Court Opinion

ID: 9868163
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 18:03:52.39408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:09.712494
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/26/23 P. v. Lopez CA4/2

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      E081551

 v.                                                                      (Super.Ct.No. FSB21002426)

 SARAH DEBORAH LOPEZ,                                                    OPINION

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Ronald M.

Christianson, (retired judge of the San Bernardino Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief

Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.), and Cheryl C. Kersey, Judges.

Affirmed.

         James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

         No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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                                   I. INTRODUCTION

       Defendant and appellant Sarah Deborah Lopez appeals the trial court’s

postjudgment order denying her purported motion to amend the judgment to show that

she was not directed to serve a term of parole upon her release from custody. Counsel

has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216

(Delgadillo), requesting this court to conduct an independent review of the record. In

addition, defendant has had an opportunity to file a supplemental brief with this court and

has not done so. Because defendant’s counsel filed a brief raising no issues and

defendant was notified that failure to timely file a supplemental brief may result in the

dismissal of the appeal as abandoned and was given an opportunity to file a personal

supplemental brief but failed to do so, we may dismiss the appeal. Even if we exercise

our discretion to conduct an independent review of the record in the interest of justice, we

find no meritorious arguable issue and affirm the postjudgment order. (Delgadillo, at

pp. 228, 232.)

                                   II. BACKGROUND

       On August 24, 2021, an information was filed charging defendant with first degree

residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) with another person, other than an accomplice,

present (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (c)). The information also alleged that defendant had

suffered a prior serious and/or violent felony strike conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 667,

subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (d)).

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       On April 18, 2022, pursuant to a negotiated disposition, defendant pled no contest

to the charge and admitted the allegation that another person was present during the

commission of the residential burglary. In return, the prior strike conviction allegation

was dismissed, and defendant was promised a two-year sentence with credit for time

served. Prior to pleading no contest, defendant executed, initialed, and signed a felony

plea form. Within the plea form, in relevant part, defendant initialed box 5b which

stated: “Any state prison commitment will be followed by a period [of] PAROLE of 3 to

4 years . . . . Any violation of the terms of parole could result in up to an additional year

in custody for each violation, up to a maximum of 4 years, 7 years, or life.” After

questioning and examining the plea form with defendant, the trial court found that

defendant read and understood the declaration and plea form, the nature of the charges,

the consequence of punishment, and her constitutional rights. The court also found that

defendant knowingly, intelligently, freely, and voluntarily waived her rights, that

defendant personally and orally entered the plea in open court, that there was a factual

basis for the plea based on the preliminary hearing transcript, and that the plea was given

freely, knowingly, and intelligently.

       Defendant was sentenced on June 15, 2022, in accordance with her plea

agreement, to two years in prison with actual and conduct credits of two years. The trial

court deemed defendant’s sentence served and ordered her released from custody.

Thereafter, the court specifically directed defendant to report to county parole within 24

hours of her release “to go over all of [her] terms and conditions of [ ] parole.”

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       On May 8, 2023, defendant filed a written letter to the trial court indicating that

her judgment erroneously reflected that she was directed to serve a term of parole upon

her release from custody and that was not part of the agreement. Defendant sought to

have her “files” and minute order “updated” to reflect no parole as part of her plea

agreement.

       On May 30, 2023, the trial court denied defendant’s request to correct the minute

order. Defendant timely appealed.

                                    III. DISCUSSION

       After defendant appealed, appointed appellate counsel filed a brief under the

authority of Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216, setting forth a statement of the case and a

summary of the procedural background. (See People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436

(Wende); Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders).) Counsel considered

potential issues on appeal but found no specific arguments as grounds for relief, and

requests that we exercise our discretion and independently examine the appellate record

for any arguable issues. Under Anders, which requires “a brief referring to anything in

the record that might arguably support the appeal” (Anders, at p. 744), counsel raises the

issue of whether the trial court erred in denying defendant’s request to correct the

judgment and sentencing minute order.

       We offered defendant an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, and she

has not done so.

                                              4
       In Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216, the California Supreme Court held that

Wende and Anders procedures do not apply in appeals from the denial of a Penal Code

section 1172.6 postjudgment petition. (Delgadillo, at pp. 224-226.) Thus, we need not

examine the entire record ourselves to look for arguable grounds for reversal. (Id. at

p. 228.) Because defendant’s counsel filed a brief raising no issues, and defendant was

given an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief but declined, we may dismiss

the appeal as abandoned. (Id. at p. 232.) “Independent review in Wende appeals

consumes substantial judicial resources,” and “[t]he state . . . has an interest in an

‘economical and expeditious resolution’ of an appeal from a decision that is

‘presumptively accurate and just.’” (Id. at p. 229.)

       We, however, have discretion to conduct Wende review even when it is not

required. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.) Although this case does not call for

us to exercise our discretion to independently examine the record for arguable issues,

even if we exercised our discretion to independently examine the record, defendant’s

record of conviction shows that she agreed to a term of parole for a period of three to

four years. Defendant never objected to the term during her sentencing hearing and after

the trial court ordered her to report to parole upon her release from custody. Moreover,

“‘the length of a parole term is not a permissible subject of plea negotiations.’

[Citation.].” (Berman v. Cate (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 885, 894 (Berman), quoting In re

Moser (1993) 6 Cal.4th 342, 357.) “‘[T]he court is authorized neither to determine

whether a parole period shall be served nor to prescribe its duration; that is the province

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of the Board of Prison Terms.’ [Citations.]” (Berman, at p. 894, citing People v.

McMillion (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1369; People v. Renfro (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th

223, 232.) “As ‘there is no legal mechanism for negotiating a plea agreement

containing . . . reduced time on parole, the imposition of parole at sentencing simply

cannot be regarded as a breach of such an agreement.’ [Citation.] Parole periods cannot

be the subject of negotiations nor a condition of a final negotiated plea. [Citation.]”

(Berman, at pp. 894-895.) Therefore, even if by any stretch of the imagination the

negotiated plea agreement could be deemed to have incorporated a no term of parole

upon defendant’s release, the term would remain unenforceable. (Id. at p. 895.)

                                    IV. DISPOSITION

       The trial court’s order denying defendant’s request to correct the sentencing

minute order and/or judgment is affirmed.

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                                CODRINGTON
                                                                                          J.
We concur:

McKINSTER
                Acting P. J.

MILLER
                           J.

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