Court Opinion

ID: 9957337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 14:07:41.79925+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:16.705000
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2431-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

PHILIP J. IANUALE,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Submitted March 18, 2024 – Decided April 4, 2024

                   Before Judges DeAlmeida and Bishop-Thompson.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 14-01-
                   5648.

                   Philip J. Ianuale, appellant pro se.

                   Raymond S. Santiago, Monmouth County Prosecutor,
                   attorney for respondent (Alecia Nathanne Woodard,
                   Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Defendant Philip J. Ianuale appeals from the November 28, 2022 order of

the Law Division dismissing his second petition for post-conviction relief (PCR)

as untimely filed. We vacate the order and remand for further proceedings.

                                         I.

      In 2017, a jury convicted defendant of third-degree aggravated assault on

a police officer, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(5)(a), and fourth-degree resisting arrest,

N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(2). The jury acquitted defendant of third-degree resisting

arrest but found him guilty of the lesser-included disorderly persons offense of

preventing an officer from effecting an arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(1). The court

subsequently found defendant guilty of disorderly persons possession of a

controlled dangerous substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1), and disorderly

persons possession of drug paraphernalia, N.J.S.A. 2C:36-2.              The court

sentenced defendant to a three-year term of noncustodial probation. Defendant

did not file a direct appeal from his convictions and sentence.

      On December 5, 2017, defendant filed his first petition for PCR. He

alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel and errors by the trial court.

      On April 11, 2019, the trial court issued an oral opinion and order denying

defendant's first petition.

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      On August 25, 2021, we affirmed the trial court's decision.      State v.

Ianuale, No. A-5352-18 (App. Div. Aug. 25, 2021).

      Defendant alleges that he did not receive notice of our August 25, 2021

decision until April 4, 2022.

      On August 4, 2022, defendant filed a second petition for PCR. The only

document in defendant's appendix described as a petition for PCR consists of

the following single paragraph:

            Please accept this verified Petition for Post-Conviction
            Relief of the action identified above based on grounds
            that rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the
            Constitution of the United States and Article I[,]
            Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution were
            violated.

It appears no subsequent filing in the trial court specified the basis for these

broad allegations. As far as we can discern from the record, defendant was not

given an opportunity to file an amended second petition detailing the basis for

his claims or written argument opposing dismissal of his second petition.

      On November 28, 2022, the trial court issued an order dismissing

defendant's second PCR petition. The court concluded the second petition was

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untimely because it was filed more than one year after dismissal of the first

petition for PCR. See R. 3:22-12(a)(2)(C); R. 3:22-4.1

      This appeal followed. Defendant raises the following arguments.

            POINT I

            THE SECOND PETITION WAS TIMELY SINCE IT
            WAS FILED WITHIN ONE YEAR OF THE DATE
            ON WHICH THE FACTUAL PREDICATE WAS
            DISCOVERED.

            POINT II

            FAILURE TO FILE A TIMELY SECOND PETITION
            IS ACTUALLY A FURTHER INDICATION OF
            INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

            POINT III

            THE CONCURRENT PANDEMIC CAUSED MANY
            TIMELINES TO EXCEED THEIR USUAL
            LENGTHS.

            POINT IV

            THERE WAS A LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY BY
            THE PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE TO ASSURE
            DEFENDANTS ARE TIMELY INFORMED.

1
  The trial court, citing Rule 3:22-12(a)(3), also concluded defendant's second
petition was untimely because it was filed more than ninety days after the date
of the judgment on direct appeal. Defendant, however, did not file a direct
appeal of his conviction and sentence. Thus, Rule 3:22-12(a)(3) does not apply
here. Presumably, the trial court was referring to our August 25, 2021 decision
affirming the order dismissing defendant's first petition for PCR. That decision,
however, is not a judgment on a direct appeal within the meaning of the rule.
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            POINT V

            THE    COMBINATION     OF    INEFFECTIVE
            ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, THE IMPACT OF THE
            PANDEMIC     AND    THE      LACK     OF
            ACCOUNTABILITY ALL CONTRIBUTED TO THE
            RESULTING DELAY.

            POINT VI

            THESE ISSUES MUST BE ADDRESSED SO THAT
            ALL   DEFENDANTS'    RIGHTS  CAN    BE
            PROTECTED VIA FURTHER COURT RULES OR
            PROCEDURES.

                                        II.

      We review de novo the trial court's legal conclusion that defendant's

second PCR petition is barred by Rule 3:22-4 and Rule 3:22-12(a)(2). State v.

Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 419 (2004).

      Rule 3:22-4(b) provides, in relevant part:

            A second or subsequent petition for post-conviction
            relief shall be dismissed unless:

            (1)   it is timely under R. 3:22-12(a)(2); and

            (2)   it alleges on its face either:

            (A) that the petition relies on a new rule of
            constitutional law, made retroactive to defendant's
            petition by the United States Supreme Court or the
            Supreme Court of New Jersey, that was unavailable
            during the pendency of any prior proceedings; or

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            (B) that the factual predicate for the relief sought
            could not have been discovered earlier through the
            exercise of reasonable diligence, and the facts
            underlying the ground for relief, if proven and viewed
            in light of the evidence as a whole, would raise a
            reasonable probability that the relief sought would be
            granted; or

            (C) that the petition alleges a prima facie case of
            ineffective assistance of counsel that represented the
            defendant on the first or subsequent application for
            post-conviction relief.

      Rule 3:22-12(a)(2) provides that "no second or subsequent petition shall

be filed more than one year after the latest of" the following:

            (A) the date on which the constitutional right asserted
            was initially recognized by the United States Supreme
            Court or the Supreme Court of New Jersey, if that right
            has been newly recognized by either of those Courts
            and made retroactive by either of those Courts to cases
            on collateral review; or

            (B) the date on which the factual predicate for the
            relief sought was discovered, if that factual predicate
            could not have been discovered earlier through the
            exercise of reasonable diligence; or

            (C) the date of the denial of the first or subsequent
            application for post-conviction relief where ineffective
            assistance of counsel that represented the defendant on
            the first or subsequent application for post-conviction
            relief is being alleged.

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"These time limitations shall not be relaxed, except as provided herein." R.

3:22-12(b).

      Although we do not have the benefit of a second petition setting forth a

detailed description of the basis for defendant's claims, it appears, according to

the briefs he filed with this court, that he does not allege he is entitled to relief

based on a newly recognized constitutional right. His second petition, therefore,

does not appear to fall within subsection (A) of the rule.

      Defendant appears, however, to allege that his second petition is based on

a factual predicate he discovered within a year of the filing of that petition.

According to defendant, it was not until April 4, 2022, when he received notice

of our August 25, 2021 opinion, that he became aware of the factual predicate

to allege ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel on this first PCR

petition. He argues that the exercise of reasonable diligence would not have

revealed that factual predicate prior to April 4, 2022.         Defendant argues,

therefore, that his claims fall within subsection (B) of the rule, which allows him

to file a second PCR petition within one year of April 4, 2022.

      To the extent defendant's second petition alleges he was denied the

effective assistance of counsel with respect to his trial counsel on his first

petition, subsection (C) of the rule requires that a second petition be filed no

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more than a year after the date of the denial of the first petition. Defendant's

first petition was denied on April 11, 2019. He did not file his second petition

until August 4, 2022, more than three years later. Defendant appears to argue,

however, that he did not discover, and could not reasonably have discovered,

the factual predicate supporting his claim of ineffective assistance of first PCR

trial counsel until April 4, 2022, when he was notified of our decision.

      The trial court dismissed the second petition in the absence of allegations

or written arguments by defendant detailing the basis of his claims. Given the

sparse record before it, the trial court understandably did not consider

defendant's arguments, raised for the first time before this court, that his second

petition was timely filed pursuant to Rule 3:22-12(a)(2)(B) and (C), because he

did not discover, and could not have discovered through the exercise of

reasonable diligence, the factual predicate for the claims in his second petition

until April 4, 2022. In the absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law by

the trial court with respect to the timeliness of defendant's second petition under

Rule 3:22-12(a)(2)(B) and (C), we cannot engage in effective appellate review

of the November 28, 2022 order. See R. 1:7-4(a); Raspantini v. Arocho, 364

N.J. Super. 528, 534 (App. Div. 2003).

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      In light of these circumstances, we vacate the November 28, 2022 order

and remand this matter to permit defendant to file an amended second petition

for PCR detailing the basis of his claims of ineffective assistance of trial and

appellate counsel with respect to his first PCR petition. The trial court shall,

after briefing by the parties, consider whether any of the claims in defendant's

amended second petition for PCR were timely filed, using the original August

4, 2022 filing date of defendant's second PCR petition to determine timeliness.

We offer no opinion with respect to whether defendant's second PCR petition

was timely filed or whether he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing or PCR.

      Vacated and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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