Court Opinion

ID: 9956588
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-02 16:10:12.731816+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:38.315028
License: Public Domain

J-A02001-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 SHANA STERLING                           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                    Appellant             :
                                          :
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 ANDREW ROBINHOLT                         :   No. 1052 MDA 2023

               Appeal from the Order Entered June 26, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Civil Division at No(s):
                               2018-11720

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., KING, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                             FILED: APRIL 2, 2024

      Appellant Shana Sterling (Mother) appeals from the order denying her

petition for contempt of a prior custody order relating to J.R. (Child) and

granting Appellee Andrew Robinholt’s (Father) emergency petition for special

relief. After careful review, we are constrained to quash Mother’s appeal.

      The underlying facts of this case are well known to both parties. See

Trial Ct. Op., 8/17/23, at 1-4. Briefly, the trial court entered an order on May

3, 2021 providing for shared physical custody of Child. On June 12, 2023,

Father filed an emergency petition for special relief “alleging that Mother

screamed at and abused her dog in the vicinity of [] Child on more than one

occasion, the last of which involved [] Child recording the incident.” Id. at 2

(some formatting altered).

      The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on June 16, 2023, during

which both parties testified. Child also testified in camera. On June 26, 2023,
J-A02001-24

the trial court entered an interim order denying Mother’s petition for contempt

and granting Father’s emergency petition for special relief. The trial court’s

order awarded Father sole physical custody of Child “until further order of

court.” Trial Ct. Order, 6/26/23, at 1. The trial court’s order also noted that

the “order shall remain in effect in order to give the parties an

opportunity to file a petition for modification.”           Id. at 2 (formatting

altered and emphasis added).

      Mother filed a timely notice of appeal. Both Mother and the trial court

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. On August 15, 2023, this Court entered an

order directing Mother to show cause as to the finality and appealability of the

order from which the instant appeal is taken. Mother filed a timely response.

This Court entered an order discharging the rule to show cause, deferring a

decision on the propriety of the appeal to the merits panel.

      Mother raises the following issues for our review:

      1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion or commit an error of
         law in its June 26, 2023 order in that it removes [Mother’s]
         shared 50/50 physical custody of [] Child and instead awards,
         grants and orders the switching of the so [sic] primary custody
         of [] Child solely to [] Father?

      2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion or commit an error of
         law, based on the testimony of record below, in failing to follow
         the mandates and factors set forth in 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328?

      3. Were the trial court’s conclusions unreasonable as shown by
         the evidence of record?

      4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion or commit an error of
         law by failing to enter a custody order that is in the best interest
         of [] Child?

                                       -2-
J-A02001-24

Mother’s Brief at 3.

       Initially, we must determine whether the instant appeal is properly

before this Court. In her brief, Mother acknowledges that the trial court’s June

26, 2023 order was not a final order and instead “maintains that the order

was properly appealable to [this] Court as an interlocutory appeal because the

rights involved are too important to be denied review.” Mother’s Brief at 8-

9.1

       Rule 313 permits an appeal “as of right from a collateral order of a trial

court or other government unit.”               Pa.R.A.P. 313(a).   Rule 313 defines a

collateral order as “an order separable from and collateral to the main cause

of action where the right involved is too important to be denied review and

the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment

in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.” Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). With regard

to appeals from collateral orders, this Court has held:

       The “collateral order doctrine” exists as an exception to the finality
       rule and permits immediate appeal as of right from an otherwise
       interlocutory order where an appellant demonstrates that the
       order appealed from meets the following elements: (1) it is
       separable from and collateral to the main cause of action; (2) the
       right involved is too important to be denied review; and (3) the
       question presented is such that if review is postponed until final
       judgment in the case, the claimed right will be irreparably lost.
       See Pa.R.A.P. 313.

       Our Supreme Court has directed that Rule 313 be interpreted
       narrowly so as not to swallow the general rule that only final
____________________________________________

1 While Mother refers to the order at issue as an interlocutory order, her
reasoning mirrors the language of Rule 313 of the Pennsylvania Rules of
Appellate Procedure, which governs the appealability of collateral orders.

                                           -3-
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       orders are appealable as of right. To invoke the collateral order
       doctrine, each of the three prongs identified in the rule’s definition
       must be clearly satisfied.

In re L.B., 229 A.3d 971, 975 (Pa. Super. 2020) (some citations omitted).

       “With regard to the first prong of the collateral order doctrine, an
       order is separable from the main cause of action if it is entirely
       distinct from the underlying issue in the case and if it can be
       resolved without an analysis of the merits of the underlying
       dispute.” K.C. v. L.A., 128 A.3d 774, 779 (Pa. 2015) (internal
       citation and quotation marks omitted). Regarding the second
       prong, “a right is important if the interests that would go
       unprotected without immediate appeal are significant relative to
       the efficiency interests served by the final order rule.” Id. at 779.
       “[I]t is not sufficient that the issue under review is important to a
       particular party; it ‘must involve rights deeply rooted in public
       policy going beyond the particular litigation at hand.’” [Stahl v.
       Redcay, 897 A.2d 478, 485 (Pa. Super. 2006)]. Concerning the
       third prong, whether a party’s claims will be “irreparably lost” if
       review is postponed turns on the particular facts and
       circumstances of each case. See K.C., supra; [G.B. v. M.M.B.,
       670 A.2d 714, 715, 721 (Pa. Super. 1996) (en banc)].

Z.P. v. K.P., 269 A.3d 578, 587 (Pa. Super. 2022).

       We find this Court’s decision in Damiani v. Schmidt, 979 EDA 2022,

2022 WL 6914686 (Pa. Super. filed Oct. 12, 2022) (unpublished mem.), 2 to

be instructive. In Damiani, the trial court entered a final order setting forth

the terms of the parties’ custody schedule in 2016. Id., 2022 WL 6914686 at

*1. In 2022, the appellant filed an emergency special petition, alleging that

the appellee had engaged in inappropriate behavior with the parties’ children.

Id.   Following a hearing, the trial court denied the appellant’s petition for

____________________________________________

2 We may cite to an unpublished memorandum filed after May 1, 2019 for its

persuasive value. Pa.R.A.P. 126(b).

                                           -4-
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special relief and stated that the 2016 custody order was to remain in effect.

Id. at *2.

      On appeal, this Court held that the order denying the appellant’s

emergency special petition was not a final order. Id. Specifically, the Court

noted that:

      The order was entered solely to address the issues framed by [the
      appellant’s] emergency petition, which are interim issues in the
      parties’ ongoing custody proceedings. While the trial court did
      hold hearings on the emergency petition, the orders entered after
      those hearings merely resolved the emergency petition and
      otherwise kept the current custody order in place.

      As the trial court mentioned numerous times throughout the
      hearings on the emergency petition, the February and March 2022
      hearings were solely on the narrow issue of whether or not an
      emergency existed. The trial court also made clear that the case
      still awaits a custody hearing and that information can be
      presented at a future hearing. . . . It is clear [that] the trial court
      did not intend for the orders at issue to be its final word on
      custody. Rather, those orders were the trial court’s emergency
      response required to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the
      children.

Id. (citations omitted).

      In the instant case, Mother appealed from the order granting Father’s

emergency petition, which the trial court has labeled an “interim order.” The

order set forth the following relevant provisions:

      The special relief ordered on June 12, 2023 shall continue and
      Father shall have sole physical custody of [] Child under further
      order of court.

      Mother shall have contact with [] Child as may be agreed upon by
      the parties.

                                       -5-
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      This order shall remain in effect in order to give the parties an
      opportunity to file a petition for modification.

Trial Ct. Order, 6/26/23, at 1-2 (unpaginated) (formatting altered).

      As in Damiani, the trial court’s order addressed only the issues raised

in Father’s emergency petition for special relief and awarded Father sole

physical custody of Child “until further order of court.” See id. It is clear

from the record that the trial court did not intend for the order at issue to be

its “final word” on custody, as it was labeled as an “interim order” and also

provided the parties with the opportunity to file a petition for modification.

See Z.P., 269 A.3d at 587; L.B., 229 A.3d at 975; Damiani, 2022 WL

6914686 at *2. Therefore, for these reasons, we conclude that because the

June 26, 2023 order only addressed interim issues present in the parties’

ongoing custody litigation, it is neither a final order nor a collateral order

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313. See Z.P., 269 A.3d at 587; Damiani, 2022 WL

6914686 at *2.     Accordingly, on this record, we are constrained to quash

Mother’s appeal.

      Appeal quashed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 04/02/2024

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