Court Opinion

ID: 9383007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-29 15:14:09.250536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:43.552645
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                               FOURTH DISTRICT

    TRAVELERS HOME AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, and
                     SCOTT ALBEE,
                       Appellants,

                                       v.

                  WEST BOCA COLLISION, INC., a/a/o
                         ROSEMARY SOTO,
                             Appellee.

                                No. 4D22-716

                              [March 29, 2023]

  Appeal from the County Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
Beach County; Frank S. Castor, Judge; L.T. Case No. 50-2017-SC-
003317-XXXX-SB.

  Jack R. Reiter and Robert C. Weill of GrayRobinson, P.A., Miami, for
appellants.

  Jeffrey J. Molinaro of Fuerst Ittleman David & Joseph, Miami, for
appellee.

PER CURIAM.

    We reverse the order requiring appellant and appellant’s attorney to pay
$3,200 in attorney’s fees as a sanction for litigation conduct. 1 While a
court has inherent authority to impose attorney’s fees against an attorney
for bad faith conduct, the court must make “an express finding of bad faith
conduct [which] must be supported by detailed factual findings describing
the specific acts of bad faith conduct that resulted in the unnecessary
incurrence of attorneys’ fees.” Moakley v. Smallwood, 826 So. 2d 221, 227
(Fla. 2002). “Although the magic words ‘bad faith’ are not necessary, the
trial court must use equivalent language to describe the sanctionable
conduct.” Hicks v. Hicks, 284 So. 3d 576, 579 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019). While
the order in this case detailed conduct that the court found “improper,”
the court did not find bad faith or use any “equivalent language.” See id.

1We are without jurisdiction to address the remainder of the sanction order. See
Ruppel v. Gulf Winds Apartments, Inc., 508 So. 2d 534, 535 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).
We have examined the attorney’s conduct and cannot conclude that it
constituted the type of vexatious litigation conduct that would warrant
exercising the court’s inherent sanction authority.

   Reversed with directions to vacate the sanction order assessing
attorney’s fees.

GERBER and LEVINE, JJ., concur.
WARNER, J., dissents without opinion.

                          *        *       *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                                   2