Court Opinion

ID: 9918989
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 05:04:49.379588+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:56.007580
License: Public Domain

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
                       Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

                             STATE OF MINNESOTA
                             IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                   A23-0029

                           Republican Party of Minnesota,
                                    Respondent,

                                          vs.

                                 Nathan Miller, et al.,
                                      Relators,

                           Attorney General Keith Ellison,
                                     Intervenor.

                               Filed January 16, 2024
                                      Affirmed
                               Smith, Tracy M., Judge

                          Office of Administrative Hearings
                               File No. 60-0320-38740

R. Reid LeBeau, Jacobson, Magnuson, Anderson & Halloran, P.C., The Jacobson Law
Group, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Erick G. Kaardal, Mohrman, Kaardal & Erickson, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
relators)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Janine Kimble, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for intervenor)

      Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge;

and Gaïtas, Judge.
                            NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

SMITH, TRACY M., Judge

       Relator Nathan Miller, a political candidate in the November 2022 election, 1

challenges the determination by the Minnesota Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

that he made a false statement implying support of a major political party, in violation of

Minnesota Statutes section 211B.02 (2022), as well as the fine that OAH levied against

him for that violation. Miller also asserts that section 211B.02, as applied to him, is

unconstitutional because it violates his rights of free speech and association. Because OAH

did not make an error of law and had sufficient evidence for its decision, and because the

statute is constitutional as applied to Miller, we affirm.

                                           FACTS

       In the November 2022 election, Miller ran as a write-in candidate for Minnesota

State Senate District 9. Miller had first sought the endorsement of respondent Republican

Party of Minnesota, but the party endorsed another candidate. Miller then ran in the party’s

primary election but lost to the party’s endorsed candidate. After losing the primary, Miller

filed with the Minnesota Secretary of State as a write-in candidate for the general election.

       During his campaign, Miller accepted an invitation to participate in an October 15,

2022 rally to be hosted by the group Caravan of Patriots. Caravan of Patriots produced a

flyer for the event, which is reproduced below. Miller posted the flyer to his campaign

1
  Miller’s campaign committee is also a relator, but, consistent with the single brief
submitted by relators, we refer only to Miller in this opinion.

                                              2
website. The flyer indicated that Miller would attend the rally, and underneath his name it

stated, “(SD 9 – Republican Party).”

       The day before the event, the Republican Party of Minnesota filed a complaint with

OAH, alleging that Miller’s posting of the flyer to his website violated Minnesota Statutes

section 211B.02 because the flyer stated and implied that the Republican Party of

Minnesota endorsed Miller for the State Senate District 9 seat. The party also alleged that

other statements by Miller violated the statute. Shortly thereafter, an administrative law

judge determined that the Republican Party of Minnesota had alleged a prima facie

violation and then determined that there was probable cause that Miller had violated the

statute.

       The matter was then submitted to a panel of three administrative law judges based

on the record and written and oral closing arguments. During the pendency of the

                                            3
complaint, the Republican Party of Minnesota’s endorsed candidate won the November

2022 election for Minnesota State Senate District 9, defeating both Miller and the

Democratic-Farmer-Labor (DFL) Party candidate.

       In December 2022, the panel issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and

order. It determined that Miller’s posting of the flyer falsely implied that he had the support

or endorsement of a major political party in violation of Minnesota Statutes section

211B.02. Using OAH’s penalty matrix, the panel determined that Miller’s violation was

“negligent” and “may have had some impact on voters” and imposed a fine of $250.

       Miller appeals by writ of certiorari, challenging OAH’s decision and arguing that

section 211B.02 is unconstitutional as applied to him. The Republican Party of Minnesota

did not file a responsive brief. 2 Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison intervened for

the limited purpose of defending the constitutionality of section 211B.02.

                                        DECISION

I.     OAH’s decision was not affected by an error of law and is supported by
       substantial evidence.

       Miller first challenges (A) OAH’s determination that he violated Minnesota Statutes

section 211B.02 and (B) the fine that OAH imposed.

       Generally, complaints of unfair campaign practices, including violations of

Minnesota Statutes section 211B.02, must be filed with and decided by OAH. Minn. Stat.

§ 211B.32, subd. 1(a) (2022). On appeal, OAH’s decision is presumed to be correct.

2
  Under the Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, when a respondent does not
submit a brief, we decide the case on the merits. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.

                                              4
Lewison v. Hutchinson, 929 N.W.2d 444, 447 (Minn. App. 2019). An appellate court can

reverse or remand only if the substantial rights of the relator have been prejudiced because

the decision was (1) in violation of constitutional provisions, (2) in excess of the authority

of the agency, (3) made through an unlawful procedure, (4) affected by other error of law,

(5) unsupported by substantial evidence, or (6) arbitrary or capricious. Minn. Stat. § 14.69

(2022); see Minn. Stat. § 211B.36, subd. 5 (2022) (providing for judicial review of OAH

determinations of election-law violations via Minn. Stat. § 14.69).

       Appellate courts review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. J.D. Donovan,

Inc. v. Minn. Dep’t of Transp., 878 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 2016). In a challenge asserting that

an OAH decision was not supported by substantial evidence, the relator has “the burden of

establishing that the findings of the agency are unsupported by the evidence in the record,

considered in its entirety.” Fine v. Bernstein, 726 N.W.2d 137, 142 (Minn. App. 2007),

rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 2007). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id.

       A.     Violation of the Statute

       Section 211B.02 reads in relevant part: “A . . . candidate may not knowingly make,

directly or indirectly, a false claim stating or implying that a candidate . . . has the support

or endorsement of a major political party . . . .” Miller contends that OAH made an error

of law and a decision unsupported by substantial evidence when it determined that the

flyer’s statement “SD 9 – Republican Party” under his name on the rally flyer falsely

implied that the Republican Party of Minnesota supported or endorsed him.

                                               5
       First, Miller argues that OAH committed legal error by determining that the flyer’s

statement implied that a “major political party” had supported or endorsed him because the

flyer stated only “Republican Party”—not “Republican Party of Minnesota”—and the

national Republican Party is not a “major political party” under the statute.

       There is no dispute that the Republican Party of Minnesota is the relevant “major

political party” in this matter. See Minn. Stat. § 200.02, subd. 7 (2022) (defining “major

political party”); Minn. Sec’y of State, Elections & Voting, How Elections Work, Political

parties, https://www.sos.state.mn.us/elections-voting/how-elections-work/political-parties

[https://perma.cc/Q5LJ-7SBQ] (listing the current major political parties). Contrary to

Miller’s argument, OAH did not interpret “major political party” to include the national

Republican Party. Rather, OAH explicitly stated that the Republican Party of Minnesota

was the major political party at issue and determined that Miller had implied the support

or endorsement of the Republican Party of Minnesota. Miller’s argument that OAH legally

erred is unavailing.

       Second, Miller contends that OAH’s determination that the statement “impl[ied]

. . . the support or endorsement” of the Republican Party of Minnesota is not supported by

substantial evidence. Miller suggests that the statement reflected merely that he was a

“republican” and “a member of the Republican Party.”

       But, in other election-law cases, Minnesota courts have decided that using the name

or initials of a political party is sufficient to imply the support or endorsement of the

political party. In In re Ryan, the Minnesota Supreme Court sustained the factfinder’s

determination that placing the terms “DFL” and “LABOR ENDORSED” on campaign

                                             6
materials implied that the candidate was supported or endorsed by Minnesota’s DFL party.

303 N.W.2d 462, 465-66 (Minn. 1981).

       And, in Schmitt v. McLaughlin, a case relied on in Ryan, the supreme court affirmed

the determination that a candidate’s use of the initials “DFL” in his advertisements and

lawn signs violated the statute by falsely implying that the candidate had the support or

endorsement of the DFL party. 275 N.W.2d 587, 591 (Minn. 1979). The supreme court

wrote that the candidate’s “use of the initials ‘DFL’ would imply to the average voter that

[he] had the endorsement or, at the very least, the support of the DFL party,” explaining

that “[t]o hold otherwise would render the word ‘imply’ meaningless.” Id. The Schmitt

court further stated that the candidate “could have informed the voters of his political

affiliation”—while avoiding the implication of party endorsement or support—“had he

done so clearly by the use of such words as ‘member of’ or ‘affiliated with’ in conjunction

with the initials ‘DFL.’” Id.

       Like in Schmitt, Miller’s use of the phrase “Republican Party” in the context of his

posting would imply to the average voter that Miller had the support or endorsement of the

party, especially since Miller did not state that he was simply a “member of” or “affiliated

with” the Republican Party. And, although the full phrase “Republican Party of Minnesota”

was not on the rally flyer, Miller has not shown that the record lacks evidence that a

reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support the conclusion that the use of

“Republican Party” implied support or endorsement by the Republican Party of Minnesota.

In the context of a Minnesota state election, use of the term “Republican Party” on a rally

                                             7
flyer is enough to indicate by implication that Miller was supported or endorsed by the

Republican Party of Minnesota.

       Because Miller has not shown an error of law or a lack of adequate evidence to

support OAH’s decision that Miller implied the support or endorsement of the Republican

Party of Minnesota when he posted a rally flyer using the phrase “SD 9 – Republican Party”

under his name, OAH did not err by determining that Miller violated Minnesota Statutes

section 211B.02.

       B.     Monetary Fine

       Miller also challenges OAH’s imposition of a monetary fine based on the violation.

He contends that OAH’s determination that his statement was “negligent” is not supported

by the record because his statement was truthful. He also argues that OAH’s determination

that his statement “may have had some impact on voters” was speculation and is not

supported by the record.

       For a violation of Minnesota Statutes section 211B.02, OAH may impose a civil

penalty of up to $5,000. Minn. Stat. § 211B.35, subd. 2(d) (2022). Under Minnesota

Statutes section 14.045, subdivision 3 (2022), OAH must consider several factors in

determining the amount of a fine, including the “willfulness of the violation” and the

“gravity of the violation.” OAH has developed a penalty matrix that, consistent with section

14.045, subdivision 3, measures the willfulness of the violation on one axis and the gravity

of the violation on the other axis. See Minn. Off. of Admin. Hearings, Home, Self Help,

Administrative Law Overview, Fair Campaign Practices, https://mn.gov/oah/self-

help/administrative-law-overview/fair-campaign.jsp [https://perma.cc/XV6N-UQ84]; see

                                             8
also Fine, 726 N.W.2d at 149. On the “willfulness” axis, the middle category is “negligent,

ill-advised, ill-considered.” On the “gravity of violation” axis, the lowest category is

“minimal/no impact on voters, easily countered.” The fine range for a “negligent” violation

that has “minimal/no impact on voters” is $250 to $600. OAH determined that Miller’s

violation fell on that point in the matrix and imposed a fine of $250.

       Miller has not shown that OAH’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence.

First, as to the willfulness of the statement, as we concluded above, substantial evidence

supports OAH’s finding that Miller falsely implied the support or endorsement of the

Republican Party of Minnesota. Because OAH relied on that finding when evaluating the

willfulness of Miller’s violation, that part of OAH’s fine determination was supported by

the record.

       Second, as to the gravity of the violation, OAH stated that Miller’s violation “may

have had some impact on voters.” OAH went on to state:

              [G]iven that [Miller] was a write-in candidate, it is not
              likely that many voters were misled or confused.
              Moreover, [Miller] widely publicized the fact that he
              was a write-in candidate running against the
              [Republican Party of Minnesota] endorsed candidate.
              These factors mitigate the violation and support
              imposition of a penalty at the lower end of the range.

OAH’s determination was supported by the record. The record contains several affidavits,

submitted by Miller, in which the affiants aver that they were not confused by the rally

flyer—supporting OAH’s determination that it is not likely that many voters were misled.

Yet the publication of the false statement in the context of a campaign event provides

support for OAH’s determination that the statement “may have had some impact on

                                             9
 voters.” OAH found that the gravity of the violation fell in the lowest category based on

 the record and assessed the fine accordingly.

        OAH has the authority to impose a fine of up to $5,000 for a violation of section

 211B.02. Minn. Stat. § 211B.35, subd. 2(d). Its decision to impose a $250 fine for Miller’s

 violation is supported by substantial evidence in the record.

II.     As applied to Miller, Minnesota Statutes section 211B.02 does not violate
        Miller’s free-speech or associational rights under the U.S. and Minnesota
        Constitutions.

        Miller next argues that, as applied to him, Minnesota Statutes section 211B.02 is

 unconstitutional because it violates his free-speech and associational rights under the U.S.

 and Minnesota Constitutions. See U.S. Const. amend. I; Minn. Const. art I, § 3.

        We begin with the level of scrutiny to apply. Miller argues for strict scrutiny.

 Quoting State v. Holloway, he asserts that application of the statute is constitutional only

 “if it advances a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to further that interest.”

 916 N.W.2d 338, 344 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted). Miller observes that the Minnesota

 Supreme Court has held that courts must employ the same constitutional standard to an as-

 applied challenge to a statute as to a facial challenge, see, e.g., Rew v. Bergstrom, 845

 N.W.2d 764, 778 (Minn. 2014), and points out that we applied strict scrutiny when we

 upheld section 211B.02 against a facial challenge in Linert v. MacDonald, 901 N.W.2d

 664, 668 (Minn. App. 2017).

        The Attorney General, on the other hand, asserts that we should apply the lower

 standard that the U.S. Supreme Court employed in evaluating the constitutionality of a state

 election law in Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992). In Burdick, a voter challenged

                                               10
Hawaii’s prohibition on write-in voting, asserting that the law did not satisfy strict scrutiny.

504 U.S. at 432. While recognizing that the law imposed some burden on the right to vote,

the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the law therefore was subject to strict

scrutiny. Id. at 433-34. Rather, the Court explained, the rigorousness of the inquiry depends

on the extent to which the law burdens voters’ First or Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id.

at 434. If a challenged regulation imposes “severe” restrictions on those rights, strict

scrutiny applies. Id. (quotation omitted). But, if the regulation imposes only “reasonable,

nondiscriminatory restrictions” upon voters’ rights, the standard is whether “the State’s

important regulatory interests” justify the restrictions. Id. (quotation omitted). The Burdick

Court concluded that the latter, less demanding standard applied to Hawaii’s regulation. Id.

at 438-39. Here, the Attorney General asserts that, like the regulation in Burdick, section

211B.02’s prohibition on false statements of endorsement is a “reasonable,

nondiscriminatory restriction” and that the lower constitutional standard therefore applies.

       We question whether the lower standard used in Burdick applies here. In McIntyre

v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, a case involving an Ohio statute that prohibited distributing

anonymous pamphlets in an election, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to use the standard

used in Burdick and instead applied strict scrutiny. 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995). The Court

explained that Ohio’s prohibition on anonymous election pamphlets, unlike Hawaii’s

prohibition on write-in voting, did not “control the mechanics of the electoral process” but

rather burdened “core political speech.” Id. at 345, 347. Similarly, here, although section

211B.02 involves the regulation of elections, it is primarily a statute that regulates speech

(albeit false speech), not the mechanics of an election. Moreover, we have already applied

                                              11
strict scrutiny in evaluating the facial constitutionality of section 211B.02. See Linert, 901

N.W.2d 664. Nevertheless, we need not decide whether strict scrutiny or a less rigorous

standard applies if the application of section 211B.02 satisfies strict scrutiny. We turn to

that question.

       Freedom of Speech

       Miller asserts that application of the statute violates his constitutional right to free

speech. Although statutes are generally presumed constitutional, a statute that restricts

speech is not presumed to be constitutional, and the government must show that the statute

is constitutional. Id. at 667. “Content-based restrictions on speech survive First

Amendment strict-scrutiny analysis only if they are necessary to serve a compelling state

interest and are narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” Id. at 668 (quotation omitted).

       First, we evaluate whether application of section 211B.02 serves a compelling

government interest. As we concluded when we upheld section 211B.02 against a facial

challenge, “promoting informed voting and protecting the political process” is a

compelling government interest and that interest is served by the statute’s “prohibition

against false claims of support or endorsement.” Id.; see also McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 349

(stating that the state’s interest in preventing fraud carries “special weight” during election

campaigns); Schmitt, 275 N.W.2d at 591 (determining that the prohibition against false

statements of support or endorsement serves the government interest in “protecting the

political process”).

       Miller contends that that governmental interest is not served here because he is being

penalized for “truthful, non-falsifiable speech.” He characterizes the challenged statement

                                              12
as expressing that he is a “republican” who has “Republican Party virtues but as a

constitutional conservative.” He contends that the statement, thus characterized, is true,

and therefore properly informed the electorate, or is at least nonfalsifiable because it cannot

be proved false. But, as OAH found, Miller’s statement in the context of the rally flyer

implied that he had the support or endorsement of the Republican Party of Minnesota—a

statement that was false and could be proved false. His statement therefore did not

accurately inform the voters, and the state has a compelling interest in prohibiting it.

       Second, we evaluate whether section 211B.02, as applied to Miller, is narrowly

tailored to achieve the government’s interest. “A statute is narrowly tailored if it advances

a compelling state interest in the ‘least restrictive means among available, effective

alternatives.’” Linert, 901 N.W.2d at 668 (quoting Ashcroft v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union,

542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004)). A statute is overbroad if it prohibits constitutionally protected

activity in addition to the activity that is not constitutionally protected. Id.

       Miller suggests that, as an alternative to applying the statute to him, voters could

have accessed several websites, including the Minnesota Secretary of State’s website and

political parties’ websites, in order to find out whether Miller had been endorsed by the

Republican Party of Minnesota. Miller, however, does not show that this would be an

effective alternative because he does not explain how the availability of other information

would combat the harm of his false claim of support or endorsement. In Linert, we rejected

the argument that counterspeech is an effective and less-restrictive means to achieve the

compelling state interest served by section 211B.02’s prohibition on false statements of

support or endorsement. Id. at 669. We concluded that the candidate challenging the statute

                                               13
had not demonstrated or persuaded us “that counterspeech—even media statements and

retractions—is an effective alternative means to combat false claims of support or

endorsement” and that “[t]his is particularly true with respect to false claims made in the

final days leading up to an election.” Id. at 670. Similarly, here, we reject the argument that

other sources of information render application of the statute not “narrowly tailored.”

       As for overbreadth, Miller argues that application of the statute to him is overbroad

because it penalizes a truthful or at least a nonfalsifiable statement. But, for the reasons

explained above, Miller’s implied statement of support or endorsement of the Republican

Party of Minnesota was neither truthful nor nonfalsifiable. His argument that application

of the statute is overbroad is unavailing.

       Freedom of Association

       Finally, Miller argues that section 211B.02 is unconstitutional as applied to him

because it violates his right to free association. Miller contends that OAH’s penalty violates

his right to associate with the Caravan of Patriots and his right to associate with potential

voters for the purpose of engaging in expressive activity regarding conservatism and

political views.

       As Miller asserts, the constitutional right to freedom of association includes the right

to associate for the purpose of engaging in other activity protected by the First Amendment,

including speech and assembly. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). But the

statute’s prohibition on false statements of support or endorsement did not restrict Miller’s

ability to associate with the Caravan of Patriots or to attend the event, nor did it limit his

ability to associate with voters. And, even if any such restrictions were imposed, again, the

                                              14
statute is constitutional as applied to Miller because it furthers the compelling government

interest of promoting informed voting and is also narrowly tailored since it merely forbids

falsely implying party support or endorsement.

       Affirmed.

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