Court Opinion

ID: 9953057
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-21 15:02:10.018269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:45:37.615140
License: Public Domain

22-6367
    Fu v. Garland
                                                                                    BIA
                                                                              Nelson, IJ
                                                                            A206 085 920

                         UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                              SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

          At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
    Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
    Square, in the City of New York, on the 21st day of March, two thousand
    twenty-four.

    PRESENT:
                    RICHARD C. WESLEY,
                    GERARD E. LYNCH,
                    BETH ROBINSON,
                     Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________

    YE GUANG FU,
            Petitioner,

                    v.                                            22-6367
                                                                  NAC
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
    STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
               Respondent.
    _____________________________________

    FOR PETITIONER:                      Joshua Bardavid, Esq., New York, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT:                      Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
                                     Attorney General; Brianne Whelan Cohen,
                                     Senior Litigation Counsel; Lindsay Corliss,
                                     Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration
                                     Litigation, United States Department of
                                     Justice, Washington, DC.

      UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

      Petitioner Ye Guang Fu, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of

China, seeks review of a June 28, 2022 decision of the BIA affirming a June 5, 2018

decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum,

withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

(“CAT”). In re Ye Guang Fu, No. A206 085 920 (B.I.A. June 28, 2022), aff’g No. A206

085 920 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. June 5, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with

the underlying facts and procedural history.

      We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan

Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). We review adverse credibility

determinations “under the substantial evidence standard,” Hong Fei Gao v.

Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018), and “the administrative findings of fact are

conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to
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the contrary,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

      “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a

trier of fact may base a credibility determination on . . . the consistency between

the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements (whenever made and

whether or not under oath, and considering the circumstances under which the

statements were made), the internal consistency of each such statement, the

consistency of such statements with other evidence of record . . . , and any

inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without regard to whether an

inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim,

or any other relevant factor.” Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s

credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain

that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.”

Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891

F.3d at 76.

      Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility determination.

Fu testified before the IJ that he was arrested, detained, interrogated, and beaten

for attending an underground church in China and that his wife had to pay a fine

to secure Fu’s release from prison. But Fu’s testimony was inconsistent with the

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statements given at his credible fear interview at least with respect to who paid

the fine, whether he knew the amount of the fine when it was paid, and whether

he knew the full name of Jing Guang Chen, the individual who introduced him to

Christianity. In addition, during his credible fear interview, Fu entirely omitted

the allegation that he was beaten by police during his alleged interrogation, even

when the asylum officer conducting the interview asked him multiple times to

explain “anything” that happened during the interrogation.

      Fu attempted to explain many of these inconsistencies and omissions by

testifying that he was confused and nervous during the credible fear interview.

But “[a] petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation for his

inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable

fact-finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” Majidi v. Gonzales, 430

F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Zhou Yun

Zhang v. INS, 386 F.3d 66, 76 (2d Cir. 2004)). Fu has not shown that a reasonable

fact-finder would be compelled to credit his explanation based on confusion and

nerves.

      Fu’s explanations for other inconsistencies were, themselves, inconsistent

with each other. For example, at one point in the hearing, Fu testified that he was

                                        4
not sure why he had previously said that he did not know Chen’s full name

because he had “always known” his full name since meeting him in China. At

another point, however, he testified that he did not learn Chen’s full name until

after he arrived in the United States. The IJ was not compelled to credit either of

those explanations for why Fu had previously stated that he did not know Chen’s

full name.

      Fu also argues that the IJ should not have considered the statements he

made at his credible fear interview because the interview record was not reliable

since the interview was conducted in Mandarin even though his best language is

Fuzhou. But he did not express a lack of understanding during the interview, he

confirmed that he understood the purpose of the interview, his application reflects

that he is fluent in Mandarin, and he admitted at the hearing that he understood

the Mandarin interpreter during the interview. Further, the interview record

contained sufficient indicia of reliability: the interview was memorialized in a

typewritten document that indicated the questions asked of Fu and the responses

that Fu gave, and the questions asked were designed to elicit the basis for Fu’s

asylum claim. For all those reasons, the IJ properly relied on the record of the

credible fear interview in assessing Fu’s credibility. See Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585

                                         5
F.3d 715, 725 (2d Cir. 2009) (concluding that credible fear interview record was

reliable for purposes of assessing credibility where the interviewing officer

explained the purpose of the interview and informed petitioner that she could seek

clarification, the questions were designed to elicit a basis for an asylum claim, the

interview was memorialized in a typewritten document setting forth questions

and responses and was conducted with the aid of an interpreter, and the applicant

did not contend that she did not understand the questions).

      Because it was not improper for the agency to consider the inconsistencies

between Fu’s hearing testimony and the statements at his credible fear interview,

there was substantial evidence to support the adverse credibility determination.

See Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single

inconsistency might preclude [a non-citizen] from showing that an IJ was

compelled to find him credible. Multiple inconsistencies would so preclude even

more forcefully.”); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (noting that the “cumulative effect”

of multiple inconsistencies can support an adverse credibility determination).

The adverse credibility determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of

removal, and CAT relief because all three claims are based on the same factual

predicate. See Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.

                                         6
      Finally, Fu’s argument that the agency should have considered his fear of

persecution based on his practice of Christianity in the United States

independently from the adverse credibility determination fails. First, because the

IJ’s adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence,

there was no credible evidence to suggest that Fu would be “singled out” for

persecution. 1 Second, as the Government points out, to the extent that Fu argues

that the IJ should have considered whether he had shown a “pattern or practice”

of persecution of similarly situated people, see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii), he did

not raise that claim on appeal to the BIA, so the issue is unexhausted and not

properly before us. See Ud Din v. Garland, 72 F.4th 411, 419–20 & n.2 (2d Cir. 2023)

(explaining that the issue exhaustion requirement is a claim-processing rule that

is “mandatory in the sense that a court must enforce the rule if a party properly

raises it” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fort Bend County v. Davis,

587 U.S. ----, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1849 (2019))).

1 Fu also submitted letters from his wife and a friend in China to corroborate his
testimony, but the BIA concluded that those letters were entitled to minimal
weight and were therefore insufficient to rehabilitate his testimony or
independently establish his claim. Fu does not argue that we should give those
letters greater weight, and, indeed, “[w]e defer to the agency’s determination of
the weight afforded to [a non-citizen’s] documentary evidence,” Y.C. v. Holder,
741 F.3d 324, 334 (2d Cir. 2013).
                                          7
     For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

                                   FOR THE COURT:
                                   Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
                                   Clerk of Court

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