Court Opinion

ID: 9423588
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:08:21.779795+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:44.967101
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Douglas,
with whom Mr. Justice Stewart concurs,
dissenting.
The questions posed by Mr. Justice Stewart cover the wide range of problems which the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations recently explored,1 in connection with the SEATO Treaty of February 19, 1955,2 and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.3
Mr. Katzenbach, representing the Administration, testified that he did not regard the Tonkin Gulf Resolution to be “a declaration of war” 4 and that while the Resolution was not “constitutionally necessary” it was “polit*936ically, from an international viewpoint and from a domestic viewpoint, extremely important.” 5 He added:
“The use of the phrase ‘to declare war’ as it was used in the Constitution of the United States had a particular meaning in terms of the events and the practices which existed at the time it was adopted ....
“[I]t was recognized by the Founding Fathers that the President might have to take emergency action to protect the security of the United States, but that if there was going to be another use of the armed forces of the United States, that was a decision which Congress should check the Executive on, which Congress should support. It was for that reason that the phrase was inserted in the Constitution.
“Now, over a long period of time, . . . there have been many uses of the military forces of the United States for a variety of purposes without a congressional declaration of war. But it would be fair to say that most of these were relatively minor uses of force ....
“A declaration of war would not, I think, correctly reflect the very limited objectives of the United States with respect to Vietnam. It would not correctly reflect our efforts there, what we are trying to do, the reasons why we are there, to use an outmoded phraseology, to declare war.” 6
The view that Congress was intended to play a more active role in the initiation and conduct of war than the above statements might suggest has been espoused by Senator Fulbright (Cong. Rec., Oct. 11, 1967, pp. 14683-14690), quoting Thomas Jefferson who said:
*937“We have already given in example one effectual check to the Dog of war by transferring the power of letting him loose from the Executive to the Legislative body, from those who are to spend to those who are to pay.” 7
These opposed views are reflected in the Prise Cases, 2 Black 635, a five-to-four decision rendered in 1863. Mr. Justice Grier, writing for the majority, emphasized the arguments for strong presidential powers. Mr. Justice Nelson, writing for the minority of four, read the Constitution more strictly, emphasizing that what is war in actuality may not constitute war in the constitutional sense. During all subsequent periods in our history— through the Spanish-American War, the Boxer Rebellion, two World Wars, Korea, and now Vietnam — the two points of view urged in the Prise Cases have continued to be voiced.
A host of problems is raised. Does the President’s authority to repel invasions and quiet insurrections, do his powers in foreign relations and his duty to execute faithfully the laws of the United States, including its treaties, justify what has been threatened of petitioners? What is the relevancy of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the yearly appropriations in support of the Vietnam effort?
*938The London Treaty (59 Stat. 1546), the SEATO Treaty (6 U. S. T. 81, 1955), the Kellogg-Briand Pact (46 Stat. 2343), and Article 39 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter deal with various aspects of wars of “aggression.”
Do any of them embrace hostilities in Vietnam, or give rights to individuals affected to complain, or in other respects give rise to justiciable controversies?
There are other treaties or declarations that could be cited. Perhaps all of them are wide of the mark. There are sentences in our opinions which, detached from their context, indicate that what is happening is none of our business:
“Certainly it is not the function of the Judiciary to entertain private litigation — even by a citizen— which challenges the legality, the wisdom, or the propriety of the Commander-in-Chief in sending our armed forces abroad or to any particular region.” Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U. S. 763, 789.
We do not, of course, sit as a committee of oversight or supervision. What resolutions the President asks and what the Congress provides are not our concern. With respect to the Federal Government, we sit only to decide actual cases or controversies within judicial cognizance that arise as a result of what the Congress or the President or a judge does or attempts to do to a person or his property.
In Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, the Court relieved a person of the death penalty imposed by a military tribunal, holding that only a civilian court had power to try him for the offense charged. Speaking of the purpose of the Founders in providing constitutional guarantees, the Court said:
“They knew . . . the nation they were founding, be its existence short or long, would be involved in war; *939how often or how long continued, human foresight could not tell; and that unlimited power, wherever lodged at such a time, was especially hazardous to freemen. For this, and other equally weighty reasons, they secured the inheritance they had fought to maintain, by incorporating in a written constitution the safeguards which time had proved were essential to its preservation. Not one of these safeguards can the President, or Congress, or the Judiciary disturb, except the one concerning the writ of habeas corpus.’' Id., 125.
The fact that the political branches are responsible for the threat to petitioners’ liberty is not decisive. As Mr. Justice Holmes said in Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536, 540:
“The objection that the subject matter of the suit is political is little more than a play upon words. Of course the petition concerns political action but it alleges and seeks to recover for private damage. That private damage may be caused by such political action and may be recovered for in a suit at law hardly has been doubted for over two hundred years, since Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 3 id. 320, and has been recognized by this Court.”
These petitioners should be told whether their case is beyond judicial cognizance. If it is not, we should then reach the merits of their claims, on which I intimate no views whatsoever.

 Hearings on S. Res. No. 151, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).

 [1955] 6 U. S. T. 81, T. I. A. S. No. 3170.

 78 Stat. 384.

 Hearings on S. Res. No. 151, supra, n. 1, at 87.

 Id., at 145.

 Id., at 80-81.

 15 Papers of Jefferson 397 (Boyd ed., Princeton 1958). In The Federalist No. 69, at 465 (Cooke ed. 1961), Hamilton stated:
“[T]he President is to be Commander in Chief of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the King of Great-Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and Admiral of the confederacy; while that of the British King extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies; all which by the Constitution under consideration would appertain to the Legislature.”