Court Opinion

ID: 9536838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:07:49.683049+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:55:24.132885
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Justice,
concurring specially and dissenting.
I agree the summary judgment in this case must be reversed, and the ease remanded for further proceedings. I cannot, however, subscribe to the rationale of the opinion of the Court.
We have chosen to use this case as a vehicle to debate the continuing viability of the no duty rule with respect to natural accumulation of moisture when we really are setting aside a summary judgment because of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the condition of which the injured party complains was the product of a natural accumulation. In the process we have im*902ported some muddy water from Massachusetts to adopt a definition of an unnatural accumulation of water from a ease that does not appear to have been resolved in the context of a rule of no duty relating to natural accumulations.
The Massachusetts court also said:
It was a question of fact whether the defendant was negligent in maintaining an improper or defective marquee from which water escaped upon the way and froze and in suffering the ice to remain upon the sidewalk up to the time the plaintiff was injured.
Harrison v. Poli-New England Theatres, Inc., 304 Mass. 123, 23 N.E.2d 99, 100 (1939).
To paraphrase that concept for this case:
It was a question of fact whether K-Mart was negligent in maintaining an improper or defective parking lot on which water melted and froze and in suffering the ice to remain upon the parking lot up to the time the plaintiff was injured.
It would be far more helpful to the parties in this case, since we are opting to maintain the rule that an entrepreneur has no duty to protect customers from hazardous conditions attributable to the natural accumulation of ice and snow, to offer guidance as to the resolution of the case if the finder of fact should conclude the condition in this instance was not caused by a natural accumulation of ice and snow. If a duty exists on the part of the business proprietor to attend to the condition of the parking lot at some time subsequent to the natural accumulation (and I submit that such a duty does exist), then what are the rules that apply in identifying a breach of such a duty that may lead to liability?
It appears we all might agree a finder of fact could conclude the conditions in the parking lot were not the result of a natural accumulation of moisture (unless we also adopt a rule that all moisture comes from the sky and therefore moisture is always a natural accumulation). The résumé of Wyoming cases found in O’Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278 (Wyo.1985), then becomes useful in addressing this case. A fair summary of O’Donnell is that, if the applicable rule is the clear and obvious danger rule, the negligence of the plaintiff and the defendant must be compared in resolving the issue of liability. There is also to be gleaned from O’Donnell the proposition that an actor may have a duty to correct a known and obvious danger if the actor created it. It does not seem that it should be necessary to find a distinction between those situations in which the dangerous condition was created generally by, for example, the construction of a parking lot or specifically by, for example, spreading gravel on a street.
At this juncture, the known and obvious danger rule really comes down to a comparison between the actors as to which had the best opportunity to be aware of, and avoid, the injury. That comparison assumes each knew of the hazardous condition and, in this instance, I would extend the rule of Buttrey Food Stores Division v. Coulson, 620 P.2d 549, 20 A.L.R.4th 419 (Wyo.1980), to satisfy the requirement for proving the knowledge of K-Mart. In light of the record information of the attention K-Mart paid to the parking lot, the application of the Buttrey rule must have been anticipated by K-Mart. Conceding that, in an imperfect world, it may not be possible to construct a perfect parking lot, a warning of a known hazardous condition is well within the realm of possibility.
In summary, I agree the summary judgment should be reversed and the case remanded because there is a genuine issue of a material fact, ie., was the accumulation natural or unnatural. I would not, however, adopt the definition of an unnatural accumulation offered in the majority opinion, but might well leave that to the common sense judgment of the trier of fact. I would impose a duty upon an owner of land, particularly a business proprietor, to address the hazardous condition at some point in time after the moisture was deposited as a natural phenomenon. In so doing, I would apply the rule of Buttrey in determining whether the owner was chargeable with knowledge of the hazardous condition. The relative responsibility of the actors then should be weighed *903under the rule relating to comparative negligence.
I would reverse and remand because there is a genuine issue of material fact. I accept the natural accumulation rule of no duty, but I would attempt to afford guidance for the application of the clear and obvious danger rule in this instance.