Court Opinion

ID: 9966275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-06 16:09:06.359259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:39.562146
License: Public Domain

J-A07038-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN RE: ADOPTION OF: A.L.R.H., A              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: R.L.R., MOTHER                    :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1552 MDA 2023

             Appeal from the Decree Entered October 12, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):
                               2023-0120a

BEFORE:      STABILE, J., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                 FILED: MAY 6, 2024

       R.L.R. (“Mother”), appeals from the October 12, 2023, decree granting

the petition of York County Offices of Children, Youth and Families (“the

Agency”) and involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her daughter,

A.L.R.H. (“Child”), born in June 2006, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1),

(2), (5), (8), and (b).1 After review, we affirm.

       We glean the following factual and procedural history of this case from

the certified record.

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 By separate decree dated and entered September 25, 2023, the orphans’

court involuntarily terminated the parental rights of Child’s father, D.L.H.
(“Father”). Father did not file an appeal or participate in the instant appeal.
Father’s whereabouts had been unknown to the Agency since the time of
adjudication. Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 9/25/23, at 26.
J-A07038-24

                                          ...

       6. An Application for Emergency Protective Custody was filed by
       the Agency on December 7, 2020. . . . [I]t was alleged that the
       Agency has received numerous referrals regarding [C]hild and
       family.2 On or about November 24, 2020, the Agency received a
       referral regarding [C]hild] due to allegations of environmental
       concerns. The home [in which] the family was residing was
       condemned. The family was believed to be residing in [a] Red
       Roof Inn but they often move from place to place. Mother
       routinely permits indicated perpetrators of abuse to come in and
       out of the home and interact with [C]hild unsupervised. [] Father
       is indicated for sexual abuse; there are concerns and allegations
       that [C]hild has been [a] victim of sexual abuse by [] Father.
       [C]hild gave birth to a son on December 3, 2020. There is concern
       that Mother allowed a 24 year old man to have a sexual
       relationship with [C]hild who was 14 years of age and that
       [Child]’s son is the result of this relationship. [C]hild reports that
       she has not attended school in the 2020/2021 school year. There
       are concerns regarding [] Mother’s ability to care for [C]hild due
       to the unstable housing and environment. The Agency has
       concerns regarding the safety and wellbeing of [C]hild should she
       remain in the parents’ custody. . . .

       7. In an Order for Emergency Protective Custody dated December
       7, 2020, sufficient evidence was presented to prove that
       continuation or return of [C]hild to the home of Mother and Father
       was not in the best interest of [C]hild. Legal and physical custody
       of [C]hild was transferred to the Agency. . . .

                                          ...

____________________________________________

2 The record reveals that Child is the youngest of seven children born to
Mother.    See CYS Exhibit 7 (parenting capacity assessment) at 1
(unpaginated). Mother’s older children are not subjects of the underlying
proceedings or the instant appeal.

                                           -2-
J-A07038-24

Stipulation of Counsel, 9/15/23, at ¶¶ 6, 7. Child was placed, along with her

infant child, and has remained in care since.3

       The court adjudicated Child dependent on January 27, 2021, and

established a permanency goal of return to parent or guardian. See id. at ¶

10; see also N.T., 9/25/23, at 23. In furtherance of reunification, the Agency

instituted family service plans which were forwarded to Mother, the goals of

which remained consistent throughout the dependency proceedings.4 See id.

at ¶ 13; see also Agency Exhibits 1 through 5 (family service plans); N.T.,

9/25/23, at 20-22, 47-48.           Mother failed to raise any objection or take

exception to any of her family service plan goals. See N.T., 9/25/23, at 22-

23. Her primary goals were to maintain Child’s safety, cooperate with provider

services, and address Child’s truancy. See id. at 24.

       Throughout the ensuing dependency proceedings, the court conducted

regular review hearings at which it maintained Child’s commitment and

placement. The court consistently characterized Mother’s compliance with the

permanency plan and progress towards alleviating the circumstances which

____________________________________________

3 At the time of the subject proceedings, Child, then over seventeen years old,

and her minor child, then over two and half years old, had been placed in their
current pre-adoptive, kinship care home for over a year. See Order Modifying
Placement, 7/28/22; N.T., 9/25/23, at 31.

4 We note that the Agency had previously been involved with this family and,

as such, the initial family service plan dates back to August 2018. See CYS
Exhibit 1 (family service plan); see also N.T., 9/25/23, at 20-21.

                                           -3-
J-A07038-24

necessitated placement as moderate. See Stipulation of Counsel, 9/15/23, at

¶¶ 14-18.

       Ultimately, on May 18, 2023, the court changed Child’s permanency goal

to adoption with a concurrent goal of permanent legal custody (non-relative).

See id. at ¶¶ 18, 19; see also N.T., 9/25/23, at 23.

       On July 11, 2023, the Agency filed a petition for the involuntary

termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511

(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). The orphans’ court held an evidentiary hearing

on September 25, 2023. At the time, Child, then seventeen years old, was

represented by a separate guardian ad litem (“GAL”) and legal counsel.5 See

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a). Mother, who was represented by counsel, was not

present. Upon request of the Agency, the orphans’’ court incorporated the

dependency record and granted judicial notice of all applications, petitions,

motions, and orders as docketed with the Clerk of Courts in the dependency

action.6 See N.T., 9/25/23, at 5-6. The Agency presented the testimony of

Pressley Ridge parent educator, Regina Fike; and Agency caseworker, Family

____________________________________________

5 Both the GAL and legal counsel argued in favor of termination at the
conclusion of the September 25th hearing. See N.T., 9/25/23, at 56-57. The
GAL likewise submitted a letter in lieu of brief to this Court in support of
termination. See Letter, 1/23/24.

6 A stipulation of counsel had additionally been filed on September 15, 2023.

See Stipulation of Counsel, 9/15/23.

                                           -4-
J-A07038-24

Preservation Unit, Aubree Dedrick.7 The Agency additionally proffered exhibits

which were admitted without objection. See id. at 5. By decree dated and

entered September 25, 2023, the court involuntarily terminated Mother’s

parental rights to Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8),

and (b).8

       Subsequent to the filing of a timely petition, pursuant to order of

October 4, 2023, the orphans’ court vacated the termination decree as to

Mother and reopened the record to allow for additional testimony, including

that of Mother.9 The court convened a continued hearing on October 12, 2023,

wherein Mother testified on her own behalf.      On the same date, the court

entered its decree involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).10

       Thereafter, on November 13, 2023, Mother filed a timely notice of

appeal, along with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal

____________________________________________

7 Ms. Dedrick testified that she had been the assigned caseworker for
approximately one year and two months. N.T., 9/25/23, at 20.

8 Pursuant to order of the same date, the court memorialized its reasoning as

placed on the record at the conclusion of the hearing. See Order, 9/25/23.

9 The court found that Mother failed to appear at the September 25th hearing

for credible reasons. See N.T., 10/12/23 at 21; see also id. at 24.

10 Pursuant to order of the same date, the court memorialized its reasoning

as placed on the record at the conclusion of the hearing.          See Order,
10/12/23.

                                           -5-
J-A07038-24

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).11 The orphans’ court filed a Rule

1925(a) opinion on November 27, 2023, which referenced and incorporated

its reasoning placed on the record on September 25, 2023, and October 12,

2023.

        On appeal, Mother raises the following issue for our review, “Did the

[orphans’ court] abuse its discretion and err as a matter of law in finding that

the Agency met its burden to terminate Mother’s parental rights under 23

Pa.C.S.A. Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and 2511(b)?” Mother’s Brief at

5.

        Our standard of review in this context is well-established:

        In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights,
        appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the
        decree of the termination court is supported by competent
        evidence. When applying this standard, the appellate court must
        accept the orphans’ court’s findings of fact and credibility
        determinations if they are supported by the record. Where the
        orphans’ court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence,
        an appellate court may not disturb the orphans’ court’s ruling
        unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.

        An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the
        reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion or the
____________________________________________

11 We note that Mother’s time in which to file a timely appeal with respect to

the orphans’ court’s decrees technically fell on November 11, 2023. See
Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Since that day was a Saturday, however, Mother’s time in
which to appeal was extended until Monday, November 13, 2023, by operation
of statute. See Pa.R.J.A. 107(a)-(b) (relating to the computation of time and
setting forth a rule of construction that excludes the last day of any period
that falls upon a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday); Pa.R.A.P. 107
(incorporating by reference the rules of construction set forth in the
Pennsylvania Rules of Judicial Administration with respect to the Pennsylvania
Rules of Appellate Procedure); see also Pa.R.A.P. 903, cmt.

                                           -6-
J-A07038-24

     facts could support an opposite result. Instead, an appellate court
     may reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration
     of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
     will. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial
     courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple
     hearings.

     In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, the orphans’
     court must balance the parent’s fundamental right to make
     decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her
     child with the child’s essential needs for a parent’s care,
     protection, and support. Termination of parental rights has
     significant and permanent consequences for both the parent and
     child. As such, the law of this Commonwealth requires the moving
     party to establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing
     evidence, which is evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and
     convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,
     without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.

Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 829-30 (Pa. Super. 2022) (cleaned up).

     The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed at statute by

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis. See

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.   The trial court must initially determine whether the

conduct of the parent warrants termination under one of the eleven

enumerated grounds set forth at Section 2511(a).            Only if the court

determines that the petitioner has established grounds for termination under

Section 2511(a) does it then engage in assessing the petition under Section

2511(b), which focuses upon the child’s needs and welfare. See In re T.S.M.,

602 Pa. 602, 628, 71 A.3d 251, 267 (2013).          To involuntarily terminate

parental rights, the petitioner must satisfy both Section 2511(a) and (b) by

clear and convincing evidence, which is evidence that is so “clear, direct,

weighty, and convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear

                                     -7-
J-A07038-24

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re

Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 359 (Pa. 2021).

      In the case sub judice, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). To affirm the

underlying decrees, however, we need only agree with the court’s decision as

to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), along with Section 2511(b). See

In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). As such, we

limit our discussion to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:

         (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a
         child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
         following grounds:

                                     ...

            (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
            neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
            to be without essential parental care, control or
            subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
            being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
            abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
            remedied by the parent.

                                     ...

         (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the
         rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
         developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
         of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
         solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
         inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
         medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
         With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
         (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
         the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which
         are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
         filing of the petition.

                                      -8-
J-A07038-24

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

      To prove the applicability of subsection (a)(2), the party petitioning for

termination must establish: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,

neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused

the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3)

that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot and will not

be remedied. See In re Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 443 (Pa. Super.

2021). Subsection (a)(2) emphasizes the child’s present and future needs,

not the parent’s refusal to perform their duties and thus “should not be read

to compel courts to ignore a child’s need for a stable home and strong

continuous parental ties. . . . This is particularly so where disruption of

the family has already occurred and there is no reasonable prospect

for reuniting it.”    In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2010)

(citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Section 2511(a)(2) grounds are not

limited to affirmative misconduct; they may also include acts of refusal and

incapacity to perform parental duties. See In re S.C., 247 A.3d 1097, 1104

(Pa. Super. 2021), abrogated on other grounds by Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d

1085, 1110 n.23 (Pa. 2023).       We have long recognized that a parent is

required to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption

of full parental responsibilities. See In re M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 443 (Pa.

Super. 2017).

                                     -9-
J-A07038-24

      With respect to the orphans’ court’s findings of incapacity pursuant to

subsection (a)(2), Mother argues that she

      is able to provide essential parental care for [C]hild now. Mother
      is able to provide a stable home for [C]hild. Again, this is not
      saying that Mother does not have certain limitations; however,
      they do not warrant termination of parental rights and therefore
      the Lower Court erred as a matter of law.

Mother’s Brief at 20. We disagree.

      Contrary to Mother’s arguments, the record supports the orphans’

court’s finding of an ongoing lack of parental capacity which persisted and was

denied by Mother. The orphans’ court stated:

            The court would note that the record establishes that
      [Mother], while engaged in some services during the course of
      adjudication of dependency of her daughter, never progressed to
      the point to which she was able to adequately address the very
      real concerns regarding her protective capacity as it relates to
      [Child], as well as advance and demonstrate appropriate
      understanding and implementation of proper parenting. The
      testimony established that [Mother] did not believe she needed
      additional parenting, training, or assistance. . . .

N.T., 10/12/23, at 29; see also N.T., 9/25/23 at 65-66 (noting, in part,

“[M]other’s overall protective capacity and ability to properly parent [Child]

remains a very significant concern for the [c]ourt.”).   We agree.

      Jonathan Gransee, Psy.D., licensed psychologist, conducted a parenting

capacity assessment of Mother dated May 5, 2021, which was admitted

without objection as CYS Exhibit 7. See N.T., 9/25/23, at 4-5. Dr. Gransee

expressed “serious concerns regarding [Mother’s] ability to ensure the safety

of her children.”   CYS Exhibit 7 (parenting capacity evaluation), at 9 ¶ 2

(unpaginated). Following testing, including testing related to Mother’s IQ, he

                                     - 10 -
J-A07038-24

found that Mother suffered from intellectual disability.    See id. at 7.    He

explained that, not only would this result in academic difficulty, but

      individuals with this level of intelligence often have issues with
      regards to judgment, and they tend to make mistakes in thinking,
      because of their limited cognitive abilities. They may also try to
      disguise their limited cognitive abilities, which can make it seem
      as if they are being non-compliant, rather than that they simply
      do not understand.

Id. Dr. Gransee therefore concluded, “At this point it does not appear that

she is capable of safely parenting her child, and it is not clear that that will

change.” Id. at 10. As such, he recommended, inter alia, “ongoing parenting

support in terms of learning additional parenting skills.” Id.

      While Mother engaged in parent education with Child through Pressley

Ridge, Ms. Fike, the Pressley Ridge parent educator, testified that Mother was

“noncompliant and continued to be resistant to the idea that she could benefit

from parent education services.” N.T., 9/25/23, at 12. She continued,

      Mother was very resistant is perhaps the better way to discuss
      this. Mother was -- we were doing the visits concurrently with
      parent education. So[,] a parent education session would occur
      and then the visit. Mother frequently would be late or would not
      – say that she couldn’t stay after the visit. Mother was also very
      vocal about telling me that she felt this was an inappropriate
      request that was being made of her and she was generally not
      supportive of it.

Id. at 12-13. Ms. Fike acknowledged that Mother had cognitive limitations

but “never felt that [she] didn’t understand . . . . She understood the concepts

that were being presented to the extent that she could relay them back to me.

She did not ever reach a threshold where she felt that any of those things

                                     - 11 -
J-A07038-24

applied to her.” Id. at 13. Parent education services were therefore closed

without Mother completing the program successfully. See id. at 16; see also

CYS Exhibit 6 (Pressley Ridge closing summary).

      Similarly, Ms. Dedrick confirmed that Mother had not successfully

engaged in parent education services. Id. at 33. She further testified, “It’s

my impression that [Mother] believes she doesn’t need parent[] education.

She, in the time that I’ve been assigned the case, has never expressed the

desire for any services from the agency besides visitation. . . .” Id. at 38. As

a result, Ms. Dedrick opined that Mother was not prepared to care for and

meet the needs of Child due to her cognitive limitations and denial of parent

education.   Id. at 37-38.    Ms. Dedrick expressed concern about Mother’s

ability to meet her own needs, as well as Child’s, and concern for Mother’s

ability to care for Child and Child’s child. See id. at 33, 40, 42. Specifically,

as to visitation, Ms. Dedrick noted Mother’s inability to parent and correct Child

and her inability to manage Child without supervision.       See id. at 42.    In

addition, she noted Mother’s failure to comprehend the circumstances

surrounding Child’s conception of her child. She stated, “[Mother]’s in denial

of the circumstances.” Id. at 43.

      Based on the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion by the court

in concluding the evidence warranted termination pursuant to Section

2511(a)(2). The record substantiates the conclusion that Mother’s repeated

and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused Child to be

                                     - 12 -
J-A07038-24

without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for her

physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the Mother. See

A.H., 247 A.3d at 443. After over two and a half years, Mother had yet to

remedy her continuing diminished protective capacity and rejected efforts at

parent education. As the court stated:

      It was more than two years ago when Dr. Gransee identified that
      [Mother] was not capable of safely parenting [Child]. Mother has
      had more than two years to address the concerns raised by Dr.
      Gransee’s evaluation. The [c]ourt finds that [M]other has failed
      to in any way be proactive in addressing Dr. Gransee’s concerns
      and demonstrate that she is able to safely parent [Child].

N.T., 9/25/23, at 70. Significantly, “a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance

while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting

responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s

need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope

for the future.” In re R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006).

      Having found sufficient grounds for termination pursuant to Section

2511(a)(2), we next must determine whether termination was proper under

Section 2511(b), which affords “primary consideration to the developmental,

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.”          23 Pa.C.S.A. §

2511(b).   “[T]he determination of the child’s ‘needs and welfare’ requires

consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and child.            The

‘utmost attention’ should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of

permanently severing the parental bond.” See T.S.M., 620 Pa. at 628, 71

                                     - 13 -
J-A07038-24

A.3d at 267 (internal citations omitted).     As our Supreme Court recently

explained in Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1113 (Pa. 2023):

      [A] court conducting a Section 2511(b) analysis must consider
      more than proof of an adverse or detrimental impact from
      severance of the parental bond. We emphasize analysis of the
      parental bond is but one part of the overall subsection (b)
      analysis, which includes a determination of whether the bond is
      necessary and beneficial to the child, i.e., whether maintaining the
      bond serves the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional
      needs and welfare.

K.T., supra (emphasis added).

      The evaluation of a child’s respective bonds is not always an easy task.

“In cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the parent and

child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent of any bond

analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular

case.”   In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-763 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation

omitted).

      In addition, the K.T. Court held that the “Section 2511(b) inquiry must

also include consideration of other important factors.” Id. While not inventing

an exhaustive list of considerations, the Court explained that the inquiry must

consider and weigh certain evidence if it is present in the record,

including, but not limited, “the child’s need for permanency and the length of

time in foster care [. . .]; whether the child is in a pre[-]adoptive home and

bonded with foster parents; and whether the foster home meets the child’s

developmental, physical, and emotional needs, including intangible needs of

                                     - 14 -
J-A07038-24

love, comfort, security, safety, and stability.”   Id. (footnote omitted); see

also id. at n.28 (emphasis in original).

      As to Section 2511(b), Mother argues that termination does not serve

Child’s best interests, pointing to a mutually desired relationship between she

and Child. Mother states:

      [T]ermination of Mother’s parental rights does not serve the best
      needs of [C]hild. Throughout the case, it was stated that [C]hild
      wanted a relationship with [] Mother and Mother wanted a
      relationship with [C]hild. It is argued that terminating Mother’s
      rights do not help [C]hild in anyway.         With [C]hild’s age,
      theoretically she could continue to live outside of Mother’s home
      by agreement without terminating parental rights.

Mother’s Brief 24-25. Mother further asserts that a Section 2511(b) analysis

is not even warranted. “As stated previously in this brief, the [c]ourt does not

even get to a [Section] 2511(b) analysis if sufficient grounds do not exist

under Section 2511(a). It is argued that in this case, there is no reason to

move to an analysis under [Section] 2511(b).” Id. at 25. We disagree.

      As noted above, we conclude that the orphans’ court did not abuse its

discretion or legally err in concluding that sufficient grounds for termination

existed pursuant to Section 2511(a).       In determining that termination was

additionally proper under Section 2511(b), the orphans’ court found that Child

does not share a parent-child bond with Mother, but instead shares such a

bond with her kinship parents. The court stated as follows:

            As it relates to any bond between [Child] and [M]other, the
      [c]ourt finds that there is a bond, but it is not a parental bond.
      The [c]ourt finds that based on the testimony here today, and the
      [c]ourt’s lengthy involvement with both [Child] and [M]other

                                     - 15 -
J-A07038-24

      throughout the course of adjudication of dependency, that
      [M]other has in essence a friend bond with [Child]. The [c]ourt
      finds that the strongest and, at this point, only parental bond with
      [Child], is between [Child] and her resource parents, who are
      identified a[s] pre-adoptive parents for [Child].

            Testimony established that [Child] looks to her [kinship]
      parents as her parental figures. The [c]ourt notes in assessing
      the bond that exists between the parents and [Child], the court is
      to assess whether the bond that does exist is necessary and
      beneficial to the child in order for the child’s developmental,
      physical, and emotional needs and welfare to be properly met.
      The [c]ourt finds that [Child]’s [kinship] parents are the ones who
      are providing a bond to [Child] that is allowing her to meet her
      developmental, physical, and emotional needs.

            The [c]ourt finds by clear and convincing evidence that the
      bond that exists between [Mother] and [Child] is not necessary
      for [C]hild’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs to be
      met, and, in fact, is not beneficial to her meeting those needs.

N.T., 10/12/23, at 68-69; see also N.T., 9/25/23, at 31 (“The [c]ourt

reaffirms that there’s a bond between Mother . . . and [Child]. However, that

bond is not an appropriate parental bond but more of a friend bond. . . . [T]he

termination of her parental rights . . . best serves the needs and welfare of

[Child], and . . . will allow her to move forward and achieve permanency.”).

We discern no abuse of discretion.

      Indeed, while Mother maintained visitation with Child, such visitation

remained supervised and never progressed. See N.T., 9/25/23, at 11-12, 28.

Ms. Fike expressed concerns for Child’s emotional safety, describing the visits

as traumatic. See id. at 12-14. She explained, “I spent a fair amount time

with [C]hild. . . . She was noticeably different in the visits with [M]other. I

felt that she was a bit more hypervigilant, a bit more aware, seemed very

                                     - 16 -
J-A07038-24

concerned when mom would say things that might ring as inappropriate. She

just seemed generally stressed in that environment. . . .” Id. at 14. Then,

clarifying that the negativity emanated from the parent education sessions

that were held in connection with visitation, Ms. Fike continued, “I can’t say

the visits themselves had a negative impact, but us doing parent education

appeared to raise issues and subject matter that that caused some anxiety, I

believe for [Child]. That was my impression.” Id. at 17. Moreover, the court

ceased phone contact between Mother and Child, and there was no indication

of any contact via mail or social media. See id. at 29, 50. Thus, although

Ms. Dedrick recognized a bond between Mother and Child, it was not a parental

bond. See id. at 30, 38 (“I would not call it parental, but they do have a

bond.”). She labelled the relationship as “more of a friendship.” Id. at 38.

     Rather, Ms. Dedrick recognized that Child shares a parental bond with

her kinship parents. See id. at 30-31. Ms. Dedrick testified:

     Q. [C]ould you comment upon what type of parental bond the
     minor child has with the [kinship] family?

     A. [Kinship] parents have stepped in to provide that parental
     relationship for [Child]. They correct her when needed. They
     guide her with parenting her own child. They give her that
     stability that a parent should give her.

     Q. Would you conclude that she views them as parental type
     figures?

     A. Yes.

Id. at 31. Her child likewise has a positive relationship with Child’s kinship

parents. He “calls [kinship parents] Meme and Popop. So he does view them

                                    - 17 -
J-A07038-24

as grandparents figures. All interaction I’ve seen have been positive.” Id. at

31.

      Ms. Dedrick confirmed that Child is doing “exceedingly well” in the

kinship home, which is pre-adoptive. Id. at 40-41. She indicated that Child

has an IEP and is doing “exceptional” in school. Id. at 39. In fact, Ms. Dedrick

observed, “All of her grades are fantastic.” Id. She also reported that Child

is involved in marching band. See id. at 40.

      Ms. Fike stated that Child expressed a desire for permanency in her

kinship home. She testified:

      Q. During your visits -- excuse me -- and work with [Child], did
      she express her views to you regarding her permanency?

      A. She did.

      Q. And what were those?

      A. Over the amount of time that I spent with her, she moved from
      a position of being very, very concerned that she not heard from
      [M]other to articulating a belief that it was not in her best interest
      or her son’s best interest to return to [M]other, and from that
      point expressed a desire to have permanency in her current home.

Id. at 14-15. Likewise, Ms. Dedrick stated that Child indicated that she wants

“to be adopted.” Id. at 41-42. As such, Ms. Dedrick opined that termination

was in Child’s best interests. She explained, “Once termination of parental

rights occurs, [Child] would be able to have permanency that she desires and

deserves in [her kinship home].”      Id.   She further predicted no long-term

negative impact as a result of termination. Id.

                                     - 18 -
J-A07038-24

      Hence, the record corroborates the orphans’ court’s determination that

termination of Mother’s parental rights best serves Child’s developmental,

physical, and emotional needs and welfare pursuant to Section 2511(b). As

such, we do not disturb the orphans’ court’s determination.

      As Mother has failed to show that the orphans’ court abused its

discretion in finding grounds for termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2)

and that termination of her parental rights favors the Child’s needs and welfare

pursuant to Section 2511(b), she is due no relief. For the foregoing reasons,

we affirm the termination decree.

      Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/6/2024

                                     - 19 -