Court Opinion

ID: 9636163
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:18:30.490774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:06:26.716451
License: Public Domain

Carleton Harris, Chief Justice, dissenting. The only question, as I view it, is whether the re-enactment of the crime by Payne was voluntarily done, or under duress and compulsion. The first Payne case was reversed by the United States Supreme Court under the holding that a confession of the defendant, admitted into evidence, was obtained by coercion. At no place in that Opinion is mentioned the re-enactment of the crime. I do not agree that Payne was acting under the operation of the same influences present when the confession was made. Evidence was offered in the first case that at the time the confession was made, Payne was told that thirty or forty people were outside the jail wanting in to get the defendant. According to Payne, the Chief of Police had told him “if I wanted to make a confession, he would try to keep them out.” No such threat occurred during the re-enactment, which took place at the building where Robertson was killed, a considerable distance from the jail. The testimony reflects that appellant’s actions on the premises were entirety-voluntary, and that he demonstrated the manner in which the crime was committed without “prodding” or suggestions from the police. For instance, relative to the murder weapon, a piece of iron, Payne, in relating from the witness stand his actions at the lumber company building, stated: ‘ ‘ Q. Where did you go first when you came in the rear of the building, where did you stop, did you stop ? A. We stopped at the door if I am not mistaken. Q. How far down from Mr. Robertson’s desk? A. I wouldn’t know to be exact. Q. Is it further than an arm’s reach away from the desk where you stopped? A. Yes, sir, it is. Q. Did you indicate at that point anything? A. Yes, sir. Q. What did you indicate there ? A. At the door? Q. That is at the door. A. I indicated that I picked up an iron, I was picking up something there. Q. You picked up something there - you said an iron what? A. I said I was indicating where I picked up something. Q. You indicated you picked up something — who lead you to that spot, Prank? A. Who lead me to that spot? Q. That’s right — who told you that was the spot where you picked up something? A. No one. (my emphasis) Q. No one did that, but you stopped at that point, didn’t you? A. I did. Q. And you indicated that you picked up something there. Then where did you go next? A. To Mr. Robertson’s desk.” He subsequently pointed out the place where he had thrown the weapon, which, according to the evidence, was within inches of the spot where it was found by a radio newsman. Appellant does not claim that he was forced to re-enact the crime, or that anybody told him what actions to perform. There is no claim that he was threatened or abused. Certainly, he had no reason to fear mob action at the time. The most that he said was that he was * ‘ scared. ’ ’ This certainly was not unusual, for most anyone who is arrested has a feeling of fear, and this is probably even true where people are stopped by officers and given traffic tickets. The point is that the officers did nothing to cause that fear. As stated, the sole question is whether this re-enactment was voluntary and free from any improper influence, and not traceable' to any prohibited influence previously exerted either by promise made by way of previous inducement, or by threats or violence. Smith v. State, 74 Ark. 397. The sheriff and police officers all testified that Payne received no promises, nor was he mistreated in any way in order to obtain the re-enactment, and Bill Miles, city editor of the Pine Bluff Commercial, testified that following the reenactment, he walked over to Payne and asked if he had been mistreated in any way, and that the defendant replied that he had not. I am fully cognizant of the rights given a defendant under our Constitution, and I am entirely persuaded that Payne received every safeguard afforded by these guarantees. At the trial itself, the jury was instructed, at the request of defendant, as follows: “Before any statements or acts made by the defendant to the officers or other persons can be considered by you as evidence in the case you must believe from the testimony that such statements or acts were freely and voluntarily made and done without any threat or fear of punishment and without any promise or hope of reward. If you believe from the evidence in this case that any statements or acts that were made or done by the defendant were freely and voluntarily made by him you should consider such statements and acts along with all the testimony in the case in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant. If you believe that said statements and acts were not free and voluntary, that they were induced by fear of punishment or promise of reward, you should not consider such statements and acts for any purpose whatsoever.” Certainly it is proper to assume that jurors consider all of the instructions given by the court. The jury (which incidentally, included two members of appellant’s race), by its verdict, if it considered the evidence of re-enactment at all, apparently found that these acts of the defendant were not coerced, and there being no evidence to the contrary, the jury’s verdict should be allowed to stand. I strongly feel that the judgment should be affirmed. Justices McFaddin and Ward join in this dissent.