Court Opinion

ID: 9593681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:23:51.766101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:25.002563
License: Public Domain

Birdsong, Chief Judge,
concurring in judgment only.
I concur with portions of the majority opinion and with the judg*829ment, but I cannot concur with all that is held in Division 1. Analysis of cases cited and of the wording used by the majority in stating what they held, leads me to believe that the majority espouses a search of “other persons” on the premises of a drug dealer without compliance with OCGA § 17-5-28.
Campbell v. State, 139 Ga. App. 389 (228 SE2d 309), cited by the majority, states the general law in Georgia: “With particular regard to the ‘other persons’ clause in this warrant, we note that this language gives police no authority to search persons other than [the specific person named in the warrant] unless such search falls within the ambit of Code Ann. § 27-309 [now OCGA § 17-5-28]. Language identical to that contained in this warrant was considered in our opinion, issued this month, in Smith v. State, 138 [sic] Ga. App. 129, wherein we stated that [OCGA § 17-5-28] ‘describes the maximum extent to which the particularity of description required by the Fourth Amendment may be encroached upon by the practical necessities of the search environment. [Cits.] Thus, if defendant’s search is to be upheld on the basis of the warrant, the state must demonstrate that the officer acted under either of the two justifications provided by [OCGA § 17-5-28].’ See also Wallace v. State, 131 Ga. App. 204 (205 SE2d 523).
“[OCGA § 17-5-28] allows a very limited search of persons present on the premises at the time of the search to look only for weapons or for the items particularly described in the warrant. . . .
“In conjunction with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (88 SC 1868, 20 LE2d 889), this right is limited to a pat-down of the person’s outer clothing.” Id. at 390-391. This court phrased the general rule very clearly and very succinctly in Wyatt v. State, 151 Ga. App. 207, 208 (259 SE2d 199): “ ‘The courts of this state have often held that searches of persons not named in a search warrant but found on the premises to be searched are illegal absent independent justification for a personal search.’ ”
One further reason for my failure to follow the majority is that contained in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85, 86 (100 SC 338, 62 LE2d 238). Illinois has an “other persons” statute almost identical to Georgia’s statute. The Supreme Court held: “The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments will not be construed to permit evidence searches of persons who, at the commencement of the search, are on ‘compact’ premises subject to a search warrant, even where the police have a ‘reasonable belief that such persons ‘are connected with’ drug trafficking and ‘may be concealing or carrying away the contraband.’ ”
Georgia law is in agreement that “ ‘[a] person does not lose the protection of the Fourth Amendment by entering the apartment of another. [Cits.] Neither do a person’s effects.’ ” Hayes v. State, 141 Ga. App. 706, 708 (234 SE2d 360); Campbell, supra at 615. The law in *830Georgia on this point is well settled, that searches of “other persons” on premises being searched under a warrant are illegal, absent independent justification for a search of the person. Bundy v. State, 168 Ga. App. 90 (308 SE2d 213); Hawkins v. State, 165 Ga. App. 278 (300 SE2d 224); Childers v. State, 158 Ga. App. 613 (281 SE2d 349); Wyatt v. State, supra at 208; Hayes v. State, supra at 708; Smith v. State, 139 Ga. App. 129, 130 (1) (227 SE2d 911); Brown v. State, 133 Ga. App. 500 (211 SE2d 438).
Decided July 14, 1988.
Roger G. Queen, District Attorney, for appellant.
George J. Thomas II, for appellees.
Accordingly, I concur in judgment only as to Division 1, and concur specially as to Divisions 2 and 3.