Court Opinion

ID: 9917294
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-11 21:03:35.39412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:07.021205
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (1st) 221781-U
                                                                                   Fourth Division
                                                                            Filed January 11, 2024
                                          No. 1-22-1781

         NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent
         except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                        IN THE
                              APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                    FIRST DISTRICT
                                                 )
DAUDA ILIYA,                                              Appeal from the
                                                 )
       Plaintiff-Appellant,                      )        Circuit Court of Cook County
                                                 )
  v.                                                      No. 22 M3 365
                                                 )
VENTON AUTOS, INC.,                              )        The Honorable Martin C. Kelley,
                                                 )        Judge, presiding.
       Defendant-Appellee.
                                                 )

         JUSTICE OCASIO III delivered the judgment of the court.
         Presiding Justice Rochford and Justice Hoffman concurred in the judgment.

                                             ORDER

¶1       Held: The appeal is dismissed because the trial court’s order dismissing the complaint
               without prejudice was not a final, appealable order.

¶2       Plaintiff Dauda Iliya appeals pro se from the trial court’s order dismissing his complaint

without prejudice. Because the complaint was dismissed without prejudice, however, the trial

court’s order was not final, nor was it an appealable interlocutory order. We therefore lack

jurisdiction to review that order, so we must dismiss the appeal.

¶3                                      BACKGROUND

¶4       In June 2022, Iliya filed a complaint seeking $10,000 in compensatory and punitive

damages for physical damage sustained to a vehicle he had purchased while it was being

transported from Los Angeles to Sacramento by defendant Venton Autos, Inc. (Venton), a now-
Iliya v. Venton Autos, Inc.                                                          No. 1-22-1781
                                                                        2024 IL App (1st) 221781-U

dissolved Illinois corporation.1 After multiple unsuccessful attempts to serve the complaint on
Venton at its registered address, Iliya filed a motion asking for permission to use a special service

method under section 2-203.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. See 735 ILCS 5/2-203.1 (West

2022). The next day, October 28, 2022, Iliya appeared in court via Zoom for a status hearing. The

record does not contain a transcript, only an order entered by the trial court using form CCM 0346,

which listed more than a dozen common orders or dispositions that might be entered during a

routine trial call and provided checkboxes for the court to indicate the appropriate order or orders.

On the order entered in this case, the court checked the box for “Case Dismissed by Agreement of

Parties/No Cost” and another box indicating that the dismissal was “Without Prejudice.”

¶5      On November 28, 2022, Iliya filed a pro se notice of appeal from the dismissal. 2 Then, on

December 1, 2022, Iliya filed a pro se motion asking the trial court to certify a bystander’s report

of the October 28, 2022, proceedings. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 323(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). Although the

motion stated that the proposed bystander’s report was attached, no such document is included in

the record on appeal. On December 16, 2022, the trial court denied Iliya’s motion on the basis that

it had “no memory” of the proceeding.

¶6      In this court, Iliya subsequently filed the common law record, but not a report of

proceedings. He also filed a pro se brief challenging both the dismissal of his complaint and the

trial court’s refusal to certify his proposed bystander’s report. Iliya attempted to serve his brief on
Venton via mail at its registered address and via email at an address listed on the bill of lading

found in the record. Unsurprisingly, Venton did not file a brief, so we took the case on Iliya’s brief

1
    According to the Secretary of State, Venton Autos Inc. was dissolved on March 11, 2022. See
    Business Entity Search, ILSOS.gov, https://apps.ilsos.gov/businessentitysearch/ (last visited
    January 4, 2024) (search by name or by file number 72954653); see also Country Mutual
    Insurance Co. v. Under Construction & Remodeling, Inc., 2021 IL App (1st) 210600, ¶ 10 n.3
    (taking judicial notice of corporate registration information on the Secretary of State’s website).
2
    Iliya’s notice of appeal was timely filed on Monday, November 28, 2022, as November 27,
    2022, was a Sunday. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a) (eff. July 1, 2017); 5 ILCS 70/1.11 (West 2022).

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Iliya v. Venton Autos, Inc.                                                          No. 1-22-1781
                                                                        2024 IL App (1st) 221781-U

and the record. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128,

133 (1976) (stating that a reviewing court may decide a case on an appellant’s brief alone “if the

record is simple and the claimed errors are such that the court can easily decide them without the

aid of an appellee’s brief”).

¶7                                          ANALYSIS

¶8     On appeal, Iliya argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his complaint, and he asks

us to reverse and remand for further proceedings. Before reaching the merits of his arguments,
however, we have a duty to independently determine whether we have jurisdiction. Secura

Insurance Co. v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 232 Ill. 2d 209, 213 (2009).

¶9     In general, we have jurisdiction to review appeals from final orders or judgments. See Ill.

Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6; Ill. S. Ct. R. 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). We only have jurisdiction to review

nonfinal orders as provided for by the supreme court rule. EMC Mortgage Corp. v. Kemp, 2012 IL

113419, ¶ 9. Here, the record shows that the trial court dismissed Iliya’s complaint without

prejudice which, by definition, means that he “is not barred from refiling the action.” Richter v.

Prairie Farms Dairy, Inc., 2016 IL 119518, ¶ 24. But for precisely that reason, the trial court’s

dismissal order was not a final order with respect to Iliya. DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth’s Hospital, 147

Ill. 2d 57, 76 (1992) (“An order dismissing an action without prejudice is not final.”). An order

dismissing without prejudice is not appealable as of right. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 307(a) (eff. Nov. 1,

2017). The dismissal order also does not appear to be one that would be appealable by permission
under Supreme Court Rule 306(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020), and, in any event, Iliya did not file a petition

for leave to appeal, which would be a jurisdictional prerequisite. See Law Offices of Jeffrey M.

Leving, Ltd. v. Cotting, 234 Ill. App. 3d 495,499 (2003). Hence, we lack jurisdiction to review the

trial court’s nonfinal dismissal order.

¶ 10   In the absence of jurisdiction, we have no choice but to dismiss Iliya’s appeal. Lebron v.

Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 237 Ill. 2d 217, 252 (2010). And because the appeal must be

dismissed, Iliya’s challenge to the trial court’s denial of his motion to certify a bystander’s report

                                                 -3-
Iliya v. Venton Autos, Inc.                                                           No. 1-22-1781
                                                                         2024 IL App (1st) 221781-U

is moot. See Fisch v. Loews Cineplex Theatres, Inc., 365 Ill. App. 3d 537, 539 (2005) (“An appeal

is considered moot *** if events have occurred that make it impossible to grant the complaining

party effectual relief.”).

¶ 11                                       CONCLUSION

¶ 12      Because the trial court’s order allowing the voluntary dismissal of Iliya’s complaint without

prejudice was not a final, appealable order, we lack jurisdiction. Accordingly, we must dismiss the

appeal.
¶ 13      Appeal dismissed.

                                                   -4-