Court Opinion

ID: 9769155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 14:36:13.456667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:56.237286
License: Public Domain

KELLER, Judge,
concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court. I write, however, because I think that there could be cases in which a trial court could deny as untimely a motion for change of venue filed after the Art. 28.01' deadline without running afoul of the Constitution.
Change of venue procedures are governed by statute, and Art. 28.01 would appear to apply to motions for change of venue. And although the question of change of venue is a question of constitutional dimension, see Revia v. State, 649 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Tex.Crim. App.1983), even constitutional matters are not wholly exempt from procedural rules. See Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 97-98, 76 S.Ct. 158, 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955)(a state “may attach reasonable time limitations to the assertion of federal constitutional rights” including “the right to challenge discriminatory practices in the make-up of a grand jury”); id. at 97 n. 4, 76 S.Ct. 158 (“A state procedural rule which forbids the raising of federal questions at late stages in the case, or by any other than a prescribed method has been recognized as a valid exercise of state power,” quoting Williams v. Georgia 349 U.S. 375, 382-383, 75 S.Ct. 814, 99 L.Ed. 1161 (1955)). If the basis for a change of venue motion were to come into existence or be made known to defense counsel only after the Art. 28.01 deadline, a defendant would not be bound by the statutory directives. *665But if the facts alleged in the motion were present before the deadline, I do not believe that requiring compliance with the statute would deny a defendant any constitutional rights. And, our statute’s requirement of controverting affidavits is not a constitutional requirement. So even if new prejudicial publicity occurred after the deadline, and the court denied the motion without controverting affidavits and without a hearing, I think there would be no constitutional violation unless the merits of the motion required a change of venue.
We do not need to reach these matters in this case. For the reasons given in the majority opinion, the trial court did not err in its handling of the motion for change of venue. I make these comments because I think appellate courts should be aware of the possibility that a trial court that denies a motion for change of venue as untimely might not necessarily fall into constitutional error and because we appear to have taken the matter out of the hands of the legislature by suggesting that it may not restrict the time for filing a motion for change of venue.1 And I make these comments because defendants should be aware that they may risk disappointment if they file an untimely motion for change of venue for the purpose of building in reversible error rather than for the purpose of actually seeking a change of venue.
MANSFIELD, J., joins.

. Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991) was decided after Revia. A Boykin analysis might lead to a different result.