Court Opinion

ID: 9544755
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:01:27.31239+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:14:07.531986
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                                AUG 7 2023
                      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                             U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

                                 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: MARK E. STUART,                              No.   21-60063

               Debtor,                              BAP No. 21-1063

------------------------------
                                                    MEMORANDUM*
MARK E. STUART,

               Appellant,

 v.

CITY OF SCOTTSDALE; RUSSELL
BROWN, Chapter 13 Trustee; CITY OF
SCOTTSDALE ATTORNEY’S OFFICE,

               Appellees.

                            Appeal from the Ninth Circuit
                             Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
           Faris, Lafferty III, and Spraker, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding

                                 Submitted August 7, 2023**
                                  San Francisco, California

      *
        This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
         The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Before: WALLACE, O’SCANNLAIN, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.

      Mark Stuart appeals pro se from the judgment of the Bankruptcy Appellate

Panel (BAP) affirming the bankruptcy court’s order denying his motion for

sanctions against the City of Scottsdale (Scottsdale) for a purported violation of the

11 U.S.C. § 362(a) automatic stay. We review de novo,1 and we affirm.

      Scottsdale’s conduct — promptly requesting a stay of the pre-petition writ of

garnishment proceedings but refusing to request or agree to dismissal of the writ —

complied with the relevant automatic stay provisions. See 11 U.S.C.

§ 362(a)(1)–(3), (6). The Supreme Court has explained that an entity does not

violate 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) or exercise control over a bankrupt estate’s property

merely “by retaining possession of a debtor’s property after a bankruptcy petition

is filed.” City of Chicago v. Fulton, __ U.S. __, __, 141 S. Ct. 585, 589, 208 L. Ed.

2d 384 (2021). That reasoning applies with more force here: Scottsdale was not

even in possession of Stuart’s property and thus had no obligation to act

affirmatively to facilitate his access to that property. See id. at __, 141 S. Ct. at

590; see also Citizens Bank of Md. v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 21, 116 S. Ct. 286,

290, 133 L. Ed. 2d 258 (1995). Likewise, Scottsdale’s conduct did not amount to a

      1
       Retz v. Samson (In re Retz), 606 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2010); Eskanos
& Adler, P.C. v. Leetien, 309 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir. 2002).
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“continuation” of the writ of garnishment proceedings,2 an “enforcement” of an

earlier judgment,3 or an “act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against” Stuart.4

The writ proceedings were stayed, and it is undisputed that Scottsdale took no

action during the stay to obtain payment from Stuart or from the bank accounts

subject to the writ.

      Reading 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) as inapplicable in these circumstances is a

“rational, common-sense result,” notwithstanding Stuart’s contrary preference.

Ariz. State Bd. for Charter Schs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 464 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th

Cir. 2006).

      AFFIRMED.

      2
          11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1); see Eskanos, 309 F.3d at 1214–15.
      3
          11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2).
      4
        Id. § 362(a)(6); see Morgan Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. Am. Sav. & Loan
Ass’n, 804 F.2d 1487, 1491 (9th Cir. 1986).
                                           3