Court Opinion

ID: 9751688
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:50:10.45264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:57.093592
License: Public Domain

FARRELL, Associate Judge,
concurring.
I agree that a hearing is necessary on appellant’s Sixth Amendment claim, but only because the case involves a potential conflict of interest on the part of appellant’s trial counsel. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). Were this an ordinary claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), appellant would not be entitled to a hearing because his assertions of deficient performance are too vague and con-elusory or are refuted by the record.1 But here the reasonable possibility of a conflict of interest is enough to warrant inquiry if appellant can also show that the conflict (if any) adversely affected his lawyer’s performance, Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350, 100 S.Ct. at 1719 — a showing less difficult to make than under Strickland’s prejudice requirement. Yet, because appellant must show an adverse effect on counsel’s performance, the hearing may well be a very short one. That is, the judge may go right to the “adverse effect” question and leave aside a potentially lengthier probe of Ms. Hunter’s social relationship with other Fifth District police officers besides Muzzatti. Whether or not Ms. Hunter admits telling appellant that she “messed up” the case, if the judge can find no act or omission of hers that, objectively viewed, affected appel*753lant’s defense adversely2 that will end the inquiry.

. Appellant's complaint that counsel's cross-examination of the police witnesses was inadequate is wholly conclusory and not borne out by the trial record. Even at oral argument his attorney could not point to any matter which the cross-examination failed to explore. Appellant's assertion, without any particularization, that counsel was deficient in failing to call two witnesses (one named, the other not) is likewise vague and con-clusory. And certainly it cannot be that a defendant obtains a hearing under Strickland merely by citing a statement of his counsel post-trial that she “messed up” the case and that the defendant should file a § 23-110 motion.

. The test for "adverse effect" applied by the district judge in United States v. Harris, 846 F.Supp. 121 (D.D.C.1994), quoting federal appellate court decisions, requires the defendant first to
demonstrate that some plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic might have been pursued. He need not show that the defense would necessarily have been successful if it had been used, but that it possessed sufficient substance to be a viable alternative. Second, he must establish that the alternative defense was inherently in conflict with or not undertaken due to the attorney’s other loyalties or interests.
Id. at 129 (quoting United States v. Gambino, 864 F.2d 1064, 1070 (3d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906, 109 S.Ct. 3215, 106 L.Ed.2d 566 (1989) (further citations omitted)).