Court Opinion

ID: 9737226
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:19:24.46551+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:57.312540
License: Public Domain

*1259BECK, J.,
Dissenting.
¶ 1 I respectfully dissent based on Officer Neffs location and conduct during the time that Officer Wildt informed appellant he was free to go. I believe that despite Officer Wildt’s comment, Officer Neffs continued presence at the vehicle, and the fact that he was engaged in conversation with the passengers, would reasonably lead a driver to believe that he was not free to go.
¶ 2 It would be unreasonable for a person to believe that he could get into his car and drive away while another police officer was still investigating the incident, even if one of the other officers on the scene told him he could do so. In essence, Officer Neffs actions contradicted Officer Wildt’s statement and at best left appellant uncertain about whether his involuntary interaction with police had ended. What is far more likely — and inherently logical — is that those actions reasonably led appellant to believe that he was required to wait until all of the officers on the scene were finished with their investigation before he could depart.
¶ 3 The Commonwealth argues that Officer Neffs conduct is irrelevant since the parties entered into a stipulation at the suppression hearing in lieu of presenting Officer Neff as a witness. The stipulation provided that Officer Neff assisted in the stop and “in no way impeded [appellant] from leaving the scene.” The Commonwealth insists that this stipulation establishes that Officer Neffs location at the car with the other passengers “is not supported by the record.” Appellee’s Brief at 8, n. 2.1 cannot agree.
¶ 4 The record clearly establishes, by way of Officer Wildt’s own version of events, that at the time Officer Wildt informed appellant of his right to leave and requested his consent to search, Officer Neff was “up talking to passengers in the car.” Suppression Hearing Transcript, 2/6/01/, at 12. In light of this testimony, I would not read the stipulation as broadly as the Commonwealth. The agreement merely addressed Officer Neffs direct interaction, or lack thereof, with appellant. It did not negate Officer Wildt’s testimony and could not alter the effect Officer Neffs conduct reasonably had on appellant’s belief that he was free to go.
¶ 5 I also see a material difference between this case and United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002), upon which the majority relies. First, Drayton concerned a bus, not a car. Further, there was no testimony that the officer in Drayton engaged in conversation with any of the passengers. Here, if appellant wanted to act on Officer Wildt’s statement and indeed leave the area as Officer Wildt said he could, he would have had to get into his vehicle and drive away while another police officer stood at the car engaged in a conversation with the passengers. In my view, it is unreasonable to think a motorist would attempt such a thing.
¶ 6 I would find that when coupled with the coercive factors already cited by the majority, ie., the original traffic stop, the time of night and the presence of three police officers, the additional factor of Officer Neffs position and conduct during the time appellant spoke with Officer Wildt would reasonably have led appellant to believe that he was not free to leave. As a result, police were required to articulate a reasonable basis for appellant’s continued detention. Freeman, supra. The record reflects none and so suppression should have been granted.