Court Opinion

ID: 9709339
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:45:22.88984+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:47.865978
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
dissenting.
The trial prosecutor blatantly told the jury that he personally believed that the prosecution witness Steele was telling the truth. According to the ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Prosecution and the Defense Functions, The Prosecution Functions § 5.8 at 126 (1971):
“It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to express his personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt of the defendant.”
This is the appropriate standard to be applied in gauging the prosecutor’s action. I would hold in this case that the trial court committed error in overruling the defense objection to the prosecutor’s personal belief in assessing the credibility of Steele. No court can possibly tolerate attempts by a trial lawyer to give weight and credibility to his witnesses through the expression of such personal opinions.
The prosecutor is a specialist in the criminal law and his office is considered a prestigious one entitled to the respect and cooperation of all. As a result, statements of his personal belief in the credibility of prosecution witnesses are undoubtedly persuasive to the jury and can easily spell the difference between conviction and acquittal. Such statements are an invasion of the fact-finding role of the jury. In this case Steele was a key witness who testified that appellant made an admission of guilt to her while the two were confined together in a jail cell. The majority describes her as a key witness as indeed she was. If the jury had not believed Steele’s testimony, the probability that it would have found her guilty would have been drastically reduced. There was misconduct here on the part of the prosecutor which placed appellant in a position of grave peril to which she should not have been subjected. Maldonado v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 492, 355 N.E.2d 843.
*919This verdict is tainted by the misconduct of the prosecutor and the explicit sanction of that misconduct by the trial court when it ruled on the objection. To refuse to grant a new trial in this appeal is to sanction the prosecutor’s misconduct, a result which I find totally at odds with our duty to maintain the fairness of criminal trials.