Court Opinion

ID: 9891140
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-17 17:00:53.901801+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:11.906144
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                           No. 17-15104

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                   D.C. Nos.
                                                      3:16-cv-00748-
    v.                                                   RCJ
                                                      3:12-cr-00004-
DANIEL JAMES DRAPER,                                    RCJ-VPC-1

                 Defendant-Appellant.                 OPINION

          Appeal from the United States District Court
                   for the District of Nevada
          Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding

           Argued and Submitted December 5, 2022
                  San Francisco, California

                      Filed October 17, 2023

    Before: Jacqueline H. Nguyen and Jennifer Sung, Circuit
        Judges, and Joseph F. Bataillon, * District Judge.

                    Opinion by Judge Nguyen

*
 The Honorable Joseph F. Bataillon, United States District Judge for the
District of Nebraska, sitting by designation.
2                          USA V. DRAPER

                          SUMMARY **

                        28 U.S.C. § 2255

    The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of Daniel
Draper’s motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in which he argued
that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for using a
firearm during a crime of violence and its mandatory
consecutive sentence should be vacated because his
predicate crime, voluntary manslaughter, does not qualify as
a crime of violence.
    Applying United States v. Begay, 33 F.4th 1081 (9th Cir.
2022) (en banc) (which held that depraved heart murder
necessarily entails the force required to qualify as a crime of
violence under § 924(c)’s elements clause, 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(3)(A)), the panel held that voluntary manslaughter
is a crime of violence under § 924(c). The panel wrote that
for purposes of § 924(c), voluntary manslaughter has the
same mental state as murder—intent to commit a violent act
against another or recklessness with extreme indifference to
human life. Like murder, voluntary manslaughter requires
at least an “extreme and necessarily oppositional” state of
mind. The panel held that the district court therefore
properly denied Draper’s § 2255 motion.

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                       USA V. DRAPER                      3

                       COUNSEL

Wendi L. Overmyer (argued) and Amy B. Cleary, Assistant
Federal Public Defenders; Rene L. Valladares, Federal
Public Defender; Federal Public Defender’s Office, Las
Vegas, Nevada; for Defendant-Appellant.

Adam M. Flake (argued), Assistant United States Attorney;
Elizabeth O. White, Appellate Chief; Jason M. Frierson,
United States Attorney; United States Attorney’s Office, Las
Vegas, Nevada; Robert L. Ellman and William R. Reed,
Assistant United States Attorneys, United States Attorney’s
Office, Reno, Nevada; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

                        OPINION

NGUYEN, Circuit Judge:

    Daniel Draper shot and killed Linford Dick. A jury
convicted him of voluntary manslaughter, a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1112, and using a firearm during a crime of
violence, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Draper appeals
the district court’s denial of his motion under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255. He argues that his § 924(c) conviction and its
mandatory 15-year consecutive sentence should be vacated
because his predicate crime, voluntary manslaughter, does
not qualify as a crime of violence.
   Whether homicide is inherently a violent crime might
seem like a straightforward question, but the answer depends
on both the definition of violent crime and the type of
homicide at issue. The statute we consider here, 18 U.S.C.
4                      USA V. DRAPER

§ 924(c)(1)(A), enhances the sentence of a person who uses
or possesses a firearm while committing a crime of violence.
The statute defines “crime of violence” to include any
federal felony that “has as an element the use, attempted use,
or threatened use of physical force against the person or
property of another.” Id. § 924(c)(3)(A). This definition—
in particular, the phrase “against . . . another”—requires a
mens rea akin to knowledge or intent. See Borden v. United
States, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1828 (2021). It includes murder,
which must be committed with at least extreme recklessness,
but not homicide involving only ordinary recklessness. See
United States v. Begay, 33 F.4th 1081, 1093–95 (9th Cir.
2022) (en banc), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 340 (2022).
    We must decide whether § 924(c) applies to the crime of
voluntary manslaughter, 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a). We hold that
it does. In Begay, we determined that second degree murder
satisfies § 924(c) because the least culpable act criminalized
under 18 U.S.C. § 1111, depraved heart murder, entails the
“use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person or property of another.” Begay, 33 F.4th
at 1091 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A)). Voluntary
manslaughter, though lacking the element of malice,
requires the same mental state. Courts deem voluntary
manslaughter to be without malice only because the
attendant circumstances—heat of passion with adequate
provocation—make the offense less blameworthy.
Depraved heart voluntary manslaughter entails the same
extremely reckless violence as second degree murder.
    Daniel Draper moved the district court for relief from his
§ 924(c) conviction. In denying relief, the district court
correctly concluded that Draper’s voluntary manslaughter
conviction is a crime of violence. Therefore, we affirm.
                        USA V. DRAPER                         5

                               I.
    Draper used a shotgun to kill Linford Dick within Battle
Mountain Indian Colony, for which a jury convicted him of
violating § 924(c). The jury found that the underlying crime
of violence was voluntary manslaughter (rather than murder,
as the prosecution had argued) and separately convicted him
of that offense. The district court imposed consecutive
sentences of 15 years for each crime. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(j)(2).
    Shortly after we affirmed his conviction and sentence,
see United States v. Draper, 599 F. App’x 671, 672 (9th Cir.
2015), Draper sought relief in a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255, raising claims not at issue here. The district court
denied the motion.
    In light of Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015),
we authorized Draper to file a second or successive § 2255
motion. He argued that his § 924(c) conviction should be
vacated because part of the statute’s definition of “crime of
violence” is unconstitutionally vague under Johnson and the
surviving part does not apply to voluntary manslaughter.
The district court did not address Draper’s constitutional
argument because it disagreed with his statutory argument
and denied relief on that basis. However, the court found the
question “difficult” and granted a certificate of appealability.
    We have jurisdiction over Draper’s appeal under 28
U.S.C. § 2253. We review the district court’s decision de
novo. See United States v. Fultz, 923 F.3d 1192, 1194 (9th
Cir. 2019).
                              II.
   Before turning to the merits, we first address a
procedural issue. The government argues that Draper
6                        USA V. DRAPER

procedurally defaulted his claim. Draper maintains that the
government forfeited its procedural default argument by
failing to raise it in the district court and that, regardless, his
claim is not subject to procedural default because it
challenges the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
    A § 2255 motion, which collaterally attacks a federal
inmate’s conviction or sentence, seeks “an extraordinary
remedy” and cannot substitute for an appeal. United States
v. Pollard, 20 F.4th 1252, 1255 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998)). If a
defendant fails to raise a claim on direct review, the claim is
“procedurally defaulted,” and the defendant may raise it via
a § 2255 motion only if he can demonstrate either cause and
actual prejudice or his actual innocence. Bousley, 523 U.S.
at 622.
    Because “procedural default is an affirmative defense,”
United States v. Werle, 35 F.4th 1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 2022),
“the defendant does not bear the burden of pleading cause
and prejudice in his motion.” Id. We thus reject the
government’s suggestion that Draper had an obligation to
anticipate this defense in his opening brief.
    At the same time, we reject Draper’s argument that the
government forfeited the defense by failing to raise it in the
district court. It is true that “the government can [forfeit] a
procedural default defense by failing to raise it,” United
States v. Swisher, 811 F.3d 299, 307 (9th Cir. 2016) (en
banc), and we “will usually not allow the government to
raise a petitioner’s default for the first time on appeal, when
it did not take the opportunity to do so before the district
court,” United States v. Barron, 172 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th
Cir. 1999) (en banc). But forfeiture on appeal presupposes
that the government had an obligation to raise the defense in
                        USA V. DRAPER                        7

the district court. Cf. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455
n.8 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding forfeiture appropriate where “the
state was obligated to raise all of its objections” to the
magistrate judge).
    The government had no such obligation here because the
district court denied Draper’s motion at the screening stage.
See Sec. 2255 R. 4(b) (directing district courts to dismiss
§ 2255 motions before ordering a response from the
government “[i]f it plainly appears . . . that the [defendant]
is not entitled to relief”). The government “is not required
to answer the motion unless a judge so orders.” Id. R. 5(a).
While nothing prohibits the government from responding
before being ordered to do so, we see no reason to require
the government to raise all affirmative defenses at the
screening stage—at pain of forfeiture—which would
undermine the screening process. Because the district court
did not order a response to Draper’s § 2255 motion, the
government did not forfeit its procedural default defense.
    We also reject Draper’s argument that he cannot
procedurally default his claim because it concerns the district
court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3231,
district courts have subject matter jurisdiction “[i]n every
federal criminal prosecution.” United States v. Ratigan, 351
F.3d 957, 962 (9th Cir. 2003); see United States v. Cotton,
535 U.S. 625, 630–31 (2002) (“[A] district court ‘has
jurisdiction of all crimes cognizable under the authority of
the United States . . . .’” (quoting Lamar v. United States,
240 U.S. 60, 65 (1916))). Draper does not dispute that
§ 924(c) is a federal criminal statute; he merely argues that
the conduct for which he was charged and convicted does
not fall within its constitutional scope. An “objection that
the indictment does not charge a crime against the United
States goes only to the merits of the case.” Cotton, 535 U.S.
8                      USA V. DRAPER

at 631 (quoting Lamar, 240 U.S. at 65). To the extent earlier
cases described indictment defects as “jurisdictional,”
Cotton overruled them. See United States v. Salazar-Lopez,
506 F.3d 748, 754 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Cotton, 535
U.S. at 630 (explaining that courts once employed an “elastic
concept of jurisdiction [that] is not what the term
‘jurisdiction’ means today, i.e., ‘the courts’ statutory or
constitutional power to adjudicate the case’” (quoting Steel
Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998))).
    Normally, we would not decide a timely assertion of
procedural default in the first instance. See, e.g., Maronyan
v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 658 F.3d 1038, 1043 n.4
(9th Cir. 2011) (remanding for the district court to consider
affirmative defense). As the government acknowledges,
however, Draper’s ability to show prejudice turns on the
merits of his claim, which the district court addressed.
Because we conclude that Draper’s claim lacks merit, we
need not remand for the district court to consider the
procedural default issue when “the result will be the same.”
Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir. 2002).
                             III.
    Section 924(c) defines “crime of violence” in two
alternative ways—through the “elements” clause and the
“residual” clause. Under the elements clause, a crime of
violence “has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or
property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). Under the
residual clause, a crime of violence, “by its nature, involves
a substantial risk that physical force against the person or
property of another may be used in the course of committing
the offense.” Id. § 924(c)(3)(B).
                       USA V. DRAPER                       9

    In United States v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that
§ 924(c)’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. 139
S. Ct. 2319, 2325–26 (2019). We will assume that Davis
applies retroactively to Draper’s conviction (which the
government does not dispute), see Muñoz v. United States,
28 F.4th 973, 975 (9th Cir. 2022), and thus focus on whether
§ 924(c)’s elements clause encompasses voluntary
manslaughter.
    In making this determination, we apply the categorical
approach described in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575,
598–600 (1990). See Begay, 33 F.4th at 1090. Under the
categorical approach, “the facts of a given case are
irrelevant,” and we focus instead on “whether the elements
of the statute of conviction meet the federal standard.” Id.
(quoting Borden, 141 S. Ct. at 1822). Here, the statute of
conviction is voluntary manslaughter, 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a).
Voluntary manslaughter is a crime of violence under
§ 924(c)’s elements clause only if the least culpable act
criminalized in § 1112(a) entails “the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or
property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A); see Begay,
33 F.4th at 1091.
                             A.
    In Borden, the Supreme Court held that a statute defining
“crime of violence” like § 924(c) does not apply to offenses
that punish ordinary recklessness. See 141 S. Ct. at 1821–
22, 1825 (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 16(a)); see also United
States v. Benally, 843 F.3d 350, 354 (9th Cir. 2016)
(observing that §§ 16 and 924(c)(3) are “virtually identical”
and “we interpret their plain language in the same manner”).
Borden explained that the statutory phrase “against . . .
another,” in context, has an “oppositional” meaning.
10                      USA V. DRAPER

Borden, 141 S. Ct. at 1826. It “demands that the perpetrator
direct his action at, or target, another individual.” Id. at
1825. The Court declined to decide whether the definition
reaches offenses requiring a mens rea between recklessness
and knowledge, such as the extreme recklessness required
for depraved heart murder. See id. at 1823 n.3.
    In Begay, we answered the question Borden left open,
holding that depraved heart murder necessarily entails the
force specified by § 924(c)(3)(A). See Begay, 33 F.4th at
1086. Murder, we explained, is “the unlawful killing of a
human being with malice aforethought,” id. at 1091 (quoting
18 U.S.C. § 1111(a)), and the least culpable way to kill with
malice aforethought is to act with “the mental state of
depraved heart.” Id.
    A depraved heart mens rea requires acting “recklessly
with extreme disregard for human life.” Id. (quoting United
States v. Paul, 37 F.3d 496, 499 (9th Cir. 1994)). It is the
“functional equivalent of ‘reckless and wanton, and a gross
deviation from the reasonable standard of care.’” Id. at 1093
(quoting United States v. Pineda-Doval, 614 F.3d 1019,
1038 (9th Cir. 2010)). Such conduct differs from conduct
involving ordinary recklessness in that the perpetrator
consciously disregards not just a substantial and
unjustifiable risk but the very value of human life. See id. at
1093–94.
    Begay concluded that depraved heart murder “is fairly
characterized as extreme and necessarily oppositional,” thus
satisfying § 924(c)(3)’s elements clause, “because a
defendant ‘certainly must be aware that there are potential
victims before he can act with indifference toward them.’”
Id. at 1095 (quoting United States v. Báez-Martínez, 950
F.3d 119, 127 (1st Cir. 2020)).
                             USA V. DRAPER                               11

                                    B.
    Federal law defines voluntary manslaughter as “the
unlawful killing of a human being without malice” that
occurs “[u]pon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.” 18
U.S.C. § 1112(a). “While most voluntary manslaughter
cases involve intent to kill,” a defendant also commits
voluntary manslaughter by “kill[ing] unintentionally but
recklessly with extreme disregard for human life,” provided
that he “acted in the heat of passion with adequate
provocation.” United States v. Crowe, 563 F.3d 969, 974
(9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Paul, 37 F.3d at 499 n.1).
    In other words, voluntary manslaughter requires the
same mental state as murder. See Paul, 37 F.3d at 499. It is
only the attendant circumstances—a “finding of heat of
passion and adequate provocation”—that “negates the
malice that would otherwise attach” to voluntary
manslaughter. Id.; see also Comber v. United States, 584
A.2d 26, 37 (D.C. 1990) (en banc) (“[I]n all voluntary
manslaughters, the perpetrator acts with a state of mind
which, but for the presence of legally recognized mitigating
circumstances, would constitute malice aforethought, as the
phrase has been defined for purposes of second-degree
murder.”). 1 We describe “evidence of a sudden quarrel or

1
  While many jurisdictions treat heat of passion as a mitigating factor
rather than an element of the defendant’s mental state, not all do. Florida,
for example, appears to view heat of passion as impacting the
defendant’s mental state. See Taylor v. State, 316 So. 3d 420, 427 (Fla.
Ct. App. 2021) (“At the heart of the heat of passion defense is adequate
provocation and the defendant’s state of mind.”). Our discussion is
limited to 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a). We express no opinion as to whether
voluntary manslaughter or its equivalent under other federal statutes or
in other jurisdictions constitutes a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c).
12                     USA V. DRAPER

heat of passion” as “a defense to [a] murder charge,” Begay,
33 F.4th at 1088, because absent those mitigating
circumstances, the crime of voluntary manslaughter would
be murder.
    Draper argues that “the lack of malice attendant to
voluntary manslaughter” distinguishes it from murder, but
that distinction makes no difference in this context. Malice
aforethought has a legal meaning that “does not even
approximate its literal meaning.” Pineda-Doval, 614 F.3d at
1037–38 (quoting 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal
Law § 14.1 (2d ed. 2003)). It is a catchall element covering
“four different kinds of mental states,” including “killings
that, while not specifically intended or planned, were
grievous enough to be considered murder.” Id. at 1038.
While malice distinguishes murder from voluntary
manslaughter based on the defendant’s culpability in light of
the circumstances, culpability plays no role in determining
whether an offense is a crime of violence under § 924(c).
    According to Draper, malice makes a difference because
“killing in the heat of passion or upon provocation renders
an ordinary person unable to fully comprehend the ‘risk to
human life.’” That is incorrect. “[T]he criminal law
generally permits a finding of recklessness only when
persons disregard a risk of harm of which they are aware,”
United States v. Albers, 226 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2000),
and manslaughter is no exception. The state of mind for a
depraved heart killing—a “subjective awareness” that one’s
conduct creates “a very high degree of risk of serious bodily
injury or death,” Pineda-Doval, 614 F.3d at 1038 n.13—is
the same for murder and voluntary manslaughter. See Paul,
37 F.3d at 499.
                            USA V. DRAPER                             13

     Essentially, Draper advocates for the minority view of
the law: that the defendant’s emotional disturbance “must be
so great as to destroy the intent to kill”—or, as relevant here,
the ability to appreciate the extreme recklessness of his
actions—in order to reduce a homicide from murder to
voluntary manslaughter. 2 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive
Criminal Law § 15.2(a) (3d ed. 2022). But in the Ninth
Circuit and most other jurisdictions, voluntary manslaughter
merely requires the defendant to show that the emotional
disturbance “made him lose the normal self-control which
enables him to resist any temptation to slay another person,”
id., not that it affected his mental state. See 40 Am. Jur. 2d
Homicide § 45 (2022) (“A conviction for voluntary
manslaughter requires that the defendant acted either with an

2
   Jurisdictions that appear to adopt the minority view generally
categorize homicide differently than federal law. For example,
Montana’s offense of mitigated deliberate homicide is akin to voluntary
manslaughter in that it “is a lesser included offense of deliberate
homicide” in which the defendant acts “under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional stress for which there is reasonable explanation or
excuse.” Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-103(1)–(2). Montana treats extreme
mental or emotional stress as part of the defendant’s mental state. See
Park v. Mont. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 961 P.2d 1267, 1271 (Mont. 1998)
(“Mitigated deliberate homicide . . . clearly depends on proof of [the
defendant’s] mental state at the time of the acts alleged . . . .”). But
Montana does not recognize a depraved heart theory of homicide. Aside
from felony murders, unlawful killings are either deliberate (requiring a
purposeful or knowing mens rea), see Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-
102(1)(a), or negligent, see id. § 45-5-104(1). Hawaii, which similarly
divides homicide between intentional and reckless killings and lacks a
depraved heart theory of murder, see Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 707-701.5(1)
(second degree murder), 707-702(1)(a) (manslaughter), treats the
extreme mental or emotional disturbance that reduces murder to
manslaughter as “a mitigating factor” rather than “the mental state of a
defendant.” State v. Adviento, 319 P.3d 1131, 1146 (Haw. 2014)
(quoting State v. Dumlao, 715 P.2d 822, 825 (Haw. Ct. App. 1986)).
14                          USA V. DRAPER

intent to kill or with conscious disregard for life, i.e. the
mental state ordinarily sufficient to constitute malice
aforethought.”); see also Ortiz v. Garland, 25 F.4th 1223,
1227 (9th Cir. 2022) (“The [voluntary manslaughter]
statute’s reference to ‘without malice’ merely explains that
voluntary          manslaughter    involves        mitigating
circumstances . . . that negate the malice aforethought
required for murder. It does not mean that voluntary
manslaughter lacks any culpable mental state. To the
contrary, a conscious disregard for life or specific intent to
kill is still required.”). 3
                                   C.
    Draper argues that Begay and other case law establishes
that “manslaughter” requires “a lesser recklessness than
murder.” That is true only with respect to involuntary
manslaughter.      See Begay, 33 F.4th at 1092 n.7
(“[I]nvoluntary manslaughter—which requires a mens rea of
‘gross negligence’—is not a crime of violence under
§ 924(c)(3).” (citing Benally, 843 F.3d at 354)). We
differentiate “involuntary manslaughter . . . from voluntary

3
  Ortiz involved section 192(a) of the California Penal Code, which is
worded identically and interpreted similarly to the federal statute. See
United States v. Rivera-Muniz, 854 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 2017)
(“California Penal Code section 192(a) does not stray from the generic
definition of voluntary manslaughter . . . .”). In Quijada-Aguilar v.
Lynch, we held that section 192(a) is not a crime of violence under 18
U.S.C. § 16, see 799 F.3d 1303, 1306–07 (9th Cir. 2015), a holding that
presumably would apply to § 924(c) as well. But our reasoning, that “the
underlying offense must require proof of an intentional use of force,” id.
at 1306 (quoting United States v. Gomez-Leon, 545 F.3d 777, 787 (9th
Cir. 2008)), is no longer tenable. See Begay, 33 F.4th at 1094 (“Borden
sufficiently undermines [Gomez-Leon and other Ninth Circuit] authority
suggesting that anything less than intentional conduct does not qualify
as a crime of violence.”).
                        USA V. DRAPER                       15

manslaughter . . . by the absence of [either] intent,” United
States v. Quintero, 21 F.3d 885, 891 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994), or
“reckless[ness] with extreme disregard for human life,”
Paul, 37 F.3d at 499 n.1. Whereas voluntary manslaughter
has the same mental state as murder but is less culpable due
to mitigating circumstances, involuntary manslaughter is
less culpable than voluntary manslaughter because “the
offender’s mental state [does not] meet the traditional malice
requirements.” Id. at 499.
    Nothing in Begay is to the contrary. Begay observed that
“there are varying degrees of recklessness” and “[t]he
categories of criminal homicide reflect the[se] distinctions.”
33 F.4th at 1093–94. As an example, we contrasted
depraved heart murder with “manslaughter” without
specifying the type of manslaughter. We stated: “[t]he
difference between the recklessness that displays depravity
and such extreme and wanton disregard for human life as to
constitute ‘malice’ and the recklessness that amounts only to
manslaughter lies in the quality of awareness of the risk.” Id.
at 1094 (cleaned up) (quoting United States v. Lesina, 833
F.2d 156, 159 (9th Cir. 1987)). This statement refers
specifically to involuntary manslaughter. See Lesina, 833
F.2d at 158 (faulting jury instructions for failing “to
differentiate second degree murder from involuntary
manslaughter”).
    Similarly, our statement that criminal homicide
“constitutes manslaughter when . . . it is committed
recklessly” but “constitutes murder when . . . it is committed
recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life,” Begay, 33 F.4th at
1094 (first quoting Model Penal Code § 210.3(1)(a); and
then quoting Model Penal Code § 210.2(1)(b)), contrasted
murder with involuntary manslaughter. The Model Penal
16                     USA V. DRAPER

Code, unlike § 1112, does not formally label manslaughter
as either voluntary or involuntary. But the provision we
cited, section 210.3(a), corresponds to involuntary
manslaughter. Section 210.3(b), which applies to “a
homicide which would . . . be murder” but for “the influence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there
is [an objectively] reasonable explanation or excuse,”
corresponds to voluntary manslaughter.
                             D.
    Draper relies on several canons of statutory construction
that, he argues, reveal Congress did not intend § 924(c)’s
elements clause to include voluntary manslaughter. We
disagree.
                              1.
    Draper first highlights what he sees as significant
differences between the “crime of violence” definitions in
§ 924(c) and the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18
U.S.C. § 924(e). See Cheneau v. Garland, 997 F.3d 916,
920 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (“[W]hen the legislature uses
certain language in one part of the statute and different
language in another, the court assumes different meanings
were intended.” (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692, 711 n.9 (2004))). The ACCA enumerates four offenses
that constitute crimes of violence, none of which are
voluntary manslaughter, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii),
while § 924(c)(3) does not enumerate any violent offenses.
But the ACCA’s enumerated offenses “illustrate the kinds of
crimes that fall within the [residual clause’s] scope.” Begay
v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 142 (2008) (emphasis added).
They shed little light on the crimes that satisfy the elements
clause. If the two clauses covered precisely the same
offenses, there would be no need for both.
                       USA V. DRAPER                      17

    The elements clauses of the ACCA and § 924(c) are
identical in all but one respect. The ACCA applies to
“physical force against [another’s] person,” 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i), while § 924(c) applies to “physical force
against [another’s] person or property,” 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(3)(A) (emphasis added). This difference suggests
that Congress intended a broader elements clause in § 924(c)
than in the ACCA. See Begay, 553 U.S. at 144 (explaining
that “Congress rejected a broad proposal [for the ACCA]
that would have covered every offense that involved a
substantial risk of the use of ‘“physical force against the
person or property of another”’” (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S.
at 583)).
                             2.
    Draper also compares § 924(c) with Sentencing
Guidelines section 4B1.2(a), which once contained a “crime
of violence” definition matching the ACCA’s. Following
Johnson, the Sentencing Commission modified section
4B1.2(a)’s definition by removing the residual clause and
adding several enumerated offenses, including voluntary
manslaughter. See Notice of Submission to Congress of
Amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines, 81 Fed. Reg.
4741, 4743 (Jan. 27, 2016). Draper argues that it would have
been superfluous to include voluntary manslaughter in
section 4B1.2(a)’s enumerated offenses clause if section
4B1.2(a)’s elements clause—which is similar to
§ 924(c)’s—already encompassed the offense. However,
the Sentencing Commission expressly rejected this
implication. See id. (“Importantly, [an elements clause]
offense may, but need not, be specifically enumerated in [the
enumerated offenses clause] to qualify as a crime of
violence.”).
18                      USA V. DRAPER

    Moreover, the Sentencing Commission’s decision to
update Guidelines section 4B1.2(a) does not explain
Congress’s inaction concerning § 924 in the wake of
Johnson. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 106
(2007) (“Ordinarily, we resist reading congressional intent
into congressional inaction.”). Draper points to other parts
of § 924(c) that Congress amended after Johnson, but these
amendments had nothing to do with the Supreme Court’s
ruling and are unilluminating.
                              3.
    Draper relies on the legislative history of the First Step
Act, which allows inmates convicted of voluntary
manslaughter to earn an earlier release through certain
activities but excludes those convicted of murder from
participating. See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A), (D)(xxv).
This provision did not modify § 924(c) and has nothing to
do with sentencing. More relevantly, § 924(c)’s “legislative
history indicates that Congress did not intend to limit ‘crimes
of violence’ to crimes of specific intent.” United States v.
Springfield, 829 F.2d 860, 863 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987),
abrogated on other grounds by Benally; see S. Rep. No. 97-
307, at 890–91 (1982) (“Since no culpability level is
prescribed in this section, the applicable state of mind that
must be shown is, at a minimum, ‘reckless,’ i.e., that the
defendant was conscious of but disregarded the substantial
risk that the circumstances existed.”).
                              4.
    Draper also invokes the rule of lenity, which “requires
ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor of the
defendants subjected to them.” United States v. Kelly, 874
F.3d 1037, 1049 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v.
Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (plurality opinion)). The
                       USA V. DRAPER                     19

rule applies, however, only if “a reasonable doubt persists
about a statute’s intended scope even after resort to the
language and structure, legislative history, and motivating
polices of the statute.” United States v. Merrell, 37 F.4th
571, 577 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Moskal v. United States,
498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990)). Because the legislative history
suggests that Congress intended § 924(c) to apply to
voluntary manslaughter, the rule of lenity does not apply.
                            IV.
    For purposes of § 924(c), voluntary manslaughter has the
same mental state as murder—intent to commit a violent act
against another or recklessness with extreme indifference to
human life. Consequently, Begay resolves this case.
Voluntary manslaughter is a crime of violence under
§ 924(c) because, like murder, it requires at least an
“extreme and necessarily oppositional” state of mind.
Begay, 33 F.4th at 1095. The district court properly denied
Draper’s § 2255 motion.
   AFFIRMED.