Court Opinion

ID: 9473641
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:35:02.086778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:38.600022
License: Public Domain

VAN GRAAFEILAND, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
One of the great strengths of the Second Circuit is the willingness of its able and respected district judges to accept the not-always-perfect leadership of this Court in our mutual effort to establish a just and coherent body of Circuit law. If this system is to function properly, a district judge who has followed faithfully a precedent of this Court should not have the ground cut out from under him by a decision which overturns a prior holding while purporting to simply “carve out a' limited exception” to it. Because that is what is happening to Judge Elfvin in this case, I respectfully dissent.
In DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983), the Supreme Court ordered the dismissal of a four-year-old lawsuit against an employer and a union because it was not brought within the six-month limitation period of section 10(b) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). In Welyczko v. U.S. Air, Inc., 733 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.--, 105 S.Ct. 512, 83 L.Ed.2d 402 (1984), we refused to “carve out an exception to the retroactivity principle” adopted in DelCostello. Id. at 241. Holding that a Chevron Oil analysis (see Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07, 92 S.Ct. 349, 355-56, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971)) was inappropriate because the DelCostello court had squarely held its decision to be retroactive, we concluded that “in employment termination cases, a six-month statute of limitations applies both retroactively and prospectively to wrongful discharge/failure to represent claims.” Id. My colleagues now effectively overturn the Welyczko panel’s holding by “carving out an exception” to that panel’s refusal to carve out an exception.
In the process, they compound what I believe to be error by asserting a basis for their holding that, so far as the record discloses, was neither argued in the district court nor briefed on appeal, i.e., “inexcusable delay”. As a general rule, arguments that neither the trial court nor opposing counsel have had an opportunity to weigh and discuss will not be considered by an appellate court. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Association, Inc., 360 U.S. 334, 342 n. 7, 79 S.Ct. 1196, 1202 n. 7, 3 L.Ed.2d 1280 (1959); Wedra v. Thomas, 671 F.2d 713, 718 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1109, 102 S.Ct. 3491, 73 L.Ed.2d 1372 (1982); In re Chinese Maritime Trust, Ltd. v. Panama Canal Co., *368478 F.2d 1357, 1359 n. 1 (2d Cir.1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1143, 94 S.Ct. 894, 39 L.Ed.2d 98 (1974); Independent Wireless Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corporation of America, 270 U.S. 84, 86, 46 S.Ct. 224, 225, 70 L.Ed. 481 (1926); Hamdi v. Ibrahi m Mango Co. v. Reliance Insurance Co., 291 F.2d 437, 445 (2d Cir.1961) (per curiam). The wisdom of this general rule is clearly evident in the instant case.
The record shows that appellant was represented by an attorney as far back as 1969, when his differences with appellees first arose, and the district court found that “had [appellant] acted with reasonable diligence the instant suit would have been instituted by the end of July, 1970.” See Byrne v. Buffalo Creek Railroad Co., 536 F.Supp. 1301, 1305, 1313 (W.D.N.Y.1982). In contrast to the district court’s finding of “inexplicable delay” on appellant’s part, which was not clearly erroneous, id. at 1312, the majority concoct reasons out of whole cloth to justify the delay; e.g., the difficulty in finding counsel willing to take appellant’s case. My colleagues then find the district court’s delay to be “inexcusable”, despite the fact that neither opposing counsel nor the district court ever had the opportunity to consider and discuss whether this was so.
In the determination of whether a change of law should be applied to a particular case, it has been well said that “[t]oo many irrelevant considerations, including the common cold, bear upon the rate of progress of a case through the judicial system.” Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 658 n. 9, 91 S.Ct. 1148, 1155 n. 9, 28 L.Ed.2d 388 (1971) (White, J., quoting W.V. Schaefer, The Control of “Sunbursts”: Techniques of Prospective Overruling, 42 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 631, 645 (1967)); see United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 556 n. 17, 102 S.Ct. 2579, 2591, 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982). Such a consideration in the instant case, for example, might be the number of pending cases on the trial judge’s calendar, which, according to the 1984 Annual Report of the Second Circuit, averaged 758 cases for each of the three judges in the Western District. Other time consuming matters, which are represented by over half-a-hundred docket entries, are discussed generally in the district court’s interim opinion reported at 536 F.Supp. 1301 and in that court’s unreported Memorandum and Order of November 30, 1984. Here, as always, we should be careful not to put one of our district court judges in a position where he is more sinned against than sinning.
Unfortunately, my brothers in the majority do not content themselves with faulting the district judge for following Welyczko to the letter.1 For some reason which I am unable to fathom, they have seen fit to visit the sins of the district judge upon the defendants. In my opinion, the only way in which one could begin to justify such a result would be to assume that the defendants had some means of speeding up Judge Elfvin’s judicial functions that were unavailable to the plaintiff. That assumption would, of course, be erroneous. Mandamus relief is as available to a plaintiff as it is to a defendant.
It is quite obvious that the plaintiff never considered time to be of the essence in this proceeding. Plaintiff delayed almost six years in bringing suit, and it does not appear that he took any steps thereafter to expedite the disposition of his claim. In fact, a principal cause of the thirty-four-month interval between the end of the trial *369and the district court’s interim decision on liability was the plaintiff’s twenty-month delay in submitting his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. In stating that an appeal on the merits should have been decided in 1980, the majority does not explain how this could have been done when plaintiff’s proposed findings and conclusions were not submitted to the district court until February 16, 1981. It is noteworthy that plaintiff’s brief in this court contains no criticism of the district court for the delay which is the cornerstone of the majority’s decision to reverse.
The majority treats Welyczko as if that case differed from the instant one in moving expeditiously from the filing of the complaint to its dismissal. In fact, that is not what happened. Welyczko sought recovery from his employer and his union for his allegedly wrongful discharge which occurred in 1975. He brought his action in New York State Supreme Court on March 13, 1981. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York on June 18, 1981, where issue was joined on July 6, 1981. Almost two years elapsed thereafter before there w;as another entry in the district court’s docket sheet. That entry simply noted the case’s appearance on the dismissal calendar. Two months later, DelCostel-lo was decided, and, ten months later, the complaint was dismissed.
Had there been no two-year hiatus in Welyczko, it is possible that a final judgment would have been entered before Del-Costello was decided. However, this would not have dictated a different result. This Court would have had to apply the law that was in effect at the time it rendered its decision, despite the fact that the law was changed after judgment was entered in the district court. Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 714-15, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2017-18, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974); United States v. Alabama, 362 U.S. 602, 604, 80 S.Ct. 924, 926, 4 L.Ed.2d 982 (1960) (per curiam); Hospital Association of New York State, Inc. v. Toia, 577 F.2d 790, 796-97 (2d Cir.1978). That is what we should do in the instant case. See Bradley v. General Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 239, 240 (6th Cir.1972) (per curiam).
Assuming that, contrary to the crystal-clear holding of Welyczko, we must weigh “the inequity imposed by retroactive application”, the third factor in the Chevron Oil analysis, 404 U.S. at 107, 92 S.Ct. at 355, the district court’s judgment nonetheless should be affirmed. Because the responsibility for whatever delay has occurred must be attributed in large measure to the plaintiff himself, it would not be inequitable to apply the statute of limitations retroactively to bar his claim. Perez v. Dana Corporation, Parish Frame Division, 718 F.2d 581, 588 (3d Cir.1983) (no inequity in view of twenty-three month delay in bringing suit); Murray v. Branch Motor Express Co., 723 F.2d 1146, 1148 (4th Cir.1983) (no inequity where plaintiff delayed 29 months).
In United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 101 S.Ct. 1559, 67 L.Ed.2d 732 (1981), Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated that the union grievance procedure “could easily become unworkable if a decision ... could suddenly be called into question as much as six years later.” Id. at 64, 101 S.Ct. at 1564-65. Justice Stewart, concurring, stated that “Congress enacted § 10(b) of the NLRA to protect continuing collective-bargaining systems from delayed attack.” Id. at 68, 101 S.Ct. at 1567.
In the instant case, there has been not only a “delayed attack”, but also a less than zealous prosecution of the attack once it was commenced. Whatever fault for the latter might be attributable to the district court, none can be attributed to the defendants. Under the circumstances, it seems to me that all of the equities are with the defendants.
Because I believe that the majority’s sua sponte opinion is unfair to Judge Kaufman, who wrote a lucid opinion in Welyczko, to Judge Elfvin, who accurately interpreted that opinion, and to the defendants, who, through no fault of their own, are denied *370the benefit of the six-month limitation period prescribed by Congress, I respectfully dissent.

. Other courts have interpreted the Welyczko opinion in the same manner as Judge Elfvin did. In Smith v. General Motors Corp., 747 F.2d 372, 375 (6th Cir.1984), Judge Martin, writing for eight members of an en banc court, said:
Nevertheless, we agree with the Second Circuit that use of the Chevron analysis is not appropriate here because the Supreme Court implicitly held in DelCostello that the statute of limitations should be applied retroactively by barring the claim that was in front of the Court.
See also Campbell v. McLean Trucking Co., 592 F.Supp. 1560, 1562 (E.D.N.Y.1984). Despite the majority’s assertions to the contrary, it seems to me that, when one panel of this Court holds that a Chevron Oil analysis is inappropriate when applying the DelCostello rule and a second panel holds that it is appropriate, the second panel is effectively overturning the holding of the first.