Court Opinion

ID: 9894201
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-31 20:04:05.342785+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:00.063139
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/31/23 L.J. v. R. J. CA4/3

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 L.J.,

      Respondent,                                                      G061890

           v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 21D007379)

 R.J.,                                                                 OPINION

      Appellant.

                   Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Carmen R.
Luege, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
                   Strunk Loos and Shannon R. Thomas for Appellant.
                   Sarieh Law Offices, Wail Sarieh and Jennifer Axelrod for Respondent.
                   L.J. (Wife) and R.J. (Husband), who are now going through a marital
dissolution, are the parents of three young children. It is unclear when their relationship
began to deteriorate, but certainly by late 2021, the marriage was on an untenable path
and Wife was seeing someone else.
              Wife filed for divorce after seeking and obtaining a temporary domestic
violence restraining order (DVRO) against Husband. In October 2021, Husband had
wielded a weapon inside the couple’s home and threatened to kill her (the gun incident).
Even so, her request for a permanent DVRO was denied, with the judge then presiding,
leaving the door open to reconsideration if there were new allegations. The DVRO and
marital dissolution proceedings were merged.
              A little less than one year later, Wife filed a new request for a DVRO. This
time, she pointed to a pattern of controlling and obsessive behavior by Husband, in
addition to the gun incident. She also told the trial court her children were essentially
being threatened and/or weaponized against her by Husband, and that he was
systematically turning neighbors and friends against her. She wanted a DVRO protecting
her and the children. The court granted the DVRO and ordered Husband to obtain a
mental health assessment.
              Husband appeals not just the grant of the DVRO, but also its requirement
that he obtain a mental health evaluation and treatment plan. The trial court felt he was
struggling to cope with the breakdown of his marriage and his wife’s new relationship,
and his struggles were becoming a danger to himself and his children. We appreciate the
court’s concerns. However, we agree with Husband that the assessment order was an
abuse of discretion. We reverse this aspect of the court’s ruling and remand it so the
issue can be corrected. We affirm the remainder of the DVRO.
                                          FACTS
              Wife and Husband had an argument before Husband left for work.
Husband awakened Wife and accused her of being in love with her personal trainer
(Boyfriend). He then told her he was going to “go get a gun to kill us all.” According to

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Wife, this was not the first time Husband had threatened to kill her—indeed, he had just
                                   1
made the threat the week before.
              Husband proceeded to remove a handgun from the family gun safe and
carry it in front of Wife. Wife took a video of this incident and sent the video to her
mother. She “thought he was going to kill” her and the children, and she wanted her
mother to “have a record of it.”
              Wife’s mother notified the police, who responded to the couple’s residence
after Husband had departed for work. Husband was ultimately arrested and an
emergency protective order was issued because of the incident.
              The following day, Wife filed an ex parte request for a DVRO. A
temporary DVRO issued that day, and a hearing was conducted to consider the possibility
of a permanent DVRO. After hearing testimony from Wife and Husband, the judge
presiding at the time declined to issue a permanent DVRO. Husband had testified he had
gotten the gun because he was concerned Boyfriend might be able to access it. The judge
seemed to think Husband’s concern about his wife’s frequent communication with
Boyfriend was credible. Having watched Wife’s video of the gun incident, the judge
noted Husband had walked around with the gun in his hand, but had then secured it in his
waistband behind him and later put it back. According to the judge, Husband did not
appear to threaten anyone or lose his temper in the video. The judge also questioned
whether Husband had ever made any threats because Wife had never called the police
and had waited several weeks to seek a restraining order after Husband supposedly began
making the threats. The court left open the possibility that grounds for a permanent
DVRO might later come to light, stating Wife could refile based on any new allegations.
Shortly after filing for the DVRO, Wife initiated divorce proceedings.

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               Husband testified he had caught Wife and Boyfriend in a compromising
position in the back of Boyfriend’s truck about 10 days prior.

                                             3
              In March 2022, the Orange County Sheriff’s Department sought and
obtained a gun violence restraining order (GVRO) against Husband based on the gun
incident. At the GVRO hearing, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence
that Husband posed a significant danger to himself or others by possessing firearms. He
was required to surrender his firearms and prohibited from possessing any for a period of
five years.
              In April 2022, Husband and Wife were to do a custody exchange of the
children in front of the family home. Husband chose to record the exchange and insisted
he be permitted to enter the residence to view some slab-leak damage that had occurred.
The video shows Wife was clearly uncomfortable allowing Husband to enter the home.
              Friends and neighbors of the couple began to publicly rebuke and harass
Wife over her dispute with Husband, starting in February 2022. In February, one of
Husband’s close friends had a written and public exchange with Wife on Facebook,
faulting her for the situation. In May, the couple’s neighbor across the street called Wife
“Amber,” a pejorative comparison to an actress who had been successfully sued by her
former husband for defamation. The neighbor further testified she offered to take
pictures of Boyfriend’s truck to help Husband prove Boyfriend was living at the
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residence. Husband’s father also e-mailed Wife a photograph he had of her and wrote
the word “slut.”
              On July 1, 2022, Wife filed a new request for DVRO. Her declaration in
support of the request cited not only the gun incident, but all of the ensuing conduct
summarized above, as well as the GVRO. Wife believed the previous denial of her
permanent DVRO request had only “emboldened” Husband. The request was heard by a
new judge in August 2022.

2
              Wife had been friendly with this neighbor prior to the gun incident.

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              In addition to testimony from Wife, Husband, and their neighbors,
Boyfriend testified he was staying in Wife’s house for her protection after the gun
incident. He testified Wife has a lot of nightmares and seemed scared of Husband.
              Boyfriend also testified to the negative impact the discord had on the
children. He claimed the six-year-old son had walked up to him after completing a visit
with his dad, punched him in the groin, and said, “My dad told me to do that to you.”
The child then turned to Wife, gestured as if to slit his own throat and said, “My daddy
told me to do that to you.” On another occassion, Boyfriend recalled waking up around
midnight or 1:00 a.m. and finding the child standing over Wife with a knife in his hand.
She was trying to talk to him, and he simply held the knife over her and said, “My daddy
told me to slit your throat in your sleep.” Further, he said the oldest child, a daughter,
had become reluctant to visit with her dad. The youngest child, only four years old at the
time, reported she had dreamed that her father was drowning her. Boyfriend was cross-
examined by Husband’s attorney, and Boyfriend’s testimony did not vary.
              At the conclusion of testimony, the trial court granted a DVRO protecting
Wife and the children for a period of three years. The court expressed grave concern
about Husband’s mental state and his response to his wife’s relationship with Boyfriend.
It wanted a mental health assessment before it would consider allowing Husband any
visitation with his children.
                                       DISCUSSION
              Husband’s arguments can be grouped into two categories. First are those
pertaining to whether it was proper for the trial court to grant Wife’s petition for DVRO
at all. Second are those pertaining to the court’s order requiring Husband to obtain a
mental health assessment. We take each category up separately.

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I. Grant of the DVRO
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              “The purpose of the [Domestic Violence Prevention Act ] is ‘to prevent
acts of domestic violence, abuse . . . and to provide for a separation of the persons
involved in the domestic violence for a period sufficient to enable these persons to seek a
resolution of the causes of the violence.’ [Citation.] To that end, the DVPA provides for
the issuance of restraining orders that enjoin ‘abuse.’ Sections 6203 and 6320 define
‘abuse’ to include stalking, harassment, striking, and battering. [Citations.] A trial court
has broad discretion under the DVPA to determine whether to grant a petition for a
restraining order. [Citation.] [¶] We review an order granting or denying a DVRO for
abuse of discretion. [Citation.] In reviewing the trial court’s factual findings, we apply
the substantial evidence rule. [Citation.] The inquiry is whether substantial evidence
supports the court’s finding, not whether a contrary finding might have been made.
[Citation.] We accept as true all evidence tending to establish the correctness of the trial
court’s findings and resolve every conflict in favor of the judgment. [Citation.]” (M.S. v.
A.S. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1139, 1143-1144.)
              The DVPA does not encompass just physical abuse or harassment, but also
“coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of the other party, and, in
the discretion of the court, on a showing of good cause, of other named family or
household members.” (§ 6320, subd. (a).)
              As this court recently summarized, “‘“[T]he plain meaning of the phrase
‘disturbing the peace of the other party’ in section 6320 may be properly understood as
conduct that destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party.”’ [Citation.] What
disturbs the peace of a person differs in each case. [Citations.]” (K.L. v. R.H. (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 965, 981.)

3
              Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) Family Code, section 6200 et
seq. All further statutory references are to the Family Code, unless otherwise indicated.

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               Husband argues the trial court improperly relied on information contained
in transcripts and records from the GVRO matter in March 2022. He also believes the
previous judge’s refusal to issue a permanent DVRO should have had res judicata effect
as to whether the gun incident constituted domestic violence. Without the GVRO or the
gun incident, Husband says, Wife could not have met her burden to show “reasonable
proof of a past act or acts of abuse” by a preponderance of the evidence. (§ 6300, subd.
(a).) We disagree.
A. GVRO
               In preparation for the DVRO hearing, Wife asked the trial court to take
judicial notice of the November 2021, DVRO hearing transcript, two GVRO hearing
transcripts from March 2022, and the GVRO issued on March 10, 2022. The court
granted this request and took judicial notice of these materials. As it issued its ruling
from the bench, the court found several facts compelling in its review of the GVRO
transcripts.
               The court noted the GVRO was prosecuted by the sheriff, not by Wife, and
the GVRO would only expire after five years, rather than a shorter time period. The
court also observed that GVRO proceedings are pursuant to Penal Code section 18175,
by which the petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the subject
poses a danger to himself or others through possession of firearms. (Pen. Code, § 18175,
subd. (a).) When Husband went to the family home in April 2022, said the court, he
already knew the GVRO had been adjudicated against him. Finally, the court recited a
fact which apparently had been adduced at the GVRO hearing: Husband potentially had
access to a .40-caliber rifle owned by his father. This worried the court.
               Husband is correct that the GVRO transcripts were never taken into
evidence, and thus, the only method by which the trial court could consider them was
through judicial notice. Under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d), the court can
take notice of the records of any state court. However, this does not mean the

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truthfulness and proper interpretation of the records are indisputable. (See Copenbarger
v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, Inc. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1, 14-15.) It was error
for the court to have considered the contents of the transcripts for their truth.
              It is proper for the trial court to take judicial notice of an order of the court
contained within the court record. Here, the court could take judicial notice of the GVRO
itself. The GVRO is a part of the record because it was attached as an exhibit to Wife’s
declaration in support of her DVRO request. The GVRO proves most of the facts
highlighted by the court—the GVRO’s duration, the applicable evidentiary standard, and
                                                     4
its date of issuance relative to Husband’s conduct. The GVRO does not prove whether
Husband’s father owned a rifle and whether Husband had access to that rifle. Therefore,
the court could not rely on these facts. But setting aside inadmissible testimony, and
considering only the proper judicially noticed facts, we find sufficient admissible
evidence exists to support the court’s conclusion.
              Husband says the trial court’s consideration of the GVRO was an abuse of
discretion because GVRO proceedings are governed by a clear and convincing evidence
standard, whereas DVRO’s are governed by a preponderance of the evidence standard.
He is correct about the differing standards, but we do not see how this helps him. In a
case in which the petitioner’s evidentiary burden was higher, Husband was found to be a
danger to himself and others.
B. Effect of November 2021 Hearing
              “The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel bar relitigation of a
factual dispute even when the factual dispute was erroneously decided in favor of a party
who did not testify. [Citations.] ‘“Collateral estoppel” is an awkward phrase, but it

4
               Indeed, the GVRO, printed on California Judicial Council form GV-030,
clearly states, “The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that . . . [¶] . . . the
Restrained Person poses a significant danger of causing personal injury to themselves or
another by having in their custody or control, owning, purchasing, possessing, or
receiving firearms, ammunition, or magazines.”

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stands for an extremely important principle in our adversary system of justice. It means
simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final
judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future
lawsuit.’ [Citation.]” (Hawkins v. SunTrust Bank (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1393.)
                Husband would have preferred that Wife be collaterally estopped from
resurrecting the gun incident. But the previous judge’s ruling pertaining to it did not have
preclusive effect. We can glean this from the previous judge’s own words: “[T]he court
cannot conclude that domestic violence has occurred based on this record. [¶] . . . [¶] . . .
I’m denying the request for a [DVRO]. However, any party is free to refile based on new
allegations. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [I]t appears to the court that there is little to no chance that
these circumstances will reoccur. So under these circumstances, the court denies the
request for a [DVRO]. [¶] As stated, any party can reapply should the need arise in the
future.” (Italics added.)
                If anything, the November 2021 ruling would only have precluded Wife
from reapplying for a DVRO based on the exact same allegations stated in her previous
petition. This she did not do. She listed the gun incident in her 2022 petition, and added
several new allegations: the GVRO, the April 2022 incident, her children’s disturbing
statements, and third-party antipathy toward her which she believed was being fomented
by Husband. The trial court was correct to consider the gun incident in light of the new
allegations.
C. New Allegations
                Given our determinations that portions of the GVRO and the gun incident
were properly considered by the trial court and were sufficient to establish a disturbance
of Wife’s and the children’s peace, we need not opine on whether Wife had sufficient
additional evidence, standing alone, to support issuance of the order.

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II. Mental Health Assessment Order
              Wife did not just seek to avoid contact with Husband. She asked the trial
court to order him to complete a batterer intervention program and seek help for anger
management. After hearing all of the testimony and considering all of the evidence, the
trial court seemed to take Wife’s request to heart—it ordered “a mental assessment” of
Husband. It did so because it found Husband’s actions and demeanor troubling: “I don’t
know how to look at this evidence and not walk away thinking this is not a close case. . . .
The way that you testified to me, you have this monotone tone to it. I looked at you, you
never made any eye contact with me. Even when I asked you questions, you didn’t make
any eye contact. [¶] It speaks to me of someone who is controlling the anger but afraid
that the anger be seen. So you have this very monotone control approach, and I think that
behind that is all the anger that you’re carrying because you do feel victimized by the
affair, and I’m not here to tell you [sic] shouldn’t feel victimized. But I am going to tell
you [sic] need to deal with those feelings.”
              The trial court had also previously ordered Wife and Husband to do co-
parenting therapy, but no therapy had occurred. This clearly irked the court: “I have to
tell you that with regards to your emotions, I find it difficult that you are not in therapy.
And that despite my insistence of the co-parenting therapy, that that hasn’t happened. . . .
[¶] . . . I told you the other day you must follow the court order and, frankly, at this point,
I want a mental assessment . . . by a professional. [¶] And I want a plan of action to deal
with whatever mental issues he’s dealing with as a result of the affair, as a result of
whatever victimization he thinks he’s going through because I think that has to get
resolved before he sees the kids. I’ve got to get that resolved.”
              Husband challenges this aspect of the DVRO on several grounds: (1) the
trial court had no authority under the DVPA to order a mental health assessment, (2) even
if it did, the order was unconstitutionally broad and vague, (3) there was no evidence
Husband had a mental health condition or required treatment, (4) there was no notice to

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him that such a procedure could be ordered, and (5) the order improperly shifted the
burden from the trial court to Husband to seek out and obtain the appropriate assessment.
While we find the trial court had discretion to order a mental evaluation, we agree with
Husband that its ultimate order was outside the scope of this discretion.
               “‘“The discretion of a trial judge is not a whimsical, uncontrolled power,
but a legal discretion, which is subject to the limitations of legal principles governing the
subject of its action, and to reversal on appeal where no reasonable basis for the action is
shown. [Citation.]”’ [Citations.] The scope of discretion always resides in the particular
law being applied, i.e., in the ‘legal principles governing the subject of [the] action . . . .’
Action that transgresses the confines of the applicable principles of law is outside the
scope of discretion and we call such action an ‘abuse’ of discretion. [Citation.] If the
trial court is mistaken about the scope of its discretion the mistaken position may be
‘reasonable’, i.e., one as to which reasonable judges could differ. [Citation.] But if the
trial court acts in accord with its mistaken view the action is nonetheless error; it is wrong
on the law.” (City of Sacramento v. Drew (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1287, 1297-1298.)
Although the trial court was understandably concerned given its observations of
Husband, its action was erroneous.
               While the trial court enjoys broad discretion under the DVPA, there is no
provision in it permitting the court to order a mental health assessment. The only
provision in the DVPA authorizing any sort of counseling is section 6343, through which
the court can order the restrained party to complete a batterers intervention program.
               While a psychiatric assessment may be advisable in a family law case to
determine custody, the court “is not empowered to order an individual to undergo
involuntary psychiatric therapy for an indefinite period of time” where the record does
not support it. (Camacho v. Camacho (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 214, 221.) Indeed, such an
order would represent “a significant curtailment of [a litigant’s] liberty.” (See In re
Marriage of Matthews (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 811, 818.) As a result, when a family

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court feels mental health services may be required to make final custody or visitation
determinations, it must be mindful of the authority the law gives it. Its order can and
must adequately safeguard a party’s rights, and this is best done by procedures
formulated and delineated by the Legislature.
                 The trial court made numerous observations of Husband which were a basis
for its concern. But we would suggest caution when taking the next step and opining
what the underlying causes may be for the behavior. This is best left to mental health
professionals.
                 As Husband correctly observes, the order is outside the DVPA authority.
Section 3190 allows the family court to require parents to participate in outpatient
counseling for a period of one year if counseling would be in the child’s best interest and
the custody dispute poses a substantial danger to his or her best interest. (Id. at subd. (a).)
The court may also make appropriate orders as to the cost of counseling and
arrangements to pay for it. (Id. at subd. (c).) It must set out the reasons for the findings it
makes on the record. (Id. at subd. (d).) Here, the trial court did not mention section 3190
and made none of the specific findings required by it.
                 Section 3111 allows the court to appoint a child custody evaluator where
the court feels it is in the best interest of the child. Section 3112 requires the court to
inquire into the parents’ financial condition to determine if they are able to reimburse the
court for the evaluator’s cost.
                 Also, Evidence Code section 730 allows the court to appoint an expert to
investigate and report on any fact or matter “as to which the expert evidence is or may be
required.” A family court does not abuse its discretion when it appoints such an expert to
conduct a psychiatric evaluation of clearly troubled litigants if it deems it “necessary . . .
to resolve the custody and visitation issues before the court.” (In re Marriage of Kim
(1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 364, 372.)

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              The trial court’s vague order in the DVRO did not comport with any of
these statutory authorities. It ordered Husband to “undergo a psychiatric assessment by a
psychiatrist or psychologist with a report and treatment plan submitted to the court at
least [five] days prior to the next hearing.” The court did not appoint the provider to
ensure the opinion it would receive would be focused and worthy of reliance. It made no
written findings as to the need for an evaluation, or the duration of any treatment that
might be needed. Nor did it make a provision for the psychiatrist or psychologist’s
compensation. We therefore reverse and remand this component of the DVRO for the
trial court to fashion an appropriate mental health assessment order that complies with
                                 5
existing statutory procedures.
                                      DISPOSITION
              The order granting respondent’s request for a DVRO is affirmed. Only the
portion of the order requiring appellant to obtain a psychiatric evaluation and treatment
plan is reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The parties are to bear their own
costs on appeal.

                                                  O’LEARY, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

MOTOIKE, J.

DELANEY, J.

5
            In light of this conclusion, we need not consider Husband’s other
arguments about the order’s purported inadequacies.

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