Court Opinion

ID: 9865477
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 18:00:46.886358+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:33.963795
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-14002    Document: 20-1     Date Filed: 09/25/2023   Page: 1 of 9

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-14002
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       DENZIL EARL MCKATHAN,
                                                   Petitioner-Appellant,
       versus
       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                                  Respondent-Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Southern District of Alabama
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cv-00611-KD
                          ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-14002

       Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Denzil McKathan, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, ap-
       peals the district court’s denial of his motion under Federal Rule of
       Civil Procedure 60(b), which sought relief from the denial of his
       28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate. After careful review, we aﬃrm.
                                         I.
              We start with a summary of the relevant facts, which are set
       out in greater detail in our opinion in McKathan v. United States, 969
       F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2020). In 2005, McKathan was convicted of
       possessing child pornography and sentenced to 27 months in
       prison and a life term of supervised release. In 2014, a probation
       oﬃcer discovered that McKathan had violated the terms of his re-
       lease by accessing the internet through a mobile phone. In re-
       sponse to the oﬃcer’s inquiries, McKathan conceded—the condi-
       tions of his release mandated truthful answers on pain of revoca-
       tion—he had been using the phone to access child pornography
       over the internet, and he provided the PIN to unlock his phone,
       which contained child pornography. The district court revoked his
       release, sent him back to prison, and reimposed a life term of su-
       pervised release.
              Based on the probation oﬃcer’s investigation, federal law en-
       forcement obtained a warrant to search McKathan’s phone, which
       revealed that McKathan had downloaded images of child pornog-
       raphy. McKathan was indicted on three counts of knowing receipt
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       22-14002               Opinion of the Court                         3

       of child pornography and one count of knowing possession of
       child pornography. After the district court denied his motion to
       suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds, McKathan pled guilty to
       one receipt count, and the court sentenced him to 188 months in
       prison. McKathan did not directly appeal.
               In November 2015, McKathan ﬁled a pro se motion for col-
       lateral relief from his conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The court
       appointed counsel, who ﬁled an amendment. McKathan argued
       that his trial attorney was ineﬀective for failing to seek suppression
       of his statements to the probation oﬃcer, and the fruits of those
       statements, on the ground that the evidence had been obtained in
       violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
       A magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing and then recom-
       mended denial of that claim for failure to establish prejudice. Over
       McKathan’s objection, the district court adopted the magistrate
       judge’s recommendation and denied his ineﬀective-assistance
       claim. The district court granted a COA, and McKathan appealed.
              We reversed on appeal, holding that “there is a reasonable
       likelihood that a Fifth Amendment suppression motion would have
       been successful.” McKathan, 969 F.3d at 1231. We explained that
       McKathan’s case presented the “classic penalty situation” covered
       by the Fifth Amendment’s protections, “where the supervised-re-
       leasee’s statements, coerced on pain of revocation for invocation of
       the Fifth Amendment privilege, were used against him in a separate
       criminal case.” Id. In that scenario, the privilege against self-in-
       crimination was “self-executing,” meaning the government could
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                22-14002

       not “use those same statements to prosecute McKathan for a new
       crime,” even if he didn’t invoke the privilege. Id. at 1228–29.
              But that was not the end of our analysis. We explained that
       a motion to suppress based on the Fifth Amendment would not
       have been reasonably likely to aﬀect the outcome if, “despite the
       legal virtue of a Fifth Amendment argument, McKathan’s state-
       ments and their fruits would have nonetheless been admissible for
       an independent reason.” Id. at 1223, 1231–32. The government
       had argued that it would have inevitably discovered the evidence of
       child pornography on McKathan’s phone, and we agreed that the
       “inevitable-discovery doctrine can apply when a Fifth Amendment
       violation occurs.” Id. at 1232.
              But because the record was insuﬃcient to resolve whether
       inevitable discovery applied, we vacated the denial of McKathan’s
       § 2255 motion and remanded for the district court to determine
       whether the challenged evidence would have been otherwise ad-
       missible. Id. at 1232–33. We instructed the court that it “shall deny
       the § 2255 motion” if it “conclude[s] that the evidence would have
       been otherwise admissible.” Id. at 1233. We rejected the view that
       the government had waived or abandoned its inevitable-discovery
       argument during the underlying criminal case. Id. at 1232 n.8.
              On remand, the district court permitted limited discovery
       and then held an evidentiary hearing. Then, in February 2021, the
       court entered an order denying McKathan’s § 2255 motion. The
       court concluded that the evidence of child pornography on McKa-
       than’s phone likely would have been discovered by lawful means
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       22-14002               Opinion of the Court                          5

       being actively pursued, and so the evidence was otherwise admissi-
       ble under the inevitable-discovery doctrine. Thus, the court denied
       the § 2255 motion. McKathan appealed, and both the district court
       and this Court denied a COA.
                                         II.
               Beginning in January 2022, McKathan sought to reopen his
       § 2255 proceedings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), (4) and (6), assert-
       ing that the proceedings were fundamentally defective, incom-
       plete, and deprived him of due process. He maintained that the
       district court failed to address his claim that the Fifth Amendment
       rendered him immune from criminal liability resulting from his
       compelled disclosures and that the indictment would have been dis-
       missed on proper motion. He also asserted that the court applied
       the wrong legal rules and denied him a fair opportunity to contest
       the government’s case, and he accused the courts of a “judicial hi-
       jacking of the 2255 process” by reviving the government’s inevita-
       ble-discovery argument.
               The district court entered an 18-page order denying the Rule
       60(b) motion in November 2022. In the court’s view, McKathan
       failed to identify a defect in the integrity of the § 2255 proceeding.
       The court rejected McKathan’s arguments that the court wrong-
       fully denied him discovery, applied the wrong legal standards, and
       failed to fully resolve the merits of his claims. The court noted that
       his immunity argument was misguided because we had “already
       determined that McKathan would have prevailed on a Fifth
       Amendment-based motion to suppress if it had been raised.” The
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                  22-14002

       court also reasoned that, “to the extent that McKathan[] seeks to
       reassert his claims for relief, or raise new claims, . . . his motion is
       the equivalent of a second or successive motion and therefore,
       barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2554(h).” McKathan appeals.
                                         III.
               Rule 60(b) permits relief from a civil judgment. See Fed. R.
       Civ. P. 60(b). Although Rule 60(b) generally applies in § 2255 cases,
       the rule cannot be used to circumvent restraints on ﬁling second or
       successive § 2255 motions. Farris v. United States, 333 F.3d 1211,
       1216 (11th Cir. 2003). Under the Antiterrorism and Eﬀective Death
       Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), a prisoner seeking to ﬁle a “second or suc-
       cessive” § 2255 motion must “ﬁrst ﬁle an application with the ap-
       propriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district
       court to consider it.” Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (outlining the require-
       ments an applicant must meet to obtain an order authorizing a suc-
       cessive § 2255 motion). Without authorization from a court of ap-
       peals, the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a successive
       motion. Farris, 333 F.3d at 1216.
               The district court’s jurisdiction depends on whether resolv-
       ing the Rule 60(b) motion “would be inconsistent with the re-
       strictions imposed on successive petitions by the AEDPA.” Wil-
       liams v. Chatman, 510 F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th Cir. 2007). A Rule 60(b)
       motion will be “treated as a successive habeas petition if it: (1) seeks
       to add a new ground of relief; or (2) attacks the federal court’s pre-
       vious resolution of a claim on the merits.” Id. (quotation marks
       omitted). But Rule 60(b) may properly be used to raise a “defect in
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       22-14002               Opinion of the Court                         7

       the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings.” Id. (quoting Gon-
       zalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 532 & n.4 (2005)). The court has juris-
       diction to decide the motion to the extent it’s “conﬁned to a non-
       merits aspect of the [§ 2255] proceedings.” Id. at 1295.
               McKathan contends that the district court had jurisdiction
       because his argument related to the § 2255 proceeding, not the un-
       derlying criminal case. He also reiterates his view that the court
       failed to consider his claim of Fifth Amendment immunity. And he
       repeats a list of alleged legal errors committed by the district court
       during the § 2255 proceeding.
              Here, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider McKa-
       than’s argument that he was immune from prosecution and that
       the underlying indictment would have been dismissed on proper
       motion. This argument is either a new ground for habeas relief or
       an “attack[ on] the federal court[s’] previous resolution of a claim
       on the on the merits.” See Williams, 510 F.3d at 1293 (emphasis
       omitted).
              In McKathan’s prior appeal, after citing many of the same
       cases on which he now relies, we remanded to the district court
       with instructions to rule on whether “the evidence from McKa-
       than’s phone would have otherwise been admissible,” notwith-
       standing that the government could not have used his statements
       or evidence derived from those statements in the criminal case. See
       McKathan, 969 F.3d at 1223–24, 1229, 1232–33. We noted that “[t]he
       inevitable-discovery doctrine can apply when a Fifth Amendment
       violation occurs.” Id. at 1232. And we speciﬁcally told the court
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       8                      Opinion of the Court                 22-14002

       that, if it “conclude[s] that the evidence would have been otherwise
       admissible, it shall deny the § 2255 motion.” Id.
               Consistent with that mandate, the district court concluded
       that the evidence of child pornography on McKathan’s phone
       would have been otherwise admissible under the inevitable-discov-
       ery doctrine, so it denied the § 2255 motion, and no COA was
       granted. While McKathan seems to disagree with our analysis of
       his claim, the scope of remand, and the district court’s ultimate
       conclusion, these matters are intertwined with the merits of his
       § 2255 motion. So we must treat them as subject to the “re-
       strictions imposed on successive petitions by the AEDPA.” Wil-
       liams, 510 F.3d at 1293. And without our authorization to proceed,
       the district court lacked jurisdiction.
              McKathan responds that his Rule 60(b) motion, if treated as
       a habeas petition, was merely “chronologically second,” not “sec-
       ond or successive” within the meaning of AEDPA, relying on the
       Supreme Court’s decision in Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930,
       945–46 (2007). But unlike the competency claim in Panetti, McKa-
       than’s ineﬀective-assistance claim was both ripe and raised in his
       ﬁrst § 2255 motion, so Panetti’s reasoning does not apply.
               McKathan also asserts in conclusory terms that the legal er-
       rors he alleged in his motion warrant relief under Rule 60(b)(1),
       and he includes a list of those alleged errors, including denying dis-
       covery and preventing examination of certain witnesses. But the
       district court considered and rejected the same list of errors in
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       22-14002                  Opinion of the Court                                9

       detail when it denied the Rule 60(b) motion, and McKathan fails to
       address the court’s reasoning at all on appeal.
               While we read briefs ﬁled by pro se litigants liberally, issues
       not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned.
       See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). And “[w]e
       have long held that an appellant abandons a claim when he either
       makes only passing references to it or raises it in a perfunctory
       manner without supporting arguments and authority.” Sapuppo v.
       Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014).
              Here, McKathan’s brieﬁng fails to provide any indication of
       why he believes the district court erred in rejecting his arguments
       that the § 2255 proceeding was procedurally defective. He has
       therefore abandoned any challenge to the denial of his Rule 60(b)
       motion based on nonmerits defects in the § 2255 proceeding.
              For these reasons, we aﬃrm.1
              AFFIRMED.

       1 The parties dispute whether or to what extent a COA is necessary for McKa-

       than’s appeal and whether we should remand to the district court for a COA
       ruling in the first instance. No COA is necessary to review the district court’s
       subject-matter jurisdiction over the Rule 60(b) motion, see Hubbard v. Campbell,
       379 F.3d 1245, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004), and McKathan has not properly briefed
       any issue that ordinarily requires a COA, see Williams, 510 F.3d at 1295.