Court Opinion

ID: 9732586
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:26:59.663858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:01.271541
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, J.
(dissenting). Today, four members of this Court have whimsically and waywardly rendered purportless an historic, fundamental and perhaps, in the vast majority of criminal cases, the most significant stage in the criminal process. The clear message they today impart to police and prosecutors and the trial court judges of this state is this:
"Don’t worry if the evidence introduced at the preliminary examination is legally inadmissible or even if it is insufficient to warrant a bindover. As long as there is sufficient evidence to convict at the time of trial, this Court will ignore any pretrial error.”
Why do we find it necessary to abandon this time-honored statute and court-rule sanctioned procedure? It simply cannot be because our appellate courts are deluged with claims of preliminary examination errors. There are probably two good reasons why they are not. First, until today, police, *617prosecutors, defense counsel and trial judges operated under the impression that the preliminary examination was a very important step in the criminal process at which sufficient legally admissible evidence was required. So, as a result, they got it right in the overwhelming number of cases. Secondly, inasmuch as some ninety-two percent1 of our criminal cases result in a guilty plea, most pretrial claims of error are waived. Therefore, the occasion is rare indeed that we are confronted with a confessed error as in this case.
Once it becomes established that the evidence submitted at the trial cures any error or other deficiency at the preliminary examination, circuit and Recorder’s Court judges considering a motion to quash an information, asserting as a basis that there was insufficiency in the evidence or other deficiency, will be asked to ignore the same on the representation and promise of the prosecutor that the error or deficiency will be cured at the trial. That is the next step in the slippery slope.
A motion to quash can then become almost a waste of time. In some counties they may not even pay the lawyers for filing them on the ground that the only motion that the court should be asked to consider is a motion for dismissal after the prosecutor completes the proofs at the trial. What then is the purpose; what is left of the preliminary examination?
It will be interesting to see if today’s majority enthusiastically remands to our already overburdened Court of Appeals all those routine denials of interlocutory appeals from denials of motions to quash. It will certainly require a change in our usual treatment of such matters — a change necessitated by today’s majority’s fear that a conviction *618of one improperly required to stand trial in the first instance, will be, on very rare occasion, reversed. I must dissent.
In this case, the prosecution admitted on appeal in the Court of Appeals that the hearsay statements related by the undercover officer at defendant’s preliminary examination were improperly admitted into evidence.2
Appellee must concede that the examining judge erroneously admitted into evidence at the preliminary examination the statements which Julia Le-Clair and Sandra Bell [codefendants] made [to the] officer .... [T]his is so because while there was evidence that Appellant had delivered the cocaine to Ms. LeClair, which Ms. LeClair subsequently delivered to [the] officer . . . there was no evidence presented which established that Appellant knew or understood that the cocaine she delivered to LeClair was to be distributed to a third party rather than used by LeClair for her own personal use.
Nonetheless, the prosecution urged the Court of Appeals to sustain defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance because there was sufficient evidence at trial to convict. The prosecution argued that People v Johnson, 427 Mich 98; 398 NW2d 219 (1986), reh den 428 Mich 1206 (1987), supported its contention; however, the Court disagreed:
To the extent Johnson can be read in the manner suggested by the prosecution, it is dicta and we cannot say that the concurring opinion by then Chief Justice Williams provides the crucial vote in *619support of that proposition. Hence, we will follow People v Charles D Walker, 385 Mich 565; 189 NW2d 234 (1971), and reverse defendant’s conviction. [Unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided December 8, 1988 (Docket No. 100610).]
The Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction, and we granted the prosecution’s application for leave.
In People v Walker, supra, the defendant was convicted of unlawful possession or control of narcotics. Police officers, after receiving a "tip” from an informant, stopped the defendant’s car and seized heroin from the car and incriminating drug paraphernalia from his person. At the preliminary examination, probable cause for the search and seizure was not shown. The defendant’s motion to quash the information for lack of probable cause was nonetheless denied. At trial, the prosecutor conducted an examination of one of the police officers outside the presence of the jury. The defendant’s attorney objected on the ground that probable cause must be shown first at the preliminary examination, not later at trial. The officer’s testimony at trial clearly established probable cause.
The Walker Court noted the longstanding rule in this state that at the preliminary examination, the people are required to show that a crime has been committed and that there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of having committed that crime. In the absence of such a showing, the accused cannot properly be bound over by the examining magistrate. See People v Dellabonda, 265 Mich 486; 251 NW 594 (1933); People v Kennedy, 384 Mich 339; 183 NW2d 297 (1971).
We stated in Walker:
*620In light of what was presented to the examining magistrate, it was clearly error to allow the narcotics into evidence to determine probable cause. Since probable cause for the arrest and search was not properly established at the preliminary examination, it begs the question to say that probable cause existed to believe that a crime had been committed. There can be no judicial determination of probable cause unless it is made at the proper stage of the proceedings. . . . Unless we require such a showing [to establish probable cause], the preliminary examination becomes meaningless, and a defendant is forced to stand trial in violation of a proper determination from legally admissible evidence at the preliminary examination stage that a crime has been committed and that there is probable cause to believe he is guilty of it. [Id. at 574-576. Emphasis in original.]
The Michigan Code of Criminal Procedure requires that a magistrate discharge a defendant if at the conclusion of the preliminary examination it appears that an offense has not been committed or there is not probable cause for charging the defendant with the crime. MCL 766.13; MSA 28.931. See also People v Asta, 337 Mich 590, 611; 60 NW2d 472 (1953):
[P]roofs on which to base the findings required by the statute must be introduced on a preliminary examination to justify binding over to circuit court for trial. In the case at bar the burden rested on the people to show by competent evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, that the crime of conspiracy as charged in the warrant had been committed, and that there was probable cause to believe defendants guilty thereof.
Thus, evidence sufficient to constitute probable cause must be shown at the preliminary examination. Evidence adduced at the subsequent trial *621cannot relieve the prosecution of the burden of producing sufficient admissible evidence to establish probable cause at the preliminary examination.
This principle has been an integral part of Michigan law. In People v White, 276 Mich 29; 267 NW 777 (1936), the defendants were arraigned for larceny and conspiracy to commit larceny. Over the defendants’ objection, the people introduced admissions by the defendants and a transcript of unsigned statements that were made earlier to the police. The defendants were held for trial following a denial of their motion to quash the information, and were found guilty of receiving stolen property. This Court reversed the convictions, stating:
Aside from the confessions, there was not sufficient testimony in the examination to connect defendants with the offenses charged in the warrant. . . . The motion to quash should have been granted. . . . The failure of the people to sustain their charge may be unfortunate, in view of the subsequent testimony at the trial, but it would be more unfortunate to upset established and well-understood rules of law. [Id. at 31-32. Emphasis supplied.]
See also People v Kennedy, supra.
The requirement that sufficient evidence to bind a defendant over for trial must be presented at the preliminary examination has survived in Michigan for good reason. The preliminary examination has been held to be a critical step of the criminal process. Coleman v Alabama, 399 US 1, 9-10; 90 S Ct 1999; 26 L Ed 2d 387 (1970); People v Bellanca, 386 Mich 708, 712; 194 NW2d 863 (1972); People v Duncan, 388 Mich 489, 501-502; 201 NW2d 629 (1972). By statute, a felony information cannot be filed against any person until that person has *622undergone or waived a proper preliminary examination. MCL 767.42; MSA 28.982.
As this Court stated in People v Dochstader, 274 Mich 238, 244; 264 NW 356 (1936):
This binding conclusion and finding of the examining magistrate is a judicial determination, and constitutes the basis of the right of the prosecuting attorney to proceed in the circuit court by filing an information against defendant. Without such finding and determination by the examining magistrate, the prosecuting attorney is without jurisdiction to proceed in the circuit court by filing an information against defendant.
The prosecutor in this case maintains that, while there was insufficient admissible evidence at the preliminary examination to warrant the bind-over of the defendant to the circuit court, there was sufficient evidence adduced at trial to sustain defendant’s conviction. Therefore, we are urged to approach this case with hindsight and to subject the error to a harmless error analysis rather than reverse the conviction pursuant to MCR 6.110(H).
In 1989, this Court had an opportunity to adopt such a harmless error rule. The Criminal Rules Committee proposed MCR 6.107(G), which would have prohibited a court from reversing an otherwise valid conviction because of an evidentiary error, absent a showing of prejudice by the defendant^3
*623This Court, however, rejected the proposed rule and instead adopted the present rule, MCR 6.110(H)- This rule provides that upon a proper motion, a violation of various subrules at a preliminary examination requires the circuit court either to dismiss the information or remand the case to the district court.
Exemplifying the importance of adherence to proper preliminary examination procedures, this Court in People v Weston, 413 Mich 371; 319 NW2d 537 (1982), reversed the conviction of a defendant whose preliminary examination was held to be in violation of MCL 766.4; MSA 28.922.4 There was no question that the date set for the defendant’s preliminary examination was more than twelve days after the defendant appeared in district court. At the beginning of the preliminary examination, defense counsel challenged the holding of the examination on the basis of MCL 766.4; MSA 28.922. However, the defendant was bound *624over for trial and was subsequently found guilty of armed robbery. The Court of Appeals found that the error did not require reversal because the defendant did not suffer any prejudice because of the delay. This Court noted the strict limitation on any delay as provided by MCL 766.7; MSA 28.925. We rejected the Court of Appeals application of a "no prejudice/no reversible error” rule, despite its "repeated application.” Id. at 375.
We stated in Weston:
A preliminary examination functions, in part, as a screening device to insure that there is a basis for holding a defendant to face a criminal charge. A defendant against whom there is insufficient evidence to proceed should be cleared and released as soon as possible. The notion that a presumptively innocent defendant should remain in custody until a convenient time arrives for the magistrate to conduct the preliminary examination is exactly what the Legislature precluded in MCL 766.1; MSA 28.919. {Id. at 376.]
The rule in Weston was later modified and upheld in People v Crawford, 429 Mich 151; 414 NW2d 360 (1987), reh den 429 Mich 1213 (1987).
Thus, it is clear to us that if a defendant is entitled to a prompt preliminary examination as mandated by statute, a fortiori a defendant is entitled to a preliminary examination where the substantive evidence presented is legally admissible. See People v Kubasiak, 98 Mich App 529, 536; 296 NW2d 298 (1980) ("[i]t is well-settled that an examining magistrate may consider only legally admissible evidence in reaching a decision to bind a defendant over for trial”); People v Gwinn, 47 Mich App 134, 139, 142; 209 NW2d 297 (1973).
At one point in its appeal, the people argued that this Court’s decision in People v Johnson, *625supra, supported the assertion that a conviction should only be reversed where there is error at the preliminary examination if the defendant shows prejudice as a result. The prosecution seized upon the language in a footnote in Johnson which addressed reversals for errors at preliminary examinations.5 As stated by the Court of Appeals and as conceded by the prosecution at oral argument, that was a misreading of the Johnson decision since that language was dicta.
The prosecution cites a number of jurisdictions which have adopted a harmless error rule in preliminary examinations in cases involving matters of state law. Where there has been insufficient evidence at the preliminary hearing, some courts hold that a subsequent jury conviction either cures or renders moot those earlier deficiencies. People v Alexander, 663 P2d 1024 (Colo, 1983); State v Franklin, 194 Neb 630; 234 NW2d 610 (1975); State v West, 223 Neb 241; 388 NW2d 823 (1986). The prosecution relies heavily upon People v Pompa-Ortiz, 27 Cal 3d 519; 165 Cal Rptr 851; 612 P2d 941 (1980), in which the California Supreme Court determined that the defendant was denied a public preliminary hearing, yet nevertheless held that unless such denial prejudiced the defendant, his subsequent conviction at trial would not be reversed despite the error. I acknowledge that some other jurisdictions have developed different rules concerning the effect of error at preliminary examinations. However, I am not persuaded that these decisions mandate a change in our own state law. Some jurisdictions do have laws pertaining to preliminary examinations that are similar to Michigan’s. For instance, in Myers v Commonwealth, 363 Mass 843, 849, n 6; 298 NE2d 819 (1973), the Massachusetts Supreme Court stated *626that the rules of evidence should apply to preliminary examinations. ("Since the primary objective of the probable cause hearing is to screen out those cases where the legally admissible evidence of the defendant’s guilt would be insufficient to warrant submission of the case to a jury if it had gone to trial, the rules of evidence at the preliminary hearing should in general be the same rules that are applicable at the criminal trial.”) See also State v Jacobson, 106 Ariz 129, 130; 471 P2d 1021 (1970) (" 'The proof which will authorize a magistrate in holding an accused person for trial must consist of legal, competent evidence. No other type of evidence may be considered by the magistrate. The rules of evidence require the "production of legal evidence” and the exclusion of "whatever is not legal.” ’ ” Citing People v Schuber, 71 Cal App 2d 773, 775; 163 P2d 498 [1945]); see also Rogers v Superior Court of Alameda Co, 46 Cal 2d 3, 8; 291 P2d 929 (1955); Goldsmith v Sheriff of Lyon Co, 85 Nev 295, 303; 454 P2d 86 (1969).
The people further contend that MCR 6.110(H) is contrary to MCL 769.26; MSA 28.1096, which provides:
No judgment or verdict shall be set aside or reversed or a new trial be granted by any court of this state in any criminal case, on the ground of . . . the improper admission or rejection of evidence . . . unless in the opinion of the court, after an examination of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively appear that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
The prosecution argues that the automatic reversal rule conflicts with the statute because it does not require defendant to show prejudice or a "miscarriage of justice.”
*627In People v Weston, supra at 376, this Court rejected that argument, stating:
We are unable to apply this more general statute in the face of an unqualified statutory command that the examination be held within 12 days.
A preliminary examination functions, in part, as a screening device to insure that there is a basis for holding a defendant to face a criminal charge. A defendant against whom there is insufficient evidence to proceed should be cleared and released as soon as possible. [Emphasis added.]
In affirming this principle in People v Crawford, supra at 159, n 12, we noted:
The burden imposed on the prosecution, when the charges are dismissed without prejudice before the preliminary examination is held, is substantial and sufficient to encourage the magistrate timely to schedule and hold the preliminary examination or to establish a record with the requisite showing of good cause for delay required by the statute. The burden on the prosecution of dismissal without prejudice if the requisite showing is not made, while substantial, is not overwhelming. The charges can be refiled, the defendant rearrested, and a timely preliminary examination held.
Here, the same considerations are present. Despite the language of MCL 769.26; MSA 28.1096, there are unqualified statutory commands that a defendant only be bound over after a preliminary examination if there is probable cause, and if not, the defendant shall be discharged, MCL 766.13; MSA 28.931, and that a preliminary examination or a waiver thereof is a condition precedent to even the filing of a felony information, MCL 767.42; MSA 28.982.
*628In addition, our own rule of evidence, MRE 801(d)(2)(E), requires independent proof of the conspiracy before a statement of a coconspirator is allowed. This requirement was disregarded in the instant preliminary examination, and defendant was bound over solely on the basis of this improperly admitted evidence, rendering meaningless the significance of this preliminary examination. Michigan courts have held several times over that the Michigan Rules of Evidence apply to preliminary examinations. People v Makela, 147 Mich App 674; 383 NW2d 270 (1985); People v Washington, 84 Mich App 750; 270 NW2d 511 (1978); see also People v Woodland Oil Co, 153 Mich App 799; 396 NW2d 541 (1986).
In adopting the prosecutor’s view that an error at preliminary examination could be cured by sufficient evidence at trial, the majority leaves a defendant no remedy, short of seeking a motion to quash the information, or then an interlocutory appeal, which is granted very infrequently. See People v Johnson, supra at 127, n 9 (Levin, J., dissenting). Additionally, I am persuaded that a harmless error requirement would undermine the accuracy of the screening process of the preliminary examination. The intended beneficiaries of this process are defendants who are innocent or against whom evidence is weak. These defendants will not appeal because at trial they generally are acquitted. Thus, as a practical matter, the only group of defendants who can be a "check” on the accuracy of the screening process are those against whom there is a strong case at trial. The harmless error rule would invariably apply to these defendants.
In affirming the principle of Walker, I do not propose that any error committed at a preliminary examination justifies automatic reversal after a *629defendant’s subsequent trial conviction. If at the preliminary examination there is sufficient legally admissible evidence in addition to that which should have been excluded, the decision to bind over the defendant can stand. See People v Usher, 121 Mich App 345, 349; 328 NW2d 628 (1982), and People v Johnson, supra at 116. However, where there is no other admissible evidence sufficient to bind over the defendant, I believe that such an improper bindover creates a travesty of justice and thwarts the purpose of the preliminary examination. We should not ignore the fact that
[i]n modern criminal law pretrial procedure is for most defendants the only criminal procedure. . . . The core of pretrial procedure, in theoretical terms at the very least, is the preliminary hearing, at which police and prosecutorial discretion and the defendant’s guilt are first subjected to judicial scrutiny.
For this reason, if no other, the criminal justice system must pay close attention to the functioning of pretrial procedure to insure that it is providing the protections to which all accused persons are entitled.[6]
Thus, I would affirm the Court of Appeals reversal of defendant’s conviction.
Levin and Archer, JJ., concurred with Cavanagh, J._

 Criminal Justice in Crisis, American Bar Association, Criminal Justice Section, November, 1988.

 Before this Court in oral argument, the prosecution also conceded that without the testimony of the undercover officer about Julia LeClair’s statements, there would not have been enough evidence to connect defendant to the crime, or to even establish that a conspiracy had occurred.

 This rule became effective October 1, 1989. The underlined portions were contained in the proposed rule version, but were not adopted by this Court:
Motions to Dismiss; Harmless Error on Appeal. If, on proper motion, the eirouit trial court finds a violation of subrule (C), (D), (E), or (F), it shall must either dismiss the information or remand the case to the district court for further proceedings. Absent a showing of prejudice, a court may not reverse an *623otherwise valid conviction because of either a violation of these subrules or an error in failing to dismiss an information for violation of these subrules.
In the case at bar, there was a violation of Rule 6.110(C), which provides:
Conduct of Examination. Each party may subpoena witnesses, offer proofs, and examine and cross-examine witnesses at the preliminary examination. Except as otherwise provided by law, the court must conduct the examination in accordance with the rules of evidence. A verbatim record must be made of the preliminary examination.

 [T]he magistrate before whom any person is brought on a charge of having committed a felony shall set a day for a preliminary examination not exceeding 12 days thereafter, at which time a magistrate shall examine the complainant and the witnesses in support of the prosecution, on oath in the presence of the accused, in regard to the offense charged and in regard to any other matters connected with the charge which the magistrate considers pertinent.

 427 Mich 115, n 14.

 Note, The function of the preliminary hearing in federal pretrial procedure, 83 Yale L J 771, 805 (1974).