Court Opinion

ID: 9745624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 23:14:12.178368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:51.490023
License: Public Domain

RUBIN, J., Concurring.
“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. ” (New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann (1932) 285 U.S. 262, 311 [76 L.Ed. 747, 52 S.Ct. 371] (dis. opn. of Brandeis, J.), italics added.)
I join in the majority opinion, which I have signed and which I believe is compelled by the United States Supreme Court opinion in American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi (2003) 539 U.S. 396 [156 L.Ed.2d 376, 123 S.Ct. 2374] (Garamendi). As an intermediate appellate court we are obligated to follow United States Supreme Court precedent in matters involving federal constitutional law. (See Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Martin (1931) 283 U.S. 209, 220-221 [75 L.Ed. 983, 51 S.Ct. 453, 458]; Perkins Mfg. Co. v. Jordan (1927) 200 Cal. 667, 678 [254 P. 551]; People v. Superior Court (Moore) (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1211 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 205].)
I write separately only to note the consequences of applying implied preemption in this setting. Certainly, the federal government in making executive agreements or treaties can expressly preempt state statutes that intrude in an area that the federal government considers sacrosanct. All that is required is an affirmative declaration by Congress that federal law prohibits state regulation. (Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts (1985) 471 U.S. 724, 738 [85 L.Ed.2d 728, 105 S.Ct. 2380] (Metropolitan); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. (1992) 505 U.S. 504, 516-518 [120 L.Ed.2d 407, 112 S.Ct. 2608]; see also Tafflin v. Levitt (1990) 493 U.S. 455, 458-459 [107 L.Ed.2d 887, 110 S.Ct. 792] [it is presumed Congress ordinarily does not intend to displace existing state authority].) In those instances, the supremacy clause mandates that state interests must yield to paramount federal concerns. Garamendi and our majority opinion, however, are founded on a form of implied preemption also authorized as a matter of federal constitutional principle. (Metropolitan, supra, 471 U.S. at p. 738.) In the former, the court concluded that federal policy is to resolve Holocaust claims through diplomacy. In the latter, we state implied federal policy dictates that claims of Korean nationals against Japan are also to be resolved through diplomatic channels.
In some respects the present case is a stronger one for federal preemption. As the majority points out, Garamendi deals with unilateral presidential agreements. The present matter deals with a ratified treaty, “the ultimate formal expression of the federal executive and legislative branches in matters *400of foreign policy.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 393.) Nevertheless, applying implied preemption here dramatically tips the balance between state and federal power in favor of the latter when, by definition, the federal government has not spoken expressly on the subject. The United States Supreme Court has addressed state powers vis-a-vis the federal government on a number of occasions in recent years. (See, e.g., Federal Maritime Comm’n v. South Carolina Ports Authority (2002) 535 U.S. 743 [152 L.Ed.2d 962, 122 S.Ct. 1864].) We have been reminded that “ ‘[t]he “constitutionally mandated balance of power” between the States and the Federal Government was adopted by the Framers to ensure the protection of “our fundamental liberties.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 769, 122 S.Ct. at p. 1879.) By guarding against encroachments by the federal government on matters preserved for the states, “we strive to maintain the balance of power embodied in our Constitution” and to “ ‘reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.’ ” (Ibid.; see also Gregory v. Ashcroft (1991) 501 U.S. 452, 458 [115 L.Ed.2d 410, 111 S.Ct. 2395].)
Here, the 1951 Treaty is silent on claims involving Korean nationals. Code of Civil Procedure section 354.6, the California statute in question, essentially extends the statute of limitations for certain common law claims that would otherwise be time barred. The enactment of statute of limitations has been historically a matter left to the wide discretion of each state. (See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman (1988) 486 U.S. 717, 722 [100 L.Ed.2d 743, 108 S.Ct. 2117].) Given the lack of express preemption in an area traditionally reserved for the states, the doctrine of implied preemption should be used sparingly. This is especially so since the federal government may easily negate state power by simply stating its intent to do so in the applicable legislation, agreement or treaty. Under these circumstances, Justice Ginsberg’s words in her dissent in Garamendi are particularly convincing; “Although the federal approach differs from California’s, no executive agreement or other formal expression of foreign policy disapproves state disclosure laws like the HVIRA. Absent a clear statement aimed at disclosure requirements by the ‘one voice’ to which courts properly defer in matters of foreign affairs, I would leave intact California’s enactment.” (Garamendi, supra, 539 U.S. at p. 430 [123 S.Ct. at p. 2395].) Even though from this vantage point it is difficult to see that preemption is “implicitly contained in [the 1981 Treaty’s] structure and purpose” (Metropolitan, supra, 471 U.S. at p. 738), I agree with the majority that, since Justice Ginsberg’s words are found in her dissent, we must vacate the trial court’s order under Garamendi’s compulsion.
The petition of real party in interest for review by the Supreme Court was denied July 14, 2004.