Court Opinion

ID: 9377754
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-08 17:06:58.837657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:16.435062
License: Public Domain

J-S06039-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 CHRISTIAN SCOTT THOMAS                :
                                       :
                   Appellant           :   No. 1166 MDA 2022

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 5, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-36-CR-0003140-2001

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 CHRISTIAN SCOTT THOMAS                :
                                       :
                   Appellant           :   No. 1167 MDA 2022

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 5, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-36-CR-0000805-2001

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 CHRISTIAN SCOTT THOMAS                :
                                       :
                   Appellant           :   No. 1168 MDA 2022

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 5, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-36-CR-0001147-2001

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
J-S06039-23

                                                 :
                v.                               :
                                                 :
                                                 :
    CHRISTIAN SCOTT THOMAS                       :
                                                 :
                       Appellant                 :   No. 1169 MDA 2022

              Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 5, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-36-CR-0002950-2001

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                                 :
                v.                               :
                                                 :
                                                 :
    CHRISTIAN SCOTT THOMAS                       :
                                                 :
                       Appellant                 :   No. 1170 MDA 2022

              Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 5, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-36-CR-0002952-2001

BEFORE:      STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                            FILED: MARCH 8, 2023

        Appellant, Christian Scott Thomas, appeals pro se from the August 5,

2022, order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, which

dismissed Appellant’s petition filed under the Post-Conviction Relief Act

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546, without an evidentiary hearing on the

basis it was untimely filed. After a careful review, we affirm.

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

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      The relevant facts and procedural history have been set forth previously,

in part, by this Court as follows:

            Throughout the time from May 13, 2000, to January 19,
      2001, [Appellant] committed numerous counts of burglary,
      robbery, and rape. [Appellant] was 14 and 15 years old during
      the time of his offenses. On June 6, 2003, [Appellant] entered a
      guilty plea [to numerous charges at separate docket numbers,
      which were consolidated in the trial court], and he was later
      sentenced to [an aggregate of] 66-150 years’ incarceration. This
      Court affirmed the initial sentence on August 6, 2004.
             After the decision by this Court to affirm the original
      sentence imposed by the trial court, [Appellant] filed a writ of
      habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern
      District of Pennsylvania. The District Court ordered that the trial
      court resentence [Appellant]. The District Court held that the
      aggregate sentence of 66-150 [years] violated [Appellant’s] rights
      against cruel and unusual punishment based upon the United
      States Supreme Court decision in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
      48, 75 (2010). On October 2, 2013, the trial court resentenced
      [Appellant] to a new aggregate sentence of 40-80 years’
      incarceration. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 105 A.3d 32
      (Pa.Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum at *1), appeal
      denied, 101 A.3d 786 (Pa. 2014). [On June 12, 2014, this Court]
      affirmed [Appellant’s] second judgment of sentence, finding that
      it afforded him a reasonable opportunity to be released during his
      lifetime. [Appellant filed a timely petition for allowance of appeal,
      which our Supreme Court denied on October 8, 2014. Appellant
      did not file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States
      Supreme Court.]
             On December 3, 2014, [Appellant] filed a pro se petition for
      collateral relief. The court appointed new counsel, and on March
      6, 2015, counsel filed an amended PCRA petition, which asserted
      that [Appellant] was denied effective assistance of counsel during
      his October 2013 resentencing [hearing. He alleged counsel failed
      to present readily available evidence of Appellant’s maturation,
      rehabilitation, and improvement since his conviction in 2002-03,
      at age 15, and in failing to object to the presentence investigation
      report. Following a hearing, the PCRA court denied the petition.]
      This Court affirmed the PCRA court’s order on August 16, 2016.
             On March 25, 2019, [Appellant] filed [another] pro se PCRA
      petition that was later amended….[O]n April 22, 2019, the PCRA

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      court dismissed the petition as untimely because [it was filed]
      more than one year after his appeal on his resentencing resolved
      in this Court. Moreover, the PCRA court found that [Appellant] did
      not even allude to any exception to the timeliness requirement.

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 225 A.3d 1146, *3-4 (Pa.Super. filed

12/10/19) (unpublished memorandum) (quotation omitted).

      On appeal, Appellant failed to recognize his PCRA petition was untimely

filed. Instead, he contended his October 2, 2013, judgment of sentence was

manifestly excessive since the sentencing court failed to consider the

mitigating circumstances, including Appellant’s history of substance abuse,

lack of mental capacity, young age at the time of the offenses, and difficult

family background.    Concluding the PCRA court did not err in dismissing

Appellant’s PCRA petition on the basis it was untimely, and Appellant failed to

establish an exception to the PCRA’s timeliness requirements, we affirmed on

December 10, 2019. See id. Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal,

which our Supreme Court denied on August 12, 2020.

      On or about November 6, 2020, Appellant filed another PCRA petition,

which he amended on November 13, 2020, and the PCRA court dismissed

Appellant’s PCRA petition on November 17, 2020.

                                     -4-
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       On November 4, 2021,1 Appellant filed the instant pro se PCRA petition.2

Therein, Appellant contended he “file[d] the petition for [collateral] relief

under the newly discovered [evidence exception], steming (sic) from the new

case of Jones v. Mississippi, No. 18-12, 59 Decided April 22, 2021.”3

Appellant’s PCRA Petition, filed 11/4/21, at 1.

       On March 21, 2022, the PCRA court provided Appellant with notice of its

intent to dismiss the petition without an evidentiary hearing on the basis it

was untimely filed.        See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. On or about April 6, 2021,

Appellant filed a response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice. Therein, he

argued he was entitled to the newly discovered evidence exception and/or the

new constitutional right exception in light of Jones, supra.

____________________________________________

1 Although the pro se petition was time-stamped and docketed on November
9, 2021, we shall deem the petition to have been filed on November 4, 2021,
when Appellant handed the petition to prison officials. See Commonwealth
v. Chambers, 35 A.3d 34 (Pa.Super. 2011) (discussing the prisoner mailbox
rule).
2On or about November 29, 2021, Appellant filed an amended PCRA petition;
however, as the PCRA court noted, the amended petition was identical to the
November 4, 2021, petition. See PCRA Court Opinion, filed 10/20/22, at 2
n.3.

3 The case to which Appellant refers is Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S.Ct. 1307
(2021).

                                           -5-
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       Further, following permission from the PCRA court, on May 12, 2022,4

Appellant filed an amended PCRA petition. Therein, Appellant averred he had

newly discovered evidence regarding Detective John Burkhart, who was the

arresting officer in Appellant’s case. He averred he had evidence showing a

“pattern of how this Detective has been violating people’s rights, and

[committing] police misconduct concerning a pattern and practice of falsifying

evidence and overty (sic) coercive interrogations and investigation tactics

resulting in [Detective] Burkhart being charged.” Appellant’s Petition, filed

5/12/22, at 1. In support of his claim, Appellant attached copies of excerpts

from two newspaper articles.

       On August 5, 2022, the PCRA court entered an order dismissing

Appellant’s PCRA petition on the basis Appellant’s petition was facially

untimely, and he failed to establish he was entitled to any of the exceptions.

On or about August 22, 2022, Appellant filed five separate notices of appeal.5

All Pa.R.A.P. 1925 requirements have been met.

____________________________________________

4 Although the pro se petition was time-stamped and docketed on May 17,
2022, we shall deem the petition to have been filed on May 12, 2022, when
Appellant handed the petition to prison officials. See Chambers, supra
(discussing the prisoner mailbox rule).

5We note that each of Appellant’s separate notices of appeal list all five trial
court docket numbers, but each has a different docket number highlighted.
The notices comply with Pa.R.A.P. 341, which “requires that when a single
order resolves issues arising on more than one docket, separate notices of
appeal must be filed from that order at each docket.” Commonwealth v.
Young, 265 A.3d 462, 477 (Pa. 2021). See Commonwealth v. Johnson,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -6-
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       On appeal, Appellant sets forth the following issue in his “Statement of

Question Involved” (verbatim):

              Whether the lower court abused it’s (sic) discretion when it
       failed to consider fully all mitigating factors, An (sic) buy (sic)
       [Appellant] being deprived of the proper hearings to determine
       when his sentence could have been corrected and by not accepting
       that it would be a Brady violation if the District Attorney’s Office
       refuses to give documents of John Burkhart’s misconduct and
       wrongdoing and whether the lower court’s (sic) of Lancaster
       County did or did not find beyond a reasonable doubt that
       [Appellant] was permanently incorrigible, irreparably corrupt or
       irretrievably depraved, An (sic) whether Lancaster County court’s
       (sic) dismissal of [Appellant’s] petition without a hearing would be
       in violation being that a sentencing matter cannot be waived.

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

       Initially, we note the following:

             On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard of
       review calls for us to determine whether the ruling of the PCRA
       court is supported by the record and free of legal error. The PCRA
       court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for
       the findings in the certified record. The PCRA court’s factual
       determinations are entitled to deference, but its legal
       determinations are subject to our plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Nero, 58 A.3d 802, 805 (Pa.Super. 2012) (quotation

marks and quotations omitted).

             Pennsylvania law makes clear no court has jurisdiction to
       hear an untimely PCRA petition. The most recent amendments to
       the PCRA, effective January 16, 1996, provide a PCRA petition,
       including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one
____________________________________________

236 A.3d 1141, 1145-48 (Pa.Super. 2020) (en banc) (finding a single
defendant appealing from multiple dockets may include multiple docket
numbers on each notice of appeal, but still must file separate notices of appeal
for each docket).

                                           -7-
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         year of the date the underlying judgment becomes final. 42
         Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment is deemed final “at the
         conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the
         Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of
         Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the
         review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).

Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1079 (Pa.Super. 2010)

(citations omitted).

                [There are] three statutory exceptions to the timeliness
         provisions in the PCRA [that] allow for the very limited
         circumstances under which the late filing of a petition will be
         excused. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). To invoke an exception, a
         petitioner must allege and prove:
                (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
         interference by government officials with the presentation of the
         claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
         or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
               (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
         unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by
         the exercise of due diligence; or
                (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
         recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
         Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in
         this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

Id. at 1079-80 (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii)).

         Any petition invoking a timeliness exception must be filed within one

year of the date the claim could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9545(b)(2). “We emphasize that it is the petitioner who bears the burden to

allege      and     prove     that    one     of    the    timeliness    exceptions

applies.”    Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d 714, 719 (Pa. 2008)

(citation omitted).

                                         -8-
J-S06039-23

      Here, Appellant was resentenced on October 2, 2013, and this Court

affirmed his judgment of sentence on June 12, 2014.             The Pennsylvania

Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on October

8, 2014, and Appellant did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari with the

United States Supreme Court.

      Accordingly, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final 90 days

later, on January 6, 2015, when the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari

expired. See U.S. Supreme Court Rule 13 (effective January 1, 1990).

Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition on November 4, 2021, and

consequently, it is facially untimely.

      However, this does not end our inquiry as Appellant contends that he is

entitled to the timeliness exception set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii)

since Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S.Ct. 1307 (2021), fashioned a new

constitutional right that applies retroactively. Initially, Appellant met the

threshold of demonstrating he filed the instant petition invoking Jones within

one year of the date the claim could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9545(b)(2). That is, the United States Supreme Court filed Jones on April 22,

2021, and Appellant filed his PCRA petition on November 4, 2021. However,

assuming, arguendo, Jones raises a new constitutional right that applies

retroactively, Appellant did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of

Subsection 9545(b)(1)(iii) since he did not present a claim falling within the

ambit of the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones. See Commonwealth v.

                                         -9-
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Furgess, 149 A.3d 90, 93-94 (Pa.Super. 2016) (holding the appellant’s

petition did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of Section 9545 because

the petition did not present a claim falling within the ambit of the Supreme

Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), and, thus, did

not fall under the “newly recognized constitutional right” exception).

      Jones reiterated the principle that a life without parole sentence

(“LWOP”) for a juvenile homicide offender meets the requirements of the

Eighth Amendment so long as the sentence is part of a sentencing scheme in

which the sentencer has the discretion to impose a sentence less than LWOP.

Jones, 141 S.Ct. at 1311. In addition, the sentencing scheme only requires

the sentencer to consider the juvenile homicide offender’s “youth and

attendant   characteristics”   to   meet   the   requirements   of   the   Eighth

Amendment.     Id. at 1314 (quotation omitted). The U.S. Supreme Court

concluded the Eighth Amendment does not require a sentencer to make a

separate factual finding of “permanent incorrigibility,” and, thus, the Court

rejected the need for the sentencer to make “an on-the-record sentencing

explanation with an implicit finding of permanent incorrigibility” to be legal

under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 1319. The Jones decision did not

preclude the States from imposing additional sentencing limits in cases

involving murderers under eighteen years old. Id.

      In the case sub judice, Appellant did not commit homicide, and upon

resentencing, he was not given a LWOP sentence. Despite these factual

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distinctions from Jones, Appellant contends Jones is applicable to his case

since it mandates the sentencer is required to make a finding of “permanent

incorrigibility” before imposing any sentence in a non-homicide case.

However, we agree with the PCRA court that “[t]here is simply no support in

the Jones decision for [this] contention[.]” PCRA Court Opinion, filed

10/20/22, at 6. Thus, since Appellant’s petition did not present a claim falling

within the ambit of Jones, he did not demonstrate his entitlement to the

“newly     recognized       constitutional     right”   exception   in   Subsection

9545(b)(1)(iii).6

       Appellant next contends he is entitled to the timeliness exception set

forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) pertaining to newly discovered facts.

              To establish the newly discovered fact timeliness exception
       in [Sub]section 9545(b)(1)(ii), a petitioner must demonstrate he
       did not know the facts upon which he based his petition and could
       not have learned those facts earlier by the exercise of due
       diligence.    Due diligence demands that the petitioner take
       reasonable steps to protect his own interests. A petitioner must
       explain why he could not have learned the new fact(s) earlier with
       the exercise of due diligence. This rule is strictly enforced.
       Additionally, the focus of this exception is on the newly discovered

____________________________________________

6 Appellant also relies on Jones in advancing his contention that he is entitled
to the newly discovered facts exception set forth in Subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii).
He reasons that his “discovery” of Jones meets the requirements of
Subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii).
      We dispose of Appellant’s assertion by noting the well-established
principle that judicial decisions do not qualify as previously unknown facts.
Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 986 (Pa. 2011) (holding a judicial
opinion does not qualify as a previously unknown fact capable of triggering
the timeliness exception set forth in Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) of the PCRA).

                                          - 11 -
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      facts, not on a newly discovered or newly willing source for
      previously known facts.

Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa.Super. 2015) (citations

and quotation marks omitted).

      “The test is conjunctive; the appellant must show by a preponderance

of the evidence that each of these factors has been met in order for a new

trial to be warranted.” Commonwealth v. Foreman, 55 A.3d 532, 537

(Pa.Super. 2012) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we must determine whether

Appellant has established both that “there were facts unknown to him and

that he exercised due diligence in discovering those facts.” Brown, 111 A.3d

at 176.

      Appellant contends he is entitled to the newly discovered facts exception

due to alleged police misconduct committed by Detective Burkhart.

Specifically, Appellant avers:

             [Detective] Burkhart violated a number of witnesses’ rights
      when he…questioned them,…[including] Vanessa J. Rodriguez,
      Robert Thomas, Charles Thomas, Sekou Roy, Lamont M. Jackson,
      [and] Shaw Smith, [who] are stating that Burkhart had used false
      statements by [these] witnesses to charge [Appellant] and used
      theating (sic), overty (sic) coercive interrogations and
      investigation tactics which [Appellant alleges constitutes] [n]ewly
      [d]iscovered [e]vidence that could bring to light all that Burkhart
      had done to strong arm witnesses to testify [against Appellant],
      which was violations by Mr. Burkhart at the time and he was
      investigating [Appellant’s] case and at the time Burkhart was
      already under investigation for taking his work hand gun and
      hitting a young man with it, this was a misconduct inwhich (sic)
      was put in the newspapers when he was charged as of the
      investigation that he is under now.
                                     ***

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             [Appellant] is entitled to a new trial based upon newly
      discovered evidence of relevant police misconduct by arresting
      and testifying office (sic) John Burkhart[, who] has Tempered (sic)
      with or [f]abricated physical evidence in the past and abused his
      position of hte (sic) public and the people in his community and
      defrauded the citizens of Lancaster County, and the Lancaster
      County Ploice (sic) Department. [Appellant] moves under the
      [PCRA] for a new trial based on the new exculpatory evidence that
      was not previously available to [Appellant], that which could of
      not been discovered through the exercise of Due Diligence, and
      has been timely persented (sic) and which, when considered alone
      or in connection with other exculpatory evidence that was
      previously before the court, because it would “Likely” result in a
      different outcome[.]
             [Appellant] states that he is entitled to a new trial based
      upon newly discovered evidence of said ex-detective John
      Burkhart’s Police Misconduct that concerns a pattern and practice
      of falsifying evidence and overty (sic) coercive interrogations and
      investigations tactics resulting in Burkhart being charged, in which
      “NO” one person can know or determming (sic) when or how long
      Burkhart was tempering (sic) with records and or fabricating
      physical evidence. [Appellant] states that all evidence handled by
      John Burkhart should be reviewed and all cases should be re-
      looked at for any violations because without Burkhart fabricating
      and tempering (sic) with evidence it would have been a different
      outcome of the case.

Appellant’s Brief at 12-13.

      Initially, to the extent Appellant contends he has newly discovered

evidence that Detective Burkhart forced various witnesses, including Vanessa

J. Rodriguez, Robert Thomas, Charles Thomas, Sekou Roy, Lamont M.

Jackson, and Shaw Smith, to lie, we note that, aside from Appellant’s bald

allegation, Appellant proffered no evidence in support thereof. We specifically

note he did not attach a signed certification to his amended PCRA petition such

as would have supported a request for an evidentiary hearing. See

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Commonwealth v. Brown, 767 A.2d 576, 582 (Pa.Super. 2001) (“[W]here

a petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing,…the petition must include…a

signed certification as to each intended witness and the petitioner must also

provide the witness’s name, address, date of birth and the substance of the

proposed testimony.”); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(d)(1).7 Further, he has failed to

demonstrate why he could not have learned the witnesses allegedly lied to the

police “earlier with the exercise of due diligence.” Brown, 111 A.3d at 176.

Simply put, Appellant raised this claim for the first time in his May 12, 2022,

____________________________________________

7This rule relevantly provides:
      (d) Evidentiary hearing.--
      (1) The following apply:
      (i) Where a petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing, the petition
      shall include a certification signed by each intended witness
      stating the witness’s name, address, date of birth and substance
      of testimony and shall include any documents material to that
      witness’s testimony.
      (ii) If a petitioner is unable to obtain the signature of a witness
      under subparagraph (i), the petitioner shall include a certification,
      signed by the petitioner or counsel, stating the witness’s name,
      address, date of birth and substance of testimony. In lieu of
      including the witness’s name and address in the certification under
      this subparagraph, counsel may provide the witness’s name and
      address directly to the Commonwealth. The certification under this
      subparagraph shall include any documents material to the
      witness’s testimony and specify the basis of the petitioner’s
      information regarding the witness and the petitioner’s efforts to
      obtain the witness’s signature. Nothing in this subparagraph shall
      be construed to contravene any applicable attorney-client
      privilege between the petitioner and postconviction counsel.
      (iii) Failure to substantially comply with the requirements of this
      paragraph shall render the proposed witness’s testimony
      inadmissible.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(d)(1) (bold in original).

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amended petition, which was filed almost nineteen years after Appellant

entered his guilty pleas.

       To the extent Appellant contends he has newly discovered evidence that

Detective Burkhart engaged in a pattern of misconduct, including “a pattern

and practice of falsifying evidence and overty (sic) coercive interrogations and

investigations tactics resulting in [Detective] Burkhart being charged[,]” we

note Appellant relies exclusively upon two excerpts of newspaper articles,8

which he attached to his amended petition. Appellant’s Brief at 13.

       We conclude Appellant has not met the initial threshold of proving he

raised this claim within one year of the date the claim could have been

presented.     42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). Notably, the newspaper articles

____________________________________________

8 The newspaper articles contain allegations of misconduct occurring in cases
unrelated to Appellant’s case. For instance, one of the newspaper articles
contains information indicating that (1) Detective Burkhart falsified
information in a detective’s report, which resulted in an internal investigation;
(2) Task force detectives executed a search warrant in a case without
informing local police; (3) Detective Vance left a bag of seized cocaine in his
desk for nearly 10 months without destroying it as instructed by his
supervisor, Detective Burkhart, and as a result, Detective Vance was placed
on administrative leave; (4) Approximately $150,000 of drug forfeiture money
was missing, and the matter had been referred to Attorney General Josh
Shapiro’s office; (5) The incidents led to the termination of Detective Burkhart,
who was challenging the termination with the assistance of the detectives’
union; (6) Detective Burkhart made statements that the true motive for his
termination related to him making statements critical of the Lancaster County
commissioners; and (7) The newly elected prosecutor wanted to fire the
detective because she did not like his tone during meetings.
       In the other newspaper article, it was reported that Detective Burkhart
was fired for allegedly falsifying a report and demonstrating poor managerial
skills. The article revealed Detective Burkhart was contesting his termination
on the basis it was politically motivated, and he denied any misconduct.

                                          - 15 -
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contain no dates and do not identify the newspapers in which the articles

allegedly appeared.       However, the PCRA court noted it was taking judicial

notice of the fact the articles were published on or around June 12, 2020. See

PCRA Court Opinion, filed 10/20/22, at 8 n.5. Still, Appellant did not raise his

claims based on the newspaper articles until May 12, 2022, when he filed his

amended PCRA petition.9 Appellant has offered no explanation as to why he

did not present his claim within one year of the date the claim could have been

presented.10 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

       For all of the foregoing reasons, we agree with the PCRA court that

Appellant’s instant PCRA petition is facially untimely, and Appellant failed to

plead and prove any of the timeliness exceptions. Thus, we affirm.

____________________________________________

9 Even if we consider the date Appellant initially filed his instant PCRA petition,
November 4, 2021, and giving Appellant the benefit of the PCRA court taking
judicial notice of the fact the newspaper articles were published on or about
June 12, 2020, Appellant has failed to demonstrate he raised his claim within
one year of the date the claim could have been presented.

10 Also, we note Appellant provides no date as to when he allegedly learned
of the newspaper articles; but rather, he indicates he filed his petition within
a few weeks of the publication of the newspaper articles. However, given the
articles contain no dates, and the PCRA court took judicial notice of the fact
the newspaper articles were published on or about June 12, 2020, Appellant
has not met his burden. Further, he contends he learned about the articles
when his daughter told him, but he provides no date as to when this alleged
communication occurred.

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Affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/8/2023

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