Court Opinion

ID: 9661177
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:31:35.213377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:26.111600
License: Public Domain

UHLENHOPP, Justice
(concurring specially).
I. I am not willing to go as far as the court in cutting down § 321.45(2) of the Code. Two matters are involved: (1) the title to or a security interest or other interest in the vehicle itself as the res, and (2) enforceability of an in personam claim apart from the res. I think § 321.45(2) controls the former; a person cannot have title to or a security or other interest in the res itself apart from the title certificate; by virtue of the statute the certificate is the title and the endorsement on the certificate is the security or other interest. See Professor Hudson’s series of articles, Iowa Certificate of Title Law, 3 Drake L.Rev. 3, 4 Drake L.Rev. 86, 5 Drake L.Rev. 31, 14 Drake L.Rev. 36, 23 Drake L.Rev. 585. But a person may enforce his in personam rights against another person apart from the res, even though enforcement may lead to court-imposed transfer of title to or imposition of a security or other interest in the res absent harm to a bona fide purchaser or encumbrancer for value. Thus a buyer can enforce a contract to purchase a vehicle without reference to the title certificate. Bunch v. Signal Oil & Gas Co., 505 P.2d 41 (Colo.App.); Sroka v. Catsman Transit-Mix Concrete, 350 Mich. 672, 86 N.W.2d 801.
II. Essentially the present situation is of the latter kind; Sandhorst is attempting to enforce his agreement and obtain damages from Mauk’s Transfer for breach. The agreement is enforceable apart from title to the vehicle. Sandhorst is entitled to the money the jury awarded him.
The most troublesome point is San-dhorst’s going beyond the pleading of the agreement and Mauk’s Transfer’s breach and pleading conversion in addition. See rule 69(a), Rules of Civil Procedure (“a short and plain statement of the claim”). I think Sandhorst did not prove a technical conversion, for he had not title to or an interest in the res. Munier v. Zachary, 138 Iowa 219, 114 N.W. 525 (necessity for an interest in the res). But Sandhorst pleaded and proved sufficient facts concerning the agreement and Mauk’s Transfer’s breach to entitle him to recover although he did not prove the additional fact of a technical conversion. A party is not required to prove more than necessary to entitle him to the relief asked. Code 1977, § 619.9 (“A party shall not be compelled to prove more than is necessary to entitle him to the relief asked for, or any lower degree included therein, nor more than necessary to sustain his defense.”); Raine v. City of Dubuque, 169 Iowa 388, 151 N.W. 518 (unnecessary aver-ments need not be proved).
I thus concur in affirmance.