Court Opinion

ID: 9759924
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:32:57.737428+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:05.119510
License: Public Domain

Ed. F. McFaddin, Associate Justice, dissenting. In Ward Furniture Manufacturing Company v. Feather, 234 Ark. 151, 350 S. W. 2d 691, we affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court which returned a case to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission for further development. I am strongly of the opinion that the same course should be pursued in the case at bar because there are several matters absent from the record in the present case. On the record here before us, I cannot vote to deny the worker his claim for compensation. The Majority Opinion says: ‘ ‘ Our view is, that if the claim is not barred by limitations the cause would have to be remanded to the Commission to give claimant an opportunity to produce the required evidence” (to connect claimant’s present condition to the original trauma). I agree with the foregoing statement, and learned counsel for appellee so conceded in the oral argument before this Court. But the Majority holds that Mr. Phillips’ present claim (i.e., the one filed with the Commission1 on January 18, 1960) is barred by limitations; and it is from such holding that I dissent. On appeal from the Referee, the Full Commission held that the claim was not barred by limitations, saying: “The Referee was in error in holding that the claim was barred by limitations. The determination of the degree of permanent partial disability of the claimant was not made by the Referee until November 12, 1958. The period covered by the degree of disability determined extended for 56 1/4 weeks. This period did not end until about December 15, 1959, and the claim was filed January 18, 1960. Furthermore, not all of the doctor’s bill due Dr. John W. Cole has been paid.” Thus, the Commission assigned two reasons for holding that the claim was not barred: (a) the award of November 12, 1958 was prospective and did not expire until December 15, 1959; and (b) all of the bill due Dr. John W. Cole had not been paid by the employer. I desire to discuss these two findings made by the Commission, each of which is reversed by the Majority Opinion. (a) The Award of November 12, 1958 Was Prospective. In holding that the Commission was in error when it said that the payments due under the award of November 12, 1958 were prospective, the Majority Opinion says: “Also, there can be no doubt that the $1,406.25 payment was to take care of payments already accrued and not for future accruals. ’ ’ I cannot see how the Majority can be so positive in the above quoted statement when the Majority Opinion had previously recited: “A record of the proceedings before Referee Calhoun is not contained in the record before us.” How can the Majority be so positive that the payments under the award of November 12, 1958 were not prospective, as the Commission found, when the Majority does not have in the present transcript a copy of the award2 made by Referee Calhoun on November 12, 1958! The Commission certainly had in its files the original award made by Referee Calhoun in 1958; and, based on that award, the Commission held in this case that the payments were prospective. Does the Majority mean to say that, as a matter of law, an award by the Referee could never be prospective! Unless the Majority goes to that extent, it is overruling the Commission on a question of fact when the record evidence (on which the Commission could have based its ruling) is not before us. So I cannot agree with the Majority Opinion, when it holds that the award was not prospective. (b) All of Dr. Cole’s Bill Had Not Been Paid By The Employer. The Commission held that all of Dr. Cole’s bill had not been paid by the employer; and the Majority is reversing the Commission on this question of fact. In the hearing before the Pull Commission, Mr. Phillips testified regarding Dr. Cole’s bill: “A. It hasn’t been paid and the time I got it, Mr. Calhoun was in charge then and he asked me to get receipts from all druggists that I owed and doctors. And I got a receipt from the Cole Drug Company, from the Millard Drug Company at Malvern, from the Parker Drug Company at Benton. And they were all paid except Dr. Cole. Q. Dr. Cole’s bill hasn’t been paid yet? A. No, sir. Q. And you’ve talked to him recently about that? A. Yes, sir.”3  So, we have in the record now before us the positive testimony of Mr. Phillips that he got Dr. Cole’s unpaid bill in accordance with instructions from Referee Calhoun, and that the said bill had not been paid. With that positive testimony in the record the Commission found that the bill was unpaid, yet the Majority is reversing; the Commission on this fact question! The last item in the record before the Pull Commission was the remark by Mr. Bray’s attorney, which is as follows: “Chairman Pope: Do you have anything, Mr, Eiffel? Mr. Eiffel: No, sir. I haven’t got anything. I note on our Pinal Eeceipt that — looks like $112.67 in total medical expenses were paid. I don’t know what that’s for. We did send him to several other doctors. I guess that’s the twenty-four dollars they paid to Cole plus the rest of them. Chairman Pope: Well, let the matter be submitted. ’ ’ This last copied item speaks volumes. The Workmen’s Compensation law requires in § 81-1319 (h) Ark. Stats: “Within thirty (30) days after the final payment of compensation has been made, the employer shall send to the Commission a notice, in accordance with a form prescribed by the Commission, stating that such final payment has been made, the total amount of compensation paid, the name of the employee and of any other person to whom compensation has been paid, the date of the injury or death, and the date to which compensation has been paid . . .” That some such final receipt was filed with the Commission is shown by the last colloquy above; but that final receipt is not in this record before us. The Commission had that final receipt before it; and, from that receipt, could have reached the conclusion that Dr. Cole got only $24.00 on his bill and that the remainder had not been paid. In other words, the Commission could have reached the conclusion that there was still $30.00 left unpaid, just as Mr. Phillips has contended all the time. If that $30.00 was shown as unpaid, then the claim is not barred! The Commission, had before it at least two documents that we do not have: (a) Referee Calhoun’s award of November 12, 1958, and (b) the final receipt. With these documents before it, the Commission made a factual finding that the claim of Mr. Phillips was not barred. This Court should not reverse the Commission on a fact issue when we do not have all the facts before us that the Commission had before it. Therefore, I dissent from the holding of the Majority and maintain that this claim should be sent back to the Commission for further development, just as was done in Ward Furniture Manufacturing Company v. Reather, first cited herein.   This claim was filed with the Commission and not “before a Referée, Mathis” as stated in the Majority Opinion.    The only thing that the Majority has is a “Statement of the Case” made by Referee Thomasson on September 19, 1960, which reads: “Several hearings in this cause culminated in an opinion dated November 12, 1958, in which Referee J. R. Calhoun found that the claimant had a 12 and % per cent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole and awarded him compensation at the rate of $25.00 per week for 56 and 14 weeks, in addition to all reasonable medical expenses incurred as a result of his injury.”   It was also shown by Mr. Phillips’ attorney that there had been a continuous effort to collect Dr. Cole’s bill from Mr. Bray. In the colloquy before the Commission, it developed that Mr. Phillips’ attorney had sued Mr. Bray in the Circuit Court for the balance of Dr. Cole’s bill; and the Circuit Court held that it did not have jurisdiction because the bill was to be paid through the Workmen’s Compensation Commission.