Court Opinion

ID: 9713488
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:16:10.406277+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:18.974820
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE STOUDER, dissenting: I respectfully disagree with the result reached by my colleagues. I believe the majority opinion errs in its failure to address the State’s arguments in this appeal and in its reliance on Village of Algonquin v. Ford (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 19, 495 N.E.2d 595. Considering the facts and proceedings of this case, the decision of the trial court should have been affirmed. The State presents two arguments. First, it argues that the implied consent warnings were properly given in spite of the fact that Eaves was found in a private parking lot. This argument is contrary to the position it took at the rescission hearing earlier in this case. The record indicates that prior to the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court entered an order rescinding the summary suspension of Eaves’ license. The order was the result of the State’s stipulation that the implied consent warnings were not properly administered to Eaves because he was found in a private parking lot and not on a public highway as the implied consent statute so requires. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 951/2, par. 11 — 501.1.) The State never appealed from that order. Indeed, an appeal may have been unsuccessful, considering that the State stipulated to the order. (See Alan Drey Co. v. Generation, Inc. (1974), 22 Ill. App. 3d 611, 617, 317 N.E.2d 673, 678-79 (holding that a party cannot on appeal urge that the trial court erred in matters to which that party has stipulated and acquiesced).) The trial court’s order at the rescission hearing represents a binding judgment, and the State is estopped from now asserting a position contrary to that judgment. (Blair v. Bartelmay (1986), 151 Ill. App. 3d 17, 19-21, 502 N.E.2d 859, 861-62.) I think that if the State believed the implied consent warnings to have been properly given, it should not have stipulated otherwise and/or should have appealed from the order. Accordingly, I believe that any issue relating to the propriety of the administration of the implied consent warnings is not properly before this court. I would have held that the State is estopped from asserting that the implied consent warnings were properly given. Next, the State argues that if the warnings were not properly given, the cause should be remanded to determine whether Eaves’ consent to take the breathalyzer test was voluntary. Such a remand is unnecessary. The trial court has already ruled that the results of the test are inadmissible because the officer improperly administered the implied consent warnings to Eaves. The trial court noted that the officer, knowing that the implied consent warnings were inapplicable to Eaves, nevertheless administered the warnings. The officer did not tell Eaves that he did not have to take the test. Eaves testified that he took the test because he understood that if he refused his license would be suspended for six months. I think that these facts provided the trial court with a sufficient basis to conclude that the breathalyzer test results are inadmissible in the DUI prosecution. If the State had urged at the rescission hearing and in the DUI prosecution that the officer was justified in his administration of the implied consent warnings, then the trial court could not have suppressed the evidence under the authority of People v. Foster (1988), 170 Ill. App. 3d 306, 524 N.E.2d 681, and People v. Wingren (1988), 167 Ill. App. 3d 313, 521 N.E.2d 130. Both cases hold that officers may administer implied consent warnings to a person found on private lots or roads where there is evidence to suggest that the person had been driving under the influence on a public highway. (Foster, 170 Ill. App. 3d at 311, 524 N.E.2d at 684-85; Wingren, 167 Ill. App. 3d at 323, 521 N.E.2d at 136-37.) As I have mentioned above, however, the State is estopped from asserting such a position now, and we can only decide the justiciable issues before us. Unfortunately, the majority opinion has undertaken to decide this case on a different basis. For its authority, the majority relies exclusively on Village of Algonquin v. Ford (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 19, 495 N.E.2d 595. I must note that nowhere in either the State’s or the defendant’s arguments exists any reference to the Ford case. This is most likely because the Ford case has little applicability here, since this case does not involve issues relating to Miranda warnings and consent to a breathalyzer test. Once again, we have a departure from appropriate appellate procedure. Since neither the parties nor the trial court addressed such an issue, it should be considered to have been waived for purposes of this appeal. The court in Ford addressed the issue of whether the failure to give Miranda warnings prior to the administration of a breathalyzer test rendered the defendant’s consent to the test involuntary. (Ford, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 22-23, 495 N.E.2d at 596-98.) At the outset of its opinion the court states that “the trial court granted the motion to suppress because Miranda warnings were not given prior to the test.” (145 Ill. App. 3d at 19, 495 N.E.2d at 596.) The court then begins its analysis with cases relating to admissibility of breath-alcohol results in cases where Miranda warnings have not been given. (145 Ill. App. 3d at 21-22, 495 N.E.2d at 597.) The court finally concludes as follows: “Here the trial court found that the failure to give the Miranda warnings made the consent to the test involuntary. As we have ruled above, that finding is in error; ***” 145 Ill. App. 3d at 23, 495 N.E.2d at 598. My reading of the Ford case persuades me that it stands for the proposition that the failure to give Miranda warnings prior to the administration of a breathalyzer test does not, by itself, render the defendant’s consent to the test involuntary. My reading also persuades me that Ford is at best only remotely related to this case. Notwithstanding the narrowness of the Ford case and notwithstanding the fact that the giving or failure to give Miranda warnings is a question not addressed by either the trial court or the parties at trial or on appeal, the majority opinion relies exclusively on the Ford case. To compound the confusion, the majority opinion reads Ford to stand for the proposition that the defendant’s consent is not required to take a breathalyzer test if the arresting officer has “reasonable grounds to initiate the investigation.” (174 Ill. App. 3d at 913.) Such an interpretation not only muddles the holding of Ford but also confounds the purpose of the implied consent statute, which is to give the person a choice as to whether to take or refuse the breathalyzer test. That the holding of the Ford case is narrowly tailored to address the Miranda-related issue is evidenced by the Second District’s failure to rely on Ford in subsequent identical cases. (See People v. Foster (1988), 170 Ill. App. 3d 306, 524 N.E.2d 681; People v. Wingren (1988), 167 Ill. App. 3d 313, 521 N.E.2d 130.) Accordingly, I think that the majority opinion stretches unreasonably the holding of the Ford case. Its reliance on that case is overmeasured. In sum, I believe that on the basis of the claims before it the trial court was justified in suppressing the evidence. Its decision should be affirmed.