Court Opinion

ID: 9721571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:02:35.886217+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:27.277600
License: Public Domain

RILEY, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
I agree with the majority that a statute or provision must be viewed within the context of the entire act. I further agree that we are required to adopt the construction which sustains the Act, carries out its purpose, and renders all parts harmonious. I disagree, however, with the majority's position that the Worker's Compensation Board's decision accomplishes these goals.
As the majority concedes, IND.CODE 22-3-3-8 specifically limits a general award of total disability to 500 weeks. 1.0. 22-8-3-10, as interpreted by the Board and the majority, allows for a general award of total disability in excess of 500 weeks. Acceptance of the majority's interpretation of 1.C. 22-8-3-10, ignores the unequivocal language of IC. 22-3-8-8.
The language of ILC. 22-8-3-8 indicates that the statute covers general awards of total disability. On the other hand, the language of I.C. 22-3-8-10 indicates that the statute's application is limited to cases involving scheduled injuries. It follows that the language referring to total permanent disability in I.C. 22-8-8-10(b)(@8) refers only to scheduled injuries which result in total permanent disability. Thus, LC. 22-8-3-10(b) does not conflict with L.C. 22-8-3-8, but instead delineates a narrow exception to the general limitation listed therein. The language of I.C. 22-3-8-10 has no application to unscheduled injuries such as the back injury suffered by Jordan. See Weaver v. Budd Manufacturing Co. (1946), 313 Mich. 310, 21 N.W.2d 142 (holding that a claim for a statutory award is separate from a general injury *679claim); Jirout v. Gebelein (1923), 142 Md. 692, 121 A. 831 (holding that the fact that certain injuries are not covered by a schedule does not mean that they are not compensa-ble, because unscheduled injuries are covered by general provisions).
I would reverse and remand to the Board for an award which is limited to 500 weeks.1

. Even if the Board was correct in its interpretation of LC. 22-3-3-10, its award was still erroneous. The Board used the percentage authorized by LC. 22-3-3-8 instead of the lower percentage authorized by IC. 22-3-3-10.