Court Opinion

ID: 9405672
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-28 21:05:51.033759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:23.569264
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
            in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                        2023 IL App (3d) 210105-U

                                   Order filed June 28, 2023
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                   IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                             THIRD DISTRICT

                                                    2023

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                       )      Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                        )      of the 14th Judicial Circuit,
                                                       )      Henry County, Illinois,
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                       )
                                                       )      Appeal No. 3-21-0105
             v.                                        )      Circuit No. 14-CF-334
                                                       )
      STEVEN J. VARNAUSKAS,                            )      Honorable
                                                       )      Terence M. Patton,
             Defendant-Appellant.                      )      Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court.
            Justices Albrecht and Peterson concurred in the judgment.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                 ORDER

¶1          Held: Postconviction counsel failed to file the certificate required by Illinois
                  Supreme Court Rule 651(c), and the record does not establish counsel’s
                  compliance with the rule.

¶2          Defendant, Steven J. Varnauskas, appeals the Henry County circuit court’s denial of his

     postconviction petition. Defendant argues postconviction counsel failed to file the certificate

     required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017), and the record does not

     establish that counsel otherwise satisfied the requirements of the rule. We reverse and remand.
¶3                                           I. BACKGROUND

¶4          A jury found defendant guilty of two counts of controlled substance trafficking (720 ILCS

     570/401.1(a) (West 2014)). The evidence adduced at trial established that defendant was stopped

     for an obstructed license plate. Defendant drove a car that was rented from Los Angeles and was

     stopped in Illinois. Receipts located inside the car showed that many stops had been made from

     California to Illinois and purchases were made in cash. Pursuant to a positive canine alert for the

     presence of drugs, police searched defendant’s car on the side of the road for approximately 20

     minutes before moving the car to the police department to continue the search. The initial search

     on the side of the road was fruitless. Following the move, officers located drugs under the hood in

     the engine compartment. We affirmed on direct appeal. People v. Varnauskas, 2018 IL App (3d)

     150654, ¶ 38. Specifically, we found that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a

     motion to suppress arguing that the probable cause developed during defendant’s traffic stop

     dissipated after the vehicle was relocated. Id. ¶¶ 35-36.

¶5          On April 17, 2020, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition. Defendant’s petition

     alleged, inter alia, various claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel,

     prosecutorial misconduct, circuit court error, and actual innocence. Defendant attached an affidavit

     averring that when he told trial and appellate counsel that he was “actually innocent” he was told

     that “it was not important” and “there was no need to prove anything.” Further, defendant asserted

     that he informed trial and appellate counsel that he had alibi witnesses, and those witnesses would

     have changed the outcome of his trial. The affidavit was signed by defendant and notarized. The

     court advanced defendant’s petition to the second stage and appointed counsel.

¶6          On June 11, 2020, counsel filed a motion for discovery. In the motion, counsel stated that

     obtaining the materials he sought would enable him to “discharge his duties under Supreme Court

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     Rule 651(c).” On September 24, 2020, counsel filed an amended postconviction petition solely

     advancing defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel for failing to

     file a motion to suppress arguing the dissipation of probable cause during defendant’s traffic stop.

     Counsel also stated that defendant sought “incorporation of the Affidavits attached to his pro se

     Petition.” Counsel filed a second amended postconviction petition elaborating on the ineffective

     assistance of trial and appellate counsel claim raised in the prior amended petition. At the hearing,

     counsel referenced our decision in Varnauskas, 2018 IL App (3d) 150654, ¶ 38, and argued that it

     was “defendant’s position that that’s not the law.” Additionally, counsel indicated that he was

     prepared to present defendant’s testimony if the court advanced the petition to an evidentiary

     hearing. The court granted the State’s motion to dismiss, finding that defendant’s claim, the only

     one advanced by counsel, was barred by res judicata.

¶7                                              II. ANALYSIS

¶8          On appeal, defendant argues that postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance

     by failing to comply with and file the certificate required by Rule 651(c), where the record does

     not explicitly show that counsel (a) consulted with defendant to ascertain his constitutional

     violations, (b) reviewed the entirety of the record, and (c) shaped defendant’s claims into proper

     legal form. Defendant also argues that counsel failed to develop a claim worthy of pursuit. The

     State concedes that counsel failed to file a Rule 651(c) certificate and “never explicitly stated on

     the record that he spoke to defendant” but argues the record is otherwise sufficient to show that

     counsel fulfilled the duties required by the rule.

¶9          The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020)) “provides a

     method by which persons under criminal sentence can assert that their convictions were the result

     of a substantial denial of their rights under the United States or the Illinois Constitution or both.”

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       People v. Kirkpatrick, 2012 IL App (2d) 100898, ¶ 10. A defendant is only entitled to reasonable

       assistance from postconviction counsel. People v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34, 42 (2007). To ensure

       that defendant receives reasonable assistance, Rule 651(c) requires that counsel comply with and

       file a certificate that he or she has

                       “consulted with petitioner by phone, mail, electronic means or in person to

                       ascertain his or her contentions of deprivation of constitutional rights, has

                       examined the record of the proceedings at the trial, and has made any

                       amendments to the petitions filed pro se that are necessary for an adequate

                       presentation of petitioner’s contentions.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. July 1,

                       2017).

¶ 10           Postconviction counsel’s failure to file an affidavit certifying compliance with Rule 651(c)

       does not warrant an automatic reversal. People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227, 238 (1993). “If counsel

       fails to file a certificate of compliance with Rule 651(c), a reviewing court is not entitled to assume

       that counsel has complied with the rule; rather, there must be an explicit showing in the record that

       the rule’s requirements have been met.” People v. Myers, 386 Ill. App. 3d 860, 865 (2008). When

       an explicit showing exists, the error caused by counsel’s failure to file a Rule 651(c) certificate is

       harmless. People v. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37, 45-46 (2007). Where the record does not sufficiently

       demonstrate counsel’s compliance with the rule, we must remand the matter to the circuit court for

       compliance. Id. at 47.

¶ 11           Here, the record does not include a Rule 651(c) certificate and fails to explicitly show that

       postconviction counsel consulted with defendant by phone, mail, electronic means, or in person to

       ascertain his or her contentions of deprivation of constitutional rights. See Myers, 386 Ill. App. 3d

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       at 865. Therefore, remand is required for compliance with Rule 651(c) and de novo second-stage

       proceedings.

¶ 12          We are unpersuaded by the State’s argument that we can “presume[ ],” “infer,” and rely on

       “suggest[ions]” in the record to find that counsel was “aware” of, and “fulfilled” his duties under

       Rule 651(c), and consulted with defendant to ascertain his constitutional claims. Presumptions and

       inferences are insufficient to establish an explicit showing that counsel communicated with

       defendant specifically to ascertain his contention of deprivation of his constitutional rights required

       under the rule. See Myers, 386 Ill. App. 3d at 865; see also Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017).

       Therefore, we reverse the circuit court’s denial of the postconviction petition and remand for

       de novo second-stage proceedings. Because we reverse for second-stage proceedings, we need not

       consider defendant’s remaining contentions.

¶ 13                                            III. CONCLUSION

¶ 14          The judgment of the circuit court of Henry County is reversed and remanded.

¶ 15          Reversed and remanded.

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