Court Opinion

ID: 9762507
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:25:38.537241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:35.089042
License: Public Domain

OLSZEWSKI, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
We enthusiastically join the majority’s disposition of appellant’s first three claims, but must respectfully dissent from the majority’s treatment of the final claim regarding the merger of the crimes of aggravated assault and voluntary manslaughter.
As the majority notes, our Supreme Court recently clarified the law surrounding merger. See Commonwealth v. Anderson, 538 Pa. 574, 650 A.2d 20 (1994), modified, 539 Pa. 476, 653 A.2d 615 (1994). In Anderson, the Supreme Court wrote:
Our inquiry ... is whether the elements of the lesser crime are all included within the elements of the greater crime, and the greater offense includes at least one additional element which is different, in which case the sentences merge, or whether both crimes require proof of at least one element which the other does not, in which case the sentences do not merge.
Id. at 582, 650 A.2d at 24 (footnotes omitted). After reviewing Anderson, the majority concluded that the two crimes at issue here merge because all of the elements of aggravated assault are subsumed in the requirements of voluntary manslaughter. See majority opinion at 39. Since we find that malice is a *41requisite element of aggravated assault that is not present in voluntary manslaughter, we must disagree with the majority’s conclusion that these crimes merge.
Voluntary manslaughter is “the intentional killing of another, without malice aforethought, but in a sudden heat of passion caused by adequate legal provocation.” Commonwealth v. Garcia, 370 Pa.Super. 132, 138, 535 A.2d 1186, 1189, appeal denied, 519 Pa. 652, 546 A.2d 57 (1988). See also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503. While this crime does require a specific intent to kill, it is an intent devoid of malice. E.g., Garcia, 370 Pa.Super. at 138-39, 535 A.2d at 1189. Rather than being driven by cruelty or hardness of heart, the actor in a case of voluntary manslaughter is driven by the heat of passion arising out of legal provocation or an unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense. Id. This absence of malice distinguishes voluntary manslaughter from other categories of homicide, and therefore serves as a defining element of the crime. See Commonwealth v. Smouse, 406 Pa.Super. 369, 379, 594 A.2d 666, 671 (1991) (“It has long been clear that malice is an essential element of third-degree murder and is the distinguishing factor between murder and manslaughter.”); Garcia, 370 Pa.Super. at 138, 535 A.2d at 1189 (“Consequently, absence of malice is the critical determinant of culpability [for voluntary manslaughter], and the jury must be satisfied that the death was not the consequence of the actor’s hardness of heart or careless disregard for human life.”).
An aggravated assault occurs when one “attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1). It is well-established that this crime requires both the specific intent to commit serious bodily injury and the existence of malice. E.g., Commonwealth v. Lopez, 426 Pa.Super. 625, 627-29, 627 A.2d 1229, 1230 (1993). Thus, a defendant can only be found guilty of aggravated assault if he or she acted with a “wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, wanton conduct, cruelty, recklessness of *42consequences and a mind regardless of social duty.” Id. at 628, 627 A.2d at 1230 (citations omitted).
After examining and comparing the elements of these two crimes, we find that the malice requirement in aggravated assault precludes it from merging with voluntary manslaughter. The majority’s statement on page 39 of its Opinion that “the intent to kill must, include the intent to do a lesser degree ... of damage” ignores the element of malice. When malice is accounted for, the equation looks much different: the intent to kill out of passion does not necessarily subsume the intent to do serious bodily injury out of cruelty or hardness of heart.
Our conclusion that these two crimes do not merge is supported by this Court’s decision in Lopez. In that case, we held that aggravated assault would not merge with involuntary manslaughter because “[mjalice is a required element of aggravated assault but not involuntary manslaughter.” Lopez, 426 Pa.Super. at 628, 627 A.2d at 1230. The same analysis applies to voluntary manslaughter, which also lacks the element of malice.
Since our legislature has seen fit to create a manslaughter category of homicide that is legally distinguishable from murder, and has used malice to differentiate the two, we must respect the legal significance of the element of malice. Unless and until the legislature creates a lesser category of aggravated assault, which is characterized by the absence of malice, the crime of aggravated assault should not merge with the manslaughter categories of homicide.
On this issue, therefore, we agree with the trial court that these two crimes should not merge. Accordingly, we would affirm appellant’s judgment of sentence in its entirety.