Court Opinion

ID: 9698921
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:04:12.112031+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:44.657650
License: Public Domain

Newton, J.,
concurring.
I concur in the opinion of White, C. J-., and reluctantly conclude that this court now has no other recourse.
The dissent of Smith, J., is based on the attempt by the Board to reserve “the right to reject any or all bids” and thus implement the statute in a manner specifically rejected by the Legislature as pointed out in the opinion of White, C. J. The dissent of McC'own, J., falls into a similar category.
As made apparent in State ex rel. Belker v. Board of Educational Lands & Funds, 184 Neb. 621, 171 N. W. 2d 156, on rehearing, ante p. 270, 175 N. W. 2d 63, we have here a statute deliberately and purposely designed to prevent any possibility of review of school land sales. Because it infringed the right of judicial review of sales of trust property, a majority, though not controlling, of the members of this court found the statute to be unconstitutional. The controlling minority then insisted and now again insists that the right to judicial review can be read into the statute notwithstanding the clearly expressed legislative mandate and intent. This clearly entails amendment by judicial action and the exercise of a power not conferred upon this court. The controlling minority having succeeded in preventing a ruling that the statute was unconstitutional, it must now be regarded as constitutional and enforced in ac*813cordance with the expressed command and intent of the Legislature. Rhetoric may confuse the issue, but the logic contained in the present majority opinion cannot be so readily confounded.
With the passage of sections 72-257 and 72-258, R. S. Supp., 1967, the Legislature made possible and in the case of State ex rel. Belker v. Board of Educational Lands & Funds, supra, this court sanctioned a situation permitting the greatest loss of public funds ever witnessed in this state. The fact that all parties acted in good faith does not serve to alleviate or lessen the prospective damage.
According to the June 30, 1968, report of the Board of Educational Lands and Fund's, we have 1,611,499.19 acres of school lands in Nebraska, having an appraised value of $70,340,595, or about $43.65 per acre. With the constant inflationary rise in farmland values during the past 30 years, these figures on valuation appear to be inordinately low. This is verified by the sale of the tract now under consideration.
The present case serves to clarify and point up the existing situation and the amount of the prospective loss. The school lands have been most recently appraised at a value of $70,340,595. In this instance, one section of land was sold. This section was appraised at a supposed market value of $35,840. It was sold at auction for $66,560 and thereafter was subject to a bid of $73,225. It is evident that the appraised value was not representative of market value, yet, under the law, the land would have had to have been sold for the appraised value of $35,840 had no further bid been received. This would be $37,385 less than the amount finally bid and also less than 50 percent of the final bid. If this is a fair example of what is to be expected from the forced sale of school lands' under the existing statute, without discretionary action being vested in the Board of Educational Lands and Funds, the extent of the possible loss to the school fund becomes apparent. The possible loss, on the basis of percentages found in the present case, *814could amount to more than the total appraised value of $70,340,595. Thus far we have mentioned possibilities. That they would be fully realized is, of course, extremely unlikely. Nevertheless, where such extreme losses are theoretically possible, it is obvious that material or major losses will be sustained. Cases where a single bidder appears are certain to be found, as where chilled bidding is encountered, the land is surrounded by other land under one ownership, or an understanding is arrived at between prospective purchasers, and in other situations not conducive to free and open bidding.
The theory that appraisal can supplant the protection afforded by a post-sale scrutiny with a view to determining the fairness and adequacy of the sale is not tenable. This is recognized by the Legislature in other similar fields. For instance, in the sale of lands under foreclosure or belonging to a trust or decedent’s estate, the Legislature requires a post-sale scrutiny and confirmation by the courts. Do lands held in trust by the state merit any less protection than those owned by private individuals or their estates? There can be but one answer. I find it impossible to believe that the Constitution of Nebraska sanctions such a position and adhere to the dissenting opinions appearing in the case of State ex rel. Belker v. Board of Educational Lands & Funds, supra.