Court Opinion

ID: 9679766
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:05:38.350667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:19.678590
License: Public Domain

MAUZY, Justice,
dissenting.
The dissenting opinion delivered November 21, 1990, is withdrawn, and the following is substituted therefor.
I respectfully dissent. The trial court properly exercised its discretion in finding good cause to allow the testimony of Jacqueline Arrambide. Furthermore, considering the extensive record in this case, any error in admitting Arrambide’s testimony was harmless.
The rule requiring automatic exclusion of testimony from an undisclosed witness is subject to a good cause exception. Tex. R.Civ.P. 215(5). Determination of good cause is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will only be set aside if that discretion was abused. Morrow v. Inc., 714 S.W.2d 297 (Tex.1986). To determine if there is an abuse of discretion, we must look to see if the court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles. Id. at 298.
Arrambide was called as a rebuttal witness to impeach the testimony of Farah’s personnel director. This is the first time the court has considered Rule 215(5) in a case involving an undisclosed rebuttal -witness.1 Without any specific guidance from this court, the trial court made a good faith effort to determine whether this rebuttal witness fell under the rule. During the *918pretrial motion hearing, the trial judge responded to Farah’s objections by noting, “I don’t know of any requirement in the law to disclose the names of rebuttal witnesses.” Later, during the trial, Farah cited the case of Walsh v. Mullane, 725 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.), to support its contention that rebuttal witnesses are covered under the rule.2 The trial court found this case distinguishable since the complaining party in Walsh knew nothing about the undisclosed witness “until the moment she was called to testify.” Id. at 264. Here, the opponent was already aware of the witness; in fact, Farah’s counsel had deposed Arrambide several weeks earlier. Farah had even filed a motion in limine to prohibit Alvarado from calling her. In summing up the situation, the trial court said:
What we have here is that you all were notified of the possibility that this witness would be used. As a matter of fact, myself, as judge, even ruled on this matter as to whether or not this testimony would be admissible. It’s just that she didn’t formally in writing modify her discovery.
In other words, all the cards were already on the table.
This court has specifically referred to surprise as a factor for a trial court to consider in deciding whether good cause exists. In Gee v. Liberty Mut. Life Ins. Co., 765 S.W.2d 394, 395 (Tex.1989), we stated that “[although lack of surprise is not the standard, it may be a factor for the trial court to consider when weighing whether good cause exists for allowing the testimony of an undisclosed witness.” Thus, lack of surprise is not by itself enough to establish good cause; however, it can definitely be a factor for the trial court to consider in its determination of whether good cause exists. Here, the trial court determined that admission of Arram-bide’s testimony was warranted because there was a need to call her as a rebuttal witness and because Farah was not surprised by her testimony. Under the facts of this case, this was not an abuse of discretion.
This court apparently disapproves of the trial court’s failure to make a specific finding of good cause. Under our rules, though, the trial court was not required to make an express finding of good cause. See Clark v. Trailways, Inc., 774 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex.1989). The rule requires only that good cause be shown on the record. Tex.R.Civ.P. 215(5). A requirement of stating for the record how the trial court determines good cause would be tantamount to a return to the old form of action practice or recitation of the fiat. Our modern-day legal system rejects such antiquated practices.
Before our court can reverse a judgment, a determination must be made that the error was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment. Tex.R.App.P. 81(b). To determine whether the alleged error probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment, the court must examine the evidence in light of the entire record. McKinney v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 772 S.W.2d 72 (Tex.1989). The record in this case shows that Farah was not harmed by Arrambide’s testimony. Farah called two rebuttal witnesses to refute Ar-rambide’s testimony, Arrambide’s former supervisor and Farah’s personnel director. Moreover, the jury had ample evidence before it, without considering Arrambide’s testimony, to conclude that Farah had wrongfully terminated Alvarado. See Gee v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 765 S.W.2d at 397.
In adopting the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, this court recognized that the real purpose of such rules is to obtain a “just, fair, equitable and impartial adjudication of the rights of litigants under established principles of substantive law.” Tex. R.Civ.P. 1. Thus, we expressly provided that the rules “shall be given a liberal construction” to achieve justice. Id. Rule 215(5) does require the supplementation of all previously-answered discovery motions, and imposes a sanction for the failure to *919supplement. Like all rules, though, Rule 215(5) must be applied with an eye toward the ultimate goal of fairness. See David W. Holman & Byron C. Keeling, Disclosure of Witnesses in Texas: The Evolution and Application of Rules 166b(6) and 215(5) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, 42 Baylor L.Rev. 405, 448 (1990). To be fair, the Rules of Civil Procedure must have some measure of flexibility. That is the reason for the “good cause” exception to Rule 215(5): a trial court must have the discretion to apply the rule in a manner that avoids injustice. Here, it is clear that all the cards were on the table. Nevertheless, the court overturns a valid jury verdict because of a technical defect that harmed no one. Almost five years after the original judgment, this court forces Jose Alvarado back to trial, producing the very sort of injustice that our rules were designed to prevent.
For too long, this court has insisted on a purely mechanical approach to Rule 215(5). A trial court now has virtually no discretion to admit testimony from an undisclosed witness — even if the testimony itself would come as no surprise to either party. Eventually, this court will have to reassess the wisdom of such rigidity. I would undertake that reassessment sooner, rather than later.
The court does acknowledge that its construction of Rule 215(5) produces harsh consequences. Still, in spite of Rule 1, the court chooses not to modify its construction of Rule 215(5) to promote justice, stating emphatically that “we are not free to disregard its plain language.” Majority opinion 921.
Apparently, though, trial courts are free to disregard the rule’s plain language. To mitigate the impact of its holding, the court encourages trial courts to circumvent Rule 215(5) by postponing trials and imposing sanctions under Rule 215(3): Majority Opinion 921. This admonition is directly contrary to the court’s own recognition that “Rule 215.5 prescribes a single sanction for failing to supplement discovery.” Majority opinion 921. Nothing in Rule 215(5) suggests that a failure to supplement discovery should be cured by postponement of the trial and sanctions under Rule 215(3). The rule unequivocally states that a party failing to supplement shall not be entitled to present the testimony, unless good cause exists.
The sanctity of our rules cannot be preserved by encouraging courts to disregard them. Our rules should be interpreted fairly, and applied evenly. If, as the court holds today, good cause did not exist for the admission of Arrambide’s testimony, the only proper solution would be to disallow Arrambide from testifying.
I would hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding good cause to allow Arrambide’s testimony. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.
GONZALEZ and GAMMAGE, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.

. All of the Court’s earlier decisions involved either fact witnesses or expert witnesses. Sharp v. Broadway Natl Bank, 784 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. 1990) (undisclosed expert witness); Rainbo Baking Co. v. Stafford, 787 S.W.2d 41 (Tex.1990) (fact witness); McKinney v. Natl Union Fire Ins. Co., Ill S.W.2d 72 (Tex.1989) (fact witness with special technical knowledge); Clark v. Trailways, Inc., 774 S.W.2d 644 (Tex.1989) (fact witness); Boothe v. Hausler, 766 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. 1989) (fact witness); Gee v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 765 S.W.2d 394 (Tex.1989) (two fact and two expert witnesses); E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Youngblood, 741 S.W.2d 363 (Tex.1987) (expert used to establish reasonableness of attorney’s fees); Morrow v. H.E.B., Inc., 714 S.W.2d 297 (Tex.1986) (fact witness); Yeldell v. Holiday Hills Retirement and Nursing Center, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 243 (Tex.1985) (fact witness).

. This is the same case cited by the court as authority for its holding.