Court Opinion

ID: 9379643
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-15 21:03:07.204957+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:01.408863
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
            in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                        2023 IL App (3d) 220932-U

                                  Order filed March 15, 2023
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                   IN THE

                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                             THIRD DISTRICT

                                                    2023

      In re E.R.,                            )     Appeal from the Circuit Court
                                             )     of the 9th Judicial Circuit,
             a Minor                         )     Knox County, Illinois,
                                             )
      (The People of the State of Illinois,  )
                                             )
             Petitioner-Appellee,            )     Appeal No. 4-22-0932
                                             )     Circuit No. 20-JA-55
             v.                              )
                                             )
      Jodi M.,                               )     Honorable
                                             )     Curtis S. Lane,
             Respondent-Appellant).          )     Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE DAVENPORT delivered the judgment of the court.
            Justices McDade and Hettel concurred in the judgment.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                 ORDER

¶1          Held: We affirm, concluding the trial court’s unfitness and best-interests findings were
                  not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶2          Respondent, Jodi M., appeals from the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights as

     to her minor child, E.R., under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS
     405/1-1 et seq. (West 2020)).1 She contends the court’s findings that she was unfit and that

     terminating her parental rights was in E.R.’s best interests were against the manifest weight of the

     evidence. We disagree and affirm.

¶3                                                        I. BACKGROUND

¶4                                         A. Adjudicatory and Dispositional Phase

¶5            On October 7, 2020, respondent gave birth to E.R., her third child and second with Jay R. 2

     When respondent and E.R. were discharged from the hospital on October 10, 2020, the Department

     of Children and Family Services (DCFS) took protective custody of E.R. and placed her with her

     paternal aunt and uncle, who were already caring for E.R.’s siblings.

¶6            On October 13, 2020, the State petitioned for an adjudication of neglect as to E.R. In its

     petition, the State alleged E.R. was neglected based on an injurious environment (705 ILCS 405/2-

     3(1)(b) (West 2020)). Specifically, the State alleged (1) respondent had been found unfit in

     proceedings concerning her other minor children (Knox County case Nos. 19-JA-16 and 19-JA-

     17) and had not yet restored her fitness; (2) respondent had three indicated findings of neglect

     based on domestic-violence and substance-abuse issues; (3) domestic violence between

     respondent and Jay R. had increased since the birth of E.R.’s sibling in October 2018; (4) one of

     E.R.’s siblings had been struck at least once in a domestic-violence incident involving respondent

     and Jay R.; (5) respondent had obtained an order of protection against Jay R. but then allowed him

     to violate the order; and (6) respondent had tested positive for methamphetamine on three

              1
                  Respondent initiated her appeal in the Fourth District. On February 6, 2023, the supreme court, in the

     exercise of its administrative and supervisory authority, transferred the matter for decision to this district. Ill. S. Ct.,

     M.R. 31650 (Feb. 6, 2023).
              2
                  Jay R. is not a party to this appeal.

                                                                  2
       occasions and failed to appear for drug tests on at least 23 occasions since September 2019. After

       a hearing, on January 5, 2021, the trial court found E.R. was neglected as alleged in the State’s

       petition.

¶7             On February 2, 2021, the trial court entered a dispositional order, finding (1) respondent

       was unfit, for reasons other than financial circumstances alone, to care for, protect, train, educate

       supervise, or discipline E.R.; and (2) it was in E.R.’s best interests that she be placed in DCFS

       custody. The court determined the appropriate permanency goal was a return home within 12

       months and ordered respondent to (1) cooperate with all tasks designated in DCFS’s client service

       plan, (2) obtain and maintain a legal and verifiable source of income, (3) follow all

       recommendations for domestic-violence victim services, (4) complete a mental-health assessment

       and follow all recommendations, (5) maintain housing that meets minimal parenting standards,

       (6) complete a substance-abuse assessment and follow all recommendations, and (7) comply with

       all requested random drug screens.

¶8                                          B. Permanency Reviews

¶9                                             1. August 17, 2021

¶ 10           On August 17, 2021, the trial court conducted a permanency review. During the hearing,

       the court admitted several documents, including reports from the Center for Youth and Family

       Solutions (CYFS) and the Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA), and heard testimony from

       Erica Baumgardner, a CYFS caseworker. The evidence established respondent had signed all

       necessary consents and regularly attended her weekly parent-child visits at the CYFS office in

       Galesburg. But, at the time of the hearing, she had failed to maintain contact with CYFS, allow

       CYFS access to her home, maintain a substance-free lifestyle, and failed to complete most of her

       recommended services.

                                                        3
¶ 11          Respondent successfully completed “domestic violence survivor’s sessions” at Safe

       Harbor in March 2020. (She began those classes after the State commenced the proceedings

       involving E.R.’s older siblings.) However, while she was completing those services, she became

       pregnant with Jay R.’s child, E.R. Respondent remained in contact with her provider for support

       after she completed the sessions. But she refused Safe Harbor’s recommendation to obtain an order

       of protection against Jay R., citing fear of violent retaliation. According to Baumgardner,

       respondent had failed to demonstrate progress as a result of those services, because she refused to

       obtain an order of protection against Jay R. and had another child with him.

¶ 12          Respondent was involuntarily discharged from substance abuse treatment in January 2021,

       due to her failure to attend. Respondent tested positive for methamphetamines on February 23,

       2021, and March 16, 2021, and she failed to attend any of her random drug screens since that time.

       Respondent reported to CYFS that, in August 2021, she had completed a new substance-abuse

       assessment through the county health department, and the health department recommended she

       receive “extensive outpatient treatment.”

¶ 13          Respondent was engaged in individual counseling at CYFS. Her therapist, had expressed

       concerns that she was “regressing substantially in her sessions and had attendance issues.” The

       therapist reported respondent had trouble accepting responsibilities for her actions. The therapist

       planned to discharge respondent because she believed respondent needed more intensive

       counseling than she could provide. The therapist had worked with respondent for two years and

       observed a pattern in which respondent would briefly progress but then regress.

¶ 14          Respondent reported living in an apartment in Galesburg. In January 2021, a previous

       caseworker was twice scheduled to visit the apartment to observe it and complete a “Home Safety

       Checklist.” However, respondent rescheduled both visits and later “continue[d] to cancel home

                                                       4
       visits.” In early August 2021, respondent reported obtaining employment as an in-home caregiver,

       but CYFS was unable to verify her employment at the time of the hearing. Respondent frequently

       changed her phone number and had “no call[ed]/no show[ed] *** many scheduled appointments”

       with CYFS and her service providers.

¶ 15          Because only six months had passed since the dispositional order, Baumgardner

       recommended the permanency goal not be changed. The trial court found respondent had not made

       reasonable efforts or progress toward the return of E.R. but determined the goal should remain as

       return home within 12 months.

¶ 16                                          2. January 13, 2022

¶ 17          On January 13, 2022, the trial court conducted another permanency review hearing. The

       court again admitted several documents, including reports from CYFS and CASA. The court also

       heard testimony from respondent and Rene Pelotte, a CYFS caseworker assigned to the case in

       early November 2021.

¶ 18          The evidence established respondent had signed all necessary consents and continued to

       regularly attend her once-weekly parent-child visits with E.R. Since the previous permanency

       hearing, respondent had been referred for mental-health services at Bridgeway. Respondent

       reportedly attended one session but CYFS had no documentation reflecting her attendance or

       engagement. Respondent reported that, after her August 2021 substance-abuse assessment, she

       engaged in substance-abuse treatment at Bridgeway and had attended one visit. She admitted to

       using methamphetamines in July 2021 and failed to attend any random drug screens since August

                                                      5
       27, 2021. 3 CYFS made efforts to visit respondent’s apartment, but respondent canceled at least

       two scheduled appointments. Most recently, Pelotte scheduled a visit for December 6, 2021. After

       respondent failed to respond to text messages to confirm a time, the caseworker attempted to visit

       respondent but was unable to make contact with her. Respondent later told the caseworker she had

       forgotten about the appointment and was meeting with her attorney at the time. Respondent

       reported she had been offered employment in July 2021 but the offer had since been rescinded. (It

       is not clear whether the July 2021 offer was for the in-home caregiving services referenced in the

       reports admitted at the August 2021 permanency hearing.)

¶ 19          Respondent testified that, since the last permanency hearing, she worked for about two

       weeks at a fast-food restaurant. However, because she was only offered 20 hours per week, she

       sought employment at NAEIR through a temp agency. She was scheduled to begin work there

       later in January 2022. At the time of the hearing, respondent had been engaged with a drug

       counselor at Bridgeway twice a week for “well over a month, a month and a half.” She also

       attended Narcotics Anonymous meetings. Respondent was performing regular drug screens at

       Bridgeway, and she was not using any substances. The most recent screen was “an instant test”

       which came back negative. Respondent did not know the results of the other screens. Respondent

       confirmed she was referred to Bridgeway for mental-health treatment but was placed on a three-

       month waiting list. Thus, she planned to seek treatment through the county health department.

¶ 20          Respondent testified she had not seen Jay R. in approximately six months. She visited with

       E.R. every Tuesday for three hours. She explained she had been late to recent visits because she

              3
                  Evidence admitted at a later permanency-review hearing established that respondent did, in fact, comply

       with four random drug screens in November and December 2021 and three times tested positive for

       methamphetamines.

                                                               6
       relied on a bicycle for transportation and was coming from appointments at Bridgeway, which was

       “way on the edge of Galesburg.”

¶ 21             The trial court found respondent had not made reasonable efforts or progress and entered

       an order changing the permanency goal to substitute care pending the determination of parental

       rights.

¶ 22                                           C. Termination Phase

¶ 23                                           1. The State’s Petition

¶ 24             On January 24, 2022, the State petitioned to terminate respondent’s parental rights, which

       it later twice amended. In its second amended petition, the State alleged respondent was unfit, in

       part, because between September 28, 2021, and June 28, 2022, she failed to make (1) reasonable

       efforts to correct the conditions which were the basis for E.R.’s removal (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i)

       (West 2020)); and (2) reasonable progress toward the return of E.R. (id. § 1(D)(m)(ii)). The State

       further alleged it was in E.R.’s best interests that respondent’s parental rights be terminated.

¶ 25                                             2. Fitness Hearing

¶ 26             On August 30, 2022, the trial court conducted a fitness hearing. The State presented the

       testimony of Cecily Dorsett, Rene Pelotte, and Stephanie Brockett. Respondent also testified. The

       trial court later stated it did not consider Dorsett’s testimony in reaching its decision; thus, we omit

       from our account her testimony.

¶ 27             The evidence established respondent was required to verify that she had income and

       housing, comply with random drug screens, and cooperate with CYFS. She was also required to

       complete a substance-abuse assessment and follow any recommendations, engage in mental-health

       services, and integrate into her daily life the lessons from her previously completed domestic-

       violence services.

                                                          7
¶ 28                                                a. Pelotte

¶ 29          Pelotte was E.R.’s caseworker between November 1, 2021, and January 24, 2022.

       According to Pelotte, respondent did not “do any mental health services” during those three

       months. Respondent failed to appear for drug screens on November 15, November 23, December

       6, and December 15. Respondent reported that she had an apartment but CYFS was not able to

       verify. Pelotte testified respondent agreed to allow her to visit respondent’s apartment, but when

       Pelotte arrived, respondent was not home. Respondent did not have any in-home parent-child visits

       with E.R. during that time period.

¶ 30                                               b. Brockett

¶ 31          Brockett was Pelotte’s supervisor from November 1, 2021, to January 24, 2022. She took

       over as E.R.’s caseworker from January 24, 2022, to April 2022, and then supervised E.R.’s

       caseworker beginning in May 2022. Brockett testified CYFS was never able to verify respondent

       had adequate housing or obtained employment. On May 17, 2022, respondent made a threat of

       self-harm to E.R.’s foster parent. CYFS attempted to contact respondent but respondent did not

       respond to phone calls or texts. The next day, Brockett went to respondent’s apartment to check

       on her. Brockett knocked on and saw movement under the door, but respondent did not answer.

¶ 32          With respect to respondent’s substance abuse, Brockett testified respondent attended an

       assessment but was discharged when she failed to complete it. Respondent reported in February

       2022 that she was engaged in services at Bridgeway and was being screened. CYFS received

       records from Bridgeway, which indicated respondent had positive drug tests in November and

       December 2021, had a single clean screen in December 2021, and gave a sample, on January 24,

       2022, “that was unsuitable for testing due to *** protein levels in the urine,” suggesting the sample

       had been tampered with.

                                                        8
¶ 33          Respondent began mental-health services at Bridgeway but, to the agency’s knowledge,

       did not complete the assessment or participate in any mental-health treatment.

¶ 34          According to Brockett, respondent “sometimes” cooperated with CYFS. She explained

       respondent attended visits with E.R., at which time CYFS could speak with respondent. However,

       Brockett had scheduled meetings with respondent at her apartment that fell through. Thus, Brockett

       scheduled a meeting with respondent at the CYFS office. On the morning of the meeting,

       respondent called and said “her ride didn’t come through.” They met briefly over the phone, but

       respondent became upset and ended the call.

¶ 35                                                c. Respondent

¶ 36          Respondent testified she had lived in the same apartment in Galesburg for more than two

       years. Since January 2021, she had been generally unemployed, except she worked at a fast-food

       restaurant for about a week and worked as a caretaker for an older man with whom she was friends.

       (Respondent did not specify when she worked these jobs or how long she worked as a caretaker.)

       Most recently, beginning in June or July 2022, respondent worked at Dick Blick, where she was

       still employed at the time of the hearing.

¶ 37          Respondent completed a domestic-violence course through Safe Harbor in 2020. At some

       point before the hearing, she had engaged in substance-abuse treatment at Bridgeway. She

       explained Bridgeway had changed her counselor to one with whom she previously was engaged

       and with whom she did not “click.” She did not request a new counselor and was discharged when

       she missed her first appointment.

¶ 38          Respondent acknowledged she had not completed any mental-health treatment. She

       explained that, at the direction of an old caseworker, she sought and obtained an assessment at the

       health department, with the plan of receiving treatment and counseling at Bridgeway. When she

                                                         9
       returned to Bridgeway, however, she was placed on a six-month waiting list. About two months

       before the hearing, she sought treatment at the health department. According to respondent, had

       she sought treatment originally at the health department and not Bridgeway, she would have been

       much further along in her treatment.

¶ 39                                    d. The Trial Court’s Findings

¶ 40          The trial court found respondent unfit based on her failure, between September 28, 2021,

       and June 28, 2022, to make (1) reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that brought E.R. into

       care and (2) reasonable progress toward the return of E.R.

¶ 41                                      4. Best-Interests Hearing

¶ 42          On September 29, 2022, the trial court conducted a best-interests hearing. Respondent

       failed to appear.

¶ 43          The trial court admitted reports from CYFS and CASA and heard testimony from Sarah

       Decker, a CYFS caseworker who was currently assigned to E.R.’s case. The evidence showed E.R.

       was now almost two years old and was doing well in her foster home, where she had been since

       her discharge from the hospital three days after her birth. She was well-bonded with her foster

       parents and referred to them as “mom” and “dad.” E.R. cried when the foster mother dropped her

       off for her visits with respondent but calmed down when the foster mother assured E.R. that she

       would be back. She was also well-bonded with her foster and biological siblings that lived with

       her in the foster home. E.R. appeared to be safe, secure, and comfortable in the foster home. She

       was “current with medical” and was a “very happy, busy little girl.” The foster parents had

       completed adoption classes, were willing to provide her with permanency, and were excited and

       eager to soon adopt E.R. and her siblings.

                                                      10
¶ 44          Respondent was still attending visits, though they had been reduced to three hours every

       two weeks. Respondent agreed to allow CASA to visit her apartment but never contacted CASA

       to schedule an appointment. CASA made three attempts to set up a visit, calling both cell phone

       numbers respondent had provided, but respondent ignored those attempts.

¶ 45          E.R. “struggle[d] to listen to [respondent] at times during visits, and in response

       [respondent would] often let [E.R.] have her way instead of sticking with the boundaries she

       establishe[d].” Respondent was “able to focus on [E.R.] intermittently but struggle[d] to remain

       focused *** when she [was] feeling angry about her case.” During visits, respondent spent

       “significant time expressing her discontentment about her case to the visit supervisor instead of

       focusing her attention on [E.R.]”

¶ 46          Decker opined it was in E.R.’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights. She

       based her opinion on respondent’s inability to meet E.R.’s basic needs for health, safety, education,

       and well-being. By contrast, the foster parents had met all of E.R.’s needs since birth. E.R.

       displayed attachment to the foster parents and her siblings; her “sense of security and familiarity

       [lay] with her foster family.”

¶ 47          After hearing arguments, the trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights, finding it

       was in E.R.’s best interests to do so.

¶ 48          This appeal followed.

¶ 49                                             II. ANALYSIS

¶ 50          On appeal, respondent contends the trial court’s fitness and best-interests findings were

       against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 51                              A. Proceedings to Terminate Parental Rights

                                                        11
¶ 52           Proceedings to terminate parental rights are principally governed by the Juvenile Court Act

       and the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 2020)) and consist of two phases. In re Deandre

       D., 405 Ill. App. 3d 945, 952 (2010). First, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence

       the parent is unfit on any one of the grounds listed in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS

       50/1(D) (West 2020)). Deandre D., 405 Ill. App. 3d at 952. Second, if the court finds the parent is

       unfit, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of the parent’s

       rights is in the minor’s best interests. Id. at 953.

¶ 53           We will not disturb the trial court’s unfitness or best-interests findings unless they are

       against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1064, 1072

       (2006). A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence when it is unreasonable. In re

       D.W., 386 Ill. App. 3d 124, 139 (2008).

¶ 54                                            B. Unfitness Finding

¶ 55           The trial court found the State proved respondent was unfit on two grounds: her failure to

       make (1) reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that brought E.R. into care (750 ILCS

       50/1(D)(m)(i) (West 2020)) and (2) reasonable progress toward the return of E.R. (id.

       § 1(D)(m)(ii)). Because the grounds for finding unfitness under the Adoption Act are independent,

       we may affirm the trial court’s judgment if the evidence supports any one of the grounds alleged.

       In re B’Yata I., 2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B, ¶ 30.

¶ 56           We conclude the trial court’s finding that respondent failed to make reasonable progress

       toward the return of E.R. during the nine-month period between September 28, 2021, and June 28,

       2022, was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Reasonable progress is an objective

       standard that requires, at a minimum, “measurable or demonstrable movement” toward

       reunification. Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1067. “Reasonable progress exists when the trial

                                                          12
       court can conclude that it will be able to order the child returned to parental custody in the near

       future.” Id.

¶ 57           The evidence established respondent was required to verify that she had income and

       housing, comply with random drug screens, and cooperate with CYFS. She was also required to

       complete a substance-abuse assessment and follow any recommendations, engage in mental-health

       services, and integrate into her daily life the lessons from her previously completed domestic-

       violence services.

¶ 58           At the fitness hearing, the State presented evidence that respondent had made no progress

       in regard to her mental-health or substance-abuse issues. Admittedly, respondent participated in

       mental-health and substance-abuse assessments during the relevant time period, but she failed to

       actually engage in treatment. And while she made some effort to engage in mental-health services,

       by her own admission, she could have been much further along in her treatment at the time of the

       hearing. Further, respondent chose not to engage in substance-abuse treatment, terminating the

       services because she did not “click” with her provider. Instead, she continued to use drugs, testing

       positive for drugs on three occasions in November and December 2021.

¶ 59           We acknowledge that Brockett testified respondent “sometimes” cooperated with CYFS.

       But, as a whole, the evidence established that respondent’s cooperation with CYFS was poor.

       Though respondent reported she lived in the same apartment for more than a year, CYFS was never

       able to verify that fact. Despite multiple attempts and scheduled appointments, respondent did not

       once allow CYFS to enter her apartment to assess its safety and suitability for a young child.

       Respondent also failed to communicate with CYFS unless she was present in the CYFS office for

       her parent-child visits. She failed to return phone calls, failed to attend an in-person meeting with

       Brockett, and terminated a telephone meeting when she became upset.

                                                        13
¶ 60          Additionally, respondent failed to obtain and maintain adequate employment throughout

       much of the nine-month period. She testified she had been generally unemployed since January

       2021, except for two brief periods of employment at a fast-food restaurant and as an in-home

       caregiver for a friend. She never provided any verification of these jobs to CYFS. It was not until

       the very end of the nine-month period at issue that respondent obtained stable employment.

¶ 61          Respondent nevertheless argues she made measurable movement toward the goal of

       reunification. She notes she completed domestic-violence services “in a satisfactory manner many

       months prior and no service plan or testimony evidences any further recommended classes to

       address domestic[-]violence concerns.” She also points out that she “rarely, if ever, missed a visit”

       with E.R., “had consistent, safe, and stable housing,” had obtained employment, and was engaged

       with a mental-health counselor. Based on this evidence, respondent asserts, the trial court should

       not have found she failed to make reasonable progress toward reunification. We disagree.

¶ 62          Admittedly, respondent satisfactorily completed a domestic-violence victim class.

       However, that class was completed well before the nine-month period at issue, and we fail to see

       how that demonstrates reasonable progress during the relevant timeframe. Moreover, the record

       shows that, while respondent was enrolled in domestic-violence services, she continued her

       involvement with her abuser, Jay R., had a child with him after she completed those classes, and

       had contact with him well into 2021. Given her continued contact with her abuser, the trial court

       could properly find she failed to implement into her life what she learned in the classes.

¶ 63          Further, we reject respondent’s assertion that she had “consistent, safe, and stable housing.”

       We appreciate that respondent reportedly lived in the same apartment throughout much of this

       case, which supports her assertion that her housing was consistent and stable. But despite multiple

                                                        14
       opportunities, she never permitted CYFS to enter the apartment to determine whether it was safe

       or suitable for E.R. Thus, the safety of her home was never evaluated or verified.

¶ 64          We likewise reject respondent’s argument that she demonstrated reasonable progress

       toward addressing her mental-health concerns and achieving stable employment during the nine-

       month period at issue. To be sure, respondent testified she had reengaged in mental-health

       treatment at the county health department about two months before the fitness hearing, i.e., in June

       2022. In the same vein, she testified she obtained employment at Dick Blick about two months

       before the fitness hearing, in June or July 2022. However, the record establishes she engaged in

       no mental-health treatment and was unemployed during a large portion of the nine-month period.

       She did not engage in treatment or obtain the job at Dick Blick until the very end of that period.

       See In re A.P., 277 Ill. App. 3d 592, 599 (1996) (“A recent ‘flurry of activity’ regarding [the

       respondent’s] goals immediately prior to the *** hearing on the petition *** can hardly overcome

       several months where her efforts were minimal at best.”). Respondent’s delay undercut her ability

       to establish she made “measurable or demonstrable movement” toward reunification. See Daphnie

       E., 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1067.

¶ 65          We acknowledge respondent regularly attended her weekly, supervised parent-child visits

       at the CYFS office. We do not disagree that respondent’s efforts in this regard were laudable.

       However, efforts should not be confused with progress. See In re R.L., 352 Ill. App. 3d 985, 999

       (2004). Here, respondent never progressed from weekly supervised visits to more frequent or in-

       home, unsupervised visits and failed to demonstrate her ability to independently parent E.R.

¶ 66          Simply put, we agree with the trial court’s finding that, at the time of the fitness hearing,

       E.R. was no closer to returning home than she was at the inception of the case, almost two years

       earlier. Respondent made little, if any, progress during the relevant time period. Accordingly, we

                                                       15
       conclude the trial court’s finding that respondent was unfit based on her failure to make reasonable

       progress was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. In light of our conclusion, we need

       not determine whether the State also proved she failed to make reasonable efforts. See B’Yata I.,

       2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B, ¶ 30.

¶ 67                                         C. Best-Interests Finding

¶ 68          The trial court’s focus at the best-interests stage is the child’s welfare and whether

       termination would improve the child’s future financial, social, and emotional atmosphere. In re

       D.M., 336 Ill. App. 3d 766, 772 (2002). “[A]t a best[-]interests hearing, the parent’s interest in

       maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the child’s interest in a stable, loving home

       life.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 364 (2004). When making a best-interests determination, the court

       must consider the following factors: (1) the physical safety and welfare of the child; (2) the

       development of the child’s identity; (3) the child’s background and ties; (4) the child’s sense of

       attachment, including where the child feels love, attachment, and security; (5) the child’s wishes

       and long-term goals; (6) the child’s community ties; (7) the child’s needs for permanence,

       including the need for stability and continuity of relationships with parent figures, siblings, and

       other relatives; (8) the uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the risks attendant to entering and

       being in substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the persons available to care for the child. 705

       ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2020).

¶ 69          We conclude the trial court’s finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was

       in E.R.’s best interests was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The evidence presented

       at the best-interests hearing established E.R. was almost two years old and had been with her foster

       parents, her paternal aunt and uncle, since her discharge from the hospital three days after her birth.

       E.R. was thriving in her foster home and all of her needs were met. She was well-bonded with her

                                                         16
       foster parents, referred to them as “mom” and “dad,” and was also well-bonded with her foster and

       biological siblings that lived in the home.

¶ 70          Respondent was still attending visits, though they had been reduced to three hours every

       two weeks. E.R. cried when the foster mother dropped her off for her visits but calmed down when

       the foster mother assured E.R. that she would be back. E.R. appeared apprehensive toward

       respondent at the beginning of the visits but would eventually warm up. E.R. “struggle[d] to listen

       to [respondent] at times during visits, and in response [respondent would] often let [E.R.] have her

       way instead of sticking with the boundaries she establishe[d].” Respondent was “able to focus on

       [E.R.] intermittently but struggle[d] to remain focused *** when she [was] feeling angry about her

       case.” During visits, respondent spent “significant time expressing her discontentment about her

       case to the visit supervisor instead of focusing her attention on [E.R.]”

¶ 71          E.R. appeared to be safe, secure, and comfortable in the foster home. She was “current with

       medical” and was a “very happy, busy little girl.” The foster parents had completed adoption

       classes, were willing to provide her with permanency, and were excited and eager to soon adopt

       E.R. and her siblings.

¶ 72          Respondent nevertheless asserts she had remedied the conditions that brought E.R. into

       foster care. Thus, she argues, there exists no basis on which to terminate her parental rights. We

       disagree.

¶ 73          First, we note that, while we may consider a parent’s conduct at the best-interests stage,

       our focus is primarily on the child. In re T.A., 359 Ill. App. 3d 953, 959 (2005). Second, we reject

       respondent’s assertion that she had remedied the conditions that brought E.R. into care. For the

       reasons discussed above, that assertion is simply not true.

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¶ 74          In any event, the evidence overwhelmingly established that termination of respondent’s

       parental rights was in E.R.’s best interests. Indeed, throughout E.R.’s entire life, her foster parents

       met each and every one of her needs and their home was the only home E.R. ever knew. The foster

       parents fully integrated E.R. into their family, treated her as their own, and were ready, willing,

       and able to provide permanency to E.R. Simply put, based on the evidence presented, the trial

       court correctly declined to prolong these proceedings for an indeterminate period of time so that

       respondent could demonstrate her ability to effectively parent E.R. Under these circumstances, we

       conclude the trial court’s best-interests finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 75                                            III. CONCLUSION

¶ 76          For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Knox County.

¶ 77          Affirmed.

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