Court Opinion

ID: 9607623
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:00:56.294653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:48.723356
License: Public Domain

DURHAM, Justice
(concurring separately)-
I respectfully submit that Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion and to some extent the majority opinion had misdirected their *1229analysis of the admissibility of Dr. Moench’s testimony.
The majority opinion correctly concludes that the defendant failed to object to the admission of the testimony on the basis of Rules 403 and 404 and is therefore precluded from arguing that theory on appeal. However, since I believe Dr. Moench’s tes: timony did not contain hearsay, given the purpose for which it was offered, I think the analysis of that question by both the majority and Justice Stewart is superfluous. Moreover, the opinions are confusing in failing to identify precisely the content and purpose of the testimony the majority approves and Justice Stewart finds objectionable.
Dr. Moench’s testimony repeats statements made to him by Marc Schreuder about Frances Schreuder and events in their family history. Dr. Moench referred to statements made by Frances only indirectly, as in the following example:
[I]f [Marc] didn’t do everything to please [Frances], she would threaten to lock him out, threaten to disown him and repeatedly told him that they would be disowned, that they would be thrown out' of their apartment, that they would wind up in Harlem living in the gutter. That she and Lavinia would starve if Marc didn’t do everything she said to.
There are thus two types of statements at issue here: those made out of court by Frances, repeated by Marc to Dr. Moench and described at trial, and those made out of court by Marc and repeated by Dr. Moench at trial. I submit that neither type of statement was hearsay under our rules. Frances’ out-of-court statements were not hearsay because they were not “offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Utah R.Evid. 801(c). That is, they were not offered to prove that Frances and Lavinia would starve or that the family would be disowned. It is clear that they were offered merely to prove that they were made. Just as Marc could testify without any hearsay problem, for example, that his mother raised her voice or opened a window, he may testify as to what he heard her say if the testimony is not offered to show that what she said was true.
Marc’s out-of-court statements, as distinguished from Frances’, were not hearsay because they were offered pursuant to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) to rebut implications raised by the defense that Marc’s trial testimony was improperly influenced or motivated. As indicated by the majority opinion, Marc testified at the trial about his family history and his relationship with his mother. His testimony was subject to cross-examination, and a strenuous attack was made on his credibility. The statements made by Marc to'Dr. Moench corroborated the consistency of Marc’s version of events over time, tending to rebut the implication that he had fabricated his testimony or had an improper motive for giving it at Frances’ trial.1 That Marc’s testimony seems inherently unreliable, as the dissent asserts, would be grounds for the jury to disbelieve it, but not grounds in this context for the trial court to reject it. See State v. Speer, 718 P.2d 383 (Utah 1986).
If the foregoing analysis is accurate, there is no need to address the admissibility of Dr. Moench’s testimony under the hearsay/expert opinion rule at all. The defendant’s brief focuses only on the out-of-court statements of Marc and Frances, not on the expert opinion Dr. Moench offered. Those statements were not hearsay. The only possible exception to that conclusion is the possibility that the scope of Dr. Moench’s testimony exceeded the subject *1230matter covered by Marc’s trial testimony. If new evidence was contained in Marc’s statements to Dr. Moench, it would be difficult for the State to sustain the position that Dr. Moench’s testimony was simply rebuttal. However, the defense has made no effort to develop this argument or to delineate the material covered by Marc at trial, as opposed to his pretrial communications to Moench. In the event that such a distinction exists, however, and Dr. Moench’s testimony did not in every way qualify as nonhearsay under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), the analysis undertaken by the majority opinion correctly disposes, in my view, of any hearsay objection.
ZIMMERMAN, J., concurs in the concurring opinion of Justice DURHAM.

. Although Dr. Moench testified as part of the State’s case-in-chief, that fact does not mean that the testimony regarding Marc’s statements was not offered to rebut a charge of improper influence or motive. Direct testimony can function as rebuttal when it is offered in response to attacks made on cross-examination. Here, Marc testified prior to Dr. Moench and was subjected to extensive cross-examination regarding fabrication of testimony, improper influence, and improper motive. By offering Dr. Moench’s testimony immediately after Marc's, the State was able to rebut inferences from cross-examination and thereby strengthen its version of events.