Court Opinion

ID: 9742141
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:07:27.488083+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:05.686242
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting: The Illinois General Assembly has explicitly rejected the policy adopted today by this court. The other opinions fail to discuss or even mention this fact. Instead, the court engages in what can only be described as an act of judicial legislation, defying the will of the people as expressed through their elected representatives. I therefore respectfully dissent. The court today requires that an automobile insurer pay up to the full amount of underinsured-motorist coverage specified in its policy whenever an insured sustains losses which are not fully covered by the liability insurance of the driver at fault. This requirement was once mandated by the General Assembly. Section 148a — 1 of the Illinois Insurance Code, effective March 1, 1980, provided as follows: "Under underinsured motorist coverage the insurer agrees to pay damages the insured would be legally entitled to recover, but which are uncompensated because the total damages exceed the liability coverage limits of the owner of the at-fault vehicle.” Pub. Act 81 — 1202, eff. March 1, 1980. This statute codified the policy adopted by the plurality, basing underinsured-motorist liability on the damages sustained by the insured. This statute was subsequently repealed and replaced with the current version: "[T]he term 'underinsured motor vehicle’ means a motor vehicle *** for which the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury liability insurance policies *** is less than the limits for underinsured coverage provided the insured *** at the time of the accident.” 215 ILCS 5/143a — 2(4) (West 1994). The new statute changed the basis of underinsuredmotorist liability from the insured’s damages to the relative limits of liability specified in the policies of the parties involved in the accident. By continuing to base underinsured liability on the insured’s damages, the plurality simply defies the legislature’s repeal of the earlier version of the statute. Until the Fifth District’s decision in this case, every Illinois court which had considered the current version of the statute, including a previous panel of the Fifth District, agreed that the provision makes underinsured coverage contingent on the limits of liability specified in the policies of those involved in the accident. See Golladay v. Allied American Insurance Co., 271 Ill. App. 3d 465, 467-68 (1st Dist. 1995); Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. v. Tabor, 267 Ill. App. 3d 245, 250 (2d Dist. 1994); Purlee v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 260 Ill. App. 3d 11, 26 (5th Dist. 1994); Moriconi v. Sentry Insurance of Illinois, Inc., 193 Ill. App. 3d 904, 908 (4th Dist. 1990). For example, the court in Golladay held: "The determination of whether a tortfeasor’s vehicle is underinsured is made by comparing the limits of liability insurance for bodily injury applicable to that vehicle with the limits of the injured person’s UIM [underinsured motorist] coverage. [Citation.] It is only when the tortfeasor’s coverage limits are less than the injured party’s UIM coverage that the tortfeasor’s vehicle meets the statutory definition of an 'underinsured motor vehicle.’ ” Golladay, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 467-68. Each of the appellate opinions cited above specifically rejected the construction of the statute advanced by the plurality. Today this court overrules these decisions solely by virtue of superior authority, not superior analysis. The plurality seeks support for its position in the second sentence of section 143a — 2(4) of the Insurance Code: "The limits of liability for an insurer providing underinsured motorist coverage shall be the limits of such coverage, less those amounts actually recovered under the applicable bodily injury insurance policies *** maintained on the underinsured motor vehicle.” 215 ILCS 5/143a— 2(4) (West 1994). The plurality asserts that this sentence of the statute "recognizes that the recoverability of proceeds must be considered when calculating the liability of an insurer who provides underinsured motorist coverage.” The plurality concludes that "[t]herefore, the amount actually recovered may be the appropriate figure to be used in determining whether a vehicle is underinsured.” 178 Ill. 2d at 481. Such a reading of the second sentence of section 143a — 2(4) is wholly unwarranted and completely insupportable. That provision merely grants an insurer who is liable for underinsured-motorist coverage a setoff for the amount of proceeds the plaintiff actually recovers from the at-fault driver’s liability insurance. Whether the insurer is liable for underinsured coverage in the first place, however, is an entirely separate question, which is answered by comparing the limits specified in the insurance policies held by those involved in the accident. As one court has explained: "The application of section 143a — 2(4) first requires a determination of whether the tort-feasor’s vehicle is 'under-insured’ based on the definition provided. The set-off clause mandating the reduction of UIM payments by the amounts received from the tort-feasor operates only if the tort-feasor’s vehicle is classified as underinsured.” Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. v. Tabor, 267 Ill. App. 3d 245, 250 (1994). As noted above, until the instant case, this straightforward reading of the statute was the unanimous conclusion of courts which had considered this issue. Although the General Assembly has had ample opportunity to disturb these decisions through recent amendments to section 143a — 2, it has declined to do so. Both the plurality and the special concurrence offer several potentially persuasive reasons for the State of Illinois to require that an automobile insurer pay the underinsured-motorist coverage specified in its policy whenever the insured sustains losses which are not fully covered by the liability insurance of the driver at fault. The arguments contained in these opinions might very well convince legislators that the state should once again adopt such a requirement. Unfortunately, however, rather than allow legislators to decide this question, the court instead arrogates unto itself the legislative function, imposing by judicial fiat a requirement the General Assembly has specifically repealed. Because I believe that the current Illinois Insurance Code cannot possibly be read to contain such a requirement, I respectfully dissent. JUSTICE MILLER joins in this dissent.