Court Opinion

ID: 9830296
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:05:02.745355+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:18.394596
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
At a former day of the present term of this court we reversed and remanded the judgment of the .trial court herein upon three points, namely: First, for refusing to permit plaintiff in error to prove by Krizan, defendant in error, that he signed a written order for another thrasher, as stated in the opinion herein; second, in not permitting defendants in error to read in evidence the original answer of defendants in cause No. 67393, as stated in the opinion herein; and, third, in permitting testimony as to the value of certain items of expense alleged to have been paid by defendants in error.
[6] As to the first point we were of the opinion that the testimony was admissible as tending to impeach Krizan. Defendants in error in their brief herein did not reply to this assignment of error. They have; however, in their motion for a rehearing called our attention to some authorities upon the subject, an examination of which has convinced us that we were in error.
In the first' place, the purchase of the second thrasher, for which the defendants in error gave a written order, was a collateral matter, and in such cases the admission of testimony with reference to such matters is largely within the discretion of the court, and we do not think that the court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the parties to go into this matter. The offered testimony with reference to the same would have shown that defendants in error purchased a Case thrasher in Dallas soon after rejecting the- thrasher which they bought from plaintiff in error. As to why they signed a written order for said thrasher similar to the one that they signed in this case might have been shown for various reasons, such as their familiarity with the thrasher last bought, their knowledge of the parties that they were buying it from, etc.; and it might also have involved the issue of fraud in obtaining their signature to the second order. The trial court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to open up these collateral matters.
In 17 Oye. p. 275, it is said:
“ * * * That a person is more apt to do than not to do, under similar circumstances, what he has done before. It is equally deducible from experience that, in proportion as volition is eliminated, identical conduct results from similar stimuli, and that, as in other parts of the natural world, similar causes produce like results. The doing of similar acts or the occurrence of similar events is to that extent probative on an issue as to whether the particular act was done by the same person or like occurrence happened at another time. But experience also demonstrates that the inference is in itself a weak one; that men do not invariably, or even in the great majority of instances, do as they have done before, where the conditions are apparently similar, and that, still more often, the absence of a former element or the presence of a new factor in a psychological or physical combination of causes suffices to produce a very different result. * * .* Judges have also realized the practical inconvenience of trying a number of collateral issues at the same time.”
In Beakley v. Rainier, 78 S. W. 702, the court said:
“The fact that a defendant has made a particular contract with a third person does not tend to show that he has made a similar contract with the plaintiff.”
In Stuart v. Kohlberg, 53 S. W. 596, the court said:
“A fact which renders the existence or nonexistence of any fact in issue probable by reason of its general resemblance thereto, and not by reason of its being connected therewith, is deemed not to be relevant to such fact.” Citing Kelley v. Schupp, 60 Wis. 76, 18 N. W. 725 ; Evans v. Koons, 10 Ind. App. 603, 38 N. E. 350; Newhall v. Appleton, 102 N. Y. 133, 6 N. E. 120; Roberts v. Dixon, 50 Kan. 436, 31 Pac. 1083; Altman v. Fowler, 70 Mich. 57, 37 N. W. 708.
Defendants in error also cite in their motion for rehearing Ry. Co. v. Cabell, 161 S. W. 1087; Kelley v. Davis, 138 S. W. 1186; Bevy v. Lee, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 510, 36 S. W. 311.
[7-9] As to the second point, defendants in error in their original brief herein likewise did not reply to the same. We gathered from the brief of appellant that the objection to this testimony was that it was an abandoned pleading. An admission made by a party against his interest is admissible in evidence, whether made in court or out, whether by the pleading upon which he goes to trial, or an abandoned pleading. That an abandoned pleading may be read in evidence in a proper case, see Prouty v. Musquiz, 59 S. W. 568; Coles v. Perry, 7 Tex. 109; Wright v. Mortgage Co., 54 S. W. 368; Jordan v. Young, 56 S. W. 762; Ry. Co. v. Wright, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 198, 64 S. W. 1001.
An examination of the abandoned pleading *839offered in this case, as shown by the bill of exception, does not show that defendants in error made any statement or admission therein contrary to any contention which they are making in this case. In that case, which was a suit upon the notes given by defendants in error for the thrasher, in their original answer, after alleging that the machine was worthless, they pleaded as an offset $300 paid by them and freight paid on the machine. In their amended answer in that case they abandoned their offset. The contention of plaintiff in error is that, inasmuch as they claimed these items as an offset in that case, and did not plead the other items of damage herein, namely, loss of profits and of oats, etc., that the inference was that these additional items are an afterthought. This inference does not follow from the facts stated. As defendants in error suggest in their motion for rehearing, they might not have plead these items in that case, for the reason that the suit was pending in Houston, Tex., and their witnesses to establish such claim lived in McLennan county. But whatever might have been their reasons, the fact that they did not plead these items in that case is not admissible as tending to show that they are not entitled to recover for such items in this case. As to reading pleadings in evidence, whether the same be abandoned pleadings or not, an admission or statement made under one allegation in the pleading is not admissible where inconsistent defenses are pleaded. Ry. Co. v. De Walt, 96 Tex. 121, 70 S. W. 531, 97 Am. St. Rep. 877.
Defendants in error in their motion for rehearing have offered to remit the amounts recovered for. such items as they were not entitled to recover for on account of not having allege^ the reasonable value thereof. These items are fan box, $5.25; coal, $8; and engineer, $15; amounting in the aggregate to $28.25,
Defendants having offered to remit as to these items, the judgment of the trial court is here now reformed so that the amount of the judgment will be for $2S.25 less than that rendered in the trial court. As thus reformed, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Motion granted.
Reformed and affirmed.