Court Opinion

ID: 9524923
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:58:32.979138+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:12:20.039714
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE PINCHAM, specially concurring: Illinois Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction, Criminal, No. 1.02 (2d ed. 1981) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 2d) is on the credibility of witness. IPI Criminal 2d No. 2.03 is on the defendant’s presumption of innocence and the State’s burden of proof. Neither instruction is on eyewitness identification, although the portion of instruction No. 1.02 that, “In considering the testimony of any witness, you may take into account his ability and opportunity to observe,” is obviously applicable to an identification witness, as it is to a nonidentification or any other witness. The instruction on eyewitness identification tendered by the defendant, refused by the trial court, and set forth in the court’s opinion is No. 3.06 from Federal Criminal Jury Instructions. In rejecting it, the trial court stated: “The court considers that IPI 1.02 as an issue on credibility and it does provide that ‘in considering the testimony and any witness you may take into account his ability and opportunity to observe, his memory and manner while testifying.’ et cetera. And the court considers that IPI instruction [1.02] is sufficient, broad and exclusive to cover the contents of this proposed instruction. The proposed instruction will not be given.” IPI Criminal 2d No. 1.02, which the court gave, did not cover the four following additional elements of identification: (1) the witness’ degree of attention at the time of the offense; (2) the accuracy of the witness’ earlier description of the offender; (3) the level of certainty shown by the witness; and (4) the length of time between the witness’ observations of the offender during the commission of the offense and the witness’ later identification of the offender. The committee comments to IPI Criminal 2d No. 1.02 expressly “recognize[ ] that the evidence in a particular case could call for the insertion of [these aforestated] additional elements” in an identification instruction. The case at bar was clearly such a “particular case.” IPI Criminal 2d No. 1.02 failed to cover the complete elements that are required to be considered in assessing identification testimony, and it was therefore inadequate. It did not, even in conjunction with IPI Criminal 2d No. 2.03, advise the jury on the circumstances it should consider in evaluating identification evidence and they therefore were not duplicitous. Nor did IPI Criminal 2d Nos. 1.02 and 2.03 sufficiently instruct the jury on the issue of the victim’s identification of the defendant as the offender. The defendant’s proposed instruction was therefore improperly refused and the trial court erred in refusing it. In this case, however, in view of the totality of the evidence, particularly, but not limited to, the victim’s observations of the robbers during the commission of the offense, the victim’s prompt reporting of the offense and description of the robbers and their weapons to the police, the defendant’s arrest shortly after the robbery, the discovery of the weapon described by the victim practically in the defendant’s possession and the defendant’s admission that the weapon belonged to him, the discovery of another weapon described by the victim and the victim’s property that was taken in the robbery in the car in which the defendant was arrested, the victim’s identification of the defendant as the robber shortly after the robbery, and the victim’s careful scrutiny of the lineups to be certain of his identification of the defendant as the robber, I unreluctantly conclude that the error was harmless. In People v. Moore (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 404, the supreme court held that the trial court’s refusal to give the defendant’s tendered instruction on voluntary manslaughter was harmless error because the evidence overwhelmingly established that the defendant was guilty of felony murder and, thus, it made no difference if the homicide was committed by the defendant under the unreasonable belief that the homicide was in self-defense and therefore justified. Similarly, the supreme court in People v. Jones (1979), 81 Ill. 2d 1, held that where the intent to kill was “blatantly evident,” the trial court’s improper failure to correctly instruct the jury on the defendant’s mental state, i.e., his intent to kill in attempt murder, was harmless error. It is only because of the unique facts in the case at bar that the trial court’s erroneous refusal to instruct the jury on the aforementioned additional elements of identification was harmless. On the facts in the case at bar it can be concluded with reasonable certainty that the jury’s guilty verdict would have been the same had it been properly instructed on the aforestated omitted elements on identification. Similarly, the court held that the “defendant suffered no prejudice by the court’s refusal of his [identification] instruction” in People v. Benson (1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 591, 595, 390 N.E.2d 113, cited in the court’s opinion in the case at bar. In Benson, the restaurant owner robbery victim gave the officers descriptions of the three robbery offenders and told the officers that the name of one of them was Rufus, who had previously worked for him in his restaurant, and that he had many times seen the other two robbers in Rufus’ company in and around the victim’s restaurant prior to the robbery. In People v. Griswold (1977), 54 Ill. App. 3d 246, 369 N.E.2d 392, also cited in the court’s opinion in the case at bar, the court pointed out that defendant’s tendered instruction on identification was properly refused because it did not “conform to the evidence because Sergeant Keckler [the armed robbery victim] testified that he saw defendant three times the night of the robbery while defendant’s instruction refers to a single sighting. The trial court correctly refused defendant’s identification instruction.” It is quite apparent that the Griswold court improperly relied on its erroneous interpretation of People v. Fox (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 239, and mistakenly stated, “IPI Criminal 1.02 and 2.03 on credibility and burden of proof, respectively, have been held sufficient to instruct the jury as to the defense of mistaken identity.” (Griswold, 54 Ill. App. 3d at 251.) The opinion in the case at bar, also based upon the court’s improper reliance on its mistaken interpretation of Fox, likewise erroneously states, “that Illinois courts have rejected the giving of a separate instruction for identification, holding that IPI Criminal 2d No. 1.02 (witness credibility) and IPI Criminal 2d No. 2.03 (burden of proof) sufficiently instruct the jury on the issue of misidentification.” 183 Ill. App. 3d at 606. The following complete language of Fox on the identification instruction issue clearly reveals that Fox does not hold that “IPI Criminal 2d No. 1.02 (witness credibility) and IPI Criminal 2d No. 2.03 (burden of proof) sufficiently instruct the jury on the issue of misidentification,” (183 Ill. App. 3d at 606) nor precludes the giving of, nor justifies the refusal to give, an additional instruction on the aforementioned four elements of identification. “The court refused to give defendant’s instruction No. 3 on the subject of identification. The defendant complains that since his theory of defense was erroneous identification he had a right to have his instruction on identification given. IPI-Criminal section 3.15 recommends that no instruction be given on this subject stating that the subject is adequately covered by instruction No. 1.02 on credibility of witnesses.1 Instruction No. 1.02 was given as State’s Instruction No. 2. The court also gave IPI-Criminal Instruction No. 2.03 as State’s instruction No. 4. This instruction covers the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof on the State to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We think these two instructions adequately cover the subject matter of defendant’s instruction No. 3 in a clearer and more concise and accurate manner than defendant’s instruction. We are not informed whether the language of defendant’s instruction No. 3 has ever been judicially approved. We do note however, that its language violates the spirit of the last sentence of our Rule 451(a) (43 Ill. 2d R. 451(a)) which provides: ‘Whenever IPI-Criminal does not contain an instruction on a subject on which the court determines that the jury should be instructed, the instruction given on that subject should be simple, brief, impartial, and free from argument.’ We conclude that this instruction is not simple, brief, impartial and free from argument. It contains many of the evils IPI-Criminal seeks to avoid. If a party wishes to have the jury instructed on a subject that is not covered by IPI-Criminal he must tender an instruction to the court that does not violate the spirit of Rule 451(a).” (Emphasis added.) People v. Fox (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 239, 249. From the foregoing language of Fox, it is quite apparent that Fox does not hold that IPI instructions Nos. 1.02 and 2.03 sufficiently instruct the jury on the law in assessing identification testimony and on the circumstances to be considered in evaluating an identification, or that no additional instruction on identification need be given. Quite the contrary. Our supreme court just recently held in People v. Slim (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 302, 307: “In assessing identification testimony, our courts have generally been using steps set out by the Supreme Court in Neil v. Biggers (1972), 409 U.S. 188, 34 L. Ed. 2d 401, 93 S. Ct. 375. There the Court held that circumstances to be considered in evaluating an identification include: (1) the opportunity the victim had to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal; (U) the level of certainty demonstrated by the victim at the identification confrontation; and (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification confrontation.” (Emphasis added.) These foregoing five “circumstances to be considered in evaluating an identification” and “in assessing identification testimony,” pronounced by our supreme court in Slim, a bench trial where the trial judge is presumed to know the law, a fortiori, must be given in the form of an instruction on the law to a jury, which is not presumed to know the law. IPI criminal instructions did not change, but only codified Illinois law on jury instructions. Thus, the following language of People v. Ricili (1948), 400 Ill. 309, 315-16, although predating the IPI criminal instructions, is nevertheless uniquely applicable to the instant case: “Our attention is directed at this point to an [identification] instruction which was tendered by the defendant and refused by the court ***. The instruction was refused and no other instruction was given to the jury covering the question of identification. It was the position of the People that the instruction as offered contained elements not shown by the evidence and *** was not supported by any evidence. A similar instruction was tendered in the case of People v. LeMar, 358 Ill. 58, which was refused by the court. We there held that this was reversible error as no instruction was given by the trial court on the question of the defendant’s identification, and that the refusal to submit any instruction to the jury on this important issue may have prejudiced defendant, especially since he was identified only by one of four eyewitnesses to the crime. He had a right to have the jury instructed on his theory of the case. [Citations.] We think in the instant case it was error to refuse this instruction. If there could have been any question as to that part of the instruction above referred to it could have properly been modified by the court striking out the line objected to as set out above, thus not depriving defendant of a crucial instruction pertaining to the law as applicable to his case.” (Emphasis added.) Where a defendant relies on mistaken identification as his defense, the above-quoted language of Fox, Slim and Ricili, the above-quoted recommendations by the committee comments regarding IPI Criminal 2d No. 1.02, the State and the defendant’s right to have the jury correctly and completely instructed on the law applicable to each phase of their case, prudence, caution, wisdom, the exercise of good judgment, and to insure the validity of a conviction if one is obtained, dictate an instruction to the jury on the additional identification elements of (1) the opportunity the victim had to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at the time of the offense; (3) the accuracy and the witness’ earlier description of the offender to the police; (4) the level of certainty shown by the witness when confronting the defendant; and (5) the length of time between the offense and the witness’ subsequent identification of the defendant as the offender. For these foregoing reasons, I concur in the affirmance of the defendant’s judgment of conviction.  The original section 3.15 of IPI Criminal, referred to in Fox, has been eliminated. It stated that the committee recommended that no instruction be given on the circumstances of an identification on the ground that the subject was adequately covered by the instruction on the credibility of witness, IPI No. 1.02. The complete comments to IPI Criminal 2d No. 1.02 (1989 Supp.) now state however: “While this instruction contains most of the usual elements of believability, the Committee recognizes that the evidence in a particular case could call for the insertion of additional elements. For example, in a case involving eyewitness identification, the trial judge may add factors such as, [1] the witness’s opportunity to view the offender at the time of the offense, [2] the witness’s degree of attention at the time of the offense, [3] the accuracy of the witness’s earlier description of the offender, [4] the level of certainty shown by the witness when confronting the defendant, and [5] the length of time between the offense and the confrontation. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S. Ct. 2243, 53 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1977); People v. Manion, 67 Ill. 2d 564, 367 N.E.2d 1313,10 Ill. Dec. 547 (1977).”