Court Opinion

ID: 9791742
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:16:57.379184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:38.244414
License: Public Domain

SCHWAB, C.J.,
dissenting.
The majority opinion says that the word “sustenance” is too broad, but the phrase “medical care” is sufficiently precise and understandable. Accepting the broadest possible interpretation of the word “sustenance,” it means physical nourishment necessary to life be it food, water or other substance. I fail to see how this word can be too broad, but the phrase *534“medical care” not subject to the same vice when it can cover everything from major surgery to aspirin or a cold cloth on a fevered brow. Hygienic care used in the context of the indictment to me means simply “sanitary care.” Thus the indictment, if we give its language a common-sense interpretation, charges the defendants with deliberately and with premeditated malice failing to provide their child the minimum requirements of food, medical attention and sanitation necessary to preserve life.
The majority seeks to explain away State v. Bischert, 131 Mont 152, 308 P2d 969 (1957), and State v. Staples, 126 Minn 396, 148 NW 283 (1914),① on the grounds that there the defendants were charged only with manslaughter and not with premeditated murder. Do the defendants know more about the facts against which they have to defend if they are charged with a lesser degree of homicide?
In State v. Bischert, supra, the Montana Supreme Court upheld a conviction under an indictment charging *535the defendants with feloniously killing their child by neglecting and refusing to provide it with food, and that as a result, the child starved to death. The distinction between first-degree murder and manslaughter is not based on the acts or omissions; it is based upon the mental attitude and deliberation lying behind those acts. I know of no case which says that an indictment must allege what evidence the state has going to prove deliberation and malice.
Contrary to the position of the majority, State v. Staples, supra, holds that an indictment which for all practical purposes was identical to the one at hand was sufficient. It points out that under Minnesota law an indictment is sufficient if it fairly advises defendant of the charges made against him. The court said:
“* * * This indictment charges that defendant became the mother of a male child, that after its birth and on the same day she wilfully made an assault upon said child, and by acts, procurements and culpable negligence she did wilfully neglect to provide care, nurture, sustenance and medical assistance and aid, to preserve its life, but wholly neglected it, and that in consequence thereof ‘and by reason of the * * * felonious neglect, abandonment, and refusal to care for and provide * * * for said * * * child needful food, sustenance, care, aid, and assistance for the maintenance of the life of * * * said * 0 '* child by her, the said Nellie Staples, * * * and * ÍS * for want of proper care, nurture and assistance, and medical assistance and attendance, and by reason of said wilful, unlawful, and felonious acts and culpable negligence of said Nellie Staples committed, the life of said male child was * * # shortened and * * * said * * * child did * * * languish * * * and * * * die.’
“These allegations are sufficient. A parent *536who, by culpable negligence, fails to provide care, nurture, sustenance and medical assistance to a child wholly incapable of supplying its own wants, and so causes its death is, under the statute, guilty of manslaughter in the second degree.
“It is contended that this language does not sufficiently charge that the acts of negligence of defendant caused the death of the child. We think it does. It contains very direct charges to this effect, and it is in this respect sufficient. State v. Lowe, 66 Minn. 296, 68 N. W. 1094, cited by defendant, is plainly distinguishable. This indictment is not open to the objections on which the indictment in that case was held invalid.” 126 Minn at 398-99.
The fact is that State v. Bischert, supra, and State v. Staples, supra, are the only cases that either the majority or I have been able to find in which the indictments are substantially similar to the indictment in the case at bar, and in both instances those indictments were held sufficient.
It may well be that two-way criminal pretrial discovery is desirable in Oregon, particularly in cases such as this. This, however, is a legislative matter and one which has constitutional problems.② I do not *537believe that absent sneb provisions we must hold that the type of child abuse and child neglect here alleged is prosecution-proof. We do not know what evidence led to the indictment. We can reasonably assume that the state is not likely to be able to produce an observer who would testify that on a given date the child was given no food, on a given date the child was very ill with some specific ailment and no doctor was called, or that during a given period the child was allowed to wallow in its own filth. We do know that lack of food makes people more susceptible to disease, and lack of sanitation makes people more susceptible to disease. We know that the combination of lack of food, lack of medical care and lack of sanitation may cause death, and that in such an instance the medical evidence might very well be that neither, standing alone, would have been fatal.
The defendants, and apparently the majority agrees, argue that when the grand jury is unable to allege the particulars of the crime with certainty, then the indictment should recite the inability, citing State v. Davis, 1 Or App 285, 462 P2d 448 (1969), and State v. Schwensen, 237 Or 506, 392 P2d 328 (1964). In the Schwensen case the indictment charged the defendant with lulling by means unknown. The court there held, at 526:
“The defendant’s argument seems to be based upon the contention that if the cause of death is known to the grand jury and is not set forth in the indictment, then a demurrer thereto will lie.
*538“This court has stated on numerous occasions that if the cause of death is unknown to the grand jury and it is so stated in the indictment, the indictment complies with the requirements of the constitution and statutes in stating a crime * *
The indictment here need not state that the cause of death was unknown, because it does state the cause of death — the combination of lack of food, medical care and sanitation. The indictment here is distinguishable from State v. Davis, supra. It tells the defendants what they realistically need to know in order to prepare their defense.
I dissent.
Langtry, J., joins in this dissent.

 The majority states:
«* * * n ¿oes not appear from a reading of the opinions in Staples and Bischert if either of the defendants moved for a bill of particulars before trial, as he was entitled to do. Both opinions are silent on this point. However, if, in fact, neither defendant did so but waited until after trial and conviction to attack the indictment on this ground this may well have been the controlling factor in the refusal of both appellate courts to upset the indictments.”
I find nothing in either opinion to support this statement. So far as the opinions indicate, the defendants may have unsuccessfully moved for bills of particulars prior to trial. The two appellate courts involved did not say in their opinions that if the defendants needed more facts they could have obtained them by moving for a bill of particulars. They unequivocally held the allegations sufficient. It seems to me that if we can deduce anything from the failure of the opinions to mention the availability of bills of particulars it would be that they were sought and denied.

 State v. Foster, 242 Or 101, 105, 407 P2d 901 (1965), states: “* * * it is generally held that pre-trial discovery of the state’s evidence is not permissible. 6 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed 1940), § 1859, pages 475, 476.
“It is said that pre-trial discovery permits an accused to fabricate evidence for his defense. More important, however, ‘It was felt, furthermore, that to allow the defendant to compel production when the prosecution could not in its turn compel production from the defendant because of the privilege against self incrimination would unduly shift to the defendant’s side a balance of advantages already heavily weighted in his favor.’ People v. Riser, supra, 47 Cal 2d 585, 305 P2d 13. We recognize that the rule restraining pre-trial *537discovery is .the subject of debate and criticism. See, for example, Krantz, Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 1962, 42 Neb L Rev 127. We are not convinced that the rule is unsound. There was no error in the courts refusal to permit the pre-trial discovery.”