Court Opinion

ID: 9380553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-20 16:00:41.378569+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:26.094307
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 20-4120     Document: 010110829030      Date Filed: 03/20/2023    Page: 1
                                                                                  FILED
                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                                       PUBLISH                                Tenth Circuit

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       March 20, 2023
                                                                         Christopher M. Wolpert
                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                          Clerk of Court
                          _________________________________

  WESTERN WATERSHEDS PROJECT,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                          No. 20-4120

  INTERIOR BOARD OF LAND
  APPEALS; UNITED STATES
  DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,

        Defendants - Appellees,

  and

  STATE OF UTAH; UTAH SCHOOL
  AND INSTITUTIONAL TRUST LANDS
  ADMINISTRATION; UTAH
  DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,

        Intervenor Defendants - Appellees.
                        _________________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                                for the District of Utah
                             (D.C. No. 1:19-CV-00095-TS)
                        _________________________________

 Laurence J. Lucas of Advocates for the West, Boise, Idaho (John Persell of Western
 Watersheds Project, Hailey, Idaho, and Megan Backsen of Reno, Nevada, with him on
 the briefs), for Plaintiff-Appellant.

 Rebecca Jaffe, Attorney (Jean E. Williams, Acting Assistant Attorney General, with her
 on the brief), Environment and Natural Resources Division, U.S. Department of Justice,
 Washington, D.C., for Defendants-Appellees.
Appellate Case: 20-4120    Document: 010110829030         Date Filed: 03/20/2023     Page: 2

 Mark S. Boshell, Special Assistant Attorney General (Kaitlin T. Davis, Kathy A.F. Davis,
 and Anthony L. Rampton, Assistant Attorneys General, with him on the brief), Public
 Lands Section, Department of Natural Resources, State of Utah Office of the Attorney
 General, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Intervenor Defendants-Appellees.
                         _________________________________

 Before MORITZ, EBEL, and EID, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

 EID, Circuit Judge.
                          _________________________________

       In 2019, Western Watersheds Project sued to challenge the issuance of permits

 that expired in 2018. 1 The district court dismissed the case for lack of Article III

 standing. We agree with that decision. Western Watersheds Project’s claims were

 brought against expired permits that had already been renewed automatically by 43

 U.S.C. § 1752(c)(2). Moreover, the timing of a new environmental analysis of the

 new permits is within the Secretary’s discretion under 43 U.S.C. § 1752(i). Western

 Watersheds Project, therefore, lacks Article III standing because its claims are not

       1
          We have before us an unopposed motion by the appellees “to take judicial
 notice of the ten renewal permits attached as exhibits A through J to the []
 declaration” of Michael Gates. Defendants-Appellees’ Motion for Judicial Notice at
 4, Western Watersheds Project v. Interior Bd. of Land Appeals, No. 20-4120 (10th
 Cir. May 24, 2021). Because these documents are publicly available and relevant to
 the parties’ arguments regarding subject matter jurisdiction, we grant the motion and
 take judicial notice of the renewal permits. See Winzler v. Toyota Motor Sales
 U.S.A., Inc., 681 F.3d 1208, 1213 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting that “[t]he contents of an
 administrative agency’s publicly available files . . . traditionally qualify for judicial
 notice, even when the truthfulness of the documents on file is another matter,” and
 “that we may take judicial notice of materials on appeal” (citing In re Calder, 907
 F.2d 953, 955 n.2 (10th Cir. 1990); Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1264 n.24 (10th
 Cir. 2006))).
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Appellate Case: 20-4120     Document: 010110829030      Date Filed: 03/20/2023       Page: 3

 redressable. Accordingly, we need not address the parties’ other arguments and

 affirm the district court’s dismissal of this case.

                                              I.

        In 2007, the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) prepared an environmental

 assessment to analyze the impact of new grazing permits on the Duck Creek

 Allotment. In May 2008, the BLM proposed new grazing permits for the Duck Creek

 Allotment. Western Watersheds Project challenged the BLM’s 2007 environmental

 assessment and the proposed permits through an administrative protest. On

 September 12, 2008, based on its finding that the permits would yield no significant

 environmental impact, the BLM denied Western Watersheds Project’s protest and

 approved issuing new permits for a ten-year term. Western Watersheds Project

 appealed the BLM’s decision through the Department of the Interior’s internal review

 process. On May 16, 2013, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) reversed the BLM’s

 decision. Then, on September 22, 2017, the Interior Board of Land Appeals reversed

 the ALJ’s decision, thereby approving the BLM’s decision to deny Western

 Watersheds Project’s protest. In 2018, the permits at issue in this lawsuit expired;

 and new permits were issued automatically by statute. See 43 U.S.C. § 1752(c)(2).

 The plaintiffs brought this action in 2019, challenging only the expired permits.

                                             II.

                                             A.

        “The Constitution gives federal courts the power to adjudicate only genuine

 ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” California v. Texas, 141 S. Ct. 2104, 2113 (2021)

                                              3
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 (quoting U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2); accord Kerr v. Polis, 20 F.4th 686, 692 (10th Cir.

 2021) (en banc) (quoting California, 141 S. Ct. at 2113). A fundamental contour of

 this power is “the requirement that litigants have standing.” California, 141 S. Ct. at

 2113. “The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing

 standing.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014) (internal

 quotation marks omitted) (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 411–

 12 (2013)). Here, the plaintiff bears this burden. We review de novo whether the

 plaintiff has standing. See Collins v. Daniels, 916 F.3d 1302, 1311 (10th Cir. 2019)

 (citing S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Palma, 707 F.3d 1143, 1152 (10th Cir. 2013)).

        Western Watersheds Project must establish that it has standing—or put

 differently, that it had the “requisite personal interest . . . at the commencement of the

 litigation” such that the district court and this court may exert Article III power over

 the case. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.

 167, 189 (2000) (quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68

 n.22 (1997)). “[T]o establish standing, a plaintiff must show (i) that he suffered an

 injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the

 injury was likely caused by the defendant; and (iii) that the injury would likely be

 redressed by judicial relief.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2203

 (2021) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). “If ‘the

 plaintiff does not claim to have suffered an injury that the defendant caused and the

 court can remedy, there is no case or controversy for the federal court to resolve.’”

 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Casillas v. Madison Avenue Assocs., Inc., 926 F.3d

                                              4
Appellate Case: 20-4120    Document: 010110829030        Date Filed: 03/20/2023     Page: 5

 329, 333 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J.)). “Plaintiffs have the burden to demonstrate

 standing for each form of relief sought.” Collins, 916 F.3d at 1314 (quoting Lippoldt

 v. Cole, 468 F.3d 1204, 1216 (10th Cir. 2006)). “In sum, under Article III, a federal

 court may resolve only ‘a real controversy with real impact on real persons.’”

 TransUnion LLC, 141 S. Ct. at 2203 (quoting Amer. Legion v. Amer. Humanist Ass’n,

 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2103 (2019)).

                                            B.

       “Relief that does not remedy the injury suffered cannot bootstrap a plaintiff

 into federal court; that is the very essence of the redressability requirement.” Steel

 Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998). Western Watersheds

 Project has not met its burden of establishing standing because its claims are not

 redressable. Western Watersheds Project does not have a redressable claim related to

 the 2008 permits because those permits had expired by the time they filed suit, new

 permits were granted by statute, and the new permits will remain until the Executive

 Branch undertakes environmental analysis—the timing of which is discretionary.

       First, the challenged 2008 permits were no longer operative when this suit was

 filed. Western Watersheds Project challenged only the 2008 permits, not the

 currently effective 2018 permits. The courts can offer no remedy for the expired

 permits. Those permits are gone, so nothing can be done directly about those

 permits. A decision about the 2008 permits will have no real-world effect.

       Second, the 2018 permits are not a continuation of the 2008 permits because

 the allegedly incorrect decision to issue the 2008 permits did not infect the statutorily

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 required issuance of the 2018 permits. 2 The 2018 permits were not a continuation of

 the challenged decision related to the 2008 permits because they were required by

 statute. See 43 U.S.C. § 1752(c)(2). The relevant statute provides the following:

       The terms and conditions in a grazing permit or lease that has expired . . .
       shall be continued under a new permit or lease until the date on which the
       Secretary concerned completes any environmental analysis and
       documentation for the permit or lease required under the National
       Environmental Policy Act of 1969 [(“NEPA”)] (42 U.S.C. [§] 4321 et
       seq.) and other applicable laws.

 43 U.S.C. § 1752(c)(2). Even if the challenged government decisions were legally

 invalid—which we do not decide—the 2018 permits were still statutorily required.

 As Western Watersheds Project noted, some case law in other circuits has found that

 if the effects of the expired permits continue, the alleged injury might still involve an

 Article III case or controversy. See Aplt. Br. at 19 (citing Nat’l Parks Conservation

 Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1323 (S.D. Fla. 2008);

 Kescoli v. Babbitt, 101 F.3d 1304, 1309 (9th Cir. 1996); Montgomery Env’t Coal. v.

       2
          Notably, Western Watersheds Project stated explicitly in the district court
 that it was not challenging the 2018 permits. See App’x Vol. I at 150 (“[Western
 Watersheds Project] has no need to challenge [the new permits] before this court.”
 (second alteration in original) (quoting Plaintiff’s Reply Brief on Petition for Judicial
 Review at 6, Western Watersheds Project v. Interior Bd. of Land Appeals, No. 1:19-
 cv-00095-TS-JCB (D. Utah Aug. 3, 2020), ECF No. 70)). Thus, Western Watersheds
 Project waived the argument that it was actually challenging the 2018 permits
 because they were the same as the 2008 permits. But Western Watersheds Project
 did argue that the 2008 permits’ effects continued through the same terms still being
 in effect. See Plaintiff’s Reply Brief on Petition for Judicial Review at 3–7, Western
 Watersheds Project v. Interior Bd. of Land Appeals, No. 1:19-cv-00095-TS-JCB (D.
 Utah Aug. 3, 2020), ECF No. 70. Thus, although Western Watersheds Project
 waived a direct challenge to the 2018 permits, we must still address its indirect
 challenge through its argument that the 2008 permits’ effects continued through the
 2018 permits.
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 Costle, 646 F.2d 568, 578–79 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Mine Reclamation Corp. v. Fed.

 Energy Regul. Comm’n, 30 F.3d 1519, 1522–23 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). But that out-of-

 circuit case law neither binds us nor persuades us. The cited case law was written

 before the 2014 amendments to the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, which

 required the automatic renewal of the permits under different permits and granted the

 Secretary discretion on the timing of new environmental analyses. See Carl Levin

 and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-291, § 3023, 128 Stat. 3292, 3762–64 (2014). Moreover, the

 portions of that case law relevant to this issue purport to discuss mootness rather than

 standing—which is at issue in this case. A plaintiff must have standing “at the

 commencement of the litigation,” and it must not become moot during the litigation.

 Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 189 (quoting Arizonans for Official English,

 520 U.S. at 68 n.22); accord Ajaj v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 25 F.4th 805, 811 (10th

 Cir. 2022) (quoting Prison Legal News v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 944 F.3d 868, 879

 (10th Cir. 2019)). The changes arguably impacting our Article III power over this

 matter took place before the suit was filed. Thus, standing—not mootness—is the

 proper legal framework for this case. 3 As a result, the cited out-of-circuit case law

 does not persuade us that the effects of the 2008 decision continued when Western

 Watersheds Project filed suit. The statute counsels otherwise. Whatever took place

       3
        The government’s argument in the alternative that this case is moot misses
 the mark because standing is the proper framework.
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 with the agency decisions and proceedings surrounding the old permits, the new

 permits were statutorily required and were issued before this lawsuit was filed.

        Third, even if we thought that the 2008 decision’s effects continued, this court

 could not cause a real-world effect through a favorable decision related to those 2008

 permits. This court cannot override the Secretary’s statutorily given discretion to

 determine when a new NEPA analysis occurs. See 43 U.S.C. § 1752(i) (“The

 Secretary concerned, in the sole discretion of the Secretary concerned, shall

 determine the priority and timing for completing each required environmental

 analysis with respect to a grazing allotment, permit, or lease . . . .”). That is, this

 court cannot remedy the alleged harm by requiring a new NEPA analysis. And this

 court cannot provide guidance for a future, indeterminate analysis because that would

 merely be an advisory opinion about something that is within the Secretary’s

 discretion—something for which there is currently no concrete injury-in-fact. But

 “[r]elief that does not remedy the injury suffered cannot bootstrap a plaintiff into

 federal court; that is the very essence of the redressability requirement.” Steel Co.,

 523 U.S. at 107. Because of the Secretary’s statutorily defined discretion in this

 matter, we cannot issue a favorable decision regarding the 2008 permits with any

 real-world effect—which would make such a decision advisory and beyond our

 power.

        Because the 2008 permits no longer existed at the start of this litigation and no

 evidence suggests that there is any ongoing impact that we could address through a

 favorable decision, no relief could be granted with respect to those permits that could

                                              8
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 redress the harm that has allegedly been caused by the agency. Cf. Dr. John’s, Inc. v.

 City of Roy, 465 F.3d 1150, 1156 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding that a plaintiff had

 established redressability where “the injury would be redressed by a declaration that

 the ordinance is unconstitutional and an injunction against its enforcement”).

 Therefore, Western Watersheds Project lacks standing.

                                             III.

        Because Western Watersheds Project lacks Article III standing, its appeal of

 the district court’s denial of its motion to recuse is moot; and we do not address it.

 See Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 254 F.3d 941, 946 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Plaintiff

 asserts that the district judge abused his discretion by refusing to recuse himself . . . .

 However, our conclusion that Plaintiff’s federal and state claims no longer belong in

 federal court renders the recusal issue, with its request for prospective relief, moot.”);

 Stein v. New Mexico, 684 F. App’x 720, 720 n.1 (10th Cir. 2017) (“Also, Mr. Stein

 appeals the court’s denial of his motion to recuse[] and asks this court to reassign the

 case on remand. . . . However, our conclusion that the court lacks subject matter

 jurisdiction also renders the recusal issue moot.”). 4 We similarly need not reach

 either party’s other arguments or the merits. We AFFIRM the district court’s

 dismissal of this case for lack of Article III standing.

        4
         Unpublished decisions are not binding precedent but may be cited for their
 persuasive value. See 10th Cir. R. 32.1; Fed. R. App. P. 32.1.
                                              9