Court Opinion

ID: 9659141
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:33:13.498645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:04.455496
License: Public Domain

HEFLIN, Chief Justice (concurring in the result) :
There may be reasons why an uninsured motorist insurer should not be allowed an attorney’s fee when it interpleads the monetary limit of its policy in court. However, such reasons have not been presented to this Court in this case.
I have concurred in the result concerning the proration of the “fund” on the ratio that each claimant’s “special damages” bears to the total of “special damages”. However, under the language o'f this case, this does not set a precedent to be binding on future litigation. The language of the case makes it applicable only to the facts of this case. Personal injury litigation involves many facets of damages. To establish a set of binding guidelines in every case would be unrealistic.
I am fearful that the parties did not fully realize that the proration result was an alternate which this Court could adopt in an effort to reach an equitable solution to the problem. I would prefer to make a final decision on this matter in this case aft*145er an opportunity for all parties to present their positions. Perhaps on rehearing this Court will be favored with an analysis of this result, both pro and con.
ON REHEARING.
BLOODWORTH, Justice.
Both appellant and appellees have filed applications for rehearing.
Appellant insists again that she is entitled to priority because o'f her judgment. We feel that we adequately answered this contention in our original opinion. Appellant then says that we should consider the severity, nature and permanency of the injuries to the parties. We did consider these factors in reaching our result.
Appellees likewise are dissatisfied. They say the decision will cause them “irreparable harm.” Appellees’ attorney takes the blame for not having made “the terrible injuries and loss suffered by his clients, regardless of any special damages, absolutely clear to the court.”
We were also favored with an amicus curiae brief, which we have read and considered.
We wish to reiterate that the decision we reached in the instant case was based on the stipulation of facts. The cause was submitted to the trial court on this stipulation of facts which disclosed, aside from the amounts of special damages, the nature'j severity and permanency of injuries as to each party. If the parties thought the trial court (and this court) should have had the benefit of other evidence, it was their privilege to offer it.
All the testimony having been stipulated, and no testimony having been taken orally before the trial court, we review without any presumption in favor of the trial court’s findings. Muscogee Construction Co. v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 286 Ala. 258, 238 So.2d 883 (1970) ; Machen v. Wilder, 283 Ala. 205, 215 So.2d 282 (1968); Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Alabama v. Jackson, 42 Ala.App. 594, 172 So. 2d 804 (1965); 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1564(1), p. 1262. Moreover, “We must sit in judgment on the evidence.” Maryland Casualty Co. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 281 Ala. 671, 207 So.2d 657 (1968).
In conclusion, though it seems unnecessary to do so, we state again that the holding of this case is limited to the facts of this case. We do not intend, by virtue of this decision, to adopt the method of proration in this case as an approved formula or standard to be used in any and all cases arising from a proration of an insurance fund. We still believe that the result we reached is the most equitable under, the stipulated facts of this case.
Each application for rehearing is overruled.