Court Opinion

ID: 9796421
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:57:13.237727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:13.491422
License: Public Domain

CHIN, J., Concurring.
I agree that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants under the relevant statutes. I write separately to explain that any other result would violate free speech rights under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and its California counterpart, article I, section 2 of the California Constitution (hereafter collectively the First Amendment).
This case has very little to do with sexual harassment and very much to do with core First Amendment free speech rights. The writers of the television show, Friends, were engaged in a creative process—writing adult comedy— when the alleged harassing conduct occurred. The First Amendment *296protects creativity. (Winter v. DC Comics (2003) 30 Cal.4th 881, 888, 891 [134 Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 P.3d 473].) Friends was entertainment, but entertainment is fully entitled to First Amendment protection. “There is no doubt that entertainment, as well as news, enjoys First Amendment protection.” (Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. (1977) 433 U.S. 562, 578 [53 L.Ed.2d 965, 97 S.Ct. 2849]; see also Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson (1952) 343 U.S. 495, 501-502 [96 L.Ed. 1098, 72 S.Ct. 777] [First Amendment protects motion pictures].) “ ‘[T]he constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression apply with equal force to the publication whether it be a news report or an entertainment feature.’ ” (Gates v. Discovery Communications, Inc. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 679, 695 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 663, 101 P.3d 552].) Scripts of the Friends show “ ‘are no less protected because they provide humorous rather than serious commentary.’ ” (Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 387, 406 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 797].)
We have found that the First Amendment protects even threatening speech that does not rise to a criminal threat. (In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 93 P.3d 1007] [dark poetry in school].) Similarly, we should protect the creative speech here. I do not suggest that the First Amendment protects all sexually harassing speech. Just as the First Amendment does not protect criminal threats (In re George T., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 630; People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 228-229 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 315, 26 P.3d 1051]), so too may the state proscribe sexual harassment. But the proscription must be carefully tailored to avoid infringing on First Amendment free speech rights in the creative process.
Balancing the compelling need to protect employees from sexual harassment with free speech rights can, in some contexts, present very difficult questions. For example, a potential, and sometimes real, tension between free speech and antiharassment laws exists even in the ordinary workplace. (See, e.g., Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 121, 131, fn. 3, 136-137, fn. 5 [87 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 980 P.2d 846] (Aguilar); see also id. at pp. 147-169 (conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.); id. at pp. 169-176 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.); id. at pp. 176-189 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.); id. at pp. 189-196 (dis. opn. of Brown, J.).) Debating these issues has kept academia occupied. (See, e.g., Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment (1992) 39 UCLA L.Rev. 1791 (Volokh) [generally defending free speech against harassment laws unless the hostile speech is directed towards the plaintiff]; Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment: No Collision in Sight (1995) 47 Rutgers L.Rev. 461 [generally defending antiharassment laws against First Amendment attack and disagreeing with much of Professor Volokh’s argument]; Volokh, How Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech (1995) 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 563 [Professor Volokh’s response to Professor Sangree]; *297McGowan, Certain Illusions About Speech: Why the Free-Speech Critique of Hostile Work Environment Harassment Is Wrong (2002) 19 Const. Comment. 391 (McGowan) [generally defending antiharassment laws against First Amendment attack]; see also Aguilar, supra, at pp. 136-137, fn. 5.)
But the issue here is quite different. In Aguilar, supra, 21 Cal.4th 121, the workplace was a car rental company. Creative expression was not the company’s product. Here, by contrast, the product, a comedy show, was itself expression. Questions regarding free speech rights in the ordinary workplace—where speech is not an integral part of the product—can be difficult, as the five separate opinions in Aguilar attest. I need not, and do not, go into these questions here, because this case presents an entirely different and, to my mind, rather straightforward constitutional question. When, as here, the workplace product is the creative expression itself, free speech rights are paramount. The Friends writers were not renting cars and talking about sex on the side. They were writing adult comedy; sexual repartee was an integral part of the process.
Lawsuits like this one, directed at restricting the creative process in a workplace whose very business is speech related, present a clear and present danger to fundamental free speech rights. Even academics who generally defend antiharassment law against First Amendment attack recognize the importance of defending the First Amendment in a context like this. (E.g., McGowan, supra, 19 Const. Comment, at pp. 393, 425-31 [concluding, on p. 431, “In expressive workplaces that foster, support, and encourage debate, discussion, and plural opinions, the First Amendment insulates much more.”].)
For example, Professor McGowan contrasts two workplace situations involving the display of Playboy Magazine centerfolds: (1) at a shipyard where only one woman is employed as a welder, and (2) in a museum where centerfolds were displayed “to document changes in American visions of female beauty.” (McGowan, supra, 19 Const. Comment, at p. 391.) McGowan argues that free speech rights must yield to antiharassment law in the first case. But she agrees that the museum is an expressive workplace and, as such, is entitled to First Amendment protection. This case is like the second situation, not the first. As Professor Volokh explains, the free speech problem is especially serious “if the speech that creates the hostile work environment is an inherent part of the employer’s business.” (Volokh, supra, 39 UCLA L.Rev. at p. 1853.) “It seems clear that, say, a female employee of an art gallery—or a female employee of an adult bookstore—cannot claim that sexually explicit materials in the workplace are creating a hostile work environment.” (Id. at p. 1861.)
The writers here did at times go to extremes in the creative process. They pushed the limits—hard. Some of what they did might be incomprehensible *298to people unfamiliar with the creative process. But that is what creative people sometimes have to do. As explained in an amicus curiae brief representing the Writers Guild of America, West, Inc.; the Directors Guild of America; the Screen Actors Guild; and 131 named individuals representing a “who’s who” of television and motion picture writers and directors (hereafter the Writers Guild brief), “the process creators go through to capture the necessary magic is inexact, counterintuitive, nonlinear, often painful—and above all, delicate. And the problem is even more complicated for group writing.” “Group writing,” the brief explains, “requires an atmosphere of complete trust. Writers must feel not only that it’s all right to fail, but also that they can share their most private and darkest thoughts without concern for ridicule or embarrassment or legal accountability.” The brief quotes Steven Bochco, cocreator of Hill Street Blues, L.A. Law, and NYPD Blue, and one of the individuals the brief represents, as explaining that a “certain level of intimacy is required to do the work at its best, and so there is an implicit contract among the writers: what is said in the room, stays in the room.” The brief further explains that “with adult audiences in particular, the characters, dialogue, and stories must ring true. That means on shows like Law and Order, ER, or The Sopranos, writers must tap into places in their experience or psyches that most of us are far too polite or self-conscious to bring up.”
The creative process must be unfettered, especially because it can often take strange turns, as many bizarre and potentially offensive ideas are suggested, tried, and, in the end, either discarded or used. As the Writers Guild brief notes, “All in the Family pushed the limits in its day, but with race rather than sex.” The brief quotes Norman Lear, All in the Family's creator, and another of the individuals on whose behalf the brief was filed, as saying, “We were dealing with racism and constantly on dangerous ground. . . . We cleaned up a lot of what was said in the room, and some people still found it offensive.” It is hard to imagine All in the Family having been successfully written if the writers and others involved in the creative process had to fear lawsuits by employees who claimed to be offended by the process of discovering what worked and did not work, what was funny and what was not funny, that led to the racial and ethnic humor actually used in the show.
“[S]peech may not be prohibited because it concerns subjects offending our sensibilities.” (Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002) 535 U.S. 234, 245 [152 L.Ed.2d 403, 122 S.Ct. 1389].) We must not permit juries to dissect the creative process in order to determine what was necessary to achieve the final product and what was not, and to impose liability for sexual harassment for that portion deemed unnecessary. Creativity is, by its nature, creative. It is unpredictable. Much that is not obvious can be necessary to the creative process. Accordingly, courts may not constitutionally ask whether challenged speech was necessary for its intended purpose. (Shulman v. Group W. *299Productions, Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.45th 200, 229 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 955 P.2d 469].) “The courts do not, and constitutionally could not, sit as superior editors of the press.” (Ibid.)
For this reason, it is meaningless to argue, as plaintiff does, that much of what occurred in this process did not make its way into the actual shows. The First Amendment also protects attempts at creativity that end in failure. That which ends up on the cutting room floor is also part of the creative process. An amicus curiae brief representing, among others, the American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression explains: “To require the participants to justify after the fact the ‘necessity’ of minor segments of the creative process represents a misunderstanding of the creative process. That process usually includes many dead ends that are not reflected in the final work. But the dead ends are part of creating the final work; the fact that one approach or suggestion is not productive is part of the process of creatively reaching end result. In that sense the dead ends, as well as everything else in the creative process, are necessary.”
The Writers Guild brief explains it similarly. “[T]he creative person tr[ies] one notion after another before coming up with the final product. Writers are like scavengers and get their ideas wherever they can: ‘Ninety percent of everything doesn’t work,’ says Lear, ‘That’s why it’s so hard, that’s why you spend so much time there.’ . . . Lear puts it this way: ‘There were things we said we would never print. That’s true of racism or any touchy subject. That’s what it takes to make a great show: smart people sitting in a room, going wherever they want.’ ” As that brief notes, “It is impossible to imagine how writers, directors, and actors could work together if they had to worry about doing only what was ‘creatively necessary’ in order not to offend a worker on the set.”
Does this mean that anything that occurs while writing a television show is permissible? Do employees involved in that process receive no protection? Of course not. Just as criminal threats are not protected, just as no one has the right to falsely shout “fire” in a crowded theater, limits exist as to what may occur in the writers’ room. I agree with Professor Volokh that, even in this context, speech that is directed, or “aimed at a particular employee because of her race, sex, religion, or national origin,” is not protected. (Volokh, supra, 39 UCLA L.Rev. at p. 1846.) “The state interest in assuring equality in the workplace would justify restricting directed speech . . . .” (Ibid.) Speech directed towards plaintiff because of her sex could not further the creative process.
Accordingly, I agree with the general test proposed in the amicus curiae brief of the California Newspaper Publishers Association et al.: “Where, as *300here, an employer’s product is protected by the First Amendment—whether it be a television program, a newspaper, a book, or any other similar work—the challenged speech should not be actionable if the court finds that the speech arose in the context of the creative and/or editorial process, and it was not directed at or about the plaintiff.”
This test presents the proper balance. Often, free speech cases involve the very difficult balancing of important competing interests. But here, in the creative context, free speech is critical while the competing interest— protecting employees involved in the creative process against offensive language and conduct not directed at them—is, in comparison, minimal. Neither plaintiff nor anyone else is required to become part of a creative team. But those who choose to join a creative team should not be allowed to complain that some of the creativity was offensive or that behavior not directed at them was unnecessary to the creative process.
When First Amendment values are at stake, summary judgment is a favored remedy. “ ‘[BJecause unnecessarily protracted litigation would have a chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights, speedy resolution of cases involving free speech is desirable. [Citation.] Therefore, summary judgment is a favored remedy [in such cases] ....’” (Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 228.) “ ‘To any suggestion that the outer bounds of liability should be left to a jury to decide we reply that in cases involving the rights protected by the speech and press clauses of the First Amendment the courts insist on judicial control of the jury.’ ” (Ibid.) “While the crucial test as to whether to grant a motion for summary judgment remains the same in free speech cases (i.e., whether there is a triable issue of fact presented in the case), the courts impose more stringent burdens on one who opposes the motion and require a showing of high probability that the plaintiff will prevail in the case. In the absence of such showing the courts are inclined to grant the motion and do not permit the case to proceed beyond the summary judgment stage [citations].” (Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1040, 1046-1047 [201 Cal.Rptr. 665].)
Indeed, cases like this, arising in a creative context, often can and should be decided on demurrer. (Winter v. DC Comics, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 891-892.) Because even the taking of depositions could significantly chill the creative process, by destroying the mutual trust and confidentiality necessary to writing television shows like Friends, courts should independently review the allegations to ensure that First Amendment rights are not being violated. (See In re George T, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 631-632 [independent judicial review necessary when First Amendment interests are at stake].) If the complaint does not allege that the offending conduct was pervasive and directed at the plaintiff, and include specific supporting facts *301that, if true, would establish those allegations, the court should grant a demurrer. The threat of litigation must not be permitted to stifle creativity.
We must “[a]lways remember[] that the widest scope of freedom is to be given to the adventurous and imaginative exercise of the human spirit. . . .” (Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents (1959) 360 U.S. 684, 695 [3 L.Ed.2d 1512, 79 S.Ct. 1362] (conc. opn. of Frankfurter, J.).) We must not tolerate laws that “lead to timidity and inertia and thereby discourage the boldness of expression indispensable for a progressive society.” (Ibid.) The allegedly offending conduct in this case arose out of the protected creative process and was not directed at plaintiff. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in defendants’ favor. The First Amendment demands no less.