Court Opinion

ID: 9797872
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:31:20.958429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:59:18.154216
License: Public Domain

HALL, Presiding Judge,
concurring in the result.
¶35 In Part IV of its opinion, my colleagues impose a new requirement on trial court judges considering whether to permit impeachment of a criminal defendant with previous felony convictions pursuant to Rule 609(a). Henceforth, “in deciding whether to reveal the nature of the defendant’s offenses to the jury [a trial court] must balance the probative value of the conviction” against “the very real possibility that the jury may misuse this information to the defendant’s prejudice.” Ante ¶ 19. The majority then concludes that the trial court, because it did not make “formal findings” that the proba*342tive value of impeachment with the nature of the offenses outweighed the prejudicial effect, abused its discretion by not “sanitizing” defendant’s felony convictions. I respectfully disagree with my colleagues’ construction of Rule 609(a).
¶ 36 My analysis begins with the language of Rule 609(a):
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or established by public record, if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect, and if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was convicted or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
Clearly, the language of the rule does not support the majority’s dictate that a trial court must either sanitize a conviction that is otherwise admissible under Rule 609(a) or justify its reasons for failing to do so. In contrast, Rule 609(b) provides that a remote conviction is inadmissible unless the court finds that “the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, under Rule 609(b), remote convictions should be admitted “very rarely and only in exceptional circumstances.” State v. Green, 200 Ariz. 496, 499, ¶ 11, 29 P.3d 271, 274 (2001) (quoting S.Rep. No. 93-1277, at 15 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7061-62). In effect, the majority amends Rule 609(a) by adding Rule 609(b)’s more restrictive “specific facts and circumstances” requirement.
¶37 Neither does Arizona ease law construing Rule 609(a) support the majority’s analysis. Before today’s decision, the manner in which a trial court should conduct a hearing to determine the admissibility of pri- or convictions for impeachment was well-settled. The state provided the trial court with the date, nature, and place of the conviction, and any other relevant circumstances. Williams, 144 Ariz. at 438, 698 P.2d at 683. The defendant was then permitted to rebut the state’s showing by pointing out the prejudicial effect of the evidence. Id. In determining admissibility, the trial court considered a myriad of relevant factors, including the remoteness of the conviction, the nature of the prior felony, the length of the former imprisonment, the age of the defendant, his or her conduct since the prior offense, the similarity between the past and present crimes, the importance of defendant’s testimony, and the centrality of defendant’s credibility to the issues in the case. See id.; State v. Noble, 126 Ariz. 41, 43, 612 P.2d 497, 499 (1980). The better procedure is for the trial court to enumerate the specific facts and circumstances upon which its ruling is based, see State v. Ellerson, 125 Ariz. 249, 252, 609 P.2d 64, 67 (1980), but a trial court substantially complies with Rule 609(a) by making an on-the-record finding, based on the information presented, that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. See State v. Poland, 144 Ariz. 388, 400, 698 P.2d 183, 195 (1985); Williams, 144 Ariz. at 439, 698 P.2d at 684; State v. Sullivan, 130 Ariz. 213, 217, 635 P.2d 501, 505 (1981).
¶38 The hearing conducted by the trial court in this case substantially complied with the procedure set forth above. The state met its initial burden by showing the date, place, and nature of the prior convictions. The defendant then attempted to rebut the state’s showing by arguing that the court: (1) should limit the number3 of defendant’s felony convictions that could be used to impeach his testimony and (2) should not permit the nature of the convictions to be revealed to the jury. The court, after specifically referring to the Rule 609 criteria (probative value versus prejudicial effect), permitted the state to impeach defendant with six named convictions. The court impliedly excluded any evidence regarding defendant’s two convictions for misconduct involving weapons, presumably because it considered the nature of those convictions too prejudicial. It also de*343nied defendant’s request that the six admissible convictions be sanitized.
¶39 Thus, after considering defendant’s request to limit the prejudicial effect of his prior felony convictions, the court granted his request in part and denied it in part. In doing so, the trial court clearly acted within its considerable discretion. See State v. Perkins, 141 Ariz. 278, 284, 686 P.2d 1248, 1254 (1984), overruled on other grounds by State v. Noble, 152 Ariz. 284, 731 P.2d 1228 (1987) (“[W]e will not upset a trial court’s ruling so long as the record shows that the court carefully considered the matter.”). Further, unlike the majority, I am unwilling to discard the presumption that the jury followed the limiting instruction given by the trial court. See State v. Brito, 183 Ariz. 535, 538, 905 P.2d 544, 547 (App.1995).
¶ 40 With the possible exception of Bolton, in which the Arizona Supreme Court never reached the “close question” whether the trial court abused its discretion because it concluded that any error was harmless, 182 Ariz. at 303, 896 P.2d at 843, Arizona case law is bereft of any support for the majority’s contrary conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion because it did not explain why it denied defendant’s request to sanitize the remaining priors. See, e.g., Williams, 144 Ariz. at 439, 698 P.2d at 684 (rejecting defendant’s contention that the trial court erred by permitting the state to impeach defendant with a similar prior offense without making specific findings of fact); Perkins, 141 Ariz. at 285, 686 P.2d at 1255 (“Further, although when the prior felony is identical to the pending charges, trial courts on occasion have limited the admissible evidence to the fact of a prior felony conviction, such a procedure is not required.”) (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted); State v. Harrison, 195 Ariz. 28, 33, ¶ 23, 985 P.2d 513, 518 (App.1998) (trial court permitted state to use prior aggravated assault conviction to impeach defendant charged with aggravated assault: “The trial court’s ruling did not ‘sanitize’ the prior conviction____That aspect of the ruling is within Rule 609 and is not in dispute.”).4
¶ 41 Indeed, some jurisdictions have gone so far as to specifically disapprove of the practice of sanitizing priors because it prevents the fact finder from making an individualized assessment regarding the weight that a previous conviction has on a witness’s credibility. See, e.g., Bells v. Maryland, 134 Md. App. 299, 759 A.2d 1149, 1154-55 (2000) (sanitized prior conviction leaves a jury “completely unable to assess what, if any, impact a ‘prior felony conviction’ has upon a witness’s veracity.”); Commonwealth v. Ioannides, 41 Mass.App.Ct. 904, 668 N.E.2d 845, 846 (1996) (“Masking the nature of prior offense ... is more likely to affect the defendant unfairly than receipt in evidence of the unvarnished conviction.”); People v. Van Dorsten, 409 Mich. 942, 298 N.W.2d 421, 421 (1980) (“It is improper to impeach a defendant by telling the jury only of the existence of unnamed prior felony convictions, without providing the names of the offenses. It is the nature, rather than the fact, of a prior felony conviction which the jury is to use in its evaluation of credibility.”).
¶ 42 The trial court admitted six of defendant’s prior convictions for impeachment after finding that the probative value of the convictions outweighed the prejudicial effect. The trial court disallowed the two convictions that specifically referenced the use of weapons. Defendant relied on a mere presence defense; thus, his credibility was in issue. Therefore, I am unable to conclude that the trial court abused its considerable discretion under Rule 609(a). See State v. Moya, 138 Ariz. 12, 14, 672 P.2d 964, 966 (App.1983) *344(upholding trial court's ruling that permitted state to impeach a defendant with eleven prior felony convictions, some of which were for the same offense for which the defendant was on trial). Because the majority nonetheless affirms defendant’s convictions, I concur in the result.

. Defense counsel believed defendant had nine prior felony convictions; the record on appeal supports the existence of only eight.

. The majority’s reliance on Old Chief is misplaced. Old Chief was charged under a statute prohibiting possession of a firearm by anyone with a prior felony conviction. 519 U.S. at 175, 117 S.Ct. 644. He claimed that he was unfairly prejudiced in violation of Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence because the specifics of his previous offense — assault causing serious bodily injury — were revealed to the jury despite his offer to stipulate to his prior-conviction status. Id. The issue before the United States Supreme Court was whether the trial court abused its discretion under Rule 403 when it rejected the defendant’s offer, not whether prior convictions admitted for impeachment purposes under Rule 609(a) should be sanitized.