Court Opinion

ID: 9908099
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-07 18:06:18.909321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:34:33.417010
License: Public Domain

139 Nev., Advance Opinion    SP-
                      IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                 LARRY J. WILLARD, INDIVIDUALLY                   No. 83640
                 AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE LARRY
                 JAMES WILLARD TRUST FUND; AND
                 OVERLAND DEVELOPMENT
                 CORPORATION, A CALIFORNIA
                 CORPORATION,
                 Appellants,
                                                                  HUD
                 vs.                                               NOV 30 2023
                 BERRY-HINCKLEY INDUSTRIES, A                  ELI7 i.TH kBSO
                                                                                       RT
                                                             CLEM' FP       EC
                 NEVADA CORPORATION; JERRY                   BY
                 HERBST, AN INDIVIDUAL; AND                       C IEF DEPUTI CLERK

                 TIMOTHY P. HERBST, AS SPECIAL
                 ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE
                 OF JERRY HERBST, DECEASED,
                 Respondents.

                 LARRY J. WILLARD, INDIVIDUALLY                   No. 84848
                 AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE LARRY
                 JAMES WILLARD TRUST FUND; AND
                 OVERLAND DEVELOPMENT
                 CORPORATION, A CALIFORNIA
                 CORPORATION,
                 Appellants,
                 vs.
                 BERRY-HINCKLEY INDUSTRIES, A
                 NEVADA CORPORATION; JERRY
                 HERBST, AN INDIVIDUAL; AND
                 TIMOTHY P. HERBST, AS SPECIAL
                 ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE
                 OF JERRY HERBST, DECEASED,
                 Respondents.

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                             Consolidated appeals from district court orders denying NRCP
                60(b) relief. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Lynne K.
                Simons, Judge.
                             Affirmed.

                Lemons, Grundy & Eisenberg and Robert L. Eisenberg, Reno; Robertson,
                Johnson, Miller & Williamson and Richard D. Williamson and Jonathan J.
                Tew, Reno,
                for Appellants.

                Dickinson Wright, PLLC, and John P. Desmond, Brian R. Irvine, and Anjali
                D. Webster, Reno,
                for Respondents.

                BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT EN BANC.

                                                   OPINION

                By the Court, STIGLICH, C.J.:
                            In this opinion, we consider whether the district court abused
                its discretion in denying appellants relief under NRCP 60(b)(1), NRCP
                60(b)(5), and NRCP 60(b)(6). We have not previously resolved whether an
                order of dismissal applies "prospectively" for purposes of NRCP 60(b)(5) and
                today conclude that it does not.
                            The underlying proceedings commenced with a complaint
                sounding in breach of contract.       After appellants generally failed to
                prosecute their case, the district court granted respondents' motion for
                sanctions, dismissing the case with prejudice. Appellants moved for NRCP
                60(b)(1) relief, which the district court denied. In a first appeal, this court
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                   reversed and remanded for the district court to make findings as to the
                   factors set forth in Yochum v. Davis, 98 Nev. 484, 653 P.2d 1215 (2018).
                   Willard v. Berry-Hinckley Indus., 136 Nev. 467, 471, 469 P.3d 176, 180
                   (2020).     On remand, the district court again denied the NRCP 60(b)(1)
                   motion, now providing detailed findings as to the Yochum factors. The
                   district court also denied a subsequent niotion for relief under NRCP
                   60(b)(5) or NRCP 60(b)(6). Appellants appealed both denial orders, and we
                   have consolidated the appeals.
                                 As to the denial of appellants' NRCP 60(b)(1) motion, we
                   conclude that the district court's decision is supported by substantial
                   evidence and therefore does not constitute an abuse of discretion. As to
                   NRCP 60(b)(5), we follow persuasive federal authority and clarify that
                   orders of dismissal are not "prospective" within the meaning of the rule.
                   Therefore, NRCP 60(b)(5) was not an appropriate vehicle by which
                   appellants could obtain relief. Finally, we conclude that the district court
                   did not abuse its discretion in denying relief under NRCP 60(13)(6), given
                   that appellants sought relief on a basis that was cognizable under NRCP
                   60(b)(1),    which   is   mutually exclusive from   NRCP     60(b)(6) relief.
                   Accordingly, we affirm the district court's orders denying NRCP 60(b) relief.
                                        FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                                 Appellants Larry J. Willard and the Overland Development
                   Corporation (collectively, Willard) sued respondents Berry-Hinckley
                   Industries and Jerry Herbst' (collectively, Berry-Hinckley) on claims
                   sounding in breach of contract.     After three years of Willard failing to
                   comply with discovery requirements and various court orders and otherwise

                        'Timothy P. Herbst is participating in this matter as special
                   administrator of the estate of Jerry Herbst, who passed away in 2018.
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                failing to prosecute the case, Berry-Hinckley moved for sanctions, seeking
                dismissal with prejudice. Willard did not oppose, and the district court
                granted the motion. Willard did not appeal the sanctions order.
                            Willard moved to set aside the sanctions order under NRCP
                60(b)(1) based on excusable neglect. He argued that mental health issues
                had caused his lead attorney, Brian Moquin, to constructively abandon the
                case, ultimately resulting in the dismissal of the action. The district court
                denied Willard's rnotion without addressing the factors set forth in Yochum,
                and Willard appealed.
                            In resolving the appeal, we held that when determining
                whether NRCP 60(b)(1) relief is warranted, the district court must address
                the Yochum factors regardless of whether the movant seeks relief from an
                order or a judgment.      Willard, 136 Nev. at 470, 469 P.3d at 179.       We
                concluded that the district court abused its discretion by failing to set forth
                findings as to the Yochum factors, reversed the district court's order denying
                Willard's NRCP 60(b)(1) motion, and remanded the case for further
                proceedings. Id. at 471, 469 P.3d at 180.
                            Berry-Hinckley moved for en banc reconsideration. This court
                denied reconsideration but clarified that the parties were precluded from
                presenting new evidence or arguments on remand and that the district
                court's consideration of the Yochurn factors was limited to* the record
                currently before the court.
                            On remand, the district court held a status hearing and
                requested proposed orders from the parties. The district court subsequently
                issued an order denying Willard's NRCP 60(b)(1) motion with consideration
                of the Yochurn factors.    Willard appealed the order denying the NRCP
                60(b)(1) motion.

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                                 While that appeal was pending, Willard moved for relief under
                     NRCP 60(b)(5) or (6). Willard explained that attorney Moquin had admitted
                     he violated the rules of professional conduct with regard to Willard's case in
                     a guilty plea entered pursuant to attorney discipline proceedings. In re
                     Discipline of Moquin, No. 78946, 2019 WL 5390401 (Nev. Oct. 21, 2019)
                     (Order Approving Conditional Guilty Plea Agreement and Enjoining
                     Attorney From Practicing Law in Nevada). Willard argued that Moquin's
                     admissions constituted a change in conditions• that made application of the
                     sanctions order prospectively no longer equitable and thus that relief was
                     warranted under NRCP 60(b)(5).         Willard also argued that Moquin's

                     admissions constituted new evidence of the mental illness that allegedly
                     caused Moquin's failures during the district court proceedings and that
                     relief was warranted on that basis.        The district court denied Willard's

                     motion.   The court ruled that NRCP 60(b)(5) relief was not warranted
                     because the guilty plea did not constitute a significant change in factual
                     conditions and •that NRCP 60(b)(6) relief was not available because
                     Willard's allegations sounded in excusable neglect under NRCP 60(b)(1). It
                     alternatively ruled that Willard did not show extraordinary circumstances
                     to justify reopening the case    Willard appealed the district• court•order

                     denying the motion seeking relief pursuant to NRCP 60(b)(5) and (6). We
                     have consolidated Willard's appeals.
                                                     DISCUSSION
                     Standard of review
                                 We review a district court's decision "to grant or deny a motion
                     to set aside a judgment under NRCP 60(b)" for abuse of discretion. Cook v.
                     Cook, 112 Nev. 179, 181-82, 912 P.2d 264, 265 (1996). An abuse of discretion
                     occurs when the district court's decision is not supported by substantial
                     evidence, which is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
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                adequate to support a conclusion, see Otak Nev., LLC v. Eighth Judicial
                Dist. Court, 129 Nev. 799, 805, 312 P.3d 491, 496 (2013). or when the district
                court disregards established legal principles, Willard, 136 Nev. at 469, 469
                P.3d at 179.
                The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief under NRCP
                60(b)(1)
                               Willard argues that the district court misapplied the Yochum
                factors, as each factor favored granting the NRCP 60(b)(1) motion. Berry-
                Hinckley counters that the district court correctly considered and applied
                each of the Yochum factors.
                               Under   NRCP 60(b)(1),      a district court "may relieve      a

                party... from a final judgment, order, or proceeding" on grounds of
                "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." An NRCP 60(b)(1)
                movant bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the
                evidence, that such grounds for relief exist. See Willard, 136 Nev. at 470,
                469 P.3d at 179-80. To determine whether such grounds for relief exist, the
                district court must consider the following four factors, set forth by this court
                in Yochum: "(1) a prompt application to remove the judgment; (2) the
                absence of an intent to delay the proceedings; (3) a lack of knowledge of
                procedural requirements; and (4) good faith." Id. at 470, 469 P.3d at 179
                (quoting Yochum, 98 Nev. at 486, 653 P.2d at 1216). The district court
                must issue express factual findings, preferably in writing, pursuant to each
                Yochum factor." Id. at 468, 469 P.3d at 178. And the district court must
                consider Nevada's policy of "decid[ing] cases on the merits whenever
                feasible when evaluating an NRCP 60(b)(1) motion." Id. at 47C), 469 P.3d at
                179.

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                                  While the district court found that Willard filed the NRCP
                       60(h)(1) motion promptly with respect to the first Yochum factor, it
                       concluded that the Yochum factors as a whole weighed against granting
                       relief. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the district court's
                       findings and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
                       Willard NRCP 60(b)(1) relief.
                                   We note that neither party contests the district court's finding
                       on the first factor on appeal. As to the second Yochum factor, the district
                       court found, giVen Willard's failures to comply with procedural obligations
                       and other conduct causing delay, intent to delay proceedings. The record
                       supports this finding. Willard's initial disclosures did not provide a
                       computation of alleged damages, which was required by NRCP
                       16.1(a)(1)(A)(iv) and necessary to enable Berry-Hinckley to complete
                       discovery. Larry J. Willard personally appeared at least once at a hearing
                       at which this deficiency was addressed and thus knew of thiS omission,
                       which contributed to the delay.           Willard also failed to respond to
                       interrogatories, requiring Berry-Hinckley to move to compel, and failed to
                       oppose Berry-Hinckley's motion for sanctions, even after the district court
                       urged him to respond. See Rodriguez v. Fiesta Palms, LLC, 134 Nev. 654,
                       658, 428 P.3d 255, 258 (2018) ("[Appellant] should have inferred the
                       consequences of not opposing the motion to dismiss, especially in light of the
                       court's express warning to take action."); see also Kahn v. Orme, 108 Nev.
                       510, 514, 835 P.2d 790, 793 (1992) (concluding that a party did not show an
                       absence of intent to delay proceedings where the party did not oppose a
                       motion for a default judgment, among other considerations), overruled on
                       other grounds by Epstein v. Epstein, 113 Nev. 1401, 950 P.2d 771 (1997), as
                       recognized in Rodriguez, 134 Nev. at 657, 428 P.3d at 258: Willard further

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                failed to timely and properly disclose his expert witness. Willard's
                noncompliance with discovery requirements and court orders reqUired
                extending trial and discovery deadlines numerous times. While Willard
                argues that Moquin's mental illness supported finding excusable neglect,
                Willard knew that Moquin was not responding to communications, and
                many procedural deficiencies occurred before the sanctions order was
                entered, but Willard took no measures to replace Moquin aS counsel. , See
                Kahn, 108 Nev. at 515, 835 P.2d at 793 (admonishing that the "failure to
                obtain new repreSentation or otherwise act on his own behalf is inexcusible"
                in reviewing appellant's knowledge of procedural requirements). Willard
                has not shown that the district court's findings as to this factor were not
                supported by substantial evidence. See Rodriguez, 134 Nev. at 658, 428
                P.3d at 258 (inferring an intent to delay proceedings from a party's earlier
                conduct).
                            As to the third Yochum factor, the district court found that the
                record showed Willard knew the relevant procedural requirements. A party
                is held to know the procedural requirements where the facts establish either
                knowledge or legal notice, the party should have inferred the consequences
                of failing to act, or the party's attorney acquired legal notice or knowledge.
                See Stoecklien v. Johnson Elec., Inc., 109 Nev. 268, 273, 849 P.2d 305, 308
                (1993). As noted, Willard personally attended at least one hearing where
                the court discussed the discovery violations and ordered that an updated
                NRCP 16.1 damages disclosure be filed by a certain date. At the hearing on
                Willard's NRCP 60(b)(1) motion, Willard's counsel acknowledged that
                'WiHard' [had] been here and [had] been involved." He further explained
                that "candidly, [Willard did] know that things needed to be filed" and. that
                Willard had been "an active participant" in the case. Willard also teXted
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                attorney Moquin about deadlines. The court also found that Willard was
                represented by two attorneys; who participated in multiple communications
                with the court related to procedural requirements, and Willard does not
                argue that his attorneys were unaware of procedural requirements.
                Willard's contention that his reliance on Moquin establishes that he was
                unaware of his procedural obligations is belied by the record. Willard has
                not shown the district court's findings as to this factor were not supported
                by substantial evidence.
                            As to the fourth Yochum factor, the district court found that
                Willard failed to show that he acted in good faith given the evidence
                demonstrating an intent to delay the proceedings and which supported
                issuance of the sanctions order. "Good faith is an intangible and abstract
                quality with no technical meaning or definition and encompasses, among
                other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice, and the absence of
                design to defraud." Stoecklien, 109 Nev. at 273, 849 P.2d at 309. The court
                may look to a party's conduct in the proceedings in ascertaining good faith.
                See id. (observing that, while the underlying action alleged fraud, the record
                did not show that appellant perpetrated a fraud in the court uroceedings).
                The district court noted its previous findings that Willard knew the relevant
                procedural requirements and intended to delay the proceedings and that
                multiple willful violations had justified the issuance of the sanctions order.
                The court also found that after three years of failing to comply with the rules
                of civil procedure, and with only four weeks remaining for discovery; Willard
                moved for summary judgment, alleging new bases for damages. And it
                found tb.at the new damages request was based on information that Willard
                had possessed throughout the proceedings and that Willard's conduct was
                intentional, strategic, and in bad faith. The court likewise fbund that. the

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                failure to disclose NRCP 16.1 damages was done in bad faith.. Although
                Willard argues for good faith on the premise that Moquin's personal
                hardships were responsible for the procedural failings, the record shows

                that Willard continued to retain Moquin after becoming aware of diecovery
                and disclosure violations.2    The initial disclosure regarding damages was

                deficient, Willard knew of the deficiency by February 2015 at the latest, and
                Willard retained Moquin through 2017. Willard has not shown that the
                district Court's findings as to this factor were not supported by substantial
                evidence.
                             Finally, the district court acknowledged Nevada's policy of
                adjudicating cases on the merits but found that Willard had frustrated that
                policy by failing to provide damages calculations or expert disclosures and
                thus could not "hide behind" it. This policy "is not absolute and must •he
                balanced against countervailing policy considerations, including• the
                public's interest in expeditious resolution of licases], the parties' interests •in
                bringing litigation to a final and stable judgment, prejudice to the opposing
                side, and judicial administration concerns, such as the court's need to
                manage its sizeable and growing docket." Huckabay Props., Inc: v. NC Auto
                Parts, LLC, 130 Nev. 196, 198, 322 P.3d 429, 430-31 (2014). The Court found

                      2 Willardargues that the district court improperly excluded certain
                evidence of Moquin's mental illness. Having reviewed the arguments in this
                regard, we conclude that Willard has not shown that the district court
                abused its discretion. See Frei ex re?. Litem v. Goodsell, 129 Nev. 403,. 408-
                09, 305 P.3d 70, 73 (2013) (reViewing the district court's decision to exclude
                evidence for abuse of discretion). Eyen a.ssuming that the district court had
                improperly excluded this evidence, Willard has not shown relief would be
                warranted given his continued retention of Moquin after deficiencies
                became apparent. See Wyeth v. &watt, 126 Nev. 446, 465, 244 P.3d 765,
                778 (2010) ("When an error is harmless, reversal is not warranted.").
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                 that Berry-Hinckley served multiple rounds of discovery requests but
                 Willard, by failing to provide threshold information necessary to resolve the
                 claims alleged, impeded a merits resolution. Substantial evidence supports
                 this finding, and Willard has not shown that the district court abused its
                 discretion in concluding Nevada's policy in favor of adjudicating cases on
                 the merits did not warrant granting the NRCP 60(b)(1) motion here.3 See
                 Lentz v. Boles, 84 Nev. 197, 200, 438 P.2d 254, 256-57 (1968) ("Litigants and
                 their counsel may not properly be allowed to disregard process or procedural
                 rules with impunity."). We therefore affirm the district court's order
                 denying Willard NRCP 60(b)(1) relief.4

                       3Willard invokes Passarelli v. el-Mar Development, Inc., 102 Nev. 283,
                 720 P.2d 1221 (1986), to argue that Moquin abandoned his representation
                 and that the matter should be resolved on the merits. However, Passarelli
                 presents significantly different facts. In Passarelli, the attorney ceased
                 performing job functions due to substance abuse, and the record did not
                 show that Passarelli had knowledge of his attorney's abandonment until the
                 damage had been done. 102 Nev. at 285-86, 720 P.2d at 1223. Here, Moquin
                 appeared at status hearings, participated in depositions, filed motions and
                 other papers, and participated in oral arguments before abandonment
                 occurred in December 2017. Numerous instances of failure to comply with
                 discovery requirements and court orders preceded December 2017, and thus
                 allowing the dismissal to stand did not unjustly frustrate the policy favoring
                 disposition on the merits.
                       4Willard also argues the district court 'violated this court's mandate
                 on remand when the district court purportedly aHowed Berry-Hinckley to
                 raise new arguments through a p.roposed order that applied .the Yochum
                 factors because its opposition to Willard's NRCP 60(b)(1) motion did n.ot
                 analyze those factors. We limited the remand to considering the Yochum
                 factors based on the record then before the district court without any nOw
                 evidence or arguments. Willard v. Berry-Hinckley Indus., Docket NO. 77780
                 (February 23, 2021) (Order Denying En Banc Reconsid.eration). Berry.-
                 Hinckley's prOposed order applied the Yochum factors based on the record
                 already befbre the court and did not introd.uce new arguments. Had the
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                     Orders of dismissal are not "prospective" and therefore do not fail within the
                     purview of NRCP 60(b)(5) relief
                                 Willard argues that NRCP 60(b)(5) provides a ground for relief

                     based on "significant" changes in both legal and factual circumstances.
                     Willard explains that Moquin admitted to violating the rules of professional
                     conduct during Willard's case by way of a conditional guilty plea in attorney
                     discipline proceedings.    Willard argues that therefore it is no longer

                     equitable to maintain the sanctions order of dismissal. .Berry-Hinckley
                     counters that orders of dismissal are not "prospective" and thus cannot be
                     set aside under NRCP 60(b)(5).
                                 NRCP 60(b)(5) permits a district court to relieve a party from
                     an order i.f "applying [the order] prospectively is no longer equitable." This
                     court has yet to address the meaning of "prospective" under NRCP 60(b)(5),
                     but "[w]here the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure parallel the Federal Rules
                     of Civil Procedure, rulings of federal courts interpreting and applying the
                     federal rules are persuasive authority for this court in applying the Nevada
                     Rules." Nutton v. Sunset Station, Inc., 131 Nev. 279, 285 n.2, 357 P.3d 966,
                     970 n.2 (Ct. App. 2015).
                                 The federal. circuit courts of appeal agree that orders of
                     dismissal do not apply prospectively within the meaning of the federal
                     counterpart to NRCP 60(b)(5). See Tapper v. Hearn, 833 F.3d 166, 171 (2d
                     Cir. 2016) (collecting circuit court cases universally holding "that a
                     judgment or order of dismissal or a judgment or order denying a plaintiff
                     injunctive relief . . . does not apply prospectively within the meaning of Rule
                     60(b)(5)"). To that end, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that "a

                     proposed order failed to address YochUrn, it would hal:Te violated Otir
                     mandate. Willard has not shown that the distrid court erred in. this regard.
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                final judgment or order has prospective application for purposes of Rule
                60(b)(5) only where it is executory or involves the supervision of changing
                conduct or conditions." Id. at 170-71 (internal quotation marks omitted).
                            We agree with the interpretation put forward by the federal
                courts. As the D.C. Circuit has explained, "[v]irtually every court order
                causes at least some reverberations into the future, and has, in that literal
                sense, some prospective effect." Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia,
                841 F.2d 1133, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 'That a cOurt's action has continuing
                consequences, however, does not necessarily mean that it has 'prospective
                application for the purposes of Rule 60(b)(5)." Id. Accordingly, we. clarify
                that orders of dismissal are not prospective within the meaning of NRCP
                60(b)(5). See id. at 1139 ("Mt is difficult to see how an unconditional
                dismissal could ever have prospective application within the meaning of
                Rule 60(b)(5).").
                            Here, the sanctions order is not prospective within the meaning
                of NRCP 60(b)(5) because it dismissed Willard's case with prejudice. NRCP
                60(b)(5) was therefore not an appropriate vehicle by which Willard could
                seek relief. We acknowledge that the district .court did not rely on. this
                analysis in denying Willard's 60(b)(5) motion, but we affirm the district
                court's order denying NRCP 60(b)(5) relief because it nevertheless reached
                the correct outcome. See Saavedra-Sandoval v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 126
                Nev. 592, 599, 245 P.3d 1198, 1202-(2010) (affirming the district court where
                it reached the correct result, albeit fbr the wrong reason).

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                The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Willard's request
                for relief under NRCP 60(h)(6)
                             Willard argues the district court abused its discretion in
                denying relief under NRCP 60(b)(6). Willard asserts the NRCP 60(b)(6)
                motion is based on attorney Moquin's willful misconduct rather than on
                excusable neglect.   Berry-Hinckley counters that Willard's motion falls
                within the scope of NRCP 60(b)(1) and therefore Willard cannot seek NRCP
                60(b)(6) relief.5
                             Under NRCP 60(b)(6), a district court may relieve a party from
                an order for "any other reason that justifies relief." NRCP 60(b)(6) relief,
                however, is available only under extraordinary circumstances. Vargas v.
                J Morales Inc., 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 38, 510 P.3d 777, 781 (2022). And relief
                may not be sought under NRCP 60(b)(6) where it would have been available
                under the provisions of NRCP 60(b)(1)-(5). Id.

                      5 Berry-Hinckley  also argues that Willard's motion was not filed
                within a reasonable time, as it was filed more th.an two years after the
                conditional guilty plea on which it was predicated. A motion for NRCP
                60(b)(6) relief must be "made within a reasonable time." NRCP 60(c)(1).
                The reasonableness of the timing of an NRCP 60(b)(6) motion depends• on
                the facts of the case and may include, but is not limited to, considerations
                such as "whether the parties have been prejudiced by the delay and whether
                a good reason has been presented for failing to take action sooner." See
                United States v. Boch Oldsmobile, Inc., 909 F.2d 657, 660-61 (lst Cir. 1990)
                (interpreting the federal analog to NRCP 60(b)(6)). Given that the district
                court denied the motion on a different basis and did not make findings as to
                whether the NRCP 60(b)(6) motion was filed within a reasonable time, we
                decline to address this matter for the first time on appeal. See • Wynn
                Re.sorts, Ltd. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 133 Nev. 369, 386, 399 P.3d
                334, 349 (2017) (declining to consider an issue that would require the
                appellate court to engage in factfinding, which is more properly the province
                of district courts).
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                            The district court found that Willard's motion was based on the
                allegation of Moquin's mental illness and its effect on Moquin's
                representation of Willard. It therefore concluded that NRCP 60(b)(6) relief
                was precluded because the motion was based on another ground delineated
                in NRCP 60(b), namely, NRCP's 60(b)(1)'s "excusable neglect." The record
                supports the district court's ruling.      Willard argued that Moquin's
                conditional guilty plea was new evidence of the rnental illness that
                purportedly resulted in Moquin's failures throughout -the district court
                proceedings. In other words, Willard argued in his NRCP 60(b)(6) motion
                that this additional evidence reinforced his argument for excusable neglect.
                As NRCP 60(b)(1) and NRCP 60(b)(6) are mutually exclusive, NRCP
                60(b)(6) relief was not available for this repackaged claim of excusable
                neglect. Willard therefore has not shown that the district court abused its
                discretion in denying NRCP 60(b)(6) relief.6
                                              CONCLUSION
                            The district court did not abuse its discretion in denyi.ng
                Willard's requests for relief under NRCP 60(b). The district court's findings

                      6 Willard presents a number of arguments challenging the district
                court's sanctions order. Willard summarily argues that "[b]ecause the
                district court denied relief on remand, [Willard's] additional contentions are
                again ripe for this court's consideration in t.his appeal." We disagree.
                Willard voluntarily dismissed his challenge to the district court's sanctions
                order in his previous appeal, and he cannot revive those claims now.
                Willard v. Berry-Hinckley Indus., 136 Nev. 467, 471 n.7, 469 P.3d 176, 1.80
                n.7 (2020). Furthermore, Willard failed to appeal the final judgment in. this
                case, and the sanctions order is not reviewable in this appeal from the
                orders denying post-judgment relief. Holiday Inn Downtown u. Barnett, 103
                Nev. 60, 63, 732 P.2d 1376, 1378-79 (1987).
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(th I947A
                as to NRCP 60(b)(1) and NRCP 60(b)(6) are supported by substantial
                evidence. As to NRCP 60(b)(5), we hold that orders of dismissal are not
                prospective within the meaning of that rule. Accordingly, NRCP 60(b)(5)
                was not an appropriate vehicle by which Willard could seek relief. In light
                of the foregoing, we affirm the district court's orders denying Willard's
                motions to set aside the sanctions order.

                                                                               , C.J.
                                                   Stiglich

                We concur:

                                          , J.
                Ca dish                                     Pickering

                Herndon                                     Lee

                  CVO'
                Parraguirre

SUPREME COURT
         OF
      NEVADA
                                                     16
(0) I 947A