Court Opinion

ID: 9401058
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-09 21:00:39.566173+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:50.515638
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 21-4417      Doc: 29         Filed: 06/08/2023     Pg: 1 of 4

                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 21-4417

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        HECTOR VILLAREAL-URRUTIA, a/k/a Hector Josue Urrutia, a/k/a Hector Villareal,
        a/k/a Hector Jose Villareal-Urrutia,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
        Charlotte. Kenneth D. Bell, District Judge. (3:20-cr-00396-KDB-DSC-1)

        Submitted: December 5, 2022                                           Decided: June 8, 2023

        Before KING, QUATTLEBAUM, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: W. Rob Heroy, GOODMAN, CARR, LAUGHRUN, LEVINE & GREENE
        PLLC, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Dena J. King, United States Attorney,
        Anthony J. Enright, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
        STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Hector Villareal-Urrutia pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm after having been

        convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, in

        violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2).              The district court sentenced

        Villareal-Urrutia to 66 months’ imprisonment. Villareal-Urrutia now appeals, challenging

        the district court’s calculation of his advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. We affirm.

               Villareal-Urrutia first argues that the district court erred in applying a base offense

        level of 20 under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) (2018). The district

        court applied that provision because Villareal-Urrutia committed the instant offense after

        sustaining a felony conviction for a “crime of violence,” that is, North Carolina common

        law robbery. Villareal-Urrutia maintains, however, that North Carolina common law

        robbery is not a “crime of violence” as defined in USSG § 4B1.2(a). But we held to the

        contrary in United States v. Gattis, 877 F.3d 150, 156 (4th Cir. 2017), ruling that the offense

        is a “crime of violence” under the enumerated offenses clause of the Guidelines’ “crime of

        violence” definition, USSG § 4B1.2(a)(2). And we later held in United States v. Dinkins,

        928 F.3d 349, 355-57 (4th Cir. 2019), that North Carolina common law robbery is a

        “violent felony” under the force clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C.

        § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), which is identical to the force clause of the Guidelines’ “crime of

        violence” definition, USSG § 4B1.2(a)(1). See United States v. King, 673 F.3d 274, 279

        n.3 (4th Cir. 2012) (“We rely on precedents evaluating whether an offense constitutes a

        ‘crime of violence’ under the Guidelines interchangeably with precedents evaluating

        whether an offense constitutes a ‘violent felony’ under the [Armed Career Criminal Act].”).

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               While Villareal-Urrutia contends that subsequent decisions of this court undermine

        those holdings, we have long recognized that “one panel cannot overrule another” and that

        if a later panel opinion conflicts with an earlier panel opinion, the earlier panel opinion

        controls “unless the prior opinion has been overruled by an intervening opinion from this

        court sitting en banc or the Supreme Court.” McMellon v. United States, 387 F.3d 329,

        333 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc).      Based on that well-established principle, we reject

        Villareal-Urrutia’s suggestion that Gattis and Dinkins are no longer binding precedent, and

        we conclude that the district court properly applied USSG § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) in calculating

        Villareal-Urrutia’s base offense level.

               Villareal-Urrutia next argues that the district court clearly erred in applying a

        four-level enhancement under USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) based on its finding that

        Villareal-Urrutia possessed the firearm in connection with another felony offense:

        attempted discharge of a firearm into an occupied vehicle. The district court ruled that the

        enhancement applied after hearing testimony from an investigating officer who

        interviewed the driver of the vehicle.       The driver told the officer that he passed

        Villareal-Urrutia, who was on foot, and recognized him. The driver thought about giving

        Villareal-Urrutia a ride and looked in the rearview mirror to confirm that the person he saw

        was Villareal-Urrutia.    While looking in the rearview mirror, the driver observed

        Villareal-Urrutia pull out a firearm, point it in the direction of his vehicle, and fire. The

        driver also heard two gunshots. The officer estimated that the driver was about 250 feet

        away from Villareal-Urrutia when the shots were fired. The district court credited the

        driver’s statement and found that Villareal-Urrutia attempted to discharge a firearm into

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        the occupied vehicle, which constitutes a felony under North Carolina law. See N.C. Gen.

        Stat. § 14-34.1(a).

               Villareal-Urrutia asserts that the driver’s statement was unbelievable because he

        could not have seen Villareal-Urrutia fire at him from 250 feet away while looking in the

        rearview mirror. “In assessing whether a sentencing court has properly applied the

        Guidelines, we review factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.”

        United States v. Thompson, 874 F.3d 412, 414 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks

        omitted). Our review of the record does not leave us with “a definite and firm conviction”

        that the district court erred in crediting the driver’s statement. United States v. Manigan,

        592 F.3d 621, 631 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v.

        Conley, 875 F.3d 391, 400 (7th Cir. 2017) (explaining those “extreme situations” in which

        court may rule that testimony is “incredible as a matter of law”). We therefore conclude

        that the district court did not clearly err in applying the four-level enhancement under

        USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).

               Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral

        argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

        before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                       AFFIRMED

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