Court Opinion

ID: 9408304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-12 14:05:13.284907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:43.199860
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                          Opinion filed July 12, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D19-0439
                      Lower Tribunal No. F87-35790
                          ________________

                           Gregory Boucher,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

                         The State of Florida,
                                  Appellee.

     An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Spencer
Multack, Judge.

     Dutko & Kroll, P.A., and Jeremy J. Kroll (Ft. Lauderdale); and Joyce E.
Brenner, for appellant.

    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Linda Katz, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.

Before LOGUE, C.J., and LINDSEY, and GORDO, JJ.

                     ON MOTION FOR WRITTEN OPINION

LINDSEY, J.
         On March 29, 2023, this Court per curiam affirmed a juvenile

resentencing order that determined Appellant Gregory Boucher (Defendant

below) was not entitled to resentencing on his first-degree murder conviction.

Boucher v. State, 48 Fla. L. Weekly D646 (Fla. 3d DCA Mar. 29, 2023).

Boucher has filed a Motion for Written Opinion. We write solely to address

Boucher’s argument that the resentencing order violates the Eighth

Amendment. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that the order is

constitutional.

    I.     BACKGROUND

         In 1988, Boucher pleaded guilty to three crimes he committed when he

was 16 years old: first-degree murder (Count I), sexual battery (Count II),

and burglary with battery (Count III). He was sentenced to life in prison with

the possibility of parole eligibility after 25 years on the homicide count and

natural life on the two nonhomicide counts.

         Following the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Atwell v. State, 197

So. 3d 1040 (Fla. 2016), the lower court entered an agreed order stating that

Boucher was entitled to resentencing. 1         After the court conducted a

resentencing hearing, but before it entered a resentencing order, the Florida

1
  In Atwell, our highest Court held “that a juvenile homicide offender’s life
with parole sentence violated the Eighth Amendment based largely upon a
presumptive parole release date set far beyond Atwell’s life expectancy.”
Franklin v. State, 258 So. 3d 1239, 1241 (Fla. 2018).

                                        2
Supreme Court overturned Atwell in Franklin v. State, 258 So. 3d 1239 (Fla.

2018). The lower court then entered the resentencing order now under

review, which concludes that Franklin is controlling and precludes

resentencing on Boucher’s first-degree murder sentence.

      Although the trial court determined Boucher was not entitled to

resentencing on his homicide conviction, the court concluded Boucher was

entitled to resentencing on his two nonhomicide life without parole

convictions.   See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (“The

Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a

juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.”). The court considered the

juvenile individualized sentencing factors set forth in § 921.1401, Fla. Stat.,

and resentenced Boucher to 40 years on his nonhomicide counts, with credit

for time served.

      Boucher appealed, arguing that the agreed order stating he was

entitled to resentencing on his homicide conviction, which was based on

Atwell, was a final order and therefore could not be modified. This Court per

curiam affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that the agreed entitlement order

was a non-final order and, consequently, subject to modification.         See

Morgan v. State, 350 So. 3d 712, 716 (Fla. 2022) (“We agree with the State’s

argument that in rule 3.800(a) proceedings the process of sentence

correction is not complete until an order is entered imposing a corrected

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sentence. Until that point, there is no final order. Judicial labor in the cause

remains to be done . . . .”).

     II.     ANALYSIS

           In his Motion for Written Opinion, Boucher argues, based on dicta in

State v. Purdy, 252 So. 3d 723 (Fla. 2018), that “the Florida Supreme Court

left open the question whether the Eighth Amendment is violated where a

defendant is not eligible for resentencing on one count because of parole

eligibility but has been otherwise shown to be rehabilitated after a sentencing

hearing on non-parole eligible counts pursuant to Fla.Stat. 921.1401.” 2 We

write to explain why Boucher is not entitled to relief pursuant to Purdy.

           In Purdy, the Florida Supreme Court considered whether a trial court

is required to review the aggregate sentence of a juvenile offender at a

sentence review hearing. 252 So. 3d at 724. The juvenile offender in Purdy

was sentenced to life without parole for murder and 112.7 months

(approximately 9.4 years) for armed robbery and armed carjacking, to run

concurrently with each other but consecutive to the life sentence. Id. at 727.

2
    Boucher also raised this argument in his briefs.

                                         4
      Years later, the juvenile offender moved for resentencing on his life

sentence pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).3 Purdy, 252

So. 3d at 727. “The trial court granted the relief requested and resentenced

Purdy to 40 years for the murder conviction . . . .” Id. The trial court later

conducted sentence review pursuant to § 921.1402 and determined that the

juvenile offender was rehabilitated and fit to reenter society. Id. at 728.

Based on this determination, the court reduced the 40-year sentence to the

amount of time already served on that sentence (approximately 20.5 years),

followed by 10 years of probation. Id. However, despite finding that the

juvenile offender was rehabilitated and fit to reenter society as to his

homicide conviction, the court ordered him to prison to begin serving his

112.7-month sentences for his nonhomicide convictions. Id.

      The Florida Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion authored by Justice

Lawson, held that “the trial court was correct in determining that [§ 921.1402]

does not provide any basis for resentencing for the 112.7-month sentences.”

Id. However, the Court noted “several gaps and anomalies” in the statutory

scheme, including potential Eighth Amendment concerns with continued

3
  In Miller, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “the Eighth Amendment forbids
a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole
for juvenile offenders.” 567 U.S. at 479.

                                      5
incarceration after a sentencing court’s finding that an offender is

rehabilitated and fit to reenter society:

            [B]ecause the statute limits the review provisions and
            does not deal with the overall sentence, there will be
            other cases, like this one, where the sentencing court
            is required to consider whether the offender “is
            rehabilitated and is reasonably believed to be fit to
            reenter society” even though the offender will
            continue to be incarcerated irrespective of the
            outcome of the hearing. Amicus points out that the
            continued incarceration of an offender on offenses
            arising from a single criminal episode under these
            circumstances—long after a judicial determination
            that the juvenile offender is rehabilitated—may raise
            additional Eighth Amendment issues.

Id. at 728-29.

      The Court did not resolve this issue because it was only presented with

an issue of the statutory construction of § 921.1402, Florida’s sentence

review statute. Id. at 729 n.2. But the Court explained that the juvenile

offender was not foreclosed “from challenging his consecutive 112.7-month

sentences in the trial court on Eighth Amendment grounds.” Id.

      We do not resolve the potential constitutional issue left open in Purdy

because the situation here is distinguishable.      In Purdy, the trial court

reviewed the juvenile offender’s sentence pursuant to § 921.1402 and

determined that he had been rehabilitated and was fit to reenter society. See

§ 921.1402(7) (“If the court determines at a sentence review hearing that the

juvenile offender has been rehabilitated and is reasonably believed to be fit

                                        6
to reenter society, the court shall modify the sentence and impose a term of

probation of at least 5 years.”). Based on its finding of rehabilitation, the

court in Purdy reduced the sentence under review to time served and 10

years of probation.

      Here, by contrast, the lower court did not conduct sentence review of

any of Boucher’s sentences pursuant to § 921.1402. Instead, the court

resentenced Boucher pursuant to § 921.1401. In Horsley v. State, 160 So.

3d 393, 401 (Fla. 2015), our Supreme Court explained the difference

between these two statutes:

            [Section 921.1401] sets forth the procedures for the
            mandatory individualized sentencing hearing that is
            now required before sentencing a juvenile to life
            imprisonment; and [section 921.1402] relates to
            subsequent judicial review of a juvenile offender’s
            sentence.

      Because Boucher had originally been sentenced to life in prison for his

nonhomicide offenses, the trial court was required to consider the factors set

forth in § 921.1401 to determine if a life sentence was appropriate. See

Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 404 (“Juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses,

thereby implicating Graham rather than Miller, also may be sentenced to life

imprisonment if the trial court, after considering the specified factors during

an individualized sentencing hearing, determines that a life sentence is

appropriate.”).

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      Importantly, the factors set forth in § 921.1401 differ from those in §

921.1402.    Unlike in Purdy, the sentencing court here did not find that

Boucher had been rehabilitated and was fit to reenter society, which is a

factor relevant to sentence review pursuant to § 921.1402(7). Instead, the

court correctly considered the factors set forth in § 921.1401 and found that

there was a “possibility of rehabilitating the Defendant.” See § 921.1401(2)

(“In determining whether life imprisonment or a term of years equal to life

imprisonment is an appropriate sentence, the court shall consider factors

relevant to the offense and the defendant’s youth and attendant

circumstances, including, but not limited to . . . (j) The possibility of

rehabilitating the defendant.”). 4

4
  In Bellay v. State, 277 So. 3d 605, 608–09 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) our Sister
District explained the distinction between the rehabilitation factors set forth
in §§ 921.1401 and 921.1402 as follows:

                   The question as to whether a juvenile has in
            fact been rehabilitated comes from section
            921.1402(7), which applies to subsequent judicial
            review of a sentence. Thus, Appellant’s argument,
            made in the context of the resentencing process,
            lacks merit. For resentencing, Appellant’s
            “performance in prison” was one part of the equation
            in considering element (j), “[t]he possibility of
            rehabilitating the defendant.” § 921.1401(2), Fla.
            Stat. Such evidence is not, however, dispositive of a
            trial court's resentencing determination. That factor is
            only one of the ten in the sentencing statute. While it
            may weigh in Appellant's favor, this does not make
            the life sentence unconstitutional. Appellant will be

                                       8
     Since rehabilitation is only a possibility at this point, the sentencing

court did not reduce any of Boucher’s sentences to time served, as in Purdy,

and Boucher continues to serve prison sentences on all three of his

convictions. In short, the potential Eighth Amendment issue Boucher claims

was left open in Purdy is not present here.        We therefore affirm the

resentencing order under review.

     Affirmed.

           entitled to present evidence of the full extent of his
           rehabilitation in prison at a sentence review hearing.

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