Court Opinion

ID: 9479923
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:33:00.142612+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:22.384295
License: Public Domain

BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Throughout my consideration of this case, I have felt that the issue was whether or not the petitioner, Johnny Ray Bagby, received a fair trial. “A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.” In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 625, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955) (Black, J.). Certainly, under the facts of this case, Johnny Ray Bagby committed an offense. I recognize that offenses are defined by the state and may be enforced without constitutional problems so long as they are enforced within the limits of due process. The difficulty with this case is whether or not the lesser-included offense instruction, which was requested and denied, should have been given.
As Judge Norris points out, in Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980), the United States Supreme Court held that in capital cases, a state court must give instructions on lesser-included offenses which are supported by the evidence. In Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 2052, 72 L.Ed.2d 367 (1982), the Court clarified Beck in a habeas petition from a capital conviction, holding that due process requires that a lesser-included offense instruction be given only when the evidence warrants such an instruction. I agree with Judge Contie that the plurality’s analysis, that “the Supreme Court’s opinion in Beck is grounded upon Eighth Amendment concerns, rather than those arising from the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” is incorrect.
The extreme nature of capital cases requires greater judicial vigilance to ensure that a defendant receives every available protection of the law. However, the fact that an appeal or a habeas petition involves a capital case does not mean that this or any other court’s analysis is guided solely by the eighth amendment. The plurality’s position is that, because Beck and Hopper involve capita] defendants, the analysis of whether defendants are entitled to lesser-included offense instructions revolves solely around the eighth amendment and the death penalty. This analysis is convenient, but superficial. That reasoning would result in the curious doctrine that capital defendants have eighth amendment rights, but not due process rights. As the Court noted in Hopper, “On the facts shown in Beck, we held that the defendant was entitled to a lesser-included offense instruction as a matter of due process." Hopper, 456 U.S. at 609, 102 S.Ct. at 2051 (emphasis supplied). Again, in Hopper, the Court emphasized that due process requires instructions only where the evidence warranted it. Id. at 611, 102 S.Ct. at 2052.
The concern that motivated the Court to rule that due process requires instructions on lesser-included offenses where warranted by the evidence was recently reiterated by the Court in Schmuck v. United States, *801— U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989). In Schmuck, the Court addressed what constituted a lesser-included offense under Rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in a case where the defendant had requested a lesser-included offense instruction under Rule 31(c). The Court noted that Rule 31(c) protected the defendant, as well as the prosecution:
Of course, it is now firmly established that Rule 31(c)’s provision for lesser offense instructions benefits the defendant as well. The Court recognized in Keeble v. United States [412 U.S. 205, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973) ], that where the jury suspects that the defendant is plainly guilty of some offense, but one of the elements of the charged offense remains in doubt, in the absence of a lesser offense instruction, the jury will likely fail to give full effect to the reasonable doubt standard, resolving its doubts in favor of conviction. 412 U.S. at 212-213, 36 L.Ed.2d 844, 93 S.Ct. 1993 [1997-1998]. The availability of a lesser included offense instruction protects the defendant from such improper conviction.
Schmuck, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. at 1451, 103 L.Ed.2d at 747.
Although Rule 31(c) applies only to criminal proceedings in federal court, the absence of a third option, a lesser-included offense instruction, was clearly a factor in the Court’s constitutional decision in Beck. Beck, 447 U.S. at 642-645, 100 S.Ct. at 2392-2394. This analysis is also supported by the Third Circuit’s consideration of the issue we decide today. In Vujosevic v. Rafferty, 844 F.2d 1023 (3d Cir.1988), the court reasoned:
In capital cases, a court must give a requested instruction on lesser included offenses where it is supported by the evidence. Beck v. Alabama. This court applies that requirement to non-capital cases as well. This requirement is based on the risk that a defendant might otherwise be convicted of a crime more serious than that which the jury believes he committed simply because the jury wishes to avoid setting him free. See Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-213, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 1997-1998, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973).
Vujosevic, 844 F.2d at 1027 (citations omitted). In short, the requirement that lesser-included offenses be given where warranted by the evidence is grounded in due process, in a concern for the fairness of the proceeding.
I have read the record in this case closely, and I am confident that Johnny Ray Bagby was entitled to an instruction on the lesser-included offense of first degree sexual assault. I believe the evidence warrants a jury instruction on not only first degree rape, Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. 510.040, but on the lesser-included offense of sexual abuse in the first degree, Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. 510.110, as well. As Judge Contie so eloquently points out, Johnny Ray Bagby, as unfortunate as his social demeanor may be, is entitled to a fair trial. Despite his “unfortuitous” position of not being charged with a capital crime under the plurality’s analysis, the stakes for Johnny Ray Bagby are nevertheless high. His conviction for first degree rape, a class B felony, carries a 10 to 20 year sentence, whereas a conviction for first-degree sexual assault, a class D felony, carries a 1 to 5 year sentence. See Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. 532.-020. This disparity in terms of incarceration highlights the central issue of fairness in this case and the oversimplification of making a death-penalty based distinction on this issue.
In the absence of the warranted lesser-included offense instruction:
it is pure speculation to forecast what verdict the jury would have returned if properly instructed based on the jury’s verdict ... after an incomplete instruction. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court’s constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Vujosevic, 844 F.2d at 1028 (footnote omitted).
The plurality is concerned with a docket swamped with habeas petitions if we were to rule that defendants in noncapital trials have a due process right to lesser-included offense instructions. Although I too share *802a concern with docket management, I feel that such concerns are inappropriate in the consideration of habeas petitions. Such a justification for not hearing habeas petitions involving the fundamental fairness of criminal trials should be addressed to other tribunals. In the absence of congressional action affecting our jurisdiction, such as the recent amendment of the money damages requirement for federal court diversity jurisdiction, or a United States Supreme Court decision like Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976), limiting our habeas review, or implementation of the recommendations of the Judicial Conference’s Ad Hoc Committee Report on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, we should not foreclose our scrutiny of state court decisions based on an increased docket load for ourselves and the district courts.
As I stated at the beginning, I felt this case presented a real issue as to whether or not the state had determined fairly that the offense charged was the offense for which the petitioner Bagby was convicted. After consideration, I now feel that Bag-by’s constitutionl right to a fair trial was abridged and that his petition for habeas corpus should be granted with the alternative that the state be allowed to retry on this offense only within a reasonable time after the issuance of our order.