Court Opinion

ID: 9953744
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 19:02:47.20426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:30.778236
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/22/24 P. v. Wilson CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                                          D081652

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. SCD222818)

JAMAR EDWARD WILSON,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Kimberlee A. Lagotta, Judge. Affirmed.
         John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa
Mandel and Elana Miller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                                               INTRODUCTION
         Jamar Edward Wilson was serving a 22-year prison term for his
convictions on two counts of voluntary manslaughter pursuant to his
negotiated guilty plea. In 2023, the trial court vacated the convictions

pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1172.6 and redesignated them as two
convictions for assault with a semiautomatic firearm. It then resentenced
him to 11 years, selecting the upper term on one of the new convictions.
      Wilson contends the trial court erred and violated section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2), by imposing the upper term without ordering a jury trial
on the aggravating facts. We affirm. Section 1170, subdivision (b)(2),
permits courts to rely on aggravating facts to which the defendant stipulated,
a condition that was satisfied here because Wilson admitted in his plea
agreement the aggravating facts the court used to impose the upper term.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      In April 2010, Wilson was charged in an information with two counts of
murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), with allegations he committed the crimes for the
benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), he personally used a
firearm causing great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), and he
was a principal, and a principal personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm causing great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)).
      In July 2010, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement that included

Harvey2 and Blakely3 waivers, Wilson pled guilty to two counts of voluntary
manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) and admitted the truth of the gang
enhancement allegations (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), in exchange for a total
sentence of between 17 and 32 years and dismissal of the remaining charges.

1     Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2     People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754.

3     Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296.

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With the assistance of counsel, Wilson executed a written plea form in which
he stipulated to the following factual basis for his guilty plea and admissions:
“Aided and abet[t]ed for the benefit, at the direction of or in association with
a criminal street gang the intentional killing of two people without malice or
premeditation and did not personally cause said deaths[.] Stipulate prelim
transcript.” The trial court also confirmed on the plea form that it had
questioned Wilson and his counsel, had accepted Wilson’s plea, and had
found there was “a factual basis for same.” Wilson’s counsel as well as the
prosecutor likewise signed the plea form to indicate they concurred in
Wilson’s plea.
      At the sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Wilson to an aggregate
sentence of 22 years in state prison, consisting of two six-year terms (one for
each voluntary manslaughter conviction) plus one 10-year term for the gang
enhancement allegation attached to count 1, and dismissed the balance of the

charges.4
      In 2018, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017‒2018 Reg.
Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), which amended the felony-murder rule to narrow
the scope of murder liability for participants in a felony who were not the
actual killer, and eliminated the natural and probable consequences theory of
liability as a basis for a murder conviction. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2; see
§§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e).) Senate Bill 1437 also added a statute
that set forth a procedure for qualifying defendants to petition the sentencing
court to have his or her murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced.
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4; former § 1170.95.) This statute was later amended

4     The trial court struck the gang enhancement allegation attached to
count 2 “because both deaths were under one transaction and all under the
gang culture.”

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to “[c]larif[y] that persons who were convicted of attempted murder or
manslaughter under a theory of felony murder and the natural [and]
probable consequences doctrine are permitted the same relief as those
persons convicted of murder under the same theories.” (People v. Porter
(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 644, 651–652; see Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1.)
      In April 2022, Wilson filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to
former section 1170.95, later renumbered as section 1172.6 (Stats. 2022,

ch. 58, § 10),5 challenging the validity of his voluntary manslaughter
convictions. The trial court appointed counsel and, after the parties
stipulated there was a prima facie case for relief, set the matter for an
evidentiary hearing.
      In subsequent briefing, the prosecution stated it was electing to waive
its right to an evidentiary hearing in favor of asking the court to vacate
Wilson’s voluntary manslaughter convictions and redesignate them as two
convictions for assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)). The
prosecution based its redesignation request on Wilson’s record of conviction,
including his guilty plea as well as portions of his preliminary hearing
transcript establishing that the victims of the voluntary manslaughter
convictions were shot with a semiautomatic pistol, as well as on case law
holding that section 1172.6 authorizes trial courts to redesignate murder
convictions as uncharged felonies and to sentence the petitioner on the
redesignated crimes. (See § 1172.6, subd. (e) [providing that “[t]he
petitioner’s conviction shall be redesignated as the target offense or
underlying felony for resentencing purposes if the petitioner is entitled to
relief pursuant to this section, murder or attempted murder was charged

5     For clarity, we will simply refer to section 1172.6.

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generically, and the target offense was not charged”]; People v. Silva (2021)
72 Cal.App.5th 505, 519–520 [a resentencing court may “redesignate a
vacated murder conviction as a lesser offense commensurate with [the
petitioner’s] participation in the underlying felony, not just generically, but
with the petitioner’s individual culpability in mind based on the evidence at
trial”]; accord People v. Howard (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 727, 738–740; People v.
Watson (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 474, 485–489.)
      The prosecution further asked the trial court to impose the upper term
of nine years in state prison on the first count, and two years in state prison
(one-third the middle term of six years) on the second count. (See § 245,
subd. (b) [assault with a semiautomatic firearm punishable by three, six, or
nine years in state prison].) As for the gang enhancement, the prosecution
asserted, “The gang allegations . . . must be vacated by operation of law,
pursuant to Assembly Bill [No.] 333 [(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill

333)].”6
      At the scheduled evidentiary hearing, the prosecution reiterated its
decision to seek redesignation and resentencing in lieu of an evidentiary
hearing. The defense conceded the prosecution was authorized “to waive
evidentiary hearing and get to resentencing,” although the defense asked the

6     Assembly Bill 333, which went into effect January 1, 2022, created
“new substantive and procedural requirements for imposing gang
enhancements.” (People v. Ramos (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 1116, 1125; see id.
at pp. 1126–1127 [Assem. Bill 333 applies retroactively].) Among other
things, Assembly Bill 333 narrowed the definition of “criminal street gang,”
revised section 186.22 to create more stringent requirements regarding the
predicate offenses that make up a “pattern of gang activity,” and redefined
the section 186.22 phrase “to benefit, promote, further, or assist” to mean “to
provide a common benefit to members of a gang where the common benefit is
more than reputational.” (See Ramos, at pp. 1125–1126 [listing changes to
gang enhancement law made by Assembly Bill 333].)

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court to simply vacate the voluntary manslaughter convictions with no
redesignation.
      After hearing the arguments of the parties, the trial court vacated
Wilson’s two voluntary manslaughter convictions and redesignated them as
two counts of conviction for assault with a semiautomatic firearm in violation
of section 245, subdivision (b). The court found the entirety of the record,
including the preliminary hearing transcript and change of plea form,
supported the redesignations. Citing Assembly Bill 333, the court further
stated the gang allegations were vacated “by operation of law.”
      Turning to resentencing, the prosecution argued an upper term
sentence was supported by two aggravating factors—first, the assaults
“ended in the death of two people, which would constitute great violence,” and
second, “the vacated . . . gang allegation.” The defense asked for the middle
or low term, arguing that “[p]ursuant to [section] 1170(b)(2), the
circumstances in aggravation need to be either stipulated to by the defendant
or found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury or a trial judge,” and
that although “the death was an element of the voluntary manslaughter,”
“the death and the gang allegation are not the type of proof contemplated for
[section] 1170(b)(2).”
      The trial court selected the upper term of nine years for the first count
of assault with a semiautomatic firearm. It explained: “[I]t does appear to
the [c]ourt, under . . . [s]ection 1170(b)(2) that there are sufficient
aggravating factors to order the upper term in state prison. [¶] The reason I
say that is this particular case, having reviewed the record, having found
beyond a reasonable doubt that [c]ounts 1 and 2 be redesignated, based upon
the facts in evidence in the case, pursuant to . . . [s]ection 245(b). In this
particular case, there are sufficient aggravating factors as a result of the

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defendant’s use or aiding and abetting the use pursuant to . . . [s]ection
245(b) of a semiautomatic firearm. Two individuals were killed as a result of
the discharged weapon. And there is evidence that the defendant did so in
order to -- as a documented gang member, in order to facilitate and encourage
the motives of the gang.”
      On the second count of assault with a semiautomatic firearm, the trial
court imposed a consecutive two-year term. The total sentence was 11 years

in state prison.7
                                 DISCUSSION
      Wilson contends the trial court erred and violated section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2), by imposing the upper term on count 1 because it relied on
facts in aggravation that were neither admitted by him nor found true
beyond a reasonable doubt by a trier of fact. On our de novo review (People v.
Bell (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 315, 341 [de novo standard of review governs
application of law to undisputed facts]), we reject his contention and affirm
the judgment.
      Under section 1170, subdivision (b)(1), “When a judgment of
imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three possible terms,
the court shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to
exceed the middle term, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2).”
Paragraph (2) provides, as relevant here, “The court may impose a sentence
exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation
of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding

7     The trial court declined to calculate Wilson’s custody credits, stating
“we will leave the credit calculation to the state prison system.” In
supplemental briefing, the parties inform us that Wilson has been released
from custody and awarded his proper custody credits.

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the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been
stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(2).)
      Wilson asserts a violation of section 1170, subdivision (b)(2). The
parties dispute whether this provision applies to a section 1172.6
resentencing proceeding. We need not resolve this dispute, because even if
we assume section 1170, subdivision (b)(2), governs the trial court’s authority
to impose the upper term at a resentencing conducted pursuant to section
1172.6, Wilson fails to establish the trial court violated its requirements.
      At the heart of Wilson’s claim of sentencing error is the following
assertion: “The trial court imposed the upper term because: (1) appellant
used a semi-automatic firearm or aided and abetted a person who used it
[fact (1)]; (2) two individuals were killed [fact (2)]; and (3) appellant
committed the crimes to benefit a gang [fact (3)].” We disagree that the court
relied on fact (1), and find no error in the trial court’s reliance on facts (2) and
(3), when it chose the upper term.
      Wilson objects to the trial court’s supposed reliance on fact (1) on the
ground the same fact was an element of the redesignated offenses and was
therefore not a proper basis for increasing his sentence. (See Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.420(h) [“A fact that is an element of the crime on which
punishment is being imposed may not be used to impose a particular term.”].)
We do not read the court’s explanation of its reasons for imposing the upper
term as encompassing this fact. It is true the court stated, “In this particular
case, there are sufficient aggravating factors as a result of the defendant’s
use or aiding and abetting the use pursuant to . . . [s]ection 245(b) of a
semiautomatic firearm.” However, it is clear from the court’s words as well

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as their context that it was merely explaining why the factors it found
aggravating (death of the two victims, fact (2), and benefitting a gang, fact
(3), were related to the redesignated assault with a firearm offense. (See Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 4.421 [listing factors “relating to” the crime as
circumstances in aggravation].) It was not also relying on the offense
elements to aggravate his term.
        With respect to fact (2), Wilson makes the following argument:
“Appellant did not stipulate that two individuals were killed and the trial
court did not make that finding of fact.” But his assertion that he “did not
stipulate that two individuals were killed” is unexplained, and we disagree
with it. In his plea agreement, Wilson admitted he aided and abetted “the
intentional killing of two people.” The agreement was signed by Wilson, his
counsel, the prosecutor, and the trial judge. The record thus squarely refutes
Wilson’s assertion he did not stipulate that two individuals were killed. We
therefore reject his contention that the proof requirements of section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2), were not satisfied with respect to this fact.
        With respect to fact (3), Wilson’s argument is simply: “These findings
were vacated.” He appears to be referring to the trial court’s striking of the
gang enhancement allegations. However, although the court struck the
allegations “by operation of law” due to the enactment of Assembly Bill 333, it
did not vacate or otherwise disturb Wilson’s underlying admission in his plea
agreement that he acted “for the benefit, at the direction of or in association
with a criminal street gang.” This admission was sufficient to satisfy the
proof requirements of section 1170, subdivision (b)(2), with respect to this
fact.
        Wilson raises an additional objection to the trial court’s reliance on
fact (3) to impose the upper term. He cites People v. Arellano (2022) 86

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Cal.App.5th 418, 436, review granted Mar. 15, 2023, S277962 (Arellano), in
which the court held that subdivision (e) of section 1172.6 does not permit a
resentencing court to include a dismissed firearm enhancement in the
redesignated offense for purposes of resentencing. (See § 1172.6, subd. (e)
[“The petitioner’s conviction shall be redesignated as the target offense or
underlying felony for resentencing purposes if the petitioner is entitled to
relief pursuant to this section, murder or attempted murder was charged
generically, and the target offense was not charged.”].) Wilson argues the
trial court circumvented this limitation by relying on the facts underlying his
stricken gang enhancement to impose the upper term.
      Arellano does not help Wilson. The Arellano court’s holding was based
on the phrase “target offense or underlying felony” in section 1172.6,
subdivision (e), which the court concluded “does not authorize a court to
include a sentence enhancement when it redesignates a vacated conviction as
the target offense or underlying felony for resentencing purposes under that
subdivision.” (Arellano, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 437, review granted.)
The court reasoned “[b]y directing that the vacated conviction shall be
redesignated only ‘as the target offense or underlying felony for resentencing
purposes’ [citation] and failing to mention sentence enhancements, the
Legislature spoke to both redesignation of the conviction and resentencing for
that conviction” and “limit[ed] resentencing to the target offense or
underlying felony.” (Id. at p. 436.) Here, by contrast, the upper term of nine
years is within the sentencing triad set forth in section 245, subdivision (b),
as punishment for that offense. (See § 245, subd. (b) [“Any person who
commits an assault upon the person of another with a semiautomatic firearm
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for three, six, or nine
years.”].) In sentencing Wilson to a nine-year term, the court did not impose

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punishment beyond that contemplated by the redesignated target offense or
underlying felony. Moreover, sentencing courts are permitted to consider as
matters in aggravation any factors “that reasonably relate to the defendant
or the circumstances under which the crime was committed.” (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.421(c).) The trial court’s reliance on the gang benefit of Wilson’s
crime to aggravate his term falls within the broad discretion accorded by this
rule.
        Wilson thus fails to establish that the trial court relied on fact (1) to
impose the upper term, or that its reliance on facts (2) or (3) ran afoul of the
requirements of section 1170, subdivision (b)(2). Because the essential
premise of his appellate challenge fails, we affirm the judgment without
addressing the parties’ remaining arguments with respect to Wilson’s right to
a jury trial on aggravating facts used to impose an upper term sentence in a
resentencing proceeding under section 1172.6, and whether the deprivation of
a jury trial was prejudicial.
                                   DISPOSITION
        The judgment is affirmed.

                                                                              DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

DATO, J.

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