Court Opinion

ID: 9887068
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 17:03:36.617656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:02.566955
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/6/23 In re Hunter G. CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

 In re Hunter G., a Person Coming                                 B328244
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.                                    (Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. No.
                                                                  20CCJP03534B)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 C.G. and M.M.,

           Defendants and Appellants.

     APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Gabriela H. Shapiro, Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed.
     Suzanne Davidson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant C.G.
      Karen B. Stalter, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant M.M.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
      __________________________________________

       This is parents’ second appeal from the underlying juvenile
dependency proceedings. The instant appeal involves Hunter G.
(son), who was born during the pendency of this case and who is
C.G. (father) and M.M.’s (mother) second child. The juvenile
court terminated mother’s and father’s parental rights to son. On
appeal, mother and father do not directly challenge the court’s
order terminating parental rights. Rather, father challenges the
juvenile court’s order summarily denying his section 388 petition,
which order the court issued the same day it terminated parental
rights. Father argues the court erred when it refused to hold a
hearing on his section 388 petition and, therefore, the order
terminating parental rights should be reversed and, on remand,
an evidentiary hearing should be held on his section 388 petition.
Mother argues, if we agree with father’s position on appeal, we
should reinstate her parental rights to son as well. Finding no
error, we affirm.
                          BACKGROUND
1.     First Appeal
       The underlying proceedings began before son was born and
when his older brother, Charles, was a newborn. At Charles’s
birth, he and mother both tested positive for drugs, including
opiates. The juvenile court declared Charles a dependent of the
court based on mother’s and father’s extended histories of drug

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abuse and current drug use, including mother’s drug use while
pregnant with Charles. Eventually, after parents failed to
participate in any court-ordered programs, the juvenile court
terminated mother’s and father’s parental rights to Charles.
Although mother and father both appealed the order terminating
parental rights, they did not challenge the factual basis for that
order. Instead, on appeal, mother and father challenged
termination of their parental rights based on alleged errors made
under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (24 U.S.C. § 1901
et seq.) and related California law (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224
et seq.). In a nonpublished opinion, we found no prejudicial error
and affirmed. (In re Charles G. (Nov. 4, 2022, B318363).) We
incorporate by reference our opinion in B318363.
2.     Petition as to Son
       Son is mother and father’s second child. He was born
prematurely during the pendency of the underlying proceedings.
At son’s birth, mother tested positive for amphetamines, and
mother and son both tested positive for opiates. Son was placed
in the hospital’s neonatal intensive care unit, where he remained
for a few weeks. At the time, mother and father had been
homeless for a year, had unsuccessfully participated in Suboxone
programs to treat their opioid addictions, and each had a
contagious blood infection and life-threatening disease, which
resulted in their own hospitalizations. Father’s medical condition
was serious, and he remained hospitalized for over one month,
awaiting heart surgery.
       In August 2021, soon after son’s birth, the Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services
(Department) filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300

                                3
petition on behalf of son (petition).1 The petition alleged mother’s
and father’s past and current drug abuse placed son at risk of
serious harm, father knew of mother’s substance abuse and failed
to protect son from it, and son’s brother Charles already was a
dependent of the court receiving permanent placement services.
The juvenile court detained son from mother and father and
ordered monitored visitation.
       Upon his release from the hospital, son was placed in foster
care. In early October 2021, son was placed with his current
caregiver and prospective adoptive parent, Ms. J., who is a close
friend of, and lives minutes away from, maternal aunt, who is the
adoptive parent of son’s brother Charles. Throughout the
underlying proceedings, and with the help of son’s maternal
grandmother, Ms. J. and maternal aunt ensured consistent and
frequent visits between son and his brother Charles.
       Prior to adjudication, mother had entered a rehabilitation
program, but was asked to leave after two days because she
brought amphetamines into the program. After that, mother’s
whereabouts were unknown. Although father remained
hospitalized and needed heart surgery, around the same time
mother left her rehabilitation program, father left the hospital
against medical advice. Mother and father were together and
homeless in an unknown location. In an October 2021 report for
the court, a Department social worker indicated she had sporadic
telephone contact with father and mother. The parents were
homeless and had been unable to enroll in any drug
rehabilitation programs.

      1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

                                 4
       In late October 2021, the juvenile court sustained in part
and dismissed in part the petition. The court sustained two
section 300, subdivision (b) counts related to parents’ past and
current drug use. The court dismissed the remaining counts.
       At the dispositional hearing held months later in January
2022, the juvenile court declared son a dependent of the court
and removed him from parents’ custody and care. The juvenile
court ordered that reunification services for mother and father be
bypassed and that the case proceed to permanency planning. The
court stated it was “not offering reunification services to the
parents, pursuant to . . . [section] 361.5(b)(10), because the
parents failed to make reasonable efforts to ameliorate their
underlying actions with respect to their other child, as well as
this child. And because the parents have demonstrated the
chronic use of alcohol or drugs. And also because I just
terminated parental rights for a sibling, who also is under the
age of three.” Parents did not challenge the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional findings or dispositional orders as to son.
3.     Visits
       In the months between the adjudication and disposition
hearings, parents rarely visited son and when they did their
visits were always virtual. There was a span of approximately
five to six months when parents did not visit son at all, and the
Department was unable to locate mother and father. Parents’
visits with son were always monitored.
       In November 2021, father was arrested for an unknown
misdemeanor. A few days later he was released from custody. At
some point later, he was again incarcerated. Following his
release from jail in August 2022, father began in-person visits
with son (who was then one year old) three times a week and

                                5
sometimes also for holiday events. The Department reported
father’s visits with son went well. In August 2022, maternal
grandmother reported mother and father “are very happy and
loving with [son]. They typically share holding him the entire
visit and they alternate sitting in the back seat when we are
driving. They sing him a lullaby at the end of all their visits
now.” As of January 2023, maternal grandmother continued to
give positive reports about mother’s and father’s visits with son.
Maternal grandmother explained parents visited with son a few
times a week for many hours at a time. They had started to
change son’s diaper, feed him, and put him down for naps.
       Around the same time, however, Ms. J. stated her belief
that neither mother nor father was fit to be a parent. Ms. J. said
father lacked “ ‘any knowledge on how to be a parent’ ” and
described him as “ ‘the cool uncle,’ ” “hyper,” and “rambunctious.”
Similarly, father described himself as “ ‘the fun dad.’ ” When
father attended a physical therapy session with son, Ms. J.
reported father was “just too hyper and full of interruptions,” all
of which distracted son to the extent the session had to end early.
Ms. J. also noted that, on one occasion, she asked father to be
careful with son during a visit because son recently had
undergone a medical procedure. During that visit, however,
father threw son in the air to play with him. In February 2023,
father brought loose Suboxone pills in his pocket to a visit at Ms.
J.’s home. At some point, father lost the pills and thought they
might have fallen out of his pocket during his visit and been
accessible to children in the home. As a result, in-home visits
were suspended. Ms. J. said son was attracted to father’s “ ‘crazy
energy’ ” and they had fun together. But, after visits with father,

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son was “ ‘especially energetic’ ” and “ ‘more clingy’ ” with Ms. J.
She indicated son did not ask for parents after visits.
       Ms. J. believed maternal grandmother “ ‘is overinvolved
and is pushing [mother and father] to remember to go to visits.’ ”
Rather than mother or father, Ms. J. stated maternal
grandmother was the person who initiated visits and asked about
son’s physical therapy sessions.
       The Department consistently reported son had developed a
strong bond with Ms. J. and was thriving in her care. Son called
Ms. J. “ ‘mama’ ” and “ ‘constantly seeks for her.’ ” Conversely,
the Department did not believe mother or father was a “source of
emotional security, stability, or safety” for son.
4.     Section 388 Petitions and Termination of Parental
       Rights
       In March 2023, a few days before the permanency planning
hearing, father and mother each filed a section 388 petition for
modification, asking the juvenile court to order reunification
services. In his section 388 petition, father stated he had
“enrolled in and completed services to address the issues
underlying this case” and had “secured stable employment.”
Father stated he believed the requested change (i.e., ordering
reunification services) would be better for son because: Father
“has successfully addressed the issues that brought this case
before the court. He has been sober for 10 months, has enrolled
in programs and services to address his history of substance
abuse. Father has visited his son as often as possible and has
maintained frequent phone and video contact when in-person
visitation is not possible. Father has established a loving and
enduring parental bond with his son.”

                                 7
       On March 28, 2023, the juvenile court summarily denied
father’s and mother’s section 388 petitions without a hearing.
The court explained it denied hearings on the petitions because it
could not “find that there is prima facia [sic] evidence of sufficient
change. Or more importantly, even if the court could find change
because the parents are demonstrating change, it’s that the court
cannot find that it would be in the best interest of the child.”
       That same day, the juvenile court terminated mother’s and
father’s parental rights to son. Although mother and father both
argued the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption
applied, the court disagreed. Among other things, the court
found the attachment between parents and son was “one-way in
the terms of the parents and their feelings and relationship to
[son]” and, although son enjoyed his time with parents, “one
could argue that any baby or any child who is being placed as the
center of attention to any adults would be happy and enjoy that
time.” The court also noted there was no evidence showing son
had “difficulty when the visitation [with parents] ends or that
[son] is dis-regulated or that he otherwise has a difficult time not
being in the care of the parents.”
5.     Appeals
       Mother and father each appealed the juvenile court’s order
terminating their parental rights to son. Father also appealed
the court’s order summarily denying his section 388 petition.
                           DISCUSSION
1.     Father’s Appeal
       Father claims the juvenile court abused its discretion when
it summarily denied his section 388 petition without a hearing.
Father claims the court should have granted a hearing on his
petition because he made a prima facie showing of both changed

                                  8
circumstances and that the requested modification (i.e., ordering
reunification services) would be in son’s best interest. As a
result, father argues we must reverse the denial of his section
388 petition as well as the court’s order terminating his parental
rights to son. As discussed below, we find no error.
       a.    Applicable Law
       “After the termination of reunification services, the
parents’ interest in the care, custody and companionship of the
child are no longer paramount. Rather, at this point ‘the focus
shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability.’ ”
(In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.) Nonetheless,
“[u]nder section 388, a parent may petition to modify a prior
order ‘upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence.’
(§ 388, subd. (a)(1); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(a).)” (In re
K.L. (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 52, 61.) “ ‘The burden . . . is on the
parent to prove changed circumstances pursuant to section 388 to
revive the reunification issue. Section 388 provides the “escape
mechanism” that . . . must be built into the process to allow the
court to consider new information.’ ” (In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6
Cal.4th 435, 447.) “Even after the focus has shifted from
reunification, the scheme provides a means for the court to
address a legitimate change of circumstances while protecting the
child’s need for prompt resolution of his custody status.” (In re
Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) Thus, “after reunification
services have terminated, a parent’s [section 388] petition for
either an order returning custody or reopening reunification
efforts must establish how such a change will advance the child’s
need for permanency and stability.” (In re J.C. (2014) 226
Cal.App.4th 503, 527.) The parent’s best interests “are simply no
longer the focus.” (Ibid.)

                                  9
       The juvenile court is not required to hold a full hearing on a
section 388 petition. “The parent seeking modification must
‘make a prima facie showing to trigger the right to proceed by
way of a full hearing. [Citation.]’ [Citations.] There are two
parts to the prima facie showing: The parent must demonstrate
(1) a genuine change of circumstances or new evidence, and that
(2) revoking the previous order would be in the best interests of
the children. [Citation.] If the liberally construed allegations of
the petition do not show changed circumstances such that the
child’s best interests will be promoted by the proposed change of
order, the dependency court need not order a hearing.” (In re
Anthony W. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 246, 250.) “ ‘While the petition
must be liberally construed in favor of its sufficiency [citations],
the allegations must nonetheless describe specifically how the
petition will advance the child’s best interests.’ [Citation.] In
determining whether the petition makes the required showing,
the court may consider the entire factual and procedural history
of the case.” (In re K.L., supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 62.)
       b.     Standard of Review
       “We review the juvenile court’s summary denial of a section
388 petition for abuse of discretion.” (In re Anthony W., supra, 87
Cal.App.4th at p. 250.) “ ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse of
discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of
reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced
from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute
its decision for that of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re Stephanie M.,
supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 318–319.)
       c.     No Abuse of Discretion
       We conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion
in concluding father failed to make a prima facie showing that

                                 10
the requested modification would be in son’s best interest. By the
time father filed his section 388 petition, son was over one-and-a-
half years old. Son had never lived with father. Instead, son had
lived all but two months of his life with Ms. J., with whom it was
undisputed he was bonded and in whose care he was thriving.
Moreover, father started visiting son in earnest only
approximately seven months before filing his section 388 petition.
Son and father enjoyed their visits, but they were always
monitored and, often, father was overly excited or rambunctious.
For example, at least one visit (which occurred during one of son’s
physical therapy sessions) was cut short due to father’s
disruptive behavior. It was also reported father lacked basic
parenting skills. Ms. J. described father as the “cool uncle,”
which description father echoed when he described himself as the
“fun dad.” Rather than evidencing a parent-child bond, the
juvenile court determined son’s attraction to father was rooted in
son’s young age and his enjoyment of being the center of
attention. This was a reasonable interpretation of the evidence,
which we do not disturb on appeal. (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7
Cal.4th at pp. 318–319.)
      In his section 388 petition, father stated that it was in son’s
best interest for the court to order reunification services because
he had addressed issues that brought the case before the court,
visited with son as often as possible, and “established a loving
and enduring parental bond with his son.” As the Department
points out, however, “The presumption favoring natural parents
by itself does not satisfy the best interests prong of section 388.
The cases that state a child may be better off with his or her
biological parent rather than with strangers do so when the
biological parent has shown a sustained commitment to the child

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and parenting responsibilities.” (In re Justice P. (2004) 123
Cal.App.4th 181, 192.) Simply, father did not “ ‘describe
specifically how the petition will advance the child’s best
interests.’ ” (In re K.L., supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 62.)
       Thus, even assuming father made a prima facie showing of
a genuine change in circumstances, the juvenile court did not
abuse its discretion in summarily denying father’s section 388
petition. Father filed his section 388 petition late in the
proceedings, at a time when son’s stability was paramount.
Father failed to make a prima facie showing it would have been
in son’s best interest to delay permanency, open reunification
services, and wait to see if father might at some future point be
able to reunify. (See In re Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184,
206.) “ ‘ “ ‘Childhood does not wait for the parent to become
adequate.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) In light of the entire record, we find no
abuse of discretion.
2.     Mother’s Appeal
       Although the juvenile court also summarily denied
mother’s section 388 petition without a hearing, mother did not
appeal that order. Mother appealed only the court’s order
terminating her parental rights. In conclusory fashion, mother
states that, if we agree with father’s arguments on appeal, we
should reinstate her parental rights as to son. Because we do not
agree with father’s position on appeal, mother’s appeal fails as
well.

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                         DISPOSITION
      The juvenile court’s March 28, 2023 orders are affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                           KWAN, J.*
We concur:

      ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J.

      HOFFSTADT, J.

      * Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

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