Court Opinion

ID: 9730029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:57:49.744138+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:03.320625
License: Public Domain

GIVAN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this ease. I refer to my dissent in the case of Mark Jenkins v. State, (1981) Ind., 424 N.E.2d 1002, handed down by this Court August 18, 1981. The situation in the case at bar is similar to the situation in the Jenkins case. The jury foreman requested of the court further instructions as to the meaning of “competency of witnesses” and “reasonable doubt”. In response to that inquiry, the trial judge, over the objection of the defendant, gave an additional instruction, number 17, which is quoted in the majority opinion.
In addition to the reasons I gave in Jenkins for my dissent which I believe are equally applicable to the ease at bar, I would also point out that the trial court’s instruction, number 17, given in response to the inquiry of the jury foreman was completely innocuous. There was no attempt on the part of the trial judge to add anything to his former instructions. There was no definition of the meaning of any terminology but a bare admonition to the jurors that all witnesses who testified are presumed to be competent and their credibility is a matter for the jury to determine. I am at a total loss to see how such a statement on the part of the trial judge during deliberation could prejudice the defendant.
I agree with the cases cited by the majority in support of their position and I firmly believe that we should adhere to a set of rules concerning the instructions of juries. However, I do not believe a set of otherwise good rules should be administered in a blind adherence to the letter of the rule in the absence of obvious jeopardy to the person charged with the crime. In my dissent in Jenkins, I opted for a reasonable response of a trial judge to a reasonable inquiry of a deliberating jury.
In the case at bar, had the judge attempted to answer the questions posed by the jury I would have taken the same position I took in Jenkins; however, the trial judge in this case did not go as far as the trial judge in Jenkins. The trial judge made no direct response to the questions. His so-called instruction, number 17, was really little more than a statement that the jury should rely on the initial instructions given. I concur with the majority opinion in the other questions resolved in view of the upcoming new trial.
I would, therefore, affirm the trial court.