Court Opinion

ID: 2964354
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Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:24:29.267424+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:54.665817
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USCA1 Opinion

	

          November 25, 1996 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                 ____________________

          No. 95-1628

                                     JAMES TANCA,

                                Plaintiff - Appellant,

                                          v.

                             NILS NORDBERG, COMMISSIONER,

                           AND THE MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT

                             OF EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING,

                               Defendants - Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                                 ____________________

                                     ERRATA SHEET

                                _____________________

               The  opinion of  this Court  issued on  October 28,  1996 is

          amended as follows:

               On  page 13,  line  3, delete  "lead"  and replace  it  with

          "leads".

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

          No. 95-1628

                                     JAMES TANCA,

                                Plaintiff - Appellant,

                                          v.

                             NILS NORDBERG, COMMISSIONER,
                           AND THE MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT
                             OF EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING,

                               Defendants - Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                     [Hon. Nancy J. Gertner, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                           Stahl and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
                                            ______________

                                _____________________

               Scott  A. Lathrop, with whom  Scott A. Lathrop,  P.C. was on
               _________________             _______________________
          brief for appellant.
               Benjamin  Robbins,  Assistant  Attorney General,  with  whom
               _________________
          Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General of Massachusetts, and Douglas
          _________________                                         _______
          Wilkins, Assistant Attorney General, were on brief for appellees.
          _______

                                 ____________________

                                   October 28, 1996
                                 ____________________

                    TORRUELLA,   Chief  Judge.     Appellant   James  Tanca
                    TORRUELLA,   Chief  Judge.   
                                 ____________

          ("Tanca") brought  this action  alleging retaliation  under Title

          VII  of the 1964  Civil Rights Act, 42  U.S.C.   2000e-3, against

          his employer,  the  Massachusetts Department  of  Employment  and

          Training  ("DET") and  Nils Nordberg,  Commissioner of  the DET.1

          The central  issue is whether  the changes wrought in  the law by

          section 107 of the Civil  Rights Act of 1991, Public  Law 102-166

          (the "1991  Act"), which explicitly apply  only to discrimination

          claims  (and  which  were   meant  to  partially  overrule  Price
                                                                      _____

          Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)), also apply to claims
          __________    _______

          of retaliation.  We  hold that they do not  and that the rule  of

          Price Waterhouse applies to retaliation claims.
          ________________

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND

                    The following facts are drawn from the district court's

          Memorandum and Order.   Tanca is a white male  who was a longterm

          DET  employee.   After several  minority employees  were promoted

          into positions for  which Tanca had applied, Tanca  complained to

          high  level DET  managers.    He  believed  that  he  was  better

          qualified than  the promoted  employees and that  their promotion

          was due to reverse discrimination.  At some point, a  position as

          an  Unemployment  Insurance  Manager ("UI")  became  available in

          DET's Hyannis, Massachusetts, office,  where Tanca worked, and he

          applied.    Instead  of  offering him  the  Hyannis  UI position,

          however,  DET offered  him  a similar  position  in New  Bedford,

                              
          ____________________

          1 A  count alleging  violations of  Mass.  Gen. L.  ch. 151B  was
          voluntarily dismissed.

                                         -2-

          Massachusetts.  Tanca brought  suit, alleging that DET retaliated

          against  him for making his complaints -- a protected activity --

          by refusing him  the Hyannis  position and offering  him the  New

          Bedford one.  Because  of the distance between Hyannis,  where he

          lived, and New Bedford, Tanca  described the offered position  as

          significantly less desirable.   DET denied that the decision  was

          motivated by retaliation, and maintained that it was based solely

          on legitimate concerns regarding Tanca's management abilities and

          DET's ability to supervise Tanca in New Bedford.

                    The case  was tried  before  a jury,  which found  that

          Tanca had  engaged in good  faith activity protected  under Title

          VII,  that the activity was a motivating factor in DET's decision

          (and thus that DET had retaliated), but that Tanca would not have

          received  the Hyannis  UI position  even absent  the illegitimate

          consideration.    The  district court  then  granted  defendants'

          Motion  for Judgment  as  a Matter  of  Law, finding  that  Price
                                                                      _____

          Waterhouse  governed the  parties' dispute  and that,  under that
          __________

          case, because the jury found that DET would have reached the same

          decision absent  any retaliatory motives, DET could  not be found

          liable.  This appeal ensued.

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION

                        A.  Price Waterhouse and the 1991 Act
                        A.  Price Waterhouse and the 1991 Act
                            _________________________________

                    We  first outline the  pertinent law, and  then turn to

          the interpretation of the statutes in question.

                              1.  The Legal Framework  
                              1.  The Legal Framework  
                                  ___________________

                    At the  center of  this case sits  the Supreme  Court's

                                         -3-

          decision  in Price Waterhouse.  In that gender bias decision, the
                       ________________

          Court confronted a case in  which the adverse employment decision

          resulted from  a mixture of legitimate  and illegitimate motives.

          Settling  a dispute among the circuits over how to deal with such

          "mixed  motive" cases, see Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 238 n.2,
                                 ___ ________________

          the Court determined that "an employer shall not be  liable if it

          can prove that, even if it had not taken gender  into account, it

          would have  come  to the  same  decision regarding  a  particular

          person."   Id. at 242.   As the trial  court in this  case noted,
                     ___

          "[p]ut another way,  the Court  held that it  was an  affirmative

          defense  to a  charge of  unlawful intentional  discrimination to

          show that the employer would have made the same decision even  in

          the absence of an unlawful motive."  Memorandum and Order, at 3.

                    Although Price  Waterhouse was  a gender case  under 42
                             _________________

          U.S.C.    2000e-2, the  Supreme Court  stated  that its  analysis

          extended  to the  other unlawful  employment practices  listed in

          section  2000e-2(a),  namely,  "discrimination  based   on  race,

          religion, or national origin."  Id. at 244 n.9.  Subsequent cases
                                          ___

          have  extended the Price Waterhouse analysis to a series of other
                             ________________

          discrimination  contexts,  including  retaliation  claims.    See
                                                                        ___

          Cosgrove v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,  9 F.3d 1033, 1039-41 (2d  Cir.
          ________    ____________________

          1993)  (analyzing   Title  VII  retaliation  claim   under  Price
                                                                      _____

          Waterhouse); Griffiths  v.  CIGNA Corp.,  988 F.2d  457, 468  (3d
          __________   _________      ___________

          Cir.)  (noting  that Price  Waterhouse  applies  to mixed  motive
                               _________________

          retaliation claims), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 865 (1993), overruled
                               ____________                       _________

          on other grounds, Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586, 596 n.8 (3d
          ________________  ______    ___________

                                         -4-

          Cir.  1995); Kenworthy  v. Conoco, Inc.,  979 F.2d  1462, 1470-71
                       _________     ____________

          (10th  Cir.  1992)  (applying   Price  Waterhouse  to  Title  VII
                                          _________________

          retaliation  claim).   Indeed,  at least  one court  has analyzed

          retaliation claims  in terms of Price  Waterhouse even subsequent
                                          _________________

          to the passage of the  1991 Act.  See Veprinsky v.  Fluor Daniel,
                                            ___ _________     _____________

          Inc., 87  F.3d 881, 893  (7th Cir. 1996).   However,  neither the
          ____

          Supreme Court nor  this Circuit  has held  that Price  Waterhouse
                                                          _________________

          applies to retaliation cases.

                    However, Congress partially overruled  Price Waterhouse
                                                           ________________

          in the 1991  Act by allowing a  finding of liability  and limited

          relief to plaintiffs in mixed motive cases.   See Landgraf v. USI
                                                        ___ ________    ___

          Film Prods.,  511 U.S. 244,  __, 114 S.  Ct.  1483,  1489 (1994).
          ___________

          First, section 107(a) of that Act, codified at 42 U.S.C.   2000e-

          2(m), determines that an employment practice is  unlawful even if

          there are  legitimate, as  well as illegitimate,  motivations for

          it.2   Next, section  107(b) of  the Act,  codified at  42 U.S.C.

            2000e-5(g)(2)(B), establishes that  if the  plaintiff proves  a

          violation of section 107(a),  but the defendant demonstrates that

          it  "would have  taken  the same  action in  the  absence of  the

                              
          ____________________

          2  Section 107(a) reads: 

                      Except  as  otherwise  provided  in  this
                      subchapter,   an    unlawful   employment
                      practice   is    established   when   the
                      complaining party demonstrates that race,
                      color, religion, sex, or  national origin
                      was   a   motivating   factor   for   any
                      employment  practice,  even though  other
                      factors also motivated the practice.

          42 U.S.C.   2000e-2(m).

                                         -5-

          impermissible  motivating  factor,"  id.,  the  court  may  grant
                                               ___

          declaratory  and injunctive  relief as  well as  attorney's fees,

          although  it cannot grant other damages,  such as monetary relief

          or  reinstatement.3  Thus, where  Price Waterhouse would not have
                                            ________________

          held there  was no liability  and so  would not have  allowed any

          damages, the 1991 Act enables an employee in at  least some mixed

          motive cases to receive certain limited relief.

                             2.  Statutory Interpretation
                             2.  Statutory Interpretation
                                 ________________________

                    Tanca  argues   that  the  new  mixed   motive  damages

          provision  applies  to  all  forms of  employment  discrimination

          cases, including his  own retaliation claim, and  we should allow

          him  the liability finding and remedies  under section 107(b) the

          statute  permits.   We  are accordingly  faced  with an  issue of
                              
          ____________________

          3  Section 107(b) states, in relevant part, that

                    [o]n a claim in  which an individual proves a
                    violation  under  section 2000e-2(m)  of this
                    title and a  respondent demonstrates that the
                    respondent  would have taken  the same action
                    in   the   absence   of   the   impermissible
                    motivating factor, the court --

                         (i)  may grant  declaratory relief,
                         injunctive   relief    (except   as
                         provided   in  clause   (ii)),  and
                         attorney's    fees    and     costs
                         demonstrated    to   be    directly
                         attributable only to the pursuit of
                         a claim under section 2000e-2(m) of
                         this title; and

                         (ii)  shall  not  award damages  or
                         issue   an   order  requiring   any
                         admission,  reinstatement,  hiring,
                         promotion, or payment, described in
                         subparagraph (A).

          42 U.S.C.   2000e-5(g)(2)(B).

                                         -6-

          statutory  interpretation:   do  the mixed  motive provisions  of

          section  107(b) extend  to Title  VII retaliation  claims brought

          under 42 U.S.C.   2000e-3?

                    As  always,  we  begin  our  analysis  with  the  plain

          language  of the statute.   See, e.g., United  States v. Ram rez-
                                      ___  ____  ______________    ________

          Ferrer, 82  F.3d 1131,  1136 (1st  Cir. 1996).   By doing  so, we
          ______

          immediately  encounter  Tanca's  fundamental   problem:    as   a

          retaliation  claim,  his suit was brought under section 2000e-3,4

          and  although  section   107(b)  specifically  addresses  section

          107(a),  it makes no mention of section 2000e-3.  Indeed, section

          107(b) plainly states  that it applies  to "a  claim in which  an

          individual  proves  a  violation  under     2000e-2(m) [107(a)]."

          Section 107(a),  in turn, specifies that  "an unlawful employment

          practice is established when  the complaining party  demonstrates

          that  race, color,  religion,  sex,  or  national  origin  was  a

          motivating factor."5  There is no reference to section 2000e-3 or
                              
          ____________________

          4   That section,  which codifies section  704 of the  1964 Civil
          Rights  Act, makes  it  an unlawful  employment  practice for  an
          employer to discriminate against an employee

                      because he has  opposed any practice made
                      an unlawful employment  practice by  this
                      subchapter,  or because  he  has  made  a
                      charge,    testified,     assisted,    or
                      participated   in   any   manner  in   an
                      investigation,  proceeding,  or   hearing
                      under this subchapter.

          42 U.S.C.   2000e-3(a).

          5   The  parties do  not make  an argument  on the  basis  of the
          "[e]xcept as  otherwise provided in this  subchapter" language of
          section 107(a), quoted in footnote 2,  supra.  We note that we do
                                                 _____
          not read the quoted  language as expanding the scope  of   2000e-
          2(m) to  include retaliation  claims.   Indeed, such an  argument

                                         -7-

          retaliation claims in  either provision.   As the district  court

          found,  "nothing in the 1991 Act would  appear to change any rule

          with respect  to retaliation claims  which existed  prior to  its

          enactment."   Memorandum and Order, at 8; cf. Sunshine Dev., Inc.
                                                    ___ ___________________

          v. FDIC, 33  F.3d 106,  116 (1st Cir.  1994) ("[A]  legislature's
             ____

          affirmative description of  certain powers or  exemptions implies

          denial of nondescribed  powers or  exemptions.").   On its  face,

          then,  the statute  seems to  express an  intent not  to preclude

          application of  Price Waterhouse  in the context  of mixed-motive
                          ________________

          retaliation cases.   See Reiss v. Dalton,  845 F. Supp.  742, 744
                               ___ _____    ______

          (S.D.  Cal. 1993)  (rejecting  application of  section 107(b)  to

          Title VII mixed motive retaliation claim as contrary to the plain

          meaning of the statute).

                    Tanca argues otherwise.   He maintains that reliance on

          the plain  meaning of the statute would be inappropriate, because

          the   "clear"  legislative  history  demonstrates  that  Congress

          intended that  other employment statutes modeled  after Title VII

          adopt its new mixed motive analysis.6  See Greenwood Trust Co. v.
                                                 ___ ___________________
                              
          ____________________

          "would require  us to assume  that Congress chose  a surprisingly
          indirect  route  to  convey  an important  and  easily  expressed
          message."  Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 262.
                     ________

          6   Tanca also seeks support  from section 3(4) of  the 1991 Act.
          That  section states  that  one of  the  Act's purposes  was  "to
          respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the
          scope of  relevant  civil rights  statutes  in order  to  provide
          adequate protection to victims of discrimination."  Although this
          language lends  credence to the  premise that Congress  sought to
          overturn  Price  Waterhouse  at  least   in  part,  it  does  not
                    _________________
          necessarily  follow that Congress  felt victims of discrimination
          could only  be  "adequate[ly]  protect[ed]"  if a  new  rule  was
          established  in relation  to retaliation  claims  as well  as the
          enumerated discrimination claims.

                                         -8-

          Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818, 825 (1st Cir. 1992) ("[A] court must
          _____________

          always hesitate to construe words in a statute according to their

          apparent  meaning if to do so  would defeat Congress's discovered

          intendment."), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1052 (1993).   
                         ____________

                    First, he  argues that,  because we "must  presume that

          Congress  knows   of   prior   judicial   or   executive   branch

          interpretations  of a  statute when it  . . .  amends a statute,"

          Ram rez-Ferrer,  82 F.3d at  1137, we must  presume that Congress
          ______________

          knew  of  the  judicial  practice  of  borrowing  the  order  and

          allocations  of burdens  of proof developed  under Title  VII and

          applying   them  to  retaliation   cases  and   other  employment

          discrimination cases.   See, e.g.,  Griffiths, 988  F.2d at  468.
                                  ___  ____   _________

          Therefore,  the argument  goes,  Congress' failure  to amend  all

          other employment discrimination statutes at the same time that it

          amended section  2000e-2 can mean that Congress presumed that the

          courts would continue  to borrow  and apply  Title VII  concepts,

          including  the  newly  minted  mixed  motive  damages  provision.

          Indeed, there is some arguable support in the legislative history

          for  his position.  The House Report from the Judiciary Committee

          states that 

                      [t]he Committee  intends that . . . other
                      laws   modeled   after   Title   VII   be
                      interpreted  consistently   in  a  manner
                      consistent with  Title VII as  amended by
                      this Act.  For example,  disparate impact
                      claims under the ADA should be treated in
                      the same manner as under Title VII.  

          H.R. Rep. No. 40(II),  102d Cong., 1st Sess. 4  (1991), reprinted
                                                                  _________

          in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 697.
          __

                                         -9-

                    Assuming arguendo that Congress  did intend the section

          107  model to  apply  beyond Title  VII,  Tanca's argument  still

          fails.  Simply  put, Tanca is not arguing that  we borrow a Title

          VII  concept and use it to interpret another statute, such as the

          ADA.   Rather, he wants us  to read one Title  VII provision into

          another.   He  contends  that  Congress  wanted  us  to  do  such

          borrowing, but it seems just as likely that because Congress knew

          of  the judicial borrowing, in  order to avoid  such borrowing it

          specified which particular aspects of Title VII would be affected

          by  referencing  107(a)  in  section  107(b).    Tanca  cites  no

          legislative history that suggests otherwise.  

                    This interpretation  gains additional support  from the

          fact that "'[w]here Congress  includes particular language in one

          section of  a statute but omits it in another section of the same

          Act, it  is generally  presumed that Congress  acts intentionally

          and  purposely   in  the  disparate  inclusion   or  exclusion.'"

          Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United
          ________    _____________                                  ______

          States v.  Wong Kim  Bo,  472 F.2d  720,  722 (5th  Cir.  1972)).
          ______     ____________

          Section  102 of  the 1991  Act, codified  at 42  U.S.C.    1981a,

          provides for compensatory and punitive damages and specifies that

          its provisions  will apply to  complaining parties  who bring  an

          action under section  2000e-3 -- the retaliation section at issue

          here --  as well as  2000e-2.   42 U.S.C.    1981a(a)(1).   Thus,

          because Congress addressed  the retaliation section elsewhere  in

          the 1991 Act, but chose not to do so in section 107(a) or (b), it

          would seem  that "where Congress intended  to address retaliation

                                         -10-

          violations, it knew how to do so and did so  expressly."7  Reiss,
                                                                     _____

          845 F. Supp. at 745. Second,  Tanca cites a  series of additional

          passages from  the legislative  history in arguing  that Congress

          intended  that no part of the prior Price Waterhouse mixed motive
                                              ________________

          analysis  should remain in  effect.  As  Tanca argues, statements

          such  as the following could be  read to support the premise that

          the 1991 Act  should be  read liberally as  regards mixed  motive

          cases:

                      If Title  VII's ban on  discrimination in
                      employment is to  be meaningful,  victims
                      of  proven discrimination must be able to
                      obtain   relief,   and  perpetrators   of
                      discrimination  must  be held  liable for
                      their   actions.       Price   Waterhouse
                                             __________________
                      jeopardizes that fundamental principle.

          H.R.  Rep. 40(I), 102d Cong.,  1st Sess. 47  (1991), reprinted in
                                                               ____________

          1991  U.S.C.C.A.N.   549,  585  (Education  and  Labor  Committee

          Report).  

                    We need not enter into his argument in detail, however,

          as  our review of this and  the other passages of the legislative

          history on which Tanca seeks  to rely leads us to  the conclusion

          that Congress'  intent remains unclear  regarding the application

          of the 1991  Act to  Title VII mixed  motive retaliation  claims.

          Indeed, such  claims are never  directly addressed  in the  cited

                              
          ____________________

          7  Indeed, although section 107(b) does not reference retaliation
          claims,  the already existing subsection immediately preceding it
          in  Title VII  does.   See 42  U.S.C.    2000-e(5)(g)(2)(A).   As
                                 ___
          appellees  note,  the  inclusion  of retaliation  claims  in  one
          subsection, juxtaposed with their omission in  the next, tends to
          support the premise that  Congress' omission of the claim  in the
          latter provision was  intentional.   See Reiss, 845  F. Supp.  at
                                               ___ _____
          745.

                                         -11-

          legislative history.   "'Absent  a clearly  expressed legislative

          intention  to the  contrary [the]  language [of  a statute]  must

          ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.'"  Kaiser Aluminum  & Chem.
                                                   ________________________

          Corp. v.  Bonjorno, 494  U.S. 827,  835 (1990) (quoting  Consumer
          _____     ________                                       ________

          Prod.  Safety Comm'n  v. GTE  Sylvania, Inc.,  447 U.S.  102, 108
          ____________________     ___________________

          (1980)).    Therefore, as  the plain  meaning  of the  statute is

          clear, and this  is not a statute whose  "meanings . . .  take on

          different  colorations   when  read  in  their   legislative  and

          historical  context,"  Greenwood Trust  Co., 971 F.2d  at 826, we
                                 ____________________

          conclude that the mixed  motive provisions of section 107  of the

          1991 Act do  not apply  to Title VII  retaliation claims  brought

          under section 2000e-3.  

                    We are conscious  that our decision  in this case  goes

          against those of  some federal  courts that have  looked at  this

          issue.   However, examination of the cases Tanca cites as support

          for his argument reveals  that, although all of them  would apply

          section  107(b) to Title VII mixed motive retaliation claims, and

          some of  them examined  the legislative  history in  drawing that

          conclusion,  none of  them  weighed  the  plain language  of  the

          statute  prior to borrowing the provision.  See Beinlich v. Curry
                                                      ___ ________    _____

          Dev., Inc., 54 F.3d 772 (table), No. 94-1465, 1995 WL 311577 (4th
          __________

          Cir.  May 22,  1995) (unpublished  disposition) (citing  sections

          107(b)  and 2000e-3(a),  without  applying  them, in  retaliation

          claim); Woodson, 898 F.  Supp. at 304-06 (pretext case);  Hall v.
                  _______                                           ____

          City of Brawley, 887 F. Supp. 1333, 1345 (S.D. Cal. 1995); Jones-
          _______________                                            ______

          Bell v.  Illinois Dept. of Employment Sec., No. 95 C 948, 1995 WL
          ____     _________________________________

                                         -12-

          692321, at *6-*7 (N.D.  Ill. Nov. 20,  1995).8  Indeed, the  only

          case  we  found  that  examined  the  statute  under  traditional

          statutory interpretation  methods supports our  conclusions here.

          See Reiss, 845 F. Supp. at 744-45.  Nothing in the cited cases or
          ___ _____

          others we have examined leads us  to question our conclusion.  We

          also believe that the  Price Waterhouse rule does apply  to mixed
                                 ________________
                              
          ____________________

          8 The  parties cite  one case  from this circuit.   In  Selgas v.
                                                                  ______
          American  Airlines, Inc.,  858 F.  Supp.  316 (D.P.R.  1994), the
          ________________________
          district court was faced with a claim that  the jury's answers to
          special interrogatories  regarding Title VII retaliation  and sex
          discrimination claims were contradictory.  The employer, American
          Airlines,  argued that  the jury found  that American  would have
          made the  same employment decisions  even if Selgas'  gender were
          not taken into account,  and so American had an  absolute defense
          under  Price   Waterhouse.     The  district  court   found  that
                 __________________
          supplemental   questions   put   to   the   jury   remedied   any
          inconsistencies in  the verdict,  but noted in  passing that  the
          1991 Act  had overruled Price Waterhouse.   Id. at 318  n.2.  The
                                  ________________    ___
          district court cited Robinson  v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth.,
                               ________     ______________________________
          982 F.2d 892  (3d Cir.  1993), as support  for that  proposition.
          Examination of Robinson shows that the court there cited the 1991
                         ________
          Act  only for the proposition that "Title VII contemplates that a
          corporation may  be liable  for dismissing  an employee  when its
          motives  contain   a  mixture  of  legitimate   and  illegitimate
          reasons."   Id.  at 899  &  n.8.   As the  underlying dispute  in
                      ___
          Robinson was tried prior  to the 1991 Act's enactment,  the court
          ________
          did not apply it to the dispute.

              A panel of this  court affirmed in part  and vacated in  part
          the  district  court's decision.    See  Kerr-Selgas v.  American
                                              ___  ___________     ________
          Airlines,  Inc., 69 F.3d  1205 (1st Cir. 1995).   The panel found
          _______________
          that American had no alternative just cause to fire Selgas.  Thus
          neither Price Waterhouse nor the 1991 Act was implicated.  Id. at
                  ________________                                   ___
          1210-11.   In  outlining  American's failed  argument, the  panel
          cited Griffiths v.  CIGNA Corp. for the proposition  that section
                _________     ___________
          107(b)'s  affirmative  defense  would apply  to  the  retaliation
          claim.   Id. at 1210; see  Griffiths, 988 F.2d at  472.  However,
                   ___          ___  _________
          the court  in  Griffiths neither  applied section  107(b) to  the
                         _________
          plaintiff's  retaliation  claim  nor  engaged  in  any  statutory
          interpretation  of its  applicability, as  that case  was brought
          prior  to the application of  the 1991 Act.   In the end, we find
          that, although there is  some suggestion in Kerr-Selgas  that the
                                                      ___________
          1991  Act should  apply to  Tanca's claim,  neither of  the cases
          relied on for that  proposition, nor Kerr-Selgas itself, supplies
                                               ___________
          us with any reason to doubt the result reached here today.  

                                         -13-

          motive retaliation  claims.  Accordingly, we  weigh the remainder

          of Tanca's arguments under Price Waterhouse.
                                     ________________

                              B.  The Jury Instructions
                              B.  The Jury Instructions
                                  _____________________

                    Tanca's next argument centers on the jury instructions.

          Question  four  on  the jury  verdict  form  asked:   "Would  the

          employer  have offered Mr. Tanca  a promotion in  Hyannis were it

          not  for plaintiff's protected opposition?"  The jury sent a note

          to the judge regarding question four as follows:

                      Does the word "a"  refer to any promotion
                      in  the Hyannis office or the specific UI
                      position for which Mr. Tanca had applied?

          The court replied that 

                      [t]he words  "a promotion" in  Question 4
                      refers [sic] to the specific  UI position
                      for which Mr. Tanca had applied.

          The jury then returned  a verdict answering question four  in the

          negative,  finding that DET would  not have offered  Tanca the UI

          position in Hyannis, even without the illegitimate motivations.

                    Tanca  argues now that the UI position was not the only

          Hyannis  position that the jury should have considered.  In fact,

          he points out, after naming the new Hyannis UI, DET created a new

          manager position below the  UI in Hyannis, which would  also have

          been a  promotion for  Tanca.  This  position was not  offered to

          Tanca.    Based on  this, Tanca  claims DET  did not  satisfy its

          burden of proof  under Price Waterhouse in that  it did not prove
                                 ________________

          that it would  have come to the same decision even  if it had not

          taken the unlawful  motive into account.   See Price  Waterhouse,
                                                     ___ _________________

          490 U.S. at 244.   The pertinent decision here,  he contends, was

                                         -14-

          DET's choice to offer him a position in New Bedford,  and not one

          in Hyannis.  While the jury found that DET would not have offered

          him the Hyannis  UI position, it did not find  that DET would not

          have  offered him the new  manager position either, he maintains,

          because it was  not asked.   Therefore, he  continues, the  court

          should  have responded to the jury's inquiry by telling them that

          question four referred  to any promotion  in the Hyannis  office.
                                     ___

          Since it  did not, he concludes, DET has not met its burden under

          Price Waterhouse.  Tanca  acknowledges that he did not  object to
          ________________

          the district court's response,  but contends that it was  not his

          duty to do so:  as DET had to  prove each element of its defense,

          he argues, it should have objected.

                    Our  review of  the record  below, however,  reveals no

          mention  of  the  new  manager  position  in  Tanca's  Complaint,

          Opposition to Defendants' Motion  for Summary Judgment, Pre-trial

          Memorandum, Trial Brief, Motion for a New Trial, or Opposition to

          Defendants'  Motion for Judgment.  Nor did Tanca object to either

          the  jury  instructions  or  the judge's  answer  to  the  jury's

          question  on these grounds.  Accordingly, we find that by failing

          to squarely raise any question regarding the new manager position

          before  the district court, Tanca has  waived the opportunity for

          argument  on that  point here.   See  Timberland Design  v. First
                                           ___  _________________     _____

          Serv. Bank  for Sav., 932  F.2d 46,  51 (1st Cir.  1991) ("It  is
          ____________________

          clearly  established that  arguments not  raised at  the district

          court  level  will  not  be  considered on  appeal.");  see  also
                                                                  _________

          Kavanaugh v. Greenlee Tool  Co., 944 F.2d 7, 10  (1st Cir. 1991);
          _________    __________________

                                         -15-

          Nimrod  v. Sylvester, 369  F.2d 870, 872  (1st Cir. 1966).   Even
          ______     _________

          were we not to  find waiver, Tanca's position would fail.  Simply

          put, we  cannot  see how  the trial  court could  have felt  that

          anything  besides the UI position  was at issue.9    The district

          court,  therefore,  did  not err  in  its  answer  to the  jury's

          question, as  the pertinent  issue was  not  whether any  Hyannis
                                                               ___

          position  would  have  been offered  Tanca,  but  whether the  UI

          position would have been offered.

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION

                    In view of the above the judgment of the district court

          is affirmed.  
             ________

                              
          ____________________

          9   For example, in  his Pre-Trial Memorandum,  Tanca listed only
          two contested issues of fact:

                      A.   The  reasons why  Mr. Tanca  was not
                      awarded the position of  U. I. Manager in
                      Hyannis, Massachusetts.

                      B.  Mr. Tanca's damages.

          See Correa v.  Hospital San  Francisco, 69 F.3d  1184, 1195  (1st
          ___ ______     _______________________
          Cir.  1995) (noting that failure  to raise an  issue in the final
          pretrial order generally constitutes waiver).

                                         -16-