Court Opinion

ID: 9523285
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:38:17.738353+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:49.835836
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE TRAPP, dissenting: In factual context, defendant entered a negotiated plea in which it was agreed that he was to pay *50 per month to be applied upon the fine, restitution and court costs. Incident to the proceedings he filed a statement that he was earning *398 per month. The opinion recites his discharge from the Marine Corps by reason of undesirable conduct, his two short periods of subsequent employment and reasons for discharge and his purported efforts to obtain employment. The trial court found that there is “no evidence that defendant is not healthy and physically capable.” The “chronic ‘acute laryngitis’ ” in evidence appears to have been the stated reason for the failures to report for work which resulted in each dismissal. There is no affirmative evidence supporting a conclusion of general disability for employment. Section 5 — 9—3(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 1005—9—3(a)) provides that the default in the payment of a fine may be punished by imprisonment upon a finding of contempt. In subparagraph (b), nonpayment supports a finding of contempt: The measure of the conduct which constitutes contempt is stated in the disjunctive. “Unless the offender shows that his default was not due to his intentional refusal to pay, or not due to a failure on his part to make a good faith effort to pay, * 6 The opinion cites Sullivan v. Sullivan (1973), 16 Ill. App. 3d 549, 306 N.E.2d 604; Storm v. Storm (1973), 9 Ill. App. 3d 1071, 293 N.E.2d 633, and Shapiro v. Shapiro (1969), 113 Ill. App. 2d 374, 252 N.E.2d 93. Each stated case concerned a civil contempt in which the proceedings were designed to enforce relief for a party. The language in those opinions may have some relevance in the determination of “[h]is intentional refusal to pay.” It is not apparent, however, that the language in such opinions is properly applied as a standard in determining whether the default “[w]as not due to a failure on his part to make a good faith effort to pay e # To so interpret the statute would make the language of the latter statement meaningless. It is suggested that the standard of a good faith effort is more properly measured in People v. Rezek (1952), 410 Ill. 618, 103 N.E.2d 127, cert, denied, 343 U.S. 965, 96 L. Ed. 2d 1362, 72 S. Ct. 1059, where a corporate officer was held in contempt for failure to produce records by a subpoena duces tecum. Defendant asserted inability to comply because he did know where the records were and stated a belief that the records were in the possession of another. In affirming the order finding contempt, the court noted the duties under a subpoena duces tecum and said: “The inability which excuses, however, must be real. Self-created inability will not suffice; nor will passive inactivity when reasonable effort might secure compliance.” (410 Ill. 618, 628, 103 . N.E.2d 127, 132.) The opinion found that there had been no steps taken to attempt to comply. In County of Cook v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 131, 319 N.E.2d 472, the trial court sentenced for contempt upon a failure to comply with an “agreed order” to abate pollution. Defendant contended and the appellate court determined that there was an inability to comply with the order by reason of the unavailability of design details and bids. In reversing the appellate court, the supreme court said, “The record reflects not only a lack of diligence upon his part as well as ° ° but also it may be inferred that there was a negligent if not intentional disregard in terms of the order * * *.” 59 Ill. 2d 131, 138, 319 N.E.2d 472, 477. The court said: “Defendant also argues that its inability to comply with the terms of the agreed order precludes a finding of contempt ° ° °. The corollary to this rule, however, prevents assertion of the defense of inability where the contemnor has voluntarily created the incapacity. [Citations.]” 59 Ill. 2d 131, 137, 319 N.E.2d 472, 476. Other statutes of the State include as public policy requirements that one may be required to seek, or be available, for work. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 23, par. 4 — 1.8.) Section 11 — 20 of the same statute requires recipients of public aid to register for employment and to accept bona fide offers of employment. Section 500 of “An Act in relation to a system of unemployment insurance” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 48, par. 420), provides that eligibility to receive benefits requires registering for employment and actively seeking work. As suggested in the concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Blackmun in Tate v. Short (1971), 401 U.S. 395, 28 L. Ed. 2d 130, 91 S. Ct. 668, the reversal of the judgment in this case may discourage the use of fines by the courts. There is apparent potential for discrimination if, as suggested, the trial court is required to consider the financial resources of a defendant in determining whether to sentence by fine or imprisonment. (See ABA Standards, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures par. 2.7(c) (1968).) It appears that the appropriateness of a fine as a deferent, or as a corrective measure, may necessarily be determined in terms of financial resources of the defendant. An equally undesirable result arises as noted in Williams v. Illinois (1970), 399 U.S. 235, 244, 26 L. Ed. 2d 586, 595, 90 S. Ct. 2018, for the inability of the State to enforce sanctions for failure to pay a fine may result in serious: “[I]nverse discrimination since it would enable an indigent to avoid both the fine and imprisonment for non-payment whereas other defendants must always suffer one or the other conviction.” At the time the fine was imposed through plea negotiation, the defendant was able to pay the fine in installments. ABA Standards, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures par. 2.7(b) (1968); Williams v. Illinois (1970), 399 U.S. 235, 245, 26 L. Ed. 2d 586, 595, 90 S. Ct. 2018, footnote 21. The conclusion of the trial court that defendant did not “make a good faith effort to pay 9 9 9” is supported by the record and I would affirm the judgment.