Court Opinion

ID: 9864559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 14:00:37.319425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:11.446055
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                            FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 22-5256                                                    September Term, 2023
                                                               FILED ON: SEPTEMBER 25, 2023
ROBERT M. MILLER,
                       APPELLANT

       v.

MARTIN J. GRUENBERG, CHAIRMAN, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, ET AL.,
                  APPELLEES

                           Appeal from the United States District Court
                                   for the District of Columbia
                                       (No. 1:21-cv-03035)

        Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, GARCIA, Circuit Judge, and RANDOLPH, Senior
Circuit Judge.

                                        JUDGMENT

       The court has accorded the issues full consideration and has determined that they do not
warrant a published opinion. See D.C. CIR. R. 36(d). For the reasons stated below, it is:

       ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the judgment of the district court be affirmed.

                                             *    *   *

        In 2020, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation placed employee Robert Miller on an
indefinite suspension. Miller appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board. In September 2021,
an Administrative Judge issued an initial decision finding that the Agency should have ended the
suspension. Although the Judge ordered the Agency to “retroactively restore” Miller and pay him
“the appropriate amount of back pay with interest,” the Judge’s decision was silent on whether Miller
should be afforded interim relief under Section 7701 of the Civil Service Reform Act during the
pendency of an appeal to the Board. See 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b). The Agency appealed the Judge’s
decision without reinstating or paying Miller.

       While the Board was considering the Agency’s administrative appeal, Miller filed this civil
action. See 5 U.S.C. § 7702(e). He sought a preliminary injunction that would require the agency
to restore his pay and benefits until the Board issued a final order. The district court denied the
motion, and Miller appealed.

        Miller’s motion relied on the Civil Service Reform Act, which provides that a “prevailing”
employee “shall be granted the relief in the [Board’s initial] decision” until “the outcome of any
petition for review,” with two exceptions. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2). He argued that as a prevailing
party, he was entitled to interim relief as a matter of law and that neither statutory exception applied.

       The Agency now agrees. The Board recently issued a precedential opinion holding that §
7701(b)(2) of the Act entitles prevailing employees to interim relief “by default.” Stewart v. Dep’t
of Transp., 2023 M.S.P.B. 18 ¶ 10 (May 16, 2023). In May 2023, the Board also issued a final order
(1) vacating the Administrative Judge’s finding that the Agency should have ended Miller’s
suspension and (2) holding that Miller was entitled to the interim relief described in the initial
decision.

        The Agency has conceded that it owes Miller back pay for the period between the initial and
final decisions. In August 2023, the Agency gave Miller this back pay, plus interest. When an
accepted payment fully satisfies a plaintiff’s claim, the claim is moot. Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, 557 U.S. 153, 163–64 (2016). But at oral argument, Amicus stated that Miller disputes both
the payment amount and the terms of his benefits. So the appeal is not moot.

       But injunctive relief is discretionary. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193
(1978). The Agency has represented that it is working to calculate the correct payment and benefits.
We presume that federal officers will adhere to the law as pronounced by the court. Sanchez-
Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 208 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J.). That law now includes
Miller’s statutory entitlement to back pay, so a preliminary injunction ordering that relief is
unnecessary.

         And, regardless, Miller did not show a probability of success on the merits. His underlying
civil action did not include any claims based on § 7701(b)(2). Miller asked the district court to grant
the preliminary injunction without “relying on any facts relating to the merits of [his] case.” The
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying preliminary-injunctive relief based on a claim
that was not presented in the case.

       In addition to seeking back pay, Miller also requested various forms of nonmonetary relief.
 Any claim to interim reinstatement was mooted by the Board’s final order. See 5 U.S.C. §
7701(b)(2)(A). Miller cannot be retroactively reinstated. And Miller’s other requests fall outside
the scope of interim relief contemplated by the Act.

       To the extent Miller based his nonmonetary claims not on the Act but on the district court’s
general equitable powers, the argument was inadequately developed and therefore forfeited.

          Finally, any challenge to the substance of the Board’s final order is outside the scope of this
appeal.
       The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction.

                                            *    *   *

       This disposition is unpublished. See D.C. CIR. R. 36(d). The Clerk will withhold the
mandate until seven days after any timely petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc is resolved.
See FED. R. APP. P. 41(b); D.C. CIR. R. 41(a)(1).

                                                                     FOR THE COURT:
                                                                     Mark J. Langer, Clerk

                                                             BY:     /s/
                                                                     Daniel J. Reidy
                                                                     Deputy Clerk