Court Opinion

ID: 9517151
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:05:49.459034+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:37.061827
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RARICK, dissenting: Contrary to the majority, I believe the reasoning of In re Estate of Nakaerts (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 166, 435 N.E.2d 791, is applicable to the situation here. Past-due child support payments are a vested right, and the trial court has no right to modify them. (In re Marriage of Hardy (1989), 191 Ill. App. 3d 685, 690, 548 N.E.2d 139, 142.) The application of social security benefits to reduce arrearages in child support constitutes a retroactive modification of vested support rights which I do not believe the trial court had the discretionary authority to do. (See Nakaerts, 106 Ill. App. 3d at 170, 435 N.E.2d at 794-95.) Consequently, I must dissent with respect to the majority’s holding as to respondent’s past-due obligations. I recognize other States are divided on this issue (see McDaniel, Annotation, Right to Credit on Child Support Payments for Social Security or Other Government Dependency Payments Made for Benefit of Child, 77 A.L.R.3d 1315 (1977)), but I believe more is at stake here than merely a method of discharging vested support payments.