Court Opinion

ID: 9660585
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:16:31.618882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:20.806630
License: Public Domain

WHITE, Justice,
concurring.
At this point in time, a decade after Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), I thought all members of this Court were well aware that the “no evidence” standard of sufficiency review was defunct. At the very least, I do know that the general members of the bar have long been aware of this fact. This is why, although I do not disagree, I do find the majority’s perceived need to overrule the implicitly invalid “no evidence” language in Combs v. State, 643 S.W.2d 709 (Tex.Cr.App.1982), quite perplexing. Had I realized that anyone considered this language in Combs the least bit viable, I would have never cited Combs in Moreno v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866 (Tex.Cr.App.1988). Moreno’s reliance on Combs was intended to be, albeit implicitly, purely limited to Combs’ discussion of and quotation from Jackson concerning the type of sufficiency evaluation involved in a due process standard of review. Moreno, supra at 867. However, after reading the instant majority opinion, I now must give credence to Judge Clinton’s concerns in Moreno that a Combs citation would revive the totally unacceptable “no evidence” standard. Moreno, supra at 872 (Clinton, J., concurring). Such was never my intent, nor, I dare say, the majority’s intent in voting for Moreno. Thus, to the extent that the “no evidence” standard of review has once again been disavowed, I do not disagree.
*244What I do disagree with, however, is the less than favorable characterization of Moreno by the majority, many of whom fully joined the Moreno opinion less than eight months ago. Further, and what disturbs me even more, is that the majority ignores the most important aspect of Moreno —the discussion of the actual degree of evidence necessary to support the jury’s verdict. Here lies the crux of any Jackson analysis yet the majority fails to even acknowledge this issue. In Moreno we stated,
Under the Jackson standard, the reviewing Court is not to position itself as a thirteenth juror in assessing the evidence. Rather, it is to position itself as a final, due process safeguard ensuring only the rationality of the factfinder.... The factfinder, best positioned to consider all the evidence firsthand, viewing the valuable and significant demeanor and expression of the witness, has reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. Such a verdict must stand unless it is found to be irrational or unsupported by more than a ‘mere modicum’ of the evidence, with such evidence being viewed under the Jackson light.
Moreno, supra at 867. Thus, this Court has decided that any amount of evidence constituting more than a “mere modicum” to support the jury’s verdict will suffice.
Finally, I must point out the folly in the majority’s denouncement of prior applications of Jackson while they themselves attempt to validate a method of sufficiency review that Jackson expressly disapproved. In footnote 1, the majority ‘reiterates’ the continued validity of the “outstanding reasonable hypothesis” theory, op. at 238. However, the Jackson Court explicitly rejected this notion by stating,
Only under a theory that the prosecution was under an affirmative duty to rule out every hypothesis except that of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt could this petitioner’s challenge be sustained. That theory the Court has rejected in the past. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140, 75 S.Ct. 127, 137, 99 L.Ed. 150 [(1954)]. We decline to adopt it today. Under the standard established in this opinion as necessary to preserve the due process protection recognized in Winship, a federal habeas corpus court faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume — even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record — that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.
(emphasis supplied). Jackson, supra 443 U.S. at 325-327, 99 S.Ct. at 2792-93. Thus, Jackson specifically denounces the “reasonable hypothesis theory” while the majority embraces it. Further, whether this theory is euphemistically labeled as an “analytical construct” (see op. at 238, fn. 1) or a standard of review is of little moment; the resultant effect remains the same — the adoption of a theory of sufficiency review expressly denounced by Jackson. Thus, although the majority, by all auspices, fully adheres to Jackson, it appears to me that such adherence is disturbingly selective.
Because the Court sees fit to selectively adhere to certain convenient aspects of Jackson, supra and Moreno, supra, while completely disregarding the less palatable holdings of those opinions, I must concur only in the result reached.
McCORMICK, J., joins this concurrence.