Court Opinion

ID: 9832238
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:44:33.868164+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:44.556687
License: Public Domain

*56ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.
GARRETT, Chief Justice.
The motion for rehearing in this case was transferred to this court by the Supreme Court, the same having been filed after the adjournment of the last term of that court at Austin.
The appeal was from the judgment of the District Court of Jefferson County in favor of the appellees, who were defendants below, in a suit of trespass to try title to a lot of land in the city of Beaumont.
At the late Galvestom Term of the Supreme Court, on report of the ' Commission of Appeals in an opinion by Judge Harr, the judgment of the court below was reversed and the cause remanded. Counsel for appellant filed a motion to reform the judgment, and instead of reversing and remanding to reverse and render for the appellant.
In an opinion by Judge Henry on the motion to reform, the former judgment of the Supreme Court was set aside and the judgment of the court below was affirmed; and the case is now before us on a motion for rehearing.
After a careful examination of the record we are of the opinion that a rehearing should be granted.
Appellant’s title to the lot in controversy is based on a judgment of the District Court of Jefferson County, at the suit of the city of Beaumont, establishing a lien on the lot for the cost of the construction of a sidewalk, and an order of sale issued on said judgment, and a sale of the lot by virtue of said order of sale. The question for our determination is, did the District Court have jurisdiction to render the judgment?
, Article 376 of the Revised Statutes defines the powers of the city council with reference to the construction of sidewalks. It is as follows:
“Article 376. To establish, erect, construct, regulate, and keep in repair bridges, culverts and sewers, sidewalks and crossings, and to regu-' late the construction and use of the same, and to abate and punish any obstruction or encroachments thereon; and the cost of the construction of sidewalks shall be defrayed by the owner of the lot or part of the lot or block fronting on the sidewalk; and the cost of any sidewalk constructed by the city shall be collected, if necessary, by the sale of the lot or part of the lot or block on which it fronts, together with the cost of collection, in such a manner as the city council may by ordinance provide; and a sale of any lot or part of lot or block to enforce collection of. costs of sidewalks shall convey a good title to the purchaser, and the balance of proceeds of sale, after paying the amount due the city and costs of sale, shall be paid by the city to the owner.”
An ordinance was passed by the city council providing for the construction of sidewalks, which, among other things, provided:
“ The cost of the construction of said sidewalks shall be a lien in favor of the city for the amount thereof on the property of such owner, and *57said lien shall exist in favor of the city for such costs, and shall be by the city enforced in any court having jurisdiction of the subject matter of a suit brought for the purpose, and said property sold according to law to pay the cost of such construction, besides the cost of suit.”
Article 376 of the Revised Statutes made the assessment a lien upon the lot, and we think that the power conferred by it to collect the cost of construction by a sale of the lot in such manner as the city council might by ordinance provide, was sufficient to authorize the passage of the ordinance providing for the sale by process of a court of competent jurisdiction.
The conclusion reached by the Supreme Court was evidently based upon a construction of articles 474, 475, 476, and 477 of the Revised Statutes. These articles relate to avenues, streets, and alleys exclusively; and while it may be said that the sidewalk is a part of the street, still an examination of articles 375 and 376, in connection with those relating to avenues, streets, and alleys, will, as we think, conclusively show that they are treated as distinct and separate. For the construction of a sidewalk the lot may be charged with the entire cost, but it can be charged with only one-third of the cost of the paving and repair of the street.
Article 446 relates to the method of sale for taxes. It is general, but it is the method of sale provided for in article 476 by its language directing the sale in the manner “ provided by ordinance for the sale of real estate in the city, charged with the payment of taxes imposed by said corporation.” The method of sale, however, for the cost of the construction of a sidewalk is a special provision which will control the general provision in article 446, if, indeed, that provision should be more than the method prescribed for the collection of ad valorem taxes.
In the case of The City of Galveston v. Heard, 54 Texas, 420, the suit was by the city against Heard to recover a sidewalk assessment made under a provision of the charter of Galveston identical with article 376, and to have the property sold to satisfy the lien of the assessment. The right of the city to proceed by a suit in the District Court to establish a lien and have the property sold does not seem to have been questioned, but that is what was done by the court.
Article 376 is a special and independent provision of the charter relating to the construction of sidewalks, and it is not in any manner controlled by the articles 474, 475, 476, and 477, relating to avenues, streets, and alleys; nor is it controlled as to the manner of sale by article 446, relating to- the sale of real estate for the taxes assessed thereon.
The fact that the lot was the homestead of Higgins and his wife would not defeat the lien of the assessment, nor prevent it from being sold in satisfaction thereof, even if we could now inquire into that matter after-judgment against them.
Appellees' pleaded in reconvéntion that the property sold was worth *58about $2000, and that the price at which it was bid off was grossly inadequate, and asked that the sale be set aside.
Delivered October 27, 1892.
In his conclusions of fact the court found that the sale was regular; but the judgment was rendered on another ground, which was the invalidity of the judgment in the suit of the city against appellees.
In view of the gross inadequacy of price, and because the case went off on another ground, we think that the first judgment of the Supreme Court, remanding the cause for another trial, was right.
The judgment of the court below will be therefore reversed and the cause remanded.

Reversed and remanded.