Court Opinion

ID: 9849615
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:43:18.211047+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:20.070983
License: Public Domain

Blackburn, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in the judgment of the majority. I write separately to stress the necessity that sanctions and remedies under OCGA § 17-16-6 be applied equally to the defendant and the State.
OCGA § 17-16-6 provides that, if the State fails to comply with discovery requirements, “the court may order the [Sjtate to permit the discovery or inspection, interview of the witness, grant a continuance, or, upon a showing of prejudice and bad faith, prohibit the [Sjtate from introducing the evidence not disclosed or presenting the witness not disclosed, or may enter such other order as it deems just *564under the circumstances.” The statute goes on to apply the same standard to a defendant who fails to follow applicable discovery procedures.
“This statute clearly reflects two principal goals. First, and most important, any remedy fashioned by the trial court must be designed to restore to [the State or to a] defendant all those rights which the legislature intended for [the State or] the defendant to have had [the opposing party] met [his or] its burden under the statute, and to correct the prejudice [to the State or] to the defendant caused by the [opposing party’s] failure to perform . . . mandatory discovery obligations, regardless of whether the [party failing to do so] acted in bad faith. Second, the statute clearly contemplates the imposition of punitive sanctions, including the exclusion of evidence, to deter [a party] from violating its discovery obligations. This deterrent goal is important because, if the most serious consequence of a failure to perform is the mere grant of a continuance, the [parties] would have little incentive to ensure that [they] fully [comply] with . . . discovery obligations.” Hammitt v. State, 225 Ga. App. 21, 23 (482 SE2d 437) (1997) (Blackburn, J., concurring specially).
On its face, OCGA § 17-16-6 assumes, as it must, that the State and a criminal defendant begin on a level playing field at the outset of trial. Each party has similar remedies against the other should there be a deviation from the standard discovery procedure set forth under the Georgia Code. If OCGA § 17-16-6 is neutrally applied in practice to both the State and criminal defendants, then the goals of the statute are satisfied.
On the other hand, if the courts do not apply sanctions or remedies equally to the defendant or the State for comparable breaches of duty, the goals of the statute will be fatally undermined. This Court has consistently required defendants to seek continuances when confronted with the State’s failure to meet its duty under OCGA § 17-16-6. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 226 Ga. App. 313, 314 (1) (485 SE2d 837) (1997); Franklin v. State, 224 Ga. App. 578 (2) (481 SE2d 852) (1997); Bell v. State, 224 Ga. App. 191, 192 (480 SE2d 241) (1997).
On the other hand, this Court routinely affirms the trial court’s exclusion of evidence where it is the defendant who has failed to meet its burden under OCGA § 17-16-6, without requiring the State to first seek a continuance of the case. While the statute is neutral as to the parties, the practice is to apply the statute to the benefit of the State. What is good for the goose may indeed be good for the gander, but only if they start from a position of equality on a level playing field.
I am authorized to state that Judge Eldridge joins in this special concurrence.
*565Decided May 18, 1998.
John D. Staggs, for appellant.
Richard E. Currie, District Attorney, James D. Lamb, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.