Court Opinion

ID: 9496800
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:35:33.27925+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:48.191250
License: Public Domain

GIBBONS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent because I believe that Hossler lacks standing to contest the district court’s order releasing her .judgment lien. The district court was enforcing the terms of its prior restitution order, which was entered at sentencing in a criminal case in which Hossler was not a party. The majority’s broad interpretation of the MVRA would allow victims to appeal numerous decisions relating to the enforcement of restitution orders and would lead to victims participating in criminal proceedings in a manner that Congress never intended when it enacted the MVRA. Hossler has not been deprived of a constitutionally protected right to receive restitution; she has been deprived of the ■ opportunity to enforce a restitution order in a manner that was contrary to what was intended by the district court and in a way that harms the rights of Perry’s other victims to receive the restitution to which they are also entitled.
*540Standing is a threshold issue in every ease before a federal court. United States v. McVeigh, 106 F.3d 325, 334 (10th Cir.1997). To establish standing, plaintiffs must show that “their claimed injury is personal, particularized, concrete, and otherwise judicially cognizable.” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997) (emphasis added). Standing involves both constitutional requirements, which are based on the case or controversy clause in Article III, and prudential limitations, which are crafted by the courts. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992); McClure v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 404, 408 (5th Cir.2003). “[T]o satisfy Article Ill’s standing requirements, a plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130). Beyond the constitutional requirements in Article III, “the federal judiciary has also adhered to a set of prudential principles that bear on the question of standing.” Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). One of these prudential requirements is that the interest of a plaintiff seeking standing under a particular statutory provision must be “within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.” United States v. Mindel, 80 F.3d 394, 397 (9th Cir.1996) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984)). Under the zone of interests test, plaintiffs lack standing if their interests are “so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.” United States v. Grundhoefer, 916 F.2d 788, 792 (2d Cir.1990) (quoting Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399, 107 S.Ct. 750, 93 L.Ed.2d 757 (1987)).
The district court granted the Perry Investors’ motion to vacate Hossler’s lien upon finding that the lien would give preferential treatment to Hossler. At sentencing, Perry expressed a strong desire to make restitution, and his counsel described a plan for selling his property and liquidating his assets in order to pay his restitution obligations. The district court found that Perry’s restitution payments “should be made to the Clerk of Courts,” who would then “forward the money to the victims pro rata until the full amount is paid.” In granting the Perry Investors’ motion to vacate Hos-sler’s judgment lien, the district court noted that its restitution order “unequivocally required that restitution be distributed to all the Perry Investors pro rata,” and concluded that Hossler’s lien “would give preferential treatment to only one of Perry’s numerous victims — which is plainly inconsistent [with the court’s prior restitution order].” For both constitutional and prudential reasons, Hossler lacks standing to challenge the district court’s order.
Prior to the MVRA’s enactment in 1996, courts consistently held that victims did not have standing to appeal a district court’s decision modifying or enforcing a restitution order. See Mindel, 80 F.3d at 397 (holding that beneficiary of criminal restitution order lacked standing to challenge modification of sentence to rescind restitution order); United States v. John*541son, 983 F.2d 216 (11th Cir.1993). These courts have noted that while a criminal restitution order resembles a judgment for the benefit of the victim, restitution is penal, not compensatory. Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 52, 107 S.Ct. 353, 93 L.Ed.2d 216 (1986). Thus, “[t]he direct, distinct, and palpable injury in a criminal sentencing proceeding plainly falls only on the defendant who is being sentenced ... and he alone suffers the direct consequences.” Grundhoefer, 916 F.2d at 791; see also Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973) (finding that a private citizen generally lacks standing “to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution”). Because restitution is part of criminal sentencing and is penal in nature, victims of crime do not suffer an “injury in fact” when a district court modifies or terminates a restitution order. See Mindel, 80 F.3d at 397; Johnson, 983 F.2d at 221 United States v. Schad, No. 97-5003, 1998 WL 193129, at *2 (10th Cir. April 22,1998) (holding that a crime victim lacked standing to appeal the district court’s order terminating the victim’s right to continue garnishing the defendant’s wages pursuant to a criminal restitution order).
As the majority opinion notes; Mindel, Johnson, and Schad all involved appeals from orders rescinding or modifying restitution orders. In Johnson, for example, the district court rescinded its prior restitution order when the defendant became delinquent in her restitution payments that were supposed to be made to the victim bank in monthly installments. Id. at 218. The bank appealed the district court’s order rescinding the restitution obligation, and the Eleventh Circuit held that the bank lacked standing because it had not suffered a direct injury adequate to satisfy Article Ill’s constitutional requirements. Id. at 221. But just as a victim does not suffer an injury in fact when a district court modifies or rescinds a restitution order, Hossler has not suffered an injury in fact in this case because the district court’s decision vacating her judgment lien was in essence enforcing the terms of its prior restitution ■ order. The fact that the district court in this case vacated Hossler’s judgment lien instead of modifying or rescinding its restitution order does not mean that she has somehow been injured in a more concrete or particularized way than the plaintiffs in Mindel and Johnson. The majority opinion asserts that the MVRA does not provide an “express means by which a district court can alter a victim’s lien rights post hoc,” but presumably a district court does exactly that when it rescinds or modifies restitution orders. However, prior cases have held that in those circumstances, victims have not suffered injury in fact and do not have standing to appeal. Similarly, Hossler has not suffered an injury in fact because the district court denied her the opportunity to make an end run around the schedule set forth in the court’s previous restitution order.1
*542Even if Hossler has suffered an injury in fact different from that suffered by the victim bank in Johnson, for example, prudential limitations counsel against according Hossler standing to challenge the district court’s order in this case. Critical to the issue of Hossler’s standing is the context in which her appeal occurs: Hossler is appealing an order entered in a criminal case in which she was not a party. If the Perry Investors had gone to state court and filed a lawsuit seeking to vacate her judgment lien, Hossler certainly would have standing to appeal from any subsequent decision by the state court, but that is not what is happening here. Nothing in the language or legislative history of the MVRA indicates that Congress intended to provide victims with a private remedy to sue or appeal restitution decisions made in the context of criminal cases in which the victims were not parties.2
As the majority notes, a comparison between the MVRA and its predecessor, the VWPA, is relevant here because courts have held that victims do not have standing to appeal a district court’s modification or rescission of a restitution order under the VWPA. The majority concludes that the MVRA reflects a more “pro-victim” attitude, primarily because restitution is now mandatory for certain crimes under the MVRA, and district courts may no longer consider a defendant’s financial circumstances when determining the amount of restitution to be paid. Even if Hossler has a right to restitution because restitution is now mandatory under the MVRA, this right was not denied when the district court entered its order vacating her judgment lien. Hossler retained her right to restitution in the manner and amount set forth in the district court’s original restitution order. She was merely denied the opportunity to enforce the district court’s restitution order in a manner that was contrary to what was intended by the district court. In its zeal to protect Hossler’s judgment lien, the majority makes no mention of Perry’s other victims, who presumably also have a right to receive restitution under the provisions of the MVRA and who will be denied that right if Perry is unable to sell his remaining assets due to Hossler’s judgment lien.
In fact, the MVRA has removed victim discretion to enforce restitution orders; enforcement of such orders now rests exclusively with the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(m)(l)(A). In this respect at least, the MVRA is less “pro-victim” than the predecessor VWPA. Prior to 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 3663 provided that an order of restitution could be enforced by the United States and “by the victim named in the order to receive the restitution in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action.” Under this statutory scheme, either the United States or the victim could seek to enforce an order of restitution. This provision was amended, and pursuant to the new legislation in the MVRA, an order of restitution is now enforceable only by the United States. It is worth noting that this change was enacted after several circuit courts had concluded that victims did not *543have standing to challenge restitution orders.3 It seems unlikely that Congress intended to extend standing to criminal victims in light of those decisions and its decision to remove victims from the enforcement provision.
While the legislative history of the MVRA indicates that Congress intended mandatory restitution to be one means by which the criminal justice system could be reformed into a system that is more responsive to the needs of crime victims, the legislative history also evinces a Congressional intent to streamline the administration of restitution within the criminal justice system:
The procedures contained in this section are intended to provide a streamlined process for the determination of both the amount of restitution owed to each victim and the terms of repayment based on a reasonable interpretation of the defendant’s economic circumstances. The committee believes that the need for finality and certainty in the sentencing process dictates that this determination be made quickly, but also recognizes that justice requires that this particular aspect of the criminal sentence be subject to review in the light of changed circumstances. The committee believes that restitution must be considered a pari of the criminal sentence, and that justice cannot be considered served until full restitution is made.
S. Rep. 104-179, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 933 (emphasis added). It is hard to see how the goal of streamlining the restitution process is served by allowing victims to intervene and enforce restitution orders in ways that are contrary to what was intended by the district court at sentencing.
In support of its position that Hossler has met the prudential requirements for standing in this case, the majority notes that “the equities favor permitting this appeal” because “[t]here is a substantial question as to whether the district court had the authority to vacate the lien because no MVRA provision specifically grants district courts that right.” This analysis confuses the issue of Hossler’s standing with the issue of whether the district court had the authority to vacate a state court judgment lien. These are two separate issues. Hossler does not have standing merely because she does not like the district court’s order or because we do not like the district court’s order. Prudential limitations on standing require that Hossler’s interests be within the zone of interests encompassed by the MVRA. Permitting Hossler’s appeal in this case will provide victims with unprecedented ability to intervene in criminal restitution orders, even if the effect of their intervention is to *544the detriment of other victims and to the desire for finality and certainty in the restitution process that was articulated by the drafters of the MVRA. Because Hossler’s interests are so “inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the [MVRA] that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit” this lawsuit, I would dismiss her appeal for lack of standing and decline to address whether the district court properly released her judgment lien.

. While the majority notes that the MVRA provides a mechanism for victims to obtain judgment liens in § 3664(m)(l)(B), it is worth noting that the MVRA also contemplates the authority of district courts to require reimbursement in a particular manner — whether in lump-sum payments, partial payments at specified intervals, in-kmdppayments, or some combination of the above. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(3)(A). District courts may also favor one victim over another in crafting a restitution order, based on "the type and amount of each victim's loss and accounting for the economic circumstances of each victim.” § 3664(i). A restitution order creating a priority of victims for payment would certainly impact a victim's right to obtain a judgment lien under § 3664(m)(l)(B) and would *542likely result in situations where a victim desires to challenge the district court's order of priority. These victims, like Hossler, have not suffered injury in fact and should not be permitted to appeal such decisions. By opening the door to victims like Hossler, the majority also opens the door to other victims unhappy with the terms of a district court's restitution order.

. In fact, it is telling that Hossler has never formally intervened because no mechanism exists for a private citizen to intervene in a criminal case. The absence of such a mechanism for intervention is further evidence that Congress did not contemplate that victims would participate in criminal cases as parties with standing to appeal restitution orders.

. While this court has not issued any published opinions on the issue of a victim's standing to appeal a restitution order, it briefly discussed the issue in an unpublished opinion. United States v. Curtis, No. 99-5574, 2000 WL 145183 (6th Cir. Feb.1, 2000). In Curtis, the defendant appealed a district court order denying his motion to end interest charges on his order of restitution. Id. at *1. The motion had been filed in an attempt to force a finance company who had purchased the account to cease charging interest on the defendant's restitution debt and to restore any interest already charged on his debt. Id. In affirming the district court’s judgment, the court noted that the finance company was never a party to Curtis’s criminal case, and that the district court had no authority over the finance company. Id. The court added: “Even the victim itself, as a non-party to the criminal case, would not have standing to challenge the restitution order." Id. (citing Mindel, 80 F.3d at 397). According to the court, the victim "would have to bring a civil action to enforce the restitution order.” Id. (citing United States v. Diamond, 969 F.2d 961, 969 (10th Cir.1992)).