Court Opinion

ID: 9784593
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:49:05.8509+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:56.158852
License: Public Domain

JIM SHARP, Justice,
dissenting.
Texas’ Bill of Rights guarantees the right to trial by a fair and impartial jury and authorizes the Legislature to pass laws to effectuate this right. See Hyundai Motor Co. v. Vasquez, 189 S.W.3d 743, 749 (Tex.2006); see also Tex. Const, art. I, § 15 (“The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. The Legislature shall pass such laws as may be needed to regulate the same, and to maintain its purity and efficiency.”). Towards this end, the Supreme Court, as authorized by the Legislature and the Texas Constitution1, has promulgated rules governing proper jury selection. Among these is Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 223 that sets out an un*326qualified right to a jury shuffle, provided the demand is made prior to the commencement of voir dire. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 22B.2 The majority assumes without deciding that the trial court erred in denying Jackson’s timely demand for a jury shuffle and then proceeds to analyze the error under the harmless error standard adopted by the Fort Worth Court of Appeals in Carr v. Smith, as well as the traditional harm analysis set forth in Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 44.1(a)(1) and (2), and concludes that Jackson failed to meet her burden under either standard. Jackson argues that reversal is mandated in this case because the trial court’s error probably prevented her from properly presenting her case on appeal. See Tex. R.App. P. 44.1(a)(2). Because I would hold that Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.1(a)(2) requires reversal in the present case, I respectfully dissent.
The majority cites to Rivas v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 480 S.W.2d 610 (Tex.1972), for the proposition that a complaining party must demonstrate that the denial of a jury shuffle affected the randomness of the jury in order to prevail under either rule 44.1(a)(1) or (2). Faulting Jackson for failing to offer evidence that the court’s refusal to shuffle the jury panel made it less random, the majority holds that Jackson failed to demonstrate harm under either standard.
The “randomness” language utilized by Rivas, however, does not pertain to whether the litigant has demonstrated sufficient harm, as the majority contends, but rather, whether an appellate court should presume harm when confronted with the type of error found in that case. The Rivas court reasons that because Rule 223 was intended to “insure a random selection of jurors” and the jury selection method utilized insured “a degree of randomness,” the method used “substantially complied” with the underlying purpose of the rule, and therefore, the error complained of did not raise an inference of probable harm.
The Rivas court then proceeds to analyze the error under the traditional harmless error standard. Applying this standard, the court states that the complaining party must do more than simply allege that the “jury would have been composed of different jurors had its demand been granted” and suggests that a party could prevail under such a standard if it were to “show that it was required to accept a juror which it otherwise would have stricken had it not been for the trial court’s ruling.” Rivas, 480 S.W.2d at 612.3
At most, Rivas stands for the proposition that in order to prevail under the traditional harmless error standard of review set forth in Rule 44.1(a)(1), a litigant must do more than simply show that the “jury would have been composed of different jurors had its request been granted.” Id. at 612. Rivas, however, does not require a litigant to show that the denial of such a demand affected the randomness of the jury in order to prevail under the same standard. To the extent the majority opinion misconstrues Rivas to require such *327a showing, the majority opinion’s application of Rivas is flawed.
Citing to Cortez v. HCCI-San Antonio, Inc., 159 S.W.3d 87 (Tex.2005), Jackson contends that the trial court’s error prevented her from properly presenting her issue on appeal, and consequently, reversal is required. See Tex.R.App. P. 44.1(a)(2). In that case, the Texas Supreme Court stated: “No one except the jurors themselves knows exactly what transpires in the jury room; we know only the verdict. .. ,[W]e cannot know for certain that [the challenged juror’s] inclusion did not affect the verdict, so we presume harm.” Cortez, 159 S.W.3d at 91 (citing Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378, 388 (Tex.2000)) (applying Supreme Court’s harmless error rule, codified as Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 61.1(a), which mandates reversal if error probably prevents appellant from properly presenting case on appeal; also citing Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.1(a)(2) (court of appeals harmless error rule)). Although Cortez addresses the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause, and is therefore distinguishable from the present case, the Cortez court’s reasoning is nevertheless persuasive.4 It is no less difficult for a litigant to satisfy the onerous requirements in this case than it was in Cortez. Just as the trial court’s erroneous refusal to strike a juror for cause in Cortez requires reversal because it was not possible for the appellate court to determine the impact the juror had on the verdict, the trial court’s erroneous denial of a jury shuffle in this case also requires reversal because it is not possible for the court to determine (1) what impact the two jurors that Jackson was forced to accept after her demand for a jury shuffle was denied had on the verdict, or (2) which prospective jurors would have been impaneled had the jury been shuffled, much less what impact those jurors would have had on the case.
To require a litigant to demonstrate harm under such circumstances places the litigant in an impossible position. How can a litigant prove that a jury is more or less random based on a shuffle that never happened? This analysis leads to a chain of speculation about the possible composition of the jury and the harm suffered. Where, as the majority would require here, courts hold litigants to such an impossible standard, they foster a situation in which any trial court judge can refuse a jury shuffle demand with perfect impunity, secure in the knowledge that the litigant cannot meet its burden of proof on appeal. How, after all, can a litigant “prove” that one selection of qualified, nominally impartial jurors was preferable to another selection of qualified, nominally impartial jurors?
*328This case also presents a deeper, unaddressed question — How can the trial court remain impartial when it receives a timely Rule 223 demand to shuffle the jury panel? 5 Rule 223 states that the court “shall” shuffle, which imposes a duty on the court to act. See Tex. Gov’t Code ANN. § 311.016(2) (West 2005). Lawyers demand shuffles because they have a professional belief that those shuffles benefit their clients. However, for reasons that continue to mystify this Justice, existing case law imposes a harmless-error analysis on a sitting Texas trial judge’s conscious refusal to abide by a very clearly-worded rule. Obviously the appellate court cannot compare the composition of the non-shuffled panel with the shuffled panel when the trial court did not do its job. Instead, harm is analyzed under this so-called “relaxed” standard by which a burden is placed on the party demanding the shuffle to somehow prove a lack of randomness in the jury panel. This begs the question of just how bad does the panel have to be before it crosses over into hypothetical “unrandomness.” Engaging in such esoteric arguments is a valid reason for laypersons to make fun of our jury system.
The worst part of this “relaxed” harm analysis, however, is that, absent an egregious “unrandom” initial jury panel, the trial court’s response to the shuffle demand is essentially discretionary. As the Court of Criminal Appeals has candidly explained, such discretionary rulings are essentially the trial court’s limited right to be wrong. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex.Crim.App.1990 & 1991). When the rule says “shall” and the appellate courts allow the trial courts to ignore the plain meaning of that word, then the trial court has no law to follow. Because I believe that judges should be impartial, I respectfully dissent to a relaxation of a clear duty into “do what you want.” I doubt many trial judges want that freedom.
Accordingly, I would hold that the trial court’s denial of a jury shuffle was error and reverse and remand for a new trial. See Tex.R.App. P. 44.1(a)(2).

. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.003(d) (West 2004) ("The supreme court from time to time shall promulgate suitable rules, forms, and regulations_”); id. § 22.004(a) ("The supreme court has the full rulemaking power in the practice and procedure in civil actions, except that its rules may not abridge, enlarge, or modify the substantive rights of a litigant.”); see also Tex. Const, art. V, § 31(b) ("The Supreme Court shall promulgate rules of civil procedure for all courts not inconsistent with the laws of the state as may be necessary for the efficient and uniform administration of justice in the various courts.”).

. Article 35.11 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure guarantees a party’s right to a jury shuffle in a criminal case. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 35.11 (West 2006).

. Although Jackson argues that the lack of a jury shuffle kept prospective jurors that she considered more desirable off the panel, she also contends that she was forced to accept two objectionable jurors that she would have struck, had she not already exhausted all of her peremptory challenges. Accordingly, Jackson has done more than simply allege that the "jury would have been composed of different jurors had [her] request been granted.” See Rivas v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 480 S.W.2d 610, 612 (Tex.1972).

. Citing to Cortez v. HCCI-San Antonio, Inc., 159 S.W.3d 87 (Tex.2005), Jackson also argues that we should presume harm in this case. Despite the Cortez court’s use of the term “presume harm”, neither Cortez nor Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378 (Tex.2000), the case upon which it relies, stand for the proposition that the errors complained of in those cases were immune to a harmless error analysis. Rather, the Casteel court reasoned that, because the complained-of error was such that it prevented the reviewing court from determining the impact of the error, the error was harmful under the Supreme Court's harmless error rule because it probably prevented the litigant from presenting his case on appeal.- See Casteel, 22 S.W.3d at 388 (citing Tex.R.App. P. 61.1(a) and holding "that when a trial court submits a single broad-form liability question incorporating multiple theories of liability, the error is harmful and a new trial is required when the appellate court cannot determine whether the jury based its verdict on an improperly submitted invalid theory”); Cortez, 159 S.W.3d at 91 (citing Casteel and stating "Here, we do not know why veniremember 7 was objectionable. But as in Casteel, we cannot know for certain that his inclusion did not affect the verdict, so we presume harm.”)

. The word "demand” is from Rule 223 itself. Presumably the Texas Supreme Court appreciated the distinction when it allowed a party to demand — not request — action from a trial court.