Court Opinion

ID: 9743288
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:29:58.595501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:40.351545
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH, dissenting: I respectfully disagree with the majority that section 2 — 1117 expresses a clear legislative intent. Section 2 — 1117 is ambiguous. Resort to legislative history does not answer the question of whether employers were intended to be included in the definition of those “who could have been sued by the plaintiff.” The 1986 statute was intended to modify Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981), which abolished contributory negligence and substituted pure comparative negligence. “We’ve been told that the abuses in product liability have been such that have created such an unpredictable and large...and judgment-large situation. We have addressed that at the request of the business community so that the same comparative negligence restrictions and joint and several restrictions apply to product liability also. And perhaps most of all, the worst case scenario that we’ve been presented with are the minimally culpable individual defendants who end up paying 100 percent of the award, primarily the local government, perhaps the retailer that are just there, and they have the deep pockets, and they end up paying. We have said anyone less than 25 percent is a minimally culpable defendant and they should not be required to pay all. So, as to non-economic damages or as to all damages other than medical, they’re only severally hable. We’ve addressed that abuse. With the exception of medical costs, we do not believe that a medically indigent individual should end up paying all or any of this medical cost rendered...by an injury rendered by any defendant. We’ve made a restriction in there that provides for that medically indigent plaintiff to get relief. In the ‘Alvis versus Rebard’ [szc] case in a dissent by Justice Ryan, he points out why the Legislature is in a much better position to address the complexities of something such as this. In discussing the change from contributory negligence to comparative negligence, he indicates that it is the paramount role of the Legislature as a coordinate branch of our government, to meet the needs and demands of changing times and legislate accordingly. I believe that the problem with the courts creating laws is that they’re presented with a factual situation under which they cannot change, and that the law is applied to this particular, perhaps polarized, factual situation and it sets the trend and sets the precedent for any other case that comes before this...or that particular court. What we have done is, we have singled out the abuses of the tort system and addressed them, single issue by issue, and provided for equitable, just relief. We have not made everyone happy. We may not have made everyone happy with the manner in which we’ve come to what we consider an equitable solution, but it is a solution, and it is an equitable one, and I would heartily recommend that we adopt the Conference Report on Senate Bill 1200.” 84th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 30, 1986, at 19-20 (statements of Representative O’Connell). I can find no discussion in the legislative history, however, of third-party employer’s liability in tort in the context of this case. Clearly, however, the 1996 amendments to section 2 — 1117 were meant to codify Kotecki, 146 Ill. 2d 155, 585 N.E.2d 1023, which held that an employer sued as a third-party defendant in tort is liable in contribution for no amount in excess of his statutory workers’ compensation liability: “These modifications are entirely fair and equitable and consistent with Illinois law concerning an employer’s responsibility to an employee and joint defendant’s. This Bill merely codifies the decision of Kotechi [sic] versus Cyclops Welding Corporation (585 N.E.2d 123 (Ill. 1991)). In that case, Mr. Kotechi [sic] brought an action for personal injuries against the defendant-manufacturer of a welding agitator used on the premises of his employer. The manufacturer then filed a third[-]party complaint against Mr. Kotechi’s [sic] employer seeking contribution. Mr. Kotechi [sic] moved to strike the third[-]party complaint and the court denied the Motion. On appeal, the Appellate Court reviewed whether an employer sued as a third[-]party defendant, in a product liability case, is liable for contribution for any amount in excess of the employer’s statutory obligation or liability under Workman’s Compensation laws. The court determined that the employer is not liable for any amount above the statutory Workman’s Compensation Act recoveries. This Bill codifies current case law into the context of Workers’ Compensation Laws.” 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, February 16, 1995, at 129-30 (statements of Representative Cross). This is the first discussion of an employer third-party defendant found in the legislative history of section 2 — 1117. This discussion appears to recognize the need for legislation that allows the third-party defendant employer to be sued. The definition of “tortfeasor” in the amendment clearly recognizes that liability: “ ‘Tortfeasor’ means any person, excluding the injured person, whose fault is a proximate cause of the death, bodily injury to person, or physical damage to property for which recovery is sought, regardless of whether that person is the plaintiffs employer, regardless of whether that person is joined as a party to the action, and regardless of whether that person may have settled with the plaintiff.” 735 ILCS 5/2 — 1116(b) (West 1998). However, the majority correctly notes that our supreme court in Kotecki and Doyle v. Rhodes, 101 Ill. 2d 1, 461 N.E.2d 382 (1984), has concluded employers are subject to the Contribution Act. I, though, agree with the dissent in Ribar: “MR. JUSTICE UNDERWOOD, dissenting: While I acknowledge the court’s power to radically change a rule of law which has existed in this State for nearly a century, I still believe, as I did when Maki v. Frelk (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 193, was decided, that the decision to change is best left to the General Assembly.” Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d at 29, 421 N.E.2d at 898. Nonetheless, I also agree that the pertinent supreme court authority controls this issue. I do, however, believe the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury after the jury submitted questions. All questions should have been answered. The trial court should also have given IPI Civil (1995) No. 180.19. For these reasons, I would reverse the trial court.