Court Opinion

ID: 9657953
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:42:05.851101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:49.835379
License: Public Domain

V. J. Brennan, J.
(dissenting). The defendant contends that her plea of guilty is invalid because (1) the trial court failed to,inquire into her conduct *686before accepting her plea, as required by GrCR 1963, 785.3, and (2) an allegedly invalid confession was used as an inducement to the plea. Neither of these claims, on the present record, supports a ruling that her plea is invalid.
As to the first claim, I cannot accept the majority’s view that without some evidence on the record indicating the truth of the defendant’s plea, the plea cannot stand. Although past decisions of both this Court and the Supreme Court adhere to this view,* the Supreme Court has recently held that noncompliance with the prophylactic standards of GCR 1963, 785.3, does not alone warrant the withdrawal of a plea. People v. Dunn (1968), 380 Mich 693; People v. Stearns (1968), 380 Mich 704; People v. Winegar (1968), 380 Mich 719. Before the withdrawal of a plea is justified, it must appear that the procedural fault affected the outcome:
“ [A convicted defendant] has the burden of showing something more than technical noncompliance with a rule. Absent a showing of violation or denial of constitutional rights, he has the obligation of alleging in a motion to withdraw plea such facts as would, if true, substantiate a finding that there was noncompliance which resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” People v. Winegar, supra, 733.
Without attempting to define the limits of this requirement, it seems that the reason accompanying a request to withdraw a plea must relate to the defendant’s innocence in fact. See People v. Dunn, supra, 701. In this respect, the present defendant has failed to sustain her burden: the trial court asked her several times whether she was guilty of the crime charged, and she answered without hesita*687tion that she was; defendant was represented by counsel; and, most significantly, she does not assert that she is, in fact, innocent. I am unable to say that the trial court’s failure to inquire into her conduct resulted in a “miscarriage of justice.”
Defendant’s second claim, that her plea is invalid because it was induced by an invalid confession, is founded on People v. Daniels (1966), 2 Mich App 395. Whatever the merit of that case, defendant has not shown that she is entitled to relief under it. Although she asserts in conclusory fashion that her plea was induced by an invalid confession, she does not state why the confession is invalid or how it was used to induce a plea of guilty. Failing to specify the facts underlying her claim, defendant has not established the need for an evidentiary hearing to determine its truth. People v. Scruggs (1968), 14 Mich App 47; People v. Dickerson (1969), 17 Mich App 201.
Neither People v. Daniels, supra, nor the majority of this panel has convinced me that a trial judge need go any further in accepting a plea than to be satisfied that it is tendered voluntarily and understandingly, that it was not induced by threats or promises, and that it reflects the defendant’s guilt in fact. To require a trial judge to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of a confession is to destroy the utility of the guilty plea. If that is to be the criterion, then it only follows that a hearing should be conducted on the admissibility of any evidence acquired before the plea. We might as well then forget pleas and have a full hearing on the merits.
We must accept the fact that guilty pleas and plea bargaining are an important part of criminal proceedings, and, because they are important, we should not restrict them unrealistically. We should, not *688allow review to replace the discretion of the trial judge, who has the ability to observe through confrontation whether a defendant is pleading voluntarily and knowingly. Nor should we minimize or forget the presence of his counsel, who has discussed the case with his client and has reviewed the entire file so as to advise him properly. Each case must be reviewed on its individual merits without requiring that a procedural checklist be carefully followed. To require a checklist is to open the door for procedural error while we should be more concerned, I think, with the spirit of the law than with the letter of the law.
The record in this case clearly indicates that defendant voluntarily tendered her plea, that she knew what she was doing, and that she was pleading guilty because she said she was guilty. I would affirm the denial of defendant’s motion to withdraw her plea of guilty.

 People v. Barrows (1959), 358 Mich 267; People v. Stewart (1968), 10 Mich App 553; People v. Perine (1967), 7 Mich App 292; People v. Goldfarb (1967), 6 Mich App 7.