Court Opinion

ID: 9695241
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:13:25.952594+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:10.237125
License: Public Domain

NIX, Justice,
dissenting.
The Supreme Court of the United States in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) set forth specific warnings to be given to individuals who are being subjected to “custodial interrogation.” That Court defined “custodial interrogation” as questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of their freedom of action in any significant way. Commonwealth v. Meyer, 488 Pa. 297, 412 A.2d 517 (1980); Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 475 Pa. 97, 379 A.2d 1056 (1977); Commonwealth v. Brown, 473 Pa. 562, 375 A.2d 1260 (1977); Commonwealth v. Butler, 454 Pa. 95, 309 A.2d 720 (1973); Commonwealth v. Banks, 429 Pa. 53, 239 A.2d 416 (1968). To conclude that appellant was not derived of his freedom of action in significant way is to ignore the record before us.1
*579Implicitly, the majority attempts to draw upon the distinction between the “investigatory” and the “accusatory” process. This distinction was made in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964), but not carried over in the Miranda analysis. In footnote four (4) of the Miranda opinion, the Court stated the Escobedo decisive stage was the same as that set forth therein. The inference was that the focus requirement of Escobedo is satisfied by the nature of the detention.
As noted in Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976), the concern of the Miranda Court was to offset the coercive and compulsive aspect of custodial interrogation. While the police have a legitimate right to question those who may have knowledge of criminal activity, Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 477, 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1629, 1630, they do not have the power to force answers to their inquiries. Thus whether the questioning is classified as “investigative” or “accusatory,” it is immaterial where, as here, the individual is obliged to participate and the questioning occurs in the sterile and coercive police controlled setting.
The fact that police suspicion had focused upon the individual is not controlling, rather it is the nature and setting of the in-custody interrogation the police employ to elicit the desired information. Beckwith v. U. S., supra. Where the person has been placed in custody pursuant to an arrest, it is clear that the focus had also centered upon him. However, the Miranda definition of custodial interrogation is broader than the question of arrested suspects. Even absent a formal arrest, the Miranda concern is present where police initiate questioning concerning a crime or criminal activity and conduct that interrogation in a police controlled coercive setting. Such was the case here and appellant was entitled to the warnings.
I therefore dissent.

. The instant factual setting is clearly distinguishable from those cases where the individual voluntarily supplied information, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brantner, 486 Pa. 518, 406 A.2d 1011 (1979); Commonwealth v. Boone, 467 Pa. 168, 354 A.2d 898 (1975); Commonwealth v. Yount, 455 Pa. 303, 314 A.2d 242 (1974), or consented to a police request to go to the police headquarters to be interviewed. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Patterson, 488 Pa. 227, 412 A.2d 481 (1980); Commonwealth v. Peters, 473 Pa. 72, 373 A.2d 1055 (1977).