Court Opinion

ID: 9664006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:59:17.706424+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:00.897104
License: Public Domain

PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.
¶ 79. (dissenting). The majority concludes that its reading of the due process clause of Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution1 now requires suppression of any identification obtained through a process known as a "showup"2 unless it was necessary to make identifica*189tion in that manner. Majority op., ¶ 2. By so concluding, the majority requires the suppression of identifications of defendants charged with crimes, no matter how reliable the identification. This holding substitutes a search for the truth, which should form the foundation for every criminal prosecution, with one social science theory that showup identifications are "unnecessarily suggestive." Id. In so doing, the majority opinion abandons our previous jurisprudence and the United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence concerning showup identifications, both of which have used the reliability of the identification as the linchpin for determining admissibility. I dissent because reliability, and not a disputed social science theory, must be the key to admissibility of all identification testimony in criminal trials and because I conclude that the totality of circumstances bearing on the identification in this case resulted in a rehable identification of Dubose as the perpetrator of the armed robbery of which he was convicted. Accordingly, I would affirm the court of appeals.
¶ 80. The term "due process of law" comes from the Magna Carta's promise of a trial directed by the "law of the land" as established by the legislative body of government. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 305 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting). One of the four paintings in the Wisconsin Supreme Court hearing room depicts the signing of the Magna Carta. And though many of the Magna Carta's provisions were subsequently repealed, my understanding is that the subject of the painting was chosen because of the significance of the foundational principle of due process that the Magna Carta promised in 1215 and that Wisconsin courts were to preserve. I note this because constitutional principles are not to change depending on what social science theory is in fashion.
*190¶ 81. The United States Supreme Court addressed constitutional due process in the context of a showup eyewitness identification in Stovall. It held that a claim to suppress an out-of-court identification implicates a defendant's constitutional right to procedural due process. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 299. However, the United States Supreme Court also explained that blanket suppressions of identifications are not in keeping with the promotion of justice.
The per se rule, however, goes too far since its application automatically and peremptorily, and without consideration of alleviating factors, keeps evidence from the jury that is reliable and relevant.
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112 (1977). And, as we have explained, " 'the admission of evidence of a showup without more does not violate due process.'" State v. Streich, 87 Wis. 2d 209, 214, 274 N.W.2d 635 (1979) (quoting Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972)). We have also held that a one-to-one identification is not per se suggestive, and because such an identification is often done while the witness's memory is fresh, it actually promotes fairness by assuring reliability and preventing the holding of an innocent suspect. Streich, 87 Wis. 2d at 215-16 (citing State v. Isham, 70 Wis. 2d 718, 724-25, 235 N.W.2d 506 (1975); see also Johnson v. State, 47 Wis. 2d 13, 18, 176 N.W.2d 332 (1970).
¶ 82. Prior to today's ruling, Wisconsin courts have held that a criminal defendant was denied due process only when identification evidence admitted at trial stemmed from a showup that was " 'so impermis-sibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.'" State v. Wolverton, 193 Wis. 2d 234, 264, 533 N.W.2d 167 (1995) *191(quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968). "A criminal defendant [bore] the initial burden of demonstrating that a showup was impermissibly suggestive." Wolverton, 193 Wis. 2d at 264. If this burden was met, the State was required to prove that "under the 'totality of the circumstances' the identification was reliable even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive," using the following five factors:
"(1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, (2) the witness' degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, (4) the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and (5) the time between the crime and the confrontation."
Wolverton, 193 Wis. 2d at 264-65 (quoting Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114; see also Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200; Powell v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 51, 65, 271 N.W.2d 610 (1978). The court's examinations of £¿1 eyewitness identifications focused on reliability, because it is the absence of reliability that violates due process. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301-02.
¶ 83. There are many factors that bear on whether an identification is reliable. Showup identifications that are done soon after the commission of the crime, while the appearance of the perpetrator is fresh in a -witness's mind, have more reliability than identifications done after the passage of considerable time.3 Wolverton, 193 Wis. 2d at 267; State v. Russell, 60 Wis. 2d 712, 721, 211 N.W.2d 637 (1973); Johnson, 47 Wis. 2d *192at 18. As we explained in Johnson, a "fresh identification" promotes fairness "by assuring reliability." Id. Additionally, showup identifications are done in-person, and corporeal identifications are generally held more reliable than photo identifications. Simmons, 390 U.S. at 386 n.6 (citing E Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in Criminal Cases 83 (1965); Williams, Identification Parades, [1955] Crim. L. Rev. 525, 531).
¶ 84. The majority opinion asserts that it is relying on Stovall. Majority op., ¶ 32. It contends that Stovall is "limited to situations where, based on the totality of the circumstances, the showup was necessary." Majority op., ¶ 32. This is a misreading of Stovall because there is nothing in Stovall that limits the use of showup identifications to those circumstances where that mode of identification was "necessary." Instead, Stovall defines its task as determining whether "the confrontation conducted in this case was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that [the defendant] was denied due process of law." Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301-02. The United States Supreme Court then further explained, "a claimed violation of due process of law in the conduct of a confrontation depends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding it." Id. at 302. Therefore, Stovall expressly focuses on the reliability of the identification, not on whether it was "necessary" to do a showup, as the majority opinion represents.
¶ 85. The majority opinion also relies on United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), which were decided the same day as Stovall. Majority op., ¶ 19. However, Wade *193and Gilbert are not due process cases. Instead, they are Sixth Amendment cases, where the United States Supreme Court concluded that post-indictment identifications could not be conducted without notice to and the presence of counsel. Wade, 388 U.S. at 219-21; Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 272. The concern in Wade and in Gilbert was the right to the assistance of counsel at all critical phases of a criminal prosecution, and the Court concluded that an identification conducted after indictment was a critical phase of a prosecution. Wade, 388 U.S. at 236-37; Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 272. The showup identification of Dubose was not a post-indictment identification, so Wade and Gilbert have no application.
¶ 86. By banning all showups unless there is a "necessity," the majority completely overrides one of the major tenets in the administration of justice: the presentation of reliable, relevant evidence at trial. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 112. The United States Supreme Court has reasoned that inflexible rules of exclusion may frustrate justice, rather than promote it. Id. at 113.1 agree completely.
¶ 87. The rule of law announced today is not based on constitutional principle. This is demonstrated in part by the majority opinion's decision that if officers lack probable cause to arrest, then a showup is permissible. Majority op., ¶ 34 n.ll. What follows from this is that at the trial of such a defendant later prosecuted for the crime, suppression of the showup identification will not occur unless the defendant is able to meet the current test showing the identification was unreliable.4 If the due process clause of Article I, Section 8 of the *194Wisconsin Constitution truly requires the suppression of identifications made through the use of a showup, the majority opinion provides those suspects for whom law enforcement has less evidence of guilt with less constitutional protection when that person comes to trial. The majority opinion may also place a defendant in the unusual position of arguing that law enforcement had probable cause to arrest, so the showup identification was unnecessary and accordingly should be suppressed. This is an odd position in which to place a defendant whose defense is, "It wasn't me."
¶ 88. In the case before us, Dubose's showup identification was done in person, within 30 minutes of his commission of the armed robbery, which occurred in a well-lighted apartment, when he wore no mask, the victim had a significant period of time to view him and Dubose had been seen by the victim prior to the date of the robbery. There is no indication of unreliability in this identification.5 Nevertheless, in the event of a new trial, the majority opinion will deny a jury the right to *195hear this relevant, reliable evidence, and unless the circuit court concludes that there is an independent basis for the identification of Dubose that the victim made at trial, that identification will be suppressed also. Majority op., ¶ 38. By so doing, the majority sets up a process where witnesses will be prevented from identifying the perpetrator of the crime for the jury. How does due process require and how is justice served by refusing to permit the admission of this relevant, reliable evidence? In my view, due process does not require it and justice is not served. Instead, the perpetrator of a violent armed robbery may be set free to victimize others.
¶ 89. The majority's main basis for holding that showups must be suppressed is "extensive studies on the issue of identification evidence" that assert that eyewitness testimony is " 'hopelessly unreliable.'" Majority op., ¶¶ 29-30 (quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1262 (Mass. 1995)).6 In my view, the majority opinion errs by adopting a disputed social science theory as a requirement for constitutionally sufficient due process instead of continuing to focus on the reliability of the evidence.
¶ 90. The research cited by the majority does not represent the only social science theory on the subject of identifications. Hard data that social scientists have analyzed have resulted in disagreements about the unreliability of showups. One social science study reports that "[ojverall, the results present surprising commonality in outcome between [showups and line*196ups] and ... an apparent contradiction of the ambient knowledge that showups are more dangerous for innocent suspects than are lineups." Nancy Steblay, et al., Eyewitness Accuracy Rates in Police Showup and Lineup Presentations: A Meta-Analytic Comparison, 27 Law and Human Behavior 523, 535 (2003). Steblay reported that
[w]hen overall identification decisions are tabulated, showups produce an accuracy advantage over lineups (69% vs. 51%). This initial result is qualified by subsequent analyses. As anticipated, a consideration of specific subject choices provides a more complete picture. Correct identification (hit) rate within the context of a target-present condition is nearly identical for the two types of procedures: Approximately 46% of witnesses shown either a lineup or a showup correctly identified the perpetrator when he or she was present. False suspect identification rates in a target-absent display are also approximately equal between showups and lineups, at about 16%.

Id.

¶ 91. Another study reports, "[0]ur results suggest that the formal task structure of a one-person showup does not create an unacceptable increase in the risk that an innocent suspect will be identified as the perpetrator." Richard Gonzalez, et al., Response Biases in Lineups and Showups, 64 Journal of Pers. and Soc. Psychol. 525, 533 (1993). One of the experiments that Gonzalez conducted showed "a striking tendency for subjects to respond no to the showup but yes to the lineup." Id. at 528.
¶ 92. The majority opinion attempts to gain support for its reliance on a disputed social science theory by paralleling its use of social science data with the reference to social science reports in the landmark *197decision by the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Majority op., ¶¶ 43-44. The majority opinion asserts, "we have no trouble following the lead of Brown." Majority op., ¶ 44.
¶ 93. However, the Brown holding was not made in reliance on a social science theory, nor was Brown the earliest or the latest case to refer to a social science report. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). The reports in Brown were listed in one footnote and used without discussion to support one sentence in the entire opinion. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n.ll. Rather, Brown is preeminent because it judicially proclaimed that the enormity of suffering that generation after generation of African-Americans were forced to endure by the doctrine of "separate but equal" simply because they were a different color, was unconstitutional. I object to the manner in which the majority opinion uses Brown because it trades on Brown's prestigious position in American jurisprudence to support the majority opinion's reliance on a disputed social science theory.
¶ 94. No one wants the wrong person identified as the perpetrator of a crime. However, where I part company with the majority opinion and the concurrence is that I am not willing to throw out identifications like the one now before us that are reliable, as the means of addressing those identifications that are not reliable. Suppressing the use of a reliable identification is not necessary in order to guarantee due process of law because it is only an unreliable identification that violates due process. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301-02.
¶ 95. All identification procedures, from showups to lineups to photo arrays, can be improved by crafting *198better techniques for these methods to reduce suggestiveness and increase reliability.7 Proposed improvements include videotaping eyewitness identifications and making standard the need for officers to inform eyewitnesses that the suspect in the showup may not be the perpetrator or that the perpetrator may not be included in the lineup or array. See Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 277, 286 (2003). Research and common sense agree with former United States Attorney General Janet Reno's statement that, "Even the most honest and objective people can make mistakes in recalling and interpreting a witnessed event; it is the nature of human memory." United States Department of Justice, Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement, at iii (1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdf filesl/nij/178240.pdf. Other proposed enhancements include allowing expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identifications or jury instructions on eyewitness identification. None of these well-respected sources advocate the ban of showup identifications as the majority opinion has done. Instead, they advocate for law enforcement education on how to better conduct eyewitness identifications and for a more complete presentation of the problems with eyewitness identification at trial.
*199¶ 96. In sum, because reliability, and not a disputed social science theory, must be the key to admissibility of all identification testimony in criminal trials and because I conclude that the totality of circumstances bearing on the identification in this case resulted in a reliable identification of Dubose as the perpetrator of the armed robbery of which he was convicted, I would affirm the court of appeals.
¶ 97. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.

 Article I, Section 8 provides in relevant part:
(1) No person may be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law....

 A showup is the individual presentation of a suspect in the commission of a crime to a witness of that crime.

 See also State v. DiMaggio, 49 Wis. 2d 565, 586, 182 N.W.2d 466 (1971) ("An immediate confrontation is inherently more reliable than a delayed one, while failure to identify terminates any inconvenience to the suspect."); Turner v. United States, 622 A.2d 667, 672 (D.C. App. 1993) ("[Ijdentifi-*192cations conducted soon after the crime enhance the accuracy of witnesses' identifications and allow innocent suspects to be quickly freed.").

 As set out in State v. Wolverton, 193 Wis. 2d 234, 533 N.W.2d 167 (1995), such a defendant must prove that the showup was impermissibly suggestive. Id. at 264. If he does so, *194then the State is required to prove that "under the 'totality of the circumstances' the identification was reliable." Id. (citations ommitted).

 1 disagree with the majority's discussion citing Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969), as in that case, the witness initially could not positively identify the suspect and was "talked into" identifying the suspect after speaking with him one-on-one and viewing another lineup. There, even though the witness could not initially identify the suspect, "[i]n effect, the police repeatedly said to the witness, 'This is the man.1" Id. at 443. Here, while the second showup and photograph identification were needlessly redundant, they were used by police to ask the victim, "Are you sure?" They were not used to talk the witness out of an initial failure to identify Dubose. Accordingly, the coercive nature of the identification procedures in Foster was not present here.

 It should be noted that the broad statement quoted from Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1262 (Mass. 1995), is not limited to showup identifications. It questions all eyewitness identifications. Will the next step for this court be the suppression of all eyewitness identifications?

 1 do not contend that "eyewitness id 49. I recognize that no form of eyewitness identification is reliable 100% of the time. But I do contend that an eyewitness identification made by a witness very soon after the witness observed the commission of the crime and the witness had a good opportunity to view the perpetrator for a significant period of time is not inherently unreliable.