Court Opinion

ID: 9665725
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:55:35.249974+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:18.202882
License: Public Domain

SEILER, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent for the reasons set forth in my dissent in the companion case of State v. Wright, 515 S.W.2d 421, decided this same date.
In addition, I do not believe there was compliance with Sec. 211.061, RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S., which requires that the police turn custody of the juvenile over to the juvenile authorities “immediately and directly” and the outcome of this case instead gives the police incentive to retain the child. The police arrested defendant about 9:00 p. m. and took him in a paddy wagon to a police substation at 27th and Van Brunt, where he was booked in. However, the written confession was not obtained until around 1:30 a. m. the following morning at the main police station in the Crimes Against Persons unit. There is no clear or direct evidence that defendant was turned over to the juvenile authorities before his confession was obtained by the police. The only witness who was asked about this was detective Merle Hoffman, who said he “supposed” defendant was sent to the youth bureau, but the witness admitted on cross-examination he had no personal knowledge on the matter. This witness also testified that the deputy juvenile officer “brought” defendant to police headquarters, but nothing appears as to when or where the juvenile officer received custody of the defendant. The juvenile officer did not testify. The defendant testified that he was taken by the police first to the substation and then to the main - police headquarters; that he talked to the. police before he was taken to the juvenile home.
Near the close of the state’s case, when the state was getting ready to introduce the confession, the defendant moved to su-press his statements, oral and written. The court heard testimony, outside the presence of the jury, from two policemen and the defendant, and then overruled the motion, finding that defendant was advised of his right to remain silent, that any statement given could be used against him, and as to his right of counsel. The court made no finding as to whether the police complied with Sec. 211.061 prior to obtaining the statement, an issue on which the burden of proof would logically fall on the state, which was offering the confession.
The above, in my opinion, does not comply with Sec. 211.061, even though the deputy juvenile officer was present at police headquarters when the police interrogated defendant. The interrogation admittedly took place at police headquarters, in the Crimes Against Persons unit. Beyond question the police department, not the deputy juvenile officer, is in charge and control of the police headquarters and what goes on there. If defendant were still in police custody at the time of his confession, as he demonstrably was, his statement was inadmissible under the established law, State v. Arbeiter, 408 S.W.2d 26 (Mo.1966).
At the most, the juvenile authorities had no more than joint custody with the police *443of the juvenile at the police station. Joint custody is not authorized under Sec. 211.-061, supra, or any other provision of the juvenile code and does not satisfy the requirements of said section or the Arbeiter decision, supra.
The state invokes State v. Sinderson, 455 S.W.2d 486 (Mo.1970), where a statement was admitted against a juvenile made at the police station to a police officer and the juvenile officer together. Sinderson is distinguishable, both as to law and facts. In the first place, the court expressly declined to construe the language or determine the meaning of Sec. 211.271(3) as amended, State v. Sinderson, l.c. 493. There are additional important differences. In Sinderson, the court pointed out that the juvenile was not picked up or arrested by the police, but was brought to the police station by his uncle and mother pursuant to arrangements made with the juvenile officer. The subsequent interrogation was arranged by the juvenile officer after he arrived at the police station. So the court concluded there was no violation of Sec. 211.061, supra, State v. Sinderson, l.c. 491-492, which is not true of the present case. In our case, defendant was arrested by the police, taken by them to one police station and then to another, where he confessed under police questioning. His parents were not notified. A juvenile officer known to defendant from prior occasions was present at police headquarters but stood by silently. It seems to me, therefore, that Sinderson does not rule the present case.
The majority opinion recognizes that it is necessary to make clear to the juvenile that criminal responsibility can result from any statement he makes. And yet having acknowledged this requirement, the majority promptly undercuts its own rule. On the evidence before the trial court the defendant here patently did not understand his situation. The following colloquy took place during the hearing on the motion to suppress:
“Q. (by the state) But they did tell you, did they, that what you said could be used against you in the event of a trial, could be used in court.
“A. (the defendant) Yeah.
“Q. And there was no mention made of juvenile court, just court is all they said?
“A. They said court. And me being a juvenile, I presume juvenile court.
“Q. And you weren’t worried about making that statement because you said when you go down to juvenile court there is not much to it ?
“A. In juvenile court all you do is have a hearing on it and assign your D.J.O. [deputy juvenile officer].”
The trial court’s ruling found only that “He was advised that any statement he would make might be used against him as evidence in court.” The issue of whether the juvenile actually understood and appreciated the possibility of prosecution as an adult was not squarely met, and it cannot be said that the defendant here made an intelligent waiver. Further, the police officer who interrogated the defendant admitted that defendant was not apprised of the possibility of criminal responsibility:
“Q. Did you advise him [the defendant] that he could be prosecuted as an adult and also as a juvenile, or you just told him he could be prosecuted in court ?
“A. I just told him that the evidence that was set forth in this statement could be used against him. I had no way of knowing .. .
“Q. Did he—
“A. . . . where he would be tried.”
From this we can see it was not made clear to defendant that he was exposing himself to criminal as well as juvenile liability.
The majority opinion asserts that because the defendant admitted his statement was voluntarily made, he therefore recognized that anything he said could be used against him in any subsequent proceedings in court. The defendant’s admission of *444voluntariness, however, was made m response to a question about whether any violence was used on him to extract the statement, and the fact remains that defendant was not apprised and did not understand that his statement was admissible against him at a trial under the general law.
The juvenile code was also violated by the failure of either police or juvenile authorities to get in touch with defendant’s parents or relatives or to have them present at the questioning, despite the provisions of Sec. 211.131, RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S., that when a child is taken into custody the parents are to be notified as soon as possible. See State v. White, 494 S.W.2d 687 (Mo.App.1973). This failure further illustrates the general disregard by the police of their duties and obligations under the juvenile code in the present case.
For these reasons, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.