Court Opinion

ID: 9713422
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:15:06.68891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:18.700724
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE QUETSCH, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority decision as to issue V (the failure of the trial court to give defendant’s tendered instruction on a defendant’s justified use of force). Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal No. 24 — 25.06 (3d ed. 1992). The majority properly acknowledges the defendant is correct in asserting that "a defendant is entitled to jury instructions which present her theories of the case when the evidence supports such theories, and even very slight evidence upon a given theory will warrant the giving of an instruction.” (Emphasis added.) (267 Ill. App. 3d at 88; People v. Lyda (1989), 190 Ill. App. 3d 540, 544; People v. Veatch (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 23, 28-30.) Thus, any evidence that Ms. Williams believed that her conduct was necessary to defend herself against the imminent use of unlawful force requires the giving of the instruction in dispute here. Lyda also held that a trial court is not allowed to decide credibility or weigh evidence which would support a claim of self-defense, but may only determine whether there is any such evidence. (190 Ill. App. 3d at 544-45.) Curiously, and contrary to the clear standards of Lyda, the majority reviews, weighs, and determines credibility of the evidence and concludes that "there was no evidence to support” the giving of the instruction. Thus, not only did the trial court invade the province of the jury in this cause, but also our reviewing majority does the same and compounds the error, resolving questions of fact regarding the defendant’s knowledge, belief, and the reasonableness of her belief, and usurping a task properly reserved for a jury of citizens. Lyda, 190 Ill. App. 3d 540. I disagree that there was no evidence to support the instruction. It is not disputed that Ward was in civilian clothing when he approached the defendant’s car and grabbed her by the wrist. Defendant said that Ward did not identify himself as a peace officer or exhibit his badge, but merely said "baby girl, you can’t do this.” She was confused, according to an officer bystander. How was defendant to know that Ward was a policeman and not a lay interloper? Knowledge by the defendant that she was resisting a peace officer is a required element of the State’s proof in the charge of resisting arrest (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 31 — 1 (now 720 ILCS 5/31 — 1 (West 1992))); and reasonable belief of necessity is an element in a defendant’s affirmative defense (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 7 — 1 (now 720 ILCS 5/7 — 1 (West 1992))). There was evidence to support defendant’s theories of both not knowing of Ward’s status as a peace officer and her belief in the necessity of her self-protection. The weight and credibility of that evidence was for a jury, not for the trial judge or this court. People v. Veatch (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 23, 28-30. If the State was allowed to prove and argue defendant’s knowledge of Ward’s status (by direct but contradicted evidence that he identified himself and showed his badge, and circumstantially by the surrounding events) and to have its instructions given, should not defendant’s instruction on her defense of justifiable use of self-protecting force based on a reasonable belief also have been given? The answer is "yes.” Lyda, 190 Ill. App. 3d 540; Veatch, 145 Ill. App. 3d 23. The trial court (and this reviewing court’s majority) improperly weighed the evidence and invaded the province of the jury, by, on its own, resolving questions of fact regarding defendant’s knowledge and belief and the reasonableness of that belief. The majority, by its decision, endorses the trial judge’s usurping of the jury’s role. On this issue, the trial court’s only function and duty was to determine whether there was any evidence to support defendant’s theory of justifiable use of self-protection and, if so, to give the disputed instruction to guide the jury in its deliberations. Lyda, 190 Ill. App. 3d 540; Veatch, 145 Ill. App. 3d 23. Should this court close its eyes to the current and growing incidence of criminals impersonating police officers and stopping drivers on our roadways for various illicit purposes? I think not. Inasmuch as there clearly was some evidence to support the giving of the instruction (as shown by the majority’s own statement of facts), the trial court exceeded its authority and misused its discretion. The defendant’s convictions should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new and fair trial.