Court Opinion

ID: 9651142
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 16:08:51.769534+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:30.444588
License: Public Domain

J-A14007-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    JHALIL ALLEN,                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1760 EDA 2022

                 Appeal from the Order Entered June 22, 2022
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
             Criminal Division at No(s): MC-51-CR-0022865-2020

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                           FILED AUGUST 23, 2023

       Jhalil Allen appeals from the order denying his petition for writ of

certiorari filed with the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas after he was

convicted of terroristic threats1 in the Philadelphia Municipal Court.2 We affirm.

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706.

2 A defendant convicted in Philadelphia’s Municipal Court has two appellate
options for relief. The defendant has the right to request either a trial de novo
or to file a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Philadelphia Court of
Common Pleas. See Commonwealth v. Beaufort, 112 A.3d 1267, 1269 (Pa.
Super. 2015). “A trial de novo gives the defendant a new trial without
reference to the Municipal Court record; a petition for writ of certiorari asks
the Common Pleas Court to review the record made in the Municipal Court.
See id. Essentially, this Court has held that when a defendant files a petition
for a writ of certiorari, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas sits as an
appellate court. See Commonwealth v. Coleman, 19 A.3d 1111, 1119 (Pa.
Super. 2011) (citations omitted).
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      For purposes of this appeal, the following factual and procedural

summary is not in dispute. On September 18, 2020, while Allen was

incarcerated at the Philadelphia Industrial Corrections Center, Corrections

Officer Chryle Hill noticed that Allen was in possession of clothing considered

to be contraband. The officer asked Allen multiple times to turn over the item,

and Allen refused. Allen told the officer multiple times that she would need a

team to get him out of his cell. The officer then summoned additional

corrections officers, and Allen continued to be noncompliant. His behavior led

a corrections officer to deploy pepper spray to gain Allen’s compliance.

      Subsequently, officers escorted Allen to the medical area for treatment,

and Officer Hill supervised the transfer. During the transfer process, Allen said

to Hill that she “was wrong for that and that he remembers faces and he

wouldn’t be in jail forever and [she] was dead.” N.T., 11/9/21, at 14. Allen

repeated the statement multiple times.

      Allen was arrested and charged with terroristic threats. On November 9,

2021, the Honorable Henry Lewandowski III of the Philadelphia Municipal

Court conducted a nonjury trial, after which he found Allen guilty and

sentenced him to serve a term of probation of two years. Allen filed a petition

for writ of certiorari challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his

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conviction in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas.3 The Honorable

Carmella Jacquinto denied the petition on June 22, 2022, thereby affirming

the Municipal Court’s judgment of sentence. This timely appeal followed.

        Allen’s single issue on appeal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

to support his conviction of terroristic threats. See Appellant’s Brief at 8-16.

He contends that his statements to Hill, when taken into context, were spur-

of-the-moment threats that were the product of transitory anger. See id. at

14. Allen further alleges there is nothing in the record to support the

conclusion that he held a settled intent to terrorize. See id. at 13. He

concludes that the Commonwealth failed to prove the necessary mens rea

beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 16.

        A lower court’s decision on the issuance of a writ of certiorari will
        not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Certiorari provides
        a narrow scope of review in a summary criminal matter and allows
        review solely for questions of law. Questions of fact, admissibility,
        sufficiency or relevancy of evidence questions may not be
        entertained by the reviewing court on certiorari. A petition for a
        writ of certiorari provides an aggrieved party an alternative to a
        trial de novo in the Court of Common Pleas.

Commonwealth v. Elisco, 666 A.2d 739, 740-41 (Pa. Super. 1995)

(citations omitted). When a writ of certiorari is denied, a defendant may then

raise evidentiary and sufficiency issues on appeal. See Coleman, 13 A.3d at

1119.

____________________________________________

3 Allen’s petition for writ of certiorari requested that the Philadelphia Court of

Common Pleas review the record of the Municipal Court. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Menezes, 871 A.2d 204, 206 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2005).

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      We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence with great

deference to the credibility determinations of the fact finder:

      The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
      is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
      most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
      to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
      a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
      the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
      addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
      the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
      innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be
      resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
      inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
      drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
      may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
      beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
      evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
      must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
      considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the
      credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
      is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Gause, 164 A.3d 532, 540-41 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en

banc) (citation omitted).

      “A person commits the crime of terroristic threats if the person

communicates, either directly or indirectly, a threat to … commit any crime of

violence with intent to terrorize another[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706(a)(1). As this

Court has stated, for a defendant to be convicted of terroristic threats “the

Commonwealth must prove that 1) the defendant made a threat to commit a

crime of violence, and 2) the threat was communicated with the intent to

terrorize another or with reckless disregard for the risk of causing terror.”

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Commonwealth v. Beasley, 138 A.3d 39, 46 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation

omitted).

       Section 2706 is not meant to encompass “mere spur-of-the-moment

threats which result from anger.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706, Comment. However,

anger “does not render a person incapable of forming the intent to terrorize.”

Commonwealth v. Walker, 836 A.2d 999, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation

omitted). In determining whether a threat was a spur-of-the-moment

statement made during a heated verbal exchange, we consider the totality of

the circumstances. See Commonwealth v. Sexton, 222 A.3d 405, 418 (Pa.

Super. 2019). Further, in Commonwealth v. Tizer, 684 A.2d 597, 601 (Pa.

Super. 1996), this Court concluded that a lack of evidence that the victim was

acting violently was sufficient to negate the defendant’s claim that his threats

were caused by heated argument.

       We have long held that a defendant’s intent to terrorize can be inferred

from    his   actions   and   from   the   message   he   communicated.       See

Commonwealth v. Kelley, 664 A.2d 123, 128 (Pa. Super. 1995). Moreover,

as our Court has explained,

       [n]either the ability to carry out the threat, nor a belief by the
       person threatened that the threat will be carried out, is an element
       of the offense. Rather, the harm sought to be prevented by the
       statute is the psychological distress that follows from an invasion
       of another’s sense of personal security.

Beasley, 138 A.3d at 46 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Also, the Commonwealth is not required to produce evidence that the person

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to whom the defendant communicated the threat was actually frightened. See

id.

      Here, the certiorari court summarized its sufficiency analysis as follows:

      [T]he evidence presented by the Commonwealth established
      beyond a reasonable doubt that [Allen] committed the crime of
      Terroristic Threats. The evidence the Commonwealth presented
      established that [Allen] directed a threat to commit a crime of
      violence against Lieutenant Hill with the intent to terrorize her
      when he stated multiple times that he remembers faces and he
      would not be in jail forever and she was dead. (Municipal Court
      N.T. 11/09/21, 14). Lieutenant Hill stated that she took the threat
      very seriously due to the nature of her job as a supervising
      correction officer in the prison.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/2/22, at 5. We agree.

      Our review of the record reflects the trial judge had sufficient evidence

to conclude that Allen possessed the necessary intent to commit the crime.

Officer Hill testified that during her course of employment at the Philadelphia

Department of Prison on September 18, 2020, she encountered Allen, who

was in possession of clothing considered to be contraband. See N.T., 11/9/21,

at 11-13. Allen refused Officer Hill’s multiple requests for the item to be turned

over to her. See id. at 12-13. In addition, Allen told Officer Hill that she

“needed a team to get him out of his cell.” Id. at 12.

      At this point, Officer Hill called for assistance, and Allen continued to

refuse the directives from the other officers. See id. at 13. One of the other

officers used pepper spray on Allen, which required that he be taken to the

medical unit. See id.

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      Officer Hill served as the supervising escort while Allen was being

transferred to the medical area by the other officer. See id. at 13-14. During

the transfer, Allen repeatedly stated that Officer Hill “was wrong for that and

that he remembers faces and he wouldn’t be in jail forever and [Officer Hill]

was dead.” Id. at 14. Further, Officer Hill indicated that, because of her work

she “take[s] threats very seriously.” Id.

      Viewing the totality of this evidence, in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, we are satisfied that the Court of Common Pleas was justified

in determining that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to

establish all the elements of the crime of terroristic threats beyond a

reasonable doubt.

      Specifically, Allen made a threat to commit a crime of violence, and the

threat was communicated with the intent to terrorize Officer Hill. Further,

there was no evidence that Allen was reacting to any violent action taken

directly by Officer Hill. Rather, the facts cited above reveal that Allen’s

interaction with Officer Hill changed when other officers arrived, and Allen

continued to refuse their directives. This behavior led an officer, other than

Hill, to deploy the pepper spray that caused Allen’s physical condition and

attendant anger. Therefore, any “spur-of-the-moment” threats and transitory

anger were misdirected at Officer Hill, as there is a lack of evidence that Hill

was acting violently toward Allen. Consequently, the evidence as presented to

the trial court was sufficient to sustain Allen’s conviction of terroristic threats,

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and his contrary claim lacks merit. Accordingly, we discern no error or abuse

of discretion and affirm the June 22, 2022, denial of Allen’s petition for writ of

certiorari.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/23/2023

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