Court Opinion

ID: 9891487
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-18 18:09:37.954802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:25.134847
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Moore, 2023-Ohio-3785.]

                                       COURT OF APPEALS
                                   GUERNSEY COUNTY, OHIO
                                   FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO                                     JUDGES:
                                                  Hon. John W. Wise, P.J.
        Plaintiff-Appellee                        Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
                                                  Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
-vs-
                                                  Case No. 22 CA 40
ROCHELLE E. MOORE

        Defendant-Appellant                       OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                       Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common
                                               Pleas, Case No. 22 CR 37

JUDGMENT:                                      Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                        October 18, 2023

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee                         For Defendant-Appellant

LINDSEY DONEHUE-ANGLER                         KIMBERLY E. BURROUGHS
PROSCUTING ATTORNEY                            ASSISTANT STATE PD
JASON R. FARLEY                                250 East Broad Street
ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR                           Suite 1400
627 Wheeling Avenue                            Columbus, Ohio 43215
Cambridge, Ohio 43725
Guernsey County, Case No. 22 CA 40                                                          2

Wise, P. J.

         {¶1}   Appellant Rochelle E. Moore appeals her conviction and sentence entered

in the Guernsey County Court of Common Pleas. Appellee is State of Ohio. The relevant

facts leading to this appeal are as follows.

                            STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

         {¶2}   On January 8, 2022, Appellant was employed at a hotel in Cambridge, Ohio.

Video surveillance showed Appellant taking her coworkers' paychecks from under the

hotel desk. Appellant was later caught on camera cashing the checks at Hondros Market

in Cambridge, Ohio.

         {¶3}   On February 15, 2022, Appellant was indicted on two counts of Theft, in

violation of R.C. §2913.02, and one count of Forgery, in violation of R.C. §2913.31.

         {¶4}   On June 27, 2022, Appellant entered a plea of guilty to the two counts of

theft.

         {¶5}   On September 29, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to seven

months imprisonment on each count to be served consecutively.

                                    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

         {¶6}   Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. He herein raises the following four

Assignments of Error:

         {¶7}   “I. MS. MOORE’S DEFENSE COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO PRESENT MATERIAL MITIGATING

EVIDENCE AT SENTENCING.

         {¶8}   “II. MS. MOORE’S DEFENSE COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN HE INDUCED MS. MOORE’S GUILTY PLEA WITH
Guernsey County, Case No. 22 CA 40                                                          3

AN UNPROFESSIONAL GUARANTEE THAT SHE WOULD RECEIVE A SENTENCE

OF PROBATION. MS. MOORE WAS PREJUDICED AS A RESULT, AND HER GUILTY

PLEAS SHOULD THEREFORE BE VACATED.

       {¶9}   “III. THIS COURT SHOULD FIND, BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING

EVIDENCE, THAT THIS RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT THE SENTENCING

COURT’S FINDINGS UNDER R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). AFTER SO FINDING, THIS COURT

SHOULD VACATE MS. MOORE’S SENTENCE AND REMAND FOR RESENTENCING.

       {¶10} “IV. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE A PROPORTIONALITY

FINDING PURSUANT TO R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) BEFORE IMPOSING A CONSECUTIVE

SENTENCE. ITS SENTENCE MUST THEREFORE BE VACATED.”

                                                I., II.

       {¶11} In Appellant’s first and second Assignments of Error, Appellant argues trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence at sentencing and for

inducing a guilty plea from Appellant by guaranteeing Appellant she would receive

probation. We disagree.

                                       a. Standard of Review

       {¶12} Our standard is set forth in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668,

104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. Ohio adopted this standard in the case of State v.

Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373. These cases require a two-pronged

analysis in reviewing a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. First, we must

determine whether counsel’s assistance was ineffective; whether counsel’s performance

fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation and was violative of any of

his essential duties to the client. If we find ineffective assistance of counsel, we must then
Guernsey County, Case No. 22 CA 40                                                           4

determine whether or not the defense was actually prejudiced by counsel’s

ineffectiveness such that the reliability of the outcome of the trial is suspect. This requires

a showing there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional error,

the outcome of the trial would have been different. Id.

       {¶13} Trial counsel is entitled to a strong presumption that all decisions fall within

the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. State v. Sallie (1998), 81 Ohio

St.3d 673, 675, 693 N.E.2d 267. In addition, the United States Supreme Court and the

Ohio Supreme Court have held a reviewing court “need not determine whether counsel’s

performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as

a result of the alleged deficiencies. Bradley at 143, 538 N.E.2d 373, quoting Strickland at

697, 103 S.Ct. 2052. Even debatable trial tactics and strategies do not constitute

ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Clayton, 62 Ohio St.2d 45, 402 N.E.2d 1189

(1980).

                                    b. Guarantee of Sentence

       {¶14} Appellant argues trial counsel was ineffective for guaranteeing her

probation if she entered a plea of guilty. Appellant makes this claim in a post-sentencing

ex-parte letter to the trial court. However, it is Appellant’s burden to present evidence that

meets a required minimum level of cogency to support her claim. State v. King, 5th Dist.

Stark No. 2021CA00140, 2022-Ohio-676, ¶33. A self-serving statement generally does

not meet this required minimum level of cogency. Id. at ¶26. Additionally, at the change

of plea hearing, Appellant stated that she was entering the plea voluntarily and that she

was not promised anything besides what the judge placed in the record. With no other

supporting evidence other than Appellant’s brief and her self-serving ex-parte letter to the
Guernsey County, Case No. 22 CA 40                                                           5

trial court, we find Appellant has failed to support her allegation with evidentiary quality

materials supporting her contention that trial counsel’s performance fell below an

objective standard of reasonable representation, or that any prejudice arose from the

alleged ineffectiveness.

                           c. Failure to Present Mitigating Evidence

       {¶15} Next, Appellant argues trial counsel’s performance was ineffective for failing

to present Appellant’s current attempts to get custody of her two children and failure to

object to inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report regarding the custody of

Appellant’s children. We disagree.

       {¶16} Appellant appears to argue that trial counsel failed to strenuously enough

present that a term of imprisonment would negatively affect her ability to regain custody

of her children and that had he done so, the trial court would have given a more lenient

sentence. This appears to be nothing more than speculation.

       {¶17} Appellant has a long criminal history and lost custody of her children. It

appears that while working on her case plan to regain custody of her children she

committed this theft. Appellant further assigns error that trial counsel failed to describe in

detail the particulars of the custody case. The record fails to show that these details would

be helpful to Appellant. These details, in fact, could be harmful to Appellant, and if so, it

is a reasonable trial strategy for trial counsel not to strenuously present potentially harmful

information at Appellant’s sentencing hearing. Therefore, Appellant’s argument is

unpersuasive and does not show trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective

standard of reasonable representation.
Guernsey County, Case No. 22 CA 40                                                      6

       {¶18} Accordingly, Appellant’s first and second Assignments of Error are

overruled.

                                               III.

       {¶19} In Appellant’s third Assignment of Error, Appellant argues the record does

not support the sentencing court’s findings under R.C. §2929.14(C)(4) as consecutive

sentences were not proportionate to the crime. We disagree.

       {¶20} This Court reviews felony sentences using the standard of review set forth

in R.C. §2953.08. State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d

1231; State v. Howell, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2015CA00004, 2015-Ohio-4049. Subsection

(G)(2) sets forth this Court’s standard of review as follows:

              (2) The court hearing an appeal under division (A), (B), or (C) of this

       section shall review the record, including the findings underlying the

       sentence or modification given by the sentencing court.

              The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a

       sentence that is appealed under the section or may vacate the sentence

       and remand the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing. The

       appellate court’s standard of review is not whether the sentencing court

       abused its discretion. The appellate court may take any action authorized

       by this division if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following:

              (a)    That the record does not support the sentencing court’s

       findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or

       (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929 of the Revised

       Code, whichever, if any, is relevant;
Guernsey County, Case No. 22 CA 40                                                         7

              (b)    That sentence is contrary to law.

       {¶21} R.C. §2929.13(B)(1)(b) states:

              The court has discretion to impose a prison term upon an offender

       who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony of the fourth or fifth degree

       that is not an offense of violence or that is a qualifying assault offense if any

       of the following apply:

              ***

              (vii) The offender held a public office or position of trust, and the

       offense related to that office or position; the offender’s position obliged the

       offender to prevent the offense or to bring those committing it to justice; or

       the offender’s professional reputation or position facilitated the offense or

       was likely to influence the future conduct of others.

       {¶22} “Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is

more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of such certainty

as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in

the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be

established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three

of the syllabus.

       {¶23} Appellant does not dispute the sentence is within the statutory range for a

felony sentence, and Appellant makes no argument the statute is contrary to law.

Appellant summarily argues that consecutive sentences are disproportionate to the crime

committed. However, the trial court noted Appellant’s long criminal history, this offense

occurred only sixty-three days after her parole ended for her last offense, and that she
Guernsey County, Case No. 22 CA 40                                                      8

was in a position of trust which she abused. The aggregate term of incarceration in the

case sub judice is fourteen months, just two months more than the court could have

imposed for a single offense. Accordingly, we do not find clear and convincing evidence

the record does not support the trial court’s findings in the instant case.

       {¶24} Appellant’s third Assignment of Error is overruled.

                                             IV.

       {¶25} In Appellant’s fourth Assignment of Error, Appellant argues the trial court

erred by failing to make a proportionality finding pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). We

disagree.

       {¶26} R.C. §2929.14(C)(4) provides:

              (4) If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions

       of multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison

       terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is

       necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender

       and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness

       of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public,

       and if the court also finds any of the following:

              (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses

       while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction

       imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised

       Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.

              (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of

       one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of
Guernsey County, Case No. 22 CA 40                                                      9

      the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single

      prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses

      of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.

             (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that

      consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime

      by the offender.

      {¶27} Appellant argues the trial court failed to make a proportionality finding as

required by R.C. §2929.14 (C)(4) and summarily makes a claim that consecutive

sentences are not proportionate to the crime.

      {¶28} “In State v. Bonnell, the Supreme Court held that ‘no statute directs a

sentencing court to give or state reasons supporting imposition of consecutive sentences.

Thus, a trial court is not required by Crim.R. 32(A)(4) to give reasons supporting its

decision to impose consecutive sentence.’ 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16

N.E.3d 659, ¶27. In ordering the sentences be served consecutively, the trial court simply

needs to read the provisions of R.C. §2929.14(C)(4).” State v. Carbaugh, 5th Dist. No.

CT2022-0050, 2023-Ohio-1269 213 N.E.3d 180, ¶34, motion for delayed appeal granted,

170 Ohio St.3d 1517, 2023-Ohio-2771, 214 N.E.3d 586, ¶34.

      {¶29} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court read the provision of R.C.

§2929.14(C)(4). The trial court emphasized that in order to protect the public from

Appellant, consecutive sentences were necessary. Accordingly, we find the trial court

adequately made the appropriate findings required by R.C. §2929.14(C)(4).
Guernsey County, Case No. 22 CA 40                                             10

       {¶30} Appellant’s fourth Assignment of Error is overruled.

       {¶31} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas,

Guernsey County, Ohio, is hereby, affirmed.

By: Wise, P. J.

Delaney, J., and

King, J., concur.

JWW/br 1016