Court Opinion

ID: 9777196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:02:03.476203+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:49.993221
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Justice,
concurring.
In pertinent part the Fifth Amendment provides:
“nor shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ...”
Article I, § 10, Texas Bill of Rights, provides in pertinent part:
“[An accused] shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself ...”
So also does Article 1.05, V.A.C.C.P.
The core of § 10 privilege that one may not be compelled to give evidence against oneself is the right to remain silent. Stanton v. State, 94 Tex.Cr.R. 366, 252 S.W. 519, 521 (1923); Butler v. State, 64 Tex.Cr.R. 482, 142 S.W. 904, 907 (1912); Ex parte Park, 37 Tex.Cr.R. 590, 40 S.W. 300 (1897).1
The thesis of the dissenting opinion seems to be “the rule against the use of a *583defendant’s post-arrest originated from the rule that silence was an act and, as such, was to be treated as a confession and governed by the statutes relative to admission of confessions.”2 Ergo meaning, scope and extent of our constitutionally guaranteed privilege against selfincrimination depend upon rules of evidence legislatively fashioned. Whatever may be the rule when an accused has not remained silent— and much of the discussion in the prior opinions quoted at length in dissent was to equate “acts performed” and “confessions made” — the notion that “silence” is an “act” is a specious rationale for that conclusion.
Before and after the “Old Code” “[i]n the administration of the criminal law, the common law, where not modified by the constitution or statute has been held to furnish the rule of decision, as well in matters of practice as principle.” Hyde v. The State, 16 Tex. 446, 455 (1856). That was equally true in construing the constitutional right to remain silent. Thus it was held that any witness was immune from compulsion to answer a question tending to degrade him or subject him to a civil or criminal suit. See, e.g., Simons v. Simons, 13 Tex. 468 (1855); Jordan v. The State, 14 Tex. 426 (Ct.App.1855); Floyd v. The State, 7 Tex. 215 (1851), quoting and relying on the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in The United States v. Burr, 1 Rob.R. 207, and the opinion of the court in The People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 254, as “a true exposition of the rule.” Id., at 216; Holman v. Mayor, 34 Tex. 668, 673 (1871) (contempt order void when made by Mayor after witness refused to answer questions regarding occurrences in certain house leading witness to believe it was house of prostitution, citing Simons, supra); Owen v. The State, 7 Tex.App. 329, 334 (Ct.App.1879). In Cain v. The State, 18 Tex. 387, 389-390 (1857), it was consulted regarding confessions.
In short, early on Texas courts developed a body of common law for application of this privilege, derived largely from judicial decisions in other jurisdictions and from learned commentators. That common law construction of the constitutional guarantee was to be applied independently of provisions of the Old Code and its successors.3
Similarly, in Nolen v. The State, 14 Tex.App. 474 (Ct.App.1883), which the dissenting opinion identifies as the seminal decision that “acts as well as words would be treated the same under the statute, then Article 750, Code of Criminal Procedure,” from its reading of common law found in learned treatises the Court did indeed overrule prior opinions distinguishing acts and words: “Acts, it is said, speak louder than words, and this being generally true they should be regarded as confessions, as much so as words, and the law does so regard them.”
While Nolen may have pointed in silence to the hill where body of deceased had been found, the opinion treats his act of pointing — not his silence at the time. The decision ultimately turned on whether he had been “cautioned,” as article 750 then required. See article 750, set out in Butler v. State, 493 S.W.2d 190 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), quoted in dissenting opinion at page 588.
As to the purpose for which the dissent has appropriated it, the lesson of Nolen is that neither acts nor words amounting to a confession before being cautioned were admissible under article 750. It teaches nothing about silence being treated as words or *584acts constituting a confession, however, and its rationale for equating acts and words is inapposite to silence.
On the matter of “silence” the only value of Nolen to the dissent is its reference to a treatise by Mr. Wharton, viz:
“Mr. Wharton says that ‘confessions may be by acts as well as words’ (Whart. Cr.Ev., sec 683); and even silence, under certain circumstances, is taken as a confession. (Id., sec. 679).”
Mr. Wharton was not writing about article 750 or any other Texas statute. We need to know what those circumstances are — as prescribed by common law interpretation.4
In § 679, cited in Nolen, supra, Mr. Wharton is discussing a general rule of evidence regarding silence. He says that statements made to another who listens in silence and interposes no objection may be put in evidence “whenever silence is of such a nature as to lead to the inference of assent.” Accord: Gilford v. State, 78 S.W. 692 (Tex.Cr.App.1903) (Testimony recounting statements made by another “in the presence and hearing of appellant, who was not under arrest ” clearly admissible, id., at 693). However, in § 680 he explains that such a silent party must be in a position to respond, and when he comes to one in arrest, Mr. Wharton states a different rule, viz:
“... nor can silence, when a party is under arrest, be used as sustaining the hypothesis of acquiescence.”
Please notice that under the common law reported by Mr. Wharton the status of an accused is simply that he be “under arrest,” and to the significance of that I now turn.
John A. Gardner was arrested in Dallas for killing another. To Sheriff Ben E. Ca-bell he claimed to have been at several other places on the night and at the time of that homicide, so Sheriff Cabell took Gardner to those places and presented him to persons staying there or doing business there. In the presence of Gardner each person stated to Sheriff Cabell that Gardner had not been there at the time he told Sheriff Cabell he had been. Gardner made no reply to any of that. At trial all that Sheriff Cabell did and all that those persons stated to him and silence of Gardner were introduced in evidence “as confessions of appellant to the truth of those statements.”
In Gardner v. State, 34 S.W. 945 (Tex.Cr.App.1896), one question Judge Hurt noticed for the Court is, as framed by him:
“The appellant being under arrest for this crime (whether cautioned or not), can his silence or failure to deny statements made in his presence be used against him, as a confession of the truth of the statements?”
Id., at 945-946. According to the thesis of the majority, if he had been cautioned pursuant to former article 750, the answer is “yes.” However, the answer by the Court is “no” — “these facts, and especially the silence of the appellant, [were not] competent evidence.” Id., at 946.
As had been its wont, see ante, p. 577, the Court looked to decisions in other jurisdictions and findings by Mr. Wharton in § 680 to reach its conclusion, viz:
“We deem these authorities sufficient to support the rule that, if the party is under arrest, silence cannot be used to support the hypothesis of consent to statements made in his presence by others. From the bill of exceptions, we infer that the learned judge who tried this case admitted this evidence because appellant had been cautioned. Our Code of Criminal Procedure (article 750) provides that ‘the confession shall not be used if at the time it was made the defendant ... is in custody of an officer, unless such confession ... be made voluntarily after having first been cautioned *585that it may be used against him,’ etc. As above stated, the learned trial judge admitted in evidence the silence of appellant upon the ground that the appellant had been cautioned. We are of the opinion that appellant had been cautioned was an ADDITIONAL reason, to being under arrest, for excluding his silence. * * * * We are of the opinion that, whether cautioned or not, his silence should not have been received in evidence against him.”
Ibid, [all ellipsis mine].5
In Stanton v. State, 94 Tex.Cr.R. 366, 252 S.W. 519 (1923), another sheriff was asked by the prosecutor, “When you opened the flap [to a tent] and found the still and liquor there, did he make any explanation to you or claim innocence?” Sheriff Head answered, “No sir; he did not. I asked him if he wanted to make a statement after I brought the still in and brought him downstairs in the jail in the presence of the county attorney, and he said he did not want to make any.” The objection to that testimony was “because he was under arrest.” Id., at 520.
Writing for the Court, Presiding Judge Morrow noted the effect and sequence of things, viz:
“The effect and apparent purpose of the question was to elicit the fact that appellant did not specifically disclaim his innocence at the time; in other words to make his silence speak against him. The answer to the question showed that, while he was silent at the time inquired about, he at another time and place, while he was formerly under arrest, expressly refused to make any statement.”
Id., at 521. Characterizing the answer as unresponsive, Presiding Judge Morrow said it was not admissible “under any circumstances developed by the record.”
“It was violative of the statute against proving unwarned statements while under arrest. It was ALSO contrary to the constitutional inhibition against requiring witness to give evidence against himself. At the time to which the answer given by the sheriff refers the appellant had a right to be silent, and the law did not permit his silence to be used against him. * * * * [U]nder the circumstances it was incumbent, we think, upon the trial court to exclude it upon the objection made, namely, that the appellant was under arrest.”
Id., at 521 [ellipsis mine].
What Gardner and Stanton and their host of progeny find or hold is that the right to remain silent under arrest is of constitutional dimension, and the protection thus afforded is not at all dependent upon statutory support.6
Thus the thesis underlying the conclusion of the dissent is demonstrably untenable. Silence is a constitutional guarantee. The constitutional protection provided by § 10 forbids using mere silence against an accused under arrest, including for impeachment.
I join the judgment of the Court.

. As we shall see, this privilege against selfin-crimination is not confined to an accused in a criminal prosecution; it extends as well, for but one example, to a witness in any type of case and in many kinds of administrative proceedings. See generally Interpretive Commentary following § 10. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1493-1494, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964).

. All emphasis is mine throughout unless otherwise indicated.

. In Wood v. State, 22 Tex.App. 431, 3 S.W. 336, 338 (1886), however, the Court did both. Under "common law rules” followed by the Court testimony given by one at an inquest is not thereafter admissible against him as an accused — the "correct rule [being] supported by the weight of authority,” viz:
“It will be seen that the fact of arrest or no arrest does not figure in this proposition. Whether the party be under arrest, whether by warrant or without warrant, or is not under arrest, if he is charged or suspected of the crime, and knows himself to be charged or suspected, his testimony taken before the ... inquest is not admissible against him.”
Id., at 338. Separately, the Court examined the statute and, finding he was "in arrest, and, not being cautioned," reached the same result. Ibid.

. The treatise extant when Nolen was decided in 1883 is not immediately available. However, Mr. Wharton published his next edition in 1884 —-just four years after the other. See Preface, Wharton’s Criminal Evidence (Ninth Edition). Since § 683 of the latter also discusses acts and words as confessions, I take it that he did not change section numbers in this part; from them my findings and observations in the text following are derived.

. Explaining why the fact that he had been cautioned was an additional reason, Judge Hurt wrote:
"He had been warned that if he said anything it might be used against him. He obeyed the caution, and because he did obey his silence was admitted in evidence and used as a confession of the truth of the statements made by others.”

. Accord: Wright v. State, 37 Tex.Cr.R. 627, 40 S.W. 491, 494-495 (1897); Guinn v. State, 39 Tex.Cr.R. 257, 45 S.W. 694, 695 (1898); Denton v. State, 42 Tex.Cr.R. 427, 60 S.W. 670, 672-673 (1901); Funderburk v. State, 61 S.W. 393, 394 (Tex.Cr.App.1901); Weaver v. State, 43 Tex.Cr.R. 340, 65 S.W. 534, 537 (1901); Simmons v. State, 50 Tex.Cr.R. 527, 97 S.W. 1052, 1053 (1906); Ripley v. State, 58 Tex.Cr.R. 489, 126 S.W. 586, 587 (1910); Couch v. State, 58 Tex.Cr.R. 505, 126 S.W. 866, 867-868 (1910); Young v. State, 91 Tex.Cr.R. 511, 240 S.W. 930, 935 (1922) (Opinion on Motion for Rehearing); Sharp v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 96, 217 S.W.2d 1017, 1018 (1949); see Hicks v. State, 493 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) and Conway v. State, 625 S.W.2d 35, 38-39 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1981) PDR refused.
Those decisions not only "indicate otherwise” but make clear that constitutionally guaranteed "silence" under arrest is not "to be treated as a confession and governed by statutes relative to admission of confessions,” as the dissent would have it.