Court Opinion

ID: 9657782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:37:55.778604+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:48.385335
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.

(dissenting).

everywhere the crosses are burning, sharp-shooting goose-steppers around every corner, there are snipers in the schools ... (I know you don't believe this. You think this is nothing but faddish exaggeration. But they are not shooting at you.)
Lorna Dee Cervantes1
The law in question is not a "hate speech" law.
*183Nor is it really a "hate crimes" law as it has been somewhat inappropriately named.
It is a law against discrimination — discrimination in the selection of a crime victim.
Today the majority decides that the same Constitution which does not protect discrimination in the marketplace does protect discrimination that takes place during the commission of a crime. Numerous federal and state laws exist which prohibit discrimination in the selection of who is to be hired, or fired, or promoted. No one seriously (at least until today) questions their constitutionality. Yet the majority today gives constitutional protection to discrimination in the selection of who is to be the victim of a crime. Both sets of laws involve discrimination, both involve victims, both involve action "because of" the victim's status.
The majority says there is a difference in the two types of laws. They are wrong. There is no support in law or logic for their position. How can the Constitution not protect discrimination in the selection of a victim for discriminatory hiring, firing, or promotional practices, and at the same time protect discrimination in the selection of a victim for criminal activity? How can the Constitution protect discrimination in the performance of an illegal act and not protect discrimination in the performance of an otherwise legal act? How can the Constitution not protect discrimination in the marketplace when the action is taken "because of" the victim's status, and at the same time protect discrimination in a street or back alley when the criminal action is taken "because of” the victim's status?
These are laws against discrimination, pure and simple. Dictionaries do not disagree on the meaning of the term discrimination: to distinguish, to differentiate, to act on the basis of prejudice. Laws forbidding discrim*184ination in the marketplace and laws forbidding discrimination in criminal activity have a common denominator: they are triggered when a person acts "because of" the victim's protected status. These exact words appear in most, if not all antidiscrimination laws. These exact words appear in the laws before us today.
Yet the majority says one is constitutional, one is not. I submit it is pure sophistry to distinguish the two. In its effort to protect speech, the majority's constitutional pien gets too close to the trees and fails to see the forest.
The majority rationalizes their conclusion by insisting that this statute punishes bigoted thought. Not so. The statute does not impede or punish the right of persons to have bigoted thoughts or to express themselves in a bigoted fashion or otherwise, regarding the race, religion, or other status of a person. It does attempt to limit the effects of bigotry. What the statute does punish is acting upon those thoughts. It punishes the act of discriminatory selection plus criminal conduct, not the thought or expression of bigotry. The Constitution allows a person to have bigoted thoughts and to express them, but it does not allow a person to act on them. The majority says otherwise. I disagree.
I conclude the statute in question is neither vague nor overbroad, nor does it offend equal protection. Accordingly, I dissent.
► — 1
Examples of shocking bias related crimes making headlines recently include:
[A] white man assaults a black woman, rips off her clothes, douses her with lighter fluid and, yelling 'nigger', threatens to set her on fire.
*185According to police in a Washington suburb, the attack capped a night in which two young white men planned to hunt down blacks in revenge for being called 'honkies', a derogatory term blacks use for whites.
They pounced on two black women walking towards a shopping centre early in the morning. One escaped and ran for help, the other was beaten, stripped nearly naked, and sprayed with lighter fluid. Bernd Debusmann, Hate Crime Shocks Washington, Shows Race Problems, Reuters, March 4, 1992.
In Kentucky this September, assailants beat a young gay man with a tire iron, locked him into a car trunk with a bunch of snapping turtles and then tried to set the car on fire. He was left with severe brain damage. Neal R. Peirce, Recurring Nightmare of Hate Crimes, National Journal, December 15, 1990, at Section State of the States; Vol. 22 No. 50 p. 3045.
Amber Jefferson, a 15 year-old high school cheerleader in Orange County, Calif., almost lost her life because of the fact that she has one white and one black parent. Four attackers, allegedly all white, beat her with a baseball bat and split her face open with a shard of plate glass. Surgery to fix the wounds took 10 hours. It will be two years before she regains muscle control in her face. Id.
The 120 boys at Valley Torah High typically spend half their school day in college prep classes and half in religious instruction.
But for the past week — since their school was painted with swastikas, Ku Klux Klan symbols and Jewish slurs — they have been getting an education in hate. Sally Ann Stewart, Hate Crimes: 'Litany of shame' Incidents on rise in California, USA Today, March 13, 1992, at 3A.
Wisconsin has also not been immune from reprehensible incidents of bias related crime:
*186Anti-Semitic attacks erupt regularly, even at such supposedly progressive, enlightened institutions as the University of Wisconsin (Madison), where a Jewish student center has been pelted with rocks and bottles and where Jewish fraternities and sororities have been vandalized. Counselors at a Madison Jewish day camp discovered that the brake linings had been cut on a bus used to transport children — fortunately before the bus was used. A Madison synagogue, after repeated anti-Semitic incidents, was kept under armed guard for a time. Recurring Nightmare of Hate Crimes, National Journal, December 15, 1990, at Section State of the States; Vol. 22 No. 50 p. 3045.
In 1987, the Wisconsin legislature acted to alleviate bias related crime. The Wisconsin legislature's response was to enact séc. 939.645, Stats., which enhances the penalty a perpetrator receives if the State of Wisconsin (State) proves that the perpetrator intentionally selected the victim because of the victim's race, religion, color, or other protected status.
I first address Mitchell's and the majority's over-breadth argument. A statute is overbroad when its language, given its normal meaning, is so sweeping that its sanctions may be applied to conduct which the state is not permitted to regulate. Bachowski v. Salamone, 139 Wis. 2d 397, 411, 407 N.W.2d 533 (1987). "The essential vice of an overbroad law is that by sweeping protected activity within its reach it deters citizens from exercising their protected constitutional freedoms, the so-called 'chilling effect.' " Id. An overbreadth challenge may be based on hypothetical speculation and does not require the presence of a "chilling effect" in the defendant's particular case. Milwaukee v. Wilson, 96 Wis. 2d 11, 19-20, 291 N.W.2d 452 (1980). This court has also held *187that where possible we must interpret a statute to avoid constitutional invalidity. Bachowski, 139 Wis. 2d at 405.
I conclude that the First Amendment is not implicated in this case. However, in concluding that the challenged statute is constitutional I do not take lightly the First Amendment issue that Mitchell has raised. "If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
I reject the majority's and Mitchell's argument that sec. 939.645, Stats., punishes or has a chilling effect on free speech. The penalty enhancement statute is directed at the action or conduct of selecting a victim and committing a crime against that victim because of his or her protected status. The gravamen of the offense is selection, not the perpetrator's speech, thought, or even motive.2 The statute does not impede or punish the right *188of persons to have thoughts or to express themselves regarding the race, religion, or other status of a person. The statute's concern is with criminal conduct plus purposeful selection. By enhancing the penalty, the penalty enhancer statute punishes more severely criminals who act with what the legislature has determined is a more depraved, antisocial intent: an intent not just to injure but to intentionally pick out and injure a person because óf a person's protected status. The legislative concern expressed in this statute is not with the beliefs, motives, or speech of a perpetrator but with his or her action of purposeful selection plus criminal conduct.
Admittedly, the conduct prohibited by the penalty enhancer statute can be proven by an extensive combination of facts that might include words uttered by a *189defendant.3 However, if words are used to prove the crime, the words uttered are not the subject of the statutory prohibition; rather, they are used only as circumstantial evidence to prove the intentional selection. Permitting the use of such evidence does not chill free speech. Just as words of defendants are frequently used to prove the element of intent in many crimes without violating the First Amendment, words may be used to prove the act of intentional selection. It is no more a chilling of free speech to allow words to prove the act of intentional selection in this "intentional selection" statute than it is to allow a defendant's words that he "hated John Smith and wished he were dead" to prove a defendant intentionally murdered John Smith.
The use of speech under the penalty enhancer is not different than its use in prosecutions under antidis-*190crimination laws or fair housing discrimination laws. Antidiscrimination statutes often employ terms similar to those contained in the penalty enhancer. For instance, secs. 118.13,111.321,101.225, and 66.395, Stats., all prohibit certain conduct that occurs either "because of" or "on account of" or "on the basis of" a status of another person. Proof of violations of these statutes will often involve proof of words used by the violators. Under these statutes and the penalty enhancer, a particular action or conduct is being punished, and speech may be used to prove the conduct. Under the penalty enhancer statute, speech is simply probative of the element of intentional selection. The use of such evidence does not violate the First Amendment. The action of intentional selection is punished, and the words used by a defendant are merely evidence of an intentional selection.
Although the majority attempts to distinguish this statute and antidiscrimination statutes, its distinction is a .distinction without a difference. The majority at 164 states that the penalty enhancer statute is unconstitutional because the statute does not punish only the conduct of intentional selection of a victim "[t]he statute punishes the 'because of aspect of the defendant's selection, the reason the defendant selected the victim . . .." On pages 176-177, the majority abandons this reasoning when applied to antidiscrimination laws. The majority posits that the distinction between the penalty enhancer statute and antidiscrimination laws is that antidis-crimination laws punish only the discrimination, i.e., the refusal to hire, not the discriminatory motive. The majority forgets a key requirement of antidiscrimination statutes. Antidiscrimination statutes do not prohibit a person from not hiring someone of a protected class, they prohibit a person from not hiring someone of a protected class because or on the basis of his or her *191protected class. It is not, as the majority suggests, the failure to hire that is being punished, it is the failure to hire because of status. How can the majority find the penalty .enhancer statute unconstitutional because it punishes the "because of" aspect of a selection process, and at the same time conclude that antidiscrimination statutes, which do the same thing, are constitutional? The majority at the least ought to answer this question.
The majority also attempts to explain its very complicated and elaborate distinction between this statute and antidiscrimination laws based on some sort of difference between subjective motivations and objective acts. Although I do not quite understand the majority's use of the terms objective and subjective in the context of this case, I interpret the majority's argument to be that this statute is unconstitutional because it punishes the subjective motivations of the actor, while discrimination statutes involve objective acts of discrimination. This is merely the same distinction without a difference referred to above. Like antidiscrimination statutes, the penalty enhancer statute involves an "objective act" — the criminal conduct, e.g., the battery, etc. Likewise, despite the majority's contentions to the contrary, under the majority's analysis antidiscrimination statutes, because they require that the act be "because of" the protected status of the victim, implicate and punish the subjective motive of the actor. For example, in disparate treatment cases (cases in which the discrimination alleged is overt discrimination as opposed to disparate impact where the practices are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation) a person simply does not violate Title VII for refusing to hire a person of a protected status. The objective act alone does not invoke the provisions of the statute. Rather, the refusal must be "because of" the victim's protected status. Assuming that the majority is correct *192ttíat this statute punishes motive, it fails to explain how the enhancer is any different from antidiscrimination laws.
If one assumes that the majority is correct that the penalty enhancer punishes motive there is only one distinction between it and antidiscrimination laws. The only distinction that exists between the penalty enhancer statute and antidiscrimination statutes is that the objective acts that are punished are different in that antidiscrimination laws punish legal conduct plus bad motive and the enhancer punishes criminal conduct plus bad motive. While it is true that this is a distinction, the majority never explains why it is a distinction that matters. Why is it permissible to punish motive when it is accompanied by legal conduct and impermissible to punish motive when it is accompanied by illegal conduct. The majority does not give an answer to this question, it merely concludes that the distinction somehow makes a difference. Saying so, again and again, does not make it so.
Lastly, even assuming that the majority is correct in saying that this statute punishes motive, it has still failed to explain why punishing motive is impermissible. A recent case from the U.S. Supreme Court would seem to indicate that the majority is in error. In Dawson v. Delaware, 90-6704, slip. op. at 5 (U.S. Supreme Court March 9, 1992), the United States Supreme Court held that "the Constitution does not erect a per se barrier to the admission of evidence concerning one's beliefs and associations at sentencing simply because those beliefs and associations are protected by the First Amendment." Although under the facts of Dawson the Court concluded that there was a First Amendment violation, its analysis lends considerable support to the conclusion that considering the perpetrator's motivations in deter*193mining the appropriate sentence is permissible. For example, in concluding that evidence that the defendant belonged to the Aryan Brotherhood was impermissibly submitted during the penalty phase of a capital case in violation of the First Amendment, the court stated:
Even if the Delaware group to which Dawson allegedly belongs is racist, those beliefs, so far as we can determine, had no relevance to the sentencing proceeding in this case. For example, the Aryan Brotherhood evidence was not tied in any way to the murder of Dawson's victim. In Barclay, on the contrary, the evidence showed that the defendant's membership in the Black Liberation Army, and his consequent desire to start a 'racial war,' were related to the murder of a white hitchhiker. See 463 U.S., at 942-944 (plurality opinion). We concluded that it was most proper for the sentencing judge to 'tak[e] into account the. elements of racial hatred in this murder.' Id., at 949. In the present case, however, the murder victim was white, as is Dawson; elements of racial hatred were therefore not involved in the killing. Dawson v. Delaware, 90-6704, slip. op. at 6-7 (U.S. Supreme Court March 9, 1992) (Emphasis added.)
The U.S. Supreme Court is clearly indicating that when racial hatred is relevant to the crime, i.e., the racial hatred is the perpetrator's reason for committing the crime, this information is completely relevant in sentencing. How then can the majority suggest that punishing motive is impermissible?
I repeat. Section 939.645, Stats., is not concerned with speech or thought. It is concerned with intentional selection. It becomes operative not just when a person's speech evinces the discriminatory selection, but rather anytime the choice of a victim from a protected class is *194shown to be selective rather than random, discriminating rather than indiscriminate, or designed rather than happenstance.
The penalty enhancer statute also does not seek to punish the motive of a perpetrator. Neither a perpetrator's bigoted beliefs, nor his or her motivation for intentionally selecting a victim because of a protected status are punished. Again, it is the act of selecting a victim because of his or her race, color, or etc., that is proscribed. If a perpetrator seeks out a Jewish person to physically assault, his intent is not just to injure, but to injure a Jewish person. He may be motivated by a hatred of Jewish people, a calling from God to sacrifice a Jewish person, or some other irrational motive. This law does not look to motive. This law does not look at why the perpetrator sought out a Jewish person. It looks only to whether the fact that the victim was Jewish was a substantial factor in the defendant's purposeful choice of the victim.
Similarly, under the facts of the present case, even if Mitchell could show that his motive was not a hatred of whites, his conduct would still be punishable under the statute. As the State points out, Mitchell's motive could have been to impress the group of boys that accompanied him. Nevertheless, the statute would still apply. Its focus is not on bigoted or hateful motivations. Rather, it punishes the action of intentionally selecting a victim on the basis of a protected status listed in the statute. As Mitchell himself emphasized at oral arguments, the term "hate crimes" statute is a misnomer. The crimes that fall under the statute may be motivated by many emotions; the intentional selection is what is prohibited. The statute looks at intent, and statutes are used in many ways to punish crimes differently based on the perceived seriousness of the intent of the perpetrator. For example, an *195intent to kill is punished greater than an intent showing utter disregard for human life. Likewise, a reckless intent is punished less than an intent showing utter disregard for human life.
Section 939.645, Stats., does not attempt to prohibit or punish bigotry, antisemitism, or the like. It does attempt to limit their effects. An individual's freedom to express his or her views in writing, speech, or otherwise is not regulated or chilled by this statute. What is prohibited is the act of intentionally selecting victims because of their'protected status. Why a Black or a Jewish person or any other person of a protected class was chosen as the victim is not relevant. What is relevant is that the victim is intentionally chosen because of the victim's protected status.
I conclude that sec. 939.645, Stats., legitimately regulates criminal conduct, and raises no issue under the First Amendment. It does not punish speech, thought, or even motivation, nor does it sweep within its ambit actions which are constitutionally protected as to render it unconstitutionally overbroad.
It is necessary to discuss the vagueness and equal protection issues, even though they are not reached by the majority. These issues are raised by Mitchell. I therefore take this opportunity to address each issue.
Mitchell asserts that this legislative attempt to alleviate bias related crime is unconstitutionally vague. Specifically he contends that the phrases "intentionally selects," "because of," and "race," are vague, undefined, and ambiguous. Thus, he argues that, they lead to erratic convictions and unfair prosecutions. I disagree.
*196A statute is "unconstitutionally vague if it fails to afford proper notice of the conduct it seeks to proscribe or if it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions." Milwaukee v. Wilson, 96 Wis. 2d at 16 (footnote omitted). This court has repeatedly indicated that " [t]he principles underlying the void for vagueness doctrine . .. stem from concepts of procedural due process." State v. Popanz, 112 Wis. 2d 166, 172, 332 N.W.2d 750 (1983).
To determine whether a statute survives a vagueness challenge, this court has applied a two-part analysis. First, the statute must be sufficiently definite to give persons of ordinary intelligence who wish to abide by the law adequate notice of the proscribed conduct. Second, the statute must provide adequate standards for those who enforce the laws and adjudicate guilt. See State v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 135, 447 N.W.2d 654 (1989) (citing City of Oak Creek v. King, 148 Wis. 2d 532, 546, 436 N.W.2d 285 (1989)). "However, a statute need not define with absolute clarity and precision what is and what is not unlawful conduct." State v. Hurd, 135 Wis. 2d 266, 272, 400 N.W.2d 42 (Ct. App. 1986). Furthermore, to survive a vagueness challenge it is not necessary, "for a law to attain the precision of mathematics or science . . .." Milwaukee v. Wilson, 96 Wis. 2d at 16. This court has summarized its analysis under a vagueness challenge as follows:
Thus it is not sufficient to void a criminal statute or regulation to show merely that the boundaries of the area of proscribed conduct are somewhat hazy, that what is clearly lawful shades into what is clearly unlawful by degree, or that there may exist particular instances of conduct the legal or illegal nature of which may not be ascertainable with ease. Before a statute or rule may be invalidated for vagueness, *197there must appear some ambiguity or uncertainty in the gross outlines of the duty imposed or conduct prohibited such that one bent on obedience may not discern when the region of proscribed conduct is neared, or such that the trier of fact in ascertaining guilt or innocence is relegated to creating and applying its own standards of culpability rather than applying standards prescribed in the statute or rule. State v. Courtney, 74 Wis. 2d 705, 711, 247 N.W.2d 714 (1976).
Mitchell's first contention is that the failure, of the statute to define the phrase "intentionally selects" renders the statute unconstitutionally vague because it is not a term easily understood by ordinary persons who wish to abide by the law, and fails to provide adequate standards for enforcers of its provisions. I disagree. I conclude that the phrase "intentionally selects" is sufficiently definite to provide notice of prohibited conduct to persons of ordinary intelligence who wish to abide by the law and adequate standards for those who enforce the laws and adjudicate guilt.
The word "intentionally" is a word that is easily understood. "Intentionally" means a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified. Lay persons of ordinary intelligence do not need to scurry to their dictionaries in order to understand the meaning of this well recognized and easily understood word.
Nor is this a word that is a stranger to law enforcement officials, judges^ and juries. "Intentionally" is defined in the criminal code at sec. 939.23(3), Stats.:
'Intentionally' means that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified, or is aware that his or her conduct is practically certain to cause that result. In addition, except as provided in sub. (6), the actor must have knowledge of those facts *198which are necessary to make his or her conduct criminal and which are set forth after the word 'intentionally'.
The Wisconsin statutes, particularly criminal statutes, are replete with references to "intentional" acts, or acts or conduct done "intentionally." See, e.g., sec. 939.051(b), Stats, (whoever intentionally aids and abets the commission of a crime may be charged as a principal); sec. 939.48 (person is privileged to threaten or intentionally use force against another for the purpose of self defense); sec. 940.07 ("[w]hoever knowing the vicious propensities of any animal intentionally allows it to go at large . . .."); see also secs. 7.37(5), 19.58, 12.13, 26.05(3)(b), 26.14(8) and 20.927(4). Unquestionably, law enforcement officials, judges, and juries are quite capable of applying the word to varied situations in the resolution of a legal case.
Likewise, the word "selects" is well understood and easily defined. "Select" means "to choose from a number or group ... by fitness, excellence, or other distinguishing feature . . .." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2058 (1961). As the court of appeals concluded, the meaning of the phrase "intentionally selects" is easily discerned. It means to purposely choose or pick out. I conclude that the phrase "intentionally selects" is sufficiently clear to persons of ordinary intelligence to afford a practical guide for law-abiding behavior and is capable of application by those responsible for enforcing the law.
In the court of appeals, Mitchell appeared to make an alternative vagueness argument with respect to the phrase "intentionally selects." The court of appeals explained his argument as follows:
*199Assuming that 'intentionally selects' means to purposely pick out, Mitchell apparently argues that the term is still ambiguous as applied. If we understand Mitchell's argument correctly, the underlying rationale for Mitchell's attention to the term 'intentionally selects' is this: Any time an accused is a different race than the alleged victim, it can be viewed as a 'hate crime' suitable for use of the penalty enhancer since there is no way to discern whether the victim was picked out because of race or because of other reasons. Under the statute, the very fact that this particular victim was picked out indicates that the victim was 'intentionally selected.' Therefore, Mitchell argues that so long as the accused 'knows' the victim is of a different race, a different color or a different religion, the accused will be subject to the statute. This, he claims, allows its use by prosecutors and police without ány guidelines. State v. Mitchell, 163 Wis. 2d 652, 661-62, 473 N.W.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1991).
Although Mitchell does not appear to have abandoned this argument, he seems to have framed it in slightly different terms. Mitchell now appears to argue that the statute is vague because it does not indicate to what extent a victim's protected status must affect the perpetrator's selection decision in order to implicate the statute. In other words, he argues that because the meaning of the phrase "because of" is vague and not ascertainable by an ordinary person, a fair application of the statute is impossible, and it will likely be applied any time an accused is a different race than the victim. I do not agree.
I agree with the court of appeals that the operative terms in the statute are not whether the victim is of a different "color" or "race," or other protected status. Rather, the operative terms are whether the victim was *200"intentionally selected" or purposely picked out "because of" the victims race, color, etc. "If a victim is of a different race . . . than the perpetrator, that fact alone will not allow the penalty enhancer to be used." Mitchell, 163 Wis. 2d at 662. What is important is whether the perpetrator picked out the victim because of his or her race. The key is the "intentional selection because of" the victims protected status.
I reject Mitchell's contention that the language "intentionally selects because of" fails to define with sufficient specificity the conduct which is proscribed. I again emphasize that " '[T]he Constitution does not require impossible standards'; all that is required is that the language 'conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices . . ..' " Bachowski, 139 Wis. 2d at 410. (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491 (1957)). Giving the phrase "because of" its ordinary commonsense meaning, see State v. Whittrock, 119 Wis. 2d 664, 670, 350 N.W.2d 647, measured by common understandings and practices, I conclude that where a victim's protected status is a substantial factor in the perpetrator's selection decision, the. enhancement statute applies.
It is unreasonable to construe "because of" to mean that the statute applies where race, color, or the like is only a minor or de minimis factor in the perpetrator's selection decision. Such a construction in light of the legislature's rationale (see Section III below) would be absurd. Nor would it be reasonable to construe the phrase to mean that the statute applies only when race, color, or the like is the sole factor in the perpetrator's selection decision. Legislatures realize that seldom, if ever, do people act based on one factor or consideration. Rather, people's conduct is largely driven by a multitude *201of factors which have varying impacts on their decisions. A reasonable reading of the statute is that it creates liability where "but for" the victim's protected status, the perpetrator would not have selected the victim for the crime. Thus, I conclude the victim's status must be a substantial factor in the selection decision to the extent that in the absence of that status the perpetrator would not have selected the victim.
I therefore conclude that the legislature's use of the words "because of," in sec. 939.645, Stats., although perhaps not as precisely drafted as possible, conveys "sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct" to withstand a vagueness challenge. Furthermore, Mitchell's conduct plainly falls within the prohibited zone of the statute, as there is no doubt that Gregory Reddick's race was a substantial factor in Mitchell's selection of him as his victim.4
Mitchell also contends that the word "race" is vague and ambiguous. I agree with the State that it is difficult to determine the basis of defendant's argument in this regard. I construe Mitchell's argument, as did the court *202of appeals, to be that persons of ordinary intelligence do not know the difference between the terms "race" and "color." This argument has no merit.
I find it difficult to believe that persons of ordinary intelligence would not understand what the word "race" means. Furthermore, even if there were difficulty understanding the literal difference in the terms "race" and "color," both are terms covered in the statute. Selection because of race or color is prohibited by the statute. Therefore, if people of ordinary intelligence understand the general parameters of either term, they have fair notice of the conduct that is prohibited.
Mitchell also suggests that the statute is unconstitutional because law enforcement authorities, judges, and juries may or may not pursue penalty enhancement under the statute based on their own prejudices or views toward the race, or religion, etc., of the victim or the defendant. I understand Mitchell's argument to be a constitutional challenge based on vagueness, i.e., because the statute is vague, law enforcement officials will use their own prejudices to apply the statute. This argument is meritless.
As I concluded above, the statute is sufficiently clear to persons of ordinary intelligence to provide adequate standards for those who enforce the laws, such that they will not be relegated to creating their own standards. The law enforcement responsibility to determine whether the conduct proscribed by the penalty enhancement statute can be proven in a particular case is no more difficult than similar determinations routinely made by officials in enforcing the law. Furthermore, the potential for improper jury bias and prosecutorial abuses is present in many cases. Safeguards exist to protect against these abuses. For example, this court has reviewed prosecutorial charging decisions to determine if *203there has been an abuse of discretion or discriminatory prosecution. See State v. Karpinski, 92 Wis. 2d 599, 609, 285 N.W.2d 729 (1979). This court has held that a prosecutor's decision to prosecute may not be deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification. Sears v. State, 94 Wis. 2d 128, 134, 287 N.W.2d 785 (1980). Thus, discriminatory abuses can be dealt with through other law; its potential does not render a statute vague.
The last contention made by Mitchell concerning vagueness is that the statute does not provide standards to help law enforcement determine what evidence can be used to prove a violation of the statute. A statute does not have to dictate rules in regard to admissibility of evidence. Just as in any other case, the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence provide a comprehensive guide for law enforcement. Hypothetical speculation as to how far back into a person's life a prosecutor can delve to prove the prohibited conduct of intentional selection does not render the statute unconstitutional. The rules of evidence which deal with relevancy provide adequate standards to guide law enforcement in determining the appropriate nexus between evidence and alleged misconduct, such that the evidence is admissible. See Wisconsin Rules of Evidence 904.01, 904.02, and 904.03.
I conclude that the legislature has defined the conduct proscribed by sec. 939.645, Stats., with sufficient specificity to meet constitutional requirements with respect to vagueness. The law is clear in its terms and its meaning. When the victim's protected status (i.e., race, religion, etc.) is a substantial factor in the defendant's purposeful choice of a victim, the statute becomes operative.
*204III.
Lastly, I discuss Mitchell's equal protection challenge. In McManus, 152 Wis. 2d at 130-31, this court summarized the law with respect to equal protection:
Equal protection . . . requires that there exist a reasonable and practical grounds [sic] for the classifications drawn by the legislature.... Equal protection does riot deny a state the power to treat persons within its jurisdiction differently; rather, the state retains broad discretion to create classifications so long as the classifications have a reasonable basis. The fact a statutory classification results in some inequity, however, does not provide sufficient grounds for invalidating a legislative enactment. (Citations omitted.)5
If the statute in question does not impinge on a fundamental right or create a classification based on a suspect criterion, the legislative enactment " 'must be sustained unless it is 'patently arbitrary' and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate government interest.' " Id. *205(citation omitted). "If the classification is reasonable and practical in relation to the objective, that is sufficient and doubts must be resolved in favor of the reasonableness of the classification." State v. Jackman, 60 Wis. 2d 700, 705-06, 211 N.W.2d 480 (1973). I examine sec. 939.645, Stats., under a rational basis test. The present case does not impinge on a fundamental right or create a classification based on a suspect criterion.
Section 939.645, Stats., is violated when the victim's protected status is a substantial factor in the defendant's purposeful choice of a victim for certain crimes. When such intentional selection on account of status is proved, penalties in addition to the underlying crime are assessed. I perceive this legislation to be a legislative judgment that crimes involving intentional selection of a victim because of the victim's status cause greater harm to victims and to the public than do crimes in which status is not a factor. Because of this, the legislature has chosen to punish these intentional selection crimes more severely than conviction of the underlying crime would otherwise require.
Regulation of harmful conduct is a legitimate exercise of a state's power. The function of the legislature in drafting criminal laws is always to make reasoned decisions concerning the social harm of particular conduct. The criminal laws are replete with similar legislative judgments involving enhanced penalties. For example, sec. 939.63, Stats., increases the penalty for a crime if the person possesses, uses, or threatens to use a dangerous weapon. Similarly, if a person'commits a crime while his or her identity is concealed, the penalty for the underlying crime may be increased under sec. 939.641. See also, sec. 939.62 (increased penalty for habitual criminality); sec. 939.621 (increased penalty for certain domestic abuse offenses); sec. 939.64 (increased penalty *206for committing a felony while wearing a bullet-proof garment); sec. 948.02 (sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who has not attained the age of 13 years is guilty of Class B felony, while sexual contact or intercourse with a person who has not attained the age of 16 is a Class C felony); sec. 940.31 (kidnapping, a Class B felony under the statute is enhanced to a Class A felony when it is committed with the intent "to cause another to transfer property in order to obtain the release of the victim").
There is ample evidence to support the legislature's conclusion that intentional selection of a victim from a protected class causes a greater harm to its victims as well as to society than do crimes where the victim's status is not a factor. Many commentators have discussed the widespread psychological harms caused by crimes that appear to be bias related. See generally, Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 133 (1982); Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2320 (1989); Developments in the Law Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 Harvard L. Rev. 1508, 1541 (1989). These theorists posit that bias related crimes cause injury and damage far beyond that created by similar criminal conduct which does not appear to be bias related because of their tendency to perpetuate prejudice and victimize classes of people. See generally, Gellman, supra at 340. Crimes that appear to be based on intentional selection because of the victim's status create fear not only among those who share the victim's race, color, religión, etc; but they also threaten society in general. Reports of intentional selection, even if perhaps not motivated by bigotry, create the appearance of bigotry and hatred. These crimes breed fear, misunderstanding, *207misconceptions, and isolation between different classes of people. The Wisconsin legislature has attempted to hinder these crimes, not by regulating speech, thought, or even motivation, but rather by enhancing the criminal penalty for any crime, however motivated, where the perpetrator purposefully selects a victim because of a protected status. I conclude that the legislature's action was eminently reasonable and does not violate principles of equal protection.
Mitchell posits an additional equal protection challenge to sec. 939.645, Stats. Mitchell argues that because sec. 939.645 applies only to crimes listed in the Criminal Code, chs. 939-948, and not to other crimes found in the Wisconsin statutes, it violates equal protection. Mitchell contends that this differentiation creates a classification based on suspect criterion which violates equal protection for three reasons: (1) the statute discriminates against the poor and uneducated because they are most frequently accused of the crimes listed in chs. 939-948, and in contrast "white collar" criminals are exempt from the penalty enhancement because they commit the crimes found outside these chapters; (2) treating crimes proscribed under chs. 939-948 differently from other crimes is unreasonable because some crimes found outside chs. 939-948 are more serious than those found in chs. 939-948; (3) it is unreasonable to exclude certain crimes, such as illegal restraints of trade, hunting violations, motor vehicle violations, consumer fraud, drugs and narcotics, etc., found outside chs. 939-948 from the penalty enhancement provision. Mitchell's arguments are without merit.
Section 939.645, Stats., singles out no particular group for different treatment, and thus no suspect classification is involved. As the State points out, there simply is no "white collar/poor people" distinction found in sec. *208939.645. Mitchell has offered no evidence to support his theory that poor or minorities are the groups usually accused of committing crimes under chs. 939-948. Furthermore, several crimes listed in the Criminal Code involve what are traditionally viewed as "white collar" crimes. See, e.g., sec. 943.70, (theft of trade secrets); sec. 943.38 (forgery); sec. 943.70 (computer crimes); and sec. 946.12 (misconduct in public office). Likewise, crimes that are not traditionally viewed as "white collar" crimes are found outside chs. 939-948. See, e.g., ch. 161 which covers drug offenses. The dichotomy which Mitchell seeks to establish does not exist and his argument is without merit.
Mitchell's second argument is also without merit. Mitchell contends that the classification is not proper because some crimes found outside chs. 939-948, Stats., are more serious than crimes in the Criminal Code. Even if, as Mitchell suggests, some crimes outside chs. 939-948 pose more serious harms, equal protection does not require legislatures to order "evils hierarchically according to their magnitude and to legislate against the greater before the lesser." U.S. v. Holland, 810 F.2d 1215, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1057 (1987).
Lastly, Mitchell claims it is irrational to exclude certain crimes from the penalty enhancer statute. Mitchell points to crimes such as hunting violations and motor vehicle violations and argues that these crimes may be committed against specially selected victims just as those covered by the enhancer. However, as the State notes, this assertion is also meritless because although the harm is undeniable when victims are singled out for non-criminal code crimes, the legislature is not required to legislate against all harms. See McDonald v. Board of *209Election, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969). Therefore no equal protection violation exists.
The State offers two further explanations for why the legislature chose to apply sec. 939.645, Stats., only to crimes grouped in the criminal code chs. 939-948. First, the crimes which are most likely to involve bias related victim selection are listed in the Criminal Code. For example, battery, homicide, and criminal damage to property are listed in the Criminal Code. Second, by limiting application of the penalty enhancer to the Criminal Code, the legislature was able to quickly identify with certainty the majority of offenses which are most appropriate for penalty enhancement. The limiting application "avoided the cumbersome task of examining the multitude of crimes found outside the criminal code for possible unanticipated and undesired results." I find these explanations rational and practical in light of the purpose behind sec. 939.645 of preventing and deterring bias related crime.

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In conclusion, no one disagrees with the majority's statement that "punishment of one's thought, however repugnant the thought, is unconstitutional." The majority misses the point entirely. Of course the Constitution protects bigoted and hateful thoughts, but it does not lend its protection to the person who harbors such thoughts and then acts on them. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) ("acts of invidious discrimination in the distribution of publicly available goods, [and] services . . . like violence or other types of potentially expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from their communicative impact, ... are entitled to no constitutional protection"); Hishon *210v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) (" '[ijnvidious . . . discrimination . . . has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections.'... There is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union."); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976) (" 'the constitution places no value on discrimination', ... and while '[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as . . . protected by the First Amendment ... it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections' "). Is it the majority's conclusion that it is permissible to act on bigoted beliefs?
I conclude that the penalty enhancer statute is neither vague nor overbroad. I further conclude that the statute does not violate principles of equal protection. Accordingly, I dissent.

 Cervantes, Poem for the Young White Man Who Asked Me How I, An Intelligent Well Read Person Could Believe in the War Between Races, in M. Sanchez, Contemporary Chicana Poetry 90 (1986).

One of the majority's chief contentions seems to be that the statute is unconstitutional because it punishes motive. Although I do not think that this statute punishes motive, even if it did, I have serious doubts about the majority's conclusion that punishing motive is impermissible under the First Amendment. The majority cites no authority to support its conclusion that punishing motive is impermissible under the First Amendment. In fact, the majority fails to explain why, under its analysis, it is impermissible for the penalty enhancer statute to punish a discriminatory motive, yet permissible for antidiscrimination statutes to punish a discriminatory motive. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 424-425 (1984), aff'd, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987) ("it is merely concluded that the company's pre-discharge conduct toward plaintiff was not based on anti-female animus. Absent such animus, there can be no violation of Title VII"); E.E.O.C. v. Maxwell Co., 726 F.2d 282 (1984). In fact one writer commenting *188on Title VII is at complete odds with the majority's analysis of motive under the criminal law. He writes:
Title VII was passed because Congress perceived that actions resulting from bad thoughts were sufficiently pervasive to substantially limit economic opportunities of blacks. 'Bad thoughts' is, of course, shorthand for a wide range of interior activities which are the necessary predicate for disparate treatment liability. A more common terminology is ’prohibited considerations,’ but ’bad thoughts' describes more graphically what disparate treatment entails.
The notion of bad thoughts is not peculiar to disparate treatment discrimination under Title VII. It has played an important role in the Court's constitutional decisions over the last two decades in contexts ranging from equal protection to freedom of speech and religion. Nor is such concern new in the law. Modem criminal law has always manifested a concern for motivations under the rubric of mens rea. In the discrimination context, however, motivations are both more important and more elusive than in criminal law because the 'conduct' violating Title VII is neutral or positive except when it springs from bad thoughts. In the criminal context, much prohibited conduct is itself suspect. Charles A. Sullivan, Accounting For Price Waterhouse: Proving Disparate Treatment Under Title VII, Brooklyn L. Rev. 1107,1139-1140 (1991).

The majority essentially contends that the use of speech as circumstantial evidence impermissibly chills free speech. Once again the majority fails to explain why this is not also true in antidiscrimination cases. For example, under Title VII sexual harassment jurisprudence, an employee's or employer's sexist speech is not merely evidence of prohibited conduct; it is the prohibited conduct. See, e.g., Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780, 782-83 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (in three-year period, 75 sexually explicit drawings posted on pillars and other conspicuous places in the workplace); Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1426-27 (7th Cir. 1988) (plaintiff alleged, among other things, that her supervisor called her and other female employees 'hon,' 'honey,' 'babe' and 'tiger.') Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir. 1990) (pervasive use of derogatory and insulting terms relating to women generally and addressed to female employees personally may be sufficient to show a hostile work environment). See also Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1535 (M.D. Fla. 1991) ("pictures and verbal harassment are not protected speech because they act as discriminatory conduct in the form of a hostile work environment").

The defendant has waived any challenge he might have had to the propriety of the jury instruction given in this case. However, even if it were not waived, the defendant would be hard pressed to show that the instruction given in this case caused him harm. The instruction in this case indicated that in order for the jury to conclude that the defendant intentionally selected the victim because of his race they must conclude "that the defendant knew that Gregory Reddick was a member of the white race and committed the crime of aggravated battery against him for the reason that he was a member of that race." While this instruction may have given the jury the impression that the victim's race had to be the sole factor in the defendant's selection decision, it certainly did not give the impression that a finding that race was anything less than a substantial factor would trigger the penalty enhancer statute.

The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution provides:
No state shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Amendment XIV, Section 1, United States Constitution.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Wisconsin Constitution Provides:
All people are bom equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights; among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. ... Article I, Section 1, Wisconsin Constitution.
This court has held that the equal protection clause of the Wisconsin Constitution is the substantial equivalent of its respective clause in the federal constitution. See State ex rel. Cresci v. H&SS Department, 62 Wis. 2d 400, 414, 215 N.W.2d 361 (1974).