Court Opinion

ID: 9890522
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-13 14:07:24.572019+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:22.995110
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: OCTOBER 6, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                    TO BE PUBLISHED

           Commonwealth of Kentucky
                  Court of Appeals
                     NO. 2022-CA-0384-MR

CITY OF NEWPORT, KENTUCKY;
HOWARD NIEMEIER; MARK
BRANDT; NORM WAGNER; PAT
MOORE; RICK SEARS; ROBERT
BRADFORD; SARAH TOLLE (A/K/A
SARAH DESENTZ); AND TOM
FROMME                                              APPELLANTS

          APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
v.       HONORABLE JULIE REINHARDT WARD, JUDGE
                  ACTION NO. 20-CI-00489

WESTPORT INSURANCE
COMPANY, AS SUCCESSOR TO
COREGIS INSURANCE COMPANY                             APPELLEE

AND

                     NO. 2022-CA-0415-MR

JEREL COLEMON, AS
ADMINISTRATOR AND PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE
OF WILLIAM VIRGIL                                   APPELLANT
               APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
v.            HONORABLE JULIE REINHARDT WARD, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 20-CI-00489

WESTPORT INSURANCE
COMPANY, AS SUCCESSOR TO
COREGIS INSURANCE COMPANY                                                APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: EASTON, JONES, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

EASTON, JUDGE: This case is about insurance coverage for a personal injury,

specifically a wrongful prosecution resulting in decades of imprisonment.

Westport Insurance Company (“Westport”) filed this action in the Campbell

Circuit Court seeking a declaratory judgment that Westport had no contractual

obligation to defend the City of Newport and past and present members of the

Newport Police Department (“NPD”) (collectively the “Newport Insureds”) from a

lawsuit filed in federal court by William Virgil (“Virgil”). The circuit court

granted summary judgment to Westport. Both the Newport Insureds and Virgil

appeal. While Virgil suffered damages during Westport’s policy periods, the

personal injury which caused those damages occurred ten years before the

                                         -2-
Westport policy periods. As a result, the Westport policies do not provide

coverage, and Westport does not have a duty to defend. We affirm.

                      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                The controlling facts in this case are undisputed. In 1987, Virgil1 was

charged by the NPD with the murder of Retha Welch. Virgil was convicted and

spent the next twenty-eight years in prison2 before DNA testing revealed that no

physical evidence on the murder victim’s body tied the crime to Virgil. The

Campbell County Grand Jury declined to reindict Virgil.

                Finally free from his incarceration, Virgil filed a federal lawsuit3

(“Virgil Lawsuit”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C.4 § 19835 against the Newport Insureds in

2016. Virgil claimed his constitutional rights were violated because the NPD

arrested and charged him, when the Newport Insureds knew probable cause did not

1
  Virgil died on January 2, 2022. The administrator of Virgil’s Estate, Jerel Colemon, was
subsequently substituted as the proper party in the circuit court.
2
 Virgil’s incarceration after his conviction was with the Kentucky Department of Corrections, an
agency of the state government. We are not aware of the status of any claim which may have
been made against the state itself to the extent permitted by law.
3
 Virgil v. City of Newport, No. 2:16-cv-00224-DLB-EBA, 2021 WL 4494610 (E.D. Ky. Sep. 30,
2021).
4
    United States Code.
5
  “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]”

                                                -3-
exist to charge Virgil for the murder. Virgil also offered proof that police officers

fabricated evidence against him.

             The Newport Insureds tendered their defense to the different

companies which insured them from 1987-2015. National Casualty Company

(insurer for the 1987 policy period) and the Kentucky League of Cities (insurer

from 1988 to 1996) accepted the tender.

             In 2017, the Newport Insureds tendered the Virgil Lawsuit to

Westport for defense and indemnification. Westport, as successor to Coregis

Insurance Company, had issued a policy (“Westport Policy”) to the Newport

Insureds with a policy period of July 1, 1997 to July 1, 1998. This policy, as

modified by endorsement, provided liability coverage per “occurrence” for law

enforcement liability (“LEL”). The Westport Policy was renewed for the July 1,

1998 to July 1, 1999 policy period, and again renewed for the July 1, 1999 to July

1, 2000 policy period.

             In response to the Newport Insureds’ tender of defense, Westport’s

claims expert sent a letter denying coverage for the Virgil Lawsuit. In this letter,

Westport explained “coverage is not afforded under the Westport policy for the

Virgil lawsuit because no triggering event occurred during the Westport policy

period.” Westport determined that, since Virgil was charged in 1987 and

convicted in 1988, the Virgil Lawsuit did not allege an offense or occurrence

                                          -4-
causing a “personal injury” during any of the policy periods between July 1, 1997

and July 1, 2000. Westport asserted that, for purposes of triggering coverage,

personal injury arising from a wrongful prosecution takes place at the time charges

were filed. Westport then further asserted their policies were not triggered because

they were not in place at that time, and no additional trigger of an offense or

occurrence causing a personal injury occurred during Virgil’s continued

incarceration.

              In the meantime, the Newport Insureds had also tendered their defense

to St. Paul Guardian Insurance Company, which insured the Newport Insureds

from July 1, 2007 to July 1, 2010; The Phoenix Insurance Company, St. Paul’s

successor, which insured the Newport Insureds from July 1, 2010 to July 1, 2012;

The Travelers Indemnity Company of America, another successor, which insured

the Newport Insureds from July 1, 2012 to July 1, 2013 (collectively “Travelers”).

Travelers decided to both defend the Newport Insureds and file a federal

declaratory judgment action to determine their coverage obligations.6 Similar to

Westport’s argument here, Travelers argued no defense was owed under their LEL

policies as Virgil’s personal injury did not take place during the applicable policy

periods.

6
 St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. City of Newport, No. 2:17-cv-00115-DLB-CJS (E.D. Ky. Jul. 31,
2019).

                                            -5-
              As to the Travelers policies applied in this separate litigation, the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky ruled in favor of

Travelers.7 But the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Virgil’s

“continuous and ongoing injury” triggered coverage under the Travelers LEL

forms. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. City of Newport, 804 F. App’x 379, 384 (6th

Cir. 2020).

              Westport was monitoring the Travelers litigation. Soon after the St.

Paul ruling, Westport wrote to the Newport Insureds asserting it would not change

its coverage position. Westport maintained the Virgil Lawsuit does not allege a

“personal injury” as defined that occurred during Westport’s policy periods and

thus Westport’s LEL coverage was not triggered.

              Even so, Westport decided to defend the Newport Insureds in the

Virgil Lawsuit, while reserving its rights to seek a judicial determination of

Westport’s coverage obligations. The Newport Insureds agreed to Westport’s

participation in their defense. Westport filed this declaratory judgment action in

the Campbell Circuit Court asserting it had no obligation to defend or indemnify

the Newport Insureds.

7
 St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. City of Newport, 416 F. Supp. 3d 671 (E.D. Ky. 2019), reversed
by St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. City of Newport, 804 F. App’x 379 (6th Cir. 2020).

                                             -6-
                Westport also named Virgil in the declaratory judgment action as he

may have been deemed a necessary party. Virgil attempted to remove Westport’s

action to federal court. Despite its prior experience with insurance coverage in this

same dispute, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky

remanded the case, finding the controversy to be an “otherwise ordinary insurance

dispute[.]”

                Westport filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, while the

Newport Insureds and Virgil filed Motions for Summary Judgment. The circuit

court reviewed documents outside the pleadings, which converted Westport’s

motion to a Motion for Summary Judgment. CR8 12.02. The parties provided oral

arguments to the circuit court on February 24, 2022. The circuit court then issued

its Order on March 8, 2022, finding coverage was not triggered under the Westport

LEL policies. The Newport Insureds and Virgil filed separate appeals.9

                                STANDARD OF REVIEW

                “The standard of review on appeal of a summary judgment is whether

the circuit judge correctly found that there were no issues as to any material fact

8
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

9
  During the pendency of this appeal, the Virgil Estate and the Newport lnsureds reached a
settlement in principle of all claims asserted against the Newport Insureds in the Virgil Lawsuit.
A term of the settlement is that the Newport Insureds have assigned to the Virgil Estate all rights
to any insurance proceeds and all causes of action against Westport.

                                                -7-
and that the moving party was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Pearson

ex rel. Trent v. Nat’l Feeding Systems, Inc., 90 S.W.3d 46, 49 (Ky. 2002).

Summary judgment is only proper when “it would be impossible for the

respondent to produce evidence at the trial warranting a judgment in his favor.”

Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991).

             In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court is required to

construe the record “in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion

. . . and all doubts are to be resolved in his favor.” Id. A party opposing a

summary judgment motion cannot rely on the hope that the trier of fact will

disbelieve the movant’s denial of a disputed fact but must present affirmative

evidence to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Id. at 481.

In Steelvest the word “‘impossible’ is used in a practical sense, not in an absolute

sense.” Perkins v. Hausladen, 828 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Ky. 1992).

             In this case, the underlying facts and the terms of the applicable

policies are undisputed. The remaining interpretation and construction of an

insurance contract is a matter of law, which we review de novo. Auto-Owners Ins.

Co. v. Veterans of Foreign Wars Post 5906, 276 S.W.3d 298, 301 (Ky. App. 2009).

As review is de novo, “no deference is given to the decisions of lower tribunals,

even as to the existence of an ambiguity.” Kentucky Employers’ Mutual Ins. v.

Ellington, 459 S.W.3d 876, 881 (Ky. 2015).

                                         -8-
                                    ANALYSIS

             The Newport Insureds and Virgil argue the circuit court erred in

granting summary judgment to Westport. They argue the Westport LEL policies

are injury-based occurrence policies, triggered if any injury occurs during the

policy period. They allege that, because Virgil suffered loss of his personal liberty

and experienced emotional distress during the Westport coverage period, there

existed a continuous and ongoing personal injury. Thus, they argue Westport had

at least a duty to defend the Newport Insureds as Virgil suffered continuous and

ongoing injuries from being wrongfully incarcerated during the Westport policies.

             An insurer has the duty to defend if there is “any allegation which

potentially, possibly or might come within the coverage terms of the insurance

policy.” Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Commonwealth, 179 S.W.3d 830, 841 (Ky.

2005). The duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify. James Graham

Brown Foundation, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 814 S.W.2d 273, 280

(Ky. 1991). In this case, as we will explain, there is neither a duty to indemnify

nor a duty to defend.

             “To ascertain the construction of an insurance contract, one begins

with the text of the policy itself.” Pryor v. Colony Ins., 414 S.W.3d 424, 430 (Ky.

App. 2013), abrogated on other grounds by Estate of Bramble v. Greenwich Ins.

Co., 671 S.W.3d 347 (Ky. 2023). Since most insurance policies are contracts of

                                         -9-
adhesion, courts recognize the doctrine of ambiguity as applicable. Woodson v.

Manhattan Life Ins. Co. of New York, N.Y., 743 S.W.2d 835, 838 (Ky. 1987).

Clear and unambiguous terms in insurance policies should be given their plain and

ordinary meaning. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nolan, 10 S.W.3d 129, 131 (Ky.

1999). In the absence of ambiguities, courts will enforce the terms of an insurance

policy as written. Pryor, supra, at 430.

             The doctrine of reasonable expectations is a corollary to the rule for

construing ambiguities. Woodson, supra, at 839. The reasonable expectation

doctrine “is based on the premise that policy language will be construed as laymen

would understand it.” True v. Raines, 99 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Ky. 2003) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). But this doctrine applies only to policies

with ambiguous terms that can have two or more reasonable interpretations. Id.

When such an ambiguity exists, the ambiguous terms should be interpreted “in

favor of the insured’s reasonable expectations.” Id. (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). Thus, the interpretation favorable to the insured is adopted. St.

Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Powell-Walton-Milward, Inc., 870 S.W.2d 223,

226 (Ky. 1994). However, nonexistent ambiguities should not be utilized to

resolve a coverage dispute against the company. Id. “We consider that courts

should not rewrite an insurance contract to enlarge the risk to the insurer.” Id. at

                                           -10-
226-27. What an insured expected generally when buying insurance does not

defeat unambiguous terms in the policy itself.

             The insurance term “trigger” describes “that which, under the specific

terms of an insurance policy must happen in the policy period in order for the

potential of coverage to arise.” EnergyNorth Natural Gas, Inc. v. Underwriters at

Lloyd’s, 848 A.2d 715, 718 (N.H. 2004). Liability insurance policies generally fall

within one of two broad categories: “occurrence” policies and “claims-made”

policies. Matador Petroleum Corp. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 174 F.3d

653, 658 (5th Cir. 1999). “A pure claims-made policy provides coverage for

claims made during the policy period, regardless of when the events out of which

the claim arose occurred. In contrast, an occurrence policy provides coverage for

all ‘occurrences’ which take place during a policy period, regardless of when the

claim is made.” Craft v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co., 560 Fed. App’x 710, 711-

12 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

             Courts have classified occurrence policies into subcategories based on

how coverage is triggered. The manifestation theory is that coverage is triggered

at the time personal injury becomes known to the victim. Dow Chemical Co. v.

Associated Indem. Corp., 724 F. Supp. 474, 478 (E.D. Mich. 1989). The injury-in-

fact theory is that coverage is triggered when real personal injury first occurs. Id.

The exposure theory is when coverage is triggered when the first exposure to

                                         -11-
injury-causing conditions occurs. Id. Finally, if coverage is triggered so that

insurance policies in effect during different time periods all impose a duty to

indemnify, then the approach is labeled a “continuous” or “multiple” trigger

theory. Id.

              The Newport Insureds argue the Westport LEL forms are “injury-

based” occurrence forms, triggered if “personal injury” occurs during the policy

period, and that it does not matter whether the “occurrence” happens during the

policy period. In their view, the occurrence or offense is continuing because Virgil

suffered every day. So, the personal injury is continuous. Before we analyze the

language of the Westport policies, we see that the Newport Insureds concede this is

a personal injury claim, not one for bodily injury as defined.

                          WESTPORT POLICIES

              As suggested previously, we must carefully review the policy

language contained in the Westport policies as a whole and in context. During the

policy periods in which the Newport Insureds were insured, Westport used two

different but similar LEL forms. Form CFM 92.4.0143 (4/92) (“92 Form”) was

utilized for the July 1, 1997 to July 1, 1998 and the July 1, 1998 to July 1, 1999

policy periods. The Insuring Agreement for the 92 Form reads, in part:

              We will pay those sums that the insured is legally
              obligated to pay as damages because of “bodily injury,”
              “property damage,” or “personal injury” to which this
              insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to

                                         -12-
              defend any “suit” seeking those damages. We may at our
              discretion investigate any “occurrence” and settle any
              claim or “suit” that may result. But:

              ....

              c. This insurance applies to “bodily injury,” “personal
              injury,” “property damage” and only if:

              (1) The “bodily injury,” “property damage” or “personal
              injury” is caused by an “occurrence” that takes place in
              the “coverage territory”; and

              (2) The “bodily injury,” “property damage” or “personal
              injury” occurs during the policy period.

(Emphasis added.) The term “occurrence” is defined as either (a) “[a]n accident,

including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general

harmful conditions, that results in ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’;10 or (b)

[a]n offense that results in ‘personal injury.’” (Emphasis added.) The term

“personal injury” is defined in relevant part as “injury, other than ‘bodily injury,’

arising out of one or more of the following offenses . . . b. False arrest, detention or

imprisonment . . . c. Malicious prosecution . . . or i. Violation of civil rights,

including but not necessarily limited to violations of the Federal Civil Rights Act

and similar laws.”

10
  Because this case involves a personal injury, this subsection (a) does not apply. Examples of
such bodily injuries may be those caused by repeated exposure over time to chemicals, mold,
asbestos, or other environmental factors.

                                              -13-
               Form CMPCK.1000 10/97 (“1000 Form”) was used by Westport for

the July 1, 1999 to July 1, 2000 policy period. The Insuring Agreement for the

1000 Form reads, in relevant part:

               a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes
               legally obligated to pay as “damages” because of “bodily
               injury,” “property damage” or “personal injury” caused
               by an “occurrence” or offense, as more fully described
               in the definitions of “personal injury,” in the course of
               your “law enforcement activity” to which this insurance
               applies. We will have the right and duty to defend the
               insured against any “suit” seeking such “damages.”
               However, we will have no duty to defend the insured
               against any “suit” seeking “damages” because of “bodily
               injury,” “property damage” or “personal injury” to which
               this insurance does not apply. We may at our discretion
               investigate any “occurrence” or offense and settle any
               claim or “suit” that may result. . . .

               ....

               b. This insurance applies to “bodily injury,” “property
               damage” or “personal injury” only if:

               (1) The “bodily injury,” “property damage” or “personal
               injury” is caused by an “occurrence” or offense that takes
               place in the “coverage territory”; and

               (2) The “bodily injury,” “property damage” or “personal
               injury” occurs during the policy period.

(Emphasis added.) The definition of “personal injury” is substantially the same as

the 92 Form.

                                          -14-
             APPLICATION OF MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

             Before we delve into the various case authorities pertinent to the

issues in this case, we will address the confusion caused by the tendency to discuss

malicious prosecution as the name of the tort claim and personal injury in such

circumstances. We will discuss cases which use malicious prosecution as the

rubric or example of the injury. As was pointed out by the parties, there is no

longer a claim of malicious prosecution as applied to this litigation. This does not

alter the reality that the actions giving rise to the § 1983 claim may also be actions

alleged as part of a malicious prosecution claim.

             This does not change the substance of the analysis. What allegedly

happened to Virgil was a violation of his rights in a wrongful prosecution for

which he may seek recovery under § 1983. This is the personal injury claim.

Whether it meets all the details of a malicious prosecution claim is not the issue.

We need not reject all the caselaw which discusses insurance coverage in the

context of malicious prosecution. Under the facts of this case, sufficient similarity

exists to justify application of the cases to be discussed.

             We note as one example Genesis Insurance Company v. City of

Council Bluffs, 677 F.3d 806 (8th Cir. 2012). In that case, the Court discussed the

claim for civil rights violations as “in the nature of malicious prosecution.” Id. at

810. Applying policy language like that in this case, the court determined the

                                          -15-
offending occurrence happened before the terms of the policies, and a continuing

personal injury claim must be rejected.

                                 TRAVELERS POLICIES

               The Newport Insureds rely heavily on the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in St.

Paul. So, we should examine and compare the LEL policy the Newport Insureds

had with Travelers. The St. Paul court reviewed the policies in place from July 1,

2007 to July 1, 2010 and their identical LEL provisions.11 The Travelers LEL

provision reads as follows:

               Law enforcement liability. We’ll pay amounts any
               protected person is legally required to pay as damages for
               covered injury or damage that:

                   • results from law enforcement activities or operations
                   by or for you;

                   • happens while this agreement is in effect; and

                   • is caused by a wrongful act that is committed while
                   conducting law enforcement operations.

St. Paul, supra, at 381 (emphasis added). The LEL provision defines “injury or

damage” as “bodily injury, personal injury, or property damage.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). Further, “bodily injury” means “any harm to the health

11
   In St. Paul, the parties agreed that, if there were coverage under the LEL provision of the first
three policies (July 2007 to July 2010), there would be coverage under the fourth policy (July
2010 to July 2011), due to the fourth policy’s “liberalization” provision. The Newport Insureds
in St. Paul appeared to have abandoned the argument for coverage under the last two Travelers
policies. St. Paul, supra, at 380 n.1.

                                                -16-
of other persons” and “personal injury” means any “injury, other than bodily

injury, caused by any of the following wrongful acts[, including] . . . [m]alicious

prosecution.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

             As previously noted, the Sixth Circuit in St. Paul reversed the district

court’s conclusion that Travelers is not obligated to defend or indemnify Newport

against Virgil’s lawsuit. Id. at 385. The court noted the Travelers LEL provision

covers both injury and damages sustained during the policy period that the insured

is legally required to pay for any “personal injury” caused by certain wrongful acts

– in this instance, malicious prosecution. Id. at 383. The court stated: “Thus, by

the plain terms of the LEL Provision, covered personal injuries include any

injuries caused by the wrongful act – malicious prosecution. Malicious

prosecution cannot, therefore, be the injury.” Id. at 383 (emphasis in original). In

other words, the court reasoned Virgil’s injury was the “loss of personal liberty and

attendant emotional pain and suffering caused as those years [of imprisonment]

passed Virgil by” caused by the wrongful act of malicious prosecution. Id. That

type of damage continued into the Traveler’s policy period.

             In coming to their conclusion, the Sixth Circuit analyzed Travelers

Indemnity Company v. Mitchell, 925 F.3d 236 (5th Cir. 2019), which interpreted

the exact same policy language as in St. Paul. The Fifth Circuit noted:

                  The . . . policy provides coverage for “injury or
             damage that . . . happens while this agreement is in

                                        -17-
             effect.” That temporal requirement applies only to the
             injury. The two other requirements for coverage – that
             the injury resulted from the insured’s “law enforcement
             activities” and was “caused by a wrongful act that is
             committed while conducting law enforcement
             operations” – do not have a temporal limitation. [The
             insurer] thus bargained for an injury-based trigger of
             coverage, not an act-based trigger.

Id. at 241. The Mitchell court held that bodily injury coverage (which we do not

have in the present case) was triggered by the wrongfully accused’s multiple

physical and mental health issues while incarcerated. Id. at 242.

            In analyzing Mitchell, the St. Paul court omitted that the Mitchell court

held there was no personal injury coverage for the insured because the tort of

false imprisonment ends with the inception of legal process. Mitchell, 925 F.3d at

241. “The inception of legal process predated the Travelers policy period by

decades, so the policy does not cover injuries for a claim of false arrest or

imprisonment. . . . If there is a false arrest claim, damages for that claim cover the

time of detention up until issuance of process or arraignment, but not more.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Similarly, the tort of malicious

prosecution or civil rights violation for a wrongful prosecution is complete when

the charges are brought, even though damages continue to be sustained.

             The St. Paul ruling is inapposite to the current case. The Travelers

policy in St. Paul was triggered by both injury and damages sustained during the

term of the policy, unlike the Westport policy here which is triggered only by an

                                         -18-
offense or occurrence causing a personal injury during the policy period. Because

the damages continued into the Traveler’s policy period, the St. Paul case may

better fit into Virgil’s concept of a continuing claim or multiple trigger for

insurance coverage under the specific language of the Traveler’s policies.

             In its Order granting summary judgment to Westport, the circuit court

noted:

                    This case differs from St. Paul, where the policy
             agreed to pay for injury or damage that occurred during
             the policy period. . . . The St. Paul policy clearly stated
             that the damages must occur during the policy period, not
             simply the personal injury. Because the damages accrued
             during the policy period, the St. Paul policies were
             triggered.

(Emphasis in original.) The circuit court also noted that, per Davis v. Kentucky

Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, 495 S.W.3d 159 (Ky. App. 2016),

Kentucky law states a tort occurs when the alleged injury first manifests.

Kentucky has long recognized a separation of the injury itself and the damages

later sustained. “A legal injury must be a violation of some legal right, and is

distinct in meaning from the damage that may flow from the injury.” Combs v.

Hargis Bank & Trust Co., 27 S.W.2d 955, 956 (Ky. 1930). The damage is the

harm, or loss, sustained by reason of the injury.

             This understanding is not contrary to what a typical insured would

understand about insurance coverage. Anyone who has been in a car accident

                                         -19-
would understand they were injured by the actions of an at-fault driver when the

accident occurred. If they continued to have pain and suffering for years or had to

have a second surgery a year later, they would understand they could claim more

damages but would not have thought they had a new injury caused by the car

accident – rather a continuation of the initial harm. For Virgil, his injury, whatever

name might be given to it, occurred when he was wrongfully charged and

incarcerated in 1987. The fact he continued to suffer damages every day does not

alter this.

              Keeping with the rubric of malicious prosecution, the circuit court

outlined the elements of a malicious prosecution claim: (1) the institution or

continuation of original judicial proceedings, either civil or criminal, or of

administrative or disciplinary proceedings, (2) by, or at the instance, of the

plaintiff, (3) the termination of such proceedings in defendant’s favor, (4) malice in

the institution of such proceeding, (5) want or lack of probable cause for the

proceeding, and (6) the suffering of damage as a result of the proceeding.

Davidson v. Castner-Knott Dry Goods Co., Inc., 202 S.W.3d 597, 602 (Ky. App.

2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The circuit court

determined that, save for the termination of the proceedings in Virgil’s favor, all

the elements of malicious prosecution took place at the time of Virgil’s arrest, trial,

and initial incarceration.

                                         -20-
             An injury for insurance purposes is not the same as a cause of action

for that injury or the time limits for such a claim. For example, malicious

prosecution does not ripen into a cause of action subject to an applicable statute of

limitations until the successful termination of the prosecution. McDonough v.

Smith, 588 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2149, 204 L. Ed. 2d 506 (2019). This does not

change the analysis of what insurance coverage may apply. The personal injury or

wrong committed results in a cause of action in which damages may be awarded

against the wrongdoers. Insurance coverage answers the separate question of who

pays the damages, an insurance company pursuant to the terms of its contract, or

the wrongdoers themselves.

             We agree with the circuit court’s reasoning. Coverage under the

Travelers policy in St. Paul was triggered by either an injury or damages occurring

during the policy period provision. According to Westport’s Form 92, Westport

agreed to “pay those sums that the insured is legally obligated to pay as damages

because of . . . ‘personal injury’ to which this insurance applies.” According to

Westport’s 1000 Form, Westport agreed to “pay those sums that the insured

becomes legally obligated to pay as ‘damages’ because of . . . ‘personal injury’

caused by an ‘occurrence’ or offense, as more fully described in the definitions of

‘personal injury,’ in the course of your ‘law enforcement activity’ to which this

insurance applies.”

                                        -21-
             Westport’s policies are distinguishable from the Travelers policies as

personal injury coverage under Westport’s policies is only triggered by a personal

injury arising out of one or more of certain offenses occurring during the policy

period. Westport’s policies are not continuously triggered by damages

accumulating over the years like the Travelers policies.

             As Kentucky’s state courts have not addressed this precise question,

we look to out-of-state authority to assist in our analysis of what triggers coverage.

Many of the cases discuss the question in the context of the tort of malicious

prosecution. Again, this categorization is not controlling as personal injury may

take the form of multiple torts in these cases or as § 1983 liability. The common

question is when does the personal injury occur for insurance coverage.

             Most courts that have addressed this question have held the

commencement of a malicious prosecution is the event that triggers insurance

coverage. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. City of Zion, 18 N.E.3d 193, 198

(Ill. App. Ct. 2014). “Although there is no agreement on when the tort of

malicious prosecution occurs for insurance coverage purposes, the clear majority

of courts have held the tort occurs when the underlying criminal charges are filed.”

City of Erie, Pa. v. Guaranty Nat. Ins. Co., 109 F.3d 156, 160 (3d Cir. 1997)

(citations omitted). A common rationale for the “majority rule” is that the

                                         -22-
“essence,” “gist,” or “focus” of malicious prosecution is the filing of the

underlying charges. Id.

             This majority rule was first adopted by the Superior Court of New

Jersey in Muller Fuel Oil Company v. Insurance Company of North America, 232

A.2d 168 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967). In Muller Fuel, the relevant policy

provided that the insurer would pay “all sums which the insured shall become

Legally obligated to pay as damages.” Id. at 174. The insured in Muller Fuel was

sued for malicious prosecution based on a criminal prosecution that was terminated

in the accused’s favor during the policy period. Id. at 170. The insured argued

coverage was triggered by the accused’s acquittal; the insurer argued coverage was

triggered by the initiation of prosecution proceedings. Id. at 170-71. The court

rejected the insured’s argument, reasoning that “damage flows immediately from

the tortious act” of filing a criminal complaint with malice and without probable

cause. Id. at 174. The court added, “In a claim based on malicious prosecution the

damage begins to flow from the very commencement of the tortious conduct – the

making of the criminal complaint. Thus, wrong and damage are practically

contemporaneous, although the passage of time can magnify the damage.” Id. at

175.

             In Royal Indemnity Company v. Werner, 979 F.2d 1299 (8th Cir.

       1992), the

                                         -23-
relevant policy agreed to cover claims brought against the policyholder for

damages due to “personal injury . . . caused by an occurrence” that happened

“during the policy period.” Appellant Werner had filed a lawsuit against his

former business partner for fraud. Id. at 1299. Werner’s fraud action was

dismissed, and the defendant subsequently filed a malicious prosecution suit

against Werner. Id.

               Werner demanded that Royal Indemnity defend and indemnify him in

the malicious prosecution suit. Id. Royal Indemnity refused on the ground that the

“occurrence” causing the “personal injury” was the filing of the fraud suit by

Werner and that no coverage was provided since the occurrence arose outside the

policy period. Id. at 1299-1300. The Eighth Circuit held the term “personal

injury” is “likely intended to describe the time when harm begins to ensue, when

injury occurs to the person[.]” Id. at 1300. The court reasoned Werner’s fraud suit

was when harm began to ensue and when injury occurred to Werner’s former

partner. Id.

               Many other cases may be found accepting the majority view. We

point out that our nearby sister states with similar insurance law principles have

adopted the majority view. See, e.g., TIG Insurance Company v. City of Elkhart,

122 F. Supp. 3d 795 (N.D. Ind. 2015); City of Lee’s Summit v. Missouri Public

Entity Risk Management, 390 S.W.3d 214 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012). We will conclude

                                        -24-
this discussion with a case involving the same policy language because the case

involved Westport’s predecessor company using the same forms, during the same

years as in this case, and with similar facts.

             In Coregis Insurance Company v. City of Harrisburg, No. 1:03-cv-

00920, 2006 WL 860710 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2006), an unpublished case from the

United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, the court

analyzed a policy with virtually the same language as the Westport policies.

Coregis had issued policies to the City of Harrisburg during the period between

1997 and 2001. Id. at *2. The City was named as a defendant in a civil rights

lawsuit initiated by a plaintiff who was arrested in 1974 and later exonerated in

2003. Id. at *6.

             Coregis denied coverage on the ground that the allegations set forth in

the civil rights lawsuit concerned acts and injuries that first occurred in the 1970s,

and not during any periods covered by any of Coregis’ insurance policies at issue.

Id. at *4. The court determined Coregis was not obligated to provide the City of

Harrisburg with a defense in the civil rights lawsuit under any of the Coregis

policies because the injuries pleaded in that litigation first occurred years prior to

any of the applicable policy periods. Id. at *12. The fact that the plaintiff in the

civil rights lawsuit may have had injuries or damages that extended into the

respective policy periods did not change the court’s analysis.

                                          -25-
             We are aware of authority to the effect of providing coverage under

the wording of the policies in question. But such cases address allegations of

affirmative wrongful conduct during the policy period which may be considered a

new injury. For example, giving false testimony in a post-conviction hearing may

be considered a new personal injury. Siehl v. City of Johnstown, No. 3:18-cv-

00077-LPL, 2022 WL 4341364 (W.D. Pa. 2022). The Complaint in this case

contains no such allegations, and the record is devoid of such evidence.

             Another contention is that the Newport Insureds should have come

forward after the initial personal injury of the wrongful prosecution. Continued

concealment or taking no action did not cause a new personal injury. Sarsfield v.

Great American Ins. Co. of New York, 833 F. Supp. 2d 125, 130 (D. Mass. 2008).

While any failure to come forward is reprehensible and may well have other

serious consequences, it is not a new personal injury. There is no constitutional

right to exculpatory evidence after trial. See District Attorney’s Office for the

Third Judicial District v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 68, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2319-20, 174

L. Ed. 2d 38 (2009). See also Gavitt v. Born, 835 F.3d 623, 647-48 (6th Cir.

2016). The wrong had already been done, and the damages continued from that

original wrong.

                                         -26-
                                 CONCLUSION

            The circuit court did not err when it determined Westport has no

contractual obligation to defend the Newport Insureds in the Virgil Lawsuit. The

personal injury of a wrongful prosecution of Virgil did not occur within the

Westport policy periods. Therefore, the Order of the Campbell Circuit Court is

AFFIRMED.

            ALL CONCUR.

                                        -27-
CASE NO. 2022-CA-0384-MR     BRIEFS FOR APPELLEES:
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:
                             William B. Orberson
Jason C. Kuhlman             Ryan D. Nafziger
Fort Mitchell, Kentucky      Louisville, Kentucky

                             Adam H. Fleischer
CASE NO. 2022-CA-0415-MR     Kevin F. Harris
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:        Chicago, Illinois

Alexander T. Brown
Kansas City, Missouri

Amy Robinson Staples
Shelbyville, Kentucky

ORAL ARGUMENT FOR            ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANTS:                  APPELLEES:

Alexander T. Brown           Adam H. Fleischer
Kansas City, Missouri        Chicago, Illinois

                           -28-