Court Opinion

ID: 9440654
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 17:01:00.076429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:46.308531
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GREGORY L. BROWN,                             Nos. 20-16290
                                                   21-15922
                Petitioner-Appellant,
                                                D.C. Nos.
 v.                                        4:20-cv-03405-YGR
                                           4:21-cv-02649-YGR
M. ATCHLEY, Warden,
                                               OPINION
                Respondent-Appellee.

        Appeal from the United States District Court
           for the Northern District of California
      Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, District Judge, Presiding

           Argued and Submitted March 30, 2023
                San Francisco, California

                    Filed August 3, 2023

 Before: M. Margaret McKeown, Ronald M. Gould, and
            Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges.

                  Opinion by Judge Ikuta;
                 Concurrence by Judge Ikuta
2                        BROWN V. ATCHLEY

                          SUMMARY *

                         Habeas Corpus

    In consolidated appeals, the panel reversed the district
court’s judgments dismissing, as second or successive under
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), Gregory Brown’s third and fourth
federal habeas corpus petitions, and remanded.
    Brown was convicted in California state court of one
count of conspiracy to commit murder and one count of
attempted murder on an aiding and abetting theory, and
sentenced to 56 years to life. His conviction and sentence
were affirmed on appeal. The district court denied his first
federal habeas petition on the merits and declined to grant a
certificate of appealability (COA); this court also declined to
grant a COA. The district court dismissed as second or
successive Brown’s second federal habeas petition, and this
court affirmed the dismissal.
    After the district court dismissed Brown’s second habeas
petition, the California legislature amended the law relating
to accomplice liability for murder, and added section
1170.95 to the California Penal Code, which provides a
procedure for a defendant convicted of felony murder or
murder under a “natural and probable consequences” theory
to obtain retroactive relief. Shortly thereafter, Brown filed
an application for resentencing in state court pursuant to
section 1170.95, which the state denied.

*
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                      BROWN V. ATCHLEY                       3

    Brown’s third federal habeas petition argued that he was
entitled to resentencing under section 1170.95, and that his
continued incarceration under the original sentence violated
his due process rights. His fourth federal habeas petition
alleged, among other things, that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel in applying to the state court for
resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95 and that the state
court’s denial of his application violated his equal protection
rights.
    The panel held that Brown’s due process, ineffective
assistance of counsel, and equal protection claims did not
become ripe until his application for resentencing was
denied, which occurred well after the district court denied
his first and dismissed his second habeas petitions. Because
Brown could not have raised these claims in his first or
second petition, his failure to do so is not an abuse of the
writ. Applying Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007),
the panel concluded that the third and fourth habeas petitions
were, accordingly, not second or successive under
§ 2244(b).
    The panel did not reach the parties’ argument that, under
Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010), the state
court’s denial of Brown’s application for resentencing under
section 1170.95 constituted a new judgment for purposes of
§ 2254.
    Concurring, Judge Ikuta wrote that the panel does the
parties a disservice by declining to address their primary
argument in this case. She would hold that the state court’s
denial of Brown’s application for resentencing under section
1170.95 did not constitute a new judgment for purposes of
§ 2254.
4                         BROWN V. ATCHLEY

                             COUNSEL

Yevgeniy M. Parkman (argued), Assistant Federal Public
Defender; Jodi Linker, Federal Public Defender; Federal
Public Defender’s Office; San Francisco, California; for
Petitioner-Appellant.
Gregory A. Ott (argued), Deputy Attorney General; Peggy
S. Ruffra, Supervising Deputy Attorney General; Jeffrey M.
Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Rob Bonta,
Attorney General of California; Office of the California
Attorney General; San Francisco, California; for
Respondent-Appellee.

                             OPINION

IKUTA, Circuit Judge:

     Gregory Brown, a prisoner serving a sentence of 56 years
to life, brought two federal habeas petitions challenging the
state court’s denial of his application for resentencing under
section 1170.95 of the California Penal Code. 1 The district
court dismissed his petitions as second or successive under
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Under the circumstances of this case,
Brown’s petitions raise claims that “were not ripe for
adjudication” when he brought his prior habeas petitions,
and so should not be dismissed as second or successive.

1
 Section 1170.95 was renumbered as section 1172.6, effective June 30,
2022. See Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10. Because the events of this case took
place before June 30, 2022, we refer to section 1170.95.
                            BROWN V. ATCHLEY                         5

United States v. Buenrostro, 638 F.3d 720, 725 (9th Cir.
2011) (per curiam). Therefore, we reverse and remand.
                                      I
                                      A
    We begin with the applicable legal framework. A federal
court “shall entertain an application for writ of habeas corpus
in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of
a State court” if the petitioner “is in custody in violation of
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254(a).
    Because Brown filed his federal habeas petitions after
1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA) governs this case. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521
U.S. 320, 336 (1997). Under AEDPA, courts are limited in
their ability to consider claims brought in successive habeas
petitions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). 2 “A claim presented in
a second or successive habeas corpus application under
section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application
shall be dismissed unless” a statutory exception applies. 3 Id.

2
  Consistent with the Supreme Court’s practice, “[a]lthough 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b) refers to a habeas ‘application,’ we use the word ‘petition’
interchangeably with the word ‘application.’” Magwood v. Patterson,
561 U.S. 320, 324 n.1 (2010).
3
    These statutory exceptions are:
       (A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule
       of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on
       collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was
       previously unavailable; or
       (B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have
       been discovered previously through the exercise of due
       diligence; and
6                         BROWN V. ATCHLEY

§ 2244(b)(2). In addition, § 2244(b)(3)(A) provides that
“[b]efore a second or successive application permitted by
this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall
move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order
authorizing the district court to consider the application.” Id.
    “Although Congress did not define the phrase ‘second or
successive,’ as used to modify ‘habeas corpus application
under section 2254,’ §§ 2244(b)(1)–(2), it is well settled that
the phrase does not simply ‘refe[r] to all § 2254 applications
filed second or successively in time.’” Magwood, 561 U.S.
at 331–32 (quoting Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930,
944 (2007) (alteration in original)). Rather, “[t]he phrase
‘second or successive petition’ is a term of art,” Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 486 (2000), that follows from the
history of the writ.
    Historically, “[a]t common law, res judicata did not
attach to a court’s denial of habeas relief,” and courts
allowed “endless successive petitions” after a court’s initial
denial of habeas relief. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,
479 (1991). In 1924, after courts began allowing appellate
review of denied habeas claims, the Supreme Court clarified
that courts had discretion to dismiss a petition based on a
prior denial of the same claim in an earlier petition. See id.
at 480–82 (discussing Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 223
(1924) and Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U.S. 239
(1924)). Courts continued to expand upon the rule that

    (ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in
    light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to
    establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for
    constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have
    found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2).
                       BROWN V. ATCHLEY                        7

repetitive petitions could constitute an abuse of the writ and
a ground for dismissal through judicial decision-making.
See generally McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 479–89 (detailing the
origins and development of the common law abuse of the
writ doctrine). Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held
that, under certain circumstances, the failure to bring a claim
in a prior petition (if the claim had been available at the time)
constituted an abuse of the writ. See, e.g., Delo v. Stokes,
495 U.S. 320, 321–22 (1990) (per curiam) (holding that the
petitioner’s fourth habeas petition was an abuse of the writ
where two claims “could have been raised in his first petition
for federal habeas corpus” and that “[t]he equal protection
principles asserted by [petitioner] are not novel and could
have been developed long before this last minute application
for stay of execution.”); see also Wong Doo, 265 U.S. at 241
(concluding that the petitioner’s second habeas petition was
an abuse of the writ where the petitioner had a “full
opportunity to offer proof” of the same claim in his first
habeas application).
    AEDPA incorporated some of these judge-made
principles, Slack, 529 U.S. at 483, for dismissing petitions
that were claimed to be an abuse of the writ in § 2244(b)(2).
This section indicates that a petition could escape dismissal
as second or successive where “the factual predicate for the
claim could not have been discovered previously through the
exercise of due diligence” (and “the facts underlying the
claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a
whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no
reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty
of the underlying offense”), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). This
language echoed—and toughened—the common law view
that a petitioner had to bring any available claims at the
8                      BROWN V. ATCHLEY

earliest opportunity. See United States v. Lopez, 577 F.3d
1053, 1060–61 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Congress enacted AEDPA,
codifying the judicially established principles reflected in
the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine and further restricting the
availability of relief to habeas petitioners.”)
    Following the enactment of AEDPA, the Supreme Court
has continued to use “pre-AEDPA law to interpret AEDPA’s
provision governing ‘second or successive habeas
applications.’” Slack, 529 U.S. at 486 (quoting Stewart v.
Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 641–42 (1998)); see also
Buenrostro, 638 F.3d at 724 (stating that in Magwood, 561
U.S. at 332, “seven justices agreed that second or successive
is a habeas ‘term of art’ that incorporates the pre-AEDPA
abuse-of-the-writ doctrine”).
                                B
    Notwithstanding the prohibition of second or successive
petitions in most cases, not every petition filed after an initial
petition has been adjudicated is considered second or
successive. The Supreme Court has identified two situations
where a second-in-time petition is not analyzed under the
rules governing second or successive petitions.
    First, in Magwood, the Supreme Court explained that the
limitations imposed by § 2244(b) applied only to habeas
petitions that relate to a specific “judgment of a State court”
under § 2254(b)(1). 561 U.S. at 332 (emphasis omitted).
Because “the phrase ‘second or successive’ must be
interpreted with respect to the judgment challenged,” id. at
333, a habeas petition is second or successive only if it
challenges the same judgment as the prior petition, see id. at
339. Magwood applied this rule and concluded that because
the petitioner’s new sentence, imposed after a resentencing
proceeding, qualified as a new judgment, his “first
                       BROWN V. ATCHLEY                         9

application challenging that new judgment” was not “second
or successive.” Id. at 331.
    Second, even if a petitioner’s second petition is
challenging the same judgment as an earlier petition, it is not
second or successive if it raises a claim “brought in an
application filed when the claim is first ripe.” Panetti, 551
U.S. at 947. The Court has clarified that a petitioner does
not run afoul of the abuse of the writ doctrine by raising a
new claim in a successive petition that could not have been
raised in a prior petition. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. at
645; McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 497.
    The Supreme Court applied these abuse-of-the-writ
principles, post-AEDPA, for the first time in Panetti. There,
the petitioner, a capital defendant, raised a mental
incompetence claim about his ability to stand trial in his first
federal habeas petition, which was denied. 551 U.S. at 937.
After the state trial court set the execution date, the petitioner
filed a second habeas petition based on his claim that he was
incompetent to be executed, pursuant to Ford v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 399 (1986). Id. at 938–39. The district court stayed
the petitioner’s execution to allow him to exhaust this claim
in state court. Id. The state court rejected this claim after
various evidentiary proceedings. Id. at 939–40. The
petitioner then returned to federal district court raising his
now exhausted mental competence claim. Id. at 941. The
court denied the petitioner’s claim on the merits, and the
appellate court affirmed. Id. at 941–42.
    The Supreme Court first considered whether it had
jurisdiction to consider the petitioner’s appeal. Id. at 942.
Although the second petition was second or successive on its
face because it challenged the same judgment as the first
petition, the Court held that “Congress did not intend the
10                    BROWN V. ATCHLEY

provisions of AEDPA . . . to govern a filing in the unusual
posture presented here: a § 2254 application raising a Ford-
based incompetency claim filed as soon as that claim is
ripe.” Id. at 945. 4 Further, the Court held that petitioner’s
actions did not constitute an abuse of the writ, because
“claims of incompetency to be executed remain unripe at
early stages of the proceedings.” Id. at 947. Therefore, the
Supreme Court held that “[t]he statutory bar on second or
successive applications does not apply to a Ford claim
brought in an application filed when the claim is first ripe.”
Id. The Court therefore proceeded to the merits of the claim.
    After Panetti, we have applied the judge-made rule that
a petition filed when a claim first becomes ripe is not second
or successive in a range of cases beyond the context of Ford
claims. See Buenrostro, 638 F.3d at 725. In general,
“[p]risoners may file second-in-time petitions based on
events that do not occur until a first petition is concluded,”
and such petitions are not second or successive, id., because
a claim does not become ripe until the facts that give rise to
the constitutional claim first arise. To illustrate this
principle, we stated that a “prisoner whose conviction and
sentence were tested long ago may still file petitions relating
to denial of parole, revocation of a suspended sentence, and
the like because such claims were not ripe for adjudication
at the conclusion of the prisoner’s first federal habeas
proceeding.” Id. (collecting cases). Our sister circuits have
arrived at the same conclusion, holding that claims that could
not have been raised in a prisoner’s earlier habeas petition
because the alleged violations giving rise to the claims had

4
  The petitioner’s Ford claim became ripe when his execution was
imminent. See Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. at 644–45.
                           BROWN V. ATCHLEY                               11

not yet occurred do not implicate the gatekeeping
requirements of § 2244(b). 5
                                     II
                                     A
    We now turn to the facts of this case. 6 In January 1995,
Robin Williams was at a home shared by Brown, Wanda
Fain, and Joseph Diggs, when the police arrived in response
to reports of a domestic disturbance nearby. Muniz, 889 F.3d
at 664. They found Brown holding drugs and a firearm in
the doorway. Id. The police arrested Brown and Williams.
Id. Williams told the police that she had seen Brown with
both the drugs and the firearm. Id. About ten days later,
while Brown was awaiting trial on drug charges stemming

5
  The following cases from five of our sister circuits held that a prisoner’s
petition was not second or successive because it raised a claim that had
not been ripe at the time of the initial petition. See United States v.
Orozco–Ramirez, 211 F.3d 862, 869 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that a claim
relating to counsel’s ineffective assistance on an out-of-time appeal
could not have been raised in the first appeal); In re Jones, 652 F.3d 603,
605 (6th Cir. 2010) (order) (holding that an ex post facto claim resulting
from amendments to state parole law was unripe until the amendments
were enacted); United States v. Obeid, 707 F.3d 898, 903 (7th Cir. 2013)
(holding that an equal protection challenge was unripe until the
government breached its promise to treat the petitioner and a co-
conspirator equally with respect to a motion for a sentence reduction);
Morgan v. Javois, 744 F.3d 535, 538 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that “a
challenge to a state-court decision regarding the legality of an insanity
acquittee’s continued confinement is unripe until that decision is
rendered”); In re Weathersby, 717 F.3d 1108, 1110–11 (10th Cir. 2013)
(per curiam) (holding that a petitioner’s habeas claim to correct a
sentencing enhancement based on a state conviction was not ripe until
the state vacated that conviction).
6
 Because we have already set out the facts in detail in Brown v. Muniz,
889 F.3d 661 (9th Cir. 2018), we recite them only briefly here.
12                        BROWN V. ATCHLEY

from this arrest, Brown and Fain threatened Williams in an
effort to persuade her not to testify against Brown. Id. On
the day of the attempted murder, Williams arrived at Brown
and Fain’s residence and saw them talking (Diggs was also
there). Id. Williams left, but returned five minutes later to
find that Brown had left the residence. Id. Fain asked
Williams to go with her to a house of prostitution to earn
money for drugs. Id. Williams agreed, and left with Fain
and Diggs. Id. Williams, Fain, and Diggs offered divergent
accounts of what occurred after they left the residence.
Williams testified that while she and Fain were walking
down the street, laughing and talking, with Diggs following
behind, Williams was shot in the back of the head by
someone in a car following behind her. Id. at 665. Brown,
Fain, and Diggs were prosecuted for conspiracy to commit
murder, id. at 663, pursuant to sections 182 (defining
conspiracy) and 187 (defining murder) of the California
Penal Code, as well as for attempted murder of Williams, id.,
pursuant to sections 187, 189 (defining the degrees of
murder), and 664 (defining attempt) of the California Penal
Code. Under California law at the time of the shooting,
section 187 defined murder as the “unlawful killing of a
human being . . . with malice aforethought.” The mens rea
of “malice” was defined in section 188. 7

7
 At the time, section 188(a) of the California Penal Code provided:
     (a) For purposes of Section 187, malice may be express or
     implied.
     (1) Malice is express when there is manifested a deliberate
     intention to unlawfully take away the life of a fellow
     creature.
                         BROWN V. ATCHLEY                           13

    Brown was convicted of one count of conspiracy to
commit murder and one count of attempted murder on an
aiding and abetting theory, and sentenced to 56 years to life
in state prison. Muniz, 889 F.3d at 663. Fain and Diggs were
also convicted. Id. The California Court of Appeal affirmed
Brown’s conviction and sentence in 1998. On the charge of
aiding and abetting attempted murder, the state court
determined that the jury “could have reasonably concluded
that Brown at least intended to aid and abet Fain and Diggs
in the attempted murder, even if he did not personally intend
to kill Williams.” Id. at 665. The California Supreme Court
denied review. Id.
                                  B
    In 1998, after the California Court of Appeal affirmed
his convictions, Brown filed his first petition for habeas
corpus in federal district court. Id. The court denied the writ
on the merits and declined to grant a certificate of
appealability (COA). Id. We also declined to grant a COA,
thus ending Brown’s first habeas effort in 1998. 8 Id. In
2014, Brown filed a second habeas petition in federal district
court, alleging that previously undisclosed information
contained in three police officers’ personnel files was subject
to disclosure under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963). Id. at 665–66. On February 23, 2016, the district
court dismissed Brown’s petition, holding that it was a
second or successive petition requiring pre-filing

    (2) Malice is implied when no considerable provocation
    appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing
    show an abandoned and malignant heart.
Cal. Penal Code § 188(a).
8
 An appeal may not be taken from the final order in a habeas proceeding
unless the petitioner first obtains a COA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).
14                         BROWN V. ATCHLEY

authorization from the Ninth Circuit under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(3)(A). Brown v. Asuncion, 2016 WL 705987, at
*5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2016). We affirmed the dismissal on
May 8, 2018. Muniz, 889 F.3d at 663.
                                    C
    After the district court dismissed Brown’s second habeas
petition, the California legislature amended the law relating
to accomplice liability for murder, pursuant to Senate Bill
1437 (effective January 1, 2019). People v. Bucio, 48 Cal.
App. 5th 300, 307 (2020). The legislature found that it was
“necessary to amend the felony murder rule and the natural
and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to murder,
to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person
who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill,
or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who
acted with reckless indifference to human life.” People v.
Alaybue, 51 Cal. App. 5th 207, 212–13 (2020) (quoting
Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1). 9

9
 The two doctrines amended by the California legislature—the felony-
murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine—are
defined in California law as follows. First,
     [t]he felony-murder rule makes a killing while committing
     certain felonies murder without the necessity of further
     examining the defendant’s mental state. . . First degree
     felony murder is a killing during the course of a felony
     specified in section 189, such as rape, burglary, or robbery.
     Second degree felony murder is ‘an unlawful killing in the
     course of the commission of a felony that is inherently
     dangerous to human life but is not included among the
     felonies enumerated in section 189 . . . .’
People v. Chun, 45 Cal. 4th 1172, 1182 (2009) (citation omitted).
                             BROWN V. ATCHLEY                           15

    Senate Bill 1437 made three changes to implement these
legislative findings. First, Senate Bill 1437 changed the
definition of “malice” in section 188 by adding a new
provision stating that “[m]alice can no longer ‘be imputed to
a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.’”
Bucio, 48 Cal. App. 5th at 307. (alteration omitted).
    Second, the bill changed the felony-murder rule by
adding section 189(e), which provides that a defendant
cannot be held liable for murder that occurs in the course of
a felony unless the defendant was the actual killer (or “a
major participant” in the conduct leading to murder) and had
the requisite mens rea.10 Id. As the legislature “stated in the
uncodified statutory findings,” “‘[a] person’s culpability for

  Second, under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, a
defendant who aids and abets another in the commission of a crime is
guilty not only of that crime, but also of any other crime that the other
person commits if it is a natural and probable consequence of the crime
originally aided and abetted. See People v. Prettyman, 14 Cal. 4th 248,
254 (1996). For example, “if a person aids and abets only an intended
assault, but a murder results, that person may be guilty of that murder,
even if unintended, if it is a natural and probable consequence of the
intended assault.” People v. McCoy, 25 Cal. 4th 1111, 1117 (2001).
10
     Section 189(e) of the California Penal Code provides:
       A participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration
       of a felony listed in subdivision (a) in which a death occurs
       is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven:
       (1) The person was the actual killer.
       (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent
       to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
       solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the
       commission of murder in the first degree.
       (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying
       felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life,
       as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.
16                         BROWN V. ATCHLEY

murder must be premised upon that person’s own actions
and subjective mens rea.’” Alaybue, 51 Cal. App. 5th at 213
(citing Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1.)
    Third, Senate Bill 1437 added section 1170.95, which
provides a procedure for a defendant convicted of felony
murder or murder under a “natural and probable
consequences” theory to obtain retroactive relief. Id. (citing
Cal. Penal Code § 1170.95(a)).11 To seek relief under
section 1170.95, a petitioner must make a prima facie case
that the petitioner could not be convicted of first or second
degree murder due to the changes in section 188 or 189.12
The sentencing court must then review the application and
determine whether the petitioner “has made a prima facie
case for relief.” Cal. Penal Code § 1170.95(c). If the
petitioner has made a prima facie case, then the court must
hold an evidentiary hearing regarding whether the petitioner
is entitled to relief. Id. § 1170.95(d)(1). At the hearing

11
  Section 1170.95 did not address the crimes for which Brown was
convicted: attempted murder and conspiracy to commit murder.
12
   Specifically, the petitioner had to file a petition in the sentencing court
stating that:
     (1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed
     against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to
     proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder under
     the natural and probable consequences doctrine[;]
     (2) The petitioner was convicted of first degree or second
     degree murder following a trial or accepted a plea offer in
     lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be convicted for
     first degree or second degree murder[;] [and]
     (3) The petitioner could not be convicted of first or second
     degree murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189
     made effective January 1, 2019.
Cal. Penal Code § 1170.95(a)(1)–(3).
                         BROWN V. ATCHLEY                          17

stage, “the burden of proof [is] on the prosecution to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt,” that the petitioner is “guilty of
murder or attempted murder under California law as
amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189.” Id.
§ 1170.95(d)(3). If the prosecution fails to carry its burden,
“the prior conviction, and any allegations and enhancements
attached to the conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner
shall be resentenced on the remaining charges.” Id.
                                 D
    In February 2019, shortly after the effective date of
Senate Bill 1437, Brown filed an application for
resentencing in state court pursuant to section 1170.95.
Brown’s theory was that because he had not been the shooter
or a major participant in the killing, and did not have the
requisite mens rea, his conviction for conspiracy to commit
murder had to be vacated.13 The state court denied his
application. It reasoned that section 1170.95 did not apply
to conspiracy to commit murder, and “it does not look like
the felony murder rule was involved or [the] natural probable
consequences rule was involved in Mr. Brown’s
conviction.” Therefore, the state court found that Brown had
failed to make a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief.
The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s
judgment in November 2020, and the California Supreme
Court affirmed the state court’s denial of Brown’s
application for resentencing in January 2021.

13
    The state trial court considered only Brown’s conviction for
conspiracy to commit murder and the record does not indicate whether
Brown raised an argument regarding his conviction for attempted murder
to the highest state court.
18                     BROWN V. ATCHLEY

                                E
    In May 2020, while Brown’s appeal of this denial to the
California Court of Appeal was still pending, Brown filed
his third federal habeas petition [Case No. 20-16290]. In this
petition, he argued that he was entitled to resentencing under
section 1170.95 for conspiracy to commit murder and
attempted murder, and that his continued incarceration under
the original sentence violated his due process rights. The
district court dismissed the petition as a second or successive
petition because Brown did not have “an order authorizing
the district court to consider the application” as required by
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). Brown then applied for a COA,
claiming that the district court erred in ruling that his petition
was second or successive because his petition was based on
the change in law enacted by Senate Bill 1437. The district
court did not act on the COA, and Brown filed a notice of
appeal in June 2020. In July 2020, we remanded the case to
the district court for the limited purpose of granting or
denying the COA. The district court denied the COA,
holding that jurists of reason would agree that the petition
was second or successive, and again noting that Brown had
not obtained permission to bring such a claim.
    Brown filed his fourth federal habeas petition in April
2021 [Case No. 21-15922] in which he alleged, among other
things, that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in
applying to the state court for resentencing pursuant to
section 1170.95. He also argued that the state court’s denial
of his application violated his equal protection rights because
he was treated differently from other prisoners who had been
convicted of first-degree murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, and were then resentenced
pursuant to the procedure in section 1170.95. In May 2021,
the district court dismissed this petition as second or
                     BROWN V. ATCHLEY                     19

successive because it was “attacking the same conviction
and sentence as [Brown’s] prior federal habeas petition.”
Later the same month, Brown filed a notice of appeal and an
application for a COA. In August 2021, the district court
granted a COA because Brown was not challenging his
conviction and sentence, but was instead claiming his lawyer
rendered ineffective assistance in connection with the
application for a resentencing hearing. At the same time, the
district court overruled its own earlier order denying a COA
as to the May 2020 petition, and instead granted a COA on
the ground that Brown was not attacking his prior
conviction, but rather challenging the denial of his motion
for resentencing.
    We granted Brown’s unopposed motion to consolidate
his appeals of the two federal habeas cases related to his
resentencing denial.
    We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253.
Under AEDPA, we review de novo the district court’s
decision that a petition is second or successive. Lopez, 577
F.3d at 1059; see also Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918,
921 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). The only question before us
is whether the district court erred in dismissing Brown’s
three constitutional claims in his May 2020 and April 2021
habeas petitions as second or successive pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b).
                             III
    We begin by considering the exception established in
Panetti: that a petition is not second or successive when it
raises claims that were not ripe at the time a prior petition
was filed.
20                        BROWN V. ATCHLEY

    Brown raised three constitutional claims to the district
court: a violation of his due process rights, a violation of his
equal protection rights, and ineffective assistance of
counsel.14 Each of these claims related to his application for
resentencing under section 1170.95 and the denial of his
application on March 8, 2019. We consider whether the
events that gave rise to Brown’s constitutional claims
occurred before either his first or second petitions were
denied or dismissed (in 1998 and 2016, respectively). If so,
Brown’s claims could have been brought in either petition
and—consistent with pre-AEDPA abuse of the writ doctrine
requiring claims to be brought at the earliest opportunity—
his petitions are “second or successive.” Panetti, 551 U.S.
at 947; see also Buenrostro, 638 F.3d at 725–26 (noting
“Congress’ clear intent to prohibit us from certifying second-
in-time claims, ripe at the time of a prisoner’s [habeas]
proceeding but not discovered until afterward,” unless a
statutory exception applies).
    We conclude that Brown’s due process, ineffective
assistance of counsel, and equal protection claims did not
become ripe until March 2019, when his application for
resentencing was denied, which occurred well after the
district court denied his first and dismissed his second
habeas petitions. In his third petition, Brown alleged a due
process violation resulting from his continued confinement
after the denial of his application for resentencing. Because

14
   The record does not indicate whether Brown raised his due process,
equal protection, and ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his third
and fourth federal habeas petitions to the highest state court, or instead
challenged only state law errors. It is well established that “‘federal
habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.’” Swarthout v.
Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v.
McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991)).
                          BROWN V. ATCHLEY                            21

his application for resentencing was denied on March 8,
2019, his claim did not ripen until after that date, when he
remained confined. See Morgan, 744 F.3d at 538. In his
fourth petition, Brown alleged that his attorney rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to prepare properly for the
hearing on his application for resentencing.15 Because
Brown must show both deficient performance and prejudice
in order to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
his claim did not arise until after his application was denied
on March 8, 2019. Finally, Brown’s equal protection claim
(also in his fourth habeas petition) was based on his claim
that in denying his resentencing application, the state court
treated him differently from other prisoners who were
resentenced. Again, the facts underlying this claim did not
arise until his resentencing application was denied in March
2019. See Obeid, 707 F.3d at 903.
    Because Brown’s due process, equal protection, and
ineffective assistance of counsel claims were not ripe when
his first federal habeas petition was denied by the district
court or when his second habeas petition was dismissed by
the district court, Brown could not have raised these claims
in his first or second petition, so his failure to do so is not an
abuse of the writ. Therefore, the third and fourth habeas
petitions were not second or successive under 28 U.S.C.

15
  We leave for the district court to determine on remand, if necessary,
whether the fourth petition filed on May 2021 should be construed as an
amendment to the third petition filed on April 2020. See Woods v. Carey,
525 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 2008). For purposes of this opinion, we treat
the two petitions as if they were a single petition.
22                        BROWN V. ATCHLEY

§ 2244(b).16 See Panetti, 551 U.S. at 947; Buenrostro, 638
F.3d at 725.
    Because Brown’s third and fourth petitions were not
second or successive petitions, Brown could bring them
without qualifying for an exception under § 2244(b)(2)(B),
and without obtaining our permission to authorize the district
court to consider them, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A).
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred by
dismissing the petitions for failing to follow the
requirements applicable to second or successive petitions.17
Because we decide on this ground, we do not reach the
parties’ argument that, under Magwood, the state court’s
denial of Brown’s application for resentencing under section
1170.95 constituted a new judgment for purposes of § 2254.
     REVERSED AND REMANDED.

16
  Although Brown filed his third habeas petition in May 2020 (over a
year after his claims ripened) and his fourth habeas petition in April 2021
(over two years after his claims ripened), the government does not argue
that Brown abused the writ by not bringing the claims “as soon as” they
were “first ripe,” Panetti, 551 U.S. at 945, 947, so any such argument is
forfeited, see Williams v. United States, 927 F.3d 427, 439 (6th Cir.
2019).
17
   The government has not forfeited the argument that Brown failed to
exhaust his challenges to the conviction for attempted murder or his
constitutional claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3) (“A State shall not be
deemed to have waived the exhaustion requirement or be estopped from
reliance upon the requirement unless the State, through counsel,
expressly waives the requirement.”). On remand, if the district court
determines that Brown’s claims are not barred by AEDPA’s statute of
limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), the district court may consider
whether it may stay the habeas proceedings to allow Brown to exhaust
any unexhausted claims, see Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 276–77
(2005); Mena v. Long, 813 F.3d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 2016) (applying
Rhines to a petition that raises only exhausted claims).
                         BROWN V. ATCHLEY                            23

IKUTA, Circuit Judge, concurring:

    We hold today that Brown’s petition is not second or
successive because he raises a claim that was not ripe at the
time his prior petitions were filed. Nevertheless, we do the
parties a disservice by declining to address their primary
argument in this case.
    In his opening brief on appeal, Brown relied on an
argument based on our decision in Clayton v. Biter, 868 F.3d
840 (9th Cir. 2017). As explained in more detail below,
Clayton held that the denial of a motion for resentencing
under section 1170.126 of the California Penal Code
constituted a new judgment, and that a habeas petition
challenging that new judgment was not second or successive
for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). 1 Id. at 843. Brown
argued that the same reasoning applied to the denial of his
motion for resentencing under section 1170.95 of the
California Penal Code. Underlining the importance of this
argument, the government conceded that under the reasoning
of Clayton, the state trial court’s order denying Brown’s
petition for resentencing constituted a new, appealable
judgment. Nor are the parties alone in relying on Clayton in
this context. District courts in our circuit have consistently
relied on Clayton to conclude that the denial of resentencing
under section 1170.95 is a new judgment, such that
challenges to such a denial are not second or successive. 2

1
  As noted in the majority decision, the Supreme Court has made clear
that a habeas petition is second or successive only if it challenges the
same judgment as the prior petition, not a new judgment. See Magwood
v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 331 (2010).
2
 See, e.g., Allen v. Madden, 2021 WL 4731342, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr.
12, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 4732581
(C.D. Cal. May 5, 2021); Vasquez v. Allison, 2021 WL 1164470, at *3
24                       BROWN V. ATCHLEY

Moreover, multiple petitioners whose section 1170.95
applications for resentencing were denied in state court have
pending motions seeking our permission to file a second or
successive petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). 3
There is no question that we have authority to consider
whether the denial of resentencing under section 1170.95 is
a new judgment: “[p]anels often confront cases raising
multiple issues that could be dispositive, yet they find it
appropriate to resolve several, in order to avoid repetition of
errors on remand or provide guidance for future cases.”
United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 914 (9th Cir. 2001)
(en banc) (per curiam) (Kozinski, J., concurring); see also
United States v. Vallejo, 237 F.3d 1008, 1026 n.9 (9th Cir.
2001) (recognizing four “independent grounds for reversal”
and remanding for a new trial). Indeed, when we give “clear
direction to the district court on how to proceed” with respect
to an issue raised by the parties, it is “binding precedent,
even if characterized as an alternative holding.” Operating
Eng’rs Pension Tr. v. Charles Minor Equip. Rental, Inc., 766
F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir.), amended, 778 F.2d 538 (9th Cir.
1985). For the reasons explained below, we should hold that
the state court’s denial of Brown’s application for

(C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2021); Young v. Cueva, 2020 WL 8455474, at *2
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2020); Kirkpatrick v. Foss, 2019 WL 4859062, at *1
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2019); Esparza v. Lizarraga, 2019 WL 6749449, at *5
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL
5589040 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2019).
3
  See Prado v. Cueva, Case No. 21-71427; Torlucci v. Allen, Case No.
22-155; Fegan v. Matterson, Case No. 22-722; Cole v. Cates, Case No.
22-1119; George v. Cisneros, Case No. 22-1496; Khan v. Broomfield,
Case No. 22-1497; Cervantes v. Cisneros, Case No. 22-1600; Millender
v. Cates; Case No. 22-1755.
                         BROWN V. ATCHLEY                          25

resentencing under section 1170.95 did not constitute a new
judgment for purposes of § 2254.
                                  I
    In considering the question whether Brown’s petitions
are challenging a new judgment, we must apply California
law because “a state court’s interpretation of state law . . .
binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.” Bradshaw v.
Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (per curiam). We “look to
state law to determine what constitutes a new or intervening
judgment.” Clayton, 868 F.3d at 844.
    California courts have determined that when a prisoner
submits an application to a state trial court claiming prima
facie eligibility for relief under section 1170.95, the trial
court’s initial eligibility determination regarding
resentencing is only the first step in a multi-step process that
may result in a resentencing. See People v. Hampton, 74
Cal. App. 5th 1092, 1101 (2022). As such, the first step,
without more, does not change a prisoner’s sentence and is
therefore not a new judgment. Id. In Hampton, a state trial
court held that a prisoner convicted of murder had made a
prima facie case that he was entitled to relief under section
1170.95. Id. at 1098. After an evidentiary hearing, the court
held that the government failed to carry its burden of proving
the prisoner was ineligible for relief, and therefore issued an
order granting the application under section 1170.95. Id. 4
    When the government appealed the order granting the
application, the prisoner argued that the government could
not appeal. Id. at 1100. The prisoner reasoned that the “right
to appeal is statutory, and appeals that do not fall within the

4
  The state trial court subsequently vacated the murder conviction and
resentenced the prisoner. Id.
26                    BROWN V. ATCHLEY

exact statutory language” of section 1238 of the California
Penal Code “are prohibited.” Id. (citing People v. Salgado,
88 Cal. App. 4th 5, 11 (2001)). Because section 1238 did
not allow an appeal from a final judgment in a criminal case,
id. at 1101–02, the prisoner argued that the government
could not appeal the order granting resentencing, which
constituted a new judgment, id. at 1101.
     The California Court of Appeal rejected this argument.
The court first noted that section 1238 allows the
government to appeal “[a]n order made after judgment,
affecting the substantial rights of the people.” Id. at 1101.
The court explained that the government was challenging the
trial court’s conclusion that the prisoner was entitled to
relief. Id. at 1102. This was a preliminary decision “that
then required the court to vacate the murder conviction and
resentence [the] defendant,” not a new sentence imposed in
a resentencing hearing (which would be a final judgment).
Id.; see also People v. McKenzie, 25 Cal. App. 5th 1207,
1213 (2018), aff’d, 9 Cal. 5th 40 (2020) (“In a criminal case,
the sentence is the judgment.”). Because “the trial court’s
order finding defendant entitled to relief under section
1170.95” was merely a threshold ruling, it was an appealable
post-judgment order, not a new judgment. Hampton, 74 Cal.
App. 5th at 1102.
                              II
    The same reasoning applies here. Brown’s third and
fourth federal habeas petitions are challenging an order
denying his eligibility for relief under section 1170.95.
According to Hampton, a prima facie determination
regarding eligibility for resentencing under section 1170.95
does not constitute a new judgment. 74 Cal. App. 5th at
1101. Therefore, Brown’s petitions are not challenging a
                      BROWN V. ATCHLEY                      27

“new judgment” as in Magwood, but are instead challenging
a post-judgment order and asking for resentencing, which
would entail vacatur of his original sentence. The rule that
a petition challenging a new judgment is not second or
successive is therefore inapplicable. See Magwood, 561
U.S. at 332–33.
    Brown argues that, notwithstanding Hampton, our
decision in Clayton compels the conclusion that the denial
of a petition for resentencing relief should be viewed as a
new judgment. This argument fails. Clayton involved the
procedure for implementing California’s Three Strikes
Reform Act of 2012 (which requires that a third strike
generally has to be a serious or violent felony). See 868 F.3d
at 842. Section 1170.126 of the California Penal Code
provides a procedure for prisoners sentenced under the prior
Three Strikes law to apply for resentencing.                Id.
Recognizing that under California law, a prisoner may take
an appeal from any post-judgment order “affecting the
substantial rights of the party,” id. at 844 (citing Cal. Penal
Code § 1237), Clayton held that “a denial of a resentencing
petition under section 1170.126” qualifies as “an appealable
‘postjudgment order affecting the substantial rights of the
party, ’” id. (quoting Teal v. Superior Ct., 60 Cal. 4th 595,
598 (2014)). This is consistent with Hampton. See 74 Cal.
App. 5th at 1102. But instead of stopping there, Clayton
added, without explanation, that such a denial was not only
an appealable post-judgment order, but also constituted a
new judgment. See 868 F.3d at 844 (holding that because
“under California law, a resentencing petition does not
challenge the underlying conviction or sentence” but seeks a
resentencing proceeding, “[t]he denial of [the petitioner’s]
section 1170.126 petition therefore constitutes a new
judgment.”). Therefore, Clayton concluded that a state
28                    BROWN V. ATCHLEY

prisoner’s second-in-time federal habeas petition
challenging an order denying the prisoner’s application for
resentencing pursuant to section 1170.126 was not second or
successive, because it challenged a new judgment. Id. at
846.
    In reaching this conclusion, Clayton did not have the
benefit of Hampton, which made clear that an order
addressing prima facie eligibility for relief from a sentence
is only a post-judgment order, not a new judgment. Because
Hampton was decided after Clayton, and is directly on point
in addressing section 1170.95, we are bound by Hampton,
not Clayton. Cf. Ocwen Loan Servicing, L.L.C. v. Berry, 852
F.3d 469, 473 (5th Cir. 2017) (holding that “[i]n diversity
cases”—where state court decisions likewise bind us—“we
are to follow subsequent state court decisions that are clearly
contrary to a previous decision of this court” (citation
omitted)). Therefore, Brown’s reliance on Clayton and his
reading of Hampton are unavailing.
    The government also misreads Hampton. It argues that
although Hampton held that an order granting relief under
section 1170.95 was not a custodial judgment, the order in
this case was distinguishable because it was an appealable
post-judgment order that constituted a new legal event
separate from the original custodial judgment. As such, the
government argues, it can be challenged by a second habeas
petition. This argument fails. The Supreme Court has
clarified that a habeas petitioner must “ask for relief from the
state court judgment contested” (under which a prisoner is
incarcerated). Magwood, 561 U.S. at 334 n.9 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Brown’s application
under section 1170.95 is an application to vacate the state
court judgment authorizing Brown’s current confinement.
Because the state has determined that the denial of such an
                       BROWN V. ATCHLEY                        29

application is not itself a new judgment, see Hampton, 74
Cal. App. 5th at 1101, Brown cannot escape the second or
successive bar on the basis of the denial of resentencing
being a new legal event. Regardless whether it is a new legal
event, it is not a new custodial judgment under Magwood,
and is therefore irrelevant to the second or successive
inquiry. Therefore the government’s attempt to distinguish
Hampton is unavailing.
                               III
    Because Clayton has caused confusion for prisoners, the
government, and the district courts regarding the import of a
denial of a motion for resentencing, we should ensure the
public receives “the normal law-clarifying benefits that
come from an appellate decision on a question of law.”
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 561 (1988). “The role
of the appellate court in theory, of course, is to right the legal
wrongs that occur in the district courts and, in the course of
so doing, to explain to the parties the error in the arguments
they advance in defense of and challenge to the district
court’s judgment.” Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc.
v. Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d 425, 449 (4th Cir. 2003) (Luttig, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). We should do so
here.