Court Opinion

ID: 9945603
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 22:05:51.156095+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:34.059957
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/27/24 P. v. Aparacio CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                   B326802
                                                               (Los Angeles County
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                           Super. Ct. No. VA158353)
           v.

 NOE APARACIO,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Deborah Cole-Hall, Judge. Affirmed.
      Jason M. Howell, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Nicholas Webster and William H. Shin,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                     _____________________
      Defendant and appellant Noe Aparacio challenges the trial
court’s decision to sentence him to the high term of four years in
prison after a jury convicted him of one count of assault with a
deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1).)1 A high-term
sentence requires either an admission by the defendant or a
finding by the jury of at least one aggravating circumstance.
(§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).) In this case, the jury found true three
factors in aggravation, but Aparacio argues they could not serve
as the basis of a high-term sentence because all three factors
duplicated the elements of assault with a deadly weapon.
Aparacio acknowledges he failed to raise this issue at the time of
his sentencing hearing but argues this was due to ineffective
assistance of counsel.
      We agree with Aparacio as to one of the three aggravating
factors: the trial court could not impose a high-term sentence on
the basis of the jury’s finding that he “was armed with or used a
weapon at the time of the commission of the crime” (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.421(a)(2)) because that circumstance is inherent in
assault with a deadly weapon. The two remaining findings of
aggravating circumstances, however, deal with the violence and
cruelty of Aparacio’s offense (id., rule 4.421(a)(1)) and the danger
he poses to society (id., rule 4.421(b)(1)), and do not duplicate
elements of assault with a deadly weapon. We conclude there is
no reasonable possibility the inclusion of one improper
aggravating factor (along with two proper aggravating factors)
affected the trial court’s choice of sentence. Because Aparacio
cannot show that his attorney’s failure to object to the inclusion

      1 Unless otherwise specified, subsequent statutory
references are to the Penal Code.

                                 2
of the aggravating circumstance prejudiced him, his claim of
ineffective assistance fails. We therefore affirm.
            FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
       In the afternoon of May 15, 2022, Ryan C., the manager of
a fast-food restaurant in Downey, found Aparacio standing near
the speaker where customers place orders at the restaurant’s
drive-thru. Ryan, who had been informed that Aparacio was
harassing customers, approached Aparacio and asked him to
leave. Aparacio responded, “fuck you.” When Aparacio continued
to refuse to leave, Ryan threatened to call the police, at which
point Aparacio said, “You know what, I have a little surprise for
you. . . . [I]t looks like it’s your lucky day.”
       Aparacio reached into a nearby shopping cart that
contained his possessions, pulled out a bottle of lighter fluid, and
began squirting it over Ryan’s body from his chest to his knee.
Ryan said, “[P]lease leave or else I’m going to call the cops.”
Aparacio did not leave but went back behind his cart. Ryan
heard a ripping sound, and Aparacio stepped out from behind the
cart carrying a paper bag that he had lit on fire. Aparacio walked
toward Ryan and threw the bag at him, but Ryan dodged out of
the way. Ryan then rushed at Aparacio and tackled him to the
ground. Ryan and another employee dragged Aparacio off the
restaurant’s property to the sidewalk, where they waited for
police to arrive.
       An information charged Aparacio with one count of
attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664), one count of assault
with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), and one count of
assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury
(§ 245, subd. (a)(4)). The prosecution alleged several aggravating
factors as to all three counts, including that Aparacio was armed

                                 3
with and used a weapon in the offense (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.421(a)(2)), that the crime involved the threat of great bodily
harm and other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty,
viciousness, and callousness (id., rule 4.421(a)(1)), and that
Aparacio engaged in violent conduct indicating serious danger to
society (id., rule 4.421(b)(1)).2 A jury acquitted Aparicio of
attempted murder but convicted him of the other two offenses
and found all three aggravating circumstances true as to both
counts.
      The trial court imposed the high term of four years for
assault with a deadly weapon,3 explaining its choice of sentence
as follows:
       “You had a young man who was working, and . . .
fortunately, the fire did not get to the victim and he didn’t suffer
any injury. But what Mr. Aparacio did was very dangerous. The
jury did find the aggravating factors; that the offense involved
violence, great bodily harm, and threat of great bodily harm, and
other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness and
callousness. They also found that he was armed with and used a
weapon, which would be the paper on fire which was thrown at
the victim. I think it is—I think the victim was very lucky [not to

      2 The prosecution alleged several additional aggravating
factors related to Aparacio’s prior criminal conduct and
unsatisfactory performance on parole or probation but did not
present those factors to the jury.
      3 The court vacated Aparacio’s conviction of assault by
means of force likely to cause great bodily injury on the ground
that it represented a different statement of the same offense as
assault with a deadly weapon. (See People v. Aguayo (2022) 13
Cal.5th 974, 993.)

                                 4
be injured] because you first doused him with some flammable
fluid. So Mr. Aparacio, after thinking about it, I do believe you
are a danger. I understand you’re homeless, but that does not
excuse or justify the way you were acting at that . . . restaurant.”
                          DISCUSSION
      A trial court may not impose a high-term determinate
sentence unless “there are circumstances in aggravation of the
crime that justify the imposition of” such a term, “and the facts
underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the
defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at
trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.”4 (§ 1170, subd.
(b)(2).) As we noted above, the jury found true three aggravating
factors, but Aparacio argues these are insufficient because “a
circumstance that is an element of the substantive offense cannot
be used as a factor in aggravation.” (People v. Burbine (2003) 106
Cal.App.4th 1250, 1261; accord, People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th
331, 350; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.420(h).)
       Before we consider the merits of Aparacio’s argument, we
must address the People’s contention that Aparacio forfeited the
issue by failing to make a timely objection before the trial court.
A defendant who does not object to the court’s reliance on an
improper factor in sentencing may not challenge the sentence on
appeal. (People v. Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 353.) This
forfeiture rule applies to “cases in which the stated reasons

      4 The requirement of a jury finding or defendant’s
admission of the facts underlying an aggravating circumstance is
the result of the Legislature’s enactment of Senate Bill No. 567 in
2021. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.) Aparacio’s trial took place after
this amendment became effective.

                                 5
allegedly do not apply to the particular case, and cases in which
the court purportedly erred because it double-counted a
particular sentencing factor, misweighed the various factors, or
failed to state any reasons or give a sufficient number of valid
reasons.” (Ibid.)
        Aparacio concedes that he failed to object to the use of the
jury’s aggravating-circumstance findings at trial, but he argues
we should not deem the issue forfeited because his attorney’s
failure to object constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. “To
establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
show: (1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and
(2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.
(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 691-692
[104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674].) ‘If it is easier to dispose of an
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice
. . . that course should be followed.’ (Id. at p. 697.) It is not
enough to establish prejudice for defendant to propose that
counsel’s performance had some ‘conceivable effect’ on the
outcome; rather, defendant must show a reasonable probability of
a different result but for counsel’s errors. (Id. at pp. 693-694.)
Prejudice must be a demonstrable reality established based on
facts in the record, not simply speculation as to the effect of the
errors or omissions of counsel. [Citations.]” (People v. Tilley
(2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 772, 778.)
        We agree with Aparacio that one of the aggravating
circumstances was duplicative of the elements of assault with a
deadly weapon and thus could not justify a high-term sentence,
but we disagree as to the two remaining aggravating
circumstances. We need not decide whether Aparacio’s trial

                                 6
attorney was deficient for failing to object to the improper
aggravating circumstance because Aparacio cannot demonstrate
a reasonable probability of a different result if not for the alleged
error. There is no reason to believe the court would have imposed
a lower sentence if Aparacio’s attorney had made a timely
objection.
      A sentencing factor is an element of an offense “if the crime
as defined by statute cannot be accomplished without
performance of the acts which constitute such factor.” (People v.
Burbine, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 1262.) Aparacio is correct,
and the Attorney General concedes, that the finding that he “was
armed with and used a weapon at the time of the commission of
the . . . offense” duplicates one of the elements5 of assault with a
deadly weapon, which, as the name suggests, is defined as “an
assault upon the person of another with a deadly weapon or
instrument other than a firearm.” (§ 245, subd. (a)(1).) We

      5 The jury was instructed on the elements of assault with a
deadly weapon as follows: “1. The defendant did an act with a
deadly weapon other than a firearm that by its nature would
directly and probably result in the application of force to a
person;
       “2. The defendant did that act willfully;
       “3. When the defendant acted, he was aware of facts that
would lead a reasonable person to realize that his act by its
nature would directly and probably result in the application of
force to someone;
       “AND
       “4. When the defendant acted, he had the present ability to
apply force with a deadly weapon to a person.”
       Neither side takes issue with the correctness of this
instruction.

                                  7
disagree as to the two remaining aggravating circumstances,
however. The jury found that Aparacio’s “offense involved great
violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, and
other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, and
callousness, within the meaning of California Rules of Court[,
r]ule 4.42l(a)(1),” and that “the defendant engaged in violent
conduct[,] to wit, attempted to set the victim on fire, in
committing [assault with a deadly weapon] that indicates a
serious danger to society, within the meaning of California Rules
of Court[, r]ule 4.421(b)(1).”
       It may be true that an assault with a deadly weapon
usually involves great violence or the threat of great bodily harm,
but it is not necessary to display “a high degree of cruelty,
viciousness, and callousness” in order to commit the offense, nor
does an assault with a deadly weapon necessarily “indicate[ ] a
serious danger to society.” These factors simply do not duplicate
elements of assault with a deadly weapon, and Aparacio offers no
case law suggesting otherwise.
       Aparacio argues that the jury’s findings cannot serve as
aggravating circumstances because, “The essence of ‘aggravation’
relates to the effect of a particular fact in making the offense
distinctively worse than the ordinary.” (People v. Moreno (1982)
128 Cal.App.3d 103, 110.) In Aparacio’s view, “None of the three
aggravating factors found to be true related to any particular fact
that made the offense distinctively worse than the offense itself,
where . . . the information alleged that [Aparacio] did ‘willfully
and unlawfully commit an assault upon Ryan . . . with a deadly

                                 8
weapon, to wit, lighter fluid [and] ignited rag.’ ”6 (Capitalization
omitted.)
      Aparacio errs by attempting to compare his actions to the
allegations in the information, rather than to what is inherent in
assault with a deadly weapon. The correct test is “whether the
manner of the crime’s commission was distinctively worse ‘when
compared to other ways in which such a crime could be
committed.’ [Citations.]” (Chavez Zepeda v. Superior Court
(2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 65, 89.) In other words, the question is not
whether Aparacio’s conduct was distinctively worse than an
ordinary attempt to set a stranger on fire. Instead, it is whether
Aparacio’s attempt to set Ryan on fire was worse than a typical
assault with a deadly weapon. In imposing the high-term
sentence, the trial court answered that question in the
affirmative. The court’s conclusion was reasonable, and there is
no reason to believe Aparacio would have received a lower
sentence if the court had considered only two aggravating
circumstances rather than three.

      6 The information stated that Aparacio used an ignited rag
in the attack, but Ryan testified that it was a paper bag.

                                 9
                          DISPOSITION
     The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                         WEINGART, J.

We concur:

             CHANEY, J.

             BENDIX, Acting P. J.

                               10