Court Opinion

ID: 9528746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:43:36.823922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:16.495291
License: Public Domain

Caporale, J.
Pursuant to findings of the county court jury, defendant-appellant, Wayne E. Zima, was adjudged guilty of failing to signal a turn, in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-652 (Reissue 1988), and of first-offense driving while intoxicated, in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07 (Reissue 1988). This judgment was affirmed by the district court. In his appeal to this court, Zima assigns as error the district court’s failure to find the county court erred on the record by permitting jurors to question witnesses, claiming this exercise deprived him of a fair and impartial jury and trial. For the reasons set forth hereinafter, we disapprove the practice of permitting jurors to question witnesses, but nonetheless affirm the judgment of the district court.
On the evening of October 18, 1988, Zima was stopped by a Seward County deputy sheriff for failing to signal his left turn from Centennial Avenue onto Highway 34 in Utica, Seward County, Nebraska. Upon reaching Zima’s vehicle, the deputy noted an odor of alcohol emanating from within and the bloodshot condition of Zima’s eyes. In addition, Zima was unsteady as he, upon request, walked to the deputy’s patrol vehicle. Zima also had difficulty with several field sobriety tests administered by the deputy, and the deputy concluded that Zima was intoxicated, an opinion corroborated by the results of a preliminary and a subsequent, more sophisticated, breath test.
*954During trial, after the parties completed their questioning of witnesses, the county court judge invited the jurors to ask questions. Zima complains of the following colloquy, which occurred at the conclusion of the parties’ examination of the State’s breath testing device witness:
[JUROR]: Well now if the breath test simulator doesn’t work, then what test do you use on____
THE WITNESS: If I have a problem with the breath simulator, then I notify the Department of Highway Safety and then they submit another one to me and then I do my checks according to what he has sent me.
[JUROR]: To your knowledge, has there ever been a time when that one at the county jail hasn’t worked?
THE WITNESS: Not to my knowledge.
[JUROR]: To mine there was.
THE COURT: Now wait a minute.
THE WITNESS: This is the breath simulator. This is the breath simulator. This is not the intoxilyzer or the gas chromatograph. We had a gas chromatograph at one time
[JUROR]: There’s more than one —
THE WITNESS: Yes, ma’am.
[JUROR]: — machine that they run it on, that you’ve tried?
THE WITNESS: Yes, ma’am. We had the gas chromatograph at one time, and we put that instrument out of operation and sent it back to the state because we were — we heard about the intoxilyzer 401 IAS. And we’ve never had any problems with it, ever.
[JUROR]: Okay. So more than — so they use more than one breath simulator type like that — one machine?
THE WITNESS: Right, yes. Before I was the jail administrator, they used the gas chromatograph instrument over at the Seward County Detention Center. And since that period when I have become the administrator, we have put in the intoxilyzer 4011 AS.
[JUROR]: Now, I don’t know, can I ask — I don’t know if it will pertain to him or not. If — like say if you was [sic] giving me the test and I objected to that test, what *955test would you do then?
THE WITNESS: Okay, the officer is the person that you’d have to talk to, the individual officer. He has the option — if there is something wrong, if it were to present itself that something were wrong, then I would put the machine out of service. I would advise the officer that there was a problem. Then it would be up to him whether or not he would go blood or urine. And then those tests would be taken to Lincoln and subjected to the Department of Health Laboratories.
[JUROR]: Okay. Thank you.
Because of the foregoing colloquy, the State, which now urges that no error occurred because of juror questioning, moved the county court judge for a mistrial. Zima, however, resisted the State’s motion, stating, through counsel, “I just don’t think there’s sufficient grounds for a mistrial.” Apparently persuaded by Zima’s analysis, the county court overruled the State’s motion.
Although the issue of juror questioning of witnesses is one of first impression in Nebraska, it is not without precedent. One group of jurisdictions, although it may discourage juror questioning of witnesses, holds that allowing the practice is within the discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., U.S. v. Johnson, 914 F.2d 136 (8th Cir. 1990); U.S. v. Lewin, 900 F.2d 145 (8th Cir. 1990); State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1989); People v Heard, 388 Mich. 182, 200 N.W.2d 73 (1972); People v Wesley, 148 Mich. App. 758, 384 N.W.2d 783 (1985), aff’d 428 Mich. 708, 411 N.W.2d 159 (1987), cert. denied 484 U.S. 967, 108 S. Ct. 459, 98 L. Ed. 2d 399; Carter v. State, 250 Ind. 13, 234 N.E.2d 650 (1968); Lucas v. State, 381 So. 2d 140 (Miss. 1980).
Another group of jurisdictions outlines a procedure for allowing jurors to submit written questions to the court, subject to review by the court and counsel. See, e.g., People v. McAlister, 167 Cal. App. 3d 633, 213 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1985); State v. LeMaster; 137 Ariz. 159, 669 P.2d 592 (1983); State v. G. Barrett, 278 S.C. 414, 297 S.E.2d 794 (1982); Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Medical Ctr., 293 N.W.2d 550 (Iowa 1980); People v. Gates, 97 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 10, 158 Cal. Rptr. 759 *956(1979). See, also, Urbom, Toward Better Treatment of Jurors by Judges, 61 Neb. L. Rev. 409 (1982).
Although the techniques employed by the second group of jurisdictions (1) minimize the likelihood of debacles such as that in this case, (2) may obviate the concern which would otherwise face counsel who fear that raising an objection would alienate the questioning juror, and, (3) to a lesser extent, address as well the question of juror qualification to examine witnesses, they do not deal with the more fundamental question of what effect juror questioning may have, or appear to have, on juror impartiality. Since due process requires a fair trial before a fair and impartial jury, Simants v. State, 202 Neb. 828, 277 N.W.2d 217 (1979), the judicial process is better served by the time-honored practice of counsel eliciting evidence which is heard, evaluated, and acted upon by jurors who have no investment in obtaining answers to questions they have posed. See Pacific Improvement Co. v. Weidenfeld, 277 F. 224 (2d Cir. 1921). But see United States v. Witt, 215 F.2d 580 (1954) (without referring to Pacific Improvement Co., holds juror questioning within discretion of trial judge).
Our system is an adversary one which depends upon counsel to put before lay fact finders that which should be admitted in accordance with the rules of evidence and to keep from them that which should not be received in evidence. A change in this system whereby jurors become advocates and possible antagonists of the witnesses does not on its face suggest a fairer or more reliable truth-seeking procedure. We therefore rule that in the trial courts of this state, juror questioning of witnesses is prohibited.
However, the foregoing declaration does not end our analysis of this case, for we have held that a party cannot silently tolerate error, gamble on a favorable result, and then complain that he or she guessed wrong. See State v. Jenson, 232 Neb. 403, 440 N.W.2d 686 (1989). Indeed, Zima did more than remain silent, he successfully argued against a mistrial and thereby invited the very error which is the source of his present discontent. It is a well-established principle of appellate practice that a party cannot complain of error which he or she invited the trial court to commit. State v. Ditter, 232 Neb. 600, 441 *957N.W.2d 622 (1989). Zima thus cannot now complain that the outcome achieved is not the result he desired.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Affirmed.