Court Opinion

ID: 9885195
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:45:17.790539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:46.296854
License: Public Domain

Melvin, J.,

dissenting:

In concluding that the trial judge was wrong in granting defendant’s motion for judgment n.o.v., I think the majority has misapplied well established principles of the law of agency to the evidence in this case. I, therefore, with due respect, dissent and state my reasons.
*238I. THE LAW
A.
The declaration filed on April 19, 1973, by the plaintiff, Claude J. Mabe, against B. P. Oil Corporation and Lonnie Faison, trading as Faison Service Station, alleged that the “service station [was] owned and under the direction of the defendant, B. P. Oil Corporation and operated by its agent Lonnie Faison . . . .” It is therefore clear that the only legal theory relied upon by the plaintiff to recover against B. P. Oil Corporation (hereafter sometimes called “the Company”) is the doctrine of respondeat superior. It is not alleged that the Company was negligent in employing Faison, that it knew or should have known that Faison or his employees were unskilled or a danger to the public, that the Company negligently failed to maintain the premises in a safe condition, or that it directly in any other manner breached any duty it owed to the plaintiff. The sole issue here is the Company’s responsibility for the negligence of Faison’s employee in handing to the plaintiff a can of gasoline instead of water.
“. . . All of the authorities agree that the rule of respondeat superior, which requires one person to answer for the acts of another, arises from the relation of principal and subordinate. It only applies when the relation of master and servant, employer and employee or principal and agent is shown to exist between the wrongdoer and the person sought to be charged for the result of the wrong. It does not apply when the virongdoer is an independent contractor, even though there be an agreement or ‘arrangement’ between him and the person who is claimed to be responsible for the wrong. Greer Lines Co. v. Roberts, 216 Md. 69, 78, 139 A. 2d 235; 2 Mechem, Agency (2d Ed.), Section 1858.” Hoerr v. Hanline, 219 Md. 420, 421 (1959). (Emphasis added.)
Thus, for the plaintiff to survive a motion for directed *239verdict at the close of the evidence, there must appear in the record legally sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably conclude that an agency relationship 1 existed between the Company and Faison. Unless such a relationship exists there is no predicate for the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior to impose vicarious liability upon the Company.
B
Both parties to this appeal have by their briefs correctly assumed there are only two major types of agency relationship, both descriptive of the way in which the relationship is created. The first type is an actual agency. An actual agency may be created in two ways: expressly or by implication. Thus an express agency is formed by express agreement, oral or written. An implied agency is an agency created by inference from facts sufficient to justify the inference. An implied agency may be said to exist even in the face of a written or oral agreement between the parties that an agency does not exist. The key factor here seems to be the right of one party to control the day-to-day operations of the other party in the conduct of the subject matter in dispute.
The second type of agency, descriptive of the way in which the relationship is formed, is agency by estoppel. Paradoxically, this type of agency presupposes the *240non-existence of an actual agency, either express or implied. It is sometimes called “apparent” agency or “ostensible” agency and is said to exist in order to serve as a predicate for the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior in those situations in which it is considered inequitable to permit the “principal” to deny that an agency relationship really exists and thus escape liability for the tortious acts of his “agent”.
I agree with the majority opinion that § 267 of the Restatement of the Law, Agency 2d (1958) sets forth in general the elements of proof necessary to establish agency by estoppel:
“One who represents that another is his servant or other agent and thereby causes a third party justifiably to rely upon the care or skill of such apparent agent is subject to liability to the third person for harm caused by the lack of care or skill of the one appearing to be a servant or other agent as if he were such.”
It would therefore appear that in order to hold the Company liable for Faison’s negligence on the basis of agency by estoppel or apparent agency, the record must contain legally sufficient evidence from which the jury could have reasonably concluded that:
1) The Company “represented” that Faison was its servant or other agent; and
2) Such “representation” thereby caused appellant justifiably to rely upon Faison’s care or skill.
II. APPLICATION OF LAW TO THE EVIDENCE
The majority rests its decision on its holding that the evidence is legally sufficient for a jury to conclude that an “apparent agency” or agency by estoppel existed. I disagree.
A. Representation of Agency Relationship
In order for the plaintiff to show that in going to Faison’s gas station he relied on “representations” of an agency *241relationship, there must, of course, be evidence that he had knowledge of the alleged representations at the time he claims to have relied on them. Obviously one can not rely on something of which he has no knowledge. In this case, therefore, the inquiry is: what “representations” by the Company that Faison was its agent was the plaintiff aware of when he decided to drive his car into the “Hilltop B P filling station”?
The only evidence in the record bearing on this question is contained in the plaintiff’s testimony set forth in the majority opinion:
“Q Was there anything in particular you — attracted you to the BP station on Hilton Street?
A Nothing except for the BP station, had BP signs, BP gas, BP pumps.
Q Was there any sign up that said anything about being operated by anybody other than BP?
A No, sir.”
The majority relies on other evidence in the record indicating that “the B.P. trademark was used in national and regional sales campaigns and in advertising in television and in periodicals” to support its view of “manifestations by the principal” of an agency relationship between the Company and Faison. In my view, this evidence, such as it is, is completely irrelevant to the issue to be decided. In the first place, there is not even a gossamer of evidence as to the content of the advertising. Presumably, it promoted the sale of “BP” products — just as the sale of any other brand name product might be promoted, e.g., “Ivory” soap. In the second place, there is likewise no evidence whatever that the plaintiff had any knowledge of, much less relied upon, any such advertising.
Thus, the only “representations” relevant to the issue of agency by estoppel.m this case are the signs and distinctive colors on the filling station premises. The weight of authority in other jurisdictions is that the display of distinctive colors and emblems, standing alone, is insufficient evidence of a representation of an agency *242relationship between an oil company-lessor and an operator-lessee of a gasoline service station. A leading case on the issue is Coe v. Esau, Okla., 1963, 377 P. 2d 815, where it is stated:
“It may be stated as a general rule that tenancy alone will not render the landlord liable for the torts of his tenant. Neither the mere fact of ownership of property nor that goods marketed under the trade mark or trade name of the landlord are advertised and sold upon the demised premises is deemed sufficient to raise an inference that the tenant-vendor is the agent or employee of the landlord. (Citing cases). It is indeed a matter of common knowledge and practice that distinctive colors and trade mark signs are displayed at gasoline stations by independent dealers of petroleum product suppliers. These signs and emblems represent no more than notice to the motorist that a given company’s products are being marketed at the station. ’’(Emphasis supplied.)
See also Sherman v. Texas Company, Mass. 1960, 165 N.E.2d 916, where a directed verdict for the oil company was affirmed in a case where the plaintiff sought to hold the oil company-lessor liable for injuries caused by an employee of the operator-lessee of a service station on the theory of “ostensible agency”. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts said, at 917:
“We rule that the representation of the signs was confined to the statement that Texaco gasoline was sold at the station. We agree with the statement in Reynolds v. Skelly Oil Co., 227 Iowa 163, 171, 287 N.W. 823, 827, that it ‘is a matter of common knowledge that these trademark signs are displayed ... by independent dealers.’ ”
In Crittendon v. State Oil Company, Ill. 1966, 222 N.E.2d 561, another case in which tort liability of an oil company *243was sought on the theory of agency by estoppel, the Appellate Court of Illinois said:
“The signs alone might indicate that this service station sold State products, either to the exclusion of, or in preference to, other competitive brands. There may be service stations which carry on their premises only the name of a particular line of gasoline and oil products which they sell. However, we do not believe that the prominent display of such brand name or symbol alone, would necessarily warrant the assumption that such service station was being operated as an agency of the owner of the brand name or symbol. See: Trust Co. of Chicago v. Sutherland Hotel Co., 389 Ill. 67, 72, 73, 58 N.E.2d 860 (1945).”
See also Apple v. Standard Oil, et al, 307 F. Supp. 107 (N.D. Calif. 1969) and Manis v. Gulf Oil Corporation, 185 S.E.2d 589 (Ga. 1971).
In Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc., 437 F. 2d 308 (1971), cited by the majority to support its holding regarding the “manifestation of authority” element of agency by estoppel, there was evidence that the signs involved contained the slogan “Trust your car to the man who wears the star” and that Texaco engaged in “substantial national advertising, the purpose of which was to convey the impression that Texaco dealers are skilled in automotive servicing, as well as to promote Texaco products, and that this advertising was not limited to certain services or products”. In that case the plaintiff testified that he was aware of the advertising engaged in by Texaco and that it had instilled in him a certain sense of confidence in the corporation and its products.
In this case the signs which attracted Claude Mabe to the “Hilltop BP filling station” consisted of the letters “B” and “P” side by side on a yellow or green background. There is nothing in this record that Claude Mabe considered that it conveyed the message, as in Gizzi, supra, with Texaco, that the B. P. Oil Corporation was vouching for or inducing him to believe that Faison was its agent, servant, or employee. *244Indeed, so far as this record is concerned there is not a whit of evidence that the plaintiff had ever heard of the B. P. Oil Corporation. In the circumstances, in my view, this is not enough to estop the B. P. Oil Corporation from asserting the truth, the truth being that Faison was an independent contractor over whom it exercised no day-to-day control in the operation of the filling station.2 I agree with the appellate court of Iowa which said in Reynolds v. Skelly Oil Company, 287 N. W. 823 (1939), at 827:
“The argument of appellee that the Skelly Oil Company was estopped because of the signs displayed and that, because of such signs, there was a presumption that the station was owned by the Skelly Oil Company has no support in reason or authority. As well argue that, because the word ‘Chevrolet’ or ‘Buick’ is displayed in front of a place of business, General Motors would be estopped to claim that it was not the owner of the business. It is a matter of common knowledge that these trademark signs are displayed throughout the country by independent dealers.”
See also Apple v. Standard Oil, et al, 307 F. Supp. 107 (N.D. Calif. 1969), where the Court said at 115:
“Under these circumstances the mere fact that the station sold defendant’s gasoline and displayed defendant’s signs would not constitute a ‘holding out’ to Apple that the lessee-operator was defendant’s agent or that Apple reasonably relied upon any representations of the defendant.”
Based on the authorities cited, I would hold that the mere fact that the Company permitted its signs and distinctive emblems to be displayed on the premises is legally insufficient evidence of a representation that Faison was its *245agent and certainly not enough to estop the Company from showing, as it has, that there was in fact no agency relationship, express or implied, between it and Faison.
B. Justifiable Reliance
The majority asserts that “[t]he testimony of Claude J. Mabe heretofore set forth exhibits evidence of sufficient reliance upon the B. P. representations to indicate that, but for those representations, he would have patronized another more convenient station”. As I have said, the only evidence in this record of any “representations” made by the Company that were known to Claude J. Mabe concerns the “BP” sign and symbols. Therefore, that is all he may arguably claim to have relied upon to support his contention that the Company is estopped to deny that Faison was its agent at the time Faison’s employee was negligent.
Assuming, arguendo, that the sign and symbols “represented” that Faison was an agent of the B. P. Oil Corporation, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to produce legally sufficient evidence that he was “thereby” caused to rely to his detriment upon the care or skill of Faison. I would agree that a jury could reasonably conclude that “but for” the large “BP” sign the plaintiff would not have driven into Faison’s station. I would further agree that when the plaintiff decided to patronize the station, he had a right to expect that whoever operated the station would not cause him harm through tortious conduct. To that extent it may be said that he placed “justifiable reliance” upon Faison’s care or skill — just as any customer of any other business would expect not to be harmed by negligent acts of the proprietor. But that is not to say, in the context of the law of estoppel, that it was necessarily the sign and symbols in this case that “caused” the plaintiff to rely upon Faison’s care or skill. Expecting care and skill from the proprietor of a commercial business that caters to the public is not the same as being “caused” to rely upon that expectation by representations of the proprietor’s “ostensible principal” that the proprietor is his “agent”. To work an estoppel there must be a causal connection between the representations of agency and *246reliance upon those representations. To establish a causal connection there must be evidence from the person claiming to have relied upon the representations that tends to show why he so claims; otherwise, the fact finder would have no basis for determining that the plaintiff really did rely upon the “agent’s” care or skill, or that the claimed reliance was justifiable. If the evidence fails to show that the plaintiff relied at all upon the “agent’s” care or skill or if the reasons given for such reliance are unrelated to the “principal’s” representations of agency, the test (with which I agree) set forth by the majority for establishing an apparent agency or agency by estoppel has not been met.
In this case, by his own testimony, the plaintiff went to the gas station solely because he “needed gasoline and water”. He said he chose the “Hilton BP filling station . .. [bjecause I always buy BP gasoline, always deal with BP”. In my opinion, that statement, without some explanation of why he “always buy[s] BP gasoline” or why he “always deal[s] with BP”, is evidence only of the fact that he, like thousands of other motorists, had become accustomed to using one particular brand of gasoline, i.e., “B.P.” The only explanation in this record of why the plaintiff “always deal[s]” with “BP” is found in the testimony of his brother who testified: “My brother [the plaintiff] deals at it [BP] because he lives right around the corner”. He was referring to another “BP” station near the plaintiffs home. Thus, the explanation is that the plaintiff “dealt with” BP simply as a matter of convenience. There is simply no evidence of any other reason the plaintiff “always deals with BP”. The reason given, so far as this plaintiff is concerned, is utterly unrelated to any “representation” by the B. P. Oil Corporation that Faison was its agent.
Finally, I would observe that the majority’s assertion that “[w]here a corporation has ostensibly held itself out to the public as the operator of a service station, public policy requires that it bear the responsibility not simply for the quality of its product, but for its proper and safe delivery as well”, could be interpreted as a holding, albeit by dictum, that the legal theory of “strict liability” for tort in product *247liability cases should somehow be applied to the doctrine of agency by estoppel. It should be noted, however, that the Court of Appeals “has not, as yet, either rejected or accepted the ‘strict liability’ theory set forth in Restatement 2d, Torts, § 402A, in the type of case where that section might logically be applied”. Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 298. Moreover, by the above quoted assertion the majority seems to be establishing a different test for the Company’s liability than that espoused at the beginning of its opinion — one that would only require half of the two prong test set forth by § 267 of the Restatement of Agency, without regard for the “justifiable reliance” prong of that test. Such a “public policy test” was neither presented below nor argued on this appeal. In my opinion, the Court should not now consider it ex mero motu. Rule 1085.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.

. Por purposes of this opinion the term “agency relationship" is used broadly to include not only a principal-agent relationship but master-servant and employer-empioyee relationships as well. It should be noted, however, that in legal contemplation the distinction between a servant and an agent who is not a servant “may be important in determining the liability of an employer for a tortious act of his employee”. (A. & P. Co. v. Noppenberger, 171 Md. 378 (1937)); for “it is stated as a general rule that a principal is not liable for any physical injury caused by the negligent conduct of his agent, who is not a servant, during the performance of the principal’s business, unless the act was done in the manner authorized or directed by the principal, or the result was one authorized or intended by the principal. In other words, a principal employing an agent to accomplish a result, but not having the right to control the details of his movements, is not responsible for incidental negligence while such agent is conducting the authorized transaction. 1 Restatement of Agency, Sec. 250.” Henkelmann v. Insurance Co., 180 Md. 591 (1942).

. See Standard Oil Co. v. Gentry, 1 So. 2d 29 (Ala. 1941), cited by majority, and Miller v. Sinclair, 268 F. 2d. 114 (5th Cir. 1959) for holdings on facts similar to case sub judice that there was no actual agency, express or implied. See also 83 ALR 2d. 1296 and cases there discussed for similar holdings.