Court Opinion

ID: 9960156
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 16:11:19.463331+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:14.668877
License: Public Domain

J-S08041-24

                                   2024 PA Super 73

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JOSE M SANTIAGO-BURGOS                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 573 MDA 2023

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 29, 2018
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-06-CR-0000886-2016

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                              FILED APRIL 15, 2024

       Appellant, Jose M Santiago-Burgos, appeals nunc pro tunc from the

judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County

following his conviction by a jury on three counts of possession with the intent

to deliver a controlled substance (“PWID”), 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), and

three counts of possession of a controlled substance, 35 P.S. § 780-

113(a)(16).1 After a careful review, we affirm.

       The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: On March 4,

2016, the Commonwealth filed an Information charging Appellant with

numerous drug-related offenses, and on May 23, 2018, Appellant, who was

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 As discussed infra, Appellant’s direct appeal rights were reinstated via the

Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46.
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represented by counsel, proceeded to a two-day jury trial. The trial court has

aptly summarized the evidence offered at the jury trial as follows:

              [The Commonwealth presented three witnesses, John
       Fielding, Detective Pasquale Leporace, and Lieutenant Nelson
       Ortiz. Their testimony established the following:] On January 15,
       2016, at approximately 6:35 a.m., a Berks County drug task force
       executed a search warrant on the residence located at [***]
       South 18th Street, a three-story row home located in Reading,
       Berks County, Pennsylvania (“the Residence”). [N.T., 5/23-
       5/24/28,] at 80-84. The search was related to an ongoing
       investigation regarding the distribution of illegal narcotics from
       the Residence and the subjects of the search were Appellant…and
       another individual—Luis Otero Casiano. [Id.] at 82. Upon entry
       to the Residence, officers found Appellant, his [paramour], and
       their two children. Id. at 83. Luis Otero Casiano was not found
       at the Residence. Id. at 85. After having been advised of his
       Miranda[2] rights, Appellant agreed to speak with detectives, and
       when asked whether there were drugs, guns, or money in the
       Residence, Appellant answered in the affirmative. Id. at 90.
       When asked [specifically about] guns or money in the Residence,
       Appellant told the officers that “he had a little bit of money
       upstairs.” Id. at 101.
              Appellant then led the officers into the basement of the
       Residence and, specifically, to a dresser where officers found 490
       packets of heroin, a digital scale, and various packaging items.
       Id. at 91-99. In the basement, officers located a small plastic
       cabinet in which they found a bag containing ammunition and
       magazines for firearms. Id. at 109. In the bottom of the cabinet,
       [officers] found a Ruger case with a .380 pistol inside of the case.
       Id. It was determined that the boxes of ammunition found were
       consistent with the firearm located in the plastic cabinet. Id. at
       110-11.
              Officers found a bucket containing a kilo press, which, as
       testified, is used “when drug dealers dilute their product and they
       don’t want the product to appear to be diluted, so therefore they
       repress the product in order to make it appear as if it’s
       untouched.” Id. at 112-13. Large vice grips were also found that
       would be used in conjunction with the kilo press to apply pressure

____________________________________________

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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     to the press. Id. at 114. Officers later found a bag containing
     benzocaine, which is used as a cutting agent for cocaine, which
     would be consistent with diluting cocaine with the benzocaine and
     using the kilo press to repackage the cocaine. Id. at 126.
            Officers further found a box containing masks, a coffee
     grinder with heroin residue inside, boxes of blue glassine packets,
     and rubber bands, both of which are specific to the heroin trade
     and used in packaging for street level distribution. Id. at 116-17.
     Additionally, officers found a glass mason jar containing rice and
     a bulk amount of heroin in a plastic bag. Id. at 119. Officers
     likewise located a drill box in the basement in which [they] found
     ten baggies each containing twenty-eight grams of bulk
     methamphetamine, consistent with manufacturing for the purpose
     of distribution. Id. at 125.
            On a shelf in the hallway leading to the basement, officers
     found a heat sealer machine, which was consistent with sealing
     drugs for distribution in the packaging material found in the
     basement. Id. at 103-04. Hanging under the shelf, officers
     discovered a men’s jacket and a backpack, and inside the jacket,
     officers found a bulk amount of marijuana, which was packaged
     in one-ounce sized baggies for distribution. Id. at 106-07.
     Officers also found a larger scale for weighing bulkier items. Id.
     at 107-08.
           In a room upstairs in the Residence, officers located a teal
     tub in which they found a .45 caliber handgun with a loaded
     magazine. Id. at 128. The handgun was later determined to be
     stolen. Id. at 129. [In the pockets of a] jean jacket found in a
     second-floor bedroom, [police found] numerous .45 caliber rounds
     of ammunition consistent with the handgun found in the tub. Id.
     at 131. Officers located bulk amounts of U.S. currency tucked into
     a blue purse and in a jacket—both found upstairs at the Residence.
     Id. at 132-35. Some of the currency was bound together into
     stacks with various names on papers attached to the stacks. Id.
     at 135-36.
             On the third floor of the Residence, officers found a small
     amount of marijuana and a marijuana grinder, along with a pill
     bottle containing Oxycontin pills. Id. at 138-39. Appellant had
     directed officers to a plastic cabinet where he indicated there was
     a little money. Id. at 139. On top of the cabinet, there was a
     calculator and a wallet containing Appellant’s driver’s license and
     credit cards bearing Appellant’s name. Id. Inside of the plastic
     cabinet, officers located a notebook with the same corresponding

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      names as those earlier discovered on the papers attached to
      stacks of currency, as well as numeric values consistent with
      records of sales. Id. at 141, 143-44.
                                   ***
             Appellant presented three witnesses: Bernardo Cartagena,
      Jacqueline Casiano, and himself. Mr. Cartagena, who is the
      brother of Appellant’s [paramour], testified that he moved to the
      Reading area from Wisconsin in 2017 and that he works long hours
      with Appellant in the construction business. Id. at 249-52. Ms.
      Casiano, Appellant’s [paramour], testified that she has been with
      Appellant for eighteen years, and that Appellant worked long
      hours in construction. Id. at 254-55. Ms. Casiano stated that a
      portion of the money found by law enforcement was actually from
      a lawsuit that she had settled, and that she had planned to use
      the money for house repairs, bills, and a trip to Puerto Rico. Id.
      at 257. Ms. Casiano further testified that her son, Luis, along with
      his three children, came to live with her and Appellant in 2016.
      Id. at 255-56. Ms. Casiano noted that she believed the firearm
      found in the Residence may have belonged to Luis and that she
      knew Luis had been drinking a lot. Id. at 258-59. Ms. Casiano
      denied ever seeing Appellant involved in drugs or in the sale or
      distribution of drugs. Id. at 258.
            Appellant testified on his own behalf and denied any
      involvement in the sale or distribution of illegal drugs. Id. at 280-
      81. Appellant further testified that he got [a] tattoo on his chest
      approximately twenty years before the trial. Id. at 282-83.
      Appellant denied ever telling officers that there were any drugs in
      the house but indicated that he did tell officers that everything
      they would find at the Residence belonged to him. Id. at 286-87.
      Appellant stated he believed that Luis was selling drugs. Id. at
      289. Appellant noted that the money found at the Residence was
      in part from Ms. Casiano’s lawsuit and the rest was from hi[s]
      construction business. Id. On cross-examination, Appellant
      stated that the tattoo [on his chest] was in reference to his
      astrological sign of the Libra, and that the money and marijuana
      [depicted in the tattoo] did not mean anything. Id. at 292-93.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 8/28/23, at 1-3, 10-11 (footnote added).

      At the conclusion of all evidence, the jury convicted Appellant of the

offenses indicated supra. On June 29, 2018, Appellant proceeded to a

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sentencing hearing, at the conclusion of which the trial court sentenced

Appellant to an aggregate of eight and one-half years to seventeen years in

prison, to be followed by five years of probation. Appellant did not file post-

sentence motions; however, he filed a timely, counseled direct appeal on July

25, 2018.     Thereafter, counsel failed to file an appellate brief, and,

consequently, by order entered on March 25, 2019, this Court dismissed

Appellant’s appeal.

      On or about October 11, 2019, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA

petition seeking the restoration of his direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc. The

PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended PCRA petition on

February 14, 2023. By order entered on March 20, 2023, the PCRA court

reinstated Appellant’s direct appeal rights, and on April 17, 2023, this

counseled appeal followed. All Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925

requirements have been met.

      On appeal, Appellant sets forth the following issues in his “Statement of

Questions Involved” (verbatim):

      1. Whether it was error to admit at trial, over defense objection
         and in violation of Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 403,
         photographic evidence of Appellant’s large tattoo on his chest
         which depicts a scale, drugs, and money where:
            a. the probative value was outweighed by the
               prejudicial effect as the photograph was potentially
               perceived as Appellant’s continued trade in
               controlled substances and glamorization of selling
               drugs;
            b. the evidence implied previous involvement in
               illegal narcotics transactions; and/or,

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              c. no written notice was given pursuant to
                 Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 403(c)[3] and no
                 motion was filed seeking to admit the photograph
                 as evidence of other acts?
       2. Whether it was error for the prosecutor to twice show to the
          jury on a large screen monitor Appellant’s large tattoo on his
          chest which depicts a scale, drugs, and money, and to further
          impermissibly aver to the jury that the tattoo is evidence that
          Appellant is a longtime, proud drug dealer and was, therefore,
          a drug dealer in the instant offense?

Appellant’s Brief at 5 (suggested answers omitted) (footnote added).

       In his first issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred in permitting

the Commonwealth to introduce into evidence a photograph, which depicted

Appellant’s shirtless chest, thus revealing a large, colored tattoo on his chest.4

It is undisputed Appellant’s tattoo depicts a scale with a stack of money on

one side and marijuana leaves on the other side.5 Appellant argues the trial

court should have excluded the evidence on the following basis: (1) the

probative value of the photograph was outweighed by its prejudicial effect as

____________________________________________

3 We note Pa.R.E. 403 has no subsection (c).

4 The photograph is of Appellant’s chest and does not include his head.

5 We note the trial court included copies of the Commonwealth’s exhibits,
including the photograph at issue, with the certified paper record. However,
the photograph has been reduced to the size of a post-it note, and, due to the
low quality of the black and white copy, the tattoo is difficult to make out in
the photograph. In any event, Appellant included in his reproduced record a
full-size colored copy of the Commonwealth’s exhibit, which clearly shows the
tattoo at issue. The Commonwealth does not challenge the accuracy of the
copy of the photograph provided in Appellant’s reproduced record. Thus, for
the sake of judicial economy, we shall address Appellant’s issue without
requiring the trial court to further supplement the certified record.

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provided by Pa.R.E. 403; (2) the photograph was improper evidence of

Appellant’s prior bad acts under Pa.R.E. 404(b); and (3) the Commonwealth

failed to give written notice seeking to introduce the evidence.

      Initially, we note the following exchange occurred outside the presence

of the jury on the first day of trial:

      THE COURT: [Defense counsel,] you made mention of the
      photographs when we were back in the retiring room. Do you
      want to raise those issues now? I think I know which ones, but—
                                     ***
      [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So then referring to Commonwealth pre-
      marked Exhibit C3, C4, and C5. C3 and C4 being a shirtless
      picture of [Appellant] showing tattoos, which I do not believe
      they’re relevant in this case. Identification is not relevant.
             C5, I believe is a picture of [Appellant’s paramour], which I
      don’t know why that’s relevant. Again, identification is not at
      issue.
      THE COURT: Let me ask [the ADA]. First of all, I note that the
      woman in the photograph is not charged, nor is she alleged to be
      a co-conspirator in the case; is that correct?
      [ADA]: Correct.
      THE COURT: All right.        What is the purpose of these three
      particular exhibits?
      [ADA]: Most importantly, there’s going to be evidence that when
      [Appellant] was taken away, he asked for clothing. In fact, his
      [paramour], the person identified in C5, is the person that
      retrieved his clothing. It was retrieved from the bin identified as
      Commonwealth’s Exhibit Number 8. The same bin [where] one of
      the guns was located. It goes to show—
      THE COURT: I understand that. But, I don’t see—there’s a
      potential prejudicial value of these extensive tattoos, and it seems
      to be that you have witnesses who are going to testify that this
      was the state of dress or undress he was in at the time.
      [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: 6:30 in the morning.
      [ADA]: One of the tattoos, on [Appellant’s] right chest area, is
      relevant. My expert witness, Lieutenant Ortiz, is going to refer—

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     that’s going to be one of his items that also goes into his—partly
     goes into his—
     THE COURT: What tattoo might that be?
     [ADA]: It’s a tattoo of scales. One scale has—and I do have the
     full page. One scale has a stack of cash, the other scale appears
     to have a bunch of marijuana.
     THE COURT: Well, I note that Commonwealth’s Exhibit 4 portrays
     that particular tattoo as well as another one, but also, maybe more
     importantly, it does not contain [Appellant’s] head. So, the other
     one, Commonwealth’s Exhibit 3, doesn’t even show the tattoo in
     its entirely.
     [ADA]: Right. I didn’t have a photograph that had the entire head
     or the entire tattoo, so that’s why I put in both of them.
     THE COURT: Well, what’s your—is your argument in favor of
     Commonwealth’s 5 simply that this is a picture of the woman who
     got the clothing for him?
     [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Just that—
     THE COURT: No, that’s [a question] for [the ADA].               I’m
     addressing—
     [ADA]: Right. People that were in the house. Everybody who was
     in the house, not law enforcement, were photographed. Which,
     you could imply that Luis Otero Casiano was not present. Which,
     I think—I don’t know what the defense is going to be, but I think
     they’re going to pin these drugs on Luis Otero Casiano.
     THE COURT: I understand that. But what do photographs have to
     do with that? Your officers are going to testify as to who was there
     and who was not there.
     [ADA]: It just—well, they would have to believe the officers in
     their entirety, and I hope they do, but—
     THE COURT: Well, this is what I’m going to do. I’m going to allow,
     over [Appellant’s] objection, the use of Commonwealth’s 4. I will
     not allow the use of Commonwealth’s 3 and 5, unless they become
     more germane due to cross-examination or the testimony of
     defense witnesses.
     [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Got you, that makes sense.
     [ADA]: So, 3 and 4 are—
     THE COURT: 3 and 5.
     [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: 3 and 5 are out.

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            With 4, Your Honor, I’m still going to renew my objection
      there. I understand the tattoo, which half of Facebook has. We
      don’t know what age he was when he got that. Certainly,
      someone that has a scale with money and marijuana doesn’t mean
      they’re a drug dealer.
      THE COURT: Well, I don’t disagree with that but it’s relevant
      evidence and its probative and you may make those arguments.
      I don’t believe it is unduly prejudicial under the circumstances, so
      your objection to Commonwealth’s 4 is denied.

N.T., 5/23-5/24/18, at 18-22.

      Thereafter, during the direct examination of Lieutenant Nelson Ortiz, the

Commonwealth showed the lieutenant the photograph of the tattoo on

Appellant’s chest. Id. at 232. The lieutenant testified people often get tattoos

of items or other people that are important to them. Id. He testified: “So,

this tattoo obviously is something that’s important to [Appellant]. It’s showing

that marijuana—in my opinion, it’s showing marijuana equals cash.” Id.

      As indicated supra, the trial court permitted the Commonwealth to

introduce the photograph at issue, marked as Commonwealth’s Exhibit 4, on

the basis it was relevant, and the probative value outweighed the prejudicial

effect. On appeal, Appellant does not dispute the photograph was relevant;

however, Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in holding

the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect.

            The trial court’s decision to admit evidence is subject to
      review for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion may not
      be found merely because an appellate court might have reached
      a different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest
      unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such
      lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.

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Commonwealth v. Hairston, 624 Pa. 143, 84 A.3d 657, 664-65 (2014)

(citation, quotation marks, and quotation omitted). See Commonwealth v.

Pruitt, 597 Pa. 307, 951 A.2d 307 (2008) (indicating the appellate courts

review a challenge to the trial court’s admission of photographs under an

abuse of discretion standard).

      Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 402 provides that “[a]ll relevant evidence

is admissible, except as otherwise provided by law.       Evidence that is not

relevant is not admissible.” Pa.R.E. 402. “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has

any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without

the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”

Pa.R.E. 401.   However, “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its

probative value is outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:

unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay,

wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Pa.R.E. 403.

      In the case sub judice, the trial court relevantly indicated the following:

             The [trial] court, when presented with [defense] counsel’s
      objection, noted that the photograph of Appellant as shirtless and
      appearing with his tattoo was relevant and probative. The
      photograph was relevant both to Appellant’s physical state when
      the officers arrived to execute the search warrant, but also to
      demonstrate, at least, the personal importance of drugs and
      money to Appellant. Appellant’s physical state at the time of the
      search led his [paramour] to retrieve clothing from the same
      plastic bin from which the stolen handgun had earlier been found,
      demonstrating a connection between Appellant’s personal effects
      and the handgun, and tending to show that Appellant had received
      and now possessed the stolen handgun. The photograph of
      Appellant’s tattoo was relevant in demonstrating that he valued
      drugs and money, and the connection between the two, to such

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      an extent as to have a permanent tattoo placed on his body
      depicting that relationship. This tended to show that Appellant
      was involved in the sale or distribution of illegal drugs.
             While Appellant argues that “the probative value was
      outweighed by the prejudicial effects as the photograph was
      potentially perceived as Appellant’s continued trade in controlled
      substances and glamorization of selling drugs,” such an argument
      can hardly be considered meaningful since any relevant evidence
      will have the effect of causing the factfinder to infer a connection
      between the evidence and a defendant’s guilt in the crime being
      charged. Our courts have repeatedly held that “[e]vidence will
      not be prohibited merely because it is harmful to the defendant.”
      Commonwealth v. Kouma, 53 A.3d 760, 770 (Pa.Super. 2012).
      The prejudice complained of by Appellant provides no basis in
      itself to exclude the evidence. The very behavior that the
      Commonwealth was attempting to prove was Appellant’s current
      participation in the drug trade. There was no allegation of
      Appellant’s prior involvement in drug transactions, or that the
      tattoo was demonstrative of Appellant’s prior involvement in drug
      transactions.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 8/28/23, at 8-9 (some quotation marks and

quotations omitted).

      We find no abuse of discretion. Appellant contends the introduction of

the photograph resulted in “unfair prejudice” because “society has a general

disdain for drug dealers.”    Appellant’s Brief at 20.   Thus, he suggests the

photograph “damned Appellant” for glamorizing drugs. Id. However, as the

trial court indicated above, “[e]vidence will not be prohibited merely because

it is harmful to the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736,

750 (Pa.Super. 2014) (quotation marks and quotation omitted). Trial courts

are not required to “sanitize the trial to eliminate all unpleasant facts from the

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jury’s consideration where those facts are relevant to the issues at hand[.]”

Commonwealth v. Dillon, 592 Pa. 351, 925 A.2d 131, 141 (2007).

       Further, as the Comment to Pa.R.E. 403 instructs:

       “Unfair prejudice” means a tendency to suggest decision on an
       improper basis or to divert the jury’s attention away from its duty
       of weighing the evidence impartially….[E]xclusion is limited to
       evidence so prejudicial that it would inflame the jury to make a
       decision based upon something other than the legal propositions
       relevant to the case.

Antidormi, 84 A.3d at 750 (citations, quotation marks, and quotations

omitted). Here, the photograph of Appellant’s tattoo on his chest, introduced

for a legitimate purpose, was not so prejudicial that it likely diverted the jury’s

attention away from its duty of weighing the evidence impartially or inflamed

the jury to make a decision based on “something other than the legal

propositions relevant to the case.” Id. Thus, we find Appellant is not entitled

to relief.

       To the extent Appellant contends the photograph should have been

excluded under Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1) as it was indicative of a prior bad act and

improperly used by the Commonwealth to show Appellant acted in conformity

with the bad act, Appellant has not set forth that place in the record where he

objected to the evidence on this basis. Pointing to the discussion on the record

set forth supra, the trial court indicates Appellant failed to object to the

admission of the photograph on this basis.        See Trial Court Opinion, filed

8/28/23, at 9. That is, Appellant confined his objection at trial to whether the

photograph was relevant and/or whether the probative value was outweighed

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by the prejudicial effect. “The rule is well settled that a party complaining on

appeal of the admission of evidence in the [c]ourt below will be confined to

the specific objection there made.” Commonwealth v. Cousar, 593 Pa. 204,

928 A.2d 1025, 1041 (2007) (quotation marks and quotations omitted). Thus,

we decline to address this challenge further.

       Similarly, regarding Appellant’s contention the trial court should have

excluded the photograph on the basis the Commonwealth failed to give

Appellant pre-trial written notice that it was planning to introduce the

evidence, Appellant has failed to set forth that place in the record where he

objected on this basis. The trial court notes in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion

that Appellant did not raise an objection to the admission of the photograph

on this basis during trial. See Trial Court Opinion, filed 8/28/23, at 9. Thus,

this issue is waived. Cousar, supra.

       In any event, we note that, assuming, arguendo, Appellant preserved

his issues, and the trial court should have precluded the evidence and/or

testimony related to the photograph as alleged by Appellant, any error with

regard thereto is harmless.6

____________________________________________

6 We note our Supreme Court has held that this Court may sua sponte invoke

the harmless error doctrine since it “does nothing more than affirm a valid
judgment of sentence on an alternative basis.” Commonwealth v. Hamlett,
660 Pa. 379, 234 A.3d 486, 492 (2020) (quotation marks and quotation
omitted). In any event, the Commonwealth, as well as the trial court, indicate
any error in the admittance of the photograph was harmless error.

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            The harmless error doctrine reflects the reality that the
      accused is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect trial. [The Supreme
      Court has] described the proper analysis as follows:
            Harmless error exists if the record demonstrates
            either: (1) the error did not prejudice the defendant
            or the prejudice was de minimis; or (2) the
            erroneously     admitted    evidence    was    merely
            cumulative of other untainted evidence which was
            substantially similar to the erroneously admitted
            evidence; or (3) the properly admitted and
            uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so overwhelming
            and the prejudicial effect of the error was so
            insignificant by comparison that the error could not
            have contributed to the verdict.

Commonwealth v. Hairston, 624 Pa. 143, 84 A.3d 657, 671 (2014)

(quotation marks and quotations omitted).

      Relevantly, in analyzing the harmless error doctrine, the trial court

indicated the following:

             Instantly, the Commonwealth presented three witnesses at
      the trial. First, John Fielding, the owner of the stolen firearm,
      testified to his ownership of the stolen firearm and the
      circumstances of its theft. Next, Detective Pasquale Leporace
      testified about the investigation and executed the search of the
      Residence, detailing the discovery of all the previously cited items
      retained and presented as evidence at trial. Finally, Lieutenant
      Nelson Ortiz, who was qualified as an expert in the trafficking of
      narcotics, testified as to the items that were discovered through
      the search of the Residence and how those items are utilized in
      the sale and distribution of illegal drugs. Lieutenant Ortiz likewise
      testified as to the behavior and common habits of those involved
      in the drug trade.
                                          ***
            Given    the   detailed    evidence    presented    by   the
      Commonwealth, including photographs of all items found during
      the search, and the expert opinion analysis provided by Lieutenant
      Ortiz, it is clear that the other properly admitted evidence
      demonstrated [Appellant’s guilt] overwhelmingly. It is difficult to

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       imagine that the minimal prejudicial effect of the photograph of
       the tattoo contributed in any meaningful manner to the verdict of
       the jury.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 8/28/23, at 10-11 (citations to record omitted).

       We agree with the trial court’s analysis.          Here, the Commonwealth

established at length, and its witnesses described in detail, the controlled

substances,     guns,    and     cash   found      throughout   the   Residence.   The

Commonwealth also established the police discovered several items, which

are commonly used in the drug distribution business, in the Residence.

Further, not only was Appellant discovered in the Residence during the early

morning hours when the police executed the search warrant, but a wallet

containing his driver’s license and credit cards was discovered in the

Residence. Accordingly, given that the uncontradicted evidence of guilt was

so overwhelming, the prejudicial effect from the evidence and testimony

related to the photograph of Appellant’s tattoo was so insignificant by

comparison that any error in the admittance of the photograph could not have

contributed to the verdict. Hairston, supra. Thus, Appellant is not entitled

to relief.

       In his second issue, Appellant challenges the Commonwealth’s closing

statement to the jury.7 Specifically, Appellant contends:

____________________________________________

7 In the argument portion related to his second issue, Appellant also makes a

passing reference to the Commonwealth presenting the photograph of
Appellant’s tattoo during the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief via a large screen.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       During the trial, [the ADA] exceeded what was proper in a District
       Attorney’s presentation to the jury. In his closing argument, [the
       ADA] gave his personal opinion to the jury that Appellant was a
       longtime drug dealer and was therefore a drug dealer on this
       occasion as well.       Appellant argues that this was highly
       inflammatory and also a statement of personal opinion. District
       Attorneys are well regarded by the public, and they have a duty
       to act within the confines of the law. The case law is very clear
       that a District Attorney cannot act in an inflammatory manner,
       and the District Attorney cannot give their personal opinion at any
       time in the trial.

Appellant’s Brief at 24.

       Specifically, Appellant challenges the following bolded portions of the

ADA’s closing argument:

             [Appellant] branded himself as a drug dealer.
       (Indicating). Drugs equals money. That’s forever branded
       on his body. That’s who he is. He’s a drug dealer. How do
       we know that? Because the evidence tells you. [Appellant]
       told you though his tattoo.
             I’m not going to show you every single photograph. There
       are almost a hundred of them. I’m not going to show you every
       single piece of evidence because you already saw it. I don’t want
       to waste your time.
            How do we know that [Appellant] is a drug dealer? He told
       Detective Leporace. He came into the house on January 15 th of
       2016 and was asked, “Do you have any drugs, guns or money in

____________________________________________

See Appellant’s Brief at 27. Appellant contends the presentation of the
photograph in this manner was “likely offensive.” Id. Appellant has not set
forth where in the record he objected to the photograph being displayed on
the large screen monitor. In any event, as discussed supra, given the
overwhelming evidence of Appellant’s guilt, we conclude any error in the trial
court allowing the jury to view the photograph on a large screen monitor is
harmless error. See Hairston, supra, 84 A.3d at 671 (holding error is
harmless where “the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt
was so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so insignificant
by comparison that the error could not have contributed to the verdict”)
(quotation marks and quotation omitted)).

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       the house?” Detective Leporace told you that he said, “My drugs
       are downstairs.”
                                           ***
              So, I’m not going to go into any further detail, but I’ll
       just ask you, is there any explanation about where the
       money came from or where the money got to? Does that
       make sense? Does his explanation about his tattoo make
       sense that it was just a nice design? He liked the design,
       therefore he put it [sic]. You have to determine whether
       [Appellant] lied to you, whether [Appellant’s paramour] lied to
       you. And if you believe that they lied to you, you can disregard
       their entire testimony.
             This has been a long case. From January of 2016 until now,
       almost two and a half years. [Appellant] ever since the first day
       has been cloaked—has been covered in the cloak of innocence. To
       this day he still wears that cloak. But you can change that. You
       have the power to change that. You can tell him that what he did
       was wrong.

Appellant’s Brief at 25 (citing N.T., 5/23-5/24/18, at 323, 329) (bold added).8

       The trial court concluded the ADA did not commit misconduct.        Trial

Court Opinion, filed 8/28/23, at 11-12. Assuming, arguendo, Appellant has

preserved his claim of prosecutorial misconduct, we find no relief is due.9

____________________________________________

8 We note the trial transcript from May 23 and 24, 2018, is included in the

certified record; however, pages 328 to 331 have apparently been
inadvertently omitted from the certified transcript. In any event, Appellant
included in his reproduced record an excerpt of the transcript, including page
329, which is related to his second appellate issue. The Commonwealth does
not challenge the accuracy of the excerpt included in Appellant’s reproduced
record. Thus, for the sake of judicial economy, we shall address Appellant’s
issue without requiring the trial court to further supplement the certified
record.

9 The Commonwealth suggests Appellant did not object to the challenged
portions of the ADA’s closing argument, and, therefore, his issue is waived.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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J-S08041-24

              With specific reference to a claim of prosecutorial
       misconduct in a closing statement, it is well settled that “[i]n
       reviewing prosecutorial remarks to determine their prejudicial
       quality, comments cannot be viewed in isolation but, rather, must
       be considered in the context in which they were made.”
       Commonwealth v. Sampson, 900 A.2d 887, 890 (Pa.Super.
       2006) (citation omitted). Our review of prosecutorial remarks and
       an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct requires us to evaluate
       whether a defendant received a fair trial, not a perfect trial.
       Commonwealth v. Rios, 554 Pa. 419, 721 A.2d 1049, 1054
       (1998).
                                         ***
              It is well settled that a prosecutor has considerable latitude
       during closing arguments and his arguments are fair if they are
       supported by the evidence or use inferences that can reasonably
       be derived from the evidence. Further, prosecutorial misconduct
       does not take place unless the unavoidable effect of the comments
       at issue was to prejudice the jurors by forming in their minds a
       fixed bias and hostility toward the defendant, thus impeding their
       ability to weigh the evidence objectively and render a true verdict.
       Prosecutorial misconduct is evaluated under a harmless error
       standard.
       Commonwealth v. Holley, 945 A.2d 241, 250 (Pa.Super.2008)
       (internal citations and quotations omitted). We are further mindful
       of the following:
             In determining whether the prosecutor engaged in
       misconduct, we must keep in mind that comments made by a
       prosecutor must be examined within the context of defense
       counsel’s conduct. It is well settled that the prosecutor may fairly
       respond to points made in the defense closing. Moreover,
       prosecutorial misconduct will not be found where comments were
       based on the evidence or proper inferences therefrom or were only
       oratorical flair.
                                        ***
            It is settled that it is improper for a prosecutor to express a
       personal belief as to the credibility of the defendant or other
____________________________________________

However, given the certified record is missing pages from the ADA’s closing
argument (and some of those pages are also absent from Appellant’s
reproduced record), we are unable to confirm whether Appellant did or did not
object. Accordingly, we decline to find waiver under these particular
circumstances.

                                          - 18 -
J-S08041-24

      witnesses. However, the prosecutor may comment on the
      credibility of witnesses. Further, a prosecutor is allowed to
      respond to defense arguments with logical force and vigor. If
      defense counsel has attacked the credibility of witnesses in
      closing, the prosecutor may present argument addressing the
      witnesses’ credibility.

Commonwealth v. Judy, 978 A.2d 1015, 1019 (Pa.Super. 2009) (citation

omitted). Thus, proper examination of the comments of the ADA in closing

requires review of the arguments advanced by defense counsel in the defense

summation. Id.

      Here, during his closing statement, defense counsel indicated Appellant,

who testified during trial, “spoke the truth.”   N.T., 5/23-5/24/18, at 316.

Defense counsel argued the drugs found in the Residence belonged to Luis

Otero Casiano, who is the son of Appellant’s long-time paramour. Id. at 317.

He averred that, if the police had tested the fingerprints, they would have

discovered that fingerprints on various items belonged to Mr. Casiano. Id.

Defense counsel argued the reason the police did not test the fingerprints was

because “[t]hey know whose fingerprints are on this.” Id.

      Defense counsel also suggested the police should have conducted a

more thorough investigation, including stopping people who came in and out

of the Residence. Id. at 320-21. Defense counsel indicated that, if the police

had done so, they would have discovered people were buying drugs from Mr.

Casiano. Id. at 321. Defense counsel specifically argued Appellant was not

involved with the drugs. Id. at 318. Defense counsel suggested he had to

make “difficult decisions” on how to defend Appellant because Appellant

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wanted to protect family and friends who were actually involved in the drug

trafficking. Id. at 314.

      In response, as indicated supra, the ADA argued in his closing that the

evidence, including Appellant’s tattoo, reveals that Appellant was the person

dealing the drugs seized from the Residence.       Id. at 323. When read in

context, the comments of the ADA represented a fair response to defense

counsel’s contention that Appellant was not involved with the dealing of drugs,

and it did nothing more than focus the attention of the jury on the evidence

that was presented by the Commonwealth. See Judy, supra. Contrary to

Appellant’s assertion, the ADA’s comments were not improper personal

opinions. See id.

      Moreover, regarding the ADA’s comments asking the jury to consider

whether Appellant’s explanations about the money and tattoo make sense, we

disagree with Appellant that the ADA improperly asserted a personal opinion

regarding the credibility of Appellant’s explanation. When read in context, the

ADA specifically informed the jury that the jury needed to determine whether

to believe Appellant and/or his paramour. N.T., 5/23/-5/24/18, at 329. The

ADA specifically advised the jury that Appellant was presumed innocent, and

it was up to the jury to decide whether Appellant was telling the truth. Id. In

a case such as this where the outcome is controlled by credibility

determinations, an ADA “is permitted to make comments reinforcing the fact

that the jury is presented with conflicting accounts.” Judy, 978 A.2d at 1024

                                    - 20 -
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(citation omitted). Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his claim

of prosecutorial misconduct.

      For all of the aforementioned reasons, we affirm.

      Affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 04/15/2024

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