Court Opinion

ID: 9889841
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 17:10:38.824669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:48.751411
License: Public Domain

J-S26028-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 CHARLES SHEPPARD                         :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 290 EDA 2023

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 29, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0606581-1973

BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                      FILED OCTOBER 11, 2023

      Charles Sheppard appeals pro se from the order denying his latest,

untimely-filed petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. We affirm.

      Previously, this Court has summarized the pertinent facts and extensive

procedural history as follows:

             On October 23, 1973, [Sheppard] pleaded guilty to
      receiving stolen property and was sentenced to three years’
      probation. On September 7, 1974, while still on probation, he
      participated in a robbery that resulted in the death of a victim.
      [Sheppard was not arrested for this crime until July 1978, as he
      had fled and lived as a fugitive for four years following the
      robbery.] He was subsequently convicted of second[-]degree
      murder and sentenced to life imprisonment on March 6, 1979. On
      November 20, 1978, the trial court revoked his probation
      stemming from his 1973 receiving stolen property conviction, and
      imposed a two and one-half to five year sentence of incarceration.

           [Sheppard] filed a direct appeal. On June 25, 1979, while
      the appeal was pending, the Commonwealth asked that the
      matter be remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine
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     whether [Sheppard] received the requisite written notice of the
     probation violation prior to the revocation hearing.         The
     Commonwealth’s request was granted and the sentence vacated
     due to [Sheppard’s] lack of proper notice. A new violation of
     probation hearing was held on January 16, 1980, at which
     [Sheppard] once again received a two and one-half to five[-]year
     incarceration sentence, consecutive to his life sentence.

           On October 4, 1983, [Sheppard] filed a petition under the
     Post Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA), the predecessor to the PCRA,
     challenging the revocation of probation, but his petition was
     denied June 25, 1985. [Sheppard’s] appeal to this Court was
     dismissed due to his counsel’s failure to file a timely appellate
     brief. [Sheppard] filed a second PCHA petition in July 1986, but
     this was also dismissed for defense counsel’s failure to file a brief.
     On August 12, 1988, [Sheppard’s] third PCHA petition was
     granted and this Court affirmed the PCHA court’s denial of his
     original PCHA petition.

            [Sheppard] the filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas
     corpus, but his petition was denied on January 9, 1990. On
     January 10, 1991, this Court reversed the trial court’s denial of
     habeas corpus relief, vacated the sentence imposed at the second
     violation of probation hearing, and re-imposed the two and one-
     half to five[-]year imprisonment sentence. Commonwealth v.
     Sheppard, No. 00287 PHILADELPHIA 1990 (unpublished
     memorandum) (Pa. Super. filed 1/10/91). [Sheppard’s] petition
     for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was
     denied on September 4, 1991. [Sheppard] filed two more PCRA
     petitions, on February 25, 1994 and January 5, 1997,
     respectively. Both petitions, however, were dismissed as untimely
     and the dismissals were affirmed by this Court. On April 17, 2007,
     [Sheppard filed a writ of habeas corpus that the court treated as
     a PCRA petition], which was once again dismissed as untimely.
     [Sheppard appealed].

Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 986 A.2d 1265 (Pa. Super. 2009), non-

precedential decision at 1-3 (footnotes omitted). On September 2, 2009, this

Court concluded that the PCRA court correctly treated his habeas corpus

petition under the PCRA and dismissed it as untimely. Id.

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      On April 6, 2020, Sheppard filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus ad

subjiciendum.    On October 25, 2022, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 907

notice of its intent to dismiss Sheppard’s petition, which the court treated as

a serial PCRA petition. The court stated therein that Sheppard’s latest PCRA

petition was untimely, and Sheppard did not invoke an exception to the PCRA’s

time bar. Sheppard filed a response. By order entered December 29, 2022,

the PCRA court denied Sheppard’s petition. This appeal followed. The PCRA

court did not require Pa.R.A.P. 1925 compliance.

      Sheppard raises the following issues on appeal:

      1. Did the [PCRA] court err by not granting [Sheppard] a hearing
         on his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which resulted in a
         violation of substantive due process and the equal protection
         of the law?

      2. Can a court resentence a defendant to a term of imprisonment
         that has already expired by operation of law, and modify the
         sentence that increased his period of incarceration 13 years
         after the original lawful sentence went into effect, thus
         resulting in double jeopardy and a miscarriage of justice under
         the state and federal constitutions?

      3. Did the [PCRA] court err and deny [Sheppard] due process of
         law and the equal protection of law, and he suffers under cruel
         punishment in violation of his state and federal constitutional
         rights?

      4. Did the [PCRA] court err by not granting [Sheppard] a hearing
         in violation of his state and federal constitutional right to a writ
         of habeas corpus; and the court failed to credit him for time
         served and spent in custody.

Sheppard’s Brief at 8 (italics added; excess capitalization omitted).

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         Using the applicable standard of review, we must determine whether

the ruling of the PCRA court is supported by the record and is free of legal

error.    Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 749-50 (Pa. 2014)

(citations omitted). We apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s

legal conclusions. Id.

         Before we consider the issues Sheppard raises on appeal, we first note

that the PCRA court properly considered his latest filing for post-conviction

relief as a serial PCRA petition because the sentencing claims within his

petition are cognizable under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (providing

that the PCRA “shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and

encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same

purpose . . . including habeas corpus”); Commonwealth v. Descardes, 136

A.3d 493, 499 (Pa. 2016) (explaining that “claims that could be brought under

the PCRA must be brought under that Act. . . . A claim is cognizable under

the PCRA if the . . . conviction resulted from one of seven enumerated errors

set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)”).

         Treating Sheppard’s filing as a PCRA petition, we must next determine

whether the PCRA court’s conclusion that his latest PCRA petition was untimely

filed, and that he failed to establish a time-bar exception. The timeliness of a

post-conviction petition is jurisdictional. Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79

A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013). Generally, a petition for relief under the

PCRA, including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed within one year

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of the date the judgment becomes final unless the petition alleges, and the

petitioner proves, that an exception to the time for filing the petition is met.

      The three narrow statutory exceptions to the one-year time bar are as

follows: “(1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the

claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional

right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012)

(citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii)). In addition, exceptions to the PCRA’s

time bar must be pled in the petition and may not be raised for the first time

on appeal.        Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super.

2007); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the

lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).

Moreover, a PCRA petitioner must file his petition “within one year of date the

claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

      Finally, if a PCRA petition is untimely and the petitioner has not pled and

proven an exception “neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction

over the petition.      Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal

authority    to    address   the   substantive   claims.”   Commonwealth       v.

Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).

      Here, Sheppard’s judgment of sentence became final on December 3,

1991, ninety days after our Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance

of appeal, and the time for filing a writ of certiorari to the United States

Supreme Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Therefore, Sheppard

had until December 3, 1992, to file a timely petition. Because Sheppard filed

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the petition at issue in 2020, it is patently untimely unless he has satisfied his

burden of pleading and proving that one of the enumerated exceptions

applies. See Hernandez, supra.

      Sheppard has failed to plead and prove any exception to the PCRA’s time

bar. As noted by the PCRA Court:

             [Sheppard] makes no attempt to invoke an exception to the
      PCRA’s time bar, arguing instead that the PCRA does not apply to
      his claims. It does. [Sheppard’s] erroneous denial of the PCRA’s
      applicability falls short of satisfying his burden of demonstrating
      that one of the three statutory exceptions to the PCRA’s timeliness
      requirement applies to his petition.

PCRA Court Opinion, 12/29/22, at 2-3 (unnumbered). In both his appellate

brief and reply brief, Sheppard persists in his belief that his claims do not fall

within the purview of the PCRA and addresses the alleged merit of the

substantive issues enumerated above.

      In sum, the PCRA court correctly treated Sheppard’s latest filing as an

untimely PCRA petition and, therefore, the PCRA court correctly determined

that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of Sheppard’s petition.

Derrickson, supra. We therefore affirm its order denying Sheppard post-

conviction relief.

      Order affirmed.

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Date: October 11, 2023

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