Court Opinion

ID: 9911149
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-19 16:13:14.903957+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:56:12.975189
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Judges Humphreys, Friedman and White
UNPUBLISHED

              ERIK STEWART SMITH, SOMETIMES KNOWN AS
               ERICK STEWART SMITH
                                                                            MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.     Record No. 1807-22-3                                   JUDGE FRANK K. FRIEDMAN
                                                                               DECEMBER 19, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                  FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CAMPBELL COUNTY
                                                John T. Cook, Judge

                              (Rebecca Wetzel; Wetzel Legal, PLLC, on brief), for appellant.
                              Appellant submitting on brief.

                              (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Jason D. Reed, Assistant
                              Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Following a bench trial, the trial court convicted Erick Stewart Smith of distributing heroin

              and methamphetamine. Smith asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions.

              After examining the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously holds that oral argument is

              unnecessary because “the dispositive issue” in this appeal has been “authoritatively decided, and

              the appellant has not argued that the case law should be overturned, extended, modified, or

              reversed.” Code § 17.1-403(ii)(b); Rule 5A:27(b). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s

              judgment.

                                                       BACKGROUND

                     “In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, the facts will be stated in the

              light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.” Meade v. Commonwealth,

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
74 Va. App. 796, 802 (2022) (quoting Gerald v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 472 (2018)).

“Accordingly, we regard as true all credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all

inferences that may reasonably be drawn from that evidence.” Id. (quoting Gerald, 295 Va. at 473).

       Campbell County Sheriff’s Lieutenant Wilson met with an informant, Childress, and they

arranged a controlled purchase of methamphetamine from Smith. Childress had known Smith for

about six months and contacted him to schedule the transaction. Lieutenant Wilson searched

Childress and his car before the meeting and found no drugs. The police provided Childress with

video and audio equipment and funds to purchase the drugs. Childress testified that he met with

Smith at Smith’s apartment and purchased methamphetamine and heroin. Childress met with

Lieutenant Wilson immediately after the encounter and surrendered the drugs, the remaining funds,

and the recording devices. Lieutenant Wilson searched Childress and his car after the transaction

and found no drugs. Childress acknowledged that he had pending criminal charges of his own and

was hoping for consideration for his cooperation with the drug operation, although he had not been

promised anything. He also stated that he had received money for his participation as an informant.

       Smith denied having sold drugs to Childress and claimed that another occupant of his

apartment must have engaged in the transaction. The trial court found that Childress’s testimony

was corroborated by the recordings, that he was a credible witness, and that Smith’s testimony was

not believable. The trial court convicted Smith of the two offenses. Smith appeals.

                                            ANALYSIS

       “In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, ‘the

relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” Melick v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 122, 144 (2018) (quoting Kelly v.

Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 250, 257 (2003) (en banc)). “This familiar standard gives full play to

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the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the

evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Raspberry v.

Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 19, 29 (2019) (quoting Burrous v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 275,

279 (2017)). “In conducting our analysis, we are mindful that ‘determining the credibility of the

witnesses and the weight afforded the testimony of those witnesses are matters left to the trier of

fact, who has the ability to hear and see them as they testify.’” Id. (quoting Miller v.

Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 527, 536 (2015)). “Thus, we will affirm the judgment of the trial

court unless that judgment is ‘plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Id. (quoting Kelly,

41 Va. App. at 257).

        On appeal, Smith concedes that he met with Childress at his residence and that Childress

returned to Lieutenant Wilson afterwards with drugs. He argues, however, that “the video presented

at trial does not show any actual exchange of money or narcotics between [Smith] and the

informant” and that the trial court “relied heavily on the testimony of the informant.” He concludes

that the trial court erred by accepting Childress’s testimony because Childress was a paid informant

and hoped to “receive a favorable outcome on his own pending charges.”

        “Determining the credibility of witnesses . . . is within the exclusive province of the [fact

finder], wh[o] has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they

testify.” Dalton v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 512, 525 (2015) (first alteration in original)

(quoting Lea v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 300, 304 (1993)). “Where credibility issues are

resolved by the [fact finder] in favor of the Commonwealth, those findings will not be disturbed

on appeal unless plainly wrong.” Smith v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 711, 718 (2010).

        The “reasonable-hypothesis principle is not a discrete rule unto itself” and “does not add

to the burden of proof placed upon the Commonwealth in a criminal case.” Vasquez v.

Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 513

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(2003)). “The Commonwealth . . . is not required to exclude every possibility that others may

have committed the crime for which a defendant is charged, but is only required to exclude

hypotheses of innocence that flow from the evidence.” Dowden v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 459,

468 (2000). Thus, the reasonable-hypothesis principle “is ‘simply another way of stating that the

Commonwealth has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Commonwealth v.

Moseley, 293 Va. 455, 464 (2017) (quoting Hudson, 265 Va. at 513). “It is true that a factfinder

cannot ‘arbitrarily’ choose, as between two equally plausible interpretations of a fact, one that

incriminates the defendant.” Vasquez, 291 Va. at 250 (quoting Dixon v. Commonwealth, 162 Va.

798, 803 (1934)). An arbitrary choice occurs “only when no rational factfinder could believe the

incriminating interpretation of the evidence and disbelieve the exculpatory one.” Id.

       On appeal, in reviewing a defendant’s claim that a trial court unreasonably rejected his

hypothesis of innocence, we are mindful that “[w]hether an alternate hypothesis of innocence is

reasonable is a question of fact and, therefore, is binding on [this Court] unless plainly wrong.”

Wood v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 286, 306 (2010) (quoting Emerson v. Commonwealth, 43

Va. App. 263, 277 (2004)). “As long as ‘a rational factfinder could reasonably reject [the

appellant’s] theories in his defense and find that the totality of the suspicious circumstances

proved [his guilt] beyond a reasonable doubt,’ the appellate court must affirm the conviction.”

Part v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 635, 654 (2022) (alterations in original) (quoting Moseley,

293 Va. at 466). “[M]erely because [a] defendant’s theory of the case differs from that taken by

the Commonwealth does not mean that every reasonable hypothesis consistent with his

innocence has not been excluded. What weight should be given evidence is a matter for the

[factfinder] to decide.” Edwards v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 284, 301 (2017) (second and

third alterations in original) (quoting Haskins v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 1, 9 (2004)).

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       Here, we conclude that the trial court did not err in rejecting Smith’s alternate hypothesis

of innocence that someone else sold the drugs to Childress. The Commonwealth’s evidence,

viewed in the light most favorable to it, demonstrated that Childress went to Smith’s residence

with the buy money that Lieutenant Wilson provided and with the intention of buying drugs from

Smith. After arriving, Childress gave the money to Smith and returned to Lieutenant Wilson with

methamphetamine and heroin. Although Lieutenant Wilson did not witness the transaction, the

recording demonstrated that Childress interacted with Smith to complete the drug transaction.

While others were present at the residence, nothing in the record indicated that Childress

exchanged money or drugs with them rather than Smith. Moreover, Lieutenant Wilson searched

Childress before and after the encounter, and found no drugs.

       Childress testified that he had known Smith for six months, had purchased drugs from

him before, and arranged the controlled drug buy. He met with Smith at Smith’s residence and

purchased methamphetamine and heroin. The trial court permissibly rejected Smith’s version of

the events and accepted the evidence proving that he distributed the drugs to Childress.

Childress’s testimony was corroborated in part by the recordings introduced at trial and

Lieutenant Wilson’s testimony. “In its role of judging witness credibility, the fact finder is

entitled to disbelieve the self-serving testimony of the accused and to conclude that the accused

is lying to conceal his guilt.” Speller v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 378, 388 (2018).

       The Commonwealth’s evidence was competent, was not inherently incredible, and was

sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith was guilty of distributing

methamphetamine and heroin. Thus, we affirm Smith’s convictions.

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                                          CONCLUSION

       The Commonwealth’s evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude that

Smith distributed the drugs. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                                          Affirmed.

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