Court Opinion

ID: 9928193
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 22:02:38.24423+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:50:31.300563
License: Public Domain

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                  NANCY CIARA v. ATLANTIC
                    MOTORS, LLC, ET AL.
                        (AC 45491)
                 JERYD GRIFFIN v. ATLANTIC
                    MOTORS, LLC, ET AL.
                        (AC 45492)
                         Elgo, Cradle and Seeley, Js.

                                    Syllabus

The plaintiffs, N and J, filed separate actions, which were later consolidated
    for trial, alleging, inter alia, that the defendants misrepresented the
    mileage on the odometers of two motor vehicles that the plaintiffs
    allegedly purchased from one of the defendants. Several of the defen-
    dants were defaulted for failure to appear, and the plaintiffs withdrew
    their complaints against several other defendants. At the time of trial,
    the defendants consisted of N Co. and three individual defendants. On
    the first day of trial, counsel for the plaintiffs, T, indicated his intention
    to present the testimony of the plaintiffs and the individual defendants.
    C, who appeared at trial on behalf of N Co., subsequently filed an
    appearance on behalf of each of the individual defendants and indicated
    that they had no intention of testifying in this case, that he did not plan
    to put them on the stand, and that T had not subpoenaed them, deposed
    them, or tried to interview them. On the second day of trial, T indicated
    to the court that the day before he had subpoenaed the individual
    defendants through C, who he claimed had indicated on his appearance
    that he agreed to accept service of all documents. C responded that T
    had sent him emails asking him to serve his clients with subpoenas and,
    therefore, had not properly subpoenaed the defendants. The court ruled
    that T’s emails to C were not sufficient to comply with the requirement
    for the service of a subpoena and declined to enforce the subpoenas.
    During the trial, T attempted to introduce two Carfax reports related
    to the motor vehicles at issue. T attempted to admit evidence contained
    in the first report through the testimony of N. C objected on the basis
    that the report was hearsay, and the court sustained the objection. T
    showed the second report to J during his testimony but indicated that
    he was using the report to refresh J’s memory, not to enter it into
    evidence. After the trial, the court rendered judgments for the defen-
    dants, finding that the plaintiffs failed to prove by a preponderance of
    the evidence any of their claims against the defendants, that they failed
    to offer evidence that any of the defendants were involved in the motor
    vehicle purchases or subsequent dealings the plaintiffs had concerning
    the vehicles, and that they failed to meet their burdens of proof as to
    damages because they presented no evidence as to specific damages
    they claim to have suffered. On the plaintiffs’ appeals to this court, held:
1. The trial court did not err when it declined to enforce the subpoenas to
    compel the attendance of the individual defendants at trial; contrary to
    the plaintiffs’ claim that emailing subpoenas to the attorney for the
    individual defendants constituted proper service on those individuals
    pursuant to the rules of practice (§§ 10-12 and 10-13), the plain and
    unambiguous language of those rules of practice reveals that neither
    provision applies to the service of subpoenas, and, consequently, deliv-
    ery of a subpoena to counsel under one of the methods described in
    Practice Book § 10-13 was not sufficient service pursuant to the statute
    (§ 52-143) governing the proper service of subpoenas for witnesses, and
    the subpoenas were not properly served.
2. This court declined to review the plaintiffs’ unpreserved claim that the
    trial court abused its discretion in failing to admit into evidence the
    Carfax reports pertaining to the two motor vehicles at issue: because
    the plaintiffs did not attempt to introduce their respective Carfax reports
    into evidence, the court did not issue a ruling to exclude them; moreover,
    no articulation was sought from the court as to the basis for sustaining
    the defendants’ hearsay objection, and, accordingly, any claim related
    to the admission of the Carfax reports was not preserved for this
   court’s review.
     Argued October 19, 2023—officially released January 2, 2024

                         Procedural History

   Action, in each case, to recover damages for, inter
alia, fraud, and for other relief, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where the
cases were consolidated for trial; thereafter, the named
defendant et al. in each case were defaulted for failure
to appear; subsequently, the plaintiff in each case with-
drew the action as against the defendant Uncle and
Nephews, LLC, et al.; thereafter, the court, Hon. Robert
B. Shapiro, judge trial referee, rendered judgment in
each case for the defendant New England Property,
LLC, et al., from which the plaintiffs appealed to this
court. Affirmed.
  Clifford S. Thier, for the appellants (plaintiff in
each case).
  Leonard M. Crone, for the appellees (defendant New
England Property, LLC, et al. in each case).
                          Opinion

  CRADLE, J. These two appeals arise from consoli-
dated cases. The plaintiffs in the respective actions,
Nancy Ciara and Jeryd Griffin, appeal from the judg-
ments of the trial court in favor of the defendants New
England Property, LLC (New England Property),
Edmond Ferati, Balkiz Ferati, and Rini Ferati.1 On
appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court erred in (1)
declining to enforce subpoenas to compel the atten-
dance of the defendants at trial and (2) failing to admit
Carfax reports into evidence at trial. We affirm the
judgments of the trial court.
  The following procedural history is relevant to this
appeal. On November 30, 2017, the plaintiffs filed these
actions arising ‘‘from the alleged purchases of used
motor vehicles in 2017 at Atlantic Motors, LLC [Atlantic
Motors] . . . which [the plaintiffs] claim[ed] were
defective in various ways.’’ The alleged defect most
pertinent to this appeal is the plaintiffs’ claim that the
defendants had ‘‘[m]isrepresent[ed] the mileage’’ on the
odometers of the vehicles.2 The plaintiffs sought com-
pensatory and punitive damages, fees, and costs.
   A remote bench trial was held on March 8 and 9,
2022. On April 27, 2022, the court, Hon. Robert B. Sha-
piro, judge trial referee, issued a memorandum of deci-
sion rendering judgments for the defendants. The court
reasoned that ‘‘the plaintiffs failed to prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence any of their claims against
any of the defendants’’ and that they ‘‘failed to offer
evidence that any of the defendants were involved in
the motor vehicle purchases or subsequent dealings the
plaintiffs had concerning the vehicles. While there was
some evidence that Edmond Ferati supervised and man-
aged operations at Atlantic Motors . . . the plaintiffs
failed to prove that he knew about or was involved in
the 2017 purchases or subsequent events concerning
the vehicles.’’ (Citation omitted.) The court further
found that ‘‘the plaintiffs presented no evidence as to
specific damages they claim to have suffered,’’ so they
had ‘‘failed to meet their burdens of proof as to dam-
ages.’’ This appeal followed. Additional procedural his-
tory will be set forth as necessary.
                             I
   The plaintiffs first claim that the trial court erred in
failing to enforce subpoenas to compel the attendance
of the individual defendants at trial. We disagree.
   The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to our resolution of this claim. At the outset of
trial, Attorney Clifford Thier, counsel for the plaintiffs,
indicated his intention to present the testimony of the
plaintiffs and the defendants. Attorney Leonard Crone,
who appeared at trial on behalf of New England Prop-
erty, also filed an appearance after the commencement
Edmond Ferati, Balkiz Ferati, and Rini Ferati. Crone
indicated that ‘‘none of [the individual defendants] ha[d]
any intention of testifying in this case,’’ that he did not
plan to ‘‘put them on the stand,’’ and that Thier ‘‘ha[d]
not subpoenaed them . . . deposed them . . . [or]
tried to interview them . . . .’’ On the second day of
trial, Thier indicated to the court: ‘‘I subpoenaed, yester-
day, three of the defendants within the eighteen hour—
less than eighteen hour time frame called for by the
statute, and utilizing their attorney, who has on his
appearance . . . agreed to accept service of all docu-
ments.’’ Crone responded that Thier had sent him emails
asking him to serve his clients with subpoenas and,
therefore, had not properly subpoenaed the defendants.
The court, Hon. Robert B. Shapiro, judge trial referee,
ruled that Thier’s email to Crone was ‘‘not sufficient
to comply with the requirement for the service of a
subpoena.’’
   On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the court should
have enforced the subpoenas because they were timely
served on the defendants’ counsel, who, by virtue of
filing an appearance on behalf of the defendants, had
agreed to accept service of all documents on their
behalf.
   To resolve the plaintiffs’ claim, we examine the law
related to the proper service of subpoenas for wit-
nesses. General Statutes § 52-143 (a) provides in rele-
vant part: ‘‘Subpoenas for witnesses shall be . . .
served by an officer [or] indifferent person . . . not
less than 18 hours prior to the time designated for the
person summoned to appear, unless the court orders
otherwise.’’ It is undisputed that the plaintiffs did not
comply with § 52-143 in their attempt to subpoena the
defendants to testify at trial. In fact, the plaintiffs
acknowledge that ‘‘[i]t [is] true that an attorney does not
ordinarily have to accept subpoena service on behalf
of a client.’’ The plaintiffs argue, however, that counsel
for the defendants agreed to accept service of the sub-
poenas by virtue of his filing an appearance on behalf
of the defendants.3 In support of this argument, they
refer to the appearance form filed by Crone, which
provided that he ‘‘agree[s] to accept papers (service)
electronically in this case under Practice Book Section
10-13.’’ On that basis, the plaintiffs contend that
emailing the subpoenas to counsel for the defendants
constituted proper service pursuant to Practice Book
§§ 10-12 and 10-134 and, therefore, was sufficient to
compel the defendants’ attendance at trial.
   ‘‘Our interpretation of the rules of practice is a ques-
tion of law subject to plenary review.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Riley v. Travelers Home & Marine
Ins. Co., 333 Conn. 60, 81, 214 A.3d 345 (2019). ‘‘[When]
the meaning of a statute [or rule] is plain and unambigu-
ous, the enactment speaks for itself and there is no
occasion to construe it. Its unequivocal meaning is not
subject to modification by way of construction. . . . If
a statute or rule is ambiguous, however, we construe
it with due regard for the authors’ purpose and the
circumstances surrounding its enactment or adoption.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brown v. Commis-
sioner of Correction, 345 Conn. 1, 9, 282 A.3d 959 (2022).
‘‘[A]lthough [t]he Superior Court is empowered to adopt
and promulgate rules regulating pleading, practice and
procedure . . . [s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge
or modify any substantive right . . . .’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) In re Ryan C., 220 Conn. App.
507, 523, 299 A.3d 308, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 901, 300
A.3d 1166 (2023).
   The plaintiffs contend that Practice Book §§ 10-12
and 10-13 ‘‘apply to subpoenas, meaning that serving a
subpoena on the attorney constitutes service on the
client.’’ The plain and unambiguous language of those
rules of practice reveals that neither provision applies
to the service of subpoenas. Practice Book § 10-13
describes the acceptable methods of service of the doc-
uments identified in Practice Book § 10-12. The list of
documents in Practice Book § 10-12 consists of plead-
ings, ‘‘every written motion other than one in which an
order is sought ex parte and every paper relating to
discovery, request, demand, claim, notice or similar
paper . . . .’’ A subpoena to compel a witness’ pres-
ence at trial is not a pleading or a paper relating to
discovery, request, demand, claim, notice or similar
paper and, therefore, does not fall within the ambit of
Practice Book §§ 10-12 and 10-13. Consequently, deliv-
ery of a subpoena to counsel under one of the methods
described in Practice Book § 10-13 is not sufficient ser-
vice under § 52-143. Because the subpoenas were not
properly served, the court did not err in declining to
enforce them.
                             II
  The plaintiffs also claim that the court erred in failing
to admit into evidence the Carfax reports pertaining to
the two vehicles at issue. We disagree.
   The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to the resolution of this claim. During the first day
of trial, Thier asked Ciara, on direct examination, how
she had attempted ‘‘to find out what . . . the true mile-
age [of the vehicle allegedly purchased from Atlantic
Motors] was.’’ Ciara answered that she had done ‘‘a
Carfax inquiry.’’ Thier then asked, ‘‘And what did you
learn from that inquiry?’’ Crone objected, and the court
sustained the objection. Thier argued that ‘‘Carfax is a
recognized provider of service history for vehicles all
over the United States’’ and that it is ‘‘like an encyclope-
dia or a dictionary.’’ He asked the court that ‘‘it be
recognized as an impartial source of information. It is
the only source of information, and . . . the only way
it’s admissible is [Ciara’s] reading of it.’’ Crone
responded that he ‘‘would never be able to . . . cross-
examine the person who propounded the actual . . .
report. . . . [He] could never find out what the basis
was.’’ The court again sustained the objection.
   Griffin, on direct examination, testified about the
vehicle he had allegedly purchased from Atlantic
Motors. Related to a line of questioning about Griffin’s
attempt to trade in that vehicle at another dealership,
Thier asked permission to show Griffin a copy of a
Carfax report related to that vehicle, ‘‘not to enter it
into evidence, but to refresh his memory . . . .’’ Crone
again objected ‘‘because it’s hearsay [and] whoever
completed that document is no one you’re going to put
on the stand and it’s no one that I’m going to be able
to cross-examine.’’ The court responded that the Carfax
report is not necessarily ‘‘admissible by showing it to
[Griffin]. So, it’s been marked for identification . . . .’’
Thier then asked the court for clarification, stating that
he was not ‘‘introducing it for the truth, but [for] what
[Griffin] was told was the reason for the dealership
saying, ‘We’re not going to buy your truck from you.’ ’’
(Emphasis in original.) The court ruled that Griffin
could tell the court what he understood about why
the dealership would not purchase the vehicle. Griffin
answered that he ‘‘understood . . . [that] the vehicle
needed a lot of work and [that] the odometer was not
correct.’’ Thier showed the Carfax report to Griffin and
the court confirmed that it was ‘‘not being offered in[to]
evidence at this time.’’
   On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the court abused
its discretion when it ‘‘excluded the Carfax reports and
ruled that the plaintiffs would have to obtain certified
letters from the multiple out-of-state government agen-
cies and repair shops that had performed odometer
readings during the life and travels of the automobiles.’’
Our review of the record reveals that the court never
made such a ruling. In fact, the plaintiffs did not attempt
to introduce their respective Carfax reports into evi-
dence. In Ciara’s case, the offer as to the Carfax report
was limited to Thier’s attempt to have Ciara testify
about its contents; the report itself was never offered
into evidence. In Griffin’s case, the record is clear that
the report was being used to refresh Griffin’s recollec-
tion and it was ‘‘not being offered at [that] time.’’
Because the plaintiffs failed to move for the admission
of the Carfax reports into evidence, the court did not
issue a ruling to exclude them. Moreover, no articula-
tion was sought from the court as to the basis for sus-
taining the defendants’ objection. Accordingly, any
claim as to the admission of the Carfax reports is not
preserved for our review.5 See, e.g., State v. Warren,
83 Conn. App. 446, 451, 850 A.2d 1086 (unpreserved
evidentiary claims are not reviewable on appeal), cert.
denied, 271 Conn. 907, 859 A.2d 567 (2004).
  The judgments are affirmed.
  In this opinion the other judges concurred.
   1
     Atlantic Motors, LLC; Dritero Ferati; Anthony Pinheiro; 911 Motorsports,
LLC; Betim Ferati; Uncle and Nephews, LLC; Dr. Auto; Save the Children
Foundation Company, LLC; Edmond Ferati; New England Property; Balkiz
Ferati; Rini Ferati; and Erkan Aydar were the original defendants in both
of these actions.
   The following defendants were defaulted for failure to appear: Dritero
Ferati; 911 Motorsports, LLC; New England Property; Balkiz Ferati; Atlantic
Motors, LLC; Uncle and Nephews, LLC; Betim Ferati; Edmond Ferati; and
Rini Ferati. On August 27, 2018, the court, Hon. Patty Jenkins Pittman,
judge trial referee, granted the plaintiffs’ motions for judgment of default
and rendered judgments thereon as to the defendants Atlantic Motors, LLC;
911 Motorsports, LLC; New England Property; Dritero Ferati; Betim Ferati;
Edmond Ferati; and Balkiz Ferati. On September 5, 2018, the plaintiffs
withdrew their complaints against the defendants Uncle and Nephews, LLC;
Save the Children Foundation Company, LLC; Dr. Auto; Anthony Pinheiro;
and Erkan Aydar. On April 29, 2019, the court, Sheridan, J., granted the
motions to open the judgments filed by the defendants New England Prop-
erty, Edmond Ferati, and Balkiz Ferati. Any reference to the defendants
herein is to New England Property, Edmond Ferati, Balkiz Ferati, and
Rini Ferati.
   2
     The plaintiffs alleged four counts of odometer fraud in violation of 49
U.S.C. §§ 32703 (2) and (4) and 32705 (a) (2) and General Statutes § 14-
106b; two counts of breach of warranty; and claims of common-law fraud;
negligent misrepresentation; unjust enrichment; negligence; violation of Gen-
eral Statutes § 42-225; violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices
Act, General Statutes § 42-110a et seq.; violation of General Statutes § 42-
110b and related state regulations; and civil conspiracy.
   3
     To be clear, the plaintiffs do not claim that counsel for the defendants
expressly agreed to accept service of the subpoenas.
   4
     Practice Book § 10-12, entitled ‘‘Service of the Pleading and Other Papers;
Responsibility of Counsel or Self-Represented Party: Documents and Per-
sons To Be Served,’’ provides in relevant part: ‘‘It is the responsibility of
counsel . . . filing the same to serve on each other party who has appeared
one copy of every pleading subsequent to the original complaint, every
written motion other than one in which an order is sought ex parte and
every paper relating to discovery, request, demand, claim, notice or similar
paper, except a request for mediation under General Statutes § 49-31l. . . .’’
   Practice Book § 10-13, entitled ‘‘Method of Service,’’ provides in relevant
part: ‘‘Service upon the attorney . . . may be by delivering a copy or by
mailing it to the last known address of the attorney . . . . Delivery of a
copy within this section means handing it to the attorney . . . or leaving
it at the attorney’s office with a person in charge thereof; or if there is no
one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place therein; or, if the office is
closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at the usual place
of abode. Delivery of a copy within this rule may also mean electronic
delivery to the last known electronic address of the attorney . . . provided
that electronic delivery was consented to in writing by the person served.
. . .’’
   5
     Even if the plaintiffs had preserved their claim as to the admission of
the Carfax reports, they did not demonstrate that the alleged error was
harmful. They do not offer any argument as to how the Carfax reports would
overcome the court’s finding that the plaintiffs ‘‘failed to offer evidence that
any of the defendants were involved in the motor vehicle purchases or
subsequent dealings . . . .’’