Court Opinion

ID: 9586822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:15:33.472079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:53.187993
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I agree with that aspect of the court’s opinion which affirms the judgment in favor of International Fabricators, Inc. I disagree with that portion of the majority opinion which denies the award of attorney fees. In my judgment, the trial court should be affirmed in all respects.
I am disposed to read differently from the majority the provisions of Okla.Stat. Ann.Tit. 12, § 936 (West 1988). While that section may be included within that part of the statutes relating to procedure in Oklahoma, the language providing that “[i]n any civil action to recover on * * * [a] contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, or merchandise * * * unless otherwise provided by law or the contract which is the subject of the action, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney fee to be set by the court, * 4 * ” articulates a substantive right. That conclusion is particularly appropriate in this instance since the contracting parties both were residents of the state of Oklahoma, and it is reasonable to assume that they contemplated Oklahoma law in the formation of their contract.
The majority cites Bowers Welding and Hotshot, Inc. v. Bromley, 699 P.2d 299 (Wyo.1985), for the proposition that attorney fees cannot be awarded unless the parties so provide by their agreement or there exists an explicit statute justifying the award. This court has said that a statute that affected the rights of the parties “became a part of the contract as though written into its terms. Meuse-Rhine-Ijssel Cattle Breeders of Canada, Ltd. v. Y-Tex Corporation, 590 P.2d 1306, 1309 (Wyo.1979) (the statute involved was the U.C.C.); see Century Ready-Mix Company v. Lower & Company, 770 P.2d 692 (Wyo.1989). In two other instances, the court has noted that “laws which subsist at the time and place of making a contract, and where it is to be performed, enter into and become a part of it as though expressly referred to and incorporated in its terms.” Tri-County Electric Association, Inc. v. City of Gillette, 584 P.2d 995, 1007 (Wyo.1978); Application of Hagood, 356 P.2d 135, 138 (Wyo.1960). While those cases did not involve attorney fees, the principle is apt, and the quotation alludes to two places, the time and place of making the contract and the time and place where it is to be performed.
Consequently, I would not reverse the district court with respect to the award of attorney fees on the basis of whether the statute is substantive or procedural, although I do perceive it as substantive. In my view, the Oklahoma statute, where the contract was made, became a part of this contract. The rule is consistent with the substantive law of the state of Wyoming and cannot be perceived as being contrary to the public policy of this state. I, therefore, would hold that the Oklahoma statutory provision for attorney fees became a part of the contract of these parties and, for that reason, I would affirm the district court in its award of attorney fees to International Fabricators, Inc.