Court Opinion

ID: 9907961
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-07 17:03:57.533455+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:12:49.044743
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                               Dec 07 2023, 8:53 am

                                                                                   CLERK
                                                                               Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                  Court of Appeals
                                                                                    and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Charles E. McFarland                                      R. Patrick Magrath
New Castle, Kentucky                                      Alcorn Sage Schwartz &
                                                          Magrath, LLP
Michael A. Gillenwater
                                                          Madison, Indiana
Jeffersonville, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Joseph Chapo, Sherry Chapo,                               December 7, 2023
and Deputy Big Shot, LLC,                                 Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellants-Defendants,                                    23A-CT-467
                                                          Appeal from the Jefferson Circuit
        v.                                                Court
                                                          The Honorable Sally A.
Jefferson County                                          McLaughlin, Judge
Plan Commission,                                          Trial Court Cause No.
Appellee-Plaintiff                                        39C01-1605-CT-380

                                Opinion by Judge Weissmann
                              Judges Riley and Bradford concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-467 | December 7, 2023                       Page 1 of 21
      Weissmann, Judge.

[1]   In 2012, Joseph and Sherry Chapo sought from the Jefferson County Board of

      Zoning Appeals (BZA) a conditional use permit to sell guns and operate a

      future shooting range on the Chapos’ agriculturally zoned property. The BZA

      approved the sale of guns but denied the Chapos’ request to operate a range.

      Rather than appealing this decision, they proceeded to operate the shooting

      range through their company, Deputy Big Shot, LLC, without the necessary

      permit.

[2]   A decade-long court battle ensued between local zoning officials and the

      Chapos and Deputy Big Shot, LLC (collectively, the Chapos). Ultimately, the

      trial court entered a permanent injunction requiring the Chapos to remove the

      unauthorized commercial shooting range. The court also fined the Chapos

      more than $200,000, ordered them to pay the BZA’s attorney fees, and

      authorized county officials to enforce its order if the Chapos did not comply

      within 90 days.

[3]   On appeal, the Chapos contend the trial court’s judgment is improper because

      the BZA lacked authority in 2012 to deny the conditional use permit. The

      Chapos also challenge the sanctions imposed by the trial court. We affirm,

      concluding that the Chapos are barred from challenging the BZA’s 2012

      decision that they did not appeal. We also conclude the sanctions were proper.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-467 | December 7, 2023     Page 2 of 21
      Facts
[4]   The Chapos have owned 100 acres in Deputy, Indiana, since 1991. The

      property is subject to the Jefferson County Zoning Ordinance (Zoning

      Ordinance).

[5]   In September 2012, the Chapos applied for a conditional use permit to operate

      “in the future an Indoor/Outdoor tactical and test firing range to be marketed

      to professional marksmen, law enforcement and light military forces in the

      region.” Appellee’s App. Vol. III, p. 243. They also sought permission to

      manufacture and sell firearms on their property. While those applications were

      pending, the Chapos incorporated their solely owned business as Deputy Big

      Shot, LLC.

[6]   Within a few months, the BZA approved the Chapos’ request to manufacture

      and sell firearms but denied the conditional use permit needed to operate the

      shooting range. Despite this denial, the Chapos later operated a shooting range

      on the property.

[7]   In April 2016, for instance, the Chapos began advertising for future tactical test

      firing range events on their property. They announced the Deputy Big Shot

      “Grand Opening” in April 2016 and both advertised and conducted beginner

      pistol classes on their property starting in May 2016. Appellee’s App. Vol. IV,

      pp. 7-8.

[8]   The Chapos’ advertisements and a citizen complaint prompted the Jefferson

      County Zoning Enforcement Officer (Enforcement Officer) to twice order the
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-467 | December 7, 2023      Page 3 of 21
       couple in April 2016 to cease operating a tactical test firing range on their

       property. When the Chapos failed to comply, the Jefferson County Plan

       Commission (Commission) filed in May 2016 a Complaint for Injunction and

       Damages alleging the Chapos were violating the Zoning Ordinance. The

       Commission amended its complaint to include Deputy Big Shot, LLC, as a

       defendant.

[9]    The trial court in January 2017 granted a preliminary injunction barring the

       Chapos from operating a shooting range on their property. The Chapos filed an

       interlocutory appeal later that month. Meanwhile, the Chapos continued to

       operate the shooting range, conducting a “Target Discrimination” event in

       January 2017, an “Advanced Movement and Shooting Event” in February

       2017, a “3 Gun Run” competition in June and July 2017, and an

       “Independence Day Machine Gun Shoot” and a “Bill of Rights Woods Walk”

       in July 2017. Id. at 8, 35, 37-40, 43-52, 101, 106-7, 110, 112.

[10]   While that appeal was pending, the trial court in October 2017 found the

       Chapos in contempt for continuing to operate the shooting range in violation of

       the preliminary injunction. In May 2018, this Court affirmed the preliminary

       injunction. Chapo v. Jefferson Cty. Plan Com’n, No. 39A05-1612-CT-2840, *13-14

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (mem.), reh. denied, trans. denied.

[11]   The Chapos later moved under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) for relief from the

       preliminary injunction and contempt findings. The motion alleged those rulings

       were void because the Commission lacked standing to bring the suit. The

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-467 | December 7, 2023       Page 4 of 21
       motion also alleged the Commission’s members had not filed oaths as

       statutorily required and that their offices therefore were considered vacant. The

       trial court denied the 60(B) motion, and the Chapos appealed again. This Court

       affirmed. Chapo v. Jefferson Cty. Plan Com’n, 164 N.E.3d 131 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2021), reh. denied, trans. denied, cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 429 (2021).

[12]   Meanwhile, the Chapos had moved for summary judgment in the trial court,

       which, instead, granted summary judgment to the Commission. Finding the

       Chapos had violated a lawful zoning ordinance by initiating and operating the

       shooting range on their property, the court ordered:

               The Chapos are hereby enjoined from further violation of the
               Jefferson County Zoning Ordinance and are permanently
               enjoined from operating a shooting range/tactical and test firing
               range at the property and shall not allow any other individual or
               entity to operate a shooting range/tactical and test firing range at
               the property . . . .

               The Chapos shall remedy and abate all violations of the Jefferson
               County Zoning Ordinance occurring on the property within
               ninety (90) days of this Order by demolishing and/or destroying
               any and all buildings, facilities or improvements of land
               associated with the shooting range/tactical and test firing range
               at the property and/or the allowance of any other individual or
               entity to operate a shooting range/tactical and test firing range at
               the property.

               If the Chapos fail to remedy and abate all violations of the
               Jefferson County Zoning Ordinance occurring on the property
               within ninety (90) days of this Order, the [Commission] or any
               other entity or third party designated by Jefferson County[] is
               authorized to enter upon the property to remedy and abate the
               violations . . . .

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-467 | December 7, 2023        Page 5 of 21
                The [Chapos] are fined the sum of $209,625.00, which is 15% of
                the $1,397,500.00 potential fine that could be imposed . . . .

                In addition, the Plaintiff[s] are awarded costs which include
                $27,490.78 in attorney fees . . . plus court costs . . . .

       Appellants’ App. Vol. II, pp. 44-45. The Chapos appeal that judgment.1

       Discussion and Decision
[13]   The Chapos raise a number of often overlapping issues, which we restate as:

                I.       Whether the Chapos are barred from challenging the
                         Commission’s denial of the conditional use permit in
                         2012.

                II.      Whether the trial court erred in: (1) ordering that county
                         officials could enter the Chapos’ property to remedy the
                         ordinance violations; (2) fining the Chapos $209,625; and
                         (3) requiring the Chapos to pay the Commission’s attorney
                         fees of $27,490.78.

[14]   When reviewing a trial court’s entry of summary judgment, we apply the same

       standard as the trial court. Johnson v. Harris, 176 N.E.3d 252, 255 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2021). The moving party bears the burden of showing that there are no genuine

       issues of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fox v.

       Barker, 170 N.E.3d 662, 665 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Summary judgment is

       1
         We note that Appellants’ Brief contains numerous legal and factual assertions that lack supporting citations
       to authority or to the record on appeal. Although a party may waive appellate claims based on such
       omissions, see Holland v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 171 684, 688 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), reh. denied, we have been
       able to discern most of the Chapos’ appellate arguments and therefore address them. See In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d
       574, 580 (Ind. 2017) (noting the preference for deciding cases on their merits).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-467 | December 7, 2023                               Page 6 of 21
       improper if the moving party fails to meet that burden or, if it does, the

       nonmoving party establishes a genuine issue of material fact. Id. We construe

       all factual inferences for the nonmoving party and all doubts as to the existence

       of a material fact against the moving party. Id. at 656-66.

       I. The Board of Zoning Appeals’ 2012 Decision is not Void
[15]   The Chapos’ various attacks on the permanent injunction rest on one common

       proposition: that the BZA’s 2012 decision denying their application for a

       conditional use permit was invalid. The Chapos contend their failure to appeal

       that decision does not prevent them from challenging it here.

[16]   An appeal taken under Indiana Code § 36-7-4-1600 to -1699 “establishes the

       exclusive means for judicial review of zoning decisions . . . made by a board of

       zoning appeals.” Ind. Code § 36-7-4-1601. Indiana Code § 36-7-4-1604 provides

       that “[a] person who fails to timely object to a zoning decision . . . within the

       period prescribed . . . waives the person’s right to judicial review under this

       chapter.” Thus, a party’s failure to appeal a zoning decision normally prevents

       that party from later challenging it.

[17]   But the Chapos claim these statutes do not preclude their collateral attack

       because the BZA’s 2012 decision is void. “A collateral attack is ‘a judicial

       proceeding pursued to avoid, defeat, evade or deny the validity and effect of a

       valid judgment or decree.’” Earl v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 91 N.E.3d 1066,

       1071-72 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting In re Chapman, 466 N.E.2d 777, 780 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 1984)).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-467 | December 7, 2023          Page 7 of 21
[18]   In arguing that the BZA’s 2012 decision is void and subject to collateral attack,

       the Chapos correctly observe that “the ‘powers of the BZA are strictly limited to

       those granted by its authorizing statute.’” Mies v. Steuben Cty. Bd. of Zoning

       Appeals, 970 N.E.2d 251, 258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Schlehuser v. City of

       Seymour, 674 N.E.2d 1009, 1014 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)). Any action by the BZA

       that exceeds those powers is ultra vires and void. Id. As the Chapos emphasize,

       “[a] void action is subject to collateral attack at any time.” Id.

[19]   The Chapos’ claim that the BZA’s decision was ultra vires is two-pronged.

       First, they assert the Indiana Shooting Range Protection Act (ISRPA)

       prohibited the BZA’s denial of the conditional use permit. Second, they argue

       that the BZA lacked legal authority to deny the conditional use permit because:

       (1) the Zoning Ordinance did not limit shooting ranges; (2) given the lack of

       any zoning limitations, the BZA therefore violated the Second Amendment to

       the United States Constitution by requiring the Chapos to obtain a conditional

       use permit before operating the shooting range; and (3) the BZA and

       Commission members failed to take their oath and were thus not members

       entitled to vote on the conditional use permit.

       A. Indiana Shooting Range Protection Act is Inapplicable
[20]   The trial court found the ISRPA does not apply to the shooting range on the

       Chapos’ property and thus did not void the BZA’s denial of the condition use

       permit in 2012. On appeal, the Chapos argue that their shooting range fell

       within the “safe harbor” provisions in the ISRPA applicable to shooting ranges

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-467 | December 7, 2023        Page 8 of 21
       in operation before July 1, 1996. They also assert the ISRPA’s provision

       limiting liability for noise-related actions applies here.

[21]   When interpreting an ordinance, this Court “will employ the same principles as

       those employed for the construction of statutes.” Wastewater One, LLC v. Floyd

       Cty. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 947 N.E.2d 1040, 1047 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).

       Statutory construction is a question of law to be determined de novo by this

       Court. Id. We conclude that the Chapos have not established that the ISRPA

       barred the BZA’s denial of their conditional use permit or rendered that

       decision void.

       1. Safe Harbor Provisions of the ISRPA do not Protect the
       Chapos’ Shooting Range
[22]   The ISRPA provides that “[e]xcept as specifically prohibited by this chapter and

       subject to [Ind. Code § 35-47-11.1], a local unit of government may regulate the

       location, use, operation, safety, and construction of a shooting range.” Ind.

       Code § 14-22-31.5-5. The ISRPA limits a government’s restrictions on shooting

       ranges in existence before July 1, 1996. Indiana Code § 14-22-31.5-7 provides:

               Notwithstanding any ordinance adopted by a local unit of
               government, a shooting range that is in existence before July 1,
               1996, may do the following within the geographic boundaries of
               the shooting range as it existed on June 30, 1996:

               (1) Repair, remodel, or reinforce a building or structure that is
                   needed to ensure public safety or to secure the continued use
                   of the building or structure.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-467 | December 7, 2023         Page 9 of 21
               (2) Reconstruct, repair, restore, or resume the use of a
                   nonconforming building that has been damaged by fire,
                   collapse, explosion, act of nature, or war after July 1, 1996.
                   However, the reconstruction, repair, or restoration must be
                   completed not more than one (1) year after the date of the
                   damage to the building or the settlement of the property
                   damage claim . . .

               (3) Expand or increase the membership of the shooting range or
                   opportunities for public participation at the shooting range.

[23]   The trial court determined the ISRPA “is not a defense to this action and does

       not provide an opportunity to collaterally attack the [2012] decision of the

       [BZA].” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 30. It found the Chapos’ commercial

       shooting range was developed between 2012 and 2016 and therefore fell outside

       the ISRPA’s safe harbor provisions that apply to shooting ranges existing before

       July 1, 1996.

[24]   We find unavailing the Chapos’ contention on appeal that the ISRPA’s safe

       harbor provisions protect their commercial shooting range as an expansion of

       their personal shooting range. First, the Chapos do not show that their personal

       shooting range was a “shooting range” within the meaning of the ISRPA. The

       ISRPA defines a “shooting range” as “an area designed and operated for the use

       of archery, rifles, shotguns, pistols, muskets, or similar firearms that are fired at

       silhouettes, skeet, trap, paper, stillboard, or other similar targets.” Ind. Code §

       14-22-31.5-3 (emphasis added).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-467 | December 7, 2023          Page 10 of 21
[25]   The Chapos simply assume that their personal shooting range meets this

       definition. As a result, they offer no basis for finding that they “operated” a

       shooting range within the meaning of the ISRPA before July 1, 1996, when the

       range was limited to their personal use and not open to the public. Because the

       Chapos raised the ISRPA as an affirmative defense both in their answer to the

       Commission’s complaint for injunctive relief and during the summary judgment

       proceedings, they bore the burden of showing the applicability of the ISRPA.

       See King v. Dejanovic, 170 N.E.3d 268, 270 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021); Fox v. Barker,

       170 N.E.3d 662, 665 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). They have failed in that burden.

[26]   But the Chapos’ reliance on the ISRPA fares no better even if we assume their

       original personal shooting range qualified as a “shooting range” under the

       ISRPA. The ISRPA’s safe harbor provisions apply only to activities “within the

       geographic boundaries of the shooting range as it existed on June 30, 1996.”

       Ind. Code § 14-22-31.5-7. The record contains no evidence of the geographic

       boundaries of their personal shooting range as of June 30, 1996. The record

       simply reflects that the Chapos created a personal shooting range at several

       unspecified locations on their 100-plus acre property before 1996.

[27]   Nor do the Chapos establish that their commercial shooting range first

       proposed in 2012 operated within the same geographic boundaries as their

       original personal shooting range on June 30, 1996. In fact, the Chapos made

       clear that the commercial shooting range expanded the personal range.

       Appellants’ App. Vol. II, p. 58; Appellants’ Br., p. 45 (noting that the Chapos

       hosted a grand opening of the commercial shooting range after “expanding the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-467 | December 7, 2023      Page 11 of 21
       sho[oting] range”). The Chapos’ answer to the Commission’s complaint for

       injunctive relief specifically alleged that the BZA “lacked authority to regulate

       the expansion of their shooting range.” Id. at 59 (emphasis added). Deputy Big

       Shot’s advertisements showed 23 firing positions for one event. Appellee’s App.

       Vol. IV, p. 109.

[28]   The ISRPA’s safe harbor provisions do not apply to any expansion of the

       shooting range’s activities outside the June 30, 1996, geographic boundaries.

       Ind. Code § 14-22-31.5-7. Even within those boundaries, the only “expansion”

       authorized by the ISRPA is in “membership” to or “opportunities for public

       participation” at the shooting range. Ind. Code § 14-22-31.5-7(3). The ISRPA’s

       safe harbor provisions also do not authorize or protect any construction of new

       “buildings” or “structures” on any post-1996 shooting range. Ind. Code § 14-22-

       31.5-7(1)-(2). As the record contains no evidence that the commercial shooting

       range was within the limits set by the ISRPA’s safe harbor provisions, the trial

       court properly concluded those provisions did not apply.

       2. The ISRPA Noise Provisions do not Apply.
[29]   The Chapos next claim that the ISRPA’s protections in noise-related actions

       barred the BZA’s 2012 denial of their conditional use permit application and

       thus rendered that decision void. At issue is:

               A person who owns, operates, or uses a shooting range is not
               liable in any civil or criminal matter relating to noise or noise
               pollution that results from the operation or use of the shooting
               range if the construction and operation of the shooting range
               were legal at the time of its initial construction or initial
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-467 | December 7, 2023         Page 12 of 21
                operation, and the shooting range continues to operate in a
                manner that would have been legal at the time of the inception or
                initial operation.2

[30]   The Chapos argue that the BZA denied their conditional use permit application

       based on noise concerns. Even assuming the Chapos’ contention is correct and

       that the ISRPA applies, they do not show that the BZA’s denial was a civil

       matter relating to noise “that results from the operation or use of the shooting

       range.”

[31]   First, the Chapos’ commercial shooting range was not in operation or use at the

       time of their conditional use permit application. All the concerns about noise

       expressed at the BZA hearing related to the future commercial shooting range,

       not the Chapos’ existing personal range. The BZA made clear that its denial of

       the conditional use permit would not prohibit the Chapos from personally using

       their existing shooting range.

[32]   But even if the BZA’s 2012 decision qualified as the type of civil matter

       governed by Indiana Code § 14-22-31.5-6, the Chapos have not shown that the

       BZA’s conditional use permit denial rendered them “liable” within the meaning

       of Indiana Code § 14-22-31.5-6. The BZA’s denial merely deprived the Chapos

       of the opportunity to legally build and operate a commercial shooting range on

       2
        The version of Indiana Code § 14-22-31.5-6 (1996) in effect before July 1, 2013, referred to “normal operation
       or use of the shooting range” but otherwise was identical.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-467 | December 7, 2023                              Page 13 of 21
       their property. The denial did not impose any personal liability on the Chapos

       as it merely barred them from expanding their personal shooting range into a

       commercial shooting range. Cf. Yates v. Kemp, 979 N.E.2d 678, 681-82 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2012) (analyzing Indiana Code § 14-22-31.5-6 in the context of a nuisance

       claim brought against shooting range operator). For these reasons, we find

       unpersuasive the Chapos’ claim that the ISRPA’s noise-related protections

       apply.

[33]   Without any showing that the ISRPA applies, we need not address the Chapos’

       remaining arguments under that statute. The trial court properly rejected the

       Chapos’ claim that the BZA’s 2012 decision was void based on the ISRPA.

       B. BZA had Authority to Deny the Conditional Use Permit
[34]   We also reject the Chapos’ claim that the BZA lacked legal authority to deny

       the conditional use permit. We have already determined that the Zoning

       Ordinance limited shooting ranges on agricultural land by requiring a

       conditional use permit. Therefore, for the reasons already expressed, we reject

       the Chapos’ initial claim that the lack of a specific zoning ordinance governing

       shooting ranges deprived the BZA of the legal authority to deny them that

       permit.

[35]   We also find no merit in the Chapos’ remaining claims that the BZA lacked

       legal authority based on the Second Amendment and on the failure of the BZA

       members to take statutorily required oaths.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-467 | December 7, 2023     Page 14 of 21
       1. The Chapos are Barred from Raising Their Second
       Amendment Claim
[36]   The Second Amendment specifies that “[a] well regulated Militia, being

       necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear

       Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. The Second Amendment

       applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. McDonald v. City of

       Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010).

[37]   The Chapos explicitly state that they are not claiming the Zoning Ordinance

       violates the Second Amendment. Appellants’ Br., p. 23. Instead, they claim

       “the act of the [BZA] in treating shooting ranges as a conditional use and

       thereby preventing the Chapos from exercising their Second Amendment right

       is unconstitutional.” Id. But the Chapos are barred from raising this claim

       because they invited the error that they allege.

[38]   The Chapos applied for a conditional use permit under the “Other

       Amusements” category of the Zoning Ordinance. The BZA acted on that

       application at the Chapos’ request and denied them a conditional use permit.

       Years later—only after they were told to shut down the unpermitted shooting

       range—the Chapos reversed position and claimed for the first time that the

       BZA never had jurisdiction over the shooting range and that no conditional use

       permit was needed. “A party may not take advantage of an error [the party]

       commits, invites, or allows to happen as a natural consequence of [the party’s]

       own neglect or misconduct.” Hickey v. Hickey, 111 N.E.3d 242, 246 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2018). A party who invites the very decision that the party later alleges is

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-467 | December 7, 2023      Page 15 of 21
       void does not raise a claim that is subject to appellate review. See Crowl v.

       Berryhill, 678 N.E.2d 828, 830 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (ruling that a party who

       stipulated to an order could not later claim the judgment was void due to lack

       of statutory authority); Stolberg v. Stolberg, 538 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989)

       (“Invited error is not subject to review by this court.”). Therefore, we need not

       address the Chapos’ claim that the BZA’s treatment of a shooting range as a

       conditional use violated the Second Amendment and thus rendered the BZA’s

       2012 decision void.

       2. The Chapos are Collaterally Estopped from Claiming the
       BZA Decision is Void due to Untaken Oaths
[39]   The Chapos also argue that the BZA lacks standing to sue because its board

       members did not timely take an oath of office. The Chapos acknowledge that

       they raised this issue in their Trial Rule 60(B) motion, which the trial court

       denied and the Chapos then unsuccessfully appealed. Chapo, 164 N.E.3d at 135.

       Yet the Chapos assert that this Court “ignored” parts of the oath-based claim in

       that prior appellate decision. Appellants’ Br., p. 50. For that reason, the Chapos

       maintain this Court’s earlier decision does not preclude them from renewing

       their attack on the BZA’s standing on identical grounds. Id.

[40]   This Court in Chapo fully addressed the oath-based claim, including directly

       citing the statute that the Chapos now contend was ignored. Id. at 135. The

       Chapos are barred from relitigating this issue. Holland, 171 N.E.3d at 689

       (“[C]ollateral estoppel[] bars the subsequent litigation of a fact or issue that was

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-467 | December 7, 2023       Page 16 of 21
       necessarily adjudicated in a former lawsuit if the same fact or issue is presented

       in the subsequent lawsuit.”).

[41]   As we have rejected all of the Chapos’ attacks on the BZA’s legal authority to

       deny the condition use permit in 2012, we conclude that the Chapos have failed

       to establish that the BZA’s decision was void and subject to collateral attack.

       This ruling resolves the Chapos’ remaining summary judgment claims, all of

       which rest on an unavailable collateral attack on the BZA’s decision.

       II. The Trial Court had Discretion to Enter the Challenged
       Remedy, Fine, and Attorney Fees
[42]   In their final claim, the Chapos challenge the sanctions imposed by the trial

       court. They first challenge the trial court’s decision to allow county officials to

       enter the Chapos’ property to remedy and abate the violations if the Chapos did

       not comply with the judgment. They next challenge the fine imposed and the

       attorney fees awarded by the trial court.

       A. The Chapos Offer No Valid Challenge to the Remedy
[43]   The Chapos allege that the trial court overstepped its authority by authorizing

       county officials to enter their property “to remedy and abate the violations of

       the Zoning Ordinance occurring on the property” if the Chapos failed to

       remedy the violations within 90 days. Appellants’ App. Vol. II, p. 44. In

       support of this argument, the Chapos simply assert that there was no violation

       of the ordinance and therefore any sanctions were inappropriate. But we have

       already determined that the trial court properly entered the permanent

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-467 | December 7, 2023       Page 17 of 21
       injunction based on the Chapos’ non-compliance with the Zoning Ordinance.

       Accordingly, they have presented no error.

       B. The Chapos Have Waived Their Eighth Amendment
       Claim that the Fine was Excessive
[44]   The Chapos challenge the trial court’s imposition of a cumulative fine of

       $209,625 as excessive under the Eighth Amendment to the United States

       Constitution. The Chapos rely on Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 682,

       689, 203 L.Ed.2d 11 (2019), in which the United States Supreme Court ruled

       that the Eighth Amendment applied to the states through the Fourteenth

       Amendment to the United States Constitution. On remand, the Indiana

       Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s determination that the forfeiture of

       Timbs’s $35,000 vehicle, which was involved in two drug buys totaling less than

       $400, was an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment. State v. Timbs, 169

       N.E.3d 361, 376-77 (Ind. 2021).

[45]   The trial court’s order shows that the maximum statutory fine was nearly $1.4

       million for the 559 days that the Chapos flouted the administrative and court

       orders to cease operating the shooting range. See Ind. Code § 36-1-3-8(a)(10)(B)

       (limiting governmental fines for ordinance violations to $2,500 for the first

       occurrence and $7,500 for a second or subsequent occurrence). The court’s fine

       of $209,625 amounted to 15% of the maximum statutory fine.

[46]   The Chapos assume, without any supporting citations to the record, that the

       trial court did not consider the Timbs decisions when imposing that fine. But a

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-467 | December 7, 2023     Page 18 of 21
       “trial court is presumed to know the law and apply it correctly.” Holtzleiter v.

       Holtzleiter, 944 N.E.2d 502, 506 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). In any case, the Chapos

       do not even explain how the trial court’s order violates the Timbs decisions. The

       Chapos also do not reveal why the $209,625 fine is excessive under the Eighth

       Amendment or, specifically, the Timbs decisions.

[47]   We will not transform into a party’s advocate and fashion arguments on their

       behalf. Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023). Nor will we address

       arguments that are too poorly developed to be understood. Id. The Chapos have

       therefore waived this claim. See id.; Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (“The

       argument [in the Appellants’ Brief] must contain the contentions of the

       appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning” and by

       “citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record

       on Appeal relied on”).

       C. The Trial Court had Discretion to Award the $27,490.78
       in Attorney Fees
[48]   Finally, the Chapos contend the trial court erroneously ordered them to pay the

       Commission’s attorney fees of $27,490.78. We review the trial court’s award of

       attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. Minser v. DeKalb Cty. Plan Comm’n, 170

       N.E.3d 1093, 1102 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). “An abuse of discretion occurs when

       the court’s decision either clearly contravenes the logic and effect of the facts

       and circumstances or misinterprets the law.” River Ridge Dev. Auth. V. Outfront

       Media, LLC, 146 N.E.3d 906, 912 (Ind. 2020).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-467 | December 7, 2023       Page 19 of 21
[49]   The Commission sought attorney fees generally in its complaint. At the

       sanctions hearing, the Commission argued that attorney fees were appropriate

       because the Chapos pursued frivolous claims throughout the litigation and

       thereby increased the length and expense of the litigation. Although the trial

       court otherwise entered detailed findings, its ruling on attorney fees was brief:

               [The Commission is] awarded costs which include $27,490.78 in
               attorney fees as verified by Plaintiff’s affidavit of attorney fees
               submitted as Plaintiff’s “Exhibit 1” plus court costs.

       Appellants’ App. Vol. II, p. 45.

[50]   Indiana courts generally follow the “American Rule,” which calls for each party

       to a lawsuit to bear its own legal fees. River Ridge Dev. Auth., 146 N.E.3d at 912.

       But exceptions to this rule exist. A trial court may award attorney fees

       authorized by statute. Id. For instance, Indiana Code § 34-52-1-1 authorizes an

       attorney fees award to the prevailing party in any civil action if the court finds

       that the other party: “(1) brought the action or defense on a claim or defense

       that is frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless; (2) continued to litigate the action

       or defense after the party’s claim or defense clearly became frivolous,

       unreasonable, or groundless; or (3) litigated the action in bad faith.”

[51]   The Chapos note the trial court did not enter the findings required by Indiana

       Code § 34-51-1-1. But the trial court need not have done so because it appears

       to have awarded attorney fees on a different basis.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-467 | December 7, 2023        Page 20 of 21
[52]   The Zoning Ordinance specifies that Jefferson County may take legal action “to

       prevent or remedy any violations” of the Ordinance’s terms. Appellee’s App.

       Vol. II, p. 100. The Zoning Ordinance further provides that “[a]ll costs

       connected therewith shall accrue to the person or persons responsible” for the

       violation. Id. In addition, Indiana Code § 36-7-4-1014(f) provides that when the

       Commission succeeds in an enforcement action in court, “the respondent shall

       bear the costs of the action.”

[53]   The trial court appears to have relied on the “costs” provisions of the Zoning

       Ordinance and Indiana Code § 36-7-4-1014(f) when it “awarded [to the

       Commission] costs which include $27,490.78 in attorney fees.” Appellants’

       App. Vol. II, p. 45. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.

[54]   We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

       Riley, J., and Bradford, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-467 | December 7, 2023    Page 21 of 21