Court Opinion

ID: 9629995
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:56:42.162124+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:32:18.189949
License: Public Domain

HALLEY, Justice
(dissenting).
It is my contention that a party plaintiff cannot be a nonresident for one purpose and a resident for another in the same action. We know that if an attempt to remove this case to the Federal Court had been made in the trial court, the administrator would immediatley have set up that he was a resident of Maine as was the defendant and assert there was no diversity of citizenship. However, here the counsel for the administrator are claiming that for the purposes of this lawsuit he is a resident of Oklahoma because he is the personal representative of the deceased who was a resident of Oklahoma at the time of his death. These are inconsistent positions.
The real question here is a construction of Section 99, 12 O.S.1951, in relation to the Kentucky statute of limitation of one year which applies in death cases. The statute of limitations in this case started running on May 8, 1948. If the case was filed in Kentucky it had to be filed by May 8, 1949. It had to be filed in Oklahoma by the same date if both parties were nonresidents under Section 99, 12 O.S.1951. Are the parties nonresidents ? It is immaterial for whose benefit the suit was filed for it is a question who are the parties for the purpose of maintaining this lawsuit. In National Valve & Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 205 Okl. 571, 240 P.2d 766, 767, 29 A.L.R.2d 1448, which was a wrongful death case prosecuted by the administrator of the deceased, we said:
“Plaintiff in error contends that the widow was the real party in interest and therefore could compromise and settle the claim regardless of the wishes of the administrator, the administrator being in reality only her agent for the purpose of bringing the action. We are unable to agree with this contention. * * *
“ * * * In the instant case the administrator had been appointed, and while he was a resident of the State *806of Pennsylvania, and the reason for his appointment was to prevent the removal of the case to the Federal Court, he was nevertheless vested with all the powers of an administrator, and, under the statutes governing the conduct of such cases, when the action was brought by him he was vested with full authority to prosecute the same as in his judgment seemed best, and no settlement could be effected therein by the widow without his knowledge and consent.”
When the administrator is appointed and files an action, it is his lawsuit from then on. Here he is beyond question a citizen and resident of Maine. The defendant was also a resident of Maine that had domesticated and was entitled to do business in Oklahoma. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction in litigation, it has been held that the mere fact that a foreign corporation has been domesticated and entitled to do business in a state does not make it a resident of the state for purposes of litigation. In Magna Oil & Refining Co. v. Uncle Sam Oil Co., 81 Okl. 8, 196 P. 142, we held that a foreign corporation that is doing business in this State was not a resident under our attachment statute and it would be required to put up an attachment bond as all nonresidents.
The State of Oregon has a statute identical with Section 99, 12 O.S.1951. It was referred to as Section 26, L.O.L. in the case of Hamilton v. North Pacific S.S. Co., 84 Or. 71, 164 P. 579. The opinion quoted the following authorities 164 P. at page 582:
“ * * * The books are full of general statements in line with the authorities last above cited. 1 Cook on Corporations (7th Ed.) § 1, p. 3, states the rule as follows :
“ ‘The domicile, residence, and citizenship of a corporation are in the state where it is incorporated.’
“In 1 Thompson on Corporations (2d Ed.) § 490, p. 592, we find the following language:
“ ‘The first and prime rule is that a corporation is a resident or has its legal domicile in the state or country by and under whose laws it was organized. As said by one court: “A corporation can exist only within the sovereignty which created it, although, by comity it may be allowed to do business in other jurisdictions through its agents. It can have but one legal residence, and that must be within the state or sovereignty creating it.” The authorities are practically unanimous on this proposition.’
“In 1 Clark & Marshall on Private Corporations, § 114, p. 352, it is said:
“ ‘The settled doctrine is that a corporation, for the purposes for which it may be considered a citizen resident, or inhabitant, is a citizen, resident, or inhabitant of the country or state by or under whose laws it was created or organized, and that it cannot be a citizen, resident, or inhabitant of any other country or state.’ ”
The following was adopted as a paragraph of the syllabus in conformity with the views expressed in the opinion:
“A foreign corporation is a ‘nonresident,’ although doing business within this state within meaning of L.O.L. § 26, providing that, when actions between nonresidents arising in another state are barred by statute of limitation of such state, no action thereon can be here maintained, such corporation being only a resident of the state incorporating it, the word ‘resident’ not meaning ‘one found within the jurisdiction.’ ”
See also 53 C.J.S., Limitations of Actions, § 31.
The statute of limitations applies to the lawsuit that is filed and it is the parties to that particular action that answers the question as to whether one or two year statute controls. If an Oklahoma resident had been appointed administrator, this action could have been maintained under the two year provision of Oklahoma, but when a nonresident was appointed, which by the *807way was done several ■ months before the one year period from the happening of the accident had elapsed, he was bound by said Section 99 and he was not entitled to maintain the action after the expiration of one year.
I dissent.