Court Opinion

ID: 9672806
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:00:35.964954+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:18.450091
License: Public Domain

V. J. Brennan, P.J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. I find that the common, ordinary meaning of the phrase "public disturbance” is sufficiently definite to provide fair notice of the conduct proscribed and does not confer on the trier of fact unstructured and unlimited discretion to determine whether an offense has been committed. I do not find the statute to be so obscure that men of *685common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its applicability.
The ordinary meaning of a word can be determined by consulting a dictionary, People v Biegajski, 122 Mich App 215, 225; 332 NW2d 413 (1982), or by looking to past decisions of our appellate courts where the word has been defined. The word "disturbance” has been defined in Michigan:
"A disturbance, which is something less than threats of violence, is an interruption of peace and quiet; a violation of public order and decorum; or an interference with or hindrance of one in pursuit of his lawful right or occupation.” People v Weinberg, 6 Mich App 345, 351; 149 NW2d 248 (1967).
I would reverse.