Court Opinion

ID: 9455575
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:26:14.386868+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:38.828849
License: Public Domain

BARNES, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I dissent. I am persuaded that the continuing vitality of Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 78 S.Ct. 191, 2 L.Ed. 2d 167 (1957) as recognized by Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516, 82 S.Ct. 884, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962) — a case cited by the majority for its position — leaves the burden of proving inadequate waiver of counsel with the petitioner-appellant, and that he fails to meet that burden.
The Carnley Court specifically limited its holding in the following manner:
“Neither Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 68 S.Ct. 763, 92 L.Ed. 986 nor Moore v. Michigan, supra, is m any way inconsistent with our holding and disposition here. * * * In Moore, the record showed clearly that the petitioner had expressly declined an offer of counsel by the trial judge, and we held that the accused had to show by a preponderance of the evidence that his acquiescence was not sufficiently understanding and intelligent to amount to an effective waiver. But no such burden can be imposed upon an accused unless the record — or a hearing, were required — reveals his affirmative acquiescence. * * * ” 369 U.S. at 516-517, 82 S.Ct. at 890. (Emphasis added.)
The clear declination of an “offer of counsel” that was approved by the Carnley opinion was recounted as follows by the Moore Court:
“In accordance with the then prevailing procedure no stenographic transcript was taken of the proceedings in the Circuit Court at the time of the arraignment and plea. However, at the hearing held on the delayed motion for a new trial, two witnesses, who were present in the courtroom on October 29, 1938, testified as to what then transpired. On the basis of their testimony the Circuit Court in denying the motion for new trial found as a fact — which finding is, of course, accepted by us — that before the petitioner tendered the plea of guilty the trial judge asked the petitioner ‘whether he had a lawyer and whether he desired to have a lawyer and that [the petitioner] gave a nega*617tive reply to both of these inquiries, and stated that he wanted to get the matter over with.’ ” 355 U.S. at 157-158, 78 S.Ct. at 193 (emphasis added).
There is a striking similarity between the language of offer and waiver in Moore and in the ease before us. Specifically, the judgment roll for the 1952 conviction (Ex. 5) reads as follows:
“ * “■ * and the defendant having been advised by the Court of his right to be represented by counsel, and the defendant having stated that he did not desire counsel; * * (Emphasis added.)
Both records speak to the advice as to right to counsel tendered by the trial judge and the lack of desire for counsel on the part of the criminal defendant. Neither record contains specific language regarding compensation of such counsel by the court. As such, both records are “silent” in the manner indicated in the majority opinion. The majority finds that this fact compels its holding that the burden must shift to the government on the waiver issue. In sharp contrast, however, the Moore Court, citing the landmark ease of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (quoted in relevant part in the margin),1 was of the opinion that the record was sufficient to leave the burden upon the petitioner-appellant to show lack of intelligent waiver. I find the conclusion inescapable that a similar burden should be placed upon this appellant.
There are additional reasons for my reaching this conclusion. The subsequent decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1962), which overruled Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 62 S.Ct. 1252, 86 L.Ed. 1595 (1942), cannot be thought to alter the validity of the Moore holding, since the Moore Court specifically held that the defendant involved had the right to court-appointed counsel unless it had been intelligently waived. Thus, as evidenced by the following passage, Moore had the full panoply of Gideon rights.
“The principles determining the extent to which this constitutional right to counsel is secured in a state prosecution have been discussed in a long series of decisions of this Court, [footnote citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) and other cases omitted] We hold that the petitioner’s case falls within that class in which the intervention of counsel, unless intelligently waived by the accused, is an essential element of a fair hearing.” Moore v. Michigan, supra, 355 U.S. at 159, 78 S.Ct. at 194.
I can find no language in Gideon that alters the standard for determining intelligent waiver that was enunciated in Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, and applied in Moore v. Michigan, supra. Nor do any subsequent cases with which I am familiar alter the standard. From this I conclude that the “offer of counsel” in the case before us, which was essentially the same as the one in Moore, requires us to reach the same result as the Moore opinion on the burden of proof issue.2
Alternatively, it is my opinion that we could dispose of this case without a reso*618lution of the burden of proof issue for the same reasons the Third Circuit avoided decision of the issue in United States ex rel. Ackerman v. Russell, 388 F.2d 21 (3rd Cir. 1968), also cited by the majority. In that case the habeas petitioner admitted that he had been offered counsel but contended that he did not know that the court would appoint one at no cost to him. The other relevant facts are similar to those of the case before us. There was no transcript of the original proceeding and the only evidence of waiver of counsel was petitioner’s signature on a form that was stamped on the back of the indictment reciting the charges against him. In addition, the state trial judge had died. The Third Circuit in discussing the application of rules governing burden of proof stated the following:
“The rules relating to which party has the onus of proving a valid waiver of counsel are also well established. Where the record is silent and does not show that the accused was offered the assistance of counsel and declined counsel after an appropriate inquiry by the trial court, the burden of proving an intelligent waiver is on the government, [footnote citing Camley, supra] Conversely, when the record indicates that the accused was offered counsel but declined the offer, he has the burden of showing that his declination was not knowingly and intelligently made. [footnote citing Camley and Moore, supra] in the instant case no transcript exists of the 1961 proceedings at which appellant waived counsel and pleaded guilty. The only evidence as to the advice given appellant is the transcript of the [habeas] hearing in 1963. It is unnecessary for this court to decide which of the two rules governing the burden of proof is applicable in this case because regardless of on whom the burden proof rests the determination of the validity of appellant’s ivaiver of counsel depends largely on what was said to him by Judge Mook and what he understood the advice to mean. In determining the credibility of appellant’s contention that he understood that he would have to pay for counsel even though court appointed, it was essential that he be given a hearing to enable him to demonstrate the truthfulness of his assertion. The court before whom appellant could testify would have the opportunity to evaluate his demeanor and fully explore the merit of his contention.” 388 F.2d at 24 (emphasis added).
I am convinced that the case before us is essentially indistinguishable from Russell,3 supra. I believe that the issue of waiver should be decided on the basis of this defendant’s credibility and the totality of circumstances surrounding his waiver. I would affirm the findings of the trial judge who carefully considered all the relevant factors.
If the issue of burden of proof must be met head-on, I think that the Ninth Circuit case of Beasley v. Wilson, 370 F.2d 320 (9th Cir. 1966) deserves some mention; its facts and holding are relevant to the case before us. The documentary evidence of waiver of counsel in the state court proceeding was as follows:
“[T]he transcript of the preliminary hearing where appellant had been advised of his right to counsel and had stated that he did not desire counsel and which also showed that the appellant at that time admitted in detail the commission of the crime was submitted.” 370 F.2d at 322 (emphasis added).
The opinion goes on to discuss the requirements of Gideon, Moore and Camley and concludes that the burden was *619upon the habeas petitioner to establish that he did not intelligently waive counsel. Specifically, the panel said:
“We are mindful of the requirement stated in Carnley v. Cochran [citations omitted], that ‘the record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understanding^ rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver.’ However, our examination of the evidence presented amply supports the finding and order of the district court.” 370 F.2d at 322-323.
I think the Beasley approach to the burden of proof and determination of waiver from all the evidence and circumstances to be sound, and I think it would be unwise to alter it so as to make it inconsistent with Moore and Carnley, supra; both of which the Supreme Court has yet to modify in the manner it has modified the related requirements surrounding acceptances of pleas of guilty. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); cf. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969). Moreover, I am convinced that even if the Supreme Court did alter the standards governing waiver of counsel such a holding would be restricted to prospective application such as was accorded to McCarthy, supra in Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831, 89 S.Ct. 1498, 23 L.Ed.2d 16 (1969).
In conclusion, I think it worth mentioning that the issues in the case before us bring into sharp relief some of the practical difficulties brought about by recent Supreme Court cases reinterpreting the constitutional guarantees of the Bill of Rights as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment. These difficulties are minimized by considering the contested state proceedings in light of all the relevant circumstances to determine whether fundamental rights subsequently recognized have been denied.4 Such a flexible standard of review does no injustice to the criminal defendant in the context of the specific factual and legal questions of this case, and I can see no useful purpose to be served by adopting the formalistic requirement that the majority holding fastens upon state proceedings of an earlier era. Thus in view of Moore, Carnley and our own holding in Beasley, I would place the burden upon the petitioner to establish lack of intelligent waiver of his right to court-appointed counsel. The trial judge, after viewing the totality of circumstances of the case, found that this burden has not been met. I cannot characterize his evidentiary determination as clearly erroneous, and, therefore, I would affirm.

. The Court in Johnson v. Zerbst spoke of the burden in collateral proceedings as follows:
“It must be remembered, however, that a judgment cannot be lightly set aside by collateral attack, even on habeas corpus. When collaterally attacked, the judgment of a court carries with it a presumption of regularity, [footnote omitted] Where a defendant, without counsel, acquiesces in a trial resulting in his conviction and later seeks release by the extraordinary remedy of habeas corpus, the burden of proof rests upon him to establish that he did not competently and intelligently waive his constitutional right to assistance of Counsel.” 304 U.S. at 468-469, 58 S.Ct. at 1025. (emphasis added).

. It should be noted in passing that the evidence of threats of violence and other intimidation of the defendant in Moore enabled him to fulfill the burden of establishing that he had not intelligently waived counsel. Such facts are not present in this case.

. I find it insignificant that the defendant in Russell acknowledged that he had been offered counsel since the contested issue in that case and in ours is whether the defendant was sufficiently made aware that the court would pay for counsel. Both our case and Russell deal with records that are, in the words of the majority, “silent” as to payment of appointed counsel by the court.

. The question of -whether or not retro-activity should be accorded to recent Supreme Court decisions has raised many of the same problems. See, e. g., the divergent opinions in our recent decision of United States v. Scott, 425 F.2d 55, decided March 6, 1970 en banc.