Court Opinion

ID: 9925559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-22 08:09:09.409743+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:00.803934
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
      ___________________________
           No. 02-23-00375-CV
      ___________________________

      ELISHA HOLLOWAY, Appellant

                       V.

 REVELSTOKE VENTURE, LLC, Appellee

 On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 1
          Tarrant County, Texas
      Trial Court No. 2023-005682-1

Before Wallach, J.; Sudderth, C.J.; and Walker, J.
      Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion
                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Appellee Revelstoke Venture, LLC prevailed on its forcible detainer action

against Appellant Elisha Holloway in the justice court. The judgment awarded

Revelstoke possession of the premises, $4,958 in back rent, and costs. The judgment

further ordered Holloway to pay $2,670 in rent into the court’s registry each month

during the pendency of any appeal.

       Holloway appealed to the county court. The justice court sent her a notice

acknowledging receipt of the notice of appeal and reminding her that she needed to

deposit the monthly rental amount into the court’s registry within five days and that

her failure to make that payment “MAY RESULT IN THE COURT ISSUING A

WRIT OF POSSESSION WITHOUT HEARING.”

       The next month, Revelstoke filed a motion requesting issuance of a writ of

possession on the basis that Holloway had failed to make the monthly rent payments

into the court’s registry. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 510.9(c)(5)(B)(iv). A month later, the

county court signed an “Order Authorizing Immediate Issuance of Writ of

Possession.” In the order, the county court found that Holloway had not paid rent

into the court’s registry, that Revelstoke had given Holloway proper notice of the

failure, and that Revelstoke was entitled to issuance of a writ of possession. The order

did not mention Revelstoke’s claim for back rent. Nevertheless, the order stated that

it was a final judgment disposing of all clams of all parties. The next day, the county

clerk issued the writ.

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      Holloway appealed to this court. Because the clerk’s record shows that the writ

of possession had been executed, this court became concerned that the appeal was

moot. Consequently, we notified Holloway that we would dismiss the appeal unless

she or another party wishing to continue the appeal filed with this court a response

showing grounds for the appeal’s continuance.

      Holloway filed a response, but it does not show grounds on which we may

continue the appeal. First, she cites Texas Property Code Section 92.0561 and asserts

that “[w]e assert our right under this code to address necessary repairs when the

landlord neglects maintenance requests.” See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 92.0561. Next,

she asserts that her appeal “defends the fundamental right of tenants to reside in

habitable dwellings, demanding swift resolution of maintenance issues.” She then

claims that Revelstoke’s “continuous disregard for maintenance requests potentially

breaches the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment” and that her “meticulously

documented email communication serves as indispensable evidence, exposing [her]

sincere attempts and the landlord’s failure to address valid concerns.” Finally, she

asserts that her appeal “is fueled by the violation of civil rights, including but not

limited to discrimination and harassment,” and she “insist[s] that our counterclaim1 be

duly considered in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations governing such

claims.”

      1
       The clerk’s record does not show that Holloway filed any counterclaims.

                                          3
      Regardless of whether Holloway would have had recourse against Revelstoke

for failing to perform its obligations under the lease, and regardless of whether

Holloway may have any other claims against Revelstoke, her response has not raised

any meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession of the property. As the

Supreme Court of Texas has explained, “[j]udgment of possession in a forcible

detainer action is not intended to be a final determination of whether the eviction is

wrongful; rather, it is a determination of the right to immediate possession.” Marshall

v. Hous. Auth. of City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2006). “The only issue in

a forcible detainer action is the right to actual possession of the premises.” Id. at

785 (emphasis added). Thus, a forcible detainer action may resolve only a claim for

possession and related claims for unpaid rent and attorney’s fees. See Tex. Prop. Code

Ann. §§ 24.0051, .006; Brigandi v. Am. Mortgage Inv. Partners Fund I Tr., No. 02-16-

00444-CV, 2017 WL 1428726, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 20, 2017, pet.

dism’d) (mem. op.).

      Here, the county court’s judgment awards possession but does not award

damages or attorney’s fees, and so the only issue on appeal is possession. But

Holloway no longer has possession of the premises, her response did not raise any

meritorious claim of right to possession, and nothing in the record before us shows

that she has a potentially meritorious claim to possession. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at

787; Ratliff v. Homes by Ashley, Inc., No. 02-20-00014-CV, 2020 WL 1057320, at

*1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 5, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that a forcible-

                                            4
detainer appeal becomes moot upon an appellant’s eviction from the property unless

the appellant holds and asserts a meritorious claim of right to current, actual

possession of the property or unless damages or attorney’s fees remain at issue).

      Accordingly, regardless of whether Holloway has other claims that she could

bring in a separate suit, she has not shown grounds for continuing this appeal.

Because she no longer has possession of the property, her appeal is moot, and we

have no jurisdiction over her appeal. We therefore vacate the county court’s judgment

and dismiss the appeal. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 790.

                                                      Per Curiam

Delivered: January 18, 2024

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