Court Opinion

ID: 9793627
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:50:51.00938+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:16.919141
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, J.,
dissenting opinion.
I dissent from the majority opinion and would reverse the trial court decision. Accepting the majority’s finding that the landlord waived his right to 30-days written notice, the landlord’s acceptance of the tenant’s oral notice, together with the tenant’s holdover after the agreed upon departure date, gave the landlord justification for an action for possession under the terms of ORS 91.855(3). The landlord brought his action for possession in the form of an FED action. Therefore, the issue before us is whether the FED procedures as set forth in ORS 105.105 et seq were properly followed.
Despite the majority’s statement to the contrary, the relevant notice rules are not "stated solely in the Residential Landlord Tenant Act, ORS 91.700 to 91.895.” 36 Or App at 662. Notice requirements for an FED action are found at ORS 105.120(2). While the majority is correct in noting that ORS 105.120(2) refers the reader back to ORS 91.855, the FED statute *665is clear in its requirement that the notice run from landlord to tenant.
ORS 105.120 (2) provides:
"(2) An action for the recovery of the possession of a dwelling unit to which ORS 91.700 to 91.895 apply may be maintained in cases provided in subsection (2) of ORS 105.115 when the notice to terminate the tenancy or to quit has been served upon the tenant or person in possession in the manner prescribed by ORS 91.855. (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no statutory authority for the proposition that an FED action may be initiated by notice running from tenant to landlord.
Further, ORS 105.120(2), when read together with ORS 91.855, makes clear that the amount of notice required for an FED action is 30 days. Therefore, although the landlord may have waived his right to 30-days written termination notice from the tenant, this did not affect the tenant’s right to 30-days written notice from the landlord before eviction by an FED action.
In Teresi v. Gina Belmonte Corp., 31 Or App 1231, 572 P2d 647 (1977), we stated that:
"An FED action is a special statutory proceeding, summary in its nature; it is in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed. Schroeder v. Woody, 166 Or 93, 96, 109 P2d 597 (1941). In that case, the court quotes with approval 22 Am Jur 934, Jurisdiction § 35 (1939), as follows:
" ' " Since the action of forcible entry and detainer is a special statutory proceeding, summary in its nature, and in derogation of the common law, it is a rule of universal application in such actions that the statute conferring jurisdiction must be strictly pursued in the method of procedure prescribed by it, or the jurisdiction will fail to attach, and the proceeding be coram non judice and void. * * *” ’ ”
In accordance with this language, I would hold the writing requirement for an FED action to be absolute *666and that the procedure must be in strict compliance with the statutes. Assuming arguendo that the contents of the August 12 letter from the landlord’s agent to the tenant would be sufficient to constitute notice to quit, the letter could not be the basis for an FED action because it did not provide a 30-day notice.
I, therefore, respectfully dissent.