Court Opinion

ID: 9644117
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:48:15.954535+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:08.880068
License: Public Domain

BROOKSHIRE, Justice,
dissenting.
This appeal is from a conviction for the felony offense of driving while intoxicated. Simon Sorensen, the appellant, was charged with the offense of DWI. The occurrence occurred on July 16, 1990. On April 27, 1991, the appellant pleaded not guilty before a jury. The jury found the appellant guilty. Appellant pleaded true to the enhancement allegations. Appellant was sentenced on May 3, 1991; the trial court assessed punishment at two and a half years imprisonment and a fine of $1650. This appeal now ensues.

Partial Factual Narrative

Officer Hinton stated at trial that he saw nothing usual about the accused when the appellant stopped his car. The appellant exited the vehicle and met Officer Hinton halfway between the patrol unit and the suspect’s vehicle. The appellant was asked to perform various tests.
On cross-examination of Officer Hinton, he revealed that he did not observe any moving violation. Also, Officer Hinton testified that the HGN test was inaccurate by about 23 percent of the time. The officer admitted that smokers and others may have blood-shot eyes and still not be intoxicated. The officer admitted furthermore that the intoxilyzer machine was not working properly because it had already recorded “invalid” prior to the appellant being tested. The officer admitted that the appellant had a very heavy Danish accent and his speech was slightly slurred. Some of the evidence crucial to the State’s case was not of strong probative value — some being equivocal.
The appellant testified that the officer gave a HGN test to the two passengers but not to him. The appellant further testified that he did not have anything to drink in the car and did not notice either passenger with anything to drink inside the car. The appellant said that he had told the officer that he had a major defect to his left foot. His left heel was half cut off. He had arthritis in both knees and a portion of his calf was missing. The appellant told the officer that as he walked his legs jerked a lot and people had commented that he walked like a duck. These deformities of the appellant were clearly demonstrable and probative (if permitted in evidence) as to the foot, leg, calf and heel. The appellant offered to exhibit these physical defects to the jury; however, the State objected at the time and the objection was sustained by the court.
Appellant’s first point of error states that the trial court wrongfully excluded evidence beneficial to the appellant’s con*796tentions. Intoxication can be proved in two ways; first, intoxication can be shown by demonstrating that the person cannot control the normal use of his mental and physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol to his body; secondly, intoxication can be shown by the fact that the person has a blood alcohol concentration of a .1 or more in his body. See Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat.Ann. art. 6701Z-l(a)(2). The prosecution’s evidence on each basis — while sufficient — is equivocal. The nature and quality of the State’s case justifies and necessitates the admission of the excluded evidence.
In determining reversibility the Court of Criminal Appeals set up a two-prong test in the opinion of Bird v. State, 692 S.W.2d 65 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). In Bird the court held that in order to reverse a trial court judgment, an appellate court must first determine whether or not the offered evidence was relevant and, second, whether the exclusion of such evidence was harmful to the accused. Appellant has met both tests. Common sense and justice require a remand.
Relevancy is determined when the evidence has a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequent to the determination of the ease more probable or less probable than it would without such evidence. See Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 401. Consequently, any item of evidence that alters the probability of a consequential fact is relevant. In other words, for an item of evidence to alter the probabilities of the existence of the consequential fact and thus be relevant, it must logically increase one’s knowledge and enhance the likelihood of ascertaining the truth about the fact. See Brown v. State, 757 S.W.2d 739 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). The actual physical condition of appellant’s leg, calf, foot and heel was clearly relevant. The issue before this Court is whether the trial court wrongfully excluded relevant evidence beneficial to the appellant’s contention. This physical condition was beneficial to the appellant’s contention and to the core of his defense.
The State heavily relies upon the testimony of Officer Gary Hinton, who was the person who actually arrested the appellant. Officer Hinton’s testimony induces the excluded evidence.
Since the State had placed the appellant’s lack of control of his movements in issue, it was only fair and equitable that evidence of the scars, injuries and incapacities to his left foot and leg should have been allowed before the jury. This evidence was material, relevant to the determination of crucial facts, being beneficial to appellant’s defense.
Visual, real, demonstrative evidence is admissible at trial of a criminal case if it tends to resolve some issue in the case and is relevant. It has high probative value. See Simmon v. State, 622 S.W.2d 111 (Tex.Crim.App.1981). Furthermore, the inflammatory nature or sympathetic nature of a particular exhibit or fact will not bar its admissibility, if it is relevant to the issue at trial. The issue need not be contested; the issue only needs to be material. See Martin v. State, 475 S.W.2d 265 (Tex.Crim.App.1972).
I think this demonstrative, real evidence was material and relevant. It was clearly beneficial to appellant’s contentions. Besides, the officer had revealed through his own testimony that the appellant had told him that appellant had some physical scars and defects and disabilities that limited his ability to walk and stand, thus the appellant had a right to display these facts. The jury had a right to see the appellant’s left leg and foot.
Appellant’s physical condition tended to be a direct and forceful contradiction to the State’s case. Importantly, the record reflects that at the time in question a test of the intoxilyzer was run which test did not calibrate. It showed “Invalid”. Also, there was another test attempted involving the machine which was not completed.
An expert on these machines was asked generally if there were several reasons other than just that the subject was not blowing long enough into the machine that would cause an invalidation, some of which reasons would be printed out and some would not. The expert’s answer was, in substance, that there were several reasons why a test may be invalidated. The expert *797reasoned: “[B]ut, then, it would have a different reading on it. It wouldn’t say, ‘Invalid test,’ as this one did.”
The appellant’s testimony concerning the intoxilyzer test was important. The appellant testified that during an early test the machine gave a read-out and that it showed .08-something. Then the appellant was told to stop. Then, according to the appellant, the administrator of the test said: “Hell, I don’t know what happened. We’ve got to do it all over again.” When the appellant blew again, “invalidated” appeared on the screen. As I view the record, the nature and quality of the evidence concerning the intoxilyzer is questionable. This state of the record makes the appellant’s excluded real and demonstrative evidence more cogent and probative; the admissibility thereof is compelled. I cannot hold, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the exclusion, in view of the totality of the record, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
By the trial court failing to admit all the relevant evidence in order for the jury to have before it all the facts, the trial court has limited the jury in reaching an informed, intelligent verdict. I find this exclusion of evidence to be harmful. Therefore, I would sustain the appellant’s first point of error.
Indeed, the Court finds that it was error to exclude the proffered evidence. Since the Court declines to reverse the judgment and remand the cause, I must respectfully dissent. Furthermore, the Court cannot correctly, judiciously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the excluded evidence made no contribution to the conviction. The Court does not have before it the excluded evidence. The Court cannot know the probative evaluation of evidence that is not in the record. In sum, the Court cannot know what the Court does not know. The Court cannot fully comprehend, understand, and correctly evaluate the absent, excluded evidence. Basically the citizen has not been allowed to present his defense.