Court Opinion

ID: 9965749
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-03 14:07:33.032825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:38.268556
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: APRIL 26, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

               Commonwealth of Kentucky
                         Court of Appeals
                            NO. 2023-CA-0148-MR

DIANE WHITE                                                       APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
v.              HONORABLE JEFFREY A. TAYLOR, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 21-CI-01945

BAPTIST HEALTHCARE SYSTEM,
INC., D/B/A BAPTIST HEALTH
LEXINGTON, F/K/A CENTRAL
BAPTIST HOSPITAL AND
PANAYIOTIS MICHAEL ZAVOS                                           APPELLEES

                               OPINION
                AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART,
                          AND REMANDING

                                 ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: GOODWINE, KAREM, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

GOODWINE, JUDGE: Diane White (“White”) appeals the January 5, 2023

judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court dismissing her claims and granting summary

judgment in favor of Panayiotis Michael Zavos (“Zavos”) and Baptist Healthcare
System, Inc. d/b/a Baptist Health Lexington f/k/a Central Baptist Hospital

(“Baptist”). We affirm, in part; reverse, in part; and remand.

                                  BACKGROUND

             In 1988, White wished to have a child through artificial insemination.

She sought the services of Zavos, a physiologist operating out of a Baptist hospital,

to obtain donor sperm. She requested a donor with features like hers, specifically

blond hair and blue eyes. Zavos told her he would obtain sperm from an

anonymous donor he claimed was a 24-year-old medical student with the requested

features. White recalls signing a written contract with these terms. Zavos twice

provided sperm to White who then sought artificial insemination services from her

gynecologist. White paid $500 each time. The first insemination failed but the

second was successful.

             In October 1989, White gave birth to a daughter with dark hair and

olive skin. She contacted Zavos soon after the birth to inquire about the donor’s

medical history. Zavos told her the donor had no medical issues. White did not

investigate the identity of the donor at that time.

             In 2018, White’s daughter took a commercially available DNA test.

The results indicated she had no Nordic heritage and some of her relatives had the

surname Zavos, raising White’s suspicions about the identity of the donor. White

then sought counsel who hired an investigator who retrieved discarded items

                                          -2-
allegedly belonging to Zavos. Those items were tested for DNA and the results

indicated Zavos was White’s daughter’s biological father.1 On this basis, White

alleges she became aware of her daughter’s paternity and, therefore, Zavos’ actions

in 2020.

                   On June 29, 2021, White filed suit against Zavos and Baptist. She

claimed (1) breach of contract; (2) fraud; (3) violation of the Kentucky Consumer

Protection Act (“KCPA”);2 (4) battery;3 and (5) practice of medicine without a

license. Regarding Baptist’s liability, she claimed Zavos acted as an agent of

Baptist and that Baptist should have known of Zavos’ conduct. On October 5,

2021, Baptist filed a motion for summary judgment on White’s claims. On

November 1, 2021, Zavos moved to dismiss White’s claims. On November 30,

2021, Baptist also filed a motion to dismiss.

1
 The DNA test submitted by White identifies the “alleged father” as “Ken.” White has provided
no explanation for the use of a pseudonym. The results indicate the probability of paternity is
>99.9999%.
2
 White claims Zavos’ actions were unlawful under Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”)
367.170(1) and bases her claim on KRS 367.220(1), which states, in part:

                 Any person who purchases or leases goods or services primarily
                 for personal, family or household purposes and thereby suffers any
                 ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a
                 result of the use or employment by another person of a method, act
                 or practice declared unlawful by KRS 367.170, may bring an
                 action[.]
3
    White brought her battery claim against only Zavos.

                                                -3-
                On January 5, 2023, relying on the Supreme Court of Kentucky’s

decisions in Grubbs ex rel. Grubbs v. Barbourville Family Health Center, 120

S.W.3d 682 (Ky. 2003) and Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983), the

circuit court dismissed White’s claims, finding that Kentucky law does not permit

wrongful conception or birth claims and “does not permit parents to recover

compensable damages because their child’s physical features are not as they

desired.” Record (“R.”) at 567. The court further found that, without proof of the

existence of a written contract, White’s breach of contract claim could not survive.

The court also found her fraud, battery, and Kentucky Consumer Protection Act

claims were time-barred. Finally, the court found it was without jurisdiction to

decide White’s claim that Zavos practiced medicine without a license because she

did not first exhaust all administrative remedies.

                This appeal followed.

                                STANDARD OF REVIEW

                We review dismissals under CR4 12.02(f) de novo. Shaw v. Handy,

588 S.W.3d 459, 461 (Ky. App. 2019) (citation omitted). We must accept the facts

alleged in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s

favor. Id. (citation omitted). We must decide, based on the complaint, if there is

4
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

                                          -4-
any set of facts which may be proven under which the plaintiff would be entitled to

relief. Id. (citation omitted).

              We also review summary judgments de novo. Summary judgment is

proper when

              [t]he record, when examined in its entirety, shows there
              is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving
              party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The
              trial judge must view the evidence in a light most
              favorable to the nonmoving party, resolving all doubts in
              its favor. Because summary judgment does not require
              findings of fact but only an examination of the record to
              determine whether material issues of fact exist, we
              generally review the [denial] of summary judgment
              without deference to either the trial court’s assessment of
              the record or its legal conclusions.

Hammons v. Hammons, 327 S.W.3d 444, 448 (Ky. 2010) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted).

                                     ANALYSIS

              On appeal, White argues (1) the circuit court improperly dismissed

her claims as wrongful birth and/or wrongful conception claims; (2) Baptist is

liable under the theories of negligent supervision and respondeat superior; (3)

equitable estoppel prevents the applicable statutes of limitation from barring her

claims; (4) the statute of repose for fraud, KRS 413.130(3), is unconstitutional; (5)

the existence of a written contract prevents application of KRS 304.40-300; and (6)

                                          -5-
because Zavos was not licensed by the Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure

(“KBML”), she was not required to exhaust administrative remedies.

             First, the circuit court incorrectly characterized White’s entire

complaint as an action for wrongful conception and/or birth. The court’s reliance

on Grubbs and Schork to dismiss her case is misplaced. In Schork, 648 S.W.2d at

863, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held, where a pregnancy resulted from a

failed sterilization procedure, “parents cannot recover damages based on the cost

of raising a child from a physician for his alleged negligence.” In Grubbs, 120

S.W.3d at 685, parents alleged they were deprived of the opportunity to make

informed decisions about whether the continue their pregnancies because

physicians failed to diagnose and inform them of profound, incurable birth defects.

The Court analyzed the plaintiffs’ claims under traditional negligence principles,

concluding they were unable to prove their claims because the existence of human

life is not a legally cognizable injury. Id. at 689; see also Schork, 648 S.W.2d at

862 (holding “a child can be considered as an injury offends fundamental concepts

attached to human life”).

             In her amended complaint, White alleges she

             has been monetarily damaged by Dr. Zavos’s and Baptist
             Health’s conduct, in that she paid fees for the medical
             services she thought she was receiving, when in fact, she
             did not receive the medical services for which she had
             contracted, which included the fertilization of her egg or
             eggs by a medical student, not by Dr. Zavos, a fact which

                                         -6-
             Baptist Health either knew or should have known.
             Additionally, she provided a home and financial
             support for her child during her minority.

R. at 37 (emphasis added). In both Schork and Grubbs, the parents sought to

recover costs of raising their children. The Supreme Court has deemed such

damages speculative and remote. Schork, 648 S.W.2d at 862. Even where the

parents did not seek to recover the entirety of the cost of raising the child, but only

the costs for the necessary expenses, care, and treatment attributable to the child’s

birth defects, the Court characterized such damages as a claim for wrongful birth.

Grubbs, 120 S.W.3d at 691 (citation omitted). Following the Supreme Court’s

reasoning, White cannot recover the costs of raising her child because this would

amount to a claim for wrongful birth and/or conception.

             White’s remaining claims are otherwise distinguishable from Schork

and Grubbs because White alleges distinct damages. In Grubbs, 120 S.W.3d at

691, the Court allowed the parents’ breach of contract claim to proceed where they

alleged the physician did not correctly perform diagnostic prenatal testing. The

Court reasoned

             [w]e do not believe physicians should be relieved of any
             proven contractual responsibility to report to patients the
             accurate results of diagnostic procedures, even if the
             condition is “incurable.” In the absence of such a
             conclusion, we would be forced to hold that physicians
             could perform and charge for diagnostic procedures and
             report whatever they want if the diagnosis is of an

                                          -7-
               incurable condition, and physicians could legally charge
               and be paid for services they did not perform.
Id. Here, White claims breach of contract, fraud, battery, violation of the KCPA,

and unlawful practice of medicine without a license. Unlike the medical

negligence claims involved in Schork and Grubbs, White claims injuries resulting

from Zavos’ intentional act of providing her with his own sperm after promising to

obtain sperm from an agreed upon donor. Her claims exist independent of her

pregnancy and the birth of her child. Were we to hold that the birth of a healthy

child invalidates her claims, we would essentially be permitting the alleged

intentional and fraudulent conduct. Just as the Court in Grubbs refused to relieve

the physicians of their contractual obligations, we refuse to allow these defendants

to escape liability under this theory.5

               Next, we will address White’s allegation that Baptist is liable for

fraud, the practice of medicine without a license, breach of contract, and violation

of the KCPA under the theories of negligent supervision and respondeat superior.

Both of White’s claims are predicated on her assertion that Zavos was an agent of

5
  In both Schork and Grubbs, the Supreme Court discusses the authority of the General Assembly
to create new causes of action. We note the General Assembly did so in 2022 when it enacted a
fraudulent assisted reproduction statute. Therein, “[a] person is guilty of fraudulent assisted
reproduction when he or she is a health care provider performing an assisted reproduction
procedure on a patient and . . . intentionally causes the use of his or her own human reproductive
material without the patient’s knowledge and written consent.” KRS 311.373(2)(b). After this
statute was enacted, White did not request to amend her complaint to include a claim under this
statute.

                                               -8-
Baptist. Although Baptist does not concede this issue, it argues “[e]ven if Ms.

White could prove that an agency relationship existed between Zavos and Baptist

during the relevant period, it would have no bearing on the legal determinations

before this Court.” Baptist’s Brief at 23. We disagree.

              White argues Zavos was an ostensible agent of Baptist. “An apparent

or ostensible agent is one whom the principal, either intentionally or by want of

ordinary care, induces third persons to believe to be his agent, although he has not,

either expressly or by implication, conferred authority upon him.” Sneed v.

University of Louisville Hospital, 600 S.W.3d 221, 232 (Ky. 2020) (citation

omitted). The principal is subject to liability for the actions of its ostensible agent

where a third party relies on the agent’s apparent authority. Id. (citation omitted).

In the context of medical care, “it is unreasonable to put a duty on the patient to

inquire of each person who treats him whether he is an employee or independent

contractor of the hospital.” Id. (citation omitted). At a minimum, a hospital must

attempt to alert patients of whether someone is a hospital employee. Id. at 233.

             Here, the parties agree Zavos was not a licensed physician, but a

physiologist. However, White alleges he operated a laboratory in the Baptist

hospital facility and met with Baptist patients in an office therein. White relies on

evidence presented in Zavos v. Thompson, Fayette Circuit case No. 95-CI-00245,

wherein Zavos testified he entered into a contract with Baptist to provide services.

                                          -9-
He further testified that he saw “all patients at [Baptist]” and created patient files

for Baptist. He attested to splitting his fees with Baptist. In the same proceedings,

Baptist’s Senior Vice President for Patient Care Services testified “[a]ny time you

come to have services [at Baptist], you are a patient there.” White alleges she

understood Zavos to be an employee and/or agent of Baptist and neither Zavos or

Baptist attempted to inform her otherwise.

             On appeal, Baptist does nothing to refute these alleged facts.

Considering this failure, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to White,

and resolving all doubts in her favor, there remains a genuine issue of material fact

as to agency.

             A plaintiff may pursue claims of negligent supervision and respondeat

superior in the same action. MV Transp., Inc. v. Allgeier, 433 S.W.3d 324, 337

(Ky. 2014). The two theories are distinguishable because “‘respondeat superior’ is

based upon the employer/employee relationship and imposes strict liability,

whereas claims of negligent [supervision] focus on the direct negligence of the

employer which permitted an otherwise avoidable circumstance to occur.” Feltner

v. PJ Operations, LLC, 568 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Ky. App. 2018) (citation omitted).

             First, White alleges Baptist is liable for negligent supervision of

Zavos. Her claim is based on the following allegations in her amended complaint:

             51. Baptist Health either knew or should have known that
             Dr. Zavos used his own sperm to fertilize her eggs; if it

                                          -10-
               did not know this fact, its lack of knowledge is because it
               did not have in place a proper protocol or procedure for
               the identification of sperm collected on its premises, and
               to regulate the use of that sperm.

               52. Because Baptist Health materially assisted Dr. Zavos
               in his fraudulent and unlawful conduct toward her, it is
               jointly and severally liable to her for that conduct.
R. at 35-36.

               A defendant may be held liable for harm resulting from its own

negligent supervision of its agent. Allgeier, 433 S.W.3d at 336 (citation omitted).

However, the defendant may only be held liable where it “knew or had reason to

know of the risk that the employment created.” Carberry v. Golden Hawk Transp.

Co., 402 S.W.3d 556, 564 (Ky. App. 2013) (citations omitted). White relies on the

Smith v. Isaacs, 777 S.W.2d 912, 914 (Ky. 1989), wherein the Supreme Court of

Kentucky cites to Restatement (Second) of Agency, Section 213 (2024), which

states “A person conducting an activity through servants or other agents is subject

to liability for harm resulting from his conduct if he is negligent or reckless . . . in

giving improper or ambiguous orders [or] in failing to make proper regulations[.]”

However, Comment c to Section 213 explains, “the directions may be negligent

because the principal does not anticipate circumstances which he should realize are

likely to arise.” White fails to show Baptist had reason to know that Zavos’ use of

his own sperm in place of that of anonymous donors. Without any explanation of

why Baptist should have known of this risk, we cannot find any conceivable basis

                                          -11-
on which White’s claim of negligent supervision could succeed. Carberry, 402

S.W.3d at 564.

             White further argues Baptist is liable for Zavos’ conduct under the

doctrine of respondeat superior.

             [T]he doctrine of respondeat superior, is not predicated
             upon a tortious act of the employer but upon the
             imputation to the employer of a tortious act of the
             employee by considerations of public policy and the
             necessity for holding a responsible person liable for the
             acts done by others in the prosecution of his business, as
             well as for placing on employers an incentive to hire only
             careful employees.
Disabled American Veterans, Dep’t of Kentucky, Inc. v. Crabb, 182 S.W.3d 541,

555 (Ky. App. 2005) (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted). “[A]n

employer’s liability is limited only to those employee actions committed in the

scope of employment.” Patterson v. Blair, 172 S.W.3d 361, 366 (Ky. 2005). An

employer may be held liable for an intentional tort committed by an employee

“where its purpose, however misguided, is wholly or in part to further the

[employer’s] business.” Id. at 369 (citation omitted). If an employee “acts from

purely personal motives . . . which [are] in no way connected with the employer’s

interests, he is considered in the ordinary case to have departed from his

employment, and the master is not liable.” Id. (citation omitted). An employer

may be held liable for even “unprovoked, highly unusual, and quite outrageous”

acts by an employee. Id. at 371 (citation omitted).

                                        -12-
              Here, White alleges Baptist is liable for Zavos’ intentional acts of

breach of contract, fraud, violations of the KCPA, and the practice of medicine

without a license. To prove liability, she alleges Zavos acted to further Baptist’s

interests by providing sperm to patients for a fee. Based on Zavos’ testimony in

the 1995 case, Baptist received half of the fees for his services. White claims

Zavos furthered Baptist’s pecuniary interests by providing her with his own sperm

in exchange for the fee. Although Zavos’ conduct can easily be categorized as

highly unusual and outrageous, this is not determinative of Baptist’s liability.

Because we have previously determined there is sufficient proof that Zavos was

acting as an agent of Baptist during the relevant time, the circuit court did not

address Baptist’s liability, and discovery was limited, it is possible White could

prevail at trial.6 Therefore, summary judgment is unwarranted.

6
 The parties conducted minimal discovery during the pendency of this action. In October 2021,
White served Baptist and Zavos with requests for admissions, interrogatories, and requests for
production of documents. Thereafter, both defendants moved for protective orders holding
White’s discovery requests in abeyance until the trial court ruled on Baptist’s motion for
summary judgment. The motions remained pending, halting discovery, until entry of the court’s
January 5, 2022 judgment.

                                             -13-
               Next, equitable estoppel makes the relevant statutes of limitation

inapplicable to White’s claims of breach of contract,7 fraud,8 battery,9 and

violations of the KCPA.10 Equitable estoppel prevents a defendant from invoking

a statute of limitations as a defense because of his own wrongdoing. Williams v.

Hawkins, 594 S.W.3d 189, 193 (Ky. 2020) (citation omitted). Where a defendant

has acted “with a full knowledge of the facts with reference to a particular right or

title, induced another, in reliance upon such course of conduct, to act to his

detriment,” he cannot later benefit from his own wrongdoing. S.R.D. v. T.L.B., 174

S.W.3d 502, 506 (Ky. App. 2005) (footnote omitted).

                      The essential elements of equitable estoppel are:
               (1) conduct which amounts to a false representation or
               concealment of material facts, or, at least, which is
               calculated to convey the impression that the facts are
               otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the
               party subsequently attempts to assert; (2) the intention, or
               at least the expectation, that such conduct shall be acted
               upon by, or influence, the other party or other persons;
               and (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real
               facts. And, broadly speaking, as related to the party

7
  An action for breach of a written contract “shall be commenced within fifteen (15) years after
the cause of action first accrued[.]” KRS 413.090(2).
8
 Actions for relief or damages for fraud or mistake “shall be commenced within five (5) years
after the cause of action accrued[.]” KRS 413.120(11).
9
 “An action for an injury to the person of the plaintiff” must “be commenced within one (1) year
after the cause of action accrued[.]” KRS 413.140(1)(a).
10
   “Any person bringing an action under this section must bring such action within one (1) year
after any action of the Attorney General has been terminated or within two (2) years after the
violation of KRS 367.170, whichever is later.” KRS 367.220(5).

                                              -14-
             claiming the estoppel, the essential elements are (1) lack
             of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth
             as to the facts in question; (2) reliance, in good faith,
             upon the conduct or statements of the party to be
             estopped; and (3) action or inaction based thereon of such
             a character as to change the position or status of the party
             claiming the estoppel, to his injury, detriment, or
             prejudice.

Williams, 594 S.W.3d at 196 (citation omitted).

             Zavos misrepresented the sperm he provided to White as that of a 24-

year-old medical student when he had to know it was actually his own sperm.

When he gave White the sperm without telling her it was not from the agreed upon

donor, he intended for her to rely on that information and use the sperm for

artificial insemination. He knew the origin of the sperm but never informed White

of that fact. Conversely, White did not have knowledge of Zavos’ deception. She

relied on Zavos’ assurances that the donor would be a 24-year-old medical student.

Practically speaking, she had no means for ascertaining the truth. Both Baptist and

Zavos argue White should have investigated her daughter’s paternity soon after she

was born because she had dark hair and olive complexion. However, due to the

anonymous nature of sperm donation, it appears there was no reasonable way

White could have investigated her child’s paternity in 1989. She did not discover

her child’s paternity and, therefore, Zavos’ harmful conduct, until an investigator

obtained the items from Zavos and tested them for DNA in 2020. Therefore,

equitable estoppel prevents invocation of the relevant statutes of limitation.

                                         -15-
              Next, White challenges the constitutionality of the statute of repose

for claims of fraud or mistake.11 Causes of action for fraud must “be commenced

within five (5) years after the cause of action accrued[.]” KRS 413.120(11). The

discovery rule is “a means by which to identify the ‘accrual’ of a cause of action

when an injury is not readily ascertainable or discoverable[.]” Wiseman v. Alliant

Hospitals, Inc., 37 S.W.3d 709, 712 (Ky. 2000) (citation omitted). Under the rule,

a cause of action does not accrue “until the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of

reasonable diligence should have discovered, not only that he has been injured but

also that his injury may have been caused by the defendant’s conduct.” Id.

(citation omitted). As stated above, White’s claim did not accrue until she received

the DNA results identifying Zavos as her child’s biological father in 2020.

              However,

              [i]n an action for relief or damages for fraud or mistake,
              referred to in subsection (11) of KRS 413.120, the cause
              of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the
              discovery of the fraud or mistake. However, the action
              shall be commenced within ten (10) years after the time
              of making the contract or the perpetration of the fraud.

KRS 413.130(3). Baptist and Zavos claim White’s claim is time-barred even if it

did not accrue until 2020. They argue she was required to commence the action no

11
  As required by KRS 418.075, White served the Kentucky Attorney General with her notice of
appeal and briefs. She also served the Attorney General with her response to Baptist’s motion
for summary judgment wherein she first raised this argument. CR 24.03. The Attorney General
has declined to respond to this challenge.

                                            -16-
later than 1999, ten years after her transactions with Zavos. White claims KRS

413.130(3) is an unconstitutional statute of repose. “Statutes of limitations limit

the time in which a plaintiff may bring suit after a cause of action accrues,

whereas statutes of repose potentially bar the plaintiff’s suit before the cause of

action arises.” McCollum v. Sisters of Charity of Nazareth Health Corp., 799

S.W.2d 15, 18 (Ky. 1990) (citation omitted). The portion of KRS 413.130(3)

which requires an action to be “commenced within ten (10) years after the time of

making the contract or the perpetration of the fraud” is a statute of repose because

it is possible that an injury may not be discovered before the expiration of this

period, meaning “the cause of action would be destroyed before it legally existed.”

McCollum, 799 S.W.2d at 18.

              White argues KRS 413.130(3) unconstitutionally violates the “open

courts” provisions, also known as the jural rights doctrine, of the Kentucky

Constitution. The open courts doctrine is judicially derived from Sections 14,12

54,13 and 24114 of the Kentucky Constitution. See Ludwig v. Johnson, 49 S.W.2d

12
  “All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without
sale, denial or delay.”
13
  “The General Assembly shall have no power to limit the amount to be recovered for injuries
resulting in death, or for injuries to person or property.”
14
  “Whenever the death of a person shall result from an injury inflicted by negligence or
wrongful act, then, in every such case, damages may be recovered for such death, from the
corporations and persons so causing the same. Until otherwise provided by law, the action to

                                              -17-
347, 351 (Ky. 1932); see also Taylor v. King, 345 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Ky. App.

2010). “[T]he doctrine states that the General Assembly has no authority to

abolish or restrict a common law right of recovery for personal injury or wrongful

death.” Dutschke v. Jim Russell Realtors, Inc., 281 S.W.3d 817, 823 (Ky. App.

2008) (citations omitted). The doctrine has also been found to preclude legislation

restricting “a right of action in negligence that was recognized at common law

prior to the adoption of the 1891 Constitution.” Id. (citations omitted).

               White relies on McCollum in support of her argument. Therein,

appellants challenged the five-year statute of repose for medical malpractice claims

contained in KRS 413.140(2) as an unconstitutional violation of the open courts

doctrine. McCollum, 799 S.W.2d at 16. The Supreme Court found the statute

unconstitutional because claims for medical malpractice existed at common law

prior to the adoption of the 1891 Constitution. Id. at 18-19. “[T]he legislature may

not abolish an existing common-law right of action for personal injuries or

wrongful death caused by negligence.” Id. at 19 (citing Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d

218, 224 (Ky. 1973)). White erroneously argues the same reasoning should be

applied to KRS 413.130(3).

recover such damages shall in all cases be prosecuted by the personal representative of the
deceased person. The General Assembly may provide how the recovery shall go and to whom
belong; and until such provision is made, the same shall form part of the personal estate of the
deceased person.”

                                               -18-
              It is true that fraud existed as a common law claim prior to 1891. See,

e.g., Hardwick v. Forbes’ Administrator, 4 Ky. 212 (Ky. 1808); see also Rutledge

v. Lawrence, 8 Ky. 396 (Ky. 1818); see also Robinson v. Gilbreth, 7 Ky. 183 (Ky.

1815). However, the open courts doctrine does not apply to such claims. In

Dutschke, the appellants claimed KRS 417.050 was an unconstitutional violation

of the doctrine. 281 S.W.3d at 822 (citation omitted). The Court rejected this

argument because claims for fraud in the inducement fall outside the areas to

which the doctrine applies – negligence, personal injury, and wrongful death. Id.

at 823. On the same grounds, the open courts doctrine is not applicable to common

law fraud claims, although such claims preexisted the Kentucky Constitution.

Therefore, KRS 413.130(3) is constitutional, and, under it, White’s fraud claim is

time-barred.15

              Next, there is sufficient evidence of the existence of a written contract

for White’s breach of contract claim to survive summary judgment.

              No malpractice liability shall be imposed upon any health
              care provider on the basis of an alleged breach of any
              guaranty, warranty, contract or assurance of results to be
              obtained from any procedure undertaken in the course of
              providing health care, unless such guaranty, warranty,

15
  Alternatively, White argues KRS 413.130(3) is an affirmative defense which Baptist waived
by failing to plead it in its answer. However, statutes of repose are not affirmative defenses
which can be waived. Hieneman v. Wooten, No. 2021-CA-1081-MR, 2024 WL 648704, *4 (Ky.
App. Feb. 16, 2024) (citation omitted); see also Roskam Baking Co., Inc. v. Lanham Mach. Co.,
288 F.3d 895, 902-03 (6th Cir. 2002).

                                            -19-
                  contract or assurance is in writing and signed by the
                  provider.
KRS 304.40-300.16 Where a written contract is required, the plaintiff must prove

the existence of such a writing so that its terms can be ascertained. See Mills v.

McGaffee, 254 S.W.2d 716, 717 (Ky. 1953) (citation omitted).

                  Summary judgment should only be granted “if it appears impossible

that the nonmoving party will be able to produce evidence at trial warranting a

judgment in his favor.” Blackstone Mining Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 351 S.W.3d

193, 198 (Ky. 2010) (citation omitted). Impossible “is meant to be used in a

practical sense, not in an absolute sense.” Id. (citation omitted). Furthermore,

summary judgment may only be granted “after a party has been given ample

opportunity to complete discovery[.]” Pendleton Bros. Vending, Inc. v.

Commonwealth Finance and Admin. Cabinet, 758 S.W.2d 24, 29 (Ky. 1988)

(citation omitted).

                  White has not produced a written contract between herself and either

Zavos or Baptist. Both defendants contest the existence of such contracts. White

asserts that she entered into a written contract with Zavos. In support of this claim,

she cites to her answers to Baptist’s request for admissions in which she stated that

she entered into a contract with Zavos and she “recall[ed] that the agreement was

16
     On appeal, White does not contest the applicability of this statute to her claim.

                                                  -20-
in writing.” R. at 143. Although White has not produced the written contract,

neither defendant claims White was not a Baptist patient. Instead, both appear to

accept she was a patient, sought Zavos’ services, received donor sperm, was

artificially inseminated by a physician at a Baptist facility, and gave birth to a child

as a result of the procedure. These facts are affirmative evidence showing that

there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a written contract

existed and, if so, whether its terms were breached. See Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel

Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 482 (Ky. 1991) (citations omitted).

Summary judgment is improper for this reason and because we cannot say it would

be impossible for White to produce the written contract through discovery.

             Finally, White does not have standing to bring her claim of unlawful

practice of medicine. The practice of medicine is regulated and controlled by the

KBML. KRS 311.555. White alleges she may pursue her claim because Zavos is

not a “licensee” under the statute. She cites to no supporting authority, perhaps

because none exists.

             By establishing the KBML, the General Assembly intended that “the

judiciary of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, who may be caused to review the

actions of the board, shall not interfere or enjoin the board’s actions until all

administrative remedies are exhausted[.]” Id.

             [N]o person shall engage or attempt to engage in the
             practice of medicine or osteopathy within this state, or

                                          -21-
              open, maintain, or occupy an office or place of business
              within this state for engaging in practice, or in any
              manner announce or express a readiness to engage in
              practice within this state, unless the person holds a valid
              and effective license or permit issued by the board[.]
KRS 311.560(1). It is within the purview of the KBML to

              institute, in its own name, proceedings to temporarily or
              permanently restrain and enjoin the practice of medicine
              by:

                 (a) An individual who is not licensed to practice
                     medicine or who is not involved in conduct
                     specifically exempted from the requirements of
                     this chapter by KRS 311.550(11)[.]
KRS 311.605(3). Individuals may file grievances with the KBML. KRS

311.591(2). However, KRS Chapter 311 does not provide a private cause of action

for the practice of medicine without a license.17 On this basis, White’s claim must

fail.

                                    CONCLUSION

              Based on the foregoing, we affirm the Fayette Circuit Court’s

judgment on wrongful conception and/or birth grounds to the extent that White

may not recover costs related to providing a home and financial support for her

child during her minority. We also affirm the circuit court’s summary judgment in

favor of Baptist and Zavos on White’s claims of fraud and practicing medicine

17
   In her amended complaint, White alleged she had standing under KRS 446.070 to pursue
damages for violations of KRS 311.990(4), which makes violations of KRS 311.560 Class D
felonies. She has abandoned this argument on appeal.

                                           -22-
without a license. We reverse and remand the court’s judgment on her claims of

breach of contract, battery, and violations of the KCPA. White may proceed on

her claims of breach of contract and the KCPA against Zavos, as well as Baptist

under the theory of respondeat superior, and her claim of battery solely against

Zavos. Nothing in this Opinion shall be construed as barring any further

dispositive motions after discovery.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                        -23-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE BAPTIST
                          HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, INC.:
Matthew S. Goeing
M. Stanley Goeing         Jeffery T. Barnett
Lexington, Kentucky       Kimberly G. DeSimone
                          Lexington, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:                ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
                          APPELLEE BAPTIST
Matthew S. Goeing         HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, INC.:
Lexington, Kentucky
                          Jeffery T. Barnett
                          Lexington, Kentucky

                          BREIF FOR APPELLEE
                          PANAYIOTIS MICHAEL ZAVOS:

                          Stephen C. Keller
                          Louisville, Kentucky

                          ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
                          APPELLEE PANAYIOTIS
                          MICHAEL ZAVOS:

                          Stephen C. Keller
                          Louisville, Kentucky

                        -24-