Court Opinion

ID: 9941701
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 19:02:08.810294+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:56.870408
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12045   Document: 54-1    Date Filed: 02/16/2024   Page: 1 of 51

                                                           [PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 22-12045
                         ____________________

        JENNIFER AKRIDGE,
                                                    Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        ALFA INSURANCE COMPANIES,

                                                           Defendant,

        ALFA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,

                                                  Defendant-Appellee.

                         ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-12045

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Alabama
                       D.C. Docket No. 2:17-cv-00372-JTA
                            ____________________

        Before GRANT, ABUDU, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
        HULL, Circuit Judge:
               Plaintiﬀ Jennifer Akridge appeals the entry of summary
        judgment for her former employer, defendant Alfa Mutual
        Insurance Company, on her claim brought under the Americans
        with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Akridge
        contends Alfa discriminated against her by terminating her to avoid
        paying healthcare costs related to her multiple sclerosis (“MS”) and
        severe migraines. Akridge stresses that Alfa self insures for medical
        plans.
               Alfa responds that after most of Akridge’s duties became
        automated, her position was no longer needed, and Alfa eliminated
        it to cut business expenses. Alfa’s medical plan was administered
        by a third party, BlueCross BlueShield (“BCBS”). Alfa argues there
        is no evidence Alfa’s decisionmakers knew Akridge’s healthcare
        costs.
              Additionally, Akridge asserts that she is not required to show
        her disability was a but-for cause of her termination but may
        simply show it was a motivating factor. Akridge also appeals the
        award of $1,918 in discovery sanctions in favor of Alfa.
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        22-12045               Opinion of the Court                         3

               After review, and with the beneﬁt of oral argument, we
        aﬃrm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Alfa and the
        sanctions award of $1,918 against Akridge.
                          I.   FACTUAL BACKGROUND
                Because Akridge was the non-moving party at summary
        judgment, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to her
        and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. Crane v. Lifemark
        Hosps., Inc., 898 F.3d 1130, 1133-34 (11th Cir. 2018). When factual
        conﬂicts arise, we must credit the non-moving party’s version.
        Feliciano v. City of Mia. Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1252 (11th Cir. 2013).
        A. Akridge’s Employment at Alfa
              In 1989, Akridge began working at Alfa, an insurance
        company. In 1993, Akridge was diagnosed with MS and began
        suﬀering from severe migraines.
               By 2015, Akridge was promoted to a strategic coordinator
        position in Alfa’s auto underwriting department. Akridge’s
        primary task concerned the strategic underwriting program, in
        which she worked with Alfa’s agents and district managers to
        identify proﬁtable policies for struggling agents.
                Akridge also (1) prepared a monthly strategic underwriting
        report for that program; (2) created manuals for auto and
        watercraft underwriting; (3) veriﬁed proofs of insurance for
        lawsuits with auto claims; (4) assisted with rate ﬁlings for the state
        insurance department; and (5) taught workshops for agents and
        district managers.
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        4                     Opinion of the Court                22-12045

               By all accounts, Akridge excelled at her job, with excellent
        performance reviews. In the mid-nineties, Alfa named her
        employee of the year. Akridge estimated that she reduced Alfa’s
        losses by $2 million in her ﬁrst nine months as coordinator of the
        strategic auto underwriting program.
               Alfa was self-insured and paid the healthcare costs of its
        employees. Akridge estimated that it cost Alfa between
        $10,000 and $12,000 per month to treat her MS and migraines.
        While it was common knowledge at Alfa that Akridge had MS, no
        one at Alfa ever said anything to Akridge about her healthcare
        costs.
        B. Guidewire
               Between 2012 and 2016, Alfa developed Guidewire, a new
        computer program that “changed how [Alfa] d[id] business”
        because it automated certain capabilities. Among other things,
        Guidewire enabled agents and district managers to access the
        strategic underwriting information that Akridge previously
        gathered and distributed. Alfa estimated Guidewire would cost
        $90 million to develop, but it ultimately cost between $150 and
        $160 million.
        C. Decisionmakers and the Decision to Terminate Akridge
              In 2016, Akridge’s chain of command was as follows: (1) her
        immediate supervisor was Robert Plaster, Director of
        Underwriting Services; (2) Plaster reported to Beth Chancey, Vice
        President of Property and Casualty Operations; and (3) Chancey
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        22-12045              Opinion of the Court                        5

        reported to Tommy Coshatt, Senior Vice President of Property and
        Casualty Underwriting (collectively the “decisionmakers”).
               The decisionmakers discussed eliminating Akridge’s
        position for one to two weeks before her termination. They
        ultimately decided to terminate Akridge because some of her
        responsibilities were now automated and other responsibilities that
        could not be automated were absorbed by other employees.
        Akridge’s non-automated responsibilities were given “to other
        people in the department that had been doing those [tasks] as well.”
        Chancey testiﬁed that Alfa did not have enough spare
        responsibilities to combine with these non-automated duties to
        keep Akridge’s position or create a new one for her.
               Regarding automation, the decisionmakers testiﬁed that
        Alfa had automated the strategic underwriting program, including
        the report Akridge created. Essentially, Akridge’s interaction with
        agents and district managers using information from the strategic
        underwriting report became an automated “pull and a self-service
        functionality,” allowing agents and district managers in the ﬁeld to
        access that information themselves.
               Plaster, Akridge’s direct supervisor, characterized this
        responsibility as the “major portion of [Akridge’s] job” that was
        now automated, and that her remaining responsibilities were
        “minor parts, very small.” Akridge conﬁrmed that “[w]orking with
        the agents and district managers” using “data from the reports was
        the majority of [her] day.” As for Akridge’s workshops, Chancey
        testiﬁed that they were meant to introduce agents to the strategic
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        6                     Opinion of the Court               22-12045

        underwriting report and were no longer needed after the agents
        became familiar with the report because they could direct
        questions to their supervisors. Coshatt and Plaster also testiﬁed
        that Alfa increased webinars and eLearning instead of relying on
        Akridge’s workshops.
               Having made their decision, but prior to terminating
        Akridge, the decisionmakers spoke with Susan White, who worked
        in Alfa’s human resources (“HR”) department. White was not
        involved in the decision to terminate Akridge. White only advised
        the decisionmakers on the administrative steps of terminating
        Akridge, including drafting a severance agreement and calculating
        her ﬁnal paycheck. Akridge’s disabilities did not come up during
        these conversations.
               In December 2016, Coshatt and Plaster informed Akridge in
        person that Alfa was eliminating her position eﬀective immediately
        due to the expense of developing Guidewire and in the interest of
        cutting business expenses companywide. During this meeting,
        Coshatt and Plaster did not mention Akridge’s disabilities or
        healthcare costs.
              They also provided Akridge with Alfa’s standard severance
        agreement and general release. Below the signature lines, the
        agreement had a handwritten notation designating Scott Forrest as
        who would sign on behalf of Alfa. Forrest was Alfa’s Senior Vice
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        22-12045               Opinion of the Court                          7

        President of Human Resources and Facilities. 1 Forrest signed all
        employee releases, which included a waiver for ADA claims.
        Akridge did not sign the severance agreement.
               After being terminated, Akridge wished to remain at Alfa,
        but she did not apply to any open positions. Akridge asked Al Dees,
        Vice President of Marketing, if he could create a new position for
        her. Dees told Akridge that he already had created marketing
        positions for two other employees from the underwriting
        department whose positions were eliminated, and he could not
        create another position for her. At the time of her termination,
        there were no openings in the underwriting department. White on
        her own reviewed openings in other departments, but she did not
        think Akridge’s skills would be a good ﬁt.
        D. Knowledge of Healthcare Costs
               As background, here is how Alfa’s self-insurance plan
        worked. Alfa paid BCBS to administer its health insurance plan.
        BCBS sent Alfa a weekly bill for the total amount of Alfa’s
        employees’ healthcare costs, and Alfa wired that amount to BCBS.
        The BCBS bill gave a total amount of healthcare costs, did not list
        individual healthcare costs by employee, and did not note high
        healthcare costs, for example, if an employee had an expensive
        surgery.

        1 Since Akridge’s termination, Forrest has become Alfa’s Executive Vice
        President of Administration.
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        8                     Opinion of the Court                22-12045

               Forrest was the BCBS contact for Alfa. Forrest was aware of
        amendments to Alfa’s health insurance plan, but he would not
        know how any amendment aﬀected an individual employee. BCBS
        owned another entity, Prime, which made some decisions about
        drug coverage under Alfa’s health insurance plan without Alfa’s
        involvement.
              Alfa did not maintain information about individual
        employees’ healthcare costs. Instead, BCBS stored the individual
        healthcare costs of Alfa employees in a system separate from Alfa.
        White testiﬁed that Holly Dean and Kate Taylor, members of Alfa’s
        HR beneﬁts team, had access to the BCBS system, but White did
        not have such access. In their aﬃdavits, Dean and Taylor
        conﬁrmed that although they had access to the BCBS system, they
        had not used this access to view any individual employee’s
        healthcare costs.
               Akridge contends that the true reason for her ﬁring was the
        high cost of treating her MS and migraines. Akridge asserts the
        fact that she was ﬁred instead of demoted or transferred within Alfa
        evinces that true reason. Akridge also testiﬁed that she believed
        Forrest was ultimately responsible for her termination. Akridge
        stated that, as the head of HR, Forrest had access to what BCBS
        paid for her healthcare costs, which Akridge contended Forrest
        gave to the decisionmakers. However, Akridge admitted that she
        did not know whether Forrest actually accessed her healthcare
        costs and communicated them to the decisionmakers. Akridge
        stated that she simply believed he did because (1) she was
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        22-12045                  Opinion of the Court                              9

        ultimately terminated and (2) her healthcare costs were higher than
        the average employee.
               Akridge also noted that within approximately two years
        prior to her termination, Alfa once, and maybe twice, told
        employees to go to the doctor only if medically necessary and that
        rising healthcare costs aﬀected the healthcare premiums of all Alfa
        employees. Nine months after her termination, BCBS informed
        Akridge that her Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
        (“COBRA”)2 insurance would no longer cover her particular
        migraine medication due to its cost. BCBS informed Akridge that
        she would need to contact Alfa about her change in coverage.
              Akridge also produced a document titled “Group
        Reporting” from “BlueCross BlueShield of Alabama.” The
        document lists a “billing” amount and a corresponding “payment”
        amount for healthcare costs in 2009 for certain employees, but not
        for Akridge. Some of the higher payments appear highlighted or
        otherwise marked, including payments of $18,890, $6,501.67, and
        $56,235. A $34.68 charge is also marked.
               In her aﬃdavit, Dean, Alfa’s HR Beneﬁts Manager, described
        a similar document from 2016 that Alfa received from BCBS. The
        2016 document identiﬁed another Alfa employee with MS who was
        not Akridge and that employee’s healthcare costs. Dean stated that

        2 COBRA entitles employees to a continuation of their healthcare coverage for

        a period of time post-termination. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161, 1163(2); Cummings v.
        Wash. Mut., 650 F.3d 1386, 1389-90 (11th Cir. 2011).
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        10                    Opinion of the Court                 22-12045

        (1) the 2016 document was prepared by BCBS as part of its annual
        “Renewal Analysis” and sent to Alfa; (2) Alfa did not determine
        what information would be included in BCBS’s analysis; and
        (3) Alfa had not requested this document.
               While the three decisionmakers, Plaster, Chancey, and
        Coshatt, knew of Akridge’s disabilities, each expressly denied
        knowing her, or any other employee’s, healthcare costs. White and
        Forrest also denied knowing any individual employee’s healthcare
        costs.
        E. Akridge’s Proﬀered Comparators
               Akridge proﬀered several non-disabled employees who she
        asserts were similarly situated to her in the underwriting
        department but were not terminated. First, Akridge presented
        Hillery McCaleb. Akridge and McCaleb both “worked with agents
        who were not proﬁtable,” “handled manuals for [their] respective
        areas[,] and worked with the state insurance department in ﬁling
        the manual and changes to it.” Akridge admits, however, that
        McCaleb “worked on the property/home side” of the
        underwriting department, while Akridge “worked on the auto
        side.”
              Further, Coshatt testiﬁed that Akridge had responsibilities in
        auto underwriting that Alfa automated, but McCaleb’s work in
        homeowner underwriting had not become as automated.
        According to Coshatt, McCaleb performed other special projects in
        the homeowner underwriting department that could not be
        automated.
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        22-12045               Opinion of the Court                      11

               Second, Akridge proﬀered these ﬁve employees as
        comparators: Becky Roper, Kim Byrom, Brennan Goray, Teri
        Williams, and Sonya McInvale. These employees worked in the
        underwriting department, but Akridge did not know their job titles
        or the general work they performed.
               Chancey testiﬁed that these ﬁve employees worked under
        her chain of command. Chancey stated that these employees
        developed and implemented Guidewire. Chancey explained that
        “[w]hat [Akridge] was doing was totally diﬀerent than what this
        team was doing,” and Akridge’s responsibilities with the strategic
        underwriting program were automated and her remaining
        responsibilities were absorbed by others. When asked whether
        anything distinguished these ﬁve employees from Akridge, Coshatt
        testiﬁed that Akridge’s responsibilities were automated to a greater
        extent.
                         II.   PROCEDURAL HISTORY
        A. Akridge’s Amended Complaint
               In her amended complaint, Akridge alleged that Alfa
        violated the ADA by terminating her. Akridge claimed that Alfa
        discriminated against her based on her disability by ﬁring her to
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        12                        Opinion of the Court                       22-12045

        avoid paying her healthcare costs. Akridge sought compensatory
        and punitive damages, costs, and reasonable attorney’s fees.
        B. Depositions and Discovery Disputes
              Akridge deposed Coshatt, Chancey, and Plaster. Akridge
        also deposed White twice as Alfa’s designated corporate
        representative under Rule 30(b)(6). 3
              After White’s ﬁrst deposition, the court determined that
        White was unable to answer certain questions outlined in Akridge’s
        Rule 30(b)(6) notice. 4 The court extended the discovery period to
        allow Akridge to depose again a corporate representative under
        Rule 30(b)(6). Alfa again designated White as its representative.
        Akridge took White’s second deposition as Alfa’s Rule 30(b)(6)
        representative.
               Several times, Akridge moved to compel the deposition of
        Scott Forrest, the head of HR. The court denied each motion. In
        a sworn declaration, Forrest denied any role in Akridge’s
        termination. Consequently, the court found that Forrest’s
        testimony “[wa]s no more than minimally relevant” and that

        3 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may notice an individual

        for deposition under Rule 30(b)(1), while “Rule 30(b)(6) is the principal
        mechanism for deposing entities.” Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Brown, 69 F.4th
        1321, 1324 n.1 (11th Cir. 2023). For brevity, we refer to these as Rule 30(b)(1)
        and Rule 30(b)(6).
        4 At the outset of the case, the parties consented to have a magistrate judge

        conduct all proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Throughout, we refer to the
        magistrate judge as “the court.”
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        22-12045               Opinion of the Court                        13

        compelling his deposition was “disproportional to the needs of the
        case” because Akridge could depose Plaster, Chancey, and Coshatt,
        the decisionmakers.
               After Akridge produced documents indicating that Forrest
        had responsibilities over Alfa’s health insurance plan, the court
        found that Akridge still failed to show that Forrest had knowledge
        of her termination, and it denied Akridge’s ﬁnal motion to compel
        Forrest’s deposition.
        C. Summary Judgment and First Appeal
               Ultimately, the court entered summary judgment in favor of
        Alfa. The court determined that (1) none of Akridge’s comparators
        were similarly situated and (2) her evidence was insuﬃcient for a
        reasonable jury to infer that she was ﬁred because of her healthcare
        costs. The court observed that none of Akridge’s evidence
        indicated that the decisionmakers knew her individual healthcare
        costs.
               Akridge appealed. In that prior appeal, this Court reversed
        the denial of Akridge’s motion to compel Forrest’s deposition,
        vacated the summary judgment, and remanded for Akridge to take
        Forrest’s deposition. Akridge v. Alfa Mut. Ins., 1 F.4th 1271,
        1278 (11th Cir. 2021). We did not reach the summary judgment
        issue. As to Forrest’s deposition, we explained that Forrest’s role at
        Alfa and his access to health insurance information “are relevant
        and thus suﬃcient to make his testimony discoverable.” Id. at 1277.
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12045

        D. Discovery Dispute on Remand and Sanctions
               On remand, Akridge noticed Forrest for deposition
        individually under Rule 30(b)(1) and as Alfa’s corporate
        representative under Rule 30(b)(6). Alfa responded that Forrest was
        available for deposition in his individual capacity, but it declined to
        designate Forrest to testify as Alfa’s corporate representative under
        Rule 30(b)(6).
               Akridge, nonetheless, ﬁled a motion to compel Alfa to
        produce Forrest for a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition and for sanctions.
        Alfa countered with its own motion for sanctions.
               At a hearing on the motions, the court pointed out that this
        Court’s opinion in the initial appeal did not mention Rule 30(b)(6)
        and that a party seeking a corporation’s deposition under that rule
        could not designate the representative to testify on the
        corporation’s behalf. The court denied Akridge’s motion to
        compel Forrest as a Rule 30(b)(6) witness and granted in part Alfa’s
        sanctions motion, awarding reasonable expenses incurred in
        opposing Akridge’s motion.
        E. Forrest’s Deposition
               Akridge then deposed Forrest individually, who testiﬁed as
        follows. He was not involved in the decision to terminate Akridge.
        Rather, the Executive Vice President of each department at Alfa
        was responsible for decisions to terminate or eliminate positions.
        As the Senior Vice President of HR, Forrest could have eliminated
        jobs or terminated an employee only if they worked in the
        compensation, beneﬁts, or HR department.
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        22-12045              Opinion of the Court                       15

               Coshatt and White told Forrest that Akridge’s position was
        eliminated and that Plaster, Chancey, and Coshatt were involved in
        that decision. Forrest did not ask Coshatt how much money Alfa
        saved by eliminating Akridge’s salary and medical costs. Alfa did
        not have a general policy of transferring employees whose
        positions were eliminated to diﬀerent positions in the company.
               Forrest further testiﬁed that Alfa did not maintain the
        individual healthcare costs of its employees because that
        information was stored at BCBS. BCBS sent Alfa the total
        employee-medical costs, but this information was not broken down
        by employee. Forrest was the contact for Alfa’s BCBS plan and
        spoke with BCBS once a year. Forrest did not know of any health
        insurance beneﬁts that were excluded from its plan by BCBS or
        Alfa since 2015.
               Following his promotion in 2016 to Executive Vice
        President, Forrest was given responsibility over Alfa’s accounting,
        ﬁnance, and investment departments. Since 2016, Alfa eliminated
        (1) 10 positions in its accounting department and (2) a signiﬁcant
        number of positions in the investments department, including by
        closing its real estate investment department.
        F. Second Summary Judgment Motion
               Alfa ﬁled its second motion for summary judgment, which
        the court granted. First, the court rejected Akridge’s argument that
        she could pursue her ADA claim under the mixed-motive theory in
        the Title VII decision of Qui v. Thomas County School District,
        814 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2016). The court pointed to a subsequent
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        16                    Opinion of the Court                22-12045

        unpublished decision, Barber v. Cellco Partnership, 808 F. App’x
        929 (11th Cir. 2020), in which this Court explained that the
        mixed-motive theory, discussed in Qui, did not apply to ADA
        actions. As a result, the court concluded that Akridge had to show
        her disability was a but-for cause of her termination and not merely
        a motivating factor for that decision.
               Second, the court found that Akridge failed to establish a
        prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA
        because she did not present a proper comparator. The court
        concluded that (1) McCaleb was not a proper comparator because
        her job functions were not automated and she worked in a diﬀerent
        underwriting department (homeowner underwriting) with
        diﬀerent responsibilities than Akridge and (2) Roper, Byrom,
        Goray, Williams, and McInvale were not proper comparators
        because Akridge did not present evidence that they had job
        functions similar to hers.
               Third, the court noted that even if Akridge established a
        prima facie case, her evidence failed to show that Alfa’s reason for
        ﬁring her—that her position was no longer needed and it wished to
        cut business expenses—was pretext for disability discrimination.
        The court explained that each decisionmaker testiﬁed that
        Akridge’s position was no longer necessary and there was no
        evidence that her disability aﬀected the decision to eliminate her
        position.
              Fourth, the court determined Akridge’s circumstantial
        evidence did not create a convincing mosaic that would allow a jury
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        22-12045                Opinion of the Court                         17

        to infer intentional disability discrimination. The court concluded
        that (1) while Akridge was ﬁred and not transferred to a new
        position, she admitted she never applied to an open position at Alfa
        and (2) the decisionmakers testiﬁed that they were unaware of
        Akridge’s healthcare costs.
                        III.    STANDARDS OF REVIEW
               We review de novo a grant of summary judgment. See Crane,
        898 F.3d at 1133-34. We also review for an abuse of discretion an
        award of sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. Serra
        Chevrolet, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 446 F.3d 1137, 1146-47 (11th Cir.
        2006).
                         IV.    AKRIDGE’S ADA CLAIMS
               The ADA bars employers from “discriminat[ing] against a
        qualiﬁed individual on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
        On appeal, Akridge challenges the entry of summary judgment on
        her claim that Alfa discriminated against her by terminating her to
        avoid paying her high healthcare costs.
              Akridge does not challenge the court’s ﬁnding that she
        presented no direct evidence of disability discrimination.
        Therefore, we examine whether she established a prima facie case.
               When evaluating an ADA claim, we use the same McDonnell
        Douglas burden-shifting framework that often applies in Title VII
        claims. Todd v. Fayette Cnty. Sch. Dist., 998 F.3d 1203, 1215 (11th Cir.
        2021); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
        In the absence of direct evidence, this framework allows the
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12045

        plaintiﬀ to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination
        using circumstantial evidence. Todd, 998 F.3d at 1215. If the
        employee is successful in making a prima facie case, the burden of
        production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,
        non-discriminatory reason for its decision. Id. at 1216. The burden
        then shifts back to the employee to present suﬃcient evidence
        creating a genuine issue of material fact that the employer’s reason
        is pretext for discrimination. Id.
               An ADA plaintiﬀ establishes a prima facie case by showing
        (1) she has a disability; (2) she is a qualiﬁed individual under the
        ADA; and (3) the employer discriminated against her “on the basis
        of disability.” See Beasley v. O’Reilly Auto Parts, 69 F.4th 744,
        754 (11th Cir. 2023); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Alfa does not dispute
        that Akridge meets these ﬁrst two prongs, so we discuss only the
        third prong.
        A. But-For Causation Prong
               To begin, we set forth three principles about the statutory
        language “on the basis of disability” in § 12112(a) and the level of
        causation it requires.
               First, our Court has long understood the ADA as imposing
        a “but-for” causation standard—that is, an adverse employment
        action would not have occurred but for the plaintiﬀ’s disability. See,
        e.g., McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1076 (11th Cir.
        1996); Holly v. Clairson Indus., L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247, 1263 n.17 (11th
        Cir. 2007). In 2008, however, Congress amended the ADA’s causal
        language to prohibit discrimination “on the basis of disability”
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        22-12045                Opinion of the Court                          19

        instead of “because of ” disability. See ADA Amendments Act of
        2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 5, 122 Stat. 3553. We have yet to
        address the impact, if any, of this amendment.
               Several circuits have concluded that this amended
        language—“on the basis of ”—invokes but-for causation. See
        Natofsky v. City of New York, 921 F.3d 337, 349 (2d Cir. 2019) (“We
        ﬁnd no reason to hold that there is any meaningful diﬀerence
        between ‘on the basis of,’ ‘because of,’ or ‘based on,’ which would
        require courts to use a causation standard other than ‘but-for.’”);
        Gentry v. E. W. Partners Club Mgmt. Co., 816 F.3d 228, 235-36 (4th Cir.
        2016) (“We see no ‘meaningful textual diﬀerence’ between [‘on the
        basis of ’] and the terms ‘because of,’ ‘by reason of,’ or ‘based on.’”);
        Murray v. Mayo Clinic, 934 F.3d 1101, 1106 & n.6 (9th Cir. 2019)
        (“We ﬁnd no meaningful textual diﬀerence in the two phrases with
        respect to causation.”); Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d
        312, 315, 321 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (recognizing the
        2008 amendments to the ADA and holding that the ADA requires
        but-for cause).
               Furthermore, the Supreme Court has instructed that “[t]his
        ancient and simple ‘but for’ common law causation test . . . supplies
        the ‘default’ or ‘background’ rule against which Congress is
        normally presumed to have legislated,” including for “federal
        antidiscrimination laws . . . .” Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr.
        Am.-Owned Media, 589 U.S. ----, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1014 (2020). And
        the particular phrase “on the basis of” is “strongly suggestive of a
        but-for causation standard.” Id. at 1016 (quotation marks omitted);
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        20                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12045

        see also Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 213 (2014) (“Our
        insistence on but-for causality has not been restricted to statutes
        using the term ‘because of.’ We have, for instance, observed that
        in common talk, the phrase ‘based on’ indicates a but-for causal
        relationship.” (cleaned up)).
              We agree with our sister circuits and hold that the switch
        from “because of ” to “on the basis of ” in the 2008 amendment to
        the ADA did not change or aﬀect its but-for causation standard.
               Second, we recognize that Akridge argues that she is not
        required to show her disability was a but-for cause of her
        termination but may simply show it was “a motivating factor.” We
        disagree.
                This motivating-factor causation standard located in Title
        VII is distinct from, and “more forgiving” than, a but-for standard,
        as “liability can sometimes follow even if [a protected trait] wasn’t
        a but-for cause of the employer’s challenged decision.” Bostock v.
        Clayton Cnty., 590 U.S. 644, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1740 (2020). In contrast,
        but-for causation requires an employee to show that a cause was
        outcome determinative, meaning that “a particular outcome
        would not have happened ‘but for’ the purported cause.” Id. at
        1739.
               The problem for Akridge is that the employee-friendly,
        motivating-factor standard does not apply to ADA claims, as this
        standard is drawn directly from the text of Title VII. See Title VII
        of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, as
        amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
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        22-12045                  Opinion of the Court                             21

        § 107, 105 Stat. 1071; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (“[A]n unlawful
        employment practice is established when the complaining party
        demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was
        a motivating factor for any employment practice . . . .”) (emphasis
        added).      Because the ADA does not contain similar
        motivating-factor language, Akridge cannot resort to this lesser
        showing. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009)
        (holding “a motivating factor” causation standard did not apply to
        claims brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
        (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a), because, “[u]nlike Title VII, the
        ADEA’s text does not provide that a plaintiﬀ may establish
        discrimination by showing that age was simply a motivating
        factor”); Comcast Corp., 140 S. Ct. at 1017-18 (declining to extend
        this motivating-factor standard to claims brought under 42 U.S.C.
        § 1981 because of the distinct histories of Title VII and § 1981 and
        the absence of this motivating-factor language in § 1981). 5
               Even as to Title VII, the Supreme Court has pointed out that
        Congress chose to place a motivating factor language in only a
        subset of Title VII claims and not as to other Title VII claims, such
        as retaliation, which still use but-for causation. See Univ. of Tex. Sw.
        Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 353, 362 (2013).

        5 For similar reasons, this Court recently held that the proper causation

        standard for a retaliation claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act,
        29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2), is but-for causation, not motivating-factor causation.
        Lapham v. Walgreen Co., 88 F.4th 879, 890-893 (11th Cir. 2023).
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        22                        Opinion of the Court                     22-12045

               Notably too, when Congress added “a motivating factor”
        language to Title VII, it contemporaneously amended the ADA
        without including this lesser standard. See Civil Rights Act of 1991,
        Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 107, 109, 105 Stat. 1071; see also Gross,
        557 U.S. at 174 (noting Congress amended the ADEA alongside
        Title VII but did not add this motivating-factor standard to the
        ADEA); Comcast Corp., 140 S. Ct. at 1017-18 (noting Congress
        contemporaneously amended Title VII and § 1981, “[b]ut nowhere
        in its amendments to § 1981 did Congress so much as whisper
        about motivating factors”). For these reasons, we hold that a
        plaintiﬀ may not pursue an ADA discrimination claim by showing
        “a motivating factor” causation but must show but-for causation.
               To be complete, we note that Akridge relies on our decision
        in Qui. But Qui was a Title VII case and had nothing to do with
        the ADA. The Qui court simply explained how McDonnell Douglas
        in a Title VII case was not the proper framework for evaluating
        mixed-motive claims that rely on circumstantial evidence.6 Qui,
        814 F.3d at 1232-33, 1236-40.

        6 An employee presents a Title VII claim under a “mixed-motive” theory when

        she alleges both legitimate and discriminatory reasons were motivating factors
        for an adverse employment action. Gross, 557 U.S. at 171; see also Quigg,
        814 F.3d at 1235 (“An employee can succeed on a mixed-motive claim by
        showing that illegal bias . . . was a motivating factor for an adverse
        employment action, even though other factors also motivated the action.”
        (quotation marks omitted)). Single-motive claims require the employee to
        show that an impermissible consideration “was the true reason for the adverse
        action.” Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1235.
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        22-12045               Opinion of the Court                       23

               Third, Akridge’s reliance on Farley v. Nationwide Mutual
        Insurance Co., 197 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 1999), is also misplaced. Our
        Farley decision conﬁrmed that the ADA required “but-for”
        causation. Let’s examine the context too.
                In Farley, the jury found that the employer violated the ADA
        when it terminated a disabled employee. 197 F.3d at 1326. The
        district court had instructed the jury that discrimination could be
        shown if disability was “a motivating factor.” Id. at 1330, 1333-34,
        1334 n.5 (quotation marks omitted). On appeal, the defendant
        employer argued that the district court erred by not instructing the
        jury that disability must be the sole reason for the employee’s
        termination, that is, “the motivating factor.” Id. at 1334 (quotation
        marks omitted).
               Under plain error review, the Farley court held that “using
        ‘but-for’ language would have been a clearer exposition of the law,”
        but the instruction’s use of motivating factor language “d[id] not
        rise to the level of a plain error so fundamental as to aﬀect the
        fairness of the proceedings.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). This
        was because an ADA plaintiﬀ could have more than one but-for
        cause for her termination, and the employer had argued for a
        sole-reason instruction.
               The Farley Court explained (1) that “‘[a] motiving factor’
        [wa]s synonymous with a ‘determinative factor’” or “a factor which
        ‘made a diﬀerence in the outcome,’” and (2) that disability must be
        shown to be “a determinative, rather than the sole,
        decision-making factor.” Id. (quoting McNely, 99 F.3d at 1077).
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        24                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12045

        Although Farley used the phrase “a motivating factor,” it did so in
        reference to the district court’s jury instructions, not in reference
        to the text of Title VII. See id. Farley never mentions Title VII’s
        motivating-factor standard and does not tie the ADA’s but-for
        standard to Title VII’s lower standard.
               Recent Supreme Court decisions made clear that Title VII’s
        motivating-factor standard is distinct from, and “more forgiving”
        than, the but-for cause standard. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739-40; see
        also Gross, 557 U.S. at 174 (holding a motivating-factor standard
        could not apply to an ADEA claim because “the ADEA’s text does
        not provide that a plaintiﬀ may establish discrimination by showing
        that age was simply a motivating factor”); Comcast Corp., 140 S. Ct.
        at 1017-18 (same regarding § 1981).
        B. Akridge’s Prima Facie Case
               With these principles, we return to whether Akridge
        established the “on the basis of disability” prong of a prima facie
        case under the ADA. Akridge’s claim that she was discriminated
        against based on her disability-related healthcare costs is necessarily
        a claim of disparate treatment.            See Akridge, 1 F.4th at
        1274 (characterizing Akridge’s claim in her prior appeal as one for
        “disparate treatment” under the ADA). In other words, Akridge
        argues that Alfa treated her diﬀerently than non-disabled
        employees by terminating her due to her high disability-related
        healthcare costs.
              The ADA’s text “require[s] a plaintiﬀ alleging disparate
        treatment to prove that [s]he was treated less favorably than a
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        22-12045               Opinion of the Court                         25

        similarly situated, non-disabled person.” Sailboat Bend Sober Living,
        LLC v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 46 F.4th 1268, 1275-76, 1278 (11th Cir.
        2022) (concluding the phrase “discriminate against,” as used in
        several federal antidiscrimination laws including the ADA and the
        Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f ), refers to diﬀerences
        in treatment that injure protected individuals); see also Schwarz v.
        City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1216 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting
        in the context of a FHA claim that, “[a]s its name suggests, a
        disparate treatment claim requires a plaintiﬀ to show that [s]he has
        actually been treated diﬀerently than similarly situated
        non-handicapped people”).
              First, Akridge presents McCaleb as a comparator. Both
        worked to help unproﬁtable agents, handled manuals, and worked
        with state insurance department ﬁlings. Akridge acknowledges,
        however, that they worked in diﬀerent areas of underwriting;
        undisputedly, McCaleb “worked on the property/home side” of
        the underwriting department, while Akridge “worked on the auto
        side.” Coshatt further testiﬁed that home underwriting was
        automated to a lesser extent than auto underwriting, and that
        McCaleb’s special projects relating to home underwriting could not
        be automated.
               Second, Akridge presents, as comparators, Roper, Williams,
        McInvale, Byrom, and Goray. Akridge argues that these employees
        worked in the underwriting department and were aﬀected by the
        implementation of the Guidewire system but were demoted
        instead of terminated. Akridge, however, did not know these
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        26                     Opinion of the Court                 22-12045

        employees’ job titles, and she could not generally describe the work
        they performed.
              On the other hand, Chancey, who was in the chain of
        command for these employees, testiﬁed that (1) “[w]hat [Akridge]
        was doing was totally diﬀerent than what this team was doing,”
        which was working on and implementing the Guidewire system
        and (2) Akridge’s job duties with the strategic underwriting
        program were automated and her remaining duties absorbed by
        others. Coshatt also testiﬁed that Akridge’s responsibilities were
        automated to a greater extent than these employees.
              We need not decide whether these diﬀerences make these
        comparators insuﬃcient because Akridge’s evidence still fails to
        show that Alfa’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for her
        termination were pretextual. We explain why.
        C. Akridge’s Evidence does not Show Pretext
               As background, “[w]e have made clear that an employer may
        ﬁre an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on
        erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action is not
        for a discriminatory reason.” Owens v. Governor’s Oﬀ. of Student
        Achievement, 52 F.4th 1327, 1338 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks
        omitted). In our review of an employer’s proﬀered reasons for an
        adverse employment decision, we “do not sit as a super-personnel
        department that reexamines an entity’s business decisions,” and we
        may not “analyze whether an employer’s proﬀered reasons are
        prudent or fair.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
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        22-12045               Opinion of the Court                        27

               Here, Alfa’s decisionmakers eliminated Akridge’s position to
        reduce business expenses because her position was no longer
        needed. As the decisionmakers testiﬁed, the strategic underwriting
        program Akridge worked on was now automated, including the
        report she created, and agents and district managers themselves
        could now access that information over the computer. Akridge
        conﬁrmed that “[w]orking with the agents and district managers”
        using “data from the reports was the majority of [her] day.” The
        decisionmakers also testiﬁed that Akridge’s workshops were meant
        to introduce agents to information in the strategic underwriting
        report, and that those workshops were no longer necessary and
        were replaced by increased webinars and eLearning. Regarding
        Akridge’s non-automated duties, Chancey testiﬁed that these
        responsibilities were absorbed by other people in the underwriting
        department who had already been performing those duties
        alongside Akridge.
                Given Alfa’s non-discriminatory reasons for her termination,
        Akridge must show they were pretextual. See Todd, 998 F.3d at
        1216. “A reason cannot be proved to be a pretext for discrimination
        unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that
        discrimination was the real reason.” Ring v. Boca Ciega Yacht Club
        Inc., 4 F.4th 1149, 1163 (11th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). “[T]he pretext
        inquiry centers on the employer’s beliefs, not the employee’s
        beliefs and, to be blunt about it, not on reality as it exists outside
        the decision maker’s head.” Todd, 998 F.3d at 1218.
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        28                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12045

               Here, Akridge’s evidence fails to create a genuine factual
        dispute that Alfa’s reasons for ﬁring her were both false and that
        the true reason was her high healthcare costs. See Ring, 4 F.4th at
        1163. Crucially, while the decisionmakers and Forrest knew of
        Akridge’s disabilities, her evidence does not show that anyone, and
        certainly not the decisionmakers or Forrest, knew her speciﬁc
        individual healthcare costs—the basis she provides for Alfa’s alleged
        discrimination. See Walker v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 286 F.3d
        1270, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002) (recognizing “[a]n empty head means
        no discrimination” (quotation marks omitted)); see also Silvera v.
        Orange Cnty. Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2001)
        (“Discrimination is about actual knowledge, and real intent, not
        constructive knowledge and assumed intent.”).
               Each of the three decisionmakers, plus Forrest and White,
        testiﬁed that they were unaware of Akridge’s healthcare costs.
        White did not have access to the BCBS system and the other HR
        representatives to give testimony—Forrest, Dean, and Taylor—
        stated that they had not become aware of Akridge’s healthcare
        costs through Alfa’s access to the BCBS system.
               To show pretext, Akridge relies on this evidence: (1) the
        decisionmakers and others at Alfa knew of her disabilities;
        (2) Forrest had access to her healthcare costs; (3) the 2009 BCBS
        document had high healthcare costs marked; (4) she was
        terminated instead of being transferred to a new position; (5) her
        COBRA insurance stopped covering her particular migraine
        medication nine months after her termination; (6) once, and maybe
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        22-12045               Opinion of the Court                       29

        twice, in the last two years of her employment, Alfa instructed
        employees to go to the doctor only when medically necessary and
        that medical costs aﬀected all employees; (7) her proﬀered
        comparators were not terminated; and (8) Alfa did not produce any
        written documents about its decisionmaking to terminate her.
                Yet viewing this record evidence in the light most favorable
        to her, Akridge still oﬀers only conjecture or speculation that
        (1) Forrest, or someone else in Alfa’s HR department, used their
        access to BCBS’s system to view Akridge’s individual healthcare
        costs; (2) this information was then actually given to the
        decisionmakers; and (3) the decisionmakers ﬁred her based on this
        information. Such “[s]peculation does not create a genuine issue of
        fact; instead, it creates a false issue, the demolition of which is a
        primary goal of summary judgment.” Cordoba v. Dillard’s, Inc.,
        419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted); see
        also Martin v. Fin. Asset Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 959 F.3d 1048, 1054 (11th
        Cir. 2020) (holding evidence of a conversation between a
        decisionmaker and a senior HR oﬃcial after plaintiﬀ’s protected
        conduct but before her termination did not rebut the
        decisionmaker’s denial of knowledge about the protected conduct,
        as “[e]vidence that the HR manager ‘could have told’ is not the
        same thing as evidence that she ‘did tell’”).
               While Akridge’s brief does not mention the 2016 BCBS
        report, we note that report identiﬁed the individual healthcare
        costs of another employee with MS, but not her costs. Even this
        2016 report fails to show knowledge of Akridge’s healthcare costs
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        30                    Opinion of the Court                22-12045

        or to connect Akridge’s healthcare costs to her ﬁring. Moreover,
        the only record evidence about this 2016 report is Dean’s aﬃdavit.
        Dean, a beneﬁts manager in Alfa’s HR department, stated that Alfa
        had not requested this speciﬁc information, and BCBS supplied it
        in a yearly analysis in which BCBS, not Alfa, determined what to
        include. At most, this 2016 report reveals the unremarkable fact
        that BCBS could provide Alfa, a self-insured company, information
        about an individual employee’s healthcare costs. It does not show
        that anyone at Alfa actually accessed Akridge’s individual
        healthcare costs, passed them along to the decisionmakers, and that
        Akridge was terminated on that basis. Instead, the decisionmakers
        all denied knowing Akridge’s healthcare costs or ever accessing
        them.
               Akridge’s evidence also does not show that Alfa’s
        non-discriminatory reasons for her termination were false—i.e.,
        that her position was not automated, that others were not able to
        absorb her non-automated duties, or that Alfa did not wish to
        reduce business expenses. See Ring, 4 F.4th at 1163. The
        decisionmakers testiﬁed that the majority of Akridge’s duties were
        automated and that her non-automated duties were absorbed by
        others, including those who already shared those duties with her.
        The decisionmakers explained that Akridge’s trainings and
        workshops were no longer necessary and that her primary
        responsibility as coordinator of the strategic underwriting
        program was automated too. Alfa’s interest in reducing expenses
        is supported by the overbudgeted development of Guidewire.
        Alfa’s eﬀorts to reduce expenses is evidenced by Alfa’s elimination
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        22-12045               Opinion of the Court                        31

        of (1) two senior loss control representative positions in 2015,
        (2) three underwriting department positions in 2018 due to
        automation, (3) ten accounting positions since 2016, and (4) its
        entire real estate investment department.
               In sum, even if Akridge established a prima facie case using
        comparators, record evidence does not create a factual issue that
        Alfa’s non-discriminatory reasons for ﬁring her were both false and
        pretext for disability discrimination.
        D. No Convincing Mosaic
               Although Akridge failed to show that Alfa’s reasons for her
        termination were false and pretextual, a “plaintiﬀ will always
        survive summary judgment if [s]he presents . . . a convincing
        mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer
        intentional discrimination.” Lewis v. City of Union City, 934 F.3d
        1169, 1185 (11th Cir. 2019) (second alteration in original)
        (quotation marks omitted); see also Tynes v. Fla. Dep’t of Juv. Just.,
        88 F.4th 939, 946-47 (11th Cir. 2023). As set forth earlier, the
        inference to be drawn by a jury must be that the employee’s
        disability was a but-for cause of the employer’s intentional
        discrimination. See Comcast Corp., 140 S. Ct. at 1014-15 (noting
        while the materials a plaintiﬀ may rely upon to show but-for
        causation change as a case progresses from complaint to trial, her
        burden to show but-for causation “remains constant”); Bailey v.
        Metro Ambulance Servs., Inc., 992 F.3d 1265, 1274 (11th Cir. 2021)
        (stating a party “mistakenly” argued that but-for cause was “not a
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        32                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12045

        precondition under the convincing mosaic model” (quotation
        marks omitted)).
               A plaintiﬀ’s mosaic may be made up of, among other things,
        (1) “suspicious timing, ambiguous statements . . . , and other bits
        and pieces from which an inference of discriminatory intent might
        be drawn”; (2) systemically better treatment of similarly situated
        employees; and (3) evidence that the employer’s justiﬁcation is
        pretextual. Lewis, 934 F.3d at 1185. Here too, Akridge’s evidence is
        insuﬃcient to survive summary judgment.
               Tellingly, the timing of relevant events in this case is
        anything but suspicious. Akridge worked at Alfa in 1993 when she
        was diagnosed with MS, and she stated that “in the earlier years,
        shots needed for MS could cost [her] insurance [as] much as $11,000
        per month.” Signiﬁcantly, Alfa continued to employ Akridge for
        decades, funding the cost of her healthcare for decades too.
                Similarly, Akridge draws speculation about a change in her
        COBRA coverage nine months after her termination. Again, if
        Alfa’s aim was to ﬁre Akridge to rid itself of her healthcare costs, it
        is hard to understand why Alfa would wait nine months—and
        continue to pay $10,000 to $12,000 per month or $90,000 to
        $108,000 total—before changing her COBRA coverage. Cf. Thomas
        v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting
        that, in the context of retaliation claims, a three-to-four-month gap
        between protected conduct and an adverse employment action
        could not, standing alone, establish a causal connection).
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        22-12045                Opinion of the Court                          33

                In addition, the only potentially ambiguous statements in
        the record are that within the two years prior to Akridge’s
        termination, Alfa once, or maybe twice, told employees to go to
        the doctor only if medically necessary and that rising healthcare
        costs aﬀected the premiums of all employees. These companywide
        statements about rising healthcare costs and the general nature of
        self-insured businesses are too far removed from Akridge’s ﬁring in
        time and scope for a jury to infer discriminatory intent. See Lewis,
        934 F.3d at 1185. This is especially true given the absence of any
        comments, ambiguous or otherwise, to Akridge or others about
        her healthcare costs.
               Certainly, in a convincing-mosaic case, we may consider
        relevant evidence about similarly situated employees, even if those
        employees are not “strict comparator[s]” at the prima facie stage.
        Jenkins v. Nell, 26 F.4th 1243, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 2022); see also Tynes,
        88 F.4th at 947 (“[I]t is possible that her comparators were
        insuﬃcient to establish a prima facie case yet still relevant to the
        ultimate question of intentional discrimination.”). Yet, we
        conclude that a reasonable jury could not infer discriminatory
        intent based on the fact that Akridge’s proﬀered comparators were
        not terminated because (1) Akridge had diﬀerent job duties; (2) her
        duties were automated to a greater extent; and (3) Alfa eliminated
        a signiﬁcant number of other positions, including several in the
        underwriting department and the elimination of its entire real
        estate investment department.
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        34                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12045

               As we already explained, Akridge also failed to present
        evidence indicating that Alfa’s reasons for her ﬁring were
        pretextual. At bottom, there was no genuine factual dispute that
        the decisionmakers did not have access to, and did not have
        knowledge of, Akridge’s individual healthcare costs. “Evidence
        that [Alfa’s] HR [department] ‘could have told’” the decisionmakers
        about Akridge’s healthcare costs “is not the same thing as evidence
        that [the HR department] ‘did tell.’” See Martin, 959 F.3d at 1054.
               In short, Akridge has failed to present evidence that “would
        allow a jury to infer intentional [disability] discrimination.” See
        Lewis, 934 F.3d at 1185. Thus, we aﬃrm the entry of summary
        judgment on Akridge’s disparate-treatment claim.
        E. Reasonable Accommodation Claim
               In her amended complaint, Akridge also claimed that Alfa
        failed to reasonably accommodate her disability. The court
        granted summary judgment on her reasonable-accommodation
        claim because she abandoned it by failing to reference or support
        that claim in her brief opposing summary judgment.
                On appeal, Akridge presents arguments on the merits of her
        reasonable-accommodation claim, but she does not challenge the
        trial court’s abandonment ﬁnding. Akridge thus has forfeited any
        challenge to this abandonment ﬁnding, and we decline to consider
        merits-based arguments she failed to raise below. See Sapuppo v.
        Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding
        a party abandons an issue by failing to raise it on appeal); Feldman
        v. Am. Dawn, Inc., 849 F.3d 1333, 1344 (11th Cir. 2017) (“We will not
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        22-12045               Opinion of the Court                        35

        consider arguments raised for the ﬁrst time on appeal.”).
        Accordingly, we aﬃrm the entry of summary judgment on
        Akridge’s reasonable-accommodation claim.
                                 V.    SANCTIONS
               The court denied Akridge’s motion to compel Alfa to
        produce Forrest for a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, but she does not
        challenge this ruling on appeal. Akridge contests only the court’s
        separate order awarding sanctions to Alfa for having to respond to
        Akridge’s motion about Rule 30(b)(6).
               A party seeking discovery, like Akridge, may ﬁle a motion to
        compel a discovery response. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a). If a motion to
        compel is denied, the court must award reasonable expenses to the
        opposing party unless “the motion was substantially justiﬁed or
        other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” FED. R.
        CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(B). The court found that Akridge’s motion to
        compel Forrest to testify as a Rule 30(b)(6) witness was not
        substantially justiﬁed and awarded $1,918 in sanctions. That $1,918
        award was strictly limited to Alfa’s reasonable expenses in opposing
        Akridge’s motion to compel Forrest’s Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. On
        appeal, Akridge’s challenge is to the award of any sanctions, not to
        the particular amount imposed.
               Akridge has shown no error or abuse of discretion in that
        ruling. First, nothing in our opinion in Akridge’s prior appeal
        suggested she could seek Forrest’s deposition under Rule 30(b)(6).
        See Akridge, 1 F.4th 1271. Our opinion nowhere cites Rule 30(b)(6).
        See generally id. Instead, our Court explained that Forrest’s roles at
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        36                      Opinion of the Court                    22-12045

        Alfa and his corresponding access to information were “relevant
        and thus suﬃcient to make his testimony discoverable.” Id. at 1277
        (emphasis added).
                Second, the text of Rule 30(b)(6) provides that “[t]he named
        organization,” here Alfa, “must designate one or more oﬃcers,
        directors, or managing agents, . . . or other persons who consent to
        testify on its behalf.” FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6). Alfa’s choice of White
        as the designated Rule 30(b)(6) representative was not challenged
        or at issue in the prior appeal. Akridge raised only whether Forrest
        could be deposed. In her reply brief in that prior appeal, Akridge
        conﬁrmed that she “speciﬁcally requested, pursuant to Rule
        30(a)(1), to question . . . Scott Forrest. . . . This discovery is allowed
        by Rule 30(a)(1), and should have been permitted by the District
        Court.”
              Under the particular procedural history of the case,
        Akridge’s motion to compel Forrest’s appearance as a Rule 30(b)(6)
        witness, ﬁled after the prior appeal, was not substantially justiﬁed.
                    VI.    RESPONSE TO DISSENT IN PART
               One ﬁnal matter. Our colleague joins our majority opinion
        except for its causation holding. Respectfully, as to causation, our
        colleague’s dissent misstates our holding, and her discussion of “a
        motivating factor” causation rests on faulty citations and ﬂawed
        analysis.
               To begin, the majority opinion holds that “a plaintiﬀ may
        not pursue an ADA discrimination claim by showing ‘a motivating
        factor’ causation but must show but-for causation.” Maj. Op. at 24.
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        22-12045               Opinion of the Court                         37

        However, the dissent misreads our holding as requiring that an
        ADA claimant “must prove that her disability was the ‘but-for’
        reason for an adverse employment action[.]” Dissent Op. at 1
        (emphasis added). This is not our holding, nor could it be.
               As the Supreme Court and this Court have made clear, there
        can be multiple but-for causes of an adverse employment action.
        See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739 (“Often, events have multiple but-for
        causes.”); Farley, 197 F.3d at 1334 (“[W]e simply require that a
        disability be shown to be a determinative, rather than the sole,
        decision-making factor.”); see also Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island,
        544 F.3d 1201, 1212 n.6 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[P]laintiﬀs claiming
        intentional discrimination under the [Rehabilitation Act (“RA”)]
        must show that they were discriminated against ‘solely by reason of
        [their] disability,’ but the ADA requires only the lesser ‘but for’
        standard of causation.” (citation omitted)). Because there can be
        more than one but-for cause for an adverse employment action, an
        ADA claimant need only show that her disability was one such
        cause, i.e., one “determinative . . . decision-making factor.” See
        Farley, 197 F.3d at 1334.
               The dissent also misreads our precedent as holding “that ‘but
        for’ causation means the same thing as ‘a motivating factor’
        causation standard.” Dissent Op. at 5 (citing McNely, 99 F.3d at
        1073, 1076). McNely never discussed motivating-factor causation.
        See generally McNely, 99 F.3d 1068. Instead, the McNely court held
        that the ADA imposed a “but-for” causation standard, and that an
        ADA claimant need not show her disability was the sole cause of
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        38                      Opinion of the Court                    22-12045

        an adverse employment action. Id. at 1073-74, 1076 (“[W]e hold
        that the ADA imposes liability whenever the prohibited motivation
        makes the diﬀerence in the employer’s decision, i.e., when it is a
        ‘but-for’ cause.”). McNely’s characterization of but-for cause under
        the ADA—i.e., a cause that made the diﬀerence in the outcome—
        is consistent with how the Supreme Court in Bostock described
        but-for causation and is at odds with how it described the
        motivating-factor standard.
               As we explained above, the Supreme Court in Bostock
        clariﬁed that but-for causation and motivating-factor causation are
        distinct standards. See Maj. Op. at 22 (citing Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at
        1740). But-for causation means that a particular cause was
        “outcome determinative.” Id. But the motivating-factor causation
        standard is “more forgiving” than but-for causation, as “liability can
        sometimes follow even if [a protected trait] wasn’t a but-for cause
        of the employer’s challenged decision.” Id. (quoting Bostock, 140 S.
        Ct at 1740).
                Second, the dissent miscites several circuits as applying a
        motivating-factor causation standard to ADA claims. See Dissent
        Op. at 4-5 (citing Oehmke v. Medtronic, Inc., 844 F.3d 748, 756 (8th Cir.
        2016); EEOC v. LHC Grp., Inc., 773 F.3d 688, 702 (5th Cir. 2014); C.G.
        v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 734 F.3d 229, 236 n.11 (3d Cir. 2013); Katz v. City
        Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1996); Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc.,
        60 F.3d 1300 (8th Cir. 1995)). However, none of these decisions are
        on point.
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        22-12045               Opinion of the Court                        39

               For example, in Oehmke, the Eighth Circuit assumed,
        without deciding, that motivating-factor causation applied to an
        ADA claim because the employer was entitled to summary
        judgment under either a motivating-factor or but-for causation
        standard. 844 F.3d at 757 n.6 (“[B]ecause we agree with the district
        court that Medtronic is entitled to summary judgment even under
        the less restrictive mixed-motive causation standard, we decline to
        address this important question at this time.”).
               The dissent’s reliance on another Eighth Circuit decision,
        Pedigo, is misplaced, given that it predates Oehmke, the
        2008 amendments to the ADA, and the Supreme Court’s decisions
        in Gross and Comcast Corporation. See 60 F.3d 1300. More recently,
        the Eighth Circuit noted “the potential eﬀect of Gross on [its]
        interpretation of the ADA,” but has yet to decide that impact. See
        Oehmke, 844 F.3d at 757 n.6; see also Pulczinski v. Trinity Structural
        Towers, Inc., 691 F.3d 996, 1002 (8th Cir. 2012) (“We have our doubts
        about the vitality of the pre-Gross [ADA] precedent.”).
               The Third Circuit’s decision in C.G. also provides no
        support. That decision never uses the words “motivating factor.”
        See generally C.G., 734 F.3d 229. Instead, in the C.G. footnote our
        colleague cites, the Third Circuit distinguished between sole
        causation under the RA and but-for causation under the ADA.
        734 F.3d at 236 n.11. And the Third Circuit’s characterization of
        causation under the ADA is consistent with but-for causation, not
        motivating-factor causation: “The existence of an alternative
        cause, however, may not necessarily be fatal to an ADA claim so
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        40                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12045

        long as disability played a role in the . . . decisionmaking process
        and . . . had a determinative eﬀect on the outcome of that process.” Id.
        (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted); see Bostock, 140 S. Ct.
        at 1739 (characterizing a but-for cause as outcome determinative).
               We recognize that in Katz, the First Circuit did characterize
        the causation element of an ADA claim as requiring that a claimant
        show her “disability was a motivating factor in [the employer’s]
        decision to ﬁre [her].” 87 F.3d at 33. However, the Katz court did
        not discuss but-for causation or the motivating factor language
        found in Title VII. See generally id. More importantly, Katz was
        issued before the 2008 amendments to the ADA and the Supreme
        Court’s decision in Gross. And since Katz, the First Circuit has
        found Gross persuasive, and it characterized Katz’s use of
        “motivating factor” as “loose language” and dicta. See Palmquist v.
        Shinseki, 689 F.3d 66, 74-75 (1st Cir. 2012) (declining, in light of
        Gross, to “transplant” Title VII’s motivating-factor causation
        standard to the RA).
                That leaves only the Fifth Circuit’s decision in LHC Group.
        But that case also did not discuss the motivating-factor language
        found in Title VII, whether but-for cause applied, or Gross. See
        generally LHC Grp., 773 F.3d 688. Additionally, the dissent reads too
        much into LHC Group’s passing reference to a “motivating factor.”
        See id. at 702. The Fifth Circuit describes the “motivating factor
        test” under the ADA as whether discrimination “play[ed] a role in
        the employer’s decision making process” and had “a determinative
        inﬂuence on the outcome.” Pinkerton v. Spellings, 529 F.3d 513,
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        22-12045               Opinion of the Court                       41

        519 (5th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted). That standard is
        but-for causation. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1740.
              Third, the dissent mistakenly relies on the ADA’s
        incorporation of diﬀerent Title VII provisions to support its adding
        “a motivating factor” language to the ADA’s text. Dissent Op. at 3.
               This ignores that several circuits have expressly held that
        while the ADA incorporates some Title VII provisions, it does not
        incorporate the motivating-factor causation standard found in Title
        VII under § 2000e-2(m). See Natofsky v. City of New York, 921 F.3d
        337, 349 (2d Cir. 2019) (“Notably absent from [the ADA’s
        incorporation provision], however, is § 2000e-2(m).”); Gentry v. E.
        W. Partners Club Mgmt. Co., 816 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir. 2016)
        (“[W]hile [the ADA] incorporates Title VII’s ‘Enforcement
        provisions’ in § 2000e-5, it does not incorporate the ‘Unlawful
        employment practices’ in § 2000e-2[(m)].”); Lewis v. Humbolt
        Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 319 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“That
        Congress did not incorporate § 2000e-2 into the ADA ought to give
        a court pause before doing so itself.”); Murray v. Mayo Clinic,
        934 F.3d 1101, 1104-07 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding the ADA did not
        incorporate the motivating-factor standard from Title VII); cf.
        Palmquist, 689 F.3d at 73-74 (holding the RA, which also
        incorporates part of Title VII, simply “borrows its remedial
        scheme from Title VII, but it does not borrow the
        [motivating-factor] causation standard set out in section
        2000e-2(m). Instead, the [RA] borrows the causation standard from
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        42                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12045

        the [ADA],” which has “language [that] contrasts sharply with the
        ‘motivating factor’ standard used in section 2000e-2(m).”).
               In addition, as explained above, these circuits held that, after
        the 2008 amendments to the ADA, but-for causation applies to
        ADA claims, even though the amendments changed “because of ”
        to “on the basis of.” See Maj. Op. at 21; Natofsky, 921 F.3d at 349;
        Gentry, 816 F.3d at 235-36; Murray, 934 F.3d at 1106 & n.6; Lewis,
        681 F.3d at 315, 321.
                The dissent also misses the fact that the motivating-factor
        standard does not apply to all Title VII claims, much less to ADA
        claims. The Supreme Court’s decision in Nassar is instructive. In
        Nassar, the Supreme Court held that but-for causation, not
        motivating-factor causation, applies to Title VII retaliation claims.
        570 U.S. at 362. Noting the structure of Title VII, the Supreme
        Court stated that Congress chose to place the motivating-factor
        language only in a section pertaining to status-based
        discrimination, not retaliation. Id. at 353. In characterizing Title
        VII’s structure, the Supreme Court stated that, “[i]f Congress had
        desired to make the motivating-factor standard applicable to all
        Title VII claims”—and as relevant here, applicable to ADA claims
        through its partial incorporation of Title VII—“it could have
        inserted the motivating-factor provision as part of a section that
        applies to all such claims, such as § 2000e-5.” Id. at 354.
               Finally, the dissent relies on legislative history to support
        applying motivating-factor causation in ADA cases. Dissent Op. at
        5-6. “But we should not, cannot, and do not use legislative history
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        22-12045               Opinion of the Court                         43

        to get around the plain meaning of a statute’s text.” Nesbitt v.
        Candler Cnty., 945 F.3d 1355, 1361-62 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[I]t is better
        to analyze a statute than it is to psychoanalyze Congress.”). Here,
        the plain text of the ADA requires a claimant to show that an
        employer made an adverse employment decision “on the basis of ”
        her disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Our colleague contends that
        “[l]ater amendments to the ADA further underscore that Congress
        sought to retain the ‘motivating factor’ causation standard.”
        Dissent Op. at 4. Yet the 2008 amendments to the ADA did not add
        “motivating factor” language. Rather, the amendments changed
        “because of ” to “on the basis of.” See ADA Amendments Act of
        2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 5, 122 Stat. 3553.
               If Congress intended to retain, clarify, or add the
        motivating-factor standard to the ADA, it could have simply added
        that language, like it did in its 1991 amendments to Title VII. See
        Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 107, 109, 105 Stat.
        1071. Instead, and in direct contrast to Title VII, Congress chose to
        not add the motivating-factor language to the text of the ADA. We
        presume this choice was intentional, and we decline to add
        language to the ADA that Congress chose not to include. See Gross,
        557 U.S. at 174 (“When Congress amends one statutory provision
        but not another, it is presumed to have acted intentionally.”).
                              VII.    CONCLUSION
              We aﬃrm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Alfa
        and the sanctions award of $1,918 against Akridge.
               AFFIRMED.
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        22-12045 ABUDU, J., Concurring and Dissenting in part                   1

        ABUDU, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
               I join in the Majority’s opinion affirming the district court’s
        grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant Alfa Mutual In-
        surance Company and the sanctions award against Plaintiff Jennifer
        Akridge. I write separately because I disagree with the Majority’s
        holding that a plaintiff bringing a claim pursuant to the Americans
        with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) and its subsequent amend-
        ments must prove that her disability was the “but for” reason for
        an adverse employment action as opposed to the disability being a
        motivating factor. The ADA’s purpose and language, especially its
        incorporation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s (“Title
        VII”) enforcement mechanism, all lead to the conclusion that the
        ADA forbids adverse employment decisions motivated, even in
        part, by a plaintiff’s disability. For this reason, I respectfully dissent
        in part.
           I.      THE ADA’s HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND
                   CONNECTION TO TITLE VII
                As originally enacted, Title I of the ADA provided as follows:
                      No covered entity shall discriminate against a
                      qualified individual with a disability because of
                      the disability of such individual in regard to job
                      application procedures, the hiring, advance-
                      ment, or discharge of employees, employee
                      compensation, job training, and other terms,
                      conditions, and privileges of employment.
        See Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. 101-336, Title I, § 102,
        July 26, 1990, 104 Stat. 331 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994)).
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        2          ABUDU, J., Concurring and Dissenting in part 22-12045

        Congress enacted the ADA to correct an omission in the categories
        of protected classes enumerated in Title VII. 42 U.S.C. §
        12101(a)(4) (explaining Congress enacted the ADA, in part, because
        “unlike individuals who have experienced discrimination on the ba-
        sis of race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or age, individuals
        who have experienced discrimination on the basis of disability have
        often had no legal recourse to redress such discrimination”).
               In 1989, the Supreme Court decided Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
        kins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), which interpreted the causation standard
        for Title VII by defining the statutory phrase “because of.” For con-
        text, Title VII states that it is unlawful for an employer to discrimi-
        nate against an employee “because of such individual’s race, color,
        religion, sex, or national origin.” Id. at 240 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§
        2000e-2(a)(1),(2)). In interpreting that statutory section, a plurality
        of the Supreme Court held that where a plaintiff proved her mem-
        bership in a protected class played “a motivating part” in an adverse
        employment action, i.e., there were mixed motives that played into
        the decision, the plaintiff had established that the action was “be-
        cause of” the protected class in violation of the statute. Id. at 250.
                In response to Price Waterhouse and similar Supreme Court
        cases decided around that time, Congress amended Title VII to ex-
        plicitly allow for a mixed-motive standard of causation. See Title
        VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88 352, 78 Stat. 241,
        as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102 166, §
        107, 105 Stat. 1071; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (“[A]n unlawful employ-
        ment practice is established when the complaining party
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        22-12045 ABUDU, J., Concurring and Dissenting in part                  3

        demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was
        a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other
        factors also motivated the practice.”) (emphasis added). Congress
        explained its twin aims behind the amendments: (1) “to respond to
        recent Supreme Court decisions by restoring the civil rights protec-
        tions that were dramatically limited by those decisions[;]” and (2)
        “to strengthen existing protections and remedies available under
        federal civil rights laws. . . .” H.R. REP. NO. 102-40 at 1 (1991), re-
        printed in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 694.
                Congress enacted the ADA shortly thereafter and crafted the
        statute’s causation standard using the “because of” language. See
        Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. 101-336, Title I, § 102, July
        26, 1990, 104 Stat. 331 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994)). It
        also incorporated by reference Title VII’s “powers, remedies, and
        procedures” linking the two statutes. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). No-
        tably, the ADA contains no other enforcement or remedies provi-
        sions besides those explicitly incorporated from Title VII, see id.;
        42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, and the Title VII remedies section specifically
        incorporates a plaintiff’s ability to proceed under mixed-motive
        causation, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. This incorporation matters. Given
        Price Waterhouse’s holding, Congress’s codification of the motivat-
        ing factor language, the Title VII Amendments, and the ADA link-
        ing the two statutes, it is clear that plaintiffs need not establish “but
        for” causation in ADA cases and must only meet the “motivating
        factor” test.
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        4          ABUDU, J., Concurring and Dissenting in part 22-12045

               Later amendments to the ADA further underscore that Con-
        gress sought to retain the “motivating factor” causation standard.
        See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 5, 122
        Stat. 3553 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2009))
        (“ADAAA”). The ADAAA reads, in relevant part, “No covered en-
        tity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of
        disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, ad-
        vancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation,
        job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employ-
        ment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (emphasis added).
                Before and after the ADAAA amendments, our sister circuits
        applied and continue to apply a “motivating factor” standard in
        ADA cases. See, e.g., Oehmke v. Medtronic, Inc., 844 F.3d 748, 756-57
        (8th Cir. 2016) (“We apply a mixed-motive causation standard [to
        ADA claims], allowing claims based on an adverse employment ac-
        tion that was motivated by both permissible and impermissible fac-
        tors” (citing Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., 60 F.3d 1300, 1301 (8th
        Cir. 1995)); EEOC v. LHC Grp., Inc., 773 F.3d 688, 702 (5th Cir. 2014)
        (explaining that under the ADA, “discrimination need not be the
        sole reason for the adverse employment decision . . . [so long as it]
        actually play[s] a role in the employer’s decision making process
        and ha[s] a determinative influence on the outcome”) (alterations
        in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Katz
        v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1996) (explaining that the
        third element of a prima facie case under the ADA is to show “that
        [plaintiff’s] disability was a motivating factor in [the employer’s] de-
        cision to fire him”); see also C.G. v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 734 F.3d 229,
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        22-12045 ABUDU, J., Concurring and Dissenting in part                        5

        236 n.11 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining that the existence of “an alterna-
        tive cause” for an adverse employment action “may not necessarily
        be fatal to an ADA claim so long as disability ‘played a role in the .
        . . decision[]making process and . . . had a determinative effect on
        the outcome of that process’” (citation omitted)). Moreover, even
        though our Circuit has used the “but for” language in ADA cases
        with respect to causation, our application of that language has been
        to find in a plaintiff’s favor “whenever the prohibited motivation
        ma[de] a difference in the employer’s decision.” See McNely v. Ocala
        Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1076 (11th Cir. 1996) (“When Con-
        gress enacted the ADA, it did so against the backdrop of recent Su-
        preme Court employment discrimination case law that interpreted
        the phrase ‘because of’ not to mean ‘solely because of.’ We think
        Congress knew what it was doing . . . .”). Thus, we held that “but
        for” causation means the same thing as “a motivating factor” cau-
        sation standard. Id.
                Congress amended the ADA with this tapestry in mind. Leg-
        islative history shows that the purpose of the amendment was not
        to disturb the original causation standard that had been appropri-
        ately interpreted by our Circuit and other circuits, but to decrease
        debate about what constitutes a disability. 1

        1 The bill amends Section 102 of the ADA to mirror the structure of

        nondiscrimination protection in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
        1964, changing the language of Section 102(a) from prohibiting dis-
        crimination against a qualified individual ‘with a disability because of
        the disability of such individual’ to prohibiting discrimination against
        a qualified individual ‘on the basis of disability.’ This more direct
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        6            ABUDU, J., Concurring and Dissenting in part 22-12045

               Congress passed the ADA and ADAAA “to provide a clear
        and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of dis-
        crimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. §
        12101(b)(1). It also intended to “provide clear, strong, consistent,
        and enforceable standards addressing discrimination against indi-
        viduals with disabilities.” Id. § 12101(b)(2). Strong and enforceable
        standards are ones that deter discrimination, not condone it. Rais-
        ing the bar to a “but for” causation standard is contrary to the stat-
        ute’s direct link to Title VII, historical context, legislative history,
        and purpose. Thus, mixed-motive causation applies to ADA and
        ADAAA claims.
            II.     AKRIDGE’S ADA CLAIM STILL FAILS
               Even under the “motivating factor” test, Akridge still has not
        met her burden of proving that her disability was a consideration
        in Alfa’s decision to terminate her employment.

        language, structured like Title VII, ensures that the emphasis in ques-
        tions of disability discrimination is properly on the critical inquiry of
        whether a qualified person has been discriminated against on the basis
        of disability, and not unduly focused on the preliminary question of
        whether a particular person is even a ‘person with a disability’ with
        any protections under the Act at all.
        H.R. Rep. No. 110-730, pt. 1, at 6 (2008); see also 154 Cong. Rec. S8840-01
        (Sept. 16, 2008) (Senate Statement of Managers) (explaining that recent Su-
        preme Court decisions had the impact of lower courts finding “that an indi-
        vidual’s impairment did not constitute a disability” and never reaching the
        more salient question of whether unlawful discrimination had occurred).
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        22-12045 ABUDU, J., Concurring and Dissenting in part             7

                Because Alfa moved for summary judgment, we review the
        district court’s decision de novo and draw all reasonable inferences
        in Akridge’s favor. Sutton v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, 64 F.4th 1166,
        1168 (11th Cir. 2023). Under the mixed-motive framework that ap-
        plies to Akridge’s ADA claim, she must prove that: (1) her termina-
        tion was an adverse employment action; and (2) her disability was
        a motivating factor in her termination. See Quigg v. Thomas Cnty.
        Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d 1227, 1239 (11th Cir. 2016) (ruling that the
        McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework does not apply to
        mixed-motive claims). Akridge bears the burden to prove her case
        by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 1329. At issue here is
        the second prong of that framework—whether Akridge demon-
        strated that her multiple sclerosis and the related employer-funded
        healthcare costs were a motivating factor in Alfa’s decision to ter-
        minate her. See id. She did not.
               Because the evidence supports a finding that none of the de-
        cision makers were aware of her healthcare costs, she cannot rely
        on that as a basis for her ADA claim. Although three of the indi-
        viduals who played a role in Alfa’s decision to terminate her knew
        about her multiple sclerosis, there was no evidence showing that
        any of them knew about Akridge’s—or any other employee’s—
        healthcare costs. She also did not present any evidence showing or
        genuinely questioning whether the head of human resources had
        any access to her healthcare costs. Furthermore, Alfa employed
        Akridge for twenty-seven years, and she had multiple sclerosis for
        twenty-three of those years. In Akridge’s own words, Alfa had no
        problem paying for her multiple sclerosis medications “over the
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        8          ABUDU, J., Concurring and Dissenting in part 22-12045

        course of th[ose] years.” Given these material facts and the other
        evidence fleshed out in the Majority Opinion, Akridge did not meet
        her burden.
            III.   CONCLUSION
                Congress, through the ADA’s “motivating factor” standard
        recognized the reality that many employees with disabilities face—
        that an employer may have or manufacture multiple reasons to fire
        someone, but if one of those reasons is related to a person’s disabil-
        ity, the employer’s behavior is unlawful. Nevertheless, Akridge’s
        ADA claim still cannot survive.