Court Opinion

ID: 9447243
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 22:29:41.735759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:57.450626
License: Public Domain

SOBELOFF, Chief Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I fully concur in the opinion and judgment of the court that there was no error in the trial of Mike Milanovich and that his conviction should be affirmed. Also I agree with the court in its frank recognition that as to Virginia Milanovich the District Court erred in failing to instruct the jury, as requested, that they could not convict her of both larceny and receiving the goods stolen. However I do not agree that the error can be deemed nonprejudicial and therefore does not require reversal of the judgment as to her.
It is difficult to convince oneself that Virginia Milanovich was not harmed by the admitted error. It is notable that, although her husband, who was convicted of larceny only, was sentenced to a five year term, her sentence for the larceny was ten years. Who can say that if she had been convicted on the larceny count only, the sentence would still have been ten years? Does not the situation strongly suggest that the five year sentence for receiving was made concurrent with the ten year sentence for larceny precisely because the latter already reflected the punishment for the receiving ? True, this cannot be demonstrated one way or the other, but the uncertainty must in fairness be resolved in favor of the defendant.
However, even if it could be assumed that Virginia Milanovich’s ten year sentence for larceny did not reflect punishment for receiving, I think that she is entitled to a new trial for a more fundamental reason. The majority takes the position that the jury had no alternative but to convict her of larceny and not of receiving. The opinion goes on to say that the appropriate instruction to the jury “should have been to acquit on the receiving count if it found her guilty on the larceny count.” I think the proper instruction would have been that the jury could convict of either larceny or *722receiving but not both. T-he judge should not, I submit, indicate to the jury that the larceny and not the receiving is the principal offense.
The result reached' by the majority is made possible only by assuming that larceny was the primary offense of which Virginia was guilty, and that the receiving count is of a secondary character coming into play only after the defendant has been acquitted of the larceny. This is contrary to the traditional idea concerning larceny and receiving, that they are separate, distinct, and inconsistent offenses. The two crimes contemplate separate individuals performing entirely different roles. Kirby v. United States, 1899, 174 U.S. 47, 19 S.Ct. 574, 43 L.Ed. 890; Heflin v. United. States, 1959, 358 U.S. 415, 79 S.Ct. 451, 3 L.Ed.2d 407; Springer v. State, 1897, 102 Ga. 447, 30 S.E. 971; People v. Barnhill, 1928, 333 Ill. 150, 164 N.E. 154; State v. Tindall, 1948, 213 S.C. 484, 50 S.E.2d 188; 2 Wharton’s Criminal Law and Procedure (1957 ed.) section 566; 45 Am.Jur., Receiving Stolen Property, section 2. The general rule, where one cannot be convicted of both stealing and receiving the same goods, is that the prosecution need not elect between counts but such election is for the jury, upon proper instructions. 45 Am.Jur., Receiving Stolen Property, section 13 and section 20. By the affirmance of the conviction, the jury is deprived of its function to make the choice, and instead an appellate court makes it.
If Virginia Milanovich had been a principal in the first degree, i. e., one of the actual thieves, with the evidence overwhelmingly establishing larceny rather than receiving, then perhaps the reasoning of the majority would be more plausible, though still questionable. See People v. Daghita, 1950, 301 N.Y. 223, 93 N.E.2d 649. In the present case, however, although only one overall transaction was involved (thereby precluding a conviction for both offenses), there was different evidence establishing each offense. While the receiving by the actual thieves took place immediately upon the theft, we do not know from the record when Virginia received the goods. There was separate and distinct evidence connecting her with receiving. She was seen two weeks later counting the money and a suitcase with the money was found in her home. The evidence implicating •her in the larceny, i. e., assisting in the .planning of the theft and going to the scene of the crime, consisted entirely of the testimony of admitted thieves, while the testimony showing receiving was corroborated by the additional physical proof, produced by reputable witnesses, of the suitcase of money found in her home. The jury, which admittedly deemed the evidence sufficient to establish both offenses, might well have thought the evidence of receiving was the more credible; if told that they could convict of one charge only, they might well have preferred the receiving count. For the receiving Virginia Milanovich was given only five years. The choice should have been left to the jury, and since they might reasonably have convicted of receiving instead of larceny, and since a lesser sentence was imposed for receiving, this court should not allow the greater sentence to stand. See State v. Sweat, 1952, 221 S.C. 270, 70 S.E.2d 234, where in a factual situation similar to the present one, the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the conviction of the defendant for receiving rather than larceny was justified. It cannot be assumed that if she had been convicted of the receiving rather than the larceny, the court would then have imposed a ten year sentence instead of five.
It is suggested that the case falls within the rule, exemplified in a long line of federal decisions, that where the judgment is on an indictment containing multiple counts, if any one of them, standing alone, is good and will support the judgment, it will be affirmed. These cases all involved attacks upon one or more counts of an indictment on the ground that the counts did not state facts sufficient to constitute an offense (e. g., Claassen v. United States, 142 U.S. 140, 12 S.Ct. 169, 35 L.Ed. 966), or that the *723counts charged an offense which was not constitutionally permissible (e. g., Hirabayshi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 63 S.Ct. 1375, 87 L.Ed. 1774), or that the evidence was insufficient to convict under one or more of the counts (e. g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 40 S.Ct. 17, 63 L.Ed. 1173). In such cases, if one count was found unobjectionable on the above grounds, and the sentence did not exceed what could lawfully have been imposed upon that count, the conviction was affirmed. The present case poses a quite different problem. The defendant’s attack is not directed at one or more independent counts of an indictment but at the jury’s failure, because of erroneous instructions, to elect between the two counts.
It bears repeating that the validity or sufficiency of none of the counts is assailed. Rather the complaint is that if the jury had been correctly instructed, the jury might have elected to acquit of larceny and convict of receiving, for which the sentence imposed was only five years. The rule of the above cases is applicable when there is one good count unaffected by the others, the bad counts. Here, however, the larceny count is not a “good” count unaffected by the receiving. The two counts are not independent but interrelated. They do affect each other. Either standing alone would be good, but standing together, convictions upon both are inconsistent as a matter of law, when directed against the same person. Thus, because of the erroneous instructions, the larceny count will not support the ten year total sentence.
Nor does Heflin v. United States, 1959, 358 U.S. 415, 79 S.Ct. 451, 3 L.Ed.2d 407, afford any support for the judgment below. In Heflin, the defendant moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255, and while the reported opinions do not specify which sentence was being attacked, the inference is clear that the defendant was asking only that the receiving sentence be struck down. Here we have a direct appeal from the conviction, not an attempt to revise a sentence.
Moreover, the result reached by the majority appears to be directly contradictory to the decided cases involving the specific problem here, i. e., the appropriate remedy where there is a concededly erroneous conviction for both stealing and receiving the same goods. Although there appear to be no federal cases exactly in point, the state cases have generally reversed such convictions. In Commonwealth v. Haskins, 1880, 128 Mass. 60, the leading case on this subject, the defendant was indicted for both larceny of a cow and receiving it knowing it to have been stolen. The jury found him guilty of both counts, but after the verdict, the trial judge, upon the state’s motion, allowed a nolle prosequi to be entered as to the receiving count. This attempt of the prosecutor to retrieve the situation proved unavailing. In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts said:
“The record, therefore, notwithstanding the entry of the nolle prosequi shows that the defendants had been convicted by the jury upon both counts; and although, as a legal effect of a conviction upon each count it cannot be said strictly that it is an acquittal upon the other, yet the finding of guilty upon both is inconsistent in law, and is conclusive of a mistrial. It would have been quite proper, before the record and affirmation of the verdict, for the presiding judge to have called the attention of the jury to their misunderstanding of his previous instructions, and to have explained to them the mode by which it became their duty, if they convicted upon either of the counts, to acquit upon the other, and to have required of them to retire for further deliberation. * * * After the affirmation of the verdict, when there was no means of knowing of record upon which count the jury intended to convict, as there was no right in them to convict upon both, to assume that the error is corrected by a nolle prosequi of either count by the dis*724trict attorney, is to permit the district attorney to determine, instead of the jury, upon which count the defendants were guilty. But the nolle prosequi corrects no error, and has no effect upon the record as it stood prior to its entry. The record showed a verdict so inconsistent with itself, and so uncertain in law, that no judgment could be entered upon it.”
This reasoning is cogent and convincing, not only as to the inability of the prosecutor to second guess the jury but also to delimit the prerogative of the appellate court.
In Bargesser v. State, 1928, 95 Fla. 404, 406, 116 So. 12, where the defendant was improperly convicted of larceny of an automobile and also receiving the same, the Supreme Court of Florida stated:
“Although a count charging each of these offenses against the same person and with respect to the same property may properly be included in one information, a verdict which in effect finds the defendant guilty both as a principal in the larceny and as a receiver of the same goods which he himself has stolen is inconsistent, and no judgment can be rendered upon it, although the evidence might sustain a conviction under either count.” (Emphasis supplied) .
It is no answer in our case, therefore, to say, “the verdict of guilty on the larceny count is abundantly supported by the evidence.” Returning to the Florida case, the court concluded at page 408 of 95 Fla., at page 13 of 116 So.:
“Since the defendant, under the evidence in this case, could not in law be guilty of both of these offenses, of which one did the jury find him guilty ? The proof renders this uncertain. Under the circumstances, the verdict does not aid the matter, nor can the verdict be construed, under the usual rules, with reference to the pleadings and proof so as to clarify the situation. Since the verdict is one which the law does not authorize, the judgment entered thereon must be, and is hereby, reversed.”
See also Tobin v. People, 1882, 104 Ill. 565; State v. Hamilton, 1934, 172 S.C. 453, 174 S.E. 396; 32 Am.Jur., Larceny, section 155; and cases cited in Annotation, 136 A.L.R. 1087.
To summarize: Just as it is not for judges but for the jury, where a jury trial has been prayed, to find a verdict of guilty, however plain the case may appear to be, so judges may not assume to choose between alternatives available to the jury. Judges may not do so even for the laudable purpose of preventing the possibility of error on the jury’s part. Likewise, if guilt is pronounced on two counts where under proper instructions conviction could be permitted on only one, neither the district judge nor the appellate judges may take it upon themselves to speculate which count the twelve jurors would have unanimously picked if they had been correctly instructed. Virginia Milanovich was entitled to have the choice made under proper instructions by the jury before whom she elected to be tried; without this, she may not be deprived of her liberty.
Since we cannot be certain what the jury would have decided if not erroneously charged, the doubt must be resolved in her favor. Either she should be given the benefit of the lesser sentence, or a new trial should be awarded.