Court Opinion

ID: 9847131
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:54:30.824189+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:01.579237
License: Public Domain

CONNOR, Justice
(dissenting).
I must respectfully dissent.
I do not believe that Rule 26(g) of the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure was designed to apply only to the situations presented in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), and Dimmick v. State, 473 P.2d 616 (Alaska 1970). I am not persuaded that the rule should be interpreted as barring one collateral use exception to the exclusionary rule, i. e., impeachment, and not another such exception, i. e., probation revocation proceedings.
Rule 26(g) works, at a minimum, to bar the use of illegally obtained evidence for the purpose of directly proving guilt. Furthermore, as the Alaskan expression of the constitutionally mandated exclusionary rule,1 it necessarily operates to remedy a violation of federal Fourth Amendment rights as well as the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights addressed in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed.2d 694 (1966).
The commentary pertaining to 26(g) clearly indicates the committee’s intent to guarantee, by means of the new criminal rule, an exclusionary remedy which would prohibit the collateral as well as direct use of illegally obtained evidence — at least with regard to its use for impeachment purposes. The state urges us to distinguish between one collateral use of illegal evidence and another. The state argues that although 26(g) was designed to extinguish the collateral use exception to the exclusionary rule that was established in Harris, it was not intended to prohibit the collateral use of illegal evidence for probation revocation purposes. I do not find merit in the distinction that the state would draw, either on the basis of the history of the rule or on grounds of policy.
Examination of the rules committee’s comments reveals that the committee’s concern was not so much with' the specific circumstances present in Harris and Dim-mick, as with the more pervasive problem of the erosion of constitutional rights. The committee’s notes do not indicate that its members found the use of illegally obtained evidence for impeachment purposes to be the only problem addressed, except insofar as it affected constitutional rights. The committee’s attention was focused on the erosion of constitutional protections by the Harris and Dimmick decisions, and on general notions of exclusionary policy as enunciated in the dissent (Connor, J.) in Dimmick v. State, supra, at 623.
The exclusionary remedy is the primary means of effectuating certain basic constitutional rights. When the scope of the remedy is curtailed, protection of those rights is likewise limited. To establish a collateral use exception for probation revocation proceedings means that the constitutional rights for which protection was intended in the drafting and adoption of Rule 26(g) are again subject to erosion.
Moreover, I believe that the general policy underlying the "exclusion of illegally obtained evidence merits application of the exclusionary rule in probation revocation proceedings. The function of the exclusionary rule is two-fold: (1) the deterrence of official lawlessness by eliminating the prosecutorial benefits of such lawless behavior, and (2) the furtherance of the imperative of judicial integrity, which demands that the courts not be made “party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13, *91688 S.Ct. 1868, 1875, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).2 A recurring theme in the development of exclusionary doctrine has been the emphasis placed on these two aspects of the rule.3
As the trial court noted in its decision below, because of the small number of criminal cases which actually reach trial, the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule is severely limited if illegally obtained evidence is inadmissible only at trial proceedings.4 Furthermore, the use of such evidence at probation revocation proceedings provides substantial incentive for unconstitutional searches and seizures. Thus I am persuaded that the deterrence of unconstitutional police practices will be furthered by the adoption of the exclusionary rule in probation revocation proceedings. I am certainly not persuaded by what has been presented in the case before us that the incremental deterrent effect of applying the exclusionary rule is so slight that it is outweighed by the needs of our probationary system.
There is nothing inherent in or peculiar to the probation system which justifies circumvention of the “imperative of judicial integrity”, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960). Some courts have found that in order for the rehabilitative function of probation to be fostered, the judge at the revocation hearing should know all of the circumstances of the case before him, whether or not the pertinent information was uncovered by illegal means.5 These decisions, however, have failed to explain satisfactorily how the rehabilitative goals of probation would, in fact, be furthered by the admission of illegally obtained evidence. Moreover, such reasoning flies in the face of decisions such as In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), which emphasize that rehabilitative and therapeutic goals can . no longer be used as an excuse for a lack of procedural safeguards and the deprivation of constitutional rights.6
*917Of even greater significance is the impact of the case before us on the integrity of the judicial process. Historically the exclusionary rule did not arise merely from the need to deter official misconduct. Rather it was designed to keep intact certain values basic to our constitutional system of government.
The Founding Fathers did not believe that any one branch of government could be relied upon to honor or make effective the fundamental guarantees contained in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. What they hoped was that the interplay between the several branches of government would keep alive the protections which they had incorporated into the basic document which was to set permanently the organic pattern of American government. It must be remembered that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights were regarded as so important that they were considered as a necessary precondition to the acceptance of the Constitution itself The citizens of the several states wfcre unwilling to delegate power to a strong central government without positive guarantees of individual freedom and liberty which, it was thought, would stand as a barrier against the tendency of any strong government toward oppressive mastery of its citizens.
The Bill of Rights did not emerge as an abstract statement of desirable governmental values in an ideal world. What it did represent was a positive expression of restraint against the abuse of governmental power. The Bill of Rights reflected a suspicion on the part of the several states and their citizenry that, unless restrained by positive utterances in our organic law, the government could not be trusted to abstain from obliterating the very rights and freedoms for which the American Revolution had been fought.
It was perceived by the framers that the role of the judiciary was vital to the preservation of the fundamental guarantees of the Bill of Rights. In an address to Congress, James Madison stated:
“[Independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the Legislative or Executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration of rights.” 1 Annals of Cong. 439 (1789).
By its very nature the judiciary has neither the power nor the machinery to direct the everyday operations of govérnment. It can act only upon justiciable issues brought before it in the form of actual cases and controversies. Moreover, the protection of fundamental constitutional rights is often accomplished by negation, i.e., by a refusal on the part of the courts to validate unconstitutional behavior by the other branches of government.7 Hence the exclusionary rule as to illegally obtained evidence.8
Many jurists have observed that if the courts permit unlawful action by other branches of government they become parties to the wrong. When they permit the use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence in judicial proceedings they render the con*918stitutional guarantee a nullity and, in effect, indicate their approval of lawless conduct.
As Mr. Justice Brandeis observed in his classic dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485, 48 S.Ct. 564, 575, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) :
“In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.”
In that same case Mr. Justice Holmes said:
“[W]e must consider the two objects of desire both of which we cannot have and make up our minds which to choose. It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that end that all available evidence should be used. It also is desirable that the government should not itself foster and pay for other crimes, when they are the means by which the evidence is to be obtained. . . . We have to choose, and for my part I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part.
If the existing code does not permit district attorneys to have a hand in such dirty business it does not permit the judge to allow such iniquities to succeed.”
Unless the exclusionary rule is applied against all forms of official lawlessness we engage in governmental hypocrisy of the most serious kind. For we are not dealing merely with ordinary legalities but with fundamental constitutional values of first magnitude. Freedom from unlawful searches and seizures goes to the very core of our constitutional heritage, encompassing as it does our right to privacy and to protection from arbitrary governmental intrusion into our lives.
Unless some meaningful consequence follows from the violation of constitutional rights, those rights become merely a form of words without substantive content. To the extent that we condone official lawlessness we become parties to the subversion of constitutional rights, and we fail to support and defend the constitution, which we are sworn to do.9
When the exclusionary rule is viewed in light of the imperative of judicial integrity, it is of no moment that the case before us is a probation revocation proceeding. The nature of the proceeding does nothing to remove the constitutional taint which attaches to the proffered evidence. The principle of judicial refusal to be a party to wrongdoing remains the same.10
As Mr. Justice Grimes observed, dissenting in Stone v. Shea, 113 N.H. 174, 304 A. 2d 647, 649-50 (1973), the use in probation revocation proceedings of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment results in a society dependent upon transgressing the very charter of its own existence.11 Recent historical events in the United States should have taught us the importance of adhering to basic constitutional commands, and how fraught with peril are the claims that expediency or *919governmental necessity should override the fundamental guarantees of personal liberty which are basic to a free society.
As I urged in Dimmick v. State, supra, (dissenting), we must close the courthouse door to evidence obtained in violation of fundamental constitutional rights. Our failure to do so validates the role of government as lawbreaker, it betrays our obligation to support and defend the constitutions of the United States and Alaska, and it renders ineffective one of the most important guarantees necessary to the maintenance of a free society.
I would affirm the ruling of Judge Burke, and would exclude the illegally obtained evidence at the trial of this case.

. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961).

. The dissent (Connor, J.) in Dimmick v. State, supra, contains an extensive discussion of the origins and development of the exclusionary rule. There is no need to repeat that discussion here. However, one point should be clarified. The balancing test discussed at 473 P.2d at 628, should not be read to imply that a defendant’s own Fourth Amendment rights may in any way be eroded. In the Dim-mick dissent balancing was only applied to the question of whether a defendant has standing to raise the Miranda rights of another.

. Undoubtedly, far greater emphasis has been placed on the deterrence function of the exclusionary rule. But see the dissent of Brennan, J. in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974), joined by Douglas and Marshall, JJ., in which it is pointed out that the historical predecessors of the rule in its current form were based on grounds other than deterrence.

. Respondent points out that, according to a recent study conducted by the Alaska Judicial Council, 94% of the felony eases disposed of in Alaska 1973 were resolved in non-trial proceedings. See B. Cutler, Sentencing in Alaska : A Description of the Process and Summary of Statistical Data for 1973, 84 (Alaska Judicial Council, March 1975).

. See, e, g., United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1163-64 (2nd Cir. 1970) (a parole revocation) ; United States ex rel. Lombardino v. Heyd, 318 F.Supp. 648, 651 (E.D.La.1970), aff'd per curiam, 438 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1971).

.In Gault, the Supreme Court was highly critical of the constitutional and theoretical bases of juvenile justice administration, particularly with respect to the traditional reliance on the doctrine of parens patriae. It noted: “The Latin phrase proved to be of great help to those who sought to rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional scheme; but its meaning is murky and its historic creditials are of dubious relevance.” 387 U.S. at 16, 87 S.Ct. at 1437.
One commentator has stated:
“Gault made it perfectly clear that the court is relucant to be hemmed in by such artificial labels as ‘criminal,’ ‘civil,’ or ‘quasi-administrative.’ If Gault’s primary concern was with the procedural niceties of entry vel non into a deprivation process, the court also demonstrated that a desire to help — the rehabilative ideal — no longer will serve as the incantation before which procedural safeguards must succumb.” Cohen, “Sentencing, Probation, and the Rehabilitative Ideal: the View from Mempa v. Rhay," 47 Texas L.Rev. 1, 3 (1968).

. As Mr. Justice Brandéis noted in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928), the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence is necessary to maintain respect for law and to preserve the judicial process from contamination. “The rule is one, not of action, but of inaction.” 277 U.S. at 484, 48 S.Ct. at 575.

. For the historic background of the Fourth Amendment see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) ; Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (1947) ; United State v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L.Ed. 653 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (1950) ; and Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (1937). See also our own opinion in Fresneda v. State, 458 P.2d 134, 139-40 (Alaska 1969), and my dissent in Dimmick v. State, 473 P.2d 616, 624-26 (Alaska 1970).

. See the opinions of Brennan, J., (dissenting) in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 355, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974) ; People v. Cohan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955) (majority opinion of Traynor, J.), and the dissenting opinion of Peters, J., in In Re Martinez, 1 Cal.3d 641, 83 Cal.Rptr. 382, 463 P.2d 734, 741-45 (1970).

. It is notable that some courts exclude illegally obtained evidence even in administrative proceedings, not criminal in nature. See, e. g., One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 85 S.Ct. 1246, 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965) ; Knoll Associates, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) ; Leogrande v. State Liquor Authority, 25 A.D.2d 225, 268 N.Y.S.2d 433, reversed on other grounds, 19 N.Y.2d 418, 280 N.Y.S.2d 381, 227 N.E.2d 302 (1967).

. Accord: Michaud v. State, 505 P.2d 1399 (Okl.1973).