Court Opinion

ID: 9555904
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-15 17:01:02.126607+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:36:29.935212
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BACKCOUNTRY AGAINST                     No. 21-71426
DUMPS; DONNA TISDALE; JOE E.
TISDALE,

                Petitioners,              OPINION
 v.

FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION; U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

                Respondents.

       On Petition for Review of an Order of the
           Federal Aviation Administration

        Argued and Submitted January 25, 2023
              San Francisco, California

                Filed August 15, 2023

  Before: Ronald M. Gould, Johnnie B. Rawlinson, and
            Daniel A. Bress, Circuit Judges.

              Opinion by Judge Gould;
             Concurrence by Judge Bress
2             BACKCOUNTRY AGAINST DUMPS V. FAA

                          SUMMARY *

              Federal Aviation Administration

    The panel vacated the Federal Aviation Administration’s
(“FAA”) denial of a petition for discretionary review of a
plan to construct 72 wind turbines to generate renewable
energy in Southern California, and remanded to the agency
to consider the merits of the petition.
    Pursuant to FAA regulations, Terra-Gen Development
Company gave the FAA notice of its planned wind turbine
development. The FAA conducted an aeronautical study of
the project and issued a “no hazard” determination, finding
that the turbines did not pose a hazard to air
navigation. Backcountry Against Dumps, a non-profit
organization, and two individuals who live near the
development, petitioned for review of the “no hazard”
determination.
    The panel held that the FAA’s rejection of
Backcountry’s petition for discretionary review, for the sole
reason that Backcountry did not comment on the
aeronautical study of the project, was arbitrary and
capricious. The FAA’s reasonable interpretation of its own
regulations specified that interested parties must receive
personal notice of the comment period, and Backcountry fits
within the plain meaning of an “interested
party.” Therefore, the FAA failed to comply with its own
regulations by not providing Backcountry with personal
notice of the second comment period. In addition,

*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
            BACKCOUNTRY AGAINST DUMPS V. FAA             3

Backcountry was substantially prejudiced by the FAA’s
procedural error.
    Concurring in the judgment, Judge Bress agreed with the
majority opinion that the FAA erred in denying
Backcountry’s petition for discretionary review of the
FAA’s “no hazard” determination, but he would reach that
result through a narrower path because the majority opinion
exceeds what is needed to decide the case.

                       COUNSEL

Stephan C. Volker (argued), Alexis E. Krieg, Stephanie L.
Clarke, and Jamey M.B. Volker, Law Offices of Stephan C.
Volker, Berkeley, California, for Petitioners.
Caroline D. Lopez (argued) and Abby C. Wright, Appellate
Staff Attorneys; Noah J. White, Staff Attorney; Sara
Mikolop, Acting Assistant Chief Counsel for Regulations;
Marc A. Nichols, Chief Counsel; Brian M. Boynton,
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Civil
Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington,
D.C.; for Respondents.
Jennifer Trock, Baker & Mckenzie LLP, Washington, D.C.,
for Amicus Curiae Terra-Gen Development Company LLC.
4               BACKCOUNTRY AGAINST DUMPS V. FAA

                              OPINION

GOULD, Circuit Judge:

    This    case     concerns   the    Federal     Aviation
Administration’s (“FAA”) review of a plan to construct 72
wind turbines to generate renewable energy in Southern
California.    The case has exceptionally high public
importance. On the one hand, the development of renewable
energy, such as wind, is of the utmost importance in our
obligation as a Nation to address climate change and its ill
effects. The transition away from fossil fuels as an energy
source is vital to meeting national and international
benchmarks, which as a world we must achieve in order to
avoid the worst impacts of climate change. 1
    On the other hand, whatever the benefits of more clean
energy from wind turbines harnessing the air rather than
fossil fuels, there can be no doubt that the development must
proceed in a manner that accounts for the safety of aircrafts

1
  “Climate change is a threat to human well-being and planetary health
(very high confidence). There is a rapidly closing window of opportunity
to secure a liveable and sustainable future for all . . . . The choices and
actions implemented in this decade will have impacts now and for
thousands of years (high confidence).” Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, Synthesis Report of the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report
(AR6),       Summary       for     Policy      Makers        25     (2023),
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/. “Rapid and far-reaching transitions
across all sectors and systems are necessary to achieve deep and
sustained emissions reductions and secure a liveable and sustainable
future for all. These system transitions involve a significant upscaling of
a wide portfolio of mitigation and adaptation options.” Id. at 30. Wind
energy is a “feasible adaptation option[] that support[s] infrastructure
resilience, reliable power systems and efficient water use for existing and
new energy generation systems (very high confidence).” Id.
               BACKCOUNTRY AGAINST DUMPS V. FAA                       5

flying near the turbines. Limiting hazards to aircrafts is a
very high priority in the national mind because of the
potential for loss of life and catastrophic accidents.
     Pursuant to FAA regulations, Terra-Gen Development
Company (“Terra-Gen”), amicus curiae in this case, gave the
FAA notice of its planned wind turbine development, and
the FAA requires notice of any structure more than 200 feet
tall. 14 C.F.R. § 77.9(a). Because the wind turbines are over
499 feet tall, the FAA conducted an aeronautical study of the
project and issued a “no hazard” determination, finding that
the turbines do not pose a hazard to air navigation.
Backcountry Against Dumps, a non-profit organization, and
Donna and Joe “Ed” Tisdale, who live near the development,
(collectively “Backcountry”) petitioned the FAA for
discretionary review of its “no hazard” determination.
    The FAA’s regulations provide that members of the
public may petition for discretionary review of a “no hazard”
determination if they are a sponsor, if they commented on a
proposal in aeronautical study, or if they were not given an
opportunity to state their comment. 14 C.F.R. § 77.37. The
FAA rejected Backcountry’s petition on the sole ground that
Backcountry did not comment on the study during the
comment period. Backcountry argues that it was not given
an opportunity to comment because the FAA did not provide
Backcountry with particularized notice of the comment
period, as the FAA’s regulations and internal guidance
document require. 2 Backcountry does not challenge the

2
  In the alternative, Backcountry argues that its comments on a previous
aeronautical study were sufficient to meet the comment requirement of
14 C.F.R. § 77.37. We do not address this argument because we resolve
this case on alternative grounds.
6            BACKCOUNTRY AGAINST DUMPS V. FAA

substance of the FAA’s “no hazard” determination at this
time.
    We agree that the FAA erred in not providing
Backcountry with notice of the comment period, depriving
Backcountry of an opportunity to comment on the proposal.
Backcountry was therefore eligible to petition for
discretionary review of the no hazard determination under
14 C.F.R. § 77.37 as a party who was not given an
opportunity to state its substantial aeronautical comment.
The FAA’s rejection of Backcountry’s petition for
discretionary review, for the sole reason that Backcountry
did not comment on the aeronautical study, was arbitrary and
capricious. We vacate the FAA’s decision and remand to the
agency with instructions that it consider the merits of
Backcountry’s petition for discretionary review.
I. Regulatory Structure
    Under FAA regulations, the FAA must be notified of any
new structure standing over 200 feet above ground level. 14
C.F.R. § 77.9(a). A new structure that stands more than 499
feet above ground level exceeds air navigation standards and
is considered an obstruction to air navigation. 14 C.F.R.
§ 77.17(a)(1). The FAA conducts aeronautical studies on
projects that propose constructing structures that obstruct air
navigation, and, based on the aeronautical study, the FAA
determines whether the proposed object poses a hazard to air
navigation. 14 C.F.R. § 77.15(b); 14 C.F.R. § 77.29(a)
(“The FAA conducts an aeronautical study to determine the
impact of a proposed structure . . . on aeronautical
operations, procedures, and the safety of flight.”). The FAA
issues “hazard” or “no hazard” determinations based on its
findings.
             BACKCOUNTRY AGAINST DUMPS V. FAA                7

    “When the FAA needs additional information” in
conducting its aeronautical study “it may circulate a study to
interested parties for comment.” 14 C.F.R. § 77.25(c).
FAA’s Order JO 7400.2 Procedures for Handling Airspace
Matters (“FAA Order 7400.2” or “FAA Order”) provides
additional direction to the agency when circulating notice for
public comment on aeronautical studies. FAA Order 7400.2.
“Circularizing a public notice allows the FAA to solicit
information that may assist in determining what effect, if
any, the proposed structure would have to the navigable
airspace. The [Obstruction Evaluation Group (“OEG”)]
determines when it is necessary to distribute a public notice,”
pursuant to criteria laid out in the FAA Order. FAA Order
7400.2 6-3-17(a).
    Under the FAA Order 7400.2, the FAA “should”
distribute public notice of the aeronautical study to “those
who can provide information needed to assist in
identifying/evaluating the aeronautical effect of the
structure.” FAA Order 7400.2 6-3-17(c). The FAA Order
7400.2 specifies that “[a]s a minimum,” certain groups
“should be included on distribution lists due to their inherent
aeronautical interests,” including:

       All known aviation interested persons and
       groups such as state, city, and local aviation
       authorities; airport authorities; various
       military organizations within the DoD; and
       other organizations or individuals that
       demonstrate a specific aeronautical interest
       through                subscription           to
       notifications. . . . [and] As appropriate, state
       and local authorities; civic groups;
       organizations; and individuals who do not
8            BACKCOUNTRY AGAINST DUMPS V. FAA

       have an aeronautical interest, but may
       become involved in specific aeronautical
       cases, must be included in the notice
       distribution, and given supplemental notice
       of actions and proceedings on a case-by-case
       basis.

FAA Order 7400.2 6-3-17(c)(2), (6) (emphasis added).
    The FAA issues a “Determination of No Hazard to Air
Navigation . . . when the aeronautical study concludes that
the proposed construction or alteration will exceed an
obstruction standard but would not have a substantial
aeronautical impact to air navigation.” 14 C.F.R. § 77.31(d).
“The FAA will make determinations based on the
aeronautical study findings” and other factors. 14 C.F.R.
§ 77.31(b). The FAA “will advise all known interested
persons” of its “no hazard” determination. 14 C.F.R.
§ 77.31(a).
    A party may petition the FAA for discretionary review
of a “no hazard” determination if the party is “the sponsor,
provided a substantive aeronautical comment on a proposal
in an aeronautical study, or ha[s] a substantive aeronautical
comment on the proposal but w[as] not given an opportunity
to state it.” 14 C.F.R. § 77.37(a). The petition “must include
new information or facts not previously considered or
presented during the aeronautical study, including valid
aeronautical reasons why the determination . . . made by the
FAA should be reviewed.” 14 C.F.R. § 77.39(b). The FAA
regulations specify that the review is “discretionary,” but, if
review is granted, “the FAA will inform the petitioner and
the sponsor (if other than the petitioner) of the issues to be
studied and reviewed. The review may include a request for
             BACKCOUNTRY AGAINST DUMPS V. FAA               9

comments and a review of all records from the initial
aeronautical study.” 14 C.F.R. § 77.41(a).
    Courts have recognized that an FAA hazard/no hazard
determination alone does not have the authority to authorize
proceeding, that is to give a “green light” to proceeding with
the project. Nor does it authorize or compel the stopping of
development of a project. But other permits and practical
hurdles for the construction of the project may hinge on the
hazard/no hazard determination. See Aircraft Owners &
Pilots Ass’n v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 600 F.2d 965, 966–67
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (“Once issued, a hazard/no-hazard
determination has no enforceable legal effect. The FAA is
not empowered to prohibit or limit proposed construction it
deems dangerous to air navigation. Nevertheless, the
[hazard/no hazard] ruling has substantial practical impact.”
(footnote omitted).
II. Procedural History
    On October 21, 2019, the FAA circulated notice of its
aeronautical study of Terra-Gen’s proposed turbines for
public comment. The FAA posted the notice on its website
and circulated notice to some parties. The FAA did not
circulate notice to Backcountry specifically. Backcountry
commented on the project during the first comment period
in January 2020. On July 16, 2020, the FAA issued “no
hazard” determinations for 72 turbines in the proposed
project. On August 17, 2020, Backcountry filed a timely
petition for discretionary review of the “no hazard”
determinations with the FAA. In the August 2020 petition,
Backcountry argued that (1) the project is located in an area
that is used by aircrafts, but the determinations did not
analyze the impact on visual flight rules (“VFR”), (2) the
project would have an adverse impact on low flying aircrafts,
10           BACKCOUNTRY AGAINST DUMPS V. FAA

especially those used for agriculture and firefighting; (3)
four of the turbines would degrade nearby radar function; (4)
the proposed lighting was insufficient; and (5) the FAA did
not consider potential turbulence caused by the turbines.
    The FAA granted the petition for discretionary review as
to some issues raised in the petition, finding that there were
“errors in the aeronautical study process.” First, the OEG
stated that there was “no data available” to indicate that the
wind turbines would impact VFR operations, but on review
the FAA noted that “[t]here is no data in the case file to
support any type of query into VFR flight with the air traffic
facility, through radar analysis, or with outside entities.
Absent any type of documentation to support this finding,
we dispute any claim that there is no data available within or
outside of the FAA concerning VFR flight.” Second, the
FAA noted that the public notice was not properly
distributed to “many of the entities listed” in the in FAA
Order 7400.2, paragraph 6-3-17(c), including “flying clubs,
flight schools, or local aviation organizations.”
    The FAA directed OEG to: Rescind the “no hazard”
determinations; “Initiate a new public notice with
dissemination to all entities listed in FAAO 7400.2,
paragraph 6-3-17(c);” “Restudy the proposal with any new
comments;” “Contact the local air traffic facilities for
feedback concerning VFR flyways and operations in the
vicinity of the proposed wind farm;” and “Ensure that all
coordination and analyses are uploaded into the aeronautical
study files.”
    The FAA opened a second public comment period on
April 7, 2021. The FAA posted the notice of the second
comment period on its website and sent notification to
various parties, along with “postcard mailers and email
             BACKCOUNTRY AGAINST DUMPS V. FAA               11

notifications to those with registered FAA accounts.” The
FAA did not receive any comments. Backcountry did not
create a registered FAA account and it did not receive the
FAA’s email notification of the second comment period, and
it did not otherwise receive notice of the comment period.
Backcountry explained that it only learned about the second
comment period after it had ended. The FAA does not
dispute this.
    On August 31, 2021, the FAA reissued the “no hazard”
determinations for the 72 wind turbines. Backcountry filed
a timely petition for discretionary review on September 30,
2021. See 14 C.F.R. § 77.39(a) (petition must be filed within
30 days of No Hazard Determination). In the petition,
Backcountry argued that the project would “have a
significant adverse effect on aircraft safety and operation, by
forcing aircraft to higher elevations where they will suffer
greater risks of wing- and rotor-blade icing, by producing
turbulence, by degrading radar function, and by impeding
low flying aircraft, among other hazards.” The petition also
argues that the project poses a risk of “fatal aircraft
collisions” with wind turbines “that cannot be eliminated by
FAA-required lighting.”
    The FAA rejected the petition as invalid under 14 C.F.R.
§ 77.37(a) because Backcountry did not comment during the
second public comment period. Backcountry now petitions
this court for review of the FAA’s rejection of
Backcountry’s petition for discretionary review on the
grounds that Backcountry was not given an opportunity to
comment because it was not given required notice of the
revised aeronautical study.
12           BACKCOUNTRY AGAINST DUMPS V. FAA

III. Jurisdiction
   We have jurisdiction to review a final order issued by the
FAA Administrator. 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a). See City of
Rochester v. Bond, 603 F.2d 927, 934–35 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
IV. Standards of Review
    We review the FAA decision under the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”), which directs us to hold unlawful
and set aside agency actions if they are “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law” and “without observance of procedure
required by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (D); Pub. Citizen,
Inc. v. F.A.A., 988 F.2d 186, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding
that the APA applies to review of FAA orders). “[T]he
touchstone of ‘arbitrary and capricious’ review under the
APA is ‘reasoned decisionmaking.’ ‘[T]he agency must
examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory
explanation for its action including a rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made.’” Altera Corp.
& Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 926 F.3d 1061, 1080 (9th Cir.
2019) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 52 (1983)
(internal quotations omitted)).
    Further, “[f]indings of fact by the . . . Administrator of
the Federal Aviation Administration, if supported by
substantial evidence, are conclusive.” 49 U.S.C. § 46110(c);
Aircraft Owners & Pilots Ass’n, 600 F.2d at 972 (applying
the substantial evidence standard to findings by the FAA in
its no hazard determination, where the agency considered
arguments from both sides).
             BACKCOUNTRY AGAINST DUMPS V. FAA               13

V. Discussion
        Backcountry argues that the FAA erred by
dismissing its 2021 petition for discretionary review for
failure to comment because Backcountry was not given an
opportunity to state its “substantive aeronautical comment
on the proposal” because Backcountry did not receive notice
of the second comment period. See 14 C.F.R. § 77.37(a).
We agree.
   A. Duty to notify
    A federal agency, like the FAA, is “obliged to abide by
the regulations it promulgates,” including its own internal
operating procedures. Sameena Inc. v. U.S. Air Force, 147
F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1998); Church of Scientology of
California v. United States, 920 F.2d 1481, 1487 (9th Cir.
1990); United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347
U.S. 260, 267 (1954). This is especially true “[w]here a
prescribed procedure is intended to protect the interests of a
party before the agency.” Sameena Inc., 147 F.3d at 1153
(quoting Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 547 (1959)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)); see also Morton v. Ruiz, 415
U.S. 199, 235 (1974) (“Where the rights of individuals are
affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own
procedures. This is so even where the internal procedures are
possibly more rigorous than otherwise would be required.”).
Stated another way, it is absolutely essential that responsible
federal agencies must follow their own binding procedures.
Cf. United States v. Alameda Gateway Ltd., 213 F.3d 1161,
1168 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that an agency was not bound
by a general policy statements in an agency’s manual);
Farrell v. Dep't Of Interior, 314 F.3d 584, 590 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (“[A]n agency statement . . . binds the agency only if
the agency intended the statement to be binding.”). The
14             BACKCOUNTRY AGAINST DUMPS V. FAA

powers that federal regulatory agencies have to act within
their regulatory spheres of responsibility are necessarily
constrained and corralled by the agency’s own procedures.
    We apply traditional rules of statutory interpretation to
regulations, starting with the plain language of the
regulation. Mountain Communities for Fire Safety v. Elliot,
25 F.4th 667, 676 (9th Cir. 2022); Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct.
2400, 2415–16 (2019) (stating that we “must exhaust all the
‘traditional tools’ of construction” in interpreting a
regulation). If a regulation is genuinely ambiguous, then we
defer to the agency’s reasonable interpretation of its own
regulation. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2414; Auer v. Robbins, 519
U.S. 452, 461 (1997). However, we only defer to
interpretations that are “the agency’s ‘authoritative’ or
‘official position,’ rather than any more ad hoc statement not
reflecting the agency's views.” Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416.
We may look to guidance documents when applying Auer
deference. See Mountain Communities for Fire Safety, 25
F.4th at 676. 3
    Here, the FAA is not required to provide public notice
and solicit comments on all aeronautical studies that it
conducts. However the regulations state that “[w]hen the
FAA needs additional information, it may circulate a[n
aeronautical] study to interested parties for comment.” 14
C.F.R. § 77.25(c). The term “circulate” is ambiguous—it
could mean the agency should generally make the study

3
  The concurrence argues that Auer should not apply here. However,
because the relevant portion of the FAA Order interprets the FAA
regulation, the FAA Order implicates the agency’s “substantive
expertise,” and the FAA Order reflects the agency’s “fair and considered
judgment,” this is exactly the type of case that would call for the
application of Auer deference. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2417.
               BACKCOUNTRY AGAINST DUMPS V. FAA                    15

available to interested parties or alternatively that the agency
must place the study in the hands of interested parties.
Because the term circulate is ambiguous, we look to the
FAA’s interpretation of its own regulatory term in the FAA
Order. 4 See FAA Order 7400.2 6-3-17.
    The FAA Order directs the agency to personally send
notice of the comment period to the interested parties in most
cases. FAA Order 7400.2 6-3-17(d) (requiring the OEG to
“[d]ocument and place in the obstruction evaluation file the
names of each person and/or organizations to which public
notice was sent”). This is a reasonable interpretation of the
term circulate. Thus, the FAA must personally notify
“interested parties” of the comment period if it determines
that it will solicit comments. Circulation of the study via
public notice on the FAA’s website, without any
individualized communication with Backcountry, was not
sufficient to satisfy the FAA’s regulatory obligation. See
FAA Order 7400.2 6-3-17(c) (stating that the OEG “should”
distribute public notices to groups with “inherent
aeronautical interests” such as other governmental agencies
and nearby airports); id. (c)(6) (stating that “individuals who
do not have an aeronautical interest, but may become
involved in specific aeronautical cases, must be included in
the notice distribution” (emphasis added)); Distribute,

4
  Backcountry argues that the FAA Order has the binding effect of law
because, although it was not published in the Federal Register, it was
subject to a 30-day notice and comment period before publication. See
FAA Order 7400.2 1-1-8. The FAA argues that we need not reach this
question because the FAA “substantially complied with any applicable
procedure.” We reject the FAA’s contention that it complied with the
applicable procedure, but we need not address the issue of whether the
FAA Order has the binding effect of law because the Order is the FAA’s
reasonable interpretation of its ambiguous regulation.
16              BACKCOUNTRY AGAINST DUMPS V. FAA

Miriam-Webster,                      https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/distribute (defining distribute as “to
give out or deliver especially to members of a group”).
    The next question is who qualifies as an “interested
party” to whom the FAA must send personal notice of the
comment period on the aeronautical study. The regulations
make it clear that the FAA may not choose to circulate the
study and solicit comment from only some interested parties.
While the outer bounds of the term “interested parties” is not
clear from the statute, in this case Backcountry is squarely
and unambiguously an interested party because it previously
petitioned the FAA for discretionary review in this case. 5
    The FAA argues that “interested parties” is a term of art
defined in the FAA Order. However, even if “interested
parties” were ambiguous in this context, the FAA Order
supports our interpretation that Backcountry is clearly an
interested party. The order defines interested parties as, in
relevant part “state and local authorities; civic groups;
organizations; and individuals who do not have an
aeronautical interest, but may become involved in specific
aeronautical cases.” FAA Order 7400.2 6-3-17(c)(6). The
order goes on to require that these parties “must be included
in the notice distribution.” Id. (emphasis added). The full
text of the pertinent section of the FAA Order is set forth

5
 In fact, the FAA recognized its own mistake in failing to circulate notice
to all interested parties during its first discretionary review. The FAA
directed the OEG to “[i]nitiate a new public notice with dissemination to
all entities listed in FAAO 7400.2, paragraph 6-3-17 3 (c).”
                BACKCOUNTRY AGAINST DUMPS V. FAA                         17

below. 6 Backcountry is such an organization, and under the
FAA Order it must be provided notice.
    The FAA Order also specifies that “as a minimum”
certain groups “should be included on distribution lists due
to their inherent aeronautical interests.” FAA Order 7400.2

6
  FAA Order 7400.2 6-3-17(c) says: “Public notices should be distributed
to those who can provide information needed to assist in
identifying/evaluating the aeronautical effect of the structure. As a
minimum, the following governmental agencies, organizations, and
individuals should be included on distribution lists due to their inherent
aeronautical interests: (1) The sponsor and/or his representative. (2) All
known aviation interested persons and groups such as state, city, and
local aviation authorities; airport authorities; various military
organizations within the DoD; and other organizations or individuals that
demonstrate a specific aeronautical interest through subscription to
notifications. More information about subscribing to notifications
regarding structures that may impact a specific airport or airspace area is
available at https://oeaaa.faa.gov. (3) Airport owners as follows: (a) All
public-use airports within 13 NM of the structure. (b) All private-use
airports within 5 NM of the structure. (4) The specific FAA approach
facility, en route facility (ARTCC), and Flight Service Station (FSS) in
whose airspace the structure is located. (5) An adjacent regional/service
area office if the structure is within 13 NM of the regional state boundary.
(6) As appropriate, state and local authorities; civic groups;
organizations; and individuals who do not have an aeronautical interest,
but may become involved in specific aeronautical cases, must be
included in the notice distribution, and given supplemental notice of
actions and proceedings on a case-by-case basis. Those involved should
clearly understand that the public notice is to solicit aeronautical
comments concerning the physical effect of the structure on the safe and
efficient use of airspace by aircraft. (7) A proposed structure that
penetrates the 40:1 by 35 feet or more, departure slope must be
circularized to the following: (a)Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association;
(b) National Business Aviation Association; (c) Regional Air Line
Association; (d) Department of Defense; (e) Air Transport Association;
(f) Air Line Pilots Association; and (g) Other appropriate persons and
organizations listed in this section.”
18           BACKCOUNTRY AGAINST DUMPS V. FAA

6-3-17(c). The FAA Order itself shows that “must” is used
intentionally.  The FAA Order explicitly states that
“‘[s]hould’ is used when application is recommended,”
while “‘[m]ust’ means an action/procedure is mandatory.”
FAA Order 7400.2 1-2-5.
    Thus, because the FAA’s reasonable interpretation of its
own regulations clearly specified that interested parties must
receive personal notice of a comment period beyond a mere
public website posting, and because Backcountry
unambiguously fits within the plain meaning of an
“interested party,” we hold that the FAA erred by not
providing Backcountry with personal notice of the comment
period.
     B. Prejudice
    The FAA further contends that even if the FAA erred by
not giving Backcountry notice, Backcountry did not show
that it was prejudiced by the procedural deficiencies. The
FAA “‘is entitled to a measure of discretion in administering
its own procedural rules’ where the rules do not confer
important procedural benefits upon individuals and the
complaining party has not shown ‘substantial prejudice.’”
City of Las Vegas, Nev. v. F.A.A., 570 F.3d 1109, 1115 n.3
(9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Am. Farm Lines v. Black Ball
Freight Serv., 397 U.S. 532, 538 (1970)); see also
Steamboaters v. FERC, 759 F.2d 1382, 1390–91 (9th
Cir.1985). The Supreme Court has drawn an important
distinction in such cases between procedural rules that
“confer important procedural benefits upon individuals” and
procedural “rules adopted for the orderly transaction of
business before” the agency. Am. Farm Lines v. Black Ball
Freight Serv., 397 U.S. at 539; see also Montes-Lopez v.
Holder, 694 F.3d 1085, 1093 (9th Cir. 2012).
             BACKCOUNTRY AGAINST DUMPS V. FAA                19

     The prejudice analysis depends on the “types of action
and error at issue.” City of Sausalito v. O'Neill, 386 F.3d
1186, 1220 (9th Cir. 2004). We have long recognized the
importance of procedural rules that allow interested parties
to comment on and engage with administrative processes.
See, e.g., California Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep't of
Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1095 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that
the Department of Energy’s (“DOE”) “failure to consult
[states prior to publishing a report] was not some technical
error, but resulted in a decisionmaking process that was
contrary to that mandated by Congress and one that deprived
DOE of timely substantive information.” Thus, the
procedural error was not harmless and substantially
prejudiced the plaintiffs); Paulsen v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 999,
1007 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a procedural error of
failing to solicit comments before administrative rulemaking
prejudiced the plaintiffs, and was not a harmless error,
because the procedural error precluded the plaintiffs from
participating in the administrative process until after the rule
was promulgated); City of Sausalito v. O'Neill, 386 F.3d
1186, 1220 (9th Cir. 2004) (“In the rulemaking context, we
exercise great caution in applying the harmless error rule,
holding that failure to provide notice and comment is
harmless only where the agency’s mistake clearly had no
bearing on the procedure used or the substance of decision
reached.” (internal citation and quotation omitted));
Riverbend Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 958 F.2d 1479, 1482 (9th
Cir. 1992) (“Procedure, not substance, is what most
distinguishes our government from others.”). See also
Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 547 (6th Cir.
2004) (“A procedural right must generally be understood as
“substantial” in the context of this statement when the
regulation is intended to confer a procedural protection on
20           BACKCOUNTRY AGAINST DUMPS V. FAA

the party invoking it.”). In cases where an agency committed
a procedural error that precluded an interested party from
engaging with an administrative action, we have held that
the determination of prejudice “must focus on the process as
well as the result” to give meaning to statutory and
regulatory procedural requirements. California Wilderness
Coal., 631 F.3d at 1090 (quoting Riverbend Farms, Inc., 958
F.2d at 1487 (internal citation and quotation omitted));
Paulsen, 413 F.3d at 1007. A statutory “notice requirement
reflects the desirability of the interactive process itself.”
California Wilderness Coal., 631 F.3d at 1092. The purpose
of notice and public comment procedures in those cases, as
here, “was directed at process and not merely a final result.”
Id.
    Under this regulatory scheme at issue in this case, the
FAA is not required to change the outcome of its “no hazard”
determination based on the comments it receives. The
purpose of the regulatory comment period is the “interactive
process itself” and not the “final result.” Id. The procedural
error completely deprived Backcountry of the opportunity to
comment on the second “no hazard” determination. Thus,
the FAA’s procedural error substantially prejudiced
Backcountry by depriving it of the opportunity to engage in
this interactive administrative process.
     C. Substantial aeronautical comment
    A party may petition the FAA for discretionary review
of a determination if, in relevant part, the party has “a
substantive aeronautical comment on the proposal but [was]
not given an opportunity to state it.” 14 C.F.R. § 77.37(a)
(emphasis added).      The petition “must include new
information or facts not previously considered or presented
during the aeronautical study.” 14 C.F.R. § 77.39(b).
            BACKCOUNTRY AGAINST DUMPS V. FAA             21

     In this appeal, the FAA contends that all issues
Backcountry raised in connection with the 2021 petition
were previously raised before the FAA in its prior petition,
so that even if Backcountry was not given the opportunity to
comment, it did not meet the requirements of 14 C.F.R.
§ 77.37 because it does not have a substantial aeronautical
comment. However, the FAA did not reject Backcountry’s
petition for review on this basis and the record is not
sufficiently developed for us to determine this issue in the
first instance. Therefore, we remand this case for the FAA
to determine whether Backcountry provided a substantial
aeronautical comment pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 77.37.
VI. Conclusion
    We hold that the FAA failed to comply with its own
regulation by not providing notice of the second comment
period to Backcountry. Because of this procedural error,
Backcountry was not given an opportunity to state its
“substantive aeronautical comment on the proposal.” 14
C.F.R. § 77.37(a). We vacate the FAA’s denial of
discretionary review and remand to the FAA to consider
Backcountry’s petition for discretionary review.
   VACATED AND REMANDED.
22           BACKCOUNTRY AGAINST DUMPS V. FAA

BRESS, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:

    I agree with the majority opinion that the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) erred in denying
Backcountry’s petition for discretionary review of the
FAA’s “No Hazard” determination for a wind farm project
near Campo, California. But I reach this result through a
narrower and straighter path.
                               I
     When a person plans to “construct[] or alter[] a structure
[that] may result in an obstruction of the navigable airspace,
. . . the Secretary of Transportation shall conduct an
aeronautical study to decide the extent of any adverse impact
on the safe and efficient use of the airspace, facilities, or
equipment.” 49 U.S.C. § 44718(b)(1). “On completing the
study, the Secretary of Transportation shall issue a report”
regarding the risks that the planned construction may pose to
the “use of the navigable airspace.” Id. § 44718(b)(2)(A).
    The FAA carries out these aeronautical studies and risk
assessments on behalf of the Secretary. See Paskar v. U.S.
Dep’t of Transp., 714 F.3d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 2013). For
aeronautical studies, if the FAA “needs additional
information, it may circulate a study to interested parties for
comment.” 14 C.F.R. § 77.25(c). For risk determinations,
the FAA “will issue a determination stating whether the
proposed construction . . . would be a hazard to air
navigation, and will advise all known interested persons.”
Id. § 77.31(a). If the FAA concludes that the proposed
structure will not have a “substantial aeronautical impact” on
air navigation, the FAA will issue what is called a
“Determination of No Hazard.” Id. § 77.31(d); see also
Paskar, 714 F.3d at 92; City of Rochester v. Bond, 603 F.2d
             BACKCOUNTRY AGAINST DUMPS V. FAA                23

927, 930 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
    The FAA’s regulations provide that three categories of
persons are eligible to petition the FAA for discretionary
administrative review of a “No Hazard” determination. The
three categories of eligible petitioners are: (1) the sponsor of
the project; (2) those who “provided a substantive
aeronautical comment on a proposal in an aeronautical
study”; or (3) those who “have a substantive aeronautical
comment on the proposal but were not given an opportunity
to state it.” 14 C.F.R. § 77.37(a).
    In this case, the FAA denied Backcountry’s petition for
review solely on the ground that the FAA had published
notice of its aeronautical study and Backcountry had not
commented on it. Backcountry did not fit into the first two
categories of eligible petitioners under 14 C.F.R. § 77.37(a)
because it was not the project sponsor and did not comment
on the operative aeronautical study. But Backcountry
maintains that it fits within the third category of eligible
petitioners because it had a substantive aeronautical
comment and was not given the opportunity to state it. The
reason it lacked this opportunity, Backcountry claims, is that
FAA failed to provide it with required notice of the
aeronautical study.
    Backcountry is right that it lacked an opportunity to
comment on the study. An FAA implementing order, Order
JO 7400.2 Procedures for Handling Airspace Matters,
provides that “[p]ublic notices should be distributed to those
who can provide information needed to assist in evaluating
the aeronautical effect of the structure.” Id. § 6-13-17(c).
The Order goes on to state that “[a]s appropriate,” persons
“who do not have an aeronautical interest, but may become
involved in specific aeronautical cases, must be included in
24          BACKCOUNTRY AGAINST DUMPS V. FAA

the notice distribution.”    Id. § 6-3-17(c)(7) (emphasis
added).
    Backcountry was one of these persons entitled to notice:
it became “involved” in this specific aeronautical case by
commenting on the first aeronautical study for this project
and successfully petitioning for review of the FAA’s first
“No Hazard” determination in 2020. The FAA does not
contend that its compliance with FAA Order 7400.2 § 6-3-
17(c) is merely optional. Indeed, the FAA previously
recalled its first “No Hazard” determination for this same
project precisely because Backcountry pointed out that
FAA’s notice distribution of the first aeronautical study
failed to comply with FAA Order 7400.2 § 6-3-17(c). The
FAA has not explained why it was “appropriate” to leave
Backcountry off the distribution list for the second
aeronautical study at issue here, especially when it was
Backcountry’s efforts that led to the FAA needing to pursue
a second study for this project.
    The FAA now contends that it posted the second
aeronautical study on its public website, and that this was
sufficient notice. This was not a stated basis for the FAA
decision on review. But regardless, this website posting is
not in the record, nor is there evidence that the FAA told
Backcountry how to arrange to receive notice via the
website. On the limited record before us, there is also no
evidence that Backcountry viewed the study on the FAA
website or that Backcountry otherwise knew about it in time
to provide a substantive comment.             Under these
circumstances, because Backcountry was entitled to receive
notice of the second aeronautical study under FAA Order
7400.2 § 6-3-17(c)(7) and did not receive it, Backcountry
was “not given an opportunity to state” its comments on the
study. 14 C.F.R. § 77.37(a). In denying Backcountry’s
             BACKCOUNTRY AGAINST DUMPS V. FAA             25

petition on the sole ground that Backcountry failed to
comment on the second aeronautical study, the FAA
committed legal error.
    The FAA maintains that its non-compliance with its
notice obligations did not prejudice Backcountry and
therefore does not constitute grounds for granting
Backcountry any relief. It is true that “relaxation of a
procedural rule by an agency in a particular case is not
subject to judicial interference in the absence of a showing
of injury or substantial prejudice.” City of Fremont v. FERC,
336 F.3d 910, 917 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Steamboaters v.
FERC, 759 F.2d 1382, 1391 (9th Cir. 1985); Am. Farm Lines
v. Black Ball Freight Serv., 397 U.S. 532, 539 (1970). On
this record, however, I cannot conclude there was a lack of
prejudice. See Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1093 (9th Cir. 2011) (granting
petition for review because “we are left with substantial
doubt as to whether [the agency] would have made the same
findings had it consulted with the affected” parties).
     Other than its factually unsupported website notice
theory, the FAA argues that Backcountry suffered no
prejudice because the FAA has already considered
Backcountry’s same basic arguments in connection with the
first “No Hazard” finding. Effectively, FAA is arguing that
even if Backcountry lacked a prior opportunity to comment
on the second study, Backcountry’s petition could have been
denied under 14 C.F.R. § 77.39(b) because Backcountry did
not raise sufficiently “new information or facts not
previously considered or presented during the aeronautical
study.” The FAA also maintains that Backcountry’s petition
for discretionary review was based on “fundamentally
flawed interpretations” of the scope of FAA’s second study.
26           BACKCOUNTRY AGAINST DUMPS V. FAA

    The agency’s arguments are not enough. The FAA is
asking us to delve into the merits and substance of
Backcountry’s operative petition, which is something the
FAA did not itself do in the discretionary review process.
Even if we could reach the FAA’s desired result in the name
of a prejudice analysis without running afoul of SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947), the record in this case
does not provide a sound basis for doing so. The matters
here are technical and complex, involving aviation safety. I
am unwilling to discredit Backcountry’s substantive
arguments in the absence of any such determination by the
FAA, whose expertise is supposed to be brought to bear here.
That is especially so when the FAA’s decision on
Backcountry’s petition for discretionary review consists of a
non-descript two-line order finding that Backcountry had not
previously commented on the study. The agency cannot be
heard to complain when we are not well-positioned to do the
heavier lifting that it failed to do on its own.
    Backcountry’s petition for review must thus be granted.
The FAA may well be able to deny Backcountry’s
discretionary petition on other grounds. It just cannot do so
on the ground that the FAA was not required to inform
Backcountry about the second aeronautical study.
                              II
    The majority opinion reaches the same result, but in three
areas, the majority’s reasoning exceeds what is needed to
resolve this case.
   First, in concluding that the FAA was required to give
Backcountry notice of the second aeronautical study, the
majority unnecessarily affords the agency Auer deference.
See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). The majority
concludes that FAA regulations are ambiguous on the
             BACKCOUNTRY AGAINST DUMPS V. FAA              27

question of who must receive notice of an aeronautical study
and the means of providing that notice, and it then defers to
FAA Order 7400.2 under Auer. This exercise is unnecessary
because the FAA has not disputed that it is required to
comply with Order 7400.2. The majority’s application of
Auer strikes me as rather casual considering the more recent
guidance we have received from the Supreme Court on this
limited form of agency deference. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139
S. Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019). But in any event, resort to Auer is
unnecessary here.
    Second, the majority opinion appears to hold that
Backcountry demonstrated prejudice merely because it was
deprived of the opportunity to comment on the second
aeronautical study. It is unnecessary to go so far here. We
have repeatedly found violations affecting the right to public
comment to fall short of prejudicial error. See, e.g., Bear
Valley Mut. Water Co. v. Jewell, 790 F.3d 977, 993 (9th Cir.
2015); Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. U.S. EPA, 688 F.3d
989, 993 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam); Idaho Farm Bureau
Fed’n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1995); Cal-
Almond, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 14 F.3d 429, 442 (9th
Cir. 1993); Riverbend Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 958 F.2d
1479, 1488 (9th Cir. 1992); Warm Springs Dam Task Force
v. Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017, 1023 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
Thus, the denial of a petitioner’s right to public comment
may be prejudicial, but is not invariably so, as the majority
appears to suggest.
    We can see this in California Wilderness Coalition, 631
F.3d at 1093, on which the majority relies. There, we
concluded that the Department of Energy’s failure to consult
with affected States was prejudicial because the States
“indicated what evidence and information they would have
provided if given the opportunity[] and have shown how
28           BACKCOUNTRY AGAINST DUMPS V. FAA

their interests were harmed by their exclusion.” Id. at 1093.
We further observed that “petitioners’ objections are not
frivolous, may well have some merit, and thus, we cannot
conclude that [the agency], were it to exercise its discretion
when informed by consultation with the affected States,
would not modify its decisions.” Id. at 1095. Our prejudice
assessment was record-based and did not turn on the mere
fact that the States had not been consulted in the
administrative process.
    The problem with the FAA’s prejudice argument is thus
not one of theory, but of the current state of the record. The
agency never made a finding that Backcountry is merely re-
raising arguments that the FAA has previously rejected, or
that Backcountry’s petition for discretionary review is
substantively flawed. Although the FAA now makes those
arguments, I cannot draw the FAA’s desired conclusions
from the current record. Under our precedents, because “we
are left with substantial doubt,” Cal. Wilderness Coal., 631
F.3d at 1093, about whether the FAA’s decision would have
been the same if not for its failure to provide notice of the
second aeronautical study, we can and should hold that
Backcountry has carried its burden of demonstrating
prejudicial error. The record provides sufficient grounds for
finding prejudice here. It is not necessary to go further.
    Third, and finally, I would be remiss if I did not comment
on the majority’s opening statements about “our obligation
as a Nation to address climate change and its ill effects,” and
the majority’s further instruction about “meeting national
and international benchmarks,” which the majority tells us
“as a world we must achieve.” Today’s decision rules in
favor of a petitioner that wishes to prevent the development
of a source of wind-generated power, notwithstanding the
majority’s imperative that renewable energy be pursued.
             BACKCOUNTRY AGAINST DUMPS V. FAA             29

This result only underscores that the majority’s comments
about climate change have no legal relevance to the technical
procedural arcana that we deal with in this case. And as
statements of pure policy, these comments can only
contribute to the common confusion about the proper and
limited role of the courts. Sincere though the majority’s
views on environmental policy may be, they command no
authority.
   For all of these reasons, I can concur only in the
judgment.