Court Opinion

ID: 9577038
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:31:05.35747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:52.107606
License: Public Domain

Hunstein, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to the majority’s opinion. The state court acted in uncontroverted compliance with Uniform State Court Rule 33.11 in the proceedings surrounding the entry of King’s guilty plea. Thus, this is not an instance where there is only a “silent record” from which waiver is being presumed so as to render it constitutionally infirm under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238 (89 SC 1709, 23 LE2d 274) (1969). Rather, the record of King’s guilty plea followed the procedure which was promulgated by the Council of State Court Judges and approved by this Court in 1985. The majority, relying solely on comments made during ABA proceedings in 1968, asserts that the procedure we approved in Rule 33.11 was actually only a temporary measure and that the Rule must be corrected instanter by an exercise of our inherent power. I disagree with the majority that the history of Rule 33.11 in Georgia reflects that its implementation was solely for temporary purposes: there is no indication that the ABA’s concerns about the standard of recording facilities available in 1968 played any role in our approval in 1985 of different recording requirements between the superior and state courts regarding guilty plea proceedings. Indeed, the “temporary” nature of the rule is irrelevant since there is no question that the state court recording requirement in Rule 33.11 complies as completely with the constitutional standards for the entry of guilty pleas now as it did in 1985 when this Court approved it.
Furthermore, I disagree with the majority that this Court should exercise its inherent power to establish a new rule imposing unanticipated recording requirements on our state courts. The majority has failed to demonstrate any urgency behind changing a rule which has operated within constitutional parameters for over a decade and continues to so operate now. The majority has likewise failed to justify abrogating the established procedure for review and amendment of state court rules. Uniform Superior Court Rule 1.6, which is applicable to state courts, provides that the Council of State Court Judges shall have a permanent committee to recommend to this Court “such changes and additions to [the uniform state court] rules as may from time to time appear necessary or desirable.” This rule also provides for notice to the State Bar of Georgia and the Uniform Rules committee chairpersons of the other classes of courts to receive notice of the proposed changes and be given the opportunity to comment. Rule 1.6 clearly represents the appropriate procedure to be followed in this case and adherence to this rule can only benefit this Court in its con*374sideration of the recording requirements which should be utilized in state court guilty plea proceedings. In light of the magnitude of the change necessitated by the rule the majority would institute, there is every reason for this Court to avoid intemperate haste and instead to utilize established procedure which will allow a deliberate and considered review of the issue and informative comment by the parties most closely associated with the matter.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hines joins in this dissent.