Court Opinion

ID: 9474590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:02:27.242866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:11.964613
License: Public Domain

SNEEDEN, Circuit Judge:
In this Federal Tort Claims Act case, appellants1 contest the lower court’s dismissal of their suits for failure to timely file an administrative claim with the appropriate federal agency. We agree that appellants did not file an administrative claim within the period required by law. The decision below will therefore be affirmed.
I.
On March 14, 1980, the plaintiff-appellants [“appellants”] were- injured when the car in which they were riding was struck by a car being driven by a substitute rural mail carrier employed by the United States Postal Service.2 Appellants admit that the accident report listed the government as a special use for the car with which they collided.3
The appellants both filed suit against the other vehicle’s driver in South Carolina state court on December 9, 1980. On December 30, 1980, the United States Attorney for the District of South Carolina certified that the substitute rural carrier was a United States employee acting within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident. Thereafter, an Assistant United States attorney sent the appellants’ lawyer a letter confirming a recent telephone conversation in which she advised the lawyer that, since the carrier was a federal employee, the state court suits were in reality against the United States.4 The letter further stated that before a suit may be brought against the government, a claim must be filed with the proper administrative agency. The letter also confirmed an understanding that the appellants’ attorney would dismiss the suits in state court. Finally, the letter contained a warning that, if the state actions were not dismissed, government attorneys would remove the cases to federal court and seek a dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
The government’s warning went unheeded. The state actions were not dismissed. As promised, the suits were removed to federal court where the government moved for a dismissal based on the failure to exhaust administrative remedies. A federal magistrate ruled that the suits were improperly filed before administrative remedies were exhausted.5 The actions were dismissed. No appeals ensued.6
The United States Postal Service subsequently received administrative claims from the appellants. The claims were received on July 6, 1982 — more than 27 months after the date of the accident. The *123Postal Service denied the claims because they were not timely filed.7 Thereafter, on April 5, 1983, appellants filed suit in federal court seeking damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The government objected that the suits were improper because the administrative claims were not filed within two years of the date of the car crash and because the appellants had not filed suit within six months after denial of the administrative claims.8 Subsequently, the district court dismissed the actions.
Appellants contend the dismissal of their claims was improper. On appeal, they argue that by filing their complaints in state court they satisfied the statutory requirement of filing an administrative claim with the Postal Service. Since their state suits were filed within two years of the accident, they argue that their administrative filings were timely. In the alternative, they argue that their administrative claim filings were timely because their cause of action did not accrue on the date of the accident but on the date that they learned the mail driver was a federal employee acting within the scope of her employment. Finally, they argue that their suits were timely because the Postal Service’s August 25, 1982 letter advising them that their claims were not timely filed did not constitute a final denial of their claim.9
II.
Plaintiffs must meet certain prerequisites before filing an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) in federal court. The FTCA clearly provides that, prior to bringing an action against the United States, a claimant “shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency.” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). It is well-settled that the requirement of filing an.administrative claim is jurisdictional and may not be waived. Kielwien v. United States, 540 F.2d 676, 679 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979, 97 S.Ct. 491, 50 L.Ed.2d 588 (1976).
The time requirements for the filing of an administrative claim and the commencement of a civil suit are set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2401. That section provides that a claim must be “presented in writing to the appropriate federal agency within two years after such claim accrues” and that a civil action must be commenced within six months after the final denial of the claim by the agency. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (emphasis added). Three of the four cases relied on by the appellants support the proposition that some form of written notification, plus a claim for a sum certain, must be received by the agency from the claimants. In each case, some type of claim was presented by the claimant to the agency in a timely fashion.10 None of *124these cases, however, lends any support to the plaintiffs contention that the filing of a state court action satisfies the requirement of filing an administrative claim. The weight of the case law clearly supports the government’s position that the filing of a suit does not provide sufficient notice to the federal agency. Particularly pertinent to this appeal are decisions by the Eighth and Sixth Circuits. See Meeker v. United States, 435 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir.1970); Rogers v. United States, 675 F.2d 123 (6th Cir.1982).
In Meeker, as in the case before us, the plaintiff initially filed suit in state court against the individual government employee. There too the government removed the action to federal court, certified that the employee was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident, and sought to dismiss because of plaintiff’s failure to timely file an administrative claim. The Eighth Circuit dismissed the suit, holding that the plaintiff could not circumvent the statutory requirement of filing an administrative claim by commencing action in state court against an individual employee. In so doing, the court specifically stated that “ft]he mere filing of a suit does not meet the requirement of § 2675(a) of first presenting a claim to the appropriate federal agency.” 435 F.2d at 1221.
The facts of Meeker are analogous to the facts of the case at hand. The plaintiff in Meeker, however, made a somewhat different argument concerning his failure to file an administrative claim. In Meeker, the plaintiff contended that he was not required to file .an administrative claim because he was proceeding against the individual employee rather than the government. In the case now before us the plaintiff-appellants contend that, although they were required to file a claim, that requirement was satisfied by the filing of a state court suit against the individual employee. This is a distinction without a difference. The result of accepting either argument would be the same — plaintiffs would be allowed to proceed to the merits of their claims in federal court without first having timely filed an administrative claim.
We agree with the court in Meeker that dismissal is mandatory when a plaintiff fails to file a claim with the proper administrative agency:
To hold otherwise would afford a claimant the choice of either pursuing administrative remedies or of filing suit against the individual employee. Congressional intent in enacting the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies, as evidenced by the legislative history of the 1966 amendment, was to improve and expedite disposition of monetary claims against the Government by establishing a system for prelitigation settlement, to enable consideration of claims by the agency having the best information concerning the incident, and to ease court congestion and avoid unnecessary litigation ... [I]f, as appellant urges, a claimant could forego agency consideration of a tort claim by the simple expedient of initiating an action against the individual employee in a state court, the effect which the amendment was intended to accomplish would be completely frustrated.
435 F.2d at 1222-23.
Similarly, in Rogers v. United States, 675 F.2d 123 (6th Cir.1982), the plaintiff *125initially filed suit in state court against the individual employee. The government subsequently removed the case to federal court and certified that the employee was acting within the scope of his employment. The plaintiff argued that he did not know the employee was acting within the scope of his employment and, in the alternative, that there was no requirement of filing an administrative claim where the plaintiff proceeds against the individual employee and the government substitutes itself as a party. 675 F.2d at 124. The court rejected both arguments and dismissed for failure to timely file an administrative claim. Id.
Again, although the plaintiff in Rogers made a somewhat different argument to justify his failure to file a claim, the dismissal of the suit in Rogers strongly suggests a similar result here.11 Furthermore, even if Meeker and Rogers could be convincingly distinguished, which we are unable to do, there are numerous factually analogous district court cases in which suits were dismissed for failure to timely file administrative claims.12
Finally, we are concerned about the practical impact of holding that the filing of a state court suit satisfies the requirement of filing an administrative claim. Such a holding would be tantamount to judicial repeal of the provisions requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies found in 28 U.S.C. § 2675. Whether a court holds that the filing of a state court suit against the individual employee obviates the need for filing an administrative claim, as the plaintiffs in Meeker and Rogers claimed, or whether it holds that the filing of a state court suit satisfies that administrative requirement would seem to make little practical difference. In neither instance is a claim presented by the claimant to the appropriate federal agency as required by law. Instead of our current, relatively straightforward system in which all claims must be presented to the relevant agency, we open a door for the multitude of plaintiffs’ arguments that the administrative filing requirement was satisfied because the agency was aware of, or had notice of, their claims.
Moreover, if we adopt the position urged by appellants, we would begin to shift from plaintiffs the responsibility to properly file a claim. Instead, federal agencies or the U.S. Attorney would be forced to investigate the suits being filed in state court and to convince those plaintiffs to file administrative claims. This would add unnecessary confusion and inefficiency to the claims process. Finally, as noted by the court in Meeker, allowing these cases to come to federal court without first going through the administrative claims process would simply add to the federal docket and result in unnecessary litigation.
III.
We turn now to appellants’ contention that their causes of action did not accrue *126until they learned that the other vehicle’s driver was a federal employee acting within the scope of her employment. The issue need not detain us because it has recently been addressed by this court.
In Wilkinson v. United States, 677 F.2d 998 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 906, 103 S.Ct. 209, 74 L.Ed.2d 167 (1982), a rented car being driven by a sailor on business for the Navy collided with the plaintiff’s car. At the time of the crash, the plaintiff knew that the other driver was employed by the Navy. There was no indication, however, that the plaintiff was aware that the driver was actually on government business. 677 F.2d at 1000. The court in Wilkinson rejected the plaintiff’s assertion that the cause of action did not accrue until he learned that the sailor was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the crash. Id.
In the present case, the accident report indicated that the vehicle with which appellants collided was being used by the government. This was sufficient notice to prompt the appellants to explore the legal ramifications of the government’s involvement. We cannot state more clearly what Judge Murnaghan has written in Wilkinson: 677 F.2d at 1002. Here too the existence and the cause of the appellants’ injuries were apparent from the outset. We must also conclude, therefore, that the appellants’ cause of action accrued on the date of the collision.13 Since the appellants failed to file their administrative claims within two years of the date of the accident, it is “forever barred” under section 2401(b).
In the instant case, the fact of injury and the identity of the person committing the injury were immediately beknownst. Plaintiff was possessed of sufficient knowledge to put him on inquiry as to whether Gray, a naval rating on active service, was operating within the scope of his employment. In any case, from the outset both the existence of his injury and its cause were known. What was not known, at most, was the fact that the Government would indemnify and hold harmless a naval rating who, nevertheless, clearly was and at all times remained the cause of plaintiff’s injury.
IV.
In conclusion, we hold that the appellants’ cause of action accrued on the date of the collision. We also hold that the filing of appellants’ suits in state court did not satisfy the requirement of filing an administrative claim with the appropriate government agency. Since the appellants submitted their claims to the Postal Service more than two years after the date of the accident, the filing was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). The district court therefore properly dismissed appellants’ suits.
AFFIRMED.

. This consolidated appeal concerns two actions arising from the same motor vehicle accident.

. Appellants’ alleged injuries are presumed for the purposes of this appeal.

. Appellants’ Brief at 12.

. Letter of January 6, 1981 from Heidi M. Solo-man, Assistant United States Attorney to Gene Dukes, Esquire. Supplemental Joint Appendix at 43-44.

. Joint Appendix at 64, 69.

. Joint Appendix at 69.

. Federal law bars any tort claim against the United States unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate federal agency within two years after the claim accrues. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). The Postal Service maintained that the claims were required to be filed with that agency within 24 months from the date of the accident. The claims were actually presented 27 months after the collision.

. Joint Appendix at 73-74.

. This latter issue need not concern us. The timing of the final denial is important only if we address the question of whether the suit was timely filed. Since we hold that the appellants did not meet the initial requirement of filing a timely administrative claim we need not address the issue of the timing of the rejection of the claim.

. See Crow v. United States, 631 F.2d 28 (5th Cir.1980) (letter to agency from claimant's attorney enclosing receipts for alleged items of damage held sufficient notification); College v. United States, 572 F.2d 453 (4th Cir.1978) (letter to Air Force from claimant's attorney held insufficient because it did not state a claim for a sum certain); Lester v. United States, 487 F.Supp. 1033 (N.D.Texas 1980) (filing with the Navy of a Standard Form 95 with the copy of a complaint attached held sufficient notification); Mack v. United States, 414 F.Supp. 504 (E.D.Mich.1976) (repair estimates sent to Postal Service by claimant found sufficient notification).
Also, the additional case which the dissent cites, Williams v. United States, 693 F.2d 555 (5th Cir.1982), supports only the proposition that some form of written notification other than a completed Standard Form 95 is acceptable. In Williams, the Fifth Circuit held that a state court complaint could be taken together with an administration claim form to supply the notice requirements of an administrative claim. The court, however, took pains to distinguish *124the situation it faced from that facing the courts in Meeker v. United States, 435 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir.1970) and Rogers v. United States, 675 F.2d 123 (6th Cir.1982). The court in Williams pointed out that the plaintiff had indeed filed a claim with the Postal Service and sought only to supplement the information in the form with the facts contained in his complaint, unlike the •plaintiffs in Rogers and Meeker who argued that the filing of state suits constituted sufficient notice to the government. 693 F.2d at 558.
Furthermore, the Code of Federal Regulations provides no indication that the requirements of section 2401(b) are optional. Although 28 C.F.R. § 142(a) states that some form of written notification other than Standard Form 95 may be sufficient, it still requires that written notification, plus a claim for a sum certain, be received by the agency from the claimants.

. See also Driggers v. United States, 309 F.Supp. 1377 (D.S.C.1970) (court dismissed suit because of failure to timely file an administrative claim, rejecting argument that requirement for an administrative claim did not exist when suit was filed against individual employee whose status as a government employee was not clearly known to plaintiff); Dunaville v. Carnago, 485 F.Supp. 545 (S.D.Ohio 1980) (follows Driggers; suit dismissed for failure to file administrative claim even though state court suit initiated against government employee within two years after accident).

. See, e.g., Flickinger v. United States, 523 F.Supp. 1372, 1377 (W.D.Pa.1981) (court rejected plaintiff's argument that she had fulfilled the requirements of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2675(a) and 2401(b) by filing in state court, thereby putting government on notice of her claim); Miller v. United States, 418 F.Supp. 373, 376 (D.Minn.1976) (court held that the filing of a state court suit did not provide an effective alternative to the administrative claim, stating "[t]he statute requires that the claim be ‘presented in writing to the appropriate federal agency,' not that it came to the attention of the United States Attorney by some other means.”); Smith v. United States, 328 F.Supp. 1224, 1226 (W.D.Tenn.1971) ("It is generally conceded that a plaintiff does not satisfy the requirement of filing an administrative claim by commencing an action in state court against the individual employee.”); Gun-stream v. United States, 307 F.Supp. 366, 369 (C.D.Cal.1969) (“Filing suit does not meet the requirement of first presenting a claim to the appropriate governmental agency.”)

. See also Wollman v. Gross, 637 F.2d 544 (8th Cir.1980), reh'g en banc denied, 646 F.2d 1306 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893, 102 S.Ct. 389, 70 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); Rogers v. United States, 675 F.2d 123 (6th Cir.1982); West v. United States, 592 F.2d 487 (8th Cir.1979); Flickinger v. United States, 523 F.Supp. 1372 (W.D. Pa.1981); Lien v. Beehner, 453 F.Supp. 604 (N.D. N.Y.1978), Driggers v. United States, 309 F.Supp. 1377 (D.S.C.1970).