Court Opinion

ID: 9954559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 16:11:17.561548+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:52.942466
License: Public Domain

J-S08022-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  TERRELL MAURICE WILKINSON, JR.               :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1185 MDA 2023

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 25, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-21-CR-0002279-2022

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                              FILED: MARCH 26, 2024

       Terrell Maurice Wilkinson, Jr. (Appellant), appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered following his jury convictions of indecent assault (victim

unconscious or unaware) and indecent assault (lack of consent).1 We affirm.

       The trial court concisely described the incident underlying this appeal:

       Appellant and the victim had been friends since elementary
       school. On September 27, 2019, Appellant was spending time
       with the victim at her parents’ house while she was home from
       college visiting. She fell asleep on one end of a couch while
       Appellant was on the opposite end, and she woke up to Appellant’s
       hand under her shirt touching and rubbing her nipple….

Trial Court Opinion, 11/8/23, at 1 (footnotes omitted).

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(1), (4).
J-S08022-24

       A jury convicted Appellant of the above-described charges. On April 25,

2023, for his conviction of indecent assault (victim unconscious or unaware),

the trial court sentenced Appellant to 6-23 months in jail, followed by one year

of supervised probation.2 The trial court directed Appellant to comply with the

Tier II3 registration requirements of the Sexual Offender Registration and

Notification Act (SORNA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.14 - 9799.15. The Sexual

Offender Assessment Board (SOAB) determined Appellant did not meet the

criteria to be deemed a sexually violent predator (SVP).

       Appellant filed post-sentence motions challenging the weight and

sufficiency of the evidence and seeking bail pending appeal. Appellant further

challenged the constitutionality of SORNA’s registration and notification

provisions under Revised Subchapter H.4          See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9791.    As

____________________________________________

2 Appellant’s second conviction of indecent assault merged for sentencing
purposes.

3 Indecent assault under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(4) is a Tier II offense.See
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.14. A conviction of a Tier II offense subjects offenders
to a 25-year registration period. See id.

4 SORNA was originally enacted on December 20, 2011, effective December

20, 2012. See Act of Dec. 20, 2011, P.L. 446, No. 111, § 12 (Act 11 of 2011).
Act 11 was amended on July 5, 2012, also effective December 20,
2012. See Act of July 5, 2012, P.L. 880, No. 91 (Act 91 of 2012). That Act
was amended on February 21, 2018, effective immediately (Act 10 of 2018).
See Act of Feb. 21, 2018, P.L. 27, No. 10, §§ 1-20. The Act was further
reenacted and amended on June 12, 2018, P.L. 140, No. 29, §§ 1-23, effective
June 12, 2018 (Act 29 of 2018). Acts 10 and 29 of 2018 are generally referred
to collectively as SORNA II.          As our Supreme Court explained
in Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 232 A.3d 567 (Pa. 2020),
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -2-
J-S08022-24

summarized        by     the     trial    court,   Appellant   claimed   SORNA’s

registration/notification provisions constituted

       (1) [a] violation of due process via creating an irrebuttable
       presumption infringing on the right to reputation; (2) [a] violation
       of the dictates of Apprendi [v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466
       (2000),] and Alleyne [v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013),]
       via subjecting offenders to “increased registration provisions”
       without a jury determining the risk of future dangerousness; (3)
       imposition of an illegal sentence in excess of statutory maximums;
       (4) [the] imposition of an excessive sentence in violation of the
       cruel and unusual punishment prohibitions in the state and federal
       constitutions; and (5) [a] violation of the separation of powers
       doctrine….

Trial Court Opinion, 11/8/23, at 2; see also Appellant’s Post-Sentence

Motions, 5/1/23, ¶¶ 45-48.

       The trial court conducted a post-sentence motion hearing on July 24,

2023, at which Appellant’s trial counsel “presented no evidence and made

____________________________________________

       Act 10 split SORNA, which was previously designated in the
       Sentencing Code as Subchapter H, into two subchapters. Revised
       Subchapter H applies to crimes committed on or after December
       20, 2012, whereas Subchapter I applies to crimes committed after
       April 22, 1996, but before December 20, 2012. In essence,
       Revised Subchapter H retained many of the provisions of SORNA,
       while Subchapter I imposed arguably less onerous requirements
       on those who committed offenses prior to December 20, 2012, in
       an attempt to address this Court’s conclusion in [Commonwealth
       v.] Muniz[, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017),] that application of the
       original provisions of SORNA to these offenders constituted an ex
       post facto violation.

Id. at 580-81. Because Appellant was convicted of offenses committed after
December 20, 2012, Subchapter H applies. Incidentally, the Torsilieri Court
refers to “Subchapter H” as “Revised Subchapter H”. See generally id.

                                           -3-
J-S08022-24

argument only as to the sentence modification and bail motions, having said

that he did not feel he needed to belabor legal argument” for the SORNA

issues. Trial Court Opinion, 11/8/23, at 2. Appellant’s counsel acknowledged

he presented the SORNA claim for issue-preservation purposes only, as the

matter was then pending before the Supreme Court in Torsilieri. See N.T.,

7/24/23, at 4 (wherein Appellant’s counsel stated, “The issue that I … raised

under [SORNA], is currently before the Supreme Court, again, filed for issue

preservation since it’s pending.”).

      On July 25, 2023, the trial court granted bail pending appeal, but denied

Appellant’s remaining post-sentence motions.      Appellant timely appealed.

Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Appellant, represented by new counsel, presents the following issues for

our review:

      1.    Whether SORNA’s registration and notification provisions
      violate   Pennsylvania’s      due    process     provisions    and
      unconstitutionally infringe upon the right of reputation by
      authorizing an irrebuttable presumption that all sexual offenders
      pose a high risk of recidivism and that the tier-based registration
      system protects the public from recidivist sexual offenders?

      2.    Whether SORNA’s registration and notification periods
      constitute an illegal sentence in excess of the statutory maximum
      and is cruel and unusual punishment under the State and federal
      constitutions?

      3.    Whether SORNA’s tiered registration and notification system
      for non-SVP’s violates Alleyne and Apprendi?

      4.    Whether SORNA violates the separation of powers doctrine
      by encroaching on the fact-finding and sentencing responsibilities
      of the judiciary?

                                      -4-
J-S08022-24

       5.    Whether, based on the short-sentence exception,
       [Appellant] is entitled to a remand and should be permitted to
       waive [Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA)5] review and present
       ineffective assistance of counsel claims as part of unitary review?

       6.    Whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately
       cross[-]examine the accuser using all of the text-messages she
       sent to another male friend during the time period of the alleged
       incident where the messages were not hearsay because they were
       not being introduced for the truth of the actual messages?

       7.     Whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately
       cross[-]examine the accuser about her continued relationship with
       [Appellant] and using text messages that she sent to [Appellant]
       after the alleged incident to impeach the credibility of the accuser?

Appellant’s Brief at 8-9 (issues renumbered, footnote added).

       Appellant’s first four issues challenge the constitutionality of SORNA’s

registration/notification requirements as unconstitutional. Because the issues

are related, we address them together.

       Appellant first challenges the irrebuttable presumption in SORNA’s

Revised Subchapter H violated his right to due process, as guaranteed under

Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id. at 32, 33. Appellant

claims that 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.11(a)(4) imposes an irrebuttable presumption

that all sex offenders have a high risk of recidivism, by requiring registration

and notification even where the defendant is not deemed an SVP. Id.

       Appellant further argues that SORNA’s imposition of an irrebuttable

presumption unconstitutionally infringes on his right of reputation. Id. at 32.

____________________________________________

5 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.

                                           -5-
J-S08022-24

Appellant argues, “it is beyond cavil that an individual’s reputation is a

fundamental right protected by due process of law.” Id. at 35-36. In support,

Appellant relies on our Constitution’s prohibition against self-incrimination,

claiming it “was originally construed as protecting against disclosure of

information that would subject the individual to shame, ignominy, or

contempt.” Id. at 36. Appellant also cites the right of privacy. Id. Appellant

contends,

      an irrebuttable presumption that one is at high risk of sexually
      reoffending and must register with the State Police based solely
      on a misdemeanor conviction for indecent assault, encroaches on
      the right[s] of reputation and privacy.

Id. Moreover, Appellant argues that the presumption “is not universally true.”

Id.

      Appellant directs our attention to the dissenting opinion of Supreme

Court Justice Christine Donohue in Torsilieri. Id. at 37-38. Justice Donohue

pointed out the risk-assessment tools already employed by the SOAB, and

opined that “actuarily derived” assessments are preferrable for determining

high-risk and low-risk offenders. Id. at 37 (citing Torsilieri, 232 A.3d at 607-

08 (Donohue, J., dissenting)). Because individualized risk assessments are

available to determine an offender’s recidivism risk, Appellant asserts that

SORNA’s irrebuttable presumption is unconstitutional. Id. at 38.

      In his second issue, Appellant claims that SORNA’s registration and

notification requirements constitute an illegal sentence in excess of the

statutory maximum. Appellant’s Brief at 39. Appellant further asserts Revised

                                     -6-
J-S08022-24

Subchapter H’s registration/notification requirements are “cruel and unusual

punishment under the State and federal constitutions.” Id. Under SORNA’s

Revised Subchapter H, Appellant argues, he “is required to register for twenty-

five years and verify registration and be photographed at an approved

registration site semi-annually.”        Id. at 41.   Further, Appellant states that

SORNA requires in-person appearances after any change in name, residence,

phone number, vehicle ownership, email, or instant messaging designation.

Id. at 42.

       Appellant acknowledges that in Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 234

A.3d 602 (Pa. 2020), our Supreme Court rejected an ex post facto challenge

to SORNA’s Subchapter I (not H), and concluded it was not punitive.

Appellant’s    Brief   at    42.      Appellant   further   acknowledges   that   in

Commonwealth v. Butler, 173 A.3d 1212 (Pa. Super. 2017), this Court

concluded that Revised Subchapter H’s registration requirements for SVPs did

not constitute “punishment.”            Id. at 42-43.       Nevertheless, Appellant

distinguishes his case based on his status as a non-SVP offender under

Subchapter H.       Id. at 43.      Appellant argues that, applying the analysis

articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-

Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963),6 application of Revised Subchapter H’s

____________________________________________

6
 As noted by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Santana, 266 A.3d
528 (Pa. 2021), the United States Supreme Court, in Mendoza-Martinez,

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -7-
J-S08022-24

registration/notification requirements to him is punitive. Appellant’s Brief at

43-44.

       In his third issue, Appellant claims that SORNA’s tiered registration and

notification system for non-SVPs violates Alleyne and Apprendi.7 Appellant’s

Brief at 51. Appellant argues the registration and notification provisions of

SORNA equate to punishment. Id. Appellant claims the provisions violate

Alleyne and Apprendi, as they increase the prescribed range of penalties

____________________________________________

       articulated a two-part test for deciding whether a legislative
       enactment is punitive. The first inquiry asks whether the
       legislature intended a statutory scheme to be punitive. If so, the
       inquiry ends. If not, the reviewing court must assess whether the
       statute nonetheless is punitive in its effect. This second inquiry
       requires consideration of the following seven factors:

       [(1)] whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or
       restraint, [(2)] whether it has historically been regarded as a
       punishment, [(3)] whether it comes into play only on a finding of
       scienter, [(4)] whether its operation will promote the traditional
       aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, [(5)] whether the
       behavior to which it applies is already a crime, [(6)] whether an
       alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is
       assignable for it, and [(7)] whether it appears excessive in relation
       to the alternative purpose assigned.

Santana, 266 A.3d at 538 n.46 (original brackets omitted) (citing Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69).

7  In Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court held that New Jersey’s
sentencing procedure violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a
trial by jury, as well as his due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment, because any fact that increases the penalty for a crime is an
element of the offense. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483 n.10. In Alleyne, the
Supreme Court held that the Apprendi rule applies to facts that increase a
mandatory minimum sentence. Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 111 n.1.

                                           -8-
J-S08022-24

and must, therefore, be determined beyond a reasonable doubt by the fact-

finder. Id. at 51-52.

      In his fourth issue, Appellant challenges the constitutionality of SORNA’s

tiered system.    Id. at 50.     Appellant claims that SORNA’s irrebuttable

presumption precludes the judiciary “from engaging in individualized

assessments of the offender.” Id. Appellant argues,

      [a]s it relates to Tier II (and Tier III) offenders, SORNA precludes
      Judges from making a determination as to the likelihood of re-
      offending     and     making      any      independent   fact-finding
      determinations at sentencing that would impact registration and
      notification. SORNA’s removal from judges of the ability to
      engage in individualized sentencing for registration and
      notification, based on the unsupported presumption that an
      offender is at a high risk of re-offending, violates the separation
      of powers doctrine.

Id. at 51.

      Where, as here, an appellant challenges the constitutionality of a

statute,

      the appellant presents this Court with a question of
      law. See Commonwealth v. Atwell, 785 A.2d 123, 125 (Pa.
      Super. 2001) (citation omitted). Our consideration of questions
      of law is plenary. See [id.] (citation omitted). A statute is
      presumed to be constitutional and will not be declared
      unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably, and plainly
      violates the constitution.         See Commonwealth           v.
      Etheredge, 794 A.2d 391, 396 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations
      omitted). Thus, the party challenging the constitutionality of a
      statute has a heavy burden of persuasion. See [id.] (citation
      omitted).

                                      -9-
J-S08022-24

Commonwealth v. Villanueva-Pabon, 304 A.3d 1210, 1214 (Pa. Super.

2023) (emphasis added) (quoting Commonwealth v. Howe, 842 A.2d 436,

441 (Pa. Super. 2004)).

      “While the General Assembly may enact laws which impinge on

constitutional rights to protect the health, safety, and welfare of society, any

restriction is subject to judicial review to protect the constitutional rights of all

citizens.” In the Interest of J.B., 107 A.3d 1, 14 (Pa. 2014). We are mindful

that “the wisdom of public policy is one for the legislature, and the General

Assembly’s    enactments      are   entitled    to   a   strong   presumption     of

constitutionality rebuttable only by a demonstration that they clearly, plainly,

and palpably violate constitutional requirements.” Shoul v. Com., Dept. of

Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 173 A.3d 669, 678 (Pa. 2017)

(footnote omitted).

      Similar to this case, in Villanueva-Pabon, the appellant argued that

SORNA’s Revised Subchapter H

      is unconstitutional because it (a) creates an irrebuttable
      presumption of dangerousness in violation of the right to
      reputation protected by the Pennsylvania Constitution; (b)
      increases punishment based on facts found by the legislature as
      opposed to a jury in violation of Apprendi and Alleyne; (c)
      creates an illegal sentence by requiring registration for a period in
      excess of the maximum term of incarceration; (d) is excessive
      under the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions; and (e) violates
      separation of powers principles.

Villanueva-Pabon, 304 A.3d at 1214.

                                       - 10 -
J-S08022-24

      Summarizing our Supreme Court’s holding in Torsilieri, as applied to a

constitutional challenge to SORNA’s registration/notification provisions, this

Court explained:

      In Torsilieri, the Commonwealth appealed from the order
      entered [by the trial court] declaring Subchapter H of SORNA II
      unconstitutional as violative of several provisions of the United
      States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Specifically, the trial court
      found that Subchapter H violated due process through the use of
      an irrebuttable presumption; that Revised Subchapter H’s
      notification and registration requirements were punitive in nature;
      and that Revised Subchapter H violated the requirements of
      Apprendi and Alleyne, imposed sentences in excess of the
      statutory maximum, constituted cruel and unusual punishment,
      and violated the separation of powers doctrines by preventing trial
      courts from imposing an individualized sentence. Torsilieri, ...
      232 A.3d at 582.

      Based on the evidence relied upon by the trial court,[FN1] our
      Supreme Court decided that the appellee had posed colorable
      constitutional challenges to Revised Subchapter H’s registration
      and notification provisions based on his asserted refutation of two
      legislative determinations: “(1) that all sexual offenders pose a
      high risk of recidivation and (2) that the tier-based registration
      system of Revised Subchapter H protects the public from the
      alleged danger of recidivist sexual offenders.” Id. at … 584.

      [FN1] The appellee had introduced affidavits and supporting
      documents of three experts concluding that sex offenders
      generally have low recidivism rates and questioning the
      effectiveness of sex offender registration systems. The
      Commonwealth stipulated to the content of the exhibits offered by
      the appellee but not their validity or relevance.

      In considering these claims, the Court stated it was “unable to
      conclude based upon the record currently before [it] whether [the
      a]ppellee has sufficiently undermined the validity of the legislative
      findings supporting Revised Subchapter H’s registration and
      notification provisions, especially in light of the contradictory
      scientific evidence cited by the Commonwealth during this appeal

                                     - 11 -
J-S08022-24

     which may refute [the a]ppellee’s experts.” Id. at … 585.[FN2] The
     Court went on to state that “[i]t is not the role of an appellate
     court to determine the validity of the referenced studies based on
     mere citations rather than allowing the opportunity for the truths
     to develop through a hearing on the merits of the evidence.
     Accordingly, a remand is appropriate to allow the parties to
     address whether a consensus has developed to call into question
     the relevant legislative policy decisions impacting offenders’
     constitutional rights.” Id. at … 585 (internal footnote omitted).

     [FN2] Specifically, the Commonwealth emphasized on appeal a
     conflict among social scientists regarding the recidivism rates of
     sexual offenders and introduced a then-recent study refuting the
     appellee’s experts’ conclusions. See id. at … 583.

     In framing the remand, the Court then discussed the extent to
     which each of the trial court’s conclusions of unconstitutionality
     rested on its crediting of the appellee’s scientific evidence. The
     Court noted that the trial court’s analysis of each of the three
     prongs of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine relied heavily
     upon the scientific evidence presented by the appellee. Id. at …
     587. Thus, the Court concluded that remand was necessary “to
     allow the parties to present additional argument and evidence to
     address whether a scientific consensus has developed to overturn
     the legislative determinations in regard to adult sexual offenders’
     recidivation rates and the effectiveness of a tier-based registration
     and notification system as they relate to the prongs of the
     irrebuttable presumption doctrine.” Id. at … 587-88.

Villanueva-Pabon, 304 A.3d at 1214-16 (footnotes in original).

     The Court further recognized that

     [s]ince Torsilieri, this Court has remanded for a full evidentiary
     hearing to resolve similar constitutional claims, where the
     parties did not have an opportunity for a hearing before the
     trial court. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mickley, 240 A.3d
     957 (Pa. Super. 2020) (vacating order denying motion to bar
     registration requirements and remanding for evidentiary hearing
     where court did not permit defense counsel to offer evidence at
     hearing, despite defense counsel’s attempt to do so);
     Commonwealth v. Snyder, 292 A.3d 1106 (Pa. Super. filed

                                    - 12 -
J-S08022-24

     2023) (unpublished memorandum) (addressing, upon remand
     from Supreme Court, claims identical to those addressed in
     Torsilieri; because appellant had not offered any specific
     scientific evidence or learned testimony in support of his position,
     this Court remanded to trial court for evidentiary hearing and
     opportunity for appellant to supplement his arguments with
     scientific evidence); Commonwealth v. Chittester, 292 A.3d
     1069 (Pa. Super. filed 2023) (unpublished memorandum)
     (remanding for appellant to have opportunity to file post-sentence
     motion nunc pro tunc asserting his constitutional challenges to
     Revised Subchapter H, after which trial court shall hold hearing to
     provide both parties opportunity to develop arguments and
     present evidence so that court may then weigh evidence in
     determining whether appellant has refuted relevant legislative
     findings supporting challenged registration and notification
     provisions of Revised Subchapter H); Commonwealth v.
     Escabal, 287 A.3d 844 (Pa. Super. filed 2022) (unpublished
     memorandum) (rejecting appellant’s claims to extent he
     maintains we may invalidate Revised Subchapter H as matter of
     law and without further factual development before trial court;
     vacating and remanding for further proceedings at which parties
     can present evidence for and against relevant legislative
     determinations and challenges at issue).

Villanueva-Pabon, 304 A.3d at 1217 (emphasis added).

     Under the circumstances presented in Villanueva-Pabon, this Court

concluded that remand was not warranted. See id. at 1218. The appellant

in Villanueva-Pabon was afforded an evidentiary hearing on his post-

sentence motion. See id. at 1217. At that hearing, the trial court sustained

the Commonwealth’s hearsay objection to the appellant’s evidence; the

appellant did not challenge this evidentiary ruling on appeal. Id. at 1218.

The appellant instead “ask[e]d this Court to declare Revised Subchapter H

unconstitutional based on the same arguments advanced in Torsilieri, as well

as [the a]ppellant’s proffered evidence that was marked but not admitted at

                                    - 13 -
J-S08022-24

the hearing due to the court’s ruling sustaining the Commonwealth’s

objection.”   Id.   Because of the appellant’s “strategic decision to forego

offering live testimony[,]” the Villanueva-Pabon Court was “left with a

record that contains no evidence from which we can evaluate the veracity of

[the a]ppellant’s constitutional claims.” Id.

      [D]ue to the trial court’s ruling sustaining the Commonwealth’s
      objection to [a]ppellant’s proffered evidence, [a]ppellant
      essentially presented no evidence to overcome the
      presumption of Revised Subchapter H’s constitutionality.
      See Howe, supra. See also … Commonwealth v. Manzano,
      237 A.3d 1175 (Pa. Super. 2020) (holding appellant failed to
      satisfy his burden to prove that Revised Subchapter H
      provisions applicable to him “clearly, palpably, and plainly”
      violated constitution where appellant produced no scientific
      evidence whatsoever to support his claims that underlying
      legislative policy infringes on appellant’s rights; rather, appellant
      simply relied on trial court’s initial decision in Torsilieri declaring
      statute as unconstitutional in attempt to persuade trial court in his
      case to reach same conclusion); Commonwealth v.
      Outterbridge, 283 A.3d 403 (Pa. Super. filed 2022) (unpublished
      memorandum) (explaining that appellant raised his Subchapter H
      claims implicating irrebuttable presumption argument and
      Apprendi/Alleyne argument before trial court but he failed to
      present any evidence of scientific studies to support his claim;
      likewise, appellant presented no evidence to this Court on appeal;
      instead, appellant asks us to resolve his Subchapter H claim as
      matter of law; however, without any scientific studies, appellant
      cannot make [a] colorable argument that [the] General
      Assembly’s factual presumptions have been undermined by recent
      scientific studies; therefore, appellant has failed to satisfy his
      burden to prove that Revised Subchapter H provisions applicable
      to him, clearly, palpably, and plainly violate [the] constitution;
      concluding appellant is not entitled to relief and affirming).

Villanueva-Pabon, 304 A.3d at 1218 (emphasis added).

      Recently, in Commonwealth v. Bueno, 307 A.3d 1255 (Pa. Super.

2024), this Court rejected an appellant’s request to resolve a Subchapter H

                                      - 14 -
J-S08022-24

issue as a matter of law, based upon the appellant’s designation as a non-

SVP:

       Appellant suggests that we resolve his Subchapter H claims as a
       matter of law. However, as this Court noted in Outterbridge,
       “without any evidence of scientific studies, [a]ppellant
       cannot make ‘a colorable argument that the General
       Assembly’s factual presumptions have been undermined by
       recent scientific studies.’” Outterbridge, 2022 Pa. Super.
       Unpub. LEXIS 1738, 2022 WL 2965808, at *4 (citation omitted).

       Further, to the extent [a]ppellant argues his own case is proof that
       the irrebuttable presumption on which SORNA’s registration
       requirements depends is false since he was designated as a non-
       SVP offender, and, thus, he is not likely to engage in predatory
       sexual violent offenses such that requiring him to register as a
       sex-offender is unconstitutional, we find no relief is due.

       In Commonwealth v. Wolf, 276 A.3d 805 (Pa. Super. 2022),
       this Court addressed a claim similar to the one raised by
       [a]ppellant and held:

          … In Torsilieri, the defendant was also “not designated an
          SVP” and the Supreme Court still concluded that the
          defendant did not “demonstrate a consensus of scientific
          evidence as was present to find a presumption not
          universally true in [J.B.,] nor the ‘clearest proof’ needed to
          overturn the General Assembly’s statements that the
          provisions are not punitive.” Torsilieri, 232 A.3d at
          594. Again, in the case at bar, [the a]ppellant invites us
          to go beyond Torsilieri’s holding and conclude that the
          registration statutes are, as a matter of law,
          unconstitutional on their face. We decline [the a]ppellant’s
          invitation. Torsilieri binds this Court and [the a]ppellant’s
          claim fails, as [the appellant’s] unsupported challenge does
          not “demonstrate a consensus of scientific evidence as was
          present to find a presumption not universally true in J.B.,
          nor the ‘clearest proof’ needed to overturn the General
          Assembly’s statements that the provisions are not
          punitive.” See Torsilieri, 232 A.3d at 594.

       Wolf, 276 A.3d at 813.

                                      - 15 -
J-S08022-24

Bueno, 307 A.3d at 1262.

         In the instant case, Appellant raised his Subchapter H claims before the

trial court, but declined to present evidence supporting his constitutional

challenge. See N.T., 7/24/23, at 4. Because of this strategic choice, Appellant

failed    to   overcome   SORNA’s      presumption   of   constitutionality.   See

Villanueva-Pabon, 304 A.3d at 1218. As in Villanueva-Pabon, Wolf and

Bueno, Appellant failed to advance a colorable argument challenging the

General Assembly’s factual presumptions, as implemented in SORNA.

         Further, Appellant failed to present the clearest proof necessary to

overturn the General Assembly’s pronouncement that SORNA’s provisions are

not punitive. See Shoul, 173 A.3d at 678; Torsilieri, 232 A.3d at 594. As

such, Appellant cannot establish that the 25-year registration period, as

applied to him, is so disproportionate as to be punitive, thereby implicating

Alleyne and Apprendi. Appellant failed to meet his heavy burden of proving

that SORNA’s registration and notification requirements, as applied to him,

“clearly, palpably, and plainly” violated the constitution.” Torsilieri, 232 A.2d

at 575; accord Bueno, 307 A.3d at1263; Wolf, 275 A.3d at 813. Appellant’s

first four issues warrant no relief.

         Appellant’s remaining issues claim the ineffective assistance of

Appellant’s trial counsel. In his fifth issue, Appellant argues that review of his

ineffectiveness claims should be permitted under the “short-sentence

                                        - 16 -
J-S08022-24

exception” to the PCRA’s timeliness requirement.8               Appellant’s Brief at 17.

Appellant explains that the short-sentence exception should apply, because

his sentence of less than three years (including his term of probation) is likely

to expire before completion of any PCRA review. Id. Appellant relies on our

Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562 (Pa.

2013), which recognized that unitary review could be appropriate where the

defendant     establishes     “good     cause”     or    “exceptional   circumstances.”

Appellant’s Brief at 17.      Appellant asserts, “[b]ecause [his] total sentence

(based on time already served) is less than three years, his short sentence

establishes ‘good cause’ to permit him to waive PCRA review and pursue

unitary review.” Id. (footnote omitted). Appellant argues,

       [b]ecause [he] was afforded bail pending appeal, he admittedly is
       not currently serving his sentence and served approximately three
       months of his sentence. However, a less than three-year period
       (approximately 2 years and nine months) to pursue PCRA relief
       through the trial level, the Superior Court, and the Supreme Court
       is insufficient time to guarantee that [Appellant] would still be
       serving his sentence at the conclusion of appellate review.

Id. at 20 (emphasis in original).

       Without citation,      Appellant claims          the   typical appeal   period is

approximately one year from the filing of the notice of appeal. Id. Appellant’s

____________________________________________

8 Any PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed

within one year of the date the underlying judgment of sentence becomes
final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence is final “at the
conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme
Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the
expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).

                                          - 17 -
J-S08022-24

counsel relies on his own experiences in shepherding cases though the direct

appeal and PCRA process. See id. at 22-23. Appellant argues,

      it is evident that a sentence that is less than three years is an
      insufficient period to realistically guarantee PCRA review through
      the entirety of the State appellate process. Since [Appellant’s]
      sentence, when factoring in the almost three month period he has
      already served, and including his probation period, is less than
      three years, his sentence is sufficiently short to establish “good
      cause” to permit him to waive PCRA review. … A sentence of three
      years or less qualifies as a short sentence.

Id. at 23 (emphasis in original).

      Appellant requests a remand to allow him “to undergo a PCRA waiver

colloquy due to his short sentence.” Id. at 24. Appellant points out he was

represented by trial counsel at the time he filed post-sentence motions, “and

counsel generally cannot raise his own ineffectiveness.” Id. Thus, Appellant

asserts, he had no opportunity to waive PCRA review and raise his

ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal. Id.

      In Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed

the general rule which was initially set forth in Commonwealth v. Grant,

813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002), that “claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are

to be deferred to PCRA review; trial courts should not entertain claims of

ineffectiveness upon post-verdict motions; and such claims should not be

reviewed upon direct appeal.”         Holmes, 79 A.3d at 576 (footnote

omitted). The Holmes Court identified two limited exceptions to this general

rule: (1) in “an extraordinary case where the trial court, in the exercise of its

discretion, determines that a claim (or claims) of ineffectiveness is both

                                     - 18 -
J-S08022-24

meritorious and apparent from the record so that immediate consideration

and relief is warranted[;]” or (2) when the defendant raises “multiple, and

indeed comprehensive, ineffectiveness claims[,]” which the court, “in its

discretion, and for good cause shown,” determines post-verdict review is

warranted, and the defendant waives his right to PCRA review. Id. at 577-

78.

      In Commonwealth v. Delgros, 183 A.3d 352 (Pa. 2018), our Supreme

Court additionally recognized an exception “where the defendant is statutorily

precluded from obtaining subsequent PCRA review[,]” such as when a

defendant receives a short sentence or a fine for their crimes. Id. at 361. In

Delgros, the defendant was sentenced to pay a fine without incarceration or

probation. Id. at 353.

      None of these exceptions apply to Appellant’s case. Appellant’s claims

are not apparent from the record and meritorious. Appellant has not waived

his right to PCRA review, and the sentence imposed by the trial court does not

statutorily prohibit him from seeking PCRA review. See Holmes, 79 A.3d at

563-64; Delgros, 193 A.3d at 361. As the trial court correctly observed,

      [t]hough Appellant’s maximum sentence may be short (2 years
      and 11 months), the lion’s share of Appellant’s sentence has yet
      to be served as he is currently released on bail pending appeal
      and will not resume serving his sentence until after direct review
      is complete. … [The trial court] note[s] that [it] held a bail
      modification hearing on November 8, 2023[,] upon notification
      from the Probation Department that Appellant was not in
      compliance with the terms of his bail; [the court] issued an order
      the same day modifying the non-monetary terms of his bail and
      Appellant remains un-incarcerated.

                                    - 19 -
J-S08022-24

Trial Court Opinion, 11/8/23, at 8 n.25. Appellant’s sentence is not so short

as to preclude him from seeking relief under the PCRA. Consequently, we

decline to address Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal.

Appellant may seek relief through a timely filed PCRA petition.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 03/26/2024

                                    - 20 -