Court Opinion

ID: 9396332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-22 07:08:59.076057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:16.139903
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued May 18, 2023

                                      In The

                               Court of Appeals
                                      For The

                          First District of Texas
                             ————————————
                               NO. 01-21-00569-CR
                            ———————————
                          TYRIK TURNER, Appellant
                                         V.
                       THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                    On Appeal from the 174th District Court
                            Harris County, Texas
                        Trial Court Case No. 1640818

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      A jury found appellant Tyrik Turner guilty of the offense of aggravated

robbery. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 29.03. The jury assessed Turner’s punishment at

22 years’ imprisonment. In three appellate issues, Turner challenges the sufficiency

of the evidence to support his conviction (issue one), and he contends that the trial
court committed reversible error in admitting extraneous-offense evidence (issues

two and three).

      We affirm.

                                    Background

      On July 9, 2019, shortly before 1:00 a.m., Carlos Maceda-Jimenez (Jimenez)

parked his Chevy truck on Trevor Way, near the apartment complex where he lived.

As he was getting out of his truck, two male assailants ran up to him demanding that

he give them the keys to the vehicle. Each assailant pointed a handgun at Jimenez.

One assailant was wearing a red hoodie and the other was wearing a gray hoodie.

Jimenez also had a handgun, and he and the assailants exchanged gunfire. Jimenez

was shot three times, and the assailant in the red hoodie was also shot. The assailants

fled, running north on Trevor Way.

      Jimenez walked to his apartment and was taken to Houston Northwest

Hospital by his sister. Jimenez survived his injuries.

      Shortly after the two assailants fled from Jimenez’s truck, a person who

identified himself as “Little T” called 9-1-1. He said that his location was the La

Monterra Apartments. The caller reported that he was with someone who had been

shot. The caller sounded distraught and said that the person was dying.

      Deputy F. Salgado of the Harris County Sherriff’s Office was dispatched to

the scene. When he arrived, Deputy Salgado found a man wearing a red hoodie lying

                                          2
on grass outside the fence of the La Monterra Apartments. The man, later identified

as Kyron Hagen, had been shot and was struggling to breathe. Hagen was taken by

ambulance to Houston Northwest Hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival.

      Deputy Salgado spoke to a witness at the apartment complex who had heard

gunshots. The witness told Deputy Salgado that he had looked out his window and

saw two males running north on Trevor Way. He then saw Hagen on the ground and

heard the other male telling him not to die.

      Based on this information, Deputy Salgado and other officers walked from

the apartment complex south on Trevor Way. About 300 feet from where Hagen had

been found, the officers saw a Chevy truck parked on Trevor Way with its rear

window shattered. They also noticed that the truck had bullet holes. Deputy Salgado

learned that a second person, Jimenez, had been taken to Houston Northwest

Hospital with gunshot wounds. Another officer went to the hospital to speak with

Jimenez. Jimenez told the officer that he owned the Chevy truck. Deputy Salgado

testified that the officer also learned from Jimenez that Jimenez had been “rushed”

by two “unknown black males holding guns.” Jimenez had then “pulled his weapon

and a gunfight ensued, both parties exchanging gunfire.”

      Deputy Salgado noticed that Jimenez’s truck was parked next to a car

dealership and that the dealership had surveillance cameras pointing at Trevor Way.

                                          3
The sheriff’s department contacted the dealership and obtained surveillance videos

recorded from different camera angles.

      The videos were provided to Sergeant R. Martinez, a sheriff’s department

homicide investigator. One video had been recorded by a camera pointing at the area

on Trevor Way where Jimenez’s truck was parked and had captured the aggravated

robbery of Jimenez. At trial, Sergeant Martinez testified that he used a computer

“tool” that allowed him to zoom in on the individuals in the red and gray hoodies

seen in the video to obtain closer images of them.

      The video showed two males, one wearing a red hoodie and the other a gray

hoodie, run up to Jimenez as he was getting out of his truck. Both assailants had an

arm outstretched and were pointing something at Jimenez. Sergeant Martinez noted

that the video showed the assailant in the gray hoodie pointing his hand toward

Jimenez’s head. Sergeant Martinez testified that the video appeared to show “a

firearm pistol robbery” of Jimenez. He stated that muzzle flashes seen in the video

indicated that Jimenez and the assailants exchanged gunfire.

      While Sergeant Martinez testified, the State played the surveillance video

frame by frame, and Sergeant Martinez provided a narration of what was shown in

the frames. In one frame, Sergeant Martinez testified that the assailant in the gray

hoodie was behind the truck discharging his firearm toward Jimenez who was near

the driver’s side door. In another frame, Sergeant Martinez testified that the assailant

                                           4
in the gray hoodie was shown discharging his firearm, aiming toward the truck’s

back window while Jimenez was inside the truck, which was consistent with the

truck’s shattered back window.

      After the exchange of gunfire, a video from another camera angle showed both

assailants running north on Trevor Way. They stopped near the driveway of the La

Monterra Apartments where the assailant in the red hoodie collapsed. The assailant

in the gray hoodie remained, standing next to him. Sergeant Martinez testified that,

in the video, the assailant wearing the gray hoodie appeared to be using a cell phone.

Sergeant Martinez testified that he had then obtained the 9-1-1 records for the calls

placed relating to the incident, including the call in which the caller identified

himself as “Little T.” In that call, “[a] male [was] requesting help, [saying] that his

friend had been shot.” Sergeant Martinez said that, in the background of the call, “a

male” could be heard “gurgling” and trying to catch his breath, indicating to him that

the caller was near someone who was injured.

      Sergeant Martinez determined the telephone number for the call made by

Little T. There were also two other 9-1-1 calls from that number, including a hang-

up call. Sergeant Martinez obtained an “ad hoc report” from the telephone company

for the number. The report provided the longitude and latitude coordinates for the

location from which the calls had originated. Sergeant Martinez testified that the

coordinates corresponded to the “scene location” on Trevor Way. He also

                                          5
determined that the telephone number belonged to Tyrik Turner. Sergeant Martinez

obtained Turner’s photograph and his physical description. Sergeant Martinez

determined that Turner fit the description of the assailant in the surveillance video

who was wearing the gray hoodie.

      Jimenez was shown a photo array that included Turner’s photograph, but he

was unable to identify Turner as an assailant. At trial, Jimenez explained that he was

unable to recognize the assailants because it was dark, and the incident had happened

quickly. He also testified that he was focused on the guns that the assailants were

pointing at him and not focused on their faces.

      On July 23, 2019, Houston Police Officer C. Meade pulled over an SUV

driven by Keithen Williams in which Turner was a passenger. Turner provided his

phone number to Officer Meade. The number was the same phone number from

which the 9-1-1 calls regarding Hagen been placed. During the traffic stop, Officer

Meade found two handguns in a backpack in the SUV’s rear cargo area. Officer

Meade testified that Williams was arrested at the scene and was later charged “with

possession of firearms,” but Turner was not arrested and was released at the scene

of the stop. S. Tokay with the Harris County Institute of Forensic Sciences testified

that he tested shell casings recovered near Jimenez’s truck. The testing linked the

casings to the two firearms found in the backpack recovered from Williams’s SUV.

                                          6
      On July 31, 2019, Turner was arrested for the offense of aggravated robbery.

He was transported to the sheriff’s homicide office where he was questioned by

Sergeant Martinez and another officer. Before the questioning began, Turner was

advised of his Miranda and statutory rights.1 During the interview, which was

recorded, Turner admitted that he and Hagen had intended to rob Jimenez of his

pickup truck. Turner also admitted that he was right behind Hagen when they

approached Jimenez. Turner said that Hagen was wearing a red hoodie.2

      In his statement, Turner acknowledged that he knew Hagen had a gun. He said

that, when Hagen and Jimenez exchanged gunfire, he took cover first behind the

truck and then on its passenger side. Sergeant Martinez testified that Turner’s

description of where he had been in relation to the truck was consistent with what

was shown in the surveillance video. Turner stated that he and Hagen ran from the

scene and that Hagen collapsed near the driveway of the La Monterra Apartments.

He admitted that he called 9-1-1 and that he told the dispatcher that his name was

“Little T.” Sergeant Martinez testified that, from Turner’s description of the events

in his statement, he determined that Turner was the assailant in the gray hoodie.

1
      See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (expanded and codified in TEX. CODE
      CRIM. PROC. art. 38.22).
2
      During the interview, Turner told Sergeant Martinez that Jimenez had shot Hagen.
      In its brief, the State acknowledges that it was “State’s theory that Jimenez struck
      Hagen when he shot in self-defense” and that “[n]o one accused [Turner] of shooting
      Hagen.”
                                           7
      The State indicted Turner for the offense of aggravated robbery. Among the

State’s witnesses presented at trial were (1) Deputy Salgado, (2) Sergeant Martinez,

(3) Officer Meade, (4) Tokay, and (5) Jimenez. The State’s evidence also included

(1) the recordings of the 9-1-1 calls, (2) the surveillance videos from the car

dealership, and (3) the audio and visual recordings of Turner’s statement.

      The jury found Turner guilty of the offense of aggravated robbery and

assessed his punishment as 22 years in prison. This appeal followed. Turner raises

three issues on appeal.

                            Sufficiency of the Evidence

      In his first issue, Turner contends that the evidence was insufficient to support

the judgment of conviction.

A.    Standard of Review and Aggravated Robbery Elements

      We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard

enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). See Winfrey v. State, 393

S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Pursuant to the Jackson standard, we

“consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine

whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational juror

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Alfaro-Jimenez v. State, 577 S.W.3d 240, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (quoting

Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)); see Jackson, 443 U.S.

                                          8
at 319. We can hold evidence to be insufficient under the Jackson standard when

(1) the record contains no evidence, or merely a “modicum” of evidence, probative

of an element of the offense, or (2) the evidence conclusively establishes a

reasonable doubt. Britain v. State, 412 S.W.3d 518, 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)

(citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320).

      The sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard gives full play to the responsibility

of the fact finder to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to

draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. See Jackson, 443 U.S.

at 319; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). An appellate

court presumes that the fact finder resolved any conflicts in the evidence in favor of

the verdict and defers to that resolution, provided that the resolution is rational. See

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326.

      Our review of the record includes all of the evidence introduced, whether it

was properly or improperly admitted. See Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 767 (stating courts

consider admissible and inadmissible evidence presented at trial when conducting

sufficiency analysis). Direct and circumstantial evidence are treated equally;

circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of

an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.

Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. Finally, “[e]ach fact need not point directly and

                                           9
independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the

incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.” Id.

B.    Analysis

      To establish that he committed the offense of aggravated robbery as alleged

in the indictment, the State was required to prove that Turner, while in the course of

committing theft of property owned by Jimenez, and with intent to obtain and

maintain control of the property, intentionally and knowingly threatened and placed

Jimenez in fear of imminent bodily injury and death while using and exhibit a deadly

weapon, namely, a firearm. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 29.03(a)(2) (defining elements

of aggravated robbery with deadly weapon); § 29.02(a)(2) (defining elements of

robbery); see also id. § 1.07(17)(A) (defining “deadly weapon” to include firearm).

A person commits theft if he appropriates property without the owner’s consent and

with intent to deprive the owner of the property. Id. at § 31.03(a), (b)(1). “‘In the

course of committing theft’ means conduct that occurs in an attempt to commit,

during the commission, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission

of theft.” Id. at § 29.01(1). As part of its burden, the State must prove, beyond a

reasonable doubt, the accused’s identity as the person who committed the charged

offense. See Johnson v. State, 673 S.W.2d 190, 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Smith

v. State, 56 S.W.3d 739, 744 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d).

                                          10
      In the trial court, Turner’s primary defense was that the State failed to show

that he was one of the assailants who committed the offense of aggravated robbery

against Jimenez. To determine whether there is sufficient evidence that a defendant

is the individual who committed the offense, we review the totality of the

circumstances. See Rohlfing v. State, 612 S.W.2d 598, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).

Identity may be proven by direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or by reasonable

inferences from the evidence. Ingerson v. State, 559 S.W.3d 501, 509 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2018).

      Here, the record contains sufficient evidence from which the jury could have

found beyond a reasonable doubt that Turner committed the charged offense of

aggravated robbery. The jury viewed the car dealership’s surveillance videos. One

of the videos showed that two assailants, one wearing a red hoodie and one wearing

a gray hoodie, ran up to Jimenez as he got out of his truck. Each assailant had an arm

outstretched pointing something at Jimenez. Muzzle flashes are seen in the video,

indicating that Jimenez and the assailants exchanged gunfire. The two assailants then

ran north on Trevor Way, stopping near the driveway of the La Monterra

Apartments. There, the assailant in the red hoodie collapsed, and the assailant in the

gray hoodie remained standing next to him. The assailant in the gray hoodie then

appeared to be using a cell phone. The evidence showed that, around that time, an

individual identifying himself as Little T called 9-1-1 to report that someone had

                                         11
been shot, and a person can be heard gurgling and struggling to breathe in the

background. The address he provided was the La Monterra Apartments. Two other

calls to 9-1-1, including a hang-up call, were also placed from the same telephone

number. The three 9-1-1 calls were admitted into evidence.

      Deputy Salgado testified that, when he arrived at the La Monterra Apartments,

Hagen, who was wearing a red hoodie, was lying on the ground. He had been shot

and was struggling to breathe.

      Sergeant Martinez testified that he obtained an ad hoc report from the

telephone company for the number from which the 9-1-1 calls were placed. The

report showed the coordinates for the location where the calls originated. Sergeant

Martinez testified that the coordinates corresponded to the “scene location” on

Trevor Way. Sergeant Martinez also testified that the telephone number belonged to

Turner. He obtained a physical description and a photograph of Turner and

determined that Turner fit the description of the assailant shown in the surveillance

video who was wearing the gray hoodie.

      Officer Meade testified that, on July 23, 2019, he pulled over an SUV driven

by Williams in which Turner was a passenger. Turner told Officer Meade his phone

number, which matched the number that had called 9-1-1 regarding Hagen. Officer

Meade testified that he found two handguns in a backpack in the SUV’s rear cargo

area. He arrested Williams, who was charged with “possession of firearms,” but he

                                         12
released Turner at the scene. The jury also heard testimony from Tokay who had

conducted forensic testing on the shell casings recovered near Jimenez’s truck. His

testimony linked the casings found near the truck to the two firearms found in

Williams’ SUV.

      The State also introduced into evidence Turner’s recorded statement, given

after his arrest to Sergeant Martinez. In his statement, Turner admitted that he and

Hagen had intended to take Jimenez’s truck and that he was right behind Hagen

when they approached Jimenez. Turner stated that Hagen was wearing a red hoodie,

and he admitted that he was the person in the video behind, and then to the side of,

Jimenez’s truck while Jimenez and Hagen exchanged gunfire. The video showed

that person was wearing a gray hoodie. Turner also acknowledged that he and Hagen

ran from the scene, stopping near the entrance of the La Monterra Apartments.

There, Hagen collapsed, and Turner admitted to calling 9-1-1 and identifying

himself as Little T. During his statement, Turner also provided his cell phone

number, which matched the number from which the 9-1-1 calls were made.

      Turner argues that the evidence was not sufficient to establish his identity as

an assailant because no eyewitnesses placed him at the scene. Turner points out that

Jimenez could not identify him either in the photo array or in the courtroom.

      It is well-established that eyewitness identification is not necessary to support

a conviction. See Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 285–86 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)

                                          13
(concluding that evidence was sufficient to support conviction despite lack of

eyewitness testimony); Greene v. State, 124 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d) (recognizing eyewitness identification not necessary to

identify perpetrator). And, regarding his inability to identify Turner, Jimenez

testified that, at the time of the offense, “it was dark and it happened so quickly.” He

also testified that he was focused on the firearms that the assailants were pointing at

him and not focused on their faces. Thus, the jury could have reasonably inferred

that Jimenez failed to identify Turner not because Turner was not an assailant but

due to the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense.

      Turner also cites a lack of physical evidence. He points out that the State

presented evidence showing that it had conducted DNA testing on samples taken

from the crime scene and that Turner was excluded as a source of the DNA. He also

points out that his fingerprints were not found on Jimenez’s truck.

      The lack of physical evidence does not render evidence supporting a

conviction insufficient. Harmon v. State, 167 S.W.3d 610, 614 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d). “A rational jury could have found [Turner] guilty of

aggravated robbery without DNA evidence [or] fingerprint evidence . . ..” See id.;

see Santos v. State, 116 S.W.3d 447, 459 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003,

pet. ref’d) (rejecting argument that lack of fingerprints connecting appellant to

robbery rendered evidence insufficient to support conviction).

                                          14
      The evidence reflected that, while Jimenez and Hagen were both shot and left

blood at the scene, the assailant in the gray hoodie was not injured during the

commission of the offense. The evidence also showed that the assailant in the red

hoodie had entered Jimenez’s truck, but the assailant in the gray hoodie had not

entered the truck. Thus, the jury could have reasonably inferred that a lack of DNA

and fingerprint evidence pointing to Turner was consistent with the other evidence

presented and did not mean that Turner was not an assailant.

      Turner also suggests that the probative value of Turner’s recorded statement

was undermined by Sergeant Martinez’s acknowledgement, during cross-

examination, that he told several lies to Turner during the interview. For example,

Sergeant Martinez acknowledged that he told Turner that his fingerprints were found

on Jimenez’s truck when that was not true. But, like the lack of eyewitness testimony

identifying Turner as being at the scene and the lack of DNA and fingerprint

evidence, Sergeant Martinez’s interview technique was a factor for the jury to

consider in weighing the evidence, and we defer to the jury’s resolution of these

issues. See McGregor v. State, 394 S.W.3d 90, 110 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2012, pet. ref’d).

      In sum, Turner attacks the sufficiency of the evidence by asserting that the

State should have offered additional evidence and by pointing out alleged

weaknesses in certain pieces of the State’s evidence. However, when resolving a

                                         15
sufficiency challenge, we must look at the combined and cumulative force of all the

evidence. See Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Here,

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and looking at the

combined and cumulative force of the evidence, we conclude that a rational fact

finder could have found that the State proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, Turner’s

identity as a person who committed the charged offense of aggravated robbery.

      We next determine whether the State offered sufficient evidence to prove the

remaining elements of the charged offense of aggravated robbery. That is, we

determine whether the State proved that Turner, while in the course of committing

theft of Jimenez’s property, and with intent to obtain and maintain control of the

property, intentionally and knowingly threatened and placed Jimenez in fear of

imminent bodily injury and death while using and exhibit a deadly weapon, namely,

a firearm. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 29.03(a)(2).

      In his recorded statement, Turner admitted that he and Hagen had decided to

take Jimenez’s truck and that he had approached Jimenez with Hagen. Jimenez

testified that both assailants rushed him. He said that each assailant pointed a firearm

at him and demanded that he give them the keys to his truck. Jimenez also testified

that both assailants shot at him. The surveillance video corroborated Jimenez’s

testimony, showing both assailants pointing something at Jimenez. The video and

                                          16
Sergeant Martinez’s testimony also showed that the assailant in the gray hoodie had

discharged his firearm, aiming it toward Jimenez.

      Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude

a rational fact finder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt each element

necessary to support the jury’s finding that Turner committed the charged offense of

aggravated robbery. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence was legally sufficient to

support the judgment of conviction for that offense.

      We overrule Turner’s first issue.

                  Admission of Extraneous-Offense Evidence

      In his second issue, Turner contends that the trial court erred in admitting

evidence of the possession-of-firearm offense with which Williams was charged

after Officer Meade pulled over Williams’s SUV and found two handguns in a

backpack in the rear cargo area of the SUV. As he did at trial, Turner asserts that

evidence of the possession-of-firearm offense was not admissible extraneous-

offense evidence under Rule of Evidence 404(b), and he claims that the evidence

should have also been excluded under Rule of Evidence 403 because its probative

value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See TEX. R. EVID. 403,

404(b). Specifically, Turner objected to Officer Meade’s testimony about the

possession-of-firearm offense, which included testimony that Turner was a

passenger in Williams’s SUV at the time Officer Meade found the handguns.

                                          17
Tokay’s subsequent testimony linked the handguns to shell casings found near

Jimenez’s truck.

A.    Legal Principles

      We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of extraneous offenses

for an abuse of discretion. De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343–44 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2009). An extraneous offense is any act of misconduct, whether resulting in

prosecution or not, which is not shown in the charging instrument and which was

shown to have been committed by the accused. Martinez v. State, 190 S.W.3d 254,

262 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d). Texas Rule of Evidence

404(b) prohibits the admission of extraneous-offense evidence solely to prove a

person’s character or to show that the person acted in conformity with that character.

TEX. R. EVID. 404(b); Blackwell v. State, 193 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that Rule

404(b) applies not only to the extraneous acts of the accused but also to the acts of

third parties. Castaldo v. State, 78 S.W.3d 345, 348–49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

      Evidence of extraneous offenses may, however, be admissible to show

“motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of

mistake, or lack of accident.” TEX. R. EVID. 404(b); see Montgomery v. State, 810

S.W.2d 372, 387 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Extraneous-offense evidence that is

admissible under Rule 404(b) may still be excluded under Rule 403 if its probative

                                         18
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See TEX. R.

EVID. 403; Blackwell, 193 S.W.3d at 9.

B.    Harmless Error

      Even if we assume without deciding that the trial court abused its discretion

by admitting evidence of the possession-of-a-firearm offense, we will not reverse

the judgment if the error was harmless. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2. Generally, error in

admitting evidence concerning extraneous offenses is reviewed as non-

constitutional error. Robinson v. State, 236 S.W.3d 260, 269 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d); see Casey v. State, 215 S.W.3d 870, 885 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2007). Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b) provides that an appellate court

must disregard non-constitutional error not affecting a criminal defendant’s

substantial rights. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). A substantial right is affected when

the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s

verdict. Schmutz v. State, 440 S.W.3d 29, 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing Motilla

v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). In assessing the likelihood

that the jury’s decision was adversely affected by the error, an appellate court

considers everything in the record. Id. This includes testimony, physical evidence,

jury instructions, the State’s theories, any defensive theories, closing arguments, and

voir dire, if applicable. Id. (citing Bagheri v. State, 119 S.W.3d 755, 763 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2003)). Important factors include the nature of the evidence supporting the

                                          19
verdict, the character of the alleged error and how it might be considered in

connection with other evidence in the case and may also include whether the State

emphasized the error and whether overwhelming evidence of guilt was present. Id.

      Here, the alleged error involved the admission of third-party extraneous-

offense evidence that was of a dissimilar character to the charged offense. While it

referenced the extraneous-offense evidence in its closing statement, the State did not

emphasize it. Instead, the State mentioned it as one of several pieces of evidence

connecting Turner to the offense. The more powerful evidence relied on by the State

was the surveillance video, the 9-1-1 evidence, and Turner’s own inculpatory

statement.

      The record also shows that Turner’s counsel relied on the extraneous-offense

evidence in his closing statement to support Turner’s defense that he was not one of

the assailants. He pointed out that the handguns linked to the charged offense were

found in William’s SUV and that the State had arrested and charged Williams, not

Turner, for possessing the handguns. Relying on the possession-of-a-firearm offense

against Williams, defense counsel asserted, “Mr. Williams, there’s your robber.”

      Finally, as shown above in the sufficiency-of-the evidence analysis, the record

contains ample evidence of Turner’s guilt, aside from the extraneous-offense

evidence. Jimenez’s and Sergeant Martinez’s testimony, combined with the

surveillance videos, the 9-1-1 evidence, including the phone company records

                                         20
showing that the 9-1-1 calls were made from Turner’s phone number near the scene

of the offense, and Turner’s recorded statement. In his statement, Turner admitted

that he and Hagen planned to rob Jimenez, he was right behind Hagen as they ran up

to Jimenez to rob him, and he was present at the scene during the aggravated robbery.

      After examining the record as a whole, we conclude that the admission of the

extraneous-offense evidence did not affect Turner’s substantial rights because we

have a fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury or had but a slight effect.

See Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 355. We hold that any error in admitting the extraneous-

offense evidence was not harmful error. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b).

                      Notice of Extraneous-Offense Evidence

      In his third issue, Turner contends that the State failed to give notice of its

intent to use the evidence related to possession-of-firearm offense charged against

Williams. Under Rule 404(b), on timely request by a defendant, the State must

provide reasonable notice before trial that it intends to introduce extraneous-offense

evidence in its case-in-chief. TEX. R. EVID. 404(b); see Hernandez v. State, 176

S.W.3d 821, 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Even if we assume without deciding that

the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the extraneous-offense evidence

over Turner’s objection regarding a lack of notice, we conclude that any error was

harmless because it did not affect Turner’s substantial rights. See TEX. R. APP. P.

44.2(b); Hernandez, 176 S.W.3d at 822–25 (recognizing Rule 44.2(b) harm analysis

                                            21
applies to violation of Rule 404(b) notice provision). The purpose of the notice

requirement is to avoid unfair surprise to the defendant and to enable him to prepare

to answer the extraneous-misconduct evidence. See Hernandez, 176 S.W.3d at 823;

Apolinar v. State, 106 S.W.3d 407, 414 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003),

aff’d, 155 S.W.3d 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

      The record shows that Turner cross-examined Officer Meade, the source of

the testimony about the possession-of-firearm offense. The record reflects that

Turner’s trial strategy was to cast doubt on whether he was one of the assailants.

Through Officer Meade, Turner’s counsel elicited testimony that Williams was

arrested and charged with possessing the two firearms linked to the aggravated

robbery of Jimenez, while Turner was released at the scene of Williams’s arrest.

Defense counsel relied on this evidence to suggest to the jury that Williams, not

Turner, was the assailant in the gray hoodie. Thus, any lack of notice did not affect

Turner’s trial strategy. To the contrary, Turner was able to use the evidence to

support his defense. And, had there been a surprise requiring a re-evaluation of trial

strategy, Turner could have requested a continuance, which he did not do. See

McDonald v. State, 179 S.W.3d 571, 578 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (considering

defendant’s failure to request continuance as factor weighing against finding of harm

when State failed to give timely Rule 404(b) notice); see also Lindley v. State, 635

S.W.2d 541, 544 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982) (“The failure to request a

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postponement or seek a continuance waives any error urged in an appeal on the basis

of surprise.”).

      We hold that any error in admitting the evidence of the possession-of-firearm

offense without the State providing notice did not affect Turner’s substantial rights

because it did not influence the jury or had but a slight effect. See TEX. R. APP. P.

44.2(b). Accordingly, we hold that any error was not harmful error. See id.

      We overrule Turner’s third issue.

                                    Conclusion

      We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                               Richard Hightower
                                               Justice

Panel consists of Justices Hightower, Rivas-Molloy, and Farris.

Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

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