Court Opinion

ID: 9688277
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:42:18.610522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:05:49.322984
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing
SIMPSON, Justice.
On application for rehearing appellee insists that we were in error in our conclu*671sion that appellant’s agent Cooper occupied no such position of authority with the appellant as to constitute him its alter ego and to render his purported statement as to the terms of a policy contract binding upon his principal. Appellee calls our attention to phases of the evidence tending to show that Mr. Cooper did have such authority. With this contention we cannot agree. We took careful account of all the evidence on original consideration, and have re-examined it in the light of the application for rehearing.
While it may be conceded, for the sake, of the argument, that Mr. Cooper was possessed of more authority than ordinarily attaches to a district insurance agent, it is clear to us that he was not vested with.authority to bind appellant by a statement as of fact that a given policy contract named a certain person as beneficiary thereof, when he had nothing to do with the actual matter of formulating the policy and, so far as appears, had at no time had such policy under his control for any purpose. It is clear to us that any statement made by Cooper arose out of preliminary negotiations on the part of appellee’s attorney with the company and its agents for collection of the proceeds of the policy. It is clear that in the beginning of the negotiations both parties proceeded on the theory that the policy first issued was the only policy issued on the life of Myrick. It was subsequent to the company’s denial of liability on said policy, on the ground that it had lapsed for nonpayment of premiums, that appellee discovered that a second policy had been issued to Myrick. A communication from appellant’s vice-president states that he was unaware of the “rewriting” of the policy until receipt of appellee’s later communication to him. He referred the matter to the district agent, or manager, Cooper, but, as we interpret the matter, the referral was for the matter of a check of Cooper’s records with respect to the status of payments of premiums. This we think is clearly borne out by subsequent negotiations and pleadings in the case. Appellee filed interrogatories to appellant’s general officers, and in answer thereto appellant’s officers produced, as an exhibit, a copy of the policy in suit, showing Mattie Lee Gamble as beneficiary. Answers to appellee’s interrogatories were not, however, introduced in evidence. Further, appellee filed a replication to appellant’s pleas, predicated upon an estoppel on the part of appellant, because of denial of liability, to question the right of appellee as beneficiary. Demurrer to this replication was sustained by the trial court and, of course, is not before us, there being no cross-assignment taking the point. This situation is mentioned as throwing light upon the issues and evidence upon which the case was tried.
In its final analysis the record and evidence 'before us disclose an- effort on the part of appellee to establish a contract by parol, aided by waiver or estoppel. In the face of appellant’s pleadings and evidence to the effect that the policy in suit named Mrs. Gamble as beneficiary, the contrary statement attributed to Cooper that in both the old and the new policies. Mrs. Hall was named as beneficiary could have had no other purpose or effect than that of a waiver or estoppel.
It has been often and consistently held that waiver or estoppel cannot create a primary liability, and that to create such a liability all of the elements of a binding contract must be present. Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Cole, 230 Ala. 450, 161 So. 818; Fidelity Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Raper, 242 Ala. .440, 6 So.2d 513; Clark v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 252 Ala. 84, 88(5), 39 So.2d 675; Simpson Sales Co. v. British General Ins. Co., 252 Ala, 337, 40 So.2d 409. The right of a beneficiary is. a primary right, an essential feature of the original contract itself. Such a right cannot be established by waiver or estoppel, for, as here, there was an absence of all elements of a binding contract in the-matter of the statement attributed to Cooper. To repeat, such statement, if made, was not in the nature of a waiver of some condition or right of forfeiture which, in-some circumstances, a general agent may make with binding effect upon his principal. It was rather a statement, gratui*672tously made, as of fact with respect to a •contractual status.
We are not convinced that we should depart from our original opinion and conclusion.
Opinion extended and application for rehearing overruled.
BROWN, LIVINGSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.