Court Opinion

ID: 9601426
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:43:29.025268+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:50:23.038271
License: Public Domain

BERRY, Justice
(dissenting).
The nature and effect of the majority opinion compel this statement of my views. The present opinion recognizes that the claimant fraudulently concealed existence of an existing physical disability, both at the time of application for employment and at the time of medical examination. The issue of fraud in procurement of employment was raised by respondents although neither the trial judge nor the Industrial Court en banc made any finding thereon.
In affirming the order awarding compensation, the Court recognizes that under F.E.L.A. cases, where the issue has been raised, injuries sustained within the course of a “voidable” employment generally have been held compensable, unless there is a causal connection between the injury and the fraudulent misrepresentation. See text citations in the majority opinion. The conclusion in the present case is predicated upon the declaration that, absent a clear legislative intent, this Court may not impose limitation, forfeiture or abridgment upon an employee’s right to compensation. The reasoning is that our Workmen’s Compensation Act is silent as to the effect of fraud not amounting to fraud “in esse contractus”, which would render the contract of employment absolutely void. From this is derived the conclusion that the fraud apparent in the present contract of employment did not render the contract void, and thus provided nothing other than a ground for rescission at the employer’s option.
The far-reaching and regrettable results of this holding are most apparent: (1) judicial stamp of approval is placed upon active fraud in procuring employment; (2) hereafter different rules of law are to be applied by this Court in determining the ultimate result. In ordinary civil cases a wrong-doer will not be permitted to profit from his fraud, but in Workmen’s Compensation cases the active fraud by which an employee is induced to enter a contract of employment not only is judicially condoned but the employer is deprived of legal defense thereto.
It is my opinion the general provisions of our code provide grounds which wholly preclude enforcement of compensation benefits under a contract of employment *644procured by active, fraudulent misrepresentations.
85 O.S.1961, Sec. 105 provides:
“If for the purpose of obtaining any benefit or payment under the provisions of this act, either for himself or any other person, any person wilfully malees a false statement or representation, he shall he guilty of a misdemeanor. Laws 1915, ch. 246, art. 5, § 6.”
The claimant fraudulently misrepresented his physical condition. By reason of his fraud the employer was misled and claimant was enabled to procure employment. The statute, 15 O.S.1961, Sec. 53 provides that apparent consent to a contract cannot be free when obtained through fraud. Sec. 54 provides that consent is deemed obtained through fraud when consent would not have been given had such cause not existed. Sec. 58 provides:
“Actual fraud, within the meaning of this chapter, consists in any of the following acts, committed by a party to the contract, or with his connivance, with intent to deceive another party thereto, or to induce him to enter into the contract:
“1. The suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true.
“2. The positive assertion in a manner not warranted by the information of the person making it, of that which is not true, though he believe it to be true.
“3. The suppression of that which is true, by one having knowledge or belief of the fact.
“4. A promise made without any intention of performing it; or,
“5. Any other act fitted to deceive.”
Sec. 151 declares that both public and private contracts are to be interpreted by the same rules.
We have held innumerable times that the laws in force when a contract is made are as fully a part of the contract as though incorporated therein. In Knight v. Clinkscales, 51 Okl. 508, 152 P. 133 Syllabus 2 states:
“2. The laws which exist at the time and place of making a contract, and at the place where it is to be performed, effecting its validity and construction, enter into and form a part of it.”
By reason of the statutes above mentioned the respondents’ consent or agreement to employ claimant was not a free consent because procured by fraud. This consent or acceptance of claimant for employment would not have been given except for the fraud practiced upon respondents and the examining physicians. That claimant’s conduct when seeking employment constituted actual fraud is reflected by the evidence measured under Sec. 58, supra.
The further statute, 15 O.S.1961, Sec. 211 provides:
“Those contracts are unlawful which are:
“1. Contrary to an express provision of law.
“2. Contrary to the policy of express law, though not expressly prohibited ; or,
“3. Otherwise contrary to good morals.”
The majority opinion fails to recognize the requirements of the statutes above mentioned and their applicability to the present situation. In my view, the positive requirements of these statutes must be applied in order to determine the rights of the parties. The Workmen’s Compensation Act declares it a misdemeanor for any person to make false representations or statements for the purpose of obtaining any benefit under the Act. The fraudulent statements by claimant indisputably were made for the purpose of procuring employment in an occupation claimant knew was defined as hazardous and covered employment under the provisions of the Act.
It is unnecessary to resort to applicable Motor Carrier Safety Regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission which *645would have made claimant unemployable as an interstate operator or to our own public safety regulations (47 O.S.1961, Secs. 6-103 et seq.) which would have precluded claimant’s licensure as a chauffeur. The general code provisions governing all contracts entered into within this State fully establish the illegality of the contract of employment herein. There was a direct and causal relation between the fraudulent misrepresentation and the injury for which the State Industrial Court awarded claimant compensation. The provisions of the statutes must be read in conjunction with the Workmen’s Compensation Act and, being a part of the Act, it follows that the failure to enumerate fraud as a defense to a claim for compensation cannot be construed or interpreted as meaning that active fraud is not a defense to a claim for compensation. Neither, in view of the statutes, can it reasonably be said that the Court is imposing an additional limitation upon an employee’s right to compensation.
Within my opinion and in an effort to avoid the absurd and dangerous consequences to accrue in the future from the majority opinion, this Court should adopt the rule stated in Martin Company v. Carpenter, (Fla.), 132 So.2d 400:
“We therefore adopt the rule that a false representation as to physical condition or health made by an employee in procuring employment will preclude the benefits of the Workmen’s Compensation Act for an otherwise compen-sable injury if there is shown to be a causal relationship between the injury and the false representation and if it is also shown that (1) the employee knew the representation to be false, (2) the employer relied upon the false representation and (3) such reliance resulted in consequent injury to the employer.”
Approval and continued application of the majority rule will result only in the grossest abuses in the future. I dissent.
Rehearing denied; IRWIN and BERRY, JJ., dissenting.