Court Opinion

ID: 9554015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:39:25.387815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:32:48.305804
License: Public Domain

WEISBERG, Judge,
Dissenting.
¶ 14 Although I agree with the majority’s substantive analysis, I respectfully dissent because I conclude that this ease does not warrant special action jurisdiction.
¶ 15 To begin, the denial of a typical motion to suppress cannot merit the exercise of special action jurisdiction. If that were so, this court would be opening floodgates of petitions beyond its capacity.
¶ 16 What, then, makes this petition special? The majority concludes that Defendant would otherwise be forced to trial without having the opportunity to assert his Fourth Amendment rights or have to refile his motion to suppress and assume a burden properly belonging to the State. While that may be so, it does not explain why any error cannot be corrected on appeal, which makes special action relief unavailable. See R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a); see also State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Crt., 129 Ariz. 156, 159, 629 P.2d 992, 995 (1981); State ex rel. Hyder v. Superior Crt., 114 Ariz. 337, 339, 560 P.2d 1244, 1246 (1977).
¶ 17 The majority has added that the issue presented here is of law, of first impression, of constitutional magnitude, and of statewide importance. I can agree, however, only to the first because Defendant has provided nothing on this record to conclude otherwise.
¶ 18 This record depicts only one trial judge who has made one wrong decision. Although Defendant has asserted that the State has applied “similar tactics” in other cases, he has failed to support his claim. Nonetheless, based on Defendant’s unsupported assertion, the majority has accepted special action jurisdiction.
¶ 19 To accept jurisdiction in such a case-specific matter is inappropriate because it encourages Defendants to treat special action proceedings as the means of resolving disputes over any motion to suppress. For this reason, I would decline jurisdiction.