Court Opinion

ID: 9553897
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:37:01.999364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:32:32.656652
License: Public Domain

Ringold, A.C.J.
(dissenting)—I respectfully dissent from
the majority's conclusion that the affidavit for the search warrant satisfied the veracity prong of the Aguilar-Spi-nelli*8764 test.
This case provides a good example of the necessity for carefully drafting affidavits in support of warrants. Under Aguilar-Spinelli, the affidavit must set forth sufficient facts and circumstances so that the magistrate can determine whether the informant is credible or that his information is reliable. State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 443, 688 P.2d 136 (1984); State v. Woodall, 100 Wn.2d 74, 76, 666 P.2d 364 (1983); State v. Fisher, 96 Wn.2d 962, 965, 639 P.2d 743, cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1137, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1355, 102 S. Ct. 2967 (1982). Mere conclusory statements are insufficient. Woodall, at 78; Fisher, at 965.
The affidavit first asserts that Special Agent Thompson indicated that the informant who contacted her was confidential and reliable. Standing alone, this statement is merely a bald conclusion of reliability that was determined to be insufficient in State u. Woodall, supra at 75.
Later, the affidavit indicates that the informant had been associated with the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) for 2 months and was "classed as a Confidential and reliable Informant." While it is true, as the State suggests, that this provides an indication that the informant's reliability has been independently determined by one other than the affi-ant, it is still nothing more than a bald conclusion. The basis for the DEA's assessment of the informant's reliability is not given so it cannot be evaluated independently by the magistrate.
Given these deficiencies, the linchpin in the State's argument is that the informant's reliability is evident from the fact that the informant introduced the United States DEA to an individual who "was subsequently arrested and charged with the delivery of a controlled substance and also a quantity of controlled substances were seized." The fault of this argument is illustrated in the State's own brief where it is stated that the arrest and seizure was "appar*877ently" a result of the informant's information. The fact that the informant introduced the DEA to the individual does not indicate that the information provided by the informant was at all instrumental in either the arrest or the seizure.
Contrast State v. Wolken, 103 Wn.2d 823, 700 P.2d 319 (1985) , relied on by the majority.5 In that case the informant had been associated with the Oregon authorities for 3 months "and had provided information which led to one arrest and seizure of marijuana." (Italics mine.) Wolken, at 825. The Supreme Court held that this was sufficient evidence of the informant's track record and satisfied the veracity prong. Wolken, at 827. Unlike the present case, the affidavit in Wolken supplied the necessary facts for the magistrate to conclude that the informant's information had been instrumental in a previous arrest and seizure of marijuana.
In the affidavit under review in this case, no direct correlation is made between any information supplied to the DEA by the informant and the subsequent arrest and seizure by the DEA. There are insufficient facts to establish the informant's track record and the magistrate was left to speculate as to the informant's veracity. Justice Utter's dissent in State v. Fisher, 96 Wn.2d 962, 639 P.2d 743, cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1137 (1982) and Judge Mclnturff's dissent in State v. Paradiso, 43 Wn. App. 1, 7-10, 714 P.2d 1193 (1986) are particularly instructive.
When the authorities are dealing with informants who meet the Aguilar-Spinelli test, it is not chance that the affidavits are not convoluted, are in simple English, and logically establish the essential factors. Such is not the case here, and I would reverse.
Review denied by Supreme Court September 1, 1987.

Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723, 84 S. Ct. 1509 (1964); Spi-nelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637, 89 S. Ct. 584 (1969).

The basic issue in Wolken concerned the defendant's right to discovery of the identity of the informant and the right to a Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667, 98 S. Ct. 2674 (1978) hearing.