Court Opinion

ID: 9760472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:57:07.228311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:12.621825
License: Public Domain

ROBERT M. BELL, Judge,
concurring and dissenting, in which McAULIFFE and RODOWSKY, JJ., join.
I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it concludes that the trial judge was not clearly erroneous when he determined that alcoholism was not the “substantial or precipitating cause of Bakas’s misconduct.” I do not join the majority, however, in concluding that the appropriate sanction in this case is an indefinite suspension.
It is well settled, and this Court has consistently so held, see Matter of Murray, 316 Md. 303, 308, 558 A.2d 710, 712 (1989); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Sparrow, 314 Md. 421, 426-27, 550 A.2d 1150, 1152 (1988); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Ezrin, 312 Md. 603, 608-09, 541 A.2d 966, 969 (1988); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Nothstein, 300 Md. 667, 687, 480 A.2d 807, 817 (1984); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Molovinsky, 300 Md. 291, 296, 477 A.2d 1181, 1184 (1984); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Pattison, 292 Md. 599, 609, 441 A.2d 328, 333 (1982); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Burka, 292 Md. 221, 225, 438 A.2d 514, 517 (1981), that, in the words of the majority opinion, “[misappropriation of funds by an attorney is an act infected with deceit and dishonesty and ordinarily will result in disbarment in the absence of compelling extenuating circumstances justifying a lesser sanction.” Moreover, that there are compelling extenuating circumstances justifying a less onerous sanction than disbarment must be demonstrated by *405the attorney, Burka, 292 Md. at 225, 438 A.2d at 517, which demonstration must be by a preponderance of the evidence. Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Bakas, 322 Md. 603, 605, 589 A.2d 52, 53 (1991). In Ezrin, we rejected a respondent’s “general good character, ... excellent reputation as a lawyer, lack of prior misconduct, ... restitution of the stolen funds, and ... cooperation with the authorities” as compelling extenuating circumstances. Id., 312 Md. at 609, 541 A.2d at 969. And, we have held, “only mitigating factors present at the time of the commission of the crime are relevant.” Molovinsky, 300 Md. at 297, 477 A.2d at 1185. Thus, contrition and rehabilitative efforts, being acts occurring after the fact, are not extenuating circumstances. Id. See also Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Mandel, 294 Md. 560, 588, 451 A.2d 910, 922 (1982).
The procedural posture of the case is significant. The only issue before the Court now is, as it always was, the appropriate sanction for respondent’s misconduct. Our initial focus was on the causal relationship between respondent’s alcoholism and his misconduct. On two separate occasions, we directed inquiries to the trial court on that issue and, on two occasions, the trial court responded that there was none. The focus thus shifted to whether there are other compelling extenuating circumstances justifying the lesser sanction.
Although, as the majority holds, the trial court was not clearly erroneous in finding no causal relationship between the respondent’s misconduct and his alcoholism, this Court nevertheless also holds that there are compelling extenuating circumstances sufficient to justify a lesser sanction than disbarment, specifically, the “nature and gravity of the misappropriation, and the relatively short period during which Bakas’s escrow account was in arrears.” By so doing, the majority makes the usual sanction applicable only in the case of “serious” misappropriations and rather lengthy escrow account arrearages. We are not told what constitutes “serious” misappropriations or “relatively short *406period[s]” of escrow account arrearages. Presumably, they must be determined on a case-by-case basis.
The rationale advanced by the majority fails to support the sanction imposed. Indeed, no cases are cited in support of the position. To be sure, we recently ordered an indefinite suspension in a case involving, inter alia, management of an escrow account. Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Singleton, 311 Md. 1, 532 A.2d 157 (1987). In that case, the lawyer’s honesty was not at issue, the hearing court having determined that “it is hard to find evidence showing dishonesty, fraud or deceit,” 311 Md. at 13, 532 A.2d at 163; the only issue was that lawyer’s ineptitude in managing the escrow account. 311 Md. at 16, 532 A.2d at 165.
A sanction other than disbarment was imposed in Prince George’s County Bar Association v. Vance, 273 Md. 79, 327 A.2d 767 (1974). That case does not, however, support the majority’s position. The lawyer’s escrow account was not involved; rather, the issue was whether his act of forgery for the purpose of obtaining favorable prices at a branch office of the Bolling Field Post Exchange should result in his disbarment. Although recognizing that “respondent’s acts were fruits of misrepresentation; moreover, they were studied, not impulsive,” we elected to suspend him for 90 days rather than disbar him. Our decision was not based solely on the nature and gravity of the misconduct, however. There were other factors, including Vance’s “genuine contrition” and “the obvious esteem in which respondent is viewed in his community.” 1 273 Md. at 84, 327 A.2d 767. Vance is to be contrasted with Fellner v. Bar Ass’n, 213 Md. 243, 131 A.2d 729 (1956). In Fellner, we disbarred a lawyer whose misconduct consisted of in*407serting slugs, rather than coins, in a parking meter in Baltimore City. Although the financial benefit to Fellner was de minimis, we noted (213 Md. at 247, 131 A.2d at 731):
In the instant case, the offense committed by the appellant was not a casual or thoughtless one. The evidence supports the inference that he resorted to a deliberate and systematic practice of cheating the City by the use of slugs. Morally, the offense was as great as though he had stolen money deposited by others in the meters, and amounts at least to “fraud or deceit”.
Our cases make clear that “[t]he misappropriation by an attorney of funds of others entrusted to his care, be the amount small or large, is of great concern and represents the gravest form of professional misconduct.” Bar Ass’n v. Marshall, 269 Md. 510, 519, 307 A.2d 677, 682 (1973). See also Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. McBurney, 283 Md. 628, 631, 392 A.2d 81, 82 (1978). When, as is the case with these proceedings, the issue is the protection of the public, not the punishment of the respondent, McBumey, 283 Md. at 631, 392 A.2d at 82, it is most inappropriate that the sanction be made to depend, as the majority does, on the “seriousness” of a misappropriation or the length of time the misconduct continued. As I see it, this is not what is meant by compelling extenuating circumstances.2 See Bar Ass’n of Balto. City v. Carruth, 271 Md. 720, 728, 319 A.2d 532, 536 (1974).
Because in my view, the majority has not identified any appropriate compelling extenuating circumstance to justify the lesser sanction, I respectfully dissent.
*408Judges McAuliffe and Rodowsky have authorized me to state that they join in the views expressed herein.

. The majority does not rely on Vance, perhaps because it feels that it was wrongly decided. Certainly, I think it was wrongly decided. The misconduct in Vance, while not resulting in significant gain for Vance, was designed to defraud the Post Exchange and, as the Court pointed out, was studied and deliberate. In my view, such conduct may not be excused simply because it did not produce lucrative returns.

. Indeed, the seriousness of the misappropriation and its duration may not be mitigating at all. They may be simply indications that the misconduct was not so successful as it could have been or was discovered sooner than it might have been, that the scheme in which it manifested itself was not so complex or ingenious as it may have been, or even that the respondent was a petty, as opposed to a grand, thief.