Court Opinion

ID: 9484111
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:40:51.792706+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:50:01.552245
License: Public Domain

ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
While I join that part of the majority’s opinion affirming the directed verdict, I respectfully dissent from the portion that reverses the district court. While I have difficulty discerning from the majority opinion exactly what portion of the district court’s decision it is reversing, I conclude that the majority is reversing the district court’s treatment of Ms. Deimer’s motion to reconsider the grant of partial summary judgment.
The majority holds that the district court misapprehended the procedural context of Ms. Deimer’s motion for reconsideration. I note that the majority specifically concludes based on a strained reading of Rule 54(a) and Minority Police Officers Ass’n of South Bend v. City of South Bend, Ind., 721 F.2d 197, 200 (7th Cir.1983) that Ms. Deimer’s motion should not have been treated as a Rule 59(e) motion. Nevertheless, the majority does not provide us with a definitive procedural context for the motion. That omission is immaterial, however, as I do not believe that the district court’s apprehension of the procedural context is relevant. No matter what the procedural context, the district court could not consider the affidavit.
A multitude of cases stands for the proposition that a party cannot avoid summary judgment by submitting an affidavit that conflicts with earlier deposition testimony. See, e.g., Adelman-Tremblay v. Jewel Companies, Inc., 859 F.2d 517, 520 (7th Cir.1988); Diliberti v. United States, 817 F.2d 1259, 1263 (7th Cir.1987); Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d 857, 861 (7th Cir.1985); Miller v. A.H. Robins Co., 766 F.2d 1102, 1104 (7th Cir.1985). These cases, which involved affidavits attached to motions in opposition to summary judgment, apply even more strongly in this context because Ms. Deimer filed the affidavit after the judge had already granted partial summary judgment. The purpose of summary judgment motions is “to weed out unfounded claims, specious denials, and sham defenses.” Babrocky, 773 F.2d at 861. To allow a party to create a genuine issue of material fact by contradicting or endeavoring to provide a strained interpretation of a deposition by means of an affidavit would destroy these purposes and eviscerate the summary judgment rule, leaving district courts with caseloads even more burdensome than they already are. I *348believe that the majority’s treatment of this case allows for just such a possibility.
Finally, this is not a case where one of the few exceptions to the rule against the use of affidavits to contradict deposition testimony applies. A subsequent affidavit may be allowed to clarify ambiguous or confusing deposition testimony. Adelman-Tremblay, 859 F.2d at 520. A subsequent affidavit is also permissible if it is based on newly discovered evidence. Id. Ms. Deimer does not assert that she based her affidavit on newly discovered evidence. However, her affidavit is apparently based on the proposition that the following deposition testimony was confusing or ambiguous:
Q. Have you ever searched any [Blank-etrol] machines for any type of device to secure the cord?
A. There was never a place to put the cord in.
Q. My question is did you ever search the machine for any type of device to secure the cord?
A. Did I ever search for it personally?
Q. Yeah.
A. No.
(R. 40, Ex. B at 73). I do not believe that this testimony is either ambiguous or confusing. Her answer regarding the cord wrap device was not equivocal, it was not itself ambiguous, nor was it a response to an ambiguous question. Therefore, she is not entitled to explain this testimony through the use of an affidavit. Thus, I would affirm the district court in all respects.