Court Opinion

ID: 9740895
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:44:16.94275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:20.926299
License: Public Domain

Concurring in Result
Kelley, J.
I arrive at the same conclusion as the majority opinion but by different paths.
The record in this appeal is woefully deficient in matters essential to a proper determination of the questions involved. The judgment of the court is based wholly On a stipulation entered into by certain named parties, one being the appellant herein and another being the administrator of decedent’s estate, who purported to act on behalf of the widow of decedent. The widow, herself, did not. join in the stipulation.
The stipulation undertakes to establish, in substance, the following facts: Decedent died March 6, 1951 (it is not stipulated that he died intestate but it may be fairly inferred that such was the fact) ; the. estate is insolvent and assets insufficient to satisfy the various claims of the parties; that Dora Kehr, the widow, did not join in decedent’s application for old age assistance; that petition to settle the estate as insolvent was filed June 3, 1951 and notice thereof duly published on June 15, 1951; that the claim of appellant was filed May 31, 1951, as Claim No. 1, for $2,589.10 based upon old age assistance rendered under the terms of a certain contract between decedent and appellant, a copy of which said contract is set forth; that notice of the old age assistance was filed in the Recorder’s Office of Elkhart County on May 1, 1947; that decedent died the owner of certain described real estate; and that one Henry S. Weaver has a claim, designated as Claim No. 2, based on a judgment in his favor taken against the de*336cedent in the latter’s lifetime. The stipulation was filed in the court on July 3, 1952.
It makes no reference to any sale of the real estate but it appears from another part of the record that the administrator published notice of the time, place and terms of sale of the real estate on August 21st and 28th, -1951, and made a report of private sale to a named purchaser for $1,900.00 in cash, which sale was confirmed by the court and deed approved and ordered delivered. Nothing appears in the record as to the proceedings for the sale, whether adversary in character, who, if any, were made parties thereto, or whether the interest of the widow therein was set off to her or was sold with order of attachment to the proceeds of the sale.
The record is devoid of any reference to what the assets of decedent consisted of, that is, what part was personalty, cash, and real estate. This is important because, under the statute, the widow may select articles not exceeding $1,000.00, or, if she fails to select, she becomes entitled to her allowance out of the first moneys received by the administrator in excess of administration costs, and expenses of last sickness and funeral. See §6-711, Burns’ 1933.
It is noted that the inheritance tax appraiser made an appraisement of the estate in the net sum of $3,325.23. The real estate sold for $1,900.00, thus indicating a personal estate of $1,425.23. If such be the fact, then all or some part of the widow’s allowance could or may have been paid out of the personalty as provided by the statute, but the record fails to disclose anything as to these facts. It may be urged that such matters are of no influence in the determination of this appeal, as we have only to look to the stipulation and the judgment of the court as the basis for our consideration. I do not agree with this conclusion.
*337The majority opinion is predicated wholly upon a determination of the priority of liens, the lien of the widow and the lien of the appellant. But the judgment of the court, from which this appeal is taken makes no reference to priority of liens. It establishes priority of claims. Upon the record presented here, the court could not have adjudged the priority of liens, and this for the good reason that circumstances and facts necessary under the statute for the creation of any widow’s lien are not shown. The statute provides when and how the widow’s allowance becomes a lien but none of such essentials or requisites are shown in the stipulation or in the record presented to us. Nor does the court, in its judgment or order of priority, make any reference or order that the widow’s claim for allowance attaches to the real estate or the proceeds thereof. It simply orders the administrator to “settle said claims in accordance with said priorities.”
Such being the condition of the record, there is a total absence of any submitted ground for the determination of this appeal on the basis of comparative priorities of liens.
The real question, then, for our consideration on this record before us, is one of priorities of claims. The statute, §52-1213, Burns’ 1951 Replacement, in creating a lien in favor of the Welfare Department, refers only to “real property” of the recipient. It has no application to personalty. However, §52-1214, of the Burns’ Replacement, provides that “any claim filed for recovery of aged assistance shall have priority in order of payment from the estate over all other claims, except prior recorded encumbrances, taxes, reasonable costs of administration, and funeral expenses in an amount not to exceed $125.00.” (Our emphasis.)
It is evident, therefore, that if the widow possesses only a claim against the estate of the decedent, then, *338under the quoted provision of the statute, the claim of the appellant would seem to have priority. It has been the holding of our courts that, under the statute, §6-711, Burns’ 1933, the widow has a “preferred”, claim, payable out of the personal estate if it is sufficient for that purpose; and, if the personalty is insufficient therefor, the real estate can be sold to pay her. Claypool v. Jaqua, Administratrix, et al. (1893), 135 Ind. 499, 505, 35 N. E. 285; Mugg v. Fenn (1926), 198 Ind. 372, 374, 153 N. E. 776. “The husband can not, by any act, deprive her of it against her will . . . .” Shipman v. Keyes, Administrator (1890), 127 Ind. 353, 356, 26 N. E. 896. (Our emphasis.) “The statutory allowance to the widow of $500.00 (now $1,000.00) was not an interest in the estate of the decedent . . . .” (Our emphasis.) Mugg v. Fenn, supra, and “Her right to such payment was not a ‘claim against the decedent’ to be filed by her as provided in . . . (Our emphasis.) Rush, Administrator, et al. v. Kelley (1905), 34 Ind. App. 449, 454, 73 N. E. 130. The widow’s right to her statutory allowance is “analogous to the right of dower . . . Shipman v. Keyes, Administrator, supra, Claypool v. Jaqua, Administratrix, et al., supra.
Thus, from the authorities, it seems that the statutory allowance given .the widow of a decedent, although sometimes referred to as a “preferred claim,” is not just a claim of commensurate value and standing in the sense of being a claim arising from some obligation of the decedent which must be filed against the estate for allowance, but it partakes of the nature of a prior right vested in her by virtue of statutory authorization.
This allowance made to the widow is one especially favored by the law. There has been a constant tendency to make a better provision for her. The amount allowed to her has been increased from one hundred dollars to five hundred dollars and, by ch. 53 of the Acts of 1949, *339to one thousand dollars. “It gives her a credit for the necessaries of life at once upon her husband’s death, and the means of decent burial should she die before the amount comes into her hands. The statute requires a liberal, instead of a narrow, interpretation, in order to accomplish the purposes of the legislature in enacting it. . . . The right and title of the widow to this allowance, either in property or money at her election, vests in her and becomes absolute immediately on the death of the husband. The . . . allowance made to a widow . . . becomes her absolute property. . . . The amount allowed the widow by this statute, when taken by her, either in property or money, must be considered as so much deducted from the assets in the hands of the executor or administrator, without reference to the debts of the estate . . . .” (Our emphasis.) Henry’s Probate Law and Practice, Fifth edition, Vol. 1, pp. 214, 215, 216, §197.
It is my opinion, therefore, that the wording of the statute, §52-1214, Burns’ 1951 Replacement, in giving priority to the claim of the public welfare department, “in order of payment” from the estate over “all other claims” gives no priority over the widow’s statutory allowance for the reasons: (1) that her allowance is not merely a “claim,” and, (2) that the word “claims,” as used in the statute, refers to claims as used in the ordinary understanding of that word and does not include or refer to the statutory provision for the widow of a sum certain.
The trial court reached the right result and the judgment should be affirmed.