Court Opinion

ID: 9414671
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 15:05:06.553632+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:56.307405
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                             FOURTH DISTRICT

                          STATE OF FLORIDA,
                              Appellant,

                                     v.

                           ELIANA VELASCO,
                               Appellee.

                              No. 4D23-264

                             [August 2, 2023]

   Appeal from the County Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Deborah Carpenter-Toye, Judge; L.T. Case No. 22-
5141MM10A.

  Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melynda L. Melear,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

  Gordon Weekes, Public Defender, and Lisa S. Lawlor, Chief Assistant
Public Defender, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

LEVINE, J.

   Appellee was charged with driving under the influence (“DUI”), driving
while license suspended or revoked with knowledge, and possession of
cannabis. The trial court granted appellee’s motion to suppress, finding
that the officer who stopped appellee lacked reasonable suspicion to
conduct a DUI investigation. We disagree. We find that the officer had
more than sufficient evidence establishing reasonable suspicion to initiate
a DUI investigation. As such, we reverse.

   Appellee moved to suppress all evidence obtained after the officer
conducted a DUI investigation, including statements made in connection
with the investigation, observations of field sobriety tests, video footage,
and breath sample refusal. During the evidentiary hearing on appellee’s
motion to suppress, the officer testified that he had been a DUI
enforcement officer with the City of Coconut Creek for 17 years. During
that time, he had conducted over a thousand investigations, and had
training in conducting field sobriety exercises as well as advanced roadside
impaired driving courses.
    Around 1:00 a.m., this officer, who was running a stationary radar,
clocked appellee driving 83 miles per hour in an area with a speed limit of
35 miles per hour. The officer then conducted a traffic stop. The officer
testified that appellee came to a sudden stop in the turn lane, instead of
the usual behavior of “roll[ing]” to a stop. As soon as the officer
approached the vehicle, he smelled a strong odor of alcohol coming from
the vehicle. While requesting appellee’s driver’s license, registration, and
proof of insurance, the officer noticed a half full cup of liquid on the
floorboard behind the passenger seat. As appellee spoke with the officer,
he detected a strong odor of alcohol coming from appellee. Additionally,
the officer observed appellee having bloodshot and watery eyes as well as
slurred speech.

   Appellee told the officer that she had been out with friends celebrating
her birthday, and she admitted to having consumed three vodka and
lemon drinks and an additional three shots. It was at this point the officer
called for back-up to assist in conducting a DUI investigation.

    Although the trial court found the officer’s testimony to be credible, the
trial court concluded that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion “at the
juncture that he started the DUI investigation.” The trial court stated:

         [I]n this case, he’s investigating a DUI. He clearly had
      probable cause to stop the car for speeding or reasonable
      suspicion, either one and there’s cases all over the place that
      either standard applies. But he clearly had—the stop was
      justified. The Court finds that. The Court also finds that
      that—[the officer’s] testimony credible.

          The Court, in the totality of all of the evidence that was
      presented before me today, does find that there was a lack of
      evidence to suggest that he had reasonable suspicion to
      detain her for the specific offense of driving under the
      influence in light of the lack of testimony regarding any sign
      of impairment.

         And we both know that the case law’s pretty clear that
      speeding, in and of itself, does not necessarily suggest that
      someone might be impaired.

         So, in the totality of the circumstances in these [sic]
      particular case, which is the standard that the Court’s
      required to apply, the Court does find that the—this officer, at

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      the juncture that he started the DUI investigation, lacked
      reasonable suspicion to do so in light of the testimony before
      the Court.

    The trial court entered a written order granting the motion to suppress
for the reasons stated on the record in open court. The written order also
stated: “The Court finds that based on the totality of the circumstances
and the testimony in this hearing—the officer lacked reasonable suspicion
to conduct a DUI investigation. No testimony or evidence offered re:
impairment.”

   From the trial court’s order granting appellee’s motion to suppress, the
state appeals.

   When we review a motion to suppress, we “defer to the trial court’s
factual findings, while reviewing application of the law to the facts de
novo.” State v. Castaneda, 79 So. 3d 41, 41-42 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). In
this case, we are asked to determine whether the officer had reasonable
suspicion to detain appellee.

   Section 316.193(1), Florida Statutes (2022), makes it unlawful for a
person to drive a vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages
or controlled substances “when affected to the extent that the person’s
normal faculties are impaired . . . .” Section 316.1934(1), Florida Statutes
(2022), provides it is unlawful for a person to drive a motor vehicle while

      under the influence of alcoholic beverages or controlled
      substances, when affected to the extent that the person’s
      normal faculties are impaired or to the extent that the person
      is deprived of full possession of normal faculties . . . . Such
      normal faculties include, but are not limited to, the ability to
      see, hear, walk, talk, judge distances, drive an automobile,
      make judgments, act in emergencies, and, in general,
      normally perform the many mental and physical acts of daily
      life.

   “In order to detain someone for a DUI investigation, the officer must
have reasonable suspicion that the detainee committed the offense.”
Castaneda, 79 So. 3d at 42. We have defined reasonable suspicion as
having “a factual foundation in the circumstances observed by the officer,
when those circumstances are interpreted in the light of the officer’s
knowledge and experience.” Id. (quoting Origi v. State, 912 So. 2d 69, 71
(Fla. 4th DCA 2005)).

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   We find two cases to be particularly persuasive on this issue. In Origi,
the officer stopped the defendant for driving 90 miles per hour in a 65 mile
per hour zone. 912 So. 2d at 70. The officer in Origi detected an alcoholic
odor when approaching the vehicle, as well as noted that the defendant
has bloodshot and glassy eyes. Id. This court found that the defendant’s
high rate of speed while driving, the odor of alcohol, and the defendant’s
bloodshot, glassy eyes were all circumstances sufficient to constitute
reasonable suspicion justifying the officer’s detention of the defendant for
a DUI investigation. Id. at 71-72.

   The other persuasive case is Castaneda. In Castaneda, we relied on
the Origi case, finding that

      [h]ere, the officer made the same observations which we said
      in Origi constituted reasonable suspicion to detain the driver
      for a DUI investigation—the officer observed Defendant
      speeding, smelled an alcoholic beverage on Defendant’s
      breath, and observed that Defendant’s eyes were bloodshot
      and watery. Consistent with Origi, we hold that these
      observations provided sufficient reasonable suspicion to
      detain Defendant for the purpose of conducting a DUI
      investigation.

79 So. 3d at 42; see also State v. Ameqrane, 39 So. 3d 339, 342 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2010) (finding reasonable suspicion for DUI investigation where the
defendant was speeding, smelled of alcohol, and had glassy, bloodshot
eyes); State v. Taylor, 648 So. 2d 701, 703 (Fla. 1995) (finding reasonable
suspicion for DUI where defendant was speeding; staggered upon exiting
his car; and had slurred speech, watery, bloodshot eyes, and a strong odor
of alcohol).

   In the present case, the officer made almost the same observations as
in Origi and Castaneda. The officer here observed appellee speeding,
smelled an alcoholic beverage emanating from appellee, and observed
appellee’s eyes to be bloodshot and watery. These factors were sufficient
to constitute reasonable suspicion in Origi and Castaneda, and they are
sufficient to find reasonable suspicion in this case.

   Further, in the present case, there are additional factors that only add
to the finding of reasonable suspicion. In this case, appellee came to a
sudden stop when the officer activated his lights while appellee was driving
83 miles per hour in a 35 mile-per-hour zone. The officer smelled alcohol
emanating from the vehicle, observed a drink on the floorboard behind the
passenger’s seat, and noted appellee’s slurred speech, and appellee

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admitted to drinking three vodka and lemon drinks as well as three shots.
All told, all these factors constitute reasonable suspicion to detain appellee
to conduct an investigation regarding DUI.

   In summary, we find the trial court erred in granting the motion to
suppress, and as such, we reverse and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

   Reversed and remanded.

GROSS and GERBER, JJ., concur.

                            *         *         *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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