Court Opinion

ID: 9910215
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-15 06:04:06.106404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:51:31.548422
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     December 14, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 361755
                                                                     Wayne Circuit Court
TODD BENNETT SQUIRES,                                                LC No. 21-000139-01-FH

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: GLEICHER, C.J., and GARRETT and MALDONADO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Todd Bennett Squires appeals as of right his bench trial convictions for operating a motor
vehicle while intoxicated, third-offense, MCL 257.625(1); operating a motor vehicle without a
valid license, MCL 257.904(1); and failure to stop after a collision, MCL 257.620. Because the
evidence adequately supported Squires’s convictions and allowing them to stand would not be a
miscarriage of justice, we affirm.

                                       I. BACKGROUND

        This case arises out of a motor vehicle accident near the intersection of Tyler Road and
Morton Taylor Road in Van Buren Township. Kenneth Mixon and Brenda Mixon testified that
when driving in the left-turn lane on Tyler Road and preparing to turn on Haggerty Road, a dark
truck collided with the front passenger side of their vehicle where Brenda sat. The truck did not
stop after hitting the Mixon’s vehicle but drove away.

        Kenneth followed the vehicle and Brenda called police. After Brenda reported the truck’s
license plate number to police, Kenneth pulled into a parking lot. At that point, they temporarily
lost sight of the truck. Kenneth and Brenda then observed the truck pull into the back of a car wash
across the street. They did not see anyone leave or enter the car wash parking lot until police
arrived a short time later. Brenda acknowledged not watching the truck closely the entire time
before police arrived, and Kenneth stated that the truck, once it pulled to the back of the car wash,
was out of his view. Brenda said it was too dark to tell if there were ever any individuals in the
truck besides the driver.

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         Officer Daniel Svabik responded to the scene and observed a black Ford F150 truck in one
of the car wash parking spots, with Squires standing next to the truck’s passenger side. The truck’s
license plate number matched that reported by Kenneth and Brenda. Svabik noticed fresh damage
to the front driver’s side of the truck. He did not see anyone else near the vehicle, nor leaving the
car wash. Svabik spoke to Squires, who appeared intoxicated. Svabik checked on the status of
Squires’s license, which was expired and “denied/revoked.” Svabik’s partner, Kurtis Mowbray,
also responded to the scene, observed the damage to both vehicles, and opined at trial that they
were involved in a side-swipe collision.

        Squires testified that he was not operating a motor vehicle at any point on the night in
question, though he admitted to being intoxicated and having an invalid license. Squires claimed
that his friend, Shawn Knox, drove him in the truck that night. Squires did not remember any
collision. Squires testified that Knox drove into the car wash parking lot and then, for a reason
unknown to Squires, left the keys of the truck and fled on foot. After his arrest, Squires’s blood
alcohol content measured above the legal limit at 0.107 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of
blood. At a bench trial, the trial court convicted Squires as described earlier, and he now appeals.

                                          II. ANALYSIS

        Squires argues that the trial court convicted him on insufficient evidence, and that the
verdict was against the great weight of the evidence.

        “When reviewing an argument following a bench trial that insufficient evidence existed to
prove the elements of the crimes, this Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to
the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential
elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Muhammad, 326 Mich
App 40, 60; 931 NW2d 20 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “We will not interfere
with the trier of fact’s role of determining the weight of the evidence or the credibility of
witnesses.” People v Eisen, 296 Mich App 326, 331; 820 NW2d 229 (2012) (quotation marks and
citation omitted).

         “The test to determine whether a verdict is against the great weight of the evidence is
whether the evidence preponderates so heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage
of justice to allow the verdict to stand.” People v Lacalamita, 286 Mich App 467, 469; 780 NW2d
311 (2009). “Generally, a verdict may be vacated only when the evidence does not reasonably
support it and it was more likely the result of causes outside the record, such as passion, prejudice,
sympathy, or some other extraneous influence.” Id. “Conflicting testimony, even when impeached
to some extent, is an insufficient ground for granting a new trial.” Id. at 469-470.

       The trial court convicted Squires of operating a vehicle while intoxicated, operating a
vehicle with no valid license, and failing to stop after a collision. Operating a vehicle while
intoxicated under MCL 257.625(1) “requires proof of three elements: (1) the defendant operated
a motor vehicle (2) on a highway or other place open to the general public or generally accessible
to motor vehicles (3) while under the influence of liquor or a controlled substance, or a
combination of the two.” People v Hyde, 285 Mich App 428, 448; 775 NW2d 833 (2009).

       As for driving without a valid license, MCL 257.904(1) states:

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       A person whose operator’s or chauffeur’s license or registration certificate has been
       suspended or revoked, whose application for license has been denied, or who has
       never applied for a license, shall not operate a motor vehicle on a highway or other
       place open to the general public or generally accessible to motor vehicles, including
       an area designated for the parking of motor vehicles, within this state.

       Finally, regarding the failure to stop after a collision, MCL 257.620 states:

       The driver of any vehicle which collides upon either public or private property with
       any vehicle which is attended or unattended shall immediately stop and shall then
       and there either locate and notify the operator or owner of such vehicle of the name
       and address of the driver and owner of the vehicle striking the vehicle or, if such
       owner cannot be located, shall forthwith report it to the nearest or most convenient
       police officer.

         The sole issue here is whether the evidence adequately proved that Squires was operating,
i.e., driving, the vehicle in question. Each of Squires’s convictions required him to be the driver
of the vehicle that collided with Kenneth and Brenda. Squires argues that since he was not driving
the truck involved in this collision, there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty of any
offense. Specifically, Squires asserts, because no witness testified that they physically saw Squires
driving a vehicle on the night in question—or that there was only one individual in the truck
involved—there was insufficient evidence of his guilt.

         Here, Kenneth and Brenda testified that a dark truck struck their vehicle and fled to a car
wash parking lot. Once arriving at the car wash, Officer Svabik observed Squires standing outside
a dark truck, with no one else around. The truck’s license plate number matched that given by
Brenda after the collision. Svabik also testified that the truck had fresh damage consistent with
the type of collision Kenneth and Brenda described. Officer Mowbray observed both vehicles and
testified that they were involved in a side-swipe collision. Svabik testified that Squires admitted
at the scene to driving the truck only from the front of the car wash parking lot to the back, but
otherwise denied driving the truck or being involved in an accident. When testifying, however,
Squires denied driving that night at all. Squires testified that his friend was driving him and, once
at the back of the car wash, fled on foot for some unknown reason. But neither Kenneth nor Brenda
ever saw anyone leaving the car wash once the truck parked there.

        Deferring to the trial court’s assessment of witness credibility, the testimony of the officers,
Kenneth, and Brenda sufficed to support an inference that Squires drove the vehicle that collided
with Kenneth and Brenda. Importantly, the trial court, hearing the testimony firsthand, did not
believe Squires’s version of events. The trial court expressly found that Squires “lied through his
teeth” to police and at trial. “I find his version of what happened to be so utterly ridiculous. To
say that it doesn’t pass the giggle test is really to understate the ridiculousness of his defense.”
Once the court rejected Squires’s version of events, his own admissions that he was intoxicated
and had a suspended license, along with the evidence of him standing alone shortly after—and
next to the truck involved in—the collision at issue, sufficed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that Squires operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated, drove with an invalid license, and failed
to stop after a collision.

                                                  -3-
         Squires also argues that it would be a miscarriage of justice to uphold his convictions
because they were based on the erroneous finding that the truck involved in the collision belonged
to him. The trial court, however, merely acknowledged the possibility that the car was Squires’s.
At Squires’s bench trial, the court stated, “The question I have to decide is whether or not it was
[Squires] who was operating his own truck or his girlfriend’s truck at the time of the accident.”
The essential question here was whether Squires operated the truck at, not who owned it. Indeed,
none of Squires’s convictions turned on who owned the truck. Further, even if relevant, the court’s
reference to the truck being Squire’s or his girlfriend’s was made to accommodate conflicting
testimony on this issue, and not a finding contrary to the evidence. Notably, Squires initially
described the truck as “my vehicle” at trial. He allegedly misspoke, testifying that the truck “is
owned by my girlfriend, [and was] driven by somebody else other than me.” And Officer Svabik
testified that Squires said at the scene that the truck was his. For these reasons, the evidence does
not preponderate so heavily against the trial court’s verdict that it would be a miscarriage of justice
to allow it to stand.

       We affirm.

                                                               /s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
                                                               /s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett
                                                               /s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado

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