Court Opinion

ID: 9784724
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:52:29.276362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:58.472207
License: Public Domain

OPALA, V.C.J.,
concurring.
T 1 The court holds that in this post-decree proceeding the district court has cognizance to determine the quantum of Father's obligation (if any Re have) to support his disabled adult child of a dissolved marriage. The dissent challenges for want of jurisdictional support the enforceability of Father's decree-imposed duty. Father's successful liability-defeating defense below calls on us here to retest the trial court's view that it lacked cognizance to enforce the decree-created obligation.1 I write separately to answer Father's jurisdiction-anchored argument for the correctness of the nisi prius dismissal and to respond to the dissent's analysis of Father's defense theory.
12 Even if it were true that the decree portion sought to be enforced is patently infirm, at least insofar as it imposes on Father a duty to support his disabled adult child, the district court would not be without jurisdiction to entertain Mother's quest for enforcement of that promise and for determination of the support's quantum. The district court is an omnicompetent tribunal of "unlimited jurisdiction." 2 The constitutional breadth of its jurisdiction invests that court in this case with subject-matter cognizance over the claimed support for the parties' adult child. While the decree-imposed duty in contest may, for other reasons, be attacked as unenforceable, Father's jurisdiction-anchored defense does not defeat the *929trial court's cognizance over the subject matter of Mother's motion that will once again stand before it on remand. The dissent's analysis, if adopted, would undermine the stability of judgments and unsettle their present-day invulnerability to delayed and procedurally impermissible attacks for mere mistakes of law. Father's challenge, based on want of specificity in the decree-approved support promise, cannot be catapulted to the level of a jurisdiction-vitiating defect. Nimply put, this case is not at all about jurisdiction but about post-remand enforceability of Father's decree-imposed duty.
I
THE CRITICAL FACTS IN LITIGATION
13 Cynthia Jo (Mother or obligee) and Randall Dexter Holleyman (Father or obli-gor) were divorced by a 1998 consent decree. By its terms they agreed (a) to leave undetermined the quantum of Father's post-majority support obligation until the minor should reach the age of eighteen or complete high school and (b) to let the district court (upon either party's request) set the amount of Father's post-majority support obligation, based upon the then-established needs and requirements of the child-beneficiary. The divorced father stopped paying support when his child graduated from high school at the age of 21. By her post-decree proceeding now on review Mother moved to enforce Father's on-the-record, decree-approved promise to provide support for the parties' disabled offspring. After the trial court's dismissal (for want of jurisdiction ) of Mother's proceeding stood affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals, we granted certiorari on Mother's petition.
T4 The cognizance-related issues tendered by arguments on certiorari3 call for a two-part analysis. In its first step we must ascertain whether the district court-in the exercise of its adjudicative authority over the parties' divoree-had the power to approve an issue-expanding interspousal agreement. If so, our second step should determine whether the approved agreement may be enforced in this post-decree modification proceeding Mother filed in her divorce case. For the reasons to be explained, I, like the court, resolve both issues by an affirmative answer.
II
THE DISTRICT COURTS SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION
A.
The District Court Has A Constitutionally-Derived Unlimited Original Cognizance Over Mother's Claim To Father's Support For Her Disabled Adult Child
T5 The district court's subject-matter jurisdiction is derived from the State's constitution. Under its provisions, the court serves as an omnicompetent, single-level, first-instance tribunal4* with "unlimited original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters...."5 While that constitutionally-con*930ferred jurisdiction is conceptually indivisible, even though its exercise stands carved into several separate dockets,6 the full sweep of its cognizance cannot be abridged by either legislation or caselaw. If is the constitutional breadth of the district court's jurisdiction, not the parties' consent, that operates to invest the trial court with cognizance over Mother's claim for an adult child's support. The district court clearly erred in bottoming its dismissal on "lack of jurisdiction."
B.
The Impact of Docket Boundaries on Divorce-Related Issues
T6 Interdocket boundaries cannot be invoked to restrict the tribunal's constitutional ommicompetence.7 They are merely procedural demarcation lines separating different remedial regimes (small claims, probate, jury or non-jury cases) or dividing discrete classes of litigation (domestic, civil, criminal or the like). Because interdocket boundaries are merely remedial (rather than jurisdictional), the district court's exercise of cognizance over any issue tendered for its judicature upon the wrong docket will not defeat its constitutionally-invested unlimited subject-matter jurisdiction. Neither may the docket boundary's extension render a judgment (or any of its parts) facially void as coram non judice.8 Errors in crossing remedial inter-docket lines, though perhaps correctible on direct appeal,9 will not impress themselves as a fatal flaw upon the face of the judgment roll."10 No remedial lines were crossed in this case.11"
T7 Oklzhoma's jurisprudential development has led to a very early post-statehood accommodation of expanded issues cognizga-ble within the cases placed upon what is now the fomily-and-domestic docket of the dis*931trict court."12 That docket has become the main channel for processing both divorce- and-family-status litigation as well as for all kinds of divoree-generated post-decree disputes. The district court's divorce-related authority includes approval of consent decrees 13 that confer upon the parties greater post-marital rights than those defined by statute.14 There is hence mo need to direct here that after remand the cause be re-processed along a different docket route."15
T8 In sum, there is no longer any doubt about the propriety of allowing the parties in a divorce suit to expand the litigation's scope by injecting into the decisional process extra-statutory issues generated by an interspousal agreement that settles either some or all marital rights in contest. In this stage of our jurisprudential development, it is much too late to restrict the family-and-domestic docket disputes solely to rights that are stat*932utorily defined.16 The district court's constitutionally-derived unlimited original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters cannot be shrunk by imprisoning its range of cognizance over divorce-related issues within the parameters cireumseribed by the pre-1857 English-law antecedents.17
THE EXTENT OF THE DISTRICT COURTS SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION IN POST-DECREE STAGES
EII
19 The district court's authority to approve an on-the-record agreement clearly includes the power to enforce the parties' pacts through post-decree modification proceedings brought upon the family-and-domestic docket (under the earlier-assigned cause number).
110 Once an interspousal agreement is approved and incorporated into the decree, the parties' private contract stands converted to a solemn judicially enforceable obligation of record which is no longer one of a purely private-law (or contractual) character.18 Because a mid-divorce, on-the-record promise to provide support for one's disabled adult child may be enforced in post-decree proceedings, the claim falls within the family- and-domestic docket boundary.19 In that sense and for that purpose this district court docket may be said to include all promise-generated, post-decree issues to the end that the same enforcement remedies stand accorded all decree-bottomed obligations-*933those that are solely statute-based as well as those that derive from approved inter-spousal pacts.20
1 11 We need not be concerned here about the custodial Mother's post-decree standing as a Hohfeldian*21 plaintiff to enforce Father's on-the-record promise. She is the ob-ligee of a court-approved agreement as well as a co-contributor of support for her adult child. In that dual capacity she would be entitled to standing both as the beneficiary of an enforceable promise (if it proves to qualify under that category) as well as the actual provider of support for which legal liability will now extend to both parents.22
IV
THE DISSENTS VIEW OF THE DECREE-IMPOSED SUPPORT DUTY AS A JURISDICTION-VITIATING FACIAL DEFECT RESTS ON THE MISTAKEN NOTION THAT (1) THE INTERSPOUSAL CONTRACT WAS INDEFINITE, (2) IT WAS UNENFORCEABLE QUA CONTRACT AND (3) ITS DECREE-IMPOSED DUTY STANDS SUSPENDED IN A JURISDICTIONAL VACUUM
12 The dissent appears to argue that had the trial court not dismissed Mother's motion (for want of cognizance), the efforts to en-foree Father's promise would have been in vain because the decree-rendering nisi prius court stood sams cognizance to transform the decreed obligation into an enforceable judgment for the latter's want of a requisite jurisdictional element-that of power to enter a support judgment in favor of an adult child.?23 The decree's facial invalidity also is urged to stem from the dissent's view that the terms of the interspousal agreement are indefinite and hence unenforceable as a contract.
A.
In the Absence of a Complete Judgment Roll, a Forensic Assessment of the Decree's Facial Invalidity Is Impermissible
113 A judgment may not be attacked for facial invalidity when the entire (complete) judgment roll24 has not been incorporated into the record for review.25 The record
before us falls far short of what is necessary to establish a facial jurisdictional defect in the 1998 duty-creating decree.26
B.
A Mistake of Law Cannot Be Catapulted to the Level of a Jurisdictional Flaw
1 14 Even if a complete judgment roll were now before the court, an attack on the de*934cree-imposed duty to provide support for the disabled adult child, based on an alleged facial flaw, would be impermissible. The de-feet Father invokes does not constitute an infirmity that would serve to divest the court of jurisdiction over the post-decree modification quest. The relied-on infirmity in the critical decree clause (H any there was) would at most constitute legal error, rather than a jurisdiction-vitiating defect. A facialty apparent mistake of law will not taint the judgment roll by an imprint of facial invalidity."27 Excessive use of the term "jurisdiction"-as mere synonym for error or for some other deficiency-introduces confusion into the law and undermines the district court's constitutional sweep of cognizance. This court's duty is to protect the stability of judgments rather than expose them to procedurally impermissible and hence unwarranted delayed attacks.
I 15 A district court has jurisdiction over unenforceable judgments to the same extent as it does over nonactionable claims.28 When authority to deal with a subject is present, the manner and extent of the power's exercise, though patently excessive, must stand undisturbed, absent a direct attack timely launched within three years29 The interspousal agreement, even if deficient for lack of specificity, would no longer be vulnerable to an attack unless it be mounted for its facial invalidity.30 Upon the record before us, that kind of attack is here clearly unwarranted.31
C.
The Misplaced Reliance On Chapman v. Parr Places District Courts In A Pre-Statehood Jurisdictional Straitjacket
116 The dissent's reliance on Chapman v. Parr32 for the notion that courts exercising divorce cognizance are "without jurisdiction" when entertaining issues not authorized by statutory divoree law is an unwarranted extension of both Chapman and Irwin v. Irwin,33 the case on which Chapman is bottomed. Chapman dealt with the inapplicability of general venue statutes to divorcee litigation. It refused to extend to divorcee suits the common law's intrastate forum non conveniens doctrine. To that extent Chapman is still effective law. Insofar as Chapman appears to treat trial judges (sitting in divorce cases) as eunuchs fitted into a statutory straitjacket, its holding should be relegated to antiquarian lore as an aberrational exposition of post-statehood law. Chapman relies on Irwin,"34 a pronouncement by the Supreme Court of the Territory of Oklahoma. Insofar as Chapman would deny the district *935court its power to entertain for approval agreement-generated issues, it is pure ipse dixit-a statement utterly unsupported by the text of Irwin or by any post-statehood jurisprudence of this court. The territorial court's pronouncement stands not only sams precedential effect, it is also imprisoned in territorial divorcee law that is contrary to this court's extant (post-statehood) jurisprudence 35 (as well as to the present-day statutory divoree-law regime).
D.
Settled Common-Law Contract Jurisprudence Militates Against Attributing Lack Of Enforceability To The Decree-Imposed Support Obligation For Want Of Definiteness In Father's Promise
1 17 Even under pure contract law the lack of the assumed obligation's specificity would not preclude its enforceability if the trial court is able to determine, with a reasonable degree of certainty, what the parties had intended.36 A contract will not fail for lack of specificity in its terms if it is clear that the parties contemplated the open terms to be resolved in a specified manner and in a from high school. specified time.37 The parties' promise here under review specifies that the post-majority child support will be determined by the trial judge based upon the established needs and requirements of the disabled adult child when he reaches the age of 18 or graduates The decree-approved in-terspousal agreement in controversy clearly contemplates further proceedings to ascertain the quantum of Father's post-majority support obligation. The parties' agreement and the decree-imposed support duty are hence free from both legal infirmity and facial invalidity.
E.
The Common Law Of Contracts Is Not Implicated Here Because Mother Is Enforcing A Solemn Judicial Obligation, Not A Contract
{18 Mother is enforcing here a solemn Judicial obligation created by the merger of Father's promise in, and its incorporation into, the decree which now stands converted to judgment38 by caselaw that authorizes enforcement of approved interspousal agree*936ments qua judgment.39 Because Father's promise to provide support for his disabled adult child (1) is not unenforceable as a contract lacking specificity 40 and (2) is a vital part of the agreement incorporated into and merged in the decree, now invulnerable to attack for nonfacial defects,41 the district court is vested with authority to adjudicate the modification quest in the exercise of its (Mother-invoked) power to ascertain and enforce the quantum of Father's assumed obligation.
F.
According To The Mainstream Of American Jurisprudence On The Subject, A Promise To Support One's Disabled Adult Child Is Neither Contrary To Public Policy Nor Unenforceable
{19 Although the early common law did not extend one's parental duty of support beyond a child's minority,42 the great majority of American jurisdictions, in which the statutory law is silent, has recognized an exception where, as here, the child is unable to care for itself upon attaining majority.43 This view is rested on common-law developments.44 While at the time of the 1998 decree the issue had neither been addressed by this court nor by the legislature, the parents' interspousal agreement that creates a support duty clearly is not contrary to public policy nor to the mainstream of American jurisprudence.
T20 An interspousal agreement that does not offend any public policy principles qualifies for judicial approval. The outer bounds of the district court's jurisdictional perimeter for decretal incorporation of approved agreements are co-extensive with their sanctioned terms. The critical terms in contest here are: (1) Father's promise-based assumption of post-majority support responsibility, (2) whose quantum is to be set after performance is due, (3) in a post-decree proceeding (4) which will be processed through and enforced by the trial court in the very same manner as if it were an imposed nonconsen-sual duty. None of these terms exceeds the district court's jurisdictional boundary. Their incorporation does not inject a fatal flaw into the judgment roll.45 Moreover, no judgment may be condemned for facial invalidity without a judicial inspection of the entire roll."46 The dissent's attempt to exempt consent decrees from the law's requirement (ealling for a four-corners' examination *937of the record proper) rests neither on logic nor on extant authority."47 Mother's decree is clearly impervious to the dissent's attack on its facial fitness. Were we to follow today the dissent's analysis and were we to condemn-upon an incomplete judgment roll-the assailed part of the decree as unenforceable for facially apparent jurisdictional excess, Mother's adjudged rights would become im-permissibly extinguished by interposition of after-pronounced jurisprudence. Because the validity, meaning, and effect of a judgment must always be assayed by the law in force at the time it was entered, judicial testing of these factors in an adjudged obligation must be kept free from impairment by after-enacted legislation and by after-promulgated caselaw.48
y
SUMMARY OF MY VIEWS IN CONCURRENCE
121 Constitutional omnicompetence of the district court is not subject to legislative abridgement. The district court's "unlimited jurisdiction" includes the authority to resolve extra-statutory status- or promise-related issues generated by a decree-approved, on-the-record interparental agreement for post-majority support of a disabled child of the marriage. The issues settled by an interspousal agreement, though expanding the divorce suit's range of cognizable matters, neither defeat the court's subject-matter jurisdiction nor make the suit unqualified for processing upon the family-and-domestic docket as a post-decree dispute. The district court's authority extends to those issues, arising after the divorcee decree, which were generated by an approved (and memorialized) mid-divoree agreement imposing on Father a duty to support his disabled adult child.
122 The parties in a divorcee suit may expand the litigation's scope by injecting into the decisional process extra-statutory issues generated by their approved agreement which settles some or all marital rights in controversy. The district court's constitution-derived omnicompetent cognizance that unquestionably includes divorce suits may not be cireumseribed by resort to pre 1857 English-law restrictions (onee attached to ecclesiastical divorcee judicature and to the now-defunct authority of the British Parliament to dissolve marriages by special acts).49 Nonprecedential pre-statehood jurisprudence that would make the district court impotent to consider any divorce-related issues outside of those specifically sanctioned by legislation cannot be regarded as a correct exposition of present-day Oklahoma law.
'I 23 Settled common-law contract jurisprudence firmly militates against declaring Father's assumed obligation unenforceable because his promise was not in a definite amount. The case presents no real challenge to the trial judge's jurisdiction over Mother's post-decree child-support quest. The decree-imposed obligation is now invulnerable to any attack for want of jurisdiction other than one pressed on grounds of facial *938invalidity. The record for this certiorari review presents no facial appearance of any fatal jurisdictional flaw. Even an apparent mistake of law would not taint the judgment roll by an imprint of facial invalidity. If ordinary error were to become a facial jurisdictional infirmity no judgment would be safe from delayed and unwarranted attack. Public policy calls on this court to stabilize judgments and protect them from unauthorized assaults. The district court is not divested of jurisdiction to entertain Mother's quest for enforcement of Father's decree-imposed duty. District courts have jurisdiction of actions that are barred by limitations as well as of those in which enforceability of a decree is sought to be defeated on jurisdictional grounds.
[ 24 This case is not at all about want of jurisdiction but rather about enforceability of Father's decree-imposed duty to support his disabled adult child. Even if, as Father urges, his decree-imposed duty were jurisdic-tionally flawed, the district court would have jurisdiction to accept or reject that defense. The trial court's dismissal "for want of jurisdiction" was clearly erroneous and must be reversed even if the nisi prius court, by its ruling's confusing phraseology, meant to accept Father's jurisdictional challenge. For the latter disposition there is here a total absence of record-supported facial invalidity.
125 I hence concur in reversing the nisi prius order and remanding the cause for post-remand proceedings to be consistent with today's pronouncement

. As I understand Father's argument on certiora-ri, he makes (1) a broad challenge to the district court's cognizance over the modification proceeding because it was "without jurisdiction" either (2) to impose the very obligation that was sought to be enforced in this proceeding or (3) to enforce the decree-imposed obligation for want of specificity in the interspousal agreement.

. Art. 7 § 7(a), Ok. Const. (infra note 5).

. The certiorari arguments patently intermix the concepts of continuing with subject-matter jurisdiction. Mother argues that by the terms of the consent decree the trial court acquired "continuing jurisdiction" of the claim for enforcement of an on-the-record promise. Father, on the other hand, claims the trial court is utterly without subject-matter jurisdiction to compel support payments after the child has reached the age of 21 and its want of jurisdiction cannot be cured (or filled) by the parties' decree-merged agreement.

. See Eskridge v. Ladd, 1991 OK 3, 811 P.2d 587 (Opala, C.J., concurring); Matter of B.C., 1988 OK 4, 13, 749 P.2d 542, 548 (Opala, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Lee v. Hester, 1982 OK. 30, 16, 642 P.2d 243, 246; Childers v. Independent School Dist. No. 1 of Bryan County, 1981 OK 123, 116, 645 P.2d 992, 999 (Opala, J., dissenting); Interstate Brands Corp. v. Stephens, 1980 OK 121, 12, 615 P.2d 297, 299 (Opala, J., concurring); Logan v. Smith, 1979 OK 148, 14, 602 P.2d 647, 651 (Opala, J., dissenting); Carter v. Gulleft, 1979 OK 146, 13, 602 P.2d 640, 642 (Opala, J., dissenting).

. The pertinent terms of Art. 7 § 7(a), OK. Const., are:
"* * * The District Court shall have unlimited original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters, except as otherwise provided in this Article, and such powers of review of administrative action as may be provided by statute. * * *"
(emphasis added).
Pre-1969 district courts were tribunals of general jurisdiction. Art. 7 § 7, Okl. Const. (repealed in *9301967, eff. Jan. 13, 1969); Flick v. Crouch, 1967 OK 131, 116, 434 P.2d 256, 261. Since 1969 district courts exercise unlimited original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution. Art. 7 § 7, Okl. Const. (eff. Jan. 13, 1969); State ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Brown, 1974 OK 19, 121, 519 P.2d 491, 495.

. The division of the district court's business into separate dockets is authorized by the provisions of 20 0.$.2001 § 91.2, which stand vitalized by this court's administrative directives (SCAD No. 99-87 (16 December 1999), 92-06 (24 December 1992), 89-7 (12 September 1989), 89-1 (31 January 1989), 68-1 (23 December 1968)). See, eg., Wilson v. Kane, 1993 OK 65, 1% 6-8, 852 P.2d 717, 721-22, for an analysis of interdocket remedial boundaries' impact on probate judicature.

. Interdocket boundaries are not rigidly frozen along some jurisdictional lines. The notion of multiple procedural tracks for some classes of district court proceedings which cannot be accommodated by the Pleading Code is not new to the body of our adjective law. See, eg., the Uniform Adoption Act, 10 0.$.2001 § 7501-1.1 et seq.; the Oklahoma Children's Code, 10 O.S. 1991 § 7001-1.1 et seq.; statutes governing filiation proceedings, 10 0.$.2001 § 70 et seg.; condemnation proceedings for highways, 69 O.S. 2001 § 1708; condemnation proceedings for railroads, 66 0.$.2001 § 51 et seq.; probate procedure, 58 0.$.2001 § 1 et seq.; the provisions of 52 0.8.2001 §§ 318.2-318.8, commonly known as the "Surface Damages Act;" Ward Petroleum Corp. v. Stewart, 2003 OK 11, 111, 64 P.3d 1113, 1116; City of Tahlequah v. Lake Region Elec., 2002 OK 2, 14, 47 P.3d 467, 473-74 (Opala, J., dissenting); Wilson v. Kane, supra note 6 at \l 6-8, at 721-22; Williams v. Mulvihill, 1993 OK 5, T8 n. 14, 846 P.2d 1097, 1102 n. 14; Board of Law Library Trustees of Oklahoma County v. State ex rel. Petuskey, 1991 OK 122, 15 n. 11, 825 P.2d 1285, 1288 n. 11.

. A case is said to be coram non judice when the court in which it is brought is without jurisdiction to settle the dispute. Goldman v. Goldman, 1994 OK 111, 12, 883 P.2d 164, 166 n. 1, citing Board of Law Library Trustees, supra note 7, at (15 n. 31, at 1291 n. 31; Buack's Law Dictionary at 305 (5th ed.1979).

. Wilson, supra note 6, at 14 6-8, at 721-22.

. A district court judgment (or order) is facially void if, on an inspection of the judgment roll, it is apparent that one or more of the requisite jurisdictional elements-that of subject matter jurisdiction, in personam cognizance, or the power to render a particular decision-is shown to have been absent. Halliburton Oil Producing Co. v. Grothaus, 1998 OK 110, 110, 981 P.2d 1244, 1249; Scoufos v. Fuller, 1954 OK 363, 115, 280 P.2d 720, 723. The materials included in the judgment roll are those enumerated in the provisions of 12 0.$.2001 § 32.1.

. A suit for divorce, like condemnation, probate, adoption or juvenile cases, is not stricto sensu governed by the general regime of the Pleading Code. Langley v. District Court of Sequo-yah County, 1993 OK 3, 112-3, 846 P.2d 376, 377; see in this connection City of Tahlequah, *931supra note 7, at I 4, at 473-74 (Opala, J., dissenting).

. Before the 1969 court reorganization, when the district court's constitutional jurisdiction was merely "general," this court had to confirm in a case-by-case approach whether maiters not stricto sensu divorce-related (i.e., family-status or divorce-generated post-decree litigation) could be docketed in the district or in the county court. If a case did not fit into the district court's then-maintained civil or divorce docket, it would be deemed a county court matter. See, eg., Green v. Green, 1957 OK 70, 309 P.2d 276 (an action filed under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act to secure support for a child of a bigamous marriage, in which the court held that it was properly brought before the district court); Ex parte Yahola, 1937 OK 306, 71 P.2d 968, 972, 180 Ok. 637 (the court allowed the district court's docket to accommodate an original habe-as corpus proceeding by a child's father against its grandmother); Ross v. Ross, 1949 OK 35, 203 P.2d 702, 705 (an original suit for a minor child's support was allowed to be brought in the district court); the Whitney v. Whitney trilogy: (a) 1942 OK 268, 1125-26, 134 P.2d 357, 361, 192 Ok. 174 (the court recognized an equitable property right, described as an interest in a quasi-partnership estate, arising from a bigamous marriage and held that this right, though not marital, could be settled in a district court lawsuit between bigamous spouses); (b) 1944 OK 205, 151 P.2d 583, 194 Ok. 361 (the court allowed former bigamous spouses to bring a district court action for settlement of property rights arising from their void marriage); (c) 1947 OK 44, 110, 181 P.2d 245, 246-47, 198 Ok. 681 (the court held that a contract for settlement of rights claimed by bigamous spouses was enforceable in the district court). By the post 1969 district court's transformation from a general to an unlimited jurisdiction tribunal the fitness of a case for processing on the divorce track no longer presents a jurisdictional matter. All cases are now docketa-ble (under one rubric or another) in the same single-level trial court.

. Oklahoma is in the mainstream of jurisdictions that allow interspousal agreements to expand litigation issues by inclusion of those the court could not entertain in their absence. See the American Law Institute's (the authors and publishers of Restatements) Princirtes or tur Law or Faminy Dissorution: Amatysis amp Recommenpa-Tions [Principles] (adopted 16 May 2000), where it is observed that "[mjost jurisdictions allow the court to incorporate agreement terms that the court does not have the power to order itself, and to enforce them as terms of the decree." Id., § 7.10 (Incorporation of the Terms of a Separation Agreement in a Decree) Comment at 1022 (emphasis added); (Reporter's Notes at § 7.11, pg. 1023). According to the Priweiptes (Introduction at pgs. 39-40), [separation agreements resolving the terms of dissolution are favored, both under existing law and these Principles." It counsels that "the law should enforce separation agreements unless the rules of contract, viewed in the context of family dissolution, have been violated, or the terms of the agreement would frustrate some important policy of the law of family dissolution." Id.

. Oklahoma jurisprudence has long sanctioned the expansion of the family-and-domestic docket cases by injecting issues generated through consent decrees that go far beyond the legislative limit of divorce-related parameters. Consent decrees are a legitimate means of expanding rights of divorcing parties. Whitehead v. Whitehead, 1999 OK 91, §10, 995 P.2d 1098, 1101; Dicka-son v. Dickason, 1980 OK 24, 119 13, 607 P.2d 674, 677-78; Greeson v. Greeson, 1953 OK 111, 1 10, 257 P.2d 276, 278 (the parties consented to a post-decree retroactive modification of child support). Divorce-related orders, which expand the issues, were never treated as facially void eten when the district court exercised only "general jurisdiction." After the court came to be reorganized in 1969 and acquired unlimited jurisdiction, it is with even greater reason that we should now consider all consent-expanded issues effectively and legitimately within the district court's authority to settle.

. Family-and-domestic docket boundaries are to be treated as elastic and dynamic with a shape that is far from static or mummified. They change as the law expands. Today's pronouncement adds no more than another logical sequence: an approved divorce-related promise to support one's disabled adult child, which is *932merged in the decree, is enforceable as a judgment, much like other consent-based obligations.

. According to the dissent, [while a court may have general jurisdiction of the subject matter of a class of actions, it does not necessarily follow that the court may hear and determine a particular case submitted for its consideration. A court must have the judicial power to decide a particular matter and to render a particular judgment in order to pronounce a valid judgment.... The parties may not confer upon the court the jurisdiction to pronounce a particular decision it enters. 'Divorce was not recognized at common law, where divorces were either ecclesiastically or legislatively granted. The right to divorce is recognized as purely a creature of statute.' Chapman v. Parr, 1974 OK 46, €32, 521 P.2d 799, 803. Accordingly, all rights of parties with respect to divorce are fixed by the statutory law of the state." (citations omitted).
The dissent appears to view divorce litigation as firmly compressed in a straitjacket of statutory law. According to the dissent, despite its unlimited original jurisdiction, the district court is impotent to consider any divorce-related issue not specifically sanctioned by legislation. Overlooked by the dissent's analysis is that no textually demonstrable indicia of legislative intent to curb the district court's capacity for broad judicature upon all issues directly related or ancillary to divorce contests. This State's (as well as the Nation's) jurisprudence strongly militates against adopting the dissent-suggested constraints upon divorce judicature, even if these constraints could pass constitutional muster. See Part III and IV of my concurrence.

. Neither the three courts of common law nor that of chancery could dissolve a marriage (or grant a separate maintenance decree). A divorce a mensa et thoro (from "bed and board", which meant a decree of legal separation) could be procured from ecclesiastical courts; a divorce a vinculo matrimonii ("from the bond of matrimony" or one granting "an absolute divorce," which means a marriage dissolution) might be obtained only by a special act of the British Parliament. Divorce jurisdiction was transferred in 1857 from ecclesiastical courts to the civil court system by the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85. See Reaves v. Reaves, 1905 OK 32, 114, 82 P. 490, 494, 15 OKI. 240; Irwin v. Irwin, 1894 OK 29, 1 10, 37 P. 548, 557 (Scott, J., dissenting); 15 W. Holdsworth, A HisTory Or EncuisH Law 205-06 (1965); Homer H. Clark, Jr., THs Law or Domestic Rerations In THE Unitep States § 16.1, at 619 (2d ed.1988); Max Radin, Aneto American Lecar History § 269, at 512-513 (1936).

. When an approved interspousal agreement is incorporated into the decree, the former (contract) is extinguished and merged in the latter (decree) by force of law. Chapman v. Chapman, 1984 OK 89, 111, 692 P.2d 1369, 1374; Dicka-son, supra note 14, at 19, at 677; Acker v. Acker, 1979 OK 67, 17, 594 P.2d 1216, 1219. While the district court is not bound by an agreement of the parties settling their property rights, alimony and child support (Blount v. Blount, 1967 OK 74, 118, 425 P.2d 474, 477), once the inter-spousal agreement is incorporated into the decree upon its judicial approval, the rights the parties enjoy under its terms will merge in the decree. Chapman, supra, at T11, at 1374. These rights cease to be contractual and become enforceable as a judicial obligation. Dickason, supra note 14, at 19, at 677; Acker, supra, at 17, at 1219.

. Warren v. Hunter, 1981 OK 98, 13-4, 632 P.2d 418, 419 (an interparental support claim for an adult child is actionable by a parent who is providing the child with the necessities of life on a day-to-day basis; an equitable right of contri*933bution by the custodial parent may be pressed against the nonpaying parent).

. Dickason, supra note 14, at 119-13, at 677-78.

. A Hohfeldian plaintiff is one who seeks judicial determination as a party litigant that it has "a right, a privilege, an immunity or a power'" vis-a-vis the opposite party. Macy v. Board of County Com'rs, 1999 OK 53, 11 12 n. 28, 986 P.2d 1130, 1137-38 n. 28; Toxic Waste Impact Group, Inc. v. Leavitt, 1994 OK 148, n. 1, 890 P.2d 906, 914 n. 1 (Opala, J., concurring); Fowler v. Bailey, 1992 OK 160 n. 6, 844 P.2d 141, 150 n. 6 (Opala, C.J., concurring); Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen As Litigant In Public Actions: The non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U.Pa. L.Rev. 1033 (1968).

. Warren, supra note 19, at M 3-4, at 419 (parents, as co-obligors for child support, are required to contribute, either equally or equitably, toward the discharge of a common obligation).

. For the three requisite jurisdictional elements, see supra note 10.

. The record proper or judgment roll consists of ''the petition, the process, return, the pleadings subsequent thereto, reports, verdicts, orders, judgments, and all material acts and proceedings of the court." 12 0.$.2001 § 32.1; Elliott v. Guthrie, 1986 OK 59, 17, n. 8, 725 P.2d 861, 863, n. 8; Mayhue v. Mayhue, 1985 OK 68, 8, n. 17, 706 P.2d 890, 895, n. 17.

. The absence of a jurisdictional element from a judgment roll must be rested on record support. Chamberlin v. Chamberlin, 1986 OK 30, 18, 720 P.2d 721, 725; Salazar v. City of Oklahoma City, 1999 OK 20, 111-12, 976 P.2d 1056, 1061-62.

. The record on appeal includes only three items from the judgment roll of the 16 October 1993 decree-Mother's divorce petition, Father's answer and the October 16 journal entry granting a divorce.

. Matter of Estate of Mouse, 1993 OK 157, 110, 864 P.2d 1284, 1286, citing Vanguard Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Amick, 1973 OK. 86, § 11, 512 P.2d 807, 808; State ex rel. Commissioners of Land Office v. Keller, 1953 OK 371, "1 19, 264 P.2d 742, 746; Fitesimmons v. City of Oklahoma City, 1942 OK 422, 16, 135 P.2d 340, 342, 192 OKI. 248.

. Woodrow v. Ewing, 1953 OK 60, 16, 263 P.2d 167, 171. Regardless of the post-remand proceeding's outcome, there is absolutely no doubt about the trial court's jurisdictional power to entertain Mother's modification quest.

. See Pettis v. Johnston, 1920 OK 224, 1 19, 190 P. 681, 688 and Scoufos, supra note 10, at 133, at 725, holding that a judgment valid on its face may not be attacked after the passage of three years. Father did not attack the 26 October 1993 decree as facially infirm for want of jurisdiction until 2000. At that time he was limited to an attack for facial invalidity. See 12 0.$.2001 § 1038.

. Jurisdiction is not wanting but merely exceeded when judicial authority is exercised erroneously. Mayhue, supra note 24 at 15 n. 8, at 893 n. 8; Woodrow, supra note 28, at 1 6, at 171. For the difference between absence and excess of jurisdiction see Oklahoma Tax Com'n v. City Vending, 1992 OK 110, 117-8, 835 P.2d 97, 104-05 (Opala, C.J., concurring in judgment).

. See discussion in Part IV(F), 1 19, infra.

. 1974 OK 46, 521 P.2d 799.

. Supra note 17. The dissent also relies on Williams v. Williams, 1975 OK 163, 19, 543 P.2d 1401, 1403. In Roesler v. Roesler, 1982 OK 21, T4, 641 P.2d 550, 550-51, the court observes that "[whhile divorce is wholly a creature of statute [citing Williams, supral, actions for divorce and division of property are of purely equitable cognizance." The quoted Roesler explanation correctly identifies the notion that Oklahoma judges who hear divorce cases are not in the straitjacket imposed by the English legal system's ecclesiastical or parliamentary antecedents.

. Supra note 17.

. See, e.g., Whitehead, supra note 14, at 110, at 1101 Dickason, supra note 14, at ¥ 9-13, at 677-78; Greeson, supra note 14, at 110, at 278.

. Brown v. Bivings, 1954 OK 301, 113, 277 P.2d 671, 673; Watts v. Elmore, 1946 OK 232, T8, 176 P.2d 220, 223; Webb v. Moran, 1939 OK 369, 121, 96 P.2d 308, 312; Harlow Publishing Co. v. Patrick, 1937 OK 579, 11 0, 181 Okla. 83, 72 P.2d 511 syl. 2, 72 P.2d 511, 181 Ok. 83. Once it is determined that the parties intended to form a binding agreement, the certainty of the terms is important only as a "basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 33(2).

. It is a settled principle that the law does not favor invalidation of agreements on the ground of uncertainty. A contract is not void for uncertainty because it fails to set out details as to the subject matter if it can be ascertained with a reasonable degree of certainty what the parties intended. Brown, supra note 36, at 673; Watts, supra note 36, at 223; Webb, supra note 36, at 312. This has long been the common law in Oklahoma. It is now codified in 124 0.8.2001 § 2-204 of the Uniform Commercial Code [UCC]. The terms of 12A 0.$.2001 § 2-204(3) provide in pertinent part: "Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy." According to the Uniform Commercial Code Comment that follows § 2-204, "Oklahoma courts have not previously required absolute certainty in all respects to grant relief. The agreement has been held sufficiently certain if the court could determine the intention of the parties. * * * Since the Oklahoma courts have previously been liberal in considering all the circumstances, and searching for the intention of the parties in enforcing an agreement, it does not appear that this section materially changes Oklahoma law." In sum, the common law that antedates the adoption of Article 2 of the UCC, much like the Article itself, supports the enforceability of contracts with terms that are indefinite but capable of being ascertained by methods agreed upon and known to both parties. The lack of specific terms does not necessarily invalidate contracts as long as the open or missing terms could be reduced to certainty by the use of extraneous evidence. 1 on Contracts, § 4.1, p. 533 n. 19 (1993).

. Chapman, supra note 18 at T11, at 1374; Dickason, supra note 14, at 19, at 677; Acker, supra note 18, at 17, at 1219.

. See cases cited in supra note 14.

. See Part IV(D), supra.

. See Part III, supra.

. Nelson v. Nelson, 548 A.2d 109, 113 (D.C. 1988) (citing Annotation, Parent's Obligation to Support Adult Child, 1 A.L.R.2d 910 (1948)).

. See American Law Institute's Principres, supra note 13, Introduction at pgs. 39-40, §§ 3.13(1) (Effect of a Parental Agreement on a Child Support Award ), 3.24(4) (Duration of the Child Support Obligation), 7.09 (The Enforceability of a Separation Agreement ), 7.10 (Incorporation of the Terms of a Separation Agreement in a Decree). The pertinent terms of § 3.13(1) are: "The child-support terms of a parental agreement should be approved and adopted by the court unless the agreement provides for substantially less child support than would otherwise be awarded under this Chapter." The terms of § 3.24(4) state: ''The parties may by agreement extend the duration of the child-support obligation." According to Comment h to § 3.24: "The parties may always agree to obligations to a child or to each other that exceed those imposed by law. This is a consistent theme in current law and in these Principles." Comment g to § 3.24 notes that the statutes of most states are silent as to post-majority support for disabled children, "in which case many courts have judicially extended the support obligation to adult disabled children." Id., citing in support Kamp v. Kamp, 640 P.2d 48, 50-51 (Wyo.1982); Streb v. Streb., 774 P.2d 798, 800 (Alaska 1989); Koltay v. Koltay, 667 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Colo.1983); Nelson, supra note 42, at 119; Castle v. Castle, 15 Ohio St.3d 279, 473 N.E.2d 803, 806-807 (1984); Kinder v. Schlaegel, 185 W.Va. 56, 404 S$.E.2d 545 (1991), but noting a contrary view in Smith v. Smith, 433 Mich. 606, 447 N.W.2d 715 (1989).

. In Nelson, supra note 42, the court observes that in the absence of statute (a) the "trend among courts considering this issue is to recognize the parental duty of support for the adult disabled child as a natural extension of the common law obligation of support for minor children" (id. at 116) and (b) that the vast majority of those courts "have found that the developing common law imposes such a duty" (id. at 115).

. See Part IV(B) supra.

. See Part IV(A) supra.

. Consent decrees are not an exempted rubric from the sine qua non four-corners' examination. The parties failed to stipulate as to (or even suggest that they agreed on) the contents of the complete judgment roll in the proceedings that led to the decree here under the jurisdictional scrutiny. The burden to show a flaw on the face of the judgment roll is cast on Father. Salazar, supra note 25, at 111, at 1061. It was his duty to have in the record the four corners of the judgment roll. The record for Mother's appeal is devoid of her stipulation that the decree is facially and fatally void. Nothing short of Mother's stipulated admission (or concession) will support the dissent's analysis.

. Hedges v. Hedges, 2002 OK 92, 126, 66 P.3d 364, 374; Evans v. Evans, 1993 OK 59, 11 10-11, 852 P.2d 145, 149; Messenger v. Messenger, 1992 OK 27, 112, 827 P.2d 865, 870; Timmons v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 1985 OK 76, 1 13, 713 P.2d 589, 594 n. 18; Mayhue v. Mayhue, 1985 OK 68, T6, 706 P.2d 890, 894; Nantz v. Nantz, 1988 OK 9, 16, 749 P.2d 1137, 1143 (Opala, J., dissenting); Harry R. Carlile Trust v. Cotton Petroleum Corp., 1986 OK 16, 124, 732 P.2d 438, 449; Wootten v. Askew, 1983 OK 37, 18, 668 P.2d 1123, 1124-125, citing Crain v. Farmer's United Cooperative Pool, 1970 OK 134, 113, 472 P.2d 882, 884 and Curtis v. Barby, 1961 OK 252, 1T 31-32, 366 P.2d 616, 622; Bomford v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 1968 OK 43, 124, 440 P.2d 713, 720-21; American-First Title & Trust Company v. Ewing, 1965 OK 98, 140, 403 P.2d 488, 496.

. For the various English restrictions upon divorce judicature see supra note 17.