Court Opinion

ID: 9641297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:27:53.918534+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:35.582995
License: Public Domain

Bogdanski, J.
(dissenting in part). Litigants have a constitutional right to have issues of fact determined by a jury. Conn. Const., art. I § 19, amend. IV; Spencer v. Good Earth Restaurant Corporation, 164 Conn. 194, 198, 319 A.2d 403; Blados *453v. Blados, 151 Conn. 391, 396, 198 A.2d 213. Directed verdicts are therefore disfavored, and should he granted only if on the evidence the jury could not reasonably and legally reach any conclusion other than that embodied in the verdict as directed. Johnson v. Newell, 160 Conn. 269, 279, 278 A.2d 776; Loukides v. United Illuminating Co., 160 Conn. 66, 68, 273 A.2d 719. “If the evidence presented is in conflict, and more than one conclusion is reasonably open to the jury, particularly when it consists of oral testimony, [and] if the jury may reasonably draw different inferences from the evidence, ... a verdict should not ordinarily be directed by the court. Terminal Taxi Co. v. Flynn, 156 Conn. 313, 317, 240 A.2d 881; Wood v. Wood, 135 Conn. 280, 285, 63 A.2d 586; 53 Am. Jur., Trial, § 332. Every reasonable and legitimate inference favorable to the plaintiff fairly arising from the evidence considered on a whole should be entertained by the trial court and those facts should be assumed as true which the jury may properly find from the evidence.” Loukides v. United Illuminating Co., supra, 70.
It is elementary that the jury, and not the court, are the judges of the credibility of the testimony of a witness and the weight to be accorded to that testimony, and this is true whether there is a contradiction between different witnesses or in the testimony of a single witness. Giambartolomei v. Rocky DeCarlo & Sons, Inc., 143 Conn. 468, 473, 123 A.2d 760; Zullo v. Zullo, 138 Conn. 712, 715, 89 A.2d 216; Stitham v. LeWare, 134 Conn. 681, 683, 60 A.2d 658. “The trier of fact may disbelieve all or any part of the testimony of a party or witness if it is tainted with evasiveness, uncertainty, or contradictions, or may believe only such portion as *454seems credible in the light of other evidence.” 30 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, § 1082, p. 230; see Rickert v. Fraser, 152 Conn. 678, 681, 211 A.2d 702.
In the present case, the plaintiff had the bnrden of producing testimony to the effect that an earlier diagnosis and treatment of the decedent’s disease might have prolonged her life. The plaintiff met that burden when his counsel asked Dr. Sadowsld, “Now, before she became completely paralyzed, in your opinion, based upon reasonable probability, would an operation to remove the tumor have prolonged her life?” and Dr. Sadowsld replied, “I would think so.” (Emphasis supplied.) It is true that shortly thereafter the plaintiff’s counsel asked Dr. Sadowsld: “Now, doctor, the evidence shows, the hospital record shows that on the 25th of November, 1966, at three o’clock in the afternoon, she walked into the hospital, that during the night— rather the morning of November 26th, on the three a.m. to seven a.m. shift, she explained to the nurses that she was becoming paralyzed. Now you testified that a further investigation, tests should be made, and that with the discovery with these other tests of the tumor, she could be operated on, and this would have prolonged her life, did you not?” Dr. Sadowsld replied, “I said it might have,” and “This is in the realm of possibility, yes, sir.” The majority have concluded that these latter statements “completely and clearly destroyed any value of” the former testimony of the doctor.
I do not agree. It is an impermissible invasion of the province of the jury for the court to decide questions of fact. Therefore, in the absence of an outright retraction of prior testimony, it is not permissible for an appellate court to decide that *455the “value” of testimony was “destroyed” by later testimony. That determination is for the trier of fact. The only proper inquiry for a court is whether there was any evidence on the issue to be submitted to the jury.
The jury could have reasonably understood Dr. Sadowski’s latter testimony as simply a modification of the former testimony, referring to a different time period: the first testimony referring to the time before complete paralysis set in, and the second referring to November 25 and 26,1966, when the paralysis had begun to develop. Thus, although the direction of verdicts in favor of Drs. Rogowski and Silberstein would not be improper since they did not treat the decedent until after paralysis began to set in, the weight and sufficiency of the testimony and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom as to causation in respect to Dr. Tulin would be for the jury’s determination. I would, therefore, set aside the directed verdict as to Dr. Tulin and remand the case for further proceedings in accordance with the law.