Court Opinion

ID: 9777864
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:26:02.812939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:02.139806
License: Public Domain

MAUZY, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The pertinent inquiry in this due process analysis is whether, based upon the conduct of Guardian Royal, it would have been reasonably foreseeable that the Company would be “haled into court” in Texas. See, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 567, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980) An insurer should foresee being sued in any jurisdiction in which its insured has substantial contacts. Eli Lilly and Co. v. Home Ins. Co. 794 F.2d 710, 721 (D.C.Cir.1986), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 1060, 107 S.Ct. 940, 93 L.Ed.2d 990, 991 (1981). In the endorsements to the English China policy, Guardian Royal extended coverage to the Texas subsidiaries Southern Clay and Gonzales Clay, extended the definition of “Insured” to include any subsidiary of English China anywhere in the world, and specifically deleted the policy’s geographical limits. Clearly, Guardian Royal should have foreseen being “haled into court” in a jurisdiction where English China subsidiaries are located.
Insurance companies offer broad-based coverage to induce customers to buy policies and pay higher premiums for them. Substantial financial benefits may accrue to companies which offer such policies. If Guardian Royal had desired to avoid suit in Texas, it could have refused to insure entities located in Texas and refused to provide coverage for acts occurring in Texas. As was the case in Rossman v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 282 (4th Cir.1987), Guardian Royal’s willingness to being haled into court in a foreign state was an express, and very marketable, feature of its policy. Id. at 286. The company’s contacts with the state of Texas cannot be viewed as “random” or “fortuitous.” Since Guardian Royal purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business with English China and its Texas subsidiaries, it now has the burden of presenting “a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2185, 85 L.Ed.2d 528, 543-44 (1985).1
*234There is no such compelling case here. In determining reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction in a case, the court should evaluate several factors. The court must consider the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum state, and the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 113-115, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 1033-34, 94 L.Ed.2d 92, 105 (1987). The insured subsidiaries in this case, Southern Clay and Gonzales Clay are Texas corporations and their principal places of business are in Texas. Texas has a manifest interest in providing a forum for its residents. The fact that United States Fire Insurance Company subrogated to the interests of the insured should not be relevant. A subrogee “stands in the shoes” of his subrogor. Fox v. Kroeger, 119 Tex. 511, 35 S.W.2d 679, 681 (Tex.1931). This holding extends to procedural as well as substantive matters. See Seale v. Hudgens, 538 S.W.2d 459, 460 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1976, writ dism’d) (venue). The result here should be no different than if Gonzales Clay and Southern Clay brought this lawsuit directly, rather than as subrogees. Texas has an interest in encouraging subrogation since it facilitates recovery of injured plaintiffs and functions to distribute the incidence of loss in accordance with responsibility for the loss. Considering Guardian Royal’s purposeful contacts with the state, it cannot be said that the exercise of jurisdiction does not comport with fair play and substantial justice. I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

. It should be noted that the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, 13 Uniform *234Laws Ann. 361 (Master Ed.1986), which has been adopted by several states provides:
§ 1.03 [Personal Jurisdiction Based Upon Conduct]
(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising from the person’s
(6) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this state at the time of contracting.
Under the provisions of the act, Guardian Royal would have subjected itself to state court jurisdiction solely by reason of its contracting to insure Gonzales Clay and Southern Clay.