Court Opinion

ID: 9634928
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:29:18.363152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:45:04.502125
License: Public Domain

Murphy, C. J,

dissenting:

The Court today holds that a confession to crime, voluntarily made by an accused person afforded the full panoply of Miranda warnings, is nevertheless inadmissible in evidence if it was made during a period of “unnecessary delay” in bringing the accused before a judicial officer in violation of former M.D.R. 709 a, now M.D.R. 723 a. In so concluding, the Court has not only adopted a position concededly at variance with the overwhelming weight of authority in the country, but has overruled, sub silentio, long-established and well-considered Maryland law to the contrary. The action taken by the Court will result in the exclusion of highly probative and reliable evidence and will most assuredly have a devastating impact on the administration of criminal justice in Maryland. Were the result reached by the Court mandated by the federal or state constitutions, or otherwise required by the prevailing law, I would, of course, unhesitatingly join in the Court’s opinion. Since it plainly is not, I most respectfully dissent.
M.D.R. 709 a requires that an arrested person shall be brought before a judicial officer “without unnecessary delay” but in any event not later than the earlier of the first session of court after arrest or 24 hours. When the earlier of either of these outer limits is exceeded, the rule adopted by the Court would automatically exclude from evidence a confession made at any time thereafter, irrespective of the reason for the delay. The Court’s per se exclusionary rule applies as well without regard to these prescribed maximum limits, since it operates to exclude any statement made during any period of delay in prompt presentment following arrest if the delay, irrespective of its length or the reason for it, was “unnecessary.”
As the majority readily acknowledges, the per se exclusionary rule is not constitutionally mandated but derives *343from an exercise by the Supreme Court of the United States of its supervisory authority over the lower federal courts. McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 63 S. Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819, decided in 1943; Upshaw v. United States, 335 U. S. 410, 69 S. Ct. 170, 93 L.Ed. 100, decided in 1948; and Mallory v. United States, 354 U. S. 449, 77 S. Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479, decided in 1957, collectively make clear that it was the Supreme Court’s view that the right of an accused person to prompt presentment before a judicial officer following arrest would be most effectively protected by a rule which automatically excluded from evidence confessions obtained during a period of “unnecessary delay” in presenting the accused for arraignment. Defining just what delay in presenting an arrested person before a judicial officer was “unnecessary” predictably caused great problems to courts required to grapple with such a vague and elusive concept. Because the rule was neither sensible nor clear, because it . was unrealistic in application, unworkable in practice, and led to widely varying results, almost all states, including Maryland, rejected it. Indeed, language in Mallory itself has fostered confusion as to what constitutes “unnecessary delay,” particularly delay for the purpose of additional police investigation. Mallory states at one point that arraignment should take place “as quickly as possible”; yet the Court also said:
“The duty enjoined upon arresting officers to arraign ‘without unnecessary delay’ indicates that the command does not call for mechanical or automatic obedience. Circumstances may justify a brief delay between arrest and arraignment, as for instance, where the story volunteered by the accused is susceptible of quick verification through third parties. But the delay must not be of a nature to give opportunity for the extraction of a confession.” 354 U. S. at 455.
In apparent recognition of the uncertainty which followed in the wake of its adoption of the McNabb-Mallory rule, the *344Supreme Court observed in Culombe v. Connecticut; 367 U. S. 568, 81 S. Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961):
“The McNabb Case was an innovation which derived from our concern and responsibility for fair modes of criminal proceeding in the federal courts. The States, in the large, have not adopted a similar exclusionary principle. And although we adhere unreservedly to McNabb for federal criminal cases, we have not extended its rule to state prosecutions as a requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 367 U. S. at 600-01 (footnotes omitted).
. The “unnecessary delay” formulation of McNabb-Mallory provides no guidelines with respect to the limits of permissible custodial interrogation prior to presentment, as the experience of the federal courts so graphically demonstrates. For example, an intérrogation of eight hours following arrest was held not to constitute unnecessary delay in United States v. Vita, 294 F. 2d 524 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U. S. 823 (1962), the court stating:
“We cannot agree with the appellant that federal law enforcement officers are so rigidly confined by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a) that they must, immediately upon ‘arrest,’ cease all interrogation and formally charge the accused before a committing magistrate. Such an inflexible edict would paralyze the investigative process and eviscerate effective law enforcement.” 294 F. 2d at 532..
See also United States v. Ladson, 294 F. 2d 535 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U. S. 824 (1962) (delay in arraignment of one hour for interrogation not unnecessary); Metoyer v. United States, 250 F. 2d 30 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (two-hour delay permissible). Some courts, however, have taken the opposing view that a delay of even a few minutes for the purpose of interrogation renders a statement inadmissible. Thus, in Alston v. United States, 348 F. 2d 72, 73 (D.C. Cir. 1965), the court held that a delay of five minutes for the purpose of *345interrogation was violative of the prompt presentment rule, and that the statement obtained was inadmissible, since “the arresting officers failed to take appellant before a committing magistrate ‘as quickly as possible.’ ” Accord, Greenwell v. United States, 336 F. 2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U. S. 923 (1965). One federal district judge surveyed cases within the District of Columbia circuit and found them to be in irreconcilable conflict. See United States v. Fuller, 243 F. Supp. 178 (D.D.C. 1965), aff'd 407 F. 2d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1967), aff'd on rehearing (1968), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 1120 (1969). See also 3 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 862(a), at 612-15 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
Congressional dissatisfaction with the McNabb-Mallory exclusionary rule eventually culminated in the passage of Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 3501; that statute provides in subsection (c) that a confession is not inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing the person before a commissioner if the trial judge finds that the confession was voluntarily made, if the weight to be given to it is left to the jury, and if the confession was made within six hours following arrest. While it is possible to construe this legislation as restricting the McNabb-Mallory rule to delays in excess of six hours, see United States v. Erving, 388 F. Supp. 1011 (W.D. Wis. 1975); Annot., 12 A.L.R. Fed. 377 (1972); 3 J. Wigmore, supra, § 862(a), at 619-623, the federal courts have generally construed the statute in a more liberal manner, rejecting McNabb-Mallory completely, and holding that a delay in arraignment greater than six hours “merely constitutes another factor to be considered by the trial judge in determining voluntariness.” United States v. Hathorn, 451 F. 2d 1337, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971). Accord, United States v. Gaines, 555 F. 2d 618 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. Shoemaker, 542 F. 2d 561 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1004 (1976); United States v. Edwards, 539 F. 2d 689 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 984 (1976); United States v. Bear Killer, 534 F. 2d 1253 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 846 (1976); Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F. 2d 914 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U. S. 909 (1975); United States v. Halbert, 436 F. *3462d 1226 (9th Cir. 1970). Thus, the McNabb-Mallory doctrine has been effectively vitiated in the federal courts and replaced with a voluntariness test in which delay in arraignment is considered as only one factor in determining admissibility. See Note, Admissibility of Confessions Obtained Between Arrest and Arraignment: Federal and Pennsylvania Approaches, 79 Dickinson L. R. 309 (1975).
Similarly, as the majority here recognizes, the overwhelming majority of states have refused to adopt a per se exclusionary rule for violations of prompt arraignment statutes. See, e.g., Rogers v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 46 Cal. 2d 3, 291 P. 2d 929 (1955), where a defendant confessed four days after his arrest, and was not arraigned until the eighth day, in violation of a California statute which required presentment without unnecessary delay and in any event within two days after arrest. The court rejected the contention that the confession was inadmissible due to violation of the statute, stating that the test of admissibility is whether, coilsidering all the circumstances, the statement was freely and voluntarily made. See generally cases cited in Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 1331 (1951); 3 J. Wigmore, supra, § 862(a). Even in those few states which have adopted the McNabb-Mallory doctrine, the wisdom of the rule is sometimes questioned because it considers only the amount of time between arrest and confession without giving any consideration to whether the confession was voluntary, leading to the exclusion of statements freely given and constitutionally valid. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tingle, 451 Pa. 241, 301 A. 2d 701 (1973) (Eagen, J. concurring).
In Taylor v. State, 238 Md. 424, 209 A. 2d 595 (1965), our predecessors rejected the contention that statements were rendered inadmissible because the defendant had not been promptly taken before a judge of the municipal court, as then required by statute. We there pointed out that no time limit for arraignment was fixed in the statute, unlike the rule under consideration here, but that in any event “no mention is made to the effect that a failure to take such a person before one of the judges by a specified time shall render a voluntary confession inadmissible.” 238 Md. at 432. We stated *347that “the critical test of ... admissibility depended upon whether the totality of the circumstances surrounding [the] making [of the confession] disclosed that the statements were freely and voluntarily made.” Id. at 432.
The test of voluntariness enunciated in Taylor would allow the trial court to consider, in ruling on the admissibility of a confession, all the circumstances surrounding the confession, including the fact that the defendant has been illegally detained in violation of M.D.R. 709 a. Thus, the voluntariness test places emphasis not so much on the time of delay as on what occurred during the delay. Unnecessary delay is, of course, a factor in determining voluntariness, but it is not, and should not, be dispositive. Indeed, Maryland decisions have long recognized that the test of a confession’s admissibility is whether it was voluntarily given. See, e.g., Gill v. State, 265 Md. 350, 289 A. 2d 575 (1972); Price v. State, 261 Md. 573, 277 A. 2d 256 (1971); Streams v. State, 238 Md. 278, 208 A. 2d 614 (1965); Bean v. State, 234 Md. 432, 199 A. 2d 773 (1964).
It is particularly unfortunate that the Court has chosen the instant case to overrule our prior precedents and adopt the now thoroughly eroded rationale of McNabb-Mallory. In view of the circumstances disclosed by the record, it is doubtful that the delay in bringing Johnson before a judicial officer actually violated the provisions of M.D.R. 709 a. Johnson surrendered to the police at 3:15 P.M. on January 30, 1975. Had the District Court then been in session, it would have been incumbent upon the police in complying with M.D.R. 709 a to bring Johnson before a judicial officer for his initial appearance not later than the end of that court session. The record does not disclose, however, whether the court was in session at the time of Johnson’s arrest on January 30, 1975, or at any time thereafter on that day. Nor does it disclose that the delay in presenting Johnson before a District Court Commissioner was “unnecessary” within the contemplation of the rule. Johnson became ill with stomach pains almost immediately after his arrest and at his request, after refusing a police offer of hospitalization, he was permitted to remain in the station house lockup overnight. The testimony indicated *348that had he been taken before a Commissioner while he was ill, the regulations precluded his referral to a county detention center. It cannot be said, therefore, that this period of delay was unnecessary; certainly it was not contrived by the police as a ruse to deliberately postpone Johnson’s initial appearance before a judicial officer in order to subject him to interrogation and coerce a confession.
The record is similarly deficient in. disclosing the time at which the first session of the District Court began or ended on the following day. It is perfectly clear, however, that at 9:45 A.M. on January 31, 1975, Johnson was once again afforded Miranda warnings and indicated a willingness to undergo police questioning. As of that time, neither of the outer prescribed time limits of M.D.R. 709 a had elapsed and, in view of the circumstances, the delay in bringing Johnson before a Commissioner was not “unnecessary.” The record fairly discloses that beginning shortly after 9:45 A.M. on January 31, Johnson’s agreement to submit to police interrogation culminated in a voluntary oral statement by which he incriminated himself in the Acme Market robbery.
While it is true that the confession was not ultimately reduced to writing and signed until 3:45 P.M. on January 31 — 30 minutes after the 24-hour period had expired — the substance of the confession was orally given well prior to that time. Detective Wallace, one of the two interrogating officers who had questioned Johnson, testified that during the five-hour interrogation conducted on January 31, Johnson gave a 10-page statement concerning the Acme robbery and, in addition, drew a diagram of the crime scene. In his testimony, Wallace explained how a statement is obtained: “Well we usually ask them after we get finished talking to them to try to put it in their own words and we try to do this line by line so that nothing is put into this statement in our own words but of the person who is being interrogated to try to put it into their own words. The time it was started was 9:45 A.M. and we have a ten page statement and it ended at 3:45 P.M.”
The other interrogating officer, Detective Brown, said that *349Johnson proceeded to make a statement after waiving his Miranda rights. He said that Johnson just “started talking” and that he “started writing.” It is implicit in his testimony that Johnson began incriminating himself shortly after 9:45 A.M. and continued until the confession was ultimately completed and signed at 3:45 P.M. Brown further testified that during the course of his statement, Johnson admitted that he robbed the Acme with two other people. Johnson agreed to view a photographic lineup for the purpose of identifying his accomplices. The detectives filled out a photographic lineup form noting that Johnson viewed six photographs from which he positively identified the two other individuals. This form, introduced in evidence at the trial, was signed by Johnson; below his signature in a space marked “time” is written “2/56 PM.” It is thus clear that at the very latest Johnson had incriminated himself in the Acme robbery by 2:56 P.M. on January 31, 19 minutes before the 24-hour period had run.
In view of these facts, the exception to the McNabb-Mallory rule created by United States v. Mitchell, 322 U. S. 65, 64 S. Ct. 896, 88 L. Ed. 1140 (1944), appears to be applicable. That case involved an oral confession voluntarily given by an accused shortly after his arrest. The Court there found that even though the accused was not brought before a committing magistrate for arraignment until some eight days after he had confessed, and that such failure constituted illegal detention, that the delay in presentment nevertheless did not require exclusion of the confession. The Court said that the confession was not induced by the illegal detention, nor was it obtained as a result of a violation of the accused’s legal rights; consequently, it said, the admission of the confession did not constitute use by the government of the fruits of wrongdoing by its own officers. As in Mitchell, there was no demonstrated violation of M.D.R. 709 a prior to the commencement of Johnson’s confession on the morning of January 31. That he did not sign the confession until much later in the day, some 30 minutes after the 24-hour period had expired, and because he was not actually brought before *350a Commissioner until 4 P.M. that day, does not mandate the exclusion of the confession under the McNabb-Mallory rule, since its admission did not constitute use by the prosecution of the fruits of any wrongdoing on the part of the police. See Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F. 2d 914 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U. S. 909 (1975); Com. v. Jones, Pa., 374 A. 2d 970 (1977).
It seems foolhardy in the extreme to so interpret the requirements of M.D.R. 709 a, as the majority has done, to mandate the automatic exclusion from evidence of a voluntary confession given under the circumstances present in this case. The benefits of the doctrine that the Court today adopts will accrue only to those who have made incriminating statements following arrest but prior to presentment before a judicial officer. No sanctions are provided to secure rights afforded to an accused person under M.D.R. 709 a who does not confess prior to prompt presentment, unless, of course, the ultimate exclusionary rule is to be applied in such instances, namely, outright and final release from all prosecution of an individual subjected to “unnecessary delay” in arraignment under M.D.R. 709 a — by no means an illogical extension of the Court’s holding if the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future police misconduct.
As a result of the majority’s decision, the prosecution will be required affirmatively to establish, where challenged, that the confession was not made during a period of “unnecessary delay” in violation of M.D.R. 709 a, now M.D.R. 723 a. This burden upon the prosecution will be in addition to demonstrating, where the confession’s admissibility is challenged, traditional voluntariness and compliance with all Miranda requirements. That the Court’s holding will be afforded a retroactive effect, at least to 1971 when M.D.R. 709 a was first enacted, is more than likely, thus spawning a plethora of post conviction applications to overturn convictions long since final.
I would, therefore, affirm the judgments of conviction in this case. I fully concur in the dissenting views of my Brother *351Orth and agree that while the provisions of M.D.R. 709 a prescribe a mandatory rule for police conduct, a violation of the rule does not, absent express provision for the sanction in the rule itself, require exclusion of an otherwise voluntary confession.
Judges Smith and Orth authorize me to state that they join in the views expressed herein.