Court Opinion

ID: 9386030
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-11 09:08:01.450168+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:45.048368
License: Public Domain

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

                                      NO. 03-22-00013-CV

                                  Michael L. Marin, Appellant

                                                 v.

                                    Jenifer L. Marin, Appellee

              FROM THE 201ST DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY
  NO. D-1-FM-21-001848, THE HONORABLE MADELEINE CONNOR, JUDGE PRESIDING

                             MEMORANDUM OPINION

                Michael L. Marin appeals from the trial court’s final decree of divorce. In three

issues, Michael challenges the trial court’s award of spousal maintenance to Jenifer L. Marin and

its determination that the community estate was entitled to reimbursement of $137,641 for the

enhancement of the value of Michael’s separate property.1 We will affirm.

                      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

                Michael and Jenifer were married in August 2009. They have two children who

were minors when the divorce decree was signed. Additionally, Michael has two children from a

previous marriage who were minors when Michael and Jenifer married. In the decree, Jenifer

       1
           Because the parties share a surname, for clarity we refer to them by their given names.
       2
           Because the parties are familiar with the facts of the case, its procedural history, and
the evidence adduced at trial, we do not recite them in this opinion except as necessary to advise
the parties of the Court’s decision and the basic reasons for it. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1, 47.4.
was named the conservator with the right to designate their minor children’s residence. Michael

does not challenge any of the child-custody or child-support orders.

               At the time of the divorce, Michael was a partner at a law firm in Austin. Jenifer,

who was also a lawyer though not licensed to practice in Texas, did not work outside the home at

all during the marriage and was principally engaged with caring for the four children.3 Michael,

Jenifer, and the children lived in a house Michael had purchased before he and Jenifer married.

The evidence at trial showed that Michael controlled the parties’ finances during the marriage.

               Michael initially filed a petition for divorce in January 2021 but nonsuited it

shortly thereafter. He filed a second petition for divorce on April 1, 2021. The trial judge held

a three-day bench trial in October 2021.     The court granted the divorce on the ground of

insupportability, found that Jenifer should receive a disproportionate division of the community

estate, and ordered Michael to pay Jenifer spousal maintenance of $2,500 per month for four

years. Michael perfected this appeal challenging the court’s award of spousal maintenance and

its adjudication of Jenifer’s claim for reimbursement to the community estate against Michael’s

separate estate.

                                         DISCUSSION

Spousal Maintenance Award

               Michael challenges the trial court’s spousal-maintenance award ordering him to

pay Jenifer $2,500 per month for four years. He asserts that the trial court abused its discretion

by ordering any spousal maintenance because there was “no evidence of the statutory predicates

for spousal maintenance.” We review a trial court’s award of spousal maintenance for an abuse

       3
         Michael and the mother of his two daughters divorced in 2005. In 2009, Michael
became the “primary caregiver” for his daughters, and they lived with Michael and Jenifer.

                                                2
of discretion. Kelly v. Kelly, 634 S.W.3d 355, 364 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no

pet.). Thus, we will not disturb an order awarding spousal maintenance unless the trial court acts

arbitrarily, unreasonably, without regard to guiding rules and principles, or without supporting

evidence. See Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998); In re Fuentes, 506 S.W.3d

586, 593 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, orig. proceeding). When considering whether

the trial court abused its discretion, “legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are not

independent grounds for asserting error, but they are relevant factors” in our assessment. Dunn

v. Dunn, 177 S.W.3d 393, 396 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied); see also

Zeifman v. Michels, 212 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied). There is no

abuse of discretion if some evidence of a substantive and probative character exists to support

the trial court’s decision. Stamper v. Knox, 254 S.W.3d 537, 542 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2008, no pet.). Because of the overlap between the abuse-of-discretion and sufficiency-of-

the-evidence standards of review, courts apply a hybrid analysis, engaging in a two-pronged

inquiry to determine whether the trial court (1) had sufficient information on which to exercise

its discretion and (2) erred in its application of that discretion. Zeifman, 212 S.W.3d at 588.

               We conduct a traditional sufficiency review to answer the first question, applying

the familiar standards for determining the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence. Jenifer

bore the burden of proof on her spousal-maintenance claim. See, e.g., Peck v. Peck, No. 03-14-

00440-CV, 2016 WL 3917131, at *3 n.16 (Tex. App.—Austin July 15, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(citing Cooper v. Cooper, 176 S.W.3d 62, 65 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dis.] 2004, no pet.)).

Consequently, in attacking the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s

determination of Jenifer’s spousal-maintenance claim, Michael must demonstrate on appeal that

there is no evidence to support the adverse findings. See Zeifman, 212 S.W.3d at 588 (citing

                                                 3
Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. 1983)). We analyze whether the evidence

would enable reasonable people to reach the judgment being reviewed, crediting evidence

favorable to the findings if a reasonable factfinder could and disregarding contrary evidence

unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Id. (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802,

827 (Tex. 2005)). We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings and

indulge every reasonable inference that would support them. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 822.

               Under the legal sufficiency standard, we defer to the reasonable credibility

determinations made by the factfinder—here, the trial court—and do not merely substitute our

judgment for that of the factfinder. See id. at 816-17, 819-20, 822. The factfinder “is the sole

judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.” Golden

Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003). If we conclude in answer to

the first question that the trial court had sufficient information on which to exercise its discretion,

then to answer the second question we determine whether the trial court made a reasonable

decision based on the evidence, “that is, that the court’s decision was neither arbitrary nor

unreasonable.” Zeifman, 212 S.W.3d at 588.

               Family Code Chapter 8 governs the award of spousal maintenance in a divorce

decree. See Tex. Fam. Code §§ 8.001–.359; Dalton v. Dalton, 551 S.W.3d 126, 130 (Tex. 2018)

(“In 1995, the Texas Legislature first authorized courts to award a form of involuntary post-

divorce alimony referred to as ‘spousal maintenance.’”). The Family Code defines “maintenance”

as “an award in a suit for dissolution of a marriage of periodic payments from the future income

of one spouse for the support of the other spouse.” Tex. Fam. Code § 8.001(1). “The legislative

purpose in enacting provisions for spousal maintenance was to provide temporary and

rehabilitative support for a spouse whose ability for self-support is lacking or has deteriorated

                                                  4
over time while engaged in homemaking activities and whose capital assets are insufficient to

provide support.” O’Carolan v. Hopper, 71 S.W.3d 529, 533 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.).

               The Family Code authorizes trial courts to award spousal maintenance “only

under ‘very narrow’ and ‘very limited circumstances’” and only if the parties meet certain

eligibility requirements.   Dalton, 551 S.W.3d at 130 (quoting McCollough v. McCollough,

212 S.W.3d 638, 645 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.)); see also Tex. Fam. Code § 8.051. In

this case, Jenifer sought maintenance under Section 8.051(2)(B), which provides in relevant part:

       [T]he court may order maintenance for either spouse only if the spouse seeking
       maintenance will lack sufficient property, including the spouse’s separate
       property, on dissolution of the marriage to provide for the spouse’s minimum
       reasonable needs and:

       ….

               (2) the spouse seeking maintenance:

       ….

               (B) has been married to the other spouse for 10 years or longer and lacks
               the ability to earn sufficient income to provide for the spouse’s minimum
               reasonable needs. . . . .

Tex. Fam. Code § 8.051(2)(B) (eligibility for spousal maintenance). The parties do not dispute

that Michael and Jenifer were married for 10 years or longer. There was legally and factually

sufficient evidence at trial to support a finding that Jenifer lacked the ability to earn sufficient

income to provide for her minimum reasonable needs, and Michael does not challenge that

determination on appeal.

               In his first issue, Michael asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in

awarding Jenifer spousal maintenance because she “did not prove the statutory predicates for an

award of spousal support.” Michael maintains that to be eligible for an award of spousal

                                                 5
maintenance, Jenifer was required to rebut a presumption that spousal maintenance is not

warranted and, relatedly, that the only way Jenifer could rebut the presumption was to offer

legally sufficient evidence that she had exercised diligence in earning sufficient income to

provide for her minimum reasonable needs or that she had exercised diligence in developing the

necessary skills to provide for her minimum reasonable needs during the period of separation and

during the time the suit for dissolution of the marriage was pending.

               The Family Code provides that unless the spouse seeking maintenance pursuant to

section 8.051(2)(B) has “exercised diligence in (1) earning sufficient income to provide for the

spouse’s minimum reasonable needs; or (2) developing the necessary skills to provide for the

spouse’s minimum reasonable needs during a period of separation and during the time the suit

for dissolution of the marriage is pending,” there is a rebuttable presumption that maintenance is

not warranted. Id. § 8.053(a). Thus, even when a spouse meets the eligibility requirements for

an award of spousal maintenance under section 8.051(2)(B), if the spouse fails to demonstrate

that she exercised diligence in one of the two ways provided for in section 8.053(a), she must

rebut a presumption that maintenance is not warranted. See Peck, 2016 WL 3917131, at *1 n.7

(“With respect to [Family Code section 8.051(2)] Paragraph (B), there is a rebuttable

presumption that maintenance is not warranted unless the spouse seeking maintenance has

‘exercised diligence’ in either ‘earning sufficient income to provide for the spouse’s minimum

reasonable needs’ or ‘developing the necessary skills to provide for the spouse’s minimum

reasonable needs during a period of separation and during the time the suit for dissolution of

the marriage is pending.’”). We first consider whether there was legally sufficient evidence

presented at trial to support a finding that Jenifer exercised diligence in earning sufficient income

to provide for her minimum reasonable needs. See Tex. Fam. Code § 8.053(a)(1). The diligence

                                                 6
inquiry under this section of the Family Code is not limited to the period of separation and the

time the suit for dissolution of the marriage is pending. See Debrock v. Debrock, No. 03-21-

00308-CV, 2022 WL 17970214, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 28, 2022, pet. filed) (mem. op.)

(citing Day v. Day, 452 S.W.3d 430, 434 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied)

(comparing Family Code section 8.053(a)(1) with section 8.053(a)(2))).

               At trial, Jenifer testified that in October 2020 she took and passed a course

required to obtain a license to sell real estate in North Carolina.4 After finishing the first course,

Jenifer took the first of three additional courses and had registered for the second and third

courses. She was scheduled to complete the second and third courses in December 2021.

Obtaining a North Carolina real-estate license would reduce the number of courses she would be

required to take to obtain a license to sell real estate in Texas if she chose to remain in the state.

Jenifer testified that taking these courses would set her up for taking the Texas real estate exam

in January 2022. Jenifer testified that she had reactivated her license to practice law in the

District of Columbia, which had required that she take an ethics course. Jenifer met with a

career counselor, was working on her resume, and had explored educational opportunities for

alternative careers. This evidence is legally sufficient to support a finding that Jenifer exercised

diligence in earning sufficient income to provide for her minimum reasonable needs. See Slicker

v. Slicker, 464 S.W.3d 850, 863 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.) (reasonable diligence

demonstrated by spouse who conducted job search, took one computer class and planned to take

another, had sent resume to one potential employer, and had worked for a short period of time).

       4
           Jenifer was raised in North Carolina, her parents reside there, and she wanted to return
there after the divorce.

                                                  7
               Even when there is legally insufficient evidence to support a finding of reasonable

diligence, however, the lack of such evidence simply gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that

spousal maintenance is not warranted. See Tex. Fam. Code § 8.053(a) (presumption that spousal

maintenance is not warranted arises when spouse seeking maintenance has failed to exercise

diligence in either earning sufficient income or developing necessary skills to provide for

minimum reasonable needs).5       This presumption is subject to the same rules governing

presumptions generally. Its effect is to shift the burden of producing evidence to the party

against whom it operates. See General Motors Corp. v. Saenz, 873 S.W.2d 353, 359 (Tex.

1993). Once that burden is discharged and evidence contradicting the presumption has been

offered, the presumption disappears and “is not to be weighed or treated as evidence.” Id.

(quoting Combined Am. Ins. Co. v. Blanton, 353 S.W.2d 847, 849 (Tex. 1962)). “A presumption

is nothing more than a rule for the guidance of a trial judge in locating the burden of production

at a particular time.” Texas A & M Univ. v. Chambers, 31 S.W.3d 780, 784 (Tex. App.—Austin

2000, pet. denied). Thus, the effect of a failure to present evidence supporting a finding of

reasonable diligence is that the party seeking spousal maintenance has the burden of producing

evidence that contradicts the presumption that such spousal maintenance is not warranted.

               Our review of the evidence is informed by the legislative purpose in enacting

provisions for spousal maintenance, which was to provide temporary and rehabilitative support

for a spouse whose ability to support herself is lacking or has deteriorated over time while the

spouse was engaged in homemaking activities and whose capital assets are insufficient to

provide support. See O’Carolan, 71 S.W.3d at 533. At trial, Jenifer testified that while she and

       5
           Section 8.053 sets forth the conditions under which a rebuttable presumption arises.
See Tex. Fam. Code § 8.053. It does not, however, define or circumscribe what type of evidence
is required to overcome that presumption.

                                                8
Michael were married, she stayed at home and took care of their two children as well as his two

children from a prior marriage. There was evidence that Jenifer’s role as primary caretaker of

the children facilitated Michael’s pursuit of his successful and lucrative legal career. At the time

of the divorce, Jenifer was 47 years old and had not worked in more than ten years. She testified

that she currently lacked the qualifications to practice law in Texas or to work as a real estate

agent. Jenifer testified that she could not get a pre-approval letter from any mortgage lender

unless she received child support and spousal maintenance. She also testified that she did not

independently have sufficient capital to purchase a house or pay rent for a suitable place in

Austin for her and the children. Jenifer’s financial planner testified that even assuming Jenifer

obtained a job with a $60,000 yearly salary she would likely deplete her resources in fifteen

years. We conclude that the trial court could have determined that evidence of Jenifer’s long

absence from the work force due to her homemaking activities, her inability to secure

employment that would cover her household expenses without additional education or

certifications, and her inability to provide for her minimum reasonable needs would overcome

a presumption against spousal maintenance. See Debrock, 2022 WL 17970214, at *6 (lack of

education and employment experience combined with diminished ability to provide for

minimum reasonable needs overcame presumption against spousal maintenance); Slicker,

464 S.W.3d at 863 (evidence of spouse’s long period of time not working outside home and lack

of specific education or employment skills that would facilitate job search supported finding

that wife was eligible to receive spousal maintenance). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in awarding Jenifer spousal maintenance. We overrule Michael’s

first issue.

                                                 9
Reimbursement Claim

                  In his second issue, Michael challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence

supporting the trial court’s finding that the community estate had a right of reimbursement in the

amount of $137,641 for improvements made to the Austin home in which he and Jenifer lived,

which was Michael’s separate property. Michael asserts that the trial court abused its discretion

in its award of Jenifer’s reimbursement claim because there was no evidence of the value of the

improvements made to his separate property. Section 3.402 of the Family Code authorizes

reimbursement claims between marital estates for capital improvements to property and

directs courts to resolve a claim for reimbursement using equitable principles. See Tex. Fam.

Code § 3.402(a)(8), (b). We review a trial court’s award of reimbursement under an abuse of

discretion standard. In re Estate of Baker, 627 S.W.3d 523, 526–27 (Tex. App.—Waco 2021, no

pet.). If some evidence supports the trial court’s decision, there is no abuse of discretion. Ayala

v. Ayala, 387 S.W.3d 721, 726 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.). Great latitude

must be given to the trial court in applying equitable principles to a claim for reimbursement.

Penick v. Penick, 783 S.W.2d 194, 198 (Tex. 1988). An equitable claim for reimbursement is

not merely a balancing of the ledgers between the marital estates. Id. The discretion to be

exercised in evaluating a claim for reimbursement is equally as broad as that discretion

subsequently exercised by the trial court in making a “just and right” division of the community

property. Id. However, a trial court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable

manner. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985). The

legal sufficiency of the evidence is a relevant factor in assessing whether the trial court abused its

discretion. In re Marriage of McCoy, 488 S.W.3d 430, 433 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2016, no pet.).

                                                 10
               The rule of reimbursement is purely an equitable one.         Vallone v. Vallone,

644 S.W.2d 455, 458 (Tex. 1982). A right of reimbursement arises when funds of one estate,

here the community estate, are used to benefit another estate, here Michael’s separate estate,

without itself receiving some benefit. Id. at 459. “The right of reimbursement is not an interest

in property or an enforceable debt, per se, but an equitable right which arises upon dissolution

of the marriage through death, divorce, or annulment.” Id. at 458–59. The spouse seeking

reimbursement must establish the following: (1) that a contribution was made by one marital

estate to another, (2) that the contribution was reimbursable, and (3) the value of the

contribution. Id. On appeal, Michael challenges only the third element—the value of the

contribution. A claim for reimbursement for funds expended by an estate for improvements to

another estate is to be measured by the enhancement in value to the benefitted estate by reason of

the improvements. Anderson v. Gilliland, 684 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex. 1985). Evidence showing

the value of the property without improvements and the value of the property with improvements

is sufficient to sustain a finding as to the amount of the enhancement value. See In re Marriage

of McCoy, 488 S.W.3d at 435. The enhancement value is determined by presenting evidence

that shows and compares the fair market value of the property in its improved condition, at the

time of the dissolution, with what the fair market value of the property would have been on the

date of the dissolution if the improvements had not been made:

       The enhanced value from the improvements made is calculated under the
       following formula. First, the fair market value of the property in its improved
       condition is determined as of the date of the dissolution of the marital
       relationship. Then, a determination is made as to what the fair market value of
       the property would have been at the date of the dissolution had the improvements
       not been present on the property. The difference between these two value
       calculations is the amount of the reimbursement claim.

                                               11
Id. (quoting 38 Aloysius A. Leopold, Texas Practice Series: Marital Property and Homesteads

§ 14.6 (1993)).

                  At trial, the court heard evidence about the value of the residence from Michael

Benaglio. Benaglio stated that he had assessed the enhanced value of property for purposes of

reimbursement claims 120 to 140 times and always used the same methodology. Benaglio

testified that improvements to Michael and Jenifer’s residence made in 2012 added 218 square

feet of living space. The improvement was the enclosure of a screened porch to create additional

living space.      Benaglio reviewed two third-party appraisals done by licensed real estate

appraisers that valued the property at $980,000 and $2,400,000 respectively. Benaglio also

reviewed a 2021 appraisal done by Keller Williams that valued the property at $1,150,000.

Using these appraisals, Benaglio testified that the enhancement value of the enclosed screen

porch ranged from $59,450 to $150,700. Benaglio testified that he arrived at this range by

dividing the lowest appraisal and the highest appraisal by the total square footage of the

residence to arrive at a per-square-foot value and then multiplied that value by the square footage

added to the house by the enclosed screen porch. Benaglio agreed with Michael’s counsel that in

the “real estate world” people typically do not delineate the value of the improved structure

versus the value of the lot it is on but, rather, value the entire improved property as a whole.

Benaglio testified that the appraisals he reviewed did not value the land and the structure

separately. The trial court found that the community had enhanced the value of Michael’s

separate property by $137,641, an amount within the range of values to which Benaglio testified.

The evidence presented by Benaglio is sufficient to sustain the trial court’s finding as to the

amount of the enhancement value.

                                                 12
               On appeal, Michael argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the

trial court’s finding because there was no evidence of the value of the property in 2012,

immediately before the improvement at issue was made.           Michael argues that Benaglio’s

testimony has no probative value because he did not provide the trial court with a value of the

property “before the porch was enclosed in 2012.” As previously noted, however, the proper

measure of the enhancement value is the difference between the property with and without the

improvement at the time of the dissolution of the marriage. See In re Marriage of McCoy,

488 S.W.3d at 435. Using fair market values assigned to the property by third-party appraisers

in 2021, Benaglio provided his opinion of how much less the house would be worth if it was 218

square feet smaller, i.e., without—or before—the 2012 improvements. Michael also argues that

the methodology Benaglio used was incorrect, and that he should have valued the land and

the structure separately when making his calculations. Although that could be an alternative

methodology for calculating the enhancement value, Michael points to no authority mandating

that it be used. Courts consistently require only that court’s finding be supported by evidence of

the fair market value of the property with and without the improvements. Moreover, Michael did

not present any evidence of what the enhancement value would be using the alternative

methodology he advocated. Benaglio testified that he had done more than 100 valuations for

reimbursement claims using his methodology and that it is the method appraisers typically use

when valuing real property. We conclude that the trial court’s finding in valuing Jenifer’s

reimbursement claim was a proper exercise of its broad discretion and fell within the great

latitude given to apply equitable principles. See In re Marriage of Wells, No. 12-21-00152-CV,

                                               13
2022 WL 3724724, at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler Aug. 30, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). We overrule

Michael’s second issue.6

                                        CONCLUSION

              Having overruled Michael’s issues, we affirm the divorce decree.

                                            __________________________________________
                                            J. Woodfin Jones, Justice

Before Justices Baker, Smith, and Jones*

Affirmed

Filed: April 5, 2023

*Before J. Woodfin Jones, Chief Justice (Retired), Third Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment.
See Tex. Gov’t Code § 74.003(b).

       6
         Because of our disposition of Michael’s second issue, we need not address his third
issue in which he asserts that the trial court’s abuse of discretion in granting Jenifer’s
reimbursement claim had more than a de minimus effect on the trial court’s division of the
community estate such that remand was warranted. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

                                               14