Court Opinion

ID: 9453794
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:24:02.362091+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:48.301987
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Chief Judge
(dissenting):
I agree that there was no error in submitting the premeditated murder count to the jury. However, I believe that the record discloses substantive and procedural defects in the application of Luck v. United States1
2which require a remand for reconsideration.
“The trial court is not required [by D.C.Code § 14-305] to allow impeachment by prior conviction every time a defendant takes the stand in his own defense.” Luck v. United States, supra note 1 at 156, 348 F.2d at 768. There may be cases where it would be of greater importance that the jury hear a defendant’s story than the defendant fore-go ' testifying' because of the fear of prejudice founded upon a prior conviction. Id. Among the factors which were relevant to this determination are the nature of the prior crimes, the length of defendant’s record, his age and background, and, as we stressed in Luck, “the extent to which it is more important to the search for truth * * * for the jury to hear the defendant’s story than to know of a prior conviction.” Id. at 769. Moreover, the prejudice incident to evidence of prior convictions might so out-weigh the usefulness of such evidence on credibility as to require its exclusion.
In the present case there was a 14-month delay between the alleged offense and trial, which the government admits was “unfortunately long.” 2 Some government witnesses could not testify without the use of their earlier statements to refresh their recollection 3 *and the tes*681timony they gave was contradictory.4 In these circumstances the defendant’s story might well have had a significant, if not decisive, impact on the jury.
The majority contends, however, that these circumstances are not relevant because they were not fully brought to the attention of the trial court by defense counsel. I do not think the court itself is without obligation sua sponte to consider the Luck doctrine.5 I agree that the initial responsibility for raising the Luck issue rests with counsel. But here counsel invoked the doctrine and proffered some valid reasons for its application. Clearly in such a case the trial court has an independent responsibility to insure that it is properly applied. In this case the trial .court plainly did not meet its responsibility. Because, as the record demonstrates, the trial court did not understand the Luck doctrine it made no attempt to comply with the procedural requirements for “carefully exploring] ”6 the testimony to be offered by appellant.7
(The jury left the court room at 11:30 a. m.)
(AT THE BENCH)
THE COURT: You have made your opening statement.
MR. IANNI: Yes, your Honor.
Your Honor, at this time I am confronted with a problem on behalf of the defendant Evans. He would like to take the stand in his own behalf but he has a prior criminal record. He feels that it would prejudice him if the criminal record were used to impeach him.
THE COURT: Mr. Caputy.
MR. CAPUTY: Yes.
I heard him talking about the Luck decision I think about the criminal record.
THE COURT: Well, now—
MR. IANNI: I would ask the court to allow him to testify and allow him to testify and prevent the Government from using the record to impeach his testimony.
THE COURT: What is the record ?
MR. IANNI: I believe there are petty larceny and drug — every one are not crimes of violence, however.
As I understand the Luck case.
THE COURT: We got one the other day. We got Robinson—
MR. IANNI: About the disorder-lies, and so on.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. CAPUTY: I am not going into anything like that.
*682THE COURT: You see one came down the other day.
MR. IANNI: I am not familiar with that one, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Off the record. (Further discussion at the bench off the record.)
THE COURT: The Court uñll rule that [the record of convictions] will be introduced. [Emphasis added.]
Defense counsel, however, was not prepared to let the Luck issue rest after such an off the record consideration.
MR. IANNI: Your Honor, please, for the record, let me ask you to consider all of these factors in exercising your discretion.
And he proceeded to make his Luck proffer, broadly raising three points: (1) it was important that the jury hear defendant’s version of the story; (2) there were conflicts in the testimony of the prosecution’s witness; and (3) Evans’ conviction on a narcotics charge did not bear on credibility.
THE COURT: They are not acts of violence.
MR. IANNI: That is one big thing.
Another thing is, of course, the extent to which — the importance, as the Court pointed out, the fifth point, “The extent to which it is important in the search for truth, in a particular case for the jury to hear the defendant’s story.”
Now, the defendant is inclined, not to take the stand if he is going to be confronted with his record. So that the jury would be deprived of his testimony. Now, there is quite a bit even in the Government’s case, there is quite a bit of difference between some of their testimony.
THE COURT: The Court feels that you are then in the wrong forum. You should be before Congress, arguing that question.
Now Congress has set the statute.
MR. IANNI: That is true.
THE COURT: Now, the Court cannot understand that the Court of Appeals sort of indicates that the testimony is introduced for proof of guilt, and the evidence is not introduced as proof of guilt.
It is introduced for the sole purpose of elevating the credibility.
Do you follow me?
MR. IANNI: Yes.
THE COURT: Now, Ross, Hood, the Luck, and now the Pinkney case— do you follow me, sort of indicates that the convictions are introduced for proof of guilt.
Now, they used textbooks on the Pinkney case as I recall, referring to the fact that the research of jurors, that they cannot differentiate between credibility and proof of guilt.
But Congress in its wisdom controls the statute, and Congress has said that the Government may introduce this testimony.
Now, your point is well taken, do you follow me?
The Court has put it on the record. But the Court in its discretion feels that the Government is entitled, because it is not introduced — he does not have to commit an act of violence, does not have to have the same type of events.
It is not introduced for that purpose. In other words, if it were introduced for the purpose of showing he has an assaultive nature, or that he is a thief or anything of that kind, the Court would exclude it as proof of guilt.
But the Court specifically will instruct the jury that they are not to consider this as any proof of guilt in this particular case and they may assume that any conviction, that he has already paid society for that particular conviction.
MR. IANNI: Judge, I feel this way about it, especially the charge of narcotics. I think, with the average jury, this is extremely important, the average juror or average layman which we must assume these jurors are, kind of *683look upon somebody who has either been addicted to narcotics, or who at one time or another has been connected with narcotics is a bad person.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. IANNI: There might be a tendency then, on their part if they learn this, to sit back there and say to themselves, “Well, I do not know whether Evans is telling the truth or not, but he was once connected with narcotics. He has got to be a bad egg and he probably did do that.”
It would prejudice him, I think.
THE COURT: The Court rules that the convictions may be introduced in evidence. You have your position on the record.
These proceedings show that the trial court did not understand (1) that under Luck resort to Congress was unnecessary for the exercise of discretion to exclude prior convictions, .(2) that Luck is primarily concerned with weighing convictions which bear on credibility against their effect on the presentation of defendant’s case if admitted for impeachment purposes, and not particularly with convictions whose admission might suggest “proof of guilt,” and (3) that Luck requires a “considered judgment” 8 by the trial court in response to defense counsel’s argument that it was important for the jury to hear Evans’ story. Furthermore the court did not weigh the effect of credibility arising from appellants conviction for narcotics possession and petty larceny against significant facts which were obvious even without counsel’s guidance — e. g., that (a) defendant was on trial for a capital offense, (b) he was in custody during all of the 14 months before trial, (c) the delay was not fairly attributable to him,9 (d) the government’s principal witnesses needed to refresh their recollection for testifying, (e) the government’s witnesses gave contradictory testimony.
Because the trial court misconceived Luck and did not consider all the relevant factors, it could not properly exercise its discretion. Therefore, I would remand with directions to do so.

. 121 U.S.App.D.C. 151, 348 F.2d 763 (1965). For a recent overview of Luclc and subsequent cases under it, see The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; 1966-67 Term Criminal Law and Procedure, 56 Geo.L.J. 58, 116-129 (1967).

. Brief for Appellee at 21. The Government went on to say that “appellants have shown a delay, perhaps overly low,.t in retrospect, but not of sufficient length to create automatically a denial of the right [to a speedy trial] [emphasis added].” at 22.

. Government witness Hackley, who was with appellants and the deceased [Green] when the alleged acts took place, was unable to recall a conversation she had with appellants a few days after the shooting. Upon refreshing her recollection she said that she saw both men several days later and that “they were debating about who shot * * * Green * * * Maurice [Evans] said J. B. [Pliilson] shot him and J. B. said Maurice shot him.”
Government witness Brown, who was also with appellants and the deceased during this period, was unable to recall (a) who gave the directions that took the group to the scene of the shooting, (b) exactly who said “please don’t kill me” immediately after the shooting, and *681(c) whether she saw Philson just after the shooting. Upon refreshing her recollection she said (a) both “Maurice and J. B. Philson” gave directions, (b) Green said “please don’t kill me,” (c) but even when confronted with her signed statement still was unable to recall whether Philson was at the scene of the shooting after Green yelled out.
Government witness Holloway, who was awakened by a noise and looked out his window to see the acts charged, also needed to refresh his recollection from an earlier statement.

. There are several instances of contradictory testimony in the record. For example, Gloria Brown and Alma Hackley were together in the car at the time of the shooting. Gloria Brown testified that while she heard a noise “like a firecracker” and a voice say “please don’t kill me,” she neither saw nor heard a fight or anything else. She testified that Evans yelled “split” to them and that she and Alma Hackley then left without looking back. Alma Hackley, on the other hand, testified that she saw a fight, saw Green with a gun in his hand, “heard a woman holler from out of a window,” heard a shot and saw Green lying on the ground. She said she saw appellants “going through” the deceased’s pockets, and she claimed that “[she] got out of the car and went over to look at Edward [Green].” Thomas Holloway, who watched the fight, did not say he saw any women.

. See Stevens v. United States, 125 U.S. App.D.C. 239, 370 F.2d 485 (1966) (dissenting opinion).

. Brooke v. United States, 128 U.S.App. D.C. 19, 26, 385 F.2d 279, 286 (1967).

. See Hood v. United States, 125 U.S. App.D.C. 16, 365 F.2d 949, 951 (1966).

. Brooke v. United States, supra note 5, 385 F.2d at 285.

. Of the five continuances granted, only the first, when Evans sought a pretrial mental examination, is directly attributable to Evans. Two other continuances were sought by the District Court’s assignment office. One continuance was at the request of the government and another followed the government’s failure to be ready to proceed on June 22, 1966. Then, instead of carrying the case over for the next day, the court at the request of Evans’ counsel set the trial for July 18.