Court Opinion

ID: 9687999
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:56:34.866893+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:34.009530
License: Public Domain

RAWLINGS, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
As disclosed by the majority opinion, the original divorce decree incorporated a stipulation dividing property by which:
“Defendant-wife received the 165-acre farm, all farming equipment, crops, all bonds, checking accounts not in plaintiff-husband’s name and other personal property. Plaintiff-husband received his clothing, sporting equipment, books and a steam engine. Each party kept an automobile. The total value of these various properties is not shown in the record. Defendant-wife promised to pay plaintiff $30,000, of which $15,000 was to be paid at the entry of the decree, the remainder to be paid at the rate of $2000 per year. Plaintiff-husband further agreed to make the monthly payments contested herein.”
Child support is not here involved.
Under these circumstances this statement in Wolter v. Wolter, 183 Neb. 160, 158 N.W.2d 616, 619, is to me instantly applicable and persuasive:
“ * * * it is against public policy that a woman should have support or its equivalent during the same period from each of two men. * * * ‘ “Aside from positive unseemliness, it is illogical and unreasonable that she should have the equivalent of an obligation for support by way of alimony from a former husband and an obligation from a present husband for an adequate support at the same time. It is her privilege to abandon the provision made by the decree of the court for her support under sanctions of the law for another provision for maintenance which she will obtain by a second marriage; and when she has done so, the law will require her to abide by her election since there is no reason why she should not do so.” ’ Bowman v. Bowman, 163 Neb. 336, 79 N.W.2d 554.”
The net result is, remarriage of a prior marriage alimony recipient should terminate all rights thereto, save and except where a specific lump sum alimony award has been granted. See In re Alcorn, 162 F.Supp. 206, 208-209 (N.D.Cal.S.D.); Barnett v. Barnett, 95 Ariz. 226, 388 P.2d 433, 434—435; Piacquadio v. Piacquadio, 22 Conn.Supp. 47, 159 A.2d 628, 629; Despain v. Despain, 78 Idaho 185, 300 P.2d 500, 503; Evans v. Evans, 212 So.2d 107, 108-109 (Fla.App.); Crum v. Upchurch, 232 Miss. 74, 98 So.2d 117, 121; cf. Berkely v. Berkely, 269 Cal.App.2d 872, 75 Cal.Rptr. 294; Bridges v. Bridges, 217 So.2d 281, 283-284 (Miss.); Flaxman v. Flaxman, 57 N.J. 458, 273 A.2d 567, 569-572; Herscher *116v. Herscher, 51 Misc.2d 921, 274 N.Y.S.2d 295, 297-299.
I would accordingly reverse and remand with instructions that trial court set aside the adjudication from which this appeal is taken and enter decree consistent herewith.