Court Opinion

ID: 9403990
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 22:03:25.661394+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:10.666767
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/21/23 Sonya J. v. Robert M. CA1/3
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 SONYA J.,
           Petitioner and Appellant,
                                                                        A164423
 v.
 ROBERT M.,                                                             (San Mateo County
                                                                        Case No. FAM0127563)
           Respondent.

         In 2015, the trial court issued a domestic violence restraining order
(“DVRO”) against appellant Sonya J. barring her from harassing her then
husband Robert M. and their then minor children, S. and J. In 2017, the
DVRO was modified to require Sonya to take down her Facebook page and
forbid her from posting about Robert or the children on social media or online
for the duration of the DVRO.
         Before the amended DVRO expired, Robert, now divorced from Sonya,
petitioned to renew the DVRO and make it permanent. In November 2021,
following a four-day trial in which Robert and the now adult children testified
in support of the petition, the court renewed the DVRO. The renewed DVRO
included a modified and narrower social media restriction which permitted
Sonya’s use of social media but restricted the substance of her posts.
         We conclude the trial court did not err in renewing the DVRO. We do
not address Sonya’s argument that a provision in the renewed DVRO

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imposing social media restrictions on her is an unconstitutional prior
restraint because, as a threshold matter, we find the provision
unconstitutionally vague and remand for that reason.
                 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
General Information
      Sonya J. and Robert M. married in 1994. They have two children: S., a
daughter born in 1999, and J., a son born in 2002. They separated in
November 2014, and Sonya petitioned for dissolution of their marriage
shortly thereafter. Judgment in the divorce was entered in June 2018.
The DVRO
      On December 12, 2014, Robert filed a DVRO request to protect himself
and S. and J., then ages 15 and 12, respectively, from Sonya. The court
issued a temporary restraining order pending a court hearing on the request.
      On September 10, 2015, following the hearing, the court issued the
DVRO with an end date of August 27, 2019. Among other things, the court
ordered Sonya to do the following: stop harassing Robert and the children;
stay away from their work and schools; and move out of the family home. No
visitation was allowed pending mediation.
      Approximately two years later, on October 16, 2017, and upon Robert’s
request, the court issued a temporary emergency ex parte order amending
the DVRO. The temporary order incorporated the following language into the
DVRO: “Petitioner shall immediately take down her Facebook page and
refrain from posting material about [Robert and the children] on any internet
forum or website for the duration of the protective order.” Sonya opposed the
modification. On June 1, 2018, the court issued an amended DVRO
incorporating the provision requiring Sonya to take down her Facebook page
and to refrain from posting any material about Robert and the children on

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any internet forum or website for the duration of the protective order.1 The
expiration date of the amended DVRO remained August 27, 2019.
Criminal Protective Orders and Other Criminal Proceedings
      Throughout the four-year period the DVRO was in effect, various San
Mateo County courts issued multiple criminal protective orders (“CPOs”) to
protect Robert and the children from Sonya, and several criminal matters
arising from Sonya’s conduct towards Robert proceeded against her:
      Case No. SM395386A: On November 13, 2014, Sonya was charged with
misdemeanor violations of Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (a)2 for
inflicting corporal punishment on a spouse/co-habitant and section 243,
subdivision (e)(1) for battery against a cohabitant. On December 16, 2014,
the court issued a one-year domestic violence criminal protective order
protecting Robert from Sonya. Later, the complaint was amended to add two
misdemeanor contempt charges under section 166, subdivision (c)(1) for
violating a protective order in a domestic violence proceeding. On March 20,
2015, Sonya entered into a negotiated disposition in which she pled no
contest to the two contempt charges, and the inflicting corporal punishment
and battery charges were dismissed. Sonya was sentenced to a year of
probation, no contact orders, and 32 hours of anger management. In
addition, the court issued another domestic violence CPO with a three-year
term protecting Robert, as well as S. and J., from Sonya. The CPO allowed
the children to initiate peaceful contact with their mother, but Sonya was
barred from initiating such contact.

1     Notwithstanding her opposition to the amendment, it appears that
Sonya eventually agreed to abide by the amendment as part of the settlement
provisions included in the judgment of dissolution.
2     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
stated.

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      Case No: 16-SM-001682: On February 19, 2016, Sonya was charged
with another misdemeanor violation of section 166, subdivision (c)(1) for
being in contempt of court for violating the CPO. On April 6, 2016, the court
issued another one-year CPO protecting Robert from Sonya.
      Case No: 16-SM-003626: On April 5, 2016, in a new criminal
proceeding, Sonya was charged with a misdemeanor violation of section 530.5
for unlawfully obtaining Robert’s personal identifying information and using
it for an unlawful purpose. She was also charged with a misdemeanor
violation of section 487, subdivision (a) for unlawfully taking $8,000 from
Robert.
      Case No. 16-SM-013908: On November 30, 2016, Sonya was charged
with another misdemeanor violation of section 166, subdivision (c)(1)
for being in contempt of court for violating the CPO.
      Case No. 17-SM-010509: On August 23, 2017, Sonya was charged with
two additional misdemeanor violations of section 166, subdivision (c)(1)
for being in contempt of court for violating the CPO.
      On November 27, 2017, the above four matters were resolved in
another negotiated disposition in which Sonya pled guilty to one contempt
charge (from Case No. 16-SM-13908) and the remaining charges were
dismissed. She was sentenced to 15 days in jail and three years of probation.
The court entered another three-year domestic violence CPO against her.
Request to Renew DVRO
      On June 5, 2019, Robert filed a request to renew and make permanent
the DVRO. Included in the request was a document listing a dozen alleged
violations of the DVRO and crimes committed by Sonya between December
2014 and March 2019. He also included a six-page statement entitled
“Reasons to Fear Future Abuse.” Sonya opposed the request to renew the

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DVRO on the basis that there was no objectively reasonable fear of future
abuse. The matter was originally scheduled to be heard in late June 2019
but delayed for nearly two and a half years for numerous reasons, including
the pandemic. The renewal hearing ultimately took place in November 2021
over the course of a four-day bench trial.
Robert’s Case
Judicial Notice
      The court took judicial notice of the DVRO and related orders, the
CPOs, and the court dockets for the above-described criminal proceedings.
Robert’s Testimony
      Robert testified that he, S., and J. had been granted a DVRO and four
CPOs since 2014 but he did not consider himself protected over that period.
Still, he wanted the DVRO renewed to protect the children because Sonya
was a “vengeful person and has not respected the restraining orders at all,
and it’s hurt both kids badly and continues to do so.” He counted
approximately a dozen violations of no contact orders by his ex-wife. For
example, she used third parties to give messages to S. and J., posted on
Facebook to reach out to them and their friends, and spread rumors. In
addition, Sonya stole his identity as well as $8,000. Around Christmas 2014,
when their break-up was starting, she went to the house and stole all the
presents from under the tree. In 2015, she pled no contest to contempt
charges for violating the protective orders which resulted in “grand theft,
identity theft” and “willful cruelty to a child” charges being dropped. In 2017,
there was another plea bargain in which she pled no contest to two charges of
violating the protective orders.
      Robert “[a]bsolutely” feared for himself if the restraining orders were
not renewed. On Facebook, she accused him of being physically violent to

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her, lying to the police and judges, and having a secret bank account in the
Cayman Islands. She physically abused him, too. In August 2007, for
example, Sonya became upset with him and started swinging around a
pewter trophy which struck him in the legs and caused cuts. In December
2013, during an argument in the kitchen, she got angry and punched him
between the legs and “grabbed [him] by the testicles and kept yanking [him]
around the island in the kitchen,” which caused extreme discomfort. In
November 2014, during an argument, she slapped him and kicked him in the
groin several times. This was the incident that led him to call the police and
resulted in her arrest. He noted that at the trial for the initial DVRO, Sonya
admitted to hitting him, grabbing his testicles, and dragging him around the
kitchen. He never fought back because he was “huge” and could hurt her.
      It was commonplace for Sonya to scream at him. She had episodic
“rages” in which she “would just scream and yell almost constantly,” which
impacted the children. When the children were little and came screaming
into a room, she often reacted without thinking and hit them. Over the
years, he saw her hit J. at least 10 times and she had also struck S., which
she denied at her first trial. When the children became teenagers and
started to push away, she became more violent with them. Several times,
Sonya said she would stop yelling and hitting the children, but these periods
were short. All the screaming, along with the episodes of violence,
constituted emotional abuse.
      To the best of Robert’s knowledge, Sonya never underwent the
psychological assessment ordered by the court. No such assessment was ever
provided to his attorneys or the court.
      Robert estimated that since restraining orders were issued in 2014,
Sonya had violated them roughly 20 times, which caused his “[s]tress level [to

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go] sky-high.” There was no peace and no sense of security at home. Her
violations interfered with his sleep, and his ensuing interactions with police
when reporting the violations were generally unpleasant since officers were
initially hostile to him. The violations interrupted his work and cost him
jobs. He could not plan his social or professional life. Further, sometimes
people approached him and asked him “crazy things” or became angry at him
for something Sonya wrote. When the violations involved S. and J., he tried
to protect them. But after a certain number of violations, they reached the
point where they did not want to go spend three to four hours with the police.
      Sonya’s violations of the restraining orders also affected the children.
The two lost friendships and received messages from friends accusing them of
mistreating their mother. Others were uncomfortable socializing with them
because of stories written by Sonya on Facebook. On Facebook, Sonya
inaccurately posted that S. and J. beat her, perjured themselves, and lied to
police and Family Court Services. She posted about their sexuality, their
son’s first erection, and the like. Other kids heard about the posts and
humorously confronted S. and J. about them, but they did not find the
comments funny.
      Several judges in open court had warned Sonya not to publish anything
online about the children. Sonya was also ordered to take down her Facebook
page which included all posts relating to him and the children. She had
agreed to this as part of their dissolution judgment. To Robert’s knowledge,
Sonya never took down her Facebook page after being served with the order
instructing her to do so in violation of that order. He referred to 26 items she
posted in the days following the takedown order, in which she referred to him
as a toad and commented on their sex life. In her posts, she accused him of
battering her, parental alienation, child abuse, and violence. In October

                                       7
2017, she took her Facebook page down for several hours or a day. However,
based on posts from July 2020, he understood that her Facebook page was
“absolutely active.” A November 2020 post included a picture of her and the
children. Her posts were humiliating to him because he knew 700 people,
including family and his friends and the children’s friends, could read them.
In social situations with people who are Sonya’s Facebook friends, he
constantly wondered what they had read about him and how they viewed
him.
       If there were no restraining order, Robert surmised that Sonya’s posts
would “go to the world” rather than just her private viewers, and she would
write anything about him and the children. This would scar his reputation
and continue to impact his social and professional life. He was also fearful of
continued harassment without a restraining order. He believed the
harassment, which had never stopped, would intensify. He feared Sonya
would appear at their home or wherever he was and disturb his peace or
destroy property.
       On cross-examination, Robert stated that the last time he saw Sonya
was in 2016 or 2017. He confirmed that he had no allegation of physical
abuse by her since 2015. Even though he had a black belt in taekwondo,
lifted weights, and was 280 pounds, he still considered her a physical threat.
He acknowledged their arguments in which he raised his voice and an
incident in which he punched a hole in the wall once in the mid-1990s for a
matter unrelated to Sonya. He denied ever shoving Sonya in a bathroom
incident which resulted in her hitting her head on the bathtub, as well as
other incidents.
       Robert also acknowledged monitoring Sonya’s social media accounts,
which included her Match.com account and public Facebook account, to know

                                       8
what she was publishing about him and the children. He often took screen
shots of her posts and printed them out. Her Match.com account profile
included pictures of her and the children when they were young. He had 500
to 600 pages of posts but did not know when a particular post went down, or
when the last time he saw a given post was.
S.’s Testimony
      S., age 22 at the time of trial, testified via Zoom. She feared Sonya and
was uncomfortable testifying in her presence since she had not previously
confronted her mother about her feelings. Based on experience, S. was also
concerned that her mother might misconstrue her testimony as an invitation
to contact her. S. wanted to make the restraining order permanent so that
she could move forward without having to continuously renew the DVRO and
deal with all the effort renewing entailed. The renewal process interfered
with S.’s healing and recovery, as it brought up many negative emotions,
fear, depression, and anxiety. She wanted a permanent order so that she no
longer had to interact with her mother again and to avoid being dragged back
to a bad place.
      Without the restraining order, S. worried her mother would find her
and she would not feel safe. S. declined to state where she was attending
college because she did not want Sonya to come after her or contact the
school. She was concerned for her own physical safety because she knew her
mother was capable of extreme violence and emotionally unstable. If her
mother were to find her and become upset, S. could readily imagine her
getting violent and hurting her.
      S. discussed various incidents of physical violence from the past. She
had been slapped and pushed by Sonya. When she was young, her mother
pushed her down the stairs. Sometimes when Sonya became upset with her

                                       9
in the car, she tried to push S. out of the car while driving. S. did not believe
her mother was ever concerned about her getting seriously injured during
these incidents. Another incident which led to the initial DVRO occurred in
December 2014, when Sonya was recording an argument they were having on
her laptop. Sonya momentarily turned off the recording, elbowed S. in the
face, and immediately resumed recording. When the police arrived, Sonya
denied hitting S.
      Sonya called the police all the time when she was upset and used the
police to make S. and her brother afraid. In one incident, Sonya called the
police, and told officers S. was making her feel unsafe. Her mother left the
house, and S., then 14 years old, was left to talk to the responding officers.
      Sonya also sometimes took away her and her brother’s devices when
their father went on business trips, as she did not want them to report her
being violent or fighting. Sonya also did not tell them when he called either.
Sonya yelled at her all the time. S. also witnessed her mother hit her father
many times.
      Because of her mother’s abuse, S. developed PTSD and frequently had
nightmares. S. suffered from eating disorders, which she attributed to her
mother telling her she needed to lose weight. On occasion, Sonya prepared
separate meals for S. because as a woman, S. burned fewer calories than her
father and brother during the day. S. has been in therapy since she was 16
years old. When they were living together, S. was severely depressed and
suicidal, but things have gotten better since her mother moved out.
      There were many instances her mother violated the DVRO. On one
occasion, Sonya came to one of S.’s theater performances wearing a wig and
sunglasses. Another time when S. was still in high school, Sonya sent letters
to all her teachers pushing for S. to attend a certain college. The idea that

                                       10
her mother somehow found all her teachers and knew all her classes scared
her.
       S. maintained her belief that Sonya was emotionally unstable and
unable to control her emotions. Her mother lashed out when upset and was
incapable of abiding by the DVRO. Asked if she would be fearful of abuse by
mother if the DVRO was not renewed, S. responded: “Yes, I am. She still --
you know, she hasn’t ever taken accountability for abusing me. You know, I
think she still thinks that this is unjust and that, you know, she deserves to
have a relationship with me. And so if she still believes that, I don’t think
she’s capable of changing.” S. later added that this view was shaped by
Sonya’s Facebook posts in which she discussed everything being her father’s
fault, and never took personal responsibility for her own actions. She
remained concerned that her mother would harass and stalk her and disturb
her emotional peace. Having the restraining order permanently in place
would make her feel a lot safer.
       Finally, S. rejected the notion that her father convinced her to seek the
renewal. As an adult who had been living on her own for a while, she could
make the decision on her own and had done so.
       On cross-examination, S. acknowledged that the last time her mother
was physically violent with her was the elbowing incident in 2014 and that
she alleged no violence since that date. The incident S. described of Sonya
pushing her down the stairs was in 2010 or 2011. Her mother sent letters to
her high school teachers in December 2017. The last time they engaged in a
conversation was in 2016 over Facebook. The last time they interacted was
in April 2020, when her mother drove by her as she was walking with a
friend. Sonya only called out S.’s name and then kept driving. After that
encounter, S. did not see her mother again that day.

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J.’s Testimony
      J., age 19 at trial, also testified via Zoom and stated that he too wanted
the DVRO renewed and believed it was a good security measure, especially
for his sister. He recounted episodes of domestic violence he experienced as a
child. It was primarily emotional abuse, which also manifested itself as
physical abuse on many occasions. The family home was a “a hostile
environment, with a lot of yelling and grabbing and things like that.” Sonya
yelled at him. She dragged him down the stairs, pushed him out of a moving
vehicle, and withheld food from him if she were upset. Sonya locked him
outside of the house for punishment. Once during an argument they had
while in the car, she parked and left, and J. ran three miles home. She called
him lazy and slow. J. did not feel safe with her.
      There were times when Sonya violated the current DVRO. Once, he
was at his friend’s house, and Sonya appeared in the window. J., who
recorded this incident, did not let her in the house and returned home with
his friend. More recently, Sonya showed up at the house of another friend of
his, creating a very awkward situation for his friend. Sonya’s violations of
the DVRO made him feel uncomfortable. With certain friends he trusted, he
could be open about his family situation, but for others he did not know well
who knew about his family problems, it was difficult.
      If there were no restraining order, J. believed his mother would have no
repercussions for her continued harassment. As in 2015 when the DVRO was
first issued, he continued to feel Sonya was dangerous and disliked her for
being terrible to the family or such a long time. He still had no desire to talk
to his mother. The thought of seeing her in public or of her being aware of his
whereabouts caused him anxiety. J. did not trust his mother to act rationally
or be level minded. To him, his mother lashed out in ways destructive to

                                       12
others quite often. While he would be fine if his sister wanted a relationship
with their mother, he did not want one.
      On cross-examination, J. stated that the last time his mother hit him
was probably before December 2014. The incident in which he was dragged
down the stairs took place in middle school. The incident where Sonya
appeared in the window of his friend’s house also happened when he was in
middle school. The incident in which Sonya tried to push him out of a car took
place when he was 5 years old. He last spoke to his mother before the DVRO
was issued, around December 2014. He was 12 or 13 years old when he last
saw her.
Sonya’s Testimony
      Robert’s counsel called Sonya to testify as an adverse witness. She
denied ever having been convicted of criminal contempt for violating
restraining orders though she acknowledged having pled no contest to four
charges on the advice of her lawyers. She had wanted to go to trial on the
charges, but her lawyer was not prepared and had not worked up a brief. She
felt forced to enter a no contest plea. She did not remember the court’s 15-
day jail sentence and noted she did community service. She denied ever
hitting S. in the face in December 2014. She did not remember ever hitting J.
Nor did she have any memory of anything that happened in the trial leading
up to the initial DVRO.
      Sonya did not remember agreeing to take down her Facebook page and
stop posting about the children as part of an overall settlement. She
acknowledged posting on Facebook since December 2017 a piece on the
pandemic and another one on a concert she attended when she thought the
order was expired.

                                      13
        Sonya also did not recall any court order requiring her to undergo a
psychological assessment. However, she acknowledged that her lawyer
arranged for the assessment to be done with a doctor in Hawaii. She
assumed her attorney provided Family Court Services with whatever report
was required.
Sonya J.’s Case
Sonya’s Testimony
        At the time of her testimony, Sonya had been restricted from contact
with S. and J. for nearly 7 years. This was a difficult period for her, as she
worried about their wellbeing and believed it was important for adult
children to have contact with both parents. She always loved S. and J. and
believed no one could ever love them more than she loved them. She wanted
them to know that she cared for them and that her door was always open to
them.
        Sonya hoped to mend her relationship with S. and J. If the restraining
order were lifted, she would want to contact them but would defer to them to
reach out to her if and when ready. Facebook provided a space where they
could message her at any time. If they made such contact, she would follow
their lead. She would offer to engage in reunification therapy with a
psychologist if they wanted that, or just have a coffee if that is all they
wanted. She understood S. and J. were now adults able to make their own
decisions about whether to contact her. She recognized the process to mend
their relationships would be long and not easy.
        During her 20-year marriage with Robert, he threatened her hundreds
of times. He told her she would lose him, the house, the children, and her
life. He said she would never see the children again. He told her he would
kill or destroy her, but she never took these statements seriously and

                                        14
believed he was just angry. She described one incident in which Robert
threw her into a bathtub, causing her to hit her head on the granite and
injuring her.
      Sonya avoided people who know Robert. She no longer attended her
neighborhood book club because two members sided with Robert. She no
longer attended services at the Mormon church because she had been
recorded there twice and felt one person there believed irrational things
about her. These spaces made her feel uncomfortable, and she did not want
any of her actions misconstrued or to be used against her in the future.
      On Facebook, Sonya expressed her thoughts on a wide variety of topics:
religion, literature, the environment, politics. She had been very active on
Facebook, especially to keep in touch with friends who, like her, were
educated abroad and scattered all over the world. Her posts included
messages with many international friends, including some who have since
passed away.
      Asked if she removed the posts that she was ordered to remove from
Facebook, she replied, “Yes, I did.” She figured that if the court order
directed her to remove her posts by November 8, 2017, she did it before that
date. She explained that she went to Facebook headquarters and asked for
help to take the posts down in a way that she did not lose them forever.
When Facebook staff asked if she wanted to have her posts archived, she
agreed. She assumed the archive exists and believed she had access to it but
would need technical help from Facebook, as she had not made any effort to
retrieve the posts in the last 5 years. She had no plans to make the posts she
removed publicly available, but it was important for her to keep the archive
because it included messages with friends.

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      Sonya started therapy at the end of her marriage. Since then, she had
been in therapy weekly. She took medication for anxiety. In the past, she
participated in numerous psychological evaluations. Whenever her attorneys
wanted her to see someone, she did so.
      On cross-examination, Sonya acknowledged posting to Facebook
regarding the pandemic (within the last three years). When asked whether it
was correct that the court order required her to take down her Facebook page
immediately and to not post on social media about Robert and the children,
she stated she did not know that. Counsel attempted to impeach Sonya with
a Facebook post in which she wrote: “[I]n court on Monday the ex moved to
muzzle me on Facebook. He had my piece on “mercy fucks” that I had posted
THE DAY BEFORE all ready to show the judge. The ex isn’t my friend on
Facebook and neither are our children. . . .” She agreed that she posted a
statement stating that Robert wanted to shut her down on Facebook and that
she had been ordered to take down her account and needed help to do so.
Sonya understood the order to mean that she was to take down her posts by a
certain date or be in contempt of court. She had no idea whether her
psychological evaluations were ever provided to the court or opposing counsel,
repeating that she followed her attorneys’ instructions and that her attorneys
should have provided them if required.
Michael A.
      Michael A., who befriended Sonya in a divorce support group, testified
in her support. In 2016, Sonya asked him to accompany her to a play in
which S. was performing, and he agreed. At the theater, they sat as far back
as possible. Sonya never approached S., nor did she try to get her daughter’s
attention. At the conclusion of the performance, when the actors dispersed
into the audience to collect donations, S. approached her mother and gave her

                                      16
a big hug. After they embraced for a minute, S. told Sonya she loved her, and
she had to go. Sonya did not try to stop S. or say anything further to her.
Expert Witnesses Testimony
      Dr. Harlan Watkins, a physician qualified by the court as an expert on
PTSD and anxiety disorder, testified about the forensic medical evaluation he
conducted on Sonya. He opined that Sonya’s primary psychiatric diagnosis
was anxiety reaction due to family separation and that she also suffered from
PTSD. But she was improving due to a variety of factors, including her
divorce, work, medication, and a new relationship.
      Dr. Robert Simon, designated by the court as an expert in forensic
psychology, testified as a rebuttal witness. He expressed serious concern that
Dr. Watkins was not a specialist in anxiety disorders. Dr. Simon was also
skeptical of Sonya’s PTSD diagnosis as the screening device used by Dr.
Watkins to diagnose her PTSD was not designed for that purpose. He further
noted that even if PTSD were properly diagnosed, Dr. Watkins could not
know independently what caused it since he did not witness the events
between Sonya and Robert and was unaware of other events in Sonya’s life
that could have triggered trauma.
The Trial Court’s Findings and Conclusions
      On November 18, 2021, the court issued its order granting renewal of
the DVRO and explained its ruling. After reviewing the applicable law, the
court stated that it found S. and J. to be credible witnesses. On the other
hand, the court found Sonya evasive and not credible: “I believe that she
lacks insight as to the impact that her behavior actually has upon her
children. I do believe . . . that people can change. Perhaps there has been
some change in [Sonya], but based upon her testimony, I do not believe that it
is so significant that the emotional abuse that she inflicted has stopped or

                                      17
would stop if this restraining order was not re-issued.” The court further
noted that no evidence was offered to the court that Sonya had been in
therapy for years and on medication, or whether she had complied with the
prior court’s order for psychotherapy years ago. The court gave little weight
to the testimony offered by Dr. Watkins.
      The court further explained that the “repeated violations that
amounted to multiple criminal cases being filed, some of which were
dismissed as a part of plea negotiation, which is customary, but that also
resulted in criminal protective orders being filed, shows this Court that the
apprehension that the abuse . . . . [t]he emotional abuse” will continue “has
been clearly established.” The court further found that “based upon the
testimony and the evidence that the reasonableness that it would continue if
a restraining order was not issued has clearly been demonstrated.”
      The court elected to extend the DVRO for five years until November 17,
2026. In reaching this term, the court wondered if Sonya would ever be able
to repair her relationship with her children and advised: “[U]ntil you get
some insight into how even just posting pictures of them to garner sympathy
for yourself which then result in mutual friends and family putting them in a
position of having to defend why they don’t want to have a relationship with
you is emotional abuse. Until you start to understand that you need to be
silent on social media when it comes to them, when it comes to their father,
you will get nowhere. I guarantee it.” The court added that when her
children are independent, it will be up to them do decide whether they want
to try to repair their relationship with their mother.
      After noting that the reissued DVRO “will include all the provisions . . .
that were granted in the last four-year, an extended order,” the court
addressed the portion of the DVRO requiring Sonya to take down her

                                       18
Facebook page and narrowed the scope of the restriction. The court stated:
“In regards to the argument about Facebook and the new case [Molinaro v.
Molinaro (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 824] that blanket order to take down
Facebook is an unconstitutional prohibition on first amendment rights, I
would concede . . . that I believe that that law is good law.”3 The court thus
narrowed the social media restriction in its order as follows: “[Y]ou are to
cease and desist from any posting of anything that either is remotely related
to your children to refuse/resist childhood – or parental alienation – anything
that demeans or belittles their father whether you are intending to refer to
him or leaving it up to the readers’ imagination if ‘He is a mercy fuck.’ None
of that will be posted on your Facebook. If you violate that, the Court will,
again, order you to take down your entire page.” The court asked Robert’s
counsel to prepare the reissuance and informed the parties its oral ruling
constituted its statement of decision.
      A month later, in December 2021, the reissued form DV-130
Restraining Order After Hearing (“December 2021 DV-130 Order” or “DV-130
Order”) was filed. In item 23 – “Other Orders” – the social media restriction
appeared as follows: “[Sonya] shall immediately take down from the Internet
and social media any and all photos of the protected parties; and cease and
desist from posting any photos, descriptions, references, or allusions to any of
them for the duration of the protective order. [Sonya] will also cease and
desist from posting anything directly or indirectly mentioning child/parental

3      In closing argument, Sonya’s counsel argued that under Molinaro v.
Molinaro (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 824 – a case decided after she was ordered to
take down her Facebook page – broad prohibitions on social media activity
peripherally related to a divorce constituted an unconstitutional prior
restraint on free speech. Under this recent case law, Sonya contended the
social media restriction that had been imposed upon her in the amended
DVRO was unconstitutional and specifically requested that it not be renewed.

                                         19
alienation as well as anything about Robert, including but not limited to that
which may be immediately or remotely interpreted as demeaning or belittling
to him.”
      On May 11, 2022, the statement of decision was filed. Tracking the
court’s oral ruling with some modifications, the statement provided: “In
regards to [Sonya’s] counsel’s argument and the recent holding of Molinaro v.
Molinaro (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 824 that blanket orders to take down
Facebook [are] an unconstitutional prohibition on First Amendment rights,
the Court agrees with counsel that that law is good law. The Court, however,
may narrowly tailor its order and does so as follows: [Sonya] is ordered to
cease and desist from any posting of anything that either is remotely related
to the children, to resist/refuse childhood, parental alienation or anything
that demeans or belittles their father whether [Sonya] is intending to refer to
him directly or leaving it up to the readers’ imagination if he is the subject of
her post – for example the “mercy f*ck” to which she is referring. [Sonya]
shall not post any of these things. If [Sonya] violates that order, the Court
will again order her to take down her entire page.” Item 23 of the DV-130
Order was not modified following the statement of decision.
      Sonya objected to the renewed DVRO and now appeals it.
                                  DISCUSSION
I.    Robert’s Motion to Dismiss
      We first address Robert’s motion to dismiss Sonya’s appeal. He argues
the appeal must be dismissed because of Sonya’s “failure to provide anything
even resembling an adequate record and for her failure to properly
summarize the evidence supporting the [DVRO].” He echoes these
contentions in his Respondent’s Brief, adding that if the appeal is not
dismissed, we should conclude Sonya has waived any contention she makes

                                       20
regarding the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the trial court’s
findings. We decline to dismiss the appeal.
      Robert is correct that the burden is on the appellant to provide an
adequate record on appeal to assess error. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24
Cal.4th 1122, 1140–1141.) “ ‘Failure to provide an adequate record on an
issue requires that the issue be resolved against [appellant].’ ” (Foust v. San
Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 187 (Foust).)
      Here, Sonya provided a 228-page appendix, which includes the original
DVRO (2015), the modified DVRO (2017), Robert’s petition to renew the
DVRO (2019), the parties’ trial briefs, and the court’s statement of decision.
Sonya also provided an approximately 400-page reporter’s transcript
consisting of all four days of trial testimony during the renewal hearing.
Robert augmented it with his own 3,887-page appendix. Because we have a
complete record that enables us to address the issues Sonya raises on appeal,
we are disinclined to dismiss the appeal.
      We note that even without Robert’s augmented record, we would not
dismiss the appeal. Robert has cited no authority indicating that dismissing
an appeal is the proper remedy for an inadequate record. For instance, in
Foust, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th 181, the appellant’s failure to provide a
reporter’s transcript or other statement of the evidence resulted in the issue
being decided against the appellant and affirmance of the trial court decision.
(Id. at p. 187.) In Bel Air Internet, LLC v. Morales (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 924,
the court expressly concluded the appellants did not forfeit their appeal by
failing to provide the reporter’s transcript because the issue on appeal was
reviewed de novo and the available record included all the materials germane
to the ruling under review. (Id. at p. 933.) None of the other cases cited by
Robert involved the dismissal of an appeal due to an inadequate record.

                                       21
      In addition, one of Sonya’s primary contentions is whether the renewed
DVRO constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech, for which
our review is de novo. (Berry v. City of Santa Barbara (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th
1075, 1082.) Robert makes no showing as to how any of the purportedly
dozens of “pertinent records that [Sonya] failed to include” bears on our
review of this issue. For these reasons, we decline to dismiss Sonya’s appeal
due to an inadequate record.
      Robert is also correct that it is an appellant’s duty to set forth all the
evidence on which the trial court relied in granting the DVRO. California
Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C), states that an appellant’s opening brief
must “[p]rovide a summary of the significant facts limited to matters in the
record.” (Cal. Rule Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C).) “[A]n appellant has a duty to
summarize the facts fairly in light of the judgment.” (Ajaxo Inc. v. E*Trade
Group Inc. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 21, 50.) An appellant’s one-sided
recitation of the facts risks forfeiture of her claims. (Foreman & Clark Corp.
v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881 (Foreman & Clark).)
      Here, we agree that Sonya’s summary of significant facts in her
appellate briefs is incomplete and unrepresentative. For instance, the
statement of facts in her opening brief makes no reference to the substance of
the children’s testimony, nor does it reference any of the criminal complaints
filed against her, the criminal protective orders issued against her, or the
negotiated dispositions she entered, and which were pivotal to court’s
renewal order. Most of the evidence she cites to in her statement of facts is
her own testimony.
      Even if we again assume such a skewed summary of significant facts
constitutes a violation of rule 8.204(a)(2)(C), Robert has not provided any
authority supporting his view that the penalty for such a violation is

                                        22
dismissal of the appeal. Rule 8.204 does not authorize us to dismiss an
appeal for violating its terms. (See generally Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.204(e).) For a filed brief, noncompliance with the rule to provide a fair
summary of the facts authorizes us to order the brief returned for corrections
and refiling within a specified time, or to strike the brief with leave to file a
new brief within a specified time. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(e).) We did
neither. Such orders would have been unnecessary since we can deem any
contentions not supported as waived. (See Toigo v. Town of Ross (1998) 70
Cal.App.4th 309, 317 (Toigo) [“ ‘When appellants challenge the sufficiency of
the evidence, all material evidence on the point must be set forth and not
merely their own evidence. [Citation.] Failure to do so amounts to waiver of
the alleged error and we may presume that the record contains evidence to
sustain every finding of fact.’ ”]; Foreman & Clark, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 881.)
      For these reasons, Sonya’s presentation of the facts of the case, albeit
one-sided and incomplete, does not provide grounds for dismissal of her
appeal, and we proceed to the merits of her claims.
II.   Sonya’s Contentions on Appeal
      A.    Reasonable Apprehension of Future Abuse for DVRO
            Renewal
      Sonya argues the trial court abused its discretion in renewing the
DVRO for another five years because the order was not supported by
substantial evidence. We disagree.
            1.     Applicable Law
      The purposes of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act “are to prevent
acts of domestic violence, abuse and sexual abuse and to provide for a
separation of the persons involved in the domestic violence for a period
sufficient to enable these persons to seek a resolution of the causes of the

                                        23
violence.” (Fam. Code, § 6220.) Family Code section 6345, which governs
renewal of a DVRO, provides that such an order “may be renewed, upon the
request of a party, either for five or more years, or permanently, at the
discretion of the court, without a showing of further abuse since the issuance
of the original order . . . subject to termination [or] modification . . . by further
order of the court either on written stipulation filed with the court or on the
motion of a party.” (Id., § 6345, subd. (a).)
      The legal standard for renewal of a DVRO is whether the protected
party entertains a reasonable apprehension of future abuse. (Ritchie v.
Konrad (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1290 (Ritchie).) “[T]his does not mean
the court must find it is more likely than not future abuse will occur if the
protective order is not renewed. It only means the evidence demonstrates it
is more probable than not there is a sufficient risk of future abuse to find the
protected party’s apprehension is genuine and reasonable.” (Ibid.) An
imminent and present danger of abuse is not required; there must only be a
reasonable apprehension that “abuse will occur at some time in the future if
the protective order is allowed to expire.” (Id. at p. 1288.)
      Ritchie explained this standard sets an objective test for renewal of a
DVRO: “It is not enough [the requesting] party entertain[s] a subjective fear
the party to be restrained will commit abusive acts in the future. The
‘apprehension’ those acts will occur must be ‘reasonable.’ That is, the court
must find the probability of future abuse is sufficient that a reasonable
woman (or man, if the protected party is a male) in the same circumstances
would have a ‘reasonable apprehension’ such abuse will occur unless the
court issues a protective order.” (Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1288.)
      Ritchie further noted it is “unnecessary for the protected party to
introduce or the court to consider actual acts of abuse the restrained party

                                         24
committed after the original order went into effect. It would be anomalous to
require the protected party to prove further abuse occurred in order to justify
renewal of that original order. If this were the standard, the protected party
would have to demonstrate the initial order had proved ineffectual in halting
the restrained party's abusive conduct just to obtain an extension of that
ineffectual order. Indeed the fact a protective order has proved effective is a
good reason for seeking its renewal.” (Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p.
1284.)
      Nor is it necessary for the protected party to show reasonable
apprehension of future physical abuse. (Eneaji v. Ubboe (2014) 229
Cal.App.4th 1457, 1463 (Eneaji).) The Domestic Violence Protection Act
defines “abuse” broadly to include any behavior that could be enjoined under
section 6320, such as harassing or disturbing the peace of the other party.
(Fam. Code, § 6203, subd. (a); In re Marriage of Brubaker & Strum (2021) 73
Cal.App.5th 525, 536.) This definition encompasses “a multitude of
behaviors” that “[do] not involve any physical injury or assaultive acts.”
(Eneaji, at p. 1464.)
      In evaluating whether the requesting party has a reasonable
apprehension of future abuse, the trial court ordinarily considers the
evidence and findings on which the initial DVRO was based. (Ritchie, supra,
115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1291 [“[T]he underlying findings and facts supporting
that order often will be enough in themselves to provide the necessary proof
to satisfy that test.”].) “Also potentially relevant are any significant changes
in the circumstances surrounding the events justifying the initial protective
order. For instance, have the restrained and protected parties moved on with
their lives so far that the opportunity and likelihood of future abuse has
diminished to the degree they no longer support a renewal of the order?”

                                       25
(Ibid.) “Also relevant are the seriousness and degree of risk, such as whether
it involves potential physical abuse, and the burdens the protective order
imposes on the restrained person, such as interference with job
opportunities.” (Lister v. Bowen (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 319, 333 (Lister).)
      The trial court’s ruling on a request to renew a domestic violence
prevention restraining order is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (Lister,
supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 333; Rybolt v. Riley (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 864,
874–875 (Rybolt).) In considering the evidence supporting a DVRO, “ ‘the
reviewing court must apply the “substantial evidence standard of review,”
meaning “ ‘whether, on the entire record, there is any substantial evidence,
contradicted or uncontradicted,’ supporting the trial court’s finding.
[Citation.] ‘We must accept as true all evidence . . . tending to establish the
correctness of the trial court’s findings . . . , resolving every conflict in favor of
the judgment.’ ” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Evilsizor & Sweeney (2015) 237
Cal.App.4th 1416, 1424.)
             2.    Analysis
      As an initial matter, for her unrepresentative presentation of the trial
court record as described above, we conclude Sonya has waived her
contentions challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. (See Toigo,
supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 317.) We nevertheless discuss the evidence
supporting the trial court’s decision to renew the DVRO to demonstrate the
court’s decision was amply supported and it did not abuse its discretion in
renewing.
      Based on the standard elaborated in Ritchie and its progeny, there was
substantial evidence that Robert, S., and J. maintained a reasonable
apprehension of future abuse by Sonya. Collectively, they presented Sonya’s
history of verbal, emotional, and physical abuse towards them before the

                                         26
initial DVRO was issued. The extensive record is replete with evidence of
such abuse, and we just cite a few examples. In addition to submitting the
original DVRO as evidence, Robert described one incident in which Sonya
“grabbed [him] by the testicles” and “yank[ed] him around” and another
incident in which Sonya slapped him and kicked him in the groin prior. S.
recounted the incident which resulted in the initial DVRO in which her
mother elbowed her in the face during an argument, and deliberately
excluded the incident from the video she was recording of their dispute. J.
stated generally that his mother lashed out against others in a destructive
matter and made their family home a hostile environment. The initial DVRO
and the reasons for it supported renewal. (See Lister, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th
at p. 333 [“In evaluating whether the requesting party has a reasonable
apprehension of future abuse, ‘the existence of the initial order certainly is
relevant and the underlying findings and facts supporting that order often
will be enough in themselves to provide the necessary to satisfy that test.’ ”].)
      There was also ample evidence that Sonya routinely violated the
DVRO, as the trial court found. There were multiple criminal complaints
charging Sonya with contempt for violating the DVRO or other criminal
protective orders that had been issued against her. Sonya pled no contest to
at least three of these contempt charges as part of negotiated dispositions to
resolve other, more serious criminal charges pending against her for her
behavior towards Robert. Beyond these violations which resulted in criminal
charges, each family member testified to additional violations of the DVRO
on multiple occasions. These violations of the existing DVRO and protective
orders further supported the court’s renewal order. (See Lister, supra, 215
Cal.App.4th at p. 335 [“It almost goes without saying that any violation of a
restraining order is very serious, and gives very significant support for

                                       27
renewal of a restraining order.”]; see also Rybolt, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p.
876.) This evidence was adequate to establish a reasonable apprehension of
future abuse in support of the DVRO’s renewal.
      Sonya argues that her behavior since 2017 has not been abusive,
threatening or harassing. She claims the “evidence presented at trial . . .
does not come close to meeting the objective test that [she] did anything to
cause a reasonable person to have ‘reasonable apprehension of future
abuse.’ ” While acknowledging her violations of the DVRO or other protective
orders, she contends such violations were based on “minimal and non-
threatening conduct.” In her view, Robert presented no evidence showing her
conduct since 2017 would cause anyone to be fearful of abuse.
      These arguments do not undermine the renewal order. Sonya offers no
explanation as to why only her behavior post-2017 matters. As noted, a trial
court ruling on a renewal request should consider evidence and findings on
which the original DVRO was based, which is often sufficient to support a
renewal. (Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1290–1291.) Moreover, a
showing of recent abuse is not required to demonstrate a reasonable
apprehension of future abuse. (Eneaji, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 1464.) In
addition, Sonya’s efforts to minimize her violations of the DVRO or CPOs or
to characterize her actions underlying those violations as non-abusive and
non-threatening are unavailing. These arguments appear to seek to
relitigate the evidence, but we are required to defer to the court’s credibility
determinations and make all reasonable inferences in support of the court’s
findings. (In re Marriage of Martindale & Ochoa (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 54,
61.) The court found Sonya was not credible, and we defer to that
determination. (Ibid.) These arguments in any event simply disregard the
fact that the violations alone – many which resulted in criminal contempt

                                       28
charges to which she pled no contest – are sufficient to support the renewal
order. (Lister, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 335.)
      Sonya also contends that the court erred because it did not consider the
impact the restraining order would have on her. She cites her participation
in book club and attendance at the Mormon church as activities impacted by
the restraining order. More importantly, she explains that her relationship
with S. and J. has suffered and posits that cutting off all of her
communications with them could harm them. She further laments that
unless reversed, the reissued order will prevent any possibility of reconciling
with her children through November 17, 2026.4
      We are not persuaded by these arguments either. There was no
evidence that Robert or the children were book club participants or regular
churchgoers, such that Sonya’s participation in these activities were
impacted by the renewed DVRO. While Sonya’s concerns about the burden
the renewed DVRO places on her ability to try to reconcile with her children
appear to be more genuine, we have no basis to conclude the court did not
consider this in making its ruling. In conveying its ruling, the trial court
cited to Ritchie as the proper legal standard, so “[w]e presume the trial court
knew and properly applied the law absent evidence to the contrary.”
(McDermott Will & Emery LLP v. Superior Court (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1083,

4      In asserting these arguments, Sonya suggests certain testimony she
sought to introduce from a Dr. Robert Kaufman should have been considered
by the court. She asserts that “the court’s decision not to allow Dr. Kaufman
to testify about considering alternatives to a restraining order” was
“improper.” To the extent these statements seek to challenge the court’s
evidentiary ruling, such arguments have been waived. (Brown v. El Dorado
Union High School Dist. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1003, 1022 [“ ‘ “[E]very brief
should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points
made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as
waived, and pass it without consideration.” ’ ”].)

                                       29
1103). This includes consideration of the burdens on the restrained party if
subjected to a continuing protective order. (Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 1283, 1292.) We also presume the trial court considered these burdens
on Sonya because when issuing its ruling, her admonishment to Sonya
specifically invoked the court’s uncertainty as to Sonya’s ability to repair her
relationship with her children, noting it would be up to them when they were
truly independent adults. Finally, the court did not grant the permanent
DVRO Robert requested and limited the duration of the renewed order to five
years. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude the court failed to
consider the burden of the renewed DVRO on Sonya.
      In sum, the trial court was within its discretion to conclude that the
totality of the evidence indicated it was more probable than not there was a
sufficient risk of future abuse to find that Robert’s and the children’s
apprehension was genuine and reasonable. The court did not err in renewing
the restraining order.
      B.    Constitutionality of Restrictions in Item 23 of DV-130
            Order
      Sonya also contends the DVRO violated her constitutional rights
because it is a prior restraint that prevents her from exercising her free
speech rights. Specifically, she targets as unconstitutional the social media
restrictions set forth in item 23 in the December 2021 DV-130 Order and
requests they be stricken.5

5      We issued pre-oral argument focus questions asking the parties to
address the differences between the social media and internet restrictions set
forth in item 23 of the DV-130 Order and the court’s statements regarding
those restrictions delivered orally at the November 18, 2021, hearing and in
the May 11, 2022, written statement of decision. (See ante.) We asked
whether the language in item 23 in the DV-130 Order should be modified
based on these other statements and whether such a modification would be

                                       30
      Sonya’s constitutional arguments attack item 23 primarily as an
overbroad prior restraint on speech. We do not address these contentions
since we conclude item 23 is unreasonably vague and shall remand to the
trial court to modify on this basis.
      A restraining order is unconstitutionally vague when the order does not
clearly define the conduct prohibited. (Evans v. Evans (2008) 162
Cal.App.4th 1157, 1167.) “ ‘An injunction must be narrowly drawn to give the
party enjoined reasonable notice of what conduct is prohibited.’ [Citation.] It
‘must be sufficiently precise to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair
notice that her contemplated conduct is forbidden.’ ” (Midway Venture LLC v.
County of San Diego (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 58, 92.) “ ‘An injunction which
forbids an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application exceeds the
power of the court.’ ” (People ex rel. Gascon v. HomeAdvisor, Inc. (2020) 49
Cal.App.5th 1073, 1082.) Whether a restraining order infringes upon the
constitutional rights of the restrained party because it is vague presents a
question of law subject to de novo review. (Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248
Cal.App.4th 484, 497.)
      While it is abundantly clear and there is no dispute that the court did
not intend to impose a blanket prohibition of Sonya’s use of Facebook or other
social media with the item 23 restrictions, the specific scope of those
restrictions is unreasonably vague. As noted, item 23 states: “[Sonya] shall
immediately take down from the Internet and social media any and all photos

unconstitutionally vague or overbroad or a prior restraint. No party provided
any authority for modifying item 23 of the DV-130 Order to reflect the
versions of the restriction as stated orally or in the statement of decision.
Therefore, we address Sonya’s constitutional arguments against the existing
language in item 23 of the DV-130 Order.

                                       31
of the protected parties; and cease and desist from posting any photos,
descriptions, references, or allusions to any of them for the duration of the
protective order. [Sonya] will also cease and desist from posting anything
directly or indirectly mentioning child/parental alienation as well as anything
about Robert, including but not limited to that which may be immediately or
remotely interpreted as demeaning or belittling to him.”
      Under this language, Sonya risks violating the DVRO by posting
anything “directly or indirectly mentioning child/parental alienation,” but
what is meant by “child/parental alienation” is not explained, and not
reasonably understood. Nor is it clear whether the restriction enjoins Sonya
from writing about this topic as a general matter (which may raise
overbreadth concerns) or specifically with respect to her children. The scope
of the restrictions with respect to social media posts involving Robert and the
children is also unclear. Specifically, it is not clear whether Sonya is enjoined
from posting about them generally (which again may raise overbreadth
concerns) or whether her posts about them are limited to those that would be
demeaning, belittling, or otherwise abusive under the Domestic Violence
Prevention Act (see Fam. Code, §§ 6203, 6320.) Because a reasonable person
must necessarily guess at the meaning of item 23, it cannot stand as written.6
      Having concluded that item 23 is unreasonably vague, we do not reach
Sonya’s other arguments, including whether the restriction is an

6
      The clarity of item 23 is further undermined by the two other
variations of the social media restrictions which were stated orally and
memorialized in the statement of decision. For example, in those rulings,
prohibited posts about the children appear to be limited to anything related
to the children “to refuse/resist childhood.” Likewise, in those rulings,
restricted posts about Robert appear to be limited to those that belittle or
demean him, which appears appropriately narrower than the broad
formulation in item 23.

                                       32
unconstitutional prior restraint, because the trial court will presumably
revisit the scope of the restriction on remand.
                                 DISPOSITION
      The matter is remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of
modifying item 23 in the DV-130 order consistent with views expressed in
this opinion. In all other respects, the renewed DVRO is affirmed. The
parties are to bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.278(a)(5).)

                                       33
                                 _________________________
                                 Petrou, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Tucher, P.J.

_________________________
Rodríguez, J.

                            34