Court Opinion

ID: 9669550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:59:39.756658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:57.934373
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING
Brickley, C.J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). With the benefit of rehearing and reconsideration of the merits of this significant case, I find that I cannot, as I did in this Court’s original offering, join the opinion of Justice Boyle to the extent that it finds it necessary to interpret the meaning of "financial benefits” as the term applies to Const 1963, art 9, § 24.
That opinion concludes, as did the Court of *577Appeals, that there is no legally acceptable remedy by which the executive or legislative branch can be compelled to appropriate funds in order to comply with art 9, § 24 of the Michigan Constitution, regardless of the construction given to the term "financial benefits.”1
It is a well-accepted principle of constitutional jurisprudence that courts do not engage in constitutional interpretation that is unnecessary to the disposition of the case at hand.2 The relief sought by the instant plaintiffs—a mandamus compelling the Legislature to appropriate sufficient resources to prefund their pension benefits as provided in art 9, § 24, is not advanced by the outcome of the debate over whether the framers of our state constitution intended the words "financial benefits” to include the health care benefits that have been added to the plaintiff’s pension plan.
Accordingly, I join the rationale and result of the opinion of Justice Boyle, only to the extent that it denies the request for mandamus.
Riley, J.
I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my opinion of April 25, 1995. 448 Mich 503, 524-533; 533 NW2d 237 (1995).
*578Levin, J., concurred with Riley, J.

 One aspect of the plaintiffs’ request for relief that would not intrude on the prerogatives of the executive and legislative branches is that the state be enjoined from transferring those funds that remain in the health benefits fund, MCL 38.1334; MSA 15.893(144)—a fund that was a subject of our stay order at the time rehearing was granted. See Kosa v State Treasurer, 408 Mich 356; 292 NW2d 452 (1980). Those funds represent less than ten percent of the predicted amounts needed to carry out the plaintiffs’ requested relief. In my view, that does not alter the conclusion that plaintiffs’ request for relief is substantially unavailable regardless of the constitutional interpretation of the term "financial benefits.” For the same reason, I would vacate the temporary stay.

 "[F]ew principles of judicial interpretation are more firmly pounded than this: a court does not grapple with a constitutional issue except as a last resort.” Taylor v Auditor General, 360 Mich 146, 154; 103 NW2d 769 (1960).