Court Opinion

ID: 9652338
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:22:30.610448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:50.419173
License: Public Domain

Murphy, C. J.,

dissenting:

The Court today strikes down as unconstitutional Maryland’s Obscene Matter Act, Maryland Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, §§ 417 (2) and 418, on the ground that these sections violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since the Court finds that the constitutionally offending provisions of § 417 (2) are not severable from the basic proscriptions of § 418, Maryland is left without any law inhibiting the distribution or sale of obscene matter, other than to juveniles.1 Were this result commanded by the Constitution of the United States, or by the Constitution of Maryland, I would, of course, unhesitatingly join the Court’s opinion. Since it is not — indeed since the result reached by the Court is so plainly at odds with what I perceive to be the governing law — I must respectfully dissent.
Section 418 provides that any person who sells or distributes obscene matter is guilty of a misdemeanor; § 417 (2) provides that § 418 does not apply to a salaried employee of an entity “operating a theatre which shows motion pictures,” if the salaried employee has no other financial interest in the theatre. A distinction is thus drawn between employees of bookstores and employees of theatres which show motion pictures.
The Court says that § 417 (2) cannot be read to limit the *610theatre-employee exception to the showing of motion pictures. It, therefore, concludes that a theatre usher who distributes an obscene pamphlet in the course of his employment with the theatre cannot be prosecuted under § 418, while a bookstore employee who distributes the same obscene pamphlet is subject to prosecution under that section.
What is so obviously intended by the legislature, and so easily gleaned from its language, read in a common sense way, is that the § 417 (2) exception for salaried theatre employees is limited to the activities of these employees in the “showing of motion pictures” and not otherwise. The distribution or sale of obscene pamphlets by a theatre employee is an act separate and distinct from the showing of motion pictures; thus, if such an employee distributes an obscene pamphlet in the theatre, whether connected with the showing of the motion picture or not, he would not be performing a function within the ambit of the exception, and would be subject to prosecution under § 418.
The Court states, quite correctly I think, that a legislative classification which involves, as here, neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class, must be sustained unless it is patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. The Court readily acknowledges that statutes are presumed constitutional and that the equal protection clause does not command that different classes of persons be treated identically and equally in every situation. In properly applying the rational basis test in this case, the Court refers to Aero Motors v. Adm’r, M.V.A., 274 Md. 567, 337 A. 2d 685 (1975), where, we recognized the following principles:
1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary.
2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because *611it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.
3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed.
4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.
In my judgment, the distinction between motion picture theatre employees and other employees drawn by § 417 (2) and § 418 rests upon a ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the objective of the legislation. As Chief Judge Gilbert so cogently observed for the Court of Special Appeals in affirming the judgment in this case:
.. in a motion picture theatre there is not ordinarily any necessity for an employee, except the projectionists, to handle the film. In fact, it is highly doubtful that anyone other than the projectionist comes in contact with the film itself, and even his contact is limited. A seller of books and magazines can hardly make a sale without in some manner coming into physical contact with the item sold. Furthermore, while controls may be placed so as to regulate the age of all who enter the theatre to see the film, no such controls are present when obscene material, such as the magazine in the instant case, is once removed from the seller’s premises. Patently, it is unlikely that a film will be transported from the motion picture establishment so as to become available for viewing by juveniles.” 35 Md. App. at 377.
It is, of course, the function of a motion picture theatre to show motion pictures to its patrons, and not to distribute printed matter, while the function of a bookstore is to sell books and magazines. A theatre showing motion pictures may *612regulate who sees what is shown on the screen; the viewer has no means to disseminate the film beyond the confines of the theatre. In contrast, once printed matter is removed from a bookseller’s premises, it and its corrupting influence may be distributed and redistributed without limit to anyone, including juveniles. Under § 417 (3), a person who “transfers] possession” of obscene matter is a distributor subject to prosecution under § 418, as is a person who sells or “prepares, publishes, prints [or] exhibits” such matter. The legislature could properly take into account the remote nature of the contact of the exempted theatre employees with the actual showing of an obscene film, and rationally conclude that the limited reach of the film did not justify seeking to prevent its exhibition by punishing employees having no direct responsibility for its showing. As we noted in Matter of Trader, 272 Md. 364, 399, 325 A. 2d 398 (1974), the problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations — illogical and unscientific though they may be. That we may think that a legislative classification is unwise, does not justify our striking it down, so long as it is constitutional.
Just this year, the Supreme Court, in Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U. S. 471, 97 S. Ct. 1898, 52 L.Ed.2d 513 (1977), reaffirmed the validity of the rational basis test in equal protection cases. It emphasized that classification in legislation pursuant to the state’s police power is a peculiarly legislative task; it said:
“The decision of the weight to be given the various effects of the statute, however, is a legislative decision, and appellee’s position is contrary to the principle that ‘the Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal courts no power to impose upon the States their views of what constitutes wise economic or social policy.’ Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 486, [90 S. Ct. 1153, 1162, 25 L.Ed.2d 491] (1970)
“... ‘If the classification has some “reasonable basis,” it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification “is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results *613in some inequality.” Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78, 31 S. Ct. 337, 55 L.Ed. 369.’ Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. at 485, 90 S. Ct. at 1161....” 97 S. Ct. 1909-1910.
Surely, the statutes here meet the test of whether any state of facts can reasonably be conceived that would sustain them. Of course, the mere ability to find fault with a law demonstrates neither its invalidity nor its unconstitutionality. Matter of Trader, 272 Md. at 391-392.
The presumption of a statute’s constitutionality can be overcome only by an explicit demonstration by the one attacking it that the classification drawn is invidiously discriminatory. In Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U. S. 356, 364-365, 93 S. Ct. 1001, 35 L.Ed.2d 351 (1973), the Supreme Court said:
“ ‘A state legislature, in the enactment of laws, has the widest possible latitude within the limits of the Constitution. In the nature of the case it cannot record a complete catalogue of the considerations which move its members to enact laws. In the absence of such a record courts cannot assume that its action is capricious, or that, with its informed acquaintance with local conditions to which the legislation is to be applied, it was not aware of facts which afford reasonable basis for its action. Only by faithful adherence to this guiding principle of judicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the legislative branch its rightful independence and its ability to function.’ ”
See also Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83, 60 S. Ct. 406, 84 L. Ed. 590 (1940); Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U. S. 495, 57 S. Ct. 868, 81 L. Ed. 1245 (1937). Consistent with this authority, I would conclude that the difference in treatment between motion picture theatre employees and other employees is not so irrational as to be invidiously discriminatory on its face.
Assuming, arguendo, that the § 417 (2) exception violates *614the equal protection clause, the Court’s holding that that provision is not severable from the body of the Obscene Matter Act, and that the entire act, including § 418, must fall, plainly thwarts the legislative intention. The fundamental test of severability is the effectiveness of the statute to carry out the original legislative intent without the invalid provisions. State v. Schuller, 280 Md. 305, 372 A. 2d 1076 (1977); Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor, 276 Md. 36, 343 A. 2d 521 (1975). In view of the Maryland General Assembly’s long and consistent history of enacting penal statutes prohibiting the sale and distribution of obscene matter, it is inconceivable to me that it would not want § 418 to retáin its vitality, even if § 417 (2) was found to be unconstitutional.
In any event, since I think the sections in question fully comport with equal protection principles, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
Judge Levine has authorized me to state that he concurs with the views expressed herein.

. See Maryland Code, Art. 27, §§ 416A-416G, inclusive.