Court Opinion

ID: 9894391
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-01 18:00:37.403927+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:42.033513
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                     ____________________
No. 22-2922
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                   Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                 v.

MONICA WRIGHT,
                                               Defendant-Appellant.
                     ____________________

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the
                     Central District of Illinois.
            No. 20-cr-40003 — Sara Darrow, Chief Judge.
                     ____________________

 ARGUED SEPTEMBER 13, 2023 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 1, 2023
               ____________________

   Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.
   FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Drug dealers from the Quad Cities
traveled to Colorado to buy kilos of meth from Monica
Wright. After the dealers testiﬁed on behalf of the govern-
ment, Wright was convicted of conspiring to distribute and
possessing with intent to distribute methamphetamine. On
appeal, Wright challenges what she characterizes as an actual
conﬂict of interest with her attorney, as well as the suﬃciency
of the evidence underpinning her conspiracy conviction.
2                                                             No. 22-2922

Because there was no conﬂict of interest and suﬃcient evi-
dence of conspiracy, we aﬃrm Wright’s conviction.

                            I. Background

    Shawn Pfister and Cynthia Evans dealt methampheta-
mine in the Quad Cities. 1 In the summer of 2016, they learned
of a new potential source: Colorado Springs resident, Monica
Wright. In the weeks that followed, Pfister and Evans traveled
to Colorado approximately twenty times to buy meth from
Wright.
    The first trip was in June 2016. Pfister, accompanied by
Joey Deherrera—a Colorado-based middleman—went to
Wright’s home on Marilee Way and purchased just under one
kilogram of meth. That cadence persisted, with Wright selling
Pfister and Evans roughly one-to-two kilograms of meth per
week for approximately seven-to-eight weeks. Deherrera ac-
companied Pfister and Evans on some of these trips and when
he did, he received $500 from the total paid to Wright.
    That summer, Pfister was arrested at a casino in Iowa. To
help pay Pfister’s bail, Evans, who was his on-again, off-again
girlfriend, turned to Wright. Wright agreed to sell Evans meth
and let Evans stay with her for several days while she sourced
the meth. Drugs in hand, Evans returned to the Quad Cities
where she sold about nine ounces to a local dealer, Regina
Heavener.

    1 Because Wright challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we relay

the facts in the light most favorable to the government. United States v.
York, 48 F.4th 494, 499 (7th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 1772 (2023).
No. 22-2922                                                           3

   Officers searched Heavener’s home on September 13,
2016, and recovered over fifty grams of meth. Heavener knew
that Evans got the meth from “Monica” in Colorado Springs.
After learning of the drug bust (and posting bail), Pfister
warned Wright that police might be following their activities.
   At one point, Pfister was short on funds to pay for meth,
but Wright nevertheless fronted him approximately eight
ounces. To pay her back, Pfister gave Wright a stolen pull-
behind trailer. On another occasion, Wright asked Pfister if he
could get a gun for her meth source. Pfister gave Wright one
that he had obtained by trading a vehicle.
    Pfister and Wright also had several conversations about
the business side of the operation. They discussed the cost of
meth, how much Pfister was selling it for, his profits, and
whether Wright could keep up with his demand. They also
discussed how Wright’s drug dealing was paying for rent at
the Marilee Way house and for renovations at her house on
Auburn Drive. Wright cautioned Pfister and Evans not to use
phones to discuss their drug transactions, explaining that her
ex-husband had been arrested on drug conspiracy charges
after a wiretap was placed on his phone.
   In October 2017, the Drug Enforcement Administration
executed a search warrant at Wright’s residence on Auburn
Drive—not the Marilee Way address where Pfister and Evans
purchased drugs. Agents did not recover drugs or drug para-
phernalia during the search. 2

   2 Wright testified at trial that she was renting out her Auburn Drive

home and living with a roommate at the Marilee Way address at the time
of the alleged conspiracy.
4                                                  No. 22-2922

   Wright was nevertheless charged by indictment with in-
tent to distribute at least fifty grams of meth and at least 500
grams of a mixture containing meth. She was initially repre-
sented by a Federal Public Defender but ultimately retained
Hal Garfinkel, who took the case to trial in June 2022.
    In its opening statement, the government previewed testi-
mony from Evans, Pfister, Heavener, and Deherrera. Gar-
finkle also foreshadowed testimony from Deherrera, referring
to him as the government’s witness. He told the jury that De-
herrera would testify that he never saw Wright with large
amounts of meth. Despite this potentially helpful testimony,
Garfinkel never planned to call Deherrera, just cross-examine
him.
    The morning of the second day of trial, the government
alerted the court to an issue that arose while prepping De-
herrera the night before. Deherrera told the government that
during a meeting a few months earlier, Garfinkel insinuated
that Deherrera lied to the grand jury and encouraged him to
change his testimony. The government referenced De-
herrera’s potentially exculpatory testimony but did not ex-
plain whether Deherrera had changed those aspects of his tes-
timony. The government simply stated that it no longer
planned to call him as a witness. As a result, it informed the
court of a potential conflict: If Wright called Deherrera and he
testified to being pressured to change his testimony, Garfinkel
would have to take the stand to impeach him. Consequently,
it was possible that Garfinkel’s decision not to call Deherrera
could be motivated by self-interest and in conflict with
Wright’s best interest.
   During the colloquy with the court, Garfinkel vehemently
denied Deherrera’s allegations. He then said:
No. 22-2922                                                   5

      So, now if the government doesn’t call him—I
      have no idea what Mr. Deherrera is going to say.
      And if, in fact, he is going to get up on that stand
      and say that during our conversation or conver-
      sations that I made that insinuation, then asked
      him to change his testimony, I’m not calling
      him … .
      [T]he government’s not going to call him. I’m
      not going to call him. It is an interesting issue if,
      in the event Ms. Wright is convicted, if she were
      to come back post-conviction and then say, well,
      I could have called Deherrera and I didn’t, if
      that somehow, you know, becomes a Strickland
      argument. I don’t know.
      I would think now if Mr. Deherrera is going to
      testify consistent with the interview last night, I
      can’t imagine why Miss Wright would want
      him on the stand. I don’t want him on the stand.
      I think at that point that vitiates any conflict.
  The court directed Garfinkel to discuss the issue with
Wright:
      I’m going to ask her about whether or not she —
      what she wants to do and whether or not her
      decision is knowingly [sic] and not forced and if
      she—it’s not necessarily a waiver of a conflict
      because I don’t know that there is a conflict, but
      I just want to explore that with her so it’s on the
      record.
After a brief recess to allow Garfinkel and Wright to confer,
the court questioned Wright. Wright confirmed she
6                                                 No. 22-2922

understood and agreed with Garfinkel’s strategy to not call
Deherrera. She affirmed that she understood the possibility
that Garfinkel was personally motivated not to call Deherrera.
Nevertheless, she confirmed that she was “comfortable and
confident that Mr. Garfinkel [was] making the decision … be-
cause [it was] not a good strategy for [her] defense.”
    No additional record was made, and Garfinkel continued
representing Wright. At the close of the government’s case-
in-chief, Garfinkel made an oral motion for directed verdict,
which the court denied.
    Wright testified in her own defense. Wright explained that
she and her boyfriend purchased meth in user amounts to
share on a near-daily basis. As for her relationship with
Pfister, Evans, and Deherrera, she testified that they came to
her home infrequently to smoke meth with her. On those oc-
casions, Pfister and Deherrera provided small amounts of
meth and sometimes Wright would contribute some of her
own to smoke communally.
    Deherrera did not testify at trial, but references to him
dominated Garfinkel’s closing argument. Garfinkel argued
that Deherrera “[was] the[ government’s] case,” “the seminal
figure,” and “the elephant in the room” was that he did not
testify at trial. He described Deherrera’s absence as the miss-
ing link—a burden the government had to overcome to con-
vict Wright.
    The jury nevertheless found Wright guilty on June 16,
2022. On July 10, 2022, Garfinkel filed a motion for leave to
file a motion for a new trial instanter. Any motions for a new
trial or for judgment of acquittal were due by June 30, 2022.
Undeterred, on July 18, 2022, Garfinkel filed an amended
No. 22-2922                                                      7

motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial, attributing the
belated filing to a Covid exposure. At Wright’s sentencing
hearing on October 12, 2022, the court denied the motion for
leave, finding no excusable neglect. Wright was then sen-
tenced to 264 months in prison. Represented by new counsel,
she timely appealed her conviction.

                        II. Discussion

   On appeal, Wright mounts a Sixth Amendment challenge.
She argues that her constitutional right to conflict-free counsel
was violated by Garfinkel’s actual conflict of interest. She also
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her con-
spiracy conviction, claiming that, at most, the evidence
showed a buyer/seller relationship. We evaluate each chal-
lenge in turn.
   A. Sixth Amendment
    The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants
two, sometimes opposing, rights: (1) the right to choose their
attorney (assuming they do not require appointed counsel),
and (2) the right to effective assistance of counsel. United
States v. Turner, 594 F.3d 946, 950 (7th Cir. 2010). “[W]here an
actual conflict of interest or a serious potential for a conflict
exists” between the attorney and her client, those rights are
pitted against each other, and the right to select an attorney
must give way. United States v. Turner, 651 F.3d 743, 749 (7th
Cir. 2011); Turner, 594 F.3d at 948 (reversing the district court’s
disqualification of counsel explaining it “disregarded the pre-
sumption in favor of the defendant’s chosen counsel”); Wheat
v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 164 (1988) (expounding upon the
“presumption in favor of petitioner’s counsel of choice,” but
explaining that “the presumption may be overcome … by a
8                                                     No. 22-2922

demonstration of actual conflict” or “showing of a serious po-
tential for conflict”).
    Wright challenges the district court’s handling of the al-
leged conflict of interest between her and Garfinkel. Accord-
ing to Wright, after the government flagged the potential con-
flict, Garfinkel’s on-the-record response should have alerted
the district court to the existence of an actual conflict of inter-
est. In that situation, Wright argues the district court is re-
quired to either appoint new counsel or obtain a valid waiver
of the conflict.
    At the outset we must acknowledge the district court’s dif-
ficult position when facing a conflict-of-interest claim. “If the
accused says he wants to be represented by a lawyer who
faces an actual or potential conflict of interest, the district
court can err in either direction: either deny the accused his
choice of counsel or deny him counsel free of conflicts of in-
terest.” United States v. Vizcarra-Millan, 15 F.4th 473, 491–92
(7th Cir. 2021). Consequently, district courts “have broad dis-
cretion in how to handle this constitutional balancing act.” Id.
at 492.
    Wright’s argument finds the most support from case law
addressing conflicts that arise in the joint-representation
context. In those cases, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44
requires the court to “promptly inquire about the propriety of
joint representation and … personally advise each defendant
of the right to … separate representation.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
44(c)(2). Specifically, the district court has “the duty to inquire
adequately into a trial counsel’s conflict of interest if it knows
or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists.”
United States v. Lafuente, 426 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Holleman v. Cotton, 301 F.3d 737, 742 (7th Cir. 2002)).
No. 22-2922                                                       9

Otherwise, a judge’s failure “to appoint separate counsel or to
take adequate steps to ascertain whether the risk was too
remote to warrant separate counsel” deprives the defendant
of his Sixth Amendment right. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S.
475, 484 (1978). The only appropriate remedy in those cases is
automatic reversal. See id. at 489; see also Lafuente, 426 F.3d at
897 (explaining in a joint-representation-conflict case, the
defendant is entitled to “automatic reversal or a remand for
an evidentiary hearing” under Holloway).
    Wright would have us apply a similar principle to all con-
flicts and require the district court use standardized language
to admonish the defendant of her Sixth Amendment right. But
the Supreme Court has not extended the redress identified in
Holloway to contexts other than joint representation. Lafuente,
426 F.3d at 897. As we explained in Lafuente, Supreme Court
decisions in the wake of Holloway have limited its “holding to
situations in which the district court requires joint represen-
tation over a timely objection.” Id. The required procedure is
elastic in cases like this one that fall outside that context. The
district court “ha[s] discretion to determine what type of hear-
ing [is] necessary to address [the defendant’s] conflict of in-
terest claim.” Id. at 898.
    “To establish a violation of [her] Sixth Amendment right
to conflict-free counsel, [Wright] ‘must demonstrate that an
actual conflict of interest adversely affected h[er] lawyer’s
performance.’” United States v. Lewisbey, 843 F.3d 653, 657 (7th
Cir. 2016) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980)).
The first step in doing so is “establish[ing] the existence of a
conflict of interest” and the second is showing adverse effect.
United States v. Coscia, 4 F.4th 454, 475 (7th Cir. 2021), cert. de-
nied, 142 S. Ct. 1127 (2022); see also United States v. Beck, 718 F.
10                                                    No. 22-2922

App’x 429, 432 (7th Cir. 2017) (applying standard where al-
leged conflict emanated from the government’s concurrent
federal criminal investigation of the defense attorney).
    “An actual conflict exists if an attorney is torn between
two different interests,” United States v. Holman, 314 F.3d 837,
845 (7th Cir. 2002), or “required to make a choice advancing
his own interests to the detriment of his client’s interests,”
Stoia v. United States, 109 F.3d 392, 395 (7th Cir. 1997) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
    There was no actual conflict of interest in this case. To
start, neither the government nor Wright’s attorney believed
there was an actual conflict of interest. The government raised
the issue on the second day of trial but framed it as a situation
that “could potentially create a conflict” under certain, con-
tingent circumstances. Garfinkel agreed that there was no
conflict of interest. He somewhat obliquely explained, “[I]f
Mr. Deherrera is going to testify consistent with the interview
last night, I can’t imagine why Miss Wright would want him
on the stand. I don’t want him on the stand. I think … that
vitiates any conflict.” See Holleman, 301 F.3d at 744 (describing
reliance on representations made by counsel as reasonable
given “presumption that attorneys make truthful representa-
tions to the court”); United States v. Fish, 34 F.3d 488, 493 (7th
Cir. 1994) (explaining that the “attorney confronted with a po-
tential conflict … is in the best position professionally and
ethically to determine when a conflict of interest exists” (cita-
tion and internal quotation marks omitted)). While not calling
Deherrera might be to his benefit, Garfinkel believed it was
also in Wright’s best interest. It is evident that the district
court agreed. When questioning Wright about how she
No. 22-2922                                                      11

wished to proceed, the court remarked, “[W]e’re not really
sure what [Deherrera] might testify to.”
    What the government, Garfinkel, and the trial court all
seemed to understand—but Wright does not acknowledge on
appeal—are the risks inherent in calling a witness who
changed his story the night before testifying. This is true even
if Deherrera could provide potentially helpful testimony to
Wright’s defense. Deherrera’s testimony had suddenly
changed in at least one respect—he belatedly accused Gar-
finkel of pressuring him to change his testimony. That made
him an extremely risky witness.
    The risks associated with calling Deherrera align Wright’s
interest with Garfinkel’s alleged personal interests. There was
no actual conflict of interest because he was not caught be-
tween “advancing his own interests to the detriment of
[Wright’s].” Stoia, 109 F.3d at 395 (citation and internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
    The risks associated with calling Deherrera also prevent
Wright from proving that failing to call him had an adverse
effect on her defense. See Hall v. United States, 371 F.3d 969,
974 (7th Cir. 2004); see also United States v. Lake, 308 F. App’x
6, 9 (7th Cir. 2009). “[I]t is significantly easier to demonstrate
an ‘adverse effect’ than to show ‘prejudice’”—the Strickland
standard. Stoia v. United States, 22 F.3d 766, 771 (7th Cir. 1994).
An attorney’s performance is adversely affected if “there is a
[reasonable] likelihood that” absent the conflict of interest
“counsel’s performance somehow would have been differ-
ent.” Id. (alteration in original) (citation and internal quota-
tion marks omitted). This hypothetical different performance
“must be a ‘plausible alternative to the strategy actually pur-
sued at trial.’” Burkhart v. United States, 27 F.4th 1289, 1295 (7th
12                                                   No. 22-2922

Cir. 2022) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted),
cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 309 (2022). “There can be no ‘reasonable
likelihood’ that counsel would have done something differ-
ent … if the alternative defense strategy was implausible.” Id.
at 1296. After all, “the law does not require defense counsel to
pursue hypothetical strategies with no on-the-ground plausi-
bility in the realities of the prosecution facing a defendant.”
Id.
    Because Garfinkel had good reason not to call Deherrera,
Wright cannot show “a reasonable likelihood that his coun-
sel's performance would have been different had there been
no conflict of interest.” Hall, 371 F.3d at 974. Even assuming
Garfinkel was personally motivated not to call Deherrera, it is
implausible to believe that he would not have reached the
same decision if his singular focus had been Wright’s best in-
terest. As a consequence, Wright’s Sixth Amendment claim
fails.
     B. Suﬃciency of the Evidence
    Normally we review sufficiency challenges in the “light
most favorable to the government,” reversing “only if the fact
finder’s take on the evidence was wholly irrational.” United
States v. Tinsley, 62 F.4th 376, 386 (7th Cir. 2023) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). To preserve a sufficiency
challenge though, a defendant must make or renew her mo-
tion for judgment of acquittal either at the close of evidence
or through a timely post-trial motion as specified by Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. See, e.g., United States v. Pless,
982 F.2d 1118, 1122 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Fitzpatrick,
32 F.4th 644, 647–49 (7th Cir. 2022) (reviewing sufficiency
challenge in light most favorable to the government where
defendant made and then renewed his motion for acquittal
No. 22-2922                                                   13

after the close of evidence and in a post-trial motion); see Fed.
R. Crim. P. 29(c)(1) (“A defendant may move for a judgment
of acquittal, or renew such a motion, within 14 days after a
guilty verdict or after the court discharges the jury, whichever
is later.”). Where the defendant does not preserve her chal-
lenge, we review for plain error. United States v. Beaver, 515
F.3d 730, 741 (7th Cir. 2008).
    When a sufficiency challenge is preserved, the hurdle is
“nearly insurmountable,” but the “hurdle is even higher”
when it is not. United States v. Lundberg, 990 F.3d 1087, 1095
(7th Cir. 2021) (citation and internal quotation marks omit-
ted). To reverse a jury verdict on plain error review, the rec-
ord must be “devoid of evidence pointing to guilt.” Id. (cita-
tion and internal quotation marks omitted). Put another way,
we will reverse only if there was a “manifest miscarriage of
justice.” United States v. Owens, 301 F.3d 521, 528 (7th Cir.
2002).
    We review Wright’s challenge for plain error. While she
made an oral motion for acquittal at the close of the govern-
ment’s case, she did not renew it at the close of evidence or
through a timely post-trial motion. See id. at 527–28 (“[De-
fendant] did not preserve normal review of the issue because,
although he moved for a judgment of acquittal at the close of
the government’s case, he failed to renew his motion at the
close of all the evidence.”); United States v. Archambault, 62
F.3d 995, 998 (7th Cir. 1995).
    With the standard of review settled, we review the evi-
dence to determine whether it is “clear or obvious … that
there was insufficient evidence” to find Wright guilty; that is,
whether “the record is devoid of evidence pointing to guilt,
or if the evidence [of Wright’s participation in a conspiracy]
14                                                    No. 22-2922

was so tenuous that a conviction would be shocking.” United
States v. Meadows, 91 F.3d 851, 855 (7th Cir. 1996) (citation
omitted).
    Wright’s argument for reversing her conviction is that the
government failed to prove conspiracy, proving at most a
buyer/seller relationship. To convict a defendant of conspir-
acy, the government must prove “(1) two or more people
agreed to commit an unlawful act, and (2) the defendant
knowingly and intentionally joined in the agreement.” United
States v. Hidalgo-Sanchez, 29 F.4th 915, 924 (7th Cir. 2022) (cita-
tion and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied sub
nom. Gomez v. United States, 143 S. Ct. 385 (2022). For drug con-
spiracies like this one, the government must prove “the de-
fendant knowingly agreed, perhaps implicitly, with someone
else to distribute drugs.” Id. at 924–25.
    To determine if the government proved conspiracy, we
must differentiate between evidence that supports the exist-
ence of a conspiracy and evidence that is merely indicative of
a buyer/seller relationship. Id. If the evidence is “‘in equi-
poise’—that is, it suggests that either [a conspiracy or
buyer/seller relationship] is equally likely,” it “is insufficient
to prove a drug-distribution conspiracy.” Id. at 925.
     Some characteristics of a conspiracy include:
        sales on credit or consignment, an agreement to
        look for other customers, a payment of commis-
        sion on sales, an indication that one party ad-
        vised the other on the conduct of the other’s
        business, or an agreement to warn of future
        threats to each other’s business stemming from
        competitors or law enforcement authorities.
No. 22-2922                                                    15

Id. (citation omitted). Still, our charge is to make a “holistic
assessment” not limited to or confined by any factors. Id. Cir-
cumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove a conspiracy, but
the government must present “evidence establishing an
agreement to distribute drugs that is distinct from evidence of
the agreement to complete the underlying drug deals.” United
States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 749, 754–55 (7th Cir. 2010). With
these principles in mind, in context of plain error review, it
must be obvious that Wright only had a buyer/seller relation-
ship with those who purchased meth from her; we must find
the conviction “shocking.” Meadows, 91 F.3d at 855.
    Three categories of evidence tip the scale in this case. First
is the sale of drugs on credit, repaid in part by a stolen pull-
behind trailer. A single sale on credit is significant and may
be evidence of conspiracy when coupled with other evidence.
Hidalgo-Sanchez, 29 F.4th at 925; Johnson, 592 F.3d at 756 n.5.
While “not all credit sales can support an inference that there
was an agreement to distribute,” if it “is coupled with certain
characteristics inherent in an ongoing wholesale buyer-seller
relationship … the credit sale becomes sufficient evidence to
distinguish a conspiracy from a nonconspiratorial buyer-
seller relationship.” Johnson, 592 F.3d at 756 n.5. For example,
“large quantities of drugs, [or] repeat purchases or some other
enduring arrangement” is evidence of a conspiracy when cou-
pled with a credit sale. Id. (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted); see also United States v. Moreno, 922 F.3d 787,
794 (7th Cir. 2019) (noting that while “occasional sales on
credit” “alone do not support an inference of conspiracy,”
when taken with other evidence it “can support a conspiracy
finding” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Here, in addition to the credit sale, there was significant evi-
dence of repeated, distribution-quantity drug transactions
16                                                  No. 22-2922

over a seven-to-eight-week period. Moreno, 922 F.3d at 794–95
(holding sufficient evidence supported conspiracy where ev-
idence of credit sales was coupled with evidence of sales of
“two to four kilograms of heroin … once or twice a month”).
    The second piece of evidence is the gun Pfister gave to
Wright. It falls into a category we have frequently recognized
as indicative of a conspiracy: “sharing tools and supplies.” Id.
at 794; United States v. Foy, 50 F.4th 616, 625 (7th Cir. 2022)
(discussing evidence of sharing tools as support for conspir-
acy conviction), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 2660 (2023); cf. United
States v. Perez, 581 F.3d 539, 547 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[W]eapons
are recognized tools of the drug trade.” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)). Pfister provided a gun to Wright
for her meth source to use to ensure the conspiracy continued.
After all, if Wright’s source was unable to defend his stash,
the conspiracy would be imperiled. As such, the gun also sup-
ports Wright’s conspiracy conviction. See United States v. Brad-
ford, 905 F.3d 497, 506 (7th Cir. 2018) (describing evidence
such as “the provision of tools to advance the distribution” as
common evidence supporting the existence of a drug conspir-
acy (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
    Third, and last, is Wright and Pfister warning each other
about potential threats to the conspiracy. Wright warned
Pfister and Evans not to discuss drug transactions over the
phone out of concern for a federal wiretap. Similarly, Pfister
warned Wright, after the drug bust at Heavener’s home, that
the authorities might be watching them. Both are examples of
providing “warnings of threats by … law enforcement.”
Moreno, 922 F.3d at 794. Much like one-time sales on credit,
singular warnings are insufficient to establish a conspiracy.
Johnson, 592 F.3d at 757. However, these two warnings,
No. 22-2922                                                              17

coupled with the other evidence discussed, and in light of our
plain error review, are sufficient to establish a conspiracy.3
Moreno, 922 F.3d at 794; United States v. Pulgar, 789 F.3d 807,
815–16 (7th Cir. 2015).

                          III. Conclusion

   For the reasons explained, the judgment of the district
court is AFFIRMED.

    3 Also evincing a conspiracy is Deherrera’s participation as a middle-

man, receiving a cut of the money Pfister and Evans paid for the drugs.
Recognized characteristics of conspiracy include “payment of commission
on sales,” Hidalgo-Sanchez, 29 F.4th at 925, and use of middlemen, United
States v. Cruse, 805 F.3d 795, 812 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Cooperation with a mid-
dleman is a conspiracy per se because the dealer and the middleman have
agreed to work together to distribute drugs to third parties.”).