Court Opinion

ID: 6412133
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-06-25 11:53:29.239385+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:51:24.509532
License: Public Domain

Bigelow, J.
The defendants, at the trial of this case, rested their defence solely on these two grounds, 1st. That the plaintiff had failed to comply with certain executory representations and stipulations, concerning the construction and mode of use of the property insured, during the period of time covered by the policy; and 2d. That he had misstated the amount of insurance existing on the buildings at the time of making application to the defendants to insure them.
1. In support of the first ground of defence, and in order to prove the stipulations and representations which it was alleged the plaintiff had violated, the defendants offered in evidence a paper containing a description of the property insured, in the form of questions and answers, as usually made in applications for insurance. But this paper did not on its face purport to have been made by the plaintiff or in his behalf, nor was it signed by him. It was a description of the property by a third person; nor was there any evidence that its contents were assented to or even known by the plaintiff.
The defendants, however, sought to hold him responsible for the statements and stipulations contained in it, by reason of a clause in the policy to the effect that the contract of insurance was made and accepted in reference to a “ survey ” on file in the office of the defendants, which was to be resorted to in order to explain the rights and obligations of the parties under the contract. The argument was, and it is now again urged, that the plaintiff, having accepted a policy which referred to a survey, is shown to have had constructive notice of the existence of such survey; that he is bound by the stipulations and representations contained in it, and in seeking to enforce the contract is *497estopped to deny that they were made by him or by his au« thority.
Admitting the soundness and force of this argument, and that the plaintiff is bound by the survey so far as he has recognized and adopted it by accepting the policy, the question stiff remains to be determined, to what extent such recognition and adoption go. And the answer to this question depends on the proper and legitimate meaning of the word “ survey ; ” because it was of this, and this only, that the plaintiff had notice by the terms of his policy. Upon this point, we think there can be no doubt. In its strict signification, as well as in the broader meaning which it may be supposed to have as applied to the subject matter, it can be taken to import only a plan and description of the present existing state, condition and mode of use of the property. It cannot, by any reasonable construction, be held to signify that any statements or representations of a promissory or executory nature were embraced within it, relating to any contemplated alteration or improvement in the property, or to the mode in which the premises were to be occupied during the continuance of the policy. In this sense, the word appears to be used in the conditions of insurance attached to the policy and forming a part of the contract. The terms “ survey, plan and description ” are there used as being nearly synonymous.
Such being the true import of the word " survey,” we can have no difficulty in ascertaining the extent to which the plaintiff is bound by the representations and stipulations contained in the paper which the defendants offered in evidence at the trial. So far as they are of an executory nature, or relate to the use or occupation of the premises subsequently to the date of the policy, it is clear that the plaintiff is not bound by them. He has neither recognized nor adopted them, nor is he estopped from showing that they are not obligatory upon him. The defendants therefore cannot sustain their first ground of defence by proof that no watchman was constantly kept in the mill, or that ladders were not erected on the buildings. Those were stipulations by which he was not bound.
The condition in the certificates of renewal, “ that the appliea*498tian upon which said policy was originally predicated shall continue valid and in full force,” cannot enlarge the effect of the original reference in the policy.
2. As to the second ground of defence, based on the alleged misrepresentation concerning the amount of insurance dn the property when the policy was issued, it is sufficient to say that there was no evidence at the trial, that any representations on the subject were ever made or authorized by the plaintiff.
3. It was suggested at the argument of the case on the questions raised at the trial and presented by the report of the judge, that the facts in evidence disclosed an additional ground of defence. The policy on its face contains the express stipulation or warranty that twenty five thousand dollars were insured on the property elsewhere; and it appeared at the trial that the amount actually insured was much less than this sum. It is quite probable that this would have been a sufficient answer to the plaintiff’s claim, if it had been seasonably insisted on. But we think it is quite too late for the defendants now to avail themselves of it. No such ground of defence was distinctly stated in their answer, nor was it suggested at the trial. They cannot be permitted, in this stage of a cause, to start a new objection to the plaintiff’s right to recover, which was within their knowledge at the time of the trial, and of which they did not seek to avail themselves, when the plaintiff had an opportunity to meet it. Judgment on the verdict„