Court Opinion

ID: 9730596
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:17:15.911078+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:07.697823
License: Public Domain

SCOTT, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. In State v. McKinley, 305 Minn. 297, 232 N.W.2d 906 (1975), we recognized that a stop of a motor vehicle by a law enforcement official is constitutional if it is based on specific and articulable facts which, together with any rational inferences therefrom, reasonably warrant the intrusion. We noted in McKinley that the actual factual basis for such a stop is minimal. All that is required is that the stop not be the result of mere whim, caprice or curiosity on the part of the law enforcement official. Id. at 304, 232 N.W.2d at 911. The majority fails to point to any facts that make the stop in this case a product of such whim, caprice or curiosity.
On January 23, 1985, at approximately 2:10 a.m., Officer Wayne Pfuhl of the Frid-ley Police Department was sitting in his squad car parked at a Q Petroleum self-service gas station. Officer Pfuhl was approached by the attendant working at the station and was told that the black Dodge Charger just leaving one of the gas pumps might be the same vehicle that was involved in a gasoline theft at the station some two months earlier. A short time later the clerk indicated to Officer Pfuhl *851that he was certain the black Dodge Charger was the same vehicle involved in the earlier theft.
In Marben v. State, Department of Public Safety, 294 N.W.2d 697 (Minn.1980), we noted that information forwarded to a police officer by a private citizen is presumed to be reliable. We upheld in Marben an officer’s stop of a vehicle based solely on information radioed to the officer by a truck driver. We stated that the officer in Marben was able to verify the truck’s presence in the area and in close proximity to the car about which the trucker supplied information. Id., 294 N.W.2d at 699. Here, Officer Pfuhl was able to talk face-to-face with the gas-station attendant and learn that the clerk had witnessed an earlier gasoline theft. The attendant told the officer he was certain that the automobile in question was the vehicle involved in that theft. At this point, Officer Pfuhl had specific and articulable facts to conduct an investigatory stop.
In Olson v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 371 N.W.2d 552 (Minn.1985), we held that an anonymous tip by a citizen who had observed a possible drunk driver did not justify stopping the car. We stated, however, that the police dispatcher in Olson did not have specific and articulable facts on which to issue the information to the police because the dispatcher knew nothing about the informant nor what the informant saw which led to a suspicion that the driver might be driving while intoxicated. We noted that when the officers following the vehicle failed to observe any erratic driving, the reliability of the informant could no longer be presumed. Id., 371 N.W.2d at 556.
Such was not the case here. Officer Pfuhl was able to elicit information about the earlier gas theft from the informant himself. His purpose in following the car was to investigate this theft. Even though the individual driving the Dodge Charger was not identified by the gas station attendant, it is reasonably likely that, because the vehicle had been identified, the driver would have some information about the involvement of the vehicle in the theft.
Such investigatory stops are an important part of effective crime prevention and detection. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Here, the investigatory stop was based on specific and articulable facts and was not a product of mere whim, caprice or curiosity on the part of Officer Pfuhl.
Concluding that there was an insufficient basis for the stop in this case, the majority states that it was unnecessary for the court of appeals to reach the broader question of whether any stop to investigate a “completed misdemeanor” is constitutional. In United States v. Hensley, — U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985), the United States Supreme Court held that the proper way to identify the precise limits on Terry stops to investigate “completed felonies” is “to apply the same test already used to identify the proper bounds of intrusions that further investigations of imminent or ongoing crimes.” 105 S.Ct. at 680.
To carve out an exception to the Terry doctrine for “completed misdemeanors” would thwart the state’s interest in solving crimes of any nature, whether they be labeled misdemeanors or felonies. An exception for “completed misdemeanors” would appear to rest on the assumption that a misdemeanor need not be solved as promptly as a felony because a misdemeanor does not involve the same threat to public safety as does a felony. This assumes too much. The distinction between felonies and misdemeanors is no longer “broad and deep,” but is typically “minor and often arbitrary.” See Tennessee v. Garner, — U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 1703, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985).
The Terry test, grounded on the principle of reasonableness, serves to balance the interest of the state in effective law enforcement with the individual’s interest in being free of a stop and detention. Its application to situations of “completed misdemeanors” is appropriate.1
*852I would reverse the court of appeals’ determination that all stops of a vehicle to investigate a “completed misdemeanor” are unconstitutional. Such stops can be constitutional if they are based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences therefrom, reasonably warrant the intrusion. Here, specific and articulable facts were present and the investigatory stop should be upheld.

. Distinguishing between crimes that are "completed" and crimes that are "ongoing” presents problems that may not be easily solved by judicial bodies. If an exception is recognized for “completed misdemeanors,” courts would be *852forced to decide the difficult question of when misdemeanors become complete crimes. The result may very well be arbitrary distinctions that will serve only to confuse citizens and law enforcement officials.