Court Opinion

ID: 9840560
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-19 13:07:40.399409+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:34:18.205260
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                     San Antonio, Texas
                                 MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                        No. 04-22-00126-CR

                                         Albino CEDILLO,
                                             Appellant

                                                  v.

                                        The STATE of Texas,
                                              Appellee

                    From the 63rd Judicial District Court, Val Verde County, Texas
                                   Trial Court No. 2020-0019-CR
                              Honorable Steve Hilbig, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:       Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice

Sitting:          Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
                  Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
                  Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

Delivered and Filed: September 13, 2023

DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED

           A jury convicted appellant Albino Cedillo on one count of aggravated sexual assault of a

child and one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child, and the trial court assessed punishment

at fifty-three years’ imprisonment for the continuous sexual abuse of a child count. TEX. PENAL

CODE ANN. §§ 21.02; 22.021. The trial court signed a final judgment of conviction and sentence

regarding the continuous sexual abuse of a child count. In two issues, Cedillo complains that: (1)

the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction on both counts; and (2) his trial counsel

rendered ineffective assistance. We dismiss for want of jurisdiction, in part, and affirm.
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                                               I. BACKGROUND

        At trial, the jury considered the testimony of: (a) Susan, 1 the complainant; (b) Susan’s

stepmother (“Stepmother”); (c) Jesus Galindo, a sergeant with the Del Rio Police Department; (d)

Amanda Negrete, a forensic interviewer; and (e) Cedillo.

A.      Susan

        Susan testified that, when she was around four or five years old, she lived in a house with

her mother (“Mother”) and her mother’s boyfriend, Cedillo, in Del Rio, Texas. Susan specifically

recalled a sexual encounter with Cedillo that occurred when she was four years old, testifying:

        I was laying down [on the bed]. My mom was in the shower. And I remember him
        behind me and he was, like, touching my butt and stuff, like rubbing against me.
        And I felt something, and it wasn’t his hand, and then I felt something go inside of
        my butt and it hurt really bad. And I remember crying and him telling me that it
        was okay and that he was sorry and to stop crying.

At fourteen years old at the time of time of trial, Susan testified that it was Cedillo’s “private part.”

        Susan recalled two sexual encounters with Cedillo after her family moved to Center Point,

Texas. First, when Susan was approximately six years old, Cedillo rubbed her “thigh area” and

then she “felt something, like hard, and it wasn’t his hand.”                    Second, when Susan was

approximately eight or nine years old, she recalled:

        playing with my brother. And [Cedillo] had called me over to the restroom, he
        made me touch his private part. And he told me to get a tissue and made me move
        with it, like, up and down, and there was white stuff coming out, and he, like,
        cleaned it up. And then I remember going back, playing with my brother.

Susan wanted to tell Mother about Cedillo’s sexual contact when the family lived in Del Rio.

However, Susan was “too scared that [Mother] would get mad at [her]” or disbelieve her. Indeed,

1
 We use pseudonyms for the child complainant and her family to protect the identity of the child. See TEX. R. APP.
P. 9.10(a)(3).

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when Susan was ten years old, she told Mother about Cedillo’s sexual contact. However, Mother

disbelieved Susan.

       Eventually, Susan began living with her father and Stepmother, but she occasionally visited

Mother. During one of Susan’s visits with Mother, she went to the bathroom and encountered an

overnight male guest that Mother had snuck in the window. Susan was “scared” that the man

would hurt her “because it happened before.” The next day, Susan went to her aunt and uncle’s

home, and she told them that she was mad at Mother for sneaking the man into her home and about

Cedillo’s sexual contact with her. Susan also told Stepmother about Cedillo’s contact with her.

B.     Stepmother

       Stepmother began dating Susan’s father (“Father”) when Susan was approximately five

years old. Stepmother recalled that she and Father traveled to Del Rio to pick up Susan for

weekend visits. During these visits, Stepmother specifically recalled that Susan “complain[ed] of

her bottom hurting when she would go to the bathroom, and at the time [Stepmother] thought it

was like constipation.” Stepmother also recalled that Susan “would be very sad” when she was

returned to Mother at the end of her weekend visits. Stepmother specifically recalled one time

where Susan was “in the back seat crying,” as they drove to Del Rio to return Susan to Mother.

When Susan was approximately nine years old, Susan began living with Stepmother and Father.

Shortly thereafter, Susan told Stepmother about Cedillo’s sexual abuse. Instead of contacting the

police, Stepmother contacted Mother. Stepmother did not call the police until June 2019, when

Susan was twelve years old and returned upset after visiting Mother.

C.     Sergeant Galindo

       Sergeant Galindo testified that, in June 2019, he was assigned a case wherein Susan, who

was twelve years old at the time, had made an outcry that Cedillo had sexually abused her six-to-

seven years earlier. Sergeant Galindo arranged for Susan to undergo a forensic interview, obtained

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Susan’s school records to verify where she lived during the relevant period, and photographed the

home that Susan lived in when she said the sexual abuse occurred.

D.       Negrete

         Negrete testified that, during a forensic interview, Susan described Cedillo’s sexual contact

with her. Negrete recalled Susan telling her that on one occasion, when the family lived in Del

Rio and Mother showered, Cedillo put his “private part . . . in her bottom.” Negrete took Susan’s

account as an indication of penetration. Negrete also recalled Susan describing another incident,

when the family lived in Center Point, wherein Cedillo made Susan “grab his private part with her

hand and go, like, up and down with it, and that [Susan] saw white stuff . . . come out of his private

part.”

E.       Cedillo

         Cedillo denied Susan’s allegations. He testified that he and Mother had been in a

relationship for approximately ten years. Cedillo worked as a migrant farmer, and he would leave

the family’s home for four-to-five month stretches. Cedillo recalled that, upon his return, Susan

or neighbors told him that Mother had “men in the house.” Cedillo first heard of Susan’s

allegations when she was six-or-seven years old. Mother told Cedillo that “Susan had told her

something,” and the two confronted Susan. Cedillo offered to call the police “because if somebody

would be doing that to my daughter, I would call the police.” Susan, according to Cedillo, told

them not to call the police and that she was lying because she was mad at Mother.

F.       Verdict and Judgment

         The jury convicted Cedillo on one count of aggravated sexual assault of a child and one

count of continuous sexual abuse of a child. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court noted:

                 All right. We’ve had a jury trial, jury found him guilty of continuous sex
         assault, also of the aggravated sexual assault. My thought is, I will impose sentence

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       only on the continuous sex assault. I will not impose the sentence on the aggravated
       sexual assault, as I believe that it would violate the double jeopardy provisions.

               However, I’m going to withhold sentencing on that in case there’s an
       appeal. And if we have any issues with the continuous sex assault, then the
       aggravated sex assault sentence could be imposed in that case. So that’s the plan
       of the Court.

The judgment of conviction comports with the trial court’s oral pronouncements, providing in

relevant part, “Ct.1: Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child — Held in Abeyance.” The trial court

assessed punishment at fifty-three years’ imprisonment for the continuous sexual abuse of a child

count, and it signed a final judgment regarding that count. Cedillo timely appealed.

                                          II. DISCUSSION

A.     Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child Count

       Cedillo’s sufficiency challenge implicates both counts. However, we lack jurisdiction over

Cedillo’s challenge to the aggravated sexual assault of a child count.

       In Thompson v. State, 108 S.W.3d 287, 289 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003), the defendant was

charged in a single indictment with one count of sexual assault of a child and one count of

indecency with a child. A jury convicted the defendant on both counts. Id. At the sentencing

hearing, the trial court orally pronounced a sentence of thirty years on the sexual assault of a child

count, but it did not orally pronounce a sentence on the indecency with a child count. Id. No one

objected. Id. The written judgment sentenced the defendant to thirty years’ imprisonment for each

count. Id. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals observed that:

       Quite simply, [the defendant] was never sentenced on the second count. The trial
       court made a mistake in entering a sentence of thirty years in the written judgment.
       Because no sentence was ever rendered, there is no valid judgment on the indecency
       with a child count. Without a valid written judgment, there is no “conviction” for
       [the defendant] to appeal.

Id. at 290 (citations omitted). On appeal, the defendant sought reversal on both counts. The

intermediate appellate court dismissed the defendant’s appeal on the indecency with a child count

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for want of jurisdiction, but considered and rejected the defendant’s sufficiency of the evidence

challenge concerning his conviction for the sexual assault of a child count. Id. at 289. The

defendant petitioned the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals for review, arguing that the intermediate

court “should have either remanded both counts or asserted jurisdiction over both counts.” Id. at

290. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stressed that it “need not address the question of

whether there is only one proper remedy for this situation; it is enough to determine whether the

court of appeals chose a proper remedy.” Id. at 291–92. The court affirmed the intermediate court,

noting that it “properly exercised jurisdiction over appellant’s conviction for sexual assault and

appropriately addressed the merits of that appeal” and that it “correctly dismissed the appeal over

the second count for want of jurisdiction.” Id. at 293.

       Following Thompson, we will dismiss for want of jurisdiction Cedillo’s challenge to the

aggravated sexual assault of a child count. We will, however, address Cedillo’s challenge to the

continuous sexual abuse of a child count.

B.     Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child

       1.      Standard of Review

       Our review of the sufficiency of the evidence is governed by the rules articulated in Zuniga

v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 732–33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). When addressing a challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence, we consider whether, after viewing all of the evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Villa v. State,

514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). This standard requires the appellate court to defer

“to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the

evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S.

at 319. We may not re-weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder.

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Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The court conducting a

sufficiency review must not engage in a “divide and conquer” strategy but must consider the

cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa, 514 S.W.3d at 232. Although juries may not speculate

about the meaning of facts or evidence, juries are permitted to draw any reasonable inferences

from the facts so long as each inference is supported by the evidence presented at trial. Cary v.

State, 507 S.W.3d 750, 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319); see also

Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16–17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We presume that the factfinder

resolved any conflicting inferences from the evidence in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that

resolution. Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). This is because the

jurors are the exclusive judges of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be

given to the testimony. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Direct

evidence and circumstantial evidence are equally probative, and circumstantial evidence alone

may be sufficient to uphold a conviction so long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating

circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.

       We measure whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support a conviction

by comparing it to “the elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge

for the case.” Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The hypothetically

correct jury charge is one that “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does

not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories

of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Id.;

see also Daugherty v. State, 387 S.W.3d 654, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The “law as authorized

by the indictment” includes the statutory elements of the offense and those elements as modified

by the indictment. Daugherty, 387 S.W.3d at 665.

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       2.      Elements

       A person commits the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child if, during a period that

is thirty or more days in duration, he commits two or more acts of sexual abuse and, at the time of

the commission of each act, he is seventeen years of age or older and the victim is a child younger

than fourteen. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(b) (West 2011). Although the exact dates of the

abuse need not be proven, the offense does require proof that two or more acts of sexual abuse

occurred during a period of thirty days or more. Baez v. State, 486 S.W.3d 592, 595 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio 2015, pet. ref’d); see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(d).

       3.      Analysis

       Cedillo’s sufficiency challenge contains four subparts. First, Cedillo argues that it “was

never established beyond a reasonable doubt” that the sexual abuse occurred in Val Verde County,

Texas, between April 30, 2012, and April 30, 2014. Cedillo’s complainant is misplaced. The

legislature created the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child in response to a need to address

sexual assaults against young children who are normally unable to identify the exact dates of the

offenses when there are ongoing acts of sexual abuse. See Williams v. State, 305 S.W.3d 886, 890

n.7 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, no pet.) (citing Dixon v. State, 201 S.W.3d 731, 737 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2006) (Cochran, J., concurring) (“Perhaps the Texas Legislature can address this conundrum

and consider enacting a new penal statute that focuses upon a continuing course of conduct crime

— a sexually abusive relationship that is marked by a pattern or course of conduct of various sexual

acts.”)). Accordingly, Section 21.02(d) of the Texas Penal Code provides:

       If a jury is the trier of fact, members of the jury are not required to agree
       unanimously on which specific acts of sexual abuse were committed by the
       defendant or the exact date when those acts were committed. The jury must agree
       unanimously that the defendant, during a period that is 30 or more days in duration,
       committed two or more acts of sexual abuse.

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TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(d). The testimony of a child victim alone is sufficient to support

a conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07(b)(1).

In this case, Susan testified that her first sexual encounter with Cedillo occurred when she was

four years old and lived in Del Rio. Stepmother provided circumstantial evidence corroborating

Susan’s account of Cedillo’s sexual contact when she recalled that Susan “complain[ed] of her

bottom hurting when she would go to the bathroom” when she and Father picked up Susan from

her Del Rio home for visits. Susan also testified that her last sexual encounter occurred when she

was eight or nine years old and lived in Center Point.

       Second, Cedillo’s implicit contention that the evidence is insufficient to establish that at

least two sexual encounters occurred in Val Verde County is equally unavailing. In Meraz v. State,

415 S.W.3d 502, 506 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. ref’d), the defendant in a continuous

sexual abuse of a child case contended that the evidence was insufficient “to support the conviction

because the jury could not rationally have concluded that the acts of sexual abuse constituting the

offense all occurred in Tarrant County.” We observed:

       The allegation that the offense was committed in Tarrant County is a venue
       allegation, and the State may always allege that the offense was committed in the
       county where the prosecution is carried on. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
       13.17. Venue is not a constituent element of the offense charged. Skillern[ v. State,
       890 S.W.2d 849, 860 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, pet. ref’d), abrogate on other
       grounds by Ex parte Pue, 552 S.W.3d 226, 232 n.21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)]; State
       v. Blankenship, 170 S.W.3d 676, 682 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet ref’d). Venue
       need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and, the State’s failure to prove
       venue does not negate the guilt of the accused. Fairfield[ v. State, 610 S.W.2d 771,
       779 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981)].

       To sustain the allegation of venue, the State’s burden is only to prove by a
       preponderance of the evidence that the county where the offense is prosecuted has
       venue. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 13.17. On appeal, we presume that venue
       was proved in the trial court unless it was disputed in the trial court or the record
       affirmatively shows the contrary. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(c)(1). Appellant did not
       dispute venue in the trial court, and the record does not affirmatively negate Tarrant
       County as a county of proper venue.

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Meraz, 415 S.W.3d at 506. As in Meza, Cedillo did not dispute venue in the trial court and, on

appeal, he has not explained how the record affirmatively negates Val Verde County as a county

of proper venue.

       Third, Cedillo highlights the “presence of other men in the home,” implicitly positing the

scenario that these “other men” committed the sexual abuse for which he was charged and arguing

that this scenario “was never discredited beyond a reasonable doubt.” The identity of a perpetrator

may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence, “coupled with all reasonable inferences from

that evidence.” Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). “Each fact need

not point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force

of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.” Hooper v. State,

214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard “does not

require the State to disprove every conceivable alternative to a defendant’s guilt.” Ramsey v. State,

473 S.W.3d 805, 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). As already noted, Susan’s testimony alone is

sufficient to support Cedillo’s conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child, TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. art. 38.07(b)(1), and the State need not have disproved Cedillo’s “other men” theory.

See Ramsey, 473 S.W.3d at 808.

       Fourth, Cedillo highlights his testimony that Susan recanted her allegation, and he argues

that her recantation somehow renders the evidence insufficient. Cedillo’s recollection of Susan’s

recantation does not render her in-court testimony insufficient. See Jackson v. State, 110 S.W.3d

626, 631 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d) (“[A] criminal conviction, which

requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, may rest on hearsay despite the lack of the

complainant’s testimony or even the complainant’s recantation.”); see also Saldana v. State, 287

S.W.3d 43, 60 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2008, pet. ref’d) (“[I]t is up to the fact finder to

determine whether to believe the original statement or the recantation[;]” “[a] factfinder is fully

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entitled to disbelieve a witness’s recantation.”). The jury was the exclusive judge of the weight to

be given to Cedillo’s assertion that Susan had recanted her allegations, Susan’s in-court testimony

of Cedillo’s sexual contact with her, and Negrete’s recollection of her forensic interview with

Susan. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. We overrule Cedillo’s first issue.

C.     Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

       In Cedillo’s second issue, he contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

conduct a reasonable investigation.

       1.      Standard of Review

       Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and section ten of Article 1

of the Texas Constitution, a criminal defendant is entitled to be represented by effective, competent

counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137,

142 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI and TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 10). A

criminal defendant, however, is not entitled to a flawless performance from counsel; “isolated

lapses or mistakes during the trial are not necessarily indicative of ineffectiveness.” Calderon v.

State, 950 S.W.2d 121, 128 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, no pet.) (citing McFarland v. State, 845

S.W.2d 824, 843 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). Rather, the defendant must show that counsel’s

performance was deficient to the extent that counsel failed to function as the “counsel” guaranteed

by the Sixth Amendment. Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).

       To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Cedillo must establish by a

preponderance of evidence that (1) his trial counsel’s performance was deficient, and that (2) the

deficient performance deprived him of a fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Ex parte Chandler,

182 S.W.3d 350, 353 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Cedillo must satisfy both Strickland elements, and

the failure to show either deficient performance or prejudice will defeat the claim. Perez v. State,

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310 S.W.3d 890, 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107, 110–11 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2003).

       Under the first prong of the Strickland test, Cedillo must show his trial counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d

808, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Stated otherwise, he must show trial counsel’s actions do not

meet the objective norms for professional conduct of trial counsel. Mitchell v. State, 68 S.W.3d

640, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). We presume, however, that trial counsel’s representation fell

within the wide range of reasonable and professional assistance. Mallett v. State, 65 S.W.3d 59,

63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Ineffective assistance claims must be firmly founded in the record to

overcome this presumption. Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813; Coffman v. State, 465 S.W.3d 797, 800

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, no pet.) (recognizing that an ineffective assistance claim must be

“firmly founded in the record,” and “the record must affirmatively demonstrate the meritorious

nature of the claim.”). Consequently, a direct appeal is usually an inadequate vehicle for raising

an ineffective assistance of counsel claim because the record is generally undeveloped as to why

trial counsel did what he or she did. Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App.

2005); Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814 n.6.

       Generally, in the absence of direct evidence of trial counsel’s reasons for the challenged

conduct, an appellate court will assume a strategic motivation if any can be imagined. Garcia v.

State, 57 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). In more rare circumstances, a court may

address an ineffective assistance claim when the challenged conduct was “so outrageous that no

competent attorney would have engaged in it.” Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392 (internal quotes

omitted); see also Rylander, 101 S.W.3d at 111 (noting that “trial counsel should ordinarily be

afforded an opportunity to explain his actions before being denounced as ineffective”). In deciding

whether a case falls into that category, the key question is whether trial “counsel’s performance

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[fell] below an objective standard of reasonableness as a matter of law, regardless of whether the

record adequately reflects the trial counsel’s subjective reasons for acting as he did.” See Ex parte

Bryant, 448 S.W.3d 29, 39–40 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (internal brackets omitted). As the Texas

Court of Criminal Appeals has noted, however, this poses a “difficult hurdle to overcome,” Lopez,

343 S.W.3d at 143, and, a “reviewing court will rarely be in a position on direct appeal to fairly

evaluate the merits of an ineffective assistance claim.” Salinas v. State, 163 S.W.3d 734, 740 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2005). Under the second Strickland prong, in a case that was actually tried, the

defendant must establish that there is a reasonable probability that but for trial counsel’s deficient

performance, the outcome of the case would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694;

Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 812. A “reasonable probability” is that which is “sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Jackson v. State, 973 S.W.2d 954, 956

(Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (per curiam).

       2.      Applicable Law

       In general, trial counsel has a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation to assist his client’s

case, or to make a reasonable decision that a particular investigation is not necessary. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691; see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521–23 (2003); Ex parte

Martinez, 195 S.W.3d 713, 721 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Aldrich v. State, 296 S.W.3d 225, 244

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d) (en banc). A claim for ineffective assistance based on

trial counsel’s general failure to investigate the facts of the case fails absent a showing of what the

investigation would have revealed that reasonably could have changed the result of the case. See

Cooks v. State, 240 S.W.3d 906, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Likewise, a claim for ineffective

assistance based on trial counsel’s failure to interview a witness cannot succeed absent a showing

of what the interview would have revealed that reasonably could have changed the result of the

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case. See Jordan v. State, 883 S.W.2d 664, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Walker v. State, 195

S.W.3d 250, 255–56 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.).

       3.      Analysis

       Cedillo references two categories of evidence — records and witness interviews — in

support of his contention that his trial counsel failed to conduct a reasonable investigation. First,

Cedillo contends that his trial counsel should have sought his payroll records, which may have

provided “an alibi,” and potential investigative records from Child Protective Services, which may

have established “strange men” who visited Susan’s mother were the sexual assailants. Second,

Cedillo contends that his trial counsel failed to interview (1) Mother, (2) his out-of-state relatives,

(3) Susan’s three younger siblings, and (4) Susan’s maternal grandmother. As with the document

discovery that Cedillo finds lacking, he implicitly argues that these witness interviews may have

unearthed potentially exculpatory evidence.

       Cedillo fails to detail what the two missing categories of evidence would have revealed

that reasonably could have changed the result of the case. Accordingly, his ineffective assistance

of counsel claim fails. See Jordan, 883 S.W.2d at 665 (holding conclusory affidavit that failed to

say “what further investigation would have revealed” or what “witnesses would have said to

exculpate” defendant did not “put the trial judge on notice that reasonable grounds existed to

believe counsel’s representation may have been ineffective”); Walker, 195 S.W.3d at 255–56. We

overrule Cedillo’s second issue.

                                          III. CONCLUSION

       We dismiss for want of jurisdiction Cedillo’s challenge to the aggravated sexual assault of

a child count and affirm the remainder of the trial court’s judgment.

                                                    Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH

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