Court Opinion

ID: 9363035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 16:06:09.90354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:27.859733
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                            No. 124,556

              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                     DENNIS W. SCOTT, et al.,
                                          Appellants,

                                                  v.

                                  CITY OF LEAWOOD, KANSAS,
                                           Appellee.

                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Appeal from Johnson District Court; RHONDA K. MASON, judge. Opinion filed December 2,
2022. Affirmed.

       Andrew I. Spitsnogle, John M. Duggan, and Alex M. Johnson, of Duggan Shadwick Doerr &
Kurlbaum LLC, of Overland Park, for appellants.

       Michael K. Seck, of Fisher, Patterson, Sayler & Smith, L.L.P., Overland Park, for appellee.

Before ARNOLD-BURGER, C.J., BRUNS and HURST, JJ.

       PER CURIAM: Dennis and Kristine Scott appeal the district court's ruling in favor
of the City of Leawood in a dispute that arose after the Scotts placed two stone columns
in the public right-of-way of a newly constructed cul-de-sac that is required to be
dedicated to the City as part of a residential construction project. Although the Scotts
submitted plans and specifications to the City of Leawood for the cul-de-sac that depicted
the required public right-of-way, those plans and specifications did not show that they
intended to place stone columns in the right-of-way. Ultimately, the City of Leawood
informed the Scotts that one of the two stone columns must be removed from the public

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right-of-way before it would accept dedication of the cul-de-sac. In response, the Scotts
filed a petition in district court seeking a declaratory judgment and other relief.

         On appeal, the Scotts contend that the district court erred in concluding that a
building codes inspector employed by the City of Leawood did not have authority to
authorize the placement of the stone columns in the public right-of-way of the required
cul-de-sac. The Scotts also contend that the district court erred in concluding that they
had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Based on our review of the record in light
of Kansas law, we conclude that the building codes inspector did not have actual
authority to authorize or approve the placement of the stone columns in the public right-
of-way of the cul-de-sac to be dedicated to the City. As a result, it is unnecessary for us to
reach the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Thus, we affirm the district
court.

                                              FACTS

         On September 17, 2018, the Scotts filed a petition against the City of Leawood in
which they sought a declaratory judgment, asserted a claim for equitable estoppel, and
requested injunctive relief. In the alternative, the Scotts asserted a claim for
compensatory damages. After completion of discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgment that were denied by the district court. On February 21, 2021, the
district court commenced a two-day bench trial utilizing interactive live streaming
technology.

         Prior to trial, the parties stipulated to many of the facts. During the trial, the
district court also heard the testimony of five witnesses. In addition, the district court
reviewed several exhibits that were admitted into evidence. After considering the
stipulated facts as well as the evidence presented by the parties at trial, the district court

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entered a comprehensive 24-page journal entry of judgment in which it ruled in favor of
the City.

       Although the parties disagree regarding the district court's legal conclusions,
neither party challenges the district court's findings of fact. Moreover, we note that each
of the district court's factual findings was supported by a citation to the record. Thus, we
adopt the findings of fact as set forth by the district court in its journal entry of judgment.

       In summary, the district court found that in 2015 the Scotts purchased real
property in Leawood to build a new house. The Scotts subsequently retained Ambassador
Construction to serve as their contractor. In doing so, they authorized Keith Eymann—
who is part owner of Ambassador Construction—to act on their behalf in dealing with the
City of Leawood during the construction process. In particular, the Scotts granted
Eymann the authority to act on their behalf to obtain the necessary permits and approvals
from the City to complete the project.

       Prior to beginning construction of the house, Eymann participated in a pre-
application meeting with representatives of the City of Leawood's Public Works
Department and Planning Department to review the required plans for the construction
project. As a result, Eymann knew that the City required a cul-de-sac to be constructed to
connect the Scotts' property to the existing street in order to obtain sufficient frontage.
Eymann also knew that the City required the cul-de-sac to be dedicated to the City upon
approval. In addition, he knew that there would need to be a public right-of-way
surrounding the required cul-de-sac.

       On December 1, 2015, Eymann filed a "Residential & Commercial Building
Permit Application" with the City of Leawood to begin the process of obtaining a
building permit. Prior to filing the application, Eymann knew that there were limitations
in Leawood regarding what could be placed in a public right-of-way. The City ultimately

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accepted the plans and issued a building permit for the construction of the home in
January 2016. On behalf of the Scotts, during the construction process, Eymann applied
for and obtained the necessary right-of-way permit and submitted plans to the City that
included the required cul-de-sac and public right-of-way. However, the plans did not
show the stone columns that are the subject of this case.

       At some point, Ambassador Construction subcontracted with Towner, Inc.—
which is a concrete construction company—to perform the concrete work on the Scotts'
new residence. The services provided by Towner, Inc. included work on the basement
floor, the driveway, and the driveway approach. In addition, Towner, Inc. was asked to
build the footings to support the two stone columns that the Scotts desired to place in the
public right-of-way in order to mark the entrance into their property.

       It appears that the footings were placed based on undated drawings prepared by
Richard Barrett—a landscape architect retained by the Scotts—that showed where the
stone columns were to be located. The north column was to be decorative only. On the
other hand, the south column was to house both a mailbox and a security camera.

       It is undisputed that Barrett's landscape drawings were never submitted to the City.
Furthermore, the original plans for the cul-de-sac filed with the City were never amended
to depict the desired placement of stone columns in the public right-of-way. In fact, it is
undisputed that neither Eymann nor anyone else acting on behalf of the Scotts ever
contacted the City of Leawood about the Scotts' intent to place the stone columns in the
public right-of-way of the cul-de-sac required by the City to be built as part of the
approval process for the construction project.

       As the district court found, the City of Leawood has separate inspectors who are
employed by the Public Works Department and the Codes Administration Department.
The Public Works Department has its own hotline to call to request inspections involving

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right-of-way and other infrastructure issues. Similarly, the Codes Administration
Department has a separate hotline to call to request inspections of construction work
performed within the City for building code compliance.

       Eymann testified that he knew there were two separate hotlines controlling
inspections by the Codes Administration Department and the Public Works Department.
Likewise, a principal of Towner, Inc. testified that he also knew that the Public Works
Department and the Codes Administration Department are separate and responsible for
conducting inspections within their own area of responsibility. The representative of
Towner also testified that he was familiar with the process for requesting public right-of-
way inspections.

       As indicated above, Towner, Inc. was retained on behalf of the Scotts to prepare
the footings upon which the two stone columns were constructed. On July 20, 2017,
Geoff Bowen—who is employed as a building codes inspector for the Codes
Administration Department—inspected the work performed by Towner, Inc. on the
footings. He did so in response to a voicemail left on the Codes Administration
Department's hotline by a representative of Towner, Inc. As the district court found,
Bowen is not an employee of the Public Works Department nor does he report to the
Director of Public Works.

       The technician in the Codes Administration Department who listened to the
voicemail requesting an inspection of the footings prepared a "Codes Administration
Inspection" form that was then given to Bowen. The technician listed the date, the permit
number, the contact's name, the contractor's name, and the contact phone number. In
addition, the word "footing" is circled on the form. The technician also wrote "gatepost
and mailbox" on the inspection form that was given to Bowen.

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       After going to the construction site to inspect the work on the footings, Bowen
completed the remainder of the inspection form. In doing so, he noted that the work on
the footings had been performed in a satisfactory manner. There is no mention in the
inspection form regarding the placement of the footings in the public right-of-way of the
cul-de-sac required by the City. Similarly, there is no evidence in the record to establish
that the placement of the stone columns was discussed during Bowen's inspection of the
work performed on the footings. The record reflects that the two stone columns were
ultimately constructed in the public right-of-way and that each column is located only
about six to seven inches from the curb of the cul-de-sac.

       On April 25, 2018, Tom Klotz—who is one of the right-of-way inspectors
employed by the Public Works Department—inspected the cul-de-sac prior to dedication
to the City and completed a final "Right-of-Way Inspection-Observation Report." In his
report, Klotz indicated that the north column located inside the public right-of-way would
need to be removed. Although the south column is also in the public right-of-way, Klotz
indicated that it could remain because it contained a mailbox allowed by United States
Postal Service regulations. Nevertheless, Klotz indicated that the camera and wiring in
the south column would need to be removed. To date, the Scotts have not removed the
north column. Moreover, the City of Leawood has not accepted dedication of the required
cul-de-sac nor has it issued a permanent occupancy permit for the Scotts' house.

       Based on the district court's findings of fact, it determined that the building codes
inspector had no actual or apparent authority to authorize the placement of the stone
columns in the public right-of-way of the cul-de-sac required to be dedicated to the City
of Leawood. Accordingly, the district court concluded that the Scotts were not entitled to
a declaratory judgment nor were they entitled to recover under any of their legal theories.
In addition, the district court ordered the Scotts to remove the north column from the
public right-of-way and ordered the City to issue a certificate of occupancy to the Scotts
once the column is removed.

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       Thereafter, the Scotts filed a timely notice of appeal.

                                          ANALYSIS

       Although the parties have presented several interesting legal arguments in support
of their respective positions, they agree that this appeal turns on the issue of whether a
building codes inspector employed by the City of Leawood had the actual authority to
authorize the placement of the north column in the public right-of-way of the cul-de-sac
that was required to be dedicated to the City. We note that the placement of the south
column was never an issue because the parties agree that it is subject to federal
regulations issued by the United States Postal Service. Thus, we must decide only
whether the building codes inspector who inspected the columns' footings had the actual
authority to authorize the placement of the north column in the public right-of-way of the
cul-de-sac and, if so, whether he exercised such authority.

       At the outset, we note that the Kansas Supreme Court has held that the private
rights of an adjacent landowner to a public street "are subordinate to the right of the
public to proper use of the street or highway, so that the exercise of the rights of abutting
landowners is subject to reasonable regulation and restriction for the purpose of providing
reasonably safe passage for the public." Frick v. City of Salina, 290 Kan. 869, 887, 235
P.3d 1211 (2010) (citing Smith v. State Highway Commission, 185 Kan. 445, 452, 346
P.2d 259 [1959]). In Frick, our Supreme Court found that a municipality's moratorium on
the construction of improvements within a public right-of-way in order to promote
"public safety, general welfare, and economic concerns" to be reasonable. 290 Kan. at
892. Thus, we find that the City of Leawood—officially acting through its city council—
has the authority to place reasonable restrictions on the use of a public right-of-way
adjacent to a street that has or will be dedicated to the City.

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       In discussing the delegation of authority by the governing body of a municipality
to its agents or employees, this court has held:

               "Municipal government authority in Kansas is exercised by council members
       voting, in open meetings, on the various ordinances, resolutions, and motions that the
       issues of the day bring before the council. Thus, through public debate, discussions, and
       voting at open meetings, the interests of the public are protected and promoted. Cities are
       often called municipal corporations for good reasons, for the city council is the functional
       equivalent of a corporation's board of directors. A city's power to act begins with the city
       council. . . . While authority to act is the often delegated to various agents, their actions
       cannot bind the City to a particular position or action unless the Council has authorized
       the agent to so act or has ratified agent's act after the action has taken place." City of
       Topeka v. Imming, 51 Kan. App. 2d 247, 252-53, 344 P.3d 957 (2015).

       In other words, the authority of a municipal government to protect public safety
and welfare rests with the municipality's governing body. In this case, the City of
Leawood exercises its authority through a city council composed of eight council persons
and a mayor. Although a municipality may ratify the actions of an employee or agent
under certain circumstances, there is no allegation that the City of Leawood's council has
done so in this case.

       Consequently, there must be some affirmative step taken by a municipality's
governing body to explicitly delegate its authority to an agent or employee. Likewise,
there must be some affirmative step taken by a municipality's governing body to
explicitly ratify the actions of an agent or employee who has acted outside the scope of
his or her authority. "Otherwise, cities would be able to avoid a transparent and
democratic process by simply acquiescing in the actions of its agents who lack specific
authority for their actions, with no express ratification vote required. Such a holding
would mock the democratic process." Imming, 51 Kan. App. 2d at 254. Here, there is no
evidence in the record to establish that the City of Leawood ever took the affirmative step

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of granting building codes inspectors the actual authority to approve or disapprove the
placement of structures within a public right-of-way.

       The Scotts argue that a building codes inspector employed by the City of
Leawood's Code Administration Department had the actual authority to approve the
placement of the north column in the public right-of-way of the cul-de-sac required to be
dedicated to the City as part of the residential construction project. We note that before
the district court the Scotts argued that the building codes inspector also had the apparent
authority to approve the placement of the north column in the public right-of-way.
However, they have dropped their apparent authority argument on appeal.

       In support of their argument that the building codes inspector had the actual
authority to approve the placement of the north column in the public right-of-way, the
Scotts refer us to City of Leawood Code § 4-203 (2020), which applies "to the
construction, alteration, relocation, enlargement, replacement, repair, equipment use and
occupancy, location, maintenance, removal and demolition of every building or structure
or any appurtenances connected or attached to such buildings or structures." Elsewhere,
the City of Leawood Building Code states that "[t]he Building Official is hereby
authorized and directed to enforce the provision of this Building Code. . . . The Building
Official shall be known as the codes administrator, and such term shall include his/her
authorized representatives." City of Leawood Code § 4-205 (2020). While section 4-205
delegates enforcement of the Building Code to the Codes Administration Department,
nothing with these ordinances explicitly delegates the actual authority to approve or
disapprove the placement of objects within a public right-of-way to the Codes
Administration Department or any of its building codes inspectors. On their face, we find
that these ordinances make no reference to determining the types of objects that can and
cannot be placed in a public right-of-way.

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       The Scotts also cite to Skaggs v. City of Pratt, 183 Kan. 424, 327 P.2d 1083
(1958) and its progeny for the proposition that representations made by "properly-
designated officials" can bind a municipality under certain circumstances. However, it is
important to recognize that the Skaggs decision goes on to state the "properly-designated
officials" must be acting "under the proper exercise of their authority" in order for their
representations to be binding on a municipality. 183 Kan. at 429. Here, there is no
evidence that the City of Leawood—properly or improperly—designated Bowen or other
employees of the Codes Administration Department with the authority to approve or
disapprove the placement of objects in a public right-of-way.

       A review of the undisputed evidence shows that a subcontractor working for the
Scotts called the Codes Administration Department and left a message requesting an
inspection of the footings for the stone columns. In response, the Codes Administration
Department sent Bowen—who was one of the department's building codes inspectors—to
inspect the work done on the footings of the columns. The record reflects that Bowen
completed his inspection on the morning of July 20, 2017, and noted on his report that the
work on the "Prep base" of the columns was satisfactory. Significantly, there is nothing in
the report to indicate that Bowen made any representations to the Scotts or their agents
regarding the placement of the footings in the public right-of-way of the required cul-de-
sac.

       The City of Leawood does not dispute that Bowen had the actual authority to
inspect the work being performed on the columns for building code compliance.
However, it disputes that Bowen had the actual authority to approve the placement of the
columns in the public right of way of the cul-de-sac to be dedicated to the City. We agree
with the position articulated by the City that the approval of the work by a building codes
inspector employed by the Codes Administration Department is not the equivalent of the
approval of the placement of items in a public right of way.

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       We find no evidence in the record to establish that the Codes Administration
Department was called upon to authorize the placement of the columns in the right-of-
way of the cul-de-sac required to be dedicated to the City of Leawood. Rather, a review
of the evidence in the record reveals that the subcontractor called the Codes
Administration Department for an inspection of the work on the footings of the columns.
We also find no evidence in the record to establish that the City of Leawood ever granted
Bowen—or any other employee of the Codes Administration Department—the actual
authority to authorize the placement of structures in a public right-of-way.

       We pause to note that even if Bowen had been granted actual authority to make
such decisions regarding the placement of items in a public right-of-way, there is still no
evidence in the record to establish that he ever represented to the Scotts or their agents
that it was acceptable for the columns to be placed in the public right-of-way of the cul-
de-sac required to be dedicated to the City of Leawood. Similarly, there is no evidence in
the record to establish that Bowen—or any other employee of the Codes Administration
Department—ever discussed with the Scotts or their agents the subject of whether it was
acceptable to place the columns in the required public right-of-way either prior to or
during the construction process. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record to
establish that anyone acting on behalf of the City of Leawood has ever explicitly agreed
to or authorized the placement of the north column in the public right-of-way.

       We recognize that the Scotts relied upon their contractor or subcontractors to act
on their behalf in dealing with the City of Leawood during the construction process.
However, they have not named them as defendants in this lawsuit. Hence, we do not
render an opinion regarding the potential liability of the contractor and/or the
subcontractors to the Scotts regarding the placement of the columns.

       Notwithstanding, "[w]hen an agent acts with the principal's authorization, the
agent's acts are generally imputed to the principal." Bicknell v. Kansas Dep't of Revenue,

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315 Kan. 451, 503, 509 P.3d 1211 (2022). Here, a review of the record reveals that
Eymann knew that the City of Leawood had requirements regarding the type of objects
that could and could not be placed in a public right-of-way. Likewise, Eymann testified
that he knew early in the process of constructing the Scotts' residence that the City of
Leawood would require the construction of a cul-de-sac to be dedicated to the City and
that the dedication would include a public right-of-way adjacent to the required cul-de-
sac.

       In addition, Eymann testified that he knew that the required cul-de-sac—including
the public right-of-way—was subject to final approval by the City of Leawood.
Consistent with this testimony, the record reflects that Eymann filed right-of-way permit
applications relating to the construction of the required cul-de-sac with Public Works
Department on behalf of the Scotts. Eymann also submitted the plans and specifications
for the construction of the cul-de-sac to the City on behalf of the Scotts. Although these
plans show the public right-of-way adjacent to the cul-de-sac, the stone columns were not
depicted on any of the plans or drawings submitted to the City during the construction
process.

       As the district court found, "no one ever indicated that the Columns would be built
inside the right-of-way, nor were they identified on any plans submitted to the City's
Public Works Department." At some point, a landscape architect prepared undated plans
or drawings that show where the stone columns were to be placed. However, these
drawings were also never submitted to the City of Leawood nor did the Scotts or their
contractors ever amend the plans and specifications previously submitted to depict the
projected placement of the stone columns in the public right-of-way of the cul-de-sac
required by the City.

       The parties spent a great deal of time and effort in their briefs—as well as during
oral arguments—debating about various City of Leawood ordinances. On the one hand,

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the City contends that the actual authority to decide what can and cannot be placed in a
public right-of-way has been delegated by the City Council to the Public Works Director.
On the other hand, the Scotts suggest that the delegation to the Public Works Director
applies only to already existing public right of ways. Ultimately, although these
arguments are thought-provoking, we need not decide them to resolve this appeal because
the Scotts would still need to prove that the City Council delegated the actual authority to
determine the use of a required public right-of-way to the Codes Administration
Department in order to prevail on the claims asserted in their petition.

       As discussed above, it is the governing body of a municipality that possess the
authority—and the responsibility—to address public safety, general welfare, and
economic concerns. This authority extends to the placement of reasonable restrictions on
the use of a public right-of-way. Here, there is simply no evidence to support the Scotts'
argument that the City Council explicitly delegated the actual authority to approve or
disapprove the placement of objects in a public right-of-way to Bowen or any other
employee of the Codes Administration Department.

       Accordingly, we conclude that the Scotts have failed to establish that they are
entitled to a declaratory judgment or other relief from the City of Leawood. We also
conclude that the district court's findings of fact were based on substantial competent
evidence contained in the record. Furthermore, we conclude that the district court
appropriately interpreted the law in determining that Bowen did not have the actual
authority to approve or disapprove the placement of the stone columns in the public right-
of-way of the cul-de-sac required by the City of Leawood as part of this residential
construction project. Finally, we conclude that the remedy ordered by the district court
was reasonable.

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       For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court, and we find it
unnecessary for us to reach the other issues presented by the parties in their briefs.

       Affirmed.

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