Court Opinion

ID: 2964768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:30:45.446166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:01.137520
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 96-1618
        No. 96-1663

                                   LORI-ANN MOLLOY,

                                 Plaintiff, Appellee,

                                          v.

                           WESLEY BLANCHARD, ETC., ET AL.,

                               Defendants, Appellants.

                                 ____________________

                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

                    [Hon. Raymond J. Pettine, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                  Cyr, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________

                           Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________

                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                 ____________________

            Kathleen M. Powers, with whom Marc DeSisto and DeSisto Law
            __________________            ____________     ___________
        Offices were on brief for appellants.
        _______
            Ina P. Schiff for appellee.
            _____________
                                 ____________________

                                    June 10, 1997
                                 ____________________

                      CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge.    The former Chief
                                ____________________

            of  Police and the City of Warwick, Rhode Island, appeal from

            a  judgment against them in the district court entered on the

            jury's  verdict  in  favor  of  a  Warwick  police  officer.1

            Plaintiff  had  alleged, inter  alia,  that  she was  treated
                                     ___________

            disparately because of her gender and that her constitutional

            right  to procedural due process  was violated when the Chief

            suspended her without holding a hearing as  required by state

            law.  We affirm.

                                          I.

                      We state the  facts in the light most  favorable to

            the verdict.  See Ferragamo v. Chubb Life Ins. Co. of Am., 94
                          ___ _________    __________________________

            F.3d 26, 27 n.1 (1st Cir. 1996).

                      Plaintiff, Lori  Ann Molloy,  a police  officer for

            the  City of Warwick, Rhode Island, was suspended by Chief of

            Police Wesley  Blanchard, on  June 3,  1994.  The  suspension

            resulted from  her ostensible  refusal to cooperate  with the

            state  police in  their  investigation of  a triple  homicide

            involving Robert Sabetta, a  police officer from the  Town of

            Foster, Rhode Island.  

                      Before Molloy joined  the Warwick police department

            in 1991, she and Sabetta were in the same class at the police

            academy.  After the police academy, Molloy had little contact

                                
            ____________________

            1.  Cf. Molloy v. Blanchard, 907 F. Supp. 46 (D.R.I. 1995)
                ___ ______    _________
            (granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motion
            for summary judgment).

                                         -2-
                                          2

            with Sabetta until 1993.   In February 1993, Molloy  spent an

            evening socializing  with  Sabetta and  Paula Duffy,  another

            police academy  classmate and  a police officer  in Cranston,

            Rhode Island.  During that evening, Sabetta showed Molloy and

            Duffy  his personal  firearm,  a semiautomatic  with a  laser

            sight.

                      Molloy  saw Sabetta  again approximately  two weeks

            later.  Duffy,  with Sabetta  in the car,  drove to  Molloy's

            home to  show Molloy her new Jeep.  The  three then went to a

            nearby  restaurant  for pizza  and  beer.   During  the meal,

            Sabetta complained  about his suspension for  improper use of

            force.  He commented  that perhaps he should have  killed, or

            should kill, the people whose complaints had resulted in  his

            suspension.

                      On April  13, 1993,  Sabetta shot and  killed three

            teenage  boys and injured a  fourth.  Among  the victims were

            persons who had filed brutality complaints against  him.  The

            injured  victim identified  Sabetta as  the shooter.   Molloy

            learned about  the murders  and Sabetta's involvement  during

            her  midnight to 8:00  a.m. shift on April  14, 1993.  Molloy

            told her sergeant about  knowing Sabetta from having attended

            the police academy with him.  

                      Later that morning, Duffy contacted Molloy, worried

            that  Sabetta  might  come  to  Duffy's  home.   At  Molloy's

            suggestion, Duffy arranged to spend the night at the house of

                                         -3-
                                          3

            her friend  Suzanne Jardine, also a  Cranston police officer.

            Molloy stopped by  Jardine's home after her duty  shift. When

            the Sabetta  matter was  broached, Duffy stated  that talking

            about the  shootings upset her too much  and that she did not

            want to discuss them further.  Molloy acceded to her request.

                      During their investigation,  the Rhode Island state

            police  contacted Molloy in June 1993 to ask her some general

            questions  about  Sabetta.   Molloy  did  not volunteer  that

            Sabetta  had said either he should have killed or should kill

            the people who had  filed a brutality complaint  against him,

            nor   did  she   mention   knowing  that   Sabetta  owned   a

            semiautomatic with a laser sight.  The murder weapon had been

            Sabetta's service revolver, not a semiautomatic.

                      After the Sabetta murder  trial began the following

            summer,  the  state  police  received   an  anonymous  letter

            claiming  that a  Warwick  police dispatcher  and a  Cranston

            police  officer possessed  information relevant  to Sabetta's

            prosecution.  This led  the state police to interview  Molloy

            on  June 2, 1994.  At this  interview Molloy revealed her two

            meetings  with Sabetta, his comments about the people who had

            complained  about his  brutality,  and his  ownership of  the

            laser sighted semiautomatic.

                      Not  satisfied  with  the  information  Molloy  had

            supplied,  the state  police  asked her  to  report to  their

            barracks for a third interview the following morning.  During

                                         -4-
                                          4

            this session, Molloy  told the state  police about her  visit

            with Duffy  after the  triple homicide.   The police  pressed

            Molloy for  additional information, but  Molloy denied having

            any.

                      The state police called  Chief Blanchard, told  him

            that Molloy  was refusing to  cooperate with them,  and asked

            him to  come down to their  barracks to speak with  her.  The

            Chief prepared a letter  of suspension and then drove  to the

            state  police barracks with  Deputy Chief Stephen Castiglioni

            and Captain Thomas K. Wilson.  

                      After he arrived at  the state police barracks, the

            Chief met  with several  investigators who accused  Molloy of

            conspiring  with  Duffy  to withhold  information  about  the

            murders.   The Chief then met with Molloy and, without asking

            for her side of the story, advised her to cooperate  with the

            state  police investigation.  When  she insisted she had told

            the  state  police all  she knew,  the  Chief handed  her the

            letter  of suspension and told her she was suspended with pay

            until the state police concluded their investigation into her

            alleged conspiracy  with Duffy.   The Chief  also barred  her

            from participating  in training activities and  from entering

            the police headquarters building.

                      Molloy remained  on suspension for nine  and a half

            weeks.  While suspended she received her salary, but she lost

            the  opportunity  to work  extra  shifts,  to participate  in

                                         -5-
                                          5

            training  sessions,  and  to  work on  special  details,  all

            activities which  would have provided additional  pay.  While

            suspended, Molloy  suffered emotional distress  and damage to

            her  personal  and  professional  reputations.    On  several

            occasions during  her suspension,  Molloy was required  while

            testifying as  a witness in  connection with arrests  she had

            made before her suspension  to explain in open court  why she

            had been suspended.

                      On  June 9,  1994, approximately  a week  after her

            suspension, Molloy, with the  help of her attorney, requested

            a  hearing concerning  her suspension  pursuant to  the Rhode

            Island Law  Enforcement Officers'  Bill of Rights,  R.I. Gen.

            Laws   42-28.6-13(C) ("the Officers' Bill of Rights").2   The

                                
            ____________________

            2.  Although it has since been amended, see 1995 R.I. Pub.
                                                    ___
            Laws ch. 19,   1, at the time of Molloy's suspension, R.I.
            Gen. Laws   42-28.6-13(C) stated:

               Emergency suspension may be imposed by the chief or the
               highest ranking officer of the law enforcement agency,
               when it appears that such action is in the best
               interest of the public.  Any emergency suspension of
               any law enforcement officer shall consist of the law
               enforcement officer being relieved of duty and he or
               she shall receive all ordinary pay and benefits as he
               or she would have if he or she were not suspended.  Any
               law enforcement officer so suspended shall be entitled
               to a prompt hearing before a hearing committee upon his
               or her request.  The time period for the hearing is not
               to exceed fourteen (14) days.  If, after hearing, the
               hearing committee does suspend or dismiss the law
               enforcement officer, he or she shall not be entitled to
               his or her pay and benefits; however, if the
               enforcement officer is reinstated by a subsequent
               hearing, he or she shall be entitled to be reimbursed
               for all salary and benefits that have not been paid.

                                         -6-
                                          6

            Chief had met with the City Solicitor, William Smith, the day

            before.   The Chief testified  Smith had advised  him that he

            did  not need to specify any charges against Molloy or afford

            her a hearing  so long as  Molloy was receiving full  pay and

            benefits.3    The Chief  did not  charge  Molloy, nor  was he

            willing to  grant her the  hearing required by  the Officers'

            Bill of Rights.

                      Molloy filed a mandamus  action in the Rhode Island

            Superior Court  under R.I. Gen.  Laws   42-28.6-14(2).4   The

            Chief  never answered  Molloy's  state court  complaint.   In

            August 1994, the Chief reinstated her, reserving the right to

            file disciplinary  charges upon  the completion of  the state

            police investigation.   Her reinstatement rendered  her state

            court mandamus action moot.   In September 1994, the Attorney

            General informed the Chief that no criminal charges  would be

            filed against Molloy.

                                
            ____________________

            3.  In contrast, Smith testified he told the Chief to put
            Molloy on "administrative leave status" and specifically
            advised him not to suspend Molloy under the emergency
            suspension provision of the Officers' Bill of Rights, R.I.
            Gen. Laws   42-28.6-13(C), because that provision did not
            apply to Molloy's case.

            4.  R.I. Gen. Laws   42-28.6-14(2) states:

               Any law enforcement officer who is denied any right
               afforded by this subtitle may apply, either
               individually or through his or her certified or
               recognized employee organization, to the superior court
               where he or she resides or is regularly employed for
               any order directing the law enforcement agency to show
               cause why the right should not be afforded.

                                         -7-
                                          7

                      On September 30, 1994, Molloy filed an eight-count5

            complaint against  the City of Warwick,  the Chief, Warwick's

            Board of Public Safety,  and Mayor Lincoln Chafee.   Under 42

            U.S.C.   1983,6 Molloy  alleged she had been deprived  of her

            constitutional rights to equal  protection, free speech,  and

            substantive  and procedural due process.   Under Title VII of

            the Civil  Rights Act  of 1964, 42  U.S.C.    2000e et  seq.,
                                                                ________

            Molloy claimed disparate treatment  because of her gender and

            disparate  impact  because  of  policies  having a  disparate

            negative impact on her  as a woman.  Under  state law, Molloy

            alleged  discrimination  and  the  negligent  or  intentional

            infliction of emotional distress.

                      Before  trial, the  district  court  dismissed,  on

            grounds   of   qualified   immunity,   Molloy's   claims  for

            substantive  and procedural  due  process violations  against

            Mayor  Chafee and  her claim  for a  substantive  due process

            violation against the Chief.   The trial then proceeded.   At

                                
            ____________________

            5.  The complaint actually states nine counts, though two are
            labeled "VIII."  However, the first two counts are apparently
            identical.

            6.  42 U.S.C.   1983 states, in relevant part:

               Every person who, under color of any statute,
               ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
               or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
               causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
               States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
               to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
               immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
               be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
               suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

                                         -8-
                                          8

            the  close of all the evidence, the court granted judgment as

            a  matter of law for all the defendants on Molloy's disparate

            impact and  First Amendment claims.   The court  also granted

            judgment as a matter of law for Molloy on her  procedural due

            process claim,  submitting her gender discrimination claim to

            the  jury.  The jury was also instructed to ascertain damages

            on both claims.7

                      The   jury   determined   that   Molloy   had  been

            discriminated against on the basis of her gender.  It awarded

            her $23,000 in damages on the discrimination claim as well as

            for violation of  procedural due process as earlier  found by

            the  court.   The  district  court  denied Defendants'  post-

            verdict motions  for judgment as a  matter of law,  for a new

            trial, and to alter judgment.  Defendants appealed.

                                         II.

                      We  turn first to  Defendants' contention  that the

            district  court committed  error  in granting  judgment as  a

            matter of  law against Defendants and in Plaintiff's favor on

            the  procedural due process claim.  This is a close question.

            Given, however, our affirmance,  infra, of the jury's verdict
                                             _____

            for   Plaintiff   on  her   Title   VII   claim  for   gender

            discrimination,  there is  no practical  need to  address it;

            however resolved,  the outcome  would not affect  the damages

                                
            ____________________

            7.  The remaining claims appear to have been dropped and, in
            any event, are not at issue in this appeal.

                                         -9-
                                          9

            awarded to Plaintiff.   The  jury provided  a single  damages

            award  for both  claims, and  so long  as Plaintiff  is found

            entitled to have prevailed  on either of the two  claims, the

            award  stands, with  no alteration in  the amount  of damages

            regardless of whether  one or  both claims are  upheld.   The

            same conduct underlay both:  the Chief's suspension of Molloy

            while  depriving  her  of  the  hearing  called  for  by  the

            Officers' Bill  of  Rights.   Her damages  consisted in  each

            instance of her lost  opportunity to earn extra income  while

            suspended  (for  special  details,  overtime,  etc.)  and her

            emotional  distress  and loss  of  reputation  caused by  her

            suspension.  The special  verdict form handed to the  jury by

            the court instructed  the jury  to award a  single amount  of

            damages  even if  it  found (as  the  jury reported  it  did)

            liability  and  causation   under  both  of  Molloy's   legal

            theories.8   We  also note  that the  district  court's final

            judgment,  which  we  affirm,  infra, does  not  mention  the
                                           _____

            underlying  legal  theories  but  only states  a  finding  of

            liability and the amount of damages. 

                      Because the jury's damages  award would be the same

            under either or both liability  theories, and because we find

            there was  sufficient evidence to support  the jury's finding

                                
            ____________________

            8.  Although liability under Molloy's procedural due process
            claim had been directed by the court, the causation
            determination under that theory was left to the jury, as were
            damages.

                                         -10-
                                          10

            of   gender   discrimination,   infra,   we  need   make   no
                                            _____

            determination as  to  whether  or  not  the  court  erred  in

            granting  judgment to  Plaintiff as  a matter  of law  on her

            constitutional   claim  of  a  violation  of  procedural  due

            process.9   Cf. Gulf  Oil Co.  v. Bernard,  452  U.S. 89,  99
                        ___ _____________     _______

            (1981)  ("[P]rior to  reaching any  constitutional questions,

            federal  courts must  consider nonconstitutional  grounds for

            decision.").  

                      Our analysis has the effect of mooting the district

            court's holding as  to the  due process  claim, leaving  that

            ruling without  legal  effect.   Cf.  Cardinal Chem.  Co.  v.
                                             ___  ___________________

            Morton Int'l,  Inc., 508  U.S. 83, 93-95  (1993) (recognizing
            ___________________

            that  in  patent  infringement   cases,  a  finding  of  non-

            infringement prevents  a court  from reaching  an affirmative

            defense  asserting   the  patent's  invalidity   because  the

            validity issue becomes "immaterial  to the disposition of the

            case," and that any determination of the patent's validity by

            the  district court in such a case should be vacated) (citing

            Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241
            _________________________    __________________

            (1939)).  

                                
            ____________________

            9.  For the same reasons, we also do not reach the City's
            claim that it is not liable for the Chief's actions under  
            1983.  The City does not contest respondeat superior
            liability under Title VII.  See Randle v. City of Aurora, 69
                                        ___ ______    ______________
            F.3d 441, 450 (10th Cir. 1995); Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d
                                            ________    _______
            439, 444 (5th Cir. 1986); Scott v. City of Topeka Police &
                                      _____    _______________________
            Fire Civil Serv. Comm'n, 739 F. Supp. 1434, 1438 (D. Kan.
            _______________________
            1990).

                                         -11-
                                          11

                                         III.

                      We  turn next to  Defendants' assertion  that there

            was insufficient  evidence to  support the jury's  verdict in

            Plaintiff's favor on the sex discrimination claim.  Title VII

            makes it unlawful  for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire

            or to discharge any  individual, or otherwise to discriminate

            against  any individual  with  respect  to his  compensation,

            terms, conditions, or  privileges of  employment, because  of

            such individual's  race,  color, religion,  sex, or  national

            origin."  42 U.S.C.   2000e-2(a)(1).

                      In  a Title VII disparate treatment case, if, as is

            often  true, see Smith v. Stratus Computer, Inc., 40 F.3d 11,
                         ___ _____    ______________________

            15 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1958 (1995), the
                                ____________

            plaintiff has  no direct proof of  deliberate discrimination,

            "the   plaintiff  must  make  out  a   prima  facie  case  of

            discrimination, the employer must then come forward with some

            non-discriminatory justification, and  the plaintiff  finally

            is given the opportunity  to convince the trier of  fact that

            the justification was pretextual and that the real reason was

            discriminatory."   Cuello-Suarez v.  Puerto Rico  Elec. Power
                               _____________     ________________________

            Auth., 988 F.2d 275, 278 (1st Cir. 1993).  
            _____

                      For  the  prima  facie  case,  a  disparate  impact

            plaintiff must "identify and relate specific  instances where

            persons  situated similarly  'in  all relevant  aspects' were

            treated differently."  Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College,
                                   ________________    _________________

                                         -12-
                                          12

            889  F.2d 13, 19 (1st  Cir. 1989) (quoting  Smith v. Monsanto
                                                        _____    ________

            Chem. Co., 770 F.2d  719, 723 (8th Cir. 1985),  cert. denied,
            _________                                       ____________

            475  U.S. 1050  (1986)).   "The  test  is whether  a  prudent

            person, looking  objectively at  the  incidents, would  think

            them  roughly  equivalent  and  the   protagonists  similarly

            situated."   Id.  "Exact  correlation is  neither likely  nor
                         ___

            necessary,  but the cases must  be fair congeners.   In other

            words, apples should be compared to apples."  Id.
                                                          ___

                      The  defendants  contend   that  Molloy  failed  to

            establish a prima facie  case by establishing that "similarly

            situated" males received more lenient treatment in respect to

            suspension.  We disagree.

                      At  trial,  the  Chief himself  testified  that  in

            approximately  a  dozen  discipline  cases  involving Warwick

            police  officers who were male,10 the  Chief had afforded the

            officers the rights  created by the Officers' Bill of Rights,

            as  he  conspicuously  would  not  do  for Molloy,  a  woman.

            Moreover,  in a  number of  these cases  he kept  officers on

            active duty after learning that they were suspected of highly

            questionable behavior.  

                      Scott Hornoff, for example, was the primary suspect

            in the state  police investigation  of the 1989  murder of  a

            woman  named Victoria Cushman.  Although the Chief knew as of

                                
            ____________________

            10.  The Chief also briefly referred to a situation involving
            a woman officer, but she was not identified, and the details
            of her case remain unclear.

                                         -13-
                                          13

            October  1991 that Hornoff was  the main suspect,  he did not

            suspend him  as he later did  Molloy but instead  kept him on

            active duty  working at an  administrative job.   Hornoff was

            not suspended until he was eventually indicted for murder  by

            a  grand jury in December  1994.  It  was conceded, moreover,

            that  Hornoff's rights  under the  Law Enforcement  Officers'

            Bill of Rights were recognized.

                      Joseph Duquette, a senior Warwick police officer at

            the  time of  the  Cushman case,  interfered  with the  state

            police investigation of Hornoff.  In  1993, Duquette issued a

            memorandum in  which he  ordered the members  of the  Warwick

            Major Crimes  Unit not  to discuss the  Cushman investigation

            with anyone  from the state attorney  general's office unless

            such a discussion took  place pursuant to a subpoena  or with

            the   explicit   permission   of   Duquette,   then-Commander

            Castiglioni or Chief Blanchard.  Duquette was not disciplined

            in  any  way  for  his  interference  with the  state  police

            investigation until August of 1995, after Chief Blanchard had

            been replaced by  Chief DeFeo.   While Appellants argue  that

            the  Chief  was  unaware  of  Duquette's  activity,  we  find

            sufficient evidence in  the record from which  the jury could

            have properly inferred knowledge.

                      We   conclude   that   Molloy  presented   evidence

            sufficient   for  the  jury  to  have   found  that  she  had

                                         -14-
                                          14

            established her prima  facie case  that "similarly  situated"

            males had received dissimilar treatment.

                      The  defendants go  on to  argue that  even if  the

            conduct of  the disciplined  male  officers was  sufficiently

            similar in material respects to Molloy's to establish a prima

            facie case,  the weight of  the evidence was  insufficient to

            support  a finding  "that the  justification [offered  by the

            defendants]  was  pretextual and  that  the  real reason  was

            discriminatory."  Cuello-Suarez, 988 F.2d at 278.
                              _____________

                      Presented  with  the  evidence  of  cases  such  as

            Hornoff's and  Duquette's in  which male police  officers who

            had  committed similar  or  more severe  offenses than  those

            Molloy was  accused of  were  either not  disciplined or,  if

            disciplined,  were  first  afforded their  rights  under  the

            Officers' Bill of Rights, the jury was entitled to infer that

            the   Chief's  proffered  explanation   for  his  more  harsh

            treatment of Molloy    the state police's advice that she was

            refusing  to cooperate  with them  and the  ostensible advice

            that the  granting of rights was  unnecessary where, although

            suspended, she was still being paid    was a pretext.  

                      Essentially  the  same   evidence  also  allowed  a

            reasonable jury  to conclude  that the plaintiff  had carried

            her  burden  of  proving  that the  Chief  had  discriminated

            against Molloy  because of her  gender in violation  of Title

            VII.    See Udo  v.  Tomes, 54  F.3d  9, 13  (1st  Cir. 1995)
                    ___ ___      _____

                                         -15-
                                          15

            (holding  that a plaintiff may  rely on the  same evidence to

            prove both pretext and discrimination).  Molloy was suspended

            without being  offered the  same rights granted  to similarly

            situated male  officers.   Moreover, the reasons  supplied by

            the  Chief for his refusal  to provide Molloy  with a hearing

            were so flimsy as to permit a finding of mendacity:

                      The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons
                      put    forward     by    the    defendant
                      (particularly if disbelief is accompanied
                      by   a   suspicion  of   mendacity)  may,
                      together with  the elements of  the prima
                      facie case, suffice  to show  intentional
                      discrimination.  Thus,  rejection of  the
                      defendant's proffered reasons will permit
                                                         ______
                      the trier of  fact to infer  the ultimate
                      fact  of intentional discrimination . . .
                      .

            St. Mary's Honor  Ctr. v.  Hicks, 509 U.S.  502, 511  (1993).
            ______________________     _____

            See also Woods v. Friction Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255, 260-
            ________ _____    ________________________

            61 n.3 (1st Cir. 1994); LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d
                                    _______    __________________

            836, 843 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1018 (1994).
                                      ____________

            The  Chief  was  experienced  in matters  arising  under  the

            Officers' Bill of Rights,  yet he refused to grant  Plaintiff

            her rights even after, with the assistance of an attorney and

            a union  representative, she  had requested a  hearing.   The

            Chief  said that  he had  refused to  grant Molloy  a hearing

            because  the City  Solicitor  had  told  him no  hearing  was

            required.   Yet  the statutory  language seems  utterly clear

            that a hearing was required in this case.  See R.I. Gen. Laws
                           ___                         ___

               42-28.6-13(C) ("Any  law enforcement officer  so suspended

                                         -16-
                                          16

            shall  be  entitled  to a  prompt  hearing  before a  hearing

            committee upon his  or her request.").  The  Chief's outright

            refusal was  in marked contrast  to his regular  allowance of

            these rights to  male officers.   We hold that  the jury  had

            sufficient  evidence  from  which  to   infer  discriminatory

            intent.  

                                         IV.

                      The  defendants'  remaining  contentions   are  not

            persuasive.  First, they  argue that the district court  made

            certain errors in admitting evidence at trial.  Our review of

            the  record  satisfies us  that  such  errors,  if any,  were

            harmless.   See Lataille v. Ponte,  754 F.2d 33, 37 (1st Cir.
                        ___ ________    _____

            1985) ("Our standard for determining whether the admission of

            such evidence is harmless  error is whether we can  say 'with

            fair assurance . . . that the judgment  was not substantially

            swayed  by the  error  . . . .'") (quoting  United States  v.
                                                        _____________

            Pisari, 636 F.2d 855, 859 (1st Cir.  1981) (quoting Kotteakos
            ______                                              _________

            v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946))).
               _____________

                      Defendants  protest  that  there  was  insufficient

            evidence to  allow  a reasonable  jury  to award  $23,000  in

            damages, pointing  out that Molloy  could not have  lost more

            than $5,000 in overtime, training, detail work and the  like.

            They acknowledge that the  jury may have granted all  or some

            of the remaining damages to compensate for Molloy's emotional

            distress, but  insist that  since there were  other potential

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                                          17

            causes  of  Molloy's  distress,  such  as  the  state  police

            interrogation   and  her  worries   about  possible  criminal

            prosecution, expert testimony was essential to establish what

            portion  of her distress came from her suspension.  They cite

            Andrade v. Jamestown Hous. Auth.,  82 F.3d 1179, 1187-88 (1st
            _______    _____________________

            Cir.  1996), as  holding that  where there  is more  than one

            possible cause  of a  plaintiff's emotional  distress, expert

            testimony  is   required  to   establish  that  it   was  the

            defendant's conduct that caused the plaintiff's  symptoms and

            not some other factor.

                      The defendants misstate our holding in Andrade.  In
                                                             _______

            that case,  the plaintiff had  a previous history  of stomach

            problems,  headaches, and  diarrhea.   We  held that  medical

            testimony was  required for the  plaintiff to prove  that the

            irritated   bowels,   diarrhea,    tension   headaches    and

            sleeplessness  she experienced were  the result  of emotional

            distress   caused  by   the  defendant   and  not   merely  a

            continuation of her previous medical problems.  In that case,

            we  sought  to  avoid  putting  juries  in  the  position  of

            evaluating  the effect  of  a  preexisting medical  condition

            without  the aid  of expert  medical testimony.   We  stated,

            "[W]e  are not  establishing a  bright-line rule  that expert

            testimony is always necessary to prove the causation prong of

            [intentional infliction  of emotional distress].   There  may

            very well be  situations where causation is within the common

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                                          18

            knowledge and experience  of the layperson  . . . ."  Id.  at
                                                                  ___

            1188 n.5.

                      This is such a  case.  There is no  contention that

            Molloy's   asserted   anxiety,   nervousness,    nausea   and

            sleeplessness  derived from a  preexisting medical condition.

            The  sole  issue  was  the  role  of  Defendants' conduct  in

            producing  those symptoms and the  placing of a fair monetary

            valuation on them relative to the circumstances of this case.

            The jury  heard and  could evaluate her  testimony describing

            what  effect  the suspension  had upon  her as  compared with

            other events.  It is unclear how an expert could have helped.

            This  is the  kind  of determination  typically entrusted  to

            juries.

                      Besides emotional distress,  Molloy also  testified

            that  the defendants' actions caused her  to suffer damage to

            her personal  and professional reputations.   She stated that

            her suspension, related as it was to  Sabetta's murder trial,

            received  substantial publicity.  Also, during her suspension

            Molloy testified as a witness at several trials in connection

            with arrests she had  made previously.  At these  trials, she

            had  to admit in open  court that she  was then suspended and

            was  obliged  to describe  the circumstances  surrounding her

            suspension.  The  jury was entitled to  compensate Molloy for

            these additional elements of damage.

                      The judgment is affirmed.  Costs to appellee.
                      ________________________   _________________

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