Court Opinion

ID: 9396145
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-19 17:00:50.413046+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:14.243265
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                     ____________________
No. 21-3379
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                 Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                 v.

TRAVIS LEE BEECHLER,
                                              Defendant-Appellant.
                     ____________________

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the
         Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
       No. 1:20-cr-00211-JPH-MJD-1 — James P. Hanlon, Judge.
                     ____________________

     ARGUED DECEMBER 6, 2022 — DECIDED MAY 19, 2023
                ____________________

   Before ROVNER, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.
    ROVNER, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted Travis Beechler of
drug trafficking and firearms offenses based on evidence
gathered pursuant to a home detention compliance check.
Beechler alleged that the search was an unlawful warrantless
law enforcement search disguised as a home detention com-
pliance check, and thus violated his Fourth Amendment
rights. Viewing the totality of the circumstances, Beechler’s
expectation of privacy was minimal, and the government’s
2                                                 No. 21-3379

legitimate needs were significant; therefore, we agree with the
district court that the search did not violate his Fourth
Amendment rights. We also affirm the district court’s denial
of Beechler’s motion for a judgment of acquittal and for a new
trial and affirm the district court’s sentencing decision.
                                I.
    In August 2020, Travis Beechler and his girlfriend, Kimia
Turner, were both serving terms of home confinement
through Marion County Community Corrections (MCCC)
and were required to stay within their residences. Turner re-
ported her residence as 2041 East Legrande Avenue, in Indi-
anapolis, Indiana, and Beechler reported his elsewhere. At the
same time that Beechler and Turner were serving their home
confinement sentences, the FBI Safe Streets Gang Task Force
was engaged in a wiretap investigation involving several in-
dividuals distributing controlled substances in Indianapolis.
The agents discovered that a target of the investigation ex-
pected a shipment of marijuana to arrive at Turner’s residence
at 2041 East Legrande Avenue. During their surveillance of
the house, the FBI agents noticed a man with an ankle monitor
and reported to MCCC that it suspected that one of the occu-
pants was on home confinement and might be engaged in
drug trafficking activity. Based on this report, MCCC employ-
ees surmised that Beechler was not staying at his reported ad-
dress but was instead staying with Turner at 2041 East
Legrande. On August 3, 2020, an employee from MCCC, ac-
companied by officers from the Indianapolis Metropolitan
Police Department (IMPD), went to Turner’s address to check
compliance with residency requirements and other terms of
the home detention contract. While there, MCCC officers en-
countered both Turner and Beechler and discovered
No. 21-3379                                                  3

methamphetamine in the bedroom in which they were stay-
ing. Officers then stopped the search and obtained a search
warrant for the residence. During that search they seized five
firearms, ammunition, and additional evidence of drug traf-
ficking, including 388.4 grams of methamphetamine, 10.6
grams of heroin, and $1,508 in cash. Beechler was charged
with possession with intent to distribute controlled sub-
stances, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug traf-
ficking crime, and possession of a firearm by a previously
convicted felon.
    After officers took Beechler into custody and read him his
Miranda rights, he agreed to an interview in which he
acknowledged that he stored the drugs at the home for an-
other person in exchange for free rent, that he had the ability
to sell pounds of methamphetamine at a time, that others of-
ten fronted him up to five pounds of methamphetamine, and
that he tried to make at least a thousand dollars for each
pound of methamphetamine sold. He also acknowledged the
guns in the home, admitted that he knew they were loaded,
and said that they were there to protect the drugs for which
he was responsible.
    Before trial, Beechler filed a motion to suppress the evi-
dence recovered from the compliance check, claiming that alt-
hough law enforcement labeled the search as a community
corrections compliance check, the officers actually conducted
the search for law enforcement purposes and thus the war-
rantless search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The
district court denied Beechler’s motion to suppress, finding
that Beechler waived his Fourth Amendment rights as a con-
dition of MCCC’s Home Detention agreement. That agree-
ment contained the following provision:
4                                                  No. 21-3379

       You waive your rights under the Fourth
       Amendment of the United States Constitution,
       as well as Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana
       Constitution, regarding search and seizure of
       your person or effects. Furthermore, you shall
       permit law enforcement, MCCC staff, and/or
       their contracted vendor, as well as any law en-
       forcement officer acting on MCCC’s behalf, to
       search your person, residence, motor vehicle, or
       any location where your personal property may
       be found, to insure [sic] compliance with the re-
       quirements of MCCC or their contracted ven-
       dor.
R. 46-3 at 1.
    After a two-day trial, the jury convicted Beechler on all
counts. Beechler moved for a judgment of acquittal and a new
trial, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the
convictions. The district court denied Beechler’s post-trial
motions, reasoning that they merely restated his suppression
arguments rather than contesting the sufficiency of the evi-
dence at trial.
    At sentencing, the district court, over Beechler’s objec-
tions, applied four different sentencing enhancements: the
“manager or supervisor” enhancement, the “drug premises”
enhancement, an enhancement for having five firearms, and
the “career offender” enhancement. The district court sen-
tenced Beechler to a total of 360 months in prison—below the
bottom end of the United States Sentencing Guidelines range
of 420 months.
No. 21-3379                                                      5

    On appeal, Beechler challenges the district court’s denial
of his motion to suppress, the denial of his motion for a judg-
ment of acquittal, the denial of his motion for a new trial, and
the district court’s application of various sentencing enhance-
ments.
                                  II.
                                  A.
    Beechler contends that the district court improperly de-
nied his motion to suppress primarily because it failed to view
the search for what it was—a warrantless, non-consensual
search. In considering a district court’s denial of a motion to
suppress, we review questions of law de novo and findings of
fact for clear error. United States v. Radford, 39 F.4th 377, 383
(7th Cir. 2022).
    The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Where a search
is found to be unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment, the exclusionary rule prohibits the use of evidence re-
covered from the illegal search at trial. Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S.
232, 237 (2016). A court assesses the reasonableness of a search
by looking at the totality of the circumstances, including “by
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes
upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to
which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate govern-
mental interests.” United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–
19 (2001) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300
(1999)); Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006); see also
United States v. White, 781 F.3d 858, 862 (7th Cir. 2015). When
assessing the privacy expectations of a person subject to a cor-
rectional system, salient factors include the level of
6                                                     No. 21-3379

punishment or supervision to which the individual has been
subjected, whether the individual has agreed to waive some
or all Fourth Amendment rights in exchange for more free-
dom within the correctional system, and expectations of pri-
vacy formed pursuant to state law. See United States v. Woods,
16 F.4th 529, 535–37 (7th Cir. 2021). On the other side of the
scale, a court must consider the government’s interest in pro-
tecting the public, reducing recidivism, and promoting rein-
tegration into society. Samson, 547 U.S. at 849–50.
    Beechler’s status as a person serving a sentence of home
confinement informs both sides of the balance as a court as-
sesses “the intru[sion] on individual liberty and the degree to
which it promotes legitimate governmental interests.”
Knights, 534 U.S. at 119. When the Supreme Court weighed
the privacy expectations of the probationer in Knights, it con-
sidered that punishment exists on a continuum from proba-
tion to solitary confinement, with inversely proportional ex-
pectations of privacy. Id.; see also Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S.
868, 874 (1987) (noting that expectations of privacy corre-
spond to the “continuum of possible punishments ranging
from solitary confinement in a maximum-security facility to a
few hours of mandatory community service,” with work-re-
lease programs in the middle). It then noted that probation
significantly diminishes a person’s expectation of privacy and
increases the governmental interest in preventing recidivism
such that government officials need no more than a reasona-
ble suspicion to conduct a search of a probationer’s house. Id.
at 119–21. Then, in Samson, the Court went one step further
while considering the privacy rights of a parolee and con-
cluded that “a condition of release can so diminish or elimi-
nate a released prisoner’s reasonable expectation of privacy
No. 21-3379                                                      7

that a suspicionless search by a law enforcement officer
would not offend the Fourth Amendment.” 547 U.S. at 847.
    Like Samson, Beechler had severely diminished expecta-
tions of privacy by virtue of his status as a person on home
confinement subject to the strict conditions for participation
in the program. See Samson, 547 U.S. at 852 (“The extent and
reach of these conditions clearly demonstrate that parolees
like petitioner have severely diminished expectations of pri-
vacy by virtue of their status alone.”). Beechler was part of a
post-conviction monitoring program that allowed convicted
individuals to serve out their sentence at home with the use
of an electronic monitoring system in what is essentially “an
established variation on imprisonment of convicted crimi-
nals.” Id. at 850 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477
(1972) (“The essence of parole is release from prison, before
the completion of sentence, on the condition that the prisoner
abide by certain rules during the balance of the sentence.”)).
Beechler’s status on home confinement, like Samson’s status
as a parolee, significantly diminished his expectations of pri-
vacy. See Id. at 852.
    People on home confinement or parole have lowered ex-
pectations of privacy, not merely because of their status but
also because the government usually extends the benefits of
additional freedom in exchange for an agreement to comply
with certain requirements. Id. at 850; see also Pennsylvania Bd.
of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 365 (1998). In both
Knights and Samson, the prisoners, like Beechler, signed waiv-
ers of virtually all of their Fourth Amendment rights in ex-
change for particular conditions of release. Knights, 534 U.S.
8                                                            No. 21-3379

at 114; Samson, 547 U.S. at 846. 1 Neither opinion, however, re-
lied exclusively on the acceptance of the search condition in
the agreement signed by the prisoner in its determination of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. See Knights,
534 U.S. at 118 (“We need not decide whether Knights’ ac-
ceptance of the search condition constituted consent in the
Schneckloth sense of a complete waiver of his Fourth Amend-
ment rights, however, because we conclude that the search of
Knights was reasonable under our general Fourth Amend-
ment approach of ‘examining the totality of the circum-
stances,’ with the probation search condition being a salient
circumstance.”) (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39
(1996)); Samson, 547 U.S. at 852 n.3 (quoting Knights for this
same proposition). However, as the Court in Knights pointed
out, the fact that a parolee signed an agreement waiving
Fourth Amendment rights is certainly a “salient circum-
stance” in the examination of the totality of the circumstances.
Knights, 534 U.S. at 118.
    The agreement Beechler signed weighs heavily into the to-
tality of the circumstances analysis, as that agreement con-
tained clear and significant restrictions on Beechler’s liberty—
requiring him to be confined to the inside of his home at all
times except for work, medical appointments, and a select few

    1  Samson agreed in writing, as required by California law, that he
could be “subject to search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace
officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant
and with or without cause.” Samson, 547 U.S. at 846 (citing Cal. Penal Code
Ann. §3067(a)). Knights signed a probation agreement that required him
to “[s]ubmit his ... person, property, place of residence, vehicle, personal
effects, to search at anytime, [sic] with or without a search warrant, war-
rant of arrest or reasonable cause by any probation officer or law enforce-
ment officer.” Knights, 534 U.S. at 114.
No. 21-3379                                                     9

other approved activities; restricting where he could live and
work; prohibiting the possession and use of alcohol and non-
prescription drugs (including possession by others in the
home); prohibiting the purchase and possession of firearms;
and many other very restrictive limitations on his liberty. See
R. 46-3. Most importantly, it contained an absolute waiver of
Fourth Amendment rights. It did not limit Beechler’s consent
to searches based on reasonable suspicion or probable cause.
Cf. United States v. Price, 28 F.4th 739, 744, 750 (2022) (uphold-
ing warrantless search of parolee even where parole agree-
ment required “reasonable cause to believe that the parolee is
violating or is in imminent danger of violating a condition to
remaining on parole”).
    Beechler unambiguously waived his rights under the
Fourth Amendment. The waiver “clearly expressed the search
condition” and “unambiguously informed” Beechler of it.
Knights, 534 U.S. at 119. And the compliance check fell
“squarely within the terms of the conditions of” Beechler’s
home detention contract—to check for violations of residency
requirements, state and federal law, and other required con-
ditions. See White, 781 F.3d at 864. In sum, Beechler’s reasona-
ble expectations of privacy were significantly diminished
both by his status on home confinement and the agreement
he made to participate in the program.
    Finally, because assessing an individual’s liberty interest
“turns in large part on the extent of [the defendant’s] legiti-
mate expectations of privacy,” the reasonableness analysis
also “is shaped” by whether state law governing the terms of
the home detention contract authorized the search condition.
White, 781 F.3d at 861. Under Indiana law, “[a] probationer or
community corrections participant may, pursuant to a valid
10                                                    No. 21-3379

search condition or advance consent, authorize a warrantless
premises search without reasonable suspicion.” State v. Van-
derkolk, 32 N.E.3d 775, 780 (Ind. 2015).
    As for the government’s interest, given the fact that Beech-
ler was serving his sentence within the confines of his home,
the state had an interest in supervising him to ensure compli-
ance with the terms of his agreement, to prevent recidivism,
protect the public from further criminal activity, and to mon-
itor his reentry into society. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 120–21;
Price, 28 F.4th at 749. The government’s interest grew signifi-
cantly as soon as it learned that Beechler might be committing
drug crimes and skirting residency requirements. Preventing
Beechler from being involved in illegal activity and monitor-
ing his location were, after all, the very purpose for the home
confinement agreement.
    Beechler does not challenge the waiver as ambiguous or
not express, nor does he deny its legality under Indiana law.
Instead, he invites the court to apply the “stalking horse” the-
ory (although he does not name it as such), based on the
premise that “when a parole or probationary search operates
as ‘a subterfuge for a criminal investigation’ to evade the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant and probable cause require-
ments, such searches ‘violate[] the Fourth Amendment.’”
Price, 28 F.4th at 750 (quoting United States v. Stokes, 292 F.3d
964, 967 (9th Cir. 2002)). However, we have made clear that
when the rationale for a search relies on the ordinary, totality
of the circumstances Fourth Amendment analysis, as it does
here, there is no basis for examining the official purpose of the
search and thus “the stalking horse theory has no applica-
tion.” Price, 28 F.4th at 752; see also Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in
No. 21-3379                                                     11

ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”). The
MCCC and IMPD officers’ motivations for initiating the com-
pliance check are simply “irrelevant.” Price, 28 F.4th at 752.
    Given Beechler’s exceptionally low expectation of privacy
and the government’s strong interest in his compliance with
the terms of his home confinement, the totality of the circum-
stances test dictates that the search was reasonable within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. We therefore affirm the
district court’s denial of Beechler’s motion to suppress.
                                  B.
    Beechler also argues that the district court erred in deny-
ing his motion for a judgment of acquittal and motion for a
new trial because the evidence was insufficient as a matter of
law. “[W]e review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evi-
dence to determine only whether any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most fa-
vorable to the government.” United States v. Stewart, 902 F.3d
664, 679 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing United States v. Webster, 775 F.3d
897, 904–05 (7th Cir. 2015)). “Great deference is afforded to
jury verdicts,” United States v. Maldonado, 893 F.3d 480, 484
(7th Cir. 2018), and thus, we will overturn a jury verdict for
insufficiency of the evidence only if the record is “devoid of
evidence from which a reasonable jury could find guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Stevenson, 680 F.3d
854, 856 (7th Cir. 2012). This is a “nearly insurmountable bur-
den.” Maldonado, 893 F.3d at 484.
   Beechler’s sufficiency of the evidence argument depends
on this court finding that the motion to suppress the evidence
should have been granted. Beechler argues that if his motion
12                                                  No. 21-3379

to suppress had been granted, the government would not
have been able to prove all of the essential elements required
to support a finding of guilt. Having determined that the dis-
trict court properly denied his motion to suppress, however,
we can consider this evidence in assessing the jury’s verdict.
    The government presented more than sufficient evidence
of Beechler’s guilt to support the jury’s verdict on all counts.
The evidence presented at trial was overwhelming. The jury
heard Beechler’s recorded interview in which he admitted to
selling large quantities of drugs, aiming to make at least one
thousand dollars for every pound of drugs he sold. Police
seized 404.6 grams of a mixture or substance of methamphet-
amine from the home where Beechler was residing, and
Beechler admitted that he was holding the drugs at the home
for someone else in exchange for lodging. In addition to the
drugs, police seized five firearms from the home which Beech-
ler acknowledged he possessed to protect the drugs in the
home. Additionally, the jury heard evidence of drug dealing
and gun possession in the texts found on Beechler’s phone.
This is more than sufficient evidence to allow the jury’s ver-
dict to stand.
                                 C.
    Beechler next contends that the district court committed
reversible error by applying four different enhancements dur-
ing sentencing, including enhancements for being a “manager
or supervisor,” for “maintaining a premises for the purpose
of distributing controlled substances,” for possessing five fire-
arms, and the “career offender” enhancement. We review for
clear error only the district court’s findings of fact when ap-
plying a sentencing enhancement and accord “great defer-
ence” to those findings. United States v. Lundberg, 990 F.3d
No. 21-3379                                                    13

1087, 1097 (7th Cir. 2021). A district court’s factual findings at
sentencing need only be supported by a preponderance of the
evidence. United States v. Galvan, 44 F.4th 1008, 1012 (7th Cir.
2022). We reverse a district court’s application of a sentencing
enhancement “only if we are left with a definite and firm con-
viction that a mistake has been made.” United States v. Lovies,
16 F.4th 493, 504 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. House,
883 F.3d 720, 723 (7th Cir. 2018)). Although the Sentencing
Guidelines are advisory, not mandatory, a district court
should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculat-
ing the applicable Guidelines range. Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (“[T]he Guidelines should be the starting
point and the initial benchmark. The Guidelines are not the
only consideration, however.”). The district court must then
consider the arguments of the parties and the factors set forth
in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a). Id. at 49–50.
    The district court did not commit reversible error in ap-
plying the “manager or supervisor” sentencing enhancement
to Beechler. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. §3B1.1(c), “[i]f the defendant
was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor,” the offense
level increases by two. U.S.S.G. §3B1.1(c); U.S.S.G. §3B1.1(c)
cmt. 2. A manager or supervisor in a criminal organization
under §3B1.1 is “straightforwardly understood as simply
someone who helps manage or supervise a criminal scheme.”
House, 883 F.3d at 724. To apply the enhancement, a court
need only find that the defendant directed at least one other
person. United States v. Hernandez, 309 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir.
2002). In applying this enhancement, the district court con-
cluded that the evidence established that Beechler “was a sub-
stantial drug operator and not merely a menial.” R. 140 at 10.
The district court found that Beechler “was personally in-
volved in the redistribution of substantial quantities of
14                                                  No. 21-3379

drugs,” and played a “leadership role” on at least one occa-
sion when he “directed his cousin to make a drug delivery.”
Id. These factual findings were not clearly erroneous, so we
uphold the district court’s application of the “manager or su-
pervisor” enhancement to Beechler.
    Likewise, ample evidence supported the district court’s
application of the “drug premises” sentencing enhancement.
Pursuant to U.S.S.G. §2D1.1(b)(12), “if the defendant main-
tained a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distrib-
uting a controlled substance,” the offense level increases by
two. U.S.S.G. §2D1.1(b)(12). Maintaining a drug premises en-
tails “own[ing] or rent[ing] [the] premises, or exercis[ing] con-
trol over them, and for a sustained period of time, us[ing]
those premises to manufacture, store, or sell drugs, or di-
rect[ing] others to those premises to obtain drugs.” United
States v. Ford, 22 F.4th 687, 694 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting United
States v. Acosta, 534 F.3d 574, 591 (7th Cir. 2008)).To exercise
the requisite control, “the defendant does not necessarily
need to have owned or rented the premises,” so long as he
was more than a “casual visitor.” Id. A defendant maintains
the premises for purposes of this enhancement even if others
also have control of the premises. Id. Manufacturing or dis-
tributing controlled substances “need not be the sole pur-
pose” for maintaining the premises but must be one of the de-
fendant’s “primary or principal uses for the premises.”
U.S.S.G. §2D1.1 cmt. n.17. In making a primary purpose de-
termination, the court should consider the frequency with
which the premises were used by the defendant for manufac-
turing or distributing controlled substances versus for lawful
purposes. Id.
No. 21-3379                                                   15

    The district court found that Beechler stored large quanti-
ties of drugs meant for later sale, and that “he was given free
lodging in exchange for safeguarding the drugs.” R. 140 at 16.
Thus, there can be no doubt that he exercised control over the
premises, for a sustained period of time, and that he used
those premises to store drugs intended for later sale. See Ford,
22 F.4th at 694. Indeed, but for his agreement to safeguard the
drugs, he would not have been staying at the house. We see
no error in the district court’s application of the drug premises
enhancement.
    The district court did not commit reversible error in ap-
plying an enhancement for having five firearms to Beechler.
Pursuant to U.S.S.G. §2K2.1(b)(1)(A), if the offense involved
more than two but less than eight firearms, the defendant’s
offense level increases by two. U.S.S.G. §2K2.1(b)(1)(A). “To
determine which guns, if any, should be considered ‘involved
in’ the defendant’s offense, sentencing courts apply the defi-
nition of ‘relevant conduct’ in U.S.S.G. §1B1.3.” United States
v. Burnett, 37 F.4th 1235, 1238 (7th Cir. 2022). These provi-
sions—§2K2.1 and §1B1.3—read together, instruct a district
court to apply the enhancement if the firearms were “in-
volved in the same course of conduct or common scheme or
plan as the offense of conviction.” Id. at 1238–39 (citing
U.S.S.G. §1B1.3(a)(2)). “That total includes not only the spe-
cific gun or guns which the defendant was convicted of pos-
sessing, but any firearm the possession of which qualifies as
relevant conduct.” United States v. Ghiassi, 729 F.3d 690, 694
(7th Cir. 2013).
    The district court found ample evidence to conclude that
all the guns were part of the same course of conduct or com-
mon scheme or plan, as the district court pointed out at
16                                                        No. 21-3379

sentencing. R. 140 at 16 (noting that a “large quantity of drugs
… [was] being stored at the residence … [Beechler] was given
free lodging in exchange for safeguarding the drugs … and
the guns … were located there as well”). This included even
those guns that were stored in other parts of the house. Beech-
ler admitted that he personally possessed the guns and
acknowledged that the guns were at the home to protect the
drugs. R. 119-2 at 13–14. All of the guns, therefore, were part
of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan, and
the district court properly applied an enhancement for the
five firearms Beechler possessed.
    Beechler’s final enhancement argument alleges that the
district court erred in applying the career offender enhance-
ment, but Beechler waived this argument by failing to
properly develop it on appeal. United States v. Lanzotti, 205
F.3d 951, 957 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[P]erfunctory and undeveloped
arguments … are waived.”). 2 In his appellate brief, Beechler
merely incorporated by reference the objections that he made
below to the application of the career offender enhancement.
(Beechler Brief at 29). (“Beechler timely objected to the career
criminal determination … Beechler continued his objection in
his supplemental briefing and hereby incorporates the same as if
fully set forth herein.”). However, “[t]he incorporation of argu-
ments by reference in an appellate brief is forbidden.” Norfleet

     2
     The government contends that all of Beechler’s sentencing enhance-
ment challenges suffer from underdevelopment and incorporation by ref-
erence and are thus waived on appeal. (Government Brief at 24). We have
given Beechler the benefit of the doubt despite under-developed argu-
ments as to the other sentencing enhancements, but because Beechler only
incorporated by reference his argument regarding the career criminal en-
hancement, we must consider it to be waived.
No. 21-3379                                                    17

v. Walker, 684 F.3d 688, 690–91 (7th Cir. 2012). “It is not this
court’s responsibility to research and construct the parties’ ar-
guments.” Lanzotti, 205 F.3d at 957 (7th Cir. 2000).
     Even if Beechler had preserved this argument, the claim
still fails. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. §4B1.1, a defendant is a career
offender if “(1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old
at the time the defendant committed the instant offense of
conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that
is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense;
and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions
of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance of-
fense.” U.S.S.G. §4B1.1. Beechler contends that the prior fel-
ony conviction that the district court used to apply this en-
hancement does not qualify because he committed this felony
when he was seventeen years old, and the case was improp-
erly waived into adult court. A defendant cannot attack the
validity of the previous state conviction used to enhance his
federal court sentence unless it was obtained in a proceeding
where the defendant was denied his right to counsel. Harris v.
United States, 13 F.4th 623, 626 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Custis v.
United States, 511 U.S. 485, 496–97 (1994)).
   Finally, even if Beechler were correct that the facts do not
support the conclusion that these sentencing enhancements
apply to him, we would still affirm his sentence because any
error in applying these enhancements would be harmless.
“Any error in calculating a total offense level is harmless
when the district court makes clear that—considering the sen-
tencing factors under 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)—it would have im-
posed the same sentence even if we were to conclude it had
incorrectly calculated the Guidelines range.” Lovies, 16 F.4th
at 508. The district court confirmed that it would have
18                                                  No. 21-3379

imposed the same sentence even if the enhancements did not
apply. R. 140 at 42 (“[I] have fashioned a sentence that I be-
lieve is the one that I would choose, weighing all of the
§3553(a) factors, regardless of the application of any one of the
particular guideline provisions that were challenged.”).
Therefore, any remand to the district court for it to impose the
same sentence would be “pointless.” See United States v. Jett,
982 F.3d 1072, 1079 (7th Cir. 2020).
    In addressing Beechler’s challenge to the substantive rea-
sonableness of the district court’s sentencing decision, we
look only at whether the district court abused its discretion.
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. A sentence within or below the Guidelines
range is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonable-
ness. United States v. Moore, 851 F.3d 666, 674 (7th Cir. 2017).
Beechler’s sentence of 360 months was well below the bottom
end of the Guideline recommendation of 420 months. R. 140
at 43–44.
   To rebut this presumption, Beechler contends that his be-
low-Guidelines sentence failed to adequately reflect the re-
quired §3553 factors. Section 3553(a) sets forth factors that the
court should consider in imposing a sentence that is sufficient,
but not greater than necessary, instructing the court to con-
sider “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the his-
tory and characteristics of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C.
§3553(a)(1). Beechler argues that consideration of §3553(a)(1)
warrants a below-Guidelines sentence in his case because he
has positive relationships in his life, a dependent who will be
detrimentally impacted by his prolonged incarceration, and
has a history of extensive reliance on illegal drugs which
causes him to be untruthful and make bad decisions.
No. 21-3379                                                  19

    Beechler also argues that consideration of §3553(a)(6) war-
rants a below-Guidelines sentence in his case because his sen-
tence was harsher than that of similarly situated offenders,
contrary to §3553’s instruction to consider “the need to avoid
unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar con-
duct[.]” 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)(6). Beechler, however, does not cite
any sentencing decisions involving similarly situated persons
to support this proposition.
    The district court thoroughly discussed the §3553(a) fac-
tors it considered in determining Beechler’s sentence. R. 140
at 37–44. The court balanced Beechler’s criminal history of vi-
olence, drugs, and guns, and the seriousness of his offense
against his youthfulness, drug dependence, and potential for
rehabilitation. Id. An appeal is not an occasion to second-
guess a district court’s weighing of the §3553(a) factors, par-
ticularly when a defendant receives a below-Guidelines sen-
tence. United States v. De La Torre, 940 F.3d 938, 954 (7th Cir.
2019). The sentence the district court imposed was reasonable
and well within the court’s discretion.
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Beechler’s convic-
tions and sentence.