Court Opinion

ID: 9375186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-25 20:09:23.641596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:56.466116
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-21-00382-CR

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                   THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                     CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

RUSSELL ERIC LOFLAND,                                                      Appellant,

                                              v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                         Appellee.

                    On appeal from the 36th District Court
                       of San Patricio County, Texas.

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

    Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Longoria and Silva
           Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Contreras

      A jury convicted appellant Russell Eric Lofland of aggravated robbery, a first-

degree felony, and sentenced him to twenty-five years’ imprisonment in the Correctional

Institutions Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. See TEX. PENAL CODE

ANN. §§ 12.32, 29.03(a), (b). By his sole issue, appellant contends that the evidence was
legally insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.

                                    I.     BACKGROUND

       A grand jury indicted appellant on December 12, 2017. The indictment alleged that

“on or about the 22nd day of February, 2015, . . . while in the course of committing theft

of property and with intent to obtain or maintain control of said property,” appellant

“intentionally or knowingly cause[d] serious bodily injury to Elvin Young [Jr.] by striking

and hitting . . . Young in the face and head with the [appellant’s] hands and feet or [an]

object unknown by the grand jury.” On October 5, 2021, appellant pleaded not guilty, and

trial commenced. We summarize the testimony relevant to the disposition of this appeal.

A.     Merry Spriggs Moreno’s Testimony

       Merry Spriggs Moreno, Young’s sister, testified that Young was a fifty-year-old

man, about five feet tall, who had suffered from various disabilities throughout his life.

According to Moreno, Young also had a drinking problem and lived at home with his and

Moreno’s mother, Lucille Spriggs. Spriggs, Moreno noted, was displeased with Young’s

drinking habit, so, on occasion, Young would rent a room at the nearby Cedar Lodge

Motel to “hang out with his drinking buddies, and just have a good time.” Moreno last saw

her brother on February 21, 2015, at Spriggs’s house just as Young was preparing to

head to the Cedar Lodge in his red Ford Mustang. Moreno was not familiar with appellant

and did not believe Young knew him prior to that excursion to the Cedar Lodge.

       Moreno testified that her brother “loved jewelry.” The State offered photographs as

Exhibits 2–6 depicting various pieces of jewelry, which Moreno confirmed belonged to her

brother. The jewelry included: (1) two rope chains, one of which was missing a fish

                                              2
pendant that usually adorned Young’s neck; (2) a few rings; and (3) a shrimp-shaped

charm. Moreno stated that the chains’ clasps appear broken in the photos. The State also

offered Exhibit 7 depicting a blood-covered fish pendant, which Moreno identified as the

one missing from Young’s chain.

B.    Officer Derrell Harvill’s Testimony

      In 2015, Officer Derrell Harvill was a patrol officer with the Aransas Pass Police

Department (APPD). On February 22, 2015, at about 3:00 a.m., Officer Harvill was

dispatched to the Cedar Lodge for a welfare check on Young, called in by Spriggs. 1

Officer Harvill testified that he arrived at the Cedar Lodge and parked behind a red

Mustang which had its engine running and “its lights on, with the doors open.” Two people,

later identified as appellant and his fiancé, Angel Kerns, were “loading stuff in[to] the

Mustang,” which was parked outside their motel room, room 16. Officer Harvill stated that

he went straight to room 21, situated about twenty or thirty feet to the left of room 16,

where Young was staying. Officer Harvill knocked on the door but received no answer.

He attempted to enter the room, but the door was locked. Officer Harvill noticed “a lot of

blood everywhere,” including on the porch, deck chair, ground, and exterior wall outside

of Young’s room, and he testified that the blood looked fresh. Officer Harvill’s body

camera footage was admitted into evidence and played for the jury; it showed the bloody

scene and another officer volunteering to go obtain the master key to enter Young’s room.

      When the officers finally opened the door to room 21, they found Young next to the

bed lying face down. Officer Harvill checked for a pulse and found none. He asked his

      1   It is not clear from the record what prompted Spriggs to call to request the welfare check.
                                                     3
supervisor whether he should move Young to render aid, as Young’s body felt warm. The

officers called for emergency medical services (EMS). EMS arrived, flipped Young’s body,

and attempted to resuscitate him, to no avail. Photos of Young were admitted at trial.

Officer Harvill testified that Young’s face and head were bloodied.

       At some point after finding Young’s body, Officer Harvill approached appellant and

Kerns and started asking them questions. Officer Harvill testified that the couple told him

they helped Young into Young’s motel room. At points of Officer Harvill’s body camera

footage, appellant can be heard stating he and Kerns found Young passed out on his

porch and helped him into his room from there. At other points, appellant suggested that

Young “pulled up here and said get me in the house,” so appellant obliged. Officer Harvill

testified that he observed no blood trail between appellant’s room and Young’s, nor any

blood in the red Mustang, which was determined to be Young’s vehicle. He agreed that

the Mustang was parked in front of appellant’s room even though there were available

parking spots in front of Young’s room. Officer Harvill noticed that appellant had blood on

his arm, which appellant attributed to his lip. According to Officer Harvill, appellant’s lip

looked “[s]wollen like he [had] been in a fight.” Given the circumstances, including

appellant being “the last person to see [Young] alive,” Officer Harvill detained appellant

and later transported him to the police station for further questioning.

       Officer Harvill testified that during booking, appellant emptied his pockets, and the

pockets’ contents included several blood-covered pieces of jewelry, which Officer Harvill

photographed and collected as evidence. Those photographs were admitted at trial as

Exhibits 2–6. Moreno confirmed that the jewelry depicted in those exhibits belonged to

                                             4
Young.

C.    Sergeant Antonio Davila’s Testimony

      Antonio Davila is a sergeant in APPD. On February 22, 2015, Sergeant Davila was

the on-call detective. Sergeant Davila testified that he received a call at about 4:00 a.m.

that his services were required at the Cedar Lodge. Sergeant Davila arrived at the scene

as EMS was leaving. He noted that Young’s face looked like it had been hit with

something. He and another APPD detective, Frank Kent, photographed the scene and

“collect[ed] blood samples from all the areas that [they] had observed where there was

blood at.” Along with the blood samples, Sergeant Davila noticed and collected a gold,

blood-covered fish pendant on the porch outside of Young’s motel room. A picture of the

pendant was admitted at trial as Exhibit 7, and Moreno confirmed that the pendant

depicted was Young’s. Sergeant Davila also collected Young’s clothing and secured

Young’s Mustang.

      In the Mustang, Sergeant Davila noticed some men’s and women’s clothing in the

back seat and a large glass bottle of Jack Daniels whiskey on the floor of the front

passenger side. Sergeant Davila was informed that appellant and Kerns claimed the

clothing as their own and told Officer Harvill when he arrived on the scene at about 3:00

a.m. that they were using the car to go to the laundromat. Sergeant Davila had the

Mustang towed back to the police station. There, he searched the vehicle and noticed the

Jack Daniels bottle had blood on “the main part of the body and on the neck part of” the

bottle. Save for the blood on the bottle, though, Sergeant Davila found no other blood in

the Mustang.

                                            5
      Later on February 22, detectives Davila and Kent returned to the Cedar Lodge.

While there, they found the keys to Young’s room located in the grass outside the porch

area of room 21, which was notable because Young’s door was locked when Officer

Harvill arrived to conduct the welfare check. The detectives were also approached by the

motel owner, Robert Oxley, who told them that he went into appellant’s room and saw

“one of the coverings to the window [A/C] unit was removed.” He went to check the A/C

unit and “noticed a dark colored [object which] look[ed] like [a] wallet stuffed in between

the A[/]C unit and where the housing was located.” Oxley pointed it out to the detectives,

who then collected the wallet. Contained within the wallet was Young’s driver’s license.

Sergeant Davila also collected a bloody towel from appellant’s room.

      Sergeant Davila testified that the medical examiner’s office called the next day to

inform him that Young’s autopsy was completed. Sergeant Davila went to the medical

examiner’s office to collect Young’s personal belongings and various DNA swabs and

fingernail clippings that had been taken during Young’s autopsy. Sergeant Davila stated

that he transported the evidence to the APPD station and turned it over to the evidence

technician. Sergeant Davila also collected appellant’s jeans and polo shirt from the

previous night for DNA analysis.

D.    Samantha Perkins’s Testimony

      In 2015, Samantha Perkins was the DNA supervisor and technical leader at the

Corpus Christi Crime Lab. Perkins testified that she tested various pieces of evidence for

DNA profiles. Perkins stated that the DNA profile collected from the blood on the jewelry

was consistent with Young’s. She noted that she tested DNA from two blood spots on

                                            6
appellant’s shirt, one of which was consistent with Young’s DNA, the other of which was

consistent with both Young’s and appellant’s DNA. Perkins also tested two blood spots

from appellant’s jeans. A spot on one of the legs was consistent with Young’s DNA, and

a spot tested from appellant’s front left pocket was consistent with both appellant’s and

Young’s DNA. Perkins tested ten fingernail clippings from Young, all of which were

consistent with only Young’s DNA, except one—“the right first digit fingernail[] DNA profile

was . . . a mixture” of appellant’s and Young’s DNA. The bloody towel in appellant’s room

was consistent with appellant’s DNA. Finally, Perkins described that DNA tested from a

“red stain” on the Jack Daniels bottle found in Young’s car was consistent with Young’s,

and DNA from the bottle cap and neck of the bottle were consistent with a mixture of

appellant’s and Kerns’s.

E.     Dr. Adel Shaker’s Testimony

       In 2015, Adel Shaker, M.D., was the Nueces County Medical Examiner. He

testified that he conducted Young’s autopsy on February 23, 2015. During his

examination of Young, Dr. Shaker found an “H shape laceration in [Young’s] midfrontal

scalp” and that Young’s septum was fractured. Dr. Shaker stated that below the laceration

was a deep hematoma, indicative of “strong blunt force trauma.” Blunt force trauma, Dr.

Shaker explained, could be caused by an object or a punch or kick. Dr. Shaker testified

that Young was not a healthy person—he had high blood pressure, heart disease, and a

heavy heart.

       On cross-examination, Dr. Shaker noted that Young’s blood alcohol content (BAC)

at the time of his examination was 0.292%. He testified that BAC was itself potentially life-

                                             7
threatening. He also informed the jury that Young was on blood pressure medication and

anxiolytics, which should not be mixed with alcohol. Dr. Shaker’s autopsy report was

admitted into evidence and shows a presumed cause of death as “[c]ombined drug

toxicity.” The manner of death was listed as “undetermined.” On re-direct examination,

the State asked Dr. Shaker whether, given Young’s health condition, “the trauma [Young]

suffered played a role in his demise?” Dr. Shaker answered affirmatively, suggesting that

tachycardia, or an accelerated heart rate, associated with a fight can cause ventricle

fibrillation, “which is a final stage [in] stopping the heart.” The State then rested its case.

F.     Angel Kerns’s Testimony

       Kerns testified for the defense. She stated she and appellant met Young on

February 21, 2015. The three spent the afternoon drinking. At some point, they ran out of

alcohol and went to buy more. They returned to the Cedar Lodge and continued drinking.

According to Kerns, she and appellant left around 7:00 or 8:00 p.m. to go to a bar. When

the couple returned between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m., they saw Young face-down outside of

his room with the door ajar. They exchanged no words with Young and did not call EMS

because they only thought Young was passed out from drinking. Kerns testified that she

and appellant placed Young in his room and then retired to their room. She noted that

soon thereafter, the police knocked on her and appellant’s door to arrest them.

       On cross-examination, Kerns testified that she was in the red Mustang when the

police arrived because she and appellant were heading out to do laundry.

       The defense rested. The jury convicted appellant of aggravated robbery and

sentenced him to twenty-five years’ incarceration. This appeal followed.

                                               8
                           II.    SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

       By his sole issue, appellant argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to

support his conviction for aggravated robbery “in that the evidence supporting the finding

an assault or theft took place . . . and the evidence that an assault was committed with

the intent of facilitating a theft is so weak that the verdict seems clearly wrong and

manifestly unjust.”

A.     Standard of Review & Applicable Law

       “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we consider

the evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the verdict’ to determine whether any rational

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Delagarza v. State, 635 S.W.3d 716, 723 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg

2021, pet. ref’d) (quoting Stahmann v. State, 602 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex. Crim. App.

2020)); see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). We consider both direct and

circumstantial evidence as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the

evidence and are not mere speculation. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2017); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “We resolve

any evidentiary inconsistencies in favor of the verdict, keeping in mind that the factfinder

is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to give

their testimony.” Delagarza, 635 S.W.3d at 723 (first citing Walker v. State, 594 S.W.3d

330, 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020); and then citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.04).

       “The sufficiency of the evidence is measured by comparing the evidence produced

at trial to ‘the essential elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct

                                             9
jury charge.’” Curlee v. State, 620 S.W.3d 767, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (quoting Malik

v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “A hypothetically correct jury

charge ‘accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not

unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s

theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the

defendant was tried.’” Id. (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240).

       A hypothetically correct charge would instruct the jury that a person commits the

offense of robbery if, “in the course of committing theft . . . and with intent to obtain or

maintain control of the property, he . . . intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes

bodily injury to another.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.02(a)(1). “A person commits an

offense [of theft] if he unlawfully appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of

property.” Id. § 31.03(a). The offense of robbery becomes an aggravated robbery if,

among other things, the person “causes serious bodily injury to another.” Id. § 29.03(a)(1).

“‘Serious bodily injury’ means,” among other things, “bodily injury that creates a

substantial risk of death or that causes death.” Id. § 1.07(a)(46).

       “A person acts . . . with intent[] with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a

result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct

or cause the result.” Id. § 6.03(a). “A person acts knowingly . . . with respect to a result of

his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.”

Id. § 6.03(b). A jury may infer a defendant’s knowledge or intent from direct or

circumstantial evidence, including the accused’s acts, words, and conduct. Garza v.

State, 398 S.W.3d 738, 744 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2010, pet. ref’d).

                                              10
B.     Analysis

       Appellant argues that there was legally insufficient evidence (1) that he committed

theft, (2) that he committed an assault, and (3) “to prove a nexus between an assault and

theft.” We disagree.

       As to evidence of theft, after being transported to the APPD station, appellant was

asked to empty his pockets. Contained within his pockets were blood-covered pieces of

jewelry. Perkins testified that the DNA from the blood matched Young’s. Moreno testified

that Young “loved jewelry” and described the pieces he was wearing when she last saw

him. When shown Exhibits 2–6, Moreno confirmed the jewelry collected from appellant at

the APPD station belonged to her brother. Moreno stated, and Exhibits 4–6 confirm, that

the clasp to at least one of Young’s chains was broken. Moreover, Young’s wallet was

found in the A/C unit in appellant’s motel room. And Officer Harvill testified that, when he

arrived at the Cedar Lodge, appellant and Kerns were loading personal belongings into

Young’s Mustang, which was running and parked in front of appellant’s, rather than

Young’s room. This evidence sufficed to prove that property was appropriated from

Young. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(a). The jury was free to infer, among other

things, that the presence of blood on the jewelry, the chain’s broken clasp, appellant’s

possession of the jewelry, Young’s wallet hidden in appellant’s room, and appellant’s

loading up and using Young’s Mustang proved that appropriation was intended and

unlawful. See id.; Garza, 398 S.W.3d at 744. Indeed, Kerns testified that Young was non-

responsive and she and appellant exchanged no words with Young when moving him into

his room, and yet Young’s bloody jewelry, wallet, and car ended up in appellant’s

                                            11
possession with no indication that Young willingly provided appellant with the same. And

there was no explanation given by appellant for his possession of the jewelry. See

Hardesty v. State, 656 S.W.2d 73, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (providing that recent and

unexplained possession of property supports an inference of guilt).

        There is also sufficient evidence to prove appellant caused Young to suffer serious

bodily injury. 2 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.03(a)(1); Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d

274, 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“[T]he State may prove the defendant’s identity . . . by

either direct or circumstantial evidence, coupled with all reasonable inferences from that

evidence.”). Officer Harvill testified that there was a significant amount of blood right

outside of Young’s motel room door. Sergeant Davila testified that Young looked as

though he was hit in his face, and photographs of Young corroborate that testimony. Dr.

Shaker testified that Young had a fractured septum, a laceration on his forehead, and a

deep hematoma underneath it, indicative of significant blunt force trauma. While he

testified that Young’s cause of death was combined drug toxicity, Dr. Shaker agreed that,

given the condition of Young’s health, “the trauma [Young] suffered played a role in his

demise.” Perkins testified that (1) blood found on appellant’s polo shirt and jeans was

positive for both appellant’s and Young’s DNA, (2) appellant’s DNA was found under one

of Young’s fingernails, and (3) Young’s blood was found on the Jack Daniels bottle that

was in the car. Sergeant Davila testified there was no other blood found in the Mustang.

Further, Officer Harvill testified that appellant’s lip looked swollen, as though he had been

        2We note that appellant focuses his argument on the lack of sufficient evidence that he perpetrated
an assault on Young, not that Young suffered serious bodily injury.
                                                   12
in a fight. And Perkins testified that blood from a towel found in appellant’s motel room

came back as belonging to appellant. See Jones v. State, 458 S.W.3d 625, 632 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d) (concluding that evidence of victim’s and

appellant’s DNA on discarded clothing near scene of crime, along with reasonable

inferences from that evidence, sufficed to prove appellant was attacker). Given this

evidence, a reasonable juror could have inferred that appellant and Young engaged in a

fight near room 21, and appellant struck Young with his hands, feet, a Jack Daniels bottle,

or another object that caused Young to suffer serious bodily injury. See id.; Delagarza,

635 S.W.3d at 723; Garza, 398 S.W.3d at 744.

       Appellant argues that Kerns’s testimony that she and appellant found Young lying

on the porch outside of his motel room “impl[ies] that she and [a]ppellant found . . . Young

after the injuries to his forehead had occurred.” But the jury is the sole “judge of the facts,

the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to give their testimony.” Delagarza, 635

S.W.3d at 723. Here, the jury was free to disregard all or parts of Kerns’s testimony as

incredible. See Febus v. State, 542 S.W.3d 568, 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (“A jury may

accept one version of the facts and reject another, and it may reject any part of a witness’s

testimony.”). Notably, Kerns testified that when they found Young, she and appellant did

not call for emergency services because they thought Young was merely passed out from

being drunk. But the blood all over room 21’s porch and Young’s face suggests otherwise

and challenges any supposed implication that Young was found only after suffering

injuries. Moreover, Officer Harvill’s body camera footage shows appellant making

inconsistent statements as to how he came to purportedly help Young into room 21. In

                                              13
one rendition, appellant and Kerns came back from a bar, found Young lying face down

on his porch, and helped him into his room. Later, however, appellant stated that Young

“pulled up here and said get me in the house,” so appellant obliged. Even if appellant was

consistent in his statements, the jury was free to believe or disbelieve them, and the

evidence was otherwise sufficient to prove appellant was Young’s attacker. See TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.02(a)(1); Febus, 542 S.W.3d at 572; Delagarza, 635 S.W.3d at

723.

       Finally, appellant contends that “[e]ven assuming the evidence is sufficient to prove

[a]ppellant committed an assault and a theft, to be convicted of robbery, the State must

prove a nexus between an assault and the theft.” Appellant argues that there is insufficient

“evidence that appellant formed the requisite intent to steal Young’s jewelry or vehicle

either before or during the commission of the assault.” Instead, he suggests that, at best,

“[a] rational trier of fact could conclude that picking up the jewelry was an afterthought

following a fight between two intoxicated persons over some disagreement.”

       As noted, a person commits robbery if “in the course of committing theft . . . and

with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, he . . . intentionally, knowingly, or

recklessly causes bodily injury to another.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.02(a)(1). The

penal code defines “[i]n the course of committing theft” as “conduct that occurs in an

attempt to commit, during the commission, or in immediate flight after the attempt or

commission of theft.” Id. § 29.01(1). To support his argument that a nexus between an

assault and theft must exist to sustain a conviction, appellant cites Cooper v. State, 67

S.W.3d 221, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Apart from reciting the general nexus

                                              14
requirement between an assault and theft, however, Cooper stands for the rule “that a

theft occurring immediately after an assault will support an inference that the assault was

intended to facilitate the theft” for purposes of proving robbery. Id. at 224; see Walter v.

State, 581 S.W.3d 957, 974 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2019, pet. ref’d) (noting that the nexus

requirement “may be inferred when both offenses [an assault and theft] occur in close

temporal proximity”). And that “inference will not be negated by evidence of an alternative

motive that the jury could rationally disregard.” Cooper, 67 S.W.3d at 224. That is because

“[t]he appellant’s motive in committing the assault . . . may be probative of the nexus

element, but it is not itself an element of the offense of robbery.” Sorrells v. State, 343

S.W.3d 152, 158 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). The relevant question is whether the assault

took place “in the course of committing theft,” not whether the theft was appellant’s motive

for the assault. See id.

       In Cooper, appellant was a recent parolee who was living with his uncle, E.W.

Cooper, 67 S.W.3d at 222. One morning, E.W. took appellant “to help him work on a

fence.” Id. “As [E.W.] was about to put a fence post into the ground, appellant struck him

from behind without any warning. A struggle followed and both men fell to the ground.”

Id. When E.W. “released his grip on appellant, appellant stood up, walked to [E.W.]’s

truck, got into it, and drove away.” Id. Appellant was found about an hour later in a nearby

town trying to fix the truck, which had broken down. Id. The Beaumont court of appeals

held that those facts did not suffice to prove the nexus element of aggravated robbery.

The court of criminal appeals disagreed, noting that the jury could have rationally

disbelieved appellant’s testimony that “at the time of the attack, he was hearing voices,”

                                            15
“thought his uncle was hitting a child,” “didn’t know what [he] was doing,” and “just ran

and jumped in the truck and just took off,” and the evidence was otherwise sufficient to

support a conclusion that the assault was committed in the course of the commission of

the theft of E.W.’s truck. Id. at 224.

       In Sorrells, Reynolds was waiting outside a nightclub for her boyfriend, Rice, to

retrieve their vehicle. Sorrells, 343 S.W.3d at 153. While waiting, Reynolds leaned up

against a parked Mercedes SUV. Id. Appellant exited the club, told Reynolds to “get the

f*** off the car,” and pistol whipped her; a scuffle ensued. Id. At some point, Rice arrived

and joined the fray, and appellant aimed his gun at Rice. Id. Rice punched appellant, the

two started fighting, and then a third person came over and punched Rice. Id. Reynolds

left to seek help. Id. When she returned, the fight had ended, and Rice told her that his

lion medallion necklace had been stolen. Id. Rice’s friend, Fritz, testified that he saw Rice

getting attacked, joined the fight, and he too got hit across the head with a pistol. Id. at

154. Sometime during the fight, he saw Rice’s medallion on the ground. Id. Officer Riley

testified that he arrived at the scene and, within minutes, found three suspects walking

down the alley behind the club. Id. One of the suspects had Rice’s lion medallion in his

coat pocket. Id. This Court held that there was insufficient evidence proving a nexus

between appellant’s assault and the theft of the medallion because appellant’s motive

was evidently to keep Reynolds off his SUV and Rice from interfering. The Texas Court

of Criminal Appeals disagreed and reversed our decision, holding that:

       Based on Rice’s testimony that the necklace was missing immediately after
       the assault, and Fritz’s testimony that he saw the necklace on the ground
       during the course of the assault, a rational juror could draw a reasonable
       inference that the assault and the theft occurred simultaneously, and thus

                                             16
       the assault was committed during the commission of theft.

Id. at 158.

       Here, even assuming appellant had no motive or intent to steal any of Young’s

property before or during the assault as appellant suggests, there is sufficient evidence

that appellant caused Young’s serious bodily injury “in the course of committing theft.”

See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 29.01(1); 29.02(a)(1); Sorrells, 343 S.W.3d at 157; Cooper,

67 S.W.3d at 224. First, Officer Harvill arrived at the Cedar Lodge at about 3:00 a.m. on

February 22, 2015, and noted that Young’s body was “still warm,” as though he was only

recently deceased. Officer Harvill also stated that the blood outside of Young’s room

looked fresh. Kerns testified that she and appellant returned to the Cedar Lodge from a

bar between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m. when they saw Young passed out on his porch and

helped him into his room. Within the next hour or so, appellant was found with Young’s

jewelry and loading up Young’s Mustang, purportedly to go do laundry at 3:00 a.m. The

jewelry was covered in Young’s blood and at least one of the chains’ clasps was broken

as though it had been yanked from Young’s neck. The fish pendant found on the porch

bolsters that prospect. Young’s wallet was tucked away inside the A/C unit in appellant’s

motel room. And Young’s car was parked and running outside of appellant’s room being

loaded up for departure. We conclude that a rational juror could draw reasonable

inferences from this evidence that the assault of Young was committed in the course of

committing theft. See id.; Walter, 581 S.W.3d at 974; see also Razor v. State, No. 03-13-

00568-CR, 2015 WL 3857293, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin June 17, 2015, no pet.) (mem.

op., not designated for publication) (concluding that evidence was sufficient to prove the

nexus requirement between an assault and theft where, following a rendezvous with
                                      17
appellant, a prostitute was hit in the back of her head in an isolated alley and knocked

unconscious, she knew appellant was behind her when she was hit, she woke up with a

bloody head with all her belongings missing, and appellant’s DNA was found on her body);

Abdullah v. State, No. 06-13-00257-CR, 2014 WL 6450482, at *1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

Nov. 18, 2014, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding that

evidence was sufficient to prove the nexus requirement between the assault and theft

where mother and daughter were assaulted while entering their home, and mother

noticed when police arrived soon after that her wallet was missing from her unlocked car

in the driveway).

       In sum, viewing the evidence in a light favorable to the jury’s verdict, we conclude

that a rational juror could have found the essential elements of the crime of aggravated

robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. See Delagarza, 635 S.W.3d at 723; Stahmann, 602

S.W.3d at 577. We overrule appellant’s sole issue.

                                   III.   CONCLUSION

       We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                              DORI CONTRERAS
                                                              Chief Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the
23rd day of February, 2023.

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