Court Opinion

ID: 9945811
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 16:19:47.382212+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:22:10.665147
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

                                        2024 WY 23

                                                       OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2023

                                                                    February 28, 2024

 JERRY PETERSON,

 Appellant
 (Petitioner),

 v.                                                   S-23-0149

 LARAMIE CITY COUNCIL,

 Appellee
 (Respondent).

                     Appeal from the District Court of Albany County
                         The Honorable Misha E. Westby, Judge

Representing Appellant:
      Cassie Craven, Longhorn Law Limited Liability Company, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee:
      J. Mark Stewart, Davis & Cannon, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.
Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne,
Wyoming 82002, of typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final
publication in the permanent volume.
KAUTZ, Justice.

[¶1] Jerry Peterson filed a declaratory judgment complaint against the Laramie City
Council (City Council or Council), claiming it violated the Wyoming Public Meetings Act
by holding its meetings remotely during and after the COVID-19 pandemic. The district
court dismissed the complaint based on laches. We reverse and remand.

                                         ISSUE

[¶2] The dispositive issue on appeal is: Did the district court err by dismissing Mr.
Peterson’s declaratory judgment complaint against the City Council on the basis of laches?

                                        FACTS

[¶3] The district court granted the City Council’s motion to dismiss under Wyoming
Rule of Civil Procedure (W.R.C.P.) 12(b)(6); consequently, the only facts recited here are
those alleged in Mr. Peterson’s declaratory judgment complaint, including information
from attachments incorporated into the complaint. SH v. Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist., 2018
WY 11, ¶ 5, 409 P.3d 1231, 1233 (Wyo. 2018) (reviewing complaint and attachments on
a motion to dismiss).

[¶4] In March 2020, the City Council began prohibiting in-person attendance at its
meetings due to the COVID-19 pandemic. On March 24, 2020, it issued Resolution 2020-
17, which, in accordance with the Governor’s and the Wyoming State Health Officer’s
Public Health Orders, closed “places of public accommodation” and prohibited gatherings
of “10 or more people” in “a single confined space at the same time.” On April 21, 2020,
the Council passed Resolution 2020-24, which allowed it to meet remotely through
“telephone or web conferencing.” The City Council used the Zoom web-conferencing
platform, and the public apparently had the opportunity to comment through Zoom during
the meetings. Resolution 2020-24 was “effective and retroactive [to] March 1, 2020[,] and
until Public Health Orders restricting gatherings of 10 people or more [were] lifted or
expire[d].” The Governor lifted the ban on gatherings of 10 or more people in May 2020,
but the City Council continued to prohibit in-person meetings. The City Council passed
Resolution 2021-07 in January 2021, reiterating the prohibition on in-person meetings
based on its mistaken understanding that gatherings were still restricted to fewer than 10
people.

[¶5] In January 2022, the City Council passed resolution 2022-2 again forbidding in-
person meetings and allowing attendance “only [through] telephone or web conferencing.”
The order was to remain in effect “until rescinded by [the] Council or the end of the
COVID-19 pandemic . . . .” On March 14, 2022, the Governor signed an executive order
formally “declaring the end to the State of Emergency and Public Health Emergency
relating to the COVID-19 pandemic.” The City Council, however, continued to meet

                                            1
remotely throughout 2022 and did not provide the opportunity for in-person attendance at
its meetings.

[¶6] Mr. Peterson filed his declaratory judgment complaint on January 4, 2023. 1 He
alleged the City Council violated the Wyoming Public Meetings Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§
16-4-401 through 16-4-408, by refusing to allow in-person attendance at its meetings from
when the Governor lifted the restriction on gatherings of 10 or more persons in May 2020
through November 2022.2 Mr. Peterson asserted the City Council denied him entry to its
meetings approximately four times per month during this time period. He claimed the
“[Z]oom format” presented a “condition precedent” to attendance at the City Council
meetings in violation of § 16-4-403(b), which states: “A member of the public is not
required as a condition of attendance at any meeting to register his name, to supply
information, to complete a questionnaire, or fulfill any other condition precedent to his
attendance.” Mr. Peterson also contested the validity of several of the Council’s resolutions
prohibiting in-person attendance at its meetings because they were based on incorrect
information about COVID-19 restrictions. His prayer for relief requested: 1) a court order
directing the Council “to conduct legal public meetings in accord with the requirements”
of the Wyoming Public Meetings Act; 2) “[c]ivil damages in accord with statutory
allowances”; 3) “[a]n award of attorney fees due to the willful and damaging nature of
excluding the public from public meetings”; and 4) a “declaratory judgment . . . that
meetings held since May 15, 2020[,] were illegal, out of accord with statute and as such
void under law, including the decisions made at said illegal meetings.”

[¶7] The City Council filed a motion to dismiss under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) arguing Mr.
Peterson’s claims were barred by laches because he inexcusably delayed filing suit. It
asserted: 1) Mr. Peterson delayed for approximately two and one-half years in filing his
claim about the 2020 meetings because it ripened in May 2020 when the Governor revoked
the restriction on in-person meetings of 10 persons or more; 2) he delayed two years in
registering his claim about the 2021 meetings because it matured when the City Council
adopted Resolution 2021-07 in January 2021 prohibiting in-person meetings based on the
mistaken belief that meetings were still restricted to fewer than 10 persons; and 3) he
delayed over nine months in bringing his claim about the 2022 meetings because it ripened
when the Governor declared an end to the Public Health Emergency on March 14, 2022.
1
  On January 3, 2023 (the day before Mr. Peterson filed his complaint), the City Council resolved to hold
its 2023 public meetings at the City Hall and allow attendance both “in person” and “via web-conferencing.”
Mr. Peterson did not acknowledge the 2023 resolution in his complaint; instead, he claimed the City
Council’s meetings “remain[ed] closed to the public” and “this practice [was] expected to continue
indefinitely.” The district court took judicial notice of the 2023 resolution even though Mr. Peterson did
not refer to it in his complaint. However, the court did not base its dismissal of Mr. Peterson’s complaint
on the 2023 resolution, and the effect of that resolution is not an issue in this appeal.
2
 The record does not reveal an explanation for why Mr. Peterson did not include the December 2022
meetings within the scope of his complaint, given the City Council also prohibited in-person attendance
during that month.
                                                    2
The City Council also maintained that granting Mr. Peterson’s requested relief by declaring
all its actions during the relevant period null and void would injure and prejudice the
Council and the “citizenry” which relied on those actions, including for example,
businesses, vendors, and contractors that obtained licenses or were paid during the period.
To support its claim of prejudice, the Council attached an affidavit from the City Clerk
which included a list of actions taken in August 2022 and general links to the City Council’s
website where its meeting minutes and ordinances were posted.

[¶8] After a hearing, the district court granted the City Council’s motion to dismiss.
Although it did not convert the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment, it
considered information outside the complaint by taking “judicial notice” of it. The court
grouped all of Mr. Peterson’s claims together and ruled they were barred by laches because
they “ripened” in May 2020, and the injury and prejudice which would result from
“undoing nearly three-years’ worth of decisions” by the City Council was “manifest and
need[ed] no further elaboration.” Mr. Peterson filed a timely notice of appeal.

                               STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶9] The district court dismissed Mr. Peterson’s complaint for “failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted” under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). When reviewing a Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal, “[w]e conduct a de novo review of the materials that were before the
district court.” Matter of Est. of Britain, 2018 WY 101, ¶ 11, 425 P.3d 978, 981 (Wyo.
2018) (citing Bush Land Dev. Co. v. Crook Cnty. Weed & Pest Control Dist., 2017 WY
12, ¶ 7, 388 P.3d 536, 539 (Wyo. 2017)) (other citations omitted). “‘[W]e accept the facts
stated in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’”
Woodie v. Whitesell, 2019 WY 115, ¶ 22, 451 P.3d 1152, 1158 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting
DeLoge v. Homar, 2013 WY 33, ¶ 9, 297 P.3d 117, 120 (Wyo. 2013)). Dismissal is a
drastic remedy which should be used cautiously; however, a motion to dismiss “‘is the
proper method for testing the legal sufficiency of the allegations and will be sustained when
the complaint shows on its face that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief.’” Britain, ¶ 11,
425 P.3d at 981-82 (quoting WW Enters., Inc. v. City of Cheyenne, 956 P.2d 353, 355
(Wyo. 1998), and Feltner v. Casey Fam. Program, 902 P.2d 206, 208 (Wyo. 1995)) (other
citations omitted).

[¶10] The parties suggest the district court’s decision on laches should be reviewed using
an abuse of discretion standard. In doing so, they ignore that the district court dismissed
this case under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. There is no place for an abuse of discretion analysis in reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint. See generally, Guy v. Lampert, 2015 WY 148, ¶¶ 2,
12, 362 P.3d 331, 333, 335 (Wyo. 2015) (reviewing a dismissal using the typical Rule
12(b)(6) analysis instead of the abuse of discretion standard suggested by the appellant in
his statement of the issues on appeal); Feltner, 902 P.2d at 207-08 (same).

                                              3
                                      DISCUSSION

[¶11] The district court dismissed Mr. Peterson’s complaint after concluding his claims
were barred by laches.

              “Laches bars a claim when a party has delayed in enforcing its
              rights to the disadvantage of another. Windsor Energy Grp.,
              L.L.C. v. Noble Energy, Inc., 2014 WY 96, ¶ 12, 330 P.3d 285,
              288 (Wyo. 2014) (citing Dorsett v. Moore, 2003 WY 7, ¶ 9, 61
              P.3d 1221, 1224 (Wyo. 2003)). The defense of laches is based
              in equity and whether it applies in a given case depends upon
              the circumstances. Id., ¶ 12, 330 P.3d at 288–89 (quoting Ultra
              Resources, Inc. v. Hartman, 2010 WY 36, ¶ 123, 226 P.3d 889,
              929 (Wyo. 2010)). Two elements must be proven to
              establish laches: 1) inexcusable delay; and 2) injury, prejudice,
              or disadvantage to the defendants or others. Id., ¶ 12, 330 P.3d
              at 289 (citing Moncrief [v. Sohio Petroleum Co.], 775 P.2d
              [1021,] 1025 [(Wyo. 1989)]). The existence of laches is
              primarily determined not by lapse of time but by
              considerations of justice. Merrill v. Rocky Mountain Cattle
              Co., 26 Wyo. 219, 181 P. 964, 974 (1919) (citation omitted).”

EOG Res., Inc. v. JJLM Land, LLC, 2022 WY 162, ¶ 33, 522 P.3d 605, 614-15 (Wyo.
2022) (quoting Tram Tower Townhouse Ass’n v. Weiner, 2022 WY 58, ¶ 44, 509 P.3d 357,
367 (Wyo. 2022)) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also, United States v. Rodriguez-
Aguirre, 264 F.3d 1195, 1208 (10th Cir. 2001) (“In order to prove the affirmative defense
of laches, the defendant must demonstrate that there has been an unreasonable delay in
asserting the claim and that the defendant was materially prejudiced by the delay.”)
(emphasis omitted). “Laches, in legal significance, is not mere delay, but delay that works
a disadvantage to another.” Rodriguez-Aguirre, 264 F.3d at 1208.

[¶12] Because of the fact-dependent nature of a laches defense, “[t]he strictures of Rule
12(b)(6), wherein dismissal of the claim is based solely on the complainant’s pleading, are
not readily applicable to [its] determination[.]” Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v.
Scimed Life Sys., Inc., 988 F.2d 1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1993). See also, Jordan v. Sprint
Nextel Corp., 3 F.Supp.3d 917, 929 (D. Kan. 2014) (a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss based solely on the complaint is “not readily applicable to a determination of
laches”) (citation omitted). Factual development beyond the contents of the complaint is
usually necessary to demonstrate unreasonable delay, lack of excuse, and material
prejudice to the defendant. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., 988 F.2d at 1161. However,
in the rare event “the elements of laches appear on the face of the complaint, the defendant
may move for—and the court may grant—dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).” Strauss v.
Angie’s List, Inc., No. 2:17-CV-02560-HLT-TJJ, 2019 WL 399910, at *3 (D.Kan. 2019).

                                             4
[¶13] The district court held that the first element of laches was satisfied because Mr.
Peterson inexcusably delayed filing his complaint. It determined “the earliest time” he
could have asserted his claims was May 2020, after the Governor lifted the ban on
gatherings of 10 or more people and Resolution 2020-24 expired on its own terms. The
district court declared “there [was] no plausible excuse” for Mr. Peterson’s delay of “more
than two and one-half years” in filing his January 2023 complaint. This determination
completely ignores that Mr. Peterson’s claims relate to actions taken at different times by
the City Council. Many of the City Council meetings addressed by the complaint occurred
closer in time to January 2023. Mr. Peterson could not have alleged, in May 2020, that
those meetings violated the Wyoming Public Meetings Act because they had not yet
occurred.

[¶14] We explained in Tram Tower Townhouse Ass’n, ¶ 45, 509 P.3d at 367:

              “[T]here is no set length of delay that will be considered undue
              or inexcusable; the circumstances of each case must be
              considered in making that determination.” Windsor, ¶ 25, 330
              P.3d at 292 (citations omitted); see also Cathcart v. Meyer, 2004
              WY 49, ¶ 13, 88 P.3d 1050, 1058 (Wyo. 2004) (“Laches does
              not depend on the passage of time alone; the plaintiff must be
              chargeable with lack of diligence in failing to proceed more
              promptly.” (citation omitted)). To determine whether the
              [plaintiff]’s delay was undue or inexcusable, we must identify
              the earliest time the [plaintiff] could have brought its claim and
              then analyze whether the time that passed between then and
              when the [plaintiff] first asserted its claim was
              unreasonable. See 30A C.J.S. Equity § 151, Westlaw (Mar.
              2022 Update).

“Laches may . . . be invoked only after the plaintiff discovers or with reasonable diligence
could have discovered the facts giving rise to his or her cause of action[] and will not be
invoked absent knowledge or notice of the wrong.” 27A Am.Jur.2d Equity § 139 (2024).
To suggest that all Mr. Peterson’s claims accrued at the same time, in some cases years
before the City Council took the actions he objected to, misreads and misinterprets his
claims. Furthermore, the court’s determination that there was “no plausible excuse” for
his delay is not readily apparent from the face of his complaint. His complaint simply does
not address the reasons, if any, for his delay in raising his objections to the City Council’s
separate actions from May 2020 through November 2022, or provide a basis for
concluding, as a matter of law, his delay was unreasonable.

[¶15] The district court also determined the second element of laches was met because
Mr. Peterson’s requested relief of declaring the Council’s May 2020 to November 2022

                                              5
meetings illegal and every action taken in those meetings “null and void” would prejudice
and injure the City Council and its “citizenry.” In arriving at its decision, the district court
took judicial notice of facts set forth in the City Clerk’s affidavit showing

              the City Council ha[d] taken numerous actions since May 15,
              2020[,] and . . . those actions d[id] not just involve the City
              Council. The numerous examples of action[s] taken by the
              City Council include[d] approving payments to vendors,
              renewing business licenses, and other actions affecting the
              citizenry of the City of Laramie in both their personal and
              business lives. The injury and prejudice that would result from
              a declaration that every meeting conducted between May 15,
              2020[,] and November 16, 2022[,] [a]s illegal and undoing
              every decision of the City Council during that period is
              manifest and needs no further elaboration. The City Council,
              but more importantly those that have relied upon the actions of
              the City Council during the period at issue, would be
              significantly prejudiced and injured by a declaration undoing
              nearly three-year[s’] worth of decisions.

[¶16] We must first determine whether it was appropriate for the district court to consider
facts stated in the City Clerk’s affidavit attached to the City Council’s motion to dismiss.
When addressing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the only materials the district
court should consider are “the complaint and any incorporated attachments . . . .” Bush
Land Dev. Co., ¶ 7, 388 P.3d at 539 (citing Irene v. Seneca Ins. Co., 2014 WY 145, 337
P.3d 483 (Wyo. 2014), and Ridgerunner, LLC v. Meisinger, 2013 WY 31, 297 P.3d 110
(Wyo. 2013)).

              If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside
              the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court,
              the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under
              Rule 56. All parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to
              present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.

W.R.C.P. 12(d). See also, Sweetwater Station, LLC v. Pedri, 2022 WY 163, ¶ 11, 522 P.3d
617, 622 (Wyo. 2022) (“Because the court considered materials outside the complaint in
ruling on its motion to dismiss, it should have converted the motion to one for summary
judgment.”).

[¶17] The district court took into consideration two different types of information not
attached to Mr. Peterson’s complaint in deciding the City Council’s motion to dismiss.
First, it considered the City Council’s resolutions we described above. Mr. Peterson
referred to these resolutions in his complaint, but he did not attach hard copies of the

                                               6
documents to his complaint; instead, he included internet hyper-links to them. We need
not address whether providing an internet link qualifies as an attachment incorporated into
a complaint which may be properly considered when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
because the City Council included hard copies of the same documents with its motion to
dismiss. In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court may “consider documents . . . referenced
in the complaint if they ‘are central to the plaintiff’s claim and the parties do not dispute
the documents’ authenticity.’” Brokers’ Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 861
F.3d 1081, 1103 (10th Cir. 2017) (applying the similar Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and quoting
Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 941 (10th Cir. 2002)) (other citation omitted).
See also, Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1186 (10th Cir. 2010) (in ruling on a motion to
dismiss, the court may consider “documents referred to in the complaint if the documents
are central to the plaintiff’s claim and the parties do not dispute the documents’
authenticity”) (quotation marks and citations omitted). The resolutions referenced in Mr.
Peterson’s complaint were central to his claims and, given the City Council attached them
to its motion to dismiss, there was no dispute as to their authenticity. Consequently, the
district court properly considered them.

[¶18] The second type of information the district court considered was not referenced in
Mr. Peterson’s complaint. The court apparently took judicial notice of the City Clerk’s
affidavit, which recited her “personal knowledge of . . . actions taken by the City Council
at [its] meetings” during the relevant time period, including a specific list of actions taken
by the Council in August 2022 and hyperlinks to the general sections of the City of
Laramie’s website where the city ordinances and City Council’s meeting minutes were
posted                     http://www.cityoflaramie.org/Ordinances                         and
http://www.cityoflaramie.org/agendacenter. The links were not to specific ordinances or
meeting minutes, so anyone seeking the relevant documents would have to search for them.
Because Mr. Peterson did not reference this information in his complaint, it does not
qualify for consideration under the same principle as the resolutions.

[¶19] Instead of identifying specific meeting minutes or ordinances, the district court
generally took judicial notice of the City Council’s “numerous actions in furtherance of the
business and governance of the City . . . during the period at issue” and “that those actions
do not just involve the City Council.” The district court cited a United States Supreme
Court case discussing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for authority that it was entitled to take
judicial notice of the City Council’s actions – Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,
551 U.S. 308, 127 S.Ct. 2499, 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007). There, the Supreme Court stated:
“[C]ourts must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources courts
ordinarily examine when ruling on [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in
particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which
a court may take judicial notice.” Id., 551 U.S. at 322, 127 S.Ct. at 2509 (citing 5B Wright
& Miller § 1357 (3d ed. 2004 and Supp. 2007)). In the same vein, the Tenth Circuit stated
in Zimomra v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 111 F.3d 1495, 1503-04 (10th Cir. 1997), that it
was “entirely appropriate for the district court to take judicial notice” of a municipal

                                              7
ordinance in ruling on a motion to dismiss. See also, United States ex rel. Dingle v. BioPort
Corp., 270 F.Supp.2d 968, 971-73 (W.D. Mich. 2003) (under Fed. R. Evid. 201, “public
records and government documents are generally considered not to be subject to reasonable
dispute” and can be considered in a Rule 12(b)(6) proceeding) (some quotation marks and
citation omitted).

[¶20] Wyoming has limited authority about the use of judicially noticed information in
ruling on Rule 12 motions to dismiss. We have recognized the use of judicially noticed
facts when deciding a motion to dismiss based upon res judicata or collateral estoppel. In
In re Paternity of JRW, 814 P.2d 1256, 1259 (Wyo. 1991), we followed “‘the modern
trend’” that a defendant can raise res judicata or collateral estoppel through a motion to
dismiss if “‘the information necessary for decision is available to the court by judicial
notice.’” Id. (quoting Texas West Oil & Gas Corp. v. First Interstate Bank of Casper, 743
P.2d 857, 858 (1987), reconfirmed, 749 P.2d 278 (Wyo. 1988)). The district court in JRW
took judicial notice of a parentage ruling from an earlier divorce proceeding between the
parties in concluding the father was barred from relitigating the issue of paternity in a later
proceeding. Id. at 1258-59, 1263-66. More recently in Bird v. Lampert, 2019 WY 56, ¶ 9,
441 P.3d 850, 854-55 (Wyo. 2019), we affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Bird’s
complaint based on res judicata and collateral estoppel after taking “judicial notice of prior
proceedings between the parties.” Id. See also, BB v. RSR, 2007 WY 4, ¶ 11, 149 P.3d
727, 732 (Wyo. 2007) (a judgment on the pleadings under W.R.C.P. 12(c) is appropriate if
“‘the undisputed facts appearing in the pleadings, supplemented by any facts of which the
trial court may take judicial notice, establish that no relief can be granted’” (quoting
Johnson v. Griffin, 922 P.2d 860, 861-62 (Wyo. 1996))).

[¶21] This case, obviously, does not involve judicial notice of court records from a related
proceeding. It is, instead, more like Sweetwater Station, ¶ 10, 522 P.3d at 621-22, where
the defendants, in their motion to dismiss, asked the district court to take judicial notice of
a recorded plat, minutes from a Rock Springs City Council meeting, and a recorded
amendment to subdivision covenants. In response, the plaintiff asked the court to take
judicial notice of minutes from a separate Rock Springs City Council meeting. Id.
Although the district court did not rule on either request for judicial notice, its order
referenced information from the materials. Id. We noted that, “[b]ecause the court
considered materials outside the complaint in ruling on its motion to dismiss, it should have
converted the motion to one for summary judgment.” Id., ¶ 11, 522 P.3d at 622 (citing
W.R.C.P. 12(d)).

[¶22] We need not establish a general rule in this case about the propriety of using
judicially noticed facts when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss because the City
Council and the district court failed to follow the proper procedure for taking judicial
notice. The City Council argued judicial notice of its actions during the disputed period
was proper because the actions were not subject to reasonable dispute. This argument
references Wyoming Rule of Evidence (W.R.E.) 201(b), which states “[a] judicially

                                              8
noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and
ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”

[¶23] We emphasized in Cockreham v. Wyo. Prod. Credit Ass’n, 743 P.2d 869, 872 (Wyo.
1987), that it is important for a party requesting judicial notice of facts to give written
notice to the court, so it is “clear what matters the . . . court ha[s] the opportunity to
consider.” See also, Gaston v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 2021 WY 74, ¶ 11 n.1, 488
P.3d 929, 935 n.1 (Wyo. 2021) (recognizing the importance of identifying documents
subject to judicial notice). In addition, W.R.E. 201(e) provides that “[a] party is entitled
upon timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial
notice and the tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request
may be made after judicial notice has been taken.”

[¶24] W.R.E. 201 was not followed in this case. Other than the actions taken by the City
Council in August 2022 referenced in the City Clerk’s affidavit, the City Council did not
give written notice of the specific matters it wanted the court to judicially notice under
W.R.E. 201, and the court did not perform a full analysis under Rule 201(b). In fact, the
only time the district court even alluded to the proper standard was in a footnote in its
dismissal order. Without citing W.R.E. 201, the district court simply declared “the fact . .
. the City Council during the period at issue took numerous actions in furtherance of the
business and governance of the City [is] . . . capable of accurate and ready determination
and the Court takes judicial notice of these facts . . . .” The record does not show that Mr.
Peterson was given an opportunity to respond under W.R.E. 201(e) even though he
specifically requested “clarification on motion procedure” in his response to the motion to
dismiss.

[¶25] By using judicial notice as a vehicle for considering evidence outside the complaint,
the district court skirted the W.R.C.P. 12(d) requirement that, when matters outside the
pleadings are considered by the court in deciding a motion to dismiss, the motion “must be
treated as one for summary judgment under W.R.C.P. 56,” and “[a]ll parties must be given
a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” The
court did not follow the W.R.E. 201 procedure for taking judicial notice, and it did not
convert the Council’s motion to one for summary judgment in order to allow Mr. Peterson
to respond with evidence of his own. Thus, the district court erred by considering City
Council actions not referenced in Mr. Peterson’s complaint when deciding whether the
delay in bringing his claims was prejudicial to the City Council and others.

[¶26] Furthermore, the district court did not simply take judicial notice of the City
Council’s actions. It also made a subjective factual determination that the prejudice to the
City Council and its “citizenry” from Mr. Peterson’s delay in bringing his action was
“manifest” and “need[ed] no further elaboration.” In Rodriguez-Aguirre, 265 F.3d at 1200,
1207, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ request for

                                              9
return of seized property on the ground of laches because the court did not require the
government to show material prejudice from the plaintiffs’ delay in bringing their claim.
The government argued it was “obvious” and “apparent” it was materially prejudiced by
the plaintiffs’ delay in bringing the claim. Id. at 1208. Specifically, it asserted the delay
was prejudicial because “[m]emories fade, [the] forfeited property ha[d] been disposed
of[,] and retrieval of the records [would] be unnecessarily difficult and potentially
impossible in some instances if records ha[d] been destroyed.” Id. The Tenth Circuit
said the “conclusory allegation of prejudice [was] insufficient to establish material
prejudice” to the government. Id. See also, Malibu Media, LLC v. Cuddy, No. 13-CV-
02385-WYD-MEH, 2015 WL 1280783, at *6 (D.Colo. 2015) (“material prejudice is not
shown by conclusory allegations or mere speculation”). Here, too, the court’s non-specific,
conclusory determination that the City Council and its citizenry would be prejudiced by
Mr. Peterson’s delay in bringing his action does not satisfy the second element of laches.

                                      CONCLUSION

[¶27] To determine if a claim is barred under the doctrine of laches, the court must conduct
a fact-intensive inquiry, which is typically not subject to resolution on a motion to dismiss.
The district court in this case improperly took judicial notice of the City Council’s
evidence. Because it considered matters outside the complaint, it should have converted
the City Council’s motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment and allowed Mr.
Peterson to present evidence that laches did not apply. In any event, the district court erred
by declaring Mr. Peterson inexcusably delayed in bringing his claims because they all
accrued in May 2020, and by making the conclusory determination that the prejudice to
the City Council from Mr. Peterson’s delay in bringing his action was manifest.

[¶28] Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this decision.

                                             10