Court Opinion

ID: 9643451
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:29:24.529062+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:00.589575
License: Public Domain

PAUL M. SPINDEN, Judge,
dissenting.
Because this case involves judicial review of an administrative agency decision, it is an administrative action. Hedrick v. Director of Revenue, 839 S.W.2d 300, 301 (Mo.App.1992). As such, Rule 100.01 mandates that the provisions of Section 536.100 through 536.150, RSMo 2000 — not the rules of civil procedure — govern the procedures of such actions.
Sections 536.100 through 536.150 do not provide for discovery — certainly not interrogatories and requests for admission. Section 577.041.4, RSMo Supp.2005, provides only for “a hearing” of the “petition for review to contest the license revocation” authorized by Section 577.041.1. Because I deem the circuit court’s imposing the rules of civil procedure concerning discovery in a Section 577.041 hearing to be evident, obvious, and clear error, I would grant plain error review under Rule 84.13(c).
Indeed, this court’s Eastern District concluded that imposing rules of civil procedure on Section 577.041 actions is clearly erroneous. Nguyen v. Director of Revenue, 900 S.W.2d 238, 239 (Mo.App.1995); Daus v. Director of Revenue, 840 S.W.2d 892, 893 (Mo.App.1992). In Nguyen and Daus, the courts ruled that Rule 55.25 did not impose a duty on the director to file a responsive pleading because the rules of civil procedure simply do not apply to actions initiated pursuant to Section 577.041. The Nguyen court declared that “Section 577.041.4 prescribes the exclusive procedure for review of Director’s revocation of a license for the driver’s refusal to submit to a breath test, and precludes the use of any other or nonstatutory method.” 900 S.W.2d at 239.
Not only is the circuit court’s imposing the rules of civil procedure erroneous because it was an exercise of excessive authority, but it also thwarts a central purpose of the General Assembly’s establishing an administrative agency action: to provide a forum in which individuals can resolve their disputes in a less cumbersome and expensive manner than what they encounter in a more traditional civil action. 2 AMERICAN JurispRüdenCE, Administrative Law Section 4 (2d ed.2004). The circuit court’s application of rules of discovery to an administrative agency action in this case was a miscarriage of justice.
Seemingly apposite is Woodard v. Director of Revenue, 876 S.W.2d 810 (Mo.App.1994), in which this court’s Southern District concluded that Section 508.080, RSMo 1986, applied to a Section 577.041 proceeding. This court, however, resolved the seeming conflict in Minx v. Department of Social Services, 945 S.W.2d 453, 455-56 (Mo.App.1997), which involved a dispute concerning which documents the circuit court should accept for filing in an administrative agency action. The Minx court, while recognizing that Rule 100.01 mandates that Section 536.100 through 536.150 govern such proceedings, still concluded that Rule 55.03 applied to the proceedings because such actions “are not immune from other statutes and rules to the extent their provisions are not conflicting.945 S.W.2d at 456 (emphasis added). *437Indeed, certain minimum, basic procedures governing the manner in which the judiciary conducts its affairs — rules concerning filings, assignment of judges, and the like — must apply, even in administrative agency actions, so the judiciary can operate.
In this case, unlike Woodard and Minx, the circuit court applied rules that directly conflict with the procedure contemplated by the General Assembly and articulated in Section 577.041. Because administrative law and procedure is purely a creation of statute, authority in an administrative agency action is restricted to that which the General Assembly has granted. Jenkins v. Director of Revenue, 858 S.W.2d 257, 260 (Mo.App.1993).
A comparison of Section 577.041 with Section 302.535.1, RSMo Supp.2005, is quite telling. The latter statute, involving judicial review of revocation of driving licenses based on administrative hearings, mandates that the proceeding before the circuit court shall be de novo and “shall be conducted pursuant to the Missouri rules of civil procedure!.]” Section 577.041 does not contain any such language. Obviously, the General Assembly did not intend for the rules of civil procedure to apply in actions filed under Section 577.041. In contrast to Section 302.535, the General Assembly granted no authority in Section 577.041 for applying the rules of civil procedure. Nothing in Section 536.100 through 536.150 provides for interrogatories and requests for admissions or any discovery mechanisms.
Hence, the circuit court committed plain error in applying the rules of civil procedure and deeming the director of the Department of Revenue to have admitted Randy Hunsucker’s requests for admissions.1 The circuit court’s only authority was to conduct a hearing and to render a judgment. By imposing the rules of civil procedure on this action for review of an administrative agency’s decision, the circuit court exceeded its authority. Its judgment should be reversed and the case remanded for a proper hearing without imposition of the rules of civil procedure.

. The majority suggests that the director agreed to submit the case on the pleadings and the admissions. This is not correct. According to the circuit court’s judgment, the director agreed only to submit the case on the pleadings. The circuit court ordered that the admissions contained in the request for admissions be deemed admitted because of the director's failure to respond to the request until the day of hearing.