Court Opinion

ID: 9635632
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:57:01.362273+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:31.209206
License: Public Domain

HARRELL, Judge,
concurring.
Like Judge Wilner, I concur in the result reached by the Court and most, if not all, of the Court’s opinion. Also, I *297agree with Judge Wilner’s point in his concurring opinion that the Court’s opinion unnecessarily imagines a sub-issue pitting the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review in the Maryland APA (Md.Code, § 10-222(h)(vi) of the State Government Article) against a strawman “abuse of discretion” standard (slip op. at 18-20). Unlike Judge Wilner, however, I would stop at that and decline to address or ponder further on the merits of this illusory sub-issue, at least in the present case.
The Court’s opinion introduces the specter of potentially divergent standards of judicial review based on its perception that the Court of Special Appeals, in its assessment of King’s proportionality challenge, may have “suggest[ed]” that it reviewed the Maryland Transportation Authority’s action based on an abuse of discretion standard (slip op. at 18). It is clear from my reading of the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals, however, that the intermediate appellate court did not utilize an abuse of discretion standard in its analysis of King’s Accardi contention. To the contrary, the court, in its unreported, per curiam opinion, appears to have viewed, under an arbitrariness test, the question of the agency’s application (or not) or its rules and policies. I glean this from the court’s threshold mention of Kohli v. LOOC, Inc., 103 Md.App. 694, 718, 654 A.2d 922 (1995), advanced in King’s argument in his brief before that court, where agency arbitrariness is referred to as the underlying evil intended to be remedied by proper application of the Accardi doctrine. I could find nothing in that court’s analysis of King’s proportionality challenge from which to infer that the court was basing its otherwise erroneous conclusion, semantically or substantively, on abuse of agency discretion, separate from or commingled with agency arbitrariness. Accordingly, I would not engage, as Judge Wilner does in his concurrence, in any meaningful consideration of the difference (if any) between “arbitrary and capricious” and “abuse of discretion.” The question simply is not presented (nor briefed or argued) in this case.
*298By the same token, I have some concern that portions of the Court’s opinion could be misconstrued by any who give it a less than careful reading regarding the sweep of its observations regarding the role abuse of discretion may (or may not) play in any legal modality in which a court properly considers a challenge to action taken by an administrative agency. Judge Eldridge, writing for the Court, certainly is correct that, as such, “arbitrary and capricious” has been a Maryland standard for review of agency actions in statutorily-authorized judicial review situations governed by the Maryland APA.3 He also is correct that the same standard has been construed as applying in other statutorily-authorized judicial review cases *299not governed by the state APA (slip op. at 19). To the extent, however, that his words would be construed as suggesting that “abuse of discretion” in no way plays a role in review by courts of agency action through legal modalities other than a petition for judicial review, I would caution the reader.
In the final Report of the Governor’s Commission To Revise the APA, dated 1 September 1992,4 the Commission, in the section entitled “Judicial Review of Agency Actions,” stated:
VII. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY DECISIONS
It has long been established that Maryland courts have inherent power to correct abuses of discretion and arbitrary, illegal, capricious, or unreasonable acts of administrative agencies by mandamus, injunction or otherwise. Heaps v. Cobb, 185 Md. 372, 45 A.2d 73 (1945). When judicial review or a statutory appeal process is provided by statute, the statutory method of review is exclusive and the court may not exercise its inherent powers to review the administrative decision by a mandamus proceeding. The jurisdiction of the court on appeal is limited to that conferred by the statute. Commission on Medical Discipline v. Stillman, 291 Md. 390, 435 A.2d 747 (1981); Lee v. Secretary of State and Mahoney, 251 Md. 134, 246 A.2d 562 (1968). (Emphasis supplied).
Heaps v. Cobb embraces language from a slightly earlier case, Hecht v. Crook, 184 Md. 271, 280-81, 40 A.2d 673, 677 (1945):
In the last analysis, the question-as to what decisions of an administrative agency are reviewable must turn upon the statute creating it, and upon the type and degree of discretion conferred upon the particular agency. Courts have the inherent power, through the writ of mandamus, by injunction, or otherwise, to correct abuses of discretion and arbitrary, illegal, capricious or unreasonable acts; but in exercising that power care must be taken not to interfere with the legislative prerogative!,] or with the exercise of sound *300administrative discretion, where discretion is clearly conferred.
Heaps, 185 Md. at 379, 45 A.2d at 76 (quoting Hecht, 184 Md. at 280-81, 40 A.2d at 677).
Therefore, non-APA, non-statutory forms of court review of administrative agency action include abuse of discretion, in addition to arbitrary and capricious, as a standard of review. The Court’s opinion and observations in the present case with regard to abuse of discretion are confined to statutorily-authorized avenues of judicial review (the old “administrative appeal”), regardless of whether the State APA applies.

. For example, at the 7 April 1992 meting of the Governor’s Commission To Revise The APA, Judge Eldridge, then a member of the Commission, after reciting the extant language of “Judicial Review’’ section of the State APA, explained:
‘(g) Decision — In a proceeding under this section, the court may:
(1) remand the case for further proceedings;
(2) affirm the decision of the agency; or
(3) reverse or modify the decision if any substantial right of the petitioner may have been prejudiced because a finding, conclusion, or decision of the agency:
(i) is unconstitutional;
(ii) exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency;
(iii) results from an unlawful procedure;
(iv) is affected by any error of law;
(v) is unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in light of the entire record as submitted; or
(vi) is arbitrary or capricious.'
Judge Eldridge staled that this is standard language and also contains a remand provision. Basically, the same authority and provisions apply to all agencies with the exception of the Liqúor Boards.
Judge Eldridge summarized § 215 stating that the wording is substantially standard throughout the country and is essentially the same in virtually all APAs. It seems to be all encompassing and embodies what courts were saying in common law decisions before the APA was enacted.
Judge Eldridge saw no reason to change the standards of judicial review; he was not sure how much could be changed without raising a constitutionality issue.
Governor's Commission To Revise The APA, Minutes, 7 April 1992.
The Commission subsequently neither discussed nor recommended any change in the language of the APA as to the arbitrary and capricious standard.

. Judge Eldridge resigned from the Commission on 21 July 1992, prior to publication of its linal Report.