Court Opinion

ID: 9854921
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:16:58.598172+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:36.396494
License: Public Domain

Gregory, Justice:
Appellants, co-executors and sole legatees and devisees of the will of Pearl H. Stone, deceased, commenced this action for an accounting of the estate of Chaney W. Stone, deceased, whereby they sought to withdraw all accumulated, unexhausted income from the life estate left to Pearl H. Stone by the will of her husband, Chaney W. Stone. Respondents, legatees under the will of Chaney W. Stone and Administrators D.B.N.C.T.A., in their Answer and Counterclaim denied appellants’ claim to the income and sought to have any assets in the estate of Chaney W. Stone that were in the hands of the appellants turned over to respondents.
Respondents moved for summary judgment based on the pleadings and Mr. Stone’s will. No opposing affidavits were filed. The court granted summary judgment in favor of respondents, thus, denying the legatees of Pearl H. Stone the accumulated income generated by Mr. Stone’s estate unexhausted by Mrs. Stone during her lifetime. This appeal followed. We reverse.
The single issue is whether Mr. Stone intended by his will to bequeath his wife an absolute life estate or a restricted life estate. If he bequeathed an absolute life estate 'the lower court should be reversed as all income generated by the corpus of the husband’s estate would belong to the wife with portions thereof which she did not use during her lifetime becoming a part of her estate and passing by her will. If he bequeathed his wife a restricted life estate, we must affirm the lower court as only income which she actually consumed belonged to her with accumulated, un*294exhausted income remaining as part of his estate and passing by his will.'
Mr. Stoné provided in Item 5 of his will as follows:
“I do give, bequeath and devise all the rest and residue of my property, both real and personal of every kind to my wife, Pearl Hays Stone, for the term of her life, she to have the use and full custody and control of same and all income therefrom during her lifetime for her comfortable support and enjoyment and also to have during her lifetime the right and privilege of disposing of any part or parts of the corpus of my estate, both real and personal, as may be desired by her for her comfortable support and enjoyment and I do give her full power and authority to use her discretion in this respect.”
Mrs. Stone was appointed as executrix of her husband’s will. She was also empowered in Item 12 of the will to sell any and all of the estate property “real and personal, wheresoever located, at such time and on such terms as she may deem advisable” in order that the properties not be sacrificed in final settlement.
It is also pertinent that the residuary of the estate was directed to be distributed in accordance with the laws of Descent and Distribution of Intestate Estates of South Carolina.
In construction of a will, the primary purpose of the court is to arrive at the testator’s intention as expressed in his will considered as a whole. Green v. Green, 210 S. C. 391, 42 S. E. (2d) 884 (1947). In determination of the intent to bequeath an absolute life estate with its concomitant right to all unexpended income, we find that consideration of the following factors salient. First, the testator apparently considered income and principal separately, rather than treating the estate as a unit, as he speaks of devising the residue of his property, real and personal “and all income therefrom” to his wife. The *295wife was not directed to use the estate as a unit, rather she was first given the income and then the right to invade corpus. Thus, the wife’s comfort and happiness and not the unity of his estate which eventually was to be distributed in accordance with the Statute of Descent and Distribution seems to have been the testator’s primary concern. See Langdell v. Dodge, 100 N. H. 118, 122 A. (2d) 529 (1956).
Second, there seems to be an intention to give the wife complete and unassailable possession and control of his property while she lived. In Item 5 he gives her the residue of his property, she to have “the use and full custody and control of the same.” He further gives her the “privilege of disposing of any part ... of corpus . . . both real and personal, as may be desired for her comfortable support and enjoyment” with full authority to use her discretion in this respect. In Item 12 he gives her the power to sell his property to prevent sacrifice during settlement of his estate without posting bond or getting the court’s permission.
Third, there is nothing to indicate that the testator intended to accumulate income.
Fourth, we must presume where the wife is the primary specified beneficiary, that it is unlikely that the husband-testator would desire to burden his wife
with the accounting for income which a limited life estate would entail. As pointed out in Langdell v. Dodge, supra, [p] roblems of this nature might have been vexing and worrisome as to have militated against her enjoyment of the property. It is presumed that the testator intended to make a practical disposition of his estate so that his wife could manage it with a minimum of trouble and did not intend a situation which could cause her worry and harassment.”
Fifth, the testator clearly gave his wife “all income” from his estate during her lifetime. Under South Carolina law if a sift is made in one clause of a *296will in clear and unequivocal terms, it will not be enlarged or cut down or qualified by words of doubtful import found in a subsequent clause. King v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 253 S. C. 646, 173 S. E. (2d) 92 (1970).
The grant of “custody and control of the same” in Item 5 refers to the residue of real and personal property as opposed to “income” in the next phrase. Custody and control connote less than ownership, so that by inference the grant of “all income” without such qualification seems to be an outright gift of the income with the words “for her comfortable support and enjoyment” expressive of motive rather than limitation. Further, the wife was given total unaccountability in invading corpus “as may be desired for her comfortable support and enjoyment.” Any doubt as to “support and enjoyment” being expressive of limitation rather than motive are clearly resolved in favor of their use in describing motive by the unlimited discretion the wife is given to invade corpus. It would be senseless to intend “support and enjoyment” as a limitation on the power to invade corpus, then immediately follow the limitation with a grant of power vitiating the limitation. A, proper construction seeks to harmonize the various provisions and a construction which gives meaning to all should be preferred over one which renders some provisions meaningless. “Support and enjoyment” construed as words describing the testator’s motive is in complete harmony with the full discretionary right to invade corpus given to the wife.
We think it unbelievable that Mr. Stone intended for his wife to control and manage his estate for the benefit of his collaterals while she was limited to support with all else added to corpus and kept for his relatives. The repeated use of “comfortable” to describe support and the use of “enjoyment” indicate that her welfare, happiness, and comfort were uppermost on the testator’s mind in writing his will.
*297We think the words “for her comfortable support and enjoyment” were precatory and that the wife was entitled to the income without restriction. 51 Am. Jur. (2d), Life Tenants and Remaindermen, § 107 through 108. Page on Wills, § 39.16, page 90; 118 A. L. R. 339.
We find that all accumulated, unexhausted income becomes a part of the widow’s estate and goes to her heirs, not to the remaindermen.
Respondents raise a question as to the form of appellant’s exceptions, both of which are based on “the pleadings and briefs.” As respondents point out, trial briefs do not constitute a part of the record before the court and thus no exception can be properly based upon them. Because we feel the reference in the exceptions to the briefs was inadvertent, we have deleted the faulty reference and considered the important issue thus properly raised in the second exception.
We do not pass on appellants’ first exception as the foregoing disposes of the case.
Reversed and remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Lewis, C. J., and Ness and Rhodes, JJ., concur.
Littlejohn, A. J., dissents.