Court Opinion

ID: 9688488
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:51:33.42884+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:06:31.189668
License: Public Domain

CONCURRENCE
PAGE, Justice
(concurring).
Although I would affirm Pearson’s convictions, I write separately because the court misconstrues our holding in State v. Juarez, 572 N.W.2d 286 (Minn.1997), and erroneously concludes that allowing the jury to hear the portions of Pearson’s statements referencing a lawyer was error.
On April 23, 2006, Pearson was arrested for the shooting death of Corodarl Merri-man. The day after his arrest, Pearson voluntarily requested to speak with Officer Aguirre, the brother of his best friend. At the time, Pearson generally denied involvement in the shooting, though he ac*166knowledged that he may have handled the gun used in the shooting. Pearson told Officer Aguirre that “I’m just tryin’ to holler at you to see what was goin’ on.” In his testimony at trial, Pearson admitted that he lied to Officer Aguirre throughout their conversation and that he was trying to get information about the case against him from Officer Aguirre. The State sought to offer the videotape recording of this conversation as rebuttal to Pearson’s claim of self-defense. The trial court denied Pearson’s motion to exclude the videotape and admitted it to rebut “any implication that [Pearson] made concerning his intent at the time” of the statement. The trial court also noted that the videotape was relevant to Pearson’s credibility. After the parties agreed on three parts to redact from the video, it was played for the jury.
Pearson argues that the trial court erred by not sua sponte redacting certain other portions of the videotaped conversation with Officer Aguirre. Pearson did not object to the admission of these references. In fact, the record indicates that counsel for the State and for Pearson worked together to edit the videotape and to exclude materials that both parties agreed should not be included. Although the parties redacted three parts of the videotape, they did not redact any of the references about which Pearson now complains. Thus, not only was there no objection by Pearson to the videotape being shown to the jury, Pearson actually consented to the contents of the videotape as shown.
The error claimed by Pearson falls under the invited error doctrine, which prevents Pearson from asserting on appeal an error that he was complicit in during the trial. See State v. Everson, 749 N.W.2d 340, 348-49 (Minn.2008). “The invited error doctrine does not apply, however, if an error meets all four parts of the plain error test.” Id. at 349. To establish plain error, an appellant must show: (1) that there was error; (2) which was plain; and (3) which affected the appellant’s substantial rights. State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn.1998). If these three prongs are met, we then assess (4) whether we should address the error to ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings. Id. Because Pearson needs to prove all parts of the plain error test, we need not analyze each separate part individually. See Everson, 749 N.W.2d at 349; State v. Goelz, 743 N.W.2d 249, 258 (Minn.2007). Here, the admission of the unredacted portions of the videotape about which Pearson now complains does not satisfy the plain error test, and under the invited error doctrine, Pearson should be foreclosed from raising this issue on appeal. However, the court, relying on State v. Juarez, agrees with Pearson’s contention that “allowing the jury to hear [his] statement about his desire for an attorney violated well-settled law that the state cannot use a defendant’s exercise of his right to counsel against him.” 572 N.W.2d at 290-91.
The court’s reliance on Juarez is misplaced. In Juarez, the defendant was arrested and interrogated on suspicion of sexually assaulting children. Id. at 286. During the trial, a portion of Juarez’s taped interrogation that was played for the jury included the statement, “I’m gonna have to get a lawyer next.” Id. at 288, 290, 292. We held that the issue in Juarez was not whether the defendant invoked his right to counsel, but rather whether a reasonable jury hearing this statement would likely conclude that Juarez was requesting an attorney. Id. at 291.1 We went on to say that it was error for the *167jury to be informed of Juarez’s request for counsel because the jury could treat the request as a badge of guilt. Id. at 291. We based this holding on the United States Supreme Court’s ruling that a defendant’s choice to exercise his constitutional right to counsel may not be used against him at trial. Id. (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n. 37, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)). Similarly, in State v. Hall, we concluded that allowing the jury to hear the final portion of the defendant’s statement, which said, “So what’s the deal man? You gonna give me a lawyer or what?” was error because it left the jury likely to infer that the defendant was concealing his guilt. 764 N.W.2d 837, 841-42 (Minn.2009).
We have never, however, held that every fleeting reference made by a suspect to the words “lawyer,” “counsel,” or “attorney” during an interrogation constitutes a request for counsel. Nor have we ever held that it is error for a jury to hear such references. In State v. Hale, 453 N.W.2d 704, 708 (Minn.1990), we held that a suspect’s fleeting, off-hand comment about his future need for an attorney was “not even arguably an invocation of his [] right to counsel.” Thus, if a statement, viewed in the context in which it is made, does not arguably suggest that the defendant wants to terminate the interrogation until counsel is present, further questioning is allowed. State v. Risk, 598 N.W.2d 642, 649 (Minn.1999).
The facts in Pearson are substantially different from the facts in Juarez and Hall. In Juarez and Hall, the last statements the juries heard from the taped interrogations could arguably be perceived by the jury as an invocation of the defendant’s right to counsel. The cessation of interrogation after the defendant mentioned a lawyer could reasonably lead a jury to infer that the defendant was invoking his right to counsel and the purpose of the invocation was to end the interrogation and “conceal his guilt.” However, the facts of Pearson do not support such an inference. Here, Pearson voluntarily spoke to a friend who happened to also be a police officer and sought to gain information from the officer. No interrogation took place. During that conversation, Pearson made the following statements, “I need to figure out who ... my lawyer is. [She] was going to find a lawyer for me.... And I called her and told her what’s going on.” Pearson also asked Officer Aguirre if he could call “that girl. I’m just tellin’ her to hurry up, hurry up and send that attorney ... up here to see me.” Viewed in context, these fleeting references to the words “lawyer” and “attorney” do not even arguably constitute requests for counsel and are not likely to be viewed by any juror as requests for counsel or as an effort to conceal guilt. Further, the conversation with Officer Aguirre continued after the references to a lawyer. Because the references to a lawyer were in passing and did not end the interrogation, the references were not likely to be viewed as a badge of guilt. On the record presented, I would conclude that because Pearson’s statements, when taken in context, would not likely lead a jury to believe that Pearson was invoking his right to counsel or be seen as a badge of guilt, the trial court’s failure to sua sponte redact the references was not error, much less an error that was plain. On that basis, his claim fails.

. We favorably cited to the court of appeals’ conclusion that '‘[i]t is not the legal effect of *167Juarez’s ambiguous statement that is at issue, rather it is its prejudicial effect on the jury. From all the jury was allowed to hear, Juarez did invoke his right to counsel.” Juarez, 572 N.W.2d at 291 (internal citations omitted).