Court Opinion

ID: 9693939
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:11:13.164035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:08:39.399099
License: Public Domain

J-A02037-23

    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    ALLEN DONALD BORN                          :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 30 WDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 1, 2021
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
                 Criminal Division at CP-02-CR-0005815-2020

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., MURRAY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                          FILED: August 25, 2023

       Allen Donald Born (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed after the trial court convicted him of failure to comply with sex

offender registration requirements.1 We affirm.

       The trial court summarized the relevant procedural history as follows:

       [Appellant] pled guilty on September 10, 2011[,] to one count of
       indecent assault of a person less than 13 years of age (18 Pa.C.S.
       § 3126(a)(7)). [The trial court sentenced Appellant to five years
       of probation.] At that time, [Appellant] was ordered to register
       as a sex offender for a period of ten (10) years.[2] In 2012, when

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.2(a)(1).

2 Beginning in 1995, the General Assembly enacted a series of statutes
requiring convicted sex offenders living in the Commonwealth to register with
the State Police upon release from prison. At the time of Appellant’s offense
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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       [the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA I)3]
       was enacted, [Appellant’s] registration status changed from a ten
       (10) year registration period to a lifetime registration period. In
       2017, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued its [plurality]
       opinion in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017).
       The Muniz Court held that retroactive application of SORNA [I]
       constitutes an ex post facto violation of the Pennsylvania
       Constitution. Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1223.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/1/22, at 4 (footnotes added).

       After the Muniz decision, Appellant filed a Post Conviction Relief Act

(PCRA)4 petition requesting relief from his registration requirement.        On

November 28, 2017, the PCRA court granted partial relief, stating:

       [Appellant] is not required to register under SORNA [I] as a sex
       offender, because under Commonwealth v. Muniz, … it would
       be an ex post facto violation of the Constitution of Pennsylvania.
       However, [Appellant’s] reporting requirements under Megan’s Law
       II remain in effect. By virtue of his Indecent Assault Person Less
       than 13 Years of Age—M1 (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3125(A)(7)) conviction,
       [Appellant] is required to register under Megan’s Law II for a
       period of ten years.

PCRA Court Order, 11/28/17. Appellant did not appeal.

       Thereafter, in response to Muniz, the General Assembly

       returned to the drawing board and redrafted SORNA into two
       subchapters: Subchapter H and Subchapter I. Subchapter H
       governs those whose offenses occurred after December 20,
       2012. Subchapter I applies to those whose offenses were
       completed prior to that date.
____________________________________________

and sentence, he was subject to the ten-year reporting requirement set forth
in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § § 9791-9799.9 (Megan’s Law II).

3 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.41 (2012).

4 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.

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Commonwealth v. Santana, 266 A.3d 528, 530 n.7 (Pa. 2021).

      On August 12, 2020, nearly three years after the PCRA court granted

Appellant partial relief, the Commonwealth charged him with one count of

failure to register. The trial court explained:

      City of Pittsburgh Detective Michael Nowe [(Detective Nowe)] was
      conducting a proactive compliance check on Megan’s Law
      offenders in the 15234[-]zip code on August 12, 2020. On that
      date, he was investigating the compliance status of [Appellant].
      Detective Nowe testified that [Appellant] has had to register since
      2011 and was a 10[-]year registrant. Detective Nowe testified
      that [Appellant’s] last known registered address was 44 Briggs
      Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15234 [(the Briggs Street residence)]. On
      August 12, 2020, Detective Nowe went to [the Briggs Street
      residence] and “made contact with the current occupant,” Donna
      Terlecki [(Terlecki)]. [Appellant] was not at that address.

      [] Terlecki testified that she began to live at [the Briggs Street
      residence] on July 1, 2019. She further testified that she knows
      [Appellant], but he has never lived with her at [the Briggs Street
      residence,] and he moved out the day she moved into that
      residence.

            [Appellant] testified that he is required to register under the
      sex offender registry and had most recently registered on
      September 19, 2020. [Appellant] testified that he was forced out
      of [the Briggs Street residence] and moved into a homeless
      shelter. He continued to use [the Briggs Street residence] as his
      mailing address. [Appellant] testified that he did not register at
      the homeless shelter because it was across the street from a
      school and the shelter did not want problems.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/1/22, at 2-3 (record citations omitted).

      Following a bench trial on September 10, 2021, the trial court convicted

Appellant of failure to register. On December 1, 2021, with the benefit of a

presentence investigation report, the trial court sentenced Appellant to one

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year of probation. Appellant filed this timely appeal. Appellant and the trial

court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Appellant presents the following issue for review:

      Where [Appellant’s] PCRA … was granted on November 28,
      2017[,] and purported to impose registration conditions pursuant
      to the long-repealed Megan’s Law II, was the effect of that order
      to remove [Appellant] from the registry? Put another way, should
      the trial court have granted [Appellant’s] Motion to Dismiss
      because his period of registration expired when the PCRA court
      ruled that SORNA [I] did not apply to him?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

      Appellant raises a question of law. Therefore, our scope of review is

plenary    and   we   review   the   trial   court’s   determinations   de   novo.

Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 234 A.3d 602, 608 (Pa. 2020).

      Appellant argues the PCRA court’s 2017 order “had the legal effect of

terminating his registration requirement, requiring dismissal of the instant

case.”    Appellant’s Brief at 10.   Appellant acknowledges the PCRA court

required his continued registration under Megan’s Law II.         Id.   However,

Appellant claims he “could legally never have been subjected to the

requirements of Megan’s Law II” or its successors. Id. Appellant asserts the

effect of the PCRA court’s order invalidating his SORNA I registration

requirement “was to hold that [Appellant’s] registration requirements

expired.” Id.

      Appellant relies on our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v.

Derhammer, 173 A.3d 723 (Pa. 2017), concluding that the trial court and

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this Court “cannot revive Megan’s Law II to fill the gap the General Assembly

created in unconstitutionally applying SORNA [I] ex post facto.” Appellant’s

Brief at 25. According to Appellant, the enactment of SORNA I repudiated the

prior versions of Megan’s Law.             Id.     Appellant asserts: “SORNA’s

unconstitutionality [] applied retroactively did not revive Megan’s Law II.” Id.

at 26. Therefore, Appellant argues, “there was no text appearing in any valid

aspect of the Crimes Code which made [Appellant’s] conduct an offense.” Id.

(quoting Derhammer, 173 A.3d at 729).

       Appellant further asserts:

       Because [the PCRA court’s] order effectively removed his
       registration requirements, [he] cannot now be compelled to
       register under Subchapter I, because his “period of registration”
       had expired via both [the PCRA court’s] ruling and the Supreme
       Court’s holding in [Commonwealth v. Nieman, 84 A.3d 603 (Pa.
       2013)], and Muniz, supra.

Id. at 28-29. Appellant’s reliance on Derhammer and Nieman is misplaced.

       In Neiman, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Megan’s Law III

was unconstitutional in its entirety because it was included in a bill that

violated the single subject rule.    Nieman, 84 A.3d 606.         Recognizing the

possible impact of its decision, the Supreme Court stayed its effect for 90

days    to   allow   the   Legislature    “to    consider   appropriate   remedial

measures.” Neiman, 84 A.3d at 616. In response, the General Assembly

modified Section 9799.13(3) to clarify that persons who were required to

register any time before SORNA I’s effective date, and whose registration

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period had not expired, were still required to register.   See 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9799.13(3) (effective 2014).

     In Derhammer, the Supreme Court held the defendant could not be

prosecuted for violating Megan’s Law III because at the time he was

charged with failing to register, Megan’s Law III had been voided as

unconstitutional. Derhammer, 173 A.3d at 729-30.

     Instantly, Appellant was charged with failing to comply with Subchapter

I’s 10-year registration requirement in violation of Crimes Code Section

4915.2(a)(1). 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.2(a)(1); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.

At the time Appellant failed to register, Subchapter I imposed a ten-year

registration requirement on

     (A) Individuals convicted within this Commonwealth of any of the
     following offenses committed on or after April 22, 1996, but before
     December 20, 2012:

     ….

     18 Pa.C.S. § 3126 (relating to indecent assault) where the offense
     is graded as a misdemeanor of the first degree or higher.

     ….

     (B) Individuals convicted within this Commonwealth of an offense
     set forth in clause (A) who were required to register with the
     Pennsylvania State Police under a former sexual offender
     registration law of this Commonwealth on or after April 22, 1996,
     but before December 20, 2012, whose period of registration has
     not expired.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.55(a)(1)(i)(A), (B).

     Subchapter I expressly states:

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       This subchapter shall apply to individuals who were:

       (1) convicted of a sexually violent offense committed on or after
       April 22, 1996, but before December 20, 2012, whose period of
       registration with the Pennsylvania State Police, as described in
       section 9799.55 (relating to registration), has not expired; or

       (2) required to register with the Pennsylvania State Police under
       a former sexual offender registration law of this Commonwealth
       on or after April 22, 1996, but before December 20, 2012, whose
       period of registration has not expired.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.52.5

       Unlike Derhammer, which involved Megan’s Law III, Subchapter I was

not void in 2021 when Appellant was prosecuted. We recently explained:

         Subchapter I addresses sexual offenders who committed an
         offense on or after April 22, 1996, but before December 20,
         2012; or those who were required to register under a former
         sexual offender registration law of this Commonwealth on or
         after April 22, 1996, but before December 20, 2012, whose
         period of registration has not expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
         999.52. …

         In Commonwealth v. Lacombe,           Pa. , 234 A.3d 602
         (2020), our Supreme Court held that Subchapter I of [Act 29]
         is nonpunitive and does not violate the constitutional
         prohibition against ex post facto laws. See id. at , 234
         A.3d at 626-27. See also Commonwealth v. Elliott, 249
         A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2021) (rejecting ex post
____________________________________________

5
  Appellant did not appeal the PCRA court’s imposition of Megan’s Law II’s
reporting requirements. Accordingly, Appellant waived any challenge to the
legality of that sentence. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cline, 177 A.3d 922,
927 (Pa. Super. 2017) (observing, in the context of Pa.R.A.P. 302(a), that
“issues, even those of constitutional dimension, are waived” if not timely
raised); see also Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 256 A.3d 1242, 1261 (Pa.
Super. 2021) (en banc) (Bowes, J., concurring) (“Likewise, it has long been
true that failure to raise an issue in the trial court, even one of constitutional
dimension, results in waiver of the issue on appeal.”).

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        facto challenge to lifetime registration for rape conviction
        where appellant was subject to Subchapter I reporting
        requirements).

Commonwealth v. Lippincott, 273 A.3d 1157, 1163 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en

banc) (emphasis in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hubert, 276 A.3d

210, 2022 WL 628630, at *3 (Pa. Super. filed Mar. 4, 2022) (unpublished

memorandum at *3)); see also Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (providing that non-

precedential decisions filed after May 1, 2019, “may be cited for their

persuasive value”).

     Appellant does not dispute his 2011 conviction of indecent assault of a

child less than 13 years old occurred “on or after April 22, 1996, but before

December 20, 2012.” Appellant’s ten-year registration period had not expired

at the time of Subchapter I’s enactment, or when Appellant failed to register

in 2020.   See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.52.       As Subchapter I’s registration

requirements applied to Appellant, his issue does not merit relief. See id.;

see also Lippincott, 273 A.3d 1163.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

     Judge Pellegrini joins the memorandum.

     Judge Bowes files a concurring memorandum.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/25/2023

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