Court Opinion

ID: 9378447
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-10 16:00:23.386936+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:21.308924
License: Public Domain

22-848-pr
Valverde v. Folks
                                 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                       SUMMARY ORDER
Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed
on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a
document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an
electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order
must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.

       At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
on the 10th day of March, two thousand twenty-three.

PRESENT:            JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
                    JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
                    MYRNA PÉREZ,
                                  Circuit Judges.

ANGEL VALVERDE,
                            Plaintiff-Appellant,                          22-848-pr

                            v.

J.D. FOLKS, Correction Officer at Sing Sing
Correctional Facility, L. BROWN, Correction Officer
at Sing Sing Correctional Facility, JOHN GONZALEZ,
Sergeant at Sing Sing Correctional Facility, JANE
FRANGELLA, Registered Nurse at Sing Sing
Correctional Facility, JOHN RICCIO, Lieutenant at Sing
Sing Correctional Facility, JOHN MAYES, Hearing
Officer at Downstate Correctional Facility, ROBERT
MORTON, Superintendent of Downstate Correctional
Facility, MICHAEL CAPRA, Superintendent of Sing
Sing Correctional Facility, JOHN ORICCO, Lieutenant
at Sing Sing Correctional Facility, T.A.
CUNNINGHAM,
                         Defendants-Appellees. *

     *
         The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official case caption as set forth above.
For Plaintiff-Appellant:                               Sofia Aranda, Aranda Law Firm, PLLC, New
                                                       York, NY.

For Defendants-Appellees J.D. Folks                    Sarah Coco, Judith N. Vale, Barbara D.
Tyrone Cunningham; Lawton Brown; Julio                 Underwood, on behalf of Letitia James, Attorney
Gonzalez; Alfonso Orrico; Robert Mayes;                General State of New York, New York, NY.
Michael Capra; Robert Morton:

For Defendant-Appellee Jane Frangella:                 Anthony M. DeFazio, Anthony DeFazio Law,
                                                       PC, Beacon, NY.

     Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York. (Mary Kay Vyskocil, Judge).

     UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court be and hereby is
AFFIRMED.

         Plaintiff-Appellant Angel Valverde commenced this action in August 2019. In his Third
Amended Complaint (“TAC”), Plaintiff alleged (1) a section 1983 claim under the Eighth
Amendment for excessive force against all Defendant Officers, TAC ¶¶ 87–92; (2) a section 1983
claim under the Eighth Amendment for deliberate indifference against Defendant Michael Capra,
the superintendent of Sing Sing, TAC ¶¶ 93–99; (3) a section 1983 claim under the Eighth
Amendment for procedural due process violations against Commission Hearing Officer Mayes and
Defendant Robert Morton, the superintendent of Downstate, TAC ¶¶ 100–104; and (4) a section
1983 claim for a failure to intervene against Correction Officer (“CO”) Folks, CO Cunningham, CO
Brown, Sergeant Gonzales, Nurse Frangella, Lieutenant Orrico, and Superintendent Capra, TAC ¶¶
105–110. In 2020, the District Court granted Superintendents Morton and Capra’s motion to
dismiss claims, App’x 13, Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 93, and in 2022, the District Court granted summary
judgment to the remaining defendants. App’x 232–52. On appeal, Plaintiff contends that the
District Court erred in granting summary judgment because, inter alia, Plaintiff did not fully exhaust
the prison grievance system and other factual discrepancies raise triable issues. We assume the
parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and the issues on appeal.

         We review de novo both Plaintiff’s exhaustion of administrative remedies under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), Williams v. Priatno, 829 F.3d 118, 121–22 (2d Cir. 2016),
and the grant of summary judgment, Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115, 123 (2d Cir. 2013).

        On appeal, Plaintiff contends that the District Court erred in its exhaustion determination.
The PLRA provides that incarcerated individuals may not file lawsuits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to
challenge prison conditions “until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Below, Judge Vyskocil granted judgment for Defendants on Plaintiff’s failure to
exhaust available remedies. For the reasons set forth in the District Court’s Opinion, we agree as to
the Eighth Amendment excessive force and failure-to-intervene claims. App’x 241–46. Although
opaque processes “so confusing that . . . no reasonable prisoner can use them,” may excuse
noncompliance, Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 644 (2016) (citation and internal quotation marks

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omitted), we conclude, for the same reasons articulated by the District Court, that the administrative
procedures applicable to Plaintiff’s grievance appeal did not reach the required threshold, App’x
245–46. Consequently, Plaintiff offers no basis to excuse his failure to exhaust administrative
remedies as to the Eighth Amendment claims.

         Plaintiff also argues that the District Court erred in granting summary judgement to
Commission Hearing Officer Mayes, who oversaw Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing. Upon our de novo
review, we agree with the District Court that Plaintiff received adequate due process during the
disciplinary hearing. See id. at 248–51.

                                          CONCLUSION

       We have reviewed all of the arguments raised by Plaintiff on appeal and find them to be
without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.

                                                       FOR THE COURT:
                                                       Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

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