Court Opinion

ID: 9897361
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:37.673784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:44.498302
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                           Jun 22 2023, 9:03 am

                                                                               CLERK
                                                                           Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                              Court of Appeals
                                                                                and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Karen Celestino-Horseman                                   Rori L. Goldman
Austin & Jones, P.C.                                       Brandais H. Hagerty
Indianapolis, Indiana                                      Hill Knotts & Goldman, LLC
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                             IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Patricia Dorsett,                                          June 22, 2023
Appellant-Plaintiff,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           22A-SC-2948
        v.                                                 Appeal from the Hamilton
                                                           Superior Court
Dr. Jenna Lubitz, DVM,                                     The Honorable P. Chadwick Hill,
Appellee-Defendant                                         Magistrate
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           29D05-2208-SC-6133

                                Opinion by Judge Crone
                       Judge Brown and Senior Judge Robb concur.

Crone, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-SC-2948 | June 22, 2023                              Page 1 of 9
      Case Summary
[1]   Patricia Dorsett appeals the small claims court’s dismissal of her negligence

      claim against Dr. Jenna Lubitz, DVM. We reverse and remand.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   On September 11, 2020, Dorsett took her nearly fifteen-year-old dog, Walter, to

      MedVet Animal Hospital for emergency veterinary care. Dorsett had taken

      Walter to MedVet the day prior due to excessive vomiting and lethargy. Walter

      was treated and discharged, and Dorsett was advised by the veterinarian on

      duty to monitor him overnight and return in the morning for an ultrasound if

      she felt like his condition did not sufficiently improve.

[3]   At approximately 8:30 a.m. on the morning of September 12, Dorsett returned

      to MedVet with Walter. Dr. Lubitz was the veterinarian on duty. Dorsett

      reported that Walter was not eating or drinking, seemed uncomfortable, and

      was overall weak. Upon physical examination, Walter appeared dehydrated,

      tense, and uncomfortable in his abdomen. Dr. Lubitz had three twenty- to

      thirty-minute phone conversations about Walter with Dorsett that day. 1 During

      those conversations, Dr. Lubitz and Dorsett discussed Walter’s health history,

      his current condition and symptoms, and the treatment options including

      diagnostic testing, medications, and even euthanasia. Walter was eventually

      1
       Due to COVID-19 restrictions, Dorsett remained in her car in the MedVet parking lot while Walter was
      being treated.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-SC-2948 | June 22, 2023                             Page 2 of 9
      admitted to MedVet. An ultrasound revealed evidence of pancreatitis,

      cholangitis, and partial common bile duct obstruction. Dorsett and Dr. Lubitz

      agreed to a plan where Walter would be treated with IV fluids, antinausea

      medications, antibiotics, pain medications, and steroids. Dorsett left MedVet

      around 4:00 p.m. Staff notes indicate that at some point during that day, Walter

      developed a fever, was unable to sit upright on his own, and was crying out in

      pain. Dr. Lubitz increased his pain medications to provide more pain control.

      Dr. Lubitz continued to be in charge of Walter’s care until her shift ended at

      7:00 p.m. Sometime thereafter, Walter’s condition further declined, and he

      experienced cardiac arrest. CPR was initiated by staff, but Walter died.

[4]   In August 2022, Dorsett filed a negligence claim against Dr. Lubitz in the

      Hamilton Superior Court Small Claims Division. She alleged that Dr. Lubitz

      “violated her legal and ethical obligation to disclose fully the clinical condition

      of Walter (dog) to his owner, [Dorsett], and also failed to disclose key aspects of

      his treatment when seeking consent to treat from owner, [Dorsett].” Appellant’s

      App. Vol. 2 at 6. Dorsett sought $900.00 in damages, which she alleged

      represented the cost of medications given to Walter to which she would not

      have consented had she known of his dire condition.

[5]   A hearing was held via Zoom on December 1, 2022. Dorsett appeared pro se,

      and Dr. Lubitz appeared with counsel. At the outset, Dorsett testified and

      explained her negligence theory to the trial court in relevant part as follows:

              Your Honor, this case is about a breach of duty that occurred on
              September 12, 2020 ….

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-SC-2948 | June 22, 2023           Page 3 of 9
              On this day, Dr. Lubitz either intentionally or negligently failed
              in her duties …. She failed to advise me of Walter’s significantly
              deteriorating health over the course of the day while under her
              care and while I sat outside in the parking lot.

              ….

              And because of her failure to provide a reasonable level of candor
              and honesty and detail in her statements to me, I incurred
              additional charges that I would never have consented to had I
              simply known … how much worse Walter had become over the
              course of the day while under her care.

              ….

              I was never advised by Dr. Lubitz that my dog was a very ill pet.
              That was something – I was sitting in the parking lot for eight
              hours that day – that was for her to tell me whether or not he was
              very ill. And if he was, I had already alerted her to the fact that I
              would want to push the euthanasia.

      Tr. Vol. 2 at 6-7, 15. Dorsett also presented several documentary exhibits to

      support her claim.

[6]   At the conclusion of her testimony, the trial court asked Dorsett if she had any

      additional evidence. Dorsett indicated that she wished to call Dr. Lubitz as a

      witness. Defense counsel objected, stating, “Well, she didn’t list my client as a

      witness on her discovery.” Id. at 29. The trial court then informed Dorsett that

      she could not call Dr. Lubitz as her own witness, but that she would be

      permitted to cross-examine Dr. Lubitz after the defense concluded direct

      examination. Dorsett then asked if she could call her husband as a witness.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-SC-2948 | June 22, 2023               Page 4 of 9
      Dorsett admitted that his testimony would likely be cumulative of her own, and

      the trial court denied her request, stating, “I’m not finding that that would be

      beneficial to the Court’s processing of the evidence at this point.” Id. at 30.

[7]   Thereafter, defense counsel called Dr. Lubitz as a witness and conducted direct

      examination. At the conclusion of Dr. Lubitz’s direct testimony, and before

      allowing Dorsett to ask a single question, the trial court sua sponte determined

      that Dr. Lubitz could not be held personally liable for any negligence because

      the court believed that the evidence revealed that she was an employee of

      MedVet. Therefore, the court concluded that Dorsett had essentially “failed to

      state a claim upon which relief can be granted because … this claim was

      brought against the wrong party.” Id. at 65. The court stated that it was denying

      Dorsett’s negligence claim and abruptly ended the hearing. The trial court

      subsequently issued a written order to this effect. Dorsett now appeals.

      Discussion and Decision
[8]   Our standard of review in small claims cases is well settled. Small claims

      judgments are “subject to review as prescribed by relevant Indiana rules and

      statutes.” Ind. Small Claims Rule 11(A). “We review facts from a bench trial

      under a clearly erroneous standard with due deference paid to the trial court’s

      opportunity to assess witness credibility.” Branham v. Varble, 952 N.E.2d 744,

      746 (Ind. 2011). We consider evidence in the light most favorable to the

      judgment, together with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.

      Hastetter v. Fetter Props., LLC, 873 N.E.2d 679, 682 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-SC-2948 | June 22, 2023            Page 5 of 9
[9]    “This deferential standard of review is particularly important in small claims

       actions, where trials are designed to speedily dispense justice by applying

       substantive law between the parties in an informal setting.” Berryhill v. Parkview

       Hosp., 962 N.E.2d 685, 689 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citation omitted). “Although

       the method of proof may be informal, the parties in a small claims court bear

       the same burdens of proof as they would in a regular civil action on the same

       issues.” Spainhower v. Smart & Kessler, LLC, 176 N.E.3d 258, 263 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2021), trans. denied (2022). The party bearing the burden of proof must

       demonstrate that she is entitled to the recovery sought. Id. We review questions

       of law de novo. Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2006).

[10]   Our review of the record here reveals that the trial court sua sponte dismissed

       Dorsett’s negligence claim for “[f]ailure to state a claim upon which relief can

       be granted, which shall include failure to name the real party in interest under

       Rule 17.” Ind. Trial Rule 12(B)(6); see Meyers v. Meyers, 861 N.E.2d 704, 705

       (Ind. 2007) (noting that motion to dismiss asserting Rule 12(B)(6) challenges

       legal sufficiency of complaint). First, we note that ordinarily, “a trial court may

       not sua sponte dismiss an action unless the court lacks jurisdiction or is

       otherwise authorized by statute or the rules of procedure.” Tracy v. Morell, 948

       N.E.2d 855, 862 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Moreover, the trial court dismissed

       Dorsett’s claim based upon its mistaken belief that Dr. Lubitz could not be sued

       personally for negligence because she was an employee of MedVet. On appeal,

       Dorsett asserts, and Dr. Lubitz concedes, that this was clear error. As noted by

       Dorsett, it is well settled that when an employee commits wrongful acts within

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-SC-2948 | June 22, 2023            Page 6 of 9
       the scope of her employment, “[t]he employer and employee are jointly and

       severally liable: both the employer and employee are liable for any injury and

       damages caused by the employee’s negligence, and either or both may be sued

       for such damages at the option of the injured party.” Hogan v. Magnolia Health

       Sys. 41, LLC, 161 N.E.3d 365, 370 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied (2021).

       Accordingly, the trial court clearly erred in concluding that Dorsett could not

       sue Dr. Lubitz personally for negligence.

[11]   Dr. Lubitz maintains that the trial court’s error in this regard was harmless. She

       urges us to simply affirm the trial court and summarily dismiss Dorsett’s claim

       based upon the theory that “Dorsett failed to meet her burden to prove her case

       of veterinary negligence by not presenting expert testimony regarding the

       applicable standard of care which is required in negligence actions against

       professionals where the standard of care is a complicated issue outside the

       understanding of lay persons.” Appellee’s Br. at 15. We agree with Dr. Lubitz

       that the evidentiary standard for a negligence claim against a veterinarian is the

       same as for other highly trained professions in that, in order for the finder of

       fact to know if a professional has complied with the applicable standard of care,

       a party must present expert testimony establishing the standard of care. See, e.g.,

       Methodist Hosps., Inc. v. Johnson, 856 N.E.2d 718, 721 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (to

       establish the applicable standard of care and a breach of that standard in a

       medical negligence case, a plaintiff generally must present expert testimony);

       Troutwine Ests. Dev. Co. v. Comsub Design & Eng’g. Inc., 854 N.E.2d 890, 902 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2006) (same regarding engineers), trans. denied (2007); Storey v. Leonas,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-SC-2948 | June 22, 2023          Page 7 of 9
       904 N.E.2d 229, 238 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (same regarding attorneys), trans.

       denied.

[12]   Nevertheless, the trial court here wholly deprived Dorsett of the opportunity to

       establish that standard of care and properly prove her case. Indeed, Dorsett was

       not required to present her own expert but could have used Dr. Lubitz’s own

       testimony to establish the applicable standard of care. See Perry v. Driehorst, 808

       N.E.2d 765, 769-70 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (noting that defendant/professional’s

       own testimony could be used as sole expert testimony regarding standard of

       care), trans. denied. But the trial court short-circuited the case and dismissed

       Dorsett’s negligence claim on clearly erroneous grounds without giving her the

       opportunity to call and question Dr. Lubitz directly as a witness or, at the very

       least, to cross-examine Dr. Lubitz. This was a denial of due process.

[13]   “Generally stated, due process requires notice, an opportunity to be heard, and

       an opportunity to confront witnesses[,]” Ind. State Bd. of Educ. v. Brownsburg

       Cmty. Sch. Corp., 842 N.E.2d 885, 889 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), and it is well

       established that the informality of small claims proceedings does not supplant

       fundamental rights or constitutional protections. See Morton v. Ivacic, 898

       N.E.2d 1196, 1199 (Ind. 2008) (holding that Due Process Clause of Fourteenth

       Amendment to United States Constitution supersedes informal format of small

       claims case); see also Lowry v. Lanning, 712 N.E.2d 1000, 1001 (Ind. Ct. App.

       1999) (reversing small claims court that denied litigant fundamental right to

       cross-examine witnesses). It was within this informal format that there is no

       question that Dorsett should have been permitted to call Dr. Lubitz as a witness

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-SC-2948 | June 22, 2023           Page 8 of 9
       in her case-in-chief. Dr. Lubitz’s assertion that this trial court decision was

       proper because Dorsett had not identified Dr. Lubitz, the defendant, as a

       testifying witness in discovery was incorrect. Then, compounding that error, the

       trial court inappropriately terminated the proceedings prior to Dorsett being

       allowed to cross-examine Dr. Lubitz, thus denying her the fundamental right to

       cross-examine witnesses. Under the circumstances, we do not have a sufficient

       record from which to conclude that any error in the dismissal was harmless.

       Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new hearing during which Dorsett

       shall be given a full opportunity to prove her case.

[14]   Reversed and remanded.

       Brown, J., and Robb, Sr.J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-SC-2948 | June 22, 2023           Page 9 of 9