Court Opinion

ID: 9912455
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-22 15:05:33.261631+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:59:32.509108
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  23-P-63

                                  COMMONWEALTH

                                       vs.

                              JUNIAS JEAN-LOUIS.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       Following a jury trial in the Superior Court in 2005, the

 defendant was found guilty of assault with intent to rape,

 kidnapping, indecent assault and battery on a person over the

 age of fourteen, assault and battery, threatening to commit a

 crime, and intimidation of a witness.           Prior to sentencing, the

 trial judge granted the defendant a new trial based on the

 procedure the judge had required the parties to follow in

 exercising peremptory challenges to jurors.             After the

 Commonwealth appealed, the order for new trial was reversed.

 See Commonwealth v. Jean-Louis, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 740 (2007).

 In 2011, a panel of this court affirmed the defendant's

 convictions in an unpublished decision.            See Commonwealth v.

 Jean-Louis, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 1119 (2011), cert. denied, 568

 U.S. 1174 (2013).      Ten years later, after his first motion for
new trial filed by a second appellate attorney was denied in

2013, the defendant, through a third appellate attorney, filed a

second motion for new trial, this time alleging (1) that his

original appellate counsel (appellate counsel) was ineffective

for not pursuing an issue regarding limitations on cross-

examination of the victim and (2) that both trial and appellate

counsel were ineffective for failing to raise and pursue,

respectively, an issue relative to his recorded statement to

police.   The motion judge, who was not the trial judge, denied

the defendant's motion in a thorough, sixteen-page decision. 1

Concluding that neither counsel was ineffective and discerning

no error in the motion judge's denial of the defendant's motion

for new trial, we affirm.

     Background.   We recite the facts as the jury could have

found them, reserving certain details for further discussion.

On the night of May 8, 2003, the victim was talking on her cell

phone in the lobby of her apartment building.    The defendant

entered the lobby with the victim's older brother and another

man whom the victim did not know.    Prior to that night, the

victim had rejected the defendant's romantic overtures on a

couple of occasions.   When the victim walked toward the

stairwell to go up to her apartment, the defendant followed her

1 The trial judge had retired by the time this motion for new
trial was filed.

                                 2
(the victim's brother and the other man had taken the elevator).

When the victim declined the defendant's advances, he became

verbally and then physically aggressive toward her.    The

defendant trapped the victim in the stairwell, where he sexually

assaulted and beat her.    When the victim attempted to call the

police, he threw her cell phone on the ground and threatened to

shoot her if she screamed.    Eventually, as she struggled against

the defendant, the victim began screaming and "slamming the door

harder and harder . . . so someone could hear [her]."    The

defendant ran up the stairs and the victim fled outside.     She

ran, still screaming, past a Massachusetts Bay Transportation

Authority station and a security guard, to a nearby park where

she saw police officers.

     Police were in the area in response to a 911 call from the

security guard, who heard the victim screaming.    The officers

described the victim as "hysterical" and "really physically

shaking."   A detective who interviewed her the following morning

noted that the victim had a "fat lip" and scratches on both

sides of her neck as well as on her arms.

     Discussion.   The parties disagree as to which standard of

review applies in this appeal.    The defendant argues that our

review of the motion judge's decision is de novo "[b]ecause the

motion judge did not preside over the trial or conduct an

evidentiary hearing . . . and the only relevant evidence . . .

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consisted of affidavits and other documentary evidence."

Commonwealth v. Mazza, 484 Mass. 539, 547 (2020).   See

Commonwealth v. Duguay, 492 Mass. 520, 531 (2023) ("where the

motion judge neither presided over the trial nor conducted an

evidentiary hearing, we are in as good a position as the motion

judge to assess the documentary evidence found within the

record, thus allowing this court to review the judge's decision

de novo").   The Commonwealth counters that we should review the

motion judge's decision for error of law or abuse of discretion.

See Commonwealth v. Gibson, 492 Mass. 559, 567-568 (2023)

(motion judge, who was not trial judge, "did not abuse her

discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial"

after nonevidentiary hearing); Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 492

Mass. 469, 474-475 (2023) ("In analyzing the defendant's motion

for a new trial where the motion judge neither presided at trial

nor held an evidentiary hearing, we examine [his] conclusion

only to determine whether there has been a significant error of

law or other abuse of discretion, although as he did not assess

the credibility of any witnesses, we regard ourselves in as good

a position as the motion judge to assess the trial record"

[quotations and citation omitted]).   We need not resolve the

dispute because the claims fail even under de novo review, the

standard more favorable to the defendant.

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     "A defendant has a heavy burden to establish ineffective

assistance of counsel sufficient to warrant a new trial."

Commonwealth v. Lao, 450 Mass. 215, 221 (2007).     The defendant

must show not only that counsel's behavior fell "measurably

below that which might be expected from an ordinary fallible

lawyer," but also that the attorney's conduct "likely deprived

the defendant of an otherwise available, substantial ground of

defen[s]e."    Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).

See Commonwealth v. Sowell, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 229, 231-232

(1993) (same standard applies for ineffective assistance of both

trial and appellate counsel).

     1.    Cross-examination of the victim.   At trial, the

defendant objected when the judge initially did not allow the

defendant to cross-examine the victim about a potential civil

lawsuit.    After trial counsel asked him to reconsider, the judge

ruled that the defendant was permitted to ask the victim whether

she had contacted a law firm and was seeking to file a civil

suit against the management company of her apartment building

"based on this incident."    The defendant objected to the

limitation, but subsequently cross-examined the victim on her

potential civil lawsuit and argued to the jury that contemplated

money damages gave the victim a motive to lie about the nature

and extent of her physical injuries.    The defendant now claims

that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to assert

                                  5
error in the judge's limitation on cross-examination.    We

disagree.

     To begin, we are convinced that appellate counsel's failure

to raise the cross-examination issue was a strategic decision.

The defendant supported his motion for new trial with an

affidavit by appellate counsel, signed on November 6, 2020,

stating that she "never made any strategic or other decision to

forgo pursuing an appellate issue based on the limitations that

the trial judge had placed on [the defendant's] ability to cross

examine the . . . victim regarding the [civil suit]."    However,

the same attorney wrote to the defendant on October 20, 2009,

that she was not pursuing the judge's ruling on cross-

examination on appeal based on her analysis of the viability of

the argument:

     "Although [trial counsel] wasn't allowed to ask every
     question that he wanted, he was allowed to inform the jury
     that [the victim] had spoken to a law firm and was
     considering suing the building management and that the jury
     should know that she could be biased in her testimony
     because of this. So [trial] counsel fully addressed this
     issue." 2

2 In her detailed four-page letter, appellate counsel provided
the defendant with an "update on all of the different legal
issues that we've discussed, and the legal issues that I am
going to raise in your brief for the direct appeal." It
included an overview of three issues to be raised on appeal,
seven issues that would not be raised, and four issues that
could be the basis of a motion for new trial. Appellate counsel
provided analysis for each item on the list, including her
assessment of its likelihood of success.

                                6
     This assessment was not manifestly unreasonable.   At trial,

the defense focused on relatively minor inconsistencies to

suggest that the victim had fabricated or at least greatly

exaggerated her interaction with the defendant, that her brother

may have physically assaulted her, and that she may have been

motivated by some nebulous possibility of suing her apartment's

management company.   In contrast, the Commonwealth's case was

strong:   the victim was seen running and screaming from her

apartment building; she immediately reported the sexual and

physical assault to police; she knew and identified her

assailant; the victim's physical injuries were consistent with

her description of the assault; the defendant made admissions in

a recorded interview; and, finally, the victim did not explore

any civil remedy until nearly one year after the crime was

reported.   It was unlikely that more expansive cross-examination

on the victim's potential civil suit would have materially

impacted the jury's verdict.   See Commonwealth v. Butler, 464

Mass. 706, 720 n.16 (2013) ("[W]innowing out weak arguments in

favor of strong arguments is a virtue of appellate advocacy").

     Moreover, although a judge may not foreclose reasonable

cross-examination into a witness's bias or prejudice, see

Commonwealth v. Magdalenski, 471 Mass. 1019, 1019 (2015), it was

within the trial judge's broad discretion to set limits on the

scope and extent of questions regarding the victim's potential

                                 7
civil suit.   See Commonwealth v. Martin, 434 Mass. 1016, 1017

(2001).   Here, the trial judge did not bar all inquiry into the

subject of the victim's potential civil action.      Trial counsel

asked the victim if she discussed with attorneys a civil suit

"concerning in some way the allegations that [she] made" and

whether she intended to file one after the trial.      Thus, there

was no legal error on which appellate counsel could have based a

successful appellate argument, and no substantial risk of a

miscarriage of justice.    See Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 446 Mass.

435, 442 (2006) (strategic or tactical decision by counsel not

considered ineffective assistance unless manifestly unreasonable

when made).

     2.   Failure to request jury instruction.     On May 9, 2003,

the day after the assault, the defendant went to the Cambridge

police department "to correct the record" regarding the victim's

allegations against him.   A recorded interview of the

defendant's statement was played at trial, in which the

defendant denied that he "put [his] hand down [the victim's]

pants [and] touched her vagina."       In her closing argument to the

jury, the prosecutor asserted that the defendant's statements

corresponded with the victim's allegation, and he would not have

known those details unless he committed the sexual assault.

Although Miranda warnings were given to the defendant before

police began recording the interview, trial counsel did not

                                   8
request the jury be instructed that "they should weigh evidence

of the defendant's alleged statement with great caution and

care."   Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423, 448

(2004) (DiGiambattista instruction).

     The defendant argues that both trial and appellate counsel

were ineffective for failing to pursue issues relating to a

DiGiambattista instruction.   In his motion for new trial, the

defendant asserted, "[t]here is now evidence that, before

beginning the recording, the police described the details of the

victim's allegations to [the defendant]."   However, the only

"evidence" he produced was his own and his wife's self-serving

affidavits, written more than eighteen years after the events

they described.   The detective who interviewed the defendant

initially testified he was uncertain if the allegations were

mentioned at the beginning of the process, but then clarified

that the defendant was never told "that the allegation was

attempted digital rape."   Trial counsel had no recollection that

the defendant told him that police had given him details of the

crime before they began recording, despite "discussing with [the

defendant] everything that was said from the time he began

speaking with the police to the time he learned he was being

charged."   We thus agree with the motion judge that that the

affidavits were not credible or sufficient to warrant an

evidentiary hearing.   See Commonwealth v. Lopez, 426 Mass. 657,

                                 9
663 (1998) (judge ruling on motion for new trial "may discredit

untrustworthy affidavits").   See also Commonwealth v. Denis, 442

Mass. 617, 633-634 (2004) (no evidentiary hearing required

because defendant's self-serving affidavits not sufficient to

raise substantial issue).

     Furthermore, we disagree with the defendant's claim that

the absence of a DiGiambattista instruction "deprived [him] of a

way to counter one of the prosecutor's strongest arguments."

The prosecutor's comment on the defendant's statement regarding

the details of the assault occupied fifteen lines of a twenty-

three page closing argument that primarily focused on the

victim's testimony.   Cf. Commonwealth v. Lester, 486 Mass. 239,

249 (2020) (closing argument made no possible difference to

jury's conclusions where prosecutor's misstatements comprised

thirteen words of thirty-three page closing argument).

     We therefore conclude that trial counsel was not

ineffective for failing to request a DiGiambattista instruction,

                                10
nor was appellate counsel ineffective for failing to raise the

issue on appeal.    See Acevedo, 446 Mass. at 442.

                                      Order denying motion for new
                                        trial affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Shin, Brennan &
                                        Hodgens, JJ. 3),

                                      Clerk

Entered:    December 22, 2023.

3   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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