Court Opinion

ID: 9756888
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:06:16.901231+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:32.610536
License: Public Domain

CAPPY, Justice,
dissenting.
I strongly disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court in divorce had no authority pursuant to the Divorce Code1 to equitably divide any portion of the value of the Exeter Township residence or to partition the residence based upon a resulting trust.
The residence was purchased solely by appellee Susan in 1973 for $34,000. She paid $6,800 cash and mortgaged $27,-200. At that time Susan’s equity in the residence would have been $6,800. William claims a resulting trust as to the $6,800 because such funds were allegedly generated by the combined efforts of both parties in renovating and selling a separate property titled solely in Susan’s name. William claims a resulting trust as to the remaining portion of the value of the residence because he allegedly co-signed, guaranteed and paid the mortgage on the Exeter Township residence, which was issued in Susan’s name alone.
The majority holds that William had no right to seek equitable distribution of the residence since it was acquired prior to the marriage and comprised non-marital property not subject to the rules of equitable distribution. Sadly, the majority ignores the power of the trial court in divorce to equitably divide any increase in the value of the residence during the marriage.
Pursuant to 23 P.S. § 401(e)(1),2 any increase in the value of non-marital property during the course of the marriage quali*64fíes as marital property. Thus, to the extent that Susan’s equity in the residence increased during the marriage, whether due to inflationary appreciation, reduction of the mortgage obligation, improvements to the residence, or any other factor, such increase in equity would qualify as marital property. This marital property would be subject to equitable distribution pursuant to Section 401(e)(1) regardless of whether the residence was singularly owned by Susan or jointly owned by both as a result of the equitable doctrine of resulting trust.
Here the residence was titled in Susan’s name alone. Presumptively, she was its legal owner. When William waived his right to equitable distribution prior to the final divorce decree, pursuant to 23 P.S. 401(j),3 he waived any right he may have had to the marital property; to wit, at minimum, the increase in value of the residence during the course of the marriage. He waived this interest regardless of whether Susan was the *65sole owner of the residence or whether they both owned the residence pursuant to a resulting trust.
Thus, even if the majority is correct in concluding that William has a right to partition, it grievously errs by failing to address Section 401(e)(1) and properly limit the portion of value of the residence that is subject to the partition action. Under any scenario, only the value of the residence prior to the marriage can be subject to partition. On these facts, that portion totals $6,800.
However, it is my view that the majority compounds its error by concluding that William has a right to the present action in partition. Pursuant to 23 P.S. 401(c)4 the trial court in divorce possesses full equity power. I find it inappropriate and absurd that under the majority view William has been authorized to use equity to defeat equity. Rather than risk a final determination of the ownership issue by the trial judge in divorce and thus potentially subject himself to equitable distribution of his interest, here William attempts to defeat the concept of equitable distribution by pleading the equitable doctrine of resulting trust under the guise of a civil action in partition.
Unquestionably, the trial court in divorce had full authority to finally adjudicate the resulting trust issue. Had William been successful in divorce court, the entire value of the residence would have been subject to equitable distribution pursuant to 23 P.S. 401(d)5 because he would have proven that *66he was a joint owner of the entire residence as of the date of purchase. However, pursuant to equitable distribution and those factors to be considered under Section 401(d), it is possible that William’s final share of the entire residence could have been less than 50 percent, the portion which he would expect to recover at a civil action of partition. Hence the transparent waiver of his rights under equitable distribution and the institution of the civil action of partition.
Since equitable distribution would have afforded William an adequate remedy at law as to his right to legal ownership of the entire property by means of the equitable doctrine of resulting trust, he should be estopped from avoiding the Divorce Code and its provisions for equitable distribution, when he attempts to utilize an equitable doctrine of resulting trust under the guise of a civil action for partition. He had his opportunity to plead a resulting trust in the divorce court. The trial court in divorce had full authority to finally adjudicate that issue and thus finally determine legal ownership. If William had been successful, the entire value of the residence *67would have been deemed to be marital property subject to equitable distribution. On the other hand, if his theory of resulting trust proved to be meritless, only the increase in value of the residence during the course of the marriage would have been deemed to be marital property and subject to equitable distribution. In the latter case, the $6,800 downpayment would have remained with Susan as non-marital property acquired prior to the marriage.
On the facts of this case, I conclude that in his effort to avoid the laws of equitable distribution and gain a more favorable result by means of a 50-50 split through partition, William outsmarted himself. Unquestionably, by waiving equitable distribution he virtually assured himself that Susan would also waive, since it was she who was the sole owner of the residence by deed. It would be ludicrous to expect that she would demand equitable distribution of real estate over which she had presumptive and legal title where her husband waived any right to an equitable interest therein. The games must cease! Equitable distribution is the law of Pennsylvania governing distribution of property necessitated by divorce. I would conclude that any claims by the parties based upon the equitable doctrine of resulting trust for property acquired prior to separation (including property acquired prior to the marriage) must be raised in the divorce proceeding or forever waived. Otherwise, the distribution of property under the Divorce Code by court decree, the parties’ agreement or the parties’ inaction would be subject to subsequent collateral attack, thereby defeating equitable distribution which would have taken into account the ownership scheme of all property owned by the parties.
Therefore, I would hold that William not only waived his right to Section 401(d) equitable distribution of any increase in value of the subject residence owned during the course of the marriage (Section 401(e)(1)), but also waived his right pursuant to Section 401(c) to have the issue of the resulting trust adjudicated in a civil action for partition. For the reasons stated, I would affirm the judgment of the lower court. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

. At the time of the proceedings herein, 23 P.S. § 401(e) provided:
*64(e) For purposes of this chapter only, “marital property” means all property acquired by either party during the marriage except:
(1) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the marriage except for the increase in value during the marriage____
Section 401(e) was subsequently amended in 1988 to expressly provide that which was implied in former Section 401(e) as follows:
For purposes of this chapter only, “marital property” means all property acquired by either party during the marriage, including the increase in value prior to the date of final separation of any nonmarital property acquired pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (3), except:
(1) Property acquired prior to marriage or property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the marriage____ (Emphasis added).
Section 401(e) was subsequently repealed in 1990, and the definition of marital property is now provided in a similar provision of the Divorce Code, 23 Pa.C.S. § 3501(a).

. At the time of the proceedings herein, 23 P.S. 401(j) (repealed 1990) provided:
Whenever a decree or judgment is granted which nullifies or absolutely terminates the bonds of matrimony, any and all property rights which are dependent upon such marital relation, save those which are vested rights, are terminated unless the court otherwise expressly provides in its decree in accordance with subsection (b). All duties, rights, and claims accruing to either of said parties at any time heretofore in pursuance of the said marriage, shall cease and the parties shall, severally, be at liberty to marry again in like manner as if they had never been married, except where otherwise provided by law.
The substance of former Section 401(j) is now found in a similar provision of the Divorce Code, 23 Pa.C.S. § 3503.

. At the time of the proceedings herein, 23 P.S. 401(c) (repealed 1990) provided:
In all matrimonial causes, the court shall have full equity power and jurisdiction and may issue injunctions or other orders which are necessary to protect the interests of the parties or to effectuate the purposes of this act, and may grant such other relief or remedy as equity and justice require against either party or against any third person over whom the court has jurisdiction and who is involved in or concerned with the disposition of the cause.
The substance of former Section 401(c) is now provided in a similar provision of the Divorce Code, 23 Pa.C.S. § 3323(f).

. At the time of the proceedings herein, 23 P.S. 401(d) (repealed 1990) provided:
*66In a proceeding for divorce or annulment, the court shall, upon request of either party, equitably divide, distribute or assign the marital property between the parties without regard to marital misconduct in such proportions as the court deems just after considering all relevant factors including:
(1) The length of the marriage.
(2) Any prior marriage of either party.
(3) The age, health, station, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties.
(4) The contribution by one party to the education, training, or increased earning power of the other party.
(5) The opportunity of each party for future acquisitions of capital assets and income.
(6) The sources of income of both parties, including but not limited to medical, retirement, insurance or other benefits.
(7) The contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation, depreciation or appreciation of the marital property, including the contribution of a party as homemaker.
(8) The value of the property set apart to each party.
(9) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage.
(10) The economic circumstances of each party at the time the division of property is to become effective.
The substance of former Section 401(d) is now provided in a similar provision of the Divorce Code, 23 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a).