Court Opinion

ID: 9928667
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 20:03:58.68456+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:52:52.803420
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/31/24 Zeppieri v. Archuleta CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION THREE

 WALTER ZEPPIERI,                                                    B317305

      Cross-complainant and                                          (Los Angeles County
 Respondent,                                                         Super. Ct. No. 20STLC02638)

          v.

 ANDREW ARCHULETA et al.,

          Cross-defendants and Appellants.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Barbara M. Scheper, Judge. Affirmed.
      Pettis Law Firm, James C. Pettis, and Vincent Unuorakpor
for Cross-Defendants and Appellants.
      Law Offices of T. Britt Rudman and T. Britt Rudman for
Cross-Complainant and Respondent.
                 ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
       This appeal is from a default judgment in the amount of
$430,913 entered against cross-defendants Andrew Archuleta
(Archuleta) and Archuleta Construction LLC (Archuleta LLC)
(collectively, defendants). Defendants contend the default
judgment is void because the cross-complaint did not specify the
damages sought, and the summons served on Archuleta LLC did
not contain language required by Code of Civil Procedure1 section
412.30.
       As we discuss, the damages awarded in the default
judgment did not exceed those pled in the cross-complaint, and
the evidence establishes that the summons served on Archuleta
LLC contained the mandatory language. Accordingly, we affirm
the default judgment.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.    Cross-complaint.
       In March 2020, Wesco Insurance Company filed a
complaint seeking indemnity under a construction bond against
Archuleta and Walter Zeppieri, among others. Thereafter,
Walter Zeppieri d/b/a Walter Zeppieri Construction (Zeppieri)
filed a cross-complaint alleging contract and tort causes of action
against defendants.2 The cross-complaint alleged that Zeppieri
was the general contractor on a construction project in Agua
Dulce, California (the project). Zeppieri subcontracted with
defendants to perform the project’s excavation, grading, and pipe

1     All subsequent undesignated statutory references are to
the Code of Civil Procedure.
2     Only the cross-complaint is relevant to this appeal, and
thus we will not further discuss the underlying complaint.

                                 2
work. The subcontract provided that defendants would work six
days a week and would complete their work by May 7, 2018;
however, they failed to do so, causing substantial delays to the
project. Further, defendants did substandard work that did not
pass inspections, failed to pay some of their equipment suppliers,
and abandoned their work under the subcontract, leaving the
project unfinished and unpermitted. The cross-complaint alleged
that Zeppieri therefore was damaged “in [an] amount not less
than $438,289.20,” as follows:
      —“In order to finish the [project], [Zeppieri] performed the
work of [defendants] himself, and retained other vendors,
equipment, and suppliers and another Sub-Contractor to finish
the work . . . and repair the defective work done by [defendants].
[Zeppieri] spent $233,371.12 over the amount paid to
[defendants] or on [their] behalf.”
      —“Additionally, when [defendants] failed to pay [an
equipment supplier] for Equipment [defendants] had rented for
the [project], [the supplier] filed a mechanics lien against the
[property] . . . and filed suit against the [property’s] owner.” As a
result, “Zeppieri was required to indemnify the [property] owner’s
attorney fees in the amount of $2,500.”
      —“Per the contract, [defendants] agreed that there would
be a $500 a day assessment from October 15, 2018 until the work
was completed. . . . Therefore, as a proximate result of
[defendants’] breach in not finalizing the contract, [defendants]
owe[ ] [Zeppieri] an amount of $183,500 in assessments.”
      —Zeppieri additionally “has been damaged in the amount
of $18,918.08,” the amount that he overpaid defendants on the
subcontract.

                                 3
       The cross-complaint alleged that “[t]he total amount of
damages incurred by [Zeppieri] as a proximate result of
[defendants’] breaches is $438,289.20 or an amount to be proven
at trial.” It sought damages “according to proof.”
II.   Default and default judgment.
       Zeppieri served defendants with the summons and
complaint by substituted service on July 23, 2020. Neither
defendant answered the cross-complaint, and on September 4,
2020, the court entered both defendants’ defaults.
       In June 2021, Zeppieri filed a request for entry of a default
judgment against defendants in the amount of $438,289, plus
prejudgment interest and costs, for a total of $546,358. The
following month, Archuleta, in propria persona, purported to file
an answer to the cross-complaint.
       In July 2021, the trial court held a hearing at which
Archuleta appeared without counsel. The court advised
Archuleta that he could not appear while in default status, and it
advised Zeppieri of problems related to the proposed default
judgment.
       In early September 2021, Archuleta, again in propria
persona, filed a motion to set aside the default. In his supporting
declaration, Archuleta stated that he had not been personally
served with the cross-complaint, he had not been aware of the
litigation, and the request for a default judgment sought damages
in excess of what was pled in the cross-complaint. On the merits,
Archuleta urged that he performed all work required under the
subcontract, he completed his work on time, and his work passed
all required inspections.
       In late September 2021, Zeppieri submitted an amended
declaration and request for default judgment seeking damages of

                                 4
$338,253, plus prejudgment interest of $92,116 and costs of $543,
for a total of $430,913.
       The trial court denied Archuleta’s motion to set aside the
default.3 On September 30, 2021, the court entered a default
judgment against defendants jointly and severally in the amount
of $430,913. The judgment included damages of $338,253,
prejudgment interest of $92,116, and costs of $543. Notice of
entry of judgment was served on October 7, 2021.
       Defendants timely appealed from the judgment.
                          DISCUSSION
       Defendants contend the default judgment is void because
(1) the cross-complaint did not specify Zeppieri’s alleged
damages, and (2) the summons served on Archuleta LLC did not
contain language required by section 412.30. As we discuss,
these claims lack merit.
I.    Appealability.
      We begin with the issue of appealability. The notice of
appeal filed on behalf of Archuleta LLC was signed by “Andrew
Archuleta, President of Archuleta Construction, LLC.” Zeppieri
urges that because a corporation cannot appear in propria
persona, the notice of appeal was invalid, and this court thus
lacks jurisdiction to consider Archuleta LLC’s appeal.
      Some older California cases held that an appeal must be
dismissed if a notice of appeal is signed only by a nonattorney
agent for a corporation. (See Eisenberg & Hepler, Cal. Practice

3     Defendants did not file a reporter’s transcript with this
appeal, and thus we cannot determine the basis for the trial
court’s ruling.

                                 5
Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2023)
¶ 3:125.7, citing Paradise v. Nowlin (1948) 86 Cal.App.2d 897,
898.) More recent cases, however, have treated a corporation’s
lack of representation by an attorney “as a defect that may be
corrected, on such terms as are just in the sound discretion of the
court.” (CLD Construction, Inc. v. City of San Ramon (2004)
120 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1149; and see Gamet v. Blanchard (2001)
91 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1282 [considering appeal on the merits,
even though notice of appeal had been filed on corporation’s
behalf by a majority shareholder].)
       In the present case, although Archuleta LLC’s notice of
appeal was signed by Archuleta, the LLC subsequently retained
counsel who filed appellate briefs on its behalf. We therefore
conclude that Archuleta LLP’s appeal is validly before us, and we
will consider it on the merits.
II.   The default judgment did not exceed the damages
      pled in the cross-complaint.
      Defendants urge that the default judgment entered against
them is void because it awarded damages in excess of what was
pled in the complaint. The contention is without merit.
      Section 580 provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he relief
granted to the plaintiff, if there is no answer, cannot exceed that
demanded in the complaint.” (Subd. (a).) Our Supreme Court
has explained that the notice requirement of section 580 is
designed to insure “ ‘fundamental fairness’ ”: “[D]ue process
requires notice to defendants, whether they default by inaction or
by willful obstruction, of the potential consequences of a refusal
to pursue their defense. Such notice enables a defendant to
exercise his right to choose—at any point before trial, even after
discovery has begun—between (1) giving up his right to defend in

                                 6
exchange for the certainty that he cannot be held liable for more
than a known amount, and (2) exercising his right to defend at
the cost of exposing himself to greater liability.” (Greenup v.
Rodman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 822, 826, 829.) To this end, “a default
judgment entered in violation of section 580 is void and must be
vacated.” (Dhawan v. Biring (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 963, 975
(Dhawan); see also Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania v.
American Safety Indemnity Co. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 898, 909
[“ ‘section 580 is to be interpreted, in accordance with its plain
language, to deprive a trial court of jurisdiction to enter a
judgment against a defaulting defendant which awards greater
relief than that sought in the plaintiff’s complaint’ ”].) Whether a
default judgment violates section 580 is a question of law that we
review de novo. (Dhawan, at p. 968; see also Calvert v. Al Binali
(2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 954, 961 [“[W]hether a judgment is void on
its face is a question of law, which we review de novo”].)
       Case law is clear that while the amount of a default
judgment cannot exceed the damages pled in the complaint, the
damages allegation need not appear in the prayer for relief.
Instead, a defendant may “be notified by the prayer [citation] or
allegations in the body of the complaint of the damages sought.”
(National Diversified Services, Inc. v. Bernstein (1985)
168 Cal.App.3d 410, 417–418, italics added; see also Greenup v.
Rodman, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 829–830 [“the allegations of a
complaint may cure a defective prayer for damages”].) For
example, in Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania v. American
Safety Indemnity Co., supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 909–910, the
court held that although a complaint’s prayer for judgment did
not state a specific amount of damages, the body of the complaint
incorporated by reference an arbitration claim attached as an

                                 7
exhibit to the complaint, and thus a default judgment that was
less than the amount of damages alleged in the arbitration claim
did not violate section 580. Similarly, in Greenup, supra, at
page 830, the court held that although a complaint did not
specifically allege the amount of the plaintiff’s claimed damages,
the trial court nonetheless had jurisdiction to enter a default
judgment of $15,000 because the complaint alleged that plaintiff
suffered damages “ ‘in an amount that exceeds the jurisdictional
requirements of [a limited jurisdiction] court,’ ” which was then
$15,000.
       In the present case, defendants urge that the default
judgment is void under section 580 because while the cross-
complaint “contains allegations in some of its 126 paragraphs
relating to amounts paid or damages purportedly incurred in
different amounts,” it “never demands or prays for an amount.”
Instead, defendants assert, the cross-complaint “prays for
damages ‘in an amount subject to proof at trial’ or similar
language.” We do not agree. While the cross-complaint’s prayer
did not demand a specific monetary recovery, the body of the
cross-complaint did. Specifically, the cross-complaint alleged
that, as a proximate result of defendants’ breaches, Zeppieri
suffered “total amount of damages . . . [of] $438,289.20,”
comprised of $233,371.12 to retain subcontractors to complete the
work defendants had been hired to do, $2,500 in recoverable
attorney fees, $183,500 in assessments, and $18,918.08 in
overpayments. Under the authorities cited above, these
allegations were sufficient to put defendants on notice that
Zeppieri was seeking damages of at least $438,289.20.
       Defendants urge that the allegations of the complaint are
insufficient because they are “ ‘ “allegations of fact which [happen

                                 8
to] include numbers,” ’ ” not “demands for relief.” But the cases
on which defendants rely do not require any particular language
to put defendants on notice of the damages sought against them.
Instead, these cases require only that a complaint “distinguish
between allegations of damages, and allegations of fact which
include numbers.” (Heidary v. Yadollahi (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th
857, 866, italics added and omitted (Heidary).) Thus, for
example, an allegation that the defendants, who were the
plaintiffs’ former business partners, transferred funds between
accounts maintained for the benefit of the parties’ jointly owned
businesses did not support entry of a default judgment because
“[i]n and of itself, the allegation demonstrates no damages.”
(Ibid.) Similarly, an allegation that the defendants released a
$20,000 certificate of deposit to the State Board of Equalization
did “not amount to an assertion of damages. To the contrary, it
merely recites payments made for the benefit of the jointly owned
business.” (Ibid.) In contrast, the court said, had the complaint
alleged that the defendants transferred money from a business
account for their own personal use, “that might be a different
story.” (Ibid.) What is required of the trial court, therefore, is to
compare the amounts sought at the default prove-up with “the
properly pled damages for each defaulting party.”
(Id. at p. 868, italics added.)
       Heidary does not assist defendants. As we have described,
the cross-complaint in the present case specifically alleged
Zeppieri’s damages proximately caused by defendants’ alleged
wrongdoing, and the default judgment did not exceed those
alleged damages. While the complaint also contained other
allegations containing numbers (i.e., ¶ 41 [“The total amount of
the contract price as $96,000”], ¶ 43 [Zeppieri “paid over $73,340

                                  9
to Cross-Defendants”], ¶ 107 [“Zeppieri has sustained and will
sustain damages which exceeds the jurisdictional limits of the
Court (over $25,000)”]), Zeppieri did not seek a default judgment
based on those allegations. The default judgment entered in the
present case, therefore, does not run afoul of Heidary.
       Nor are defendants assisted by Becker v. S.P.V.
Construction Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 489, which defendants say
holds that damages must be “ ‘specifically requested’ ” to support
a default judgment. Not so. Instead, Becker holds: “The notice
requirement of section 580 was designed to insure fundamental
fairness. Surely, this would be undermined if the door were
opened to speculation, no matter how reasonable it might appear
in a particular case, that a prayer for damages according to proof
provided adequate notice of a defaulting defendant’s potential
liability. . . . Consequently, a prayer for damages according to
proof passes muster under section 580 only if a specific amount of
damages is alleged in the body of the complaint.” (Id. at p. 494,
italics added; see also id. at pp. 494–495 [default judgment was
void insofar as it awarded damages in excess of $20,000 where
“the specific amount of damages alleged in the complaint was
$20,000”].) In the present case, as we have said, specific damages
were alleged in the body of the complaint, curing any infirmity in
the prayer for relief.
       Finally, defendants are not assisted by Dhawan, supra,
241 Cal.App.4th 963. There, it was undisputed that the
complaint did not allege the amount of the plaintiff’s damages;
the issue on appeal was whether the plaintiff nonetheless had
met the requirements of section 580 by serving the defendant

                               10
with a statement of damages pursuant to section 425.11.4 The
present case does not concern a statement of damages under
section 425.11, and therefore it is not relevant to our analysis.
      For the foregoing reasons, the trial court properly
concluded that the default judgment was not void under section
580.
III.   The trial court did not err in denying the motion to
       set aside the default for lack of personal jurisdiction
       over Archuleta LLC.
      Defendants contend that the trial court did not obtain
personal jurisdiction over Archuleta LLC because the summons
did not state that Andrew Archuleta was being served on behalf
of Archuleta LLC, as required by section 412.30. The claim lacks
merit.5

4      Section 425.10 provides that where an action is brought to
recover actual or punitive damages for personal injury or
wrongful death, the amount demanded “shall not be stated” in
the complaint. In order to take the defendant’s default in such a
case, therefore, the plaintiff is required to serve on the defendant
a statement setting forth the nature and amount of damages
being sought. (§ 425.11, subd. (b).) The issue in Dhawan was
whether a statement of damages could satisfy defects in the
complaint in a case other than for personal injury or wrongful
death.
5      We note that only Archuleta filed a motion to set aside the
default, and thus Archuleta LLC arguably forfeited the
contention by failing to raise it below. However, because the
issue is a purely legal one—and because a void judgment can be
attacked at any time (Gamet v. Blanchard, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1286)—we will exercise our discretion to consider the issue

                                 11
      A.    Service of summons and complaint.
       A summons is issued at a plaintiff’s request by the superior
court clerk, who retains the original summons in the court files
and provides a copy to the plaintiff. (§ 412.10.) Pursuant to
section 412.30, in an action against a corporation or an
unincorporated association, the service copy of the summons
must “contain a notice stating in substance: ‘To the person
served: You are hereby served in the within action (or special
proceeding) on behalf of (here state the name of the corporation
or the unincorporated association) as a person upon whom a copy
of the summons and of the complaint may be delivered to effect
service on said party under the provisions of (here state
appropriate provisions of Chapter 4 (commencing with Section
413.10) of the Code of Civil Procedure).’ ” If such notice does not
appear on the copy of the summons served, “no default may be
taken against such corporation or unincorporated association.”
(§ 412.30.)
       Consistent with section 412.30, Judicial Council form
SUM–100 contains the following language:

on the merits. (E.g., People v. Rodriguez (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th
890, 904 [appellate court may exercise its discretion to review a
forfeited claim].)

                                12
      “NOTICE TO THE PERSON SERVED: You are served:
      “1.    □      as an individual defendant.
      “2.    □      as the person sued under the fictitious name of
                    (specify):
      “3.    □      on behalf of (specify):
      “Under:       □ CCP 416.10 (corporation)
                    □ CCP 416.20 (defunct corporation)
                    □ CCP 416.40 (association or partnership)
                    □ other (specify):
                    □ CCP 416.60 (minor)
                    □ CCP 416.70 (conservatee)
                    □ CCP 416.90 (authorized person)”
      A summons may be served personally or by substituted
service by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint.
(§§ 415.10, 415.20.) Service on an unincorporated association,
including a limited liability company, may be made on the person
designated as agent for service of process. (§ 416.40.)
      All proofs of personal service shall be made on a form
adopted by the Judicial Council. (§ 417.10.) If a summons is
served personally or by substituted service, proof of service shall
be made “by the affidavit of the person making the service
showing the time, place, and manner of service and facts showing
that the service was made in accordance with this chapter.”
(§ 417.10, subd. (a).) The affidavit shall recite “the name of the
person to whom a copy of the summons and of the complaint were
delivered, and, if appropriate, his or her title or the capacity in
which he or she is served, and that the notice required by Section
412.30 appeared on the copy of the summons served, if in fact it
did appear.” (Ibid., italics added.)

                                13
      In accordance with these sections, the Judicial Council
adopted form POS-010, which includes the following language:
      “6.   The ‘Notice to the Person Served’ (on the summons)
was completed as follows:
      “a.   □      as an individual defendant.
      “b.   □      as the person sued under the fictitious name of
                   (specify):
      “c.   □      as occupant.
      “d.   □      On behalf of (specify):
       “under the following Code of Civil Procedure section:
            □ 416.10 (corporation)
            □ 416.20 (defunct corporation)
            □ 416.30 (joint stock company/association)
            □ 416.40 (association or partnership)
            □ 416.50 (public entity)
            □ 416.95 (business organization, form unknown)
            □ 416.60 (minor)
            □ 416.70 (ward or conservatee)
            □ 416.90 (authorized person)
            □ 415.46 (occupant)
            □ other:”
      After a summons is served, “proof of service of the
summons as provided in Section 417.10 or 417.20 shall be filed.”
(§ 417.30.) Filing a proof of service that shows on its face
compliance with the statutory requirements creates a rebuttable
presumption of proper service. (Yolo County Dept. of Child
Support Services v. Myers (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 42, 47, fn. 2
(Yolo County); American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011)
199 Cal.App.4th 383, 390; Floveyor Internat., Ltd. v. Superior
Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 789, 795 (Floveyor); see also

                                14
Evid. Code 647 [registered process server’s return establishes a
presumption of the facts stated in the return].)
      B.    Motion to set aside entry of default or default
            judgment.
       A party may move to set aside a void judgment or order
under section 473, subdivision (d). “ ‘A default judgment is void if
the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the parties.’ (Falahati v.
Kondo (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 823, 830.) A default judgment
entered against a defendant who was not served in the manner
prescribed by statute is void. (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co.
(1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1444.) ‘Under section 473,
subdivision (d), the court may set aside a default judgment which
is valid on its face, but void, as a matter of law, due to improper
service.’ (Ellard v. Conway (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 540, 544.)”
(First American Title Ins. Co. v. Banerjee (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th
37, 42 (First American).)
       If a trial court considers disputed evidence concerning
whether service was proper, our review is for abuse of discretion
or substantial evidence. (First American, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th
at p. 42.) But where, as here, there are no conflicts in the
evidence, “the question of jurisdiction is purely one of law and the
reviewing court engages in an independent review of the record.”
(Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th
434, 449; see also Preciado v. Freightliner Custom Chassis
Corporation (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 964, 975.)
      C.    Analysis.
     In the present case, Zeppieri filed a proof of service of
summons executed on Judicial Council form POS-010 by
Marcos Garcia, a licensed process server. Sections 2 through 5 of

                                15
the proof of service stated that Garcia substitute-served
Archuleta LLC through Andrew Archuleta, “a person authorized
to accept service of process,” with copies of the summons and
cross-complaint on July 23, 2020. Section 6 of the proof of service
stated that the “ ‘Notice to the Person Served’ (on the summons)
was completed . . . on behalf of: [¶] ARCHULETA
CONTRUCTION LLC,” a “Limited Liability Company.”
       Under the authorities cited above, the proof of service
created a rebuttable presumption that Archuleta LLC was
properly served with the summons and complaint. The burden
therefore shifted to Archuleta LLC to establish with admissible
evidence that it was not properly served. (See Pacifica First
National, Inc. v. Abekasis (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 654, 656
[because plaintiff put a proper proof of service into evidence,
burden shifted to defendant to prove that service was invalid].)
It did not do so. Although Archuleta stated in a declaration that
he was not served personally, he neither suggested that there
were any defects in the proof of service nor provided the court
with a copy of the allegedly defective proof of service.
       Defendants contend that they met their burden to
demonstrate improper service by drawing the trial court’s
attention to the summons in the court file, which did not contain
the language required by section 412.30. But as Zeppieri
correctly notes, the summons to which defendants cite is the
original summons retained by the court, not the copy served on
Archuleta LLC. The portion of the summons form that contains
the language required by section 412.30 “is usually left blank
when the summons is issued, because the contents may vary for
each defendant,” and is filled out prior to service. (Weil & Brown,
Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter

                                16
Group 2023) ¶ 4:91.) Thereafter, a copy of the fully executed
summons served on a defendant is not generally filed with the
court; instead, the plaintiff files proof of service of the summons,
as Zeppieri did in this case. The fact that the original summons
in the court file does not contain the language required by section
412.30 therefore does not give rise to an inference that Zeppieri
failed to comply with the statutory service requirements.
       Defendants contend, finally, that the process server’s
declaration in the proof of service was insufficient because it
“does not have the requisite statutory language.”6 But it is the
summons, not the proof of service, that is required to contain the
language of section 412.30. And, as noted above, the proof of
service filed by the process server in this case contains precisely
the language required by Judicial Council Form POS-010, which
is required by statute for use in this context. (See § 417.10, subd.
(f) [“All proof of personal service shall be made on a form adopted
by the Judicial Council.”]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.150
[computer-generated form may be substituted for the Judicial
Council’s proof of service].)

6     Defendants urge that “the process server’s declaration
cannot confer jurisdiction on the court” because “it is the
summons, not the process server, which asserts judicial power.”
Defendants are correct that the court’s personal jurisdiction over
them results from proper service of the summons, not the process
server’s declaration—but the proof of service nonetheless is
competent evidence of proper service of the summons. (E.g., Yolo
County, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 48, fn. 2; Floveyor, supra,
59 Cal.App.4th at p. 795.)

                                17
                       DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded his
appellate costs.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                                       EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

                 LAVIN, J.

                 EGERTON, J.

                              18