Court Opinion

ID: 9683021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:20:57.330792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:44.079697
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
In our original opinion we did not pass on the ’ question of whether the evidence shows as a matter • of law that Kizziah, the driver of the car in which plaintiff’s intestáté was riding at the-time of his in*631jury, was guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to intestate’s injury. A decision on that question was unnecessary in view of our holding to the effect that the evidence did not show, as a matter of law, that the negligence of Kizziah, if any, could be imputed to intestate.
In briefs filed here in support of application for rehearing, counsel for appellant, defendant below, earnestly insist that the evidence in this case without dispute shows that Kizziah was the agent of intestate and that, therefore, intestate was chargeable with the negligence of Kizziah, which it is insisted appears without dispute.
It is well established that where a relation of principal and agent or master and servant exists between the driver and an occupant of an automobile, the negligence of the agent or the servant is imputable to the principal or master and will prevent his recovery against a third person. Brown v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines,1 51 So.2d 524; 5 Am.Jur. 785, § 499; 65 C.J.S., Negligence, §§ 161-162, pages 804, 805.
But we do not think the evidence as it appears in this record shows that as a matter of law Kizziah was the agent of plaintiff’s intestate, Battles.
In the original opinion we summarized the facts as they tended to explain Battles’ presence in the car driven by Kizziah. In deference to counsel for appellant, we set out below the evidence as given in brief, which it is contended shows as a matter of law that the relationship of principal and agent existed between- Kizziah and intestate. We quote from appellant’s brief, omitting, of course, conclusions of counsel drawn from the evidence and rulings on obj ections:
“For convenience, the testimony in support of this contention is quoted from the record as follows: On direct examination the .witness Kizziah was asked the following questions and made the following replies.
“Q. Where were you going, Mr. Kizziah? A. Well, we was going- — he was going to get Jack Dailey to take him over to Jack Martins’ and Jack said if I would drive, he said he was sleepy and didn’t feel like driving, and we started over there.
“Q. Over to Mr. Martin’s? A. Yes, sir.
“On cross examination the witness Kizziah testified as follows:
“Q. What business were you going to Mr. Martin’s on? A. Mr. Battles was going to see Mr. Martin.
“Q. Now, Mr. Battles asked Mr. Dailey to let him go to Mr. Martin’s in his car, in Dailey’s car? A. That’s right.
“Q. And Dailey told him that he was sleepy? A. That’s right.
“Q. And that you could ride him over there ? A. That’s right.
' “Q. And you were driving Mr. Battles at Mr. Battles’ request in Mr. Dailey’s car to Mr. Martin’s at the time of the collision? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. That’s what happened? A. Yes, sir.”
The testimony of the owner of the car as set forth in appellant’s brief is as follows :
“Q. Did Mr. Battles make any arrangement with you as to the operation of the car? A. Yes>, sir, he asked me to take him up there.
“Q. Mr. Battles asked you to take him where? A. Take him up towards'Bucks-ville.
“Q. What did you tell him? A. I told him that I didn’t feel like driving.
“Q. What did Mr. Battles say ? A. He said he’d get Abram Kizziah to drive the car and he asked me if it would be all right and I told him it would.
“Q. And then Abram Kizziah proceeded to drive the car up the road and that’s when the collision happened? A. Yes, Sir.”
At the time of the accident, as shown in the original opinion, Kizziah was driving the car, Battles was on the front seat with Kizziah, and Dailey was on the back. Dailey was asleep at the time of the accident.
*632The rule is too well settled to require citation of authority that if Dailey, the owner of the car, had invited Battles to go on the trip, Dailey’s negligence could not be imputed to Battles. And the rule would be the same if Dailey had been driving the car, although Battles had asked him to take him on the trip. Robinson v. Leonard, 100 Vt. 1, 134 A. 706; Faltico v. Minneapolis Street Ry. Co., 198 Minn. 88, 268 N.W. 857. The fact that the trip was taken for the sole benefit of Battles would not change the rule. In this connection we quote from Mork et ux. v. Caslov, 327 Pa. 298, 192 A. 903, 904:
“On the other hand, the plaintiff argues that her status in the car was that of a guest passenger; that while the trip was undertaken for her benefit and at her request, she had no control of the car, nor did she assume to direct her sister in its operation; that the sister did not, as a matter of law, become her servant or agent merely because she extended to plaintiff the accommodation of a conveyance.
“It is well settled that the status of an occupant of an automobile does not depend upon the fact that the purpose to be served is for his benefit, or even that the trip is made at his instance or request. In other words, the relation of master and servant, or of principal and agent does not arise in cases of this character solely from the fact that the occupant of the car is transported at his request, or in connection with some matter affecting his own interest, * *
Although Dailey the owner of the car, was not driving at the time of the accident, it cannot be said that the driver of the car became the agent of Battles merely because the trip was taken for Battles’ benefit alone.
Kizziah in his direct testimony said that Dailey asked him to drive. On cross-examination he indicated the request came from Battles. Dailey’s testimony was to the same effect. In any event, Dailey gave his permission that Kizziah drive and he, the owner, was in the car at the time of the accident. We just cannot say, under such a state of facts, that as a matter of law Dailey had surrendered his right of control of the operation of the car to Battles or that Battles had any right to control Kizziah in the operation of the car on the theory that he was his agent. And unless Battles had the right to control Kizziah, then, of course, Kizziah’s negligence cannot be imputed to him. We think that under the evidence the jury could have found that Kizziah was the agent of Dailey, in which event the negligence of Kizziah would not be imputable to Battles. In McAndrews v. Leonard, 99 Vt. 512, 134 A. 710, 715, it was said: “The negligence of the driver was not imputable to the plaintiff. She had no control of the car nor of its management. The relation of master and servant, or of principal and agent, or of being engaged in the joint prosecution of a common purpose, did not exist between them. In driving the car on the occasion in question, the defendant was the agent of Attilio Franzoni, its owner, at whose request he was driving it, and he will be held to the same degree of care and responsibility to the plaintiff that his principal would have been had he personally been operating the car and the same accident happened in other respects under the same circumstances.”
We have carefully examined the cases cited by counsel for appellant hi brief. We do not think any of them are in point because the factual situations are in no wise analogous to that presented in this record.
Application for rehearing overruled.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and FOSTER and STAKELY, JJ., concur.

. Ante, p. 308.