Court Opinion

ID: 9823364
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 09:54:37.271441+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:39:19.075321
License: Public Domain

Hall, J.P,
dissents, and votes to reverse the judgments, grant that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials, and order *977a new trial, with the following memorandum: I respectfully dissent because, in my view, the cumulative effect of certain errors, which occurred both at the pretrial suppression hearing and at trial, require a reversal of the defendant’s judgments of conviction.
“It is the People’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that statements of a defendant they intend to rely upon at trial are voluntary. To do that, they must show that the statements were not products of coercion, either physical or psychological, or, in other words, that they were given as a result of a ‘free and unconstrained choice by [their] maker’ ” (People v Thomas, 22 NY3d 629, 641 [2014] [citations omitted], quoting Culombe v Connecticut, 367 US 568, 602 [1961]).
I have no disagreement with the majority’s recitation of the facts of this case. However, based on these same facts, I conclude that the People failed to meet their burden of establishing the voluntariness of the defendant’s statements beyond a reasonable doubt. As acknowledged by the majority, the People presented no direct evidence that the defendant ate, drank any water, slept, or had access to the bathroom during the up to 33-hour period of his detention at the precinct station house. There was no evidence presented that the defendant even had the opportunity to eat, sleep, drink, or use the bathroom during that time period (see People v Guilford, 21 NY3d 205, 210 [2013]; cf. People v Brown, 120 AD3d 954, 955 [2014]; People v Bonds, 118 AD3d 717, 718 [2014]).
Where, as here, there is a delay of up to 33 hours between the time a defendant is arrested and arraigned, and where that defendant is interrogated by multiple law enforcement agencies, it is my view that the People must present evidence to demonstrate that the defendant was provided access to food, water, a bathroom, and sleep, in order to establish that any statements, which were the product of such custodial interrogation, were made voluntarily. Such evidence is part of the People’s burden. Indeed, in People v Jin Cheng Lin (26 NY3d 701 [2016]), a recent Court of Appeals case relied on by the majority, the People presented direct evidence that the defendant’s “basic human needs were provided for because he was able to eat, drink, and take bathroom breaks” during his period of detention of over 24 hours (id. at 725). The defendant in Jin Cheng Lin was even allowed to smoke cigarettes (see id.). In contrast, there was no such evidence presented here.
The majority’s determination, which affirms the denial of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials, effectively *978places the burden on a defendant to show, in the first instance, that he or she was not provided with basic necessities of life such as food, water, and the opportunity to use a bathroom during the period of detention and custodial interrogation. This burden shifting violates the well-settled principle that it is the People’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that statements of a defendant they intend to rely upon at trial are voluntary (see People v Thomas, 22 NY3d at 642). Accordingly, I find that the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials.
In addition, Carlos Nicholls, a cooperating prosecution witness who was with the defendant shortly before the carjacking, improperly suggested, during his trial testimony, that the defendant had committed other, uncharged crimes, and had a “bad character or propensity towards crime” (People v Morris, 21 NY3d 588, 594 [2013]). Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, however, I do not believe that the Supreme Court’s curative instruction was sufficient to ameliorate the prejudice to the defendant caused by Nicholls’s improper testimony. The jury heard detailed testimony from Nicholls about how he and another individual, designated as “Accomplice A,” whom the jury could readily conclude was the defendant, stole cars and created fake identification cards and fraudulent documents. This suggested that the defendant had a criminal propensity to commit crimes involving stolen cars and fake identifications, which were the crimes underlying the attempted murder, robbery, and assault charges at issue here. Furthermore, some of these uncharged crimes were identical to the criminal possession of a forged instrument counts. Under these circumstances, despite the court’s instruction not to consider the letters designating the accomplices, the impermissible suggestion that the defendant had a propensity to commit theft crimes could not have been ignored by the jurors. “A court’s instructions to a jury to disregard matters improperly brought to their attention cannot ‘always assure elimination of the harm already occasioned’ ” (People v Calabria, 94 NY2d 519, 523 [2000], quoting People v Carborano, 301 NY 39, 42 [1950]).
I am also troubled by the fact that Nicholls’s existence was not even disclosed to the defense until the conclusion of jury selection. This prejudiced the defendant in that defense counsel was not provided with an opportunity to question prospective jurors about their attitudes toward cooperating witnesses who receive a benefit from the government in exchange for their testimony. Then, in piecemeal fashion, the prosecutor gave *979defense counsel Nicholls’s statements and minutes of his guilty plea, in which he admitted possessing the gun used to shoot the complainant in this case. Under these circumstances, the delayed and piecemeal disclosure of Rosario material (see People v Rosario, 9 NY2d 286 [1961]) prejudiced the defense by not allowing a meaningful opportunity to investigate Nicholls and his potential identity as the man who shot the complainant (see People v Wagstaffe, 120 AD3d 1361, 1364 [2014]; People v Roberts, 203 AD2d 600 [1994]).
The People maintain that they properly delayed disclosure of Nicholls’s existence and the related discovery materials pursuant to a protective order. This is troubling to me as well, since, based on the record before this Court, it cannot be determined if the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in issuing the protective order.
Furthermore, contrary to the majority’s determination, I find that the Supreme Court erred in denying the defendant’s request for a missing witness charge with respect to the complainant’s son. The witnesses at trial estimated the assailant’s height to be between five feet eight inches and 5 feet 10 inches. The complainant’s son, however, who was an eyewitness to the crime, described the assailant as being six feet one inch or six feet two inches. Thus, the complainant’s son’s description of the assailant, which was up to five inches taller than the descriptions given by other witnesses, went directly to a material issue pending in the case, i.e., the identity of the assailant, and differed materially from the descriptions provided by the People’s witnesses (cf. People v Miller, 282 AD2d 691 [2001]).
Under these circumstances, the defendant made an adequate prima facie showing that the complainant’s son was knowledgeable about a material issue in the case, that he could be expected to testify favorably to the People, and that he was available and in the People’s control. In response, the People failed to meet their burden of establishing that a missing witness charge would be inappropriate (see People v Gonzalez, 68 NY2d 424, 428 [1986]; People v Days, 131 AD3d 972, 974 [2015]). Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, I do not find that the testimony of the complainant’s son as to the assailant’s height would have been immaterial. As indicated above, the testimony of the complainant’s son would have differed materially from the testimony of the other prosecution witnesses regarding the assailant’s height and, if such testimony was introduced, the resolution of the differing testimony would have been placed squarely before the jury. Consequently, the *980defendant’s request for a missing witness charge should have been granted.
Moreover, it is my opinion that these cumulative errors cannot be considered harmless, as the evidence of guilt was not overwhelming (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 241-242 [1975]; People v Days, 131 AD3d at 981). Specifically, the People’s evidence as to the defendant’s identity as the carj acker and shooter was not overwhelming, as the assailant wore a mask concealing his entire face except for his nose and eyes. In any event, the errors deprived the defendant of a fair trial.
Accordingly, I vote to reverse the judgments, grant that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials, and order a new trial.