Court Opinion

ID: 9953285
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-21 18:03:02.270177+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:45:54.080610
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/21/24 P. v. Lee CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                    (San Joaquin)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C098085

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                        (Super. Ct. No.
                                                                                STKCRFECOD20180012122)
           v.

 RICHARD ELMO LEE,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Richard Elmo Lee orchestrated the murder-for-hire of a doctor who
treated his late wife. A jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and found true
the special circumstance that the murder was committed for financial gain. (Pen. Code,
§§ 187, subd. (a) and 190.2, subd. (a)(1).)1 The trial court sentenced defendant to state
prison for life without the possibility of parole.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                                             1
          Defendant appeals, raising two sets of issues. First, he argues the prosecution
violated Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady) by failing to timely disclose
information contained in the lead investigator’s personnel records. In a related vein, he
argues the trial court erred in denying mid-trial motions to dismiss and declare a mistrial,
and a post-trial motion for a new trial.
          Second, defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a .32
caliber semiautomatic pistol that was not the murder weapon, or alternatively, that
defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object to evidence of the
pistol.
          We will reject both sets of issues and affirm the judgment.
                                      I. BACKGROUND
          Defendant was married to Bonnie. They had been together since they were
teenagers, some 60 years before the events described herein. Bonnie suffered from
various health problems, including problems with one of her feet. Bonnie was treated for
an ingrown toenail by Dr. Thomas Shock, a podiatrist. The toenail became infected and
gangrenous, and Dr. Shock eventually amputated Bonnie’s toes and half of her foot.
Bonnie’s health and quality of life declined precipitously, and she passed away in 2016 at
the age of 78.
          Defendant blamed Dr. Shock for Bonnie’s death. He told his daughter, Cheri, he
wanted Shock dead. At first, defendant told Cheri he intended to kill Shock and take his
own life. Later, he told Cheri he met a man at a gas station who was going to help him
kill Shock. Cheri thought defendant was just blowing off steam.
A.        The Shooting of Dr. Shock
          Dr. Shock lived in Lodi with his wife of many years, Nancy. On the night of
August 1, 2018, Nancy went upstairs to bed sometime between 9:00 and 9:30 p.m.
Shock stayed downstairs.

                                                2
       A neighbor was walking across the street from the Shocks’ house that night
around 9:45 p.m. The neighbor heard a gunshot and saw a man running toward a car
parked in front of the Shocks’ house. Another neighbor was driving by the house around
the same time. That neighbor heard two gunshots and saw a light-colored SUV idling in
front of the house. Both neighbors saw someone drive away quickly.
       Police officers from the Lodi Police Department responded shortly thereafter.
They found Dr. Shock lying across the threshold of the house. Shock had been shot in
the chest, arm, and head and was unresponsive. An autopsy and ballistics analysis would
later reveal that he had been shot three times at close range with bullets consistent with a
.38 special or a .357 magnum revolver. Shock was declared dead at the scene.
B.     Investigation
       Officers secured the scene and detectives began their investigation. Surveillance
videos from neighbors showed a single vehicle—an SUV—driving down the street
around the time of the shooting. The SUV was registered to codefendant Raymond
Jacquett.
       A piece of paper was found near the body. Detective Michael Hitchcock, the lead
investigator, determined the paper was a page from a complaint against Dr. Shock to the
Medical Board of California by Bonnie. The page was analyzed for fingerprints and
found to contain the prints of codefendants Mallory Stewart and Christopher Costello.
       A search warrant was executed on Costello’s cell phone.2 An examination of the
phone revealed that Costello called defendant the day before the shooting.
       A search warrant was executed on defendant’s house. Police found a copy of
Bonnie’s complaint against Dr. Shock. The complaint was missing a single page—the
one found at the crime scene. Police also found a handwritten note from defendant to his

2 The name on the home screen of the phone, which was found in Costello’s pocket, was
“Yung Cos.” “Yung Cos” was believed to be Costello’s nickname.

                                              3
children, stating, in part: “Maybe I will find out why God took mom so soon and let her
suffer so. I believe in an eye-for-an-eye . . . . I hope Shock spends his time in [hell] . . .
and I get to see him face-to-face.”
        Police searched defendant’s computer. They found several searches relating to Dr.
Shock, including a search for his home address. They also found searches relating to
guns and silencers. Defendant’s bank records showed he made a series of withdrawals
totaling $5,600 in the days before the shooting. They also reflected a charge at a diner in
Sacramento on the day of the shooting.
        A search of the California Department of Justice’s automated firearm system
database revealed that defendant owned three revolvers, all .38 caliber. No such weapon
was found in defendant’s house. However, police found a .32-caliber semiautomatic
pistol. Police also found three boxes of .38 special ammunition, with 10 rounds missing
from one of the boxes.
        Police recovered several cell phones from defendant’s house and car. As we shall
discuss, call detail records showed defendant communicated with Costello and Stewart in
the days leading up to the shooting. Cell site locational data likewise showed that
members of the group were in the same places at the same times on the day of the
shooting. Defendant and the others were arrested and taken into custody.
C.      Charges and Dispositions of Codefendants’ Cases
        The four men—defendant, Costello, Stewart, and Jacquett—were charged by
consolidated information with murder with special circumstances of murder for financial
gain and lying in wait (§§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(1) and (15).)3 Defendant pled
not guilty and denied the allegations.

3 The trial court granted defendant’s motion to strike the special circumstance for lying in
wait.

                                               4
       Jacquett and Costello were each tried separately. (See People v. Jacquett (July 14,
2022, C091059) [nonpub. opn.]; People v. Costello (May 9, 2023, C095289) [nonpub.
opn.].) Jacquett was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to 15 years to life
in state prison. (People v. Jacquett, supra, C091059.)4 Costello was convicted of first
degree murder for financial gain and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of
parole. (People v. Costello, supra, C095289.)
       Stewart entered a negotiated plea in which he agreed to plead guilty to first degree
murder and receive a sentence of 50 years to life in state prison in exchange for his
testimony against defendant.
D.     Jury Trial
       Defendant’s case was tried to a jury over the course of several weeks in March
2022. The prosecution’s witnesses, including Detective Hitchcock, testified substantially
as described ante.5 The prosecution also presented other evidence that will be relevant
here, which we will attempt to summarize as briefly as possible.
       1.     The Prosecution’s Case
       As previously discussed, Cheri testified to conversations in which defendant, her
father, expressed an intent to kill Dr. Shock. She also testified to conversations after the
shooting. According to Cheri, defendant said three men came to his house on the night of
August 1, 2018. Some of them, including defendant, drove to Shock’s house. Defendant
told Cheri he waited in the car and watched as one of the men walked to the door and

4 Another panel of this court affirmed the conviction but remanded for resentencing
because the trial court mistakenly believed Jacquett was statutorily ineligible for
probation. (People v. Jacquett, supra, C091059.)
5 It is not necessary to describe Hitchcock’s testimony in detail; however, we will have
more to say about Hitchcock (who also testified for the defense) later in this opinion.

                                              5
shot Shock with defendant’s .38 caliber revolver. Defendant said he paid the men
$5,000. He asked Cheri to testify that he had given her $3,000.
       Cheri was interviewed several times by Detective Hitchcock and Eduardo
Rodriguez, an investigator with the San Joaquin County District Attorney’s Office. She
initially went along with defendant’s version of events. She told Hitchcock and
Rodriguez she received $3,000 or $3,500 from defendant and insisted he never said
anything about hurting Dr. Shock. However, she later called Rodriguez and told him
defendant had admitted to playing a role in the shooting.
       Cross-examination focused on possible reasons for Cheri’s change in tune. Cheri
admitted lying to Detective Hitchcock when she said defendant had given her $3,000.
She also admitted lying when she said he never mentioned hurting Dr. Shock. Cheri
acknowledged that she had an interest in defendant’s financial affairs and his mounting
legal fees were a source of concern to her. At some point, Cheri learned one of
defendant’s attorneys had placed a lien on defendant’s house. Cheri was disappointed, as
she had always understood she and her brother stood to acquire an interest in the house.
She urged her father to fire his attorney and retain someone less expensive. Defendant
refused. Cheri called Detective Rodriguez less than two weeks later. Rodriguez, who
testified for both the prosecution and defense, would later testify that Cheri was upset
about the house when she told him about defendant’s alleged admission.
       Stewart testified pursuant to the aforementioned plea agreement. Stewart said he
met defendant through Costello on the day of the shooting. They had lunch at a diner in
Sacramento. Afterwards, they went to a nearby bank, where defendant withdrew money
to give Costello. A plan was made to meet later at defendant’s house in Lodi.
       Stewart and Costello were eventually joined by Jacquett. The three men drove to
defendant’s house. Stewart and Costello went inside and spoke with defendant.
Defendant showed them a photograph of Dr. Shock on the Internet. He told them he
wanted Shock dead for having botched surgery on his wife. He showed them two guns

                                             6
and suggested they use a pizza box as an excuse to approach Shock’s door. In the end,
they decided to approach Shock’s door with a clipboard and piece of paper.
       Defendant, Stewart, and Jacquett drove to Dr. Shock’s house.6 They parked in
front. Stewart got out of the car and went to the door holding the clipboard and one of
defendant’s guns. Shock answered the door in his underwear. Stewart shot him and
returned to the car. The group drove back to defendant’s house. Defendant gave Stewart
$3,000 and the gun. At some point, Stewart realized he no longer had the piece of paper
from the clipboard.
       Sara Morin, a crime analyst with the California Department of Justice, testified as
an expert in the field of cell site analysis. Morin explained that she analyzed call detail
records and cell phone extractions for phones associated with defendant, Stewart,
Costello, and Jacquett.7 The records showed cell phones associated with defendant and
Costello connected with a cell tower near a store in Lodi on July 27, 2018. That
connection was followed by a flurry of calls between the relevant phones over the next
several days including two calls between phones associated with defendant, Costello, and
Stewart, lasting more than 40 minutes altogether. On July 31, 2018, the day before the
shooting, Stewart’s phone sent defendant’s phone a text message, stating: “Hey, im
waitn for yall so I can get that job done for you.”8
       Cell site analysis of the relevant phones placed defendant and the other men in the
same locations at the same times on the day of the murder. Phones associated with
defendant and Costello were both near Stewart’s house in Sacramento around 1:00 p.m.

6 Costello appears to have left the group.

7 Morin testified that she received the call detail records and cell phone extractions from
Detective Hitchcock. However, Hitchcock would have received the call detail records
from cell phone carriers. This will become important later.
8 Defendant denied speaking to Stewart or receiving texts from him.

                                              7
on August 1, 2018. There was no call activity between the phones from 1:00 p.m. to 2:00
p.m., but all three phones connected to cell towers near Stewart’s house and the bank. At
2:23 p.m., defendant’s phone connected with a cell tower near the diner in Sacramento.
       Around 5:00 p.m., defendant’s phone connected to a cell tower near his home in
Lodi. Jacquett and Costello’s phones connected to cell towers in Lodi shortly thereafter.9
Costello’s phone attempted to connect with defendant’s phone, Jacquett’s phone, and
Stewart’s phone in the 15 minutes preceding the shooting, but the calls went to voicemail
or failed to connect. There was a break in cell phone activity around the time of the
shooting.
       Cell phone activity resumed within 20 minutes of the shooting, with a succession
of three short calls between defendant’s phone and phones associated with Costello. Cell
phone activity between phones associated with defendant and Costello continued the next
day. According to Morin, defendant’s phone called Costello’s phone at 11:07 a.m., and
connected for less than two minutes. Costello’s phone called defendant’s phone at 3:51
p.m. that afternoon and connected for nearly five minutes. That call appears to have been
the last contact between defendant’s phone and of those of any of his codefendants.
       All in all, Morin testified there were “less than 20 contacts” between defendant’s
phone and phones associated with Costello, and “about [10] contacts” between
defendant’s phone and phones associated with Stewart.10 Significantly, all such contacts
took place during the four-day period between July 30 and August 2, 2018. Morin also
noted that the day of the shooting (August 1, 2018) was the only time defendant’s phone

9 Stewart testified he left his phone at home in Sacramento.

10 By our count, there were 16 contacts between defendant’s phone and phones
associated with Costello, and nine contacts between defendant’s phone and phones
associated with Stewart.

                                            8
connected with a cell tower in Sacramento or Jacquett’s phone connected with a cell
tower in Lodi.
       On cross-examination, Morin explained that she received the names of suspected
users of the relevant phones from Detective Hitchcock. Morin acknowledged she has no
way of knowing the names of the suspected users are correct. She also acknowledged she
has no way of knowing what might have been said during conversations between users.
       2.      Defense Case
       Defendant testified in his own defense and denied any involvement in Dr. Shock’s
murder. Defendant acknowledged meeting Costello at the store in Lodi on July 31, 2018.
However, he testified that Costello offered to sell him pain pills. Defendant said he
bought the pills and exchanged phone numbers with Costello. He then drove Costello to
Stockton. As they drove, defendant told Costello about what had happened to Bonnie.
       According to defendant, Costello called the next day to offer more pills for sale.
Defendant drove Costello to Sacramento, where they were joined by Stewart. The group
went to a diner, where they had lunch and discussed pills defendant might buy. They
went to the bank and agreed to meet at defendant’s house in Lodi to complete another
transaction for pills. Somewhere along the line, on July 30 or July 31, 2018, defendant
withdrew $5,000 from the bank. He said he gave $3,500 to Cheri and kept the balance
for himself.
       Defendant confirmed that Costello and Stewart came to his house on August 1,
2018, as agreed. They were driven by Jacquett, who waited in the car while the others
discussed the drug deal. According to defendant, Costello and Stewart noticed
photographs of Bonnie and asked about her. Around the same time, Costello told
defendant they intended to rob him. Costello took pills, money, and two guns from
defendant’s bedroom. He also took a single page from Bonnie’s complaint against Dr.
Shock. According to defendant, Costello handed the page to Stewart and told him to “go

                                             9
do what I told you.” Costello and Jacquett left defendant’s house, leaving Stewart
behind. Eventually, Jacquett came back and collected Stewart.
       The next day, Costello called and demanded $4,000. When defendant asked what
for, Costello responded, “we did you a favor.” That, defendant said, was the last he heard
from any of his codefendants.
       Defendant testified he gave Cheri power of attorney following his arrest. But
father and daughter argued about legal expenses. According to defendant, Cheri became
upset upon learning that he had given a prior attorney an attorney’s lien. What’s more,
defendant said, his son told him that Cheri and her boyfriend were spending all his
money. Defendant eventually revoked Cheri’s power of attorney and granted that
authority to his son. Defendant denied telling Cheri he planned to kill Dr. Shock.
       On cross-examination, defendant acknowledged speaking with Detective
Hitchcock for several hours on September 20, 2018, but saying nothing about pills or a
robbery. He admitted driving by Dr. Shock’s house and searching the Internet for
information about Shock and guns. He allowed that he might have told Hitchcock he had
no revolvers or, if he were going to buy a gun, it would be an automatic. He also said he
regularly researches guns and other things on the Internet to pass the time.
E.     Verdict and Sentence
       The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder after approximately two
hours of deliberation. (§ 187, subd. (a).) The jury found true the special circumstance
allegation that the murder was committed for financial gain. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1).) The
trial court sentenced defendant to life in state prison without the possibility of parole.
This appeal timely followed.
                                     II. DISCUSSION
A.     Brady Violation
       Defendant argues for reversal based on an alleged Brady violation. He argues the
prosecution’s failure to timely disclose information contained in Detective Hitchcock’s

                                              10
personnel records deprived him of due process and a fair trial. He also argues the trial
court erred in denying his motions to dismiss, declare a mistrial, and order a new trial.
None of these arguments carry the day.
       1.     Additional Background
       Detective Hitchcock was arrested for misdemeanor driving under the influence in
October 2021. The prosecutor notified defense counsel of the arrest by letter dated
January 6, 2022. Defense counsel decided against seeking more information by filing a
motion pursuant to Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).
       Trial began on March 2, 2022. Several days later, on March 8, 2022, defense
counsel learned through courthouse gossip that Detective Hitchcock may have been
involved in an internal affairs investigation concerning “the way he disposes of
evidence.” By then, Hitchcock had already completed his testimony for the prosecution.
       Defendant filed a Pitchess motion seeking discovery of information from
Detective Hitchcock’s personnel records. The trial court heard the motion on an
expedited basis on March 14, 2022. After hearing objections from the City Attorney and
Lodi Police Department, the trial court conducted an in camera review and found the
records contained discoverable information. By now, the prosecution had rested, and
defendant was scheduled to present his defense the next day. The trial court continued
the case for one week to give the defense an opportunity to review the Pitchess material
and conduct any necessary investigation.
       Trial resumed on March 22, 2022. Outside the presence of the jury, defense
counsel informed the trial court that he had interviewed witnesses from the Lodi Police
Department and learned that allegations had been sustained that Detective Hitchcock
mishandled evidence, including various cell phones. Defense counsel reminded the trial
court that Hitchcock had handled cell phones belonging to defendant and others and
provided information to Morin for use in her cell site analysis.

                                             11
       Defense counsel argued he would have prepared the case differently had he known
Detective Hitchcock had been reprimanded for “mishandling electronic devices.”
Specifically, he said he would have “hired expert witnesses to get those cell phones that
were analyzed in this case and to have them do their own extractions and to compare the
records that were provided by the service providers.”
       Defense counsel acknowledged he could impeach Detective Hitchcock “and have
the jury understand that he has mishandled evidence in the past.” But he said he had still
been put “at a great disadvantage” because he could not demonstrate that Hitchcock had
mishandled evidence here. Had the information been timely disclosed, defense counsel
said, he “would have made greater efforts to find out if [Hitchcock] did mishandle
evidence in this case.” With trial set to resume that very day, the implication was that it
was now too late to do so. Accordingly, defense counsel moved to dismiss the case or, in
the alternative, declare a mistrial. The trial court denied both motions.
       The defense recalled Detective Hitchcock. Hitchcock testified he recovered cell
phones from defendant’s house and car and booked them into evidence. He also
recovered and booked cell phones from Stewart and Costello. Hitchcock said he did not
extract data from any of the phones; that task fell to another officer. However, Hitchcock
downloaded the extracted data onto an electronic storage device (a disk or USB drive)
and drove the device to the California Department of Justice in Sacramento, where he
physically delivered it to Morin.
       Detective Hitchcock acknowledged having been the subject of an internal affairs
investigation in 2021. The investigation involved two firearms booked into evidence in
another case. Hitchcock explained that he checked the firearms out of the evidence room
with the intention of taking them to the ballistics testing center for testing. However, he
failed to send the firearms to the ballistics testing center for two weeks. As a result, he
was found to have violated police department policies and local rules.

                                             12
       Detective Hitchcock also acknowledged having received letters of reprimand on
two occasions. On one occasion, Hitchcock had been downloading data from cell phones
using Cellebrite equipment. That process can be time consuming, Hitchcock said, so he
worked on more than one phone at a time, leaving them to download in a locked drawer
or cabinet of his desk. Hitchcock somehow mixed the phones up and transposed numbers
on the evidence envelopes, resulting in the release of the wrong phone to the wrong
person. He testified he was reprimanded for mishandling evidence.
       On another occasion, Hitchcock recalled recovering several electronic devices
from a residence and trying to book them all into evidence as a group, rather than
individually. Hitchcock testified he was reprimanded for booking the evidence
improperly. Hitchcock also testified that he had recently resigned from the Lodi Police
Department to accept a job in the private sector.
       On cross-examination, Detective Hitchcock maintained no evidence had been
compromised in any of the cases in which he had been investigated or reprimanded. He
added that he followed protocols in the present case, and Morin would have double
checked the data extracted from the phones against the phone records from the cell phone
carriers to ensure they matched.
       After the verdict, defendant moved for a new trial on the ground that the delayed
disclosure of information concerning Detective Hitchcock’s mishandling of cell phones
in other cases violated his rights to due process and a fair trial. The trial court denied the
motion, finding, again, that the information was required to be disclosed by Brady, but
the court’s remedial measures, including the week-long continuance and expedited
hearing on defendant’s Pitchess motion, were sufficient to remedy any potential
violation.
       2.     Applicable Legal Principles and Standards of Review
       “The federal due process clause prohibits the prosecution from suppressing
evidence materially favorable to the accused. The duty of disclosure exists regardless of

                                              13
good or bad faith, and regardless of whether the defense has requested the materials.”
(People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1132 (Zambrano), overruled on another
ground as stated in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22; see Brady, supra,
373 U.S. at p. 87.) “There are three elements to a Brady violation: (1) the state
withholds evidence, either willfully or inadvertently, (2) the evidence at issue is favorable
to the defendant, either because it is exculpatory or impeaching, and (3) the evidence is
material.” (People v. Lewis (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 257, 263 (Lewis).) Reversal for
failure to turn over exculpatory evidence is required only if the evidence is material.
(Zambrano, supra, at p. 1133.)
       Evidence is material under Brady if there is “a reasonable probability its disclosure
would have altered the trial result.” (Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1132.) “ ‘The
question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a
different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial,
understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.’ ” (In re Brown (1998)
17 Cal.4th 873, 886.) In other words, “the defendant must show that ‘the favorable
evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to
undermine confidence in the verdict.’ ” (Lewis, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 263.)
“Materiality includes consideration of the effect of the nondisclosure on defense
investigations and trial strategies.” (Zambrano, supra, at p. 1132.)
       We independently determine whether a Brady violation has occurred, giving great
weight to the trial court’s factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence.
(People v. Letner & Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 176.) We review the trial court’s ruling
on defendant’s motion for a new trial based on the alleged Brady violation for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 917, fn. 27.) In that circumstance,
“the asserted abuse of discretion is the asserted failure of the trial court to recognize
violations of defendant’s constitutional rights.” (Ibid.) We apply the same deferential
standard of review to rulings on defendant’s motions to dismiss the charges and declare a

                                              14
mistrial. (People v. Velasco-Palacios (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 439, 445 [motion to
dismiss]; People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 573 [mistrial].)
       3.     Analysis
       Defendant argues the prosecution violated Brady by failing to timely disclose
information from Detective Hitchcock’s personnel records. The People appear to
concede the second Brady element: that the information was favorable to defendant. We
accept the apparent concession and focus on the first and third elements, which we
consider in turn.
              a.     Whether the Information Was Withheld
       Reading his briefs generously, defendant suggests the untimely disclosure of
information from Detective Hitchcock’s personnel records was tantamount to a failure to
disclose. The People respond that the information, “while disclosed late, [was]
nonetheless disclosed to the defense before trial ended,” and so cannot be said to have
been withheld. The People are not wrong, but that does not end the matter.
       Our Supreme Court considered the midtrial disclosure of Brady material—
fingerprint testing reports—in People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 467-468
(Mora and Rangel).) There, as here, the reports were only disclosed after the prosecution
rested at trial. (Id. at p. 465.) Upon receiving the reports, the defendants moved for a
mistrial, arguing the untimely disclosure impaired their ability to effectively cross-
examine police officers who testified during the prosecution’s case-in-chief. (Id. at p.
466.) The trial court denied the motion. (Ibid.)
       The Supreme Court found no Brady violation. (Mora and Rangel, supra, 5
Cal.5th at p. 467.) The high court explained: “Evidence actually presented at trial is not
considered suppressed for Brady purposes, even if that evidence had not been previously
disclosed during discovery.” (Ibid.) But that was not all. The Supreme Court also said,
“when considering whether delayed disclosure rather than ‘total nondisclosure’
constitutes a Brady violation, ‘the applicable test is whether defense counsel was

                                             15
“prevented by the delay from using the disclosed material effectively in preparing and
presenting the defendant’s case.” ’ ” (Ibid.; see also United States v. Anderson (9th Cir.
2004) 391 F.3d 970, 975 [no Brady violation from government’s delay in identifying two
witnesses where defense secured the witnesses and had opportunity to recall other
witnesses who could have been impeached]; United States v. Tyndall (8th Cir. 2008) 521
F.3d 877, 882 [“A mid-trial disclosure violates Brady only if it comes too late for the
defense to make use of it”].) Put another way, evidence that is belatedly disclosed during
trial may be considered suppressed or withheld within the meaning of Brady if the delay
causes prejudice. (United States v. Burke (10th Cir. 2009) 571 F.3d 1048, 1055-1056
[observing that a majority of federal Courts of Appeal have held that while untimely
disclosure of Brady material does not constitute a constitutional violation in itself, it may
violate due process if the defendant can show he was prejudiced by the delay].) We thus
turn to the question of prejudice, which is encompassed by the third Brady element.
              b.     Whether the Information Was Material
       “Prejudice” in the context of a potential Brady violation turns “on ‘the materiality
of the evidence to the issue of guilt and innocence.’ ” (People v. Salazar (2005) 35
Cal.4th 1031, 1043.) To demonstrate the materiality necessary to establish a Brady
violation in a delayed disclosure case, a defendant must show what he would have done
differently had he been given more time to address the Brady evidence, and how earlier
disclosure would have given rise to a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial
would have been different. (McNeill v. Bagley (6th Cir. 2021) 10 F.4th 588, 600-601;
United States v. Blackwell (6th Cir. 2006) 459 F.3d 739, 759.) This defendant fails to do.
       Defendant suggests defense counsel would have prepared the case differently had
he known Detective Hitchcock had been disciplined for “mishandling evidence.”
Specifically, he suggests he would have retained an expert to poke holes in the
prosecution’s cell phone evidence. There are several problems with this argument.

                                             16
       First, as the People observe, Detective Hitchcock played only a limited role in
handling the cell phone evidence. Hitchcock testified on recall that he recovered phones
from defendant’s house and car and booked them into evidence. Another officer
extracted data from the phones and Hitchcock downloaded the data onto an electronic
storage device, which he delivered to Morin. Although Hitchcock may have struggled
with similar tasks in the past, there was no evidence he had any such issues here. To the
contrary, Hitchcock’s uncontradicted testimony was that he followed the protocols and
procedures set by the Lodi Police Department.
       Second, and related, there was no evidence that Detective Hitchcock was
meaningfully involved in processing or preparing the evidence on which Morin relied.
As previously discussed, Morin testified she relied on call detail records and cell phone
extractions. Again, the evidence showed that another officer performed the extractions.
Although Hitchcock downloaded the data onto an electronic storage device and delivered
the device to Morin, nothing suggests he was involved in manipulating data, such that he
could have interfered with Morin’s analysis. Similarly, the evidence showed that
Hitchcock obtained call detail records from cell service carriers, which he passed along to
Morin, together with his theories about which users may have been associated with which
phones. Here again, there was no evidence Hitchcock was involved in manipulating the
data on which Morin relied. At most, he appears to have functioned as a courier so far as
Morin was concerned.
       Defendant invites us to presume that Detective Hitchcock, having been
reprimanded for mishandling cell phone evidence in the past, must surely have
mishandled such evidence again.11 But defendant has not established that Hitchcock

11 Defendant adds another level of speculation in his reply brief, in which he asserts that
Detective Hitchcock either “resigned under threat of termination” from the Lodi Police

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handled cell phone evidence at all, at the data level, other than in the most rudimentary
sense. In the absence of any explanation as to how Hitchcock might have mishandled
evidence, we are left to speculate that he must have messed up somehow. But the mere
possibility that some unidentified expert might have so testified does not establish
materiality. (See United States v. Agurs (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 109-110; People v. Fauber
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 829.)
       Third, even assuming an expert had been obtained, and testified to Detective
Hitchcock’s mishandling of cell phone evidence in some way, such testimony would not
have been reasonably likely to change the outcome of the trial. As previously discussed,
the prosecution relied on two types of cell phone evidence: (1) evidence of
communications between phones; and (2) evidence that the relevant phones connected
with cell towers near the same places around the same times. Significantly, defendant’s
own testimony confirms the essential accuracy of both types of evidence.
       Morin testified to a series of communications between defendant’s phone and
phones associated with Costello and Stewart in the days leading up to the shooting.
Morin also testified to communications between defendant’s phone and phones
associated with Costello on the day of the shooting and the day after. Defendant denied
communicating with Stewart by phone but admitted speaking with Costello. Although he
claims to have discussed potential drug deals, rather than murder-for-hire, the evidence
was undisputed that defendant was in frequent phone communication with at least one of
his coconspirators on the days leading up to the shooting and the day after. An expert
would not have changed much, given the defense’s decision to offer another reason for
the communications, rather than deny them altogether.

Department or experienced “outright termination.” Neither assertion is supported by any
citation to record evidence.

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       Morin also testified that: phones associated with defendant and Costello connected
with cell towers near the store in Lodi on July 27, 2018; phones associated with
defendant, Costello, and Stewart connected with cell towers near Stewart’s house in
Sacramento on the afternoon of August 1, 2018; and phones associated with defendant,
Costello, and Jacquet connected with cell towers in Lodi on the evening of August 1,
2018. Here, too, defendant’s testimony generally confirmed Morin’s. He admitted
meeting Costello at the store on July 27, 2018, admitted meeting Costello and Stewart for
lunch at the diner in Sacramento on the day of the murder, and admitted inviting them to
his home in Lodi later that same day. Although he offered another reason for the
meetings, he made no attempt to deny they took place.
       Under the circumstances, we discern no reasonable probability the outcome of the
trial would have been different had the information from Detective Hitchcock’s personnel
records been disclosed sooner. Even assuming that Hitchcock had mishandled cell phone
evidence in some way, and an expert had been retained to so testify, the jury would have
still had to decide between the prosecution’s murder-for-hire theory and the defense
theory that Costello ordered Stewart to murder Dr. Shock as some sort of favor to
defendant. The jury would still have to weigh Cheri and Stewart’s credibility against
defendant’s and decide whether the purpose of the phone calls and meetings was to
arrange a murder or buy pills. Defendant has given us no reason to believe defense
counsel would have prepared for trial differently, or the jury would have made another
choice, had the information from Hitchcock’s personnel records been disclosed sooner.
We therefore reject defendant’s Brady claim. Having done so, we likewise reject
defendant’s arguments that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motions to
dismiss, for a mistrial, and for a new trial.
B.     Alleged Error in Admitting Evidence of .32 Caliber Semiautomatic Pistol
       Defendant next argues the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a .32 caliber
semiautomatic pistol found in his house. Specifically, he argues the evidence should

                                                19
have been excluded as irrelevant because the pistol was not believed to be the murder
weapon. He also argues the evidence was improper character evidence, and more
prejudicial than probative. The People respond that defendant forfeited this claim by
failing to object in the trial court. We agree with the People. (People v. Seumanu (2015)
61 Cal.4th 1293, 1318-1319.)
       Anticipating forfeiture, defendant argues in the alternative that defense counsel
was ineffective in failing to object to the .32 caliber semiautomatic pistol. We are not
persuaded.
        To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel a claim, defendant must
establish “not only deficient performance, i.e., representation below an objective standard
of reasonableness, but also resultant prejudice. [Citation.] Tactical errors are generally
not deemed reversible, and counsel’s decisionmaking must be evaluated in the context of
the available facts.” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 333.) “In the usual case,
where counsel’s trial tactics or strategic reasons for challenged decisions do not appear
on the record, we will not find ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal unless there
could be no conceivable reason for counsel’s acts or omissions.” (People v. Weaver
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 926.)
       Here, defense counsel could have reasonably declined to object for tactical
reasons. Defendant told Detective Hitchcock he had no revolvers, which was untrue. He
also said he regularly researched guns on the Internet, and if he were going to buy a gun,
it would be an automatic. Defense counsel could have reasonably believed the .32 caliber
semiautomatic pistol explained both defendant’s false statement to Hitchcock (e.g., he
was confused about which guns he had), and his suspicious search history (e.g., he was
simply interested in guns). The ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.

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                                  III. DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                                  /S/

                                              RENNER, J.

We concur:

/S/

HULL, Acting P. J.

/S/

MAURO, J.

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