Court Opinion

ID: 9541272
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:24:02.431991+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:41.955997
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur in the majority’s holding that the ordinance is without force and effect within the limits of the incorporated municipalities located within Franklin County, but do not agree with the holding that appellant has no standing to challenge the ordinance insofar as it prohibits the possession of keg beer within the county. There is, of course, a considerable portion of the county which lies outside the confines of the few scattered municipalities.
I.C. § 10-1202 provides that “[a]ny person ... whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a ... municipal ordinance ... may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the ... ordinance ... and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.”
Section 2 of the ordinance as written prohibits not only the sale of keg beer within Franklin County, but also the purchase, consumption, or possession of keg beer in Franklin County.1 Under the Court’s construction of the ordinance, appellant, whose licensed retail premises are situated in two incorporated municipalities, is not prohibited from selling keg beer. However, the Court ignores the impact on appellant of Section 3 of the ordinance which prohibits the consumption or possession in the unincorporated areas of the county. Can it be that prohibiting the possession of beer within the county in all areas outside of the incorporated city limits will not affect appellant’s “rights, status or other legal relations”? I think not. This ordinance is obviously intended to and will destroy a large segment of appellant’s trade; those customers who might purchase in Preston and Franklin a keg of beer which they intend to take home or elsewhere in parts of the county not within any corporate limits, or, even which might be transported within the county in order to reach another municipality or some other county, will have to recognize that in so doing they may be faced with charges of violation of the ordinance, the consumption or possession of keg beer outside municipality limits being criminalized by the county’s ordinance. Those who otherwise would make keg purchases at ap*209pellant’s establishment simply will not chance the threat of 30 days imprisonment and/or a $300 fine imposed under the ordinance.2
Seeing little value in a lengthy unilateral dissertation on a proposition with which the Court declines to come to grips, I simply point out that the State has occupied the whole field of regulating beer container sizes and thereby pre-empted the county from acting in this area.3 In Clyde Hess Distributing Co. v. Bonneville County, 69 Idaho 505, 510, 210 P.2d 798, 800 (1949), the Court held that if the legislature has shown its intent to occupy the whole field “any regulation by the county [would] necessarily [be] inconsistent with the general law.” In Lancaster v. Municipal Court, 6 Cal.3d 805, 494 P.2d 681 (1972), the California Supreme Court held:
“[A] local municipal ordinance is invalid if it attempts to impose additional requirements in a field that is preempted by general law. ... Local legislation in conflict with general law is void. Conflicts exist if the ordinance duplicates ..., contradicts ..., or enters an area fully occupied by general law, either expressly or by legislative implication.... If the subject matter or field of the legislation has been fully occupied by the state, there is no room for supplementary or complementary local legislation, even if the subject were otherwise one properly characterized as a ‘municipal affair.’ ” 494 P.2d at 682 (citations omitted). See Phoenix Respirator & Ambulance Service, Inc. v. McWilliams, 12 Ariz.App. 186, 468 P.2d 951 (1970).
That the State has manifested its intent to occupy the whole field is established by I.C. § 23-1030 which regulates the sizes of containers that may be sold in this state and by I.C. § 23-1007 which governs the sale of beer in kegs.4
I.C. § 23-1030 provides in pertinent part that:
“No brewer, dealer, or wholesaler shall, without permission of the director, adopt or use any container for beer, differing in size from the following:
whole barrels
half-barrels
quarter-barrels
eighth-barrels”
In State v. Barsness, 102 Idaho 210, 628 P.2d 1044 (1981), this Court recently held that a Boise city ordinance which was more restrictive than the state provision governing the same subject was pre-empted by state law. In that case state law required emergency vehicles to utilize an audible or visible signal, I.C. § 49-606, and the Boise City Code required emergency vehicles to use both audible and visible signals. We there held that, “[assuming such conflict exists, the provisions of a city ordinance must yield to provisions of the state statute.” 102 Idaho at 211, 638 P.2d at 1045. Similarly, in the present case, the ordinance in question is more restrictive than state law and so should be struck down.
I.C. § 23-1007 which governs the sale of beer in kegs, provides that any dealer or wholesaler at his licensed premises shall be allowed to sell to consumers beer in unbroken packages (cases of cans or bottles) or kegs of not less than four gallons. Nothing in the entire act suggests that counties or cities are allowed any say in the matter of *210beer container sizes — which is far different from allowing any sales at all or the setting of permissible hours of sale. The ordinance directly conflicts with the mandatory terms of this provision and is therefore pre-empted. State v. Clark, 88 Idaho 365, 399 P.2d 955 (1965).
I would therefore hold that appellant, as a person affected by this ordinance, has standing to determine the legality of this ordinance which I deem questionable in light of the statutory provisions cited above.

. This section making both the sale and the purchase, consumption or possession illegal subjects both the seller and the purchaser to the penalties prescribed in section 6 of the ordinance.

. Section 6 of the ordinance provides:
“Violations of this act shall be punishable by the imposition of a fine in the sum not to exceed Three Hundred and No/100 ($300.00) Dollars or by being sentenced to serve thirty (30) days in the county jail, or by both such fine and imprisonment.”

. Id. Const, art. 12, § 2 provides that: “Any county ... may make and enforce, within its limits, all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or with the general laws." (Emphasis added.)

.I.C. § 23-1020 provides the penalty for violations of either of these sections: “Any person who violates any of the provisions of this act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” I.C. § 18-113 sets out the punishment for commission of a misdemeanor: “[E]very offense declared to be a misdemeanor, is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding six (6) months, or a fine not exceeding $300, or by both.”