Court Opinion

ID: 9352379
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-05 22:01:44.203171+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:01:52.362523
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/5/23 P. v. Villescas CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,                                                  B320061

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. VA044837)
         v.

ALBERTO VILLESCAS,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Raul A. Sahagun, Judge. Dismissed.

     Richard B. Lennon, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Gary A. Lieberman,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                              ******
       Alberto Villescas (defendant) appeals from the trial court’s
order denying his petition to strike his prior prison term
enhancement pursuant to newly enacted Senate Bill No. 483
(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3) (Senate Bill
483). We conclude defendant has appealed from a nonappealable
order. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       In October 1998, defendant was convicted by a jury of two
counts of possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 12021,
subd. (a)(1)).1 The trial court found true the allegation that
defendant had previously suffered two prior “strike” convictions
and one prior prison term. (§§ 667, 667.5, subd. (b), & 1170.12.)
The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for a total
term of 26 years to life—two concurrent 25-years-to-life terms
plus one year for the prior prison term. Defendant appealed, and
a prior panel of this division of the Court of Appeal affirmed the
judgment. (People v. Villescas (May 2, 2000, B129758) [nonpub.
opn.].)
       In 2021, the Legislature passed, and the Governor
signed, Senate Bill 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.). Senate Bill 483
added section 1171.1, which was later renumbered as section
1172.75. The legislation renders “legally invalid” “[a]ny sentence
enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020,
pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

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enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent
offense.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) Pursuant to section 1172.75,
defendant filed a petition to strike the one-year enhancement
attributable to his prior prison term. The trial court denied his
petition without prejudice on the basis it was premature.
       Defendant filed this appeal.
                           DISCUSSION
I.     We lack jurisdiction to correct the unauthorized
       sentence.
       In accordance with our recent decision in People v.
King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629 (King), we dismiss defendant’s
appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
       In King, the defendant “was charged with multiple sex
offenses, all committed against a single victim on one day in
1985.” (King, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 633.) In 1986, he was
convicted and sentenced to a determinate term of 105 years in
state prison. (Ibid.) In 2021, he filed a motion to vacate an
unauthorized sentence. (Ibid.) We held that although defendant
“correctly contend[ed] that the sentence . . . was unauthorized, . .
. the trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain [his] motion to
vacate his sentence, and therefore this court [had] no
appellate jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.” (Ibid.)
       In so ruling, we noted “[t]he general rule . . . that ‘once a
judgment is rendered and execution of the sentence has begun,
the trial court does not have jurisdiction to vacate or modify the
sentence.’” (King, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 634.) That is
because “a freestanding motion [or petition] challenging an
incarcerated defendant’s sentence is . . . . not an independent
remedy, but must be attached to some ongoing action.” (Id. at p.
640.) Here, there is no ongoing action. And because the trial

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court lacked jurisdiction, any appeal from the trial court’s
dismissal must also be dismissed. (Id., at p. 634.)
       Here, because execution of defendant’s sentence began in
October 1998, and his judgment became final in August 2000, the
trial court did not have jurisdiction to rule on defendant’s
freestanding petition to modify this sentence; under King, neither
do we.
II.    We decline to treat this appeal as a petition for
       habeas corpus.
       In King, we noted that “a trial court may of course rule on a
defendant’s challenge to an unlawful sentence in a properly filed
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.” (King, supra, 77
Cal.App.5th at p. 637.) Applying this principle, defendant asks
that we treat his appeal as such a habeas petition. We decline to
do so as defendant has an adequate remedy at law.2 (In re
Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 452 [because the defendant had “a
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law,” “resort[ing] to
habeas corpus [was] unnecessary”]; Michelle K. v. Superior
Court (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 409, 433 [“habeas corpus is
appropriate only when there are no other available and adequate
remedies; it may not be used to avoid otherwise available and
adequate remedies”].)
       Section 1172.75 already provides defendant a remedy.
Subdivision (b) obligates the Secretary of the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation to forward information on which
defendants might be eligible for relief by July 1, 2022, and
subdivision (c) obligates the sentencing court to conduct its
review and any resentencing—for persons like defendant who are

2      We reach this decision regardless of whether the procedure
set forth in section 1172.75 is exclusive.

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not currently serving time on the enhancement that may be
stricken—by December 31, 2023. (§ 1172.75, subds. (b) & (c)(2).)
      Thus, under the express terms of the statute, defendant
will be resentenced by December 31, 2023, before he begins to
serve any time on account of the now invalid enhancement.3 It
follows that we need not treat his appeal as a petition for habeas
corpus. In short, neither his unauthorized petition nor habeas
corpus empowers defendant to skip to the front of the line our
Legislature has already created and prioritized.

3     Thus, there is no harm in defendant either waiting for the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to act as
anticipated by section 1172.75 or filing a new petition for habeas
corpus.

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                        DISPOSITION
      The appeal is dismissed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

                                     ______________________, J.
                                     HOFFSTADT
We concur:

_________________________, Acting P. J.
CHAVEZ

_________________________, J.*
BENKE

*      Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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