Court Opinion

ID: 9383523
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-30 16:11:08.900906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:45.955823
License: Public Domain

J-S06041-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    SEAN MICHAEL ROBERTS                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1122 MDA 2022

          Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 17, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-21-CR-0002611-2020

BEFORE:      STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                          FILED MARCH 30, 2023

        Sean Michael Roberts appeals from the June 17, 2022 judgment of

sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole imposed after

a jury found him guilty of first-degree murder.1 After careful review, we affirm

the judgement of sentence.

        The trial court summarized the relevant facts of this case as follows:

              In the predawn hours of October 15, 2020, the Carlisle
              Borough Police Department responded to a 9-1-1 call
              reporting a homicide at 169 and ½ East High Street,
              Carlisle, Cumberland County. The caller, later
              identified as Appellant, reported that he had murdered
              Jodi Sivak (hereinafter “Victim”), by stabbing her in
              the neck. The police quickly responded to the call,
              taking Appellant into custody, and securing the scene
              of the crime. Immediately inside the front door of the
____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a).
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          property the police discovered Victim, who was
          pronounced dead at the scene due to multiple stab
          wounds to the head and neck. Clearly visible was a
          trail of blood leading from Victim’s body to the first-
          floor kitchen where the murder weapon, a folding
          knife, was recovered from the sink. Also visible was
          a blood trail leading to the second-floor bathroom,
          where Appellant’s bloody clothes were located next to
          the shower. Appellant also had a bandaged wound on
          his hand, which appeared to have been a result of
          either Victim’s attempt at self-defense, or Appellant
          cutting himself while struggling with Victim for control
          of the knife.

          After being detained at the scene, Appellant was
          transported to the Carlisle Police Department, where
          he gave a voluntary interview. In that interview,
          Appellant described that he had flown out from
          Massachusetts to spend a week with Victim, a
          previous girlfriend of his. He stated that they had
          spent a pleasant time together, and that he was
          originally going to fly home on October 15th. Appellant
          went on to describe that, on the night of the crime, he
          and Victim had been drinking whiskey earlier in the
          night, and that a neighbor had provided some “Amish
          weed” for the pair to smoke. However, Appellant flatly
          stated during the interview that at the time of the
          stabbing he was not impaired or intoxicated to the
          point that he was out of control of his actions, and he
          had a clear recollection of having an argument with
          Victim before stabbing her. Importantly, during the
          interview Appellant stated with respect to his alcohol
          consumption being a factor in the murder, “Yeah I
          don’t, I don’t think that had anything to do with it, but
          I mean, whatever, lawyers, whatever is gonna try to
          say otherwise, but I don’t think it had anything to do
          with it.” In fact, the recorded interview demonstrated
          that Appellant was both candid regarding his actions
          and fully cooperative with the police in their initial
          investigation of the murder.

          Notably, Appellant recalled that he grabbed the knife
          and repeatedly stabbed Victim, and that he attempted
          to cover her mouth during the attack to prevent her

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              from screaming. After killing Victim, Appellant walked
              to the first-floor kitchen to wash his hands and deposit
              the knife in the sink. He stated that he then went to
              the second-floor bathroom to take a shower, dress his
              wound, and change his clothes, before taking a nap
              and then making the 9-1-1 phone call which
              summoned the police to his location. During that 9-
              1-1 call, Appellant informed the operator that he
              intended to peacefully surrender, and that he was not
              armed.

Trial court opinion, 10/4/22 at 1-4 (footnotes omitted).

        Appellant was subsequently charged with first-degree murder and

proceeded to a jury trial on April 11, 2022. Following a three-day jury trial,

the trial court found Appellant guilty of first-degree murder.               As noted,

Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole

on June 17, 2022. Appellant filed a post-sentence motion which was denied

by the trial court following a hearing on July 14, 2022. This timely appeal

followed on August 9, 2022.2

        Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

              I.     Was the conviction against the weight of the
                     evidence such that it shocked one’s sense of
                     justice based on the evidence of [Appellant’s]
                     intoxication presented during trial and the
                     Commonwealth’s failure to prove that he acted
                     with the specific intent to kill?

              II.    Based on the evidence of [Appellant’s]
                     intoxication presented during trial, did the trial
                     court err in failing to give the jury instruction for
                     voluntary intoxication or drugged condition as

____________________________________________

2   Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

                                           -3-
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                  defense to first-degree murder, as requested by
                  counsel?

Appellant’s brief at 5 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

      Appellant first argues that the verdict was against the weight of the

evidence because “it shocked one’s sense of justice based on the evidence of

[his] intoxication” and the Commonwealth’s purported “failure to prove [his]

specific intent to kill[.]” Appellant’s brief at 10. We disagree.

      This Court has recognized that “a true weight of the evidence challenge

concedes that sufficient evidence exists to sustain the verdict but questions

which evidence is to be believed.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 172 A.3d 632,

643 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 183 A.3d 970 (Pa.

2018). “An allegation that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is

addressed to the discretion of the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Galvin,

985 A.2d 783, 793 (Pa. 2009) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1051

(2010).

            [W]here the trial court has ruled on the weight claim
            below, an appellate court’s role is not to consider the
            underlying question of whether the verdict is against
            the weight of the evidence. Rather, appellate review
            is limited to whether the trial court palpably abused
            its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.

Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 40 A.3d 1250, 1253 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation

omitted).

            Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to
            hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate
            court will give the gravest consideration to the
            findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when

                                      -4-
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            reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict
            is against the weight of the evidence. One of the least
            assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial
            is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or
            was not against the weight of the evidence and that a
            new trial should be granted in the interest of justice.

            This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by
            the trial court in granting or denying a motion for a
            new trial based on a challenge to the weight of the
            evidence is unfettered. In describing the limits of a
            trial court’s discretion, we have explained[,] [t]he
            term “discretion” imports the exercise of judgment,
            wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate
            conclusion within the framework of the law, and is not
            exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of
            the judge. Discretion must be exercised on the
            foundation of reason, as opposed to prejudice,
            personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary actions.
            Discretion is abused where the course pursued
            represents not merely an error of judgment, but
            where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or
            where the law is not applied or where the record
            shows that the action is a result of partiality,
            prejudice, bias or ill-will.

Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (citations and

emphasis omitted).

     Upon review, we find that the trial court properly exercised its discretion

in concluding that the jury’s verdict was not against the weight of the

evidence. See trial court opinion, 10/4/22 at 5-7. “[T]he trier of fact while

passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence

produced,   is   free   to   believe   all,   part   or   none   of   the   evidence.”

Commonwealth v. Andrulewicz, 911 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa.Super. 2006)

(citation omitted), appeal denied, 926 A.2d 972 (Pa. 2007).

                                        -5-
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        Here, the jury heard testimony from multiple witnesses that Appellant

stabbed the victim nine times in her neck and head area, resulting in her

death. See notes of testimony, 4/12/22 at 183-196, 208-210 (Dr. Wayne

Ross); 236-238, 244-246 (Robert Johnson). The jury also had the benefit of

a video recording of Appellant’s interview with the police in the immediate

aftermath of the murder, wherein he provided a detailed timeline the murder

and expressly stated that he was not intoxicated to the point where he did not

know what he was doing. See Commonwealth’s Exhibit No. 10 – Recorded

Interview; notes of testimony, 4/11/22 at 127-128. The jury clearly found

the testimony and evidence presented at trial credible and elected not to

believe Appellant’s subsequent version of the events. We are precluded from

reweighing the evidence and substituting our judgment for that of the

factfinder. Clay, 64 A.3d at 1055. Accordingly, Appellant’s weight claim must

fail.

        Appellant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing

to charge the jury with an “instruction for voluntary intoxication or drugged

condition as a defense to first-degree murder[.]”3 Appellant’s brief at 14. We

disagree.

        The standard of review for a trial court’s decision to refuse a diminished

capacity jury instruction based on voluntary intoxication is an abuse of

____________________________________________

3   This defense is also known as “diminished capacity.”

                                           -6-
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discretion.   Commonwealth v. Clemons, 200 A.3d 441, 465 (Pa. 2019),

cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 140 S.Ct. 176 (2019). This Court has stated:

              Our standard of review when considering the denial of
              jury instructions is one of deference — an appellate
              court will reverse a court’s decision only when it
              abused its discretion or committed an error of law.
              Further, the trial court is not required to give every
              charge that is requested by the parties and its refusal
              to give a requested charge does not require reversal
              unless the Appellant was prejudiced by that refusal.

Commonwealth v. Green, 273 A.3d 1080, 1084 (Pa.Super. 2022) (citations,

internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted), appeal denied, ___ A.3d

___, 2022 WL 17662326 (Pa. 2022).

      Our Supreme Court has examined when a jury must be provided a

voluntary intoxication/diminished capacity instruction in Commonwealth v.

Padilla, 80 A.3d 1238 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied, 573 U.S. 907 (2014).

Padilla involved a defendant who argued that his convictions for first-degree

murder should be vacated because the trial court erred when it instructed the

jury that there was no evidence of diminished capacity due to his ingestion of

alcohol and/or drugs. Id. at 1263. The Padilla Court held:

              A defense of diminished capacity negates the element
              of specific intent, and thus mitigates first-degree
              murder to third-degree murder. The mere fact of
              voluntary intoxication does not give rise to a
              diminished capacity defense. Rather, to prove
              diminished capacity due to voluntary intoxication, a
              defendant must show that he was overwhelmed to the
              point of losing his faculties and sensibilities. Evidence
              that the defendant lacked the ability to control his or
              her actions or acted impulsively is irrelevant to

                                        -7-
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               specific intent to kill, and thus is not admissible to
               support a diminished capacity defense.

               This Court has previously made clear that a jury
               instruction regarding diminished capacity due to
               voluntary intoxication is justified only when the
               record contains evidence that the accused was
               intoxicated to the point of losing his or her
               faculties or sensibilities. Evidence that the accused
               ingested alcohol or other intoxicating drug — without
               more — does not warrant a voluntary intoxication
               instruction.

Id. (citations omitted; emphasis added).

      Upon review, we find no basis to conclude that the trial court abused its

discretion by denying Appellant’s requested jury instruction on voluntary

intoxication.    The record reveals no evidentiary basis that Appellant was

sufficiently intoxicated during his murder of the victim to warrant such an

instruction.    On the contrary, Appellant’s own admissions during his video

interview with police immediately following the murder belie his claim that he

was intoxicated to the point of having lost his faculties or sensibilities.

      As stated by the trial court,

               Appellant provided a detailed walkthrough of his
               actions from the time he first stabbed Victim until he
               summoned the police and surrendered himself into
               their custody. Further, Appellant himself discounted
               his intoxication during the interview, stating that while
               his attorneys might attempt to argue that he was too
               intoxicated to know what he was doing, that was not
               the case. Appellant’s actions following the murder
               through his confession were calm and calculated, and
               reflected a clear recollection of events as well as a
               clear thinking pattern. For example, Appellant stayed
               on the line with the 9-1-1 dispatcher, so she could
               ensure the police knew that he was not armed and

                                         -8-
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            thus they would not find him to be a threat. At no
            time in Appellant’s actions or presentation in the video
            did he act as though he was even slightly intoxicated.

Trial court opinion, 10/4/22 at 8-9.

      This Court has long recognized that there is no right to have any

particular form of instruction given; it is enough that the charge “clearly and

accurately characterize relevant law.” Commonwealth v. Akhmedov, 216

A.3d 307, 321 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 224 A.3d

364 (Pa. 2020).

      Here, the record reveals that the trial court charged the jury with an

instruction similar to the one given in Padilla, which permitted the jury to

consider Appellant’s alcohol and drug intake on the evening in question

together with all the other evidence in the case to “determine if the

Commonwealth has met its burden of proving specific intent beyond a

reasonable doubt.” See notes of testimony, 4/13/22 at 113-114. We find

these instructions clearly, adequately, and accurately presented the relevant

law to the jury for its consideration.       Appellant’s claim to the contrary,

therefore, must fail.

      For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s June 17, 2022

judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

                                       -9-
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 03/30/2023

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