Court Opinion

ID: 9720418
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:29:52.401397+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:17.794639
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(dissenting).
Peil’s testimony was direct commentary on the girl’s credibility, which is within the exclusive province of the jury. State v. Huber, 356 N.W.2d 468, 476 (S.D.1984); State v. Myers, 88 S.D. 378, 381, 220 N.W.2d 535, 537 (1974).
In allowing into evidence expert testimony on the credibility of the complaining witness and the rape trauma syndrome, trial court erred. Peil’s answers to hypothetical questions embraced ultimate issues of fact. Peil became the jury. It is contrary to SDCL 19-15-2 regarding the propriety of an opinion of an expert witness. Also, under SDCL 19-12-3, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Accord: State v. Logue, 372 N.W.2d 151, 157 (S.D.1985). Here, the prejudicial effect far outweighed the probative value. In Logue, which I joined, Justice Wuest, writing for this Court expressed, at page 158, “Not every accused is guilty, but every accused, innocent or guilty, is entitled to a fair trial.” In my opinion, Svihl did not get a fair trial. In Logue, at 158, we held that a social worker’s opinion invaded the province of *275the jury. We held that it was not harmless error. Here, we say it is harmless error. I respectfully disagree.
We have, before us, the underlying message that E.U. was abused. Peil did not confine her opinion to a rape trauma syndrome. She specifically mentioned E.U. Moreover, the prosecutor in his questions specifically zeroed in on E.U. As an example, the prosecutor (jury trial transcript, at 260, 262), couched his questions in this phraseology and vernacular: “If there were evidence in this case....” “this young lady_” “this girl’s grades_” “she indicated the sexual intercourse began.” This is contrary to all of the settled law on this general subject. A prosecutor is not to go into the specifics of the facts and relate the rape trauma syndrome to the set of facts before the court. General characteristics testimony, yes. Details related to the scenario at hand, with conclusions, no.
In my dissent in State v. Bachman, 446 N.W.2d 271 (S.D.1989), joined by Justice Sabers, I developed the point that the nature of the rape trauma syndrome, developed as of that date absolutely did not permit its proof that a rape occurred. At 279 thereof, I quoted from People v. Bledsoe, 681 P.2d 291, at 300, 36 Cal.3d 236, at 249-50, 203 Cal.Rptr. 450, at 459 (1984), as follows:
There is, however, a fundamental difference between rape trauma syndrome and both the battered child syndrome and the other scientific methods of proof that have in the past been evaluated against the Frye [293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923) ] standards of reliability. Unlike fingerprints, blood tests, lie detector tests, voice-prints or the battered child syndrome, (footnote omitted) rape trauma syndrome was not devised to determine the “truth” or “accuracy” of a particular past event — i.e., whether, in fact, a rape in the legal sense occurred — but rather was developed by professional rape counselors as a therapeutic tool, to help identify, predict and treat emotional problems experienced by the counselors clients and patients.
At the Motions Hearing, transcript III, at 41, the trial judge questioned the state as to the parameters of the rape trauma syndrome. Thereat, state reflected that it would not ask Peil to give an opinion that E.U. was sexually abused. But it did. It fudged. Before it was all over, the state, under its questioning, and Peil, by her answers, established by testimony, before the jury:
E.U. was sexually abused;
E.U. exhibited behavioral signs, from this specific sexual abuse that she lost self-esteem, trust, and became powerless.
The predicate was this: Svihl was guilty. Instead, you see, of testifying in generalities, Peil connected Svihl to the sexual abuse. And over and over and over. This is an evidentiary defilement. And I cannot join the majority opinion.
In my dissent in State v. Spaans, 455 N.W.2d 596, 599 (S.D.1990). At 599, I wrote:
Without, again, regaling the reader with my extensive writings on this subject, I call the reader’s attention to my special concurrence in State v. Hallman, 391 N.W.2d 191, 196-7 (S.D.1986) for my concern that incest or rape trauma victims cannot be singled out, specifically, in a given factual scenario, by professional experts as having had a crime perpetrated upon them; and, also, my dissent in State v. Bachman, 446 N.W.2d 271 (S.D.1989), for my general academic viewpoint, spiced with numerous authorities on rape trauma syndrome, that it is improper to permit an expert to suggest that a complainant exhibits rape trauma syndrome, (or having been sexually contacted) because there is a certain aura of special reliability and trustworthiness implicit in the experts’ testimony (hearsay evidence vaulted over solid evidence); and, lastly, my dissent in McCafferty v. Solem, 449 N.W.2d 590 (S.D.1989), wherein I attempted to pinpoint the difference in behavioral science expert testimony, bearing on the credibility of sexually abused children. One concept pertains to approval or disapproval of expert testimony on credibility of a victim. *276Eleven authorities did I root out which decries a stamp of approval of expert testimony on credibility. McCafferty. In McCafferty, at 596, I pointed out that some courts refuse to permit behavioral science experts to offer opinions on credibility of sexually abused children as a class.
Hearsay is a very low quantum of proof. Here, Peil’s statements invaded the province of the jury because her purpose of testifying was to enhance the credibility of the alleged victim. Again, it appears to me that social experts are preempting the constitutional right of a trial by jury. It poses a great danger to the Bill of Rights. United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1986); State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).
There are many undisputed facts in the record which have not been related for the reader. E.U., a disturbed child, expanded and retracted stories of sexual abuse on a monthly basis. While at the Human Services Center, she wrote a 12 page statement describing some 14 incidents of sexual and physical abuse with 30 different men, all incidents alleged to have been committed when she was between the ages of 11 and 13. Two of these alleged 30 men testified at trial that they had never abused her. Her allegations against these two men included that three boys had to hold her down when she was raped. There was no corroboration of this horrible revelation. A counseling expert, one Mark Ventralla, testified that based upon a psychological examination and his interviewing with her that she gave frequent contradictory answers to questions. He testified, at this trial, that she gave no thought to the consequences of what she, from time to time says.
Faced with the credibility factor of E.U.’s testimony, State shifted its position to establish the alleged crimes with “expert testimony.” State sought to bolster her stories. After all, it faced alleged victim’s retractions, lack of details, and inconsistencies.
In the context of the preceding’ paragraphs, the reader’s attention is directed to SDCL 19-16-38 and State v. Thompson, 379 N.W.2d 295, 298 (S.D.1985) relating to the reliability of statements. I respectfully suggest that these out of court statements are not admissible thereunder. E.U. was not a reliable witness. See, State v. McCafferty, 356 N.W.2d 159 (S.D.1984) and the three factors therein listed as requirements for admission of evidence in this factual scenario. Here, the first factor was missing, i.e., sufficient “indicia of reliability.”
State did not meet its burden of proof as to the necessary factors under the settled law of this state. Rife with inconsistencies, recantations and conflicting assertions of E.tL, hearsay testimony was admitted; under SDCL 19-16-38, an inadequate showing was established of “sufficient indicia of reliability.” Testimony revealed that she stole money and a car from her mother, shoplifted prior to being 9 years old, and had a history of telling falsehoods. She formally accused her mother of a crime; the mother was tried and found not guilty by a jury.
When will this Court draw a line on offered testimony to enhance the credibility of a witness?