Court Opinion

ID: 9913649
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-28 16:13:22.450922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:58:15.343208
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Judges Malveaux, Ortiz and Friedman
UNPUBLISHED

              Argued at Norfolk, Virginia

              DANIEL LEE HORNE
                                                                            MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.     Record No. 1267-22-1                                   JUDGE FRANK K. FRIEDMAN
                                                                               DECEMBER 28, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK
                                              Robert B. Rigney, Judge

                              J. Barry McCracken, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

                              Ken J. Baldassari, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
                              Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Daniel Lee Horne was convicted of aggravated malicious wounding, using a firearm in

              the commission of a felony, and maliciously shooting into an occupied dwelling. He challenges

              the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions and asserts that the trial court erred in

              refusing to grant his tendered “Castle Doctrine” jury instruction.

                                                        BACKGROUND

                     There are two main questions posed in this appeal—and each of these issues raises a

              different standard of review, which in turn changes the way we look at the facts. To begin,

              “[w]hen reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is presumed

              correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’”

              McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (second alteration in original)

              (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204,

228 (2018)). “Rather, the relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v.

Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193

(2009)). “If there is evidentiary support for the conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted

to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by

the finder of fact at the trial.’” McGowan, 72 Va. App. at 521 (quoting Chavez v.

Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018)).

       However, “[w]hen reviewing a trial court’s refusal to give a proffered jury instruction, we

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the proponent of the instruction.” Pena Pinedo

v. Commonwealth, 300 Va. 116, 118 (2021) (quoting Commonwealth v. Vaughn, 263 Va. 31, 33

(2002)). In general, “the matter of granting and refusing jury instructions rests ‘in the sound

discretion of the trial court.’” Id. at 121 (quoting Cooper v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 377, 381

(2009)). But we review de novo whether a proffered jury instruction “accurately states the . . .

law.” Graves v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 702, 707 (2016) (quoting Sarafin v.

Commonwealth, 288 Va. 320, 325 (2014)). “This Court’s ‘sole responsibility in reviewing’ the

trial court’s decision ‘is to see that the law has been clearly stated and that the instructions cover

all issues which the evidence fairly raises.’” Id. (quoting Cooper, 277 Va. at 381).

       In short, when reviewing sufficiency, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth. By contrast, when reviewing proffered instructions, we view the facts in the

light most favorable to the party proposing the instruction—here, Horne. This difference in

standards of review leads us to review the facts in two ways—which, in this case, are

diametrically opposed. The facts are outlined below.

                                                 -2-
                        Facts in Light Most Favorable to Commonwealth

       Tyquane Perry was the shooting victim in this case. He testified that he arrived at the

residence of Jasmine Murphy in the early morning hours of July 6, 2020, to have her fix him

some food and to spend time together before he went to work. Although the couple was

separated, Murphy is the mother of his three children and the children lived with Murphy. Perry

and Murphy had spent the previous several days together, and they had made plans the night

before for Perry to come over the following morning.

       When Perry arrived at Murphy’s residence, he attempted to reach her via telephone but

when he received no response, he testified that he proceeded to enter the home in a way that was

not out of the ordinary. Perry went to the rear of the residence and removed the air conditioner

from the window in order to gain access to the home. Perry testified that “[g]oing through the

back window is normal if I didn’t have my key on me” and that both he and Murphy had

previously entered her residence this way. Perry also testified that he believed it was proper for

him to enter the house because his children resided there and he kept his work clothes and

multiple forms of identification there.

       There was a reason Murphy was ignoring Perry’s efforts to reach her—her boyfriend,

Horne, had spent the night. Murphy tried to send Perry money to go buy food elsewhere, but he

was undeterred and entered anyway. When Perry entered, Murphy came downstairs and asked

him to go outside to talk. Perry testified that Murphy was not upset by his entrance but was

simply saying to “go to the car to talk.” However, Perry testified that he had to use the

bathroom, located upstairs. When Perry went upstairs to use the restroom, Horne appeared.

Horne had a gun pointed at Perry and stated “[w]hat’s up, pussy?” At this time, Horne “busted”

Perry’s lip and shot Perry in the neck. After shooting Perry, Horne fled the residence.

                                               -3-
       Perry was aware that Horne and Murphy had been dating, and he was not jealous. To the

contrary, Perry was “okay” with Murphy “hav[ing] other relationships” because he was “having

other relationships” too. However, Perry testified that he was not aware Horne was supposedly

staying at Murphy’s residence, as Murphy had spent several days with Perry and had discussions

with him regarding rekindling their relationship.

       Similarly, Murphy testified that Horne was not officially living there, but was there quite

frequently. Murphy also testified that the night before, she attended a cookout at Perry’s home

and “[i]t was great coparenting.”

       After being shot by Horne, Perry became paralyzed from the chest down and remained in

the hospital for 28 days. Perry testified that although he had a 9-millimeter Taurus with him, he

did not take it out at any point. Instead, Perry only had this gun with him because he worked as

security. Although there was another one of Perry’s guns located in a dresser, Perry does not

know how his firearm ended up in there. The Commonwealth’s evidence established that the

gun Perry was carrying was not the one that shot him.1

                             Facts in Light Most Favorable to Horne

       According to Horne, when Perry arrived at Murphy’s residence the morning of July 6,

2020, Perry began throwing rocks at her window after not being let in the front door. He

ultimately gained entry by removing the air conditioning unit from the window. Perry had

neither a key nor permission to enter the house. Perry’s entrance prompted Murphy to begin

yelling at him and telling him to go outside. Although Perry wanted Murphy to make him lunch,

       1
          Virginia Department of Forensic Science firearm and toolmark examiner Julianna Red
Leaf testified that she examined both a Taurus Model G2C, 9-millimeter caliber Luger pistol and
a “Starline brand caliber .45 GAP cartridge case.” Red Leaf testified that a .45 GAP is much
larger in width and would not fit into a 9-millimeter Luger firearm and therefore “[t]he GAP
cartridge case could not have been fired in the 9-millimiter pistol.” In other words, the gun
which was shot was not the gun which Perry was carrying.
                                                -4-
she instead sent him $10 via cash app. Perry struck her and then dragged her by her hair to the

dining area as Murphy continued to scream. None of this, however, prompted Horne to come

downstairs. Perry then appeared to acquiesce and agreed to go outside to talk; however, while

Murphy was walking towards the front door, Perry ran to the top of the stairs towards the

bedrooms.

       Horne was initially awoken by the rocks hitting Murphy’s window and then heard

Murphy’s phone continuously ringing with messages from Perry. Horne then heard the

commotion going on downstairs, as Murphy attempted to make Perry leave the residence. Then,

Horne observed Perry rushing up the stairs with one gun in his hand and a second gun on his hip.

Horne, unarmed at the time, tussled with Perry at the top of the stairs. At this time, the gun in

Perry’s hand discharged. Horne testified that he had his back to the wall and when he got toward

the gun, “the gun goes off and shoots [Perry], and I just ran for my life. The gun was still out

there. I didn’t know that he was shot.” Horne then testified that he and Perry “probably shot it

together. I don’t know. I didn’t exactly possess the gun and point it at him and shoot him.”

Horne then fled the scene, unaware that Perry had been shot.

       Prior to the shooting, Horne had been spending several days with his girlfriend, who was

not Murphy. However, he testified that he and Murphy had recently become fiancées and that he

now lived in her house. His residency was not confirmed by Murphy; in any event, the record

makes clear there was no formal “tenancy” agreement nor was Horne the “homeowner.”

               The Tendered Instructions on Self-Defense and the Castle Doctrine

       The trial court granted a jury instruction on self-defense without fault that stated:

               If you believe that the defendant was without fault in provoking or
               bringing on the fight, and you further believe that: 1) he reasonably
               feared, under the circumstances as they appeared to him, that he
               was in imminent danger of bodily harm; and 2) he used no more
               force, under the circumstances as they appeared to him, than was
               reasonably necessary to protect himself from the perceived harm,
                                                -5-
               then he acted in self-defense, and you shall find the defendant not
               guilty.

Horne contended that he was also entitled to a broader instruction on the Castle Doctrine. He

tendered the following: “[w]hen a party is assaulted in his own home, that party as a homeowner

or tenant, as the case may be, has a right to use whatever means necessary to repel the aggressor

even to the taking of life.” The trial court denied the instruction. The convictions and this

appeal followed.

                                           ANALYSIS

                                          I. Sufficiency

       Horne argues that the trial court erred in denying his motions to strike as to the three

alleged offenses because the evidence presented was insufficient to permit a reasonable trier of

fact to conclude that he acted with malice in causing the discharge of the firearm within the

residence. He argues that without malice, no charges of aggravated malicious wounding,

malicious wounding, and maliciously shooting in an occupied building can be established; then

he asserts if those charges fail, there can be no conviction for use of a firearm while committing

a felony. Horne contends that the Commonwealth bore the burden of establishing beyond a

reasonable doubt that, at the moment the shot was fired, he was acting with malice.

       “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to

support it.’” McGowan, 72 Va. App. at 521 (alteration in original) (quoting Smith, 296 Va. at

460). In challenging the judgment, appellant argues that his act was in a heat of passion, which

is mutually exclusive to malice. Horne states that “he had every reason to be both fearful and

enraged just prior to the confrontation between the two men. Perry was an armed intruder, who

had forcibly entered in the nighttime into a residence where the Appellant was residing, even if

only for the night.”
                                               -6-
       “Malice inheres in the doing of a wrongful act intentionally, or without just cause or

excuse, or as a result of ill will. It may be directly evidenced by words, or inferred from acts and

conduct which necessarily result in injury.” Hernandez v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 626, 631

(1993) (citations omitted)). Code § 18.2-51.2 provides in relevant part that:

               If any person maliciously shoots, stabs, cuts or wounds any other
               person, or by any means causes bodily injury, with the intent to
               maim, disfigure, disable or kill, he shall be guilty of a Class 2
               felony if the victim is thereby severely injured and is caused to
               suffer permanent and significant physical impairment. . . .

A conviction for either aggravated malicious wounding or malicious wounding under Code

§§ 18.2-51 and 18.2-51.2, requires the Commonwealth to prove that the appellant inflicted the

victim’s physical injuries “maliciously and with the intent to maim, disfigure, disable or kill.”

Campbell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 476, 483 (1991) (en banc).

       As the trial court instructed the jury, the elements of the offense of maliciously shooting

in an occupied building are:

               (1) That the defendant discharged a firearm within a building
               occupied by one or more persons; and (2) That the life or lives of
               such person or persons were endangered; and (3) That the act was
               done with malice.

See Code § 18.2-279. Likewise, the elements of use of a firearm in commission of a felony in

this case required that the evidence establish:

               (1) That the defendant used a firearm; and (2) That the display, use
               or attempted use, was while committing or attempting to commit
               aggravated malicious wounding or the lesser included offense of
               malicious wounding.

See Code § 18.2-53.1.

       In this case, there is sufficient evidence to show Horne acted with malice. There is also

sufficient evidence to reject Horne’s heat of passion claims. “[H]eat of passion and malice are

mutually exclusive” and “[w]hether violence was completed in the heat of passion and due to a

                                                  -7-
reasonable provocation is generally a question for the fact finder.” Washington v.

Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 606, 619 (2022).

       “Malice is evidenced either when the accused acted with a sedate, deliberate mind, and

formed design, or committed a purposeful and cruel act without any or without great

provocation.” Branch v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 836, 841 (1992). “Malice may be inferred

from the ‘deliberate use of a deadly weapon unless, from all the evidence, [there is] reasonable

doubt as to whether malice existed.’” Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 493, 507 (2020).

       Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence

shows Horne had the firearm out when Perry reached the top of the stairs, called him a “pussy,”

and “busted” Perry’s lip, before shooting him. Any verbal exchanges between Perry and Murphy

do not constitute provocation sufficient to support the heat of passion defense. Washington, 75

Va. App. at 620. Perry stated that he was attacked by Horne and never drew his weapon.

Furthermore, Horne testified in his own defense at trial; the jury, sitting as factfinder, “is entitled

to disbelieve the self-serving testimony of the accused and to conclude that the accused is lying

to conceal his guilt.” Speller v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 378, 388 (2018).2 Perry’s

description of events plainly established malice and, essentially, an ambush.

       On this record, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in denying Horne’s motion to

strike as to the three alleged offenses because the evidence presented was sufficient to permit a

reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Horne acted with malice.

                              II. The Castle Doctrine Instruction Issue

       Horne asserts that he was entitled to a Castle Doctrine instruction in addition to the self-

defense instruction the trial court granted. If Horne’s testimony is believed, an uninvited intruder

       2
         For example, Horne’s claim that Perry was shot with the gun he was carrying was flatly
rebutted by ballistics testimony.
                                             -8-
entered the house at night and Horne stood his ground to stop him, resulting in a tussle in which

Perry’s gun unexpectedly went off, paralyzing Perry.

        The Commonwealth claims that Horne received the proper self-defense instruction to

which he was entitled.

               If you believe that the defendant was without fault in provoking or
               bringing on the fight, and you further believe that: 1) he reasonably
               feared, under the circumstances as they appeared to him, that he
               was in imminent danger of bodily harm; and 2) he used no more
               force, under the circumstances as they appeared to him, than was
               reasonably necessary to protect himself from the perceived harm,
               then he acted in self-defense, and you shall find the defendant not
               guilty.

In addition, the jury was instructed:

               A person who reasonably believes that another intends to attack
               him for the purpose of killing him or doing him serious bodily
               harm has a right to arm himself for his own necessary self-
               protection. In such a case, no inference of malice can be drawn
               from the fact that he armed himself.

The Commonwealth asserts that these instructions fully encompass Horne’s defense and that

Horne was not entitled to a Castle Doctrine instruction under his version of the facts: an

accidental shooting. Finally, the Commonwealth contends that the specific Castle Doctrine

instruction tendered by Horne was not proper under the facts of this case.

        A. The Castle Doctrine in Virginia

        Virginia has long recognized that an individual has the right to defend himself in his

home:

               In the early times our forefathers were compelled to protect
               themselves in their habitations by converting them into holds of
               defense: and so the dwelling house was called the castle. To this
               condition of things, the law has conformed, resulting in the
               familiar doctrine that while a man keeps the doors of his house
               closed, no other may break and enter it, except in particular
               circumstances to make an arrest or the like—cases not within the
               line of our present exposition. From this doctrine is derived

                                               -9-
               another: namely, that the persons within the house may exercise all
               needful force to keep aggressors out, even to the taking of life.

Fortune v. Commonwealth, 133 Va. 669, 687 (1922) (distinguishing between an invited guest

and one that enters forcefully) (citation omitted), cited with approval in Hines v. Commonwealth,

292 Va. 674, 679-80 (2016).

       The common law Castle Doctrine embodies two distinct legal principles. First, the

doctrine provides that “persons within the home” or curtilage have no duty to retreat and “may

exercise all needful force,” including deadly force, to prevent an intruder from wreaking havoc.

Fortune, 133 Va. at 687. Under that rule, deadly force is only permissible, however, if the

intruder is “trespass[ing]” and it is “necessary to prevent a felonious destruction of [the

homeowner or tenant’s] property or the commission of a felony therein.” Bausell v.

Commonwealth, 165 Va. 669, 688 (1935); see also Fortune, 133 Va. at 687 (holding that the

doctrine does not apply if the decedent was peaceably present in the home or curtilage under an

implied license). Second, the Castle Doctrine provides that one attacked in his own home or its

“curtilage,” if “free from fault,” has no duty to retreat and may use reasonable force, including

deadly force, to eject or subdue the attacker. Fortune, 133 Va. at 686; see also Hines, 292 Va. at

681 (“[W]hen a party is assaulted in his own home, that party, as a homeowner (or tenant, as the

case may be), has the right to use whatever means necessary to repel the aggressor, ‘even to the

taking of life.’” (quoting Fortune, 133 Va. at 687)).3

       3
          Virginia law recognizes two forms of self-defense involving homicides: self-defense
without fault (“justifiable self-defense”) and self-defense with fault (“excusable self-defense”).
“Justifiable homicide in self-defense occurs where a person, without any fault on his part in
provoking or bringing on the difficulty, kills another under reasonable apprehension of death or
great bodily harm to himself.” Bailey v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 92, 96 (1958). “In such a case,
the defendant need not retreat, but is permitted to stand his ground and repel the attack by force,
including deadly force, if it is necessary.” Foote v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 61, 67 (1990)
(quoting McCoy v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 771, 775 (1919)). Conversely, “[e]xcusable
homicide in self-defense occurs where the accused, although in some fault in the first instance in
provoking or bringing on the difficulty, when attacked retreats as far as possible, announces his
                                                - 10 -
       We note that the amount of force that may be used against a trespasser is not without

limits. It is well-established that “[f]or a mere trespass upon land, the owner has no right to

assault the trespasser with a deadly weapon, the result of which may be to kill him or do him

great bodily harm.” Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 98 Va. 840, 844 (1900); see also Pierce v.

Commonwealth, 135 Va. 635 (1923) (finding that use of a trap gun to protect a store would

justify a finding of second-degree murder). Additionally, a defendant could not use the Castle

Doctrine as a shield against prosecution for using deadly force against a toddler who had

wandered uninvited into the home.

       B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Rejecting Horne’s Proffered Instruction

       The Commonwealth asserts that it was not error for the trial court to reject Horne’s Castle

Doctrine instruction because the self-defense instructions he received adequately covered his

defenses, and also because such an instruction is inappropriate where a shooting is “accidental”

or unintended. Because of the posture of the case, we do not need to address the

Commonwealth’s contentions relating to Horne’s entitlement to a Castle Doctrine instruction.

       For purposes of our analysis, we will assume without deciding that Horne was entitled to

a Castle Doctrine instruction.4 Horne’s rejected Castle Doctrine instruction stated, in its entirety,

that “when a party is assaulted in his own home, that party as a homeowner or tenant, as the case

may be, has a right to use whatever means necessary to repel the aggressor even to the taking of

life.” Horne argues, citing Hines, 292 Va. at 679, that the “language of the rejected instruction

was taken from a recent Virginia Supreme Court decision and states a correct principle of law.”

desire for peace and kills his adversary from a reasonably apparent necessity to preserve his own
life or save himself from great bodily harm.” Id.
       4
        Much of Horne’s testimony was hotly contested. Nonetheless, as noted above for
purposes of analyzing Horne’s entitlement to an instruction, we view the evidence in best light to
him. Pena Pinedo, 300 Va. at 18.
                                             - 11 -
       Virginia courts “have frequently cautioned against ‘the danger of the indiscriminate use

of language from appellate opinions in a jury instruction’”—and for good reasons. Shaikh v.

Commonwealth, 276 Va. 531, 546 (2008) (quoting Clohessy v. Weiler, 250 Va. 249, 255 (1995)).

Indeed, “[u]nless clearly intended for use as a jury instruction, such language is inappropriate for

that purpose.” Id.; see National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Bruce, 208 Va. 595, 601 (1968).

       A literal interpretation of Horne’s snippet of case language could lead to chaotic results.

The proposed instruction permits the use of virtually unlimited force without addressing who the

“homeowner” may attack or whether the “homeowner” must be free from fault in causing the

confrontation. Moreover, by simply labeling the recipient of the repelling attack as “the

aggressor,” the instruction does not require that the “aggressor” be an intruder or uninvited guest.

It could be a friend or neighbor or anyone who is properly in the house—including the father of

three children who reside in the home who was invited to be there by the owner, Murphy (which

is what Perry purported to be).

       In short, while the snippet of case law may be a correct statement of law in the context of

a blameless homeowner and a dangerous, unknown intruder—standing alone without reference

to blame or any right to be present—the language is confusing, misleading and problematic

here.5 Moreover, even in best light to Horne, he put on no evidence that he was the

“homeowner” or a “tenant” at Murphy’s home—and these are the only terms used in the

instruction to describe Horne. Horne clearly did not own the property. He was not a tenant—nor

did he offer an instruction defining a tenant. Thus, the instruction that Horne offered was

inappropriate in this setting. Craig v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 155, 164 (2000) (“An

       5
        Indeed, standing alone it would justify lethal force among co-residents or siblings living
under one roof. Taken literally the instruction would allow a host to use lethal force on a
drunken, invited party guest who pushes the host.
                                               - 12 -
instruction is properly refused when it is unsupported by the evidence.”); Lynn v.

Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 336, 346 (1998) (same).6

       We conclude that Horne’s proffered instruction, standing alone, was not supported by the

evidence in this case. Pena Pinedo, 300 Va. at 121-22. Accordingly, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion when it rejected Horne’s proposed Castle Doctrine instruction.

                                         CONCLUSION

       The judgment of the trial court is affirmed as to the sufficiency of the evidence to support

Horne’s convictions. We also uphold the trial court’s decision to reject Horne’s proposed

instruction on the Castle Doctrine.

                                                                                         Affirmed.

       6
         The Commonwealth suggests that, at best, Horne was an “authorized occupant” (see
Code § 55.1-1200); however, he plainly did not fit either of the terms “homeowner” or “tenant”
—the criteria contained in his instruction. We note that the Castle Doctrine may apply to a
resident of a home who is neither homeowner nor tenant. See, e.g., Beard v. United States, 158
U.S. 550, 559-60 (1895) (finding no duty to retreat for an accused attacked “on his own
premises, near his dwelling house” when those premises “constitut[ed] a part of his residence
and home”); Fortune, 133 Va. at 686-87 (applying the Castle Doctrine to one attacked “in his
own curtilage” or “within his own home,” and noting that one need not retreat if attacked “in his
dwelling”). However, in this case the language of Horne’s proposed instruction was not broad
enough to encompass such a situation.
                                              - 13 -