Court Opinion

ID: 9352990
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-10 18:01:03.874797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:06:25.713978
License: Public Domain

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                                File Name: 23a0019n.06

                                            No. 22-3315

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT                                     FILED
                                                                                   Jan 10, 2023
                                                 )                             DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
 KIMBERLY WHEELER,
                                                 )
        Plaintiff-Appellant,                     )
                                                                  ON APPEAL FROM THE
                                                 )
                v.                                                UNITED STATES DISTRICT
                                                 )
                                                                  COURT     FOR      THE
                                                 )
 MIAMI VALLEY            CAREER       TECHNOLOGY )                SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
 CENTER,                                                          OHIO
                                                 )
        Defendant-Appellee.                      )
                                                                                         OPINION
                                                 )
                                                 )

Before: GILMAN, McKEAGUE, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.

       GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.

       Plaintiff Kimberly Wheeler is a teacher with defendant Miami Valley Career Technology

Center (MVCTC). After she applied, but was not selected, for several administrative positions at

MVCTC, she sued, alleging retaliation under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 and the Ohio Civil

Rights Act, Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of

MVCTC. We affirm.

                                                  I.

       MVCTC is a “joint vocational school district” in southwestern Ohio. Wheeler has been a

teacher at the school since 1988. In 2018, she applied for three different administrative positions:

an academic supervisor position, a health and consumer sciences position, and a building principal

position. Even though Wheeler was qualified and interviewed for all three positions, MVCTC

received “significant interest” in all three and did not offer any of the positions to Wheeler.
No. 22-3315, Wheeler v. Miami Valley Career Tech. Ctr.

       Wheeler subsequently filed several complaints, alleging that MVCTC’s decision not to hire

her resulted from sex and age discrimination and was in retaliation for an earlier complaint against

the school that she filed in 2012. The first two complaints—filed with the Ohio Civil Rights

Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)—were unsuccessful.

She then filed suit in state court, raising the same claims. After the case was removed to federal

court, the district court granted summary judgment to MVCTC on all counts, concluding (as

relevant for our purposes) that Wheeler had not established a genuine dispute of material fact that

the 2012 complaint caused the failed 2018 promotions because it happened six years before the

events pertinent to this case; thus, she failed to show a prima facie case of discrimination. Wheeler

now appeals, raising only her retaliation claims.

                                                 II.

                                                 A.

       We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Rogers v. O’Donnell, 737 F.3d 1026,

1030 (6th Cir. 2013). We review evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, but

“[n]ot just any alleged factual dispute between the parties will defeat an otherwise properly

supported motion for summary judgment; the dispute must present a genuine dispute of material

fact.” Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

                                                 B.

       Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee who has

opposed any discriminatory practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).1 When a plaintiff relies on

       1
         The same is true under the Ohio Civil Rights Act, Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02(I), and Ohio
courts have “adopted the framework established in federal case law concerning Title VII” when
interpreting similar state statutes. Peters v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 285 F.3d 456, 469 (6th Cir. 2002);
see also Little Forest Med. Ctr. of Akron v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm’n, 575 N.E.2d 1164, 1167
(Ohio 1991).
                                                -2-
No. 22-3315, Wheeler v. Miami Valley Career Tech. Ctr.

circumstantial evidence of retaliation (as Wheeler does here), we use the McDonnell-Douglass

burden-shifting framework. Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 730 (2014); see also

McDonnell-Douglass Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under that framework, the plaintiff

has the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Imwalle v. Reliance Med.

Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 544 (6th Cir. 2008). If the plaintiff carries this burden, the employer

then must “produce evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.” Id. Finally,

the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer’s reason was pretextual.

Id.

       As part of her prima facie burden, Wheeler must demonstrate “a causal connection between

the adverse employment action and the protected activity.” Taylor v. Geithner, 703 F.3d 328, 336

(6th Cir. 2013). This requires “but-for causation,” i.e., “proof that the unlawful retaliation would

not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer.”

Univ. of Texas S.W. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360 (2013). Though the initial burden is

“not onerous” and “easily met,” Taylor, 703 F.3d at 336 (citation omitted), a plaintiff who relies

on temporal proximity alone cannot establish a prima facie case unless that proximity is “very

close,” Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) (per curiam). Indeed, “the

more time that elapses between the protected activity and the adverse employment action, the more

the plaintiff must supplement [her] claim with other evidence of retaliatory conduct to establish

causality.” Vereecke v. Huron Valley Sch. Dist., 609 F.3d 392, 400 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

       Wheeler alleges that MVCTC retaliated against her (by not selecting her) because of a prior

EEOC complaint and lawsuit that she originally filed against the school in December 2012.

Though the record is light as to the details of the 2012 claim, it appears that the suit (which, like

                                                -3-
No. 22-3315, Wheeler v. Miami Valley Career Tech. Ctr.

this case, appeared to later end up in federal court) also originated after Wheeler applied for an

administrative position at MVCTC but was not selected. See generally Wheeler v. Miami Valley

Career Tech. Ctr. No. 3:14-cv-73, 2016 WL 237075 (S.D. Ohio January 20, 2016), affirmed

No. 16-3153, 2017 WL 9473121 (6th Cir. 2017).

       We agree with the district court that Wheeler has not established a prima facie case of

retaliation. Here, Wheeler complains of actions that occurred years before the alleged wrongful

actions by MVCTC, with her prior complaint being filed in 2012. This proximity is woefully

insufficient by itself—the Supreme Court has held that events not even two years apart are nowhere

near close enough. See Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 532 U.S. at 274 (“Action taken . . . 20 months later

suggests, by itself, no causality at all.”). Wheeler responds that we should consider that her

litigation lasted until January 2017, about 15 months before MVCTC hired someone other than

Wheeler for the first administrative position. But this is still insufficient—we have held that far

shorter time periods do not establish the required causation. See Imwalle, 515 F.3d at 550 (“In this

circuit, a period of more than four months was found to be too long to support an inference of

causation.”). The temporal proximity in the present case is simply not enough.

       Wheeler responds, raising other evidence of supposed retaliation. She states that MVCTC

had a history of promoting internal candidates (except for her) and that individuals involved in the

prior litigation “poisoned” her 2018 application because she had to interview with those

individuals. But the record evidence does not support her theories. For one, she cannot point to

evidence showing that MVCTC consistently prioritized internal candidates over equally (or, as the

school’s evidence suggests, more) qualified external candidates. And the fact that she received

interviews for each position (amid such heavy interest) belies her hypothesis that MVCTC was

prejudiced against her. In short, the only possible retaliatory conduct that Wheeler can assert to

                                                -4-
No. 22-3315, Wheeler v. Miami Valley Career Tech. Ctr.

show a genuine dispute of material fact was the school’s failure to promote her in 2018. But given

the amount of time that has elapsed since the prior lawsuit, this, by itself, is far from enough

evidence needed to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to causation. See Vereecke,

609 F.3d at 400. She has not produced sufficient evidence establishing that the 2012 complaint

was a “but-for” cause of her failed 2018 promotion, nor can she prove that she would have been

promoted if not for the 2012 complaint. See Univ. of Texas, 570 U.S. at 360.2 Therefore, we agree

that summary judgment was properly granted in favor of MVCTC.

                                               III.

       For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

       2
         And even if Wheeler did satisfy the prima facie inquiry, she would still not survive
summary judgment. MVCTC easily produced evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
(the successful candidates were more qualified), and Wheeler never produced any evidence
showing that this was pretext, such as by showing that the candidates were less qualified than her
or that other evidence of retaliatory conduct existed apart from MVCTC failing to hire her. Cf.
Provenzano v. LCI Holdings, Inc., 663 F.3d 806, 815–18 (6th Cir. 2011).
                                               -5-