Court Opinion

ID: 9464938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:47:00.538797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:53.596394
License: Public Domain

SETH, Chief Judge,
dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion, and in so doing, it is necessary to refer again to the sequence of events. The defendant, Bruce Thompson, entered a plea of guilty to an information filed by the State of Arkansas on October 17, 1975, charging in one count the possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. This guilty plea was made on January 5, 1976. He was sentenced by the state court to one year's imprisonment and a fine of $15,000.00.
This defendant Thompson was then charged in a federal indictment on March 3, 1976, of conspiracy to distribute marijuana contrary to 21 U.S.C. § 846. He entered a plea of not guilty, and filed several motions to dismiss on March 29, 1976, including one based on a violation of the Fifth Amendment arising from the dual prosecution. The due process aspect of the dual prosecution was argued. In his motion to dismiss at point 14 he stated that a directive of the Attorney General had been violated, and in the supporting memorandum the Petite case is cited. This with the double jeopardy argument, was sufficient to raise the issue in the trial court.
The Government in its brief states of the state and federal convictions: “The convictions for both crimes involved the same factual situation.” The charges by the state and the federal governments were based on defendant’s possession of about 500 pounds of marijuana in Arkansas on October 15, 1975. We thus do not have a problem as to whether the prosecutions arose from the same incident. The record further shows that the prosecutions arose out of a cooperative effort of state and federal law enforcement officers, and concerned marijuana flown into the United States by federal agents. These agents then followed the distribution with state agents helping. Thompson was one of the minor figures who was down the distribution chain in Arkansas.
It is apparent that the federal prosecution of Thompson was contrary to the Petite policy. The issue thus comes down to the validity of the federal prosecution, as a second prosecution of Thompson, in the face of the Justice Department policy violation. Also the effectiveness of the after-the-fact authorization for dual prosecution must be examined.
We have held on a number of occasions that the Fifth Amendment does not of itself bar dual prosecutions. See United *1190States v. Smaldone, 485 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir.), and United States v. Villano, 529 F.2d 1046 (10th Cir.), citing Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 79 S.Ct. 676, 3 L.Ed.2d 684, and Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 79 S.Ct. 666, 3 L.Ed.2d 729. See also United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 43 S.Ct. 141, 67 L.Ed. 314.
The case before us is however concerned only with the consequences arising from the Petite policy. This “policy” is much more than a departmental policy in the usual sense. The origin of the policy was in the difficulties and division the Supreme Court encountered in the cases wherein the double jeopardy rule for state and federal prosecutions was established. The dual sovereignty concept as a logical but somewhat artificial explanation was thus announced by the Court after a difference of opinion. What is now the Petite policy was then established to meet the objections and fears of the minority on the Court. As the opinion in Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 98 S.Ct. 81, 54 L.Ed.2d 207, states in part:
“In this respect, the policy represents the Government’s response to repeated expressions of concern by Members of this Court.”
The Court then quoted from United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 43 S.Ct. 141, 67 L.Ed. 314. The Court then said:
“What has come to be known as the Petite policy was formulated by the Justice Department in direct response to this Court’s opinions in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, [79 S.Ct. 676, 3 L.Ed.2d 684] >»
The origin of the policy is a significant factor in evaluating its importance, its purpose, and how it should be implemented. Again, it is significantly more than a departmental policy in view of its origin and its “parallel purpose” to the guaranty against double jeopardy. It was adopted “in response” to the Court’s opinion in Bart-kus, and further the Court in Rinaldi said:
“In response to the Court’s continuing sensitivity to the fairness implications of the multiple prosecution power, the Justice Department adopted the policy of refusing to bring a federal prosecution following a state prosecution except when necessary to advance compelling interests of federal law enforcement. The Petite policy was designed to limit the exercise of the power to bring successive prosecutions for the same offense to situations comporting with the rationale for the existence of that power. Although not constitutionally mandated, this executive policy serves to protect interests which, but for the ‘dual sovereignty’ principle inherent in our federal system, would be embraced by the Double Jeopardy Clause. In light of the parallel purposes of the Government’s Petite policy and the fundamental constitutional guaranty against double jeopardy, the federal courts should be receptive, not circumspect, when the Government seeks leave to implement that policy.”
The “parallel purpose” reference above is most significant in considering whether the defendant Thompson can assert a violation of the policy on this appeal, much in the same way the Department could.
The Court has said in strong terms, which sound like double jeopardy words, that the policy is to protect the individual. Again in Rinaldi it said:
“The overriding purpose of the Petite policy is to protect the individual from any unfairness associated with needless multiple prosecutions. The defendant, therefore, should receive the benefit of the policy whenever its application is urged by the Government.”
The statement is, of course, concluded by the reference to an application “urged by the Government,” but that was the way the issue arose in Rinaldi, since the trial court had refused to dismiss for a violation of the policy when moved to do so by the Government.
The Supreme Court has, of course, in several cases granted the Government’s motion to remand for dismissal when the prosecution has realized that the Petite policy has been violated. See Watts v. United States, 422 U.S. 1032, 95 S.Ct. 2648, 45 L.Ed.2d 688; Ackerson v. United States, *1191419 U.S. 1099, 95 S.Ct. 769, 42 L.Ed.2d 796, and Hayles v. United States, 419 U.S. 892, 95 S.Ct. 168, 42 L.Ed.2d 136. These are instances where the Government has made the request for a remand.
In view of the important and fundamental nature of the Petite policy, as described in Rinaldi, and considering its origin, I would hold that the matter was properly raised in the trial court, and since the Government has given no consideration whatever in advance of trial to the policy, the defendant should receive the benefit of it although the Government may not have urged its application.
When the reasons for the policy are couched in double jeopardy terms, it is apparent that a preprosecution determination must be made in order for the purpose to be carried out. When the department has recognized that a mistake has been made, the Supreme Court is quick to approve corrective action. Here Thompson adequately raised the issue before trial, and a similar correction should have been made. There are many cases holding that an agency must follow its own rules, regulations, statements of policy, press releases, and instructions to its employees.
It would not seem necessary to discuss at length the cases which require an agency to adhere to the policy and regulations its promulgates. The cases are especially clear in the Internal Revenue Service rule problems. United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809 (4th Cir.), contains a clear and direct statement on the reasons why policy statements should be enforced and gives many
examples. See also United States v. Leahey, 434 F.2d 7 (1st Cir.). The court there applied Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 74 S.Ct. 499, 98 L.Ed. 681, a deportation case where established procedures were not followed. See also Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 83 S.Ct. 1828, 10 L.Ed.2d 778; Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 79 S.Ct. 968, 3 L.Ed.2d 1012, and Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 77 S.Ct. 1152, 1 L.Ed.2d 1403. The Service v. Dulles case is especially pertinent because it concerned a policy not required or authorized by statute to be promulgated. The policy in United States v. Heffner, was of a similar nature. In Smith v. Resor, 406 F.2d 141 (2d Cir.), the court applied a “Weekly Bulletin,” and in Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 30, 269 F.2d 221, the court applied an order not formally promulgated. Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 83 S.Ct. 1828, 10 L.Ed.2d 778, concerned the rules of a Congressional Committee. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 79 S.Ct. 968, 3 L.Ed.2d 1012, concerned orders of the Department of Interior. See also United States ex rel. Brooks v. Clifford, 409 F.2d 700 (4th Cir.).
From the variety of situations in which the courts have held that agencies must follow their statements of policy and directives, it is apparent that if the statements are applicable, are made known, and are of guidance for the execution of the agency policies, it makes no difference what they are called nor how they are adopted. The public has a right to rely on them as against some inconsistent case by case subjective determination by a public official. The cases further demonstrate that it makes no difference whether the agency has express statutory authority to adopt the policy. The agency has to run its business, it has to function. This is done by regulations and policy statements, and it makes no difference whether Congress has expressly directed them or not if they are within the general objectives of the agency, and especially if they represent some self-restraint on its authority or discretion as in the case before us.
The Petite policy against dual prosecutions contains an exception to permit dual prosecution when necessary to advance “compelling interests of law enforcement.” The basic Department policy was apparently announced or reiterated in June 1975; it referred to Abbate v. United States, and the power to have dual prosecutions. It then stated in part: “However, no federal case should be tried when there has already been a state prosecution for substantially the same act or acts without the United States Attorney first submitting a recom*1192mendation . . .The statement of policy further said that no recommendation should be approved until it had been brought to the attention of the Attorney General. See footnotes in Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 98 S.Ct. 81, 54 L.Ed.2d 207, for a further description of the policy and its origin. That note refers also to “prior authorization.”
The brief of the Government in the case before us shows that on October 5, 1976, an Assistant United States Attorney General recommended to the Attorney General that authority be given for the dual prosecution of defendant Thompson. This recommendation was approved on December 17, 1976. The approval thus came some nine months after the federal indictment of Thompson, and some five months after he was sentenced in the federal court.
We will not consider the reasons expressed in the much belated recommendation for dual prosecution, but do observe that they apparently refer to other persons than this defendant. Also we notice that reference was made therein to the fact that the policy was not known to the Assistant United States Attorney handling this prosecution until the defendant raised the matter in the district court by his motion to dismiss. No decision or consideration of the policy by the Attorney General or United States Attorney was made in advance of trial. It is thus apparent that the after-the-fact approval was an effort to patch up an unfortunate situation wherein the defendant by that time was serving his sentence.
In any event, it would not seem to be a proper function of the Department of Justice or of the Solicitor to decide whether the state court sentence was severe enough. This was the presentation here. It is not a law enforcement — Executive Department area of authority. The second prosecution for the same offense, decided by such an official on a subjective basis, is not in accord with the federal system, and especially so in a setting where the prosecution arose from a law enforcement effort which was a cooperative one between state and federal officers. It is just the situation and the danger contemplated in Bartkus v. United States, 359 U.S. 121, 79 S.Ct. 676, 3 L.Ed.2d 684, United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 43 S.Ct. 141, 67 L.Ed. 314, and in Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 79 S.Ct. 666, 3 L.Ed.2d 729. It is so much a part of the decisions formulating the dual sovereignty concept for double jeopardy as a protection to the defendant that it must be available to the defendant Thompson. It is a double jeopardy protection in sheep’s clothing.
Thus I would hold that the postconviction attempt to authorize the prosecution of defendant Thompson in the federal court came too late to be effective as he had been convicted and sentenced some nine months before. It was not a compliance with: “The prior authorization requirement in the Petite policy . . . The policy was thus violated, and the defendant, since it is to “ . . . protect the individual from any unfairness associated with needless prosecutions . . should receive the benefit of the policy whether he asks for it or the Government asks for it.