Court Opinion

ID: 9701805
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:38:50.676421+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:29.853352
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge
(dissenting):
One way a judgment of non pros may come before this court is on appeal from the judgment. This occurs when the plaintiff has failed to move the case to trial, and after a long wait, the defendant moves for and is granted judgment of non pros. Kennedy v. Bulletin Company, 237 Pa.Super. 66, 346 A.2d 343 (1975), is a good example. There, “the [defendant] answered the [plaintiff’s] interrogatories in 1968, and by so doing, indicated a willingness to try the case on the merits at that time. The [plaintiff], however, took no action until December 6, 1973 [when she filed a certificate of readiness].” Id. at 71, 346 A.2d at 346. The defendant filed a petition for rule to show cause why judgment of non pros should not be entered, the lower court entered the judgment, and the plaintiff appealed to this court.
*88A second way a judgment of non pros may come before this court is on appeal from an order denying a petition to open thevjudgment. There the plaintiff has not complied with an order. The order may have originated with the defendant, as where the defendant rules the plaintiff to file a complaint within 20 days or suffer judgment of non pros; or the order may have originated with the court, as where the court orders the plaintiff to answer interrogatories within a stated period or suffer judgment of non pros. In either situation, what happens is that the plaintiff does not comply with the order, judgment is entered, the plaintiff files a petition to open the judgment, the lower court denies the petition, and the plaintiff appeals to this court. Thorn v. Clearfield Borough, 420 Pa. 584, 218 A.2d 298 (1966) (failure to file a complaint), is one example; Boyles v. Sullivan, 230 Pa.Super. 453, 326 A.2d 440 (1973) (failure to answer interrogatories), is another.
Judge HOFFMAN states in his concurring opinion that we are to apply different rules, according to which way the judgment of non pros comes before us. If it comes before us in the first way — on appeal from the judgment — we are to look to see whether the defendant has suffered prejudice, but if in the second way — on appeal from denial of petition to open — we are not to concern ourselves with prejudice. The reason for this difference, he suggests, is that in the first way, “[pjrejudice is a prerequisite to securing a judgment of non pros .”, whereas in the second way, “the judgment of non pros was entered as a sanction . . . 244 Pa.Super. at -, 366 A.2d at 928.
I am not persuaded that there are these two different rules. The essence of a sanction is that it is punishment. In considering whether to inflict punishment, one always asks what harm has been done, which is simply another way of saying, one asks what prejudice the other party has suffered. Not to ask this question would lead-to an *89anomalous result. Suppose D-l has obtained judgment of non pros after ruling P-1 to file a complaint. Further suppose that D-2 has obtained his judgment of non pros, because, after he has waited for years for P-2 to move the case to trial, he has petitioned for the judgment. Why should it be easier for D-l to hold onto his judgment, because whether he has been prejudiced is immaterial? D-l is no more meritorious than D-2; or, to state the matter conversely, P-1 is no more a wrongdoer than P-2 (he may be less a wrongdoer). D-l and D-2 simply happen to be in different procedural situations, not because of any difference in merit but only because P-1 did not file a complaint, while P-2 did. Nothing should turn on such happenstance. Cf. Gordon-Stuart Ltd. v. Allen Shops, Inc., 289 Pa.Super. 35, 361 A.2d 770 (1976) [1975] (“no viable distinction exists” between the two different sorts of judgment of non pros).
The true principle, I suggest, is that in any case involving a judgment of non pros, whatever the procedure that preceded the judgment, the decision whether to let the judgment stand should be made according to general principles of equity. This conclusion, moreover, is supported by the cases, when they are closely read. While it is true that cases such as Thorn v. Clearfield Borough, supra, and Boyles v. Sullivan, supra, do not say that prejudice is a relevant factor, neither do they say, as Judge Hoffman’s opinion does, that “prejudice is not a relevant factor.” They simply do not mention prejudice at all. However, the principle applied is that “[a] petition to open a judgment is an appeal to the equitable side of the court, and the petition must establish equitable considerations which convince the court that the parties could best be served by the striking of the judgment.” Thorn v. Clearfield Borough, supra at 585, 218 A.2d at 298. In “establish [ing] equitable considerations,” it is always necessary to ask what prejudice the other party has suffered. Thorn, in fact, is somewhat similar to the present case, for it involved an attorney whose ability to *90perform his professional duties was diminished by poor health and consequent mental distress.
Accordingly, I think the majority has correctly looked to see if there is prejudice. My disagreement is with the majority’s statement that it “cannot ignore the implicit prejudice visited upon the appellants” by opening the judgment. I do not know what “implicit prejudice” means. If it refers to delay, it is not convincing; delay generally helps a defendant. In any event, the lower court “note[d] that the [appellants] have not produced any evidence which would show that they have been prejudiced in any manner by this delay.” In these circumstances, I would remand for further proceedings. If appellants can show prejudice, very well; but if they cannot, I think the balance of equitable considerations tips in appellees’ favor — -at least, I would find no abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court in so concluding —and I would allow the order granting the petition to open to stand.
PRICE, J., joins in this opinion.