Court Opinion

ID: 2964810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:31:26.269297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:37:25.866269
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                                           
                                ____________________
          No. 96-2123
                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                      Appellee,
                                         v.
                                KENNETH LEON MEADER,
                                Defendant, Appellant.
                                ____________________
                    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                              FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
                     [Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge]
                                ____________________
                                       Before
                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                            Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
                              and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
                                ____________________
               David 
                    M. 
                       Sanders, by Appointment of the Court, for appellant.
               Margaret 
                       D. 
                          McGaughey, Assistant United States Attorney, with
          whom 
              Jay 
                  P. 
                     McCloskey, United States Attorney, and Gail F. Malone,
          Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for appellee.
                                ____________________
                                    July 11, 1997
                                 ___________________

               COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge.  Appellant Kenneth Leon Meader
          was convicted on all  three counts of an indictment charging  him
          with distributing cocaine,  using a firearm in connection with  a
          drug trafficking  crime,  and being  a felon-in-possession  of  a
          firearm. 
                   
                   He 
                     essentially 
                                 raises two claims on appeal, one involving
          possible juror bias and the other concerning his sentencing as  a
          career criminal  based on prior  convictions for unlawful  sexual
          contact and intercourse with  a minor.  After careful review,  we
          affirm.
                                I. Factual Background
               The 
                  facts 
                        of 
                          the 
                              crime 
                                    are largely irrelevant to the issues we
          face 
              on 
                 appeal, and we therefore do not recite them in any detail.
          It suffices to say that,  viewing the evidence in the light  most
          favorable  to the  prosecution, the  jury could  have found  that
          appellant 
                   abducted 
                           the 
                               mother of his young son at gunpoint from her
          parents' 
                  home, 
                        took 
                            her 
                                to the house they had shared, forced her to
          ingest 
                cocaine and sleeping pills, and assaulted her sexually.  He
          eventually released her, and surrendered to authorities.  
               The jury returned its guilty verdicts on March 27, 1996.  On
          April 19, defense counsel advised the court that he had  received
          information about a  juror that suggested  that she possibly  was
          biased.  A defense  witness, Decato, had spoken with the  juror's
          son,  who reported  that  his mother  had  a history  of  abusive
          relationships and consequently  was "dead  set against"  domestic
          abusers. 
                   
                   The 
                      son 
                          also 
                               told Decato that once his mother made up her
          mind she would not change it.
                                         -2-

               Before trial,  Meader had submitted  six proposed voir  dire
          questions, four of which pertained to domestic abuse.1  The court
          reframed them into a single question:
               There 
                    may 
                        be 
                           evidence in this case concerning a domestic
               relationship  in which  physical  force  or  abuse  was
               involved or threatened.   Does any member of the  panel
               have personal views or personal experiences that  would
               prevent you from deciding this type of case fairly  and
               impartially?
          No juror responded.
               In 
                 a 
                   conference with counsel following revelation of Decato's
          conversation, the district court  identified two issues: did  the
          juror 
               prejudge the case, and did she answer the voir dire question
          falsely? 
                   
                   Attempting to adhere to First Circuit authority strongly
          disfavoring direct  contact  with jurors,  see United  States  v.
          Kepreos
                , 
                  759 
                     F.2d 
                          961, 
                               967 (1st Cir. 1985), the court determined to
          hear testimony first from Decato, then from the juror's son, and,
          only 
              if 
                 questions remained, from the juror.  Further reflection by
          both 
              court 
                    and 
                       counsel 
                               following Decato's testimony and a review of
          the voir  dire transcript  led, however,  to a  decision to  hear
          directly from the juror rather than her son.
                1  The four questions  proposed by Meader  on the issue  of
          domestic violence were as follows:
               1. Have you been involved in a domestic relationship in
               which physical force or abuse was involved?
               2. Has  a relative  of yours,  or a  close friend  been
               involved in a  domestic relationship in which  physical
               force was used, or was claimed to have been used?
               3. Have you been involved in a domestic relationship in
               which 
                    the 
                        threat 
                              of 
                                 physical force or abuse was involved?
               4. Has  a relative  of yours,  or a  close friend  been
               involved in a domestic relationship in which the threat
               of physical force or abuse was used, or claimed to have
               been used?
                                         -3-

               The 
                  juror, 
                         Sandra Petersen, was questioned by the court in an
          informal session.   Both counsel were  present and had  submitted
          proposed 
                  questions, but they were asked to remain at the periphery
          of the proceeding  "to maintain a certain level of  informality."
          Juror Petersen  acknowledged that  she had  been emotionally  and
          verbally abused  by an  ex-husband,  and that  her son  had  been
          physically abused by the same man.  She further acknowledged that
          she does not  like abusers, but  emphatically rejected her  son's
          suggestion to Decato that she had her mind made up about the case
          before its conclusion.  She responded to the court's question  on
          that point as follows:
               What? No way.  No way.   He -- he must have  fabricated
               that because no way.  No, I -- in fact, I told him that
               it 
                 would 
                       take 
                           awhile 
                                  for 
                                      me to -- to come to the decision
               because 
                      it's 
                           a 
                            man's 
                                  life is what I said.  And that's the
               way I feel about any case.  You know, I'm -- I've got a
               man's life here in my hands.  There's no way I -- no.
          In 
            response 
                     to 
                       her 
                           son's 
                                 comment that "my mother doesn't change her
          mind once  it's set,"  she explained that  that was  the way  she
          handled him -- "if I tell him this is it, that's all" -- and that
          she viewed his statement as an attempt "to pump himself up,  make
          himself look big" because his  mother was a juror for the  trial.
          Asked 
               if 
                  her 
                      views had any impact on the trial, the juror replied:
               I retarded everyone else in the deliberation because  I
               had 
                  a 
                    life 
                         in my hand and I did not know, you know, if I
               should go along with everybody else.  Everyone else was
               going  towards guilty.   I was not.   Because I  waited
               until, 
                     you 
                         know, I heard more about it and more evidence
               and, 
                   you 
                       know, we deliberated before I finally said yes.
          When the court asked if her experiences with her ex-husband
          affected her attitude toward the trial, she answered:
                                         -4-

               It did in a way because  I had to really think out  the
               case and say, you know,  is this -- you know, is  there
               abuse here or  is it that  this man has  a -- a  mental
               problem 
                      . 
                        . 
                          . I know a little bit about the psychic mind
               and how it works.   And sometimes when you're under  an
               awful 
                    lot 
                        of 
                          stress 
                                 you 
                                     will do things on the spur of the
               moment.  But the other jurors made me see that this was
               premeditated,
                            he thought it out before he -- he actually
               did the crime.
          Additionally, when  asked  specifically whether  her  experiences
          affected 
                  her 
                      fairness or impartiality, the juror replied: "I think
          I was very  fair because I thought it all out . . . . I  wouldn't
          make a judgment on someone unless I really thought something out.
          And 
             I 
               wouldn't let my own personal feelings interfere in any way."
          She repeated that sentiment when asked whether her personal views
          made her more or less sympathetic to either the government or the
          defense: "I went by  what was on the table .  . . . I put my  own
          feelings aside."
               Based on this inquiry, the court tentatively concluded  that
          neither predisposition nor outside factors influenced the  jury's
          verdict, but  also asked  for  briefs from  counsel.   The  court
          rejected 
                  defense 
                         counsel's request that the court also question the
          juror's son, noting the First Circuit's reluctance to probe  into
          the jury process unless absolutely necessary.
               On 
                 June 
                      14, 
                          1996, three weeks after the court's exchange with
          the juror, Meader moved for a mistrial.  He claimed both that the
          court 
               should 
                      have 
                          used 
                               his proposed voir dire questions, instead of
          the court's modification, and that additional investigation  into
          juror bias was necessary.
                                         -5-

               The 
                  district 
                           court denied the motion in a thoughtful ten-page
          order, 
                and 
                    we here provide only a summary of its contents.  First,
          the court found  no suggestion of  prejudice, observing that  the
          juror's answers -- which the court found "logical and believable"
          -- "reveal that, if anything, she gave this defendant the benefit
          of the doubt."   On Meader's claim  that his voir dire  questions
          should  have been asked,  the court noted  that no objection  was
          raised  to the  questions  actually  posed and  no  requests  for
          additional questions were made at the time of the voir dire.  The
          claim therefore was waived.  Responding to Meader's attack on the
          adequacy of the investigation into bias, the court noted the need
          to  avoid undue  intrusion into  jurors' lives,  and stated  that
          testimony from the juror's son was unnecessary because the  court
          had credited Decato's testimony about what the son told him, even
          though Decato had reason to testify so as to make a mistrial more
          likely.  
               The court sentenced Meader to 120 months in prison on  Count
          One (felon-in-possession), to be served concurrently with a  360-
          month term  on Count Two (distribution  of cocaine).  A  60-month
          consecutive term, as  required by statute, would follow on  Count
          Three (use of firearm in drug trafficking crime).  The  penalties
          reflected increases for  various specific characteristics of  the
          offenses, including  the abduction of  the victim, commission  of
          criminal 
                  sexual abuse, and use of force and threats of death.  The
          penalty 
                 also 
                      reflected Meader's status as a career offender, based
          on his having two prior convictions for drug or violent crimes.
                                         -6-

               On 
                 appeal, 
                         Meader challenges the district court's handling of
          the voir dire and the allegations of juror bias, both relating to
          the  domestic  abuse  issue.   He  also  claims  that  his  prior
          convictions 
                     for 
                        statutory rape and unlawful sexual contact were not
          crimes of violence and thus should not have been used to classify
          him as a career offender.
                    II. Domestic Abuse: Voir Dire and Juror Bias
               A. Voir  Dire.  We  need not dwell  on the district  court's
          failure 
                 to 
                    ask 
                       verbatim 
                                Meader's proposed voir dire questions.  The
          court had  no obligation  to ask  the questions  in the  specific
          language 
                  proposed, see United States v. Victoria-Peguero, 920 F.2d
          77, 84 (1st Cir. 1990), and counsel's acquiescence in the court's
          reframed 
                  question means that any objection to that formulation was
          not preserved for appeal.  See United States v. Walsh, 75 F.3d 1,
          6 (1st Cir. 1996) ("[T]he usual rule is that an objection must be
          made 
              known 
                    at 
                      the 
                          time 
                               that the court is making its decision to act
          . 
           . 
             . 
               ."). 
                     
                     Because the district court's inquiry -- asking whether
          jurors could impartially judge a case involving domestic violence
          -- directly  focused on  the  critical concern  of bias,  we  are
          persuaded beyond any doubt that no plain error occurred.
               In so  concluding, we  offer  no view  of the  substance  of
          Meader's complaint.    He contends  that  the court's  voir  dire
          question, 
                   allowing jurors who were exposed to domestic violence to
          reveal their experiences  only if they  felt such exposure  would
          impact their jury service, deprived him of the ability to use his
          challenges 
                    effectively.  Although this position has some force, we
                                         -7-

          decline 
                 to 
                   consider 
                            whether, in other circumstances, the failure to
          pose more discerning questions would be reversible error.
               B. Juror Bias.  Meader also challenges the district  court's
          approach and conclusion with respect to the possible bias of  one
          juror. 
                 
                 He 
                   particularly 
                                complains about the court's failure to hear
          testimony from the juror's son and its prohibiting the  defendant
          from 
              either 
                     directly contacting the son or sending an investigator
          to 
            interview 
                      him.  Meader asserts that this limitation on the bias
          inquiry prevented him  from effectively  challenging the  juror's
          "self-serving statements  . . .  that she could  and did put  her
          feelings about domestic abuse aside in deciding this case."
               Our  caselaw holds  that  a  district court  is  obliged  to
          investigate plausible allegations of improper influence on a jury
          verdict, see,  e.g., Walsh,  75  F.3d at  6-7; United  States  v.
          Hunnewell, 891 F.2d 955, 961 (1st Cir. 1989), but that the  court
          has 
             "broad 
                    discretion to determine the type of investigation which
          must be mounted," United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 258 (1st
          Cir.  1990); see also  Walsh, 75 F.3d  at 7.   In this case,  the
          court's process was a textbook model of conscientiousness, and so
          far from  an abuse  of discretion that  it is  difficult to  take
          Meader's complaint seriously.
               The 
                  court 
                       promptly 
                                conferred with counsel about how to proceed
          when alerted to the possible juror taint, it ordered a transcript
          of the jury selection process so that it could accurately  review
          the new information in light of what previously had occurred,  it
          heard  testimony from  the witness  who had  brought the  juror's
                                         -8-

          possible bias to the defendant's attention, and it discussed with
          the parties how  best to proceed in  keeping with both the  First
          Circuit's 
                   admonition 
                             against unnecessary juror contact and the need
          to ferret  out the  juror's true  attitudes.   Indeed, the  court
          overcame 
                  its 
                     reluctance 
                                to question the juror directly in deference
          to defendant's preference.
               The  process of  questioning the  juror also  was marked  by
          commendable attention to the various interests at stake.  So that
          the  juror would  not  be unduly  alarmed  or prepare  ahead  for
          questioning 
                     on the bias issue, she was asked to appear in court by
          means of a  regular jury summons.   The attorneys were given  the
          opportunity 
                     to submit questions to the court, but were kept on the
          sidelines 
                   during 
                         the 
                             actual questioning to contain the formality of
          the proceeding.  After completing the preliminary questions,  the
          court excused the juror and consulted with counsel about possible
          additional 
                    areas of inquiry.  Its rejection of defendant's request
          to question the son as well, or to allow him to be  questioned by
          investigators, was carefully  considered and  supportable.2   Its
               2 On this point, the court wrote, in substantial part:
                    First, I am crediting the account of Mr. Decato --
               the defendant's employee, witness and boyfriend of  his
               daughter 
                       -- 
                          as to what the young man said to Mr. Decato.
               . . . Second, now that I have interviewed the juror and
               she is  fully aware that  her son is  the cause of  the
               inquiry,  I am concerned  that to bring  her son in  by
               subpoena 
                       or 
                          to 
                            send 
                                 an 
                                    FBI agent and private investigator
               to interview him (as was proposed by the lawyers) would
               unnecessarily  increase the  juror's  apprehension  and
               concern that her son is now in trouble  notwithstanding
               her explanation of  what took place.  Third, to  pursue
               from her son things that the juror may or may not  have
               said to him would be embarking on a fishing  expedition
                                         -9-

          substantial written  opinion  fully explained  the basis  of  its
          conclusions.  
               Nor  is  the   court's  finding  that  the  juror  was   not
          prejudicially biased assailable.  The dialogue between the  court
          and 
             the 
                 juror 
                      recounted 
                                above reveals that the juror understood her
          obligation to keep her  own subjective, though related,  feelings
          outside of  the  deliberation process,  and  that, as  the  court
          observed,  she gave  the defendant  "the benefit  of the  doubt."
          Assessment of  the juror's credibility  as she  responded to  the
          questioning is uniquely the domain of the district court, and, to
          borrow  the government's  language, her  "clear, responsive,  and
          forthright  responses  provided   ample  reason  to  credit   her
          assertions."
               Thus, we find no basis connected to the court's handling  of
          the  domestic  abuse  issue upon  which  to  disturb  the  jury's
          verdicts.3
               contrary to the admonitions of the appellate courts  to
               keep the jury process and the jurors themselves free of
               unnecessary intrusions.  Finally, any interview I might
               conduct of the son  now would clearly be preceded by  a
               frank  and candid  discussion  between juror  and  son,
               thereby making any such interview of limited value.
          Order at 4-5.
            
            
             
              
              3
                
                We 
                   find no merit in Meader's additional suggestion that the
          jury as a whole engaged in misconduct by deliberating before  the
          conclusion of all the evidence.  The district court's response to
          this contention in  its Order was both adequate and  appropriate.
          See Order at 9-10.
                                        -10-

                             III. Career Offender Status
               Meader 
                     claims that the district court erred in sentencing him
          as a career offender  under U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1, which provides  for
          enhanced sentences if  a defendant's  criminal history  satisfies
          three  criteria: (1) he was at least 18 years old at the time  he
          committed the offense for  which he is being sentenced; (2)  that
          offense 
                 is 
                    a 
                      felony that either constituted a crime of violence or
          a 
           controlled 
                      substance offense; and (3) the defendant has at least
          two prior  felony convictions for  either crimes  of violence  or
          crimes involving controlled substances.  Meader concedes most  of
          these requirements, including one of the two necessary "predicate
          offenses."4   The only issue in  dispute is whether his  criminal
          history includes a second such offense.
               The 
                  district 
                           court 
                                based 
                                      its finding of career offender status
          on two  1988 Maine convictions  for statutory  rape and  unlawful
          sexual 
                contact 
                        with 
                            a 
                              child under the age of fourteen, finding that
          they qualified as "crimes of violence" within the meaning of  the
          guidelines.5  Meader contends that neither was properly  counted.
          The issue is  one of law,  and our review  is therefore de  novo.
          United States v. Winter, 22 F.3d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1994).
               4  Meader does not dispute that his 1982 conviction for  the
          sale of narcotics constitutes such an offense.
               5 At some points during the sentencing hearing, the district
          court seemed to deal with the two offenses as one, and its "crime
          of violence" determination seemed to apply only to the  statutory
          rape conviction.   Whether or not the  court meant its ruling  to
          include 
                 both 
                     convictions 
                                 does not matter for purposes of this case,
          however, since only  one additional offense is needed to  trigger
          career offender status. 
                                        -11-

               A "crime of violence"  under the guidelines is any state  or
          federal offense punishable by a year or more in prison that
                (i)  has as  an  element the  use, attempted  use,  or
               threatened use of physical force against the person  of
               another, or (ii)  is burglary of a dwelling, arson,  or
               extortion, involves  use  of explosives,  or  otherwise
               involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk
               of physical injury to another.
          U.S.S.G.  S  4B1.2(1).   Application  note  2  to  the  provision
          elaborates on  the  meaning of  "crime  of violence"  by  listing
          additional crimes that fall  within its scope, including  murder,
          manslaughter, kidnapping, and forcible sex offenses.
               Because neither of the two Maine sexual offenses includes as
          an element the use or threat of physical force,6 it is undisputed
          that in order to qualify  as "crimes of violence" they must  fall
          under 
               the 
                   "otherwise" clause of S 4B1.2, and therefore be offenses
          that present "a serious potential risk of physical injury."   The
          district court, noting that the requisite risk is of any physical
          injury, found that "there is a strong likelihood of some physical
          injury, 
                 however minor the injury might be in the range of possible
          physical injuries  that can  happen  to a  human body  in  sexual
          intercourse 
                     with 
                         a 
                           13-year-old female."  The court drew support for
          its 
             conclusion from a Maine Supreme Court case, State v. Rundlett,
               6 The two offenses were denominated as  rape, Me. Rev. Stat.
          Ann. tit. 17-A, S 252, and unlawful sexual contact, id. at S 255.
          The conviction for rape required  the jury to find only that  the
          defendant had engaged in sexual intercourse with another  person,
          not his  spouse, who was  not yet fourteen.   The conviction  for
          unlawful sexual  contact similarly  required a  finding that  the
          defendant had subjected another person, not his spouse, to sexual
          contact when that other person was not yet fourteen and he was at
          least three years older.
                                        -12-

          391 A.2d 815 (1978), that linked passage of the state's statutory
          rape provision to a concern about physical injury to young girls,
          id.                    d medical literature on injuries caused to
          young adolescent females by sexual intercourse with adult males.7
          Thus, combining  its  own  perceptions with  this  precedent  and
          supporting material,  the  district  court held  that  the  Maine
          convictions triggered career offender status.
               M
             
             at 
                819, 
                    and 
                        that 
                             cite
                eader 
                     takes 
                           issue 
                                with 
                                     this finding on multiple fronts.   His
          primary argument is that the district court failed to follow  the
          well 
              established "categorical" approach for deciding the "crime of
          violence" 
                   issue, see, e.g., Winter, 22 F.3d at 18, and that, if it
          had, 
              its 
                  conclusion would have been different.  He emphasizes that
          the  rape statute  embraces a  wide variety  of consensual  acts,
          including 
                   those between two individuals who are both under the age
          of  fourteen,   and   imposes  liability   without   culpability.
          Consequently, he  asserts, many,  if not  most, circumstances  of
          statutory rape  would not  involve a  likelihood of  the sort  of
          accompanying violence  that was targeted  by the career  offender
          guideline.  Therefore, viewed from a categorical perspective,  he
          maintains 
                   that statutory rape under Maine law cannot be classified
          as a crime of violence. 
               The sentencing court's inquiry is not as confined as  Meader
          posits 
                it 
                   to 
                      be.  Meader is correct that the standard approach for
               7  Quoting from a 1977 article in a clinical obstetrics  and
          gynecological journal, the Maine court reported: "'These injuries
          are  most  frequently   minor  and  include  abrasions,   hymenal
          transections, first-degree vaginal  tears, and perianal  tears.'"
          State v. Rundlett, 391 A.2d 815, 819 (1978).
                                        -13-

          determining whether a particular crime fits within the "crime  of
          violence" rubric is a generic one, in which inquiry is restricted
          t           ory definitions of the prior offenses, without regard
             the  particular facts underlying  them, see  Taylor v.  United
          States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990);8 Winter, 22 F.3d at 18;  United
          States v.  DeJesus, 984  F.2d  21, 23  (1st Cir.  1993)  ("formal
          categorical 
                     approach 
                              . 
                               . 
                                 . is the method of choice" for determining
          "crime 
                of 
                   violence").  Thus, in United States v. Doe, 960 F.2d 221
          (1st Cir. 1992), we concluded that the crime of being a felon  in
          possession of a firearm was  not a crime of violence despite  the
           o 
            the 
                statut
          to
          fact 
              that 
                   the defendant in that case possessed the gun while lying
          in 
            wait 
                 for 
                     an enemy to come out of a restaurant.  This conclusion
          was warranted  under the  formal categorical  approach, we  held,
          because the conduct that typically constitutes firearm possession
          (keeping  a gun in a  closet, a car, a  pocket) is not likely  to
          include accompanying violence.  Id. at 224-25.
               Application  Note 2  to  guideline section  4B1.2,  however,
          explicitly 
                    identifies the defendant's charged conduct, rather than
               8  Taylor involved the definition of a "violent felony"  for
          purposes  of the Armed  Career Criminal Act  (ACCA), 18 U.S.C.  S
          924(e), which we have noted is "the same in all material respects
          as the definition  of a 'crime of  violence' for purposes of  the
          sentencing guidelines' career offender provision."  United States
          v. 
            Bell
                , 
                  966 
                      F.2d 703, 704 (1st Cir. 1992).  Given the similarity,
          "authority interpreting  one  phrase frequently  is found  to  be
          persuasive in  interpreting the other  phrase," United States  v.
          Winter
               , 
                 22 
                   F.3d 
                        15, 
                            18 
                               n.3 (1st Cir. 1994).  See also United States
          v. 
            Fiore
                 , 
                   983 
                      F.2d 
                           1, 
                              4 
                                (1st Cir. 1992) (relying in career offender
          context 
                 on 
                   interpretation of ACCA's "identically worded 'otherwise'
          clause" because the two contexts represent "a distinction without
          a 
           difference"). 
                          
                         Accord
                                
                                U
                                 nited States v. Wood, 52 F.3d 272, 275 n.2
          (9th Cir. 1995).
                                        -14-

          the general  offense category, as  the focus  of the  "otherwise"
          c       See
           o 
            "the 
                 conduct 
                        set 
                            forth  i.e., expressly charged) in the count of
          which 
               the 
                   defendant was convicted").  The district court therefore
          was explicitly authorized to review the charging papers.9
               Meader's focus on a categorical analysis is not entirely off
          the mark, however, because even when inquiry beyond the statutory
          language is appropriate,  we have held  that the scrutiny  should
          remain 
                categorical 
                           rather than become fact-specific, see Winter, 22
          F.3d at 19:
               [T]he court  should not plunge  into the  details of  a
               particular 
                         defendant's conduct, but, rather . . . should
               merely assess the nature . . . of the . . . activity as
               described in the indictment and fleshed out in the jury
               instructions.
            cord United States v. 
           lause. 
                  
                      
                      U.S.S.G. S 4B1.2, comment. (n.2) (directing attention
          t                       (
          Ac                      Wood,  52 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.  1995).
          This  is what  the district  court  did.   Using only  the  facts
            
            
             
              
              9
                
                A 
                  second basis for looking beyond the statutory language is
                   Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990), where
          the 
             Supreme 
                     Court carved out a narrow exception to the categorical
          found in 
          approach  for cases  in which  the statute  of conviction  covers
          conduct 
                 both 
                      inside 
                            and 
                                outside the "crime of violence" sphere.  In
          such 
              instances, 
                        the 
                            sentencing court may look to the information or
          indictment and jury instructions to ascertain whether the conduct
          that was  the basis  for the  conviction constituted  a crime  of
          violence.  See Winter, 22 F.3d  at 18; United States v. Doe,  960
          F.2d 221,  224 (1st  Cir. 1992).   Here, for  example, where  the
          statute 
                 of 
                    conviction covers a wide range of sexual crimes -- from
          an adult's  violent rape  of  a child  to the  consensual  sexual
          intercourse 
                     of 
                       two 
                           teenagers -- it was permissible under Taylor for
          the  district  court  to review  the  charging  papers  and  jury
          instructions to determine whether the jury in deciding to convict
          "necessarily 
                      had 
                         to 
                            find" force, see Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602, which
          would bring the conviction directly within the list of qualifying
          crimes contained in the Application Note.  See U.S.S.G. S  4B1.2,
          comment. 
                  (n.2) 
                       (identifying "forcible sexual offenses" as crimes of
          violence).  There was, however, no allegation in the  indictment,
          and thus no jury finding, of force.
                                        -15-

          contained 
                   in 
                      the indictment, the court identified the issue before
          it as "whether  sexual intercourse with  a 13-year-old female  or
          sexual touching of a 13-year-old female by a 36-year-old male . .
          . 'by its nature  presented a serious potential risk of  physical
          injury' to the 13-year-old female."
               This 
                   careful 
                           articulation of the question provides the target
          for Meader's second-tier assault on the court's methodology.   He
          argues 
                that, 
                      assuming the court acted properly in referring at all
          to the indictment, it was improper to rely on factors as specific
          as the  victim's gender  and the  age disparity  between the  two
          individuals. 
                       
                       He 
                         points 
                                out that the statute is gender neutral, and
          that the specific age difference was irrelevant to the conviction
          (beyond 
                 the 
                    three-year 
                               gap required by the sexual contact offense).
          Focusing 
                  too 
                      narrowly, Meader contends, will inject disparity back
          into  the sentencing  procedure,  undermining  the  rationale  of
          consistency that supports the categorical approach.
               In Meader's view, therefore,  once scrutiny of the  charging
          papers revealed  no allegation of  force, a categorical  analysis
          required the conclusion  that this conviction  was not a  violent
          crime within the meaning  of the Guidelines.  He emphasizes  that
          this result  is  consistent with  the  intent of  the  Sentencing
          Commission, 
                     which 
                          listed 
                                 sexual offenses as crimes of violence only
          when 
              they 
                   were "forcible."  See supra at 12.  Indeed, he maintains
          that 
              using 
                    a 
                      conviction for underage sexual relations without that
          requirement "runs contrary to  the stated purpose of the act,  to
          focus law enforcement efforts on 'those who commit a large number
                                        -16-

          of  fairly  serious  crimes  as  their  means  of   livelihood.'
          Appellant's Brief at 45 (citing       , 495 U.S. at 587).
                e 
                 do 
                    not 
                       accept 
                              the 
                                  prop
                                                                          "
                                          Taylor
               W                      osition that the guidelines permit no
          more refined scrutiny than an examination of whether the charging
          documents 
                   (or jury instructions) include an explicit allegation of
          force. 
                 
                 The 
                     question for the sentencing court here was whether the
          defendant's conduct,  by  its nature,  posed  a serious  risk  of
          physical injury.   Although the use  of force in virtually  every
          instance could be expected to create a serious risk of injury, it
          is not the only way in which the guideline standard could be met.
          The age of the girl and the chronological gap between her and the
          defendant were crucial facts that framed the nature of the crime,
          and were relevant to the question of injury.10
               Other circuits  have treated the  issue in similar  fashion,
          linking 
                 their determinations that sexual contact with a minor is a
          crime of violence to the specific age of the victim.  See,  e.g.,
          United 
                States v. Shannon, 110 F.3d 382, 388-89 (7th Cir. 1997) (en
          banc) (limiting holding to thirteen-year-olds and younger, though
          statute 
                 applied 
                        to 
                           persons under the age of sixteen); Wood, 52 F.3d
          at 275  (accepting  government argument  that "anytime  an  adult
          engages in sexual  contact with a four  year old child, there  is
               10 We recognize that the specific age disparity is stated in
          the unlawful sexual contact count, not in the rape count.  Since,
          however, the court clearly  had justification in considering  the
          disparity in the sexual contact count and the jury found guilt on
          both 
              counts, 
                      our 
                         inquiry 
                                 need reach no farther.  Moreover, it would
          be  excessively artificial  to require  a court  to overlook  the
          indictment information  relating to  one count  which so  clearly
          increases its understanding  of the nature of the statutory  rape
          charged in the other count.
                                        -17-

          always 
                a 
                 serious 
                         potential risk of physical injury"); United States
              Rodriguez
                                                                    11
          license to focus at that level of particularity seems inherent in
          the 
             sentencing 
                       court's 
                               authority to evaluate the conduct "expressly
          charged."   
               Having 
                     approved the district court's procedure, we can easily
          endorse 
                 its 
                     conclusion.  If commonsense is inadequate to establish
          that there is a strong likelihood of some physical injury when  a
          thirteen-year-old girl has sexual  intercourse with a man  nearly
          three times  her age, the medical  literature cited by the  Maine
          Supreme Court substantiating that view completes the support.12
               11 Rodriguez involved enhanced punishment for illegal  entr
          v.           , 979  F.2d  138,  140 (8th  Cir.  1992)  (involving
          lascivious acts with children "of the tender age of ten").    The
               
          into the United States by a deported alien who had been convicted
          o                      ence that are defined somewhat differently
                                                                          y
           f 
            certain 
                    crimes 
                          of 
                             viol
          from  the  career  offender  context;  rather  than  involving  a
          substantial risk of physical injury, a crime of violence in  this
          immigration setting must involve  a substantial risk of  physical
          force.  See U.S.S.G. S 2L1.2(b)(2) & 18 U.S.C. S 16.
            
            
             
              
              12
                 
                 We 
                    find unpersuasive Meader's argument that the Sentencing
          Commission could not have intended convictions for statutory rape
          to  trigger career offender  status, if they  did not involve  an
          element 
                 of 
                    force, because they do not reflect the sort of longterm
          commitment 
                    to 
                       crime 
                            that 
                                 the career offender guideline was designed
          to punish.   See generally Taylor,  495 U.S. at 587  (enhancement
          provision in ACCA focused on "those who commit a large number  of
          fairly serious crimes as their means of livelihood").  First, the
          language of the "otherwise" clause is broadly written, presumably
          to ensure capture of any crime posing a serious risk of  physical
          injury.   Second, a criminal  history that  satisfies the  career
          offender requirements  by means of  any crime  serious enough  to
          possibly 
                  cause 
                        injury 
                              to 
                                 a person is not, in our view, inconsistent
          with the objective of the guideline to punish more heavily  those
          who commit serious  crimes and also  have a significant  criminal
          history. 
                                        -18-

               We 
                 recognize 
                           in so deciding that we have bypassed a number of
          troubling 
                   and 
                      complex 
                              iss
          the conduct charged -- could be classified as a crime of violence
          the                                                             e
          considered to pose a "serious potential risk of physical  injury"
          for 
             a 
               minor.13
                       
                        
                        Indeed, 
                                even determining what is meant by "physical
          injury" is  a task fraught with  complexity, as evidenced by  the
          contrasting views of  the Seventh Circuit judges in Shannon,  110
          F.3d at 388-90.14
               These are  issues that we  believe courts, and  particularly
                                                                          s
          appeals courts, have  neither the expertise nor the authority  to
               
                                 ues that would need to be addressed before
           tatutory 
                   rape 
                        at 
                          its 
                              mos                       i.e., regardless of
          for federal sentencing purposes.  Perhaps foremost among them  i
              standard age below which sexual intercourse typically may  b
               13
          s                      t categorical level -- 
                    If statutory rape is to be classified generically as  a
          crime  of  violence  for  purposes  of  the  federal   sentencing
          guidelines, 
                     the 
                        actionable age should be the same regardless of the
          state in which the crime occurred.  Yet, in a recent decision  on
          whether to  classify statutory rape as  a crime of violence,  the
          Seventh 
                 Circuit, sitting en banc, reported that states vary widely
          in setting  the age  above which  sex with  a minor  is not  made
          felonious, 
                    in 
                      the 
                          absence of aggravating circumstances.  See United
          States
                
                v. 
                   Shannon
                         , 
                           110 
                               F.3d 382, 386 (7th Cir. 1997) (en banc).  In
          Illinois, for example, the age is seventeen; in Wisconsin, it  is
          sixteen; in Pennsylvania, it is thirteen.  Moreover, not all such
          statutes 
                  are 
                      justified by the risk of physical injury.  Id.  As we
          indicate  below,  these inconsistencies  call  for  action  at  a
          policymaking level.
                
               14 In holding that the sexual assault by an almost eighteen-
          year-old against  an  almost  fourteen-year-old was  a  crime  of
          violence, the majority of the en banc court focused primarily  on
          the  risk of  pregnancy or  disease.   110  F.3d at  388.   In  a
          concurrence, Judge Manion, joined by Judge Kanne, stated his view
          that 
              "the 
                   risk 
                       of 
                          physical injury referred to in the Guideline must
          be  confined  to  the  act  of  intercourse,  not  the   possible
          consequences 
                      that 
                          could 
                                develop, such as pregnancy or disease." Id.
          at 390. 
                                        -19-

          resolve 
                 in 
                    the first instance,15
                 of cases in this area, should be handled expeditiously  b
                     Meader argues that, in the meantime, we should  invoke
                      courts deciding that sexual offenses involving minors
                                          and that, in light of the growing
          number                                                          y
          the Sentencing Commission and Congress.  Accord Shannon, 110 F.3d
          at 389.16
            
            
             
              
                 
                 Some 
                      
                  be classified  as crimes  of violence  have framed  their
          holdings broadly, however, notwithstanding the lack of supporting
          data.     , e.g., United States v. Velazquez-Overa, 100 F.3d 418,
          422 (5th Cir. 1996) (Texas offense of sexual contact with a child
          under 17 is a crime of violence within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. S
          16); United States v.  Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d 377, 379 (10th  Cir.
          should
              15
                 See
          1993) (holding that sexual abuse of a child is crime of  violence
          within meaning of  18 U.S.C. S 16  because "when an older  person
          attempts 
                  to 
                    sexually 
                             touch a child under the age of fourteen, there
          is always a substantial risk that physical force will be used  to
          ensure the child's compliance"); United States v. Bauer, 990 F.2d
          373, 375  (8th Cir. 1993)  (per curiam)  (holding generally  that
          sexual intercourse  with a female  child under 16  is a crime  of
          violence).  It should be noted that the first two cases  involved
          the 
             definition of "crime of violence" contained in 18 U.S.C. S 16,
          focusing 
                  on 
                     the 
                        risk 
                             of 
                                physical force rather than physical injury.
          The third case, Bauer, is  a brief per curiam that relied  almost
          entirely 
                  on 
                     the 
                        Eighth 
                               Circuit's earlier decision in Rodriguez, 979
          F.2d  at 140,  which was  more circumscribed  (question of  first
          impression whether commission of lascivious acts with a child, in
          the manner Rodriguez admits he committed the crime, qualifies  as
          crime of violence).
               Other  courts,  as  noted  earlier,  have  referred  to  the
          defendant's specific conduct and/or focused on the minor's age in
          reaching their conclusions.  See, e.g., United States v. Shannon,
          110 F.3d 382, 389  (7th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (sexual  intercourse
          with a 13-year-old  is a crime of violence; statute  criminalized
          sexual contact or intercourse with child under 16); United States
          v. Taylor,  98 F.3d  768,  773-74 (3d  Cir. 1996)  (holding  that
          indecent exposure was crime of violence based on facts alleged in
          indictment  showing  that  victim was  "forced  onto  a  bed  and
          restrained while [defendant] commit[ted] a sexual act upon her");
          Wood, 52 F.3d at 275 (sexual contact with a four-year-old  always
          poses serious risk of violence).
               16 In Shannon, the en banc Seventh Circuit, in reversing the
          panel's 2-1 ruling that the district court had erred in enhancing
          the 
             defendant's sentence based on a previous conviction for sexual
          assault, 
                  recognized the difficulty of the issue and observed "[w]e
          cannot 
                be 
                   certain that we have gotten it right."  110 F.3d at 389.
          The panel majority had  emphasized the fact that the prior  crime
          involved  intercourse  between  two  teenagers,  the  17-year-old
                                        -20-

          the 
             rule 
                  of 
                    lenity 
                           to 
                              exclude his conviction from predicate offense
                   It is unnecessary to do so.  Whatever the dividing  line
          betw
          status.
              een sexual  offenses that constitute  crimes of violence  and
          those that do not,  we are confident that the circumstances  here
          fall well within the "crime of violence" category.  
               We therefore hold that, because defendant's conviction under
          Maine's 
                 statutory 
                          rape 
                               law involved conduct that created a "serious
          potential risk  of  physical  injury to  another,"  that  offense
          qualifies as  a crime of  violence under  the federal  sentencing
          guidelines.  Meader thus having two such convictions, he properly
          was sentenced as a career offender.
               Affirmed. 
          defendant and a  13-year-old girl, and  stated that such  conduct
          between 
                 two 
                     minors cannot automatically be deemed violent.  See 94
          F.3d 1065, 1072 (7th Cir. 1996).
                                        -21-