Court Opinion

ID: 9779621
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 00:26:22.714888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:36.840722
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GARMAN, specially concurring: Unlike the majority, I would conclude this court is unable to reach defendant’s substantive arguments because defendant has waived them. Therefore, I write separately on this procedural issue. In this case, the record is largely silent as to defendant’s discussions with his appointed counsel. As the majority notes, defendant’s trial counsel briefly mentioned a claim based on a mechanical problem with defendant’s car that defendant believed should have been explored at sentencing. 238 Ill. 2d at 59. Beyond this, appointed counsel explained only that she “went over the issues in this case with him.” It is undisputed that defendant did not object to appointed counsel’s statement and the record lacks any other indication that the statement did not reflect defendant’s position. The majority concludes that the context of appointed counsel’s statement indicates that defendant intended to waive only the ineffective assistance claim related to his car’s mechanical problem. However, the record reflects that appointed counsel went over “the issues” in this case, which suggests that defendant discussed multiple possible grounds for pursuing ineffective assistance claims. The mechanical problem with defendant’s car may or may not have been one of the issues discussed. We cannot say based on the record before us. We also cannot say which other issues were or were not raised. What we can say, first, is that counsel was specifically appointed in this case to investigate whether defendant would bring any ineffective assistance of counsel claim. As the majority notes, the circuit court did not limit counsel’s representation to any particular aspect of defense counsel’s performance. We can also say that under these circumstances we presume that appointed counsel’s decision not to raise an ineffective assistance claim was the result of competent advice. We strongly presume that “counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” People v. Richardson, 189 Ill. 2d 401, 413 (2000). Richardson addressed an ineffective assistance claim raised against trial counsel, yet the principle applies equally in this case to presume that appointed counsel discussed potential ineffective assistance claims in accordance with her instructions by the circuit court. Under this presumption, defendant would have to provide some basis for rejecting the presumption. In this case, defendant has not provided a sufficient reason for rejecting this presumption. Indeed, defendant has not even affirmatively suggested that appointed counsel failed to discuss any speedy-trial issue with defendant. Rather, defendant merely asserts that the record is silent, and that there is no indication the issue was discussed. An affirmative declaration that the speedy-trial issue was not raised in his conversation with appointed counsel would, at the very least, serve as an argument in favor of excusing any waiver by defendant. Nonetheless, defendant makes no argument that appointed counsel was deficient for failing to raise the issue. The majority notes that waiver principles are to be construed liberally in favor of the defendant. 238 111. 2d at 62. However, it is incumbent on the defendant to affirmatively assert that appointed counsel failed to discuss this issue with him. Failing to require defendant to make this showing would be to allow an ineffective assistance claim to proceed, regardless of the length of the discussion between defendant and counsel, so long as counsel declines to mention the claim on the record. Thus, counsel will have incentives to be as vague as possible in declining to pursue ineffective assistance claims when appointed by the circuit court. Based on the facts of this case, I disagree with the majority on this procedural question and, therefore, would grant the State relief on that ground. However, if presented with the substantive issue raised in this case I would conclude that no speedy-trial violation occurred and counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise the claim, for the reasons presented in the majority opinion. Therefore, I concur in the judgment.