Court Opinion

ID: 8022928
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-09 02:27:45.708545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:36:43.617188
License: Public Domain

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BRANTLY
delivered the opinion of the court.
The defendant, Felix Gomez, and two others, Ben Gomez and Crescenciano Rodriguez, were jointly charged with the murder of one Juan Domengo at Divide, a station on the Oregon Short Line Railway in Silver Bow county, on March 17, 1918. They were awarded separate trials. Ben Gomez was convicted of manslaughter and Rodriguez of murder in the second degree. At the close of the state’s case on the trial of Felix Gomez, the court, on motion of his counsel, ordered the jury to return a verdict in his favor. From this order the state has appealed. The question for decision is whether the evidence was sufficient to require the case to be submitted to the jury.
The evidence is entirely circumstantial. It would serve no useful purpose to recapitulate and analyze it in detail. It is sufficient to say that after a careful study of it we are of the opinion that, taking it as a whole, it does not meet the [1] requirements of the rule applicable to such cases, viz., that *180when a conviction is sought upon circumstantial evidence the criminatory circumstances proved must not only be consistent with each other but also point so clearly to the .guilt of the accused as to be inconsistent with any other rational hypothesis. (State v. Suitor, 43 Mont. 31, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 230, 114 Pac. 112; State v. Chevigny, 48 Mont. 382, 138 Pac. 257; State v. Woods, 54 Mont. 193, 169 Pac. 39.) Some of the circumstances proved, considered apart from the rest of the [2] evidence, tend to incriminate the accused; but other circumstances, the proof of which cannot be questioned, so far explain and destroy the criminatory force of the former that they leave no substantial basis in the evidence for the conclusion that the accused had anything to do with the homicide. In other words, there was no substantial evidence upon which to base a verdict of guilty. This being the condition of the evidence, if the ease had been submitted to the jury and a verdict of guilty had been returned, it would have been obligatory on the trial court, on motion addressed to it, to grant the defendant a new trial. It was therefore its duty at the close of the evidence to order the jury/as it did, to return a verdict of not guilty. (Territory v. Laun, 8 Mont. 322, 20 Pac. 652; State v. Welch, 22 Mont. 92, 55 Pac. 927; State v. Foster, 26 Mont. 71, 66 Pac. 565.)
Contention was made by the attorney general during the £3] argument that the court should have advised the jury to acquit the defendant instead of peremptorily instructing them to do so. The statute (Rev. Codes, sec. 9297) “is applicable to those cases only in which the trial court deems the evidence, although tending to prove every element necessary to constitute the crime charged, insufficient in weight to warrant a conviction.” (State v. Mahoney, 24 Mont. 281, 61 Pac. 647.) It has no application to the facts of this case.
The order is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Associate Justices Holloway, Hurly, Matthews and Cooper concur.