Court Opinion

ID: 9889211
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 21:00:47.494267+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:34:12.341276
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4101      Doc: 25         Filed: 10/05/2023     Pg: 1 of 4

                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 23-4101

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        JOSE DAVID LOVO-SERRANO,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
        Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (5:21-cr-00398-FL-1)

        Submitted: September 18, 2023                                     Decided: October 5, 2023

        Before WILKINSON, KING, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: W. Michael Dowling, THE DOWLING FIRM PLLC, Raleigh, North
        Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon,
        Assistant United States Attorney, Lucy Partain Brown, Assistant United States Attorney,
        OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Jose David Lovo-Serrano appeals his conviction following his guilty plea to

        possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

        §§ 922(k), 924. On appeal, Lovo-Serrano argues his guilty plea was not knowing and

        voluntary and was not supported by an adequate factual basis. We affirm.

               Beginning with the validity of Lovo-Serrano’s plea, because Lovo-Serrano moved

        to withdraw his guilty plea on this basis, our review is for abuse of discretion. See United

        States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 434 (4th Cir. 2008). “We have long held that a plea does

        not qualify as intelligent unless a criminal defendant first receives real notice of the true

        nature of the charge against him.” United States v. Kim, 71 F.4th 155, 162 (4th Cir. 2023).

        Thus, the district court must “inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant

        understands, . . . the nature of each charge to which the defendant is pleading.” Fed. R.

        Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G). But “a recitation of all elements [of an offense] is [not] always

        required in a Rule 11 proceeding,” and “there is no requirement that the defendant receive

        all of the information about the nature of the charges from the court at the plea hearing

        itself.” Kim, 71 F.4th at 164 (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, “the district court

        may rely on detailed information received by the defendant on occasions before the plea

        hearing,” id. (cleaned up), including information contained in the plea agreement, see

        United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 117 (4th Cir. 1991).

               Section 922(k) makes it “unlawful for any person knowingly . . . to possess or

        receive any firearm which has had the importer’s or manufacturer’s serial number removed,

        obliterated, or altered and has, at any time, been shipped or transported in interstate or

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        foreign commerce.” Lovo-Serrano contends his plea is invalid because the magistrate

        judge * did not inform him during the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing that, as an element of the

        offense, the Government was required to prove he knew the firearm he possessed had an

        obliterated serial number. However, the plea agreement correctly identified all three

        elements of the § 922(k) offense, and Lovo-Serrano confirmed during the Rule 11 hearing

        that he had reviewed the plea agreement with his attorney, understood its terms, and

        understood the nature of the charges against him. Accordingly, we conclude that the

        magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion in finding Lovo-Serrano understood the true

        nature of the § 922(k) offense and, thus, that he knowingly pleaded guilty to that offense.

               As to Lovo-Serrano’s second argument, before accepting a defendant’s guilty plea,

        a district court must confirm the plea is supported by an adequate factual basis. Fed. R.

        Crim. P. 11(b)(3). Because Lovo-Serrano did not object to the adequacy of the factual basis

        before the district court, our review of this issue is for plain error. United States v. Stitz,

        877 F.3d 533, 536 (4th Cir. 2017). To succeed on plain error review, a defendant “must

        show (1) that the district court erred, (2) that the error was plain, and (3) that the error

        affected his substantial rights.” United States v. Cohen, 888 F.3d 667, 685 (4th Cir. 2018).

               The factual basis requirement “ensure[s] that the [district] court make[s] clear

        exactly what a defendant admits to, and whether those admissions are factually sufficient

        to constitute the alleged crime.” United States v. Mastrapa, 509 F.3d 652, 659-60 (4th Cir.

        2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The district court possesses wide discretion in

               *
                   Lovo-Serrano consented to proceed before a magistrate judge.

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        finding a factual basis, and it need only be subjectively satisfied that there is a sufficient

        factual basis for a conclusion that the defendant committed all of the elements of the

        offense.” Stitz, 877 F.3d at 536 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court is

        not required to rely on the Rule 11 colloquy, but rather “may conclude that a factual basis

        exists from anything that appears on the record.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

               To establish a violation of § 922(k), the Government must prove the defendant knew

        the relevant firearm’s serial number had been “removed, obliterated, or altered.” 18 U.S.C.

        § 922(k); see United States v. Sullivan, 455 F.3d 248, 261 (4th Cir. 2006) (“The defendant

        must know of the alteration.”); see also United States v. Haile, 685 F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th

        Cir. 2012) (collecting cases). This knowledge “may be inferred where the defendant has

        possessed the gun under conditions under which an ordinary man would have inspected

        the [gun] and discovered the absence of a serial number.” Sullivan, 455 F.3d at 261. Our

        review of the record reveals sufficient evidence to support such an inference: Lovo-Serrano

        physically possessed the firearm; he had been in possession of it for at least a few weeks;

        and the serial number was obliterated by scratching. Accordingly, we discern no plain error

        in the magistrate judge’s finding that there was an adequate factual basis for Lovo-

        Serrano’s plea.

               We therefore affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument because

        the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court

        and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                         AFFIRMED

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