Court Opinion

ID: 9696582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:51:54.705905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:23.680240
License: Public Domain

Ryan and Brickley, JJ.,
state: We dissent from the Court’s reconsideration of this matter and dissent from the judgment of ouster for the reasons stated in Justice Ryan’s opinion of February 11, 1983.
*218Opinion Filed February 16, 1983
Levin, J.
My opinion in the instant case, filed Friday afternoon, February 11, 1983, concluded with the following statement:
"Because I am of the opinion that no judgment of ouster should be issued at this time, I join in the decision to deny issuance of a judgment of ouster.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The opinion also states:
"The quo warranto complaint filed by the Attorney General cannot be decided until four members of this Court vote to grant the relief prayed for therein or to dismiss the complaint.10” (Emphasis supplied.)
The five opinions of the justices filed February 11, 1983, addressed the question whether the former Governor had or the present Governor has the power to make an appointment to fill the Moody seat for the period beginning January 1, 1983. The five opinions did not consider or address the separate question1 of the effect on Justice *219Riley’s authority to exercise the powers of a justice of this Court of the three different views2 of *220the justices on the question whether the former Governor had the power to appoint Justice Riley for the period beginning January 1, 1983, or of an equal division of the Court on that question.
On consideration of the question of the eifect of the five opinions of the justices, I am of the opinion that the ultimate question in the instant case is not whether one Governor or another is empowered to make the appointment for the period beginning January 1, 1983, but whether, by virtue of the appointment by the former Governor, Justice Riley is empowered to exercise the power of the office of justice of the Supreme Court for the period beginning January 1, 1983.
However the question arises3 or whatever the *221form of action,4 unless a majority of the six justices (four) participating in the instant case agree that Justice Riley has been so empowered, her authority to act has not been adjudicated favorably to her claim of authority.5 Absent an adjudication by *222four justices favorable to Justice Riley’s claim of authority,6 Justice Riley should not and cannot *223exercise the power of the office. Her participation in the work of this Court without an adjudication favorable to her claim would leave the question of the authority of her vote and of a decision of this Court in which she were to participate open to continuing dispute.7
Because less than four votes were garnered for the view that Justice Riley’s authority from and after January 1, 1983, should be recognized, a judgment of ouster, which could not properly be issued before consideration and determination of the separate question of the effect of the five opinions of the justices filed February 11, 1983, should now be issued.
I therefore join in the entry of a judgment of ouster at this time.

"!<• No judgment of a trial court is here being affirmed by an equally divided court. Opinions joined in by less than four of the six participating members of this Court do not have finality. Today’s disposition cannot, in my opinion, decide or adjudicate this controversy.” (Emphasis supplied.)
"The court rule provides:
" 'Decisions by the Supreme Court. No motion shall be decided nor order entered by the Court unless all required documents have been filed with the Court and requisite fees have been paid and, except for affirmance of action by a lower court or tribunal by even division of the Justices of the Supreme Court voting thereon, decisions of the Supreme Court shall be made by concurrence of a majority of the Justices voting thereon.’ GCR 1963, 865.3.”

 Where a majority of the Court or of the participating justices signs one opinion, the consequence, to affirm or reverse, is ordinarily readily determinable from the opinion without regard to whether the bottom line (affirmed or reversed) is noted.
*219Where, however, less than a majority agree on an opinion — where, as here, less than four of the six participating justices voted either to recognize or deny the claim that the former Governor had the power to make an appointment effective for the period beginning January 1, 1983 — it then becomes necessary to consider as a separate question the meaning or significance of the opinions of the justices.
While the question of the meaning or signiñcance of the February 11 opinions of the justices regarding whether the former Governor had the power to make an appointment for the disputed period is a separate question from whether the former Governor had the power to make an appointment, the answer depends on the February 11 opinions.
The question whether a judgment of ouster should or should not be entered is not answered by asking how many votes are required to enter a judgment of ouster — GCR 1963, 865.3 requires a majority— but rather requires an analysis of the question whether, where the Court divides as it did on February 11, the meaning or significance of that division is that,
—because a majority of the justices participating were not of the opinion that the former Governor did not have the power to make the appointment, the allegation that he did not have the power has not been sustained (and, therefore, a judgment of ouster should not be entered), or
—because a majority of the justices participating were not of the opinion that the former Governor had the power to make the appointment, the claim that the former Governor did have the power has not been adjudicated favorably to that claim (and, therefore, a judgment of ouster should be entered).
There are two separate questions: (1) which Governor is or was "the governor” empowered to make the appointment (for the disputed period) to fill the vacancy which occurred because of the death of Justice Moody, within the meaning of Const 1963, art 6, § 23 (the issue addressed in the February 11 opinions), and (2) the meaning or significance of the division of the Court in the February 11 opinions.
The decision whether to oust or not, albeit in a sense still a third question, flows as a matter of course once the second question is answered — once it is decided whether it takes a majority to sustain the allegation that the former Governor did not have the power or it takes a majority to recognize the power of the former Governor to make the appointment. The second question was not addressed in the February 11 opinions.
The second question, the meaning or significance of the February 11 opinions, is not and should not be a political or partisan question.

 Although my opinion filed February 11, 1983, states that I would not enter a judgment of ouster "at this time”, that opinion did not constitute an affirmation of Justice Riley’s authority to exercise the powers of the office pursuant to the appointment for the period beginning January 1, 1983 made by the former Governor.
*220Even if I had voted for the view that the former Governor was empowered to make an appointment for the period beginning January 1, 1983, there would still have been only three votes to uphold Justice Riley’s authority to exercise the powers of the office pursuant to the appointment made by the former Governor.

 The disputed issue of whether the former Governor had or the present Governor has the power to fill the vacancy created by the death of Justice Moody should be decided on the basis of principles which do not depend on the manner or time the issue is presented.
The correct construction of the constitution, the correct resolution of the question "which governor is 'the governor’ ” empowered by § 23 to make the appointment, cannot properly depend on whether the present Governor made or makes an appointment before or after February 15 or ever makes an appointment or the form of action in which the question is presented.
It has been argued that Justice Riley occupies the office until four justices decide that the former Governor did not have the power to appoint her. The grounds on which Justice Riley asserts the right to sit after January 1, 1983, is the language of the former Governor’s commission of appointment and a debatable construction of the constitution. However, an appointee of the present Governor would be armed with the same credentials and an opposing debatable construction.
Justice Riley may not, although less than a majority of the justices are prepared to recognize her authority, properly be permitted to sit by default. Appointees of both Governors could claim such a right. To say one appointment takes precedence over the other because it bears an earlier or later date would be to adopt a principle of resolution that favors one side of the controversy over the other without a principled basis for doing so. Requiring a majority of the justices *221participating to recognize the authority of either Governor’s appointee is a principle of resolution consistent with evenhanded disposition of the dispute.
To hold that possession of the office is a factor and decisive would be to create a holdover clause by a rule of construction regarding the significance or meaning of the February 11 opinions although there are not four votes to declare there is a holdover clause in the construction of the constitution. To do so would be a tilt in favor of holdover. There is no more reason to deem extra votes for holdover than there would be to deem an extra vote against holdover because there are not four votes for holdover.
Quo warranto actions (Attorney General ex rel McKenzie v Warner, 299 Mich 172; 300 NW 63 [1941]; Attorney General ex rel Bean v Showley, 307 Mich 690; 12 NW2d 439 [1943]) where the holder of a public office continued to occupy it because the Court was evenly divided on the construction of a statute were decided before the creation of the Court of Appeals or the adoption of GCR 865.3 providing that a decision in an original proceeding shall be made by concurrence of a majority. Further, the results in those cases may reflect a jurisprudence formulated before an action for a declaratory judgment could be commenced to test the authority to hold public office and recognition of a need to have a principle of resolution which operates independently of the form of action.
As late as 1961, this Court declared that an action for declaratory judgment "may not be regarded as a substitute for other legal actions”. McLeod v McLeod, 365 Mich 25, 33; 112 NW2d 227 (1961). The court rules were amended in 1963 to provide: "The existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate.” GCR 1963, 521.3; see 2 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated, Authors’ Comments, p 687. The authorities state that an action for a declaratory judgment is an appropriate and indeed the preferred means of determining title to public office. 1 Anderson, Declaratory Judgments, § 189, p 382 (1951); Borchard, Declaratory Judgments (2d ed, 1941), pp 362-363, 858-862; Developments in the Law: Declaratory Judgments— 1941-1949, 62 Harv L Rev 787, 877 (1949). See also High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies (2d ed, 1884), § 629, p 497, § 712, pp 568-569, and §§ 748, 750, p 593.

 See fns 3 and 7.

 The need for applying this Court’s generally applicable rule of four (see GCR 1963, 865.3 quoted in text preceding fn 1 supra) in this case becomes apparent if one considers the dilemma the Court would confront if the present Governor had also made an appointment for the period beginning January 1, 1983, and the Court had again *222deadlocked. The controversy would remain unresolved and the Court could not function effectively unless a favorable vote of a majority of the justices participating (four) were required to recognize the authority of the appointees to sit, or the Court were prepared to recognize the authority of both appointees.
Analysis of the separate question of the meaning or significance of the opinions of the justices has been obscured by the decision of the present Governor to defer making an appointment of a justice for the disputed period although he has publicly asserted, with the support of the Attorney General in this action, that he has the power to do so.
If the present Governor had made an appointment and then two actions quo warranto had been commenced, or if an action for a declaratory judgment had been commenced on the question whether the former Governor had the power or the present Governor has the power to make the appointment, it would, based on the views of the justices reflected in the February 11 opinions, be evident that, unless the Court is willing to seat the appointees of both Governors, the appointee of neither can sit because less than a majority of the justices participating recognize the power of either Governor to make an appointment:
(a) if a majority of the justices participating is required to sustain an allegation that a Governor did not or does not have the power to make an appointment, complaints quo warranto should be dismissed as to the appointees of both Governors, or
(b) if a majority of the justices participating is required to recognize the power of a Governor to make an appointment, judgments of ouster should issue as to both appointees.
The Court, as a court, has not indicated a willingness to accept either alternative, to seat appointees of both Governors or neither Governor. Seating appointees of both Governors requires accommodations (see my February 11 opinion) which have not been agreed to by the Court or a majority of the justices participating. Seating appointees of neither Governor — functioning with six justices as the Court has since the death of Justice Moody — does not require such accommodations; the Court could authorize "persons who have been elected and served as judges to perform judicial duties [as a seventh participant in the work of the Court] for limited periods or specific assignments”. Const 1963, art 6, § 23.

 Because there were six justices participating and a majority (four) did not agree on whether the former Governor had or the present Governor has the power to make the appointment for the Moody seat for the period beginning January 1, 1983, there is no decision of the Court on whether the former Governor had or the present Governor has the power of appointment to fill the Moody seat for the period beginning January 1, 1983.
The judgment of ouster entered February 15, 1983 does not say anything about the meaning of the Constitution or the constructional question, "which governor is 'the governor’ ”. It does not say that the *223former Governor did not have the power to make the appointment; it does not say that the present Governor has such power. It reflects (i) the view of three justices that the former Governor did not have the power and the present Governor has the power and (ii) the view set forth in this opinion of the meaning or significance of the February 11 opinions.

 The question whether Justice Riley has the authority to exercise the powers of the office might arise again by petition for rehearing, by a further complaint quo warranto (the present complaint having been dismissed without a decision on the merits), or a complaint for a declaratory judgment by the state or another litigant questioning Justice Riley’s authority or the authority of a decision of this Court. The question could also arise later this year or a year from now, early in 1984, on the question whether Justice Riley is entitled to file an affidavit of candidacy or to designation on the ballot as an incumbent. If the present Governor were to make an appointment, this Court would be confronted with two claimants to the Moody seat.