Court Opinion

ID: 9714321
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:35:15.31152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:25.191748
License: Public Domain

FORD ELLIOTT, J.,
concurring:
¶ 1 I agree with the majority that a remand for a more complete best interests analysis is required in this case. However, I am concerned that we are extending the Gruber analysis to apply to a joint custody arrangement. My concern centers on the idea that a fair reading of Gruber would indicate that the Gruber factors can only be effectively applied to a custodial parent seeking to relocate. In such a scenario, a court has already determined that the best interests of the children with respect to *214their physical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual well being are met by the custodial parent. The question of the children’s best interests addressed by Gruber is whether relocation with the custodial parent is in the children’s best interests. I recognize, as does the majority, that Gru-ber does not create a “new” or different best interests standard. The court's focus in determining best interests must always focus on the child’s overall well being. However, the issue to which this standard applies is very different in a relocation case versus a custody matter. An application of Gruber does not determine the custody issue; it determines only the relocation issue.
¶ 2 Joint custody arrangements are favored by courts because the overall best interests of the children are met through the cooperation and continuity provided by both parents. However, once a joint custodial parent seeks to relocate some distance away, the joint custodial arrangement can no longer exist.6 Therefore, as occurred in the instant case, the relocation petition raises the custodial issue — very often for the first time. The court below granted primary physical custody to Mother and allowed the relocation. The concern I have is that I believe the trial court erred in making the primary custody decision based on an application of the Gruber factors. By determining that Mother satisfied the Gruber criteria, and therefore awarding her primary custody on this basis, the trial court precluded Father from consideration as primary custodian.
¶ 3 The sine qua non of Gruber is the idea that, all things being equal, the status quo of the children with regard to the primary parent is more important than the status quo of the children with respect to where the children live geographically.7 The whole import and application of the Gruber factors is that the overall best interests of the children are already being served by the custodial parent. This is the only context in which the Gruber factors make any sense. The Gruber factors look to the reasons and motives of the custodial parent in seeking to relocate. There is a presumption that if the custodial parent can show that his or her life will improve substantially, there is a concomitant benefit to the children. As set out in Gruber:
In light of the foregoing, we conclude the mother more than met her burden of establishing that the proposed move would significantly and directly improve the quality of life - for herself and therefore her children. We stress that we consider the children’s well-being and best interests inextricably joined to the health and happiness of the custodial parent. We think it is indisputable, under the circumstances of this case, that appellant’s ability to be an effective parent to her children is seriously undermined by the difficulty and unhappiness of her life in Pennsylvania. Conversely, there is no question that the move to Illinois is likely substantially to promote the well-being of the mother and, consequently make her a more effective, superior parent. We think it is fundamental that the best interests of the children cannot, in this case, be severed from the interests of the mother with whom they five and upon whose mental well-being they primarily depend.
Gruber v. Gruber, 400 Pa.Super. 174, 583 A.2d 434, 440-41 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
¶ 4 What is missing in the instant case is a preliminary determination by the trial court that it is in the best interests of the children that primary physical custody *215should be with Mother. Rather, the court decides the custody issue by analyzing the Gruber factors. For a grant of primary custody, the court must assess which parent will best serve the physical, intellectual, spiritual, and moral well being of the children. When making this preliminary determination, the relocation issue should not be a relevant fact. This is so because of the tremendous burden on, and obstacle to, the relocating parent to show that a disruption in the status quo will not be detrimental to the children. Although not directly on point, this court has decided as much in Gancas v. Schultz, 453 Pa.Super. 324, 683 A.2d 1207 (1996), where we reversed the trial court on its application of the Gruber factors when it concluded that primary custody should be with father because mother was upsetting the child’s status quo by her relocation.
¶ 5 A fundamental reality for the children of divorce is change. Therefore they can never be guaranteed a status quo.
‘[I]t is obvious that for the child the fact of the divorce becomes the predicate of his subsequent relationship with both parents and that relationship can never be the same as it would have been had the marriage remained intact. Adjustments and accommodations must be made as a result of the divorce, the whole point of which was to permit each parent to go his or her own way. Within reason, both parties must be permitted to do so, and the child’s best interests must be served within that context.’
Gruber, 583 A.2d at 437-438, quoting Helentjaris v. Sudano, 194 N.J.Super. 220, 230, 476 A.2d 828, 833 (1984), cert. denied, 99 N.J. 200, 491 A.2d 699 (1984), disapproved on other grounds, Holder v. Polanski, 111 N.J. 344, 544 A.2d 852 (1988).
¶ 6 I recognize that Mother was granted primary custody and the right to relocate. However, the trial court arrived at this conclusion by examining the benefits to Mother occasioned by the move. Nowhere can I find an evaluation of the physical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual well being of the children being served by primary custody with Mother versus Father. Although the majority’s remand would require the trial court to make new findings with regard to the best interests of the children, I would go further and require the trial court to hold a full hearing directed to whether primary custody should be with Father or Mother.
¶ 7 As in any custody determination, the relationship of the children to each parent should be explored. The court should order any additional evaluations or studies it deems necessary. Evidence as to the type of home the children have or may have in the Lehigh Valley and in Alabama, the schools, the community, and family ties as set forth in the majority’s opinion may all be relevant considerations. However, the Gruber factors which address Mother’s motives and reasons for relocating and Father’s issues regarding limited visitation caused by the relocation would not be proper subjects for this initial custody determination. If the court determines that primary physical custody should be granted to Mother, then the Gruber factors should be applied to assess the effect of the relocation on Mother, the children, and Father. However, if, following a full custody hearing, primary physical custody is awarded to Father, then no Gruber analysis would be required.
¶ 8 In conclusion, I fully recognize and appreciate that asking the trial court to divorce the relocation issue from the preliminary custodial question may be difficult in application for very practical reasons. This is especially trae when the choice is otherwise between two loving and caring parents. However, I also recognize that judges make such “Solomon-like” decisions every day and sometimes with nothing more than their instincts to go on. Although formulistie approaches such as Gruber at least give a court a framework to use when rendering difficult decisions, tests such as Gruber only work within the context to which they apply. For Gruber, I believe that context requires an initial *216determination as to which parent is to be the primary physical custodian of the child, before the court can delve into the issue of the effect of that parent’s relocation on the child.
¶ 9 JOHNSON, J., joins Concurring Opinion by FORD ELLIOTT, J.

. Even in non-relocation cases, joint custody arrangements may cease because of other concerns regarding the child. See Beers v. Beers, 342 Pa.Super. 465, 493 A.2d 116 (1985) (court is required to determine primary custody where joint custody arrangement is no longer feasible because of child reaching school age).

. See generally A.H. v. D.H., 146 P.L.J. 234 (1997), affirmed sub nom. Hoesch v. Hoesch, 731 A.2d 201 (Pa.Super.1998).