Court Opinion

ID: 9570661
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:25:02.589367+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:13:36.525846
License: Public Domain

Hall, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent, because I do not believe that the phrase "[c]learly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record,” Code § 40-2207.1 (m) (4), is the equivalent of the "any evidence” test. The cases1 in which the Court of Appeals held that the "any evidence” test is to be applied under the same language in the Administrative Procedure Act (Code § 3A-120), should be overruled.
The "clearly erroneous” standard first mentioned in the crucial phrase is not the same as the "any evidence” test. The United States Supreme Court has established the meaning of the "clearly erroneous” standard: "A finding is 'clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364, 395 (1948). This test provides a broader scope of review than the "substantial evidence” test used in reviewing agency decisions under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act. 5 USCA § 706 (2) (E). See Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission, 383 U. S. 607, 619-620 (1966).
The "substantial evidence” test means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,” Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S. 197, 229 (1938), considering all of the evidence before the agency. Univer*588sal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U. S. 474, 487-488 (1951). This is not the same as determining the weight of the evidence. Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission, supra. Moreover, a comparison of the "substantial evidence” test and the "any evidence” test as used in Georgia cases makes it quite clear that the former provides a broader scope of review than the latter.
The issue is one of statutory construction. In using two terms of art ("clearly erroneous” and "substantial evidence”) in one section the legislature created some ambiguity. But there is no indication that the legislature intended the section in question to be the equivalent of yet a third distinct test, the "any evidence” test. Cf. Field, The Georgia Uniform Administrative Procedure Act. 1 Ga. St. Bar J. 269, 297-298 (1965) (discussing the same language used in the APA). The Court of Appeals rendered useless, if not meaningless, the terms of art used by the legislature when that court redefined them to mean the "any evidence” test. No rule of statutory construction supports the conclusion of the Court of Appeals.
This statute unambiguously rejects the "any evidence” test in favor of a broader standard of review. Whatever ambiguity there is involves only the question of which of the stricter standards is to be applied. I believe that the "substantial evidence” test was intended in light of the similarities of our Act and its federal counterpart. The federal judiciary has repeatedly considered the precise meaning of "substantial evidence,” and a suitable standard of review has evolved.
I would reverse the Court of Appeals.

 Primarily Ga. Dept. of Human Resources v. Holland, 133 Ga. App. 616 (211 SE2d 635) (1974).