Court Opinion

ID: 9694157
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:26:28.937472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:56.934952
License: Public Domain

Brodkey, J.,
concurring.
I feel the time has come for this court to reconsider and overrule our previous pronouncement in Claus v. DeVere, 120 Neb. 812, 235 N. W. 450 (1931), in which this court announced the rule that an injured workman cannot recover for his wife’s services as a nurse which were furnished to him while he was cared for at home.
*516The accident in question occurred on August 11, 1971. The defendant and the insurance company refused to make any further payments to the claimant after March 3, 1972, on the basis that plaintiff’s condition would not be further improved, and might even deteriorate. The applicable statute in effect at that time provided that: “The employer shall be liable for reasonable medical and hospital services and medicines as and when needed, and in addition to devices necessary for treatment, the first prosthetic devices, subject to the approval of the compensation court, not to exceed the regular charge made for such service in similar cases * * *. The court shall have the authority to determine the necessity, character, and sufficiency of any medical services furnished or to be furnished and shall have authority to order a change of doctor, physician, hospital, or rehabilitation facility when it deems such change is desirable or necessary.” See section 48-120, R. R. S. 1943, in effect at that time. We point out that the above section was amended, effective August 24, 1975, and the principal change in the language is italicized as follows: “The employer shall be liable for all reasonable medical and hospital services, appliances, supplies, prosthetic devices and medicines as and when needed, which are required by the nature of the injury and which will relieve pain or promote and hasten the employee’s restoration to health and employment, subject to the approval of and regulation by the compensation court, * * *.” Laws 1975, L.B. 127, § 1, p. 264. However, even under the wording of the original statute, this court held in Newberry v. Youngs, 163 Neb. 397, 80 N. W. 2d 165 (1956): “The burden placed upon the employer by section 48-120, R. R. S. 1943, is designed to relieve or cure the physical injuries suffered by the employee.” (Emphasis supplied.) There is little question that under either the original statute or the subsequent amendment, nursing services, as such, are covered *517as “reasonable medical services.” In some of the jurisdictions hereinafter referred to, the statutes specifically provide for liability for “nursing services,” but we do not believe the result would be any different even though not specifically mentioned in the particular statute involved. The principal problem involved in this case, as well as one frequently encountered in other jurisdictions, is whether recovery for nursing services are recoverable when rendered by the claimant’s spouse or other members of his or her immediate family. See, 2 Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation, § 61.13, pp. 10-469 to 10-472; 10 Schneider’s Workmen’s Compensation (Perm. Ed.), § 2004(m), p. 34 et. seq., and Supplements thereto; 99 C. J. S., Workmen’s Compensation, § 268, pp. 918, 919. The problem is well delineated and discussed by the court in A. G. Crunkelton Electric Co., Inc. v. Barkdoll, 227 Md. 364, 177 A. 2d 252 (1962), where the court states: “Appellants’ next contention is that the appellee’s wife is not entitled to receive compensation for nursing services performed for her husband. This raises a question novel in this State. Ordinarily nursing services, when necessary and authorized, are part of any workmen’s compensation law, and the injured employee, when it is required, is entitled to nursing services at home or in a hospital. There is no dispute on this point. However, when a member of the employee’s immediate family (wife) as here, is involved, a conflict of judicial opinion arises.
“The cases which deny such allowances (compensation to the wife) do so on the grounds that the services rendered constitute a duty imposed by the marital relationship and for which the husband would not be liable in suit for quantum meruit, nor can the wife recover in a suit against a third party. Other cases have held, in the absence of a showing that the wife had given up other employment to care for her husband, that such a claim would not be allowed. *518For cases denying the allowance to a wife, see Claus v. DeVere (Neb.), 235 N. W. 450; Graf v. Montgomery Ward (Minn.), 49 N. W. 2d 797; and Galway v. Doody Steel Erecting Co. (Conn.), 130 Atl. 705.
“However, other states have adopted the so-called ‘modern rule’ as enunciated by Professor Larson, and have permitted such payments to a wife on the grounds that when the wife was employable she was entitled to compensation for caring for her husband, or, that the services required were of an extraordinary nature and not those contemplated by the usual marital relationship and, therefore, she would be entitled to be recompensed for the same. California Casualty Ind. Exch. v. Industrial Acc. Com’n (Cal.), 190 P. 2d 990; Daugherty v. City of Monett (Mo.), 192 S. W. 2d 51; and Berkowitz v. Highmount Hotel, 120 N. Y. S. 2d 600. See also 2 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 61.13.”
Inasmuch as the decision in many of the opinions hereinafter cited appear to turn on the peculiar facts of the individual cases, it will be helpful at this point to set out the type of services rendered by Mrs. Spiker to her husband during the course of his illness. The insurer informed the plaintiff’s attorney on February 18, 1972, that all medical payments for the plaintiff would terminate on March 3, 1972. After that date, Mrs. Spiker cared for her husband at their home for a total of 171 days, during which time she attended her husband singlehandedly for a total of 3,371 hours. During the night it was necessary for her to get up at least once an hour to turn her husband, change the bedding when he had a bowel movement, give him medication when his bladder spasms commenced, insert catheters when necessary, and generally take care of him in the evenings and on weekends, when the employed nurse was absent. Her stated reason for the extensive care she rendered him was for the purpose of reducing the cost of such care. It is clear that the *519type of services rendered by Mrs. Spiker to her husband were not those of an ordinary housewife, but were of an extraordinary nature and the type usually rendered by professional nurses.
In-depth research of authorities from other jurisdictions, as well as our own, reveals that there are three basic requirements to be satisfied before compensation will be allowed for the care given an injured employee by the spouse in their home. These requirements are that: (1) The employer must have knowledge of the employee’s disability and need of assistance as a result of a work-related accident; (2) the care given by the wife must be extraordinary and beyond normal household duties; and, finally (3) there must be a means of determining the reasonable value of the services rendered by the spouse. These considerations presuppose that nursing care in the employee’s home is allowable under the statute. As set out in the majority opinion, Nebraska would allow recovery for such care in the home.
Both Michigan and Massachusetts have considered statutes similar to Nebraska’s section 48-120, R. R. S. 1943, and have held that nursing care rendered at home by the wife would be included in the term “medical services.” Dunaj v. Harry Becker Co., 52 Mich. App. 354, 217 N. W. 2d 397 (1974); In re Klapac, 355 Mass. 46, 242 N. E. 2d 862 (1968). The Michigan Court of Appeals in Dunaj v. Harry Becker Co., supra, discussed the question of “whether medical services rendered by claimant’s wife are unpaid medical services within the meaning of the statute,” (in effect at the time of the accident) and held “that medical service by a claimant’s wife are compensable to the same extent as they would be if the services had been rendered by someone other than the wife.” (Emphasis supplied.) The court concluded by stating ‘ ‘we do not believe that the Legislature intended that an employee and its insurer should re*520ceive a windfall by reason of the fact that claimant’s wife has performed services which should have been provided by said employer.”
The Massachusetts Supreme Court in In re Klapac, supra, stated: ‘.‘The term ‘medical services’ as used in the statute is inclusive of the services of a nurse * * The court stated that: ‘‘The wife was not barred from receiving payments for nursing services because of the marital relationship * * *. It is beside the point that no debt may have arisen between husband and wife * * *. The employer through the insurer, if insured, has the affirmative duty to furnish to an injured employee ‘adequate and reasonable medical and hospital services, and medicines if needed, * * *.’ G. L. c. 152, § 30. If services that fall within the statutory provisions are furnished by the wife, they should be paid for. The statutory obligation is not expressed in terms of reimbursing the employee for amounts he became obligated to pay.” The court in In re Klapac, supra, did not allow compensation for the wife’s care as she was not supervised by a physician.
Many other jurisdictions, with statutes specifically providing nursing care, have allowed the spouse’ claim for services. In Daugherty v. City of Monett, 238 Mo. App. 924, 192 S. W. 2d 51, the appellate court found that ‘‘the wife rendered excellent services and it was certainly in addition to her ordinary household duties.” The court also distinguished Claus v. DeVere, supra, because the wife in the Daugherty case was not being compensated for the ‘‘ordinary household services of a wife but extraordinary services in addition to her ordinary duties.” See, also, Groce v. J. E. Pyle, 315 S. W. 2d 482 (Mo. App., 1958).
The Missouri Court of Appeals spoke again on the issue of compensating a spouse for home care in Collins v. Reed-Harlin Grocery Co., 230 S. W. 2d 880 (Mo. App., 1950). The court found that the employer knew of the employee’s injuries and his need for as*521sistance. The court concluded that the employer’s failure to provide or to offer to provide such services resulted in its liability for the care provided by the wife. See, also, Stephens v. Crane Trucking, Inc., 446 S. W. 2d 772 (Mo., 1969); Balsamo v. Fisher Body Div. G. M. Corp., 481 S. W. 2d 536 (Mo. App., 1972).
California has also decided that a spouse should be compensated for nursing care provided an injured employee at their home in the case of California Cas. Indem. Exch. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 84 Cal. App. 2d 417, 190 P. 2d 990 (1948). The California statute, section 4600 of the Labor Code provided that “nursing” should be provided an injured employee by the employer. See, also, Pacific Elec. Ry. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 96 Cal. App. 2d 651, 216 P. 2d 135 (1950), where a practical nurse was hired in order to reduce medical expenses. The Court of Appeals allowed the employee full compensation although the nurse performed general housework in addition to providing nursing care.
Both Texas and Oklahoma have statutes which require the employer to provide nursing care to an injured employee. Texas, Vernon’s Ann. Civ. St., art. 8306, § 7; Oklahoma Statute, 85 O. S. 1961, § 14. Both states have found that a spouse’ care of an injured employee is to be compensated under the statutes. Western Alliance Ins. Co. v. Tubbs, 400 S. W. 2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App., 1965); Transport Ins. Co. v. Polk, 400 S. W. 2d 881 (Tex., 1966); Orrick Stone Co. v. Jeffries, 488 P. 2d 1243 (Okla., 1971). The court in Western Alliance Ins. Co. v. Tubbs, supra, stated that the wife’s services “consisted of feeding, bathing, shaving and turning claimant, taking him to the doctor and generally ‘taking care of’ him in his home while he was an invalid.” In the instant case Mrs. Spiker has rendered very similar care and assistance to her husband.
The Supreme Court of Michigan in Kushay v. Sex*522ton Dairy Co., 394 Mich. 69, 228 N. W. 2d 205 (1975), found that the Michigan statute, M. C. L. A., § 418.315, which provided for “other attendance” of an injured employee, included the care rendered by a spouse. The Michigan Supreme Court stated that: “The language of the statute * * * focuses on the nature of the service provided, not the status or devotion of the provider of the service. * * * If services within the statutory intendment are provided by a spouse, the employer is obligated to pay for them.” I believe that Mrs. Spiker in this case provided the same type of nursing care in the nurse’ absence, hence, the employee should be compensated for the reasonable value of such services. It is the “nature of the service provided, not the status or devotion of the provider of the service * *
Florida has allowed compensation for the wife’s services as a practical nurse while caring for her husband, but without discussion or explanation as to the reasons for so doing. Brinson v. Southeastern Utilities Service Co., 72 So. 2d 37 (Fla., 1954); Brown v. Dennis, 114 So. 2d 335 (Fla. App., 1959).
The Florida Supreme Court has also allowed a wife compensation for nursing her husband, although “she did not give up any regular employment.” Oolite Rock Co. v. Deese, 134 So. 2d 241 (Fla., 1961). The court there stated that: “The position that the wife could not be compensated in such an extreme case, though the petitioners were escaping the payment to some one else, simply because the wife did not happen to have been employed at the time of the husband’s misfortune, is one we cannot accept. We think adoption of the rule would be so harsh as to be downright unjust.” See, also, McMahon v. Huntington, 246 So. 2d 743 (Fla., 1971).
Many of the cases which have denied a spouse compensation for the care rendered an injured employee, did so on the ground that the care rendered was not so unusual or extraordinary from normal *523household duties as to be compensable. Claus v. DeVere, supra; Galway v. Doody Steel Erecting Co., 103 Conn. 431, 130 A. 135; South Coast Constr. Co. v. Chizauskas, 172 So. 2d 442 (Fla., 1965); Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Weaver, 226 So. 2d 801 (Fla., 1969); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Wilbanks, supra; Graf v. Montgomery Ward Co., 234 Minn. 485, 49 N. W. 2d 797.
The reason given by the Nebraska Supreme Court for its holding in the case of Claus v. DeVere, supra, was as follows: “The rule is that the husband is entitled to the services of the wife. He is not liable to her; nor could she sue and recover from him for any service rendered him as a wife * * *.”
The care rendered by a spouse is intended for the injured employee’s benefit only, not for the employer-insurer’s benefit. In this case the employer and insurer refused to provide further care for Mr. Spiker and Mrs. Spiker was forced to care for her husband at their own expense. Mrs. Spiker testified that she was trying to reduce the cost of her husband’s care by bringing him home. The employer-insurer should not be allowed to profit from the gratuitous care, given out of love, to an injured employee by his spouse, when it was the employer which forced the care of the employee upon the spouse.
I conclude from the foregoing authorities that it would be most inequitable not to permit an injured employee, entitled to workmen’s compensation benefits under the applicable statute, to recover the value of services rendered him by his spouse or other members of his family. The obvious injustice is made clear particularly in cases where a wife, prior to the time of the accident, has been gainfully employed and contributing the fruits of her labors to the family income. The same is true in situations where the wife, although not employed at the time, would normally have had the opportunity to obtain *524employment and make such contribution. In either event, through no fault of the wife or the injured husband, the family had been deprived of income probably sorely needed to supply their daily requirements. See Oolite Rock Co. v. Deese, supra.
As previously noted, there are jurisdictions which do not permit the injured employee compensation for services rendered in the home by the spouse or by other close relatives. However, as stated in 2 Larson, the Law of Workmen’s Compensation, § 61.13, p. 10-465, the modern trend of authority is away from that espoused in older cases previously referred to and the equitable view adopted by the more modern cases would appear to be in line with the view I am espousing herein. Most of the cases to the contrary, which I have cited above, may be distinguished on their facts. Other older cases, not cited herein and holding to the contrary, may also be distinguished on other grounds.
I believe the rule announced by this court in Claus v. DeVere, supra, in 1931 is outdated, out of step with modem thinking, and highly inequitable in its result, and that this court is correct in overruling that decision. We have in the past stated on many occasions that the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be liberally interpreted so as to effectuate the beneficent purposes of the act. Our action today gives substance to that adage.
Boslaugh, McCown, and White, C. Thomas, JJ., join in the opinion of Brodkey, J.