Court Opinion

ID: 9928842
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-01 00:01:55.121088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:55:37.095427
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/31/24

                       CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

        IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                               DIVISION FOUR

 In re M.B., a Person Coming Under
 the Juvenile Court Law.

 THE PEOPLE,                                 A166408
        Plaintiff and Respondent,            (San Francisco County Super. Ct.
                  v.                         No. JW186158)
 M.B.,
        Defendant and Appellant.

        In this juvenile wardship proceeding under Welfare and Institutions
Code1 section 602, defendant M.B. admitted committing attempted murder
and related enhancement allegations. The juvenile court committed M.B. to
a secure youth treatment facility (SYTF) pursuant to section 875. The court
specified a four-year “baseline term of confinement” (§ 875, subd. (b)), as well
as a “maximum term of confinement” of 22 years to life (id., subd. (c)). The
court ordered that M.B.’s precommitment credits be applied against the
maximum term of confinement (id., subd. (c)(1)(C)).
        On appeal, M.B. presents three main challenges to the court’s orders,
all pertaining to the court’s rulings as to confinement terms and the

        1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions

Code.

                                        1
application of credits.2 First, he contends the court lacked jurisdiction to
modify an earlier order setting the maximum term of confinement at four
years. Second, M.B. argues in the alternative that, even if the court had
jurisdiction, the indeterminate 22-years-to-life maximum term it set is
unauthorized, because the longest term permitted by statute is a determinate
term of 22 years. And, because the court had discretion to set a “maximum
term of confinement” (§ 875, subd. (c)) that was lower than the 22-year
statutory maximum, M.B. asserts that a remand is necessary for the court to
exercise its discretion in selecting the maximum term of confinement.
Finally, in his third set of arguments, M.B. claims equal protection principles
require that his precommitment credits be applied against his four-year
baseline term (rather than against the maximum term of confinement).
      In response, the Attorney General argues the court had jurisdiction to
make the challenged rulings and properly applied M.B.’s precommitment
credits. As to the maximum term of confinement set by the court under
section 875, the Attorney General concedes that the 22-years-to-life term is
unauthorized and that the maximum term permitted by statute is 22 years.
The Attorney General also agrees the juvenile court had discretion to set a
maximum term of confinement that is lower than the 22-year statutory
maximum.3 The Attorney General contends, however, that this court should
simply modify the maximum term of confinement to 22 years, and that no
remand is necessary because it is clear from the record that the court
intended to impose that term.

      2 M.B. does not challenge the court’s decision to commit him to the

SYTF.
      3 Based on this latter concession, we need not address M.B.’s argument

that a construction of section 875 that precluded the exercise of such
discretion would violate equal protection principles.

                                        2
      We conclude the court had jurisdiction to enter the challenged order,
and we reject M.B.’s argument that equal protection principles require
application of precommitment credits against the baseline term. We will
modify the court’s order to specify the maximum term of confinement is 22
years, and we will otherwise affirm.
                              I. BACKGROUND
      On November 3, 2021, the San Mateo County District Attorney filed an
amended wardship petition (§ 602, subd. (a)) alleging M.B. had committed
attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664,
187, subd. (a); count 1); aggravated mayhem (id., § 205; count 2); five counts
of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (id., § 245, subd. (b); counts 3
through 7); discharge of a firearm with gross negligence (id., § 246.3,
subd. (a); count 8); and unlawful possession of a firearm by a minor (id.,
§ 29610; count 9).4 On each count, the petition alleged M.B. was over 16
years old at the time of the offenses (§ 707, subd. (a)(1)).
      As to the attempted murder count, the petition alleged M.B. personally
used a firearm, personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, and
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury
(Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subds. (b)–(d)). The aggravated mayhem count was
enhanced by an allegation that M.B. personally and intentionally discharged
a firearm causing great bodily injury (id., § 12022.53, subd. (d)). For all the
assault with a firearm counts, the petition alleged M.B. personally used a

      4 In addition to the November 2021 petition at issue in this case, M.B.

was the subject of earlier wardship proceedings beginning in 2018. We also
note that, in April 2021, as part of the proceedings in the present case but
prior to the filing of the operative amended petition, the San Mateo juvenile
court denied a motion by the People to transfer the matter to adult court.
The juvenile court found M.B. was a “fit and proper subject to remain in [the]
Juvenile Justice System.”

                                         3
firearm (id., § 12022.5, subd. (a)). As to one of the assault with a firearm
counts (count 3) and the attempted murder count, the petition alleged M.B.
personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim (id., § 12022.7,
subd. (a)).
      The allegations in the wardship petition arose from a shooting on
August 21, 2020, on a public bus in Daly City.5 M.B. was seated on the bus.
When the victim boarded the bus, M.B. pulled out a handgun and fired five
times at the victim, hitting him in the abdomen. Other passengers were “in
the line of fire of the discharged bullets.”
      M.B. and a female companion fled, running past the fallen victim and
off the bus. Police later found them “hiding in thick vegetation near Highway
35/Northbound Highway 1 onramp.” The victim “underwent emergency
surgery for a single gunshot wound to the lower left abdomen, where 1/10th
of his colon was removed, and he was treated for damage to his bowels.” M.B.
was 16 years, 11 months old at the time of the shooting.
      On November 3, 2021 (the same day the amended petition was filed),
M.B. admitted committing attempted murder and the allegations in
connection with that count that he was over 16 years old at the time of the
offense, that he personally used a firearm, and that he personally inflicted
great bodily injury, in exchange for the striking of the premeditation and
deliberation allegation and the dismissal of the other counts and allegations.
      On April 26, 2022, the San Mateo County Juvenile Court transferred
the matter to San Francisco County for disposition based on M.B.’s residency
in San Francisco.

      5 We derive this summary of the underlying incident from the probation

officer’s dispositional report.

                                         4
      At the August 24, 2022 dispositional hearing, the San Francisco County
Juvenile Court redeclared wardship and committed M.B. to an SYTF. The
court set M.B.’s baseline term of confinement at four years, commencing, by
stipulation, on July 6, 2022. The court set the maximum term of confinement
at 22 years to life. The court stated it would reserve ruling on the application
of precommitment credits and the baseline term.
      The court’s written order issued after the August 24 hearing included
the following findings:
      “13. The maximum period of confinement that could be
      imposed pursuant to [section 875, subdivision (c)] is: 22 years to life.
      “14. Having considered the individual facts and
      circumstances of the case, the court orders that the maximum
      period of confinement is: 22 years to life.
      “15. The youth shall receive credit for time served in the
      amount to be determined by the court. This issue is reserved
      pending the court’s determination (at the review hearing on
      9/6/22).
      “16. The baseline term of confinement based on the most
      serious recent adjudicated offense is 4 years, commencing 7/6/22
      pursuant to the stipulation of the parties. The issue of baseline
      term is reserved by the court.”
      After the August 24 hearing, the parties filed briefs addressing the
question of how M.B.’s precommitment credits should be applied. M.B.
argued the credits should be applied against the baseline term of
confinement, while the prosecutor contended the credits should instead be
applied against the maximum term of confinement. The parties’ briefs

                                        5
focused in part on the decision in In re Ernesto L. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 31
(Ernesto L.), a case we discuss further below.
      At a hearing on September 14, 2022, the court ruled M.B.’s
precommitment credits would be applied against his four-year baseline term
in the SYTF. The court also modified certain portions of its August 24 order,
specifically findings 13 and 14 (which, as noted, dealt with the “maximum
period of confinement”). The court’s new finding 13 states the “maximum
period of confinement to which the minor is exposed by statute is 22 years to
life.” The new finding 14 states that, “[h]aving considered the individual
facts and circumstances of the case,” the “maximum custodial term is four
years.”
      The next day (September 15, 2022), the court—on its own motion—
stayed the September 14 “order regarding credit for time served” and set a
hearing for reconsideration of the order. The court’s stay order stated: “The
issue of interest to the court is whether the recent opinion in the case of
Ernesto L. is relevant to the ‘maximum term of confinement’ described in
[section 875].”
      On September 26, 2022, defense counsel filed a written objection to the
court’s reconsideration of the September 14 order applying M.B.’s
precommitment credits to the baseline term. Counsel argued that, because
the order was valid and had been entered in the minutes, the court had lost
jurisdiction to modify it.
      On September 27, 2022, after a hearing, the court vacated the
September 14 order and reinstated the August 24 order (including
findings 13 and 14 pertaining to the “maximum period of confinement”). The
court applied M.B.’s precommitment custody credits against “the maximum
period of confinement as described under [section 875, subdivision (c)].” In

                                        6
response to defense counsel’s objection, the court concluded it had power to
act because its ruling on September 14 had resulted in an unauthorized
disposition.
      M.B. appealed the August 24 and September 27 orders.6
                              II. DISCUSSION
   A. Additional Background: Juvenile Justice Realignment,
      Section 875, and the Terms Imposed by the Juvenile Court
      Until recently, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,
Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) was “the state’s most restrictive placement
for its most severe juvenile offenders . . . .” (In re Miguel C. (2021)
69 Cal.App.5th 899, 902; see In re J.B. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 410, 413.)7 “[I]n
2020 the Legislature passed ‘juvenile justice realignment’ through Senate Bill
No. 823 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2020, ch. 337).” (In re J.B., at p. 413,
fn. 3.) The Legislature’s juvenile justice realignment program has included
the transfer of DJJ’s responsibilities to California’s counties beginning on
July 1, 2021 (§ 736.5, subd. (a)) and the closure of DJJ on June 30, 2023 (id.,
subd. (e)). The stated purpose of these changes is “[t]o ensure that justice-
involved youth are closer to their families and communities and receive age-
appropriate treatment.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 337, § 1(b); In re Miguel C., at
p. 907.)

      6 We will refer to the three orders entered in August and

September 2022 as the August 24 order, the September 14 order, and the
September 27 order.
      7 “The DJJ is also known as the Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF). [Citation.] DJJ and
DJF are used interchangeably in case law.” (In re J.B., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th
at p. 413, fn. 1.) “The DJJ was previously known as the California Youth
Authority.” (In re Miguel C., supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 906, fn. 4.)

                                         7
      As part of the legislative shift from DJJ to county-level commitments,
section 875 took effect on May 14, 2021 with the enactment of Senate Bill
No. 92 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 18, § 12). Section 875
provides that, commencing July 1, 2021, a juvenile court may commit a ward
to an SYTF under certain circumstances. (§ 875, subd. (a).)8 The court must
set both a “baseline term of confinement” (baseline term) (id., subd. (b)) and a
“maximum term of confinement” (id., subd. (c)). Subdivision (b) of section 875
states the baseline term is to be “based on the most serious recent offense for
which the ward has been adjudicated” and “shall represent the time in
custody necessary to meet the developmental and treatment needs of the
ward and to prepare the ward for discharge to a period of probation
supervision in the community.” (Id., subd. (b)(1).)
      Pending the development of offense-based classifications by the
Judicial Council, the court must set the baseline term using the “discharge
consideration date guidelines” applied by the DJJ prior to its closure. (§ 875,
subd. (b)(1), citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, §§ 30807–30813.) Under those
guidelines, attempted murder is a “category two” offense, resulting in a
baseline term of four years. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, §§ 30807, subd. (a),
30808, subd. (a)(12).) The court may “modify the initial baseline term with a
deviation of plus or minus six months.” (§ 875, subd. (b)(1).) The baseline
term is also subject to modification in later progress review hearings. (Id.,
subds. (b)(1), (e).) As noted, the court here set a four-year baseline term.
      Subdivision (c) of section 875 requires that the court also set a
“maximum term of confinement for the ward based upon the facts and
circumstances of the matter or matters that brought or continued the ward

      8 As noted, M.B. does not challenge the court’s decision to commit him

to an SYTF.

                                        8
under the jurisdiction of the court and as deemed appropriate to achieve
rehabilitation.” (§ 875, subd. (c)(1).) Under section 875, subdivision (c)(1),
the maximum term of confinement is “the longest term of confinement in a
facility that the ward may serve subject to” three limitations. (Ibid.) First, a
ward committed to an SYTF is not to be held in secure confinement beyond
23 years of age (or 25 years of age for more serious offenses) or two years
from the date of commitment, whichever occurs later. (Id., subd. (c)(1)(A).)
Second, the maximum term of confinement “shall not exceed the middle term
of imprisonment that can be imposed upon an adult convicted of the same
offense or offenses,” with additional directives as to how a court is to proceed
if it elects to aggregate the period of confinement on multiple counts or
multiple petitions. (Id., subd. (c)(1)(B); accord, § 726, subd. (d)(1), (3), (5) [this
cap applies when a ward is placed in “physical confinement,” which includes
placement in an SYTF under § 875].) Third, section 875, subdivision (c)
specifies that “[p]recommitment credits for time served must be applied
against the maximum term of confinement as set pursuant to this
subdivision.” (Id., subd. (c)(1)(C).)
      Subdivision (c)(2) of section 875 additionally provides: “For purposes of
this section, ‘maximum term of confinement’ has the same meaning as
‘maximum term of imprisonment,’ as defined in” section 726,
subdivision (d)(2).9 In turn, section 726, subdivision (d)(2) defines

      9 Subdivision (c) of section 875 provides in full:

      “(1) In making its order of commitment, the court shall additionally set
a maximum term of confinement for the ward based upon the facts and
circumstances of the matter or matters that brought or continued the ward
under the jurisdiction of the court and as deemed appropriate to achieve
rehabilitation. The maximum term of confinement shall represent the

                                          9
“ ‘maximum term of imprisonment’ ” to mean “the middle of the three time
periods set forth in paragraph (3) of subdivision (a) of Section 1170 of the
Penal Code, but without the need to follow the provisions of subdivision (b) of
Section 1170 of the Penal Code or to consider time for good behavior or
participation pursuant to Sections 2930, 2931, and 2932 of the Penal Code,
plus enhancements which must be proven if pled.”
      The parties agree that since M.B. admitted committing attempted
murder (but did not admit the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and
premeditated), his maximum term of confinement could not exceed 22 years

longest term of confinement in a facility that the ward may serve subject to
the following:
      “(A) A ward committed to a secure youth treatment facility under this
section shall not be held in secure confinement beyond 23 years of age, or two
years from the date of the commitment, whichever occurs later. However, if
the ward has been committed to a secure youth treatment facility based on
adjudication for an offense or offenses for which the ward, if convicted in
adult criminal court, would face an aggregate sentence of seven or more
years, the ward shall not be held in secure confinement beyond 25 years of
age, or two years from the date of commitment, whichever occurs later.
      “(B) The maximum term of confinement shall not exceed the middle
term of imprisonment that can be imposed upon an adult convicted of the
same offense or offenses. If the court elects to aggregate the period of
physical confinement on multiple counts or multiple petitions, including
previously sustained petitions adjudging the minor a ward within
Section 602, the maximum term of confinement shall be the aggregate term
of imprisonment specified in subdivision (a) of Section 1170.1 of the Penal
Code, which includes any additional term imposed pursuant to Section 667,
667.5, 667.6, or 12022.1 of the Penal Code, and Section 11370.2 of the Health
and Safety Code.
     “(C) Precommitment credits for time served must be applied against
the maximum term of confinement as set pursuant to this subdivision.
      “(2) For purposes of this section, ‘maximum term of confinement’ has
the same meaning as ‘maximum term of imprisonment,’ as defined in
paragraph (2) of subdivision (d) of Section 726.”

                                       10
under sections 875, subdivision (c)(1)(B) and 726, subdivision (d)(2). The 22-
year maximum consists of the seven-year midterm for attempted murder
(Pen. Code, §§ 664, subd. (a), 187, subd. (a), 190), plus 10 years for the
firearm enhancement (id., § 12022.53, subd. (b)) and three years for the great
bodily injury enhancement (id., § 12022.7, subd. (a)), plus one year each (one-
third the midterm) for findings in prior proceedings that M.B. committed
assault with a deadly weapon and second degree robbery (id., §§ 245,
subd. (a)(1), 213, subd. (a)(2), 1170.1, subd. (a)).
      As noted, the court instead determined (based on the prosecutor’s
calculation and without objection by the defense) that the maximum term
that could be imposed was 22 years to life.10 This statutory maximum is
stated or incorporated in each of the court’s orders (as finding 13). And,
within that limitation, the court, based on consideration of the “individual
facts and circumstances of the case” (as finding 14), initially imposed a
“maximum period of confinement” of 22 years to life at the August 24
hearing; the court replaced that term with a “maximum custodial term” of
four years at the September 14 hearing; and the court reinstated the 22-
years-to-life maximum term of confinement at the September 27 hearing.
   B. The Court Had Authority to Modify Its Orders
      The parties rely on In re Eugene R. (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 605
(Eugene R.), as well as cases involving adult criminal sentencing, to contend

      10 The prosecutor reached this total by including in the calculation the

term of seven years to life that applies to attempted premeditated murder
(Pen. Code, §§ 664, subd. (a), 3046, subd. (a)), rather than the seven-year
midterm that applies to attempted murder (id., §§ 664, subd. (a), 187,
subd. (a), 190). It appears counsel and the San Francisco Juvenile Court
(which, as noted, received the case for disposition when it was transferred
from San Mateo County) were unaware that M.B. had not admitted the
premeditation allegation.

                                         11
the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to make certain modifications to its
disposition orders (although they differ as to which changes were
permissible). We disagree and conclude the juvenile court had authority to
make the challenged modifications.
         1. The Parties’ Arguments
      M.B. argues the court lacked jurisdiction on September 27 to modify
the four-year maximum term of confinement it set at the September 14
hearing (finding 14), because that term was “lawful” and M.B. “had already
begun his SYTF commitment.” He argues the court’s earlier modification of
the August 24 order on September 14 was permissible, because the 22-years-
to-life maximum term of confinement in the August 24 order was an
unauthorized term. M.B. urges this court to reverse the September 27 order
and direct the juvenile court to reinstate the September 14 order.11
      The Attorney General counters that on September 27 the court
“properly vacated the September 14 order because the portion of that order
changing the maximum term of confinement was void for lack of fundamental
jurisdiction”—i.e., the court lacked jurisdiction on September 14 to change
the August 24 order setting the maximum term of confinement at 22 years to
life. The Attorney General bases his jurisdictional argument on the fact M.B.
began his SYTF commitment on August 24.
      Although acknowledging the 22-years-to-life maximum term of
confinement set in the August 24 order was unauthorized, the Attorney
General contends that defect did not make the August 24 order facially void
(instead making it only voidable), and therefore that portion of the August 24

      11 M.B. notes that, if the September 14 order is reinstated, the 22-

years-to-life “maximum exposure term” in that order (finding 13) should be
modified to 22 years.

                                       12
order was not modifiable on September 14. In the Attorney General’s view,
the September 14 order purporting to change the maximum term of
confinement was void, and the court therefore had jurisdiction on
September 27 to vacate the void September 14 order and reinstate the
August 24 order.12
         2. Section 775 Authorizes Juvenile Courts to Modify Prior
            Orders
      Section 775—a statute that neither party cites—authorizes a juvenile
court presiding over a delinquency proceeding to modify its prior orders.
Section 775 states: “Any order made by the court in the case of any person
subject to its jurisdiction may at any time be changed, modified, or set aside,
as the judge deems meet and proper, subject to such procedural requirements
as are imposed by this article.”
      The statute confers authority to make both clerical and substantive
changes. “Under section 775, ‘the juvenile court may modify an order that
contains a clerical error, [and] may also reconsider the substance of a
previous order the court considers to have been erroneously, inadvertently or
improvidently granted.’ ” (In re K.W. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 467, 473 (K.W.).)
The juvenile court’s authority continues after disposition. (In re D.N. (2022)
14 Cal.5th 202, 207 [addressing challenge to juvenile court orders governing
a minor who was placed on probation; “After disposition, the juvenile court
retains the authority to modify its orders regarding a minor under its
jurisdiction (§ 775), and a parent, the minor through a guardian ad litem, or
another person having an interest in the minor may petition the court for a
modification (§ 778).”].)

      12 The Attorney General agrees that, on appeal, the maximum term of

confinement should be reduced to 22 years.

                                      13
      We and other appellate courts construing a parallel statute that applies
in juvenile dependency proceedings—section 385—have held a juvenile court
may exercise its modification authority sua sponte. (In re G.B. (2014)
227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1160 [construing § 385; “A juvenile court has the
authority to change, modify, or set aside a previous order sua sponte if it
decides that a previous order was ‘erroneously, inadvertently or
improvidently granted.’ ”]; accord, Nickolas F. v. Superior Court (2006)
144 Cal.App.4th 92, 116, 110 (Nickolas F.) [construing § 385].) The wording
of sections 775 and 385 is “word-for-word identical,” so “authorities
construing section 385 are persuasive in construing section 775.” (K.W.,
supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 473.) We conclude sua sponte modifications are
permissible under section 775.
      As noted, section 775 states the authority to modify a prior order is
“subject to such procedural requirements as are imposed by this article,” i.e.,
article 20 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. Sections 776 and 779.5 are
the sections in article 20 that appear to directly restrict the court’s authority
to sua sponte modify a disposition order committing a ward to a county
SYTF.
      Section 776 provides: “No order changing, modifying, or setting aside a
previous order of the juvenile court shall be made either in chambers, or
otherwise, unless prior notice of the application therefor has been given by
the judge or the clerk of the court to the probation officer and prosecuting
attorney and to the minor’s counsel of record, or, if there is no counsel of
record, to the minor and his parent or guardian.” Read in conjunction with
section 775, this section indicates that the juvenile court may modify its
orders if it gives prior notice to the interested parties.

                                        14
      Here, in our view, the court complied with section 776’s notice
requirement when it entered the September 27 order now challenged in this
appeal, including its ruling vacating the maximum term of confinement set in
the September 14 order and reinstating the August 24 order. As noted, in a
written order filed on September 15 (one day after entering the September 14
order), the court notified the parties it was staying that order and setting a
review hearing to reconsider its findings. The court stated in part that it was
interested in whether a specified case (Ernesto L.) was relevant to the
maximum term of confinement under section 875. And the court then
allowed expansive argument on the issue at the September 27 hearing.13
      Section 779.5 (the other relevant section in article 20) states the
standard that must be met, and the procedures that must be followed, to
“modify or set aside” an order of commitment to an SYTF, specifically to end
a ward’s placement in an SYTF. Section 779.5 states: “The court committing
a ward to a secure youth treatment facility as provided in Section 875 may
thereafter modify or set aside the order of commitment upon the written
application of the ward or the probation department and upon a showing of
good cause that the county or the commitment facility has failed, or is unable
to, provide the ward with treatment, programming, and education that are

      13 As to the court’s earlier modification—its September 14 change to the

August 24 order—the court similarly entertained substantial oral argument
at the September 14 hearing. It is true that, on August 24, the court only
specifically reserved ruling on the questions of precommitment credits and
the baseline term of confinement. We need not determine whether the court
gave adequate notice, prior to the September 14 hearing, that it might modify
the maximum term of confinement. Any noncompliance with section 776’s
notice requirement before the court modified the maximum term of
confinement at the September 14 hearing (from 22-years-to-life to four years)
was rendered harmless by the court’s subsequent restoration of the 22-years-
to-life maximum term at the September 27 hearing.

                                       15
consistent with the individual rehabilitation plan described in subdivision (d)
of Section 875, that the conditions under which the ward is confined are
harmful to the ward, or that the juvenile justice goals of rehabilitation and
community safety are no longer served by continued confinement of the ward
in a secure youth treatment facility. The court shall notice a hearing in which
it shall hear any evidence from the ward, the probation department, and any
behavioral health or other specialists having information relevant to
consideration of the request to modify or set aside the order of commitment.
The court shall, at the conclusion of the hearing, make its findings on the
record, including findings as to the custodial and supervision status of the
ward, based on the evidence presented.” (Italics added.)
      The language of section 779.5 makes clear it establishes the standard
and procedures for recalling an order of commitment to an SYTF, i.e., the
applicant (the ward or the probation department) must show the SYTF is not
meeting the ward’s rehabilitative needs. (§ 779.5 [requiring a showing that
the facility is not providing appropriate “treatment, programming, and
education”; that the conditions of confinement are “harmful to the ward”; or
that the “goals of rehabilitation and community safety are no longer served
by continued confinement” in the SYTF].) We do not read section 779.5 as
providing for application of these unique standards when a juvenile court
exercises its more general modification authority under section 775 to revise
an SYTF commitment order to correct what it has recognized to be a legal
error. In our view, as discussed, under section 775, the court may correct
clerical errors and may reconsider substantive aspects of the order such as
the maximum term of confinement, if the court determines (as it did almost
immediately in the present case) that those orders were “ ‘erroneously,

                                       16
inadvertently or improvidently granted.’ ” (K.W., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at
p. 473 [describing court’s authority under § 775].)
      Other sections in article 20 of the Welfare and Institutions Code also
address modification of a court’s order, but they do not change our conclusion
the court had authority here to modify its order sua sponte to reinstate the
maximum term of confinement it had originally set. (E.g., §§ 777 [procedures
applicable for changing order based on alleged probation violation], 778
[petition procedure to be followed when a “parent or other person having an
interest in a child who is a ward of the juvenile court or the child himself or
herself through a properly appointed guardian” seeks to modify a prior order
“upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence”], 779 [procedures
for modifying an order committing a ward to the Youth Authority].)
         3. The Juvenile Court Did Not Lose Jurisdiction to Modify
            Its Orders
      In support of their arguments about whether the juvenile court had
jurisdiction at certain points in the proceeding, the parties rely primarily on
case law addressing adult criminal sentencing. In the adult criminal context,
our Supreme Court has explained: “Under the general common law rule, a
trial court is deprived of jurisdiction to resentence a criminal defendant once
execution of the sentence has commenced.” (People v. Karaman (1992)
4 Cal.4th 335, 344.) This general rule is subject to statutory exceptions
allowing later resentencing in certain circumstances. (E.g., Pen. Code, §§
1172.1, 1170.18, 1170.126; see Karaman, at pp. 351–352 [Pen. Code, § 1170,
former subd. (d), the predecessor to Pen. Code, § 1172.1, “creates a statutory
exception to the common law rule that the trial court loses jurisdiction to
resentence a defendant upon commencement of execution of his or her
sentence”].)

                                       17
      Noting M.B. had begun his SYTF commitment when the juvenile court
modified its dispositional orders on September 14 and September 27, the
parties rely on Eugene R., supra, 107 Cal.App.3d 605 to argue the court no
longer had jurisdiction to make certain of the challenged modifications. In
Eugene R., the juvenile court committed the minor to the Youth Authority
and set the maximum term of confinement at three years, 10 months, with
credit for 124 days served. (Id. at p. 611.) The court then gave notice on its
own motion that it would hold a hearing to review the minor’s “ ‘maximum
commitment time and days in custody.’ ” (Ibid.)
      The appellate court in Eugene R. held the juvenile court lacked
jurisdiction to modify the original commitment order. (Eugene R., supra,
107 Cal.App.3d at p. 612.) The Eugene R. court cited cases holding that in
adult criminal matters, “where a defendant has commenced serving the
sentence, the court has no jurisdiction to vacate or modify the sentence as
pronounced and formally entered in the minutes in an attempt to revise its
deliberately exercised judicial discretion unless the sentence was improper on
its face.” (Ibid.)
      The Eugene R. court then explained its reasoning for applying this rule
to juvenile delinquency proceedings, stating in part: “The foregoing
procedural rule should also apply to juvenile matters. Although denominated
as civil in nature, the courts have long recognized and emphasized that
original section 602 and supplementary juvenile proceedings are quasi-
criminal in nature. Ramifications of a section 602 hearing include a possible
finding that the alleged criminal conduct is true, resulting in a substantial
loss of personal freedom.” (Eugene R., supra, 107 Cal.App.3d at p. 612.) The
Eugene R. court also noted that, under the California Rules of Court, the
general rules governing criminal appeals apply to juvenile appeals, to enable

                                      18
the expeditious handling of juvenile matters. (Id. at pp. 612–613.) The court
stated: “When we apply the jurisdictional rule in controversy to juvenile
proceedings, the cited legislative policy is promoted and the criminal
appellate rules are followed. To conclude otherwise and allow collateral
modification based upon another judge’s view of abuse of discretion would
inevitably promote ‘judge-shopping’ and sanction delay.” (Id. at p. 613.)
      The Eugene R. court rejected the Attorney General’s argument in that
case that the juvenile court could modify the judgment pursuant to
section 775 at any time that the court had continuing jurisdiction over the
minor, stating: “Granted the juvenile court has continuing jurisdiction over
the minor; however, such jurisdiction must be properly activated by petition
or application and cannot be exercised on the court’s own motion without
procedural statutory authority.” (Eugene R., supra, 107 Cal.App.3d at
p. 613.)
      In support of its conclusion that section 775 does not authorize a
juvenile court to modify its orders sua sponte, the Eugene R. court cited the
language of section 775 and stated: “Article 20, sections 775 through 779
read together, does not authorize the juvenile court to modify a previous
order on its own motion. If such power was inherent or provided for by
section 775, then the Judicial Council and the Supreme Court would not have
enacted [California Rules of Court,14 former rule 1391(d); now rule 5.560(f)]
in the narrow manner written providing for the correction of only clerical

      14 Rule references are to the California Rules of Court.

                                      19
errors in judgments, orders and the record by the court at any time on its own
motion.”15 (Eugene R., supra, 107 Cal.App.3d at p. 613.)
      We decline to follow Eugene R. For three reasons, we think it is a
mistake in the juvenile context simply to borrow the common law
jurisdictional prohibition against revisiting an adult criminal sentence once
the sentence has commenced.
      First, we note that juvenile delinquency proceedings and adult criminal
proceedings serve different purposes. “The purpose of juvenile proceedings
remains markedly different from that of adult proceedings. The state’s
purpose in juvenile proceedings is a rehabilitative one distinguishable from
the criminal justice system for adults, which has a purely punitive purpose
separate from its rehabilitative goals. [Citation.] The proceedings are
intended to secure for the minor such care and guidance as will best serve the
interests of the minor and the state and to impose upon the minor a sense of
responsibility for his or her actions. The purpose of imprisonment pursuant
to criminal law is punishment. [Citation.] While part of the juvenile justice
system does include punishment in certain cases, it does not change the
primary purpose of juvenile proceedings from that of preserving and
promoting the welfare of the child. In juvenile law, ‘. . . the reference to
punishment did not alter the overall rehabilitative aspect of the juvenile
justice system.’ ” (In re Myresheia W. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 734, 740–741.)
In light of these differences, it does not follow that the rule prohibiting the
court from modifying a criminal sentence that has commenced being served
applies to juvenile proceedings simply because juvenile proceedings are

      15 Rule 5.560(f) provides:“Clerical errors in judgments, orders, or other
parts of the record may be corrected by the court at any time on the court’s
own motion or on motion of any party and may be entered nunc pro tunc.”

                                        20
quasi-criminal in nature or because a rule of court “expressly provide[d] for
the application of the general rules relating to criminal appeals to all juvenile
appeals.” (Eugene R., supra, 107 Cal.App.3d at p. 612.)
       Second, we are not persuaded by Eugene R.’s conclusion that
section 775 does not authorize a court to sua sponte modify its order, a
conclusion Eugene R. reached on the ground that the language in former rule
1391(d) (currently rule 5.560(f)) would not have been enacted in the “narrow
manner written providing for the correction of only clerical errors in
judgments . . . .’’ (Eugene R., supra, 107 Cal.App.3d at p. 613.) The
Eugene R. court thus suggests that if the juvenile court had jurisdiction to
modify its orders sua sponte, the rule would have been written to provide for
such modifications. But since the express language of section 775 already
allowed the court to modify its orders with respect to a juvenile over whom it
had jurisdiction, it was unnecessary to include this provision in rule 5.560(f).
Moreover, the correction of clerical errors is a ministerial task that does not
require the exercise of discretion. Modifications in a juvenile court’s orders
that involve more than the correction of clerical error may, however, involve
an exercise of discretion and thus require notice to the parties and the
opportunity to be heard. This may explain why the court’s power to correct
these two different types of errors are not contained in the same rule or
statute. In any event, it does not follow from rule 5.560(f) that section 775
does not mean what it says, that “[a]ny order made by the court in the case of
any person subject to its jurisdiction may at any time be changed, modified,
or set aside . . . .” (§ 775.)
       Third, the Eugene R. holding was disavowed, or at least limited, in the
closely analogous juvenile dependency context by the court that originally
issued it. (See Nickolas F., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 115–116, fn. 20.) In

                                       21
Nickolas F., the court held that, under section 385 (the analogue of
section 775 that applies in dependency proceedings), “the juvenile court has
the authority . . . to change, modify or set aside its prior orders sua sponte”
(Nickolas F., at p. 116), if it provides the parties with notice and an
opportunity to be heard (id. at p. 98). In reaching this conclusion, the
Nickolas F. court relied in part on the Supreme Court’s decision in Le
Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1104–1108, which addressed the
authority of a court to modify its own interim orders. (Nickolas F., at pp. 98,
110–111.)
      In a footnote, the Nickolas F. court noted its prior holding in Eugene R.
that in delinquency matters, “section 775 limited the court’s authority to
modify its previous orders sua sponte to the correction of clerical error . . . .”
(Nickolas F., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 115–116, fn. 20.) Noting
sections 385 and 775 are identical to each other, the Nickolas F. court stated
Eugene R.’s holding “has been called into question” by Le Francois and other
authority. (Nickolas F., at pp. 115–116, fn. 20.) The Nickolas F. court
concluded: “To the extent Eugene R. is interpreted to apply to dependency
cases, we decline to follow the holding.” (Ibid.)
      We agree the interpretation of sections 775 and 385 should align on
this point. For the reasons discussed above, we conclude section 775, like
section 385, confers authority on a juvenile court to modify its prior orders
sua sponte, after providing the parties with notice and an opportunity to be
heard (see Nickolas F., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 98), a view we have
already adopted with respect to section 385 (In re G.B., supra,
227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1160). (See K.W., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 473
[§§ 775 and 385 are identically worded, so “authorities construing section 385
are persuasive in construing section 775”].)

                                        22
      At oral argument, prompted by the tentative opinion we issued in this
case, M.B.’s counsel urged this court to adopt in part the result reached in
Eugene R., and to do so based on double jeopardy principles. Specifically,
counsel argued that, once a juvenile commitment has begun, double jeopardy
protections bar a juvenile court from modifying the commitment order in a
way that increases the ward’s term of confinement. According to counsel,
that is what occurred here when the court in its September 27 order changed
a four-year maximum term of confinement (which it had specified on
September 14) back to the 22-years-to-life maximum term of confinement
that it had originally imposed on August 24.16
      We do not agree that double jeopardy principles require limiting the
statutory authority of a juvenile court under section 775 to modify a
disposition or commitment order. “The ‘protection against double jeopardy
applies to juvenile offenders as well as to adults.’ [Citation.] Jeopardy
attaches in a juvenile delinquency proceeding ‘when the first witness is sworn
at the adjudicatory phase of the jurisdictional hearing.’ ” (In re Pedro C.
(1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 174, 180; see In re Abdul Y. (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d
847, 856 [adjudicatory hearing is “ ‘one at which a minor is exposed to a
finding of truth of allegations contained in a petition filed pursuant to
[§ 602]’ ”].) But “[m]odification of a dispositional order in the exercise of the
court’s continuing jurisdiction over a ward does not constitute double
jeopardy.” (In re Glen J. (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 981, 987; see In re Steven S.
(1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 349, 353; Pedro C., at p. 181.)

      16 In counsel’s view, the court’s prior change (on September 14) did not

violate double jeopardy, because on that occasion the court reduced the
original 22-years-to-life maximum term of confinement to four years.

                                        23
      Here, M.B. was not subjected to a further adjudicatory hearing.
Neither the attempted murder count (which M.B. admitted during earlier
proceedings in San Mateo County) nor the other counts alleged against him
(which were dismissed at that time as part of the negotiated disposition) were
relitigated. Instead, the juvenile court made modifications only to its
dispositional order. We find no double jeopardy violation on this record.
      For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the juvenile court had authority
under section 775 to modify its SYTF commitment order and to enter the
September 27 order that is now challenged in this appeal. The scope of this
power to revisit prior orders extends to matters of form and substance. As
noted above, a juvenile court may correct clerical errors and “ ‘may also
reconsider the substance of a previous order the court considers to have been
erroneously, inadvertently or improvidently granted.’ ” (K.W., supra,
54 Cal.App.5th at p. 473.) But the court’s authority is not unlimited. The
statement in section 775 that a modification is permissible when the judge
deems it “meet and proper” has been construed as a requirement that “the
judge must find good cause” (K.W., at p. 473). “And that finding is subject to
appellate review. It has been held that ‘the court must have substantial
reasons’ for modifying a prior order under section 775; should it do so, ‘the
question . . . would be of whether or not the court had abused its discretion
. . . .’ ” (Id. at pp. 473–474.) Here, it is clear from the record that, when the
court reconsidered and modified certain aspects of its dispositional order, it
was simply making a diligent effort to comply with the law (i.e., a relatively
new statute, section 875). The court acted promptly, and it gave the parties

                                        24
notice and an ample opportunity to be heard. Any good cause requirement is
fully satisfied.17
      Some courts, to be sure, have stated that, “ ‘[d]espite its apparent
breadth, section 775 “does not authorize the court to make substantive
changes or modifications that otherwise exceed the court’s jurisdiction.” ’ ”
(In re Hunter W. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 358, 370, italics added.) This
jurisdictional limiting principle does not affect our conclusion here. There is
no question the juvenile court had a statutory jurisdictional basis to act. In
Hunter W., the court held that section 775 and related statutes did give the
juvenile court “continued jurisdiction over the matter,” although they did not
alter principles of finality for purposes of retroactivity of ameliorative
legislation under In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740. (Hunter W., at pp. 365,
367–368, 371 [for Estrada purposes, a dispositional order in a juvenile
delinquency case is final once direct review of that order has been
exhausted].) No such issue is presented here—no party sought retroactive
application of an ameliorative statute after the disposition order became
final. Instead, as noted, the juvenile court modified the disposition order on
its own motion and did so shortly after the order was entered.

      17 In the context of an adjudication made at a jurisdictional hearing,

where a court must make true findings if the allegations have been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, the K.W. court held “section 775 does not give the
juvenile court the authority to reduce or modify an adjudication, in the
absence of circumstances showing that the original adjudication was
somehow flawed—e.g., ineffective assistance of counsel or new evidence.”
(K.W., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 474.) The court did not make that sort of
modification here. Instead, the court modified aspects of its dispositional
order, specifically its rulings pertaining to the maximum term of confinement
and the application of credits. In any event, for the reasons we have
discussed, we conclude any good cause requirement is satisfied under the
circumstances here.

                                        25
      Because the court had jurisdiction to enter the September 27 order
reinstating the August 24 order, we now turn to M.B.’s remaining challenges
to those orders.
   C. The Maximum Term of Confinement
      As an alternative to his jurisdictional argument, M.B. contends that
the court abused its discretion in setting the 22-years-to-life maximum term
of confinement under section 875, subdivision (c) and that the case must be
remanded for a new dispositional hearing.18 The Attorney General counters
that the maximum term of confinement need only be modified to 22 years and
that no remand is needed.
      As discussed, the parties agree the 22-years-to-life maximum term of
confinement set by the court was unauthorized because M.B. did not admit
the attempted murder was premeditated. The maximum term permitted by
statute was instead 22 years. (§ 875, subd. (c)(1)(B).)
      The parties also recognize the court had discretion under section 875,
subdivision (c) to set a maximum term of confinement for M.B. that was less
than the 22-year maximum allowable by statute. Section 875,
subdivision (c)(1) states the maximum term of confinement is to be “based
upon the facts and circumstances of the matter or matters that brought or
continued the ward under the jurisdiction of the court and as deemed
appropriate to achieve rehabilitation.” (Italics added.) The maximum term
of confinement “shall not exceed” the middle term of imprisonment that could
be imposed on an adult convicted of the same offense. (§ 875, subd. (c)(1)(B).)

      18 M.B. does not challenge the four-year baseline term set by the court

under section 875, subdivision (b).

                                       26
      Similar language in section 731, which governed commitments to the
DJJ prior to its closure,19 has been held to mean a juvenile court has
discretion to set a maximum term of confinement that is shorter than the
term that could be imposed on an adult convicted of the same offense. (In re
Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 495 (Julian R.) [“Succinctly put, the juvenile
court must consider the crime’s relevant ‘facts and circumstances’ in
determining whether the minor’s maximum commitment period should be
equal to or less than the maximum confinement term for an adult.”]; § 731,
subds. (b), (c).) We agree with the parties that section 875 likewise allows a
juvenile court to impose a maximum term of confinement in an SYTF that is
equal to or less than the middle term of imprisonment that could be imposed
on an adult convicted of the same offense. (§ 875, subd. (c)(1).)20 Here, the
court had discretion to set a maximum term of confinement that was equal to
or less than the 22-year statutory maximum.21

      19 Section 731 states it will remain in effect until the final closure of the

DJJ (§ 731, subd. (c)), which occurred on June 30, 2023 (§ 736.5, subd. (e)).
      20 Section 875, subdivision (c) may not be free from ambiguity on this

point. As discussed above, subdivision (c)(2) of section 875 appears to equate
the “ ‘maximum term of confinement’ ” (by reference to § 726, subd. (d)(2))
with the maximum term of exposure permitted by statute (i.e., the middle
term that would apply to an adult, with specified adjustments). But when
read in conjunction with subdivision (c)(1) of section 875—which expressly
states the maximum term of confinement is to be based on the relevant “facts
and circumstances” (id., subd. (c)(1)) and “shall not exceed” the middle term
(id., subd. (c)(1)(B))—we conclude the statute confers discretion on the
juvenile court to impose a maximum term of confinement that is equal to or
less than the middle term that could be imposed on an adult.
      21 And, of course, M.B.’s actual time spent in confinement will likely be

shorter, as it is subject to the separate cap in section 875,
subdivision (c)(1)(A) prohibiting confinement “beyond 25 years of age, or two
years from the date of commitment, whichever occurs later.”

                                        27
      The parties dispute whether the juvenile court understood the scope of
its discretion in setting the maximum term of confinement. In our view, the
record supports the Attorney General’s position that the juvenile court
understood and exercised its discretion in setting that term.
      As the Attorney General points out, the court stated in its hand-signed
August 24 order (which it reinstated on September 27) that it had
“considered the individual facts and circumstances of the case” in setting the
maximum term of confinement (finding 14). This express statement supports
a conclusion on review that the court did exercise its discretion under the
statute in setting the maximum term of confinement. (See Julian R., supra,
47 Cal.4th at pp. 492, 499 [under § 731, even on a silent record, reviewing
court will presume juvenile court “exercised its discretion in setting a
maximum period of physical confinement that was measured against both the
ceiling set by the maximum adult prison term and a possibly lower ceiling set
by the relevant ‘facts and circumstances’ ”]; id. at p. 499, fn. 4 [noting that, in
light of a newly revised Judicial Council form requiring the juvenile court to
acknowledge its consideration of the crime’s facts and circumstances, “in the
future a court’s exercise of its discretion will be evident”].)
      We also note that, during the third hearing on the matter (on
September 27), the prosecutor stated section 875, subdivision (c) required the
court to first determine the total amount of time M.B. could spend in physical
confinement (finding 13) and then exercise its discretion to impose all or a
portion of that time (finding 14). This was not a case in which either party
argued the court was required to set a maximum term of confinement that
was identical to the maximum term allowable by statute.
      Finally, although this fact is less directly relevant to the court’s
determination of the maximum term of confinement under section 875,

                                         28
subdivision (c), the court stated, both orally and in its written order, that it
had considered M.B.’s background and individual circumstances in
determining under section 875, subdivision (a) that an SYTF commitment
was appropriate. These circumstances included the severity of the offense;
M.B.’s delinquent history; whether the programming, treatment, and
education in an SYTF would be appropriate for his needs; whether a less
restrictive placement could achieve the goals of rehabilitation and community
safety; and M.B.’s “age, his developmental maturity, his mental and
emotional health, sexual orientation, identity and expression and any
disability or special needs affecting the safety or suitability committing
[M.B.] to a term of confinement in a Secure Youth Treatment Facility.” (See
§ 875, subd. (a).) The court thus had in mind factors that may also have been
relevant when it set a maximum term of confinement based on the “facts and
circumstances” of the case.
      M.B. argues the record of the oral proceedings at the three hearings
reflects the juvenile court did not clearly understand the different terms it
needed to impose under section 875. In particular, M.B. suggests the court’s
statements show it did not understand it had the discretion to set a
maximum term of confinement that was below the maximum term permitted
by statute. While the court did express some uncertainty at times, we are not
persuaded the record on this point requires a remand for a new dispositional
hearing. (Julian R., supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 498–499 [trial court order is
presumed to be correct, and reviewing court must “ ‘apply the general rule
“that a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the
applicable law” ’ ”].)
      For example, at the August 24 hearing, in a statement highlighted by
M.B., the court stated: “So let me set the maximum confinement time under

                                        29
section 875(c), and that maximum period of confinement that could be
imposed on [M.B.], pursuant to that statute, is 22 years to life.” The court
was correct to begin with the maximum term that could be imposed under the
statute (which, as noted, was actually 22 years), but its written order makes
clear it did consider the “facts and circumstances” of the case in deciding to
set that term.
      Also at the August 24 hearing, after stating that the maximum period
of confinement that could be imposed was 22 years to life, the court stated: “I
am not quite sure how to answer—to determine what the maximum period of
confinement is. I guess the maximum period—I don’t know whether this is
a—this finding I have to make is with respect to the life term or with respect
to the baseline term.” The clerk stated, “I believe it’s the life term, Your
Honor,” and the court continued, “I guess I’m assuming that the maximum
period of confinement is the life term, and, therefore, the maximum period, as
I’ve already indicated, is 22 years to life.”
      Although it is not entirely clear, we agree with the Attorney General
that this passage may show only that the court “briefly believed there was a
third term—a maximum period of confinement—and expressed confusion as
to whether that period of confinement encompassed the maximum term of
confinement or the baseline term.” In any event, we are not persuaded these
passages clearly show the court did not understand it had discretion to set a
maximum term of confinement that was less than the maximum term
permitted by statute.
      M.B. also notes that, at the September 27 hearing, the court stated that
it was reconsidering its September 14 order (where it had set a four-year
maximum term of confinement) because it had “failed to comply with
mandatory provisions governing the length of punishment.” But this may

                                         30
have meant the court believed it had misapplied the statute on September 14
in selecting a four-year maximum term of confinement, rather than a belief
that it had no discretion to impose a maximum term of confinement that was
less than the statutory maximum. Similarly, the court asked during the
September 27 hearing whether the maximum term of confinement it set
under section 875, subdivision (c) should simply be the middle term
referenced in section 726, subdivision (d)(2). The prosecutor answered (as
noted above) that section 875, subdivision (c) required the court to determine
both the “maximum potential time” and “how much of that total time the
Court’s going to set at maximum confinement time . . . .”
      Neither these nor the other record passages identified by M.B.
persuade us that the court did not understand it had discretion to set a
maximum term of confinement, based on the “facts and circumstances” of the
case (§ 875, subd. (c)(1)), that was either equal to or lower than the maximum
term permitted by statute. As it stated in its written order, the court
determined, based on those “facts and circumstances,” that the appropriate
maximum term of confinement was the same as the maximum term allowed
by statute (findings 13 and 14).22

      22 The court’s express statement that it had considered the “facts and

circumstances” of the case in setting the maximum term of confinement, as
well as the prosecutor’s statement the court could set a maximum term of
confinement that was lower than the maximum allowed by statute,
distinguish this case from In re Sean W. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1177, cited
by M.B. In Sean W., the appellate court remanded for an exercise of
discretion as to the maximum term of confinement under section 731, stating,
“[t]he court, counsel, and the probation department indicated no awareness of
court discretion in setting the maximum term of confinement.” (In re Sean
W., at p. 1182; id. at p. 1179, 1188–1189.) That was not the case here. And,
as noted, under Julian R., even on a silent record, we would presume the
trial court understood and exercised its discretion. (Julian R., supra,
47 Cal.4th at pp. 499, 492.)

                                      31
         As discussed, the court was mistaken as to what the statutory
maximum was—it was 22 years, rather than 22 years to life. For the
foregoing reasons, we will modify the court’s August 24 order (as reinstated
by the September 27 order) so that both the maximum period of confinement
allowable by statute (finding 13) and the maximum term of confinement
actually set by the court (finding 14) are 22 years (rather than 22 years to
life).
    D. Equal Protection Principles Do Not Require the Application of
       M.B.’s Precommitment Credits to the Baseline Term
         As noted, section 875, subdivision (c) provides that, when a ward is
committed to an SYTF, the court must set a maximum term of confinement
and apply the ward’s precommitment credits to that term. (§ 875,
subd. (c)(1)(C) [“Precommitment credits for time served must be applied
against the maximum term of confinement as set pursuant to this
subdivision.”].) The juvenile court here, in its operative September 27 order,
directed that M.B.’s precommitment credits be applied against the maximum
term of confinement it had set under section 875, subdivision (c) (i.e., a term
of 22 years to life, which we are reducing to 22 years).
         M.B. argues on two grounds that equal protection principles require the
application of his precommitment credits against the four-year baseline term
of confinement that the court set under section 875, subdivision (b). First, he
contends a failure to apply credits against the baseline term would treat
wards committed to a county SYTF unequally in comparison to wards
committed to the DJJ, because “the baseline term at an SYTF is the
functional equivalent of the maximum term of confinement at DJJ.” Second,
he claims a failure to apply credits against the baseline term violates equal
protection by penalizing wards whose cases take longer to resolve. We reject
both arguments.

                                         32
         1. Legal Standards
      The right to equal protection is violated when “the government . . .
treat[s] a [similarly situated] group of people unequally without some
justification.” (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288.) The degree of
required justification depends on the classification at issue. Distinctions that
involve suspect classifications (such as race) or affect fundamental rights are
subject to strict scrutiny, and will be upheld only if they are necessary to
achieve a compelling state interest. (Ibid.) But when “a statute involves
neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right, it need only meet minimum
equal protection standards, and survive ‘rational basis review.’ ” (People v.
Turnage (2012) 55 Cal.4th 62, 74.) Under that standard, “equal protection of
the law is denied only where there is no ‘rational relationship between the
disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.’ ” (Ibid.)
      We review equal protection claims de novo. (People v. Yang (2022)
78 Cal.App.5th 120, 125.)
         2. Alleged Equal Protection Violation Based on Differential
            Treatment of Wards Committed to DJJ and to County
            SYTFs
      In support of his first equal protection argument (alleging differential
treatment of wards based on whether they are committed to the DJJ or to an
SYTF), M.B. relies on the recent decision by Division One of this court in
Ernesto L., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th 31. There, the appellate court held that,
when a ward is committed to the DJJ, the ward’s precommitment credits
must be applied against the term Ernesto L. called the “maximum custodial
term” set by the juvenile court under section 731, subdivision (b) “ ‘based
upon the facts and circumstances,’ ” rather than against the term Ernesto L.
called the “maximum exposure term” set by section 726, subdivision (d)(1).
(Ernesto L., at p. 34.)

                                       33
      The Ernesto L. court explained the two terms at issue in that case.
First, in general, “if a minor is removed from a parent’s physical custody after
being adjudged a ward of the court, the dispositional order must ‘specify that
the minor may not be held in physical confinement for a period in excess of
the middle term of imprisonment’ that could be imposed on an adult
convicted of the same offense. [(§ 726, subd. (d)(1).)]” (Ernesto L., supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at p. 34.) But for DJJ commitments in particular, “the
juvenile court has discretion, ‘based upon the facts and circumstances,’ to set
an even lower maximum term of physical confinement. (§ 731, subd. (b).)”
(Ibid.) As noted, Ernesto L. held that, when a ward is committed to the DJJ,
a juvenile court must apply precommitment credits against “the actual
maximum term set under section 731” (the maximum custodial term), rather
than against “the theoretical maximum term under section 726” (the
maximum exposure term). (Id. at pp. 34, 41.)
      In reaching this conclusion, Ernesto L. interpreted section 731’s
requirement that a minor “not be confined” in excess of the maximum
custodial term set by the court to refer to both precommitment and
postcommitment physical confinement. (Ernesto L., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 41–42; § 731, subd. (b) [ward committed to DJJ “shall not be confined in
excess of the term of confinement set by the committing court”].) The
Ernesto L. court concluded this result followed from the reasoning of the
California Supreme Court in In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, which had
held similar language in former section 726 referred to both precommitment

                                       34
and postcommitment physical confinement. (Ernesto L., at p. 41, citing
Eric J., at p. 536.)23
      M.B. argues that, “[b]ecause an SYTF commitment has now replaced a
DJJ commitment,” the application of precommitment credits should be
similar in the two schemes. But as we read them, the statutes governing
SYTF commitments and the application of precommitment credits in that
context already do operate in the way Ernesto L. determined the statutes
should operate in the DJJ context.
      First, in both settings, section 726, subdivision (d)(1)—which generally
applies when a minor is removed from the physical custody of a parent after
being adjudged a ward—provides the dispositional order must “specify that
the minor may not be held in physical confinement for a period in excess of
the middle term of imprisonment” that could be imposed on an adult
convicted of the same offense. (§ 726, subd. (d)(1), italics added; Ernesto L.,
supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 34.) Section 726 defines “ ‘[p]hysical
confinement’ ” to include both DJJ and SYTF placements, among other
things. (§ 726, subd. (d)(5).)24 The maximum period of confinement
permitted by statute—the middle term of imprisonment that would apply to

      23 In its July 2022 opinion, the Ernesto L. court stated it was publishing

its holding about the application of precommitment credits in the DJJ context
because of its disagreement with a different Court of Appeal decision on that
point (In re A.R. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1076), although the Ernesto L. court
“recognize[d] that most juveniles can no longer be committed to DJJ, which is
set to close on June 30, 2023. (§ 736.5, subds. (b)–(c), (e).)” (Ernesto L.,
81 Cal.App.5th at p. 34, fn. 2.)
      24 Section 726, subdivision (d)(5) states:“ ‘Physical confinement’ means
placement in a juvenile hall, ranch, camp, forestry camp or secure juvenile
home pursuant to Section 730, or in a secure youth treatment facility
pursuant to Section 875, or in any institution operated by the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice.” (Italics added.)

                                       35
an adult—is thus the same under section 726 for both types of
commitments.25 And section 875 states this same limitation for SYTF
commitments in particular. (§ 875, subd. (i); see id., subd. (c)(1)(B).)
      Second, as discussed, the specific statutes governing DJJ and SYTF
commitments—sections 731 and 875 respectively—give the juvenile court
discretion, “based upon the facts and circumstances,” to set a maximum term
that is lower than the maximum permitted by statute. (§§ 731, subd. (b)
[“maximum term”], 875, subd. (c)(1) [“maximum term of confinement”];
Julian R., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 495 [§ 731]; Ernesto L., supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at p. 34 [§ 731].) Sections 731 and 875 describe this
maximum term in identical language, stating the term is to be “based upon
the facts and circumstances of the matter or matters that brought or
continued the ward under the jurisdiction of the court and as deemed
appropriate to achieve rehabilitation.” (§§ 731, subd. (b), 875, subd. (c)(1).)
      Finally, in both settings, precommitment credits are to be applied
against the potentially lower maximum term set by the court. As discussed,
for DJJ commitments, Ernesto L. held precommitment credits must be
applied to this actual maximum term (what it called the “maximum custodial
term”), concluding that result is compelled by the requirement in section 731,
subdivision (b) that a ward must “not be confined” in excess of that term.
(Ernesto L., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 41–42.) And for SYTF
commitments, section 875, subdivision (c) specifies precommitment credits
“must be applied against the maximum term of confinement as set pursuant
to this subdivision” (§ 875, subd. (c)(1)(C)), i.e., the maximum term set by the

      25 M.B.’s suggestion that section 726 applies to DJJ commitments but

that SYTF commitments are governed by “a separate dispositional scheme”
that only involves section 875 is incorrect.

                                       36
court “based upon the facts and circumstances” (id., subd. (c)(1), which may
be lower than the maximum permitted by statute.
      Section 875, subdivision (c) thus directs that, for SYTF placements,
precommitment credits are to be applied in the same way Ernesto L. held
they should be applied in the DJJ setting. As the Attorney General points
out, there is no disparate treatment that could give rise to an equal
protection problem.26
      M.B. contends, however, that in the SYTF context, the baseline term set
under section 875, subdivision (b) is the “functional equivalent” of the
maximum custodial term that is set for DJJ commitments under section 731.
He argues that therefore, to be consistent with Ernesto L. and prevent an
equal protection violation arising from the disparate treatment of wards
committed to SYTFs and to DJJ, his precommitment credits must be applied
against the four-year baseline term.27
      We disagree. In our view, the functional equivalent of the maximum
custodial term for DJJ commitments (§ 731, subd. (b); Ernesto L., supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at p. 34) is the maximum term of confinement set in the SYTF
context under section 875, subdivision (c). As noted, sections 731 and 875

      26 Because DJJ and SYTF wards are not treated differently, we need

not address the parties’ arguments as to whether the two groups are
similarly situated, or as to which legal standard—strict scrutiny or rational
basis—should be used to analyze any alleged disparate treatment.
      27 There was some temporal overlap between the DJJ and SYTF

commitment schemes. Although DJJ closed on June 30, 2023 (§ 736.5,
subd. (e)), M.B. notes that, at the time of his SYTF commitment in 2022, he
was eligible for a DJJ commitment because a motion to transfer his case to
adult court had been filed prior to the closure of DJJ (id., subds. (b)–(c)). He
also notes some wards who were initially committed to DJJ may have been
subsequently transferred to an SYTF after DJJ’s closure (see §§ 875,
subd. (b)(2), 736.5, subd. (d)).

                                         37
describe those terms using identical language—in each case, the term is a
maximum to be set by the court “based upon the facts and circumstances of
the matter or matters that brought or continued the ward under the
jurisdiction of the court and as deemed appropriate to achieve rehabilitation.”
(§§ 731, subd. (b), 875, subd. (c)(1).) And precommitment credits must be
applied against those analogous maximum terms. (Ernesto L., at pp. 41–42;
§ 875, subd. (c)(1)(C).)
      In contrast, the baseline term under section 875, subdivision (b), is not
a maximum term. Instead, it “represent[s] the time in custody necessary to
meet the developmental and treatment needs of the ward and to prepare the
ward for discharge to a period of probation supervision in the community.”
(§ 875, subd. (b)(1).) Pending the development of offense-based classifications
by the Judicial Council, the baseline term is to be set using (with some
permitted deviation) the “discharge consideration date guidelines” applied by
the DJJ prior to its closure (found in Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, §§ 30807–30813).
(§ 875, subd. (b)(1).)
      Accordingly, even if it were necessary to identify functional equivalents
as to each aspect of the now-phased-out DJJ and current SYTF schemes—
and we do not think that is the case, since the Legislature is free to change
the juvenile justice system over time—we agree with the Attorney General
that the closest analogue of the SYTF baseline term is the set of DJJ
discharge consideration date guidelines that are temporarily to be borrowed
in setting the baseline term. Those guidelines existed alongside the court’s
duty to set a maximum term for a ward committed to the DJJ under
section 731, subdivision (b), just as a court that now commits a ward to an
SYTF must set both a baseline term and a maximum term of confinement
under section 875, subdivisions (b) and (c).

                                       38
      M.B. argues there are differences between the application of the
discharge consideration date guidelines in the DJJ context and the baseline
term in the SYTF setting. Specifically, he notes that, under the applicable
regulations, a parole consideration date is not “a fixed parole release date.”
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, § 30815, subd. (a).) In contrast, he argues, a baseline
term creates “a presumptive release date.” He relies on section 875,
subdivision (e)(3), which states that, at a “probation discharge hearing” to be
held at the conclusion of the baseline term, the court “shall order that the
ward be discharged to a period of probation supervision in the community
under conditions approved by the court, unless the court finds that the ward
constitutes a substantial risk of imminent harm to others in the community if
released from custody.” In that circumstance, the ward may be retained in
an SYTF for up to one additional year. (§ 875, subd. (e)(3).) M.B. argues
that, in light of this provision, the baseline term is “akin to a fixed release
date from an SYTF,” except in “exceptional circumstances” where the court
finds the ward’s release would endanger the community.
      Although the parties debate how frequently courts are likely to make
the findings necessary to deny probation under section 875, subdivision (e)(3),
we need not consider that question. We are not persuaded that any
differences between the SYTF baseline term and the DJJ parole
consideration guidelines somehow transform the baseline term into the
equivalent of a maximum term. As discussed, the SYTF scheme has its own
detailed provisions governing the setting of a maximum term of confinement
(§ 875, subd. (c); see id., subd. (i)), and the fact that other provisions may
allow a ward to be released before the expiration of that term does not change
that maximum. And, even if M.B. is correct that the probation discharge
provisions in section 875, subdivision (e) make the SYTF scheme more

                                        39
favorable than the DJJ parole discharge system, that does not create an
equal protection issue requiring application of precommitment credits to the
baseline term.
      We also disagree with M.B.’s reading of Ernesto L. As noted, that
case’s holding requiring application of precommitment credits against the
maximum term set by the court (rather than against the maximum term
permitted by statute) was based on the text of section 731, subdivision (b),
which specifies a ward committed to DJJ must “not be confined” beyond the
maximum term set by the court. (Ernesto L., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 41–42.) Ernesto L. did not announce a general rule that precommitment
credits must be applied to any term that may be said, in M.B.’s phrasing, to
be “akin to a fixed release date.” In the SYTF context, it is the section 875,
subdivision (c) maximum term of confinement that sets the limit on the
length of a ward’s confinement; the section 875, subdivision (b) baseline term
is not described as, and does not function as, a maximum term. No equal
protection problem arises from applying precommitment credits to the
maximum term set by the court under both schemes. (§§ 731, subd. (b), 875,
subd. (c)(1)(C).)
      Finally, M.B. suggests section 875 does not prohibit the application of
precommitment credits against the baseline term. But we think it is clear
the application of precommitment credits against the baseline term is not
intended. Section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(C) expressly states precommitment
credits are to be applied against the maximum term of confinement (and does
not state they are to be applied against the baseline term). And other
provisions of the statute provide for application of credits to the baseline term
in specified circumstances, not including credits for time spent in
precommitment custody. (§ 875, subds. (f)(2) [if a ward is transferred from an

                                       40
SYTF to a less restrictive placement and then back to an SYTF, the baseline
term is to be “adjusted to include credit for the time served by the ward in the
less restrictive program”], (b)(2) [youth who are transferred from the DJJ to
an SYTF shall receive credit against the baseline term “for all programs
completed or substantially completed” at the DJJ].) The court here correctly
applied M.B.’s precommitment credits against the maximum term of
confinement, rather than against the baseline term.
         3. Alleged Equal Protection Violation Based on the Length of
            Time Cases Take To Resolve
      M.B. contends the failure to apply precommitment credits against the
SYTF baseline term would violate equal protection “by penalizing wards
whose cases take longer to resolve.” He notes the length of time a case takes
may depend on a number of variables, such as the complexity or closeness of
the matter or how busy a given court is. M.B. observes that a ward who
spends about two years in precommitment custody (as M.B. did) and then
serves a four-year baseline term in an SYTF will spend more total time in
custody than a ward who spends two months in precommitment custody and
then serves a four-year SYTF baseline term. Finally, M.B. asserts that
application of precommitment credits against the maximum term of
confinement is an “illusory” benefit “because, as a result of the age
limitations on confinement set forth in section 875, most ward[s] never near
their maximum periods of confinement.” (See § 875, subd. (c)(1)(A) [age
limitations].) As a result, M.B. asserts, the time spent in precommitment
custody is “ ‘dead time.’ ”
      We do not agree that application of precommitment credits to the
maximum term of confinement is an illusory benefit. In some cases, a ward’s
maximum term of confinement may end before the ward reaches the
applicable age limit, so the application of precommitment credits to the

                                       41
maximum term of confinement will shorten the amount of time the ward
spends in custody. In addition, section 875 provides that, during a ward’s
term of commitment to an SYTF, the court is to hold a progress review
hearing at least every six months. (§ 875, subd. (e)(1)(A).) At the hearing,
the court “shall evaluate the ward’s progress in relation to the rehabilitation
plan and shall determine whether the baseline term of confinement is to be
modified.” (Ibid.) At the hearing, the court may also order that the ward be
assigned to a less restrictive program. (Ibid.) A ward who has served
significant precommitment time or who can show significant rehabilitative
progress made during that time may be able to show (in conjunction with
other factors, including rehabilitative progress while in an SYTF) that he or
she is a good candidate for a shortened baseline term or a transfer to a less
restrictive program.
      In any event, M.B.’s arguments about the perceived deficiencies of the
statutory provisions governing precommitment credits do not establish an
equal protection violation. There is no basis to conclude that wards receive
disparate treatment under the rule that precommitment credits are to be
applied against the maximum term of confinement rather than against the
baseline term. (§ 875, subd. (c)(1)(C).) The two sets of SYTF wards identified
by M.B. as the foundation of his equal protection claim—“those whose cases
resolve slowly and those whose cases resolve quickly”—are treated equally.
For both sets of wards, precommitment credits are applied to their maximum
terms of confinement. (Ibid.) Neither group has their baseline terms reduced
based on precommitment credits. Both are potentially eligible for discharge
to probation upon completion of their baseline terms. (Id., subd. (e)(3).) And
for both groups, the precommitment credits apply to a maximum term of

                                       42
confinement they may not reach because they may age out of the SYTF by
that time. (Id., subd. (c)(1)(A).)
      To the extent a ward may in some instances spend more total time in
custody than another ward with a similar baseline term, that is because of
the numerous variables that can affect the length of precommitment custody,
not because section 875 provides for the unequal application of credits.
Unlike the schemes at issue in People v. Sage (1980) 26 Cal.3d 498, 507–508
and People v. Yang, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at pp. 129, 136–138 (cases cited by
M.B.), section 875 does not deny credits to certain groups while granting
them to others. There is no disparate treatment here and no equal protection
violation.
                             III. DISPOSITION
      The juvenile court’s August 24, 2022 disposition order, as modified and
reinstated by the juvenile court on September 27, 2022, is modified as
follows:
      (1) “the maximum period of confinement that could be imposed” under
section 875 (finding no. 13 on the attachment to the August 24, 2022 order) is
modified to 22 years (rather than 22 years to life); and
      (2) the maximum term of confinement set by the court based on “the
individual facts and circumstances of the case” (finding no. 14 on the
attachment to the August 24, 2022 order) is modified to 22 years (rather than
22 years to life).
      In all other respects, the August 24, 2022 order, as modified and
reinstated by the juvenile court on September 27, 2022, is affirmed. In
particular, the court’s ruling in the September 27, 2022 order that
precommitment credits for time served are to be applied against the

                                       43
maximum term of confinement set by the court under section 875,
subdivision (c) is affirmed.

                                                    STREETER, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

GOLDMAN, J.
SMILEY, J.*

      * Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda,

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

                                      44
Trial Court: Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco

Trial Judge: Hon. J. Anthony Kline

Counsel:      Sangeeta Sinha, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
                Defendant and Appellant.

               Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
                 Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M Lawrence, Senior
                 Assistant Attorney General, Donna M Provenzano,
                 Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Victoria
                 Ratnikova and Amit Kurlekar, Deputy Attorneys General,
                 for Plaintiff and Respondent.

In re M.B. – A166408