Court Opinion

ID: 9523097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:36:04.136226+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:33.647305
License: Public Domain

STATON, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent. I do not dispute the accuracy of the Majority’s characterization of its evi-dentiary review as “extensive”. But its evidentiary review departs from the standard of review which binds this Court’s adjudication of challenges to factual determinations. This departure from the proper standard of review results in a reversal of the jury’s award of punitive damages to Kenneth and Jeannette Callender; when the proper standard of review is applied to the evidence, we can not say as a matter of law that the jury’s award was wholly unsupported by the evidence. The Majority has usurped the fact finder’s role in the judicial process.
The standard of review which the Majority has departed from was explained in Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor (1977), 266 Ind. 310, 362 N.E.2d 845, one of this State’s leading cases in the law of punitive damages; Justice Hunter wrote
“This Court has often stated the maxim that it will not reweigh the evidence nor *344determine the credibility of witnesses, but will sustain a verdict if there is any evidence of probative value to support it. Moore v. Waitt (1973), 157 Ind.App. 1, 298 N.E.2d 456; Smart and Perry Ford Sales, Inc. v. Weaver (1971), 149 Ind.App. 693, 274 N.E.2d 718.”
362 N.E.2d at 845. Here, there is clearly evidence of probative value — some summarized by the Majority and some not — to support the jury’s verdict.
The jury could have concluded from the evidence that the conduct of Art Hill Ford amounted to nothing more than a failure to satisfy the warranty of prompt service. But, it did not. From the evidence presented, it concluded that there was oppressive conduct on the part of the Art Hill Ford dealership and that there were other elements of tortious conduct which entitled the Callenders to punitive damages. If there is evidence in the record to support this factual determination by the jury, it is not the prerogative of the appellate tribunal to substitute its factual determination for that of the jury. In Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor, supra, our Indiana Supreme Court was faced with precisely the same question after it was determined that oppressive conduct existed. The factual circumstances in Hibschman are very similar to the factual circumstances presented to the jury here.
The record indicates that Ken Callender purchased his Ford truck from Art Hill Ford sometime in March of 1976. Ken Callender testified that during his conversations with Art Hill’s salesmen prior to his purchase of the truck, he twice inquired whether the truck was built for use “off the road.” The salesmen assured him, as well as his mother, who was present and cosigned for the truck, that the truck had heavy-duty suspension and was built for off the road use.
On April 20, 1976, Callender took possession of his truck. Three days later, an axle broke on the truck as Callender proceeded down an unpaved trail for cars and bikes. He described the incident in the following manner:
“I was back there going down the trail and there was a minibike on one side and on the other side of me and there was a Volkswagen coming towards me. There was a hole in the middle of the trail to where I could get off so the Volkswagen could get around me because there was another tree there too. I go through the hole between five and ten miles an hour, if that fast, because I had kids around me on both sides. I come out of the hole, the front end never left the ground, bounced twice and all of a sudden I go off to the left. So, I thought I was just stuck. I put it in reverse, tried to get out and I couldn’t move. I asked my partner to get out of the truck, he got out of the truck and shook his head. So, then I crawled out of the truck. I seen the left side tire pointing — the top of the tire was in towards the inside fender well and bottom was sticking out and I knew what had happened.”
After this inspection of the truck, it was towed to Art Hill Ford.
One week later, a Ford Motor Company Dealer representative inspected the truck and authorized that the costs of repair be covered under warranty. Art Hill then told Callender that it would take two weeks to obtain the parts necessary for repair. About one and a half weeks later, Callender inquired about the status of the truck; Art Hill Ford responded that the parts had been placed on “back order”. Repeated telephone inquiries and personal visits by Cal-lender to Art Hill Ford during the next month prompted the same response form the dealership — that the parts were on “back order”. Callender testified that personnel at Art Hill Ford would “take off running” when he and his mother entered the dealership; similarly, he was often placed on “hold” over the telephone.
In the face of Art Hill Ford’s inaction, Callender’s mother contacted the Ford Dealer Representative in Melrose Park, Illinois, regarding the necessary parts. The representative ran a computer check of inventory at Ford warehouses, located the parts, and had them shipped to Art Hill *345Ford. Eventually, in response to an inquiry in late May, Callender was informed that the truck would be ready for him by July 4, 1976.
Callender picked up the truck on July 2 and was informed that a spring for the front hubs had not been delivered. Art Hill Ford also informed him that during his contemplated trip to Michigan over the July 4th weekend, he should not use the 4-wheel drive, should not drive the truck over fifty miles per hour, and should not take the truck “off the road.” Art Hill Ford also informed Callender that there was a sound coming from the truck which he did not need to worry about — “that it [the sound] would take care of itself.”
During his trip to Michigan, Ken Callen-der became concerned over the crackling noise coming from the truck. Based on his mechanical experience and inspection of the truck, he concluded that the noise was coming from the transfer case located near the previously-broken axle. He returned the truck to Art Hill Ford on July 19, and he informed the dealership of the source of the noise.
Art Hill Ford had not inspected the transfer case when the truck was in its shop with a broken axle. Conflicting testimony was presented with respect to whether the transfer case should have been inspected at that time.1 Callender testified that based on his experience, the fact that the axle had been broken in turn warranted an inspection of the transfer case, since the broken axle would likely have pushed a driveshaft into the case. Although Art Hill Ford’s testimony indicated that the circumstances surrounding the break in the axle ruled out the need to examine the transfer case, it is undisputed that a driveshaft (albeit a rusty one) was replaced at the same time that the axle was repaired.
Art Hill Ford agreed after an inspection of the transfer case that the transfer case had been damaged and would have to be replaced. Once again, Callender was informed that it would take a week or two for Art Hill Ford to obtain the necessary parts. Again, Callender’s later inquiries to Art Hill Ford resulted in the response that the parts had been placed on “back order”.
Finally, in August, the Callenders and Art Hill Ford’s General Manager engaged in a verbal dispute over Art Hill Ford’s handling of Jeannette Callender’s car, which was also at the dealership for repair. Although the Majority has indicated that the incident was wholly unrelated to the truck problems, the General Manager’s admonishments to the Callenders clearly suggest that the incident was merely part of the continuing difficulties between the parties. As he raised his fist at Ken Callender, he told the Callenders that they had caused “enough trouble.”
Thereafter, Ken Callender’s telephone inquiries, wherein he was oftentimes placed on hold for long periods of time, received either of two responses: (1) the parts were not available, or (2) the truck would be ready in a week. During that time Ken Callender drove past the dealership many times and always observed his truck located in the same spot outside the building.
Finally, on October 15, 1976, the Callen-ders initiated this lawsuit. Three days later, Art Hill Ford called the Callenders to inform that the truck had been repaired and was ready for them.
While the Majority has indicated, as some testimony suggested, that the long delays in the repair of the truck were occasioned by a shortage of available parts for the new truck, Richard Karchunas of Ford Motor Company’s Marketing Division in Dearborn, Michigan testified that he knew of no such shortage.
Based on this evidence, the jury could reasonably have found elements of fraud, misrepresentations, malice, gross negligence, or oppression mingled with the breach of warranty. When confronted with *346strikingly similar conduct by an auto dealer in Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor (1977), 266 Ind. 310, 362 N.E.2d 845, our Supreme Court refused to reverse a jury’s award of punitive damages.2
In reversing the jury’s award of punitive damages here, the Majority has departed from the appellate standard of review which governs this Court’s disposition of challenges to factual determinations. A cursory comparison of the factual summaries included in the Majority and dissenting opinions reveals that the Majority has overlooked evidence favorable to the judgment, weighed the evidence, and substituted its conclusion for that of the jury. I would affirm the award of punitive damages.

. I do not imply that it is our province to weigh the evidence. I point out that the evidence was conflicting merely because the Majority has summarized both aspects of this particular factual aspect.

. As stated by the Court in Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor, the facts presented there were:
“The evidence showed that requested repairs were not satisfactorily completed although covered by the warranty and capable of correction. Some of these defects were clearly breaches of warranty. Paint was bubbled, the radio never worked properly, the hood and bumper were twisted and misaligned, the universal joints failed, the transmission linkage was improperly adjusted, the timing chain was defective causing improper tuneups and the carburetor was defective, among other things. Batchelor took the car to the defendant with a list of defects on numerous occasions and picked up the car when told it was ‘all ready to go.’ It was reasonable to infer that the defendant’s service manager represented repairs to have been made when he knew that the work had not been done and that in reliance on his representations, Batchelor drove the car on trips and had breakdowns. Before purchasing the car Batchelor was given special representations on the excellence of Hibschman’s service department, and the jury could find that Batchelor relied on these in buying the car from the defendant. After having brought the car in on numerous occasions, Batchelor was told by Jim Hibschman, T would rather you would just leave and not come back. We are going to have to write you off as a bad customer.’ And he was told by one of Hibschman’s mechanics that, ‘If you don’t get on them and get this fixed, they will screw you around and you will never get it done.’ From these statements the jury could infer that the defendant was attempting to avoid making certain repairs by concealing them during the period of the warranty. Batchelor gave the defendant numerous opportunities to repair the car and the defendant did not do so; instead he tried to convince Batchelor that the problems were not with the car, but rather with Batchelor. We are of the opinion that in this case the jury could have found there was cogent proof to establish malice, fraud, gross negligence and oppressive conduct.”
362 N.E.2d at 848.