Court Opinion

ID: 9812424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:39:51.865916+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:58.346207
License: Public Domain

Hoke, J.,
concurring: I concur in the disposition made of this case, for the reason that it affirmatively appears from the testimony that the plaintiff at the time he was injured was neither a passenger nor employee of the company, and .the facts disclose no breach of duty on the part of the defendant.
I do not assent to the position maintained in the principal opinion, as I understand it, that when a conductor of a freight train employs an ordinary hand to' assist him in its operation, and the hand while so engaged in the company’s work is injured by the company’s negligence, that a presumption exists that the employment is without authority and the burden is on the injured employee to show the contrary. A conductor of a freight train is necessarily given very extfended authority over a train under his control while being operated on the road away from the general offices of the company, and fre*77quently without present means of communication with them. He bas under such circumstances tbe general right to employ a hand whenever it becomes necessary in the proper management of his train, and he must from the nature of the case be given very large discretion in determining when such necessity exists.
There are so many and various cases where the power may arise that I think when a conductor does employ a hand who engages in the company’s work, there should be a presumption that he is acting within the scope of his authority till the contrary is made to appear; and at times such authority will be implied as a matter-of law.
The decisions cited in the principal opinion are chiefly cases where the question was on the authority existing in the conductor of a freight train to confer on an injured party the position of passenger on his train, and the power of such com ductor to employ help in the operation of his own train was in no way involved. While not directly in point, I think the position here contended for finds support in two well-considered decisions: Sloan v. Railway, 62 Iowa, 736, Railway v. Propst, 83 Ala., 525. In the first case, and on this question, Seeversj for the Court, says: “It is said that the plaintiff was not an employee of the receiver, but an intermeddler, and therefore he cannot recover. The undisputed facts are that one Voorhees was a brakeman in the employ of the receiver, and he desired to have a rest for a week or more, and the plaintiff took his place on the train with the knowledge and consent of the conductor, on the first day of July, and continued to perform the duties of brakeman until the sixth day of said month, when he was ordered by the conductor to perform the duty in discharging which he was injured. The conductor testified that to properly manage the train two’ brakemen were required, and that there was but one other on the train besides the plaintiff. This evidence is not controverted. It does not *78clearly appear that the receiver or any of his employees, other than those on the train, had knowledge that the plaintiff was acting as brakeman. An intermeddler is a person who officiously intrudes into- a business to which he has no right. The distinction between an intermeddler and a trespasser is not in any case very great. Under the circumstances of this case, if the plaintiff was an intermeddler, he was a trespasser. But, as he was on the train, and discharged the duties of brakeman for six days with the knowledge and consent of the conductor, he was not either. The train, when passing between stations and distant from any other officer, is in charge of the conductor, and he has authority to eject such persons therefrom. So far from so doing, the conductor availed himself of the services of the plaintiff and required him to -perform duties which were necessary and essential to the safe operation of the train. The regular brakeman was absent, and it is immaterial whether with or without cause. The conductor consented that the plaintiff should perform his duties. We think, when the regular brakeman is absent and the proper and safe management of the train so requires, the conductor has the authority to supply the place of the absent brakeman, and for the time being such person is- an employee of the conductor’s principal. Of necessity, it seems to us, the conductor must have such authority.”
In the second case, Stone, G. J., for the Oourt, says: “The conductor testified that he had no authority from the superintendent or from the defendant to engage or utilize the services of the plaintiff in the capacity of brakeman. Express authority for this purpose was not necessary. The circumstances themselves, about which there is no conflict of testimony, gave him the authority. In such an emergency, there must be discretion and authority somewhere to- supply the place of disabled or missing servants, and no one could exercise this power so well or so- prudently as the conductor in charge of *79the train. We will therefore treat the plaintiff as the lawfully employed servant of the company.”
I am of opinion that when the conductor of a freight train employs an ordinary hand to assist in the operation of his train, the presumption should be that his act is rightful till the contrary is made to appear. And in many instances such hiring being within the scope of his apparent authority, will conclusively bind the company so far as third persons are concerned, who act without notice. . ■