Court Opinion

ID: 9829152
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:02:01.617844+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:57.802885
License: Public Domain

OR REI-IEARIRG.
1. In the able argument of counsel for plaintiff in error on the motion for rehearing, several points are presented which we deem it proper to notice. Upon the first ground of the motion, it is insisted that the *502writ of attachment should have been quashed, because 8800 of the amount was for capital stock of the company, and the petition does not allege 'that it was of any value.
The allegations of the petition were, in part, as follows: “the defendant agreed to pay plaintiff an annual rental of 83200, said rent to be paid semi-annually in advance, and to be paid in the city and county of Dallas — 81200 in cash, and 8400 in the face value of the capital stock of said company on the first days of July and January * * * and plaintiff alleges that the said sum of 8800 per annum payable in capital stock of said company was, in making said lease, estimated as cash, dollar for dollar, and that said rental of 83200 per year, including 8800 per year, was and is a fair and reasonable cash value for the use and occupation of said lands.” The petition then sets out specifically the items of rent unpaid. The allegations of the petition clearly show that the 8800 to be paid in stock was valued by the parties in their contract at its face value. The fact that on the trial of the case on its merits, the court instructed the jury to find against the plaintiff on the claim of 8800 to be paid in capital stock of the company, because the proof failed to show its value, is no reason why the court should have sustained the motion to quash the writ of attachment — the allegations of the petition being sufficient. For the reasons fully set out in the original opinion, we conclude that the first ground of appellant’s motion is not well taken.
2. The second and third grounds of the motion for rehearing raise practically the same question, and are considered together.
We think the point considered in the original opinion is fairly stated. In order that there could not be any mistake in the point made by plaintiff in error, we set out in full in the opinion the thirteenth assignment of error, which complains that the court erred in refusing to permit defendant to prove, as it offered to do, each and every allegation made in the 14th paragraph of its third amended original answer, filed April 9, 1895, as shown by defendant’s bill of exceptions No. 5.
By reference to bill of exceptions No. 5, as set out in the record, we find that “defendant offered to prove each and every allegation set forth by it in the 14th paragraph of its third amended original answer filed herein April 9, 1895, as a cross-action or counter-claim.” By what testimony, or by what character of testimony such proof was offered to be made, does not appear. We are wholly unable to determine from the record whether such proof was proposed to be made by oral or written evidence; whether it was original or hearsay, or whether such testimony would be relevant or irrelevant. We have not been able to find any rule, or decision of our courts authorizing us to consider an objection to testimony without knowing what testimony was offered. To say that appellant offered to prove each and every allegation set forth in the 14th paragraph of the amended answer, is but little more definite than that he offered testimony to sustain his answer. The point is not technical, but substantial. Rule 59 of the district courts. *503is as follows: “Bills of exceptions must state enough of the evidence or facts proved in the case, to make intelligible the ruling of the court excepted to, in reference to the issue made by the pleadings.”
In the case of Beeman v. Jester, 62 Texas, 433, our Supreme Court said: “A party bringing up for revision a ruling of the court below excluding evidence, must clearly lay before us in a bill of exceptions the nature of the evidence he proposed to introduce. It must be plainly shown that it does not consist of facts which were irrelevant or unimportant, and not leave us to presume that they were otherwise by putting upon the evidence a construction that would render its exclusion error, when a construction might be placed upon it that, would justify the ruling of the court.”
In the case of Brothers v. Mundel, 60 Texas, 242, our Supreme Court said: “The bill of exceptions taken to the ruling of the court.rejecting the testimony as to damages offered by Brothers does not inform us what the testimony was, so that we can tell whether or not it conformed to his pleadings upon this subject. It merely says that ‘the defendant offered evidence to prove actual and exemplary damages, to which plaintiff objected, because there were no allegations in defendant’s answer sufficient to admit such evidence.’ The inference from this is that the proof offered did not correspond with the allegations made; and as the defendant has not informed us of the nature of his proof, we must presume that the court rejected it for that reason. Without deciding as to whether or not any proof of this character was admissible under his pleas, we do hold that the bill of exceptions points out no error whatever in the rejection of the evidence.”
In Railway v. Leak, 64 Texas, 656, the court says: “In the absence of a bill of exceptions distinctly stating what testimony was objected to, we cannot revise the action of the court below in admitting the evidence.”
In Mass v. Cameron, 66 Texas, 413; Judge Willie said: “This court has invariably refused to revise the action of the district court in excluding testimony when there is no proper bill of exceptions showing what the testimony would have been.” Milliken v. Smoot, 64 Texas, 171. See also Cheek v. Herndon, 82 Texas, 146; Railway v. Lacker, 78 Texas, 280; McAuley v. Harris, 71 Texas, 632; Beeks v. Odom, 70 Texas, 186; Burleson v. Hancock, 28 Texas, 84.
This rule is not of modern origin, but has been enforced almost from the beginning of our judicial system. Burleson v. Hancock, 28 Texas, 83; Jones v. Cavasos, 29 Texas, 432; Bost v. Alford, 22 Texas, 399; King v. Gray, 17 Texas, 71; Styles v. Gray, 10 Texas, 507.
In the last named case this question was discussed by Judge Lipscomb. In that case, the first bill of exceptions showed that the defendant offered to prove an outstanding title to the land sued for. The court said: “There might have been exceptions to the kind of evidence offered; hence the necessity of a party excepting to a decision of the court *504excluding evidence, showing in his bill what the evidence substantially was that he wished to use in his defense.”
Further on in the same case the court says: “The fourth and last of appellant’s bills of exception shows ‘that the defendant offered evidence to attack the correctness of- the surveyor’s record, and to show fraud in the dates of the location and survey of Ann Gray, which was ruled out by court.’ There can be no doubt but that it was competent for the defendant to show that the record of the surveyor was fraudulently incorrect; and if so fradulently made by him to give preference over an older location, such fraud would vitiate the entry so made with that intent and sustain the rights of the party really entitled to the preference; and what we have said in discussing the second bill of exceptions upon the effect of fraud supercedes the necessity of its further discussion. This bill of exceptions is, however, subject to the same objection raised to the one referred to: it is too vague and uncertain as to the character of the evidence by which the defendant sought to establish the fraud to enable this court to say whether the court below erred in ruling out the evidence offered. * * * ”
A further discussion of the bill of exceptions seems to us unnecessary. It is true, as suggested by counsel, that the court below in its bill of exceptions certified that the plaintiff in error offered to prove the allegations of the amended answer, but by what testimony it proposed to make such proof does not appear, and for this reason the bill of exceptions is defective. It is insisted that the court should consider only such objections as were made to the testimony in the court below. This may be conceded, and still we must know what testimony was offered, before we can intelligently consider the objections to it.
In the argument of counsel for plaintiff in error in attempting to show clearly the objections made, he refers to the 14th paragraph of the answer, as follows: “These allegations were, in short, that the defendant in error had during the lease period, conveyed by general warranty deed the leased premises to one Dubois, and that Dubois, armed with such deed as his authority so to do, entered upon the leased premises, subjecting the plaintiff in error to damages by his occupancy thereof and his trespasses thereon, which were fully set forth in appropriate averment.”
That the defendant in error had during the lease period conveyed by general warranty deed the leased premises to Dubois, was charged in the defendant’s answer and admitted in plaintiff’s supplemental petition. This fact was not disputed, and the court so charged the jury.
By what testimony plaintiff in error desired to show he was damaged, by Dubois, in any manner, for which the defendant in error would be responsible, the bill of exceptions does not disclose.
The settlement between the cattle company and Powell after the time at which the damage is claimed to have accrued, the long correspondence between the parties in which the Dubois matter was mentioned, but no claims made against Powell therefor, the execution of the notes sued on *505without any such claim, all seem to justify the correctness of our original conclusions upon the matter.
The other points presented by plaintiff in error we think are fully discussed in our original opinion.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.

Motion overruled.

May 23, 1896.