Court Opinion

ID: 9564735
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:05:59.434091+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:38.617886
License: Public Domain

KLEINSCHMIDT, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Under A.R.S. § 13-2910, a person who recklessly subjects an animal to cruel mistreatment, to cruel neglect or abandonment, or who kills another person’s animal without legal privilege or consent, is guilty of cruelty to animals. In my opinion, this crime is one of moral turpitude. The term “moral turpitude” describes conduct which is “depraved and inherently base” or refers to acts which “adversely reflect on honesty, integrity, or personal values.” Mungarro v. Riley, 170 Ariz. 589, 590, 826 P.2d 1215, 1216 (App.1991). The proscription against cruelty to animals is based on the need to uphold the moral values of society. See Waters v. People, 23 Colo. 33, 46 P. 112, 113 (1896); Commonwealth v. Higgins, 277 Mass. 191, 178 N.E. 536, 537-38 (1931); Stephens v. State, 65 Miss. 329, 331-32, 3 So. 458 (1887); State v. Porter, 112 N.C. 887, 16 S.E. 915, 916 (1893). See also 4 Am.Jur.2d Animals § 28 at 369 (1995); 3A C.J.S. Animals § 99 (1973); Daniel S. Moretti, Animal Rights and the Law 1 (1984). More to the point, since animals are virtually helpless against humans, the more serious forms of cruelty to animals are depraved or inherently base. Less shocking forms of conduct which constitute such cruelty certainly reflect on a person’s personal values. See Stephens, 65 Miss, at 331-332, 3 So. 458.
I would grant the relief requested.