Court Opinion

ID: 9699456
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:24:40.794777+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:50.531791
License: Public Domain

Justice BAER
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the decision of the Majority based upon my conclusion that the “household exclusion” *369operates as a waiver of stacking, and thus contradicts and undermines the very specific statutory provisions set forth in the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”) establishing the methodologies an insurer must employ to protect a consumer from an inadvertent waiver of stacking. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 1738. Indeed, I believe that this case exemplifies the antithesis of these statutory provisions.
Initially, I agree with Justice Saylor’s concurring opinion that the Majority’s reliance on the analysis allowing for the enforcement of household exclusions in Prudential Insurance v. Colbert, 572 Pa. 82, 813 A.2d 747 (2002), and Eichelman v. Nationwide Insurance, 551 Pa. 558, 711 A.2d 1006 (1998), is misplaced because those cases considered whether a household exclusion violated general public policy and did not address the interaction between the household exclusion and the specific language of § 1738. However, I differ with the concurring opinion because I conclude that the household exclusion violates § 1738, and thus is unenforceable. See Colbert, 813 A.2d at 751 (“[Stipulations in a contract of insurance in conflict with, or repugnant to, statutory provisions which are applicable to, and consequently form a part of, the contract, must yield to the statute, and are invalid, since contracts cannot change existing statutory laws”) (citations omitted).
Under § 1738 of the MVFRL, stacked coverage is the default coverage: “The limits of coverages available under this subchapter for an insured shall be the sum of the limits for each motor vehicle as to which the injured person is an insured.”1 75 Pa.C.S. § 1738(a). To reject the default provi*370sion of stacked coverage, an insurer must provide the insured with a statutorily prescribed waiver form which the named insured must sign. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1738(d). If the waiver form set forth in § 1738(d) is not signed and dated by the named insured, the waiver is void. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1738(e).
In this case, Appellant did not waive stacking on his automobile policy covering three automobiles with $100,000 of underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage on each automobile. Instead, he paid increased premiums to purchase UIM coverage and to obtain stacked coverage of up to $300,000. Additionally, he paid increased premiums to obtain stacked UIM coverage on the policy covering his motorcycle.2 Under the *371Majority Opinion, however, the household exclusion operates to eliminate the stacking, for which Appellant paid premiums, through the inclusion of the following language: “This insurance does not apply to ... damages sustained by anyone we protect while occupying or being struck by a motor vehicle owned by you or a relative, but not insured for Uninsured or Underinsured Motorists Coverage under this policy.” This language in no way reflects the language provided in § 1738(d), and therefore, cannot operate as a valid waiver of stacking.
The Majority and the Concurrence conclude that the household exclusion does not operate as a waiver of stacking, but instead precludes underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage prior to any consideration of stacking. The concurrence determines that, to the extent that the General Assembly actually considered the matter, the Legislature likely regarded exclusions and stacking as separate issues. It therefore concludes that the exclusions frame the scope of UIM coverage, and thus do not effect the application of the stacking provisions because stacking does not apply when an accident does not come within the scope of the UIM coverage of the policy in question. The proverbial bottom line deriving from this analysis is the employment of the household exclusion to deny an insured the benefits of stacking, for which he paid, without complying with the statutorily mandated waiver provisions, in violation of the clear language of the legislature. Rather than requiring an overt act of waiver by the named insured pursuant to the specific form as specified in § 1738(d), the household exclusion does not even require the insurer to demonstrate that the insured was aware of the exclusion.
As noted by the concurrence, Concurring Op. at 367-68, n. 2, 972 A.2d at 515, n. 2, the MVFRL fails to provide specifically for many circumstances including this one, and arguably, the legislature did not consider the interaction of these two scenarios. More significantly, I have no doubt that most consumers of stacked coverage have not considered that their *372payment of increased premiums for stacking may be for naught if they are injured in one of their own vehicles, insured through a different policy.
I acknowledge that the Majority correctly asserts the general law that “an insured’s failure to read carefully the clear and unambiguous terms of his insurance policy has never furnished grounds to invalidate those terms or otherwise nullify them.” Maj. Op. at 362, 972 A.2d at 511. However, we have distinguished the case relied upon by the Majority, Standard Venetian Blind v. American Empire Insurance Co., 503 Pa. 300, 469 A.2d 563 (1983), and refused to apply it to cases where the insured receives a policy that differs from the policy requested:
We find a crucial distinction between cases where one applies for a specific type of coverage and the insurer unilaterally limits that coverage, resulting in a policy quite different from what the insured requested, and cases where the insured received precisely the coverage that he requested but failed to read the policy to discover clauses that are the usual incident of the coverage applied for. When the insurer elects to issue a policy differing from what the insured requested and paid for, there is clearly a duty to advise the insured of the changes so made. The burden is not on the insured to read the policy to discover such changes, or not read it at his peril.
Tonkovic v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 513 Pa. 445, 521 A.2d 920, 925 (1987). While my esteemed colleagues may contend that the household exclusion is one of the “clauses that are a usual incident of the coverage,” I would suggest that the consumer who does not waive stacking and agrees to pay the increased premiums associated with stacking is requesting a policy that actually provides stacking. The insured would not expect the decision to pay an increased premium for stacking to be undercut by a household exclusion buried in the fíne print of the policy, without the insurer advising the insured of this restriction.
Moreover, if the allegation is true that consumers cannot add motorcycles to their automobile policies and cannot obtain higher UIM coverage for their motorcycles, then insurers are *373selling consumers stacked UIM coverage for increased premiums, without any intention of allowing the consumers to benefit from that coverage in one of the most common scenarios, where the insured is injured in a household vehicle. Under the Majority’s holding, this denial of coverage may occur without the insurer informing the consumer of this unexpected hole in their coverage.
In short, I believe this Court should consider itself bound by the affirmative statements of the MVFRL that require an explicit waiver of stacking on a specific waiver form. Rather than interpreting legislative silence as approving of the household exclusion, I conclude that the household exclusion violates the stated requirements that the waiver of stacking occur through a clear affirmative act, and accordingly, dissent from the decision to enforce the exclusion.
Justice TODD and Justice McCAFFERY join this dissenting opinion.

. 1738. Stacking of uninsured and underinsured benefits and option to waive
(a) Limit for each vehicle. — When more than one vehicle is insured under one or more policies providing uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage, the stated limit for uninsured or underinsured coverage shall apply separately to each vehicle so insured. The limits of coverages available under this subchapter for an insured shall be the sum of the limits for each motor vehicle as to which the injured person is an insured.
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(d) Forms.—
*370(1) The named insured shall be informed that he may exercise the waiver of the stacked limits of uninsured motorist coverage by signing the following written rejection form:
UNINSURED COVERAGE LIMITS
By signing this waiver, I am rejecting stacked limits of uninsured motorist coverage under the policy for myself and members of my household under which the limits of coverage available would be the sum of limits for each motor vehicle insured under the policy. Instead, the limits of coverage that I am purchasing shall be reduced to the limits slated in the policy. I knowingly and voluntarily reject the stacked limits of coverage. I understand drat my premiums will be reduced if I reject this coverage.
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(2) The named insured shall be informed that he may exercise the waiver of the stacked limits of underinsured motorist coverage by signing the following written rejection form:
UNDERINSURED COVERAGE LIMITS
By signing this waiver, I am rejecting stacked limits of underinsured motorist coverage under the policy for myself and members of my household under which the limits of coverage available would be the sum of limits for each motor vehicle insured under the policy. Instead, the limits of coverage that I am purchasing shall be reduced to the limits stated in the policy. I knowingly and voluntarily reject the stacked limits of coverage. I understand that my premiums will be reduced if I reject this coverage.
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(e) Signature and date. — The forms described in subsection (d) must be signed by the first named insured and dated to be valid. Any rejection form that does not comply with this section is void.
75 Pa.C.S. § 1738 (emphasis added).

. As noted by the Majority, Appellant's amicus have suggested that Appellant may not have been able to add his motorcycle to the policy covering his automobiles or to insure his motorcycle for more than *371$15,000 of UIM coverage. See Maj. Op. at 363-64, n. 9, 972 A.2d at 512, n. 9. Thus, if accepted, Appellant purchased the best coverage available.