Court Opinion

ID: 9389794
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-26 15:00:53.638616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:29.725281
License: Public Domain

20-333
     Singh v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                             Poczter, IJ
                                                                          A208 455 405

                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                   SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
 3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 4   New York, on the 26th day of April, two thousand twenty-
 5   three.
 6
 7   PRESENT:
 8            DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
 9                 Chief Judge,
10            STEVEN J. MENASHI,
11            EUNICE C. LEE,
12                 Circuit Judges.
13   _____________________________________
14
15   HARJOT SINGH, AKA HWJOT SINGH,
16            Petitioner,
17
18                      v.                                       20-333
19                                                               NAC
20   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
21   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
22            Respondent.
23   _____________________________________
24
25
26   FOR PETITIONER:                    Dalbir Singh, Esq., Dalbir Singh
27                                      & Assoc., PC, New York, NY.
28
 1   FOR RESPONDENT:              Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Acting
 2                                Assistant Attorney General;
 3                                Bernard A. Joseph, Senior
 4                                Litigation Counsel; Erik R. Quick,
 5                                Trial Attorney, Office of
 6                                Immigration Litigation, United
 7                                States Department of Justice,
 8                                Washington, DC.
 9
10       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

11   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

12   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

13   is DENIED.

14       Petitioner Harjot Singh, a native and citizen of India,

15   seeks review of a December 30, 2019, decision of the BIA

16   affirming an April 9, 2018, decision of an Immigration Judge

17   (“IJ”) denying Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of

18   removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

19   (“CAT”).     In re Harjot Singh, No. A208 455 405 (B.I.A. Dec.

20   30, 2019), aff’g No. A208 455 405 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Apr.

21   9, 2018).      We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

22   underlying facts and procedural history.

23       Under the circumstances, we have considered both the IJ’s

24   and the BIA’s opinions.     See Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland

25   Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006).          We review the

26   agency’s     adverse   credibility   determination   “under   the

27   substantial evidence standard,” Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891

                                     2
 1   F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018), and “the administrative findings

 2   of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator

 3   would be compelled to conclude to the contrary,” 8 U.S.C.

 4   § 1252(b)(4)(B).        “Considering        the    totality    of    the

 5   circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may

 6   base a credibility determination on . . . the consistency

 7   between   the   applicant’s   or       witness’s   written    and   oral

 8   statements . . . , the internal consistency of each such

 9   statement, [and] the consistency of such statements with

10   other evidence of record . . . without regard to whether an

11   inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of

12   the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.”                Id.

13   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).    “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility

14   determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances,

15   it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an

16   adverse credibility ruling.”           Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534

17   F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008).

18       Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination

19   that Singh was not credible as to his claim that members of

20   the Bharatiya Janata Party and Akali Dal Badal Party beat him

21   and threatened to kill him on account of his work for the

22   Akali Dal Mann Party.         The agency reasonably relied on

                                        3
 1   inconsistencies in Singh’s evidence regarding whether he

 2   reported a death threat to police, how police responded to

 3   the report of his attack, and whether his family members were

 4   harassed.      See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).           He failed to

 5   provide compelling explanations for these inconsistencies.

 6   See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A

 7   petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation

 8   for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must

 9   demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled

10   to    credit    his    testimony.”       (internal     quotation      marks

11   omitted)).

12         The   agency    also   reasonably    found     that   the    striking

13   similarities between Singh’s supporting affidavits impugned

14   his credibility.      See Mei Chai Ye v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 489

15   F.3d 517, 524 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]his court has . . . firmly

16   embraced the commonsensical notion that striking similarities

17   between affidavits are an indication that the statements are

18   ‘canned.’”); Singh v. BIA, 438 F.3d 145, 148 (2d Cir. 2006)

19   (upholding agency’s reliance on “nearly identical language in

20   the   written    affidavits     allegedly    provided       by    different

21   people”).      Singh’s explanation that the notary might have

22   been the source of the identical language does not compel a

                                          4
 1   contrary conclusion.    See Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80–81.

 2       The inconsistencies and strikingly similar affidavits

 3   provide substantial evidence for the adverse credibility

 4   determination.     See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also

 5   Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020)

 6   (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude an alien from

 7   showing that an IJ was compelled to find him credible.

 8   Multiple     inconsistencies   would   so   preclude   even   more

 9   forcefully.”).     The adverse credibility determination is

10   dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief

11   because all three claims are based on the same factual

12   predicate.     See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d

13   Cir. 2006).

14       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

15   DENIED.    All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

16   stays VACATED.

17                                  FOR THE COURT:
18                                  Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
19                                  Clerk of Court

                                     5