Court Opinion

ID: 9752386
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:03:59.951422+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:44:57.830785
License: Public Domain

POMEROY, Justice
(dissenting).
I cannot agree that the district attorney’s reference to appellant’s not-guilty plea in his summation amounted to an adverse comment upon appellant’s exercise of his right not to testify in his own behalf. In rejecting a like contention that a district attorney had impermissibly attempted to create an adverse inference regarding the exercise of appellant’s Fifth Amendment right, this Court recently set forth the standard which should guide such a determination:
“While it is fundamental that the Fifth Amendment forbids comment by the prosecution on the accused’s silence at trial, Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 *353S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965); Commonwealth v. Davis, 452 Pa. 171, 305 A.2d 715 (1973), the cross-examination complained of did not either expressly or by reasonable implication indicate that an adverse inference could be drawn from the failure of Tervalon to testify nor did it draw attention to his failure to do so.”
Commonwealth v. Tervalon, 463 Pa. 581, 595, 345 A.2d 671, 678 (1975) (emphasisadded).
See also Commonwealth v. Davis, 452 Pa. 171, 305 A.2d 715 (1973) (Pomeroy, J., concurring on other grounds).
In the instant case the district attorney made no express reference to appellant’s failure to testify; nor do I believe that it can plausibly be said that such a reference arises by “reasonable implication.” Indeed, “[t]o hold that this kind of remark, without more, and particularly without any reference to the refusal of the defendant to testify . . . is an adverse comment on the defendant’s exercise of his Fifth Amendment right seems to me to be stretching things unduly.” Commonwealth v. Davis, 452 Pa. at 181, 305 A.2d at 721 (Pomeroy, J., concurring on other grounds).
While the zeal of the public prosecutor must never be allowed to transform the search for truth into a mere quest for conviction, neither must the prosecutor be unduly hampered in the presentation of the Commonwealth’s case. In the course of reversing a judgment of sentence on the ground that a district attorney had impermissibly expressed his personal opinion as to the guilt of the defendant we stated:
“To hold as we do today does not mean, as the Commonwealth suggests, that a prosecuting attorney is no longer ‘entitled to argue his case to the jury forcefully and, if need be, with eloquence,’ (Commonwealth’s brief at 24) nor does it mean, that ‘he has been [shorn] of all oratorical emphasis,’ to use Judge *354Learned Hand’s phrase. See DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 706, 45 S.Ct. 640, 69 L.Ed. 1168 (1925). We recognize that a district attorney must have reasonable latitude in fairly presenting a case to the jury, and that the trial judge must have reasonable discretion in deciding whether the bounds of propriety have been exceeded. See Commonwealth v. McNeal, 456 Pa. 394, 400, 319 A.2d 669 (1974). As the commentary to the ABA Standards puts it, ‘Of course, a prosecutor must be free to present his arguments with logical force and vigor.’ ”
Commonwealth v. Cronin, 464 Pa. 138, 143, 346 A.2d 59, 62 (1975).
Viewed in the context of his entire closing address, the district attorney’s reference to appellant’s not-guilty plea Was made as part of an argument calculated to persuade the jury that the defendant’s assertion of innocence was incredible in light of the evidence presented at trial. Such advocacy, I believe, falls within the bounds of the “reasonable latitude” the district attorney must be allowed in the presentation of his case. Furthermore, even if it be assumed that the district attorney exceeded the limits of permissible advocacy, a reversal would be mandated only if the unavoidable effect of his comments would be so to prejudice the jury that they could not fairly weigh the evidence and reach a just verdict. Commonwealth v. Stoltzfus, 462 Pa. 55, 337 A.2d 873 (1975); Commonwealth v. Riley, 459 Pa. 42, 326 A.2d 400 (1974); Commonwealth v. McNeal, 456 Pa. 394, 319 A. 2d 669 (1974). In my mind, the cautionary instructions given to the jury by the trial judge were sufficient to prevent this prejudicial effect. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.