Court Opinion

ID: 9533581
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:32:48.798853+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:05.686404
License: Public Domain

*653Dissenting Opinion
DeBruler, J.
The accomplice of appellant, Charlotte Hendricks, testified at his trial under direct questioning by the prosecuting lawyer that “I had been made no promises whatsoever.” In the post-conviction proceeding below appellant presented the testimony of Charlotte Hendricks, Detective Robert Overby and Deputy Prosecutor Knight, all of which is in accord in establishing the fact that Charlotte Hendricks was first contacted by Overby in Roseville, Michigan, and that she was there told that she was suspected of being involved in the homicide allegedly committed by appellant and that she would be given “consideration” if she cooperated in the case against appellant. Specifically in this regard Detective Overby stated under oath:
Q. “On or about that initial contact with her did you tell her or advise her that her cooperation on her part there would be consideration given by you as a member of the Evansville Department that you represented and the Prosecutor, that you would assist her and help her in any way you could ?”
A. “That I could.”
Q. “Did you not tell her that you would help her for her cooperation?”
A. “Yes, Sir.”
The detective stated further that he believed that she then cooperated because she held the belief, induced by his statements, that she would benefit thereby in the prosecution against her.
She then cooperated with the police in accordance with the agreement up to a point prior to trial when according to the testimony of the prosecutor, he gained knowledge of the offer of consideration made to her by Overby and in response called her in and “instructed her that there were no promises, no rewards, no deals, no agreements, absolutely nothing.”
The uncontradicted evidence before the post-conviction judge leads to only one conclusion and that is that the prose*654cution kept highly significant information, namely, that Hendricks had been offered consideration for her cooperation in the case against appellant and that upon that offer she did cooperate for a time, and that thereafter the prosecutor can-celled the agreement. There was further testimony by Hendricks that her testimony in the trial of appellant was exaggerated and there was further testimony by the prosecuting attorney that if appellant’s trial had taken place without Hendricks’ testimony, or if Hendricks’ testimony had not been believed by the jury, the prosecution would have had only a slim chance to succeed in getting a conviction. The credibility of Hendricks was thus a vital issue in appellant’s trial and the prior understanding or agreement was relevant to that issue. Under these circumstances the prosecutor was under a constitutional duty to disclose this information to the appellant and the jury and his failure to do so denied appellant’s right to a fair trial. United States v. Agurs, (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392; Giglio v. United States, (1972) 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104; Newman v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 569, 334 N.E.2d 684.
Prentice, J., concurs.
Note. — Reported at 372 N.E.2d 739.