Court Opinion

ID: 9573441
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:55:16.453645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:40:29.772900
License: Public Domain

Smith, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur fully as to Divisions 1, 2, 4, and 5, but differ with the majority’s treatment of Divisions 3 and 6.
*4351. The majority’s Division 3 makes it appear that appeal counsel has somehow overlooked the fact that the child witness to whom certain hearsay statements were attributed took the witness stand and was cross-examined by trial counsel. This is not the case. The contention, fairly stated, is that the hearsay statements were inadmissible because the witness was not examined by the court under OCGA § 24-9-5 as it existed prior to the 1989 amendment, and therefore was not “available to testify” within the meaning of OCGA § 24-3-16. See, e.g., Hunnicutt v. State, 194 Ga. App. 714 (391 SE2d 790) (1990). Trial counsel waived the issue of competency by failing to object at trial, and we should not be hesitant to say so. See Keasler v. State, 165 Ga. App. 561 (1) (301 SE2d 915) (1983). As the majority points out, the child did take the witness stand and was subject to cross-examination. Since any potential issue of competency was waived, we can find no error on this basis.
2. (a) As for the issue of trial counsel’s effectiveness, I first address trial counsel’s waiver of the competency issue as discussed above. After reviewing the transcript, there appears to be no reasonable probability that but for trial counsel’s failure to object on competency grounds, the child witness would have been declared incompetent. The State’s questioning of the child and the child’s responses affirmatively indicate that the child could distinguish between the truth and a lie, that she knew she should only tell the truth in court, and that she intended to do just that. This testimony belies any contention that the trial court probably would have ruled the witness incompetent if trial counsel had asked for such a determination. Based on the transcript of the child’s testimony, I see no reason to believe that the trial court would have exercised its discretion to White’s benefit and declared the witness incompetent even if trial counsel had timely objected. White “has failed to show that, but for this omission, the result at trial would have been different.” Robinson v. State, 210 Ga. App. 278, 280 (3) (435 SE2d 718) (1993).
(b) The majority affirmatively states that trial counsel did not testify at the motion for new trial, but then later states, without apparent support, that the failure to pursue a Batson-type challenge by counsel for this white defendant was a “strategic decision.”1 I am not willing merely to assume that White’s trial counsel allowed the State to strike black jurors as part of his trial strategy. The majority plainly implies that White’s counsel made a strategic decision based on the “fact” that White would certainly be pleased to have the State strike all blacks from the venire. I cannot accept this premise.
*436Decided June 3, 1994.
Wallace C. Clayton, for appellant.
Thomas J. Charron, District Attorney, Rose L. Wing, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
The State likewise disagrees with the majority’s conclusion. In fact, the State readily concedes that trial counsel did in fact attempt to allege a Batson violation, albeit late. The State’s position is that it did not in fact discriminate, or at least the record does not show it, and that therefore White cannot show harm as well as error.
Despite my strong differences with the majority’s analysis, I nevertheless can find no basis for reversible error on this ground. “Appellant made no attempt to have the record or transcript amended to include any objectionable matter which might have transpired during voir dire. OCGA § 5-6-41 (f). The entire voir dire is not required to be reported in all felony cases. Where the transcript or record does not fully disclose what transpired at trial, the burden is on the complaining party to have the record completed in the trial court under the provisions of OCGA § 5-6-41 (f). When this is not done, there is nothing for the appellate court to review.” (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Meier v. State, 190 Ga. App. 625, 626 (1) (379 SE2d 588) (1989).
White has failed to meet his burden to complete the record using the statutory means available to him. Since we have been presented with no basis to determine the existence of a Batson violation in the first instance, we are likewise presented with no basis to conclude that the ruling of the trial court in denying White’s motion for new trial on the ground of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was clearly erroneous. Nolan v. State, 204 Ga. App. 170, 172 (3) (419 SE2d 72) (1992).
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Pope joins in this special concurrence.

 Since trial counsel has not been heard on this issue, it is questionable whether White has presented a claim worthy of review. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749, 809 (20) (312 SE2d 40) (1983).