Court Opinion

ID: 9498179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:10:24.327298+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:40.360577
License: Public Domain

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I agree with the court that this appeal should be dismissed as moot.2 I write separately to state my reasons for concluding that the appeal does not fall within the exception to the mootness doctrine for controversies that are “capable of repetition yet evading review.”
This case is moot because after the district court entered the disputed stay of execution on January 6, 2004, Roberts expressed a desire in March 2004 to file an application for writ of habeas corpus, and then did file an application through counsel in July 2004. At those points in time, the district court plainly was authorized to order a stay of execution pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2251, see McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 852, 858-59, 114 S.Ct. 2568, 129 L.Ed.2d 666 (1994), and the court did twice extend the stay of January 6 on that basis. Whether or not the January stay was authorized, there is no question that the district court had jurisdiction to enter the subsequent stay orders, and those subsequent orders remain in effect as the basis for staying the execution. A ruling at this time that the January order exceeded the district court’s jurisdiction would have no effect. There is no live controversy over the validity of that order.
The State argues vigorously, however, that the question whether the district court has jurisdiction to stay an execution *821even when the inmate has not authorized the filing of an application for writ of habeas corpus is capable of repetition yet evading review. The State contends that the Federal Public Defender “continues to employ this tactic of making unauthorized stay requests.” (Reply Brief of Appellant at 2). It is urged that application of the mootness doctrine will prevent the State fro.m gaming appellate review of whether the district court has jurisdiction to grant such a stay, because it is likely that by the time an appeal is briefed, argued, and decided, changed circumstances will lead to a stay that all agree would be authorized under § 2251.
I respectfully disagree with some of the court’s reasons for concluding that the dispute is not capable of repetition yet evading review. If there were a demonstrated probability that the State would be confronted again with an application for stay of execution from counsel acting on behalf of a prisoner who had authorized a request for a stay, but who had not authorized the filing of an application for writ of habeas corpus, then I believe this case would fall within the exception to the mootness doctrine for disputes that are capable of repetition yet evading review.
Although the court suggests that “the issuance of stays is subject to timely appellate review,” ante, at 5, this case demonstrates that our process for appellate review is not sufficiently timely to avoid mootness. The State filed its notice of appeal on the same day that the district court entered its order granting a stay of execution, but the appeal was not resolved before the district court extended the stay based on subsequent actions by Roberts and an indisputable application of McFarland. In previous cases, we have held that the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception applies where changed circumstances are likely to moot a controversy in -a short time. See Rice v. Kempker, 374 F.3d 675, 678 (8th Cir.2004); Webster Groves Sch. Dist. v. Pulitzer Publ’g. Co., 898 F.2d 1371, 1373-74 (8th Cir.1990).
Nor do I agree that the State’s failure to appeal the district court’s subsequent stay orders in this case demonstrates that the controversy is not capable of repetition yet evading review. Once Roberts expressed a desire to pursue a habeas action, any appeal of the district court’s order granting a stay to allow Roberts an opportunity to prepare a habeas petition would have been frivolous in light of McFarland. And if the district court had sufficient grounds in the exercise of its discretion under § 2251 to grant a further stay once the habeas application was filed, then again the State would have no basis to appeal the subsequent stay orders. But that the State has no grounds to appeal those later orders says nothing about whether the district court had jurisdiction to order a stay of execution on January 6. That issue may evade review where the State has no basis to challenge the subsequent orders.
Nonetheless, I concur that this case should be dismissed as moot because the record does not demonstrate a “reasonable expectation” or “demonstrated probability” that the same controversy will recur involving the same complaining party. See Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482, 102 S.Ct. 1181, 71 L.Ed.2d 353 (1982). Certainty is not required to meet this exception to the mootness doctrine, but a “mere physical or theoretical possibility” is insufficient to satisfy the test. Id.
Measuring whether there is a “demonstrated probability” or “reasonable expectation” is a difficult and imprecise task. It seems to me, however, that the State must present some concrete reasons for us to expect that this situation will recur. So far as I can tell, the record shows no prior occasion on which a stay of execution was *822sought or granted under these circumstances. The State cites State v. Newman, No. 03-1257, 2004 WL 2188967 (Ark. Sep.28, 2004) (per curiam), as a recent example of what it characterizes as similar litigation tactics by the public defender, but that case was different. Newman’s case involved an action filed by a person asserting “next friend” status, and there were issues concerning Newman’s mental competence. Unlike Roberts, Newman had not consented to the filing of an application for stay. Roberts’s case presents an unusual factual scenario, and the record does not in my judgment suggest a sufficient probability or expectation that it will recur. This is a predictive judgment, of course, and if it turns out to be wrong, then the State will be in a strong position to invoke the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine in a future case. On this record, I concur in the decision to dismiss the appeal as moot.

. I also believe that we should vacate the district court’s order of January 6, 2004, staying the execution of Karl Roberts, and remand the case to the district court with di- ' rections to dismiss the January 6 application for stay of execution as moot. "A party who seeks review of the merits of an adverse ruling, but is frustrated by the vagaries of circumstance, ought not in fairness be forced to acquiesce in the judgment.” U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18, 25, 115 S.Ct. 386, 130 L.Ed.2d 233 (1994). "The same is true when,” as here, "mootness results from unilateral action of the party who prevailed below.” Id..; see also United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 39 & n. 2, 71 S.Ct. 104, 95 L.Ed. 36 (1950) ("The established practice of the Court in dealing with a civil case from a court in the federal system which has become moot while on its way here or pending :our decision on the merits is to reverse or vacate the judgment below and remand with a direction to dismiss”); United States v. Stute Co., 402 F.3d 820, 826 (8th Cir.2005). We have reached no decision on whether the district court had jurisdiction to enter the disputed stay of execution on January 6, and the State has been unable to gain appellate review of the stay order due to unilateral action by Roberts. To the extent the court's judgment leaves in place the district court’s order of January 6, I respectfully dissent.