Court Opinion

ID: 9651172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 16:09:35.028853+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:54.996998
License: Public Domain

On Petition for Rehearing
Petitioners argue that full effect has not been given to the doctrine of estoppel. True, the result reached is akin to that of set-off. But that does not indicate that there has been an erroneous ap*439plication of the doctrine of quasi estoppel. For that doctrine is essentially one of fundamental justice which must be so applied as to reach the fairest possible result in the particular circumstances. In our case, Ball paid Midland for its Midamerica stock, and should not be forced to pay for it again by including it in the recovery. Clearly, the extent that Ball was damaged was the amount that he paid for fifty-five per cent of Midland’s Midamerica common stock, so this amount should, and will, be deducted from the recovery.
Petitioners also argue that plaintiff does not own the claim which he is seeking to enforce because the receiver who transferred it to plaintiff’s predecessor was powerless to transfer it, citing certain authorities which hold that a trustee in bankruptcy may not assign his right to set aside a transfer which is preferential1 or in fraud of creditors.2 These authorities are not applicable here because this is a case of a receiver transferring a common law right, not a case of a trustee in bankruptcy assigning a statutory right which was conferred on said trustee exclusively. A further significant distinction, and this also distinguishes Voorhees v. Carpenter, 127 Ind. 300, 26 N.E. 838, is that plaintiff sues as trustee on behalf of the Cleveland creditors, who are the owners of substantially all the claims proved against the partnership and allowed by the receiver of the partnership’s assets in the receivership proceedings. This is not a situation where an individual creditor is attempting to benefit at the expense of other creditors. Plaintiff as trustee represents substantially all the creditors represented by the receiver and duly acquired with court approval all of his right as held by him for the partnership and all of its creditors. Because no question of an attempt to transfer a right of action by a receiver was involved in National State Bank of Terre Haute v. Vigo County National Bank, 141 Ind. 352, 40 N.E. 799, 50 Am.St.Rep. 330, it is without force here.
Since a right of action for conversion is a property right which is assignable, 4 Am.Jur. p. 255 and cases there cited, and since the court having control of a receivership undoubtedly has the power to authorize and confirm a disposition of any asset or property right of the estate which will be beneficial to the creditors, this plaintiff who in fact represents the creditors of the partnership estate may maintain this action.
The petition for rehearing is denied.

 Belding-Hall Mfg. Co. v. Mercer & Ferdon Lumber Co., 6 Cir., 175 F. 335; Grass v. Osborn, 9 Cir., 39 F.2d 461; Compton v. Three Rivers Glass Co., Tex.Civ. App., 43 S.W.2d 175; Parker v. Hand, 299 Ill. 420, 132 N.E. 467.

 Webster v. Barnes Banking Co., 10 Cir., 113 F.2d 1003; Neuberger v. Felis, 203 Ala. 142, 82 So. 172.