Court Opinion

ID: 2964257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:22:54.280291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:53.008264
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

        September 6, 1996       [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                 ___________________

        No. 96-1186

                                 ROBERT F. KELLEHER,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                      LORAL INFRARED AND IMAGING SYSTEMS, INC.,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                       [Hon. Mark L. Wolf, U.S. District Judge]
                                           ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Selya, Cyr and Boudin,
                                   Circuit Judges.
                                   ______________

                                 ____________________

            Robert F. Kelleher on brief pro se.
            __________________
            Alan  B.  Pearl,  Pearl  &  MacKenzie,  P.C.,  Leonard  Paris  and
            _______________   __________________________   ______________
        Laurence I. Cohen on brief for appellee.
        _________________

                                 ____________________

                                 ____________________

                      Per  Curiam.      Plaintiff-appellant  alleged  age
                      ___________

            discrimination  in  the  termination  of   his  eighteen-year

            employment as a quality  assurance engineer during a company-

            wide  reduction in  force  which occurred  shortly after  his

            former employer was acquired by another corporation.  The new

            employer,   LIRIS,  responded   that   the  elimination   and

            consolidation  of employee  positions was  a necessary  cost-

            cutting  move, and that it  had treated age  neutrally in the

            process.  After lengthy discovery, the district court granted

            summary judgment to LIRIS because plaintiff's proof failed to

            create a genuine issue of fact as to LIRIS's motivation. 

                      Reviewing the  judgment de novo, and  after a close
                                              __ ____

            examination of the record and briefs, we find no  substantial

            reason  to disagree  with  the  district court's  conclusion.

            Accordingly, we summarily  affirm the  judgment, adding  only

            the  following comments  in  response to  two of  appellant's

            arguments on appeal.

                      (1)  We have  reviewed with care the excerpts  from

            appellant's  deposition  testimony   which  he  claims   were

            overlooked  by the district court.    The  testimony does not
                                                                      ___

            identify the  anonymous declarant(s) who reported  that LIRIS

            was prejudiced against older workers and "taking a hard  look

            at  anyone  over  40 years  of  age  and  earning over  40K."

            Appellant named  employees who "discussed,"  "referenced," or

            "mentioned" the anonymous statements, not those who initially

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            uttered them.       Appellant's reliance on Conway v. Electro
                                                        ______    _______

            Switch  Corp., 825 F.2d 593  (1st Cir. 1987),  and Woodman v.
            _____________                                      _______

            Haemonetics  Corp., 51  F.3d  1087 (1st  Cir.  1995) is  thus
            __________________

            misplaced.   In Conway, we  held that the  district court did
                            ______

            not abuse its  discretion in a gender  discrimination case by

            admitting  into  evidence   testimony  reflecting  two  prior

            instances of gender bias in the treatment of women employees.

            The witnesses testified that in each instance a named company

            manager  explained a  decision to  deny a  pay increase  to a

            woman employee on the basis of the woman's gender.  The named

            declarants had authority  to make the statements, and  one of

            them  was the  president  of the  company  at the  time  that

            plaintiff's employment  was terminated.   We held  that under

            Fed. R. Evid. 401, the  statements were not wholly irrelevant

            to  the issues  at hand  because they  might circumstantially

            evidence  a  "corporate state-of-mind"  or  a "discriminatory

            atmosphere."  

                      In Woodman,  an age  discrimination  case, we  held
                         _______

            admissible  a  named  supervisor's  statement  purporting  to

            communicate management's desire for a younger workforce.  The

            supervisor  was  in  a   position  to  know  of  management's

            intentions; she was  "directly involved" in implementing  the

            challenged   reduction  in  force;   and  the  statement  was

            admissible  under  Fed.  R.  Evid.  801(d)(2)(D)  because  it

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            concerned  matters  within  the  scope   of  her  employment.

            Woodman, 51 F.3d at 1093-94.  
            _______

                      In  contrast, appellant's  proof is  that anonymous

            statements  reporting a  discriminatory animus  were "abound"

            during the  layoff period,  and "bantered about"  by numerous

            employees.   There was no evidence that the banterers were in

            a  position to know of  management's sentiments nor that they

            had  any  responsibility  for  communicating  or implementing

            LIRIS's policy.  The  identification of one of the  banterers

            as a "supervisor"  does not alone  provide the missing  link,

            especially  since this supervisor was himself a victim of the

            new management's layoff. 

                      Proof of "bantering" by  employees fearful of a new

            employer's motives for a layoff does not suffice to establish

            a  genuine issue of fact as to the employer's actual mindset.

            Cf.  Betkerur v. Aultman Hosp. Ass'n, 78 F.3d 1079, 1095 (6th
            ___  ________    ___________________

            Cir. 1996) (holding that "rumors, conclusory allegations  and

            subjective  beliefs  [are]  wholly insufficient  evidence  to

            establish a claim of discrimination as a matter of law").  As

            the district  court observed, too, appellant's  proof did not

            satisfy the  foundation requirements for  admissibility under

            Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(C)(D).

                      (2)  Appellant's evidence also was  insufficient to

            establish  a genuine issue of  fact in support  of his theory

            that  he was "replaced" in his position by a younger employee

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            and/or that  LIRIS retained  younger employees in  the "same"

            position.  Viewing  the evidence in the light  most favorable

            to  appellant, it  could not  support a  reasonable inference

            that  any employee  assumed a  position that  was coextensive

            with,  or  identical  to,  the  duties  which  appellant  had

            performed.   See LeBlanc v.  Great American Ins.  Co., 6 F.3d
                         ___ _______     ________________________

            836, 846  (1st Cir. 1993) (an employee is not "replaced" when

            another is  assigned  to perform  his duties  in addition  to

            other duties, or when  the work is redistributed among  other

            existing  employees already  performing related  work), cert.
                                                                    _____

            denied,  114 S.Ct. 1398  (1994); cf. Hebert  v. Mohawk Rubber
            ______                           ___ ______     _____________

            Co., 872 F.2d 1104, 1114  (1st Cir. 1989) (finding sufficient
            ___

            proof to survive summary  judgment where the younger retained

            person "exactly" conducted the  work of riffed employee, with

            only minor modifications). 

                      Appellant's motion for reconsideration of the order

            submitting this  case for  decision without oral  argument is

            denied.  The judgment is affirmed.  See Loc. R. 27.1.  
            ______                   ________   ___

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