Court Opinion

ID: 9569102
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:10:39.049043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:48:57.311250
License: Public Domain

*485Deen, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
While I concur fully with the majority opinion, the following additional relevant observations are set forth.
1. Under the present state of the law, there should be no room for doubt that Crider may not be held liable for wrongful discharge of Favors or for tortious interference with her contract of employment. It was uncontroverted that Crider had the authority to fire Favors, and under Georgia Power v. Busbin, 242 Ga. 612 (250 SE2d 442) (1978) and its multitudinous progeny, he could exercise that authority for whatever reason, good, bad, or otherwise. The dissenting opinion, in effect, seeks to create an exception to this rule, where sexual discrimination is alleged, but it should be emphasized that “[w]e dare not decide a question of right by a rule of courtesy, or substitute deference to sex for deference to law.” Williams v. Simmons, 79 Ga. 649, 655 (1887). There is, as yet, no crack in Georgia’s employment-at-will doctrine through which Favors’ claim against Crider could slip. See Levin, “Georgia’s ‘Employment-at-Will Doctrine: Time for a Change,” The Atlanta Lawyer (Fall 1987), pp. 5-12. (This excellent article may sprout and cause to thrive an idea whose time has come.)
“In the court-house, the standard of justice for both sexes is the same. Like the sun, the law shines on all who are in the same place with equal warmth and splendor. The most charming and attractive woman in the universe, loaded down with misfortune, is not to prevail as a suitor where she is in the wrong, be her adversary whom [sic] he may.” Boland v. Klink, 63 Ga. 448, 453 (1879). In the specific context of employment-at-will cases, women and men equally are subject to discharge for either good or bad or no reason.
2. Favors’ claim against Aleo for the shop foreman’s sexual harassment, based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, is controlled adversely to her position by Cox v. Brazo, 165 Ga. App. 888 (303 SE2d 71) (1983) and Murphy v. ARA Sues., 164 Ga. App. 859 (298 SE2d 528) (1982). The shop foreman’s alleged harassment while on the job is wrong and to be deplored. “Surely, the matrons of the land are not [to be] exposed to such an indignity at the pleasure of every libertine who, with no check from the law, may be rude and reckless enough to insult their virtue.” Goodrum v. State, 60 Ga. 509, 510 (1878). However, the shop foreman’s crude, rude, reckless, rough, and rapacious behavior obviously was outside the scope of his employment, and the employer may not be held vicariously liable on that basis.