Court Opinion

ID: 9910311
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-15 15:01:54.954234+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:11.784112
License: Public Domain

Rel: December 15, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

                 Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
                               OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024
                                _________________________

                                          CR-21-0410
                                   _________________________

                                    Lavacus Derrell Hooks

                                                      v.

                                         State of Alabama

                     Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court
                                 (CC-19-1351)

COLE, Judge.

        Lavacus Derrell Hooks appeals his conviction for second-degree

assault, a violation of § 13A-6-21(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975, 1 and his resulting

        1Hooks was indicted for attempted murder, a violation of §§ 13A-4-

2 and 13A-6-2, Ala. Code 1975, but he was convicted of the lesser-
included offense of second-degree assault.
CR-21-0410

sentence of 20 years' imprisonment, which was split to serve 5 years'

imprisonment followed by 2 years' probation.

                         Facts and Procedural History

     Hooks and David Jerome Lee were incarcerated in the same "lock-

down" wing of the Montgomery County Detention Center. That wing

remains locked down with a "23-1" rotation, meaning that inmates are

allowed out one at a time for one hour, but otherwise they are secured in

a cell. (R. 104.) The cell doors are secured electronically, but there is a

history of inmates "jamming" the door locks to prevent them from being

secure without alerting detention-center staff. (R. 103-04, 109.)

     On August 7, 2019, Lee was on his way to take a shower when

Hooks exited his cell and used an unknown object to stab Lee multiple

times. Hooks then "skipped" back to his cell. Lee was taken to the

hospital to be examined. Lee had multiple lacerations on his left arm and

shoulder, a minor puncture wound on the back of his head, and four

puncture wounds on his back with lacerations. He had been stabbed

approximately eight times. (R. 125-26.)

     At trial, the State presented two witnesses, Lieutenant Oscar

Richardson    of   the    Montgomery      County   Detention   Center   and

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Investigator M.B. Morrow of the Montgomery County Sheriff's Office.

The State presented a jail-surveillance video, which was labeled State's

Exhibit 1, photographs of Lee's injuries, and photographs of the cell area

after the incident. State's Exhibit 1 was played during the testimony of

Lt. Richardson and Inv. Morrow and during the State's closing

arguments. Hooks objected to the introduction of State's Exhibit 1 on the

ground that the State had failed to lay the proper foundation under the

"silent witness" theory.

     On February 15, 2022, the jury found Hooks guilty of second-degree

assault.   (C. 135.)   The Montgomery Circuit Court sentenced Hooks

immediately after the jury returned its verdict. After argument from

counsel, the trial court imposed two different sentences, but after Hooks's

counsel objected to both sentences, the trial court imposed a sentence of

15 years and 1 day in prison, which was split to serve 3 years in prison

followed by 2 years of probation. (R. 205-08.) The following day, the trial

court returned Hooks to the courtroom and resentenced him, over defense

counsel's objection, to 20 years in prison, which was split to serve 5 years

in prison followed by 2 years of probation.

                                     3
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                                  Discussion

      Hooks raises four issues on appeal: (1) that the trial court erred

when it admitted the jail-surveillance video without requiring the State

to lay the proper predicate for the admission of the video, (2) that the trial

court erred in instructing the jury on the issue of "flight," (3) that the trial

court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense

of third-degree assault, and (4) that the trial court violated double-

jeopardy principles by increasing Hooks's sentence after imposing a legal

sentence the preceding day.

                                       I.

      As set out above, the State introduced a jail-surveillance video of

Hooks stabbing Lee -- State's Exhibit 1 -- during the testimony of Lt.

Richardson. Hooks objected to the admission of the video because, he

said, the State did not lay the proper foundation to authenticate the video

under the silent witness theory.           The trial court overruled Hooks's

objection and admitted the video, and the video was played for the jury.

(R. 99.) Except for the video, there was no other direct evidence that

Hooks committed the offense in question. As he asserted at trial, Hooks

argues on appeal that the trial court erred in admitting the video into

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evidence because the State failed to establish a proper foundation for the

admission of the video.

     As both parties acknowledge in their briefs on appeal, there are two

primary theories for the admission of video evidence. In Ex parte Fuller,

620 So. 2d 675, 678 (Ala. 1993), the Alabama Supreme Court held:

            "There are two theories upon which photographs,
     motion pictures, videotapes, sound recordings, and the like
     are analyzed for admission into evidence: the 'pictorial
     communication' or 'pictorial testimony' theory and the 'silent
     witness' theory.     [James H. Chadbourn,] Wigmore [on
     Evidence], § 790 [(1970 & Supp. 1991)]; [2 John W. Strong,]
     McCormick [on Evidence] § 214 [(1992)]; 6 William A.
     Schroeder [et al.], Alabama Evidence, [§ 11-3 (1987 & Supp.
     1988)]. The 'pictorial communication' theory is that a
     photograph, etc., is merely a graphic portrayal or static
     expression of what a qualified and competent witness sensed
     at the time in question. Wigmore, supra, § 790, and
     McCormick, supra, § 214. The 'silent witness' theory is that a
     photograph, etc., is admissible, even in the absence of an
     observing or sensing witness, because the process or
     mechanism by which the photograph, etc., is made ensures
     reliability and trustworthiness. In essence, the process or
     mechanism substitutes for the witness's senses, and because
     the process or mechanism is explained before the photograph,
     etc., is admitted, the trust placed in its truthfulness comes
     from the proposition that, had a witness been there, the
     witness would have sensed what the photograph, etc., records.
     Wigmore, supra, § 790, and McCormick, supra, § 214.

          ".... The proper foundation required for admission into
     evidence of a sound recording or other medium by which a
     scene or event is recorded (e.g., a photograph, motion picture,
     videotape, etc.) depends upon the particular circumstances. If

                                    5
CR-21-0410

    there is no qualified and competent witness who can testify
    that the sound recording or other medium accurately and
    reliably represents what he or she sensed at the time in
    question, then the 'silent witness' foundation must be laid.
    Under the 'silent witness' theory, a witness must explain how
    the process or mechanism that created the item works and
    how the process or mechanism ensures reliability. When the
    'silent witness' theory is used, the party seeking to have the
    sound recording or other medium admitted into evidence
    must meet the seven-prong Voudrie [ v. State, 387 So. 2d 248
    (Ala. Crim. App. 1980),] test. Rewritten to have more general
    application, the Voudrie standard requires:

              " (1) a showing that the device or process or
         mechanism that produced the item being offered
         as evidence was capable of recording what a
         witness would have seen or heard had a witness
         been present at the scene or event recorded,

               " (2) a showing that the operator of the device
         or process or mechanism was competent,

               " (3) establishment of the authenticity and
         correctness of the resulting recording, photograph,
         videotape, etc.,

               " (4) a showing that no changes, additions, or
         deletions have been made,

              " (5) a showing of the manner in which the
         recording, photograph, videotape, etc., was
         preserved,

               " (6) identification of the speakers, or persons
         pictured, and

              " (7) for criminal cases only, a showing that
         any statement made in the recording, tape, etc.,

                                   6
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           was voluntarily made without any kind of coercion
           or improper inducement.

           "On the other hand, when a qualified and competent
     witness can testify that the sound recording or other medium
     accurately and reliably represents what the witness sensed at
     the time in question, then the foundation required is that for
     the 'pictorial communication' theory. Under this theory, the
     party offering the item must present sufficient evidence to
     meet the 'reliable representation' standard, that is, the
     witness must testify that the witness has sufficient personal
     knowledge of the scene or events pictured or the sounds
     recorded and that the item offered accurately and reliably
     represents the actual scene or sounds."

     At trial, the State did not present any witnesses who could testify

that the video reliably and accurately reflected what they sensed at the

time of the incident. Therefore, the State was required to lay a predicate

under the "silent witness" theory to admit State's Exhibit 1 into evidence.

     The State called only two witnesses during Hooks's trial.          Lt.

Richardson -- a shift commander at the detention center -- was the

primary witness called by the State to lay a predicate for the video. Lt.

Richardson testified that he is familiar with the surveillance system that

is installed in the detention center and that he has been trained in how

to search for incidents in the system's hard drive.       (R. 96-97.)   Lt.

Richardson testified that the system is "designed to aid us in monitoring

the inmate population because it's humanly impossible to see everything

                                    7
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-- everyone and everything." (R. 96.) He described the training he had

received on the system as "pretty basic and routine." (R. 96.) He further

detailed the training as follows:

           "The basic training is you utilize the monitors to, like I
     said, aid in monitoring the inmates, things of that nature.
     The system records 24/7. There is a database that is primarily
     utilized by supervisors that we go back -- log into to research
     incidents; or if we have an issue in a cell block, to try to narrow
     down, you know, to find out what really happened, yeah."

(R. 96-97.)

     Lt. Richardson further testified that surveillance footage is kept on

a hard drive and could be transferred to a USB drive. He said that the

system constantly records and "never" records over footage. (R. 97.) Lt.

Richardson stated that he watched the video related to the incident

involving Hooks and Lee "when the incident first occurred" and reviewed

it again the day of trial. (R. 97-98.) He identified State's Exhibit 1 as

"the disk that I viewed, and I also initialed it." (R. 98.) He testified that

when he reviewed the footage it was in the same or substantially the

same condition as the last time he had reviewed it and that it had not

been altered in any way. (R. 98.) Lt. Richardson testified that the video

accurately and fairly depicted the J1, 4B cell block at the Montgomery

County Detention Center. (R. 108, 111.)

                                     8
CR-21-0410

     However, on cross-examination, after the video had been admitted

into evidence and published to the jury, Lt. Richardson testified that he

did not know how the system was installed or how it is maintained. He

responded to questions regarding installation and maintenance by

stating that "IT" would need to be consulted for that information. Lt.

Richardson said that he did not know what kind of safeguards or security

measures exist in the system's software and that all supervisors have

access to the system. He also could not testify as to how the system itself

is kept secure in the detention center. Also, Lt. Richardson stated that

he was not working the night of the incident, did not watch the video

footage of the incident until the next day, and was not the person who

downloaded the video from the system to the disk. (R. 105-06.) But, he

said, the video was "burned directly from the software directly to the

disk." (R. 108.) He again testified on redirect examination that the video

fairly and accurately depicts the J1, 4B cell block at the Montgomery

County Detention Center. (R. 111-12.)

     Hooks argues that the video was not properly authenticated under

the silent-witness theory. Hooks does not contend that the surveillance

system was incapable of recording the event in question, that the

                                    9
CR-21-0410

operator of the system was not competent, that the identity of the

individuals pictured was not established, or that there was any type of

coercion in creating the video. Hooks, instead, argues that the State

failed to establish the "authenticity and correctness" of the recording,

that the State failed to show that no "changes, additions, or deletions

have been made," and that there was an insufficient showing of how the

recording was preserved. Hooks focuses on the State's failure to mention

any specific "safeguards" in the system to prevent alterations and the fact

that Lt. Richardson did not view the video until the day after the incident.

Hooks's argument, which depends on a rigid reading of the requirements

set forth in Voudrie v. State, 387 So. 2d 248 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980), is

without merit.

     We first note that "[t]he question of admissibility of evidence is

generally left to the discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's

determination on that question will not be reversed except upon a clear

showing of abuse of discretion." Ex parte Loggins, 771 So. 2d 1093, 1103

(Ala. 2000).     Regarding the fourth Voudrie requirement -- that no

alterations have been made -- this Court explained in Capote v. State,

323 So. 3d 104, 133 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020), that the Voudrie

                                    10
CR-21-0410

requirements, particularly this one, should not be applied "too strict[ly]."

Id.   "[T]he clear import of the prong is that the video in question

accurately reflects what it is purported to show." Id. The State made

this showing.

      Lt. Richardson testified that the video "fairly and accurately"

represented the jail cell block, that the surveillance system records

continuously, and that the system "never" records over data.            Lt.

Richardson further testified that he and other supervisors routinely log

in to the system and view videos to research incidents on the cell block.

Lt. Richardson viewed the video of Hooks stabbing Lee the day after the

assault.    The video that he watched the day after the assault was

downloaded from the system's hard drive directly onto the disk that Lt.

Richardson initialed. Moreover, Lt. Richardson testified that the video

played at trial was the same as the video he watched the day after the

incident.

      Additionally, it is important to note that "[t]here is no evidence

indicating that the recording was altered so as to give a misleading

account of the [stabbing] or that the video footage was anything other

than what it purported to show." Capote, 323 So. 3d at 134. Indeed,

                                    11
CR-21-0410

Hooks has never alleged that the video has been altered. Moreover, that

a video is accurate and trustworthy and that no alterations have been

made may be shown in multiple ways. For example, in Capote, this Court

found that Voudrie's requirements had been satisfied because the

operator of the equipment testified that "she did not 'see how [the officers]

could [edit the video]' because the video is 'time and date stamped.' " Id.

at 133 (quoting R. 509-10). Although no witness so testified in Hooks's

trial, the video, which this Court has viewed, speaks for itself. As in

Capote, the video is date- and time-stamped, and there was no challenge

below to the accuracy of those stamps. Furthermore, the time is provided

by a clock that is accurate to the nearest thousandth of a second. The

entire video lasts less than a minute and continuously shows Hooks's

attack on Lee from start to finish. On August 7, 2019, Lee gets to the top

of the stairs at 7:38:35.448 p.m. Hooks is clearly seen running out of his

cell after Lee at 7:38:40.254 p.m. At 7:38:43.925 p.m., Hooks starts

stabbing Lee, then he drops onto the ground a bedsheet that was used as

a "handle" for the weapon used in the stabbing. Hooks then skips back

to his cell at 7:39:01.801 p.m. Hooks arrives back at his cell and closes

the door at 7:39:09.023 p.m. There are no breaks or pauses in the video

                                     12
CR-21-0410

that would indicate any alteration, addition, or deletion of any kind. The

accuracy of the video is corroborated by the testimony of Inv. Morrow who

authenticated photographs, taken less than an hour after the stabbing,

of blood stains in the area where the stabbing occurred and of the "sheet"

found in the area where it was shown to be discarded in the video. (R.

118-19, 124, 133.) Furthermore, the video depicts Hooks exiting and

returning to the jail cell that Inv. Morrow confirmed was Hooks's own

"lock-down" "isolation area" jail cell, and there was no dispute that Hooks

was found in the cell after the assault. (R. 101-02, 176.) In sum, the

reliability and trustworthiness of the surveillance system was explained

by Lt. Richardson, and his testimony, in combination with the trial

court's and this Court's viewing of the video, shows no evidence of

alteration of the continuous, date- and time-stamped surveillance-video

recording.

     Finally, "[b]ecause the videotape was properly authenticated … and

because the State established that the video[-recording device] was a

reliable mechanism that was capable of accurately recording the

[stabbing], the State was not required to establish a chain of custody for

                                    13
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the videotape." Woodward v. State, 123 So. 3d 989, 1027 (Ala. Crim. App.

2011).

      Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting

the jail-surveillance video.

                                    II.

      Hooks next argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury

on the issue of "flight." On appeal, Hooks raises two grounds for this

Court's consideration: (1) that the instruction was improper because it

"informed the jury that flight should be considered as a consciousness of

guilt rather than allowing the jury to weigh the reason for the supposed

flight" (Hooks's brief, pp. 31-32) and (2) that the evidence did not support

a flight instruction.

      The first argument regarding the content of the trial court's flight

instruction was not properly preserved for appellate review. The trial

court instructed the jury as follows: "If you find from the evidence that

the defendant fled from the scene of the crime, then you may consider

that evidence as tending to show the defendant's consciousness of guilty."

(R. 189.) Hooks compares this instruction to the one given in Ex parte

Weaver, 678 So. 2d 284, 287 (Ala. 1996), in which Weaver's conviction

                                    14
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was reversed because the instruction "improperly suggested to the jury

that the only conclusion that could be reasonably drawn from the

evidence was that Weaver had gone to Florida to avoid prosecution." At

trial, Hooks objected to the State's proposed flight instruction and

asserted that the instruction was not justified because Hooks was merely

"leaving the assault as opposed to trying to escape the jail or trying to

run from apprehension" and that he left to a location where authorities

"can find him."     In other words, although Hooks objected to the

applicability of a flight instruction, he did not object based upon the

content of the specific flight instruction given in this case.

     It is well settled that

     " '[r]eview on appeal is restricted to questions and issues
     properly and timely raised at trial.' Newsome v. State, 570
     So. 2d 703, 717 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989). 'An issue raised for
     the first time on appeal is not subject to appellate review
     because it has not been properly preserved and presented.'
     Pate v. State, 601 So. 2d 210, 213 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992).
     ' "[T]o preserve an issue for appellate review, it must be
     presented to the trial court by a timely and specific motion
     setting out the specific grounds in support thereof." '
     McKinney v. State, 654 So. 2d 95, 99 (Ala. Crim App. 1995)
     (citation omitted). 'The statement of specific grounds of
     objection waives all grounds not specified, and the trial court
     will not be put in error on grounds not assigned at trial.' Ex
     parte Frith, 526 So. 2d 880, 882 (Ala. 1987). 'The purpose of
     requiring a specific objection to preserve an issue for appellate
     review is to put the trial judge on notice of the alleged error,

                                     15
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     giving an opportunity to correct it before the case is submitted
     to the jury.' Ex parte Works, 640 So. 2d 1056, 1058 (Ala.
     1994."

Ex parte Coulliette, 857 So. 2d 793, 794-95 (Ala. 2003). " 'In order to

preserve for review an objection to the giving or the denial of a jury

instruction, it is necessary for the appellant to state for the record upon

what specific grounds the objection is made.' Cauley v. State, 681 So. 2d

1105, 1107 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996)." Buford v. State, 891 So. 2d 423, 431

(Ala. Crim. App. 2004).

     Because Hooks did not object to the content of the trial court's flight

instruction that he now challenges on appeal, this issue is not properly

before this Court. Therefore, Hooks is not entitled to relief on the first

ground he raised regarding the content of the trial court's flight

instruction.

     Hooks also argues on appeal that there was no evidence to support

the trial court's instruction on flight. Specifically, Hooks asserts that his

"exiting and returning to his cell could not have been to avoid

apprehension or prosecution"; therefore, he asserts, his actions after the

assault could not be regarded as "flight."       Although this issue was

                                     16
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preserved for appellate review, Hooks is not entitled to relief on this

claim.

     This Court has consistently held that " '[a] trial court has broad

discretion when formulating its jury instructions.' " Belcher v. State, 341

So. 3d 237, 289 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020) (quoting Williams v. State, 795 So.

2d 753, 780 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999)).      As both parties acknowledge,

" 'Alabama caselaw has long held that evidence of flight or attempted

flight in a criminal case is a circumstance that a jury may take into

consideration in determining guilt or innocence.' " Young v. State, [Ms.

CR-17-0595, Aug. 6, 2021] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2021)

(quoting Henderson v. State, 248 So. 3d 992, 1011 (Ala. Crim. App.

2017)).

     Although Hooks did not leave the detention center where he was

incarcerated, he did leave the "scene" of the stabbing. As previously

noted, a video of the incident showed that Hooks left his cell, stabbed Lee

numerous times from behind, and went immediately back to his cell and

closed the door.   The jury could have concluded that Hooks left the

common area where the stabbing occurred and returned to his cell to

cover up his involvement in the stabbing and to avoid apprehension for

                                    17
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his acts. Although Hooks correctly asserts that his whereabouts would

have been known because he returned to his own cell, his decision to

return to his cell could have certainly been regarded as an attempt to act

as if he had never left his cell and, thus, be regarded as an attempt to

avoid apprehension and prosecution. The jury could have concluded that

Hooks exhibited a consciousness of guilt when he fled, albeit by skipping

away, from the area where Lee was assaulted; therefore, the trial court

did not err in instructing the jury that it could consider Hooks's actions

in determining whether the State had proven its case beyond a

reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in giving a

flight instruction.

                                   III.

     Third, Hooks argues that the trial court erred by refusing to

instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of third-degree assault.

The State argues that this issue was not properly preserved for appellate

review and that, regardless, the evidence did not warrant an instruction

on third-degree assault. We agree that this issue was not preserved for

appellate review and that the argument is without merit.

                                   18
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     The indictment returned by the Montgomery County Grand Jury

charged Hooks with the attempted murder of Lee. After both sides

presented evidence and rested, the trial court held a charge conference.

The trial court denied the State's request for a jury charge on first-degree

assault. Hooks did not object to the State's request for a jury instruction

on the lesser-included offense of second-degree assault. Hooks's attorney

then orally requested, as follows, that the jury be instructed on third-

degree assault:

          "[Hooks's attorney]: I would ask -- request that the
     Court also instruct on assault third. Assault third requires
     physical injury. And the only difference between assault
     second and assault third is the lack of a dangerous instrument
     or deadly weapon.

           "In this case, Your Honor, although there is evidence to
     suggest that one was used, the jury could believe that an
     object that would not constitute a deadly weapon, but would
     -- For example, if the jury believed that something like a
     pencil was used, some sharp object that wasn't typically used
     for the purpose of causing injury, if they believe that -- Under
     the circumstances of this case, a dangerous instrument would
     be defined as something -- sorry -- which under the
     circumstances in which it is used or threatened to be used is
     highly capable of causing death or serious physical injury.
     Because there is no evidence of substantial risk of death or
     serious physical injury in this case, the jury could believe that
     whatever was used was not -- did not constitute a dangerous
     instrument. And, therefore, we think, whether it's a strong
     argument or not, it's sufficient to go to the jury."

                                    19
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(R. 150-51.)   After the State gave reasons why it believed that an

instruction on third-degree assault was inappropriate, the following

transpired:

          "THE COURT: [Prosecutor], does a pencil qualify as a
     dangerous instrument?

            "[Prosecutor]: It can qualify as a sharp object.

           "[Hooks's attorney]:       It can depending on the
     circumstances in which it's used, Your Honor. The case law
     on that is specific to if you jammed it into someone's eye or
     some other area that would have a substantial risk of death
     or serious physical injury.

           "Our argument that if that is what's used in this case, it
     did not create substantial risk of death or serious physical
     injury and, therefore, it could be considered not a dangerous
     instrument under the specific facts and circumstances.

          "THE COURT: All right. Here's what I think we're
     going do to [sic]. We're going to charge on attempted murder
     and assault second.

            "[Hooks's attorney]: Yes, Judge."

(R. 153.)

     After hearing from both sides, the trial court determined that a jury

charge on the lesser-included offense of second-degree assault would be

given but that a charge on third-degree assault would not be given.

Hooks's attorney did not object to that decision. The attorneys and the

                                    20
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trial court continued to discuss potential jury charges before the

attorneys were allowed to give closing arguments, but Hooks did not

object to the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on third-degree

assault. Furthermore, after closing arguments, the trial court met with

the parties outside the presence of the jury, reviewed several of the

State's proposed written jury charges, and reiterated that it would "read

the code section on attempted murder and on assault second," but defense

counsel did not make an objection. (R. 173-74.) During that discussion,

Hooks's attorney made very specific objections to other requested charges

by stating things such as "[t]here is an objection to number eight" while

giving detailed reasons for the objection, and when the trial court stated

that "charge number eight will be given," defense counsel further

explained their objections.   When the trial court again said charge

number eight would be given, Hooks's attorney stated:

           "[Hooks's attorney]: Just because I'm paranoid, Judge,
     is that a ruling that my objection is overruled?

          "THE COURT: Yes. I'm sorry. Your objection is
     overruled, for the record. So eight will be given."

(R. 178.) Although Hooks requested a charge on third-degree assault and

provided grounds regarding why the trial court should give a charge on

                                   21
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third-degree assault, no objection was made to the trial court's decision

to charge the jury only on attempted murder and second-degree assault.

      The law is clear that " ' " '[a] person accused of the greater offense

has a right to have the court charge on lesser included offenses when

there is a reasonable theory from the evidence supporting those lesser

included offenses.' MacEwan v. State, 701 So. 2d 66, 69 (Ala. Crim. App.

1997)." ' " Williams v. State, 351 So. 3d 559, 563 (Ala. Crim. App. 2021)

(quoting Harbin v. State, 14 So. 3d 898, 909 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008),

quoting in turn Clark v. State, 896 So. 2d 584, 641 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000)

(opinion on return to remand)). Although individuals have the right to

have the jury charged on lesser-included offenses that are supported by

the evidence, to raise that issue on appeal they must properly preserve

the trial court's failure to give such an instruction. "It is well settled that

' "[r]eview on appeal is restricted to questions and issues properly and

timely raised at trial." ' Ex parte Coulliette, 857 So. 2d 793, 794 (Ala.

2003) (quoting Newsome v. State, 570 So. 2d 703, 717 (Ala. Crim. App.

1989))." Fitzgerald v. State, 334 So. 3d 257, 261 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020).

Furthermore, " ' "it is incumbent upon counsel to obtain an adverse ruling

to preserve an issue for appellate review." ' " Knight v. State, 300 So. 3d

                                      22
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76, 92 (Ala. Crim. App. 2018) (quoting Lucas v. State, 204 So. 3d 929, 939

(Ala. Crim. App. 2016), quoting in turn Pettibone v. State, 91 So. 3d 94,

114 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011)). Rule 21.3, Ala. R. Crim. P., also states, in

part, that

     "[n]o party may assign as error the court's giving or failing to
     give a written instruction, or the giving of an erroneous,
     misleading, incomplete, or otherwise improper oral charge,
     unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to
     consider the verdict, stating the matter to which he or she
     objects and the grounds of the objection."

The record reflects that Hooks did not submit written requested jury

charges. Yet,

     "[w]hile the proper procedure for requesting a jury charge is
     to file a written request with the trial court, [the Alabama
     Supreme Court] has held an oral request for a jury charge to
     be sufficient, provided, if the trial court does not give the
     charge, that the defendant objects to the refusal and the court
     is aware of the objection and the reason counsel is requesting
     the instruction. Ex parte McCall, 594 So. 2d 628 (Ala. 1991)."

Ex parte Weaver, 763 So. 2d 982, 985 (Ala. 1999).

     In this case, Hooks neither objected nor obtained an adverse ruling

from the trial court. As noted above, after Hooks's attorney argued that

a jury instruction on third-degree assault should be given, the trial court

responded: "All right." This is similar to Davenport v. State, 653 So. 2d

1006 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994), in which Davenport requested a jury

                                    23
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instruction on intoxication and its effect on the issue of intent.        In

response to Davenport's request, the trial court responded, "Thank you,"

but did not give the requested instruction. This Court held that " 'Thank

you,' does not constitute an adverse ruling, which is necessary for

preservation of the alleged error." Id. at 1008 (citing Seay v. State, 479

So. 2d 1338, 1342 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985)). Likewise, the trial court's

response of "All right" was not an adverse ruling. It also appears that

Hooks acquiesced in the trial court's decision by responding, "Yes, judge,"

without objecting at that time or during future occasions when he was

given an opportunity to make an objection.

     Even if this issue had been properly preserved for appellate review,

Hooks would not be entitled to relief based upon to the trial court's failure

to instruct the jury on third-degree assault. As Hooks stated to the trial

court, the difference between the instruction that the trial court gave on

second-degree assault and an instruction on third-degree assault is that

third-degree assault does not involve the use of a "deadly weapon or a

dangerous instrument." §§ 13A-6-21 and 13A-6-22, Ala. Code 1975. A

"dangerous instrument" is defined as "[a]ny instrument, article, or

substance which, under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted

                                     24
CR-21-0410

to be used, or threatened to be used, is highly capable of causing death or

serious physical injury." § 13A-1-2(5), Ala. Code 1975. In this case, Lee

was stabbed and cut with an unknown object. There was testimony that

he suffered multiple lacerations and puncture wounds to the head and

the body. (R. 125.) This included a "very deep" puncture wound that was

close to Lee's neck and spine. (R. 127.) There was evidence of blood on

the floor and wall where Lee was stabbed and additional blood on the bed

where he was treated. The jury also considered multiple photographs of

the injuries suffered by Lee. (C. 151-160.) Based upon the nature of the

injuries, it is clear that the unknown object that was used by Hooks was

capable of causing serious physical injury. Therefore, Hooks was not

entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser-include offense of third-degree

assault.

                                    IV.

     Hooks also asserts that the trial court erred in resentencing him to

a more severe sentence than the sentence imposed on the day that he was

convicted.   As previously noted, the trial court sentenced Hooks

immediately after he was adjudged guilty of second-degree assault. Both

parties agreed to waive the preparation of a presentence-investigation

                                    25
CR-21-0410

report. (R. 200.) Before trial, the State had filed a notice of intent to

apply the Habitual Felony Offender Act ("HFOA"). This provided notice

to Hooks and to the trial court that Hooks had two prior felony

convictions, including one for first-degree assault and one for first-degree

theft of property. (C. 115-18.) After finding that the range of punishment

under the HFOA was imprisonment for 10-99 years or life, and hearing

from the parties regarding the punishment to be imposed (R. 202-04), the

trial court initially imposed a straight 132-month sentence of

imprisonment, but Hooks's attorney objected on the ground that a 132-

month sentence would have to be split pursuant to the "Split Sentencing

Act," and the State agreed with that conclusion. (R. 205.)

     The trial court then amended the sentence to 143 months of

imprisonment, split with 36 months to serve in prison, followed by 2 years

of probation. However, Hooks again objected and asserted that 2 years

in prison was the maximum split that could be imposed for that sentence.

(R. 206.) After discussions indicating that a sentence of 15 years or less

in prison could be split to a maximum of 2 years to serve in prison, the

trial court indicated that a 2-year split was insufficient. (R. 206.) The

trial court then imposed a sentence of 15 years and 1 day, but that

                                    26
CR-21-0410

sentence was split with 3 years to serve in prison followed by 2 years of

probation. Hooks was then returned to the jail. (R. 207.)

     The following day, Hooks was returned to court and appeared with

his attorney. The trial court informed Hooks that part of the reason it

had "rushed" Hooks's sentencing was to "alleviate the burden on the jail

… so that [Hooks] could then begin serving [his] sentence." (R. 208-09.)

The trial court further explained that, before the initial sentencing

hearing, it had not had an "opportunity to look into [Hooks's] prior

charge" and that, although Hooks had correctly told the trial court that

his prior offense was an assault with a 10-year sentence, the trial court

had decided to increase the sentence it had imposed the day before based

upon its subsequent review of Hooks's prior assault charge.

     Hooks's trial counsel objected, stating, in part, that she did "object

to Mr. Hooks being re-sentenced with a more severe sentence in this case.

Because the law on this issue is clear and unequivocal that, under the

constitution of the United States and the constitution and law of

Alabama -- that it violates Mr. Hooks' right to be free of double jeopardy."

(R. 211.) Hooks's counsel pointed out that a valid and legal sentence had

been imposed the preceding day, that Hooks had been honest about his

                                    27
CR-21-0410

prior conviction and sentence, and that "there was no fraud perpetrated

against the Court in getting that sentence [of 15 years and 1 day split to

serve 3 years]." (R. 212.) The trial court agreed that "Hooks did not

attempt any fraud on the Court" but indicated that the court's inability

to "locate the prior charge at the time" was a "compelling reason" to

amend the sentence. (R. 213.) The trial court also indicated that, "[w]hile

the sentence was placed on the record yesterday, there's been nothing

transmitted to the clerk" and that Hooks had not been on bond so he

merely remained in custody and "continue[d] to accumulate jail credit

toward his sentence." (R. 213.) After stating that "Hooks ha[d] not

begun, in [the trial court's] mind, serving his sentence," the trial court

imposed a 20-year sentence, but it split that sentence with 5 years to

serve in prison followed by 2 years of probation. (R. 214-17.)

     As he argued at the sentencing hearing, Hooks argues on appeal

that the trial court violated his right not to be placed in jeopardy twice

by imposing a legal sentence and then increasing that sentence the

following day. We agree with Hooks.

     The Alabama Supreme Court has held that "[o]nce a valid sentence

has been entered, it cannot, in the absence of fraud or another compelling

                                    28
CR-21-0410

reason, be altered anytime thereafter so as to increase the severity of the

sentence." Ex parte Tice, 475 So. 2d 590, 591 (Ala. 1994) (citing Brown

v. State, 376 So. 2d 1382 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979)). Both parties agree that

the third sentence imposed by the trial court at the original sentencing

hearing -- the sentence of 15 years and 1 day, which was split with 3 years

to serve -- was a valid sentence and that Hooks did not commit any type

of fraud to induce that sentence. Hooks cites Snell v. State, 723 So. 2d

105 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998), in support of his argument that the trial court

erred in increasing his sentence.

     In Snell, the trial court imposed a "valid sentence," but when Snell

"directed obscene remarks towards the trial court shortly after

sentencing … [the trial court] set aside the original sentence and

resentenced" Snell to a more severe sentence. This Court did not specify

the time that had passed between the imposition of Snell's original

sentence and the imposition of the second sentence, but the opinion did

state that it was "shortly after" the initial sentencing hearing and that

Snell "was in the custody of the sheriff and had begun to serve his original

sentence when the second and more severe sentence was imposed." Id.

at 108. In addressing the trial court's assertion in Snell that it had a

                                    29
CR-21-0410

"compelling reason" under Tice to resentence Snell, this Court held that

it was "unnecessary to address that question because the resentencing

was unauthorized and violated [Snell's] constitutional guarantee against

double jeopardy." Id.

     Furthermore, in addressing Hooks's assertion that there was not a

"compelling reason" for the trial court to amend his sentence, the State

appears to agree that, based upon this Court's holding in Brown v. State,

376 So. 2d 1382 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979), there was not a sufficient

"compelling reason" to change Hooks's sentence. Like what occurred in

this case, in Brown the trial court increased Brown's sentence after

"additional information came to [the trial court's] attention which [he]

did not know about concerning [Brown's] previous record." Id. at 1384.

This Court held in Brown that a legal sentence "cannot, in the absence of

fraud or another reason more compelling than the one presented by the

circumstances in the instant case, be so changed at any time thereafter

as to increase the severity of the sentence." Id. at 1391. As in Brown, the

trial court's discovery of more detailed information about Hooks's prior

conviction was not a "compelling reason" to increase Hooks's sentence.

                                    30
CR-21-0410

     The State appears to question whether the original sentence had

been "entered" as required by Tice. The State also cites Ex parte Yeung,

489 So. 2d 1106 (Ala. 1986), in support of its argument that "any error in

the trial court's actions was harmless." As Hooks points out in his reply

brief, Yeung is clearly distinguishable from this case. First, the Court in

Yeung held that Yeung's argument that the trial court had improperly

set aside his 15-year sentences and imposed 20-year sentences was not

properly preserved for review. Unlike in Yeung, Hooks clearly objected

and preserved this issue for appellate review. Furthermore, the Court in

Yeung noted that the record in that case showed "that immediately after

the trial judge pronounced the first sentence, the prosecutor pointed out

to him that § 13A-5-6(a)(4)[, Ala. Code 1975,] required that Yeung be

sentenced to at least 20 years on each [first-degree robbery] count." Id.

(emphasis added). Thus, the trial court in Yeung amended the sentence

because the original sentence was not authorized under the applicable

sentencing statute. The situation in Yeung is more analogous to the trial

court's decision to amend Hooks's sentence immediately after it was

imposed the first two times because the trial court had imposed an illegal

sentence, and neither party in this case has claimed that those changes

                                    31
CR-21-0410

during the initial sentencing hearing were in any way improper. This

Court has held on numerous occasions that, "in correcting an illegal

sentence, the double jeopardy protection is not violated even if the

defendant has begun serving the original sentence." Cline v. State, 571

So. 2d 368, 370 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (citations omitted). Unlike in this

case, in which the trial court imposed a valid sentence, in Yeung the trial

court was authorized to amend the original illegal sentence, and that

amended sentence was imposed "immediately" and without objection.

     The trial court indicated at the second sentencing hearing that the

amendment of Hooks's sentence was appropriate when it stated as

follows: "Mr. Hooks was on a no bond or revoked bond such that he

continues to accumulate jail credit toward his sentence.         However,

nothing has been transmitted to the clerk to indicate that the sentence

has actually begun, though it might have been placed on the record." (R.

213-14.) Yet, this conclusion by the trial court is not dispositive of the

issue.

     Indeed, Tice, 475 So. 2d at 591, states that double-jeopardy

protection in this context begins when the sentence is "entered," but this

does not refer to the procedural step of filing the proper paperwork with

                                    32
CR-21-0410

the clerk's office. This Court has uniformly held that "[i]ncreasing a valid

sentence after a defendant has commenced serving the sentence violates

the prohibition against double jeopardy in both the United States and

Alabama Constitutions." Snell, 723 So. 2d at 108 (emphasis added). In

this case, Hooks had clearly started serving his sentence. The trial court

imposed the original sentence, and, as the proceedings concluded, the

trial court stated:

      "So, Mr. Hooks, they'll take you back. You'll be serving your
      sentence -- you will go to DOC for that; okay? So they'll
      transfer you over to DOC at some point and you'll serve the
      remainder of your split -- whatever time you have remaining
      on the split will be served in DOC. When you're released from
      that, you'll start your term of probation. So they'll transfer
      you to DOC at some point.

            "(The proceedings were adjourned on Tuesday,
            February 15, 2022 and resumed on Wednesday,
            February 16, 2022 as follows:)"

(R. 207-208.) When the parties returned the following afternoon, Hooks

objected to an increased sentence and argued that

      "the sentence begins when it's read into the record. In terms
      of all of the rules of appellate procedure, that is when the
      sentence begins in terms of when the 42 days begins for us to
      give notice, it's when the 30 days begins for the Court to
      reconsider a sentence to give a more lenient sentence if it's a
      split sentence. It's not based on when the clerk's office gets
      the sentencing order. It's based on when it's read into the
      record."

                                    33
CR-21-0410

(R. 214.) Here, the original sentencing hearing had already concluded

and Hooks had been taken to jail. We agree with Hooks that he had

already begun serving his sentence when he was resentenced by the

circuit court. Because the sentence in question was a legal sentence that

had commenced and because there was neither fraud nor a "compelling

reason" to increase Hooks's sentence, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the

Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution precluded the trial

court from increasing Hooks's sentence.

     "To allow the second sentence to stand in this case would
     punish the appellant twice for the same offense. He would not
     only be put in jeopardy twice, but would actually be punished
     twice. Therefore, this case is due to be remanded to the trial
     court with instructions that the appellant's second sentence
     be vacated and that his original sentence be reinstated."

Snell, 723 So. 2d at 109.

                               Conclusion

     For the reasons stated herein, Hooks's conviction for second-degree

assault is affirmed, but his sentence is reversed and this cause is

remanded for the trial court to reinstate Hooks's sentence of 15 years and

1 day of imprisonment, split to serve 3 years of imprisonment followed by

2 years of probation. The trial court shall take all necessary action to

                                   34
CR-21-0410

ensure that the circuit clerk makes due return to this Court within 28

days of the date of this opinion, and the return to remand shall include a

transcript of the new sentencing hearing and the amended sentencing

order.

     AFFIRMED       AS    TO   CONVICTION;        REVERSED       AS   TO

SENTENCE; AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

     Windom, P.J., and McCool and Minor, JJ., concur. Kellum, J.,

concurs in the result.

                                   35