Court Opinion

ID: 9364765
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-20 06:04:04.605336+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:40.180728
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     January 19, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 359522
                                                                     Jackson Circuit Court
RAHEIM RAHHMAN ARMSTRONG,                                            LC No. 17-005574-FC

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: PATEL, P.J., and BORRELLO and SHAPIRO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Defendant appeals as of right his jury-trial convictions of one count of first-degree felony
murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b), and one count of carrying a firearm during the commission of a
felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b(1). The trial court sentenced defendant as a fourth-offense
habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to life in prison without parole for the first-degree felony-murder
conviction and two years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. For the reasons stated
in this opinion, we affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences, but remand for the ministerial
task of correcting his sentencing documentation.

                                       I. BACKGROUND

         Defendant’s convictions stem from the murder of Ronald Demetrius Owens. Prettyattie
Cooper testified that, on the night of the murder, defendant asked her for a ride to a party store.
Cooper and defendant met an unnamed individual at the party store. The individual got in the back
of Cooper’s vehicle and discussed a drug sale with defendant. According to Cooper, after the
individual handed defendant what appeared to be a bag of drugs, defendant drew a gun and pointed
it at the individual. The individual threw something at defendant and jumped out of the vehicle.

       Cooper next drove defendant to a second party store to pick up Orlando Cunningham.
Cunningham testified that he and defendant had communicated on Facebook Messenger about
finding someone to sell defendant cocaine. Cunningham testified that he messaged the victim,
who agreed to sell cocaine to defendant. Cunningham directed Cooper to drive to the victim’s
mother’s house. When they arrived, Cooper remained in her vehicle, while defendant and
Cunningham exited to meet with the victim.

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        Defendant and Cunningham met with the victim in the middle of the street. After
discussing the price of drugs with the victim, defendant reached down to his pocket. According
to Cunningham, instead of money defendant pulled out a gun, pointed it at the victim’s face, and
shot him. Defendant ran back to Cooper’s vehicle, and Cooper drove defendant away from the
scene. Cunningham ran to his aunt’s house and called his father. After his father advised him to
go to the police, Cunningham went to the police station and gave a statement. At the station, he
noticed that he lost both his cell phone and his wallet.

        Police arrived on the scene of the shooting and found Cunningham’s wallet and cell phone,
as well as a baggie containing a suspected controlled substance. Cooper and defendant were
arrested two days later. Two days before defendant’s trial, Cooper pleaded guilty to manslaughter
in exchange for her cooperation in testifying against defendant. Defendant brought a motion in
limine seeking to exclude under MRE 404(b) Cooper’s testimony regarding the alleged armed
robbery committed the same night as the murder. The trial court allowed the testimony,
determining that it was proof of defendant’s intent to commit an armed robbery with respect to the
murder victim, which was the predicate offense to the felony-murder charge.

                      II. OTHER-ACTS EVIDENCE UNDER MRE 404(B)

       Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting other-acts
evidence under MRE 404(b). We disagree.1

       “MRE 404 governs the admissibility of other-acts evidence. The general rule under MRE
404(b) is that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is inadmissible to prove a propensity to
commit such acts.” People v Denson, 500 Mich 385, 397; 920 NW2d 306 (2017). MRE 404(b)
provides in part:

                (1) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
       character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
       however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
       intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or
       absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other
       crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the
       conduct at issue in the case.

To be admissible, other-acts evidence must (1) relevant to an issue other than propensity, (2)
relevant under MRE 402 to an issue or fact of consequence at trial, (3) probative and not
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice in accordance with MRE 403, and (4) subject to a

1
 “The decision whether to admit evidence falls within a trial court’s discretion and will be reversed
only when there is an abuse of that discretion.” People v Duncan, 494 Mich 713, 722; 835 NW2d
399 (2013). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision “falls outside the range of
reasonable and principled outcomes.” People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 217; 749 NW2d 272
(2008).

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limiting instruction if such an instruction is requested. People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 55;
508 NW2d 114 (1993).

         In this case, the evidence of the alleged armed robbery committed prior to the murder was
offered for the proper purpose of showing defendant’s intent as to the murder victim. This was
relevant because the predicate offense to the felony-murder charge was attempted armed robbery,
i.e., it was the prosecution’s position that defendant intended to rob the murder victim. Armed
robbery is a specific intent crime, requiring a showing that defendant intended to permanently
deprive the victim of possession. People v Parker, 230 Mich App 337, 344; 584 NW2d 336
(1998). Because the robbery of the victim was not completed, the prosecution was required to
show that defendant attempted to perpetrate the armed robbery. See MCL 750.316(1)(b).
Defendant’s intent with respect to the murder victim was therefore critical to determining whether
the predicate-offense element of felony murder was satisfied.

        Further, evidence of the alleged earlier robbery was highly probative of defendant’s intent
to commit an armed robbery against the murder victim. The uncharged conduct took place less
than an hour before the charged offense and showed that defendant was acting pursuant to a
common plan or scheme. In both instances, defendant discussed the exchange of money for drugs.
When defendant was expected to take out money, he instead took out a gun. Thus, the uncharged
armed robbery and the charged offense were sufficiently similar such that the jury could infer that
defendant planned to rob the murder victim. See People v Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich 43,
63; 614 NW2d 888 (2000). Lastly, the other-acts evidence was not unfairly prejudicial to
defendant, and any risk of an improper propensity inference was neutralized by the trial court’s
limiting instruction that the jury could not consider the evidence for propensity purposes. Jurors
are presumed to follow their instructions. People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229
(1998). Accordingly, the risk of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value
of the evidence. MRE 403.

       Defendant also argues that the prosecution failed to provide the notice required by MRE
404(b)(2), which states:

               (2) The prosecution in a criminal case shall provide written notice at least
       14 days in advance of trial, or orally on the record later if the court excuses pretrial
       notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends
       to introduce at trial and the rationale, whether or not mentioned in
       subparagraph (b)(1), for admitting the evidence. If necessary to a determination
       required to state the theory or theories of defense, limited only by the defendant’s
       privilege against self-incrimination.

        MRE 404(b)(2) requires the prosecution to provide 14 day’s notice of an intent to introduce
other-acts evidence. If the prosecutor has not given pretrial notice, the trial court must determine
whether to excuse pretrial notice “on good cause shown.” MRE 404(b)(2). In this case, there was
good cause for the prosecution’s failure to provide pretrial notice of Cooper’s testimony regarding
the alleged robbery. Cooper pleaded guilty on the Friday before the start of the trial on Monday.
Accordingly, at the time that notice was due under MRE 404(b)(2), the prosecution did not
anticipate calling Cooper as a witness given the pending charges against her.

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        Moreover, if the other-acts evidence was otherwise substantively admissible, the defendant
cannot establish an error warranting relief unless he shows that the lack of notice prejudiced his
trial. People v Jackson, 498 Mich 246, 278-279; 869 NW2d 253 (2015). The defendant must
show that he would have conducted the trial differently had he known about the prosecution’s
intent to present the evidence. Id. As discussed, the other-acts evidence was substantively
admissible under MRE 404(b). Further, defendant was aware of Cooper’s allegations regarding
the uncharged robbery because a detective had testified about those allegations at the preliminary
examination over defendant’s objection. And defendant does not explain how he would have
conducted the trial differently had formal notice of the uncharged robbery been provided under
MRE 404(b)(2). Therefore, defendant does not establish error entitling him to relief.

                            III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

      Defendant also argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of felony murder.
We again disagree.2

       The elements of felony murder are as follows:

               The elements of felony murder are (1) the killing of a person, (2) with the
       intent to kill, do great bodily harm, or create a high risk of death or great bodily
       harm with the knowledge that death or great bodily harm was the probable result,
       (3) while committing, attempting to commit, or assisting in the commission of an
       enumerated felony. [People v Lane, 308 Mich App 38, 57-58; 862 NW2d 446
       (2014) (citation omitted).]

        Defendant challenges only the third element, arguing that there was insufficient evidence
that he committed the predicate offense of armed robbery. However, the felony-murder statute
specifically provides that a murder committed during an attempt to commit a robbery is a sufficient
basis for a jury to convict of felony murder. See MCL 750.316(1)(b).

        Here, the jury was instructed to consider attempted armed robbery as a predicate offense
for felony murder and found defendant guilty. There was sufficient evidence to support that
conclusion. As discussed, the evidence showed that earlier that evening defendant committed an
armed robbery during which he pulled a gun on a drug dealer. Defendant followed a similar
scheme with respect to the murder victim. When Cunningham and defendant met with the victim,
defendant and the victim discussed an exchange of money for cocaine. Instead of pulling out
money as expected, defendant pulled out a gun and shot the victim. Viewed in a light most

2
  This Court reviews de novo a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. People v Savage, 327
Mich App 604, 613; 935 NW2d 69 (2019). “The test for determining the sufficiency of evidence
in a criminal case is whether the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the people, would
warrant a reasonable juror in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Nowack, 462
Mich 392, 399; 614 NW2d 78 (2000). “[W]e must defer to the fact-finder by drawing all
reasonable inferences and resolving credibility conflicts in support of the jury verdict.” People v
Schumacher, 276 Mich App 165, 167; 740 NW2d 535 (2007).

                                                -4-
favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable trier of fact could infer from this evidence that defendant
committed attempted armed robbery.

        Defendant further questions the credibility of Cooper and Cunningham as interested
parties. The determination whether Cooper and Cunningham were credible witnesses was for the
jury. The jury heard defendant’s counsel extensively question each witness regarding their
willingness to lie and motivations to blame defendant. The jury also heard that there was no
forensic evidence and that Cunningham was linked to the scene through his cellphone and wallet,
while defendant was not forensically linked to the scene. Nonetheless, the jury rejected
defendant’s arguments and found the witnesses at least partially credible. This Court defers to the
credibility determinations of the jury. People v Schumacher, 276 Mich App 165, 167; 740 NW2d
535 (2007).

                                 IV. ACCURACY OF THE PSIR

        Lastly, defendant argues that the presentence investigation report (PSIR) and judgment of
sentence should be amended to reflect that he is a second-offense habitual offender rather than a
fourth-offense habitual offender.3 We disagree, but conclude that remand for further correction of
the sentencing documentation is warranted.

        The PSIR “should accurately reflect any determination the sentencing judge has made
concerning the accuracy or relevancy of the information contained in the report.” People v
Norman, 148 Mich App 273, 275; 384 NW2d 147 (1986). The appropriate remedy for an
inaccurate PSIR is remand so that the sentencing court can correct the report and transmit a
corrected copy to the Department of Corrections. Id. at 276.

        At sentencing, the prosecution pointed out that the PSIR listed defendant as having four
prior felonies, when he had only been convicted of two prior felonies. The prosecution explained
that two of the convictions that were listed as felonies were for attempted resisting and obstructing
a police officer, which is a misdemeanor. See MCL 750.92(3). The trial court agreed and changed
the PSIR accordingly.

       However, defendant is mistaken that this correction had any effect on his status as a fourth-
offense habitual offender. A defendant may be sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender
when the defendant “has been convicted of any combination of 3 or more felonies or attempts to
commit felonies.” MCL 769.12(1) (emphasis added). Resisting and obstructing a police office is
a felony, MCL 750.81d, and therefore defendant’s prior attempted resisting and obstructing
convictions are attempted felonies. Accordingly, defendant was properly sentenced as a fourth-
offense habitual offender, and his argument regarding the judgment of sentence is without merit.

       That said, while the PSIR was updated to show that defendant has only two prior felony
convictions, the basic information report still shows defendant as having four previous felony

3
  This Court reviews a trial court’s response to a claim of inaccuracy in the PSIR for an abuse of
discretion. People v Uphaus (On Remand), 278 Mich App 174, 181; 748 NW2d 899 (2008)
(citation omitted).

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convictions. Accordingly, we affirm defendant’s convictions and sentence, but we remand for the
trial court to complete the ministerial task of correcting defendant’s sentencing documentation.
We do not retain jurisdiction.

                                                           /s/ Sima G. Patel
                                                           /s/ Stephen L. Borrello
                                                           /s/ Douglas B. Shapiro

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