Court Opinion

ID: 9427523
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:21:05.376119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:07.381953
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Rehnquist,
with whom Mr. Justice Stewart joins, dissenting.
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 81, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 3601 et seq., which outlaws discrimination in virtually all aspects of the sale or rental of housing, provides two distinct and widely different routes into federal court. Under § 810, 42 U. S. C. § 3610,1 a “person aggrieved,” *117that is, “[a]ny person who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice,” may seek administrative relief from the Secretary of the Department of Housing and *118Urban Development and, if the Secretary cannot within 30 days resolve the dispute “by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion,” may bring a civil action in federal district court. In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U. S. 205 (1972), we held that the broad definition given to the term “person aggrieved” in § 810 evinced “ 'a congressional intention to define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution.’ ” 409 U. S., at 209.
The second route into federal court under Title VIII — • §8122 — provides simply that “[t]he rights granted by sec*119tions 803, 804, 805, and 806 of this title may be enforced by civil actions in appropriate United States district courts . . . 42 U. S. C. § 3612. Despite the absence from § 812 of the “person aggrieved” language so crucial to our holding in Trafficante regarding standing under § 810, the Court today holds that “[s]tanding under § 812, like that under § 810, is 'as broa[d] as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution.’ ” Ante, at 109, quoting Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra, at 209. I think that the Court’s decision ignores the plain language of § 812 and makes nonsense out of Title VIII’s formerly sensible statutory enforcement scheme.
I
The doctrine of standing is comprised of both constitutional limitations on the jurisdiction of federal courts and prudential rules of self-restraint designed to bar from federal court those parties who are ill-suited to litigate the claims they assert. In its constitutional dimension, the standing inquiry asks whether the party before the court has “ 'such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify *120exercise of the court’s remedial powers on his behalf.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498-499 (1975) (emphasis in original), quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962). The crucial elements of standing are injury in fact and causation. To demonstrate the “personal stake” in the litigation necessary to satisfy the Constitution, the party must suffer “a distinct and palpable injury,” Warth v. Seldin, supra, at 501, that bears a “ 'fairly traceable’ causal connection” to the challenged action. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 72 (1978), quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 261 (1977). Accordingly, when an objection to a party’s standing to litigate in federal court is constitutionally based, “the relevant inquiry is whether . . . the plaintiff has shown an injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 38 (1976).
A plaintiff who alleges sufficient injury to satisfy these minimum constitutional limitations on federal jurisdiction may nonetheless be barred from federal court under our prudential standing rules because he asserts a generalized grievance shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208 (1974), or because he seeks to “rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties” rather than his own. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S., at 499. These prudential' rules, however, are subject to modification by Congress, which may grant to any person satisfying Art. Ill’s minimum standing requirements a right “to seek relief on the basis of the legal rights and interests of others, and, indeed, [to] invoke the general public interest in support of [his] claim.” Id., at 501. Congress did just that in enacting § 810 of Title VIII, which grants to “[a]ny person who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice” a right to seek federal administrative and judicial relief. In Trafficante, *121supra, we held that the broad definition given “person aggrieved” in § 810 indicated a congressional intent to accord apartment dwellers, who had not themselves suffered discrimination, an actionable right to be free from the adverse consequences flowing to them from racially discriminatory rental practices directed at third parties.3 Plaintiffs’ alleged “loss of important benefits from interracial associations,” 409 U. S., at 210, was sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Art. III.
In the case now before us, respondents — the village of Bellwood, five of its residents, and one resident of a neighboring community — brought suit against petitioner real estate firms, alleging that the firms had violated both 42 U. S. C. § 1982 and § 804 of Title VIII by “steering” prospective homebuyers to different areas in and around Bellwood according to their race. Like plaintiffs in Trafficante, the individual respondents allege that petitioners’ practice of racial steering has deprived them of “the social and professional benefits of living in an integrated society.” 4 App. 6, 99. Respondent village of Bellwood alleges that it has been injured “by having [its] housing market . . . wrongfully and illegally *122manipulated to the economic and social detriment of [its] citizens.” Ibid. Unlike plaintiffs in Trafficante, however, respondents have not proceeded under § 810 of Title VIII, choosing instead to travel the direct route into federal court provided by § 812.
In pertinent part, § 812 provides:
“The rights granted by sections 803, 804, 805, and 806 may be enforced by civil actions in appropriate United States district courts without regard to the amount in controversy and in appropriate State or local courts of general jurisdiction.” 82 Stat. 88, 42 U. S. C. § 3612 (a).
The language of § 812 contains no indication that Congress intended to authorize the commencement of suits under Title VIII by persons who would otherwise be barred from federal court by prudential standing rules. Indeed, were § 812 the only method for enforcing Title VIII, respondents — who were not themselves discriminated against by petitioners — could hardly argue that they were statutorily authorized to seek relief on the basis of legal rights and interests of third parties who had been racially “steered” into and away from certain areas in the community. The Court, however, in effect reads the broadly defined “person aggrieved” language of § 810 into § 812, holding that the alternative routes into federal court provided under the sections are available to precisely the same class of plaintiffs. The language and structure of Title-VIII lead me to a contrary conclusion.
II
The term “person aggrieved” is used throughout § 810 — no less than four times — to denominate the proper § 810 claimant; 5 by contrast, in § 812 Congress wholly avoided use of this broadly defined term, preferring instead the familiar “plaintiff.” Noting that § 812 is phrased in the passive voice, *123the Court concludes that the absence of the “person aggrieved” language from the provision “does not indicate that standing is more limited under that provision than under § 810.” Ante,' at 103 (emphasis added). The point of our decision in Traf-ficante, however, was that the presence of the “person aggrieved” language in § 810 demonstrated Congress’ affirmative intent to abrogate prudential standing rules and to expand standing under the section to the full extent permitted by Art. Ill of the Constitution. It thus follows that the absence of “person aggrieved” from § 812 indicates that Congress did not intend to abrogate the normal prudential rules of standing with regard to § 812.
Consistent with § 810’s broad grant of standing is the language chosen by Congress to define the scope of the civil action that may be brought under the section: “[T]he person aggrieved may . . . commence a civil action in any appropriate United States district court ... to enforce the rights granted or protected by this title ....” 82 Stat. 86, 42 U. S. C. § 3610 (d) (emphasis added). Section 812, in contrast, authorizes the commencement of a civil action to enforce only “[t]he rights granted by,” as opposed to “rights granted or protected by,” §§ 803, 804, 805, and 806. Clearly, Congress contemplated that § 812 suits could be instituted only by persons alleging injury to rights expressly secured under the enumerated sections.
Section 804, the provision allegedly offended by petitioners, provides in pertinent part:
“[I] t shall be unlawful—
“(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
“(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or *124in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
“(d) To represent to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental when such dwelling is in fact so available.” 82 Stat. 83, as amended, 88 Stat. 729, 42 U. S. C. § 3604.
In essence, § 804 grants to all persons6 seeking housing the right not to be discriminated against on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Nowhere in the section are the individual respondents granted a right to reap the “social and professional benefits of living in an integrated society.” Nor does § 804 grant the village of Bellwood an actionable right not to have its housing market “wrongfully and illegally manipulated.” Accordingly, respondents have suffered no injury to “rights granted by [§ 804].”
The structure of both § 810 and § 812 and the significant differences between the two enforcement provisions further support the conclusion that Congress intended to restrict access to federal courts under § 812 to a more limited class of plaintiffs than that contemplated under § 810. A “person aggrieved” proceeding under § 810 must first file a complaint with the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, who is authorized “to try to eliminate or correct the alleged discriminatory housing practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.” 42 U. S. C. §3610 (a). The Secretary, however, must defer to the appropriate state *125or local agency whenever state or local fair-housing laws provide rights and remedies substantially equivalent to those secured under Title VIII. The Secretary may recommence action on the complaint only upon certification that such action is necessary to protect the rights of the parties or the interests of justice. 42 U. S. C. § 3610 (c). If the Secretary’s informal efforts prove futile, the “person aggrieved” may commence a civil action under Title VIII in federal district court, but only if he has no comparable judicial remedy under “substantially equivalent” state or local fair-housing legislation. 42 U. S. C. §3610 (d).
The § 812 “plaintiff” is not similarly encumbered. He may proceed directly into federal court, deferring neither to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development nor to state administrative and judicial processes. See 42 U. S. C. § 3612 (a). The District Court is authorized to appoint an attorney for the § 812 plaintiff and to waive payment of fees, costs, and security. 42 U. S. C. § 3612 (b). Additionally, broader relief is available under § 812. The “prevailing plaintiff” may be awarded a “permanent or temporary injunction, temporary restraining order, or other order, and . . . actual damages and not more than $1,000 punitive damages, together with court costs and reasonable attorney fees . . . .” 42 U. S. C. § 3612 (c). Section 810, by contrast, makes no allowance for damages, costs, or counsel fees, limiting the victorious claimant to injunctive relief and such other affirmative action as may be appropriate. 42 U. S. C. § 3610 (d). Nor does § 812 contain a provision similar to § 810 (e), which provides that “[i]n any proceeding brought pursuant to [§ 810], the burden of proof shall be on the complainant.” Given the advantages to the claimant of proceeding under § 812, it is hard to imagine why anyone would voluntarily proceed under § 810 if both routes were equally available.
When the carefully chosen language and the widely variant provisions of § 810 and § 812 are thus compared, the logic of *126Title VIII’s private enforcement mechanism becomes clear. Immediate access to federal judicial power under § 812 was reserved to those directly victimized by a discriminatory housing practice;, that is, those actually discriminated against on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Only direct victims of housing discrimination were deemed to suffer injuries of sufficient magnitude to authorize appointment of counsel and recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, costs, and attorney fees. But because discrimination in housing can injure persons other than the direct objects of the discrimination, Trafficante, 409 U. S., at 210, Congress believed that the statute’s fair-housing goals would be .served by extending standing under § 810 as broadly as constitutionally permissible. Anyone claiming to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice, even if not himself directly discriminated against, is authorized to seek redress under § 810. By barring indirect victims of housing discrimination from immediate access to federal court under § 812, and thus requiring them to exhaust federal conciliation procedures as well as viable state and local remedies pursuant to § 810, Congress sought to facilitate informal resolution of Title VIII disputes, to avoid federal judicial intervention when possible, and to encourage state and local involvement in the effort to eliminate housing discrimination.
The legislative history of Title VIII, while “not too helpful,” Trafficante, supra, at 210, supports the view that standing to commence a civil action under § 812 is limited to direct victims of housing discrimination. Introduced on the Senate floor and approved unchanged by the House, Title YIII’s legislative history must be culled primarily from the Congressional Record. The brief debate preceding adoption of Amendment No. 586, which amended § 810 to require exhaustion of “substantially equivalent” remedies under state or local fair-housing laws as a prerequisite to the filing of a Title *127VIII action in federal court, is particularly enlightening. Senator Miller, who introduced the amendment, explained:
“I provide in the second part of my amendment that no civil action may be brought in any U. S. district court if the person aggrieved has a judicial remedy under a State or local fair housing law which provides substantially equivalent rights and remedies to this act.
“I believe it is a matter of letting the State and local courts have jurisdiction. We in the Senate know that our Federal district court calendars are crowded enough, without adding to that load if there is a good remedy under State law.” 114 Cong. Rec. 4987 (1968).
Senator Hart added that the amendment “recognizes the desire all of us share that the State remedies, where adequate, be availed of and that unnecessary burdening litigation not further clog the court calendars.” Ibid. It seems unlikely that Congress would wholly frustrate the concerns moving it to adopt § 810’s exhaustion requirement by opening § 812’s direct route into federal court to all “persons aggrieved.”
The debate concerning the allowance of attorney’s fees to prevailing plaintiffs under § 812 also indicates a congressional understanding that standing to proceed immediately into federal court under § 812 was limited to discriminatees. Senator Hart commented that §§ 812 (b) and (c) — which authorize the district court to waive payment of fees, costs, and security in appropriate cases and to award damages, court costs,. and reasonable attorney fees to prevailing plaintiffs — “reveal a clear congressional intent to permit, and even encourage, litigation by those who cannot afford to redress specific wrongs aimed at them because of the color of their skin.” 114 Cong. Rec. 5514-5515 (1968) (emphasis added).
The meager legislative history marshaled by the Court provides at best thin support for its expansive interpretation of standing under § 812. References in the legislative history describing § 812 as an “addition [al]” and “alternative” reme*128dial provision to § 810, ante, at 106, and nn. 16, 17, and 18, are hardly dispositive: one need only read the two sections to conclude that they provide “alternative” enforcement mechanisms. That § 810 and § 812 are “alternative” remedial provisions does not, however, compel the conclusion that they are equally available to all potential Title VIII claimants. The only piece of legislative history arguably supporting the Court’s interpretation of § 812 is the House Judiciary Committee staff’s use of the term “aggrieved person” to refer to potential § 812 plaintiffs. Ante, at 107 n. 18. This single, fleeting reference in the legislative history hardly seems sufficient to overwhelm the contrary indications of congressional intent found elsewhere in Title VIII’s legislative history and in the carefully worded and structured provisions of § 810 and §812.
I think that Trafficante pushed standing to the limit in construing the “person aggrieved” language of § 810. I cannot join the Court in pressing the more narrowly confined language of § 812 to the same limit.
Ill
Respondents also claim standing under 42 U. S. C. § 1982, which provides: “All citizens of the United States shall have the same right ... as is enjoyed by white citizens ... to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” Unlike Title VIII, “§ 1982 is not a comprehensive open housing law.” Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409, 413 (1968). Enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the section bars all racial discrimination, both private and public, in the sale or rental of property. Ibid.
It is clear that respondents have suffered no injury to the only right secured under § 1982 — the right to be free from racially motivated interference with property rights. Their claim of standing under § 1982 is thus conceptually indistinguishable from a similar claim rejected by this Court in *129Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490 (1975). Plaintiffs in Warth brought a § 1982 action against the town of Penfield, N. Y., and members of its Zoning, Planning, and Town Boards, claiming that the town’s zoning ordinance effectively excluded persons of minority racial and ethnic groups. One of the plaintiffs, a nonprofit corporation organized to alleviate the housing shortage for low- and moderate-income persons in and around Penfield, based its standing to challenge the zoning ordinance on the loss to its members residing in Penfield of the “benefits of living in a racially and ethnically integrated community.” 422 U. S., at 512. This Court rejected plaintiff’s claim of standing, distinguishing Traficante on the ground that § 1982, unlike § 810 of Title VIII, does not give residents of certain communities an actionable right to be free from the adverse consequences of racially discriminatory practices directed at and immediately harmful to others. Thus, we held plaintiff’s “attempt to raise putative rights of third parties,” 422 U. S., at 514, barred by the prudential rules of standing.
Like plaintiffs in Warth, respondents claim that they have been injured by racially discriminatory acts practiced on others. Thus, their claim of standing under § 1982 must also fail.
Because I think that respondents have no standing to litigate claims under 42 U. S. C. § 1982 and § 812 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,1 would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

 Section 810 provides:
“(a) Any person who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice or who believes that he will be irrevocably injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur (hereafter ‘person aggrieved’) may file a complaint with the Secretary. Complaints shall be in writing and shall contain such information and be in such form as the Secretary requires. Upon receipt of such a complaint the Secretary shall furnish a copy of the same to the person or persons who allegedly committed or are about to commit the alleged discriminatory housing practice. Within thirty days after receiving a complaint, or within thirty days after the expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c), the Secretary shall investigate the complaint and give notice in writing to the person aggrieved whether he intends to resolve it. If the Secretary decides to resolve the complaint, he shall proceed to try to eliminate or correct the alleged discriminatory housing practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. Nothing said or done in the course of such informal endeavors may be made public or used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding under this title without the written consent of the persons concerned. Any employee of the Secretary who shall make public any information in violation of this provision shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year.
“(b) A complaint under subsection (a) shall be filed within one hundred *117and eighty days after the alleged discriminatory housing practice occurred. Complaints shall be in writing and shall state the facts upon which the allegations of a discriminatory housing practice are based. Complaints may be reasonably and fairly amended at any time. A respondent may file an answer to the complaint against him and with the leave of the Secretary, which shall be granted whenever it would be reasonable and fair to do so, may amend his answer at any time. Both complaints and answers shall be verified.
“(c) Wherever a State or local fair housing law provides rights and remedies for alleged discriminatory housing practices which are substantially equivalent to the rights and remedies provided in this title, the Secretary shall notify the appropriate State or local agency of any complaint filed under this title which appears to constitute a violation of such State or local fair housing law, and the Secretary shafi take no further action with respect to such complaint if the appropriate State or local law en-forement official has, within thirty days from the date the alleged offense has been brought to his attention, commenced proceedings in the matter, or, having done so, carries forward such proceedings with reasonable promptness. In no event shall the Secretary taire further action unless he certifies that in his judgment, under the circumstances of the particular case, the protection of the rights of the parties or the interests of justice require such action.
“(d) If within thirty days after a complaint is filed with the Secretary or within thirty days after expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c), the Secretary has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance with this title, the person aggrieved may, within thirty days thereafter, commence a civil action in any appropriate United States district court, against the respondent named in the complaint, to enforce the rights granted or protected by this title, insofar as such rights relate to the subject of the complaint: Provided, That no such civil action may be brought in any United States district court if the person aggrieved has a judicial remedy under a State or local fair housing law which provides rights and remedies for alleged discriminatory housing practices which are substantially equivalent to the rights and remedies provided in this title. Such actions may be brought without regard to the amount in controversy in any United States district court for the district in which the discriminatory housing practice is alleged to have occurred or be about to occur or *118in which the respondent resides or transacts business. If the court finds that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred or is about to occur, the court may, subject to the provisions of section 812 of this title, enjoin the respondent from engaging in such practice or order such affirmative action as may be appropriate.
“(e) In any proceeding brought pursuant to this section, the burden of proof shall be on the complainant.
“(f) Whenever an action filed by an individual, in either Federal or State court, pursuant to this section or section 812 of this title, shall come to trial the Secretary shall immediately terminate all efforts to obtain voluntary compliance.” 82 Stat. 85, 42 U. S. C. § 3610.

 Section 812 provides:
“(a) The rights granted by sections 803, 804, 805, and 806 of this title may be enforced by civil actions in appropriate United States district courts without regard to the amount in controversy and in appropriate State or local courts of general jurisdiction. A civil action shall be commenced within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged discriminatory housing practice occurred: Provided, however, That the court shall continue such civil case brought pursuant to this section or section 810 (d) of this title from time to time before bringing it to trial if the court believes that the conciliation efforts of the Secretary or a State or local agency are likely to result in satisfactory settlement of the discriminatory housing practice complained of in the complaint made to the Secretary or to the local or State agency and which practice forms the basis for the action in court: And provided, however, That any sale, encumbrance, or rental consummated prior to the issuance of any court order issued under the authority of this Act, and involving a bona fide purchaser, encum-brancer, or tenant without actual notice of the existence of the filing of a *119complaint or civil action under the provisions of this Act shall not be affected.
“(b) Upon application by the plaintiff and in such circumstances as the court may deem just, a court of the United States in which a civil action under this section has been brought may appoint an attorney for the plaintiff and may authorize the commencement of a civil action upon proper showing without the payment of fees, costs, or security. A court of a State or subdivision thereof may do likewise to the extent not inconsistent with the law or procedures of the State or subdivision.
“(e) The court may grant as relief, as it deems appropriate, any permanent or temporary injunction, temporary restraining order, or other order, and may award to the plaintiff actual damages and not more than $1,000 punitive damages, together with court costs and reasonable attorney fees in the ease of a prevailing plaintiff: Provided, That the said plaintiff in the opinion of the court is not financially able to assume said attorney’s fees.” 82 Stat. 88, 42 U. S. C. § 3612.

 Despite suggestions to the contrary by the Court, ante, at 101 n. 7, our decision in Trafficante was clearly not intended to construe § 812 as well as § 810. The opinion focuses exclusively on § 810, closing with the following statement:
“We can give vitality to § 810 (a) only by a generous construction which gives standing to sue to all in the same housing unit who are injured by racial discrimination in the management of those facilities within the coverage of the statute.” 409 U. S., at 212.
The Court’s passing reference in Trafficante to § 812 can hardly be construed as an interpretation of that provision.

 Alleging injury to “their right to select housing without regard to race,” App. 6, 99, the individual respondents initially sought to establish standing in their capacity as “testers.” Respondents have abandoned, in this Court, their claim of standing as testers, electing to stand or fall on their allegations of injury in their capacity as residents in and around Bellwood.

 Indeed, the term is found nowhere else in Title VIII.

 “Person” is defined in Title VIII as “one or more individuals, corporations, partnerships, associations, labor organizations, legal representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, receivers, and fiduciaries.” 42 U. S. C. § 3602 (d).