Court Opinion

ID: 9948258
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Date Created: 2024-03-06 18:09:35.744726+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:22.655534
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          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-40210

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

      Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ALEJANDRO AZAMAR-NOLASCO,

      Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF COLFAX COUNTY
Emilio J. Chavez, District Court Judge

Raúl Torrez, Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
Michael J. Thomas, Assistant Attorney General
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellee

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Allison H. Jaramillo, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellant

                              MEMORANDUM OPINION

IVES, Judge.

{1}    After a jury trial, Defendant Alejandro Azamar-Nolasco was convicted of two
counts of possession of a deadly weapon by a prisoner, contrary to NMSA 1978,
Section 30-22-16 (1986) and tampering with evidence, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section
30-22-5 (2003). On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) insufficient evidence supports the
convictions; (2) double jeopardy principles prohibit him from being convicted of two
counts of possession of a deadly weapon by a prisoner, and from being convicted of
possession of a deadly weapon by a prisoner after receiving administrative punishment
for the same conduct; and (3) the failure to provide a special verdict form for tampering
with evidence resulted in fundamental error. We agree that Defendant’s double jeopardy
rights were violated when he was convicted of two counts of possession and we
therefore reverse and remand for one of the convictions to be vacated. We affirm in all
other respects.

DISCUSSION

I.     Sufficient Evidence Supports Defendant’s Convictions

{2}     Defendant argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain
his two convictions for possession of a deadly weapon and his conviction for tampering
with evidence. Deferring to the jury in the manner required by our established standard
of review, see State v. Holt, 2016-NMSC-011, ¶ 20, 368 P.3d 409, we disagree.

A.     Possession of a Deadly Weapon

{3}     Defendant was charged with two counts of possession of a deadly weapon by a
prisoner for a razor and a “shank”1 that were found in his cell but not on his person. The
State relied on a theory of constructive possession, which, under the given jury
instructions, required the State to prove that Defendant knew what the objects were and
exercised control over them. See id. (“The jury instructions become the law of the case
against which the sufficiency of the evidence is to be measured.” (citation omitted) (text
only)). To conclude that evidence of constructive possession suffices, we “must be able
to articulate a reasonable analysis that the fact-finder might have used to determine
knowledge and control.” State v. Garcia, 2005-NMSC-017, ¶ 13, 138 N.M. 1, 116 P.3d
72 (citation omitted) (text only). “[K]nowledge of the presence of [prohibited items] may
be inferred” where an individual has “exclusive possession” of an area. State v. Becerra,
1991-NMCA-090, ¶ 14, 112 N.M. 604, 817 P.2d 1246; see, e.g., State v. Montoya,
1973-NMCA-060, ¶ 5, 85 N.M. 126, 506 P.2d 893 (holding that a reasonable inference
can be drawn that a defendant who was in possession of a motel room for six days had
knowledge of the presence of drugs in the room).

{4}     The State presented evidence that supported a reasonable inference that
Defendant constructively possessed the two weapons. See Montoya, 1973-NMCA-060,
¶ 5. Lieutenant Regina Slade2 and Officer Brianne Hernandez testified about the nature
of the cells at Vigil Maldonado Detention Center (VMDC). Lieutenant Slade testified that
Defendant was held in a single-occupancy cell and that the razor and shank were found
within that cell. The State also presented evidence that it was VMDC’s standard
procedure to thoroughly search a cell and remove any contraband from that cell before
housing a new person there. Finally, the State called DNA expert Samantha Rynas,
who testified that biological material found on the shank in the toilet matched

1Here, a “shank” was described by the State as “an instrument that is made from whatever someone can
find that is incarcerated to use as a weapon, as a cutting or stabbing instrument.”
2Regina Slade was a Sergeant at the time of the incident but is now an Operational Lieutenant.
Defendant’s DNA. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict,
see Holt, 2016-NMSC-011, ¶ 20, a rational juror could find that Defendant had exclusive
control over his cell and therefore had constructive possession over the items found
during the search of his cell.

{5}    Defendant argues that the State failed to establish exclusive control because
there was evidence that “the items were found in a cell where guards and other inmates
routinely entered” and because there was no evidence that Defendant’s cell was
searched prior to his placement. However, “[c]ontrary evidence supporting acquittal
does not provide a basis for reversal.” State v. Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 19, 126 N.M.
438, 971 P.2d 829. We therefore hold that there was sufficient evidence to support
Defendant’s convictions for possession of a deadly weapon by a prisoner.

B.    Tampering With Evidence

{6}    We also conclude the State presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the elements
of tampering with evidence as set forth in the jury instruction: (1) “[D]efendant hid or
placed a sharp metal object, or a shank,” and (2) “[D]efendant intended to prevent the
apprehension, prosecution, or conviction of himself for the crime[] of [p]ossession of a
[d]eadly [w]eapon by a [p]risoner.”

{7}     As to the first element, Lieutenant Slade testified that individuals were not
allowed to possess weapons in their cells and that those held at the facility were made
aware that they were not allowed to have these items. Further, as discussed previously,
testimony was elicited from VMDC employees about the standard booking procedure at
the jail prior to assignment of a cell, including a thorough search of the cell, and the
removal of contraband if found during the preassignment search. The jury was free to
weigh this evidence as it saw fit, see State v. Pitner, 2016-NMCA-102, ¶ 6, 385 P.3d
665, and infer that standard booking procedures were followed, contraband was
removed prior to Defendant’s placement, and the shank was therefore placed in the
toilet by Defendant.

{8}     Turning to the second element—intent to tamper—we conclude that the State’s
circumstantial evidence sufficed. See State v. Telles, 2019-NMCA-039, ¶ 21, 446 P.3d
1194 (“Intent to tamper with evidence can be inferred from circumstantial evidence.”).
The State presented evidence that the shank was found in a small hole in Defendant’s
toilet and that employees needed to use a wire to remove it from the hole. Viewing this
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, see Holt, 2016-NMSC-011, ¶ 20, it
supported a reasonable inference by the jury that the discovery of the shank—not in
plain view, but inside the toilet—was evidence of Defendant’s desire to hide the
prohibited item and prevent his apprehension, prosecution, or conviction for possession
of a deadly weapon. We therefore hold that there was sufficient evidence to support
Defendant’s conviction for tampering with evidence.

II.   Double Jeopardy
{9}    Defendant argues that his double jeopardy rights were violated when (1) he was
convicted of two counts of possession of a weapon by a prisoner, and (2) he was
administratively punished at VMDC for possession and subsequently tried in a criminal
proceeding. We agree with Defendant’s first argument but disagree with his second.

A.     Two Convictions for Possession of a Deadly Weapon

{10} We review Defendant’s double jeopardy claims de novo. See State v. Swick,
2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 10, 279 P.3d 747. In unit of prosecution cases—when a person is
convicted of multiple violations of the same statute—we ask “whether the [L]egislature
intended punishment for the entire course of conduct or for each discrete act.” Swafford
v. State, 1991-NMSC-043, ¶ 8, 112 N.M. 3, 810 P.2d 1223. To discern legislative intent,
we apply a two-part test. See State v. Bernard, 2015-NMCA-089, ¶ 17, 355 P.3d 831.
First, “we look to the language of the criminal statute to determine whether the
Legislature has defined the unit of prosecution.” Id. If the language of the statute is
ambiguous regarding the unit of prosecution, we move to the second step and ask
“whether a defendant’s acts are separated by sufficient ‘indicia of distinctness’ to justify
multiple punishments under the same statute.” Id. (citation omitted) (text only).

{11} In this case, precedent resolves the first step in Defendant’s favor. In State v.
Benally, 2021-NMSC-027, ¶ 35, 493 P.3d 366, our Supreme Court concluded that the
statute prohibiting possession of a deadly weapon by a prisoner, § 30-22-16, is
“insurmountably ambiguous.” The Court therefore applied the rule of lenity and
“presume[d] that the Legislature did not intend to punish [the d]efendant separately for
each weapon possessed, unless [the] possession of each weapon could in some way
be considered distinct.” Benally, 2021-NMSC-027, ¶ 36.

{12} Turning to the second step, see Bernard, 2015-NMCA-089, ¶ 17, we consider
four factors to determine whether there were sufficient indicia of distinctness: “(1) the
relative timing of [the d]efendant’s gaining possession of the two weapons, (2) the
spacing between locations of the weapons [the d]efendant possessed, (3) the qualities
or nature of the weapons themselves, and (4) the results of [the d]efendant’s conduct.”
Benally, 2021-NMSC-027, ¶ 37.

{13} First, the relative timing of Defendant’s gaining possession of the razor and the
shank does not suffice to separate the two acts. In Benally, our Supreme Court rejected
the State’s speculation about when the defendant acquired the two weapons, noting
that “the [s]tate [did] not cite any evidence that show[ed] either how or when [the
d]efendant acquired each weapon.” Id. ¶ 38. Here, Defendant argues that this case and
Benally are analogous and that the State did not elicit testimony about when either of
the weapons at issue were acquired by Defendant. We agree with Defendant—and the
State concedes—that no evidence was presented about when the weapons were
obtained or for how long either of the weapons were in Defendant’s cell.

{14} Moving to the second factor in Benally—the “spacing” between the two items—
Defendant argues that “the weapons were found in different places in [D]efendant’s
area, but during the same search” and that the items must have been in close proximity
because they were found within a single jail cell. In Benally, “the weapons were found in
different places in [the d]efendant’s bunk area, . . . within an arm’s-length of the other”
and “both were found during the same search.” 2021-NMSC-027, ¶ 39 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court held that “[t]his indicium [did] not
distinguish [the d]efendant’s conduct.” Id. Here, the razor and shank were both found in
Defendant’s single occupancy cell at VMDC. Although the items were found in different
areas of the cell, that spacing was insufficient in Benally and, for similar reasons, is
insufficient here. Id. Additionally, while the shank was found at a slightly later time, it
was during the continuation of the same search by Lieutenant Slade and Deputy Trubert
Flowers. We therefore conclude that here, as in Benally, the spacing between the two
items does not suffice to separate the acts of possession.

{15} The State argues that evidence of Defendant “fidgeting with his waistband”
outside of the cell is an indication of “sufficient separation by physical ‘spacing’
between” the razor in his cell and the shank outside his cell. The State contends that
“[t]he record supports a conclusion that Defendant used one of the shanks in one cell [in
an attack on another inmate] while at least one other weapon, the razor, was in his own,
adjacent cell.” We are not persuaded that the record supports this conclusion in light of
Defendant’s acquittal for aggravated battery. Further, the State seemingly used the
placement of the shank inside of Defendant’s cell to prove constructive possession at
trial, suggesting that the jury implicitly found that Defendant possessed the shank in his
cell. Now, on appeal, the State argues that possession outside of the cell was also
proven by testimony about Defendant holding his waistband. We do not accept the
State’s parsing of the facts on appeal to avoid a double jeopardy violation. See State v.
Reed, 2022-NMCA-025, ¶ 27, 510 P.3d 1261 (“The [s]tate cannot wait for an appeal to
adequately separate [the d]efendant’s conduct to support each conviction; rather, the
[s]tate must do this work below to ensure that distinct conduct supports each charge
tried.”).

{16} The third factor—the “nature” of the razor and the shank—also falls short of
establishing distinct conduct. Defendant argues that, like in Benally, the two items at
issue were “more similar than different.” 2021-NMSC-027, ¶ 40 (citation omitted) (text
only). We agree. In Benally, our Supreme Court reasoned that “[u]nder [NMSA 1978,]
Section 30-1-12(B) [(1963)], both weapons fit the definition of ‘deadly weapon’ and had
a similar functionality as being weapons ‘with which dangerous cuts can be given, or
with which dangerous thrusts can be inflicted.’” 2021-NMSC-027, ¶ 40. The Court
therefore concluded that “the minor differences in functionality between the two prison-
made weapons possessed by [the d]efendant [did] not justify convicting him of separate
counts under Section 30-22-16.” 2021-NMSC-027, ¶ 40. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). The same logic applies here: Even if there were minor differences in
functionality between the razor and the shank, both are “weapons with which dangerous
wounds can be inflicted.” Section 30-1-12(B).

{17} Finally, we consider the “result” of Defendant’s possession of the two prohibited
items. See Benally, 2021-NMSC-027, ¶ 41. Defendant argues that, like in Benally, “the
only ‘result’ of the possession was the completed act of possession.” The State argues
that “the result of Defendant’s conduct was an actual ‘distinct decrease in prison safety’
as demonstrated by an undisputed attack on another inmate.’” The State contends that
“[t]he evidence objectively supports, for purposes of the analysis here, that Defendant
attacked another inmate in an adjacent cell” using a shank, and that the facts here are
therefore unlike those in Benally, in which the threat of the weapon “was never
actualized.”

{18} We disagree with the State. Importantly, the evidence presented at trial does not
“objectively support” that there was an attack on another inmate, as the State suggests,
with either of the items in Defendant’s cell. In fact, as previously discussed, the jury
found Defendant not guilty of aggravated battery. Because the State failed to prove
aggravated battery, the only result of Defendant’s conduct supported by the record was
the completed act of possession of the weapons.

{19} In Benally, our Supreme Court “agree[d] that the Legislature may have intended
to authorize multiple punishments when a defendant’s possession of a deadly weapon
had either the objective or result of a distinct decrease in prison safety.” 2021-NMSC-
027, ¶ 42. The Court explained that there may be some circumstances in which “an
inmate who is armed with multiple deadly weapons could . . . pose a distinctly greater
threat to prison safety than that same inmate armed only with a single weapon.” Id. The
Court concluded, however, that “the threat posed by the two makeshift weapons . . .
was never actualized, and, as such, any resultant decrease in safety [was] too
amorphous and abstract to sufficiently distinguish [the d]efendant’s conduct as two
discrete violations.” Id. ¶ 43. But here Defendant is not the “stockpiling” or “dual-
wielding” defendant envisioned by our Supreme Court in Benally. See id. Instead, just
as in Benally, the act of possessing two weapons in Defendant’s cell did not pose a
distinctly greater threat to prison safety than the possession of one weapon.

{20} For these reasons, we believe that Defendant’s two convictions for possession of
a deadly weapon by a prisoner are not separated by sufficient indicia of distinctness.
We therefore hold that the convictions violate double jeopardy, and we reverse and
remand for one of the convictions to be vacated. See State v. Porter, 2020-NMSC-020,
¶ 42, 476 P.3d 1201 (holding that if “both offenses result in the same degree of felony,
the choice of which conviction to vacate lies in the sound discretion of the district
court”).

B.     Defendant’s Double Jeopardy Rights Were Not Violated When He Was
       Punished Administratively and Subsequently in a Criminal Proceeding

{21} Double jeopardy also protects against “multiple punishments for the same
offense.” State v. Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 23, 306 P.3d 426 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Defendant argues that his double jeopardy protection
against multiple punishments for the same crime was violated “when he received a
disciplinary punishment including seventeen days in segregation and then again when
he was convicted and sentenced to additional prison time.” We disagree.
{22} Administrative sanctions “do not implicate double jeopardy protections . . . and
therefore those sanctions do not bar the subsequent prosecution of [the d]efendant for
crimes arising out of that incident.” State v. Astorga, 2000-NMCA-098, ¶ 8, 129 N.M.
736, 13 P.3d 468. This Court held in Astorga that the goal of disciplinary sanctions went
more to “effective prison management and less to the goal of individual punishment,”
and that the State is therefore justified in addressing individual punishment in a
separate criminal proceeding. Id. ¶ 6. Here, as in Astorga, Defendant was first subjected
to a disciplinary sanction at VMDC and then faced criminal charges; this did not violate
double jeopardy principles.

III.    The District Court Did Not Commit Fundamental Error by Failing to Give the
        Jury a Special Verdict Instruction

{23} Defendant argues that the district court committed fundamental error by failing to
provide the jury with a special verdict form regarding the instruction for tampering with
evidence. Defendant contends that because he was on trial for aggravated battery, as
well as possession of a deadly weapon, the jury may have been confused about the
crime to which the tampering charge pertained. Reviewing for fundamental error
because the issue was not preserved, see State v. Benally, 2001-NMSC-033, ¶ 12, 131
N.M. 258, 34 P.3d 1134, we conclude that no error occurred. The special verdict form
Defendant argues should have been provided at trial, UJI 14-6019 NMRA, is to be used
only “[i]f the defendant is charged with tampering with evidence of crimes that fit into
more than one category as defined in . . . Section 30-22-5(B).” UJI 14-2241 NMRA.3 But
that circumstance is not present here. Instead, the jury was explicitly instructed that the
tampering charge was for possession of the shank—a second degree felony. It was not
necessary to instruct the jury based on UJI 14-6019.

CONCLUSION

{24} We remand for the district court to vacate one of the convictions for possession
of a deadly weapon and to resentence Defendant accordingly. We affirm in all other
respects.

{25}    IT IS SO ORDERED.

ZACHARY A. IVES, Judge

WE CONCUR:

GERALD E. BACA, Judge

MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge,
retired, sitting by designation.

3Section 30-22-5(B) details the different degrees of punishment for tampering depending on the
seriousness of the underlying offense.