Court Opinion

ID: 9391800
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-03 14:00:45.993881+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:15.288433
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10888    Document: 38-1     Date Filed: 05/03/2023   Page: 1 of 7

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-10888
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiff-Appellee,
       versus
       RAKEEM MOORE,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 8:21-cr-00023-SCB-SPF-1
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-10888     Document: 38-1      Date Filed: 05/03/2023    Page: 2 of 7

       2                      Opinion of the Court                22-10888

       Before BRANCH, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Rakeem Moore appeals his convictions and sentence of 200
       months’ imprisonment for brandishing a firearm during and in re-
       lation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
       § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Moore makes two arguments on appeal. First, he
       argues that the district court plainly erred by accepting his guilty
       plea when it did not specifically inform him of the elements of the
       Hobbs Act robbery offenses that served as the underlying crimes of
       violence for his Section 924(c) convictions. Second, Moore con-
       tends that his total sentence is substantively unreasonable because
       the district court over-emphasized his juvenile criminal history. Af-
       ter careful review and addressing each argument in turn, we affirm.
              First, Moore contends that the district court plainly erred
       during the plea colloquy by not setting forth the elements of a
       Hobbs Act robbery offense, which is the “crime of violence . . . in
       furtherance of” which Moore “brandished” a firearm in violation
       of Section 924(c)(1)(A)(ii)—twice. We review the district court’s ac-
       ceptance of a guilty plea for plain error when a defendant fails to
       object to a violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.
       United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1018 (11th Cir. 2005).
       Moore agrees that his failure to object to the court’s acceptance of
       his guilty plea means that the plain error standard governs our re-
       view.
USCA11 Case: 22-10888       Document: 38-1      Date Filed: 05/03/2023      Page: 3 of 7

       22-10888                Opinion of the Court                           3

               To prevail under the plain error standard, Moore must es-
       tablish the district court committed (1) an error, (2) that is plain, (3)
       that impacts Moore’s substantial rights, and (4) that “seriously af-
       fects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceed-
       ings.” Id. at 1019 (cleaned up). Moore cannot satisfy these require-
       ments.
               In evaluating whether a Rule 11 error has occurred, we look
       to Rule 11’s three “core objectives,” which are ensuring that (1)
       “the guilty plea is free of coercion,” (2) “the defendant understands
       the nature of the charges against him,” and (3) “the defendant is
       aware of the direct consequences of the guilty plea.” United States
       v. Monroe, 353 F.3d 1346, 1354 (11th Cir. 2003). However, “[t]here
       is no rigid formula or ‘mechanical rule’ for determining whether
       the district court adequately informed the defendant of the nature
       of the charges.” United States v. Presendieu, 880 F.3d 1228, 1238
       (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Camacho, 233 F.3d 1308,
       1314 (11th Cir. 2000)). Instead, “[d]istrict courts must ensure, one
       way or another, that the defendant knows and understands the na-
       ture of the offenses to which he or she is pleading guilty.” Id. A
       district court “plainly errs where its plea colloquy is so deficient
       that it results in a total or abject failure to address Rule 11’s core
       principle, to wit that a defendant understands the nature of the
       charges against him.” Id. And “in some cases, a factual proffer may
       set forth in such detail the facts of the crime that it effectively in-
       corporates the substance of the elements of the offense.” Id. We
       also review a district court’s finding “that the defendant
USCA11 Case: 22-10888      Document: 38-1     Date Filed: 05/03/2023     Page: 4 of 7

       4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10888

       understood the nature of the charges and that the defendant had
       entered a knowing a voluntary plea of guilty” for clear error. Id.
              Here, the district court explained to Moore the elements
       that the government must prove to obtain convictions on counts
       three and five of the indictment against Moore, which charged vi-
       olations of Section 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). The court told Moore that for
       the purposes of his offenses, the relevant crime of violence is 18
       U.S.C. § 1951(a)—specifically, the violations of Section 1951(a)
       charged in counts two and four of the indictment. The court also
       explained that the government must prove beyond a reasonable
       doubt that Moore committed those underlying offenses. When
       asked, Moore said he understood the elements of counts three and
       five. After explaining the maximum and minimum penalties for
       those offenses, the district court confirmed with Moore that he un-
       derstood “every word” of the plea agreement.
              Then, the district court went over Moore’s plea agreement,
       and Moore confirmed that he committed the two underlying rob-
       beries and brandished a firearm while doing so. Specifically, Moore
       admitted that it was true that he brandished a firearm at a Circle K
       gas station, “ordered the store clerk to ‘put everything in the bag
       and do what I say,’” and “took the items and fled.” And he admitted
       it was true that he “pointed a silver revolver at the victim store
       clerk and demanded money” at a Thorntons gas station and fled
       the store with the money he stole. Finally, Moore admitted he in-
       terfered with the abilities of the stores to participate in interstate
       commerce by robbing them. The court found that Moore was
USCA11 Case: 22-10888      Document: 38-1       Date Filed: 05/03/2023     Page: 5 of 7

       22-10888                Opinion of the Court                          5

       “aware of the nature of the charges and the consequences of [his]
       plea.”
              Moore cannot establish that the district court plainly erred
       because the “factual proffer . . . set[s] forth in such detail the facts
       of the crime that it effectively incorporates the substance of the el-
       ements of the offense.” See Presendieu, 880 F.3d at 1239. A person
       violates Section 1951(a) if he “obstructs, delays, or affects com-
       merce . . . by robbery.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). Section 1951(b)(1) de-
       fines “robbery” as “the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal
       property from the person or in the presence of another, against his
       will, by means of actual threatened force, or violence, or fear of
       injury . . . to his person or property . . . at the time of the taking.”
       Id. § 1951(b)(1). Although we have never held that a district court
       must list or explain the elements of an underlying offense, which
       merely serves as an element of the offense of conviction, the factual
       proffer sufficiently established Moore’s awareness of these ele-
       ments. That is, the factual proffer indicates that Moore understood
       that he was pleading guilty to impacting interstate commerce by
       unlawfully taking money from gas stations by threatening their
       employees with firearms and the prospect of physical harm.
               Second, Moore argues that his 200 months’ imprisonment
       sentence, which is a 62-month downward variance from the guide-
       lines range, is substantively unreasonable. We review the substan-
       tive reasonableness of a sentence, considering the totality of the
       circumstances, for an abuse of discretion. See Gall v. United States,
       552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). “[T]he party who challenges the sentence
USCA11 Case: 22-10888      Document: 38-1     Date Filed: 05/03/2023     Page: 6 of 7

       6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10888

       bears the burden of establishing that the sentence is unreasonable
       in the light of both [the] record and the factors in [18 U.S.C. §
       3553(a)].” United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 832 (11th Cir.
       2007) (quoting United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir.
       2005)). “The district court must evaluate all of the § 3553(a) factors
       when arriving at a sentence but is permitted to attach great weight
       to one factor over others.” United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230,
       1237 (11th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). Accordingly, we must have a
       “definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a
       clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors” to vacate
       a sentence on substantive reasonableness grounds. Id. at 1238.
               The district court did not abuse its discretion when consid-
       ering the Section 3553(a) factors and by sentencing Moore to a sen-
       tence that is substantially shorter than the lower end of the guide-
       lines range. That Moore’s sentence is far below the statutory-max-
       imum term of life imprisonment, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii),
       strongly suggests reasonableness. See United States v. Gonzalez,
       550 F.3d at 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). And although Moore con-
       tends that the district court over-considered his juvenile criminal
       conduct, the district court could consider his background and past
       conduct when assessing the need to deter and protect the public
       from Moore. See Amedeo, 487 F.3d at 832; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
       Contrary to Moore’s assertion, the district court varied his sentence
       downward because of his background and difficult upbringing. But
       the district court limited its downward variance based on the need
       for Moore to reform himself. The court considered all the Section
USCA11 Case: 22-10888      Document: 38-1     Date Filed: 05/03/2023     Page: 7 of 7

       22-10888               Opinion of the Court                         7

       3553(a) factors, too. For these reasons, we cannot say that the dis-
       trict court committed a clear error in judgment when sentencing
       Moore.
              Moore makes two other arguments related to his sentence
       that we briefly address. First, neither the government nor the court
       needed to provide Moore notice that the court was imposing an
       enhanced sentence on the ground that Moore qualified as a career
       offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(h) (requir-
       ing a district court to give “the parties reasonable notice that it is
       contemplating” a departure “from the applicable sentencing range
       on a ground not identified for departure . . . in the presentence re-
       port”). Even if we assume that an application of the career-offender
       enhancement must comply with the notice requirements of Rule
       32(h), Moore’s presentence report included the enhancement, and
       Moore did not object to it. Second, Moore did not have to admit,
       nor did a jury have to find, that he qualified for the enhancement
       because the career-offender enhancement did not change Moore’s
       statutory-maximum sentence of life imprisonment. See Apprendi
       v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that “any fact that
       increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
       maximum must be submitted to a jury”).
             Accordingly, the district court is AFFIRMED.