Court Opinion

ID: 8805372
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-26 14:46:32.413613+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:04:04.588627
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
DENISON, Circuit Judge.
The motion points out two errors in the opinion.
It was said that the indictment for granting a concession was dismissed while the indictment for not observing the tariff was prosecuted to the judgment against which the writ of error is directed. The names given to the indictments should have been reversed. The same count of each indictment recited in identical language the same facts, but the concluding paragraph of each count in one indictment alleged that the described offense was the giving of a concession, and in the other indictment alleged that the same facts constituted a failure to observe the tariff. We do not see that the erroneous recital in the opinion as to the name of the surviving indictment could possibly have been important.
By way of giving support to the conclusion already independently reached that the evidence on a certain point was undisputed, the opinion recited that the District Judge had so stated in his charge to the jury and that his statement had not been then challenged. The rehearing application points out that this statement by the District Judge was not in his charge to the jury, but in the course of giving his reasons for rejecting the evidence claimed by defendant to be vital. It is not said that, whenever the District Judge made the statement, his attention was then, or ever, distinctly directed to the point. In view of the use which the opinion made of this subject-matter, whatever error there was therein cannot be controlling.
*366The careful review now made of the whole record confirms the majority of the court in its conclusion that there was no dispute in the evidence, concerning the precise point upon which the opinion made the case turn.
It is also now said that the defendant was indicted for violating the demurrage tariff, but convicted of violating the cartage tariff. We think this a misapprehension. To a prosecution based on the demur-rage tariff, the defendant interposed the cartage tariff, practically by way of confession and avoidance. Conceding that the demurrage had not been collected, it justified because an exception to the demurrage tariff had been created by the cartage tariff. We held that the proper application of the cartage tariff did not justify the alleged exception. This did not convict defendant of an offense not charged.
In other substantial respects, the application presents nothing not already fully considered. It is denied.