Court Opinion

ID: 9844773
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:08:44.468064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:42.670541
License: Public Domain

Pannell, Judge,
dissenting. I concur in Division 6 of the ■opinion, but dissent from the remainder of the majority opinion and the judgment rendered therein.
Plaintiff paid a monthly rate for the privilege of parking in a multi-level parking garage operated by the defendant. He parked his automobile where he pleased and was not relegated to a particular spot and no attendant ever handled or took possession of the automobile for the purpose of parking it or delivering it to the plaintiff who had the privilege of removing the automobile and bringing it back at his convenience. When the plaintiff brought the automobile into the parking lot he was given a ticket on the face of which appeared the following: “Five Points Parking Company. Give ticket to attendant at ■exit when car is removed. This is a license, no bailment created. Holder may park one automobile in this area at his own risk of any fire, theft or damage to auto or contents of same.” 'There was no evidence whatsoever that plaintiff had ever read ■what was on the' face of the ticket nor was there any evidence that its provisions had ever been called to his attention. Each time plaintiff removed the automobile from the parking garage, Tie would surrender the ticket after signing it on the back. At -one of the entrances to the parking, gar age was a large sign with the following words thereon: “Park 30‡ % hour. Clean—dry—• protected—insured garage. Elevators to Peachtree St., Decatur St.” This sign had been there for several years and was placed there for the purpose of attracting customers. The plaintiff relied upon this sign and changed his place for parking his automobile from another nearby lot to this lot in reliance upon this sign and that his auto would be protected and insured against damage by others and fire and theft. While it was in the parking garage, a battery was stolen from the plaintiff’s automobile. He brought an action seeking recovery for the value of the battery plus the value of time spent by him in buying and replacing the battery. Upon the trial, the trial judge excluded testimony as to the time and the value thereof spent by plaintiff in *828securing the new battery and installing the same and directed a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed.
The following contain my views in reply to Divisions 1, 2, 3 and 7.
Do the facts (in the absence of ,a special contract) show a bailment here?
“A bailment is a delivery of goods or property for the execution of a special object, beneficial either to the bailor or bailee, or both; and upon a contract, express or implied, to carry out this object and dispose of the property in conformity with the purpose of the trust.” Code § 12-101. “In all cases the bailee, during the bailment, has a right to the possession of the property, and in most cases a special right of property in the thing bailed. For a violation of these rights by anyone he is entitled to his action.” Code § 12-102. “All bailees are required to exercise care and diligence in protecting and keeping safely the thing bailed. Different degrees of diligence are required, according to the nature of the bailments.” Code § 12-103. (Emphasis supplied.) The evidence in the present case showing the facts as stated above, were sufficient to authorize, if not demand, a finding that possession and control of the automobile was surrendered to the defendant and a bailment was created because the plaintiff received a ticket when he parked his car and surrendered this ticket and signed his name thereon when he removed his car from the parking garage. Keene v. Lumbermen’s Mut. Ins. Co., 60 Ga. App. 864 (5 SE2d 379). This feature distinguishes the present case from Hartley v. Robinson, 78 Ga. App. 594 (51 SE2d 617). Nothing to the contrary was ruled in Southeastern Fair Assn. v. Ford, 64 Ga. App. 871, 880 (14 SE2d 139), rendered by a three-judge division of this court with one concurring and one dissenting. That case involved no ticket surrender and bears within its own writing the distinction between that case and the present case, when it distinguished, on motion for rehearing, certain cases referred to therein, in the following language: “In each of them the parking lot in question-was a regular parking station, operated daily the year round, for profit, while in this case there was a clear inference from the evidence that the parking lot was used only for a week or two *829each year, while the fair was in operation, and for the convenience of the patrons of the fair.” See also in this connection White v. American Ins. Co., 53 Ga. App. 320 (185 SE 605); Nelliger v. Atlanta Baggage &c. Co., 109 Ga. App. 863 (137 SE2d 566).
The jury was authorized to find that it was necessary for the plaintiff to surrender the ticket in order to regain possession of his automobile. If this be true, a bailment was by necessity created as the defendant had the exclusive possession of the automobile until the ticket was surrendered. Mere possession of the key by the alleged bailor is not determinative of the question; in other words, it is not the possession of the key that solves the problem in this case. If possession is otherwise exclusively held by the alleged bailee to the extent that it cannot be regained by the alleged bailor without consent of the alleged bailee, a bailment is created even though the key may be retained by the alleged bailor. See in this connection Buena Vista Savings & Loan Assn. v. Bickerstaff, 121 Ga. App. 470 (174 SE2d 219). That the bailee could not operate the automobile because the bailor had the key does not prevent the bailee for storage from being in the exclusive possession of the automobile, where, as here, it was necessary to secure the permission of the bailee, by surrendering and signing the ticket, in order for the bailor to regain possession of the item bailed. If one should leave a box with another for safe keeping which is locked and retains the key, the retention of the key has nothing whatsoever to do with the determination of whether the contract is one of bailment or not, if in order to secure possession of the bailed item, it is necessary for the bailor to secure the permission of the bailee by surrender of an identifying ticket. An automobile is no different in this respect. There was a bailment here unless the signing on the back of the parking ticket constitutes a contract.
Was there any special contract between the parties eliminating the apparent contract of bailment?
Where the bailee in the present case issued a ticket upon receipt of the automobile reciting that the contract was one of license rather than bailment and that there was no liability for *830damages or fire or theft, there arises no contract releasing the bailee from liability or changing the contract from one of bailment to one of license.
As was ruled in American Laundry v. Hall, 27 Ga. App. 717 (1) (109 SE 676): “Where a bailee, such as a laundry company, in accepting articles of wearing apparel from a customer, leaves with the customer a paper containing a memorandum. of the articles bailed, with a printed notice thereon to the effect that in the event of loss or damage to the articles the bailee’s liability therefor shall not exceed a certain sum, to be determined by its proportion to the amount charged for the laundering of the articles, the mere receipt by the customer of the memorandum containing such printed notice does not amount to an agreement and assent to the terms of the notice, and therefore there arises no special contract whereby the customer consents to any limitation of liability of the bailee on account of the latter’s negligence.” To the same effect, see Red Cross Laundry v. Tuten, 31 Ga. App. 898 (1) (121 SE 865).
There was no showing in the present case that the plaintiff read the language on the ticket and, after reading the same, agreed thereto or that it was ever, in fact, called to his attention. Whether, even under these circumstances, the language was sufficient to change a contract of bailment to one of license and release the defendant from the obligation of a bailee to exercise ordinary care, it is not necessary to decide except under the majority view. See in this connection Anno. 175 ALR 8, § 55 et seq.
The majority assume the plaintiff was informed of the language on the front of the ticket and assume that when the plaintiff signed on the back of the parking ticket each time he took his automobile from the parking garage that a contract was entered into by reason of such signing. While the evidence might authorize such conclusion, it does not demand it and in order for the majority opinion here to be correct, the evidence must demand such a conclusion. The evidence in this area discloses only that the plaintiff surrendered the ticket as required and signed it on the back each time he removed the automobile. This and nothing more. The so-called contract was on the front. This evidence more readily authorizes a finding that the *831signing on the back of the ticket, which was surrendered when the automobile was removed from the parking garage, was merely a return receipt for the automobile or an identification of the person who removed the automobile.
What this evidence means is for a jury of twelve men, and a jury only, and the conclusions to be drawn from such evidence are not matters for assumption by the nine judges of this court. If there be a jury question as to this matter then the trial court was in error in directing a verdict.
To further show the error of the majority assumption that the signing of the ticket amounted to a contract as to what appeared on the face of the ticket, we have only to call attention to the fact that on the occasion in question when the plaintiff discovered his battery was stolen, the evidence does not show he had signed the ticket given to him for that day’s parking, and therefore the signing of the ticket would not be controlling here. In other words, under the majority ruling the terms of the contract cannot be determined until the contract is at an end, that is, when the plaintiff retrieves his automobile from the parking garage.
While the majority admit that in the absence of a special contract a bailment was created here, they blandly distinguish this case from American Laundry v. Hall, 27 Ga. App. 717, supra, and Red Cross Laundry v. Tuten, 31 Ga. App. 898, supra, on the ground that in these two cases a bailment existed. May I ask them, where is the distinction?
While the majority hold that Code § 12-403 would not, as a matter of public policy, prevent a special contract of the parties to the contrary, this holding was not necessary to a decision of this case, and for that reason I dissent therefrom.
The following contains my views in reference to Divisions 4 and 5 of the majority opinion.
I dissent from these rulings primarily on the basis that it is not necessary to reach these questions if the case be properly decided, but even if they were properly reached, I could not agree with the reasons given for the conclusions reached by the majority. If, as the majority say, the complaint be sufficient to raise the question of fraud and deceit by reason of the advertising at the parking garage, it is no answer to this claim that *832the language of the sign is too vague and uncertain to form the basis for any enforceable contract and that a contract of insurance must be in writing.
The judgment should be reversed.
I am authorized to state that Judge Evans concurs in this dissent.