Court Opinion

ID: 9670353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:19:22.390459+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:04.039137
License: Public Domain

DAY, J.
(dissenting). The majority opinion has now extended this court’s jurisdiction over criminal defendants beyond the grave. Its appellate grasp now reaches "from here to eternity!”
But the grave should end this court’s involvement with the defendant. We trust the defendant — and his victim — are in the hands of one whose judgments "are true and righteous altogether.” Our judgments, even at their best, are but imperfect reflections of absolute justice. We should recognize that the death of Judge McDonald ended this court’s role in this matter. This case should be dismissed as moot.
Judge McDonald was convicted of first degree murder for the killing of the young law partner of the man who had recently defeated Judge McDonald in his re-election bid for Circuit Court Judge of Lafayette *542county. Judge McDonald committed suicide in prison after starting an appeal of his conviction.
The majority of this court has decided that the appeal should proceed in spite of the fact the he is dead by his own hand. The theory is that the dead or those who survive them should have the opportunity for "vindication” by allowing an appeal of his conviction to go forward. But for what purpose?
The most that could happen would be that a majority might hold an error occurred in the trial warranting a new trial. Does that "vindicate” the deceased? Hardly. There is not going to be a determination that the deceased was "not guilty.” That issue will never be retried. The majority opinion might make sense if it held that if a new trial was granted to the deceased, he would be retried "in absentia.” That isn’t going to happen. The law provides that deceased persons may be plaintiffs or defendants by their personal representatives so that resolution of such issues as their negligence or culpability for fraud or theft resulting in civil liability may proceed and their ultimate "vindication” or "condemnation” can begin, be tried, appealed, and if prejudicial error is found, reversed and be tried over again. But it is obvious that this court is not prepared to hold that this should be done with deceased criminal defendants.
The majority opinion (at 551) cites various statutes that adversely affect the right of an intentional felonious killer to profit from the death of his victim.
The principal statute in sec. 852.01(2m) which reads as follows:
"852.01 Basic rules for intestate succession .... (2m) REQUIREMENT THAT HEIR NOT HAVE INTENTIONALLY KILLED THE DE*543CEASED, (a) If any person who would otherwise be an heir under sub. (1) has feloniously and intentionally killed the decedent, the net estate not disposed of by will passes as if the killer had predeceased the decedent.
"(b) A final judgment of conviction of felonious and intentional killing is conclusive for purposes of this subsection. In the absence of such a conviction, the court, on the basis of clear and convincing evidence, may determine whether the killing was felonious and intentional for purposes of this subsection.
"(c) This subsection does not affect the rights of any person who, before rights under this subsection have been adjudicated, purchases for value and without notice from the killer property that the killer would have acquired except for this subsection; but the killer is liable for the amount of the proceeds. No insurance company, bank or other obligor paying according to the terms of its policy or obligation is liable because of this subsection unless before payment it has received at its home office or principal address written notice of a claim under this subsection.”
Each of the statutes cited in addition to the above, i.e., secs. 853.11(3), 895.43, 895.435, 632.485, 700.17(2)(b) all provide: "Section 852.01(2m)(b) and (c) applies to this section” (or "paragraph”).
In any of the statutory possibilities if the time for appeal had expired, the convicted one could not profit from his victim’s death. If, however, an appeal had been started and the killer died prior to the appeal determination no "presumption” as to his guilt or innocence would be effective and that issue would be tried under any of the cited statutes in a civil court. *544There the burden of proving intentional felonious killing under sec. 852.01(2m)(b), Stats., is "clear and convincing evidence” not "beyond a reasonable doubt” as in a criminal case. Thus, even if an appellate court found there was not sufficient evidence to convict the defendant beyond a "reasonable doubt” and reversed the conviction and dismissed the criminal charge, the case would still go to trial as a civil case under sec. 852.01(2m)(b), Stats.!
This shows the futility of the procedure the majority adopts today. It does nothing.
In the case before us there is no claim that Judge McDonald stood to profit from his victim’s death. Thus there is absolutely nothing to be gained by the procedure adopted by the majority today.
The better rule is that in criminal cases death moots the matter at whatever stage of the proceedings it occurs. If a person is charged and dies before coming to trial that ends the matter; it is moot.
If a person is in the process of being tried and dies, the trial should end. The possibility of a finding of guilt or innocence is ended. It’s moot; it’s over. No matter how insistent those near and dear to the accused might be in demanding that the trial proceed, and claim that proof could be offered to vindicate the accused, the trial cannot go forward without the criminal defendant.
If one convicted took an appeal, won a new trial and died before the trial could take place, the matter would be moot and what might have happened in a new trial will forever remain unknown.
So it should be with the proceedings here before us, where an appeal was initiated in time but the convicted defendant died before the appeal was heard. The matter should be treated the same as in the *545hypothetical situations illustrated above — it should be recognized as moot.
Suppose a defendant, represented at trial by the public defender, was convicted and then the public defender filed an appeal. Further suppose the defendant died before the appeal was heard. Further suppose the deceased defendant had no relatives, no personal representative, because he owned no property, and no "friends.” What should be done? Is the public defender to be ordered at public expense to proceed with the appeal to "vindicate” the deceased? To ask the question seems to point up the absurdity of the rule adopted today by the majority. Any interest "society” might have in the matter (Majority opinion at pages 537-539) would be better served by declaring such a case moot.
There is no end to the slippery slope down which the majority has started to slide. For instance, while there is a limit on appeal time for alleged error at trial, there is no such limit when constitutional error is claimed. Section 974.06, Stats., provides:
"Postconviction procedure. (1) After the time for appeal or postconviction remedy provided in s. 974.02 has expired, a prisoner in custody under sentence of a court claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the U.S. constitution or the constitution or laws of this state, that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
*546"(2) A motion for such relief is a part of the original criminal action, is not a separate proceeding and may be made at any time ....
"(b) If it appears that counsel is necessary and if the defendant claims or appears to be indigent, refer the person to the state public defender for an indigency determination and appointment of counsel under ch. 977 _
"(5) A court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing ....”
After the time for appeal is long gone and the defendant is long dead, what stops a relative, or "friend,” or anyone else from bringing a sec. 974.06, Stats., motion to set aside the conviction and order a new trial? Under the reasoning of the majority the answer is: "nothing.” It could be an interesting "full employment” program for the legal profession to dig up old files from years back and start the process of "vindication” for those long gone to their reward.
Furthermore, this court has already resolved the issue of what to do with a case that involved the vindication of a man’s reputation, when he died after his case was briefed and argued in this court but before a decision was mandated. The case is State ex rel. Steiger v. Eich, 86 Wis. 2d 390, 272 N.W.2d 380 (1978).
While McDonald is a criminal case, the Steiger matter involved a John Doe proceeding. A John Doe investigation is about the closest thing to a criminal proceeding that we have without being denominated as such. This proceeding was directed solely against Congressman William A. Steiger and he was the only witness called. Clearly, as a Congressman and as a *547citizen, his reputation was "on the line.” His refusal to obey an order to name the sources of his information on vote fraud subjected him to possible incarceration.
The case arose because a large number of people involved in the political process in Wisconsin wanted to make it easier for citizens to register to vote. They got legislation passed which established a system of election day registration at the polls. William A. Steiger, a United States Congressman for the Sixth District of Wisconsin and former state legislator, had evinced a longtime interest in these matters. He expressed concern that the system adopted in Wisconsin and being considered by Congress for nation-wide application made voter registration fraud easier and more likely. He publicly stated that three University of Wisconsin students from Madison had visited him in his offices in Washington, D.C. and told him that each had managed to vote twice in the Presidential election of 1976 in Madison. They cited their experience as showing a need for Congress to tighten up the voter registration law which was a "hot” political issue in Congress. Following his revelation of these conversations, Congressman Steiger was asked to reveal the names of the students by the Dane County District Attorney. He refused and claimed it was a privileged communication to him under the Speech and Debate Clause of the United States Constitution.
In a letter to the Congressman from the Dane County District Attorney dated June 1, 1977 (Exhibit L to Steiger Affidavit dated Sept. 28, 1977), the District Attorney said:
"Again, I find it surprising that a person claiming great concern about voter fraud refuses to cooperate with those charged with the enforcement of the *548law. No election law which you might design will protect against voter fraud unless it provides for the prosecution of its violators and unless citizens concerned with the integrity of the electoral process cooperate in its enforcement.”
The matter became a political "cause celebre.” The Capital Times of Madison on May 18, 1977 (Exhibit H to Baldwin Affidavit filed April 28, 1978 in this court), headlined a story, "Doyle calls vote fraud hearing — Steiger is asked to appear voluntarily.” The story read in part as follows:
"Dane County District Attorney James E. Doyle, Jr. said today he will ask U.S. Rep. William Steiger (R-Oshkosh) to appear voluntarily before a John Doe hearing in Dane County in an investigation of voter fraud allegations made by Steiger ....
"Steiger said this spring in a broadcast interview that he had evidence of voter fraud in Madison, a charge which has been repeatedly made by Republicans but which has never been proved.
"Steiger was one of 10 House Republicans who demanded Monday that Milwaukee County District Attorney E. Michael McCann turn over a memorandum which they charged, shows serious potential for vote fraud in the new Wisconsin system which allows voters to register at the polls.
"The demand by Republicans is seen as a move to discredit President Jimmy Carter’s proposed legislation to pattern national voter registration laws after Wisconsin’s system ....
"Doyle requested the John Doe hearing after Steiger repeatedly refused to turn over the names of the three persons who allegedly admitted to him *549they had voted more than once during the 1976 presidential election ....
"A John Doe hearing, under state law, can be called to investigate possible wrong-doing, but does not necessarily mean a crime has been committed
"Doyle said the alleged violations are felonies under Wisconsin law, ...”
Following correspondence between the City Clerk, the District Attorney and the Congressman, Judge William F. Eich commenced the "John Doe” proceeding at the request of the District Attorney. Congressman Steiger was subpoenaed. He appeared and refused to divulge the names of the students who had told him of their double voting under claim of privilege pursuant to the Speech and Debate Clause, Art. I, sec. 6 of the United States Constitution. (Transcript of Proceedings before Judge Eich Aug. 24, 1977, attachment IV to affidavit of Attorney Gordon B. Baldwin filed April 28, 1978.)
On February 28, 1987, Judge Eich issued a Memorandum Decision denying Congressman Steiger’s claim of immunity. Among other things the decision said:
"I have determined that his [Steiger’s] actions were not speech or debate and that he had no privilege under Art. I, Sec. 6. I thus consider Mr. Steiger’s argument as to the chilling effect and his argument on 'federal supremacy’ to be without merit.
"I hold, therefore, that Mr. Steiger has no constitutional or other privilege to refrain from answering questions as to the identity of the persons who admitted to him that they had violated the criminal laws of Wisconsin .... [T]he acts admitted to by *550the students constitute a felony — a serious offense in Wisconsin — and Mr. Steiger is the only person possessing this evidence. It would be no different in principle if the Congressman’s visitors had admitted complicity in several unsolved bank robberies (or murders!) in the State of Wisconsin.”
Congressman Steiger through one of his attorneys, Professor Gordon B. Baldwin, of the University of Wisconsin Law School, petitioned this court for a Writ of Prohibition directed against Judge Eich and District Attorney Doyle.
In his Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Prohibition in this court, among the reasons given as to why this court should take the case, the petition stated:
"The Circuit Court’s opinion of February 10, 1978, involves questions about the scope of the protections afforded to Members of Congress and the general public by the Speech or Debate Clause (Art. I sec. 6) and First Amendment of the United States Constitution and by the Federal structure of the American government. This Court has not previously answered these questions, which involve sufficient compelling interests to the public to warrant entertainment of this original action ....
"Irreparable harm to the petitioner and to the legislative independence of the Congress of the United States will continue if the Circuit Court’s decision is not vacated, ...” (Petition, p. 2.) (Emphasis added.)
In his Memorandum in support of the petition, p. 17, counsel for Congressman Steiger stated:
"The adverse effects of the ruling below would be felt by Congressman Steiger and by all other members of Congress.”
*551An order to show cause was issued and oral argument took place on June 7, 1978.
On June 8, 1978, this court granted petitioner’s request that it take original jurisdiction to consider the merits of the petition "because the case is a matter Publici juris.” The case was ordered placed on the court’s September, 1978 calendar for On Brief disposition.
Congressman Steiger passed away on December 4, 1978, before this court issued its opinion. On December 22, 1978, this court dismissed the action as moot. This court said at p. 391:
"Congressman Steiger died on December 4,1978. A decision on the merits of this dispute can have no practical legal effect upon any existing controversy. The case is therefore moot, ...”
If this court found against him he could have appealed to the United States Supreme Court. If this court had agreed with the Congressman’s position, it would have vindicated his judgment and his conception of his proper role as a Congressman and would undoubtedly have provided comfort to his family and friends. That might have been true had he lived, but he died and the right to vindication or condemnation ended with his death. So likewise should the issue in the case before us be resolved. This court should not have one rule for deceased congressmen and another for deceased judges.
The majority have rightly overruled State v. Krysheski, 119 Wis. 2d 84, 349 N.W.2d 729 (Ct. App. 1984), which held death voided a conviction from the beginning, i.e., "abated” the entire action. That result, though supported in some jurisdictions, is wrong and the majority rightly overruled it. But the majority is *552equally in error in saying an appeal may continue. If the conviction is upheld on appeal, what good does that do the dead man or those who cherish his memory? Better for all concerned if the matter is recognized as moot.
A majority of the present court was also on this court when the Steiger case was dismissed. This court should follow the reasoning of its own precedent in Steiger and recognize that death has ended the case.
Judge Sundby stated it well in his concurrence in State v. McDonald, 138 Wis. 2d 366, 373, 405 N.W.2d 771 (1987):
"I believe it is better to adopt a very simple rule covering all deaths, pending appeal, i.e., that the appeal is dismissed because the appellant is no longer subject to the jurisdiction of the court.”
There is nothing we can do for the deceased. A wise man long ago said of the dead:
"Their love and their hate and their envy have already perished, and they have no more for ever any share in all that is done under the sun. Ecclesiastics, 9:6 (RSV).”
This court should recognize its own logical limitations. It should follow Steiger and dismiss this case as moot.