Court Opinion

ID: 9963986
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 18:00:54.647652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:07.470626
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-50595            Document: 42-1         Page: 1      Date Filed: 04/26/2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                               Fifth Circuit

                                   ____________                              FILED
                                                                         April 26, 2024
                                     No. 23-50595                       Lyle W. Cayce
                                   ____________                              Clerk

Jorge Mungaray,

                                                                  Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                          versus

Bryan Collier; Bobby Lumpkin; C. F. Hazelwood; Cephus
Anderson; Bruce Armstrong,

                                            Defendants—Appellees.
                   ______________________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Western District of Texas
                              USDC No. 6:23-CV-95
                   ______________________________

Before Elrod, Duncan, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
       Jorge Mungaray, Texas prisoner # 1056798, appeals from the district
court’s dismissal without prejudice of his civil rights lawsuit for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). We review such dismissals de novo, in the
same way as dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

       _____________________
       *
           This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-50595          Document: 42-1      Page: 2     Date Filed: 04/26/2024

                                   No. 23-50595

Legate v. Livingston, 822 F.3d 207, 209–10 (5th Cir. 2016). All well-pleaded
facts are accordingly accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff. Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 637 (5th Cir. 2013). A
complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted when it does
not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has
facial plausibility” when the plaintiff pleads factual content that “allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. All the same,
we must liberally construe pleadings by pro se plaintiffs. Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
       In his complaint and more definite statement, Mungaray alleged that
the five defendants—all of whom were employees of the Texas Department
of Criminal Justice—had interfered with his Native American religious
practices and had favored other inmates’ Christian religious practices,
thereby violating his rights under the First Amendment, the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act.
       As to defendants Bryan Collier, Bobby Lumpkin, C. F. Hazelwood,
and Bruce Armstrong, Mungaray’s complaint and more definite statement
fail to allege that these supervisory officials were personally involved in any
constitutional violation or implemented any policy that caused a
constitutional violation. See Gates v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs.,
537 F.3d 404, 435 (5th Cir. 2008). An official may not be held vicariously
liable simply by virtue of his role as supervisor or employer. Monell v. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692–93 (1978). Accordingly, the
district court was correct to dismiss Mungaray’s claims against these
defendants. And as to Mungaray’s RLUIPA claims, on appeal he merely

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                                  No. 23-50595

states in conclusory fashion that he met his initial burden under that statute,
which is insufficient to support a challenge to the district court’s judgment.
Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224–25 (5th Cir. 1993).
       However, Mungaray does allege that defendant Cephus Anderson
was directly involved in violations of his constitutional rights. His claims
against Anderson therefore require further examination.
       While prison officials need not give every religious denomination
identical treatment, they must nonetheless afford “reasonable oportunities
[sic] . . . to all prisoners to exercise the religious freedom guaranteed by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.” Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2
(1972). Under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, any limits
placed on a prisoner’s religious exercise must “reasonably relate[] to
legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
And under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, the state
may not engage in “purposeful discrimination resulting in a discriminatory
effect among persons similarly situated.” Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112,
123 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 566 (5th Cir.
2004)).
       The district court permitted Mungaray to file a more definite
statement so that he could specifically state every injury that he alleges he
suffered. Mungaray alleges that Anderson is the head chaplain for his unit of
the prison and is responsible for the unit’s religious programs and for
scheduling time for religious musical groups to play and practice. Mungaray
alleges that Anderson intentionally cancelled timeslots for the Native
American religious group while permitting Christian groups to proceed with
theirs, and that Anderson said that he “did not care about the Native
American community.” Mungaray also alleged in his original complaint that
Anderson told Native American prisoners: “You worship and get what I

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allow you to. Ya’ll need Jesus and to quit practicing this witch craft and devil
worship.”
       While Anderson’s alleged statements might indicate discriminatory
purpose, Mungaray has still failed to describe his injuries with the requisite
level of specificity. Even construing Mungaray’s pleadings liberally, Haines,
404 U.S. at 520, we agree with the district court that it is unclear when any
of the alleged events occurred or for how long they had been ongoing. Cf.
Wooten v. McDonald Transit Assocs., Inc., 788 F.3d 490, 498 (5th Cir. 2015)
(sparsely detailed allegations sufficient where plaintiff nonetheless provided
dates and timeline of events). Mungaray’s vague reference to Anderson’s
cancelling Native American musical practices is insufficient to state a claim
for violation of Mungaray’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (plaintiff must provide more than an “unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”).
       Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

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