Court Opinion

ID: 9589923
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:50:15.755343+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:22.915879
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority’s affirmance of the grant of summary judgment in favor of David Edwards (Father) on the claim of Bobby Edwards. However, I believe that the trial court also correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Father on the claim of Bill Edwards (Son). Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent to the majority’s reversal of that order of the trial court.
OCGA § 53-12-93 (a) defines a “constructive trust” as a trust which is
implied whenever the circumstances are such that the person holding legal title to property, either from fraud or otherwise, cannot enjoy the beneficial interest in the property without violating some established principle of equity.
Such a trust is “sometimes referred to as a trust ex maleficio. . . .” Mays v. Perry, 196 Ga. 729, 734 (27 SE2d 698) (1943). The law is clear that, insofar as real property is concerned, the principle of constructive trusts “can never be applied when there is nothing more than a broken verbal promise (otherwise the statute of frauds would be virtually abrogated). . . .” Mays v. Perry, supra at 735. “[I]n order for *783such a promise to be the basis of a constructive trust it must have been made with the intention of being broken and for the purpose of thereby obtaining title. . . .” Mays v. Perry, supra at 735-736.
[WJhere, as here, the question involves a deed to land, and the legal title to the land is sought to be recovered by the enforcement of an oral agreement to reconvey it, fraud must have existed contemporaneously with the acquisition of the land by the one who is sought to be charged as trustee ex maleficio. [Cit.]
Bennett v. Bennett, 212 Ga. 128, 129 (91 SE2d 29) (1956). See also Davis v. Davis, 237 Ga. 448 (228 SE2d 838) (1976) (directed verdict).
Son’s maternal grandmother may have promised to give or leave the land to him, but she never made an inter vivos gift to him and she did make an inter vivos conveyance of the land to Son’s mother. See Tucker v. Addison, 265 Ga. 642 (1) (458 SE2d 653) (1995). Father may have urged Son’s grandmother to make this conveyance, but he did not obtain title to the land as a result, since the land was conveyed not to him, but to his wife. Son contends that it was his grandmother’s intent that he have the homeplace after the death of his parents. If that were his grandmother’s intent, however, she could have provided for life estates in her daughter and son-in-law, at the termination of which Son would be vested with the remainder fee interest. She did not do this, but conveyed the land to her daughter in fee simple. Accordingly, with regard to Son’s grandmother, his allegation of a constructive trust shows no more than a broken oral promise to give or leave the land to him.
Son also may have been promised the land by his mother, but she never made an inter vivos gift of the land to him and provided in her will that the land would go to Father. There is no evidence that Father urged his wife to leave the land to him rather than Son and, even if there were, there is no evidence that Father did so fraudulently. Son contends that it was his mother’s intent that he have the homeplace after she and Father died. If that had been his mother’s intent, however, she could have conveyed the property to him, but reserved a life estate in herself and Father or devised a vested remainder to Son following the termination of a life estate in Father. Instead, she retained title throughout her life and then devised the land to Father in fee simple. Accordingly, as to Son’s mother, his allegation of a constructive trust shows only an oral promise which was not fulfilled by the provisions of her will.
It may seem unfair that Son’s two siblings obtained a portion of the ‘Tamily” land, and Son has not. However, Son’s siblings received their portions of the land by means of a written conveyance from *784their mother, but no title has been conveyed or devised to Son. Mother devised her remaining land to Father and Father now owns it. If Father refuses to convey the land to Son, then Son is entitled to the land only if a constructive trust can be implied against Father. A constructive trust cannot be implied if Son can show nothing more than a mere broken oral promise. There is absolutely no evidence that Father acquired his title to the property by means of a promise which he never intended to keep. Even assuming that Father broke an oral promise to Son’s grandmother to convey the homeplace to her grandson, there is nothing to show that his promise was false when he made it.
Decided February 24, 1997
Reconsideration denied April 3, 1997.
The failure to perform a verbal promise made by the sole heir at law of one desiring to dispose of her estate by will to third persons, that he will dispose of her estate as she desires, can not make the heir at law, in case of an intestacy, a trustee ex maleficio as to the property inherited by him, in the absence of actual fraud.
Cassels v. Finn, 122 Ga. 33, 36 (49 SE 749) (1905). Moreover, as previously noted, Father obtained his title from his wife, rather than Son’s grandmother, and there is no evidence that Father made a fraudulent promise to his wife that he would convey the property to Son. If Son can recover under the evidence in this case, the title of any owner of land can be challenged successfully on the basis of an alleged oral agreement made at some time in the past to convey title at some time in the future. It certainly is not inequitable for Father to retain title to land that he obtained non-fraudulently, since it would violate the statute of frauds for Son to take title without any writing to support his ownership. To hold that summary judgment in favor of Father is unauthorized is, in my opinion, a clear abrogation of OCGA § 13-5-30 (4), which requires “[a]ny contract for sale of lands, or any interest in, or concerning lands” to be in writing. Mays v. Perry, supra at 736. Accordingly, I dissent to the majority’s reversal of the grant of summary judgment in favor of Father against Son’s constructive trust claim.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Benham joins in this opinion.
*785John T. Brown, for appellants.
Davidson, Hopkins & Booth, Joseph H. Booth, for appellee.