Court Opinion

ID: 9435593
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 00:11:30.145693+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:04.286540
License: Public Domain

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I agree with my colleagues that Rule 23(g) requires district courts to decide whether to certify a class prior to the appointment of class counsel. Likewise, I agree that counsel’s failure to raise the Rule 23(g) argument constituted waiver. Unlike the Majority, however, I would not hold that the District Court abused its discretion when it denied Appellants’ motion to recertify the class.
When decertifying the class, Judge Hedges found that then-class counsel harmed the interests of the class in several ways. For example, counsel failed to provide class members notice of class certification. In addition, counsel’s proposed notice — which was never sent — did not explain class members’ potential liability under the fee shifting provisions of ERISA and the WARN Act. Counsel also was unaware of court filings, including an order setting the case for trial, because counsel neither monitored the docket nor required local counsel to register on the Court’s electronic case filing system as required by local rule. As Appellants’ current counsel concedes, these errors severely prejudiced the interests of the putative class members.
In light of that severe prejudice, there were two questions before the District Court when faced with the motion for re-certification: (1) could prior counsel’s errors be remedied at the late stage of the litigation; and, if so, (2) did new counsel remedy the prejudice caused by predecessor counsel. The District Court answered both questions in the negative. In doing so, it distinguished Korn v. Franchard *135Corp., 456 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir.1972), by writing: “The substitution of counsel in this case cannot remedy the myriad failings that have occurred throughout this litigation. In fact, new counsel continues to make the same errors and exemplify the same deficiencies Judge Hedges cited when he found that the plaintiff class must be decertified.” Because the record supports this conclusion, I would hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellants’ motion to recertify the class.