Court Opinion

ID: 9898919
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-15 16:08:12.41098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:49.619264
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-522

                                  COMMONWEALTH

                                       vs.

                              BRIAN J. KELLIHER.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       After a jury trial in the Superior Court, the defendant was

 convicted of trafficking in cocaine, 100 grams or more but less

 than 200 grams, and possession with intent to distribute both

 class B and class D substances.          On appeal, he challenges the

 judge's failure to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on duress.                 We

 affirm.

       Discussion.     As relevant here, for a defendant to rely on

 the affirmative defense of duress, the evidence must show that

 there was "a present, immediate, and pending threat of such a

 nature as to induce a well-founded and reasonable fear of death

 or serious bodily injury if the criminal act is not done, with

 no reasonable and available chance of escape, and where no

 person of reasonable firmness could have acted otherwise in the
circumstances." 1   Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 462 Mass. 827, 832-833

(2012).   In assessing the adequacy of that showing in this case,

we consider the evidence in its totality and in the light most

favorable to the defendant.    See Commonwealth v. Guardado, 491

Mass. 666, 683 (2023), S.C., 493 Mass. 1 (2023); Commonwealth v.

Melzer, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 174, 184 (1982) ("even if a criminal

defendant gives incredible testimony, he is entitled to any

instruction required upon the hypothesis that the testimony is

true").   The defendant did not request an instruction on duress;

to the extent that we discern error in the judge's failure to

provide the duress instruction sua sponte, our review is for a

substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.    See Commonwealth

v. Freeman, 352 Mass. 556, 563-564 (1967).

     Summarized in the light most favorable to the defendant,

see Guardado, 491 Mass. at 683, the evidence at trial showed

that at the direction of a former friend, Darwin Soto, the

defendant unwillingly participated for several months in a

1 "The rationale of the defense [of duress] is not that the
defendant, faced with the unnerving threat of harm unless he
does an act which violates the literal language of the criminal
law, somehow loses his mental capacity to commit the crime in
question. Nor is it that the defendant has not engaged in a
voluntary act. Rather it is that, even though he has done the
act the crime requires and has the mental state which the crime
requires, his conduct which violates the literal language of the
criminal law is justified because he has thereby avoided a harm
of greater magnitude." Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 462 Mass. 827,
833 (2012), quoting United States v. LaFleur, 971 F.2d 200, 205
(9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 924 (1993).

                                  2
scheme to distribute fentanyl and cocaine 2 and that he did so

because he feared for his life and the safety of his family at

the hands of Soto and Soto's drug suppliers.   The defendant's

fear was based on three considerations:   (1) his observation of

a gun in a car used by a non-English speaking stranger to

deliver drugs to the defendant during the summer of 2016 while

Soto was in jail; 3 (2) unspecified threats made to him by Soto in

August or September 2017; and (3) his observation of a firearm

in Soto's possession on an occasion in the same late summer

timeframe in 2017.

     For our purposes, the evidence established that Soto

threatened the defendant and that the defendant continued to

participate in the drug operation because he was afraid of Soto

and Soto's suppliers.   It did not, however, establish the

defendant's entitlement to an instruction on duress because

several elements of duress were not established in the evidence. 4

2 The defendant also possessed and sold marijuana by agreement
with Soto although, at trial, he testified that he did so
voluntarily.
3 The defendant testified that he was aware that he and Soto owed

money to the people from whom Soto obtained the drugs that the
defendant and Soto sold.
4 We assume without deciding that the defendant's voluntary

participation in one facet of Soto's drug dealing (his selling
marijuana to defray the cost of his own marijuana purchases from
Soto) did not disqualify him from relying on duress as an
affirmative defense to the indictments related to his role in
selling cocaine and fentanyl. But see Vasquez, 462 Mass. at 833
(duress "is not available to a person who recklessly puts
himself in a position where coercion probably will be applied").

                                 3
First, without any detail about the substance of the threats,

the jury had no basis on which to determine whether the

threatened harm met the "imminence requirement" under our law by

showing that the harm was "near at hand" or "menacingly near."

Commonwealth v. Perl, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 445, 448-449 (2000)

(quotation omitted).    Contrast Commonwealth v. Robinson, 382

Mass. 189, 192 (1981) (defense of duress available where

codefendant responded to defendant's withdrawal from robbery

plan by reentering defendant's car and discharging shotgun into

car's interior door).    To the extent that the defendant suggests

that the jury could have inferred that the threat was both

imminent and serious from the fact that the defendant "did not

feel safe being involved" with Soto and was concerned for his

family's safety, we do not agree.     Analogizing to the

affirmative defense of necessity, we consider the defense

applicable only to threats of harm that are "imminent," not

those that are "debatable or speculative."     See Commonwealth v.

O'Kane, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 470 (2001) (quotation omitted).

     Second, in the absence of any evidence about the substance

of Soto's threats, the threats and the defendant's observations

of the firearms 5 (in a stranger's car and in Soto's possession)

are insufficient to allow a judge or jury to assess whether the

5 There was no evidence to suggest that Soto threatened the
defendant with a gun, or that anyone else did so.

                                  4
defendant's fears were "well-founded and reasonable," or

whether, in context, "no person of reasonable firmness could

have acted otherwise in the circumstances." 6     Vasquez, 462 Mass.

at 832-833.   Contrast Perl, 50 Mass. App. Ct. at 446 (defense of

duress available where defendant subjected to threats against

his daughter accompanied by maker's miming strangling movements,

"wav[ing] a gun in front of the defendant's nose," and

indicating intention to set "large dog" then in his car on the

daughter).

     Third, even if we were to conclude (which we do not) that

the evidence established that the defendant's ongoing

participation in the drug operation was the result of his "well-

founded and reasonable fear" of an imminent threat of harm by

Soto or his suppliers, we are not persuaded that the evidence

could support a finding that the defendant lacked a "reasonable

and available chance of escape."       Vasquez, 462 Mass. at 832-833.

See Perl, 50 Mass. App. Ct. at 449-450.      "By linking the

imminency of harm and the possibility of escape, we advance, as

matter of policy, the proposition that a threatened person,

given the opportunity, must utilize available law enforcement

6 We are not blind to the inherent dangers involved in drug
trafficking or in the possession of illicit drugs. A
participant's fear on general principles of being harmed by
other drug dealers does not, however, require a sua sponte
instruction on duress.

                                   5
resources to avoid committing a serious crime, provided those

resources reasonably may be relied upon in the circumstances to

protect him and any other threatened person."    Perl, supra at

450.

       Soto's threats were made in August or September 2017 and

the defendant's observations of the two firearms about which he

testified had been made by that time.    Despite having a home

apart from Soto's, a telephone, a vehicle, and a family member

who was an attorney, the defendant made no effort to contact the

police for help, either when the threats were made or in the

months that followed. 7   Where the defendant had an available

avenue of escape from participation in Soto's operation, but

"did not want to" avail himself of it and did not do so, he was

not entitled to rely on the affirmative defense of duress.       See

Melzer, 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 184, 185 (defendant not entitled to

duress instruction where uncontested evidence revealed

defendant's coercers left him alone for "at least a half an hour

in the middle of a continuing criminal episode"; facts did not

show that defendant lacked opportunity to escape).    Contrast

Robinson, 382 Mass. at 192 (judge obligated to instruct on

7 Further, as demonstrated by the defendant's immediate
cooperation with the police, including his provision of a
detailed statement about the drug operation, nothing in the
evidence suggested that the defendant had reason to doubt that
the police could or would help him to escape from Soto and his
other associates. See Perl, 50 Mass. App. Ct. at 450.

                                  6
duress where evidence included defendant's testimony that he

participated in crime because he "couldn't see anything else to

do" after codefendant responded to his effort to withdraw by

firing shotgun inside defendant's car).

       We are satisfied that, in this case, the judge did not err

by failing to instruct the jury on duress.

                                      Judgments affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Blake,
                                        Massing & Hand, JJ. 8),

                                      Clerk

Entered:    November 15, 2023.

8   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                  7