Court Opinion

ID: 9374432
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 21:03:00.69647+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:47.259428
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/22/23 P. v. Padua CA2/3

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
 opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a).
 This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule
 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                 B316569

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                          Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. A362244
          v.

 ARTURO GARCIA PADUA,

          Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, David V. Herriford, Judge. Affirmed.
      Steven A. Brody, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, David E. Madeo, William H. Shin, and Gabriel
Bradley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
            _______________________________________
                           INTRODUCTION
       In 1981, a jury convicted Arturo Padua of two counts of
murder, one count of robbery, one count of attempted robbery,
and four counts of assault with intent to commit murder. The
jury found true special circumstance allegations that the murders
were committed during a robbery. After this Division affirmed
Padua’s conviction, the trial court struck the special circumstance
findings. (People v. Padua (Nov. 4, 1982, B41150) [nonpub. opn.].)
       In 2019, Padua filed a petition to vacate his murder
convictions under Penal Code1 section 1172.6,2 arguing he
couldn’t now be convicted of first or second degree murder
following the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437 (S.B. 1437). The
court appointed counsel for Padua, found he made a prima facie
showing of entitlement to relief, and issued an order to show
cause. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court denied
Padua’s petition, finding he could still be convicted of murder
under a felony murder theory because he was a major participant
in the underlying robberies and acted with reckless indifference
to human life.
       Padua appeals, arguing the court applied the wrong
standard of proof when it found he was not entitled to relief
under section 1172.6, and, in any event, the People failed to prove
he was guilty of murder under a currently valid theory. We
affirm.

1   All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered as section
1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)

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                        BACKGROUND
1.    The Murders
       In September 1980, Padua and his brother, Victor, went
“cruising” with their friend, Jaime Avena. Padua was driving,
Victor was in the front passenger seat, and Avena was in one of
the back seats. When Padua picked Avena up, he saw that Avena
was carrying a rifle.
       While Padua, Victor, and Avena were driving on Broadway
Avenue near Pico Boulevard, a car pulled up next to them.
Someone in the other car shouted “Florence” and threw a beer
bottle at Padua’s car. Avena fired several rounds from his rifle at
the other car. Padua followed the other car.
       Padua eventually crashed his car, so he and his cohorts
began looking for one to steal. Near the corner of 21st Street and
Main Street, they saw a pink Camaro parked near the side of the
road. Avena opened the Camaro’s front door, and Padua told the
driver to hand over his keys. When the driver refused to get out
of the car, Avena shot and killed him. Padua later told the police
he struck the driver with a stick before Avena shot him.
According to a witness at the scene, one of the assailants threw
the passenger to the ground. As the passenger tried to run away,
Avena shot him several times in the back, killing him too.
       Padua, Victor, and Avena then took the Camaro and drove
to Avena’s house to pick up more ammunition. After leaving
Avena’s house, they set the Camaro on fire and started looking
for another car to steal. While they were on foot, Avena fired
multiple rounds at a passing car.
       Padua and Victor then went to buy beer. When they
returned, they saw a car exiting the freeway. Padua approached
the driver’s window and hit it with his beer bottle. Avena then
fired multiple rounds at the car before it drove away.

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      Several minutes later, two police officers in an unmarked
car saw Padua, Victor, and Avena in the street. As Padua and
Victor ran away, Avena fired several shots at the officers, who
returned fire. Padua, Victor, and Avena fled, but they were
arrested days later.
2.    The Jury Trial and Direct Appeal
       Following a jury trial, Padua was convicted of two counts of
murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), one count of robbery (§ 211), one count
of attempted robbery (§§ 667, 211), and four counts of assault
with intent to commit murder (§ 217). The jury also found true
several special circumstance allegations, including an allegation
that the murders were committed during a robbery. The court
sentenced Padua to life in prison without the possibility of parole
for the murder counts, plus 14 years and two months for the
remaining counts.
       In 1982, this Division affirmed Padua’s conviction but
remanded the matter to allow the trial court to exercise its
sentencing discretion under section 1385. On remand, the court
struck the jury’s felony-murder special circumstance finding and
resentenced Padua to concurrent terms of 26 years to life in
prison for each murder count, plus eight years for the remaining
counts.
3.    The Resentencing Petition
       In April 2019, Padua filed a resentencing petition under
section 1172.6, alleging (1) he had been convicted of first or
second degree murder under a felony murder or natural and
probable consequences theory; (2) he was not the actual killer; (3)
he did not, with the intent to kill, aid and abet the actual killer;
(4) he was not a major participant in the underlying felony or did
not act with reckless indifference to human life; and (5) he could

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not be convicted of murder under a currently valid theory. The
People opposed Padua’s petition.
      In May 2021, after appointing counsel for Padua, the court
found he made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief
under section 1172.6 and issued an order to show cause.
      The court held an evidentiary hearing on Padua’s petition
in September 2021. In support of their opposition, the People
submitted a copy of the opinion from Padua’s direct appeal, a
copy of the transcript from Padua’s preliminary hearing, and
copies of Padua’s and Victor’s written confessions made during
the police’s investigation of the underlying murders. Padua didn’t
present any evidence at the hearing, nor did he object to any of
the People’s evidence.
      The court took the matter under submission before issuing
a written ruling denying Padua’s petition. After applying the
factors outlined in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks)
and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), the court
concluded: “Based on the totality of circumstances, the court finds
that evidence in the record of conviction indicates that [Padua]
was a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life. This evidence conclusively
refutes [Padua’s] claim that he is entitled to relief” under section
1172.6.
      Padua appeals.

                          DISCUSSION
1.    S.B. 1437 and Section 1172.6
      S.B. 1437 limited accomplice liability under the felony
murder rule and eliminated the natural and probable
consequences doctrine to ensure a person’s sentence is
commensurate with his or her culpability. (People v. Gentile
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843.) Currently, the felony murder

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rule applies only if the defendant: (1) was the actual killer; or (2)
with the intent to kill, aided and abetted the actual killer’s
commission of murder; or (3) acted as a “major participant” in a
felony listed in section 189 and acted with “reckless indifference
to human life.” (§ 189, subd. (e), as amended by Stats. 2018, ch.
1015, § 3; § 188, subd. (a)(3), as amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 1015,
§ 2.)
       S.B. 1437 also added section 1172.6, which provides people
who have been convicted of murder under one of the now-invalid
theories the opportunity to petition for resentencing. (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, § 4; Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) A petitioner is eligible for
relief under section 1172.6 if (1) the complaint or information
allowed the prosecution to proceed under a felony murder theory;
(2) the petitioner was convicted of murder “following a trial or
accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner
could have been convicted” of murder; and (3) the “petitioner
could not presently be convicted” of murder “because of changes
to Section 188 or 189.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
       If the petitioner files a facially sufficient petition, the court
must appoint counsel. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(3).) Additionally, if the
petitioner makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief,
the court must issue an order to show cause and “hold a hearing
to determine whether to vacate the murder … conviction and to
recall the sentence.” (Id., at subds. (c) & (d)(1).)
       “At the hearing to determine whether the petitioner is
entitled to relief, the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution
to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty
of murder … under California law as amended by the changes to
Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019. The
admission of evidence in the hearing shall be governed by the
Evidence Code, except that the court may consider evidence
previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is

                                   6
admissible under current law, including witness testimony,
stipulated evidence, and matters judicially noticed. The court
may also consider the procedural history of the case recited in
any prior appellate opinion. … The prosecutor and the petitioner
may also offer new or additional evidence to meet their respective
burdens. A finding that there is substantial evidence to support a
conviction for murder … is insufficient to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for
resentencing.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
       “If the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the
prior conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached
to the conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be
resentenced on the remaining charges.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
If the petitioner is eligible for relief, his “conviction shall be
redesignated as the target offense or underlying felony for
resentencing purposes, murder or attempted murder was charged
generically, and the target offense was not charged.” (Id., at subd.
(e).)
       Despite Padua’s assertion to the contrary, we review the
trial court’s factual findings following a section 1172.6,
subdivision (d) hearing for substantial evidence. (People v.
Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298, 301 (Clements); People
v. Garrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 735, 747; People v. Ramirez
(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 985.) We review the entire record in
the light most favorable to the court’s order to determine whether
any rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. (People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87.)
Accordingly, before we may set aside the court’s order, it must be
clear that “ ‘ “upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
evidence to support [it].” ’ ” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th
327, 357.)

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2.    Any error in the court’s application of the standard
      of proof for section 1172.6, subdivision (d) hearings
      was harmless.
       Padua contends the court applied the wrong standard of
proof when it found he was ineligible for resentencing at the
section 1172.6, subdivision (d) hearing.3 Whether the court
applied the appropriate standard of proof is a question that we
review de novo. (Clements, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 293.)
       Padua takes issue with the court’s use of the terms
“indicate” and “show” while explaining its findings that he was a
major participant in the underlying felonies who acted with
reckless indifference to human life. Without citing any authority,
Padua contends the court’s use of such terms shows it applied a
substantial evidence standard of review, as opposed to a beyond a
reasonable doubt standard identified in section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3). We disagree.
       Nothing about the terms “indicate” and “show” suggest the
court applied a particular standard of proof or standard of review.
Those terms can be used as synonyms of “prove”—i.e., to describe
what something, such as evidence, establishes, demonstrates, or
signifies. (See Merriam-Webster.com Thesaurus, Merriam-
Webster 

3 As an initial matter, Padua asserts, and the People agree, the jury’s
felony-murder special circumstance findings that the trial court struck
after remand from this court cannot serve as a basis to deny him relief
under section 1172.6. (See People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 710,
720.) However, Padua points to nothing in the record, nor have we
found anything in the record, suggesting the trial court relied on the
stricken special circumstance findings when it found he was ineligible
for resentencing relief at the section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) hearing.
We therefore need not address this argument any further.

                                    8
[as of Feb. 14, 2023], archived at .)
       Nor does the court’s statement that “there is sufficient
evidence in the record to conclude that Petitioner exhibited a
reckless indifference to human life” demonstrate the court
applied a substantial evidence standard of review, as opposed to a
beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof. The phrase
“sufficient evidence” merely describes the amount or quality of
evidence that the court determined supported a particular
finding or conclusion. That phrase can be used by a trier of fact
when making a factual finding in the first instance under any
standard of proof, or it can be used by a reviewing court when
applying a standard of review, such as the substantial evidence
or abuse of discretion standard. Indeed, in making its findings on
Padua’s petition, the court never mentioned the jury’s findings or
suggested that there was sufficient evidence such that the jury
could have found Padua was a major participant in the
underlying felonies who acted with reckless indifference to
human life.
       To be sure, the court didn’t state that it was applying the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof in its written ruling
denying Padua’s petition. But neither did the court state it was
applying a substantial evidence standard of review or any lesser
burden of proof than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
And, at the hearing on Padua’s petition, the court correctly stated
that the People carried the burden of proof to establish Padua
isn’t eligible for relief. Because we must presume a court’s ruling
is correct in the absence of an affirmative showing of error, we
reject Padua’s claim that the court applied the wrong standard of
proof when it denied his resentencing petition. (People v.
Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 666 [“On appeal, we presume
that a judgment or order of the trial court is correct, ‘ “[a]ll

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intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on
matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be
affirmatively shown.” ’ ”].)
        In any event, even if we were to assume the court applied
the wrong standard of proof, that error was harmless. That is, it
is not reasonably probable Padua would have received a more
favorable outcome had the court applied the correct standard of
proof identified in section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) because
overwhelming evidence establishes Padua was a major
participant in the underlying robbery who acted with reckless
indifference to human life. (See People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 973–974 [denial of section 1172.6 petition is evaluated under
standard of prejudice discussed in People v. Watson (1956) 46
Cal.2d 818].)
        S.B. 1437 amended section 189’s definition of felony murder
by incorporating section 190.2, subdivision (d)’s requirements for
proving a felony-murder special-circumstance allegation. Now, to
support a felony-murder conviction, the People must prove that
the killing was committed in the perpetration of, or during an
attempt to perpetrate, one of several enumerated felonies,
including robbery, and that the defendant either: (1) “was the
actual killer;” (2) “was not the actual killer, but, with the intent
to kill,” aided and abetted the killer in the commission of the
murder; or (3) “was a major participant in the underlying felony
and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described
in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.” (§ 189, subds. (a) & (e).)
        In Banks and Clark, the California Supreme Court
discussed several factors that should be considered in
determining whether a defendant was a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803 [discussing major
participant factors]; Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618–623

                                10
[discussing reckless indifference factors].) As the court explained,
no single consideration is necessary, “ ‘nor is any one of [the
factors] necessarily sufficient.’ ” (Clark, at p. 618, quoting Banks,
at p. 803.)
       Banks identified the following factors for determining
whether a defendant was a major participant in the underlying
felony: (1) the role the defendant had in planning the target
crime that led to the victim’s death; (2) the role the defendant
had in supplying or using lethal weapons; (3) the defendant’s
awareness of the particular dangers posed by the nature of the
crime, the weapons used, or the past experience or conduct of the
other participants; (4) whether the defendant was present at the
scene of the killing and, if so, whether he was in a position to
facilitate or prevent the death; (5) whether the defendant’s
actions or inactions at the scene of the killing played a particular
role in the victim’s death; and (6) the defendant’s conduct after
lethal force was used. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.)
       As for determining whether a defendant acted with
“reckless indifference” to human life, courts must look to whether
the defendant knowingly engaged in criminal activities known to
carry a grave risk of death. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 801;
see also Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 616–617.) “Reckless
indifference” “encompasses both subjective and objective
elements. The subjective element is the defendant’s conscious
disregard of risks known to him or her.” (Clark, at p. 617.) The
objective element looks to “what ‘a law-abiding person would
observe in the actor’s situation.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
       Clark discussed the following factors to be considered in
determining whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference
to human life: (1) the defendant’s awareness that a gun or other
weapon would be used during the target offense; (2) the
defendant’s presence at the crime and whether he had an

                                 11
opportunity to prevent the crime or aid the victim; (3) the
duration of the felony, including how long the defendant and the
victim interacted before the killing; and (4) the defendant’s
apparent efforts to reduce the risk of violence during the
commission of the target offense. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp.
618–623.)
       Here, Padua’s murder convictions arose out of the robbery
of the pink Camaro, during which the car’s driver and passenger
were killed. As we explain, overwhelming evidence supports the
court’s finding that Padua was a major participant in that felony
who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
       As to the major participant factors outlined in Banks,
Padua helped plan the robbery. He told the police that after he
crashed his car, he and Avena looked for another car that they
could steal. Once they saw the Camaro pull to the side of the
road, Padua and Avena ran toward it. Avena pointed the rifle at
the driver while Padua told the driver to hand over the car’s keys.
       Padua also was aware that a gun was likely to be used
during the robbery. Although Padua didn’t supply the rifle that
Avena used to kill the victims, Padua told the police he was
aware that Avena was carrying a rifle and had fired it several
times at another occupied car not long before they approached
the Camaro. Thus, when he decided to steal the Camaro, Padua
was aware of the potential lethal danger Avena posed to the
victims.
       Most importantly, Padua was not only present when Avena
killed the victims, but he also facilitated at least one of the
occupants’ deaths. Padua admitted that he struck the car’s driver
with a stick to make him get out of the car. Immediately after the
driver got out of the car, Avena shot and killed him. Victor
provided a similar account, telling the police that Padua struck
the driver with a stick shortly before Avena killed him.

                                12
       Finally, Padua did nothing to help the victims after Avena
used lethal force. Padua didn’t try to prevent Avena from
shooting the passenger after Avena shot the driver, nor did
Padua provide, or seek out, any aid for the victims. Instead,
Padua, along with his cohorts, drove off with the Camaro to
continue their terror spree.
       Many of these facts also establish Padua acted with
reckless indifference to human life under the factors discussed in
Clark. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 614–615 [there is often
“ ‘significant[ ] overlap’ ” between the Banks and Clark factors].)
As we just discussed, Padua told the police that he was aware
Avena was armed with a rifle and had fired that gun several
times shortly before they attacked the victims. It is undisputed
that Padua was present at the scene of the killing but failed to
offer any aid to the victims. Instead, as we explained above,
Padua actively participated in the robbery, was present when the
victims were killed, and helped facilitate at least one of their
deaths. (People v. Garcia (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 123, 148
[“Presence at the scene of the murder is a particularly important
aspect of the reckless indifference inquiry.”].) Nothing in the
record suggests Padua tried to deescalate the use of violence or
otherwise reduce the risk that the victims would be killed.
       In short, overwhelming evidence supports a finding that
Padua was a major participant in the underlying robbery and
acted with reckless indifference to human life. Thus, any error in
the court’s application of the standard of proof at the section
1172.6, subdivision (d) hearing was harmless. Padua’s challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence also fails because of the
overwhelming evidence that he was a major participant who
acted with reckless indifference to human life.

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                            DISPOSITION
      The order denying Padua’s section 1172.6 petition is
affirmed.

    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                      LAVIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

      EDMON, P. J.

      NGUYEN, (KIM) J.*

*Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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