Court Opinion

ID: 9596441
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:49:46.03117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:21.088712
License: Public Domain

CARLEY, Justice,
dissenting.
In this case, the trial court gave an extensive charge on identity and the assessment of the reliability of eyewitness identification evidence. As part of that comprehensive instruction, the trial court enumerated the following as “[s]ome, but not all of the factors” the jury would be authorized to consider in making its assessment:
the opportunity of the witness to view the alleged perpetrator at the time of the alleged incident, the witness’ degree of attention towards the alleged perpetrator at the time of the alleged incident, the level of certainty shown by the witness about his identification, the possibility of mistaken identity, whether the witness’ identification may have been influenced by factors other than the view that the witness claimed to have had, and whether the witness on any prior occasion did not identify the defendant in this case as the alleged perpetrator.
This list of relevant factors is consistent with that previously recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States, as well as by this Court. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U. S. 188, 199 (III) (93 SC 375, 34 LE2d 401) (1972); Thomason v. State, 268 Ga. 298, 303-304 (3) (486 SE2d 861) (1997). Because these factors have been approved by controlling federal and state authority as relevant to the determination of eyewitness reliability, they have been incorporated into the pattern jury charge on that issue. Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases, Par. 1.35.10 (c), pp. 27-28 (3d ed. 2003). Today’s opinion does not hold that it was error to give this pattern charge in its entirety. Compare Renner v. State, 260 Ga. 515, 517 (3) (397 SE2d 683) (1990) (disapproving a charge on flight altogether). Instead, the majority singles out the eyewitness’ “level of certainty” as the only factor which the trial court should have omitted from the instruction. I submit that this holding is not only insupportable under controlling Georgia authority, it also is contrary to the established law in most other jurisdictions. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
No one disputes that “[t]he vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification.” United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 228 (87 SC 1926, 18 LE2d 1149) (1967). For precisely this reason, Georgia *444permits expert testimony to “assist the jury in assessing the reliability of eyewitness testimony . . ..” Johnson v. State, 272 Ga. 254, 257 (1) (526 SE2d 549) (2000). In fact, the trial court’s erroneous refusal to admit such expert testimony resulted in the reversal of Brodes’ original convictions, and necessitated a new trial on the armed robbery charges. Brodes v. State, 250 Ga. App. 323, 324 (1) (551 SE2d 757) (2001). At the retrial, Brodes presented the testimony of an
expert [who] testified that, among other things, his research shows that there is no correlation between the degree of an eyewitness’s certainty about his identification of a subject and the accuracy of the degree of the eyewitness’s identification. In other words, someone who is highly confident that he has identified a suspect is not more likely to identify the right person than someone who is not as confident.
Brodes v. State, 268 Ga. App. 895, 896 (602 SE2d 895) (2004).
Notwithstanding the acknowledged “vagaries of eyewitness identification” as exemplified by the testimony of Brodes’ expert, an eyewitness is not invariably mistaken. Some eyewitnesses may be wrong when they identify the accused, but not all defendants are misidentified by their victims or by others who had the opportunity to see the crime as it occurred. “ ‘Where [a] witness is unable to positively identify the defendant, his opinion and best judgment were relevant.’ [Cit.]” Randall v. State, 73 Ga. App. 354, 367 (2) (36 SE2d 450) (1945). See also Sanford v. State, 225 Ga. App. 898, 899 (2) (485 SE2d 233) (1997). Therefore, the victims in this case were properly allowed to testify as to the circumstances surrounding the crimes and the certainty of their identification of Brodes as the armed robber. Thus, there was a clear conflict in the evidence as to the reliability of the victims’ testimony, and the jury was required to determine whether to believe them or the defense expert. To assist the jurors in making that determination, the trial court gave the pattern instruction on the factors that they were authorized to consider, including the “level of certainty” shown by the victims in their identification testimony. This instruction was completely neutral, permitting the jury to credit Brodes’ expert as to the “level of certainty’ and thereby discount the victims’ testimony or, on the other hand, to believe the victims’ testimony as to their “level of certainty” and reject the expert’s opinion. Having heard the victims and the defense expert,
“[t]he jury, as in cases of opinion evidence, could have said either that we, upon consideration of the facts detailed by you upon which you base your opinion, do not accept that opinion and will, therefore, disregard it, or that we will give *445it credence. (Cit.)” [Cit.]
Sanford v. State, supra. The expert expressed an opinion as to the unreliability of eyewitness identification generally, and the jury was required to determine whether the specific identification testimony of victims in this case came within or without that general rule.
The majority does not hold that evidence as to a witness’ level of certainty is inadmissible for either the defense or the prosecution. To do so would require overruling Johnson v. State, supra, Brodes v. State, 250 Ga. App., supra at 324 (1), and other cases. What today’s opinion does hold is that a trial court errs when it charges jurors that they may consider that evidence for its intended purpose. The longstanding rule in this state is that “ ‘[w]here there is any evidence, however slight, upon a particular issue, it is not error for the court to charge the law in relation to that issue. (Cits.)’ [Cit.]” Rhodes v. State, 271 Ga. 481, 483 (3) (521 SE2d 579) (1999). The majority completely ignores that principle. Now a trial court errs if it charges the jury that it is authorized to consider the witness’ “level of certainty” as a factor in assessing reliability, notwithstanding the admission of evidence relevant to that very matter. The introduction of evidence, coupled with the prohibition against the trial court’s giving of any instruction as to its relevancy, will undoubtedly create confusion for the jury and leave a gap which the attorneys for the accused and for the State will be tempted to fill during closing arguments. For example, defense counsel could truthfully point out that, although an eyewitness to the crime gave unshakable testimony that he was positive in his identification, the trial court’s instruction will not include that as a possible factor for the jury’s consideration. On the other hand, the prosecutor could argue in all honesty that, even though the defense produced an expert who questioned the general reliability of eyewitness identification, the trial court’s charge will be silent as to the relevancy of that expert testimony. The jury should receive a full and comprehensive instruction on the law from the trial court in the form of an objective charge, not from advocates who are seeking to sway the jury to reach a particular outcome. The majority acknowledges that
“[t]he office of a charge by the court is to give to the jury such instruction touching the rules of law pertinent to the issues involved in a pending trial as will enable them intelligently to apply thereto the evidence submitted, and from the two constituents law and fact make a verdict. (Cit.)” [Cit.]
Majority opinion, p. 438. In accordance with that principle, so long as evidence regarding an eyewitness’ “level of certainty” remains admissible as a factor in determining the reliability of identification *446testimony, the trial court should be authorized to give an instruction that the jury may consider it along with the other factors which are set forth in the pattern charge.
The majority correctly recognizes the existence of a split of authority among the jurisdictions as to whether any instruction on eyewitness identification should ever be given. Majority opinion, p. 439, fn. 6. Some states hold that a charge should be given, whereas others consider such an instruction superfluous or an impermissible judicial comment on the evidence. However, this divergence of opinion does not affect our resolution of this case, since Georgia has long recognized that the jury should be instructed on that issue. Compare Renner v. State, supra (no charge should be given on flight). The question presented for resolution here is how that instruction should be phrased. In holding that the trial court erred, the majority relies upon certain foreign cases which, I submit, actually support the instruction given in this case. See State v. Dyle, 899 SW2d 607,612 (V) (Tenn. 1995) (approving a charge authorizing the jury to consider “[t]he degree of certainty expressed by the witness regarding the identification”); State v. Long, 721 P2d 483, 493, fn. 7 (Utah 1986) (approving a charge that permits the jury to “take into account both the strength of the identification, and the circumstances under which [it] was made”). Those cases do contain language citing scientific opinions expressing doubt as to the reliability of eyewitness identification. However, that language was actually cited in those cases as authority for joining those states, like Georgia, which have authorized trial courts to give jury instructions, including the “degree of certainty,” on the factors which a jury may consider in making its determination. See State v. Dyle, supra at 612 (V) (approving the charge on “degree of certainty expressed by the witness,” after finding that “the pattern identity instruction traditionally given in Tennessee is not adequate in cases where identity is a material issue”); State v. Long, supra at 494 (holding that, even though an instruction on “the strength of the identification” “incorporates some of the fallacious assumptions expressed by the Supreme Court in Neil v. Bigger s[, supra, it] would seem to suffice as an adequate cautionary instruction under most circumstances”). See also State v. Robinson, 754 A2d 1153 (N.J. 2000), which the majority cites on p. 442 as recognizing the necessity for “appropriate guidelines focusing the jury’s attention on how to analyze and consider the factual issues with regard to the reliability of a witness’s identification.” Robinson, supra at 1159 (III) actually approves a “model charge” that lists as a factor “the degree of certainty expressed by the witness in making the identification.”
Of the remaining foreign cases cited by the majority, most have no material bearing on the issue presented for review here, since they *447do not address the giving of a jury charge and merely contain language or citations to treatises which argue the unreliability of eyewitness identification in other contexts. See Krist v. Eli Lilly & Co., 897 F2d 293 (7th Cir. 1990) (no charge issue presented); United States v. Moore, 786 F2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1986) (no charge issue presented); United States v. Burrous, 934 FSupp. 525, 531, 533 (Appendix) (E.D. N.Y. 1996) (which does not expressly disapprove an instruction on “level of certainty,” and which does endorse charge that “it is not essential that the witness him or herself be free from doubt as to the correctness of his or her identification of the defendant”); Lee v. State, 873 S2d 582 (Fla. App. 2004) (no charge issue presented); Rimmer v. State, 825 S2d 304, 316 (Fla. 2002) (no charge issue presented, but also recognizing “ ‘the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation’ ” as a viable factor); Reed v. State, 687 NE2d 209 (Ind. App. 1997) (no charge issue presented).
Indeed, of all the foreign cases cited by the majority, only Commonwealth v. Santoli, 680 NE2d 1116, 1121 (Mass. 1997) actually disapproves an instruction on the “strength of the identification.” However, that case is distinguishable. In Santoli, unlike in this case, the defense was not allowed to present expert testimony which questioned the reliability of the eyewitnesses’ identification testimony. Thus, there, unlike here, the eyewitness testimony was uncontested. The court in Santoli, supra at 845, noted that “[i]t is probably true that the challenged instruction has merit in so far as it deals with the testimony of a witness who expressed doubt about the accuracy of her identification. . . .” Likewise, an instruction on the “level of certainty” would be beneficial to the jury where, as here, there is expert testimony expressing doubt about the reliability of the eyewitnesses’ identification testimony. Such an instruction permits the jury to consider all of the relevant testimony and determine for itself whether the accused has been misidentified.
The majority appears to be motivated by a concern that Georgia is somehow out of step with the current scientific thinking, noting on p. 442 that “ ‘[t]he law will always lag behind the sciences to some degree because of the need for solid scientific consensus before the law incorporates its teachings. . . .’ [Cit.]” The error in relying upon this as a rationale for today’s decision is that no scientific proof currently exists to show that eyewitness testimony is always incorrect. “Scientific studies have amply demonstrated the dangers of mistake in human perception and identification. Of course, this does not mean that the identification in this case is incorrect.” United States v. Burrous, supra at 532 (Appendix) (which was cited with approval by the majority). An expert who lacks personal knowledge can never testify with absolute certainty that any eyewitness is mistaken in his identification of the accused. All that the expert can *448express is an opinion about the reliability of eyewitness identification generally. That opinion does not establish the unreliability of the eyewitness’ identification, but merely provides a frame of reference to apply in considering whether it is reliable. Therefore, the credibility of eyewitness identification testimony should remain, as it always has, a matter for the jury to decide in accordance with legal instruction from the trial court. The law of this state already fully accommodates all scientific views in that regard by permitting the introduction of expert testimony to assist the jurors in assessing for themselves the reliability of the eyewitness. See Johnson v. State, supra. The pattern charge reflects that scientific accommodation.
It is within the common knowledge of a juror that the certainty of a witness’s identification does not necessarily reflect its accuracy, and the language of the instruction makes this clear. The current pattern jury instruction provides that the juror “may consider,” not “must consider,” the certainty of identification. Certainty is only one of the six factors in the pattern jury instruction. Another factor the jury may consider is the possibility of mistaken identity. The juror determines how much weight to give each of the factors. The charge also provides that identification is dependent on the credibility of the witness and that the testimony, facts, and circumstances of the case must identify the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt as the perpetrator.
Armstead v. State, 255 Ga. App. 385, 388 (2) (565 SE2d 579) (2002).
Although today’s decision deals only with the “level of certainty” as a factor in eyewitness identification, it sets a very dangerous precedent. It allows expert opinion testimony to determine the permissible scope of the trial court’s authority to instruct the jury on the legal principles applicable in a case. In effect, the expert now becomes the judge whenever he expresses a general opinion based upon a “ ‘solid scientific consensus____’ [Cit.]” Majority opinion, p. 442. When such an expert opinion is given, the existence of contrary lay testimony based upon personal knowledge becomes immaterial and the trial court is compelled to refrain from instructing the jury on its responsibility for resolving that conflict. I do not believe that one isolated foreign case, which is itself distinguishable, justifies taking such a radical step. The majority may act in the belief that it is placing Georgia in the mainstream of current scientific thought, but it has, in fact, steered us far outside the mainstream of current legal thinking, as exemplified by the very cases cited as authority for its ill-advised *449change of course. See State v. Robinson, supra; State v. Dyle, supra; State v. Long, supra. The judgment of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed.
Decided June 16, 2005.
Cromwell & Hibbert, Henry A. Hibbert, for appellant.
PaulL. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Alvera A. Wheeler, Anne E. Green, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Justice Thompson and Justice Hines join in this dissent.