Court Opinion

ID: 2964760
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:30:39.7215+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:37:25.753427
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                ____________________
       No. 96-2351
                                  JOHN DOE, ET AL.,
                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,
                                         v.
                                BRUCE MOFFAT, ET AL.,
                               Defendants, Appellees.
                                ____________________
                    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
                      [Hon. Mary M. Lisi, U.S. District Judge]
                                ____________________
                                       Before
                               Selya, Boudin and Stahl,
                                   Circuit Judges.
                                ____________________
            Gerard McG.DeCelles and Stephen A. DeLeo on brief for appellants.
            Jeffrey B.  Pine, Attorney General,  and James R.  Lee, Assistant
       Attorney General, on brief for appellees.
                                ____________________
                                    JUNE 11, 1997
                                ____________________

                      Per  Curiam.   We  have  carefully  considered  the
            relevant case  law, the record and  the parties' briefs.   We
            affirm the district  court's decision  substantially for  the
            reasons 
                   stated 
                          in 
                            its 
                                Memorandum and Order of October 22, 1996.
            We add only the following comments.
                 I. Damages Claims
                 In the context of a  state actor's entry into a home  to
            investigate 
                       a report of child abuse or neglect and to remove a
            child 
                 from 
                      his 
                         parents' 
                                  custody, the standards under the Fourth
            Amendment 
                     and 
                         the 
                            Due 
                                Process Clause are essentially the same.1
            The search fits within the exigent circumstances exception to
            the 
               Fourth 
                     Amendment's 
                                 warrant requirement if "the state actors
            making the search . . .  have reason to believe that life  or
            limb is  in  immediate jeopardy  and  that the  intrusion  is
            reasonably 
                      necessary 
                               to 
                                  alleviate the threat."  Good v. Dauphin
            County Social Services, 891 F.2d 1087, 1094 (3d Cir.  1989). 
                 Similarly, the Due  Process Clause tolerates  officials'
            taking  custody  without  a prior  hearing  "if  a  child  is
            immediately 
                       threatened with harm or is bereft of adequate care
               1 We assume, without deciding, that the Fourth Amendment's
            warrant and probable cause requirements apply in this
            context. But cf. McCabe v. Life-Line Ambulance Service, 77
            F.3d 540 (1st Cir.) (reversing decision denying defendants'
            motion for summary judgment on ground that city's policy of
            permitting police officers to execute civil commitment orders
            by means of forcible entries into private residences fell
            within the "special need" exception to Fourth Amendment
            warrant requirement), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 117 S. Ct.
            275 (1996). 
                                         -2-

            or 
              supervision. . . . [I]t is sufficient if the officials have
            been presented  with evidence  of serious  ongoing abuse  and
            therefore have reason to fear imminent recurrence."  Robinson
            v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 922 (2d Cir. 1987).  See also Weller v.
            Dept. 
                 of 
                    Social Services for Baltimore, 901 F.2d 387, 393 (4th
            Cir. 1990) ("Due process does not mandate a prior hearing  in
            cases where  emergency  action may  be  needed to  protect  a
            child."); Lossman v.  Pekerske, 707 F.2d  288, 291 (7th  Cir.
            1983)  ("When  a  child's  safety  is  threatened,  that   is
            justification 
                         enough 
                               for 
                                   action first and hearing afterward.").
                 "In order to survive the 'swing of the summary  judgment
            axe,' the nonmoving  party must produce  evidence on which  a
            reasonable 
                      finder of fact, under the appropriate proof burden,
            could 
                 base 
                      a 
                        verdict for it; if that party cannot produce such
            evidence, 
                     the 
                        motion 
                               must be granted."  Ayala-Gerena v. Bristol
            Myers-Squibb 
                        Co., 95 F.3d 86, 94 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting Mack
            v. 
              Great 
                    Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., Inc., 871 F.2d 179, 181
            (1st Cir. 1989)).   Given appellants' failure to provide  any
            factual support for their claims, the district court properly
                                         -3-

            took defendants' statement of uncontested facts as admitted.2
            See id. at 95.
                 Even 
                     if 
                        on 
                           the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most
            favorable 
                     to 
                        appellants, a reasonable jury could conclude that
            the 
               foregoing requirements of the Fourth Amendment and the Due
            Process 
                   Clause were not met in this case, the defendants would
            be entitled to qualified immunity.  No reasonable jury  could
            conclude on these facts that defendants lacked an objectively
            reasonable basis  for  their decision  to remove  the  infant
            plaintiff. 
                       
                       S
                        ee Hollingsworth v. Hill, 110 F.3d 733, 741 (10th
            Cir. 1997);  Van  Emrik v.  Chemung  County Dept.  of  Social
            Services, 911 F.2d 863, 866 (2d Cir. 1990).  With respect  to
            defendant  Rhode Island  Department  of Children,  Youth  and
            Families, "[i]t is settled beyond peradventure . . . that . .
            . 
             a 
               state 
                     agency 
                           . 
                             . 
                               . 
                                 may not be sued for damages in a section
            1983 action."  Johnson  v. Rodriguez, 943 F.2d 104, 108  (1st
            Cir. 1991).
                 II. Stay of Discovery
                 Appellants 
                           argue that their ability to oppose the summary
            judgment motion was hampered by the order staying  discovery.
               2  Appellants argue that they provided factual support in
            the form of references to a transcript of a Rhode Island
            Family Court proceeding.  As appellants concede, however,
            that transcript was not submitted to the district court (nor
            has it been submitted to this court) and, therefore, the
            references thereto are mere "unsupported factual allegations"
            which were properly disregarded by the district court. 
            Ayala-Gerena, 95 F.3d at 95.
                                         -4-

            "It is well settled that the trial judge has broad discretion
            in ruling on pre-trial management matters, and we review  the
            district  court's  denial  of  discovery  for  abuse  of  its
            considerable  discretion."   Ayala-Gerena,  95  F.3d  at  91.
            Appellants' opposition to  summary judgment was  "deafeningly
            silent 
                  as 
                     to 
                        their inability to oppose summary judgment due to
            incomplete discovery."  Id. at 92.  Appellants still have not
            identified how their opposition was hampered by the  district
            court's order staying discovery.  Under these  circumstances,
            appellants' argument that  summary judgment was premature  in
            this case is without merit.  See R.W. Intern. Corp. v.  Welch
            Food, Inc., 13 F.3d 478, 488 (1st Cir. 1994).
                 The district court  judgment is affirmed.   See Loc.  R.
            27.1.
                                         -5-