Court Opinion

ID: 9907516
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 17:05:45.204638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:59:25.681043
License: Public Domain

This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in
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          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-41203

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

       Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

AMADEO DANIEL JARAMILLO,

       Defendant-Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
Lucy Solimon, District Court Judge

Raúl Torrez, Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
Mark A. Probasco, Assistant Attorney General
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellant

                               MEMORANDUM OPINION

HANISEE, Judge.

{1}     This matter was submitted to this Court on the brief in chief, pursuant to the
Administrative Order for Appeals in Criminal Cases from the Second, Eleventh, and
Twelfth Judicial District Courts in In re Pilot Project for Criminal Appeals, No. 2022-002,
effective November 1, 2022. Having considered the brief in chief, concluding the briefing
submitted to this Court provides no possibility for reversal, and determining that this
case is appropriate for resolution on Track 1 as defined in that order, we affirm for the
following reasons.

{2}    The State appeals from an order of the district court imposing sanctions in the
form of a monetary fine for the State’s failure to (1) provide substitute defense counsel
with discovery that was previously turned over to Defendant’s prior attorney; (2) file a
timely trial exhibit list; (3) file timely motions in limine; and (4) file timely proposed jury
instructions. [RP 107]

{3}     “[District] courts possess broad discretionary authority to decide what sanction to
impose when a discovery order is violated.” State v. Le Mier, 2017-NMSC-017, ¶ 22,
394 P.3d 959. “The propriety of a [district] court’s decision to exclude or not to exclude
witnesses is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Id. “An abuse of discretion occurs when
the ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances of the
case. We cannot say the [district] court abused its discretion by its ruling unless we can
characterize it as clearly untenable or not justified by reason.” Id. (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). “In reviewing the district court’s decision, this Court views
the evidence—and all inferences to be drawn from the evidence—in the light most
favorable to the district court’s decision.” Id.

{4}     To answer the question of whether the district court abused its discretion in the
choice of a sanction, we look to the framework set out in State v. Harper, 2011-NMSC-
044, ¶¶ 16-20, 150 N.M. 745, 266 P.3d 25, and further explained in Le Mier, 2017-
NMSC-017, ¶ 20. “When a party violates a discovery or scheduling order, Harper
instructs our courts to assess (1) the culpability of the offending party, (2) the prejudice
to the adversely affected party, and (3) the availability of lesser sanctions.” State v.
McWhorter, 2022-NMCA-011, ¶ 16, 505 P.3d 865, 870, cert. denied (S-1-SC-39047,
Jan. 6, 2022). “Le Mier requires the district court to not only weigh the degree of
culpability and extent of prejudice, but also explain its decision regarding applicability of
lesser sanctions on the record.” Id. ¶ 16 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Additionally, as noted in Le Mier, “it is not the case that [a sanction] is justified only if all
of the Harper considerations weigh in favor of exclusion.” Le Mier, 2017-NMSC-017,
¶ 20; see also McWhorter, 2022-NMCA-011, ¶ 17 (acknowledging that while Harper and
Le Mier are both “addressed toward severe sanctions such as dismissal with prejudice
or witness exclusion, the analytical framework articulated in these cases does not occur
after the fact based on the level of sanction the district court deems appropriate;
instead, it is the framework the court must work through to arrive at the appropriate
sanction, and this analysis may in some instances lead the court to lesser sanctions”).

{5}     The State first argues that the district court failed to address the culpability of the
State. We disagree. The district court’s order sanctioning the State as well as the order
denying the State’s motion for reconsideration explain that the State’s motions in limine,
proposed jury instructions, and witness list were all filed late in contravention of the
district court’s scheduling order. [RP 95, 107] Indeed, the State conceded in its motion
to reconsider that it had no excuse for its failures to comply with the scheduling order,
reflecting its culpability for the late filings. [RP 103]

{6}    The district court’s order for sanctions also indicates that it believed that counsel
for both the State and Defendant failed to ensure that all relevant discovery was turned
over prior to trial, and fined them equally in an amount of $1,902.50—the cost expended
by the Second Judicial District to call in a jury for voir dire unnecessarily in this case.
[RP 97-98] The State argues that it was not responsible for providing discovery to
Defendant’s substitute counsel, and thus it cannot be sanctioned in the above amount
for its conduct in this case. [BIC 9] Even if we were to agree that a sanction was
improper on this basis, the State’s repeated failure to comply with court-ordered
deadlines in this case are more than sufficiently detailed on the record to establish its
culpability in this matter.

{7}     The State next argues that the defense suffered no prejudice by the State’s
conduct in this case. [BIC 9] The district court’s discussion of prejudice in its order for
sanctions notes that, due to the State’s late filing of proposed jury instructions, the
district court was unable to review them until the day of trial. [RP 95] See State v. Ortiz,
S-1-SC-37127, dec. ¶ 7 (N.M. Aug. 15, 2019) (nonprecedential) (concluding that
prejudice to a district court’s efficient administration of its docket is a sufficient showing
of prejudice under Harper and Le Mier). The remaining discussion of prejudice appears
to relate to the parties’ failure to exchange all adequate discovery, and the resulting
need to vacate the trial after voir dire had already been conducted. [RP 96-97] Again,
even if we were to discount the discussion of prejudice relevant to the alleged discovery
violations, we are mindful of the statement made by our Supreme Court in Le Mier that
the district court retains inherent authority to impose sanctions even in the absence of a
showing of prejudice to the opposing party. See Le Mier, 2017-NMSC-017, ¶ 20 (“[O]n
occasion the district court may need to [sanction a party] that did not comply with
discovery orders to maintain the integrity and schedule of the court even though the
defendant may not be prejudiced.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Accordingly, we do not believe that the district court’s consideration of prejudice in this
matter renders its ultimate sanction an abuse of discretion. See id. ¶ 22 (“[District]
courts possess broad discretionary authority to decide what sanction to impose when a
discovery order is violated.”).

{8}    Finally, with respect to the availability of lesser sanctions, the district court’s order
denying reconsideration clearly states that it considered a verbal admonishment in lieu
of a monetary fine but concluded that the lesser sanction would not be sufficient to
achieve the objective in this case. [RP 108] The State’s brief in chief makes no
argument that this was insufficient under Harper/Le Mier. See State v. Aragon, 1999-
NMCA-060, ¶ 10, 127 N.M. 393, 981 P.2d 1211 (stating that we presume correctness in
the district court’s rulings and the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate district
court error).

{9}   Having reviewed the district court’s orders under the relevant Harper/Le Mier
framework, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in this case.

{10}   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court.

{11}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

J. MILES HANISEE, Judge

WE CONCUR:
ZACHARY A. IVES, Judge

KATHERINE A. WRAY, Judge