Court Opinion

ID: 9907448
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 16:02:11.827869+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:56:22.987053
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10611    Document: 47-1      Date Filed: 12/06/2023   Page: 1 of 40

                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-10611
                           ____________________

        CHARLES BALDWIN,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        EXPRESS OIL CHANGE, LLC,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                      D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-03874-AT
                           ____________________

        Before JILL PRYOR, GRANT, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10611

        JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge:
               This appeal requires us to address a novel issue of state law:
        the proper application of the presumptions of reasonableness con-
        tained in the Georgia Restrictive Covenants Act (“GRCA”). In de-
        ciding this case, the district court was confronted with difficult is-
        sues involving complex business arrangements and a Georgia stat-
        ute that both rejiggered a significant body of Georgia common law
        and remains largely untested by Georgia’s appellate courts.
                Applying the GRCA, the district court preliminarily en-
        joined the enforcement of a restrictive covenant between a na-
        tional automotive service chain and a former employee of its fran-
        chisees. The district court found the covenant to be unreasonable
        in two respects: its geographic scope and its duration. We agree
        that the covenant’s geographic scope is unreasonable (and thus un-
        enforceable) under the GRCA. But the district court applied the
        wrong presumption when it concluded that the covenant’s dura-
        tion was unreasonable under the GRCA. And part of this appeal is
        now moot. We thus affirm in part, vacate in part, dismiss the ap-
        peal in part, and remand to the district court to reconsider aspects
        of its preliminary injunction under the proper presumptions.

                              I.     BACKGROUND

               For more than 20 years, appellee Charles Baldwin worked as
        an employee of various franchisees of appellant Express Oil
        Change, LLC, a national automotive service chain. Baldwin’s rela-
        tionship with Express began in 1998, when Express purchased a
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        22-10611                  Opinion of the Court                             3

        group of privately owned automotive stores in Atlanta operating
        under the name Tune-Up Clinic. Baldwin worked at Tune-Up as a
        store manager and, after the purchase, came to be under the super-
        vision of one of Express’s franchisees, Adam Fuller.
               Over the years, as Fuller acquired additional Express fran-
        chises, Baldwin’s responsibilities grew. When Fuller owned eight
        stores (around January 2001), he asked Baldwin to take on the role
        of area manager, overseeing operations for all eight stores—a
        “manager of managers.” Doc. 25 at 14. 1 Baldwin’s role included
        neither significant marketing responsibilities nor customer interac-
        tions. He would occasionally greet customers or help resolve cus-
        tomer complaints, and he was able to look up the history of one
        customer at a time in Fuller’s “point of sale system.” Id. at 16. But
        Baldwin lacked access to a complete customer list and focused his
        efforts on “train[ing] and coach[ing] and support[ing] other store
        managers” rather than interacting with customers. Id. at 14. By all
        accounts, Baldwin was a superior employee. 2
               While Baldwin served as area manager, Fuller entered a se-
        ries of business relationships with Darrell Lamb, another Express
        franchisee. In 2006, when the pair purchased their first store to-
        gether, Baldwin trained and supported its manager, as he had with

        1 “Doc.” numbers refer to the docket entries of the district court.
        2 The district court’s description of Baldwin as a “highly talented employee”
        is well-supported by the record. Doc. 30 at 44. Baldwin won a national award
        from Express. And a former Express executive called Baldwin “an excellent
        operator with [Express].” Doc. 25 at 72.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                22-10611

        Fuller’s other stores. Later, Fuller and Lamb jointly purchased four
        more stores. They formed a limited liability company (“LLC”)
        called Middle Georgia Investments to hold these four stores.
                Fuller and Lamb placed these stores under Baldwin’s super-
        vision and restructured his compensation. They increased Bald-
        win’s salary, granted him five percent “phantom equity” in Middle
        Georgia Investments, and offered him 15 percent of the stores’
        profits. Id. at 21. According to Baldwin, his phantom equity meant
        that if Fuller and Lamb sold Middle Georgia Investments, he would
        receive five percent of the net proceeds, but he gained no “addi-
        tional rights in the operation and overs[ight] of” the entity. Id. at
        21.
                Fuller and Lamb later purchased two more stores in Geor-
        gia, which they placed under a new LLC, 138 Investments. They
        asked Baldwin to oversee the new stores. In exchange, they offered
        him “sweat equity” in 138 Investments. Id. at 22. Baldwin received
        15 percent of the profits generated by 138 Investments and—pro-
        vided he met sales targets at the new stores—15 percent “phantom
        equity” in the LLC. Id. at 23. Baldwin testified that this equity op-
        erated just like his interest in Middle Georgia Investments: he was
        entitled to 15 percent of the net proceeds of 138 Investments upon
        its sale but gained no management or operational rights in 138 In-
        vestments. Despite his “equity” in both Middle Georgia Invest-
        ments and 138 Investments, Baldwin never signed a franchise
        agreement with Express, and he invested none of his own money
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        22-10611                   Opinion of the Court                                 5

        in either entity. But Baldwin did become a member of 138 Invest-
        ments.
               Fuller and Lamb also formed an employee leasing com-
        pany—Velocity Ventures, Inc.—to provide employees for their
        stores. After its formation, Velocity employed Baldwin as its “sen-
        ior vice president of operations.” Doc. 30 at 5. In that role, he was
        no longer employed directly by the stores or the entities that held
        them. 3
               Eventually, Express sought to buy out Fuller and Lamb to
        convert their franchised stores into corporate-owned ones. Bald-
        win learned in March of 2021 that a sale was imminent. On a Fri-
        day, Fuller emailed Baldwin to ask him to attend a meeting the next
        morning, along with Lamb. When Baldwin arrived, Fuller ex-
        plained that the pair planned to sell 29 stores (of which Baldwin
        managed 18) to Express and that the deal was scheduled to close
        on Monday. Fuller gave Baldwin a summary of the proposed sale
        showing that Baldwin would receive a total payment of $1,985,402:
        $1,104,352 for his 15 percent interest in 138 Investments, $600,616
        for his five percent interest in Middle Georgia Investments, and

        3 “Employee-leasing companies hire employees and then lease them out to
        clients.” Payroll Mgmt., Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 815 F.3d 1293, 1295 n.1 (11th
        Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). The benefit of such an arrange-
        ment to the client is the ability to obtain “the leased employees’ labor” without
        “the attendant administrative, financial, and legal responsibilities” that come
        with being an employer. Id.
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        6                        Opinion of the Court                    22-10611

        $321,441 for a six percent interest in an entity called Knoxville Ex-
        press. 4
                But there was a catch. Fuller handed Baldwin a contract with
        a restrictive covenant, limiting Baldwin’s ability to compete against
        Express, and a consent to an asset purchase agreement concerning
        138 Investments. Unless Baldwin signed both documents, Fuller
        told him, there would be no sale and Baldwin would receive no
        payment. Fuller also told Baldwin that he could not view the asset
        purchase agreement to which he was required to consent.
               At first, Baldwin protested. He told Fuller and Lamb that he
        was not an owner of 138 Investments, had not signed a franchise
        agreement, did not wish to agree to something he could not re-
        view, and did not “feel comfortable” agreeing to a restrictive cove-
        nant. Doc. 25 at 34. Unable to reach an agreement with Fuller and
        Lamb, Baldwin next met with a representative of Express, its then-
        outgoing executive chairman, Ricky Brooks. Baldwin told Brooks
        that he just wanted payment of his equity based on his prior agree-
        ments with Fuller and Lamb. Brooks replied, “we absolutely do not
        want you competing against us,” and he explained that the pur-
        chase price reflected the assumption that Express would receive
        covenants from Fuller, Lamb, and Baldwin. Id. at 38.

        4 The term sheet Fuller and Lamb gave Baldwin shows a payout of $321,441
        to Baldwin based on a $5,357,352 valuation of two stores held by “knox exp.”
        Doc. 16 at 6. Baldwin confirmed that he received this payment.
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        22-10611               Opinion of the Court                          7

               Ultimately Baldwin relented. After concluding that “80 per-
        cent of [his] retirement [was] hanging in the balance” and receiving
        concessions from Express, he signed both documents so that he
        could receive the payment. Id. at 41. He dated the signed restrictive
        covenant March 8, 2021.
                The restrictive covenant Baldwin signed contained a series
        of provisions limiting his ability to work for or otherwise be in-
        volved in competing automotive service businesses. In Section 1 of
        the covenant, Baldwin promised that he would not “engage in, in-
        vest in, become an owner of, advise, or become a landlord and/or
        lender of, or employed by, or construct a facility for . . . a Compet-
        itive Business” within a defined “Non-Competition Area.” Doc. 1-
        1 at 50 (internal quotation marks omitted). The covenant defined a
        competitive business as “an automotive repair or service business
        . . . which promotes as one or more of its services any form of retail
        sales of new tires and/or tire-related services, tire rotation, balanc-
        ing and alignment, oil change services, quick lube services, brake
        repair or replacements services, transmission repair or service, au-
        tomotive repairs or similar service.” Id. (internal quotation marks
        omitted). It defined the non-competition area to include all of
        Georgia and Alabama, as well as “a five (5) mile radius of any auto-
        motive repair or service facility business operated by Purchaser in
        the continental United States.” Id. The covenant defined “Pur-
        chaser” to include, in addition to Express, certain affiliates, includ-
        ing Mavis, a national automotive tire chain, and its affiliates. The
        agreement contained no list of the locations operated by Express
        and the affiliates but stated that one would be provided “upon
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10611

        request.” Id. at 51. As of 2021, the Mavis corporate umbrella in-
        cluded at least 1,100 franchises in 29 states. In Section 2 of the cov-
        enant Baldwin also agreed not to engage in targeted solicitation of
        Express’s customers or employees.
               The covenant provided that its terms would remain in force
        for four years. But, after 18 months, the non-competition area
        would no longer include the entirety of Georgia and Alabama, and
        Baldwin would be permitted to become an employee of a compet-
        itive business, even within the reduced non-competition area.
               Following the sale, Baldwin briefly worked for Express. For
        12 weeks the parties sought to negotiate a role for Baldwin in the
        combined business. Ultimately, though, Express and Baldwin failed
        to reach an agreement. Express offered Baldwin significantly less
        compensation than Fuller and Lamb had and would have required
        Baldwin to undertake significant travel, something he did not do
        under Fuller and Lamb. Baldwin resigned and parted ways with
        Express.
               In August 2021, while the covenant remained in full force,
        Baldwin began to explore other business opportunities. He consid-
        ered purchasing an independent repair shop located just under five
        miles from an Express location. He contacted Brooks, as Express’s
        representative, to request permission. Brooks’s superiors told Bald-
        win that permission was refused: Express would enforce the cove-
        nant.
              Baldwin, a Georgia resident, sued Express in Superior Court
        in Gwinnett County, Georgia, seeking a declaration that Sections 1
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        22-10611                   Opinion of the Court                                 9

        and 2 of the restrictive covenant were unenforceable under the
        GRCA, and requesting an injunction barring Express from enforc-
        ing these sections against Baldwin. Baldwin moved for a prelimi-
        nary injunction in the Georgia court, arguing in part that these sec-
        tions violated the GRCA. Baldwin argued that the covenant agree-
        ment contained restrictions that were unreasonable (and thus un-
        enforceable under the GRCA) “in terms of time, geography, and
        scope.” Id. at 6. Baldwin argued that the 48-month term of the cov-
        enant was presumptively unreasonable and the geographic scope
        of the covenant was unreasonably broad. Express—a citizen of Del-
        aware and New York—removed the action to the United States
        District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, pursuant to 28
        U.S.C. § 1441. See also 28 U.S.C. 1332(a). 5

        5 After Express appealed, we issued a jurisdictional question to the parties
        about Baldwin’s and Express’s respective citizenships, which Express’s plead-
        ings below had not adequately alleged. See 28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(1) (providing dis-
        trict courts with jurisdiction over controversies between citizens of different
        states where amount in controversy exceeds $75,000); Molinos Valle Del Cibao,
        C. por A. v. Lama, 633 F.3d 1330, 1342 n.12 (11th Cir. 2011) (explaining that
        pleadings ordinarily must allege the parties’ citizenship in diversity cases). We
        allowed Express to amend its pleadings to allege that Baldwin is a citizen of
        Georgia and Express a citizen of Delaware (its sole member’s place of incor-
        poration) and New York (its sole member’s place of business). See Purchasing
        Power, LLC v. Bluestem Brands, Inc., 851 F.3d 1218, 1221 (11th Cir. 2017) (“The
        citizenship of an LLC is the citizenship of each member.”); 28 U.S.C.
        § 1332(c)(1) (specifying that, for purposes of determining diversity jurisdiction,
        “a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of every State and foreign state
        by which it has been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it
        has its principal place of business”).
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10611

               After removal, Baldwin renewed his motion for a prelimi-
        nary injunction before the district court, which held an evidentiary
        hearing. At the hearing, the district court heard argument from
        Baldwin and Express as well as live testimony by Baldwin, Brooks,
        and James Durkin, the president of Express.
                Brooks and Durkin testified to Express’s reasons for pursu-
        ing the restrictive covenant. Brooks explained that Express did not
        “want to buy the assets of a franchise operation . . . and then have
        them take that money and compete against [it].” Doc. 25 at 72–73.
        He explained Express’s concern that Baldwin, freshly infused with
        capital, could “acquire or build an operation” and “not only com-
        pete for Express’s customers but [also] solicit team members spe-
        cifically and directly that helped build [Express’s] business.” Id. at
        73. To allay these concerns, Brooks testified, Express “paid a signif-
        icant premium for the noncompete.” Id. Durkin explained the im-
        portance of retaining Express’s existing employees—particularly its
        mechanics, whom Durkin referred to as technicians. He testified
        that without good technicians, Express could not meet the de-
        mands of its customers. He also testified that the market for hiring
        and retaining technicians was exceptionally competitive. Because
        customers often develop a service relationship with a single tech-
        nician, when “a technician leave[s], customers will follow,” he said.
        Id. at 90–91.
              Express also sought to show that Baldwin would receive a
        windfall if the district court allowed him to compete in violation of
        the covenant. In an affidavit, another Express executive estimated
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        22-10611               Opinion of the Court                        11

        that Baldwin could generate $1,000,000 annually in revenue and
        $250,000 annually in profit by operating a single automotive ser-
        vice shop in Georgia, based on Baldwin’s “experience in th[e] in-
        dustry, and the revenue and profit generated by the [Express] fran-
        chise units that Mr. Baldwin ran.” Doc. 12-1 at 4.
                Following the hearing, the district court issued a preliminary
        injunction partly enjoining Express from enforcing Baldwin’s cov-
        enant. The district court found that Express had a legitimate busi-
        ness interest in “preventing Baldwin from luring away its techni-
        cians and, vicariously, its customers.” Doc. 30 at 23; see also
        O.C.G.A. § 13-8-51(9)(C) (defining “[l]egitimate business inter-
        est[s]” to include “[s]ubstantial relationships with specific prospec-
        tive or existing customers, patients, vendors, or clients”). With this
        interest in mind, the district court concluded that two aspects of
        Section 1 of the covenant were unreasonable and unenforceable
        under the GRCA. First, it concluded the covenant’s geographic
        scope was unreasonable and thus unenforceable under O.C.G.A.
        §§ 13-8-53(b) and 13-8-56(2). The court found that the scope of the
        geographic restrictions—the entirety of two states and the five-
        mile radius surrounding more than 1,100 franchised locations—
        was far greater than necessary to protect Express’s interest in re-
        taining its technicians. Second, it concluded that the covenant’s
        four-year term was presumptively unreasonable under O.C.G.A.
        § 13-8-57(b), which presumes unreasonable “a restrictive covenant
        sought to be enforced against a former employee and not associ-
        ated with the sale or ownership” of a business if its duration exceeds
        two years.
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                  22-10611

               The district court “blue-penciled” Section 1 of the cove-
        nant—meaning, the court re-wrote the covenant to make it en-
        forceable under Georgia law and enjoined Express from enforcing
        the covenant except as revised. The district court altered Section 1
        in four ways. First, it reduced the term of the covenant from four
        years to two years. Second, it eliminated the states of Georgia and
        Alabama from the non-competition area. Third, it amended the
        five-mile radius provision of the non-competition area so that it
        only applied to those Express locations Baldwin previously had
        overseen. And fourth, it eliminated the provisions that stepped
        down certain restrictions on Baldwin at the 18-month mark.
              As revised, Section 1 read:
              Baldwin covenants and agrees that, from the Eﬀective
              Date hereof until the forty-eighth (48)twenty-fourth
              (24) month anniversary of the date hereof (the
              “Term”), he will not directly or indirectly (through an
              entity), engage in, invest in, become an owner of, ad-
              vise, or become a landlord and/or lender of, or em-
              ployed by, or construct a facility for an automotive re-
              pair or service business (other than Purchaser, if Bald-
              win and Purchaser agree for Baldwin to become an
              employee of Purchaser) which promotes as one or
              more of its services any form of retail sales of new
              tires and/or tire-related services, tire rotation, balanc-
              ing and alignment, oil change services, quick lube ser-
              vices, brake repair or replacements services, transmis-
              sion repair or service, automotive repairs or similar
              service (a “Competitive Business”), and which busi-
              ness is located (i) in the State of Georgia or the State
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        22-10611                  Opinion of the Court                               13

                of Alabama, or (ii) within a ﬁve (5) mile radius of any
                automotive repair or service facility business oper-
                ated by Purchaser that Baldwin previously oversaw
                while he was overseeing Purchaser’s franchises. in
                the Continental United States (the “Non Competi-
                tion Area”). 6

               In the same order, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
        dure 65(c), the district court imposed an injunction bond. Recog-
        nizing that it had “authorized Baldwin to engage in direct compe-
        tition with [Express’s] franchises, albeit in a limited matter” in a
        “case present[ing] arguably novel issues of law,” the district court
        required Baldwin to post a $40,000 injunction bond. Doc. 30 at 46.
               Express appealed the district court’s order granting a prelim-
        inary injunction and setting bond. This is Express’s appeal.

                           II.     STANDARD OF REVIEW

               We review a district court’s ruling on a motion for a prelim-
        inary injunction for abuse of discretion. Vital Pharms., Inc. v. Alfieri,
        23 F.4th 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2022). A district court abuses its dis-
        cretion when “it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows im-
        proper procedures in making the determination, or makes findings

        6 Text added by the district court is shown in bold type. Text removed by the
        district court is shown in strikethrough. The district court also eliminated the
        remaining provisions of Section 1, which the district court’s revisions rendered
        superfluous. See Doc. 30 at 45 (showing revisions to Section 1); Doc. 1-1 at 50–
        51 (original text of Section 1).
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        14                      Opinion of the Court                    22-10611

        of fact that are clearly erroneous.” Jysk Bed’N Linen v. Dutta-Roy, 810
        F.3d 767, 773–74 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal quotations omitted). “An
        error of law is an abuse of discretion per se.” Managed Care Advisory
        Grp., LLC v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 939 F.3d 1145, 1153 (11th Cir.
        2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).
                When a district court sets an injunction bond pursuant to
        Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c), “[t]he amount of [the] in-
        junction bond”—and the choice of whether to set a bond at all—
        “is within the sound discretion of the district court.” Carillon Imps.,
        Ltd. v. Frank Pesce Int‘l Grp. Ltd., 112 F.3d 1125, 1127 (11th Cir. 1997).
        We thus review the order setting bond for abuse of discretion. Id.

                                  III.    ANALYSIS

               On appeal, Express raises two issues: whether the district
        court abused its discretion by (1) partly enjoining Express from en-
        forcing the restrictive covenant and (2) not requiring a greater bond
        amount. We address each issue in turn.

                             A. The Preliminary Injunction

              We first consider Express’s challenge to the district court’s
        injunction.
                In general, “[a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction
        must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is
        likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,
        that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction
        is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555
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        22-10611                   Opinion of the Court                                15

        U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Here, the parties almost exclusively brief the first
        factor, and we focus our analysis accordingly.
               At the heart of the merits inquiry in this case is the Georgia
        Restrictive Covenants Act, O.C.G.A. § 13-8-50 et seq. Enacted in
        2011, the GRCA provides a statutory framework for determining
        the enforceability of Georgia-law restrictive covenants. 2011 Ga.
        Laws 99. In general, it specifies that the “enforcement of contracts
        that restrict competition during the term of a restrictive covenant”
        shall be permitted “so long as such restrictions are reasonable in
        time, geographic area, and scope of prohibited activities.”
        O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(a). By contrast, a covenant that is unreasonable
        in scope, duration, or geographic area and thus violates § 13-8-53(a)
        “is unlawful and [] void,” id. § 13-8-53(d), and “shall not [be] en-
        force[d],” id. § 13-8-54(b). See Motorsports of Conyers, LLC v. Burbach,
        892 S.E.2d 719, 726 (Ga. 2023); Belt Power, LLC v. Reed, 840 S.E.2d
        765, 771 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020) (“[U]nreasonable restrictive covenants
        are against Georgia public policy.”).7 A party seeking to enforce a

        7 Because our jurisdiction in this case rests on diversity of citizenship, see
        28 U.S.C. § 1332, we apply the substantive law of Georgia—the forum state,
        see Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Under Erie, when a state’s
        highest appellate court (in this case the Georgia Supreme Court) has addressed
        an issue of state law, we simply apply its holding. See Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v.
        Dolgencorp, LLC, 746 F.3d 1008, 1021 (11th Cir. 2014). But when we are con-
        fronted with a state law issue of first impression, we must attempt to predict
        how the state’s highest court would decide the issue. See Turner v. Wells, 879
        F.3d 1254, 1262 (11th Cir. 2018). To hazard such an “Erie guess,” we look to
        decisions of the state’s intermediate court of appeals for guidance. That means
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        16                         Opinion of the Court                         22-10611

        covenant under the GRCA must also “plead and prove the exist-
        ence of one or more legitimate business interests justifying the re-
        strictive covenant.” O.C.G.A. § 13-8-55. Thus, to be enforceable, a
        Georgia law restrictive covenant must generally be both reasona-
        ble and supported by a legitimate business interest. Where part of
        a restrictive covenant is unenforceable, the GRCA affords courts
        the authority to “modify a covenant that is otherwise void and un-
        enforceable.” Id. § 13-8-53(d). Such modification is known as “blue-
        penciling.” Burbach, 892 S.E.2d at 725.
                The GRCA creates presumptions that address when a re-
        strictive covenant’s geographic scope and time duration are reason-
        able. Section 13-8-56(2) requires a court to “make” a series of “pre-
        sumptions” when determining the reasonableness of the “geo-
        graphic territory” encompassed by a restrictive covenant. And § 13-
        8-57 provides “rebuttable presumptions” for “determining the rea-
        sonableness in time of a restrictive covenant sought to be enforced
        after a term of employment.”
                Under this framework, Express raises three challenges to the
        district court’s evaluation of Baldwin’s likelihood of success on the
        merits. Express argues: (1) the geographic scope of the covenant
        agreement is reasonable, (2) the duration of the covenant agree-
        ment is reasonable, and (3) the district court exceeded its remedial

        we apply the decisions of the Georgia Court of Appeals unless there is “per-
        suasive indication that the [Georgia Supreme Court] would rule otherwise.”
        CSX Transp., Inc. v. Trism Specialized Carriers, Inc., 182 F.3d 788, 791 (11th Cir.
        1999).
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        22-10611               Opinion of the Court                        17

        authority when it blue-penciled the covenant agreement. We ad-
        dress each of these challenges before turning to the remaining pre-
        liminary injunction factors.

                               i.   Geographic Scope

                The district court concluded that the geographic scope of
        the covenant was unenforceable under the GRCA. It proceeded to
        blue-pencil the agreement’s geographic reach in two ways: first, it
        eliminated the agreement’s 18-month prohibition on competitive
        activities anywhere within Georgia and Alabama, and second, it
        limited the agreement’s prohibition on competitive activities
        within five miles of any automotive service or repair business op-
        erated by Express to only those 18 locations Baldwin managed. On
        appeal, Express argues that the broad geographic reach of the
        agreement was enforceable.
               At the outset, we conclude that one aspect of this appeal is
        now moot. See United States v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corrs., 778 F.3d
        1223, 1226 (11th Cir. 2015) (observing that “we have an obligation
        to notice and decide mootness issues” sua sponte). An issue “be-
        comes moot . . . when [it is] no longer live or the parties lack a le-
        gally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc.,
        568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). On ap-
        peal from a preliminary injunction, “intervening events” may moot
        “the appeal by preventing us from granting any effectual relief
        whatever in favor of the appellant.” Vital Pharms., 23 F.4th at 1288
        (internal quotation marks omitted).
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10611

               The non-compete agreement defines a “Non-Competition
        Area” within which Section 1’s restrictions apply. Doc. 1-1 at 50.
        The area is defined as: “the State of Georgia or the State of Ala-
        bama, or . . . [the area] within a five (5) mile radius of any automo-
        tive repair or service facility business operated by Purchaser in the
        continental United States.” Id. After 18 months, however, the
        agreement reduces the Non-Competition Area by eliminating the
        blanket restriction on Baldwin’s activities in Georgia and Alabama.
        Because Baldwin and Express executed the agreement on March 8,
        2021, the Non-Competition Area narrowed on September 8,
        2022—as Express acknowledges. So Section 1 no longer applies
        statewide in Georgia and Alabama.
                To the extent the preliminary injunction prevented Express
        from enforcing the agreement with respect to Baldwin’s activity in
        Georgia and Alabama but not within five miles of an automotive
        repair or service facility business operated by Express, the injunc-
        tion can no longer “affect the rights of the litigants.” Brooks v. Ga.
        State Bd. of Elections, 59 F.3d 1114, 1121 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal
        quotation marks omitted). We therefore lack jurisdiction to review
        the enforceability of the statewide provision. See Al Najjar v. Ash-
        croft, 273 F.3d 1330, 1336 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[M]ootness is jurisdic-
        tional.”). We dismiss the appeal as moot to the extent it challenges
        the district court’s injunction against enforcing the since-expired
        portion of the covenant. See Vital Pharms., 23 F.4th at 1286.
              Now to the live portion of the parties’ dispute over the cov-
        enant’s geographic scope. Section 13-8-56(2) governs the
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        22-10611               Opinion of the Court                       19

        reasonableness (and thus enforceability) of a restrictive covenant’s
        “geographic territory.” This section creates a “presumption” that:
              A geographic territory which includes the areas in
              which the employer does business at any time during
              the parties’ relationship, even if not known at the time
              of entry into the restrictive covenant, is reasonable,
              provided that:

              (A) The total distance encompassed by the provisions
              of the covenant also is reasonable;

              (B) The agreement contains a list of particular com-
              petitors as prohibited employers for a limited period
              of time after the term of employment or a business
              or commercial relationship; or

              (C) Both subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph.

        O.C.G.A. § 13-8-56(2). The covenant’s prohibition on competition
        by Baldwin within a ﬁve-mile radius of any location operated by
        Express or its aﬃliates does not satisfy any of § 13-8-56(2)’s three
        prongs; thus, it is not presumptively reasonable.
                 Setting aside subsection (A) for the time being, we ﬁnd that
        the agreement does not “contain[] a list of particular competitors
        as prohibited employers.” Id. § 13-8-56(2)(B). The closest it comes
        is a provision obliging Express to provide Baldwin with “its then
        current list of facilities operated by Purchaser and its Aﬃliates” on
        request. Doc. 1-1 at 51. But that list is not “contain[ed]” in the
        agreement. O.C.G.A. § 13-8-56(2)(B). Furthermore, the described
        list is not of “particular competitors as prohibited employers.” Id.
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        20                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10611

        Because the agreement does not satisfy subsection (B), it follows
        that it cannot satisfy subsection (C), which applies only when
        “[b]oth subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph” are satisﬁed.
        Id. § 13-8-56(2)(C).
                Turning now to subsection (A), we conclude that the district
        court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that the agreement
        did not satisfy (A) because “[t]he total distance encompassed by the
        provisions of the covenant” was not “reasonable.” Id. § 13-8-
        56(2)(A). Based on testimony it heard at the preliminary injunction
        hearing, the district court determined that Express’s “legitimate
        business interest[,]” id. § 13-8-55, in restricting Baldwin’s ability to
        compete was in “preventing Baldwin from luring away its techni-
        cians and, vicariously, its customers,” doc. 30 at 23. The court also
        observed that although Baldwin oversaw only 18 Georgia-based
        franchises, the covenant applied to the ﬁve-mile radius surround-
        ing each of “1100 [to] 1200 franchises operating . . . across 29
        states”—an area comprising tens of thousands of square miles. Id.
        at 10. Comparing Express’s business interest to the geographic
        scope of the restriction, the district court found that Baldwin was
        unlikely to poach technicians or clients from Express “in service
        areas where Baldwin did not previously operate and has no appar-
        ent relationships with [Express’s] technicians or customers.” Id. at
        26. It thus determined that Express lacked “a legitimate business
        interest in restricting Baldwin outside his prior service area.” Id.
               We agree with the district court. The mismatch between Ex-
        press’s interests and the scope of the geographic restrictions the
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        22-10611               Opinion of the Court                         21

        covenant imposes on Baldwin supports the conclusion that the “to-
        tal distance encompassed by the provisions of the covenant” is not
        “reasonable.” O.C.G.A.§ 13-8-56(2)(A). Although the GRCA does
        not specify how we must determine whether the total geographical
        distance encompassed by a restriction is reasonable, at least three
        independent reasons support such a comparative approach.
               First, the GRCA requires a party seeking to enforce a cove-
        nant to “plead and prove the existence of one or more legitimate
        business interests justifying the restrictive covenant.” Id. § 13-8-55.
        As a matter of internal statutory consistency, it would be odd if a
        covenant whose scope was unsupported by a legitimate business
        interest could nevertheless be reasonable. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.
        v. Loudermilk, 826 S.E.2d 116, 120 (Ga. 2019) (when construing
        Georgia statutes, courts “may look to other provisions of the same
        statute [and] the structure and history of the whole statute” (inter-
        nal quotation marks omitted)); see also O.C.G.A. § 13-8-50 (ﬁnding
        that “reasonable restrictive covenants . . . protect[] legitimate busi-
        ness interests”).
               Second, in applying the GRCA, the Georgia Court of Ap-
        peals has evaluated the reasonableness of geographic restrictions
        by reference to the business interests they protect. See Kennedy v.
        Shave Barber Co., LLC, 822 S.E.2d 606 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018). In Kennedy,
        the court considered the reasonableness of a non-compete provi-
        sion under the GRCA. That provision barred a former employee,
        Kennedy, of a barbershop, The Shave, from operating her own
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        22                        Opinion of the Court                       22-10611

        shop within three miles of her former employer. 8 Citing and ap-
        plying O.C.G.A. § 13-8-56(2), the Georgia Court of Appeals con-
        cluded a three-mile radius was reasonable because it was supported
        by the speciﬁc business interests Kennedy’s employer identiﬁed.
        Record evidence showed that “most of The Shave’s customers
        live[d] and work[ed] within three miles” of its location and that
        “when two former employees of The Shave opened competing bar-
        bershops within three miles,” The Shave had lost customers and
        business. Id. at 612. So the restriction was reasonable “[b]ased on
        the limited territorial restriction involved in the non-compete cov-
        enant, and the demonstrated harm if the covenant is not enforced.”
        Id. Taking our cue from the Georgia Court of Appeals, we likewise
        determine whether the “total distance encompassed by the provi-
        sions of the covenant” is or is not “reasonable,” O.C.G.A. § 13-8-
        56(2)(A), by considering the territorial restriction in light of the
        business interest it protects, see CSX Transp., Inc. v. Trism Specialized
        Carriers, Inc., 182 F.3d 788, 791 (11th Cir. 1999).
                Third, Georgia common law embraced a similar approach
        before the enactment of the GRCA—“judging the reasonableness
        of . . . territorial restrictions [by] considering the nature of the

        8 More specifically, the non-compete (as modified and enforced by an injunc-
        tion issued by the Fulton County Superior Court) prevented the employee
        from “owning, operating, promoting, selling for, soliciting for, consulting for,
        controlling or participating in the ownership, operation, or management of a
        business selling or providing the services the same or similar to that provided
        by The Shave within a three-mile radius of The Shave.” Kennedy, 822 S.E.2d at
        610.
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        22-10611                 Opinion of the Court                             23

        business involved, and the facts surrounding each case.” Barry v.
        Stanco Commc’ns Prods., Inc., 252 S.E.2d 491, 494 (Ga. 1979). Often,
        this meant comparing the geographic scope of a covenant to the
        interests that underlay it. See id. (“[T]he territorial limitation in this
        case was reasonable, and a legitimate protection of Stanco’s invest-
        ment in customer relations.”); see also Howard Schultz & Assocs. of
        the Se., Inc. v. Broniec, 236 S.E.2d 265, 268 (Ga. 1977) (explaining that
        territorial restrictions on competition outside of “the territory in
        which the employee was employed” generally require “a showing
        by the employer of the legitimate business interests sought to be
        protected”). And when applying Georgia law, we construe statutes
        “in connection and in harmony with the existing law,” Grange Mut.
        Cas. Co. v. Woodard, 797 S.E.2d 814, 819 (Ga. 2017) (internal quota-
        tion marks omitted), and strictly against “derogation of the com-
        mon law,” Quynn v. Hulsey, 850 S.E.2d 725, 732 (Ga. 2020); see also
        Kennedy, 822 S.E.2d at 612 n.6 (citing pre-GRCA case law to deter-
        mine reasonableness). We see nothing in the GRCA that under-
        mines this common-law approach.
              The district court relied on other theories, too, when it de-
        termined that the geographic scope of the covenant agreement
        was unreasonable. We do not adopt its analysis wholesale. 9 Rather,

        9 For example, the district court also concluded that the geographic scope of
        the restrictions was incompatible with O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(b). But to us,
        O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(b) appears to apply to non-solicitation provisions (like
        those contained in Section 2 of the agreement) rather than non-compete pro-
        visions (like those contained in Section 1). In Kennedy, the Georgia Court of
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        24                         Opinion of the Court                        22-10611

        we conclude the district court’s relevant ﬁndings—that Express’s
        legitimate business interest is in preventing Baldwin from “luring
        away its technicians and, vicariously, its customers” and that the
        geographic “restrictions on Baldwin go much further than that”—
        are not clearly erroneous and support the district court’s conclu-
        sion that the geographic reach of the covenant is unreasonable un-
        der the GRCA. Doc. 30 at 23–24.
                Express’s counterargument does not persuade us. To sup-
        port its position that the geographic scope of the covenant is rea-
        sonable, Express points to O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(c)(1), which provides
        in part that “[w]henever a description of activities, products, or ser-
        vices, or geographic areas, is required by this Code section, any de-
        scription that provides fair notice of the maximum reasonable
        scope of the restraint shall satisfy such requirement.” Express ar-
        gues, based on this GRCA subsection, that the “geographic limita-
        tion is reasonable under Georgia law because [Baldwin] had fair no-
        tice of its maximum bounds.” Appellant’s Br. at 27. But, under
        Georgia law, reasonableness and notice are distinct issues. See Am.
        Plumbing Pros., Inc. v. ServeStar, LLC, 870 S.E.2d 518, 522 (Ga. Ct.

        Appeals applied this provision only to analyze the non-solicitation aspects of a
        covenant. Kennedy, 822 S.E.2d at 613. It did not consider this provision in ad-
        dressing the reasonableness of the geographic scope of a non-compete clause.
        See id. at 612. Moreover, the provision specifies that “[n]o express reference to
        geographic area . . . shall be required in order for the restraint to be enforcea-
        ble,” meaning it cannot govern when a geographic area is reasonable.
        O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(b). Our doubts aside, the district court’s determination
        that the geographic scope of the covenant was unreasonable is well-supported
        by the grounds we discuss above.
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        22-10611               Opinion of the Court                         25

        App. 2022) (vacating determination that geographic restriction was
        “vague” under § 13-8-53(c)(1) but reserving “whether the geo-
        graphic restriction is reasonable”). O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(c)(1) does
        not concern whether a geographic restriction is reasonable. In-
        stead, it addresses “the language that is necessary for geographic
        limitations” to be suﬃciently speciﬁc to enforce. Id. at 520. The dis-
        trict court did not conclude that the language describing the geo-
        graphic scope of the covenant was unenforceable because it was
        vague. Neither do we. Even if Express is correct that the geo-
        graphic restriction is suﬃciently precise, it remains unenforceable
        because it is not reasonable under the GRCA.

                                   ii.   Duration

                Express also attacks the district court’s injunction for limit-
        ing the duration of Section 1. Express argues that the district court
        abused its discretion because it applied the wrong GRCA presump-
        tion to determine whether the covenant’s four-year duration was
        unreasonable. Here, we agree with Express. The district court
        should have applied the five-year rebuttable presumption of rea-
        sonableness contained in O.C.G.A. § 13-8-57(d) and not the two-
        year presumption contained in O.C.G.A. § 13-8-57(b). Because a
        district court abuses its discretion when “it applies an incorrect le-
        gal standard,” Jysk, 810 F.3d at 773–74 (internal quotation marks
        omitted), or commits an “error of law,” Managed Care Advisory Grp.,
        939 F.3d at 1153 (internal quotation marks omitted), we partly va-
        cate the preliminary injunction.
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        26                     Opinion of the Court                  22-10611

              The GRCA supplies “rebuttable presumptions” a court must
        apply when “determining the reasonableness in time of a restrictive
        covenant sought to be enforced after a term of employment.”
        O.C.G.A. § 13-8-57(a). Under Georgia law, the amount of time for
        which it is presumptively reasonable to restrict a person from com-
        peting with a business depends on the person’s relationship with
        the business. Two rebuttable presumptions are at issue here.
              The first presumption, the one the district court applied, is
        found in O.C.G.A. § 13-8-57(b). This subsection governs:
               (b) In the case of a restrictive covenant sought to be
               enforced against a former employee and not associ-
               ated with the sale or ownership of all or a material
               part of:

               (1) The assets of a business, professional practice, or
               other commercial enterprise;

               (2) The shares of a corporation;

               (3) A partnership interest;

               (4) A limited liability company membership; or

               (5) An equity interest or proﬁt participation, of any
               other type, in a business, professional practice, or
               other commercial enterprise[.]

        When subsection (b) applies, a court must “presume to be reason-
        able in time any restraint two years or less in duration and . . . pre-
        sume to be unreasonable in time any restraint more than two years
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        22-10611               Opinion of the Court                         27

        in duration, measured from the date of the termination of the busi-
        ness relationship.” Id. § 13-8-57(b).
               Express argues the district court should instead have applied
        the second presumption, which is contained in O.C.G.A. § 13-8-
        57(d), and governs:
               (d) In the case of a restrictive covenant sought to be
               enforced against the owner or seller of all or a mate-
               rial part of:

               (1) The assets of a business, professional practice, or
               other commercial enterprise;

               (2) The shares of a corporation;

               (3) A partnership interest;

               (4) A limited liability company membership; or

               (5) An equity interest or proﬁt participation, of any
               other type, in a business, professional practice, or
               other commercial enterprise[.]

        Subsection (d)’s rebuttable presumption requires a court to “pre-
        sume to be reasonable in time any restraint . . . five years or less in
        duration . . . [and] presume to be unreasonable in time any restraint
        more than . . . five years in duration . . . measured from the date of
        termination or disposition of such interest.” Id. § 13-8-57(d). So the
        four-year term of the non-competition restriction is presumptively
        (but rebuttably) unreasonable if subsection (b) applies, but pre-
        sumptively (and rebuttably) reasonable if subsection (d) applies.
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        28                        Opinion of the Court                      22-10611

                We conclude that subsection (d) applies because, in the con-
        text of the sale of all or a material part of the assets of a business,
        Baldwin was a “seller” as that term is used in O.C.G.A. § 13-8-57(d).
        See id. (applying to “the owner or seller of all or a material part of”
        various business interests). The GRCA defines a “seller” as “[a]n
        owner of a controlling interest” (in turn defined as an equity or
        ownership interest involving 25 percent profit participation or vot-
        ing control), their “affiliate,” or “an executive employee of the busi-
        ness who receives, at a minimum, consideration in connection
        with a sale.” Id. § 13-8-51(4), (17). The GRCA also defines an exec-
        utive employee to include a director, “officer, [] key employee, []
        manager, or [] supervisor of an employer.” Id. § 13-8-51(7). 10
               Baldwin was an executive employee because he was a man-
        ager. See id. Indeed, the district court found that he was a “manager
        of managers.” Doc. 30 at 3. 11 Baldwin also received “consideration

        10 A few other defined terms play a role here, but either their application is
        undisputed by the parties or unnecessary to our disposition. O.C.G.A. § 13-8-
        51(8) defines a “key employee.” O.C.G.A. § 13-8-51(16) defines a “sale.” But
        nobody disputes that a sale occurred, and we need not consider whether Bald-
        win was a “key employee” of Express because we conclude he was a “man-
        ager.” See O.C.G.A. § 13-8-51(7).
        11 At oral argument, we raised the possibility that Baldwin may not have been
        an “executive employee of the business”—that is, of one of the entities sold to
        Express. O.C.G.A. § 13-8-51(7) (emphasis added). After all, at the time of the
        sale Baldwin was not a direct employee of 138 Investments, Middle Georgia
        Investments, or Knoxville Express. Instead, he was an employee of Velocity
        Ventures—the employee leasing company established by Fuller and Lamb
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        22-10611                   Opinion of the Court                                 29

        in connection with [the] sale” of Fuller and Lamb’s assets, as well
        as for the covenant agreement itself. O.C.G.A. § 13-8-51(17)(B). Re-
        call that Baldwin received nearly $2 million because of the sale—
        $1,104,352 for his 15 percent interest in 138 Investments, $600,616
        for his five percent interest in Middle Georgia Investments, and
        $321,441 for a six percent interest in Knoxville Express. The price
        Express paid included a premium for the restrictive covenants exe-
        cuted by Baldwin, Fuller, and Lamb—so Baldwin received more
        money by virtue of the covenant agreement.
               Although Baldwin meets the GRCA’s definition of “seller,”
        the district court concluded that O.C.G.A. § 13-8-57(d) did not ap-
        ply. The district court reasoned that Baldwin was not a “seller of a
        material part of the assets” purchased by Express, “even if” he met
        “the GRCA’s broader definition of a seller.” Doc. 30 at 32.
               The district court based its conclusion on the rule against
        surplusage. Georgia law recognizes the oft-recited rule that, “in
        construing a statute” courts should “avoid a construction that
        makes some language mere surplusage.” Loudermilk, 826 S.E.2d at
        574 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Walker v. State, 723
        S.E.2d 894, 898 (Ga. 2012) (deeming this rule “fundamental”).

        that was not (so far as we can tell) sold to Express. We choose not to address
        this possibility, however, because neither the parties nor the district court ad-
        dressed it. And we generally do not assume an initiating role by considering
        issues the parties have not raised. See United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct.
        1575, 1579 (2020) (observing that in our adversarial system, “we rely on the
        parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral
        arbiter of matters the parties present”).
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        30                     Opinion of the Court                  22-10611

        Applying the rule, the district court rejected an interpretation of
        O.C.G.A. § 13-8-57(d) that it determined, would “render the phrase
        ‘material part’ superfluous” by applying subsection (d) to any
        “seller” and concluded that the five-year presumption contained in
        subsection (d) should apply only “to the owner of all or a material
        part of the assets or the seller of the same.” Doc. 30 at 31–32 (inter-
        nal quotation marks omitted).
                “[M]aterial part” must do some work here. But we find the
        district court’s approach inconsistent with the GRCA’s definition
        of “seller.” See O.C.G.A. § 13-8-51(17)(B) (defining seller to include
        “[a]n executive employee of the business who receives, at a mini-
        mum, consideration in connection with a sale”). Grafting the dis-
        trict court’s requirement on to the GRCA’s definition of seller pro-
        duces a test that fails to account for executive employees. As con-
        strued by the district court, O.C.G.A. § 13-8-57(d) would apply to:
        an executive employee of the business who receives, at a mini-
        mum, consideration in connection with a sale and who sells all or
        a material part of the assets of a business. But anyone who sells all
        or a material part of a business will receive consideration. And the
        term “in connection with a sale” implies a broader category of cases
        than just those in which an executive employee owns and disposes
        of an interest in a business being sold. See In Connection with, Mer-
        riam Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/diction-
        ary/in%20connection%20with [https://perma.cc/B3SZ-PMSU]
        (meaning “in relation to (something)” or “for reasons that relate to
        (something)”); see also Camp v. Williams, 879 S.E.2d 88, 90 (Ga.
        2022) (endorsing the use of dictionaries to construe undefined
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        22-10611                   Opinion of the Court                                31

        statutory terms). Moreover, the GRCA’s definition of seller sepa-
        rately accounts for “[a]n owner of a controlling” (25 percent) “in-
        terest.” O.C.G.A. § 13-8-51(17)(A); see also id. § 13-8-51(4) (defining
        “controlling interest”). If the material part requirement modified
        the definition of seller, these two prongs of the definition would be
        largely redundant. We think the district court’s approach renders
        this definition of “seller” superfluous to rescue the term “material
        part” from the same fate. 12

        12 The district court rooted its approach largely in pre-GRCA Georgia com-
        mon law, interpreting the differing presumptions in subsections (b) and (d) of
        O.C.G.A. § 13-8-57 as codifying the traditional distinction between covenants
        ancillary to the sale of a business and covenants ancillary to employment.
        Georgia courts would “divide restrictive covenants into covenants ancillary to
        an employment contract, which [would] receive strict scrutiny . . . and cove-
        nants ancillary to a sale of business, which [would] receive much less scrutiny.”
        BB&T Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Renno, 864 S.E.2d 608, 613 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021) (internal
        quotation marks omitted). The district court relied on one case applying this
        distinction—White v. Fletcher/Mayo/Assocs., Inc., 303 S.E.2d 746 (Ga. 1983)—
        to conclude that this agreement more closely resembled a covenant ancillary
        to employment.
        Although Georgia common law is an appropriate source of law to draw upon
        where the statute is unclear, it cannot override the plain text of the statute.
        Only when the “statutory text can be as reasonably understood to conform to
        the common law” as to depart from it do we “presume that the legislature
        meant to adhere.” Loudermilk, 826 S.E.2d at 121 n.4 (internal quotation marks
        omitted). But when “the language of a statute is plain and susceptible to only
        one natural and reasonable construction, courts must construe the statute ac-
        cordingly.” Kemp v. Kemp, 788 S.E.2d 517, 522 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016) (internal
        quotation marks omitted). Under the only reasonable construction of the stat-
        ute, Baldwin meets the criteria for the application of the five-year presumption
        contained in O.C.G.A. § 13-8-57(d).
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        32                         Opinion of the Court                        22-10611

                 A different construction better harmonizes the statutory lan-
        guage. The term “all or a material part of” refers to the sale itself—
        not the executive employee’s stake in it. Therefore, O.C.G.A. § 13-
        8-57(d) applies (as relevant here) to: an executive employee of the
        business who receives, at a minimum, consideration in connection
        with a sale of all or a material part of one of the five enumerated
        interests. Baldwin meets these criteria. As we have already ex-
        plained, Baldwin is an executive employee who received significant
        consideration.13 And the sale at issue was “of all or a material part
        of . . . [t]he assets of a business.” Id. § 13-8-57(d)(1). Express pur-
        chased all of Fuller and Lamb’s stores. Thus, the district court
        should have “presume[d]” the four-year duration of the covenant
        “to be reasonable in time.” Id. § 13-8-57(d). Instead, applying
        O.C.G.A. § 13-8-57(b), it presumed the opposite. 14

        13 The “at a minimum” language contained in O.C.G.A. § 13-8-51(17) suggests
        that not just any amount of consideration will suffice to qualify a key em-
        ployee as a seller. But we need not confront that issue here. Baldwin received
        nearly $2 million. Under the circumstances, we find this amount more than
        adequate to satisfy the definition of seller.
        14 Section 13-8-57(b)—the two-year presumption—by its terms applies to
        agreements “not associated with the sale or ownership of all or a material part
        of” of a business. O.C.G.A. § 13-8-57(b). This language further supports our
        conclusion. The agreement between Baldwin and Express was certainly “as-
        sociated with” the sale of the assets of Fuller and Lamb’s businesses in the or-
        dinary sense of the term; it related to the sale. See Associated, Merriam Webster,
        https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/associated
        [https://perma.cc/JV6F-F6QV] (meaning “related, connected, or combined
        together”).
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        22-10611                   Opinion of the Court                     33

               By applying the wrong presumption in holding that Baldwin
        was likely to succeed on the merits of his claim, the district court
        abused its discretion. Jysk, 810 F.3d at 773–74. Accordingly, we va-
        cate the preliminary injunction to the extent it altered the duration
        of the covenant agreement. We note, however, that the GRCA
        specifies that the presumptions contained in § 13-8-57 are “rebutta-
        ble.” O.C.G.A. 13-8-57(a). We do not prejudge whether, on the
        facts of this case, Baldwin can rebut this presumption. On remand,
        applying § 13-8-57(d), the district court may consider in the first in-
        stance whether Baldwin is likely to rebut this presumption and thus
        succeed on the merits of his claim.

                            iii.     Blue-Pencil Authority

                Express argues that the district court lacked the authority to
        modify the covenant in the manner it did: altering those provisions
        it deemed unenforceable under the GRCA. According to Express,
        the district court “disregarded the intent and expectations of the
        parties,” inventing new terms “from whole cloth” when it nar-
        rowed the covenant. Appellant’s Br. at 22, 24 (internal quotation
        marks omitted). Because we have already concluded that the dis-
        trict court abused its discretion when it altered the covenant’s du-
        ration, we consider this argument only in the context of Section 1’s
        geographic scope.
                We find no merit to Express’s argument. The GRCA author-
        izes the enforcement of restrictive covenants that are “reasonable
        in . . . geographic area.” O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(a). When the geo-
        graphic scope of a covenant is unreasonable, it is “not in
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        34                      Opinion of the Court                   22-10611

        compliance with the [GRCA]” and thus “unlawful . . . void and un-
        enforceable.” Id. § 13-8-53(d). When faced with an unenforceable
        provision—like the overbroad non-competition area here—the
        GRCA authorizes a court to “modify the restraint provision and
        grant only the relief reasonably necessary to protect [legitimate
        business interests] and to achieve the original intent of the contract-
        ing parties to the extent possible.” Id. § 13-8-54(b); see also id. § 13-
        8-53(d) (permitting a court to “modify a covenant that is otherwise
        void and unenforceable”). That is precisely what the district court
        did. As we have explained, the covenant agreement’s geographic
        scope is unreasonable and unsupported by a legitimate business in-
        terest except within Baldwin’s prior service area. The district court
        thus narrowed the geographic reach of the covenant to equal the
        most that would be enforceable under the GRCA.
                Georgia common law bolsters our conclusion that the dis-
        trict court’s blue-pencil authority authorized it to reduce the geo-
        graphic scope of the covenant. Before the enactment of the GRCA,
        Georgia courts possessed the authority to blue-pencil restrictive
        covenants ancillary to the sale of a business. See Watson v. Waffle
        House, Inc., 324 S.E.2d 175, 177 (Ga. 1985). And where such a cove-
        nant “designate[d] a [non-competition] area greater than reasona-
        bly necessary,” courts could exercise that authority to “enjoin the
        seller from competing in only so much of that area as . . . is essential
        to protect the buyer.” Hamrick v. Kelley, 392 S.E.2d 518, 518–19 (Ga.
        1990) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Waste Mgmt. of
        Metro Atlanta v. Appalachian Waste Sys., LLC, 649 S.E.2d 578, 582
        (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (explaining that when blue-penciling a court
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        22-10611                Opinion of the Court                       35

        may “limit an [existing] area, thus making it reasonable”(internal
        quotation marks omitted)). The common-law backdrop is con-
        sistent with the district court’s revisions to the geographic scope of
        the agreement: it narrowed a defined non-competition area. See
        Doc. 30 at 37 (“The Court finds that this narrowed version of the
        agreement will sufficiently protect [Express’s] legitimate business
        interest[.]”). The GRCA extended this same blue-pencil authority
        to all restrictive covenants. See N. Am. Senior Benefits, LLC v. Wim-
        mer, 889 S.E.2d 361, 67 (Ga. Ct. App. 2023) (retaining Hamrick’s
        common-law rule governing scope of blue-pencil authority under
        the GRCA).
                Nor are we persuaded that the district court “disregarded
        the intent and expectations of the parties.” Appellant’s Br. at 22.
        Even if the district court could enforce an unreasonable covenant,
        but see O.C.G.A. §§ 13-8-53(d), 13-8-54(b), this covenant anticipated
        that the district court might narrow overbroad restrictions. Section
        6 authorizes “any court called upon to enforce this Agreement . . .
        to modify the . . . geographic area established herein, to the extent
        such court determines is necessary . . . [for] this Agreement [to] be
        enforced.” Doc. 1-1 at 52. Faced with unenforceable terms, the dis-
        trict court did as the parties intended.

                   iv.   Remaining Preliminary Injunction Factors

               Having concluded that Baldwin is likely to succeed on the
        merits of his claim that the geographic scope of the covenant agree-
        ment is unenforceable (and confirmed that that district court had
        the authority to narrow it), we consider the remaining factors
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        36                     Opinion of the Court                  22-10611

        Baldwin must show to justify a preliminary injunction: “that he is
        likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,
        that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction
        is in the public interest.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.
               Express (briefly) argues that the district court abused its dis-
        cretion when it determined that Baldwin had made the requisite
        showing as to each of these three factors. We reject its arguments.
               Addressing irreparable harm, the district court observed that
        “Baldwin is someone in his mid 50s . . . . He obviously wants to
        work. He is still productive. And to be thwarted from any produc-
        tive employment in his field is an enormous loss.” Doc. 30 at 35.
        Baldwin has already had to forgo at least one business opportunity
        because of the covenant—one that is no longer available, so the
        harm from his inability to pursue it has become irreparable. And
        the district court found no reason to conclude that “other opportu-
        nities will not come up in the future.” Id.
                Express has not explained how the district court committed
        a clear error in judgment by concluding that Baldwin is likely to
        suffer irreparable harm. It merely suggests Baldwin’s agreement is
        reasonable, he received a significant payment, and he should abide
        by the agreement. These arguments have nothing to say about
        whether Baldwin will suffer harm. And we have already rejected
        the minor premise of one by concluding that the geographic scope
        of Section 1 is not reasonable under Georgia law.
              The district court also addressed the balance of the equities
        at length. Although it acknowledged that by striking some
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        22-10611                  Opinion of the Court                               37

        restrictions it would be granting Baldwin a windfall, the district
        court concluded that “Baldwin’s interest in earning a living cer-
        tainly outweighs any interest [Express] has in enforcing the broad
        nationwide protections contemplated in the restrictive covenant as
        written.” Id. at 36. The district court determined that by using its
        blue-pencil authority to grant targeted relief to Baldwin, it would
        respect the balance of the equities.
                Express has not shown otherwise. On appeal, it points only
        to the windfall it claims Baldwin will receive: “$2,250,000 and the
        ability to immediately compete with Appellant.” Appellant’s Br. at
        29. 15 Any such windfall is significantly exaggerated. The roughly
        $2 million Baldwin received in connection with the sale of Fuller
        and Lamb’s assets represented his stake in 138 Investments, Middle
        Georgia Investments, and Knoxville Express—it was not consider-
        ation solely for the covenant agreement. Although the district
        court found that the sale price included a premium for the restric-
        tive covenants executed by Baldwin, Fuller, and Lamb, Baldwin
        “would have been entitled to a . . . share of the sale proceeds re-
        gardless.” Doc. 30 at 20. And the district court did not strike the
        covenant agreement entirely. So any windfall Baldwin received is

        15 Express also refers to Baldwin’s ability to “directly solicit” its “employees
        and customers.” Appellant’s Br. at 29. Express does not present any other ar-
        gument regarding Section 2, the non-solicitation portion of the covenant
        agreement, which the district court’s injunction did not address. We do not
        consider Section 2 in our analysis.
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        38                     Opinion of the Court                  22-10611

        significantly less than the total sum he was paid in connection with
        the sale of Fuller and Lamb’s assets.
               The district court also offered another reason for its conclu-
        sion on the equities that we find persuasive. The district court con-
        cluded that it lacked the authority under Georgia law to require
        Baldwin to return some portion of the $2 million payment (a con-
        clusion Express does not contest on appeal and we thus assume to
        be correct). Its options, then, were to (1) enforce the covenant; (2)
        strike down the covenant in its entirety, while allowing Baldwin to
        retain the $2 million; or (3) provide targeted relief while allowing
        Baldwin to retain the $2 million. See Burbach, 892 S.E.2d at 727 n.6
        (observing that, under the GRCA, a trial court may have “discre-
        tion to decide whether to blue-pencil a restrictive covenant” but
        declining to address the scope of that discretion). The GRCA does
        not permit a court to enforce an unlawful covenant. O.C.G.A. §§
        13-8-53(d), 13-8-54(b). And targeted relief does more to preserve
        the parties’ bargain than would indiscriminate relief. The district
        court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the balance
        of equities favored targeted preliminary injunctive relief in Bald-
        win’s favor.
                As to the final factor, Express argues that the district court
        abused its discretion in ruling that the public interest favored grant-
        ing preliminary relief to Baldwin because it “contravened the pub-
        lic interest in upholding reasonable . . . restrictive covenants.” Ap-
        pellant’s Br. at 30. The district court drew on essentially the same
        reasoning, concluding that the public interest did not support
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        22-10611               Opinion of the Court                         39

        “enforcing facially invalid contractual terms” that violate the
        GRCA. Doc. 30 at 44. It added that Baldwin is a skilled professional,
        and the public would be better served by having access to his ser-
        vices than by requiring him to idle. Because we agree with the dis-
        trict court that the geographic scope of the restrictions contained
        in the covenant agreement are contrary to Georgia law, we find
        Express’s argument meritless.
              In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
        decided that Baldwin made the showing necessary to warrant a pre-
        liminary injunction narrowing the geographic scope of the cove-
        nant. We therefore affirm this portion of the injunction.

                                 B. Injunction Bond

               In addition to partly enjoining Express from enforcing the
        covenant, the district court ordered Baldwin to post a $40,000 in-
        junction bond. On appeal, Express challenges the bond amount,
        calling it “patently low.” Appellant’s Br. at 30. Because we partly
        vacate the preliminary injunction, we do not decide Express’s chal-
        lenge to the bond amount. We leave it to the district court to de-
        termine the proper bond amount on remand based on whatever
        preliminary relief it ultimately awards to Baldwin.

                               IV.    CONCLUSION

               For the above reasons, we: (1) DISMISS AS MOOT Ex-
        press’s appeal insofar as it challenges the district court’s injunction
        altering now-expired components of the covenant agreement, (2)
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        40                    Opinion of the Court               22-10611

        VACATE in part the district court’s preliminary injunction insofar
        as it reduced the duration of the covenant agreement, and (3)
        AFFIRM in part the district court’s preliminary injunction insofar
        as it reduced the live aspects of the non-competition area. On re-
        mand, the district court may consider whether Baldwin has rebut-
        ted the presumption contained in O.C.G.A. § 13-8-57(d) and may
        set an appropriate injunction bond.