Court Opinion

ID: 9949234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-09 18:12:22.364509+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:03.314875
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-23-00060-CV

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                   THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                     CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

CITY OF MCALLEN,                                                          Appellant,

                                          v.

ELYDA LORETTE DIAZ,                                                        Appellee.

                   On appeal from the 206th District Court
                         of Hidalgo County, Texas.

                DISSENTING MEMORANDUM OPINION

 Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Tijerina
    Dissenting Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Contreras

      The majority concludes that, in her negligence suit against appellant City of

McAllen, appellee Elyda Lorette Diaz failed to plead facts establishing a waiver of

governmental immunity. Because I disagree, I respectfully dissent.

      The question here is whether Diaz’s pleadings, construed liberally in her favor,

allege facts establishing that the City’s immunity was waived by § 101.021 of the Texas
Tort Claims Act (TTCA). See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021 (generally

waiving sovereign immunity for a personal injury claim against a governmental unit which

(1) “arises from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle” or (2) is “so caused by a

condition or use of tangible personal or real property”); Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v.

Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). To do so, the pleadings had to allege facts

“show[ing] that the governmental employee’s use or operation of the vehicle or equipment

proximately caused the relevant injury.” Rattray v. City of Brownsville, 662 S.W.3d 860,

874 (Tex. 2023).

       Diaz’s petition alleged the following facts: (1) “[s]he was handcuffed and then

placed in a police car and while the police [were] using the car to transport her, she was

injured with police owned objects”; (2) “[t]he police officer who had custody of Ms. Diaz

negligently operated the car & its security instrumentalities and injured Ms. Diaz”; (3) her

injuries were “caused by the negligent transportation she received after being handcuffed

and while she was being transported using a police car”; and (4) “[a]s a direct and

proximate result of the [City’s] conduct,” she “experienced severe trauma, personal bodily

injuries, physical pain, head injuries[,] and mental anguish” (emphasis added). The

pleadings explicitly alleged that the City officer’s negligent “operat[ion]” of “the car [and]

its security instrumentalities” “proximate[ly]” caused her injuries.

       Citing Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. Fayette County, 453 S.W.3d 922, 927

(Tex. 2015) (per curiam), the majority holds that Diaz’s pleadings are insufficient, despite

the fact that she explicitly alleged her injuries were “proximate[ly]” caused by the City’s

conduct, because she did not explicitly allege facts showing (1) that the City’s conduct

was the “but-for” cause of her injuries, or (2) that her injuries were reasonably foreseeable

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by the City. See W. Invs., Inc. v. Urena, 162 S.W.3d 547, 551 (Tex. 2005) (“Proximate

cause has two elements: cause in fact and foreseeability.”); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co.,

690 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex. 1985) (noting that cause in fact is established when “the act

or omission was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury” and, without it, the harm

would not have occurred). In Ryder, the plaintiff alleged that a deputy sheriff negligently

directed his headlights into oncoming traffic when turning around, thereby distracting a

truck driver who, in turn, collided with and injured the plaintiff. 453 S.W.3d at 929–30. The

Court held that the allegations “easily satisfy the standard” for cause-in-fact because they

alleged that “by directing the cruiser’s lights toward eastbound traffic, [the deputy] caused

[the truck driver’s] errant driving.” Id. at 929. The majority also cites La Joya Independent

School District v. Gonzalez, where the plaintiff alleged that a city bus driver was the

cause-in-fact of a student’s death when he stopped his bus in an expressway crossover

and activated his flashing lights, and the student was then struck by a different vehicle

while attempting to board the bus. 532 S.W.3d 892, 903 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg 2017, pet. denied). We held that the pleadings were sufficient to establish

cause-in-fact and a waiver of immunity. Id. Finally, the majority cites Harlingen

Consolidated Independent School District v. Miranda, No. 13-18-00391-CV, 2019 WL

1187151, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Mar. 14, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).

There, the pleadings alleged that a school bus driver drove at an unsafe speed over poor

road conditions, causing the plaintiff to be thrown against the rear emergency exit and

ejected from the bus. Id. at *5. We held the pleadings established cause-in-fact and

foreseeability, and therefore, immunity was waived. Id.

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        The majority asserts that, “[w]ithout additional factual allegations, it is entirely

unclear how [Diaz] sustained injuries ‘while using the police unit’ or how ‘being

transported’ caused her to experience” her claimed injuries. I disagree. Diaz explicitly

alleged that the officer’s negligent operation of the patrol vehicle, in which she was a

passenger, directly and proximately caused her injuries. Her pleadings are not as factually

detailed as the ones considered in La Joya and Ryder; however, those cases are

distinguishable because of the indirect nature of the injuries alleged. In both La Joya and

Ryder, the plaintiff alleged that a government employee’s negligent driving proximately

caused a second vehicle to act erratically, and that second vehicle was then involved in

a collision which directly produced the complained-of injuries. See Ryder, 453 S.W.3d at

927; La Joya, 532 S.W.3d at 903. In those cases, merely alleging that the government

employee’s negligent operation of his vehicle “proximately caused” the plaintiff’s injuries

would be insufficient to show cause-in-fact because it was also alleged that a second

vehicle was more directly involved in the events which caused the injuries. Without further

explanation, it would be unclear how the negligence of the first driver could proximately

cause injuries which directly stemmed from a collision with the second vehicle. On the

other hand, in this case, there is only one car involved—the one driven by the government

employee in which Diaz was a passenger. Unlike in La Joya and Ryder, highly detailed

factual pleadings are not necessary to establish how the negligence of a vehicle’s driver

could proximately cause injuries to a passenger of that same vehicle. 1 The causal

        1 Harlingen involved only one vehicle. See Harlingen Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Miranda, No. 13-

18-00391-CV, 2019 WL 1187151, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Mar. 14, 2019, no pet.) (mem.
op.). But the fact that the relatively detailed pleadings in that case were sufficient to establish proximate
cause does not mean such detail is required in every case or that the pleadings here were insufficient to
serve that purpose.

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relationship is direct and obvious. I would conclude that, as in Ryder, the pleadings are

“easily” sufficient to show cause-in-fact in this case. See 453 S.W.3d at 929.

        The Ryder Court also held that the pleadings were sufficient as to foreseeability

because, though the defendant claimed that the injuries were too attenuated from the

alleged negligent acts, “the allegations suggest that [the deputy’s] operation of his cruiser

might not have been attenuated from the alleged injuries.” Id. at 930. Foreseeability

requires only “that the injury be of such a general character as might reasonably have

been anticipated; and that the injured party should be so situated with relation to the

wrongful act that injury to him or to one similarly situated might reasonably have been

foreseen.” Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 551. Here, Diaz alleged that the City employee’s

negligent operation of the car and its “security instrumentalities” (apparently handcuffs)

directly caused her injuries. It is obviously foreseeable that the negligent operation of a

car may directly result in physical injuries, such as those alleged by Diaz, to a backseat

passenger. 2 It is also obviously foreseeable that the negligent use of handcuffs may

directly result in physical injuries to the individual being handcuffed. There is no

suggestion that the negligent acts were “too geographically or temporally attenuated” from

the injuries to be actionable. See Rattray, 662 S.W.3d at 874; Ryder, 453 S.W.3d at 929–

30. Therefore, I would conclude that the allegations were sufficient to establish

foreseeability.

        2 The majority states “it is not reasonable to anticipate that transporting a person to the local jail in

a patrol vehicle—without more—may lead to the injuries she allegedly sustained . . . .” But Diaz alleged that
the officer transported her to the jail negligently, and we are required to accept her pleadings as true at this
jurisdictional stage of the proceedings. See id. If the City believes more detailed pleadings are required, it
may file special exceptions. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91.

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       For the foregoing reasons, I would conclude that Diaz met her initial burden to

plead facts establishing a waiver of immunity, and that the trial court therefore did not err

in denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction. I respectfully dissent.

                                                                  DORI CONTRERAS
                                                                  Chief Justice

Delivered and filed on the
7th day of March, 2024.

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