Court Opinion

ID: 9365354
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-23 20:02:15.07466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:45.018929
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/23/23 Medina v. Under Armour Retail CA2/6
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

 JAVIER MEDINA,                                               2d Civil No. B322855
                                                                 (Super. Ct. No.
      Plaintiff and Appellant,                                  CIVDS1812739)
                                                            (San Bernardino County)
 v.

 UNDER ARMOUR RETAIL,
 INC., et al.,

   Defendants and
 Respondents.

       Labor Code1 section 2802 requires employers to reimburse
their employees for expenses that are necessary and required to
directly discharge their duties, or, when required by the
employer. In this case, we examine whether a claim alleging a
retail employer violated section 2802 with policies encouraging
(but not requiring) employees to wear its retail apparel to work
presents a predominant common question of law and fact

         1   Further unspecified statutory references are to the Labor
Code.
appropriate for class certification. We conclude that under the
circumstances here, it does not.
       Javier Medina sued his former employer Under Armour,
Inc. and Under Armour Retail, Inc. (collectively Under Armour),
alleging that Under Armour forced employees to purchase Under
Armour branded clothing and shoes without reimbursement.
Medina moved for class certification, which the trial court denied.
       Medina appeals from the order denying his motion for class
certification. Medina contends the trial court erred in finding
that (1) his claims were not typical of the putative class, (2)
common issues did not predominate, and (3) a class trial was
unmanageable. We affirm.
             FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       Under Armour is a sports apparel and shoe company. It
operates more than a dozen retail stores and a warehouse called
the “Distribution House” in California. Distribution House
oversees distribution to retail stores and provides logistical
support for online orders. Employees of Distribution House
generally do not interact with customers.
       Medina was an employee at the Distribution House from
July 2013 to July 2017. He never worked in the retail stores.
                     First amended complaint
       Medina alleged Under Armour’s failure to reimburse
employees for wearing its retail apparel to work violated section
2802 and constituted unfair competition under Business and
Professions Code section 17200 et seq. Medina alleged Under
Armour “forc[ed]” employees “to patronize [Under Armour] by
requiring [them] to purchase logoed clothing and shoes” and

                                 2
“fail[ed] to reimburse” employees for business expenses. Medina
sought damages and/or penalties and restitution.2
             Motion for class certification and opposition
       In December 2019, Medina moved to certify a class of “all
current and former California employees of [Under Armour] who
made purchases of [Under Armour]’s goods at any time from May
25, 2014, through the present.” Medina also moved to certify a
subclass of “all current and former California Distribution House
employees of [Under Armour] who made purchases of [Under
Armour]’s goods at any time from May 25, 2014, through the
present.”
       Medina argued class certification was appropriate,
contending the predominant common question of law and fact is
“whether [Under Armour]’s policy of encouraging its employees to
wear clothing/gear similar to [Under Armour]’s products, while at
the same time prohibiting the wearing of competitor-branded
clothing and shoes violated Labor Code § 2802.” He also argued
his claims were typical of the class, and a class-wide trial was
manageable.
       Under Armour opposed class certification, asserting
Medina “fail[ed] to establish any common policy or practice
requiring Teammates to purchase or wear UA apparel” and that
the question of liability at the heart of the class-wide claims
required “hyper-individualized inquiries.” Under Armour also
argued Medina’s claims were not typical of the entire class, which
included retail workers, and Medina had not proposed a trial
plan to manage the “highly-individualized liability issues.”

      2Medina also alleged a claim under the Private Attorneys
General Act (PAGA), which the parties stipulated to dismiss
without prejudice.

                                3
       In his reply, Medina argued Under Armour’s opposition
improperly attempted to litigate the merits at the class
certification stage. Medina also filed a motion to strike the
declarations of retail and distribution employees submitted by
Under Armour in support of its opposition to class certification.
                              Evidence
       Medina submitted excerpts from his deposition and those of
Under Armour managers/persons most qualified and retail
employees. He also submitted a “Team Member Handbook” that
was effective in 2014 (the beginning of the putative class period)
(2014 Team Member Handbook), a July 2016 “Retail Supplement
To Teammate Handbook,” an April 2017 “California Supplement
To Teammate Handbook,” a memorandum to Distribution House
employees with the subject line: “Under Armour Asset Protection
Policies,” a document titled “Distribution House Dress Code
Policy” effective in March 2018, and evidence of the employee
discount policy.
       Under Armour also submitted excerpts from depositions of
Under Armour managers/persons most qualified and Medina. It
submitted much of the same documentary evidence as Medina
and other documents, including a March 2017 updated version of
the “Teammate Handbook” and “PowerPoint presentation”
outlining the Distribution House dress code policy. Under
Armour also submitted declarations of four Under Armour
managers, 15 Distribution House employees, and 55 retail
employees.
                        1. Teammate handbooks
       The 2014 Team Member Handbook included a section on
“Personal Appearance,” stating “team members are expected to
present a clean and neat appearance and to dress according to

                                4
the requirements of their positions.” A short list of restrictions
included: “Clothing and (in the future footwear) produced by
direct competitors of Under Armour should not be worn.” Brenda
Banuelos, Under Armour’s senior manager in the human
resources department, testified that the 2014 handbook policies
applied to Distribution House employees up through December
2014. After December 2014, Distribution House employees were
not prohibited from wearing competitor brands.
       The March 2017 updated handbook included a section
titled “Personal Appearance,” which stated: “Although our dress
code is business casual year round, it must be in keeping with the
business image we wish to convey. Dressing according to the
requirements of your position, as well as being neat and pulled
together is essential.” “Retail and Distribution House employees
will receive dress codes specific to their workplaces.” Nothing in
this section required employees to wear Under Armour clothing,
nor did it mention that employees were prohibited from wearing
direct competitor clothing.
                 2. Retail employee dress code policies
       A July 2016 “Retail Supplement To Teammate Handbook”
included a section on “Personal Presentation,” stating that retail
teammates “should strive to project a professional image that is
consistent with UA’s reputation as the leader in the performance
apparel and footwear industry.” Teammates “are encouraged to
wear styles and outfits in the current floor set. Additionally,
teammates may not wear apparel or footwear bearing any visible
logo other than UA while working.” Under a “Do’s” and “Don’ts”
section, “Don’ts” included “[v]isible logos of any other brand” and
“[c]ompetitor product (i.e., Nike, Reebok, . . . or any other brand
considered by the company to be a direct competitor).” The “Do’s”

                                 5
section listed several Under Armour products such as branded
chinos, shorts, tops, and shoes.
       The April 2017 California supplement to the handbook
included a section titled “California Retail Store Teammate Dress
Code.” It stated that retail “teammates are encouraged to wear
styles and outfits in the current floor set. Although teammates
are not required to wear UA clothing, teammates are not
permitted to wear apparel or footwear bearing any visible logo
other than UA while working.” Under a “Do’s” and “Don’ts”
section, “Don’ts” included “[v]isible logos of any other brand.”
The “Do’s” section listed several items such as “[a]thletic capris or
pants,” “[c]hinos,” “[t]ank tops,” and “[s]hort and long sleeve tops”
without specific mention of Under Armour branded bottoms and
tops. The September 2018 “Retail Supplement To Teammate
Handbook” included a section on “Personal Presentation,” similar
to the April 2017 supplement.
                3. Distribution House dress code policies
       A memorandum to Distribution House employees, which
was titled “Under Armour Asset Protection Policies,” included a
section for “Dress Code Policy.” The dress code stated that any
“clothing/footwear produced by direct competitors of Under
Armour” was prohibited. This memorandum was disseminated to
Distribution House employees on an annual basis. Steve Molina,
a senior manager of asset protection at Distribution House,
testified he drafted this memorandum in 2013 and 2014 and
copied the language prohibiting direct competitor clothing from
the version of the employee handbook in effect at the time. He
inadvertently did not update the asset protection policy after the
language prohibiting competitor clothing was removed from
subsequent versions of the handbook. His failure to do so was

                                 6
“not intentional[].” He later removed the language in 2018 after
human resources informed him it was no longer in the handbook.
In a 2018 email to Distribution House managers and supervisors,
Molina stated the Dress Code Policy had been edited to reflect
that “[v]erbiage regarding competitor clothing/apparel has been
removed from the 2018 policy.”
       Molina testified the asset protection team was responsible
to ensure employees follow the dress code policy, while the
human resources department set the policy and imposed any
repercussions for violations. He said in his six years at
Distribution House, no employee had been reprimanded nor
disciplined for wearing direct competitor apparel. Molina
testified he saw Distribution House employees wear visible
non-Under Armour clothing “[e]very day.”
       Under Armour submitted evidence of a “PowerPoint
presentation” outlining Distribution House’s dress code policy.
According to Banuelos, after December 2014, distribution
employees were informed of the dress code policy through these
PowerPoint presentations (distributed in team meetings called
“huddles”). The presentation included several slides of the “Do’s
and Don’ts” of the dress code and images of “appropriate” clothing
and “inappropriate” clothing. Both appropriate and
inappropriate clothing examples included images of Under
Armour clothing. The presentation “encouraged” distribution
employees to be brand ambassadors by wearing Under Armour
clothing. Nothing in the presentation required employees to wear
Under Armour clothing at work or prohibited competitor clothing.
       Effective in March 2018, Under Armour created a written
“Distribution House Dress Code Policy” reflecting the information
in the PowerPoint presentation. It specified that teammates “are

                                7
to dress according to the requirements of their position” and that
“[s]pecifically, in the [Distribution House] environment, wearing
certain types of shoes and clothing may constitute a safety
hazard.” The policy also stated that “[t]eammates are
encouraged to be brand ambassadors by wearing UA gear.” The
policy did not prohibit wearing competitor clothing at work.
            4. Medina’s deposition testimony and declaration
       During his deposition, Medina recounted one instance in
which a supervisor told him that it was “not correct” for Medina
to be wearing a Nike T-shirt and that he “had to wear an Under
Armour shirt.” The supervisor asked him to put tape over the
Nike logo. Medina said everything he purchased from Under
Armour, he wore to work. Medina also said Under Armour had
“conferences” or television presentations, in which the employees
were informed of the dress code. These presentations were in
English and a coworker translated the information to him. From
these presentations and his interaction with his supervisor,
Medina believed he was required to wear an Under Armour
T-shirt and shoes to work.
       Medina declared that throughout his employment, Under
Armour “has always required me and other employees to wear
only Under Armour branded clothing and shoes while at work”
and that it prohibited employees from wearing competitor
clothing.
                       5. Management declarations
       Banuelos, a human resources manager, and Steven Snyder,
a district manager, declared that Under Armour maintained
separate dress codes for retail and Distribution House employees.
They explained the “dress codes set forth different guidelines and
serve different purposes in large part because Teammates

                                8
working in Retail Stores face and interact with customers, while
DH Teammates generally do not.” However, neither dress codes
require employees to purchase and wear Under Armour apparel
to work. Banuelos stated that due to the nature of the work, the
Distribution House dress code “was formulated to ensure the
safety of Teammates while presenting a professional appearance
at work.”
       Snyder declared that after the December 2014 version of
the handbook, Under Armour “has maintained various iterations
of separate dress codes applicable to Retail and DH Teammates
in California, specifically, the Retail Dress Code is set forth in
California Supplement to the Teammate Handbook. . . . The
Retail Dress Code applies only to Teammates who work in Retail
Stores in California.”
          6. Employee declarations and deposition testimonies
       Fifteen Distribution House employees declared they never
felt forced to wear Under Armour clothing at work and never
understood any of the policies to require them to purchase Under
Armour clothing. Rather, they wore competitor clothing at work
or saw other employees wear competitor clothing. They were not
aware of any instance where an employee was sent home for
wearing competitor apparel at work. One employee said he never
purchased Under Armour clothing during his employment.
Another employee said he never purchased Under Armour
apparel for the sole purpose of wearing it to work. Some
employees said the dress code policies were shown during
television announcements or discussed during team “huddles.”
These policies discussed restrictions on clothes, which included
certain Under Armour shirts and tank tops because they posed a
safety concern at the warehouse. The employees declared that

                                9
Distribution House’s dress code only restricted clothing for safety
issues or to enforce appropriate professional attire in a workplace
environment.
       Retail employees from several stores also declared they
were not expected or required to wear Under Armour clothing or
shoes to work. They said they understood the dress code policy
restricted visibly logoed competitor brand clothing, but they were
permitted to wear competitor clothing without visible logos.
Several employees declared they were not required to adhere to a
certain “look” or wear up-to-date Under Armour apparel.
       Medina submitted excerpts from the depositions of several
employees, including five Distribution House employees. Two
distribution employees acknowledged that the “Under Armour
Asset Protection Policies” memorandum and 2014 Team Member
Handbook included language prohibiting apparel produced by
direct competitors, and one recalled receiving both documents at
orientation in 2015. Nonetheless, these employees said they have
seen other employees wear competitor clothing every day and
that they themselves have worn competitor clothing with visible
logos to work. One employee testified he had never been sent
home for wearing competitor clothing.
                   Order denying class certification
       The trial court issued a tentative ruling denying the class
certification motion. The court found there was no dispute that
the putative class was ascertainable and numerous and that
Medina and his counsel would provide adequate representation.
However, the court found Medina did not establish typicality,
predominance of common issues, and manageability of individual
issues. The court also denied Medina’s motion to strike the

                                10
employee declarations submitted in support of Under Armour’s
class certification opposition.3
       During the hearing, Medina argued there were several
policies, which together left employees with “no choice but to
purchase and wear Under Armour clothing” to work. Medina
claimed the different policies directed employees to: (1) wear
clothes “similar to Under Armour’s look,” (2) “be . . . brand
ambassadors,” (3) “wear styles and outfits on the current floor
sets,” and (4) not “wear clothing that’s produced by a competitor.”
He argued that if “you put all those things together—and really
the end result is there’s no realistic choice but to wear Under
Armour gear.”
       The trial court adopted its tentative ruling and issued a
supplemental ruling. It rejected Medina’s theory that there were
several different dress code policies which collectively conveyed
the message that Under Armour clothing had to be worn at work.
The court found Medina’s theory “would apply only to retail
employees, where wearing Under Armour clothing makes
commercial sense.” These dress code policies would not apply to
Distribution House employees, such as Medina, who do not
interface with consumers. The court found “no evidence that any
employees—retail or distribution—ever felt coerced to buy Under
Armour clothing based on the patchwork of dress code rules.”
The court observed Medina failed to proffer substantial evidence
to support his theory, including any declarations or deposition

      3Medina argues the trial court never ruled on this motion,
but the record shows otherwise. The court denied the motion on
the ground that “plaintiff has not demonstrated the coercion
necessary for striking the evidence.” Medina has not
demonstrated any error in the court’s ruling.

                                11
testimony from any employees. Moreover, Medina, himself, “did
not rely on this theory, but stated instead that he was told he had
to wear Under Armour apparel—a claim apparently supported by
no one else.”
                               DISCUSSION
       “Class actions are statutorily authorized ‘when the question
is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when
the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them
all before the court . . . .’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 382.)” (Johnson v.
GlaxoSmithKline, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1508-1509
(Johnson).) “The party advocating class treatment must
demonstrate the existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently
numerous class, a well-defined community of interest, and
substantial benefits from certification that render proceeding as a
class superior to the alternatives. [Citations.] ‘In turn, the
“community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1)
predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class
representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and
(3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.’
[Citations.]” (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012)
53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021 (Brinker).) In addition to identifying
predominant common issues, the “manageability of individual
issues is just as important as the existence of common questions
uniting the proposed class.” (Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn.
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 1, 29 (Duran).)
       We review the trial court’s decision in denying or granting
class certification for an abuse of discretion. (Brinker, supra, 53
Cal.4th at p. 1022.) “ ‘A certification order generally will not be
disturbed unless (1) it is unsupported by substantial evidence, (2)

                                12
it rests on improper criteria, or (3) it rests on erroneous legal
assumptions. [Citations.]’ [Citations.].” (Ibid.)
       Here, the disputed issues are whether Medina
demonstrated that (1) his employee reimbursement claim is
typical of the class, (2) common questions of law and fact
predominate, and (3) a class-wide trial of the employee
reimbursement claim was manageable.
                               Typicality
       Medina argues the trial court erred in finding his claims
were not typical of the proposed class. We disagree.
                        1. The trial court’s ruling
       In concluding Medina’s claims were not typical, the trial
court emphasized that Medina was a Distribution House
employee and not a retail employee—the latter comprising most
of the putative class. The court noted that Under Armour had
“separate dress code polices for retail employees and for
distribution employees,” and these polices had “different terms,
purposes, emphases, and underlying rationales.”
       The trial court found Medina “failed to direct the Court to
any company-wide written policy requiring employees to purchase
Under Armour products to wear at work as alleged.” With
respect to any unwritten policy, the court found the “evidence
pertaining to the distribution facility will necessarily differ from
evidence pertaining to the retail stores.” “Supervisors and
managers at retail stores have different concerns and priorities
than supervisors at a distribution facility. The dress codes are
different, reflecting those differences. At most, plaintiff’s claims,
as a distribution employee, would be typical only of claims to be
asserted on behalf of other distribution employees.”

                                 13
       With respect to a “patchwork” of different policies which
allegedly required employees to wear Under Armour apparel, the
court found such a theory “would apply only to retail employees,
where wearing Under Armour clothing makes commercial sense.”
       The court concluded Medina failed to demonstrate through
substantial evidence that his claims were typical of retail
employees. If it “were to certify a class, it would need to be
limited to distribution employees.”
                               2. Analysis
       A class representative must be similarly situated to class
members. (Caro v. Procter & Gamber Co. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th
644, 663.) The requirement that a class representative’s claim
must be typical of the class is “ ‘ “to assure that the interest of the
named representative aligns with the interests of the class.
[Citation.] ‘ “Typicality refers to the nature of the claim or
defense of the class representative, and not to the specific facts
from which it arose or the relief sought.” ’ [Citations.] The test of
typicality ‘is whether other members have the same or similar
injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not
unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members
have been injured by the same course of conduct.’ ” ’ [Citation.]”
(Johnson, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 1509.)
       The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding
Medina’s claims were not typical of “all current and former
California employees of [Under Armour] who made purchases of
[Under Armour]’s goods at any time from May 25, 2014, through
the present.” Medina failed to show he was similarly situated to
retail class members and was “injured by the same course of
conduct.” (Johnson, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 1509.) This is
so because he did not show a class-wide dress policy that required

                                  14
both retail and distribution employees to purchase and wear
Under Armour retail apparel at work. Rather, there were
significant differences with retail dress code policies because
retail employees interact with the public, and distribution
employees do not. Thus, Medina’s claims may have been typical
of Distribution House employees, but not typical of retail
employees.
       Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding.
Banuelos and Snyder declared that after 2014, Under Armour
maintained two separate dress codes for retail and distribution
employees because “Teammates working in Retail Stores face and
interact with customers, while DH Teammates generally do not.”
The employee handbooks and supplements, PowerPoint
presentations outlining the dress code policy for Distribution
House employees, and a document regarding “Distribution House
Dress Code Policy,” reflect these differences. The updated 2017
employee handbook stated that “[r]etail and Distribution House
employees will receive dress codes specific to their workplaces.”
The 2016-2018 handbook supplements for retail employees
discussed an employee’s personal presentation. It stated that
retail employees “should strive to project a professional image
that is consistent with UA’s reputation,” encouraged employees to
wear styles and outfits in the current floor set, and prohibited
visible logos of competitor brands.
       In contrast, the PowerPoint presentations and the March
2018 document outlining Distribution House’s dress code policy
focused on safety—prohibiting clothing such as open-toed shoes,
hooded sweatshirts, and loose hanging jewelry. Unlike the retail
handbooks, it did not encourage employees to wear certain styles,
nor did it prohibit competitor clothing. Moreover, the

                               15
“Acceptable” and “Unacceptable” clothing sections in the
PowerPoint included examples of Under Armour clothing for both
sections (e.g., photographs of Under Armour hooded sweatshirts
were used as examples of “Unacceptable attire”). The employees
at Distribution House confirmed that their dress code policies
related to safety issues. They also said they wore competitor
clothing or saw others wear competitor clothing while at work,
while retail employees said they were not permitted to wear
competitor clothing with visible logos.
       Despite these differences in dress code policies, Medina
argues he suffered the same injuries as retail workers because
Under Armour had the “same practice” and “policies prohibiting
competitor-branded clothing/shoes, while allowing only Under
Armour to be worn.” Medina did not support his argument with
substantial evidence—after 2014, the written Distribution House
dress code policies did not include such prohibitions or
specifications. Moreover, Medina’s testimony that a supervisor
told him he must wear Under Armour while working at
Distribution House is a claim that the trial court found was
“apparently supported by no one else.”
       Medina also argued below that retail and Distribution
House employees alike were subject to various policies, which
together left employees with no option but to purchase Under
Armour apparel. But three of the policies he identified (i.e.,
expectations that employees wear clothes “similar to Under
Armour’s look,” encouragement that employees wear clothes
reflecting the current floor set, and restrictions against
competitive brands) were not contained in the Distribution House
dress policies. Thus, Medina failed to show that he suffered the
same injuries as retail workers and that his claims were typical

                              16
of the putative class. And as we explain below, because Medina
did not show that common questions predominate and
demonstrate how individual issues would be managed at trial, he
cannot represent a subclass of Distribution House employees.
                   Predominance of common issues
       Medina argues Under Armour ’s practice of allegedly
forcing employees to purchase and wear apparel representing
Under Armour’s “look” while prohibiting competitor brands
without reimbursement presents an issue susceptible of common
proof. We disagree.
                        1. The trial court’s ruling
       The trial court found Medina “failed to produce evidence of
any written policy requiring employees to purchase Under
Armour products” and did not produce “substantial evidence of
any unwritten company-wide policy.” “Insofar as the claim
depends on unwritten practices, those would be practices imposed
by the managers or supervisors at each facility. But other than
[his] own testimony about his personal experience, [Medina] has
failed to produce substantial evidence to demonstrate that this is
a common factual question.” Nor did Medina present substantial
evidence that a “patchwork” of different dress policies collectively
conveyed the message that employees had to buy and wear Under
Armour apparel to work to discharge their duties or in response
to Under Armour’s directives as required by section 2802.
       Under Armour “presented extensive evidence contradicting
[Medina]’s claims, pertaining both to retail and to distribution
employees. This is evidence not merely from management, but
from employees who would presumably be class members if
plaintiff’s claims are true.” The court further reasoned the
“point, however, is not that these employees are necessarily

                                17
worthy of belief . . . . The point is that the truth or falsity of
plaintiff’s allegations would need to be demonstrated by
individualized inquiry of a large group of employees. Since there
are no written policies requiring employees to purchase Under
Armour apparel as a condition of employment, the employees
would each need to testify to what they were told orally.”
       The court concluded Medina “failed to demonstrate that
common questions predominate” because “beyond his own
testimony, [Medina] has failed to produce substantial evidence of
his claim that employees were required to buy Under Armour.”
                                2. Analysis
       “The ‘ultimate question’ the element of predominance
presents is whether ‘the issues which may be jointly tried, when
compared with those requiring separate adjudication, are so
numerous or substantial that the maintenance of a class action
would be advantageous to judicial process and to the litigants.’
[Citations.] The answer hinges on ‘whether the theory of
recovery advanced by the proponents of certification is, as an
analytic matter, likely to prove amenable to class treatment.’
[Citations.] A court must examine the allegations of the
complaint and supporting declarations (ibid.) and consider
whether the legal and factual issues they present are such that
their resolution in a single class proceeding would be both
desirable and feasible. ‘As a general rule if the defendant’s
liability can be determined by facts common to all members of the
class, a class will be certified even if the members must
individually prove their damages.’ [Citations.]” (Brinker, supra,
53 Cal.4th at pp. 1021-1022, fn. omitted.)
       Although certification is “ ‘ “essentially a procedural
[question] that does not ask whether an action is legally or

                               18
factually meritorious,” ’ ” “ ‘issues affecting the merits of a case
may be enmeshed with class action requirements . . . .’
[Citations.]” (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1023.) “In
particular, whether common or individual questions predominate
will often depend upon resolution of issues closely tied to the
merits. [Citations.] To assess predominance, a court ‘must
examine the issues framed by the pleadings and the law
applicable to the causes of action alleged.’ [Citation.] It must
determine whether the elements necessary to establish liability
are susceptible of common proof or, if not, whether there are ways
to manage effectively proof of any elements that may require
individualized evidence. [Citation.] In turn, whether an element
may be established collectively or only individually, plaintiff by
plaintiff, can turn on the precise nature of the element and
require resolution of disputed legal or factual issues affecting the
merits.” (Id. at p. 1024.)
       The plaintiff has the burden to present substantial
evidence that common issues of law or fact predominate over
individual issues. (Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Superior Court
(2003) 29 Cal.4th 1096, 1108.) On appeal, predominance of
common issues is a factual question reviewed for substantial
evidence. (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1022.) We presume in
favor of the trial court’s order and the existence of every fact the
court could reasonably deduce from the record. (Ibid.)
       Medina alleges Under Armour violated section 2802 by
encouraging all employees to be brand ambassadors by wearing
its retail apparel to work without reimbursement, and that this
class-wide policy spawns predominant questions of law and fact.
He argues the trial court abused its discretion when it examined

                                19
the merits of his underlying claim when it concluded otherwise.
We disagree for the following reasons.
      First, the trial court did not impermissibly examine the
merits of his claim. The court ruled that the “truth or falsity of
plaintiff’s allegations would need to be demonstrated by
individualized inquiry of a large group of employees.” Thus, the
court examined the merits of Medina’s reimbursement claim only
to the extent necessary to determine whether questions
fundamental to determining liability could be established by
common proof or individually. It did not make a substantive
ruling regarding the merits of Medina’s claim. (Brinker, supra,
53 Cal.4th at p. 1024; see also Morgan v. Wet Seal, Inc. (2012)
210 Cal.App.4th 1341 (Wet Seal) [the trial court properly
considered the merits of the plaintiffs’ causes of action for the
limited purpose of assessing whether substantially similar
questions regarding liability for Wet Seal’s dress code policy were
common to the class and predominated over individual issues].)
      Second, Medina did not present substantial evidence to
show a predominant common question of law or fact existed.
This case is similar to Wet Seal, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th 1341.
There, former retail employees sought to certify a class and
alleged that Wet Seal’s company-wide dress code policy forced
employees to purchase and wear company apparel without
reimbursement. (Id. at p. 1345.) Although employees were not
required to purchase Wet Seal apparel, the plaintiffs argued
otherwise and relied on employee handbooks, “Policies &
Procedures” manuals, and seasonal handbooks. These documents
stated that employees were “ ‘required to dress in a manner . . .
consistent with the current fashion attire that is reflected in the
stores,’ ” to “ ‘wear clothing consistent with Wet Seal’s brand,’ ” or

                                 20
to “represent the Arden B brand, current fashion trends and
current color stories presented on the sales floor.” The policies
stated: “ ‘Employees are encouraged to wear Wet Seal
merchandise at all times.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1347-1349.) The plaintiffs
also submitted their own declarations and those of over 50 other
employees, many of whom said their managers told them they
were required to dress in Wet Seal apparel. (Id. at pp. 1350-
1351.) The plaintiffs also submitted e-mails from one regional
district director, who sent e-mails to store managers expressing
her concern that employees were “ ‘not dressing for Wet Seal’ ” or
“wearing the ‘new trends.’ ” (Id. at p. 1352.)
       In opposition, Wet Seal submitted more than 100
declarations from managers and sales associates who said they
did not interpret the dress policies to require them to wear Wet
Seal clothing. (Wet Seal, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351.)
       The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of class
certification, concluding there was “no class-wide method of proof
with regard to the fundamental liability questions” at the heart of
the plaintiff’s claim. (Wet Seal, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p.
1362.) The court found the evidence of the various written
policies were insufficient to prove Wet Seal had a company-wide
policy requiring employees to wear and purchase Wet Seal items
without reimbursement. (Id. at pp. 1362, 1365.) With respect to
the declarations, the named plaintiffs’ declarations demonstrated
their claims were based on oral instructions from their specific
managers. The other employee declarations demonstrated that
employees were told different things about the company’s dress
policies. The court found that such “anecdotal evidence regarding
Wet Seal’s application of its dress code” “reinforces the conclusion
that Wet Seal’s liability to putative class members will have to be

                                21
decided on an individualized basis.” (Id. at p. 1362.) Moreover,
evidence of one regional director’s e-mails did not establish the
director was able to determine company-wide policy for Wet Seal,
and there was no evidence that such e-mails were widely
disseminated. (Id. at p. 1365-1366.)
       Similarly here, Medina did not present substantial
evidence that common issues of law and fact predominated over
individual ones. As in Wet Seal, Medina did not present
substantial evidence of a company-wide policy requiring
employees to purchase and wear Under Armour apparel to work.
The evidence includes the 2014 Team Member Handbook and the
“Under Armour Asset Protection Policies,” which only restricted
employees from wearing clothing “produced by direct
competitors.” Subsequent versions of the retail employee
handbook supplements in 2016, 2017, and 2018 modified this
restriction to only prohibit retail employees from wearing visible
logos of competitor brands. These supplements also encourage,
but do not require, retail employees to wear styles and outfits in
the current floor sets and to be “brand ambassadors.” After 2014,
Distribution House dress code policies, presented through
PowerPoint presentations, did not restrict employees from
wearing competitor clothing. The policy included an “Acceptable”
and “Unacceptable” of the dress code, using Under Armour
apparel for both the examples of appropriate and inappropriate
workplace clothing, and this section merely encouraged
employees to be “brand ambassadors by wearing UA gear.”
These documents do not demonstrate Under Armour forced
employees to buy its apparel to discharge their duties as brand
ambassadors.

                               22
       Furthermore, Medina produced no other employee
declarations or deposition testimonies to support his claim that
Under Armour had a company-wide policy that forced employees
to wear Under Armour apparel at work. In contrast, Under
Armour submitted over 70 Distribution House and retail
employees’ declarations in which employees stated they were not
forced to purchase Under Armour apparel to wear at work, and
never understood the written policies to pressure them to make
such purchases to discharge their duties. Several employees said
they were permitted to wear competitor clothing to work, wore
competitor clothing to work, or saw other employees wearing
competitor brands every day. And, some employees said they
never purchased an Under Armour item for the sole purpose of
wearing it to work.
       Moreover, like Wet Seal, the employee and Medina
declarations and deposition testimonies “reinforces the conclusion
that [Under Armour]’s liability to putative class members will
have to be decided on an individualized basis.” (Wet Seal, supra,
210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1362.) Medina’s claim is based on what he
was told by a supervisor and on his own interpretation of the
policies. The employee declarations and deposition testimonies
illustrate that their understanding of the various dress policies
was based on how they interpreted them or how their supervisors
communicated these policies. Thus, Medina has failed to
demonstrate a “classwide method of proof with regard to the
fundamental liability questions” such as how each employee
understood the written dress policies, how each employee was
instructed to dress by their managers or supervisors, and
whether each employee relied on such instruction or policy

                               23
interpretations to purchase Under Armour clothing for the
purpose of wearing those items to work. (Ibid.)
                             Manageability
       Lastly, the trial court found Medina “failed to demonstrate
through a trial plan that this case would be manageable as a
class action,” particularly “in light of the need for extensive
individualized inquiries.”
       “In certifying a class action, the court must also conclude
that litigation of individual issues . . . can be managed fairly and
efficiently. [Citations.]” (Duran, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 29.)
Trial courts must pay careful attention to manageability when
deciding to certify a class action. In considering whether a class
action is a superior device for resolving a controversy, the
manageability of individual issues is just as important as the
existence of common questions uniting the proposed class. (Ibid.)
       In the absence of Medina submitting a trial plan, we agree
that a class-wide trial would be unmanageable given our
conclusion that the threshold question of liability would require
individualized inquiries. Medina has not shown through a trial
plan how the individualized liability inquiries can be managed
fairly and efficiently.
       Medina argues that trial would be manageable because
Under Armour “keep[s] records of all class member purchases
showing how much each class member spent” on apparel. But
“[e]vidence that putative class members purchased [Under
Armour] merchandise is not evidence that they were forced to
purchase that merchandise.” (Wet Seal, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 1366, 1369.) Even with such evidence, individualized
inquiry would be necessary to determine questions such as
whether the purchase was for the purpose of wearing the item to

                                 24
work, whether the purchase was for the employee or a
family/friend, or whether employees chose to avail themselves of
an employee discount. Medina does not show how such inquiries
can be managed. Based on the record before the trial court, we
conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in finding this case
unmanageable. (See McCleery v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2019) 37
Cal.App.5th 434, 452.)
                          DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their
costs on appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                     BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

             GILBERT, P. J.

             YEGAN, J.

                                25
                     David S. Cohn, Judge

           Superior Court County of San Bernardino

                ______________________________

      Diversity Law Group, Larry W. Lee; Law Offices of Choi &
Associates, Edward W. Choi; Hyun Legal, Dennis S. Hyun; Lee
Law Offices and Thomas M. Lee for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Seyfarth Shaw, Andrew M. McNaught, Ryan A. McCoy and
Kiran A. Seldon for Defendants and Respondents.