Court Opinion

ID: 9790340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:51:53.807447+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:28.886969
License: Public Domain

BROUSSARD, J., Concurring.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion
that the applicable language of Penal Code section 1203.2, subdivision (a)— a “court may revoke . . . probation if. . . the court, in its judgment, has reason to believe . . . that the [probationer] has violated any of the conditions of. . . probation ... or has subsequently committed other offenses ...” (italics added)—authorizes the revocation of probation on the basis of a “preponderance of the evidence” standard of proof. I do not agree, however, with the majority’s suggestion that, as a matter of policy, a “preponderance of the evidence” standard is superior to a “clear and convincing evidence” standard. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 445.)
If this court were free to decide the question of the applicable standard of proof at a probation revocation proceeding on the basis of our own policy determination, I would conclude, for the reasons expressed by the drafters of the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice (ABA Standards), that a probationer should have “the right to require the government to establish [a probation] violation by clear and convincing evidence, unless the probationer admits the violation . . . .” (3 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, std. 18-7.5 (2d ed. 1980) p. 525.) As the commentary to the ABA Standards explains: “Underlying [the standard’s] position is the *450premise that a liberty interest should not be sacrificed simply on the ‘preponderance’ standard, which is normally applicable only to civil trials. Otherwise, an unfortunate incentive might arise to use the revocation hearing as a substitute for a criminal prosecution with its higher standard of proof. Even where this incentive is not present, the focus of the law should be on the precipitating event that is said to justify the loss of present liberty. Where the original crime did not require incarceration, subsequent behavior that is considered sufficient to justify confinement should be established under a standard that approaches providing the same assurance of factual accuracy that a criminal trial does.” (Id. at p. 533.)
While I personally find the position of the ABA Standards persuasive— particularly the concern expressed with the tendency to resort to revocation as a means of avoiding the constitutionally mandated procedural safeguards of an ordinary criminal prosecution—my own view of the more enlightened policy on this subject is of no moment in this case, given the controlling provisions of Penal Code section 1203.2. I agree with the majority that section 1203.2 cannot reasonably be interpreted to require that a probation violation be proved by “clear and convincing evidence.” Since I find nothing in the relevant authorities to suggest that a “preponderance of the evidence” standard is constitutionally impermissible in this context,1 I concur in the reversal of the Court of Appeal judgment.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied October 25, 1990.

See, for example, State v. Maier (Me. 1980) 423 A.2d 235, 238-239; State v. Reyes (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div. 1986) 207 N.J.Super. 126 [504 A.2d 43]. See generally 3 LaFave and Israel, Criminal Procedure (1984) section 25.4, page 162.