Court Opinion

ID: 9928160
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 21:10:19.910045+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:49:38.112571
License: Public Domain

11/29/2023
               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                          AT KNOXVILLE
                             November 15, 2023 Session

                PRISCILLA SMITH v. SHARON BERRY, ET AL.

                Appeal from the Chancery Court for Hawkins County
                 No. 2020-CH-181 Douglas T. Jenkins, Chancellor
                      ___________________________________

                            No. E2023-00281-COA-R3-CV

                       ___________________________________

Priscilla Smith filed a complaint in the Chancery Court for Hawkins County (“the Trial
Court”) against multiple neighbors, including Michael and Sharon Berry. She sought
access to her property by way of an undeveloped road called Hyder Lane. The Berrys’
garage was on the undeveloped road. After trial, the Trial Court determined that Hyder
Lane was a public road and ordered the garage to be removed and the road opened for
Ms. Smith’s use and access to her property. The Berrys appealed. Having concluded that
certain indispensable parties were never joined to the action, we vacate the Trial Court’s
judgment and remand for the joinder of these indispensable parties.

      Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court
                            Vacated; Case Remanded

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which THOMAS R.
FRIERSON, II, and KRISTI M. DAVIS, JJ., joined.

Phillip L. Boyd, Rogersville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Michael Berry and Sharon
Berry.

George Todd East, Kingsport, Tennessee, for the appellee, Priscilla Smith.
                                              OPINION

                                             Background

       On July 17, 2020, Ms. Smith filed a complaint, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 54-
14-101 et seq., against her neighbors in the Trial Court. She stated that she was the
owner of an 18.40-acre tract of land, which she alleged was enclosed by various tracts of
property separately owned by the Berrys, Eric Todd Linkous, and Joshua and Micah
Kegley. Based upon the filings and the testimony present in the record, it appears that
these properties were part of the “J.E. Clemons Subdivision” and were the result of Mr.
Clemons’s subdivision of his property in the 1950s.1 Ms. Smith alleged that she had
requested permission from the Berrys to access her property by way of Hyder Lane, a
purportedly public road that was platted to reach Ms. Smith’s property. Hyder Lane,
however, was never developed past the Berrys’ property, and the Berrys’ garage sits on
Hyder Lane, blocking further development of the road and Ms. Smith’s access to her
property.

       The Berrys refused Ms. Smith access and claimed title by adverse possession to
the contested portion of Hyder Lane where their garage sits. Ms. Smith explained that
she did not request access across Mr. Linkous’s property or the Kegleys’ property given
that the “ingress and egress is neither adequate nor convenient and would occasion
significant damage” to their properties. Ms. Smith claimed that she was “unable to fully
enjoy the Property and requires an easement to go on the Property to prepare for the sale
of Property and do any and all other things incidental to the ownership of the Property.”
Ms. Smith requested that the Trial Court grant her an easement or right-of-way via the
contested portion of Hyder Lane.

        Ms. Berry filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that Ms. Smith’s complaint failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted and that there was already a former suit
pending.2 She further claimed that her garage had been constructed in 1960, thereby
rendering Ms. Smith’s requested relief barred by the statute of limitations pursuant to
Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-18-109. She further cited Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 28-2-102, -103,
and -105, stating that she and her ex-husband, Mr. Berry, had adversely possessed the
contested portion of Hyder Lane. She also cited Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-109, stating
that Mr. Berry and she had paid taxes on the contested portion of property for more than
twenty years and were accordingly the legal owners. Mr. Berry later filed his own
separate motion to dismiss.
1
   Clemons is spelled as “Clemons” in documents in the technical record but as “Clemmons” in the
transcript. In this Opinion, we spell the last name as it appears in the technical record.
2
 Although not entirely clear from the record, it appears that this former suit was consolidated with the
present one based upon an “Order to Consolidate.” Ms. Smith testified at trial that this conflict had been
on-going since 2009.
                                                  -2-
        On March 15, 2021, the Trial Court denied Mr. Berry’s and Ms. Berry’s motions
to dismiss. Mr. Berry and Ms. Berry thereafter filed a joint answer and renewed their
request for dismissal. They also claimed that Ms. Smith’s property once fronted the
“main road” but that Ms. Smith had sold a portion of her property that gave her access to
this road. They posited that she could not now claim that her property was landlocked.

      The Trial Court conducted a trial on May 23, 2022, and heard testimony from Ms.
Smith; Lowell Bean, the Hawkins County Road Superintendent; David Pearson, the
Hawkins County Property Assessor; Timothy E. Scott, an attorney and expert in title
examinations; Margaret Louise Rimer, a former owner of the Berrys’ property and
garage; Gerald Ward, Ms. Rimer’s brother; and Ms. Berry.

       Ms. Smith testified that she had inherited her property from her father, Bob
Gilreath, and that her property was located at the end of Hyder Lane. She further
explained that she does not have access to her property if she cannot use Hyder Lane.
She acknowledged, however, that if she still owned the parcels she previously sold, then
her property would not be landlocked without access to a public road. According to Ms.
Smith, an old plat from 1956 (“1956 Plat”) demonstrated that Hyder Lane was platted to
“go all the way to the end of the property.” The 1956 Plat was admitted into evidence as
an exhibit.

       Ms. Smith grew up in the subdivision and recalled that Eddie Rimer, Ms. Rimer’s
husband, built “a little shed like thing to put his car under,” which she described as four
“sticks with a flat roof.” This is the garage at issue. She agreed that the garage had been
situated on Hyder Lane for over fifty years. She further explained that she or her
husband went to the tax assessor’s office to inquire about the garage on one occasion and
that the tax assessor’s office determined that the garage needed to be removed from the
Berrys’ “tax roll.” Ms. Smith acknowledged that the tax assessor later reinstated the
garage to the Berry’s tax roll.

       Mr. Bean testified that he has been the Hawkins County Road Superintendent for
nearly sixteen years. He stated that he was familiar with Hyder Lane and that Hawkins
County (“the County”) has previously plowed snow off the road and patched potholes but
that only one-tenth of the road is recognized as county property. He further explained
that he would not pave the unfinished portion of the road if asked, given that he would
need to get approval from the “road committee” and “county commission” and that those
two boards would have to “accept it as a county road.” He stated that Hyder Lane was
not a “county right-of-way,” although he acknowledged that the 1956 Plat shows the
contested portion as being part of the county road and that, according to the 1956 Plat, it
is supposed to “go all the way through,” presumably beyond the one-tenth developed
portion.

                                           -3-
      Speaking about the unfinished portion of Hyder Lane, Mr. Bean explained:

      [I]f the rest of that was to become a county road, then all the property
      owners has to deed that to the County with the now subdivision specs. And
      then it would go before the road committee, the road committee would go
      up and look at section of road, and either recommend or recommend it not
      go before the full commission. Then if it went before the full commission
      and they accepted it as a county road, then I’m free to do whatever . . .

        When asked how a road would be dedicated to the County if there was no
planning commission at the time of its dedication, Mr. Bean stated that the property
owners would “just make a deed to the County.” However, Mr. Bean clarified that “we
got a lot of roads in the county that don’t have deeds.”

       Through Mr. Bean’s testimony, Ms. Smith offered as evidence a 1959 Resolution
from the Hawkins County Court (“1959 Resolution”), providing:

             Be it resolved by the County Court of Hawkins County, Tennessee,
      that, as recommended by the County Superintendent of Highways, all
      Streets and Roads which have heretofore been laid out and dedicated to the
      public use, within duly platted subdivisions located in said County, shall be
      taken over by the County Superintendent of Highways and maintained as
      public roads and streets, as expeditiously as the Highway Superintendent is
      able to commence the working and maintenance of said roads and streets.

When asked whether he knew “of any acceptance of any dedications in the county other
than what shows up in the County rolls and the County minutes,” Mr. Bean answered
“No.”

       Mr. Pearson testified that he was the Property Assessor for the County and had
worked in that office since 1987. Mr. Pearson stated that taxes were no longer paid on
the garage as of 2021 or 2022 and opined that this was because it does not sit on the
Berrys’ property and therefore should not have been charged to the Berrys. He explained
that the garage had been removed from the property assessment in 2012 but had been put
back on at the request of the Berrys.

      When asked who requested that it be taken off the property assessment, Mr.
Pearson explained:

      [T]he reason it was taken off when we do our visual inspection cycle, we
      review every parcel in the county, one-fourth of the county, every year.
      The person that did that review noticed -- based upon looking at our new
      maps that we have, which have a photo overlayed over the maps, it clearly
                                        -4-
      indicated that building didn’t sit on that parcel. So it actually sits in the
      middle of our right-of-way and it shouldn’t have been charged to anybody,
      so it was taken off at that time.

Mr. Pearson clarified that the Berrys paid taxes on the garage itself, not the land, from
2011 until 2020 or 2021. He explained that he had decided that the garage should “come
off the rolls” in 2020 or 2021 because it did not physically reside on the Berrys’ parcel
and did not have much value. He indicated that the garage was not a valuable building
and that it was “grown over with a lot of bushes and stuff.”

      Next, Mr. Scott testified as an expert witness for Ms. Smith. He testified that he
was an attorney with expertise in oil, gas, and coal, as well as real estate title
examinations. The Berrys stipulated to his qualification as an expert witness. Mr. Scott
reviewed both the 1956 Plat and the 1959 Resolution. The following is an exchange
between Ms. Smith’s attorney and Mr. Scott:

      Q. The resolution, the 1959 resolution that I had which makes the reference
      to accepting all things that have been platted, is -- does that meet your
      criteria for the County accepting the property?

      A. Yes, sir, it does.

      Q. Is there any other document -- you know, Mr. Boyd [the Berrys’
      attorney] -- you heard him make reference of a deed to the property. At
      that time is that the way that business was conducted?

      A. Based on my review of records in Hawkins County, that’s correct, yes,
      sir.

      Q. Would that be the resolution, is how they are accepted?

      A. Yes, sir.

      Q. Is there commonly a deed for the roadway that’s deeded or at the time
      were deeds done in order to . . .

      A. Well, I’ve seen those, but as Mr. Bean said, there are a number of county
      roads that are maintained where those deeds are not -- are not found of
      record.

      Mr. Scott indicated that “records are pretty bleak” when asked how he determines
whether a county has accepted a roadway. He further explained:

                                          -5-
              Sometimes it’s hard to find those ordinances where things are either
      -- where roadways are accepted or they’re released back to the adjoining
      property owners. So in the particular case we would have relied on the plat
      that said that the County had accepted that road, Hyder Lane.

When asked whether the unpaved portion of Hyder Lane is still part of the right-of-way,
Mr. Scott responded: “it’s still part of the . . . plat that shows that it was dedicated.”

       With Mr. Scott’s testimony, Ms. Smith rested her case. The Berrys renewed their
motion to dismiss. The Trial Court denied the motion, noting that it had found Mr.
Scott’s testimony persuasive. The Berrys proceeded to present their case.

       Ms. Rimer testified that her father, Rowdy Ward, had purchased the property that
the Berrys now own and built a home for Ms. Rimer. She lived there with her husband,
Eddie Rimer, who built the garage in approximately 1968. She testified that Bob Gilreath
told her husband: “If you want to build a garage there, build it. This road will never be
open.” She reported that “nobody used that road but the ones that lived up there” and
opined that the road was not supposed to go farther than the Berrys’ property. According
to Ms. Rimer, when her husband and she moved there, there “wasn’t nothing but a field”
and they “had to walk all the way up through there.” She stated that they “cleaned it up”
themselves and “made us a road,” presumably referring to Hyder Lane. Her husband and
she eventually sold the property to Clarence and Nellie Christian, who then sold the
property to the Berrys. Her brother, Mr. Ward also testified and stated that Hyder Lane
was “always private.”

       Lastly, Ms. Berry testified, explaining that she had grown up in the house next
door to her current home. She testified that Hyder Lane had always been a dead end.
Her ex-husband and she bought their property, including the garage, from the Christians
in 1998.

       On August 2, 2022, the Trial Court entered an order, finding that Ms. Smith had a
right to use Hyder Lane and ordering that “all obstructions” be removed. The Court
made the following findings:

      1. That upon Motion of [ ] Eric Todd Linkous, and agreement of the
      Parties, Eric Todd Linkous is hereby dismissed from this case with
      prejudice.

      2. That Defendants Joshua T. Kegley and Micah Kegley did not appear for
      this trial.

      3. That Plaintiff Priscilla Smith has a right to the road which is the subject
      of this case by Warranty Deed of record in Deed Book 403, Page 497
                                           -6-
which was from the Clemons’ whom created the subdivision that contains
the road.

4. That the plat which corresponds to Plaintiff’s Warranty Deed, Trial
Exhibit 2, located in Map Cabinet 3, in Envelope 1100B demonstrates the
road which is the subject of this case.

5. That Defendant Sharon Berry owns Lots 44, 45, 46 and 47 which do not
include the portion of land which includes the bed of the road.

6. That an Order of Resolution from the Minutes of the County Court of
Hawkins County declared, “Be it resolved by the County Court of Hawkins
County, Tennessee that, as recommended by the County Superintendent of
Highways, all streets and roads which have been heretofore laid out and
dedicated to the public use within duly platted subdivisions located in said
county shall be taken over by the County Superintendent of Highways and
maintained as public roads and streets as expeditiously as the Highway
Superintendent is able to commence the working and maintenance of said
roads and streets.”

7. That through this resolution, and because the road is platted, the road
which is the subject of this case is a public road. This fact is additionally
proven because no private citizen has been paying tax on the property
which contains the road.

8. That once a road becomes irrevocably dedicated to the public, it cannot
be lost or forfeited by mere non-use or by the public and is not subject to
adverse possession. (Varallo v. Met Government of Nashville and
Davidson County).

9. That no proof was presented by any party indicating that the County
abandoned the road which is the subject of this case.

10. That the land upon which the Defendant Berry’s garage structure is
constructed, is a public road.

11. That despite paying County taxes on the building, Defendant Berry
does not own the land upon which the building was constructed.

12. That Plaintiff has property within the subdivision which utilizes the
road which is the subject of this case and Plaintiff has a right to use the
road.

                                    -7-
      13. That all obstructions to the road are hereby Ordered to be removed by
      and the road should be opened to the terminus of Plaintiffs’ property for her
      use or her successor in title to use.

The Berrys subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend pursuant to Tennessee Rule of
Civil Procedure 59. On January 26, 2023, the Trial Court entered an order denying their
motion to alter or amend. The Berrys timely appealed, and an agreed order staying the
Trial Court’s judgment pending the outcome of their appeal was entered.

                                        Discussion

       The Berrys have presented several issues, but we discern that one issue is
dispositive of the case and pretermits all the others. This dispositive issue, although not
stated exactly as such by the Berrys, is whether the Trial Court erred by not including in
the suit as indispensable parties the County and the Clemons heirs as possible owners of
Hyder Lane. Upon our review of the record, we conclude that the Trial Court erred by
adjudicating this case without adding the County and the Clemons heirs as indispensable
parties.

       Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 19.01 generally governs the joinder of
indispensable parties and provides as follows:

      A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party if
      (1) in the person’s absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those
      already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of
      the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person’s
      absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability
      to protect that interest, or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties
      subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise
      inconsistent obligations by reasons of the claimed interest. If the person
      has not been so joined, the court shall order that the person be made a party.
      If the person properly should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he or
      she may be made a defendant, or in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff.

       This Court has previously explained the operation of Rule 19.01,
particularly in the context of land disputes, as follows:

             We note that the language of Rule 19 is mandatory and directive;
      one who is an indispensable and necessary party “shall be joined as a
      party.” TENN. R. CIV. P. 19.01 (emphasis added). The requirement of
      joinder of indispensable and necessary parties “appears absolute and
      inflexible,” and applies to both trial courts and appellate courts. Pope v.
      Kelsey, No. 86-17-II, 1986 WL 6564, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 13, 1986),
                                           -8-
no perm. app. (quoting Glickauf v. Moss, 23 Ill. App. 3d 679, 320 N.E.2d
132, 135-316 (Ill. 1974)). When an indispensable and necessary party has
not been joined, neither the trial court nor the appellate court may proceed
further with the matter. Id. The parties are of course obliged to bring to the
court’s attention the necessity of such a joinder; however, even if the
parties fail to do so, the trial court or even the appellate court must sua
sponte enforce this principle of law. Id. (quoting Glickauf, 320 N.E.2d at
135-36).

        Persons whose real property interests may potentially be affected by
a trial court’s ruling have consistently been recognized as indispensable and
necessary parties. See Roberts v. England, No. M1999-02688-COA-R3-
CV, 2001 WL 575560, at * 2 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 30, 2001), no perm. app.
(citing Citizens Real Estate & Loan Co., Inc. [v. Mountain States Dev.
Corp.], 633 S.W.2d [763] at 764-66 [(Tenn. Ct. App. 1981)]; Lee v. Brown,
No. 89-230-II, 1989 WL 147497, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 1989), no
perm. app.; Stuart v. City of White Pine, No. 57, 1988 WL 86585 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Aug. 19, 1988), no perm. app.; St. Clair v. Evans, No. 829, 1988 WL
102767, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 1988), aff’d on app. after remand,
872 S.W.2d 49 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993); Carpenter v. Yount, No.14, 1986
WL 10150, at *3-4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 1986), no perm. app.).

        In Roberts, the Court noted that the appropriate inquiry to determine
if an adjoining landowner is an indispensable and necessary party is
“whether any resolution of the issues presented in the lawsuit could have
affected” the adjoining landowner’s real property interest, not whether the
trial court’s final ruling actually affected the adjoining landowner. Id. at *4
(emphasis added). Thus, the joinder should occur when there is some
indication in the record that an identifiable landowner exists whose interests
might be affected by the lawsuit, even if it appears likely that the third party
landowner might agree with the trial court’s judgment. See id. at *3 (citing
Lee, 1989 WL 147497, at *1; St. Clair, 1988 WL 102767, at *2).

        In cases in which the appellate court has found that an adjoining
landowner is an indispensable and necessary party and was not joined in the
proceedings below, the appellate court has vacated the judgment of the
court below and remanded the case with instructions to ensure that all
proper parties are joined before a final determination is made of the
property owners’ rights. Id. at *3. The purpose of the remand is not for a
trial de novo; rather, the purpose is to join the absent third parties and give
them the opportunity to present new evidence as deemed necessary by the
trial court. See id. at *4.

                                     -9-
Baker v. Foster, No. W2009-00214-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 174773, at *4-5 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Jan. 20, 2010).

       The subject of this dispute is the unfinished portion of Hyder Lane. Based upon
the evidence at trial, there are at least three potential owners of the property that
constitutes Hyder Lane: the Berrys, the County, and the Clemons heirs. The Berrys
claimed ownership by adverse possession of the portion of Hyder Lane upon which their
garage is situated. Ms. Smith claimed that the County owned Hyder Lane based upon the
1956 Plat and 1959 Resolution, thereby permitting her public access to her property.
Lastly, if the County does not own the undeveloped portion of Hyder Lane, it would
appear that the Clemons heirs may own the property that constitutes that part of Hyder
Lane.

       We recognize that the Berrys argue that the Trial Court’s final judgment is in
substance a declaratory judgment and that therefore the Declaratory Judgment Act’s
standard for joinder of indispensable parties should apply. In their appellate briefs, the
Berrys cite both to the general procedure for joinder in Tennessee Rule of Civil
Procedure 19.01 and to the Declaratory Judgment Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-14-107(a).
We note that this Court has previously explained the difference between Rule 19.01 and
Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-14-107(a) as follows:

      Rules 19.01 and 19.02 establish general procedural rules for requiring the
      joinder of indispensable parties in all types of cases. Parties seeking
      declaratory relief must also satisfy the more specific requirements of the
      Declaratory Judgments Act before the courts have jurisdiction to grant
      declaratory relief.

             Because of the nature of declaratory relief, the Declaratory
      Judgments Act makes it incumbent that every person having an affected
      interest be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before declaratory
      relief may be granted. The Declaratory Judgments Act imposes stricter
      requirements than those imposed generally by Tennessee Rules of Civil
      Procedure 19.01 and 19.02. While joinder may not be required under Rules
      19.01 and 19.02, it is clearly required in a suit for declaratory relief
      pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 29-14-107(a) which
      provides that: “When declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made
      parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the
      declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not
      parties to those proceedings.”

Huntsville Util. Dist. of Scott Cnty., Tenn. v. Gen. Tr. Co., 839 S.W.2d 397, 403 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1992) (finding that joinder was necessary both under the general principles of
Rule 19.01 and the Declaratory Judgment Act). We conclude that the County and the
                                           - 10 -
Clemons heirs are indispensable parties under either Rule 19.01 or Tenn. Code Ann. §
29-14-107(a).

        Keeping in mind the legal principle already set forth that parties “whose real
property interests may potentially be affected by a trial court’s ruling have consistently
been recognized as indispensable and necessary parties,” see Baker, 2010 WL 174773 at
*5, we conclude that the County and the Clemons heirs were necessary parties to this
suit. The effect of the Trial Court’s judgment is that the County, whether it wanted to be
or not, has now been confirmed as the owner of Hyder Lane. The County, of course, may
not be interested in or desire ownership of Hyder Lane. Even assuming that the County
is content with the outcome of this litigation and its ownership of Hyder Lane, its
interests could have been adversely affected if the Trial Court had determined that Hyder
Lane was not a public road. See Roberts v. England, No. M1999-02688-COA-R3-CV,
2001 WL 575560, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 30, 2001) (“The appropriate inquiry is not
whether the court’s final decision affected a nonparty’s real property interest; the
question is whether any resolution of the issues presented in the lawsuit could have
affected another landowner.”). As this Court noted in Baker, joinder should occur “even
if it appears likely that the third party landowner might agree with the trial court’s
judgment.” Baker, 2010 WL 174773, at *5. Yet, here, the County was not a party and
therefore did not have the opportunity to present evidence to support its interests one way
or another.

       With respect to the Clemons heirs, we note the Trial Court’s oral ruling and
apparent struggle with this issue. The Trial Court rightly noted that if the County had
never accepted the offer to make Hyder Lane a public road, then “that land that was never
conveyed in any of those Clemmons deeds [land platted as Hyder Lane] is still owned by
the Clemmons heirs” and “if there is a claim of adverse possession to the bed of that road
it would have to be asserted against the Clemmons heirs instead of Ms. Smith.” The
Court, clearly concerned that the County and the Clemmons heirs were not parties, also
noted:

             Let’s say that I find that the attempted dedication to public use did
      not take, so to speak . . . and that it -- that land since it was never deeded to
      anybody, the record owners of same would be the heirs of Clemmons.
      They’re not parties to this. And then I would have to find under Ms.
      Berry’s theory of the case I would have to find that she adversely -- she and
      her predecessors in title adversely possessed successfully against the heirs
      of Clemmons. And then I would have to find that your client is entitled to
      condemn a statutory road down across that. I mean, there’s more twists and
      turns in this thing than anything I ever saw.

                                           - 11 -
               But I guess as I’ve gone through this the Court’s become
       increasingly worried that we don’t have the County and the Clemmons
       heirs in -- in this thing.

As indicated on the 1956 Plat, a portion of the Clemons subdivision is platted as Hyder
Lane. Therefore, if the County is not the owner, then the Clemons heirs likely would be
the owners and obviously have an interest at stake that “may potentially be affected by
[the] trial court’s ruling.” See id. We further note that given that this lawsuit involved an
adverse possession claim by the Berrys, it is necessary for the true owner of the property
that constitutes the undeveloped portion of Hyder Lane, which may or may not be the
Clemons heirs, to be a party to the lawsuit. Milledgeville United Methodist Church v.
Melton, 388 S.W.3d 280, 288 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (“[T]he party who is in actual
possession of the property must bring a suit against the true owner, an indispensable
party, to quiet title by proving that the elements of adverse possession have been met.”).

       Because the County and the Clemons heirs are parties whose potential property
interests were the subject of this lawsuit and trial, we conclude that they are indispensable
parties, without which “no valid decree” “settling the rights between the parties that are
before the Court” could be entered. Brewer v. Lawson, 569 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1978). We therefore vacate the Trial Court’s judgment and remand for the joinder
of the County and the Clemons heirs in order that they may have the opportunity to
present evidence in support of their interests as explained in Baker v. Foster.

                                        Conclusion

        Having concluded that the County and the Clemons heirs are indispensable parties,
we vacate the Trial Court’s judgment and remand for the joinder of the County and the
Clemons heirs to allow them an opportunity to present evidence. Costs on appeal are
taxed equally to the appellants, Michael Berry and Sharon Berry, and to the appellee,
Priscilla Smith.

                                                _________________________________
                                                D. MICHAEL SWINEY, CHIEF JUDGE

                                           - 12 -