Court Opinion

ID: 9390049
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-26 19:02:56.642712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:31.317006
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/26/23 P. v. Cole CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,                                                B318976

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                         (Los Angeles County
                                                           Super. Ct. No. GA107090)
         v.

ODDIS V. COLE III,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Dorothy L. Shubin, Judge. Affirmed.
      Laura R. Vavakin, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
      Defendant and appellant Oddis Vermont Cole III
(defendant) appeals from the judgment entered following
termination of his probation and imposition of sentence. He
contends that he was entitled to remand to determine whether
custody credits are due for the substance abuse treatment
program he attended as a condition of probation. Finding no
merit to defendant’s claim, we affirm the judgment.

                         BACKGROUND
       In May 2020 defendant was charged with one count of
attempted second degree robbery. It was also alleged that
defendant had three prior serious or violent felonies under the
“Three Strikes” law, sections 667, subdivisions (b)-(j), and
1170.12, and under the five-year recidivist enhancement of
section 667, subdivision (a)(1). On June 23, 2020, defendant
entered into a plea agreement whereby the information was
amended to add as count 2, felony possession of a dirk or dagger
in violation of Penal Code section 21310,1 to which he pled no
contest. Pursuant to the agreement, the prosecution
recommended formal probation with a one-year mental health
program. The matter was continued, and eventually the trial
court heard from a representative of the Department of Mental
Health recommending treatment at its Men’s Community
Reintegration Program (MCRP). On November 13, 2020, the
trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed
defendant on three years of formal probation, conditioned upon
365 days in the county jail with credit for time served of 365

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise specified.

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days.2 The court ordered defendant released to a representative
of the MCRP and to comply with all of the program’s terms and
conditions, including a minimum of six months of residential
treatment, random drug testing and complying with injected
medication as directed. Among other conditions, defendant was
also ordered to complete a minimum of one year of mental health
treatment and remain in the program until released or
discharged by the clinical team. The remaining count and special
allegations were dismissed.
       On January 7, 2021, the court was notified that defendant
was accepted at MCRP and would be transported from the jail to
the Millennium House where he would remain in the residential
substance abuse treatment program for a minimum of six
months. The Department of Mental Health and MCRP
submitted regular monthly progress reports. The court was
notified that defendant had completed the six-month program
and MCRP was searching for a mental health program. On
August 6, 2021, the Department of Mental Health reported that
although defendant was still considered a resident of Millennium
House his whereabouts were unknown. The court was also
notified that defendant had been charged in a new case.
       Probation was revoked and a no bail bench warrant issued.
After defendant was taken into custody at a hearing on
February 2, 2022, the court was informed by counsel that
defendant’s case manager at MCRP had recommended River
Community, the only mental health program considered suitable

2    Defendant waived the application of additional credits he
had earned, so that he would qualify for local custody, with the
understanding they would be available in the future if he violated
probation.

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for him. Defendant rejected River Community, and counsel
advised him that the only alternative would be imposition of
sentence. Defense counsel also informed the court that he had
calculated custody credits at almost 737 days. He requested that
the matter be continued for further discussion, which the trial
court granted.
       On February 22, 2022, defense counsel reported that
defendant was inclined to accept the court’s indicated sentence
but he wanted a recalculation of custody credits to include the
six-month residential treatment program through MCRP. The
trial court agreed that defendant was only entitled to credit from
the date of his original plea on November 13, 2020, and the date
of his transportation to the program on January 7, 2021. The
court would “certainly consider whatever [counsel] submit[ted]
regarding residential treatment through M.C.R.P. and any legal
basis to get credit for that,” and granted a continuance to
March 3, 2022, for that purpose.
       On March 3, 2022, the trial court reiterated its prior
indicated disposition to impose the high term of three years with
credits calculated by defense counsel. When asked to state the
credits he had calculated and what additional information
obtained concerning eligibility for credit for the time spent at
Millennium House, counsel explained that he had contacted
MCRP and was advised that MCRP’s planned residential
treatment program was unavailable to defendant due to problems
with his Supplemental Security Income benefits and
overcrowding caused by COVID-19. Therefore defendant had
been transferred to Millennium House for the court-ordered six-
month program. Counsel stated that MCRP advised him
Millennium House was not classified as a residential treatment

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program, but rather an “R.D.H.” location, meaning defendant had
full off-campus privileges from the time he entered the program.
Counsel nonetheless asked that defendant be given custody credit
for the six months he spent there. The request was denied.
       The trial court then asked defendant: “Understanding all
that do you wish to proceed with the admission of the violation at
this time?” Defendant expressed confusion about not receiving
credit for the program. After a discussion with defendant and an
attempt to explain his credits, the court gave defendant the
opportunity to confer with counsel. After recess, the court asked
counsel whether he had any authority or additional information
regarding the Millennium House. Counsel did not and had asked
defendant if he wanted to continue the case. Defendant said he
would rather resolve the case then. The court indicated its
decision would be based on defense counsel’s representation that
the Millennium House was not a residential treatment program.
Defendant still did not understand why the court received the
progress reports from Millennium House and allowed him to
continue in the program, but now told him that it was not in a
residential program.
       The following colloquy then ensued:
             “The court: . . . I’ve provided you with the
       information received from [defense counsel]. I’ve
       offered a further opportunity if you want to put this
       over, and we can do that. But I’m not going to
       continue to debate the information that has already
       been provided by [defense counsel]. [¶] So do you
       wish to continue this matter so you can discuss it
       further with your attorney?
            “The defendant: No.

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           “The court: Or would you like to proceed with
      an admission today or you can set it for hearing?
           “The defendant: No, I would like to proceed. I
      would like to be sentenced, and I’d like to file an
      appeal.”
      Defendant admitted the violation and the trial court
terminated probation, sentenced him to the upper term of three
years in prison, with credit of 905 days of credit, consisting of 453
actual days plus 452 days of conduct credit, and imposed
statutory fines and fees.
      Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the
judgment.

                            DISCUSSION
       Defendant contends this matter should be remanded so his
counsel can further develop a factual basis in favor of an award of
custody credit for the time spent at Millennium House.
       Section 2900.5, subdivision (a), provides that a defendant
“shall be credited” for all days spent in custody, including time
spent in a “rehabilitation facility . . . or similar residential
institution,” “including days served as a condition of probation in
compliance with a court order.” “The right to credit is based not
on the procedure by which a defendant is placed in such a facility,
but on the requirements that the placement be ‘custodial’
[citations], and that such custody be ‘attributable to proceedings
related to the same conduct for which the defendant has been
convicted.’ (Pen. Code, § 2900.5, subd. (b).)” (People v. Mobley
(1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 320, 323.) “ ‘[C]ustody’ ” connotes
restraints not shared by public generally, and restrictive

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residential treatment facilities may be found to be custodial. (See
People v. Rodgers (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 26, 31.)
       “The question of whether a particular facility should be
regarded as sufficiently restrictive as to amount to custody
constitutes a factual question [citation] even though certain
facilities by their very nature involve some restraint on
untrammeled liberty [citation].” (People v. Ambrose (1992) 7
Cal.App.4th 1917, 1922.) Factors relevant to the determination
include “ ‘the extent freedom of movement is restricted,
regulations governing visitation, rules regarding personal
appearance, and the rigidity of the program’s daily schedule.’ ”
(Id. at p. 1921.) For example, in a case cited by defendant,
although the prosecution stipulated that the facility for which
credit was sought, Delancey Street Foundation, was a “ ‘halfway
house, rehabilitation facility . . . or similar institution’ ” within
the meaning of section 2900.5, the sentencing court found that it
did not meet the “ ‘in custody’ ” requirement. (See People v.
Rodgers, supra, 79 Cal.App.3d at p. 29.) The appellate court
disagreed, finding no question that residents were “subjected to
extreme restraints not shared by the public generally, and, for
that matter, some of which are not shared even by persons in jail
or otherwise incarcerated,” such as a one-year prohibition against
any communication with anyone outside the Foundation,
including spouses and children, and a six-month prohibition
against leaving the facility unescorted. (Id. at p. 31.)
       Defendant acknowledges that defense counsel did not
provide any such information. However, he argues because
section 2900.5 subdivision (d) imposes a duty upon the sentencing
court to determine credits, the inadequate record did not relieve
the court of its duty to make its own inquiry as to relevant

                                 7
factors. We disagree that section 2900.5 subdivision (d) imposes
a sua sponte duty upon the trial court to gather evidence to
support defendant’s claim. Rather, that provision requires the
sentencing court to calculate the number of days for which a
defendant is entitled to credit and apply that number to an
established mathematical formula. (People v. Jack (1989) 213
Cal.App.3d 913, 917.) That calculation amounts to a ministerial
duty. (Ibid.) On the other hand, it is the defendant’s burden to
demonstrate that he is entitled to custody credits. (People v.
Shabazz (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1257–1258.)
       Defendant contends that the failure of both the court and
his counsel to provide the necessary information resulted in a
silent record. Relying on In re Wolfenbarger (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d
201, defendant asserts that a silent record requires remand to
allow him to provide the information. Defendant’s reliance is
misplaced. In Wolfenbarger, the sentencing court refused to
consider the issue at all, ruling: “ ‘Request is denied on the
grounds this Court has not given time for time spent in local drug
programs and does not feel that is required under the appropriate
drug statutes.’ ” (Id. at p. 204.) The appellate court remanded
that case because “[t]he silence result[ed] from the trial court’s
summary rejection of the possibility that time spent in a local
drug program could result in credit for presentence
incarceration.” (Id. at p. 206.)
       There was no such summary refusal to consider the issue
here. Defendant was given ample opportunity to meet his burden.
On February 4, 2022, after the trial court satisfied its ministerial
duty to calculate the credits due from the time of defendant’s plea
to his transport to the program, the court continued the hearing
twice at defendant’s counsel’s request to obtain the necessary

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information regarding Millennium House. On February 22, the
trial court granted defense counsel’s request for a continuance to
March 3 to collect information regarding the residential
treatment and the legal basis to award credit. On March 3, 2022,
defense counsel still could not provide further information or the
legal basis for the award. At defendant’s expressed confusion,
the trial court gave him time to confer with counsel, engaged him
in a discussion on the record in an attempt to explain the issue,
and gave him a choice to continue the hearing. Defendant
declined and asked to proceed with the probation violation and to
be sentenced that day. The court explained to defendant his
hearing rights, which defendant said he understood and waived.
The court then accepted his admission upon finding it to have
been freely and voluntarily given. In sum, defendant’s counsel
acknowledged that defendant was not entitled to custody credits
for his stay at Millennium House, and defendant refused any
further attempt to provide additional information.
       As the trial court’s orders are presumed correct, it is
defendant’s burden, not only to present a record adequate for
review, but also to affirmatively demonstrate error. (See Denham
v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564–565.) As defendant
has failed to meet his burden to show entitlement to credit for his
stay at Millennium House with an adequate record and that the
trial court erred, we have no basis to remand for further
proceedings.

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                       DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                ________________________
                                CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

________________________
LUI, P. J.

________________________
HOFFSTADT, J.

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