Court Opinion

ID: 9364877
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-20 16:03:12.999752+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:41.093560
License: Public Domain

2023 IL 127547

                                        IN THE
                               SUPREME COURT
                                            OF
                          THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

                                   (Docket No. 127547)

      RITA LINTZERIS et al., Appellants, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellee.

                              Opinion filed January 20, 2023.

        CHIEF JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

        Justices Neville, Overstreet, and Holder White concurred in the judgment and
     opinion.

        Justices Cunningham, Rochford, and O’Brien took no part in the decision.

                                        OPINION

¶1       Plaintiffs Rita Lintzeris, William Moraitis, Zaron Jossel, and Clarence Daniels
     brought an action for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, on behalf of
     themselves and others similarly situated, against the City of Chicago (City).
     Plaintiffs challenged the City’s authority to enact an ordinance imposing
     administrative penalties on the owners of impounded vehicles (Chicago Municipal
     Code § 2-14-132 (amended Nov. 16, 2016)). Plaintiffs contended that the ordinance
     is an invalid exercise of the City’s home rule authority because it is preempted by
     section 11-208.7 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-208.7 (West 2016)).
     The Cook County circuit court dismissed the complaint under section 2-615 of the
     Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2016)), and the appellate court
     affirmed. 2021 IL App (1st) 192423-U. For the following reasons, we affirm the
     judgment of the appellate court.

¶2                                    BACKGROUND

¶3                              The Impoundment Ordinance

¶4       In 1998, the City enacted an ordinance setting forth the applicable procedures,
     penalties, and fees that apply to vehicle owners when their vehicle has been
     impounded because of its use in certain enumerated municipal code offenses. See
     Chicago Municipal Code § 2-14-132 (added Apr. 29, 1998). Under the ordinance,
     as generally relevant here, within 15 days of the impoundment, an owner may
     request a preliminary hearing, at which an administrative law officer determines
     within 48 hours whether there is probable cause to believe the owner’s vehicle was
     used in one of the enumerated offenses. Chicago Municipal Code § 2-14-132(a)(1)
     (amended Nov. 16, 2016). If the administrative law officer finds probable cause,
     the vehicle owner may regain possession of the vehicle by paying the administrative
     penalty applicable to the municipal code offense, plus towing and storage fees, as
     well as any outstanding debt arising from other vehicle offenses. Id. § 2-14-
     132(a)(1)-(2). If probable cause is lacking, the vehicle is returned to the owner, and
     no penalty or fees are owed. Id. § 2-14-132(a)(3).

¶5        Additionally, the owner of the vehicle has a right to request a hearing to
     challenge the impoundment. If the administrative law officer finds by a
     preponderance of the evidence that the vehicle was used in the offense, the owner
     is liable for the administrative penalty applicable to that offense, plus towing and
     storage fees. Id. § 2-14-132(b)(3)(A). If the administrative law officer does not find
     by a preponderance of the evidence that the owner’s vehicle was involved, the
     vehicle is returned, and the owner receives a refund of any penalty and fees paid.
     Id. § 2-14-132(b)(3)(B). If the owner does not request a hearing or fails to appear
     at the hearing, the administrative law officer enters a default order imposing the

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       applicable administrative penalty, plus towing and storage fees. Id. § 2-14-
       132(b)(4). An administrative penalty constitutes a debt due to the City and may be
       enforced as a judgment in accordance with applicable law. Id. § 2-14-132(c).

¶6                                      The Vehicle Code

¶7         The Vehicle Code covers vehicle regulation in the state, including traffic
       regulation in chapter 11, titled “Rules of the Road.” 625 ILCS 5/ch. 11 (West 2016).
       Article II of chapter 11 concerns obedience to and the effect of traffic laws. Id. ch.
       11, art. II. Section 11-207 provides that the provisions in chapter 11 are to be
       uniform throughout the State; while local authorities can adopt additional traffic
       regulations, “no local authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance rule or
       regulation in conflict with the provisions of this Chapter unless expressly
       authorized herein.” Id. § 11-207. The Vehicle Code further provides within chapter
       11 that home rule units, such as the City, cannot adopt inconsistent local police
       regulations, subject to exceptions not at issue in this case. Id. § 11-208.2.

¶8         In 2012, the General Assembly amended the Vehicle Code to add a provision
       to chapter 11, article II, governing administrative fees and procedures for the
       release of impounded vehicles. See Pub. Act 97-109, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2012) (adding
       625 ILCS 5/11-208.7). That section authorizes counties and municipalities to
       “provide by ordinance procedures for the release of properly impounded vehicles”
       and to impose “a reasonable administrative fee related to [a county’s or
       municipality’s] administrative and processing costs associated with the
       investigation, arrest, and detention of an offender, or the removal, impoundment,
       storage, and release of the vehicle.” 625 ILCS 5/11-208.7(a) (West 2016).

¶9                                      Procedural History

¶ 10       In 2017, plaintiffs brought an action on behalf of themselves and a purported
       class of vehicle owners who either paid administrative penalties or had default
       judgments entered against them for such penalties under the impoundment
       ordinance from 2012 to the time of the complaint. Plaintiff Lintzeris alleged that
       her son borrowed her vehicle and was arrested for driving while intoxicated and
       possessing unlawful drugs. Her vehicle was impounded, and she paid an

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       administrative penalty, as well as fees for towing and storage. Plaintiff Moraitis
       alleged that his son was arrested for driving with a suspended license. After a full
       hearing, an administrative law officer upheld the impoundment of his vehicle and
       ordered that he pay an administrative penalty, storage costs, and a towing fee.
       Moraitis did not allege that he paid the penalty or fees. Plaintiff Jossel alleged that
       his vehicle was impounded after he was arrested for possessing a controlled
       substance. He paid an administrative penalty, as well as towing and storage fees.
       Plaintiff Daniels alleged that his vehicle was impounded after he was arrested for
       driving while intoxicated. He alleged that he was assessed an administrative penalty
       and fees, which he did not pay.

¶ 11       Plaintiffs challenged the impoundment ordinance, alleging that the Vehicle
       Code prohibits the City from imposing the administrative penalties in connection
       with a vehicle’s impoundment. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that section 11-208.2
       expressly limits the City’s authority to adopt local police regulations that are
       inconsistent with chapter 11 and that section 11-208.7 allows for only towing,
       storage, and other reasonable administrative costs. Therefore, plaintiffs alleged that
       the impoundment ordinance’s imposition of administrative penalties is inconsistent
       with section 11-208.7 and thereby unenforceable.

¶ 12       In count I of the complaint, plaintiffs sought a declaration that the City is not
       authorized to impose the penalties. In count II, plaintiffs sought an injunction
       barring the City from imposing any further administrative penalties. In counts III
       and IV, plaintiffs asserted claims for unjust enrichment and conversion and sought
       a refund of administrative penalties collected since 2012, as well as proceeds from
       the sale of impounded vehicles.

¶ 13       The City then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to section 2-615
       of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2016). The City argued
       that plaintiffs’ claims failed as a matter of law because the ordinance is not
       inconsistent with section 11-208.7 and because section 11-208.7 does not apply to
       home rule units. After briefing and a hearing, the circuit court dismissed the
       complaint, finding that prior to the enactment of section 11-208.7 the City had home
       rule authority to impose the penalties and that adding section 11-208.7 did not
       preempt the City’s home rule authority to impose the penalties because the statute’s
       authorization to impose fees did not include a prohibition of penalties. As an

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       alternative basis, the court determined that section 11-208.7 did not apply to home
       rule units.

¶ 14       The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. 2021 IL App
       (1st) 192423-U. The court found that “nowhere in [section 11-208.7] is there an
       explicit limitation on the power of a home rule unit to charge an administrative
       penalty or fine for the underlying violation that led to the impoundment of the
       vehicle.” Id. ¶ 49. Accordingly, the court held that “[t]he impoundment ordinance
       is not inconsistent with the Vehicle Code and operates concurrently with the
       Vehicle Code.” Id. ¶ 50.

¶ 15      We subsequently allowed plaintiffs’ petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R.
       315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). We also allowed the Illinois Counties Risk Management
       Trust to file an amicus curiae brief. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).

¶ 16                                       ANALYSIS

¶ 17       The central issue in this appeal is whether the City’s ordinance, imposing
       administrative penalties on owners of vehicles impounded for certain municipal
       violations, is a valid exercise of the City’s home rule power. Plaintiffs contend that
       the statutory provisions of the Vehicle Code and the limitations on home rule
       authority in the Vehicle Code foreclose the City’s imposition of administrative
       penalties, thus rendering the ordinance unenforceable.

¶ 18       The appeal comes to this court from the circuit court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’
       complaint under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-615
       (West 2016). A motion to dismiss under that section tests the legal sufficiency of
       the complaint based on defects apparent on its face. O’Connell v. County of Cook,
       2022 IL 127527, ¶ 18. The essential question presented is whether the allegations
       of the complaint, taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the
       plaintiff, are sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted.
       Id. Our review of an order granting a section 2-615 motion is de novo. Id. ¶ 19.

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¶ 19                             The City’s Home Rule Authority

¶ 20       The City is a home rule unit. See Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Drive Condominium
       Ass’n, 2013 IL 110505. As such, our analysis begins with the scope of its home rule
       authority. The 1970 Illinois Constitution bestows broad authority on home rule
       units. Palm, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 30 (citing Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(m));
       Scadron v. City of Des Plaines, 153 Ill. 2d 164, 174 (1992). As expressed in article
       VII, section 6(a), of the Illinois Constitution:

          “Except as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may exercise any power
          and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs including,
          but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health,
          safety, morals and welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt.” Ill. Const. 1970,
          art. VII, § 6(a).

¶ 21       Thus, under section 6(a), the City, as a home rule unit, draws its power to
       regulate for the protection of the public safety directly from the constitution. This
       power does not depend on a grant of authority by the General Assembly, as was the
       design prior to the 1970 constitution. City of Chicago v. Roman, 184 Ill. 2d 504,
       512-13 (1998). Section 6 further provides that the “[p]owers and functions of home
       rule units shall be construed liberally.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(m). This broad
       power vested in home rule units is premised on the understanding that problems
       affecting units of local government and their residents should be addressed with
       solutions tailored to meet those local needs. Palm, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 29.

¶ 22       Although the constitutional power of home rule units is deliberately broad, the
       General Assembly may preempt the exercise of a home rule unit’s powers by
       expressly limiting that authority. As provided under article VII, section 6(h), the
       General Assembly “may provide specifically by law for the exclusive exercise by
       the State of any power or function of a home rule unit.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII,
       § 6(h). We have previously explained that, if the legislature intends to limit or deny
       the exercise of a home rule unit’s powers, it must provide an express statement to
       that effect. Palm, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 31; Roman, 184 Ill. 2d at 520. The General
       Assembly has codified this principle in section 7 of the Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS
       70/7 (West 2016)) and in enacting section 5 of the Home Rule Note Act (25 ILCS
       75/5 (West 2016)).

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¶ 23       If there is no express limitation or denial of home rule authority, a municipal
       ordinance and a state statute may operate concurrently as provided in article VII,
       section 6(i): “Home rule units may exercise and perform concurrently with the State
       any power or function of a home rule unit to the extent that the General Assembly
       by law does not specifically limit the concurrent exercise or specifically declare the
       State’s exercise to be exclusive.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(i). These
       constitutional provisions reflect an intention to minimize limitations on home rule
       powers, and by constitutional design “courts should step in to compensate for
       legislative inaction or oversight only in the clearest cases of oppression, injustice,
       or interference by local ordinances with vital state policies.” (Emphasis and internal
       quotation marks omitted.) Palm, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 34.

¶ 24                  Vehicle Code’s Impact on the City’s Home Rule Authority

¶ 25      With an understanding of home rule authority and its constitutional
       underpinnings, we now consider plaintiffs’ contention that several Vehicle Code
       provisions collectively preempt the City’s home rule authority to impose the
       penalties at issue here, which they assert are inconsistent with the Vehicle Code.
       The question of preemption is a question of law and requires that we construe the
       Vehicle Code and the ordinance; our review is de novo. International Ass’n of Fire
       Fighters, Local 50 v. City of Peoria, 2022 IL 127040, ¶ 11.

¶ 26       The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect
       to the legislature’s intent, and the best indicator of that intent is the statutory
       language, given its plain and ordinary meaning. O’Connell, 2022 IL 127527, ¶ 21.
       “Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we will enforce it as
       written and will not read into it exceptions, conditions, or limitations that the
       legislature did not express.” Sigcho-Lopez v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 2022
       IL 127253, ¶ 27. Additionally, we must consider the words and phrases in the
       statute in view of other relevant statutory provisions and not in isolation. Id. ¶ 28.

¶ 27      We begin with the statutory provisions of the Vehicle Code central to plaintiffs’
       argument. Section 11-207 of the Code provides, in pertinent part:

          “The provisions of this Chapter shall be applicable and uniform throughout this
          State and in all political subdivisions and municipalities therein, and no local

                                               -7-
          authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance rule or regulation in conflict with
          the provisions of this Chapter unless expressly authorized herein. Local
          authorities may, however, adopt additional traffic regulations which are not in
          conflict with the provisions of this Chapter ***.” 625 ILCS 5/11-207 (West
          2016).

       Thus, the General Assembly has plainly provided for the uniformity of the
       provisions of chapter 11, and local authorities may not adopt an ordinance that
       conflicts with those provisions. See also id. § 11-208.1 (“The provisions of this
       Chapter of this Act *** shall be applicable and uniformly applied and enforced
       throughout this State ***.”).

¶ 28       Further, section 11-208.2 is an express limitation on the power of home rule
       units. Specifically, section 11-208.2 provides that “[t]he provisions of this Chapter
       of this Act limit the authority of home rule units to adopt local police regulations
       inconsistent herewith except pursuant to Sections 11-208, 11-209, 11-1005.1, 11-
       1412.1, and 11-1412.2 of this Chapter of this Act.” Id. § 11-208.2.

¶ 29       Accordingly, although the General Assembly has not entirely preempted the
       field of vehicle regulation, section 11-208.2 limits home rule units’ authority to
       enact ordinances that are not inconsistent with the provisions of chapter 11 and that
       do not upset the uniform enforcement of those provisions. See Roman, 184 Ill. 2d
       at 517-18 (generally recognizing section 11-208.2 as a limitation on home rule
       units).

¶ 30       Prior to 2012, there were no regulations in chapter 11 relating to the
       impoundment of vehicles and none directed at the owners of impounded vehicles.
       Therefore, between 1998 and 2012 there could be no inconsistency or lack of
       uniformity between the impoundment ordinance and chapter 11 of the Vehicle
       Code. See id. at 514-15 (“different [home rule units] which perceive a problem
       differently may adopt different measures to address the problem, provided that the
       legislature has taken no affirmative steps to circumscribe the measures that may be
       taken and that the measures taken are reasonable” (internal quotation marks
       omitted)). We also note that the City’s authority to impose administrative penalties
       was found to be otherwise constitutionally sound. See, e.g., McGrath v. City of
       Kankakee, 2016 IL App (3d) 140523, ¶¶ 18-25 (holding a similar ordinance did not
       violate due process); Sloper v. City of Chicago, Department of Administrative

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       Hearings, 2014 IL App (1st) 140712, ¶¶ 25-28 (holding that the administrative
       penalties under the ordinance related to a particular code violation were not
       constitutionally prohibited as excessive fines).

¶ 31       Plaintiffs maintain that the 2012 amendment to the Vehicle Code in section 11-
       208.7 preempts the City’s imposition of administrative penalties when viewed with
       the limitations on home rule authority in the Code. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that
       section 11-208.7 is inconsistent with the ordinance, because remedial costs are
       inconsistent with punitive penalties, and that nothing in the text authorizes
       penalties. Section 11-208.7(a) provides, in pertinent part, that

          “[a]ny county or municipality may, consistent with this Section, provide by
          ordinance procedures for the release of properly impounded vehicles and for
          the imposition of a reasonable administrative fee related to its administrative
          and processing costs associated with the investigation, arrest, and detention of
          an offender, or the removal, impoundment, storage, and release of the vehicle.
          The administrative fee imposed by the county or municipality may be in
          addition to any fees charged for the towing and storage of an impounded
          vehicle.” 625 ILCS 5/11-208.7(a) (West 2016).

       Further, section 11-208.7(b) limits the fees that may be imposed to certain
       enumerated underlying violations. Id. § 11-208.7(b). Moreover, any such fee “shall
       be in addition to (i) any other penalties that may be assessed by a court of law for
       the underlying violations; and (ii) any towing or storage fees, or both, charged by
       the towing company.” Id. § 11-208.7(c)(2).

¶ 32       Notably, in 2016, the legislature amended section 11-208.7, adding subsection
       (j) directed at home rule units. See Pub. Act 99-848, § 105 (eff. Aug. 19, 2016)
       (adding 625 ILCS 5/11-208.7(j)). That subsection states that the fee limitations
       provided in subsection (b) do not apply to home rule units that tow a vehicle on a
       public way if a circumstance requires the towing or if the vehicle is towed due to a
       violation of a statute or local ordinance and the home rule unit owns and operates a
       towing facility and owns or operates tow trucks. 625 ILCS 5/11-208.7(j) (West
       2016).

¶ 33      The plain language of the statute provides that counties and municipalities
       “may” choose to charge “a reasonable administrative fee” to cover various costs

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       associated with an impoundment. For an ordinance to be consistent with the
       authorization of fees, the fees imposed must be reasonable and must relate to
       specified administrative and processing costs. The question then, is whether the
       statutory authorization to charge a reasonable fee for various costs related to an
       impoundment of a vehicle is inconsistent with the City’s imposition of
       administrative penalties related to the impoundment.

¶ 34       We find that a home rule unit’s imposition of penalties does not interfere with
       and is not inconsistent with the State’s efforts to allow municipalities to recoup the
       remedial costs incurred by an impoundment. Rather, the imposition of a penalty is
       compatible with the authorization of fees in section 11-208.7. A fee is imposed to
       recoup the costs incurred in providing a service, while a fine is intended to be
       punitive or act as a deterrent. People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569, 581-82 (2006); Carter
       v. City of Alton, 2015 IL App (5th) 130544, ¶ 37. There is no express language of
       prohibition or exclusion in the statute stating that only fees may be charged. The
       statute is silent with respect to the imposition of administrative penalties. Moreover,
       nothing in the statute expressly negates the authority to impose administrative
       penalties. The imposition of fines and fees are not mutually repugnant. In other
       words, there is no contradiction in implementing the statute and the ordinance.

¶ 35       Given the plain language of the statute and considering that the powers and
       functions of home rule units are to be construed liberally (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII,
       § 6(m)), we hold that section 11-208.7, when viewed in consideration of the rest of
       chapter 11, does not preclude the City from imposing an administrative penalty. As
       a result, the ordinance is not preempted by the General Assembly’s subsequent
       passage of section 11-208.7.

¶ 36       The cases cited by plaintiffs in support of their argument regarding
       inconsistency and lack of uniformity are distinguishable. For example, in People
       ex rel. Ryan v. Village of Hanover Park, 311 Ill. App. 3d 515, 518-19 (1999),
       various villages had ordinances that “allow[ed] the traffic offender to pay a
       settlement fee in lieu of court adjudication” and “eliminate[d] the possibility of the
       offender receiving a conviction for the offense and having the conviction reported
       to the Secretary of State.” Under the Vehicle Code, a traffic offense is adjudicated
       in circuit court, and if a driver is convicted, the clerk of the court reports the

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       conviction to the Secretary of State, who maintains records of repeat offenders and
       may suspend or revoke their driver’s licenses. Id. at 518.

¶ 37       The appellate court found that the ordinances gave “the offender an opportunity
       to circumvent the potential consequences of committing the offense, namely, a
       chance to avoid an adjudication in the circuit court, a finding of guilty, and a guilty
       finding being reported to the Secretary of State.” Id. at 527. It further found they
       “derail[ed] one of the Secretary of State’s most important duties—monitoring
       traffic offenders through reports of convictions.” Id. By interfering with the
       Secretary of State’s exclusive responsibility to suspend or revoke driving
       privileges, the ordinances “undermine[d] the policies set forth by the
       legislature.” Id. at 528. Therefore, the court concluded that the ordinances were
       unenforceable. Id.

¶ 38       Unlike the village ordinances, the City’s addition of penalties here does not
       circumvent the authorization of fees, create an obstacle to charging fees, or derail
       any state function. If the General Assembly wishes to deny or restrict the City’s
       home rule authority to impose an administrative penalty, it may enact language
       expressly providing for that limitation.

¶ 39                        Whether the Subject Pertains to the City’s
                                  “Government and Affairs”

¶ 40       For the first time in its opening brief in this court, plaintiffs argue that the
       ordinance does not pertain to the City’s local government and affairs as required by
       article VII, section 6(a), of the constitution and, therefore, falls outside the grant of
       home rule authority. The City contends that the issue is forfeited. We agree.

¶ 41       Plaintiffs never asserted this theory in their complaint. The issue raised therein
       was legislative preemption of the City’s home rule authority based on the
       provisions of the Vehicle Code. Allowing a party to change its theory of a case on
       appeal weakens the adversarial process and likely prejudices the opposing party.
       See Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc., 169 Ill. 2d 525, 536 (1996). Furthermore, even
       broadly construed, the issue was never raised in response to the City’s motion to
       dismiss, in the appellate court, or in plaintiffs’ petition for leave to appeal. Thus,
       the trial and appellate courts never had an opportunity to consider and rule upon

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       this question, and the City’s first opportunity to respond to this argument is in its
       response brief in this court.

¶ 42       We have held on numerous occasions that the failure to raise an issue in either
       the trial or appellate court may result in forfeiture. See, e.g., Vine Street Clinic v.
       HealthLink, Inc., 222 Ill. 2d 276, 301 (2006). We have further held that the failure
       to raise an issue in a petition for leave to appeal may also result in forfeiture. See,
       e.g., People v. Fitzpatrick, 2013 IL 113449, ¶ 26. Whether to review a forfeited
       issue under these circumstances is within this court’s discretion. In re Rolandis G.,
       232 Ill. 2d 13, 37 (2008). When an issue is not specifically raised in a party’s
       petition for leave to appeal but it is “ ‘inextricably intertwined’ ” with other matters
       properly before the court, review is appropriate. Id. (quoting Hansen v. Baxter
       Healthcare Corp., 198 Ill. 2d 420, 430 (2002)). If, however, the forfeited issue is
       not inextricably intertwined with the issues properly before the court, the forfeiture
       rule should be given effect. Id.

¶ 43       We do not find the issues articulated to be inextricably intertwined. As we have
       explained, a home rule unit may act concurrently with the State if the subject being
       regulated pertains to its local government and affairs and if the legislature has not
       expressly preempted its home rule authority. Palm, 2013 IL 110505, ¶¶ 29-31.
       Here, plaintiffs’ theory of the case regarding legislative preemption presupposes
       that the subject of the ordinance otherwise pertained to the City’s local government
       and affairs. Thus, rather than being inextricably intertwined, it is merely a separate,
       alternative argument.

¶ 44      Additionally, both in the appellate court and in this court, plaintiffs
       acknowledged that the legislature only began regulating issues related to
       impoundments in 2012. Prior to the enactment of section 11-208.7, the Vehicle
       Code did not prevent home rule units from adopting local impoundment
       regulations, including the City’s impoundment ordinance. Plaintiffs’
       acknowledgement is a tacit agreement that until the enactment of section 11-208.7,
       home rule units had constitutional authority to regulate in this area.

¶ 45       Nevertheless, we have relaxed the forfeiture rules if the issue is one of law, the
       issue is fully briefed and argued by the parties, and the public interest favors
       considering the issue. Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingredients Corp., 203 Ill. 2d 64, 73
       (2002). Even considering the issue, we find plaintiffs’ argument lacks merit. As set

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       forth in Roman, section (6)(d)(2) of article VII of the constitution (Ill. Const. 1970,
       art. VII, § 6(d)(2)) specifically allows home rule units to impose fines and jail
       sentences for nonfelonies. Roman, 184 Ill. 2d at 513-14. Additionally, the City’s
       imposition of a penalty has been recognized as a legitimate deterrence tool related
       to its interest in the safety and welfare of its residents. See Towers v. City of
       Chicago, 173 F.3d 619, 624 (7th Cir. 1999) (the fine serves the “purpose of
       deterring owners from allowing their vehicles to be used for prohibited purposes”).
       In Towers, although not expressly addressing the concurrent exercise of home rule
       authority, the court explained that, by facilitating illegal activity, the plaintiffs had
       contributed, however unwittingly, to the spread of drugs in their community. Id. at
       625. The court found that this was a major concern of a city responsible for the
       safety and health of its people and a particular concern for a city the size of Chicago
       and, thus, the City was on solid ground in creating an additional layer of deterrence
       against this type of prohibited activity. Id.

¶ 46       While the history of the Vehicle Code evinces a statewide role in the regulation
       of vehicles generally, nothing in the Vehicle Code remotely suggests that the
       General Assembly sought to entirely preempt a home rule unit in the field of vehicle
       regulation, much less with respect to the specific problem addressed by the
       ordinance. See, e.g., 625 ILCS 5/11-207 (West 2016) (expressly acknowledging the
       authority of municipalities to adopt additional traffic regulations not in conflict with
       chapter 11). Moreover, comprehensive state regulation cannot be the basis to
       “render an area entirely outside of local control under section 6(a).” Palm, 2013 IL
       110505, ¶ 73 (Thomas, J., specially concurring).

¶ 47       Rather, as here, a statutory provision that partially preempts home rule authority
       presupposes that local governments otherwise have concurrent authority in the area.
       See Illinois Road & Transportation Builders Ass’n v. County of Cook, 2022 IL
       127126, ¶ 48. By enacting section 11-208.2 of the Vehicle Code, the General
       Assembly recognized that home rule units had concurrent authority under section
       6(i) but chose to limit that authority in chapter 11 to those police regulations that
       are not inconsistent with its provisions. If vehicle regulation under chapter 11 did
       not pertain to a home rule unit’s government and affairs, then the limitation in
       section 11-208.2 would be unnecessary. Accordingly, for all these reasons, we find
       that plaintiffs’ new assertion lacks merit.

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¶ 48                                     Double Jeopardy

¶ 49       Lastly, plaintiffs raise the “parameters of double jeopardy” to demonstrate the
       “General Assembly’s intent to proscribe administrative penalties.” The City argues
       this issue has also been forfeited. A violation of the double jeopardy clause was
       never raised in plaintiffs’ complaint. And contrary to plaintiffs’ assertion that the
       double jeopardy claim was raised in their response to the motion to dismiss, the
       record reflects that the issue raised was that the ordinance conflicted with section
       11-208.7. Neither the circuit court nor appellate court considered whether the
       impoundment ordinance violated double jeopardy. We have held that, in a civil
       case, a party’s failure to challenge the constitutionality of a statute in the circuit
       court normally forfeits that challenge on appeal. Forest Preserve District of
       Du Page County v. First National Bank of Franklin Park, 2011 IL 110759, ¶ 27.
       Yet, to the extent the issue is one of law, is fully briefed, and the public interest
       favors considering it, we consider the merits and find the penalty does not violate
       double jeopardy.

¶ 50       The double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution provides that no
       “person [shall] be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
       limb.” U.S. Const., amend. V. “The Clause protects only against the imposition of
       multiple criminal punishments for the same offense [citations] and then only when
       such occurs in successive proceedings [citation].” Hudson v. United States, 522
       U.S. 93, 99 (1997). In determining whether a particular punishment is criminal or
       civil, we look to whether there is an express or implied intent in the legislation to
       establish a civil or criminal penalty. Id. Here, the ordinance by its plain language
       provides for an “administrative penalty,” imposed by an administrative agency. See
       Chicago Municipal Code § 2-14-132 (amended Nov. 16, 2016). An ordinance
       administered by an administrative agency is presumptively civil, as it does not
       provide for the same procedural safeguards that criminal proceedings do. See
       Turner v. Glickman, 207 F.3d 419, 429 (7th Cir. 2000) (statute administered by an
       agency is presumptively civil because agency enforcement mechanisms do not
       contain the same procedural safeguards that criminal proceedings do).

¶ 51       Even if the legislation is intended as a civil penalty, we then consider “whether
       the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect” “as to transfor[m]
       what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.” (Internal

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       quotation marks omitted.) Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99. Plaintiffs must establish the
       “clearest proof” that the penalties are “so punitive in form and effect as to render
       them criminal.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 104. Several factors have
       been considered as “useful guideposts”:

          “(1) [w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint;
          (2) whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment; (3) whether it
          comes into play only on a finding of scienter; (4) whether its operation will
          promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence;
          (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether an
          alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it;
          and (7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose
          assigned.” (Internal quotation marks omitted). Id. at 99-100.

¶ 52       Plaintiffs argue the first five factors present clear proof that the penalties are
       criminal. We disagree. With respect to the first and second factors, the penalties do
       not involve an affirmative disability or restraint as those terms are generally
       understood. The sanction is a monetary penalty, and the penalty imposed is
       “certainly nothing approaching the ‘infamous punishment’ of imprisonment.”
       (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 104. Additionally, monetary penalties
       have not historically been considered as punishment. Id. With respect to the third
       factor, the penalty does not come into play only on a finding of scienter. Rather,
       the penalty imposed does not require the vehicle owner’s knowledge of the
       vehicle’s use in the underlying offense, only that the offense occurred. See Chicago
       Municipal Code § 2-14-132(b)(3)(A) (amended Nov. 16, 2016).

¶ 53       With respect to the fourth factor, while the ordinance indeed aims to deter
       conduct, civil penalties may have some deterrent effect without being rendered
       criminal in nature, and that alone is not sufficient to transform the penalty into a
       criminal sanction. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 105. As to the fifth factor, that some conduct
       triggering the penalties under the City’s ordinance may be criminal in nature is also
       alone insufficient to transform the monetary penalties into criminal penalties. See
       id. Accordingly, plaintiffs have not met the high burden to show by the clearest
       proof that the administrative penalty imposed under the ordinance is so punitive in
       purpose or effect to transform it into a criminal penalty. Consequently, plaintiffs

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       cannot establish that the penalty violates the double jeopardy clause.

¶ 54                                     CONCLUSION

¶ 55       In sum, we hold that the motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint was properly
       granted. The City, as a home rule unit, was not preempted by the Vehicle Code
       from imposing an administrative penalty in its impoundment ordinance; the
       imposition of the penalty is a valid exercise of its home rule authority and does not
       constitute a criminal penalty for purposes of double jeopardy. Accordingly, we
       affirm the judgment of the appellate court, which affirmed the circuit court’s
       dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint.

¶ 56      Affirmed.

¶ 57      JUSTICES CUNNINGHAM, ROCHFORD, and O’BRIEN took no part in the
       consideration or decision of this case.

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