Court Opinion

ID: 9570004
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:19:17.034393+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:36.136021
License: Public Domain

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the Court’s judgment, but I write separately because I would remand on a more limited basis. I would remand solely because of the district court’s apparent reliance on our cases requiring “extraordinary physical impairment” for a departure based on a defendant’s health to deny Chase’s request for a variance based on his health.
Subsequent to the sentencing hearing, our court affirmed another district court’s refusal to grant a downward variance by referring to the “extraordinary physical impairment” standard for health departures set forth in U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4. Charles, 531 F.3d at 641. We found that Charles did not meet the three-part test for a downward departure, so his “health concerns require[d] no variance.” Id. Although the Court states that Charles does not directly conflict with our cases that distinguish between variances and departures and that Charles therefore “does not bind district courts with respect to variance decisions,” ante at 832, in my view, Charles effectively imports the guidelines’ departure requirement in § 5H 1.4 to a variance request based on a defendant’s health. This creates a conflict with our line of cases that do not impose such a requirement. See, e.g., United States v. White, 506 F.3d 635, 647 (8th Cir.2007); United States v. Wadena, 470 F.3d 735, 739-40 (8th Cir.2006). Where there are conflicting lines of cases, the Court has discretion to follow either line. See Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826, 831 n. 4 (8th Cir.2008). Because I agree with our line of cases that do not import the guidelines’ departure requirement to a variance request based on a defendant’s health, I would choose not to apply Charles. Therefore, I would remand to allow the district court to consider Chase’s variance request without imposing the “extraordinary physical impairment” requirement.
I am not convinced, however, that the district court’s other statements showed that the court believed it lacked the au*833thority to grant a variance based on the other relevant factors, such as Chase’s age, employment history and criminal history. In my view, the district court properly considered the § 3553(a) factors and concluded that the facts in this case did not warrant a variance. The district court specifically referred to Chase’s age, education, alcohol problems, physical condition, financial situation and lack of dependents. As a result, we may reasonably infer that the district court was aware of and considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors in this case. See United States v. Gray, 533 F.3d 942, 944 (8th Cir.2008) (explaining that we must consider “the entire sentencing record, not merely the district court’s statements at the [sentencing] hearing,” and that the court’s reference to some of the § 3553(a) factors implies that the court “was aware of the entire contents of the relevant statute”); see also United States v. Mooney, 534 F.3d 944, 947 (8th Cir.2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 1023, 173 L.Ed.2d 311 (2009). Indeed, “Booker, Rita, and Gall were hardly obscure decisions likely to have been overlooked by federal sentencing judges.... ” Gray, 533 F.3d at 943. Thus, I conclude that the district court considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors and simply declined to vary from Chase’s advisory sentencing guidelines range. Nevertheless, because I am concerned that the district court may have felt constrained to apply the guidelines’ departure requirement to Chase’s request for a variance based on his health, I concur in the Court’s decision to vacate the sentence and remand for further consideration.