Court Opinion

ID: 9704877
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:49:06.711388+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:06.220914
License: Public Domain

CLIFFORD, J.,
concurring.
My long-held view in “discovery-rule” cases has been that the rule should not operate to start the running of the statute of limitations afresh with the discovery of a cause of action, but rather should function to give a plaintiff a reasonable time after discovery, up to what remains of the “traditional” statutory period, within which to file the complaint. See Lynch v. Rubacky, 85 N.J. 65, 78 (dissenting opinion); Burd v. New Jersey Tel. Co., 76 N.J. 284, 293 (1978) (concurring opinion); Moran v. Napolitano, 71 N.J. 133, 142 (1976) (dissenting opinion); Fox v. Passaic Gen. Hosp., 71 N.J. 122, 128 (1976) (dissenting opinion). Because that issue is not implicated in this case (arguably, plaintiff started suit even before his alleged cause of action accrued, that is, before he became, or should have become, aware of facts that equated in law with a cause of action, see Burd v. New Jersey Tel. Co., supra, 76 N.J. at 291). I write only to indicate that I have not abandoned my *439position on that question; it remains as staked out in the minority opinions cited above.
I join fully in the opinion of the Court.
CLIFFORD, J., concurring in the result.
For reversal and remandment —Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN and STEIN — 6.
Opposed — None.