Court Opinion

ID: 9850840
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:03:33.276383+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:44.439276
License: Public Domain

Benham, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Because the majority opinion awards a freeport exemption based on a technical deficiency to an otherwise unqualified candidate, and *332administers an unfair result to a party relying on prevailing Georgia law, I must dissent.
This Court granted certiorari to consider the permissible scope of requests for admission under OCGA § 9-11-36, and whether the request at issue in this appeal was proper thereunder. The record in this case reveals that G. H. Bass & Company applied for a freeport tax exemption 45 days after the filing period. The Fulton County Board of Tax Assessors denied Bass the freeport exemption for personal goods for 1994, whereupon he filed an appeal to Superior Court. In the course of discovery, Bass filed requests for admission, the first of which stated that “[Bass] is entitled to a personal property/inventory/freeport exemption of $23,241,497.00 for the 1994 tax year.” The Board did not respond to the requests. Thereafter the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Although Bass specifically raised the issue of the Board’s failure to respond to Bass’s request for admission in its response to the Board’s motion, the Board did not move the court to allow the withdrawal or amendment of its admission. The trial court ruled in favor of the Board and against Bass without addressing Bass’s contention regarding the Board’s admission.
The trial court’s ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which held that the Board’s failure to respond did not affect the ruling because the request by Bass was improper, in that permissible admissions must deal with matters essentially factual, not opinionative or conclusions of law. G. H. Bass & Co. v. Bd. of Tax Assessors, 222 Ga. App. 118 (1) (473 SE2d 253) (1996).
1. The majority opinion does not reach the issue whether Bass’s request for admission comes within the permissible scope of OCGA § 9-11-36 because the record reveals that the Board, upon the filing of Bass’s requests for admission, did not respond, assert objections, or move to strike the request. The majority has thus fashioned two new rules: (1) if requests for admission are not challenged by the party to whom they are directed, even impermissible requests may result in admission; (2) requests for admission under OCGA § 9-11-36 (a) are not objectionable even if they require opinions or conclusions of law, even as to the ultimate issue in the case, so long as the legal conclusions relate to any fact in the case. By so ruling, the majority opinion changes the law in this state and applies that change to a party without that party having legal recourse. I caution against the imposition of such a Draconian rule.
2. By concluding that requests for admission are not objectionable even if they require opinions or conclusions of law, as long as the legal conclusions relate to the facts of the case, we foster protracted litigation, and encourage the use of unauthorized questions in an attempt to trap the unwary. Here, appellant’s request for admission *333stated, “[Bass] is entitled to a personal property/inventory/freeport exemption of $23,241,497.00 for the 1994 tax year.” The only fact in the request was the amount of the exemption. Under the majority opinion, such requests will no longer even be objectionable. Under the guise of encouraging adherence to black letter law, thereby providing simplicity in discovery, we encourage instead complexity and stealth in the drafting of requests, which will produce chaos and protracted discovery battles. All of those results are contrary to the original intent of the rule in facilitating the discovery of uncontested facts. OCGA § 9-11-36 (a) (1).
Decided July 16, 1997.
Brenskelle & Perry, David P. Brenskelle, Brock E. Perry, for appellant.
W. Roy Mays III, for appellee.
3. The Board of Tax Assessors relied on an application of prevailing Georgia law. See Tandy Computer Leasing v. Smith, 186 Ga. App. 101 (366 SE2d 417) (1988). No Georgia law is cited by the majority for the rule adopted today. The majority relies instead on Utah, Nevada, North Carolina, and Michigan law, and appellee is left with an unexpected and harsh result.
This Court should not interfere with a matter that should have been and was corrected by the trial court. Clearly, the better practice would have been for appellee to answer, object or move to strike, but a motion to strike was unnecessary since the trial court ruled for appellee after each party moved for summary judgment. The proper action for this Court, if it desires to change the law, is to make the rule prospective so as not to unfairly punish a party for relying on the prevailing law in Georgia or remand the case to the trial court so the Board is provided an opportunity to address the issue raised here. Because the majority deprives appellee of that opportunity, I must dissent.