Court Opinion

ID: 9697692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:26:32.202152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:34:05.117994
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge FRIEDMAN.
I must respectfully dissent. Unlike the majority, I agree with the trial court that *601the Miscellaneous Inappropriate Behavior provision (MIB provision) of the Warren County School District’s (School District) Discipline Code is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Jedidiah Schmader (Jedidi-ah).
The majority reminds us that, because schools need to be able to impose disciplinary sanctions for a wide range of unanticipated conduct disruptive of the educational process, the United States Supreme Court has determined that school disciplinary rules need not be as detailed as criminal codes. See Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 92 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986). Further, a looser standard of constitutional review of such school regulations is appropriate because greater flexibility must be afforded to regulate the conduct of children as opposed to adults. Alex v. Allen, 409 F.Supp. 379 (W.D.Pa.1976). I do not question these standards; however, as acknowledged by the majority, it is fundamental to due process that a statute or regulation must not be so vague as to require persons of ordinary intelligence to guess at its meaning or possible application. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). Accordingly, an enactment must define the prohibited conduct with sufficient definiteness to inform an ordinary individual as to what conduct is prohibited and must define the prohibited conduct in a manner discouraging arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Killion v. Franklin Regional School District, 136 F.Supp.2d. 446 (W.D.Pa.2001); Wiemerslage ex rel. Wiemerslage v. Maine Township High School District 207, 824 F.Supp. 136 (N.D.Ill.1993), aff'd, 29 F.3d 1149 (7th Cir.1994). Here, the trial court determined that the MIB provision of the School District’s Discipline Code ran afoul of both these principles.
The MIB provision, set forth in section IV(O) of the Discipline Code, provides:
Any student who engages in inappropriate behavior, not otherwise specifically addressed in this [Discipline] Code, including but not limited to self-destructive behavior, behavior that may be harmful to others or property of others, or other behavior which negatively reflects the values of this [Discipline [C]ode or the philosophy, goals and aims of the Warren County School District, will be subject to suspension or other disciplinary action. The discipline may include action by the administration as well as possible referral to the hearing officer for further discipline.
(R.R. at 83a-84a.) In considering this language, I agree with the trial court’s assessment that the MIB provision of the Discipline Code “does not put an eight-year-old student on notice that a failure to inform school authorities of a threat made off school property is a violation.”1 (Trial ct. op. at 10, R.R. at 105a.)2
*602In holding otherwise, the majority reasons that
any eight-year-old child knows or should know that knowledge of the intent of another child to throw a dart in order to injure a third child is wrong, and that if the action results in harm on school property, he or she will be in ‘trouble’ at school. No more should be needed to impose appropriate discipline, and, therefore, we cannot say that Section IV(O) of the School District’s Disciplinary Code is unconstitutionally vague as to Jedidiah.
(Majority op. at 600.) However, in applying such reasoning, I believe the majority loses sight of the question here. We are not asked to decide whether an eight-year-old should know whether it is wrong for someone to intend to injure a child with a dart; there is no question that this is so. Rather, we must determine whether an eight-year-old can read the language of the MIB provision and understand that by forgetting to tell school authorities of a classmate’s vague threat made off school property and during non-school hours he violates that provision and subjects himself to disciplinary action. Even under the relaxed constitutional standards applicable here, I cannot agree that the MIB provision defines proscribed conduct with sufficient clarity to provide the necessary warning to Jedidiah that his action, or, more correctly, inaction, would be both prohibited and punishable.3
The majority also accepts the School District’s argument that the trial court erred in not affording the School District maximum discretion in its decision in light of the minimal discipline imposed. Noting that school suspensions of less than ten days normally are not reviewable by the courts, see In re JAD, 782 A.2d 1069 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001), appeal denied, 568 Pa. 708, 796 A.2d 987 (2002), the majority concludes that “three days of a 15-minute after school detention does not rise to a constitutional deprivation of any type of property right requiring redress through the judicial system.”4 (Majority op. at 600.) The *603majority acknowledges that 22 Pa.Code § 12.8(a) provides students with a statutory right to education and affords students appropriate due process if they are to be excluded from school; however, the majority points out that, in this case, Jedidiah’s discipline was not exclusion from school but, instead, was “more school.” The majority then reasons that “if there is no recourse from a school district’s decision to suspend a student for fewer than ten days, then where, as here, no expulsion or suspension is imposed and only the school day is extended, there should be no recourse to the courts.” (Majority op. at 600.) I cannot agree with this analysis.
Initially, I would disagree that after-school detention is the equivalent of “more school” for Jedidiah. Clearly, the protected right to an education in 22 Pa.Code § 12.8(a) is the guarantee that a student will not be denied classroom instruction without due process. Because such “schooling” does not take place during the extended school day that comes with detention, Jedidiah’s punishment does not give him any “more school.”5
Moreover, in adopting this view, the majority loses sight of the fact that the School District itself chose to take the matter to a formal hearing, thereby subjecting the decision to review under 22 Pa.Code § 12.8(b)(2).6 In its opinion, the majority presumes to invent a rule that would preclude recourse to the courts in cases where a student’s discipline following a formal hearing is something other than expulsion or suspension in excess of ten days. However, 22 Pa.Code § 12.8(b)(2) makes judicial recourse available in all cases where “the student disagrees with the results of the hearing.” The opportunity to seek redress in the courts is tied only to the holding of a formal hearing; it does not depend on the discipline ultimately imposed.
Further, adopting the School District’s position that we consider the minimal nature of the discipline would require that I ignore my prior determination that the MIB provision is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Jedidiah. As the trial court stated in its November 1, 2001 opinion, the School District certainly can punish a student for fading to warn school authorities of a plan to harm another student, and, in this day and age, it is more important than ever that school authorities be told by students of impending danger. Nonetheless, if an eight-year-old student fails to do so, we cannot punish him if we never bothered to tell him he should in words he is able to understand. (R.R. at 113a-14a.) I have no doubt that the School District’s MIB provision is designed to serve interests that are both important and numerous, and I recognize that the School District imposed very minimal punishment; nevertheless, I will not sanction the disciplining of students in cases where they had no reason to anticipate punitive consequences.7
Accordingly, I would affirm.

. On November 1, 2001, in response to the School District's filing of matters complained of on appeal, the trial court filed a supplementary opinion pursuant to Pa. R.A.P.1925 to clarify its order of August 27, 2001. (R.R. at 113a-14a.) In that opinion, the trial court explained that it did not hold the "entire” MIB provision unconstitutionally vague and did not hold that the School District cannot punish a student for failing to warn school authorities when he knows of a plan to harm another student; rather, it held that "if the School District wants to punish an eight-year-old student for not warning school authorities when he knows of some plan to hurt another student, it must tell him in advance of his obligation to do so in language that the child is able to understand.” (R.R. at 113a.)

. In addition, the trial court concluded that the MIB provision is a "catchall provision,” unlimited by any articulated restrictions, and, thus, "the School District retains unlimited and unfettered discretion to punish a wide range of acts or omissions occurring both on or off school property.” (Trial ct. op. at 10, *602R.R. at 105a.) That the MIB provision is subject to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is evidenced by the fact that, although they played very different roles in the offense, Jedidiah and Tyler Gelotte received identical punishments.

. The School District contends that it is not required to give an exhaustive list of what qualifies as inappropriate or harmful behavior, and, in fact, relies on cases from numerous courts that have upheld school disciplinary rules containing generalized terms similar to those in the challenged MIB provision. The majority does not discuss these cases, but I note that, what the School District fails to acknowledge in making this argument is that the trial court here does not conclude that the MIB provision is unconstitutionally vague on its face, but, rather, holds that it is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Jedidiah. As stressed by the trial court, Jedidiah was an eight-year-old child who committed no harmful act himself but, rather, simply failed to report the possible intended action of another based on a threat made outside school. Because of these unique facts, the cases relied upon by the School District are easily distinguished and do not support the School District's position. Specifically, the School District relies on Fraser, Brian A. ex rel. Arthur A. v. Stroudsburg Area School District, 141 F.Supp.2d 502 (M.D.Pa.2001), Alex, and Delisio v. Ellwood City Area School Dist., 70 Pa. D. & C.2d 524 (1975). In each of these cases, the imposition of discipline on the student was upheld; however, all these cases concern older students who committed the objectionable action themselves at school or at a school-sponsored function. None involves the judgment of an eight-year-old as to the consequences of neglecting to inform someone at school of another child's intent, heard off school property, to harm a third child. Because that is the situation here, I believe the School District’s argument must fail.

. The majority appears to forget that Jedidi-ah was not only seeking to avoid what he perceived as unjust detention but also was *603seeking expungement of all reference to the underlying incident from his record, a disciplinary procedure with a much more far-reaching effect.

. Indeed, I am baffled by the majority’s attempt to equate school attendance with after-school detention, something clearly meant as punishment for a student.

. In this case, where Jedidiah was suspended for one-half day and required to spend fifteen minutes per day after school for three days, the trial court ordinarily would not even have jurisdiction, and it happened here only because the matter was referred to a Hearing Officer as a case of possible expulsion pursuant to 22 Pa.Code § 12.8(a). See 22 Pa.Code § 12.8(b)(2).

.I am not persuaded otherwise by the majority’s statement that "the 15-minute detention *604for three days was not imposed so much to discipline Jedidiah as it was to teach him a lesson that he should attempt to prevent harm from befalling another human being." (Majority op. at 600.) In its brief to this court, the School District suggests much the same thing, stating that, even if Jedidiah did not have advance notice that his action was proscribed and subject to discipline, it is a lesson well learned. (See School District’s brief at 21-22). I would suggest that the lesson learned by Jedidiah in receiving a punishment for action that he could not reasonably anticipate would merit discipline, is not the one that the School District imagines.
Going a bit further, I would add that, certainly, Jedidiah's parent, as demonstrated by her aggressive pursuit of this action, believes that there is another valuable lesson for Jedi-diah to learn. As stated in Appellee’s brief.
The Appellee does not take issue with noble statements set forth in [the School District’s] argument concerning the duties of the School District. However, it is Appel-lee’s position that concomitant with the duties of the School District, the District also has responsibility for following the law, and the Appellee believes that one of the most valuable lessons a student can learn aside from ... community values, respect for authority, and for social, moral and political values, is to also learn that he, no matter what his age, is protected by the constitution of the United States of America.
(Appellee's brief at 11.)