Court Opinion

ID: 9791061
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:04:24.655053+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:33.658453
License: Public Domain

SHENK, J.
I dissent.
This case comes directly within the rule of the cases (In re Hallinan, 126 Cal.App. 121 [14 P.2d 797]; Rose v. Superior *798Court, 140 Cal.App. 418 [35 P.2d 605]) which, the majority opinion refuses to follow but seeks to distinguish for insufficient reasons. By disapproving the general doctrine followed in those cases the majority opinion has upset the settled rule concerning the scope of inquiry in a certiorari proceeding to review an order of contempt.
For the purpose of determining the lawful exercise of jurisdiction in a summary contempt proceeding the recitals of the facts in the order of commitment must be deemed to be true. There is no procedure for the taking of evidence to contradict the facts so recited. This the majority opinion implicitly concedes; and it is not questioned that the recitals of the attorney’s tone, manner and attitude, being matters within the observation of the court, are findings of fact. (Rose v. Superior Court, supra, 140 Cal.App. at 426; Gillen v. Municipal Court, 37 Cal.App.2d 428, 431 [99 P.2d 555], with citation of In re Hallinan, supra.)
A court is the judge of its own contempts, its judgment is subject to review only on the question of jurisdiction, and the judgment of contempt is valid if the recital of facts therein shows acts which come within the legal definition of a direct contempt. (Otis v. Superior Court, 148 Cal. 129 [82 P. 853]; In re Hallinan, supra.) As said in Ex Parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 [9 S.Ct. 77, 32 L.Ed. 405], whether the attorney’s conduct justified the punishment was for the court to determine under its responsibility to do justice and to maintain its own authority, and its findings upon the facts are conclusive.
The foregoing rules are of long standing and are sound guiding principles for both trial and appellate courts in order to maintain the balance between the required respect for judicial authority and the asserted necessity for an independent bar. Abrogation thereof would destroy the functional power of the court.
It is now held by the majority that the requirement for the jurisdictional recital of facts in the contempt order is not complied with merely by stating in the order that the words uttered by the attorney were “in a loud, insolent, aggressive, belligerent, boisterous, harsh, offensive and contemptuous tone of voice and with a sneering and contemptuous expression on his face and a threatening demeanor toward” the court and the judge, and “in a disorderly and insolent manner,” followed by the conclusion that such manner and conduct tended to and did interrupt the due course of the trial and interfered *799with the orderly proceedings of the court. It should not be required, as it would now seem to be, that the court have a sound-recording device and a motion picture camera in effectual operation at all times in the courtroom in order to make a record in the trial or proceeding of the insolent tone of voice and the offensive nature of the conduct of the attorney, including his facial expressions, before its recital of the facts may be taken as true and be sufficient to show that its order was not arbitrary or in excess of jurisdiction. The majority opinion does not question that the constant interruptions and disobedience of the court’s rulings, in respectful words but in the manner and with the intemperate tones and attitudes which tend to interfere with the due course of the proceeding would constitute contempt. However, before the court may commit the contemner it is required that the facts so found must also be shown by the record of the proceedings, that is, by appropriate admonitions and warnings regarding the attorney’s tone and manner. In other words, a record of repetition of rulings and admonitions to obey, the continued disobedience on the part of the attorney, together with the findings of other matters of tone, expression, and conduct within the court’s observation, no longer support the exercise of jurisdiction to declare a direct contempt.
Section 1209 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: “The following acts or omissions in respect to a court of justice, or proceedings therein, are contempts of the authority of the court: 1. Disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior toward the judge while holding court, tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding; 2. . . .
boisterous conduct . . . tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding; ...” The law thus imposes upon the judicial officer the duty to see that court proceedings are conducted in an orderly manner. Confidence must be reposed somewhere in the matter of upholding the authority and integrity of the courts as a forum for the orderly settlement of disputes. And indeed it will come as a surprise to those charged with the orderly conduct of judicial proceedings that credence will not be accorded the recital of matters within their observation and which cannot always conveniently be reflected by the record of the trial or proceeding. In my opinion the line has correctly been drawn by the prior decisions of our appellate courts. The additional element now required before jurisdiction attaches to declare *800contemptuous an attorney’s persistent offensive or intemperate tone or manner is a burden for which there is no authority beyond the majority’s ipsi dixit.
Furthermore, the proceeding in progress in the respondent court was unquestionably a proper inquiry for the purpose of determining whether the minds of the particular jurors approached by Mrs. Hill had become prejudiced so that the trial should not proceed. The court correctly announced that Mrs. Hill was not on trial. In that proceeding the court had no power to mete out punishment to Mrs. Hill, nor was it sitting as a committing magistrate. Her attorney had no proper place in the proceeding unless Mrs. Hill was called to the witness stand, which she was not, in which event he might then counsel her concerning her rights and make appropriate objections. In fact, the majority opinion concedes that the trial court correctly ruled that Mrs. Hill and her attorney had no right to participate in the proceeding. There was no ruling or order of the court which might be said to have changed the nature of the investigation. The cases followed in the majority opinion (Curran v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. App. 258 [236 P. 975]; Platnauer v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.App. 463 [163 P. 237]; and In re Shortridge, 5 Cal.App. 371 [90 P. 478]) from all that appeared in the order or the record, involved the persistence of an attorney in advocating a point which he had a right to make in a trial where he had the right and the duty to be. The present case involves the officious and persistent disobedience of an order excluding the attorney from participation in a proceeding where he had no right and where interference would becloud the issue and unnecessarily prolong the investigation.
It is but to cavil with the facts to state that the only foundation for the contempt order was the incident which occurred after the judge ordered Mrs, Hill to be taken to the district attorney. The petitioner’s remarks at that time were but the culmination of his persistent and officious conduct from which he had been properly advised by the court to refrain. On this view of the record it is unnecessary to consider whether the words uttered by the petitioner were in themselves disrespectful or whether, as a separate question, the findings that they were loud, boisterous, contemptuous, sneering, etc., were alone sufficient to constitute a contempt. Where the basic conduct of the attorney is improper, and is persisted in against the repeated admonitions and orders of *801the court, we have a situation which is ruled by the Hallinan, Rose and other cases attempted to be distinguished, and the offensiveness of manner thereupon becomes merely cumulative.
In my opinion the order should be affirmed.
Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., concurred.