Court Opinion

ID: 9742527
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:15:25.519963+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:33.218195
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CARMAN, dissenting: I agree with the majority that plaintiffs in this case alleged an injury arising out of patient care. Accordingly, I agree with the majority’s discussion of the term “arising out of patient care” and its finding that plaintiffs’ complaint is subject to the eight-year statute of repose period found in section 13 — 212(b) of the Code. I do not agree, however, with the majority’s finding that because Robert (the child allegedly injured in this case) was a fetus at the time of the occurrence that led to his injury, the eight-year period of repose did not begin to run until he was born and had a right to pursue his claim in court. This finding leads the majority to conclude that Robert’s claim was timely filed and reverse the dismissal of count III of plaintiffs’ amended complaint. For the reasons that follow, I believe that the plain language of section 13— 212 makes Robert’s claim untimely. As such, I would affirm the dismissal of count III of plaintiffs’ amended complaint and must respectfully dissent. The appellate court found that because Robert’s cause of action accrued when he was born, and because he was not under a disability other than minority at that time, the statute of repose was not tolled. 227 Ill. 2d at 538. According to the appellate court, the repose period ended eight years after the injury occurred. 227 Ill. 2d at 539.11 As a result, count III of plaintiffs’ complaint was not timely filed. 227 Ill. 2d at 539. The majority disagrees with this analysis, finding that the word “accrued,” as used in section 13 — 212, is ambiguous. Analyzing the term “accrued” for the purposes of sections 13 — 212(b) and (c), the majority finds that it means that facts exist that authorize the bringing of a cause of action or that the claim has come into being as an enforceable claim or right. 227 Ill. 2d at 544. After noting that an injury to a fetus does not accrue until birth, the majority acknowledges that when a fetus is injured, the occurrence of the injury and the accrual of the cause of action take place at different times. 227 Ill. 2d at 545. Nevertheless, the majority disagrees with the appellate court that this means that the statute of repose began to run when Robert’s injury occurred, while he was in útero. I believe that the plain language of this statute is unambiguous. As the majority acknowledges, this is a statute of repose and statutes of repose extinguish causes of action after a fixed period of time after a specified event occurs. 227 Ill. 2d at 545. In this case, the repose period provided in section 13 — 212(b) is eight years. Robert’s injury occurred over 8V2 years before the count at issue here was filed. Unless the tolling provision provided by section 13 — 212(c) applies, Robert’s cause of action cannot be maintained. Section 13 — 212(c) only applies, though, if it can be shown that Robert was under some sort of disability other than minority when he was born, the time which even the majority acknowledges Robert’s injury accrued. The majority never suggests, however, that Robert was under any disability other than age. The majority asserts that it would be repugnant to basic notions of fundamental fairness to hold that the clock is ticking on someone’s right to file suit during a period in which the law forbids that person from filing suit. 227 Ill. 2d at 550. The majority relies on case law stating that “it has long been the public policy of this state that courts should carefully guard the rights of minors and that a minor should not be precluded from enforcing his or her rights unless clearly barred from doing so.” Bruso v. Alexian Brothers Hospital, 178 Ill. 2d 445, 454-55 (1997). In light of this, the majority finds no clear bar to Robert’s suit in section 13 — 212 and believes it farfetched that the legislature worded this statute in order to provide different time limits for children injured in útero and children injured after birth. 227 Ill. 2d at 550. The majority acknowledges, however, that this court has already spoken to the purpose behind the General Assembly’s enactment of section 13 — 212. In Hayes v. Mercy Hospital & Medical Center, 136 Ill. 2d 450 (1990), this court found that the General Assembly limited the time period in which a party could bring a suit for medical malpractice in response to what it perceived as a medical malpractice insurance crisis. Section 13 — 212 created definite time periods in which causes of action could be filed in order to prevent extended exposure of physicians, increase the ability of insurance companies to predict liability, and assist in reducing health-care malpractice insurance premiums. Hayes, 136 Ill. 2d at 458. The legislature specifically enacted section 13 — 212 to respond to a perceived medical malpractice insurance crisis by preventing extended liability exposure, increasing predictability, and assisting in reducing health-care malpractice premiums. While it is true that it is the public policy of this state that courts carefully guard the rights of minors, the plain language of this statute indicates an intent to supersede that policy in limited circumstances. I believe this is one such circumstance. The tolling provision here, section 13 — 212(c), provides that the repose period provided in section 13 — 212(b) can be tolled, but only for those persons who, “at the time the cause of action accrued, [are] under a legal disability other than being under the age of 18 years.” 735 ILCS 5/13 — 212(c) (West 2006). At the time of Robert’s birth — when his cause of action accrued — he was not under a legal disability other than age. The statutory language is clear that the tolling takes place only where a potential claimant is under a legal disability other than being under the age of 18 years. Because no such showing is made, the statute of repose is not tolled. By invoking the public policy that courts need carefully guard the rights of minors, the majority renders meaningless the provision that section 13 — 212(b) be tolled for those under legal disabilities other than being under the age of 18 years. This is improper considering that it is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that a statute should be construed, wherever possible, such that no word, clause, or sentence is rendered meaningless or superfluous. Sylvester v. Industrial Comm’n, 197 Ill. 2d 225, 232 (2001). The majority’s interpretation does just that, though, rendering mere surplusage the language “other than being under the age of 18 years.” See Arnold v. Board of Trustees of the County Employees’ Annuity & Benefit Fund, 84 Ill. 2d 57, 62 (1981) (where this court indicated a strong presumption against finding statutory language to be mere surplusage). It cannot be that the legislature intended the rights of minors to supersede other policy goals in a statutory provision which specifically excludes them. The plain and unambiguous language of the statute provides that for the repose period to be tolled it must be shown that Robert was under a legal disability other than being under the age of 18 years at his birth. Interpreting the statute in this way adheres to the rules of statutory construction and properly gives the clause “other than being under the age of 18 years” meaning in this case. It is my opinion, then, that the plain language of this statute clearly bars Robert’s suit. While this view may seem harsh, it is supported by the plain language of the statute and consistent with the purpose behind the statute’s enactment. See, e.g., Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Ill. 2d 295, 312 (1979) (holding that while statutes which bar causes of action before they are even discovered may seem harsh, “the reasonableness of the statute must be judged in light of the circumstances confronting the legislature and the end which it sought to accomplish”). When the plain language of a statute is clear, it is for the legislature, not the courts, to remedy any perceived shortcomings. See Ultsch v. Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 226 Ill. 2d 169, 184 (2007) (“There is no rule of statutory construction that authorizes a court to declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the statute says”); Big Sky Excavating, Inc. v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 217 Ill. 2d 221, 240 (2005) (“Whether a statute is wise or whether it is the best means to achieve the desired result are matters left to the legislature, not the courts”); Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Aldridge, 179 Ill. 2d 141, 156-57 (1997). I think it is important to note that this is not a situation where children injured in útero are barred from bringing suit simply by virtue of that fact. Nor even is this a situation where the time period within which such children can bring suit is severely curtailed. At the very least, a child injured in útero will still have seven years and three months to bring suit after birth. Indeed, in this case, while Robert could not have brought suit while in útero, he still had over seven years within which to bring suit after his birth.  It is not controverted that Robert’s alleged injury occurred on May 25, 1995, when his mother ingested selenium while he was in útero. He was born on January 5, 1996. Count III of plaintiffs’ amended complaint was filed on December 22, 2003.