Court Opinion

ID: 9844288
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:00:07.459837+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:31.606992
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Justice,
dissenting.
The opinion of the majority is, I believe, erroneous and will result in substantial and far reaching damage to our system of criminal justice. Hence, I respectfully dissent.
The majority opinion all at the same time tells too much and tells too little. The majority tells us more than we need or even want to know of California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970), and Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), neither of which are particularly applicable to the case at bar. Also, the majority tells us much about “depositions” and on the other hand tells us nothing of its reasons for overruling the policy considerations and policy decisions which are both explicit and inherent in State v. Potter, 6 Idaho 584, 57 P. 431 (1899), and State v. Villarreal, 94 Idaho 246, 486 P.2d 257 (1971). Finally, the majority fails to even mention or much less consider the enormous changes which its opinion will bring about in the prosecution and defense of criminal cases in the State of Idaho.
I see the following issues presented in the instant case. First, is the sixth amendment Confrontation Clause of the Federal Constitution violated when a state, by statute or judicial ruling, permits the testimony of a preliminary hearing witness to be introduced at trial when that witness is not in court or is otherwise “unavailable.” I deem the answer to be possibly yes, but probably no. Secondly, whether Idaho, as a matter of local policy, has or should now permit such introduction of preliminary hearing testimony. Potter and Villarreal clearly answer that question in the negative. The latter part of that question is totally and completely unanswered by the majority opinion, i. e., what local policy considerations in the state of Idaho mandate either overthrowing or upholding the presently existing rule of Potter and Villarreal.
As indicated in State v. Villarreal, supra, the case of California v. Green, supra, is distinguishable from the instant matter. Green involved a witness who was on the stand during the trial and whose testimony was sought to be impeached or refreshed by the utilization of his previous testimony at a preliminary hearing. In Green the court *485particularly noted that the declarant was present and testifying at trial and that the defendant was thereby assured of full and effective cross-examination at the time of trial. That court specifically stated:
“We have no occasion in the present case to map out a theory of the Confrontation Clause that would determine the validity of all such hearsay ‘exceptions’ permitting the introduction of an absent declarant's statements. For where the declarant is not absent, but is present to testify and to submit to cross-examination, our cases, if anything, support the conclusion that the admission of his out of court statements does not create a confrontation problem.” Id. 399 U.S. at 162, 90 S.Ct. at 1937. (Emphasis added.)
Therefore, in Green the court had for consideration an in court testifying declarant and whatever overbroad language was used regarding the statements of an out of court declarant remains, of course, dicta. It should also be noted that in Green Justices Marshall and Blackman did not participate, the Chief Justice and Justice Harlan filed special concurring opinions and Justice Brennan dissented. Therein it is noted that the concurrence of the Chief Justice is secured by his clear understanding that nothing forbids the individual states from applying a different rule.
Likewise, the case of Ohio v. Roberts, supra, is distinguishable from the instant case. There a preliminary hearing witness had disappeared at the time of trial and the state sought to introduce her preliminary hearing testimony under an Ohio statute so permitting the use of preliminary examination testimony. Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2945.49 (1975). Upon conviction the Ohio Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute was a violation of the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution. In turn, the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no such constitutional violation. Hence, Roberts upholds the basic rationale of Green that the states remain free to make their own decisions in this area without violating the Confrontation Clause of the Federal Constitution.
The majority opinion here having determined that permitting the introduction of preliminary hearing testimony is not violative of the Confrontation Clause of the Federal Constitution, then asserts:
“An alternative ground for the court’s ruling in Potter was application of the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution. The court saw use of the preliminary hearing testimony at trial as violative of that constitutional protection.”
Such statement finds no support whatsoever in Potter. The only mention in Potter of the federal constitutional Confrontation Clause is:
“It is true that the framers of our constitution saw fit to omit from that instrument the usual provision which obtains in not only the federal constitution, but in that of most of the states providing that in all criminal prosecutions the defendants shall be confronted with witnesses against him. Doubtless this omission was made advisedly, and the effect was to leave the matter with the legislature.” Id., 6 Idaho, at 588, 57 P. at 432. (Emphasis added.)
The decision in Potter was not based on the Federal Constitutional Confrontation Clause, but as pointed out a scant year later in State v. White, 7 Idaho 150, 61 P. 517 (1900) was based on the lack of permission therefor in the Idaho statutes. Finally, those provisions of the Federal Constitution were not applicable to the states at the time of Potter.
Thus, in its discussions of the Confrontation Clause of the Federal Constitution the majority here has merely set up and demolished a straw man. The question remains unanswered in the majority opinion as to what policy reasons presently exist for either overthrowing or upholding the rule of Potter and Villarreal. Regardless of the majority’s discourse on “depositions,” it is crystal clear that the court in Potter clearly stated that preliminary hearing testimony would not be permitted introduction at trial. The reasons therefor were enunciated and, as quoted in Villarreal:
*486“When we recall as every lawyer who has any extended experience in criminal law practice may do, how very perfunctory these preliminary examinations are, not only on the part of the prosecution, but more frequently, of necessity, on the part of the defendant, the uncharitableness of the rule is apparent. It is always the policy of the prosecution, on preliminary examinations, to only carry its investigations to the extent necessary to secure the holding of the defendant; and it is seldom that the defendant feels warranted in going fully into his defense upon a preliminary examination before a court, where it is only required that it shall be made to appear that the offense named has been committed, ‘and that there is sufficient cause to believe the defendant to have been guilty thereof.’ ” Id., 94 Idaho at 248, 486 P.2d at 259, quoting State v. Potter, supra, 6 Idaho at 589, 57 P. at 432.
The purpose, nature and timing of a preliminary hearing in our system of criminal justice to me dictate the disability of a rule excluding preliminary hearing testimony from the áctual trial proceedings. The only function of a preliminary hearing in Idaho is to determine if a public offense has been committed and if there is probable cause to believe that the crime was committed by the accused. State v. Ruddell, 97 Idaho 436, 546 P.2d 391 (1976); State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249, 486 P.2d 260 (1971); State v. Linn, 93 Idaho 430, 462 P.2d 729 (1969); Freeman v. State, 87 Idaho 170, 392 P.2d 542 (1964); State v. Bilboa, 33 Idaho 128, 190 P. 248 (1920). See also Idaho Criminal Rule 5.1. As stated in State v. Linn, supra, 93 Idaho at 434, 462 P.2d at 733, “[a] preliminary hearing is in no sense a trial and therefore it does not require the same formality and precision observed at a trial.” It is perhaps for that reason that the evidentiary rules are more relaxed in a preliminary hearing. See Idaho Criminal Rule 5.1. Indeed, in Freeman v. State, supra, a preliminary hearing was determined to be not such a critical stage of the criminal procedure that the failure to furnish counsel denied the accused a fundamental constitutional right. It has been stated, “In most * * * criminal prosecutions, the preliminary examination is conducted as a rather perfunctory uncontested proceeding with only one likely denouement — an order holding the defendant for trial.” California v. Green, supra, 399 U.S. at 196, 90 S.Ct. at 1955 (Brennan, J., dissenting), quoting People v. Gibbs, 255 Cal.App.2d 739, 743-44, 63 Cal.Rptr. 471, 475 (1967). The defense has little reason to cross-examine prosecution witnesses since “[ojnly television lawyers customarily demolish the prosecution in the magistrate’s court,” and it is assumed by most to be a tactical error to indulge in extensive cross-examination of prosecution witnesses since such “may easily amount to a grant of gratis discovery to the state.” Id. Until, this point in time a preliminary hearing has been a truncated proceeding conducted in a relatively informal manner at the conclusion of which there can only be a finding of “probable” cause as contrasted with the establishment of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
It is in the area of the timing of a preliminary hearing where I perceive the majority opinion will create the most havoc. Until today it has been deemed advisable by the prosecution, the defense and the courts that an accused be granted a preliminary hearing at a very early point in time. Reflecting the concern of the court is Idaho Criminal Rule 5.1 indicating that if an accused is in custody, a preliminary hearing must be held “in any event not later than fourteen (14) days following the defendant’s request for a preliminary hearing,” and if not in custody then “no later than twenty-one (21) days after the request for a preliminary hearing.” From the standpoint of the prosecution, it is clearly undesirable to, at the preliminary stage, conduct an entire trial, but rather it is better to present only such evidence as will satisfy the probable cause requirement, to thereafter file an information and then prepare for and go to total trial as quickly as possible to be consistent with the accused’s right to a speedy trial. From the defense standpoint, if the prosecution has no case, it will be discovered in *487its failure to sustain its burden of showing probable cause and the accused will be free at an early time.
If an accused must anticipate that upon his ultimate trial he may be faced with the testimony taken at the preliminary hearing, he must be thoroughly prepared at the preliminary hearing. Clearly, all discovery on the part of the defense must be completed prior to the preliminary hearing and presumably all motions to suppress or for a physical or a mental examination and the like should have been made and ruled upon prior to the preliminary hearing. The defense would not be able to, as is presently customary, reserve its cross-examination for the time of trial. In brief, the resultant preliminary hearing procedure would in time and effort be largely duplicative of that spent at a subsequent trial. I doubt that the increased thorough preparation for a preliminary hearing can be conducted within the time constraints of our present rules and policies. The nature and timing of our present procedures do not provide sufficient indicia of reliability. Hence, our procedures must change.
This state has since early days consistently prohibited the introduction of preliminary hearing testimony at trial. In my judgment, such ruling is bottomed on sound policy and practical considerations. The majority opinion does not mention, much less discuss, the practical and policy considerations for the rule of exclusion nor the impact of today’s decision. It merely blindly overrules. The decisions of the United States Supreme Court discussed by the majority hold only that if a state, by statute or judicial ruling, permits preliminary hearing testimony to be introduced at trial, such does not offend the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution. I know of no case, and the majority opinion cites none, holding that if a state prohibits the introduction of preliminary hearing testimony, at trial that it has somehow committed error of constitutional dimension.
I am authorized to say that Justice BISTLINE concurs in this opinion.