-1390, 89 L.Ed. 1725, 1734-1735 (1945); Allen-Bradley Local 1111, United Elec. Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd, 315 U.S. 740, 746, 62 S.Ct. 820, 824, 86 L.Ed. 1154, 1163 (1942); Wilshire Oil Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 100, 102-103, 55 S.Ct. 673, 674, 79 L.Ed. 1329, 1331 (1935); Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U.S. 8, 22, 52 S.Ct. 103, 108, 76 L.Ed. 136, 145 (1931). See generally Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 588 & n. 2, 92 S.Ct. 1716, 1719 & n. 2, 32 L.Ed.2d 317, 322 & n. 2 (1972) (court should not decide constitutional question unless the question is “presented with the clarity needed for effective adjudication”); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 584, 67 S.Ct. 1409, 1427, 91 L.Ed. 1666, 1686 (1947) (court should not decide constitutional question unless the question is presented in “clean-cut and concrete form”); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132, 57 S.Ct. 650, 655, 81 L.Ed. 953, 960 (1937) (court will not resolve constitutional question on basis of hypothetical facts). Additionally, courts frequently have adverted to the longstanding precept that they should not formulate rules of constitutional law broader than required by the facts. E.g., Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 136-137, 97 S.Ct. 1709, 1719, 52 L.Ed.2d 184, 197 (1977); Alabama State Fed’n of Labor v. McAdory, supra, 325 U.S. at 461-462, 65 S.Ct. at 1389-1390, 89 L.Ed. at 1734-1735; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 483, 80 L.Ed. 688, 711 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Liverpool, N.Y. & Phil. S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39, 5 S.Ct. 352, 355, 28 L.Ed. 899, 901 (1885). It would seem a logical outgrowth of these holdings that when, as here, the record is materially deficient, the court should not undertake any constitutional pronouncement at all, as its knowledge of relevant facts is limited at best. Indeed, we would depart from the deference historically extended to the importance and delicacy of constitutional adjudication, see Kremens v. Bartley, supra, 431 U.S. at 127-128, 97 S.Ct. at 1714, 52 L.Ed.2d at 192; Wheeler v. Barrera, supra, 417 U.S. at 426, 94 S.Ct. at 2288, 41 L.Ed.2d at 178; Ashwander v. TVA, supra, 297 U.S. at 345, 56 S.Ct. at 482, 80 L.Ed. at 710 (Brandeis, J., concurring), were we to decide Blackwell’s belatedly-posed, novel issue of constitutional law on the seriously incomplete record before us.

. See Maj. Op., text at notes 13-20. The court today concludes on statutory grounds that the judge’s statements demonstrate misapprehension of the limitations on her power to rescind judicial acceptance of a plea agreement. The court does not, however, unequivocally hold that the statements violated Blackwell’s Sixth Amendment rights, though it says that they “probably” did. Id., text at note 23. Because, for lack of plain error, we need not reach these questions, I express no opinion as to their proper resolution.

. Id., text at note 18 & note 18. The scope of this exception, if it exists at all, is as yet ill-defined, and may ultimately prove broad enough to include various misrepresentations by a defendant to the Government. If so, this *1346increases the likelihood that the Government would have been able, had it been given the chance, to introduce evidence showing that Blackwell’s Sixth Amendment rights were not infringed.

. The record suggests that this possibility might not be academic. When confronted with Robinson’s readiness to waive her privilege against self-incrimination by testifying for Blackwell — perhaps to say that she had brought the seized weapons into the motel room, see Tr. at 127 — the judge and the prosecutor raised the specter of perjury and questioned the voluntariness of the waiver, id. at 127-130. This behavior might indicate awareness of earlier representations by Robinson that she had not transported the weapons. Of course, we cannot know whether these representations occurred or, if so, whether they would have justified the Government reneging on its agreement to dismiss the gun charge against Robinson had she testified to possession of the weapons. But the fact that the judge and the prosecutor acted in a manner consistent with the existence of such representations should only bolster our resolve not to prejudge the merits of the issue adversely to the Government on an incomplete record for which Blackwell is responsible.

. See Maj. Op. at 1342.

. See id., text at notes 13-20. My colleagues seek to defend their holding, that the judge erred when she stated that the gun charge probably would not be dismissed if Robinson testified to possession of the weapons, in part on the ground that courts often decide whether the trial court committed error before they reach the question whether the error was plain within the contemplation of Rule 52(b). See id. at note 22. Of the cases cited in purported support of this proposition, however, none involves, as does the case at bar, a materially deficient or incomplete record; accordingly, none constitutes relevant authority in support of my colleagues’ decision to reach the statutory question implicated by Blackwell’s constitutional claim. I would emphasize that the cynosure of my position is not, as my colleagues apparently misapprehend, see id., merely that the Government has had no opportunity to respond to Blackwell’s Sixth Amendment claim at trial; it is, rather that this deprivation has created a seriously inadequate record, upon which any determination by this court that the judge misconceived her power to abrogate acceptance of Robinson’s plea would be premature, unfounded, and in violation of Rule 52(b). The inappropriateness of any decision on the merits of Blackwell’s untimely claim, moreover, is indeed heightened with respect to the larger constitutional issue that my colleagues do not resolve, for traditional principles of federal jurisprudence reinforce the requirement of Rule 52(b) that we not decide constitutional questions on a seriously flawed record. It is for these reasons that I concur in the court’s holding that the statements by the judge and the prosecutor do not constitute plain error.

. See Brief for Appellant at 15-16.

. See Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 291, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 1063, 92 L.Ed. 1356, 1372 (1948) (“[a]ppellate courts cannot make factual determinations which may be decisive of vital rights where the crucial facts have not been developed”); Brown v. Collins, 131 U.S.App.D.C. 68, 72, 402 F.2d 209, 213 (1968) (‘‘[wjhere the record shows no reference to the legal claim, the facts must be unambiguous before an appellate determination cutting off or requiring retrial is proper”).

. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1592 n. 14, 71 L.Ed.2d 816, 827 n. 14 (1982).