Court Opinion

ID: 9613604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:18:23.753526+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:30.376789
License: Public Domain

Lovins, Judge,
dissenting:
I do not concur in the affírmanee of the decree of the trial court for the following reasons:
I think that the action of the court in this suit gives force and effect to an inequitable principle whereby the plaintiff loses valuable property rights.
■ The opinion of the courts in other jurisdictions are varied and divergent. Some courts hold that writings, similar to that here considered, grant a mere license to remove the timber from the land for a reasonable time. Other jurisdictions take the position that such rights constitute a lease oh the land for the purpose of the timber operations. Others hold that the deed is a conveyance of the timber, and vests in the grantee an absolute *79estate. Others, including this court, adopt the principle that writings similar to the one here considered grant a defeasible fee in the timber, and where no time is specified for removal of the timber, the grantee’s title is forfeited by an implied condition to remove it within a reasonable time. Williams v. McCarty, 82 W. Va. 158, 165, 95 S. E. 638. It is to be noted however, that Keystone Co. v. Brooks, 65 W. Va. 512, 64 S. E. 614, held that the instrument there considered, vested in the purchaser an absolute estate in the timber. In the Keystone case, no time limit for the removal of the timber and no forfeiture for failure to do so was provided.
Later cases however, leave no doubt as to the character of the estate granted by deeds or agreements selling timber with a provision that they must be removed within a certain time. See Null v. Elliott, 52 W. Va. 229, 43 S. E. 173; Adkins v. Huff, 58 W. Va. 645, 52 S. E. 773; Hill v. Vencill, 90 W. Va. 136, 111 S. E. 478; Carder v. Matthey, 127 W. Va. 1, 32 S. E. 2d 640; Lumber Co. v. Haught, 132 W. Va. 530, 52 S. E. 2d 695; Williams v. McCarty, supra.
The right granted by writings of this kind gives to the grantee and the assignees an irrevocable right to perform the actions provided by the agreement. Cunningham v. Heltzel, 87 W. Va. 391, 105 S. E. 155. It is not meant to say however, that the holding in the Cunningham case renders the time limit or any extension thereof ineffective. It follows that the Lumber Company in this case' had an irrevocable right to remove the timber on the defendant’s land within 5 years or within any annual extension, made under the provision of the agreement or deed.
■For the original sale of the timber, the assignor of the Lumber Company paid $3000.00 and no timber having been removed from the land, they made a timely payment of $75.00 for one annual extension. The timber was not removed within the original time of 5 years or within the annual time of one year extension.
*80The controlling point in this case is: Was the Lumber Company required to pay the $75.00 for the annual extension in advance or could such sum be paid within a reasonable time after the commencement of the second annual extension. The first extension of time within which to remove the timber commenced on the 14th day of July, 1949, and ended on the 13th day of July, 1950. The plaintiff did not make a tender of $75.00 for the second annual extension until on or about the 14th day of September, 1950, when a check in the sum of $75.00 for the second annual extension was forwarded to the Thompson Land Company. This check was returned to the Sun Lumber Company on or about September 18, 1950, for the stated reason that the rights of the Sun Lumber Company to remove the timber had terminated July 14, 1950. The Sun Lumber Company, thereafter, on December 4, 1950, made a second tender of a check of $75.00 which was refused by the defendant land' company for the same reason. It is alleged in the bill of complaint that the failure to pay this check on the 14th day of July, 1950, was the result of an inadvertence or oversight on the part of the plaintiff’s personnel having such payment in charge. Plaintiff further alleged that the delay of the removal of the timber from the land was for the reason that it was deemed unprofitable to cut, remove and market the timber, and that merchantable timber is now growing on the defendant’s tract of land of the approximate value of $5000.00.
' By its demurrer the defendant admits the truth of the facts well pleaded, and it is to be noted that this suit was decided by the trial court on the issues of law presented by a demurrer to an amended bill of complaint. Plaintiff having declined to further amend its bill, the suit was dismissed.
It is said in the court’s opinion that the action of the trial court and this court does not present a case of forfeiture for the reason that the plaintiff had nothing to forfeit. A recital of the foregoing indicates that the *81plaintiff lost property rights of value by the actions of the trial court and this court. Dealing with reality rather than technical distinctions, I think that it comes within the rule that equity will not stand by and see a person deprived of a valuable property right without intervening and protecting such rights. “It is not reasonable to suppose that so important a privilege as that of the right to remove the timber which had been fully paid for should depend upon so trifling a circumstance as the prompt payment of $5 per annum. There is nothing in the nature of the transaction to suggest that consequences so serious were intended to be imposed by such failure, or that a forfeiture of all rights was to follow.” Ciapusci v. Clark, 12 (Cal. App.) 44, 106 Pac. 436. Applying the foregoing quotation, I do not think that the failure for approximately two and one-half months to pay the small sum of $75.00 should cause such serious result to the plaintiff as has occurred in the instant case.
It is true that there are cases in other jurisdictions which hold that under varying contracts and factual situations, that the money or consideration to be paid for extensions of time in timber contracts, must be paid in advance and before the expiration of the original or extended times. See Hartley v. Neaves, (Va.) 84 S. E. 97; Hall v. W. M. Ritter Lumber Co. (Va.) 187 S. E. 503; Williams v. John L. Roper Lumber Co. (N. C.) 93 S. E. 741; A. C. Tuxbury Lumber Co. v. Byrd, (S. C.) 127 S. E. 267.
As to general rules applicable to extension of time, see Annotation 15 A.L.R., 85; 31 A.L.R., 949; 42 A.L.R., 645; 71 A.L.R., 151.
As to the specific question whether the money or consideration for an extension must be paid in advance, see Annotation 164, A.L.R., 446. .
On the contrary, there are some well considered cases which are contrary to the doctrine just discussed and which hold that payment within a reasonable time will *82meet the requirement. Bearing in mind that no time is specified in the agreement under which plaintiff claims, 1 think the following is pertinent and appropriate: “The right to remove the timber expired June 1, 1912; and, in the absence of a provision in the agreement for a specific time within which the option to extend should be exercised and the money paid, it is sufficient if it be exercised within a reasonable time after the right to remove expires.” Gotham, v. Wachsmuth Lumber Co. (Wisc.) 146 N. W. 505, 506. The following is also pertinent: “The parties did not make time of the essence of their contract, doubtless for the reason that the amount stipulated for a year’s extension was so small as to be considered unimportant. Under the terms of this lease, we are of opinion that payment within a reasonable time was all that was required.” Bond v. Brown, 5 (C.C.A.) 2 F. 2d 797, 799. See 17 R.C.L. 1090; Stacy v. Reams, (Ky.) 299 S. W. 193; Watson v. Stout Lumber Co., (Ark.) 298 S. W. 1010. In the Watson case, there was a definite provision requiring the payment of money in advance for the extension. The money was paid within five days after the expiration of the original three year period during which the timber could be removed. In that case it was held that such payment was substantial compliance.
Prior to the decision in this case, this court has not decided whether the money or consideration should be paid in advance or whether payment may be made within a reasonable time after the expiration of the original period or an extension thereof. Having in mind the circumstance of mistake or inadvertence occasioning the delay in this case, I think the delay should have been excused since the plaintiff offered to pay within a reasonable time,' thus substantially complying with its agreement.
I think that upon consideration of the record in this suit, we are confronted with a conflict of the principle laid down in Craig v. Hukill, 37 W. Va. 520, 16 S. E. 363; *83McCutcheon v. Oil & Gas Co., 102 W. Va. 345, 353, 135 S. E. 238. It is now held in this opinion, at least by implication, that the rights of the plaintiff were defeated upon the nonperformance by it of a condition subsequent. “A condition subsequent defeating the title upon nonperformance must be clearly expressed or arise by necessary implication from the language used in the deed.” Engel v. Oil Company, 106 W. Va. 339, 146 S. E. 385. Further, “The law favors the vesting of estates, and is . adverse to their destruction after they have been vested; and hence, the firmly established rule is that courts will always construe a stipulation in a deed so as to prevent either the nonvesting or defeasance of an estate conveyed thereby, if possible.” Sands v. Holbert, 93 W. Va. 574, 117 S. E. 896.
No time is specified in the agreement between defendant and Gillespie as to when the payment should be made for the annual extensions. It seems to me that this court has in effect added a requirement that such payments must be made in advance, though Gillespie and the defendant, in their original agreement, did not so provide. Courts should not, except in instances of extreme necessity, make or alter contracts betwen private persons concerning private property rights.
In this case, the effect of this court’s decision amounts to a privation of the plaintiff of valuable property rights for which $3075.00 has heretofore been paid and which are now valued at $5000.00. Upon the ground that the plaintiff, through mistake or inadvertence, failed for approximately two and one-half months to pay the small sum of $75.00, when by their agreement, the plaintiff and the defendant did not make time the essence of their agreement. The mere statement of this discloses the inequity and lack of justification for a decree having that effect.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the. decree of the trial court.
I am authorized to say that Judge Riley concurs in this dissent.