Court Opinion

ID: 9965286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-02 00:00:49.332303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:51.029286
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-60089       Document: 81-1       Page: 1   Date Filed: 05/01/2024

        United States Court of Appeals
             for the Fifth Circuit                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                     Fifth Circuit
                             ____________                          FILED
                                                                May 1, 2024
                              No. 23-60089
                                                              Lyle W. Cayce
                             ____________
                                                                   Clerk

Sonia Guadalupe Loredo Rangel;
Luisa Fernanda Lopez Loredo; Mary Jose Lopez Loredo,

                                                                    Petitioners,

                                   versus

Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,

                                                                   Respondent.
               ______________________________

                   Petition for Review of an Order of
                   the Board of Immigration Appeals
                      Agency Nos. A202 132 712,
                      A202 132 713, A202 132 714
               ______________________________

Before Higginbotham, Smith, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
Jerry E. Smith, Circuit Judge:
       Sonia Rangel and her two minor children, Luisa and Mary Loredo
(collectively “petitioners”), petition for review of an order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying their application for asylum relief,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). Finding no error, we deny the petition for review.

                                     I.
       Petitioners are citizens of Mexico who illegally entered the United
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                                     No. 23-60089

States without valid documentation.1 Nonetheless, petitioners—submitting
applications for (1) asylum relief, (2) withholding of removal, and (3) CAT
relief—contend they should be protected from removal. Their applications
rest on the theory that the Mexican Navy will persecute and torture them to
dissuade Rangel from further pursuing her “ongoing campaign to hold the
Mexican military responsible for the disappearance of her son.”
       In October 2015, petitioners appeared with counsel before an immi-
gration judge (“I.J.”) for a hearing on the merits of their applications. In
support of those applications, petitioners testified before the I.J., submitted
numerous letters and declarations, and proffered expert testimony on Mexi-
can legal culture.
       After considering petitioners’ evidence, the I.J. determined that they
had not met their burden to receive relief. Specifically, the I.J. determined
that petitioners had failed to establish that they suffered past persecution or
that they held a well-founded fear of future persecution. The I.J. also deter-
mined that petitioners were not eligible for CAT relief because they failed to
satisfy their burden of establishing the requisite likelihood of future torture.
Accordingly, the I.J. denied the applications for relief. Petitioners appealed
to the BIA, which affirmed.

                                          II.
       “We review the BIA’s factual findings under the substantial evidence
standard and its legal conclusions de novo. Where the I.J.’s decision impacted
the BIA—as is the case here—we consider the I.J.’s decision to the extent it
influenced the BIA.” Mejia-Alvarenga v. Garland, 95 F.4th 319, 323 (5th Cir.

       _____________________
       1
          In January 2015, petitioners appeared before an immigration judge and conceded
the Department of Homeland Security’s charges of inadmissibility. That proceeding is not
part of this appeal.

                                           2
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2024) (cleaned up). The BIA’s determination may not be disturbed unless
the evidence “compels” a contrary conclusion. Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d
295, 306 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see
also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

                                               III.
        “To qualify for asylum, an applicant must show [s]he is a refugee by
proving [s]he suffered past persecution or has a well-founded fear of future
persecution.” Dayo v. Holder, 687 F.3d 653, 657 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)).

A.      Past Persecution
        1. Legal Standard
        “Past persecution entails harm inflicted on the alien on account of a
statutorily enumerated ground by the government or forces that a govern-
ment is unable or unwilling to control.” Tesfamichael v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d
109, 113 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)).
        Rangel complains that the I.J. applied the wrong legal standard in
determining whether she had established past persecution.2 She asserts that
the I.J. erred by subjecting her claim “to a more demanding standard . . . [of]
proving ‘extreme treatment’” because the I.J. found that “neither Rangel
nor her daughters suffered physical harm.”
        Rangel is mistaken. Extreme treatment is not a more demanding
standard—it is the standard for establishing past persecution for purposes of
demonstrating asylum eligibility.3 Persecution always requires an “extreme”
        _____________________
        2
         Luisa and Mary are derivative beneficiaries of Rangel’s application for asylum.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A).
        3
            See Majd v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 590, 595 (5th Cir. 2006); see also id. (observing that

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level of conduct—no matter if the alleged mistreatment is physical or not.
Qorane v. Barr, 919 F.3d 904, 909–10 (5th Cir. 2019).4 The standard does not
change when it comes to establishing persecution without a showing of physi-
cal harm. Thus, the I.J. applied the correct legal standard.

        2. Evidence
        Rangel claims that the record evidence compels a finding of past per-
secution. She relies on two incidents: First, when the Mexican Navy
“searched, ransacked, and robbed” her then-vacant home. Second, when
the Navy drove by her house to look for her and her daughters later that day.
        Citing Tamara-Gomez v. Gonzalez, 447 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2006),
Rangel claims those two incidents amount to non-physical persecution. In
Tamara-Gomez, we held that threats of violence against an alien and his
family—coupled with evidence of violent threats’ being carried out against
other similarly-situated aliens—compelled a finding of past persecution. Id.
at 348–49. Rangel claims the harm she suffered is analogous to that in
Tamara-Gomez because (1) the incidents deprived her of her belongings and
home, see id., and (2) she perceived the ransacking as a “imminent and
menacing threat” intended to dissuade her from campaigning against the
Navy, see infra note 7.
        The government counters with three contentions: (1) As to the inci-
dents themselves, they were not sufficiently severe to meet the “extreme
conduct” threshold for past persecution. Then, as to the alleged threat flow-
        _____________________
persecution “does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust,
or even unlawful or unconstitutional” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Indeed, even “brutal physical attacks” might not establish persecution. Gjetani v. Barr,
968 F.3d 393, 398 (5th Cir. 2020).
        4
        See Argueta-Hernandez v. Garland, 87 F.4th 698, 707 (5th Cir. 2023) (providing a
non-exhaustive list of non-physical harms that may rise to the level of past persecution).

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ing from the ransacking, (2) the evidence fails to establish sufficiently that the
incident was intended as a threat against Rangel and her daughters, and
(3) even if it was, it did not rise to the level of persecution, for it was “non-
specific” and “lacked immediacy.” Munoz-Granados v. Barr, 958 F.3d 402,
407 (5th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up).
        We do not minimize the harms that Rangel has asserted. Nonetheless,
there remains substantial evidence supporting the BIA’s conclusion that her
alleged harms do not amount to past persecution.
        First, the record evidence does not compel the conclusion that the
ransacking was sufficiently severe to rise to the level of persecution.
        Aliens can establish past persecution through non-physical harms. See
Argueta-Hernandez, 87 F.4th at 707. Indeed, mistreatment can take “other
forms—such as the deliberate imposition of severe economic disadvantage
or the deprivation of liberty, food, housing, employment, or other essentials
of life.” Id. (quoting Abdel-Masieh v. INS, 73 F.3d 579, 583 (5th Cir. 1996))
(cleaned up).
        That said, the alleged mistreatment—irrespective of form—must still
be sufficiently severe to constitute “extreme conduct.” See supra part
III.A.1. The myriad ways harm may arise does not affect the requisite
showing of severity for a finding of past persecution. Merely alleging a harm
such as the deprivation of housing does not automatically constitute persecu-
tion. Rather, it remains the alien’s burden to show that the economic
deprivation was extreme—i.e., “so severe that [it] constitute[s] a threat to life
or freedom.”5

        _____________________
        5
          Argueta-Hernandez, 87 F.4th at 707 (quoting Morales v. Sessions, 860 F.3d 812,
816 (5th Cir. 2017)); see also supra part III.A.1.

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          Rangel alleges that the first incident—that is, the ransacking—
damaged her home and her personal effects. As to the scope and extent of
the damage, she relies on the observations of her neighbor, who told her that
her television, speakers, other “things that belonged to her, and practically
everything” had been taken. Also relayed was that the door to her house had
been left open.
          True, society would likely regard the conduct alleged in the first inci-
dent as “unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.”                         Majd,
446 F.3d at 595 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). And, given
Rangel’s positive credibility determination, we have no reason to doubt the
sincerity of her account. But persecution requires more. Id. We “have con-
demned all manner of egregious and even violent behavior while concluding
they do not amount to persecution.” Gjetani, 968 F.3d at 398 (collecting
cases).
          Even taken at face value, the damage Rangel describes does not
compel a finding of persecution. Indeed, our sister circuits have so held when
faced with ransackings of similar—or even greater—severity.6 Take, for
          _____________________
          6
           See Munoz-Granados, 958 F.3d at 405, 407 (affirming BIA determination where
persecutors destroyed alien’s father’s merchandise and had threatened to kill alien in the
past); see also, e.g., Evelyne v. Keisler, No. 06-2314, 2007 WL 2914538, at *3 (1st Cir. Oct. 5,
2007) (per curiam) (unpublished) (noting that “the ransacking and defacing of [the alien’s]
house was not serious enough to rise above unpleasantness, harassment, or basic suffering”
(cleaned up)); Zho v. Gonzales, 156 F. App’x 354, 355 (2d Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (con-
cluding ransacking of mother’s home “would not amount to persecution”); Maraziegos-
Morales v. Garland, Nos. 20-3777/4171, 2021 WL 3140322, at *1–3 (6th Cir. July 26, 2021)
(unpublished) (holding alien was not persecuted where she alleged, inter alia, that perse-
cutors ransacked her church); Escobar-Chavez v. I.N.S., No. 95-70076, 91 F.3d 151 (9th Cir.
1996) (table) (unpublished) (noting alien was not persecuted even though “his home was
ransacked”); Villavicencio-Castillo v. I.N.S., No. 94-70708, 97 F.3d 1463 (9th Cir. 1996)
(table) (unpublished) (explaining that the “alleged conduct does not satisfy the standard
for a showing of persecution” where “police ransacked [the alien’s] parents’ home and
asked where she was”).

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example, Liu v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 307 (7th Cir. 2004), which dealt with an
alien who alleged, inter alia, that the police “searched and ransacked” the
apartment in which she and her family lived. Id. at 310. According to her,
the police expressly stated that they ransacked the apartment as “a lesson”
for “affiliati[ng] with Falun Gong.” Id. On review, the Liu court affirmed
the BIA’s determination that the alien had not suffered persecution. Id.
at 314. The Seventh Circuit so concluded after noting that the ransacking
“was a singular event and [that] it [wa]s unclear if the officials caused any
serious, permanent damage to her home,” thereby making the incident
“more akin to abusive or harassing treatment than persecution.” Id. at 313.
       We do the same. Like the alien in Liu, Rangel only alleges that her
home was ransacked once. Id. Thus, the ransacking does not “ha[ve] the
quality of a sustained, systematic effort to target an individual on the basis of
a protected ground.” Gjetani, 968 F.3d at 397 (citation omitted). Further-
more, Rangel has not shown that the ransacking caused serious or permanent
damage to her home. Instead, she only alleges that the front door to her house
was left open as a result of the incident. So, as was the case in Liu, the BIA
could have found that the ransacking was more akin to “abusive or harassing
treatment” than extreme conduct. 380 F.3d at 313.
       Consequently, the BIA did not err in concluding that the ransacking
was not sufficiently extreme to constitute persecution.
       Second, the evidence does not compel a finding that the incidents
created a threat that was so imminent and so menacing as to amount to
persecution. Threats may constitute past persecution if they have imposed
sufficiently extreme harms on the alien.7 Not so for those that are “exagger-
       _____________________
       7
         See, e.g., Tamara-Gomez, 447 F.3d at 346 (incurring harm in the form of
“mov[ing] his family to another house,” “remov[ing] his sons from school,” and

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                                       No. 23-60089

ated, non-specific, or lacking in immediacy.” Qorane, 919 F.3d at 910
(cleaned up).
        Rangel perceives the incidents as creating a threat to “the life and
freedom of [her] and her daughters.” The BIA disagreed and concluded that
she “[did] not present[] evidence that th[e] threat was sufficiently menacing
or imminent to rise to the level of persecution.” That conclusion is not error.
        The BIA permissibly determined that the threat was not sufficiently
menacing or imminent. In the four months leading up to the ransacking,
Rangel had publicly spoken out against the Navy on numerous occasions—
appearing on news media and meeting with various Mexican and U.S.
officials—without suffering any physical harm. Indeed, the Navy never
directly threatened her or her daughters during that period.                        Absent
“evidence of regular and methodological targeting,” the BIA was allowed to
find that the threat did not amount to persecution.8
        Pushing back, Rangel contends that Tamara-Gomez compels a finding
of past persecution. Not so. In Tamara-Gomez, FARC terrorists expressly
threatened retaliation against an alien who accompanied the police on a mis-

        _____________________
“sen[ding] his wife and children to Miami.”); Alvarado-Molina v. I.N.S., 33 F. App’x 703
(5th Cir. Feb. 25, 2002) (per curiam) (table) (unpublished) (holding threats “d[id] not rise
to the level of past persecution” where the alien “failed to show that the threats were of
such a menacing and immediate nature that they caused actual significant harm” (emphasis
added)).
        8
          Gjetani, 968 F.3d 398–99; see also id. (concluding that three death threats “did
not necessarily reflect the kind of pattern of sustained pursuit that persecution requires”);
Qorane, 919 F.3d at 910 (holding a death threat did not amount to past persecution because
the alien “had no further conflicts” with his persecutor “after the incident” in which the
threat was issued); Guillen Cedio v. Garland, No. 20-60013, 2021 WL 6119989, at *4 (5th
Cir. Dec. 27, 2021) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“[W]here the death threats reflect
sporadic incidents, rather than methodical targeting, we have declined to overturn the
BIA’s decision even if those threats were paired with physical attacks.”).

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                                  No. 23-60089

sion to recover the bodies of slain officers. 447 F.3d at 345, 348. Shortly after
that, the alien and his family received countless threatening calls from the
terrorists “specifically mentioning the . . . mission.” Id. at 346. The alien’s
wife also “received demands for money, death threats to her husband, and
threats to kidnap her two sons and train them to fight for FARC.” Id.
Further, when the family relocated, the terrorists followed—spray-painting
their new home with the group’s distinctive symbols and language.9 Id.
at 348. And to top it all off, FARC “tracked down and murdered” other
members of the recovery mission and their family members. Id. at 346.
       Though we are sympathetic to Rangel’s fears, the threat she alleges
nonetheless falls far short of the “organized, relentless campaign of intimi-
dation, extortion, and murder” exemplified by the threats in Tamara-Gomez.
Gjetani, 968 F.3d at 398. As already explained, there is no evidence —either
before or after the incidents—suggesting that the Mexican Navy expressly
threatened Rangel or her daughters. Tamara-Gomez is inapposite.
       Therefore the BIA did not err in concluding that Rangel failed to
establish past persecution.

B.     Well-Founded Fear of Future Persecution
       1. Legal Standard
       An alien shows a well-founded fear of future persecution by estab-
lishing that “a reasonable person in her circumstances would fear persecu-
tion if she were to be returned to her native country.” Guevara Flores v. INS,
786 F.2d 1242, 1249 (5th Cir. 1986). To establish a well-founded fear of per-
secution, “an alien must have a subjective fear of persecution, and that fear
must be objectively reasonable.” Eduard v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 182, 189 (5th
       _____________________
       9
          Specifically, “the words ‘Sapa Regaldo’ (which translated means ‘Two-Bit
Snitch’) and the letters ‘FARC.’” Tamara-Gomez, 447 F.3d at 346.

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Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
       An alien can establish a subjective fear of future persecution “in two
ways—by showing others would target her for persecution or by showing a
pattern or practice of targeting people like her.” Qorane, 919 F.3d at 910
(cleaned up).
       Then, to prove that a subjective fear is objectively reasonable, an alien
must show that
       (1) she possesses a belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks to
       overcome by means of punishment of some sort; (2) the per-
       secutor is already aware, or could become aware, that the alien
       possesses that belief or characteristic; (3) the persecutor has
       the capability of punishing the alien; and (4) the persecutor has
       the inclination to punish the alien.
Cabrera v. Sessions, 890 F.3d 153, 160 (5th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up) (quoting
Eduard, 379 F.3d at 191).
       Rangel contends the BIA’s determination is legal error in two ways:
       First, she claims that the BIA should not have “considered the ab-
sence of past persecution as evidence that [she] did not have an objectively
reasonable fear of future persecution.” In support of that claim, Rangel cites
Cabrera, where, inter alia, we quoted Zhao for the proposition that it was not
necessary “to prove that [an alien] had been personally targeted, because
such an interpretation would render the future persecution inquiry redun-
dant of the past persecution analysis.” Cabrera, 890 F.3d at 159 (quoting
Zhao, 404 F.3d at 308).
       True, Rangel is not required to show past persecution in order to
establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. See Zhao, 404 F.3d
at 308). But Zhao’s legal principle is inapposite, for the BIA did not treat past
persecution as a prerequisite to finding a well-founded fear of future perse-

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                                      No. 23-60089

cution. Instead, Rangel chose to support her claim of future persecution on
the same basis as her past persecution claim. In other words, both of her
claims rely on the same allegations and the same evidence—namely, her belief
that the Mexican Navy ransacked her home to dissuade her from campaign-
ing against them. Accordingly, the I.J.’s and BIA’s assessments of the allega-
tions and evidence underlying Rangel’s past persecution claim necessarily
bear on her future persecution claim.
        Second, Rangel claims the BIA legally erred by requiring them to show
that they would be killed upon returning to Mexico. She points to the I.J.’s
opinion, which stated that it was “implausible that the Mexican [N]avy
would target [petitioners] and kill them if they returned to Mexico”
(emphasis added).
        Wrong. Neither the I.J. nor BIA imposed such a requirement. The
I.J. was merely responding to the possible future harms that petitioners had
asserted. Indeed, it was petitioners who said that “the Mexican [N]avy would
likely seek to disappear or kill Rangel, her husband, and her daughters.”
Reviewing the record in full shows that the I.J. and BIA considered this along
with other kinds of harms when assessing Rangel’s fear of future persecution.

        2. Evidence
        Rangel contends that she has satisfied her burden10 of establishing a
well-founded fear of future persecution. Specifically, she claims that the rec-
ord compels the conclusion that the Navy has the inclination to punish peti-
tioners when they return to Mexico.
        Again, Rangel’s contention is meritless. Ample evidence supports the

        _____________________
        10
         Rangel did not establish past persecution, so she was not entitled to a rebuttable
presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1).

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I.J.’s and BIA’s determination.
       The record shows that Rangel had publicly spoken out against the
Mexican Navy—appearing on news media and meeting with various
officials—“consistently and repeatedly over a period of four months without
suffering any physical harm.” Neither Rangel nor her daughters suffered any
“harm, threats, or reprisals whatsoever” until their home was ransacked.
And, even if the Navy was so inclined, there is no indication that it remains
interested in, or is still actively searching for, petitioners. Indeed, the fact
that “no further threats . . . took place” after the ransacking cuts against the
objective reasonableness of Rangel’s fear. Gjetani, 968 F.3d at 399; see also
supra part III.A.2. Thus, the record does not compel us to reverse the I.J.’s
and BIA’s conclusions that the Navy is not inclined to punish Rangel or her
daughters upon their return to Mexico.
       In reply, Rangel alludes to the 2015 disappearance of her other son,
Jonathan, who chose not to flee to the United States. But Jonathan’s dis-
appearance is irrelevant to Rangel’s asylum claim. No evidence suggests that
the two disappearances are connected. Further, in her testimony before the
I.J., Rangel admitted that Jonathan’s disappearance “was likely unrelated to
[her other son’s] disappearance.” Thus, Rangel failed to link her campaign-
ing against the Navy with Jonathan’s disappearance. Accordingly, the record
allowed the I.J. and BIA to conclude that the Navy was not currently inter-
ested, or actively searching for, petitioners.
       Consequently, the record not does not compel our concluding that
Rangel and her daughters have a well-founded fear of future persecution.
Rangel fails to show that the evidence compels a finding of past persecution
or a well-founded fear of future persecution. So, the I.J. and BIA did not err
in rejecting her asylum claim.

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                                            IV.
        The BIA denied petitioners’ separate applications for withholding of
removal after it determined that they were not eligible for asylum.11 Peti-
tioners baldly assert that the BIA’s denial “was erroneous and should be
remanded.”
        Erroneous it is not. Withholding of removal is a higher standard than
asylum. Where an alien “does not meet the bar for asylum, she also does not
meet the standard for withholding of deportation.”12 As explained earlier,
petitioners have failed to demonstrate they suffered past persecution or have
a well-founded fear of future persecution. See supra part III.
        Since persecution is an essential element of a successful application
for withholding of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)–(2), the BIA did not
err in denying petitioners’ applications.

                                             V.
        An alien demonstrates eligibility for CAT relief by showing that (1) it
is “more likely than not that the alien will be tortured upon return to her
homeland,” and (2) “there is sufficient state action involved in that tor-
ture.”13 “To meet th[at] burden, the alien may produce evidence of past tor-
ture, an inability to relocate to a safer part of the country, human rights abuses
        _____________________
        11
           “[W]ithholding of removal does not provide relief to the spouse or minor
children of an alien.” Arif v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 677, 681 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). That
means we must evaluate each petitioner’s application separately. But petitioners’ appli-
cations are materially identical. So, as a practical matter, petitioners win or lose as one.
        12
          Efe v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 899, 906 (5th Cir. 2002) (cleaned up); see also Ghotra v.
Whitaker, 912 F.3d 284, 288 (5th Cir. 2019) (describing the “more likely than not” stan-
dard for withholding of removal as “a higher bar than the ‘well-founded fear’ standard for
asylum” (cleaned up)).
        13
          Tamara-Gomez, 447 F.3d at 350 (cleaned up); see 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1) (defin-
ing torture).

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                                           No. 23-60089

committed within the country, and any other relevant information.” Majd,
446 F.3d at 595–96 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3)).
        Petitioners claim they are entitled to CAT relief because they believe
that the Mexican Navy would torture them upon their return to Mexico. 14
But torture is a higher bar than is persecution. Qorane, 919 F.3d at 911 (quot-
ing Efe, 293 F.3d at 907). That is fatal to petitioners’ CAT claims.15
        Since the basis for relief advanced by petitioners “did not even rise to
the level of persecution, it follows a fortiori that it does not constitute tor-
ture.” Id. (cleaned up). The BIA did not err in denying their applications for
CAT relief.
                              *        *        *         *     *
        Petitioners seek review of the BIA’s order denying their applications
for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. The BIA did not err in
denying their applications.
        The petition for review is DENIED.

        _____________________
        14
             CAT does not provide for derivative beneficiaries. See Arif, 509 F.3d at 682.
        15
           Additionally, Louisa’s and Mary’s claims are based entirely on Rangel’s experi-
ences. So, Louisa’s and Mary’s claims independently fail because neither “would be
personally at risk” of torture. Cf. Qorane, 919 F.3d at 911 (analyzing incidents “specific
to” the alien).

                                                14