Court Opinion

ID: 9686873
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:10:08.851851+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:08:16.150225
License: Public Domain

J-S23044-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
  QUENTIN M. SALMOND                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :      No. 3037 EDA 2022

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 23, 2022
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
             Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0009615-2012

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                                FILED AUGUST 24, 2023

       Appellant, Quentin M. Salmond, appeals pro se from the order entered

in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which denied as untimely

his second petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1

We affirm.

       The PCRA court set forth the relevant facts of this case as follows:

          On April 12, 2008, at about 12:30 p.m., Joan Hill was
          working at an insurance office located at 5637 Chew Avenue
          when she saw a blue Lincoln town car parked with the
          engine running on Woodlawn Avenue.             A man, later
          identified as [Appellant], dressed in women’s Muslim
          clothing exited the vehicle. Hill believed the man was going
          to rob Skyline Restaurant, located around the corner, so she
          called 9-1-1 and gave the license plate number of the
          vehicle.

          At around noon that day, Kerron Denmark and Kenneth
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1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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       Wiggins went to Skyline Restaurant and Wiggins ordered
       food. Immediately after they left the restaurant with
       Wiggins carrying his food, a man approached them asking
       them for marijuana. As Denmark and Wiggins were walking
       down the street someone yelled “don’t’ f’ing move.”
       Denmark heard gunshots and ran away.

       On April 12, 2008, at 12:44 p.m., while on routine patrol,
       Police Officer Christopher Mulderrig was flagged down by a
       man on the street and told there had been a shooting about
       two blocks away. When Officer Mulderrig arrived at 5643
       Chew Avenue, he observed a male, later identified as
       Wiggins, lying in the street with a gunshot wound to his
       chest. Wiggins subsequently died from this gunshot to his
       chest.

       After the murder, Detective Thorsten Lucke recovered
       surveillance video from Skyline Restaurant.            The
       surveillance video showed Wiggins and Kerron Denmark
       enter Skyline Restaurant. While the men are inside the
       restaurant, a vehicle drove by on Chew Avenue and turned
       left at the corner.      Co-Defendant Jamil Banks and
       [Appellant], wearing women’s Muslim clothing, emerge from
       the area where the car had turned from Chew Avenue.
       [Appellant] and Banks walked towards Skyline Restaurant.
       [Appellant] stopped in an alley while Banks enters the
       restaurant.   Banks buys a bottle of soda, leaves the
       restaurant, and stood with [Appellant] in the alley, out of
       sight of the camera. After Wiggins gets his food, he and
       Demnark left the restaurant and walked down the street.
       Banks followed closely behind Wiggins and Denmark while
       [Appellant] followed farther back. [Appellant] and Banks
       confronted Wiggins and Demnark and Wiggins falls to the
       ground. Quickly thereafter everyone ran away.

       Police Officer Joanne Gain of the Crime Scene Unit recovered
       two .22 caliber fired cartridge casings (“FCCs”), a Nike Air
       Jordan sneaker, and a Mountain Dew bottle from the murder
       scene. Officer Gain tested the Mountain Dew bottle for
       fingerprints and DNA. According to Police Officer John
       Cannon, an expert in firearms identification, these two .22
       caliber FCCs were fired from the same unrecovered firearm.
       The bullet recovered from the decedent’s body and the FCCs
       were not fired from the same firearm.

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       On April 14, 2008, at about 9:00 p.m., an unlicensed blue
       Lincoln town car was found on fire in the area of Tenth
       Street and Chew Avenue. Lieutenant Rodney Wright of the
       Philadelphia Fire Department determined that the vehicle
       was burned intentionally.

       On April 15, 2008, Charles Hayward gave a statement to
       police. Hayward explained that in February he had sold the
       blue Lincoln town car that Hill had called in to 9-1-1 to
       Bernard Salmond, [Appellant’s] brother.      According to
       Hayward, about a week previously, Wiggins had robbed
       [Appellant] after they had been gambling.

       On April 17, 2008, Richard Hack, a friend of Wiggins, gave
       a statement to police. Hack explained that two days before
       the murder, [Appellant], Wiggins, and himself were
       gambling. [Appellant] and Wiggins argued about gambling
       debt and then Wiggins choked [Appellant] and took $1,000
       from him. For the next couple of nights, [Appellant] and his
       friends were in the area looking for Wiggins.

       On January 13, 2010, Robert Bluefort told police about three
       weeks after the murder, [Appellant] confessed to him that
       he shot Wiggins. According to [Appellant], he had to shoot
       or be shot. Bernard Salmond told Bluefort that the police
       had questioned Hayward because the car that was used in
       the murder was in his name. Bluefort and Bernard Salmond
       then discussed burning the vehicle. Benard Salmond stayed
       with Bluefort for about a month after the murder.

       Banks was identified at trial by Michael Miller. Miller, who
       had interacted with Banks on many prior occasions,
       identified Banks from the surveillance video from Skyline
       Restaurant.

       According to Halim Mackey and Andrea Williams, experts in
       latent print examination, Banks’ fingerprints from his right
       middle finger and right ring finger were found on the
       Mountain Dew bottle recovered at the scene.               An
       examination conducted through the AFIS database
       confirmed these findings.

       [Appellant] testified that before the murder he was

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          gambling with Hack, Wiggins, and a couple individuals from
          the neighborhood.      Wiggins won and there was a
          disagreement over payment. [Appellant] denied killing
          Wiggins or conspiring with anyone else to do so. [Appellant]
          presented evidence that he had an excellent reputation for
          peacefulness.

          Banks presented testimony from Laurie Citino, an expert in
          DNA analysis and comparison. On May 31, 2012, Citino
          examined the swab taken from the Mountain Dew bottle.
          Citino was able to get DNA results from one marker, which
          would be able to include, but not match, or exclude an
          individual as providing the DNA. Citino was never given a
          DNA sample from Banks to compare to the sample taken
          from the Mountain Dew bottle.

(PCRA Court Opinion, filed 11/23/22, at 2-4).

     Procedurally, a jury convicted Appellant on March 12, 2014, of third-

degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder.           The court sentenced

Appellant on July 28, 2014, to an aggregate term of (25) to fifty (50) years’

imprisonment.     This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on

October 30, 2015. Commonwealth v. Salmond, 134 A.3d 109 (Pa.Super.

2015) (unpublished memorandum).         Appellant did not seek further direct

review.

     On July 5, 2016, Appellant timely filed his first PCRA petition, and the

PCRA court appointed counsel. On June 29, 2017, Appellant filed an amended

PCRA petition. Following a hearing, the court denied PCRA relief on February

20, 2018. This Court affirmed the denial of PCRA relief on January 23, 2019,

and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on July 8, 2019.        See

Commonwealth v. Salmond, 209 A.3d 519 (Pa.Super. 2019) (unpublished

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memorandum), appeal denied, 654 Pa. 522, 216 A.3d 232 (2019).

      Appellant filed the current pro se PCRA petition on September 16, 2022.

On October 24, 2022, the court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to

dismiss the petition without a hearing.     The court denied PCRA relief on

November 23, 2022. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on November

30, 2022. The court did not order Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal, and Appellant filed none.

      Appellant raises eight issues for our review:

         Did the PCRA court err by dismissing [Appellant’s] Post
         Conviction Relief Act Petition without an evidentiary
         hearing?

         Did the PCRA court err by failing to recognize and/or
         acknowledge [Appellant’s] timeliness exception?

         Did the PCRA Court err by failing to recognize [Appellant’s]
         government interference exception and [Appellant’s] due
         diligence?

         Did the PCRA Court err by denying [Appellant] an
         evidentiary hearing on his claims of ineffective trial counsel
         and ineffective PCRA counsel?

         Did the PCRA Court err and violate [Appellant’s]
         constitutional right by denying [Appellant] an evidentiary
         hearing when it denied his newly-discovered fact exception?

         Did the PCRA Court err and/or violate [Appellant’s]
         Constitutional right by dismissing [Appellant’s] PCRA
         petition and by denying him an evidentiary hearing without
         acknowledging and/or addressing all of [Appellant’s]
         meritorious issues in his PCRA petition?

         Did the PCRA Court violate [Appellant’s] Constitutional Right
         by dismissing [Appellant’s] PCRA petition without correcting
         its illegal sentence of the [Appellant]?

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         Did the PCRA Court err by dismissing [Appellant’s] PCRA
         petition without providing him effective counsel?

(Appellant’s Brief at 6-7).

      Preliminarily, the timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional

requisite. Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 148 A.3d 849 (Pa.Super. 2016). A

PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within

one year of the date the underlying judgment of sentence becomes final. 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence is final “at the conclusion of

direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the

United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of

time for seeking the review.”     42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).      The statutory

exceptions to the PCRA time-bar allow very limited circumstances to excuse

the late filing of a petition; a petitioner must also assert the exception within

the time allowed under the statute. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1) and (b)(2).

      To obtain merits review of a PCRA petition filed more than one year after

the judgment of sentence became final, the petitioner must allege and prove

at least one of the three timeliness exceptions:

         (i)      the failure to raise the claim previously was the
         result of interference by government officials with the
         presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or
         laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of
         the United States;

         (ii)     the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
         unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
         ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

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         (iii)    the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
         recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or
         the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
         provided in this section and has been held by that court to
         apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Generally, “a claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel does not provide an exception to the PCRA time bar.”

Commonwealth v. Sims, 251 A.3d 445, 448 (Pa.Super. 2021), appeal

denied, ___ Pa. ___, 265 A.3d 194 (2021).

      “The governmental interference exception permits an otherwise

untimely PCRA petition to be filed if it pleads and proves that the failure to

raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government

officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitutional or

laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution of laws of the United States.”

Commonwealth v. Staton, 646 Pa. 284, 293, 184 A.3d 949, 955 (2018)

(internal citation omitted).    “In other words, [the petitioner] is required to

show that but for the interference of a government actor, he could not have

filed his claim earlier.” Id.

      To satisfy the “newly-discovered facts” timeliness exception set forth in

Section 9545(b)(1)(ii), a petitioner must demonstrate that “he did not know

the facts upon which he based his petition and could not have learned those

facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Brown,

111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa.Super. 2015), appeal denied, 633 Pa. 761, 125 A.3d

1197 (2015). Due diligence requires the petitioner to take reasonable steps

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to protect his own interests.     Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164

(Pa.Super. 2001). A petitioner must explain why he could not have learned

the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence; this rule is strictly

enforced. Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076 (Pa.Super. 2010),

appeal denied, 610 Pa. 607, 20 A.3d 1210 (2011).

      The new constitutional right exception has two requirements: First, the

right asserted must be a right newly recognized by the Supreme Court of the

United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania; second, the right must

have been held by that Court to apply retroactively.       Commonwealth v.

Spotz, 642 Pa. 717, 724, 171 A.3d 675, 679 (2017).

      In Commonwealth v. Bradley, ___ Pa. ___, 261 A.3d 381 (2021), our

Supreme Court held “that a PCRA petitioner may, after a PCRA court denies

relief, and after obtaining new counsel or acting pro se, raise claims of PCRA

counsel’s ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to do so, even if on appeal.”

Bradley, supra at __, 261 A.3d at 401 (internal footnote omitted).

Nevertheless, Bradley involved ineffectiveness claims that the petitioner

raised on direct appeal following the dismissal of a timely, first PCRA petition.

The Bradley Court noted that “an approach favoring the consideration of

ineffectiveness claims of PCRA counsel on appeal (if the first opportunity to do

so) does not sanction extra-statutory serial petitions.” Id. at ___, 261 A.3d

at 403.   Consequently, this Court has declined to extend the holding of

Bradley to cases involving untimely or serial petitions. See Commonwealth

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v. Johnson, No. 696 EDA 2022 (Pa.Super. filed Mar. 7, 2023) (unpublished

memorandum)2 (holding Bradley did not recognize new constitutional right

permitting PCRA petitioners to file subsequent PCRA petitions in order to

challenge prior PCRA counsel’s ineffective assistance).

       Instantly, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on November

29, 2015, thirty days after this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of

sentence and the time for filing a petition for allowance of appeal with our

Supreme Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). See also Pa.R.A.P.

1113 (providing 30 days to file petition for allowance of appeal with Supreme

Court). Thus, Appellant had until November 29, 2016 to file a timely PCRA

petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Appellant filed the current PCRA

petition on September 16, 2022, which is facially untimely.

       On appeal, Appellant attempts to invoke each of the PCRA’s timeliness

exceptions. In support of the governmental interference exception, Appellant

argues that the government suppressed Appellant’s phone records that

demonstrated Appellant was not at the scene of the crime at the relevant time.

Appellant claims he attached to his PCRA petition exhibits showing that he

requested the records but that government officials ignored the requests.

       Regarding the “newly-discovered facts” exception, Appellant alleges

that Detective Williams was indicted in 2019, which calls into question the

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2 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating this Court may cite to and rely on for
persuasive value unpublished decisions of this Court filed after May 1, 2019).

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detective’s conduct in Appellant’s case.3 Appellant also relies on an affidavit

by Summer Morgan, which he claims would have been critical to impeaching

testimony offered from Robert Bluefort that implicated Appellant in the

murder. With respect to the new constitutional right exception, Appellant cites

Bradley for the proposition that he is entitled to raise claims of prior PCRA

counsel’s ineffectiveness at this time.

       The PCRA court rejected Appellant’s reliance on the governmental

interference exception, reasoning:

          [Appellant] fails to prove that the government interference
          exception applies to his [underlying] alleged Brady[4]
          violation, because there is no evidence that the
          Commonwealth obtained his phone records or that he
          exercised due diligence. …

          [Appellant] provides no evidence that the Commonwealth
          obtained his phone records. A May 20, 2008 activity sheet
          indicating that Det. Williams provided Det. Dunlap with
          information to apply for a search warrant is insufficient to
          show the Commonwealth obtained the phone records or
          interfered with [Appellant’s] ability to obtain his records.

____________________________________________

3 Relatedly, Appellant alleges that based on Detective Williams’ indictment,
Appellant is entitled to an updated analysis of the Mountain Dew bottle that
was tested for Banks’ DNA and fingerprints. Nevertheless, postconviction DNA
testing is permitted only where the motion is made in a timely manner and
the petitioner explains how the testing would produce exculpatory results.
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543.1(a).        Here, the PCRA court explained that
Appellant’s request for DNA testing was boilerplate and speculative. (See
PCRA Court Opinion at 9). Given that the fingerprint analysis is tied to
Appellant’s co-defendant Banks and not Appellant, we agree with the PCRA
court that Appellant cannot show any DNA testing would yield exculpatory
results. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543.1(a).

4 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).

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        [Appellant] did not exercise due diligence because he did
        not attempt to acquire his records until over eight years
        after his conviction. …[Appellant] alleges that he spoke with
        trial counsel prior to trial about obtaining his phone records
        but provides no documentation to support this assertion
        other than a copy of the May 20, 2008 Activity Sheet with a
        handwritten note which says “Cell phone records—GPS Can
        tell where people are.” See September 16, 2022 pro se
        PCRA Petition Exhibit F2. Even if this assertion is true,
        [Appellant] failed to take any action regarding his phone
        records until June 29, 2022, when he sent the Department
        of Corrections’ (“DOC”) Office of Open Records a request for
        his phone records. While [Appellant] did send the DOC’s
        Right-to-Know-Office a letter in March of 2016, [Appellant]
        only requested a copy of his discovery and did not request
        his phone records. See September 16, 2022 pro se PCRA
        Petition Exhibits B1-B3.

(PCRA Court Opinion at 6-7). We agree with the PCRA court’s analysis that

Appellant has failed to satisfy the governmental interference exception where

Appellant has not shown there was any government action which prevented

Appellant from bringing this claim sooner. See Staton, supra.

     Additionally, the PCRA court evaluated Appellant’s reliance on the

newly-discovered facts exception as follows:

        [Appellant’s] claim that Det. Williams’ November 21, 2019
        indictment satisfies the newly-discovered fact exception for
        his claims that Det. Williams falsified evidence and that Det.
        Williams’ indictment is after-discovered evidence, fails
        because he first learned about the indictment on February
        25, 2020 [by his own admission] and did not file a PCRA
        petition within one year of when the claim could have been
        presented.

        [Appellant’s] claim that Summer Morgan’s July 28, 2022
        affidavit satisfies the newly-discovered fact exception fails
        because he failed to show that he exercised due diligence.
        On January 13, 2010, Robert Bluefort was interviewed and
        provided a statement in which he stated that Appellant and

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          Bernard Salmond (“Bernard”), [Appellant’s] brother and co-
          defendant, confessed to the murder and that he suggested
          burning Bernard’s car around Fern Rock Transportation
          Center, in Philadelphia. N.T. 3/10/2014 at 22, 26, 29.
          Bluefort also stated that Bernard stayed at his house for “a
          good month or so after the murder.” Id. at 29. At trial,
          Bluefort did not recall his statement.

          On July 28, 2022, Summer Morgan, the mother of Bluefort’s
          children, signed an affidavit stating that Bernard Salmond
          never lived or stayed at Bluefort’s house after the murder in
          2008 because she lived with Bluefort from 2007 to 2009.
          [Appellant] makes a boilerplate claim that…he exercised due
          diligence, so the claim is untimely and fails.

          Even if the claim were timely, the claim would still fail
          because the affidavit would be used solely to impeach
          Bluefort’s credibility. Additionally, the affidavit would likely
          not result in a different verdict because Bluefort did not
          recall his statement at trial and the affidavit would only
          contradict Bluefort’s statement that Bernard stayed with
          him after the murder, not his statement that [Appellant] and
          Bernard confessed to the murder or that he suggested
          burning Bernard’s car.[5]

(PCRA Court Opinion at 8-9). We agree with the PCRA court that Appellant

failed to exercise due diligence necessary to succeed on these claims. See

Brown, supra; Monaco, supra.

       Finally, the PCRA court rejected Appellant’s reliance on the new

constitutional right exception, stating that Bradley “did not assert a new

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5 To obtain relief on a substantive after-discovered-evidence claim under the

PCRA once jurisdiction is established, a petitioner must demonstrate: (1) the
evidence has been discovered after trial and it could not have been obtained
at or prior to trial through reasonable diligence; (2) the evidence is not
cumulative; (3) it is not being used solely to impeach credibility; and (4) it
would likely compel a different verdict. Commonwealth v. Washington,
592 Pa. 698, 927 A.2d 586 (2007).

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constitutional right which applies retroactively.” (PCRA Court Opinion at 7).

We agree with the PCRA court that Appellant’s reliance on Bradley affords

him no relief. See Johnson, supra. Therefore, Appellant’s current PCRA

petition remains time barred. Accordingly, we affirm.

     Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/24/2023

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