Court Opinion

ID: 9582530
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:28:26.623464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:55.510819
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
While the majority has faithfully followed the decision in Wren v. Harrison, 165 Ga. App. 847 (303 SE2d 67), it is my view that this earlier case announces an incorrect rule of law. While parents have a duty to exercise due care for the safety of their children, I see no basis for holding that the parents’ duty somehow releases a landowner or occupier of land from their duties to children who come upon the land. In accordance with the first division of the majority opinion, the injured child in the case sub judice must be viewed as an invitee so that the applicable duty of the landowner is to exercise reasonable care in keeping the premises safe. OCGA § 51-3-1. Once the landowner’s duty of care is acknowledged, a jury may resolve the questions of whether parent or landowner or both were negligent, and where lies the proximate cause of the child’s injury.
The present case is not entirely dissimilar from an automobile collision wherein an injured child is a passenger in one of the vehicles. *603The child may pursue a claim against the non-parent driver subject to proof of the elements of any tort claim, including negligence and proximate cause. Taylor v. McClendon, 205 Ga. App. 390 (2) (422 SE2d 440).
Decided November 21, 1994
Reconsideration denied December 13, 1994
Fitzpatrick & Camp, Thomas A. Camp, for appellants.
Blasingame, Burch, Garrard & Bryant, E. Davison Burch, Kim T. Stephens, for appellees.
The holding in Wren which would absolve the landowner of any duty of care towards the child is entirely unsupported by the preceding chain of authority, is contrary to our statutory law, and should now be corrected. Therefore, I respectfully dissent since I would overrule Wren, supra, reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, and return the case sub judice to the superior court for trial. See also Haliburton v. Cole, 193 Ga. App. 795, 796 (2) (389 SE2d 13).
The concept for which the majority cites Wren was stated without analysis or explanation as being predicated upon George R. Lane & Assoc. v. Thomasson, 156 Ga. App. 313 (274 SE2d 708), and the case cited therein. However, this earlier root case does not state the rule announced in Wren and was decided under alternative theories of law easily distinguishable from the rule stated in Wren, that is, that liability was barred under an indemnity clause in a lease, or because the child who died was a trespasser, or at best licensee, so that there was no liability in the absence of wilful and wanton conduct by that defendant. In the root case of George R. Lane & Assoc. v. Thomasson, supra, the only references to an absence of duties on the part of landowners to those who came upon their land was with reference to the lesser standards of care provided trespassers and licensees. The authority cited there is also limited to cases discussing these lesser standards of care. Also, while a reference is made to the parents’ duty to provide for the safety of a child, no connection between that reference and the holding of the root case was stated or explained.