Court Opinion

ID: 9860123
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:11:31.444079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:18:05.920885
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE STOUDER, dissenting: I must respectfully dissent. My concern relates to the issue whether the complainant should have been allowed to testify as to what effect the incident had on her. The complainant testified as to certain post-event traumatic effects of the alleged sexual assault. Included among the various effects the incident had on her, the complainant referred to going to a rape treatment group and obtaining psychiatric counseling. Such testimony, in my estimation, is highly prejudicial and should only be allowed into evidence when supported by the testimony of a qualified expert on rape trauma syndrome. I emphasize that my concern is limited to whether testimony regarding an alleged victim receiving psychiatric counseling should be allowed at trial without subsequent corroborative testimony from the treating psychiatrist. Section 115 — 7.2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 provides that in a prosecution for an illegal sexual act perpetrated upon a victim “testimony by an expert, qualified by the court relating to any recognized and accepted form of post-traumatic stress syndrome shall be admissible as evidence.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 115— 7.2.) The court in the instant case seems to casually brush aside this requirement by noting that in People v. Douglas (1989), 183 Ill. App. 3d 241, 538 N.E.2d 1335, the court did not hold that the victim could not testify about the adverse effects of the incident. This is true; however, the State in Douglas presented the testimony of a rape trauma syndrome expert who concluded the complainant’s testimony regarding adverse effects of the incident were consistent with symptoms suffered by someone suffering from rape trauma syndrome. Indeed, the issue in Douglas was whether the expert should be barred from being considered an expert on rape trauma syndrome due to her lack of a formal psychology degree. I am also concerned about the complainant’s testimony that she had received psychiatric counseling subsequent to the incident. In People v. Jackson (1990), 203 Ill. App. 3d 1, 560 N.E.2d 1019, the court was faced with similar testimony regarding post-event traumatic effects. In Jackson, the complainant’s mother testified that following the incident the complainant: (1) had become scared of her own house; (2) would follow her mother to every room in the house, including the bathroom; and (3) was restless at night and thought she heard the defendant breathing in her bedroom. The court did not find the mother’s testimony to be prejudicial and in contrast cited two cases, People v. Fuelner (1982), 104 Ill. App. 3d 340, 432 N.E.2d 986, and People v. Gillman (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 53, 414 N.E.2d 240, wherein the courts held that the defendants were prejudiced by the admission of testimony regarding the psychiatric treatment the victims received after the incidents. Indeed, the court in Jackson emphasized that the trial court acted properly in keeping from the jury any information regarding psychiatric treatment of the victim after the incident. 203 Ill. App. 3d at 14, 560 N.E.2d at 1027. In the instant case, consistent with the holding in Jackson, the trial court erred in allowing the complainant to testify concerning the rape treatment group and to her receiving psychiatric care. As the aforementioned cases point out, such testimony is highly prejudicial and has only recently been allowed into evidence for the limited purpose of establishing a diagnosis of rape trauma syndrome by a qualified expert witness on that subject. The State in the instant case should have presented the testimony of an expert witness on rape trauma syndrome in order to connect the complainant’s testimony regarding post-incident effects, including her having to seek psychiatric care, with the somewhat accepted psychological disorder. In any case, the court’s reliance on the Douglas case under the circumstances presented herein is misplaced. I must respectfully dissent.