Court Opinion

ID: 9680187
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:24:43.687264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:26.544255
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON PETITION TO REHEAR
TODD, Judge.
The complainant-cross-defendant, Janet Bacon Baggett, has filed a respectful petition to rehear on two grounds.
First, petitioner complains of the action of this Court in modifying the decree of the Trial Judge to delete therefrom the requirement that the defendant-cross-complainant pay to petitioner’s solicitor the sum of one thousand dollars.
Petitioner urges that this Court erred in holding that the one thousand dollar award was solely in connection with a previous appeal. No citations to the record support this allegation of error. The entire record does disclose the following:
On March 30, 1970, the Trial Court ordered defendant-cross-complainant to pay to petitioner’s solicitor $150.00 as attorney fee pendente lite.
On November 30, 1970, the Trial Court entered its final decree adjudging petitioner to be guilty of misconduct sufficient to entitle respondent herein to a divorce. Said decree also effected a division of marital property, including the proceeds of a certain savings account, one-half of which was ordered delivered to solicitor for petitioner who was granted a lien thereon.
“in the amount of $300.00 for his services rendered” without prejudice to any contractual obligation of petitioner to her solicitor.
It thus satisfactorily appears to this Court that, at the time of the final decree and division of property, the $150.00 fee pendente lite and the $300.00 fee to be paid out of petitioner’s share of the bank account was the extent to which the Trial Judge saw fit to provide fees by court order for services up to the time of the final decree.
Consequently, any further award of fees must be attributed to proceedings subsequent to the final decree, whether such proceedings be motions, petitions, or appeal.
For the foregoing reasons, there is no support in the record for petitioner’s insistence that the subsequent requirement that respondent pay additional fee to the *296solicitor for respondent was in some way involved in or justified by the manner of division of property.
Petitioner cites Raskind v. Raskind, 45 Tenn.App. 583, 325 S.W.2d 617, 624; however, in that case the wife was awarded a divorce because of the misconduct of the husband, whereas the reverse is true in the present case.
A number of other authorities are cited which relate to the amount of attorneys’ fees allowed, rather than the propriety of awarding a fee at all, which is the question in the present case.
Petitioner relies upon § 36-822, T.C.A. for the allowance of fees in connection with contests as to child custody and child support. In the view of this Court, said statute does not require the allowance of fees under the circumstances of this case as set out in the principal opinion on this appeal.
Petitioner cites 32 A.L.R.3rd 1227, 1235, § 3; however, a reading of the entire article in which said citation is found discloses that there are numerous circumstances, including those of this case, wherein a successful divorce party should not be burdened with payment of fees of the solicitor for his adversary.
Petitioner complains that this Court “deleted . . . from the fee ... allowed to her solicitor . . . one-half.”
Petitioner misinterprets the opinion and order of this Court which did not delete any fee, but merely deleted the order requiring respondent to pay any part thereof.
Petitioner’s second complaint is that this Court failed to expressly preserve the right of petitioner to possess and use the home formerly occupied by the parties. The final decree, entered on November 30, 1970, states:
“This home place, generally described as 476 Broadwell Drive, Davidson County, Tennessee, shall be maintained by the cross-defendant as a home for the children, and the cross-defendant is enjoined from selling the property without the order of this Court.”
This decree was affirmed on the former appeal.
The subsequent order, from which the most recent appeal was made, provided:
“Janet Bacon Baggett shall have the right and privilege of remaining in the said property and making a domicile for herself and the two minor children for so long as she has the principal custody of either one or both of the minor children. When the children are emancipated, or in the event the principal custody is changed, then the property will be sold, and the equity will be divided equally by and between the parties, Victor Lee Baggett and Janet Bacon Bag-gett.”
Said provision was not expressly modified by the opinion or decree of this Court, but was affirmed. Petitioner evidently fears that the action of this Court in changing “principal custody” to “divided custody” will effect an automatic termination of the rights of petitioner under the above-quoted order of the Trial Court. Such was not the intent of the opinion and decree of this Court and a further clarifying order will be entered accordingly on the minutes of this Court.
Except as indicated, the petition to rehear is respectfully overruled. An order will be entered overruling the petition and providing that the former decree of this Court was not intended to and did not change or disturb the right of petitioner to occupy the home as ordered by the Trial Judge, which right remains subject to further orders of the Trial Judge.
Petitioner will pay the costs incident to the petition to rehear.
SHRIVER and PURYEAR, JJ., concur.