Court Opinion

ID: 9467274
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:44:12.378893+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:16.287459
License: Public Domain

McKAY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I fully concur with Part I of Judge Logan’s opinion, which concludes that bank larceny and bank robbery are the “same offence” for double jeopardy purposes. However, I cannot agree with Part II. The conclusion that acceptance of a guilty plea for bank larceny does not bar trial for bank robbery is based on a formalistic distinction unrelated to double jeopardy policies and in my view works serious damage to the fabric of double jeopardy protection.
If the district court had entered judgment and imposed sentence on the "guilty plea for larceny, trial on the robbery charge would have been impermissible. I fail to see how in logic or policy the defendant’s double jeopardy protection should turn on whether or not, after accepting a guilty plea, the judge has performed the formal act of entering judgment and imposing sentence.
The time at which jeopardy attaches is “the lynchpin for all double jeopardy jurisprudence.” Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 38, 98 S.Ct. 2156, 2162, 57 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978) (quoting Bretz v. Crist, 546 F.2d 1336, 1343 (9th Cir. 1976)). In a criminal proceeding which eventuates in trial, jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn; in a nonjury trial, it attaches when the judge begins to receive evidence. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388, 95 S.Ct. 1055, 1062, 43 L.Ed.2d 265 (1975). Where there is no plenary trial because the defendant pleads guilty, the case law clearly indicates that jeopardy attaches upon the court’s acceptance of the guilty plea, unless the plea is made in a sham proceeding or the court lacks jurisdiction. See, e. g., United States v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600, 606 (3d Cir. 1973); Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 683 (1961). Guilt is established by the guilty plea, and the plea is ordinarily tantamount to a conviction. E. g., Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223, 47 S.Ct. 582, 583, 71 L.Ed. 1009 (1927) (“A plea of guilty ... is itself a conviction. Like a verdict of a jury it is conclusive. .. . [T]he court has nothing to do but give judgment and sentence.”).
Jeopardy means exposure to the risk of a determination of guilt or innocence. A defendant who pleads guilty and has his guilty plea accepted by the court obviously faces the risk of a determination of guilt. This risk is worthy of double jeopardy protection. By pleading guilty, the defendant admits all material facts alleged in the charge, Kahl v. United States, 204 F.2d 864, 866 (10th Cir. 1953), and waives nonjurisdictional defects in the proceeding. 1 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 175, at 380-82 (1969). He also waives several constitutional rights, including the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront accusers, see McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1170, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969), as well as his right to object to some, though not all, antecedent constitutional violations, see Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2, 96 S.Ct. 241, 242 n.2, 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975) (per curiam); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 1607, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973). A plea of guilty leaves the court nothing to do but impose sentence and enter judgment. 1 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 175, at 379 (1969).1
*1301The opinion’s formalistic distinction between acceptance of the plea and entry of judgment is a distinction without a difference insofar as the policies underlying the double jeopardy clause are concerned. These policies were succinctly set forth by Justice Black in Green v. United States:
[T]he State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.
355 U.S. 184, 187-88, 78 S.Ct. 221, 223, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957).
If the court has accepted a guilty plea, but nevertheless proceeds to trial on the same or a greater or lesser included offense, the “embarrassment, expense and ordeal,” the “continuing state of anxiety and insecurity,” and any increased risk of unjust conviction are the same whether the district judge has entered formal judgment or not. Surely the formality of entering judgment is not a talisman at which double jeopardy protection suddenly appears. As a general rule, the fifth amendment double jeopardy protection should apply whenever the dangers the clause was designed to prevent are implicated. That they are implicated here is beyond question. Once a defendant’s guilt has been determined, it violates the very core of the double jeopardy clause to constrain him to undergo the trauma of trial for the same offense. See United States v. Myles, 430 F.Supp. 98, 101 (D.D.C.1977) (“[T]he prohibition against multiple punishments and repeated prosecutions also means that once a person has pleaded guilty to a charge, he may not subsequently be prosecuted on other charges that allege the ‘same offence.’ ”), aff’d mem., 569 F.2d 161 (D.C.Cir.1978).
The judge’s acceptance of a guilty plea is analogous to a jury’s verdict. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223, 47 S.Ct. 582, 583, 71 L.Ed. 1009 (1927); United States v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600, 606 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Fox, 130 F.2d 56, 58 (3d Cir.) (“The defendant in this case was not found guilty by a jury of his peers but by his own plea.... [T]hat is a distinction without a difference.”), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 666, 63 S.Ct. 74, 87 L.Ed. 535 (1942). But cf. United States v. Williams, 534 F.2d 119, 121-22 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894, 97 S.Ct. 255, 50 L.Ed.2d 177 (1976); United States v. Anderson, 514 F.2d 583, 587 (7th Cir. 1975); Ward v. Page, 424 F.2d 491, 493 (10th Cir. 1970). Had this defendant been tried before a jury, the trial judge’s failure to enter judgment and impose sentence after the jury’s verdict would make no difference for double jeopardy purposes. Retrial for the same charge, or for a charge which is constitutionally considered to be the “same offence,” would be barred. We should not adopt a different rule for defendants who plead guilty rather *1302than place their guilt in issue. Such a distinction is an unjustifiable reversion to a narrow English view of double jeopardy protection.2
Society’s interest in having one complete and fair opportunity to convict an accused, as important as it is, may not override a constitutional protection. In any case, that societal interest was clearly vindicated here: a conviction was assured, and the defendant faced a possible ten-year sentence after the acceptance of the guilty plea. Society has no interest in subjecting an accused to a trial for a trial’s sake alone. The extraordinary expenditure of judicial time at both the trial and appellate levels in this case was directed not at securing a conviction for a serious crime, but only at extending an already potentially severe sentence.
The basis for Part II of the opinion lies in the conclusion that the acceptance of the plea and the trial were both part of “one criminal prosecution.” Affixing this label, however, even were it a correct one, does not resolve the double jeopardy issue. In Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 24 S.Ct. 797, 49 L.Ed. 114 (1904), the prosecution sought a trial de novo in an appellate court after an acquittal in a bench trial. Although Kepner involved only a “single proceeding,” see United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 347 & n.16, 95 S.Ct. 1013, 1024 & n.16, 43 L.Ed.2d 232 (1975), the Supreme Court regarded a second factfinding as the equivalent of a second trial and held it barred by double jeopardy principles.3
A new trial after a mistrial and an appeal from a midtrial dismissal can each be characterized as a single criminal prosecution. Such labeling does not obviate the need to analyze each such situation in light of double jeopardy principles, however. Both involve serious double jeopardy concerns and are permitted only in carefully defined circumstances. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978) (government appeal from midtrial dismissal); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 91 S.Ct. 547, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971) (plurality opinion) (mistrial).
United States v. Goldman, 352 F.2d 263 (3d Cir. 1965), cited in Part II of the opinion, concluded that acceptance of a defendant’s change of plea to guilty on one count of a two-count indictment during trial was not a judgment, and that continuation of trial on the other count did not violate the double jeopardy clause. However, the same circuit has also held that jeopardy attaches upon acceptance of a guilty plea. United States v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600, 606 (3d Cir. 1973). In the case before us jeopardy attached to Count II when the court accepted the defendant’s guilty plea. It attached to Count I when trial of Count I began. Since Counts I and II are the same offense for double jeopardy purposes, the defendant was twice, put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Also cited in Part II of the opinion is United States v. Scarlata, 214 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1954). However, Scariata merely held that a plea of guilty is not a “judgment of conviction” as that phrase is used in 18 U.S.C. § 659, which provides: “A judgment of conviction or acquittal on the merits under the laws of any State shall be a bar to any prosecution under this section for the same act or acts.” The court decided the issue on the basis of statutory interpretation, not double jeopardy analysis. 214 F.2d *1303at 809; see Riadon v. United States, 274 F.2d 804, 305-06 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 896, 81 S.Ct. 225, 5 L.Ed.2d 189 (1960). The only double jeopardy discussion in the opinion was as follows:
There is double jeopardy language in the appellant’s brief. If, by that language, it is intended to raise a constitutional argument, no more need be said than that it is absolutely without merit.
214 F.2d at 809. The reason the court rejected the appellant’s double jeopardy argument, such as it was, is obvious. The Supreme Court has held that the double jeopardy clause does not prohibit a federal prosecution after a state prosecution. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 79 S.Ct. 666, 3 L.Ed.2d 729 (1959).
The only reference Scarlata made to the issue before us tends to contradict rather than support Part II of the opinion: “It may well be that a plea of guilty is a conviction in the same sense in which a jury verdict is a conviction.” 214 F.2d at 809.
United States v. Rocco, 397 F.Supp. 655 (D.Mass.1975), is a case remarkably similar to the one before us. Count I charged the defendant with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (bank robbery). Count II, based on the same facts, charged a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (assault while engaged in bank robbery). The defendant pleaded guilty to Count I of the indictment, which plea was accepted by the court. Pointing out that the two sections charged the same offense for double jeopardy purposes, the district court held that trial on Count II was barred by the double jeopardy clause:
In short, we are not dealing with apples and oranges here. We are dealing with one big apple which the Government chose to package in two parts. It had the right to do so, but must bear the consequences of its choice. Jeopardy attached upon acceptance of defendant’s guilty plea as to count one.
Id. at 659.
The better procedure for the government to follow in a case such as this is to charge the defendant with the greater offense, and then to request a lesser included offense instruction. See generally Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 1995, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973); Fed.R.Crim.P. 31(c). But see Ekberg v. United States, 167 F.2d 380, 385 (1st Cir. 1948).
There are several reasons why the government might charge both the greater and lesser included offenses in an indictment: (1) the government might mistakenly believe that they are not greater and lesser included offenses, but separate offenses; (2) to obtain a more favorable position for plea negotiation; and (3) to enhance the possibility of conviction on a single count by creating the impression that multiple offenses were committed, United States v. Mamber, 127 F.Supp. 925, 927 (D.Mass.1955).4 In even the most innocent of the above circumstances, where the government is mistaken, the consequences of the error should fall on the government, not on the defendant.5
This is a straightforward bank robbery case in which the prosecution could have had little doubt of success. From charge through appeal the prosecution has tried to squeeze multiple convictions and sentences from one criminal act. When the defendant sought to counter this increasingly common prosecutorial practice (“piling on the charges” in order to “up the ante”)6 by *1304electing to plead guilty to the lesser included offense, the trial court permitted the prosecution to escape the consequences of its action. This court now joins in placing the sole risk and burden of such practices on the defendant. If society’s interests were not fully vindicated by the procedures followed, the fault was the prosecution’s, not the defendant’s.
To be sure, the trial court below was working under the mistaken impression that bank larceny is not a lesser included offense of bank robbery. However, the effect of today’s judgment is to punish this defendant even though his understanding of the applicable law was correct. Criminal defendants should not bear the burden of judicial or prosecutorial error.

. Although a defendant may move for withdrawal of the guilty plea, he is not entitled to such withdrawal as a matter of right. Granting leave to withdraw the plea is discretionary with the trial court, and an appellate court will rarely interfere with this discretion. 2 C. Wright, *1301Federal Practice and Procedure § 537, at 464 (1969). A defendant who has entered a guilty plea on the advice of competent counsel must usually have some reason for attempting to withdraw the plea other than just a desire to stand trial. Everett v. United States, 336 F.2d 979, 984 (D.C.Cir.1964); 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 537, at 467-69 (1969). Thus, defendant did not have it within his power, as the majority implies, to remove himself from jeopardy.
Of course, had the court subsequently permitted the withdrawal of the guilty plea, or rejected it under Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(f) for lacking a factual basis, the double jeopardy clause would not bar trial. By withdrawing his guilty plea, a defendant waives his double jeopardy protection. United States v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600, 606 (3d Cir. 1973). Rejection of a plea under Rule 11 (f) is analogous to a trial court’s sua sponte declaration of mistrial in the interest of fairness to the accused and the evenhanded administration of justice. United States ex rel. Metz v. Maroney, 404 F.2d 233, 236 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 949, 89 S.Ct. 1287, 22 L.Ed.2d 483 (1969). The double jeopardy clause does not prohibit retrial after a mistrial, though declared over the defendant’s objection, if there is “manifest necessity” for the mistrial declaration. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505, 98 S.Ct. 824, 830, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978). A proper finding that a guilty plea lacks a factual basis would constitute “manifest necessity” for a full trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.

. The English common law followed, as it does now, the rule that a criminal defendant has been put in jeopardy only when there has been a formal conviction or acquittal, i. e., after a complete trial. While in the early years of American history the double jeopardy clause was considered to be equally narrow in scope, this interpretation did not endure. Beginning with the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824), it became firmly established that a criminal defendant can be put in jeopardy even in a prosecution that does not culminate in a final conviction or acquittal. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33-34 & n.10, 98 S.Ct. 2156, 2159-2160 & n.10, 57 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978).

. Although the challenge in Kepner was based on statutory grounds, the Supreme Court has accepted Kepner “as having correctly stated the relevant double jeopardy principles.” United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 346 n.15, 95 S.Ct. 1013, 1023 n.15, 43 L.Ed.2d 232 (1975).

. While these possible reasons for the government’s action implicate due process more than double jeopardy concerns, I list them to demonstrate that the government has no legitimate interest in pursuing the practice of charging both the greater and the lesser included offense in an indictment.

. The burdens are not insubstantial. This defendant faced a trial in which both the prosecutor and the judge were going to treat the two offenses as distinct. No lesser included offense instruction would have been permitted. As far as the defendant knew, he faced conviction and punishment for each count. Such a belief would more readily induce a defendant to plea bargain rather than face multiple sentences for the “two” offenses, or plead guilty to one count in the hope of more favorable treatment on the other count.

. See, e. g., United States v. Smyer, 596 F.2d 939 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 843, 100 S.Ct. 84, 62 L.Ed.2d 55 (1979) (prosecution filed eleven separate charges for removal of fragments from two archaeological digs).