Court Opinion

ID: 9762559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:26:22.221964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:35.465222
License: Public Domain

GONZALEZ, Justice,
dissenting.
Under the guise of statutory construction, the court today abolishes the doctrine of forum non conveniens in suits brought pursuant to section 71.031 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. This decision makes us one of the few states in the Union without such a procedural tool,1 and if the legislature fails to reinstate this doctrine, Texas will become an irresistible forum for all mass disaster lawsuits. See generally, Note, Foreign Plaintiffs and Forum Non Conveniens: Going Beyond Reyno, 64 Tex.L.Rev. 193 (1985). “Bhopal”-type litigation, with little or no connection to Texas will add to our already crowded dockets, forcing our residents to wait in the corridors of our courthouses while foreign causes of action are tried.2 I would hold that section 71.031 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code does not confer upon foreign litigants an absolute right to bring suit in Texas. Because I believe that trial courts have the inherent power to apply forum non conveniens in appropriate cases, I would provide guidelines and set parameters for its use. I would thus modify the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings.
This cause of action arose in Costa Rica where certain Costa Rican agricultural workers suffered injuries allegedly as a result of exposure to a pesticide manufactured by the defendants. The injured workers are seeking to enforce in Texas courts claims for personal injuries that occurred in Costa Rica. Several suits involving many of the same plaintiffs and essentially the same defendants have previously been filed in the United States and then dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds.
In 1983, a group of plaintiffs filed suit in a Florida state court. That case was removed to a federal district court, which dismissed it on the basis of forum non *691conveniens. The dismissal was affirmed on appeal. Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d 1215 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948, 106 S.Ct. 347, 88 L.Ed.2d 294 (1985).
In 1985, members of this group of plaintiffs filed suit in California. That case was subsequently removed to a federal court, which dismissed it on the basis of forum non conveniens in 1986. Aguilar v. Dow Chem. Co., No. 86-4753 JGD (S.D.Cal.1987).
In 1987, a federal district court in Florida once again addressed a cause of action filed by certain members of this group of plaintiffs. The court dismissed the action on the basis of forum non conveniens. Barrantes Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co., 667 F.Supp. 833 (S.D.Fla.1987).
The case at bar was originally filed in state district court in Harris County, Texas in 1984. It was removed to federal court and then remanded to the district court where it was dismissed on the basis of forum non conveniens. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case for trial. It is this judgment that the court today affirms.
The term forum non conveniens refers to the discretionary power of a court to decline jurisdiction when the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice would be better served if the action were brought and tried in another forum. Black’s Law Dictionary, 589 (5th ed, 1979). It is a sound doctrine rooted in public policy concerns of judicial economy and fairness, and it is recognized in Texas. See, e.g., Flaiz v. Moore, 353 S.W.2d 74 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio), rev’d on other grounds, 359 S.W.2d 872 (Tex.1962); see also McNutt v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 693 S.W.2d 666 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1985, writ dism’d); Van Winkle-Hooker Co. v. Rice, 448 S.W.2d 824 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1969, no writ); Cole v. Lee, 435 S.W.2d 283 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1968, writ dism’d); Forcum-Dean Co. v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 341 S.W.2d 464 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1960, writ dism’d). “Forum non conveniens is a necessary antidote to the greatly expanded jurisdiction provided by ‘long-arm’ stat-utes_ It is ... a ‘flexible procedure for the discretionary determination of place of trial,’ ... not a technique for leaving unpopular litigants without a court to press their claims.” Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 478 N.Y.S.2d 597, 606-07, 62 N.Y.2d 474, 491, 467 N.E.2d 245, 254-55 (1984) (Meyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
The court today3 “conclude[s] that the legislature has statutorily abolished the doctrine of forum non conveniens in suits brought under section 71.031.” 786 S.W.2d 674. I disagree. Forum non conveniens did not arrive upon the judicial landscape of this state until after the predecessors to section 71.031 were enacted. The statute that was to become section 71.031 was first enacted in 1913. Act of April 8, 1913, ch. 161, § 1, 1913 Tex.Gen.Laws 338, repealed by Act of May 17, 1985, ch. 959, § 9(1), 1985 Tex.Gen.Laws 3322. Before 1947, the year in which the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed the doctrine of forum non conve-niens in Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947), the discretion to dismiss a case upon the basis of the unique assemblage of considerations recognized by the doctrine was at best incipient among the states;4 such discretion was non-existent in Texas. See Note, Recent Cases and Statutes, 20 Tex.L.Rev. 609, 610-612 (1942). The first reported Texas case to identify “forum non conve-niens ” was Garrett v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 218 S.W.2d 238 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amaril*692lo 1949, writ dism’d). I believe that the legislature was unacquainted with the doctrine of forum non conveniens and cannot be said to have abolished it.
Paxton Blair’s conclusion in his article The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 Colum.L.Rev. 1 (1929) that forum non conveniens has been employed in the state courts since 1817:
seems questionable. Many of the state cases cited by [Blair] involved rules that absolutely barred the action.
Such provisions, unlike forum non con-veniens, did not provide the trial courts with discretion; rather, they absolutely precluded assertion of jurisdiction. Moreover, until 1929 it was thought that the doctrine was a violation of the privileges and immunities clause of the constitution. ...
Stein, 133 U.Pa.L.Rev. at 796 n. 43 (citations omitted); see also Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 Cal.L. Rev. 380, 388-90 (1947); J. Hazard, Civil Procedure, § 2.31 (1985); Note, Forum Non Conveniens in Georgia: A Critical Analysis and Proposal for Adoption, 7 Ga.L.Rev. 744, 747, 749, n. 15 (1973) [hereinafter Forum Non Conveniens in Georgia ] (“After the publication of [Blair’s article], the use of the phrase ‘forum non con-veniens’ became quite familiar, but few American courts applied it. Not until the late 1940’s did forum non conveniens really come of age in this country.”) The court’s reliance on Blair is misplaced.
The original version of section 71.031 was enacted in 1913 to give Texas citizens the right to maintain a cause of action in the courts of this State free from the threat of a dismissal under the dissimilarity doctrine. See Note, The Texas Dissimilarity Doctrine as Applied to the Tort Law of Mexico — A Modem Evaluation, 55 Tex. L.Rev. 1281,1293 (1977) [hereinafter Note]; see also S. Bayitch & J. Siqueiros, Conflict of Laws: Mexico and the United States 152 (1968); Paulsen, Foreign Law in Texas Courts, 33 Tex.L.Rev. 437, 454 (1955); Stumberg, Conflict of Laws-Torts-Texas Decisions, 9 Tex.L.Rev. 21, 30 (1930). The caption to the statute and subsection 2 both evidence this intent:
PROTECTION OF CITIZENS OF THIS STATE INJURED IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES — PROVIDES ADEQUATE COMPENSATION THEREFOR
[S.B. No. 75} Chapter 161
An act for the protection of persons of this State who may be injured in a foreign country and providing for adequate compensation therefor, and declaring an emergency.
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Texas:
Section 1. That whenever the death or personal injury of a citizen of this State or a country having equal treaty rights with the United States on behalf of its citizens, has been or may be caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default in any State, for which a right to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof is given by a statute or by law of such State, territory or foreign country, such right of action may be enforced in the courts of the United States, or in the courts of this State, within the time prescribed for the commencement of such action by the statute of this State, and the law of the former shall control in the maintenance of such action in all matters pertaing [pertaining] to procedure.
Section 2. The fact that there is now no law permitting citizens of this State who receive injuries in a foreign country from bringing an action for said injuries under the laws of this State, creates an emergency and imperative public necessity requiring that the constitutional rule that bills shall be read upon three several days, should be suspended and it is hereby suspended, and this Act shall take effect from and after its passage.
Act of April 8, 1913, ch. 161, § 1, 1913 Tex.Gen.Laws 338 (Repealed 1985) (emphasis added). It does not follow from the language of this version of the statute or any of the subsequent versions5 that the *693legislature intended to give citizens of foreign countries an absolute right to maintain suits in Texas or to strip our courts of their equitable common law power to, on occasion and under certain circumstances, dismiss disputes that have only a tenuous connection to Texas.6 Instead, the legislature was concerned with the preclusive effect of the dissimilarity doctrine upon actions brought by Texans injured in foreign countries and intended only to prohibit courts from dismissing a case solely on the grounds that the law to be applied in the case was dissimilar. See Note, 55 Tex.L. Rev. at 1293 (1977); see also Baade, Conflict of Laws, 197Jt Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw.LJ. 166, 216-217 (1974); Note, 2 Tex.L.Rev. 244, 246 (1924).
The doctrine of forum non conveniens cannot be equated to the dissimilarity doctrine. See Flaiz, 359 S.W.2d at 87.5. The legislature simply did not contemplate forum non conveniens when the statute was drafted. Similarly, subsequent amendments to the statute did not abrogate forum non conveniens dismissals. Therefore, because the purposes of the legislature in enacting and amending this statute are ascertainable, and because there is absolutely no indication that the legislature sought to abolish the doctrine, the court’s assertion that the statute precludes forum non conveniens is indefensible. See City of Mason v. West Texas Utilities, 150 Tex. 18, 237 S.W.2d 273, 275, 278 (1951) (“the aim and object of construction is to ascertain and enforce the legislative in-tent_”); cf. Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. United North & South Development Co., 140 Tex. 417, 168 S.W.2d 226, 229 (1942) (interpretation by implication cannot be used to extend a statute when the legislative intent is discernible); Taylor v. Firemen’s and Policemen’s Civil Service Commission of City of Lubbock, 616 5.W.2d 187,189 (Tex.1981) (“In the absence of a specific amendment, a statute should be given the meaning which it had when enacted”).
The court appears to hold that this case turns upon the language in section 71.031, which states that an action “may be enforced in the courts of this State.” 7 It then proceeds, however, to substitute the holding in Allen v. Bass, 47 S.W.2d 426 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1932, writ ref’d) wherein the court of appeals held that former article 4678 (now section 71.031) conferred an absolute right to maintain a suit in Texas courts, for an explanation of how that language precludes application of forum non conveniens. Yet in Flaiz v. Moore, 359 S.W.2d 872, 876 (Tex.1962), long after Allen v. Báss was decided, the Texas Supreme Court warned that it had not yet decided whether former article 4678 was mandatory such that a court could not exercise discretion in determining whether to entertain a suit having little or no connections with the State of Texas. See also *694Note, 41 Tex.L.Rev. 924, 927 n. 19 (1963). We reiterated this warning as late as 1984 in an opinion refusing an application for writ on grounds of no reversible error: “[T]he applicability of forum non conve-niens to an article 4678 cause of action is an open question.” Couch v. Chevron International Co., Inc., 682 S.W.2d 534, 535 (Tex.1984) (per curiam), citing Flaiz v. Moore, 359 S.W.2d 872 (Tex.1962).
In short, Allen v. Bass does not control the issue of forum non conveniens dismissals under section 71.031 because that decision did not address the doctrine of forum non conveniens. See McNutt v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 693 S.W.2d 666, 668 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1985, writ dism’d) (“As we read Allen, the doctrine of comity was at issue, not the doctrine of forum non conve-niens ”). As stated earlier, the doctrine of forum non conveniens was not firmly established in American jurisdictions until the United States Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947), some 15 years after Allen v. Bass. See Willman v. McMillen, 779 S.W.2d 583, 584-85 (Mo.1989); Forum Non Conveniens in Georgia, 7 Ga.L.Rev. at 748 n. 15 (“By 1947, only six states accepted the doctrine.”); C. Wright, Federal Courts § 44 at p. 259 (4th ed. 1983); Stein, supra, fn. 4 at 796. Abrogation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens under section 71.-031 in a case such as this cannot be reasonably predicated upon Allen v. Bass; the dismissal in that case, based upon the principals of comity, cannot be equated with forum non conveniens. Nowhere in Allen v. Bass is the doctrine of forum non conveniens discussed.
Comity considerations focus on deference to a sister state; forum non conveniens considerations allow the trial court to engage in a discretionary balancing of factors in order to determine the most appropriate forum for the litigation.8 The comity dismissal ordered by the trial court in Allen did not involve the balancing of the public and private interests which inform a forum non conveniens decision,9 and the opinion does not reflect that the court of appeals intended to abolish the doctrine of forum non conveniens.10 A rule announced in a judicial opinion may not be disassociated from or taken out of the context of its facts. W.D. Haden & Co. v. Dodger, 158 Tex. 74, 308 S.W.2d 838, 840 (1958). Further, the phrase — “absolute right to maintain a transitory action” — used in Allen v. Bass, is improvidently relied upon by the court in reaching its result today. First, that language resulted from a group of cases establishing absolute open forums in order to avoid constitutional attacks under the privileges and immunities clause. Subsequently, the Supreme Court indicated that the privileges and immunities clause is no obstacle to a state vesting discretion in its courts to refuse to hear suits between nonresidents. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504, 67 S.Ct. 839, 841, 91 *695L.Ed. 1055 (1947); Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 Calif.L.Rev. 380, 393, n. 60; cf. Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 643, 55 S.Ct. 589, 592, 79 L.Ed. 1100 (1935); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 294, n. 5, 63 S.Ct. 207, 211, n. 5, 87 L.Ed. 279 (1942) (under the full faith and credit clause, a state “may in appropriate cases apply the doctrine of ‘forum non conveniens.’ ”) Second, the conclusion of the court in Allen v. Bass that article 4678 gives an absolute right to maintain a transitory action is dicta except with respect to citizens of other states. Allen v. Bass simply is not controlling as to the question of whether the legislature statutorily abolished the doctrine of forum non conveniens in Texas suits brought under section 71.031 by residents of foreign countries.
Forum non conveniens is a common law doctrine “pertaining to procedure.” See Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, 71 S.Ct. 1, 95 L.Ed. 3 (1950). I would therefore hold that the doctrine is applicable to cases alleged under section 71.031 by virtue of subsection (b), which provides:
[A]ll matters pertaining to procedure in the prosecution or maintenance of the action in the courts of this state are governed by the laws of this state,
(emphasis added). See Note, 41 Tex.L.Rev. 924, 927, n. 16 (1963).
Because I believe that the doctrine of forum non conveniens is applicable to cases brought in the courts of this state, I would adopt the following guidelines for its use.

Forum Non Conveniens Factors

At the outset it must be noted that the doctrine of forum non conveniens does not come into play until it is established that the trial court has both subject matter and personal jurisdiction. If there is any challenge to the court’s jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter, it must be resolved before the court may make the forum non conveniens determination. Thereafter, the doctrine may be invoked only by motion of a party, and the burden shall rest upon the movant to produce evidence which would authorize dismissal. This evidence must establish by a preponderance that the court should not accept trial of the case.
Once forum non conveniens has been invoked, the trial court should, as its first step, determine what substantive law governs the case under the relevant choice of law rules. See In Re McClelland Engineers, Inc., 742 F.2d 837 (5th Cir.1984) (the first step in a forum non conveniens analysis is the determination of what substantive law governs the case). If the court concludes that a foreign law will govern the case, it may consider this as a factor weighing in favor of dismissal. See J. Hazard, Civil Procedure, § 2.31 (1985).
Next, it must be established that the plaintiff has an alternate forum — the doctrine presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant is amenable to process. Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 506-07, 67 S.Ct. at 842-43. An acceptable alternate forum does not exist when, for example, the plaintiff is unable to get personal jurisdiction of the defendant elsewhere. If no acceptable alternative exists, the case should not be dismissed regardless of the additional burdens which will be thrust upon the defendant. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 84 comment c at 251 (1969). And even if an acceptable alternate forum does exist, the trial court may not dismiss the case if the plaintiff is a resident of Texas.
Once the trial judge has determined that an acceptable alternate forum exists, the judge must then consider all relevant factors of public and private interest to determine if the interests of justice would be better served if the alternate jurisdiction adjudicated the case. Factors of private (interest are those considerations that make the trial of a case relatively easy, expeditious, and inexpensive for the parties. Factors of public interest include: 1) those which take into account the burdens imposed upon the citizens of the forum state when controversies having no connection with the state are allowed to proceed to trial; 2) those which comprehend the bur*696dens which the trial will work upon the court itself; and 3) those which recognize the general interest in having localized controversies decided in the jurisdiction in which they arose. See generally Note, Foreign Plaintiffs and Forum Non Con-veniens: Going Beyond Reyno, 64 Tex.L. Rev. 193, 214 (1985). No single private or public interest factor should be outcome determinative; rather, each must be considered in relation to the others.
The consideration of public and private interest factors should be individualized on a case by case basis. Clearly, the general descriptions of those factors set forth above are capable of granulation into the more specific considerations necessitated by individual cases. See, e.g., Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508-09, 67 S.Ct. at 843-44; Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257-261, 102 S.Ct. 252, 266-269, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981); In Re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La., on July 9, 1982, 821 F.2d 1147, 1166 (5th Cir.1987); Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 786-795 (D.C.Cir.1980); Great Northern Railway Co. v. Superior Court, County of Alameda, 12 Cal.App.3d 105, 112-116, 90 Cal.Rptr. 461, 466-467 (1970); Credit Lyonnais Bank v. Manatt, et al., 202 Cal.App.3d 1424, 1435, n. 17, 249 Cal.Rptr. 559, 565, n. 17 (1988); Chambers v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, 35 Ohio St.3d 123, 132-33, 519 N.E.2d 370, 378-379 (1988); Note, Forum Non Conveniens in California: Code of Civil Procedure Section ^10.30, 21 Hastings L.J.. 1245-46 (1970). In each case, however, the trial judge must specify for the record each factor he or she considers and the manner in which these factors influenced the decision.
Accordingly, the forum non conveniens determination, though committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, must be carefully confined to a structured consideration of the relevant factors so that an appellate court may conduct a meaningful review of the decision. The trial judge may not, for example, dismiss a case from the plaintiffs chosen forum simply because, in the court’s view, another forum may be superior to that chosen by the plaintiff. See Pain, 637 F.2d at 783. The trial judge’s discretion is not unlimited: “where there has been no weighing of the relative advantages of each forum but only a consideration of the drawbacks of one, that discretion has been abused.” Founding Church of Scientology v. Verlag, 536 F.2d 429, 436 (D.C.Cir.1976) (emphasis in original); see also Credit Lyonnais Bank, 249 Cal.Rptr. at 566.
In the instant case, the trial judge dismissed the case without specifying on the record the factors which he considered and the way in which those considerations influenced his determination. I would reverse that part of the judgment of the court of appeals which precludes the possibility of a forum non conveniens dismissal, affirm that part of the judgment which reverses the dismissal, and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Response to J. Doggett’s Concurrence

When you strip Justice Doggett’s concurring opinion of its fiery rhetoric, it is clear that he has twisted my dissent to such an extent that ordinarily I would feel compelled to respond at length. Deprived of its rhetorical flourishes, however, his concurring opinion contains only the following conclusions:
(1) The legislature has abolished forum non conveniens. (We are not told when or how this was accomplished);
(2) “As a matter of law and of public policy,” the doctrine “should be abolished.” 786 S.W.2d 689. (Why is this necessary if, as J. Doggett and the plurality claims, this was done by the legislature long ago?);
(3) Allen v. Bass is “compelling precedent” that the plaintiffs have an absolute right to bring suits in Texas. (In Flaiz v. Moore and in Couch v. Chevron, we said that this issue was an open question);
(4) The legal systems of many countries of the world are not as generous as ours, and the doctrine of forum non conve-niens is a barrier to holding greedy, irresponsible multinational corporations ac*697countable. The doctrine is therefore invalid on public policy grounds. (We are a court, not a legislative body. We do not have the power or authority to make this public policy decision).
Justice Doggett also criticizes the doctrine of forum non conveniens as “yet another legal fiction” and assumes that by calling it such he has challenged its validity. Taking this line of reasoning to its logical conclusion, it appears that Justice Doggett opposes the use of such legal fictions as corporations, constructive trusts, constructive notice, constructive fraud, and numerous others. In any event, he is incorrect in suggesting that forum non con-veniens is a legal fiction, for a legal fiction is defined as an assumption of fact made by a court as a basis for deciding a legal question or a situation contrived by the law to permit a court to dispose of a matter. See Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). Forum non conveniens requires the mov-ant to prove to the court facts that warrant dismissal of the case.
In conclusion, I have no intent, much less “zeal” to implement social policy as Justice Doggett charges. That is not our role. It is clear that if anybody is trying to advance a particular social policy, it is Justice Dog-gett. I admire his altruism, and I too sympathize with the plight of the plaintiffs. However, the powers of this court are well-defined, and the sweeping implementations of social welfare policy Justice Doggett seeks to achieve by abolishing the doctrine of forum non conveniens are the exclusive domain of the legislature.
For all of the above reasons, I dissent.

. See Chambers v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, 35 Ohio St.3d 123, 519 N.E.2d 370, 373, n. 3 (1988).

. For example, in July 1988, there was an oil rig disaster in Scotland. A Texas lawyer went to Scotland, held a press conference, and wrote letters to victims or their families. He advised them that they had a good chance of trying their cases in Texas where awards would be much higher than elsewhere. Houston Post, July 18, 1988, at 13A, col. 1; The Times (London), July 18, 1988, at 20A, col. 1; Texas Lawyer, Sept. 26, 1988 at 3.

. Until today, the issue of whether the legislature or the supreme court had abolished the doctrine of forum non conveniens was an open question. See Flaiz v. Moore, 359 S.W.2d 872, 876, (Tex.1962); Couch v. Chevron International Co., Inc., 682 S.W.2d 534, 535 (Tex.1984) (per curiam).

. See Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy Court Access Doctrine, 133 U.Pa.L.R. 781, 796 (1985) [hereinafter Stein] (“Although bearing a Latin name, the forum non conve-niens doctrine is of relatively recent origin. Not until 1948 was the doctrine accepted for general application in the federal courts and it received little or no attention in the state courts until after federal adoption.”); see also Comment, Forum Non Conveniens: The Need for Legislation in Texas, 54 Tex.L.Rev. 737, 740 (1976).

. The current version, section 71.031 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, provides:
(a) An action for damages for the death or personal injury of a citizen of this state, of the *693United States, or of a foreign country may be enforced in the courts of this state, although the wrongful act, neglect, or default causing the death or injury takes place in a foreign state or country, if:
(1) a law of the foreign state or country or of this state gives a right to maintain an action for damages for the death or injury;
(2) the action is begun in this state within the time provided by the laws of this state for beginning the action; and
(3) in the case of a citizen of a foreign country, the country has equal treaty rights with the United States on behalf of its citizens.
(b) All matters pertaining to procedure in the prosecution or maintenance of the action in the courts of this state are governed by the law of this state.
(c) The court shall apply the rules of substantive law that are appropriate under the facts of this case.

. It makes no sense to argue that the legislature in 1913 abolished the doctrine of forum non conveniens when the doctrine was not recognized in Texas at that time.

. Dow and Shell contend that the legislature’s use of the word "may" makes the statute permissive. They argue that both Kansas and Iowa have statutes similar to section 71.031 that also use the word "may” and that each applies the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Compare KAN.STAT.ANN. § 60-217(b) (1986) and Gonzales v. Atchinson, Topeka, and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 189 Kan. 689, 371 P.2d 193 (1962) with IOWA CODE § 616.8 (1939) and Silversmith v. Kenosha Auto Transport, 301 N.W.2d 725, 727 (Iowa 1981). The court shuns this persuasive reasoning and chooses to hold that the language "may be enforced” in section 71.031 is mandatory thus precluding forum non conveniens dismissals.

.The court cites Morris v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 78 Tex. 17, 14 S.W. 228, 230 (1890) as authority for the proposition that Texas courts had recognized forum non conveniens long before Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert. That decision did not involve the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The Morris court never described or engaged in a balancing of public and private interest factors. Instead, the court explained the application of the doctrine of comity and affirmed the dismissal of the case by the trial court because the facts "indicate[d] the impolicy of entertaining jurisdiction ... upon principles of comity.” Id. at 230. Similarly, in the cases Mexican National Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 89 Tex. 107, 33 S.W. 857 (1896), Southern Pacific Co. v. Graham, 12 Tex.Civ.App. 565, 34 S.W. 135 (1896, writ ref'd), and Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. of Texas v. Godair Comm’n Co., 87 S.W. 871 (Tex.Civ.App.1905, writ refd), cited by the court, none of the opinions indicate that the court engaged in the discretionary balancing of public and private interest factors that is necessary in a proper forum non conveniens analysis.

. Comity does not rely on a balancing of interest factors. Rather, it "is a willingness to grant a privilege, not as a matter of right, but out of deference and good will.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th ed. (1979). The principles of comity are not properly equated with the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

. Until now, Allen v. Bass has been largely ignored. Imprecise language in the opinion is, regrettably, subject to manipulation. Accordingly, I would overrule Allen v. Bass in order to eradicate any possible confusion concerning the application of forum non conveniens to actions alleged under section 71.031.