Court Opinion

ID: 9541229
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:23:45.031675+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:40.596613
License: Public Domain

DEITS, P. J.,
concurring.
I agree with the majority opinion that there was evidence in the summary judgment record that some of the engineering decisions concerning warning signs were not dictated by the Department of Transportation Manual. For that reason only, I agree that it was error to allow the state’s motion for summary judgment. I write separately to emphasize that, were it not for the factual questions about whether the Manual apphed here and whether it was followed, the state would be entitled to prevail on its discretionary immunity defense.
Although plaintiff argues otherwise, ODOT’s promulgation of the Manual was clearly a discretionary policy *493decision, which is immune under ORS 30.265(3)(c). See, e.g., Stevenson v. State of Oregon, 290 Or 3, 619 P2d 247 (1980). The state would also be immune for the acts of its employees in implementing the policy decision embodied in the Manual, if they carried out the Manual according to its terms and, in doing so, committed no independently negligent act and exercised no independent judgment that would not itself qualify as discretionary. See, e.g., Egner v. City of Portland, 103 Or App 623, 798 P2d 721 (1990); see also Bakr v. Elliott, 125 Or App 1, 864 P2d 1340 (1993), rev den 318 Or 381 (1994).
Praggastis v. Clackamas County, 305 Or 419, 752 P2d 302 (1988), on which the state relies, supports the proposition stated in the preceding paragraph. I agree with the suggestion in the majority opinion that Praggastis, blending as it does the concepts of judicial immunity and discretionary immunity under the statute, is not the best authority for the proposition. The “explicit orders” language in Prag-gastis does not capture the rationale for immunizing the conduct of employees who simply carry out policy decisions that are themselves discretionary and immune: If the immunity did not “pass through” to those who put the discretionary decisions or programs into effect, the government’s immunity for the discretionary actions themselves would effectively be lost as soon as they took effect and would be wholly illusory.
As noted at the outset, the only problem with the state’s defense so far is that there is a question of fact that precludes summary judgment.1 Were it not for that, defendants would be entitled to immunity under the general principles of discretionary immunity that Praggastis and other cases continue to uphold.

 I note that any engineering decisions that were not covered by the Manual’s provisions may themselves be immune, Stevenson v. State of Oregon, supra, 290 Or at 15. That is another question that may turn on the facts developed at trial, but we cannot answer it as a matter of law on the basis of the record before us. See Miller v. Grants Pass Irrigation, 297 Or 312, 686 P2d 324 (1984).