Court Opinion

ID: 9703692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:05:09.19573+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:44.902895
License: Public Domain

*621Dissenting Opinion by
Mb. Justice McBbide:
This decision, in one fell swoop, reverses a whole course of procedure which is fully justified by law, has been approved by this Court and followed by the Superior Court since its creation. Between 1895 and 1919 the Superior Court reviewed a host of cases on narrow certiorari. Between 1919 and the present time that court reviewed the same types of cases on broad certiorari. Now this Court holds they never should have done it at all.
The Act of August 10, 1951, P. L. 1189, 53 P.S. §23537, et seq., provides that in any city of the second class no policeman “shall be removed, discharged or suspended for a period exceeding ten days as a penalty, or reduced in rank or pay without his written consent, except for just cause, which shall not be religious or political; . . .”. After departmental procedures have been satisfied and the Mayor has approved a discharge, the accused policeman has the right, within ten days of such notice, to appeal to the civil service commission. If the civil service commission sustains the decision the accused has the right to appeal by petition to the court of common pleas.1 The duty of the court is to “hear the charges made against the accused de novo. . . . The court shall fix a time and place for hearing, shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law, and file a decision. The issue before the court shall be whether the action of the trial court [police] shall be affirmed or modified in any respect or whether the charges should be dismissed.” No further appeal to any court is authorized or forbidden.
In the present case charges were made by their superiors against Joseph Bell, George E. Tarr, and Wil*622liam Killeen, policemen of the City of Pittsburgh, that each had been guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer. Each of the three policemen was given a hearing before a police trial board which recommended dismissal. This action was approved by the Mayor of the City of Pittsburgh and the officers were dismissed.
Upon appeal to the civil service commission the. dismissals were affirmed. The policemen then took appeals to the County Court of Allegheny County which heard the cases de novo, made findings of fact and conclusions of law and held that ample cause for the dismissals existed. The policemen then filed appeals to the Superior Court. No contention was made by the City that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to hear such an appeal. The Superior Court reversed the orders of the County Court in all three cases, President Judge Rhodes dissenting from the decision reversing the dismissals of Tarr and Killeen. The City then petitioned for allowance of appeal which this Court granted.
By “analogy” to the powers of the Supreme Court, the Superior Court asserted jurisdiction in this case on the basis of a power of “broad certiorari” with which it found itself invested.
Under the Act of May 22, 1722, 1 Sm. L. 131, §13, establishing courts of judicature in the province of Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court was given the power to “exercise the jurisdictions and powers” [granted by the act] “as fully and amply, to all intents and purposes whatsoever, as the Justices of the Court of King’s Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer, at Westminster, or any of them, may or can do.” The power of King’s Bench was exercised in criminal cases on the crown side of the court and in civil cases on the plea side of the court. Commonwealth v. Balph, 111 Pa. 365, 376, 3 A. 220.
*623By Act of June 16, 1836, P. L. 784, §1, 17 P.S. §41, the legislature confirmed our power “. . . to minister justice to all persons, in all matters, whatsoever, as fully and amply, to all intents and purposes, as the said court has heretofore had power to do, under the constitution and laws of this commonwealth; . . . .”
Then, by Article 5, §3, of the Constitution of 1874, it was provided that this Court “shall have appellate jurisdiction by appeal, certiorari or writ of error in all eases, as is now or may hereafter be provided by law.” Those three separate forms of review were utilized to meet various types of proceedings and it was essential that litigants select from among them the appropriate mode of review.
We said in Rand v. King; 134 Pa. 641, 645, 19 A. 806: “That most generally employed was the writ of error, which lay against any final judgment in any court of record, and against such interlocutory and auxiliary orders as have been made reviewable upon it by statute. On this writ the judgment is reviewed with reference to alleged errors which are pointed out by exceptions taken to the action of the trial court at the time when the rulings are made, and as a general rule the power of the Supreme Court is limited to the questions so raised: Warsaw Tp. Poor D. v. Knox Tp. Poor D., 107 Pa. 301. In all equity cases, and those following the equity forms, an appeal from the decree complained of is the proper mode of review. It brings up the pleadings and the evidence on which the decree rests, and makes it necessary for the appellate court to examine, and see whether the decision is just and eonseionable on the case that was presented to the chancellor who made it. The remaining method was by writ of certiorari. This writ brought up the record in any given case for review and correction, but it brought the record only: Carlson’s License, 127 Pa. *624380; Holland v. White, 120 Pa. 228. The errors to be corrected must appear on the face of the record: Chase v. Miller, 41 Pa. 403; and the merits cannot be inquired into upon this writ, but are left to the judgment of the court below: Election Cases, 65 Pa. 20. Neither the opinion of the court, nor the evidence, forms any part of the record proper, and for that reason they will not be examined on certiorari: Holland v. White, supra. The character of the proceeding to be reviewed, suggested, therefore, the method to be adopted, and the limits within which the practitioner should direct his preparation.”
Thereafter, by Act of May 9, 1889, P.L. 158, 12 P.S. 1131, the legislature provided “All appellate proceedings in the Supreme Court heretofore taken by writ of error, appeal or certiorari, shall hereafter be taken in a proceeding to be called an appeal.” This did not mean, however, that review by writ of error or certiorari was thereby abolished; it simply meant that the appropriate one or more of these three dissimilar modes of review could be had, under a procedure called an appeal. Rand v. King, 134 Pa. 641, 19 A. 806; Camp Hill Borough, 142 Pa. 511, 21 A. 978; Commonwealth v. Tragle, 4 Pa. Superior Ct. 159. The majority opinion says, “Any suggestion that the Act of 1889, by including the common law writ of certiorari within the term ‘appeal’, had the subsequent effect of conferring upon the Superior Court jurisdiction to entertain an appeal on certiorari, where no appeal has been authorized, is patently fallacious and merits no further consideration.” To the best of my knowledge, no such suggestion has been made by anybody and is certainly not being made in this dissenting opinion.
This was the status of appellate review when the Superior Court was created. By the Act of June 24, 1895, P.L. 212, §7, 17 P.S. §181, the legislature pro*625vided that the Superior Court “shall have exclusive and final appellate jurisdiction of all appeals which are now allowed to the Supreme Court in the following classes of cases: . . .” Under this act, and its amendments and supplements, the classes of cases enumerated are:
(1) Proceedings of any kind in the Court of Quarter Sessions of the Peace or before any judge thereof except in cases involving the right to public office. (17 P.S. §182)
(2) Proceedings of any kind in the Court of Oyer and Terminer and General Jail Delivery except cases of felonious homicide. (17 P.S. §183).
(3) Appeals from the Court of Common Pleas in any case at law or in equity if the subject of the controversy be either money, chattels, real or personal, or the possession of or title to real property if the amount in controversy be no greater than f5,000 or if the action be not brought, authorized or defended by the Attorney General in his official capacity. (17 P.S. §184).
(4) Appeals in proceedings in divorce and general appeals by labor claimants under the Act of 1897. (17 P.S. §186)
(5) Appeals from any order, judgment or sentence of the County Court of Allegheny County or the Municipal Court of Philadelphia or of any similar court hereafter created where by law it is not provided that such appeal be taken to the Court of Common Pleas or Quarter Sessions of the Peace. It was further provided that such orders, judgments or sentences are not appealable to the Supreme Court except upon allowance as in the case of other orders, judgments and sentences of the Superior Court. (17 P.S. §187)
(6) Appeals in Habeas Corpus cases involving custody of children. (12 P.S. §1874)
*626The legislature, when it gave to the Superior Court in 1895, exclusive and final appellate jurisdiction of all “appeals” which were there allowed to the Supreme Court in the enumerated classes of cases, did not mean thereby to exclude review by it on writ of error or certiorari. In view of the fact that in 1889 the legislature preserved review in all three specified modes, by using the word “appeal” to cover all of them, there is no reason to believe it intended any different meaning to be attached to the word “appeals” when it used it six years later in 1895. I believe that where the legislature specifically provides for an appeal in any case falling in any of the specifically enumerated classes provided for by the Act of 1895, as amended, the Superior Court may afford appropriate review whether it be by writ of error, appeal or certiorari, in the same way as this Court previously had jurisdiction to do. However, the Act of August 10, 1951, P.L. 1189, 53 P.S. §23537, et seq., under which the present proceeding was brought, as noted above, neither authorizes nor forbids any appeal from the County Court and although under the Act of March 2, 1923, P.L. 3, §1, 17 P.S. §187, a review of all2 appealable proceedings of the County Court of Allegheny County is given to the Superior Court no right'of appeal is thereby given in any particular case. It follows that the Superior Court could not review this case either by appeal in its strict sense or by writ of error and it has not sought to do so.
The scope of appellate review by the common law writ of certiorari has been a fruitful source of controversy both in this Court and in the Superior Court. *627As pointed out by us in Kaufman Construction Co. v. Holcomb, 357 Pa. 514, 55 A. 2d 534, there has been much vacillation in the cases. Since its creation the Superior Court from 1895 until 1919, held itself powerless to review even by narrow certiorari where the statute provided that the action of the lower court was final or conclusive or that there could be no further appeal.3 That court, during the same period, consistently reviewed by narrow certiorari to the extent of passing upon the jurisdiction of the inferior court and the regularity of its proceedings in cases where the applicable statute neither authorized nor forbade appellate review.4 Such review covered many types of cases.
*628Indeed, in Commonwealth v. Gibbons, 9 Pa. Superior Ct. 527, the Superior Court reviewed a commitment of a Quarter Sessions Court for criminal contempt. Its jurisdiction to do so was specifically questioned. In an able discussion the court held that it had statutory power to review by certiorari even though an appeal in cases of criminal contempt is not specifically authorized. This Court entertained an appeal which is reported sub nom Kelly’s Contested Election, 200 Pa. 430, 50 A. 248. The Superior Court was affirmed without discussion of the scope of review allowed to that court. It is obvious that had this Court been of opinion that the Superior Court lacked the jurisdiction asserted on the face of its opinion we would have vacated its order and then independently passed upon the judgment of the Quarter Sessions Court as the majority now does today. Thus it is seen that for twenty-four years the Superior Court, without attempted correction by this Court, consistently exercised the right to review the orders of inferior courts by narrow certiorari. And then, by the Act of April 18, 1919, P.L. 72, 12 P.S. §1165, the legislature for the *629first time created in any appellate court the right to review by what is now called broad certiorari.5
Whatever doubt may have existed prior to that statute ought to have been dispelled. This is the very act invoked by this Court in the assertion of its own power to review by broad certiorari. Without it we would have no such right. No serious contention can be made that the specific inclusion of the Superior Court along with this Court was meaningless. Presumably the legislature had full knowledge of the consistent position taken by the Superior Court since its creation in the cases cited in this opinion. The need was felt that both appellate courts should not be restricted to “certiorari to review the regularity of the proceedings in the court below”. Where an appeal is specifically allowed all three modes of review are open. Therefore this enlarged scope of review obviously was intended to apply in the class of cases where appeals tvere neither authorized nor forbidden, otherwise there would have been no reason to provide that the testimony would be considered “with like effect as upon an appeal from a judgment entered upon the verdict of a *630jury in an action at law . .'Since the Act of 1919 both this Court and the Superior Court6 have reviewed by broad certiorari cases within their respective competence where the statute neither- authorizes nor forbids an appeal. It is to be noted that these cases are not all liquor license cases as the majority opinion indicates. Bather, they include public road cases, township annexation cases, appeals from justices, criminal contempts, zoning cases, proceedings of the Courts of Quarter Sessions and proceedings in the Municipal Court of Philadelphia and the County Court of Allegheny County. But -in this. Court and also in the Superior Court there has been much vacillation as to the right of the latter court since 1919 to review by narrow certiorari where the legislature, has denied an, appeal or provided that the judgment of the inferior tribunal is final or conclusive. The position of this Court as to *631its own jurisdiction has been perfectly clear, at least since Kaufman Construction Co. v. Holcomb, 357 Pa. 514, 55 A. 2d 534; but the Superior Court has in a number of cases taken the incorrect position that it may review on narrow certiorari even where the legislature has denied all appellate review.7 In some of the cases we have approved this practice by refusal of allocatur.8 The Superior Court has gone even farther, and in a number of cases has reviewed on broad certiorari where the legislature has provided that the decision of the lower court shall be final or conclusive, thereby denying all appellate review.9 Again this *632Court has approved this situation by refusal of allocatur.10
Since the Superior Court was created purely by statute it has no power whatever to review in any way the jurisdiction of inferior tribunals where the legislature has denied an appeal.11 It is true that the word “appeal”, when granted by statute, is of uncertain meaning in that it is still necessary that the appellate court adopt the appropriate method, that is, writ of error, appeal or certiorari (Commonwealth v. Fisher, 184 Pa. Superior Ct. 75, 80, 132 A. 2d 739), nevertheless, when the legislature denies the right of appeal, it excludes all review by the Superior Court by all three methods of review and all review by this Court save only our right to review by narrow certiorari. The Superior Court has correctly so held in: Perroni v. Thornberry, 173 Pa. Superior Ct. 647, 98 A. 2d 641 (1953); Shaffer v. Sires, 81 Pa. Superior Ct. 589 (1923); Widener v. Schwartz, 74 Pa. Superior Ct. 294 (1920).
*633The distinction between the Superior Court and this Court, in this connection, is that we may review by narrow certiorari even where the legislature has provided that no further appeal beyond that of the trial court may be had.12 This is so because this Court alone of the courts of this Commonwealth has the power to bring the records of inferior judicial tribunals before us for review under our revisory powers of King’s Bench. Delaware County Natl. Bank v. Campbell, 378 Pa. 311, 316, 106 A. 2d 416 (1954); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Philadelphia County, 331 Pa. 177, 200 Atl. 598 (1938) ; Schmuck v. Hartman, 222 Pa. 190, 70 Atl. 1091 (1908). The legislature may enlarge the power of this Court (Apex Hosiery Co. v. Philadelphia County, 331 Pa. 177, 200 Atl. 598) as it did by the Act of 1919 (broad certiorari) but it may not take away our revisory power so far as it extends to an inquiry (narrow certiorari) into the asserted jurisdiction of any inferior tribunal or the regularity of its proceedings. Grime v. Dept. of Public Instruction, 324 Pa. 371, 188 Atl. 337; Rimer’s Contested Election: Appeal of Gearey, 316 Pa. 342, 175 Atl. 544; Clarke’s Appeal, 301 Pa. 321, 152 Atl. 92; White Township School Director’s Appeal, 300 Pa. 422, 425-6, 150 Atl. 744; Walker’s Appeal, 294 Pa. 385, 144 Atl. 288; Twenty-first Senatorial District Nomination, 281 Pa. 273, 126 Atl. 566. Since the governing statute in this case neither forbade nor authorized review and the class of cases is one which falls within the specifically enumerated appellate court power of the Superior Court, that court was fully justified in entertaining this appeal by the method of broad certiorari. In other words, it had the right, *634in addition to reviewing the jurisdiction of the County Court and the regularity of its proceedings, to consider the record, including the testimony as well as the findings and the opinion to determine whether the findings were supported by competent evidence and to correct any conclusions of law erroneously made.
When this appeal was taken to the Superior Court no objection to its jurisdiction was filed prior to the hearing of the appeal. I-Iowever, it is never too late to question the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the litigation. Fowler v. Eddy, 110 Pa. 117, 1 Atl. 789 (1885).
Nothing is better settled than the proposition that jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be conferred by consent, waiver or estoppel. Patterson’s Estate, 341 Pa. 177, 180, 19 A. 2d 165; Wolfe v. Lewisburg Trust and Safe Deposit Co., 305 Pa. 583, 158 A. 567; Blumenthal's Estate, 227 Pa. 268, 75 A. 1075. It follows that unless the legislature gave appellate jurisdiction of the subject matter of this controversy to the Superior Court, a purely statutory court, it was not reviewable there. See Commonwealth v. Long, 276 Pa. 154, 120 A. 125; Commonwealth v. Speer, 267 Pa. 129, 110 A. 288; Pittsburgh v. Pierce, 69 Pa. Superior Ct. 520.
In creating the Superior Court the legislature provided by §7(e) of the Act of June 24, 1895, P.L. 212, 17 P.S. §189, that in addition to the specifically enumerated eases the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction of the subject matter of: “Any case whatever, civil or criminal, at law or in equity or in the orphans’ court, except felonious homicide, in which the parties or their attorneys file a stipulation in the proper court below at any stage of the proceedings agreeing that the case may be heard and decided by the Superior Court, although the case would otherwise have *635been appealable directly to the supreme court.” No such stipulation was filed in. this case. The legislature later provided by §11 of the Act of May 5, 1899, P.L. 248, 17 P.S. §203: “Whenever an appeal is taken to the superior court, the appellee shall be held to have waived objection to the jurisdiction of that court, unless he file with the prothonotary thereof an objection on this ground, on or prior to the hearing of the appeal by the superior court. If the objection is made, the superior court shall hear and decide it speedily,. and if it is sustained and the appeal is certified to the supreme court the prothonotary. of the superior court shall, in addition to the appeal costs already paid,.be paid by the appellant the sum. of three dollars as further costs in the cause.”
When the parties in the present case participated in a hearing of the appeal by the Superior Court, they perfected the statutory jurisdiction of that court and although they are not now too late to' question the jurisdiction their position must be determined in the light of that fact. I would conclude that in addition to the appellate powers of the Superior Court specifically enumerated it also has jurisdiction over the subject matter of any case appealable to us and not specifically forbidden to it, providing there be either a stipulation filed under the Act of 1895 or a waiver under the Act of 1899. In such oases it is the legislature tohich has conferred the jurisdiction, not merely the stipulation or the toaiver.13 These provisions were obviously inserted into the law with the deliberate pur*636pose of relieving this Court of some of the burden of its business and also to provide an appellate tribunal where the parties might possibly get a speedier disposition should they make the conscious choice of doing so. Therefore, although the Superior Court does not have the revisory powers of King’s Bench, it does have jurisdiction generally to hear all appeals from the County Court of Allegheny County and it had jurisdiction to hear this particular appeal by “broad certiorari” since (1) no right of appeal is denied and (2) the City of Pittsburgh waived the right to object. I cannot see the slightest support for the conclusion in the majority opinion that these two sections apply only where a jurisdictional amount is involved.
In summary then, I believe that in any case in which an appeal is allowed, even though cognizable as of right only by the Supreme Court, the Superior Court (except where jurisdiction is specifically forbidden to it) 14 has jurisdiction to hear it if the parties file the stipulation provided for under the Act of 1895 or fail to object as stated in the Act of 1899. In addition thereto, it has cognizance of the subject matter of such appeals as are enumerated in the Act of 1895, as amended, regardless of the consent of the parties. In both instances, review in the nature of that formerly afforded by writ of error, appeal or certiorari is available, whichever is appropriate. Where appeal is neither authorized nor forbidden by common law or statute, the Superior Court ma,y review on broad certiorari both the enumerated classes and all others with the consent of the parties. In all cases, whether specifically enumerated as falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Superior Court or not, there may be no review by the Superior Court by any means *637whatever where the statute provides that there shall be no appeal or that the decision of the inferior court shall be final. In such cases this Court may review on narrow certiorari.
Nothing said by us in Martonick v. Beattie, 383 Pa. 168, 117 A. 2d 715, contradicts this conclusion. In that case this Court granted an appeal from the decision of the Superior Court reported in 179 Pa. Superior Ct. 170, 118 A. 2d 591. That court had assumed appellate jurisdiction of an election case in the Common Pleas Court which the law confided to this Court. We vacated its decree and decided the merits of the controversy. The difference between that case and the present one is that the Superior Court has never had jurisdiction of appeals from the Common Pleas either at law or in equity except in relation to “money, chattels, real or personal, or the possession of or title to real property”. Here, contrariwise, the Superior Court does have jurisdiction of the subject matter of all cases heard in the County Court where appellate review is appropriate. Besides, in the Martonick case, the Superior Court did not purport to act by virtue of its statutory jurisdiction under §7(e) of the Act of 1895, supra, or §11 of the Act of 1899, supra, and the force and effect of those provisions were not argued to this Court or considered in the opinion.
It may be contended that the result of this dissenting opinion would be that appeals from second class cities in civil service cases will go from the County Court to the Superior Court and from all other counties they will go from the Common Pleas to this Court. That is true. Such a situation, however, is infinitely preferable to one in which the Superior Court would be held powerless to review by broad certiorari the proceedings of the Courts of Quarter Sessions, including public road cases, liquor license cases, annexation *638cases, appeals from justices, criminal contempts, and all proceedings in the Municipal Court of Philadelphia County and the County Court of Allegheny County which are not specifically made appealable. This Court should not assume such jurisdiction particularly since the Superior Court was given by statute exclusive jurisdiction in such matters and this Court may not review them directly from the nisi prius level, at least, “by any form of appeal or writ of error”. Act of June 24, 1895, P.L. 212, §14, 17 P.S. §201. Under today’s holding the Superior Court will have no right to review by certiorari. This Court will have to review by certiorari all the types of cases enumerated above. Iiow can we. hold that we alone may review by broad certiorari because of the Act of 1919, supra, which by its express- terms includes the Superior Court as well?
Having allowed an appeal from the Superior Court I agree that-we therefore review the entire proceeding in the County Court on broad certiorari not only to determine regularity and jurisdiction but also to examine the evidence and see whether, in the light of it, the Court abused its discretion or committed an error of law. Act of April 18,. 1919, P.L. 72, 12 P.S. 1165; Grime v. Department of Public Instruction, 324 Pa. 371, 188 Atl. 337; Kaufman Construction Co. v. Holcomb, 357 Pa. 514, 55 A, 2d 534.. I also dissent from the conclusion of the Majority on the “merits” of the case.
The gist of the complaint against these policemen is that each of them “intentionally or otherwise” withheld the true name of a--man arrested for a minor offense. It is alleged that the true identity of such person “was known or should have been known” (not to any of the three but) “to. an officer of the Bureau of Police”. I would not rest my decision, however, upon the fact that, this is a haphazardly drawn specification. *639The intention is clear to charge conduct unbecoming an officer even though the specification, applying the standards of pleading in judicial actions, would be insufficient. Specifications in such cases need not be drawn in accordance with the same standards of care and specificity as are applied to indictments or civil procedures. Caldwell v. Fairly, 363 Pa. 213, 215, 69 A. 2d 135; Shellenberger v. Warburton, 279 Pa. 577, 124 Atl. 189.
Prom the record the following facts were given in evidence before the County Court:
In the early morning of July 3, 1957, William Killeen, a police officer employed by the City of Pittsburgh, with over seventeen years of service, was patrolling his beat, in uniform, on foot, in the downtown section of the city in the vicinity of the Diamond Market. He there encountered a man who excitedly told him that Ms automobile had been stolen and that he was trying to get a policeman to do something about recovering his ear. It would appear that angry words were exchanged between the man and Killeen in which the man addressed Killeen by name, whereupon Killeen, without any apparent justification so far as the record discloses, assaulted the man and beat him severely with his night stick. Killeen then took the man to the police call box which was close by and called for a police wagon. About the time the patrol wagon arrived at the scene another police officer, George Tarr (with fifteen and a half years of service on the police force of the city) arrived and stood approximately twenty-five feet from the call box. In addition to the patrol wagon crew and some civilians who quickly gathered, Acting Lieutenant Joseph Bell (with twenty-eight years of experience on the police force of the city) arrived at the scene, got into the patrol wagon which then departed for the Allegheny General Hos*640pital so that medical attention could be given to the injured man. Prior to its departure, Killeen had advised the wagon men to “book” the man on a disorderly conduct charge. At the hospital, where the injured man was given first aid, he gave his name as Joseph Morro (as shown by the Aided case report). He gave the same name to the wagon officers. After he was treated the officers then took him to the desk sergeant at No. 1 police station where he was slated for disorderly conduct under the name he had given. This Aided case report was later signed by Bell, the acting lieutenant. The prisoner then, in accordance with the usual custom, posted a $10 cash bail to appear for a hearing in the morning. Killeen having gone about his duties in the meanwhile, appeared at the time fixed for the hearing. When the defendant did not appear his bond was directed to be forfeited by the magistrate and no hearing on the charge has ever been held. After the forfeiture Killeen was informed by someone at the police station that the man he had arrested was in reality Tony Grosso. On July 9, 1957, a newspaper reporter of the Pittsburgh Sun Telegraph, named Chester Harris, an experienced police reporter and rewrite man, received information from his night city editor that Tony Grosso, a numbers racketeer, had been beaten by patrolman George Tarr and he commenced an investigation.
As part of that investigation he talked first with Superintendent of Police Slusser, who had already been informed of the true identity of the arrested man. Harris thereafter talked with Killeen who admitted that he had struck Tony Grosso claiming, however, that he had the impression that Grosso was preparing to attack him and that he was justified in striking him with his fist. Although Harris testified that Grosso was reputed to be one of the biggest numbers racketeers *641in Pittsburgh and was known to him as such for ten or fifteen years, he made it perfectly clear that Killeen, although he spoke of the man he arrested as Tony, did not say that he knew at the time he arrested him that his name was Tony or that it was Tony Grosso. Grosso, in fact, was a resident of a township in Allegheny County known as Mt. Lebanon Township and had not been arrested in Pittsburgh at least for a great number of years although he had been arrested in other places in Allegheny County and had used not only his real name, Tony Grosso, but also as aliases: Anthony Grassi and Joseph Russo. It would appear that Officer Foley, the driver of the patrol wagon, with fifteen years service; Officer Moceika, with ten years service; Sergeant Caplan, with eighteen years of service, the Acting Sergeant at the police desk at No. 1 Police Station, with eight years of service; and the Turnkey at No. 1 Police Station (otherwise unidentified) had not known the identity of the man at the time of the arrest.
Killeen Case
The essential element of the case ag’ainst Killeen rests on the court’s finding that “Killeen was walking his beat in the vicinity of the Diamond Market. He there observed one Tony Grosso, a known gambler and numbers operator.” But there is nothing in the testimony to show that at that time Killeen knew who Grosso was. There is no showing whatever that Grosso was known to anyone in that neighborhood, was himself familiar with it, or that he had spent any time around it or that there was any reason whatever for Killeen to know his identity. The court makes a finding of fact that “Grosso reported to Killeen that his car had been stolen. Words were exchanged between Killeen and Grosso and Killeen hit Grosso several times with his night stick”. So far as this finding rests upon an assault committed by Killeen upon *642Grosso it has no relevance whatever to the central question whether Killeen knew that it was Grosso whom he hit. It was well within the province of his superiors to have charged Killeen with an unjustified assault; but they did not do so. While it is true that specifications need not'be drawn with the niceties applicable to criminal pleading, nevertheless, Killeen was entitled to “notice” of what it was he would be called to defend against. This was his statutory right. We cannot invoke this wholesome rule on behalf of all other citizens and deny it to policemen. This finding, therefore, as a separate ground for dismissal, must be wholly disregarded and under the record in this case has no probative value against him on the only specification that was made. The court’s further finding was “Although Grosso was booked at the police station under the alias of 'Joseph Morro’, Killeen never made any effort to have the incorrect booking changed”. There was not even any evidence that at the time of arrest Killeen knew what name the man would give. Certainly, under the circumstances, the waiting patrol wagon and the desire to have him taken to a hospital for examination, it does not seem legally significant that he would insist on personally getting the name since he knew both the hospital and the patrol wagon crew would get it. The evidence is that he contented himself with merely stating the nature of the charges to be placed against the arrested man, that is, disorderly conduct. Besides, there is no evidence that Grosso would have given Killeen any other name than the one he gave at the hospital and to the patrol crew.
Thereafter, though he appeared at the hearing and was then informed that the defendant was in reality Tony Grosso, it has not been shown that he had any duty or indeed that he had any right to have the incorrect booking changed. He had not personally *643booked the man and there is no suggestion that the custodian thereof was not in possession of the facts.
It is not clear on this record that it was until July 9 that Killeen knew with any reasonable certainty that the man who had been slated as Morro was actually Grosso; but at that time the Superintendent had the same information and so did the newspaper reporter. What conceivable point would there have been in Killeen having attempted to act at that late date?
The fifth finding of the court was “In conversations with his superiors concerning the incident, Killeen made untruthful statements”. Certainly he made none to the Superintendent of Police because that official testified that he did not talk to Killeen or either of the others before the trial board hearing. There is no evidence of any questioning of Killeen prior to the hearing. As an independent finding of fact this was not included in the specifications which go to make up the charge of conduct unbecoming an officer and seems to find no support whatever in the record.
So that the court then, upon these preliminary findings, came to its ultimate conclusion that Killeen was guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer. In my opinion the evidence was insufficient to justify the findings made by the court. Furthermore, the court below misconceived its function. It said that the basic question involved in all three appeals is “Did the City have sufficient justification for its action in dismissing the officers and have just cause for said dismissals?” In other words, did the evidence taken before it justify the City’s decision? That was not the question before the court. True it is that under the statute the issue before the court was whether the action of the police trial court (oddly enough not the Civil Service Commission) should be affirmed, modified or dismissed. But in coming to its conclusion the court was required, *644under the law applicable to removal of policemen in second class cities, to review the case de novo and come to its own conclusion on the basis of the evidence without regard to whether its conclusions differed or accorded with that of the police trial court or the Civil Service Commission. Thus the court misapprehended the full scope of the Act of 1951. In this respect the law applicable to second class cities is different from that applicable to other municipalities. It is not for us to say why this is so or that if we so interpret it we will get more appeals. The majority opinion cites the opinion of the lower court in Ditko’s Appeal, 5 Pa. D. & C. 2d 569, 576, affirmed by us per curiam 385 Pa. 435, in which it was said: “In spite of the fact that the matter is before us de novo the court should not lightly set aside an order of dismissal rendered at the hands of a duly-elected and constituted body of public officials who are charged with conducting the affairs of the police department and maintaining necessary discipline so as to assure the functioning of the vital protection of an efficient police force. . .
The Ditho case has no application to cities of the second class in which, by statute, the court not only hears the matter de novo but is specifically required to make findings of fact and state their conclusions of law. At most the Ditho case is not authority for the proposition that the court does not come to its own conclusion but only goes so far as to say that in doing so it may consider the finding of the administrative tribunal as being of some persuasive weight.
Tarr Case
As to Tarr, there is evidence that he knew Grosso prior to the latter’s arrest by Killeen. lie had indeed known him for many years in connection with his police duties. There is no evidence, however, that Tarr knew that it was Grosso who was arrested by Killeen. *645There is evidence that Tarr was present in the sense that he came along, stood about twenty-five feet away at the time Grosso was being put into the patrol wagon. Even if it be assumed, however, that he did know that Grosso was being arrested by Killeen there is no evidence that Tarr had any connection whatever with the case after that or knew that Grosso had given the false name “Morro” to the hospital, the wagon crew or to the desk sergeant. Since he did not participate in the arrest it was not his duty to be present on the following day and there is no evidence that it came to the attention of Tarr at any time prior to the investigation by the newspaper reporter, Harris, or the knowledge of the Superintendent of Police that Grosso had misstated his name to be “Morro”. His own evidence that he was not present and the corroborating evidence that he was assigned to a special detail at another place may still be disregarded without leaving any evidence whatever that Tarr had anything to do with the misidentification of Grosso. The fifth finding that “George Tarr told his superior officers that he was not present at the time of the arrest” has not support in the record if it is meant to apply to an investigative phase of the matter since Tarr was not even interviewed. In any event, it is clearly not within the specification relied upon to support the charge.
Bell Case
The findings against Bell generally incorporate the other findings against Tarr and Killeen. In addition, it must be noted the City called Bell for cross-examination and he denied that he knew that the man arrested was actually Tony Grosso at any time prior to being told by Harris, the newspaper man. The court apparently found Bell guilty because he had been on the. police force for twenty-eight years and rode in the wagon along with Grosso and did not know his identity. It is true that if Bell knew it was Grosso then he could *646not justify Ms signing of the record which showed that the prisoner was Morro. Although the County Court found that Bell knew Grosso’s identity, I have searched the record in vain to find support for this statement, unless it be in the bland assumption that any policeman on a metropolitan police force for twenty-eight years knows each and every habitual law breaker at, in or near that community. At the scene of the arrest no name was given. There seems to be no evidence whatever that would charge Bell with knowledge as to the identity of Grosso at any time that would impose an affirmative duty upon him to do something about it.
These men could have been dismissed only for “just cause”. The cause asserted against them was that each was guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer. The record is made up of assumptions, conjecture and suspicion; but not proof. I would conclude, therefore, that the findings of fact of the County Court are without adequate support in the record and, additionally, in reviewing the evidence it erred in failing to come to its own independent conclusion instead of resting decision on the proposition that the dismissal by the city was supported by sufficient evidence in the record.
I believe the Superior Court correctly decided tMs case and I would affirm its judgment reversing the decision of the County Court.

 The County Court of AUegheny County was given jurisdiction by §l(m) of the Act of July 6, 1951, P.D. 994, 17 P.S. §626, and by the Act of September 29, 1951, P.D. 1654, 53 PS §604.

 This is different from the right of the Superior Court to review the proceedings of Common Pleas Court. In the latter case, review is limited to controversies as to “money, chattels, real or personal, or the possession of or title to real property if the amount in controversy be no greater than $5,000.”

 Appeals quashed or dismissed by the Superior Court between 1895 and 1919 where appellate review is specifically denied by statute: Schwenker & Co. v. Wagner, 71 Pa. Superior Ct. 573 (1919) ; Miller v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 58 Pa. Superior Ct. 464 (1914) ; Some Protective Assoc. v. Reese, 47 Pa. Superior Ct. 452 (1911) ; Huntington & Broad Top Mountain R.R. v. Fluke, 32 Pa. Superior Ct. 126 (1906) ; Adams v. Berge, 30 Pa. Superior Ct. 422 (1906) ; Fry v. Spatz, 29 Pa. Superior Ct. 592 (1905) ; Minogue v. Ashland Borough, 27 Pa. Superior Ct. 506 (1905) ; Phoenix Iron Works Co. v. Mullen, 25 Pa. Superior Ct. 547 (1904) ; Alexander & Co. v. Goldstein, 13 Pa. Superior Ct. 518 (1900) ; Crumley v. Crescent Coal Co., 13 Pa. Superior Ct. 231 (1900) ; Carroll v. Barnes & Erb Co., 11 Pa. Superior Ct. 590 (1899) ; Colwyn v. Tarbotton, 1 Pa. Superior Ct. 179 (1896).

 Cases reviewed by the Superior Court on “narrow” certiorari between 1895 and 1919 where appeal is neither authorized nor forbidden by statute: Holly v. Travis, 71 Pa. Superior Ct. 527 (1919) (Keller, J.) ; Allegheny County Commissioner s’ Case, 61 Pa. Superior Ct. 591 (1915) (Kephart, J.) ; Sinking Spring Borough, 52 Pa. Superior Ct. 481 (1913) (Henderson, J.) ; Com. v. Layton, 45 Pa. Superior Ct. 582 (1911) (Rice, P.J.) ; Star Brewing Co.’s License, 43 Pa. Superior Ct. 577 (1910) (Head, J.) ; Com. v. Brownell, 35 Pa. Superior Ct. 249 (1908) (Rice, P.J.) ; Mack v. Schuylkill Trust, 33 Pa. Superior Ct. 128 (1907) (Porter, J.) ; Franklin Township’s Election Districts, 29 Pa. Superior Ct. 534 *628(1905) (Rice, P.J.) ; Waynesburg Borough’s Election Districts, 29 Pa. Superior Ct. 534 (1905) (Rice, P.J.) ; Welsh’s Appeal, 22 Pa. Superior Ct. 392 (1903) (Porter, J.) ; West Donegal Township Rd., 21 Pa. Superior Ct. 620 (1902) (Per Curiam) ; Road in Herrick & Ararat Townships, 16 Pa. Superior Ct. 579 (1901) (Smith, J.) ; Nobles v. Piollet, 16 Pa. Superior Ct. 386 (1901) (Rice, P.J.) ; Huntingdon County Line, 14 Pa. Superior Ct. 571 (1900) (Rice, P.J.) ; Miller v. Summers, 13 Pa. Superior Ct. 127 (1900) (Orlady, J.) ; In the Matter of a Private Road in Dennison Township, Luzerne County, 13 Pa. Superior Ct. 227 (1900) (Rice, P.J.) ; Com. v. Gibbons, 9 Pa. Superior Ct. 527 (1899) (Smith, J.) ; In re Division of Wards of the City of Pittsburgh into Election Districts, Appeal of W. S. Guffey, et at., 7 Pa. Superior Ct. 478 (1898) (Per Curiam) ; Com. v. Solomon Fogelman and Harris Flomenhaft, 3 Pa. Superior Ct. 566 (1897) (Rice, P.J.).

 The Act in its entirety reads as follows: “Be it enacted, &e., That in any proceedings heretofore or hereafter had in any court of record of this Commonwealth where the testimony has been or shall be taken by witnesses, depositions, or otherwise, and where an appeal has been or shall hereafter be taken from the order, sentence, decree, or judgment, entered in said proceedings, to the Superior or Supreme Court, such testimony shall be filed in said proceedings, and the effect of said appeal shaU be to remove, for the consideration of the appellate court, the testimony taken in the court from which the appeal is taken, and the same shall be reviewed by the appellate court as a part of the record, with like effect as upon an appeal from a judgment entered upon the verdict of a jury in an action at law, and the appeal so taken shall not have the effect only of a o&rtiorari to review the regularity of the proceedings in the court below.” (Emphasis supplied)

 Cases reviewed by .the Superior Court on broad certiorari since 1919 where appellate review is neither authorized nor forbidden by statute: Jehovah’s Witnesses Appeal, 183 Pa. Superior Ct. 219 (1957) (Ervin, J.) ; Hazle Twp. Annexation Case, 183 Pa. Superior Ct. 212 (1957) (Ervin, J.) ; Com. v. Jakub, 182 Pa. Superior Ct. 418 (1956) (Wright, J.) ; Culbertson Appeal, 182 Pa. Superior Ct. 374 (1956) (Per Curiam) ; Schaub Appeal, 180 Pa. Superior Ct. 105 (1955) (Ervin, J.) ; Com. v. Richardson, 174 Pa. Superior Ct. 171 (1953) (Reno, J.) ; Lerten Appeal, 168 Pa. Superior Ct. 516 (1951) (Gunther, J.); Diana Adoption Case, 165 Pa. Superior Ct. 12 (1949) (Reno, J.) ; Middlecreek Township Road Case, 162 Pa. Superior Ct. 619 (1948) (Arnold, J.) ; Polis v. Raphael, 160 Pa. Superior Ct. 544 (1947) (Hirt, J.) ; Likar Appeal, 157 Pa. Superior Ct. 572 (1945) (Rhodes, J.) ; Roming v. Shivers, 156 Pa. Superior Ct. 205 (1944) (James, J.) ; Lynch v. Hickey, 152 Pa. Superior Ct. 129 (1943) (Rhodes, J.) ; Pacewicz Liquor License Case, 152 Pa. Superior Ct. 123 (1943) (Keller, P.J.) ; Martin’s Grill Inc. Liquor License Case, 149 Pa. Superior Ct. 185 (1942) (Keller, J.) ; Braddoclc Township Appeal, 148 Pa. Superior Ct. 52 (1942) (Rhodes, J.) ; Wood v. Industrial H., A. & L. Ins. Co., 107 Pa. Superior Ct. 338 (1932) (Stadteeld, J.).

 Cases reviewed by the Superior Court on narrow eertiorari since 1919 where appellate review is specifically denied by statute: Penn Wynne v. Lower Merion Township, 181 Pa. Superior Ct. 524 (1956) ; Wynnewood Civic Assn. v. Lower Merion Township, 180 Pa. Superior Ct. 453 (1956) ; Boyle Appeal, 179 Pa. Superior Ct. 318 (1955) ; Plum Township Annexation Case, 178 Pa. Superior Ct. 376 (1955) ; Saxony Construction Co. Appeal, 178 Pa. Superior Ct. 132 (1955) ; Pittston Debt Funding Case, 172 Pa. Superior Ct. 55 (1952) ; Blair Liquor License Case, 158 Pa. Superior Ct. 365 (1946) ; Kimmell Liquor License Case, 157 Pa. Superior Ct. 59 (1945) ; Shaheen’s Liquor License Case, 145 Pa. Superior Ct. 5 (1941) ; Lithuanian Benef. Assoc’s Club Liquor License Case, 142 Pa. Superior Ct. 556 (1940) ; Fester’s Appeal, 140 Pa. Superior Ct. 293 (1941); Spaniard’s Liquor License Case, 138 Pa. Superior Ct. 251 (1940) ; McGettigan’s Liquor License Case, 131 Pa. Superior Ct. 280 (1938).

 Boyle Appeal, 179 Pa. Superior Ct. 318, allocatur refused 179 Pa. Superior Ot. xxvi (1955); Saxony Construction Co. Appeal, 178 Pa. Superior Ct. 132, allocatur refused 178 Pa. Superior Ot. xxviii (1955) ; Plum Township Annexation Case, 178 Pa. Superior Ot. 376, allocatur refused 178 Pa. Superior xxix (1955). Refusal of allocatur by this Court has been treated by the Bench and Bar to import an approval on the merits of the ease unlike the denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court of the United States.

 Cases reviewed by the Superior Court on broad certiorari since 1919 where appellate review is specifically denied by statute: Lemoyne Borough Annexation Case, 176 Pa. Superior Ct. 38 (1954) ; *632Salisbury Township Annexation Case, 172 Pa. Superior Ct. 262 (1953) ; Ontelaunee Township Annexation Case, 172 Pa. Superior Ct. 71 (1952) ; Dallas Borough Annexation Case, 169 Pa. Superior Ct. 129 (1951) ; Derry Township School Dist. Appeal, 168 Pa. Superior Ct. 415 (1951) ; Irwin Borough Annexation Case (No. 1), 165 Pa. Superior Ct. 119 (1949) ; Warner Bros. Theatres, Inc. v. Pottstown Borough, 164 Pa. Superior Ct. 91 (1949) ; Revocation of Mark’s License, 115 Pa. Superior Ct. 256 (1934) ; Appeal of Bender, 106 Pa. Superior Ct. 376 (1932).

 Dallas Borough Annexation Case, 169 Pa. Superior Ct. 129, allocatur refused 169 Pa. Superior Ct. xxvi (1951); Derry Township School District Appeal, 168 Pa. Superior Ct. 415, allocatur refused 168 Pa. Superior Ct. xxiv (1951) ; Appeal of Bender, 106 Pa. Superior Ct. 376, allocatur refused 106 Pa. Superior Ct. xxv (1932).

 I concur with the majority’s disapproval of any case holding that the Superior Court can review on narrow or broad certiorari where appellate review is specifically denied by statute.

 This is true no matter how unequivocal the legislative mandate purports to be. Sometimes the statute says “no appeal shall be aUowed” or that the order or decision of the court shall be “final” or “final and conclusive”.

 Workmen’s Compensation is an example of the same sort of jurisdiction. Despite the fact that the statute is authorized by constitutional amendment the Board has jurisdiction of the subject matter only if both Employer and Employee have waived their right to trial by jury. See Anderson v. Carnegie Steel Co., 255 Pa. 33, 39, 99 Atl. 215.

 Such as cases of felonious homicide. Section 7(e), Act of 1895, supra.