Court Opinion

ID: 9833974
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:11:49.617888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:10.043470
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
The two outstanding reasons that furnish insurmountable barriers to any re- • covery 'by Howell, as discussed in our original opinion, are:
(1) That there never was a contract between Howell and the persons who are joint owners, with R. J. Bradley, in the Gahagen Survey lands. Being under no contractual duty to give Howell a lease on these lands, any one of them could forbid and prevent the delivery of the lease, before it was actually delivered and the proposed purchase price paid. This, some of them did. Their reasons for so doing may not be inquired into or questioned.
(2) The written memorandum, on which Howell must stand or fall, ■ shows upon its face that the lease was not to be binding upon any person unless and until all interested parties agreed to, the execution and delivery of the lease to Howell.
Therefore, when the lease was not delivered to Howell by the other Bradley heirs, he could not hold R. J. Bradley on the theory that R. J. Bradley contracted to deliver his interest in or portion of such lands to Howell, at all events.
We are of opinion that we properly disposed of this cause in our original opinion, but we here give reasons why, in our opinion, the judgment of the trial court should, in all events, be reversed and remanded, if it is held that we are in error in rendering judgment, as was done; and we here give additional reasons and authorities which we believe support our first conclusions.
(1) We do not believe that the evidence brought forward by Howell to show that he was ready, able and willing to take and pay for the lease is sufficient to raise the issue. Howell’s statement that he was so circumstanced, had it stood alone and in such simple and straight forward ' language, without objection, would have raised the issue — in our opinion — even though the testimony comes from a vitally interested party; but when Howell undertook to tell where and in what form the funds he depended upon were, he was so uncertain, so indefinite *563and his recollection was so poor that he was unable to give any details, or to show any substantially accurate knowledge of what he had or where he had it. He declined to say and rested his case on not remembering and refusing to attempt to give any facts. Of this we are quite certain: The finding of the jury on the issue of whether or not Howell was ready, able and willing to pay for the lease is without sufficient support in the evidence, and the answer is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. 66 Corpus Juris, p. 1553, par. 1657; Matthews v. Deason, Tex.Civ.App., 233 S.W. 330.
In Jones on Evidence, 2nd Edition, Sect. 90, we find the following wholesome statement: “It is generally recognized that, where a party relies on a weaker species of evidence than it is within his power to produce, the basis for an adverse inference is furnished.”
(2) In connection with this issue, we find that the trial court submitted the matters to the jury in one issue, requiring the jury to find whether or not “Howell has been ready, willing and able to pay for said oil and gas lease at all times since same was returned to R. J. Bradley,” etc.
Objection was made to the issue because it is multifarious — duplicitous—-and the objection was overruled by the trial court. Exception was taken to the ruling.
The Beaumont Court of Civil Appeals in Granata v. Mothner, 44 S.W.2d 817, condemned a charge in like terms.
We think the holding sound. It is one thing for a proposed purchaser to be willing to go through with a trade, it is altogether another thing for him to be able to do so, and yet another thing for him to be ready to do so.
He might be able to pay the purchase price and not be ready to close the deal. He might be willing to close the deal and not be able to pay the purchase price.
“Ready” means “prepared for immediate movement or action”. It is easy to see that one may be able and willing to close a deal, and yet not be prepared for immediate movement or action.
(3) The trial court, over proper objections made by the defendants, submitted an issue requiring the jury to find whether or not Howell was physically unable to meet Bradley in Howell’s attorney’s office on October 23rd, and a second issue, whether or not Howell’s inability to so meet Bradley was occasioned by sudden illness.
Vol. 10, Tex.Juris., p. 438, par. 253, lays down the rule that is general, viz.: “Illness of a party will not excuse performance in the absence of a provision to that effect in the contract.”
, No one knew better than Howell the bodily ailment to which he was heir. Knowing this, he could have provided in his contract for such contingency, but this he did not do.
We see no distinction in principle in Howell’s situation with respect to his heart trouble, and the situations dealt with in the case of T. G. Shaw Oil Corp. v. Parker, Tex.Civ.App., 61 S.W.2d 587, opinion by Mr. Justice Dunklin, and Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen v. Dee, 101 Tex. 597, 111 S.W. 396. Howell was able to use the telephone during his illness and he could have delegated the authority to close the deal to his attorney, or to any other person.
We think it was error to give these charges, in the light of the record before us.
(4) It will be observed that the proposed lease in which Howell was interested shows date of October 1, 1937, and is for a primary term of three (3) years, while the lease to the Kadanes is dated October 25, 1937, and is for a primary term of five (5) years, and the trial court has attempted to vest in Howell an interest in the last mentioned lease.
By the terms of the proposed lease, Howell could defer the drilling of a well on the leased lands for only three years, upon payment of the stipulated rentals, while under the terms of the Kadane lease, the drilling may be postponed for a period of five years. This is a distinct advantage to the lessee.
We do not believe the court is authorized to make for the parties another and different contract from that which the parties contemplated making. 38 Tex.Jur., p. 796, par. 103, and cases cited.
The judgment of the trial court is erroneous in the respect mentioned.
(5) The judgment of the trial court does not attempt to vest in Howell a complete leasehold interest in and to 7/8ths of the oil and gas produced from the 143 acres with which the trial court deals, but vests in Howell 7/12ths of such *5647/8ths of the oil and gas, on the theory that R. J. Bradley is the owner in fee of such 7/12ths interest.
The many other joint tenants were not parties and were not made parties to the instant suit, and we hold that the trial court could not render a decree, in effect, adjudicating such interests, in the absence of these necessary parties.
The question of a proper division of the mineral rights must be settled by all parties in a proper manner among themselves, or the court must settle these rights when all interested parties are before the court.
We do not believe that the trial court could, in any event, render such a judgment as was rendered against R. J. Bradley, in which only partial performance of a contract is decreed, but if the trial court had any such authority, no decree, fixing the fractional interest of R. J. Bradley, could be entered, in the absence of the other necessary parties.
Without going into details we hold that R. J. Bradley’s interest is one that must be determined, and that the record in this case does not establish as a matter of law that he owns an undivided 7/12ths interest in the minerals in and under the 143 acres involved.
(6) We believe it was error to permit the introduction of testimony to the effect that it was agreed between Howell and R. J. Bradley that Howell was not to pay for the lease until Howell’s attorney had examined the abstract of title thereon, and that the abstract was not to be examined until the lease was returned, duly signed by all of the owners; and we believe that it was error to submit issues touching on these questions.
The joint tenants, who had. nothing to do with, and who were not bound by such agreement as may have been made by R. J. Bradley, could not be bound by any oral and undisclosed agreement on which Howell seeks to rely, and the contract, as we view it, being indivisible, we think the evidence touching on R. J. Bradley’s oral agreement with Howell should not have been admitted and the special issues predicated thereupon should not have been given.
(7) In conformity with the rule laid down in Vol. 65, Corpus Juris, p. 1020, par. 950, to the effect that a trust will be established and enforced by a conveyance of the property as against the trustee or a purchaser from him, only on condition that the person seeking the relief pay, tender, offer to pay, or give security or indemnity for, the purchase price paid by the defendant for the trust property, Howell pleaded that the Kadanes held the lands in trust for him and offered to pay the Kad-anes the sum paid by them for the lease; but Howell did not plead that Farrell held the 93 acres conveyed by the Kadanes to Farrell, in trust for him, and he did not offer to pay Farrell the sum of $125 per acre, the price paid for the lease by Farrell to the Kadanes.
Therefore the judgment against Farrell is without pleadings and proof to support it.
(8) The judgment of the trial court seeking to enforce the contract as to Bradley’s undivided interest in and to the tract of 143 acres is without pleadings to support it, in that Howell does not plead that in all events Bradley promised to convey to him a lease on his undivided interest, in the event the other joint owners failed or refused to carry out the contract.
Such judgment is contrary to the evidence in the case, in that the very contract on which Howell stands shows upon its face that he not only did not contract for Bradley’s undivided interest, but same shows that he is not entitled to recover as to such undivided interest, in that the contract specifically provides that if the other joint owners do not consent to and execute and deliver the entire lease to Howell, the money advanced by Howell shall be applied to the purchase price of a different tract of land leased by Bradley and wife to Howell, and Howell was then to pay Bradley an additional $400 for such other tract of land.
We desire to say further that ap-pellee’s contention that the execution of the lease to the Kadanes effected an abandonment .of the homestead is not sound. The execution of such lease was not inconsistent with but was entirely consistent with the homestead rights, claims and user. Evans et al. v. Mills et ux., 5 Cir., 67 F.2d 840.
Any contention that the proposed lease was placed in escrow with R. J. Bradley by the other joint owners is not supported by the evidence and is not sound.
An escrow deposit cannot be made with one of the parties to the instrument, or his agent. Tyler Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. *565Biard & Scales, 106 Tex. 554, 171 S.W. 1122, 1200; Green et al. v. Priddy, 112 Tex. 567, 250 S.W. 656; Smith v. Daniel et al., Tex.Civ.App., 288 S.W. 528.
On the question of the right to repudiate the instrument before it was actually delivered to Howell and the purchase price paid, see the following additional authorities: Burke-Mobray et al. v. Ellis et al., 44 Tex.Civ.App. 21, 97 S.W. 321; Burnett et ux. v. Continental State Bank, Tex.Civ. App., 191 S.W. 172; Schmidt et al. v. Baar, Tex.Civ.App., 283 S.W. 1115, writ dismissed; Jackson et ux. v. Scoggins, Tex.Civ. App., 220 S.W. 302.
The judgment awarding damages against R. J. Bradley, because of his failure to deliver the lease to Howell covering 343 acres, is contrary to the law and the facts, in that Howell knew that 200 acres of this tract constituted the homestead of R. J. Bradley and wife, and the wife not only could not he required to perform an executory contract for the lease or sale of her homestead, hut had the absolute right to refuse to enter into the lease at any time before it was delivered to Howell, and, under such circumstances as are disclosed by this record, the court was without authority to penalize the husband, because of the wife’s refusal to consummate the transaction. 22 Tex.Juris, pp. 114—116, sect. 79; Saulsbury v. Anderson, Tex.Civ.App., 39 S.W.2d 142, writ dismissed; Collett v. Harris, Tex.Civ.App., 229 S.W. 885, and cases cited; Finley et ux. v. Messer, Tex.Civ.App., 9 S.W.2d 756, and cases cited.
We believe that our conclusions, as disclosed by our original opinion, are sound.
The motion for a rehearing is overruled.