Court Opinion

ID: 9638232
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:38:21.457657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:05.041928
License: Public Domain

PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
The gist of the offense defined in 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 is the unlawful conspiracy. It is not necessary that any act be done to effect the object of the conspiracy. The act of conspiring to restrain trade or commerce without more is made an offense. The offensive agreement or conspiracy alone, whether or not followed by efforts to carry it into effect, is a violation of the statute.1
It must follow that the language of the statute “engage in any * * * conspiracy” means to enter into a conspiracy, not to take part in carrying out a conspiracy. The word conspiracy has a well-defined meaning. It is a combination of two or more persons to accomplish, by concerted action, some criminal or unlawful act or to accomplish, by criminal or unlawful means, some act not in itself criminal or unlawful. It is constituted by an agreement but it is the continuing result of the agreement and not the agreement itself.2 As used in 15 U.S.C.A. § 1, it is a combination of two or more persons to accomplish, by concerted action, restraint of trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign nations. So when the indictment alleged that the defendants engaged in a conspiracy to fix prices, on the Oklahoma City livestock market, of hogs shipped from points in Oklahoma and other states to such market for sale therein, it charged that they entered into an unlawful agreement or *272combination to accomplish, by concerted action, restraint of interstate commerce.
Paragraph 18 alleged the means by which the unlawful purpose was to be accomplished and supplied the particulars of the unlawful agreement.
I agree that the indictment is not well-drawn, that the allegations thereof are not as clear and specific as they should be, and that many allegations are by way of recital rather than direct and positive averments. While it should not be regarded as a model, nevertheless, I am inclined to agree that it states an offense with requisite directness, clarity, and particularity. It seems to me that there can be little doubt that the defendants are apprised that they are charged with entering into a conspiracy to restrain trade in interstate commerce in hogs at the Oklahoma City market by fixing the price thereof through concerted action and the means set forth in paragraph 18 and that they are sufficiently apprised of the charge to enable them to prepare and present their defense thereto.
Paragraph 19 alleged certain overt acts done in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy. Overt acts are not an essential element of the offense. They become important only in fixing venue.3

 Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 378, 33 S.Ct. 780, 57 L.Ed. 1232; United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 402, 47 S.Ct. 377, 71 L.Ed. 700, 50 A.L.R. 989; United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 225, 60 S.Ct. 811, 84 L.Ed. 1129.

 United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608, 31 S.Ct. 124, 54 L.Ed. 1168; Marino v. United States, 9 Cir., 91 F.2d 691, 694, 113 A.L.R. 975.

 See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 402, 403, 47 S.Ct. 377, 71 L.Ed. 700, 50 A.L.R. 989; Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 365, 366, 32 S.Ct. 793, 56 L.Ed. 1114, Ann.Cas.1914A, 614.