Court Opinion

ID: 9634468
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:14:02.332068+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:13.122525
License: Public Domain

Bogdanski, J.
(dissenting). The Connecticut minority representation statute (§ 9-167a) applies by its own terms to "any board, commission, committee or similar body of the state or any political subdivision thereof, whether elective or appointive, except any such board, commission, committee or body whose members are elected on the basis of a geographical division of the state or such political subdivision . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
The meaning and intent of a statute is to be ascertained from the language itself. Schwab v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 154 Conn. 479, 482, 226 A.2d 506 (1967). This court has already held that “[t]he language of the statute [§ 9-167a] is clear and *558unambiguous.” State ex rel. Maisano v. Mitchell, 155 Conn. 256, 264, 231 A.2d 539 (1967). Where the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for statutory construction. Hartford Hospital v. Hartford, 160 Conn. 370, 375, 279 A.2d 561 (1971). Courts are not permitted to read into a statute what is not there. “ ‘We cannot “search out some intent which we may believe the legislature actually had and give effect to it ... we are confined to the intention which is expressed in the words it has used.” Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Walsh, 134 Conn. 295, 301, 57 A.2d 128.’ ” Kulis v. Moll, 172 Conn. 104, 110, 374 A.2d 133 (1976); Madison Education Assn. v. Madison, 174 Conn. 189, 192, 384 A.2d 361 (1978).
The defendants, however, claim that § 9-167a embodies an unwritten distinction between administrative and legislative bodies. No such distinction is possible in view of this court’s precise statement as to the meaning of the statute. In State ex rel. Bennett v. Glynn, 154 Conn. 237, 241, 224 A.2d 711 (1966), this court stated that § 9-167a, but for two exceptions, applies to every municipal body, whether elective or appointive: the first exception being any public body the members of which are elected on the basis of a geographical division of a municipality; and the second permitting any general or special act to provide for a greater degree of minority representation than is provided by the statute. Neither of the exceptions applies to this case.
Public Acts 1957, No. 13, § 1, now General Statutes § 1-1 (m), provides in part that “the words ‘legislative body,’ as applied to . . . towns and cities, shall mean the board of aldermen, council or other body charged with the duty of making annual *559appropriations.” (Emphasis added.) Public Acts 1957, No. 465, § 7, now General Statutes § 7-193, also enacted two years before § 9-167a, permits a town, city, or borough to have as a legislative body a board of selectmen, council, board of directors, board of aldermen or board of burgesses. In enacting a law, the legislature is presumed to know of existing relevant statutes and to intend to create a consistent body of law. Citrano v. Berkshire Mutual Ins. Co., 171 Conn. 248, 255, 368 A.2d 54 (1976). Therefore, we must presume that the legislature in enacting § 9-167a in 1959 knew that the words “board” and “council” as used in existing statutes were meant to eneompass legislative bodies.
Section 9-167a was responsive to the “overriding desire of the General Assembly to compel minority representation by limiting the number of members of any one political party on any municipal body.” (Emphasis added.) State ex rel. Bennett v. Glynn, supra, 242. “The obvious purpose of the statute is to prevent a situation wherein a simple majority of the voters of one party can elect all its candidates, leaving a substantial minority of voters without an effective voice in government.” State ex rel. Maisano v. Mitchell, supra, 264. “The legislature felt that it was important, on boards . . . with clearly ‘political’ duties, to have a significant minority voice ... to assure intelligent decision-making.” LoFrisco v. Schaffer, 341 F. Sup. 743, 750 (D. Conn. 1972), aff’d per curiam, 409 U.S. 972, 93 S. Ct. 313, 34 L. Ed. 2d 236 (1972).
Section 9-167a was designed to prevent the members of the majority party from excluding the members of the minority from participating in governmental decisions; therefore, a minority must *560be assured a role in the legislative body in order to have an effective voice in government. Because of the unambiguous language of § 9-167a; because of the definition of “legislative body” in § 1-1 (m) and § 7-193 of the General Statutes; and because of this court’s precise language in interpreting § 9-167a in State ex rel. Maisano v. Mitchell, supra, 264, State ex rel. Bennett v. Glynn, supra, 244, and the United States District Court’s decision in LoFrisco v. Schaffer, supra, I would find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that § 9-167a applies to the instant case.
The trial court, nevertheless, concluded that § 9-167a violates the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions “insofar as § 9-167a prevents a party member from being elected as an independent candidate.” The court indicated that the violation occurs because § 9-167a (g) treats a member of a party who appears on the ballot without party endorsement differently from a member of a party who appears on the ballot solely as a candidate of some other party.1
Section 9-61 of the General Statutes provides: “If the name of any elector appears on the ballot label in an election only under a party designation other than that of the party with which he is enrolled . . . such name shall be removed from the enrollment list for a period of time beginning on the day of such election and ending at the termination of the term of *561the office for which he is a candidate after which time he may apply for enrollment in said party.” Thus, although § 9-167a (g) itself does not require a party member to disenroll from his party if he runs with another party’s endorsement, the statutory scheme of which it is a part does impose such a requirement.
Even had Ludgin shown that the disaffiliation requirement unequally burdens candidates in his position, his equal protection claim lacks merit. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that necessary state-imposed burdens on the right of candidates to have a place on the ballot are justified by the compelling state interest in political stability. Moreover, that state interest outweighs the interest of the candidate in making a late rather than an early decision to such independent ballot status. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736, 94 S. Ct. 1274, 39 L. Ed. 2d 714; see also Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 93 S. Ct. 1245, 36 L. Ed. 2d 1; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 348, 92 S. Ct. 995, 31 L. Ed. 2d 274; Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 89 S. Ct. 5, 21 L. Ed. 2d 24.
In Storer, supra, 733, the Supreme Court found a state requirement that the independent candidate not have been affiliated with a political party for a year before the primary to be expressive of a general state policy aimed at maintaining the integrity of the various routes to the ballot and held that the requirement does not violate equal protection. “[The disaffiliation requirement for independent candidates] protects the direct primary process by refusing to recognize independent candidates who do not make early plans to leave a party and take the alternative course to the ballot. It works against *562independent candidacies prompted by short-range political g’oals, piqne, or personal quarrel. It is also a substantial barrier to a party fielding an ‘independent’ candidate to capture and bleed off votes in the general election that might well go to another party.” Id., 735. The holding of Storer leaves no room for doubt that the six-months disaffiliation requirement in § 9-167a (g) is constitutional.
I would, therefore, find error on the constitutional issue.

 Section 9-167a (g) provides that a party member who runs solely as the candidate of a party other than the one in which he is enrolled will be considered a member of the party under whose aegis he appears on the ballot. By contrast, a party member who appears in the ballot as a candidate without party designation is considered to be a member of his party, rather than an unaffiliated candidate, unless he withdraws from the party six months prior to his candidacy.