Court Opinion

ID: 9961472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-18 20:08:08.780201+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:48.957105
License: Public Domain

140 Nev., Advance Opinion 07
                              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                       BO JONES AND DAN JONES,                               No. 85305
                       HUSBAND AND WIFE,
                       Appellants,
                       vs.                                                    FIED
                       HAMED GHADIRI, AN INDIVIDUAL,
                       Respondent.

                                    Appeal from a district court summary judgment in a real
                       property dispute. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Crystal
                       Eller, Judge.
                                    Affirrned.

                       Black & Wadharns and Allison R. Schmidt, Las Vegas,
                       for Appellants.

                       Law Office of Malik W. Ahmad and Malik W. Ahnnad, Las Vegas,
                       for Respondent.

                       Maupin, Cox & LeGoy and Rick R. Hsu, Reno,
                       for Amicus Curiae the State Bar of Nevada, Real Property Section.

                       BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, EN BANC.1

                             1The  Honorable Patricia Lee, Justice, being disqualified, did not
                       participate in the decision of this matter.
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                                                       OPINION

                      By the Court, STIGLICH, J.:
                                  Long before the parties acquired ownership of their respective
                      properties, a block wall was erected to divide the neighboring lots. When
                      respondent discovered that the wall did not follow the property line and,
                      consequently, that he was being denied the use of his property, he sought to
                      remove the wall and build a new one on the property line. In response,

                      appellants filed a complaint in the district court for, among other things, a
                      prescriptive easement or adverse possession. The district court found that
                      appellants could not prevail on their claim for adverse possession because
                      they did not pay the property taxes on the disputed property. The district
                      court further found that a prescriptive easement was unavailable because
                      it would result in respondent's complete exclusion from the subject
                      property. Accordingly, the district court granted summary judgment for
                      respondent, determining that appellants are not entitled to a prescriptive
                      easement or adverse possession as a matter of law.
                                  We take this opportunity to distinguish the two concepts, as
                      they are fundamentally different and give rise to distinct relief. As Nevada
                      law does not concretely declare whether we recognize comprehensive
                      prescriptive easements, easements that result in the complete exclusion of
                      the servient estate from the subject property, we examine the approaches
                      taken by sister jurisdictions.    While several states have categorically
                      rejected comprehensive prescriptive easements, California has adopted the
                      view that exceptional circumstances may give rise to such easements.
                      Considering both our caselaw and California caselaw, we are persuaded
                      that exceptional circumstances may warrant comprehensive prescriptive
                      easements. However, we stress that such relief is rare. As appellants have

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                          not demonstrated exceptional circumstances, we affirm the district court's
                          order granting summary judgment in favor of respondent.
                                            FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                                       In 2015, appellants Bo and Dan Jones purchased property in

                          Las Vegas.      Immediately thereafter, the Joneses made substantial

                          improvements near a block wall that had been erected in 1989 and that ran
                          between their property and the neighboring property. These improvements
                          included the installation of recreational vehicle utility hookups and a new
                          iron gate. When not traveling, the Joneses also stored their recreational
                          vehicle next to the block wall.
                                       In 2016, respondent Hamed Ghadiri purchased the propertv
                          located on the other side of the block wall. Several years later, Ghadiri
                          discovered that a portion of his property was on the Joneses' side of the
                          block wall (the disputed property). The disputed property is 591 square feet
                          in size.   Ghadiri commissioned a survey of the property line, which
                          confirmed that the wall was not on the property line and that the disputed
                          property was on Ghadiri's side of the lot line. Ghadiri acquired a permit to
                          destroy the block wall and install a new wall on the property line at his
                          expense.
                                       The Joneses filed a complaint against Ghadiri for, inter alia, a
                          prescriptive easement, adverse possession, and a temporary restraining
                          order. Although the district court granted a temporary restraining order, it
                          denied the Joneses' subsequent motion for a preliminary injunction. This
                          court affirmed the district court's denial, Jones v. Ghadiri, No. 83184, 2022
                          WL 3336143 (Nev. Aug. 11, 2022) (Order of Affirmance), and Ghadiri
                          removed the wall sometime thereafter.
                                       Later, Ghadiri moved for summary judgment against the
                          Joneses' claims for adverse possession and a prescriptive easement.
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                Ghadiri asked the court to dismiss the Joneses claim for adverse possession
                because the Joneses had not paid property taxes on the disputed property.
                Relying heavily on California caselaw, Ghadiri further contended that a
                prescriptive easement was unavailable, as it would result in his complete
                exclusion from the disputed property. The Joneses asserted that a question
                of fact remained as to who paid taxes on the disputed property and that
                Nevada    caselaw   recognizes   prescriptive   easements    resulting   in   a
                landowner's complete exclusion frorn the subject property.2
                            After granting summary judgment in Ghadiri's favor as to the
                claim for adverse possession, the district court noted that the Joneses' claim
                for a prescriptive easement was "essentially a meshing of adverse
                possession with a prescriptive easement."       Given the dearth of Nevada
                caselaw on the availability of such easements, the district court considered

                cases from neighboring states, such as California and Arizona. Following
                those cases, the court determined that a prescriptive easement "simply
                cannot be so extensive as to create the practical equivalent of an exclusive
                possessory estate" and that adverse use, as an element of a claim for a
                prescriptive easement, "cannot result in the complete exclusion of the owner
                of the servient estate." The district court noted that an unpublished Nevada
                case, CSA Development, LLC v. Bryant, No. 68444, 2016 WL 7105072 (Nev.
                Dec. 2, 2016) (Order of Affirmance), arguably recognized the availability of
                prescriptive easements that result in the servient estates' complete
                exclusion from the subject property. Ultimately, however, the district court

                      21n relation to their claim for adverse possession, the Joneses argued
                that a question of fact remained as to who paid taxes on the disputed
                property because property taxes are partly based on visual inspections
                conducted every five years. As the Joneses do not challenge the district
                court's order as to their claim for adverse possession, we do not address it
                further.
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                indicated that the case had little persuasive value because it lacked clarity
                as to when such a prescriptive easement was available. Finding that no
                exceptional circumstances justified the Joneses' requested prescriptive
                easement, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Ghadiri
                on the claim. The Joneses now appeal.

                                                DISCUSSION
                              The Joneses primary contention on appeal is that because they
                were entitled to a prescriptive easement as a matter of law, the district court
                erred in granting Ghadiri's motion for summary judgment.3         We review a
                district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Wood v. Safeway, Inc.,
                121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005). "Surnmary judgment is
                appropriate . . . when    the    pleadings,     depositions,    answers      to
                interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits, if any, that are properly before
                the court demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the
                moving party is entitled to judgrnent as a matter of law." Id. at 731, 121

                P.3d at 1031.    We "review questions of law, including interpretation of
                caselaw, de novo." Martin v. Martin, 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 78, 520 P.3d 813,
                817 (2022).
                Adverse possession versus easements
                              As acknowledged by the district court, the arguments and
                claims for adverse possession and a prescriptive easement became muddled
                below. And while the Joneses do not challenge the district court's rejection
                of their adverse possession claim, it is necessary for us to distinguish the

                      3The Joneses also contend that the district court erred by admitting
                Ghadiri's survey because it was unauthenticated. As the Joneses did not
                raise this argument below, we decline to entertain it. See Diamond Enters.,
                Inc. v. Lau, 113 Nev, 1376, 1378, 951 P.2d 73, 74 (1997) ("It is well
                established that arguments raised for the first time on appeal need not be
                considered by this court.").
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                concepts before considering the propriety of the Joneses' claim for a
                prescriptive easement.
                            "Adverse possession is a doctrine under which a person in
                possession of real property owned by someone else may acquire valid

                title . . . ." 142 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts 349 (originally published in 2014).

                The holder of valid title is vested with all property rights, including the
                right to exclusively control the property, subject to any easernents. See City

                of Fredericktown v. Osborn, 429 S.W.2d 17, 22 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968)
                (explaining that generally, "an owner has the right to the exclusive
                possession and control of his property") (citing Hoffmann v. Kinealy, Mo.,
                389 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1965)). "[A]n adverse possessor is required to show

                that the occupation of the property is hostile, actual, peaceable, open,
                notorious, continuous and uninterrupted." Triplett v. David H. Fulstone
                Co., 109 Nev. 216, 219, 849 P.2d 334, 336 (1993) (internal quotation marks
                omitted). An adverse possessor must also show "that the land has been
                occupied and claimed for the period of 5 years, continuously, and that the
                party or persons, their predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes, state,
                county and municipal, which may have been levied and assessed against

                the land for the period mentioned." NRS 11.150.
                            A prescriptive easement is a common law claim by which one
                may acquire the legal right to use land that he or she does not own. See
                Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 1.2(1) (1998) (explaining
                that easements create "a nonpossessory right to use land in the possession
                of another" (emphasis added)). "[A]dverse, continuous, open and peaceable
                use for a five-year period are the requisite elements for claiming" a
                prescriptive easement. Jordan v. Bailey, 113 Nev. 1038, 1044, 944 P.2d 828,
                832 (1997). Importantly, an easement, whether prescriptive, implied, or
                otherwise, generally grants a "non-possessory interest in the land of another
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                which entitles the owner of the easement to a limited use or enjoyment of

                said land." Hall & Buckley, Nevada Real Property Practice & Procedural
                Manual, 32 (Nev. State Bar 2021) (citing Restatement (First) of Property
                § 450 (1944)) (emphases added).        As this court explained in Boyd v.

                McDonald,"[a]n easement is a right, distinct from ownership, to use in some
                way the land of another. . . . It gives no right to possess the land upon which

                it is imposed, but a right merely to the party in whom the easement is vested
                to enjoy it." 81 Nev. 642, 647, 408 P.2d 717, 720 (1965) (internal quotation
                marks and alterations omitted).       Thus, the crucial difference between
                adverse possession and an easement is that the former results in the
                acquisition of title and the right to exclusively control the subject property
                while the latter results in the right to a limited use of the subject property.
                Hebert v. City of Fifty Lakes, 744 N.W.2d 226, 231 n.3 (Minn. 2008).
                              Here, the Joneses asserted a claim for a prescriptive easement,
                but their requested relief aligns with adverse possession. After all, the
                Joneses demanded more than the rnere use of the disputed property; they
                sought exclusive control of it. And to seek exclusive control of the disputed
                property is to seek adverse possession. The trouble for the Joneses, as
                recognized by the district court, is that they have not paid the requisite
                property taxes on the disputed property. Thus, the Joneses sought adverse
                possession under the guise of an extraordinary prescriptive easement. This
                type of easement is known as a "comprehensive prescriptive easement," as,
                unlike a typical easement, it results in the owner of the servient estate being
                completely excluded from the subject property.             Will Saxe,    When

                "Comprehensive" Prescriptive Easements Overlap Adverse Possession:
                Shifting Theories of "Use" and "Possession," 33 B.C. Env't Aff. L. Rev. 175,
                193 (2006).

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                                           We will not lightly allow the long-recognized distinction
                               between adverse possession and prescriptive easements to collapse. Nor
                               will we lightly allow parties to reap the fruits of adverse possession without
                               complying with statutory requirements. We therefore reject the liberal use
                               of comprehensive prescriptive easements and clarify when comprehensive
                               prescriptive easements may be available in Nevada.
                               Comprehensive prescriptive easernents are available only in exceptional
                               circumstances
                                           The Joneses argue that Nevada law recognizes comprehensive
                               prescriptive easements and that the district court erred by relying on
                               California authority to hold otherwise. The Real Property Section of the
                               Nevada State Bar, as amicus curiae, argues that CSA blurred the line
                               between adverse possession and prescriptive easements and that the
                               distinction between the two, as recognized in Boyd, should be followed.
                               Ghadiri argues that this court should follow California cases, which he
                               asserts have rejected comprehensive prescriptive easements. We begin by
                               examining Nevada caselaw to see whether comprehensive prescriptive
                               easernents are available.
                                           In CSA, Patrick and Eleanor Bryant graded their lot and
                               constructed a block wall thereon. No. 68444, 2016 WL 7105072, at *1. The
                               block wall encroached onto an adjacent vacant lot. Id. At least 16 years
                               later, CSA purchased the vacant lot and filed suit, alleging quiet title,
                               nuisance, trespass, and unjust enrichment. Id. The Bryants claimed they
                               had a prescriptive easement over the area encroached upon by the block
                               wall, and the district court agreed. Id. Although CSA affirmed the district
                               court's ruling, id. at *3, this court did not consider or analyze the
                               circumstances under which we will recognize comprehensive prescriptive
                               easements. As is common of unpublished dispositions, CSA also did not

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                       include a detailed factual backgroundi such as a description of the wall, how
                       much it encroached onto the vacant property, or whether the easement
                       would prevent CSA from using and enjoying a substantial portion of its
                       property.   As a result, we are unable to rely on CSA for the broad
                       interpretation proposed by the Joneses. Thus, we disavow any language in
                       CSA that may be read as allowing for a comprehensive prescriptive
                       easement without articulation of a rationale for granting such an
                       extraordinary easement.
                                   The Joneses' reliance on our decision in Boyd, where we
                       affirmed a district court order granting an easement that resulted in the
                       servient estate's complete exclusion from the subject property, is likewise
                       misplaced. 81 Nev. at 652, 408 P.2d at 722. In Boyd, a supporting wall and
                       overhanging roof of a motel extended 2.6 feet onto an adjacent property. Id.
                       Additionally, the motel maintained a sign that was "some distance from the
                       boundary" line.4 Id. at 644, 408 P.2d at 718. After recognizing that "[a]n
                       easement is a right, distinct from ownership," this court concluded that an
                       easement existed only as to the 2.6-foot encroaching wall and roof. Id. at
                       647, 408 P.2d at 720 (internal quotations omitted). However, we held that
                       the sign could not be classified as an easement because it was too far from
                       the boundary line. Id. at 652, 408 P.2d at 722-23.
                                   Unmistakably, there was no argument for a prescriptive
                       easement in Boyd. Id. at 650 n.8, 408 P.2d at 721 n.8. Rather, this court
                       considered whether there was an easement by implication, or whether "the
                       owner of two parcels had so used one to the benefit of his other that, on
                       selling the benefited parcel, a purchaser could reasonably have expected,
                       without further inquiry, that these benefits were included in the sale." Id.

                            Also in dispute was a patio and driveway; however, this court
                             4

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                        at 649, 408 P.2d at 721. Unlike a prescriptive easement, which we described

                        in passing as "a condition generally analogous to adverse possession," an
                        easement by implication depends on the intention of the parties, as shown
                        by the reasonable expectation of a person purchasing or receiving land. Id.
                        at 647-49, 408 P.2c1 at 720-21. Despite the different type of easement at
                        issue, Boyd is instructive as it recognized a comprehensive easement only
                        as to the roof and wall that encroached a mere 2.6 feet; this court refused to
                        extend such an easement to the sign that "was so removed from the
                        boundary . . . that no reasonable purchaser could have considered it part of
                        the transaction without at least some inquiry." Id. at 652, 408 P.2d at 722-
                        23.   Thus, Boyd implicitly acknowledged limits on a comprehensive
                        easement, albeit not in the context of a prescriptive easement.
                                      Because Nevada lacks caselaw directly on point, we turn to the
                        approaches taken by jurisdictions that, like Nevada, require adverse
                        possessors to pay taxes on property subject to an adverse possession claim.
                        Many of these jurisdictions, including Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Montana,
                        and   Utah,    have   categorically   rejected   comprehensive    prescriptive
                        easements. See generally Etz v. Marnerow, 233 P.2d 443, 444 (Ariz. 1951);
                        Platt v. Pietras, 382 So. 2d 414, 416 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Oakley Valley
                        Stone, Inc. v. Alastra, 715 P.2d 935, 938-39 (Idaho 1985); Burlingame v.
                        Marjerrison, 665 P.2d 1136, 1140 (Mont. 1983); Nyman v. Anchor Dev., LLC,
                        73 P.3d 357, 362 (Utah 2003). They have done so for two common reasons.
                        First, comprehensive prescriptive easements blur the distinction between
                        adverse possession and easements.       Second, comprehensive prescriptive
                        easements subvert the tax requirement for adverse possession.
                                      California, however, has recognized that a comprehensive
                        prescriptive easement may be warranted in exceptional circumstances. See
                        Mehdizadeh v. Mincer, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 284, 290 (Ct. App. 1996) ("There are
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                some circumstances in which the grant of an exclusive easement, which
                resembles or is nearly the equivalent of a fee interest, can be justified.").
                Such circumstances may include a "socially important duty of a utility to
                provide an essential service, such as water or electricitykr id. at 290, or
                where public health or safety is at issue, cf. Otay Water Dist. v. Beckwith, 3
                Cal. Rptr. 2d 223, 226 (Ct. App. 1991).
                            Though the categorical rejection of comprehensive prescriptive
                easements is well-reasoned, we adopt the view, as taken by California, that
                comprehensive prescriptive easements may be warranted if a party
                demonstrates exceptional circumstances. While there is no exhaustive list
                of exceptional circumstances that will justify a comprehensive prescriptive
                easement, the deterrnination as to whether a circumstance is exceptional is
                generally a fact-intensive question.

                            Here,   the    Joneses     have    not   demonstrated     exceptional
                circumstances warranting a comprehensive prescriptive easement. Unlike
                our decision in Boyd, where we recognized a comprehensive easement when
                a nonmovable building encroached by a mere 2.6 feet and resulted in a de
                rninimus loss of usable property for the servient estate, here the Joneses
                merely made improvements to an RV parking space and the grant of a
                comprehensive prescriptive easement would deprive Ghadiri of nearly 600
                square feet of usable space. We therefore conclude that the district court
                did not err and affirm the district court's grant of Ghadiri's rnotion for
                summary judgment.

                                               CONCLUSION
                            Nevada has long recognized the distinction between adverse
                possession and prescriptive easements. While we continue to recognize that
                important   distinction,   today     we     also   recognize   that   exceptional

                circumstances may warrant comprehensive prescriptive easements. The
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                determination as to when an exceptional circumstance is present is
                generally a fact-intensive question. As the Joneses failed to demonstrate
                any such circumstance, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

                                                            Al4GAX            ,   J.
                                                      Stiglich

                We concur:

                   (a/2                      , C.J.
                Cadish
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                                                 J
                Pickering

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                Herndon

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