Court Opinion

ID: 9442393
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 18:46:01.72633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:05.180894
License: Public Domain

DOOLEY, District Judge
(concurring).
I concur fully in the holding that the suits filed in Federal court and now on appeal are not suits against the State of Texas and in the judgment of this Court, but with a reservation against joinder in the query on what the trial court may determine as to whether or not the suits in the State court are in effect attempts to set aside, annul or suspend orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission. I am not sure enough that this can be an open question, and mention of it could be unfortunate. The cases seem to make it clear that the present suits in Federal court, although brought to combat an obstruction, are not suits to enforce orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, within the jurisdictional sense of what used to be U.S.C.A., Title 28, Sec. 41, sub. (27). Seaboard Airline Railroad Company v. Daniel, 333 U.S. 118, 68 S.Ct. 426, 92 L.Ed. 580; Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Public Utilities Commission of Illinois, 245 U.S. 493, 38 S.Ct. 170, 62 L.Ed. 425. Conversely, on a parity of reasoning, I doubt that the suits pending in the State court, as same now stand, can ever properly be deemed suits to set aside, annul or suspend orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission within the jurisdictional sense of what used to be U.S.C.A., Title 28, Sec. 41, sub. (28). The like nature of said jurisdictional statutes, once separate as two subdivisions, is reflected in the fact that same have since been combined and in the 1948 revision of said Title 28 now constitute the single Sec. 1336.