Court Opinion

ID: 9521880
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:14:34.373769+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:01:23.904060
License: Public Domain

BUCHANAN, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
Unlike the majority I would affirm the judgment convicting all the defendants, for two reasons (grounds): First, there was sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions of the five defendants. Second, the Bruton rule should not be extended to exclude from evidence defendant York’s out-of-court statement at the joint trial.
GROUND ONE
In my opinion there was sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of Fox, Havens, York and Perry ... as well as Kapp.
In considering the sufficiency of the evidence, it is convenient to divide the discussion into two parts:
A) Were the defendants present at the scene of the arson?
B) If so, were there sufficient other circumstances in addition to their presence to support a guilty verdict for the crime of arson for all five defendants?
A.
Bearing in mind that this court considers only the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom most favorable to the State, I conclude there was sufficient evidence of the presence of the defendants at the scene of the crime.
*1173The five defendants had been together throughout the early morning hours. They were together at the Swing Bar at the time of two initial confrontations with Officer Mowery. Following the closing of the Swing Bar, the five went together to the nearby Kewpie Bar, where they remained for a short time, then left as a group. They purchased a fifth of whiskey and six small bottles of Coca Cola.
The defendants were seen traveling in the early morning hours in a greenish-gold Oldsmobile with a loud muffler registered to defendant Fox. Marion police surveillance observed the five defendants in the Oldsmobile at 3:30 a. m., less than one hour before the occurrence of the crime at the Mowery residence.
The greenish-gold Oldsmobile owned by Fox was identified by Mrs. Mowery as the car she saw outside her house at the time the fire started. She testified that two people were inside the car and three others were in the area of the barn. When the fire started, those three ran to the car which was then driven away.
Kapp’s boot print was found in the snow near the barn. A small Coca Cola bottle which smelled of whiskey or alcohol was found in the same area.
This evidence is more than sufficient to support the inference that the five people at the scene in Fox’s greenish-gold Oldsmobile were the same five people who had been spending the early morning hours together and had just a short time earlier been seen traveling together in that automobile, i. e., the five defendants.
B.
Having found more than sufficient evidence to locate the five defendants on Mow-ery’s premises, I can with like ease find more than sufficient evidence that all five persons at the scene were guilty of arson.
It is at this point that the majority opinion discovers “a link missing in the chain of circumstantial evidence which the State has woven around appellants.”
Their analysis is there was insufficient evidence to convict the two persons remaining in the Oldsmobile of being accessories to the arson and as there was no evidence as to which two of the four defendants were inside the car (defendant Kapp being placed at the barn by the presence of a matching boot print), the jury could not separate the guilty from the innocent.
I see no need to separate sheep from goats. The reasonable is that they acted in concert throughout the night in question. The act of one was the act of all. The driver of the get-away car waiting at the curb is just as guilty of murder as the gang member inside the bank who fires the shot that kills a teller as he escapes with the loot. This principle of criminal law is hoary with age.
So it is immaterial as to which defendants remained in the car and which took an active part in the arson at the barn. Acting jointly, they may all be convicted as principals of the crime of arson.1 Tessely v. State (1978), Ind., 370 N.E.2d 907; Goodlow v. State (1973), 260 Ind. 552, 297 N.E.2d 803. The hand that lit the fire was the hand of all.
In effect the majority treat this case as a mere present-at-the-scene case. But this is not so. Here there exists a series of circumstances which show not only that these defendants were present acting in concert but there were other circumstances tending to show participation. See McGill v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 293, 247 N.E.2d 514. Such other circumstances were described by our Supreme Court in Cotton v. State (1965), 247 Ind. 56, 211 N.E.2d 158:
*1174[T]he trier of facts may consider such presence in connection with other circumstances in determining' the guilt of the party involved. Even if there were no active participation in the commission of the crime, failure to oppose it at the time, companionship with another engaged therein, and a course of conduct before and after the offense are such circumstances as may be considered in determining whether aiding or abetting may be inferred (emphasis supplied).
247 Ind. at 61-62, 211 N.E.2d at 161.
This statement has been consistently reaffirmed. See Simmons v. State (1974), 262 Ind. 300, 315 N.E.2d 368; Young v. State (1978), Ind.App., 373 N.E.2d 1108; Lay v. State (1975), Ind.App., 329 N.E.2d 650.
Those Indiana cases which have reversed convictions because of lack of other circumstances in addition to presence are distinguishable from the present case.
In Pace v. State (1967), 248 Ind. 146, 224 N.E.2d 312, the defendant was driving his car from South Bend to LaPorte. His passengers were his wife, two infant children, and Eugene Rootes who was riding in the back seat. The defendant, after receiving permission from his wife, picked up a hitchhiker who sat next to Rootes in the back seat. During the trip, Rootes pulled a knife and took the hitchhiker’s wallet. When the hitchhiker later left the car Rootes also took his watch. The defendant said nothing during this drive and continued to drive to LaPorte.
In reversing the defendant’s robbery conviction, Justice Hunter found no affirmative conduct from which the jury could draw the inference that the defendant had aided in the crime. He may have known that the crime was being committed. But his failure to oppose it was not sufficient to sustain a conviction since the situation did not impose such a duty on him.
The conviction of the “innocent driver” was likewise reversed in Lipscomb v. State (1970), 254 Ind. 642, 261 N.E.2d 860, a case in which the passenger in the defendant’s auto robbed a filling station attendant out of the sight and hearing range of the defendant driver seated in the car. Lipscomb paid for the gas and cigarettes he purchased, and the car drove away in a normal manner. When apprehended twelve blocks away Lipscomb had no money on his person, the passenger had $27.00, and there was no evidence that Lipscomb knew of the robbery when arrested.
Bond v. State (1971), 257 Ind. 95, 272 N.E.2d 460 presents a situation similar to the majority’s characterization of this case. In that theft case, a specific dress was present in a store before three women entered. When the women entered, they went to different parts of the store looking at merchandise, but did not purchase anything. After they left, the dress was missing. The Supreme Court held that while there was sufficient evidence that one of the three women took the dress, there were no circumstances other than mere presence which connected more than one woman with the dress’s disappearance. Since the jury did not have the right to pick one out of a group and hold that person guilty without some specific evidence pointing to that person, the conviction was reversed.
Pruitt v. State (1975), Ind.App., 333 N.E.2d 874, involved passive passengers and a culpable driver. The three defendants traveled in a pick-up truck from Indiana to Sedaba, Missouri, for a rock concert. On the return trip the driver, Pruitt, parked the truck near a gasoline storage tank adjacent to a farm house in Putnam County, removed the lock from a tank and filled a gas can while the other defendants remained in the truck. In reversing the convictions of the passenger defendants Judge Lowdermilk noted that mere presence and negative acquiescence is not sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of guilt. There was no affirmative conduct on their part.
In Conard v. State (1977), Ind.App., 369 N.E.2d 1090, two men entered a grocery in Hammond, selected several items and took them to the counter. Instead of paying, however, the clerk was given a hold-up note with which she complied. The men then exited the store unhurriedly, carrying their *1175groceries, and entered a car driven by the defendant, Conard. The car was driven away at a normal rate of speed.
In reversing Conard’s conviction, Judge Hoffman found no evidence connecting the defendant with the crime other than his presence. Conard was not in a position to observe the in-store actions of the robbers; the robbers exited the store at a normal pace carrying a sack of groceries; and Co-nard drove away unhurriedly.
The mold of the cases just described, three of which are relied on by the majority, does not fit the facts before us. Here there were sufficient other circumstances from which the guilt of all five defendants can be inferred.
In each of the described cases, there was a complete lack of evidence as to any concert of action prior to the commission of the crime. Here all five defendants were present at the Swing Bar during the initial confrontations with Officer Mowery. As the bar was being closed, defendant Fox, in the presence of the other defendants, stated “I’ll see you later, Mowery.” This statement was heard by other persons in the bar. All five defendants then went to the Kewpie Bar, a short distance away. At the Kewpie Bar, all the defendants sat at the same table. After being informed by defendant Perry that “Everything’s okay. They’re scattered,” the five started to leave. The group refused to answer several inquiries as to where they were going. An unidentified person requested to go with the five defendants, but was not allowed to accompany them, being told by Fox, “We are just going to take care of a little business.” Coca Cola and whiskey was purchased by the five defendants and a coke bottle smelling of alcohol was found by Mowery's barn.
So there was a course of conduct of joint action by this select group of companions before the offense was committed — a circumstance which can be taken into account in determining guilt, Cotton v. State, supra.
Another circumstance was “failure to oppose” the commission of the arson by those remaining in the car. Cotton v. State, supra. Recognizing that mere presence and failure to oppose the commission of a crime may not be sufficient standing alone to support a conviction,2 the courts of this state have consistently listed failure to oppose a crime as a circumstance which can be considered, along with other circumstances, in determining guilt.3 Cotton v. State, supra; Mobley v. State (1949), 227 Ind. 335, 85 N.E.2d 489; Young v. State, supra; Bigbee v. State (1977), Ind.App., 364 N.E.2d 149.
The evidence also reveals “companionship” over the entire period in question, an exclusive group which was not open to others.
The final circumstance pointing to the guilt of the parties is the time and place of the occurrence. In each case in which convictions were reversed, the defendant not only had a right to be where he was, but his presence did' not lend itself to an inference of suspicious or improper action.4
In the present case, however, the time and location of the incident leads to an *1176inference of suspicious or wrongful activity. See Carter v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 535, 356 N.E.2d 220; Lisenko v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 488, 355 N.E.2d 841; Sleck v. State (1977), Ind.App., 369 N.E.2d 963. The defendants had gone to a stranger’s house, uninvited, in the dark early morning hours. The residents were either away or asleep.
It should be added that in addition to the events at the Swing Bar and Kewpie Bar (recited above), the five defendants were observed by Marion police traveling in Fox’s greenish-gold Oldsmobile a short time before the fire at the Mowery residence.
In sum, the defendants’ collective presence at the scene of the crime, their companionship, their course of joint conduct prior to the crime, the failure of the two persons remaining in the car to oppose the crime, and the time and circumstances under which they made their visit to the Mow-ery residence present ample evidence from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that all five defendants had knowledge of and either encouraged or participated in the commission of arson.5
GROUND TWO
I further dissent from the majority’s extension of the Bruton rule to hold inadmissible Captain Mowery’s testimony as to defendant York’s out-of-court statement.
York’s statement (as testified to by Mow-ery) was not one in which the declaring co-defendant (York) implicated other defendants in acts of wrongdoing. His own actions, not those of any other defendants, were the subject of his statement.
This kind of self-reproach is readily distinguishable from the statement in Bruton v. United States (1968), 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476. There, the non-testifying defendant had specifically implicated his co-defendant by name in an out-of-court statement. In the decade since Bruton was decided, the United States Supreme Court has not extended this rule to require the exclusion of a defendant’s admission which relates solely to his own participation in a crime, without referring to participation in the crime by any other named or unnamed persons. Without such a United States Supreme Court mandate, I would not extend the Bruton principle to the present situation.
This position is strengthened by the clear inference in Indiana statutory and case law that a non-testifying co-defendant’s admission which does not refer to any co-defendants is admissible at a joint trial.
Ind.Code 35-3.1-1-11 states:
(b) Whenever two (2) or more defendants have been joined for trial in the same indictment or information and one
(1)or more defendants move for a separate trial because another defendant has made an out-of-court statement which makes reference to the moving defendant but is not admissible as evidence against him, the court shall require the prosecutor to elect one of the following courses:
(1) a joint trial at which the statement is not admitted into evidence;
(2) a joint trial at which the statement is admitted into evidence only after all references to the moving defendant have been effectively deleted; or
(3) granting the moving defendant a separate trial. In all other cases, upon motion of the defendant or the prosecutor, the court shall order a separate trial of defendants whenever the court determines that a separate trial is necessary to protect a defendant’s right to a speedy trial or is appropriate to promote a fair determination of the guilt or innocence of a defendant, (emphasis supplied.)
The present case is not one which involves “an out-of-court statement which makes reference to the moving defendant.’’ The statute therefore does not mandate the choice of separate trials or non-admission of the statements.
*1177It is evident that the statute contemplates admission of such out-of-court statements when “all references to the moving defendant have been effectively deleted.” Although what constitutes effective deletion is the subject debate, see Burnett v. State (1978), Ind., 377 N.E.2d 1340; Rogers v. State (1978), Ind., 375 N.E.2d 1089; Carter v. State (1977), Ind., 361 N.E.2d 145, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 866, 98 S.Ct. 202, 54 L.Ed.2d 142; Sims v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 647, 358 N.E.2d 746, when effective deletion is accomplished, the statement is admissible. See Rogers v. State, supra.
It follows that if no mention is made of any co-defendants, the statement is admissible. There can be no more effective deletion than omission at the outset . which in effect is what happened in this case.
Such a conclusion is consistent with Rogers v. State, supra, in which a non-testifying co-defendant’s statement was properly admitted because all references to the co-defendants had been effectively deleted.6
An even more persuasive argument can be made in this case. As in Rogers, the statement is general and is not an attempt to “point the finger at someone else” . and, as indicated, there is no reference to any defendant for which a “blank” had to-be inserted.
If the statement in Rogers was admissible despite the deletion of references to other defendants by the insertion of the word “blank”, I fail to see how a statement which makes no reference whatsoever to the existence of other defendants (co-perpetrators) is not admissible.

. Ind.Code 35-1-29-1 (repealed effective October 1, 1977) states:
Accessory before the fact. — Every person who shall aid or abet in the commission of a felony, or who shall counsel, encourage, hire, command, or otherwise procure a felony to be committed, may be charged by indictment, or information, tried and convicted in the same manner as if he were a principal, either before or after the principal offender is charged, indicted or convicted; and, upon such conviction he shall suffer the same punishment and penalties as are prescribed by law for the punishment of the principal.

. Such evidence may be sufficient, by itself, only where there is a duty on the defendant to oppose the crime. See Mobley v. State, supra; Pace v. State, supra. This protects the innocent bystander who witnesses a crime but yet does not intervene in an effort to prevent it. See R. Perkins, Criminal Law (1969 2d Ed.) at 661. Such was the case in Pace v. State, supra.

. Indeed one noted treatise states: “When the bystander is a friend of the perpetrator, and knows that his presence will be regarded by the perpetrator as an encouragement and protection, presence alone may be regarded as an encouragement.” 1 R. Anderson, Wharton’s Criminal Law & Procedure (1957) § 108.

.In Pace the defendant was transporting his family and another man to LaPorte. The defendant in Lipscomb v. State, supra, drove his car into a service station open for business and purchased gas and cigarettes. Likewise the three women in Bond v. State, supra, were conducting themselves within the normal course of activity in a retail store open for business. The innocent passengers in Pruitt v. State, supra, were riding in a truck returning home from a long trip. In Conard v. State, supra, the defendant was parked outside a grocery store open for business.

. Just as the majority found that the boot print of defendant Kapp when considered with the other evidence was sufficient to show his participation in the crime, I would find use in the crime of the car registered to Fox, considered with the other evidence, is sufficient for the jury to infer his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

. The deletions were made by inserting blanks in the statement in place of names or numbers of co-defendants. Justice Pivarnik’s opinion stated:
The narrative given by each is a very general account in relation both to the incident and to the involvement of the one giving the statement. There is no indication that the purpose of either Stone’s or Williams’ statement is to point the finger at someone else or at the other perpetrators. Since the number involved is so large [five], the insertion from time to time of “blank” does not necessarily incriminate anyone.
375 N.E.2d at 1091.