Court Opinion

ID: 9893580
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-27 19:03:28.770467+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:34.679701
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/27/23 P. v. J.O. CA2/6
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,                                                   2d Crim. No. B327240
                                                           (Super. Ct. No. 17JV00481)
     Plaintiff and Respondent,                               (Santa Barbara County)

v.

J.O.,

     Defendant and Appellant.

       J.O. appeals an order by the juvenile court transferring his
case, four juvenile wardship petitions (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602,
subd. (a)), to a court of criminal jurisdiction. (Id., §§ 707, 801.)
The petitions alleged that J.O., then 17 years old, committed
attempted murder, assault with a semiautomatic firearm, two
counts of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury,
and one count of resisting an executive officer. We conclude,
among other things, that the trial court properly considered the
required criteria for a transfer to criminal court and the evidence
supports that order. We affirm.
                              FACTS
        On May 2, 2022, the People filed a juvenile wardship
petition alleging that on September 19, 2021, J.O. committed
assault with a semiautomatic firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd.
(b)),1 a felony, upon John Doe.
        On May 24, 2022, the People filed a juvenile wardship
petition alleging that on November 11, 2021, J.O. committed
attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd, (a)) on John Doe 1 (J.D.)
and John Doe 2 (J.M.) and he personally discharged a firearm.
(§ 12022.53, subd. (c)). On the same day, the People filed another
juvenile wardship petition alleging that on March 8, 2022, J.O.
committed attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)) upon John
Doe (E.S.) and he caused great bodily injury and personally
discharged a firearm. (§§ 12022.7, 12022.53, subd. (d).)
        On June 20, 2022, the People filed a juvenile wardship
petition alleging J.O. committed assault with force likely to
produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)) on June 13, 2022, in
juvenile hall on John Doe 1 (A.G.) (count 1); assault with force
likely to produce great bodily injury on John Doe 2 (B.P.) (count
2); and resisting an executive officer (§ 69) (count 3.)
        The probation department concluded J.O. was not
amenable to continued rehabilitation in juvenile jurisdiction
because: 1) J.O. was provided with rehabilitation treatment
programs, 2) but he did not want to “engage in treatment,” and 3)
his behavior “escalated to an incredibly dangerous level.”
        The People moved that all four petitions be transferred to
criminal court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707) At the juvenile court
hearing on the People’s motion, Detective Zackery Robbins, a

      All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
      1

otherwise stated.

                                 2
gang expert, testified that J.O. is an active member of the West
Park criminal street gang. The four warship petitions involve
crimes J.O. committed against gang rivals for the benefit of the
West Park gang. He said these gang crimes involved criminal
sophistication.
       On the November 11, 2021, incident, J.O. and his gang
initiated a criminally sophisticated gang shooting. They spotted
a gang rival near a 7-Eleven store, but they decided not to
commit a gang shooting in a public place. They waited until the
rival left the area, they followed his car, and then started
shooting at a time and place more convenient to the gang. J.O.
was criminally sophisticated. He knew that after he committed a
gang shooting that he had to promptly get rid of the gun because
it could incriminate him. J.O. had an elevated status in the West
Park gang. He was known as a “prolific shooter.”
       Miguel Ochoa, a deputy probation officer, testified that J.O.
had been provided multiple rehabilitation programs, but he did
not complete them. J.O. had a history of recalcitrance and bad
behavior as a ward that made him unsuitable for juvenile
jurisdiction.
       J.O. called Tiffany Phillips, a supervising deputy probation
officer. She testified that J.O. obtained a high school “degree”
while in juvenile hall. J.O. took and passed a “post-secondary”
educational class. Phillips said, “[H]e’s making better choices
currently.”
       The juvenile court found, among other things, that J.O.’s
crimes were very serious. They were not “impetuous crimes” or
“spur-of-the-moment crimes”; they were “very intentional.” J.O.
committed them with criminal sophistication. He failed to
benefit from the multiple rehabilitation programs that had been

                                 3
offered to him. He committed his recent crimes while he was on
probation, and he was committed to his gang’s culture. J.O. has
“no regard for being on probation” or “the authority of the court.”
There is no evidence of any “physical or emotional impairment.”
His criminal activity has been “increasing in terms of violence.”
       The juvenile court was aware of J.O.’s family history,
community environment, and childhood trauma but it found they
are not “very compelling” factors in his case. J.O. chose a
criminal lifestyle for his gang. He made some educational
progress. But that was “only within the last few months” and he
has not shown “a propensity to be rehabilitated.”
       The juvenile court granted the People’s motion to transfer
J.O.’s case (the four wardship petitions) to a court of criminal
jurisdiction pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section
707. It found by clear and convincing evidence that J.O. is not
amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court. (Id., § 707, subd. (a)(3).) J.O. filed for immediate
appellate review under Welfare and Institutions Code section
801.
                               DISCUSSION
              Transferring the Case to Criminal Court
       “ ‘[W]hen a minor has been charged in the juvenile court
with any felony allegedly committed when he or she was 16 years
of age or older’ . . . the ‘prosecutor “may make a motion to
transfer the minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal
jurisdiction.” ’ ” (Kevin P. v. Superior Court (2020) 57
Cal.App.5th 173, 185; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707.)
       In determining whether to grant a transfer, the trial court
must consider several factors, including: 1) the “degree of
criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor” (Welf. & Inst.

                                 4
Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(i)); 2) whether “ the minor can be
rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction” (id., subd. (a)(3)(B)(i)); 3) the “minor’s previous
delinquent history” (id., subd. (a)(3)(C)(i)); 4) the “[s]uccess of
previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor”
(id., subd. (a)(3)(D)(i)); and 5) the “circumstances and gravity of
the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by the
minor” (id., subd. (a)(3)(E)(i)).
       Before issuing the order of transfer, the trial court must
“find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not
amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3).) The
court must also state reasons for that finding. (Ibid.) We review
the trial court’s order for abuse of discretion. (Kevin P. v.
Superior Court, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 200.) “ ‘A decision
based on insufficient evidence or the court’s “ ‘erroneous
understanding of applicable law’ ” is subject to reversal.’ ” (D.C.
v. Superior Court (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 441, 451.)
                      The Trial Court’s Findings
       The trial court followed the standards required by the
statute for ordering a transfer to criminal court. It found “by
clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.”
It stated the reasons for that finding and weighed the factors
mentioned in the statute.
       J.O. notes that where the prosecution does not present
evidence to support a transfer, it would be an abuse of discretion
for a trial court to order one. (Kevin P. v. Superior Court, supra,
57 Cal.App.5th at p. 200.) But he has not shown an abuse of
discretion here.

                                 5
     J.O.’s Unsatisfactory History with Rehabilitation Programs
       In deciding whether to order a transfer, the trial court may
consider the services previously provided to the minor in
rehabilitation programs and the minor’s conduct in the juvenile
detention facility. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3)(C)(i),
(ii) & (D)(i), (ii).) It must consider the “[s]uccess of previous
attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor” (id.,
subd. (a)(3)(D)(i)) and the “minor’s previous delinquent history”
(id., subd. (a)(3)(C)(i)).
       The trial court found: 1) J.O. “didn’t take advantage of the
rehabilitation programs” he was offered while on four years of
probation, and 2) his behavior is not “conducive to rehabilitation.”
The People presented evidence showing J.O.’s unsatisfactory
performance in past youth rehabilitation programs that were
provided to him.
       Deputy Probation Officer Ochoa was familiar with J.O.
because he had supervised him. He testified J.O. had been on
probation since 2019. J.O. was provided with several ward
rehabilitation programs, including Seeking Safety, mentoring
services through CommUnify and Target Interventions. But he
did not successfully complete any of these programs.
       J.O. was provided services at a “boys’ camp.” He completed
some programs there, but “he absconded from his camp
commitment,” which is why he did not complete his boys’ camp
programming. He was provided rehabilitation programs while he
was not incarcerated. But he did not complete the
“programming” he was provided “in the community.”
       J.O. cites J.N. v. Superior Court (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 706,
722, and claims the People must present evidence on the types of
rehabilitation programs that are available. But Ochoa testified

                                 6
about numerous rehabilitation programs available to J.O. The
probation department said therapy was available for J.O. but he
did not want to participate in it. Ochoa named the specific
rehabilitation programs, including CommUnify mentoring
services, Target Interventions, Seeking Safety, Moral Reconation
Therapy, Interactive Journaling, Freedom for Youth, and boys’
camp programming, which he did not finish because he
“absconded” from the camp.
       The People note J.O.’s “unlikelihood of rehabilitation was
due to [his] failure in attending the programs,” not to any failure
or omission by the juvenile authorities. Consequently, the “real
problem was not lack of services . . . but a lack of initiative” to
take advantage of them. (Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36
Cal.App.4th 758, 763.)
        Previous Juvenile History and Current Bad Behavior
       The trial court found J.O. had a prior juvenile history. He
had previously been placed on probation for four years. It found
J.O. had committed the charged offenses “while out on
probation.” The record shows J.O. had an extensive juvenile
history from 2017 to 2022 with prior sustained petitions for
attempted second degree robbery (§§ 664, 211), battery by gassing
(§ 243.9, subd. (a)), two sustained petitions for assault by means
of force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)),
and street terrorism (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). In 2022 he
committed violent assaults on other wards in the juvenile facility.
The court had ordered him not to associate with gang members
as part of a prior probation order. But J.O. disobeyed it and
committed crimes with the gang.
       As a ward in 2020, J.O. was cited for “taggings found in
[his] room.” He was placed in a good behavior “Trust Unit.” But

                                7
he was removed from that unit for having “contraband”– a “vape
pen.” His recent violent attacks on other wards were factors in
the probation department’s recommendation that J.O. be
“transferred to Adult Court.” It is also a factor the juvenile court
may consider in deciding a transfer motion. (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(B)(ii); D.C. v. Superior Court, supra, 71
Cal.App.5th at pp. 457-458.) Such violent conduct is inconsistent
with an “intent to reform.” (In re Tyrone O. (1989) 209
Cal.App.3d 145, 153.)
       J.O. argues that as he turned 18 years of age, he matured
and the People presented no evidence regarding his maturity and
ability to reform in juvenile jurisdiction. But that is not the case.
The People showed his conduct as an adult did not improve.
Ochoa said J.O. turned 18 years of age in August 2022. He
testified that since that date J.O. had received disciplinary
“write-ups” for “physical altercations” and “verbal altercations.”
Moreover, on June 13, 2022, just a few weeks before his 18th
birthday, J.O. assaulted two wards in the juvenile hall and
committed the offense of resisting an executive officer. “Evidence
of the youth’s conduct is relevant” on a transfer determination
(D.C. v. Superior Court, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 457),
including the youth’s “attraction to violence.” (Id. at p. 458.)
       There is evidence about J.O. obtaining a high school degree
and taking college courses. This was evidence of his intellectual
abilities, but not a lifestyle change or change in conduct. J.O. did
not show he had any desire to leave the gang, any ability to avoid
violence, or any understanding of the cause of his violent
behavior. The trial court could reasonably find this very brief
recent evidence of academic success was substantially
outweighed by a long history of his recalcitrance, years of bad

                                  8
behavior as a ward, Ochoa’s and Robbins’s testimony, and the
evidence of his violent assaults he committed in 2022 in juvenile
hall. (In re Tyrone O., supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at p. 153.)
Moreover, the probation department said that, despite being
offered treatment programs, J.O. did not want to “engage in
treatment.”
       Relying on Kevin P. v. Superior Court, supra, 57
Cal.App.5th 173, J.O. claims there should be a reversal of the
transfer order. But that case is distinguishable. In contrast to
the current case, the Kevin P. ward had no prior “criminal history
or arrests.” (Id. at p. 182.) He had no “ ‘aggressive or predatory
behavior’ toward others,” and “no gang involvement.” (Ibid.)
Unlike J.O., the Kevin P. ward had “good citizenship while in
juvenile hall” and he engaged “in therapy.” (Id. at p. 183.) In
reversing the transfer order, the Kevin P. court said the gravity of
the offense cannot be the “sole basis” for making that order. (Id.
at p. 201.) But the trial court here knew the law and did not
solely rely on the gravity of the offenses. It reviewed the
statutory factors.
       J.O. suggests his prior conduct is not relevant evidence
regarding his future rehabilitation. He is not correct. The trial
court could properly consider J.O.’s history of bad conduct,
violence, and unsatisfactory performance in rehabilitation
programs as relevant on whether he would benefit from future
rehabilitation. (D.C. v. Superior Court, supra, 71 Cal App.5th at
pp. 457-458; In re Tyrone O., supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at p. 153; In
re Lynna B. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 682, 700.) Past performance is
often “the best indication” of future performance. (Lynna B., at
p. 700.) This is why the transfer statute requires consideration of
the success of “previous attempts by the juvenile court to

                                 9
rehabilitate the minor” in determining whether the ward could
benefit from further rehabilitation efforts or should be
transferred to criminal court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd.
(a)(3)(D)(i), italics added.)
                   J.O.’s Dedication to Gang Culture
       The trial court found: 1) J.O. is currently “very enmeshed
in gang culture,” and 2) he even exhibited this gang behavior
while in juvenile hall. The People presented evidence to support
these findings.
       J.O. attacked a rival gang member in 2022 while in juvenile
hall. Detective Robbins testified that on June 13, 2022, J.O.
committed a “gang motivated” attack on the victim. The trial
court could reasonably find that, despite being in juvenile
detention, J.O. decided to commit this attack for the benefit of his
gang and its culture.
       There was no evidence that J.O.’s association with the gang
was temporary, inadvertent, or a result of a “minor’s
impetuosity.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii).) J.O.
is an “active” gang member, known to be a “prolific shooter.” He
obtained an “elevated status within [the] West Park [gang].”
Robbins said J.O. used gang signals. J.O. “bragged about his
affiliation with [the] West Park [gang].”
                        Criminal Sophistication
       A factor to be considered by the trial court is the “degree of
criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor.” (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(i).)
       The trial court found J.O. committed crimes for his gang
exhibiting “criminal sophistication.” The evidence supports this
finding.

                                 10
       Robbins testified that J.O.’s 2022 attack on a rival gang
member at the juvenile hall was “criminally sophisticated”
involving “preplanning.” J.O. and his gang were criminally
sophisticated. In a 2021 West Park gang shooting, “multiple
people” were “patrolling a West Park territory” and were “also
trying to get rid of the firearm” to “eliminate . . . the possibility of
being tied to the shooting.” J.O. exhibited criminal sophistication
because he “tried to get rid of the firearm” to prevent himself
from being tied to the shooting. Robbins testified that the West
Park gang’s November 11, 2021, shooting offense showed
criminal sophistication. The gang identified its victim, but
decided not to immediately start shooting near a 7-Eleven store.
It “waited for the victim[] to leave.” It then followed the victim’s
car before deciding to commence the attack.
                      The Gravity of the Offenses
       A factor the court considers before making a transfer order
is “the gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been
committed by the minor.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd.
(a)(3)(E)(i).)
       The trial court found the petitions alleged offenses by J.O.
that involved “very serious offenses.” That finding is supported
because the petitions involved the violent offenses of attempted
murder and assault with a semiautomatic firearm. Here there
was no evidence of any “extenuating or mitigating circumstances”
that would reduce the serious and violent nature of J.O.’s
conduct. (People v. Superior Court (Jones) (1998) 18 Cal.4th 667,
686.) The goal of these crimes involved the use of potentially
deadly force deliberately directed against gang rivals.

                                  11
       Physical and Emotional Impairment and Other Issues
       J.O. contends the trial court erred by finding no evidence of
physical or emotional impairment.
       J.O. had the opportunity to present mitigating evidence
about any physical or mental disorder he suffered from if he
believed it was relevant. (People v. Superior Court (Jones), supra,
18 Cal.4th at p. 686.) But he did not present evidence on such
issues at the evidentiary hearing. That supports the trial court’s
finding.
        J.O. claims a probation department report noted that,
when he was 14 years old, a therapist wanted to discuss
Attention-Deficit/ Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) with him. He
refused to participate in therapy. But J.O. apparently did not
consider this evidence to be relevant to the transfer issue. In his
written opposition to transfer, he did not mention this issue or
claim he had a disabling physical or mental disorder. Moreover,
J.O. has not cited to any current medical evidence that shows he
has a current medical disorder that constitutes a substantial
factor impacting his current dangerous behavior.
       At the hearing J.O. did not present evidence of any family
history factors as causal factors or mitigating evidence. But the
trial court considered this evidence from probation department
reports. It found his family history, community environment,
and childhood trauma were “not very compelling” factors in his
case. Instead, J.O. has voluntarily chosen the criminal lifestyle
of his gang. He actively engages “in gang activities to further the
goals of the gang that he’s a part of” and he is “proud of [those]
activities.” Robbins’s testimony supports that finding.

                                12
                        Qualified Witnesses
      J.O. contends the People did not present qualified
witnesses to testify about him and his ability to benefit from
rehabilitation programs. We disagree.
      The trial court found Robbins was a qualified expert. His
testimony about J.O.’s criminal sophistication, his gang, its
culture, and J.O.’s dedication to that violent culture is
uncontradicted. Ochoa knew the various rehabilitation
programs. He was in the best position to evaluate J.O.’s progress
in rehabilitation because he knew J.O. and he supervised him.
      Given the evidence, the trial court did not err by issuing
the order.
      We have reviewed J.O.’s remaining contentions and we
conclude he has not shown grounds for a reversal.
                          DISPOSITION
      The order is affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                    GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:

             YEGAN, J.

             CODY, J.

                               13
                      Gustavo E. Lavayen, Judge

             Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

                  ______________________________

      Esther R. Sorkin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Stephanie C. Santoro,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.