Court Opinion

ID: 9844920
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:11:45.969961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:47.258279
License: Public Domain

Bobbitt, J.,
dissenting. The record discloses this novel situation: Plaintiff’s Buick was damaged by Edward R. Mallory’s negligent operation of the 1952 Cadillac. Mallory, named as a defendant, was not served; and, as to him, judgment of voluntary nonsuit was entered at trial in the Municipal-County Court. Judgment was entered in said court against Louise T. Mallory, Mallory’s wife. She appealed; and, at trial in superior court, plaintiff offered Mallory as his witness. Mallory’s testimony is the only evidence relevant to> the liability of Louise T. Mallory for his negligence.
Mallory’s testimony includes the following: His wife owned the Cadillac “for about three years.” She paid the taxes on the car. Both were working when the car was purchased. When she was working both bought gas and paid repair bills. After his wife -stopped, working, all bills were paid by Mallory. He testified: “She ain’t, worked none for about three years.”
The Cadillac was not purchased for cash; it was financed and refinanced. The details of these transactions are not shown. There is a faint inference (no explicit testimony) that Mrs. Mallory, -before she stopped working, may have made some payment -on account of the purchase price. After she stopped working, Mallory made all payments.
Presumably, all legal documents (none in evidence) indicate ownership by appellant. Mallory testified: “I ain’t signed no mortgage on the automobile.” Again: “Yes, I made payments on the car, I gave her the money to make them.”
The evidence, considered in the light most favorable to plaintiff,, suffices to show Mrs. Mallory's ownership of the Cadillac subject to> such liens as might be outstanding. Even so, when the collision oc-curredi, and for some two years prior thereto, possession was retained solely on account of payments made by Mallory. Under these *575■circumstances, it can hardly be said that Mrs. Mallory had the final say as to the use and control of the car.
Irrespective of technical ownership, it seems to me that, as of the ■date of collision and for some two years prior thereto, Mallory provided and maintained the car for his own and family use. A realistic evaluation of the evidence indicates that through financing and refinancing he was making payments, similar to rentals, to retain the possession and use of the car. Under these circumstances, I do not think Mrs. Mallory is liable under the “family-purpose doctrine” or otherwise for Mallory’s negligent operation of the car.
Whether Mallory would be liable for his wife’ negligent operation thereof is another matter. In Matthews v. Cheatham, 210 N.C. 592, 188 S.E. 87, the minor daughter owned the oar (won by her in a newspaper contest) but it was kept and maintained by her father for family use; and under the “family-.purpose doctrine,” the father was held liable for his wife’s negligent operation of said car.
Hence, in my opinion, appellant’s motion for judgment of involuntary nonsuit should have been granted.