Court Opinion

ID: 9546795
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:35:21.588952+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:51.208309
License: Public Domain

BRETT, Presiding Judge
specially concurring.
I specially concur in this decision for the reason the testimony of Forensic Serologist Gilchrist gave concerning appellant’s presence at the scene of the crime was error. She was not there and she exceeded her professional role when she answered the prosecutor’s question, as discussed in Part I and Part II in the majority opinion. I am also disturbed by the manner in which the hair samples were provided appellant’s expert, John Wilson. Denial of due process is a constitutional deprivation and must not go unnoticed.
I agree also that the prosecutors went far afield in their arguments to the jury. Prosecutors should limit their arguments to the facts provided the jury and should not offer their own opinion concerning guilt of the accused.
In his dissent, Judge Bussey states that the opinion of Gilchrist, concerning appellant’s presence at the scene of the crime, falls within 12 O.S.1981, § 2702. That Section of the Statute provides the following:
Testimony by Experts
If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
In the subcommittee notes the following dissertation is found:
Most of the literature assumes that experts testify in the form of opinions. The assumption is logically unfounded. The rule accordingly recognizes that an expert on the stand may give a dissertation or exposition of scientific or other principles relevant to the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to the facts.
In that respect, I believe Gilchrist exceeded her professional bounds. The ultimate fact for the jury to determine was whether or not appellant was present at the scene of the crime and whether or not he committed the crime. If we continue to allow such personal opinion testimony to be espoused by experts, we may find a requirement imposed upon the courts to provide additional expert assistance to defendants at *1223State expense to counter such testimony. See Munson v. State, 758 P.2d 324, 330 (Okl.Cr.1988), Part I, A.
Therefore, I specially concur in this decision.