Court Opinion

ID: 9386421
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-12 15:05:07.236678+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:06.313749
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                   No. 21-0784
                               Filed April 12, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

ANDREW JOSEPH HARRISON,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Paul D. Miller,

Judge.

      A criminal defendant appeals his conviction for second-degree sexual

abuse. AFFIRMED.

      Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Vidhya K. Reddy, Assistant

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Ogden, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

      Heard by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.
                                          2

SCHUMACHER, Judge.

       Andrew Harrison appeals his conviction for second-degree sexual abuse,

raising five arguments. He claims there is insufficient evidence to support his

conviction. He argues the victim’s out-of-court statements should have been

excluded from trial because the statements were hearsay. He contends the court

improperly denied his attempt to strike a juror for cause. He asserts the court gave

an improper jury instruction pertaining to the victim’s absence from trial. Finally,

he alleges the court improperly allowed some statements from an expert witness.

We find the conviction is supported by substantial evidence. The court properly

admitted the victim’s statements and denied Harrison’s motion to strike the juror

for cause.    Harrison did not preserve his objection to the challenged jury

instruction. The expert testimony was admissible. We affirm.

I.     Background Facts and Proceedings

       Andrew Harrison lived in the same apartment building as C.T. and her three

children—two sons, ages twelve and nine, and a daughter, H.T., who was three

years old. C.T. generally utilized daycare for the children while she worked. But

her job required her to work one evening a week and every-other weekend, times

when her daycare was not open. On those days, C.T. left the children with friends

and neighbors.

       One of those neighbors, Harrison, offered to babysit. C.T. testified that

Harrison would sometimes watch H.T. alone at his apartment while the two older

children were left unattended at C.T.’s apartment. Harrison justified this location

decision as giving the older children “a break” from their sister.
                                            3

         On July 15, 2018, C.T. dropped H.T. off at Harrison’s apartment around nine

in the morning because she had to work.             Her sons were with other family

members. C.T. returned to pick up H.T. around six-thirty in the evening. C.T.,

H.T., and the two other children then ran some errands, including dropping an item

off at a friend’s home.

         During the drive to the friend’s home, the family chatted, a “typical catching

up on their day conversation.” Then, unprompted, H.T. stated, “I played with

Drew’s dick today.”1 C.T. testified that the older children had taught H.T. the word

“dick,” and that she was not supposed to use the word. The older children laughed

at H.T.’s statement and C.T. chastised them. C.T. sent the older children into the

friend’s home once they arrived and walked over to H.T.’s side of the vehicle. C.T.

testified that H.T. was very quiet, timid, and would not make eye contact—behavior

that was highly unusual for her.

         C.T. testified that she continued to undertake the planned errands because

she did not want to make the children think something was wrong. The family

arrived at a store. While there, the older children went to the restroom. C.T. used

the opportunity to speak to H.T. C.T. testified that she asked H.T. if Harrison had

touched her anywhere else. H.T. responded by saying he had also “licked her

down there,” gesturing to her genital area.

         C.T. then dropped the older children off with a family friend and took H.T. to

the hospital. An examination by a pediatrician did not find any acute injuries. The

pediatrician did not examine H.T.’s genitals, explaining that such examination was

1   C.T. testified that the children refer to Harrison as Drew.
                                           4

best left to someone more specifically trained. The hospital referred H.T. to the

Child Protection Center at St. Luke’s Hospital. C.T. was told not to change H.T.,

bathe her, or allow her to wipe after using the restroom prior to the examination.

      H.T. arrived at the Child Protection Center the next day around one in the

afternoon. While there, staff performed two swabs for DNA. One swab covered

the area around H.T.’s vagina. The second covered the area around her anus,

including the bottom part of her buttocks. A buccal swab was also taken to obtain

a known sample of H.T.’s DNA. The swabs were sent to the Division of Criminal

Investigation (DCI) lab for testing. Police obtained a buccal swab from Harrison

after the execution of a search warrant.

      A DCI criminalist, Ryan Petruccelli, testified at trial about the tests

performed on the swabs and H.T.’s underwear. After shining a blacklight on H.T.’s

underwear, Petruccelli identified four areas that fluoresced. He screened the

underwear for seminal fluid via the AP presumptive test, which was negative. He

then performed the P30 test, which suggested high levels of a protein common in

seminal fluid. The protein is also common in urine. That test was faintly positive.

As a result, Petruccelli performed a sperm search, which was negative.

      Petruccelli also performed DNA tests. H.T.’s DNA was found on both sets

of swabs and her underwear. DNA analysis identified Harrison’s DNA on the inside

of H.T.’s underwear.2 Harrison’s and H.T.’s DNA were found at a ratio of about

1:5, meaning Harrison’s DNA was about five times more common than H.T.’s.

2 The record is somewhat unclear on the implication of that test. Petruccelli
testified that the chance of DNA randomly matching that profile was 1 in 3.19
million. However, he then clarified that there are “approximately thirty zeroes” in
3.19 million.
                                           5

Petruccelli testified that the ratio indicated the DNA likely came from a fluid.

Harrison’s DNA was also identified in the anal swab.3 The vaginal swab contained

DNA that likely came from a male, but was inconclusive.

         Petruccelli testified to several aspects of DNA that can complicate analysis.

First, he makes no determination of how the DNA gets on the items he tests. He

testified that DNA can be moved via transfer. He also testified that the amount of

DNA left somewhere is not indicative of the amount of contact that occurred.

Instead, individuals and substances shed DNA at different rates.

         Trial began on March 30, 2021. H.T. did not testify, having been found not

competent to testify by the judge prior to trial. Harrison objected to the mother’s

testimony involving the statements H.T. made to her on July 15, which the court

overruled. During jury selection, one juror indicated he would have a “tough time”

with this case because the juror had young children. Harrison sought to strike the

juror for cause, but the court denied the motion. Harrison used a peremptory strike

on that juror. An expert witness, Dr. Meidlinger, testified for the State. Some of

his testimony discussed “grooming” behaviors of sexual offenders.

         The jury found Harrison guilty of second-degree sexual abuse.4 Harrison

now appeals.

II.      Hearsay Statements

         Harrison challenges the admissibility of two statements H.T. made to her

mother. He claims both are inadmissible hearsay. In the first statement, H.T. told

her mother, “I played with Drew’s dick today.” In the second statement, H.T. said,

3   The chance of DNA randomly matching that profile was about 1 in 1.4 quadrillion.
4   This offense was enhanced to a class “A” felony due to a previous conviction.
                                         6

he had also “licked her down there,” and gestured to her genitals. Hearsay—an

out of court statement used to prove the truth of the matter asserted—is generally

inadmissible unless an exclusion or exception applies.              See Iowa Rs.

Evid. 5.801(c); 5.802. “We review hearsay rulings for correction of errors at law

and will reverse the admission of hearsay evidence as prejudicial unless the

contrary is shown.” State v. Dudley, 856 N.W.2d 668, 674 (Iowa 2014).

       A.     Excited Utterance

       The district court ruled both of H.T.’s statements were admissible pursuant

to the excited utterance exception. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.803(2) (defining an excited

utterance as, “A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the

declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused”). To determine if that

exception applies, we consider:

       (1) the time lapse between the event and the statement, (2) the
       extent to which questioning elicited the statements that otherwise
       would not have been volunteered, (3) the age and condition of the
       declarant, (4) the characteristics of the event being described, and
       (5) the subject matter of the statement.

State v. Atwood, 602 N.W.2d 775, 782 (Iowa 1999). “The court must consider all

the factors to determine if the statements are admissible.” Dudley, 856 N.W.2d at

679.

       Our supreme court has recently had an opportunity to address the excited

utterance exception involving a child. State v. Dessinger, 958 N.W.2d 590, 601

(Iowa 2021) (collecting cases). In review of Dessinger and applying the Atwood

factors, we conclude both challenged statements from H.T. qualify as excited

utterances.
                                         7

       We first consider the time between the purported abuse and H.T.’s

statements. It is not clear from the record the exact time of day the sexual abuse

occurred. H.T. did not disclose the abuse until the evening when the family was

running errands. But it is clear from the record that the abuse occurred on the

same day as the child reported it. Harrison asserts the child could not be acting

under the stress of the abuse because of the time gap. We reject that argument.

A “[l]apse of time alone will not ordinarily preclude the application of the excited-

utterance exception.” Atwood, 602 N.W.2d at 782.“[S]tatements made hours and

even days after the event have been admissible.” Dessinger, 958 N.W.2d at 601.

Moreover, “[t]he time-lapse allowed for statements by a child may be more likely

to be on the high-end of the range permitted.” Id. This is particularly true when

the child makes the statements “to a parent or other safe adult, at the soonest

possible time after the abuse occurred.” Dudley, 856 N.W.2d at 680. H.T. made

the first statement when the family started to generally discuss their day. That was

likely her first opportunity to inform her mother of what happened. The time gap

between the criminal act and the child’s statement was short. We turn to the other

factors.

       The second Atwood factor concerns “the extent to which questioning elicited

the statements that otherwise would not have been volunteered.” 602 N.W.2d at

782. “A statement in response to questioning ‘does not automatically disqualify it

as an excited utterance.’” Dessinger, 958 N.W.2d at 602 (quoting State v. Harper,

770 N.W.2d 316, 320 (Iowa 2009)). “But, questions asked to children may be

particularly suspect because they could be ‘calculated to elicit information which

would otherwise have been withheld.’” Id. (citation omitted). H.T.’s first statement
                                        8

was spontaneously given—asking about a child’s day is not likely to elicit a

statement that they would not otherwise have made.

      Her second statement was made after her mother inquired if Harrison “had

touched her anywhere else.” Courts have upheld the admissibility of statements

given in response to general questions. See, e.g., id. (“Asking a child ‘what

happened’ does not seriously undercut application of the excited utterance

exception if the child is still under stress from that event.”). But, when a child

requires “more than one prompting question before [they] made the statements,”

the statement is less likely to constitute an excited utterance. Dudley, 856 N.W.2d

at 680.

      We have also considered the age and condition of H.T., the characteristics

of the event being described, and the subject matter of the statement.         We

conclude that applying the Atwood factors leads to the conclusion that both

statements of three-year-old H.T. qualify as excited utterances. The court properly

admitted both statements.

      B.     Residual Hearsay

      While the trial court admitted both statements under the excited utterance

exception, we also address the State’s argument that H.T.’s statements were

alternatively admissible under the residual hearsay exception.       See Iowa R.

Evid. 5.807. We recognize this ground was not ruled upon by the district court.

Nevertheless, “[w]e consider the applicability of exceptions in criminal cases even

when not urged at trial as there is no point in reversing a conviction when the

evidence will be admissible at retrial in any event.” Dessinger, 958 N.W.2d at 599.

The residual hearsay exception is used “sparingly.” State v. Liggins, 978 N.W.2d
                                           9

406, 431 (Iowa 2022). We examine the statement using five factors, all of which

must be met: (1) trustworthiness, (2) materiality, (3) necessity, (4) service of the

interest of justice, and (5) notice. Id.

       “In evaluating trustworthiness, we may consider both the trustworthiness of

the declarant and the credibility of the witness reporting the statement.” Id. at 432.

H.T.’s mother asked an open-ended, non-leading question. See State v. Rojas,

524 N.W.2d 659, 663 (Iowa 1994). H.T. responded by describing an action a three-

year-old would not ordinarily know about, suggesting its credibility. The statement

was not vague. See Liggins, 978 N.W.2d at 432. The statement was made soon

after the event occurred. See id. (finding a comment made thirty years ago was

not trustworthy). And nothing suggests improper motive by either H.T. or her

mother.

       Next, the statements were both material and necessary. Harrison was

charged with second-degree sexual abuse. The State needed to prove a sex act

occurred between Harrison and H.T. Her statements describing the acts are highly

relevant to establishing a sex act occurred. It was also necessary. H.T. was

determined to be not competent to testify. The only way the State could introduce

her account of the abuse was via out-of-court statements to her mother. See State

v. Skahill, 966 N.W.2d 1, 12 (Iowa 2021) (“On the issue of necessity, the key

commonality between [two cases finding out-of-court statements were necessary]

was that the most probative evidence, the victim’s account of the alleged sexual

abuse, would not have been presented to the jury simply by having the victim

testify.”). Her out-of-court statements were the most probative evidence available

detailing her experiences.
                                           10

         Finally, Harrison had ample notice the State was seeking the admission of

H.T.’s statements. The court ruled they were admissible in its order on a motion

in limine prior to trial. Admitting the statements also promotes the interest of

justice—“[t]he appropriate showing of reliability and necessity were made, and

admitting the evidence advances the goal of truth-seeking expressed in Iowa Rule

of Evidence 5.102.” State v. Neitzel, 801 N.W.2d 612, 623 (Iowa 2011) (quoting

Rojas, 524 N.W.2d at 663). We determine H.T.’s statements were also admissible

under the residual hearsay exception.

III.     Sufficiency of the Evidence

         Harrison challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his

conviction. In particular, he alleges there is insufficient evidence he committed a

sex act with H.T.5 We review such claims for correction of errors at law. State v.

Sandford, 814 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa 2012). We view all the evidence in the

record in the light most favorable to the State. Id. We will uphold a verdict if it is

supported by substantial evidence. Id. “Evidence is considered substantial if,

when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, it can convince a rational jury

5   The jury instructions informed the jury:
                 Concerning element number 1 of Instruction No. 14 “sex act”
         means any sexual contact between two persons:
                 1. By penetration of the penis into the vagina or anus.
                 2. Between the mouth of one person and the genitals of
         another.
                 3. Between the genitals of person and the genitals or anus of
         another.
                 4. Between the finger or hand of one person and genitals of
         another person.
                 5. Or by the use of artificial sex organs or substitutes thereof
         in contact with the genitalia or anus.
                 You may consider the type of contact and the circumstances
         surrounding it in deciding whether the contact was sexual in nature.
                                          11

that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “Inherent in our

standard of review of jury verdicts in criminal cases is the recognition that the jury

[is] free to reject certain evidence, and credit other evidence.” Id. (quoting State v.

Nitcher, 720 N.W.2d 547, 556 (Iowa 2006)).

       Substantial evidence supports the conviction. H.T.’s statements that she

“played with Drew’s dick” and that he performed oral sex on her indicate Harrison

performed a sex act.      H.T.’s comment about Harrison licking her genitals is

particularly probative because it shows a knowledge of acts well beyond what an

average three-year-old would know. Those statements were supported by the

DNA evidence obtained from the inside of H.T.’s underwear and the anal swab.

Petruccelli testified that the DNA found in H.T.’s underwear was at a concentration

indicating that it likely came from a bodily fluid. And the presence of DNA inside

her underwear cuts against Harrison’s theory of DNA transferring from his

apartment to her as she played during the day. Finally, the jury could properly

consider Harrison’s prior behavior, including isolating H.T. from her siblings while

babysitting her in the past. While circumstantial, that conduct could be viewed as

grooming behavior, in line with Dr. Meidlinger’s testimony. Substantial evidence

supports the verdict.

IV.    Motion to Strike Juror 20

       Harrison claims the court wrongly denied his request to strike a juror for

cause, forcing him to use a peremptory challenge. As a result, he contends the

composition of the jury violated his right to an impartial jury. See U.S. Const.

amend. VI, XIV; Iowa Const. art. I, §10. “We review the district court’s rulings on
                                         12

challenges to potential jurors for cause for abuse of discretion.” State v. Jonas,

904 N.W.2d 566, 570 (Iowa 2017).

       Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, jury selection began with a written

questionnaire. In response to one question that asked if there was anything else

the prospective juror wanted to tell the court, Juror 20 responded, “I have 3 young

kids. Oldest is 12. I would do my best to remain impartial, but crimes of this nature

really bother me.” During voir dire, the juror expressed, “I don’t know if I’m not

going to draw comparisons to my own child and how I would feel, but as I would

say, I would try to do my best” to follow the court’s instructions. After being asked,

“[A]re you saying right now you believe you have formed an opinion?” the juror

responded, “I guess so. Yes.” Harrison moved to strike the juror pursuant to Iowa

Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.18(5)(k), which the court denied.              Harrison

subsequently asked for an additional peremptory strike, which the court also

denied.

       We need not decide whether the court abused its discretion when it denied

Harrison’s motion to strike because Harrison cannot demonstrate it resulted in

prejudice. When a court wrongly denies a motion to strike, the defendant must

establish prejudice occurred in order to warrant reversal. State v. Neuendorf, 509

N.W.2d 743, 746 (Iowa 1993). “In the absence of some factual showing that this

circumstance resulted in a juror being seated who was not impartial, the existence

of prejudice is entirely speculative.” Id. Actual prejudice is not needed, however,

in certain circumstances.

       Specifically, in order to show prejudice when the district court
       improperly refuses to disqualify a potential juror under Iowa Rule of
       Criminal Procedure 2.18(5)(k) and thereby causes a defendant to
                                           13

         expend a peremptory challenge under rule 2.18(9), the defendant
         must specifically ask the court for an additional strike of a particular
         juror after his peremptory challenges have been exhausted. Where
         the defendant makes such a showing, prejudice will then be
         presumed.

Jonas, 904 N.W.2d at 583 (emphasis added).

         Harrison did not ask to strike a specific juror. As a result, Jonas does not

apply. See id. Still, he asks us to extend the holding of Jonas to this case and

presume prejudice exists. We decline to do so. This court is not in a position to

extend supreme court precedent, particularly when the supreme court has clearly

ruled on the matter. See State v. Hastings, 466 N.W.2d 697, 700 (Iowa Ct. App.

1990).

         As a result, Harrison must make some factual showing that a biased juror

was seated. See Neuendorf, 509 N.W.2d at 746. He fails to do so. On appeal,

Harrison asserts that he would have struck Juror 28, who indicated the juror had

family members who were victims of sexual abuse. However, he does not make

any showing that Juror 28 was prejudiced against him or otherwise incapable of

rendering a fair decision. See Jonas, 904 N.W.2d at 575. We determine there

was no abuse of discretion by the trial court.

V.       Jury Instructions

         Harrison contends the district court included an improper jury instruction

informing the jurors that, “You may not consider the unavailability of H.T. for any

purpose whatsoever.” Harrison claims this was improper because it suggested

that jury could not weigh H.T.’s credibility in light of her unsworn statements. We

review jury instruction claims for correction of errors at law. Alcala v. Marriott Int’l,

Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699, 707 (Iowa 2016).
                                          14

       The State asserts this court need not address Harrison’s claim because it

is not preserved for our review. “We have repeatedly held that timely objection to

jury instructions in criminal prosecutions is necessary in order to preserve any error

thereon for appellate review.” State v. Davis, 951 N.W.2d 8, 16 (Iowa 2020)

(citation omitted). Those objections must be to the instructions “in their final form,”

and include “requesting instructions and voicing specific exception in the event

they are refused.” Id. (citation omitted).

       Throughout the proceedings, counsel for both parties and the court

discussed the propriety of several potential instructions on H.T.’s absence from

trial. However, each discussion ended with the matter being tabled for another

day. On the final day of trial, the district court informed Harrison’s counsel that it

denied their proposed instruction on the issue. Instead, the court proposed its own

instruction. Immediately after the court informed defense counsel that it was

denying counsel’s proposed instruction, defense counsel informed the court, “We

can use the Court’s instruction.” When asked again if there were any objections

to the proposed instruction, defense counsel responded, “Your Honor, we’re okay

with that.” And the court clarified one last time if defense counsel was agreeing to

the instruction, with the following exchange:

              COUNTY ATTORNEY: I just want to make sure the defendant
       is actually requesting that instruction.
              THE COURT: Or agreeing to it.
              COUNTY ATTORNEY: Okay.
              THE COURT: You are agreeing to my instruction?
              DEFENSE COUNSEL: To that instruction, yes, Your Honor.
              THE COURT: Thank you.

       Harrison’s counsel never lodged a formal objection to the final instruction.

This case is substantially analogous to State v. Welch, 507 N.W.2d 580 (Iowa
                                           15

1993). Prior to the completion of the defendant’s case, there was a short, informal

discussion outside the presence of the jury between counsel and the court

concerning the appropriateness of an instruction on aiding and abetting. Welch,

507 N.W.2d at 584. Later, the court presented the attorneys with a proposed set

of instructions which included an aiding-and-abetting instruction. Id. At that time,

defense counsel was given an opportunity to make any objections to the

instructions on the record. Id. Defense counsel did not voice any objection to the

instruction on aiding and abetting.        Id.   The court determined the informal

discussion over jury instructions was insufficient to preserve error because of the

lack of a specific objection to the instructions in their final form. Id.

       As in Welch, defense counsel expressed their misgivings over various

instructions leading up to and during trial. However, they did not specifically object

to the instruction in its final form. Indeed, they informed the court three separate

times that they accepted that instruction. In the absence of a specific objection to

the instruction, error was not preserved. See id. Harrison had the obligation to

specifically object to the instruction in its final form. He failed to do so. As a result,

error is not preserved.

       Harrison asks us to abandon our traditional rules of error preservation in

this case. In particular, he asserts the district court had an affirmative duty to

properly instruct the jury. In support of that proposition, Harrison cites to Shams

v. Hassan, 905 N.W.2d 158 (Iowa 2017). In that case, our supreme court held that

once a party proposes instructions on a matter that is relevant to the case, even if

technically inaccurate, the proposal puts the district court on notice for the need of
                                          16

a proper instruction on the issue. Shams, 905 N.W.2d at 169. Thus, the court’s

failure to include an instruction on the issue was error. Id.

       However, Hassan is inapt.        That case dealt with the omission of an

instruction entirely. Id. In contrast, an instruction was given in this case. As

Hassan explains, “Had the court advised the parties of a statute-of-limitations

instruction that it intended to give, this would have immediately shifted the burden

to the parties to identify specific objections to that instruction, as opposed to simply

identifying the need for an instruction on” the issue. Id. This is not a case where

an instruction was warranted but none was given.

VI.     Expert Testimony

       Harrison claims some testimony by the State’s expert witness, Dr.

Meidlinger, was not relevant and should have been excluded from trial.               In

particular, Dr. Meidlinger explained his experience performing evaluations of

sexual offenders. After a relevance objection by Harrison that was overruled, Dr.

Meidlinger testified,

       It entails everything that’s involved in standard psychological
       evaluation, that is, review of relevant documents, interview with the
       person, having a complete psychological testing, and then putting
       that together to form of a report. The thing that is different in a sex
       offender report is that you also follow some actuarial information
       that’s designed for the purpose of predicting their chance of re-
       offending.
              So the people want to know in sex offender evaluation is the
       person—this person re-offending, and what level of care, treatment,
       and incarceration do they need to—to rehabilitate them and protect
       the public?

       On appeal, Harrison asserts the testimony was not relevant and unduly

suggested to the jury that Harrison posed a risk of re-offending. We review

evidentiary claims for an abuse of discretion. Dudley, 856 N.W.2d at 675.
                                          17

         First, we decline to consider Harrison’s claim as it pertains to any unfair

prejudice the testimony may have caused. Harrison’s objection at trial was limited

to relevance, not its prejudicial impact. Because the district court did not consider

or rule on the prejudicial effect the testimony may have had, we cannot consider

that portion of Harrison’s claim. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537

(Iowa 2002).

         Evidence must be relevant in order to be admissible at trial. Iowa R. Evid.

5.402. Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact that is of

consequence in determining the action more or less probable than it would be

without the evidence. Iowa R. Evid. 5.401. In order to establish a particular

witness can provide expert testimony, they must have some qualification “as an

expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” Iowa R. Evid.

5.702.

         Dr. Meidlinger’s testimony was relevant to establishing his qualifications as

an expert on grooming behaviors of sexual offenders. Dr. Meidlinger testified that

he was a clinical psychiatrist. But that by itself may not make him qualified to

discuss behaviors frequently seen in sex offenders. By testifying about his work

performing psychological evaluations of sex offenders, Dr. Meidlinger was

providing the basis for his knowledge about those kinds of behaviors. That he has

spoken with and evaluated sexual offenders in the past makes his testimony about

their behavior more credible because it establishes the origins of his knowledge.

And explaining what an evaluation of a sex offender entails informs the jury about

the type of information he would be obtaining from those offenders.
                                     18

The testimony was relevant. The district court did not abuse its discretion in

admitting it.

       AFFIRMED.