Court Opinion

ID: 9609327
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:26:02.655754+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:44.636750
License: Public Domain

RABINO WITZ, Chief Justice,
concurring.
But for the fact that prior to publication of the court’s opinion in this appeal the parties advised that the matter had been settled, I would have filed a dissenting opinion. Although I can agree with the court’s analysis when co-parties become opposing parties for purposes of Civil Rule 13(a), I do not believe that this construction is facially apparent. Thus I would have held, pursuant to Civil Rule 94, that application of Civil Rule 13(a) to Miller should have been dispensed with to avoid an injus*1363tice.1 For, as indicated previously, a reading of Civil Rule 13(a) and (g) would not invariably lead the practitioners to the conclusion that, in the procedural context of this case, Miller was compelled to file a counterclaim under Rule 13(a).2

. Civil Rule 94 provides:
These rules are designed to facilitate business and advance justice. They may be relaxed or dispensed with by the court in any case where it shall be manifest to the court that a strict ad[h]erence to them will work injustice.

. I note that in Mohr v. State Bank of Stanley, 734 P.2d 1071, 1079 (Kan.1987), the court said in part:
Here, Mohr had a complusory counterclaim to the Bank’s cross-claim in the Airport case. He was advised of that by the trial fudge in this case almost a month before the Airport case was dismissed.
(Emphasis added.) Furthermore, neither Answering Service, Inc. v. Egan, 728 F.2d 1500 (D.C.Cir.1984), nor Hall v. General Motors Corp., 647 F.2d 175 (D.C.Cir.1980), furnished clear precedent for the court's construction of Civil Rule 13(a).