Court Opinion

ID: 9661891
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:54:06.470103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:34.910289
License: Public Domain

Josephine Linker Hart, Judge. Martin Hinojosa entered conditional plea of guilty to the charge of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, for which he was sentenced to 108 months in the Arkansas Department of Correction. Pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.3, Hinojosa reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence found in his vehicle. For reversal of that decision, Hinojosa argues 1) because the traffic stop was based on a mistake of law, the trooper conducting the stop did not have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation had been committed; 2) the stop was unlawful because Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-14-716, the statutory provision that the trooper making the stop purported to be invoking, did not apply to him; and 3) even if the stop was valid, the seizure became unlawful when it was prolonged beyond the time necessary to issue a citation in the absence of reasonable suspicion that he was committing a crime. We agree that the stop was unlawful because it was conducted without probable cause, and therefore, we reverse and remand. Because we find Hinojosa’s second point dispositive of this case, we shall limit our discussion to that argument. At Hinojosa’s suppression hearing, Sergeant Kyle Drown of the Arkansas State Police testified that he stopped Hinojosa’s vehicle because it had an improperly displayed license plate, a violation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-14-716 (Repl. 2008). Sergeant Drown stated that the license-plate bracket “completely covered the state name.” He asked Hinojosa if he could tell where the plate was from, and Hinojosa admitted he could not. Hinojosa also admitted that he had previously been stopped for that very violation. Pictures introduced into evidence confirmed that the bracket that secured Hinojosa’s plate had a thin metal strip that covered the outer edge of the right and left sides. That thin strip also extended over the month and year stickers, but widened to a larger strip emblazoned with the word “HONDA” that completely covered “Arizona” on the plate. However, to the left of and below the registration characters was a stylized desert landscape with prominent cacti. On the right side, below the second set of registration characters was the Arizona nickname “GRAND CANYON STATE.” On cross-examination, Sergeant Drown admitted that he had seen over 100 Arizona license plates. He acknowledged that he knew that there was a cactus symbol on the Arizona plate. Further, Sergeant Drown stated that he was “familiar” with the fact that the Grand Canyon lies in Arizona and that if he saw a license plate with “Grand Canyon State” on it, he would know that it would mean Arizona. Sergeant Drown stated that he recognized that Hinojosa’s license plate was from Arizona. Further, he stated that he was familiar with Arkansas traffic regulations, but not those of Arizona. Based on Sergeant Drown’s testimony and the pictures of the license plate, the trial court denied Hinojosa’s motion to suppress. Hinojosa then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal. In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we conduct a de novo review based on the totality of the circumstances, reviewing findings of historical facts for clear error and determining whether those facts give rise to reasonable suspicion or probable cause, giving due weight to inferences drawn by the trial court. Simmons v. State, 83 Ark. App. 87, 118 S.W.3d 136 (2003). In our review, we defer to the superior position of the trial judge to pass upon the credibility of witnesses. Davis v. State, 351 Ark. 406, 94 S.W.3d 892 (2003). Hinojosa contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because Sergeant Drown’s traffic stop was based on a mistake of law, and therefore he did not have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation had been committed. He asserts that although the trooper purported to stop him for violating Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-14-716 (Repl. 2006), that section was not applicable to out-of-state vehicles. Instead, he argues that because a general statute must yield to a specific one, in this case Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-14-704 (Repl. 2006), which concerns motor vehicles registered outside the State of Arkansas, is the applicable law. Under section 27-14-704, vehicles registered out-of-state are only required to have license plates that “conspicuously display the registration numbers.” We find this argument persuasive. In order for a police officer to make a traffic stop, he must have probable cause to believe that the vehicle has violated a traffic law. Meraz-Lopez v. State, 92 Ark. App. 157, 211 S.W.3d 564 (2005). Probable cause is defined as “facts or circumstances within a police officer’s knowledge that are sufficient to permit a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been committed by the person suspected.” Burks v. State, 362 Ark. 558, 559-60, 210 S.W.3d 62, 64 (2005).  First, we agree with Hinojosa’s assertion that section 27-14-704, captioned “Motor vehicles registered in foreign states” controls over section 27-14-716, captioned “Display of license plates generally.” It is axiomatic that a general statute does not apply and must yield where there is a specific statute addressing a particular subject matter. Osborne v. State, 94 Ark. App. 337, 230 S.W.3d 290 (2006). Under section 27-14-704, as Hinojosa notes, all that was required was that his plate “conspicuously display the registration numbers.”  Having decided what the applicable law is in this case, we next consider the evidence of its violation and find it lacking. It is not disputed that the registration number of Hinojosa’s vehicle was conspicuously displayed. Furthermore, Sergeant Drown testified that he had seen more than 100 Arizona license plates, and he admitted that he recognized the license plate on Hinojosa’s vehicle as an Arizona license plate. Accordingly, there were no facts or circumstances that would permit a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense had been committed. We therefore reverse the trial court’s denial of Hinojosa’s motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  In deciding this case today, we are mindful that in Travis v. State, 331 Ark. 7, 959 S.W.2d 32 (1998), the supreme court rejected a mistake-of-law argument. However, we believe that Travis is distinguishable. In Travis, the appellant was stopped based on a deputy’s erroneous belief that Texas law required an expiration sticker to be displayed on the license plate, in the same manner as is required by Arkansas law. In the instant case, only Arkansas law was at issue, and there clearly was no violation of the applicable Arkansas statute. Pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 12-8-101 (Repl. 2003), the Department of the Arkansas State Police was created for the express purpose of enforcing our motor vehicle laws. We hold that it is not reasonable for a trooper to stop a vehicle because he or she was not thoroughly familiar with this discrete body of law. Reversed and remanded. Hunt, J., agrees, Griffen, J., concurs.