Court Opinion

ID: 9429263
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:26:15.555382+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:18.430167
License: Public Domain

Justice Rehnquist,
with whom Justice Powell joins,
dissenting.
In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125 (1976), we held that an exclusion of pregnancy from a disability-benefits *686plan is not discrimination “because of [an] individual’s . . . sex” within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(1), 78 Stat. 255, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(a)(1).1 In our view, therefore, Title VII was not violated by an employer’s disability plan that provided all employees with nonoccupational sickness and accident benefits, but excluded from the plan’s coverage disabilities arising from pregnancy. Under our decision in Gilbert, petitioner’s otherwise inclusive benefits plan that excludes pregnancy benefits for a male employee’s spouse clearly would not violate Title VII. For a different result to obtain, Gilbert would have to be judicially overruled by this Court or Congress would have to legislatively overrule our decision in its entirety by amending Title VII.
Today, the Court purports to find the latter by relying on the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076, 42 U. S. C. §2000e(k) (1976 ed., Supp. V), a statute that plainly speaks only of female employees affected by pregnancy and says nothing about spouses of male employees.2 Congress, of course, was free to legislatively overrule Gilbert in whole or in part, and there is no question but what the Pregnancy Discrimination Act manifests congressional dissatisfaction with the result we reached in Gilbert. But I think the Court reads far more into the Pregnancy Discrimination Act than Congress put there, and that therefore it is the Court, and not Congress, which is now overruling Gilbert.
*687In a case presenting a relatively simple question of statutory construction, the Court pays virtually no attention to the language of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act or the legislative history pertaining to that language. The Act provides in relevant part:
“The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work_” 42 U. S. C. §2000e(k) (1976 ed., Supp. V).
The Court recognizes that this provision is merely definitional and that “[ultimately the question we must decide is whether petitioner has discriminated against its male employees . . . because of their sex within the meaning of § 703(a)(1)” of Title VII. Ante, at 675. Section 703(a)(1) provides in part:
“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin _” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
It is undisputed that in § 703(a)(1) the word “individual” refers to an employee or applicant for employment. As modified by the first clause of the definitional provision of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the proscription in § 703(a)(1) is for discrimination “against any individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . pregnancy, childbirth, or related medi*688cal conditions.” This can only be read as referring to the pregnancy of an employee.
That this result was not inadvertent on the part of Congress is made very evident by the second clause of the Act, language that the Court essentially ignores in its opinion. When Congress in this clause further explained the proscription it was creating by saying that “women affected by pregnancy . . . shall be treated the same ... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work” it could only have been referring to female employees. The Court of Appeals below stands alone in thinking otherwise.3
The Court concedes that this is a correct reading of the second clause. Ante, at 678, n. 14. Then in an apparent effort to escape the impact of this provision, the Court asserts that “[t]he meaning of the first clause is not limited by the specific language in the second clause.” Ibid. I do not disagree. But this conclusion does not help the Court, for as explained above, when the definitional provision of the first clause is inserted in § 703(a)(1), it says the very same thing: the proscription added to Title VII applies only to female employees.
The plain language of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act leaves little room for the Court’s conclusion that the Act was *689intended to extend beyond female employees. The Court concedes that “congressional discussion focused on the needs of female members of the work force rather than spouses of male employees.” Ante, at 679. In fact, the singular focus of discussion on the problems of the pregnant worker is striking.
When introducing the Senate Report on the bill that later became the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, its principal sponsor, Senator Williams, explained:
“Because of the Supreme Court’s decision in the Gilbert case, this legislation is necessary to provide fundamental protection against sex discrimination for our Nation’s 42 million working women. This protection will go a long way toward insuring that American women are permitted to assume their rightful place in our Nation’s economy.
“In addition to providing protection to working women with regard to fringe benefit programs, such as health and disability insurance programs, this legislation will prohibit other employment policies which adversely affect pregnant workers” 124 Cong. Rec. 36817 (1978) (emphasis added).4
*690As indicated by the examples in the margin,5 the Congressional Record is overflowing with similar statements by individual Members of Congress expressing their intention to ensure with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act that working women are not treated differently because of pregnancy. Consistent with these views, all three Committee Reports on the bills that led to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act ex*691pressly state that the Act would require employers to treat pregnant employees the same as “other employees.”6
The Court trys to avoid the impact of this legislative history by saying that it “does not create a ‘negative inference’ limiting the scope of the Act to the specific problem that motivated its enactment.” Ante, at 679. This reasoning might have some force if the legislative history was silent on an arguably related issue. But the legislative history is not silent. The Senate Report provides:
“Questions were raised in the committee’s deliberations regarding how this bill would affect medical coverage for dependents of employees, as opposed to employees themselves. In this context it must be remembered that the basic purpose of this bill is to protect women employees, it does not alter the basic principles of title VII law as regards sex discrimination. . . . [T]he question in regard to dependents’ benefits would be determined on the basis of existing title VII principles. . . . [T]he question of whether an employer who does cover dependents, either with or without additional cost to the employee, may exclude conditions related to pregnancy from that coverage is a different matter. Presumably because plans which provide comprehensive medical coverage for spouses of women employees but not spouses of male employees are rare, we are not aware of any title VII litigation concerning such plans. It is certainly not this committee’s desire to encourage the institution of such plans. If such plans should be instituted in the future, the question would remain whether, under title VII, the affected employees were discriminated against on the *692basis of their sex as regards the extent of coverage for their dependents.” S. Rep. No. 95-331, pp. 5-6 (1977), Leg. Hist., at 42-43 (emphasis added).
This plainly disclaims any intention to deal with the issue presented in this case. Where Congress says that it would not want “to encourage” plans such as petitioner’s, it cannot plausibly be argued that Congress has intended “to prohibit” such plans. Senator Williams was questioned on this point by Senator Hatch during discussions on the floor and his answers are to the same effect.
“MR. HATCH: . . . The phrase ‘women affected by pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions,’. . . appears to be overly broad, and is not limited in terms of employment. It does not even require that the person so affected be pregnant.
“Indeed under the present language of the bill, it is arguable that spouses of male employees are covered by this civil rights amendment. . . .
“Could the sponsors clarify exactly whom that phrase intends to cover?
“MR. WILLIAMS: ... I do not see how one can read into this any pregnancy other than that pregnancy that relates to the employee, and if there is any ambiguity, let it be clear here now that this is very precise. It deals with a woman, a woman who is an employee, an employee in a work situation where all disabilities are covered under a company plan that provides income maintenance in the event of medical disability; that her particular period of disability, when she cannot work because of childbirth or anything related to childbirth is excluded. . . .
“MR. HATCH: So the Senator is satisfied that, though the committee language I brought up, ‘woman *693affected by pregnancy’ seems to be ambiguous, what it means is that this act only applies to the particular woman who is actually pregnant, who is an employee and has become pregnant after her employments
“MR. WILLIAMS: Exactly.” 123 Cong. Rec. 29643-29644 (1977), Leg. Hist., at 80 (emphasis added).7
It seems to me that analysis of this case should end here. Under our decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert petitioner’s exclusion of pregnancy benefits for male employee’s spouses would not offend Title VII. Nothing in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act was intended to reach beyond female employees. Thus, Gilbert controls and requires that we reverse the Court of Appeals. But it is here, at what *694should be the stopping place, that the Court begins. The Court says:
“Although the Pregnancy Discrimination Act has clarified the meaning of certain terms in this section, neither that Act nor the underlying statute contains a definition of the word ‘discriminate.’ In order to decide whether petitioner’s plan discriminates against male employees because of their sex, we must therefore go beyond the bare statutory language. Accordingly, we shall consider whether Congress, by enacting the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, not only overturned the specific holding in General Electric v. Gilbert, supra, but also rejected the test of discrimination employed by the Court in that case. We believe it did.” Ante, at 675-676.
It would seem that the Court has refuted its own argument by recognizing that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act only clarifies the meaning of the phrases “because of sex” and “on the basis of sex,” and says nothing concerning the definition of the word “discriminate.”8 Instead the Court proceeds to try to explain that while Congress said one thing, it did another.
The crux of the Court’s reasoning is that even though the Pregnancy Discrimination Act redefines the phrases “because of sex” and “on the basis of sex” only to include discrimination against female employees affected by pregnancy, Congress also expressed its view that in Gilbert “the Supreme Court. . . erroneously interpreted congressional intent.” Ante, at 679. See also ante, at 684. Somehow the Court then concludes that this renders all of Gilbert obsolete.
In support of its argument, the Court points to a few passages in congressional Reports and several statements by *695various Members of the 95th Congress to the effect that the Court in Gilbert had, when it construed Title VII, misper-ceived the intent of the 88th Congress. Ante, at 679, n. 17. The Court also points out that “[m]any of [the Members of the 95th Congress] expressly agreed with the views of the dissenting Justices.” Ante, at 679. Certainly various Members of Congress said as much. But the fact remains that Congress as a body has not expressed these sweeping views in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.
Under our decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, petitioner’s exclusion of pregnancy benefits for male employees’ spouses would not violate Title VII. Since nothing in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act even arguably reaches beyond female employees affected by pregnancy, Gilbert requires that we reverse the Court of Appeals. Because the Court concludes otherwise, I dissent.

 In Gilbert the Court did leave open the possibility of a violation where there is a showing that “ ‘distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against members of one sex or the other.’” 429 U. S., at 135 (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U. S. 484, 496-497, n. 20 (1974)).

 By referring to “female employees,” I do not intend to imply that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not also apply to “female applicants for employment.” I simply use the former reference as a matter of convenience.

 See EEOC v. Joslyn Mfg. & Supply Co., 706 F. 2d 1469, 1476-1477 (CA7 1983); EEOC v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 680 F. 2d 1243, 1245 (CA9 1982).
The Court of Appeals’ majority, responding to the dissent’s reliance on this language, excused the import of the language by saying: “The statutory reference to ‘ability or inability to work’ denotes disability and does not suggest that the spouse must be an employee of the employer providing the coverage. In fact, the statute says ‘as other persons not so affected’; it does not say ‘as other employees not so affected.’” 667 F. 2d 448, 450-451 (CA4 1982). This conclusion obviously does not comport with a common-sense understanding of the language. The logical explanation for Congress’ reference to “persons” rather than “employees” is that Congress intended that the amendment should also apply to applicants for employment.

 Reprinted in a Committee Print prepared for the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, pp. 200-201 (1979) (hereinafter referred to as Leg. Hist.). In the foreword to the official printing of the Act’s legislative history, Senator Williams further described the purpose of the Act, saying:
“The Act provides an essential protection for working women. The number of women in the labor force has increased dramatically in recent years. Most of these women are working or seeking work because of the economic need to support themselves or their families. It is expected that this trend of increasing participation by women in the workforce will continue in the future and that an increasing proportion of working women will be those who are mothers. It is essential that these women and their children be fully protected against the harmful effects of unjust employment discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.” Id., at III.

 See 123 Cong. Rec. 8145 (1977), Leg. Hist., at 21 (remarks of Sen. Bayh) (bill will “help provide true equality for working women of this Nation”); 128 Cong. Rec. 29385 (1977), Leg. Hist., at 62-63 (remarks of Sen. Williams) (“central purpose of the bill is to require that women workers be treated equally with other employees on the basis of their ability or inability to work”); 124 Cong. Rec. 36818 (1978), Leg. Hist., at 203 (remarks of Sen. Javits) (“bill represents only basic fairness for women employees”); 124 Cong. Rec. 36819 (1978), Leg. Hist., at 204 (remarks of Sen. Stafford) (bill will end “major source of discrimination unjustly afflicting working women in America”); 124 Cong. Rec. 21437 (1978), Leg. Hist., at 172 (remarks of Rep. Green) (bill “will provide rights workingwomen should have had years ago”); 124 Cong. Rec. 21439 (1978), Leg. Hist., at 177 (remarks of Rep. Quie) (bill is “necessary in order for women employees to enjoy equal treatment in fringe benefit programs”); 124 Cong. Rec. 21439 (1978), Leg. Hist., at 178 (remarks of Rep. Akaka) (“bill simply requires that pregnant workers be fairly and equally treated”).
See also 123 Cong. Rec. 7541 (1977), Leg. Hist., at 7 (remarks of Sen. Brooke); 123 Cong. Rec. 7541, 29663 (1977), Leg. Hist., at 8, 134 (remarks of Sen. Mathias); 123 Cong. Rec. 29388 (1977), Leg. Hist., at 71 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy); 123 Cong. Rec. 29661 (1977), Leg. Hist., at 126 (remarks of Sen. Biden); 123 Cong. Rec. 29663 (1977), Leg. Hist., at 132 (remarks of Sen. Cranston); 123 Cong. Rec. 29663 (1977), Leg. Hist., at 132 (remarks of Sen. Culver); 124 Cong. Rec. 21439 (1978), Leg. Hist., at 178 (remarks of Rep. Corrada); 124 Cong. Rec. 21435, 38573 (1978), Leg. Hist., at 168, 207 (remarks of Rep. Hawkins); 124 Cong. Rec. 38574 (1978), Leg. Hist., at 208-209 (remarks of Rep. Sarasin); 124 Cong. Rec. 21440 (1978), Leg. Hist., at 180 (remarks of Rep. Chisholm); 124 Cong. Rec. 21440 (1978), Leg. Hist., at 181 (remarks of Rep. LaFalce); 124 Cong. Rec. 21441 (1978), Leg. Hist., at 182 (remarks of Rep. Collins); 124 Cong. Rec. 21441 (1978), Leg. Hist., at 184 (remarks of Rep. Whalen); 124 Cong. Rec. 21442 (1978), Leg. Hist., at 185 (remarks of Rep. Burke); 124 Cong. Rec. 21442 (1978), Leg. Hist., at 185 (remarks of Rep. Tsongas).

 See Report of the Senate Committee on Human Resources, S. Rep. No. 95-331 (1977), Leg. Hist., at 38-53; Report of the House Committee on Education and Labor, H. R. Rep. No. 95-948 (1978), Leg. Hist., at 147-164; Report of the Committee of Conference, H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1786 (1978), Leg. Hist., at 194-198.

 The Court suggests that in this exchange Senator Williams is explaining only that spouses of male employees will not be put on “income maintenance plans” while pregnant. Ante, at 680, n. 20. This is utterly illogical. Spouses of employees have no income from the relevant employer to be maintained. Senator Williams clearly says that the Act is limited to female employees and as to such employees it will ensure income maintenance where male employees would receive similar disability benefits. Senator Hatch’s final question and Senator Williams’ response could not be clearer. The Act was intended to affect only pregnant workers. This is exactly what the Senate Report said and Senator Williams confirmed that this is exactly what Congress intended.
The only indications arguably contrary to the views reflected in the Senate Report and the exchange between Senators Hatch and Williams are found in two isolated remarks by Senators Bayh and Cranston. 123 Cong. Rec. 29642, 29663 (1977), Leg. Hist., at 75, 131. These statements, however, concern these two Senators’ views concerning Title VII sex discrimination as it existed prior to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Their conclusions are completely at odds with our decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125 (1976), and are not entitled to deference here. We have consistently said: “The views of members of a later Congress, concerning different [unamended] sections of Title VII. .. are entitled to little if any weight. It is the intent of the Congress that enacted [Title VII] in 1964 . . . that controls.” Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 354, n. 39 (1977). See also Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U. S. 397, 411, n. 11 (1979).

 The Court also concedes at one point that the Senate Report on the Pregnancy Discrimination Act “acknowledges that the new definition [in the Act] does not itself resolve the question” presented in this case. Ante, at 680, n. 20.