Court Opinion

ID: 9672836
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:01:12.497339+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:18.659039
License: Public Domain

ABRAHAMSON, J.
(dissenting in part). Art. I, sec. 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides in part that “. . . in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and by counsel. . . .” (Emphasis added.) Under this provision a defendant has the clear constitutional right to be his own sole counsel. A defendant has an equally clear constitutional right to be represented by an attorney.
*312The defendant here asks to be represented by counsel and at the same time to participate in his trial.1 The majority denies the defendant this constitutional right under Art. I, sec. 7, by changing the word “and” in the constitution to the word “or.” The majority thus interprets our constitution to mean that an accused has a right to representation either by self or by counsel but not by both. In reaching this result the majority places heavy — if not exclusive — reliance on a similar construction by other state courts of their state constitutions. I approach the task of construing this section somewhat differently.
The starting place to interpret the constitution is the language itself. I concede that most, if not all, statutory or constitutional language is capable of bearing several meanings. Nevertheless, the first-reading, plain meaning of this constitutional language is that a defendant can be represented by himself, by counsel, or by both himself and counsel. Not only is this interpretation the obvious one, but also it would enhance, rather than limit, the rights guaranteed to people in Wisconsin. Thus this interpretation should be the one adopted by this court *313unless the interpretation violates other rights guaranteed to the people or is not viable.
The majority does not suggest that interpreting the provision consistently with its plain meaning would create a conflict with other guaranteed rights. Eather, the majority emphasizes pragmatic concerns. The majority says that interpreting the constitution to require the defendant to choose between self-representation and representation by counsel is necessary because “the conflicting interests of the accused and society involved in a criminal trial can be served only in an orderly proceeding.” Stated another way, the majority reasons that granting a defendant the constitutional right to be represented by counsel and at the same time to participate actively in the trial would result in disorderly proceedings; a fortiori, says the majority, there can be no constitutional right for a defendant to participate in the trial if he is represented by counsel.
I agree that justice requires an orderly proceeding, and I recognize that under certain circumstances a defendant’s participation in the trial might interfere with orderly procedure. However, the same risk exists where a defendant without counsel represents himself; and the possibility (or even probability) of this risk materializing does not justify interpreting the Wisconsin constitution so that a defendant’s right to participate in the trial is not protected by the state constitution.
I would interpret the state constitution to guarantee to a defendant the right to represent himself, to be represented by counsel, or to be represented by both himself and counsel. However, the defendant’s constitutional right to be represented by both counsel and himself is subject to reasonable procedural regulations by which the trial court can assure the defendant his constitutional right to a fair and orderly trial and reliability in the guilt-determining process. The goals of fairness and reliability are not fostered by the all-or-nothing approach *314taken by the majority, i.e., by forcing the defendant to choose, as a matter of constitutional right, between self-representation and representation by counsel. I urge that “the state should keep to a necessary minimum its interference with the individual’s desire to defend himself in whatever manner he deems best, using any legitimate means within his resources. . . .” People v. Ruiz, 263 Cal. App.2d 216, 227, 69 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1968).
The State does not argue that the criminal defendant who is represented by counsel should never be allowed to participate in the conduct of the trial proceedings. Eather it argues that the defendant’s right does not rest on the state constitution but on sec. 906.11, Stats., which gives the judge discretion over trial procedure. This court should not substitute a statutory right for a constitutional right. A right based on a statute can easily be changed by the legislature; a constitutional right can be changed only by the vote of the people.
The State asserts, and the majority agrees, that the trial court properly exercised its discretion under sec. 906.11 in its ruling on the extent to which the defendant may participate in the trial. I disagree.
In the present case the defendant wrote the court requesting to act as co-counsel. The letter is set forth in the margin at note 1. The majority says that the trial court scheduled a “hearing” on the request. The “hearing” referred to in the majority opinion consisted merely of the trial court’s announcing its ruling. There was no hearing in the true sense of that term. Neither the defendant nor his attorney nor the district attorney had an opportunity to speak. No one was allowed to advise the court as to how the defendant wished to participate in the trial or how counsel might view defendant’s participation.2
*315The majority appears to reason that the trial court’s determination not to allow the defendant to participate actively was proper because of the defendant’s expressed desire to examine “all witnesses.” The majority appears to say that this expression of a desire to examine “all witnesses” distinguishes the case at bar from the typical “co-counsel” situation “in which a party is represented by more than one counsel, and his lawyers wish to divide responsibility for examination and cross examination of witnesses, with one lawyer assuming sole responsibility for each witness.” The implication of the majority’s decision is that the trial court could have, in its discretion, permitted the defendant to act as co-counsel had the defendant so requested. The defendant specifically requested that he be considered as co-counsel. The trial court in this case should have explored the ground rules for defendant’s participation as co-counsel. The trial court’s failure to do so constitutes error.
I conclude that an accused in a criminal prosecution has a constitutional right to have counsel and at the same time to participate actively in the trial, but that the defendant’s right to participate is not absolute or unlimited. Defendant’s right is to be defined and proscribed by the trial court so that under the circumstances of the case the cause of justice will be served and the orderly conduct of judicial proceedings will not be hampered. Even if I were to view defendant’s right to participate as a statutory, not a constitutional, right, I conclude that the trial court did not exercise its discretion as required under sec. 906.11(1), Stats. Thus I conclude that the trial court did not perform the function required of it under either the constitution or the statute.

 The defendant’s letter of February 11, 1974 addressed to Judge Donald W. Gleason stated as follows:
“Dear Sir;
“I wish to inform the Court that it is my wish and my intent to participate in the examination and cross examination of all witnesses for and against me in the trial I am confronted with on March 26th. I feel my best interests as well as my Constitutional guarentees [sic] will he best safeguarded by the Court recognizing me, the Defendent [sic] as co-council [sic] in which capacity I shall be able to demand the nature and cause of the accusations against me and to meet the witnesses face to face, as well as enjoy the Constitutional Eight of assisting in my own defence [sic] as is ascertained by the Constitution of the United States and out lined in Due Process procedures.
“I also wish to inform the Court that the Defence [sic] will, in all probability expect to use ‘voir dire’ examination and challenges for cause in the examination of the prospective jurors to determine competency and qualifications of jury members.”

 If defendant participates in the trial, the role of the attorney must be clarified. To what extent is the attorney forced “to sur*315render any of the substantial prerogatives traditionally or by statute attached to [his] office.” People v. Mattson, 51 Cal.2d 777, 336 P.2d 937, 941 (1959).