Court Opinion

ID: 9903718
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 16:01:08.199832+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:39.532506
License: Public Domain

20-2785
     Graham v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                           A203 144 836

                         UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                               SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
 2   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
 3   Square, in the City of New York, on the 27th day of November, two thousand
 4   twenty-three.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7                  DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
 8                        Chief Judge,
 9                  BETH ROBINSON,
10                  MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN,
11                    Circuit Judges.
12   _____________________________________
13
14   KIMANIE TAVOY GRAHAM,
15            Petitioner,
16
17                  v.                                           20-2785
18                                                               NAC
19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21              Respondent.
22   _____________________________________
23
24
 1   FOR PETITIONER:                     Elyssa N. Williams, The Bronx Defenders,
 2                                       Bronx, NY.
 3
 4   FOR RESPONDENT:                     Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney
 5                                       General; Shelley R. Goad, Assistant Director;
 6                                       Tim Ramnitz, Attorney, Office of Immigration
 7                                       Litigation, United States Department of
 8                                       Justice, Washington, D.C.
 9
10   FOR AMICUS CURIAE:                  William Tong, Attorney General of
11                                       Connecticut, Clare Kindall, Solicitor General
12                                       of Connecticut, Joshua Perry, Special Counsel
13                                       for Civil Rights, Hartford, CT.
14
15         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

16   Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

17   AND DECREED that the petition for review is GRANTED.

18         Petitioner Kimanie Tavoy Graham, a native and citizen of Jamaica, seeks

19   review of an August 7, 2020 decision of the BIA, denying his motion to reopen to

20   apply for cancellation of removal. In re Kimanie Tavoy Graham, No. A203 144 836

21   (B.I.A. Aug. 7, 2020). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying

22   facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

23         We review the BIA’s denial of a statutory motion to reopen for abuse of

24   discretion.   See Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2008).      And

25   although we lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s discretionary decision

                                              2
 1   denying a regulatory motion to reopen proceedings sua sponte, we may remand

 2   for reconsideration where the BIA “declined to exercise its sua sponte authority

 3   because it misperceived the legal background and thought, incorrectly, that a

 4   reopening would necessarily fail.” Chen v. Garland, 43 F.4th 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2022)

 5   (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

 6         An alien seeking to reopen proceedings may file one statutory motion to

 7   reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative

 8   decision was rendered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R.

 9   § 1003.2(c)(2). It is undisputed that Graham’s April 29, 2020 motion to reopen

10   was untimely and numerically-barred because it was his second motion to reopen

11   and it was filed almost two years after his removal order became final in 2018. See

12   8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA

13   did not err in finding that Graham’s purported eligibility for cancellation of

14   removal was not an enumerated basis for excusing the time or number limits. See

15   8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).   However, although equitable tolling can excuse these

16   limitations, see generally Zhao v. INS, 452 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2006), the BIA did not

17   consider whether Graham’s pardon by the State of Connecticut warranted

18   equitable tolling. Instead, the BIA determined that, regardless of the timing of

                                              3
 1   the motion, Graham had not shown that statutory or regulatory reopening was

 2   warranted because he failed to provide evidence showing the legal effect of his

 3   pardon in immigration proceedings. That finding was erroneous.

 4          Under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi), an alien’s removability based on certain

 5   grounds of deportability is waived “if the alien subsequent to the criminal

 6   conviction has been granted a full and unconditional pardon by the President of

 7   the United States or by the Governor of any of the several States.”       The BIA

 8   “departed from its settled course of accepting full and unconditional pardons

 9   granted by a state’s supreme pardoning authority when the pardon is executive,

10   rather than legislative, in nature,” as in Connecticut. Thompson v. Barr, 959 F.3d

11   476, 489–90 (1st Cir. 2020). Indeed, in 2021, the Department of Homeland Security

12   issued a statement that a full and unconditional pardon issued by the Connecticut

13   Board of Pardons and Paroles is effective under the pardon waiver clause. See

14   DHS Statement on Treatment of a Full and Unconditional Pardon Issued Under

15   the Law and Process Currently in Place in Connecticut as Effective for Purposes of

16   the INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(vi) Pardon Waiver Clause and 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(c)(2),

17   available   at   https://www.dhs.gov/news/2021/03/23/dhs-statement-connecticut-

18   pardons-and-immigration.       Accordingly, the BIA erred in concluding that

                                              4
 1   Graham failed to establish that his pardon had any effect on his removal

 2   proceedings because, under the pardon waiver clause, his removability for having

 3   been convicted of an aggravated felony (a bar to cancellation of removal) was

 4   waived. 1 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi); id. § 1229b(a)(3).

 5         The Government argues that remand would nonetheless be futile on the

 6   ground that Graham is ineligible for cancellation of removal because he has not

 7   accrued the requisite seven years’ continuous residence. In relevant part, the

 8   agency may cancel removal “if the alien . . . has resided in the United States

 9   continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status.” 8 U.S.C.

10   § 1229b(a)(2). A period of continuous residence ends “when the alien is served a

11   notice to appear” or “when the alien has committed an offense referred to in

12   section 1182(a)(2) of this title that renders the alien inadmissible to the United

13   States under section 1182(a)(2) of this title or removable from the United States

14   under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4) of this title, whichever is earliest.” 8 U.S.C.

15   § 1229b(d)(1).

     1 The pardon waiver clause does not waive Graham’s removability on the ground
     that he was convicted of a controlled substance offense, but a controlled substance
     offense does not bar cancellation under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3). CAR at 266 (BIA
     Dec.); see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi); id. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).
                                                  5
 1         Remand is futile when “there is no realistic possibility of a different result.”

 2   Li v. INS, 453 F.3d 129, 137 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 428 F.3d

 3   391, 395 (2d Cir. 2005)). Neither the agency nor the courts have decided the

 4   impact of an unconditional pardon, such as Graham’s, on the determination of

 5   whether an alien has committed an offense referred to in § 1182(a)(2) for purposes

 6   of § 1229b(d)(1). While we review such legal questions de novo, our review is

 7   limited to those issues that formed the basis for the agency’s decision. See 8 U.S.C.

 8   § 1252(b)(4)(A); Zhong v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 480 F.3d 104, 122 (2d Cir. 2007)

 9   (“[W]hen the BIA issues an opinion in a petitioner’s administrative appeal, and

10   that opinion constitutes the final agency determination, we may consider only

11   those issues that formed the basis for that decision.”), abrogated on other grounds by

12   Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411 (2023). And, although the Government’s

13   interpretation may ultimately prevail, that issue is for the agency to decide in the

14   first instance.   See INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (“Generally

15   speaking, a court of appeals should remand a case to an agency for decision of a

16   matter that statutes place primarily in agency hands.”).

17         For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is GRANTED and the case

18   is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order. All pending

                                                6
1   motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

2                                   FOR THE COURT:
3                                   Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
4                                   Clerk of Court

                                       7