Court Opinion

ID: 9647312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:30:48.126631+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:47.779536
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
In his article, Insufficient Evidence on Appeal, supra, Judge Garwood endeavored to supply the courts of appeal a practical method for applying, in concrete cases, the abstractions presented by an appellant’s contention that a trier-of-fact’s failure to find a fact is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. Following his suggestion, we concluded that, although we would not have reached the same determination as that reached by the trier-of-fact, we could not impute to the trier-of-fact’s determination any “prejudice, sympathy or other incorrect motive.” We therefore overruled Marjorie’s assignment of error. Garwood, supra, at 812.
In her motion for rehearing, Marjorie contends we erred by resolving, in the manner suggested by Judge Garwood, the “manifestly unjust” point of error she brought to this Court. She avers that the second part of Judge Garwood’s method, i.e., an inquiry whether the fact finder must have been actuated by “prejudice, sympathy or other incorrect motive” to conclude as it did, is inconsistent with the requirement in Pool v. Ford Motor Company, 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex.1986). The Pool decision requires a court of appeals, when reversing on factual-sufficiency grounds, to:
detail the evidence relevant to the issue in consideration and clearly state why the jury’s finding is factually insufficient or is so against the great weight and preponderance as to be manifestly unjust; why it shocks the conscience; or clearly demonstrates bias.
Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 635.
According to Marjorie, the second of the two inquiries Judge Garwood suggested places on the appellant a greater burden than Pool requires — although Pool does not require a court of appeals to find bias before it may overturn a finding of fact (as indicated by the disjunctive “or” preceding the expression “clearly demonstrates bias”), we have allegedly required that bias be shown. We see in our opinion above no basis for this contention.
We have not required a showing of bias. Rather, we have stated that we may not reverse a trial court’s determination unless (1) we would not have reached the same determination and (2) we conclude the determination was actuated by some improper motive, which might be bias, sympathy, passion, prejudice, or any other extraneous and improper consideration. Independent proof of improper motive is not required, of course; a court of appeals may infer improper motive from the factual determinations reached in the trial court simply in light of all the evidence in the case. Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Bright, 156 S.W. 304, 310 (Tex.Civ.App.1913, writ ref’d) (“This court has no authority to set aside a verdict [as] against the great preponderance of the testimony unless the preponder-*399anee is such as to indicate prejudice, passion or other improper motive.”).
Marjorie contends next that any necessity for showing improper motive was eliminated from a “factual sufficiency” analysis by the decision in Pope v. Moore, 711 S.W.2d 622 (Tex.1986). In that remittitur case, the supreme court applied the Pool instructions, quoted above, stating that “P]ower courts need not find passion, prejudice, or other improper motive on the jury’s part to order a remittitur.” Id. at 624. We do not believe this language, considered in conjunction with the Pool instructions, nullified the practical method Judge Garwood suggested. Firstly, Pool purports to eliminate the requirement that a trial court find passion, prejudice, or other improper motive before ordering a remittitur, it does not purport to speak to an appellate court’s review of the evidence supporting a trial court’s factual determinations. Secondly, the language of Pope must be understood in light of the decisions cited therein for the proposition that a trial judge need not find an improper motive before ordering a remittitur. These decisions are Flanigan v. Carswell, 159 Tex. 598, 324 S.W.2d 835, 841 (1959), later “overruled to the extent that it advocates a standard for remittiturs varying from that enunciated in Pope,” Larson v. Cactus Utility Co., 730 S.W.2d 640 (Tex.1987), and Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Farnsworth, 148 Tex. 584, 227 S.W.2d 1017, 1022 (1950).
Flanigan states simply that there need not be extraneous evidence of passion, prejudice, or other improper motive before a court of appeals may sustain a trial-court order of remittitur, relying on the Farns-worth holding that the amount of the verdict, in light of all the evidence in the record, may supply sufficient evidence of passion, prejudice, or improper motive to enable a reviewing court to order a remit-titur.1
The method Judge Garwood supplied is a practical one designed to prevent a court of appeals from intruding into the trial-court domain in an effort to correct a factual determination that might have led to an injustice. We see in Pope and Pool nothing to indicate that the Garwood method is erroneous. We hold accordingly and overrule Marjorie’s motion for rehearing.
The record owners, in a motion for rehearing, assail the part of our opinion “declining to permit attorney ad litem to recover his fees for his representation of the unknown heirs as costs of court.” We have set out above our best understanding of the supreme court’s previous opinion concerning the matter of such attorney’s fees and costs in this cause. We adhere to our reasoning above and our holding that such relief “is not within the scope of the mandate that unambiguously directed us to consider Marjorie’s ‘factual insufficiency’ point of error and did not mention that we should consider the relief requested in the motion” regarding attorney’s fees and costs. The motion for rehearing does not speak to this holding. Over six months have passed since the holding was published in an opinion filed January 23, 1991. The supreme court has not changed the mandate so far as this Court has been informed, although ample time was provided therefor. We therefore overrule the record owners’ motion for rehearing.
GAMMAGE, J., not participating.

. Before Flanigan and Farnsworth, the supreme court in World Oil Co. v. Hicks, 129 Tex. 297, 103 S.W.2d 962, 964 (1937), had stated:
[P]rejudice or passion must be affirmatively shown; excessiveness of the verdict in itself does not establish it, unless it is so flagrantly excessive that it cannot be accounted for on any other ground; but it has been held that, where it clearly appears that the damages are grossly excessive, that fact may be regarded to some extent as reflecting the failure of the jury to appreciate and apply the testimony as to the question of liability, and a new trial may be granted without a condition. 446 C.J. p. 431, § 500.