Court Opinion

ID: 9780749
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 02:45:38.661898+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:12.596354
License: Public Domain

KELSEY, J.,
dissenting.
On appeal, Turna has the burden of making “each of three showings,” Skinner v. Switzer, — U.S. -, -, 131 S.Ct. 1289, 1300, 179 L.Ed.2d 233 (2011) (emphasis added), to undermine his criminal conviction under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).
*305• First, Tuma must establish the undisclosed evidence was “favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching.” Skinner [— U.S. at -] 181 S.Ct. at 1300 (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 [119 S.Ct. 1936, 1948, 144 L.Ed.2d 286] (1999)).
• Second, he must prove “the State suppressed the evidence, ‘either willfully or inadvertently.’ ” Id.
• Third, Tuma must show he suffered “prejudice,” id., by proving a “reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Smith v. Cain, [— U.S. -, -] 132 S.Ct. 627, 630 [181 L.Ed.2d 571] (2012) (quoting Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 469-70 [129 S.Ct. 1769, 1783, 173 L.Ed.2d 701] (2009)).
These factors are not to be weighed in aggregate, with a strong showing on one compensating for a weak showing on another. Nor should they be blurred together into indistinct variables. Each of the “three components of a true Brady violation,” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281, 119 S.Ct. at 1948, must be independently proven on appeal by the defendant.
In this case, Tuma lays heavy emphasis on the first and third components of his claimed Brady violation. He addresses the second component—proof that the “State suppressed the evidence,” Skinner, — U.S. at -, 131 S.Ct. at 1300— almost as an afterthought. To be sure, he all but assumes it away in a highly emotive narrative claiming the trial judge joined in the suppression effort by denying Tuma access to the evidence at trial. Neither the law nor the record supports this assertion.
I.
Brady & DSS Victim Witness Statements
With few exceptions, DSS interviews of sexual assault victims must be orally recorded. See Jones v. West, 46 Va.App. 309, 323, 616 S.E.2d 790, 798 (2005) (citing 22 Va. Admin. Code § 40-705-80(B)(l)). For Brady purposes, the audio *306recording is nothing more than a statement by a victim witness. If the statement claims the defendant committed the crime and does not suggest otherwise, it is inculpatory—not exculpatory. Neither the constitutional Brady doctrine nor state law governing discovery in criminal cases11 requires a prosecutor to provide inculpatory witness statements to a defendant before, during, or after trial. After all, “the Constitution does not require the prosecutor to share all useful information with the defendant.” United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629, 122 S.Ct. 2450, 2455, 153 L.Ed.2d 586 (2002). “There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one.” Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S.Ct. 837, 846, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977).
A witness statement, even if facially inculpatory before trial, can become exculpatory at trial if the victim takes the stand and testifies in a manner inconsistent with the prior statement. If this occurs, prosecutors then have an obligation to produce the inconsistent prior statement for defense counsel to possibly use for impeachment purposes. This disclosure obligation, however, only arises at trial—not prior to trial— where, as here, the pretrial statement allegedly contradicts the declarant’s testimony at trial. In this context, impeachment evidence does not exist until a witness takes the stand and says something impeachable.
For this reason, Virginia follows the prevailing view that “Brady is not violated” when impeachment material “is available to defendants during trial.” Read v. Va. State Bar, 233 Va. 560, 565, 357 S.E.2d 544, 547 (1987) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Behrens, 689 F.2d 154, 158 (10th Cir.1982)). As a matter of law, “no Brady violation” can occur *307when the defendant learns of the potential impeachment evidence “in sufficient time to make use of [it] at trial.” Read, 233 Va. at 564, 357 S.E.2d at 546. As Judge Easterbrook has explained: “A prosecutor must disclose information favorable to the defense, but disclosure need not precede trial. Brady thus is a disclosure rule, not a discovery rule. Disclosure even in mid-trial suffices if time remains for the defendant to make effective use of the exculpatory material.” United States v. Higgins, 75 F.3d 332, 335 (7th Cir.1996) (citation omitted); see generally 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 24.3(b), at 365 (3d ed.2007) (observing that “the prosecution should be able to satisfy its constitutional obligation by disclosure at trial”).
It does not matter that the prosecutor was or should have been “aware of the information” prior to trial. Read, 233 Va. at 564, 357 S.E.2d at 546 (citing United States v. Darwin, 757 F.2d 1193 (11th Cir.1985)). Nor does it matter if the defendant must recall a witness for the purpose of impeachment:
The point in the trial when a disclosure is made, however, is not in itself determinative of timeliness. We agree with those circuits holding that a defendant must show that the failure to earlier disclose prejudiced him because it came so late that the information disclosed could not be effectively used at trial. Appellant here made no such showing. In fact, although Dunn had completed his testimony, the trial itself was far from over. Appellant could have recalled Dunn for further questioning but chose not to.
Darwin, 757 F.2d at 1201 (emphasis added and citations omitted), quoted in part by Read, 233 Va. at 564-65, 357 S.E.2d at 546-47; see also United States v. Davis, 306 F.3d 398, 421 (6th Cir.2002) (holding disclosure of impeachment material during trial, when witnesses were subject to recall, satisfied Brady ).12
*308In Read, the Virginia Supreme Court relied on United States v. Elmore, 423 F.2d 775 (4th Cir.1970), which held no Brady violation occurs when the impeachment information was disclosed “well before the end of the trial,” particularly given that defense counsel could have requested “a continuance for whatever further time might have been necessary.” Id. at 780. This common-sense principle parallels the disclosure requirements of Rule 3A:11. A defendant who “failed to move for a continuance or even for a recess in order to consider the material” cannot “be heard to complain that he had insufficient time to prepare for trial.” Frye v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 370, 384, 345 S.E.2d 267, 277 (1986); see Madsen v. Dormire, 137 F.3d 602, 605 (8th Cir.1998) (finding no Brady violation because defendant “did not request a continuance” to examine the evidence disclosed for the first time at trial); Higgins, 75 F.3d at 335 (“If counsel needed more time, she had only to ask; yet she did not seek a continuance. Nothing more need be said.”).13
Brady is not a canon of prosecutorial ethics, as the majority mistakenly assumes. Ante, at 285-88, 726 S.E.2d at 371-72. Brady enforces the threshold requirements of the Due Pro*309cess Clause, not a state’s code of ethics. See Cone, 556 U.S. at 470 n. 15, 129 S.Ct. at 1783 n. 15 (“Although the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted by Brady, only mandates the disclosure of material evidence, the obligation to disclose evidence favorable to the defense may arise more broadly under a prosecutor’s ethical or statutory obligations.” (citing inter alia ABA Model Rule of Profl Conduct 3.8(d), which Virginia adopted in 2000 as Va. Rule of Profl Conduct 3.8(d))); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1567, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (noting that Brady “requires less of the prosecution than” ABA Model Rule 3.8(d)); see also VSB Legal Ethics Op. 1862 (draft published Mar. 15, 2012).14 In Brady cases, therefore, an appellate court sits not as a disciplinary committee of the state bar—but rather as a court of review, ensuring only that the criminal conviction satisfies the threshold requirements of due process.
II.
Disclosure of the Tape at Trial
In this case, a recorded pretrial interview of the victim witness alleged Tuma’s guilt in considerable detail. The recorded statement was internally consistent and, thus, inculpatory on its face. The Commonwealth had no duty to provide Tuma with the recorded interview unless and until the victim took the stand and testified inconsistently with it. Several statements from the recorded interview, Tuma claims, could have been used to impeach the victim’s testimony at trial. Perhaps so—but that only meant the recording had to be made “available” to Tuma’s counsel “during trial,” Read, 233 *310Va. at 565, 357 S.E.2d at 547, so counsel could decide whether, and if so, how, to use the recorded statement.
It was certainly no secret that the recording existed. Prior to trial, Tuma’s counsel met with the investigating officer and directly “asked him whether or not there was a tape” of the victim’s interview. App. at 516. The investigator said he believed so, but was not sure. Id. On appeal, Tuma’s counsel admits he had an “indication” and a “feeling” prior to trial that a tape existed. See Oral Argument Audio at 6:45 to 6:55.
The existence of the tape was confirmed early in the trial. The investigating officer, the second of the Commonwealth’s six witnesses, testified he believed the interview was recorded. The DSS investigator, the third witness, testified the interview was recorded and she had the tape with her in the courtroom. The entire interview, she added, lasted only thirty to forty minutes.
When Tuma’s counsel learned of the tape’s presence in the courtroom, he did not ask for permission to listen to it. Instead, he inexplicably moved to admit the recorded interview, in its entirety, into evidence—even though neither he, the prosecutor, nor the trial judge had listened to it. The trial judge correctly refused to admit the tape into evidence under such circumstances. Even if portions of the audiotape had qualified for impeachment, only those specific portions could have been presented to the jury, and only after Tuma’s counsel had laid the proper foundation necessary for impeachment.15 He could not do that without first listening to the recorded statement.
*311The trial judge’s evidentiary ruling, however, was not a Brady ruling precluding Tuma’s counsel from listening to the tape. Indeed, the record shows the judge twice made clear to Tuma’s counsel that he could listen to the tape: “You can go listen to it if you want to on your own time,” the judge explained. App. at 318. “You can take it off and listen to it,” the judge clarified. Id. “He can listen to it if he wants to,” the prosecutor concurred. Id. at 319. Yet, as Tuma’s counsel concedes, he never once asked for the opportunity to listen to the tape outside the jury’s presence. See Oral Argument Audio at 32:30 to 32:40.16
In his post-trial hearing on the Brady issue, Tuma’s counsel argued he was denied access to the tape before and after trial but conceded he had access to the tape during trial. App. at 523-24. Tuma’s counsel admitted the prosecutor “at the trial said I could have access to it and things of that nature.” Id. at 523 (emphasis added). Counsel similarly acknowledged the trial court “was clear at the trial that I would be able to get it and listen to it.” Id. at 537 (emphasis added). These concessions refute any suggestion that the trial court precluded Tuma’s counsel from listening to the tape at trial.17
*312These facts also belie the inapt characterization of this case as one which, if affirmed, would suggest the “prosecutor may hide” but the “defendant must seek.” Ante, at 301-02 n. 10, 726 S.E.2d at 379 n. 10. The majority lifts this language from Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 124 S.Ct. 1256, 157 L.Ed.2d 1166 (2004), which involved a prosecutor successfully hiding information from a defendant at trial. Here, unlike Banks, the prosecutor did not hide anything: Two of her witnesses openly disclosed the existence of the tape, and the prosecutor (as well as the trial judge) suggested Tuma’s counsel “listen to it if he wants to.” App. at 319. This was not a game of “hide” and “seek.” Ante, at 301-02 n. 10, 726 S.E.2d at 379 n. 10. The tape was found—in the courtroom, early in the trial, with plenty of time to put it to whatever use Tuma’s counsel may have desired.
In short, Tuma’s argument on appeal—that the “denial of the information contained on the tape amounted to a prejudice against the defendant,” Appellant’s Br. at 32—rests on one of two false assumptions. If Tuma means he was denied the tape before trial, he mistakenly assumes Brady required pretrial disclosure. It did not. The tape did not become exculpatory until the victim testified in a manner inconsistent with it. “Brady is not violated” when impeachment material “is available to defendants during trial” Read, 233 Va. at 565, 357 S.E.2d at 547 (emphasis added and citation omitted).
If Tuma means he was denied the tape at trial, he mistakenly assumes the court’s refusal to “play the tape” in the presence of the jury meant that he could not play it for himself. The trial judge could not have been clearer: Tuma’s counsel could listen to it, but the tape would not be admitted into evidence without the proper foundation—necessarily requiring that someone in the courtroom (usually the proponent of the evidence) listen to it first.
The majority excuses counsel’s failure to listen to the tape on the paradoxical ground that it will not excuse the prosecu*313tor for her failure to do the same. “While Tuma’s counsel could have asked for a recess to listen to the audio tape of L.S.’s interview once he became aware of it during the trial,” the majority reasons, “his failure to do so did not excuse or dispense with the prosecutor’s affirmative duty to discover any favorable evidence known to others acting on the Commonwealth’s behalf and to turn it over to Turna.” Ante, at 301, 726 S.E.2d at 379 (emphasis added). The majority cites no authority in support of this reasoning, because none exists.
Under settled principles, if Tuma’s counsel truly had access to the tape during trial for the purpose of impeachment, there was no Brady violation as a matter of law—no matter what the prosecutor did or did not do. See United States v. Smith Grading & Paving, Inc., 760 F.2d 527, 532 n. 6 (4th Cir.1985) (explaining that “the fact that disclosure came from a source other than the prosecutor is of no consequence”); see also supra, at 307 n. 12, 308 n. 13, 726 S.E.2d at 382 n. 12, n. 13 (citing Brady cases not excusing a defendant’s failure to ask for a recess, continuance, or an opportunity to recall a witness).18
In the end, the majority sidelines this debate as unimportant because “the futility of any request Turna might have made at trial for a recess to listen to the audio tape is obvious.” Id. at 303, 726 S.E.2d at 380. This ipse dixit implies a bold accusation.19 The majority apparently believes *314it “obvious” the trial judge would have arbitrarily denied a brief recess (if one had been requested) for Tuma’s counsel to listen to the tape—after twice suggesting that he do so. Nothing in the record suggests this censorious supposition is true, much less obvious. We will never truly know, of course, because Tuma’s counsel never asked for a brief recess to listen to the tape. I do not see how the trial judge can be blamed for that.
I respectfully dissent.

. Rule 3A:11 governs a defendant’s discovery rights in a criminal proceeding. "The Rule specifically does not authorize discovery of 'statements made by Commonwealth witnesses or prospective ... witnesses to agents of the Commonwealth ... in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case.' ” Juniper v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362, 394, 626 S.E.2d 383, 404 (2006) (quoting Rule 3A: 11(b)(2)).

. See also United States v. Mangual-Garcia, 505 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir.2007); United States v. Delgado, 350 F.3d 520, 527 (6th Cir.2003); United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 882 (8th Cir.1996); United States v. Catano, 65 F.3d 219, 227 (1st Cir.1995); United States v. Gordon, 844 *308F.2d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir.1988); United States v. Adams, 834 F.2d 632, 634-35 (7th Cir.1987); United States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289, 1340 (11th Cir.1982); State v. Aikins, 261 Kan. 346, 932 P.2d 408, 437 (1997); People v. Monroe, 17 A.D.3d 863, 864, 793 N.Y.S.2d 276 (N.Y.App.Div.2005).

. This point has been made in many different disclosure contexts. See, e.g., Davis v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 201, 204, 335 S.E.2d 375, 377 (1985) (finding no prejudice under Rule 3A:11 where defendant "did not request either a postponement or a continuance”); Knight v. Commonwealth, 18 Va.App. 207, 215, 443 S.E.2d 165, 170 (1994) (taking into account that the defendant "did not request a continuance in light of the late disclosure”). Accord United States v. Collins, 415 F.3d 304, 310-11 (4th Cir.2005); United States v. Gamez-Orduno, 235 F.3d 453, 461-62 (9th Cir.2000); United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1178 (1st Cir.1993); United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 47 (1st Cir.1989); United States v. Holloway, 740 F.2d 1373, 1381 (6th Cir.1984); Apolinar v. State, 106 S.W.3d 407, 421 (Tex.Crim.App.2003), aff'd on other grounds, 155 S.W.3d 184 (Tex.Crim.App.2005); Gutierrez v. State, 85 S.W.3d 446, 452 (Tex.Crim.App.2002); Rodriguez v. State, 962 P.2d 141, 145-46 (Wyo.1998); LaFave, supra, at 365.

. Accord Brooks v. Tennessee, 626 F.3d 878, 892-93 (6th Cir.2010) (noting "the Brady standard for materiality is less demanding than the ethical obligations imposed on a prosecutor”). See also ABA Comm, on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454 (2009) (rejecting the "incorrect assumption” that Rule 3.8(d) merely "codif[ied] the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Brady v. Maryland" and acknowledging that the "ethical duty” of the rule is "separate from disclosure obligations imposed under the Constitution, statutes, procedural rules, court rules, or court orders”).

. Tuma’s counsel apparently thought it appropriate to put the tape in the player, press the play button, and admit into evidence every word, from start to finish. Suffice it to say, the trial judge correctly understood impeachment simply does not work that way. "Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent oral statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is first afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the statement and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate him thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require.... Extrinsic evidence of a witness’s prior inconsistent statement is not admissible unless the witness denies or does not remember the prior inconsistent statement. Extrinsic evidence of collateral statements is *311not admissible.” Boyd-Graves Conference, A Guide to Evidence in Virginia § 613(a)(ii), at 75 (2012), soon to be Va. Rule of Evid. 2:613(a)(ii) (effective July 1, 2012); see also Charles E. Friend, The Law of Evidence in Virginia § 4-5(c)(l), at 147 (6th ed. 2003).

. The majority’s criticism of DSS’s reluctance to release the tape after trial contributes nothing to the analysis. The Brady violation either occurred or did not occur at trial. Just as a disclosure after trial cannot remedy a Brady violation at trial, a nondisclosure after trial cannot violate Brady if a proper disclosure was made at trial.

. These undisputed facts, coupled with Tuma’s concessions, undermine the majority’s effort to mischaracterize my dissent as a right-result-wrong-reason scenario requiring additional factfinding. See ante, at 301-02 n. 10, 726 S.E.2d at 379 n. 10. I also find no merit in the assertion that my reasoning is "inconsistent” with the trial court's factual findings. Id. The trial court concluded no Brady violation occurred because the tape was not exculpatory or prejudicial. I conclude no Brady violation occurred even if the tape were exculpatory and prejudicial because Tuma’s counsel had access to it during trial. The two views are entirely consistent—both conclude no Brady violation *312occurred (relying on different prongs of the Brady test) and neither logically nor legally negates the other.

. It is for this reason we can say "no Brady violation occurs 'if the evidence in question is available to the defendant from ... sources [other than the Commonwealth].' ” Gagelonia v. Commonwealth, 52 Va.App. 99, 113, 661 S.E.2d 502, 509-10 (2008) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378, 380 (4th Cir.1990)).

. I also question other rhetorical excesses in the majority opinion, such as the description of the “asymmetry” of the criminal justice system, the "fertile ground for many lawyer jokes,” the "apparent hopelessness” of advocacy of defense counsel, and prosecutors’ alleged frustration with the "unequal combat” required by due process. Ante, at 288, 726 S.E.2d at 372. I similarly wince at the declaration that criminal defense counsel have no "obligation to ascertain or present the truth,” but, rather, may use whatever stratagem available to "confuse a witness, even a truthful one, or make him appear at a disadvantage, unsure or indecisive” in pursuit of an acquittal. Id. (citation omitted). If the majority means only to say Brady requires prosecutors to divulge *314exculpatory evidence but does not similarly require defense counsel to divulge inculpatory evidence, simply saying so should suffice to make the point.