Court Opinion

ID: 9568218
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:01:34.770717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:24:28.857505
License: Public Domain

ANDREWS, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
Because the majority has not strictly construed the Wrongful Death Act but has instead greatly expanded its scope, I respectfully dissent.
Being in derogation of common law, the scope of the Wrongful Death Act must be limited in strict accordance with the statutory language used therein, and such language can never be extended beyond its plain and ordinary meaning. The express language of the Act will be followed literally and no exceptions to the requirements of the Act will be read into the statute by the courts.
(Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Tolbert v. Maner, 271 Ga. 207, 208 (1) (518 SE2d 423) (1999).
This case is controlled by the reasoning and the holding in Miles v. Ashland Chem. Co., 261 Ga. 726 (410 SE2d 290) (1991), a case not discussed by the majority. In Miles, the Supreme Court considered a certified question from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals asking whether the running of the statute of limitation on a wrongful death claim was tolled until the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered that the defendant was at least in part responsible for the death of the decedent. Id. at 729 (Smith, P. J., dissenting).
In answering the question, the Court stated:
The plaintiffs urge us to follow other jurisdictions which apply the discovery rule to wrongful death cases. These jurisdictions have either historically applied the discovery rule to wrongful death, or have broadly interpreted their wrongful death statutes. Georgia!,] however, has construed the wrongful death statute narrowly: As has Florida, in Walker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 320 S2d 418 (Fla. App. 1975) and Pennsylvania, in Pastierik v. Duquesne Light Co., [514 Pa. 517] [|526 A2d 323, 325D] (Pa. 1987). We have consistently held since our statutes give a right of action not had at common law, they must be strictly construed or limited strictly to the meaning of the language employed and not extended beyond plain and explicit terms. Ford Motor Co. v. Carter, 239 Ga. 657, 658 (238 SE2d 361) (1977); Taylor v. *849Murray, [231 Ga. 852, 854 (204 SE2d 747) (1974)]. Under OCGA § 9-3-33, the defendants’ liability extended two years from the date of death. To prolong the running of this period would be to subject the defendants to potentially infinite liability and is counter to the policy underlying statutes of limitation. We decline to extend the statute of limitation by adopting the discovery rule in wrongful death cases.
(Footnotes omitted.) Miles, supra at 728.
Likewise, under the majority’s expansive reading of the Wrongful Death Act, a wrongful death claim belonging to a minor child, as here, could be brought up to two years after the “disability” is removed. In this case, that would be nearly 20 years after the death of Hawkins’s mother.7
As pointed out in the trial court’s order, there are some states with statutes similar to Georgia’s that have allowed tolling of the statute for minors. Other states have adhered to strict construction, as discussed in Miles, supra, and refused to read into the Act a tolling provision for minors. See, e.g., Bulley v. Toastmaster, Inc., 2003 WL 23021475 at *3 (5th Cir. Dec. 22, 2003) (per curiam) (no tolling of the wrongful death statute for minors as long as there is a responsible party who can bring the suit on the child’s behalf); Engle Bros., Inc. v. Superior Court of County of Pima, 533 P2d 714, 717 (Ariz. App. 1975) (action brought on behalf of minor children did not toll the statute of limitation); Moncor Trust Co. v. Feil, 733 P2d 1327 (N.M. App. 1987) (tolling provision applicable to minors does not apply to minors who are beneficiaries under the Wrongful Death Act).
The majority cites to Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, 749 FSupp. 1083 (M.D. Ala. 1990) as “some persuasive authority” for its conclusion. In Braun, an Alabama federal district court was interpreting Georgia’s wrongful death act. With no discussion and no citation to any authority, the court stated that, under Georgia law the statute of limitation for a wrongful death claim was “tolled as to minors.” Id. at 1086. The Braun court also stated, again without any discussion or authority, that the statute of limitation for the wrongful death claim was tolled under Georgia’s discovery rule. Id. at 1087. Thus, any persuasive authority Braun might have carried has been lost. See Miles, supra.
*850Decided November 29, 2007
Reconsideration denied December 13, 2007
Hall, Booth, Smith & Slover, Timothy H. Bendin, Kristin L. Hiscutt, for appellant.
Vroon & Crongeyer, Bryan A. Vroon, John W. Crongeyer, Owen, Gleaton, Egan, Jones & Sweeney, Rolfe M. Martin, for appellee.
Because the majority has cited to no authority in support of its expansive interpretation of the Act, and because the reasoning in Miles appears to require that we not extend the statute of limitation in wrongful death cases, I would reverse.

 The majority’s comparison of the Wrongful Death Act to a personal injury claim, as in its statement that DMC has failed to demonstrate why OCGA § 9-3-90 (a) should be construed as tolling a statute of limitation for up to 20 years for a minor plaintiff to file a personal injury claim but not a wrongful death claim, ignores the language in Miles addressing this precise issue. See Miles, supra at 728.