Court Opinion

ID: 9899201
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-16 15:07:43.317969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:56.586911
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us

SJC-12984

                COMMONWEALTH   vs.   JULIAN TROCHE.

     Suffolk.       September 15, 2023. - November 16, 2023.

 Present:   Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ.

Homicide. Armed Assault with Intent to Murder. Assault and
     Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon. Identification.
     Evidence, Identification, Credibility of witness, Relevancy
     and materiality, Inflammatory evidence, Photograph.
     Witness, Self-incrimination. Constitutional Law, Self-
     incrimination. Practice, Criminal, Voir dire, Cross-
     examination by prosecutor, Instructions to jury,
     Stipulation, Argument by prosecutor.

     Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court
Department on June 20, 2017.

    The cases were tried before Mitchell H. Kaplan, J.

     Robert F. Shaw, Jr., for the defendant.
     Kathryn Sherman, Assistant District Attorney (Mark Zanini,
Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth.

    WENDLANDT, J.    The defendant, Julian Troche, was convicted

of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate

premeditation in connection with the November 2016 killing of
                                                                    2

Dantley Leonard, who was shot eleven times in a "drive-by"1

shooting in the Dorchester section of Boston.   The defendant was

also convicted of armed assault with intent to murder and

assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon in connection

with the shooting of Antwuan Mair, who was shot during the same

incident as Leonard.2

     Mair described the shooter as a light-skinned man, who had

been a front seat passenger in a silver or grey sedan.    The

defense at trial centered on mistaken identification.    No

witness was able to identify the defendant as the shooter.

Instead, the prosecution chiefly relied on the testimony of one

witness, who identified the defendant as the driver of a bluish-

silver Nissan sedan that the witness twice had seen a few blocks

away from the scene of the crime approximately twenty to thirty

minutes before the shooting.

     In this direct appeal, the defendant contends that the

judge erred in denying his request to conduct a voir dire

examination of this key prosecution witness when, following the

witness's testimony, defense counsel received an anonymous text

     1 A drive-by is defined as "an action carried out from a
passing vehicle." Oxford English Dictionary, https://www.oed
.com/search/dictionary/?scope=Entries&q=drive-by [https://
perma.cc/88KY-TLG4].

     2 The defendant was also convicted of unlawful possession of
a firearm.
                                                                   3

message suggesting that the witness had falsely identified the

defendant as part of a plot to frame him.   The text message was

accompanied by screenshots3 of what purported to be a

communication from the witness's social media account; if the

screenshots were genuine, as presented by the anonymous sender,

the witness appeared to express discomfort with his allegedly

false testimony and was buoyed by the unidentified person with

whom he was communicating.

     The defendant also contends that the prosecutor improperly

questioned a witness concerning his invocation of his privilege

against self-incrimination pursuant to the Fifth Amendment to

the United States Constitution and his understanding of his

grant of transactional immunity in front of the jury, that the

prosecutor impermissibly questioned lay witnesses about gang

activity, that the prosecutor introduced inflammatory

photographs of the defendant's friend's dead body from an

incident that occurred two months prior to the shooting at

issue, that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury

consistent with the parties' stipulation that the defendant was

first apprehended in connection with an investigation unrelated

     3 A screenshot is "[a] photograph or (now usually) a digital
image of all or part of what is displayed at a given time on a
screen." Oxford English Dictionary, https://www.oed.com/search
/dictionary/?scope=Entries&q=screenshot [https://perma.cc/ACR8-
89CH].
                                                                       4

to the charged crimes, and that the prosecutor misstated facts

in closing argument.   The defendant also asks the court to

exercise its authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new

trial.

    Because the judge erred in denying defense counsel's

request to conduct a voir dire examination of the key

identification witness, we vacate the defendant's convictions

and remand for a new trial.   We also address the defendant's

other claims of error to the extent they may arise in any

subsequent retrial.

    1.   Background.   "We recite the facts as the jury could

have found them, in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, reserving certain details for later discussion."

Commonwealth v. Niemic, 483 Mass. 571, 573 (2019).

    a.   Commonwealth's case.   i.   November 2016 shooting.      On

the afternoon of November 12, 2016, Leonard and Mair were on

Ames Street in Dorchester, near the Franklin Field housing

development.   Their childhood friend, who was helping his

girlfriend move furniture into an apartment, had asked Leonard

to move his vehicle to allow the friend to park a moving truck.

Mair was assisting with the move and stood behind the truck to

direct it into the parking spot.     Another longtime friend of

Leonard, Mair, and the truck's driver had accompanied Leonard

outside and also stood in the vicinity of the truck, though
                                                                       5

further away from the street.     As the truck backed into the

parking spot, a silver car approached the group of friends.      The

time was approximately 4:45 P.M.    A light-skinned man opened the

car's front passenger door and fired shots from a firearm in the

direction of Leonard and Mair.    Leonard was shot eleven times,

and Mair was shot three times.    Mair survived the shooting but

suffered two wounds in his arm and one in his back; Leonard died

from his wounds within minutes.

    Ballistics analysis following the shooting determined that

the bullets that killed Leonard and injured Mair, as well as a

spent bullet, a bullet fragment, and several casings at the

crime scene, had all been ejected from a single .40 caliber

Smith and Wesson firearm.   As discussed infra, this same weapon

had been one of the weapons used two months earlier during an

exchange of gunfire involving the defendant.    At that incident,

the defendant had been injured and his longtime friend had been

killed.

    None of those present at the November 2016 crime scene

identified the defendant as the shooter.    Instead, Mair

generally described the car from which the shooter opened fire

as silver, the shooter as light-skinned, and the driver as dark-
                                                                    6

skinned.   The two other witnesses present at the shooting did

not see the shooter or the vehicle.4

     In addition, a woman who had heard gunshots peered from her

second-floor apartment on Ames Way and saw a dark-skinned man

with braids, presumably Leonard, on the ground and bleeding.

She also saw a gray sedan fleeing the scene.   The woman later

identified the car she had seen fleeing the scene as having a

similar body type and color as the Nissan Altima sedan driven by

the defendant.   However, she too did not identify or provide a

description of the shooter.

     Approximately twenty to thirty minutes before the shooting,

Yordany Rodriguez and a companion were on the corner of Ames

Street and Westview Street, a few blocks from where the shooting

took place; they were cleaning the companion's stepfather's

vehicle.   A silver sedan5 approached a stop sign on the opposite

side of the street from where Rodriguez and his companion were

working.   The silver sedan's driver, a light-skinned man with a

goatee and a short haircut and wearing a gray hooded sweatshirt,

     4 The prosecutor also elicited testimony about gang activity
in and around Franklin Field from these two witnesses. One
testified that each of the four men had been part of a Franklin
Field gang during their youth, but the other witness responded
that he knew nothing about gangs in the area.

     5 Rodriguez described the color of this vehicle as "two-
toned" with "silver throwing to like baby blue." His companion
described it as "silver or gray."
                                                                     7

and the passenger, a dark-skinned man with a hooded sweatshirt

pulled close to his face, gave Rodriguez and his companion a

look, as if they were "trying to see if they recognized

somebody."   The driver asked Rodriguez and his companion "what

the f*ck [they] was looking at" and "if [they] were from there."

To the latter question, Rodriguez replied "no."6

     Rodriguez testified that the passenger appeared surprised

when he apparently noticed a security camera on a nearby utility

pole.    The passenger "laid back" in his seat, and the sedan

left.    A few minutes later, the sedan returned and the driver

and passenger "mean-mugged"7 the two men.

     Concerned because of these two encounters,8 Rodriguez and

his companion gathered their cleaning supplies and went inside a

nearby building where the companion lived.    Anywhere from ten to

     6 Another witness, Phillipe Woods, Sr. (Woods Senior),
testified that residents of Franklin Field and the nearby
neighborhood of Franklin Hill generally and at unspecified times
experienced "disagreements" that resulted in violence, including
"[s]hootings, stabbings."

     7 "Mean-mugging" is "the act of glowering at someone with an
intimidating, irritated, or judgmental facial expression."
Dictionary.com, https://www.dictionary.com/e/slang/mean-mugging/
[https://perma.cc/S2KC-JJ8J]. Rodriguez testified about being
"mean-mugged" during his grand jury testimony, but at trial he
denied making this statement.

     8 At trial Rodriguez testified, "That sh*t . . . always
happens around that neighborhood. That happened to us. That's
the only thing that needs to happen to us for us to be, like,
all right, we gotta get outta here."
                                                                     8

thirty minutes later, Rodriguez and his companion heard

gunshots.

     At 4:31 P.M., a surveillance video camera at the

intersection of Blue Hill Avenue and Westview Street captured a

car generally matching the appearance of the one identified by

Rodriguez and his companion turn left from Westview Street onto

Stratton Street.9   The video shows a similar vehicle driving on

Westview Street at 4:35 P.M. and slowing near the Stratton

intersection before turning right onto Blue Hill Avenue.10     The

video resolution was insufficient to show the car's license

plates or to identify its occupants.

     Rodriguez spoke to police officers on the night of the

shooting but did not report the car he had seen earlier; he

explained that he thought that his prior encounter was unrelated

to the shooting.    Six months after the shooting, Rodriguez was

called to testify before a grand jury.11   Before giving his

     9 By turning onto Stratton Street, the car headed back
towards the Franklin Field development where the shooting
occurred.

     10By taking a right on Blue Hill Avenue, the car was
heading away from the eventual crime scene. The prosecutor
contended that the defendant did this to loop around and avoid
the surveillance camera at the Ames Street and Westview Street
intersection.

     11Rodriguez testified that he had no intention of sharing
his information or testifying until police approached him about
testifying in front of the grand jury.
                                                                    9

testimony, he was shown a photographic array of eight men, and

Rodriguez selected the defendant's photograph, identifying the

defendant as the driver of the silver sedan Rodriguez had seen

prior to the shooting.   At trial, Rodriguez confirmed this

identification and identified the defendant in court.   Rodriguez

was the only witness who identified the defendant as being near

the scene of the shooting, albeit twenty to thirty minutes prior

thereto when the defendant was the driver, not the passenger, of

the silver sedan.

    ii.   Nightclub shooting.   At trial, the Commonwealth's

theory was that the defendant had shot Leonard and Mair in

retaliation for the killing of his longtime friend, Phillip

Woods, Jr. (Woods Junior), approximately two months before the

November shooting.   Specifically, on September 17, 2016, at

about 2:25 A.M., the defendant, along with Woods Junior and

another friend, Corey Jacques, were outside a nightclub in

Dorchester when an exchange of gun fire transpired.   Woods

Junior was killed, and the defendant and Jacques were injured.

    Ballistics analysis following the shooting determined that

one of the weapons used in the shootout was a nine millimeter

Luger; inferably, this was the weapon used to kill Woods Junior

and to injure the defendant and Jacques.   Based on ballistics

analysis of shell casings found near Woods Junior's body, the

other weapon was a .40 caliber Smith and Wesson, eventually
                                                                  10

determined to be the same weapon that had been used to shoot

Leonard and Mair two months later.

     At trial, the defendant called a witness who, minutes after

the nightclub shooting, encountered the defendant while walking

to his parked car behind the nightclub.   The witness testified

that the defendant, bleeding and "kinda hysterical," asked the

witness to drive him to the hospital.   The witness, who saw no

one else nearby, agreed.   An officer, whom the defendant also

called at trial, spotted the witness's car speeding and pulled

him over for a routine traffic stop.    The witness reported that

he was taking the defendant to the hospital because the

defendant had been shot.   At trial, the officer testified that,

because he was aware that a shootout had occurred near the

nightclub moments earlier, he searched the witness, the

defendant, and the witness's vehicle for firearms.    Finding

none,12 the officer called for an ambulance to take the defendant

to the hospital.

     iii.   Defendant's activities following the nightclub

shooting.   Two days after the nightclub shooting, Phillipe

Woods, Sr. (Woods Senior) –- Woods Junior's father -- sent a

text message to the defendant; the message, which contained no

     12The .40 caliber firearm used at the September and
November shootings was not found either at the Ames Street crime
scene or on the defendant's person after the September nightclub
shooting.
                                                                 11

words, consisted of a photograph depicting the upper body of a

broad-shouldered Black man with shoulder-length braids.   The

photographed man somewhat resembled Leonard insofar as the two

had similar skin tones, braided shoulder-length hair, and large

builds; they were otherwise distinguishable.13

     Approximately one week after the nightclub shooting, the

defendant engaged in the following text message exchange with an

unidentified person:

     Anonymous:   "I wish I was home so f*cking bad!"

     Defendant: "Don't even sweat it I'm here just gotta get
     back mobile"

     Anonymous: "But all this teaching me a hard lesson[.] I
     should've did so much more out there, set the tone for what
     actions like this would bring"

     Defendant:   "Like I said don't sweat it trust me"

     Anonymous: "I got all the faith in world in you my dude, I
     know your work but a extra hand lightens up the load"

     Defendant: "This run going be a pleasure it ain't just for
     the sport no more"

     Anonymous: "And I respect that! Your pleasure is the
     pleasure of everyone who feels this loss"

     Defendant:   "Real sh*t"

     13The Commonwealth theorized that the defendant shot
Leonard wrongly believing him to be the person photographed who,
the Commonwealth contended, was identified as the shooter of
Woods Junior. At trial, Woods Senior testified pursuant to a
grant of immunity. He stated that he did not remember sending
the photograph and that he did not know the man it depicted. At
trial, the Commonwealth argued that Leonard was not Woods
Junior's actual killer.
                                                                   12

     Anonymous: "I would say leave some for me but f*ck them
     suckas any way you can"14

     iv.    The defendant's activities prior to the November 2016

shooting.   At about 12:30 A.M. on the day Leonard was killed,

the defendant received a text message from Hassaun Daily, who

was a longtime friend of Woods Junior, the victim of the

nightclub shooting.    Daily stated, "let's get up tomorrow."

     At about noon that same day, cell site location information

(CSLI)15 showed the defendant's cellular telephone near his own

apartment in the Fenway neighborhood of Boston.    At 3:57 P.M.,

the defendant called Daily, after which Daily sent a text

message to the defendant that included an address in the

Mattapan neighborhood of Boston.

     At 4:15 P.M., the defendant placed a six-second telephone

call to Daily; CSLI showed that the defendant's cellular

     14At trial, the Commonwealth argued that this exchange
showed that the defendant was planning to retaliate for Woods
Junior's killing.

     15CSLI does not provide the precise location of a given
cellular telephone. Instead, it shows that a device is within a
cell tower's coverage area when that device uses the tower to
send a text or make a call; the smaller the coverage area, the
more precise the location information becomes. See Commonwealth
v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 237 (2014), S.C., 470 Mass. 837 and
472 Mass. 448 (2015) ("A cellular service provider has a network
of base stations, also referred to as cell sites or cell towers,
that essentially divides the provider's service area into
'sectors.' . . . Cell site antennae send and receive signals
from subscribers' cellular telephones that are operating within
a particular sector.").
                                                                    13

telephone was near the address sent by Daily and Daily's

cellular telephone.     CSLI also showed that Daily's cellular

telephone was near the crime scene at 4:30 P.M.     The shooting on

Ames Street occurred at 4:45 P.M.

     v.     The defendant's activities following the November 2016

shooting.    No CSLI data were available from the defendant's

cellular telephone from 4:15 P.M., when he placed a call to

Daily from a location near Daily's home address, until 4:48

P.M., three minutes after the shooting.16    At that latter time,

CSLI data showed that the defendant's cellular telephone was

near a tower one mile south of the crime scene, near the Morton

Street train station.     At 4:51 P.M., the defendant's cellular

telephone used a tower less than a mile east of the tower used

at 4:48 P.M.    No CSLI data were presented concerning the

location of Daily's cellular telephone from 4:30 P.M., when he

was near the scene of Leonard's killing, to 4:57 P.M., when

Daily's cellular telephone used the same tower that the

defendant's cellular telephone had accessed six minutes earlier.

     Around 5:30 P.M., approximately forty-five minutes after

the shooting, the defendant engaged in a brief, six-second

     16At trial, the Commonwealth argued that the defendant was
travelling with Daily, and that Daily was the dark-skinned
occupant of the silver sedan described by several witnesses,
including Rodriguez. The Commonwealth entered a photograph of
Daily in evidence but elicited no testimony identifying Daily as
the driver.
                                                                   14

telephone call with Daily, followed by a one-minute call with

Woods Senior.     The defendant had several brief calls with Daily

and Woods Senior between 8:20 P.M. and 8:55 P.M.      From 9:12 P.M.

to 9:52 P.M., the defendant and Woods Senior engaged in the

following text message exchange:

     Woods Senior:    "You good"

     Defendant:    "Yes sah"

     Woods Senior:    "Is whooo kid good"17

     Defendant:    "Yeah he with me"

     Woods Senior:    "Figure it out and be careful please"

     Defendant:    "U already"

     Woods Senior:    "Lol to hood."18

     vi.    The defendant's arrest.    On November 14, 2016, two

days after Leonard's and Mair's shooting, a Boston police

officer arrested the defendant outside his apartment in

connection with a different matter.19     At the time of his arrest,

     17   Daily's nickname was "Hu."

     18At trial, Woods Senior testified that "Lol to hood" meant
"Laugh out loud" to the "Dorchester area," specifically "Blue
Hill." The prosecutor argued that Woods Senior had actually
meant Franklin Hill as the "hood."

     19The parties stipulated that the defendant was arrested
for a matter not concerning the case at hand. The judge gave
the following instruction to the jury:

     "So the testimony you just heard about [the defendant]
     being arrested on November 16, the parties stipulate that
     that arrest had to do with an investigation that was
                                                                  15

the defendant was wearing a black sweatshirt and driving a blue-

gray Nissan Altima sedan.     In the vehicle was a black, wool and

leather jacket bearing a pin with a photograph of Woods Junior

and the words "Forever in Our Hearts Phillip Woods Jr."

Subsequent forensics testing of the sweatshirt showed a positive

result for gunshot primer residue; the jacket did not.20    The

sedan was not tested.

     b.   Defense at trial.   The defense at trial centered on

misidentification.    As discussed supra, in the Commonwealth's

case-in-chief, one witness who lived near the scene of the

shooting testified that she had observed a gray sedan fleeing

the crime scene.     By contrast, the woman's daughter testified in

the defendant's case that, from a different room in the same

     unrelated to anything having to do with this case. And
     obviously you shouldn't draw any adverse inference against
     [the defendant] because he was the subject of investigation
     that was not related to this case."

     20It was the Commonwealth's theory that the defendant was
wearing the same black sweatshirt on the day of the shooting.
Rodriguez, however, had testified before the grand jury that the
driver of the gray sedan, whom he identified as the defendant,
was wearing a "gray hoodie sweatshirt."

     A forensic scientist explained at trial that, pursuant to
the laboratory's policy, three particles of gunshot residue on a
tested item were required to register as a positive. The
sweatshirt had three such particles, but the jacket only had
one. The forensic scientist further testified that gunshot
residue particles are transferable such that a police officer
might transfer one onto a defendant when taking him or her into
custody.
                                                                    16

apartment, she saw two Black men wearing gray hooded sweatshirts

shooting toward a gate in front of her building.    She saw one of

the men fall, while the other man continued to shoot before

taking his fallen companion's gun and leaving the scene.     She

also testified that she saw no car in the vicinity of the

shooting.21

     Another witness who also lived on Ames Street heard

gunshots and looked out her front door.     She also saw two men;

they were running and yelling "Dub is down, Dub is down."22    As

they were running by, she noticed a dark blue or black vehicle

stop in the road before speeding off quickly.

     c.    Procedural history.   On June 20, 2017, the defendant

was indicted for murder in the first degree for the killing of

Leonard, G. L. c. 265, § 1; armed assault with intent to murder,

G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b), and assault and battery by means of a

dangerous weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 15A, in connection with Mair;

and unlawful possession of a firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).23

     21In his closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the
witness's testimony regarding seeing two shooters was
contradicted by the ballistics evidence that casings from only
one firearm were found at the scene. There was, however,
evidence that certain firearms do not emit casings.

     22   There was testimony that "3-Dub" was Leonard's nickname.

     23The trial took place before our decision in Commonwealth
v. Guardado, 491 Mass. 666, 690 (2023), in which we held that
"the absence of a license is an essential element of the offense
of unlawful possession of a firearm pursuant to G. L. c. 269,
                                                                    17

    Following a jury trial in August 2019, the defendant was

found guilty on all counts.    As to the charge of murder in the

first degree, the jury found the defendant guilty on the theory

of deliberate premeditation.    The defendant filed a timely

notice of appeal.

    2.   Discussion.    a.   Voir dire.   The defendant first

maintains that the judge abused his discretion in denying

defense counsel's request to conduct a voir dire examination of

Rodriguez when, following the completion of Rodriguez's

testimony, defense counsel received an anonymous text message

and accompanying screenshots of a social media account, which

purported to show that Rodriguez falsified his identification

testimony.   More particularly, defense counsel received a series

of text messages from an anonymous sender who claimed to be

Rodriguez's cousin.    The first text message stated:    "This is

annoyoms [sic] person I have your card I am one of the witness

family I think it's so wrong how they are setting up your

client[.]    [M]y cousin and his friends are lying on this poor

guy I found this in his phone the other day."     The accompanying

text messages were screenshots of the following conversation

§ 10 (a)." Here, the judge did not instruct the jury on this
element. At any new trial, the Commonwealth must prove this
element. Id.
                                                                     18

with a Facebook social media account bearing the name "Yordany

Rodriguez":24

     Anonymous:    "What's good bro

     "Heard you went to court did you say what we told you to
     say to set that n**** up"

     Rodriguez:    "Yeah bro I went up sh*t was wild

     "Nervous as f*ck

     "Bro I think it's wrong that we lying that n****"

     Anonymous:    "Man f*ck that n****

     "He's all set

     "We can't say to [sic] much on this sh*t cause the feds be
     watching you heard"

     Rodriguez:    "Snm bro we talk in person soon"

     Anonymous:    "Ight bet"

     Defense counsel notified the judge and the prosecutor of

the messages.     On the next trial day, the judge held a sidebar.

Defense counsel reported that, although he had sent a text

message to the telephone number noted in the message he had

received asking the sender to meet him that morning, no one had

appeared.   The prosecutor stated that he had asked the

investigating officers on the prosecution team to call the

cellular telephone number, but they received no response.     The

     24The screenshots also show that the social media account
includes a small profile photograph of a bearded man with a
child. Under the photograph, the name "Yordany Rodriguez" is
shown, as well as the phrase "You're friends on Facebook."
                                                                    19

officers had been unable to determine the identity of the

anonymous sender; the prosecutor explained that the text

messages were sent through voice over Internet protocol (VoIP),

an application that allowed the user to send the text messages

from a randomly generated number, making it difficult to

identify their source.25    The prosecutor also reported that

officers had been unable to access the social media account or

to confirm its authenticity.    The officers had told the

prosecutor that they had found "many Yordany Rodriguezes on

Facebook."

     The judge stated, "[I]t would seem to me that the police

ought to pay a visit to Mr. Rodriguez, I suspect as nice a visit

as possible, and ask if he would allow them to look at his

[social media] page."26    The judge added, "[I]t seems to me, on

     25The prosecutor noted that "the app[lication] assigns that
particular phone a phone number . . . which is essentially
anonymous without . . . serving legal process of some company."

     26   The judge later expanded on his comments:

     "The question is whether or not first that comes from the
     Yordany Rodriguez Facebook account that is actually
     involved in this case, and secondly, that those postings on
     Facebook were not postings that could be made by anybody
     associated with the public . . . . But we need to
     investigate it to see if that is so."27 The prosecutor
     reported that he had asked a detective to get in touch with
     Rodriguez, and the detective called Rodriguez's telephone
     number during lunch. Ten or so minutes later, the
     detective's telephone received a call, indicating that it
     was from Rodriguez; the detective was out of the room. The
     prosecutor answered the telephone and spoke with Rodriguez
                                                                   20

the face of this, one would think that this is a blatant attempt

to obstruct justice."   He also said that he did not "intend to

slow down the trial at this point." The prosecutor noted that

Rodriguez was a hostile witness who would be hostile to any

further interaction with the prosecution team, but the judge

responded that "there's no point in our speculating as to what

Mr. Rodriguez's response will be."    The judge also noted that

Rodriguez's trial testimony was consistent with his grand jury

testimony and his photographic array identification of the

defendant, although he "didn't see anything that suggested that

. . . this was anything other than Mr. Rodriguez being pulled

here against his will to provide his testimony."    At the end of

this sidebar, the judge said, "[W]e're going to now stop

speculating on the record.   [The prosecutor] has indicated that

he will have somebody interview Mr. Rodriguez.    And then when we

have the results of that interview we will come back."

    After the jury recessed for the day, defense counsel

requested to recall Rodriguez as part of the defendant's case-

in-chief to inquire about the anonymous message and social media

screen shots.   The judge denied the request, reasoning that "if

you had that when he was first being questioned, without more I

wouldn't let you inquire with respect to that."    For his part,

    for ten to fifteen minutes, during which Rodriguez denied
    the Facebook communications.
                                                                 21

the prosecutor reported that, during the lunch break, he had

spoken with Rodriguez, who "adamantly denied ever having any

communication of this sort about this case."27

     The next morning, the judge asked the prosecutor to

describe again his conversation with Rodriguez.   The prosecutor

stated that Rodriguez had denied having the conversation shown

in the screenshots, denied that someone else might have had

access to his cellular telephone, and stated that he did not

know who had sent the anonymous text to defense counsel;

Rodriguez also mentioned that he had received some messages on

his social media account "to the effect that people in jail have

labeled him a snitch, a rat."

     Defense counsel asked to conduct a voir dire examination of

Rodriguez concerning the messages.   Denying this request, the

judge explained, "I tried to determine whether there was some

basis on which I'd have to close the court room to do the voir

dire and conclude it, and I couldn't come up with a theory on

which I could close the court room to do the voir dire."   He

also said that "bringing [Rodriguez] into Court to say

     27The prosecutor reported that he had asked a detective to
get in touch with Rodriguez, and the detective called
Rodriguez's telephone number during lunch. Ten or so minutes
later, the detective's telephone received a call, indicating
that it was from Rodriguez; the detective was out of the room.
The prosecutor answered the telephone and spoke with Rodriguez
for ten to fifteen minutes, during which Rodriguez denied
the Facebook communications.
                                                                   22

essentially the same thing that he said to [the prosecutor] with

detectives over the telephone, albeit under oath . . . did not

seem to me a useful thing to do, and fraught with additional

obvious dangers, and so I've concluded not to do that."      The

judge further reasoned that he would not allow defense counsel

to cross-examine Rodriguez regarding the screenshots of the

social media account absent "materials from [the social media

company], which would take a very long time to acquire, as [the

social media company] tends not to turn this over until they

have been served with process and required to do that by a Court

order."   The judge had previously told defense counsel that,

should an investigation later show the authenticity of the

social media account as belonging to Rodriguez and of the screen

shots thereof, it might form the basis of a motion for

postconviction discovery.       The judge noted the defendant's

objection to his decision.

    i.    Standard of review.    "The decision to conduct a voir

dire examination of a witness rests in the sound discretion of

the trial judge . . . ."    Commonwealth v. Pina, 481 Mass. 413,

431 (2019), citing Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 425 Mass. 361, 370

n.5 (1997).   The judge's decision "will not be disturbed unless

it constitutes 'a clear error of judgment in weighing the

factors relevant to the decision . . . such that the decision

falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives.'"      Pina,
                                                                     23

supra, quoting L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27

(2014).

    ii.   Analysis.    To be sure, there was reason to doubt the

authenticity of this new information, and not every stray

anonymous comment can form the basis for a voir dire.    The

information in this case was sent by an anonymous sender, who

did not respond to defense counsel's request for a meeting, and

the telephone number associated with the message had not been

identified as belonging to a particular individual because of

the use of the VoIP technology –- an apparent attempt to shield

the sender's identity.   Moreover, Rodriguez arguably had been a

reluctant witness; he testified that he had no intention of

sharing his information with police until they found him and

that he did not want to take time to testify -- conduct that

arguably was inconsistent with someone involved in a plot to

frame the defendant.

    Still, the information was troubling, suggesting that the

Commonwealth's key identification witness was fabricating his

testimony; indeed, the judge recognized the need to investigate

the allegations.   Contrast Commonwealth v. McLeod, 394 Mass.

727, 740, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 919 (1985) (no abuse of

discretion to deny request to conduct voir dire of witness whose

change in testimony was not relevant to crimes at hand).       For

this reason, the judge concluded that further investigation was
                                                                  24

warranted in view of the potential effect of the new

information, if shown to be from Rodriguez's social media

account.   Relying on a brief investigation, involving a ten- to

fifteen-minute telephone conversation between the prosecutor and

Rodriguez, however, the judge denied defense counsel's request

to conduct a voir dire examination.    He based the denial on

several grounds, which we examine in turn.

    The judge believed that he could not conduct a voir dire

without basis to close the court room.   The judge did not

explain why closure might be necessary in this situation, and we

fail to identify any such reason in the record.    The purpose of

the voir dire would have been to examine Rodriguez about the new

information and determine whether it was authentic.    Nothing

about the proposed voir dire would have required, or justified,

the court room to be closed.   See Commonwealth v. Cohen (No. 1),

456 Mass. 94, 107 (2010) ("courts recognize a strong presumption

in favor of a public trial overcome only by an overriding

interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve

higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest"

[quotations and citations omitted]).

    The judge also concluded that a voir dire would be a waste

of judicial resource because, the judge believed, Rodriguez

would say nothing different in court under oath from what he had

reported to the prosecutor when questioned telephonically.      But
                                                                     25

"ensuring that a witness will give his statements under oath

. . . impresses upon him the seriousness of the proceedings and

importance that he testify truthfully."    Commonwealth v.

Bergstrom, 402 Mass. 534, 543 (1988).     Moreover, a voir dire

examination would have provided the ability to observe

Rodriguez's demeanor while testifying.    Id. at 547 ("Evaluating

a witness's credibility is one of the most difficult tasks

facing a trier of fact.   Personal observation of a witness aids

immeasurably this process" [citation omitted]).     The information

provided to defense counsel by the anonymous sender raised

significant questions regarding the truthfulness of Rodriguez's

identification testimony, which was a key element of the

Commonwealth's case; in short, the new information directly

called into question the integrity of the trial itself.      Under

the circumstances, allowing a voir dire examination of

Rodriguez, during which he would be under oath, was critical.

    Further, the judge reasoned that defense counsel would not

be able to question Rodriguez regarding the screenshots without

first obtaining a subpoena for the social media company to

authenticate the new information.   Specifically, the judge

stated that defense counsel "would have no means of cross

examining [Rodriguez] without materials from [the social media

company]," presumably because the materials otherwise could not

be authenticated.   "Evidence that . . . [an] electronic
                                                                  26

communication originates from . . . a social networking Web site

. . . that bears the [witness's] name is not sufficient alone to

authenticate the electronic communication as having been

authored or sent by the [witness]."   Commonwealth v. Purdy, 459

Mass. 442, 450 (2011).   Instead, "[t]here must be some

'confirming circumstances' sufficient for a reasonable jury to

find by a preponderance of the evidence that the [witness]

authored the [electronic communication]" (citation omitted).

Id.   A voir dire examination of Rodriguez might have elicited

the requisite confirming circumstances or alternatively might

have confirmed the messages' lack of authenticity.28

      Significantly, the inadmissibility of the social media

messages without authentication formed the basis for the judge's

denial of the defendant's request to question Rodriguez in the

defendant's case in chief.   See Purdy, 459 Mass. at 447 & n.5

("because the relevance and admissibility of the communications

       These confirming circumstances include, inter alia,
      28

acknowledgement by the witness that the account is his; the
messages being found on a computer or hard drive owned by the
witness; third-party testimony indicating the witness sent the
messages; and the messages containing details about the
witness's personal life. See Commonwealth v. Welch, 487 Mass.
425, 441 (2021); Purdy, 459 Mass. at 450-451. Authentication
may benefit from but does not require testimony that others
could not access the witness's account. See Purdy, supra at 451
& n.7; Commonwealth v. Williams, 456 Mass. 857, 868-869 (2010).
Here, the prosecutor reported that Rodriguez had told him that
no one else had access to his cellular telephone and that his
telephone was not even working.
                                                                    27

depended on their being authored by the defendant, the judge was

required to determine" authenticity).    Far from providing a

basis to deny the defendant's request to conduct a voir dire

examination, the judge's reasoning highlights the need for a

voir dire.   In particular, because he was deprived of the

opportunity to try to authenticate the social media conversation

through a voir dire of Rodriguez, the defendant was further

deprived of the opportunity to marshal his defense by calling

into question Rodriguez's credibility.    Cf. Pina, 481 Mass. at

431-433 (no abuse of discretion to deny request to conduct voir

dire of witness concerning source of witness's knowledge of

defendant's nickname where witness testified he had learned of

nickname from "someone" prior to identification procedure and

defendant had opportunity but "chose not to pursue the issue on

cross-examination"); McLeod, 394 Mass. at 740-741 (no abuse of

discretion to deny request to conduct voir dire of one witness

whose change in testimony was not relevant to any material

aspects of her testimony and of second witness who was cross-

examined at length about change in his testimony).

    In addition, the judge had previously reasoned that a voir

dire examination was unnecessary because, if the defendant were

convicted, he could seek to authenticate the materials

thereafter and bring motions for postconviction discovery and a

new trial once he was able to do so.     But allowing a voir dire
                                                                    28

of Rodriguez might have elicited information authenticating the

new information, which could have been used by the defendant to

undermine Rodriguez's credibility.   Given that Rodriguez was the

only witness to place the defendant near the scene of the crime,

calling into question Rodriguez's credibility might have planted

sufficient doubt in jurors' minds such that a conviction might

have been avoided in the first place.

    Finally, we reject the Commonwealth's contention that

Rodriguez's hostility as a witness put to rest all questions

regarding the authenticity of the social media information.

Arguably, as the Commonwealth asserts, Rodriguez's reticence to

testify was inconsistent with the suggestion in the social media

information that he had plotted to frame the defendant.    On the

other hand, Rodriguez's reticence arguably was consistent with

the social media information, reflecting his doubts about the

correctness of his participation in the alleged plot.     A voir

dire examination of Rodriguez could have provided information to

resolve these questions and thus was critical to determining

Rodriguez's credibility.

    In view of the foregoing, we conclude that the judge erred

in "weighing the factors relevant to the decision."   L.L., 470

Mass. at 185 n.27.

    iii.   Prejudice.   Because the defendant objected to the

judge's decision not to allow a voir dire examination of
                                                                     29

Rodriguez, we review for prejudicial error.     Commonwealth v.

Durand, 475 Mass. 657, 670 (2016), cert. denied, 583 U.S. 896

(2017).    "[W]e do not determine whether there was prejudicial

error by examining what a reasonable jury might have done if the

errors had never happened.     Instead, we determine whether there

is a 'reasonable possibility that the error[s] might have

contributed to the jury's verdict.'"     Commonwealth v. Crayton,

470 Mass. 228, 253 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430

Mass. 8, 23 (1999).     See Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass.

348, 353 (1994) ("if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after

pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous

action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially

swayed by the error," then error is prejudicial [citation

omitted]).

    We recognize the question to be a close one.     There was

powerful circumstantial evidence that the defendant was the

person in the silver sedan who was with Daily at the time and in

the vicinity of the shooting.     Nevertheless, Rodriguez's

identification testimony was critical to the Commonwealth's

case.     Rodriguez was the only witness who had identified the

defendant as being near the scene of the shooting, approximately

twenty minutes prior thereto; according to Rodriguez, the

defendant was the driver in a silver sedan circling the

neighborhood, which vehicle matched the description of the
                                                                  30

vehicle identified as fleeing the scene of the killing.   The

text message and screenshots, which were sent to defense counsel

after Rodriguez's testimony was complete, suggested that he had

falsely identified the defendant in connection with a scheme to

frame him.   We cannot exclude a "reasonable possibility" that

depriving the defendant of an opportunity to conduct a voir dire

examination of Rodriguez and put to rest questions regarding the

social media information "might have contributed to the jury's

verdict," and the defendant was prejudiced thereby.    Crayton,

470 Mass. at 253, quoting Alphas, 430 Mass. at 23.    Accordingly,

we vacate the convictions and remand for a new trial.

     We review the defendant's additional claims of error to

provide guidance to the extent that they may resurface at any

new trial.

     b.   Questioning Woods Senior's immunity.   Woods Senior

appeared on the first day of trial in response to a subpoena,

along with counsel; he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege

against self-incrimination.   On the seventh trial day, before

Woods Senior was called in the Commonwealth's case-in-chief, he

was granted transactional immunity,29 which the judge explained

     29Transactional immunity provides a witness protection from
prosecution for the crime about which the witness testifies.
See Attorney Gen. v. Colleton, 387 Mass. 790, 797 (1982).
                                                                   31

"immunized [him] from any possible prosecution as a result of

anything [he] might testify to in the course of this trial."

    i.   Questions directed at assertion of privilege.     The

defendant contends that the prosecutor's questions regarding

Woods Senior's invocation of the privilege were improper.

Specifically, when Woods Senior was asked about his text

messages with the defendant, Woods Senior provided answers, some

of which were inconsistent with the documentary record.     For

example, he testified that he began communicating more

frequently with the defendant "two weeks to a month" after Woods

Junior's shooting; but there was evidence that he had sent the

defendant a text message two days after his son's shooting.

When confronted with the text message, in which he sent a

photograph of a man who somewhat resembled Leonard, Woods Senior

testified that he could not recall sending the photograph and

that he did not know the man photographed.

    Similarly, Woods Senior testified that he could not recall

the conversations with the defendant following Leonard's

killing, testifying that the calls were "just to see how the

[defendant was] doing."   He denied having learned about the

shooting from those telephone calls.   The prosecutor then asked

Woods Senior about his appearance on the first day of trial, and

whether he had appeared at that time with counsel to give
                                                                    32

testimony; not surprisingly Woods Senior responded that he had

"pled the Fifth."

    A witness's invocation of the privilege against self-

incrimination has little to no probative value and may have a

disproportionate impact on the jury.   "[W]hen a witness actually

invokes the Fifth Amendment in front of the jury, the jury's

immediate (and inaccurate) assessment of what that means is more

difficult to dispel -- the jury have heard the witness state

that the answer would tend to incriminate him, and a juror would

not think it was inappropriate speculation to interpret that as

a substantive admission of wrongdoing."   Commonwealth v.

Rosario, 444 Mass. 550, 559 (2005).    Generally, it is improper.

See Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 408 Mass. 185, 196 & n.5 (1990),

S.C., 430 Mass. 348 (1999), and cases cited (improper to call

witness "for the sole purpose of invoking his or her privilege

against self-incrimination"); Commonwealth v. Hesketh, 386 Mass.

153, 157 (1982), and cases cited.

    Here, the prosecutor improperly elicited the witness's

testimony regarding his invocation of the privilege against

self-incrimination apparently to impeach his credibility after

he testified that he could not recall certain communications

with the defendant.   We have repeatedly recognized that there

are a myriad of reasons why a person might invoke the privilege

unrelated to the crimes with which a defendant has been charged
                                                                      33

or unrelated to any criminal conduct at all.     See, e.g., Gagnon,

408 Mass. at 196.    Given the communications between Woods Senior

and the defendant in the wake of Woods Junior's killing, the

prosecutor's questions seeking to highlight Woods Senior's

invocation of the privilege were particularly improper, with the

potential to taint the defendant.

    ii.   Questions regarding immunity.      The defendant further

contends that the prosecutor's questions to Woods Senior

concerning the grant of immunity were in violation of the

attorney-client privilege.    We disagree.   A witness who has

received immunity may be questioned about the immunity for

impeachment purposes.   See Commonwealth v. Michel, 367 Mass.

454, 459 (1975), S.C., 381 Mass. 447 (1980), citing Commonwealth

v. Bosworth, 22 Pick. 397, 400 (1839) ("Within the scope of

. . . cross-examination it is proper to inquire whether the

witness expects more favorable treatment from the government in

return for his testimony").   Attorney-client privilege "should

present no obstacle to inquiry into" immunity because the

privilege only protects confidential information, which excludes

information known by third parties.    Michel, supra at 460.     In

particular, "the details of what the prosecutor told counsel or

the witness, or what counsel conveyed from the prosecutor to the

witness, are subject to examination without violating attorney-

client privilege."   Commonwealth v. Birks, 435 Mass. 782, 788
                                                                   34

(2002), S.C., 462 Mass. 1013 (2012), 484 Mass. 1014 (2020), and

490 Mass. 1018 (2022).

     Contrary to the Commonwealth's position, however, the judge

was well within his discretion to intervene and halt the

prosecutor's numerous and repeated questions about Woods

Senior's understanding of the immunity agreement, which could

have led Woods Senior to divulge privileged communications

regarding, for example, "whether to accept the terms offered by

the prosecutor."     Birks, 435 Mass. at 788.30

     c.     Gang-related testimony.   The defendant asserts that the

prosecutor's questions posed to several witnesses regarding

gang-related activity, some of which was several years old, were

improper absent some nexus between the crime and that activity.31

We agree.

     30In any retrial, the judge should instruct the jury that
immunized testimony cannot serve as the sole basis for a
conviction, see G. L. c. 233, § 20I, and ensure that the jury
"in assessing an immunized witness's testimony . . . take into
consideration whether the witness had been promised some benefit
that may have induced the testimony." Commonwealth v. Webb, 468
Mass. 26, 35 (2014).

     31One of the Commonwealth's theories was that the defendant
had, in part, retaliated against Leonard ostensibly because of a
purportedly long-running feud between the Franklin Field and
Franklin Hill housing projects. The defendant and Woods Junior
had grown up in Franklin Hill, while Leonard and his friends
present at the shooting had grown up in Franklin Field. The
shooting happened outside the Franklin Field housing project.

     The prosecutor asked two of Leonard's friends about gangs
in and around Franklin Field. One witness testified that he had
                                                                  35

    "We have recognized repeatedly that evidence of a

defendant's gang membership risks prejudice to the defendant in

that it may suggest a propensity to criminality or violence."

Commonwealth v. Phim, 462 Mass. 470, 477 (2012).    "Although the

prosecution may not introduce [this] so-called prior bad act

evidence to illustrate a defendant's bad character, such

evidence may be admissible if relevant for a nonpropensity

purpose."   Commonwealth v. Chalue, 486 Mass. 847, 866 (2021).

Gang evidence therefore can be introduced to show a defendant's

motive, see Commonwealth v. Leng, 463 Mass. 779, 783 (2012), but

"it will not be admitted if the judge determines that its

probative value is outweighed by risk of unfair prejudice to the

defendant, taking into account the effectiveness of any limiting

instruction."   Chalue, supra.   As the Commonwealth admits, there

no information regarding gangs, to which the prosecutor
responded, "And would you tell us, sir, if you did know these
things?" The prosecutor also asked a second witness present at
the shooting whether he knew about gangs growing up. That
witness explained that the gang in Franklin Field went by
different names. He also said that Leonard and the three men at
the shooting (including himself) were each at some point
affiliated with this gang. On the prosecutor's prompting, the
witness testified that the Franklin Field gang had conflict with
groups outside of Franklin Field, including Franklin Hill. The
prosecutor also asked Woods Senior about the relationship
between Franklin Hill and Franklin Field. Woods Senior
responded that the two sides had disagreements involving
"shootings, stabbings." The prosecutor then asked whether Woods
Senior's text to the defendant on the night of the shooting –-
saying "LOL to hood" –- referred to any neighborhood in
particular. Woods Senior responded, "All of Dorchester,
Roxbury, Mattapan. They all hoods."
                                                                      36

was no evidence that the defendant had gang affiliations or that

the crime had any gang-related motive.      Suggestions that the

defendant grew up and lived in an area where there may have been

gang activity implied only that he had a propensity to

participate in gang violence.      These questions were improper.

    d.   Photographs of Woods Junior's body.     The defendant

maintains that four photographs of Woods Junior's body were

improperly admitted.   Evidence is generally admissible if its

probative value is not substantially outweighed by unfair

prejudice.   Commonwealth v. Spencer, 465 Mass. 32, 48 (2013).

The photographs were relevant to the Commonwealth's case.        They

depict shell casings near Woods Junior's body, which were later

found to have been ejected from the same .40 caliber firearm

used in the shooting of the Leonard and Mair.     The proximity of

the shell casings to Woods Junior's body could have supported

the inference that Woods Junior -- or someone close to him,

including perhaps the defendant, who was also injured in the

September shootout –- had used the weapon.     In turn, this

supported the Commonwealth's theory that the firearm belonged to

the defendant or one of his friends.      The judge was well within

his discretion to conclude that the probative value of this

evidence was therefore not substantially outweighed by unfair

prejudice.   See Spencer, supra.
                                                                       37

     e.   November 16 arrest.    We discern no error in the

testimony regarding the assignment32 of the officer who arrested

the defendant nor in the agreed-to instruction to the jury that

the arrest "was unrelated to anything having to do with this

case" and that the jury should not "draw any adverse inference

against [the defendant] because he was the subject of [an]

investigation that was not related to this case."

     f.   Closing argument.     The defendant maintains that the

prosecutor's closing argument was improper because, responding

to defense counsel's argument that the defendant did not shoot

Leonard because no gunshot residue was found in the defendant's

mother's car, the prosecutor contended that no such residue

would have been found because Mair testified that the shooter

"got out of the passenger side and started shooting, swung the

door open and started shooting."      "[C]ounsel may argue the

evidence and the fair inferences which can be drawn from the

evidence."   Commonwealth v. Sun, 490 Mass. 196, 221 (2022),

quoting Commonwealth v. Hoffer, 375 Mass. 369, 378 (1978).       But

he or she "should not misstate the evidence or refer to facts

not in evidence."   Sun, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Kozec,

399 Mass. 514, 516 (1987).      Here, Mair testified at trial that

     32The officer briefly testified that, at the time of the
arrest, he was assigned to the special operations unit, whose
responsibilities included special weapons and tactics duties.
                                                                   38

"[n]obody got out of the car" and that a light-skinned man

opened the sedan's front passenger door and fired shots from a

firearm in the direction of the Leonard and Mair.    Thus, the

prosecutor's statement that Mair said the shooter "got out" of

the vehicle was not faithful to Mair's words; still, the

inference that the shooter at least leaned out of the car when

he opened the passenger-side door was not contradicted by the

evidence.33

     Finally, we see no error in the prosecutor's argument that

the defense witnesses' observations of two gunmen was not

supported by the ballistics evidence.    Officers found only .40

caliber casings at the crime scene, later determined to be from

a single firearm.   While the defendant correctly notes that

experts testified that certain firearms, such as revolvers, do

not eject casings, the prosecutor's assertion was not incorrect.

     3.   Conclusion.   The judgments are vacated, the verdicts

set aside, and the matter is remanded to the Superior Court for

a new trial.

                                     So ordered.

     33The prosecutor did not misstate the evidence in
describing the gunshot residue expert's equivocal statements
about whether officers might find residue in the interior of a
vehicle. The witness testified, "There's a wide variety of
factors that come into play as to whether you will or will not
find [gunshot residue] on a surface. It's time, friction,
washing of that surface. So it's really very circumstantial
based on the case at hand."