Court Opinion

ID: 9671481
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:37:21.788442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:09.850318
License: Public Domain

Donald L. Corbin, Justice, dissenting. The Appellant raises four possible, theories that this court could utilize in order to place liability on the health-care provider — the ultimate person upon which blame should lie. I address only two of them, as the other two werfe not adequately developed by Appellant. I would be willing, however, to consider the remaining two theories in the future, in the event they are properly developed for appeal. I would apply the common-carrier liability theory to allow recovery in this case. True enough, that theory originated with companies that were in the business of transporting passengers, but I believe the reasons behind this theory could be applied to the situation presented in this case. The basis of the theory, as it relates to common carriers in Arkansas, is a recognition of an enhanced liability to passengers because they are most vulnerable due to the fact that they have entrusted the common carrier with their lives. Under this doctrine, common carriers are responsible for the intentional torts of their employees. The policy reason that militates such a high standard of care is the vulnerability of the patron. I would extend this high standard of care to medical-care providers. I can think of no greater responsibility than the duty owed by medical-care providers to safely exercise their skills and maintain control and supervision over their support staff upon accepting a patient into their care. A patient entrusts his body to the physician and necessarily to any of the physician’s support staff. The patient subjects himself to a loss of dignity by even divulging his personal thoughts as to what ails him. Who does not feel the most vulnerable when told to disrobe and put on one of those split-tail gowns? Nakedness makes one feel the weakest, the most vulnerable. In addition to these feelings of vulnerability, we are conditioned since childhood to do what the doctor or his staff say “if we want to get well.” Do we refuse to follow or question the control of physicians or their staffs? No. We blindly obey their orders. Upon their direction, we bend over, we make a fist, we turn this way or that, we take a deep breath, and we even cough on command. We are essentially like sheep being led to slaughter, blindly doing as we are told. The reason for this blind faith lies within the trust we have for all medical-care providers, whom we are told will help us in our time of need. I do not think it is proper for the medical-care provider, the authoritative figurehead, to be let off the hook of accountability because his employee’s assault on his patient did not pertain to something that is incident to the employee’s duties — that it was not foreseeable in view of the duties of the servant pursuant to our doctrine of respondeat superior. This is where I believe the majority is wrong. Certainly, the record reflects that Dr. Harshfield is a decent and fine physician, who employed Pearrow on the basis of his skills and reputation in the health-care field. The record further reflects that Dr. Harshfield did not in any manner desire or authorize Pearrow to make the sexual assault on his patient. But in this situation, control, trust, and vulnerability are the buzz words. This physician, acting through his radiology technician, Pearrow, to whom he had delegated the responsibility of solely caring for his patient, must and should bear the ultimate responsibility for the outrageous harm done to his patient, the Appellant herein. The majority’s decision is very disturbing to me. After reading this decision, who will ever totally trust any health-care provider? If it happened once, it can do so again. What makes the majority’s decision even more disturbing is the fact that it is common practice that a male medical-care provider have a female medical-care provider present when he is examining a female patient. Although I suspect that the concern for the female patient is merely secondary to the male medical-care provider’s desire to protect himself from unwarranted accusations arising from such intimate encounters, this decision has the potential of undermining such practice. Because if such acts by the employer are not foreseeable under the instant facts, then there is no need to continue this practice. It has a smack of gender bias. The bottom line is that if it is foreseeable that a one-on-one encounter between a male medical-care provider and a female patient could lead to improper sexual assaults being perpetrated on a female patient, then it is just as foreseeable that such assaults may be perpetrated on a male patient. The key to viewing such a situation lies not within a heterosexual-versus-homosexual attraction; rather, the situation turns on the fact that the vulnerable patient finds himself or herself alone with a stranger while the patient is in a submissive situation. In fact, I agree with the majority’s observation that there is no connection between a person’s sexual orientation and a predisposition to commit sexual assault. Thus, I can discern no valid reason for having a third party present in the examining room when the medical-care provider is male and the patient is female, all the while continuing to allow a male medical-care provider to be alone with a male patient. My observations would just as easily support liability under the theory of job-created power. Under this theory, employers are held vicariously hable for an employee’s intentional torts. Because Dr. Harshfield gave Pearrow supervisory control over his patient, he gave job-created power to Pearrow. The scope of risks attributable to a health-care provider should increase with the amount of authority and freedom of action granted to a servant in performing his assigned tasks. This is particularly true when those supervisory duties include one-on-one encounters with patients. Based upon the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.