Court Opinion

ID: 9699328
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:19:30.892935+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:48.780674
License: Public Domain

FERREN, Associate Judge,
concurring:
Given our existing rules on damages for negligently inflicted emotional distress, as set forth in Williams v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062 (D.C.1990) (en banc), I agree with the decision to affirm the trial court’s dismissal of appellants’ suit. I write separately only to explain why, even under the alternative rules I proposed in Williams v. Baker, 572 A.2d at 1074-76 (FerREN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), plaintiffs could not recover in this case.
In Williams v. Baker, I questioned a number of the limitations placed by the majority on damages for negligently inflicted emotional distress, including the zone-of-danger rule.1 Nonetheless, I agreed then, as I do now, that plaintiffs may bring such claims only on the basis of allegations that the defendant’s negligence has physically endangered another. In this case, as Judge TerRY points out, appellants do not claim that appellees presented any physical danger to the child or to the child’s mother. Thus, even under the approach I would have preferred for claims for negligently inflicted emotional distress, appellants would still have failed to state a claim.

. Specifically, I proposed that in order to show serious and verifiable emotional distress about negligently inflicted danger or injury to a third party, the plaintiff must show that she or he:
(1) has a close personal relationship with a person who is physically endangered by the defendant’s negligence, (2) is present at the scene of the negligent act or omission and is, at the time, aware of the danger to the third party, and (3) as a result, suffers emotional distress beyond what a disinterested witness would have suffered and beyond what the plaintiff would have otherwise suffered if not present at the scene of the negligent act or omission.
Id. at 1075.