Court Opinion

ID: 9499224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:41:31.377903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:21.626034
License: Public Domain

SUTTON, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the court’s disposition of Swiecicki’s false-arrest claim and ■ write *504separately to express some reservations about the disposition of the other two counts — the excessive-force and free-speech claims.
At first blush, it would seem to me, the district court correctly rejected Swiecicki’s excessive-force claim as a matter of law because it was time barred. The statute of limitations for an excessive-force claim generally runs from the date of the abusive police conduct. That is not the case, however, if success on the § 1983 claim would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction” for resisting arrest. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). The question, then, is whether Heck applies: If it does, then the § 1983 action is not time barred (because Swiecicki would have no obligation to file a suit that Heck prohibits him from filing); if it does not, then the § 1983 action is time barred (because Swiecicki would have no excuse for delaying the filing of his lawsuit).
Under Heck, the salient question is whether the § 1983 claim “necessarily” implies the invalidity of the state-court conviction. See Hill v. McDonough, — U.S. —, 126 S.Ct. 2096, 2103-04, 165 L.Ed.2d 44 (2006) (“[T]he injunction Hill seeks would not necessarily foreclose the State from implementing the lethal injection sentence under present law, and thus it could not be said that the suit seeks to establish ‘unlawfulness [that] would render a conviction or sentence invalid.’ ”) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 486, 114 S.Ct. 2364). As a matter of sheer logic, one may bring a successful excessive-force claim without having to establish that the resisting-arrest charge was unlawful: An officer could legitimately arrest a suspect but use excessive force in bringing the suspect to the station. And as a matter of state-court precedent, Ohio law permits exactly that type of excessive-force claim, namely one that follows a lawful arrest. See City of Cleveland v. Murad, 84 Ohio App.3d 317, 616 N.E.2d 1116, 1120 (Ohio Ct.App.1992) (recognizing that an excessive-force claim and a resisting-arrest conviction may coexist in some settings); City of Columbus v. Purdie, Nos. 84AP-127 & 84AP-128, 1984 WL 6005, at *3 (Ohio Ct.App. Nov. 29, 1984) (same).
Under these circumstances, the question is not whether Swiecicki’s claim, “as he has alleged it” as a matter of fact, Maj. Op. at 5, would imply the invalidity of his state-court conviction. One could always write a complaint so that success on its “allegations” would negate a state-court conviction. In this case Swiecicki could have brought an utterly unrelated § 1983 action concerning the lack of medical care he received in prison and yet still could have “alleged” that his claim arose from a false arrest. The question rather is the relationship between the elements of the state conviction and the elements of the § 1983 claim. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n. 6, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (explaining that a Fourth Amendment claim of a defendant convicted in state court for resisting arrest would necessarily imply the invalidity of that conviction because “to prevail in this § 1983 action, he would have to negate an element of the offense of which he has been convicted”) (emphasis added). In this instance, because some excessive-force claims would not imply the invalidity of an Ohio conviction for resisting arrest, it follows that Swiecicki’s excessive-force claim did not “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction” for resisting arrest. Id. at 487.
But even if the focus were on Swiecicki’s claim “as he has alleged it,” Maj. Op. at 495, that would not help Swiecicki here. He did not condition his excessive-force claim on any one period of time during his encounter with Delgado or on the assumption that he had not resisted arrest. In full, his complaint said, “On or about the *505evening of September 25, 2001 Defendant JOSE DELGADO deliberately and intentionally used excessive and unreasonable force and violence upon the person of Plaintiff JEFFREY SWIECICKI.” JA 11. And he could prevail on this claim whether he resisted arrest or not. See Murad, 616 N.E.2d at 1120; Purdie, 1984 WL 6005, at *3.
This circuit (in an unpublished decision) and several other circuits (in published decisions) have held that excessive-force claims may proceed in the face of a Heck challenge despite the existence of an outstanding conviction for resisting arrest. See Sigley v. Kuhn, Nos. 98-3977, 99-3531, 2000 WL 145187, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan.31, 2000) (“Sigley’s section 1983 action attempts to prove that Kuhn used unreasonable and excessive force subsequent to Sig-ley’s arrest and resistance. Nothing in that determination invalidates the underlying criminal conviction for resisting arrest.”); Martinez v. City of Albuquerque, 184 F.3d 1123, 1127 (10th Cir.1999) (“[WJhether [plaintiff] resisted arrest ... is a question separate and distinct from whether the police officers exercised excessive or unreasonable force in effectuating his arrest.”); Nelson v. Jashurek, 109 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir.1997) (holding that excessive-force claim was not Heck.barred because “it is possible for a finding that the defendant was resisting arrest to coexist with a finding that the police used excessive force to subdue him”) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 182 F.3d 391 (6th Cir.1999), which involved a § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim arising from an illegal search, does not point to a contrary conclusion. Consistent with Heck, Sha-maeizadeh recognizes that “a prisoner seeking to challenge an allegedly unconstitutional [act] in a § 1983 claim must show that a decision in his favor would not imply the invalidity of his outstanding conviction.” 182 F.3d at 398. Shamaeizadeh could not satisfy this burden because “the only evidence [against him in his criminal trial] ... was evidence discovered ... during the allegedly illegal search.” Id. Because success in his § 1983 claim would undermine the only evidence that could potentially prove the central elements of the criminal charge against him, “it would not have been possible, while criminal proceedings .'.. were pending, to determine whether a decision on Shamaeizadeh’s claim would imply the invalidity of his potential conviction.” Id.
Swiecicki does not face the same problem. While he has alleged that Delgado’s force was unprovoked (because he did not resist the arrest), the fact remains that he need not prove that allegation to prevail on his § 1983 claim. A jury would not need to believe all of Swiecieki’s factual allegations to find in his favor on the excessive-force claim: It could find that even if Swiecicki had resisted arrest, Delgado still used excessive force in response.
While the court’s approach does not seem consistent with Heck, I must acknowledge that there is something awkward about saying the Heck bar should not apply here. Had Swiecicki been forced to file his § 1983 action before the completion of his successful direct criminal appeal regarding the resisting-arrest charge, he plainly would have been forced to file a diminished version of his claim. True enough, he could still prevail on that claim. But he would have been required to show that the officer’s use of force exceeded what a reasonable officer would do in quieting an individual resisting arrest, as opposed to showing only that the force exceeded what a reasonable officer would do in arresting someone who did not resist arrest. It is difficult to imagine any litigant preferring to file the one claim over the other. In this setting, Heck also *506seems to force litigants to split their claims — bringing the excessive-force claim immediately while awaiting success on challenging the resisting-arrest conviction before bringing a false-arrest claim. Perhaps the answer is that equitable tolling should govern situations like this one. Either way, these considerations prompt me to concur in, rather than dissent from, the court’s judgment on this claim.
As for Swiecicki’s First Amendment claim, I strain to see how Swiecicki has raised a cognizable claim of First Amendment retaliation, as opposed to false arrest or excessive force. Swiecicki made two relevant statements: he criticized Cleveland Indians’ outfielder Russell Branyon, and he questioned Delgado why he was being removed from his seat in the stadium. It strains credulity to believe that Delgado was retaliating against Swiecicki for criticizing one of the Indians. Rarely does an inning in a baseball game go by (particularly during a losing season) without some fan expressing frustration with his team. And nothing in the record suggests that Delgado saw himself as Bra-nyon’s knight errant. As in virtually any debate about whether one fan’s exuberance is at the expense of another’s enjoyment, words will be involved and so will their volume. But when, as here, the ticket to the ball game explained that any fan could be removed if he “use[d] obscene or abusive language, or engag[ed] in any other antisocial conduct offensive to those around [him],” JA 46, and when it is difficult to understand how a jury legitimately could infer that Delgado removed Swiec-icki in retaliation for the content of his speech, it seems to diminish rather than uplift the First Amendment to apply it in this setting. See JA 70 (Delgado “saw [Swiecicki] being disorderly and loud”); JA 86-87 (another employee said Swiec-icki’s language “sounded foul and abusive” to him and testified that he intended “[t]o see who” had made the remarks “and to tell him to quit” “[b]ecause we don’t allow foul and abusive language in the Jacobs Field, because it’s a family oriented venue”).
Independent of the question whether Delgado had probable cause to arrest Swiecicki (which clearly presents a jury question), I also am hard pressed to understand how Swiecicki’s repeated question— “What did I do wrong?” JA 122 — shows that the decision to arrest him established a cognizable free-speech retaliation claim. During most encounters with the police, individuals exchange words with an officer, and the phrase “What did I do wrong?” is perhaps one of the most frequent. Consider an everyday traffic stop. Of course, Swiecicki had a right to ask the question. But no less importantly, the officer still had a right to arrest him without incurring the risk of a § 1983 free-speech claim or, worse, undertaking the precaution of inserting ear plugs in escorting every unruly fan out of a stadium.
Our circuit’s cases also seem to be one step removed from the innocuous setting of this case. In Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889 (6th Cir.2002), in contrast to this dispute, the plaintiff presented evidence that his speech had motivated the officer’s actions. See id. at 892 (“Well, Lt. Barber became very arrogant, you know, very very arrogant with me, like, look I don’t have to answer your questions, this is the way we do it. You don’t like it, you know, that’s just like too bad. So I responded to him, you know, you’re really being [an] asshole. And he took great exception to that.... He said to me, ‘You can’t talk to me like that in my building.’ ... I said to him — I responded, I said, ‘What do you mean I can’t talk to you like this in your building.’ I said, ‘This is ... ’ — this is— ‘I’m exercising my freedom of speech.’ I said, ‘This is the United States of America and we have freedom of speech here and if you don’t like it you should move to anoth*507er country.’ ... [He answered], ‘Well, not in my building,’ again, very adamantly. ‘Not in my building,’ just like that. And that’s when I told him, I said, “Well, if that’s how you feel you’re really stupid.’ And that’s when he turned to me and said, ‘You’re under arrest.’ ”).
McCurdy v. Montgomery County, 240 F.3d 512 (6th Cir.2001), offers still less support for Swiecicki’s claim. It holds only that it is clearly established that individuals may verbally challenge an officer’s authority. Id. at 520. McCurdy did not have before it, and thus did address, the question whether the suspect’s words motivated the officer’s actions — because the district court had not addressed that question. See id. (“Because the district court did not address whether McCurdy’s arrest was at least partially motivated by protected conduct, we remand for further proceedings.”); see also Doyle v. McFadden, 182 Fed.Appx. 506, 509, 2006 WL 1479047, at *2 (6th Cir.2006) (“The McCurdy court remanded the case, as the district court had failed to inquire about whether speech was a motivating factor in the arrest.”).
At any rate, “What did I do wrong?” offers a poor analogy to the provocative speech at issue in that ease. See id. at 515-16 (“McCurdy ... demanded [of Officer Cole], ‘what the fu*k do you want?’ ” and “exclaimed ‘what the fu*k is your job?’ ” and stated that “he did not have to do ‘sh*t’ that Officer Cole ordered.”). It is one thing to say that the plaintiffs protestations in McCurdy might have established a triable issue of fact about free-speech retaliation on remand (the case settled before the trial court could decide the issue); it is quite another to say that “What did I do wrong?” definitively does so.