Court Opinion

ID: 9684597
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:03:06.460171+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:57.665091
License: Public Domain

RENDLEN, Judge,
dissenting.
Plaintiff brought his action for personal injuries against three defendants whose successive alleged acts of negligence combined to produce permanent blindness in both eyes.
McVay (Defendant No. 1), a bus driver for the Lebanon, Missouri School District No. R-3, is charged with negligently leaving his school bus unattended on May 29, 1969, when one of the young students aboard (Defendant No. 2) injured plaintiff, then a fifth grader. Settled at $100,000, the limit of defendant’s liability insurance, this claim was dismissed with prejudice. *938Defendant No. 1 then dismissed his cross-claim against Dr. Ernest Tarrasch (Defendant No. 3 and relator here) by which he sought apportionment of relative fault and contribution.
Defendant No. 2, Carl Durremann, a schoolmate also riding the bus, is alleged to have negligently thrown a ruler, striking and injuring plaintiff’s eye. Durremann filed a cross-claim against Dr. Tarrasch and McVay, seeking'indemnification or a determination of relative fault and apportionment of plaintiff’s damages among them. The viability of this cross-claim is the subject of Dr. Tarrasch’s petition for prohibition.
Dr. Ernest Tarrasch (Defendant No. 3), who treated plaintiff’s eye following the injury, is charged with medical malpractice, allegedly resulting in plaintiff’s loss of sight in both eyes. Settling with Defendant No. 3, on payment of $50,000, plaintiff executed his release, discharging any claim arising out of the incident of May 29, 1969, and dismissed his action against Defendant No. 3, leaving, as plaintiff’s only remaining claim, that against Defendant No. 2. Defendant No. 3 then moved for summary judgment on Defendant No. 2’s cross-claim filed against him. The trial court’s stated intention to deny the motion led to this proceeding in prohibition.
I submit that our preliminary rule should be made absolute, prohibiting respondent, the trial judge, from denying Defendant Ño. 3’s motion for summary judgment, and directing that judgment be entered against Defendant No. 2 on his cross-claim.
It should be noted that Defendant No. 2’s cross-claim against Defendant No. 1 for apportionment of plaintiff’s damages between them, under the principles of relative fault enunciated in Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Whitehead & Kales, 566 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. banc 1978), is not before us. If it were, plaintiff’s release to Defendant No. 1, on payment of the $100,000 would, in my view, have been sufficient not only to require dismissal of plaintiff’s claim against Defendant No. 1, but also to defeat such cross-claim. As stated in Parks v. Union Carbide Corp., 602 S.W.2d 188, 189 (Mo. banc 1980), “[Whitehead & Kales ] did not change the right of a plaintiff to settle with one or more joint tortfeasors as provided in § 537.-060, RSMo 1978 ...” Similarly, the release to Dr. Tarrasch, in consideration of his $50,-000 payment, supports dismissal, or if you will, the extinguishment of plaintiff’s claim against him, and also sustains summary judgment for Dr. Tarrasch on Defendant No. 2’s cross-claim for indemnity on the basis of relative fault.
The sole foundation for the cross-claim against Dr. Tarrasch lies in the possibility that plaintiff might obtain judgment against Defendant No. 2 for damages flowing from the alleged malpractice of the doctor. While a tortfeasor, such as Defendant No. 2, is exposed to liability for (1) original injuries proximately resulting from his negligence, as well as (2) injuries or aggravation of original injuries caused by medical malpractice, plaintiff’s claim for damages springing from the latter, i. e. the medical malpractice, is extinguished by his release and dismissal of the claim with prejudice for such malpractice. Accordingly, Defendant No. 2’s exposure to liability and his derivative claim for damages for Defendant No. 3’s alleged malpractice are concluded because the claim’s source, that from which it is derived, no longer exists. Rule 55.32(b).
When a plaintiff elects the safe course of settlement, he will not be permitted to again assert the claim settled nor recover for amounts compensated. Though plaintiff may continue his action against Defendant No. 2, he may only pursue the claim for original injuries which was not otherwise legally terminated. That portion of his claim against Defendant No. 2 for damages stemming from the doctor’s alleged malpractice terminated when plaintiff released this claim against the doctor. Accordingly, Defendant No. 2’s cross-claim for indemnification for something he will *939never be called upon to pay should also be called to a halt.
For these reasons I respectfully dissent.