Court Opinion

ID: 9948955
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 15:15:18.992728+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:25.117513
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 1, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                         TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals

                            NO. 2021-CA-1311-MR

ALEXANDER G. CARPENTER                                             APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.               HONORABLE MITCHELL PERRY, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 20-CI-000510

BARRY GOODALL AND
JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF
EDUCATION                                                           APPELLEES

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                 ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, CETRULO, AND GOODWINE, JUDGES.

ACREE, JUDGE: Appellant, Alexander Carpenter, appeals the Jefferson Circuit

Court’s October 5, 2021 order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees,

Barry Goodall and the Jefferson County Board of Education. We affirm.

            In 2019, Appellant attended Eastern High School in Louisville as an

eleventh-grade high school student. At all relevant times, he was a minor who

suffered from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD), both of which physically manifested as panic attacks. The

school accommodated these disabilities by implementing an Individual Education

Program (IEP) for him. Appellant’s IEP allowed him to remove himself from a

stressful situation to “cool down” by going to the safe space of the Assistant

Principals’ offices. His IEP did not permit him to leave the school.

             On October 28, 2019, while Appellant sat in his fifth-period civics

class, he drank an alcoholic beverage from a water bottle. His behavior suggested

to his teacher he was intoxicated. The teacher alerted Shaun Davis, a coach at the

school who is also identified in the record as “Security.” Davis escorted Appellant

from the classroom on the second floor and toward the Assistant Principals’ offices

on the first floor. When they reached the first floor, they were joined by the

school’s In-School Security Monitor, Barry Goodall.

             Goodall was in his twenty-third year as security at Eastern High

School when this incident with Appellant occurred. A few weeks earlier, Goodall

broke up a fight involving Appellant and three other students in a school stairwell.

All four were throwing punches. (Record (R.) 226-27 (Goodall deposition)).

             As they approached their destination, Appellant began experiencing a

severe anxiety attack, but he did not alert anyone. There is not total agreement

about what happened next. We focus our attention on material facts not in dispute.

                                         -2-
               According to Appellant’s affidavit, he and Coach Davis left the

classroom around 12:28 PM. (R. 251 (Appellant’s affidavit)). As fifth-period

classes let out, Appellant, Goodall, and Davis “arrived in the area next to the

Assistant Principals’ offices . . . .” (Id. at 252). Video surveillance of the incident

shows the hallway became crowded with students. (R. 374 (Plaintiff’s Response to

Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 5)).1 Rather than entering the offices,

Appellant “continued to walk past the Assistant Principals’ offices towards the

eastern exit into the student parking lot, with the intention of ‘cooling down’ in

[his] car.” (R. 252 (Appellant’s affidavit)). Appellant said he was intent on “going

to sit out in his car until the school day ended, but they [Goodall and Coach Davis]

would not let him.” (R. 261 (Plaintiff’s Answers to Interrogatories)).

               The school officials reasonably believed they could not allow

Appellant to leave the school while intoxicated, so he was given verbal instruction;

“Mr. Goodall told me to ‘go this way,’ into the Assistant Principals’ offices.” (R.

252 (Appellant’s affidavit)). Appellant did not follow Goodall’s verbal instruction

and, according to Appellant, “Coach Davis then stepped in front of me and put his

right arm out and against my chest and said, ‘stop[.]’” (Id.). Appellant then “told

1
  This Exhibit 5 is a DVD-Rom of the surveillance footage in the hallway covering the time this
incident occurred. It is grainy footage, from quite a distance away, and reveals nothing about who
initiated any contact. It makes clear, however, that there were many students in the immediate
vicinity.

                                               -3-
Coach Davis, ‘Don’t touch me.’” (Id.). Appellant “continued to walk, attempting

to move past him.” (Id.).

             According to Appellant’s complaint, “Goodall forcefully grabbed

[Appellant’s] arm . . . .” (R. 178 (Verified First Amended Complaint, ¶ 12)).

Goodall admitted grabbing Appellant by the arm, saying in deposition, “I gave

what’s called a bicep assist, which is where I have one hand on the bicep, and one

hand above the wrist, and attempted to direct him toward the assistant principal’s

office door.” (R. 230-31 (Goodall deposition)).

             Appellant said Goodall then “grabbed me from behind and held both

of my arms behind my back . . . .” (R. 252 (Appellant’s affidavit)). Goodall

admitted this, too, calling the maneuver a “standing upper torso assist.” (R. 230

(Goodall deposition)). However, Appellant does not explain what happened

between the point in time Goodall was holding his arm in a bicep assist and when

Goodall grabbed him from behind. Goodall explained in his deposition what

transpired in a way not contradicted by the record.

             Goodall testified as follows:

             Q     Was the bicep assist one of those safe crisis
                   management physical interventions that you
                   received training in August or September prior?

             A     Yes.

             Q     Okay. And was that bicep assist . . . effective?

                                         -4-
            A      No.

            Q      Why is that?

            A      He broke loose out of it.

            Q      Then you were not able to get him into the
                   A[ssistant] P[rincipals’] offices, sir?

            A      Correct. Or should I say, no?

            Q      I understand. I appreciate it. What happened next
                   sir?

            A      From that point I attempted a standing upper torso
                   assist.

(R. 230 (Goodall deposition)).

            Appellant said he resisted Goodall’s attempted standing upper torso

assist; “I struggled to get free from Mr. Goodall and he shoved me into the corner

by the cafeteria doors with my back to the wall, and then ‘took me down’ to the

ground, causing the back of my head to hit the concrete wall, and my back to hit

the ground, and Mr. Goodall to come down on top of me.” (R. 252-53

(Appellant’s affidavit)). When they hit the floor, “[Appellant’s] arms were in front

of him.” (R. 178 (Verified First Amended Complaint, ¶ 12)). In that brief time,

according to Appellant, Goodall went from being behind him, pinning his arms

behind him, to Goodall and Appellant’s arms being in front of Appellant.

Appellant presented no proof about how that change occurred. Goodall’s

testimony again explains it without contradicting Appellant’s affidavit testimony:

                                        -5-
A   I attempted an upper torso assist. Standing upper
    torso assist.

Q   Okay, can you tell me what that is, please?

A   That is where I maneuver behind the person and
    attempt to wrap my arms around the subject’s arms,
    and where I hold them from behind.

Q   Okay, were you able to effectuate that standing
    upper torso assist on [Appellant]?

A   For less than five seconds. He broke out.

Q   At the time that you were effectuating the upper
    torso assist, what was Coach Davis doing?

A   He was still standing there where he was.

Q   Okay. And what happened after he broke free, Mr.
    Goodall?

A   At that time, Coach Davis attempted to assist me.
    We both had [Appellant] by each arm, which would
    be another attempted bicep assist. But at this – at
    the at that time, Coach Davis had a hold of
    [Appellant’s] other arm. But he immediately broke
    away from that, also.

    ....

Q   . . . Mr. Goodall, what happened when [Appellant]
    broke free of you and Coach Davis? . . . .

A   He became – he began pushing me at that point.
    And then he, [Appellant], myself and Coach Davis
    had lost control of [Appellant]. Like I said, he broke
    free of the bicep assist, he started pushing me, and
    we all three were headed in the same direction. And

                          -6-
                   as [Appellant] pushed me, I was knocked off
                   balance, went face first into a concrete wall.

(R. 230-31 (Goodall deposition)).

             Appellant’s affidavit continues to describe how Goodall “called over

to Coach Davis to help in a calm voice” and Davis did help by, in Appellant’s

words, “la[ying] over the lower-half of my body trying to hold me still . . . .” (R.

253 (Appellant’s affidavit)). Appellant continuously yelled at the security officers

to get off him, “including using curse words” and telling them, “I have PTSD[.]”

(Id.). Appellant next describes that Davis stood up first, then Goodall, and

“Goodall grabbed me and took me into the Assistant Principals’ offices.” (Id.).

Goodall’s testimony is consistent.

             According to Goodall:

             A     [W]e kept telling [Appellant] to calm down – if he
                   would calm down, quit fighting, we would let him
                   up because he kept repeatedly saying, “Get the fuck
                   off of me.” So that’s when we said, “If you stop
                   fighting, you stop – stop fighting, we’ll let you
                   up.[”]

             Q     Okay. And did you pick [Appellant] up?

                   . . . . [videoconferencing interrupted here]

             A     Coach Davis and I both assisted him up.

(R. 233 (Goodall deposition)).

                                         -7-
             The Jefferson County Public School (JCPS) report of this incident,

compiled by JCPS investigator Krisha Brown, says local police officers arrived

and administered two breathalyzer tests. The first test showed a blood alcohol

concentration (BAC) of 0.126% and the second a BAC of 0.132%. Both exceeded

the minimum standard for intoxication. Law enforcement also tested the contents

of Appellant’s water bottle and confirmed it contained alcohol. Appellant’s

mother, Melissa Kurtz, arrived at the school to pick up her son.

             The following day, the school contacted Kurtz informing her that the

school suspended Appellant for three days because of the incident. The school

asked if she wanted the notice of suspension mailed to her or left at school where

she could pick it up. She asked that it be mailed and received it eight days later.

             Two days after the incident and one day after informing Kurtz of the

suspension, an attorney representing Appellant sent a letter to the school appealing

the suspension. Appellant availed himself of the full administrative appeals

process available and, at each step, the school upheld its decision.

             On January 18, 2020, Appellant brought suit in Jefferson Circuit

Court. He alleged a battery claim against Goodall and asked the circuit court to

review his school suspension. Goodall claimed qualified official immunity.

             On May 10, 2021, Appellees moved for summary judgment on

Goodall’s immunity defense to the first count and also argued summary judgment

                                         -8-
was proper on the second count because the suspension was lawful and supported

by substantial evidence. The circuit court agreed and entered summary judgment

for Appellees on October 5, 2021. This appeal followed.

             Additional relevant facts will be found in the analysis.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

             Appellate courts review a circuit court’s granting of summary

judgment de novo. Cmty. Fin. Servs. Bank v. Stamper, 586 S.W.3d 737, 741 (Ky.

2019). “An appellate court’s role . . . is to determine whether the trial court erred

in finding no genuine issue of material fact exist[ed] and the moving party was

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Feltner v. PJ Operations, LLC, 568

S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky. App. 2018). “The record must be viewed in a light most

favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment and all doubts

are to be resolved in his favor.” Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., 807 S.W.2d

476, 480 (Ky. 1991).

                                     ANALYSIS

             Appellant argues the circuit court erred: (1) by determining Goodall

had qualified official immunity; (2) by refusing to exclude certain attachments to

the JCPS official report from consideration when weighing whether to grant

summary judgment; and (3) by granting summary judgment concerning the school

suspension. We address each in turn.

                                          -9-
Qualified Official Immunity.

             “Qualified official immunity applies to the negligent performance by

a public officer or employee of . . . acts or functions . . . involving the exercise of

discretion and judgment, or personal deliberation, decision, and judgment . . . in

good faith . . . within the scope of the employee’s authority.” Yanero v. Davis, 65

S.W.3d 510, 521 (Ky. 2001). “[A]n officer or employee is afforded no immunity

from tort liability for the negligent performance of a ministerial act, i.e., one that

requires only obedience to the orders of others, or when the officer’s duty is

absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely execution of a specific act

arising from fixed and designated facts.” Id. Appellant attempts to force

Goodall’s conduct into the latter category – the performance of a ministerial act –

but we are not persuaded by his argument.

             Appellant cites Patton v. Bickford as saying “the general supervision

of students by teachers is ministerial in nature ‘as it requires enforcement of known

rules.’” 529 S.W.3d 717, 727 (Ky. 2016). But Patton never said the courts base

the ministerial/discretionary distinction “on the status or title of the officer or

employee, but on the [act or] function performed.” Haney v. Monsky, 311 S.W.3d

235, 240 (Ky. 2010) (quoting Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 521 (citation omitted)).

“[I]mmunity issues are resolved by examining ‘the nature of the functions with

which a particular official . . . has been lawfully entrusted[.]’” Yanero, 65 S.W.3d

                                          -10-
at 518 (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224, 108 S. Ct. 538, 542, 98 L.

Ed. 2d 555 (1988)).

             Appellant wants this Court to categorize Goodall’s acts as student

supervision, citing Patton, and to hold Goodall to a ministerial duty to refrain from

taking any action to restrain him. We hold the nature of this particular official’s

function was “to provide a safe school environment” for all concerned, including

Appellant himself. Marson v. Thomason, 438 S.W.3d 292, 299 (Ky. 2014).

Providing a safe school environment is “a general and continuing supervisory duty

. . . which depend[s] upon constantly changing circumstances . . . .” Haney, 311

S.W.3d at 243.

             When Appellant was first approached and escorted from the

classroom, the circumstances called for little more than verbally directing him to

the Assistant Principals’ offices. Appellant changed those circumstances in a

substantive way when, affected by his own inebriation and contrary to the school

officials’ reasonable verbal instruction to enter the offices, he decided he would go

to the parking lot and enter his vehicle. When verbally instructed again to enter the

offices, Appellant disobeyed. Coach Davis placed himself between Appellant and

the exit, but Appellant continued to press on, necessarily bringing about contact

between himself and the stationary Coach Davis. Goodall had the choice to allow

Appellant to continue but, because his duty is to assure student safety, including

                                         -11-
Appellant’s safety and that of Coach Davis, he chose a different course. Verbal

direction was no longer effective. Appellant’s conduct compelled Goodall to

exercise the discretion available to him under the law to physically secure

Appellant’s cooperation in the interest of school safety.

              In accordance with KRS 158.444, the Kentucky Board of Education

promulgated administrative regulations relating to school safety, student discipline,

and related matters. Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 158.444(1). Those

regulations are at play here.

             When Appellant evinced a refusal to follow verbal instruction, Coach

Davis placed himself between Appellant and the school parking lot where

Appellant intended to enter his vehicle while intoxicated. He even touched

Appellant while trying to redirect him into Appellant’s designated safe space, the

Assistant Principals’ offices. This was not physical restraint. “‘Physical Restraint’

. . . does not include . . . touching . . . for the purpose of encouraging a student to

move voluntarily to a safe location . . . [or l]ess restrictive physical contact or

redirection to promote student safety . . . .” 704 Kentucky Administrative

Regulations (KAR) 7:160 § 1(10). Davis’s less restrictive physical contact was

ineffective, and Appellant continued to pursue his own unsafe course.

                                          -12-
                  Goodall, observing Appellant’s resistance, exercised discretion in

determining whether to allow Appellant to evade Davis, exit the building, and

enter his vehicle. Goodall chose increasing degrees of physical restraint.

                  The same regulation just cited also says, “Physical restraint may only

be implemented in a public school or educational program if . . . [t]he student’s

behavior poses an imminent danger of physical harm to self or others and as

permitted under . . . 503.070,[2] and 503.110[3] . . . .” 704 KAR 7:160 § 3(3)(a).

2
    The relevant portions of this statute state:

          (1) The use of physical force by a defendant upon another person is justifiable
              when:

                  (a) The defendant believes that such force is necessary to protect a third
                      person against the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by
                      the other person; and

                  (b) Under the circumstances as the defendant believes them to be, the
                      person whom he seeks to protect would himself have been justified
                      under KRS 503.050 and 503.060 in using such protection.

KRS 503.070(1)(a), (1)(b).
3
    The relevant portions of this statute state:

          (1) The use of physical force by a defendant upon another person is justifiable when
              the defendant is a parent, guardian, or other person entrusted with the care and
              supervision of a minor or an incompetent person or when the defendant is a
              teacher or other person entrusted with the care and supervision of a minor, for
              a special purpose, and:

                  (a) The defendant believes that the force used is necessary to promote the
                      welfare of a minor or mentally disabled person or, if the defendant’s
                      responsibility for the minor or mentally disabled person is for a special
                      purpose, to further that special purpose or maintain reasonable
                      discipline in a school, class, or other group; and

                                                   -13-
Goodall perceived Appellant’s behavior as posing an imminent danger of physical

harm to Appellant himself and to Davis if he were not subjected to limited physical

restraint to prevent escalation of the confrontation between Davis and Appellant.

If there is a genuine dispute about that in this record, we fail to see it. But the

irresponsibility of allowing an inebriated student to leave school and get behind the

wheel of his vehicle, and the attendant risk of danger to the public, is beyond

doubt. Williams v. Kentucky Dep’t of Educ., 113 S.W.3d 145, 151 (Ky. 2003)

(“[F]aculty members . . . should have foreseen that students who consumed

alcoholic beverages on the premises, then left the premises in their private vehicles

. . . were likely to be involved in an accident causing injury or death. . . . [T]hat an

alcohol-related accident actually occurred and caused the death of one of the

students was neither ‘extraordinary’ nor ‘unforeseeable.’”).

              We have examined the nature of the functions with which Goodall has

been lawfully entrusted and determine, as a matter of law, he was engaged in

carrying out a discretionary duty. There are no specific guidelines in laws or

regulations giving Goodall a clear directive how to handle a drunk student

              (b) The force that is used is not designed to cause or known to create a
                  substantial risk of causing death, serious physical injury, disfigurement,
                  extreme pain, or extreme mental distress.

KRS 503.110(1)(a), (1)(b).

                                              -14-
physically resisting school officials trying to perform their duty of assuring student

safety. Goodall complied with the general guidelines that do apply.

             This case is less like Patton and much more like Haney and Marson,

each of which also describe “a situation in which an officer performed a

governmental act that was ‘not prescribed’ or was left ‘without clear directive.’”

Patton, 529 S.W.3d at 727 (quoting Marson, 438 S.W.3d at 302).

             However, there is more to the analysis. Yanero requires discretionary

actions be undertaken in good faith. 65 S.W.3d at 522 (Immunity protects “good

faith judgment calls made in a legally uncertain environment.”). It cannot be

reasonably disputed that Goodall’s actions were within the scope of his

employment as security personnel. “Once the officer or employee has shown

prima facie that the act was performed within the scope of his/her discretionary

authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish by direct or circumstantial

evidence that the discretionary act was not performed in good faith.” Id. at 523.

“[T]here must be a causally related ‘violation of a constitutional, statutory, or other

clearly established right’ of the complainant.” Rowan Cnty. v. Sloas, 201 S.W.3d

469, 476 (Ky. 2006) (citing Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 522).

             Appellant seeks to carry the burden of proving bad faith by insisting

he never hit anyone. Our analysis of the immunity issue to this point presumes he

                                          -15-
is right. However, Appellant’s assertion that he did nothing to precipitate

Goodall’s actions is not sustained by this record.

             When Appellant was cooperating with school officials by obeying

their lawful commands, verbal interaction was all that was called for. When

Appellant chose not to obey verbal direction and tried to get past Coach Davis and

to his vehicle, he precipitated a process of decision-making by two government

officials. Doing nothing and allowing Appellant to make it to his vehicle was not a

legally wise choice. See Williams, 113 S.W.3d at 151. Coach Davis effectuated

the least restrictive touching to stop and redirect Appellant in a manner not even

categorized as physical restraint under the applicable regulation. If Appellant had

obeyed Coach Davis’s combined physical and verbal redirection to safety, the

episode would have ended with no one harmed. But Appellant chose to resist.

             When Appellant refused to obey Coach Davis’s physical and verbal

redirection into the offices, he precipitated the next level of decision-making by

these government officials. Goodall, knowing that Appellant had engaged in

fighting in school earlier in the year, did not immediately attempt a standing upper

body torso assist but, in accordance with recent training, attempted to redirect

Appellant with a bicep assist. If Appellant had accepted that assistance and

entered the Assistant Principals’ offices, again, the episode would have ended.

                                        -16-
Appellant continued to resist. Appellant’s actions brought on the next level of

decision-making for these officials.

             Only after Appellant’s repeated determination, in a drunken state of

being, to make it to his vehicle did Goodall turn to the standing upper torso assist

to get Appellant into the Assistant Principals’ offices – the place designated in

Appellant’s IEP as a safe space. But Appellant resisted again; he refused to go to

his safe space.

             The three individuals fell to the floor of the school hallway because of

Appellant’s actions. He does not dispute Goodall’s own injuries from that fall.

Appellant was charged as a juvenile with Alcohol Intoxication in a Public Place

and Assault. (R. 357 (Commonwealth v. Carpenter, No. 20-J-700046-001

(Jefferson Dist. Ct. Feb. 17, 2021) (Court Docket))). Those charges were

dismissed with prejudice but not before Appellant stipulated to probable cause.

(Id.).

             Stipulating probable cause does not eliminate a genuine dispute over

the fact, one way or the other, whether Appellant struck Goodall. Craycroft v.

Pippin, 245 S.W.3d 804, 806 (Ky. App. 2008). But it did inform the circuit court,

and now persuades this Court, that acknowledgment of probable cause that he

committed assault supports a ruling that Goodall’s actions were not unreasonable

and, therefore, not bad faith. The material fact that matters is whether Appellant

                                         -17-
resisted efforts to direct him to his safe space in the Assistant Principals’ offices.

There is no genuine issue regarding that material fact. He admits he did.

              If qualified official immunity protects public employees from “bad

guesses in gray areas” as said in Rasche v. Berman, 491 S.W.3d 182, 189 (Ky.

App. 2016), it certainly must protect public officials from unsupported claims of

bad guesses. See also Sloas, 201 S.W.3d at 475 (“[Q]ualified immunity protects

all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted)).

             Appellant’s representation of the facts does not demonstrate Goodall

acted in bad faith. His interpretation of the events as bad faith conduct is not

evidentiary but conclusory, uncorroborated, and refuted by the record.

             Consequently, the circuit court did not err when it determined Goodall

enjoyed qualified immunity as to Appellant’s battery claim.

JCPS Investigator’s Report Attachments.

             Next, Appellant claims the circuit court erred when it failed to exclude

certain exhibits during the summary judgment hearing because the evidence was

inadmissible hearsay. The evidence Appellant challenges is a “JCPS Compliance

and Investigations Report” and two attached unsworn statements. We decline to

address this argument for two reasons.

                                          -18-
             First, the applicable rule in this Court requires that every brief

“contain at the beginning of the argument a statement with reference to the record

showing whether the issue was properly preserved for review and, if so, in what

manner.” Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 76.12(4)(c)(v). Appellant

failed to do that. “If a party fails to inform the appellate court of where in the

record his issue is preserved, the appellate court can treat that issue as

unpreserved.” Ford v. Commonwealth, 628 S.W.3d 147, 155 (Ky. 2021). We treat

this argument as unpreserved.

             Second, this Court’s de novo review of the immunity question did not

consider the evidence of which Appellant complains. We reached the conclusion

Goodall was entitled to immunity and, therefore, summary judgment was properly

granted on that issue. As for its evidentiary value in the administrative proceeding,

the unsworn statements were cumulative of other evidence.

Appellant’s School Suspension.

             Lastly, Appellant argues the circuit court erred by granting summary

judgment in favor of Appellees in conjunction with the review of Appellant’s

administrative suspension. Appellant advances two arguments here.

             First, Appellant argues he was denied due process because he did not

receive timely written notice of his suspension. We are unpersuaded. The record

                                          -19-
shows the day after his suspension, Appellant’s counsel initiated an appeal.

Appellant had actual notice but also waived any objection by initiating the appeal.

             Second, Appellant argues he was suspended solely because of his

alleged commission of a third-degree assault and that dismissal of that charge

removed all the basis for the suspension. Again, we are not persuaded.

             When reviewing a school’s decision to suspend a student, the standard

of review is whether the school’s decision was arbitrary and not supported by the

substantial evidence. Fankhauser v. Cobb, 163 S.W.3d 389, 400-01 (Ky. 2005).

Pursuant to KRS 158.150(1), students may be suspended for “use of profanity or

vulgarity,” “use or possession of alcohol or drugs,” and “abuse of school

personnel[.]” KRS 158.150(1). The school had more than substantial evidence to

support the suspension. Multiple officials gave consistent evidence, as

memorialized by the JCPS official report, supporting the facts of Appellant’s

intoxication, his own admission of profanity, and his altercation that led to

Goodall’s suffering a cut to his forehead and a black eye.

             The record shows there is substantial evidence supporting Appellant’s

suspension, notwithstanding the prosecutor’s decision to drop formal charges a

year later. The school’s decision was not arbitrary even when considering all the

evidence in a light most favorable to Appellant.

                                         -20-
            The circuit court did not err when granting summary judgment in

favor of Appellees on this claim.

                                    CONCLUSION

            For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Jefferson Circuit Court order

granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees.

            ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                    BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:

Andrew E. Mize                           Mark S. Fenzel
Louisville, Kentucky                     Kevin L. Chlarson
                                         Louisville, Kentucky

                                       -21-