Court Opinion

ID: 9685702
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:57:39.208076+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:09.591714
License: Public Domain

Shepherd, P.J.
(dissenting). I do not believe that we should reach the issues decided by the Court in §§ i, ii and hi of the opinion since I believe that the subject policy is invalid because it was not promulgated pursuant to the required rule-making procedures set forth in the Administrative Procedures Act. Since the rule in question was not properly promulgated, I would remand to the circuit court for that court to order the Department of Social Services to determine eligibility without reference to the spouse’s Supplemental Security Income benefits.
As indicated in the majority opinion, the statute in question provides: "The state department shall establish eligibility and financial standards for all forms of general public relief and burial.” MCL 400.24; MSA 16.424. (Emphasis added.)
In my view this does not give the agency the luxury of deciding to exercise or not to exercise a permissive statutory power, a prerequisite to being exempt from the rule-making requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act. To me the apa and the statute under which dss operates are clear and unambiguous. If an agency is free to exercise or not to exercise a power, the agency need not promulgate a rule. Where the agency is required to establish standards or rights, it must promulgate a rule.
In the instant case the so-called administrative policy goes to the heart of the eligibility of recipients for benefits. The purpose behind the rule-*634making requirement is to give those who are directly affected by a substantial and substantive agency action the opportunity to be heard by the agency before it promulgates standards or rights or policies that have substantial impact upon the rights of those served by the agency. In this case individuals will be entirely cut off from benefits by the implementation of the policy in question and I believe that the whole purpose of the rule-making requirement is to afford those affected by the agency the protection against arbitrary and unreasonable action, and this cannot be accomplished without first giving the interested parties or groups the right to be heard.
In Coalition for Human Rights v Dep’t of Social Services, 431 Mich 172; 428 NW2d 335 (1988), the Supreme Court held that a system of holding telephone conferences in lieu of hearings was of such significance that the procedure could not be instituted without rule-making. The Court indicated that there is a general principle that "the preferred method of policymaking is by promulgation of rules.” Coalition for Human Rights, supra at 185. When we start with that assumption and compare telephone conferences, a mere procedural device, with the policy in question in the instant case (a policy that will totally eliminate benefits to a whole class of people) it becomes abundantly clear that the policy of eliminating general assistance benefits of one spouse because of the ssi benefits received by the other is a matter that requires the more formalized protections of the rule-making requirements.
The majority opinion relies, in part, on Village of Wolverine Lake v State Boundary Comm, 79 Mich App 56; 261 NW2d 206 (1977), and Hinderer v Dep’t of Social Services, 95 Mich App 716; 291 *635NW2d 672 (1980), lv den 409 Mich 930 (1980). I believe that such reliance is misplaced.
In Wolverine Lake the Court of Appeals interpreted a statute to mean that the agency in question had been delegated the power by the Legislature to disfavor the creation of small communities within larger metropolitan areas. The Wolverine Lake Court indicated, "[t]his bias against small communities rises as much from the statute as it does from the Boundary Commission 'policy/ but this legislative choice is a political one and not subject to judicial review.” Wolverine Lake, supra at 59-60. Thus the policy that was in question in Wolverine Lake was one that had been delegated by the Legislature to the agency. In the instant case there is nothing specific in the legislation under consideration from which it necessarily follows that there is authority to withhold all benefits from one individual based upon the ssi benefits received by that individual’s spouse.
In Hinderer the Court was concerned with nothing more than a method of accounting that would deduct benefits from a recipient in one month and add payments back in another month while leaving the total eligibility rights intact. In the long run the beneficiaries of the agency’s services received essentially the same benefits and were deprived of nothing. In the instant case a potential recipient of benefits is deprived of everything based upon an internal policy of the agency without benefit of the protection afforded by the rule-making requirements of the apa.
Once the agency complies with the rule-making procedures and all concerned parties have an opportunity to make their views known, the agency might very well modify or eliminate the proposed policy. If it persists in maintaining the policy, reasons will have been given and there will be *636justifications in the record for the judicial branch to evaluate. That was the reason for instituting the rule-making requirement of the apa. Since we do not have the results of the procedures of the apa in this case, I would not want to address the constitutional issues and would therefore require the circuit court to order that general assistance benefits should be determined without regard to a spouse’s ssi benefits.
Accordingly, I would reverse and remand to the circuit court.