Court Opinion

ID: 9674444
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:28:48.728451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:27.662583
License: Public Domain

CRIST, Judge,
dissenting.
I disagree. The writer has a gargantuan task of trying to reconcile the views expressed by the majority, the principles espoused in Blackmore v. Blackmore, 639 S.W.2d 268 (Mo.App.1982), Green v. Green, 623 S.W.2d 265 (Mo.App.1981) and the views hereafter expressed by the writer. I find irreconcilable conflict.
Husband does not seek to set aside the judgment. There is no question of procedural irregularity, negligence, insufficiency of notice, mistake or irregularity of judgment. His appeal is from the judgment and not some motion attacking the judgment.
In Blackmore, the appellant waited more than a year and a half to attempt a late appeal — not within 30 days. The Missouri eases cited in Blackmore were of a vintage when a motion for new trial was required in a judge tried case. Blackmore may have been influenced by the multitude of cases following the rule a final judgment may be set aside, by motion, for good cause within three years after rendition? *429Rule 74.05 et seq. Hub State Bank v. Wyatt, 589 S.W.2d 372 (Mo.App.1979). I must confess ignorance in my concurrence with Blackmore if it means a defendant in default cannot file a timely appeal without filing a motion when the timely appeal is from the judgment and not the overruling of a motion — a useless procedure.
But alas! The Green case still hangs in the balance. I disagree with Green in its indication that procedural deficiencies of a default judgment could not be the subject of an appeal for the stated reason the trial court must be able to correct trial errors. I believe this is a carry-back to the time when a motion for new trial was required in a judge tried case. While I would like a motion for new trial to be filed in all appealed judge tried cases, the Supreme Court has not chosen to so require.
I disagree with Green, and there is a conflict between Green and the majority opinion, in holding § 452.330, RSMo.1978, permits a direct appeal of a default judgment in a dissolution case with no delineation of the scope of review. I agree with the direct appeal aspect, but the appellate court should be limited in its review of a dissolution default judgment as in any other default judgment. Less evidence is required to sustain a default judgment.
Husband has admitted all facts well pleaded by wife. He has admitted as true the cause of action stated by wife. He does not admit unliquidated allegations. The default judgment must be consistent with the allegations of the petition, and may not be other or greater than that which wife demanded in her dissolution petition. Matter of Estate of Scholz, 615 S.W.2d 459 (Mo.App.1981).
This, then, is husband’s direct appeal. His appeal should not be summarily dismissed. We must determine if there was an abuse of very, wide discretion in the terms of the default judgment — based upon due process and not fettered by § 452.330, RSMo.1978. The Dissolution Act was not intended to be an Act above all other legal concepts.
What is the work cut out for us? Husband charges the division of marital property, maintenance award and attorney fee award were not supported by the evidence.
Wife alleged the parties owned specific marital real estate and marital household goods and furnishings and asked that this property be awarded to her. The trial court awarded same to her. Under the pleadings, wife was entitled to have this property awarded to her. However, wife’s petition did not ask for husband to pay the remaining mortgage on the marital real estate in the sum of $16,300.00. Yet, the trial court ordered husband to pay this mortgage. While this point in husband’s brief is somewhat obscure, husband says the division was so unjust as to be an abuse of discretion in a default case. If this point were properly raised, it is appealable.
Wife’s petition asks for their car to be awarded to husband. The trial court gave it to wife. This is an appealable issue.
Wife’s petition asks for reasonable maintenance. The trial court awarded her $400.00 per month as and for maintenance. Had wife asked in her petition for $400.00 per month maintenance, husband would have been foreclosed from complaining on appeal. But there must be some evidence of reasonableness in the record when wife asks for a reasonable sum. Suppose, for example, the trial court had awarded wife $40,000.00 per month instead of $400.00 per month? Appealable? Yes!
Wife’s petition asks for a reasonable attorney fee. The trial court awarded her $600.00. Again, had wife asked in her petition for an attorney fee of $600.00, husband would have been foreclosed on this issue on appeal. While little or no evidence is required for a trial court to award attorney fees, what if the trial court had awarded wife $60,000.00 in attorney fees? Ap-pealable? Yes!
There is no rational, legal nor moral reason to deny a defendant the right to a timely appeal of a default judgment. I would allow husband’s appeal within the parameters above stated.
*430ORDER
After reviewing the majority and dissenting opinions, we have jointly concluded that the issue of the limits of the right to appeal from a default judgment (in the absence of a motion to set aside) is of such general interest and importance that the case should be transferred to the Supreme Court. We hereby order this case transferred to the Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 83.02.
ORDER
DOWD, Chief Judge.
Upon remand from the Missouri Supreme Court, original opinion filed February 22, 1983 is ordered reinstated. Mandate ordered to issue.