Court Opinion

ID: 9516589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:46:10.869752+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:49.852048
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE WELCH, dissenting: I see no justification for this court to depart from its holdings on this issue, the most recent of which, the Meyer decision, interpreted the demand for speedy trial in the light of both section 103 — 5 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/103 — 5 (West 1998)) and the Twentieth Judicial Circuit’s local court rule 7.04 (20th Judicial Cir. Ct. R. 7.04 (eff. December 12, 1991)). This court has consistently held that a demand for speedy trial (1) must be clear and unequivocal, (2) must be set forth in the title or heading of any pleading containing the demand, (3) must state that the defendant “demands a speedy trial,” and (4) must make explicit reference, in the body of the pleading, to the speedy trial statute. See People v. Meyer, 294 Ill. App. 3d 954, 956, 691 N.E.2d 1191, 1192 (1998); People v. Baker, 273 Ill. App. 3d 327, 329, 652 N.E.2d 858, 860 (1995). Other districts of this court have taken a similar stance. See People v. Dunskus, 282 Ill. App. 3d 912, 668 N.E.2d 1138 (1st District 1996); People v. Erickson, 266 Ill. App. 3d 273, 639 N.E.2d 979 (2d District 1994); People v. Ground, 257 Ill. App. 3d 956, 629 N.E.2d 783 (4th District 1994). The necessity to meet the stringent requirements for a demand for a speedy trial under section 103 — 5(b) reflects the court’s conviction regarding its purpose: “The purpose of *** section 103 — 5(b) is to secure a defendant’s speedy trial guaranty, not to provide the defendant with a tactical weapon against prosecution. Because the demand for speedy trial is significant, ‘courts should not tolerate conduct by defendants that smack [sic] of efforts to hide or bury their intent to invoke the speedy trial provisions of section 103 — 5(b) of the Code.’ ” Dunskus, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 918, 668 N.E.2d at 1142-43, quoting People v. Ground, 257 Ill. App. 3d 956, 959, 629 N.E.2d 783 (1994), cited by People v. Staten, 159 Ill. 2d 419, 422, 639 N.E.2d 550 (1994). I note that, in Staten, our supreme court cited to Ground with approval. Staten, 159 Ill. 2d at 422, 639 N.E.2d at 552. The majority’s mild statement (313 Ill. App. 3d at 688) that the fourth district “may have retreated slightly from its stringent requirements” for speedy trial demands as set forth in Ground, in the recent case of People v. Huff, 308 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 721 N.E.2d 1219 (1999), is an understatement. The Huff case involved a preprinted form filing that was captioned “ENTRY OF APPEARANCE, PLEA OF NOT GUILTY, AND DEMAND FOR SPEEDY TRIAL. In one paragraph, the pleading demanded a jury trial “within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody,” and in another, it stated, “In the event that the [djefendant was not taken into custody,” he demanded a jury trial “within 160 days of the date of this [djemand.” Huff, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 1048, 721 N.E.2d at 1220. It failed to cite section 103 — 5(b) anywhere on the form. See Huff, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 1048-49, 721 N.E.2d at 1220-21. It was precisely the type of obfuscatory and confusing “demand” that this court has repeatedly found to be inadequate to commence the running of the time in which a defendant had to be brought to trial. The circuit court granted defendant Huffs motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial, and the fourth district reversed and remanded the cause in an unpublished order, finding that although there was no evidence that trial counsel had intended to mislead either the State or the court, the demand was insufficient because it failed to cite to the speedy trial statute. The defendant was again represented by the same attorney on remand. He moved to dismiss the prosecution because trial counsel provided inadequate assistance by making an inadequate demand for a speedy trial, and the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. See Huff, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 1049, 721 N.E.2d at 1221. On review, the fourth district did an abrupt about-face and decided that the trial court properly dismissed the charges against the defendant despite the fact that attorney incompetence was not an enumerated ground for the dismissal of a prosecution under section 114 — 1(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/114 — 1(a) (West 1998)). Huff, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 1050, 721 N.E.2d at 1222. It stated that it was “uncomfortable” with its prior disposition of the case and chose not to apply the “law of the case” to the appeal. Huff, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 1049-50, 721 N.E.2d at 1221-22. Justice Steigmann filed a blistering dissent, stating that he doubted that there ever had been such a case as the one under consideration “[i]n this nation’s entire legal history” and that the “miscarriage of justice” to which the majority referred was not the trial court’s dismissal of the charges against defendant Huff but their affirmance of that dismissal. Huff, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 1051, 721 N.E.2d at 1222-23 (Steigmann, J., dissenting). Like Justice Steigmann, I find that the fourth district’s decision in Huff is absolutely inexplicable and far more than a “slight retreat” from its decision in Ground that the majority in this case considers it to be. I believe that the July 22, 1997, demand for speedy trial was inadequate to comply with this court’s prior interpretations of the statute governing speedy trial demands. It was a compound filing, both an entry of appearance and a demand for speedy trial, and defendant failed to explicitly refer to section 103 — 5(b). It was thus insufficient to constitute a clear and unequivocal speedy trial demand or to begin the running of the 160-day time period in which defendant had to be brought to trial. The grant of his motion to dismiss was improper and should be reversed for failure to comply with section 103 — 5(a). Moreover, defendant, as in the Meyer case, was prosecuted in the Twentieth Judicial Circuit. Local rule 7.04 of the rules of practice for the Twentieth Judicial Circuit provides as follows: “All demands for speedy trials shall be in writing and captioned ‘Demand for Immediate Trial’[ ] or ‘Demand for Immediate Jury Trial[,]’[ ] shall include the cause number[,] and shall be signed by the defendant or the defendant’s attorney. The demand shall be filed with the Circuit Clerk and served upon the State’s Attorney.” 20th Judicial Cir. Ct. R. 7.04 (eff. December 12, 1991). In Meyer, this court found, “Local rule 7.04 provides an expedient means for ensuring the proper functioning of the statutory speedy trial provision of section 103 — 5(b) and is less demanding than the law as established in Ground. It is therefore a proper exercise of the circuit court’s powers to promulgate rules not inconsistent with the law.” Meyer, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 957, 691 N.E.2d at 1193. Defendant’s filing contained both a caption indicating an entry of appearance and a subcaption, which read “Demand for Speedy Jury Trial,” rather than “demand for immediate trial” or “demand for immediate jury trial.” It was thus inadequate under rule 7.04 of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit, as well as the Code, precluding the grant of a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. I believe that the dismissal of defendant’s prosecution on speedy trial grounds should be reversed and that this cause should be remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.