Court Opinion

ID: 9899207
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-16 15:08:17.721997+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:18.614578
License: Public Domain

SYLLABUS

This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office
of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor
approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion.

     Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. D.C.A. (A-44-22) (087604)

Argued September 12, 2023 -- Decided November 16, 2023

PATTERSON, J., writing for a unanimous Court.

       In this appeal, the Court determines whether trial courts may still consider the
relationships between children and resource families under the fourth prong of the
best interests of the child test, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4), despite a 2021
Amendment that precluded consideration of those relationships under the test’s
second prong, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2).

       Defendants “Divina” and “Javier” are the parents of “Ignacio,” born in 2015;
“Josefina,” born in 2016; “Antonia,” born in 2019; and “Ian,” born in 2020. The
record reflects extensive evidence of domestic violence involving Divina and Javier.
In July 2018, the trial court granted the Division of Child Protection and
Permanency care, custody, and supervision of Ignacio and Josefina, citing concerns
about continuing domestic violence, Divina’s inability to provide a safe environment
for the children, and Divina’s mental health. Antonia and Ian were each removed
from the home shortly after birth. Ignacio and Josefina were placed together in a
resource home; Antonia and Ian were each placed in different resource homes.

       The Division presented the testimony of its expert psychologist about the
mental health of the parents and his bonding evaluations of the four children with
Divina. In the case of each child, he found that the child had an “ambivalent and
insecure” attachment to Divina and that the child did not have a “significant and
positive bond” with her. The psychologist opined as to each child that there was a
low risk that the child would suffer severe and enduring harm if the child’s
relationship with Divina were terminated. He also testified about the bonding
evaluations that he conducted to assess the relationships between Antonia and Ian
and their respective resource families, which had expressed the intent to adopt.

      The Division next presented caseworker testimony. During cross-
examination, the Law Guardian inquired how the children were doing in their
current placements. Divina’s counsel objected, arguing that in the wake of the 2021
Amendment to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), such evidence was no longer relevant.

                                           1
       The trial court overruled that objection, noting that the Legislature prohibited
consideration of such evidence in the court’s inquiry under the second prong of the
best interests test, but not in the court’s determination of the other prongs of the test.
Ultimately, the trial court found that the Division had proven by clear and
convincing evidence all four prongs of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) and terminated the
parental rights of Divina and Javier to Ignacio, Josefina, Antonia, and Ian.

       The Appellate Division affirmed, rejecting Divina’s argument that the
Legislature’s amendment of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2) barred trial courts from
considering evidence of the child’s relationship with resource parents in any aspect
of the termination of parental rights determination. 474 N.J. Super. 11, 24-30 (App.
Div. 2022). The Court granted certification. 253 N.J. 599 (2023).

HELD: Based on the plain language of the 2021 Amendment, the Court concurs
with the trial court and Appellate Division that the Legislature did not intend to bar
trial courts from considering evidence of the child’s relationship with the resource
family when they address the fourth prong of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). The trial
court properly considered the relationships between the children and their resource
families when it considered the fourth prong of the best interests test, N.J.S.A.
30:4C-15.1(a)(4), and its determination as to all four prongs of that test was
grounded in substantial and credible evidence in the record.

1. In New Jersey, the balance between parental rights and the State’s interest in the
welfare of children is achieved through the best interests of the child standard . The
Court reviews the history of the standard, which began as a generally phrased statute
in 1951. The Court set forth a four-factor test to apply that statute in DYFS v. A.W.,
103 N.J. 591, 604-11 (1986). In 1991, the Legislature enacted the original version
of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), codifying in subsections (a)(1) through (a)(4) the four-
prong test defined in A.W. The 1991 iteration of the termination of parental rights
statute did not expressly direct courts to evaluate the child’s relationship with the
resource family as part of the best interests analysis. That specific direction was
explicitly added to the second prong of the test -- N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2) -- via
legislative amendment in 1995 following the Court’s recognition of the importance
of that evaluation in In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 19 (1992). (pp. 20-24)

2. Although the relationship with the resource family was only explicitly added to
the second prong of the best interests test as codified in statute, the Court explained
that it was also relevant under the fourth prong -- N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4) -- in In
re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 353-55 (1999), and subsequent case law.
In short, by the time the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) in 2021, New
Jersey courts had long considered a child’s relationship with a resource family to be
relevant not only when they assessed the evidence under the second prong of the
best interests test, but also when they applied the fourth prong. (pp. 24-26)
                                            2
3. In July 2021, the Legislature removed the instruction to consider the relationship
with the resource family that had been added to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2) in 1995.
A statement to the bill that proposed the amendment explained the legislation’s
intent to require the Division “to consider placement of children with relatives or
kinship guardians” when determining the placement of children, and to change
“certain standards for initiating petitions to terminate parental rights.” The rest of
N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) was left unchanged. The fourth prong of the best interests
test continues to require that a court determine whether “[t]ermination of parental
rights will not do more harm than good.” N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4). (pp. 26-29)

4. The Legislature made a single change to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) in 2021: the
deletion of the sentence, “[s]uch harm may include evidence that separating the child
from his resource family parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or
psychological harm to the child,” from N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2). It amended
N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2) to ensure that parental fitness -- not the child’s bond with
resource parents -- is the core inquiry when a judge considers the best interests
standard’s second prong in a termination of parental rights case. It did not identify
as a legislative goal the elimination of that bond as a factor in any component of the
best interests analysis. Indeed, as the Appellate Division noted, precluding the
admission of all evidence concerning resource family placements could in some
settings undermine the Legislature’s objective to promote kinship caregivers and
preserve family bonds. See 474 N.J. Super. at 25-26. In L. 2021, c. 154, which
amended no fewer than eight statutes, the Legislature could easily have barred
evidence of a child’s relationship with resource parents in a court’s inquiry under the
fourth prong of the statutory standard, or entirely precluded consideration of such
evidence in any aspect of a court’s inquiry. The Court discerns no legislative intent
for so fundamental a change and, were the Court to infer such intent absent a clear
indication from the Legislature, it would undermine the State’s parens patriae
obligation to protect the welfare of children. The Court agrees with the Appellate
Division’s construction of the 2021 Amendment. (pp. 30-33)

5. And here, the trial court’s detailed findings as to the best interests of Ignacio,
Josefina, Antonia, and Ian are amply supported by substantial and credible evidence.
The court’s determination that the Division met its burden as to all four prongs of
N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) was a proper exercise of its broad discretion. (pp. 33-35)

      AFFIRMED.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES SOLOMON, PIERRE-LOUIS,
WAINER APTER, FASCIALE, and NORIEGA join in JUSTICE
PATTERSON’s opinion.

                                          3
               SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                     A-44 September Term 2022
                               087604

                       New Jersey Division of
                        Child Protection and
                           Permanency,

                        Plaintiff-Respondent,

                                  v.

                               D.C.A.,

                        Defendant-Appellant,

                                 and

                               J.J.C.B.,

                           Defendant.
_______________________________________________________________

                                In the
                    Matter of the Guardianship of
               I.A.C.C., J.S.C.C., A.I.C.C. and I.C.C.,

                        Minors-Respondents.

               On certification to the Superior Court,
           Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at
                   474 N.J. Super. 11 (App. Div. 2022).

               Argued                      Decided
          September 12, 2023           November 16, 2023
  John A. Albright, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
  argued the cause for appellant D.C.A. (Joseph E.
  Krakora, Public Defender, Office of Parental
  Representation, attorney; John A. Albright, of counsel
  and on the briefs).

  Eleanor M. Armstrong, Assistant Attorney General,
  argued the cause for respondent New Jersey Division of
  Child Protection and Permanency (Matthew J. Platkin,
  Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa and Sara
  M. Gregory, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel, and
  Eleanor M. Armstrong and Mary L. Harpster, Deputy
  Attorney General, on the briefs).

  Neha Gogate, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued
  the cause for minors I.A.C.C., J.S.C.C., A.I.C.C., and
  I.C.C. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Office of the
  Law Guardian, attorney; Meredith Alexis Pollock,
  Deputy Public Defender, of counsel, and Neha Gogate, of
  counsel and on the briefs).

  Mary M. McManus-Smith argued the cause for amicus
  curiae Legal Services of New Jersey (Legal Services of
  New Jersey, attorneys; Mary M. McManus-Smith, Dawn
  K. Miller, Sylvia L. Thomas, Chiori Kaneko, Anne
  Gowen, and Jonnelle Casey, on the brief).

  Randi Mandelbaum argued the cause for amici curiae
  Rutgers Child Advocacy Clinic and the Advocates for
  Children of New Jersey (Rutgers Law School Child
  Advocacy Clinic and Advocates for Children of New
  Jersey, attorneys; Randi Mandelbaum and Mary E.
  Coogan, on the brief).

JUSTICE PATTERSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

                            2
      The Legislature has long mandated that in order for a Family Part judge

to terminate parental rights, the New Jersey Division of Child Protection and

Permanency (Division) must prove by clear and convincing evidence all four

prongs of the “best interests” test set forth in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). Two

prongs of that standard are central to this appeal. The second prong requires a

court to decide whether “[t]he parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the

harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable

home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the

harm.” N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2). Under the fourth prong, a court determines

whether “[t]ermination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.”

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4).

      From 1995 until 2021, the second prong of the standard provided that

“[s]uch harm may include evidence that separating the child from his resource

family parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological

harm to the child.” N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2) (1995). In a July 2, 2021

amendment to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2) (the 2021 Amendment), the

Legislature eliminated that language from the statutory standard. L. 2021, c.

154. The Legislature made no change to the fourth prong of the statute,

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4). -------
                           See ibid.

                                       3
      In this appeal, we review the Appellate Division’s decision affirming the

trial court’s termination of a mother’s parental rights to four of her children.

The trial court and the Appellate Division held that notwithstanding the

Legislature’s amendment of the second prong, a court may rely on evidence of

harm that the child will suffer if separated from the resource family when it

determines whether the Division has proven the fourth prong. DCPP v.

D.C.A., 474 N.J. Super. 11, 24-30 (App. Div. 2022). The trial court found that

the Division met its burden to prove all four prongs of the statute by clear and

convincing evidence, and the Appellate Division affirmed that determination.

      Based on the plain language of the 2021 Amendment, we concur with

the trial court and Appellate Division that the Legislature did not intend to bar

trial courts from considering evidence of the child’s relationship with the

resource family when they address the fourth prong of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).

We agree with the Appellate Division that the trial court properly considered

the relationships between the children and their resource families when it

considered the fourth prong of the best interests test, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-

15.1(a)(4), and that its determination as to all four prongs of that test was

grounded in substantial and credible evidence in the record.

      Accordingly, we affirm the Appellate Division’s judgment.

                                         4
                                        I.

                                       A.

      Defendants D.C.A. (Divina) and J.J.C.B. (Javier) are the parents of

I.A.C.C. (Ignacio), born in 2015; J.S.C.C. (Josefina), born in 2016; A.I.C.C.

(Antonia), born in 2019; and I.C.C. (Ian), born in 2020.1 A fifth child, S.C.C.,

born in 2021, is the subject of a separate guardianship proceeding and is not

involved in this appeal.

      As the record before the trial court reflects, the Division presented

extensive evidence of domestic violence involving Divina and Javier between

2015 and 2018, when they lived in New York, and additional incidents

following their move to New Jersey in 2018. The Division became involved

with the family on July 5, 2018, when Divina complained to police that Javier

was harassing her, resulting in Javier’s arrest. Divina told the Division that

Javier had physically and sexually abused her on multiple occasions, but she

declined to cooperate with the Division’s efforts to ensure her family’s safety

and refused to provide the Division with information about her children.

1
  In accordance with Rule 1:38-3(d)(12), and to protect the privacy of the
family at issue in this appeal, we refer to defendants and the children by the
pseudonyms used in the Appellate Division’s opinion. See D.C.A., 474 N.J.
Super. at 15 n.1.
                                         5
       The Division conducted an emergency removal of Ignacio and Josefina.

On July 9, 2018, citing concerns about continuing domestic violence, Divina’s

inability to provide a safe environment for the children, and Divina’s mental

health, the trial court granted the Division care, custody, and supervision o f

Ignacio and Josefina. The children were placed in a resource family home.2

       The Division offered a range of services to Divina, referring her for

psychiatric evaluations, psychological counseling, domestic violence

counseling, parenting classes, and supervised visitation. 3 The Division also

provided services to Javier. According to the trial testimony of Division

caseworkers, the Division’s initial goal was the reunification of the family. It

2
    A “resource family home” is a

             private residence wherein any child in the care,
             custody, or guardianship of the Department of Children
             and Families may be placed by the department, or with
             its approval, for care, and shall include any private
             residence maintained by persons with whom any child
             is placed by the division for the purposes of adoption
             until the adoption is finalized.

             [N.J.S.A. 30:4C-2(i).]
3
  According to the trial testimony of Division caseworkers, although most of
Divina’s visits with the children proceeded without incident, on one occasion
Divina assaulted a Division staff member. She was then prohibited from
entering the Division office and was denied access to Division staff unless
police were present.
                                        6
explored potential placements with relatives of Divina or Javier, including the

children’s maternal grandparents and Javier’s adult children. The adult

children were rejected because of Divina’s dislike of them and incidents in

their prior histories. The Division presented evidence at trial that despite its

efforts, it was unable to identify any family member as a potential caregiver

for the children.

      Shortly after Antonia’s birth, the Division conducted an emergency

removal of the child. By order to show cause entered on April 16, 2019, the

trial court granted to the Division care, custody, and supervision of Antonia.

She was placed in a different resource home from the home in which Ignacio

and Josefina had been placed.

      In the months that followed Antonia’s removal from Divina’s and

Javier’s custody, the Division continued to offer services to the parents, and

they participated in supervised visitation with all three children. However, the

pattern of domestic violence continued. In July 2019, police were called to the

family home four times in response to allegations of domestic violence by

either Divina or Javier.

      On September 25, 2019, citing the parents’ failure to “make sufficient

progress” and their mental health issues, the trial court entered a permanency

order changing the permanency plan for Ignacio, Josefina, and Antonia from

                                         7
reunification to termination of parental rights followed by adoption. The

Division filed an order to show cause and complaint for guardianship on

November 6, 2019, seeking to terminate the parental rights of Divina and

Javier to Ignacio, Josefina, and Antonia. In February 2020, the Division

transferred Ignacio and Josefina to a different resource family.

      Immediately following the birth of Ian the same month, the Division

conducted an emergency removal of the child. By Notice of Emergency

Removal dated February 8, 2020, the trial court granted care, custody, and

supervision of Ian to the Division. The Division initially placed Ian in the

resource home where Ignacio and Josefina had been placed, but the trial court

later reassigned him to a different resource home. On October 20, 2021, the

trial court entered an order establishing termination of parental rights followed

by adoption as a permanency plan for Ian.

      According to the testimony of the Division caseworker who had primary

responsibility for the family until a few weeks before trial, the Division

determined that the second resource parents with whom Ignacio and Josefina

were placed were not interested in adopting the children. The Division

                                        8
therefore sought a selected adoptive home for the two children. 4 As of the

time of trial, the Division had identified a prospective adoptive family and the

children were visiting the family’s home on weekends in anticipation of a

potential adoption. Prior to trial, the Division advised the trial court that it

anticipated that Antonia’s resource parents would adopt her and that Ian’s

resource parents would adopt him in the event that the court were to terminate

the parental rights of Divina and Javier.

                                         B.

                                         1.

      The Division’s guardianship action was tried before a Family Part judge

over five days beginning on June 23, 2021, and concluding on September 22,

4
   A “selected adoptive home” is “a resource family parent who has been
licensed as a resource family home for the purpose of providing adoptive ca re
to a child who does not currently reside with this resource family parent.”
N.J.A.C. 3A:11-1.3. “Select home adoption” is “a process that includes
looking for an adoptive home in New Jersey and registering the child on the
national adoption exchange.” DYFS v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 98 (2008); see also
Lynn V. Norcia, Adoption Through the Division of Child Protection and
Placement, N.J. Lawyer (Dec. 2018), at 16-17 (noting that in a select home
placement, “the placements are made solely with the intent of adoption,
usually once the child is already legally free for adoption”).

                                         9
2021.5 The Law Guardian, representing the four children, supported the

termination of the parental rights of Divina and Javier.

      The Division presented the testimony of its expert psychologist, Alan J.

Lee, Psy.D. Dr. Lee testified that his provisional diagnosis of Divina was

“unspecified schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorder,”

“unspecified personality disorder with paranoid avoidant and borderline

traits,” and “a rule out diagnosis [of] post-traumatic stress disorder.” Dr. Lee

stated that Divina’s difficulty with impulse control, mood swings, behavioral

changes, and inaccurate or inconsistent perception of reality were “likely to

adversely impact her own functioning,” and thereby her ability to consistently

meet the needs of her children. Moreover, Dr. Lee opined that Divina did not

acknowledge any need for change in herself. Dr. Lee also noted that Divina

had provided him with information about her family that he knew to be

5
  Over the three months during which the trial proceeded, Divina and Javier
were involved in two more domestic violence incidents in which police were
summoned to their home. According to the trial testimony of a police officer,
Divina admitted that during one of those incidents she had used a brick to
smash the window and damage the fender of Javier’s car, but she contended
that she had the right to do so because the car belonged to her.

                                       10
inaccurate, which he found “likely consistent with her difficulties accurately

recognizing and reporting and acknowledging the problems in her life .”6

      Dr. Lee recounted his observations during his bonding evaluations of the

four children with Divina. In the case of each child, he found that the child

had an “ambivalent and insecure” attachment to Divina and that the child did

not have a “significant and positive bond” with her. Dr. Lee opined as to each

child that there was a low risk that the child would suffer severe and enduring

harm if the child’s relationship with Divina were terminated.

      Dr. Lee also testified about the bonding evaluations that he conducted to

assess the relationships between Antonia and Ian and their respective resource

families, each of whom had expressed the intent to adopt. He opined that

Antonia appeared happy in the presence of her resource parents, that she had a

“significant and positive” bond with them after spending almost her entire life

with them, and that the resource parents would likely be able to ameliorate any

harm that Antonia would suffer were she to have no relationship with her birth

parents. Dr. Lee offered his opinion that severing the bond between Antonia

and her resource parents would cause severe and enduring harm to the child.

6
   Dr. Lee also testified about his mental health diagnoses of Javier, which are
irrelevant to this appeal.
                                       11
      With respect to Ian, Dr. Lee testified that the child was developing a

similar bond with his resource parents, that after a few more months there

would be a risk of severe and enduring harm if that bond were to be severed,

and that the resource parents would be expected to be able to ameliorate the

harm if the child’s relationship with his birth parents were to end.

      Dr. Lee recommended “other permanency planning for the minor

children besides reunification to [their] birth mother,” and he advised against

permitting Divina to have unsupervised visitation with the children.

      The Division next presented the testimony of a caseworker supervisor

and the former and current caseworkers assigned to work with Divina, Javier,

and their children, as well as a police officer who had responded to domestic

violence complaints involving the family.

      During cross-examination of the former caseworker, the Law Guardian

inquired how the children were doing in their current placements. Divina’s

counsel objected to testimony concerning the children’s resource family

placements, arguing that in the wake of the 2021 Amendment to N.J.S.A.

30:4C-15.1(a), such evidence was no longer relevant. The trial judge

overruled that objection, noting that the Legislature prohibited consideration of

such evidence in the court’s inquiry under the second prong of the best

interests test, but not in the court’s determination of the other prongs of the

                                        12
test. The judge indicated that he would later decide what weight to give to the

disputed testimony.

      Neither Divina nor Javier testified at trial. Divina presented the

testimony of her expert, David Bogacki, Ph.D., ABPP. Dr. Bogacki critiqued

Dr. Lee’s findings as to Divina’s mental health and stated that he would not

conclude based on those findings that Divina suffered from the mental health

conditions that Dr. Lee diagnosed.

                                        2.

      In an oral decision on the record, the trial court found that the Division

had proven by clear and convincing evidence all four prongs of N.J.S.A.

30:4C-15.1(a). The court found the Division’s witnesses to be credible,

specifically noting the credibility of Dr. Lee’s opinions based on the children’s

bonding evaluations.

      The court found that the Division satisfied the first prong of the best

interests test by virtue of clear and convincing evidence of the “toxic

relationship” between Divina and Javier and the pattern of domestic violence

continuing during trial that endangered the children’s health, safety, and

development. ---
             See N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(1).

      Addressing the second prong, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2), the trial court

did not rely on evidence regarding the children’s relationships with their

                                       13
resource families. Instead, the court found that the Division had proven by

clear and convincing evidence that Divina and Javier were unwilling or unable

to eliminate the harm facing the children or to provide a safe and stable home,

based upon Dr. Lee’s opinion that neither could effectively parent, Divina’s

“outlandish” stories, and domestic violence episodes that continued unabated

during trial.

      As to the third prong, the trial court found that the Division had proven

by clear and convincing evidence that it had made diligent efforts to provide

numerous services to Divina and Javier and had considered alternatives to

termination of parental rights. ---
                                See N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3).

      Finally, the trial court determined that the Division had presented clear

and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights would not do more

harm than good, and that it had therefore met the requirements of N.J.S.A.

30:4C-15.1(a)(4). The trial court acknowledged the argument by Divina and

Javier that the 2021 Amendment to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) barred all evidence

of the children’s relationships with their resource parents, but it found that

those relationships could nonetheless be considered under the statute’s fourth

prong. Noting that the children had been in placement since July of 2018, the

court stated that it could not “allow this case to go on forever” and identified

the long delay in affording permanency to the children as a harm. The trial

                                        14
court found that Antonia and Ian, who were in pre-adoptive homes, would

suffer “significant harm” if they were reunified with their parents rather than

adopted. The court also found that Ignacio and Josefina were visiting potential

adoptive homes and were also at risk of harm if the parental rights of Divina

and Javier were not terminated.

      The trial court entered a judgment of guardianship terminating the

parental rights of Divina and Javier to Ignacio, Josefina, Antonia, and Ian.

                                       C.

      Divina appealed the trial court’s termination of her parental rights, but

Javier did not appeal the trial court’s judgment.

      In a thorough and thoughtful opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed

the trial court’s determination. D.C.A., 474 N.J. Super. at 24-30. The

appellate court rejected Divina’s argument that the Legislature’s deletion of

the second sentence from N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2) barred trial courts from

considering evidence of the child’s relationship with resource parents in any

aspect of the termination of parental rights determination. Id. at 25-26. The

Appellate Division concluded that “[n]either the legislative history nor the

plain text necessitates such a sweeping conclusion.” Id. at 26.

      The appellate court viewed N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)’s fourth prong to

mandate “an evidentiary inquiry into the status of children in placement, to

                                       15
determine whether the child is likely to suffer worse harm in foster or adoptive

care than from termination of the biological parental bond.” Ibid. It noted that

in that final stage of the analysis, a court may “find that remaining with an

otherwise ‘unfit’ parent is still within a child’s ‘best interests’ if there are

significant concerns about the Division’s ability to place a child with an

appropriate caregiver.” Ibid.

      The Appellate Division cautioned that depriving the trial court of

“information concerning the child’s ability to forge bonds with resource

caregivers would disharmonize the statute.” Id. at 27. The court explained

that, because a child may be placed with a relative as a resource caregiver,

ignoring evidence of the bond between the child and that caregiver could

undermine a parent’s or kinship guardian’s effort to maintain custody of the

child. Id. at 26-28. The Appellate Division held that there was substantial

evidence in the legislative history that when the Legislature enacted L. 2021, c.

154, it intended that trial courts consider the totality of the circumstances in

deciding whether to terminate parental rights. Id. at 28.7

7
  The Appellate Division found persuasive a statement by a legislative aide,
responding to a concern raised by a member of the Assembly at a Health
Committee hearing, that the bill was intended to make clear that judges
“should be considering the totality of the circumstances” rather than “focusing
on one particular type” of harm to the child. D.C.A., 474 N.J. Super. at 28
(emphases omitted).
                                        16
      The Appellate Division therefore found no misapplication of the best

interests standard “under either prongs two or four based upon the record,” and

it affirmed the termination of Divina’s and Javier’s parental rights. -
                                                                      Id.
                                                                        - at 29-

30.

                                        D.

      We granted Divina’s petition for certification. 253 N.J. 599 (2023). We

also granted the applications of the Rutgers Child Advocacy Clinic and the

Advocates for Children of New Jersey (jointly, RCAC) and of Legal Services

of New Jersey (LSNJ) to appear as amici curiae.

                                        II.

                                        A.

      Divina urges the Court to reverse the Appellate Division’s judgment.

She argues that when the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) in 2021,

it intended that trial courts refrain from considering a child’s relationship with

a resource family in any aspect of its determination. Divina asserts that the

Appellate Division improperly imported the language deleted from N.J.S.A.

30:4C-15.1(a)(2) and the common law comparative bonding doctrine into

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4).

                                        17
                                        B.

      The Division argues that the harm a child would suffer if separated from

a resource family is relevant to the totality of the circumstances when a court

considers the fourth prong of the best interests test. It notes that the

Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2), not N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4),

and that bonding information is important to ensure the child’s safety, which

remained a paramount concern in guardianship actions after the 2021

Amendment.

                                        C.

      The Law Guardian argues that the Appellate Division properly construed

the plain language and legislative intent of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) and urges

that we affirm the Appellate Division’s decision.

                                        D.

      Amicus curiae RCAC contends that nothing in the 2021 Amendment

bars a court applying the fourth prong from considering a child’s relationship

with the resource parents. Amicus notes that if we were to construe the statute

to preclude all evidence of that relationship in the best interests analysis, New

Jersey would be the only state to bar such evidence.

                                        18
                                           E.

      Amicus curiae LSNJ asserts that when the Legislature amended N.J.S.A.

30:4C-15.1(a), it intended to revoke a court’s authority to consider the

potential harm resulting from a child’s separation from the resource family at

any stage of the best interests inquiry.

                                           III.

                                           A.

      We review the trial court’s factual findings in accordance with a

deferential standard, and uphold those findings if they are grounded in

substantial and credible evidence in the record. DYFS v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420,

448-49 (2012). We review de novo the Appellate Division’s construction of

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), according “no deference ‘to the Appellate Division’s

or trial court’s interpretive conclusions’ about the meaning of a statute.”

DCPP v. J.R.-R., 248 N.J. 353, 368 (2021) (quoting DCPP v. Y.N., 220 N.J.

165, 177 (2014)).

      We construe N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) pursuant to familiar principles of

statutory construction. Our aim is to “effectuate the Legislature’s intent,”

ascribing to the statute’s words “‘their ordinary meaning and significance and

read[ing] them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the

legislation as a whole.’” W.S. v. Hildreth, 252 N.J. 506, 518-19 (2023)

                                           19
(quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)). It is only when “there

is ambiguity in the statutory language that leads to more than one plausible

interpretation” that courts “turn to extrinsic evidence, ‘including legislative

history, committee reports, and contemporaneous construction.’” DiProspero,

183 N.J. at 493 (quoting Cherry Hill Manor Assocs. v. Faugno, 182 N.J. 64, 75

(2004)).

      “[W]hen amendments are passed jointly or as part of a legislative

scheme, we must construe them together to make sense of the legislative

intent.” Hildreth, 252 N.J. at 519. “‘[W]hen the Legislature includes limiting

language in one part of a statute, but leaves it out of another,’ a court should

assume that it intended a different meaning.” State v. Rangel, 213 N.J. 500,

514 (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Ryan v. Renny, 203 N.J. 37, 58

(2010)). We apply the “well-established canon of statutory interpretation . . .

that ‘the Legislature is presumed to be aware of judicial construction of its

enactments.’” State v. McCray, 243 N.J. 196, 217 (2020) (quoting Johnson v.

Scaccetti, 192 N.J. 256, 276 (2007)).

                                        B.

                                        1.

      “New Jersey’s child-welfare laws balance ‘two competing interests: a

parent’s constitutionally protected right “to raise a child and maintain a

                                        20
relationship with that child, without undue influence by the [S]tate,”’ and ‘the

State’s parens patriae responsibility to protect the welfare of children.’” J.R.-

R., 248 N.J. at 368 (alteration in original) (quoting DYFS v. A.L., 213 N.J. 1,

18 (2013)). Termination of parental rights is “a weapon of last resort in the

arsenal of state power,” and the State’s authority to take that step must be

exercised “with caution and care, and only in those circumstances in which

proof of parental unfitness is clear.” F.M., 211 N.J. at 447. “The balance

between parental rights and the State’s interest in the welfare of children is

achieved through the best interests of the child standard.” In re Guardianship

of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 347 (1999).

      From 1951 until September 10, 1991, New Jersey’s termination of

parental rights statute generally prescribed a best interests standard in certain

termination cases; it included a child “under the care and custody of the

Division whose best interests require that he be placed under guardianship”

among other categories of children who could be the subject of an action to

terminate parental rights. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15 (1990). That iteration of the

statute, however, prescribed no specific factors to guide our courts in

determining whether termination of parental rights would be in the best

interests of a child in the Division’s care and custody. See ibid.

                                        21
      In DYFS v. A.W., we identified the following factors for the court to

apply in a termination of parental rights case: (1) “[t]he child’s health and

development have been or will be seriously impaired by the parental

relationship”; (2) “[t]he parents are unable or unwilling to eliminate the harm

and delaying permanent placement will add to the harm”; (3) “[t]he court has

considered alternatives to termination”; and (4) “[t]he termination of parental

rights will not do more harm than good.” 103 N.J. 591, 604-11 (1986). We

viewed the second factor to center not on the cause of the harm, but rather on

“whether it is reasonably foreseeable that the parents can cease to inflict harm

upon the children entrusted to their care.” Id. at 607. Explaining the fourth

factor, we stated that “what the concept conveys is that termination of parental

rights will result, among other things, in a permanent resolution of the child’s

status.” Id. at 610.

      In 1991, the Legislature enacted the original version of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-

15.1(a), codifying the best interests test defined in A.W.:

            The division shall initiate a petition to terminate
            parental rights on the grounds of the ‘best interest of
            the child’ pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15] if the
            following standards are met:

                a. The child’s health and development have been or
                will continue to be endangered by the parental
                relationship;

                                       22
                b. The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the
                harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to
                provide a safe and stable home for the child and the
                delay of permanent placement will add to the harm;

                c. The division has made diligent efforts to provide
                services to help the parent correct the circumstances
                which led to the child’s placement outside the home
                and the court has considered alternatives to
                termination of parental rights; and

                d. Termination of parental rights will not do more
                harm than good.

            [L. 1991, c. 275, § 7.]

      The 1991 iteration of the termination of parental rights statute did not

expressly direct courts to evaluate the child’s relationship with the resource

family as part of the best interests analysis. Ibid. We recognized, however,

that the harm that a child would suffer if the court terminated that relationship

was one of several factors in the analysis, if considered “in a broader context

that includes as well the quality of the child’s relationship with his or her

natural parents.” In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 19 (1992). We

stressed that “[t]o show that the child has a strong relationship with the foster

parents or might be better off in their custody is not enough,” and that in order

for the Division to prove that separating the child from the resource family

would cause “enduring emotional or psychological harm,” it must present

proof including “the testimony of a well qualified expert who has had full

                                        23
opportunity to make a comprehensive, objective, and informed evaluation of

the child’s relationship with the foster parent.” Ibid.

                                        2.

      Three years after we decided J.C., the Legislature amended N.J.S.A.

30:4C-15.1(a)(2), adding language addressing harm due to a child’s separation

from the resource family to the second prong of the best interests test. See L.

1995, c. 416. The rest of the statute was left unchanged. The amended second

prong of the best interests test required a finding that

            [t]he parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm
            facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe
            and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent
            placement will add to the harm. Such harm may include
            evidence that separating the child from his resource
            family parents would cause serious and enduring
            emotional or psychological harm to the child . . . .

            [N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2) (1996) (emphasis added).]

      Following the 1995 amendment to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1, we explained

the role that evidence of the child’s relationship with the resource family

played in the second prong of the best interests test. K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 352-

54. In addition, we confirmed the relevance of that relationship to the court’s

assessment of the evidence under the fourth prong, notwithstanding the

absence of a specific reference to the child’s relationship with the resource

family in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4). Id. at 353-55. We held that “[t]he

                                        24
question to be addressed under [the fourth] prong is whether, after considering

and balancing the two relationships, the child will suffer a greater harm from

the termination of ties with her natural parents than from the permanent

disruption of her relationship with her foster parents.” Id. at 355. We noted

the importance of expert testimony in that inquiry, observing that

            [t]o determine whether the comparative harm is
            proscribed by the fourth prong in a case involving a
            child in foster care, such as K.H.O., the court must
            inquire into the child’s relationship both with her
            biological parents and her foster parent. “Weighing the
            potential harm that terminating [the child’s]
            relationship with her mother [might cause] against that
            which might come from removing her from her foster
            home is painfully difficult, but it is a decision that
            necessarily requires expert inquiry specifically directed
            to the strength of each relationship.”

            [Ibid. (second alteration in original) (quoting In re
            Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 25 (1992)).]

      Later case law decided under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) as amended in

1995 reaffirmed the importance of expert testimony comparing the child’s

bond with the resource family to the child’s bond with birth parents under the

fourth prong. See F.M., 211 N.J. at 453 (noting the importance of testimony

by a well-qualified expert based on a thorough evaluation of the child’s

relationship with birth parents and resource parents); accord DYFS v. M.M.,

189 N.J. 261, 281 (2007); DYFS v. A.R., 405 N.J. Super. 418, 442 (App. Div.

2009). We stated that the fourth prong of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) “serves as a
                                       25
fail-safe against termination even where the remaining standards have been

met” and “does not provide an independent basis for termination where the

other standards have not been satisfied.” DYFS v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 608-09

(2007); accord F.M., 211 N.J. at 453.

      In short, by the time the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) in

2021, our courts had long considered a child’s relationship with a resource

family to be relevant not only when they assessed the evidence under the

second prong of the best interests test, but also when they applied the fourth

prong. See F.M., 211 N.J. at 453; M.M., 189 N.J. at 281; K.H.O., 161 N.J. at

353-55.

                                        3.

      In May 2021, the Legislature considered a bill that would, in part, amend

the second prong of the best interests test. See A. 5598/S. 3814 (L. 2021, c.

154). As to the second prong, a statement appended to the bill explained that

the bill was intended to require the Division “to consider placement of children

with relatives or kinship guardians” when determining the placement of

children, and to change “certain standards for initiating petitions to terminate

parental rights.” Ibid. The bill proposed to delete the language “[s]uch harm

may include evidence that separating the child from his resource family

parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to

                                        26
the child” from the best interest test’s second prong, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-

15.1(a)(2). In addition, it incorporated amendments to provisions of the

statutory scheme for Kinship Legal Guardianship (KLG), N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-2,

-5, and -6. See L. 2021, c. 143.8 It also included amendments to N.J.S.A. 9:6-

8.30, -8.31, and -8.54, and to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12.1, which address removals by

the Division. Ibid. The Senate and Assembly passed the bill on June 21,

8
  When a court orders KLG, the child is placed with a caregiver with whom
the child has a kinship relationship and “who is willing to assume care of a
child due to parental incapacity, with the intent to raise the child to
adulthood.” N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-2. In N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-1(b), the Legislature
recognized that

            [a]n increasing number of relatives . . . find themselves
            providing care on a long-term basis to . . . children
            without court approved legal guardianship status because
            the caregivers either are unable or unwilling to seek
            termination of the legal relationships between the birth
            parent and the child, particularly when it is the
            caregiver’s own child or sibling who is the parent. In
            these cases, adoption of the child is neither feasible nor
            likely, and it is imperative that the State create an
            alternative, permanent legal arrangement for children
            and their caregivers. One such alternative arrangement,
            which does not require the termination of parental rights,
            is a court awarded kinship legal guardianship . . . .

The Legislature defined a “kinship relationship” for purposes of KLG to be “a
family friend or a person with a biological or legal relationship with the child.”
Ibid. A child’s KLG placement “does not sever the legal relationship between
the child and the parent.” DYFS v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 558 (2014).
                                       27
2021, and Governor Murphy signed it into law on July 2, 2021. -----
                                                              See L. 2021,

c. 154.

      The first section of the new law stated the Legislature’s findings:

            a. Foster care is intended by existing state and federal
            statute to be temporary.

            b. Kinship care is the preferred resource for children
            who must be removed from their birth parents because
            use of kinship care maintains children’s connections
            with their families. There are many benefits to placing
            children with relatives or other kinship caregivers, such
            as increased stability and safety as well as the ability to
            maintain family connections and cultural traditions.

            c. Federal law permits kinship legal guardianship
            arrangements to be used when the child has been in the
            care of a relative for a period of six months.

            d. Parental rights must be protected and preserved
            whenever possible.

            e. Children are capable of forming healthy attachments
            with multiple caring adults throughout the course of
            their childhood, including with birth parents, temporary
            resource parents, extended family members, and other
            caring adults.

            f. The existence of a healthy attachment between a
            child and the child’s resource family parent does not in
            and of itself preclude the child from maintaining,
            forming or repairing relationships with the child’s
            parent or caregiver of origin.

            g. It is therefore necessary for the Legislature to amend
            current laws to strengthen support for kinship
            caregivers, and ensure focus on parents’ fitness and the
            benefits of preserving the birth parent-child
                                        28
            relationship, as opposed to considering the impact of
            severing the child’s relationship with the resource
            family parents.

            [L. 2021, c. 154 § 1.]

      Since the 2021 Amendment, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) has provided as

follows:

            The division shall initiate a petition to terminate
            parental rights on the grounds of the “best interests of
            the child” pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15] if the
            following standards are met:

                   a. The child’s safety, health, or development has
                   been or will continue to be endangered by the
                   parental relationship;

                   b. The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate
                   the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling
                   to provide a safe and stable home for the child
                   and the delay of permanent placement will add to
                   the harm;

                   c. The division has made reasonable efforts to
                   provide services to help the parent correct the
                   circumstances which led to the child’s placement
                   outside the home and the court has considered
                   alternatives to termination of parental rights; and

                   d. Termination of parental rights will not do
                   more harm than good.

      Thus, when the Legislature enacted the 2021 Amendment to N.J.S.A.

30:4C-15.1(a)(2), it left unaltered the first, third, and fourth prongs of the best

interests standard. See N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(1), (a)(3), (a)(4).

                                        29
                                   C.

      We share the Appellate Division’s interpretation of the Legislature’s

intent when it amended N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2) on July 2, 2021. See

D.C.A., 474 N.J. Super. at 25-29. The Legislature acted to preclude trial

courts from considering harm resulting from the termination of a child’s

relationship with resource parents when they assess parental fitness under the

second prong, but not to generally bar such evidence from any aspect of the

trial court’s inquiry. See L. 2021, c. 154.

      The amendment’s plain language makes clear that intent. 9 The

Legislature made a single change to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a): the deletion of

the sentence, “[s]uch harm may include evidence that separating the child from

his resource family parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or

psychological harm to the child,” from N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2). See L.

2021, c. 154. It did not otherwise amend the statute. That is particularly

9
  Because we view the plain language of L. 2021, c. 154 to reveal the
Legislature’s intent, we do not rely on committee reports or other extrinsic
evidence to construe the amendment. See Hildreth, 252 N.J. at 519 (“When
the plain language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply the law as
written.”); accord DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 493. We do not agree with the
Appellate Division’s reliance on the comments of a legislative aide about the
Legislature’s goals in enacting L. 2021, c. 154, § 1(b). See D.C.A., 474 N.J.
Super. at 28. Courts should exercise caution in inferring legislative intent
from statements made by legislative staff.
                                         30
significant because courts had been considering comparative harm in applying

prong four of the best interests test for decades, see F.M., 211 N.J. at 453;

M.M., 189 N.J. at 281; K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 353-55, as the Legislature was

aware, see McCray, 243 N.J. at 217.

      The Legislature’s decision to change the second prong of the statutory

test comports with the goals it expressly set forth when it amended N.J.S.A.

30:4C-15.1 and seven other statutes in 2021. As the legislative findings

confirm, the Legislature sought to protect and preserve parental rights

“whenever possible.” L. 2021, c. 154, § 1(d). It did not view a healthy

relationship between children and resource parents to “in and of itself

preclude” healthy relationships with parents or caregivers of origin. Id. § 1(e),

(f). The Legislature recognized kinship care as “the preferred resource for

children who must be removed from their birth parents” because it “maintains

children’s connections with their families.” Id. § 1(b). It therefore sought to

“strengthen support for kinship caregivers.” Id. § 1(g). And the Legislature

intended that our courts focus on “parents’ fitness and the benefits of

preserving the birth parent-child relationship,” not on “considering the impact

of severing the child’s relationship with the resource family parents.” Ibid.

      The Legislature thus amended N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2) to ensure that

parental fitness -- not the child’s bond with resource parents -- is the core

                                        31
inquiry when a judge considers the best interests standard’s second prong in a

termination of parental rights case. Id. § 1. It did not identify as a legislative

goal the elimination of that bond as a factor in any component of the best

interests analysis. Ibid. Indeed, as the Appellate Division noted, precluding

the admission of all evidence concerning resource family placements could in

some settings undermine the Legislature’s objective to promote kinship

caregivers and preserve family bonds. See D.C.A., 474 N.J. Super. at 25-26.

      In L. 2021, c. 154, which amended no fewer than eight statutes, the

Legislature could easily have barred evidence of a child’s relationship with

resource parents in a court’s inquiry under the fourth prong of the statutory

standard, or entirely precluded consideration of such evidence in any aspect of

a court’s inquiry. Because the Legislature did not amend any provision of the

statute other than N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2), we discern no legislative intent

for so fundamental a change. Ibid. Were we to infer such intent absent a clear

indication from the Legislature, we would undermine the State’s parens patriae

obligation to protect the welfare of children. See J.R.-R., 248 N.J. at 368; J.C.,

129 N.J. at 10. Such a ruling would deprive a court of crucial information as it

                                        32
determines a child’s future, and could imperil children whom New Jersey is

charged to protect. See K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 348.10

      Accordingly, we concur with the Appellate Division’s holding that the

2021 Amendment precludes a court from considering the bond between a child

and resource parents under the second prong of the best interests standard but

does not bar such evidence when the court addresses that standard’s fourth

prong. See D.C.A., 474 N.J. Super. at 29. We agree with the Appellate

Division’s construction of the 2021 Amendment.

                                       D.

      We also agree with the Appellate Division that the trial court’s

application of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1 to Divina’s parental rights to Ignacio,

Josefina, Antonia, and Ian was a proper exercise of its discretion. See id. at

29-30.

10
   Indeed, were we to construe N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) to bar all evidence of a
child’s relationship with resource parents in a best interests analysis, New
Jersey would be the sole state to impose such a rule. Twenty states have
enacted statutes requiring that courts consider the relationship between a
resource parent in a best interests inquiry. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 47.10.088;
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17a-112; Me. Stat. tit. 22 § 4055. Case law in several other
states provides that a best interests of the child analysis may include
consideration of the relationship between resource parent and child. See, e.g.,
Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 285 (N.Y. 1976); In re H.J., 200 A.3d
891, 898-99 (N.H. 2018); In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662, 677 (Pa. 2014). No
state expressly prohibits consideration of the relationship between resource
parent and child in the best interests analysis.
                                          33
      We view the evidence on which the trial court relied as to prong one --

Divina’s and Javier’s numerous domestic violence incidents, some in the

presence of their children, and their inability to provide what Dr. Lee termed

“minimally adequate parenting” for the children -- to satisfy the Division’s

burden of proof.

      We reach the same conclusion with respect to the evidence supporting

the trial court’s conclusion as to prong two. The court properly refrained from

invoking evidence regarding the children’s relationships with their resource

parents, and instead relied on the parents’ pattern of violent conduct

continuing during trial, Divina’s “outlandish” statements, and Dr. Lee’s

opinion that the parents would not ensure a safe and stable home for the

children.

      As to the third prong, the trial court cited extensive evidence of the

Division’s efforts to provide services to Divina and Javier, as well as its

exploration of alternatives to termination of parental rights.

      And with respect to the fourth prong, the trial court carefully weighed

the consequences that would result from termination of parental rights, relying

on Dr. Lee’s expert testimony, evidence of the parents’ conduct, and the

children’s need for permanency.

                                        34
      We consider the trial court’s detailed findings of fact as to the best

interests of Ignacio, Josefina, Antonia, and Ian to be amply supported by

substantial and credible evidence in the record. We view the court’s

determination that the Division met its burden as to all four prongs of N.J.S.A.

30:4C-15.1(a) to constitute a proper exercise of its broad discretion. -------
                                                                       See F.M.,

211 N.J. at 448-49.

                                       IV.

      The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed.

    CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES SOLOMON, PIERRE-
LOUIS, WAINER APTER, FASCIALE, and NORIEGA join in JUSTICE
PATTERSON’s opinion.

                                       35