Court Opinion

ID: 9812663
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:44:48.390815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:25:49.571574
License: Public Domain

Faxeoloth, C. J.,
dissenting: I cannot assent to the conclusion of the court in this case. I do not question the competency of either wife to prove the fact of marriage. I do not doubt the competency of the defendant’s admissions, whatever they are. I do not doubt that it is the province of the jury to determine the question of marriage .under proper instructions as to the law arising upon the facts as shown by the evidence. My contention is that *597when two aspects of a case are presented by the proofs, the court should “state in a plain and correct manner the evidence given in the case, and declare and explain the law arising thereon” (The Oocle, 413), and that he should do so upon each aspect of the case presented by the evidence.
“Where the evidence presents the case in two aspects, it is proper for the trial judge to charge the jury upon the law as it arises upon both aspects, and then leave the question of fact to be passed on by the jury. ’ ’ Spence v. Clapp, 95 N. C,, 545.
“Where the evidence presents the case in two aspects, the trial judge should charge the jury in both aspects of the case.” State v. Gilmer, 97 N. C,, 429; State v. Brewer, 98 N. C., 607; State v. Matthews, 78 N. C., 523; State v. Dunlop, 65 N. C., 288; State v. Cardwell, 44 N. C., 245.
“Where a defendant asks a special instruction to the jury upon an aspect of the case which is presented by the evidence, which the court does not give, it is error, and entitles the defendant to a new trial.” State v. Gaskins, 93 N. C., 547; Bailey v. Pool, 35 N. C., 404.
The common law of England was imported into all the States of this Union, and this court has repeatedly held that it is presumed to continue in such States until it is shown by propel evidence that it (the common law) has been changed by Statute. It is true that slavery was largely regulated by Statutes, especially the restrictions imposed on it, but still the common law applied to slaves in many respects. They were tried for murder and other high crimes according to the facts and upon the same common law principles of evidence as other classes. It was by the same law that their marriages were allowed no legal significance.
“The marriage of slaves in this State, consisting of cohabitation merely, by the permission of their owners, does *598not constitute the relation of husband and wife so as to attach to them the privileges and disabilities incident to that relation by the common law. Hence it was held that a slave, who was the wife of another slave, might give evidence against him even in a capital case.1 ’ State v. Samuel, 19 N. C., 177.
The State introduced Harriet JVIelton, who testified that she and the defendant were both slaves, and that they were married “during slavery times” in South Carolina; that after the marriage she lived with him, the defendant, many years in South- Carolina and had children by him; that defendant was at the time of the marriage “a slave for years thereafter.” There was evidence, and it was admitted that in 1891 the defendant married Delia Ann Teel in North Carolina, and that about two yeajrs ago he said, in the presence of his last wife, that he had another wife. The justice of the peace was allowed to testify orally as to the trial before him, and said if his statement showed that defendant said he married Harriet between 1861 and 1865, it was true. Another witness said he knew the defendant and Harriet; that they were married as slaves in South Carolina; “that they were married about 39 years.” There was no proof, except by inference from the above, that the defendant and Harriet ever lived together or- cohabited after slavery was abolished. By our Act 1866, Ch. 40, wiien emancipated slaves, who had previously lived in slavery as man and wife, should continue to live together in that relation, they should be deemed to have been lawfully married, and were punishable for failure to register their intention of so continuing. The Code, Section 1842.
There was no evidence received or offered, at the trial, of the law in South Carolina concerning the marriage relation of emancipated slaves, either before or since emancipation; nor was the jury instructed as to the law on the sub*599ject, but left to determine whether the defendant and Harriet Melton were “legally married” without any reference to their status before or after emancipation.
If there had been no legislation in South Carolina (and none was shown) on the present status of slave marriages, then the common law presumption remains, and perhaps the defendant in that State, instead of being a husband, was guilty of fornication and adultery, if cohabitation continued after he became a freeman.
The defendant asked for this special instruction: “That the marriage of slaves and their living together in the relation of husband and wife while in a state of slavery did not constitute the relation of husband and wife in North Carolina; that the omission in this case, on the part of the State, to introduce any evidence of the law of South Carolina before the jury, leaves the jury to be governed by the decisions and law in this State, and by that law this marriage in South Carolina -was not a valid one; that upon the whole evidence in this-case the State cannot convict.’’ This was refused, and his Honor instructed the jury that “the State must satisfy them from the evidence beyond any reasonable doubt that the defendant was legally married to Harriet Melton as charged; * * * that the defendant was married to Harriet Melton, and that during the life of said Harriet he married Delia Ann Teel, then the jury will find the defendant guilty.” The latter part of the instructions asked, being as distinct as if they had been numbered 1 and 2, is too general to be considered and may be disregarded.
The jury then had to consider and determine whether the defendant and Harriet were legally married. The fact that parries contract in marriage may be found by the jury, but whether the marriage is legal or not is for the court. The special prayer called attention to the fact of agreement *600to marry and their relations in slavery, and it was important for them to knov? whether those facts constituted a legal marriage. They were not informed. They were not informed, even, what acts and facts after emancipation would constitute a legal marriage. When the defendant admitted he had another wife, did that mean his wife in slavery or his wife by continuance in the marriage relation after slavery, if there was any difference in South Carolina? That was for the jury, with proper directions from the court as to the law applicable to each condition. Suppose the jury thought the admission that he had another wife had reference to his slave wife, as he might naturally have done, still the jury were at liberty to find him guilty for aught that appears in the charge, and the refusal to give them the special prayer. The jury do not know and cannot know the law of South Carolina without the aid of the court on this or any other question.
I think his Honor should have explained the law on each phase of the question presented by-the evidence. The element of slavery and its changes does not enter into the authorities relied upon by the court.