Court Opinion

ID: 9664704
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:26:08.494369+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:08.674741
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Each party hereto has filed motion herein. The appellant seeks to have us set aside our judgment herein and reverse and remand the cause. The appellee seeks to have us modify our opinion.
Careful and painstaking attention has been given to the respective motions. We adhere to the views expressed in our original opinion and the motion of appellant is hereby overruled.
The deed evidencing the only rights appellant has in and to the property only purports to convey to^ him subject to the oil and gas lease made by the guardian of the minors. This deed he introduced and relied upon as establishing his rights as to the mineral interest in controversy. It is fair to say, we think, that while it establishes his interest in the property, it likewise limits his interest therein. It is thought elementary that he must recover, if at all, only to the extent he establishes title. He can not recover on the defects, if any, in the title of Amerada.
We adhere to the view that the law was, as stated in our original opinion, at the relevant time regarding the guardian’s being without power to delay development beyond the time when the minors have attained their majority or oil and gas had been produced on the premises leased in paying quantities. This was not deemed as an authoritative determination that the lease in question would necessarily terminate when the minors attained their majority. A declaratory judgment was not sought in this respect by either of the parties to the litigation. We deem it beyond our power to render such a judgment and do not think the judgment rendered has that effect.
 Further, it is not considered that the disposition of the case forecloses the question of estoppel. As stated, plaintiff’s sole claim to an interest in the property is by virtue of his deed from the guardian. This deed is his entire evidence of title. It is thought taking subject to the guardian’s lease is tantamount to' a ratification and adoption thereof. Even though the guard*827ian might not have the power, as the law then was, to delay development past the time the minors attained their majority, plaintiff did 'have power to adopt and agree to confirm and ratify such a lease. His action in taking the property subject to this lease amounted to this.
Even though certain contractual provisions be unenforceable as to the grantor, his grantee by assumption thereof may make them his own — may make them enforceable against him although invalid as to his grantor. Waco Bridge Co. v. City of Waco, 85 Tex. 320, 20 S.W. 137; Cleveland State Bank v. Gardner, Tex.Com.App., 286 S.W. 173; Rice-Stix Dry Goods Co. v. First Nat’l Bank of McGregor, Tex.Com.App., 231 S.W. 386; Volunteer State Life Ins. Co. v. Robinson, Tex.Civ.App., 74 S.W.2d 188 (Wr. ref.); Van Meter v. American Central Life Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 78 S.W.2d 251 (Wr. ref.).
In our opinion the disposition made of the cause is likewise sustainable on the ground of estoppel, even though we be in error in holding the guardian’s lease valid.