Court Opinion

ID: 9626095
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:01:58.084698+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:22.143454
License: Public Domain

Smith, Judge.
We granted a discretionary appeal by the employer and insurer in this workers’ compensation case. The employer and insurer raise four enumerations challenging the award. We conclude that at least one of the enumerations is meritorious, and we therefore reverse.
The record shows that while a full-time student, the claimant, Michele Chandler, worked at West Marietta Hardware as the office manager. She suffered a compensable work-related injury on September 13, 1993, when two metal shelves fell on her, hitting the left side of her head. Complaining of headache, nausea, and lightheadedness, she consulted a doctor on her employer’s approved list, who diagnosed a mild contusion.
Chandler’s recurrent headaches then caused her to visit the local hospital emergency room, which diagnosed concussion syndrome, referred her to a neurologist, and gave her a work excuse. The neurologist diagnosed post-concussion syndrome and post-traumatic vas*437cular headaches and released her to return to regular duty after one week, noting that a CAT scan was unremarkable. Her employer, West Marietta Hardware, accepted her claim for compensation, which was paid until she returned to work without restriction on September 27, 1993.
She continued to work at West Marietta Hardware until February 1995, although her complaints persisted and she continued to see various doctors. She complained primarily of headaches but also of other symptoms, including at various times confusion, memory loss, nausea, difficulty concentrating, and depression. At her sister’s suggestion, she consulted Dr. Donald Orr on August 3, 1994. Dr. Orr’s initial impression was post-traumatic muscle contraction headaches with paracervical trigger points. Chandler continued to see Dr. Orr, and his notes indicate that she showed some improvement.
In February 1995, Chandler left her employment at West Marietta Hardware for personal reasons. She left Georgia temporarily, but when she returned, she again saw Dr. Orr. As her symptoms evolved, with numbness and pain in the neck, shoulders, and arms emerging and increasing, Dr. Orr’s working diagnosis changed to possible thoracic outlet syndrome. At Dr. Orr’s recommendation, Chandler saw Dr. Robert Sessions for a second opinion, and Dr. Sessions agreed with Dr. Orr’s diagnosis of thoracic outlet syndrome. On May 8, 1995, Dr. Orr instructed Chandler not to return to work “while additional investigation for this disorder is pursued” and while she remained symptomatic at that level. Chandler has not worked since.
An independent medical examination was conducted by Dr. Robert Gilbert at the request of the insurer. Dr. Gilbert rejected the diagnosis of thoracic outlet syndrome and found that Chandler could perform normal duties.
Chandler applied for workers’ compensation benefits, alleging a change in condition. The employer controverted the claim, and after a hearing, the ÁLJ found that Chandler was suffering from thoracic outlet syndrome proximately caused by her work injury on September 13, 1993, and that, as a result, she was totally disabled. He awarded continuing benefits retroactive to May 8, 1995. The appellate division affirmed the award. No hearing was scheduled on the appeal to superior court, and the award was affirmed by operation of law. OCGA § 34-9-105 (b).
1. An employee who sustains a compensable injury, returns to work, and leaves for a reason unrelated to the injury must satisfy certain conditions when seeking the resumption of workers’ compensation benefits because of a change in condition. Such an employee “must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she suffered a loss of earning power as a result of a compensable work-related injury; continues to suffer physical limitations attributable to *438that injury; and has made a diligent, but unsuccessful search to secure suitable employment” after leaving work. Maloney v. Gordon County Farms, 265 Ga. 825, 828 (462 SE2d 606) (1995). The search for work need not be shown when claimants are totally disabled, however. In those circumstances, a search for suitable employment would be a “purposeless demonstration of their disability by seeking work . . . they are unable to perform.” Richardson v. Dennis, Corry, Porter & Thornton, 216 Ga. App. 476, 477 (454 SE2d 643) (1995).
The employer and insurer contend that Chandler did not meet the requirements of Maloney because she showed no search for work. They argue that the ALJ erred in concluding that Chandler was totally disabled because no doctor stated that she could not work at all. In support of this position, they point to the deposition testimony of Dr. Orr, Chandler’s primary treating physician, that she could do some work, provided it was not repetitive. They characterize this testimony as releasing Chandler to light-duty work.
Appellants mischaracterize the evidence. Nowhere in his testimony did Dr. Orr state that Chandler was released to light duty; on the contrary, he advised her not to work at all. He did indicate when questioned by appellants’ attorney that “[i]f it was a position in which she didn’t have to use her arm, then there would be no immediate reason she couldn’t” work. If her work were confined to “paper shuffling without the computer,” for instance, that might be all right. But he was unsure of this because he realized that “many types of work would involve work at the computer or moving the extremities.” After further questioning, Dr. Orr concluded that any type of work that was repetitive would be contraindicated. He still had not changed his instruction to her to be “off work duty completely.”
Although some evidence exists to the contrary, the ALJ was authorized to conclude that Chandler was totally disabled and need not engage in a purposeless demonstration of that disability by seeking work she could not perform. The exception provided in Richardson applies, and the award of benefits was not error in this regard.
2. In two enumerations, appellants assert error relating to the issue of whether Chandler was successfully impeached.
(a) Appellants strongly suggest that the thoracic outlet syndrome diagnosed by Chandler’s authorized treating physician is either a fabrication or was caused by an automobile accident in 1995. They maintain that the ALJ erred in believing Chandler about her symptoms and their causation, given that her credibility was impeached by contradictory statements with regard to her symptoms, as reported to various doctors.
But no evidence was presented indicating that the 1995 vehicular accident caused any injury to Chandler. The record includes statements and notes of various doctors containing information that con*439flicts in certain respects with Chandler’s testimony. The record also contains testimony from Chandler, however, indicating that certain medical history information recorded in those notes was not related by her and is simply incorrect. Moreover, the ALJ’s award recites that the ALJ carefully weighed and considered all the evidence, which presumably included Chandler’s allegedly inconsistent or contradictory statements.
The ALJ was the factfinder at the hearing. As such, regardless of appellants’ efforts to impeach Chandler, the ALJ had the authority and privilege to believe her testimony. The ALJ’s and the appellate division’s “findings of fact, when supported by any evidence, are conclusive and binding. [Cit.]” Dept. of Public Safety v. Boatright, 188 Ga. App. 612, 614 (373 SE2d 770) (1988).
(b) Appellants maintain that Chandler’s credibility was impugned by her actions in providing false information to the state when she applied for unemployment benefits and the ALJ therefore erred in refusing to consider these actions.
The record shows that Chandler left her job at West Marietta Hardware to care for her terminally ill mother. As the office manager, she completed her own separation notice. She listed lack of work as the reason for termination, which was untrue. The Department of Labor initially granted benefits, but her employer appealed and the decision was reversed.
The ALJ did not refuse to permit appellants to question Chandler about this incident. On the contrary, three witnesses, including Chandler, were all questioned regarding the reasons for her leaving work and her subsequent claim for unemployment benefits. The former general manager testified that he “did look at” the separation notice and he approved it as Chandler had filled it out, because no other stated reason on the form “came close to” the actual reason she was leaving.
(c) Appellants contend the ALJ applied an incorrect legal standard in finding that Chandler had not been impeached. We agree that the ALJ was under a misapprehension concerning the law on impeachment.
The ALJ concluded that to serve as impeachment, “there must be inconsistent statements bearing on material facts of the case at hand or proof of a crime involving moral turpitude,” and that neither was present in this case. He found, therefore, that although Chandler’s actions regarding her termination were not admirable, she had not been impeached.
Although the ALJ correctly stated some of the statutory methods of impeaching a witness, as embodied in OCGA §§ 24-9-80 through 24-9-84, other methods of impeaching a witness are also available. “Generally, a party may show anything which in the slightest degree *440affects the credit of an opposing witness. A witness may be impeached on a collateral issue which is indirectly material to the issue in the case.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Pound v. Medney, 176 Ga. App. 756, 760 (2) (337 SE2d 772) (1985). The questioning at issue here was a permissible attempt to impeach Chandler’s credibility.
It is unclear whether the ALJ’s misapprehension regarding permissible impeachment affected his award. It is entirely possible that had the ALJ known he was permitted to consider this evidence as impeaching Chandler’s credibility, he still would have reached the same conclusion. But it is also possible that he would not. A new hearing is not required, but we must remand this case so that the trier of fact may evaluate the evidence, applying the correct legal standard as to impeachment and credibility.
3. We find no merit in appellants’ contention that the superior court erred as a matter of law in refusing their request to schedule a hearing. Upon appeal to superior court, after transmission of the record, the case “may then be brought by either party upon ten days’ written notice to the other before the superior court for a hearing upon such record, subject to an assignment of the case for hearing by the court-, provided, however, if the court does not hear the case within 60 days from the date the notice of appeal is filed with the board, the decision of the board shall be considered affirmed by operation of law,” except under circumstances not present here. (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 34-9-105 (b). The statute clearly does not make scheduling a hearing mandatory upon the superior court; the very fact that procedures are outlined for affirmance in cases when no hearing is scheduled underscores the permissive nature of the hearing.

Case remanded with direction.

McMurray, P. J., concurs. Beasley, J., concurs specially.