Court Opinion

ID: 9578040
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:40:55.846591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:22:26.788348
License: Public Domain

HARRIS, Justice
(dissenting).
After an exhaustive discussion of defendant Davidson’s version of the facts and after reciting legal principles with which, in general, I agree, the majority reaches a conclusion at variance with that of the trial court. For at least three reasons I disagree with the majority’s analysis.
The majority grants the appellant what amounts to a de novo review in this law action. The review should be on error and, no matter what our own findings might have been, we should affirm the trial court’s conclusion if it was supported by substantial evidence. Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(1).
Second, the majority has not reviewed the plaintiff’s evidence in an effort to determine whether it supported the trier of fact’s conclusion. Rather, it has scoured *792the record to search for that evidence which would support a contrary conclusion. Under the proper scope of review: “findings of fact by trial courts are ... given a liberal construction favorable to the judgment.” Bahnsen v. Rabe, 276 N.W.2d 413, 414 (Iowa 1979) (emphasis added).
If the majority has concluded as a matter of law that a partnership did not exist it was inappropriate to do so on this record. Only if the facts are undisputed may the judge decide whether a partnership exists; otherwise it is a question of fact. See Crane and Bromberg § 4(c); Mitchem § 35 (cited by majority). Here the facts are in dispute.
No one claims the written lease here amounted to articles of partnership. The instrument would be an issue if the dispute were between the parties to it. But even an express disclaimer of partnership does not bar third persons from seeking to show that one existed. This has been the rule in Iowa since Devin v. Harris, 3 G. Greene, 186, 187 (1851). Where there is a written agreement its wording is not conclusive as to the existence of a partnership. The traditional tests for the existence of a partnership apply to farm leases when the claim is made that a landlord and tenant were in partnership. Anderson v. Walker, 256 Iowa 1324, 1328-29, 131 N.W.2d 524, 526-27 (1964). Those characteristics were explained in Malvern National Bank v. Halliday, 195 Iowa 734, 739, 192 N.W. 843, 846 (1923) as follows:
The salient features of an ordinary partnership are (1) a community of interest in profits and losses (2) a community of interest in the capital employed and (3) a community of power in administration .... The relation is predicated on mutual consent and is evidenced by the terms of the contract, the conduct of the parties, and the circumstances surrounding the transaction.
This was the test employed by the trial court in . determining that a partnership existed here.
Although it was not argued by the parties the majority seems to suggest that a finding of partnership here might impact adversely on social security benefits for some elderly Iowans. I have reservations about whether a serious threat would be posed by such a precedent. It is outside the scope of this suit to argue whether more Iowans have been or would be damaged than benefited by claims that stock share lease arrangements were de facto partnerships.
Taking, as we should, only the evidence which supports the trial court’s determination, a question was made out for the finder of facts. There was important evidence that Davidson admitted he was in partnership with Harder. Although Davidson contradicted this testimony, the trial court was entitled to believe it.
Two characteristics are usually absent in crop share leases and their absences are said to be the missing ingredients for what would otherwise be a partnership. 21 Am. Jur.2d Crops § 40 (1981) (farm share leases lack mutual principals and joint accounts). Here, however, there was significant evidence tending to prove these two partnership characteristics. Davidson was authorized to deal with suppliers on behalf not only of himself but also Harder. It is also clear that, in later stages of the operation, it was agreed that Davidson was to pay suppliers directly from one fund he controlled.
The evidence of the existence of a partnership was certainly not overwhelming but a proper question was presented. We should affirm.
McGIVERIN, CARTER and WOLLE, JJ., join this dissent.