Court Opinion

ID: 9744072
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:52:53.154346+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:46.508828
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SIMON, dissenting: The majority holds that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he rejected the minimum term of years and “double[d] that” because the defendant “show[ed] no contrition.” My colleagues, however, have failed to examine the constitutional implications of their decision. Convicted defendants have a due process right to a fair sentencing procedure. (See United States v. Rone (7th Cir. 1984), 743 F.2d 1169, 1171.) By permitting the trial judge to increase the defendant’s sentence when he proclaims his innocence, the majority condones the violation of two fundamental due process rights. First, the majority penalizes the defendant for proclaiming his innocence when he exercises his statutory right to speak before sentencing. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 4—1(a)(5).) Not only is this practice fundamentally unfair (see In re Wigoda (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 154, 160), but also it ignores the possibility that the defendant could actually be innocent — that an innocent man could conceivably have been convicted. As this court has already stated, such a view places “ ‘a mantle of absolute and inviolate perfection on our system of justice, *** an attribute that cannot be claimed for any human institution or activity.’ ” In re Wigoda (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 154, 160, quoting In re Hiss (1975), 368 Mass. 447, 458, 333 N.E.2d 429, 437. Second, permitting a trial judge to impose a longer sentence when a defendant proclaims his innocence violates the defendant’s fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. (Thomas v. United States (5th Cir. 1966), 368 F.2d 941; People v. Leckrone (1985), 134 Ill. App. 3d 978; People v. Speed (1984), 129 Ill. App. 3d 348; see, e.g., People v. Sherman (1977), 52 Ill. App. 3d 857.) In proclaiming his innocence, the defendant chose to exercise his fifth amendment right not to be a witness against himself. Had he admitted that he was guilty, this could have been used against him as an admission should he have been granted a new trial, and it also could have jeopardized his appeal and collateral remedies. The ramifications of admitting guilt are vividly illustrated in this case because the defendant raised on appeal whether he had been convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. The majority justifies imposing double the minimum sentence by inaccurately equating the defendant’s claim of innocence with a showing of “no repentance in light of the finding by the court that he was guilty” (113 Ill. 2d at 530). A defendant, however, “can hardly be expected to be remorseful for something he contends he did not do.” (People v. Evans (1986), 143 Ill. App. 3d 236, 242.) Hence the majority’s discussion of remorse in the present case misses the mark. While the majority concedes that defendants possess certain rights in the sentencing process, it asserts that these rights were not created to provide a forum for perjury. The defendant in this case, however, has not been charged with perjury. If he was suspected of perjury, the defendant should have been charged with this crime. Denying a defendant his constitutional rights when he needs them the most, however, strips these rights of their meaning. Finally, the majority contends that “[t]here is no direct statement in this case which indicates that the judge was predisposed to impose a more severe sentence because of the defendant’s failure to plead guilty.” (113 Ill. 2d at 527.) While I agree that the trial judge did not say these words verbatim, when a judge says that he will “reject the minimum term of three years and *** double that” after the defendant proclaims his innocence, this is a direct message that the defendant should have either admitted his guilt when he insisted he was not guilty or waived his statutory right to allocution. A trial judge clearly has discretion to sentence a defendant to any term within the bounds of the statute. In determining the appropriate sentence, the judge may certainly take a myriad of factors, including a defendant’s remorse, into account. The judge, however, may not sentence a defendant for an impermissible reason. Because the judge in the present case penalized the defendant for exercising both his statutory right of allocution and his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination he abused his discretion. Therefore, this case should be remanded for resentencing. CHIEF JUSTICE CLARK joins in this dissent.