Court Opinion

ID: 9862113
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 01:01:25.087062+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:30:03.098663
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE FITZGERALD, dissenting: Stare decisis, certainly, is an indispensable part of our judicial process. Prall v. Burckhartt, 299 Ill. 19, 41 (1921). It promotes evenhanded, predictable, and consistent legad development, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the integrity of the courts. See Wakulich v. Mraz, 203 Ill. 2d 223, 230 (2003), quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 736-37, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991). But as the United States Supreme Court has recently reminded us, and the majority today notes, stare decisis is not an inexorable command. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577, 156 L. Ed. 2d 508, 525, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2483 (2003), overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 92 L. Ed. 2d 140, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986); 209 Ill. 2d at 82. “The obligation to follow precedent begins with necessity, and a contrary necessity marks its outer limit. *** Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law *** requires such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable. [Citation.] At the other extreme, a different necessity would make itself felt if a prior judicial ruling should come to be seen so clearly as error that its enforcement was for that very reason doomed.” Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674, 699-700, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2808 (1992). That is, stare decisis is not so static a concept that it binds our hands to do justice when we have made a mistake. See Neff v. George, 364 Ill. 306, 309 (1936); People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312, 339 (2000) (“Our most important duty as justices of the Illinois Supreme Court, to which all other considerations are subordinate, is to reach the correct decision under the law”). We have repeatedly stated that a prior case may be overruled only if there are compelling reasons or good cause to do so. See People v. Robinson, 187 Ill. 2d 461, 463-64 (1999); Heimgaertner v. Benjamin Electric Manufacturing Co., 6 Ill. 2d 152, 166-67 (1955). Here, there are not only compelling reasons, but also the best cause to abandon Dralle v. Ruder, 124 Ill. 2d 61 (1988): it was incorrectly decided. Though I echo the arguments advanced in Justice Clark’s forceful and eloquent special concurrence in Dralle, I believe that the resolution of this case can be distilled into a single, simple question: Is there an injury? That is, did Mel and Sabrina Vitro suffer an injury of their own when their daughter Dorothy became brain damaged as a result Dr. Mihelcic’s alleged negligent management of Sabrina’s labor and delivery? We have recently reiterated that parents’ interest in the companionship, care, custody, and control of their children is perhaps the oldest liberty interest protected by the federal and state constitutions. See Wickham v. Byrne, 199 Ill. 2d 309, 316 (2002), citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000); Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d 455, 472 (2000) (“ ‘The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children’ ”), quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15, 35, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 1541 (1972). Today, parents go to great financial lengths to produce a child — from infertility treatments to childbirth classes. Even normal childbirth has become a more expensive proposition than it was a decade ago, with a marked increase in prenatal doctor visits, prenatal screening for birth defects, and hospital costs. And the emotional toll on parents is greater still — from the decision to conceive to the stress associated with pregnancy. Parents still make these enormous commitments because the satisfaction, companionship, and joy that parents feel in raising a child into a happy, healthy adult is well worth the investment. See Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 200 (1983), quoting Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973). Additionally, though parents support the child in infancy through majority and often beyond, they rely on the child to support them in their later years. In short, parents need children as parents age. Because a child’s society is beyond a doubt valuable, the injury suffered by parents deprived of this society is beyond a doubt real — so real, in fact, that we presume parents suffer pecuniary loss when a child dies. See Bullard v. Barnes, 102 Ill. 2d 505, 517 (1984). The difference between losing a child’s society to death and losing a child’s society to a permanent injury is far more than a “difference which makes no difference.” Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 76 (Clark, J., specially concurring). It is a difference with which we have justified a perverse punishment for parents purportedly fortunate enough to live with a child whose companionship they can no longer fully enjoy. “[N]o meaningfiil distinction can be drawn between death and severe injury where the effect on consortium is concerned. Often death is separated from severe injury by mere fortuity; and it would be anomalous to distinguish between the two when the quality of consortium is negatively affected by both. ‘It is easy to see that the loss of a child through his death takes from his parents the society and companionship that is the essence of the lost relationship. But consider the magnitude of the loss of society and companionship that occurs when a normal [child] is suddenly reduced to a blind, nearly deaf, partially paralyzed child with a mental age of three. The parental expectations for the continuation of the family relationship are the same in either case. That the parents still have their son to love and care for is a factor to consider in determining the extent of their loss, but does not negate the loss. They have sustained a genuine loss in the nature of the society and companionship they can anticipate receiving from their son as a consequence of his injuries. Perhaps the loss of companionship and society experienced by the parents of a child permanently and severely injured ... is in some ways even greater than that suffered by parents of a deceased child. Not only has the normal family relationship been destroyed, as when a child dies, but the parent also is confronted with his loss each time he is with his child and experiences again the child’s diminished capacity to give comfort, society and companionship.’ ” Frank v. Superior Court, 150 Ariz. 228, 230-31, 722 P.2d 955, 957-58 (1986), quoting S. Simpson, Note, The Parental Claim for Loss of Society and Companionship Resulting From the Negligent Injury of a Child: A Proposal for Arizona, 1980 Ariz. St. L.J. 909, 923. How can we justify sanctioning a damage claim in the death of a stillborn child (see Seef v. Sutkus, 145 Ill. 2d 336, 338 (1991)), whom the parents will never even know, while barring a damage claim in the nonfatal injury of a newborn child, whom the parents will come to know, live with, and suffer with for her or his entire life? In this case, the Vitros’ complaint alleges that Dorothy was rendered permanently brain damaged by Dr. Mihelcic’s negligence. Taking these allegations as true, which we must do in the context of a section 2 — 615 motion to dismiss (see Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 174 Ill. 2d 482, 490 (1996)), the Vitros will never be able to enjoy life experiences with Dorothy too numerous to list that other parents can share with a child who is not disabled. When someone disrupts the parent-child relationship by intentionally or negligently injuring a child and, consequently, injuring the ability of parents to enjoy fully the child’s companionship, we should allow the parents an opportunity to present a loss of society claim to a jury. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 12 (“Every person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy, property or reputation”); Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 458-59 (1997) (though article I, section 12, does not create a constitutional right to a certain remedy, it expresses a general statement of philosophy); see also Heck v. Schupp, 394 Ill. 296, 299-300 (1946) (“Certainly to give a license to one who would disrupt that [family] relationship by tying the hands of injured members of the family, is not only clearly in conflict with [the ‘certain remedy’ clause] of our State constitution, but appears to us to be contrary to all sense of justice”). In Dralle, a majority of this court agreed with the proposition that a nonfatally injured child’s own cause of action was an adequate substitute for the parent’s own cause of action. See Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 69. This proposition is as untrue today as it was then. A parent’s claim for loss of a nonfatally injured child’s society is just that — the parent’s claim, completely apart from any claim that the child may have against the tortfeasor. The parent’s claim and the child’s claim seek compensation for different injuries. The majority’s concern in Dralle that allowing such a claim would devalue the child’s worth is an unfounded and unfair assumption that parents would profess no love or affection for a permanently injured child. Rather, parents could testify that they are unable to share with the injured child life experiences normally shared between parents and a child. The fact finder would then determine the degree of compensation, if any, the parents should receive for such a loss of society. In Dralle, and again today, a majority of this court sends the implicit, but disturbing, message that spousal relationships deserve more protection than filial relationships. Consequently, the majority elevates the one component of consortium that spousal and filial relationships do not share — sexual intercourse — over the vast number which they do share — emotional support and material services, companionship and felicity, affection and love. See Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 427 (1960); Black’s Law Dictionary 304 (7th ed. 1999). In doing this, the majority ignores the fact that at common law, sexual intercourse was not recognized as part of consortium. As Justice Clark noted in his Dralle special concurrence, “the consortium action was derived from the right of a master to recover for tortious injury to his servants, since in such a case, the master would suffer a loss of services in addition to whatever loss the servant himself suffered.” Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 76 (Clark, J., specially concurring), citing W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 125, at 931 (5th ed. 1984). From its inception then, the concept of consortium had nothing to do with sex. Only when the rule expanded to allow a husband to recover the value of his wife’s services did that aspect enter the law’s view of consortium. If the concept of compensating a loss of consortium was not originally premised on compensating a loss of sexual intercourse, how could Dralle have used that as a reason to deny a claim for loss of filial consortium? In fact, if sex was the basis for consortium claims, we would not have allowed parents to recover for the loss of society for the death of their minor child in Bullard v. Barnes, 102 Ill. 2d 505 (1984). “The genius of the common law is its ability to adapt itself to the changing needs of society.” Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co., 34 Wis. 2d 542, 551-52, 150 N.W.2d 137, 141 (1967). Our understanding of the concept of consortium has changed over time to include a variety of conjugal and nonconjugal interests. Today, in Illinois, a spouse may recover for the loss of society resulting from the death of the other spouse (see Elliott v. Willis, 92 Ill. 2d 530 (1982)); a parent may recover for the loss of society resulting from the death of a stillborn child (see Seef, 145 Ill. 2d 336), a minor child (see Bullard, 102 Ill. 2d 505), or an adult child (see Ballweg v. City of Springfield, 114 Ill. 2d 107 (1986)); a child may recover for the loss of society resulting from the death of a parent (In re Estate of Keeling, 133 Ill. App. 3d 226 (1985)); a sibling may recover for the loss of society resulting from the death of another sibling (In re Estate of Finley, 151 Ill. 2d 95 (1992)); and a spouse may recover for loss of society resulting from a nonfatal injury to the other spouse (Dini, 20 Ill. 2d at 427). A parent may not, however, recover for the loss of society resulting from a nonfatal injury to a child. This is nonsensical. To borrow a passage from Bullard, in view of our earlier decision indicating a similar recovery would have been allowed in a case involving a nonfatal injury to a spouse, “it would be anomalous to *** deny parents this form of recovery.” Bullard, 102 Ill. 2d at 515. In short, if Dralle, which refused to allow a claim for loss of a nonfatally injured child’s society, was correctly decided, Dini, which allowed a claim for loss of a nonfatally injured spouse’s society, was not. If Dini was right, Dralle was wrong. This court has demonstrated a willingness to extend the common law parameters of consortium and to reevaluate the degree of protection certain relationships deserve. The law in this area developed in a principled and intelligible fashion until Dralle cut the evolutionary cord. Here, the majority asserts that this court reaffirmed Dralle in Doe v. McKay, 183 Ill. 2d 272 (1998). 209 Ill. 2d at 90. To the extent that Doe extended the rule in Dralle, Doe too was wrongly decided. I note, however, that Doe did not overrule Dymek v. Nyquist, 128 Ill. App. 3d 859, 868 (1984), in which, on indistinguishable facts, the appellate court recognized “a cause of action for parental loss of a minor child’s society and companionship.” Though Dralle characterized Dymek as involving a claim for direct interference with the parent-child relationship (see Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 73), a close reading shows that Dymek is not so easily cabined. And if Dymek survived Dralle, and 10 years later Doe, the state of our law is currently unclear. Allowing parents to raise a loss of consortium claim recognizes the fact that parents have a right to enjoy their children’s companionship now and in the future, as well as the devastating and irreparable loss that they feel when the quality of their child’s companionship diminishes. Dralle was not correct when it was decided 15 years ago, and it is not correct today. If, in 15 more years, this court grapples with this issue again and reaches the same conclusion, it will still be wrong. I dissent. JUSTICES KILBRIDE and RARICK join in this dissent.