Court Opinion

ID: 2964032
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:19:17.975158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:18.095688
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-1961
        No. 95-1984
        No. 95-2019
                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                 Plaintiff, Appellee,

                                          v.

                          CHARTER INTERNATIONAL OIL COMPANY,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                              ACUSHNET COMPANY, ET AL.,

                           Proposed Intervenors-Appellees.
                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                     [Hon. Robert E. Keeton, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                        Cyr, Boudin, and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
                                                ______________

                                 ____________________

            David B. Broughel,  with whom Jeffrey B.  Renton, and Day, Berry &
            _________________             __________________      ____________
        Howard  were  on  brief,  for  appellant,  Charter  International  Oil
        ______
        Company.

            David  M. Jones, with  whom Roger  C. Zehntner,  Irene C. Freidel,
            _______________             __________________   ________________
        Phoebe  S. Gallagher  and Kirkpatrick  & Lockhart  were on  brief, for
        ____________________      _______________________
        proposed intervenors-appellees, Acushnet et al.

            Evelyn S.  Ying, Attorney,  United States  Department of  Justice,
            _______________
        with  whom Lois  J.  Schiffer, Assistant  Attorney General,  Daniel C.
                   __________________                                _________
        Beckhard  and David C. Shilton, Attorneys, United States Department of
        ________      ________________
        Justice, were on brief, for the United States as appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                     May 9, 1996
                                 ____________________

                    LYNCH, Circuit  Judge.   The clean-up of  a Superfund
                    LYNCH, Circuit  Judge.
                           ______________

            hazardous waste site in New Bedford, Massachusetts is largely

            being   accomplished  and   funded  through   agreements  the

            government  has reached  with private  parties who  bear some

            legal  responsibility for  the  wastes at  the  site.   Those

            agreements, by  law, must be  approved by  the United  States

            Courts  as being  fair, reasonable,  and consistent  with the

            purposes of CERCLA, the Comprehensive Environmental Response,

            Compensation  and Liability  Act.   Multiples of  millions of

            dollars are involved in these settlements  and the stakes are

            high, both for the public and  for the parties involved.  The

            allocation of responsibility for payment of those millions --

            as  between the  public treasury and  the private  sector and

            amongst the private  players themselves -- has  given rise to

            complicated  settlement  dynamics.    Those  settlements  are

            subject  to  both the  court  approval  mechanism enacted  by

            Congress and to specific statutory clauses providing for (and

            protecting against) contribution  by some of  the potentially

            responsible parties  ("PRPs") to the settlement  sums paid by

            other such parties.

                    The question  presented here is whether  the district

            court  abused its  discretion in  approving a  CERCLA consent

            decree  between the government  and Charter International Oil

            Company arising  out of the Sullivan's  Ledge Superfund Site.

            What is unusual  is that the government and Charter disagreed

                                         -2-
                                          2

            in a very fundamental sense on  interpretation of the consent

            decree.    This, in turn,  raises the issue of  the extent to

            which  the scope  of "matters  addressed" in  the decree,  an

            issue  usually resolved in separate contribution actions, was

            required  to  be determined  by  the  district court  in  its

            approval of the consent decree.

                    Under the rubric  of approval of the decree, two sets

            of  private parties here  attempt to battle  out the ultimate

            allocation of contribution liability in a clean-up with costs

            estimated to be in  the order of $50 million.   Charter urges

            that    the   district   court   erred   in   rejecting   its

            interpretation,   which   would    give   Charter    complete

            contribution   protection  against  prior  settlors  for  its

            payment  of  $215,000 plus  interest.    The Acushnet  Group,

            comprised of prior settling  parties who have instituted such

            a  contribution  action  against  Charter,  urges   that  the

            district  court  erred  in  not  resolving  all  contribution

            questions in the course of approving the decree.

                    We affirm the district court's order.

            The Sullivan's Ledge Superfund Site
            ___________________________________

                    An  old granite quarry in  New Bedford was  used as a

            waste  disposal  area by  the city  from  1935 to  the 1970s.

            Local   industries  disposed   of  their   wastes,  including

            hazardous substances, into four  pits, extending as deep into

            the  bedrock as 150 feet.   The contaminants  from the wastes

                                         -3-
                                          3

            spread to  adjacent areas,  including some wetlands  known as

            Middle Marsh.

                    In  1984,  the EPA  placed  the  area, known  as  the

            Sullivan's Ledge Site, on the National Priorities List.   See
                                                                      ___

            40  C.F.R.  Pt.  300,   App.  B.    It  began   its  Remedial

            Investigation  and Feasibility  Study  of  the two  "operable

            units" on the Site: the entire Site save for the Middle Marsh

            ("first unit") and the Middle Marsh ("second unit").  The EPA

            found  significant hazardous  substances in  the groundwater,

            soils, and sediments of both units.

                    In  June 1989 EPA issued its Record of Decision ("ROD

            I")  as  to  the  first   unit,  calling  for  excavation  of

            contaminated   soils  and   sediments,  construction   of  an

            impermeable cap over the disposal area, groundwater treatment

            and wetlands remediation.   The government sued fourteen PRPs

            with  respect to  the first  unit (the  Acushnet  Group), who

            settled.  See  United States  v. Acushnet Co.,  Civ. No.  91-
                      ___  _____________     ____________

            10706-K  (D. Mass.).   The  district court entered  a consent

            decree  approving and  finalizing the  settlement  (the "1991

            Decree"). 

                    Under  the terms  of  the 1991  Decree, the  Acushnet

            Group paid $620,000 to the government for past costs incurred

            in  connection with ROD I.   The Group also agreed to perform

            the  ROD  I  remedy,  including  the  first  thirty years  of

            operation and  maintenance,  and  to pay  all  of  the  EPA's

                                         -4-
                                          4

            oversight  costs for  the first  five years  and half  of its

            oversight costs through the thirtieth year.

                    On September 27, 1991,  after completing its study of

            the contamination in the Middle Marsh wetlands area, the  EPA

            issued its remedy for the second  unit ("ROD II").  On  April

            26,  1993,  the  district  court  entered  a  consent  decree

            approving the  settlement between the government  and fifteen

            PRPs  (the  Acushnet  Group  and the  City  of  New Bedford).

            United States  v. AVX Corp.,  Civ. No. 93-10104-K  (D. Mass.)
            _____________     _________

            (the "1993 Decree").  The 1993 settlors agreed to perform the

            remedy  set forth  in ROD  II and  to pay  half of  the EPA's

            oversight costs with respect to the second unit.

                    Charter was offered the opportunity to participate in

            the  1991 Decree but declined  it, saying that  the price tag

            was too high  for what it believed its liability  to be.  The

            parties to both the 1991 and 1993 Decrees understood that the

            government had a larger total claim relating to the Site than

            the recovery  it had obtained  from the initial  settlors and

            that  the government  planned to  seek further  recovery from

            parties  who had not  yet settled.  That  is exactly what the

            government did,  bringing a  series of lawsuits  against non-

            settling PRPs,1 including suit against Charter.

                                
            ____________________

            1.  The  government  brought a  cost  recovery  suit for  its
            shortfall on the first unit against two non-settlors.  United
                                                                   ______
            States v.  Cornell-Dubilier Electronics,  Inc., Civ.  No. 92-
            ______     ___________________________________
            11865-K (D.  Mass.).  The  initial Cornell-Dubilier complaint
                                               ________________
            sought approximately $2.8 million  and a declaratory judgment

                                         -5-
                                          5

            Proceedings Against Charter
            ___________________________

                    The government  pursued  Charter under  a  theory  of

            successor  liability for  a company,  Pacific Oil,  which had

            dumped  soot  from  oil  burners into  the  Sullivan's  Ledge

            landfill.2      In   June  1992   the   government  initiated

            independent  settlement   negotiations  with  Charter.     On

            December  2, 1993, the proposed  consent decree was lodged in

            the  district court and  notice was published  in the Federal

            Register.3   58  Fed.  Reg.  65,397  (Dec.  14,  1993).    In

                                
            ____________________

            that the  defendants were liable for  the government's future
            response costs not covered  by the 1991 Decree.   After entry
            of  the  1993 Decree,  the  government  amended its  Cornell-
                                                                 ________
            Dubilier complaint, adding  three new defendants  and seeking
            ________
            an additional  $1 million  for costs  relating to  the second
            unit.    The City  of New  Bedford,  a defendant  in Cornell-
                                                                 ________
            Dubilier,  has agreed  to a  proposed decree  for unrecovered
            ________
            costs  from the  first  unit in  satisfaction  of the  claims
            asserted against it in the Cornell-Dubilier suit.
                                       ________________
               Similarly, seeking  to recover its claims  against parties
            not settling in the initial rounds, the Acushnet  Group filed
            suit against twelve parties, excluding Charter.  See Acushnet
                                                             ___ ________
            Co. v. Coaters, Inc., Civ. No. 93-11219-K (D. Mass.).
            ___    _____________

            2.  Charter disputes  the contention that the  soot contained
            high concentration levels of hazardous substances.   Further,
            there were  two companies that  used the name  "Pacific Oil":
            Durfee Fuels,  a Massachusetts  corporation  and Pacific  Oil
            Company, a Rhode Island corporation.   Charter claims that it
            was Durfee Fuels  (to which it was  not a successor)  and not
            the Pacific Oil  Company (to  which it was)  that dumped  the
            soot.     

            3.  Section 122(d)(2) of CERCLA requires the Attorney General
            to  provide persons who are not parties to a proposed consent
            decree  an opportunity  to  comment on  the proposed  consent
            decree "before its entry  by the court as a  final judgment."
            42 U.S.C.   9622(d)(2)(B).  Further, the Attorney  General is
            obligated  to "consider, and file with the court, any written
            comments,  views, or  allegations  relating  to the  proposed

                                         -6-
                                          6

            response,  the  Acushnet  Group  filed comments  voicing  its

            concern  that  the  decree  might be  interpreted  to  afford

            Charter  contribution   protection  against  the   claims  of

            settlors  in the 1991 and 1993 Decrees.  Charter responded in

            turn, asserting  that the prior settlors' contribution claims

            against it were  indeed impaired  by the decree.   In  August

            1994, the  government  made  it clear  to  Charter  that  its

            position was that the decree  did not grant Charter  complete
                                              ___

            contribution protection against the claims of  prior settlors

            and that it would  press this interpretation with  the court.

            Given  their  differing interpretations  of  the decree,  the

            government  offered to  let  Charter  withdraw,  but  Charter

            declined.

                    On February  2, 1995, the government  moved for entry

            of  the Charter consent decree.  It presented to the district

            court its position  that the decree  did not provide  Charter

            with complete contribution protection against prior settlors.

            The district court consolidated the consent decree action and

            the contribution  action filed by the  Acushnet Group against

            Charter  for the limited  purpose of conducting  a hearing to

            determine the impact of  the contribution protection issue on

            entry  of the  decree.   The Acushnet  Group objected  in the

            government's case to  entry of  the decree, but  only if  the

                                
            ____________________

            judgment."  Id. 
                        ___

                                         -7-
                                          7

            decree  were  interpreted to  provide  Charter  with complete

            contribution protection.4

                    At   the  consolidated   hearing,  the   court  heard

            arguments  on the  proper interpretation of  the decree.   It

            gave Charter another opportunity to withdraw from the decree,

            but  Charter again declined.  The  district court entered the

            decree,  rejecting  Charter's   assertion  that  the   decree

            afforded  it complete  contribution protection  against prior

            settlors.   The Acushnet  Group's contribution action against

            Charter is currently pending before the  district court.  See
                                                                      ___

            Acushnet  Co. v. Charter Int'l Oil, Civ. No. 94-10989-REK (D.
            _____________    _________________

            Mass.).  

            The Consent Decree on Appeal
            ____________________________

                    Two questions are  raised by this appeal.   The first

            is  whether  the  district  court abused  its  discretion  in

            approving  the  consent  decree.5     See  United  States  v.
                                                  ___  ______________

            DiBiase, 45 F.3d  541, 544 (1st  Cir. 1995).   The second  is
            _______

            whether  its  interpretation of  the  decree  was correct,  a

            question  which,  to the  extent it  involves issues  of law,

                                
            ____________________

            4.  Charter's answer  to  the Acushnet  Group's complaint  in
            contribution asserted that the claims were barred because the
            proposed  decree between  Charter  and the  government  would
            provide full contribution protection to Charter under Section
            113(f)(2) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.   9613(f)(2). 

            5.      Although  jurisdictional  issues  over  the  Acushnet
            Group's proposed  "intervention" in  this appeal lurk  in the
            background,  we  need  not  resolve them  since  the  Group's
            challenge fails on the  merits.  See Menorah Ins.  Co. v. INX
                                             ___ _________________    ___
            Reins. Corp., 72 F.3d 218, 223 n.9 (1st Cir. 1995).    
            ____________

                                         -8-
                                          8

            calls  for fuller appellate review.  See AMF, Inc. v. Jewett,
                                                 ___ _________    ______

            711 F.2d 1096, 1100-01 (1st Cir. 1983).  On the facts of this

            case,  the   first  question  cannot   be  answered   without

            addressing the second.

                    In  approving a  consent decree,  the  district court

            must determine three things:   that the decree is  fair, that

            it is reasonable,  and that  it is faithful  to the  purposes

            that  CERCLA is intended to serve.   DiBiase, 45 F.3d at 543;
                                                 _______

            United  States v. Cannons Eng'g  Corp., 899 F.2d  79, 85 (1st
            ______________    ____________________

            Cir. 1990).  This  assessment entails, in part,  an appraisal

            of what the government is being  given by the PRP relative to

            what the PRP is receiving.  What is being given by the PRP is

            clear:  $215,000 plus interest.  It is what is being received

            which implicates  the district court's interpretation  of the

            decree and the issue of contribution protection.

                    We turn  to the  statutory scheme.   In enacting  the

            1986  amendments  to  CERCLA  known as  SARA  (the  Superfund

            Amendments  and   Reauthorization  Act  of   1986),  Congress

            provided settling  parties with  certain immunity from  later

            contribution actions arising from  "matters addressed" in the

            consent  decree.    Cannons, 899  F.2d  at  91;  42 U.S.C.   
                                _______

            9613(f)(2).   As  to such  matters, "only  the amount  of the

            settlement  -- not  the pro  rata share  attributable to  the
                                    ___  ____

            settling  party -- [is] subtracted from  the liability of the

            non settlors."  Cannons, 899 F.2d at 91.
                            _______

                                         -9-
                                          9

                    Thus,  because  approval of  a  consent  decree under

            CERCLA results  in  contribution protection  to the  settling

            party, it also affects the rights of PRPs who are not parties

            to the decree.   The contribution issue, in turn,  depends on

            the scope of "matters addressed" in the settlement, for:

                    A person  who has  resolved its  liability to
                    the   United  States . . . in   a  judicially
                    approved settlement shall  not be liable  for
                    claims  for  contribution  regarding  matters
                                                          _______
                    addressed in the settlement.  Such settlement
                    _________
                    does   not   discharge  any   of   the  other
                    potentially liable persons  unless its  terms
                    so  provide,  but  it  reduces  the potential
                    liability of the others  by the amount of the
                    settlement.

            42 U.S.C.   9613(f)(2) (emphasis added).

                    This  statutory framework contemplates  that PRPs who

            do not join in a first-round settlement will be left with the

            risk  of  bearing  a  disproportionate  share  of  liability.

            "Disproportionate liability, a technique which promotes early

            settlements and  deters litigation for litigation's  sake, is

            an integral part of  the statutory plan."  Cannons,  899 F.2d
                                                       _______

            at  92.

                    Further,  the legislative history  of SARA shows that

            Congress contemplated that there would be partial settlements

            which  would leave  settling parties  liable for  matters not

            addressed in the agreement:

                    This protection attaches only to matters that
                    the  settling  party  has resolved  with  the
                    [government].    Thus,  in  cases  of partial
                    settlements where, for  example, a party  has
                    settled with  the [government] for  a surface

                                         -10-
                                          10

                    clean  up,  the settling  party shall  not be
                    subject  to any  contribution  claim for  the
                    surface clean  up by any party.   The settlor
                    may, however, remain liable in such instances
                    for  other  clean  up  action  or  costs  not
                    addressed by the settlement  such as, in this
                    example, a subsurface clean up.

            Statement of Senator  Stafford (sponsor of S.  51, the Senate

            bill for  the 1986 SARA  Amendments), 131  Cong. Rec.  24,450

            (1985).

                    Here,  two groups  are  settlors and  each seeks,  on

            opposite  sides of  the coin,  the value of  the contribution

            proviso.   The Acushnet  Group, which settled  earlier, wants

            its  contribution  rights against  Charter  arising from  the

            Sullivan's Ledge  Site clean-up maximized.   Charter, a later

            settlor, wants to cut off all contribution claims against it.

            For  purposes  of  establishing  the  scope  of  contribution

            protection afforded to Charter by the decree under  42 U.S.C.

              9613(f)(2), it would be necessary to determine the scope of

            "matters addressed" by the decree.

                    This  case, however,  involves approval of  a consent

            decree  and is  not a  suit for  contribution.   The district

            court believed, as  do we,  that it was  required to  resolve

            only certain aspects of  the dispute over "matters addressed"

            in order  to fulfill  its responsibilities in  evaluating the

            consent  decree.   Not every  aspect of  interpretation of  a

            consent  decree (or  even  the precise  contours of  "matters

            addressed") need be resolved in the course of approval of the

                                         -11-
                                          11

            decree.6    Rather, the  court must  address  so much  of the

            interpretation of the consent decree as needed to rule on the

            decree's  fairness,   reasonableness  and  fidelity   to  the

            statute.7   See  United  States v.  Charles George  Trucking,
                        ___  ______________     _________________________

            Inc., 34 F.3d  1081, 1088-89 (1st Cir.  1994).  There  may be
            ____

            prudential reasons, as this case demonstrates, not to resolve

            more  as  to "matters  addressed"  than is  necessary.   Such

            reasons, for example, may be related to uncertainty as to the

            specific fact  situations  in which  contribution claims  may

            arise or to  the absence  of parties whose  interests may  be

            affected.8   As  Aristotle noted,  wisdom  does not  seek for

                                
            ____________________

            6.  For example, in order to achieve an agreement the parties
            may,  on  relatively  minor  matters,  engage  in  purposeful
            ambiguity, leaving to  another day a  battle which may  never
            need to be fought.  If  that ambiguity is not material to the
            tripartite test for approving a  consent decree, it would not
            be necessary to resolve  it.  Perforce, it may  be preferable
            to leave it unresolved.

            7.  Although the option  was open to  it, the district  court
            chose not to  consolidate the approval of  the consent decree
            and  the contribution  action,  for all  purposes.   District
            courts  may find such a consolidation useful, if the cases so
            warrant, to expedite and  clarify matters.  But they  are not
            required to  do so.   See Fed.  R. Civ. P.  42(a); 9  Moore's
                                  ___                             _______
            Federal Practice   42.02. 
            ________________

            8.  The arguments of the Acushnet Group and Charter, that the
            district court  was required  to determine  in the course  of
            approving  the consent  decree  all aspects  of all  possible
            contribution claims, prove too much.  The    district   court
            noted that  "[t]o the extent that there  is uncertainty about
            the precise implication"  that the  settlement agreement  may
            have, "it may be  necessary in later proceedings for  this or
            another  court   to  interpret  both  the   statute  and  the
            agreement."   It would have  been premature for  the district
            court  to issue a broad order without specific facts on which
            to base its  ruling.  Cf. Charles George Trucking, 34 F.3d at
                                  ___ _______________________

                                         -12-
                                          12

            greater  precision than  the  nature of  the subject  admits.

            Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.3, 1094b23-28 (Martin Ostwald
                       __________________

            ed. & trans., 1962).

            Interpretation of the Decree
            ____________________________

                    We dispose first of an  initial argument.  The United

            States  urges that,  by  consenting to  entry of  the decree,

            Charter  has  waived  its  right to  challenge  the  district

            court's interpretation of the decree.  We disagree.  "[I]t is
                    ______________

            possible  for  a party  to consent  to  a judgment  and still

            preserve his right to appeal," so long as he "reserve[s] that

            right unequivocally."   Coughlin v. Regan, 768 F.2d  468, 470
                                    ________    _____

            (1st Cir. 1985).   Charter's Notice of  Objection makes clear

            that  it objected to, and  intended to preserve  its right to

            appeal,  any interpretation  of the  decree that  afforded it

            less than full protection against contribution claims arising

            out of the Sullivan's Ledge Site.  That suffices.

                    Charter says  the decree must be  interpreted so that

            the "matters  addressed" by it  encompass all aspects  of the

            clean-up  and  remediation  of  the  Sullivan's  Ledge  Site,

            including  all  "matters  addressed"  in the  1991  and  1993

            Decrees.   Charter  argues, consequently,  that it  cannot be

            reached for contribution  at all.   The government says  that

                                
            ____________________

            1088.   The district  court was also  appropriately concerned
            that  not all  potentially affected  parties were  before it.
            The  district court did what was necessary in order to decide
            the issues on approval of the decree and it was certainly not
            error to go no further.

                                         -13-
                                          13

            the "matters addressed" in the Charter  decree do not include

            the  clean-up work  that  the prior  settlors are  performing

            under their consent decrees.   Therefore, it asserts that the

            Charter decree  does not cut off  completely the contribution

            rights  of  prior  settling  parties  against  Charter  under

            Section 113(f) of  CERCLA   for costs of  remediation of  the

            Site.    The  government   further  says  that  the  "matters

            addressed"  in  the   consent  decree   encompass  only   the

            government's  "remainder"  case   against  Charter  for  that

            portion of the overall site liability  that was not addressed

            in the  prior settlements,  i.e., the government's  claim for
                                        ____

            the past and  future response costs that  were not reimbursed

            or covered by the prior settlements and for implementation of

            those aspects  of RODs I and II that are not performed by the

            prior settlors.

                    The district  court did  rule on  this dispute as  to

            "matters  addressed," and  ruled  against Charter.   It  left

            other  aspects to  be resolved  in the  parallel contribution

            action brought by the Acushnet Group against Charter. 

                    In  reviewing  the  district court's  ruling  on  the

            "matters addressed"  by the  decree we  look to  the decree's

            "four corners."  See United States  v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S.
                             ___ _____________     ____________

            673, 681-82 (1971).   In   United States  v. ITT  Continental
                                       _____________     ________________

            Baking Co., 420 U.S.  223 (1975), the Court expounded  on the
            __________

            "four corners" rule of Armour:
                                   ______

                                         -14-
                                          14

                    Since  a consent  decree  or order  is to  be
                    construed for  enforcement purposes basically
                    as a contract, reliance upon certain  aids to
                    construction is proper, as with any contract.
                    Such    aids   include    the   circumstances
                    surrounding  the  formation  of  the  consent
                    order, any technical  meaning words used  may
                    have  had  to  the  parties,  and  any  other
                    documents   expressly  incorporated   in  the
                    decree.

            Id. at 238.
            ___

                    The district  court held that it  would not interpret

            the   decree  as   Charter   contended  and   that  such   an

            interpretation  "would be  extreme in  its consequence  as to

            what   the    government   gave   up   compared    with   the

            disproportionately small cash sum the  government received in

            return."  It further stated that such an interpretation would

            be "disapproved as contrary to the public interest."

                    The  determination of interpretation of the decree is

            iterative  and proceeds  incrementally, as  in most  areas of

            law,  with  priorities  for   reaching  different  levels  of

            analysis.   Cf. Lomas Mortgage, Inc., v.  Louis, No. 95-1956,
                        ___ ____________________      _____

            __ F.3d __, __, slip  op. at 9-10 (1st Cir.  1996) (statutory

            interpretation starts with the  plain meaning of the statute,

            but where  the statute is ambiguous,  legislative history may

            be considered); Massachusetts v. Blackstone Valley Elec. Co.,
                            _____________    ___________________________

            67 F.3d 981, 987 (1st Cir. 1995) (same).  As in most contract

            interpretation questions, we start  here with the text.   See
                                                                      ___

            Fashion House, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 892 F.2d 1076, 1083 (1st
            ___________________    ____________

            Cir. 1989).

                                         -15-
                                          15

                    Unfortunately, apparently due  to EPA  policy at  the

            time,9  there is  no explicit  "matters addressed"  clause in

            the  agreement.    Charter  argues  that,  nonetheless,   the

            district  court should  have interpreted  "matters addressed"

            broadly in light of  the contribution protection and covenant

            not to sue  clauses of  the agreement, as  well as  extrinsic

            evidence, particularly of the parties' negotiating history.

                    In  the  absence of  explicit  language,  the parties

            agree, citing to contribution  cases from other circuits, one

            must first  look elsewhere to  determine "matters addressed."

            Different circuits have taken somewhat  different approaches.

            In Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761 (7th Cir.
               ___________________    ____________

            1994), the  Seventh Circuit  started with the  decree itself,

            and, in the absence of  an express "matters addressed" clause

            looked to various factors including "the particular location,

            time frame, hazardous substances, and clean-up  costs covered

            by the agreement."  Id. at 766.   That court recognized, over
                                ___

            a dissent, that its "flexible, fact-based approach" would not

            offer  the "settling parties the same degree of repose as one

                                
            ____________________

            9.  The  absence  of  specific  language  concerning "matters
            addressed" might be thought  to be of concern to the  EPA and
            the  public.    Having   the  scope  of  "matters  addressed"
            specifically agreed upon should lead to greater certainty and
            finality.     That  certainty  and  finality  are  attractive
            inducements  to  settle.    The  uncertainty  and  continuing
            litigation which  this case  exemplifies could reasonably  be
            thought  to be  a  deterrent to  others  to settle  with  the
            government.   Charter  advises  us  that the  EPA,  in  1995,
            changed  its policy  to require  that "matters  addressed" be
            specified.   

                                         -16-
                                          16

            based solely  on the facial  breadth of the decree."   Id. at
                                                                   ___

            767-68.   The dissent preferred a  broader reading, reasoning

            that more comprehensive contribution protection would lead to

            more  settlements.     See  id.  at   773  (Easterbrook,  J.,
                                   ___  ___

            dissenting).  The Tenth Circuit  in United States v. Colorado
                                                _____________    ________

            & Eastern R.R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530, 1538 (10th Cir. 1995), took
            __________________

            a related  "fact-specific approach,"  laying the  earlier and

            the      later      "consent      decrees     [and      their

            attachments] . . . . side by  side and comparing  the matters

            covered in  relation to the  remediation completed . . . . at

            the date of the [second] consent decree."

                      We  reject  any  argument  that  Section  113(f)(2)

            itself warrants a broad  understanding of "matters addressed"

            by the decree,  just as Colorado & Eastern, 50  F.3d at 1537-
                                    __________________

            38,  and Akzo, 30 F.3d  at 765, 770,  rejected this argument.
                     ____

            The  statute  does  not  dictate any  particular  method  for

            assessing the scope of the decree.  See Akzo, 30 F.3d at 765.
                                                ___ ____

            Thus,  the district  court  appropriately rejected  Charter's

            argument based on paragraph 16 of  the proposed decree, which

            provides:

                    With  regard  to   claims  for   contribution
                    against  [Charter]  for matters  addressed in
                    this  Consent Decree the parties hereto agree
                    that [Charter] is entitled to such protection
                    from contribution  actions  or claims  as  is
                    provided  by  CERCLA  Section  113(f)(2),  42
                    U.S.C.   9613(f)(2).

                                         -17-
                                          17

            This  language  simply  repeats  the  statutory  contribution

            language  of  Section  113(f)(2),  without  defining "matters

            addressed."   Charter says that  this language in  the decree

            would  be meaningless  unless its interpretation  is adopted.

            That  is  not so.   The  language  may provide  protection to

            Charter  should  the  government  later  recover  from  other

            parties a part of its claim. 

                    We  confine ourselves to  the text of  the decree and

            find  the answer there, thus  not reaching the  issue of what

            other  interpretive guides,  if  any, are  permissible  under

            CERCLA.   We are  unpersuaded by Charter's  argument that the

            text of the decree supports its reading.  We believe that the

            text  of the  decree  as  to: (i)  the  scope of  the  claims

            purported to be  brought and settled; (ii)  the definition of

            the response  costs being  reimbursed by the  settlement; and

            (iii)   the  explicit  references   to  the   prior  decrees,

            forecloses Charter's interpretation.

                    Charter relies heavily  on the decree's  covenant not

            to  sue  clause, which  prevents  the  government from  suing

            Charter  "pursuant to Sections  106 and 107(a)  of CERCLA and

            Section  7003 of  RCRA relating  to the  Site, including  for

            reimbursement of Response costs  or for implementation of ROD

            I or  ROD II."  But  that the government has  promised not to

            sue Charter  says nothing about  the intention as  to whether

            other, prior settling  parties were to  have their rights  of

                                         -18-
                                          18

            contribution  against Charter extinguished by this agreement.

            The one does not necessarily follow from the other.

                    Untoward and  congressionally unintended consequences

            would flow from  Charter's reading.   As the Seventh  Circuit

            observed in Akzo:
                        ____

                    If the covenant not to sue alone were held to
                    be determinative of the scope of contribution
                    protection,  the United  States would  not be
                    free to release settling parties from further
                    litigation  with  the United  States, without
                    unavoidably  cutting  off  all private  party
                    claims for response costs.

            30  F.3d at 766 (quoting  brief of United  States as amicus).
            We agree.   The  government may have  reasons to give  such a

            covenant unrelated  to an intent to  grant broad contribution

            protection against prior settlors.

                    We find  dispositive instead  the text of  the decree

            establishing  that  Charter  was  sued  on  the  government's

            remainder case, that the government sought and Charter agreed

            to reimburse the government for its response costs as to that

            remainder  case,  and that  the  remainder  case was  defined

            against the backdrop of the prior settlements.

                    The text  describing the scope  of the  claims to  be

            brought   and   settled    undermines   Charter's    proposed

            interpretation:

                    The  United  States  in its  complaint  seeks
                    reimbursement of response costs  incurred and
                    to be  incurred by EPA and  the Department of
                    Justice  for  response actions  in connection
                    with the  release  or threatened  release  of
                    hazardous substances at the  Sullivan's Ledge
                    Superfund  Site  in   New  Bedford,   Bristol

                                         -19-
                                          19

                    County, Massachusetts . . . and a declaration
                    of  the  defendants'  liability  for  further
                    response costs.

            Neither the complaint nor the  decree asserts a claim against

            Charter for  the remediation work being done  by the Acushnet

            Group.  A  reading of a decree  which far exceeds  the relief

            sought  by  plaintiffs'  complaint   would  be  strained  and

            doubtful.   See  Navarro-Ayala v.  Hernandez-Colon, 951  F.2d
                        ___  _____________     _______________

            1325, 1341 (1st Cir. 1991).  Even crediting the argument that

            some settlements  may exceed the boundaries of claims made in

            the complaint,10 there is  nothing in this decree to  lead to

            that result.11

                                
            ____________________

            10.  Cf.  Charles  George Trucking, 34 F.3d  at 1090 (consent
                 ___  ________________________
            decree   may   resolve   claims  for   damages   not  pleaded
            specifically, if the parties so intend, so long as the claims
            are within the general scope of the pleadings).

            11.  We  note the  potential  problem of  the government  not
            honoring its  agreement with  prior  settlors by  collusively
            agreeing  with  subsequent  settlors  on  language  in  their
            agreement broader than the claims the government made against
            those  subsequent  settlors.    Cf.  Akzo,  30  F.3d  at  774
                                            ___  ____
            (Easterbrook,  J.,  dissenting)  (making  an  analogous point
            about the government inducing PRPs to enter large settlements
            with promises of broad contribution protection and then later
            urging the  district court  to arrive  at a  narrow reading).
            That is not this case.  The district court here expressed its
            skepticism   that  the   earlier  settlement   empowered  the
            government  to  do whatever  it  wished  about impairing  the
            contribution rights that were  retained by the prior settling
            parties.   The  government has  expressly disavowed  any such
            intention.
                  In  addition, the government has a serious disincentive
            to collude with later settlors to cut off the rights of prior
            settlors just to extract  a higher second-round settlement in
            a single clean-up proceeding.   It is the government  that is
            the repeat player in  the world of CERCLA clean-ups.   Should
                ______
            the  government  develop  a  reputation  for  cheating  early
            settlors,  that would  deter settlements  in later  clean-ups

                                         -20-
                                          20

                    The definition  of response costs in  the decree also

            does  not  support  Charter's  interpretation.    The  decree

            defines Charter's $215,000 payment as being "in reimbursement

            of  Response Costs,"  which are  defined as  the government's
                                                             ____________

            response  costs.   The  decree says  "the  United States  has

            incurred, and  will continue  to incur, response  costs which

            have  not been recovered under the 1991 Consent Decree or the

            1993 Consent Decree."   The decree estimates the government's

            shortfall to exceed $4  million in such response costs.   The

            decree  also  indicates  that  the  government  evaluated the

            $215,000  to be paid by Charter in terms of these unrecovered

            costs  of  at  least  $4  million  and  the  risk  that  some

            remediation work may not be completed by other settlors.  The

            amount was not evaluated against  the total costs of clean-up

            at the Sullivan's Ledge Site.  

                    Further,  as the government  points out,  the Charter

            decree explicitly  refers  to the  earlier decrees.   In  the

            prior settlements  the Acushnet  Group did  not  give up  the

            right  to seek contribution from  those who were  not part of

            those  settlements.   The  prior  settlements are  explicitly

            referenced and described  in the Charter decree.   Under such

            circumstances  we  may consider  these  prior  settlements in

            interpreting the  decree.    Cf. ITT Continental  Baking, 420
                                         ___ _______________________

                                
            ____________________

            (and reduce  the amounts early-round settlors  are willing to
            pay)  and  hence, in  the  long  run,  hurt the  government's
            interests.

                                         -21-
                                          21

            U.S. at 238.  In light of these considerations,  we hold that

            the   text   of   the   decree   supports  the   government's

            interpretation and  not Charter's and so  affirm the district

            court's ruling on this point.

                    Charter argues that the  decree is ambiguous and that

            extrinsic evidence of the  negotiating history of the parties

            demonstrates that  Charter was intended to  be protected from

            all contribution claims. Cf. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan Ch. XI,
                                     ___                _________

            at  84   (Michael  Oakeshott  ed.  1962)   (1651)  (men  call

            indeterminate that  which they  wish to contest  because they

            have  interests  at  stake).     While  in  routine  contract

            interpretation extrinsic  evidence may be considered when the

            disputed  terms  are ambiguous,  we  do not  find  the decree

            ambiguous,  and  such  evidence  may  not  be  considered  to

            contradict  the written terms of the  agreement.  See Brennan
                                                              ___ _______

            v. Carvel Corp., 929 F.2d 801, 808 (1st Cir. 1991).
               ____________

                    Even so,  we  doubt, but  do not  decide, whether  in

            interpreting a CERCLA consent  decree it would be appropriate

            to rely on the  type of extrinsic evidence  Charter proffers.

            This court has at times considered certain types of extrinsic

            evidence in interpreting decrees  in public institution civil

            rights  actions.  See Navarro-Ayola,  951 F.2d at  1343.  But
                              ___ _____________

            CERCLA settlements, unlike ordinary contract  formation, take

            place  in  a  unique  statutory framework.    That  framework

            requires that before a decree is entered by the court, notice

                                         -22-
                                          22

            of  the  decree be  published,  there be  an  opportunity for

            public comment, and that the Attorney General take account of

            the  commentary and  reserve  the right  to withhold  consent

            should the  commentary show  the decree to  be inappropriate.

            42 U.S.C.   9622(d)(2).  That  public comment is part of  the

            record  before  the  district  court.    Id.   The  statutory
                                                     ___

            structure  thus assumes that the  public will be given access

            to the relevant documentary information  on the decree.   The

            evidence  of the negotiating  history which Charter proffered

            was not within the information the public had available.12

                    It is  worth  asking why  the  court should  enter  a

            consent decree when there was  a fundamental dispute over the

            effect of the decree.  There are two responses.  The first is

            that  Charter  expressed its  intent  to  live with  whatever

            interpretation the court ultimately gave the decree. There is

            no unfairness to  Charter.  When Charter said that it had not

            understood the government's position to be that Charter would

            not  be   afforded  complete  contribution   protection,  the

            government  offered to  allow  Charter to  withdraw from  the

            agreement.   Charter declined.   Charter knew  the government

            would  present  a  contrary interpretation  to  the  district

                                
            ____________________

            12.  Even were we to  adopt Charter's method of analysis,  we
            see nothing in the  negotiating materials that indicates that
            the  government intended to  undercut its earlier settlements
            with the Acushnet Group or that it ever agreed with Charter's
            view  on the scope of contribution protection afforded by the
            decree. 

                                         -23-
                                          23

            court.   Charter also knew  that courts are  required to give

            some deference to  the judgment of the Attorney  General that

            the settlement  is appropriate.13   Charles George  Trucking,
                                                ________________________

            34  F.3d at  1085.   In  addition,  the district  court  gave

            Charter the  opportunity to  withdraw from the  settlement in

            the face  of a contrary  government position and  the court's

            statement that  it would  most likely rule  against Charter's

            interpretation.  Charter again declined.  Counsel for Charter

            informed the court that, win or lose in its interpretation of

            the decree, Charter preferred  to have an agreement  with the

            government.  Such  an agreement, Charter  acknowledged, would

            both provide it with some  contribution protection and get it

            out  of costly  litigation with the  government.   Indeed, on

            appeal, Charter does not ask us to vacate the decree.  Rather

            its position is that the decree should be upheld and that its

            interpretation should be substituted for that of the district

            court.

                    Second,  while  a  different  case might  lead  to  a

            different result,  we think  that the policies  behind CERCLA

            are better served here by holding Charter to the consequences

            of its  roll  of  the dice.    Perhaps mindful  of  the  huge

                                
            ____________________

            13.  We   reject  the  Acushnet  Group's  argument  that  the
            district court is required to defer to the Attorney General's
            judgment to the extent  of exercising no independent judgment
            of  its own.  See Charles  George Trucking,  34 F.3d  at 1085
                          ___ ________________________
            (although in entering a decree a district court must defer to
            the  EPA's judgment and to  the parties' agreement,  it has a
            responsibility to exercise its independent judgment).

                                         -24-
                                          24

            resources  going  into  the  transactions   costs  of  CERCLA

            litigation,  rather   than   to  remediating   the   sites,14

            Congress sought  in SARA to encourage  earlier resolutions by

            agreement.   See United States  v. SCA Servs.  of Ind., Inc.,
                         ___ _____________     _________________________

            827 F. Supp. 526, 530-31  (N.D. Ind. 1993).  If a  party were

            permitted to use the consent decree process to delay, whether

            in  good faith  or by design,  and then  to undo  a decree by

            saying  its understanding  of the  base terms  was different,

            then  the  congressional purposes  would  be  undercut.   Cf.
                                                                      ___

            Menorah,  72  F.3d at  223.   Given that  Charter voluntarily
            _______

            chose  to consent to the decree, despite the significant risk

            of an  interpretation contrary to  its interests, it  was not

            unreasonable  for  the district  court  to  have entered  the

            decree.

            Approval of the Consent Decree
            ______________________________

                    There  was no  abuse  of discretion  by the  district

            court in approving the decree,  as based on the  government's

                                
            ____________________

            14.  See  Jan Paul  Acton  & Lloyd  S.  Dixon, Superfund  and
                 ___                                       ______________
            Transaction Costs:  The Experience of Insurers and Very Large
            _____________________________________________________________
            Industrial   Firms   32   (1992)(estimating   that   of   the
            __________________
            approximately  $470  million paid  in  1989  by insurers  for
            hazardous waste clean-ups, 88% went to legal costs); see also
                                                                 ___ ____
            Lloyd  S.   Dixon,  The  Transactions   Costs  Generated   by
                                _________________________________________
            Superfund's  Liability Approach 183,  in Analyzing Superfund:
            _______________________________       __ ____________________
            Economics, Science  and Law, (Richard L. Revesz  & Richard B.
            ___________________________
            Stewart eds.,  1995)(noting that  for 1991 alone  the private
            sector  incurred over  $4  billion  in  transactions  costs);
            William  N. Hedeman  et al.,  Superfund Transaction  Costs: A
                                          _______________________________
            Critical Perspective  on the  Superfund Liability  Scheme, 21
            _________________________________________________________
            Envtl. L. Rep. 10413, 10423 (1991) (30-60% of hazardous waste
            clean-up funds go to lawyers). 

                                         -25-
                                          25

            interpretation.   We  note  that Charter  does not  seriously

            challenge  on  this  point,  preferring  to  argue  that  its

            interpretation is mandated and that its interpretation  meets

            the tripartite  test.  The district court,  before entering a

            consent  decree, is  obliged to  determine that  it is  fair,

            reasonable and consistent with the goals of CERCLA.  DiBiase,
                                                                 _______

            45 F.3d  at 543;  Cannons,  899 F.2d  at 85.    In turn,  "an
                              _______

            appellate court  may overturn a district  court's decision to

            approve or reject the  entry of a CERCLA consent  decree only

            for manifest abuse of  discretion."  Charles George Trucking,
                                                 _______________________

            34 F.3d at 1085.  

                    Under the terms  of the decree Charter  agreed to pay

            $215,000  plus interest,  in settlement  of the  government's

            claims of  approximately $4  million in  unrecovered response

            costs  for the  first  and second  units.   In  exchange  the

            government  covenanted  not  to  sue  or take  administrative

            action against  Charter "pursuant to Sections  106 and 107(a)

            of  CERCLA  or Section  7003 of  RCRA  relating to  the Site,

            including    for   reimbursement   of   Response   Costs   or

            implementation   of  ROD  I  or  ROD  II."15    Charter  also

                                
            ____________________

            15.  The  government's  covenant not  to  sue  is subject  to
            certain  reservations, including:  (a) that  with respect  to
            future  liability, the covenant not to sue does not come into
            effect until  certification by  the EPA that  remedial action
            for  the site under  ROD I and  Rod II is  completed; and (b)
            reopener  provisions  which  allow  the  government  to  seek
            further   relief   if   previously  unknown   conditions   or
            information reveal that the remedial actions for the site are
            not protective of human health or the environment.

                                         -26-
                                          26

            receives  protection against  contribution  claims  of  other

            parties  from whom the  government might subsequently recover
                                                     ____________

            all or part of its multi-million dollar remainder claim.

            Fairness & Reasonableness
            _________________________

                     Fairness  has a procedural  component (involving the

            negotiation  process, see Cannons, 899 F.2d  at 85), which is
                                  ___ _______

            not at  issue here,  and a  substantive component, which  is.

            Id.  at  86.    "Substantive  fairness  introduces  into  the
            ___

            equation concepts  of corrective justice  and accountability:

            a  party should  bear the cost  of the  harm for  which it is

            legally responsible . . . .   The logic behind these concepts

            dictates  that  settlement  terms  must be  based  upon,  and

            roughly   correlated   with,  some   acceptable   measure  of

            comparative fault, apportioning liability among  the settling

            parties  according  to  rational (if  necessarily  imprecise)

            estimates of how  much harm each PRP has done."  Cannons, 899
                                                             _______

            F.2d  at  87 (citations  omitted);  see  also Charles  George
                                                ___  ____ _______________

            Trucking,  34  F.3d  at 1089  (so  long as  the  basis  for a
            ________

            sensible   "approximation   `roughly  correlated   with  some

            acceptable   measure   of    comparative   fault'"    exists,

            "difficulties   in   achieving   precise    measurements   of

            comparative  fault  will  not  preclude a  trial  court  from

            entering  a consent  decree"  (quoting Cannons,  899 F.2d  at
                                                   _______

            87)).

                                         -27-
                                          27

                    A  district court's reasonableness inquiry, like that

            of  fairness,  is  a  pragmatic one,  not  requiring  precise

            calculations.   See Charles George  Trucking 34 F.3d  at 1085
                            ___ ________________________

            (depth  of inquiry  depends  on the  context and  information

            available  to the court).  The question is whether the decree

            provides for an efficient clean-up and adequately compensates

            the public for its  costs, in light of the  foreseeable risks

            of loss.  See Cannons, 899 F.2d at 89-90.  Because the first-
                      ___ _______

            round  settlors  have  already  contracted  to implement  the

            clean-up,  we  review only  the  adequacy  and efficiency  of

            implementing the cash settlement  reached here.  This amounts

            to asking  whether the  terms of  the settlement  are roughly

            proportional  to  Charter's responsibility  and  whether they

            serve the public interest.

                    Approval of Charter's cash-out settlement of $215,000

            plus  interest  in  exchange  for  both limited  contribution

            protection  and  a  limited  covenant  not  to sue  from  the

            government cannot be said  to constitute a manifest abuse  of

            discretion.  Although $215,000 is small  in absolute terms as

            compared to the government's total unrecovered response costs

            of  $4  million,  it  must  be  evaluated  in  context.    In

            particular, Charter's liability  in this case was  uncertain.

            It was not clear  whether Pacific Oil, the company  which had

            contributed  to  the  wastes   at  the  Site,  was  Charter's

            predecessor.  The degree to which the predecessor's wastes --

                                         -28-
                                          28

            soot  from oil  fuel --  contained hazardous  substances that

            would have  contributed to the Site's  contamination was also

            at issue.  Given  the potentially high costs of  litigating a

            difficult case  against Charter and the benefit  of a certain

            cash  settlement (and  the limited  contribution protection),

            the $215,000 plus interest payment passes muster.  This court

            explained in Cannons:
                         _______

                    In  a  nutshell,  the  reasonableness   of  a
                    proposed  settlement  must take  into account
                    foreseeable  risks of  loss. . . .   The same
                    variable,   we   suggest,   has   a   further
                    dimension: even if  the government's case  is
                    sturdy, it may take time and money to collect
                    damages  or  to  implement  private  remedial
                    measures  through litigatory success.  To the
                    extent  that  time  is  of  essence  or  that
                    transaction  costs  loom large,  a settlement
                    which nets less than  full recovery of clean-
                    up  costs  is  nonetheless  reasonable. . . .
                    The  reality   is   that,  all   too   often,
                    litigation is  a cost-ineffective alternative
                    which can squander valuable resources, public
                    as well as private. 

            899 F.2d at 90  (citations omitted).  In addition,  there are

            other non-first-round settlors against whom the government is

            currently seeking to recover the  remainder of its $4 million

            claim.

                    The  question arises  as  to whether  the decree,  as

            entered, unfairly hurts the interests of third  parties.  See
                                                                      ___

            Charles George Trucking, 34  F.3d 1085-89 (addressing  third-
            _______________________

            party  challenge  to entry  of CERCLA  consent decree).   For

            purposes of  our review,  the district  court's determination

            that  the  decree  does  not  represent  a  complete  bar  to

                                         -29-
                                          29

            contribution  claims  that first-round  settlors  expected to

            have against those  that did  not settle along  with them  is

            adequate to  pass the abuse  of discretion threshold.16   Cf.
                                                                      ___

            Charles  George Trucking,  at 1088 (in  entering a  decree it
            ________________________

            might be better to  leave technical disputes between settling

            parties in a class to the discourse between them).  As to the

            extinguished  contribution  claims of  non-settlors  or later

            round  settlors,  protection  against  those   claims  was  a

            reasonable benefit Charter acquired in exchange  for settling

            before those others.               

            Fidelity to the Statute
            _______________________

                    As we noted in Cannons, the two major policy concerns
                                   _______

            underlying  CERCLA are  ensuring  that  prompt and  effective

            clean-ups  are put into place  and making sure  that the PRPs

            responsible for the  hazards created  bear their  approximate

            share of the responsibility.   899 F.2d at 89-91;  cf. United
                                                               ___ ______

            States v. Rohm  & Haas  Co., 721  F.Supp. 666,  680 (D.  N.J.
            ______    _________________

            1989) (noting Congress' goal of expediting effective remedial

                                
            ____________________

            16.  In the separate contribution action between the Acushnet
            Group  and Charter,  Charter  had asserted  that the  consent
            decree provided  it with  an affirmative defense  against the
            Acushnet Group's contribution claims.  The Acushnet Group, in
            turn,  moved for summary judgment on the issue of whether the
            decree afforded Charter such a  defense.  The district  court
            denied  the motion  without  ruling on  its  merits.   It  is
            basically  that motion  that the  parties want us  to decide.
            However, absent  unusual circumstances,  denial of a  summary
            judgment motion  is not  independently appealable as  a final
            order.  See Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., 942 F.2d 48, 54-55 (1st
                    ___ _______    _____________
            Cir.  1991), cert.  denied, 502  U.S. 1082  (1992).   No such
                         _____  ______
            circumstances exist here.

                                         -30-
                                          30

            action and minimizing litigation).  Both  these goals and the

            honoring of the settlement  dynamics Congress created in SARA

            are effectuated here.

                    CERCLA, through Section 113(f)(2),  provides settling

            parties with broad contribution protection so as to encourage

            them to settle early.   See Browning-Ferris, 33 F.3d  at 102-
                                    ___ _______________

            03.   However, CERCLA also  aims to induce  those parties who

            settle  earlier to do so  for higher amounts  than they might

            otherwise  by assuring  them the  right to  seek contribution

            protection from those  who have  not as yet  settled.17   See
                                                                      ___

            42  U.S.C. 9613(3)(B); see also  S. Rep. No.  11, 99th Cong.,
                                   ___ ____

            1st Sess. 44 (1985); cf. Colorado & Eastern, 50  F.3d at 1535
                                 ___ __________________

            (Section  113(f)(1) was  intended to  enable those  bearing a

            disproportionate  share of  the  liability in  a clean-up  to

            recover from others).   Hence, a  decree that is read  not to

            provide  second-round  settlors  with  complete  contribution

            protection against prior settlors is consistent with the goal

            of enabling  the government  to enter  into  early and  large

                                
            ____________________

            17.  An early cash-out  settlement may sometimes require  the
            settling  party to pay a premium for the risks the government
            bears out of the uncertainty of the total cost of the remedy.
            As more is known about the site and as the government decides
            on  the  precise  remedy,  that uncertainty,  and  hence  the
            premium, is reduced, but not eliminated.  Here, there were no
            settlements  until the  RODs were issued  and the  remedy was
            outlined.  Nonetheless,  early settlors,  even post-ROD,  may
            pay some premium.  Settlors  who actually perform the remedy,
            such  as the Acushnet Group,  assume the risks  of the actual
            costs of performance.  Congress may well have thought it fair
            to  require later settlors to bear a share of those risks and
            premiums.   

                                         -31-
                                          31

            settlements.   Cf. Akzo,  30 F.3d 767  (interpreting "matters
                           ___ ____

            addressed" clause  of decree not to  bar the claims  of a PRP

            that  had undertaken  remedial  work prior  to  entry of  the

            decree); United  States v.  Alcan  Aluminum, Inc.,   25  F.3d
                     ______________     _____________________

            1174, 1186  n.17 (3d  Cir. 1994)  (in light  of  the goal  of

            promoting  early  large  settlements,   the  assertion  of  a

            contribution  defense by  a  second-round  settlor against  a

            first-round  settlor  is   far  more  problematic  than   its

            assertion against a non-settlor).

            Conclusion
            __________

                    The  district  court's  order  entering  the  consent

            decree is affirmed.
                      ________

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                                          32