Court Opinion

ID: 9793887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:54:53.054568+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:28.661384
License: Public Domain

Johnson, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part) — I concur in parts I, II, IV, V and VI of the majority opinion. I dissent, however, to part III, discussing Taylor’s age discrimination claim. The majority unnecessarily confuses the standard of review on this issue, and, in doing so, reaches the wrong result.
Taylor’s age discrimination claim was tried before a jury and the jury rendered a verdict in Taylor’s favor. The trial judge denied Defendants’ motion for a judgment n.o.v. on this issue and the Defendants now appeal the trial court’s decision. When we review a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for judgment n.o.v., we apply the same standard as the trial court. Hizey v. Carpenter, 119 Wn.2d 251, 271-72, 830 P.2d 646 (1992) (quoting Industrial Indem. Co. of N. W., Inc. v. Kallevig, 114 Wn.2d 907, 915-16, 792 P.2d 520, 7 A.L.R.5th 1014 (1990)). A judgment n.o.v. is appropriate only if, when viewing the material evidence most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court can say, as a matter of law, there is not substantial evidence or a reasonable inference to sustain a verdict for the nonmoving party. Hizey, 119 Wn.2d at 271 (quoting Kallevig, 114 Wn.2d at 915-16). If the majority had applied this standard, it would have affirmed the judgment of the trial court on this issue.
However, rather than limiting its inquiry to whether the evidence in this case was sufficient to sustain the verdict, the majority confuses the standard of review and instead asks whether Taylor’s evidence was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of discriminatory intent. Majority, at 668. This question is appropriate when we are reviewing a motion for summary judgment, not judgment n.o.v. This error apparently occurred because the *677majority relies on Grimwood v. University of Puget Sound, Inc., 110 Wn.2d 355, 753 P.2d 517 (1988), a case involving review of a summary judgment adjudication in an age discrimination case.
Appellate review of summary judgment and judgment n.o.v. are not equivalent, and it is improper to impart the relevant inquiry from one standard of review to ¿nother. An appellate court reviewing a motion for summary judgment engages in the same inquiry as the trial court and reviews the motion de novo. Herron v. Tribune Pub’g Co., 108 Wn.2d 162, 169, 736 P.2d 249 (1987). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court considers all facts submitted and all reasonable inferences from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wn.2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982). Because a grant of summary judgment is an adjudication without a trial, appellate courts must adhere to a stricter standard of review in order to protect a party’s right to a trial on the merits.
In contrast, appellate review of a motion for judgment n.o.v. takes place after there has been a full adjudication on the merits. It is no longer the role of the court to evaluate the credibility of the evidence. Nor is it the role of the reviewing court to determine whether it would have reached the same result as the jury, given the facts established at trial. Instead, the sole function of the appellate court when reviewing a motion for judgment n.o.v. is to establish whether "as a matter of law that there is no evidence or reasonable inference therefrom to sustain a verdict for the opposing party”. Miller v. Payless Drug Stores of Wash., Inc., 61 Wn.2d 651, 653, 379 P.2d 932 (1963).
Because the majority adopts the analysis in Grimwood and applies the standard of review applicable to summary judgment, the majority complicates the review by focusing on the burdens of production in an age discrimination case. In Grimwood, we adopted the federal McDonnell Douglas test to establish the elements of an employee’s prima facie discrimination case and to allocate the procedural burdens of production. Grimwood, 110 Wn.2d at 362; McDonnell *678Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). This analysis was necessary to establish whether the plaintiff’s evidence created a genuine issue of material fact because the nature of the burden establishing nonexistence of a material fact depends on who bears the burden of proof at trial and what standard of proof is required. Jack H. Friedenthal et al., Civil Procedure § 9.3, at 445 (2d ed. 1993).
Where, as here, we are reviewing a motion for judgment n.o.v., this analysis is not only unnecessary, it confuses the issue because these allocated burdens are only pertinent at various stages of pretrial and trial proceedings. Xieng v. Peoples Nat’l Bank, 120 Wn.2d 512, 522, 844 P.2d 389 (1993). Once there has been an adjudication on the merits,
issues concerning the employer’s burden merge into the ultimate disposition of the issue of discrimination made by the trier of fact.
Issues of the plaintiff’s prima facie case, the employer’s burden to rebut with a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, and the employee’s showing of pretext are irrelevant once all the evidence is in.
(Citations omitted.) Xieng, 120 Wn.2d at 522 (quoting Burnside v. Simpson Paper Co., 66 Wn. App. 510, 524, 832 P.2d 537 (1992), aff’d, 123 Wn.2d 93, 864 P.2d 937 (1994)).
Thus, our sole focus in this case is whether the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain a verdict in Taylor’s favor. I find that it was. Taylor’s claim was essentially that his employers deliberately and systematically maintained an unreasonable work schedule that prevented older workers from staying on the job until retirement age. In support of this claim, Taylor presented expert testimony that the Defendants’ routes were longer than the industry standard. He further produced evidence that the Defendants fired a fellow employee after having received a medical opinion the employee was unable to finish his routes on time because of his age. Lastly, Taylor produced evidence that the vice president knew age was a factor for some employees who were having trouble finishing their routes on time, but neverthe*679less maintained the route schedules. From this evidence the jury concluded the Defendants discriminated against Taylor based on his age.
Because I believe this evidence is sufficient to establish a claim of age discrimination under RCW 49.60.180, I would affirm the decision of the trial court denying the Defendants’ motion for judgment n.o.v.
Utter and Brachtenbach, JJ., concur with Johnson, J.
After modification, further reconsideration denied October 27, 1994.