Court Opinion

ID: 9770314
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:58:22.058903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:37:38.830834
License: Public Domain

OPINION
TOM G. DAVIS, Judge.
Appeal is taken from a conviction for burglary. Trial was before the court and punishment was assessed at five years probated.
In his second ground of error, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. The State relied upon circumstantial evidence.
The indictment alleges in pertinent part that on October 31, 1977, appellant did:
“Knowingly and intentionally enter a habitation without the effective consent of Cecil Chatman, the owner thereof, and with the intent to commit theft.. . ”
Curtis Wilson testified that his home in Dallas is directly behind a home owned by Cecil Chapman. At approximately 10:30 a. m. on October 31, 1977, Wilson returned to his home and observed two men in his backyard. The men were carrying a tape player and a radio. Wilson took a gun out of his car and approached the men. The two men then fled and dropped the items they were carrying in a nearby alley. Wilson identified appellant as one of the men who had been in his backyard.
Officer Joe Decorte, of the Dallas Police Department, testified that after speaking with Wilson, some property was recovered from some bushes. Decorte then proceeded to Chapman’s home and found some speakers and tapes on the floor of one of the rooms in the house.
Cecil Chapman testified that his home was burglarized on October 31,1977. Entry was gained after a window in the back of the house was broken. Among the items taken in the burglary were some jewelry, a tape player, a radio and two pistols. The only items Chapman recovered following the offense were the tape player and radio.
A conviction based on circumstantial evidence cannot be sustained if the circumstances do not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt of the defendant. Schershel v. State, Tex. Cr.App., 575 S.W.2d 548; Bryant v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 574 S.W.2d 109. Thus proof which amounts only to a strong suspicion or mere probability is insufficient. Ford v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 571 S.W.2d 924. However, every circumstantial evidence case must necessarily be tested by its own facts to determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. Earnhart v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 575 S.W.2d 551. Lastly, the rules of circumstantial evidence do not require that circumstances should to a moral certainty actually exclude every hypothesis that the act may have been committed by another person, but the hypothesis in*594tended is a reasonable one consistent with the facts proved and the circumstances, and the supposition that the act may have been committed by another person must not be out of harmony with the evidence. Sullivan v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 564 S.W.2d 698.
The evidence in the instant case shows that appellant and another were found on property directly behind Chapman’s property, at a time immediately prior to the discovery of the burglary at Chapman’s house. Appellant and the other individual fled when they were approached by Wilson and disposed of a tape player and radio which they had been carrying. De-corte recovered the disposed of property and Chapman testified that the tape player and radio were the only items of stolen property returned to him after the burglary.
The evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis except for that of appellant’s guilt. Appellant’s second ground of error should be overruled.
While no complaint was made by appellant in either the trial court or on appeal, the dissent finds that there is a material variance between the proof and the indictment with regard to the complainant’s name and based on such finding concludes that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. The indictment alleges that the home was owned by Cecil Chatman, while at trial the owner stated his name to be Cecil Chapman.
The issue is thus one of idem sonans. In Martin v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 541 S.W.2d 605, this Court held:
“. .. we will therefore refrain from disturbing on appeal a jury or trial court determination that the names in question are idem sonans unless evidence shows that the names are patently incapable of being sounded the same or that the accused was misled to his prejudice.... “. .. Questions involving the rule of idem sonans must be raised in the first instance at trial. If the issue is raised for the first time on appeal, it will be treated as having been waived and will present nothing for review.” Id. at 607 and 608. (Emphasis supplied).
This Court has considered the issue of a variance in the complainant’s name when the issue has been preserved for review in compliance with Martin v. State, supra. See Cox v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 608 S.W.2d 219; Escobar v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 578 S.W.2d 139. In Cox and Escobar, there was evidence presented at trial which proved that the names as alleged and the names as proven were patently incapable of being sounded the same.
In the instant cause, the alleged variance involving idem sonans was not called to the trial court’s attention. Appellant did not present any evidence at trial which showed that the names Chatman and Chapman are patently incapable of being sounded the same. Finally, appellant does not allege that he was misled to his prejudice, in that he does not even raise the issue of this alleged variance on appeal. Having failed to raise the contention at trial and present evidence showing the names are not idem sonans, the alleged variance has not been preserved and should not be considered in a contention which generally challenges the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence to support appellant’s conviction.
In his first ground of error, appellant maintains this Court does not have jurisdiction of this appeal and that the appeal should be dismissed. He contends “[t]he Court improperly pronounced and sentenced the Defendant before the expiration of ten days from the conclusion of the trial without a written waiver of the right to file a motion for new trial and a motion in arrest of judgment.”
The record reflects that at the conclusion of the trial, appellant was found guilty by the court and punishment of five years, probated, assessed. Immediately thereafter, appellant gave notice of appeal. No attempt was made to file a motion for new trial or motion in arrest of judgment.
The assessment of punishment in the instant case did not constitute a sentence. See Art. 37.07(3)(d), V.A.C.C.P. Moreover, *595in view of the suspended imposition of sentence, under the terms of Art. 42.04, V.A.C. C.P., no sentence was pronounced before this appeal was taken.
In those cases in which sentence is pronounced within ten days of the judgment, without a waiver of the ten day period in which to file a motion for new trial or motion in arrest of judgment, the sentence is premature and voidable. Ex Parte Shields, Tex.Cr.App., 550 S.W.2d 670. If the sentence is premature and a defendant objects at trial or raises the contention in his brief on appeal, this Court will dismiss the appeal. Parr v. State, Tex.Cr. App., 575 S.W.2d 522.
In the instant case, the court’s action did not deprive appellant of his right to file a motion for new trial or motion in arrest of judgment. In view of the probated nature of the sentence, no sentence was imposed. Moreover, no sentence was pronounced because notice of appeal was given. Following the judgment and assessment of punishment, appellant had ten days in which to file the motions. Appellant’s first ground of error is not supported by the record and is overruled.
The judgment is affirmed.