Court Opinion

ID: 9578410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:44:56.71401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:24:09.814558
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION OF
RICHARDSON, C.J.,
WITH WHOM NAKAMURA, J„ JOINS
The court concludes summary judgment in defendants’ favor was improperly granted because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the actions of the police officers were affirmative acts which worsened the situation of appellant’s decedent by preventing someone else from rendering further aid and assistance. It purports to find legal support for overruling the circuit court in this generally phrased excerpt from a treatise:
If there is no duty to come to the assistance of a person in difficulty or peril, there is at least a duty to avoid any affirmative acts which make his situation worse.
W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 56, at 343 (4th ed. 1971). Viewing the inferences to be drawn from the materials considered by the circuit court in the most favorable light to plaintiff, I would conclude as the circuit court did that defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
I.
If a duty on the part of the defendants to plaintiffs decedent can be established, it would have to be from the following circum*186stances recounted in the court’s opinion:
At approximately 6:30 p.m., Police Officers John Souza (hereinafter “Souza”) and Peter Carlos (hereinafter “Carlos”) arrived at Schrader’s residence in response to his call. After the officers talked to Schrader, Carlos attempted, for about. 20 minutes and from different vantage points, to locate the light on the ridge with binoculars, but was unsuccessful. During Carlos’ attempt, a military helicopter was seen in the area and there was some speculation between Schrader and the officers as to whether or not the helicopter or power lines in the area may have been the source of the light.
After failing to confirm any of Schrader’s sightings, both officers left Schrader’s residence at approximately 7:00 p.m. In Schrader’s deposition he said that immediately before leaving, one of the officers stated that “Well, maybe the power company is working up there or the military could be having some manuvers [sic] up there. We’ll check it out.” The officers did not, however, do so. Shortly thereafter, Souza called in to report that he was back on patrol and was making a written report of the incident. There is nothing to indicate that the officers called either the power company, the military or the fire department division in charge of rescues. Souza turned in his “Miscellaneous Cases” report at approximately 11:00 p.m. that night.
Nothing in the foregoing recitation of facts indicates the defendants were aware of the presence of plaintiffs decedent on the mountain ridge, let alone his plight. Moreover, nothing presented to the circuit court tends to substantiate that the decedent’s situation was made worse by the failure of the police officers to take affirmative action. The court nevertheless finds a duty owed by the defendants to the decedent may have arisen.
II.
The majority acknowledges that the controlling precedent in the determination of governmental liability for failure to provide police protection is to be found in Freitas v. City & County, 58 Haw. 587, 574 P.2d 529 (1978), and Namauu v. City & County, 62 Haw. 358, 614 P.2d 943 (1980). The pertinent principles were stated in *187Freitas as follows:
[T]he generally accepted proposition [is] that the failure of the police to provide protection is ordinarily not actionable. See, e.g., Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968). An exception to this rule has been recognized which imposes liability where police action has increased the risk of harm and there is negligence in providing protection against the enhanced danger. Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958). Plaintiffs seek to fit this case into the exception. In order to do so, it is necessary to discover some circumstance, other than their official duty to preserve the peace and enforce the laws, the occurrence or existence of which created a duty owed by the police officers, or the City, or both, to take some affirmative action for the protection of the plaintiffs. It is also necessary for the plaintiffs to show that the affirmative action which was so owed was not taken and that, if it had been, the injuries which the plaintiffs suffered would have been prevented.1
58 Haw. at 590-91, 574 P.2d at 532. The majority recognizes that Freitas and Namauu lend no support to plaintiffs cause.
The instant case, however, is distinguished on grounds that “the duty at issue is the duty to avoid any affirmative acts which worsen the situation of the plaintiff.” The purported authority for this proposition is § 56 of Prosser’s treatise on torts. Neither § 56 nor its implications escaped us in Freitas. See note 1 supra. But we viewed the section as supporting a denial of liability in the absence of a showing that “affirmative action which was . . . owed was not taken and that, if it had been, the injuries ... the plaintiffs suffered would have been prevented.” Freitas v. City & County, supra, 58 Haw. at 590-91, 574 P.2d at 532. And a fair reading of that portion of the treatise describing the applicability of the exception to the *188general rule cited by the majority sustains our prior reading.2 For it clearly applies to instances of “misfeasance” following an assumption of duty; it does not serve to create a duty where the putative tortfeasors are unaware of the plaintiffs peril.
“A fundamental requirement of a negligence action is the existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. Ono v. Applegate, 62 Haw. 131, 137, 612 P.2d 533, 538 (1980); see Seibel v. City and County of Honolulu, 61 Haw. 253, 257, 602 P.2d 532, 536 (1979); Ajirogi v. State, 59 Haw. 515, 522, 583 P.2d 980, 985 (1978); Freitas v. City and County of Honolulu, 58 Haw. 587, 590, 574 P.2d 529, 531-532 (1978).” Namauu v. City & County, supra, 62 Haw. at 361, 614 P.2d at 945. The facts related in the court’s opinion indicate that the officers left Schrader’s residence after efforts “to confirm any of Schrader’s sightings” proved fruitless and that “there was some speculation between Schrader and the officers as to whether or not ... [a] helicopter or power lines in the area may have been the source of the light.” Nothing in § 56 of Prosser, including the cited exception to the general rule, supports the imposition of a duty under such circumstances. See also Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 314, 314A, and 314B (1965). I would affirm the award of summary judgment to defendants.

 The footnote at this point in the.opinion reads as follows:
See, generally, Prosser on Torts, § 56 (4th ed. 1971); Note: Munidpal Tort Liability for Failure to Provide Adequate Police Protection in New York State, 39 Albany L. Rev. 599 (1975).
The treatise section cited in the footnote is the same section the majority relies on to support the proposition that the instant case is distinguishable from Freitas.

 Prosser reads in relevant part:
If there is no duty to come to the assistance of a person in difficulty or peril, there is at least a duty to avoid any affirmative acts which make his situation worse. When we cross the line into the field of “misfeasance,” liability is far easier to find. A truck driver may be under no obligation whatever to signal to a car behind him that it may safely pass; but if he does signal, he will be liable if he fails to exercise proper care and injury results. There may be no duty to take care of a man who is ill or intoxicated, and unable to look out for himself; but it is another thing entirely to eject him into the danger of a railroad yard; and if he is injured there will be liability. But further, if the defendant does attempt to aid him, and takes charge and control of the situation, he is regarded as entering voluntarily into a relation which is attended with responsibility. The same is true, of course, of a physician who accepts a charity patient. Such a defendant will then be liable for a failure to use reasonable care for the protection of the plaintiffs interests. And on the same basis one who, without any legal obligation to do so, attempts to remove ice from the sidewalk, may find himself liable when he makes the situation worse.
Prosser, supra, at 343-44 (footnotes omitted).