Court Opinion

ID: 9926176
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-23 22:03:27.446431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:07.925994
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (5th) 210272-U
             NOTICE
                                                                                          NOTICE
 Decision filed 01/23/24. The
                                                                               This order was filed under
 text of this decision may be               NO. 5-21-0272
                                                                               Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
 changed or corrected prior to
                                                                               not precedent except in the
 the filing of a Petition for                  IN THE                          limited circumstances allowed
 Rehearing or the disposition of
                                                                               under Rule 23(e)(1).
 the same.
                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                               FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,      )     Appeal from the
                                          )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellee,                 )     Jefferson County.
                                          )
v.                                        )     No. 20-CF-172
                                          )
LEE V. DAVIS,                             )     Honorable
                                          )     Jerry E. Crisel,
      Defendant-Appellant.                )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

         JUSTICE MOORE delivered the judgment of the court.
         Justices Welch and McHaney concurred in the judgment.

                                              ORDER

¶1       Held: Cause remanded with directions for the trial court to conduct a hearing to address
               the defendant’s pro se ineffective assistance of counsel claims, as required by
               People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984), and to determine, based on the trial court’s
               conclusion following the hearing, whether additional proceedings are required.

¶2       The defendant, Lee V. Davis, appeals his conviction and sentence, following a jury trial in

the circuit court of Jefferson County, for being an armed habitual criminal.

¶3       For the reasons that follow, we remand this cause for the limited purpose of a proper

Krankel inquiry in the circuit court. Prior to doing so, we examine the defendant’s first claim that

the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, because, as the defendant correctly

notes, if he prevails on this claim there is no need to remand for a Krankel inquiry, because the

principles of doubly jeopardy would bar the retrial of the defendant. However, also for the reasons

that follow, we reject the defendant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim. We do not reach the
                                                1
remaining issues raised by the defendant, but retain jurisdiction to consider them, if necessary,

following the Krankel inquiry. See, e.g., People v. Bell, 2018 IL App (4th) 151016, ¶¶ 3, 36-37;

see also People v. Roberson, 2021 IL App (3d) 190212, ¶ 22.

¶4                                   I. BACKGROUND

¶5     We recite only those facts necessary for an understanding of our disposition of this appeal.

On June 15, 2020, the defendant was charged, by information, with one count of armed habitual

criminal (AHC), a Class X felony. It alleged that on June 13, 2020, the defendant knowingly

possessed a firearm after having been convicted of two prior qualifying felony offenses. On June

18, 2020, a grand jury returned a true bill of indictment charging the defendant with the same.

¶6     On March 30, 2021, selection of the jury for the defendant’s trial began. Opening

statements were given on March 31, 2021, and the State began its case-in-chief.

¶7      The State’s first witness to testify was Officer Braden Kelley. He testified that he was

employed by the Mount Vernon Police Department as a patrol officer and had been employed

there for three years. Kelley testified that while on duty on June 13, 2020, at approximately 3:30

a.m., dispatch informed him that the defendant was in the 800 block of South 19th Street. It was

known at that time that the defendant had a current arrest warrant. He testified that he and Officer

Wesley Song responded to the area and parked at the Corner Tavern to approach the defendant on

foot rather than in marked patrol vehicles. Kelley testified they observed a maroon Charger parked

on the east side of the street in front of 816 South 19th Street, which matched the description of

the vehicle reported by dispatch. He testified he observed someone in the driver’s seat but was

unable to identify the person at that time. As they approached the vehicle, Sergeant Travis

Chapman drove past the maroon Charger in his marked patrol vehicle. Kelley testified this

“spooked” the driver and he exited the vehicle, slumped over, and began to walk away from them.

Kelley demonstrated for jurors the manner in which the driver “slumped” and walked. He testified
                                               2
the individual had his right hand in front of his face and he could not observe the other hand. Once

the individual reached the shadow of a house, he began to flee by running east through the yard of

816 South 19th Street.

¶8     Kelley testified he and Song pursued the individual on foot, commanded him to stop, and

identified themselves as police. The individual did not stop, and continued until he reached the

alley on the east side of 816 South 19th Street, where he turned and ran north. Kelley testified he

dropped behind Song to let him gain primary on the pursuit. Kelley lost sight of the individual in

the back yard of 816 South 19th Street. He then followed behind Song until they reached Conger

Avenue. Both officers stopped at Conger Avenue because they had lost sight of the individual.

Kelley testified he looked west and saw the same individual running south through the intersection

of 19th Street and Conger Avenue back toward the maroon Charger. He testified he knew it was

the same individual, because he was wearing the same clothing—a long pair of black shorts and a

black t-shirt with logos and designs. He and Song reengaged the pursuit and observed the

individual get back into the driver seat of the maroon Charger. Kelley testified he approached the

vehicle and gave commands for the individual to exit. The individual complied and Song placed

him into custody. Kelley testified he was able to identify the individual as the defendant, Lee

Davis, and confirmed he had an outstanding warrant. He further testified that the defendant was

placed in Chapman’s patrol vehicle for transport to the county justice center.

¶9     Kelley testified that he and Song remained on scene to search for possible evidence along

the defendant’s flight path. Deputy Kevin Rodriguez arrived on scene with his canine partner to

assist in completing an article search along the defendant’s flight path. Kelley testified that

Rodriguez and his canine partner led the front of the search with Song and Kelley approximately

10 to 15 feet behind on the left and right respectively. He testified that Song located a revolver on

the left side of the alley a couple of feet off the path that the defendant had recently fled. Kelley
                                                   3
testified the revolver was lying in the weeds on its right side. He testified that it was black and

silver in color with a brown handle and appeared to be in operating condition. The revolver was

first photographed as it lay and then Song put on gloves, picked it up, and observed live rounds of

ammunition in the cylinder. Kelley testified he took photographs of the weapon with the live

rounds while Song held it. The revolver was then secured in Song’s patrol vehicle. He testified

that no other items or articles were located during the search of the flight path.

¶ 10    Kelley was shown People’s exhibits 1A through 1V, which he identified generally as

photographs of the defendant’s flight path. He testified he took some of the photographs but not

all of them. Additionally, he testified he took the photographs on September 14, 2020, and that

they truly and accurately depicted a fair representation of the flight path. The photographs were

admitted into evidence, without objection, and published to the jury. He testified that exhibit 1H

showed a close view of the area where the firearm was located. Exhibits 1I, 1J, 1K, and 1L showed

a pothole or uneven space in the alleyway along the flight path. The remaining exhibits were

photographs of the alleyway, intersections, and roadways along the defendant’s flight path. Kelley

was shown People’s exhibit 2, which he identified as a street view or Google Earth view of the

defendant’s flight path. He testified that the flight path could be contained within the photograph,

and that it was a true and accurate depiction of the streets of Mount Vernon. The photograph was

admitted into evidence, without objection, and published to the jury. Kelley demonstrated for the

jury, utilizing a laser pointer, the defendant’s flight path.

¶ 11    On cross-examination, Kelley testified that he did not observe the defendant fall down, and

that the area is not necessarily a high crime area, but a high call area. On redirect examination, he

testified that he has never found any other discarded loaded weapons in that area. On recross-

examination, Kelley testified the only time he has searched that alleyway for a weapon was on the

night in question.
                                                   4
¶ 12    Ray Gilbert was the next witness to testify. He testified that he was a sergeant with the

Mount Vernon Police Department. Gilbert testified he supervised a squad of night shift officers,

and he was the evidence custodian for “all of the evidence at the police department.” He described

his duties as correctly securing, storing, transferring, and maintaining chain of custody for

evidence. He testified to the proper protocols and procedures required for collecting, receiving,

packaging, storing, and maintaining evidence. Gilbert testified he not only maintains a physical

record, but also an electronic record of each individual piece of evidence. He testified that in this

case, he transferred all the items of evidence related to this case to the Jefferson County Circuit

Clerk while adhering to the proper protocols and procedures.

¶ 13    Wesley Song was the next witness to testify. He testified that he was a patrol officer with

the Mount Vernon Police Department and had been for approximately three years. Song testified

that on June 13, 2020, dispatch advised that Lee Davis was in a maroon Charger in the 800 block

of South 19th Street, and he had a current arrest warrant. He testified that he reviewed in-house

photos of Lee Davis so that he would be able to identify him. Song testified that he and Officer

Kelley responded to the area and parked at the Corner Tavern to approach the defendant on foot

rather than in marked patrol vehicles. He testified it was approximately 3:40 a.m. and dark out

when they began to walk northbound on 19th Street and they observed the maroon Charger parked

near 816 South 19th Street. Song testified he observed a male sitting in the driver’s seat. As he and

Kelley approached, Sergeant Chapman happened to drive southbound on 19th Street. He testified

that he observed the male exit the maroon Charger slumped over and walking eastbound toward

the back yard of the residence at 816 South 19th Street. Song demonstrated for the jury the manner

in which the defendant “slumped” and walked. He testified he was not able to see the male’s hands

at this time.

                                                 5
¶ 14   Song testified the male took off running when he reached the back yard of the residence,

and he and Kelley chased after him announcing “police and to stop running.” He testified the male

did not stop running, and instead, turned northbound in the alleyway. Song testified he lost sight

of the male for “a matter of seconds” when he turned and ran northbound through the alleyway.

He testified he quickly regained sight of the male when he made it to the alleyway and looked

northbound. Song testified the male was wearing a black shirt and long jean shorts. He testified he

continued to pursue the male down the alleyway but lost sight of him near Conger Avenue. Song

and Kelley paused briefly when they reached Conger Avenue and regained sight of the male now

running southbound on 19th Street back toward the maroon Charger. Song testified he and Kelley

pursued the male again and observed him entering the maroon Charger. He testified as they

approached the vehicle, they ordered him out and he complied. Song and Kelley identified the

male as Lee Davis, and he was placed in custody. Song testified he searched the defendant and

located a pair of gloves and a black skeleton mask on his person.

¶ 15   Song was shown People’s exhibits 3 and 4, which he identified as the pair of gloves and

black skeleton mask he removed from the defendant. He testified they were in substantially the

same condition as the date of the crime. The exhibits were admitted into evidence, without

objection, and published to the jury. Song testified that the gloves were dirty and that they were

dirty when he removed them from the defendant on June 13, 2020.

¶ 16   Song testified that he and Kelley remained on scene to search the defendant’s flight path

for items that may have been thrown. Deputy Rodriguez and his canine partner arrived to assist in

the search. Song testified Rodriguez and his canine partner led in the front and he and Kelley

followed behind on the left and right respectively. He testified that he located a gun on the left side

of the alley about 50 feet north of 816 South 19th Street. He testified he photographed the firearm

                                                  6
before disturbing it. Song testified he then collected the firearm and observed it loaded with

ammunition.

¶ 17   Song was shown People’s exhibit 5, which he recognized and identified as the box that

contained the same black and brown revolver he had located in the alley. The exhibit was admitted

into evidence, without objection, and published to the jury. Song was shown People’s exhibit 6,

which he identified as six rounds of .38-Special caliber ammunition that was located inside the

revolver. He testified it is the same ammunition he removed from the revolver and had placed into

evidence. The exhibit was admitted into evidence, without objection.

¶ 18   Song testified he took photographs of the firearm before he disturbed it and after he

collected it for evidence. He also testified he took photographs of the gloves and mask. Song was

shown People’s exhibits 7A through 7H, which he identified as photographs of the gloves, mask,

and revolver, and he testified that they truly and accurately depicted the condition of those items

on June 13, 2020. The photographs were admitted into evidence, without objection, and published

to the jury. Song testified that exhibit 7A showed the mask and the gloves in the same condition

as when he removed them from the defendant. He testified that there appeared to be some kind of

grass or weeds on the mask that came from the alleyway, and that he did not place it there. He

testified that exhibit 7B showed the other side of the same mask and gloves. Song testified that

exhibit 7C showed the location where the revolver had been discovered before it had been

disturbed. Exhibit 7D showed Song holding the revolver with gloves exposing the loaded

ammunition. He testified he wore gloves to protect the integrity of the revolver and any potential

DNA. Exhibits 7C and 7D showed the gun covered in dust except for the handle of the gun. He

testified exhibit 7E showed the right side of the revolver and a piece of grass in the hammer of the

firearm. Song testified he did not place that piece of grass there. Exhibit 7F showed the left side

of the firearm in the evidence box. He testified that the gun was on its right side when it was
                                               7
initially recovered. Exhibit 7G showed a closer photograph of the right side of the firearm depicting

the grass near the hammer. Exhibit 7H showed the six rounds of ammunition that were located in

the firearm.

¶ 19   On cross-examination, Song testified that the piece of grass in the hammer of the firearm

was fresh and green, and it was still on the gun at the time he placed it into evidence. Song was

shown defendant’s exhibit D, which he identified as the photograph he took of the firearm before

it was disturbed and testified it fairly and accurately depicted the firearm at the scene. He testified

he took one photograph of the gun on the ground. The exhibit was admitted without objection.

Song was shown defendant’s exhibit N, which he identified as the photograph of him holding the

gun exposing the loaded ammunition, and testified he fairly and accurately depicted the weapon

on June 13, 2020. The photograph was admitted without objection. Song further testified that the

gun was located approximately 50 feet from the gate in the back yard of the residence at 816 South

19th Street. He testified that the gloves and mask were later seized by Officer Mayberry from the

defendant’s personal property at the county justice center and placed into evidence. He testified

that the defendant did not have the gloves on his hands at the time he was taken into custody, and

that the gloves were located in the defendant’s pockets.

¶ 20   On redirect examination, Song testified that the gloves and mask were located on the

defendant’s person. He testified Officer Mayberry was advised to go to the county justice center

and seize the mask and gloves from the defendant’s personal property.

¶ 21   Travis Chapman was the next witness to testify. He testified that he was a sergeant with

the Mount Vernon Police Department and had been for almost 14 years. He testified that on June

13, 2020, he received information from dispatch that Lee Davis was sitting outside 816 South 19th

Street in a maroon Charger and he had an outstanding warrant. He responded to the area and drove

past the maroon Charger and observed Song and Kelley walking on foot toward the vehicle. He
                                            8
testified they called out a foot pursuit and he turned around his patrol vehicle and drove northbound

on 19th Street toward Conger Avenue. He testified he observed a male running across Conger

Avenue. He turned his vehicle into an alley and observed the male run behind a house in the 700

block of South 19th Street and lost sight of him. He testified he received information from Song

and Kelley that the male was running back toward the maroon Charger located on South 19th

Street. Chapman testified he circled back and drove toward that location. He testified Song and

Kelley placed the defendant into custody and placed him in his patrol vehicle for transportation to

the county justice center on the outstanding warrant. He testified the defendant was searched prior

to being placed in his patrol vehicle, and that he transported the defendant and the property located

on his person, including the gloves and mask, to the county jail.

¶ 22   Chapman testified, while at the booking area in the jail, he observed that the defendant’s

elbow and knees were “scraped up.” He testified he took photographs of the defendant’s injuries.

Chapman was shown People’s exhibits 8A and 8B, which he identified as the photographs he took

of the defendant’s injuries to his elbow and knees. The photographs were admitted into evidence,

without objection, and published to the jury. Chapman testified that exhibit 8A showed the

defendant’s left forearm with a scrape and fresh blood. He testified that it also showed a little bit

of dust on the defendant’s shirt. He testified that exhibit 8B showed the defendant’s injuries to his

knees and dust on the front of his pants. On cross-examination, Chapman testified that he never

observed the defendant fall down or stumble while fleeing in the area of South 19th Street.

¶ 23   The next witness was Kevin Rodriguez. He testified he was a patrol deputy with the

Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office and had been for three years. He testified that on June 13, 2020,

he received information from dispatch that Lee Davis had an active warrant and was sitting in a

maroon Charger in the 800 block of South 19th Street. Rodriguez testified he retrieved his canine

partner and responded to the area. He testified the defendant had already been placed into custody
                                                  9
at the time of his arrival. He testified Kelley asked him to utilize his canine partner to search the

flight path for any discarded items. Rodriguez testified he had received specialized training to

handle a canine unit. He testified the canine was certified to detect the presence of narcotics as

well as patrol functions. He testified that he, Song, Kelley, and his canine partner began a search

of the area following the defendant’s flight path. He testified his canine partner began to track and

pull hard on the leash. He testified 50 feet into the alleyway he heard Song say he located a firearm.

Rodriguez testified the location of the firearm was out of the parameter of where his canine partner

would normally alert when tracking. He testified the area was too big to put the canine on an article

search and believed tracking would be the best option with such a large area. He testified he

observed a revolver lying in some grass. He testified he was present when Song and Kelley took

photographs of the firearm. Rodriguez testified Song utilized gloves when picking up the weapon.

On cross-examination, Rodriguez testified he did not take any photographs of the weapon.

¶ 24   Jeremy Reichert was the next witness to testify. He testified that he was a sergeant in the

detective division with the Mount Vernon Police Department and had been for 22 years. He

testified he was the main crime scene technician and that he processed and collected evidence.

Reichert testified he received the revolver in this case to process for possible DNA or fingerprints.

He testified that prior to processing the weapon, he photographed the sealed evidence box, the box

after it was opened, and the revolver after it had been removed from the box. He testified he

swabbed the common contact areas of the weapon for possible DNA, and then processed the

firearm for possible latent prints. Reichert testified he placed the swabs for DNA in evidence to be

sent to the Illinois State Police crime lab for analysis. He testified he examined the firearm for

obvious latent prints. Reichert was shown People’s exhibits 9A and 9B, which he identified as

photographs he took of the firearm, and testified they fairly and accurately depicted the condition

of the firearm when he processed it. The photographs were admitted into evidence, without
                                           10
objection. He testified further that no latent prints suitable for comparison were located or

developed on the firearm.

¶ 25   On cross-examination, Reichert testified that he swabbed for DNA first to prevent any

alteration or damage to the potential DNA on the firearm. He testified he swabbed the grip, the

hammer, and the trigger of the firearm for possible DNA. He testified that he examined the

ammunition from the firearm, and he did not swab the ammunition for DNA and there were no

latent prints suitable for comparison located.

¶ 26   On redirect examination, Reichert testified he did not swab the ammunition for DNA

because it could potentially damage or remove possible fingerprints. He further testified that no

suitable latent prints were located on the ammunition.

¶ 27   The trial court then read the following stipulation to the jury:

       “Stipulation as to testimony of Robert Kane. ‘The People of the State of Illinois and the

       defendant, Lee V. Davis, by and through counsel for the defendant, Matt Vaughn, agree

       and stipulate that if Robert Kane was sworn under oath, he would testify to the following.

               (1) That Robert Kane is employed as a detective with the Mt. Vernon Police

       Department.

               (2) That as part of his duties as a detective with the Mt. Vernon Police Department,

       Robert did take temporary custody of a piece of evidence related to this case, being a .38

       Rohm and Gesellschaft revolver on March 1, 2021.

               (3) That Robert Kane did take custody of this revolver by contacting Officer Ray

       Gilbert of the Mt. Vernon Police Department, obtaining a key to access a locked and secure

       evidence locker, and signing out a chain of custody sheet relating to his taking possession

       of the revolver.

                                                 11
              (4) That Robert Kane then did transport the revolver to a local firing range and test

       fired the revolver using two .38 rounds of ammunition.

              (5) That the .38-caliber Rohm Gesellschaft revolver did expel the two rounds of .38

       ammunition via an external action of expulsion.

              (6) That following the test firing of the .38-caliber Rohm Gesellschaft revolver,

       Robert Kane was able to determine that the revolver is an operable firearm.

              (7) That following the test firing of the revolver, Robert Kane transported the

       revolver back to the Mt. Vernon Police Department and signed custody of the revolver

       back to Officer Ray Gilbert of the Mt. Vernon Police Department.’ ”

¶ 28   The trial court then read the following stipulation next to the jury:

       “[S]tipulation as to testimony of Bobby Wallace. ‘The People of the State of Illinois and

       the defendant, Lee V. Davis, by and through counsel for the defendant, Matt Vaughn, agree

       and stipulate that if Bobby Wallace were sworn under oath he would testify to the

       following.

              (1) That Bobby Wallace is employed as a detective with the Jefferson County

       Sheriff’s Office.

              (2) That as part of his duties as a detective with the Jefferson County Sheriff’s

       Office, Bobby Wallace did receive an order form this court on August 21, 2020, directing

       him to collect a buccal swab from Lee V. Davis.

              (3) That Bobby Wallace provided a copy of this order to Lee V. Davis on August

       21, 2020.

              (4) That on August 21, 2020, Bobby Wallace utilized an Illinois State Police

       biological standard collection kit to collect a biological sample from the inside of Lee V.

       Davis’ mouth.
                                                12
               (5) That Bobby Wallace then sealed the Illinois State biological standard collection

       kit and placed it in a secured evidence locker at the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office.’ ”

¶ 29   Jay Winters was the next witness to testify. He testified he was employed as a forensic

scientist with the Illinois State Police at the Metro-East Forensic Science Laboratory in Belleville

and had been for 15 years. He testified regarding his educational background and training. He

testified that he held a Bachelor of Science degree in biology and sociology, was a member of the

American Academy of Forensic Science, and had completed an 18-month forensic biology and

DNA training program with the Illinois State Police. He testified that the Belleville laboratory is

an accredited lab subject to examination and accreditation every year. Winters was tendered and

accepted as an expert in forensic biology and forensic DNA analysis.

¶ 30   Winters testified that he was assigned to perform DNA analysis in the defendant’s case.

He testified he received known buccal swab standards from the defendant to be used for DNA

comparison. He testified the results of his analysis on the swab of the firearm were a mixture of at

least three individuals. Winters testified he was unable to form an opinion as to the source of the

DNA profile, because it was a low-level degraded mixture of at least three people.

¶ 31   On cross-examination, Winters testified that degraded means that the DNA molecule has

deteriorated from exposure to elements like sunlight, moisture, and heat. Winters was shown

People’s exhibit 5 and testified it is common for firearms to be placed in a cardboard evidence box

of that type to prevent DNA evidence degradation.

¶ 32   On redirect examination, People’s exhibit 10 was admitted into evidence, without

objection. Winters testified that at least three people had DNA on the firearm and that the defendant

could not be “ruled out,” but based on his results, he cannot “conclusively prove” the defendant

touched the firearm.

                                                 13
¶ 33   On recross-examination, Winters testified that he could not rule out that defense counsel

touched the firearm, stating, “Any profile would be inconclusive.”

¶ 34   Following a break in the trial, the State moved to admit People’s exhibit 11, which was a

certified copy of the defendant’s conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, based

on the trial court’s previous granting of the State’s motion in limine regarding prior bad acts or

conduct. The prior conviction was admitted into evidence, over the objection of defense.

¶ 35   The trial court then read the conviction and limiting instruction to the jury:

       “Ladies and gentlemen, on the 19th day of July, 2006, the defendant, Lee V. Davis, was

       convicted of the felony of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon in Jefferson County

       Case No. 06-CF-285.

                                                      ***

               *** I will show that that was read to the jury. Now, ladies and gentlemen, evidence

       has been received that the Defendant has been involved in an offense other than that

       charged in the indictment. This evidence has been received on the issues of the Defendant’s

       intent, knowledge and absence of mistake and may be considered by you only for those

       limited purposes. It is for you to determine whether the Defendant was involved in those

       offenses and if so what weight should be given to this evidence on the issues of intent,

       knowledge and absence of mistake.”

¶ 36   The trial court then read the following stipulation of facts to the jury:

       “As approved by the Court, it is agreed that the parties in this case stipulate to the following

       facts. One, the defendant, Lee V. Davis, is charged with the offense of armed habitual

       criminal. Two, the defendant, Lee V. Davis, was previously convicted of two prior

       qualifying felony offenses under the offense of armed habitual criminal. Three, that as such

       People’s Exhibits No. 12 and 13 are admitted into evidence.”
                                             14
¶ 37   People’s exhibits 12 and 13, certified copies of defendant’s convictions for aggravated

discharge of a firearm and robbery, were then tendered to the circuit clerk.

¶ 38   Jeffery Clark was the next witness to testify. He testified he was a correctional officer with

the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office and had been for 20 years. He testified that on June 15, 2020,

he was assisting with video court that day. He explained that he takes inmates down to a training

room for video court to have their first appearance. He testified he took the defendant to video

court for his first appearance that day. Clark testified that during the defendant’s first appearance

on one of his charges, he heard the defendant state that he was not in town in 2008 when the

warrant was issued. He testified he believed that meant the defendant was not aware of the

outstanding warrant. The State then rested its case.

¶ 39   The defense did not call any witnesses and rested. A jury instruction conference was then

held. There were no objections made to proposed instructions that are relevant to this appeal. The

defendant tendered one additional instruction that was not objected to by the State.

¶ 40   Following closing arguments, the jury retired to deliberate and returned a verdict finding

the defendant guilty of being an armed habitual criminal.

¶ 41   On April 28, 2021, the defendant filed a pro se posttrial motion entitled “Defendant’s

Appeal of Conviction.” In paragraph 10 subsection 5, the defendant made the following claim:

       “Defense was not effective to say the least. He was not forth-coming of the lack of forensic

       evidence relating Defendant to said firearm, which, if made known by disclosure of the

       State, said trial would not have commenced, for the Defendant’s charge would have been

       dropped and dismissed without prejudice by the Judge upon Motion by Defense Counsel.”

The defendant’s pro se motion was never addressed by the trial court.

¶ 42   On May 26, 2021, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial and to vacate the jury verdict.

On May 27, 2021, the defendant was sentenced to serve 20 years in the Department of Corrections,
                                             15
followed by 3 years of mandatory supervised release (MSR). On June 3, 2021, the State filed a

motion to strike the defendant’s motion for a new trial. On June 7, 2021, the defendant filed a

motion to reconsider the sentence. On September 7, 2021, the State’s motion to strike defendant’s

motion for a new trial was heard and granted, and the defendant’s motion to reconsider the sentence

was heard and denied. The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on September 8, 2021.

¶ 43                                    II. ANALYSIS

¶ 44                            A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 45   On appeal, the defendant first contends that the evidence adduced at his jury trial was not

sufficient to sustain his conviction of being an armed habitual criminal. To sustain a conviction for

the offense of being an armed habitual criminal, the State must prove that the defendant knowingly

possessed a firearm after having been convicted two or more times of a qualifying offense. 720

ILCS 5/24-1.7 (West 2020). On appeal, the defendant only contests whether the evidence was

sufficient as to the element of whether he possessed a firearm.

¶ 46   When a defendant makes a claim that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his

conviction, this court reviews the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the

prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable

doubt the essential elements of the crime or crimes of which the defendant was convicted. People

v. Saxon, 374 Ill. App. 3d 409, 416 (2007). We will not reverse a criminal conviction unless the

evidence presented at trial is so improbable or unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt as to

the guilt of the defendant. Id. We allow all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the

prosecution, whether the evidence in the case is direct or circumstantial. Id. Circumstantial

evidence alone, if it satisfactorily proves the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt,

will sustain a criminal conviction. People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 64.

                                                 16
¶ 47   There is no requirement that this court disregard inferences that flow from the evidence, or

that this court search out all possible explanations consistent with innocence and raise them to a

level of reasonable doubt. Id. at 416-17. We do not retry the defendant, instead leaving it to the

trier of fact to judge the credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts in the evidence, and draw

reasonable inferences based upon all of the evidence properly before the trier of fact. Id. at 416

¶ 48   In this case, the defendant posits that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

that he possessed the firearm located in the alleyway along the defendant’s flight path. He

contends, inter alia, that the evidence only demonstrates that he ran down the alley where the gun

was located. He argues that there is no direct evidence linking him to the gun. Further, the State

did not produce any witnesses at trial that testified they observed the defendant possess a gun.

Defendant alleges that he never gave any incriminating statements to officers claiming he

possessed the gun. He argues that officers did not observe him holding or discarding a gun, and

neither officer observed him fall down during the pursuit. Defendant further alleges that the

location where the firearm was recovered is a “high call” area and the dirty condition of the gun is

evidence that the gun had been lying in the alleyway for a much longer period. Additionally, the

defendant contends that the “low level degraded mixture” DNA evidence on the gun from at least

three people did not connect him to the gun in any way and that there were no fingerprints on the

gun or ammunition suitable for comparison. In essence, the defendant contends that there is no

physical evidence or eyewitness testimony connecting him to the gun, and the State’s

circumstantial evidence is too “speculative” to support his conviction. As such, the defendant

argues that under these circumstances, no rational trier of fact could conclude that the State proved

that the defendant possessed the gun.

¶ 49   In its brief on appeal with regard to this issue, the State counters that when the defendant

exited the maroon Charger, he “slumped” over and started walking away from them. The defendant
                                              17
had his right hand in front of his face and officers could not see his left hand or left arm. The State

contends that the manner in which the defendant walked supports an inference he was hiding a

weapon. In addition, the State argues that the defendant’s flight and refusal to stop after commands

is circumstantial evidence demonstrating the defendant’s consciousness of guilt. As such, the

defendant’s flight supports the inference that the defendant possessed the gun. Further, the fact the

defendant returned to the maroon Charger, where the pursuit began, and then complied with

officers’ commands is circumstantial evidence in support of the defendant fleeing for the purpose

of discarding the gun. Moreover, evidence at trial that the defendant was unaware of his

outstanding warrant supports that he fled for another purpose, to discard the gun. The State argues

that the gun was located along the defendant’s flight path, a couple feet off the path, within minutes

of the defendant having run down it. Further, there was no evidence that anyone but the defendant

was in that alleyway on the morning of June 13, 2020.

¶ 50   Additionally, the State argues that there was a pothole or uneven ground in the alleyway

near where the gun was located. Although officers did not observe the defendant fall, officers

observed dust on his shirt and pants and injuries to his elbow and knees. Further, the gloves located

on the defendant were dirty, and the skeleton mask on his person, when viewed at trial, appeared

to have grass or weeds on it. In relation, the gun also appeared to be covered in dust, except for

the grip, suggesting the defendant fell and that the gun had recently been handled. Also, the piece

of green grass lodged near the hammer of the gun suggests that the gun was recently discarded and

had not been lying there for a long period of time. The State contends that the gloves found in the

defendant’s pockets are circumstantial evidence supporting the lack of fingerprints and DNA

evidence on the gun. The State notes that possession of a firearm may be actual or constructive,

and that in this case there was sufficient evidence to establish both actual possession and

constructive possession.
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¶ 51   In his reply brief, the defendant argues that the State did not prove possession because there

was no direct evidence establishing the defendant possessed the gun. Further, he argues that the

gun was not located near the defendant at the time he was taken into custody, but that it was

discovered several feet off the path of the alleyway he had run down. The defendant argues that

mere presence in the vicinity or access to the area in which contraband is found is insufficient to

establish constructive possession. Additionally, officers never saw the defendant fall or discard a

firearm, and it is not certain the pothole or uneven ground in the alleyway existed on June 13,

2020, because the photographs of the pothole were taken months after the incident. Lastly, the

defendant argues that the defendant may have fled, not because he possessed a gun, but because it

is “possible Mr. Davis was intoxicated and not thinking clearly.” Thus, he contends that possession

was not established, and criminal convictions cannot be based on speculation.

¶ 52   As explained above, when reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, this court allows

all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the prosecution, whether the evidence in the

case is direct or circumstantial, and will not disregard such reasonable inferences that flow from

the evidence. See, e.g., Saxon, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 416-17. Moreover, we (1) do not retry the

defendant, instead leaving it to the trier of fact to judge the credibility of witnesses, resolve

conflicts in the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences based upon all of the evidence properly

before the trier of fact, and (2) will not search out all possible explanations consistent with

innocence and raise them to a level of reasonable doubt (see id.), both of which are exactly what

the defendant asks us to do in this appeal.

¶ 53   “Circumstantial evidence is proof of facts or circumstances that give rise to reasonable

inferences of other facts that tend to establish guilt or innocence of the defendant.” Id. at 417. It is

axiomatic that “[a] defendant can be convicted solely on circumstantial evidence,” and that “[t]he

                                                  19
trier of fact does not have to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to each link in the chain of

circumstantial evidence.” Id.

¶ 54   Possession of a firearm may be actual or constructive. People v. Ingram, 389 Ill. App. 3d

897, 899 (2009).

       “Actual possession is the exercise by the defendant of present personal dominion over the

       illicit material [citation] and exists when an individual exercises immediate and exclusive

       dominion or control over the illicit material [citation]. Actual possession does not require

       present personal touching of the illicit material but, rather, present personal dominion over

       it. [Citation.] *** Where possession has been shown, an inference of guilty knowledge can

       be drawn from the surrounding facts and circumstances. [Citation.] The fact of possession

       must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]” People v. Schmalz, 194 Ill. 2d 75,

       82 (2000).

“Constructive possession exists where there is no actual, personal, present dominion over

contraband, but defendant had knowledge of the presence of the contraband, and had control over

the area where the contraband was found.” People v. Hunter, 2013 IL 114100, ¶ 19.

¶ 55   The evidence that was presented to the jury is described in detail above, and when viewed

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, that evidence was sufficient, beyond a reasonable

doubt, to sustain the conviction on appeal. The defendant “slumped over” and walked away from

officers in a manner unusual enough to attract the attention of both officers. The defendant slumped

over and used his right hand to hide his face and officers testified his left hand was not visible.

Evidence that the defendant was unaware of his outstanding warrant coupled with his flight from

officers establishes the defendant’s consciousness of guilt and supports an inference he possessed

the gun later discovered in the alleyway. Further, the defendant’s return to the vehicle where the

pursuit began and sudden compliance with officers is circumstantial evidence in support that the
                                             20
defendant fled for the purpose of discarding the gun. The gun’s location was no more than a few

feet off the defendant’s flight path and there was no evidence that anyone else was present in the

alley at the time. Although the defendant contends that mere presence in the vicinity or access to

the area in which contraband is found is insufficient to establish constructive possession, we find

that there was sufficient, additional evidence to support a finding that the defendant possessed the

gun. Specifically, the defendant, his clothing, the gloves in his possession, and the gun were all

covered in dust to varying degrees. Moreover, the gun had a piece of green grass wedged in the

hammer suggesting that the gun was recently discarded. Further, the mask in defendant’s

possession also appeared to have some type of grass or weeds on it. These facts elevate the

evidence beyond mere presence in the vicinity of the gun and establish some degree of nexus

between the firearm and the defendant. Additionally, the defendant’s possession of gloves in the

middle of summer coupled with the fact that the handle of the gun was absent of dust is

circumstantial evidence of the gun being recently handled and would also support the lack of

fingerprints or DNA evidence on the gun or ammunition. For all of these reasons, we find there

was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly

possessed the handgun, and the principles of double jeopardy do not apply.

¶ 56                                      B. Krankel

¶ 57   With regard to the defendant’s third issue, he argues that this case must be remanded for a

Krankel inquiry into his pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant

claims that his pro se motion entitled “Defendant’s Appeal of Conviction” filed on April 28, 2021,

sufficiently raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and the trial court failed to conduct

any type of preliminary inquiry into that claim.

¶ 58   In response, the State argues that the defendant’s pro se motion was not a clear claim

triggering the trial court’s duty to conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry. In support, the State
                                                21
claims the title of the defendant’s motion and his prayer for relief indicate the defendant was

attempting to appeal his conviction, not raise an ineffective claim. Thus, it was unclear whether

the trial court was required to address the defendant’s pro se motion when he was represented by

counsel. Furthermore, the State argues that the specific language or “substance” of the defendant’s

motion in contention, especially when read together with the defendant’s other claims, is subject

to different interpretations and not an explicit claim. Thus, it is insufficient to trigger a preliminary

inquiry by the trial court.

¶ 59    We begin by noting our standard of review. “The issue of whether the trial court properly

conducted a preliminary Krankel inquiry presents a legal question”; therefore, we will use a

de novo standard of review. People v. Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, ¶ 28.

¶ 60    In 1984, the Illinois Supreme Court in Krankel announced the manner in which the court

should handle ineffective assistance of counsel posttrial claims. People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181

(1984). Since that time, and in accordance therewith, a common law procedure has developed that

“is triggered when a defendant raises a *** posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel.” Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, ¶ 29. It is well-settled law that in such situations, the trial court

is not automatically required to appoint new counsel for a defendant. Id. “If the trial court

determines that the claim lacks merit or pertains only to matters of trial strategy, then the court

need not appoint new counsel and may deny the *** motion.” People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 78

(2003). If, on the other hand, “the allegations show possible neglect of the case, new counsel should

be appointed” to represent the defendant at a hearing on the defendant’s claims. Id. This ensures

that newly appointed counsel can independently evaluate the defendant’s allegations, and it also

avoids “the conflict of interest that trial counsel would experience if trial counsel had to justify his

or her actions contrary to [the] defendant’s position.” Id.

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¶ 61   To determine whether the appointment of new counsel is required, the trial court must take

action. The first step is to “examine the factual basis of the defendant’s claim.” Id. at 77-78. To do

this, “some interchange between the trial court and trial counsel regarding the facts and

circumstances surrounding the allegedly ineffective representation is permissible and usually

necessary in assessing what further action, if any, is warranted on a defendant’s claim.” Id. at 78.

The trial court may ask the trial counsel to “simply answer questions and explain the facts and

circumstances surrounding the defendant’s allegations.” Id. Further, “[a] brief discussion between

the trial court and the defendant may be sufficient” to assist the trial court in understanding the

defendant’s allegations. Id. Lastly, the trial court may base its evaluation of the defendant’s

allegations on its own “knowledge of defense counsel’s performance at trial and the insufficiency

of the defendant’s allegations on their face.” Id. at 79.

¶ 62   The goal of a preliminary Krankel inquiry “is to facilitate the trial court’s full consideration

of” the defendant’s claims. Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, ¶ 29. Moreover, by conducting the initial

evaluation of the defendant’s claims by such an inquiry, the trial court “will create the necessary

record for any claims raised on appeal.” Id. ¶ 38. To ensure this goal of the preliminary Krankel

inquiry is met, “[t]he law requires the trial court to conduct some type of inquiry into the underlying

factual basis” of the ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and if no such inquiry is conducted,

the cause must be remanded to the trial court for that purpose. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 79, 80. As the

Illinois Supreme Court has recognized, even where a defendant’s claims may ultimately be without

merit, the trial court must afford “ ‘the defendant the opportunity to specify and support his

complaints,’ ” and the trial court may not “ ‘precipitously and prematurely’ ” deny the defendant’s

motion. Id. at 80 (quoting People v. Robinson, 157 Ill. 2d 68, 86 (1993)).

¶ 63   However, as in any case that is remanded for a proper preliminary Krankel inquiry, if, after

a proper inquiry and any results that may flow from it, the trial court ultimately determines that
                                              23
the defendant’s claims are without merit, “the court may then deny the motion and leave standing

[the] defendant’s convictions and sentences.” Id. at 81. If that happens, the defendant remains able

to “appeal his assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel along with his other assignments of

error.” Id. at 81-82.

¶ 64    The Illinois Supreme Court has made clear that a pro se defendant is not required to do

anything more than bring his claim to the court’s attention and may do so orally or in writing. In re

Johnathan T., 2022 IL 127222, ¶¶ 24, 47. “[A] bare allegation of ‘ineffective assistance of

counsel,’ without more, is sufficient to warrant a preliminary Krankel inquiry.” People v.

Downing, 2019 IL App (1st) 170329, ¶ 55 (citing People v. Ayers, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 24); see also,

e.g., People v. Patrick, 2011 IL 111666, ¶ 39; People v. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d 158, 200 (1996) (all

supporting the general proposition that a defendant is not required to file any sort of specific

motion, and simply a letter or note to the court will suffice, and that even if the defendant does not

specifically include the words “ineffective assistance of counsel” in the defendant’s filing or oral

statement, the allegations can be sufficient to require a Krankel inquiry).

¶ 65    In this case, the defendant’s pro se motion contained the following language in paragraph

10 subsection 5:

        “Defense was not effective to say the least. He was not forth-coming of the lack of forensic

        evidence relating Defendant to said firearm, which, if made known by disclosure of the

        State, said trial would not have commenced, for the Defendant’s charge would have been

        dropped and dismissed without prejudice by the Judge upon Motion by Defense Counsel.”

¶ 66    We find that the language set forth in defendant’s pro se motion was sufficient to trigger

the requirement that a preliminary Krankel inquiry be conducted, particularly when one is mindful

of the fact that Krankel inquiries always result from pro se claims, and it would not be realistic to

expect or require a pro se criminal defendant to use the precise or artful language one would
                                              24
require of a licensed attorney. Further, we note that the record reveals the trial court and the

attorneys of record were aware of defendant’s pro se motion due to the trial court’s docket entry

on April 30, 2021, two days after the defendant’s motion was filed which documented that a copy

of the defendant’s motion was distributed to the State and public defender. Accordingly, we reject

the State’s argument that the defendant failed to make a sufficient or clear ineffective claim and

remand this case with directions for the trial court to conduct a Krankel hearing.

¶ 67                                 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 68   For the foregoing reasons, we remand with directions for the trial court to conduct a hearing

to address the defendant’s pro se ineffective assistance of counsel claims, as required by People v.

Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984), and to determine, based on the trial court’s conclusion following

the hearing, whether additional proceedings are required.

¶ 69   Cause remanded with directions.

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