Court Opinion

ID: 9940249
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-13 19:00:39.556606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:41.253814
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-2049     Document: 010110999688       Date Filed: 02/13/2024    Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                         February 13, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                         Nos. 23-2049
                                                    (D.C. No. 2:10-CR-02135-RB-1)
  EDDIE JOE REZA,                                              (D.N.M.)

       Defendant - Appellant.
 _________________________________

  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                          No. 23-2050
                                                    (D.C. No. 5:21-CR-01042-RB-1)
  EDDIE JOE REZA,                                              (D.N.M.)

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, McHUGH, and EID, Circuit Judges.
                    _________________________________

       On July 17, 2020, a known source informed law enforcement that Appellant

 Eddie Joe Reza, a known felon, was in possession of firearms and fentanyl pills and

       *
          This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
 of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
 its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and
 Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-2049     Document: 010110999688         Date Filed: 02/13/2024     Page: 2

 driving a specific vehicle in a particular area of Carlsbad, New Mexico. Within a few

 hours, an officer in the identified area spotted the vehicle and initiated a traffic stop

 because the vehicle’s registration was expired. Mr. Reza was the driver. When

 officers searched the vehicle, they found firearms and fentanyl pills.

        Mr. Reza was arrested and charged with being a felon in possession of

 firearms and ammunition. Prior to trial, Mr. Reza moved to suppress the evidence

 from the search. The district court denied his motion, concluding the search was

 justified under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Mr. Reza

 entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his

 suppression motion. Mr. Reza challenges that ruling on appeal. Concluding there was

 probable cause to believe Mr. Reza was in possession of contraband at the time of the

 search, we affirm.

                               I.        BACKGROUND

                                    A.   Factual History1

        Between 8:00 and 10:00 p.m. on July 17, 2020, Carlsbad Police Department

 (“CPD”) Detective Chad Herrera received an unsolicited phone call about Mr. Reza.

 The call was from a “source of information,” a term used to describe citizens who

 provide law enforcement with tips about suspicious activities. The source advised

        1
          When reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept
 “the district court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous and view[] the evidence
 in the light most favorable to the prevailing party,” in this case the Government.
 United States v. Fonseca, 744 F.3d 674, 680 (10th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks
 omitted).
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 Detective Herrera that Mr. Reza was driving around the Lea Street area of Carlsbad

 with firearms and fentanyl pills. The source had seen Mr. Reza with the firearms and

 fentanyl on July 16, the day before the call. The source also stated Mr. Reza was

 driving a white Nissan SUV with chrome rims.

       Detective Herrera was familiar with Mr. Reza because he had previously

 interviewed him as part of a burglary investigation. During that investigation,

 Detective Herrera’s coworkers informed him that Mr. Reza was known to possess

 firearms and exhibit violent tendencies toward law enforcement. Detective Herrera

 was also familiar with the identified vehicle—it belonged to Mr. Reza’s mother, and

 Mr. Reza was known to drive it.

       Detective Herrera knew the source’s identity and determined the information

 was credible.2 The source had provided Detective Herrera with valid information the

 month before, leading to the arrest of a felon in possession of a firearm. Additionally,

 Detective Herrera had never known the source to provide false information. And, to

 Detective Herrera’s knowledge, the source was not facing criminal charges and did

 not receive payment or other special treatment for providing information. However,

 Detective Herrera did not know if the source had a criminal history.

       2
          Mr. Reza incorrectly refers to the source as “anonymous.” Appellant’s Br. at
 11. At oral argument, he clarified that by “anonymous,” he means the source’s
 identity is unknown to him, even if known to the officers. He further clarified he is
 not arguing the district court clearly erred by finding that Detective Herrera knew the
 source’s identity.
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       Immediately after speaking with the source, Detective Herrera passed the tip

 along to Sergeant John Sneathen, a CPD supervisor assigned to the Pecos Valley

 Drug Task Force (“Drug Task Force”). Sergeant Sneathen knew the source’s identity

 and considered the information “significant.” ROA Vol. I at 121.3 He also knew

 Mr. Reza drove a white Nissan SUV with chrome rims and had been involved in a

 “large-scale shoot-out” several years earlier with law enforcement. Id.

       The source’s tip corroborated other information Sergeant Sneathen had

 received about Mr. Reza. Over the past three months, the Drug Task Force had

 received anonymous “Crime Stoppers tips” that Mr. Reza was selling fentanyl. Id.

 at 122. Sergeant Sneathen had also received information from a different confidential

 source who personally told him Mr. Reza was selling fentanyl in Carlsbad.4 That

 confidential source, who was known to Sergeant Sneathen, reported seeing Mr. Reza

 in possession of fentanyl and explained that Mr. Reza was known in the area’s drug

 culture as a source for purchasing fentanyl pills. Sergeant Sneathen believed this

 information was reliable because the confidential source had previously provided

       3
         The record on appeal in this matter is split between two case numbers which
 have been consolidated for appeal: 23-2050 contains the record pertaining to
 Mr. Reza’s indictment and conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm and
 ammunition, including the relevant motion to suppress; and 23-2049 contains the
 record pertaining to Mr. Reza’s revocation of supervised release, based on the same
 charged conduct. All record citations are to the record in case number 23-2050.
       4
         We describe this source as a “confidential source” because that is the term
 Sergeant Sneathen used. But this source and the source who provided the July 17,
 2020 tip were known to officers.
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 information and purchased narcotics for the Drug Task Force. Furthermore, Sergeant

 Sneathen knew of no reason to doubt the confidential source’s information.

       Sergeant Sneathen relayed the information provided by Detective Herrera to

 the on-call Drug Task Force Agent, Devon Stinson. Agent Stinson knew Mr. Reza

 drove a white Nissan SUV with chrome rims and was familiar with his history of

 violence and the reports of drug trafficking. Agent Stinson, in turn, contacted the

 CPD on-duty supervisor, Sergeant Adrian Rodriguez. Agent Stinson relayed the

 source’s report that Mr. Reza was in the area and possessed firearms and fentanyl,

 and also provided a photograph of Mr. Reza’s vehicle.

       During pre-shift briefing, Sergeant Rodriguez shared the information and

 photograph with his graveyard-shift officers, including Officer Israel Rodriguez.

 Sergeant Rodriguez told them to be on the lookout for Mr. Reza, who was driving a

 white SUV and possibly dealing fentanyl pills and in possession of firearms. Sergeant

 Rodriguez also provided the officers with the SUV’s license plate number.

       Around 11:00 p.m. that night, a CPD officer communicated over the radio that

 Mr. Reza’s white Nissan was parked at a convenience store. Officer Rodriguez

 responded by parking his patrol car a block from the store, near the intersection of

 Texas Street and Fifth Street. This intersection was about half a mile, or several

 blocks, from Lea Street, where the source had said Mr. Reza would be.

       Mr. Reza’s Nissan began traveling eastbound on Texas Street, toward the

 intersection with Fifth Street. Officer Rodriguez pulled out behind the Nissan, ran the

 license plate over the radio, and was informed by dispatch that the vehicle’s

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 registration had expired. The Nissan then turned on North Fifth Street, with Officer

 Rodriguez following. Officer Rodriguez knew the area of North Fifth Street, and the

 nearby Colonial Hillcrest Apartments, to be a high crime area. Specially, he was

 aware of homicides, shoot-outs, and burglaries that had occurred there, and he had

 personally arrested several people for felony warrants in the apartments. North Fifth

 Street is a two-lane, residential road, with several dirt areas where cars can pull off

 the road.

       About forty-five seconds after pulling behind the Nissan, Officer Rodriguez

 engaged his emergency overhead lights to initiate a traffic stop. Rather than pulling

 over, the Nissan continued on North Fifth Street, passing several dirt areas where it

 could have safely pulled over. There were no other vehicles on the road, and nothing

 obstructed the driver’s view of Officer Rodriguez’s lights. The driver’s failure to

 promptly pull over was significant to Officer Rodriguez because in his experience,

 drivers typically pull over as soon as they see an officer’s emergency overhead lights

 and it is safe to pull over. Also in his experience, drivers who do not stop are calling

 someone, preparing to jump out of the car, or planning to flee the traffic stop. When

 the Nissan still did not pull over, Officer Rodriguez honked his “Rumbler”—a device

 that makes noise and shakes the ground to get the attention of distracted drivers—

 twice in an attempt to get the vehicle to stop. Id. at 168.

       After traveling about 300 meters from where Officer Rodriguez had first

 engaged his emergency lights, the Nissan turned into a parking area of the Colonial

 Hillcrest Apartments and came to a stop partly in a parking spot. Officer Rodriguez

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 parked behind the Nissan and was soon joined by three other officers. From his patrol

 car, Officer Rodriguez saw the Nissan’s driver inexplicably roll the passenger-side

 window down, then roll it back up. Officer Rodriguez testified that his “alert levels

 were a little bit up” based on his knowledge of CPD’s previous encounters with

 Mr. Reza, Mr. Reza’s flag as “armed and dangerous” in CPD’s system, and

 information from Sergeant Rodriguez that Mr. Reza might be armed. Id. at 167.

       Once Officer Rodriguez saw the driver roll the window back up, he exited his

 patrol car and approached the driver’s side window. He asked the driver for his

 license, registration, and proof of insurance. The driver provided his license, and

 Officer Rodriguez identified him as Mr. Reza. Officer Rodriguez noticed the address

 listed on the driver’s license was not near the area of the traffic stop. After providing

 his license, Mr. Reza explained the Nissan was his mother’s, he was unaware the

 registration had expired, and he could not find proof of insurance. Officer Rodriguez

 asked Mr. Reza to call his mother to ask if she could provide proof of insurance.

 Mr. Reza called his mother but was unable to provide proof of insurance after

 speaking with her for several minutes.

       Officer Rodriguez testified that had Mr. Reza been able to provide proof of

 insurance, he would have cited Mr. Reza for the expired registration, but he would

 have been free to leave. Because Mr. Reza could not provide proof of insurance,

 Officer Rodriguez—based on his understanding of CPD policy—decided to cite

 Mr. Reza for the expired registration, issue a warning for the lack of insurance, and

 have the Nissan towed. Officer Rodriguez completed the citations and asked

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 Mr. Reza to exit the vehicle and approach his patrol car. Officer Rodriguez explained

 the citations, and Mr. Reza signed them. Officer Rodriguez told Mr. Reza the Nissan

 would be towed and asked him if he needed anything from the vehicle. Mr. Reza

 asked for his wallet and house keys.

       Officer Rodriguez retrieved a wallet from the Nissan and looked through its

 contents to establish it was Mr. Reza’s and to verify it did not contain weapons or

 contraband. Officer Rodriguez did not have a warrant or Mr. Reza’s consent to search

 the wallet, but he believed he could search items to be sure he was not returning

 weapons or contraband to Mr. Reza.

       Officer Rodriguez also retrieved Mr. Reza’s key chain from the car and

 brought it to him so he could remove his house keys. A coin pouch was attached to

 the chain, and as Officer Rodriguez was walking to Mr. Reza, he felt the outside of

 the pouch. Based on his training and experience, the pouch contained pills that felt

 like fentanyl pills. Officer Rodriguez opened the pouch and saw different colored

 pills that, based on his training and experience, were consistent with contraband.

 Officer Rodriguez did not have a search warrant for the coin pouch, nor did he have

 Mr. Reza’s consent, but he believed he was authorized to look in the pouch as part of

 an inventory search.

       At that point, Officer Rodriguez advised Mr. Reza of his Miranda rights and

 asked him about the pills. Mr. Reza declined to answer questions about the pills, and

 Officer Rodriguez placed him under arrest for possession of a controlled substance.

 Officer Rodriguez handcuffed Mr. Reza, sat him in the back seat of his patrol car,

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 and continued searching the Nissan. He searched the driver-side area while another

 officer searched the passenger side. The officer searching the passenger side found a

 black handgun in the back pocket of the passenger seat.

       Upon finding the handgun and in accordance with CPD policy, the officers

 stopped their search and contacted Sergeant Sneathen. Sergeant Sneathen instructed

 Officer Rodriguez to stop everything, seal the vehicle, and wait for a search warrant.

 Officer Rodriguez sealed the vehicle and, after Sergeant Sneathen and Agent Stinson

 arrived to take over the investigation, transported Mr. Reza to the CPD.

       After obtaining a search warrant, Sergeant Sneathen and Agent Stinson

 searched the Nissan. They found a loaded Taurus nine-millimeter handgun in the

 back pocket of the front passenger seat, a Smith & Wesson .40 caliber handgun inside

 a duffel bag on the backseat, a large quantity of ammunition matching both firearms,

 also inside the duffel bag, and several pills which later tested positive for fentanyl.

                                B.     Procedural History

       At the time of his arrest, Mr. Reza was a convicted felon on supervised release.

 Accordingly, Mr. Reza was indicted on one count of felon in possession of a firearm

 and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924. Because Mr. Reza

 was on supervised release, this charge led to two separate proceedings: prosecution

 of the charge itself and revocation of Mr. Reza’s supervised release.

       Mr. Reza moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the July 2020 traffic

 stop. He argued the search of his vehicle was not supported by probable cause and

 was not justified as an inventory search. In response, the Government argued there

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  was probable cause, but it did not contend the “decision to impound and inventory

  the Nissan” justified the search. ROA Vol. I at 67 n.1.

         At the ensuing evidentiary hearing, the district court heard testimony from

  Detective Herrera, Sergeant Sneathen, Agent Stinson, and Officer Rodriguez. The

  Government also presented Officer Rodriguez’s dash-camera footage, his body-worn-

  camera footage, and photographs taken during the vehicle search. Following the

  hearing and the parties’ submission of their proposed findings of fact and conclusions

  of law, the district court denied Mr. Reza’s Motion to Suppress. The court concluded

  that the search of Mr. Reza’s vehicle was supported by probable cause and

  acknowledged that the Government did not argue the search was justified as an

  inventory search. The court further explained that Officer Rodriguez’s subjective

  intent was irrelevant to its analysis.

         Following the court’s denial of his Motion to Suppress, Mr. Reza pleaded

  guilty pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), reserving his right

  to appeal the denial of the Motion to Suppress. The district court entered judgment,

  and Mr. Reza timely appealed.

                                 II.       DISCUSSION

         Mr. Reza argues the district court erred in concluding there was probable cause

  to search his vehicle. He also argues the search was unlawful because Officer

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  Rodriguez subjectively (and incorrectly) believed it was an inventory search. Finally,

  he contends Officer Rodriguez unlawfully extended the stop.

        We first outline the standard of review and the applicable Fourth Amendment

  law. Next, we assess each of Mr. Reza’s arguments, concluding that none

  demonstrate error in the district court’s ruling.

                                   A.     Standard of Review

        “When reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we will

  consider the totality of the circumstances and view the evidence in a light most

  favorable to the government.” United States v. Kimoana, 383 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th

  Cir. 2004). We accept the district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly

  erroneous. Id. Factual findings are clearly erroneous only “if they are without factual

  support in the record” or if, “after reviewing the evidence, [we are] firmly convinced

  that a mistake has been made.” Leathers v. Leathers, 856 F.3d 729, 762 (10th

  Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). We defer to the district court on

  witness credibility, the weight to be given evidence, and the reasonable inferences to

  draw from the evidence. Kimoana, 383 F.3d at 1220. But “[t]he ultimate

  determination of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is a question of law

  [we] review[] de novo.” Id.

                              B.        Fourth Amendment Law

        The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

  persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”

  U.S. Const. amend. IV. Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, but

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  there are exceptions. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438, 456 (2016). Under

  the “automobile exception,” “a warrantless search is permissible if there is probable

  cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband.” United States v. Edwards, 632

  F.3d 633, 645 (10th Cir. 2001). If probable cause exists, law enforcement may

  lawfully “search any package within the vehicle that is capable of concealing”

  contraband. Id.

        When assessing probable cause, we consider the totality of the circumstances,

  rather than viewing facts in isolation. United States v. Ledesma, 447 F.3d 1307, 1316

  (10th Cir. 2006). “Even where a particular factor, considered in isolation, is of

  limited significance and must be discount[ed], it nonetheless may affect the Fourth

  Amendment analysis when combined with other indicia of probable cause or

  reasonable suspicion.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

        The government bears the burden of showing probable cause existed when the

  search occurred. United States v. Chavez, 985 F.3d 1234, 1240 (10th Cir. 2021). If

  the government does not carry its burden, then the unlawfully obtained evidence must

  be excluded from trial. Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 237 (2016). The exclusionary

  rule applies both to “primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search

  or seizure” and “evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of illegality.”

  Id. (quoting Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984)).

                                  C.     Probable Cause

        After considering all relevant facts, the district court concluded “there was

  probable cause to search [Mr.] Reza’s vehicle for contraband.” ROA Vol. I at 267.

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  Mr. Reza argues the court erred in its analysis. Below, we review the facts considered

  by the district court, first individually and then collectively. Considering the totality

  of the circumstances, we conclude there was probable cause to believe Mr. Reza was

  in possession of contraband at the time of the search.

  1.    The July 17, 2020 Tip

        When deciding whether a tip supports probable cause, we consider all relevant

  factors, “including the informant’s veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge.”

  United States v. Hendrix, 664 F.3d 1334, 1338 (10th Cir. 2011). These factors are

  intertwined and “not absolute, independent requirements that must be satisfied in

  order for probable cause to exist.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Thus, a “deficiency

  in one factor may be compensated for by a strong showing of another or by other

  indicia of reliability.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

        “Veracity concerns whether there is reason to believe that the informant is

  telling the truth, including whether he faces criminal charges or whether his

  statement is against his own penal interest.” United States v. Quezada-Enriquez, 567

  F.3d 1228, 1233 (10th Cir. 2009); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233–34

  (1983) (“[I]f an unquestionably honest citizen comes forward with a report of

  criminal activity—which if fabricated would subject him to criminal liability—we

  have found rigorous scrutiny of the basis of his knowledge unnecessary.”).

        Here, Detective Herrera’s source was not facing criminal charges and did not

  receive special treatment or payment for providing the information. This

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  demonstrates the source’s veracity. See Quezada-Enriquez, 567 F.3d at 1233; Gates,

  462 U.S. at 233–34 (discussing the veracity of citizen-informants).

        The next factor, reliability, inquires “whether the informant has provided

  accurate information in the past.” Quezada-Enriquez, 567 F.3d at 1233. Additionally,

  the fact that an informant’s identity was known to law enforcement at the time of the

  statements indicates both reliability and veracity. United States v. Pulliam, 748 F.3d

  967, 971 & n.2 (10th Cir. 2014); cf. United States v. Johnson, 364 F.3d 1185, 1190

  (10th Cir. 2004) (“A tipster who refuses to identify himself may simply be making up

  the story, perhaps trying to use the police to harass another citizen.”).

        In this case, the source historically provided accurate information, thus

  indicating reliability. See Quezada-Enriquez, 567 F.3d at 1233. Detective Herrera

  received information from the same source the previous month, who had proved

  accurate and led to the arrest of a felon in possession of a firearm. Detective Herrera

  further testified he had never known the source to provide false information.

  Additionally, he and Sergeant Sneathen knew the source’s identity. This indicates

  both reliability and veracity. Pulliam, 748 F.3d at 971 & n.2; see also Florida v. J.L.,

  529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000) (contrasting an anonymous tip with one from “a known

  informant whose reputation can be assessed and who can be held responsible if her

  allegations turn out to be fabricated”).

        With the third factor, basis of knowledge, an informant’s tip is entitled to

  greater weight if it is based on firsthand observation rather than secondhand

  information. Quezada-Enriquez, 567 F.3d at 1233. When an informant’s basis of

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  knowledge is not apparent, we ask whether the tip included “the kind of highly

  specific or personal details from which one could reasonably infer that the

  [informant] had firsthand knowledge about the claimed criminal activity” or whether

  the informant provided accurate predictive information that was confirmed by law

  enforcement observation. Id. (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted); see

  also J.L., 529 U.S. at 271 (discussing accurate predictive information as an indicia of

  reliability).

         The source’s information here was based at least in part on firsthand

  observation. While the source did not explain the basis for knowing Mr. Reza would

  be in the Lea Street area that night, the source had personally observed Mr. Reza in

  possession of firearms and fentanyl the day before. Thus, the source’s information is

  entitled to greater weight to the extent it was based on recent, firsthand knowledge of

  Mr. Reza’s criminal activity.5 See Quezada-Enriquez, 567 F.3d at 1233.

         5
            The Government argues the source’s information that Mr. Reza would be
  driving a white Nissan SUV with chrome rims in the vicinity of Lea Street was
  directly corroborated by law enforcement observation, lending additional credibility
  to the source. Accurate predictive information, even regarding banal activity, may
  lend credibility to a source’s knowledge and assertions. See Florida v. J.L., 529
  U.S. 266, 270–71 (2000) (discussing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990),
  wherein an anonymous tip gave rise to reasonable suspicion that a woman was
  carrying contraband only after observation confirmed the informant had accurately
  predicted the woman’s movements). But while “[k]nowledge about a person’s future
  movements indicates some familiarity with that person’s affairs, [it] does not
  necessarily imply that the informant knows . . . whether that person is [engaged in
  criminal activity].” Id. at 271. A tip must “be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not
  just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.” Id. at 272. Thus, while law
  enforcement observation confirmed the source provided accurate predictive
  information regarding Mr. Reza’s whereabouts and the appearance of his car, we
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        For these reasons, the veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge for the

  July 17, 2020 tip all support probable cause. But here we need not conclude that tip

  alone established probable cause.

  2.    Corroborating Tips

        Additional tips can further corroborate a source’s information, particularly if

  they are from an independent source, and even if they are anonymous. United States

  v. Artez, 389 F.3d 1106, 1114 (10th Cir. 2004); see also United States v. Sturmoski,

  971 F.2d 452, 457 (10th Cir. 1992) (discussing the independent information

  corroborating a tip).

        Here, there were two sources corroborating the July 17, 2020 tip. First, the

  Drug Task Force had received anonymous “Crime Stoppers tips” that Mr. Reza was

  selling fentanyl in Carlsbad. ROA Vol. I at 122. Additionally, an identified

  confidential source personally told Sergeant Sneathen that Mr. Reza was selling

  fentanyl and was a known source for purchasing pills. These tips came in the months

  leading up to Mr. Reza’s arrest and further corroborated the July 17, 2020 tip.

        Nevertheless, Mr. Reza faults the Government for not providing more

  information about these corroborating sources. While the record does not contain

  details of the veracity, reliability, or basis of knowledge for the anonymous “Crime

  Stoppers tips,” Sergeant Sneathen provided more information about his corroborating

  accord less weight to the corroboration of “innocent, innocuous information.” United
  States v. Quezada-Enriquez, 567 F.3d 1228, 1233 (10th Cir. 2009).

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  source. For example, the confidential source had previously provided him with

  truthful information and had purchased narcotics for the Drug Task Force. The

  confidential source had also seen Mr. Reza in possession of fentanyl and heard,

  through word-of-mouth in the area’s drug culture, that Mr. Reza was a known source

  for purchasing pills. Thus, the information was based at least partially on firsthand

  knowledge and came from a source who was not anonymous and had provided

  accurate information in the past. These factors all weigh in favor of the veracity,

  reliability, and knowledge basis for the corroborating confidential source’s

  information. See Quezada-Enriquez, 567 F.3d at 1233.

        In sum, the confidential source’s information and the anonymous Crime

  Stopper’s tips helped corroborate the July 17, 2020 tip and support probable cause.

  See Artez, 389 F.3d at 1114.

  3.    Known Criminal History

        An individual’s “prior criminal history is by itself insufficient to create [even]

  reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Santos, 403 F.3d 1120, 1132 (10th Cir. 2005).

  “[P]eople with prior convictions retain Fourth Amendment rights” and “are not

  roving targets for warrantless searches.” Id. But a person’s criminal history, when

  considered alongside other factors, may contribute to our analysis and “cast a

  suspicious light on other seemingly innocent behavior.” United States v. Davis, 636

  F.3d 1281, 1291 (10th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted); see also Santos, 403

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  F.3d at 1132 (“But in conjunction with other factors, criminal history contributes

  powerfully to the reasonable suspicion calculus.”).

         When Officer Rodriguez pulled Mr. Reza over, his criminal history was well

  known to CPD officers, including Officer Rodriguez. Multiple officers testified to

  Mr. Reza’s history of violence toward law enforcement, in particular his involvement

  in a shoot-out with CPD officers. Officer Rodriguez testified that he was aware of

  Mr. Reza’s previous violent encounters with CPD officers and that Mr. Reza was

  “flagged as armed and dangerous” in CPD’s system. ROA Vol. I at 167.

         While Mr. Reza’s known criminal history would not support probable cause on

  its own, it is another factor to be considered in the probable cause calculus.

  4.     Failure to Promptly Yield

         There may be a reasonable explanation for a person’s failure to immediately

  stop when an officer activates emergency lights, but “it [is] also reasonable for [an

  officer] to interpret the action as potentially indicative of criminal activity.” See

  Courtney v. Oklahoma ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 722 F.3d 1216, 1224 (10th

  Cir. 2013).

         Officer Rodriguez testified that, in his experience, drivers ordinarily pull over

  immediately when signaled to do so and that a failure to promptly yield may indicate

  a person is calling someone or about to flee. He also testified that after he engaged

  his emergency lights, Mr. Reza drove past multiple safe areas to pull over, and

  Officer Rodriguez could see no reason for Mr. Reza’s failure to promptly yield.

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  Indeed, it was only after Officer Rodriguez twice activated his Rumbler that

  Mr. Reza stopped.

        While there may be an innocent explanation for Mr. Reza’s actions, in our

  totality of the circumstances analysis “[w]e give deference to an officer’s ability to

  distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions.” United States v. Lyons, 510

  F.3d 1225, 1237 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly,

  Mr. Reza’s failure to pull over promptly when Officer Rodriguez engaged his

  emergency lights supports probable cause.

  5.    High Crime Area

        A person’s presence in a high crime area is not by itself sufficient to support

  even a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, let alone probable cause. Illinois v.

  Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). “But officers are not required to ignore the

  relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are

  sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.” Id. Accordingly, the fact that

  the stop occurred in a high crime area is a contextual consideration relevant to our

  analysis. See id.; United States v. Charles, 576 F.3d 1060, 1065 (10th Cir. 2009) (“It

  is also a relevant consideration, though not necessarily dispositive, that the officers

  . . . encountered [the defendant] late at night[] and in a high-crime area.”).

        The Government contends Mr. Reza’s “presence in a notoriously high-crime

  area late at night,” while not enough alone to justify a search, is a relevant

  consideration. Appellee’s Br. at 18. Mr. Reza replies that there are no facts in the

  record to support the assertion that the traffic stop occurred in a high crime area. But

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  the district court’s finding that Mr. Reza drove toward an area “known for its high

  rate of violent crime” was supported by Officer Rodriguez’s testimony. ROA Vol. I

  at 264. Officer Rodriguez testified that he knew the area to be a high crime area

  because he was aware of homicides, shoot-outs, and burglaries that had occurred

  there and had personally executed several felony arrest warrants at the Colonial

  Hillcrest Apartments. Thus, the district court’s factual finding was not clearly

  erroneous. See Fonseca, 744 F.3d at 680.

        While not dispositive, Mr. Reza’s nighttime presence in a high crime area

  weighs in favor of probable cause.

  6.    Totality of the Circumstances

        Having separately examined the factors considered by the district court, we

  proceed to evaluate them collectively, giving due weight to the district court’s

  reasonable inferences. See Santos, 403 F.3d at 1133. We conclude the district could

  did not err when it determined probable cause existed at the time of the search.

        When the search occurred, Officer Rodriguez knew the Drug Task Force had

  received credible information that Mr. Reza was driving the white Nissan while in

  possession of fentanyl and firearms.6 This information came from a known source

        6
           The district court noted Mr. Reza had not argued Officer Rodriguez was
  unaware of the information and, regardless, the information could be ascribed to
  Officer Rodriguez “under the ‘collective-knowledge doctrine,’ in which ‘the
  knowledge of one officer supporting a search or seizure may be imputed to other
  enforcement officers acting in conjunction with the knowledgeable officer.’” ROA
  Vol. I at 263 n.7 (quoting James v. Chavez, 830 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1260
  (D.N.M. 2011)). Mr. Reza has not challenged this conclusion on appeal or argued
  Officer Rodriguez was unaware of the pertinent information.
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  who had previously provided accurate information and was based on the source’s

  firsthand observation of Mr. Reza the day before. It was further corroborated by at

  least two other tips that Mr. Reza was selling fentanyl, one of which was provided by

  a known source. That known source had previously provided accurate information

  and had firsthand knowledge of Mr. Reza’s fentanyl possession. Officer Rodriguez

  was further aware of Mr. Reza’s criminal history and past violence toward law

  enforcement. Moreover, as Officer Rodriguez personally observed, Mr. Reza did not

  promptly respond to emergency lights and instead continued driving before

  eventually pulling over in an area Officer Rodriguez knew to have a high incidence

  of violent crime.

        Some of these factors, such as Mr. Reza’s presence in a high crime area,

  criminal history, and failure to promptly pull over, “do not weigh very heavily in the

  calculus,” but they still “must be taken into consideration.” Id. “[A]s the Supreme

  Court has admonished, it would be legal error to employ a divide-and-conquer

  strategy.” Id. Instead, we ask whether the facts combined to create probable cause to

  believe the vehicle contained contraband. See Edwards, 632 F.3d at 645.

        Viewed in totality, the facts known when the search occurred created probable

  cause to believe the vehicle contained firearms or fentanyl. Mr. Reza has thus not

  shown the district court erred when it denied his Motion to Suppress.

                                 D.     Subjective Intent

        Mr. Reza also argues the search was unlawful because Officer Rodriguez

  subjectively believed probable cause did not exist but nonetheless proceeded “under

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  the guise of an inventory search.” Appellant’s Br. at 12–13. We decline to reverse on

  this ground, however, because Officer Rodriguez’s subjective intent is irrelevant.

        “Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth

  Amendment analysis.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). Rather than

  assessing subjective intent, “[w]e ask whether ‘the circumstances, viewed

  objectively, justify [the challenged] action.’” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 736

  (2011) (second alteration in original) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128,

  138 (1978)). If a reasonable officer considering the totality of the circumstances

  could objectively believe probable cause existed, then the Fourth Amendment is

  satisfied, “whatever the subjective intent” of the officer. Whren, 517 U.S. at 814.

        As explained, probable cause objectively existed at the time officers searched

  Mr. Reza’s vehicle. It is thus irrelevant whether Officer Rodriguez (or any other

  officer) subjectively believed probable cause existed. See id. at 813. It is also

  irrelevant whether this was a valid inventory search because, regardless, there was

  probable cause. See Edwards, 632 F.3d at 645 (“Accordingly, despite the fact that

  this was not a valid search incident to arrest and not an inventory search, the search

  may nevertheless be justified if we find that it was supported by probable cause.”).

        Mr. Reza also argues that the officers’ failure to seek a warrant before the

  search suggests probable cause did not exist. But whether the officers could have

  applied for a warrant is immaterial. The relevant inquiry is whether an exception to

  the warrant requirement existed. And here, under the automobile exception, a warrant

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  was not required because Officer Rodriguez had probable cause to believe the vehicle

  contained contraband.

        For these reasons, we do not consider the officers’ subjective beliefs about the

  search.

                                E.     Length of the Stop

        Lastly, Mr. Reza contends that although the stop was lawful at its inception, it

  became unlawful when it lasted longer than necessary to effectuate its purpose. The

  Government responds that Mr. Reza waived this argument by not raising it before the

  district court. We agree with the Government and do not consider Mr. Reza’s waived

  argument.

        “When a defendant fails to raise a particular suppression argument in district

  court, the argument is waived absent a showing of good cause.” United States v.

  Anderson, 62 F.4th 1260, 1265 (10th Cir. 2023); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3).

  “Failure to show good cause precludes even plain error review.” Anderson, 62 F.4th

  at 1265.

        Before the district court, Mr. Reza did not argue that Officer Rodriguez

  unlawfully extended the stop longer than necessary. And on appeal, he has not argued

  good cause for failing to present the argument earlier. Rather, he responds to the

  Government’s waiver argument by stating his “contention has been that the

  impoundment of the vehicle and subsequent search was unconstitutional.” Reply at 3.

  But an argument that the search was unconstitutional is distinct from an argument

  that the stop became illegal because its purpose was accomplished. Thus, Mr. Reza

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  waived any argument about the length of the stop, and we may not consider it for the

  first time on appeal.

                             III.      CONCLUSION

        Mr. Reza has not shown any error in the district court’s probable cause

  analysis. We thus AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Mr. Reza’s Motion to

  Suppress.

                                            Entered for the Court

                                            Carolyn B. McHugh
                                            Circuit Judge

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