Court Opinion

ID: 9655884
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:24:27.796514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:22.881647
License: Public Domain

Quinn, J.
(dissenting). I am unable to agree with the opinion of Judge Gillis and the result it reaches for the reason I cannot interpret the statute1 as his opinion does, nor do I find support for his interpretation in the cases2 and the attorney general’s opinion3 it cites. "While Judge Gillis’ opinion concedes Hendershot is not precedent for the case at bar, I believe the reason it is not is because the question here presented was not presented in Hendershot nor was it presented in Gastelli. The opinion of the attorney general is not directed to that question. That opinion was in response to an inquiry from the director of the department of corrections as to the responsibilities of that department under the statute to assist the department in formulating procedure to comply with the statute. In no way does that opinion involve the effect of the statute on an outstanding information charging an inmate of a penal insti*651tution with a criminal offense when the department of corrections fails to give the prosecuting attorney the requisite notice. That is the question in the case before us.
Const 1908, art 5, § 21, provided in part :
“No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title.” (Similar provision Const 1963, art 4, § 24.)
The provisions of a statute must be construed in connection with the general purpose as set forth in the title'. People v. Asta (1953), 337 Mich 590. The title of the act before us is:
“An act to dispose of untried warrants, indictments, informations or complaints against inmates of penal institutions of this state.” 
The purpose is to dispose of untried charges against inmates of penal institutions. The method provided by the legislature to accomplish this disposition is to deny jurisdiction over these charges to any court if action on them is not commenced on such charges within 180 days after the department of corrections causes to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney involved the requisite notice. Apparently, the legislature believed that failure of the prosecuting official to proceed after 180 days was reasonable indication that prosecution was not desired and the charges should be disposed of by the denial, of jurisdiction rather than to await, formal dismissal by the prosecuting attorney. The., fact of accumulation of untried charges and the problem created thereby is understandable. The accumulation could arise from changes in the office of the prosecuting attorney, either of the prosecuting-attorney or personnel in-the-office, oversight, *652lost files, even neglect. The problem is: unless the prosecuting attorney acts, how does one dispose of these charges? The statute gives the answer, and its purpose is not that assigned to it by Judge Gtllis’ opinion, but rather the purpose expressed in its title.
Thus viewed, the statute has no application to the case before us since it is conceded the department of corrections never caused to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney the notice required by the statute. I vote to affirm.
The other issues raised by defendant were not discussed in the majority opinion, and there would be no purpose in discussing them in this dissent.

 CLS 1961, § 780.131 (Stat Ann 1965 Cum Supp § 28.969[1]).

 People v. Hendershot (1959), 357 Mich 300, and People v. Castelli (1963), 370 Mich 147.

 2 QAG 1958, 46, No 3124,