Court Opinion

ID: 9570729
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:25:41.0395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:15:18.470331
License: Public Domain

Horowitz, J.
(dissenting) — The controlling assignment of error concerns the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant giving instruction No. 3% dealing with aiding or abetting the commission of the burglary charged.
The judges of the court agree there is substantial evidence that defendant Taplin himself committed the actual burglary charged. They do not agree on whether there is sufficient substantial evidence that defendant could also be held guilty of the charge as a person “who stands by aiding, assisting or abetting, or who, not being present, directly or indirectly, has aided, assisted, abetted, advised, encouraged or counseled the perpetration of [the] crime . . .” Instruction No. 3%- Defendant excepted to the giving of the instruction on the ground there was no evidence to support it. I agree. Substantial evidence is lacking, i.e., proof beyond a reasonable doubt to warrant the giving of the aiding or abetting instruction.
The state contended below defendant himself, not Ms. Estill, had committed the burglary charged. The state did *557not charge the latter either with actually committing the crime, or aiding or abetting defendant to commit it.' Its reason was apparent. It argued to the jury that Ms. Estill “was in the car the whole time.” There was no evidence Ms. Estill ever got out of the car, saw the defendant committing the burglary, knew defendant intended to do so, or that defendant at any time had “advised, encouraged or counseled [Ms. Estill in] the perpetration of” the crime. See State v. Gladstone, 78 Wn.2d 306, 474 P.2d 274, 42 A.L.R.3d 1061 (1970). Unless, as later pointed out, the state proved a person other than defendant committed the crime as a principal, the instruction would be unsupported.
It is only on appeal, in an effort to uphold the challenged instruction, the state contends there is substantial evidence to show that
possibly Miss Estill rather than the defendant . . . actually went into Mrs. McLeod’s apartment while Mrs. McLeod was absent. . . . The aiding and abetting instruction, therefore, was necessary in order to inform the jury that if the defendant Taplin was aiding and abetting the entry of Miss Estill he would nevertheless be guilty of the burglary with which he was charged. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence . . .
Substantial evidence in criminal cases means evidence sufficient to persuade “an unprejudiced thinking mind of the truth of the fact to which the evidence is directed.” State v. Collins, 2 Wn. App. 757, 759, 470 P.2d 227 (1970). The due process clause requires the evidence to be sufficient to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt . . every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970). As explained in Winship:
[The] use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law.
397 U.S. at 364. Mere possibility, suspicion, speculation, conjecture, or even a scintilla of evidence, is not substantial evidence. State v. Moore, 7 Wn. App. 1, 499 P.2d 16 (1972); *558Wilson v. Department of Labor & Indus., 6 Wn. App. 902, 496 P.2d 551 (1972); State v. Zamora, 6 Wn. App. 130, 491 P.2d 1342 (1971). Compare State v. Myers, 158 N.W.2d 717 (Iowa 1968).
The judges of the court are not agreed on just what evidence in this case constitutes substantial evidence that Ms. Estill herself committed the burglary. Judge Williams relies on three circumstances: (1) Ms. Estill was in close proximity to the scene of the crime when committed; (2) she was a passenger in the car in which the stolen property was probably transported; and (3) she (and defendant) occupied the motel room in which the property was subsequently found. He cites State v. Frazier, 76 Wn.2d 373, 456 P.2d 352 (1969); State v. Razey, 54 Wn.2d 422, 341 P.2d 149 (1959); and State v. Nichols, 148 Wash. 412, 269 P. 337 (1928). In my opinion, the cases are distinguishable. Judge Callow relies on the circumstances that Ms. Estill was present at the scene of the crime and at the second motel with defendant. He recognizes the weakness of the evidence concerning Ms. Estill’s possible possession of the stolen goods. The substantial evidence relied on in each opinion would still be insufficient as a matter of law to show Ms. Estill herself committed the burglary if, according to the state’s theory advanced below based on the evidence in the case, “Ms. Estill was in the car the whole time.”
Judge Callow is of the further view that, notwithstanding State v. Nikolich, 137 Wash. 62, 241 P. 664 (1925), instruction No. 3% was properly given even if Ms. Estill herself did not commit the burglary charged. He expresses the view that the instruction was properly given if (1) the defendant aided and abetted Ms. Estill to commit the burglary; or (2) if defendant aided and abetted a person other than Ms. Estill, whether or not known, to commit the burglary; or (3) if Ms. Estill aided and abetted defendant to commit the burglary. He necessarily assumes there is substantial evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, as distinguished from mere suspicion or conjecture, to support the instruction on one or more of the alternative theories *559stated. I find no such evidence, however. The actual evidence shows Ms. Estill remained in the car when the burglary occurred, a fact which made it impossible for her to commit the burglary herself. There is no evidence, furthermore, Ms. Estill knew defendant was committing or had left the car to commit the burglary, or that she acted as a lookout or that she knew or saw defendant in possession of the burglarized items, or that she ever had custody or possession of such items. There is no evidence she knew the names in which the defendant had registered at either the first or second motel. There is evidence she referred to defendant as her husband when she explained to the manager at the first motel that, he was looking for someone from whom to rent a unit. That evidence, on this record, does not add up to the required substantial evidence on which to base the challenged instruction. If defendant himself committed the crime, he cannot also be said to aid and abet himself in its commission. State v. Nikolich, supra.4 See United States v. Rodgers, 419 F.2d 1315 (10th Cir. 1969); Legatos v. United States, 222 F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1955); Morgan v. United States, 159 F.2d 85 (10th Cir. 1947).
I believe we fail to give proper weight to constitutional requirements when, in a circumstantial evidence case concerned with aiding and abetting the commission of the crime charged, we substitute mere possibility, suspicion, conjecture, or even scintilla evidence for the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt required in a criminal case.
The remaining question is whether the unsupported in*560struction is prejudicial. The state does not contend that the giving of an unsupported instruction is harmless. There is case support for the view that the giving of an unsupported aiding and abetting instruction is prejudicial error. State v. Nikolich, supra at 66-67; Rodgers v. State, 213 Ga. 797, 102 S.E.2d 10 (1958); Napier v. Commonwealth, 306 Ky. 75, 206 S.W.2d 53 (1947); People v. Walker, 40 Mich. App. 142, 198 N.W.2d 449 (1972); People v. Davis, 32 Mich. App. 704, 189 N.W.2d 132 (1971). This is but an application of the general rule stated in Reynolds v. Phare, 58 Wn.2d 904, 905, 365 P.2d 328 (1961), “that it is prejudicial error to submit to the jury by instructions a question unsupported by evidence in the record.”
The rationale of the rule is clear. An aiding and abetting instruction necessarily implies that there is substantial evidence to support the instruction. The jury has a right to assume the instruction given means something. See People v. Geibel, 93 Cal. App. 2d 147, 208 P.2d 743 (1949); Napier v. Commonwealth, supra.5 There is also case support for the view that error in an instruction is only presumptively prejudicial unless it affirmatively appears from the record that it is harmless. See State v. Golladay, 78 Wn.2d 121, 138-39, 470 P.2d 191 (1970); State v. Britton, 27 Wn.2d 336, 341, 178 P.2d 341 (1947); State v. Rogers, 5 Wn. App. 347, 352, 486 P.2d 1125 (1971); State v. Johnson, 1 Wn. App. 553, 555, 463 P.2d 205 (1969). See, however, dicta in State v. Nelson, 144 Wash. 370, 372, 258 P. 24 (1927). If the court is unable to say from the record that the presumption of prejudice has been overcome, the error nevertheless is *561deemed prejudicial and reversible. State v. Golladay, supra. Accordingly, there are cases holding that under the facts of the particular case — facts distinguishable from those here involved — an aiding and abetting instruction is harmless. People v. Starkey, 234 Cal. App. 2d 822, 44 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1965); Wilson v. State, 150 Neb. 436, 34 N.W.2d 880 (1948); Richmond v. State, 456 P.2d 897 (Okla. Crim. 1969). Likewise, under other facts, an unsupported aiding and abetting instruction has been held prejudicial. Sewell v. Commonwealth, 284 Ky. 183, 144 S.W.2d 223 (1940); State v. Pacheco, 27 Utah 2d 281, 495 P.2d 808 (1972).
Under the record here prejudice exists either because it affirmatively appears or because we cannot say whether the presumption of prejudice has been overcome. Defendant relied on alibi evidence to show he was not even present at the scene of the crime and therefore could not have committed the burglary. The state accordingly argued to the jury that under instruction No. 3%
it is not necessary that the State prove the defendant himself went in provided that the evidence does show that he was aiding and abetting somebody else who went in, and if that is the case then he is guilty of burglary and the elements in Instruction No. 2 are met [to convict] . . . [i]f you find that he was present with the intention of aiding and assisting or that he counseled or suggested the commission of this crime.
The jury found defendant guilty.
Under the instructions, buttressed by the argument of the state, we do not know whether the jury found the defendant guilty (1) because he committed the burglary, or (2) because the defendant did not commit the burglary but Ms. Estill did, defendant aiding or abetting her, or (3) because he was not present at the scene but had “advised, encouraged or counseled the perpetration of” the burglary charged. The evidence was sufficient to show defendant guilty under alternative (1), but insufficient as to alternatives (2) and (3). There is no evidence Ms. Estill herself committed the burglary or that defendant aided and abetted Ms. Estill in doing so knowing of her wrongful purpose. *562Similarly, there is no evidence defendant aided or abetted a third person to commit the burglary knowing such third person’s wrongful purpose; and, similarly, there is no evidence that defendant directly or indirectly counseled or encouraged any such third person to commit the crime. State v. Hinkley, 52 Wn.2d 415, 325 P.2d 889 (1958); State v. Peasley, 80 Wash. 99, 141 P. 316 (1914); State v. Catterall, 5 Wn. App. 373, 486 P.2d 1167 (1971). See State v. Kelly, 46 Wn.2d 594, 283 P.2d 684 (1955). The jury may have rested its verdict on an unsupported alternative. Under such circumstances, “the giving of the instructions complained of was prejudicial error.” Hagan v. Commonwealth, 179 Ky. 201, 207, 200 S.W. 336 (1918). See also State v. Nikolich, supra at 67; United States v. Horton, 180 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1950).
I would reverse the judgment with directions to grant a new trial.
Petition for rehearing denied September 19, 1973.
Review denied by Supreme Court November 20, 1973.

See also State v. McCaskey, 55 Wn.2d 329, 347 P.2d 895 (1959), which involved two defendants jointly charged as principals, and State v. Frazier, 76 Wn.2d 373, 456 P.2d 352 (1969), in which two persons were involved in a robbery. State v. Frazier involved the trial of one, and State v. Brown, 75 Wn.2d 611, 452 P.2d 958 (1969), involved the trial of the other. As shown by State v. Brown, there was sufficient evidence that the separately charged and individually tried defendant Brown participated in the commission of a crime. Neither McCaskey nor Frazier involved a solely charged defendant when there was no substantial evidence that any other person, although present at the scene, was involved in the perpetration of the crime charged.

Napier states: “A trial court, especially a regular circuit judge, wields a tremendous influence on the minds of jurors; and it is not unusual for a jury to conclude that ‘technical’ rules of evidence tend to suppress ‘facts’ which in their opinion should be introduced in evidence; and when the court instructs them upon an issue concerning which no evidence was introduced, jurors sometimes gather the impression that the court is attempting to point out the ‘true facts’ in the unauthorized instruction. Oftentimes this results in the jury’s ‘reading between the lines’ of the evidence and arriving at an erroneous conclusion. Such being true, the court meticulously should follow the evidence in instructing the jury.” 306 Ky. at 82.