Court Opinion

ID: 9836981
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:50.510265+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:19.652992
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge
(concurring in part and in the result):
I disagree with the majority’s reasoning in deciding the third issue. The third granted issue asks:
III
WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY INSTRUCTING THE MEMBERS THAT PRIOR STATEMENTS COULD BE CONSIDERED AS SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE WHEN THEY DID NOT MEET THE EXPRESS REQUIREMENTS OF MIL.R.EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) AND UNITED STATES V. MCCASKEY, 30 MJ 188 (CMA1990).
In my view, any error in instructing the members that the alleged victims’ pretrial statements could be considered as substantive evidence in this case was harmless beyond any doubt.
The trial judge gave the following instructions with respect to evidence of pretrial statements by the alleged victims in this case:
Now, you have heard evidence that the witness [K] made a statement prior to trial that may be inconsistent with her testimony at this trial, specifically, her statement that [B] told her the Accused was doing stuff to her also, and she did not see a scar on the Accused. You have heard evidence that the witness Petty Officer [R] made statements prior to trial to Petty Officer [D] that may be inconsistent with his testimony at trial, specifically, that he possessed and watched pornographic videos, [K] saw he and his wife having sexual intercourse, and she was on his back on one occasion when they were having sexual intercourse. You have heard evidence that the witness [L] made statements to [B] that they possessed pornographic videos and that [K] had seen her and Petty Officer [R] engaged in sexual intercourse. If you believe that an inconsistent statement was made, you may consider the inconsistency in evaluating the believability of the testimony of [K] and Petty Officer [R] and L. You may not, however, consider the prior statement as evidence of the truth of the matters contained in that prior statement.
You have heard evidence that the witness [K] made statements prior to trial that may he consistent with her testimony at trial, specifically, that the abuse began in the Summer of 1990; the bleeding happened in the living room; he put his private part in her private part; his threat that he would not allow her to play with [T]; and she told [B] that he was doing stuff to her too. You have heard evidence that the witness [J] made statements prior to trial that may be consistent with her testimony at trial, specifically, that he put a knife to her neck; he threatened her with a gun; he threatened to kill her; he put a pillow over her face; and he touched her “boob” with his fingernail. If you believe that such a consistent statement was made, you may consider it for its tendency to refute the charge of improper influence or improper motives. You may also consider the prior consistent statement as evidence of the truth of the matters expressed therein.
(Emphasis added.)
Prejudice, however, from such substantive use instructions, even if erroneous, is hard to *155imagine for several reasons. First of all, the two alleged victims testified that appellant committed the charged offenses. Second, the pretrial statements were never admitted in this case. Third, the defense first cross-examined the alleged victims about various details in these statements, and when acknowledged by the witnesses, it also had them confirm the previously asserted facts as true. Finally, the victims’ testimony on the prior statements added no material fact not covered in their in-courtroom testimony.
In addition, the defense cross-examined the alleged victims about prior statements they had made concerning the charged incidents, in hopes of contradicting their trial testimony with their pretrial statements. This was permissible, although ultimately unsuccessful, impeachment under Mil.R.Evid. 609 and 613, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1994 ed.). See United States v. Banker, 15 MJ 207, 210 (CMA 1983). The defense did not attempt to limit the use of the witnesses’ answers to the issue of their credibility. See Mil.R.Evid. 105. It waited until after the witnesses testified and after the Government requested during the closing instructions that the evidence be considered substantively. In my view, their belated concern under the circumstances of this case was too late. See generally United States v. Taylor, 44 MJ 475, 480-81 (1996).