Court Opinion

ID: 9950952
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 13:02:38.198509+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:34:52.878674
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                 STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                        Case No. 5D23-697
                   LT Case No. 2019-CF-003366
                  _____________________________

AMBER MARIE MORREALE,

    Appellant,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellee.
                  _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Lake County.
Heidi Davis, Judge.

Amber Marie Morreale, Ocala, pro se.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Allison Leigh
Morris, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for
Appellee.

                          March 15, 2024

HARRIS, J.

     Amber Marie Morreale appeals the trial court’s order denying
her motion to dismiss the information based upon expiration of the
statute of limitations. We treat the appeal as a petition for writ of
prohibition, grant the petition, quash the order denying the
motion, and remand for further proceedings.
     On December 12, 2019, the Tavares Police Department filed
an affidavit of probable cause alleging that Morreale committed
the crimes of uttering a forged check and grand theft on August 7,
2018. An arrest warrant was issued the same day as the affidavit
of probable cause, but it was returned unexecuted. A detainer was
filed against Morreale on February 16, 2021, while she was
incarcerated for an unrelated matter. Morreale filed a pro se
motion to dismiss/resolve detainer on March 5, 2021, in which she
asserted she was sentenced to a term of five years at the Hernando
Correctional Institution for an unrelated matter where she had
resided since November 6, 2019.

     On March 10, 2021, the State filed an information charging
Morreale with one count of uttering a forged check, a third-degree
felony. On November 21, 2022, Morreale filed a motion to dismiss
the information, erroneously asserting that the charge was a first-
degree misdemeanor, and arguing that prosecution for the charge
had not commenced within the two-year statute of limitations for
a first-degree misdemeanor. The trial court denied the motion to
dismiss, reasoning that Morreale was originally charged with two
third-degree felonies, uttering a forged check and grand theft, for
which the period of limitations is three years from the commission
of the crime (thus, prosecution must have commenced before
August 7, 2021). It further explained:

      A prosecution is commenced when an information is
      filed, provided a capias, summons, or other process is
      executed without unreasonable delay. See § 775.15,
      Fla. Stat. Here, a detainer was placed on Defendant,
      who is incarcerated in the Department of Corrections,
      on February 16, 2021. An information was filed on
      March 10, 2021. Prosecution has commenced, and the
      commencement is within the three-year period of
      limitation.

Morreale appeals the order denying her motion to dismiss.

      An appellate court reviews de novo a trial court’s order on a
motion to dismiss, applying the statute of limitations in effect at
the time of the alleged crimes. See State v. Soebhag, 163 So. 3d 672,

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673 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015); State v. Perez, 952 So. 2d 611, 612 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2007).

        Section 775.15(4)(b) provides:

        A prosecution on a charge on which the defendant has
        not previously been arrested or served with a
        summons is commenced when either an indictment or
        information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or
        other process issued on such indictment or information
        is executed without unreasonable delay. In
        determining what is reasonable, inability to locate the
        defendant after diligent search or the defendant’s
        absence from the state shall be considered.

§ 775.15(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2018). Morreale argues that the term
“executed” means completion of service on the defendant, and that
the filing of a detainer is not the equivalent of the process
contemplated by section 775.15. She argues the trial court erred in
denying her motion to dismiss on the basis that a detainer and
information were timely filed. 1

      We agree with Morreale that the filing of a detainer is not
the equivalent of the process contemplated by section 775.15(4)(b).
See Lett v. State, 837 So. 2d 614, 615 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); see also
State v. Fields, 505 So. 2d 1336, 1337 (Fla. 1987) (“The word
‘executed’ . . . mean[s] service upon the defendant.”). While the
information was filed within the three-year statutory period, there
is no indication in the record that a capias, summons, or other
process was executed pursuant to section 775.14(4)(b). See State v.
Miller, 581 So. 2d 641, 642 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (“[T]he mere filing
of an information does not commence a prosecution.”). Thus, the
trial court’s reasoning—that a detainer and information were
timely filed—does not support denial of the motion. See Kidd v.

    1  Morreale acknowledges that her motion to dismiss
incorrectly stated that uttering a forged check charge was a first-
degree misdemeanor with a two-year statute of limitations, but
nevertheless asserts that her argument still applies to the correct
charge and limitation period.

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State, 985 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (holding denial of
motion to dismiss was error where defendant was not arrested on
warrant and was never served with information, and only a
detainer was issued while he was serving another sentence).

      When a defendant raises whether the applicable statute of
limitations has expired, the burden is on the State to prove by
competent, substantial evidence that prosecution is not barred. See
Mackey v. State, 333 So. 3d 775, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022). However,
it appears the State did not have an opportunity to respond to the
motion. Accordingly, we grant the petition, quash the order
denying the motion to dismiss, and remand for further proceedings
in order for the trial court to consider whether any capias,
summons, or other appropriate process was executed and whether
any delay in doing so was unreasonable. See Kidd, 985 So. 2d at
1181; Calfas v. State, 251 So. 3d 847 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018).

   PETITION    GRANTED,       ORDER            QUASHED,        and
REMANDED for further proceedings.

EDWARDS, C.J., and EISNAUGLE, J., concur.

                 _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
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