Court Opinion

ID: 9788666
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:14:52.960331+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:15.825731
License: Public Domain

Judge TAUBMAN
dissenting.
Because I believe the plain language, statutory structure, and implementing regulations of the express consent law do not impose a requirement that a person arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol recant a refusal to take a blood or breath test in the presence of the arresting officer, I dissent. I would affirm the trial court's ruling that petitioner, Nancy Gallion, validly retracted her initial refusal to take a blood or breath test after she was arrested for driving under the influence.
On September 8, 2004 at 11:46 pm., a police officer stopped Gallion in Steamboat Springs, and she initially declined to take an alcohol test. According to her undisputed testimony, sometime between 1:00 and 1:10 am., while housed in the Routt County jail, Gallion communicated to a deputy sheriff that she wished to take the alcohol test. The deputy told her the paperwork had already been completed and that she could not take the test.
Subsequently, the hearing officer found that the arresting officer was not available to administer the alcohol test because he was not present in the jail when Gallion made the request, although the arresting officer did not "clear" the police station until 1:11 a.m.
I agree with the majority that Colorado case law has not squarely addressed whether a driver must recant directly to and in the presence of an arresting officer. Therefore, I first look to the plain language of the express consent statute to discern the legislature's intent. Davison v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 84 P.3d 1023 (Colo.2004).
I. Plain Language
The express consent statute requires that an alcohol test be "administered at the direction of a law enforcement officer having probable cause." Section 42-4-1801.1(5), C.R.S.2006. This language does not require the arresting officer to administer the test. It only requires that the officer direct the taking of the test.
To "direct" means "1. to aim (something or someone). 2. To cause (something or someone) to move on a particular course. 3. To guide (something or someone); to govern. 4. To instruct (someone) with authority. 5. To address (something or someone)." Black's Law Dictionary 491 (8th ed.2004).
Thus, under § 42-4-1801.1(5), the arresting officer may guide or cause the administration of the aleohol test without being physically present. Consistent with the statute, the officer may direct an arrested person by telephone, or through another officer, to be administered a blood or breath test. His or her physical presence, therefore, is not required by the plain language of the statute.
Accordingly, I agree with the trial court that the hearing officer erred as a matter of law in concluding that Gallion's arresting officer could not direct the administration of a blood or breath test because he was not physically present when Gallion recanted.
Even if I were to determine the statute is ambiguous, I would conclude that the textual context, legislative history, and implementing regulations support the plain language reading of the statute. See § 2-4-208, C.R.S. 2006; Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Costilla County Conservancy Dist., 88 P.3d 1188 (Colo.2004).
The express consent law, viewed as a whole, does not require an arresting officer to be present to administer or to observe the test.
Indeed, the express consent law does not permit an officer to withdraw a driver's blood. Section 42-4-1301.1(6)(a), C.R.S.2006 ("No person except a physician, a registered nurse, a paramedic ... an emergency medical technician ... or a person whose normal duties include withdrawing blood samples under the supervision of a physician or regis*545tered nurse shall be entitled to withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic or drug content therein."). In addition, a preliminary sereening test performed by an officer at the site of the initial stop may not serve as a basis for a revocation. Section 42-4-1801.1(7), C.R.8.2006. Thus, a blood test must be administered by someone other than the arresting officer, and a breath test may be administered by someone other than the arresting officer. Dep't of Public Health and Environment (DPHE) Reg. 1005-2 § 1.5, 5 Code Colo. Regs. 1005-2.
Further, the arresting officer need not be present to observe the administration of the blood or breath test. Section 42-4-1801.1(5) of the express consent law requires that an aleohol test be administered in accordance with the Rules and Regulations Concerning Testing for Alcohol and Other Drugs of the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment. DPHE Reg. 1005-2.
As the trial court noted, DPHE rules do not require the arresting officer to observe the test. Blood specimens must be "collected in the presence of the arresting officer or other responsible person who can authenticate the specimens." DPHE Reg. 10052 § 1.3.1.1.1.1 (emphasis added). Likewise, a breath test must be administered by a certified evidential breath test operator, but that person need not be a police officer. DPHE Reg. 1005-2 §§ 1.3.2.4 & 1.5. Thus, the arresting officer need not be present to administer the test or to observe its administration.
The Department of Revenue argues that permitting a driver to recant outside the presence of the arresting officer would expand the right to recantation. I disagree.
In interpreting a statute, the court may not insert new words into the statutory structure. Schlessinger v. Schlessinger, 796 P.2d 1385 (Colo.1990). To require the driver to recant directly to and in the presence of the arresting officer would limit the ability of a driver to retract an initial refusal to take a blood or aleohol test in a way not contemplated by the statute. Further, this limitation would contravene the salutary purpose of allowing such recantations-to encourage drivers to comply with Colorado's express consent law. See Pierson v. Colo. Dept of Revenue, 923 P.2d 371 (Colo.App.1996).
IL. Availability
The arresting officer must be available to direct the administration of the test. Zahtila v. Motor Vehicle Div., 39 Colo.App. 8, 560 P.2d 847 (1977). Here, the hearing officer found that the arresting officer was not available because he was not physically present when Gallion recanted her initial refusal. I believe this was an error of law because the hearing officer equated availability with physical presence and, as I have explained above, the statute does not require the arresting officer's physical presence.
The evidence at the hearing was that Gal-lion recanted between 1:00 a.m. and 1:10 am., and the hearing officer found the arresting officer was outside the jail when Gal-lion stated she wanted to take a blood or breath test. Accordingly, when Gallion recanted her refusal, the arresting officer was not far from the jail to which he had taken Gallion. Thus, had the arresting officer been called by the jail deputy, he may well have been available to return to the jail to direct the taking of a blood or breath test, but the hearing officer never reached that question because he found the officer's physical absence was enough to prevent Gallion from recanting her initial refusal.
Regardless of how far away the arresting officer was, however, I believe that Gallion was entitled to call the arresting officer, either directly or with the assistance of the jail deputy, to advise him that she wished to take a blood or breath test. Such a call would not have been administratively burdensome and would have enabled the arresting officer promptly to "direct" the taking of a blood or breath test.
I do not mean to suggest that an arresting officer must stay with the driver for the entire two-hour period in order to remain available. Nor do I believe that the detention facility deputy should be required to administer the alcohol test. However, it is entirely consistent with the express consent statute to require the deputy to attempt to contact the arresting officer to advise the officer that the driver wishes to retract an *546earlier refusal to take an alcohol test. If the arresting officer desires to speak directly with the driver, the deputy could ensure such direct communication. Cf. McCampbell v. Charnes, 626 P.2d 762 (Colo.App.1981) (retraction of refusal to take test insufficient when made by driver's attorney, rather than by driver).
III. Delay Materially Affecting Test Results
Gallion argues a driver does not have the burden to show that the delay would not have materially affected the test results. I agree.
Before the General Assembly amended the express consent statute, divisions of this court held that a driver has the burden of showing the delay caused by his or her initial refusal to take a blood or breath test would not have materially affected the test results. Zahtila v. Motor Vehicle Div., supra; see also Rogers v. Charnes, 656 P.2d 1322 (Colo. App.1982). Another division of this court later ruled that a driver may recant within a reasonable time, rather than within two hours of driving, if the delay in recanting does not materially affect the test results. Pierson v. Colo. Dep't of Revenue, supra. That division held the dispositive issues as to the validity of the retraction are whether it occurred within a reasonable time after the accident, rather than within two hours of driving, and whether the petitioner established that the delay in obtaining his or her consent to taking the breath test would not have materially affected the test results. Pierson v. Colo. Dep't of Revenue, supra, 923 P.2d at 373.
In 1999, the General Assembly overruled Pierson in part, imposing a condition that "the person must cooperate with the request such that the sample of blood or breath can be obtained within two hours of the person's driving." Section 42-4-1801.1(2)(a)(III), C.R.S.2006. In my view, this amendment legislatively overruled Pierson in two ways. First, it eliminated the subjective "reasonable time" standard and imposed an objective two-hour period within which a test must be administered. Second, it eliminated the requirement that a driver prove the delay in obtaining consent because of his or her initial refusal would not have materially affected the test results.
My conclusion is supported by the legislative history of the 1999 amendment.
In presenting the bill on second reading, shortly before its unanimous passage, the bill's Senate sponsor, Senator John Evans, stated the reason for the amendment was to require a driver to submit to a test within the two-hour time frame "because after two hours, the test's validity begins to fall off and the test is no longer valid." Hearings on H.B. 99-1026 before Senate, 62d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Mar. 5, 1999).
Likewise, at the earlier House Transportation and Energy Committee hearing, Ray Slaughter, Executive Director of the Colorado District Attorneys' Council, testified that the two-hour requirement was intended to address the validity of the alcohol test and the concern that the results become less reliable after that period. Hearings on H.B. 99-1026 before House Transp. & Energy Comm., 62d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Jan. 13, 1999).
In any event, the previous requirement that a driver prove the delay would not materially affect the test results is unsupported by either statute or a careful review of case law.
A division of this court held for the first time in Zahtila that "the primary purpose of the statute is fulfilled unless the delay will materially affect the result of the test." Zahtila v. Motor Vehicle Div., supra, 89 Colo.App. at 10, 560 P.2d at 849. The Zahtila division cited Cavagnaro v. Motor Vehicles Division, 19 Or.App. 725, 528 P.2d 1090 (1974), but that opinion does not support the above-quoted proposition. Further, Oregon has adopted the majority view that a driver cannot recant an initial refusal. See Jonathan M. Purver, Annotation, Driving While Intoxicated: Subsequent Consent to Sobriety Test as Affecting Initial Refusal, 28 A.L.R.5th 459 (1995). In fact, the Covagna-ro court addressed an unrelated issue (whether a police officer waives invocation of the express consent statute by allowing a *547driver time to decide whether to take the aleohol test).
Additionally, the Zahtile division did not cite any case law or statute for the proposition that the driver had the burden of showing that the delay in taking an alcohol test does not materially affect the test results. Therefore, because I conclude there is no statutory or sound case law basis for the requirement that a driver has the burden to prove the delay would not materially affect the test results, that requirement should not be applied here.
Likewise, I do not believe the statutes and case law required Gallion to show that she could have taken the test within two hours. Colorado cases have held that a driver has the burden of showing the delay in taking the test due to his or her initial refusal would not have materially affected the test results. See Rogers v. Charnes, supra; Zahtila v. Motor Vehicle Division, supra. No Colorado case to date, however, has held that the driver must prove that the test could have been performed within two hours of driving. By the same token, the statute does not impose such a burden.
Imposing such a burden here would be especially unfair, because Gallion's retraction of her refusal to take a test occurred well within the two-hour period.
I also believe the General Assembly effectively reaffirmed the right to recant an initial refusal in enacting the 1999 amendment. "When the legislature reenacts or amends a statute and does not change a section previously interpreted by settled judicial construction, it is presumed that it agrees with judicial construction of the statute." Tompkins v. DeLeon, 197 Colo. 569, 571, 595 P.2d 242, 243-44 (1979).
By failing to address the right to recant when it amended the express consent statute, the General Assembly presumably agreed with the judicially created right to recant.
Here, the evidence was undisputed that Gallion recanted her initial refusal between one hour and fourteen minutes and one hour and twenty-four minutes after the initial stop. This was well within the statutory period, and there is little doubt the arresting officer could have directed the administration of a blood or breath test that could have been administered within two hours of Gallion's driving.
Finally, the Department contends that Gal-lion could not recant to the Routt County deputy because he did not participate in the probable cause determination and had no responsibility for investigating and prosecuting the DUI charges. Because I believe the hearing officer erred in concluding that the arresting officer was not available because he was not physically present when Gallion retracted her refusal to take a blood or breath test, I do not address this question.
Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court's reversal of the hearing officer's order of revocation.