Court Opinion

ID: 9418123
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:09:16.055745+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:55.742474
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Moody,
dissenting.
I am unable to agree to the judgment in this case, for the reason that the statute here in question, as it was enforced against the property of thé'plaintiff in error, in my opinion was an interference with interstate commerce, which was beyond the power of the State. It is to be observed that the court below did not construe the statute as applying to articles in the course of transportation between the States and not destined for sale to consumers in the State, or, in other words, the court did not hold that the statute applied to the property here affected by it. On the contrary, the court expressly refrained from passing upon the merits of the controversy, and dismissed the bill for want of jurisdiction. We, however, have assumed jurisdiction of the controversy, for reasons given in the opinion of the court, in which I concur, and therefore cannot escape the duty of interpreting the meaning of the statute. I think we should, if it be possible, give to the statute a meaning which places its constitutionality beyond doubt. The law seems clearly to be designed to protect state manufacturers and consumers within the State. Its operation is limited by the words of the first section, which directs the Governor to appoint inspectors for illuminating fluids “which may be manufactured or offered for sale in the State.” Far from enlarging the meaning of these restrictive words, the other provisions of the law accord with and confirm them. The oil in tank No. 1 at least, which was neither manufactured in the State nor offered for sale in the.State, is by this interpretation removed from the operation of the statute, and I think we ought so to decide.
But, if it be assumed that the oil in tank No. 1 is subjected to inspection by the law, in my opinion the law is unconstitu-
*235tiónal. The law is not sustained by the judgment of the court as an inspection law, which it purports to be. Perhaps it could not be under the doctrine announced and applied in Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, and Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 78. I am therefore relieved from considering whether the law, because it is a mere cloak for exacting revenue from interstate commerce, is bad as an inspection law. The judgment of the court treats it as such, and it is sustained not as an inspection but as a revenue law. I do not dissent from such an interpretation of its effect. But, with unfeigned deference to the opinions of my brethren, I venture to think that the statute, as enforced in the case at bar, is bad as a taxing law. The case of American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500, holds that articles before they have ceased to be the subjects of interstate commerce may still be reached by the taxing power of the State. Accordingly .it was held that the property of a citizen of another State which had been brought into the State of Tennessee, placed in a warehouse for sale, and from there sold to persons within as well as -without the State, was subject to a state tax. It was observed in the opinion in that case that the ..••property had come to rest in the State and was enjoying the protection of its laws. But the case at bar, so far as it concerns the oil in tank No. 1, to which I confine my observations, is sharply distinguished from that case. The judgment here takes a step forward which 1 think ought not to be taken. The oil in that tank had been sold while in Pennsylvania and Ohio •to purchasers in other States than Tennessee, before it started in the course of interstate transportation. It was shipped especially in pursuance of such sales. It was in Tennessee only momentarily (“a few days”), for the purpose of repacking and reshipping it, and for no other purpose whatever. The delay was to meet the exigencies of interstate commerce, which arose out of the nature of the transaction. It does not seem to me important, if such be the case, that it would begin the remainder of its interstate journey under a new contract of shipment. It would no more seem to be the subject of state taxation than *236a drove of cattle, whose long interstate journey was interrupted, for humane reason, to give them a few days of rest and refreshment. With respect to this oil, no business whatever was done in the State except that which was required to conduct the transaction of interstate commerce begun in another State and to be completed in a third State. The single consideration that the property enjoys in Tennessee the protection of the laws of the State cannot be enough to justify state taxation. If that were so, all property in the course of interstate transportation would be subject to state tax in every State through which it should pass. I' conclude that the oil in question was actually in the course'of transportation between the States, was delayed in the State of Tennessee only for the purpose of conveniently continuing that transportation, and was, therefore, protected from state taxation by the commerce clause of the Constitution. Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, 525; Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U. S. 1. Cases of taxation upon property before it has entered the channels of interstate transportation, or after the transportation has finally ended, seem to me to have no application. In the former class the property is taxable because it has not ceased to be a part of the mass of the property of the State, and in the latter class because it has come to rest as a part of the mass of the property of the State. Between those two points of time it is exempt from the taxing power of the State. In every case where the tax has been sustained there were facts present regarded as essential by the court, which are absent here. The property had either not began its interstate journey, as- in Coe v. Erroll, ub. sup., and Diamond Match Company v. Ontonagon, 188 U. S. 82, or it had ended that journey and was held for sale in common with other property in the State, as in Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622; Pittsburg Coal Company v. Bates, 156 U. S. 577, and American Steel & Wire Company v. Speed, ub. sup.
Mr. Justice Holmes concurs.