Court Opinion

ID: 9460728
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:58:47.251932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:45.279081
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL, Senior District Judge
(concurring).
Because the jury was not specifically advised that Bell was in possession of a dangerous weapon, I concur in the court’s decision to affirm his conviction. I wish however to emphasize that had Agent Loehr testified that he retrieved a weapon from defendant’s waistband, such testimony would have been wholly prejudicial and a cautionary instruction to the jury would not have adequately cured the error. I stress this fact because, prior to Agent Loehr’s testimony, defense counsel sought a protective order against the introduction of any evidence pr testimony that defendant had been in possession of a weapon at the time of his arrest. The district judge ruled that the witness could testify as to what was found on the defendant’s person. That ruling, under United States v. Reid, 410 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1969) was erroneous. Judge Cummings’ excellent opinion in Reid could not be more definitive:
“We can only regard the testimony concerning the * * * [weapon] as highly prejudicial and without probative value. Its presence could only serve to invite the jury to speculate about other bad acts which the defendant *890may have committed. The introduction of testimony concerning dangerous weapons found among the belongings of a person charged with a crime, no part of which depends upon the use or ownership of the weapon, has consistently been regarded as prejudicial error requiring a new trial. [Citations omitted.] Only where there is independent evidence tending to relate the use of the weapon to the commission of the offense has the introduction of such evidence been admitted. United States v. Blackburn, 389 F.2d 93, 95-97 (6th Cir. 1968). We hold that this evidence was unduly prejudicial and inflammatory and no reference to it may be permitted at the next trial.” 410 F.2d at 1226-1227.