Court Opinion

ID: 9657536
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:29:46.165265+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:46.199239
License: Public Domain

*52T. M. Kavanagji, J.
This .case is here on appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals1 affirming a judgment of the circuit court of Livingston county granting to the defendants a one-half interest as tenants in common in all the property owned by the plaintiff and Sam St. Pierre at the date of. Sam’s death.
Leave to appeal was granted by this Court on .April 12, 1967, 379 Mich 759. ,
Angeline St. Pierre filed a complaint to quiet title 'to various parcels of land, the title to which had been obtained by deeds naming as grantees herself and Sam St. Pierre as husband and wife. Plaintiff and Sam St. Pierre lived together as husband and wife from April 15, 1938, until Sam’s death on December 27, 1961. At all times during those years the plaintiff believed herself to be the lawful common-law wife of Sam St. Pierre. After Sam’s death it was discovered that he had never been divorced from defendant Irene St. Pierre.
At the time of Sam’s death plaintiff and Sam had conveyed several lots by warranty deed and agreed to convey others by land contracts. Still other lots remained in their names.
The defendants in this case are the estate of Sam St. Pierre, the undivorced wife Irene St. Pierre, and the children of the marriage of Sam and Irene.
Plaintiff contends defendants are estopped to offer proof as to the true relationship of Sam St. Pierre and herself. She relies on a line of cases in Michigan which hold that if the rights of third parties are involved, the persons claiming under the deeds will be estopped to deny that the words “as husband and wife” mean anything other than what they import.
*53Defendants contend tins case falls under another line of cases in Michigan where it has been consistently held that when grantees are described in a deed as husband and wife, when they are not in fact married, they take title as tenants in common.
The judgment of the circuit court, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, reads in pertinent part as follows:
“It is ordered and adjudged that the plaintiff, Angeline St. Pierre, is the owner of an undivided one-half of all of the property owned by Angeline St. Pierre and Sam St. Pierre on the date of the death of the said Sam St. Pierre, December 27, 1961.
“It is further ordered and adjudged that the defendant, llene Timmons, in her representative capacity as administratrix of the estate of Sam St. Pierre, deceased, is the owner of an undivided one-half of the property owned by the plaintiff, Angeline St. Pierre, and Sam St. Pierre on the date of the death of the said Sam St. Pierre, December 27, 1961.
“It is further ordered and adjudged that the ownership of said property as set forth above shall he as tenants in common, each as to an undivided one-half thereof.
“It is further ordered and adjudged that title to all property conveyed by the said Sam St. Pierre and Angeline St. Pierre, as wife of the said Sam St. Pierre, prior to the death of the said Sam St. Pierre, shall he quieted in all grantees in said conveyances. * * *
“It is further ordered and adjudged that the defendant, llene Timmons, as administratrix of the estate of Sam St. Pierre, deceased, is entitled to one-half of the proceeds of any and all land contracts accrued or paid since December 27, 1961, the date of the death of the said Sam St. Pierre.
“It is further ordered and adjudged that the plaintiff, Angeline St. Pierre, is entitled to one-half *54of the proceeds of any and all land contracts received or accrued since December 27, 1961, the date of the death of the said 8am St. Pierre.
“It is further ordered and adjudged that the plaintiff, Angeline St. Pierre, account to the defendant, llene Timmons, as administratrix of the estate of Sam St. Pierre, deceased, for any and all payments so received and that the defendant, llene Timmons, as administratrix of the estate of Sam St. Pierre, deceased, account to the plaintiff, Angeline St. Pierre, for any and all payments so received.
“It is further ordered and adjudged that the defendants, or any of them, shall join in any and all conveyances required so as to convey title pursuant to land contracts made by the said Sam St. Pierre and Angeline St. Pierre, as husband and wife, prior to the death of the said Sam St. Pierre on December 27, 1961.”
One line of cases holds that when land is conveyed to two persons and the conveyance mentions that they are taking as husband and wife, when in fact they are not married, they hold the property involved as tenants in common. In the following-cases the plaintiffs and the defendants representing the interests of one of the grantees to the conveyance were entitled to an undivided one-half interest therein as tenants in common. Collins v. Norris (1946), 314 Mich 145; Cristia v. Cristia (1947), 317 Mich 66; Spence v. Jones (1960), 359 Mich 231; Daniels v. Daniel (1961), 362 Mich 176.
The other line of cases holds that the parties challenging the relationship of the grantees taking as husband and wife are estopped to offer proofs showing that the grantees are not husband and wife, for the reason that if they are attempting- to take by the instrument they are estopped to prove the invalidity of any of the provisions therein. As they are estopped to deny that the grantees were married at the time of the taking of the property, *55they cannot disprove the taking as tenants by the entireties. Jacobs v. Miller (1883), 50 Mich 119; Hawley v. Dibble (1915), 184 Mich 298; Young v. Young (1918), 200 Mich 236; Stone v. Culver (1938), 286 Mich 263; Porter v. Landis (1950), 329 Mich 76; Franklin v. Franklin (1958), 354 Mich 543.
In the cases above cited standing for the proposition that the estate created is a tenancy in common, note the relationship of the parties in the litigation. In the Collins Case, plaintiff was the hnsband and defendant was the wife. There the Court said there was no estoppel. The Cristia Case was a divorce case between a husband and wife, and the Court held that their vendees’ interest in a land contract was held by them as tenants in common. In the Spence Case, the plaintiff was the administrator of the husband’s estate and defendant was the wife. In the Daniels Case, plaintiffs were the administratrix of the decedent’s estate, his first wife, and the first wife’s child, and the alleged second wife was the defendant.
The rule is correctly stated in the Daniels Case by Justice Souris, in a concurring opinion, where he states (p 189):
“I concur in affirmance on the ground that in the absence of a valid marriage between defendant and Joseph Daniel or Daniels, as between themselves, their heirs and their estates, no tenancy by the entireties was created.”
Justice Souris further stated (p 191):
“Where rights of others than the grantees, their heirs or estates depend upon the apparent title created, this Court will apply a theory of estoppel to protect such rights.”
We find in the cases which support the estoppel rule, that each case involves the rights of third *56parties. In the Hawley Case, the plaintiff had purchased the land from the alleged wife. In the Joung Case, the plaintiff attempted to take the land involved under the will and then have the balance of the will declared invalid. This the Court refused to do, saying (p 241) :
“He cannot elect to treat the first will as the last will and testament of David J. Young for the purpose of basing his title thereon to a portion of the lands conveyed thereunder, and at the same time elect to consider it invalid for other purposes.”
In the Stone Case, the decedent deeded the property to her purported husband, Edgar Haney. Thereafter she died and Edgar Haney conveyed the property by warranty deed to another as security for a loan, taking back a land contract. Haney later assigned his interest in the land contract to the plaintiff in the case. The decedent’s estate was estopped from showing she was not married to Haney. In each of the above cases the rights of third parties were involved.
We hold in the case at bar that as to any property involving the rights of third parties, without actual or constructive notice of the fact that Sam and Angeline St. Pierre were not husband and wife, whether created by contract or deed, before or after the death of Sam, the defendants are estopped to challenge the fact that Sam and Angeline were husband and wife and, therefore, that defendants have no interest in these properties.
We further hold that the defendants are entitled to a one-half interest in any property remaining in the name of Angeline St. Pierre as survivor of herself and Sam St. Pierre, for the reason that as to such property no rights of third parties have become involved, Each ope-half interest is held by *57Angeline and the Estate of Sam St. Pierre as tenants in common.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court are reversed insofar as they are in conflict with this opinion. The cause is remanded to the trial court for the entry of a judgment in accordance with this opinion.
Since the judgment of the trial court is reversed in part and affirmed in part, neither party shall have costs.
Dethmers, C. J., and Kelly, Black, and Souris, JJ., concurred with T. M. Kavanagh, J.

 2 Mich App 723.