Court Opinion

ID: 9692265
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:49:17.203988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:32.677024
License: Public Domain

Justice CASTILLE,
Concurring.
I join the Majority Opinion. I write separately only to address the retroactive effect of the corrective, supervisory rule recognized today. See Majority at 788 (“This rule will apply to appellant’s case and all pending cases where the issue has been properly raised.”).
*378The Majority thoroughly and accurately details the checkered history of the Davenport/Duncan1 rule, proving beyond cavil in my view, that the time to disavow that “bright line” or “per se ” rule is long-past due. As the Majority meticulously details, the “exceptions” to the rule have, in essence, marked a steady return to a “totality of the circumstances” approach. Thus, anything other than fully retroactive application of our formal acknowledgment that the proper approach has evolved into one which looks to the totality of the circumstances would cause unnecessary confusion in the lower courts. It would embroil Pennsylvania trial and appellate courts in additional years of wasteful application of a “rule” so riddled with qualification and exception, and so open to recognition of new qualifications and exceptions, “as to function as no rule at all.” Majority Op. at 370-72, 845 A.2d at 785-86 (quoting Commonwealth v. Bridges, 563 Pa. 1, 757 A.2d 859, 883 (2000) (Saylor, J., concurring)); id. at 10-11 n. 10, 757 A.2d 859 (collecting cases).
In Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48, 813 A.2d 726 (2002), Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Cappy noted the general considerations governing the determination of whether to afford retroactive or prospective effect to a new procedural rule of non-constitutional dimension:
In Blackwell [v. Commonwealth, State Ethics Comm., 527 Pa. 172, 589 A.2d 1094 (1991)], our court recognized that the decision to apply a new rule of law is within the discretion of the court. 589 A.2d at 1098. Additionally, the Pennsylvania Constitution does not mandate or prohibit the retroactive or prospective application of a new rule of law. Id. At common law in Pennsylvania, a decision announcing a new rule of law was normally considered to be retroactive. Id. at 1099. In determining whether to apply a new rule retroactively or prospectively, a court should take into account the purpose to be served by the new rule, the extent of reliance on the old rule, and the effect on the administration of justice by the retroactive application of the new rule. Id.
*379813 A.2d at 738 (footnote omitted). In my view, these considerations weigh entirely in favor of full retroactive operation of this non-constitutional rule of procedure.
First of all, the Court today is not, strictly speaking, fashioning a “new” rule of criminal procedure; that momentous event occurred in Davenport itself. That decision properly was made prospective because the new six hour rule directly affected daily police investigatory procedures. It would be inappropriate to fault police for relying upon existing law, rather than a time-specific, prophylactic rule that was not in existence at the time of an interrogation and arraignment. The Court’s formal abrogation of the Davenport/Duncan rule—or, more properly, our belated recognition that the rule has evolved in such a way that it is no longer the bright line rule it once purported to be—does not trigger equivalent concerns of detrimental reliance. As with most rules of procedure, this rule governed the conduct of the government, not that of the suspect; it did not operate to create a new personal “right” of criminal defendants. It is unlikely in the extreme that appellant here temporally confessed when he did in reliance upon the fact that more than six hours had passed since his arrest and, therefore, he could later invoke Davenport/Duncan in the hope of suppressing his otherwise-voluntary admissions. Indeed, given how riddled the rule has become with exceptions, no party who would benefit from it could properly be said to have “relied” upon it. Contrast, Commonwealth v. Freeman, 573 Pa. 532, 827 A.2d 385, 403 (2003) (holding which abrogated relaxed waiver rule on direct capital appeals given limited prospective effect because litigants may already have relied upon existence of rule in briefing appeals; “Prospective application of our new approach will avoid upsetting the expectations of capital appellants and their direct appeal counsel who have already briefed, or are in the process of briefing, their appeals in reliance upon the prospect that this Court, in its discretion, might reach the merits of some of their otherwise waived claims of trial error)”.
*380In addition, the purpose served by the Majority’s reformulation of the rule, and the effect upon the administration of justice, also weigh in favor of full retroactive operation. Today’s reformulation merely recognizes just what the rule, in fact, has become. To require application of the old repudiated formulation would, in certain cases, invite further confusion, without any remotely corresponding benefit.
Accordingly, for these reasons, I believe that retroactive application of the corrective, supervisory rule recognized today is appropriate. I join the entirety of the Majority Opinion.

. See Commonwealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. 278, 370 A.2d 301 (1977), and Commonwealth v. Duncan, 514 Pa. 395, 525 A.2d 1177 (1987).