Court Opinion

ID: 9637467
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:07:15.564729+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:56.251387
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge SMITH-RIBNER.
Upon further review of appointed counsel’s analysis of the issues in this case, I must dissent from the Majority’s decision to affirm the order of the Board of Probation and Parole and to grant the petition for leave to withdraw filed by Attorney Crowley of the Centre County Public Defender’s Office. One of the issues raised by Raymond Adams is that appointed counsel was ineffective by virtue of his failure to object to the lack of Board jurisdiction to revoke Adams’ parole after the expiration of his maximum sentence date.
In responding to Adams’ claim that the Board lacked jurisdiction, counsel contended that although the criminal charges against Adams were initiated by his arrest after the expiration of his maximum sentence date the Board did have jurisdiction to revoke parole after Adams was convicted of the charges. Counsel relied on *1126Choice v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 24 Pa.Cmwlth. 438, 357 A.2d 242 (1976), for this proposition. Nowhere in Choice, nor in any other case cited by counsel or the Majority, does it state that the Board possesses jurisdiction to convene a parole revocation hearing where the petitioner is arrested after the expiration of his maximum sentence date and later convicted of offenses occurring prior to the expiration date.
In Choice the petitioner’s arrest on new charges was made prior to his maximum expiration date although the conviction occurred after the expiration date. I agree with the Court’s holding that in such instance the Board had authority to detain petitioner upon conviction. However, those were not the facts here. Because the arrest occurred after Adams’ maximum expiration date, the Board lacked jurisdiction upon Adams’ conviction to commence the parole revocation proceedings as he was no longer on parole.1 See, e.g., Wolfe v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 126 Pa.Cmwlth. 48, 558 A.2d 600 (1989) (holding that Board not divested of jurisdiction to recommit for failure to pursue its warrant prior to parolee’s maximum expiration date where parolee arrested prior to maximum date while under Maryland supervision pursuant to interstate compact). Also see Williams v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 654 A.2d 235 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995) (holding that Board not required to initiate violation proceedings prior to maximum expiration date to obtain jurisdiction to recommit where parolee arrested prior to maximum date); Holland v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 163 Pa.Cmwlth. 258, 640 A.2d 1386 (1994) (holding that Board had jurisdiction to recommit parolee convicted after maximum expiration date where parolee arrested pri- or to maximum date); Greco v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 99 Pa.Cmwlth. 107, 513 A.2d 493 (1986) (rejecting parolee argument that Board lacked jurisdiction to recommit parolee where new charges against parolee dismissed after preliminary hearing but parolee was arrested prior to completion of maximum expiration sentence); and Mitchell v. Board of Probation and Parole, 18 Pa.Cmwlth. 69, 335 A.2d 856 (1975) (holding that Board had authority to recommit parolee who pleaded guilty after maximum expiration date but arrested pri- or to maximum date ).2
The Board’s order should be reversed, and furthermore counsel’s failure to ade*1127quately represent Adams should not be sanctioned by granting the petition to withdraw.

. See Martin v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 576 Pa. 588, 840 A.2d 299 (2003) (reiterating that offenders released on parole remain in legal custody and under control of Commonwealth until expiration of maximum sentence, and when arrested while on parole an automatic Board detainer is applied and also when arrested on parole Board may place detainer that prevents bail pending disposition of new charges or other court action).

. Cf. Kuykendall v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 26 Pa.Cmwlth. 234, 363 A.2d 866 (1976) (holding that Board does not lose authority to recommit parolee arrested after maximum expiration date where parolee declared delinquent prior to maximum date and not located until arrest on new charges after maximum date; parole act does not allow delinquent parolee to profit from absconding while on parole). Also see Stepoli v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 106 Pa.Cmwlth. 197, 525 A.2d 888 (1987) (holding that Board had authority to recommit parolee who absconded from parole supervision and declared delinquent prior to maximum expiration date but arrested after maximum date); Carr v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 90 Pa.Cmwlth. 312, 494 A.2d 1174 (1985) (holding based on the issue presented that revocation hearing timely held in case where the facts showed that parolee arrested after maximum expiration date but declared delinquent prior to maximum date).