Court Opinion

ID: 9947235
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 13:02:27.404228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:16.824631
License: Public Domain

***********************************************
    The “officially released” date that appears near the be-
ginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-
lished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was
released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-
ginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions
and petitions for certification is the “officially released”
date appearing in the opinion.

   All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut
Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of
discrepancies between the advance release version of an
opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut
Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports
or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to
be considered authoritative.

   The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the
opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and
bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not
be reproduced and distributed without the express written
permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publica-
tions, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
***********************************************
        NORTHEAST BUILDING SUPPLY, LLC v.
            MAUREEN MORRILL ET AL.
                   (AC 45845)
                        Moll, Clark and Seeley, Js.

                                  Syllabus

The plaintiff, N Co., appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial
   court denying its application for a prejudgment remedy pursuant to
   statute (§ 52-278a et seq.). N Co.’s proposed complaint alleged common-
   law and statutory vexatious litigation claims that arose out of an earlier
   action to which N Co. was not a party. The trial court in the earlier
   action had rendered judgment for H Co., the plaintiff in that action, and
   it awarded attorney’s fees to H Co. H Co. thereafter changed its name
   to B Co., and B Co. assigned the judgment obtained in the earlier action
   and all related claims arising out of such litigation to N Co. The defen-
   dants named in the present action were either defendants in the earlier
   action or attorneys and law firms who represented those defendants.
   The court in the present action thereafter denied N Co.’s application,
   concluding that its proposed vexatious litigation claims were barred by
   the doctrine of collateral estoppel and that the payment of any judgment
   rendered against the law firm defendants would be adequately secured
   by insurance. Held that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
   over N Co.’s application for a prejudgment remedy, as N Co. lacked
   standing to bring the application predicated on its vexatious litigation
   claims: N Co.’s claims fell squarely within the category of tort claims
   that may not be assigned, as its alleged damages included, inter alia,
   claims of injuries to H Co.’s business reputation and attorney’s fees
   necessary for the defense of claims against H Co., which were personal
   in nature and accrued only to H Co. and not to N Co.; accordingly, this
   court reversed the trial court’s judgment and directed the trial court to
   dismiss N Co.’s application.
      Argued November 14, 2023—officially released March 5, 2024

                            Procedural History

   Application for a prejudgment remedy seeking the
attachment or garnishment of certain of the defendants’
property, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Waterbury, where the court, Pierson, J.,
denied the application, and the plaintiff appealed to this
court. Reversed; judgment directed.
   Bruce L. Elstein, for the appellant (plaintiff).
  Kenneth A. Votre, for the appellees (named defendant
et al.).
  Jonathan C. Zellner, for the appellees (defendant
Bruce W. Diamond et al.).
  Lorey Rives Leddy, with whom, on the brief, was
David P. Friedman, for the appellees (defendants Pull-
man & Comley, LLC, et al.).
                         Opinion

   CLARK, J. The plaintiff, Northeast Building Supply,
LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court deny-
ing the application for a prejudgment remedy that it
filed in accordance with General Statutes § 52-278a et
seq. against the defendants, Maureen Morrill, Clifford
Jones, Pullman & Comley, LLC, Attorney Irve Goldman,
Attorney Bruce Diamond, and the Law Office of Bruce
W. Diamond, LLC. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that
the trial court erred in denying its application for a
prejudgment remedy when it concluded that (1) collat-
eral estoppel barred the vexatious litigation claims it
sought to bring against the defendants and (2) the attor-
ney and law firm defendants—Pullman & Comley, LLC,
Goldman, Diamond, and the Law Office of Bruce W.
Diamond, LLC—had adequate insurance to secure any
judgment that might be rendered against them.
   The defendants argue that the court properly denied
the plaintiff’s application for a prejudgment remedy.
They also, for the first time on appeal, raise a jurisdic-
tional claim. They claim that the plaintiff lacked stand-
ing to assert the vexatious litigation claims against the
defendants because those claims were assigned to the
plaintiff from a different entity, Northeast Builders Sup-
ply & Home Centers, LLC (Home Centers). The defen-
dants argue that the plaintiff’s vexatious litigation
claims constitute tort claims that involve alleged per-
sonal injuries unique to Home Centers. They further
contend that Connecticut law makes clear that such
tort claims may not be assigned. Consequently, the
defendants maintain that the plaintiff lacks standing to
pursue its application for a prejudgment remedy.
  For the reasons that follow, we agree with the defen-
dants that the plaintiff lacks standing to pursue the
application for a prejudgment remedy and, conse-
quently, that the trial court was without subject matter
jurisdiction. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of
the trial court and remand the case to that court with
direction to render judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s
application.1
                            I
    We begin with an overview of the relevant facts and
procedural history of this case. On September 17, 2021,
the plaintiff filed an application for a prejudgment rem-
edy pursuant to General Statutes § 52-278c,2 alleging
that there was probable cause to believe that it would
recover at least $600,000 on the basis of its proposed,
unsigned writ of summons and complaint. The plain-
tiff’s proposed three count complaint against the defen-
dants alleged a common-law vexatious litigation claim,
a statutory vexatious litigation claim for double dam-
ages pursuant to General Statutes § 52-568 (1), and a
statutory vexatious litigation claim for treble damages
pursuant to § 52-568 (2), all arising out of an earlier
action to which the plaintiff was not a party. See North-
east Builders Supply & Home Centers, LLC v. RMM
Consulting, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of
Fairfield, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX (February 2, 2018),
aff’d, 202 Conn. App. 315, 245 A.3d 804, cert. denied,
336 Conn. 933, 248 A.3d 709 (2021) (RMM litigation).
   The RMM litigation to which the plaintiff was not a
party was commenced by Home Centers, a building
supply company, against RMM Consulting, LLC (RMM);
Todd Hill Properties, LLC; Morrill; and Jones (original
defendants) to recover damages for breach of contract
after the original defendants purportedly failed to make
payments owed for building materials sold to them pur-
suant to a credit agreement. See Northeast Builders
Supply & Home Centers, LLC v. RMM Consulting, LLC,
202 Conn. App. 315, 321, 245 A.3d 804, cert. denied, 336
Conn. 933, 248 A.3d 709 (2021). The credit agreement
entered into between Home Centers and the original
defendants was signed by Morrill, who was the sole
member of both RMM and Todd Hill Properties, LLC,
and by Jones, who is Morrill’s husband and a building
contractor, in their capacities as both buyers and per-
sonal guarantors. Id., 320. The defendant Diamond, the
principal of the defendant Law Office of Bruce Dia-
mond, LLC, represented the original defendants in the
RMM litigation. The defendant Goldman, an attorney
with the defendant Pullman & Comley, LLC, also repre-
sented Morrill and Jones in that action but only with
respect to the fifth special defense, which claimed that
the original defendants had not purchased any of the
goods and materials at issue from Home Centers.
   After lengthy litigation and a bench trial, the court,
Arnold, J., rendered judgment in favor of Home Centers
on its claims and on the original defendants’ counter-
claim. The court awarded Home Centers $68,886.58,
plus interest on the principal debt. See id., 328. The
court further indicated that it would schedule a postver-
dict hearing to determine ‘‘if the court would award
attorney’s fees and costs to the plaintiff and, if so, what
amounts may be reasonable.’’ In its memorandum of
law in support of attorney’s fees, Home Centers argued
that it was entitled to attorney’s fees exceeding the
amount its attorneys were entitled to in accordance
with the contingency fee arrangement it had entered
into with its attorneys because Home Centers and its
counsel expended significant time and resources
defending against what Home Centers argued were mer-
itless defenses. After a hearing, the court rejected Home
Centers’ claim that it was entitled to attorney’s fees in
excess of the amount it owed under the contingency
fee arrangement and awarded Home Centers a total of
$35,346.87 in attorney’s fees, which included $10,846.87
in accordance with the contingency fee agreement
between Home Centers and its counsel to prosecute
its case-in-chief, $9500 for the defense of the original
defendants’ counterclaim, and $15,000 for the represen-
tation of Home Centers’ interest in the United States
Bankruptcy Court.3
   The plaintiff’s unsigned, proposed complaint in sup-
port of its application for a prejudgment remedy in this
case alleges that, ‘‘[b]efore December 14, 2020, [Home
Centers] obtained a judgment against the defendants,
Morrill and Jones (among others)’’ and that, ‘‘[o]n or
about December 14, 2020, [Home Centers] changed its
name to Brilco [Capital Holdings, LLC (Brilco)].’’ The
unsigned complaint further alleges that the plaintiff has
standing because ‘‘[o]n or about August 10, 2021, Brilco,
[formerly known as Home Centers], assigned the judg-
ment obtained in the RMM litigation and all related
claims that arose out of or [were] related to such litiga-
tion to [the plaintiff].’’
   In October, 2021, the defendants Pullman & Comley,
LLC, Goldman, Diamond, and the Law Office of Bruce
W. Diamond, LLC (collectively, law firm defendants),
filed objections to the plaintiff’s application for a pre-
judgment remedy arguing, inter alia, that the doctrine
of collateral estoppel barred the plaintiff’s vexatious
litigation claims against them. They claimed that Judge
Arnold in the RMM litigation already found that the
original defendants ‘‘in good faith exercised their rights
and available remedies in defending [that] case,’’ and
that the pursuit of the fifth special defense reflected
a proper effort to use all the ‘‘tools’’ in the original
defendants’ ‘‘toolbox.’’ They further claimed that these
findings were fundamental to the trial court’s determi-
nation that Home Centers’ award of attorney’s fees was
limited to the amount due under the contingency fee
agreement and not based on an hourly rate. Accord-
ingly, they argued that the doctrine of collateral estop-
pel barred the plaintiff’s underlying vexatious litigation
claims and that the plaintiff therefore could not estab-
lish that there was probable cause that it would obtain
a judgment in the amount it sought in its application
for a prejudgment remedy. The law firm defendants
also argued that the plaintiff’s application should be
denied because they had ample insurance to cover any
judgment against them. See General Statutes § 52-278d
(a) (4).
   On February 2, 2022, the court, Pierson, J., ordered
that the evidentiary hearing on the plaintiff’s application
for a prejudgment remedy would be bifurcated, and
that the hearing would be held on two separate days.
Phase I of the hearing would be limited to whether (1)
the plaintiff was collaterally estopped from pursuing
the application against one or all of the defendants and
(2) the defendants had adequate insurance to secure a
judgment in the amount of $600,000. Phase II would
address all remaining factual and legal issues raised by
the plaintiff’s application and the defendants’ opposi-
tion thereto.4
  On September 21, 2022, the court denied the plaintiff’s
application for a prejudgment remedy. The court con-
cluded that (1) the plaintiff failed to demonstrate proba-
ble cause that a judgment in the amount sought would
be rendered in its favor because its proposed vexatious
litigation claims were barred by the doctrine of collat-
eral estoppel and (2) as to the law firm defendants, the
payment of any judgment rendered against them was
adequately secured by insurance. See General Statutes
§ 52-578d (a). The plaintiff timely appealed the court’s
decision.
                              II
   For the first time on appeal, the defendants challenge
the plaintiff’s standing to bring its application for a
prejudgment remedy against them. In the defendants’
view, the underlying vexatious litigation claims that the
plaintiff seeks to pursue in this case are tort claims
alleging personal injuries unique to Home Centers and
therefore are not assignable from Home Centers to the
plaintiff under Connecticut law. As a result, the defen-
dants claim that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring
its application for a prejudgment remedy because it is
predicated on claims that the plaintiff does not have
standing to assert. They therefore claim the trial court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the matter.5
   The plaintiff argues that it has standing because the
assignment at issue is valid and enforceable. Specifi-
cally, the plaintiff maintains that enforcement of the
assignment would not violate public policy because the
assignment was part of the business reorganization of
Home Centers. It contends that Home Centers was reor-
ganized pursuant to a reorganization agreement, that
Home Centers changed its name to Brilco, and that
Brilco transferred, assigned, and conveyed all of the
operating assets it owned to New Holdco, defined as
Northeast Group Holdings, LLC. The plaintiff contends
that New Holdco then transferred to the plaintiff all
rights, title, and interest in Brilco. As a result, the plain-
tiff contends that it now owns and runs the business
that was formerly known as Home Centers. The plaintiff
maintains that, under such circumstances, it would not
violate public policy to enforce the transfer and assign-
ment of the vexatious litigation claims, which in its
view are not unique or personal to Home Centers. In
addition, the plaintiff contends that the defendants’
arguments go to the validity of the assignment, not to
whether it had standing to pursue the application for
a prejudgment remedy.
                              A
  We begin with the relevant legal principles relating
to standing. ‘‘The issue of standing implicates the trial
court’s subject matter jurisdiction and therefore pre-
sents a threshold issue for our determination. . . .
Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in
motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction
of the court unless [it] has, in an individual or represen-
tative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action,
or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject
matter of the controversy.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Bliss,
159 Conn. App. 483, 488, 124 A.3d 890, cert. denied, 320
Conn. 903, 127 A.3d 186 (2015), cert. denied, 579 U.S.
903, 136 S. Ct. 2466, 195 L. Ed. 2d 801 (2016).
   ‘‘A valid assignment transfers to the assignee exclu-
sive ownership of all of the assignor’s rights to the
subject assigned and extinguishes all of those rights in
the assignor.’’ Mall v. LaBow, 33 Conn. App. 359, 362,
635 A.2d 871 (1993), cert. denied, 229 Conn. 912, 642
A.2d 1208 (1994); see also Bouchard v. People’s Bank,
219 Conn. 465, 473, 594 A.2d 1 (1991). Contrary to the
plaintiff’s contention on appeal, our case law makes
clear that the validity or enforceability of an assignment
implicates the standing of an assignee to pursue pur-
portedly assigned claims. See Bozelko v. Milici, 139
Conn. App. 536, 539–40, 57 A.3d 762 (2012) (plaintiff
who assigned interest in action to third person no longer
had standing to file petition for new trial), cert. denied,
308 Conn. 914, 61 A.3d 1101 (2013). Indeed, in the
absence of a lawful assignment of a claim, a purported
assignee cannot stand in the shoes of the assignor and,
therefore, lacks standing to proceed with that claim.
See id.; see also Riffin v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 783
Fed. Appx. 246, 250 (3d Cir. 2019) (‘‘[T]he purported
assignment to [the plaintiff] is champertous, and, there-
fore, it is invalid. Thus, [the plaintiff] lacked standing
to bring his claims here.’’).
   ‘‘[W]hen a party is found to lack standing, the court
is consequently without subject matter jurisdiction to
determine the cause. . . . We have long held that
because [a] determination regarding a trial court’s sub-
ject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, our review
is plenary. . . . In addition, because standing impli-
cates the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the issue
of standing is not subject to waiver and may be raised at
any time.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Deutsche
Bank National Trust Co. v. Bliss, supra, 159 Conn. App.
488; see also Premier Capital, LLC v. Shaw, 189 Conn.
App. 1, 5, 206 A.3d 237 (2019) (judgment debtor’s claim
that plaintiff lacked standing to bring action was review-
able on appeal, even though judgment debtor raised it
for first time on appeal).
                              B
   We turn next to the law in Connecticut governing
the assignability of claims. The question of whether
a particular legal claim may be assigned requires an
examination of the nature of the legal claim at issue.
Our Supreme Court, for instance, has held that the
assignment of contract claims is permissible; Rumbin
v. Utica Mutual Ins. Co., 254 Conn. 259, 267–68, 757
A.2d 526 (2000); but the assignment of tort claims is
not. See Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242
Conn. 375, 382–84, 698 A.2d 859 (1997). With respect
to contract claims, our Supreme Court has explained
that ‘‘the modern approach to contracts rejects tradi-
tional common-law restrictions on the alienability of
contract rights in favor of free assignability of contracts.
. . . Common-law restrictions on assignment were
abandoned when courts recognized the necessity of
permitting the transfer of contract rights. The force[s]
of human convenience and business practice [were] too
strong for the common-law doctrine that [intangible
contract rights] are not assignable.’’ (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Rumbin v. Utica
Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 267–68.
    Conversely, our Supreme Court has held that tort
claims alleging injuries that are personal in nature are
not assignable. See Stearns & Wheeler, LLC v. Kowalsky
Bros., 289 Conn. 1, 8, 955 A.2d 538 (2008) (‘‘[w]e have
prohibited . . . the assignment of tort claims’’); Gurski
v. Rosenblum & Filan, LLC, 276 Conn. 257, 267, 885
A.2d 163 (2005) (‘‘[w]e have taken a contrary position
. . . with respect to whether a tort claim can be
assigned, at least when the claim is based on personal
injury’’). In Dodd, our Supreme Court explained that
‘‘[t]he reasons underlying the rule [prohibiting the
assignment of causes of action to recover for personal
injuries] have been variously stated: unscrupulous inter-
lopers and litigious persons were to be discouraged
from purchasing claims for pain and suffering and pros-
ecuting them in court as assignees; actions for injuries
that in the absence of statute did not survive the death
of the victim were deemed too personal in nature to
be assignable; a tort-feasor was not to be held liable to
a party unharmed by him; and excessive litigation was
thought to be reduced.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., supra,
242 Conn. 382–83.
   It is not always clear, however, whether a particular
claim is a ‘‘contract’’ claim or a ‘‘tort’’ claim for purposes
of assignability. In such circumstances, our Supreme
Court has undertaken an individualized and fact specific
analysis to determine whether the assignment of the
particular claim in question violates public policy. In
Gurski v. Rosenblum & Filan, LLC, supra, 276 Conn.
267–68, for example, our Supreme Court observed that,
‘‘[b]ecause an action for legal malpractice can be
pleaded either in contract or in tort . . . neither Dodd
nor Rumbin, nor their labels, [was] helpful,’’ and that
‘‘the better approach [was] to resolve the issue uni-
formly on the basis of public policy.’’ (Citations omit-
ted.) Id. The court held that ‘‘an assignment of a legal
malpractice claim or the proceeds from such a claim
to an adversary in the same litigation that gave rise to
the alleged malpractice is against public policy and
thereby unenforceable.’’ Id., 259–60.
   Similarly, in Stearns & Wheeler, LLC v. Kowalsky
Brothers, Inc., supra, 289 Conn. 9, our Supreme Court
concluded that the claim in that case of a violation of
the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA),
General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., was not clearly a
contract claim or a tort claim because ‘‘CUTPA claims,
generally, are purely statutory and cannot be precisely
characterized either as tort claims or as contract
claims.’’ The court again resolved the issue of assign-
ability by undertaking an individualized public policy
analysis of the particular claim that was assigned in
that case. Id., 10–11. The court concluded that the
assignment of the plaintiff’s CUTPA claim in that case
was invalid because enforcement would violate the pub-
lic policy interests of the exclusivity provision of the
Workers’ Compensation Act, General Statutes § 31-275
et seq.6 Id., 11.
   In the present case, the vexatious litigation claims
that the plaintiff asserts do not require us to undertake
an individualized and fact specific analysis to determine
whether the assignment of those claims violates public
policy. That is because the plaintiff’s vexatious litigation
claims fall squarely within the category of tort claims
that may not be assigned. First, Connecticut courts have
historically and routinely categorized vexatious litiga-
tion claims as tort claims. See, e.g., Rioux v. Barry,
283 Conn. 338, 347, 927 A.2d 304 (2007) (‘‘the fact that
the tort of vexatious litigation itself employs a [balanc-
ing test] . . . counsels strongly against a categorical or
absolute immunity from a claim of vexatious litigation’’
(emphasis added)); DeLaurentis v. New Haven, 220
Conn. 225, 267, 597 A.2d 807 (1991) (‘‘lack of probable
cause is the gravamen of the tort of vexatious suit’’
(emphasis added)); Blake v. Levy, 191 Conn. 257, 262–
63, 464 A.2d 52 (1983) (‘‘[i]n a case like the present one,
where the claimed impropriety arises out of previous
litigation, we may usefully look for guidance to the
principles that have evolved to define the tort of mali-
cious prosecution and vexatious litigation, because
those kindred torts have also had to address the compet-
ing policies of deterrence of groundless litigation and
protection of good faith access to the courts’’ (emphasis
added)). Indeed, in defining the parameters of a vexa-
tious litigation claim in Connecticut, our Supreme Court
has often looked to the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
which describes, among other things, torts relating to
unjustifiable litigation, including the torts of malicious
prosecution, wrongful use of civil proceedings,7 and
abuse of process. See 3 Restatement (Second), Torts,
§§ 653 through 682, pp. 404–75 (1977); see also
DeLaurentis v. New Haven, supra, 256; Blake v. Levy,
supra, 264.
  This is true regardless of whether the claim being
asserted is the common-law tort of vexatious litigation
or the statutory tort of vexatious litigation. ‘‘In Connect-
icut, the cause of action for vexatious litigation exists
both at common law and pursuant to statute. . . . [T]o
establish a claim for vexatious litigation at common
law, one must prove want of probable cause, malice
and a termination of suit in the plaintiff’s favor. . . .
The statutory cause of action for vexatious litigation
exists under . . . § 52-568, and differs from a common-
law action only in that a finding of malice is not an
essential element, but will serve as a basis for higher
damages. . . . In the context of a claim for vexatious
litigation, the defendant lacks probable cause if he lacks
a reasonable, good faith belief in the facts alleged and
the validity of the claim asserted.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, 158 Conn.
App. 176, 183, 118 A.3d 158 (2015). The mere fact that
the legislature has chosen to codify the common-law
tort of vexatious litigation with a statutory analog that
differs only insofar as it eliminates the requirement that
a plaintiff prove malice while also providing for the
possibility of higher damages when malice is proven
does not transform the claim into a contract claim or
create any ambiguity with respect to whether it is a
claim sounding in tort.
   Second, as with other torts that our courts have
deemed unassignable, the injuries suffered by plaintiffs
alleging vexatious litigation are personal in nature. See
Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., supra, 242
Conn. 382 (‘‘[a]n assignment of a claim against a third
person or a bargain to assign such a claim is illegal and
ineffective if the claim is for . . . damages for an injury
the gist of which is to the person rather than to property,
unless the claim has been reduced to judgment’’ (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, the personal
nature of the tort is elucidated by the types of economic
and noneconomic damages that may be incurred as a
result of vexatious litigation. For example, economic
damages for a vexatious litigation claim may include,
inter alia, ‘‘attorney’s fees, incurred to defend against
the underlying action or proceeding, any lost wages
for time required to attend court proceedings in the
underlying action or proceeding, any loss to business
or property resulting from the commencement and
prosecution of the underlying action or proceeding, and
any reasonable and necessary medical expenses
incurred to treat physical or mental injury caused by
the commencement and prosecution of the underlying
action or proceeding.’’ Connecticut Civil Jury Instruc-
tions 3.13-5 and 3.13-6, available at https://jud.ct.gov/JI/
Civil/Civil.pdf (last visited February 29, 2024). As to
noneconomic damages, a plaintiff may be entitled to
damages for, inter alia, ‘‘mental anguish, humiliation,
embarrassment, mortification, shame, fear and damage
to reputation.’’ Id. Simply put, actions for vexatious
litigation recognize ‘‘the right of an individual to be
free from unjustifiable litigation . . . . The purpose of
the action is to compensate a wronged individual for
damage to his reputation and to reimburse him for the
expense of defending against the unwarranted action.’’
(Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Bernhard-Thomas Building Systems, LLC v. Dunican,
286 Conn. 548, 553–54, 944 A.2d 329 (2008), citing 8 S.
Speiser et al., American Law of Torts (1991) § 28:20,
p. 113.
   The plaintiff’s proposed complaint in the present case
further illustrates the personal nature inherent in a
claim of vexatious litigation. It alleges, for instance,
that ‘‘[Home Centers] suffered damages,’’ including,
inter alia, ‘‘[l]ost time managing its business affairs due
to time spent attending to discovery, depositions, hear-
ings and trial’’; ‘‘[i]njuries to its business and profes-
sional reputation’’; ‘‘[p]ublic disclosure of its private and
highly confidential financial information’’; ‘‘[d]isruption
of personnel of [Home Centers] attending and
responding to defending such claim(s)’’; and ‘‘[a]ttor-
ney’s fees necessary for the defense of the claims
. . . .’’8 As is true with vexatious litigation claims in
general, whether asserted by an individual or a business
entity, these are claims that are personal in nature and,
in this case, accrued to the original assignor, Home
Centers, and not the plaintiff.
    Our conclusion finds further support in the decisions
of our Supreme Court and courts of last resort in other
states holding that malicious prosecution claims are
among the class of torts that seek redress for injuries
that are personal in nature and are therefore not assign-
able. See Whitaker v. Gavit, 18 Conn. 522, 526 (1847)
(‘‘[i]t is certain that a right of action for a personal
injury, as for an assault and battery, slander, malicious
suit . . . is not assignable even in equity’’ (emphasis
added)); see also Tomkovich v. Mistevich, 222 Mich.
425, 429, 192 N.W. 639 (1923) (‘‘a right of action for
malicious prosecution is personal, and cannot be
assigned’’); Investors Title Ins. Co. v. Herzig, 330 N.C.
681, 688, 413 S.E.2d 268 (1992) (‘‘[c]laims such as defa-
mation, abuse of process, malicious prosecution or con-
spiracy to injure another’s business are not assignable
as such claims are considered personal torts’’).
Although the plaintiff in the present case asserts a vexa-
tious litigation claim rather than a malicious prosecu-
tion claim, ‘‘[a] vexatious suit is a type of malicious
prosecution action, differing principally in that it is
based upon a prior civil action, whereas a malicious
prosecution suit ordinarily implies a prior criminal com-
plaint.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Falls
Church Group, Ltd. v. Tyler, Cooper & Alcorn, LLP,
281 Conn. 84, 94, 912 A.2d 1019 (2007), citing Schaefer
v. O. K. Tool Co., 110 Conn. 528, 148 A. 330 (1930).9
Indeed, ‘‘[t]he elements of the torts of malicious prose-
cution and vexatious litigation are identical . . . .’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bernhard-Thomas
Building Systems, LLC v. Dunican, supra, 286 Conn.
553 n.6.
   For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the vexa-
tious litigation claims assigned to the plaintiff from
Home Centers are tort claims that are personal in nature
and, therefore, the assignment is not enforceable. As a
result, the plaintiff lacks standing to pursue those
claims against the defendants. See Stearns & Wheeler,
LLC v. Kowalsky Bros., supra, 289 Conn. 8; Bozelko v.
Milici, supra, 139 Conn. App. 539. It inexorably follows
that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring its application
for a prejudgment remedy predicated on those claims,
and the trial court therefore lacked subject matter juris-
diction over the application.
   The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
with direction to render judgment dismissing the plain-
tiff’s application for a prejudgment remedy.
      In this opinion the other judges concurred.
  1
     In advancing their arguments, some of the defendants also appear to
claim that this court lacks jurisdiction over the present appeal because the
plaintiff lacked standing to bring the vexatious litigation claims against the
defendants. We disagree. ‘‘It is well established that the subject matter
jurisdiction of [our appellate courts] is governed by [General Statutes] § 52-
263, which provides that an aggrieved party may appeal to the court having
jurisdiction from the final judgment of the court.’’ (Emphasis in original;
footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) King v. Sultar, 253
Conn. 429, 434, 754 A.2d 782 (2000); see also Practice Book § 63-1. The
plaintiff is the entity that initiated this matter by filing an application for a
prejudgment remedy. The trial court denied the application on the basis of
collateral estoppel and the adequacy of insurance. The plaintiff is aggrieved
because it has a specific legal interest in its application and the issues
decided by the court in denying its application. The denial of an application
for a prejudgment remedy following a hearing is a final judgment for pur-
poses of an appeal. See General Statutes § 52-278l. Accordingly, this court
has jurisdiction over the present appeal.
   2
     General Statutes § 52-278c provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Except as
provided in sections 52-278e and 52-278f, any person desiring to secure a
prejudgment remedy shall attach his proposed unsigned writ, summons and
complaint to the following documents: (1) An application, directed to the
Superior Court to which the action is made returnable, for the prejudgment
remedy requested; (2) An affidavit sworn to by the plaintiff or any competent
affiant setting forth a statement of facts sufficient to show that there is
probable cause that a judgment in the amount of the prejudgment remedy
sought, or in an amount greater than the amount of the prejudgment remedy
sought, taking into account any known defenses, counterclaims or set-offs,
will be rendered in the matter in favor of the plaintiff; (3) A form of order
that a hearing be held before the court or a judge thereof to determine
whether or not the prejudgment remedy requested should be granted and
that notice of such hearing complying with subsection (e) of this section
be given to the defendant; (4) A form of summons directed to a proper
officer commanding him to serve upon the defendant at least four days
prior to the date of the hearing, pursuant to the law pertaining to the manner
of service of civil process, the application, a true and attested copy of the
writ, summons and complaint, such affidavit and the order and notice of
hearing . . . .’’
   3
     A more detailed recitation of the underlying facts of the RMM litigation
is set forth in this court’s prior decision in Northeast Builders Supply &
Home Centers, LLC v. RMM Consulting, LLC, supra, 202 Conn. App. 321.
   4
     On January 4, 2022, before issuing its February 2 bifurcation order, the
court issued an order indicating that it was considering bifurcating the
hearing on the plaintiff’s application and provided the parties with an oppor-
tunity to brief the issue of whether bifurcation was appropriate. Each of
the parties provided the court with their respective position. Additionally,
on January 25, 2022, Jones and Morrill filed an objection to the plaintiff’s
application for a prejudgment remedy. They claimed, inter alia, that the
advice of counsel defense barred the plaintiff’s vexatious litigation claims
against them.
    5
      On October 5, 2022, after the plaintiff filed this appeal but before the
parties briefed their claims, the defendants Pullman & Comley, LLC, and
Goldman filed a motion to dismiss the present appeal on the ground that
the plaintiff lacked standing to maintain the underlying prejudgment remedy
application and proposed complaint. They argued that the vexatious litiga-
tion claims were tort claims not assignable under Connecticut law. They
also argued that it was against public policy to allow Home Centers to assign
the vexatious litigation claims to the plaintiff because the plaintiff was a
shell company specifically formed as a separate legal entity for the sole
purpose of pursuing the vexatious suit claims against the defendants in
order to insulate the plaintiff from the risk of consequences should those
vexatious suit claims turn out to lack probable cause. On December 13,
2022, this court denied the motion to dismiss ‘‘without prejudice to parties
addressing their arguments concerning the plaintiff’s standing in their briefs
on the merits of this appeal.’’
    6
      In Stearns & Wheeler, LLC, the defendant also argued ‘‘that CUTPA
claims, generally, are not assignable.’’ Stearns & Wheeler, LLC v. Kowalsky
Brothers, Inc., supra, 289 Conn. 9 n.12. Although the court did not directly
address the defendant’s argument, it noted ‘‘that two state supreme courts,
one in North Carolina and the other in Texas, have concluded that actions
brought pursuant to their respective deceptive trade practices acts, which
are similar but not identical to CUTPA, are not assignable. See Investors
Title Ins. Co. v. Herzig, 330 N.C. 681, 688, 413 S.E.2d 268 (1992); PPG
Industries, Inc. v. JMB/Houston Centers Partners Ltd. Partnership, 146
S.W.3d 79, 83–87 (Tex. 2004).’’ Stearns & Wheeler, LLC v. Kowalsky Brothers,
Inc., supra, 9 n.12. Our Supreme Court explained that, ‘‘[i]n both cases, the
courts expressed legitimate concerns about the market that would be created
if deceptive trade practices claims were assignable.’’ Id.
    7
      As one Superior Court has observed, the elements of a claim of wrongful
use of civil proceedings ‘‘appear to be identical to those of Connecticut’s
tort of vexatious litigation.’’ J.M. Scott Associates, Inc. v. Whitney, Superior
Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX (September
6, 2012) (54 Conn. L. Rptr. 653, 655).
    8
      We note that one federal District Court has held that a vexatious litigation
claim may be assigned if it seeks to recover only attorney’s fees. See Zabelle
v. Coratolo, 816 F. Supp. 115, 121 (D. Conn. 1993). The plaintiff in this case,
however, unlike the plaintiff in Zabelle, seeks to recover for a broad range
of injuries, including but not limited to attorney’s fees. In addition, Home
Centers has already been compensated for the attorney’s fees it incurred
in the RMM litigation. See Northeast Builders Supply & Home Centers, LLC
v. RMM Consulting, LLC, supra, 202 Conn. App. 328 n.15 (‘‘[o]n September
4, 2018, following a hearing, the court issued a decision awarding the plaintiff
$35,346.87 in attorney’s fees as well as postjudgment interest pursuant to
General Statutes § 37-3a of 6 percent per annum’’). More fundamentally, we
are not convinced that a vexatious litigation claim seeking to recover only
attorney’s fees falls outside the class of torts that are personal in nature
and are therefore not assignable. Irrespective of the relief sought, a claim
for vexatious litigation is personal in nature insofar as it arises from conduct
that caused a particular person or entity to sustain injuries that are unique
to that person or entity. This is true even with respect to vexatious litigation
claims seeking to recover only attorney’s fees. The damages one incurs as
a result of having to expend money on legal fees due to the vexatious
litigation tactics of another party are influenced by personal factors, includ-
ing the very personal relationship between an attorney and a client, the
personal decisions a client makes while defending against such claims, the
unique legal advice a client receives from a particular attorney, and the
personal decision a client makes when selecting an attorney for legal repre-
sentation.
    9
      We note that many states, unlike Connecticut, refer to vexatious litigation
claims in the civil context as ‘‘malicious prosecution’’ claims. See, e.g.,
Chervin v. Travelers Ins. Co., 448 Mass. 95, 102–103, 858 N.E.2d 746 (2006)
(‘‘[t]he tort [of malicious prosecution] is not confined to the wrongful initia-
tion of criminal proceedings; it may be maintained for the unjustifiable
initiation of a civil action’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Burt v. Smith,
181 N.Y. 1, 5, 73 N.E. 495 (1905) (‘‘[a]n action for malicious prosecution is
usually based upon an arrest in criminal proceedings, although it may be
founded upon a civil action when commenced simply to harass and oppress
the defendant’’), cert. denied, 203 U.S. 129, 27 S. Ct. 37, 51 L. Ed. 121
(1906); Ims v. Portsmouth, 32 A.3d 914, 922 (R.I. 2011) (defining malicious
prosecution ‘‘as a suit for damages resulting from a prior criminal or civil
legal proceeding that was instituted maliciously and without probable cause,
and that terminated unsuccessfully for the plaintiff therein’’ (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).