Court Opinion

ID: 9673060
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:05:31.190766+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:20.036808
License: Public Domain

*188DISSENTING OPINION
STEAKLEY, Justice.
I respectfully dissent. The problem is judicial in origin — not legislative — and the separation of powers provision of the Constitution should not he held to mean that only the Legislature can solve it. I therefore disagree with the conclusion of the majority that until and unless the Legislature inserts a sentence in our wrongful death statutes expressly reciting that they shall have extraterritorial effect, we may not reconsider and overrule the discredited holding in Willis v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 61 Tex. 432 (1884), that a state is without power to give its laws extraterritorial force; or consider and adopt the judicial “significant contacts rule” and by so doing enforce the declared public policy of our State for the benefit of its citizens seeking redress for wrongful death.
Nor is there any assurance in the majority holding that any of this will be later accomplished should the Legislature accept the invitation to add the extraterritorial sentence. We have been under the judicial edict of this Court since 1884 that a state lacks the power to give its laws extraterritorial effect either by express legislative declaration or by judicial decision. So it is not surprising that the legislature has not attempted to so declare during these intervening eighty-four years since Willis. And even today the majority backs away from overruling this relic of the past.
This Court in Willis, and in cases following in its wake, gave no thought to the extraterritorial implications of Articles 4671 et seq., quoted in the majority opinion. This consideration could not even come to the surface because of the view then held that in no event could the statutes have extraterritorial thrust. Willis upheld a demurrer to the suit of a wife against the railway company to recover damages for the negligent killing of her brakeman husband. The injury and death occurred in the Indian Territory. The plaintiff and the deceased were residents of Texas and the railroad operated under a charter granted by the Legislature of Texas. The court said:
“But where the right of action does not exist except by reason of statute, it can be enforced only in the state where the statute is in existence and where the injury has occurred. That is to say, the cause of action must have arisen and the remedy must be pursued in the same state, and that must be the state where the law was enacted and has effect.
“The principle upon which the doctrine rests is the want of power in a state to give her laws an extraterritorial effect.”
One later illustration of the influence of Willis will suffice. De Ham v. Mexican Nat. Ry. Co., 86 Tex. 68, 23 S.W. 381 (1893), also upheld a demurrer to the suit of a mother for damages for injuries to her son inflicted in the Republic of Mexico causing subsequent death in Texas. The court said, citing Willis:
“It is settled law that the statute of a state which, for a tort, gives a right of action in derogation of the common law, or a right of action unknown to that law, can have no extraterritorial force; and, in accordance with this rule, it has been expressly decided in this state that for an injury inflicted in another state or territory, which results in the death of the party injured, the surviving relatives have no right to recover in this state. * * * As to torts, at least, the laws of a state have no operation beyond its own limits.”
Willis and its progeny were wrongly decided and should be overruled. Their underpinnings fall away in the modern recognition of the constitutional interest of a state with substantial ties to an occurrence outside its territorial limits in the application of its own rules of law in determining the consequences of wrongful conduct. In Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 82 *189S.Ct. 585, 7 L.Ed.2d 492 (1962), the Court said:
“Our view of a State’s power to adopt an appropriate conflict-of-laws doctrine in a situation touching more than one place has been indicated by our discussion in Part III of this opinion. Where more than one State has sufficiently substantial contact with the activity in question, the forum State, by analysis of the interests possessed by the States involved, could constitutionally apply to the decision of the case the law of one or another state having such an interest in the multistate activity. * * * a
See also Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553, 92 A.L.R.2d 1162 (2d Cir. 1962) : “We do hold, however, that a state with substantial ties to a transaction in dispute has a legitimate constitutional interest in the application of its own rules of law. * * * ”
We have recently applied Texas law to determine the consequences to a Texas citizen of conduct occurring outside the State. See Texas Employers’ Insurance Ass’n v. Dossey, 402 S.W.2d 153 (Tex.Sup.1966). In King v. Bruce, 145 Tex. 647, 201 S.W.2d 803, 171 A.L.R. 1328 (1947), we quoted with approval the exception to the general rule of control by law of the state where a contract was made:
“That rule has, however, its exceptions. It will not be observed and applied when to enforce a foreign contract, according to the provisions of the foreign laws, will contravene some established rule of public policy of the state of the forum. Union Trust Co. v. Grosman, 245 U.S. 412, 38 S.Ct. 147, 62 L.Ed. 368; 1 Wharton on Conflict of Laws (3d Ed.), 275.”
Lex loci delictus, the law of the place of the wrong, has also dominated past decisions of our courts. This is seen in the judicial treatment of the predecessor statute to present Article 4678. Illustrative is Jones v. Louisiana Western Ry. Co., 243 S.W. 976 (Tex.Com.App.1922, jdgmt adopted) :
“Our statute provides that whenever the death of a citizen in another state has been caused by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of another in such state, for which death a right to maintain an action to recover damages is given by the law thereof, such right may be enforced in the courts of this state. Complete Texas Statutes 1920, art. 7730½. It is the cause of action given by the law of the state in which negligent killing occurred that our courts are authorized to enforce. The law of the place where the cause of action arose, the lex loci delictus, must determine the nature of the cause of action, and the defenses, if any, available. The case asserted must stand or fall upon that law.”
This is again seen in El Paso & Juarez Traction Co. v. Carruth, 255 S.W. 159 (Tex.Com.App.1923):
“This statute merely declared what had theretofore been the universal rule, that the lex loci delictus must determine the nature of the cause of action, and the extent of the recovery, while the forms of remedies and the mode of pursuing same are determined by the law of the forum.”
The waning influence of lex loci delictus is seen in the growing and wide acceptance of the policy which holds that the law of the forum will determine the rights of the parties in those cases where the forum state has the most significant relationship with the occurrence.1 The doctrine pro*190vides a flexible method of solving the problem of conflicting domestic law by looking to the public policy of the respective states as reflected in its statutes. The trend for so doing, - and away from construing statutes of the forum as having no extraterritorial effect, is impressive. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 (Proposed Official Draft, Part II, May 1, 1968) expresses the principle as follows:
“The General Principle.
“(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, as to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
“(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
“(a) the place where the injury occurred,
“(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
“(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and
“(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
“These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.”
Perhaps the landmark case in the trend away from rigid application of the lei; loci is Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279, 95 A.L.R.2d 1 (1963). There a New York resident was injured in an automobile accident while traveling with other New Yorkers in Ontario, Canada. The plaintiff sued the host-driver, who pleaded the Ontario Guest Statute as a complete bar to recovery. New • York has no guest statute. The New York court adopted what it termed the “center of gravity” or “grouping of contacts” approach in holding that it would not apply the Ontario statute as a bar to recovery. The basis for the holding is that New York had sufficient contacts with the cause oí action to justify the application of Nev York law, and that a substantial interest o; the State of New York would be forwárded by doing so, while Ontario had no interest sufficient to justify the application of its law by the New York court. While Ontario would have an interest in applying its law to regulate standards of conduct, such as rules of the Ontario highways, it had no interest in regulating the rights and liabilities of New Yorkers arising from a guest-host relationship which had its origin in New York. The court stated:
“Comparison of the relative ‘contacts’ and ‘interests’ of New York and Ontario in this litigation, vis-a-vis the issue here presented, makes it clear that the concern of New York is unquestionably the greater and more direct and that the interest of Ontario is at best minimal. The present action involves injuries sustained by a New York guest as the result of the negligence of a New York host in the operation of an automobile, garaged, licensed and undoubtedly insured in New York, in the course of a week-end journey which began and was to end there. In sharp contrast, Ontario’s sole relationship with the occurrence is the purely adventitious circumstance that the accident occurred there.
* * * * * *
“The issue here, however, is not whether the defendant offended against a rule of the road prescribed by Ontario for motorists generally or whether he violated some standard of conduct imposed by that jurisdiction, but rather whether the plaintiff, because she was a guest in the defendant’s automobile, is barred from recovering damages for a wrong concededly committed. As to that issue, it is New York, the place where the parties resided, where their guest-host relationship arose and where the trip began *191and was to end, rather than Ontario, the place of the fortuitous occurrence of the accident, which has the dominant contacts and the superior claim for application of its law. * * * ”
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Kuchinic v. McCrory, 422 Pa. 620, 222 A.2d 897 (1966), held Pennsylvania, not Georgia, law applicable in the case of an airplane crash in Georgia in route from Florida to Pennsylvania and involving only Pennsylvania passengers. The court reasoned:
“We agree with appellants that the policy and interest analysis spelled out in Griffith v. United Airlines [Inc.], 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964) requires that Pennsylvania law be applied to ' these facts. * * *
“Indeed when properly analyzed the present cases are a prime example of what has been characterized as a ‘false conflict’, for under no stretch of the imagination can Georgia be viewed as a concerned jurisdiction. * * * Georgia’s only contact with the present case, as the situs of the accident, is wholly fortuitous, whereas Pennsylvania, as the place where the host-guest relationship was established, where it was intended to terminate, and as the domicile of all four of the aircraft’s occupants, is the state with the most significant interest in defining the legal consequences attached to the relationship here involved.”
Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205, 206 (1966), considered the circumstances of an automobile accident in Vermont involving New Hampshire citizens. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that its law would determine the rights and liabilities of the parties, and in speaking of the lex loci delictus rule said:
“That old rule is today almost completely discredited as an unvarying guide to choice of law decision in all tort cases due in no small part to the trenchant criticism of Cheatham, Cook, Currie, Lorenzen, Stumberg and Yntema. No conflict of laws authority in America today agrees that the old rule should be retained. * * * No American court which has felt free to re-examine the matter thoroughly in the last decade has chosen to retain the old rule. * * *
“Vermont’s interests under its statute are in suits brought in its own courts affecting hosts, guests and insurance companies subject to its jurisdiction. Our primary interest arising out of our ordinary negligence law correspondingly applies to suits in our courts affecting people and relationships with which we have a legitimate concern. That interest in this case is a real one.”
Cases in accord in other jurisdictions are cited in the footnote.2
I am in agreement with these decisions and would hold that the wrongful death statutes of our State may be constitutionally applied to occurrences beyond its territorial limits and that the rule of lex loci delictus will no longer bar application of the law of the forum. See in accord Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 175 (Proposed Official Draft, Part II, May 1, 1968), which reads as follows:
“Right of Action for Death.
“In an action for wrongful death, the local law of the state where the injury *192occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.”
Turning to the case at hand, it would be difficult to pose circumstances arguing more forcefully for the rule of “most significant contacts” and against adherence to the view that the law of the place of injury is determinative of the consequences of tortious conduct. Here the only matter of concern to the State of Colorado is the conduct of the pilot during that portion of the interstate journey when the aircraft was flying in Colorado air and using Colorado airport facilities. The negligence of the pilot in causing the fortuitous crash in Colorado, and hence the accountability of those in Texas who must answer for his acts, was stipulated. Beyond this, Colorado can have no further legitimate interest. The wrongful act of the pilot did not cause the death of a Colorado constituent nor will citizens of Colorado be answerable in damages. There is no justification in logic or reason for Colorado law to nevertheless govern the substantive rights of the parties. It is a matter of indifference to that state, and in no way contrary to its public policy, that the law of Texas should determine the consequences of the conduct of the pilot. Texas is the only state of significant connection with the Texas citizens who were killed and with those who are liable therefor; its interest is maximal while that of Colorado is minimal. There is no conflict. This being so, there should be no difficulty in concluding that the Texas citizens are entitled to the benefits of the public policy reflected in the statutes of Texas as the forum state.
It is clear, furthermore, that the cause of action authorized by Article 4671 is not limited by its terms to a wrongful death occurring within the territorial limits of the State. The statute speaks only of an injury causing death by wrongful act. A territorial limitation must be engrafted by implication and there is no logic in a supposition that the legislature would want or intend to preclude its citizens from recovering full damages for wrongful death because the causative injuries happened outside our territorial limits. Nor is it to be expected that the Texas Legislature during the years, and on the occasions of the re-enactments of Article 4671, would have undertaken to expressly provide for extraterritorial reach when this Court had repeatedly said in the past that it did not have the constitutional power so to do. Nonaction under such circumstances is not legislative acquiescence and has no bearing on the judicial responsibility of deciding the thrust of the statutes, a matter to which this Court has not heretofore addressed itself, and, in my view, does not do so today.
Finally, Article 4678 does not require our courts to enforce the foreign right of action in the extraterritorial situation. The language of the statute is permissive and not mandatory. It does no more than authorize enforcement of the foreign right of action in the courts of this State if the survivors elect to seek such relief. The statutory right of action under the law of the forum otherwise available under Article 4671 is not precluded by the subsequent enactment of Article 4678. The latter statute does not purport to prescribe the conditions under which Article 4671 is applicable. It is not a mandate to our courts to enforce the substantive law of the birthplace of the cause of action when not invoked by the parties seeking compensatory damages. The underlying purpose of Article 4671 is the establishment of a statutory right of action for wrongful death. It does not purport to speak in terms of assertion of the statutory' right under local law or under foreign law and does not, standing alone, authorize enforcement in our courts of a foreign right of action. Article 4678 does so with two conditions. There must be a statutory right of action given by the statutes of the foreign jurisdiction, and the trial of such action is to be governed by the procedural law of our State. The inter*193locking relationship of the two statutes is obvious and plausible.
I would reverse the judgments below and give the Texas survivors their statutory-rights under the law of Texas, the forum state.
SMITH and GREENHILL, JJ., join in this dissent.

. See Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, (by Professors Cavers, Cheatham, Currie, Ehrenzweig, Leflar, and Reese), 63 Colum.L.Rev. 1212 (1963) ; Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws 629-742 (1963 ed.) ; Stumberg, Princi-pies of Conflict of Laws 199-212 (3rd ed. 1963) ; Weintraub, A Method for Solving Conflict Problems — Torts, 48 Cornell L. Q. 216 (1963) ; Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 267 (1966).

. Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis.2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965); Kopp v. Rechtzigel, 273 Minn. 441, 141 N.W.2d 526 (1966); Mellk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 229 A.2d 625 (1967); Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky.Ct.App.1967); Casey v. Manson Construction and Engineering Co., 428 P.2d 898 (Or.Sup.Ct.1967); Reich v. Purcell, 63 Cal.Rptr. 31, 432 P.2d 727 (Cal.Sup.Ct. 1967); Tramontana v. S. A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 338, 350 F.2d 468 (1965); Watts v. Pioneer Corn Company, 342 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1965); Gianni v. Fort Wayne Air Service, Inc., 342 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1965). See also Seguros Tepeyac, S.A., Compania Mexicana, etc. v. Bostrom, 347 F.2d 168, 175 (5th Cir. 1965).