Court Opinion

ID: 9528137
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:37:36.423549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:32.095622
License: Public Domain

REYNOLDSON, Justice
(concurring specially).
I concur with the majority’s succinct statement of our law applicable to damages in replevin cases, set out in division II of the opinion.
But I respectfully disagree with the holding in division I.
All concede defendant’s amended answer, when allowed, injected a new jury issue into the case. The separate jury demand filed at the same time, more than a year before trial, demanded “a trial by jury on all the issues in the above-captioned matter.” Plaintiff filed a tardy motion to strike the demand. Trial court sustained the motion to strike without giving any reason.
On appeal, plaintiff seeks to uphold trial court’s action by asserting trial court deprived defendant of a jury trial as a condition of its allowance of the amendment. For the purposes of this discussion it may be conceded trial court could have imposed such a condition. See rule 88, Rules of Civil Procedure; Farmers’ Handy Wagon Co. v. Casualty Co. of America, 184 Iowa 773, 775-76, 167 N.W. 204, 205 (1918), opinion supplemented on rehearing, 184 Iowa [773,] 781, 169 N.W. 178. The majority does not elect to follow that rationale, probably because trial court in fact never imposed any conditions. Plaintiff’s argument is founda-tioned on speculation alone.
Secondly, plaintiff argues the demand for jury was filed late. But following defendant’s original answer plaintiff filed an amended petition without leave of court repleading the contents of the original petition and other allegations. After plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was overruled, defendant filed an amended answer in which he repled the allegations of his original answer and in addition pled alleged events occurring subsequent to the original answer which produced claimed damages. This amendment was allowed approximately one year before trial. Under these circumstances, plaintiff’s assertion the jury demand then filed was late finds no support in the facts. •
The majority would uphold trial court for a reason never mentioned by plaintiff: defendant demanded a jury trial on all issues and did not isolate the jury issue raised by the amended answer. This seems a hyper-technical ground for denying the right to a jury and is apparently without precedential authority, as the opinion cites none.
While defendant does not raise constitutional grounds, I suggest in our interpretation of rule 177, R.C.P., we cannot ignore the constitutional mandate that “The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate * * *.” Constitution of Iowa, Article I, Section 9. While the legislature may reasonably limit the manner of obtaining that right, Schloemer v. Uhlenhopp, 237 Iowa 279, 21 N.W.2d 457 (1946), our rules have already moved from an absolute right unless waived, to a demand endorsed on a pleading, to a demand by a separate instrument “not later than ten days after the last pleading directed to that issue.” Rule 177, R.C.P. and comment, 2 Iowa Rules Civil *481Proc. Annotated, Rule 177, p. 477 [3 ed. 1970]. The constraints our rules exert on this constitutional right should not be further tightened by unnecessarily strict interpretations.
Rule 177 provides a solution for the situation in which a party filing an unlimited jury demand is not entitled to a jury trial of all issues. In that event, “Unless limited to a specific issue, every such demand shall be deemed to include all issues triable to a jury.” (Emphasis supplied.). Rule 177(e), R.C.P. Nor do I see anything in our rules or statutes which would indicate an intent to spare trial courts the burden the majority describes as “sort[ing] out the various issues to see which are triable to a jury and which are not.”
Lastly, I suggest that nowhere else in our pleading or practice is one who has asked for too much penalized by denying him what he is entitled to. If this startling innovation takes root in our law the hazards of litigation will become even more formidable.
I would reverse on division I as well as division II, and remand for jury trial on all issues.