Court Opinion

ID: 9579878
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:59:29.190097+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:51.847880
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, C.J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). While I concur in the holding of the lead opinion, reinstating the defendant’s convictions, I dissent from its characterization of "some competent evidence.”
i
The only issue before this Court1 is whether nondocumentary evidence can be sufficient to rebut a prima facie case of a statutory violation of MCL 333.7403(1); MSA 14.15(7403)(1).2 The general *305question, as well as its resolution, is in no means novel or foreign to our jurisprudence.
We have reviewed the general question in cases involving prosecutions for carrying a concealed weapon 3 and selling unregistered securities in violation of the Uniform Securities Act.4 In People v Henderson, 391 Mich 612; 218 NW2d 2 (1974), the defendant, who was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon in a motor vehicle, argued that the state failed to prove an essential element of the crime, specifically the absence of a gun permit. The prosecutor asserted that a statutory presumption existed, absolving the state of proving nonlicensure.5 This Court agreed:
[W]e hold that upon a showing that a defendant has carried a pistol in a vehicle operated or occupied by him, prima facie case of violation of the statute has been made out. Upon the establishment of such a prima facie case, the defendant has the burden of injecting the issue of license by offering some proof—not necessarily by official record—that he has been so licensed. The people *306thereupon are obliged to establish the contrary beyond a reasonable doubt. [Id. at 616. Emphasis added.]
While we concluded that the statute imposed the burden of production on the defendant, we explicitly noted that something less than documentary evidence could fulfill this burden.
In People v Dempster, 396 Mich 700, 711; 242 NW2d 381 (1976), we held that MCL 451.802(d); MSA 19.776(402)(d), now § 402(c), of the Uniform Securities Act did not unconstitutionally require the defendant to prove his innocence. Similar to the statute at issue in the instant case, the Uniform Securities Act provides:
In any proceeding under this act, the burden of proving an exemption or an exception is upon the person claiming it. [MCL 451.802(c); MSA 19.776(402)(c).]
When rejecting the defendant’s constitutional challenge, the Court reflected on the proof needed to rebut the statutory presumption.
.The Uniform Securities Act provision, read in light of People v Henderson, supra, must be interpreted to mean that once the state establishes a prima facie case of statutory violation, the burden of going forward, i.e., of injecting some competent evidence of the exempt status of the securities, shifts to the defendant. However, once the defendant properly injects the issue, the state is obliged to establish the contrary beyond a reasonable doubt. [Id. at 713-714.]
While the Court acknowledged that the concealed weapons statute and the Uniform Securities Act used different language, it concluded that both compelled analogous results—once the defendant *307interjects some competent evidence of an exemption, the state is required to establish the contrary beyond a reasonable doubt.
We are cognizant of the fact that the concealed weapons statute speaks of the "burden of establishing” the license, and states that this does not shift the "burden of proof for the violation.” While the language might be preferable to that of the instant statute, the principle is not different. [Dempster at 712.]
The instant statute, read in light of Henderson and Dempster, establishes a prima facie case of statutory violation. However, the defendant may show an exception to or exemption from the statutory mandate by offering some competent evidence of a prescription during trial. At that point, the prosecution is required to establish the contrary beyond a reasonable doubt.6
Obviously, the amount of proof the prosecutor must present will be determined by the strength of the defendant’s proofs. In this respect, the procedure used in insanity cases is instructive.
A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed sane. Once any evidence of insanity is • introduced, however, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing defendant’s sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
The nature and quantum of rebuttal evidence of sanity sufficient to present an issue for a jury is to *308some extent determined by the strength of the case for insanity. Necessarily, the sufficiency of evidence needed to put the question of sanity before a jury will vary from case to case. Merely some evidence of sanity may be sufficient to meet some evidence of insanity and yet wholly insufficient to meet substantial evidence of insanity. [People v Murphy, 416 Mich 453, 463-464; 331 NW2d 152 (1982). Citations omitted.]
II
Although the lead opinion agrees that the defendant must present "some competent evidence” of a prescription, it holds that
to satisfy this standard in the context of the possession statute, defendant must come forward with more than his own mere assertion that he had a prescription. [Ante, p 295.]
While the defendant’s "own mere assertion” may not compel a jury to accept that the defendant possessed the controlled substances pursuant to a valid prescription, it is nevertheless "some competent evidence.”
Furthermore, the lead opinion claims that its standard does not "always require” paper documentation, however, the examples it offers as sufficient are either paper documentation or its equivalent.
The lead opinion demands more than "some competent evidence.” It heightens the burden the defendant is forced to meet, contrary to existing case law. It is with this heightened standard that I voice my disagreement.
hi
The defendant presented "some competent evi*309dence” that he obtained the controlled substances pursuant to a valid prescription. The defendant testified that he obtained prescriptions for the controlled substances from doctors while working out of state. The defense offered documented evidence of a continuous back injury. Furthermore, an expert testified that the substances found in the defendant’s possession were the type of medication typically prescribed for the condition suffered by the defendant.
In light of the evidence, I agree with the Court of Appeals that the nondocumentary evidence presented by the defendant was sufficient to rebut the prima facie case of a statutory violation. However, I disagree with its holding that the defendant is entitled to a new trial. The trial judge properly instructed the jury that the prosecution bore the burden of proving the absence of a prescription as an element of the charged offenses. It was in the province of the jury to determine whether the prosecution fulfilled its burden. There is no reason to upset the jury’s conclusion that the prosecution proved the absence of a prescription beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, I would reinstate the defendant’s convictions.
Levin, J., concurred with Cavanagh, C.J.

 This Court granted the state’s application for leave to appeal. In its brief, the state framed the question presented as:
Did the trial court exercise its sound discretion by requiring defendant to produce proof, beyond his own statement that he had a prescription, to rebut the presumption that his possession of drugs was unlawful?

 A person shall not knowingly or intentionally possess a controlled substance . . . unless the controlled substance ... . was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription .... [MCL 333.7403(1); MSA 14.15(7403X1).]
(1) It is not necessary for this state to negate any exemption or exception in this article in a complaint, information, indict*305ment, or other pleading or in a trial, hearing, or other proceeding under this article. The burden of proof of an exemption or exception is upon the person claiming it.
(2) In the absence of proof that a person is the authorized holder of an appropriate license or order form issued under this article, the person is presumed not to be the holder of the license or order form. The burden of proof is upon the person to rebut the presumption. [MCL 333.7531; MSA 14.15(7531).]

 MCL 750.227; MSA 28.424.

 MCL 451.701; MSA 19.776(301).

 The applicable statute states:
In any prosecution for the violation of any acts of the state relative to use, licensing and possession of pistols or firearms, the burden of establishing any exception, excuse, proviso or exemption contained in any such act shall be upon the defendant but this does not shift the burden of proof for the violation. [MCL 776.20; MSA 28.1274(1).]

 See also People v Bates, 91 Mich App 506, 516; 283 NW2d 785 (1979) (authored by Justice Riley) ("Upon defendant’s presentation of some competent evidence that he is authorized by license [a readily ascertainable fact particularly within his knowledge], the people must then prove to the contrary beyond a reasonable doubt”); People v Bailey, 85 Mich App 594, 599; 272 NW2d 146 (1978) ("And, if the defendant adduces any evidence of authorization, the people must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had no such authorization”).