Court Opinion

ID: 9628365
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:17:54.850695+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:04.480308
License: Public Domain

STRUCKMEYER, Vice Chief Justice,
concurring in the result.
I am of the opinion that the court below erred and that its judgment must be reversed because there was no legal basis in this case to modify the provisions of the property settlement agreement.
By A.R.S. § 25-317 (Laws of 1973, Ch. 139, § 2), to promote amicable settlement of disputes between parties to a marriage attendant upon their separation “the parties may enter into a written separation agreement containing provisions for disposition of any property owned by either of them, maintenance of either of them, * * * If the court finds that the separation agreement is not unfair as to disposition of property or maintenance * * * the separa*192tion agreement shall be set forth or incorporated by reference in the decree of dissolution * * The Superior Court, pursuant to the statute, specifically found at the time it entered judgment that the agreement was fair as to the alimony which the husband agreed to provide for the wife.
Section 25-317 also provides that except for terms concerning the maintenance of either party, the entry of the decree shall preclude the modification of the terms of the decree. The statute does not provide what facts are appropriate for the court to consider if an attempt is made by one of the parties to modify the maintenance provisions of the decree. This Court, however, pointed out the applicable principle governing modification of support for the wife in Nace v. Nace, 107 Ariz. 411, 489 P.2d 48 (1971):
“Most American jurisdictions have allowed modification of alimony only where clearly defined reasons exist. 24 Am. Jur.2d at 795; 18 A.L.R.2d 16, § 2. There must be a substantial change in the financial circumstances of the husband or wife; a merely ‘subjective’ change in circumstances is not sufficient to justify modification of an alimony judgment. See Sheeley v. Sheeley, 10 Ariz.App. 318, 458 P.2d 522 (1969).”
An examination of the record, including the testimony introduced at the modification hearing, establishes that there was no legal reason whatsoever to order the $400.00 per month support for the wife terminated contrary to the husband’s explicit and solemn promise in the agreement. The record suggests that the trial judge ordered the provision of the separation agreement changed because he thought the wife was capable of working and ought to work. The personal eccentricity of the trial judge in this respect is, of course, inconsistent with the finding of fairness of the original separation agreement.
During the marriage, the wife contributed to the marital wellbeing as a housewife and mother, working outside the home for only a brief period. The provision for alimony to which the husband agreed is as firm and plain as it is possible to make the English language. The separation agreement provides: “said payments to continue until the death or marriage of Wife, notwithstanding any change in the economic condition of Wife * * The agreement was not bottomed on the condition that the husband was to pay alimony until the wife became employed or employable. It was an agreement that the wife would receive the benefits of alimony in order that she would not have to join the labor market. The court grossly abused its discretion in ordering the decree of divorce modified by elimination of the maintenance provision for the wife.
Before proceeding further, section 6 of the property settlement agreement warrants another look. It reads:
“The Husband shall pay to the Wife as and for a conveyance of property in satisfaction of Wife’s claim to community property the following sums of money and transfer of property:
(a) Lot 4, PINEDALE ESTATES, according to the records of the Navajo County Recorder, Navajo County, Arizona.
(b) $4,000.00 in cash on or before September 10, 1971.
In addition to the foregoing, the Husband agrees to pay the sum of $400.00 per month as and for alimony to Wife, said payments to continue until the death or marriage of Wife, notwithstanding any change in the economic condition of Wife and notwithstanding the fact that Wife may become employed in the future.”
The majority of this Court conclude that it is difficult to imagine a clearer statement that the provisions of this section were intended as satisfaction of the wife’s claim to community property. I think otherwise.
By the first paragraph of section 6, the husband promised to pay to his wife “in satisfaction of Wife’s claim to community property * * * (a) Lot 4, PINEDALE ESTATES” and “(b) $4,000.00 in cash * The first paragraph of section 6 does not provide that $400.00 per month would be paid for the wife’s interest in the communi*193ty. Instead, after setting forth what shall be given to the wife in satisfaction of her claim to community property, a second, new paragraph is added. In the new paragraph, the husband promises to pay $400.00 per month to the wife “as and for alimony.” Had the $400.00 been intended to be part of the previous paragraph in satisfaction of the wife’s community property, the agreement would have read that the husband would pay to the wife in satisfaction of her community claims, “(a) Lot 4, PINEDALE ESTATES * * * (b) $4,000.00 in cash * * * (c) $400.00 per month * * But this is not the way the agreement reads. In a separate paragraph, the husband promised to pay his wife the sum of $400.00 per month “as and for alimony.”
“Alimony” is a word with a well understood meaning in the English language. It is defined by Webster’s Third New International Dictionary as “an allowance made to a woman for her support * * Literally hundreds of cases support this definition. Certainly, the husband, a lawyer, who wrote the agreement, could not have been other than fully aware of its meaning. Consequently, the $400.00 per month given to the wife by the agreement could not have been in satisfaction of her claim to community property but was an allowance made to her for her support. It is alimony simply because the agreement says it is.
For the foregoing reasons, while I disagree with the basis for the reversal, I concur in the result.