Court Opinion

ID: 9684049
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:45:34.748026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:48.840979
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Justice KELLER.
Because the majority declares that for purposes of KRS 524.100 blood cannot be physical evidence until it is withdrawn from a person’s body, I dissent. Just as seizure of a murder weapon or illegal drugs does not change those items into evidence, the seizure of blood by withdrawing it from a defendant’s body similarly does not change its status. It is the object’s involvement in or its relation to the commission of a crime, not the police’s seizure of it that alters its status and thus makes it “evidence.” The fact that the police take custody of blood does not metaphysically transform it into physical evidence. This, however, is the clear alehemical implication of the majority opinion, which uses police seizure as a philosopher’s stone to transmute blood into evidence.
Physical evidence is defined for the purposes of KRS 524.100 as “any article, object, document, record, or other thing of physical substance.”1 Blood, even though not yet drawn or analyzed, is undisputedly a “thing of physical substance.” The definition does not support the majority opinion’s conclusion that it must be drawn from the body in order to constitute evidence. And the fact that it does not have to be drawn from the body to be altered solidifies my view. I would note that search warrants often issue for the purpose of seizing and testing a person’s blood and determining its alcohol concentration.2 The blood is seized as evidence that might be used in the prosecution of a crime and “[t]he taking of a blood sample from a criminal suspect for testing constitutes a search for real or physical evidence ....”3 Where the alcohol concentration of a criminal suspect’s blood is relevant, the suspect’s blood is evidence both before and after it is drawn for testing.
A person tampers with physical evidence “when believing that an official proceeding is pending” or may be pending, he or she “conceals, removes or alters physical evidence he [or she] believes is about to be produced or used in the ... proceeding with the intent to impair its veracity or availability in the ... proceeding.” 4 The commentary to the statute states that “[i]f *424the defendant believed the evidence was to be produced or used in a proceeding and his actions were designed to prevent that from occurring, the elements of proof are satisfied.”5 And I believe the evidence supports the jury’s finding that this happened in Appellant’s case.
The majority’s sole basis for holding otherwise is State v. Peplow.6 However, since Peplow is devoid of any evidence of the specific intent to conceal or alter blood alcohol concentration, I do not find it instructive or applicable. In Peplow, the defendant had several drinks and then proceeded to drive his truck through several fences at the expense of his truck’s radiator. Since this rendered the vehicle inoperable and his house was close by, Peplow staggered home and continued his drinking. After three shots of whiskey he walked to a local bar for a beer where he was eventually apprehended by the police, who charged him with driving under the influence and tampering because he had consumed additional alcohol after the collision. Since any intent Peplow could have had with respect to altering his blood alcohol concentration would not have been in his favor, the Montana Supreme Court’s decision that the tampering charge did not apply was reasonable. What was not reasonable was its insistence that blood and its alcohol concentration cannot be evidence until drawn, despite the state’s definition of evidence as a “ ‘record, document or thing.’ ”7 In interpreting the definition, the trial court stated, “ T can’t imagine a more broad term than ‘thing.’ That’s not defined in the code so I think we have to apply its ordinary meaning and that would cover just about anything.’ ”8 The trial court was correct.
As in Kentucky, Montana’s tampering with physical evidence statute requires that the evidence be concealed or altered with the purpose to impair its veracity or availability. There is no evidence that Pe-plow consumed three shots of whiskey and half a beer in order to skew the results of any blood alcohol test, especially since his actions would not have skewed the test results in his favor.
In Appellant’s case, he was on probation and recognized that he faced probation revocation and possibly additional prison time if he was discovered intoxicated at the scene of the collision. In an effort to avoid the consequences, Appellant fled and covered his tracks by having his brother accept responsibility for driving the car. Appellant knew a proceeding would be instituted against him and he hid to avoid prosecution for driving while intoxicated and violating his probation. The jury’s finding that he did so to alter the alcohol concentration of his blood is a reasonable inference based on the evidence.9 If Appellant had truly wrecked due only to the road conditions he would not have left his fatally injured sister and niece and would not have continued to insist that his brother was the driver when he was questioned by police.
The Court in Peplow was concerned that if blood alcohol concentration could be considered evidence before blood was drawn, *425then “any driver who eats, sleeps or even receives medical treatment ... after an accident could also be accused of tampering with their blood alcohol level.”10 But if a driver does those things in an effort to alter his or her blood alcohol level, then he or she has most certainly tampered with physical evidence. Returning to the commentary discussed earlier, “[i]f the defendant believed the evidence was to be produced or used in a proceeding and his actions were designed to prevent that from occurring, the elements of proof are satisfied.” 11 I believe the elements were satisfied in Appellant’s case.
For the foregoing reasons I dissent and would affirm Appellant’s conviction under KRS 524.100.
WINTERSHEIMER, J., joins this dissenting opinion.

. KRS 524.010.

. E.g., Love v. Commonwealth, 55 S.W.3d 816, 820 (Ky.2001) ("Pursuant to the search warrant, the police drew a sample of blood and collected a urine specimen to determine if Appellant was intoxicated at the time of the accident.”).

. Farmer v. Commonwealth, 6 S.W.3d 144, 145-146 (Ky.App.1999) (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966)).

. KRS 524.100 (emphasis added).

. KRS 524.100 Kentucky Crime Commission/LRC Commentary (1974).

. 307 Mont. 172, 36 P.3d 922 (2001).

. 36 P.3d at 927.

. Id.

. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1835-1836, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) ("The officer in the present case, however, might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened 'the destruction of evidence.' ”).

. Id. at 929.

. KRS 524.100 Kentucky Crime Commission/LRC Commentary (emphasis added).