Court Opinion

ID: 9665179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:42:15.918307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:13.632414
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
MORRISON, Judge.
Appellant forcefully presents, both in a well-prepared brief and in able argument, his contention that we erred in holding admissible the two different statements made by the injured child.
In this case, we have a factor which seems not to have been emphasized in any of the cases coming to our attention, but which we think is of vital importance. The injured child remained in the presence of the man who had ravished her until shortly before she made the statements. This was because her *157mother permitted him to spend the night with her and in the same bed with the injured child. The passage of time, under such circumstances, would, as we see it, intensify the fear engendered by the attack rather than alleviate it. Can we imagine the state of mind of a child of such tender years who had been so brutally attacked and then forced to lie in the same bed with her attacker for the remainder of the night, fearing, it is reasonable to assume, that the attack might be repeated?
It is obvious that the child was afraid of appellant, as evidenced' by the statement made to her mother the following morning, in which she refused to disclose what had happened until appellant had left. From what had happened, his very presence implied the threat to injure.
Appellant contends that there can be but one spontaneous outcry from an injured party. To so hold would reduce the law to the rule of mathematics. If the element of spontaneity exists at the time each outcry is made, we can conceive of no valid reason why the same should not be admissible. Here, the child reported the attack to her mother, who, it must have seemed to the child, received the same lightly; thereupon, she went at once to her neighbors, who had cared for her to such an extent that their relationship had become almost one of locus parenti, and revealed to them her troubles. Under the circumstances, we feel her statement to them to be admissible.
The statement, in our original opinion, that a reversal of this cause should not follow even if the child’s statements were to be considered as being hearsay, may be fortified, in addition to what we said. there, by observing that appellant testified in his own behalf and did not deny that he had ravished the child or contradict the confession as to the commission of the offense in any manner, but merely said that he did not remember whether or not he had done so. Illustrative of his testimony, on cross-examination by the state, the record shows that he said:
“In answer to your question, ‘You even told Howerton you were sorry about this thing but it had happened,’ my answer is, ‘Yes, sir.’ I didn’t deny it to them.”
Appellant complains that the mother was permitted to recount that the injured child had answered an inquiry while the appellant was still present about what had happened to her by saying, “Wait a minute, Mamma, until Tommie goes and I will tell you.” As we have heretofore observed, this statement was *158the best possible evidence to show that the child was afraid of appellant and lent credence to the report she made after he had left.
Appellant last says that error was committed when the injured party, though not a competent witness, was called into the court room so that her mother, who had already testified as to her sex and age, might identify her in the presence of the jury. We find, from the record, that the child immediately left the court room after this was done. There is no showing that anything further occurred, nor is there any indication in the bill that appellant was prejudiced thereby.
In our original opinion, we held the procedure as to identification of the injured child proper. Appellant’s contention now is that such evidence was cumulative of other evidence on the question of her age and sex. The fact that such evidence was cumulative does not militate against its admissibility. Johns v. State, 155 Tex. Cr. R. 503, 236 S. W. (2d) 820; Beard v. State, 146 Tex. Cr. R. 96, 171 S. W. (2d) 869.
Remaining convinced that we properly disposed of this cause originally, appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.