Court Opinion

ID: 9581061
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:11:23.632212+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:40.994028
License: Public Domain

Reilly, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to remand to the trial court to consider the entry of a judgment for plaintiff based on defendant’s stipulation to pay $6,000 per year toward Andrew’s college expenses. That stipulation also contained plaintiff’s agreement not to seek an increase in child support above the then current level of $75 per week. The agreement further provided:
Should Dr. Aussie cease paying for Andrew’s college expenses, Elinore Aussie may, at that point, petition the court for an increase in child support.
That language clearly anticipates that Dr. Aussie might discontinue payments and provides that, if *466payments cease, Elinore Aussie "at that point” has the option to seek an increase in child support for the remaining children.
According to the record, Dr. Aussie paid $4,400 in 1986 and $4,165 in 1987 pursuant to the stipulation. In spite of these payments, plaintiff sought an increase in child support for Jason and Jacqueline in autumn, 1986.1 will not quibble over who broke the agreement first. However, I believe that the parties’ own remedy for a breach is the appropriate one. Plaintiff is entitled to seek an increase in child support which, if granted, could be retroactive to the date payments for Andrew’s expenses ceased. The trial court would then be recognizing the validity of the parties’ agreement, and properly exercising its authority under MCL 552.28; MSA 25.106. At the same time the trial court would avoid imposing an obligation to support an adult child in a manner which is inconsistent with the parties’ agreement, was not part of the judgment of divorce, and is contrary to the ruling of Smith v Smith, 433 Mich 606; 447 NW2d 715 (1989).