Court Opinion

ID: 9673107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:06:17.709973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:20.241441
License: Public Domain

SHARPE, Justice
(concurring).
I concur in affirmance of the judgment.
The majority opinion does not mention several cases cited by the parties in connection with appellants’ points one through six relating to the argument made by counsel for appellees concerning damages for pain, suffering and mental anguish on a “unit-of-time” basis. In my view, some of these cases merit consideration, discussion and analysis.
In support of their position that such argument constitutes reversible error, appellants rely in part upon the cases of West Texas Utilities Co. v. Renner, 53 S.W.2d 451 (Tex.Comm.App., 1932, holdings approved); Johnson v. Colglazier (5th Cir., 1965) 348 F.2d 420; and Baron Tube Company v. The Transportation Insurance Company (5th Cir., 1966) 365 F.2d 858. Appellees also rely in part on Baron.
The principal difficulty here with reference to the “unit-of-time” argument is caused by one of the holdings in West Texas Utilities Co. v. Renner, supra, as follows:
“Equally objectionable was the following argument, properly but futilely objected to: ‘If you pay me $3.00 a day to walk over town with my leg tied up like this (indicating) ; $3.00 a day like that (indicating) in twenty years’ time, it would be $25,000.00 at $3.00 per day.” 53 S.W.2d 456.
Texas cases on the “unit-of-time” argument are discussed (along with others, including Johnson v. Colglazier) in the notes appearing in 20 Southwestern Law Journal 208 (1966) and 44 Texas Law Review 195 (1965). Baron Tube Co. v. Transport Ins. Co. is the subject of a note in 20 Southwestern Law Journal 934 (1966).
In 20 Southwestern Law Journal 208, 211 (1966), Note, “The Unit-of-Time Argument —Inherently Prejudicial?” the following (with footnotes shown in parenthesis) appears :
“Texas is a jurisdiction difficult to categorize. In 1932 the Texas Commission of Appeals held in Renner v. West Texas Utilities (14: West Texas Util. v. Renner, 53 S.W.2d 451, Tex.Comm.App. 1932) that it was improper for plaintiff’s attorney to argue that if the jury awarded three dollars per day for twenty years to one who had lost the use of a leg as that plaintiff had, the amount so paid would be $25,000. The opinion was adopted by the Texas Supreme Court. (15: Id. at 457). A later Texas court of civil appeals case (16: Warren Petroleum Co. v. Pyeatt, 275 S.W.2d 216, Tex.Civ.App. 1955, error ref. n. r. e. held that it was improper for plaintiff’s attorney to display to the jury a blackboard which depicted, among other things, the lump-sum figure requested, and to argue therefrom damages for pain and suffering. However, in the more recent Texas court of civil appeals cases, (17: Simmons Motor Co. v. Mosley, 379 S.W.2d 711, Tex.Civ.App. 1964, error ref. n. r. e.; Mid-Tex Dev. Co. v. McJunkin, 369 S.W.2d 788, Tex.Civ.App. 1963; Hernandez v. Baucum, 344 S.W.2d 498, Tex. *396Civ.App. 1961, error ref. n. r. e.; Chemical Express v. Cole, 342 S.W.2d 773, Tex.Civ.App. 1961, error ref. n. r. e.; Texas & N. O. R. R. v. Flowers, 336 S.W.2d 907, Tex.Civ.App. 1960; Continental Bus System, Inc. v. Toombs, 325 S.W.2d 153, Tex.Civ.App. 1959, error ref. n. r. e.; Texas Employer’s Ins. Ass’n v. Cruz, 280 S.W.2d 388, Tex.Civ.App. 1953, error ref. n. r. e.; J. D. Wright & Son Truck Line v. Chandler, 231 S.W.2d 786, Tex.Civ.App. 1950, error ref. n. r. e.) where the issue of the propriety of the unit of time argument in calculating damages for pain and suffering was met squarely, the courts consistently have held, without mentioning Renner, that the argument is proper with or without the aid of blackboards, placards, or charts. (18: See Texas Employer’s Ins. Ass’n v. Cruz, 280 S.W.2d 388, Tex.Civ.App. 1955, error ref. n. r. e. and cases cited therein). The prevailing rationale of these cases is that the attorney is entitled to discuss freely or comment on such facts as are in evidence and drawn from the facts and circumstances any inferences and deductions that are reasonable, fair, and drawn in good faith. Since there must be some evidence in the record that pain was actually suffered, and since pain is suffered month-by-month and year-by-year, it is a fair argument to treat pain the way it was endured. (19: Hernandez v. Baucum, 344 S.W.2d 498, 500, Tex.Civ.App. 1961, error ref. n. r. e.). However because the intermediate appellate courts neither have distinguished nor considered Renner controlling, and, because the Supreme Court has consistently ⅛. r. e.’d’ cases involving the question, (20: See cases cited in note 17 supra. It is possible that the writ history of these cases indicates a sub-silentio repudiation of the language of West Texas Util. v. Renner, 53 S.W.2d 451, Tex.Comm.App.1932). Texas’ position remains uncertain.”
In 44 Texas Law Review 195, 196 (1965), Note, “DAMAGES — Use of Unit-of-Time Formula as Basis of Recovery for Pain and Suffering Constitutes Reversible Error. Johnson v. Colglazier, 348 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1965).”, the following (with footnotes again shown in parenthesis) appears:
“The earliest Texas appellate decision passing on the permissibility of a unit-of-time argument was J. D. Wright & Son Truck Line v. Chandler (6: 231 S.W.2d 786, Tex.Civ.App.-Galveston 1950, writ ref’d n. r. e.). There, the court sanctioned the use of the argument, reasoning that since a statement by the plaintiff’s attorney of how much he thought plaintiff ought to recover was proper, a per diem amount suggested for pain and suffering should likewise be proper. Although not adhering to the same reasoning, Texas appellate courts dealing with this issue have unanimously followed Chandler and haye allowed the use of unit-of-time-arguments. (7: Mid-Tex Dev. Co. v. McJunkin, 369 S.W.2d 788, Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1963, no writ, semble; Hernandez v. Baucum, 344 S.W.2d 498, Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1961, writ ref’d n. r. e.; Chemical Express v. Cole, 342 S.W.2d 773, Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1961, writ ref’d n. r. e.; Texas & N. O. R. R. v. Flowers, 336 S.W.2d 907, Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1960, writ ref’d n. r. e.; Louisiana & Ark. Ry. v. Mullins, 326 S.W.2d 263, Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1959, writ ref’d n. r. e., cert. denied, 361 U.S. 966, 80 S.Ct. 596, 4 L.Ed.2d 542, 1960; Continental Bus Sys., Inc. v. Toombs, 325 S.W.2d 153, Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1959, writ ref’d n. r. e.; cf Kimbell v. Noel, 228 S.W.2d 980, Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1950, writ ref’d n. r. e. But see McDowell, Operation Bootstrap, 5 For the Defense 41, 1964. An earlier Texas case, West Tex. Util. Co. v. Renner, 53 S.W.2d 451, Tex.Comm’n App. 1932, holding approved, has been cited as disapproving use of a per diem argument. The court there found objectionable numerous statements of counsel but condemnation was addressed not to the unit-of-time aspect of the argument but to the abuse of using this vehicle in so burlesque a man*397ner). Although the Texas Supreme Court has not ruled on the precise question presented in the principal case, the permissibility of a per diem suggestion for calculating damages for pain and suffering is well entrenched in Texas trial procedure. (8: See cases cited supra note 7; State Bar of Texas, Personal Injury Litigation in Texas §§ 9.2(3), 11.160, 1960).”
In Johnson v. Colglazier, 348 F.2d 420 (1965) the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a diversity case originally filed in the U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, by a divided court held that the “unit-of-time” argument was impermissible and the failure of the trial judge to instruct the jury to disregard it was reversible error. The majority opinion was authored by Judge Hutcheson, joined in by Judge Friendly of the Second Circuit sitting by designation. Judge John R. Brown dissented in an extensive opinion. In Johnson the majority opinion cited Renner along with other cases in footnote 2, 348 F.2d 422. Judge Brown’s dissenting opinion cited Renner along with other cases in footnote 7, 348 F.2d 428, as follows:
“Texas: Cf. West Texas Utilities Co. v. Renner, Tex.Com.App., 1932, 53 S.W.2d 451. Some assert this is contrary to Texas Court of Civil Appeals approach, decisions in note 8, infra.”
Thereafter, on August 3, 1966 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit sitting En Banc decided the case of Baron Tube Co. v. Transport Insurance Co., 365 F.2d 858. This was a diversity suit originally filed in the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. Circuit Judge Griffen B. Bell authored the opinion for a unanimous court. The Court pointed out that the propriety of the “unit-of-time” argument as there involved was a federal question — a matter of federal trial procedure. Johnson v. Colglazier was both distinguished and overruled to the extent that it was contrary to Baron. The Court in effect adopted the dissent of Judge Brown in Johnson. See 20 Southwestern Law Journal 934 (1966).
In Baron the Court held in part as follows:
“The unit of time type of argument is not proscribed by federal statute or by the federal rules. Thus, Johnson v. Colglazier is a judicial application of principles pertaining to jury trials and argument as those principles are followed in trial courts generally. The specific principles involved are that the argument shall not ask the jurors to place themselves in the position of a party, sometimes called the ‘Golden Rule’ argument;the argument shall not appeal to passion or prejudice; and the argument should be based only upon the evidence or the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.
“The propriety of the unit of time argument has been considered by many courts with these principles as a frame of reference. Some federal courts have countenanced this form of forensic argument, as have many state courts. There are state and federal decisions to the contrary. The subj ect has been much discussed, and Johnson v. Colglazier has been criticized. And it is to be noted, Footnote (2), that such arguments are permitted in the courts of each state within the territory of this court. Georgia, by statute, allows such arguments. Georgia Code Annot. § 81-1015.”
⅜ ⅜ ⅜ iji ⅜ ⅝
“In essence, the unit of time argument is nothing more than an effort to persuade the jury to evaluate a long period of pain and suffering in terms of its smaller time equivalents. Thus, the idea or worth of one year of pain may not be as understandable, real or persuasive to a juror as its equivalent, three hundred and sixty five days of pain and suffering. Whether the unit be cast in years or months, or weeks or days is a mere matter of degree, and there is little logic in prohibiting the *398discussion of large units of time in terms of their smaller mathematical equivalents. It is merely a different way of talking about precisely the same thing and it would he unusual, short of a showing that a defendant would be deprived a fair trial, for the use of the argument to be denied altogether. This is not to say that it is not a powerful form of advocacy, but it is to say that with proper safeguards, as here, it is permissible advocacy. To the extent that Johnson v. Colglazier indicates to the contrary, it is overruled.”
The ultimate holding of the Court in Baron was that “a unit of time type of argument is not improper where accompanied by a suitable cautionary instruction.” The Court discussed the safeguards which may be utilized in connection with such argument and the use of charts, including an instruction to the effect that “the unit of time argument is merely a method of presenting contentions, and is not to be considered as evidence.” The footnotes in Baron collect many cases from various jurisdictions concerning the “unit-of-time” argument and refer to numerous Law Review articles on the subject. The Texas Courts of Civil Appeals decisions on the subject are noted in footnote 2. Renner is not mentioned. The criticism of Johnson in 44 Texas Law Review, p. 196, is noted in footnote 5.
Both Baron and Johnson hold that the question presented is one of federal trial procedure. However, the comment concerning Johnson in 20 Southwestern Law Journal, 214, footnote 33, that “Because the Court held that federal law was controlling, the decision should not be considered speculation by the Fifth Circuit as to whether the Texas Supreme Court considers its adoption of West Texas Utility Co. v. Renner, 53 S.W.2d 451 (Tex.Comm.App. 1932) to be controlling in that jurisdiction” appears to be properly applicable also to the decision in Baron.
Analysis of the opinion in West Texas Utilities Co. v. Renner, 53 S.W.2d 451 (Tex.Comm.App. 1932, holdings approved) reflects the following. Renner’s damages for personal injuries were fixed by a jury at $22,500.00. Of this amount $7,350.50 was apportioned by the trial court judgment to intervenor Texas Employers’ Insurance Association for workmen’s compensation payments, leaving $15,149.50 net to Renner. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Commission of Appeals reversed and remanded because of improper jury argument by Renner’s counsel. The court considered three separate phases of the argument. The first argument discussed by the court was one which informed the jury that the recovery for Renner should be over and above the amount paid by the insurer. Objection made on the ground that it was a question of law as to how the verdict would be divided, and not a question of fact, was overruled. The Commission of Appeals held that the argument was improper and in effect advised the jury as to the legal effect of its answer to the damage issue; and that the objection to the argument should have been sustained. The second argument considered by the court was also held to be clearly improper. It was as follows:
“Another portion of the argument, complained of is as follows: ‘You know, twenty years from now, twenty-seven years from now, it will be, ‘tap, tap, tap,’ walking down the pavement. ‘Tap, tap,’ rain, snow, good weather, cold weather, hot weather, ‘tap, tap.’ He will just be hopping along on that peg, doing the best he can, while these officials of this company will be in their homes taking things easy, having forgotten about old Renner that they burned up out there in Upton County,’ which was unsuccessfully objected to as prejudicial, inflammatory, and out of the record.”
The third argument of Renner’s counsel, together with the holding of the court, was that set out hereinabove and repeated here for convenience, as follows:
“Equally objectionable was the following argument, properly but futilely objected *399to: ‘If yon pay me $3.00 a day to walk over town with my leg tied up like this (indicating) ; $3.00 a day like that (indicating) in twenty years’ time, it would be $25,000.00 at $3.00 per day.”
It is apparent that the opinion in Renner lacks detail and preciseness with reference to the last-mentioned argument. The Court does not state the grounds on which objection was made nor the reasons for its holding as to such argument. It may well be that the comment concerning Renner in 44 Texas Law Review 196, note 7, that “The Court there found objectionable numerous statements of counsel but condemnation was addressed not to the unit of time aspect of the argument but to the abuse of this vehicle in so burlesque a manner” is well founded. The opinion in Renner does not discuss the propriety of the “unit-of-time” argument as such. It should further be noted that at the time Renner was decided the former rule prevailed that,
“ * * * where improper argument has been indulged in, the adverse complaining party is entitled to reversal of the judgment, as a matter of law, if under all the circumstances there is any reasonable doubt of its harmful effect, or unless it affirmatively appears no prejudice resulted. * * * ” 53 S.W.2d 455.
This rule has long since been superseded. Under current practice reversal will not result “ * * * unless the appellate court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of amounted to such a denial of the rights of the appellant as was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment in the case, or was such as probably prevented the appellant from making a proper presentation of the case to the appellate court; * * * ” Rule 434 T.R.C.P. In this situation I believe that the holding of Renner concerning the third argument made therein should be considered as one strictly in the context of that case and particularly in connection with the two other clearly improper arguments there upon which reversal could have been predicated. If the Court had intended to condemn the “unit-of-time” argument as inherently improper and prejudicial, I believe it would have spelled out such important holding and not have left it to conjecture.
In the thirty-six years since the decision in Renner, the decision has not been cited on the “unit-of-time” phase of the case by any Texas Court. The rule stated in the majority opinion in Johnson, for which Renner is cited as authority (348 F.2d 422, footnote 2) along with Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713, 60 A.L.R.2d 1331 (1957) and other cases, as I view it, has been repudiated by the En Banc decision of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Baron. The Texas Courts of Civil Appeals decisions upholding the “unit-of-time” argument, hereinabove mentioned, were decided long after Renner and before the decisions in Johnson and Baron. The Supreme Court of Texas has consistently refused applications for writs of error in such cases with the notation “No Reversible Error.”
In line with the foregoing discussion it is my view that Renner is not authoritative in support of appellants’ contention that reversible error is presented here by appel-lees’ “unit-of-time” argument. I agree that appellants’ points one through six should be overruled.
I also agree that reversible error is not presented by appellants’ points seven through twenty and that they are properly overruled.
For the above-stated reasons I have voted to affirm the judgment.