Court Opinion

ID: 9898656
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 21:05:19.579901+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:38.306514
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/14/23 Choi v. Huang CA2/3

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
 opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
 opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION THREE

 JOSEPH CHOI,                                                   B313614

        Plaintiff and Appellant,                                Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No.
        v.                                                      20STCV31030
 AMY HUANG,

        Defendant and Respondent.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Holly J. Fujie, Judge. Affirmed.
     Lowe & Associates and Steven T. Lowe for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
     Lesowitz Gebelin and Steven T. Gebelin for Defendant and
Respondent.
           _______________________________________
                         INTRODUCTION

      Plaintiff Joseph Choi, a freelance photographer and former
manager of a social network for young Asian creatives, sued
defendant Amy Huang, a fashion student, for libel per se, slander
per se, and false light after Huang accused Choi of sexual
misconduct and emotional abuse. The court granted Huang’s
special motion to strike Choi’s complaint under Code of Civil
Procedure1 section 425.16 (anti-SLAPP statute). Choi appeals,
arguing none of Huang’s statements that give rise to his
defamation and false light claims constitute protected speech
and, in any event, he demonstrated his claims have minimal
merit. We affirm.

       FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2

1.    Huang’s Relationship With Choi
      In January 2019, Huang was 19 years old and attending
the Fashion Institute of Design and Merchandising in Los
Angeles. She had recently joined the Los Angeles chapter of the
Asian Creative Network (ACN), a Facebook group for “Asian
millennials in their 20’s.” The group was created to be a

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil

Procedure.
2 We grant the parties’ joint motion to augment the record with the

following documents that were submitted in the trial court but
inadvertently omitted from the clerk’s transcript: (1) eight exhibits
attached to Huang’s declaration; (2) a notice of errata filed by Huang
that includes her declaration and 11 attached exhibits, several of
which were inadvertently not attached to her original declaration; and
(3) Choi’s objections to Huang’s evidence filed in support of her anti-
SLAPP motion.

                                   2
professional networking platform and to “connect, empower, and
elevate Asian creatives.” At the time, ACN had around 45,000
members nationwide, with between 1,000 and 4,000 of those
members belonging to the group’s Los Angeles chapter.
       In late January 2019, Huang met Choi at a party hosted by
Michelle Chan, a mutual friend and founding member of ACN’s
Los Angeles chapter. Huang and Choi exchanged contact
information and friended each other on social media. At the time,
Choi was 26 years old and working as a freelance photographer
and a media and education-services consultant. Choi was also a
founding, and one of the most active, members of ACN’s Los
Angeles chapter.
       During the first few weeks of February 2019, Huang and
Choi communicated frequently on social media and hung out
several times in person. Huang bonded with Choi over stories
about his past, including his struggles with mental health issues,
drug and alcohol abuse, and “near-death experiences.” Huang
believed Choi was “understanding, caring, experienced in life and
very reliable because his words and attitude provided [her] with
comfort.”
       On the evening of February 18, 2019, Huang met Choi at
his apartment. After talking for a while, they went to a nearby
café, where they worked and studied until early the next
morning. As they were leaving the café, Huang told Choi that she
didn’t want to return to her apartment because she felt
“claustrophobic” there and had an appointment later that
morning near Choi’s apartment. Choi told Huang she could stay
at his apartment for the rest of the morning.
       When they returned to the apartment, Choi continued
working while Huang used social media and talked to him about

                                3
her “personal life” and “frustrations” in her relationship with her
boyfriend. After Choi finished working, he and Huang slept in his
bed for a few hours. According to Huang, she was fully clothed
and fell asleep on the opposite side of the bed from Choi. She
later woke up to Choi “touching” and “groping” her in an
inappropriate manner. She moved away from Choi and fell back
to sleep, but she again woke up to him “cuddling and groping” her
again without her consent. According to Choi, Huang asked him
to “hug” her before they fell asleep, and they both fell asleep
“embracing and hugging each other.”
       Around 8:00 a.m. on February 19, 2019, Choi drove Huang
to her appointment. After the appointment, Huang asked Choi if
she could return to his apartment because she left her keys there.
Huang also offered to pick up lunch for herself and Choi on her
way back. Huang dropped off the food, grabbed her keys, and left
Choi’s apartment.
       In late February 2019, Huang spoke to Chan and two other
female friends—Emily Shon and Grace Kim—about her
encounter with Choi on February 18 and 19. Huang also sent
Chan the following message, “Please don’t tell anyone else / This
is so bad ugh :( / So the day before [Choi] left for [New York] / I
slept over at his house because I was studying with him and it
was way too late / And we woke up cuddling. … [¶] I flirted with
[Choi] as well … [I don’t know] it’s been f[u]cking with me / The
fact that I did that and I know it’s going to happen again / I’m a
really needy person and like physical touch is really important to
me, and this is so f[u]cking bad like. Dude, I’m going to be his
neighbor in a month / And I want to f[u]cking die / because I’m
literally moving like 5 min[utes] straight shot down the road and

                                4
I know it’s gonna happen again.” According to Huang, the
incident with Choi “caused much confusion in [herself].”
      In March 2019, Huang called Samuel Lin, another ACN
member, to tell him that she broke up with her boyfriend. She
explained that she ended the relationship “for [Choi].” Huang
also mentioned that Choi had been “somewhat avoiding her” and
that she hadn’t spoken to him much lately.
      Although Choi and Huang never hung out alone again, they
exchanged numerous text messages between late February and
early April 2019. They often discussed their social plans or talked
about their struggles with stress and anxiety. They sometimes
said they missed each other. In one message sent in early March
2019, after Choi told Huang he had just experienced an anxiety
attack, Huang told him that she was “always here to hear [him]
out and cuddle if [he] need[ed] someone.” Several days later,
Huang invited Choi to the same café they had worked at during
the early morning hours of February 19, and she told Choi that
he was welcome to sleep at her place afterwards. Choi declined
Huang’s offer.
      In April 2019, ACN’s Los Angeles chapter held an election,
in which Choi ran for a leadership position. Before the election,
Huang told other members of the chapter that she didn’t believe
Choi “was the right person to lead the organization.”
      On April 16, 2019, Choi was elected as the city manager of
ACN’s Los Angeles chapter. That same day, Chan, Shon, and a
third person told Choi that Huang was spreading rumors about
him. Choi then sent a text message to Huang, stating that he was
“very offended” and “frustrated” that she would talk about him
behind his back. Huang replied that she had “no issues” with
Choi, to which he responded, “You don’t have to defend yourself,

                                5
I’m just letting you know what I’ve heard.” According to Huang,
Choi started speaking “negatively” about her in their “shared
social circles” after that day, claiming Huang was spreading
rumors about him and “presenting [her] as if [she] was crazy.”
       Around May 2019, Huang moved to the Bay Area. Shortly
after Huang moved, Choi sent her several text messages, all of
which Huang ignored. In one message, Choi called Huang “Rude”
because she wasn’t responding to his messages. Several hours
later, Choi told Huang that he hoped she was doing better, that
he wasn’t sure what she had against him, and that he hoped she
could “find some peace.”
2.   Huang’s Statements to ACN Leadership
      On May 29, 2019, Huang sent several text messages to
Justin Chang, an “administrative official” in ACN’s Los Angeles
chapter, complaining about Choi’s behavior. Huang claimed that
Choi insisted she sleep at his apartment on February 19, 2019,
and that she woke up to him “spooning [her] so [she] pulled
away,” but a couple of hours later, she awoke to him “spooning”
her again.
      Huang told Chang that she contemplated killing herself on
April 16, 2019, after Choi told her he was aware she had “spread
rumors” about him. She was “scared” and “felt like [she] fucked
up a friendship.” Since then, she “distanced” herself from Choi,
ignoring many of his text messages. When she did respond, she
gave him “quick answers,” but he continued messaging her and
became “progressively more and more aggressive.”
      Huang claimed that Choi has engaged in a similar
“pattern” with other women by “spewing lies” about them and
“destroying their reputations” after he was “done” with them.

                               6
Choi made himself look “innocent” when he was the one
“manipulating people into sleeping with him.”
       Huang told Chang that Choi’s behavior “fucks [her] up
because [he] is the reason why [her] 3.5 year relationship fell
apart. This was a guy [she] respected and loved as a friend …
This is the guy that LEADS ACN LA. The rules are MADE to
protect him. This is the guy that made [her] leave a community
[she] loved because [she doesn’t] feel safe. This is the guy that
caused [her] to go into depression and attempt suicide. And this
guy is doing the exact same thing to countless other girls by
using his power and position. [¶] … [¶] This guy is a leader of the
LA community and he’s a predator.”
       Huang concluded by telling Chang she felt “harassed” and
“terrified of [Choi] and his potential.” Huang later testified she
texted Chang because of Choi’s “ongoing role in ACN” and
because she wanted to stop him “from taking advantage of his
position to victimize more girls.”
       That same day (May 29), Chang spoke to Choi about
Huang’s allegations. Chang suggested Choi resign from his
position as the city manager of ACN’s Los Angeles chapter,
otherwise the “matter would be opened up to the public and a
deeper investigation would occur with other administrators from
the organization getting involved.” On May 31, 2019, Choi
resigned from his role as city manager.

                                 7
3.    Huang’s Statements on Social Media
       Kiana Vi Do3 is “an Asian creative with significant Twitter
and Instagram followings.” In 2019, she created “an online
community which provides a safe space for those who were
victims of sexual abuse and assault to share their stories and
experiences.”
       In early June 2020, Do posted a message on her Twitter
account stating, “since we are all on the topic of sexual assault
let’s also talk about the photographers on [Instagram] who use
their ‘hobby’ as a gateway for harassing, assaulting and
manipulating girls. [¶] [I]f you would like me to add any other
photographers to this thread [please] feel free to [direct message]
me! … [¶] [A] large following does not always equal good
intentions. [F]or all my new/current models—please stay safe and
aware. [D]o your research & sadly, never go alone.”
       On June 5, 2020, after seeing Do’s Twitter post, Huang
contacted Do through a private message sent to Do’s Instagram
account. Huang reached out to Do because she wanted to “further
the discussion” about photographers who harass, assault, and
manipulate women. In her messages to Do, Huang identified
Choi by his Instagram account name.
       Huang explained that she had a “really bad experience”
with Choi, who she blocked on all her social media accounts
because she was “absolutely traumatized” and “he kept
messaging [her] with no reply and got mad at [her] for not
replying.” Huang claimed “[t]here are other girls he’s crossed
boundaries/abused too. This is something [Huang] wouldn’t wish

3 Do is sometimes referred to as “Kianavi Do” or just “Kiana Vi” in the

record.

                                   8
upon anyone. He went private but [she] hope[d] the community
[was] aware of this dangerous person.”
        Huang told Do that one night when she was 18 years old,
Choi convinced her to stay at his place. She “woke up to him
touching [her].” She “woke up twice during the night to [Choi]
cuddling[,] touching[,] and groping [her] and [she] rolled away
and … woke up for the day with him pressing [her] against the
wall.” Huang “felt so violated [and] scared [because] [she] had a
boyfriend at the time and [she] was more worried that if [she]
le[ft]/d[id]n’t do as he say[,] [Choi] [was] going to doxx [her] or
message [her] boyfriend about this incident.” Huang became
depressed after the incident, “dropped out of school,” and “ended
up moving out of Los Angeles because [she] was scared.” Huang
would “never forgive [Choi] for what he did to [her] and other
girls too.”
        Huang asked Do to “post” her story about Choi on Do’s
Twitter account, but Huang wanted to “remain anonymous”
because she was still scared of Choi, who she claimed “distanced
away all [her] friends by talking shit that wasn’t true at all about
[her], … sen[t] really aggressive messages through Instagram if
[she] didn’t respond, and groped [her].”
        After Do posted Huang’s message on Twitter, Huang sent
Do another message stating that “[s]everal other women came
forward with their stories” and that ACN’s Los Angeles chapter
banned Choi from the organization. Huang said she “never
imagined [her story] to impact this much but knowing that [they]
stopped an abuser in his tracks gives [her] the closure that [she]
needed.”

                                 9
4.    Choi’s Lawsuit
       In August 2020, Choi sued Huang.4 In his operative first
amended complaint, Choi asserted three causes of action arising
out of Huang’s statements to Chang and Do:5 (1) libel per se, (2)
slander per se, and (3) false light. Choi alleged “Huang was
leading a campaign to ruin [his] goodwill, name and reputation
by defaming him to their mutual friends, members of ACN LA
and others.” Choi claimed Huang’s statements ruined his
professional reputation in Los Angeles, caused him to lose
opportunities to work as a freelance photographer in Los Angeles,
resulted in his expulsion from ACN, and caused many of his
friends to “withdraw[] from him.”
       Huang filed a special motion to strike Choi’s complaint
under section 425.16, arguing her statements to Chang and Do
and her Facebook post constitute protected speech. As for her
statements to Chang, Huang argued they addressed issues of
public interest—i.e., Choi’s fitness to serve as a leader, and
participate as a member, of ACN’s Los Angeles chapter, “in light

4 In his original complaint, Choi named another individual, Lauren

Hyun, as a defendant, but he later settled his claims against her and
dismissed her from his lawsuit.
5 Choi also alleged that Huang defamed him when she posted on her

Facebook account that “[a]busers need to be held accountable.” As we
explain below, Choi has waived any claim on appeal that the court
erred in striking any of his causes of action to the extent they arise out
of Huang’s Facebook post by failing to address that post in his
appellate briefs. (Golden Door Properties, LLC v. County of San Diego
(2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 467, 555 [issues not raised in appellant’s brief
are deemed waived or abandoned].)

                                   10
of his treatment of women and his abuse of authority and respect
within the community.” Huang also argued her statements to Do
addressed issues of public interest and were made in a public
forum—i.e., through social media sites on the internet.
Specifically, her statements to Do were made as part of a “public
discussion” addressing photographers on Instagram who use
their jobs and hobbies to prey on, and assault, young women.
Additionally, her statements to Do were made against the
backdrop of the “#MeToo” movement and were intended to
“further discussions concerning … abuse of power.”
       Addressing the second prong of the anti-SLAPP statute,
Huang argued Choi couldn’t show a probability of prevailing on
the merits of any of his claims because none of her statements
were false. In any event, Huang argued, Choi’s claims arising out
of her statements to Chang were time-barred because Choi did
not file his original complaint until more than a year after those
statements were made.
       Choi opposed Huang’s motion. He argued none of Huang’s
statements were entitled to anti-SLAPP protection because they
concerned a private dispute between Huang and Choi. In Choi’s
view, he wasn’t a person in the “ ‘public eye’ ” and his “everyday
actions pose[d] no significance to the general public.” Choi also
claimed Huang’s statements did not concern or affect “ ‘large
numbers of people’ ” because Huang published most of her
statements to only two individuals—Chang and Do—and she
asked Do to keep many of the most sensitive statements private.
As to the anti-SLAPP statute’s second prong, Choi argued all his
claims have minimal merit because Huang’s statements were
provably false and not subject to any privilege.

                                11
      In support of his opposition, Choi filed objections to
Huang’s supporting evidence, including declarations filed by
Huang and her lawyer.
      On March 30, 2021, Huang filed her reply. In support of her
reply, Huang submitted declarations executed by Chang and
Lauren Hyun.
      On April 1, 2021, Choi filed objections to Chang’s and
Hyun’s declarations, arguing, among other things, that Huang
was precluded from submitting new evidence with her reply
papers. Choi also objected to portions of Huang’s reply brief.
      The next day, on April 2, Huang filed objections to Choi’s
evidence supporting his opposition.
      The court issued a tentative ruling dated April 6, 2021,
indicating it intended to deny Huang’s anti-SLAPP motion. That
same day—April 6—the court heard argument on the motion and
took the matter under submission.
      On April 16, 2021, the court issued a written ruling
granting Huang’s anti-SLAPP motion in its entirety. The court
sustained 11 of Choi’s objections to Huang’s evidence, including
one objection to her lawyer’s declaration and 10 objections to her
declaration. The court also excluded Chang’s and Hyun’s
declarations. The court overruled Choi’s remaining objections.
The court sustained 108 of Huang’s 116 objections, including all
of her objections to declarations executed by Choi, Chan, Crystal
Duan, and Lin, and overruled her objections to declarations
executed by Do and Choi’s lawyer.
      As to the first prong of the anti-SLAPP statute, the court
found all of Choi’s claims arise out of protected activity. As to the
second prong, the court found Choi failed to show any of his
claims have minimal merit. Specifically, the court found Choi’s

                                 12
claims are time-barred to the extent they arise out of Huang’s
statements to Chang, since Choi filed his original complaint more
than a year after those statements were made. The court also
found Choi failed to present any evidence to support a finding
that the running of the statute of limitations was delayed under
the discovery rule. With respect to Choi’s claims arising out of
Huang’s statements to Do, the court found those statements were
protected under the common interest privilege (see Civ. Code, §
47, subd. (c)), and Choi failed to overcome that privilege because
he didn’t present “sufficient admissible evidence” to support a
finding that Huang made the statements with actual malice.
      Choi timely appealed from the order granting Huang’s anti-
SLAPP motion.

                          DISCUSSION

       Under the anti-SLAPP statute, a defendant may move to
strike claims arising from certain free speech or petitioning
activity. (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th
871, 884.) The statute creates a two-step process through which
the moving defendant must first show the challenged causes of
action arise from protected activity, meaning “any act … in
furtherance of the [defendant’s] right of petition or free speech …
in connection with a public issue.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) To
determine whether the plaintiff’s causes of action arise from
protected activity, we look at the “pleadings, and supporting and
opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or
defense is based.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2); see also Equilon
Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.) If
the defendant succeeds at the first step, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the
challenged causes of action, otherwise the court must strike those

                                13
claims. (Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th
610, 619–620.)
       We independently review an order granting a special
motion to strike under section 425.16. (Paulus v. Bob Lynch Ford,
Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 659, 672.) “ ‘ “[W]e engage in the
same, two-step process as the trial court to determine if the
parties have satisfied their respective burdens. [Citations.] If the
defendant fails to show that the lawsuit arises from protected
activity, we affirm the trial court’s ruling and need not address
the merits of the case under the second prong of the statute.” ’
[Citation.]” (Abuemeira v. Stephens (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1291,
1298.)
1.    Huang’s Statements Giving Rise to Choi’s Claims
      As a preliminary matter, we identify which of Huang’s
statements are at issue in this appeal. The only allegedly
defamatory statements identified in Choi’s first amended
complaint are Huang’s May 2019 statements to Chang, her June
2020 statements to Do, and her Facebook post. In its written
ruling, the court found Choi’s causes of action were based only on
Huang’s statements to Chang and Do. Choi doesn’t address
Huang’s Facebook post on appeal, and although he asserts in
passing in his opening brief that Huang defamed him through
statements she made to other individuals, he doesn’t develop any
argument explaining how the court erred in concluding his claims
arise only out of Huang’s statements to Chang and Do.
Consequently, Choi has waived any argument that the court
should not have dismissed his libel, slander, and false light
claims to the extent they arose out of statements other than
Huang’s May 2019 statements to Chang and her June 2020
statements to Do. (See Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist.

                                14
(1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691, 699–700 [issues that are not
supported by pertinent or cognizable legal argument may be
deemed abandoned].)
2.    Protected Activity Under Section 425.16, subdivisions
      (e)(3) and (e)(4)
       Huang argues her statements to Chang and Do fall within
the last two categories of protected speech identified in section
425.16, subdivision (e), which protect statements made “in
connection with” an issue of public interest. Specifically,
subdivision (e)(3) protects “any written or oral statement or
writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in
connection with an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd.
(e)(3).) And subdivision (e)(4) protects “any other conduct in
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition
or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a
public issue or any issue of public interest.” (Id., subd. (e)(4).)
       In FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th
133 (FilmOn), the California Supreme Court articulated a two-
step test to determine whether speech or conduct was made in
connection with an issue of public interest. Under the first step,
the challenged speech or conduct must implicate a public issue or
a matter of public interest. (Id. at p. 149.) Under the second step,
the speech or conduct must have been made “in connection with”
a public issue or a matter of public interest. (Ibid.)
       To determine whether speech or conduct implicates a public
issue or a matter of public interest under FilmOn’s first step,
courts look to “certain specific considerations.” (FilmOn, supra, 7
Cal.5th at p. 145.) Those considerations include whether “the
subject of the speech or activity ‘was a person or entity in the
public eye’ or ‘could affect large numbers of people beyond the

                                15
direct participants’ [citation]; and whether the activity ‘occur[red]
in the context of an ongoing controversy, dispute or discussion’
[citation], or ‘affect[ed] a community in a manner similar to that
of a governmental entity’ [citation].” (Id. at pp. 145–146.)
       The Supreme Court recently clarified the standard for
determining whether speech or conduct satisfies FilmOn’s first
step in Geiser v. Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238 (Geiser). The
Court explained that the first step “calls for an objective inquiry,
without deference to the [defendant’s] framing or personal
motivations.” (Id. at p. 1254.) Thus, “[a] court evaluating an anti-
SLAPP motion should take the position of a reasonable, objective
observer.” (Ibid.) The first step is met “so long as the challenged
speech or conduct, considered in light of its context, may
reasonably be understood to implicate a public issue, even if it
also implicates a private dispute. Only when an expressive
activity, viewed in context, cannot reasonably be understood as
implicating a public issue does an anti-SLAPP motion fail at [the]
first step.” (Id. at pp. 1253–1254.) “If a reasonable inference can
be drawn that the challenged activity implicates a public issue,
then the analysis proceeds to FilmOn’s second step.” (Id., at p.
1254.)
       As for FilmOn’s second step, courts apply a two-part test to
determine whether speech or conduct was made “in connection
with” an issue of public interest. (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p.
149.) “First we ask what ‘public issue or … issue of public
interest’ the speech in question implicates—a question we answer
by looking to the content of the speech. [Citation.] Second, we ask
what functional relationship exists between the speech and the
public conversation about some matter of public interest.” (Id. at
pp. 149–150.) The second part of this test “address[es] the specific

                                 16
nature of [the defendant’s] speech and its relationship to the
matters of public interest.” (Id. at p. 152.)
       Under FilmOn’s standard, “ ‘it is not enough that the
statement refer to a subject of widespread public interest; the
statement must in some manner itself contribute to the public
debate.’ ” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 150.) “What it means to
‘contribute to the public debate’ [citation] will perhaps differ
based on the state of public discourse at a given time, and the
topic of contention. But ultimately, our inquiry does not turn on a
normative evaluation of the substance of the speech. We are not
concerned with the social utility of the speech at issue, or the
degree to which it propelled the conversation in any particular
direction; rather, we examine whether a defendant—through
public or private speech or conduct—participated in, or furthered,
the discourse that makes an issue one of public interest.” (Id. at
pp. 150–151.)
       Because Huang’s statements to Chang and Do were made
at different times and in different contexts, we address them
separately. (See Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 1252–1253 [the
context surrounding the challenged speech or conduct is a key
consideration in determining whether that speech or conduct
implicates a matter of public interest].)
      2.1.   Huang’s Statements to Chang
      Huang’s May 2019 messages to Chang were not made in a
place open to the public or in a public forum. Rather, they were
private communications between Huang and Chang. Thus, to
qualify for protection under the anti-SLAPP statute, Huang’s
statements must fall within section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4).
(See Ruiz v. Harbor View Community Assn. (2005) 134
Cal.App.4th 1456, 1467 (Ruiz) [section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4)

                                17
“ ‘governs even private communications, so long as they concern a
public issue’ ”].) The first issue for us to decide, then, is whether
those statements implicate a matter of public interest. (See
Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1253.) We conclude they do.
       ACN’s Los Angeles chapter is a Facebook group and
networking organization for young Asian creatives. When Huang
sent her messages to Chang in May 2019, the Los Angeles
chapter had between 1,000 and 4,000 members, and the entire
ACN organization had about 45,000 members throughout the
nation. At that time, Choi was the city manager of the Los
Angeles chapter and one of its founding and most active
members. Chang was one of the chapter’s “administrative
official[s].” Huang told Chang, among other things, that Choi was
a “predator” who uses his “power and position” as a “leader of the
LA community” to “spew[] lies” about other women, “destroy[]
their reputation[s],” and “manipulat[e them] into sleeping with
him.”
       Huang’s statements to Chang include criticisms of Choi’s
fitness to represent ACN’s Los Angeles chapter and accusations
that one of the chapter’s elected leaders used his position to prey
sexually on women, including other members of the chapter.
Certainly, the chapter’s approximately 1,000 to 4,000 members
would be concerned about such allegations. (See Damon v. Ocean
Hills Journalism Club (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 468, 479
[statements addressing who should lead a homeowner association
were of public interest to association members because “they
concerned the very manner in which th[e] group of more than
3,000 individuals would be governed”].) Huang’s statements,
therefore, concerned issues that “could directly affect a large
number of people beyond the direct participants” of Huang’s

                                 18
messages to Chang, a factor supporting a finding that Huang’s
statements implicated a public issue. (Rivero v. American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO
(2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 913, 924.)
       Huang’s statements to Chang also occurred in the context
of an ongoing controversy, dispute, or discussion. (See FilmOn,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 145; see also Du Charme v. International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 107,
119 [where the asserted issue is of interest “to a limited, but
definable portion of the public (a private group, organization, or
community), the constitutionally protected activity must, at a
minimum, occur in the context of an ongoing controversy, dispute
or discussion”].) In April 2019, Choi was elected to be the city
manager of ACN’s Los Angeles chapter. Shortly before the
election, Huang told other chapter members that she didn’t
believe Choi “was the right person to lead the organization.” As
Choi testified in his declaration, Huang’s statements spread
throughout the chapter and eventually reached Choi, who
confronted Huang about them. Thus, by the time Huang sent her
messages to Chang, Choi’s fitness to represent the Los Angeles
chapter was a topic of dispute within the chapter.
       As for FilmOn’s second step, Huang’s statements to Chang
were made “in connection” with an issue of public interest. Huang
testified that she reached out to Chang because of Choi’s “ongoing
role in ACN” and because she wanted to prevent Choi “from
taking advantage of his position to victimize more girls.” Thus,
through her statements to Chang, Huang “contributed” to the
public debate by furthering the discourse on Choi’s fitness to
continue to serve as a representative of ACN’s Los Angeles
chapter. (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 150–151.) Huang’s

                               19
statements also had a direct effect on Choi’s leadership role
within ACN’s Los Angeles chapter. In his declaration, Choi
testified that he spoke to Chang the same day Huang made her
challenged statements. During that conversation, Chang asked
Choi to resign from his position as city manager of ACN’s Los
Angeles chapter in light of Huang’s allegations, which Choi
agreed to do. Chang also stated that if Choi did not resign,
Huang’s allegations “would be opened up to the public and a
deeper investigation would occur with other administrators from
[ACN’s Los Angeles chapter] getting involved.”
       Choi contends Huang’s statements to Chang are not
entitled to anti-SLAPP protection because they concern a private
dispute between Huang and Choi. In Choi’s view, Huang’s
statements amount to nothing more than Huang retaliating
against him because he rejected her romantic advances. This
argument lacks merit. While Huang’s statements to Chang
undoubtedly address a private dispute between Huang and Choi
over what transpired during their February 2019 encounter at
Choi’s apartment and their ensuing relationship, they also touch
on issues of public interest—i.e., Choi’s fitness to represent
ACN’s Los Angeles chapter and allegations that he used his
position of power within the chapter to prey sexually on women.
As our Supreme Court explained in Geiser, speech satisfies
FilmOn’s first step when it implicates a public issue, even it if
also implicates a private dispute. (Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p.
1253; see e.g., Wong v. Jing (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1361,
1366–1367 (Wong) [parent’s negative review of dentist was
protected activity because it touched on the public issue of safe
dental practices, even though the review also addressed the
parent’s private dispute with the dentist].)

                                20
      Choi also argues Huang’s statements to Chang do not
implicate a matter of public interest because ACN is merely an
online social network and not a professional organization. Choi
argues this distinction is important because it means he did not
owe any fiduciary or ethical duties to the members of ACN’s Los
Angeles chapter, and he lacked any power to “make binding
decisions on behalf of their members.” Assuming Choi’s
characterization of the nature of his role within the ACN’s Los
Angeles chapter is accurate, we fail to see the significance of this
distinction for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute. Choi was
elected by the Los Angeles chapter’s members to represent the
chapter as its city manager. It is reasonable to assume, then, that
the chapter’s sizable membership base was interested in Choi
and would be concerned about allegations that one of its elected
representatives was using his status within the chapter to prey
sexually on women, including chapter members, even if Choi did
not have the power to make binding decisions for the chapter.
      2.2.   Huang’s Statements to Do
       The court found Huang’s June 2020 statements to Do were
made in a public forum—i.e., Do published Huang’s statements,
at Huang’s request, on Do’s public Twitter thread. (See Jackson
v. Mayweather (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1252 [websites
accessible to the public are “public forums” under the anti-SLAPP
statute].) Choi contends the statements were not made in a public
forum because Huang sent them as private messages to Do before
Do published them on Twitter. Thus, Choi argues, subdivision
(e)(4), and not subdivision (e)(3), of section 425.16 applies to our
analysis of whether Huang’s statements to Do are protected
speech. We need not resolve this dispute because, even if we were
to assume subdivision (e)(4) applies, Huang’s statements to Do

                                21
qualify for protection because they were made in connection with
an issue of public interest. (Ruiz, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p.
1467 [subdivision (e)(4) “ ‘is intended to cover private
communications on public issues’ ”].)
       At the time Huang messaged Do about her experience with
Choi, Do was a social media personality with “significant Twitter
and Instagram followings” who had cultivated an “online
community” that provides “a safe space” for “victims of sexual
abuse and assault to share their stories and experiences.” Do had
recently started a public discussion on her Twitter account
addressing photographers who use their work to assault, harass,
and manipulate women. As part of that discussion, Do asked
other women to share their stories about photographers on
Instagram who use their photography as a “gateway” to target
women. Do offered to post those stories in her public Twitter
thread. Huang responded to Do’s post because she wanted to
“further the discussion” that Do had started.
       The issue of photographers using their “hobby” or work to
assault, harass, and manipulate women is a matter of interest to
the public, especially the modeling and photography
communities. (See Cross v. Cooper (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 357,
382 [statements that implicate issues “concerning the protection
of people” would be “of interest to most people,” especially those
who would most likely be affected by the public safety issue]; see
also Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions (2006) 38
Cal.4th 264, 277–278 [state laws prohibiting sexual harassment
in the workplace reflect “public policy” in favor of protecting the
right to a safe workplace].) Although Huang’s statements to Do
touched on Huang’s private dispute with Choi, much in the same
way her statements to Chang did, they also address this public

                                22
issue. (Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1253.) Specifically, Huang
told Do that Choi was a photographer who had “crossed
boundaries” with, and “abused,” other women, and that Choi’s
conduct is not something she would “wish upon anyone.” Huang
also stated she hoped the “community” was “aware of this
dangerous person” and that she was “tired of [Choi] using
‘photography’ as a way to get with really young models and then
tak[e] advantage of them.”
       Further, Huang’s statements were made in connection with
an issue of public interest. As we just explained, Huang
responded to Do’s public discussion on Twitter about
photographers using their work to prey on women. Although
Huang sent her messages privately to Do, she asked Do to post
her messages publicly on Twitter, which Do did. Thus, Huang’s
statements to Do contributed to the public discussion of
photographers using their work to assault and harass women.
(FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 150–151 [a defendant speaks “in
connection with” an issue of public interest if she “participate[s]
in, or further[s], the discourse that makes an issue one of public
interest”].)
       Choi argues Huang’s messages to Do don’t implicate a
matter of public interest because Huang asked Do to keep
Huang’s messages anonymous, a request Do honored. But Choi
fails to explain how Do posting Huang’s messages while keeping
Huang’s identity a secret would strip Huang’s statements of
protection under the anti-SLAPP statute. Indeed, under the facts
of this case, it is the content of Huang’s messages—i.e., her
statements addressing photographers using their work to prey on
women—not her identity, that implicates the public interest.

                                23
      Choi also contends Huang’s statements aren’t protected
because Choi never photographed Huang as a model. This
argument also lacks merit. While Huang may not have modeled
for Choi, her statements address Choi using his photography
work to cross boundaries with, take advantage of, and abuse
other women, which, as we just explained, implicates a matter of
public interest.
      2.3.   Conclusion
      In sum, because Huang’s statements to Chang and Do
implicate issues of public interest and were made in connection
with those issues, they are entitled to protection under the first
prong of the anti-SLAPP statute.
3.    Evidentiary Rulings
       Before reaching the court’s ruling on the second prong of
the anti-SLAPP statute, we address Choi’s challenges to the
court’s evidentiary rulings. Choi contends the court erred in
sustaining Huang’s objections to his evidence because: (1) Huang
did not timely file her objections; and (2) it was a manifest abuse
of discretion for the court to sustain more than 100 of Huang’s
116 objections. We conclude Choi has failed to show the court
abused its discretion in ruling on Huang’s objections or that any
purported error was prejudicial.
      3.1.   Standard of Review
      We review a trial court’s rulings on evidentiary objections
under an abuse of discretion standard. (Twenty-Nine Palms
Enterprises Corp. v. Bardos (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1435, 1447
(Palms).) We will not reverse a court’s order because of an
erroneous evidentiary ruling unless the appealing party

                                 24
establishes there is a reasonable probability he would have
obtained a more favorable result but for the error. (Id. at p. 1449.)
      3.2.   Timeliness of Huang’s Objections
       Choi argues the court should have disregarded Huang’s
objections because they were not timely filed. We disagree.
       Huang filed her reply on March 30, 2021, and she filed her
objections three days later, on April 2. The court heard argument
on Huang’s anti-SLAPP motion on April 6.
       Choi argues Huang’s objections were untimely because they
were not filed at the same time she filed her other reply papers.
Choi does not cite to any authority discussing when a party must
file objections in connection with anti-SLAPP motions. Instead,
he relies on California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354 (Rule 3.1354),
which provides that unless otherwise excused by the court on a
showing of good cause, “all written objections to evidence in
support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment or
summary adjudication must be served and filed at the same time
as the objecting party’s opposition or reply papers are served and
filed.” But Rule 3.1354 applies on its face only to objections filed
in connection with a summary judgment or summary
adjudication motion. Nothing in that rule of court states that it
applies to anti-SLAPP motions, and Choi doesn’t cite to any cases
or other authority holding the rule governs the filing of objections
in connection with such motions.
       To be sure, Choi argues we should nevertheless apply Rule
3.1354 because courts “have borrowed certain procedures
applicable to summary judgment motions in Anti-SLAPP cases.”
However, he fails to address the California Supreme Court’s
holding in Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, which
explains that “written evidentiary objections made before [a

                                 25
summary judgment] hearing, as well as oral objections made at
the hearing are deemed made ‘at the hearing’ under section 437c,
subdivisions (b)(5) and (d), so that either method of objection
avoids waiver.” (Id. at pp. 531–532.) Thus, even if summary
judgment procedures govern our evaluation of the timeliness of
objections filed in connection with anti-SLAPP motions, Huang’s
objections were timely under Reid’s interpretation of section
437c, since the objections were filed four days before the hearing
on her motion. (See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court
(1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [the decisions of the Supreme Court are
binding on, and must be followed by, all state courts of
California].)
      In any event, Choi fails to explain how he was prejudiced
by the court’s consideration of any untimely objections. (Palms,
supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1449.) As we just noted, Huang filed
her objections four days before the hearing on her anti-SLAPP
motion. Yet Choi did not raise any timeliness challenge to those
objections at the hearing, and he does not claim on appeal that he
lacked an opportunity to oppose Huang’s objections because they
were not filed at the same time as her other reply papers.
      3.3.   Merits of the Evidentiary Rulings
      Choi also contends the court erred by sustaining more than
100 of Huang’s 116 objections. Specifically, Choi argues it was a
manifest abuse of discretion for the court to sustain such a high
volume of objections. (See Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009)
178 Cal.App.4th 243, 254–256; Palms, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1447–1449.) As we explain, Choi has forfeited his challenges
to the merits of the court’s evidentiary rulings.
      In his opening brief, Choi does not address any particular
objection from Huang, aside from one, that he believes the court

                               26
erred in sustaining. To “not belabor the record,” Choi opts to
argue generally that the court erred in sustaining “objections to
critical evidence [in his declaration], which was admissible on its
face.” Choi fails, however, to point to which objections targeted
statements in his declaration that were admissible. Instead, he
asks us to parse Huang’s objections and his declaration, assuring
us that “[i]f [we] read[] [his] declaration, it will become readily
apparent that his first-hand account of events that took place,
including his communications with Huang, are fundamentally
admissible as both present sense impressions, past recollections
recorded, verbal acts, and opposing admissions.” That is not,
however, our responsibility. (Bains v. Moores (2009) 172
Cal.App.4th 445, 455 [the appellant must support claims of error
with citations to the record and pertinent legal authority, and the
court has no obligation “to cull the record” for the appellant’s
benefit].)
       Regardless, we have reviewed Choi’s declaration, and it is
riddled with inadmissible statements. For example, the court
properly sustained Huang’s objection to Choi’s statement that he
“speculated that Huang was simply seeking for [him] to leave the
community that she was no longer a part of since she no longer
lived in Los Angeles,” on the grounds that such statement was, in
Choi’s own words, speculation. (See Sweetwater Unions High
School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 947
[“speculative” evidence should be excluded when considering the
second prong of the anti-SLAPP statute].) Likewise, the court
properly excluded as speculation (and irrelevant) Choi’s
statement that he “thought [Huang] was emotional and mad at
[him] for not returning her romantic advances as shown in the
messages to her.” The court also properly sustained Huang’s

                                27
objection to Choi’s statement that he “recognized [Huang’s]
‘hyperventilating’ as a sign of obsessive anxiety of the fear of
being rejected,” because such statement was irrelevant,
constituted improper opinion by Choi, and lacked any foundation
for Choi’s opinion. (See ibid.)
      As for the one objection from Huang that Choi does
address, he has not shown the court erred in sustaining it. Huang
objected to part of Choi’s declaration in which he quoted the
content of some of the messages Huang sent to Do in June 2020.
Choi argues the court erred in sustaining the objection because
Huang only objected to the quoted messages on hearsay,
foundation, and authentication grounds, none of which could
apply to messages sent by Huang. Even if we were to assume
Huang’s objection lacked merit, the quoted messages to which
Huang objected were already admitted through other sources and
considered by the court in its ruling on Huang’s anti-SLAPP
motion. In other words, Choi’s transcription of the messages in
his declaration was cumulative of other evidence already before
the court. Choi, therefore, hasn’t shown the court erred in
sustaining Huang’s objection or, more importantly, that he was
harmed by that ruling. (See People ex rel. Department of Public
Works v. Donovan (1962) 57 Cal.2d 346, 357 [where evidence is
“merely cumulative,” there “is no abuse of discretion in
disallowing it”]; Palms, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1449
[appellant must show how he was prejudiced by challenged
evidentiary ruling].)
      In short, aside from addressing the one objection we just
discussed, Choi has not developed any meaningful argument
demonstrating how the court erred in sustaining Huang’s
evidentiary objections. Choi also makes only a generalized

                               28
argument that he was prejudiced by the court’s evidentiary
rulings, without explaining how he was prejudiced by the
exclusion of any specific evidence. Choi, therefore, has not shown
the court’s rulings sustaining Huang’s evidentiary objections
were an abuse of discretion or otherwise warrant reversal of the
order sustaining Huang’s anti-SLAPP motion. (Keyes v. Bowen
(2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 647, 655–656 (Keyes) [an appellant
forfeits any points that are not properly raised or that are not
supported by cognizable legal argument and factual analysis];
Palms, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1449.)
4.    Probability of Prevailing
       Choi next contends the court erred in finding he wasn’t
likely to prevail on any of his causes of action. As we discuss
below, the court properly found Choi’s claims lack minimal merit.
       If the defendant establishes the plaintiff’s claims arise out
of protected activity, the plaintiff must demonstrate a probability
of prevailing on his claims. (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376,
384 (Baral).) To do so, the plaintiff must make a prima facie
showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment. (Wong, supra,
189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1368.) As part of his burden, the plaintiff
must present evidence that would be admissible at trial and
cannot rely “on the allegations in the complaint or assertions in a
declaration based on information and belief.” (Ibid.)
       For the second prong, the court conducts an analysis akin
to evaluating a summary judgment motion. (Baral, supra, 1
Cal.5th at p. 384.) “The court does not weigh evidence or resolve
conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the
plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima
facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.
[The court] accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates

                                29
the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the
plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.” (Id. at pp. 384–385.) If the
plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of a likelihood of success,
the court should deny the anti-SLAPP motion unless, as a matter
of law, the defendant’s evidence defeats the plaintiff’s claim.
(Wong, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1368.)
      4.1.   General Legal Principles of Libel, Slander, and
             False Light
       Defamation comes in two forms: libel and slander. (Civ.
Code, § 44.) Libel arises out of written publications or “other fixed
representation[s].” (Id., § 45.) Slander arises out of, among other
things, oral statements. (Id., § 46.) The elements of a defamation
claim are: (1) a publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4)
unprivileged, and (5) has a natural tendency to injure or that
causes special damage. (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 720
(Taus).) A defamatory statement is “published” when it is made
to at least one third person. (Medical Marijuana, Inc. v.
ProjectCBD.com (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 869, 884 (Medical
Marijuana); see also Shively v. Bozanich (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1230,
1242 (Shively) [a “written dissemination” is not required for a
statement to be “published” for purposes of defamation].)
       A false light claim is a species of invasion of privacy and
arises out of “ ‘publicity that places a plaintiff before the public in
a false light that would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person, and where the defendant knew or acted in reckless
disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false
light in which the plaintiff would be placed.” (Jackson v.
Mayweather (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1264.) In substance, a
false light claim is the same as a libel claim and subject to the
same requirements. (Ibid.) Thus, “ ‘[w]hen a false light claim is

                                  30
coupled with a defamation claim, the false light claim is …
superfluous, and stands or falls on whether it meets the same
requirements as the defamation cause of action.” (Ibid.)
      4.2.   Choi’s causes of action arising out of Huang’s
             statements to Chang are time-barred.
        Choi contends the court erred in finding all his claims
arising out of Huang’s statements to Chang are barred by the one
year statute of limitations applicable to defamation and false
light claims. We disagree.
        Causes of action for libel and slander are subject to a one-
year statute of limitations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 340, subd. (c)
[defamation claims].) Choi concedes his false light claim is also
subject to a one-year statute of limitations. (Maheu v. CBS, Inc.
(1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 662, 676 [invasion of privacy claims].) The
statute of limitations begins to run when the challenged
statement is published to a third party or, in certain cases, when
the plaintiff discovered, or reasonably should have discovered or
suspected, the factual basis for his claim. (Shively, supra, 31
Cal.4th at pp. 1247–1248.)
        Huang’s statements to Chang that give rise to Choi’s libel,
slander, and false light claims were published on May 29, 2019—
i.e., the date Huang made the statements to Chang.6 (See
Medical Marijuana, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 884.) Thus, the
statute of limitations for Choi’s claims arising out of Huang’s
statements to Chang began to run on May 29, 2019. Choi did not
file his original complaint, however, until August 14, 2020. Choi’s

6 In his appellate briefs, Choi doesn’t dispute that all his claims were

based on Huang’s statements to Chang that were published on May 29,
2019.

                                   31
claims based on Huang’s statements to Chang are therefore time-
barred.
        Choi argues, however, that the statute of limitations for
those claims did not begin to run until at least August 22, 2019,
the date he discovered the content of Huang’s text messages to
Chang. We are not persuaded.
       Under the discovery rule, the accrual of a cause of action is
delayed until the plaintiff “discovers, or has reason to discover,
the cause of action.” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35
Cal.4th 797, 807 (Fox).) A plaintiff has reason to discover a cause
of action when he “ ‘has reason to at least suspect a factual basis
for its elements.’ ” (Ibid.)
       Courts don’t take a “hypertechnical approach” when
applying the discovery rule. (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 807.)
Rather than determining whether the plaintiff suspects facts
supporting each “specific legal element” of a particular cause of
action, we look to whether the plaintiff has reason to at least
suspect the “ ‘generic’ elements of wrongdoing, causation, and
harm.” (Ibid.) In other words, a cause of action accrues when the
plaintiff “at least ‘suspects … that someone has done something
wrong’ to him [citation], [with] ‘wrong’ being used, not in any
technical sense, but rather in accordance with its ‘lay
understanding’ [citation].” (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21
Cal.4th 383, 397–398.) To apply the discovery rule, the plaintiff
must conduct a “reasonable investigation” once he becomes aware
someone has injured him, and he is “charged with knowledge of
the information that would have been revealed by such an
investigation.” (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 808; see also Norgart,
at p. 398 [once the plaintiff has “reasons to suspect” he has been

                                32
wronged, he must “seek to learn the facts necessary to bring the
cause of action”].)
       The discovery rule typically does not apply to defamatory
statements published in books, newspapers, magazines, or other
similar sources. (Shively, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1250.) But it
may apply in cases where it is “particularly difficult for the
plaintiff to observe or understand the breach of duty, or when the
injury itself (or its cause) is hidden or beyond what the ordinary
person could be expected to understand,” such as statements
communicated in confidence to a third party. (Id. at pp. 1248,
1250–1251.)
       The court correctly found the discovery rule does not apply
in this case. In his declaration supporting his anti-SLAPP
opposition, Choi testified that Chang contacted him to discuss
Huang’s statements on May 29, 2019, the same day Huang
communicated with Chang. According to Choi’s declaration,
“Chang contacted [Choi] and [they] had a call about Huang’s May
29, 2019 statement in or about May 29, 2019. During this call,
Chang told [Choi] that Huang told [Chang that Choi] had
‘spooned’ [Huang] on February 18, 2019.” During that same call,
Chang suggested that Choi resign from his position at ACN’s Los
Angeles chapter or else the “matter would be opened up to the
public and deeper investigation would occur with other
administrators from [ACN] getting involved.” Choi also testified
that he agreed to resign because he “didn’t want [the] situation to
escalate due to the fear of what Huang could do to change the
narrative, despite knowing [he] did nothing wrong.”
       Choi’s declaration, therefore, establishes that he was aware
Huang harmed him through her statements to Chang. While
Choi may not have known the exact content of Huang’s

                                33
statements, it was more than reasonable for the court to infer he
was aware that she accused him of wrongdoing, otherwise he
would not have agreed to resign from his position in ACN’s Los
Angeles chapter or had reason to be concerned that Huang could
further “escalate” the situation. Because Choi points to no
evidence showing he investigated the content of Huang’s
statements once he spoke to Chang on May 29, 2019 or that he
would not have been able to discover the content of Huang’s
statements had he conducted such an investigation, the discovery
rule did not delay the accrual of Choi’s claims to the extent they
arise out of Huang’s statements to Chang. (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th
at p. 808.)
      4.3.   Choi has not shown the court erred in finding his
             claims arising out of Huang’s statements to Do
             lack merit.
      The court found Choi did not demonstrate a likelihood of
prevailing on his libel, slander, and false light claims because
Huang presented evidence that her statements to Do were
protected under the common interest privilege and Choi failed to
present prima facie evidence that Huang made her statements
with actual malice so as to overcome the privilege. As we explain,
Choi has failed to show this ruling was erroneous.
      To qualify as libel or slander, a challenged statement must
be unprivileged. (Civ. Code, §§ 45 & 46.) Under Civil Code section
47, subdivision (c), the common interest privilege applies to
statements made without malice to a person who shares a
common interest with the speaker in the statements’ subject
matter. (Hicks v. Richard (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1167, 1177.)
      A defendant bears the initial burden of showing her
allegedly defamatory statements were privileged. (Hui v.

                               34
Sturbaum (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1119 (Hui).) If the
defendant meets that burden, the plaintiff must make a prima
facie showing that the defendant made her statements with
actual malice. (Ibid.) Actual malice is established by a showing
that the statements were motivated by hatred or ill will towards
the plaintiff or by a showing that the defendant lacked
reasonable grounds to believe her statements were true and acted
in reckless disregard of the plaintiff’s rights. (Taus, supra, 40
Cal.4th at pp. 781–782.)
       As we noted above, Do testified that she created “an online
community which provides a safe space for those who were
victims of sexual abuse and assault to share their stories and
experiences.” Do also posted publicly on Twitter, soliciting stories
from women who have been victims of sexual abuse or
harassment perpetrated by photographers. Huang responded to
Do’s post because she wanted to “further the discussion” of sexual
abuse permeating the photography community. Huang, therefore,
presented prima facie evidence that she and Do shared a common
interest in the subject matter of her statements—i.e.,
photographers using their work to target, or take advantage of,
women.
       Choi does not make a meaningful effort to challenge the
court’s finding that Huang and Do shared a common interest in
Huang’s statements about Choi for purposes of the common
interest privilege. Instead, he argues that Do never requested
from Huang the information shared in Huang’s statements. This
argument is misguided because, as we’ve explained, Do did ask
women to share their experiences with problematic
photographers, and Huang specifically responded to that request.

                                35
         Choi also argues the privilege shouldn’t apply because Do
should have been suspicious of Huang’s statements after Huang
asked to remain anonymous. Choi does not cite any legal
authority to support this argument, and we don’t see the merits
of it. There are legitimate reasons alleged victims of sexual
misconduct may wish to remain anonymous when accusing a
person of misconduct. Doing so does not, by itself, render the
alleged victim’s accusation “suspicious.”
        Because Choi has not shown the court erred in finding
Huang made a prima facie showing that her statements to Do
were privileged, the burden shifted to him to make a prima facie
showing that Huang made her statements with malice. (Hui,
supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 1119.) The court found Choi failed to
meet that burden, and Choi has not shown on appeal that the
court’s finding was erroneous.
        In his opening brief, Choi makes only conclusory assertions
that Huang acted with malice when she made her statements to
Do. For instance, Choi asserts that “Huang had to know her
statements were false as she and Choi were the only two people
present at Choi’s apartment on February 18, 2019, and Huang
admitted multiple times that they just cuddled.” Choi also asserts
that he “presented a timeline of a changing narrative by Huang
which constitutes circumstantial evidence (at a minimum), as
well as some direct evidence by third party witnesses, that
Huang’s real motivation was revenge for being spurned.” And
Choi claims that “Huang could not have acted with reasonable
care in making these statements, as she was a party to the events
and thus it must be concluded as a matter of law that she knew
they were false when making them.”

                                36
       Choi fails, however, to support these assertions with
citations to any admissible evidence in the record that supports
them. This omission is fatal here because, as we explained above,
the court excluded large portions of Choi’s supporting evidence,
and his argument appears to refer to some of the excluded
statements from his declaration addressing Huang’s motives.
Choi has not shown the court erred in excluding that evidence,
and he points to no other, admissible evidence to support his
assertions that Huang acted with malice when she made her
statements to Do. Choi has, therefore, failed to show the court
erred in finding he did not produce sufficient evidence of malice
to rebut Huang’s showing that her statements to Do are protected
by the common interest privilege. (Keyes, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 655–656.)

                               37
                       DISPOSITION

      The order granting Huang’s anti-SLAPP motion is
affirmed. Huang shall recover her costs on appeal.

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                 LAVIN, J.
WE CONCUR:

     EDMON, P. J.

     ADAMS, J.

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