Court Opinion

ID: 9473982
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:45:02.442025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:50.784454
License: Public Domain

MILB.URN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Since I am unable to agree that Duffy’s petition raises a constitutional question, I respectfully dissent.
I.
Duffy’s petition, brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, is, of course, cognizable only if Duffy is being held in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. The majority announces today that petitioner’s due process rights were violated because the Michigan prosecutor failed to disprove the presence of petitioner’s affirmative defense of insanity.1 My disagreement with this conclusion is twofold. First, to so hold is inconsistent with a well-established line of Supreme Court cases. Second, in my view the holding of Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982) — the- state’s requirement that the prosecution prove the absence of an affirmative defense does not state a constitutional claim — is applicable rather than the dicta relied upon by the majority.
A.
As noted by the majority, the Supreme Court in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), “explicitly [held] that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. ” 397 U.S. at 364, 90 S.Ct. at 1073 (emphasis supplied). In the progeny of Winship, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), the Court similarly stated that the standard announced— “whether ... any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,” 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789 (“any” emphasized in original, other emphasis supplied) —“must be applied with explicit reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offenses as defined by state law.” 443 U.S. at 324 n. 16, 99 S.Ct. at 2792 (emphasis supplied). Sanity, of course, is neither an essential element nor a substantive element of either rape2 or kidnapping3 in Michigan, *1279and petitioner’s brief nowhere makes the contention that it is an element of any type. Rather, in Michigan, the defense of insanity is clearly an affirmative defense. Mich. Comp.Laws § 768.20a.
Furthermore, to hold as the majority does is inconsistent with Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977), where the court held:
We thus decline to adopt as a constitutional imperative, operative country-wide, that a State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact constituting any and all affirmative defenses related to the culpability of an accused. Traditionally, due process has required that only the most basic procedural safeguards be observed; more subtle balancing of society’s interests against those of the accused have been left to the legislative branch. We therefore will not disturb the balance struck in previous cases holding that the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is charged. Proof of the nonexistence of all affirmative defenses has never been constitutionally required; and we perceive no reason to fashion such a rule in this case and apply it to the statutory defense at issue here.
432 U.S. at 210, 99 S.Ct. at 2327 (emphasis supplied). The Patterson court continued and noted that “there are obviously constitutional limits beyond which the States may not go____” Id. The extreme examples given by the Court are instructive in the instant case. For example, the Court noted: “ ‘[I]t is not within the province of a legislature to declare an individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime.’ ” Id. (brackets in original) (quoting McFarland v. American Sugar Rfg. Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86, 36 S.Ct. 498, 500, 60 L.Ed. 899 (1916)). Concluding on the point, the Court stated that “[ljong before Winship, the universal rule in this country was that the prosecution must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. At the same time, the long-accepted rule was that it was constitutionally permissible to provide that various affirmative defenses were to be proved by the defendant.” 432 U.S. at 211, 97 S.Ct. at 2327.
Extending In re Winship and Jackson v. Virginia, to require that the prosecutor must as a matter of constitutional law prove the absence of the affirmative defense of insanity would go far beyond the “traditional” rule which is applicable here. See Greider v. Duckworth, 701 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir.1983) (Judge Posner concurring). As noted, that rule is that due process is intended to protect “only the most procedural safeguards.” It is fundamental that defining and enforcing criminal law is a function vested primarily in the states. The holding announced by this court today is an unnecessary “[fjederal intrusion [which] frustrate[s] both the States’ sovereign power to punish offenders and their good faith attempts to honor constitutional rights.” Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1572, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982).
In fact the holding announced by the majority punishes the State of Michigan for extending criminal procedural protections. As it stands, Michigan law requires that *1280once the defendant overcomes the presumption of sanity “the prosecution bears the burden of establishing the defendant’s sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Murphy, 416 Mich. 453, 331 N.W.2d 152, 157 (1982). However, it is clear that, as a matter of constitutional law, had Michigan so decided it could have required the defendant to carry the burden of proving his insanity. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed.2d 1302 (1952). Similarly, had Michigan required the prosecutor to show defendant’s sanity by a preponderance of the evidence, there would, apparently, be no constitutional violation because even under the majority’s analysis sanity would not become an “element” of the crime. Furthermore, and even more anomalously, had the State of Michigan simply applied the beyond a reasonable doubt standard but never characterized the shift of burden as an “element” or never subjected the characterization to due process analysis, then, under the majority’s analysis, there would be no violation of the federal due process clause. Such a holding, I submit, is not required to protect basic procedural safeguards under the due process clause.
B.
My second point of disagreement with the majority’s constitutional holding is based on my reading of Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982). Engle was, as the majority notes, a case in which this court was reversed after holding that:
[Ojnce a state assumes the burden of proving the absence of an affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt, fundamental fairness and therefore due process require it to meet the burden that it chose to assume. From the point of view of fairness and due process, there is no practical difference between requiring a state to prove the elements of crimes beyond a reasonable doubt and requiring it to meet its assumed burden of proving absence of affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable doubt.
Isaac v. Engle, 646 F.2d 1129, 1135-36 (6th Cir.1980) (en banc), rev’d, 456 U.S. 107, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982). In rejecting this analysis the Supreme Court held:
A State may want to assume the burden of disproving an affirmative defense without also designating absence of the defense an element of the crime. The Due Process Clause does not mandate that when a State treats absence of an affirmative defense as an “element” of the crime for one purpose, it must do so for all purposes. The structure of Ohio’s Code suggests simply that the State decided to assist defendants by requiring the prosecution to disprove certain affirmative defenses. Absent concrete evidence that the Ohio Legislature or courts understood § 2901.05(A) to go further than this, we decline to accept respondents’ construction of state law. While they attempt to cast their first claim in constitutional terms, we believe that this claim does no more than suggest that the instructions at respondents’ trial may have violated state law.
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. at 120,102 S.Ct. at 1568 (emphasis supplied) (footnotes omitted). The majority now holds that a result different from Engle must follow because, in Michigan, unlike Ohio, there is concrete ■evidence that the government’s burden of proving sanity is an element of the crime.
I disagree that Engle is materially distinguishable. There is little, if any, more “concrete evidence” present in the instant case than was present in Ohio at the time of Engle v. Isaac. In the instant case, the majority finds the requisite “concrete evidence” in the following language of the Michigan Supreme Court:
[Defendant's sanity at the time of the crime was as much an element to be proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt as the other statutory elements of the offenses charged.
People v. Murphy, 416 Mich. 453, 331 N.W.2d 152, 157 (1982). However, when Engle v. Isaac was decided by the Supreme Court, there was almost identical language *1281from the Ohio courts dealing with Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2901.05(A) at issue in En-gle:
The record clearly reveals that the trial court instructed counsel and the jury that the burden of proof on sanity was upon the state like every other essential element of the state’s case____ [TJhere was nothing inaccurate in this submission.
State v. Gall, 65 Ohio App.2d 57, 415 N.E.2d 1008, 1012 (1980). Nevertheless, as has been pointed out, the Supreme Court, two years after Gall, in Engle, held that Isaac’s claim based on Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2901.05(A) failed to do “more than suggest [a violation of] state law.” Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. at 121, 102 S.Ct. at 1568.
Furthermore, as is clear from the language of the Engle Court emphasized above, the state must do more than designate the “absence of an affirmative defense as an 'element’ of the crime for one purpose.” 456 U.S. at 120, 102 S.Ct. at 1568. Thus, concrete evidence that the state considers the government’s burden an “element” of the crime is not enough. Rather, before there is a constitutional claim there must, at least, be concrete evidence that the state decided to do more than “assist defendants by requiring the prosecution to disprove certain affirmative defenses.” Id. I fail to see any, much less “concrete” evidence on this fact. Thus, not only is this case not materially distinguishable from Engle, but furthermore, the language relied upon by the majority does not suggest a different result from Engle.
II.
In summary, in my view the proper analysis in the instant case requires that Patterson v. New York, supra, be read in conjunction with Engle v. Isaac, supra. If read together the following rule can be distilled from those cases: When a state voluntarily assumes the burden of disproving an affirmative defense which has traditionally been placed on the defendant — absent either a violation of a basic procedural safeguard or concrete evidence that the state has decided to do more than require the government to disprove the defense— the question of whether the prosecutor has carried the burden is one of state law. As applied to Duffy’s case, the above rule would require that Duffy’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus be denied and the judgment of the district court be affirmed, and I would so hold.

. The majority recognizes at 1276, supra, that Stacy v. Love, 679 F.2d 1209 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1009, 103 S.Ct. 364, 74 L.Ed.2d 400 (1982) and, of course, this court’s opinion in Isaac v. Engle, 646 F.2d 1129 (6th Cir.1980) (en banc), rev’d, 456 U.S. 107, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982), are inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Engle. Stacy and this court’s opinion in Engle, however, are the only cases which support the decision announced today.

. Duffy was convicted of rape under Mich. Comp.Laws Ann. § 750.520:
Sec. 520. Any person who shall ravish and carnally know any female of the age of 16 years, or more, by force and against her will, or who shall unlawfully and carnally know and abuse any female under the full age of 16 years, shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any term of years, or if such person was at the time of the said offense a sexually delin*1279quent person, may be punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for an indeterminate term, the minimum of which shall be 1 day and the maximum of which shall be life. Such carnal knowledge shall be deemed complete upon proof of any sexual penetration however slight.

. Duffy was convicted of kidnapping under Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. § 750.349:
Sec. 349. CONFINING PERSON AGAINST WILL, ETC. — Any person who wilfully, maliciously and without lawful authority shall forcibly or secretly confine or imprison any other person within this state against his will, or shall forcibly carry or send such person out of this state, or shall forcibly seize or confine, or shall inveigle or kidnap any other person with intent to extort money or other valuable thing thereby or with intent either to cause such person to be secretly confined or imprisoned in this state against his will, or in any way held to service against his will, shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any term of years.