Court Opinion

ID: 9950725
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 17:03:45.006119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:33.257551
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/14/24
                              CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                              THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                              (Shasta)
                                                ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                       C096979

                  Plaintiff and Respondent,                (Super. Ct. No. 03F6857)

          v.

 TIMOTHY MARVIN SANTOS,

                  Defendant and Appellant.

       APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Shasta County, Daniel E.
Flynn, Judge. Affirmed.

      John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Ivan P. Marrs and Michael A.
Canzoneri, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                                 1
       Defendant Timothy Marvin Santos was originally sentenced in 2007. His sentence
included a term of 25 years to life under the original Three Strikes law, prior prison term
enhancements under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b),1 and prior felony drug
conviction enhancements under Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (b).
The Legislature recently limited the circumstances in which these enhancements apply,2
and defendant appeals from the trial court’s July 21, 2022 resentencing order pursuant
section 1172.75. In that resentencing, the trial court struck defendant’s prior prison term
and drug conviction enhancements, but left intact his sentence of 25 years to life under
the original Three Strikes law. On appeal, defendant argues he is entitled to resentencing
because: (1) the court did not apply the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Prop. 36, as
approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012)) (Reform Act) to reduce his sentence; and
(2) the resentencing was held in his absence in violation of his federal and state
constitutional rights.
       Although the People initially argued for affirmance of the challenged order, they
later sought leave to file a supplemental brief changing their position on both issues based
on their new assertion that the trial court was required to resentence defendant under the
current penalty provisions set forth in the Reform Act. Because this is incorrect, we
reject the People’s concessions and affirm the judgment.
                                   I. BACKGROUND
A.     Factual Background
       In 2007, defendant was convicted of possession with intent to manufacture
methamphetamine (count 1), conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine (count 2), and
four misdemeanor drug and child endangerment charges (counts 4-7). In a bifurcated

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 People v. McKenzie (2020) 9 Cal.5th 40, 43; People v. Jennings (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th
664, 681.

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proceeding, the court found true that defendant had been convicted of two or more
serious or violent felonies under the former Three Strikes law, that he served three
separate prison terms under section 667.5, subdivision (b), and that he had three separate
prior convictions for controlled substance offenses under Health and Safety Code section
11370.2, subdivision (b).
       The trial court sentenced defendant to a total term of 36 years to life in prison: 25
years to life under the former Three Strikes law for count 2, plus two years for prior
prison term enhancements under section 667.5, subdivision (b), and nine years for the
prior drug conviction enhancements under Health and Safety Code section 11370.2,
subdivision (b). The court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms for the
misdemeanors. The court also imposed but stayed an additional 25-year-to-life term for
count 1 and an additional one-year prior prison term enhancement pursuant to section
654.
       In July 2022, the trial court resentenced defendant in his absence to 25 years to life
for count 2. The 25-year-to-life term for count 1 remains stayed.
B.     Statutory Background
       This case involves the interplay between resentencing under section 1172.75 and
the retroactivity of the Reform Act. We will summarize the relevant provisions of both.
       1.     Section 1172.75
       Subdivision (a) of section 1172.75 provides: “Any sentence enhancement that was
imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for
any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense as defined
in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code is legally
invalid.”
       Section 1172.75 creates a mechanism for resentencing individuals whose
convictions are already final. First, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation notifies the sentencing court of a person in its custody who is serving a

                                             3
prison term that includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a). (§ 1172.75, subd.
(b).) The trial court then reviews the judgment and, if it determines the judgment
includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a), “the court shall recall the sentence
and resentence the defendant.” (Id., subd. (c).) The statute sets forth four parameters for
resentencing. (Id., subd. (d).) First, the resentencing “shall result in a lesser sentence
than the one originally imposed . . . unless the court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety. Resentencing
pursuant to this section shall not result in a longer sentence than the one originally
imposed.” (Id., subd. (d)(1).) Second, “[t]he court shall apply the sentencing rules of the
Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for
judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of
sentencing.” (Id., subd. (d)(2).) Third, the court may take into consideration
postconviction factors. (Id., subd. (d)(3).) Fourth, “[u]nless the court originally imposed
the upper term, the court may not impose a sentence exceeding the middle term unless
there are circumstances in aggravation that justify the imposition of a term of
imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and those facts have been stipulated to by the
defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by
the judge in a court trial.” (Id., subd. (d)(4).) Section 1172.75 also requires the
appointment of counsel and provides that the parties may waive a resentencing hearing.
(Id., subds. (d)(5), (e).)
       2.      The Reform Act
       “Under the ‘Three Strikes’ law as originally enacted in 1994, an individual
convicted of any felony offense following two prior convictions for serious or violent
felonies was subject to an indeterminate term of life imprisonment with a minimum term
of no less than 25 years.” (People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 651 (Conley).) The
Reform Act lessened the prescribed sentence for a third strike defendant whose current
offense is not a serious or violent felony. (Conley, supra, at p. 652.) “A defendant does

                                              4
not qualify for this ameliorative change . . . if his current offense is a controlled substance
charge involving large quantities ([§ 1170.12], subd. (c)(2)(C)(i)), one of various
enumerated sex offenses (id., subd. (c)(2)(C)(ii)), or one in which he used a firearm, was
armed with a firearm or deadly weapon, or intended to cause great bodily injury (id.,
subd. (c)(2)(C)(iii)). The ameliorative provisions of the Reform Act also do not apply in
cases in which the defendant was previously convicted of certain enumerated offenses,
including those involving sexual violence, child sexual abuse, homicide or attempted
homicide, solicitation to commit murder, assault with a machine gun on a peace officer or
firefighter, possession of a weapon of mass destruction, or any serious or violent felony
punishable by life imprisonment or death. (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iv)(I)-(VIII).) The
Act provides that these disqualifying factors must be pleaded and proved by the
prosecution. (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C).)
       “In the Reform Act, the voters also established a procedure for ‘persons presently
serving an indeterminate term of imprisonment’ under the prior version of the Three
Strikes law to seek resentencing under the Reform Act’s revised penalty structure. ([]§
1170.126, subd. (a).) Under section 1170.126, ‘within two years after the effective date
of the act . . . or at a later date upon a showing of good cause,’ such persons [could] file a
petition for a recall of sentence before the trial court that entered the judgment of
conviction. (Id., subd. (b).) If the petitioner would have qualified for a shorter sentence
under the Reform Act version of the law, taking into consideration the disqualifying
factors (§ 1170.126, subds. (e), (f)), section 1170.126 provides that he ‘shall be
resentenced pursuant to [the Reform Act] unless the court, in its discretion, determines
that resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety’ (id., subd. (f)). In exercising this discretion, the court may consider the
defendant’s criminal conviction history, the defendant’s disciplinary record and record of
rehabilitation while incarcerated, and ‘[a]ny other evidence the court . . . determines to be
relevant.’ (Id., subd. (g).)’ ” (Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 653.)

                                              5
                                     II. DISCUSSION
A.     Retroactivity of the Reform Act
       Defendant argues the trial court erred in sentencing him to 25 years to life because
he was entitled to a “full resentencing” under section 1172.75, subdivision (d), during
which the trial court was required to apply the current penalty provisions set forth in the
Reform Act. The People initially disagreed. However, the People obtained supplemental
briefing to change their position. In this supplemental briefing, the People note that they
disagree with People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 978, 984-987,
review granted March 12, 2024, S283305 (Guevara), in which the majority explained the
interpretation of section 1172.75, subdivision (d) advanced by the parties would
unconstitutionally amend section 1170.126. As this court recently explained, entitlement
to a full resentencing does not change the retroactivity of the Reform Act provisions as to
defendant. (People v. Kimble (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 746, 750-751 (Kimble).)
Furthermore, section 1172.75, subdivision (d) did not amend the retroactivity of the
Reform Act. (Kimble, supra, at p. 757.) We also follow Guevara and Kimble in
concluding that, if it had, this would unconstitutionally amend the initiative. (Id. at p.
758, fn. 6; Guevara, supra, at pp. 984-987.)
       In Conley, our Supreme Court addressed the retroactivity of the Reform Act.
Specifically, our Supreme Court decided “whether third strike defendants who were
sentenced under the Three Strikes law before November 7, 2012, but whose judgments
were not yet final as of that date, are entitled to automatic resentencing under the revised
penalty provisions of the Reform Act.” (Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 652.) The court
concluded they were not and “instead may seek resentencing by petitioning for recall of
sentence under section 1170.126.” (Ibid.) Defendant argues Conley has no application to

                                               6
his case because the Estrada3 rule, which was discussed in Conley, has no application
here. As we explained in Kimble, this assertion is incorrect. (Kimble, supra, 99
Cal.App.5th at p. 757.)
       The so-called Estrada rule derives from our Supreme Court’s decision in Estrada,
supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, which addressed whether when “[a] criminal statute is amended
after the prohibited act is committed but before final judgment by mitigating the
punishment,” the statute in effect when the act was committed or the amended statute
should apply. (Id. at p. 742.) There, the amendatory act had been passed after the
criminal act was committed but became effective before trial. (Id. at p. 744.) The
Estrada court explained that generally, “when there is nothing to indicate a contrary
intent in a statute it will be presumed that the Legislature intended the statute to operate
prospectively and not retroactively.” (Id. at p. 746.) Thus, it was previously understood
that “the punishment in effect when the act was committed should prevail.” (Id. at p.
742.) However, the Estrada court held that “where the amendatory statute mitigates
punishment and there is no savings clause, the rule is that the amendment will operate
retroactively so that the lighter punishment is imposed.” (Id. at p. 748.) “The Estrada
rule rests on an inference that, in the absence of contrary indications, a legislative body
ordinarily intends for ameliorative changes to the criminal law to extend as broadly as
possible, distinguishing only as necessary between sentences that are final and sentences
that are not.” (Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 657.) The Estrada rule “applies to
ameliorative laws enacted by ballot proposition as well.” (People v. Padilla (2022) 13
Cal.5th 152, 160.) Further, the rule applies to cases that are nonfinal because the
sentence has been vacated and defendant is undergoing resentencing. (Id. at p. 162.)
Thus, “[w]hether we apply subsequent changes to punishments at a resentencing still

3 In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada).

                                              7
requires that we examine the retroactive application of the amended law and inquire into
the application of the Estrada rule.” (Kimble, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 757; see also
People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 994-999 [analyzing retroactive application
of statutes at resentencing under Estrada].) Thus, Conley is instructive.
       In Conley, our Supreme Court held that, as to the revised penalty provisions in the
Reform Act, the Estrada rule was overridden by section 1170.126. (Conley, supra, 63
Cal.4th at pp. 656-659.) Thus, we are bound by Conley to conclude that, as to defendant,
even during a full resentencing, the Reform Act cannot be applied retroactively to entitle
him to automatic resentencing outside of section 1170.126. (Kimble, supra, 99
Cal.App.5th at p. 758.)
       Defendant asserts the trial court was required to apply the current version of the
Three Strikes law to lessen his sentence under section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2). This
provision provides: “The court shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council
and apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial
discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of
sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) The provision does not indicate the Legislature
intended to change the way the Reform Act already operates retroactively. (Kimble,
supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 757.) The Reform Act already applies a change in the law
and eliminates disparity of sentences and promotes uniformity of sentencing by creating a
mechanism by which all individuals previously sentenced under the Three Strikes law are
afforded a mechanism for resentencing that addresses the potential need to subject them
to mini-trials on the Reform Act’s disqualifying factors years after their crimes were
committed. In Conley, our Supreme court found it “difficult to escape the conclusion that
the [Reform] Act does not address the complexities involved in applying the pleading-
and-proof requirements to previously sentenced defendants precisely because the
electorate did not contemplate that these provisions would apply.” (Conley, supra, 63
Cal.4th at pp. 660-661.) The same is true as to section 1172.75. The statute addresses

                                             8
the new pleading and proof requirements with respect to upper term sentences (see §
1170, subdivision (b)) but says nothing about third strike offenses. (§ 1172.75, subd.
(d)(4).) Likewise, there is no indication in the legislative history that the Legislature
thought it was enabling resentencing of third strike sentences.
       If the Legislature had intended to amend the Reform Act, its ability to do so would
have been constrained. “The Legislature may not amend an initiative statute without
subsequent voter approval unless the initiative permits such amendment, ‘and then only
upon whatever conditions the voters attached to the Legislature’s amendatory powers.’ ”
(People v. Superior Court (Pearson) (2010) 48 Cal.4th 564, 568 (Pearson).) Section 11
of the Reform Act states, in relevant part, that the Legislature may only amend it via
statute if the statute passes with a two-thirds vote. The parties do not challenge the
court’s conclusion in Guevara that these requirements were not met. (Guevara, supra, 97
Cal.App.5th at p. 985, review granted.) Rather, the People contend section 1172.75 does
not amend the Reform Act because the provisions “do not necessarily conflict.” This
argument is unpersuasive.
       Our Supreme Court has described an amendment “as ‘a legislative act designed to
change an existing initiative statute by adding or taking from it some particular
provision.’ [Citation.] But this does not mean that any legislation that concerns the same
subject matter as an initiative, or even augments an initiative’s provisions, is necessarily
an amendment for these purposes. ‘The Legislature remains free to address a “ ‘related
but distinct area’ ” [citations] or a matter that an initiative measure “does not specifically
authorize or prohibit.” ’ ” (Pearson, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 571.) In deciding whether a
particular piece of legislation has amended an initiative, our Supreme Court has framed
the question as simply whether the legislation “prohibits what the initiative authorizes, or
authorizes what the initiative prohibits.” (Ibid.)
       We agree with Guevara, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pages 985 to 986, review
granted, that the parties’ interpretation of section 1172.75, subdivision (d) would

                                              9
unconstitutionally amend the Reform Act by eliminating the public safety inquiry
required to avoid imposing a mandated third strike sentence of 25 years to life on
defendant. The People’s assertion that “[t]echnically, a prisoner whose third strike
sentence has been recalled for other reasons is not in the same position as a prisoner who
is ‘presently serving’ his third strike sentence” is incorrect because it fails to account for
the limited retroactivity of the Reform Act. Under the Reform Act, a prisoner in either
position is entitled to resentencing only upon a successful petition under section
1170.126. Interpreting section 1172.75, subdivision (d) to authorize retroactive
application of the revised penalty provisions set forth in the Reform Act without meeting
the criteria of section 1170.126 would therefore be an unconstitutional amendment of the
initiative statute. Additionally, it is a “leap in logic” to suggest the voters who passed the
Reform Act would not consider defendant to be “presently serving” a third strike
sentence. (Guevara, supra, at p. 986.)
       Therefore, the trial court did not err in keeping intact defendant’s 25-year-to-life
sentence.
B.     Defendant’s Absence at Resentencing
       1.     Procedural Background
       Resentencing was initially scheduled for April 26, 2022. When the matter was
called, defendant remained in custody and was not present. The court stated, “I think the
Defendant would have a right to attend; although I gave you the Court’s tentative in the
Minute Order to strike those enhancements that I think apply. [¶] . . . [¶] So he knows
essentially what the Court is headed to do.” Defense counsel stated, “In my dealings with
Mr. Santos, he usually does like to be present.”
       On May 5, 2022, defendant was again absent and defense counsel represented that
“he wants to attend.” On June 16, 2022, defendant was not present and defense counsel
said, “he would like to be present and I have not brought him yet” and asked for a

                                              10
continuance. Defense counsel also stated, “I could waive his appearance. He does
communicate he wants to come” before the continuance was granted.
       On July 21, 2022, defendant was not present. He was represented by different
defense counsel who said counsel who appeared at the earlier hearings “has been in
communication with him. I understand that he is willing to waive his appearance.” The
court resentenced defendant.
       2.     Harmless Error
       Defendant argues this case should be remanded for another sentencing hearing
because holding the hearing in his absence without a waiver by him of his right to attend
violated his constitutional rights.
       The parties agree that defendant had a constitutional right to be present at his
resentencing hearing. (People v. Cutting (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 344, 347-348.) “A
defendant may waive [their] constitutional right to be present . . . ‘as long as [their]
waiver is voluntary, knowing and intelligent.’ ” (People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404,
508.) In addition, defense counsel may waive the defendant’s presence, “but only if there
is evidence that the defendant consented to the waiver. [Citations.] At a minimum, there
must be some evidence that the defendant understood the right he was waiving and the
consequences of doing so.” (People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 532.)
       We conclude any error in accepting counsel’s waiver was harmless. “Under the
federal Constitution, error pertaining to a defendant’s presence is evaluated under the
harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967)
386 U.S. 18, 23.” (People v. Davis, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 532.) “Under that standard,
the error ‘may be deemed harmless only if we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that the deprivation did not affect the outcome of the proceeding.’ ” (People v. Cutting,
supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 348.)
       Defendant argues we “cannot know what [he] would have offered in mitigation of
his sentence because he was not present for the resentencing hearing.” As the People

                                              11
noted in their initial respondent’s brief before changing their position in supplemental
briefing, defendant could have offered no further assistance because, as to the only part of
the sentence that stands, defendant was not eligible for “reduction of his term under the
three strikes law based on section 1172.75.” Defendant’s opening brief additionally
states, without any further development, “defense counsel at a minimum should have
made a motion to dismiss one or more of the strike convictions under section 1385.” But
since no such motion was made, there was nothing for defendant to contribute. In other
words, his absence could not have affected the outcome of the proceeding. We therefore
conclude any error in accepting counsel’s waiver of defendant’s presence at resentencing
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
                                   III. DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                                           /S/

                                                 RENNER, J.

We concur:

/S/

DUARTE, Acting P. J.

/S/

KRAUSE, J.

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