Court Opinion

ID: 9690713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:36:48.370113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:02.392748
License: Public Domain

JOHN G. HILL, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because the evidence is legally insufficient to support the conviction. Ronnie Davenport’s conviction is for possession of pseudoephedrine with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine. The State showed that Davenport possessed pseudoephedrine and that, by causing it to be put in a soft drink, produced a substance consistent with that produced in the early stages of the manufacturing of methamphetamine. One witness testified that there was no other reason to possess the amount of pseudoephedrine in a cup of Coca-Cola other than to manufacture methamphetamine.
It is generally understood that methamphetamine is manufactured at methamphetamine labs, with the use of other chemical precursors. In all cases of which I am aware, convictions of this offense have been obtained by showing the defendant’s possession of other precursors or the defendant’s connection with methamphetamine labs.
In this case, there is no showing that Davenport was in possession of any other *868precursor used in the manufacture of methamphetamine and no showing of any connection between her and any methamphetamine lab. Instead, the theory appears to be that she and her companion, Tommy Holder, put the pseudoephedrine tablets in a cup of Coca-Cola with the intention of beginning the process of manufacturing methamphetamine.
I would agree that the evidence is sufficient to show that Davenport intended that the pseudoephedrine be put in the cup of Coca-Cola. I would agree that there is evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the result is equivalent or similar to that obtained in the early manufacture of methamphetamine. What is missing is any evidence from which it might reasonably be inferred that Davenport intended, by having the pseudoephed-rine placed into the Coca-Cola, to begin the process of manufacturing methamphetamine.
Juries may make inferences that are supported by the evidence at trial but are not permitted to come to conclusions based on mere speculation or factually unsupported inferences or presumptions. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 15 (Tex.Crim.App.2007). Because it is not generally understood that mixing pseudoephed-rine with Coca-Cola produces something that can be compared to the beginning of the process of manufacturing methamphetamine or that the manufacture of methamphetamine occurs outside of methamphetamine labs, a finding that Davenport intended to begin the process of manufacturing methamphetamine by mixing pseudoephedrine with Coca-Cola, outside of the context of a methamphetamine lab, is an inference based on mere speculation and is factually unsupported. It is based upon the supposition that she must have special knowledge by which she would know that the mixing of the two outside the context of a methamphetamine lab would constitute the beginning of the process of manufacturing methamphetamine. There was no showing of any special knowledge Davenport possessed by which she would know that her action would result in the manufacture of methamphetamine or that methamphetamine could be manufactured outside of the context of a methamphetamine lab. Consequently, any inference that by mixing the two, Davenport intended that result would be unreasonable, absent her possession of another precursor besides methamphetamine, a connection to a methamphetamine lab, or evidence that she possessed special knowledge of the process of manufacturing methamphetamine.
I would sustain Davenport’s second point on appeal, reverse the judgment, and remand to the trial court for the purpose of the entry of a judgment of acquittal.