Court Opinion

ID: 9747177
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:00:20.313813+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:20.800901
License: Public Domain

Justice SAYLOR
concurring.
To the extent that the majority opinion can be construed to suggest that counsel’s investigation into some aspects of potential mitigation eliminated the need to thoroughly investigate all reasonably available avenues of mitigation—including such things as life-history mitigation and a mental health evaluation (for which the court had already allocated funds, which went unused)—I note that such a proposition is at odds with the holdings of this Court as well as those of the United States Supreme Court. See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 460, 856 A.2d 767, 788 (2004) (explaining that “ ‘strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments supported the limitations on investigation’ ”) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525, 123 S.Ct. at 2537 (describing counsel’s obligation to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1515, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a *602defendant’s báckground); see also Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 361 n. 56, 865 A.2d 761, 813 n. 56 (2004) (clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided).
Presently, Appellant demonstrated that counsel made substantial omissions in his penalty phase presentation. For example, counsel did not obtain a mental health evaluation that might have proved mitigating; his rationale was that, in his lay opinion, there was insufficient evidence of “psychological disturbance” to pursue such data. Additionally, counsel did not proffer any life-history mitigation as such. Rather, his strategy appeared to be merely to combine proofs concerning Appellant’s community-oriented activities with pleas for mercy from family members. In this course, some limited information was adduced concerning Appellant’s frequent schools changes and his childhood health problems. See N.T. Feb. 4, 1998, at 1612-14 (testimony of Appellant’s father). By contrast, PCRA counsel introduced expert evidence detailing the adverse circumstances of Appellant’s childhood—including his mother’s addiction to crack cocaine, his lack of a stable home life, frequent family altercations, and the general absence of parental involvement in his childhood—together with an assessment of the negative effects that such elements may have on individual development in the abstract. See N.T. April 26, 2004, at 32-33 (testimony of mitigation expert Melissa Lang). Counsel’s own testimony, moreover, indicated that his sentencing-phase investigative work was limited at best, as he was unaware of much of this background information. See id. at 5-12. Indeed, he conceded that he would have introduced such evidence had he been aware of it, see id. at 18, and explained, concerning his approach to the sentencing proceedings, that he was “hoping we wouldn’t get to the death penalty phase.” Id. at 15.
Nevertheless, I am ultimately able to join the result reached by the majority because Appellant has not, in my view, demonstrated sufficient prejudice to cast doubt upon the
*603reliability of the verdict. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). Although Appellant’s mitigation specialist did, as noted, provide an account of Appellant’s childhood that was more thorough than that which the jury heard, she did not attempt to connect such factors with the crime other than in a highly generalized manner, namely, by indicating that Appellant’s negative childhood experiences are known to be predictors of criminal activity. See N.T. April 26, 2004, at 27-28, 32. PCRA counsel, moreover, did not introduce any expert psychological or psychiatric evidence that might have more convincingly connected Appellant’s formative environment with his own specific developmental limitations or with the crime itself. Cf. State v. Josephs, 174 N.J. 44, 803 A.2d 1074, 1124 (2002) (finding prosecutorial remarks criticizing the testimony of a similar mitigation expert proper, where the expert failed to consult any mental health professionals such as a psychologist or psychiatrist in preparing her report). In consideration of all of these circumstances, then, I am able to conclude, on this record, that a new penalty hearing is not required.
Justices NIGRO and BAER join this concurring opinion.