Court Opinion

ID: 9584574
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:50:12.103266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:08:45.756315
License: Public Domain

Spratley, and I'Anson, JJ.,
concurring.
We agree that there is ample evidence, excluding that relating to the previous assault of the accused upon his wife, to justify a verdict of murder in the first degree; but because that is true we should not be in a race with the executioner to provide a short cut to the death chamber.
The guilt or innocence of the accused is not the issue before us. The issue here is whether or not he has had a fair and impartial trial according to the law. We do not think he has had such a trial, because of the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury that evidence of the accused’s prior attack upon his wife could be considered only to show his motive or intent in making the murderous assault of December 4,1960.
It has been the long established rule in Virginia that in the trial of a criminal case, the Commonwealth may not generally offer testimony of a prior independent crime. That rule has been subject to certain exceptions, one of which is that such testimony may be admissible to show the motive or intent, which is connected with, or leads , up to the offense for which the accused is on trial. Colvin v. Common*843wealth, 147 Va. 663, 669, 137 S. E. 476; Webb v. Commonwealth, 154 Va. 866, 874, 152 S. E. 366; Boyd v. Commonwealth, 156 Va. 934, 944, 157 S. E. 546; Zirkle v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 862, 872, 55 S. E. 2d 24; Nash, The Law of Evidence, Virginia and West Virginia, § 88.
The prior attack of the accused upon his wife was a separate and distinct offense, wholly unconnected with that for which he was on trial. It was not admissible for the purpose of determining whether or not he committed the offense for which he was being tried; but was allowed to be introduced, as the Commonwealth’s Attorney and the trial judge agreed, for the sole purpose of determining the motive or intent of the accused in committing the offense for which he was on trial. But the Commonwealth offered no instruction, and the court gave none, limiting the jury in its consideration of the proof. The accused offered no such instruction; but both at the pre-trial conference and during the trial, he objected and excepted to the admission of the evidence for any purpose. This of itself was sufficient to warrant the trial court in properly instructing the jury. As we see it, the admission of such evidence, in the absence of a limiting instruction to the jury, was prejudicial to the accused.
A failure to emphasize the point here sought to be made will lead to confusion in the trial of criminal offenses in Virginia. While the error may be termed technical, it is too important to go unnoticed.
For these additional reasons, we think that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed, and a new trial granted the accused.