Court Opinion

ID: 9744627
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:10:42.256432+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:50.578054
License: Public Domain

Titone, J.
(dissenting). Relying on the limitations on our review power in cases involving trial court discretion, the majority has upheld a ruling permitting a prosecutor to conduct a private, midtestimony conference with a witness for the express purpose of questioning that witness about an unexpected and decidedly unfavorable turn in his testimony. In my view, however, the ruling fell well outside the permissible range of trial court discretion, since the risk of interference with the truth-seeking process was high and there were no countervailing considerations to justify this extraordinary departure from accepted courtroom practice. Accordingly, I dissent.
The majority begins its analysis with the premise that off-record midtestimony conferences with witnesses are generally permissible, subject to the trial court’s discretion. In support, the majority relies in part on Perry v Leeke (488 US 272) and People v Enrique (80 NY2d 869, affg 165 AD2d 13). However, both of those cases involved situations in which the trial court had refused to permit a conference between a defendant and *670defense counsel and the only question before the appellate court was whether the ruling violated any constitutional or procedural rights that the defendant may have had (see also, People v Narayan, 58 NY2d 904).
Manifestly, there is a significant difference between those cases and this one, where a midtestimony conference between a prosecutor and her witness was permitted. Unlike this situation, cases involving a midtrial conference between the defendant and defense counsel implicate the defendant’s constitutional right to the assistance of counsel (see, Perry v Leeke, supra, at 284; see also, Geders v United States, 425 US 80). Indeed, the entire focus of the analyses in Perry and Enrique was whether the trial courts’ decisions to disallow defense consultation violated that constitutional right (see also, People v Narayan, supra).
Both Perry and Enrique held only that, in the circumstances presented, the constitutional right to counsel did not obliterate the discretionary power of the trial court to forbid midtestimony conferences in order to protect the truth-seeking process. Neither case may fairly be cited for the proposition that off-the-record conferences with witnesses are generally permissible as a matter of State or Federal law.
Inasmuch as there are no New York cases affirmatively approving midtestimony conferences with nondefendant witnesses (cf., People v Gonzalez, 27 NY2d 53, 58, cert denied 400 US 996), the issue presented here should be approached as a matter of first impression. Viewed in that light, there is no particular, precedentially supported reason to treat the question as one that falls within the broad, virtually unguided discretion of the trial court, as the majority assumes. Since we are writing on a clean slate and without direct constitutional constraint, our primary focus should be on fashioning a rule that would most effectively advance the truth-seeking process.
The majority seems to proceed from the premise that mid-testimony conferences between witness and prosecutor may be helpful to that process, provided that full cross-examination to uncover any improper coaching is available. The majority’s premise, however, runs counter to the common law’s traditional mistrust of private, midtestimony consultations between witnesses and attorneys. That mistrust was recognized in Perry v Leeke (supra, at 281, 282), in which the Court stated that "[i]t is a common practice for a judge to instruct a witness not to discuss his or her testimony with third parties,” *671since midtestimony consultations by witnesses can impede "the truth-seeking function of the trial” in several ways, including "unethical 'coaching’.” The potential for impairment of the truth-seeking process was also recognized in People v Enrique (supra), in which it was cited as a basis for upholding a trial court decision to ban consultation between a defendant and his attorney during a luncheon recess.
Indeed, it is this very concern, i.e., that midtestimony consultations are inimical to the truth-seeking process, that has heretofore been used to rationalize most curtailments of what would otherwise be treated as a defendant’s absolute right to the advice of counsel during every stage of the proceeding (Perry v Leeke, supra; Geders v United States, supra; People v Enrique, supra). It is ironic (and more than a little troubling) that now — in a case where the defendant’s right to the assistance of counsel is not at stake and the person whose testimony was interrupted is witness for the prosecution — the Court has decided to take the position that midtestimony conferences can enhance, rather than undermine, the search for the truth.
Contrary to the view adopted by the majority, which relies heavily on decisions from other jurisdictions, I would adopt for our courts a view suggested in another out-of-State case, People v Pendleton (75 Ill App 3d 580, 595, 394 NE2d 496, 507), in which it was observed that midtestimony discussions between prosecutors and their witnesses "pose a tantalizing potential for misconduct” and thus "they are to be strictly scrutinized.” Under my view, trial courts would have some discretion to permit the suspect practice, but their discretion would be narrowly circumscribed and would be subject to review under one or more specific criteria.
The criterion that most readily comes to mind is that of necessity. Since the procedure in question is one that threatens the integrity of the truth-finding process, it should not be permitted until at least a threshold showing of need has been made. In most cases, of course, there are alternative, less perilous methods for remedying apparent reversals in a prosecution witness’s story. In situations involving recanting non-party witnesses, CPL 60.35 permits the prosecutor to impeach with certain of the witness’s prior inconsistent statements if that witness has "give[n] testimony upon a material issue of the case which tends to disprove the position of such party” (subd [1]). It is true that the case law has established a *672relatively stringent standard as a predicate for invoking this provision (see, e.g., People v Saez, 69 NY2d 802; People v Fitzpatrick, 40 NY2d 44). However, the difficulty of using the legislatively created procedure for challenging a witness’s eleventh-hour change of position on the record does not furnish a persuasive reason for permitting a prosecutor to cajole the witness into changing position in a private, off-record conference.
Moreover, in those rare cases where the rules for impeaching one’s own witness are genuinely too austere to fit the situation (see, State v Delarosa-Flores, 59 Wash App 514, 799 P2d 736, cited by majority opn, at 668; Frierson v State, 543 NE2d 669 [Ind], cited by majority opn, at 668) there are ordinarily other, less troubling remedies than a private, unmonitored discussion between the prosecutor and the witness. Presumably, the prosecutor can request an in camera conference in which the reasons for the witness’s change of heart can be explored in the presence of a Judge, a stenographer and even opposing counsel where appropriate (see, e.g., United States v Adams, 785 F2d 917; Kingery v State, 523 So 2d 1199 [Fla]). Since there is no attorney-client relationship and no privilege to be guarded, there is no justification for affording a conference between prosecutor and witness the same degree of privacy that is afforded when a defendant and defense counsel confer. It is the element of privacy that creates the opportunity for coaching and tampering, and, thus, courts should be directed to exercise their discretion so as to avoid unsupervised and unmonitored midtestimony colloquies unless no other practical option exists.
Viewed in light of these principles, the ruling challenged in this case can only be viewed as reversible error. When the testimony of Thomas Edwards, a critical prosecution witness, proved to be unexpectedly favorable to the defense, the trial court permitted the prosecutor to confer with her witness, in private, for the expressed purpose of affecting the substance of that witness’s testimony on a crucial point (cf., Frierson v State, 543 NE2d 669, supra [conference permitted to enable prosecutor to determine whether witness was too upset to continue]). However, apart from the prosecutor’s convenience and her partisan desire to remedy a sudden hole in her case in the most expeditious and least risky manner possible, there was no sound judicial reason — or, for that matter, any reason at all — for allowing such a drastic departure from the ordinary rules of courtroom practice. Edwards was not the prose*673cutor’s "client” so that he had a cognizable interest in obtaining midtestimony legal advice; nor was he a defendant with a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. The only other possible countervailing interest, ensuring truthful testimony, could have just as readily been served through the use of less troublesome alternatives, such as an in camera inquiry in the presence of the court and counsel or even impeachment under CPL 60.35. The resort to a private conference, a practice that has long been regarded as inimical to the interests of truth finding, was clearly erroneous and cannot be condoned.
Unlike the majority, I would also reject the People’s contention that reversal is not required in cases such as this one because the danger of prejudice can be dissipated by the availability of cross-examination to determine whether the witness has been coached or otherwise influenced. While perhaps superficially appealing, the argument is ultimately disingenuous because it places an unfair and unnecessary burden on the defense.
Although cross-examination has been dubbed "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth” (5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1367 [Chadbourn rev 1974], cited in Perry v Leeke, supra, at 283, n 7), it is not without pitfalls for the party who wishes to use it. Every experienced trial lawyer knows that each question posed to an opponent’s witness carries a risk that the answer will be harmful in some unanticipated way. Additionally, despite the value of cross-examination for uncovering truth, there is always the possibility that a skillful or well-coached witness will be able to evade its searching light. While such pitfalls may be inevitable in our necessarily imperfect truth-finding system, it is fundamentally unfair to force the defense to assume the burdens and risks of cross-examination when it was a flaw in the People’s case that prompted resort to an unorthodox courtroom procedure.
If, as the People contend, cross-examination in the presence of the jury is the most effective method we have for ferreting out the truth, the proper solution for uncovering the truth when a prosecution witness testifies in a surprising and unfavorable way would seem to be cross-examination of that witness by the People under CPL 60.35. The People may well be unsatisfied with that option and instead prefer the more comfortable route of a private, midtestimony conference. However, if that is the case, they should not be heard to argue *674that the defendant should be satisfied to remedy any resulting prejudice by relying on the same right of cross-examination that they have eschewed.
Finally, I would stress my disagreement with the majority’s view that rulings of this sort cannot be challenged in our Court, a court of law, because they fall within the realm of trial court discretion. Our nisi prius courts undoubtedly enjoy a tremendous latitude in managing the courtroom and in directing the details of trial. However, that discretion is not unlimited. Rather, it must be exercised within a framework of legal rules, criteria and general principles, all of which are within this Court’s proper purview. Indeed, far from being an area that we should shun, the functions of line drawing and establishing criteria for the exercise of discretion are squarely within our responsibilities as the State’s highest court.
Where the management of the examination of witnesses is concerned, the trial court’s discretionary rulings should be informed by a concern for the integrity of the truth-seeking process. When, as here, a trial court permits a procedure that carries a clear potential for distorting the truth and there is no identifiable countervailing reason for taking that risk, the ruling cannot be upheld on the theory that it was within the permissible range of discretion. Accordingly, I would hold that the trial court in this case committed an error of law and that the resulting judgment must be reversed.
Judges Bellacosa, Smith and Levine concur with Judge Simons; Judge Titone dissents and votes to reverse in a separate opinion in which Chief Judge Kaye and Judge Ciparick concur.
Order affirmed.