Court Opinion

ID: 9703299
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:51:13.706407+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:47.528152
License: Public Domain

Roberts, J.,
dissenting. When under our enabling act a local legislature enacts a zoning ordinance and provides therein for exceptions to its terms and requires that prior to the granting thereof the board make a finding as to whether such exceptions, if granted, would serve the welfare and convenience of the public, the making of such finding on the basis of legally competent evidence is virtually a condition precedent to an exercise by the board of its authority to make such exceptions. Hazen v. Zoning Board of Review, 90 R. I. 108. In Monforte v. Zoning Board of Review, 93 R. I. 447, 176 A.2d 726, 729, this court said that when a board under such an ordinance provision finds “that a grant of the proposed exception would not substantially serve the public convenience and welfare, the board is without authority to act affirmatively on the application for the exception.”
It does not follow, however, that such a condition prece>dent to the grant of an exception can be established only by showing on the basis of legally competent evidence that it will supply or further the personal needs or desires of some individual or group of individuals in the community. In Center Realty Corp. v. Zoning Board of Review, 96 R. I. 76, 189 A.2d 347, 350, this court clearly stated that the enabling act does not contemplate that exceptions to the terms of a zoning ordinance are to be granted on the basis of individual needs but rather “it was intended that exceptions would be made where it was shown that to relieve a particular parcel of land from the burden of existing restrictions placed thereon would not adversely affect the public interests that give validity to zoning enactments.” The view that we therein stated posits my conviction that to construe this provision of the zoning ordinance otherwise *249would raise a serious question as to the jurisdiction of the board to act at all in the premises.
A use provided for in a zoning ordinance by way of an exception is in its nature a permitted use for which the local legislature may provide in order that “the public interests and those of an owner of land might bei fairly adjusted without undue disturbance to the general welfare.” Buckminster v. Zoning Board of Review, 69 R. I. 396, 401. In that case this court recognized that the exception is a device that permits the alleviation of use restrictions on particular parcels of land that are not reasonably related to the public interests that warrant the exercise of the police power under which such were imposed. It is clear that the reduction of the restriction thus imposed to one lesser in degree should also constitute a valid exercise of the police power, and such adjustment should be made unless it be shown clearly contrary to those public interests upon which the police power is based.
In Center Realty Corp. v. Zoning Board of Review, supra, this court took the view that such exceptions set out in a zoning ordinance are intended to inure primarily to the benefit of the owner of the burdened land and that benefits inuring therefrom to the public generally are only a consequence of the grant of the exception. In that opinion we stated our conclusion “that when an applicant for an exception establishes compliance with the conditions precedent, and in particular has shown that the granting of the exception would not have results that would be contrary to the public interests, a denial of such exception by the board constitutes an abuse of the discretion vested therein.”
I perceive no reason for departing from our prior conclusion that where the grant of an exception provided for in a zoning ordinance is conditioned on a showing that it will reasonably or substantially serve the welfare and convenience of the public, the absence of proof that it will serve or convenience the exigencies or desires of individuals in *250the community does not preclude a finding by the board that compliance with the condition precedent has been established. This is true particularly where the applicant has adduced evidence tending to prove that the proposed use by way of exception will not be contrary to the public health, morals, safety, or welfare, for in such circumstances it is clear that the exception may be granted for the purpose of making the restriction imposed on the land reasonably consistent with an exercise of the police power by which it was imposed.
Testimonial evidence was adduced in this case only on behalf of the applicant. He himself testified that the neighborhood in which the land is located is devoted substantially to commercial uses, and that he had unsuccessfully sought to sell it to potential purchasers for uses permitted in a heavy commercial zone. A realtor testifying in his'behalf stated that the area was commercial in character; that the operation of a gasoline station would not devalue surrounding property but, in his opinion, would enhance such values; that it would not' generate increased traffic or create traffic hazards; and that the proposed use would result in •better lighting and improved sidewalks: No remonstrants appeared, and no evidence was adduced to contradict or impeach the testimony thus supplied in petitioner’s behalf. Were the question here simply one of weight and credibility; this court,’ of course, would not disturb the board’s finding.
The question raised, however, is whether there is in the record any evidence supporting the finding of the board that petitioner had not established as a condition precedent that to grant this exception would not be contrary to the public interests from which zoning derives its validity. The record discloses that the board made an inspection of the premises and was aware of the operation of other gasoline stations along Warwick avenue. In Center Realty Corp. v. Zoning Board of Review, 96 R. I. 482, 194 A.2d 671, we said at page 673: “It is our opinion then that evidence showing *251that other gasoline stations are -being- operated in the vicinity of the proposed station is without probative force on the issue of whether the exception, if granted, would be contrary to the convenience and welfare of the public.’’ Reasonably competent evidence, -as we noted in Zimarino v. Zoning Board of Review, 95 R. I. 383, 187 A.2d 259, 261, is “any evidence that is not incompetent by reason of being devoid of probative force as to the pertinent issues.”
Conceding that knowledge acquired by a board of review during ah inspection constitutes legally competent evidence which may súpport its findings, it will not be given that status by this court unless the récord discloses what the board observed and acted-upon. We"will-'not presume that it acted on evidence of this character absent some disclosure thereof in the record. We'said in Kelly v. Zoning Board of Review, 94 R. I. 298, 180 A.2d 319, 322: “To sustain a decision on the. basis of the board’s acting on knowledge acquired by inspection, the record must contain some reasonable disclosure as to the knowledge so acquired and their action pursuant thereto.” There is in this record no such disclosure, and -I am constrained to conclude that the finding of the board here that -petitioner failed to establish the condition precedent to a grant of this exception is not supported by legally competent evidence.
The position I here take is not to- be understood as imposing on a board of review the burden of proving the facts upon which it roaches decisions. What I rely on here is simply the settled rule that the findings or decisions of such boards of review must rest u-pon reasonably competent evidence disclosed in the record. Where such evidence is to flow from the presumption that attaches to inspections by these boards or from their -presumed expertise- in the administration of zoning ordinances, the record must disclose -the character of the observations or the conclusions from which it derives. The absence of such disclosure in the record here persuades me that the decision of the board constituted an *252abuse of its discretion. See Denelle v. Zoning Board of Review, 89 R. I. 456.
Gallogly, Beals & Tiernan, G. Chandler Beals, for petitioner.
James R. Morriss, Oity Solicitor, Howard R. Haronian, Assistant City Solicitor, for respondent.