Court Opinion

ID: 9556100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-16 00:00:27.245581+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:22.568749
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10544     Document: 00516858507         Page: 1     Date Filed: 08/15/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                   United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                 Fifth Circuit

                                ____________                                   FILED
                                                                         August 15, 2023
                                 No. 22-10544                             Lyle W. Cayce
                                ____________                                   Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                             Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                       versus

   Jeremy Glenn Powell,

                                           Defendant—Appellant.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Texas
                           USDC No. 3:17-CR-511-1
                  ______________________________

   Before Higginbotham, Graves, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge:
          Jeremy Glenn Powell’s sentence was enhanced by enhancement
   provisions in the Armed Career Criminal Act. Powell appeals, arguing that
   following the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Taylor, a
   conviction for Texas robbery-by-threat is no longer a predicate offense under
   that act. We AFFIRM.
                                         I.
          In 2017, Jeremy Glenn Powell pled guilty without a plea agreement to
   possession of a firearm after a felony conviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
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   922(g)(1). At the time of his plea, Powell had been convicted of thirty-two
   crimes. Five are relevant here: Texas burglary of a habitation, Texas robbery-
   by-threat, Texas robbery-by-injury (twice), and Texas aggravated robbery-
   by-threat with a deadly weapon. At Powell’s sentencing, the Government
   argued that these five crimes were each predicate offenses under the ACCA
   subjecting Powell to a mandatory minimum of 15 years’ imprisonment. The
   district court rejected that argument, relying on then-applicable precedent,
   and sentenced Powell to 120 months’ imprisonment. Both Parties appealed.
           The year after Powell was sentenced and while his appeal was
   pending, this Court held in United States v. Burris that Texas simple robbery
   was a categorically violent felony, 1 prompting a separate panel to vacate
   Powell’s sentence and remand for resentencing. 2 But before Powell was
   resentenced two additional decisions issued. First, in 2021 the Supreme
   Court vacated Burris in light of its decision in Borden v. United States, 3 which,
   in broad strokes, held that offenses committed with a mens rea of recklessness
   could not qualify as an ACCA predicate offense. 4 Second, in January 2022
   this Court in United States v. Garrett held that Texas simple robbery was
   divisible into two distinct crimes—robbery-by-injury and robbery-by-
   threat—and that robbery-by-injury did not categorically qualify as an ACCA
   predicate offense but that Texas robbery-by-threat did. 5 The following

           _____________________
           1
            See 920 F.3d 942, 945 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 141 S. Ct.
   2781 (2021), and abrogated by Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021).
           2
             See United States v. Powell, 785 F. App’x 227, 227 (5th Cir. 2019) (unpublished)
   (per curiam).
           3
               141 S. Ct. 2780–81 (2021).
           4
               See generally 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021).
           5
               See generally 24 F.4th 485 (5th Cir. 2022).

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   month, this Court remanded Powell’s case for resentencing in accordance
   with Garrett. 6
           On remand in May 2022, Powell argued that his sentence should not
   be enhanced under the ACCA, as robbery-by-threat did not qualify as an
   ACCA predicate because it could be accomplished without the use or
   threatened use of force and absent that he did not have three ACCA predicate
   convictions. Powell conceded that Garrett foreclosed his challenge but stated
   that he was asserting it to preserve it “for purposes of appellate review.”
   That month, the district court sentenced Powell to 189 months of
   imprisonment pursuant to the ACCA, finding that three of his convictions—
   burglary of a habitation, robbery-by-threat, and aggravated robbery-by-threat
   with a deadly weapon—were ACCA predicates, and ordered the sentence to
   run concurrently with the undischarged portion of a prior ACCA sentence
   that Powell agreed not to contest. The district court also imposed a three-
   year term of supervised release. On June 2, 2022, Powell timely appealed.
           Three weeks later, the Supreme Court issued United States v. Taylor,
   which held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery was not categorically a
   “violent felony” under the ACCA because it did not require the use,
   attempt, or threat of force, as the substantial step requirement for an attempt
   conviction could be met absent any of these three elements. 7 Now on appeal,
   Powell argues that Garrett cannot stand post-Taylor.

           _____________________
           6
            See United States v. Powell, No. 18-11050, 2022 WL 413943, at *1–3 (5th Cir. Feb.
   10, 2022).
           7
               See generally 142 S.Ct. 2015 (2022).

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                                                  II.
                                                  A.
           “We review de novo the district court’s characterization of a prior
   offense as a violent felony under ACCA.” 8
                                                  B.
           The ACCA provides that anyone who “knowingly violates subsection
   . . . (g) of section 922 shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for not more
   than 15 years, or both.” 9 It also provides that any defendant with “three
   previous convictions by any court . . . for a violent felony . . . shall be fined
   under this title and imprisoned not less than fifteen years,” 10 thereby
   addressing the “special danger” associated with “armed career criminals.” 11
   The Act defines a “violent felony” as:
           any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
           one year . . . that—

                      (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or
                      threatened use of physical force against the person of
                      another; or

                      (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of
                      explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents
                      a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. 12

           _____________________
           8
              United States v. Montgomery, 974 F.3d 587, 592 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing United
   States v. Massey, 858 F.3d 380, 382 (5th Cir. 2017)), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2823 (2021).
           9
                18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8).
           10
                Id. § 924(e)(1).
           11
                Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 146 (2008).
           12
                18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B).

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          “Subsection (i) of this definition is known as the elements clause.” 13
   Subsection (ii) is divided into two halves—the first is the “enumerated
   offenses” clause, while “the end of subsection (ii)—‘or otherwise involves
   conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another’—
   is known as the residual clause.” 14 The Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in
   Johnson v. United States struck down the residual clause as unconstitutionally
   vague. 15 By contrast, the other definitions of the term “violent felony”
   remain viable. 16
          To determine whether a given crime falls under the elements clause,
   courts first look to the text of the statute at issue to determine if it is
   “divisible,” meaning that it “create[s] multiple, distinct crimes, some
   violent, some non-violent.” 17 If the statute is indivisible, courts employ a so-
   called “categorical approach,” 18 meaning jurists “‘look only to the statutory
   definitions’—i.e., the elements—of [an offense], and not ‘to the particular
   facts underlying those convictions.’” 19 In this context, “[e]lements are the
   constituent parts of a crime’s legal definition—the things the prosecution
   must prove to sustain a conviction.” 20 And “[i]f any—even the least
   culpable—of the acts criminalized do not entail that kind of force, the statute
   of conviction does not categorically match the federal standard, and so cannot
          _____________________
          13
               Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. 120, 123 (2016).
          14
               Id.
          15
               576 U.S. 591, 606 (2015).
          16
               Id.
          17
               Garrett, 24 F.4th at 488 (citing Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500, 505 (2016)).
          18
               Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 144 (2010).
          19
              Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 261 (2013) (quoting Taylor v. United
   States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990)).
          20
               Mathis, 579 U.S. at 504 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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   serve as an ACCA predicate.” 21 “In other words, any crime that can be
   committed without the use of force cannot serve as an ACCA predicate under
   the force clause, regardless of whether the actual facts of the case at hand
   indicate that force was used.” 22
           Where a statute is divisible, on the other hand, courts employ a so-
   called “modified categorical approach” 23 wherein they examine the trial
   record, “including charging documents, plea agreements, transcripts of plea
   colloquies, findings of fact and conclusions of law from a bench trial, and jury
   instructions and verdict forms,” to ascertain which of the disjunctive
   elements formed the basis of the conviction. 24 Having done so, courts then
   “determine whether that crime of conviction requires as an element the use
   of force.” 25 Only then is it a predicate offense for the ACCA’s sentencing
   enhancement. 26
                                                  C.
           Texas Penal Code § 29.02(a) provides that a person commits robbery
   when:
           in the course of committing theft . . . and with intent to obtain
           or maintain control of the property, he:
                      (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily
                      injury to another; or

           _____________________
           21
                Borden, 141 S. Ct. at 1822 (citing Johnson, 559 U.S. at 137).
           22
                Garrett, 24 F.4th at 488.
           23
                See Mathis, 579 U.S. at 505–06.
           24
                Johnson, 559 U.S. at 144; see also Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257, 277–78.
           25
                Garrett, 24 F.4th at 488 (citing Mathis, 579 U.S. at 504).
           26
                Mathis, 579 U.S. at 505.

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                     (2) intentionally or knowingly threatens or places
                     another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death. 27
          In United States v. Garrett, we turned to whether a conviction under
   the Texas simple robbery statute was an ACCA predicate offense. 28
   Following a review of the statute’s text as well as applicable Texas
   jurisprudence, the Garrett panel held that the statute is “divisible,” 29
   “creat[ing] two distinct crimes[:] robbery-by-injury and robbery by threat.” 30
   Garrett then concluded that “[r]obbery-by-threat is a violent felony because
   intentionally or knowingly threatening or placing another in fear of imminent
   bodily injury or death plainly constitutes the ‘threatened use of physical
   force’ under the ACCA.” 31
          Six months after this Court decided Garrett, the Supreme Court
   issued United States v. Taylor. 32 Taylor addressed whether attempted Hobbs
   Act robbery constituted a “violent felony” under the ACCA. 33 The Court
   concluded that the offense did not have as an element the use, attempted use,
   or threatened use of force because one could be convicted absent any of those
   three elements, meaning it was not a violent felony and thus not an ACCA
   predicate offense. 34 To illustrate the point, Justice Gorsuch hypothesized an
   attempted robbery wherein the would-be robber drafts a note to the cashier

          _____________________
          27
               Tex. Penal Code § 29.02(a).
          28
               See generally 24 F.4th 485.
          29
               Id. at 491.
          30
               Id. at 489.
          31
               Id.
          32
               142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022).
          33
               See generally id.
          34
               See generally id. at 2019–26.

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   demanding money under threat of harm but law enforcement foils the
   robber’s plans before he can give the note to the cashier. 35 Because the would-
   be robber was caught before he perpetrated the robbery, he did not use force,
   threaten force, or attempt to use force; “[h]e may have intended and
   attempted to do just that, but he failed.” 36
           Powell challenges Garrett in light of Taylor, contending that because
   Taylor demands a communicated threat, and Texas simple robbery is broader
   than other states’ robbery statutes in allowing for a conviction absent such a
   threat, Garrett cannot stand. The Government counters with three separate
   but intertwined arguments. (1) As this Court has applied Garrett before and
   after Taylor, this Court has already implicitly rejected Powell’s argument. (2)
   This Court’s high bar for interpreting an intervening Supreme Court
   decisions as overturning its precedent precludes reading Taylor to overturn
   Garrett. (3) Distinctions between attempted Hobbs Act robbery at issue in
   Taylor and robbery-by-fear in the present action render Taylor inapposite.
   Powell’s argument ultimately cannot stand.
                                               D.
           The Government’s first rebuttal argument falls short. “It is a firm rule
   of this circuit that in the absence of an intervening contrary or superseding
   decision by this court sitting en banc or by the United States Supreme Court,
   a panel cannot overrule a prior panel’s decision.” 37 However, “[a]n opinion

           _____________________
           35
                Id. at 2021.
           36
                Id.
           37
             United States v. Setser, 607 F.3d 128, 131 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Burge v. Parish
   of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 466 (5th Cir. 1999)), aff’d, 566 U.S. 231 (2012).

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   restating a prior panel’s ruling does not sub silentio hold that the prior ruling
   survived an uncited Supreme Court decision.” 38
           None of the three cases applying Garrett post-Taylor directly address
   Taylor’s effect. 39 They do not cite Taylor nor consider its impact on Garrett.
   And for good reason: as “[a]s a general rule, we do not consider arguments
   raised for the first time in a . . . 28j letter.” 40 Indeed, in all three cases,
   briefing was completed pre-Taylor, and the Supreme Court’s decision was
   raised in a one-paragraph Rule 28j letter. And as counsel pointed out at oral
   argument, neither party moved for more exhaustive supplemental briefing on
   the issue. They do not bind this panel. 41
                                                E.
           The Government’s next two arguments tread the same ground: did
   Taylor overturn Garrett?
           “For a Supreme Court decision to override a Fifth Circuit case, the
   decision must unequivocally overrule prior precedent; mere illumination of

           _____________________
           38
                Gahagan v. USCIS, 911 F.3d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 2018).
           39
             See generally United States v. Sosebee, 59 F.4th 151 (5th Cir. 2023); United States
   v. Wheeler, No. 19-11022, 2022 WL 17729412 (5th Cir. Dec. 16, 2022) (unpublished) (per
   curiam); and United States v. Senegal, No. 19-40930, 2022 WL 4594608 (5th Cir. Sept. 30,
   2022) (unpublished) (per curiam).
           40
              Diaz Esparza v. Garland, 23 F.4th 563, 571 n.51 (5th Cir.) (quoting United States
   v. Huntsberry, 956 F.3d 270, 282 n.4 (5th Cir. 2020)), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 87 (2022); see
   also United States v. Arellano-Banuelos, 912 F.3d 862, 865 n.2 (5th Cir. 2019) (“The proper
   time to closely examine the record and develop legal defenses is before the completion of
   briefing.” (quoting Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532, 545 (5th Cir. 2008))).
           41
              See United States v. Brune, 991 F.3d 652, 664 (5th Cir. 2021) (refusing to apply
   the precedent stated in published cases issued after a Supreme Court case that failed to
   “grapple[] with” the relevant question at issue), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 755 (2022); In re
   Bonvillian Marine Serv., Inc., 19 F.4th 787, 794 (5th Cir. 2021) (holding similarly).

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   a case is insufficient,” 42 and “an intervening change in the law [cannot be] a
   mere ‘hint’ of how the [Supreme] Court might rule in the future.” 43 At the
   same time it “is a judgment call—there is no hard-and-fast requirement, for
   instance, that a Supreme Court decision explicitly overrule the circuit
   precedent at issue, or specifically address the precise question of law at
   issue.” 44 In other words,
           [it] depends on context. That two decisions involve different
           statutes is not dispositive. Sometimes a Supreme Court
           decision involving one statute implicitly overrules our
           precedent involving another statute. Sometimes it does not.
           The overriding consideration is the similarity of the issues
           decided. 45

   This said, we pause to recognize a compositional frame: the limited reach of
   ACCA jurisprudence. Whether a given offense falls within § 924(e)(2)(B)’s
   elements clause demands a focus upon the “specific offense, . . . asking
   whether the elements of that specific crime include the use of force.” 46 In other
   words, a court’s interpretation of the ACCA’s applicability to any one crime
   is cabined to its text. So for one crime’s status as an ACCA predicate offense

           _____________________
           42
             Gahagan, 911 F.3d at 302 (alteration omitted) (quoting United States v. Petras,
   879 F.3d 155, 164 (5th Cir. 2018)).
           43
               Hines v. Quillivan, 982 F.3d 266, 271 (5th Cir. 2020) (second alteration in
   original) (quoting United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 2013)); Petras, 879
   F.3d at 164 (holding that “mere illumination of a case is insufficient” to abrogate our circuit
   precedent).
           44
                In re Bonvillian, 19 F.4th at 794.
           45
                Gahagan, 911 F.3d at 302 (internal citations and footnote omitted).
           46
              United States v. Butler, 949 F.3d 230, 233 (5th Cir. 2020) (emphases added). This
   observation sets aside broad-based rules the Supreme Court announces, such as
   invalidating the entire residual clause (Johnson) or invalidating all crimes involving a mens
   rea of recklessness (Borden), which obviously have far wider repercussions.

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   to influence the status of another offense, there must be a high degree of
   overlap with the precise language of the second crime’s elements. Against
   this backdrop, we turn to Taylor and Texas robbery-by-threat.
           Taylor addresses an attempted robbery offense, not a completed
   robbery. The elements of attempted Hobbs Act robbery include: (1)
   “intend[ing] to unlawfully take or obtain personal property by means of
   actual or threatened force” and (2) “complet[ing] a ‘substantial step’ toward
   that end.” 47 “And whatever a substantial step requires,” the Court
   elaborated, “it does not require the government to prove that the defendant
   used, attempted to use, or even threatened to use force against another
   person or his property.” 48 This second element—the crux of the Supreme
   Court’s reasoning—is nowhere to be found in the Texas robbery-by-threat
   offense. 49 The Court went further, relying upon the distinction between a
   completed act and an attempted act:
           The elements clause does not ask whether the defendant
           committed a crime of violence or attempted to commit one. It
           asks whether the defendant did commit a crime of violence—
           and it proceeds to define a crime of violence as a felony that
           includes as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
           use of force. 50

   Given this distinction, Justice Gorsuch wrote, “[w]hatever one might say
   about completed Hobbs Act robbery, attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not

           _____________________
           47
             Taylor, 142 S. Ct. at 2020 (citing United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102,
   107 (2007)).
           48
                Id.
           49
                Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), with Tex. Penal Code § 29.02(a).
           50
                Taylor, 142 S. Ct. at 2022.

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   satisfy the elements clause.” 51 Taylor thus expressly addresses offenses that
   criminalize attempts that may be undertaken without a use or threat of force.
   In other words, Taylor does not reach the crime at issue here and cannot be
   said to clearly overturn Garrett, given this Court’s caution in reading a
   Supreme Court decision as overturning our caselaw that did not do so
   directly.
                                            *****
           Taylor does not undermine or contravene Garrett’s conclusion that
   Texas robbery-by-threat constitutes a violent felony.
           We AFFIRM.

           _____________________
           51
              Id. at 2020. Further: “Yes, to secure a conviction the government must show an
   intention to take property by force or threat, along with a substantial step toward achieving
   that object. But an intention is just that, no more. And whatever a substantial step requires,
   it does not require the government to prove that the defendant used, attempted to use, or
   even threatened to use force against another person or his property.” Id.

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