Court Opinion

ID: 9529073
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:47:14.077424+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:38.974797
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION
Staton, P.J.
-I concur. The mere filing of a writ of habeas corpus can never be considered a significant communication under IC 1971, 31-3-1-6 (Bums Code Ed.). The Indiana Legislature intended a more personal and direct communication with the child. Under some unusual fact situations, indirect communication or communication through a third party may be significant, but action in the courts to obtain custody is not an intended statutory communication. If, as suggested by the majority opinion, “. . . the person having custody of such child actively prevented the parent from communicating with the child. . . .”, this would constitute justifiable cause under the statute.
*463Under the present statute, the communication standard has an optional feature. The level of communication must be significant or more than “token efforts” on the part of the parent to communicate with the child. See IC 1971, 31-3-1-6 (Burns Supp. 1976).
Note. — Reported at 358 N.E.2d 157.