Court Opinion

ID: 2965903
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:46:12.428806+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:07.834677
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                 United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit

No. 98-2164

                       DIANA ORTIZ-ANGLADA,

                      Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                v.

                 DR. HECTOR ORTIZ-PEREZ, ET AL.,

                      Defendants, Appellees.

           APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
                                
       [Hon. Juan M. Perez-Gimenez, U.S. District Judge]
                                
                                
                                
                             Before
                                
                      Lynch, Circuit Judge,
             Coffin and Cyr, Senior Circuit Judges.
                                
                                
                                
                                
     Kevin G. Little on brief for appellant.
     Alfonso Miranda Cardenas, Pedro J. Cordova, Jose A. Miranda
Daleccio, Jose E. O'Neill Font and Carlos A. Ortiz Morales on brief
for appellees.

July 19, 1999

                                
                                

     COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge.  Plaintiff-appellant Diana Ortiz
Anglada claims that the district court abused its discretion when
it sua sponte and without notice dismissed her medical malpractice
action for lack of prosecution.  We agree that the circumstances do
not warrant such a harsh sanction, and therefore reverse.
     Ortiz filed this lawsuit on July 18, 1996, against Dr. Hector
Ortiz-Perez and the clinic for which he worked.  The case docket
reveals that proceedings occurred regularly through April 1, 1997. 
Although the next docket entry is the dismissal order of August 4,
1998, it appears undisputed that activity involving both parties
continued at a normal pace through September 1997, when the
transcript of plaintiff's deposition was prepared and circulated. 
In addition, the record shows that in January 1998 plaintiff was
evaluated by a psychologist in connection with the litigation. 
     Thus, when the district court dismissed the suit, the docket
showed no activity for approximately 16 months, although the case
had been dormant for no more than about seven months.  Plaintiff
was given no warning that the court was considering dismissal, and,
indeed, there had been neither a conference with the judge nor a
scheduling order setting deadlines to move the case along.  See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) ("[T]he district judge . . . shall . . .
enter a scheduling order that limits the time . . . (2) to file
motions; and (3) to complete discovery.") The court's dismissal
order stated:
               It appears from the docket of this case that no
     action has been taken since March 19, 1997.  In view
     thereof, it is hereby ORDERED that this case be
     DISMISSED, for lack of prosecution.

     Seven days after entry of that order, Ortiz filed a request
for reconsideration that listed the discovery activity that had not
been reflected on the docket.  The court was unimpressed.  It noted
plaintiff's responsibility for developing and prosecuting her case
and its own responsibility "'to achieve the orderly and expeditious
disposition of cases,'" and concluded that "plaintiff's
protraction in the instant case is evident and unwarranted." The
court thus denied the motion, and this appeal followed.
     Although our case law gives the district court broad
discretion to dismiss a case to further its case management
responsibilities, disposition on the merits is favored and we
repeatedly have held that a case should not be dismissed with
prejudice except "when a plaintiff's misconduct is particularly
egregious or extreme," Benjamin v. Aroostook Medical Center, Inc.,
57 F.3d 101, 107 (lst Cir. 1995).  We have observed more than once
that 
                    [i]n all the cases in which we have upheld a
          dismissal for want of prosecution, we have
          found either extremely protracted inaction
          (measured in years), disobedience of court
          orders, ignorance of warnings, contumacious
          conduct, or some other aggravating
          circumstance.

Cosme Nieves v. Deshler, 826 F.2d 1, 2 (lst Cir. 1987) (citing
cases); see also Benjamin, 57 F.3d at 108; Estate of Solis-Rivera
v. United States, 993 F.2d 1, 2 (lst Cir. 1993).
     Nothing of the sort occurred here.  Although the case may have
been progressing more slowly than ideal, and the long gap following
the last docketed action understandably troubled the court, it must
bear some responsibility for having failed to impose deadlines
through a scheduling order.  Plaintiff had no reason to suspect her
case was at risk, and plaintiff responded promptly to the
unexpected dismissal with a motion to reconsider it.  See Robson v.
Hallenbeck, 81 F.3d 1, 4 (lst Cir. 1996) ("[A]bsence of warning
that the court was considering dismissal . . . may be a pertinent
factor in evaluating a dismissal, especially if the conduct in
question did not violate a clear preexisting requirement."); Cosme
Nieves, 826 F.2d at 2 ("[Plaintiffs] responded immediately to the
only warning they received   the sua sponte dismissal   with a
motion to the court.")
     This court, and federal courts generally, have warned that the
drastic sanction of dismissal for want of prosecution "should be
employed only when the district court, in the careful exercise of
its discretion, determines that none of the lesser sanctions
available to it would truly be appropriate."  Zavala Santiago v.
Gonzalez Rivera, 553 F.2d 710, 712 (lst Cir. 1977); see also Enlace
Mercantil Internacional v. Senior Industries, 848 F.2d 315, 317
(lst Cir. 1988).  This is a classic case for a lesser sanction.
There has been no showing of particular prejudice to the defendants
or the court and no deliberate disregard of deadlines.  See Robson,
81 F.3d at 2-3.   Indeed, in the absence of a scheduling order, any
action in these circumstances more severe than a warning that
plaintiff should activate and expedite her case seems excessive.
     Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of plaintiff's case and
remand for further proceedings.  The district court retains the
discretion, of course, to dismiss the case if appropriate
circumstances arise.
     Reversed and remanded.