Court Opinion

ID: 9629316
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:40:33.403274+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:46.619128
License: Public Domain

BURKE, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
The majority hold inter alia that the entry and subsequent search by Police Officers Thompson and Petersen were unlawful and that the evidence they obtained must therefore be suppressed. The legality of that entry and search was. upheld, and in my opinion properly so, by the municipal court, the superior court, and the Court of Appeal. The unfortunate effect of the majority decision will be not only to suppress evidence lawfully obtained by the two officers, but also to deprive home owners of adequate police protection when a neighbor reports having seen trespassers enter an adjacent vacant house.
The superior court, in upholding the legality of the entry and ensuing search by Thompson and Petersen, appears to have applied the doctrine of necessity. The majority recognizes that People v. Roberts, 47 Cal.2d 374, 377 [303 P.2d 721], declared, “Necessity often justifies an action which would otherwise constitute a trespass, as where the act is prompted by the motive of preserving life or property and reasonably appears to the actor to be necessary for that purpose. (Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471 [71 A. 188, 189 . . .]; Metallic Compression Casting Co. v. Fitchburg R. Co., 109 Mass. 277, 280-281 . . .; see Rest., Torts, § 197; Prosser on Torts [2d ed.], 84, 97.)” But, state the majority, the doctrine of necessity is inapplicable here because no emergency situation confronted the two officers comparable to that presented in Roberts and other cases applying that doctrine. The majority note that “The ‘necessity’ in Roberts was that police heard a moaning sound as if from a person in distress and entered defendant’s apartment to render aid ... . Similarly, in [People v. Clark, 262 Cal.App.2d 471 (68 Cal.Rptr. 713)], police entered the defendant’s apartment because circumstances apparent to the officers indicated the ‘probability that a woman within the apartment was the unwilling victim of some criminal act.’ ”
Manifestly the facts in the instant case differ from those in Roberts and Clark, but, as we shall see, the situation confronting the officers also presented an emergency situation as the superior court expressly found, and the doctrine of necessity applies.
The superior court stated that Thompson had “a responsibility as a *731member of law enforcement to take reasonable steps to protect the property of the citizen,” and the superior court specifically found that Thompson’s purpose in entering was “to ascertain whether anyone was in there, whether we had a trespasser situation, whether somebody had come back for the weekend.” The evidence supported that finding. Thompson testified that the reason he sought entry was to “ascertain if there were people in the dwelling that did not have the authority to be inside.” Implicit in the court’s finding and Thompson’s testimony is that his entrance was prompted by the motive of preserving the property. There is no basis for assuming Petersen’s motive differed from that of Thompson.
It is also implicit in the superior court’s ruling upholding the legality of the search that it was reasonable for the officers to believe that the entrance was necessary to protect the property. There is sufficient evidence to support that finding.
The evidence showed that Thompson received a radio message from the dispatcher informing him that Mrs. Hamplin, whose address was 521 Riverside Drive, Newport Beach, had called and reported having seen two “hippie type gentlemen” with sleeping bags enter the residence at 519 Riverside Drive and that this residence was known to her to be vacant. From the fact that she called the police it may be inferred that she thought the individuals were trespassers, and, since she was the next-door neighbor, it is reasonable to believe that she would know the rightful occupants. It does not appear that Thompson was expressly told when Mrs. Hamplin observed the individuals or made the call but apparently both occurred shortly before the information was relayed to him.
Mrs. Hamplin was a citizen who reported having observed criminal activity. In cases involving probable cause for an arrest reliance upon the report of such a citizen or the victim of a crime has been held reasonable even though the person’s reliability has not previously been established. (People v. Hogan, 71 Cal.2d 888, 890-891 [80 Cal.Rptr. 28, 457 P.2d 868]; People v. Guidry, 262 Cal.App.2d 495, 497-498 [68 Cal.Rptr. 794]; People v. Gardner, 252 Cal.App.2d 320, 324-325 [60 Cal.Rptr. 321]; People v. Lewis, 240 Cal.App.2d 546, 549-551 [49 Cal.Rptr. 579].) Similarly here it was reasonable for the police to rely upon Mrs. Hamplin’s report. The fact that her report was transmitted to Thompson through official channels did not cause it to lose its reliability. (Cf. People v. Hogan, supra; People v. Gardner, supra.) And her report was corroborated in part by observations of Thompson at 519 Riverside Drive following his unsuccessful attempt to contact her. Through a window in the front door at that address he saw that the living room contained no furnishings except a carpet and stereo system, a matter indicating that the home was indeed *732vacant.1 The stereo was turned on “quite loud” and the back door was unlocked, circumstances tending to show that the house was or recently had been occupied by someone. Under the circumstances when the officers received no response to Thompson’s knocks and announcements identifying himself as a police officer it was reasonable for them to believe that entrance was necessary to protect the property from possible harm by trespassers.
And the situation confronting them was an emergency, as the superior court found. In this era, with vandalism, burglary, and trespass all too common, the owner could well have complained had the officers merely walked away from the house without taking any further action upon receiving no response to Thompson’s knocks and announcements identifying himself.
The majority, in concluding that no emergency was presented comparable to that in People v. Roberts, supra, 47 Cal.2d 374 and People v. Clark, supra, 262 Cal.App.2d 471, reason, “The only property to be protected was the bare carpeted house containing a stereo system, and the police officers saw nothing to indicate any immediate threat of damage or destruction.” Before entering, the officers, of course, did not know what might be stored in the areas not then visible to their view, but even if “[t]he only property to be protected” was that mentioned by the majority, such property manifestly was worth thousands of dollars. And I am certain it would be a novel idea to most home owners that when a neighbor has seen trespassers enter an adjacent vacant house no emergency exists unless in addition the police observe something indicating an “immediate threat of damage or destruction.” Extensive vandalism to nearly any house, of course, can occur in areas not visible from the outside.
There is no merit to petitioner’s claim that failure by Thompson and Petersen to comply with the demand and explanation requirements of Penal Code section 844 rendered their ensuing search unlawful. Section 844 provides: “To make an arrest ... a police officer, may break open *733the door ... of the house in which the person to be arrested is, or in which they have reasonable grounds for believing him to be, after having demanded admittance and explained the purpose for which admittance is desired.” (Italics added.) Here, since the purpose of the officers in entering was not “[t]o make an arrest” but to protect the property, the section is inapplicable. The privilege to enter property arising out of necessity must be exercised in a reasonable manner. (See Rest., Torts, § 197.) The method of entry in the instant case manifestly was reasonable. Thompson knocked on the front and back doors and identified himself as a police officer but received no response. He and his fellow officer subsequently entered through an unlocked door.
The officers could properly make only that kind of search reasonably necessary to determine whether trespassers actually were in the house. (Cf. Terry v. State of Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 [20 L.Ed.2d 889, 910, 88 S.Ct. 1868]; People v. Roberts, supra, 47 Cal.2d 374.) Here it is apparent from the facts recited by the majority that the search by Thompson and Petersen did not exceed that scope. In conducting such a search, they were not required to blind themselves to what was in plain sight simply because it was disconnected with the purpose for which they entered. (People v. Marshall, 69 Cal.2d 51, 56 [69 Cal.Rptr. 585, 442 P.2d 665]; People v. Roberts, supra, 47 Cal.2d 374, 379.)
The majority’s conclusion regarding the entry and search by Thompson and Petersen is contrary to both the law and common sense, and with respect to that portion of the decision I dissent.
With respect to the search later made by Officer Epstein of narcotics detail, I agree with the majority that his search was unlawful, as was conceded by the People at oral argument. I therefore concur with the majority opinion insofar as it directs the superior court to suppress the evidence seized in Epstein’s search.
Wright, C. J., and McComb, J., concurred.

 The superior court took judicial notice that Newport Beach is a resort area in which owners are often absent for substantial periods, and that sometimes owners, upon leaving their resort homes, take some of their furniture and leave some behind, and the superior court stated “I am not particularly surprised at the fact there was a house with a stereo in it . . . the house was to all intents and purposes vacant with the exception of the stereo.”
The majority draws an inference contrary to that reasonably drawn by the superior court as to whether the house was vacant. It is, however, elementary that an appellate court must accept all reasonable inferences supportive of a ruling by a trial court. (People v. Reilly, 3 Cal.3d 421, 425, fn. 1 [90 Cal.Rptr. 417, 475 P.2d 649]; People v. Anthony, 7 Cal.App.3d 751, 762 [86 Cal.Rptr. 767]; People v. Fisher, 184 Cal.App. 2d 308, 312 [7 Cal.Rptr. 461].)