Court Opinion

ID: 9744156
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:54:57.299783+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:47.062659
License: Public Domain

HUNTER, Justice,
dissenting.
I believe the Court of Appeals’ decision should be left undisturbed in this case. There is no doubt that the jury in the case at bar was not selected by the number of jury commissioners called for by the statute. Ind.Code § 33-5-40-18 (Burns 1975). Having only half the required number of jury commissioners should not be termed substantial compliance.
*384The Court of Appeals’ decision correctly relies on Rudd v. State, (1952) 231 Ind. 105, 107 N.E.2d 168. In that case, one jury commissioner was not present during the placing of names in the jury box or when a grand jury was selected therefrom. Additionally, one person whose name was pulled from the box was never called for service. This Court held that there was not substantial compliance with the relevant statutes and, therefore, “the substantial rights of appellant were harmed . . .” 231 Ind. at 112, 107 N.E.2d at 171. The importance of the decision in Rudd is that it established that when there is no substantial compliance with jury selection statutes, a defendant need not show actual prejudice.
“It seems to us that the proper construction is to hold that an accused, regardless of his guilt or innocence, has the right to insist that there be substantial compliance with [the statute], and if these provisions are not substantially complied with, his substantial rights are harmed.” 231 Ind. at 111, 107 N.E.2d at 170 [emphasis added].
Furthermore, Judge Emmert noted that: “The only way this court has to enforce substantial compliance with the statutes on juries is to reverse when the issue is properly presented in the trial court and here.” 231 Ind. at 113, 107 N.E.2d at 171.
The wisdom of requiring that St. Joseph County have four jury commissioners must have been fully determined by the legislature. Since that entire chapter of Title 33 is devoted to the St. Joseph Superior Courts, I am driven to the conclusion that local interests were consulted and their needs taken into consideration.
The requirement of substantial compliance obviously does not contemplate that every statutory instruction be followed perfectly with respect to every minute detail. Judge Emmert noted that each case of this nature is decided on its individual facts. Here only two of four jury commissioners were appointed. Therefore, the instant case is more like Rudd v. State, supra, than cases in which this Court found substantial compliance when jury selection failed to comport with statutory requirements in minor respects. See Madison v. State, (1955) 234 Ind. 517, 130 N.E.2d 35 (a jury commissioner had not retired when his successor was appointed to act for the time being), Leonard v. State, (1968) 249 Ind. 361, 232 N.E.2d 882 (names of prospective jurors for the grand and petit juries were not selected at the same time), or Shack v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 450, 288 N.E.2d 155 (jury commissioners were appointed in December rather than November).
I would deny transfer. I would grant rehearing only for the purpose of denying transfer.