Court Opinion

ID: 9635802
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:05:58.170874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:23.826627
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-313

             ADOPTION OF HILMA (and four companion cases 1).

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       On appeal from decrees terminating her parental rights as

 to the five children, the mother asserts that the trial judge

 (i) violated the mother's due process rights by terminating her

 parental rights, sua sponte, in a proceeding that was directed

 solely to custody (and care and protection) rather than to

 termination, and (ii) erred in concluding that the mother was

 unfit at the time of trial. 2        We discern no error of law or abuse

 1 Adoption of Georgia, Adoption of David, Adoption of Edward, and
 Adoption of Francis.
 2 Three of the five children also appeal from the decrees; one of

 the children appears as an appellee, along with the Department
 of Children and Families; the remaining child withdrew her brief
 as an appellant and took no position in this appeal. Though the
 appellant children's brief assigns error to the termination of
 Francis's father's parental rights, the brief offers no
 substantive argument in support of the assertion of error. We
 note that Francis's father was incarcerated throughout the
 trial, that he supported return of the children to the mother
 but did not seek custody of the children himself, and that the
 judge drew a negative inference from his failure to appear or
 testify at trial, and her memorandum of decision noted his
 extensive criminal history (which included open charges of child
 pornography and rape of a child).
of discretion, and accordingly affirm the decrees terminating

the mother's parental rights.

     Discussion.   1.   Termination.     In proceedings to terminate

parental rights, "[d]ue process is satisfied by providing notice

and an opportunity to be heard."       Adoption of Talik, 92 Mass.

App. Ct. 367, 375 n.9 (2017).    See Adoption of Simone, 427 Mass.

34, 39 (1998), quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552

(1965) (parents must be afforded "an opportunity to be heard 'at

a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner'").       The mother

contends that the issue of dispensing with the need for her

consent to adoption was not properly before the court because

the Department of Children and Families (department) was not

seeking termination at the time of trial, and as a result, she

was not given adequate notice or opportunity to address the

issue of her fitness to parent.    We disagree.

     The mother was served in hand on the date of filing of the

care and protection petition; consistent with G. L. c. 119, § 26

(b) (4), the summons she received on that date gave explicit

notice that a possible result of care and protection proceedings

is the dispensation with the need for the mother's consent to

adoption of the children and the termination of the mother's

parental rights.   Later in the trial, a second summons

containing the same notice was issued, ordering the mother's

presence in person on the following court date to facilitate her

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full participation at trial and allow her to be heard on her

motions for recusal and dismissal. 3   Finally, the mother's stand-

by counsel confirmed during trial in a colloquy with the judge

that the mother was "well aware" of the possibility of

termination of her parental rights as a potential outcome of

trial.   "The express language of G. L. c. 119, § 26(4), permits,

and in some instances mandates, that the judge, upon a finding

of the need of care and protection, consider and order the

dispensation of the need for parental permission to adopt." 4

Adoption of Donald, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 908, 909 (2000).    We are

unpersuaded by the mother's argument that she did not receive

adequate notice and opportunity to be heard on the issue of

termination. 5   See id. ("nothing in G. L. c. 119, § 26(4),

3 Notably, the trial judge's decision to order the mother to
appear in person came after an extensive colloquy with counsel
for the parties and the mother's stand-by counsel, all of whom
expressed reticence to proceed with trial where the mother could
only participate via telephone and was intermittently absent
during the proceedings, citing potential due process concerns
arising from mother's pro se status.
4 This express statutory language is now found at G. L. c. 119,

§ 26 (b) (4).
5 The mother's reference to Adoption of Reid, 39 Mass. App. Ct.

338 (1995), is unavailing. In that case, the joint pretrial
memorandum cited the questions to be tried as "whether . . . to
approve the department's plan for [the child's] guardianship"
and "whether the mother is presently unfit," without mention of
termination or adoption. Id. at 339 & n.3. The judge there
erred by terminating the mother's parental rights, where the
parties had agreed to try the matter as a guardianship petition.
See id. at 341-342. Here, the department stated clearly in its
opening statement that this would be a full trial on the issue

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requires that a separate petition or motion be filed [by the

department] before the judge may act").

       The mother and appellant children also argue that the judge

erred in terminating the mother's parental rights where there

was no adoption plan proposed by the department for the judge to

consider as required by G. L. c. 210, § 3 (c).      Though a judge

must meaningfully evaluate and consider any proposed adoption

plan submitted by the department, we do not understand the

language of G. L. c. 210, § 3 (c), to require the department to

submit a permanency plan as a prerequisite to the judge's

exercise of her statutory authority under G. L. c. 119, § 26 (b)

(4).    The trial judge did not err in issuing decrees terminating

the mother's parental rights upon finding clear and convincing

evidence of the mother's current unfitness and that her

unfitness was likely to continue into the indefinite future. 6

       2.   The mother's fitness.   "When reviewing a decision to

terminate parental rights, we must determine whether the trial

of mother's ability to parent, with the department seeking
custody of all five children.
6 Though three of the children assert that the trial judge

erroneously found "that the permanent separation of the siblings
from each other was in their interests," our reading of the
judge's thorough memorandum of decision reveals the contrary.
In any event, as the department observes, nothing in the decrees
precludes the children from requesting modification of the
visitation order to further adjudicate questions of placement or
visitation (or both) or, if they are over the age of twelve,
filing petitions for sibling visitation pursuant to G. L.
c. 119, § 26B (b).

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judge has abused [her] discretion or committed a clear error of

law."   Adoption of Elena, 446 Mass. 24, 30 (2006).   A finding of

unfitness must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.

See Adoption of Rhona, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 117, 124 (2005).    We

accord deference to the trial judge's assessment of the

credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence.

See Adoption of Elena, supra at 31.   The mother and appellant

children assert that the judge erred in finding sufficient

evidence of the mother's unfitness by relying on stale evidence,

improperly weighing the mother's refusal to engage in services

offered by the department, and by drawing negative inferences

from the mother's conduct at trial.   We disagree.

     Though "isolated problems in the past or stale information

cannot be a basis for a determination of current parental

unfitness," a judge may consider a parent's prior history for

its prognostic value.   Petition of the Dep't of Social Servs. to

Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 120, 126

(1984).   The mother has an extensive history of contact with the

department, demonstrating consistent and unaddressed parenting

deficiencies, including physical abuse of the children, exposure

of the children to domestic violence, failure to adequately

supervise the children, and aggression towards department staff

and school personnel.   The trial judge made specific findings

detailing the mother's failure to address these deficiencies or

                                 5
gain insight as to their harm to the children, up to and

including the time of trial. 7   The judge's findings of fact,

taken as a whole, do not indicate an undue reliance on the

mother's past conduct in reaching the ultimate finding of the

mother's current unfitness.

     The trial judge was also permitted to consider the mother's

refusal to engage in services offered by the department and her

open hostility towards department staff in reaching her finding

of unfitness.   See Adoption of Rhona, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 126.

We think this is especially true where the mother was granted

conditional custody of the three youngest children, after they

had been initially removed from her care due to an incident of

physical abuse against one of her older children.    The mother's

failure to engage in services, acknowledge her harmful

behaviors, or gain insight into the adverse effects of violence

and aggression on the children was relevant to the judge's

determination of her continuing unfitness and was appropriately

7 While it is true that there had been no reports of further
physical abuse against the younger three children during the
mother's period of conditional custody leading up to trial, "[a]
judge . . . does not have to wait for a disaster to happen,"
Custody of Michel, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 260, 269-270 (1990), in
reaching a decision to terminate parental rights if past conduct
and present behavior indicate that the children are "at serious
risk of peril from abuse, neglect, or other activity harmful to
the child[ren]" (citation omitted), Adoption of Zoltan, 71 Mass.
App. Ct. 185, 188 (2008).

                                  6
considered.   See Care & Protection of Vick, 89 Mass. App. Ct.

704, 708.

     Finally, we review a trial judge's decision to draw an

adverse inference from a parent's conduct at trial for abuse of

discretion.   See Adoption of Helga, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 521, 526

(2020).   In determining whether to exercise her discretion, the

judge as fact finder must "consider whether such an inference is

fair and reasonable based on all the circumstances before her"

(quotation and citation omitted).     Adoption of Talik, 92 Mass.

App. Ct. at 372.   Throughout the mother's sporadic participation

at trial, she was continuously hostile and disruptive, and on

numerous occasions swore at the judge and advocates or abruptly

disconnected from the zoom call or telephone bridge line.     The

trial judge made repeated attempts to ensure the mother's full

participation at trial despite the mother's direct refusals to

be cooperative and respectful.    The mother's behavior at trial

was consistent with the parenting deficiencies identified in the

findings of fact, and was fairly considered by the judge given

the circumstances.   See id.   We discern no abuse of discretion. 8

8 For the same reasons, we also discern no abuse of discretion in
the judge's denial of the mother's oral motion for recusal.
Neither the trial transcript nor the judge's memorandum of
decision indicates an animus by the judge directed at the mother
or a desire to punish the mother for her conduct during trial.
Rather, the record before us highlights the judge's commitment
to protecting the mother's rights to be fully heard at trial,

                                  7
     Conclusion.   The trial judge made proper assessments of the

credibility of the witnesses and the weight of all the evidence,

and her memorandum of decision "demonstrate[es] that she has

given the evidence close attention."     Adoption of Nancy, 443

Mass. 512, 514-515 (2005).    We see no reason to disturb the

judge's conclusion that the evidence clearly and convincingly

demonstrated the mother's present and ongoing unfitness.      We

accordingly affirm the decrees.

                                      Decrees affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Green, C.J.,
                                        Ditkoff & Hodgens, JJ. 9),

                                      Clerk

Entered:   August 22, 2023.

and the findings of fact fully credit the positive aspects of
the mother's parenting abilities.
9 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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