Court Opinion

ID: 9905550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 17:11:23.563325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:41.487536
License: Public Domain

J-A22001-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 ROSCOE BRIGHT                             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :        PENNSYLVANIA
                      Appellant            :
                                           :
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 WENDY BRIGHT                              :   No. 206 WDA 2023

             Appeal from the Order Entered February 10, 2023
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Family Court at
                        No(s): FD 91-003774-002

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                    FILED: November 22, 2023

      Roscoe Bright (“Husband”) appeals the order granting a motion to

enforce equitable distribution filed by Wendy Bright (“Wife”). We affirm.

      This   matter    concerns   Husband’s    compliance   with   an   equitable

distribution order.   Husband and Wife were married in 1992.          Before and

during the marriage, Husband bought educational savings bonds from his

employer.     In 1995, he purchased the marital residence in Elizabeth,

Pennsylvania, which was mortgaged and titled in his name only. The pair

separated in 2007, and Husband filed a divorce complaint in 2008.            Wife

remained in the residence and Husband continued to pay the mortgage at all

relevant times after they separated.

      Litigation concerning the divorce and equitable distribution was

protracted. The case was referred to a hearing officer in 2011 to consider

distribution of, inter alia, Husband’s thrift savings plan, the marital residence,
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and the savings bonds. Both Husband and Wife advocated in favor of receiving

the residence in equitable distribution.     Additionally, at the time of the

proceedings, neither party could locate the savings bonds.

        The hearing officer entered a report and recommendation on March 9,

2011.     In pertinent part, it recommended that Wife, as caretaker of the

children, retain the house until March 31, 2013, and that Husband continue

paying the mortgage and insurance expenses.         See Master’s Report and

Recommendation, 4/9/11, at 4. The recommendation also called for Wife to

have the option to refinance the home into her individual name at the end of

that period, or else Husband could resume exclusive occupancy by paying Wife

66.6% of the equity value. Id. In the event Husband decided that he did not

want to keep the marital residence, the hearing officer recommended that

Husband continue to pay the mortgage until the property was sold, but that

he would be “compensated dollar for dollar any amounts paid after March 31,

2013 from the net proceeds received.” Id.

        Both Husband and Wife filed exceptions to the recommendation.

Critically, Husband’s exceptions did not challenge the suggestion that he only

receive credit for mortgage payments if he sold the house to a third-party.

Ultimately, after over two years of additional litigation and filings, the trial

court entered a final order concerning the parties’ economic claims on June

28, 2013 (“Final Order”). The court subsequently entered a divorce decree

several months later on September 13, 2013, thus making the Final Order

appealable.

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       Relevant to this appeal, paragraph 10 of the Final Order addressed

disposition of the marital residence, which was largely consistent with the

recommendation of the hearing officer, and which gave Wife the option to

purchase the property. It also provided for reimbursement of any mortgage

payments made by Husband after March 31, 2013, under certain conditions,

including in the event Wife chose to purchase the home or Husband opted to

sell it to a third-party. That paragraph stated in full as follows:

       Wife shall be granted the option of purchasing [the marital
       residence] from Husband for the sum of the balance of the
       mortgage owed to BB&T Home plus any applicable mortgage
       payments made by Husband after March 31, 2013 for a period not
       to exceed thirty . . . days from the date of the transfer of funds
       from Husband’s Thrift Savings Plan that is referenced in Paragraph
       2 of the within order of court.[1] Should Wife purchase [the marital
       residence] within the time period set forth above, Husband shall
       sign over to Wife a deed for [the marital residence]. If Wife does
       not purchase [the marital residence] within the time period set
       forth above, Husband shall retain the option to resume and retain
       sole ownership and exclusive occupancy of [the marital residence]
       upon payment of the sum of $8,777.22 to Wife. If Wife does not
       purchase [the marital residence] within the time period set forth
       above, Wife must vacate [the marital residence] within thirty . . .
       days of Husband’s payment of $8,776.22. If Husband does not
       elect to resume sole ownership of [the marital residence], the
       property shall be listed for sale to a third party and the parties
       shall split the remaining net proceeds (after all costs of sale and
       reimbursement to Husband for any applicable mortgage, real
       estate taxes and insurance payments made after March 31, 2013)
       at a division of 66.6% to Wife and 33.4% to Husband. Husband

____________________________________________

1 Paragraph 2 of the Final Order directed that, among other things, Husband

pay $196,925 “plus the sum of the applicable rate of return that was earned
on the sum . . . from March 7, 2011 through the date of the issuance of an
applicable Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO)” to Wife within thirty
days of the issuance of the QDRO. Final Order, 6/28/13, ¶ 2.

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        shall remain responsible for payment of existing mortgage on [the
        marital residence] until a transfer of ownership occurs.

Final Order, 6/28/13, at ¶ 10. As such, the Final Order contemplated that in

the event Wife elected to purchase the house, she would be required to

reimburse Husband for any mortgage payments he made after March 31,

2013.

        Additionally, paragraph twelve of the Final Order addressed the missing

educational savings bonds. Since the bonds could not be located, it provided

that if they were lost or stolen, the parties “will make the necessary

arrangement to have the bonds replaced and the value of the bonds shall be

split 66.6% to [Wife] and 33.3% to [Husband].” Id. at ¶ 12. The Final Order

also stated that if either party redeemed the bonds, “the party responsible for

such redemption shall reimburse the other party the appropriate percentage

(which would be 66.6% to [Wife] and 33.3% to [Husband].)” Id. Neither

party filed a direct appeal from the Final Order or divorce decree.

        A Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO), as mandated by the Final

Order, was subsequently entered on December 5, 2013; however, Husband

was not able to distribute to Wife the required amounts from his thrift savings

plan until approximately March 25, 2014. By letter dated April 21, 2014, Wife

informed Husband through counsel that she elected not to purchase the

residence and requested distribution of her portion of the savings bonds.

Husband’s counsel responded in writing a month later, enclosing a check to

Wife in the amount of $8,776.22 so that he could retain the martial residence

in accordance with the Final Order. The letter also indicated that Husband

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was refusing to provide any payment arising from the savings bonds for

several reasons, one of which was because “the rental value of the property .

. . to [Wife] – from the date of termination of alimony [on March 31, 2013] to

the date that she is expected to vacate the premises – far exceeds two thirds

(2/3) of the value of the savings bonds.”           Motion to Enforce Equitable

Distribution Order, 1/11/21, at Exhibit B. Wife moved out of the residence on

or about June 7, 2014, which was within thirty days of receiving the check

from Husband and therefore in accordance with the Final Order. It was not

disputed that Husband had paid the mortgage and real estate taxes for the

residence from March 31, 2013, through the time Wife moved out in 2014.

       Approximately six years later, in June of 2020, Wife presented to the

trial court a motion to enforce the Final Order, asserting that Husband had

never paid her the 66.6% of the value of the savings bonds to which she was

entitled.2 The matter was referred to a hearing officer, who on November 8,

2021, issued a report and recommendation to grant Wife’s motion and award

her $2,000 in counsel fees. Both parties filed exceptions. Wife claimed the

attorney fee award was insufficient. Husband argued that any payment he

was required to make to Wife arising from the savings bonds should be offset

by the rental value of the martial residence from March 31, 2013, to April of

____________________________________________

2 The record reflects that although this motion was presented to the trial court

in 2020, it was not filed until January 11, 2021.

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2014, when she vacated the residence. The trial court3 ultimately entered an

order      denying   both   parties’    exceptions   and   adopting   as   final   the

recommendations made by the hearing officer in the report from November

of 2021. Husband’s timely appeal followed.

          Both Husband and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. In its

Rule 1925(a) opinion, the court asserted that Husband was collaterally

estopped from arguing for the offset. Husband raises the following two issues

on appeal:

     I.     Did the trial court err by failing to grant a credit equivalent to
            the fair rental value of the parties’ former marital residence (for
            the fourteen[-]month period that appellee Wife retained
            exclusive use and possession of said property after her award
            of alimony had ended) to appellant Husband when ordering
            appellant Husband to transfer 66.6% of the savings bonds
            acquired during their marriage to appellee Wife?

    II.     Did the trial court err by failing to bar and dismiss appellee
            Wife’s motion to enforce equitable distribution order in
            accordance with the doctrine of laches?

Husband’s brief at 4 (cleaned up).

          We begin with the legal tenets pertinent to our review. Wife’s motion

to enforce, which was filed after entry of the final divorce decree, constitutes

a petition for special relief.      See, e.g., Prol v. Prol, 935 A.2d 547, 555

(Pa.Super. 2007) (stating that the trial court’s power to enforce an order

concerning equitable distribution arises from Pa.R.C.P. 1920.43, concerning

____________________________________________

3 The trial judge who heard and decided Wife’s motion to enforce was different

than the judge who entered to Final Order in 2013.

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petitions for special relief). Appellate courts “review a trial court’s decision to

grant special relief in divorce actions under an abuse of discretion standard[.]”

Conway v. Conway, 209 A.3d 367, 371 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

This Court has stated that “the court abuses its discretion if, in resolving the

issue for decision, it misapplies the law or exercises its discretion in a manner

lacking reason. Similarly, the trial court abuses its discretion if it does not

follow legal procedure.” Id. (citation omitted).

      As collateral estoppel formed the basis of the trial court’s decision, we

examine the fundamentals of that doctrine. Collateral estoppel “operates to

prevent a question of law or issue of fact which has once been litigated and

fully determined in a court of competent jurisdiction from being relitigated in

a subsequent suit.” Vignola v. Vignola, 39 A.3d 390, 393 (Pa.Super. 2012)

(citation omitted). It applies when the following elements are met:

      (1) the issue decided in the prior case is identical to one presented
      in the later case; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits;
      (3) the party against whom the plea is asserted was a party or in
      privity with a party in the prior case; (4) the party or person privy
      to the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and
      fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding and
      (5) the determination in the prior proceeding was essential to the
      judgment.

Id. (citation omitted).

      In his first issue, Husband asserts that any payment he is required to

make to Wife should have been offset by the value of rent for the marital

residence for the fourteen-month period she retained exclusive jurisdiction

after March 31, 2013. See Husband’s brief at 18-24. He cites caselaw for the

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general proposition that “a dispossessed party spouse is entitled to a credit

against the spouse in exclusive possession for the fair rental value of the

marital residence.”   Id. at 20-21 (citing Mundy v. Mundy, 151 A.3d 230

(Pa.Super. 2016)). Husband believes that both the hearing officer and trial

court appeared to conflate his claim requesting an offset for rental value with

one asking for reimbursement of mortgage payments made during the same

period. Id. Husband also contests the court’s finding that he is collaterally

estopped from arguing this position, maintaining that the issue was never

considered by the court before nor addressed in a final judgment on the

merits, and that he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.

Id. at 23-24.

      In its opinion, the trial court determined that Husband was collaterally

estopped from asserting the claim for rental value. See Trial Court Opinion,

4/18/23, at 4-5. Particularly, it reasoned as follows:

             It is clear from the . . . Final Order . . . that the issue of
      compensation for Husband’s mortgage payments was considered
      and contemplated by the [c]ourt. Husband was to receive
      compensation for his mortgage payments if (1) Wife elected to
      purchase the property, or (2) the residence was sold to a third-
      party. Instead, Husband resumed sole ownership of the marital
      residence after Wife elected not to purchase it. The Final Order
      issued by [the court] expressly states that “Husband shall remain
      responsible for payment of existing mortgage on the real property
      . . . until a transfer of ownership occurs.” Accordingly, Husband
      was not entitled to compensation for the mortgage payments
      under paragraph 10 of the Final Order . . . .

      [Additionally, the Final Order] was a final judgment on the merits.
      Husband had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in front
      of [the hearing officer] on March 9, 2011, and in the extensive

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      subsequent litigation through exceptions and motions to
      reconsider. Husband never appealed the Final Order . . . .
      Accordingly, the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes
      relitigati[ng] the disposition of the marital property.

Id. at 5 (cleaned up).

      In the same vein, Wife contends that collateral estoppel bars Husband

from advancing this issue. See Wife’s brief at 11. She avers that Husband is

attempting to re-litigate the underlying equitable distribution, but he cannot

do so since he failed to appeal the Final Order entered in 2013. Id. at 9, 15.

Like Husband, Wife also cites Mundy, but for the proposition that any order

granting a dispossessed party fair market rental value for a residence should

be made as part of the equitable distribution process, which the court chose

not to do. Id. at 12 (citing Mundy, supra at 238). She additionally argues

that regardless of whether Husband’s claim is couched as a request for rental

value credit or reimbursement of mortgage payments, it is irrelevant because

the Final Order only permitted reimbursement of any sort to Husband if Wife

purchased the property or it was sold to a third-party, neither of which

occurred. Id. at 9.

      Upon review of the certified record and the applicable law, we discern

no abuse of discretion with the trial court’s decision to grant Wife’s motion to

enforce and deny Husband’s exception as to this issue. However, we disagree

with both the trial court and Wife that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is

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applicable in this case.4 The first prong of that doctrine requires that an issue

in a later case be identical to that decided in the first case. See Vignola,

supra at 393 (emphasis added).                 The element concerning a subsequent

litigation is not met here. Wife’s motion to enforce was filed within the same

action as the underlying divorce and equitable distribution proceedings, and

therefore does not involve an ensuing case.

       Rather, we find that Husband’s issue invokes the law of the case

doctrine, which we have described thusly:

       The law of the case doctrine refers to a family of rules which
       embody the concept that a court involved in the later phases of a
       litigated matter should not reopen questions decided by another
       judge of that same court or by a higher court in the earlier phases
       of the matter. The various rules which make up the law of the
       case doctrine serve not only to promote the goal of judicial
       economy but also operate (1) to protect the settled expectations
       of the parties; (2) to insure uniformity of decisions; (3) to
       maintain consistency during the course of a single case; (4) to
       effectuate the proper and streamlined administration of justice;
       and (5) to bring litigation to an end.

Neidert v. Charlie, 143 A.3d 384, 390-91 (Pa.Super. 2016) (cleaned up).

This rule “is one largely of convenience and public policy, both of which are

served by stability in judicial decisions, and it must be accommodated to the

needs of justice by the discriminating exercise of judicial power.” Id. at 391.

____________________________________________

4 We nonetheless bear in mind the well-established principle that “an appellate

court may affirm a valid judgment based on any reason appearing as of record,
regardless of whether it is raised by appellee.” Heim v. Medical Care
Availability and Reduction of Error Fund, 23 A.3d 506, 511 (Pa. 2011)
(citation omitted).

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      We further note that courts have declined to apply the doctrine in certain

situations that are not present in the current case, including the modification

of an existing order or a substantial change in circumstances.         See, e.g.,

Mackay v. Mackay, 984 A.2d 529, 541 (Pa.Super. 2009) (finding the doctrine

inapposite when trial court addresses a petition for modification of child

support based upon material and substantial change in circumstances); see

also Neidert, supra at 391 (stating that “a later motion should not be

entertained or granted when a motion of the same kind has previously been

denied, unless intervening changes in the facts or the law clearly warrant a

new look at the question”).

      In granting Wife’s motion to enforce and denying Husband’s request to

offset rental value, the trial court served the purposes of law of the case. First,

the trial court judge was different than the one who entered the Final Order

in 2013, and therefore had a duty to refrain from reopening questions decided

within that order absent material and substantial changes in circumstances.

Id. From our review of the record, it does not appear that there was any

material or substantial change in circumstances concerning the equitable

distribution between entry of the Final Order in 2013 and the time Wife

presented her motion to enforce in 2020. By deciding to keep the house,

Husband’s actions fell within the purview of the Final Order. As such, there

was no compelling reason for the trial court to modify or overturn this ruling

from the prior judge.

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         Next, the Final Order clearly articulated that Husband was only entitled

to reimbursement of his mortgage payments made after March 31, 2013

under two circumstances: if Wife purchased the home or if Husband sold it to

a third-party. Neither the hearing officer’s recommendation from 2011 nor

the Final Order gave Husband a right to reimbursement in the event that he

kept the house, which is what he did here. As such, the issue concerning any

sort of reimbursement or offset for Husband was fully addressed in a final,

appealable order.5      Additionally, although Husband filed exceptions to the

hearing officer’s recommendation in 2011, he did not raise any challenge in

the form of either a mortgage reimbursement or rent offset. Likewise, he

never appealed nor requested reconsideration of the Final Order as to this

issue.     Hence, the limited circumstances upon which Husband would be

entitled to an offset is the law of the case.

         At the time Husband withheld payment from Wife with respect to the

savings bonds in May of 2014, he was not in compliance with the Final Order.

Under the law of the case doctrine, Husband cannot now re-litigate this issue

in response to Wife’s motion to enforce the equitable distribution order, which

Husband concededly disregarded when he failed to redeem the educational

____________________________________________

5 Although Husband takes significant effort to distinguish his claim for rent
offset for payments made while Wife remained in exclusive possession of the
residence from mortgage reimbursement from the same time period, we find
that the claims are, in effect, synonymous. See Mundy v. Mundy, 151 A.3d
230, 239 (Pa.Super. 2016) (stating that mortgage payments made by the wife
“were tantamount to rent owed to [the h]usband for [the wife’s] exclusive use
of his property”).

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savings bonds. To permit this behavior would serve to disrupt the settled

expectations of the parties, especially Wife, and destroy the uniformity of

decisions and consistency in this case. See Neidert, supra at 391. As both

the trial court and Wife posited, it would allow Husband to relitigate an issue

addressed during equitable distribution nearly a decade ago.           Therefore,

Husband is not entitled to relief on this claim.6

       Husband next contends that the court erred when it granted Wife’s

motion to enforce equitable distribution in spite of his position that the

doctrine of laches precludes relief.           See Husband’s brief at 24-27.   He

highlights the fact that it took six years from entry of the Final Order for Wife

to file her motion. Id. at 26. Husband asserts that he was prejudiced by

Wife’s delay because the court ultimately granted her motion, yet failed to

give him the offset discussed above at length. Id. at 26-27.

       “The question of whether laches applies is a question of law; thus, we

are not bound by the trial court’s decision on the issue.” Fulton v. Fulton,

106 A.3d 127, 131 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted). This Court has stated

the following concerning the doctrine:

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6 Based on our decision, we find Husband’s reliance on Mundy unavailing.
Although the Mundy Court articulated a general proposition that a
dispossessed spouse is entitled to credit against a spouse in exclusive
possession, that case involved a direct appeal from an equitable distribution
order. Id. at 235. The appellant in Mundy therefore challenged the order in
question at the first available opportunity, not years later in response to an
unrelated motion to enforce that was necessitated by the appellant’s failure
to comply with the order. Therefore, unlike the case at bar, Mundy did not
implicate the law of case doctrine.

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             Laches bars relief when the complaining party is guilty of
      want of due diligence in failing to promptly institute the action to
      the prejudice of another. Thus, in order to prevail on an assertion
      of laches, respondents must establish: a) a delay arising from
      petitioner’s failure to exercise due diligence; and, b) prejudice to
      the respondents resulting from the delay. Moreover, the question
      of laches is factual and is determined by examining the
      circumstances of each case.

Id. (citation omitted).   Further, “[u]nlike the application of the statute of

limitations, exercise of the doctrine of laches does not depend on a mechanical

passage of time.” Id. (citation omitted).

      In rejecting this claim, the trial court determined that Husband

admittedly failed to abide by the terms of the Final Order by neglecting to

distribute to Wife funds representing her share of the value of the educational

savings bonds. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/18/23, at 5-6. It also found that

the passage of time militated in favor of Wife, not Husband, in light of the fact

that Husband did not comply with the Final Order or otherwise take the steps

to redeem the bonds. Id. at 6. For her part, Wife avers that she exercised

due diligence, despite the six-year delay in filing her motion, because there

was no change in circumstances to trigger any action, such as a sale or

redemption of the savings bonds in question. See Wife’s brief at 16-17.

      We find no error with the court’s refusal to apply the doctrine of laches

in the context of Wife’s motion to enforce the equitable distribution. Notably,

Husband concedes in his brief that he suffered “little or no prejudice from the

long delay” of the filing of the motion itself. Husband’s brief at 27. Rather,

he contends that prejudice arose because the court denied his request for an

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offset in the process of granting Wife’s motion. Since no purported prejudice

“resul[ted] from the delay,” Husband has failed to show that laches applied.

Fulton, supra at 131. Likewise, he has not demonstrated that Wife’s actions

constituted a “failure to exercise due diligence” merely based on the passage

of six years. Id. Husband’s claim warrants no relief.

      Based on the issues presented by Husband, we have no cause to disturb

the trial court’s order.

      Order affirmed.

DATE: 11/22/2023

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