Court Opinion

ID: 9716143
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:28:17.304477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:42.250652
License: Public Domain

*78Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Cohen:
In attempting to justify the searches and seizures in Commonwealth v. Bosurgi and Commonwealth v. Cockfield, the Commonwealth presents alternative arguments: (1) either the searches were valid under federal standards, or (2) Mapp v. Ohio does not require state courts to follow federal standards and the seizures involved do not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment since they resulted from reasonable police activity. In holding that the evidence need not be suppressed, the majority first declares that Mapp v. Ohio does not require state courts to follow federal standards. It then proceeds, however, to uphold the searches under federal standards, a decision which renders its statements about the impact of Mapp v. Ohio as obiter dictum.
I dissent from the decisions in Bosurgi and Cock-field for two reasons. First, I disagree with the majority’s view that these seizures can be upheld under federal standards. Secondly, even assuming that Mapp v. Ohio permits state courts to adopt less strict standards for judging the reasonableness of a search and seizure,1 the police activity in these cases violates the fourteenth amendment’s guarantee against invasions of privacy.2
In Bosurgi, the majority holds that an uncorroborated tip from an anonymous informant constitutes *79“probable cause” to arrest, thereby validating a search without a warrant incident to the arrest. Such holding is directly contrary to the federal cases on this point. The federal law is summarized as follows: “All the cases in which a ‘tip’ has been heavily relied upon to establish probable cause have stressed the need for ‘a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay,’ (citing a case), or a record of ‘accurate and reliable information,’ (citing a case) ; in short, ‘a previously reliable informant,’ (citing a case). Prudent and cautious men would not act in so decisive a fashion in reliance on an uncorroborated anonymous caller. . . .” (Costello v. United States, 298 F. 2d 99, 101 (9th Cir. 1962).3 Therefore, the search and seizure in Bosurgi cannot be upheld under federal standards.
The majority’s conclusion that there was “probable cause” under the federal cases for the arrest of defendant-Bosurgi is all the more surprising in view of the fact that the Commonwealth places little emphasis in its brief upon justifying the seizure under federal standards. The Commonwealth’s main argument is that we should break away from the rigid federal formulas for judging the legality of searches and seizures, and instead establish a test of whether the police activity in question was reasonable under the circumstances.4 *80Without deciding whether we are free to adopt the standard proposed by the Commonwealth, I cannot agree that the police acted in a reasonable manner in Bosurgi. No explanation is offered why the police did not first observe, defendant’s activities in the taproom and attempt to corroborate the anonymous tip, instead of. immediately arresting and searching him. Therefore, even, under the test suggested by the Commonwealth, I would hold that the evidence seized in Bor surgi must be suppressed.
Turning next to the Cockfield decision, the majority holds that the search of the automobile without a warrant was justified under the federal rule of “search incident, to arrest,” although at the time of the search defendant-Cockfield had been safely - behind bars for. 24 hours and the automobile was parked across the street from the police station. The meaning and rationale behind the search incident, to arrest doctrine— the only occasion under federal law where, a search can be conducted without a warrant—is not to be sought in the Oxford English Dictionary, as the. majority-does, but rather in the considerable body of federal law dealing with that concept. The two. purposes of the rule are to protect the arresting officer from bodily harm, and. to prevent the defendant from destroying evidence which is “within his control.” See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). Where, as here, the defendant has been in custody for 24 hours the rule is obviously inapplicable. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
In addition, no explanation is. offered why a search warrant was not secured. Although Rabinowitz -holds that it is not necessary for the prosecution to justify in each case the failure to obtain a search warrant, the failure to secure a warrant where, as in the instant case, one could easily, be obtained without danger of a disappearance of the evidence, is a factor in determining *81the validity of the search and seizure. See Chapman v. United States, 365 U. S. 610 (1961).
The failure to obtain a warrant under the circumstances presented in Cockfield would also lead me to hold, under the test suggested by the Commonwealth, that the police activity was not reasonable or proper. Therefore, I would hold that the evidence must be suppressed under either alternative presented by the Commonwealth.
For the above reasons, I dissent in Commonwealth v. Bosurgi and Commonwealth v. Cockfield.

 The possible interpretations of the Mapp decision are set forth in Note, The Supreme Court 1960 Term, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 152-58 (1961). See also, Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in the recent United States Supreme Court decision of Gideon v. Wainwright, 31 U.S. L. Week 4291 (March 18, 1963).

 In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the United States Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment’s protection against invasions of privacy is embodied in the fourteenth amendment. In Mapp, the Court took the next logical step and held that evidence obtained in violation of this Constitutional guarantee must be excluded by state courts.

 The most recent United States Supreme Court eases on what constitutes “probable cause” to arrest are Henry v. United Stales, 361 U.S. 98 (1959) (no probable cause) ; Draper v. United, States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) (probable cause where a paid, reliable informant and tip corroborated by personal observations of the arresting officer) ; and Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (probable cause where a reliable informant and defendant a known user of narcotics).

 The practical signifance of such a test would be to permit arrests where only reasonable suspicion exists that defendant has committed an offense, and to permit searches without warrants although not made incident to an arrest. See Specter, Mapp v. Ohio : Pandora’s Problems for the Prosecutor, 111 U. Pa. L. Rev. 4 (1962).