Court Opinion

ID: 9520477
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:40:36.841022+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:18.374445
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE REINHARD, dissenting in part: For the following reasons, I respectfully dissent from that part of the opinion which finds that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of necessity. In my view, the majority, under the facts of this case, has confused the availability of the affirmative defense of necessity with defendant’s actual defense that he did not know he was involved in an accident or collision. Defendant was charged, inter alia, with leaving the scene of an accident pursuant to section 11 — 401(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95½, par. 11—401(a)). This section imposes upon the driver a duty to render aid and to provide specified information to the victims of the accident. (People v. Nunn (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 243, 247, 396 N.E.2d 27; see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95½, par. 11-403.) To show a violation of section 11 — 401(a), the prosecution is required to prove that the accused had knowledge that the vehicle he was driving was involved in an accident or collision. Nunn, 77 Ill. 2d at 252, 396 N.E.2d at 31. Defendant’s limited trial testimony of the cause of this occurrence was that he believed “somebody had thrown something at me and that I had to get out of there and go home and call the police.” This is not evidence of an accident or collision for which he had the duty to stop pursuant to section 11 — 401(a). Rather, these facts would tend to establish that someone, in an act of vandalism, had thrown something at his vehicle. In this situation, there has been no accident or collision for which defendant had any duty to stop and render aid or information. Accordingly, the affirmative defense of necessity, which involves the choice between two admitted evils (People v. Unger (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 333, 340, 362 N.E.2d 319), is inapplicable as defendant’s conduct in leaving the scene of the occurrence, under these circumstances, would not be an offense. Instead, defendant’s trial testimony that he believed someone had thrown something at him and that he went home to call the police is consistent with a defense that he did not know he was involved in an accident or collision and was justified in going home and calling the police to report the incident. The State is required to prove defendant knew he was in an accident or collision. (Nunn, 77 Ill. 2d at 252, 396 N.E.2d at 31.) In my opinion, defendant’s testimony refutes this element of the offense rather than establishes the affirmative defense of necessity, which would involve defendant knowing he was in an accident, yet leaving the scene reasonably believing that such conduct was necessary to avoid an injury greater than that resulting from his own conduct. There is no evidence that defendant believed he had a duty to stop under these circumstances. The necessity defense involves an assertion that the conduct involved promotes some higher value than the value of literal compliance with the law. (See People v. Planer (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 938, 941-42, 515 N.E.2d 1042.) Simply put, defendant’s testimony does not reflect that he was confronted with and made such a choice. On this record, the trial court properly denied defendant’s tendered instructions on the defense of necessity. (See People v. Ballard (1975), 59 Ill. 2d 580, 585, 322 N.E.2d 473.) The jury heard defendant’s defense to this charge and rejected it. I would affirm the conviction for leaving the scene of an accident.