Court Opinion

ID: 9915566
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 19:00:42.309147+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:16:35.971086
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-50238         Document: 00517023186             Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/05/2024

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                      ____________
                                                                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit
                                       No. 23-50238
                                     Summary Calendar                                  FILED
                                     ____________                                January 5, 2024
                                                                                  Lyle W. Cayce
   United States of America,                                                           Clerk

                                                                       Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Alejandro Carrasco,

                                               Defendant—Appellant.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the Western District of Texas
                               USDC No. 7:22-CR-252-1
                      ______________________________

   Before Barksdale, Graves, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          Alejandro Carrasco challenges his guilty-plea conviction, as stated in
   the judgment, for, inter alia, using, carrying, or possessing a firearm during
   and in relation to a crime of violence or drug-trafficking crime, in violation of
   18 U.S.C. § 924(c). He contends the indictment did not sufficiently charge

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-50238        Document: 00517023186           Page: 2   Date Filed: 01/05/2024

                                       No. 23-50238

   him with a violation of § 924(c). Alternatively, he contends his plea to that
   offense was not knowing or voluntary.
             Because Carrasco did not raise these issues in district court, review is
   only for plain error. E.g., United States v. Broussard, 669 F.3d 537, 546 (5th
   Cir. 2012). Under that standard, Carrasco must show a forfeited plain error
   (clear-or-obvious error, rather than one subject to reasonable dispute) that
   affected his substantial rights. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135
   (2009). If he makes that showing, we have the discretion to correct the
   reversible plain error, but generally should do so only if it “seriously affect[s]
   the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings”. Id.
   (citation omitted). The requisite clear or obvious error is lacking for both
   issues.
             Regarding the sufficiency of the indictment, “[i]t is well-settled that
   when a defendant enters a voluntary and unconditional guilty plea, the plea
   has the effect of waiving all nonjurisdictional defects in the prior
   proceedings”. United States v. Medel-Guadalupe, 987 F.3d 424, 428 (5th Cir.
   2021) (citation omitted). A defective indictment is not a jurisdictional defect.
   E.g., United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630–31 (2002). Because, as
   demonstrated infra, Carrasco’s plea was knowing and voluntary, there is no
   clear or obvious error concerning whether he waived any challenge to the
   indictment’s sufficiency. See Medel-Guadalupe, 987 F.3d at 428.
             In the alternative, Carrasco contends his plea was not knowing and
   voluntary for two reasons. Again, there is no clear or obvious error. First, he
   asserts there was an insufficient factual basis to support his § 924(c)
   conviction. “[Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] 11(b)(3) requires a
   district court taking a guilty plea to make certain that the factual conduct
   admitted by the defendant is sufficient as a matter of law to establish a
   violation of the statute to which he entered his plea.” United States v. Trejo,

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                                     No. 23-50238

   610 F.3d 308, 313 (5th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
   “In assessing factual sufficiency under the plain error standard, we may look
   beyond those facts admitted by the defendant during the plea colloquy and
   scan the entire record for facts supporting his conviction.” Id.
          Carrasco confirmed under oath at his rearraignment that he agreed
   with, and had reviewed, the stipulated facts.         Those facts established
   detectives conducted two controlled purchases of cocaine from Carrasco.
   Each time the buyer traveled to Carrasco’s apartment to obtain the cocaine.
   When detectives later executed a search warrant at Carrasco’s apartment, he
   stated they would find a scale, cocaine, and firearms in his apartment closet.
   Two firearms and multiple narcotics were found in a backpack in Carrasco’s
   bedroom closet. Detectives discovered cocaine also in the closet and found
   items evidencing drug distribution throughout the residence. The firearms
   were easily accessible to Carrasco, not locked in a safe or in a storage
   container, and of the type commonly used for protection. Carrasco was
   present at the residence during both controlled drug purchases, and he was
   prohibited from possessing firearms because of a prior felony conviction. In
   the light of these facts, Carrasco did not show the requisite plain error in his
   § 924(c) conviction. See United States v. Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d 409, 414–
   15 (5th Cir. 2000) (listing factors relevant to “in furtherance” finding as:
   “the type of drug activity that is being conducted, accessibility of the firearm,
   the type of the weapon, whether the weapon is stolen, the status of the
   possession (legitimate or illegal), whether the gun is loaded, proximity to
   drugs or drug profits, and the time and circumstances under which the gun is
   found”).
          Second, Carrasco contends his plea was not knowing or voluntary
   because he was not adequately advised of the nature of the charge. See Fed.
   R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G) (requiring court inform defendant of “the nature
   of each charge to which the defendant is pleading”). Carrasco’s indictment

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                                    No. 23-50238

   was read, he stated he understood the charges, and he was given an
   opportunity to ask questions. See United States v. Cuevas-Andrade, 232 F.3d
   440, 444 (5th Cir. 2000) (observing “a reading of the indictment, followed
   by an opportunity given [to] the defendant to ask questions about it, will
   usually suffice to inform the defendant of the nature of the charge” (citation
   omitted)). The admissions in Carrasco’s signed factual basis, along with his
   solemn declarations made during his rearraignment proceeding, show the
   court did not plainly err. See United States v. McKnight, 570 F.3d 641, 649
   (5th Cir. 2009) (explaining “solemn declarations in open court carry a strong
   presumption of verity” (citation omitted)); Hobbs v. Blackburn, 752 F.2d
   1079, 1081 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting “[o]fficial records, such as this signed
   [guilty plea], are entitled to a presumption of regularity and are accorded
   great evidentiary weight”).
          AFFIRMED.

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