Court Opinion

ID: 9373033
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:02:15.871974+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:38.425842
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     WILLIE MAE ROBINSON,                            DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         AT-0432-10-0558-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,                     DATE: January 23, 2023
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Willie Mae Robinson, Canton, Mississippi, pro se.

           Aryeh Rosenfield, Esquire, Atlanta, Georgia, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed the appeal of her March 5, 2010 removal as settled. For the reasons set
     forth below, the appellant’s petition for review is DISMISSED as untimely filed
     without good cause shown. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e), (g).

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                     2

                                     BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant was employed as an Internal Revenue Agent, GS -11, with the
     agency’s Internal Revenue Service. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 14. On
     February 5, 2009, the appellant’s first-line supervisor placed the appellant on a
     60-day performance improvement plan (PIP), during which time she was to
     complete specific tasks to demonstrate at least a minimally successful level of
     performance.   Id. at 68-78.   On October 14, 2009, the appellant’s manager
     notified the appellant that she failed to perform as required on the PIP, and she
     proposed the appellant’s removal for unacceptable performance.      Id. at 39-49.
     After the appellant responded to the proposal, the deciding official issued a
     decision removing her effective March 5, 2010. Id. at 17-19.
¶3        The appellant filed this appeal of her removal. IAF, Tab 1 at 3-4, 28. She
     also filed a motion to compel the agency’s responses to some of her written
     discovery requests, including interrogatories 23 and 24, in which she sought
     information related to her performance leading up to the agency’s decision to
     place her on a PIP. IAF, Tab 12 at 3-4. The administrative judge denied the
     appellant’s motion as to these interrogatories, reasoning that “[t]he issue of
     whether the appellant should have been placed on a PIP [was] not relevant” to the
     appeal.   IAF, Tab 15 at 1.      The administrative judge reiterated during a
     subsequent telephonic status conference, and in her order summarizing the
     conference, that the appellant’s performance at times other than while on the PIP
     “generally, is not material or relevant” to her removal under cha pter 43. IAF,
     Tab 21 at 2.
¶4        On September 23, 2010, the appellant, her attorney, and the agency’s
     representative appeared for a hearing.    IAF, Tab 38, Hearing Compact Disc
     (HCD), Tab 40, Initial Decision (ID). Before the hearing could begin, the parties
     reached an oral agreement. HCD; ID at 1. The recording of the September 23,
                                                                                        3

     2010 hearing reveals that the administrative judge indicated she would dismiss
     the appeal as settled after she received the written settlement agreement. HCD.
¶5           On October 8, 2010, the parties entered into a signed, written settlement
     agreement, in which the appellant agreed to withdraw her appeal with prejudice.
     IAF, Tab 39 at 3. The administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing
     the appeal as settled and entering the settlement agreement into the record for
     enforcement purposes. ID. The initial decision stated that it would become final
     on November 18, 2010, unless a petition for review was filed by that date. ID
     at 2.   The initial decision was sent to the appellant by U.S. mail and to her
     attorney by electronic mail, on October 14, 2010. IAF, Tab 41. Neither party
     filed a petition for review before the finality date.
¶6           On December 21, 2021, the appellant mailed the instant petition for review
     to the Board. 2 Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 16. The Acting Clerk of
     the Board advised the appellant that her petition for review appeared to be
     untimely. PFR File, Tab 2 at 1-2. She informed the appellant that she could file
     a motion to accept her petition as timely filed or to waive the time limit.       Id.
     at 1-2, 7-8. The appellant has filed a responsive motion. PFR File, Tab 3. After
     the deadline set by the Acting Clerk, the agency responded to the petition for
     review. 3 PFR File, Tab 5.

     2
       Although the appellant was represented by an attorney below, she has indicated on
     review that she is representing herself. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 3 at 1.
     3
       The agency has moved for acceptance of its response as timely and for waiver of the
     time limit for good cause. PFR File, Tab 7. We find it unnecessary to rule on the
     agency’s motion because, regardless of its response, we agree that the appella nt’s
     petition for review was untimely filed without good cause.
                                                                                      4

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     The petition for review was untimely filed.
¶7         A petition for review must be filed within 35 days of the issuance of the
     initial decision or, if the appellant shows that the initial decision was r eceived
     more than 5 days after the date of issuance, within 30 days after the date she
     received the initial decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e). Here, the initial decision
     was issued on October 14, 2010, and in the absence of a timely petition for
     review, it became final on November 18, 2010. IAF, Tab 40. According to the
     postmark on the envelope in which the appellant mailed her petition for review,
     she filed it on December 12, 2021.        PFR File, Tab 1 at 16; see 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.4(l) (providing that the date of filing by mail is determined by the
     postmark date). Thus, the petition for review was filed over 11 years late.
¶8         On review, the appellant alleges that neither she nor her former attorney
     was provided with a copy of the initial decision. PFR File, Tab 1 at 1, Tab 3
     at 4-5. She maintains that she contacted the Board and other entities multiple
     times for over a decade requesting a copy of her file and a hearing concerning her
     removal. PFR File, Tab 3 at 4. She asserts the Board denied her requests. PFR
     File, Tab 1 at 1. She states that in 2021, the Board finally gave her electronic
     access to the file on her appeal. Id.
¶9         Documents served electronically are deemed to have been received on the
     day of electronic submission. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.14(m)(2). The appellant submitted
     a sworn statement on review that her attorney was not “provided” with a copy of
     the initial decision. PFR File, Tab 3 at 3-4. However, the certificate of service
     for the decision shows the appellant’s representative at the time, who was an
     attorney, was served electronically on October 14, 2010.        IAF, Tab 6 at 1,
     Tabs 26, 41. Therefore, as an electronic filer, he is deemed to have received the
     initial decision on October 14, 2010, whether he did so or not. See, e.g., Morton
     v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶¶ 6-7 (2010); Lima v.
                                                                                         5

      Department of the Air Force, 101 M.S.P.R. 64, ¶ 5 (2006). Even assuming, as the
      appellant asserts on review, her attorney was not “provided” with the initial
      decision, he was responsible for monitoring case activity in the Board’s e -Appeal
      Online system, and he is deemed to have received the decision when it was
      issued. Maloney v. Executive Office of the President, 2022 MSPB 26, ¶ 37 n.12.
      Likewise, the appellant would be deemed to have received the initial decision the
      same day, as service on a party’s designated representative is imputed to th e
      party. Lima, 101 M.S.P.R. 64, ¶ 5. Therefore, the Board may infer that both the
      appellant and her former attorney received the initial decision on October 14,
      2010, and her petition for review was untimely filed by over 11 years.

      The appellant did not provide good cause for the delay in filing the petition for
      review.
¶10         The Board will waive the time limit for filing a petition for review only
      upon a showing of good cause for the delay in filing. Rivera v. Social Security
      Administration, 111 M.S.P.R. 581, ¶ 7 (2009); 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.113(d),
      1201.114(g). To establish good cause for an untimely filing, a party must show
      that she exercised due diligence or ordinary prudence under the particul ar
      circumstances of the case. Alonzo v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R.
      180, 184 (1980). To determine whether an appellant has shown good cause, the
      Board will consider the length of the delay, the reasonableness of her excuse and
      her showing of due diligence, whether she is proceeding pro se, and whether she
      has presented evidence of the existence of circumstances beyond her control that
      affected her ability to comply with the time limits or of unavoidable casualty or
      misfortune that similarly shows a causal relationship to her inability to timely file
      her petition. Moorman v. Department of the Army, 68 M.S.P.R. 60, 62-63 (1995),
      aff’d, 79 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Table).      The Board should consider the
      “‘length of the delay’ in every good cause determination.”          Walls v. Merit
      Systems Protection Board, 29 F.3d 1578, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
                                                                                               6

¶11         The appellant has not demonstrated good cause for the delay in filing her
      petition for review. Importantly, her 11-year delay is far from minimal.               See
      Allen v. Office of Personnel Management, 97 M.S.P.R. 665, ¶ 8 (2004) (finding a
      14-day delay in filing a petition for review not minimal). Moreover, the appellant
      was represented by counsel. In fact, her attorney wrote a letter on her behalf to a
      U.S. Representative on October 20, 2010, shortly after the initial decision was
      issued. PFR File, Tab 1 at 3-4.
¶12         The appellant indicated she filed her petition for review after the B oard
      gave her electronic access to her file because she realized upon receiving the
      initial decision that the agreement was the result of fraud. 4 PFR File, Tab 1
      at 1-2. The appellant appears to argue that the administrative judge induced her
      into settling her appeal by advising her that she could not challenge the agency’s
      decision to place her in a PIP. Id. Newly discovered evidence that a settlement
      agreement is invalid for reasons such as fraud, coercion, or mutual mistake can
      establish good cause for an untimely petition for review, and in such cases the
      question of good cause and the underlying issue of the validity of the settlement
      agreement largely overlap. Linares-Rosado v. U.S. Postal Service, 112 M.S.P.R.
      599, ¶¶ 7-8 (2009). However, the administrative judge did not engage in fraud

      4
        The appellant also alleges that the Board engaged in fraud when it responded to an
      inquiry from a U.S. Senator regarding her appeal. PFR File, Tab 1 at 1. The appellant
      provided an April 2021 letter from the Senator to the appellant, to which the Senator
      attached the initial decision from a prior appeal filed by the appellant, Robinson v.
      Department of the Treasury, MSPB Docket No. AT-3443-04-0102-I-1, Initial Decision
      (Jan. 29, 2004). PFR File, Tab 1 at 1, 10-15. The appellant alleges that the Board
      engaged in fraud because she had inquired with the Senator regarding the instant
      appeal. Id. at 1. We decline to find that the Board’s alleged actions were intentional or
      that they present circumstances beyond the appellant’s control that might excuse her
      failure to timely file her petition for review in the instant appeal. See Odoh v. Office of
      Personnel Management, 2022 MSPB 5, ¶¶ 6, 9 (finding in a suitability action that a
      charge of material, intentional false statement, or deception or fraud in examination or
      appointment required the Office of Personnel Management to prove that the appellant
      knowingly provided wrong information with the intention of defrauding, deceiving, or
      misleading his employing agency).
                                                                                        7

      when correctly advising the appellant regarding the state of the law then
      applicable to chapter 43 appeals.
¶13        With her petition for review, the appellant attached her former attorney’s
      October 20, 2010 letter, in which he argued that the only issue he would have
      been allowed to present to the Board was “whether or not [the appellant]
      successfully performed during the PIP.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 3-4. He asserts he
      should have been able, but would not have been allowed, to show that the agency
      violated its own policies when it placed the appellant on a PIP despite her fully
      successful performance rating. Id. This letter makes clear that the inability to
      present these claims was his reasoning for advising the appellant to settle with the
      agency.   Id. at 3.   The attorney’s recitation of his understanding of the law
      applicable to chapter 43 removal cases was correct at the time the October 14,
      2010 decision was issued.     See Lee v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022
      MSPB 11, ¶¶ 13-14. The record confirms that the administrative judge provided
      this information both in denying the appellant’s motion to compel and in
      identifying the issues for the hearing. IAF, Tab 15 at 1, Tab 21 at 2. However,
      because it was an accurate representation of the case law at the time, it was not
      misleading.   Brown v. Department of the Navy, 71 M.S.P.R. 451, 454 (1996)
      (explaining that a correct statement by an administrative judge as to the scope of
      the Board’s review did not constitute misleading information) .
¶14        In a few cases, the Board has cited intervening legal precedent as good
      cause for an untimely filed petition for review. McClenning v. Department of the
      Army, 2022 MSPB 3, ¶ 12. In March 2021, over 10 years after the administrative
      judge issued her initial decision in the instant appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals
      for the Federal Circuit issued its decision in Santos v. National Aeronautics &
      Space Administration, 990 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2021).         In Santos, 990 F.3d
      at 1360-61, 1363, the court held that, in addition to the other elements of an
      agency’s burden of proof under chapter 43, the agency also must justify the
                                                                                          8

      institution of a PIP by proving by substantial evidence that the employee’s
      performance was unacceptable prior to the PIP.
¶15        Although the appellant did not cite to the Santos decision in her petition for
      review, we have considered here whether the Santos decision has changed the law
      in a manner that could have impacted the adjudication of her case.             Santos
      constitutes a change in law that could materially affect the appellant’s removal
      appeal.   However, although that decision may otherwise satisfy the “unusual
      circumstances” standard, the appellant fails to demonstrate that she exercised due
      diligence regarding her case, and therefore we are not motivated to reopen her
      appeal. Alonzo, 4 M.S.P.R. at 184. Overall, the 11-year time period that elapsed
      between the Board’s initial decision and the date of the appellant’s petition for
      review is more than the Board is generally inclined to accept. Special Counsel v.
      Greiner, 119 M.S.P.R. 492, 495 (2013) (denying a request to reopen an appeal
      15 months after the Board issued its decision).
¶16        Additionally, the fact that the appellant settled her case, rather than litigated
      it, provides a very strong reason not to reopen this case.            Generally, an
      employee’s withdrawal of an appeal is an act of finality that removes the appeal
      from the Board’s jurisdiction, and the Board will not reinstate an appeal once it
      has been withdrawn in the absence of unusual circumstances such as
      misinformation or new and material evidence. Brown, 71 M.S.P.R. at 453-54. In
      settling her appeal, the appellant agreed to “withdraw[] with prejudice . . . the
      appeal to the . . . Board.   IAF, Tab 39 at 3.       Further, public policy favors
      settlements. Delorme v. Department of the Interior, 124 M.S.P.R. 123, ¶¶ 12-13,
      17 (2017).
¶17        Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for review as untimely filed. This is
      the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board regarding the timeliness
      of the petition for review. The initial decision remains the final decision of the
      Board regarding the removal appeal.
                                                                                          9

                           NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5
      You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file.               5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable t ime
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U .S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you    must   submit   your   petition   to    the   court    at   the
following address:

5
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                    10

                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving    a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. I f so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).              If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
                                                                                11

to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs , or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower    Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
                                                                                     12

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 6   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

6
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                           13

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.