Court Opinion

ID: 9676316
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:21:46.056417+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:47.372404
License: Public Domain

MORGAN, Judge
(dissenting).
The original opinion which was submitted for consideration in this case failed of adoption. Therein, it was concluded that “the judgment convicting appellant of first degree murder cannot stand and must be set aside,” but the following disposition of the appeal was suggested, to-wit:
“Under previous rulings of this court the cause would be remanded for a new trial on all issues, with the consequential expenditure of the time and resources of witnesses, prosecuting officials, counsel for the accused, court and jury. However, in this case there is no necessity to remand the cause for a new trial on all issues. All of the necessary facts bearing upon the issue of guilt or innocence of murder in the second degree have been established and found by the jury, and such issue need not again be proved and reestablished. Where an accused is charged with a homicide and the case is submitted to the jury on the felony-murder doctrine, but the felony submitted is one other than those enumerated in § 559.010, such a homicide is murder in the second degree. State v. Robinette [Robinett], 279 S.W. 696, 700 (Mo.1962 [1926]); State v. Jasper, 486 S.W.2d 268 (Mo. banc 1972). Proof that the homicide in this case was committed in the perpetration of the crime of stealing from a dwelling house was credible and substantial, and established appellant’s guilt of the crime of murder in the second degree. Implicit in the jury’s finding of guilt on the charge of murder in the first degree is a finding of guilt of the lesser included crime of murder in the second degree, whether that finding was based on Instruction No. 2 or on Instruction No. 3. In this situation we should remand the case for the entry of a *7judgment of conviction of second degree murder, and for an assessment of punishment for that crime.
“A number of other jurisdictions have adopted this expeditious and commonsense procedure. In People v. Morrin [31 Mich.App. 301], 187 N.W.2d 434 (Mich.1971) a first degree murder conviction was held to be deficient because there was a failure of proof of deliberation. However, the case was remanded with instructions to enter a judgment of conviction on a charge of second degree murder. In De Marrias v. United States, 453 F.2d 211 (8th Cir. 1972), accused was found guilty of second degree murder. On appeal the element of malice aforethought was found to be lacking in the evidence, but the evidence was found sufficient to justify a conviction of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. The court stated that implicit in the jury’s finding of guilt of second degree murder was a finding of guilt of manslaughter. It was ruled that 28 U.S.C. § 2106 [containing language almost identical with our Rule 28.14, V.A. M.R.] authorized entry of a judgment of guilty of manslaughter, and the case was remanded for resentencing. Other cases in which this procedure was followed, by authority of statute or rule, or by reason of inherent power, include People v. McFarland [14 Mich.App. 313], 165 N.W.2d 463 (Mich.1968 receiving stolen property of value of more than $100 reduced to receiving stolen property of value less than $100) ; People v. Lee [14 Mich.App. 328], 165 N.W.2d 518 (Mich.1968 breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny reduced to breaking and entering) ; People v. Ford [65 Cal.2d 41, 52 Cal.Rptr. 228], 416 P.2d 132, certiorari denied 385 U.S. 1018 [87 S.Ct. 737, 17 L.Ed.2d 554] (Calif.1966 murder first degree reduced to murder second degree); People v. Wolff, 394 P.2d 959 [61 Cal.2d 795, 40 Cal.Rptr. 271] (Calif.1964 murder first degree reduced to murder second degree); People v. Anderson [70 Cal.2d 15, 73 Cal.Rptr. 550], 447 P.2d 942 (Calif. 1968 murder first degree reduced to murder second degree); Forsha v. State [183 Tenn. 604], 194 S.W.2d 463 (Tenn.1946 murder first degree reduced to murder second degree); State v. Porello [138 Ohio St. 239], 34 N.E.2d 198 (Ohio 1949 murder first degree' reduced to manslaughter); State v. Cosby [100 Ohio App. 459], 137 N.E.2d 282 (Ohio 1955 murder first degree reduced to murder second degree); State v. Jackson [198 Minn. 111], 268 N.W. 924 (Minn. 1936 murder second degree reduced to murder third degree); People v. Monaco [14 N.Y.2d 43, 248 N.Y.S.2d 41], 197 N.E.2d 532 (N.Y.1964 murder second degree reduced to manslaughter first degree); Hemphill v. United States, [131 U.S.App. D.C. 46] 402 F.2d 187 (D.C.Cir.1968 murder first degree reduced to murder second degree); Austin v. United States [127 U.S.App.D.C. 180], 382 F.2d 129 (D.C.Cir.1967 murder first degree reduced to murder second degree); State v. Braley [224 Or. 1], 355 P.2d 467 (Ore.1960 murder first degree reduced to murder second degree); Spencer v. State, 217 So.2d 331 (Fla.1969 stealing of value in excess of $100 reduced to stealing of value of less than $100).
“In People v. Borders [37 Mich.App.769], 195 N.W.2d 331 (Mich.1972) the court carefully outlined the circumstances in which this procedure may be followed. It was there said: ‘Although the defendant’s conviction of rape cannot be sustained, it is not necessary to order a new trial. In cases where the only error is found in a failure of proof of one element of the offense it is sometimes permissible to remand for the entry of a judgment of conviction on a lesser included offense. There are several requirements that must be met before such a disposition can be made. Defendant must have been convicted of the offense with which he was charged, thus excluding the possibility that the jury verdict was the product of a compromise. The new judgment of conviction must be for an offense which is a lesser included of*8fense of the crime originally charged. The element on which there has been a failure of proof must be an element which raises the greater offense above the lesser. The record must contain credible evidence which would support a conviction of the lesser offense.’
“We approve this criterion and adopt it as the rule and guide in Missouri. In the case before us every one of the elements above enumerated are met, and the record sustains a conviction of murder in the second degree. In this error-free trial on the issue of guilt, of at least murder in the second degree, the only deficiency preventing affirmance of the judgment of guilty of first degree murder is the giving of an erroneous felony-murder instruction which resulted in a failure of proof of deliberation, an essential element, to first degree murder. But the finding by the jury of the commission of the felony of stealing from a dwelling supplied the proof of the elements of malice and premeditation essential to second degree murder.
“We reverse the judgment finding appellant guilty of murder in the first degree, and remand the cause with directions to enter a judgment of guilty of murder in the second degree, and that the trial court empanel a jury to hear and determine the issue of punishment, unless appellant elects to have sentence imposed by the judge.”
Thereafter, Houser, C., filed a Memorandum of Dissent as follows:
“I adhere to the opinion first circulated, which represents my thinking in the dilemma presented by this appeal. The record clearly establishes that appellant actively participated in a brutal, horrifying murder. While for technical reasons the conviction of first degree murder cannot be affirmed, appellant on this record is without question guilty of the lesser included offense of second degree murder, and in the interests of justice and efficient judicial administration it is the duty of this Court to so declare. There is no acceptable reason for further grinding of the judicial machinery to reestablish this appellant’s guilt, with the attendant possibility (however remote) of an acquittal on a second trial of the question of guilt or innocence. Following the rationale of the numerous forward-looking jurisdictions deciding the several cases cited in the opinion first circulated, I would affirm a finding of guilty of murder second degree and remand for the sole purpose of sentencing. Accordingly I respectfully dissent.”
I too see no reason why the procedure suggested should not be adopted in this state. Certainly no injustice, prejudicial to the appellant, could result since the lesser crime carries a lesser penalty than that to which appellant will be exposed.
I respectfully dissent.