Court Opinion

ID: 9380735
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-21 13:02:42.990894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:27.276250
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
  Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
  opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
  prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
  official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                  Decided: March 21, 2023

                     S23A0110. MEADOWS v. THE STATE.

       ELLINGTON, Justice.

       Roden         Meadows             appeals          his      convictions           for      murder,

aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the

commission of a felony arising from the fatal shooting of Jason

Williams. 1 On appeal, Meadows contends that the evidence was

       1The crimes occurred on May 15, 2018. On August 14, 2018, Meadows
was indicted by a DeKalb County grand jury for malice murder (Count 1);
felony murder (Count 2); aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (Count 3);
and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 4). In
August 2019, a jury found Meadows guilty on all counts. On September 10,
2019, the trial court sentenced Meadows to life imprisonment on Count 1 and
a consecutive 5-year sentence on Count 4 and purported to both merge Count
3 into Count 1 and also impose a 20-year sentence on Count 3 to run concurrent
with Count 1. Count 2 was vacated by operation of law. See Malcolm v. State,
263 Ga. 369, 372 (4) (434 SE2d 479) (1993). Meadows filed a motion for a new
trial on October 4, 2019, which was amended by new counsel on March 22,
2021. After both the State and Meadows waived an evidentiary hearing, the
trial court denied the motion for new trial on June 24, 2022. Meadows filed a
timely notice of appeal. The case was docketed in this Court to the term
beginning in December 2022 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
constitutionally insufficient and that this Court should exercise its

authority under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21 as the “thirteenth juror”

and grant him a new trial. He also argues that the trial court erred

in three instances by failing to rebuke the prosecutor for making

improper and prejudicial statements during closing arguments. We

conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Meadows’s

convictions and that this Court does not have authority under the

cited statutory law to sit as the “thirteenth juror.” We also conclude

that Meadows failed to preserve his challenges to two of the

prosecutor’s statements during closing arguments, and with respect

to the third instance, even if the trial court erred by failing to rebuke

the prosecutor, any error was harmless. Although not raised by

Meadows on appeal, we have identified in the record a merger error

related to the sentence the trial court entered on Count 3 of the

indictment. Because we cannot resolve this sentencing issue based

on the record before us, we vacate the merger of and sentence on

Count 3 and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

     1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the

                                   2
evidence presented at trial showed the following. On the day of the

crimes, Meadows and an unidentified male met Williams in the

parking lot of a DeKalb County grocery store. The three men left the

grocery store parking lot in a blue sedan driven by the unidentified

male, with Meadows seated in the front passenger seat and Williams

seated in the rear seat on the passenger’s side. The three men drove

to a nearby gas station, where Meadows went inside the store to

make a purchase, leaving the driver and Williams inside the car.

While Meadows was in the store, the driver stood near the rear of

the car and pumped gas until Meadows returned, spoke to the

driver, and remained at the rear of the car pumping gas while the

driver returned to the car. Meanwhile, Williams got out of the car

and walked into the store. When Williams went in the store,

Meadows walked around the car to the rear passenger side where

Williams had been seated and looked inside the car. Meadows then

finished pumping the gas and returned to the front passenger seat.

Williams returned to the car after a few minutes, got into the back

seat, again sitting behind Meadows, and within 20 seconds of

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returning to the car, Williams was shot in the chest. After he was

shot, Williams opened the car door and ran a short distance before

he fell to the ground as Meadows and the unidentified driver sped

away with the car’s rear passenger door still open. Williams died at

the scene.

     Police were able to identify Meadows as one of the men inside

the car at the time of the shooting based on video surveillance and

evidence that Meadows’s debit card and PIN number were used

inside the gas station minutes before the shooting. Investigators also

discovered on Williams’s cellular phone an exchange of 36 text

messages with a telephone number ending in “2483” on the day of

the shooting. In this exchange, Williams’s phone received messages

about a plan to meet at the DeKalb County grocery store to conduct

a financial transaction. Just before 4:00 p.m. on the day of the

crimes, Williams’s phone received a final text message from the

phone number ending in “2483” stating, “Pulling in” to the grocery

store parking lot.

     After the shooting, a police officer interviewed Marcus Chivers,

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Meadows’s step-brother. Chivers told the officer that Meadows

owned a .40-caliber pistol that looked similar to the officer’s Glock

pistol. During the search of Meadows’s residence, investigators

discovered a box of .40-caliber hollow-point Winchester bullets in

Meadows’s bedroom. At trial, GBI forensic firearms expert testified

that the bullet recovered from Williams’s body was a .40-caliber

hollow-point bullet fired from a Smith & Wesson pistol. She stated

the bullet could have been manufactured by Winchester or

Remington, but her analysis was inconclusive on the exact

manufacturer.

     The medical examiner testified that Williams died as the result

of a single gunshot wound from a .40-caliber bullet. An autopsy

revealed an entrance and exit wound on Williams’s forearm and an

atypical entrance wound to the left side of Williams’s chest, the

shape of which indicated the bullet had passed through an object

prior to entering Williams’s chest. Based on the trajectory of the

bullet and characteristics of the wounds, the medical examiner

opined that a single bullet entered Williams’s forearm, exited the

                                 5
forearm, and entered his chest. The medical examiner testified that

she believed Williams was shot while in a defensive position with

his arm raised in front of his body, and based on the absence of soot

or stippling near the wounds, that the bullet was fired from a

distance of at least three to four feet.

     2. Meadows contends that the evidence was constitutionally

insufficient to support his convictions for malice murder and

possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. We

disagree.

     When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of

federal constitutional due process, we view the evidence presented

at trial in the light most favorable to the verdicts and consider

whether it was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of

which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319

(III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Moore v. State, 311 Ga.

506, 508 (2) (858 SE2d 676) (2021). This “limited review leaves to

the jury the resolution of conflicts in the evidence, the weight of the

                                    6
evidence, the credibility of witnesses, and reasonable inferences to

be made from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Rich v. State, 307 Ga.

757, 759 (1) (a) (838 SE2d 255) (2020) (citation and punctuation

omitted).

     Meadows asserts that the evidence presented at trial pointed

to the driver being responsible for shooting Williams and that he

was merely present in the car when Williams was shot. In support

of this argument, Meadows points to the medical examiner’s

testimony that no gun powder or stippling was found on Williams’s

body and that, in her opinion, the gun used to shoot Williams was

fired from three to four feet away. Meadows argues that this

evidence shows it was highly unlikely that Meadows shot Williams

from the front passenger seat.

     When properly viewed in the light most favorable to the

verdicts, however, the evidence presented at trial showed that

Meadows and the unidentified driver actively arranged to meet

Williams at a designated parking lot, and the three men then drove

to a gas station, where the driver and Meadows conversed and

                                 7
pumped gas while Williams went into the store. When Williams

returned to the car, someone inside the car, either Meadows or the

unidentified driver, shot Williams using a .40-caliber pistol loaded

with .40-caliber hollow-point bullets manufactured by either

Winchester or Remington. Meadows then fled the scene with the

driver of the car, without rendering any aid or assistance to

Williams. In addition, the evidence showed that Meadows was

known to own a .40-caliber pistol like the one used in the shooting

and .40-caliber hollow-point Winchester bullets were discovered by

police in Meadows’s bedroom. That evidence was sufficient for the

jury to find Meadows guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice

murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a

felony as either a direct participant or, if the driver was the actual

shooter, as Meadows contends, as a party to the crimes. See Jackson,

443 U. S. at 319 (III) (B); OCGA § 16-2-20 (b) (3) and (4) (a person is

a party to a crime if he “aids or abets in the commission of the crime”

or intentionally “advises, encourages, hires, counsels, or procures

another to commit the crime”); Williams v. State, 313 Ga. 325, 328

                                  8
(1) (869 SE2d 389) (2022) (conviction as a party to the crime requires

evidence of common intent and may be inferred from “presence,

companionship, and conduct before, during, and after the offense”)

(citation and punctuation omitted); Rawls v. State, 310 Ga. 209, 218-

219 (4) (a) (850 SE2d 90) (2020) (fact that a suspect fled the scene of

the crime points to the question of guilt in a circumstantial manner).

      3. Meadows next argues that the State failed to prove the .40-

caliber bullets found in his bedroom were from the same

manufacturer as the bullets used in the shooting, and therefore, this

Court should exercise its discretion as the thirteenth juror under

OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21 2 and grant him a new trial. This

argument has no merit, however, because the text of the statute

makes clear that this Court does not have authority to grant a

motion for new trial based on OCGA §§ 5-5-20 or 5-5-21, a conclusion

      2 The grounds set forth in OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21 authorize “the trial
judge to sit as a ‘thirteenth juror’ and to exercise his or her discretion to weigh
the evidence on a motion for new trial alleging these general grounds.” State v.
Holmes, 304 Ga. 524, 531 (3) (820 SE2d 26) (2018). Under these provisions, a
trial judge, not the appellate courts, may grant a new trial if the trial judge
concludes the verdict of the jury is “contrary to . . . the principles of justice and
equity,” OCGA § 5-5-20, or the verdict is “decidedly and strongly against the
weight of the evidence.” OCGA § 5-5-21.
                                         9
that our well-established case law confirms. See, e.g., Henderson v.

State, 304 Ga. 733, 734 (2) (822 SE2d 228) (2018) (rejecting

appellant’s request to grant a new trial based on OCGA §§ 5-5-20

and 5-5-21 because appellate courts “have no authority to grant such

a request”); Willis v. State, 263 Ga. 597, 598 (1) (436 SE2d 204)

(1993) (whether to grant a new trial under OCGA § 5-5-21 is solely

in the discretion of the trial court; an appellate court does not have

the same discretion).

     4. During closing arguments, the prosecutor, in three separate

instances, made statements which prompted defense counsel to

object on the ground that the statements were improper and highly

prejudicial. On appeal, Meadows asserts that the trial court

committed reversible error when it sustained his objections but

failed to rebuke, or sufficiently rebuke, the prosecutor. We disagree

in each of the challenged instances.

     Under OCGA § 17-8-75,

     [w]here counsel in the hearing of the jury makes
     statements of prejudicial matters which are not in
     evidence, it is the duty of the court to interpose and

                                 10
     prevent the same. On objection made, the court shall also
     rebuke the counsel and by all needful and proper
     instructions to the jury endeavor to remove the improper
     impression from their minds; or, in his discretion, he may
     order a mistrial if the prosecuting attorney is the offender.

“A trial court has broad discretion when responding to an alleged

violation of OCGA § 17-8-75,” Parker v. State, 276 Ga. 598, 599 (3)

(581 SE2d 7) (2003), and any error in “not fulfilling its duty under

OCGA § 17-8-75 is subject to harmless error analysis.” Stephens v.

State, 307 Ga. 731, 734 (1) (a) n.4 (838 SE2d 275) (2020).

     (a) During closing argument, Meadows objected and moved for

a mistrial based on the prosecutor’s argument referencing trial

evidence showing that Meadows was known to carry a .40-caliber

pistol, .40-caliber bullets were found in his bedroom, and the gun

used to shoot Williams was not found. Meadows argued this

statement was improper because evidence related to a .40-caliber

pistol investigators found during a search of Meadows’s car was

determined by the trial court in pre-trial proceedings to be

inadmissible at trial. Following Meadows’s objection, the trial court

                                  11
and the parties engaged in a long colloquy outside the presence of

the jury, after which, defense counsel withdrew his motion for

mistrial and the court sustained Meadows’s objection. The trial

court then stated it would instruct the jury to disregard the

prosecutor’s statements about the fact that the gun used in the

shooting was not presented as evidence at trial, and defense counsel

agreed, stating, “Yes, judge, that’s what I would ask.” When the jury

returned to the court room, the court instructed the jury that

Meadows’s objection was sustained, that closing arguments are not

evidence, and that they should disregard the prosecutor’s

statements about the absence of the gun.

     Under these circumstances, we need not determine whether

the trial court erred by failing to rebuke the prosecutor because the

trial court gave the agreed upon curative jury instructions, after

which Meadows failed to request any additional relief. Having

acquiesced to the remedy fashioned by the trial court, Meadows

cannot complain about the trial court’s failure to further rebuke the

prosecutor. See Stephens, 307 Ga. at 733-734 (1) (a) (“Where the

                                 12
objection to the prejudicial matter is sustained, the court has no duty

to rebuke counsel or give curative instructions unless specifically

requested by the defendant.”) (citation and punctuation omitted);

Ingram v. State, 290 Ga. 500, 503-504 (2) (722 SE2d 714) (2012) (“A

party cannot complain of a judgment, order, or ruling that his own

conduct produced or aided in causing.”) (citation and punctuation

omitted); Parker, 276 Ga. at 599 (3) (“A trial court’s ruling will not

be reversed for failing to go further than the objecting party

requests.”).

     (b) Meadows also contends the trial court erred when it failed

to rebuke the prosecutor after she stated in closing argument that

the State had been unable to retrieve the contents of certain

electronic devices investigators discovered in Meadows’s bedroom

and that if investigators had found any evidence in the devices, it

would have been presented to the jury. These statements were made

in response to defense counsel’s argument that the State had failed

to properly investigate the crimes or connect the electronic devices

to Meadows. Pretermitting whether this argument was improper

                                  13
under OCGA § 17-8-75, a trial court has no duty to rebuke a

prosecutor unless specifically requested by the defendant. See

Cheley v. State, 299 Ga. 88, 95 (5) (786 SE2d 642) (2016) (“[I]t is well

established that a trial court has no duty to rebuke a prosecutor

under [OCGA § 17-8-75] unless specifically requested by the

defendant.”); Woodham v. State, 263 Ga. 580 (1) (a) (439 SE2d 471)

(1993) (“trial court has no duty to rebuke counsel or give curative

instructions unless specifically requested by the defendant”). Here,

Meadows’s objection to the prosecutor’s comment about the

electronic devices was sustained, and Meadows did not ask the court

to rebuke the prosecutor or for any other corrective action.

Accordingly, the trial court, in this instance, had no duty to rebuke

the prosecutor.

     (c) Finally, Meadows asserts the trial court erred by failing to

rebuke the prosecutor for improperly commenting on Meadows’s

right to remain silent during closing arguments. The record shows

that during this portion of the State’s closing, the prosecutor argued,

based on reasonable inferences from the evidence, that Meadows

                                  14
was the person who texted Williams and arranged to meet him in

the grocery store parking lot and that Meadows knew the driver of

the blue sedan. The prosecutor stated:

     How did the person, the driver, know to come and pick up
     Mr. Meadows and the victim? Somebody had to have
     contacted this person, reasonably, right? Unless they’re
     saying it’s an Uber driver . . . people don’t, normally, sit
     in the front seat of a car of a person that they don’t know.
     But they do with a person that they do know. They also
     don’t normally pay for gas for people they don’t know. But
     they do for people that they do know.

     They also don’t go around the other side and help pump
     gas in the blue sedan for people they don’t know. But they
     do for people that they do know. So it’s reasonable to
     assume [Meadows] knew who the driver was and knows
     who the driver is of that blue sedan.

Defense counsel objected on the ground that the State was

commenting on Meadows’s right to remain silent and asked that the

court admonish the prosecutor in front of the jury and give a charge

on a defendant’s choice not to testify. The trial court sustained the

objection and charged the jury that closing arguments are not

evidence, that a defendant does not have to present any evidence nor

testify, and that if a defendant chooses not to testify, the jury was

                                 15
not to consider that in any way in making its decision. The trial court

also instructed the jury in its final charge that “[e]vidence does not

include . . . opening or closing remarks of the attorneys,” and the

“defendant does not have to present any evidence nor testify.”

     On this record, even assuming the trial court erred in this

instance by not rebuking the prosecutor under OCGA § 17-8-75, any

error was harmless. Considering the trial court’s instructions and

the strong evidence of Meadows’s guilt, including the gas station

video showing Meadows’s conduct before and after the crimes, we

conclude “it is highly probable that neither [these] statement[s] by

the prosecutor in closing argument, nor any alleged failure of the

trial court to comply with OCGA § 17-8-75, contributed to the

verdict.” Taylor v. State, 303 Ga. 583, 587 (3) (814 SE2d 302) (2018)

(any error by prosecutor in commenting on the defendant’s right to

remain silent was harmless considering overwhelming evidence of

the defendant’s guilt and trial court’s instruction to jury that

statements of counsel during closing are not evidence) (citation and

punctuation omitted).

                                  16
     5. Although not raised by Meadows on appeal, the record

reflects that the trial court merged Count 3, the aggravated assault

count, into Count 1, the malice murder count, but also imposed a 20-

year sentence on Count 3. A separate judgment of conviction and

sentence on Count 3 would be authorized, however, only if the

indictment averred and the State proved that Meadows committed

an aggravated assault independent of the act that resulted in

Williams’s death. See Nazario v. State, 293 Ga. 480, 480 (746 SE2d

109) (2013) (“A conviction that merges with another conviction is

void - a nullity- and a sentence imposed on such a void conviction is

illegal and will be vacated if noticed by this Court . . . .”); Culpepper

v. State, 289 Ga. 736, 738-739 (715 SE2d 155) (2011) (explaining that

a non-fatal aggravated assault and a fatal aggravated assault that

are separated by a “deliberate interval” may support separate

convictions and sentences). These circumstances can often require

us to vacate a defendant’s sentence and remand to the trial court for

new findings and resentencing. See Wheeler v. State, 314 Ga. 484,

487 (2) (877 SE2d 565) (2022). Remand is not necessary in this

                                   17
instance, however, because the indictment charged Meadows with

both murder and aggravated assault by alleging that he shot

Williams and there was no evidence showing that the shooting

occurred other than in a single transaction. Accordingly, Count 3

necessarily merged into the malice murder conviction as a matter of

fact, and the separate sentence for aggravated assault must be

vacated. See Miller v. State, 309 Ga. 549, 552 (3) (847 SE2d 344)

(2020) (When there is “no evidence to suggest the occurrence of an

aggravated assault independent of the act which caused the victim’s

death[,] . . . a jury’s guilty verdict on the aggravated assault merges

as a matter of fact with the malice murder verdict for sentencing

purposes.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

     Judgment affirmed and sentence vacated in part. All the
Justices concur.

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