Court Opinion

ID: 9577998
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:40:23.186453+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:22:16.689444
License: Public Domain

WHITE, J.
I dissent. Conceding the falsity of the representations of the proponent to his mother as set forth in the majority opinion, I am impressed that there is present in the record no substantial evidence that they were designed to and did deceive the testatrix into making a will different in its terms from that which she would have made had she not been misled.
The record conclusively and without contradiction shows that here was an estrangement between testatrix and her daughter. That it existed some months before the execution of the will here in question is attested in a letter dated October 31, 1940, from the testatrix to her son, proponent herein, introduced into evidence, and in which she writes: “If Lu leaves this scoundrel, divorcing him, I would think of her in my will, but not this way!!! After I am dead they will contest everything.” In another letter from decedent, dated January 14, 1941, a definite estrangement between her and her daughter is indicated by the following excerpt therefrom: “I, too, think no longer about Lu; I am sorry to say that I have become resigned to this, she wants it that way. I have not written any more for months, nor did I congratulate her on her birthday, and on my birthday I did not get a single line from her. ...”
In another letter, dated October 31, 1940, prior to the execution of the will now before us, and addressed to her brother-in-law, Rudolph Pohlmann, decedent wrote: “. . . I am also very satisfied and happy that my son Willy is now there and that he often comes to see you. Yes, dear Rudolph, you can have full confidence in my son!! But only to my son, not to my son-in-law. I have had much to go through with my son-in-law already and I have given my son-in-law very much what I had acquired through hard work. By means of a great stratagem he married my dear Lucie and then I also had to give him 10,000 marks outside of that. My daughter used to be a good daughter, decent person, who was much too good for this scoundrel 11 I don’t wish to tell you everything which my son-in-law has done by way of causing worries to me and his wife!!! . . . My son-in-law is not to concern *582himself about my affair nor my daughter, only my son Willy who has also my power of attorney in his hands which my son did not extort from me but which I have given my son of my own volition. ...”
While an appellate tribunal may not weigh the evidence, it must review and consider the same to determine whether, on its face, it may justly be held that it is sufficient to support the ultimate issue involved, in which case it is not a review of a question of fact, but purely one of law. Upon a reviewing court is cast the burden of determining whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support the findings made. As was said by Mr. Justice Schauer, speaking for the court in Estate of Bristol, 23 Cal.2d 221, 223 [143 P.2d 689]: “The critical word in the definition is ‘substantial’; it is a door which can lead as readily to abuse as to practical or enlightened justice.”
Neither must it be forgotten that the law presumes that a person is innocent of crime or wrong (Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, subd. 1), and that presumption must be overcome by him who alleges improper conduct. Evidence of the facts and circumstances, taken together, must amount to proof of fraud, and not to mere suspicion thereof. As was so cogently stated by Mr. Justice Carter, in a vigorous dissenting opinion in O’Bryan v. Superior Court, 18 Cal.2d 490, 501 [116 P.2d 49, 136 A.L.R. 595]: “It is a matter of common knowledge that charges of fraud and undue influence are easy to make and difficult to prove, and a review of the cases involving such charges which are reported in the decisions of this and the appellate courts of this state discloses that substantial evidence must be produced by a contestant in order to invalidate a will on either of these grounds.”
The trial court characterized the testatrix as a woman who “appears to have been a woman of some determination.” As was stated by this court in Estate of Llewellyn, 83 Cal.App.2d 534, 561 [189 P.2d 822, 191 P. 2d 419], a will “may not be held invalid on the ground of undue influence unless there be an actual showing of some sort of pressure which overpowered the mind and mastered the volition of the testator at the very moment of execution of the will.” And it is no easy thing, by mere pressure of importunities and entreaties to overpower the mind of a normal person in full possession of his or her senses. On the issue of undue influence a factor to be considered is the mental condition of the decedent. (Estate of Teel, 25 Cal.2d 520, 522 [154 P.2d 384].)
*583No useful purpose would be served by discussing the comparatively few decisions of the appellate tribunals of this state in which an order setting aside a will for undue influence has been upheld. Suffice it to here quote what was said by this court in Estate of Llewellyn, supra, at page 555: “The evidence in the case now engaging our attention is very much weaker than that held insufficient to justify the setting aside of the wills in other cases decided by the appellate tribunals of this state. For support of this statement it is necessary to do no more than to cite the following authorities: Estate of Perkins, 195 Cal. 699 [235 P. 45]; Estate of Clark, 170 Cal. 418 [149 P. 828]; Estate of Chevallier, 159 Cal. 161 [113 P. 130]; Estate of Purcell, 164 Cal. 300 [128 P. 932]; Estate of Casarotti, 184 Cal. 73 [192 P. 1085]; Estate of Finkler, 3 Cal.2d 584 [46 P.2d 149]; Estate of Garvey, 38 Cal.App.2d 449 [101 P.2d 551]; Estate of Schwartz, 67 Cal.App.2d 512 [155 P.2d 76]; Estate of Kendrick, 130 Cal. 360, 363 [62 P. 605]; Estate of Rich, 79 Cal.App.2d 22 [179 P.2d 373]; Estate of Russell, 80 Cal.App.2d 711 [182 P.2d 318].”
It is not the failure to properly apply the rule of conflicting evidence that in my opinion has resulted in the reversal of the large number of verdicts and decisions upsetting wills, but because in will contests, more than in any other class of cases, triers of fact are prone to render verdicts and decisions upon insufficient and unsubstantial evidence, overlooking the established rule enunciated by this court in Estate of Schwartz, 67 Cal.App.2d 512, 520 [155 P.2d 76], as follows: “What others than the testator may think as to the justice or injustice of a will is simply a matter of opinion and therefore, before the law will permit judges or juries to make disposition of a decedent’s property irrespective of his or her desires, substantial evidence is required to show lack of testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will. ’ ’
The majority opinion attaches considerable weight and importance, as did the trial judge, to the testimony which appears in the form of written interrogatories addressed to two. residents of Berlin, Germany. Such testimony is epitomized and quoted from in the majority opinion. As to the sufficiency or substantiality of this evidence to establish undue influence on the part of the proponent, I quote from the case of In re Calkins, 112 Cal. 296, 300 [44 P. 577]: “To the extent that these declarations at or prior to the making of the will, . . . afforded any evidence bearing upon the state of the testatrix’s mind . . . they were properly admitted, and were entitled to *584consideration by the jury; but, to the extent that they purported to he declarations of the acts of others, or of her own acts, they were hut matters of hearsay merely, whose truth rested in the veracity of the utterer, and upon which there was no opportunity of cross-examination or of explanation by the party who had uttered them, and were not entitled to any weight hy the jury, and cannot he considered for the purpose of sustaining their verdict. ” (Emphasis added.)
While this testimony was admissible to ascertain the state of mind of the decedent, it is totally insufficient to sustain a finding of fraud. (Estate of Peterson, 13 Cal.App.2d 709, 714 [57 P.2d 584].)
It must be conceded in the case at bar that a confidential relationship existed between the proponent and his mother, first, as the result of their blood relationship; secondly, because he was her attorney in fact. However, there is not shown that strict concurrence of each of the following three factors, none of which standing alone has the effect of creating a presumption against the validity of a testamentary document: (a) a confidential relation between testatrix and beneficiary, coupled with (b) activity on the part of the latter in the preparation of the will, and (c) the beneficiary unduly profiting thereby. (Estate of Llewellyn, supra, p.563.) Respondent did not sustain the burden cast upon her in the lower court and has not satisfied me that the evidence was sufficient, as a matter of law, in view of the confidential relation between the proponent and the testatrix, to arouse a presumption of undue influence, thereby shifting to appellant the burden of showing that the will was not induced by coercion or fraud.
It is also extremely important to bear in mind that as far back as May 17, 1939, more than two years prior to the execution of the will here in question, decedent, without the knowledge of anyone, so far as the record discloses, wrote out and executed the first holographic will, wherein she bequeathed all of her estate to appellant. Viewed in the light of the decedent’s attitude toward her daughter because of the latter’s marriage, as reflected in the former’s letters hereinbefore set forth, an impelling reason arises as to why in her previous will decedent left all of her estate to appellant. Furthermore, inasmuch as decedent’s holographic will of February 10, 1941, herein offered for probate, differs in no way from her original holographic will executed May 17, 1939, excepting expressly to disinherit the respondent, the record herein is *585uncontradieted that it was decedent’s free and uninfluenced intention long before the execution of the will herein offered for probate to leave her entire estate to appellant. Thus the document presently under attack constitutes a complete confirmation of the decedent’s wishes as expressed some two years previously (Estate of Stump, 202 Cal. 308, 310 [260 P. 543]), and establishes the existence of a definite pattern with respect to her testamentary intentions and desires (Estate of O’Callaghan, 82 Cal.App.2d 108, 116 [185 P.2d 659]).
It is indelibly written into our law that no person who is competent to make a will is called upon to “consult or satisfy the wishes or views of juries or courts” (Estate of Nolan, 25 Cal.App.2d 738, 740 [78 P.2d 456]). Neither is he obligated to bequeath his estate “in such a manner as to gain the approbation of his contemporaries, the wise or the good” (Estate of Moorehouse, 64 Cal.App.2d 210, 216 [148 P.2d 385].) That being so, the testatrix, being of sound mind, was entitled to dispose of her property as she saw fit, “not in equal proportions to his relatives or to those who would inherit under the laws of succession in case of intestacy (Estate of Llewellyn, supra, p. 566).
The right of people to dispose of property by will would have but little significance if that right may be legally disregarded whenever the testator has not disposed of his property in a manner which conforms to the views of a court or jury.
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment and remand the cause with directions to the court below to enter judgment admitting to probate the will executed by decedent dated February 10,1941, and issue to appellant letters of administration with the will annexed.
A petition for a rehearing was denied January 24, 1949. White, J., voted for a rehearing.
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied March 3,1949.