Court Opinion

ID: 9575993
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:19:26.711504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:53:59.728741
License: Public Domain

Donworth, C. J.
(dissenting in part) — My dissent is di*496rected to the majority’s approval of the language of instruction No. 6 (quoted in the majority opinion) defining contributory negligence, and particularly the first sentence thereof.
The trial court concluded that it had erred in failing to include and explain proximate cause in connection with contributory negligence as defined in that instruction, and granted the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial for that reason.
The majority opinion states that the language of instruction No. 6 clearly refers to the element of proximate cause in relation to the defense of contributory negligence, and that: “. . . proximate cause is specifically mentioned, clearly explained, and properly emphasized in instructions Nos. 4A, 5, and 20.”
In my opinion, none of those three instructions nor the entire thirty instructions when read together clearly present the issues of contributory negligence and proximate cause so as to be understood by a jury of laymen.
Instruction No. 4A refers to plaintiff’s alleged negligence as the proximate cause or one of the proximate causes of the collision. Instruction No. 5 is a general instruction on negligence, stating, in effect, that the negligence of the party complained against must be the proximate cause of such injuries; and defines the terms proximate cause and negligence.
Instruction No. 20 refers to defendant’s negligence as a proximate cause and the proximate cause in three places. It further refers to plaintiff’s negligence which proximately contributed to the accident, and states:
“If . . . the plaintiff was not guilty of any contributory negligence, which proximately contributed to the cause of the accident, then it will be your duty to determine the amount of damages, if any, which the plaintiff has suffered because of the accident.” (Italics mine.)
Instruction No. 6 defines contributory negligence as “negligence on the part of the person injured which materially contributes toward causing the injury ...” (Italics mine.)
It thus appears that the trial court consistently referred *497to defendant’s alleged negligence as the and/or a proximate cause of the accident. However, in referring to plaintiff’s alleged contributory negligence, the trial court described the meaning of the terms negligence and contributory negligence in three different ways: viz., (1) the proximate cause of; (2) the cause which proximately contributed to; and (3) the cause which materially contributes toward causing the injury.
Such indiscriminate use of terms can only lead to confusion of the jury, where, as here, there are some thirty instructions covering twenty-one pages. Further, this court has held that
“. . . we are not disposed to substitute the ‘materially contributed’ or ‘substantial factor’ test either as a definition of or a substitute for ‘proximate cause’ (as defined in our cases) in determining what is actionable negligence.” Blas-ick v. Yakima, 45 Wn. (2d) 309, 274 P. (2d) 122. (Italics mine.)
This rule is equally applicable to the defense of contributory negligence and brings the instant case within the above stated rule. In the Blasick case, supra, this court stated the reasons for the rule and referred to Eckerson v. Ford’s Prairie School Dist., 3 Wn. (2d) 475, 101 P. (2d) 345, where Judge Steinert, speaking for the court, explained the distinction with which we are here concerned as follows:
“There is, of course, a distinction between an actual cause, or cause in fact, and a proximate, or legal, cause.
“An actual cause, or cause in fact, exists when the act of the defendant is a necessary antecedent of the consequences for which recovery is sought, that is, when the injury would not have resulted ‘but for’ the act in question. But a cause in fact, although it is a sine qua non of legal liability, does not of itself support an action for negligence. Considerations of justice and public policy require that a certain degree of proximity exist between the act done or omitted and the harm sustained, before legal liability may be predicated upon the ‘cause’ in question. It is only when this necessary degree of proximity is present that the cause in fact becomes a legal, or proximate, cause.”
This question was again before this court in the recent case of Smith v. Rich, 47 Wn. (2d) 178, 286 P. (2d) 1034, *498wherein we held that the use of the terms “. . . contribute in any degree as a proximate cause . . did not constitute prejudicial error. The court concluded, after consideration of all the instructions, that the test of proximate cause and the issue of contributory negligence were clearly and adequately presented to the jury.
I think that, in the case at bar, the giving of instruction No. 6, when considered in connection with the trial court’s use of the three different phrases in instructions Nos. 6 and 20 to describe the same legal principle to the jury, was not only erroneous but so confusing as to be prejudicial and prevent the plaintiff from having a fair trial.
The relationship between proximate cause and contributory negligence should have been stated simply and clearly in uniform language so .that the jury could have understood the instructions relating to the law applicable to the evidence presented. See King county uniform jury instruction No. 8.
The majority recognizes that the instruction involved in this case was erroneous, but holds that the giving of it was harmless error. In my opinion, it was plainly prejudicial error, and the order granting the new trial should be affirmed.
Rosellini, Hill, and Weaver, JJ., concur with Donworth, C. J.