Court Opinion

ID: 9481873
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:34:19.13347+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:37.984522
License: Public Domain

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The court errs in this case because it (1) adopts a definition of deliberate ignorance which is inconsistent with Tenth Circuit precedent, (2) holds that the same fact or facts cannot be used to prove both actual knowledge and deliberate ignorance, and (3) requires that the evidence show that defendant “knew there were drugs hidden in the car” for a deliberate ignorance instruction to be proper. Ct. Op. at 1412. Though reasonable minds could differ on the import of the evidence in this case, when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence supports the district court’s decision to give an instruction concerning deliberate ignorance.
The court starts off on the wrong foot with the following statement:
In the context of the instruction we must analyze, “deliberate ignorance” refers to circumstantial evidence that the person against whom it is employed has actual knowledge of a fact in issue. Employing such circumstantial evidence allows the government to prove a defendant had actual knowledge of an operative fact by proving deliberate acts committed by the defendant from which that actual knowledge can be logically inferred. The acts relied upon, however, must be deliberate and not equivocal, otherwise the defendant’s acts do not imply the avoidance of knowledge which is the key to the inference of actual knowledge.
Ct. Op. at 1409 (citation omitted). This explanation is faulty for several reasons. First it confuses the means of proof with mens rea. Even in the context of the instruction, deliberate ignorance does not refer to “circumstantial evidence,” rather it is a state of mind which the government may prove to satisfy the knowledge requirement of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).1 Second, in proving deliberate ignorance, the government is not restricted only to “deliberate acts,” rather all acts and omissions of the defendant which support an inference of deliberate ignorance are permissible. See United States v. Talkington, 875 F.2d 591, 595 (7th Cir.1989) (facts and evidence must support inference of deliberate ignorance); United States v. White, 794 F.2d 367, 371 (8th Cir.1988) (same); United *1414States v. McAllister, 747 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir.1984) (same), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829, 106 S.Ct. 92, 88 L.Ed.2d 76 (1975). Third, by requiring that acts relied upon to prove deliberate ignorance be deliberate and unequivocal, Ct. Op. at 1409, the court in effect revives a rule of sufficiency that evidence cannot be consistent with both innocence and guilt. Such a standard has been soundly rejected. See Ct. Op. at 1408; Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140, 75 S.Ct. 127, 137-38, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954); United States v. Hooks, 780 F.2d 1526, 1529-30 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1128, 106 S.Ct. 1657, 90 L.Ed.2d 199 (1986). A defendant’s acts and omissions may be equivocal, yet still support an inference of deliberate ignorance — a requirement of deliberate and unequivocal acts to prove deliberate ignorance would supplant the function of the jury. Fourth, in explaining the purpose of a deliberate ignorance instruction, we have consistently defined deliberate ignorance as a conscious purpose to avoid enlightenment or intentional avoidance of knowledge motivated by sufficient guilty knowledge so as to satisfy the statute involved.2 No good reason exists to depart from these definitions.
In Manriquez Arbizo, we noted “that if the evidence against the defendant points solely to direct knowledge of the criminal venture, it would be error to give the instruction.” 833 F.2d at 248-249 (emphasis supplied). We have long recognized, however, that evidence may allow a jury to find that a defendant “either knew [of the illegality] or deliberately avoided positive knowledge.” 3 The evidence may well support both theories. Ochoa-Fabian, 935 F.2d at 1141-1142. The court adopts a new limitation on the use of the instruction: “the same evidence cannot be used as proof for the mutually exclusive categories of actual knowledge of an operant fact and deliberate ignorance of that same fact.” Ct. Op. at 1410. The court explains:
We emphasize, the same fact or facts cannot be used to prove both actual knowledge and deliberate indifference [sic] because the two are mutually exclusive concepts. If evidence proves the defendant actually knew an operant fact, the same evidence could not also prove he was ignorant of that fact. Logic simply defies that result.
Ct. Op. at 1410 (emphasis in original). The difficulty with this approach is that it assumes that each circumstantial fact admits only of a single inference, knowledge or ignorance, unaffected by the other facts at trial. But circumstantial evidence may be admitted to prove not only a consequential fact (positive knowledge or deliberate ignorance), but also as background evidence, credibility evidence or as proof of an evidential hypothesis. See 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 401[06] (1990); 1 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 94 at 658-59 (1977). The actual impact of circumstantial evidence depends upon the trier of fact; “relevancy [merely] describes the potential effect which evidence may have upon the perceptions of the trier of fact.” Federal Evidence § 94 at 652-53. The trier of fact is *1415free to weigh the circumstantial facts, decide upon plausible inferences using reason and experience, and determine guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Holland, 348 U.S. at 140, 75 S.Ct. at 138 (“[A] jury is asked to weigh the chances that the evidence correctly points to guilt against the possibility of inaccuracy or ambiguous inference.”).
Moreover, in these types of cases, the deliberate ignorance instruction is offered in response to a lack-of-positive-knowledge defense, despite suspicious facts and circumstances indicative of a high probability of criminal activity. See Sanchez-Robles, 927 F.2d at 1074. The government is never required to prove that defendant was ignorant of a fact; see Ct. Op. at 1410; rather, when a defendant interposes this defense, the government may rely upon the suspicious circumstances it has proven (which also may suggest positive knowledge) and claim that any lack of positive knowledge was due to avoidance “motivated by sufficient guilty knowledge to satisfy the statute.” See Manriquez Arbizo, 833 F.2d at 248. When suspicious circumstances indicative of a high probability of criminal activity exist, the deliberate ignorance instruction merely “informs the jury that it may look at the charade of ignorance as circumstantial proof of knowledge.” Id.; United States v. Perez-Padilla, 846 F.2d 1182, 1183 (9th Cir.1988). See also United States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d 184, 189 (7th Cir.) (“An ostrich instruction informs the jury that actual knowledge and deliberate avoidance of knowledge are the same thing.”), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186, 106 S.Ct. 2924, 91 L.Ed.2d 552 (1986).
Taken literally, the court’s new rule would be at odds with our precedent because some evidence will support both actual knowledge and deliberate ignorance. For example, two of our cases approving deliberate ignorance instructions involved defendants who disclaimed knowledge of sizable quantities of marijuana concealed in vehicles. Ochoa-Fabian, 935 F.2d at 1141, 1141-1142; United States v. Ashby, 864 F.2d 690, 692, 694 (10th Cir.1988). The smell of the marijuana and each defendant’s close proximity to that smell supported an inference of actual knowledge. Combined with suspicious circumstances, such as the absence of luggage and a travel permit to make a long trip, Ochoa-Fabian, 935 F.2d at 1141, or the failure of defendant to obtain a key to the car trunk, Ashby, 864 F.2d at 694, the smell of the marijuana also supported an inference of deliberate ignorance. See also United States v. Sanchez-Robles, 927 F.2d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir.1991) (odor of marijuana in vehicle supported actual knowledge; odor combined with driving vehicle across the border as a favor or for payment would support deliberate ignorance because circumstances would then be suspicious). Thus, contrary to the court’s opinion, “the same fact” can “be used to prove actual knowledge and deliberate” ignorance. See Ct. Op. at 1410 (emphasis supplied). Moreover, the suspicious circumstances may also be probative of actual knowledge and deliberate ignorance. See United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 699 n. 1 & 2 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (discussing facts which tended to show positive knowledge and deliberate ignorance), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951, 96 S.Ct. 3173, 49 L.Ed.2d 1188 (1976).
In summarizing its many cases on this issue, the Ninth Circuit recently explained:
Cases following Jewell show a similar pattern of suspicious circumstances that go beyond direct evidence of the criminal activity itself.
On the other hand, a Jewell instruction is not appropriate where the only evidence alerting a defendant to the high probability of criminal activity is direct evidence of the illegality itself. “A Jewell instruction is not appropriate where the evidence is that the defendant had either actual knowledge or no knowledge at all of the facts in question.” [Perez-Padilla, 846 F.2d at 1183]. (emphasis added).
Sanchez-Robles, 927 F.2d at 1074. Accord United States v. Rivera, 926 F.2d 1564, 1572 (11th Cir.1991). In cases in which there is “a middle ground of conscious avoidance,” there must be direct evidence of criminal activity and suspicious circumstances which support an inference of crim*1416inal activity. Sanchez-Robles, 927 F.2d at 1075; Rivera, 926 F.2d at 1573. In this case, the court acknowledges the suspicious circumstances, but finds them “equivocal.” Ct. Op. at 1411 (“While the circumstances under which Mr. Lopez came to be driving the car were suspicious, without more they are equivocal.”). To the extent the circumstances are equivocal, they support an inference of deliberate ignorance. See Black’s Law Dictionary 486 (5th ed. 1979) (defining equivocal as “[h]aving a double or several meanings or senses” and finding it synonymous with ambiguous).
The court declares the deliberate ignorance evidence insufficient in part because “[n]one of the evidence ... leads to the conclusion that despite his profession of ignorance, Mr. Lopez knew there were drugs hidden in the car.” Ct. Op. at 1412 (emphasis supplied). That is not the proper test because it imposes a requirement of actual or positive knowledge for deliberate ignorance. The deliberate ignorance evidence, when evaluated in the light most favorable to the government, need only show beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had a conscious purpose to avoid enlightenment, i.e. to avoid knowledge of the narcotics concealed in the vehicle. Glick, 710 F.2d at 642; Griego v. United States, 298 F.2d 845, 849 (10th Cir.1962).4 Actual or positive knowledge is unnecessary. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 417, 90 S.Ct. 642, 652-53, 24 L.Ed.2d 610 (1970); Jewell, 532 F.2d at 701; Glick, 710 F.2d at 642.
I disagree with the court’s statement that:
Even when viewed cumulatively in the light most favorable to the government, none of the evidence presented at trial is sufficiently probative of the element of deliberation which is essential to the government’s hypothesis that Mr. Lopez acted to deliberately avoid knowledge of the presence of drugs in the car to support the deliberate ignorance instruction.
Ct. Op. at 1411. In this case, some of the evidence supports direct knowledge, some supports deliberate ignorance, and some supports both theories. See Manriquez Arbizo at 249. A deliberate ignorance instruction is appropriate “when the evidence before the jury supports a finding of intentional avoidance of knowledge.” 5 United States v. Fingado, 934 F.2d 1163, 1166 (10th Cir.1991); Ochoa-Fabian, 935 F.2d *14171139, 1141-1142. Appellate review of a district court decision to give a deliberate ignorance instruction requires that we view the evidence and the inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the government. Fingado, 934 F.2d at 1166 (citing United States v. Caliendo, 910 F.2d 429, 433 (7th Cir.1990) and United States v. Hiland, 909 F.2d 1114, 1131 (8th Cir.1990)).
Here, ample evidence supports positive knowledge or deliberate ignorance. The case virtually abounds with suspicious circumstances beyond direct evidence of the criminal activity. See Sanchez-Robles, 927 F.2d at 1074. Several facts unmentioned by the court support inclusion of the instruction. Defendant’s testimony in this case is not entirely consistent; cross-examination resulted in substantial incriminatory evidence. Where the evidence conflicts, however, our task is to view it in the light most favorable to the government and the deliberate ignorance theory. Fingado, 934 F.2d at 1166.
To say that defendant came into possession of the car under “unusual circumstances,” Ct. Op. at 1407 & 1411, is an understatement. According to defendant, he met “Juan” 6 through a chance encounter at a restaurant, but declined Juan’s offer of employment as a car transporter after speaking with him for one to three minutes. II R.S. 32-33; III R.S. 17. Defendant did not give Juan his address, telephone number or any other instruction on how defendant could be located, yet a week later Juan was outside defendant’s apartment, waiting for him. II R.S. 33; III R.S. 18-20. Defendant admitted that he thought it a little strange that Juan had found him. III R.S. 20.
Defendant next accepted $300 to meet Juan “to accept the job he was offering” and to meet Juan in Santa Monica a few weeks later. Id. at 24, 26-27. Defendant bought food and paid some household bills with the $300. Id. at 24. Defendant testified that he “was worried [about what Juan was trying to get him to do] but [he] was worried more about the lack of money to take care of [his] family.” Id. at 25. Two weeks later, defendant met Juan in Santa Monica at an arcade. II R.S. 36-37; III R.S. at 29. Defendant expected to be taken to a car dealership as promised by Juan but there was no car dealership; instead defendant accompanied Juan to a parking lot. III R.S. at 23, 29, 61. Juan told defendant that the vehicle used to transport the contraband needed some repairs so that it could be driven to New York, delivered to an open air parking lot, with the keys placed under the carpet and the doors locked. Id. at 30. Although defendant asked, Juan did not give the name of the new owner, or any other instructions about delivery. Id. at 30-31.
Defendant testified that he was suspicious about the arrangement, III R.S. 40, and he repeatedly testified that he thought the car was stolen.7 II R.S. 41; III R.S. 30, 37. On direct, defendant also admitted that he was suspicious about the car containing drugs:
Mr. Trujillo: What were you suspicious about, the car?
Defendant: Could have been a stolen vehicle.
Mr. Trujillo: Did you suspect that it may have drugs in it?
Defendant: Yes, but a car that somebody leaves you like that shouldn’t have *1418drugs, should it, all the time that I was going to have that car.
II R.S. at 41. Defendant’s employer, Juan, was in the best position to tell defendant whether the car was stolen or contained drugs. Despite the meetings with Juan, defendant never asked him about these suspicions. Nor did defendant return the car. This evidence creates an inference of conscious purpose to avoid enlightenment. It is extremely probative of deliberation when one considers the three-week time span involved. Plainly, the jury was entitled to believe that defendant suspected drugs, yet not credit his explanation on why he remained complacent in light of this suspicion. See Perez-Padilla, 846 F.2d at 1183 (“The jury was not required to believe Perez-Padilla’s self-serving testimony_”). Concerning the car’s registration papers, defendant testified that he was not interested in whose name the car was registered, nor about much else concerning the car. III R.S. at 38.8
Defendant was given $1,200 to purchase insurance and expenses; the remainder was compensation and defendant figured that he would clear about $500. Id. at 31, 55. Defendant kept the car for two weeks and he had no way to contact Juan in the event he decided not to go through with the arrangement. II R.S. 42-43; III R.S. 36. Defendant cleaned the car because it was full of grease and installed fog lights, a new speedometer cable, spark plugs, new oil and adjusted the carburetor. II R.S. 35, 38, 42; III R.S. 40. Although the defendant testified that he did not notice anything different about the car when it was washed, II R.S. 42, the jury was entitled to consider that defendant is a lifelong auto mechanic, I R.S. 197, 205; III R.S. 15-16, who performed significant work on the car, not for one day, but over a period of two weeks during which he inspected it closely. I R.S. 206; II R.S. 42. The state trooper testified that although the vehicle was modified in a sophisticated fashion with spot welds and pop rivets, the underside of the car was “freshly seal coated with a tar like substance.” I R.S. 153-54. To obtain a deliberate ignorance instruction, the government was not required to prove that defendant knew the exact location of the secret compartment or its contents. It is enough that defendant was aware of suspicious circumstances making it highly probable that the car contained narcotics and he deliberately refrained from acquiring positive knowledge of that fact. See Glick, 710 F.2d at 643.
The unusual circumstances in this case together with defendant’s repeated reservations about those circumstances support the giving of a deliberate ignorance instruction. See Gonzalez, 700 F.2d at 204. See also FDIC v. Antonio, 843 F.2d 1311, 1314 (10th Cir.1988) (“the fraudulent nature of the loan as well as the exorbitant repayment terms and absurdity of [defendant’s] explanation” supported district court’s finding that defendant was willfully blind and a member of a conspiracy); United States v. Aleman, 728 F.2d 492, 494 (11th Cir.1984) (mysterious stranger, “Fernando,” asked defendant to transport briefcase (which contained cocaine) to New York to a friend who would come to defendant’s house to retrieve it; deliberate ignorance instruction proper). Defendant spoke with a total stranger for less than three minutes, and a week later the stranger tracked him down and paid him $300 to agree to another meeting. Although concerned about the situation, defendant was more concerned about supporting his family with the money, thereby providing a strong motive to avoid enlightenment. Expecting to be taken to a car dealership for work, defendant met the stranger at an arcade and went to a parking lot. The stranger paid defendant $1,200 to transport a vehicle to a parking lot in New York, but did not give him details about who was to receive *1419the vehicle. Although defendant denied that he knew the vehicle contained cocaine, he initially thought the car stolen, thereby “acknowledging the suspicious circumstances surrounding the mission.” See United States v. Villalon, 605 F.2d 937, 939 (5th Cir.1979). Defendant also was suspicious that the car might contain drugs, yet took no action which would allay those suspicions. When viewed in the light most favorable to the government, all of these suspicious circumstances would enable a jury to find that defendant acted with “a conscious purpose to avoid enlightenment,” Griego, 298 F.2d at 849, notwithstanding defendant’s justification.
A deliberate ignorance instruction “does not authorize conviction of one who in fact does not have guilty knowledge.” Manriquez Arbizo, 833 F.2d at 248. Despite a reference to objective circumstances,9 the instructions as a whole plainly conveyed that defendant “could not be convicted on the basis of negligent ignorance of apparent facts nor on the basis of a mistaken, subjective belief of what the [vehicle] contained.” 10 See id. at 249. The jury was told twice that defendant’s knowledge could be established by proof that he was aware of a high probability that the materials were narcotics, unless he actually believed the materials were not narcotics. IV R.S. 90-91. See Glick, 710 F.2d at 643 (deliberate ignorance instruction). The jury was told twice that defendant could not be convicted if he lacked knowledge of the narcotics because he was careless, negligent or even foolish. Id. at 88-89. Then the jury was instructed that the government would have to prove that defendant “knowingly did an act which the law forbids purposely intending to violate the law.” Id. at 92. “Knowingly,” the jury was told, means “voluntarily and intentionally and not because of accident or mistake or other innocent reason.” Id. “The purpose of adding the word knowingly is to ensure that no one will be convicted from an act done because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason.” Id. Taken as a whole, the instructions were adequate and insured that defendant was convicted on the basis of his subjective knowledge.
I would affirm the conviction and therefore respectfully dissent.

. For example, the instruction provided in part:
The defendant’s knowledge may be established by proof that the defendant was aware of a high probability that the materials were narcotics unless despite this high probability the facts show that the defendant actually believed that the materials were not narcotics.
Thus, if you find that the defendant acted with deliberate disregard of whether the materials he possessed were narcotics and with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth, the requirement of knowledge would be satisfied unless despite this deliberate ignorance the defendant actually believed that the materials were not narcotics.
IV R.S. 90-91. See United States v. Gonzalez, 700 F.2d 196, 204 (5th Cir.1983) ("deliberate ignorance suffices for knowledge for purposes of a § 841(a)(1) conviction.”).

. See United States v. Ochoa-Fabian, 935 F.2d 1139, 1141-1142 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Fingado, 934 F.2d 1163, 1166 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Manriquez Arbizo, 833 F.2d 244, 248 (10th Cir.1987); United States v. Glick, 710 F.2d 639, 642 (10th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005, 104 S.Ct. 995, 79 L.Ed.2d 229 (1984); Griego v. United States, 298 F.2d 845, 849 (10th Cir.1962).

. See Glick, 710 F.2d at 643 ("The evidence is sufficient to enable a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Chisolm’s loan packaging business was a fraudulent scheme from its inception, and that Glick either knew it or deliberately avoided acquiring positive knowledge.”). See also Ochoa-Fabian, 935 F.2d at 1142 ("While a deliberate ignorance instruction is not appropriate when the evidence points solely to direct knowledge, where, as here, the evidence supports both actual knowledge and deliberate ignorance, the instruction is properly given.’’); Ashby, 864 F.2d at 694 (citing circumstances which “provided a reasonable rationale for believing any lack of knowledge was deliberate;” jury apparently instructed on both theories); Manriquez Arbizo, 833 F.2d at 249 ("Because the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt Arbizo either directly knew or circumstantially knew by deliberately avoiding acquiring knowledge of the contents of the bags, the instruction was appropriate."); Griego v. United States, 298 F.2d 845, 849 (10th Cir.1962) (discussing jury’s options when deliberate ignorance at issue).

. As the Ninth Circuit recognized in Jewell, Grie-go was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 417 n. 34, 90 S.Ct. 642, 653 n. 34, 24 L.Ed.2d 610 (1970) and again approved in Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 845 n. 10, 93 S.Ct. 2357, 2363 n. 10, 37 L.Ed.2d 380 (1973). Jewell, 532 F.2d at 701.

. It serves little purpose to say that a deliberate ignorance instruction is "rarely appropriate ... because it is a rare occasion when the prosecution can present evidence that the defendant deliberately avoided knowledge.” See Ct. Op. at 1409 (citing Ninth Circuit cases) & at 1412 (“The appeal before us does not present one of the rare cases in which the deliberate ignorance instruction was appropriate.”) First, the relevant inquiry is whether the evidence in each particular case could warrant a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant "had intentionally remained ignorant despite his subjective awareness of facts plainly indicating” the commission of an offense. See United States v. Glick, 710 F.2d 639, 642 (10th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005, 104 S.Ct. 995, 79 L.Ed.2d 229 (1984). See also Griego v. United States, 298 F.2d 845, 849 (10th Cir.1962) ("The test is whether there was a conscious purpose to avoid enlightenment.”). We cannot anticipate the facts of every case in which a deliberate ignorance instruction might be appropriate. Second, our cases suggest that it is not "a rare occasion when the prosecution can present evidence that the defendant deliberately avoided knowledge." See Ct. Op. at 1409. Until today, we have never reversed a conviction because a deliberate ignorance instruction was given. See Ct. Op. at 1410 n. 3 (discussing Tenth Circuit cases). See also Ochoa-Fabian, 935 F.2d at 1141-1142 (deliberate ignorance instruction appropriate). But see United States v. Markopoulos, 848 F.2d 1036, 1040 (10th Cir.1988) (deliberate ignorance instruction was error as to one defendant, but not reversible error based upon review of instructions as a whole). Third, given the scores of cases on this frequently-appealed point, it is telling that very few cases actually reverse convictions based on an unwarranted deliberate ignorance instruction. See Ct. Op. at 1409, 1410-1411 (citing United States v. Sanchez-Robles, 927 F.2d 1070, 1075-76 (9th Cir.1991); United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, 768 F.2d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Beckett, 724 F.2d 855, 856 (9th Cir.1984); United States v. Garzon, 688 F.2d 607, 609 (9th Cir.1982)).

. Defendant never knew Juan’s real or last name. III R.S. 38.

. The court states:
[Defendant] testified his suspicions that the car might have been stolen were allayed when the insurance agency issued insurance for the car because he thought that insurance companies had the capacity to cross-check for stolen vehicles when insurance was applied for and did so routinely.
Ct. Op. at 1411-1412. While defendant’s testimony might support such a conclusion, the actual testimony is equivocal:
Mr. Trujillo: Did you check whether the car was stolen?
Defendant: The first thing that I did was go buy insurance because there they know the titles of the cars and they know whether or not it is false.
Mr. Trujillo: You figured the insurance company would find out whether it was stolen?
Defendant: Yes.
Mr. Trujillo: And did they tell you whether the car was stolen?
Defendant: No.
II R.S. 41.

. About naming an insured party for the car, the following testimony occurred:
Mr. Schwendiman: How about the person that the car was registered to?
Defendant: I don’t know the name. I don’t remember.
Mr. Schwendiman: But wait, you were given all the papers there in Santa Monica. You were given the registration. Didn't he explain what he was giving to you?
Defendant: Yes, I saw the name. I wasn’t interested in what the name was.
Mr. Schwendiman: You weren’t interested in much about this car, it appears.
Defendant: For sure, really, no.
III R.S. 38.

. The reference was:
Knowledge that the materials] were narcotics may be inferred from circumstances that would convince an average ordinary person that this is the fact, thus although the Government cannot satisfy its burden of proving defendant’s knowledge of showing that the defendant would have obtained such knowledge were he not careless, the Government may satisfy its burden of proving the defendant’s knowledge by proof that the defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what otherwise would have been obvious to him.
IV R.S. 90.

. The instruction adopted by the circuit in Glick is designed “[t]o insure that a defendant is only convicted if his ignorance is willful, rather than negligent.” Id., 710 F.2d at 643. Even given the subjective state-of-mind requirement, a jury is permitted to consider the reasonableness of a claim of negligent ignorance or mistake is assessing whether the defendant honestly acted in such a manner. See United States v. Cheek, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 604, 611-12, 112 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991) (subjective good faith belief may negate willfulness in criminal tax case, but "the more unreasonable the asserted beliefs or misunderstandings are, the more likely the jury will consider them to be nothing more than simple disagreement with known legal duties imposed by the tax laws and will find that the Government has carried its burden of proving knowledge.”). Given a purely subjective standard, the objective reasonableness of a defendant's belief is but one factor which may be considered in determining whether a subjective belief is honestly held. United States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619, 622-23 (10th Cir.1990); United States v. Mann, 884 F.2d 532, 537 n. 3 (10th Cir.1989); United States v. Payne, 800 F.2d 227, 229 (10th Cir.1986); United States v. Wainwright, 413 F.2d 796, 802 n. 3 (10th Cir.1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009, 90 S.Ct. 566, 24 L.Ed.2d 501 (1970). This explanation harmonizes those cases which have mentioned reasonableness in a deliberate ignorance discussion and yet adhered to the subjective state-of-mind requirement. See United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 52 n. 15, 60 (1st Cir.1991); Sanchez-Robles, 927 F.2d at 1074; United States v. Garzon, 688 F.2d 607, 609 (9th Cir.1982); United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 243 n. 2 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 991, 103 S.Ct. 347, 74 L.Ed.2d 387 (1982); United States v. Nicholson, 677 F.2d 706, 710-11 (9th Cir.1982).