Court Opinion

ID: 9644145
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:48:50.894115+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:09.167947
License: Public Domain

*469SPAETH, Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the majority’s result, only because, unlike the defendant in Faretta v. California, appellant never “clearly and unequivocally declared to the trial judge that he wanted to represent himself and did not want counsel.” 422 U.S. at 885, 95 S.Ct. at 2541.
I disagree with the majority’s implication that in order to be allowed to represent himself a defendant must have attained a certain level of education, must have a demonstrable grasp of legal principles or procedures, or must have experience in self-representation.
Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that “he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.”
. We need make no assessment of how well or poorly Faretta had mastered the intricacies of the hearsay rule and the California code provisions that govern challenges of potential jurors on voir dire. For his technical legal knowledge, as such, was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. at 885-36, 95 S.Ct. at 2541 (citation and footnote omitted).
The colloquy required by Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), is intended to ensure that a defendant knows what he may be giving up when he waives right to counsel. If a defendant is not sure of the exact nature of the charges against him, possible defenses, and so on, the court should inform him. See Commonwealth v. Grant, 229 Pa.Super. 419, 424-425, 323 A.2d 354, 357-358.
HOFFMAN and PRICE, JJ., join in this opinion.