Court Opinion

ID: 9703175
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:43:47.147668+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:46.161993
License: Public Domain

WICKERSHAM, Judge,
dissenting:
On November 17, 1977, Ronald Tilghman was shot to death by defendant Abdul Bey in defendant’s apartment at 3300 North Broad Street. The cause of death was a single shot to the head from defendant’s .357 magnum revolver. After shooting Tilghman, the defendant dragged the victim’s body out of his apartment, down a full flight of stairs, over a concrete railing, down a neighbor’s outside steps, and down the sidewalk into an adjoining alley. At that point, the defendant attempted to remove all traces of blood by washing his carpet and the stairs where he had dragged the victim. The defendant returned to his apartment and threw a bucket of water on his neighbor’s steps in order to remove signs of blood from that area. Thereafter, the defendant removed his clothing and shoes, washed them, and hung them in his bathtub to dry.
Shortly thereafter, police arrived on the scene and found the victim’s still-bleeding body in the alley. They followed the water and traces of blood to the defendant’s apartment. The officers knocked on the door, identified themselves, and asked if anything had happened that night. Defendant replied, “Yes, I shot my friend. It was an accident.” Defendant then led the police into his bedroom and informed them that the gun he had used was in his third dresser drawer. The police retrieved the weapon from that drawer and also seized one spent and five live .357 caliber shells from atop his dresser.
Appellant contends that the jury was permitted to consider unrelated criminal activity because of error on the part of the trial court and because trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Specifically appellant points to the trial testimony of Officer Charles Holmes who, in describing the *216layout of appellant’s apartment, mentioned that “there was a bag of syringes I noticed on the dresser.” Appellant’s trial counsel made no objections to this testimony. Later the Commonwealth introduced photographs of the apartment, one of which displayed inter alia a bag of hypodermic syringes. Appellant’s counsel objected to the introduction of the photographic exhibit which objection was overruled.
The majority of our panel have voted to vacate the judgment of sentence and remand the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether trial counsel’s failure to make appropriate motions had any reasonable basis designed to effectuate appellant’s interests.
I dissent.
I do not agree, as the majority finds, that the testimony of Officer Holmes relating to syringes on the dresser was “highly prejudicial.”
In Commonwealth v. Allen, 448 Pa. 177, 292 A.2d 373 (1972) our highest court explicitly rejected the suggestion that every reference potentially linking a defendant with prior criminality is so prejudicial that reversal must apply. Nothing in the instant case connected the defendant-appellant to personal drug addiction, illicit drug use or illegal criminal drug activity. The evidence of guilt in this case was overwhelming. The complained-of evidence could not reasonably have contributed to defendant’s conviction and was therefore harmless error at best. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 263 Pa.Super. 183, 397 A.2d 807 (1979).
Since I would find that the brief testimonial reference to the syringes and photograph were not improperly admitted, trial counsel could not be deemed ineffective for not preserving an objection to these events. To the contrary, I would find that it was good trial strategy and reasonable for trial counsel to remain silent as he did. Commonwealth v. Rivera, 470 Pa. 131, 367 A.2d 719 (1977).
The evidence was sufficient to support a verdict of murder in the first degree. The jury returned a verdict of involun*217tary manslaughter. I would affirm the judgment of sentence.1

. If we insist that the object of review is to eliminate the possibility of mistake, we condemn ourselves to endless litigation that can never produce finality of judgment. The issue was well put by Justice Jackson of the United States Supreme Court in 1953:
Whenever decisions of one court are reviewed by another, a percentage of them are reversed. That reflects a difference in outlook normally found between personnel comprising different courts. However, reversal by a higher court is not proof that justice is thereby better done. There is no doubt that if there were a super-Supreme Court, a substantial proportion of our reversals of state courts would also be reversed. We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.
The Price of Perfect Justice by Macklin Fleming page 21.