Court Opinion

ID: 9527275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:29:04.059418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:40.828454
License: Public Domain

Krivosha, C.J.,
dissenting.
I regret that I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case. To begin with, I do not believe that an easement such as that given to the Fremont, Elkhorn and Missouri Valley Railroad Company, see Lillich v. Lowery, 211 Neb. 757, 320 N.W.2d 463 (1982), was sufficient or broad enough to authorize the railroad or its successors to grant to York County Rural Public Power District (York PPD) authority to build a high-voltage electric transmission line along the right-of-way. In Muncie Electric Light Co. v. Joliff, 59 Ind. App. 349, 109 N.E. 433 (1915), the Indiana court held that *490where a railroad company owned only an easement, it could not license third persons to construct other lines on its right-of-way, and persons attempting to do so were merely trespassing.
Further, in Potomac Edison Co. v. Routzahn, 192 Md. 449, 65 A.2d 580 (1949), a case very similar to the case at bar was presented to the Maryland court. The owners of certain land argued that the construction of powerlines along a railroad right-of-way by the power company was permissive and therefore could not ripen into adverse possession. In reversing the trial court and in finding that the electric company had acquired a right by adverse possession, the court said at 462, 65 A.2d at 585-86:
The question is whether or not the power lines were erected with a view to be used by the railway company in the future in its business as a railway or whether such construction was solely for the use of a power company in the pursuit of a different business from railway business and for the profit of both companies. If the power lines were constructed with the latter motive they were not within the grant of the right of way, but if for the former reason they were and no additional servitude was imposed on the land.
The court then concluded that the use of the right-of-way for high-tension transmission lines was not within the grant by deed or merely incidental thereto, and therefore was an open, uninterrupted, adverse use for more than the statutorily prescribed time.
The evidence in this case, limited as it is, makes it clear to me that the construction of the electric power transmission line along the right-of-way was in no manner for the benefit of the Chicago and North Western Railway Company, successor to the Fremont, Elkhorn and Missouri Valley Railroad Company, but, rather, was for the purpose of transmitting electricity for and on behalf of York PPD. On that basis the railroad was without authority to grant permission to York PPD to construct the powerline, no matter what either party thought to the contrary.
I have difficulty understanding how, if the railroad had no authority to grant permission to the power district in the first *491place, York PPD’s entry upon the right-of-way could be permissive. It seems clear to me that had the owner of the land sought to eject York PPD from the right-of-way at any time before York PPD’s presence ripened into a prescriptive right, the owner would have been successful. The fact that a trespasser pays rent to one without authority to subject the land to a burden does not give the trespasser authority to remain on the land, no matter what the trespasser may honestly believe. Nor does the fact that one may believe it has a right to be on property constitute permission of the type to defeat adverse possession. Persons who claim adverse possession generally believe that they have a right in the property, only later to discover they are in error.
When we talk about intent to possess, we do not, I believe, mean in the sense that the possessor must know that his presence is unlawful and for a time precarious but, rather, that he does indeed intend to possess the land and not just unconsciously and quietly wander about.
In Barnes v. Milligan, 196 Neb. 50, 54, 241 N.W.2d 508, 511 (1976), quoting from Purdum v. Sherman, 163 Neb. 889, 81 N.W.2d 331 (1957), we said:
“Adverse possession is founded upon the intent with which the occupant has held possession and this intent can best be determined by his acts in relation thereto. * * * The real purpose of prescribing the manner in which an adverse holding will be manifested is to give notice to the real owner that his title or ownership is in danger so that he may within the period of limitation take action to protect his interest. It is the nature of the hostile possession that constitutes the warning, not the intent of the claimant when he takes possession....”
Recognizing that everyone is presumed to know the law, we must likewise recognize that the owner of this land is presumed to know that the railroad company did not have authority to grant permission to the power company and, therefore, could not permit the power company to enter the land permissively. It is hard to imagine what could be more open, adverse, and notorious, and therefore sufficient to give notice to the real owner, than a high-power transmission line strung along high *492rise towers. Whatever York PPD may like to think, it was a trespasser from the very moment it entered upon the land because it was dealing with an entity that had no authority to grant permission to it. The fact that it paid the railroad a fee is irrelevant. As we pointed out in Nebraska State Bank v. Gaddis, 208 Neb. 136, 140, 302 N.W.2d 686, 689 (1981):
“The fact that one claiming title by adverse possession never intended to claim more land than is called for in his deed is not a controlling factor. It is the intent with which possession is held rather than an intention to hold in accordance with his deed that is controlling. . . . ‘. . . In other words, it is the visible and adverse possession, with an intention to possess land occupied under a belief that it is the possessor’s own, that constitutes its adverse character, and not the remote view or belief of the possessor.’ ”
In the instant case, York PPD believed it had a right to construct its line along the railroad right-of-way. In truth and in fact, it did not have that right; and therefore if it exercised that right for more than 10 years, it acquired an easement by adverse possession.
I believe that the district court was correct, and I would have affirmed its decision.
Caporale, J., joins in this dissent.