Court Opinion

ID: 9568997
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:09:28.61475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:18:26.849343
License: Public Domain

Becker, J.
(concurring) — The former indecent liberties statute, RCW 9A.44.100, and the new child molestation statute, RCW 9A.44.083, are both written to address situations where the defendant causes sexual contact between *856the young person and a third party, as well as situations in which only the defendant has sexual contact with a young person. In cases involving a third party under either statute, the requirement that the defendant “knowingly causes” a child to have sexual contact with another person establishes a mental state element separate and distinct from the mental state involved in the sexual contact itself. That is because the “purpose of gratifying sexual desire,” which is part of the definition of sexual contact, can belong to someone other than the defendant.
In cases like this one where there is no third party, and it is the defendant who must necessarily have the purpose of gratifying sexual desire, the old statute still appears to require that the defendant act both knowingly and with a purpose, while the new statute pointedly omits the word “knowingly.” Possibly, this legislative rearrangement of key words reveals a legislative intent to decrease the mental state elements required for a conviction when the defendant is the person who both causes the sexual contact and engages in it. State v. Hudspeth30 so held: “Knowledge is an essential element of [former] RCW 9A.44.100. It has been omitted as an element in RCW 9A.44.083.”
The holding of Hudspeth is not illogical. To treat the word “knowingly” in the old statute as supplying a distinct element in all cases, including those where no third party is involved, is consistent with the rule of lenity.31 It is also consistent with the principle that we must construe a statute to give effect to every word.32 Our courts have recognized “knowingly” as a mental state element of the crime *857without equating it to the touching “for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire” that defines sexual contact.33
Still, respect for the stare decisis value of Court of Appeals’ opinions does not strictly bind us to follow Hudspeth because it is not clear that the Hudspeth court considered the argument we find dispositive in the present case.34 Rather, we are bound to follow State v. Woolworth35 which came before Hudspeth, and which did focus on the issue raised by the State’s argument here.
In Woolworth, the defendant admitted having physical contact with his stepdaughter but denied that it was knowingly sexual. Affirming the conviction for indecent liberties under the former statute, RCW 9A.44.100, the court held a defective instruction on “knowledge” to be harmless error because by finding the defendant acted for the purpose of gratifying his sexual desire, the jury necessarily found he acted knowingly. Woolworth compels the conclusion that by convicting Aho of child molestation, the jury necessarily considered the mens rea required for the former crime of indecent liberties.
Review granted at 136 Wn.2d 1007 (1998).

State v. Hudspeth, 63 Wn. App. 683, 821 P.2d 547 (1992).

State v. Lively, 130 Wn.2d 1, 14, 921 P.2d 1035 (1996) (“The rule of lenity provides that where an ambiguous statute has two possible interpretations, the statute is to be strictly construed in favor of the defendant.”).

State v. Contreras, 124 Wn.2d 741, 747, 880 P.2d 1000 (1994).

See Welfare of Shope, 23 Wn. App. 567, 596 P.2d 1361 (1979); State v. Jones, 82 Wn. App. 871, 920 P.2d 225 (1996).

See In re Personal Restraint of Burton, 80 Wn. App. 573, 584, 910 P.2d 1295 (1996).

State v. Woolworth, 30 Wn. App. 901, 639 P.2d 216 (1981).