Court Opinion

ID: 9665251
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:43:22.154274+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:14.208523
License: Public Domain

ON appellant’s motion for rehearing.
MORRISON, Judge.
Appellant urges us to reconsider our original holding in the light of Article 1, Section 9-19, of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of Texas. This, we have done.
His principal contention now, as we see it, is that, since the original arrest of Golemon in Hempstead was without a warrant, the same constituted false imprisonment, as denounced by our Penal Code, and that, since the confession was secured while appellant was so falsely imprisoned, the same became inadmissible by virtue of Article 727a, C. C. P., which makes inadmissible evidence obtained by means of a violation of the Constitution or laws of Texas or the Constitution of the United States.
An analysis of this contention involves an examination of what we consider due process of law, as is guaranteed by both our State and Federal Constitutions.
In order to hold the confession inadmissible, we must be convinced from the record that the failure of the officers to secure a warrant before arresting Golemon, in itself, contributed in some way to the securing of the confession. That is, we must be convinced that there was a causal connection between their failure to secure a warrant and the securing of the confession. Dimery v. State, 155 Tex. Cr. R. 197, 240 S. W. (2d) 293.
The mere fact that the officers had appellant in their custody is not enough. It must be shown that their failure to have secured a warrant before so taking him into custody materially altered the situation to appellant’s prejudice. We must ask our*544selves, “Would the situation have been any different if they had first secured a warrant?” If we find that it would, then the confession goes out of the case. This question of causal connection is easily and practically answered in cases where force is used by officers in securing a confession. There, we conclude that the confession would not have been forthcoming had it not been for the coercion. But, here, it would certainly seem hypercritical to say that the mere failure to have a warrant in their hands was the cause of the confession being made. An accused certainly knows when he is exposed to brutality, but he does not necessarily know whether or not an officer has a warrant for him when he is arrested. By what stretch of the imagination could we say that the non-possession of a warrant in the hands of the arresting officer actually, in itself standing alone, constituted a compelling force which brought its influence to bear on the mind of appellant and thereby became a causal factor in bringing about a confession?
We conclude that the officer’s failure to have a warrant for appellant’s arrest in nowise contributed to the securing of the confession.
Appellant’s next contention is that the undisputed facts herein bring this case within the rule expressed in Ward v. Texas, 144 Tex. Cr. R. 442, 316 U. S. 547, 86 L. Ed. 1663.
We will endeavor to discuss the facts in each case in order to determine if appellant’s contention is well taken. In the Ward case, the accused was arrested in Titus County, where the offense had been committed, and taken by the officers from there, east to Morris County, then southwest to Camp County, then south to Upshur County, then southwest to Smith County, then southwest to Henderson County, all the time getting farther away from where the offense had been committed. At each county seat, he was placed in jail.
In the case at bar, appellant was arrested in Waller County and, from there, taken northwest to Walker County, where his criminal record was checked, and then southeast to Hardin County, all the time getting nearer the place where the offense was committed.
In the Ward case, the movements described above consumed the time from Tuesday night until the following Friday afternoon.
*545In the case at bar, the movement consumed, according to appellant, approximately three and one-half hours.
In the Ward case, the confession obtained at the end of this movement from one strange town to another, and three days of questioning, was relied upon by the state to make out its case.
In the case at bar, a confession was made by appellant the morning following his arrival in Hardin County, and, immediately thereafter, a complaint charging him with murder was filed, and a warrant for his arrest issued. Appellant contends that he was physically mistreated by the officers, which caused him to sign the confession, all of which was denied by those who had him in custody. But this confession was not introduced in evidence.
A week later, appellant was interviewed by the district attorney and made the confession which was relied upon by the state in this case. Appellant does not claim, nor is there any evidence, that he was in any way mistreated during the week following the taking of the first confession and the taking of the second. The only claim of mistreatment or coercion leveled by appellant against this second confession is that, immediately prior to the time the same was made, the sheriff threatened to repeat the mistreatment of a week before. This was denied by the sheriff and, being resolved against appellant by the jury’s verdict, passed out of the case. A complaint charging appellant with murder had been filed approximately a week before this confession was made, and, according to appellant, the district attorney who took it “treated him nice” and “talked in a friendly way about my family.”
We remain convinced that the undisputed evidence does not reflect that the confession used in evidence was subject to the objection leveled by the appellant.
Appellant complains of the action of the court in changing the venue from Chambers County to Liberty County.
The basis of his contention seems to be predicated upon one sentence contained in appellant’s confession as follows: “Frog and myself had planned to rob the Hull bank at Hull, Texas,” which is in Liberty County.
Appellant has not shown in any way that a prejudice existed *546against him in Liberty County or that such a prejudice actually found its way into the jury box of the jury that tried the accused. No error appears until this has been shown. Jones v. State, 156 Tex. Cr. R. 248, 240 S. W. (2d) 771.
Appellant’s last complaint grows out of the fact that a letter written by him in jail was used as a basis for comparison with the records of the pawn shop where he bought the pistol used in the murder under a fictitious name.
In Ferguson v. State, 61 Tex. Cr. R. 152, 136 S. W. 465, we held an appearance bond signed by accused, while under arrest and without any notice that it might be used for any other purpose than as a bond, might be used as a basis for handwriting comparison. The Ferguson case would authorize the admissibility of the evidence herein. It will be noted that the letter itself was not incriminatory. See Jones v. State, 155 Tex. Cr. Rep. 475, 243 S. W. (2d) 848.
Remaining convinced that we properly disposed of this cause originally, appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.