Court Opinion

ID: 9930682
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 16:02:18.329219+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:26:05.926159
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-3007     Document: 010110996222       Date Filed: 02/07/2024    Page: 1
                                                                                  FILED
                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                         February 7, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                         Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                             Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                          No. 23-3007
                                                   (D.C. No. 6:22-CR-10071-JWB-1)
  ARMANI R. MASON,                                             (D. Kan.)

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before BACHARACH, KELLY, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

       Armani Mason pleaded guilty to brandishing a firearm during a robbery in

 violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and now appeals his conviction and resulting

 ten-year prison sentence. Defense counsel filed an Anders brief and moved to

 withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (stating that if after

 “conscientious examination” of record, counsel finds appeal “wholly frivolous,” then

 counsel may move to withdraw and contemporaneously file a “brief referring to

       *
          After examining the Anders brief and appellate record, this panel has
 determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the
 determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The
 case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment
 is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
 and collateral estoppel. But it may be cited for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App.
 P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
Appellate Case: 23-3007    Document: 010110996222        Date Filed: 02/07/2024    Page: 2

 anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal”). Mason did not file a

 pro se response, and the government declined to file a brief. After reviewing the

 Anders brief and conducting our own thorough examination of the record, we agree

 that Mason’s appeal is wholly frivolous. See id. (noting court’s obligation to fully

 examine record and determine frivolousness). We therefore dismiss the appeal and

 grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

       We begin with Mason’s conviction. As an initial matter, nothing in the record

 suggests that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, so any challenge on

 that basis would be frivolous. See United States v. De Vaughn, 694 F.3d 1141, 1145–

 46 (10th Cir. 2012). And typically, a voluntary and unconditional guilty plea waives

 nearly all nonjurisdictional challenges. 1 See id. So we next consider the voluntariness

 of Mason’s plea and whether there is any other ground on which Mason could seek to

 withdraw his plea. 2 Because Mason did not challenge the validity of his plea or seek

       1
          An unconditional guilty plea does not waive constitutional due-process
 claims for vindictive prosecution or double-jeopardy claims that are evident from the
 face of the indictment, but nothing in the record suggests Mason has such claims
 here. See De Vaughn, 694 F.3d at 1145–46.
        2
          Mason’s plea agreement contains an appeal waiver that could preclude him
 from challenging his conviction and sentence. Relying on United States v. Banuelos-
 Barraza, 639 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2011) (unpublished table decision), defense
 counsel certified in a letter of supplemental authority that the government would
 invoke the appeal waiver. But the decision counsel cites doesn’t mention an appeal
 waiver, much less discuss certification—indeed, defense counsel’s pincite is to a
 footnote that does not appear in that decision. Rather, defense counsel appears to rely
 on a prior version of that decision that was later amended nunc pro tunc. See United
 States v. Banuelos-Barraza, No. 10-4125, slip op. at 3 n.2 (10th Cir. Mar. 31, 2011).
 Moreover, contrary to defense counsel’s suggestion that defense counsel can invoke
 an appeal waiver on the government’s behalf, we have held that only the government
 may invoke an appeal waiver, whether in a letter response to an Anders brief, by
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 to withdraw it below, any such claims would be subject to plain-error review. United

 States v. Carillo, 860 F.3d 1293, 1300 (10th Cir. 2017); United States v. Vidal, 561

 F.3d 1113, 1118–19 (10th Cir. 2009). Under that standard, a defendant must show a

 plain error that affected substantial rights and “seriously affects the fairness,

 integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Carillo, 860 F.3d at 1300.

        A guilty plea must be knowing and voluntary. See United States v.

 Muhammad, 747 F.3d 1234, 1239 (10th Cir. 2014). And the district court must ensure

 as much before accepting a guilty plea; it must also advise and question the defendant

 and determine that there is a factual basis for the plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b). Here,

 the record reflects that the district court ensured that Mason was voluntarily entering

 the plea: Mason affirmed that he was pleading knowingly and voluntarily, without

 threat, and confirmed that he did not suffer from any impairments due to alcohol or

 mental health issues. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970)

 (explaining that plea is voluntary when defendant is aware of consequences and was

 neither threatened with nor promised anything). Moreover, nothing in the record

 motion, or in its brief. See United States v. Contreras-Ramos, 457 F.3d 1144, 1145
 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Calderon, 428 F.3d 928, 931 (10th Cir. 2005)
 (holding that defense counsel “has no authority to waive or invoke arguments on
 behalf of the government,” so “[t]he government cannot rely on defense counsel’s
 raising the argument in an Anders brief as a substitute for fulfilling its own obligation
 to seek enforcement of the plea agreement”). Here, the government filed a notice that
 it did not intend to file a response brief; that notice did not mention the appeal
 waiver. Nor did the government file a motion to enforce the appeal waiver or file a
 brief invoking the waiver. In the absence of an express invocation by the government
 and lacking any legal support for defense counsel’s certification that the government
 would do so, we proceed without application of the appeal waiver.
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 indicates that Mason’s plea was otherwise involuntary. The district court also fully

 and adequately advised Mason of his rights. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(A)–(N).

 Additionally, the district court confirmed the factual basis for the plea by comparing

 the elements of the offense to the facts that the government said it would prove at

 trial and that Mason admitted were true. See Carillo, 860 F.3d at 1305 (explaining

 how district court should assess factual basis for plea). We therefore agree with

 defense counsel that any challenge to the validity of Mason’s plea—and therefore his

 conviction—would be frivolous.

       We turn next to Mason’s sentence. We generally “review sentences for

 reasonableness under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v.

 Nkome, 987 F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Alapizco-

 Valenzuela, 546 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir. 2008)). But “when a defendant fails to

 preserve an objection,” review is “only for plain error.” United States v. Finnesy, 953

 F.3d 675, 688 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Martinez-Barragan, 545

 F.3d 894, 899 (10th Cir. 2008)).

       The reasonableness of a sentence “includes both procedural and substantive

 components.” Nkome, 987 F.3d at 1268 (quoting United States v. Masek, 588 F.3d

 1283, 1290 (10th Cir. 2009)). We begin with procedural reasonableness, to “ensure

 that the district court committed no significant procedural error.” Gall v. United

 States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). A district court commits a procedural error when

 miscalculating a defendant’s sentencing range under the United States Sentencing

 Guidelines (U.S.S.G. or the Guidelines), treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing

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 to consider the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), “selecting a sentence based

 on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—

 including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” Gall, 552

 U.S. at 51.

       We initially consider potential procedural errors that Mason did not raise

 below and would therefore be subject to plain-error review. 3 First, the district court

 properly calculated the Guidelines range as a seven-year mandatory minimum under

 U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4. And because the district court ultimately imposed a ten-year

 sentence, outside that range, we can infer that the court did not treat the Guidelines as

 mandatory. In so doing, the district court considered the appropriate § 3553(a) factors

 in determining Mason’s sentence. In particular, it noted that the nature of the offense

 included stealing a car and robbing two McDonald’s restaurants. See § 3553(a)(1). It

 further explained that during the first robbery, Mason placed his gun on the counter

 and specifically and repeatedly threatened to kill the minor cashier, and during the

 second, he cocked his gun before placing it on the counter and demanding money

 from the minor cashier. The district court also discussed Mason’s criminal history,

 which included juvenile theft offenses and robbery of an individual. See § 3553(a)(1),

       3
          During sentencing, Mason’s counsel stated that “[f]or purposes of preserving
 our right of appeal, [we] object procedurally and substantially to the [c]ourt’s
 tentative sentence.” R. vol. 3, 59. But a procedural-reasonableness argument can only
 be preserved through “a sufficiently specific objection,” United States v. DeRusse,
 859 F.3d 1232, 1237 (10th Cir. 2017), so this general statement did not preserve any
 argument for appeal, see Finnesy, 953 F.3d at 681 (finding no preservation where
 defense counsel merely stated “that procedurally . . . the sentence is . . .
 unreasonable” (first omission in original) (quoting R. vol. 3, 56)).
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 (2)(A)–(C). Nowhere in this discussion did the district court rely on clearly erroneous

 facts; rather, it properly deferred to the unobjected-to presentence investigation

 report (PSR). See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A). The district court also adequately

 explained the sentence and its reason for imposing an upward variance. For example,

 the district court explained that because the Guidelines range (the seven-year

 statutory minimum) provided little actual guidance in fashioning a sentence, it

 compared Mason’s conduct—which included specific threats to kill—to simple

 brandishing. And because Mason’s conduct was more serious than simple

 brandishing, the district court reasoned that it was appropriate to impose a sentence a

 few years longer than the statutory minimum but much shorter than the statutory

 maximum: life imprisonment. It also explained that various mitigating factors had

 caused it to reduce its planned 12-year sentence down to ten. In sum, any plain-error

 procedural challenge on these points would be frivolous.

        We next turn to the only procedural claim that Mason preserved below when

 he extrapolated on his general objection and argued more specifically that the district

 court erred by relying in part on Mason’s knowledge of the victims’ juvenile status to

 impose an upward variance. As the Anders brief highlights, the record demonstrates

 that the district court chose to impose an upward variance not due to Mason’s

 knowledge that the victims were minors, but rather for the simple reason that they

 were minors. And this objective fact is within the district court’s discretion to

 consider. United States v. Warren, 737 F.3d 1278, 1286 (10th Cir. 2013) (“If a PSR is

 not disputed . . . , it is well established that a district court is free to rely on the PSR

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 at sentencing.”). So any argument the district court abused its discretion in weighing

 the victims’ minor status when determining Mason’s sentence would be frivolous.

       Concluding that the district court did not procedurally err, we turn to the

 substantive reasonableness of the sentence. See United States v. Lucero, 747 F.3d

 1242, 1246 (10th Cir. 2014). Because Mason preserved a substantive reasonableness

 challenge by requesting a shorter sentence, our review is for abuse of discretion. See

 Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 762, 766–67 (2020) (explaining

 preservation of substantive-reasonableness argument); United States v. Gieswein, 887

 F.3d 1054, 1064 (10th Cir. 2018) (providing abuse-of-discretion standard of review).

 In determining substantive reasonableness, “we afford substantial deference to the

 district court” and consider “whether the length of the sentence is reasonable given

 all the circumstances of the case in light of the” sentencing factors in § 3553(a).

 Gieswein, 887 F.3d at 1064. It is a holistic inquiry, and a district “court need not rely

 on every single factor—no algorithm exists that instructs the district judge how to

 combine the factors or what weight to put on each one.” United States v. Barnes, 890

 F.3d 910, 916 (10th Cir. 2018).

       Nothing in the record supports a finding of substantive unreasonableness here.

 As we have already concluded, although the district court imposed a sentence above

 the Guidelines range, it appropriately considered the § 3553(a) factors and provided

 an adequate explanation for doing so. And it did not improperly weigh any one factor

 in determining Mason’s sentence. As discussed, the district court spoke at length

 about its reasons for imposing an upward variance and even reduced its initially

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 contemplated sentence by two years. Thus any substantive-reasonable argument that

 the district court abused its discretion in imposing Mason’s ten-year sentence would

 be frivolous.

       Because our examination of the record reveals no other nonfrivolous basis for

 appeal, we dismiss the appeal and grant defense counsel’s motion to withdraw. See

 Calderon, 428 F.3d at 930.

                                           Entered for the Court

                                           Nancy L. Moritz
                                           Circuit Judge

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