Court Opinion

ID: 9353537
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-12 01:47:05.016079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:07:01.502432
License: Public Domain

Rel: December 16, 2022

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

 ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
                               OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023
                                _________________________

                                         CL-2022-0541
                                   _________________________

                                                 A.R.H.B.

                                                      v.

            Madison County Department of Human Resources

                         Appeal from Madison Juvenile Court
                                    (JU-20-412.02)

THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.

        On August 2, 2021, the Madison County Department of Human

Resources ("DHR") filed in the Madison Juvenile Court ("the juvenile

court") a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of A.R.H.B.

("the mother") and D.D.B. ("the father") to the minor child born of their
CL-2022-0541

marriage ("the child"). The juvenile court conducted a hearing on DHR's

petition at which it received ore tenus evidence.

       On March 30, 2022, the juvenile court entered a judgment in which

it made findings of fact and ordered that the parental rights of the mother

and of the father be terminated. The mother filed a timely notice of

appeal to this court. The father has not appealed, and, therefore, this

opinion contains only limited references to the facts as they pertain to

him.

       The record reveals the following pertinent facts. In addition to the

child, the mother has an older child who was 14 years old at the time of

the March 16, 2022, termination-of-parental-rights hearing. The

mother's older child is in the custody of his father, and the mother rarely

visits that child. The mother stated that she had last seen her older child

at Christmas in 2021 for approximately one hour and that he had last

spent the night in a home in which she resided when he was

approximately five years old.

       The child was born in February 2018, and he was four years old at

the time of the termination-of-parental-rights hearing. Arronie Riley, a

DHR investigator, testified that on May 13, 2020, DHR received a report

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from an anonymous source that the mother was living in a motel and

using drugs in the presence of the child. Riley testified that it took her

several days to locate the mother and that, during that search for the

mother, she contacted the mother's mother ("the maternal grandmother")

and the mother's grandmother ("the maternal great-grandmother") to

seek information that would allow her to locate the mother. Riley located

the mother at the mother's place of employment several days after she

had spoken with the aforementioned maternal relatives. At that time, the

mother admitted that she did not have stable housing and that she had

recently   used    marijuana,     but   the    mother     denied    using

methamphetamine, as had been alleged in the anonymous report to DHR.

Riley stated that she attempted to create a safety plan for the mother and

the child but that the friends with whom the mother sought to leave the

child each had a pending drug charge or a drug conviction, and, Riley

stated, the mother refused to agree to a safety plan that would place the

child with the maternal grandmother or the maternal great-

grandmother. The child was placed in foster care on May 19, 2020, and

he has remained in foster care since that time. According to Riley, when

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the child was placed in foster care, he did not have a pediatrician, he was

underweight, and he had not been immunized.

     At the initial individualized-service-plan ("ISP") meeting, DHR

established several goals for the mother, including that she obtain and

maintain stable housing, maintain stable employment, and stop using

illegal drugs. Acey Smith, the first social worker assigned to the child's

case, testified that DHR offered the mother services, including color-code

drug screening, a mental-health assessment, a substance-abuse

assessment, parenting classes, and visitation with the child. In addition,

Smith   stated,   DHR    asked    the   mother   to   comply    with   any

recommendations resulting from the assessments. Smith left DHR three

months after the child was placed in foster care, which ended her work

on the child's case. Smith stated that, when she left, the mother had

undergone a substance-abuse assessment at Aletheia House. The

recommendation resulting from the substance-abuse assessment was

that the mother attend outpatient substance-abuse treatment.

     Roslyn Guyton, the social worker assigned to the child's case in

September 2020, testified that the mother had exhibited housing

instability throughout the time that the child has been in foster care.

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According to Guyton, the mother provided her with the maternal great-

grandmother's address to use as her mailing address but moved

frequently between motels and sometimes lived with friends as well as

the maternal great-grandmother. In her testimony, the mother at first

claimed that she had had stable housing for the entire time the child had

been in foster care, stating that she had lived with the maternal great-

grandmother. However, on cross-examination, the mother stated that she

frequently argued with the maternal great-grandmother and that, after

those arguments, she would leave the maternal great-grandmother's

home and stay in motels. The mother stated that she had lived with the

maternal great-grandmother "off and on." The mother estimated that,

during the approximately 22 months that the child had been in foster

care, she had actually lived in the maternal great-grandmother's home

for 6 months.

     The mother testified that she is an assistant manager at a local

fast-food restaurant and that she had maintained that employment since

November 2019; she stated that she earned approximately $26,000 in

2021. The mother admitted that she had not paid child support for the

benefit of the child. On questioning from her attorney, the mother

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answered in the affirmative to questions regarding whether she had

taken toys and clothes for the child to her visits with him. However, the

mother did not testify regarding any clothes she might have taken to

those visits to give to the child. Instead, the mother stated that she

almost always took food to the visits and that she took building-block toys

to each visit for the child. The mother explained, however, that she never

allowed the child to keep the building-block toys after a visitation

because, she said, she was concerned that he would swallow a piece of the

toy.

       Guyton testified that the mother completed a parenting class

through Aletheia House in late October 2020 but that the mother left a

substance-abuse-treatment program through Aletheia House without

completing that program. The mother testified, however, that she left the

substance-abuse-treatment program with only one class remaining to

complete. Emily Shulze, the mother's therapist in Aletheia House's

intensive outpatient substance-abuse-treatment program, stated that

the mother had completed the requirements of that program but that the

mother had not completed the final discharge processes necessary to be

considered to have completed that program. According to Shulze, the

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mother had attended the substance-abuse program from June 17, 2020,

through November 4, 2020.

     Erin Breeden, a laboratory technician at Alternative Sentencing, a

company that oversaw a drug-testing program used by DHR, testified

regarding the results of the mother's drug screens taken at DHR's

request. The parties' attorneys questioned Breeden extensively regarding

a discrepancy between an exhibit ("Exhibit 3") that she had compiled

setting forth the mother's drug-screen results and another exhibit

("Exhibit 5") that detailed each of those drug screens by date and

identified the particular substances for which the mother had tested

either positive or negative. 1 Those exhibits and Breeden's testimony

     1The   contents of both Exhibit 3 and Exhibit 5 clearly demonstrate
that the mother tested positive on 23 occasions and was a "no show" on
20 occasions. The mother also failed to appear for an additional drug
screen immediately before the termination-of-parental-rights hearing,
and that drug-screen result was not listed on the exhibits. Breeden was
unable to explain the reason why Exhibit 5's computer-generated
summary reflecting the number of times the mother tested positive was
in direct contrast to the contents of Exhibit 5. The juvenile court
overruled a request by the mother's attorney that Exhibit 3 and Exhibit
5 be stricken from the record, noting that the extensive questioning of
Breeden had established that the erroneous summary on Exhibit 5 was
in direct contradiction to the contents of that exhibit and stating that it
would not disregard evidence of the mother's positive drug screens
because of that error.
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indicated that, since the time the child had been placed in foster care in

May 2020, the mother had undergone 33 drug screens and had tested

negative 10 times; had tested positive for the use of marijuana 8 times;

had tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamine 13 times;

and had tested positive        for   a combination    of   amphetamines,

methamphetamine, and marijuana 2 times. In addition, the mother had

failed to appear for 21 drug screens.

     Shulze explained that, because of the restrictions imposed by the

COVID-19 pandemic, all of the mother's substance-abuse treatment had

been conducted via video-conferencing technology. In addition, she stated

that the substance-abuse-treatment program had often been unable to

conduct drug testing on the mother and that she had expected DHR, or

its service provider, to notify her of any drug screen in which the mother

tested positive. Exhibit 3 and Exhibit 5 demonstrate that while the

mother attended the substance-abuse-treatment program at Aletheia

House the mother had continued to test positive on her DHR-requested

drug screens. For example, on June 24, 2020, the mother tested positive

for marijuana, methamphetamine, and amphetamine. On July 8, 2020,

September 29, 2020, and October 13, 2020, the mother tested positive for

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marijuana on drug screens requested by DHR. According to Shulze, on

August 8, 2020, the mother had been tested for drug use through Aletheia

House and the results of that drug screen were positive for the use of

marijuana. Shulze stated that the mother had attributed that positive

drug screen result to her use of marijuana in June 2020, before she

entered the substance-abuse-treatment program.

     Shulze stated that the Aletheia House substance-abuse-treatment

program had not received notification of the mother's positive drug

screens from DHR. In response to questioning by the juvenile court,

Shulze stated that if Aletheia House personnel had been aware that the

mother was continuing to abuse drugs while she was attending the

Aletheia House substance-abuse-treatment program, the mother would

have been offered a more intensive level of treatment; if the mother had

refused that offer, Shulze said, the mother would have been dismissed

from the substance-abuse-treatment program.

     Guyton testified that, after the mother left the Aletheia House

substance-abuse-treatment program in November 2020, the mother had

asked Guyton, in early 2021, for authorization to again seek substance-

abuse treatment. Guyton stated that she explained to the mother that

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any patient dismissed from the Aletheia House substance-abuse-

treatment program could reapply for admission to that program after 30

days from the date that the patient had left the program. Shulze stated

that the mother had contacted her again about seeking treatment at

Aletheia House. However, according to Shulze, although the mother

scheduled an assessment for readmission to the Aletheia House program,

the mother had not attended that assessment and did not reenter the

program. At the time of the termination-of-parental-rights hearing, the

mother had not again sought substance-abuse treatment.

     Between November 2020, when she left the Aletheia House

substance-abuse-treatment program, and May 2021, the mother tested

positive intermittently for amphetamines and methamphetamine, and

she failed to appear for several drug screens; the other drug screens

during that time had negative results. However, from May 2021 through

March 16, 2022, when the termination-of-parental-rights hearing was

conducted, the mother consistently tested positive for the use of

amphetamines and methamphetamine. The mother also failed to appear

for some drug screens between May 2021 and March 16, 2022. At the

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time of the March 16, 2022, termination-of-parental-rights hearing, the

mother had not had a negative drug-screen result since April 2021.

     At the termination-of-parental-rights hearing, the mother testified

that she was a "functioning addict." The mother stated that she smokes

methamphetamine several times a day, every day, to help her focus so

that she can work and take care of other aspects of her life. The mother

pointed out that she had maintained her employment in spite of her use

of illegal drugs, and, she stated, she believed that she could properly care

for the child. According to the mother, however, she would immediately

stop using all illegal drugs if the child were returned to her custody. The

mother explained that she "returned" to using illegal drugs because the

child had been removed from her custody, and, she said, she would not

need illegal drugs if custody of the child were returned to her.

     The mother completed a mental-health evaluation in late summer

2021. The parties did not present evidence regarding the substance of

that evaluation, but Guyton testified that the mental-health evaluator

did not recommend any services for the mother as a result of that

evaluation. The mother testified that she had had a mental-health crisis

in 2010, when she was 22 years old, and that, at that time, she had been

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hospitalized because she was suicidal. According to the mother, during

that hospitalization, she was diagnosed as having bipolar disorder,

attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, anxiety, and depression. The

mother stated that she had not sought mental-health treatment since

that time. She claimed that, beginning in 2013, she began to use illegal

drugs to "self medicate." We note, however, that the mother also began

dating the child's father in 2013, and she admitted that the couple used

drugs together.

     With regard to possible relative resources for the child, Riley

testified that the child's paternal grandmother and the child's paternal

great-grandmother each had "indicated" reports with DHR. See Ala.

Admin. Code (Dep't of Hum. Res.), r. 660-5-34-.07(1). In addition, the

paternal great-grandmother, who lives with the paternal grandmother,

tested positive for the use of methamphetamine and amphetamines. For

that reason, Riley explained, both of those relatives were rejected as

safety-plan placements for the child. DHR's attorney asked Guyton

whether any members of the parents' families had contacted DHR

regarding serving as a relative placement for the child. Guyton testified

that the child's maternal family had not attempted to contact her

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regarding the child but that she had "had contact" with the paternal

grandmother. According to Guyton, she had asked the paternal

grandmother to complete and return to DHR a package requesting

information to determine if she would qualify as a relative resource, but,

she said, the paternal grandmother had not returned the completed

package to DHR. In addition, Guyton stated, the paternal grandmother

lives in the same home as the paternal great-grandmother, who tested

positive for the use of methamphetamine and amphetamines; Guyton

stated that, because of the paternal grandmother's failure to complete

and return the necessary paperwork and because she lived in a home

with a family member who was using illegal drugs, DHR rejected the

paternal grandmother as a relative resource for the child.

     Guyton testified that the child was doing well in his foster home

and that the child's foster mother wanted to adopt him if the juvenile

court terminated the mother's and the father's parental rights. According

to Guyton, at a July 21, 2021, ISP meeting, the permanency plan for the

child was changed to "adoption by current foster parent."

     In its March 30, 2022, judgment terminating the parents' parental

rights, the juvenile court found, among other things, that the mother had

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failed to adjust her circumstances to meet the needs of the child, that her

conduct or condition that rendered her unable to properly parent the

child was not likely to change in the foreseeable future, and that there

were no viable alternatives to the termination of the mother's parental

rights.

     The grounds warranting a termination of parental rights are set

forth in § 12-15-319, Ala. Code 1975, of the Alabama Juvenile Justice Act,

§ 12-15-101 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. With regard to the consideration of

a petition seeking to terminate parental rights, this court has explained:

           "A juvenile court is required to apply a two-pronged test
     in determining whether to terminate parental rights: (1) clear
     and convincing evidence must support a finding that the child
     is dependent; and (2) the court must properly consider and
     reject all viable alternatives to a termination of parental
     rights."
B.M. v. State, 895 So. 2d 319, 331 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004) (citing Ex parte

Beasley, 564 So. 2d 950, 954 (Ala. 1990)).

     "On appeal from ore tenus proceedings, this court presumes
     the correctness of the juvenile court's factual findings. See
     J.C. v. State Dep't of Human Res., 986 So. 2d 1172 (Ala. Civ.
     App. 2007). This court is bound by those findings if the record
     contains substantial evidence from which the juvenile court
     reasonably could have been clearly convinced of the fact
     sought to be proved. See Ex parte McInish, 47 So. 3d 767 (Ala.
     2008) (explaining standard of review of factual
     determinations required to be based on clear and convincing
     evidence)."
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C.C. v. L.J., 176 So. 3d 208, 211 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015).

     The mother raises several evidentiary issues on appeal. We find her

argument that the juvenile court erred in determining that DHR had

presented sufficient evidence that it had made a recent and sufficient

search for relative resources, i.e., for viable alternatives to termination,

to be dispositive of this appeal.

     It is not sufficient that, in support of a petition to terminate

parental rights, DHR presents evidence indicating that a child is

dependent and that there exists at least one ground under § 12-15-319

that would warrant a termination of parental rights. See, e.g., D.J. v.

Etowah Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., [Ms. 2200394, Oct. 8, 2021] ___ So. 3d

___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2021) (explaining that a finding of dependency,

alone, is not sufficient to terminate parental rights and that a juvenile

court must also determine that there are no viable alternatives to the

termination of parental rights). Instead, in addition to the foregoing,

DHR must also present evidence indicating that there are no viable

alternatives to the termination of a parent's parental rights. B.M. v.

State, supra; Ex parte Beasley, supra.

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     With regard to the possibility of placing a child with a relative as

an alternative to the termination of a parent's parental rights, this court

has held that " ' "DHR must present 'evidence of recent attempts to locate

viable alternatives in order to establish that termination of parental

rights is the least dramatic alternative.' " ' " J.F.S. v. Mobile Cnty. Dep't

of Hum. Res., 38 So. 3d 75, 78 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (quoting C.T. v.

Calhoun Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 8 So. 3d 984, 987 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008),

quoting in turn V.M. v. State Dep't of Hum. Res., 710 So. 2d 915, 921

(Ala. Civ. App. 1998), quoting in turn Bowman v. State Dep't of Hum.

Res., 534 So. 2d 304, 306 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988)) (emphasis omitted). See

also V.M. v. State Dep't of Hum. Res., 710 So. 2d 915 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998)

(same). DHR, and not a possible relative custodian, has the burden of

initiating an investigation into the suitability of a possible relative

placement for a child. D.S.S. v. Clay Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 755 So. 2d

584, 591 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999).

     In this case, DHR's attorney asked Guyton only if certain relatives

had contacted DHR, and she responded that three had not and that DHR

had rejected a fourth relative, the paternal grandmother, as being an

unsuitable placement. That brief testimony constituted the entirety of

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the evidence presented by DHR regarding possible relative resources for

the child. Although DHR presented evidence indicating that the mother

had not been willing to place the child with the maternal grandmother or

the maternal great-grandmother as an initial safety-plan placement for

the child, DHR presented no evidence concerning the mother's reason for

that refusal, and it presented no evidence regarding any further contacts

that DHR social workers might have had with those maternal relatives.

DHR failed to present any evidence concerning its social workers' efforts

to locate and investigate possible relative placements for the child. We

have recognized that, " '[a]lthough DHR has a responsibility to

investigate alternate relative placements for a child, that obligation does

not entirely alleviate the responsibility of the parent who purports to

oppose the termination of his or her parental rights of making DHR social

workers aware of alternative placement possibilities.' " J.F.S. v. Mobile

Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 38 So. 3d at 78 (quoting B.S. v. Cullman Cnty.

Dep't of Hum. Res., 865 So. 2d 1188, 1197 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003)). In this

case, however, DHR failed to present any evidence regarding whether

DHR social workers had asked the mother and the father to provide a list

of names of possible relatives with whom the child might be placed, and

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it presented no evidence indicating that DHR had investigated any

relatives that the mother or the father might have identified. Similarly,

the record contains no indication whether DHR social workers sought to,

or were able to, identify other relative placements for the child.

      Recently, our legislature amended § 12-15-319, which sets forth

grounds a juvenile court may consider when determining whether to

grant a petition seeking to terminate parental rights. That amendment

specifies:

            "(c) The juvenile court is not required to consider a
      relative to be a candidate for legal guardian of the child in a
      proceeding for termination of parental rights if both of the
      following circumstances exist:

                   "(1) The relative did not attempt to care for
             the child or obtain custody of the child within four
             months of the child being removed from the
             custody of the parents or placed in foster care, if
             the removal was known to the relative.

                  "(2) The goal of the current permanency plan
             formulated by the Department of Human
             Resources is adoption by the current foster
             parents.

§ 12-15-319(c) (emphasis added).

      DHR asserts in its brief submitted to this court that DHR social

workers contacted the maternal grandmother and the maternal great-

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grandmother during its attempt to locate the mother in May 2020 in

order to investigate the report that resulted in the child's being placed in

foster care. Therefore, DHR contends, the maternal grandmother and the

maternal great-grandmother were "aware of DHR's involvement" and,

under § 12-15-319(c), are now precluded from being considered as

possible placements for the child. However, the evidence demonstrates

that Riley located the mother three or four days after speaking with the

maternal grandmother and the maternal great-grandmother; DHR did

not present any specific evidence regarding if and when the maternal

grandmother and the maternal great-grandmother became aware that

the child was in foster care. The mother testified that, during the time

the child had been in foster care, she lived briefly with the maternal

great-grandmother; thus, it can be inferred that the maternal great-

grandmother was aware that the child was not living with the mother.

However, DHR failed to question the DHR social workers during the

termination-of-parental-rights hearing regarding any other contact those

social workers might have had with the maternal grandmother and the

maternal great-grandmother. DHR did not present any evidence

indicating that it had had any further contact with the maternal

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grandmother or the maternal great-grandmother, that those relatives

had been aware that the child was in foster care, or that DHR had

inquired whether either the maternal grandmother or the maternal

great-grandmother was willing to serve as a relative resource for the

child. Moreover, DHR did not present any evidence regarding whether

there were other possible relative resources -- other than the maternal

grandmother,     the    maternal    great-grandmother,      the    paternal

grandmother, and the paternal great-grandmother -- for the child.

     Nothing in § 12-15-319(c) alters or alleviates DHR's burden of

locating and investigating possible relative resources for a child. Instead,

that subsection limits, in certain circumstances, the juvenile court's

consideration of certain relatives as possible placements for a child when

those relatives have not come forward after being notified by DHR of a

child's being in DHR's custody and, presumably, asked whether they

could accept a child into their homes. In this case, DHR did not present

evidence regarding any relatives that might have been contacted by DHR

social workers concerning their willingness to serve as a placement for

the child. The record contains no evidence regarding whether, or when,

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any relatives of the parents became aware of the child's having been

placed in foster care such that § 12-15-319(c) might be implicated.

     We recognize that it is probable that the DHR social workers

properly located and investigated relative resources in this matter. This

court's holding in this matter is based on the failure to present evidence

concerning those efforts. " '[T]he party petitioning for termination of

parental rights bears the burden of proving the lack of a viable

alternative by clear and convincing evidence.' " D.J., ___ So. 3d at ___

(quoting K.R.S. v. DeKalb Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 236 So. 3d 910, 912

(Ala. Civ. App. 2017)). In this case, DHR failed to meet its evidentiary

burden. This court is unable to determine from the record whether the

DHR social workers properly investigated viable alternatives to the

termination of the mother's parental rights because DHR failed to

present sufficient evidence on that issue. Accordingly, we reverse the

judgment terminating the mother's parental rights.

     REVERSED AND REMANDED.

     Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.

     Moore, J., concurs in the result, without opinion.

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